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REEL
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154
United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC)
Member Governments, other National Authorities and
Military Tribunals
Box 412, 413 and 414

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents
of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (Tokyo Trials).
Court Exhibits PAG - 3/2.3.3

Court Exhibits consist of a wide variety of published
and unpublished documents mainly from United States
and Japanese sources. The Japanese items are generally
accompanied by English Translations (arranged
numerically, with gaps

Nos.

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

S\'ORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: YOSHIIE, Seiichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am a former lieutenant colonel and during the
period of from October 1, 1940 to April 30, 1943 was
mainly in charge of the personnel affairs of the army staff
officers at the General Staff Headquarters, and engaged
in the personnel and protocol business of the army officers
in the War Ministry as a member of the Appointments Section
of the Personnel Affairs Bureau since May 1, 1944 until
the termination of war. The appointments of army staff
officers, director of the Military Affairs Bureau and
chiefs of sections in the said bureau were to be deliberated
over by the director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau,
War Ministry upon consultation with the General Staff Headquarters. I am, therefore, in a position to be able to relate the general policy of the personnel administration and the order of appointment of the army at that time and the circumstances that led to the appointment of Mr. SATO, Kenryo as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section and Director of the Military Affairs Bureau.

2. Since the so-called February 26 Incident which took place on February 26, 1934, the Army was particularly careful of the personnel administration and paid much attention to the official appointment so as not to be influenced by the consideration of any personal intimacy, or in short, not to create any clique in the army. All the ministers of war who assumed the ministerial office after the incident strictly maintained this policy. Consequently, the autonomous power of making appointments by the Personnel Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, was remarkably strengthened so as not to be affected by the coercion, disturbance, etc. by the outsiders in deliberating appointments. General TOJO, when he assumed the office of War Minister, also observed this policy. Especially during his ministerial office, when an appointment was to be made, he instructed those concerned to inquire closely into the personal history of the candidate, particularly after the war broke out, to make sure of the candidate having a thorough knowledge of the circumstances to be able to
carry out the duty newly assumed, before the selection, and then he submitted it to the minister for approval.

3. In 1941, in consequence of the transfer of Colonel KAWAMURA, Saburo, Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Ministry, to the other post, Mr. SATO, Kenryo was appointed as his successor.

The appointment was first deliberated by Lieutenant General NODA, then Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, and then was approved by the War Minister.

Because of his knowledge of the circumstances in the Military Affairs Bureau and the Military Affairs Section through his service at the Military Section for more than two years since its institution in 1926, his service as the Chief of the Press Section, and also his service as a staff officer at the front for about two years, and his experience of staying in the United States when he was a captain, Mr. SATO was recognized among the military circles to be a person, possessed of the deepest knowledge of not only the situation in the army but also of the same at home and abroad. All of us who were in charge of personnel affairs considered the appointment appropriate.

In 1942, when Director of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO, Akira was transferred to another post, Mr. SATO was appointed as his successor. He was first selected by Lieutenant General TOMINAGA, then Director of the Personnel
Affairs Bureau, and after the deliberation and the approval of the selection were given therefore by the Three Chiefs of the Army (namely, Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff and Inspector General of the Military Training), he was appointed by the minister.

It was also a very natural and appropriate appointment. Mr. SATO was, as is obvious through the aforementioned career, familiar with the business in the bureau owing to his service in the Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, ever since just prior to the war. Furthermore, he was qualified to be a director of the War Ministry as he had already been promoted to the rank of major-general. For these reasons, he was considered to be a competent war-time director of the Military Affairs Bureau capable of handling the complicated and busy tasks effectively.

On this 20th day of October, 1947

At Tokyo-to

Deponent: /S/ YOSHIE, Seiichi (seal)

I, KAZUMA, Isaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: /S/ KAZUMA, Isaburo (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ YOSHIE, Seiichi (seal)
INTERROGATION OF GENERAL KOBAYUKI ABE
12 February 1947

Questions by J. N. Freeman,
American Counsel for Kerryo SATO.

Q. Will you give us your name, age, and the army rank you attained?
A. My name is Nobuyuki ABE. I am 73 years old. I was full general at the time of my retirement.

Q. Were you a full general at the termination of hostilities?
A. I was a full general at that time, but I wasn't active then.

Q. Then did you retire from active duty?
A. I became inactive in 1936, the time the February 26 incident occurred.

Q. Will you please give me the dates that you were War Vice-Minister?
A. I became Vice-Minister of War in 1929.

Q. Were you ever State Minister, and if so, when?
A. I was appointed to the State Minister without portfolio in 1930; from June to December of the same year.

Q. Did you ever occupy the position of Prime Minister, and if so, when?
A. I was appointed to Prime Minister from August of 1939 to January of 1940, four full months.

Q. Who succeeded you as Prime Minister?
A. Admiral YOFAI succeeded.

Q. How long did Admiral YOFAI serve as Prime Minister?
A. If I remember correctly, it is about six to seven months.

Q. Who succeeded Admiral YOFAI as Prime Minister?
A. Prince KONOYE succeeded Admiral YOFAI's Cabinet.

Q. Was that the first Prince KONOYE Cabinet?
A. That was the second.

Q. Second?
A. Second, yes.

Q. How long did the second KONOYE Cabinet last?
A. About a year.

Q. Can you give the approximate date?
A. If I remember correctly, from July of 1940 to about July 1941.

Q. Did you attend the conference when KONOYE was recommended to form a third cabinet, and KONOYE being Prime Minister?
A. I attended such a meeting to recommend Prince KONOYE as Prime Minister to form his third cabinet.

Q. Do you recall the names of any other persons attending
that conference?

A. If I remember correctly, the following persons were present: WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, HAYASHI, HIRANUMA, YONAI, HARA, KIDO, and I, and I am not sure if KIOURA was present.

Q. What are the titles?

A. Baron WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, Mr. HIROTA, General HAYASHI, Baron HIRANUMA, Admiral YONAI, Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council, Marquis KIDO, and I.

Q. Had all of these men at one time or other served as Prime Minister?

A. Yes, except Mr. HARA, who was at that time President of the Privy Council.

Q. Were all in agreement as to the selection of Prince KONOYE to form a third cabinet?

A. I believe that they all agreed.

Q. When did the third KONOYE Cabinet fall?

A. The third KONOYE Cabinet fell in the middle of October, 1941.

Q. Was the date October 16?

A. I am not sure. I think it was, but I am not sure.

Q. On the day that the third KONOYE Cabinet fell, did Colonel SATO visit your home?

A. Yes, he did.
Q. What was the purpose of his visit, if you remember?
A. He came to visit me to tell me about the situation of army circle.
Q. Are you well acquainted with SATO?
A. Yes, I know him well.
Q. How long have you known him?
A. He is from my native place, and I have known him since he entered war college as a first lieutenant.
Q. When was that, about when?
A. About thirty years ago.
Q. Did Colonel SATO discuss or make any recommendation as to who should succeed Prince KONOYE as Prime Minister?
A. Yes, he conveyed a message to me from the army.
Q. By army, do you mean War Minister TOJO and the General Staff?
A. The General Staff has nothing to do with politics.
Q. Then is it correct to assume that Colonel SATO brought a message from the War Minister?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Do you recall what rank SATO had in the army when he made that visit?
A. He was a colonel then.
Q. What was the message Colonel SATO conveyed to you?
A. His message was that since the KONOYE Cabinet fell,
the army deemed it desirable to recommend that an Imperial prince become Prime Minister.

Q. Did Colonel S'TO, in his message from the War Minister, suggest to you the name of the Imperial prince, and if so, who?

A. Yes, he did mention the prince's name.

Q. What was the name mentioned?

A. Prince HIGASHIKUNI.

Q. Did Colonel SATO at any time during his visit mention the name of War Minister TOJO for the position of Prime Minister?

A. No.

Q. Did you attend a conference on about October 17 to recommend a successor to Prince KONOYE?

A. Yes, I did attend.

Q. Who was present at that meeting, if you recall?

A. I believe there were Baron WAKATSUKI and Admiral OKADA and Mr. HIROTA and General HAYASHI and Baron HIRANUMA, Admiral YONAI, and Mr. TARA, the President of the Privy Council, and Marquis KIDO, Keeper of the Privy Seal, and Viscount KIOURA, and I. MR. KIDO, Keeper of the Privy Seal, presided as chairman of both conferences.

Q. Was the name of the Imperial Prince HIGASHIKUNI considered for Prime Minister at that conference?
Def. Doc. # 2732

A. The prince's name was mentioned by somebody.
Q. Do you recall who mentioned the prince's name?
A. Count KTOURA mentioned the name of Prince HYGASHIKUNI.
Q. Did you express any opinion to Colonel SATO relative to Prince HYGASHIKUNI becoming Prime Minister?
A. I did not express my opinion relative to this man to Colonel SATO.
Q. Did you express any opinion at the conference relative to Prince HYGASHIKUNI becoming Prime Minister?
A. No, I expressed no opinion as regards recommendation of Prince HYGASHIKUNI.
Q. In other words, General ABE, you said absolutely no attention to the message brought you by Colonel SATO?
A. I just listened to his story, and nothing he said affected my opinion.
Q. At that time, General, the position SATO occupied was not one which would carry any influence as to important decisions?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. At this conference on October 17, who was recommended for Prime Minister?
A. We finally came to the conclusion to recommend War Minister TOJO as Prime Minister.
Q. General, did Colonel SATO at any time during that visit mention War Minister TOJO's name as an individual who should be made Prime Minister?
A. Not once did he even mention his name.
Q. As a matter of fact, General, a colonel in the Japanese army has very little authority?
A. Yes, that is so.
Q. Could an officer with the rank of colonel have influenced the conference's decision to recommend War Minister TOJO as Prime Minister?
A. Absolutely not.
INTERROGATION OF GENERAL NOBURYUKI ABE

19 February 1947

Questions by J. N. Freeman,
American Counsel for Kenryo SATO.

Q. General, continuing our questions from February 12
relative to the conference in which TOJO was recommended for
Prime Minister, who suggested TOJO be recommended for Prime
Minister?

A. I believe it was Mr. KIDO who recommended TOJO's name,
as in record.

Q. You also stated that there were eight other persons
present at this conference besides yourself.

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. Did any member of the conference lodge an objection to
the recommendation of TOJO for Prime Minister?

A. There was no person against having General TOJO as
Prime Minister absolutely -- there was no absolute objection.

Q. General, having been an officer in the army and at
one time Prime Minister, are you familiar enough with the
War Ministry to state whether or not the bureaus within the
War Ministry were on an equal level as to exercising authority?

A. Yes, it is fundamentally true.
Q. General, do you know TANAKA, Ryukichi?
A. Yes, I know him.
Q. How long have you known him?
A. I know him since he entered war college as a lieutenant.
Q. About how long ago was that?
A. Oh, about thirty years.
Q. General, as you know, TANAKA has been used by the prosecution as a witness in this trial.
A. Yes.
Q. I now intend to read a question asked TANAKA and his answer. On January 22 of this year on direct examination General TANAKA was asked this question:
   "And do you remember General SATO telling you anything about the manner in which TOJO became Prime Minister?"
   And General TANAKA answered in this manner, and I quote:
   "After War Minister TOJO became Prime Minister he came to my office and told me about the matter. It was always the stand of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry that the army, outside of the War Minister himself, should not participate or interfere in politics; and I think that SATO's visit to me was in connection with this matter by way of excuse -- to explain his position in
the matter -- and he told me that he had seen the two veteran generals, ABE and HAYASHI, to whom he said in speaking of the trend within the army itself, that unless TOJO is War Minister -- was made Prime Minister -- it would be difficult to control the army. I listened silently to his words on this matter."

Did Colonel SATO make any statement about TOJO becoming Prime Minister and if he were not it would be difficult to control the army?

A. I never heard of it.

Q. Was there ever any indication that there would be trouble with the army unless TOJO was appointed Prime Minister? Was there ever any indication to you?

A. No. never.

Q. General, I have a book here called "Gunbatsu" (Military Clique). The author of this book is General TANAKA, Ryukichi and it was published by Sansuisha, January 1946. On page 132 he writes, and the gist of which is that at the time you became Prime Minister, Marquis KIDO was Keeper of the Privy Seal and that he was instrumental in your becoming Prime Minister in 1939. Is this statement true?

A. It is not correct; it is wrong.

Q. Was Marquis KIDO Keeper of the Privy Seal at the time you became Prime Minister?
A. No, he was not.

Q. Was KIDO influential in any way in your becoming Prime Minister?

A. None.

Q. On page 133, General TANAKA writes in substance that Colonel SATO, as a protege of Prime Minister TOJO, came to you and General HAYASHI in TOJO's behalf to solicit your aid in getting him appointed Prime Minister. Is this statement true?

A. It is not true.

Q. General, you have stated that you have known General TANAKA for some thirty years. Do you know his reputation for truth and honesty?

A. I never paid much attention what was being said about him. But from my personal experience he is unreliable as is indicated in his book or the pages just referred to.

Q. Was the Military Service Bureau in existence while you were Prime Minister?

A. I believe it was.

Q. Was it the duty of the Military Service Bureau, among other things, to supervise the Kempeitai?

A. The business routine of Kempeitai business was conducted by the Military Service Bureau, but I don't know whether they have authority to supervise over all business.
Q. General, as a matter of routine, when reports were received by the War Minister from or relating to the Kempeitai, would not this report be referred to the Military Service Bureau?

A. I believe it is the Military Service Bureau.

Q. I believe that is all, General. Thank you.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

VS.

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Deponent: MINOMIYA Yoshikiyo

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, - do hereby depose and say as follows:
Q. Please state your full name and address.
A. My name is NINOMIYA, Yoshikiyo. My present address is 4-2 Hommurascho Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.

Q. Were you formerly a member of the armed forces of Japan and if so, what rank did you hold?
A. I was a Colonel in the Japanese Army, and held a position in the War Ministry.

Q. Were you ever attached to the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and if so, in what capacity?
A. Yes, I was in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry as a Staff Member, and became Chief of the Military Affairs Section in December, 1942, remaining in that position until July, 1944.

Q. During the time you were Chief of the Military Affairs Section who was your immediate superior?
A. Major General S. TO, KENRYO was my immediate superior.

Q. Will you briefly state the functions and duties of your Section?
A. The chief function of my section was to handle matters dealing with
other ministries and matters relating to international agreements and
treaties.

Q. On January 3, 1947 (record, p. 14, 287), Haseda, Ryukichi testified
that protests relative to the treatment of prisoners of war were
sent from the Foreign Office to the War Ministry and then to the
Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. Do you
yourself recall having received such protests?

A. No.

Q. The witness T. Nakahara also testified: "Replies to be made to the
authorities outside of the war office were prepared in the Military
Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. Is this true?

A. That is not so. All replies relating to prisoners of war were made
by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

Q. Was the Prisoner of War Information Bureau already established when
you became head of the Military Affairs Section?

A. Yes, it was already established.

Q. Who was Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, if you know.

A. The Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau at that time was

Q. Do you know generally what the duties of the Prisoner of War
Information Bureau were?

A. The function of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau was to handle
matters relating to prisoners of war.
Q. Then the protests from Allied powers received by the Foreign Office relative to treatment of prisoners of war would be forwarded to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau?
A. Yes.

Q. Colonel, if all these protests relative to the treatment of prisoners of war had passed through your section, as General Tanaka testified, you would have known it, would you not?
A. Yes.

Q. But you do not recall ever having received these protests?
A. No.

At Tokyo, Japan, this 15th day of October, 1947.
On this 15 day of October, 1947

At

DEponent NINOMIYA YASUKIYBA (seal)

I, KUSANO, Yyochiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At ........................

Witness: (signed) KUSANO, Yyochiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

NINOMIYA YASUKIYBA (seal)
The Office which issued the document: War Service Section/GUMIUKA/
The Subject: Requests of the U.S. Government for Visits to
its Prisoners of War and Detained Non-Combatants.
Minister: Delegated by the Minister.
Bureau Chief: Deputy signed by SATO.
Section Chief: Deputy signed by NINOMIYA
Section Member: Signed by YAMAZAKI
Copyist: Signed by UCHIDA
Correlated: Chief of Military Service Bureau: signed by KAMIHARA.
Section Chiefs:
Wart Affairs: Signed by SANADA
Defense: Signed by TSUBOI
PCW Information: YAMAZAKI
General Staff Headquarters: 14th Section.
(Mil. Asiatic Secret)
Vice Minister's Answer to the Foreign Vice Minister.

I beg to inform you that the following is my (or/our) opinion on
the above-mentioned subject which you asked me about by Jo 3
Secret Go No. 370 of Feb. 28th.

Article 86 of the Geneva Treaty on prisoners of war in 1929
cannot be accepted and applied wholly/completely or exactly
as it is.

In view of the fact, however, that Japan is, on her own part,
providing facilities to, and treating properly, her prisoners
of war, in case the United States of America expresses her
intention to endeavor sufficiently to give proper treatment to
Japanese not only in the United States of America but also in
the countries in America which have declared war upon Japan
and have severed their diplomatic relations with her, the
above-mentioned Article 86 will be applied mutatis mutandis as
the occasion may demand and the representative of Switzerland
will be permitted to pay visits. As to the enforcement details,
our intention is to investigate each case and give permission.
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注：具体数据以实际情况为准。
In reply to your inquiry about the above-mentioned subject you referred to in "JO"-3-Ordinary - "G 0" No. 1002, I ask you to duly understand that our policy is not to permit the representatives of International Red Cross Committee and of those countries protecting the interests of enemy countries to hold interviews with war prisoners and those interned by the Army without the presence of an observer.

The reasons for drafting this reply:

1. Article 10 of Detailed Regulations for Treatment of War Prisoners. "In case any interview with any war prisoner is permitted, considerable limitations should be made, to maintain strict order as to the place and time for that interview and it should be done in the presence of an observer."

2. There is a great danger of this being misused for transmission of secret information.

Instruction for execution - Indication of Approval - Terms for Preservation Opson of the Document: Re the Interview with the POW and Persons detained by the Army.

Addressor: Vice-Foreign Minister Addressor: Vice Director.

Date of sending out:
To be shown to post-facto: related
Chief of Bureau - The Chief of Sect, KO Junior Secretary - KO Senior.
Secretary BôWAChI (?) - The Staff of Secretary.
Drafted: Date - None of Sect. No. 3 Initial "YO"? Vice Director
Initial "Tsunc".

The Director: UEMULUA or KANILULI - Higher Secretary: YAMAZAKI - Secretary in Charge: YOTSUMOTO?

Initial and no. of document sent - Higher Secretary - Secretary to General Sect. - Despatcher of the Document - Actual period in charge - A Field Bureau or Sect. Bureau - or sent to - shown to post-facto - for Intelligence Budget.

RETURN TO ROOM 361
J0 Ordinary GO No. 1002 - June 23, 1942 - from: Foreign Vice-Minister
To: War Vice-Minister.

Recently, the Swiss Minister in Tokyo who represents American interests in Japan, has given us the following notice and inquired of us about the Japanese view on the above problem.

In America, representatives of the International Red Cross Committee have just been allowed interviews without witness, with the Japanese prisoners of war and interned personnel. Therefore, American Government wishes that the Japanese Government will afford the same facilities to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo representing the American interests in Japan and the representatives of the International Red Cross Committee in the Japanese occupied zone and as well as in Japan.

Though we understand that the same facilities as in America have been afforded in Japan proper, we think it proper to allow the Red Cross Representatives the privilege, because in the occupied zone the protection of enemy interests is not allowed in principle. We must make a reply; so we should like to hear your opinion.

Destination of this note: the Vice Minister of the War, Home and Overseas Affairs Departments, the Director of the POW Information Bureau.

To: President of the Prisoners of War Intelligence Bureau -
From: Vice Foreign Minister. (Seal).
Subject: Proposal of the U.S. Government as to Giving Facilities for Interviews with Internes and Prisoners of War.

We have received the communication from the Swiss Minister in Tokyo who represents the interests of the USA in this country, to the effect that the representatives of those countries that protect the interest of Japan in the USA, and those of the International Red Cross Society have been permitted to interview the Japanese prisoners of war and non-combatant internees without observers. He also informed us that the U.S. Government desires that the Japanese Government afford the same privilege to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo who protects the interest of America in Japan and to the representatives of the International Red Cross Society in Japan and the Japanese occupied territories. The Minister wants to know, at this time,
Item 51. (contd)

the intention of Japan in this connection. Although regarding
this matter, the same facilities as in America are believed
now being given generally in Japan proper, the protection
of the enemy interest is not, as a rule, recognized in the
occupied territories and, therefore, it may be well to allow the
privilege to the Red Cross representatives only. As we have to
reply to the Swiss Minister, we shall be glad to know your
opinion on this point.

Addresses of this communication are Vice Ministers of
the Army, Home, and Overseas Departments as well as the
President of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau.
 Advance

国际

版号

日

期

No. 5

1552.01m-51
International Military Tribunal for the Far East

The United States of America, et al
vs
Araki, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (translation)

Defendant: Otuki, Akira

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. I was formerly Colonel of the Imperial Army.

2. My career in the Army was as follows:

1923 (Taisho 12) - graduated from the Military Academy.
1933 (Showa 8) - graduated from War College.
March 1935 (Showa 10) - attached to the Secretariat of War Ministry.
November 1937 (Showa 12) - member of Military Affairs Bureau.
July 1938 (Showa 13) - staff officer of the China Expeditionary Forces.
April 1939 (Showa 14) - member of Military Affairs Bureau.
September 5, 1941 (Showa 16) - attached to the Army Section of General Command and concurrently nominated to the professor of War College.

When the Pacific War started I was nominated as a Staff Officer of the Southern Army and in December, 1941, arrived at Saigon. In July, 1942, I arrived at Singapore, following the transfer of the Headquarters of the Southern Army. Toward the end of July, 1942, I was nominated as a Staff Officer of the 14th Division and transferred to Manila. From January, 1943, to January, 1945, I was in China. In March, 1940, I was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and in March, 1944, to a full Colonel.
3. In April, 1942, when Tokyo was raided by American Air Forces and at the time of the trial and execution of the Doolittle fliers, I was not in the War Ministry nor even in Japan. Therefore, I knew nothing about the trial and punishment of the fliers. Naturally I never expressed an opinion, nor discussed them with General TANAKA, Ryuikichi, Chief of the Military Service Bureau, at any time. His statement to the International Tribunal that I came to see him several times relative to the Doolittle fliers is wholly untrue and without any foundation in fact.

On this 27th day of September, 1947.

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ OTSUKI, Akira

I, KUSANO, Hyeichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo.

WITNESS: /s/ KUSANO, Hyeichiro

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ OTSUKI, Akira (seal)
RETURN TO ROOM 361

FILE COPY

Exh. 4

Exh. 2530
120 26 04 (Revised)
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月二十七日
於東京

當立會人 \( \) 前

供述者

大

章

右

當立會人

且

署名捺印

明

\( \)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: -- MATSUMURA, Shuitsu

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure follow in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. I am MATSUMURA, Shuitsu.

   My address is Hinaku-cho, Ashikita-gun, Kumamoto-ken.

   My birth place is the same as my address.

   The date of my birth is 1st Mar., 1900.

   At for my education, I

   finished 2nd Year Course of the Kumamoto Prefectural

   Yatsushiro Middle School, graduated from the Kumamoto

   Local Mil. Prep. School, Tokyo Central Mil. Prep.

   School, Mil. Academy, Mil. Art. and Eng. School and

   Mil. Staff College.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361
Dec. 1920; 2nd Lt., A. 


Jun. 1934: Member of the Press Section of the Kwantung Army H. Q. 

Aug. 1935: Member of the Press Section of the War Office. 

Mar. 1938: Chief of the Press Section of the Kwantung Army. 

Aug. 1938: Member of the Press Section of the War Office. 

Oct. 1938: Member of the Information Bureau of the War Office. 


Jul. 1945: Chief of Staff of the Chugoku Army District. 

At the time when I was a member of the Information Bureau of the War Office, Colonel Sato Kenryo was Chief of the Information Bureau. 

2. The Press Section of the War Office was originally started to look after the Press Club in the compound of the War Office and its main duty was to provide such news materials concerning war administration as laws and personnel ordinances, estimates, announcements of changes of affairs,
exercises held on the military memorial day, etc.

In 1938, its name was changed to "Information Bureau of the War Office". But the nature of the business was naturally the same as that of the Press Section. As above-mentioned, the Information Bureau of the War Office was not a section recognized as a government organization, but it was coordinate with the Army Affair Section, Military Affairs Section, etc. of the Military Affairs Bureau and the Chief and the members were under command and supervision of Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau under the jurisdiction of the War Minister.

3. When the Imperial General Headquarters was organized at the outbreak of the China Incident in 1937, the

Imperial Army Press Bureau of I G H Q was established simultaneously. Its chief duty consisted in announcement of the state of military operations (i.e. matters concerning military command), so its members including Bureau-Chief were under superintendence and command of the Chief of General Staff and was directed by the Chief of the 2nd Division of the General Staff Office.

However, most members of the Press Bureau of the War Ministry had been concurrently appointed as members of the Army Press Bureau of I G H Q.
Therefore, to speak exactly, there were two kinds of announcements of the Army, namely, the one announced by the Information Bureau of the War Ministry and the other by the Press Bureau of the Imperial Government.

So the matters concerning military command such as announcement of state of military operations, etc., was taken care of by the latter while the announcement of ordinances or personnel affairs by the former.

To explain more minutely, that which was prepared by the section in charge to be announced by newspaper was first sanctioned by the related Bureau and then approved by the Vice-minister or Minister of War or the Deputy Chief or the Chief of the General Staff, as the case may be. It depended on the degree of importance or the nature of the matter concerned, i.e., whether it was one of military administration or of military command.

After being so processed, the said announcement was made at the Press Club.

Furthermore, the principle of conducting the public opinion was decided at the cabinet conference and in accordance with the principle so decided, each agency took charge of its execution.

To supervise the matters military, particulars of prohibition from newspaper announcement were decided according to the provisions concerning military secrets notified by the Minister and censorship was conducted.
in accordance with the Minister's notice.

6. Since the outbreak of the China Incident, the personnel of the Press Bureau and those of the Military Affairs Section had frequently given lectures for the purpose of explaining the military operations already conducted, the state of occupied territories, the general situation, extermination of rumours and enhancement of national spirit.

On this 22nd day of May, 1947
At I.F.T.F.E.

DEPONENT /S/ MATSUMURA, Shuitsu (seal)

I, KUSANO, Hyoichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At I.M.T.E.

Witness; /S/ KUSANO, Hyoichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing,

/S/ MATSUMURA, Shuitsu (seal)
昭和二十一年四月十七日 二頁

質問

答

質問

答

昭和二十一年四月十七日 三、四頁

答

質問

答

東條の任命に関し私が加部及林を動かしたと日本政治家達は信
じてありますか、それは事実ではありません。
近現代の外交史を解説するために、東洋太平洋戦の政治的背景を踏まえて、特にアメリカ合衆国と日本の関係を例に、次のような状況を見ることができる。

質問に答えるために、質問の内容に沿って、以下のような内容を示す。

示す図表を一枚の紙に書いて下さいませ。
質問。「それらの状態士の状況に依って意見を求める支那諸国連合会員」

答。

「おれらの部下の動向は各国に依ってあります。」

質問。「その部下の動向は持てますか。」

答。「是の事情をお言えさしたが、その事情を見ました。しかし仮設省から合わさせられたのです。」
答

被告の処分について、私は知りません。私の記憶としての範囲内ではその情報が存在しないです。

答

裁判官は、被告の処分について、私は知りません。私の記憶としての範囲内ではその情報が存在しないです。

答

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答

裁判官は、被告の処分について、私は知りません。私の記憶としての範囲内ではその情報が存在しないです。
How long have you known General TOJO?

At one time I was not very close to him, this being the period when I was a professor at the War College, until I became spokesman, the reason being that Maj. Gen. OBATA, who was the head of the college, was not very close to TOJO, and, being a member of his staff, I also became the same way.

27 April 1946 - pp. 3 & 4

Did you use your influence to have Gen. TOJO made Premier?

No, that is a mistake. There was nothing like that.

Did you ever talk with senior statesman AISE about his appointment, or with Hayashi, Senjuro? (by Interpreter: Is he also a senior statesmen? A. by Interrogator: They are both senior statesman.)

No, however, there is something I would like to explain with regard to that.
Certainly, so read.

A. The Japanese politicians believe that I influenced ABE and HAYASHI in the appointment of TOJO. However, that is not the truth. The explanation is this. In October of 1941 Premier KOUO resigned just at the time when the United States and Japan Negotiations were critical. This left the Army in a difficult position. In order to stabilize the political situation, TOJO had thought that some person like Prince HIGASHIYAMA would be the logical successor. However, since the appointment of a Prince to that position is not the usual thing, TOJO felt that his appointment would create more difficulty than even the international situation. I was sent by TOJO to see ABE and HAYASHI to explain this problem. Following my visit, which the news reporters know of, there was a meeting of the senior statesmen and the next day the appointment of TOJO to the position of Premier was announced. It was in this way that the public believed that I had influenced TOJO's selection. Unfortunately ABE and HAYASHI are from the same Prefecture as myself.

Accepting the story as the truth, I would like to add the following: When the newspapermen came to me telling me of the Imperial Decree for TOJO to form a new Cabinet, I had not known of it nor did I believe it. I told the newspapermen that they must be mistaken.

Q. General, will you please take a sheet of paper and draw a graph showing the relation of the Military Affairs Bureau to the War Ministry and to the other Bureaus of the War Ministry - just a graph or a diagram?

A. (General SATO drew a chart "Draft of Organization of War Ministry" which is attached as Exhibit 1.)

Q. Have you shown on the chart the Prisoners of War Information Bureau and the Prisoners of War Management Bureau?

A. (General SATO made additions to the chart.)

Q. Did all of the other Bureaus here deal directly with the Vice-Minister of War, or did their matters go through your Bureau?
A. They were all able to go directly to the Vice Minister or Minister. However, when the matter concerned some other Bureau they maintained liaison with that Bureau concerned.

Q. That is, your Bureau was the policy making Bureau of the Ministry. Wasn't that true?

A. Generally speaking, our department handled the policies of the following: organization, budget, system, regulations, national defense, military administration of occupied territories, and finally domestic and foreign affairs which concerned the Army.

x x x x x

29 April 1946 - p. 7

Q. Weren't you in on the conference at which that matter was decided?

A. No, I was not there.

Q. Were you consulted about the matter?

A. No.

Q. We have correspondence from the Commander of the China Expeditionary Force to the War Minister, asking for advice concerning the disposition of those fliers.

A. You have the correspondence?

Q. Yes, I have seen the correspondence and the direction came from the War Ministry.

A. I am not familiar with the directive. I do not know through what channels that directive had been presented. As far as I can remember, it did not come through me.

x x x x x

- 3 -
29 April 1946 - p. 12

Q. Were you aware of the Imperial Conference which was held on the 6th day of September 1941?

A. I do not recall if there was one on that date, inasmuch as I did not attend them, but there may have been.

x x x x x x x

Q. Were you ever a member of the Supreme War Council?

A. I was not a member. However, I was something like a Staff Secretary.

x x x x x

29 April 1946 - p. 13

Q. You felt, did you not, during the fall of 1941 that war with the United States was inevitable?

A. No.

Q. Didn't you so advise General TOJO?

A. No, I have never told him that. I was always in opposition to becoming involved in any other war before settling the China affair. I was in earnest about finishing the China affair.

x x x x x

29 April 1946 - p. 15

x x x x x

Q. It is further stated that normally it was not the duty of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to order other
Bureau Chiefs, but technically the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was the superior officer to the Chiefs of Bureaus such as the Prisoners of War Information Bureau.

a. No, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau could never order any other Bureau.
DRAFT OF ORGANIZATION OF WAR MINISTRY (EXHIBIT 1)

MINISTER OF WAR

VICE MINISTER OF WAR

PRISONER OF JUDICIAL BUREAU
MILITARY MEDICAL BUREAU
INTENDANCE BUREAU
MILITARY SERVICE BUREAU
MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU
PERSONNEL BUREAU
MINISTERIAL SECRETARIAT

PRISONER OF WAR ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAU
PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION BUREAU
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-AVs-

AhXL, ooao, et al

sworn deposition (translation)

Deponent: Haji, Shir

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:
1. I am former Lieutenant Colonel of the Army, Hara, Shiro.

From November 1940 to February 1942, as member of the 20th section of Army General Staff, I treated, in the Army General Staff, such matters relating to the Liaison Conference between the Government and the Imperial Headquarters and those relating to the Imperial Conference. Therefore I am familiar with the document entitled "Draft regarding the fundamental reason of the opening of the war against U.S. and Great Britain" (Ex. 1175), presented by the Prosecution.

2. Under the title of this document (in the English text, it is mentioned to the right of the title) it is written as "Project to be decided at the Liaison Conference". Project to be decided does not mean the project already decided. It means a draft which awaits decision at some future date.

At that time, a deliberation was being carried out among the officials concerned of the Army General Staff, Navy General Staff, Army Ministry, Navy Ministry, and Foreign Office (or Cabinet) in order to regulate and unify the differences between the high command and the government in regard to the fundamental reasons relative to the opening of hostilities, in case the worse occurred and war became inevitable. The present document is nothing but one of these kinds of drafts for study.
3. This document was never presented to the Liaison Conference or put on the agenda for discussion. It is just a plan of study for the officials concerned. The plan proves that for itself. It is because, on the right top of the title (in English text, on the left), it is marked as _No. 4, of 5 copies_, which means that 5 copies were made. That proves that it was made for the use of five officials within sections of the Army General Staff, Navy General Staff, Army Ministry, Navy Ministry and Foreign Office (or Cabinet), each being distributed on copy.

If it was prepared for the use of the Liaison Conference, then at least 13 copies were needed because the members usually present at these Conferences at that time were Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister (concurrently nominated), Navy Minister, Finance Minister, President of Planning Board, Chief and Vice Chief of Army Staff, Chief and Vice Chief of Navy Staff and the secretary, in all 13.

4. As it is clear from the above, the present document was drafted collectively by officials of the Army General Staff, Navy General Staff, Army Ministry, Navy Ministry and Foreign Office (or Cabinet). It was not written by the Chief of Military Affairs Section, SATO as testified by the prosecutors' witness, TANAKA, Ryokichi. It is neither drafted by Military Affairs Section of War Ministry. It is for this reason that the name of the draft Department is not mentioned following the custom of Japanese administration of that time. If the present document were drafted at the Army Affairs
Section, then it would have been mentioned as "Draft of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry" or "Draft of Military Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau".

Moreover, on the right top of this document it is written "No. 4 of 5 copies". But, according to the custom of the Army, it would have been written as "the 4th among 5 copies" (Army used rubber stamp of "the ___ among ___ copies" and the number inserted with ink) that proves definitively that the present document was not prepared by the Army or War Ministry.
Def Doc No. 2843

On this 24 day of Sept., 1947
At Tokyo.

DEFENDANT KUSANO, KYOICHIRO (seal)

I, KUSANO, KYOICHIRO, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness: (signed) KUSANO, KYOICHIRO (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing

KUSANO, KYOICHIRO (seal)
Def. Doc. #2843

PRATA SHEET

AFT O

Affidavit of HARA, Shiro.

Delete following:

Line 6 from the bottom of page 1.
(or Cabinet)

Line 3-6 of page 2.
(or Cabinet)

Line 7 from the bottom of page 2.
(or Cabinet)
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月二十二日
於東京

立會人
草野一郎

同日

供述者
原四郎

右（當立會人）面前

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月二十二日
於東京
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: KURAMOTO Keijiro

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. My name is KURAMOTO Keijiro. My address is 494, 4-chome, Mabashi Suginami-ku, Tokyo.

2. I was formerly Major-general of the Army. From December, 1928 to the end of the war, I was in War Ministry and dealt with the reward affairs in the Personal Bureau. As I made investigation of the merit for the 1st Chinese Incident, I know the reason why Kenryô Sato (Colonel at that time) was bestowed of the 3rd degree of the Order of Golden Kite.

3. The period of the reward of the Chinese incident ended April 29th, 1940, therefore the bestowal of the order
to Colonel Sato is due to his merit at the battle of Nanning (China) area in his capacity of Vice Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces and has no connection with the advance in Indo-China.

On this 29 day of September, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ KURAMOTO Keijiro (seal)

I, KUSANO Hyoichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: /S/ KUSANO Hyotchiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KURAMOTO Keijiro (seal)
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: -- WAKAMURA, Aketo

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. I was formerly Lieutenant General of the Army. On January 1943, I went to Siam as Commander of the Army stationed in that country. I stayed in Bangkok till I came back to Japan in April 1946.

2. Kenryo Sato arrived at Siam from Saigon in June 1945, as chief of the 37th Division.

3. The assignment of the 37th Division in Siam was purely operational. The chief of the Division had no authority relative to the disposition or the employment of POW's.

4. I heard about the POW's matters in connection with his division during my stay in Siam.
At Tokyo.

Deponent /S/ NAKAMURA, Aketo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.
At Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ KUSANO, Hyoichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ NAKAMURA, Aketo (seal)
To Foreign Minister Shidehara

MINISTER SHIGEMITSU

No. 794.

With reference to my telegram No. 723,

1. At my interview with T. V. Sceng, I asked him whether he had fully studied the Japanese memorandum on the question of double levying of customs duties, and stated that, as a matter of fact, since the inauguration of Count Uchide as President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, he had been entirely relying upon an understanding with the Chinese Authorities on this matter, and had rejected any idea to such measures as to pass goods freely through customs houses, even if such measures were warranted. But the President and Directors of the aforesaid Company had been driven into an embarrassing situation, as inland-bound goods, for which customs duties had once been paid at Shanghai or other ports, have gradually congested Dairen Port without any possibility of being transported farther. I stated that in my opinion, the present question was that of customs clearance constituting no such fundamental question as affecting .... (The original
telegram has been mutilated and a few words are missing), and it was desirable that, through the settlement of this case, contribution be made in improving the general situation. Soong had no objection to what I said, and replied that he would straighten the matter out as soon as possible, and would make a reply to the Japanese memorandum.

Further I requested him to make efforts to solve the matter somehow in that line, as the circumstances accompanying the matter were, in my opinion, very clearly described in our memorandum, and I urged him to take up the matter, in any case, as promptly as possible, adding that I would let Secretary of Embassy Horiuchi explain it in detail to Chang Fu-yun, if necessary, and that I had no objection to their studying the memorandum together. (Horiuchi has already met Chang and explained the matter to him.)

2. In continuation of our talk reported in Paragraph 2 of my telegram above referred to, Soong stated his idea that he wished to travel to Dairen, Mukden and other places duty permits, when he pretended that he had no particular purpose for his trip, that he would exchange opinions with such people as Count Uchida on what we might call easier questions concerning Manchuria, such as customs and other matters, and thereby try
to clear up differences, letting fundamental questions wait for the time being. He had heard of Count Uchida's intention to make a trip to the Shanghai area, and if so, it would be more convenient for him, as he would have an opportunity to see the Count here. In this case, he said he would exchange opinions on these questions with me beforehand. He was endeavoring, by all possible means, to prevent the relations between both nations from deteriorating unnecessarily and added that he was satisfied to think that Chang Hsueh-liang had a fairly good mind to render a listening ear to his words.

I said thereon that, as his idea coincided with our wish, I would submit in a form of memorandum for his study various questions in need of adjustment, except fundamental ones; that I had heard nothing about Count Uchida's visit to Shanghai, which, I presume, he did not intend now to make if Song travelled north as he had planned, that it would be beneficial for us both, as he would have opportunity for forthright exchange of opinions with Count Uchida and other persons. If circumstances permitted, I would also travel north on a suitable occasion, and would render proper assistance to such interviews. I further expressed my opinion that taking everything into consideration, efforts on his part and on the part of Count Uchida and others, who were influential personages but not
parties directly concerned with diplomacy, to endeavor to adjust various questions concerning Manchuria would be very effective. Seng stated that he was also eager to realize his plan by all means.

Repeated by telegram to Mukden, and Nanking; Shanghai is informed.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Knoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:

Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that, as such official, I have custody of the original document attached hereto consisting of 3 pages, in the Japanese language, dated August 26, 1931, and described as follows:

Telegram No. 794 of Minister Shigemitsu addressed to
Foreign Minister Shidehara

I further certify that the attached document is a true and exact copy of the official document of the Japanese Government, which is part of the official archives of the following Ministry:

Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of February, 1947

/s/ Hayashi
Signature

Seal

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Witness /s/ Nagaharu Odo
CERTIFICATE

I, MIURA, Kazuichi, hereby declare that I can read, write, and speak the Japanese and the English languages, and that I have done the English translation of Telegram No. 794 of Minister Shigemitsu addressed to Foreign Minister Shidehara accurately and faithfully.

K. MIURA

Tokyo, January 10th, 1947.
Shova 6 (1931) Cipher process from Shanghai,

Received by the Foreign Ministry in the afternoon, 25 August.

To Foreign Minister Shidehara

from Minister Shigemitsu

No. 795 (Top Secret)

with reference to my telegram No. 794.

It is not clear how far Soong is ready to go in adjusting the questions pending between both nations in regard to Manchuria. But, in view of the fact that feelings on both sides have more or less been sharpened on account of the Manchurian question, he seems to have an intention first of all to settle as many easier questions as possible, and thus to improve the atmosphere, before taking up fundamental questions of importance. At the same time, we, on our part, have been constantly acting to encourage him in this direction. As to Soong's trip to Manchuria, it will probably be realized, as he has a fairly strong intention for that, and it also means a return call to Chang Haueh-liang's visit to him at Nanking, as well as Mrs. Chang Haueh-liang's attendance at the funerals of Soong's mother. I am of the opinion, therefore, that it is advisable, or at least not futile, in view of his relations.
with Chang Hauch-liang, to let Soong study in the meantime various questions in Manchuria and the wishes of the Japanese side. We will of course make preparations for that, but we shall be happy to be supplied without delay with any suggestions, even if they are fragmentary, in Japanese or preferably in English, at any time when the Ministry is ready to make.

Please take note that, as a result of my hope to cause Soong to travel in Manchuria and see the actual situation there, I have replied to him about the rumor of Count 'Chida's trip to Shanghai in such a manner as already reported in my telegram above referred to.

Repeated by telegram to Mukden and Nanking, Shanghai is informed.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity.

Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that, as such official, I have custody of the original document of the document hereto attached, consisting of 2 pages, in the Japanese language, dated August 25, 1931, and described as follows:

Telegram No. 795 of Minister Shigemitsu addressed to Foreign Minister Shidehara

I further certify that the attached document is a true and exact copy of the official document of the Japanese Government, which is part of the official archives of the following Ministry:

Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of February, 1947

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Witness /s/ Nagaharu Odo
CERTIFICATE

I, MIURA, Kazuichi, hereby declare that I can read, write and speak the Japanese and the English languages, and I have done the English translation of

Telegram No. 795 of Minister Shigamitsu
addressed to Foreign Minister Shidehara

accurately and faithfully.

/s/ K. Miura

Tokyo, January 10th, 1947.
Transcribed by
Defense Language Branch

No. 1809

Showa 6 (1931)

To Foreign Minister Shidehara

Minister Shigenitsu

No. 912 (top secret)

During the interview of my telegram No. 904 with T. V. Soong, he made a statement to the following effect:

He was especially concerned with the Manchurian question, as the feelings on both sides at present were such that it was difficult to foresee anything that might happen. As soon as the prospect of the Hunan question was clarified, he wished to visit Chang Hau-chliang in Peking, and then Chang Tso-siang in Kirin in order to express his condolences. On that occasion he would visit Dairen to exchange opinions with Count Uchida. Although he was of the opinion that it was by no means opportune at the present time to take up fundamental questions, there were numerous easier ones for which it would be possible to secure co-operation of both sides, and he wished thereby to release the tension and bring about as much conciliatory mood as possible. Such Soong reminded him a few days ago to have prepared pending questions in Manchuria, and expressed his desire that, in case the trip I intended should be made.
Dof. Doc. # 1809

...also realized, some arrangement be made for us to meet at Dairon or thenceforth, with the idea that I would assist him in achieving the purpose of his journey.

I, therefore, recommended him to make up his itinerary quickly, as I would make mine accordingly, and in as much compliance with his request as possible. I added that I would send the memorandum as soon as it was prepared. Soong further pointed out the gravity of the Hunan situation about which he had told me, as I have reported in my previous telegram No. 913.

Mukden is requested to inform Count Ushida of this telegram through Director Kitamura.

Repeated by telegram to Mukden and Nanking. Shanghai is informed.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. YaSHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity.

Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that, as such official, I have custody of the original document of the document hereto attached, consisting of 2 pages, in the Japanese language, dated September 11, 1931, and described as follows:

Telegram No. 912 of Minister Shigemitsu addressed to Foreign Minister ShidoHara.

I further certify that the attached document is a true and exact copy of the official document of the Japanese Government, which is part of the official archives of the following Ministry:

Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
4th day of February, 1947.

/\ / K. Hayashi
Signature Seal
Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Witness /\ / Nagaharu Oto.
CERTIFICATE

I, MIURA, Kazuichi, hereby declare that I can read, write and speak the Japanese and the English languages, and that I have done the English translation of

Telegram No. 912 of Minister Shigenitsu addressed to Foreign Minister Shidehara accurately and faithfully.

/S/ K. MIURA

Tokyo, January 10th, 1947.
To Foreign Minister Shidehara

No. 924.

My telegram No. 13 to Mukden (top secret)

With reference to my telegram to the Foreign Minister, No. 795 (Common Number 1027), please send us without delay or materials with which it is necessary to keep T. V. Soong informed. Also, any suggestion will be appreciated.

Repeated by telegram to the Foreign Minister.
To Foreign Minister Shidehara

No. 924.

My telegram No. 13 to Mukden (top secret)

With reference to my telegram to the Foreign Minister, No. 795 (Common Number 1027), please send us without delay materials with which it is necessary to keep T. V. Soong informed. Also any suggestion will be appreciated.

Repeated by telegram to the Foreign Minister.

Cipher process.

Showa 6 (1931)

Received by the Foreign Office in the afternoon of September 13.

Minister Shigemitsu.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity.

Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that, as such official, I have custody of the original document of the document hereto attached, consisting of 1 page, in the Japanese language, dated September 13, 1931 and described as follows:

Telegram No. 924 of Minister Shigemitsu addressed to Foreign Minister Shidehara

I further certify that the attached document is a true and exact copy of the official document of the Japanese Government, which is part of the official archives of the following Ministry:

Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of February, 1947

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature

/S/ Nagaharu Odō
Witness
CERTIFICATE

I, MIURA, Kazuichi, hereby declare that I can read, write and speak the Japanese and the English languages, and that I have done the English translation of

Telegram No. 924 of Minister Shigemitsu
addressed to Foreign Minister Shidehara

accurately and faithfully.

K. Miura

Tokyo, January 10th, 1947.
AFFIDavit

MORIYA, Kazuro

I, MORIYA, Kazuro, after having been duly sworn according to the Japanese formula, make the following statement of my own free will:

I am 55 years of age, and reside at No. 74, Nishigahara-machi, Kita Ward, Tokyo, Japan.

1. I graduated from the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Imperial University, in July, 1917, and entered the Foreign Office at the end of 1923. I remained in the service of that Ministry for seventeen years until I resigned as Minister accredited to Afghanistan in December, 1940. During the period from November, 1929, to 1932, I served about three years as First Secretary of Legation under Mr. Shigemitsu, who was at first Consul-General at Shanghai and concurrently Counsellor of Embassy, and later Minister Accredited to China.

2. At the beginning of September 1931, when I was First Secretary of Legation under Minister Shigemitsu, he made a proposal to Mr. T.V. Soong, the Finance Minister
of the Chinese Government, that the actual situation in Manchuria be investigated together, as Minister Shigemitsu was anxious about the situation then prevailing in that part of China, lest it should affect Sino-Japanese relations, and had at the same time a desire to open negotiations for revision of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce. Mr. Soong’s consent having been obtained, Minister Shigemitsu planned to take a boat on September 8th, 1931, from Shanghai to Dairen, Manchuria, taking with him Mr. Hayashi, Secretary-Interpreter of Legation, and myself, who was then in charge of the question of treaty revision. We were making preparations for the trip in strict secrecy, having contact with Count Yasuya Uchida, President of the South Manchuria Railway, who was in Dairen and who it was planned was to take part in the conferences. Unfortunately, however, Minister Shigemitsu was suddenly taken ill with a cold, and had a high temperature due to tonsillitis and so could not travel. We were unable to start as scheduled, and were obliged to wait for the next boat, which would be available about ten days later. Information to this effect was given to Mr. T. V. Soong, who had planned to proceed by land to Mukden via Peking. As Mr. Shigemitsu’s health soon improved, a new plan was made to depart on September 20th. Just at that time a telegram came, at noon on September 19th, reporting the occurrence of an incident at Liu-teno-kou. His planned trip
trip to Manchuria was thus frustrated. All this information came to me as part of my official duties in the Legation.

3. In January, 1932, while I was in Shanghai, where the main office of our Legation was located, the first Shanghai incident broke out. Clashes between Japanese Marines and Chinese soldiers took place in the middle of that month, when I was Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the absence of Minister Shigemitsu in Japan. It was on the 30th or 31st January that the Minister returned to his post by boat. I took a launch to meet him before he landed, and had an opportunity for communicating with him before he talked with any other person. He was ill-humored that day, and repeatedly told me his dissatisfaction at the outbreak of the clashes between the troops, while he expressed his firm determination to settle the situation by peaceful means.

4. Upon landing, Minister Shigemitsu began to make every effort to realize a truce as soon as possible. Even before formal conferences under the procedure proposed by the League of Nations started, he had many informal conferences with Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, and Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, the American Minister. At his request they got in touch with the Chinese General in the height of the hostilities and a temporary truce was

3
Chapei, in which hostilities centered, thus saving the civilian population from the full effect of the fighting. During its course he persuaded the officers in command of the Japanese forces to limit the fighting to Shanghai and the adjacent area, and not to advance further into China. It was just at the time when the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities around Shanghai was almost concluded that Minister Shigemitsu had the misfortune to be wounded seriously by a bomb explosion. The bomb was thrown on April 29th, during the celebration of the Emperor's Birthday in New Park, Shanghai. I was on the spot with several of my colleagues of the Legation, and transported the Minister to the hospital. In spite of his serious wounds, he could not forget the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities, and immediately dictated and ordered us to telegraph to Foreign Minister Yoshizawa his view of the matter which was that, owing to his wounds, he would be unable to attend to his daily business for some time to come, but that he strongly urged the conclusion of the Agreement should not be hindered or delayed because of the bomb incident which had injured him and others, since the conclusion of the truce agreement was from the viewpoint of national policy of the utmost importance.
5. I was present at the ceremonial signing of the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities in the British Consulate-General on May 5, 1932. In the course of the ceremonies the Agreement was taken to the bedsides of Mr. Shigemitsu, General Ueda and the Chinese delegate, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, all of whom were in different hospitals, General Ueda having been injured by the same bomb as Mr. Shigemitsu and the Chinese delegate in an assault by students. Mr. Shigemitsu's leg was amputated an hour or so after he signed.

On this 11 day of Nov. 1947.
At Tokyo.

DEponent Môriya, Kazuro (Seal)

I, Môriya, Kazuro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (Signed) Kômaya, Shizuo (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Môriya, Kazuro (Seal)
CERTIFICATE

I, K. Hayashi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the telegrams sent by Minister Shigenori to Foreign Minister Yoshizawa during the period between the end of April, 1932, and the early part of May, 1932, concerning the agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities around Shanghai, do not exist among the documents now in custody of the Foreign Office.

Tokyo, September 29, 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi

Signed and sealed before me on the same date and at the same place.

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe
I hereby certify that I am the Editor of the "North-China Daily News" of Shanghai, China, and that during the period from September 1931 to May 1932, inclusive, I was the assistant editor of the said newspaper.

I further certify that the said newspaper is wholly owned, managed and edited by British subjects.

I further certify that the following are true copies of complete despatches appearing in the said newspaper on the dates indicated.

/s/ R. T. Peyton-Griffin
R. T. Peyton-Griffin
Editor.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL
Shanghai, China

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of Sept., 1947.

/s/ Arthur K. Rosen
Arthur K. Rosen

The Consulate General assumes no responsibility for the contents of this document
"The North-China Daily News," May 1, 1932

Widespread Sympathies with Bomb Victims

London Newspaper Praise for the Dignified Restraint Shown by Japan

Emperor Expresses Deep Regret

No Likelihood of the Outrage Interfering with the Peace Negotiations

Horror and indignation have been felt throughout the world at the Hongkew Park bomb outrage, with appropriate expressions of sympathy with the victims. London has been horror-stricken, as it reflected in the press comments, one journal going to the extent of saying that except for the Sarajevo murder in 1914 no political violence has been fraught with such disastrous possibilities. This apparently is belied by messages from Tokyo, where the prevailing view is to treat the incident as an isolated one and not to drag it in to interfere with the peace negotiations.

Restrained Tokyo Comment

Tokyo, April 30.

Although a temporary postponement of the signing of a truce agreement in Shanghai is inevitable following the injury of Mr. Shigemitsu and others at Shanghai, Government circles appear hopeful it will be possible to arrange for signature to the truce with a minimum of delay.

Despite his severe injuries it is revealed that Mr. Shigemitsu dictated a number of despatches to the Government describing the incident and regretting his own inability to continue negotiations at present, but stressing the importance of concluding the truce agreement as soon as possible.—Router.
"The North-China Daily News," May 6, 1932

Signing of the Shanghai Peace Pact

Cessation of Hostilities and Withdrawal of Japanese Troops

Chinese to Posted District

...no-Japanese Delegates Sign Agreement from Rooms in Hospital

Scene in Hospital

There was a pathetic scene at the hospital when the delegates entered the
room where Mr. Shigenitsu was lying preparatory to the operation in which his leg
was amputated. Mr. Shigenitsu, attended by his brother and three doctors, was
lying in bed, pale, wan and with sunken cheeks. He greeted three bearers of the
text of the agreement and to Mr. Chang, whom he greeted cordially, he expressed
the desire that he would convey to the Chinese people his wish that the Chinese
and the Japanese be friends.

The text of the agreement was handed to him and after examining it he picked
up a pen in his right hand, which was bandaged and bloodstained, only the tips of
his fingers protruding from the bandage, and affixed his signature to the documen
一九三三年五月一日ノース・チャイナ・ダイリー・ニュース
一九四四年ノサハヴォー＝於ケル暗殺ヲ除キハノハハノヒノ政治的ノ暴行
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昭和五十七年五月十六日ノニュース、チャイナ、デイリー、ニュースー

上席停戦協定ノ締結ン、

現地ハ中華側調停スノ為、

病院ニ於ケル日報代表ノ協定署名

時、昭和五十七年五月十六日テ日本ト日本人トハ友人デアルナラウニトノ目送ノ為ヲ

希望ヲ中

レモント見テルナウデアル。
Office of Special Commissioner in South East Asia, Cathay Building, SINGAPORE
February 27th 1947

I, Right Honourable Baron Killearn, P.C., G.C.M.G., G.B., V.O., hereby certify that Mr. Makoto Shigemitsu was well known to me when he was Japanese Minister to China.

In the spring of 1932 when fighting broke out in the suburbs of Shanghai between Japanese and Chinese forces, I, with other neutral colleagues, endeavoured to put a stop to hostilities and to prevent them spreading and to this end arranged meetings attended by both Japanese and Chinese representatives. On the Japanese side Mr. Shigemitsu from the outset co-operated wholeheartedly and much of the credit for reaching an agreement was due to his persistent efforts and patient co-operation.

When agreement had been signed he was unfortunately seriously wounded in a terrorist outrage. Despite the fact that he was in severe pain he refused to allow his injuries to hold up the signature of the agreement which was accordingly taken to him in hospital where he signed it.

(Signed) Killearn

Witness to signature:
Robert Heather Scott
Counsellor
H.M. Foreign Service

(Signed) R.H. Scott
STATE OF WYOMING )
COUNTY OF PARK )

1. Nelson Trusler Johnson, being of sound age and of full and
duly
sworn upon oath, depose and say:

I was United States Minister to China during the period
August 6, 1931 to June 10, 1932, when Mamoru Shigemitsu was
Japanese Minister to China and my colleague. I knew him before,
during this period, and subsequently, and considered him a loyal
representative of his country, who labored ceaselessly by peace­
ful means and the methods of negotiation and diplomacy to bring
to solution the problems that troubled the relations between Japan
and China. I knew him as a colleague and friend, frank, straight­
forward in speech, and one whose word I learned to trust.

From the time when hostilities between Japan and China broke
out at Shanghai, China in January 1932 to the signing of the truce
that ended those hostilities on May 5, 1932, Mr. Shigemitsu devoted
all his time and energy first to finding means to bringing his own
countrymen and the Chinese to discussions aimed at ending the strife,
and latterly with me, the British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson (now
Lord Kilsarn), M. Wilden, the French Minister, and Count Ciano, the
Italian Minister, to bring these discussions to a successful con­
clusion with the truce agreement of May 5, 1932.

That agreement had to be taken to the bedside of Mamoru
Shigemitsu at a hospital, where he lay seriously wounded by an
assassin's bomb, thrown onto the speakers' platform where he and
other Japanese speakers were standing on April 29th. Throughout
this difficult time Mr. Shigemitsu spared no effort to localize
the incident, and contributed decisively to the creation of an
atmosphere of friendliness, making possible a truce and the with­
drawal of the considerable Japanese military forces landed around
Shanghai.

At all times I have considered Mr. Shigemitsu a friend and an
active proponent of settlement of international difficulties by dis­
cussion and negotiation. To these ends he was indefatigable in his
efforts; frank and sincere in his approach; and always receptive,
sympathetic and friendly in his attitude.

(signed) Nelson Trusler Johnson
Subscribed in my presence and sworn to before me this 19th day of August, 1947.

(signed) Anna Sue Rector
Notary Public.

My Commission expires: December 12, 1948.
STATE OF WYOMING
COUNTY OF PARK

I, Nelson Trusler Johnson, being of lawful age and first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:

I was United States Minister to China during the period August 6, 1931 to June 10, 1932, when Mamoru Shigemitsu was Japanese Minister to China and my colleague. I knew him before, during this period, and subsequently, and considered him a loyal representative of his country, who labored ceaselessly by peaceful means and the methods of negotiation and diplomacy to bring to solution the problems that troubled the relations between Japan and China. I knew him as a colleague and friend, frank, straightforward in speech, and one whose word I learned to trust.

From the time when hostilities between Japan and China broke out at Shanghai, China in January 1932 to the signing of the truce that ended those hostilities on May 5, 1932, Mr. Shigemitsu devoted all his time and energy first to finding means to bringing his own countrymen and the Chinese to discussions aimed at ending the strife, and latterly with me, the British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson (now Lord Killearn), M. Wilden, the French Minister, and Count Ciano, the Italian Minister, to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion with the truce agreement of May 5, 1932.

That agreement had to be taken to the bedside of Mamoru Shigemitsu at a hospital, where he lay seriously wounded by an assassin's bomb, thrown onto the speakers' platform where he and other Japanese speakers were standing on April 29th. Throughout this difficult time Mr. Shigemitsu spared no effort to localize the incident, and contributed decisively to the creation of an atmosphere of friendliness, making possible a truce and the withdrawal of the considerable Japanese military forces landed around Shanghai.

At all times I have considered Mr. Shigemitsu a friend and an active proponent of settlement of international difficulties by discussion and negotiation. To these ends he was indefatigable in his efforts; frank and sincere in his approach; and always receptive, sympathetic and friendly in his attitude.

(signed) Nelson Trusler Johnson
Subscribed in my presence and sworn to before me this 19th day of August, 1947.

(signed) Armw Sue Rector
Notary Public.

My Commission expires: December 12, 1948.
Def. Doc. #2684

Subscribed in my presence and sworn to before me this 19th day of August, 1947.

(signed) Alma Sue Rector
Notary Public.

My Commission expires: December 12, 1948.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Republic of China

Nanking, September 12, 1947.

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that search has been made in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government for the original Chinese text of Annex I to the Protocol between China and Russia on the Border East of Hunsun, signed at Yensh'ū, Russia, on June 3, the 12th year of Kuang-hai (1886), together with the map or maps, if any, annexed or attached to said document, and bearing the official seals or other symbols of authority of the signers of said Protocol, and that the said document and the map or maps are not at present available for production for the purpose of lodging the same with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East nor for making a photostatic copy thereof. The Chinese Government, however, regards the text of the said Protocol as printed on page 348 of Sino-Foreign Treaty Series, published by the Commercial Press, Shanghai, China in February 1936 to be a correct copy of the said Protocol.

/S/ George K. C. Yeh
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
CERTIFICATE


Tokyo, October 6th, 1947.

(signed) K. NEGISHI
The envoys for border demarcation of both countries have defined the border of the First Section to be the stretch from the River Tumen to the astronomical point at Changling, according to the map drawn up after the survey by Russian commissioners in 1864 (the 10th year of Kuang-hsu). This mountain is situated between the Russian outpost at Hunchun and that on the Chinese side at Ertaoho, and is on the road between Hunchun and the River Yench'u. The distance between the place where the border mark Tu has newly been established and the astronomical point is sixty-five and half Russian li, or approximately one hundred and thirty-one Chinese li, and the red line on the map marks the border all along the watershed, and the water that flows westwards and pours into the River Tumen belongs to China, and the water that flows eastwards and pours into the sea belongs to Russia. The distance southwards from the border-mark Tu along the River Tumen to the estuary is fifteen Russian li, or approximately thirty Chinese li, and the distance to the end of a sandbar measured in a straight line by land is thirteen Russian li four hundred and fifty-five sajen, or approximately over twenty-seven Chinese li. The established monolith border-mark Tu is one sajen, or approximately over seven Chinese feet high, ten Russian inches, or approximately fifteen Chinese inches wide, and four Russian inches, or
approximately six Chinese inches thick. On the one side it has the Russian letter T inscribed, and on the other three Chinese characters "Tu Character Monument" with the date at the side. The depth of the border-mark in the ground is one Russian foot, or approximately two Chinese feet and three inches. The foundation around it is constructed with hard stone, and surrounded by a deep ditch filled with crushed gravel and hardened by pouring mortar so as to make the border-mark durable. Proceeding northwards from the border-mark Tu, crossing a hill, and reaching the north of a sand hill via the west side of Lake Kasan", the border-mark No.1 is established, the total distance being eight li and one hundred sajen. Proceeding thence northwards one li and sixty-five sajen, and turning there northwest for four li one hundred and thirty-five sajen along sand hills, Ikangtzu is reached, where the border-mark No.2 is established. Turning further southeast, and proceeding around a swamp, and turning north, Mount Varanova is reached. From the north of this mountain, again turning east Mount Varabash is reached, and thence again proceeding northeast, a road between Hanchi and the river Yingen is reached, and there the border-mark No.3 is established, the total distance being thirteen li four hundred and sixty-five sajen. Thence proceeding northwards for two li and four hundred sajen along a flat hill, the border-mark No.4 is established. Thence again
proceeding northwestwards for two li one hundred and fifty sajen after crossing several hills, Mount Mach'uning is reached, where the border-mark No. 5 is established on a flat slope at the foot of the mountain. Again proceeding six li two hundred and eighty-five sajen northwestwards, descending a mild hill and crossing small ravines at several points, Heitingtzu is reached, the border-mark No. 6 is established at the roadside leading to the River Yench'u. Again proceeding northwest, Kushan or Kaisheitingtsuqahan is reached. Turning thence southwest, Fashan or Taheitingtzu is reached from where turning and proceeding northwest and crossing a large mountain, the path being narrow and steep, Mount Jlado is reached. Proceeding thence around the upper part of the River Chuiin, and turning east and again north, the border-mark No. 7 is established on the top of a mountain, which, though not high, has very rugged paths, and is situated twenty li four hundred and seventy-five sajen from the border-mark No. 6. Thence turning north at a point three li two hundred and eighty sajen northeastwards, and proceeding one li and sixty-five sajen, and again turning east for three hundred and thirty sajen, the astronomical point, erected in 1084, is reached. This is the border-mark No. 8. The distance mentioned above are all in Russian li, one Russian li corresponding to two Chinese li, and one Russian sajen to over seven Chinese feet. The astronomical point is
a tall brick building with a hard stone foundation. All the other border-markers are round mounds of earth, around which a ditch is dug and filled with gravel. On each mound is erected a small monolith with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., inscribed.

This protocol is drawn up in duplicate, in Manchurian, Chinese and Russian languages. Two maps are drawn up in accordance with the border lines defined above. The envoys for border demarcation of both countries signed both of them and affixed their seals thereto, each holding one copy of the protocol and the maps as evidence.

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I, MEGISHI, Inzo, hereby certify that I was in the service of the Chinese Maritime Custom from October 1926 till March 1945, first as Assistant and later as Commissioner of Customs, and that I am conversant with the Japanese, Chinese and English languages, having passed the highest examination of the Chinese Maritime Customs for the Chinese language.

I further certify that I have accurately and faithfully translated into English the protocol of Border-lines, Annex I of the Funchun Border protocol, 1886, from the Chinese text of the said protocol contained in the Diplomatic Documents during the Ching Dynasty, Vol. 63, published in China, January 1932. The translation is hereto attached.

Tokyo, June 6, 1947.

/s/ M. Megishi.
At the request of George A. Furness, Esq., counsel for Mamoru Shigemitsu before the International Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, I hereby attest to a statement in regard to Ambassador Shigemitsu to be used in evidence before that Tribunal, as follows:

I, JOSEPH E. DAVIES, was the Ambassador of the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from November 16, 1936 to June 9, 1938. During that period, I came into contact with Ambassador Shigemitsu as a diplomatic colleague, the accredited Ambassador of Japan to the U.S.S.R. I came to know him well. I also came to know his reputation among the members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow and in the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R. His reputation was, first of all, that he was a diplomat who would observe strictly the professional loyalties which his duty required, but that in spite of his official "correctness", he was nevertheless definitely a liberal, progressive, and humanitarian in his approach to problems of international relations. In his private conversations with me he spoke of his desire to compose peace in China and to end a war which he personally deplored and which he believed was ill-advised. He
also expressed eagerness to prevent that war from spreading into conflict between his country and mine. While disagreeing with some of his interpretations as to who was responsible for the Chinese situation, and while officially I always maintained a reserved judgment for the possible protection of my country, I nevertheless knew, and was impressed by the fact that his reputation was that he was not of the militaristic clique in Japan, but was a man of altruistic and humanitarian mind, who would not himself be a party to either initiating or projecting a policy of militaristic aggression, or to using armed force as an instrument of international policy.

From my conversations with him and my observations of his acts as a diplomatic colleague, I gained a distinct impression that he was sincere in such statements and that his reputation was well deserved.

On a specific occasion, the border incident along the Amur River in June and July of 1937, which had reached a pass where ultimatums had been laid down, I went to see both Shigemitsu and Litvinov, informally, to explore the situation, and to urge that the situation be not permitted to develop into war. Shigemitsu received me immediately. He was frank. He assured me that he, personally, would do what he could to localize the issue and prevent the possibility of war. I believed he was sincere. Shortly thereafter, at a reception given by the Soviet Government, I had opportunity to talk with Foreign Minister Litvinov and Ambassador Shigemitsu together. At that time
it was clear to mo that each, while sustaining the positions of their respective governments, was personally trying to avoid the breakdown of negotiations in the interest of peace. The controversy was adjusted. The settlement was unquestionably due to the decisions of the respective foreign offices. It nevertheless afforded me an opportunity to assess the personal attitude of Ambassador Shigemitsu.

I followed Shigemitsu's subsequent diplomatic activities in London as the Japanese Ambassador to England. His reputation in the diplomatic circles in Moscow, which I have here reported was corroborated by reports, received by me from different members of our own diplomatic corps in London, including Ambassador Kennedy, and others, who had the opportunity to talk with him and to observe his actions and to assess his general reputation in London.

To summarize, his reputation in the diplomatic world was not that of a militarist or of an aggressor in the provocation of the war, but that of fundamentally a liberal-minded and altruistic type of man who was hostile to fascist ideas, and opposed to the aggressive use of armed force, and would not be a party to the initiation of the projection of an aggressive war, or to use in war of any methods condemned by the Laws and Customs of War and the generally accepted standards of the Hague Convention, and international law. From my own observation, this reputation was well deserved.
Def. Doc. #2079

(signed) JOSEPH E. DAVIDS
Washington, D.C.
1947

STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF Nassau ) ss.

Personally appeared before me, JOSEPH E. DAVIDS, who being
first duly sworn, makes oath and states that the foregoing state­
ment, signed by him in my presence, is true and correct and that
the same is being given to Major George A. Furness of the United
States Army as counsel in the war trials before the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, now sitting in Tokyo, for such
use as may in his opinion be in the interest of justice.

(signed) E. FLOYD GRIFFIN
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Residing in Nassau County
Nassau County Clerk's No. 1398
Commission Expires March 30, 1947
Mr. M. Shigemitsu, 1940 - 1941.

Statement by the Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, GCB., GCMG., GCVO.

This statement is directed primarily to such knowledge as I possess of the circumstances in which Mr. Shigemitsu, Imperial Japanese Ambassador in London during the early years of the late war, sought at the end of March, 1941, to visit central Europe in order to meet Mr. Matsuoka, Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government during his official visit to Germany and Italy.

In order to throw light on the Ambassador's motives in projecting this visit it is necessary to refer to certain conversations in which I took part in the last five months of the previous year. The dates of the talks are extracted from my official engagement book, and other particulars mainly from contemporary notes and correspondence, filled in, where necessary, from memory.

September - December, 1940.

Early in September, 1940, when I was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, with Cabinet rank, in Mr. Churchill's Government, I received a verbal invitation from Major-General F.S.G. Figgott, D.S.O., former British Military Attaché at Tokyo and an old friend of the Washington Naval Conference, 1921-22, to meet Mr. Shigemitsu at lunch. The invitation was sponsored by another old friend and colleague, the late...
Lord Lloyd of Dlobran, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, as Chairman of the British Council, was concerned at the deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations. It was made clear to me from the first that Viscount Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, approved this contact and that the conversation would be informal and non-committal.

4. The first meeting took place in a private room at the Savoy Hotel on September 11th, 1940: present Lord Lloyd, Mr. Shigemitsu, Viscount Kano, General Figgott, Mr. George Sale, and myself. I made no notes of the afterlunch conversation, but to the best of my recollection it centred round the deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations, which had started after the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at Washington in 1921-22, and what steps could be taken to improve them.

5. The second meeting was on September 25th, again at lunch, in a private room at the Savoy Hotel. The personnel was the same as before, except that Viscount Kano was not present. The conversation was resumed where it had left off on September 11th, namely on a proposal, either initiated or at least warmly supported by Mr. Shigemitsu (who had been working on these lines during the previous summer) that an official British Government Mission, headed by a Minister of Cabinet rank, should proceed to Tokyo, nominally to attend some forthcoming ceremonial anniversary, but also to take the opportunity to
9. make the British case better known, to rally our friends and the British Colony, and to counter the propaganda of the numerous Nazi visitors to Japan. This proposal met with general acceptance and Lord Lloyd undertook to speak to Lord Halifax.

6. Two days later, on September 27th, the signature of the Tripartite Pact - Germany, Italy, Japan - was announced and Japan became a member of the Axis, but not a belligerent. This was a damper on the idea of an official mission.

7. On November 20th the third and last luncheon meeting took place, this time in a private room at the Ritz Hotel, where Lord Lloyd, Mr. Shigemitsu, General Piggott and I were the guests of Commander McGrath. The idea of a Government Mission had to be dropped, but Lord Lloyd proposed instead a mission to be sent by the British Council. On his suggestion there was general agreement that I ought to lead the mission, a proposal that was supported enthusiastically by Mr. Shigemitsu. I was prepared to undertake the mission if officially asked to do so. Lord Lloyd undertook to report the proposal to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

But relations with Japan were continuing to deteriorate, and the moment was never deemed opportune for the visit.

8. The point I wish to emphasize in the above episode is Mr. Shigemitsu's intense desire throughout to stop the rot in Anglo-Japanese relations, and to take some definite step,
such as the proposed Mission to Japan, with that object. I was convinced of his genuineness and I believe all those present at the conversations shared my view.

1941.

Conversation with Mr. Shigemitsu on March 22nd.

9. In February, 1941, Lord Lloyd, who had been the leading spirit in the above episode, died and no further meetings of the group took place.

10. In March I received messages that Mr. Shigemitsu would very much appreciate a private and informal conversation with me, and after a talk with Mr. F. A. Butler, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, who was concerned with Japanese affairs, I consented. During the German night-bombing campaign Mr. Shigemitsu had a house at Whurst, Surrey, where General Piggott lived, and our conversation took place in the General's home. It lasted several hours and was frank and sincere throughout. General Piggott was present most of the time and afterwards made some notes, which I approved two days later, subject to one amendment.

11. It is unnecessary to describe in detail this long conversation. We went over all the old ground covered by the conversations of 1940, but focussed mainly on recent events, especially Japan's adherence to the Axis and Mr. Matsuoka's impending visit to Berlin and Rome, which had made a deplorable
impression on British public opinion. The Ambassador deeply regretted that his country had joined the Axis but pointed out that the Japanese Government, cold-shouldered by their former Allies, who disapproved their policy in China, and from whom they were now almost cut off by exiguous communications, had tended to drift towards the Germans, who cultivated their friendship persistently. He quoted Mr. Matsuoka's statement that Japan's policy was one of peace. but he did not under-rate my contention that Japan, like Italy, might pass from passive to active membership of the Axis, and that Mr. Matsuoka, in visiting Berlin, would be exposed to the full force of Hitler's demonstrations of German power, his blandishments and threats. This might easily lead to war between Japan and Britain and perhaps to the intervention of the U.S.A. Although the Ambassador remarked that, in that event, Japan could give us a bad time at first, he was under no illusions as to the ultimate danger to his country.

12. In fact it was clear that Mr. Shigemitsu's main object in this conversation was to find some means of countering this risk. He agreed that the time had passed for an official British Mission, which might in his view have produced results in the previous summer, when he had first mooted it. But he thought that it would still be usefull to send a few influential British citizens to explain the allied situation
to Japan and to emphasize the importance of recent victories in North Africa and the Mediterranean, which was not realized in Japan. In this connection he contrasted the disparity between the continuous human contacts between Germany and Japan with the latter's isolation from Great Britain. He believed that the drift towards Germany was by no means universally popular among the Japanese, and gave some evidence to support it.

15. The Ambassador hinted at the possibility that Mr. Shigemitsu might be induced to come to London on the return journey but we did not pursue that idea that day. Next day, however, as General Figgott reported to me, he told the General that he had decided to urge Prince Konoe (Prime Minister) by telegram to try and induce Mr. Matsuoka to return to Japan via London in order to counteract the effects of his visits to Berlin and Rome. He expressed the hope that the British Ambassador in Tokyo might be similarly instructed by the Foreign Office.

The proposed visit to Central Europe.

15. On March 28th General Figgott gave me a message that Mr. Shigemitsu felt that he must make contact with Mr. Matsuoka somewhere in Central Europe, preferably at Berna, where they would be free from the influence of Berlin or Rome, and asking for my good offices in obtaining a passage to Lisbon for himself and his Military Attaché.

16. Inquiry showed that there was tremendous competition
for these passages. The matter seemed so urgent and important that on March 31st I appealed direct to the Prime Minister for a priority passage. I supported the appeal by stating that in the conversation on March 22nd the Japanese Ambassador had professed (genuinely I thought) to believe in the certainty of our ultimate victory, but that it was uncertain that his reports were sufficiently read or taken to heart by Mr. Matsuoka, and that was one reason why he wished to make this contact. After our recent victories in the Mediterranean it would seem especially important to ensure that Mr. Matsuoka got to know the truth. I suggested that the Ambassador ought to be allowed to take his Military Attaché. The journey to Lisbon and Berne was a formidable undertaking for a man with a wooden leg. He might find himself amid adverse surroundings in seeing Mr. Matsuoka, and it was advisable to strengthen him with a kindred spirit with whom he could talk freely and take counsel.

The journey, however, did not take place for reasons which can best be explained by the following letter from Mr. Shigemitsu to myself dated April 2nd:

I hereby report.

(Handwritten Notes)
My dear Lord Hankey,

I was so glad to have the opportunity, when you telephoned me, to explain why I had to cancel my proposed trip. On looking into the ways and means of getting to Switzerland, where I would have liked to meet my friend, I unexpectedly found that it took several days to get there from Lisbon. From Lisbon I would have had to go to Barcelona by plane and from Barcelona onwards by train, the latter only running twice a week with all reservations booked up for some time ahead. I did my best to get this information in good time, but found it physically impossible to arrange such a complicated journey at the time at my disposal, in spite of the fact that my friend having abandoned his idea of going to Vichy was kind enough to say he would wait several days for me if I could manage to make the journey. The only alternative was for me to meet him in Berlin, but I did not like to do this, and so very reluctantly had to give up the whole idea. It seemed impossible to arrange in
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spite of all the kindness and trouble taken by my British friends to arrange the necessary facilities, I had hoped to be able to do my bit for our cause, but I assure you that I shall always continue my efforts on the same lines.

I am most grateful for all the invaluable help you were kind enough to give me in the matter and am only too sorry that I was unable to avail myself of it. This letter is to explain the circumstances which compelled me to cancel the trip and to express my sincere appreciation of your kindness in the matter.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) M. SHIGMITSU.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey,
GCB., GCMG., GCVO.
18. In conclusion I stress the following points which emerge from the above summary:

(i) Mr. Shigemitsu's intense and consistent desire to keep Japan from entering the war on the side of the Axis.

(ii) That is supported by his original desire in the summer and early autumn that a British official mission should be sent to Japan; by his support to the subsequent proposal for a British Council mission; by his persistence, in March, 1941, in the plan of sending selected British citizens; by his desire that Mr. Matsuoka should be induced to return via London to counteract the effect of the Berlin and Rome visits; and by his attempt to make contact with Mr. Matsuoka, in order to bring home to the Foreign Minister the purport of his own despatches, and in conjunction with his Military Attaché to emphasize the importance of the British successes in North Africa, and, presumably, to induce the Foreign Minister to return via London.

(iii) The following passage in his letter to me of 2nd April, 1941, is particularly significant of his attitude:

"I had hoped to do my bit for our cause, but I assure you that I shall always continue my efforts on the same lines."
(iv) Throughout the whole series of conversation, extending over six months, I cannot find or recollect a word to cast doubt on Mr. Shigemitsu's bona fides, and I believe that my associates would confirm that view.

30th December, 1946.
Dear Mr. Furness,

I enclose a statement of the evidence which I am prepared to give to the Tokyo Court about Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu if officially asked by the Court to do so. In addition I am prepared to answer interrogatories on the subject.

I have sent copies of the statement to Mr. Denning of the Foreign Office, with a suggestion that they might, with advantage, send a copy to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo in case the Court should require it.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) Hankey

George A. Furness, Esq.
I, Major General Francis Steward Gildorsey Pigott, C.B., D.S.O., Colonel Commandant Royal Engineers of Rapsley, Whurast in the County of Surrey, England, having been first duly sworn, make oath and say that the attached photostatic copy marked "Y" is a true copy of the "Notes on private conversation between H. S. Mr. Shigomitsu and Lord Hankey at Rapsley Whurst, March 22nd, 1941" the original of which was delivered to G. A. Furness, Defense Counsel for Mamoru Shigomitsu, for use in evidence in the trial of major war criminals for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, now sitting in Tokyo, that such notes were typed by me on March 23rd, 1941, the day following the day on which the conversation referred to therein took place, that I was present during most of said conversation, that such notes were approved by Lord Hankey as a true record of such conversation except for the second sentence, paragraph 5, that said second sentence of paragraph 5 is further development by Mr. Shigomitsu in a conversation with me on March 23rd, 1941 at which Lord Hankey was not present, of a matter just touched on by Mr. Shigomitsu in his conference with Lord Hankey of the previous day, that Lord Hankey informed me on 30th December 1946 that the conversation of 22nd March 1941 is the conversation.
DEP. DOC. #1772A

referred to in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of his statement of 30th December 1946 and those notes were the notes referred to therein.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me
at Cranleigh in the County of Surrey, England this 29th day of April 1947.

(Signed) Basil C. W. Hart
A Commissioner for Oaths

(Signed) F. G. G. Piggott
This is the exhibit marked Y referred to in the Affidavit of Major General Piggott made before me this 29th day of April 1947.

(Signed)

Basil C. W. Hart

A Commissioner of Oaths.

Notes on private conversation between H.E. Mr. Shigomitsu and Lord Hankey at Rapsley, Ewhurst, March 22nd, 1941.

(Referred to in Lord Hankey's statement of 30.12.46)

The Ambassador and Lord Hankey had had previous conversation, in which Lord Lloyd had also taken part, during the past few months on the general subject of Anglo-Japanese relations. The friendship which had resulted from these previous meetings enabled them both to speak with great frankness and sincerity. The actual room, in a mutual friend's house, created a favourable atmosphere - photographs of Japanese and British statesmen who had the same cause at heart hanging...
in the walls. Lord Hankoy emphasized that he was speaking without responsibility and in a purely private capacity; this was fully recognized by Mr. Shigomitsu who was also, of course, fully aware of Lord Hankoy's longstanding and deep knowledge of the subject.

1. The historical background was first surveyed, and the unfortunate drift apart since the termination of the Alliance at Washington in 1921. Any quarrel amongst the three great Sea Powers, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, and the resulting mutual losses to be expected, could only benefit the Land Powers, notably Germany and Russia, and was much to be deplored.

2. Coming to more recent events, Lord Hankoy observed that Japan's adhesion to the Axis had created a widespread feeling of distrust and suspicion in British circles; and it was felt quite likely that Japan would follow the example of Italy who had been first a passive, and then an active, member of the Axis. Mr. Matsuoka's visit to Berlin, in spite of his protestations of his peaceful intentions, added to uncertainties as regards Japan's position. Lord Hankoy felt that however determined Mr. Matsuoka was to
avoid being entangled in Germany's designs. It appeared inevitable that he might be greatly influenced by Hitler's demonstrations of German might, his blandishments, and even his threats.

Mr. Shigemitsu admitted that such a danger definitely existed.

3. Mr. Shigemitsu strongly deprecated the attitude of doing nothing and awaiting developments, especially as tremendous efforts were being made by our enemies to cause these developments to be unfavourable to us. Surely the policy was to counter-attack, and not wait passively on events. He felt that both sides had failed in the past to be active in maintaining friendship, with the result that the friendship had been undermined by evilly-disposed third parties.

4. The very origin of the Three-Power Pact was really psychological rather than political, due to Japan's feeling of loneliness. Her real friends had done little to maintain friendship, and might even be said to have shown definite unfriendliness; Germany and Italy, on the other hand, her false friends, had done much to protest true friendship. No one could pretend that the Pact was universally popular in Japan.
Indeed, he (Mr. Shigomitsu) had received a letter a day or two ago from Mr. Kurusu, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, complaining about certain aspects of the Pact; from the statesman who actually signed it in Berlin this is surely a very significant admission. Mr. Kurusu had gone on to say that Mr. Shigomitsu's work had progressed so slowly that whereas "a hundred yon might have saved the situation before the Pact, many thousands would be necessary now to put matters right" i.e. to resume friendship with the democratic Powers.

On the principle that waiting for developments was to invite defeat, and in view of the great urgency of the matter (Mr. Matsuoka was due in Berlin in a few days), the possibility of his visit to England was discussed. The Ambassador said he would do all he could through Prince Konno in Tokyo, to arrange for this, and hoped that Sir Robert Craigie would be similarly instructed by our Government. Mr. Shigemitsu seemed not unhopeful that the visit might be arranged, in spite of the annoyance it would cause Hitler.

The conversation then turned on an earlier proposal of a small Mission visiting Japan which, in the Ambassador's opinion, might well have had great results last summer. Under present circumstances, however, the word "Mission" was obviously inappropriate; but did that preclude one or two

* "A stitch in time saves nine."
influential Englishmen visiting Japan to out Britain's situation before the Japanese? Mr. Shigemitsu developed this theme by emphasizing very strongly the enormous disparity between the continuous human contacts between Berlin and Tokyo, and between London and Tokyo. Even members of his own staff had great difficulty in returning to Japan; apart from inconvenience caused to the Government, surely the delay in the arrival in Tokyo of these officials, with their verbal reports of British resolution and certainty of victory, was a pity from the British point of view.

7. To sum up—
(a) Immediate steps should be taken by the Japanese Ambassador in London, and the British Ambassador in Tokyo pressing Mr. Matsuoka to visit London.

(b) Everything possible should be done to increase the number of contacts of other Japanese visiting England, and Englishmen visiting Japan to set off the steady stream of visitors backwards and forwards between Tokyo and Berlin. Two or three influential Englishmen in Japan would reinforce the reports Mr. Shigemitsu and his staff were sending about conditions in England.

7..
(ii) minimizing the effect of German propaganda
in Japan;

(iii) reduce the dangers of misunderstandings,
almost inevitable in telegraphed communications
(for example, Mr. Matsuoka's telegram
to Mr. Eden last month). In addition to these
genuine misunderstandings there were others which
would be manufactured by our enemies;

(iv) psychologically affect Japanese
public opinion and encourage pro-
British elements.

The above notes have been prepared at Mr. Shigemitsu's
particular request, and a copy given to him and to Lord
Hankey. In making the request, Mr. Shigemitsu emphasized
the importance he attached to his conversation, and was
anxious to assure himself that he had made his own point of
view clear.

23rd March, 1941.

F.S.G.P.

I certify that the above record was made by me the day
following the conversation between Lord Hankey and Mr. Shige-
mitu. Para. 5 is a development by Mr. Shigemitsu (on March
23) of a matter only just touched on by him the previous day.

(Signed) F.S.G.Piggott 30. 12. 46.
HIS EXCELLENCY "AMORI SHIGEMITSU,

STATEMENT BY

THE RT. HON. LORD SEMFILL, A.F.C., F.R.A.S.,

ELECTED SCOTS REPRESENTATIVE PEER.

LONDON.

JANUARY 1947.
An alliance was formed at the beginning of the century between Great Britain and Japan when the late Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was honoured on the instant when Great Britain declared war on Germany in August 1914. Imperial Japanese Naval Forces operated with British Naval Forces in many seas. It was not unnatural that Japan should look to Britain in Naval matters, since co-operation in the maritime field had first shown itself early in the 17th century, and was developed in the most complete form at the time of the Imperial Restoration, in the latter half of the 19th century. The Royal Navy of Britain played an all-important part in the founding of the Imperial Navy of Japan, and for half a century close contact was maintained between the two Navies.

Great Britain had been backward in applying air power to the Navy, but the events of the 1914/18 war compelled it, and the Royal Naval Air Service there came into its own and played an important part in helping to regain and maintain command of the sea routes so essential to Britain.
The development of Naval air power had been closely observed by the Japanese Naval Forces at first hand, and immediately peace was declared in 1919, the Japanese Admiralty asked that a British Naval Air Mission might be sent out with a view to organizing, equipping and training the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Service, that was but in embryo.

The Japanese Navy anticipated that an Active Service Mission would be sent, the necessary personnel being seconded from the British Navy for a period of years. Such a policy they felt would have been in line with what had happened before and would have resulted in the most up-to-date knowledge and equipment being made available for the benefit of their Service. The British Government, for reasons of high policy, did not find itself able to agree to the request in that form, but indicated their willingness to name a competent retired Naval Air Service Officer to the Japanese Admiralty, leaving them to make all the necessary arrangements with him.

The undersigned was selected by H.M. Government, and in due course the Japanese Admiralty - through the Naval Attache in London - commenced negotiations which resulted in the formation of the British Aviation Mission in 1920, which consisted of some thirty persons, all of whom had been actively employed in the Royal Naval Air Service during the War. In 1921 the Mission set out for Japan.

The work occupied several years, during which time the
Mission was responsible for the technical and practical conduct of education of many hundreds of Officers and thousands of men, all Active Service personnel. Instruction was given in the operation, maintenance and repair of different types of land and sea aircraft, their engines and equipment. Aircraft were operated at sea, firstly in flying off the turrets of cruisers and battle cruisers, and later from aircraft carriers. The Mission was solely responsible for obtaining all the necessary air equipment, and at no time did any issue arise in which the Japanese Admiralty failed to honour in the most complete fashion the understanding with the British Aviation Mission. A wide experience of Japanese philosophy and psychology was gained by living and working with many drawn from different walks of life and all parts of the Japanese Islands.

In the summer of 1921 I first had the pleasure of meeting Mons. Mamoru Shigemitsu, at an official gathering at which a number from the Foreign Office - in which he was a senior official - were present. From that time a long term friendship sprang up, which was carried on spasmodically after my return to Great Britain towards the end of 1922, until he was appointed Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, in London, in 1938. The Mission in fact, did not complete its activities until the end of 1923, and for many years I was frequently consulted on technical questions. With vivid recollections of his helpfulness when I was head of the British Aviation
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Missor in Japan, and being well aware of the serious decline in Anglo-Japanese relations, I welcomed the appointment of one with outstanding qualities of statesmanship, and whom I knew to be anxious to bring Anglo-Japanese relations back to their former state of harmonious co-operation. I was well aware too, that His Excellency held strongly the view that there was no need for wars if the leaders of different countries would but meet and frankly expound their points of view in a spirit of collaboration.

His Excellency's appointment as Ambassador to Great Britain was very timely in view of the fact that Anglo-Japanese relations had declined steadily since I first made his acquaintance in Tokio in 1921, at the time of the abrogation of the Alliance. The aggressive tactics of Germany were all too evident at that time, and caused him profound uneasiness, and I well remember him telling me a few months after his arrival in London that unless such tactics were checked in Europe he could see but one outcome - world conflict. Within about a year, war in Europe had broken out. His Excellency worked with redoubled energy to prevent his own prognostication becoming true, and lost no opportunity of initiating or joining in any discussion that might lead to some solution that would at least localize the conflict that then enveloped Europe.

He invited me to come and see him at any time that one felt that he might be able to help in preventing the spread of
hostilities over the world. When the Foreign Minister in Japan came to Europe in 1941, His Excellency frequently asked me as to how it might be possible for him to get by air to some neutral country to meet his Foreign Minister in order that he might advise him directly against closer cooperation with the Axis. He was in touch with Mr. Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, who had emphasized a number of points that he would like to have put by His Excellency to his Foreign Minister. I remember meeting His Excellency at this time, and his telling me with obvious enthusiasm and elation that he had received most important and effective material from the Prime Minister for this purpose. At this time everything in Europe was disrupted by the war, and this meeting, so full of possibilities could not take place. I was well aware that His Excellency's views were not in accord with those of all high ranking Japanese officials.

At about this time, a number of us in Britain felt that a small Mission of historic personalities should be sent to Japan to discuss Anglo-Japanese affairs. It was not proposed that those who had played at any time a prominent part in Anglo-Japanese affairs should go, but rather those who although they had not been specifically concerned with such affairs, had an international reputation of the highest order. The late Lord Lloyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was in touch with the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, with a view to
furthering this plan, but unprop-erly be died before it could be
is to maintain peace than Momotaro, Shigemitsu. He was essentially
a man of peace and one quite incapable, in my thoughts, of any
action, open or underhanded, that could lead to war. It is to
be hoped, greatly, that these outstanding qualities may carry
soon be used to further the Japanese programme of reconstruction
that fails to be accomplished, in Japan, or that that matter,
the world over.
A friendship, founded a quarter of a century ago, which
has ever been subject to incessant cabardement by anti-Japanese
politics, and despite all is unimpaired; must surely be founded
in reality. I am called to stand in the dock before an Inter-
national Tribunal of eminent men and testify as to the
character of this last friend of another race, with whom my
countrymen are so lately estranged. That, I am proud to do;
be it ever so hard to face the truth.
Sempill,
LONDON,
JANUARY, 1947.
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His Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu

This is the photostatic copy Statement referred to in the Affidavit of The Lord Sempill sworn before me this 16th day of May 1947

(Signed) Alec E. Jennings
A Commissioner for Oaths.
Def. Doc. #1774

RE:

HIS EXCELLENCY TANORU SHIGEMITSU

I, THE LORD SEMPILL, Baron of Craigievar, a Baronet of Nova Scotia and elected representative peer of the Scots of 120 Pall Mall, London, make Oath and say as follows:

1. The annexed photostatic copy of a Statement by me is a true copy of such Statement dated January 1947 given by me for use in the trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal of the Far East now sitting in Tokyo and that all the facts contained in such Statement consisting of several pages each bearing my signature are in all respects true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S'ORN at 3 Laurence Pountney Hill
in the City of London this 16th day of May, 1947.
(Signed) Sempill

Before me
(Signed) Alec E. Jennings

A COMMISSIONER FOR OATHS

A SOLICITOR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE IN ENGLAND.
As Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs from February '38 to July '41 I had frequent opportunities of exchanging views with Mr. Shigemitsu, then Japanese Ambassador in London.

Mr. Shigemitsu was generally regarded as a man of high character. While clearly an ardent patriot, he foresaw the dangers into which the militarist clique in Japan were leading his country. He never underestimated Britain's strength and spirit, and had a proper appreciation of the determination of Mr. Churchill and the British people to win the war. He frequently used language agreeing with me that it would not be in the interests of his country to become involved in a struggle with Great Britain, and he appeared to foresee the peril of war with Great Britain and America in the Pacific.

I have been shown Exhibit No. 1062 which I recognise as having been drafted by Mr. Churchill for the purpose of handing to Mr. Shigemitsu whom he regarded as a reliable representative in order that it might be put directly before the Japanese Foreign Secretary during his trip to Europe.

R. A. Butler
6/1/47
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF BARISTABLE

On this day personally appeared before me, an officer duly authorized to administer oaths in the State of Massachusetts, JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, who being by me first duly sworn, deposeth and says:

That during 1939 and 1940 he was Ambassador from the United States of America to the Court of St. James's and was in residence at the American embassy in London during this period.

That during the above-mentioned period, one Namoru Shigenitsu was the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of St. James's and was likewise in residence in London during this period. That during this period of time the affiant had a number of conferences with Namoru Shigenitsu in his official capacity and also met him on several occasions at social events; the affiant on all those occasions discussed general world conditions with Namoru Shigenitsu and heard him discuss such matters with others in the affiant's presence. That said Namoru Shigenitsu in such conversations expressed a very sincere desire of avoiding war between Japan and the Allied Powers and, in fact, expressed generally opposition to war and favoring a policy of peace. That said Namoru Shigenitsu in such conversations expressed his intense desire to have his country cooperate with Great Britain and the United States in an effort to avoid war, and he did not favor Japanese collaboration with the Axis Powers. He also expressed a sincere desire for a peaceful settlement of the China Incident and general desire for peaceful settlements of disputes and against war. The affiant from those many conversations and official and social contacts with Namoru Shigenitsu came to know him well and from his observation of Namoru Shigenitsu at these conferences and from his observations of his actions as Ambassador, obtained the distinct impression that he was sincere in such statements and worthy of belief. His reputation in diplomatic circles in London and in the Foreign Office at Whithall, the affiant knows from talks with other heads of diplomatic missions, officials of the Foreign Office, and diplomatic correspondents of leading journals was that of a man of truth and veracity.

Examples of such conversations are as follows:

On March 3, 1939, Namoru Shigenitsu called on the affiant and told him that the Japanese people were very appreciative of President Roosevelt's order to send the body of Saito, the Japanese Ambassador to Washington, back to Japan on an American cruiser. Shigenitsu told the affiant that this action of the President might open the way to solve a lot of Far Eastern problems. He said that he and the then Prime Minister were hopeful that some sort of trade agreement could be worked out with the United States, no matter how small, because it might be the opening wedge which would help in solving the Chinese problem and restoring peaceful relations once more between the United States and Japan.

On June 24, 1940, Loith-Ross, Economic Advisor to the British Government, in a conversation with the affiant told him that he believed the Japanese Embassy in England was not being kept fully informed by the Tokyo government, nor being empowered to act. He said that for example the Japanese Embassy was asking for 7,000 tons of nickel during the current year, but that he, Loith-Ross, had been telling the Japanese in London directly that only two or three thousand tons would be available after the requirements of the Allied Governments and the United States had been met.

On October 15, 1940, the affiant went to see Namoru Shigenitsu at the Japanese Embassy. He said that he was very much upset about the course his country was taking in tying up with Germany, the fact that he was upset was evident from his manner. He said that he had always belonged to the school that believed that Germany should be to work with the United States, not against them. From his manner it was obvious that he was sincere in his statements.
On October 13, 1940, the affiant had a conversation with William Hillman, one of the closest friends of the affiant, at that time head of the International News Service in Europe. Hillman told the affiant of a conversation which he had had with Kimuro Shigenitsu on the day after the pact was signed. Hillman said that he found the Japanese Ambassador decidedly annoyed and depressed by the conclusion of this pact of which he said he had not been given more than half a day's notice. Shigenitsu, Hillman said, told him it was one of the worst blows which he had suffered in his career as it threatened to kill the object of his mission in London which was Anglo-Japanese reconciliation. Shigenitsu told Hillman that he had been tempted to resign on the first impulse, but then on second thought decided to remain in London as long as it was possible in order to mitigate the effects of the conclusion of the pact and by diplomacy to prevent its being implemented. Hillman said that he told Shigenitsu that he felt very doubtful about this and that he was sure that the British Government would find it difficult to see his standpoint. Hillman told Shigenitsu that he was of the opinion that this pact had been negotiated under the pressure of the militarists.

/s/ Joseph P. Kennedy
Former Ambassador to Great Britain

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 17th day of November 1947.

/s/ William J. O'Hall Jr.
Notary Public
By Commission Expires June 20, 1952
STATEMENT

I, Howell Arthur Gwynne of Mawbys, Little Easton, Dunmow, in the County of Essex, England make this present affidavit concerning Mr. Shigemitsu, now standing his trial in Tokyo. I understand that he is charged with aiding and abetting the war party in their efforts to enlarge the area of warfare.

I was Editor of the Morning Post from 1911 to 1932 and my relations with the Japanese Embassy have always been cordial, dating as they do from the first war when Japan was fighting on the side of the allies. The incidents at Tientsin and the invasion of China were the subjects of conversation with Mr. Yoshida, recently Premier of Japan, and Mr. Shigemitsu, who succeeded him as Ambassador to London. Somewhat to my surprise, both these gentlemen expressed strong opposition to the China Invasion. They clearly expressed disapproval of the venture and equally clearly expressed their strong opposition to the War Party in Japan. Gradually, Mr. Shigemitsu gave me his confidence and suggested that I might publish occasional leading articles pointing out that the War Party was losing for Japan friendly feeling which dated from 1914-18 War. He said that from his experiences in Moscow and his contacts with Japanese diplomatists in Europe, he was convinced that Hitler at the first serious check sustained by the German Army would be swept away by the General Staff. He then went
on to express his fears lest the War Party might lose their heads and allow themselves to be infected with the world-domination germ which had already contaminated Germany. He expressed strong opposition to widening the area of hostilities and indicated that he consistently opposed the War Party in Tokyo and was doing all in his power to prevent them from further aggression.

It is well to bear in mind that these conversations covered a period of two years and I think that I might truly say that he gave me his full confidence as far as it was consistent with his duties as Ambassador. In his talks with me, he indicated that he attached more weight to the leading articles which I occasionally published than I did. He said that he believed they would appeal to the moderate men in Tokyo and enable them to put up a fight against the war mongers. I know that extracts from these articles were cabled to Tokyo and appeared in some of the Japanese press, but I confess that I saw little sign of a favourable reaction. As I have said, Mr. Shigemitsu indicated in his conversations with me that he was firmly convinced that Hitler was not going to last. His conversations indicated that he was very well informed about the German attempts to induce Japan to join in the war on her side. To this he expressed consistent opposition and opposition to every suggestion of an extension
of the war. In all my conversations, I never once found him waver ing from this opinion, nor did I, throughout these conversations extending over a period of two years, recollect any statements which would cause me to doubt his good faith. I beg to say that it has turned out that he and those of his way of thinking were right though they were unfortu nately unable to avert the ruin and desolation which have stricken Japan.

Signed and sworn to by me on 17 day of July 1947;

(Signed) H. A. Gwono

in the presence of

(Signed) Y. Floyd
Commissioner for Oaths
I, TOYODA, Teijiro, after having been duly sworn according to the Japanese formula, make the following statement of my own free will:

I am 62 years of age, and reside at No. 473, 1-chome, Shimo-ochii, Yodobashi Ward, Tokyo, Japan.

I was Foreign Minister in the third Konoye Cabinet, from July 13, 1941, to October 13, 1941. Soon after my appointment as Foreign Minister, Mr. Shigemitsu arrived in Japan, having been recalled from London, where he had been ambassador. In his report to me which was oral about the European situation, he particularly emphasized the fact that Great Britain would never be defeated in the war with Germany, and he stated his opinion that Japan should in no case be involved in any war, and that the negotiations then under way with the United States should by all means be brought to a successful end.
On the 21st day of Nov., 1947

At Tokyo

Def. Doc. 12835

DEPUTY TOYODA, Teijiro (Seal)

I, Y.N.I. Hisao hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: (signed) Hisao Yenai (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TOYODA, Teijiro (Seal)
No. 442 (via Berlin, September 1, 00:30h)

Subject: European Situation.

Press reports of the 30th:

1. According to an Associated Press report, Farsikivi, who had been confired to his villa, was summonsed to Helsinki, and it is likely that he will be appointed Minister without portfolio in order to strengthen his position in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. "Eernerheim has an intention to open direct negotiations with the Soviet Government for truce, and the Finnish Government communicated this to the Soviet side via Stockholm on August 28. The Soviet Government is reported to be ready to comply with the request of the Finnish Government to send their delegates to Moscow for peace negotiations, only if Finnish delegates are authorized to conclude and sign an agreement of truce.

2. The Turkish Government, as a mediator, requested information as to the terms of the truce agreement which Great Britain and America intend to propose to be concluded.
with Bulgaria. Muschanoff, the Bulgarian representative, is expected to come back to Istanbul within twenty-four hours to get in touch with the American and British Ambassadors. The Soviet Union is said to be obtaining every information concerning the developments of the affair. (Istanbul, A.P.)

3. Churchill returned to England from Italy on the night of August 29. In view of the urgency of the question how to deal with Germany after the war, it now appears that a conference of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin will be held in the near future. The status of France will be decided upon in the coming conference, and a more democratic solution of the Italian problem is also considered necessary. There is a strong demand to advance the session of the British Parliament which is scheduled to re-open on September 26. (The Dagers Nyheter, London Special Dispatch)

4. Radio Paris announced on the 29th the names of the members of the French Provisional Government including De Gaulle as Prime Minister, Catroux as Minister without Portfolio, andrespall as Foreign Minister. They are all members of the French Provisional Government. The French Provisional Government made the following announcement through the radio:

France has been in a state of war with Japan since December 8, 1941, and is actually fighting with her on the sea. France, in collaboration with the Allies, will keep on fighting with all her might until not only French territories are liberated, but also the enemies of France in Asia and in Europe are repulsed. (Reuter)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages, being:

Telegram No. 442, from Minister Okamoto to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, August 30, 1944,

is a true and correct copy of the official document in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed before me on the same day and at the same place,

/s/ Kaoru HAYASHI

[Signature]

[Signature]
CERTIFICATE

I, MITTRA Kazuichi, hereby certify that I can read, write and speak the Japanese and the English languages, and that I have made the English translation of Telegram No. 442, from Minister Okamoto to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, August 30, 1944, accurately and faithfully.

Tokyo, January 10th, 1947.

/S/ K. MITTRA
K. MITTRA
MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUPREME
WAR DIRECTING CONFERENCE (September 15, 1944)

The Supreme War Directing Conference opened at 4 p.m. and closed at 6:30, on the 15th.

1. Soviet-German Peace Problem.

From the Foreign Minister:

On August 28th, the Foreign Minister made a statement on this matter to the German Ambassador at Tokyo. A little, i.e. on September 4th, Oshima, Ambassador accredited to Germany, had an interview with Fuhrer Hitler and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and carried out his instructions. On the other hand, on September 14th, the Foreign Minister received Ambassador Stahmer at the latter's request. The Ambassador conveyed to the Foreign Minister, under telegraphic instructions from his home Government, the opinion of the German Government, the contents of which were identical with the statement Fuhrer Hitler had made to Ambassador Oshima. The Foreign Minister made to the Supreme War Directing Conference a detailed report based on the record of that interview (Annex A).
At this session the Foreign Minister called the attention of the Supreme War Directing Conference to the fact that, in Ambassador Stahmer's statement, it was clearly mentioned that the German Government wished the Japanese Government to take no steps vis-a-vis the Soviet Government. Further, the Foreign Minister reported to the Supreme War Directing Conference that Stahmer was under the impression that some important secrets of the Japanese Government were leaking out into the open, as the ambassador had stated it was deeply regrettable to hear of all this gossip, so rampantly circulated among the Diplomatic Corps in Tokyo, concerning the highest policy of Japan on the Soviet-German peace and other matters, and that the Ambassador called the Foreign Minister's attention to the fact that Military and Naval officers had freely been discussing the highest policy with Naval Attache Wonnecker and others. Thus the Foreign Minister gave all those present a warning, leading them to realize the seriousness of the matter.

2. Soviet Question.

After having made his report on the Soviet-German peace problem, the Foreign Minister distributed a tentative draft prepared by officials in charge (Annex B), and opened a free discussion on the subject. As the question, however, was of
a very serious nature, the necessity of keeping it secret was specifically emphasized. In particular, the questions to be taken up for the sake of an adjustment of Soviet-Japanese relations, such as the cession of rights and interests in Manchuria, and the cession of Southern Sakhalin, and other matters of importance, were so complicated and grave that, the Conference after all arrived at no conclusion. It was, however, unanimously agreed that any treatment of such questions as routine business should be strictly avoided. Finally, it was agreed that the Foreign Minister be requested to make a basic draft, as the policy on these matters should be decided upon in accordance with the progress of Soviet-Japanese negotiations, hoped shortly to be commenced in Moscow.
ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FUEHRER AND AMBASSADOR OSHIMA IN THE PRESENCE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER 4 SEPTEMBER 1944

(This document has been tendered in evidence:
Exhibit No. 2745)
ANNEX B

DIPLOMATIC MEASURES TO BE TAKEN VIS-A-VIS
THE SOVIET UNION (DRAFT) (September 12th, 1944)

I. General Line.

In view of the present situation, Japan will immediately initiate an active diplomatic démarche towards the Soviet Union, with the object of securing (1) maintenance of neutrality and improvement of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, (2) realization, as far as possible, of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union, and further (3) improvement of Japan's situation through the assistance of the Soviet Union, in case Germany should fall out of the present war. For this purpose, a special envoy shall be dispatched to the Soviet Union to conduct negotiations.

II. Outline.

1. Object of Negotiations.

To sound out the Soviet Union fully as to her intentions vis-a-vis Japan, to inform her thoroughly of our desire to co-operate, to endeavor to improve Soviet-Japanese relations, and to achieve, as far as possible, the following aims:

(5)
(1) The continuation or implementation of the Neutrality Pact. For this purpose, the following agreements shall be concluded, in lieu of the Neutrality Pact, or parallel therewith:

A. A confirmation of the obligations imposed by the Neutrality Pact, or an agreement on a prolongation of same.

B. A non-aggression pact.

C. A treaty of good neighborliness and friendship.

D. An agreement for a peaceful solution of conflicts (abolition of the use of force).

E. An agreement for economic co-operation.

(2) Use of good offices for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

(3) Mediation for peace between Japan and the Chiang regime, if such should prove to be necessary.

(4) To sound out the Soviet Union as to her attitude in case of Germany's collapse or her conclusion of a separate peace, and to endeavor to secure and enhance her favorable attitude towards Japan.

2. Negotiations to be conducted simultaneously.

Negotiations shall be conducted between Japan and the Soviet Union on the following matters, simultaneously with
the negotiations for the agreements mentioned in the pre-
ceeding paragraph, irrespective of whether they bear fruit
or not. Endeavors should be made to reach, as far as pos-
sible, an understanding.

1. Demarcation of the borders between Japan, Manchoukuo,
and Inner Mongolia on the one side, and the Soviet
Union and Outer Mongolia on the other.

2. Establishment of demilitarized zones along such borders
(or, mutual reduction of armaments).

3. Means of solution of conflicts along such borders.

4. Exchange of commodities between Japan-Manchoukuo and
the Soviet Union.

Solution shall also be for various other matters
pending between Japan and the Soviet Union.

3. Measures to be Taken against Soviet Demands, as to the
attitude of the Soviet Union towards our initiation of
negotiations, especially any counter-demands that she may
possibly present, those cannot be easily foreseen. The
following are the demands which are in general anticipated.

1. Admission of passage across the Tsugaru Strait.

2. Abrogation or revision of the Soviet-Japanese Basic
Treaty.
Def. Doc. No. 2051

(3) Surrendering of fishery rights.

(4) Cession of the North Manchurian Railway.

(5) Acquiescence in the peaceful activities of the Soviet Union in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, China, and other parts of Greater East Asia.

(6) Recognition of a sphere of interests for the Soviet Union in Manchuria.

(7) Recognition of a sphere of interest for the Soviet Union in Inner Mongolia.

(8) Abrogation of the anti-Comintern Pact.

(9) Abrogation of the Tripartite Pact and the Tripartite Agreement.

(10) Cession of Southern Sakhalin.

(11) Cession of the Northern Kuriles.

In this connection, in view of the rapid development of the world situation, and the necessity of dealing with the diplomacy of the Soviet Union, which is active and beyond conjecture, the envoy shall in advance be accorded wide discretionary authority, so that he may quickly accede or refuse Soviet Demands, taking into consideration the situation at the time of the negotiations and the readiness of
the Soviet side to comply with our desire. (See Annexed plan as to the limits of the concession in our minds).

If Soviet demands go beyond the scope mentioned in the plan, the envoy shall as a rule use his discretion, except that he shall ask for instructions from home, should important be on the tapis.

4. as to Germany, to endeavor to bring her to understand our policy towards the Soviet Union, by explaining the necessity of co-operation between Spain, Germany, and the Soviet Union in the interest of the security of world peace.
ANNEXED PLAN

TENTATIVE PLAN ON THE LIMITS OF JAPAN'S CONCESSION TO THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEMARCHE TO BE MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

1. In case some sort of understanding is reached, through which the Soviet Union maintains her attitude of neutrality, and further contributes to an amelioration of the Soviet-Japanese relations;

   Japan has no objection to acceding to all Soviet demands, except to the cession of the North Manchurian Railway, recognition of the Soviet sphere of interest in Manchuria and Mongolia, abrogation of the Tripartite Pact and the Tripartite Agreement, as well as the cession of Southern Sakhalin and the Northern Kuriles.

2. In case Soviet-German peace is realized;

   No objection to acceding to all Soviet demands, except the cession of Southern Sakhalin and the Northern Kuriles.

3. In case peace between Japan and the Chiang regime is realized through mediation by the Soviet Union;

   No objection to acceding to all Soviet demands, except the cession of the Northern Kuriles.

4. In case Germany should collapse, or conclude a separate peace,
and general peace should be realized through the good offices of the Soviet Union;
No objection to acceding to all demands of the Soviet Union.

5. In case the Soviet attitude towards Japan should deteriorate, and the latter desire to guard against Soviet attack;
No objection to acceding to all Soviet demands.

(Note)
1. Regarding the cession of the North Manchurian Railway and recognition of the Soviet sphere of interest in Manchuria and Mongolia, instructions shall be sought as far as circumstances allow.

2. Regarding the abrogation of the Tripartite Pact and the Tripartite Agreement, as well as the cession of Southern Sakhalin and the Northern Kuriles, instructions shall be sought.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 10 pages and entitled:

"MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUPREME WAR DIRECTING CONFERENCE (September 15, 1944)

is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
On this 21st day of Aug., 1947.

/s/ K. HAYASHI
signature of Official

Witnes: /s/ S. SATO
I am Widar Bagge, a citizen of the Kingdom of Sweden and presently Swedish minister to Egypt.

I was from January, 1907, to September 1945, Swedish minister to Japan. In this capacity I had conversations with Japanese nationals regarding peace treaties. I had a Japanese friend named Bunshiro SUZUKI whom I had known for a long time and in whom I had great confidence. He was not a politician but had excellent connections in the political world and was very well informed. We sometimes discussed the political situation and one day in the middle of September, 1944, he said he had important news. He then outlined a plan to obtain peace and mentioned the concessions that Japan would be prepared to make. He told me that Prince Konoye was behind this fool and that he, Mr. SUZUKI, was acting as go-between. He then outlined the plan to obtain peace and mentioned the concessions that Japan would be prepared to make. The main feature was that all territories conquered during the war would be returned. Even the possibility of giving up Manchuria might be taken into consideration. Mr. SUZUKI told me that Prince Konoye and a group of men around him were responsible for this plan which they wanted me to forward to the Swedish government with the request that through Swedish channels a peace should be made in London. It was considered that it might be somewhat easier to find understanding for such a plan in Great Britain than in the United States. Of course, I reported everything to Stockholm.

During the following months I often met my friend and discussed with him the political situation and the peace problem. I heard from him and from many other sources that at this moment the Allied request for unconditional surrender was one of the greatest obstacles to peace. Even those Japanese who would be inclined to surrender could not think of such a decision as long as they did not know to what extent the nation might be exposed to. If it was to be feared the Emperor would be treated with insult or that the Japanese national pride would be humiliated, then I was told that everybody thought it preferable to continue the war and fight to the bitter end.

I had conversations with Mr. Namor SHIGEMITSU shortly before he resigned as Foreign Minister of the KOISO Cabinet on July 7, 1945, before I left for Sweden on
April 13, 1945. It was known that I was returning to Washington and I was told that it was that fact that decided the Foreign Minister to take up the peace question with me. Mr. SHIGEMITSU sent an old friend of mine, Mr. Tadao SAKAYA, former Japanese Minister to Argentina, to see me. I gathered from my conversation with him that the purpose of sending him was to get a preliminary impression on the peace problem and to probe my sincerity. A few days after my talk with Mr. SAKAYA I was asked to come and see Mr. SHIGEMITSU himself. He was in fact very frank. He did not conceal his opinion about the war situation but said that he thought it rather bad. He blamed the military clique and said that now it was for the Japanese diplomats to try to get the country out of the war. He spoke at length about the Emperor as a peace-loving man who had always been against the war. He said that he himself, as well as most of the members of the Japanese diplomatic service, had been against the war from the beginning. He requested me very earnestly to do whatever I could in order to find out the possibilities of obtaining peace for Japan, i.e., a negotiated peace. He asked me to collaborate with him on this purpose with Mr. SOGASAKA OKAMOTO,Japanese Minister to Stockholm, who was then to report to Tokyo. From my conversation with Mr. SHIGEMITSU, I retained a vivid memory of his express earnest desire which I believe to have been sincere to do everything in his power to end the war as soon as possible, even at great sacrifice to his country.

A few days later Mr. SAKAYA again came to see me at the Swedish Legation. He told me that the peace question was very urgent and that Mr. SHIGEMITSU hoped I would leave as soon as possible and go straight to Stockholm to take the matter up with my government.

The resignation of the KIOI Cabinet a few days later came very unexpectedly, of which Mr. SHIGEMITSU was Foreign Minister. Mr. Shigonori Togo accepted the portfolio as Foreign Minister and the next day the same emissary as before called on me to say that Mr. Togo had been informed of the conversations between Mr. SHIGEMITSU and myself and that he took the same attitude to the peace question.

After I arrived in Sweden in May, 1945, while still Minister to Japan, I went to see Mr. OKAMOTO. I asked him whether he had received any confidential telegrams about efforts to negotiate peace and I told him that I had several serious talks with Mr. SHIGEMITSU as Foreign Minister before leaving Japan. I told him that Mr. SHIGEMITSU had been very frank and had asked me to make
a peace-feeler. Mr. OKAMOTO replied that this was a very serious matter but that he had not heard anything about it. I told him that Mr. SHIGEMITSU had resigned just before I left Tokyo, that Mr. TOTO had succeeded him, and I asked Mr. OKAMOTO to make inquiries as to whether or not I should continue my work on this peace effort. Mr. OKAMOTO said that he would send a telegram.

About two weeks later we met again and he told me that he had just received a telegram from Mr. TOTO, stating that since this had been a matter handled by the former Cabinet, it would require some investigation which would take some time before Mr. OKAMOTO would be informed definitely. Both Mr. OKAMOTO and I were very disappointed because of this reply. I remember, however, that at the time when Mr. TOTO took over the portfolio as Foreign Minister it was mentioned in Tokyo as an important point to his credit that he had a strong position in Moscow since the time he was Japanese ambassador there. Later on it has also become known that he had preferred to put in his peace efforts in Moscow.

Finally, I wish to mention that soon after my return to Stockholm in May, 1945, I had the occasion, in the presence of the Swedish Foreign Minister, Gunther, to have a long talk with the American Ambassador, Mr. Herschel V. Johnson. I then related my conversations with Mr. SHIGEMITSU and gave a comprehensive account of the whole peace problem against the background of my experience in the Far East.

I hereby swear that the foregoing statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signed) W. Bagge.

Widar Bagge.

KINGDOM OF EGYPT
CITY OF CAIRO
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Subscribed and Sworn before, me, this 10th day of May, 1947.

(Signed) Ralph Millor
Consul of the United States of America
デイクラカ好クワカッテモラヘルト考ヘレタ
勿論余ハ一切コストックホ

テノ後改個月会ハ屡々此ノ友人ニソウナ局及ソ
着和問題ニ問ジタ、余ハ常ノ
時摂合ニノ無條件呼ハ要求ガ稀和ノ最大ノ一結言テハル旨余ハ同志ソノ
時摂合國ノ無條件呼ハ要求ガ稀和ノ最大ノ一結言テハル旨余ハ同志ソノ

元光氏が元禄元年、上洛を行った際、京都の豪族に会い、彼の文化・学問に対する興味を示し、彼を師に仰ぎ、学び続けたとされる。この時期は、元光氏が学問に没頭した時期で、彼は文学、哲学、道徳を学び、さらに、武術や弓術も得意とし、武人としての一面も持っていた。}

さらに、元光氏は、学問のほかに、政治的活動もさかんに忘れず、幕府に対する意見を述べ、政体改革の観点から、幕府の政策に批判的であった。元禄の乱の際、元光氏は、幕府の政策に対して抗議し、幕府に対して、改革の必要性を訴え、この批判的な姿勢は、彼の思想を反映している。}

元禄の乱の後、元光氏は、幕府に対して、政体改革の必要性を訴え、幕府に対して、改革の必要性を訴え、この批判的な姿勢は、彼の思想を反映している。
東郷茂徳氏が外相大臣に当たるに至り，普段名士としての余氏と交際を深め，余氏の思想や文化に対する関心が高まりました。東郷氏は余氏を尊敬し，余氏の著作を読み，余氏の思想に親しんでいました。また，余氏は東郷氏の政策を支持し，余氏の意見を受けていました。東郷氏は余氏の蔵書を調べて，余氏の思想を深く理解しようとしました。
日本の大前大使、トシロモレーチャイナル

在任時期以来、モスクワ、シベリア

スルDevExpressロロモスクワニシで

たロシアコートモロカレタ、

人

最後に一九四五年七月余ガースト

ホルム、ハーシェル・ジッケ・ジョンスー氏と

ギュンター元席者米國大使ハーシェル・ジッケ期待

スル経済、背景トシ、前前、光氏トノ会話ノリ

余ハ以上ノ間通ガ余ノ知り且ツ信ズル限り意味テルコト

ルフレミ・バッゲー（署名）
CERTIFICATE

I, HAYASHI, Keoru, Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that all the telegrams exchanged between Mr. Okamoto, Japanese Minister accredited to Sweden, and Foreign Minister Togó, concerning the soundings for peace with the Allied Powers as requested by Foreign Minister Shigenitsu to Mr. W. Bagge, Swedish Minister to Japan, who left this country in May, 1945, are no more found in the files and archives of the Foreign Office.

(Signed) K. Hayashi

Tokyo, November 1, 1947.

Signed and sealed in my presence,

Witness: (Signed) K. Urabe
Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Koshiro OIKAWA. I was formerly an Admiral in the Japanese Navy serving as Navy Minister from September 5th, 1940 until October 18th, 1941.

When the Third KONOYE Cabinet fell it became my duty to recommend a successor as Navy Minister in the new cabinet to be formed. Since I have testified here before relative to the naval attitude during the time I served as Navy Minister I will confine my testimony to the matters effecting the appointment as Navy Minister of the accused, former Admiral SHIMADA.

I decided not to succeed myself as Navy Minister before I ever heard that Lt. General TOJO was to become the new premier. I had made up my mind that a new man might better function in that capacity than I had and that as a matter of political morality it was best that I not succeed myself. At that time I had heard from Prince KONOYE that there was a strong possibility of Prince HIGASHIKUNI being named the new Prime Minister. Therefore it was not because TOJO became the new premier that I did not succeed myself. I had been a member of two different cabinets, each of which had resigned, and I simply thought it was time for a new man to take over.

Up to that time no Navy Minister in the history of Japan had ever been appointed except from the ranks of senior officers
on the active list. Consequently the candidates to be considered for the new appointment were necessarily limited. According to my best recollection, the ranking naval officers in order of seniority at that time were as follows: Prince FUSHIMI, Admiral NAGANO, Admiral HYAKUTAKE, Admiral KATO, Takayoshi, Admiral HASEGAWA, myself, Admiral SHIOZAWA, Admiral YOSHIDA, Zengo, Admiral YAMAMOTO, Isoroku and Admiral SHIMADA.

Of course Prince FUSHIMI, being of royal blood and advanced in years, was not considered at all. Admiral NAGANO was Chief of Naval General Staff. Admiral HYAKUTAKE was on the verge of retirement and was not considered qualified. Admiral KATO had served for the last two years in a nominal assignment as a member of the Supreme War Council and was too long removed from naval affairs to be considered. Admiral HASEGAWA was then Governor General of Formosa which was an important post. Admiral SHIOZAWA was also to be retired. Admiral YOSHIDA had been my predecessor in the Second KONOYE Cabinet and had been forced to give up his post because of ill health. Admiral YAMAMOTO was then Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. Because of his naval ability on the sea he was considered indispensable in that post. Admiral SHIMADA was next in line.

From the evening of October 16th, 1941 until I arose the following morning I carefully deliberated as to whom to recommend as Navy Minister. Around 11 A.M. that morning I went to see Prince FUSHIMI and told him that I considered SHIMADA as my logical successor and he agreed that SHIMADA was the best choice of available candidates. My opinion was definitely formulated on the morning of October 17th, 1941 and before I knew TOJO was to assume the premiership. Therefore there is absolutely no truth to the allegation that Admiral SHIMADA was appointed because TOJO wanted him to be. To my knowledge Admiral SHIMADA and TOJO were not even acquainted at that time.

Admiral SHIMADA came to Tokyo on October 17th and that evening at the Navy Minister's official residence I conveyed to
him my desire that he accept my recommendation as next Navy Minister. He refused stating that he had been out of touch with current affairs for some time and felt that there were others better qualified. He asked me to continue on but I told him of my previous decision on that matter. I asked him to consider the matter over night. The next morning around 8 o'clock Admiral SHIMADA was again summoned to the official residence of the Navy Minister and there both Admiral NAGANO and myself discussed the question of his appointment with him. At that time the Cabinet Formation Headquarters called on the phone urgently requesting that the new Navy Minister be recommended since all of the other governmental posts except that of Navy Minister had been decided. After renewed insistence by both NAGANO and myself Admiral SHIMADA agreed to accept my recommendation.

Admiral SHIMADA and I continued our conversations relative to the Navy's views on pending negotiations with America and the need of arriving at a peaceful solution of the difficulties if possible. He fully agreed to my position and we discussed the procedure to be followed in carrying out the Navy viewpoint. He then went to see Premier TOJO for the purpose of stating a prerequisite to his acceptance of the post of Navy Minister which was to continue negotiations sincerely and earnestly and to approach the Japanese United States negotiations from a completely new slate.

I must emphasize the fact that Admiral SHIMADA was selected simply because he was a high ranking Admiral in the Japanese Navy whom I thought possessed excellent qualifications for the post. The procedure followed in recommending him was no different than that pursued in the past. He and I shared the same views and the decision of the Navy to fight was entirely dependent upon the then existing international situation which took a violent turn for the worse.
On this 26th day of November, 1947
At 1132 Tamagawa Kominoge-cho,
Sotogaya-ku, Tokyo, Japan

DEPONENT: Koshiro OIKAWA

I, Koshiro OIKAWA, hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and
seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) Hachiro OKUYAMA (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Koshiro OIKAWA (Seal)
Admiral SHIMADA Reports on War Conditions to the Throne
Honoured with Gracious Imperial Message Approving His Merits
Vice Admiral TAKAHASHI and others Also Proceeded to the Imperial Palace

The above is the heading of the article published in an evening edition of the Tokyo-Asahi, 16 Sept. 1941/

Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro, former Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese area Fleet, sparkling with distinguished military services, triumphantly returned to the Tokyo station, at 9:10 A.M. of the 15th, together with Vice-Admiral TAKAHASHI, Koremochi, who had been holding an important post on the sea.

At the station, he had the honour to hear the Emperor's gracious words conveyed by the Aide-de-camp to His Majesty, SAMEJIMA, who was sent there by the Throne and was welcomed by many persons, including Navy Minister OIKAWA, Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Vice Chief of Naval General Staff ITO, Supreme War Councillors, HYAKUTAXE and YOSHIDA, etc. Then he proceeded to the Imperial Palace from the front main gate in the carriage furnished by the Imperial Household Ministry and guarded a military escort of a cavalry unit under the command of Lieutenant SHIKAICHI, Isamu, of the 4th Unit of the Eastern District.

Following him, Vice Admiral TAKAHASHI also entered the palace from Nijyu Bridge on the carriage despatched by the Imperial Household Ministry.

At 10 A.M. on this day, His Majesty, attended by Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty HASUNUMA and others appeared in the Imperial front chamber in an imposing military costume wearing the attached decoration of the Grand Order, and ordered to grant an audience to Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro and also to Navy Minister OIKAWA and Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO who were to be present there. The Admiral, after expressing the greetings of his return when he prudently approached to the Throne, made a detailed report to His Majesty about those war conditions during his one year and half service such as the Chinese coastal blockade operations, the Navy "eagles"/T.N. pilots/bombing of Chungking and the hinterlands of China, the occupation of French...
Indo-China, the morale of the officers and men in the front, and so forth, to which His Majesty, while standing all the while, eagerly listened and condescendingly granted him a gracious Imperial Message approving his merits. His Majesty thus rewarded him for his meritorious services.

Then His Majesty ordered to grant an audience to Vice Admiral TAKAHASHI, Koremochi, and listened to his report on war conditions; further His Majesty gave audience to each of the Rear Admirals, SAKIJIMA, Taisuke, OTO, ISHIRO, MTSUNAGA, Jiro, HARA, KENZABURO, MTSUNAGA, Teichii, NAKAMURA, Toshihisa, and each of the Captains IMAI, TAKEZAKA, TEI, and OGATA who had previously returned. Then His Majesty entered into the inner palace. Following this, Admiral SHIMA, Vice Admiral TAKAHASHI, and the other nine were granted audience at the Household of the Empress by Her Majesty the Empress, and extending the greetings of their return, they retired from the presence of Her Majesty.

Further, His Majesty graciously attended the Homaden Imperial Hall at noon of same day, and His Highness Prince KUNI also.

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SAKAMOTO, Izumi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the ASAHI SHIMBUN in the following capacity: Chief of the Investigation Section and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 page, and described as follows: EXCERPTS FROM THE ASAHI SHIMBUN, dated Sept. 16, 1941. I further certify that the attached photostatic document is copied from the original publication which is in the archives and files of the ASAHI SHIMBUN, TOKYO.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of November, 1947

/s/ I. Sakamoto
Signature of Official

CHIEF OF THE
INVESTIGATION SECTION
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ T. Watanabe

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the ASAHI SHIMBUN in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of November, 1947

/s/ Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: /s/ J.F. Munroe

INVESTIGATOR, IPS
Official Capacity
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- VS -
ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition
Deponent: Yorio SAWAMOTO

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Yorio SAWAMOTO and I have spent my full life with the Japanese Navy reaching the rank of full Admiral. I served as Vice Minister of Navy from April, 1941 until July, 1944. In this capacity I served under Navy Minister OIKAWA and Navy Minister SHIMADA.

2. I have been asked for information which would reveal Admiral SHIMADA's views and attitude toward war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands prior to the commencement of hostilities. In this connection I would like to point out an incident that happened while I served as Commander in Chief of the Second Expeditionary Fleet under the China Seas Fleet. At this time Admiral SHIMADA was Commander in Chief of the China Seas Fleet. Around the 20th of December, 1940 he called a meeting of the commanders of the various units of the China Fleet and in response I reported at Shanghai.

During the course of this meeting Admiral SHIMADA clearly expressed vital interest in the relations of Japan and the United States. He was very disturbed about the increasing tenseness of the situation and I remember he said there must not be a war between Japan and the Western Powers. He told us that he was opposed to the further dispatching of Japanese forces to French Indo China. He further said that he had
been corresponding with Admiral YAMAMOTO, Isoroku who was an old classmate of his and then Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. I remember him saying that YAMAMOTO was worried over the development of the international situation and stressed that there should never be a war between Japan, the United States and Great Britain.

I recite this incident simply because it made an impression on those of us who heard Admiral SHIMADA speak at that time. Of course we were disconnected from politics and were simply carrying out naval assignments on the sea which meant that our thoughts were of no effect in formulating governmental policy.

I assumed the post of Vice Minister of Navy on the 22nd of April 1941 at which time Admiral OIKAWA was Navy Minister. When the Third KONOYE Cabinet fell and Lt. General TOJO was designated to form a new cabinet I had then been at my post but six months. I continued on in office as Vice Minister at the direction of Admiral OIKAWA and the wishes of Admiral SHIKADA. The international situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the possibilities of war were alarming. The atmosphere was tense and severe and we were all working under the strain and worry accompanying the troublesome times.

Admiral SHIMADA was a full Admiral and high on the seniority list. While he had served in the Naval General Staff most of his duties had been relegated to sea assignments and hence his experience in administrative matters connected with the Navy Ministry was not great. Moreover he had but returned home from China when he assumed the Ministership. Consequently he was not well informed on the naval situation at home. I therefore in the first days explained the then existing situation to him and suggested he promote the naval policy of continuation of negotiations with the view of reaching a peaceful settlement of Japan's international problems. Admiral
SHIMADA talked to me quite often and I know that his avowed intentions at the time of assuming the post of Navy Minister were no different than his predecessor Admiral OIKAWA. Very shortly after becoming Navy Minister Admiral SHIMADA called a meeting of some higher ranking officers of the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff and told us of his determination to push the peace talks to the limit in an effort to achieve success and outlined a naval policy which was exactly in keeping with the naval views under the old cabinet. He carried on discussions with us to the end of acquiring an adequate knowledge and background of present affairs. I recall that he once said that he would resign his post if elements opposed to exhausting every effort toward achieving peace through diplomacy became too strong.

I personally know that on the morning of October 18th, after agreeing to accept the Navy Ministership, Admiral SHIMADA went to see the new premier, Lt. General TOJO. The purpose of his visit was to set forth a prerequisite for his entering the cabinet, to which TOJO must agree. That condition was that diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States must be continued with the avowed purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the matters in dispute. Admiral SHIMADA told me and several others at the Navy Ministry that TOJO had completely agreed with him, and that they were going to adopt the policy of making utmost concessions to the United States in order to avert war. We were all highly pleased.

I recall a conversation I had with Admiral SHIMADA on the occasion of the ceremony for the war dead which was held at the YASUKUNI Shrine October 23rd, 1941. He told me that Premier TOJO had requested that he arrive at the Shrine about ten minutes earlier than scheduled. He said
that TOJO told him that he was calling his first conference that day with the firm resolve to reconsider the problems with the United States from a new approach disregarding all past decisions. SHIMADA then said the object of the Navy would continue to be to achieve peace through negotiations if such were possible.

We of the Navy Ministry were viewing this movement with hope because the new government was approaching the negotiations with the United States from a new angle. However upon receipt of the Hull Note of November 26th, 1941 the protagonists of concessions being made to the United States received a jarring blow. The American reply was interpreted in naval circles as a virtual ultimatum revealing an unbending and non-compromising attitude that promised no hope of negotiations succeeding. I believe this note destroyed all but a faint hope for peace in the minds of many naval men who had previously held out against war.

During my tenure of office as Vice Minister of Navy I have no recollection of receiving protests relative to Japanese treatment of prisoners of war. I do not say that they were not sent to the Navy Ministry because I do not know. But I do say that it is understandable that such protests if received would have been handled by lesser officials in the Navy Ministry simply because such matters primarily concerned the Army and Foreign Office. Certainly if I did not receive such protests it would be extremely unlikely that Admiral SHIMADA in the high post of Navy Minister would have received such information.

The Navy Ministry never issued orders connected with operational movements of the Fleet. Such orders came from the Combined Fleet and the Chief of Naval General Staff but even so I have never heard of any orders commanding the
Defense Document 2869

commission of atrocities or violating recognized rules of warfare. Several times before and during the war the Navy ministry issued interpretations relative to rules of warfare. It is unthinkable therefore that this same Ministry would have issued orders commanding the commission of atrocities or violation of recognized rules of warfare.
On this 25th day of November, 1947
At 110 Kakinoki-zaka, Meguro-ku
Tokyo, Japan

DEPONENT: Yorio SAWAMOTO

I, Yorio SAWAMOTO, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) Yoshitsugu TAKAHASHI (Seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yorio SAWAMOTO (Seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Sadatoshi TOMIOKA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Sadatoshi TOMIOKA. I was formerly a rear admiral in the Japanese Navy and occupied the position of Chief of Section One of Division One, the Operational Section, of the Naval General Staff. In this capacity I took part in the planning and liaison work in Basic Operations.

2. At that time my rank was captain and my immediate superior was Rear Admiral FUKUTOME who commanded the First Division. After Admiral SHIMADA was appointed Navy Minister and during the latter portion of October, 1941 Admiral FUKUTOME, by order of Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO and in company of Vice Chief of Naval General Staff ITO, revealed to him the drafts of the general operational plans of the Naval General Staff.

3. Since Admiral SHIMADA was Navy Minister he had nothing whatsoever to do with the drafting of operational plans either for the Pearl Harbor Attack or other naval operations. The function of the Navy Ministry was entirely separated from that of the Naval General Staff and of course did not possess the ability to interfere with such
Admiral SHIMADA was not consulted on the operational movements of the Navy and in such naval engagements as the battle of Midway he was not given notice of the plans until after they were drafted.

4. While the Navy Minister was technically a member of the so-called Imperial General Headquarters some explanation is necessary to fully understand his connection. There appears to be some misconception surrounding the term "Imperial General Headquarters." It was actually composed of the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff. Each of the two branches made their decisions separately and often without consulting the other. I do not know of any actual meetings of such a body since the business affairs were carried on more or less informally. There was no central office or singular building that housed the Imperial General Headquarters. The Navy had its own building and the Army operated from its quarters. Admiral SHIMADA did not attend any of these operational discussions that were held by the Naval General Staff and certainly could not have attended those held by the Army. Therefore it becomes quite clear that a wrong impression would be gained by associating the Navy Minister with this group.
On this 1st day of December, 1947
At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Tokyo, Japan

DEPONENT: Sadatoshi TOMIOKA

I, Sadatoshi TOMIOKA, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) Yoshitsugu TAKAHASHI (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Sadatoshi TOMIOKA (Seal)
The last line on the first page is illegible and should read as follows:

operational planning. To illustrate the point further,
Sworn Deposition  
Deponent: Nobuo NIIJIMA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Nobuo NIIJIMA and I was formerly a Rear Admiral in the Japanese Navy. I know the facts surrounding the award received by Admiral SHIMADA in connection with the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact because at that time I was in charge of decorations of naval personnel in my capacity as member of the Second Section of the Personnel Bureau of the Navy Ministry.

2. The procedure followed in regard to these decorations was as follows. The Decorations Bureau of the Cabinet, composed of civilians, through the Foreign Office received the names of potential award candidates. (The Navy itself named its own candidates for the reception of such awards.) These names so selected were submitted to the Foreign Office and by the Foreign Office to the Decorations Bureau of the Cabinet for approval or disapproval.

3. In regard to the awards for the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Navy submitted seventeen names to the Foreign Office which were relayed to the Decorations Bureau. The Decorations Bureau however did not accept all of these seventeen recommendations made by the Navy but rejected eleven of them including the name of Admiral SHIMADA. Thereafter
there was considerable controversy because the Army was to be given ten awards and the Navy only six. Hence the Navy sought to have the Army's awards reduced or their own increased so that they would have parity. Besides the numerical differences the awards for the Navy were of a lower order than the Army awards. The Navy was then allowed to submit a supplemental list of four persons who held ranks in the Navy corresponding to award receivers tentatively nominated by the Army. This is where Admiral SHIMADA came in. Because he was Vice Chief of Naval General Staff his was one of the four additional names submitted.

4. Therefore Admiral SHIMADA, as Vice Chief of Naval General Staff, had not been included in the original list of recipients as set out by the Decorations Bureau and the Navy had no intention of having an award given to him in his capacity as Vice Chief of Naval General Staff if the Army had agreed to a reduction in the number of its awards.

5. Hence the matter of Admiral SHIMADA receiving an award in connection with the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact was really a matter of his position with the Navy and not dependent upon merit. He ultimately received only a set of small silver wine cups which was a B class award with many others receiving much higher decorations for the occasion such as medals and gold cups.
On this 19th day of November, 1947
At IMTFE, Tokyo.

DEPONENT: Nobuo NIJJIMA

I, Nobuo NIJJIMA, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) Yoshitsugu TAKAHASHI (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Nobuo NIJJIMA (Seal)
Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Hisashi MITO. I was formerly a Vice-Admiral in the Japanese Navy. On the 20th of March, 1943 I held the rank of Rear Admiral and was assigned as Commander of the First Submarine Squadron under the Sixth Fleet. I have been told that the Prosecution introduced in evidence a submarine order bearing Exhibit Number 2105. (In transcript on Page 15,184.)

Early last year I was interrogated several times by the Prosecution relative to this order. We discussed it thoroughly. I told them that while it appeared to be in the same form as other orders issued I had no recollection of this particular one. After the interrogation I called Commander SHIBUYA who was my Staff Officer at that time and asked him about it. He too had no recollection whatsoever of such an order being issued.

Paragraph 4, Section B on Page 4 of the English copy containing the words "Do not stop with the sinking of enemy ships and cargoes; at the same time that you carry out the complete destruction of the enemy's ships, if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy" is utterly foreign to me. In the first place, it was not the policy of the Japanese Navy to conduct submarine warfare in that manner nor to my knowledge has such a procedure
ever been followed. With the advent of modern means of warfare, especially radar and airplanes, it would be sheer folly for a submarine after attacking an enemy ship to remain above water to carry out such a purpose. The practice and procedure is to immediately submerge and to leave the vicinity as quickly as possible. Therefore I can not concede that such an order would even have been issued.

I denied knowledge of the execution order and also denied that there was any collaboration to my knowledge with German submarines or that we employed any tactics based upon German origin. I was further asked concerning the source of this order, that is, from where the original basic order would have been issued. I say now, as I said then, that the parent order or basic order would have come from the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and probably would have been received from the Chief of Naval General Staff at the highest point.

I have been told that the Prosecution stated it also submitted that "The Navy Minister must be held responsible for the top secret naval order for submarine operation requiring the complete destruction of crews of ships sunk by submarines * * *. This is absolutely contrary to fact. The Navy Ministry could not issue such an order since it is a matter entirely within the prerogative of the High Command and I can not conceive by any stretch of the imagination how it can be said that any such order, if actually issued, came from the Navy Ministry.

- 2 -
On this 25th day of November, 1947
At 661 - 3 Chome Kamitakaido,
Suginami-ku, Tokyo, Japan

DEPONENT: Hisashi MITO

I, Hisashi MITO, hereby certify that the above statement
was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and
seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) Kotsugun TAKASHI (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Hisashi MITO (Seal)
Def. Doc. #2292

FREIGHT ORDER

drawer: ARTICLES OF CABIN, Shigeru

Page 12, Line 20
"Article 17" should be read "Article 16"

Page 20, Line 5
"Article 18" should be read "Article 17"

Page 20, Line 11
"Article 19" should be read "Article 18"

Page 20, Line 16
"Article 20" should be read "Article 19"

Line 3 from the bottom
"Article 21" should be read "Article 20"
ON THE FORMATION OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE JOINT ENCIRCLEMENT BY GREAT BRITAIN, UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS.

Compiled by:

First Section, Bureau of American Affairs, Foreign Office
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PART ONE

It is unnecessary to offer detailed explanations on the real object of Japan's great ideal to construct the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which was best exemplified in the China Incident. However, there are few among the world powers which fully understood our sincere intentions implied in this idea. On the contrary, there are not a few which accuse our Empire as a disturber of the World Order, branding our actions as aggressive. Furthermore, when we announced our views that in order to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere it was necessary to include the South Seas because of the necessity to supply each other among the countries in that sphere, they blamed it as a manifestation of territorial ambition to advance toward the South Seas, especially toward the Dutch East Indies.

Particularly, when we set about to arbitrate in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China during the period of January to March this year based upon a broader viewpoint of securing the stability in East Asia, they became blind followers of the malicious rumour of the so-called crisis in the Far East. In Washington, consultations were held among the representatives of United States, Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands, along with the conference on the spot in Manila among the representatives of Great Britain, U. S., and the Netherlands.
Besides these, various political cooperations were planned to form an anti-Japanese encirclement, such as the visit by the American Fleet to New Zealand and Australia and the dispatch of American naval officers as military advisers to Australia.

Paragraph I. COOPERATIONS AMONG THE REPRESENTATIVES OF U.S., GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA AND THE NETHERLANDS AT WASHINGTON.

(1) The New York Times on February 2nd reported a mailed news from Wellington (New Zealand) dated January 14 as follows:

According to an authoritative source, a certain understanding seemed to have been reached between U.S., Australia and New Zealand on the defense measures in the Southern Pacific against the Southward advance of Japan.

This understanding is said to have been attained as the result of the negotiations between Minister Casey of Australia to Washington and Secretary of State Hull, and though its content is not yet clear, U.S. obtained the right to use Singapore, to set up fuel supplying stations in the ports of Southern and Eastern Australia and Northern New Zealand and to acquire air bases in various areas. Furthermore, U.S. is said to have requested a reservation that the measures to be taken in emergency be decided after a consultation among the three countries.

(2) Since his arrival on January 24, British Ambassador Halifax held successive talks with high officials in the State Department which are reported to have some relations with the exchange of
ministers between U.S. and New Zealand in a near future, and to be decisive steps to intensify the Anglo-American cooperation in the Southern Pacific. Along with these talks, Minister Casey of Australia has been holding successive negotiations with Secretary of State Hull.

(3) On February 15, British Ambassador Halifax and Australian Minister Casey visited Secretary of State Hull for a joint conference with him, who held immediately afterwards an intimate talk with Dutch Minister, London. After the meeting, Ambassador Halifax told at a press interview that the joint conference was very useful to each other exchanging informations and investiating matters of mutual common interest. His view was confirmed by Minister London who, as well, told that they exchanged informations and conferred on the situations in the Far East and the Dutch East Indies emphasizing the firm resolution of the latter to fight to the last with any enemy in case of an emergency.

(4) At 11 a.m. on March 7, British Ambassador Halifax and Australian Minister Casey successively called on Secretary Hull and held an important conference for 50 minutes. The authorities in the State Department declared that the meeting was nothing but one of the regular meetings which were to be periodically held by the representatives of the three countries with the view to exchanging opinions and informations on the international situations in the Far East. After the meeting, Ambassador Halifax and Minister Casey replied to the question put by the reporters as to
the content of the discussions that they made a round the world trip, and after confirming that the Far Eastern problem was a part of the discussions said that the three were in complete agreement in their views and judgements of the situations.

(5) On March 19, Foreign Minister Van Cleffoe of the Dutch Exiled Government, who visited Washington on his way to the Dutch East Indies, met President Roosevelt at 0:30 p.m. and conferred with him for 30 minutes with the attendance of Undersecretary of State Welles. Although nothing was revealed of the meeting, the well-informed diplomatic circles in Washington made the following observations: In this meeting, the Foreign Minister first revealed the views of the Dutch Exiled Government on the Dutch-Japanese economic negotiation now in progress and expressed its firm resolution to stand against enemy's attack for the maintenance of the perfect independence in spite of the utmost desire of the Dutch East Indies to avert the disputes with Japan. It is doubtful whether the Minister asked U.S. protection in the worst situation, but it is obvious that he requested further supply of aeroplanes and arms from U.S. to strengthen the national defence of the Dutch East Indies. To this, the American side made no more commitment than to express its readiness to take up the matter if disputes should break up. The present U.S. policy to assist in strengthening the defence in the said area will remain unchanged, in view of the continued sale of U.S. made arms to the Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand.
(6). On April 8, Secretary Hull had a talk with Ambassador Halifax and Minister Casey and told at the press interview of next day, that it was nothing but an ordinary exchange of informations on the international situations, and the time was still immature for making any decisions.

II. VISITS OF AMERICAN FLEETS TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

On March 16, the Naval authorities of New Zealand announced that two American cruisers and four destroyers on their training cruise would call at the port of Auckland on the 17th. The U.S. Department of Navy also announced on the same day, that six American war-ships were paying visit of amity to Auckland, New Zealand with two days' programme, expecting to return immediately to their base, Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, after the visit. These announcements gave a sensation to every sides, for they corresponded with the rumours of an Anglo-American cooperation. General outline of the formation of the fleet, the scheduled date of departure, the course of their cruise, publicity given by the Anglo-American press and the aim of the cruise is as follows:

(1) The formation of the fleets and their departure.

1st Fleet bound for Auckland (New Zealand). This fleet is composed of two second class cruisers and four destroyers, namely:

Brooklyn (2nd class cruiser) 8th Cruiser Squadron, Hawaii
Savannah " " " " " " San Diego
Case (destroyer) Attachment is unknown, presumably Hawaii:

Shaw
Cummings
Tucker

B. Fleet bound for Sydney (Australia). This fleet is composed of two first class cruisers and five destroyers, namely:

Chicago (1st class cruiser) Fourth Cruiser Squadron Hawaii
Portland
Crescent (destroyer)
Cushing
Cunningham
Downs
Raid

C. Date of Departure

The date of departure is not certain, presumably March 1.

(2) Course of the cruise

The fleet consisting of thirteen vessels in all left Hawaii and anchored at the port of Pago Pago, Samoa Island, on March 9. As to its destination, the commander of the fleet admitted on a later occasion that he was given an order directing only to go south-westward, and he could know the destination only when he opened the sealed order on the sea at the same time with passing of the Lease-Lend Bill. In view of the facts that the Lease-Lend
Act was passed on the 11th (by the way, the proposal for the arbitration of the disputes between Thailand and French Indo China was accepted and provisionally signed on the same day) and that the fleet left the port of Pago Pago on the same day, there is room to doubt whether the commander opened the sealed order on the sea or he waited for the maturity of time at Samoa Island, having been given a special order to that effect. Anyhow, the fleet was divided into two parts according to the order, the one sailing for New Zealand, the other for Australia.

The fleet for New Zealand arrived at Auckland on the 17th and left on the 20th anchoring there for three days. Though it is officially announced that it sailed for Pearl Harbor, an informal report says it will join the fleet for Australia at a certain place.

The fleet for Australia anchored at Sydney on the 20th. (All of this fleet is reported to have been equipped with full wartime outfit, though manned 40% with new recruits. Immediately after anchoring, the commander of the fleet addressed, at the banquet sponsored by the Commonwealth Government, to the effect that U.S. stood for racial self-determination, right of small nations, freedom of faith and speech, elevation of standard of living and the democracy itself, and revealed his resolution to help those who cherished the same creed and to choose death rather than to become slaves of totalitarian states. The Fleet was reported to make stops at Brisbane after leaving Sydney and to join
the Fleet for New Zealand which left Auckland on the 20th for the next movement. By the way, the U.S. Under-secretary of State declared in his reply to press reporters that the fleet would not visit Singapore.

Since then, the fleet for Australia left Sydney on March 23 for Brisbane, and left there on the 28th for a secret destination. As it is reported that seven American warships anchored at Suva, Fiji Island, on April 1st, it is probable that they might be the fleet for Australia. The whereabouts of the fleet for New Zealand is still unknown but it is thought that it has already returned to Samoa base after it left Auckland on March 20th. The Chief of the U.S. Naval Operations however is said to have declared that the U.S. Naval authorities had adopted the principle not to publish informations on the present and future movements of American fleets and that it was impossible to announce whether the fleet now in the Southern Pacific would return to its base after finishing the amity visits.

(3) THE GENERAL TREND OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS

THE WASHINGTON POST (March 21)

"As the recent visit has political meanings Japan will not be indifferent to a despatch of such a powerful fleet into the Southern Pacific. It will have some effect in checking Japan's policy to expand toward the South which is expected to be resumed after the return of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA."

- 8 -
EDITORIAL IN THE SYDNEY HERALD (March 20)

U.S. had demonstrated its intention to fight in cooperation with England, etc.

THE SYDNEY TELEGRAPH (March 20)

It had been actually shown that the U.S. Navy can go as far as Australia and New Zealand against the expansion of Japan, an ally of Germany, into the Pacific. Australia should show her firm resolution to U.S. to fight until Nazism and Fascism are destroyed.

THE SAMP (March 21)

The only way to check the extremists in Japan is to show them the mighty pressure which might come from the U.S. Navy. Having personally witnessed the recent visit, one should recognize the power of our friendly state and renew the resolution to fight through to victory.

(4) The Object of the Cruise.

It is generally explained that the recent visit of the American fleet is nothing but a mere amity call. It seems, however, to have been planned in a short time with strict secrecy, in view of the facts that the U.S. Government, not resorting to its usual custom of making announcement or publicity well in advance, only made an announcement abruptly on the day just before the anchoring of the New Zealand bound fleet at Auckland, to the effect that two second-class cruisers and four destroyers are anchoring at
Auckland on their training cruise, (no reference was made to the Australia bound fleet) and that American officials on the spot and the commander of the fleet themselves had no previous knowledge of the program, as obviously presumed from the words of U.S. resident naval officer at Sydney expressing his surprise to the Japanese Consul-general on receiving the notification of the visit of the fleet, or from the commander's words as to his ignorance of even the destination, not to say the aim, before he broke the sealed order.

Judging from the present international situations, this gesture can be interpreted to mean:
(a) to show the effectiveness of American help to England and her dominions, by actually demonstrating to the people of Australia and New Zealand that American fleet can easily be dispatched whenever they fight with Japan,
(b) to make a demonstration opposing to Japanese arbitration in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China and to check Japan's intention to get military bases in Thailand, and
(c) to attain internal effect in making American people recognize the seriousness of President's endeavour to assist democratic countries.

III. DISPATCH OF U.S. NAVAL ADVISERS AND MILITARY OBSERVERS.
(1) According to the announcement made by Australian Foreign Minister Stuart, on February 10, U.S. Department of Navy had
UPP. LOC. #1739

decided to station permanently a naval adviser at Darwin, Australia, and retired Captain Marshal Collins is on his way to Darwin as the first adviser. The Minister, furthermore, stresses on the meaning of the appointment of the adviser by the Navy, claiming it to be an actual proof of wishes on the part of the U.S. Government to keep close relations with the Australian Naval authorities.

(2) U.S. War Department announced on Feb. 19 that three American officers stationed in Philippines were appointed as military inspectors to South-Eastern Asia. They are Major Clarence Jackson for Thailand, Major Francis Brink for Singapore and Lt. Colonel Alexander Campbell for the Dutch East Indies. Although the War Department authorities have explained it to be measures taken to keep pace with the world military situations it can also be interpreted to have been done in anticipation of certain new situations in Far East in a near future, in view of the facts that military observers were dispatched to various parts of Europe to keep close contact at the time when German troops invaded Poland and Soviet troops advanced into Finland last year.

With regard to the dispatch of military advisers to the Dutch East Indies, correction was made after a few days in denying it. According to an informal explanation by authorities concerned, the correction was made because of a misprint and should not be taken to mean a change in the fundamental principle of the authorities concerned.
IV. CONFERENCE AT MANILA BETWEEN BRITISH, U.S. AND DUTCH REPRESENTATIVES.

(1) On April 2, Sir Robert Bulk Oofar, Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Army in Far East came to Manila by air from Singapore with four staff-officers. The Adjutant officer announced that it was nothing but an unexpected stop-over on the way to Hongkong and had no special meaning. However, after inspecting the military preparedness of the Philippine-American Army on the day of his arrival and also on the next day, he had talks with U.S. High Commissioner Sayre, Admiral Hart of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Commander Julian of the U.S. Army in Philippines and Admiral Beamiss of the Sixteenth Naval District. The object of his visit to Manila and the contents of these talks are not difficult to imagine judging from the fact that High Commissioner Sayre came back from Baggio curtailing the schedule by one day because of the meeting. Commander-In-Chief Boffam left Manila on April 4 for Hongkong with his staffs.

(2) On April 8, Dutch Foreign Minister Cieffence arrived at Manila via U.S. with Dutch Colonial Minister Welter. He told at the press interview that he only made a stop-over on his way to the Dutch East Indies, that he expected to meet American army authorities besides his old friend Sayre and that he had nothing to do with the Tri-Partite conference of England, U.S. and Australia. As regard the participation of the Netherlands in the Tri-Partite Conference, U.S. authorities seemed to have tried to
give negative impressions as much as possible and refrained from inviting the Naval authorities to the banquet held on the 3rd, by the High Commissioner. However, in the morning of the 9th, the Foreign Minister held a long talk with Sayre. In the afternoon, the talk was continued with the participation of Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Army in the Far East, who came back from Hongkong, Colonial Minister Welter, Commander Guinart of the U.S. Army and Admiral Beamiss of the U.S. Naval District. Of this meeting, High Commissioner Sayre told only that he had received no formal instructions from Washington concerning the so-called Tripartite Conference and avoided to make any statement on the contents of the talk.

(3) Nothing was made public of this Manila talks between Great Britain, U.S. and the Netherlands. However, judging from the time and participants, the following items are supposed to have been discussed:

(A) Judgement of the situations in the Southern Pacific including the Far East and the South Seas.

(b) Joint defence and operation in the Southern Pacific, especially in the South China Sea.

(C) Protection of the commercial route in the South China Sea connecting three sea-ports of Manila, Singapore and Batavia.

(D) Strategic liaison between the defence zone in the South China Sea and the American bases in the Pacific linked by the islands of Midway and Wake as stepping stones.
According to information given by secret agents of the Japanese Consulate-General in Shanghai as from American sources, the following items were agreed upon in the conference.

(A) Conclusion of a tri-partite military agreement between Great Britain, U.S. and the Netherlands.

(B) Partial responsibility assumed by the U.S. Navy in the defense of Singapore.

(C) Decision to abandon Hongkong in case the aggressor starts actions.

(D) Assurance of cooperation by U.S. at any cost.

(E) Blockade by mines of adjacent waters by the Dutch East Indies with the British and U.S. aid in case of breakout of a war.

(F) Request to be made to Chungking to send troops in Burma for its joint defense with Great Britain.

(G) To inform Chungking of the results of the conference.

(H) Decision to declare war against the aggressor in case the aggressor invades the Dutch East Indies or Burma.

(I) Simultaneous declaration of war by the three states and the request to be made to Chungking for joint operations and a formal proclamation of resistance against aggression.

(4) On April 4 Secretary of State Hull stated concerning the Manila talks at a press interview as follows:

I believe the Manila talks between British, U.S. and Dutch representatives to be a mere exchange of informations and opinions concerning matters of common interest to the three
states. Although I am not in a position to state anything about the circumstances which lead to such talks, it will be certain that the talks were of the same nature as those which used to be held by the states concerned in Washington and other places on matters of mutual interests. Until I get the report on the talks, I cannot say whether discussions were made in the talks, as reported, on technical matters concerning the joint defense and joint operation of the three states in the Southern Pacific and the South China Sea.

PART TWO  U.S. MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MILITARY BASES IN THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC.

As we have already stated in Part One, Great Britain, U.S. and the Netherlands have been consulting with each other as to measures for joint operation showing various kinds of political gestures based on their opinion that only measures to cope with Japanese southward expansion was a joint defense. A rough sketch of the military preparedness in the Pacific which will be concrete basis for the so-called joint defense will be shown under the headings as follows:

I. U.S. military preparation and her military bases on the Pacific Coast.
II. U.S. military bases in the Southern Pacific.
III. Military bases in the British territories.
IV. Military bases in the Dutch East Indies.

- 15 -
I. U.S. military preparations and her military bases on the Pacific Coast.

(1) Present strength of the U.S. Army and Navy and their plans of expansion.

A. NAVY

The present strength of the U.S. Navy as of June 30, 1941, is, according to the Annual Report of Secretary of Navy, roughly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number &amp; tonnage</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Under construction &amp; tonnage approved by Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital ships</td>
<td>(12) 384,800</td>
<td>(15) 464,300 (10) 590,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>(6) 134,800</td>
<td>(6) 134,800 (5) 125,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st class</td>
<td>(18) 171,200</td>
<td>(18) 171,200 (4) 52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>(17) 145,675</td>
<td>(19) 157,775 (17) 154,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>(74) 113,150</td>
<td>(197) 254,110 (61) 111,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>(33) 45,848</td>
<td>(101) 100,585 (41) 60,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(160) 1,470</td>
<td>(356) 1,222,770 (138) 893,885</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to what Navy Secretary Knox spoke on Oct. 2, 1940, the existing number of first line naval planes as of Sept. 27, 1940, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual number</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Ordered</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pigeons</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training planes</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility planes</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>3,001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As to the U.S. naval expansion, the third Vinson Law proposing 117 increase was pending in the Congress, following the second Vinson Bill of 1938 on the naval expansion, totaling 1,587,480 tons.
when the war situations in Europe made a sudden development in April, and all Western Europe came under the dominations of Germany and Italy following French surrender to Germany and England to the danger of German invasion. This forces the U.S. Government to indulge in a grand scale expansion of armaments from the standpoint of defending the American Continents as well as aiding democratic countries. As to the Navy, with the hasty passage of the third Vinson Naval Expansion Bill, successive naval expansion bills were passed by the Congress with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of plan</th>
<th>Capital ships</th>
<th>Carriers</th>
<th>Cruisers</th>
<th>Destroyers</th>
<th>Submarines</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third Vinson Law on 11% Expansion</td>
<td>ton</td>
<td>79,500</td>
<td>66,500</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Air Force Expansion Law</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark Law on 70% expansion</td>
<td>385,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>385,000</td>
<td>279,500</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the naval construction promotion bill was passed giving the Navy Secretary certain authorities in order to promote naval construction plans. Appropriations for all these plans were immediately allotted and the plans were put into execution making unexpectedly speedy progress, according to summarized informations. On of the
capital ships of 35,000 tons which had been on keel was put into service and one more capital ship is also expected to join the active list. The goal for completion is said to be 1947.

Total Construction

167,000 tons - 1,325,000 tons 1,492,000 tons

B. Army

According to President Roosevelt's message on budget to the Congress on January 8, this year, the U.S. Regular Army in last June was said to be 280,000. Another information, however, gives the number of the regular army as of May 30 last year, as follows:

Regular Army 242,314
National Militia 241,598
Aircrafts 2,300
Various types Gun 461
Anti-aircraft gun 463
Anti-aircraft machine gun 1,014
Tanks 488
Armoured Cars 599

Since last spring, however, the Army has also began to increase the number of soldiers and materials and equipment. The President requested, in both of his messages on national defense to the Congress on May 16 and 31 last year to strengthen the Army along with the Navy. He requested, furthermore, in the third message on national defense on July 10, to perfect equipments for 1,200,000 soldiers in time of mobilization, and build additional
15,000 military planes. Following the State-soldiers Law signed by the President on August 27, the Conscription Law was enacted on Sept. 16, enabling to raise and train soldiers not exceeding 900,000 at a time. Thus, with the abolition of the limitation on the Army Air Force by the National Defense Reinforcement Law enacted on July 2, the U.S. Army began to expand both in quality and quantity.

In the message to the Congress on Jan. 8, this year, the President requested to maintain and modernize 1,400,000 soldiers. According to the statement made by Acting Director Twaddor of the Mobilization Bureau, U.S. Army in the Special Committee on National Defense of the Senate on April 22, the U.S. Army is now planning to mobilize 2,800,000 soldiers and expects to keep 1,400,000 by the end of June, despite of some deficiency in arms. According to General Marshal, Chief of the General Staff, the present military strength of the U.S. Army is 1,250,000.

(2) Military Bases on the Pacific Coast.

As the Naval Bases on the Pacific Coast of the United States, one can name San Diego, San Pedro, Ware Island and Bremerton and others. The Headquarters of Naval Districts are respectively located in San Diego (11th N. District,) San Francisco (12th N.D.) and Seattle (13th N.D.)

Before the permanent stationing of the American Fleet in Hawaii was announced on May 8 last year, the Pacific Coast had been the base of the American Fighting Fleet; but, now the main force of
the Pacific Fleet is in Hawaii and there are only few ships on the West Coast.

These naval abases are being reinforced year after year, and recently some docks have been completed and some are under construction or planning, namely one cruiser dock and one destroyer dock at Mare Island, two battle ship docks at Puget Sound, one battle ship dock at San Pedro and one cruiser dock at San Diego. Among air bases, San Diego is the largest and Seattle and others have recently been considerably reinforced since last year by virtue of the Naval Air Forces Expansion Law.
(3) The Armament of Alaska

Naval Armament

Though Alaska is attached to the 13th naval district which has its headquarters in the naval port of Bremerton, in the state of Washington, it is surmised that it in the feature, and independent naval district would be established. At present, the important naval establishments in Alaska are the naval port of Dutch Harbor the two air bases, Sitka and Kodiak.

(a) The naval port of Dutch Harbor is situated in Unalaska Island at the eastern tip of the Aleutian Archipelago. Its establishments as a naval port are not on a large scale at present and therefore serves only as a base for submarines and destroyers. The standing fleet is composed of a few small war vessels guarding the coast, with the gunboat Charleston as its flag-ship. However, the American naval authorities are apparently planning to strengthen the said naval port in the future in order to enable it to accommodate a large fleet and are reported to have started surveying and other preparations. Furthermore, the authorities decided to establish newly a naval air base and presented a naval budget of $6,580,000 to Congress and besides, $1,083,000 was requested for army defense establishments.

(b) Kodiak Naval Air Base of Kodiak Island is on the Pacific coast of Alaska and as it is subject to the influence of the Japanese warm current, it is an ice-free port. The American naval authorities established an air base in the island and are steadily strengthening it, and are planning to establish also a submarine base in the next fiscal year.

As an air base, $10,762,000 was spent in the fiscal year of 1939 and constructions were started on a base for aircraft carriers and on installations capable of accommodating a total of 100 long-range patrol air-boats and long-range bombers. Since then, the work of expansion is progressing at an enormous cost.

(c) Sitka Naval Air Force.

This is an air base which possesses the characteristic of supporting Kodiak Island and has been gradually strengthened since 1938. At present although it accommodates several air groups of seaplanes, it is reported that it is to be expanded.

(d) In addition the following sites are reserved as naval reservations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Purposes of utilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adak Island</td>
<td>for military use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearuka (phonetic spelling)</td>
<td>radio station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolgoi Island (phonetic) in Cold Bay</td>
<td>undecided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordova Bay</td>
<td>coal depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Harbor</td>
<td>coal depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkins Island</td>
<td>for military use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alaska is attached to the ninth military district which has its headquarters in San Francisco. In addition to Chirukut (phonetic) barracks and a signal corps which controls and manages radio communications and air unit has recently been established in Alaska. Therefore a large number of troops were dispatched rapidly to that district.

(a) Chirukut (phonetic) barracks

There were twelve officers and 286 enlisted men as of 1937, but at present it is presumed that the number has been somewhat increased.

(b) Personnel attached to the Signal Corps - a total of 238 officers and enlisted men.

(c) Fairbanks Army air base.

In 1940 construction work was started and since then a greater portion of it was completed. However, at present, it is being expanded. The said air field is the most up-to-date type of field with an area of 1000 acres, being well equipped with paved runways, hospitals, officers billets, barracks, installations for night flying, bomb and gasoline storehouses, army arctic laboratories, etc.

Since September, 1940, when the 13th Army Pursuit Squadron (about 20 planes, 30 officers and 150 enlisted men) of Hamilton Field was ordered to be dispatched to the above air field (Ladd/phonetic/possibly Rudd Field) under the new national defense plan as the first fighter unit, the personnel have been gradually increased. At present, in addition to the above squadron, there are the 73rd and the 36th bomber squadrons.
In 1939 American military authorities constructed an air field capable of accommodating a large number of super bombers in Anchorage at the enormous cost of $12,000,000. Since then, however, obtaining a large budget, they are now expanding the field.

After the 36th Bomb or Squadron composed of 4 flying fortresses had been transferred to this Ermandorf (phonetic) Field, the 28th mixed air force and the 23rd air force were assigned to this field.

At the same time, the Anchorage air defense unit was organized, and the 4th infantry and field artillery unit, the 10th Engineers and the 75th Coast Artillery Unit were ordered to be stationed there. At present, the total number of personnel including the Air Force, is reported to reach 1350.

(Note: The bombers dispatched to Fairbanks and Anchorage are the flying fortresses each with 4 engines and a flight range of about 4000 kilometers. Furthermore, the distance from an island off the western tip of Alaska to the Kurile Islands which is a territory of Japan, is only 660 miles (about 1000 kilometers).

(a) In September 1939, American military authorities set up an air-defense alarm system in Alaska and established one in the army warning system. And again with 300 auxiliary radio stations distributed among the various army units as the center, an air defense unit, an infantry regiment and some field artillery units numbering 2400 in all were additionally dispatched. Army warning corps and 300 auxiliary wireless telegraphic stations set up in various military corps as their centers. Furthermore, secret highest capacity sound locators, various types of anti-aircraft guns, observers, and airplanes were distributed in various districts.

(b) The cost of strengthening military installations in recent years (in units of $1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For the Nat'l Def.</th>
<th>The budget for the fiscal year of 1942 (next year)</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kodiak</td>
<td>10,762 (about two-thirds for the 3,077 fiscal year (air base)</td>
<td>5,266</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1941 total</td>
<td>27,605</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,002 (sub base)</td>
<td>4,002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unalaska</td>
<td>2,963</td>
<td>5,030</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitka</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>4,305</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Harbor</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairbanks</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>850</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchorage</td>
<td>12,734</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(This shows the additional cost, since construction is being carried on with a greater budget than before)
2. American Military Bases in the Southern Pacific

(1) Hawaii

The Hawaiian Islands is the most important military base of the American navy in the island Pacific. Especially, Pearl Harbor situated of Oahu is the base of the American Pacific Fleet.

(a) Navy

The standing fleet consists of the following:

10 battleships, 11 A-Class cruisers, 7 B-Class cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 3 aircraft carriers, 3 aircraft tenders, 60 destroyers and about 17 submarines.

(b) Naval ports and military installations.

Efforts are being made to strengthen harbor installations and naval arsenal installations in Pearl Harbor, and in order to provide a few examples, the following is given:

(a) It is said that on November 5 of last year, 1940, 1010 American laborers, arrived on board the Washington. All of those laborers were recruited from the various states of America and of the total number, 880 were engaged in construction work at Pearl Harbor and the other 130 at the naval air base of Midway.

(b) On January 8, 1941, an English newspaper in Hawaii reported, as a UP dispatch from Washington of the 8th, that the new budget drawn up in President Roosevelt's budgetary message to Congress on that day, amounted to $35,000,000 for defense in the new budget drawn up in the budgetary installations in the Pacific including Guam, Philippines, Samoa, Hawaii, Johnston, Palmyra and Midway. The paper further reported that in this amount was an estimated cost as listed below $13,000,000 for naval defense installations with Pearl Harbor as the center; and furthermore, that army was to present separately, a new budget of $10,000,000. The chief items of these naval defense establishments are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Pearl Harbor Navy Yard</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigeration plants and accessories</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers' billets</td>
<td>72,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal improvements and construction</td>
<td>850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of railroads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of water-ways</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair of water-ways and improvement</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the eastern coast</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering works, warehouses</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings for the personnel and accessories</td>
<td>2,959,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Expansion of naval air fields</td>
<td>685,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of warehouses</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving of buildings</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of repair factories for planes</td>
<td>675,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of buildings for research</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on engines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of Assembly centers</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Def. Doc. # 1739**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Cost (in dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of bachelor officers quarters</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of warehouse for paint oil</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair of gasoline storehouses</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food warehouses</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of piers</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of waterways and the harbor of Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mooring installation in Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine base in Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional construction of landing piers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Naval powder magazine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Cost (in dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of land</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smokeless powder magazine</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powder magazine</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amusement facilities</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High explosive powder magazine</td>
<td>76,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kache Air Base</td>
<td>740,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of paved runways for airplanes</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangar for seaplanes</td>
<td>773,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchorage for seaplanes</td>
<td>174,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnston Island</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline storehouses</td>
<td>168,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midway Island</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangar for seaplanes</td>
<td>740,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmyra Island</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional gasoline storehouses</td>
<td>168,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 1,347,000
The Star Bulletin on 15 February 1941 reports that the U.S. Navy has purchased during the last six months the following pieces of land, totalling 4,120 acres, that is, over 6 sq. miles, on Oahu Island for $951,569:

1) For the establishment of a naval land plane base at Barber's Point -- 2,659 acres.
   Purchased on 4 October, last year, for $198,298.
   Now under construction (see the Ordinary Official Report No. 358 7 October, last year).

2) For the establishment of recreation centers for the U.S. Fleet crews in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor -- 37.53 acres.
   Purchased on 23 May, last year, for $23,916.

3) For the establishment of a radio station at Wahiawa -- 359.24 acres.
   Purchased on 30 October, last year, for $36,000.
   The cost for the construction of the radio station being estimated at $1,000,000.00.

4) For the building of houses for the employees of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard at Moanalua, near Pearl Harbor -- 254.49 acres.
   Purchased last year for $123,971.
   The houses being under construction for 1,800 families and 1,400 unmarried workers.

5) For the enlargement of the Kaneohe Naval Air Base -- 464.66 acres.
   Purchased on 27 January, this year, for $431,189, in accordance with the third enlargement plan. (See the Ordinary Official Report No. 32, 4 February, this year.)

6) For the construction of an underground oil depository at South Halawa, Red Hill -- 344.91 acres.
   Purchased on 13 February, this year, for $83,291.

The naval authorities have not yet formally confirmed the plan of purchasing 1,500 acres of land for the enlargement of the existing naval magazine and shell-room and the radio station at Lualualei.

(D) Naval Defence Areas Designated on February 18, 1941 -- The President designated Honolulu and Kaneohe Bay as naval defence areas, in addition to the military bases such as Palmyra, Guam and so on, and declared that ninety days hence ships and aeroplanes should be prohibited to enter those areas without special permission. These areas will comprise the territorial waters and air three sea-miles northeast from Koko Point, on the northern shore of Kaneohe Bay, and four sea-miles northeast from Kapoho Point, on the eastern side of the Mokapu peninsula.
II) Air Force

(A) The Reinforcement of the Army Air Force and its present strength

(a) An English language paper published in Hawaii, on 8 January 1941, reports on the reinforcement of the Army Air Force in Hawaii and its present strength to the following effect:

1) The Army authorities in Hawaii have made public the reinforcement, on 1 January, of the 14th Pursuit Battalion at the Wheeler Airfield with the 58th Light Bomber Unit and the 44th Pursuit Unit and the 18th Bomber Battalion at the Hickam Airfield with the 19th Transport Unit. At the same time, they have announced that in the near future four-engined Boeing B-17's, bombers of the newest type, will be attached to the Hickam Airfield, that the B-10's, medium bombers now in use there, will be sent to the Philippines, and that Curtis P-40's, single-engined fighters, Lockheed P-38's, and Douglas A-20's, double-engined attack bombers, will be attached to the Wheeler Airfield. Although the Army authorities have not specified the date of arrival of these new planes from the continent and their number, this will be carried out as soon as possible. Its immediate realization, however, cannot be expected, in view of the fact that the United States is now supplying Britain with all (half, according to another paper) of the P-40's and B-17's being produced in the United States. As regards the number, the planes to be transported will probably include 60 bombers and 175 fighters and light bombers. In accordance with the Army Air Force expansion plan, 1,000 air officers, 9,000 air servicemen, and at least 500 planes will be attached in the future to the two airfields mentioned above, and in case of emergency, reinforcements will be sent from the continent.

2) There are now 2,500 air servicemen at Wheeler Airfield and 3,500 at Hickam Airfield, and although the Army authorities refrain from making it public, the forces presently retained by the Army Air Force in Hawaii, which consists of these two airfields, amount to 235 superior planes and 6,000 air servicemen. Each of the six bomber units at Hickam Airfield consist of 7 to 9 planes, while at Wheeler each of the seven pursuit units retain 12 to 25 planes, and every three units make up one group. So, the 10th pursuit group at Wheeler plus the 44th Pursuit Unit makes four fighter groups. Further, the 58th Light Bomber Unit is to be equipped with Douglas A-20's named above.

(b) An English language paper in Hawaii, on 4 February of the same year, reports that the number of those attached to the 58th Light Bomber Unit at the time of its formation in January was only 33; that it numbered to 110 at the end of the second month, and that in the near future it will, according to the Unit Commander, reach 200 which is the full complement. The report goes on to say that the B-18 bombers now in use there will be reinforced by now plans to be transported from the continent, and also that the construction of barracks for those serving in this unit not being completed, some are living in tents and temporary quarters made of wood.
(c) The aircraft carrier "Enterprise" which made Honolulu on 21 February 1941, carried in to the port 31 P-36-C Curtis-Hawk pursuit planes to be attached to Wheeler Airfield.

(d) An English language paper in Hawaii, on 25 February 1941, reports that in the near future Curtis P-40 single-seat fighters which are to be attached to the airfields here will be transported from the continent on aircraft carriers, and that also B-17 bombers will be transported here by air as soon as they have enough supply on the continent.

(B) The Consolidation of Air Bases

(a) A U.S. correspondent in Washington reports on 12 December 1940 that the Civil Aeronautic Bureau has announced a plan of improving 100 airfields in the U.S. and its dependencies. The plan includes the following estimates in connection with Hawaii: For Hilo Airfield, $359,000; For St. Rogers Airfield on Oahu Island, $101,000; For Maui Airfield, $517,000; For Molokai Airfield, $232,000; For Upolu Point Airfield in Hawaii $231,000 — Total $1,440,000

(b) According to the announcement made by the U.S. Navy authorities in Hawaii on 27 January 1941, the Navy have purchased 484.66 acres at Hclin on the Mokapu Peninsula for $481,189. This completes the purchase of the entire northwest salient of the Mokapu Peninsula, as they had originally planned.

(c) On 15 February of the same year, Kaneohe Air Base in Hawaii, where the construction of installations which has been in progress since the first purchase of lands on 10 August 1939, is nearing completion. A christening ceremony was held under the supervision of Base Commander Martin. It has been announced that this base, together with the Navy Air Base on Ford Island in Pearl Harbor, will be used as two great air bases in Hawaii, chiefly for reconnaissance planes.

(III) Army Expansion

(a) On 5 November 1940, the advance unit of the 251st California National Guard Coast Artillery (equipped with anti-aircraft guns, 20 officers and 724 soldiers arrived here on the "Washington". They are to be housed in "Shaft" and "Fort Ruger" (the phonetic) Barracks until the construction of the barracks at Barber's Point will be completed. The rest of the Coast Artillery, being 725 men, will arrive here on board the "Leonard Wood", an Army transport, which will enter Hawaii on 23 November.

(b) On 18 November 1940, 900 officers and soldiers of the 251st Coast Artillery Regiment of the California National Guards left San Pedro for Hawaii on board the Army transport "Leonard Wood", under the command of Colonel Giron H. Sherman. These officers and men, being the remainder of the regiment (the advance unit of 1,000 officers and men having been dispatched to Hawaii on the "Washington" on 3 February) had been mobilized on 16 September and received training at Santa Fe Park, Ventura, South California. It is said that this sets a new precedent for the U.S. National Guard men to be dispatched overseas in peace time.
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(c) An English language paper in Hawaii, on 28 December of the same year, reported that four 155 millimeter guns were being set up on Punchbowl Hill to the north of Honolulu City, by the Hawaii Coast Artillery Brigade. This is reported to be a part of the national defense plan which was made five years ago.

(d) As regards the internal condition of the Schofield Barracks at Hawaii, the "San Diego Union," on 17 March 1941, published a private letter of a soldier from San Diego who is now in the Schofield Barracks near Honolulu. In reporting this for your reference, we enclose a clipping of the newspaper. This particular soldier is attached to the headquarters of the 151 Coast Artillery Regiment, now stationed at Schofield, having been transferred from San Diego several months ago.

The Army presently stationed in Schofield being 37,000 strong, the barracks themselves constitute a city, a combination of university and club, so to speak. Each barracks, almost occupying one square block, is three-storied, and of grey cement. The barracks has on its facade the insignia of each regiment (illuminated at night), and accommodates 1,500 to 2,000 persons.

There are three cinema houses (the largest of which seats 3,000 people) and three PX's (kept by women, only).

The First Battalion, which consists of three artillery companies (operating three-inch anti-aircraft guns and including one company equipped with searchlights), is presently stationed at Wheeler Field, and is now carrying out anti-air raid manoeuvres in conjunction with the 14th Pursuit Unit. Every place where units are stationed is completely camouflaged. All over Hawaii there are observation posts where lookout men instantly report on planes coming in sight. Soldiers operating telephones are serving day and night. Even at night, there are three on duty.

II The Philippines

(1) Naval Reinforcement

Heretofore, the U.S. Navy stationed the main force of its Asiatic Squadron at the Philippines to cover the Far Eastern waters. In 1939, however, with the intensification of the European situation, they planned to reinforce it with a view to restraining Japanese activities. Consequently, in August they announced the dispatch of six new-type submarines, and again in September sent the "Langley," a seaplane tender. Further, on 5 January of this year Navy Secretary Knox announced that on 1 February he would effect a change in the organization of the U.S. Navy.

By this change, the Far Eastern Squadron was to be promoted to the status of a fleet. Knox further stated that there would be no change in the designated waters and the strength of the new Asiatic Fleet, that for the present no reinforcements were being planned, but that the principal objective of this promotion was to make a gesture in order to restrain Japanese activities. He went on to say that this fleet would be actually reinforced when the formation of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, now under plan, is completed.
The Asiatic Fleet consists of A-Class cruiser (Houston), B-Class cruiser (Marblehead), Submarine Squadron (comprising 1 carrier and 12 submarines), Air Squadron (3 carriers), China Patrol Unit, Supply Unit, etc. Except the China Patrol Unit, the whole fleet with two additional submarine units are stationed in the Philippines. Many combat and non-combatant vessels frequently visit there from the homeland and Hawaii. It is held by some people that this shows their intention to accustom these vessels to operations in the Far Eastern waters. Besides, the U.S. Fleet in the Philippines is constantly conducting maneuvers starting from their bases at Manila, Davao, and so on.

It has frequently been reported that the main force of the U.S. Homeland Fleet would visit the Philippines with the intention of curbing Japanese activities. Such speculations were made in June last year when the whereabouts of the U.S. Fleet that started from Hawaii became unknown. Recently, it is again rumored that a part of the Pacific Fleet would make an extra visit to the Philippines by way of an anti-Japanese gesture.

(2) Reinforcements of the Air Force

(a) First Reinforcement

In September, 1939, 14 planes of the V.P. 21st Unit were sent as reinforcement from Hawaii to Manila.

(b) Second Reinforcement

On 4 June 1940, 14 flying boats of V.P. 26th Unit left Hawaii for Manila. In exchange, 14 planes of V.P. 21st Unit returned to Hawaii on the 15th for overhauling. From the current strength, later to be shown, it appears that the V.P. 21st Unit was also dispatched to Manila thereafter.

(c) Third Reinforcement

On 23 October 1940, the U.S. War Department announced that in order to reinforce the Philippine Army, the 20th Squadron (consisting of 27 planes, 20 officers and 157 non-commissioned officers and privates) of the Hamilton Field 35th Pursuit Corps and the 17th Squadron (consisting of 27 planes, 24 officers and 330 non-commissioned officers and privates) of the 1st Pursuit Corps at Selfridge Field (TN: phonetic), Michigan, would be sent to the Philippines. According to later reports, the 177 members of the Hamilton Field arrived in the Philippines on 23 November, and the 354 members of the Selfridge Field on 5 December, and the two groups were both attached to the Nichols Field.

(d) Results of Reinforcements and Reorganizations

The strength of the Army and Navy Air Force as of December 1940 is as follows:

(1) U.S. Army Air Force at Nicholas Field:

- The Air Squadron based at the 20th Air Station; the 4th Mixed Air Squadron; the 3rd Pursuit Company (27 planes); the 17th Pursuit Company (27 planes); and the 20th Pursuit Company (27 planes).

- At Clark Field: -- The 2nd Observation Company (13 planes) and the 28th Bombing Company (13 planes).

(2) U.S. Navy Air Force

At Cavite, a minor naval station, is the 10th Patrol Group consisting of the 101st Patrol Company (12 planes) (formerly V.P. 21st Unit) and the 102nd Patrol Company (12 planes) (formerly V.P. 26th Corps).
(3) Philippino National Guard Air Force at Sablon Field: --

The 7th Observation Company (40 training planes) at Cobu: --

The 6th Observation Company (10 planes).

(a) According to information obtained towards the end of December, 1940, the U.S. Navy authorities in the Philippines are planning to establish a naval air base at Los Banos to the south of Manila.
On February 27, 1941, Secretary of War Stimson declared to despatch shortly two more chaser plan squadrons (consisting of 50 chasers and 65 pilots) to the Philippine Islands.

According to the information received at the end of April, the bombing plane parts which were originally destined for Siam, Saigon, etc. have been assembled and are being put in operation in order to reinforce the U. S. air forces in the Philippines, besides a few bombers were received secretly by air from America via Honolulu.

It is said to have been reported in newspapers that the U. S. air forces would have approximately 22 heavy bombers, including the 12 planes (naval heavy bombers of the "Consolidated" type) which came by air via Honolulu in the summer of 1940 to be shipped by air to Singapore, but were instead put in operation there.

According to an A.P. despatch from New York on April 4 (appearing in the Sydney "Telegraph" on April 5), the U.S. Army in the Philippines has further increased the number of its bombers and fighters, because of the report that French Indo-China and Siam have allowed Japan to use their air and naval bases near the Malay Peninsula and Borneo under the secret provisions of the Boundary agreement.

Reinforcement of Military Strength.

As the bill was passed by Congress on August 23, 1940, (sanctioned by the President on August 28) to enable the President to call up 590,000 national defense and reserve troops for one year's military training, and, as occasion demands, station them in the Western Hemisphere as well as in the territories, including the Philippines, it is not difficult to expect that the number of the U. S. Army in the Philippines will be increased in the future.

The natives are being occasionally trained by the U. S. garrison troops, and a Domei despatch of February 3, this year, reported that Major General Grenard, Commander of the U. S. forces, declared, on the same day that he had called up again approximately 5,000 of those Philippine reservists who had finished their military service of five months and a half to train them in the U. S. garrison forces for another year.

(Remarks) The military strength of the Philippines consists of 7,300 native troops called "Patrolmen" and 3,700 U. S. garrison forces. Barracks are at Santiago (Manila), John Hay (Baguio), St. Stotzenberg (Pampanga Province), Mills (Corregidor), MacKinley (Rizal Province), Pettiit (Zamboanga) and Manila.
5. Counter-Measures for Emergency

A. On February 28, High Commissioner Suyor of the United States to the Philippines made a statement at a press interview that, in order to protect the Philippine citizens in case of emergency, the Philippines and Americans jointly instituted the Emergency Planning Board in October last and have been studying the plan of defending the Philippine Islands in cooperation with the U.S. military authorities. The Board in question consists of a committee composed of the members concerned of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and the governments of both the United States and the Philippines, with Colonel Carswell, the Military Attaché to the High Commander, as its Chairman. The business is divided into and entrusted to (1) food supply committee, (2) transportation committee, (3) medical instruments and medical supply committee, (4) communications committee, (5) general welfare committee, and (6) labor committee. On March 18, High Commissioner Suyor invited Grunt (?), Commander of the U.S. garrison forces in the Philippines and deliberated on the plan of civil defense during the war, submitted by the said planning board. The plan is said to include such projects in particular as the military commandeering of food, fuel, water, cars, trucks and buses, and such air-defense measures as air-raid shelters, gas masks and black-out, as well as bringing women to safety in case of air raid, etc.

B. On February 24, about 250 American residents in Manila organized the so-called American Coordinating Committee and deliberated on measures to cope with international difficulties in the future.

C. According to information received towards the end of April, the U.S. Army stationed in the Philippine Islands is investigating the industrial facilities and stocks of goods in the islands.

(III) Midway, Johnston, Palmyra Rose, Snake, Wake, and Guam Islands.

No one will doubt that as military bases of the United States in the Pacific, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands are of course the most perfect ones, but these alone cannot be said to constitute a perfect defense.

Just draw a line on the map of the Pacific beginning from Midway Island to Cavite (in the Philippines) passing through Pearl Harbor (Hawaii) Johnston, Palmyra to Rose, Snake, Wake and Guam Islands and then extend it further to Singapore, and you can see the defensive line in the Pacific which the United States has in mind. As regards the military preparations in those islands other than Hawaii and the Philippines, we have no detailed information as yet, except the following:

(c) It was reported by C.P. dispatch from Washington on December 21, 1940 that the United States Navy Department announced that Palmyra Island had been placed under the
B. Information received about the middle of March reports:

1. A tank is under construction in the interior of an island off the northern coast of "Brasai" in Burigao, near Mindanao Island.

2. A bridge is being built in haste between "Cagayan" and "Surigao".

3. A signal station has been newly established on the top of Mt. Ikebai (southwest of Butsumen).

4. A look-out has been newly established on the top of Mt. Crown (at the back of "Danaran").

5. Water supply works have been begun at the "Peran" military station.

C. According to the information received early in April, some 30 guns (about three meter barrel) of apparently 6-inch guns, were landed at the U. S. military base at the mouth of the River Petung on April 4.

D. According to information received by the police authorities of the Government General of Formosa, all foreigners and Filipinos were forced to leave important areas along the Lingyen and Lingarren Bays, in the district of Subic Bay where construction for defensive purposes are being built day and night.

E. According to information received by the end of April, defensive installations are said to have been strengthened at Mariberos (Betan) on the opposite side to the Corregidor Fortress at the mouth of Leman Bay. Such is said to be included in the Naval Base Construction Plan passed by the U. S. Naval Budget Committee on April 21. It is understood that, in order to increase and improve the naval bases and airfields, five naval technicians reached Manila aboard the "Clipper" on April 20.

F. It was reported by a Domci despatch from Leman on March 13 that the Congress of the Philippines deliberated on the defense budget for 1942 in a secret meeting on March 12, and that the deliberation aimed at appropriating a greater part of the drawbacks of the sugar consumption tax and of the difference arising from the devaluation of the dollar, amounting approximately to 100 million pesos, to the purchase of weapons, and the expansion of the sea patrol, etc. And, according to the information received towards the end of April, the U. S. Government seems to have put it under consideration to permit the appropriation of the self-defense strengthening funds.

G. According to information received at the end of April, the transportation to the Philippines by U. S. military transports of airplanes, automobiles and other goods regarded to be munitions has increased of late.
D. A Dowi despatch from Washington on February 26, 1941 reports that the U. S. War Department has cancelled its return order to 66 commissioned officers of field and company grade who had already been ordered home, and a plan is under way to double the Philippine native troops numbering about 6,000 at present.

E. According to the information received at the end of April, U. S. troops 2,000 strong (including 17 commissioned officers) reached Manila on April 22, aboard the transport "Republic". A broadcast from Manila said that some more reinforcements were to arrive in a few weeks aboard the transport "Washington" and that they were 2,200 strong and scheduled to arrive in July.

F. According to a Dowi despatch from Peking on April 16, the American garrison troops, numbering 150 men (under the command of der Taruji (?)) is to leave there towards the end of July for Manila via Chinwangtao and Shanghai.

G. According to information received early in April, the Philippine Army, apart from the retraining of the levy of Philippine reservists by the American stationary troops, now calling up reservists with the view to apparently despatching them abroad. Judging from the statements of some of the called up troops, their destinations seem to be Hawaii, HongKong and Singapore.

H. According to a Dowi despatch from Manila on April 18, the Daily Bulletin of that city reported information from Philippine Government sources that the U. S. garrison troop authorities and the Philippine Government have reached a conclusion that the former will take over the charge of the training of volunteers that had been conducted by the Philippine Army. This will increase the number of trainees, which has decreased to one half on account of financial difficulties, to the former number of 40,000 a year. It is said that the U. S. military authorities, too have already increased the number of their military instructors, and will soon improve the barracks and training institutions in various parts of the country, in order to prepare for the execution of a new training system.

4. Strengthening of Defensive Facilities

I. According to a Dowi despatch from Manila on April 16, 1941, the Sappori Airfield on the northern coast of Luzon Island had recently been completed and formally opened, and the Aviation Bureau as well as the provincial authorities of Cagayan have decided to construct a new airfield of "Tugyugno", 80 kilometers south of Sappori, and are ready to set to work before long. The opening of an airfield in the north of Luzon is very important, it is reported, on account of that district being situated near Formosa.
jurisdiction of the Navy Department on that day and made it clear that fuel storage, signal stations and road construction are under way on that island for the use of the Naval Air Forces, and that the naval authorities are secretly planning the establishment of a military marine connection between Hawaii and Singapore by way of Australia, and the transfer of the jurisdiction of Midway Island to the Navy Department was the first step toward the realization of the plan.

(b) On February 11, 1941, the U.S. President ordered the submission to Congress of the budget for strengthening naval bases in the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, including the sum of $4,700,000 for strengthening the base on Guam Island and $8,100,000 for military establishments in Tutuila Island in the Samoan group. The budget was approved by Congress on March 17.

(c) On February 16 of the same year, the President of the United States designated as naval defensive areas Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Rose, Tutuila, in the Samoan group, Wake and Guam Islands, as well as the Kingman Reef and Culebra Islands, together with Unalaska, Kiska and Kneeche Bays, prohibiting thereby the entry of any ship or airplane without special permission from 90 days after February 18, 1941 (moreover, Kodiak (Alaska) and Subic Bay in the Philippines) were additionally designated as defensive areas towards the end of March.)

(d) According to a report from San Diego on March 4, two newly equipped Marine Corps (about 1,500 strong) had recently left there on board an aircraft carrier and several transports. Although their destination is kept in strict secrecy, it is generally understood that they are sailing for the Islands of Samoa and Christmas.

(e) According to newspapers to March 8, the American President Line made a denial of the rumor that its "President Coolidge" may be commandeered as a transport of the United States Army. The rumor is based on the fact that the U.S. Army and Navy are actually in need of vessels to transport troops to the bases in Hawaii, Guam and the Philippine Islands, and that the President of the Bethlehem Steel Shipbuilding Corporation recently said that some passenger ships were being converted into military transports.

The said steamer is 33,400 Tons in weight, 600 feet in length and is capable of accommodating 1,200 passengers. Starting from Kobe, the arrived at Los Angeles on March 16, with 800 passengers consisting mostly of Americans repatriated from the Far East and Central Americans.

3. **British Military Bases.**

I. Singapore

1. **Navy**

(c) **Naval Ports and Military Establishments**
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As the base of a big fleet, the port had been well equipped with supply and repair facilities before the Second European War, but it has been further expanded and strengthened since the commencement of hostilities. Some 16,000 Chinese and 25,000 natives and Malayans are said to be working there.

As the fortress to defend the port, the following are said to have been installed:

18-inch gun (with a range of 30 miles) 1
(The Los Angeles Times reports that there is one each on Penang and Ubin Islands and another near the mouth of the channel leading to the anchorage ground.)

16-inch guns .................................................... 3
15-inch " .................................................... 35
14-inch " .................................................... 3
12-inch " (The Los Angeles Times reports that there are very many of them but they probably earn the above 15-inch guns.)

9-inch " .................................................... 3

There are very many medium and smaller guns on the top of the hill. Anti-aircraft guns (46 lbs., range 40,000 feet.)

It is said that similar installations are made on Bukun and Bleak Weedy Islands and Fort Canning, Changi, Caten and Pacif Penzan.

Besides the above, as defense measures for an opposed landing, the following have been established:

(a) The defenses on both the eastern and the western coasts have been extremely strengthened and "Patton" pill boxes have been built at intervals of 300 metres on the right side of the Western Highway; a network of wire entanglements has been constructed even in swamps; five reinforced concrete watch towers have been built at the mouth of the Penang River, and three pieces of 5.2-inch coast defense guns have been additionally installed on the 65-foot hill. These are the defenses strengthened for the protection of the front of the island.

(b) Machine guns and tank-trap entanglements have been installed on the southern coast (according to the Los Angeles Times).

(c) A submarine base and seven naval fuel storehouses are being constructed at the mouth of the Kuranji River on the right side of the Johore Railway Bridge.

(d) General navigation is prohibited on the eastern side of the Johore channel where the naval port is situated as well as along the Johore River.
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(a) Many mines have been laid in the sea five miles southeast of the front of Singapore as well as at the mouth of the naval port for the purpose of blockading the port.

B. STANDING FLEET.

The island is the base of the Far Eastern Fleet. But before the Second European War, most of the naval vessels were usually at anchor at Hong Kong or in China, so that there was hardly any occasion for a large fleet of vessels to stay at Singapore for a long period. After the outbreak of the Second European War, three cruisers of the Far Eastern Fleet, namely, the "Norfolk", "Liverpool" and "Birmingham", were ordered home by the British naval authorities, so that only a few naval vessels remained at Singapore, and only those escorting vessels from Australia and New Zealand to Europe and Africa called at the port.

(2) AIR FORCES

(a) The headquarters of the Far Eastern Air Forces

Located in the Union Building, Singapore, it controls the air forces in India, Malaya, and Hong Kong.

(b) The organization and present strength of the air forces are as follows:

Selatar Flying Corps (bombing attack) 13 squadrons (two of which returned home in May last year).

Selatar Training Corps 3 squadrons (two of which returned home in May last year).

Tenaga Flying Corps (combat) 7 squadrons (one of which returned home in May last year).

Sunderland, Long Distance Patrol Corps 3 squadrons (one of which returned home in May last year).

Personnel concerned 5,000

The exact number of aircraft is not known, but the report (June 5, 1940) estimated it to be about 600 including training planes.

Later, however, the Singapore authorities announced that the aircraft has since been increased as follows:

July 1940 - Northrop twin-engined Balboas (made in the U.S.) 50

Aug. 1940 - "Commonwealth" Reconnaissance Planes (made in the U.S.A.) 40

"Spitfire" Fighter Planes (made in England) 100
Feb. 1941 - "Consolidated" Bombers (made in U.S.A.)
"Lockheed" Bombers

Apr. 1941 - Brewster Fighter Planes (made in U.S.A.)
"Consolidated" long-distance Bombers

Of the 200 "Consolidated" and "Lockheed" bombers made in the U.S.A., very few seem to have arrived, because it is technically difficult to transport them from the United States in such a way as is officially announced. Generally speaking, the British authorities made announcements for the purpose of exaggerated propaganda. It is presumed that the entire planes they have for first line purposes will be somewhere around 250 including such latest fighters as "Spitfires" and bombers like "Blenheims".

It seems to be true, however, that the flying corps in the island is being gradually replaced by fresh planes made in the U.S.A.

(C) Airfields

"Selotar"
"Chengo Tenge"
The Third Military Airfield
Singapore Island

Besides, in accordance with the lessons learned from the Chinese Incident, dispersed bases are being constructed in various parts of the Peninsula, especially on a large scale at "Kelman" (State of Johoro) and "Sungalibtani" (State of Keda). "Penang" has also become important as a base of operations for the Indian Ocean Area, as well as that of the second line for Singapore.

Accordingly, both military and naval flying establishments are being steadily constructed there. (It is said that five squadrons are stationed there now.)

(3) ARMY

The organization of the Army as of June 1940 is as follows:
Ono Mixed Division

One Heavy Artillery 4 Batteries of the 9th (Royal Heavy Artillery Regiment 8 Batteries equipped with 16.32-inch coast defence guns

4 Batteries of the 7th (Royal Heavy Artillery Regiment

One Mixed Division

22nd Mountain Regiment of the Royal Anti-aircraft Artillery

Deduction of the 3rd Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment

One Anti-aircraft Artillery Brigade

1 Battery of the 1st Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment of Hong Kong and Singapore

75" Anti-aircraft Artillery Corps

37" Anti-aircraft Machine-gun Corps

Searchlight Corps
(2nd Battalion of the Royal Rifles)

(1st Battalion of the Manchester Regiment)

One Infantry Brigade (2nd Battalion of the Gordon Highlanders)

(2nd Battalion of the Sutherland Highlanders)

(4 British Regiments)

(2 Indian Regiments)

(4 Companies of Royal Engineers and Fortress Engineers)

(15th Fighting Company of the Madras Lancers)

Auxiliary Engineer Corps

Royal Signal Corps

Special Branches of Surgeons, Chaplains, Dentists, Arms and Supplies

The total strength of the above was said to be 30,000, but later on, Indian and Australian soldiers were transported on six occasions totaling 15,000 to 16,000 in all by November, and about 10,000 arrived divided up in five groups from Australia and New Zealand and two from India by way of Colombo by the end of February of this year. In May, some of the air, artillery, infantry and mechanized corps arrived from England. The Singapore authorities are making a lot of publicity of the above arrival to say that this is the first despatch of troops from England since the outbreak of the Great War and also that England has still to spare.

Judging from the fact that some of the troops thus concentrated at Singapore were sent cut to the European Area,
Def. Dec. 1739

the present total strength with the exception of the volunteers may be estimated at about 50,000.

Attention is called to the fact that two huge steamers, the Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth are engaged in the transportation of Australian and New Zealand troops.

4. Military Budget

The Malayan Military Budget for 1939 (1000 pounds unit)

Navy
Army
Air Forces

Total 1,910

As the above shows the military budget in Malaya will amount to 16 million dollars, if the expenses for the volunteers and other troops to be defrayed by the Malayan Government are excluded.
II. AUSTRALIA.

A. Naval base.

(a) Naval station.
Sydney. Installed with every factor as a naval station.

(b) Other naval bases.
Melbourne.
George Sound.
Jervis Bay.
Darwin.
Fremantle.

B. The standing fleet.
"Canberra", cruiser, 10,000 tons, flagship.
"Australia", cruiser, 10,000 tons.
"Perth", cruiser, 7,000 tons.
"Sydney", cruiser, 7,000 tons.
"Hobart", cruiser, 7,000 tons.
"Adelaide", cruiser, 5,100 tons.
5 destroyers
2 escorts
5 others.

These vessels are currently assigned as escorts for military transports and merchant ships and the sphere of their jurisdiction is said to be fixed as the areas between Singapore and Australia, and also Fremantle and Mauritius Island. However, it is supposed that they are engaged in this work in cooperation with the British warships.

Owing to the small scale of most ships in Australia, the shipbuilding of larger type vessels is impossible, but a considerable number of ships of destroyer class can be built here. Therefore, the building of 51 "Tribal" class (1,870 tons) vessels is being taken as a target at present.

(2) Army.

(a) Military strength.
Since the outbreak of the second World War, although Australia has sent a considerable number of forces to Europe and Singapore, it has still a defense army of 95,000 strength on hand at present. However, it is now decided to augment these forces to a 250,000 strength, and for the present to organize a new force of from 80,000 to 90,000 strength (June 16, 194).  

(b) Number of conscripts.
The number of adults and young men in Australia who can be conscripted for military service are as follows (per unit in 1,000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 years - 18 years</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 &quot; - 26 &quot;</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 &quot; - 35 &quot;</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The latest movement.
As an advisory organ in the execution of war, the Australian Government has formed the Wartime Council, consisting of members, 3 each from the Government and the labour parties, and is intent on increasing its efficiency. In January of this year, the Government decided to form the following armored divisions:

43
The Government is also paying attention to perfecting the defense of Darwin area in the north. There are indications that for the purpose of constructing more barracks for the air force, and the army, a great number of labourers have been sent to said area. It is considered, therefore, that the area will be a large military base in the future. At present about 4,000 army troops, 30 small plane-carrier tanks, about 800 air forces troops, and 3 squadrons of the Spitfires are believed to be stationed here. On February 10th the dispatch of "observers" to Australia was decided by the U.S. Navy.

(3) Air force.

Prior to the second World War the air force of Australia was poor in power. However, since the outbreak of war a fair number of crack planes seem to have been supplied by the home country of England or America, although the accurate figures are unknown.

In addition, there is an air force project to train pilots, gunners, observers, etc., numbering 26,000.

III. BRITISH NORTH BORNEO.

(1) The expansion of armaments.

On March 17 the Governor-General for the British Empire concurrently the Commander of the Army, ordered the organization of the British North Borneo Volunteer Corps and train them for a period of 30 days from April 1 to May 30. On April 1 the Commander of the British Far East Army POPHAM came to Sendakan and stopped over night on his way to attend the Manila Conference. It was supposed that he had come to make previous arrangements with the authorities of this territory as to the defense of British North Borneo which was to be discussed at Manila.

(2) Defense of the cities.

While the British authorities seem to be strengthening the defense of this region of late, briefly, the condition of the defense of the cities is as follows:

(a) Kudat (T.N.: phonetic spelling)

In December last year, Kudat and Khota Bharu behind Kudat were closed as defense zone and sepoys were reinforced.

(b) Jesselton.

In addition to 500/600 guards, there are some volunteer corps.

(c) Sandakan.

200 guards and 150 men from the volunteer corps station here. A Britisher with the rank of Major commanding lately, vigorously training in the firing of machine guns is being given. A lookout post seems to be set up on the top of the mountain at the right side of the entrance to the Sendakan harbour. It appears that the area is being strengthened. At the foot of the mountain, work is going on by clearing the mountain. It is considered that pillboxes are under construction.

(d) 1,000 sepoys are said to be transferred from Singapore to the above three districts for defense. Moreover, recently arms, ammunitions, etc. seem to be shipped secretly from Singapore.

(3) Air force.

Although there is no standing air force here, it is reported that recently several bombers came from Singapore, and are practicing bombing the Imperial Consulate, etc. The distance from Singapore to Sandakan by the direct course is 800 miles; to Miri 550 miles. Moreover, airdromes to be mentioned are as follows:
(a) Kenly (phonetic). The installations are not large. 
(b) Kuching. A small airdrome of 50 acres. The ground 
of the whole environment here is not firm. For expansion, consid­
erable time will be necessary.
(c) Bintoero (T.N.: phonetic)
(d) Equija (T.N.: phonetic) This is a temporary air­
drome. As above, there are no permanent strategic installations 
such as fortresses in British North Borneo. Lately there are indica­
tions that efforts are being made to strengthen the defense, al­
though it is not strategically important.

IV. NEW ZEALAND.

(1) Navy.
(a) Naval base. Auckland.
(b) Fleet:
"Achilles" 7,030 tons.
"Leander" 7,270 tons.
1 training ship.
5 others.

(2) Army. There are few army units. A part of them have 
lately been sent to Europe and Singapore area.

(3) Air force. Before World War II there were not more 
than 17 planes of various types. However, it is considered that 
the force has been strengthened in some degree lately.

V. Military preparations of NETHERLANDS INDIES.

(1) Army.
Against the peacetime military strength of about 
32,000, approximately 70,000, or twice that strength, are mobil­
ized, of which 50,000 are stationed in Java and 20,000 in outlying 
territories. The disposition and the military strength are as 
per the following table. Defensive preparations are being made 
mainly with Soerabaja and Bandoeng as the nucleus, with Batavia, 
central Semareng and Magelang as secondary centres. Tjilatjap and 
other sea ports are placed under the strict defensive preparations. 
In the outlying territories, main efforts are placed in preparing 
for the defense of oil field zones, oil refineries and important 
sea ports.

Military strength and disposition of the Army of the NETHERLAND INDIES:

A. Java. (mechanical units whose principle characteristics are mobility).
Batavia and its vicinity, about 8,000
Bandoeng
" 16,000
Malang
" 8,000
Magelang
" 8,000
Soerabaja
" 10,000
Total
" 50,000

B. Sumatra (Commander stationed at Kotaradja). In addi­
tion, there is something similar to a branch headquarters in Medan.
Atjeh province and the vicinity of Medan, about 4,500
Pengkalang, 4 field artillery batteries.
Pajenili (about 2 km north of Pengkalang Brendan) 
sound locator, 2 artillery batteries and 
2 anti-aircraft guns.
Padang and its vicinity, about 1,500
Palembang and Djambi, 
" 2,500
Rio province (T.N.: phonetic)" 300
Total
" 8,800
C. Borneo (Commander stationed in Bendjermesin).

In the vicinity of Bendjermesin, about 600
Beliknaka: " 1,000
Tarakan: " 3,000
Pontianak: " 1,000
Total: " 5,600

D. Great Eastern District (Commander stationed in Makassar)

Makassar about 800
Menado (note 1), " 1,500
Ambon, " 1,500
5 coastal guns, 5 anti-aircraft guns,
5 anti aircraft machine guns. (Recently
military preparations in the vicinity of
this area are being strengthened remarkably.)

Ternate, about 200
Manokwari and Fakfak (T.N.: phonetic spelling of both) " 300
Koepang, " 300
Total 3,600
Grand total, 68,300

In the above, Europeans accounted for not more than
about 20% of the grand total.

In the Netherlands Indies, in addition to the above
mentioned regular army units, there are volunteer corps and munici­
pal garrisons consisting mainly of Europeans and some Chinese resi­
dents. Moreover, local garrisons are about to be organized and
in all events efforts are being made to mechanize them. Field police
corps armed with rifles are complements to the military forces. Be­
sides the above, there are aboriginal units in Solo, Jogjakarta,
Beli and Madura, totaling about 5 battalions.

2. Navy.

In August of last year, several warships were brought
here from Netherlands. At the same time, the Naval Academ was also
transferred to Soerabaja. Therefore, practically the entire Dutch
navy has been concentrated in the Netherlands Indies. However, the
replenishment of warships which Netherlands lost while they were
under construction when Germany invaded the country is difficult,
and the plan to purchase warships from England, America, South
America, etc. has not yet materialized. Hence, the actual condi­
tion is that the replenishment of warships has reached a standstill.
Furthermore, the bill for the building of a fleet with three 27,000
ton class battle cruisers as its main force, and the expanding of
the naval port of Soerabaja, which had passed the National Parlia­
ment of the Netherlands Indies in April of last year and which was
about to be sent to the Netherlands Parliament, became instantly im­
possibility. Netherlands Indies is now contemplating the supplemen­
ting of her deficiency of naval power by chiefly increasing her army
and naval air forces. Furthermore, since June of last year,
Netherlands Indies has laid mines in off the coasts of Soerabaja,
Belikpapan and Tarakan.

In November of last year, the coast of Palembang, and
in February of this year Belawan harbour were respectively desig­
nated as strategic zones and at the same time desperate efforts are
being made for the land defense of important harbours.
The naval officers and sailors of which Europeans ac­
count for 90% of the total crew, are thoroughly trained and the en­
tire navy possesses formidable actual power.
The bases of naval strength and their disposition:

A. Naval strength:

- 4 cruisers
- 8 destroyers
- 16 submarines
- 19 mine layers, sweepers and others
  Total 47 vessels.

Besides the above,

- 7 high speed torpedo boats.
- About 20 guard ships.
- Marine corps, a unit with a Captain at its head.

In addition to the above, a cruiser and a mine layer which were officially announced as having been transferred from Great Britain, have been listed in the above table. However, besides these ships, long distance submarines, sweepers and mine layers are believed to have been transferred to the Netherlands Indies.

B. Naval bases and their disposition,

- Soerabaja Naval Base. Fortified together with Singapore.
- Batavia Naval Station.
- Tarakan Naval Station. Together with Balikpapan guarded by 2 mine layers.
- Ambon Naval Station. Advanced base.
- Smunap (T.N.; phonetic) Operation Depot.
- Street Karimata.
- Gospar Streten) patrolled by warships.

Guard ships frequently call at the following ports for lookout.

- Java - Moerjo and Tjilatjap.
- Sumatra - Sabang, Koestaradja, Belawan and Palembang.
- Borneo - Pandjermas and Balikpapan.
- Great Eastern District - Makassar, Manado, Koei, Sangihe Islands, Ternate, Manokwari, Peksk, Kupar and Putong Island. (T.N.: phonetic spelling on the above 9 place names.)

(3. Air force and its disposition.

(A) Army air force.

(a) Disposition of the force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposition of the air force</th>
<th>Approximate capacity of the hangars</th>
<th>Type of planes based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andier (T.N.; phonetic)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Various types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalidjati (T.N.; phonetic)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Same as above - many training planes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tililitan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nambas (T.N. phonetic)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(A hangar with capacity of 20 planes being expanded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maesbaty (T.N. phonetic)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Various types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Semarang</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Unknown. However, the possibility of its existence has increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jogjakarta</td>
<td>(under contemplation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palembang</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarekan</td>
<td>(a hangar is under construction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambon</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With regard to Halmahera Island and other islands to its south, there are an air unit of about 50 in Dobero (T.N. phonetic) and wireless transmitting and receiving stations in the following places, in addition to air bases:

"mjabra (T.N. phonetic)
Bachen Island (T.N. phonetic)
Ohi Island "
Maini "
Sanana in Sanana Island "
Boooloo Island "
Namilla "

Southeast Celebes (a hangar is under construction)

Total about 300
Our country, as the leader of East Asia, cannot stay indifferent in the face of such a conflict, and hopes for an earliest possible solution.

(14) March 11, 1941 (Showa 16) — the Foreign Office communiqué concerning the conclusion of mediation on the Thai-French Indo-China frontier dispute.

"The development of such an event as the Thai-French Indo-China conflict was a matter of great regret for Japan which is desirous to ensure the security and peace in greater East Asia at any cost and at the same time it is needless to explain that the Empire cannot be unconcerned in the intrigues on the part of third powers to take advantage of this dispute in obstructing the holy task of the Empire to establish the co-prosperity sphere in greater East Asia. This was the reason why the Empire officially proposed mediation to the two countries on January 20, this year. Fortunately, the above proposal was immediately accepted by both governments and the mediation was signed on March 11. Thus the conflict which threatened to precipitate a serious situation by a single faute-pes was solved, and the relation of peace and friendship between the two nations was restored rendering the strong bond of co-existence and co-prosperity between our Empire and the two nations even stronger.

There were some among third powers which tried to obstruct the conclusion of mediation motivated by selfish illusions and criticizing our action as an attempt to promote our own interest under a pretext of mediation, but these mischievous plans vanished like fogs under the sun and the most difficult problem was finally solved. This proved that our attitude was honest and unselfish.

(15) April 14, 1941 (Showa 16) — Opinions expressed by Premier Konoye on the signing of Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact.

"Previously our government concluded the Tri-Partite Pact and proclaimed its firm decision, within and without the country, to ensure the peace in the whole greater East Asia by preventing the extension of the world war and acting on the policy expressed by the treaty. It is needless to say that in order to realize the above objective Japan and Soviet Union must strengthen the relation of friendship and peace upon a firm foundation, thus amplifying the spirit of the Pact. Based upon this belief, our government has been conducting negotiations in order to adjust fundamentally the diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union. Minister Matsukata's visit to Moscow, accelerated mutual talks and thus the neutrality treaty was signed. This treaty is not only an epoch-making event in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Soviet Union, but also I believe that it will contribute to the realization of the world peace."

(16) April 14, 1941 (Showa 16) — Declaration by Hull, Secretary of State, with regard to the conclusion of the above pact.

"The meaning of Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact is excessively appraised. The above pact only put into writing the existing conditions between the two countries. It goes without saying that the conclusion of this Pact does in no way affect the policy of the U.S. Government."
(11) October 5, 1940 (Showa 15) — A note concerning the Tri-Partite Pact which was handed to Ambassador Grew by Minister Matsuoka.

"The Tri-Partite Pact does not aim at any specific nation. The combination of three countries, Japan, Germany and Italy, emanated from the idea that it might diminish chances of being attacked by other countries and that it might contribute to the world peace by preventing the spread of world confusion. Our Empire reiterated its intention of creating a new order in Greater East Asia including the South Sea by this treaty. The construction of a new order in Greater East Asia means the establishment of co-existence and co-prosperity relation of each region in East Asia including the South Seas and the affirmation of freedom and equality in immigration, trade and enterprise in this region; it does not attempt the invasion and exploitation of the same region nor the exclusion of trade and enterprise of other nations. It is intended to realize these peaceful means by as far as possible and without any unfortunate change to the status quo."

(12) December 29, 1940 (Showa 15) — A fireside chat by President Roosevelt which referred to the establishment of the new order by three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy.

"Leaders of the Axis Powers have proclaimed the realization of the World New Order, but their true intention is to reconstruct the old and worst tyranny without freedom, religion and hope. The so-called new order is far from the idea of European United States or the Asiatic United States; it is not a group of men of self-respect which protect life, freedom and dignity; it is an unholy union of nations which is to conquer and enslave mankind."

(13) January 21, 1941 (Showa 16) — The part referring to Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China and Thailand in the speech of Minister Matsuoka at the Imperial Diet.

"Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China and others are in close and inseparable relations with our country in view of their geographical and other situations. Things which have obstructed the above relations must be rectified and neighborly and mutual aid relations must be realized in order to promote their mutual prosperity. Sending of our special ambassador for the purpose of economic negotiations with Dutch East Indies and the Franco-Japanese negotiations in Tokyo based on the note exchanged between myself and the French Ambassador in Japan in August of last year — these were carried out from the above viewpoint. Especially the latter is at present progressing in an extremely friendly atmosphere. As for the relation between Japan and Thailand a treaty of neutrality and friendship was concluded between the two countries in June of last year and its ratification was exchanged in Bangkok on December 23. From that time on friendly relations between the both countries have become much closer. And in the same country the movement to recover lost territories from French Indo-China arose recently on a vast scale. Now military forces of the same country hold their own against French Indo-China army along the frontier with resultant frequent border clashes."
(6) July 11, 1940 (Showa 15) — The opinion of the American Government concerning the draft of notes to be exchanged on the status quo of Dutch East Indies and Pacific areas — one of the notes handed by the American Ambassador at the unofficial interview between Arita and Grew.

"In the verbal statement (Your Excellency's) on June 28 which referred to the American proposal to exchange notes concerning the status quo of the possessions and dominions of European belligerents in the Pacific areas, your excellency intimated that if Japan and America, both non-belligerents, concluded a certain agreement concerning the problem, it might render Japan's position delicate inasmuch as Japan maintained the attitude of non-interference.

However, the American Government is not only of the opinion that the proposed exchange of notes will contribute to the affirmation of non-interfering attitude of Japan to the European war, but also hopes by this proposal to diminish the injurious influence of the European war upon the Pacific areas."

(7) July 16, 1940 (Showa 15) — Expression of opinion by Hull, Secretary of State, on the problem of closing the Yunnan-Burma Public Road and the French Indo-China Railway.

"The closing of the Yunnan-Burma Public Road and the French Indo-China Railway is reported. If it is true, it will be an unreasonable obstacle to the world trade."

(8) September 4, 1940 (Showa 15) — Declaration by Hull, Secretary of State, expressing the attitude of the American Government on the problem of French Indo-China.

"Governments of several countries which included not only U.S. but also Japan expressed their attitude to respect the principle of status quo in Pacific areas, especially the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. Now we have the report that Japan delivered an ultimatum to French Indo-China. Though we have no official confirmation of the news, this is a serious matter to this government. If it were a fact, it will adversely affect the public opinion in this country."

(9) September 23, 1940 (Showa 15) — Statement of opinion by Hull, Secretary of State, on the advancement of Japanese army into French Indo-China.

"The principle of maintenance of status quo is in the process of uprooting under duress. The attitude of our government not to recognize these situations has often been expressed. We never recognize concessions on the part of France to Japan regardless of time and formula."

(10) September 27, 1940 (Showa 15) — Statement of opinion by Hull, Secretary of State, concerning the Tri-Pertite Alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy.

"The conclusion of the Tri-Pertite Alliance has not changed the state of affairs existing for the past several years. It has merely affirmed the existing fact. Our government has been well aware of the negotiations aiming at the conclusion of the alliance and our policy has been decided taking this factor in full consideration."
(2) Statement of Secretary of State Hull in response to ARITA's statement described above on 17 April 1940.

"Interference in domestic affairs and change of the status of Dutch Indies by measures which are not peaceful would be detrimental to peace and security not only of the Dutch Indies, but also of all the areas of the Pacific Ocean. This is clearly stated in an official document exchanged between Japan and the U.S. on 30 November 1909 and also in the official document dated 4 February 1922, addressed to the Dutch Government by Japan, Britain, U.S. and France based upon the Four Powers Treaty of these nations concluded on 31 December 1921."

(3) Statement of the Director of the Intelligence Bureau about the request made to the respective Government of the Powers concerned with the status quo of the Dutch Indies.

"The Imperial Government has already declared that it is deeply concerned about the outbreak of a situation which might bring about a change in the status quo of the Dutch Indies, and has informed the Dutch Government to this effect and an understanding has been reached. Since the war has now extended to Holland, the above was again notified to the Dutch Minister at Tokyo on the 11th and the attention of the representatives in Tokyo of each belligerent nation, Britain, Germany and France, were called regarding Japan's concern about this problem. At the same time, notice was given for reference to the representatives of the two neutral nations, the U.S. and Italy, that such a request as mentioned above had been made."

(4) The broadcast of Minister ARITA making clear the plan to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which embraces the South Seas Areas.

"The Japanese Government, at the outbreak of the European War, has clearly stated its non-intervention policy and at the same time expressed hope that the war's havoc in Europe would not extend to East Asia so that the stability in the said area might not be undesirably influenced. Japan is now making progress in the establishment of a New Order in East Asia, and constantly directing her keen attention to the consequence of the European war, especially to its influence on the various regions of East Asia, including the South Seas. It states clearly that in view of Japan's responsibility and mission as the stabilizing power in East Asia, she is deeply concerned over the destiny of these regions."

(5) President Roosevelt's talk of 6 July 1940 released by Presidential Secretary Early advocating the application of the Monroe Doctrine common to Europe and Asia.

"The U.S. will not take over the territories of conquered nations, but believes that the disposition and administrations of these territories should be decided by the Republics of the entire American Continents. The American Government will not have their say regarding the disposition of French Indo-China as it belongs to Asia. Its disposition should be decided by the various countries of Asia."
Defense Doc. 1739

(1) Menado (TN: phonetic) Infantry about 1,280
   Menado Armored troops 100
   Menado Light machine gun troops 320
   Total 1,700

(2) Units locally detached
   Infantry about 1,900

   Locality of each unit
   Amran (TN: Phonetic), Tomohon, Aelmadydy,
   Tindo, Kawankawen, Rangoon, Kakas

(3) Kinahasesse volunteers 250

The above categorized by race is as follows:

   Second generation Chinese 25
   Natives 75
   Dutch 150

Lately, in the Port of Menado various types of munitions are being actively unloaded, military barracks and warehouses are being newly built, new roads are being opened and roads are being actively repaired and demonstrations and advances against the natives carried out actively.

The post of Commander of Menado was occupied heretofore by a captain, but recently a major occupies it.

Supplement

Statements regarding the attitude taken by the Japanese and the American Governments on the problem of the Far East especially of the Southern region

(Outline)

(1) Reply of Minister ARITA to questions by newsmen concerning the Dutch Indies problem on 15 April 1940 (this is the first statement officially made on the Dutch Indies problem).

"In case the calamity of the European War should extend to Holland and should influence the Dutch Indies, it would not only obstruct the progress of maintaining the mutual aid and co-existence and co-prosperity between Japan and the South Seas areas and other East Asian countries, but will develop into an undesirable situation from the point of peace and stability of East Asia. In considering this state of affairs the Japanese Government is deeply concerned about the outbreak of a situation which will bring about some change in the present status of the Dutch Indies."
1. Java

Lake Bagendit (TN: phonetic) (about 8 kilometer north of Garu (TN: phonetic))
Lake Punin (TN: phonetic) (about 40 kilometers south of Smarang) phonetic
Kalimunjava Island (TN: phonetic)

2. Sumatra

Sabaug, Eravau (Phonetic)
Brebe (Lake Toba) (Phonetic)
Palembang

3. Borneo

Pontianak
Balikpapan

4. Great Eastern Area

Macassar, Ternate, Sanguir Districts (Gasoline dump at Ternar, 30,000 litres) (Phonetic)
Minahassa and its neighborhood,
Fakfak
Manokwari, Kuban (Phonetic)

(Security condition through naval planes in the areas of Bangka, Billiton and Bintan Islands and in the Lesser Sunds archipelago are unknown)

(2) Planes under use

Dornier DO 24 Flying Boats
Dornier Wal (Phonetic) Flying Boats
Fokker Sei lines
Catalipar (TN: phonetic) B.D.Y. 5 Type

(3) Besides these, at the end of December last, 60 Cataliper B.D.Y. 5 type flying boats must have been transported by air from the U.S. to the Dutch Indies.

(4) Lastly, as to the heavy industry in Dutch Indies, there is in Macassar an army arsenal and in Surabaya a navy yard where ammunition and light cannons and guns are being manufactured but as to airplines they have only repair shops in Baudaug and Soerabaya. As to ship building there are shipyards in Baudaug and Soerabaya, each of which has a capacity of building ships such as mine layers of only 2000-3000 tonnage.

(Note 1) - According to the latest information

The military authorities in the District Menado have been furiously endeavoring to increase the number of soldiers and strengthen the airforce, and as a result of 1,000 reservists having been mustered lately the number of soldiers defending the said district has reached approximately 3,870, (including volunteers).

The situation of the distribution of the military strength is as follows:
Besides this, at the end of January of this year, a military air field was completed halfway between Madioeu and Maospatei in the east of Java, having 500,000 tsubo in area, 5 hangars (capacity of each shed 13 planes) and having at present 50 planes.

In each of the principal airfields at the outside areas, generally speaking, there are three military planes (mainly Martin bombers) and patrolling planes.

(2) Planes in use

- Martin 166 type twin-engine bombers
- Lockheed 212 type bombers
- Curtiss-schock (T.K. Phonetic spelling) 75 single seat fighter
- Douglas 6A-3N light bombers
- Callhonen (T.K. Phonetic) F.K. 51 training reconnaissance planes
- Other Focker planes and training planes

(3) Classification of estimated number of first line planes

- Bombers: about 81
- Fighters: about 66
- Light Bomber Reconnaissance Planes: about 12

Total: about 159

Naval Aviation

(1) Distribution of strength

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<tr>
<th>Sites of aviation corps</th>
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<td>Soerabaja</td>
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<td>Batavia (Tandjoengpriok)</td>
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<td>Terekan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lakes Kakas and Tondeug (Phonetic spelling), Southern shores</td>
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<td>Buoy for flying boats</td>
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<td>Officers stationed at the same base</td>
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<td>Garrison strength</td>
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<td>Ambon</td>
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<td>Talusa</td>
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<td>Lake Tibenunjen (under project) South of Baudon and neighborhood of Lake Chuncha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tjilatjap (Aeroshed under project) Carrier-borne planes</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>about 139</td>
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Estimated number of first line planes

- Flying Boats: 27
- Sea Planes and carrier borne planes: 30
- Total: 57

Besides the above, military flying boats and sea planes are often seen landing on the waters of the following ports for the purpose of guarding the entire neighborhood and carrying out demonstration towards the natives.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese, consisting of 14 pages and entitled: "The Anglo-American Policy of Encirclement against Japan in the southern Pacific Ocean" is a document compiled and issued by the Second Section, South Seas Bureau of the Foreign Office, in July 1941; having as its source, materials from the Official Reports of the Japanese Foreign Office Officials stationed abroad (both telegraphic and mailed), and news reports from papers of supplied by news agencies, all of which were in possession of Foreign Office at that time.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 31 day of July, 1947.

HAYASHI, Kaoru
Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness
at the same place
at the same date

Witness: URAÈK Katsuma
西村国男

1934年

日本の国際文書の「τη—」表記

日本の国際文書は「τη—」表記を用いる。これは、国際文書において日本語を使用する場合に、日本語の音を表すために使用されるものです。

日本の国際文書では、英語の音に近い音を表すために、日本語の音を表すためにも「τη—」表記を使用します。

日本の国際文書では、「τη—」表記は、日本語の音を表すためにも使用されるもので、そのため、日本語の音を表すためにも使用されるものです。
コードネック、スカイドール、ラディオ局

コードネック・スカイドール

ラディオ局

コードネックに、スカイドール、ラディオ局

水深測量局、水路、深波、波浪、波浪、水深測量局

ラディオ局、スカイドール、ラディオ局
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(1) 石炭・結晶所

(2) 蔵室

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(3) アクアマット

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(5) スペリオール

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(6) シャンブル

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昭和二十三年八月十日長崎港に於て
呉港

昭和二十三年八月十日長崎港に於て
呉港
根據文件的格式和內容，這段文字沒有明確的意義。它似乎是隨機的字符和編碼，可能是在測試或者錯誤中產生的。如果這是隨機生成的，那麼它沒有任何實際的意義。如果這是故意的編碼，那麼它可能需要特定的知識或者上下文來解讀。在沒有更多信息的情況下，我們無法確切地解讀這段文字。
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ロ・デア・1739

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長者部長
No. 77
Dec. 1739

[Handwritten text in Devanagari script]
週気ノ徳中ナリ・次ニ日弗聞ニ就テハ
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（附）
昭和十六年三月十一日ト接仏印周辺紛争議議後成
立＝照スル外務當局談ノ如キハ

手順スル外務局関係ハ
印俠印等へ地理的情勢等其他に依り本邦ニ
密不可分ノ関係ヲアリリ從来右ノ阻礙ヲ
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為関係ノ間ヲ相対シ期間セサル可ガラス

印ニ對スル経済交渉ノ為ノ我金庫ノ派遣及客
年八月ノ本大臣及同時訪日関書大使ノ交渉ヲ
ク東京ニ於ケル日モ何ノモニシテ殊ニ役者ヘ頼ルよ
昨テ来タルモノシテ殆ノ役者ニ従事ノ好気

Doc 1737
三八珠場攻撃計画。陸軍幹部会議の項目に、終戦前後の関係を深く考察した。関係者に、陸軍省、軍令部、外務省、陸軍総務部、海軍総部、大本営の関係者を含めた。また、終戦前後の関係を深く考察した。関係者に、陸軍省、軍令部、外務省、陸軍総務部、海軍総部、大本営の関係者を含めた。
Admiral Shigetaro SHIMADA, who has been transferred from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the China Area Fleet to that of Commander-in-Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station, returned to Tokyo on the 15th together with Vice-Admiral Ito TAKAHASHI who held an important post at the front, and after reporting on the war situation to His Majesty, they withdrew from the Imperial Palace at 2:30 p.m. They then visited the Navy Ministry, and after having tendered their greetings to Navy Minister OIKAWA and Naval Chief of Staff NAGANO, a press interview was held at the Navy Minister's Official Residence, when Admiral SHIMADA remarked as follows:

"On the occasion of today's Imperial audience when I reported on the war situation, I was deeply stirred by the gracious words of His Majesty. One year and four months have elapsed since I received the Imperial Commands on May 1, 1941 to serve as the Commander-in-Chief of the China Area Fleet. During this time I have managed to deal a serious blow to the anti-Japanese CHUNGKING regime by still further intensifying the blockade and air operations against it. At the same time, the supply lines along the YANGTZE and CANTON Rivers were firmly secured, peace and order was preserved by mopping up the remnants of the foe. At various strategic points, and war results were steadily enlarged through harmonious and close cooperation with the military units at the front. Furthermore, all officers and men under my command are, by braving stormy seas and combatting against intense cold and scorching heat as well as enduring all hardships and privations, doing their utmost towards the attainment of the object of the Holy Far by diligently performing their military duties day and night with an ardent sense of loyalty and duty to the State. All this is solely attributable to the august virtue of His Majesty, and makes me feel deeply moved.

It is also to an extremely large measure due to the colossal support given by all our fellow-nationals behind the lines either in Japan proper or elsewhere, for which I feel profoundly grateful. It is most regrettable, however, that so many loyal and brave soldiers and men have been killed in action or unfortunately fall victims to injuries or are still suffering from injuries and sickness as a result of fighting at the front. I hereby beg to express my heartfelt condolence and sincere sympathy to the spirits of the war heroes and their families."
"The CHUNGKING Regime is now practically on its last legs as a result of the close combined attack of our Navy and Army, and, on one hand, due to the steady development and strengthening of the Nationalist Government, the settlement of the China Incident has been making steady progress. On the other hand, however, the confrontation between the Chiang supporting powers and our nation has come to assume serious proportions suggestive of an aggravated tension in the international situation. It is needless to remark that, in order to attain the final goal of the Holy War, the determination to save this grave situation with a truly united national front and colossal efforts are required. I take great pleasure in being able to report to all the people of the home front that the morale of the officers and men of the China Area Fleet runs very high and that, determined to annihilate the remnants of the foe, they have adjusted themselves into a resolute and firm position, and with a strong unity irrespective of rank, are strenuously pushing their way ahead with a view towards attaining the goal. At the same time I sincerely hope that all our people will strive their best towards still further manifesting the substance of national all-out warfare. With these words I shall end my address on the occasion of my return to Japan."
Doc. No. 3300

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Masui Nagato, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Mainichi Shimbun in the following capacity: Editor in Chief. I hereby certify that as such official I hereby certify that the document here attached and described as follows: Newspaper clipping of an article entitled: "Manifest the Substance of National All-out War, Says Admiral SHIMADA. Mean Return." was published in the Mainichi Shimbun on 16 September 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of December 1947

Masui Nagato

Witness: I. Tsuruda

Editor in Chief, The Mainichi Official Capacity.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN F. MUNROE, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Mainichi Shimbun in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of December, 1947

/s/ Johnson F. Munroe

Name

Witness: Henry Shimojima

Official Capacity.
証明書

国際検察部 第三部

余、カトマガハ余、カ下記・証明

親元・マガハ余、カ下記・証明

逮捕・マガハ余、カ下記・証明

附下記・マガハ余、カ下記・証明

読者、公の資格

東京三、昭和三年

毎日新聞編輯長

公欠入欠関スル証明

余、カトマガハ余、カ下記・証明

関係・マガハ余、カ下記・証明

上記・マガハ余、カ下記・証明

東京三、昭和三年
"Do Not Loose Your Head with Immediate Victory"
"Renew Resolution and Serve the Public with Sincerity"

Gist of the talk published by the Navy Minister SHIMADA and the Foreign Minister TOGO on the eve of celebrating the fifth anniversary of the China Incident today on 7th.

Gist of the Navy Minister's Talk.

To begin with, the Great East Asia War arose as a natural consequence to round off the China Incident. The reason why our Empire (T.N. Japan) is carrying on this sacred war with such vigour and with so much sacrifices since the outbreak of the Incident is because it has been our cherished desire to establish a new order and thus ensure an eternal peace in East Asia. This should be our steadfast national policy and it is also a great mission based upon the deep rooted conviction of our people.

The war to annihilate Chiang Regime, who would not wake from anti-Japanese illusion, has been waged more vigorously than ever since the outbreak of the Great East Asia War. The occupation of Hongkong and the advance into Burma of the Imperial Army has not only been instrumental in entirely blocking the aid route to CHUNGKING by America and Britain, but also by the complete overcoming of enemy bases at Cheching and Kiangsi. The Imperial Army has been able to prevent the enemy from realising her dream of menacing our flanks. In this way the fighting power of Chungking has received a fatal blow. On the other hand, both in the Pacific and Indian Oceans our strategy has been such as to be able to control completely from the Australian Islands in the north to Indian ocean in the west as far as "cuth Africa", and in the south the whole of East Indian archipelagoes. Thus our strategic position has become both impregnable and invincible. We are not only threatening Australia endlessly, but since the battle zone has advanced into the Indo-Pacific we are not inflicting a final menace to America.

Generally speaking, there is no doubt the that the destruction of anti-Japanese influence on Chungking means the destruction of the Anglo-American offensive desire on the Eastern and the crushing away of their influence from the entire region. And to deal a final blow on the Anglo-American fighting strength should lead to the breaking up of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. However, the development of incomparably bold strategy go hand in hand in bringing about the desired result.

What makes us feel more reassured than ever is the way our friends, the Germans and Italians are enlarging their wonderful war results in Europe in response to the Imperial Army's brilliant results in East Asia. No doubt the victory of the Imperial Army in East Asia will have a great effect on the war situation in Europe and the activity of both Germany and Italy will inevitably improve the situation more and more favorably to the Empire. The
war to annihilate America and Britain by closely united Japan, Germany and Italy is progressing strongly towards the final victorious phase. The Imperial Army at the beginning of the Great East Asia war has gained an overwhelming victory since then it has been actually enlarging it, but we must endeavor to make it the final victory. For this purpose we must not for a moment become elated with our immediate victory, but remembering all the time that the prosperity of the Empire must be established on a solid foundation, and this great work falls entirely on the shoulders of our hundred million compatriots, who should realize this from the bottom of their hearts.

The China Incident has developed into the Great East Asia war and its scale has now been enlarged to the World War, and actually playing a role on the world historic stage. Consequently, it is needless to say that the people's mind should rise to higher level and take a more magnanimous and long view of things in general. On this occasion I earnestly beseech the Japanese people to renew their resolution in following their special calling more and more loyally and sincerely.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. __________

IPS No. 3327

Statement of Source and Authenticity.

I, Seiichi Toramura, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Mainichi Shimbun in the following capacity: Chief of Reference Library of the Mainichi (Tokyo) and that as such official I herewith certify that the document hereto attached, and described as follows: Newspaper clipping entitled "Do not lose your Head with Immediate Victory -- Act on Resolution and Serve the Public with Sincerity" was published in the Mainichi Shimbun on 7 July 1942.

Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of December, 1947

S. Toramura ___________________________ 
Signature of Official

Witness: Tsunowo Kubota ___________________________ 
Chief of Reference Library
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement.

I, Johnson F. Munroe hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Mainichi Shimbun in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of December, 1947

John F. Munroe ___________________________ 
Name

Witness: Edward F. Monaghan ___________________________ 
Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity.
目前の戦局に

覚悟し、新しく

誠心誠意

昭和四年

東郷外相は曰く。来春、

場相談

十四の文部事務主幹年記念日を計り、

昭和四年

戦争後は、

内閣の共有

戦争期

外交の重務

日本政府

昭和四年
By SHIMADA, Shigetaro, Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Instructions to TOYODA, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

1. The operational policy to be followed by the Combined Fleet has been decided as per attached sheet.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall carry out future operations in conformity with the above mentioned policy.

Attached Sheet.

The operational policy to be followed by the Combined Fleet.

I. Operational Policy

1. Maintain and apply the present strategic situation with the utmost effort, and by planning the gradual destruction of the enemy strength create battle opportunities automatically or seize a good opportunity for the purpose of annihilating the enemy fleet and the invading enemy forces.

2. Secure the important national defense zones in close co-operation with the Army and prepare for the future offensives.

3. Secure the sea traffic route between Japan and the important resource areas in the Southern Regions in close co-operation with units concerned.

II. The Outline of Operations.

1. Various types of Operations

(a) The Operations of the Base Air Force.

The main strength of the Base Air Force shall be stationed in the islands off Japan (Hokkaidō, Ōshima, Shikoku, and Kyushu), MANTEN SHOTO in the Southwestern Islands (e.g., Okinawa area, FORMOSA, and the PHILIPPINE Islands area), and a part shall be stationed in the KURILE Islands, in the strategic zones in the Southern Region, and in the Central Pacific Ocean area in order to seize and annihilate the enemy fleet, and the invading forces.

(b) The Operations of Task Forces and Remaining Surface Forces.

The main strength shall be stationed in the Southwestern area and in accordance with the enemy situation be made to advance
to the PHILIPPINE Islands or the MANSEI SHOTO/is Southwestern Islands/ for a time. A part of the strength shall be stationed in the Japan Proper area to carry out timely operations and at the same time annihilate enemy fleet and invading forces in cooperation with Home Air Forces.

(c) Operations of the submarine forces.

The main force shall carry out interception operations or carry out surprise attack operations in accordance with the battle opportunities.

A part of the strength will carry out reconnaissance of the enemy situation, cut the enemy's supply routes in the rear, and will transport supplies to our advance bases.

(a) Surprise Attack Operation.

(1) Try to carry out surprise attack operations, particularly make efforts to gradually destroy the enemy fleets at their advanced base by surprise attacks when good opportunities present themselves.

(2) Endeavor to carry out all types of surprise attack operations which utilize submarines, aeroplanes, and special raiding weapons and equipments.

(3) Concentrate the local strength for surprise attacks at important points, and endeavor to destroy the enemy fleets or the advancing enemy strength on the sea.

(e) Protection of Sea Communication and Anti-Submarine Operations.

Secure strategically important points necessary for the security of the sea communications between Japan and the important resource areas in the Southern regions, and at the same time, by closely cooperating with units concerned, frustrate the movements of enemy task forces, the enemy air-raids originating from bases, and the rampant activities of enemy submarines.

2. Operations in All Areas.

(a) Japan Proper (HOKKAIDO, HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU, KANTÔ/

Southwestern Island/TOKYO and the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS areas (the OGASAWARA districts belongs therein). Strengthen the defenses of the aforementioned areas, giving them first priority, in cooperation with the army and with units concerned; endeavor to establish a situation whereby a decisive battle can be fought immediately, by resorting to
Every possible plan; in the event of an enemy invasion, muster all the troops which can be concentrated and chiefly attack and destroy the enemy in the sphere of operations of our land-based aircrafts, thus securing our strategic zones.

(b) Northeastern areas.

Strengthen the battle preparations in cooperation with the Army; the invading enemy shall be annihilated and important areas shall be secured mainly with the existing strength. For this purpose, especially:

1. Carry out tenacious operations with dispositions in depth and, at the same time, prepare to oppose enemy's jumping landing operation.
2. Endeavor aggressively, if possible, to attack the enemy's advanced bases by surprise and crush their invading spirit beforehand.

(c) Central Pacific Ocean Areas.

1. Make timely use of our air bases, and carry out surprise attacks, aiming to make the enemy bases useless to them as well as to destroy gradually the enemy strength.
2. Make every effort to continue the offensive against the enemy in the MORIKA area, with aircrafts from both the OGA-SAWABA and PALAU areas; and at the same time if the enemy invades, endeavor to destroy them mainly with the existing power and check the enemy's advance.

(d) Southeastern Area.

In close cooperation with the Army, exert every effort to secure the strategic areas, by strengthening the defenses and making possible the opportune uses of some air fields.

(e) Southwestern Area.

1. Attach the greatest importance to securing the resource areas as well as areas necessary for their defense and also to the defense of the fleet anchorage, and in close cooperation with the Army, endeavor by all means to put the local personnel and materials into the fighting strength and establish the self-sufficiency situation.
2. If the enemy attacks, concentrate the existing fighting power as much as possible to destroy them and secure the strategic areas.
3. Some of the submarines or according to the situation, some of the surface crafts will be made to take actions on the Indian coast and the western coast of Australia utilizing all opportunities, in order to reconnoiter the enemy situation as well as to sever enemy supply routes.
(4) Cooperate positively with the German submarines in their communication-destruction-war in the Indian Ocean.

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, DOHI, KAZUO hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Historical Data Division, Data Arrangement Section, 1st Demobilization Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 170 pages, dated the year of 1944, and described as follows:

Files of DAI-KAI-SHI for the latter part of 1944. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): The Historical Data Division, Data Arrangement Section, 1st Demobilization Bureau.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30 day of Oct., 1947.

DOHI, Kazuo

Signature of Official

Chief of the Historical Data Division

Date Arrangement Section

1st Demobilization Bureau

Official Capacity

Witness: TSUKUDO, Tatsuo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, R. H. Lersh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30 day of Oct., 1947

Richard H. Lersh

Name

Witness: Henry Shimollima

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity
Excerpt from Interrogation of Admiral Shigetaro SHIMADA
14 March 1946 at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Q. Now, in your previous interrogation you stated that when you came back to Japan from China in September of 1941, you learned that YAMAMOTO had submitted a plan for an attack upon Pearl Harbor to NAGANO early in 1941, isn't that right?
A. It was not immediately after returning from China. It was after I had become Minister of the Navy that I heard of such plans. That was just shortly before the outbreak of the war.

Q. Do you mean to say that you learned after you became Minister of the Navy that YAMAMOTO had presented such a plan to NAGANO early in 1941?
A. Yes.

* * * * *

Q. Now, from whom or from what sources did you learn this information after you became Minister of the Navy in the TOJO Cabinet?
A. I heard it from the Naval General Staff.

Q. Did you learn it in your conferences with Admiral NAGANO?
A. When I became the Navy Minister, I received a brief explanation of operational plans.

Q. And those operational plans indicated to you that NAGANO gave his informal approval for the perfection of a plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor in the summer of 1941, didn't they?
A. I heard the over-all plans. However, I do not recall as to exactly what plans included the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q. Well, now, you have stated that when you became Minister of the Navy, you learned that a plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor had been practiced at the annual maneuvers held in the summer of 1941, is that right?
A. Oh, yes.

Q. Now, what I want to know is from whom did you learn that information?
A. Naval General Staff - one member of the Naval General Staff - the Chief of Naval Operations, I think.

Q. Who was that?
A. Admiral FUKUTOME, at that time Rear Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.

* * * * *

Q. He was the only one?
A. Yes, he explained to me...
b. Warrant-officers and those with corresponding ranks:

Railway and steamer: Second class (when no second class accommodation, first class).

Room and board: Not more than yen 3,50 per day.

9. Petty officers, non-rated men and others:

Railway and steamer: Third class

Room and board: Not more than yen 2,50 per day.

In case of P.O.W.'s repatriation, if necessary, they shall be provided with railroad and steamship fares at fixed rates, according to the foregoing classification.

Article 10. In case of deaths of P.O.W.'s (their burial expenses shall not exceed the following amounts:

a. Officers and those with corresponding ranks: yen 40.00

b. Warrant-officers and those with corresponding ranks: yen 35.00

c. Petty officers and non-rated men: yen 30.00

Article 11. Suitable rations may be issued at the front in accordance to the foregoing articles.

Article 12. When it is necessary to issue rations to crews of captured ships, P.O.W.'s, and those corresponding to crews of captured vessels, the present regulations shall apply correspondingly.

Article 13. Chiefs of various offices who defrayed pay according to the provision of the Article 2. shall, within a month after the close of every fiscal year, submit report of the year to the...
Def. Doc. # 1804

b. Petty officer  yen 0.15 per day.

c. Non-rated men   yen 0.10 per day.

When P.O.W's other than military personnel are assigned to labor, their pay shall be governed corresponding by the foregoing article.

Article 3. When P.O.W's who are wounded or ill receive medical treatment on board naval ships, naval barracks, or other departments equipped with dispensaries, they shall be provided with necessary medicines and consumable medical supplies. When the latter be quartered in squadron, or the similar, will dispensary, be supplied to them. When taken for treatment to hospitals or doctors outside the jurisdiction of the Navy, expense needed for their treatment shall be defrayed out of official funds.

Article 9. When P.O.W's are required to travel, their travelling expenses shall be composed of railway fares, steamer fares (including pierage and lighterage—this applies to what follows) carriage and hotel and boarding expenses. They shall be paid actual expenses according to the following classification:

a. Officers and those with corresponding ranks:
   Railway and Steamer  First class (When no first class accommodation, second class).

   Room and Board:  Not more than yen 4.50 per day.

-3-
Def. Doc. # 1804

**Article 5.** P.O.W.s shall be dressed in the clothing which they wear.

Those, who have no clothing or whose clothing have worn out, borrow clothing within the extent of the table 2.

Old clothing shall be loaned, and when old clothing is not available, new ones shall be loaned.

In case of P.O.W.'s repatriation, release, death or transfersence to outside the Naval jurisdiction, clothing loaned to them may be given to them, if necessary.

**Article 6.** Articles of consumption, indispensable to P.O.W.s, shall be defrayed within the extent of the following amounts,

a. Officers and those with corresponding ranks:
   yen 0.30 per day.

b. Warrant officers and those with corresponding ranks:
   yen 0.20 per day.

c. Petty officers, non-rated men and others:
   yen 0.10 per day.

**Article 7.** When captured warrant-officers and those ranking below are put to work, they shall be paid according to the following classification. An additional allowance however, of less than yen 0.25 may be paid to those assigned to special technical duty by taking into consideration their ability, and kind, hours and places of labor.

a. Warrant-officer
   yen 0.25 per day
Excerpt from: The Regulations Concerning P.O.W. s Rations

(Notice No. 44 dated Feb. 29, 1904.)

Article 1. Rations for P.O.W.s interned by the Navy shall be issued according to the present regulations.

Article 2. Captured officers shall receive pay according to Table 1. Prisoners other than officers shall not draw pay.

Article 3. Should captured officers be transferred to the Army, Paragraph 1, Article 169 of the Detailed Regulations relative to Navy Pay Regulations shall be applied to the classification of their pay.

Article 4. P.O.W.s shall draw rations within the extent of kinds and quantities as prescribed on Table 20 of the Detailed Regulations relative to Naval Pay Regulations.

In case it is impossible to apply the foregoing provisions, suitable foods may be issued within the following amounts:

a. Flag officers and those with corresponding ranks: Yen 1.05 per day.

b. Warrant officers and above and those with corresponding ranks: Yen 0.90 per day.

c. Petty officers, nonrated men and those with corresponding ranks: Yen 0.75 per day.

When P.O.W.s who are drawing pay are supplied with foods, they shall reimburse their actual cost.

-1-
Article 5. P.O.W.s shall be dressed in the clothing which they wear.

Those, who have no clothing or whose clothing have worn out, borrow clothing within the extent of the table 2.

Old clothing shall be loaned, and when old clothing is not available, new ones shall be loaned.

In case of P.O.W.s' repatriation, release, death or transferrence to outside the Naval jurisdiction, clothing loaned to them may be given to them, if necessary.

Article 6. Articles of consumption, indispensable to P.O.W.s, shall be defrayed within the extent of the following amounts:

a. Officers and those with corresponding ranks; yen 0.30. per day.

b. Warrant officers and those with corresponding ranks; yen 0.20. per day.

c. Petty officers, non-rated men and others; yen 0.10. per day.

Article 7. When captured warrant-officers and these ranking below are put to work, they shall be paid according to the following classification. An additional allowance however, of less than yen 0.35 may be paid to those assigned to special technical duty by taking into consideration their ability, and kind, hours and places of labor.

a. Warrant-officer yen 0.25. per day
Head of the Naval Accountants' Bureau, stating payees nationalities and number, classified according to ranks; and also amounts of payment.

Table 1. Salary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Monthly pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>yen 550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Admiral</td>
<td>483.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear-Admiral</td>
<td>416.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>310.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>220.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Commander</td>
<td>170.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Lieutenant</td>
<td>122.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Lieutenant</td>
<td>85.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-sub-lieutenant (Ensign)</td>
<td>70.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:

1. The salaries in table 1 shall be paid from the date of entry to the date of leaving naval concentration camp.

2. The classification of the salaries shall be based not only on the foregoing table, but also on the instances of payment of Imperial Japanese Naval personnel’s pay.
Table 2. Clothing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blanket</td>
<td>not more than 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-clothing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer-clothing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter under-ware</td>
<td>Not more than 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer under-ware</td>
<td>Not more than 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes</td>
<td>1 pair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socks</td>
<td>Not more than 2 pairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:
When weather, etc. necessitates additional clothing may be loaned to P.O.W.s.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, MICHINORI, who occupy the post of The Chief of the Archives The 2nd Demobilization Section, Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Excerpt from the regulation concerning P.O.W.'s rations" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government. (The 2nd Demobilization section Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 19 day of May, 1947.

/S/ YOSHII, MICHINORI (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ INAKIWA, TSUO (seal)
Head of the Naval Accountants' Bureau, stating payees national­ities and number, classified according to ranks; and also amounts of payment.

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Remarks:

When weather, etc. necessitates additional clothing may be loaned to P.O.W.s.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHIJUICHI, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives, the 2nd Demobilization Section, Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Excerpt from the Regulation concerning P.O.W. 's rations" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government. (The 2nd Demobilization Section, Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 19 day of May, 1947.

/S/ YOSHIJUICHI, (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ INAKI, TATSUO (seal)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YOSHII, Mitsunori, who occupy the post of The Chief of the Archives The 2nd Demobilization Section, Demobilization Bureau, further certify that the document now marked Defense Document 1804 is a true and correct copy of the "Regulation Concerning Prisoner of War Rations" as amended in April, 1904, September, 1937, May, 1942 and September, 1943.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 28th day of November, 1947.

/s/ YOSHII, Michinori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of this witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /s/ OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)
RETURN TO ROOM 361
FILE COPY
Note:
The attached document is the corrected document and should be substituted for the corresponding document which should be destroyed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Gov. &amp; other Public Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>July 22</td>
<td>Appointed as an elevo-Consul.</td>
<td>Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This-Junior (Consul)</td>
<td>Foreign Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Was conferred the 7th rank of the higher Civil service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; as given the 5th Class salary payment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; as ordered to serve at Mukdo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Nov. 7. as ordered to serve at Hongkong.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2</td>
<td>Departed from Tokyo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Arrived at Hongkong.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>Was appointed as an attache.</td>
<td>Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; as conferred the 7th rank of the higher Civil service.</td>
<td>Foreign Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; as ordered to serve in the U.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 22</td>
<td>Departed from Tokyo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>Was given the 4th Class salary payment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 13 Arrived at Washington, U.S.A.</td>
<td>Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>June 30</td>
<td>Was raised to the 6th rank of the higher Civil Service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -
CORRECTED COPY OF

DEF. DOC. 462

CURRICULUM VITAE

Ex-Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
SHIRATORI Toshio
Born June 8, 1887.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time:Junior</td>
<td>Cabinet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(Consul)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Was conferred the 7th rank of the higher Civil service</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>Was given the 4th Class salary payment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13</td>
<td>Arrived at Washington, U.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917 June 30</td>
<td>Was raised to the 6th rank of the higher Civil Service.</td>
<td>Cabinet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1917 June 30 Was given the 3rd Class salary payment.

1919 June 13 Was given the 2nd Class Salary payment due to the revision of the salary regulation by the Imperial ordinance, No. 275 of 1913.

June 28 Was appointed as 3rd Secretary of the Japanese Embassy.

" " Was conferred the 6th rank of the higher Civil Service.

" " Was given the 2nd Class Salary Payment.

1919 June 30 Was appointed to serve in the U.S.A.

Dec. 26 Was raised to the 5th rank of the higher Civil Service.

" " Was given the 2nd Class Salary Payment.

1920 Jan. 10 Was ordered to return home

March 22 Departed from Washington

April 16 Arrived at Tokyo

Aug. 7 Was appointed as an Administrative officer of the Foreign Ministry.

" " Was conferred the 5th rank of the higher Civil Service.

" " Was given the 3rd Class Salary Payment.

" " as ordered to serve in the 2nd
Section of the Bureau of the Political Affairs.

1920 Aug. 18 As given ¥ 3,067. Annual Salary due to the revision of the regulation for the higher Civil Service officers' Salaries.

Oct. 31 As given the 5th Class Salary Payment.

Nov. 2 As ordered to serve in the 3rd Section of the Bureau of European and America Affairs.

1921 June 27 As given the 4th Class Salary Payment.

Aug. 13 As ordered to serve in the 2nd Section of the Information Bureau.

1922 June 30 As conferred the 4th rank of the Higher Civil Service.

As given the 3rd Class Salary Payment.

1923 May 17 As appointed as the 2nd Secretary of the Legation.

As conferred the 4th rank of the Higher Civil Service.

As given the 2nd Class Salary Payment.

As ordered to serve in China.

June 21 Departed from Tokyo.

28 Arrived at place of appointment.
DEF. DOC. # 62

1923 Dec. 29 Was given the 1st Class Salary Payment.

1924 Dec. 25 Was ordered to return home.

1925 Feb. 4 Departed from Peking China.
Feb. 11 Arrived at Tokyo
Feb. 17 Was appointed as the Secretary of the Foreign Ministry.
Was conferred the 4th rank of the Higher Civil Service.

" " Was given the 2nd Class Salary Payment.

" " Was appointed as the Minister's Secretariat and the Chief of the Document Section.
Concurrently serving as the Chief of the Translation Section.

March 31 Was raised to the 3rd rank of the Higher Civil Service.

" " Was given the 1st Salary Payment.

1926 June 19 Was appointed as the 1st Secretary of the Embassy.
Was conferred the 3rd rank of the Higher Civil Service.

" " Was ordered to serve in Germany.

Aug. 6 Departed from Tokyo
Aug. 25 Arrived at Berlin.

1928 June 21 Was ordered to return home.
Sept. 12 Departed from Berlin.
1928 Oct. 23 Arrived at Tokyo

1929 Jan. 17 Was appointed the Secretary of the Foreign Ministry.
Was raised to the 3rd rank of the Higher Civil Service.
Was given the 1st Class Salary Payment.

May 22 Concurrently serving as the Chief of the 3rd Section of the Information Bureau.

Nov. 29 Was appointed as the Acting-Chief of the Information Bureau during the absence of Mr. H. Saito, its Chief.

1930 May 26 Was released from the above Post due to the return of Mr. H. Saito.
Was given 700 yen annual increase in Salary.

Oct. 31 Was appointed as the Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.
Was conferred the 2nd rank of the Higher Civil Service.

1931 June 1 Was given Annual Salary of 4,650 yen due to the revision of the Salary regulation for Higher Civil
1928 Oct. 23 Arrived at Tokyo

1929 Jan. 17 Was appointed the Secretary of the Foreign Ministry.
As raised to the 3rd rank of the Higher Civil Service.
Was given the 1st Class Salary Payment.

May 22 Concurrently serving as the Chief of the 3rd Section of the Information Bureau.

Nov. 29 Was appointed as the Acting-Chief of the Information Bureau during the absence of Mr. H. Saito, its Chief.

1930 May 26 Was released from the above Post due to the return of Mr. H. Saito.

Oct. 31 Was appointed as the Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.
Was conferred the 2nd rank of the Higher Civil Service.

1931 June 1 Was given Annual Salary of 4,650 yen due to the revision of the Salary regulation for Higher Civil - 5 -
1933 June 2: Appointed as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. As conferred the 2nd rank of the Higher Civil Service.

" ": Ordered to serve in Sweden.

" ": Given the 3rd Class Salary Payment. June 22: Ordered to serve Concurrently for the affairs of Norway, Denmark, and Finland.

Sept. 21: Departed from Tokyo.

Dec. 5: Arrived at Stockholm

1934 Oct. 20: Raised to the 1st rank of the Higher Civil Service.

1936 Oct. 30: Ordered to return home.

Nov. 12: Departed from Stockholm.

Dec. 16: Released to serve for the affairs of Finland.

Dec. 23: Arrived at Tokyo.

Dec. 26: Given the 2nd Class Salary Payment.

1937 April 28: Released to serve in diplomatic mission to Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.

1937 April 28: Ordered to render temporary service for Foreign Ministry and was given a full salary on the waiting list.
1930 Sept. 22 "as appointed as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Cabinet.

" " was ordered to serve in Italy

Nov. 22 Departed from Tokyo.

Dec. 29 Arrived at Home

1939 Sept. 2 "as ordered to return home Foreign Ministry

Sept. 15 Departed from Home

Oct. 13 Arrived at Tokyo

1940 Jan. 9 "as released to serve in the Embassy in Italy. Cabinet.

" " While on the waiting list was given one third of the Salary. Foreign Ministry.

Aug. 28 By request, was released from official post. Cabinet.

1940 Aug. 28 Was appointed as Advisor to the Foreign Ministry.

1941 July 22 By request, was released from official post.

1942 April 30 Elected as a member of Parliament.

1942 May 20 "as appointed as a member of the Board of Directors of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association. Society

1943 June 23 Seceded from the above Association. Society

1945 Dec. 5 Resigned membership of Parliament.
CERTIFICATE

Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKEOKA Kenji, Chief of the Section of Personnel of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages, entitled "GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENT NO. 9" and entitled "Certificate Plan of Pledge 31,000", is an exact and true copy of excerpt from the Japanese original in the Custody of the Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of August, 1946.

(Official Seal)
Signature of official

Witness: __________________________

Translation Certificate:

I, CHARLES D. SHELDON, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation of the document described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan

Date 31st Oct., 1946.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TERAOKA Keiichi, Chief of the Section of Personnel of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the documents hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 7 pages, entitled "EXTRACT DOCUMENT NO. 9" and entitled "Correlation Plan of Tripel Axis", is an exact and true copy of excerpt from the Japanese original in the Custody of the Foreign Office.

Signed in Tokyo on this 17th day of August, 1946.

[Signature]

Witness: _________________________

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE:

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation of the document described in the above certificate, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is a correct translation and as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/a/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 31th Oct., 1946.
Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(22nd October 1898 (31st year of Meiji.)
Imperial Ordinance No. 250)

Art. 1 The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall administer governmental affairs concerning foreign nations, the protection of Japanese commercial matters in foreign nations, and affairs regarding Japanese subjects residing in foreign nations, and shall command and supervise diplomats and consuls.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall command and supervise the Kwantung Governor-General in respect to matters of foreign policy.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall manage affairs concerning cultural enterprises toward China.

The Ministry's Secretariat shall conduct affairs regarding foreign diplomats and consuls residing in the Japanese Empire, the conforming of decorations on foreigners, the keeping of treaty documents, and the translation of documents, besides what is stipulated in the general provisions.

Art. 3 The full number of Secretaries in full service of the Ministry shall be 18.

Art. 4 The Ministry shall have the following 4 Bureaus:

1. Asian Affairs Bureau
2. European and American Affairs Bureau
3. Commercial Affairs Bureau
4. Treaties and Conventions Bureau
Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(22nd October 1898 (31st year of Meiji.) Imperial Ordinance No. 258)

Art. 1 The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall administer governmental affairs concerning foreign nations, the protection of Japanese commercial matters in foreign nations, and affairs regarding Japanese subjects residing in foreign nations, and shall command and supervise diplomats and consuls.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall command and supervise the Kwantung Governor-General in respect to matters of foreign policy.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall manage affairs concerning cultural enterprises toward China.

The Ministry's Secretariat shall conduct affairs regarding foreign diplomats and consuls residing in the Japanese Empire, the conferring of decorations on foreigners, the keeping of treaty documents, and the translation of documents, besides what is stipulated in the general provisions.

The full number of Secretaries in full service of the Ministry shall be 18.

Art. 4 The Ministry shall have the following 4 Bureaus:

- Asiatic Affairs Bureau.
- European and American Affairs Bureau.
- Commercial Affairs Bureau.
- Treaties and Conventions Bureau.
Art. 5  The Asiatic Affairs Bureau shall conduct affairs of foreign policy concerning China, Hongkong, MACAO, and Siam.

Art. 6  The European and American Affairs Bureau shall conduct affairs of foreign policies, excluding those conducted by the Asiatic Affairs Bureau.

Art. 7  The Commercial Affairs Bureau shall conduct affairs concerning commerce, navigation, and emigration.

Art. 8  The Treaties and Conventions Bureau shall conduct affairs concerning treaties and matters of laws and regulations governing international relations.

Art. 9  In order to conduct affairs on information, there will be an Information Board in the Ministry.

A chief shall be appointed over the same board.

The chief shall be an official of "CHOKUFUIN" rank.

(TN. A rank of Imperial Appointment)

The chief shall manage affairs of the same board, in compliance with orders of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Art. 10  In order to conduct affairs concerning cultural enterprises toward China a Cultural Enterprises Board will be set up within the Ministry.

A Chief shall be appointed over this board.

The Chief shall be an official of the "CHOKUFUIN" rank.

The Chief shall manage affairs of the same Board, in compliance with orders of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Art. 11  45 Administrative Officials and 8 Commissioners, all
DEF. DOC. #75

in full service of the Foreign Ministry shall be appointed in the Foreign Ministry.

The same officials shall be of the "SÔNIN rank." (TN. a rank appointed by Imperial approval) The same officials shall manage affairs under instructions of their senior officials.

Art. 12 7 Translator Officials in full service shall be appointed in the Ministry. The same officials shall be of the "SÔNIN rank." The same officials shall manage the translation of documents under instructions of their senior officials.

Art. 13 3 Telegraph Officials in full service shall be appointed in the Ministry. The same officials shall be of the "SÔNIN rank." The same officials shall manage matters concerning telegraphic codes, under instructions of their senior officials.

Art. 14 A Technical Official shall be of the "SÔNIN rank." The same official shall manage technical affairs under instructions of his senior officials.

Art. 15 The full number of clerks in full service of the Ministry shall be 152.

Art. 16 3 Probationary Translator Officials shall be appointed in the Ministry. The same officials shall be of "hannin" rank. (TN. minor rank) The same officials shall be engaged in the translation of documents and interpretation under instructions of their senior officials.

Art. 17 9 Assistant Technical Officials in full service shall be appointed in the Ministry. The same officials shall
be of the "hannin" rank. The same officials shall be engaged in telegraphic operation, construction, and other technical affairs.

Supplementary Provisions

This ordinance shall come into force on and after the day of promulgation.

The Foreign Ministry certifies here that the foregoing ordinance was effective from 1929 (4th year of Showa) till 1933 (8th year of Showa.)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese, consisting of 4 pages, remarked "SHIRATORI DOCUMENT Fo 2" and entitled Imperial Ordinance on the Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an exact and true copy of the Japanese original.

Signed at Tokyo on this 5th day of Sept., 1946

(signed) HAYASHI

Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Haraharu ODO

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation of the document described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 4th day of Nov., 1946
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

against

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: YATSUGI, Kazuo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

On this _7_ day of February, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT YATSUGI, Kazuo (seal)

I, SAKUMA, Shin, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of the witness.

Witness: (signed) SAKUMA, Shin (seal)
I have held the post of Secretary General of the Society for the Study of National Policy, for years. As I have testified at the Tribunal some time ago as a witness for the International Prosecution Section, this Society for the Study of National Policy is a purely private organization and it is neither an organ of the government nor a part of it. And Mr. SHIRATORI, TOSHIRO, was not a member of the same Society and had positively no relation with this Society.

In order to write a history of the World War and to collect materials for it, I made a round of calls on veterans and related persons of diplomacy in April, 1946 (21st Year of Showa), and borrowed various materials. Among the materials borrowed from ARITA, HACHIRO were included copies of private letters written by Mr. SHIRATORI, Toshio, who was then the Minister to Sweden, in November, 1935 (10th Year of Showa), and sent to Mr. ARITA, Hachiro, then Ambassador to Belgium. They were two letters of Mr. SHIRATORI, dated November 4 and November 12, and were copies and not originals. From these copies, I made other copies for my own use, and returned the copies.
Furthermore, I have never seen the originals of these letters.

(3) Afterwards my house was searched by members of the International Prosecution Section, and at the time, the above copies of the private letters written by Mr. SHIRATORI, namely, the "copies of the copies" were confiscated by the I. P. S. along with other documents. I read the documentary evidence 774 A of I. P. S. (I. P. S. document 2410A) and there was no doubt that they were those "copies of the copies" of the private letters of Mr. SHIRATORI which were confiscated from me.

(4) I read through those letters of Mr. SHIRATORI's on the demand of the I. P. S. and of the Defense Section, but I have not studied their contents. However, they were private letters, pure and simple, sent among friends, which fact could be discerned at a glance. They were not the official documents or semi-official documents sent among colleagues or from subordinates to superiors, and their composition and style obviously lacked that form which might be released for outsiders as well.
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and concealing nothing.

Yours truly, (Name)
Translation Certificate.

I, RICHARD S. Yonehiro, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in this certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Sgt. RICHARD S. Yonehiro

Tokyo, Japan
Date 25 Feb. 1947
CERTIFICATE

Tranlated by
Defense Language
Branch.

Former Foreign Minister, Hachiro born 21 September,
1884.

I hereby certify that the above-named was appointed Ambassador
to BELGIUM 2 November 8th year of Showa (TN: 1933); arrived at
his post at BRUSSELS 19 February 9th year of Showa (TN: 1934); ordered
home 16 November 10th year of Showa (TN: 1935) and left;
BRUSSELS 4 December of the same year (TN: 1935); arrived at
TOKYO 10 January 11th year of Showa (TN: 1936); appointed
Ambassador to CHINA 8 February of the same year (TN: 1936); left
TOKYO 22 February of the same year (TN: 1936) and arrived at his
post at SHANGHAI 26 February of the same year (TN: 1936).

TERAOKA, Koho (seal)
Chief of Personnel Section, Foreign Ministry’s Secretariat.

14 October 1946.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the Japanese original and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 26 Dec. 1946.
ERRATA SHEET
(Lef. Loc. #1929)

Page 1:
Line 3, read "reporter, Miss F. M. Knight".

Page 14:
Line 14, delete "the progress, and bear exhibit numbers at variance with".

Page 15:
Line 2, insert "reg" between "relations," and "Copy".

Page 19:
Line 7, read "fourth".

Page 25:
Line 20, read "Exhibit No. 1113".

Page 33:
Last line, read "rank".

Page 33:
Line 22, read "or information".

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America, et al.
against
ARAHI, Sadao, et al

WITNESS: General Eugen Ott
EXAMINING ATTORNEY: Charles B. Caudle, Counsel for Shiratori Toshio

Mr. Caudle, General, inasmuch as I understand you speak excellent English, I will carry on this interrogation in that language, in that neither the Reporter nor I speak German, if that is agreeable with you.

General Ott. It will be quite all right.

Q. General, will you please state your name, place of legal residence and place of present residence?
A. Eugen Ott, Legal residence, Icking, near Munich, Germany.
    Present residence, Peiping, China.

Q. Will you please state your present political status, and whether or not you are at present, or have at any time, been held in custody, or charged with any offence arising
out of your political activities prior to and during the war commonly known as "World War 2".

A. I am a German national, former German Ambassador to Japan. I am not now, nor have I ever been held in custody or charged with any offense arising from my political activities before and during the last War. However, when summoned to Tokyo by the Prosecution for interrogation, I was by mistake held in custody in Peiping for one night by the Chinese Police. This misunderstanding was straightened out the following day.

Q. Will you please state your official position with the German Government prior to your first visit to Japan.

A. I was an Army officer attached to the Reichshehr Ministry as Chief of the Political Department.

Q. Please state when you first arrived in Japan and in what official capacity.

A. I arrived in Japan in June 1933 as official observer for the German Army attached to the Japanese Army.

Q. How long did you remain at this time?

A. I remained until December 1933 and then returned to Germany.

Q. When did you next go to Japan and in what official capacity?

A. I went to Japan next in March 1934 as Military Attaché to the German Embassy in Tokyo.
Q. How long did you remain as Military Attaché, and what was your next official position?
A. I remained as Military Attaché until March 1938 and was next appointed German Ambassador to Japan in April 1938 after the recall of Ambassador von Dirksen.

Q. How long did you serve as German Ambassador to Japan and what official position did you occupy after being relieved of this assignment?
A. I served as German Ambassador until January 1943, and was then placed on the waiting list of Ambassadors. When my successor, Ambassador Stahler, had taken over my post, I moved my residence to Peking, China, where I have lived continuously since.

Q. Why did you not return to Germany at that time or thereafter?
A. I did not return to Germany at that time or thereafter because I had not got the permission to do so, although I made a number of requests to Hitler through the Reich's Foreign Minister to return by blockade running ship and to re-enter the German Army.

Q. General, as I have advised you, I am American Defense Counsel for Shiratori Toshio, one of the Japanese accused of alleged war crimes, now standing trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo.
Will you please state when, where and under what circumstances you first met the said accused.

A. I met Shiratori, as far as I remember, for the first time about October of November 1938, prior to his departure for Rome as Japanese Ambassador to Italy, on the occasion of a farewell dinner given by the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo.

Q. Prior to his departure to assume this post, did you at any time discuss with him in any capacity, either personal or official, the then pending or proposed alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

A. I never discussed with Shiratori, prior to his departure, any alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy. In fact at that time, I know of no negotiations having been started.

Q. When and under what conditions did you first learn of such negotiations?

A. I learnt of such negotiations first in April 1939 by the German Military Attaché, Colonel Matsky, to whom the Japanese Army had given a confidential hint.

Q. When and how were you first officially notified of this by your Government?

A. I was first officially notified by Ribbentrop in the latter part of April 1939 in response to my wired request for information about this subject.
Q. Will you please state what instructions were given to you at that time as to the activities you should take, and the course you should follow as to the said negotiations?

A. Ribbentrop instructed me at that time to keep strictly secret the personal information which he had wired to me, and to act as if I had never heard of it, if addressed by anyone, even by the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo. However, requested me to observe developments and to report accordingly.

Q. Please state when and under what circumstances you took the first active part in these negotiations and what activity you did take.

A. I took the first active part in those negotiations with the Japanese Government in May 1939 when the Japanese Foreign Minister handed over to me a letter from the Prime Minister, Hiranuma, to Hitler to be conveyed through the Reich's Foreign Minister. Upon request I forwarded this message.

Q. Did Shiratori communicate in any manner whatsoever with you during his stay in Europe?

A. No, I did not hear from Shiratori at any time during his stay in Europe.

Q. When and under what conditions did you meet Shiratori the second time?
I think I met him the second time after his return to Tokyo some time during the latter fall of 1939, at an official function given by the Italian Ambassador.

Q. How often did you meet him within the next several months after that?
A. I met him rarely.

Q. Did you discuss any political matters, and particularly the German-Japanese-Italian Alliance during these times?
A. Our meetings were social and I think that these matters were not discussed during that time.

Q. Please state if you know what official position Shiratori occupied on his return to Tokyo from Rome.
A. Shiratori was still nominally Japanese Ambassador to Italy, but in fact was relieved of every function of his post.

Q. Did Shiratori take any part in the German-Japanese-Italian negotiations during the time from his return to Tokyo until he was officially relieved of his Ambassadorship in early 1941?
A. No. All negotiations had been stopped after the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939.

Q. Please explain the condition of German-Japanese relations immediately after the signing of the German-Russian Pact and during the months that ensued.
A. The conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact struck Japan as a surprising blow, and caused the resignation of the Hiranuma Cabinet. All negotiations with Germany about the Alliance were stopped, and relations between Germany and Japan cooled down to a low degree. This situation existed until about the late spring of 1940, when the development of the War in Europe began to reflect in a changed Japanese mind. I might also say that the strong economic measures taken by the Government of the United States against Japan contributed likewise to this change of the Japanese mind.

Q. Please state if you know the official position or status of Shiratori upon being relieved of his Ambassadorial post, and further, if you know how long or to what date he remained in such a status.

A. I learnt that he was placed on the waiting list of Ambassadors about three months after his return to Tokyo, at a reduced salary. He kept this status until late August 1940 when he was appointed Adviser to the Foreign Minister. I might add that it is the normal procedure to retain Chiefs of Mission for three months after recall in their former official status in order to assist financial readjustment, as it was the same upon my retirement.
Q. Did you have any official relations with him during this time?
A. I had no official relations with Shiratori during this time. I saw him occasionally in a private capacity.

Q. Was the Alliance for which the various Governments worked during the period up to this date ever concluded?
A. The principal aim of the Alliance negotiated for up to that time was a defensive pact against Russia. Such an alliance was never concluded.

Q. When was the Alliance known as the Tripartite Pact concluded, and what were its aims?
A. The Three-Power Pact was concluded on 27th September 1940. Its principal aim was a defensive pact against an attack upon the partners. It was especially expressed that the existing relations with Russia would not be affected by it. Therefore, under the existing conditions, this primarily involved the United States.

Q. Was it ever the intention and purpose of this pact which created this Three-Power Alliance that the parties thereto, in cooperation with each other, would conquer the entire world?
A. No such intention was ever mentioned to me.

Q. Inasmuch as Shiratori became an official advisor to the Japanese Foreign Office in late August 1940 and the
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Three-Power Alliance was concluded in late September 1940, is it not true that he occupied his new position for a period of only one month prior to the conclusion of the treaty?

A. Yes.

Q. General, I have with me various copies of papers introduced as evidence before the Tribunal by the Prosecution, those being communications between you and your Government in Berlin. I will show you each of those copies and with your permission I would like to ask you some questions relating to them. Although those documents were introduced into evidence at various stages of the trial now under progress, and bear exhibit numbers at variance with the progress, and bear exhibit numbers at variance with the dates of same, I will, for the sake of clarity and expeditiency, present them to you in their chronological order for your answers and comments. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 502, a communication to you dated 26th April 1939 from the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop. Will you please read this document and explain the contents thereof. (Copy of paper was handed to Witness.)

A. This is a document I referred to previously. It informed me for the first time about the negotiations for conclusion of a defensive alliance going on between Germany, Italy and Japan. It is evident therefore that these
negotiations had been started already in the summer of 1938 without my knowledge.

Q. This, then, is the message you received from Ribbentrop in answer to your inquiry concerning the negotiations. Upon receipt of this communication what action did you take, if any?

A. I took no action. As I have already explained, I had been instructed not to enter into any activities except observation and reporting of developments, as you will find in the last part of this document.

Q. Did any of your observations disclose any activity on the part of the Japanese Government in Tokyo which may have resulted from any acts or communications from Shiratori in this regard?

A. I do not remember hearing Shiratori mentioned by the Japanese side.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 503, dated 4th May 1939, the same being a communication from you to the German Foreign Office. Will you please explain what this document is and for what purpose it was dispatched.

A. This is the message of Prime Minister Hiranuma, referred upon before, when I first took part in the negotiations with the Japanese Government. It was dispatched on May
4th 1939, in an effort to break the deadlock in the negotiations, at the request of the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 504, dated 5th May 1939, and direct your attention to the paragraph thereof which I will quote, due to its briefness. It reads as follows:

"From the Foreign Ministry a senior official who stands especially close to Ambassador Shiratori, let me know personally that, in the entire Government a deep clef between friends and enemics of the alliance had formed."

I presume that this was one of the causes of the deadlock just referred to. (Copy handed to Witness.)

A. I think so.

Q. Who was this person?

A. As far as I can remember, this person was either Matsushima or Kurihara, both senior members of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

Q. Do you know where he obtained this information?

A. No, but I presume it came from the discussions in the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo.

Q. At that time was not Shiratori in Europe?

A. Yes, he was.
Q. Then, why did you mention the name of Shiratori in this message?

A. I mentioned the name of Shiratori for the reason that it might add to the weight of the report in the mind of the German Foreign Minister.

Q. I now hand you a copy of Exhibit No. 2198 dated 11th August 1939, from you to the German Foreign Office, relating to information given you by General Hachijiri relative to conditions in the then Cabinet as pertains to German-Japanese-Italian relations, and conveying communications from the then Japanese War Minister.

You will find that this document states in the second paragraph of Section 3 thereof that, for reasons enumerated in the communication, the War Minister would risk his resignation as a last resort in the furtherance of better relations, which would also certainly entail the resignation of Ambassadors Oshima and Shiratori.

(Copy handed to Witness.)

Also on page 2 of this document you will note that you stated in paragraph 2 thereof that it was imperative that a decision in reply to the concessions demanded be made by August 15th, 1939, the same being within four days, and that the War Minister would communicate the measure he had taken direct to Oshima and Shiratori, by-passing
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the Foreign Minister.
First I will ask you about the second part of your message referred to, but please read the entire message before I proceed.

Do you know whether or not it was the usual practice of the War Minister to by-pass the Foreign Ministry in communicating with Shiratori?

A. This is the only case I was informed of when the War Minister by-passed the Foreign Ministry in communication with Shiratori about those negotiations.

Q. Why was this unusual procedure followed, if you know?

A. It is obvious that it was a matter of extreme urgency because the answer had been requested within four days. By sending through the usual channels, there was a possibility of delay.

Q. As to the first part of this message referred to, what thereafter happened?

A. I have no knowledge of what happened immediately after that, but on August 52th the Japanese Cabinet resigned, following the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia. Afterwards all negotiations between the Three Powers ceased, as I have previously pointed out.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No.408, dated September 8th 1939, the same being a communication from you to your Government, wherein the last four lines read as follows:

-13-
"The ambassador in Moscow (misprint - 'Rome')
Shiratori, will return from Rome since at that time he had taken up the post of Ambassador purely in the expectation that he would succeed in concluding an Italian-Japanese-German Military Alliance."

Do you know of your own knowledge, or had you ever been officially, or even semi-officially, advised that he was appointed for this specific purpose? (Copy handed to Witness.)

A. No.

Q. Do you know to your own knowledge, or had you ever been officially, or even semi-officially, advised that he took this post at Rome with any expectation whatsoever of concluding this alliance?

A. No.

Q. Then this information communicated in this document must have been based on hearsay. Is that correct?

A. I think so.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 507 dated 9th September 1939, the same being a communication from von Ribbentrop to you in Tokyo, wherein it is stated on the second page, at the end of the second paragraph, that -- "Shiratori, who will soon return to Tokyo from his post as Ambassador in Rome, will also work in this idea," which, from the
other parts of the document, I assume the idea being of
better Russo-Japanese relations. Copy handed to Witness.
As you have previously stated that you only saw Shiratori
very rarely, and then only at social functions, at which
times no political talks of any nature took place, and
further that your first private talk with him took place
the latter part of February 1940 upon the visit of Mr.
Stahmer to Tokyo, Shiratori did not take the active part
predicted by Ribbentrop. Is that correct?
A. As far as I know, and as far as the German Embassy is
concerned, he did not.

Q. I now hand you Exhibit No. 511, dated 23rd February 1940,
the same being a communication to your Foreign Office
signed "Stahmer-Ott", wherein the first paragraph, first
sentence, reads:

"After my arrival here I found such Japanese already
known to me as Oshima, Shiratori, TerSuchi, Ishii,
etc., in an unchanged, friendly attitude, and ready
for every support."

(Copy handed to Witness.)

General, this message seems to have been sent by Mr.
Stahmer, however it is signed, "Stahmer-Ott". Will you
please explain how this occurred?

A. The message was sent by Mr. Stahmer, but due to the regula-
tions for sending of cyphor telegrams from the German
Mission abroad to the Home Government, the Chief of Mission had always to sign such a telegram for expedition.

Q. You at that time were the Chief of the German Mission in Japan. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Please explain under what circumstances you gentlemen saw Shiratori.
A. As far as I remember, Mr. Stahmer paid a private visit in my company to Shiratori, due to the instructions of Ribbentrop to get in touch with the personal acquaintances of Ribbentrop in Japan.
Q. What was meant by the phraseology, "in an unchanged, friendly attitude", and "ready for every support"?
A. Stahmer was anxious to confirm Ribbentrop that the overall attitude towards Germany at that time prevailing in Japan had not changed the attitude of the people mentioned in this message, and so he stressed their readiness for every support for better Japanese-German relations, without having made any special arrangement for it.
Q. What was the occasion of Mr. Stahmer's visit to Tokyo?
A. Mr. Stahmer was attached as a representative of Ribbentrop to the mission of the Duke of Saxo-Coburg-Gotha, sent to Japan and the United States of America at that time. This mission was sent to Japan in order to present the
congratulations of Hitler on the occasion of the 2,000th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire, and was sent to the United States as a goodwill mission to the Red Cross Society.

Q. Did Shiratori after this take any more active part in furthering German-Japanese relations than before?

A. No, did not, as far as I knew, until the late spring of 1940, when both the war events in Europe and the American commercial measures enforced upon Japan were changing gradually the Japanese mind, as I stated previously.

Q. Is it not true that during all of this time, and even up to the very last part of August 1939, Shiratori still occupied no official status other than that of being on the Ambassadorial waiting list, as brought out before, and could not have taken, or carried on, any official activity in this regard?

A. That is correct.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 51C, dated 12th June 1940, from you to your Government, wherein you speak of Japanese-American relations among other matters, and call your special attention to the second, third and fourth paragraphs thereof. Will you please explain in detail just what you mean by the same, covering historical background, Japanese psychology and existing conditions.
at the time the communication was sent. (Copy handed to witness.)

A. The background of this report of June 12th 1940 is as follows:

The collapse of France was obviously imminent, and the British situation was very precarious, centring round Dunkirk. The only effective relief which might keep up the resistance power of England, and work against the early settlement of the War, could come from the United States of America, and was asked from them very urgently. Therefore the German Government endeavoured to hamper such a relief, and considered as a useful way, a continued tension in the Pacific area, which might prevent the United States from removing their attention and fighting forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

It was a complicated matter to advance such a policy upon Japan because the Japanese attitude was much divided, as it is given in the first part of my report. In this situation I got instructions to back an Italian protest obviously against an Japanese measure in favour of the United States and contrary to the Italian interests - I do not recall the case exactly. When I presented my objections to the Reich Government's intentions I had to avoid the permanent distrust of Ribbentrop that I
was intended to black his own. Therefore I stressed in paragraph 3 and 4 of my report that I was working in my own way and pointed to the cooperation of Shiratori and other Japanese persons known to Ribbentrop in order to impress him and to succeed in my objections.

Q. Did you mean in the fourth paragraph of this document, that the Ministry, Oshima and Shiratori worked together in a common programme, based upon a mutual understanding and common agreement, and if so, what was the aim?

A. No, I did not mean that because there was no such agreement.

Q. What, if anything, did Shiratori do in this regard?

A. Shiratori, as far as I knew, warned by private talks, and sometimes by the press, against the courting of the United States after they had enforced hard economic measures upon Japan.

Q. Was this a part of a concerted plan taken by him, Oshima and you?

A. No, it was not a common plan. I had only private talks with each of them separately, and Oshima kept himself much apart from political activities during his stay in Japan.

Q. Were you ever in the company of Shiratori and Oshima at the same time for the purpose of carrying out this?
A. No, I was not.

Q. Then why do you state that there was close cooperation between you?

A. As I stated before, I used this expression in order to give weight to the message, and to carry through my objections. I might add that I used the names of Konoyo and Suotsugu for the same reason.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 523, dated 24th June 1940, the same being a communication from you to your Foreign Office, wherein, in paragraph 3, you state:

"Also Ambassador Shiratori, who is more frequently named as the coming Foreign Minister advocated a Non-Aggression Pact with Russia in an interview yesterday with Yomuri." (Copy handed to Witness)

What, or who, is Yomuri?

A. "Yomuri" is the name of a Tokyo Newspaper.

Q. What was Shiratori's official status at that time?

A. Shiratori was still on the waiting list of Ambassadors.

Q. I now hand you a copy of Exhibit No. 538 dated 2nd August 1940, another of your communications to your Government, wherein the second paragraph states:

"Ambassador Shiratori informed confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister."
It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent Advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes that he can exercise a far-reaching influence in this capacity." (Copy handed to Witness)

Did he receive such an appointment, and if so, did he at any time, to your knowledge exercise a far-reaching influence in that capacity?

A. Yes, he did get the appointment as permanent Advisor to the Foreign Minister, but to my knowledge he did not exercise a far-reaching influence in such a capacity, as later developments, especially during the negotiations for a conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, proved.

Q. Do you know the difference in importance between Vice Foreign Minister and Advisor to the Foreign Minister, that is the duties, responsibilities and influence of the two respective positions? If so, please describe.

A. Yes, I know the difference from my own experience. By my official relations with several Vice Foreign Ministers of Japan I realized that a Vice Foreign Minister was the permanent representative of the Foreign Minister in all dealings with Foreign Missions, which the Foreign Minister did not take up personally. Furthermore, he was responsible for the administration and personal matters of the Ministry. I think that his position is
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comparable to the Under Secretary of State of the United States. The Adviser had none of those functions, and his effectiveness depended upon the personal influence he had with the Foreign Minister.

Q. Do you know whether or not Shiratori had any personal influence with Matsukata, the then Foreign Minister, and if so, please state.

A. I did not observe such an influence, even during the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact.

Q. Did you ever have occasion to learn, or know of, the nature of the personal relationship between Matsukata and Shiratori?

A. I occasionally got the impression of a certain mistrust between Matsukata and Shiratori by some remarks they made to me about each other.

Q. Do you mean by that, General, that both Matsukata and Shiratori were critical of each other during private conversations with you?

A. Yes, that I mean.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 548, dated 23rd August 1940, being another of your cables to your Foreign Office. I call your attention specifically to paragraph 2 which reads as follows:

"With the aim of further preparation of suitable
action for the adjustment of state affairs on an authoritarian model, the Government had formed a commission of 24 leading personalities. Ambassador Shiratori was appointed the representative for foreign political matters in the Commission.

The Commission consists mostly of followers of the reform movement and of the policy of cooperation with the Axis Powers which is constantly demanded by this movement."

(Copy handed to Witness.)

Where did you get this information?

A. By that time there were various rumours about interior measures taken by the new Cabinet. The reported formation of a commission was one of these rumours.

Q. Were you ever informed, even remotely, who else comprised this Commission?

A. No, I was never informed in that way.

Q. After dispatching this message, did you ever hear again of such a commission or of any of its activities?

A. No, I have to consider that information reported by me was erroneous.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 562, dated 31st January 1941, to the Reich Foreign Minister, wherein the third paragraph states as follows:
"In contrast to this, activist circles demand preventive attack on Singapore as the key position in the West Pacific Ocean. They expect to deprive America by a surprise action of the possibility of military warfare in the Pacific Ocean or to render it difficult. This minority group is under the leadership of Admiral Suetsugu, Ambassador Shiratori, and has the support of the young officers' corps and individual high leaders of the Army and Navy."

(Copy handed to Witness.)

Then by a "preventive attack" on Singapore, it was the idea that, by so doing, it would preclude America from entering the Pacific War, or at least make it more difficult for her to do so. Is that correct?

A. I was informed that was the idea.

Q. Where did you get all this information?

A. I got this information during the month of January 1941, from different members of the German Embassy, and from a number of Japanese of various kinds with whom I had private talks. As the report points out in the first paragraph, it was a time of heightened political tension, therefore a lot of sharp political discussions were going on.

Q. Were those talks considered official in any way?

A. No, they were private talks.
Q. Were you ever afforded any proof of Shiratori being a leader among such a group?
A. I was not afforded such a proof.
Q. Then this information is without basis of Fact. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 1073, dated 18th May 1941, another of your communications to your Foreign Minister.
(Copy handed to Witness.)
General, you state in the last sentence of this communication that the Activist Group is at present weakened by the serious illness of Shiratori, yet in response to my questions on Exhibit No. 562 you state that you had no proof of Shiratori being a leader of the Activist Group, and finally concluded that information you had to this effect was without basis of fact. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. General, I now hand you Exhibit No. 113, dated 7th July 1941, which is another communication to your Foreign Minister.
(Copy handed to Witness.)
Please read this carefully before answering.
Where was Shiratori residing at the time of this visit?
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A. Shiratori was residing at Hayama which is a seaside resort about two hours drive from Tokyo.

Q. Was this visit of a special nature?

A. No. I went many times in the summer to the seaside near Hayama where I had my own villa, as many Foreign diplomats had. On one of those occasions I visited Shiratori. The way to his residence was a circuit of just five minutes on the way to my own villa.

Q. It appears from your communication that you had been directed by your Foreign Minister to convey to Shiratori his best wishes for his recovery.

A. I think that is correct.

Q. However, as you stated, you did not make a special trip to this place for this purpose, but chanced to go by during your visit to your own villa. Is that correct?

A. I think so.

Q. At the time you saw Shiratori you stated in your communication that he was very ill, and stated at length as to the nature of his illness, as explained to you by him. Did you know at the time of this visit that his real and most serious illness was of a mental nature?

A. No, I reported his suffering from kidney trouble, as I had been informed. I found out later, however, that it was really of a mental nature.
Q. Then the information you received first of the nature of his illness was, to all intents and purposes, an effort to cover up the real nature of the illness, both by him and his friends.

A. I think that this wrong information was mainly due to the well-known shyness of the Japanese with regard to giving any particulars of their personal conditions.

Q. From your observations what was his mental condition at this time?

A. At this time he gave me the impression of being mentally tired.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 800, dated 1st August 1941, which I ask you to read carefully. With whom was this conversation that you reported? (Copy handed to Witness)

A. I held this conversation with Minister Secretary Yamamoto, commissioned with the affairs of the Vice Foreign Minister.

Q. Was Shiratori present at this time?

A. No. I pointed out in this report that I had visited Shiratori during the past days in his place of convalescence, and as far as I know, he was still there at this time.

Q. Was this a special visit or another visit similar to the previous one?

A. It was another visit similar to the previous one.
Q. Did any of the ideas advanced by Yamamoto ever materialize?

A. Insofar as I know, they did not.

Q. I now hand you copy of Exhibit No. 608, dated 5th December 1941, being another cable from you to your Foreign Office, the fourth paragraph of which reads as follows:

"Shiratori explained to me that the leading circles of Japan have come to the conclusion that Roosevelt wants now to enter the war by means of a conflict in the Far East. From various sides the opinion has been advocated that the United States are now sure of the coalition of the ABCD States and Russia which has been striven for more than ten years. Therefore Roosevelt believes that the moment for a settlement has come since one cannot be certain of the adherence of those states in the future."

(Copy handed to Witness.)

This paragraph appears to me to be a little confusing as to whether or not Shiratori gave all the expressions contained therein. Will you please state whether or not the entire paragraph relates to Shiratori, and if not, state what part of the same does relate to him.

A. Only the first sentence refers to Shiratori.

Q. Do you recall where you saw Shiratori at this time?
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A. I do not recall that.

Q. Is it possible that it was another visit to his seaside villa?

A. It is possible.

Q. Did you consider at this time and did you report to your Government that you thought Shiratori had recovered from this mental illness.

A. He still appeared to be in a state of convalescence, and I do not think I reported to my Government that he had recovered, at this time or before.

Q. Under those circumstances, and particularly as he occupied no position whatsoever with the Government at that time, did you consider that he meant to convey to you that "leading circles" meant the official attitude of the Government?

A. No. It will appear from the fact that I cited the Foreign Ministry's information and attitude in all other parts of this report.

Q. General, in going through these various exhibits, I find that one of the same, namely Exhibit No. 578, dated 25th March 1941, being your "Note on Situation in Japan", sent from a train in Germany to the Reich's Foreign Minister, wherein you digressed on a proposed attack by Japan upon Singapore, was inadvertently not placed chronologically with the other exhibits.
your permission, I will question you as to this document now.

(Copy handed to Witness.)

You state in this Exhibit, "Ambassador Shiratori stressed also the necessity to tie up the British Fleet." Is it correct, as I have stated, that this note was sent while you were in Germany?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the occasion of your being in Germany at this time?

A. I was called by my Government to be present during the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka to Berlin.

Q. Where was Shiratori at this time?

A. Shiratori was in Japan.

Q. Please state where, when, and the circumstances of your meeting and conversation with him in this regard.

A. I met him some time, probably in February 1941, during a farewell visit before I left for Germany.

Q. Was this meeting of an official nature?

A. No, it was not of an official nature, but purely personal.

Q. Is it not true that Shiratori was a career diplomat, and at no time saw any service either in the Japanese Army or Navy?

A. As far as I know, that is correct.

Q. Then the opinion expressed by him was only that of a
layman, and not the opinion of a man versed in military tactics. Is that correct?

A. That is correct. The same opinion had been voiced to me during that period by other laymen.

Q. General, I hand you a copy of Exhibit No. 1272, dated 17th May 1942, which is a communication to your Government recommending various German decorations. Will you please describe or explain the German protocol in awarding decorations to foreign nationals, and the circumstances surrounding this recommendation. (Copy handed to Witness.)

A. For awarding German decorations the recommendations had to be made to Hitler by his Chancellory, which got the proposals from the various Reich Ministries, as the Foreign Ministry, War Ministry, etc. Minister von Ribbentrop was, for himself and for his personal favorites, rather anxious to get foreign decorations, and became very angry when he considered the Japanese Government too reluctant in bestowing a sufficient number of decorations upon German people. He succeeded in blocking in the Reich Government every award of decorations for Japanese for a considerable time. Consequently the Japanese side became very insistent, and stressed the striking contrast with the Italian practice, where there
was a sumptuous flow of decorations.  
In order to break this deadlock troubling the atmosphere in Tokyo, I eventually presented to Ribbentrop a list wherein I recommended decorations to be bestowed on the second anniversary of the Tripartite Pact in September 1942.

From what you say, it would appear that officials of both Governments were jealous of their respective departments, and there was somewhat of a contest as to who could get the most decorations or medals to add to already crowded tunics.

A. Yes, it was proved from my own experience.

Q. Please explain the circumstances of your recommendation of Shiratori for the Great Cross, the German decoration.

A. The German Protocol had provided that the Great Cross is the only class of decoration for which a person of Ambassador's rank is eligible. As this fact was well known to the Japanese Board of Decorations, the bestowal of a lesser decoration would have been considered by the Japanese side principally as most unfavourable, as my long experience proved. I recommended Shiratori on this occasion of a decorations list for the Tripartite Pact because he was personally known to Ribbentrop, and had been the Adviser to the Foreign Minister at the time of the conclusion of the pact, in order to lessen the opposition of the Reich's Foreign minister against the
Q. General, from later developments do you think that the efforts of Shiratori, and particularly the results of such efforts to further Japanese-German relations, deserved the award given to him?

A. I am sorry, but I must say that I do not think so.

Q. Were other recommendations made for awards in commemoration of the conclusion of the Tripartite pact, and were such awards bestowed?

A. Yes. For instance, Foreign Minister Matsuoka had been decorated previously. Mr. Saito Yoshio, another Advisor to Matsuoka during the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact, had been recommended and decorated at the same time as Shiratori with the Great Cross. I think that there were others but I do not recall their names.

Q. What was the usual procedure of the Japanese with regard to these people designated or recommended for consideration of awards by them?

A. When we discussed with the Japanese side confidentially before recommendations went to the Reich Government, they usually suggested the distribution of decorations among higher ranking personalities and some of lesser rank in order not to create dissatisfaction.
Q. General, one of my associate American Defense Counsels, Mr. James N. Freeman, Counsel for General Kenry Sato, asked me to enquire about the circumstances of your recommendation of General Sato for the German award of the Distinguished Service Cross with Stars. Will you please state why and under what circumstances this recommendation was made.

A. The recommendation of General Sato and others was made by the German Military Attaché upon the insistence of the Japanese Army, which had become rather angry because no award of German decorations had been given for a considerable time. I backed the recommendation of General Sato due to his official position. He was, at that time of our common war, the Chief of the Section of the Japanese Army where the liaison with the German Embassy was conducted.

Q. General, I have questioned you about the aforesaid communications sent by, or received by you, to or from your Government, wherein the name of Shiratori was mentioned, numbering about 16 to 18. From these communications the Prosecution has endeavored to show the important position of Shiratori in the Japanese Government, and the influence he had on its policies. These wires covered a period of from April 1939 to May 1942, approximately.
three years. During this period will you please state approximately how many communications you sent from Tokyo to your Government.

A. In this period I sent about 6,000 cypher telegrams to my Government. The number of the message is given at the head of each. Every first of January the numeration began with a new Fr. 1.

Q. During this period approximately how many did you receive from your Government?

A. In this period I received from my Government between 3,000 to 4,000 cypher telegrams.

Q. Then is it not true that, comparable to the number of those sent and received, Shiratori was referred to in an unimportant number of the same?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you not mention Shiratori's name in some of your telegrams to Berlin where the name of some other person would have answered the purpose?

A. Yes.

Q. The Prosecution accuses Shiratori of furnishing important information to Germany through your Embassy. Did he ever furnish you with any news of information at all concerning an important policy or decision of his Government, or any state secret in general?
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Q. Have you ever furnished any news or information of this kind to the German Embassy.

A. No, as Shiratori in occupation of any important position in Tokyo during the whole of your sojourn in Japan?

Q. Was Shiratori in occupation of any important position in Tokyo during the whole of your sojourn in Japan?

A. Not that I know of, during my personal acquaintance with him, except as advisor to the Foreign Minister.

Q. Did he appear to you to have any influence in important affairs of state, or to carry any weight with Foreign Minister Natsuka in this position?

A. No, as I have pointed out before.

Q. Was his position not rather that of a person in opposition to the Government of the day?

A. I heard him several times criticise in a most outspoken manner measures announced by the Japanese Government.

Q. Was he not forward in expressing his personal views?

A. Yes, he appeared sometimes to be a rather talkative man.

Q. From later developments, and proven facts and events as you know them now, did Shiratori ever, during your acquaintance with him carry any weight with his Government, or influence the policies thereof, either foreign or domestic?

A. During my acquaintance with him in Tokyo, I must say "No."

Q. Will you please make a general statement as to your personal relationship with Ribbentrop, and state whether
or not such relations had any bearing on your communications to him, and why.

A. The relations between Germany and Japan went up and down several times during the years of my own experience, 1934-1943. When the Japanese Government, in the fact of dramatic changes and actions in the German policy, acted in their own way, Ribbentrop reacted often with marked distrust and decision. He had a strong tendency for "wishful thinking", and for overlooking the facts and forces upon which the Japanese Government used to base their decisions.

When I often tried to moderate the views and instructions of Ribbentrop, I awakened a mounting distrust and suspicion that my attitude was influenced by undue consideration of those Japanese tendencies which were either indifferent or opposed to friendly relations between Japan and Germany, and that I had not sufficient contact with other groups of the political Japanese life.

I had to presume that this opinion of Ribbentrop would spoil the success of my moderating work, and drive him even more to other sources of information which were more in line with his own ideas.

In order to avoid such a development, I carried on personal relations with the few Japanese who were
personally known to Ribbentrop, and whom I had therefore been instructed to contact.

I mentioned these people, among them Ambassador Shiratani, and stressed their cooperation on occasions, especially when I tried to give weight to my opinions or suggestions contrasting Ribbentrop's ideas or instructions or when it seemed necessary to confirm him that my report covered the situation from every point of view.

Q. General, was there ever any real cooperation between the German and Japanese Governments in the conduct of the War, as to Military and economic operations?

A. No, there was no real cooperation in either respect, particularly compared with the combined strategy and Long-Lease operations of the Allied Nations. The Tripartite Pact provided for a Commission which did not set to work until Japan had entered the War. Afterwards, in January 1942, an agreement was concluded in Berlin which fixed the respective separate spheres of military operations between Japan, Germany and Italy. In the military field there was only an occasional exchange of blue prints or samples of newly developed weapons or other instruments of warfare and of expert personnel during my presence in Japan.

In the economic field there was the transport of raw materials to Germany via the Siberian Railway, and
afterwards when this line was stopped by the Russo-German war, by blockade running German and Italian ships. This transport collapsed, after heavy losses, as far as I heard, about the end of 1943.

Q. General, I have been requested by another Defense Counsel, Mr. William Logan, Counsel for Marquis Kido, the former Lord Kooper of the Privy Seal, and also one of the accused, to inquire about the nature of the relations between the Marquis and the German Government. Will you please state whether or not you know the Marquis and what relations in your official capacity did you have with him.

A. I had no relations with him in my official capacity because his official position did not cover any contact with the Foreign Missions. As far as I remember, I met him occasionally during Imperial ceremonies or big social functions of the Japanese Government.

Q. Will you please state if you know what the attitude of the German Government was towards the Marquis?

A. The attitude of the Reich Government towards Marquis Kido was one of distrust. He was considered as belonging to the group which did not favour the improvement of the Japanese-German relations, primarily under the leadership of the Minister of the Imperial Household,
Matsudaira, I considered Kido in line with Matsudaira's views, and this feeling was shared in Berlin.

/\S/ Eugen Ott
/\T/ EUGEN OTT

EUGEN OTT, after being firstduly sworn doooses and says that he has read the foregoing interrogation of him by Charles B. Caudle, consisting of pages, and that he has affixed to each page thereof his signature, and further that this document contains the identical questions asked and the identical answers given in response thereto, further that the answers so given are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

/\S/ Eugen Ott
/\T/ EUGEN OTT

Sworn and subscribed to by me
this the eighteenth day of
May 1947.
/\S/ Ralph E. Johnson, Capt, C.E.
0298664 U.S. Army
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: UGAKI, Issai

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. I was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Konoye Cabinet from May 26 to September 29, 1938.

2. Toward the end of August of that year, Premier Konoye suggested to me the appointment to vice-ministership of Foreign Affairs of Mr. Shiratori Toshio who was then on the waiting list as a minister plenipotentiary. While I had no desire to remove the then vice-minister, I thought it a pity to leave Mr. Shiratori so long without any assignment. I therefore requested him to call on me and asked him if he would accept the post of Ambassador to Italy. He showed reluctance at first, but consented a few days later. He was formally installed.
In deciding upon this appointment, it was no part of my consideration to specifically make Mr. Shiratori conduct a negotiation looking to strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, nor to let him in any way put forth special efforts to induce Italy to participate in such a new agreement. In offering him the Rome post, therefore, no mention whatever, was made of this matter.

As a matter of fact at that time the question of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact had been brought to the notice of the Japanese government merely in the form of information from German quarters. It was by no means a formal overture through the German Ambassador in Tokyo or from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, but was conveyed to us by our Military Attache in Berlin as a piece of information. The whole matter was still at a quite unofficial and sounding stage. It is true that the Government decided to launch into a tentative negotiation, but no mature study had yet been made, nor a final conclusion reached at that time, I for myself was of the opinion that the question of strengthening or amplifying the Anti-Comintern Pact was one centering upon the prevention of the communistic revolution of the world and that consequently it was a matter solely of
what measures should be adopted vis-a-vis the communistic powers of the world. I believed that whether the strengthening or amplifying of the Pact should stop at mutual political assistance or should embrace military assistance as well should be studied on that major premise and determined through negotiation on that general line.

The problems that lay nearest my heart as Foreign Minister, however, was the solution of the China affair, which, in my opinion, was the most urgent need of the time. That I had accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs was in fact mainly for the purpose of tackling this all-important problem. Compared to this, the question of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact was a rather minor consideration with me. That is why I did not specifically discuss it with Mr. Shiratori in assigning him to Rome.

5. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Shiratori left Tokyo for Rome some time after I had resigned as Foreign Minister.

On this 6th day of May, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ UGAKI, Isseti (seal)

- 3 -
I, HIROTA, Yoji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ HIROTA, Yoji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ UOAKI, Isao (seal)
大賞に於いて、時日は即時印 textured to-day かつたが、東に気を遣わして居らぬ馬車は借りる
と故に、白楽氏に會見して駐伊大使に詰出するに到り、故
初は受諾を謝て居たが、敵日後承諾したので、同年九月二十二日附で
正式に授命命令された。

三
私は右任命に際し、白楽氏に反応特に日獨防共協定強化交　
渉の請に當つて質せふと、又はこの協定に伊太利を引込む為に努力せ　　
ようか言ふ考は全然無かったから、白楽氏に就任引受を勧告した時に　　
て、或は私に於いて、當時日本政府をしては當時防共協定強化の問題は極乙　　
面からの努力としては非公式な、且つ所要の段階にあつたに過ぎ　　
否けず、日本政府をしては防共協定強化の問題は、世界に於ける共産主義国に　　
おついては、共産主義国に対する對應策の問題であり、強化の程度が政　　
治的に止むか、軍事援助たる進むかは、其の後の研究交渉によって　　
之を定まるべきものと考えて居たのであつた。
問題と考えて居り、実際外務大臣を引受けたのもその解決に當る為に付け白鳥氏と何等の談話を交えたやうなことはなかった。昭和二十二年五月八日於東京出發したのは私が外務大臣を退めて

白鳥氏が伊太利赴任の為東京を出發したのと大分後のことを記憶する。右は當立會人前にて宣誓供述し且つ署名捺印したることを証明しまし

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成東膠脙軍事裁判所辯護人

二
Despatched from Rome, Jan. 10, p.m.
Received at the Foreign Office Jan. 11, a.m.

To: Foreign Minister ARITA
From: Ambassador SHIRATORI

No. 3

I presented credentials on the morning of Jan. 10.
The particulars will be given by post.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAORU HAYASHI, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "Shiratori Document No. 15" is a true and correct copy of the official document in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 29th day of Oct., 1946

(Signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagaharu ODO

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 25 February 1947
January 19th, 1939  
(The 14th year of SHOWA)

SUBJECT: Report concerning the Presentation of Credentials

TO: Mr. ARITA, Hachiro, Foreign Minister

FROM: SHIRATORI, Toshio, Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassodor
       Plienihtentiary to ITALY

I report as follows on the above-mentioned subject:

I arrived at my post on 29th December last year. On the 31st of the same month, informally paying an inaugural call to Foreign Minister CHIKU, I handed to him the copies of my credentials and the letter of call of former Ambassador Hatta and asked him to arrange for me an audience with the King in order that I might present them. He requested the Chief Chamberlain to inform me of the convenience of the Court. On 9th January, a chamberlain formally called and informed me that it had been decided that the ceremony of the presentation of the credentials would be held on the 10th at 11:30 a.m. On the said day, therefore, after the chamberlain who was sent to guide me had arrived, I started for the Royal Palace attended by the members of the Embassy staff, the military and naval officers, their assistants and the flight officer, --- riding in four coaches sent round from the Court. Arriving at the Palace we passed through the inner garden of the Palace and the court-rooms where the guards of
honour were lined up, and entering the antechamber, we exchanged courtesies with the court officials and the military aide-de-camp to the King who were awaiting our arrival. Led by the Vice-Chief Chamberlain, I entered the audience-chamber and presented the credentials and the letter of recall. (There was no attendance on the King.)

Granted the King's greeting, I said to him: "The first thing I should like to tell you is that before leaving my country, I was received in audience by His Majesty the Emperor to take my farewell and the Emperor specially requested me to convey his best regards to Your Majesty." While listening to this, he seemed to be extremely pleased. Then he said: "I am heartily grateful to hear that the Emperor who stayed at this Palace on the occasion of his visit to this country 18 years ago still remembers me." Then he added humorously: "Because of the friendly relations now existing between JAPAN and ITALY, yours, I think, is a very fortunate position." Then he inquired concerning the internal situation of JAPAN, especially the circumstances of the CHINA AFFAIR and some other matters.

Thus about a quarter of an hour passed. Obtaining the King's permission I introduced to him the members of the Embassy staff who were waiting in the other room. The King offered his hand to each of them. So the ceremony was finished and taking leave of the King, I withdrew and left the Palace with my attendants and came back to the Embassy.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAORU HAYASHI, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and remarked "Shiratori Document No. 16" and entitled "Report of the Presentation of Credentials" is a true and correct copy of the official document in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 29th day of Oct., 1946

K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: Na aheru ODO

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarko, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarko

Tokyo, Japan
Date 23 Jan., 1947
EXCERPTS FROM CIANO DIARY

January 1, 1939

The duce returned to Rome yesterday evening and we had a long conversation. He is very dissatisfied with the situation in East Africa and severely criticizes the work of the Duke of Vosta. It must be admitted that "mara is still in a state of complete revolt and the sixty-five battalions stationed there are forced to live in small forts. Mezzetti has not done well. The Duce blames his appointment on Toruzzi who acted for personal reasons. In political appointments one must be willing even to "step on one's own Mother's body".

He speaks of the situation between us and the Holy See. In the work done by Catholic Action he sees an attempt to create a real political party which, foreseeing the difficulties facing Fascism, wants to be on the spot to take its place. He defends Staraco; whatever he does, he does on the explicit orders of the Duce. He refuses to accept the proposals of the Nuncio who suggests that something be done to celebrate the Decennial of the Lateran agreements.

Finally, he informs me about his decision to accept Ribbentrop's proposal to transform the anti-Comintern pact into an alliance. He wishes the alliance to be signed during the last third of January. He considers that a clash with the western democracies is becoming increasingly inevitable and, therefore, wants to be prepared to meet it. During this month he intends to prepare public opinion, 'about which he doesn't give a damn'. I write Ribbentrop the letter in which I inform him of our acceptance of his proposal (inserted in the body of the documents).

January 2, 1940 (sec)

The letter for Ribbentrop has been approved. Tomorrow I will transmit it to Attolico, together with some instructions concerning what he is to say to the Germans in connection with the Alto Adige and the commercial relations between our two countries. Concerning the Alto Adige, it would fall in with Hitler's plans to permit the departure of those Germans who want to leave. I telephone Ribbentrop to inform him briefly of this decision. The connection was bad and it was difficult to understand each other. We were not able to say much. But he was satisfied and confirmed that by the end of the month everything will be ready, even on the Japanese side.
Conversation Duce-Pignatti. The Duce told the ambassador to inform the Vatican that he is dissatisfied with the policy of the Holy See, especially with matters concerning Catholic Action. He also spoke of the Clergy's opposition to axis policy and the racial policy. The Clergy must not have any illusions about the possible domination of Italy by the Church. The ecclesiastical forces are imposing, but greater still is the force of the State, especially of one such as the Fascist State. We want no clash; but we are ready to withstand it, and will, if it comes to a showdown, awaken all the dormant anti-clerical rancor in the nation. The Pope must remember that Italy is Ghibellino. Pignatti conducted himself well. He said that many errors have been made by the Vatican, but that the pope acts in good faith and that, more than the feeling of any other prelate, his feelings are those of an Italian. I instructed him to act with much tact. Despite Starace, I want to avoid a clash with the Vatican. It is my opinion that such a clash would be most harmful.

January 3, 1939

I give Attolico instructions on his mission to Ribbentrop; he is leaving this evening. While before I always found him to be rather hostile to the idea of an alliance with Germany, this morning he was openly in favor of it. He said that his sojourn in Italy has convinced him that nothing would be more popular here than a war with France. In the afternoon I also informed von Mackensen who, returning from a trip to Berlin, came to pay me a visit. The Polish ambassador informs me of a trip to Germany and this will be followed by a trip to Poland by Ribbentrop. This will pave the way for my trip to Warsaw which is planned to take place, approximately, at the end of February.

I was at the Duce's with the American ambassador who transmitted a message from Roosevelt and some proposals concerning the welfare of Jewish emigres. Roosevelt proposed a part of Ethiopia and the neighboring colonies. The Duce refused to consider this possibility and declared that only Russia, the United States and Brazil were in a position to solve the Jewish question by the surrender of a piece of their territory. He declared himself in favor of the creation of an independent Jewish State and promised his general support.
In Spain the CTV has resumed the offensive and seemingly with success.

January 4, 1939

Conversation with Grandi. He has returned from a rather long leave of absence in Italy and, therefore, does not have much to tell me. I make a rather vague allusion to the future alliance with Germany and observe his reactions. He declares himself in favor of this project and does not believe that it will have any too serious repercussions in the British world. This has already been taken into account. And the memory of the triple alliance, which for thirty years did not prevent the continuation of cordial relations between Italy and Great Britain, is still alive.

In Bagdad there have been great demonstrations against mass emigration into Libya. They believe that this mass exodus of Italians will destroy the continuity of the Arab world in the Mediterranean. And this is true; this is our objective. But the Duke wished me to reassure the Minister from Iraq. And, as he was annoyed at the publicity Albo had received as a result of this undertaking, he gave orders that the next departures were to take place on the 9th. The protest was useful to Mussolini. I inform Mackensen of yesterday’s American démarche. He smiled and made some sharp comments on the American lack of political sense.

In Spain matters are progressing at full steam. Garaara has made a very brilliant maneuver; he freed himself of the threat of a flank attack by attacking the Reds on the flank, thereby causing a great upset.

January 5, 1939

After a first conversation with Ribbentrop, Attolico reports that Ribbentrop proposes the 28 of January as the date for the conclusion of the alliance.

Excellent news from Spain. The only danger consists in a possible mass intervention by French forces by way of the Pyrenees. We have already had intelligence to this effect; to counteract this threat I have already notified London and Berlin that, if the French make a move, the policy of non-intervention will blow up. Then, we too, will send divisions of regular troops. This means that we will go to war against Franco on Spanish soil. I have asked the Germans to publish a note of the diplomatic correspondence favoring our thesis.
January 5 - cont.

Il Duce has told me that he has informed the King of the coming military alliance with Germany. He showed himself satisfied. The King does not like the Germans, but detests and despises the French. He believes them capable of striking a blow at us and, therefore, regards the assurance of German military support with satisfaction.

Furthermore, with the passing of time, many things are developing. The anti-Italian manifestations in France and Tunis, Daladier's move to cut our throats with a Corsican dagger, and the insults of the French press have created an atmosphere of hatred for France, especially among the people. I have instructed Cianotti to give a "social" tenor to his anti-French propaganda among the workers: France is a bourgeois state, the defender of bourgeois privileges. This is very effective propaganda. This morning even Alberto Pirelli, the shady, untrustworthy, sceptical Pirelli, declared to me his loyalty to the Axis policy and his aversion to the western democracies.

January 6, 1939

Standstill in Spain. Gamburr plans to gather his forces and resume the offensive tomorrow. This evening I spoke with Senior Munos, the head of the Spanish economic mission which has arrived in Rome for the commercial treaty. He is a very talkative man, a little frivolous and very fatuous. "He is a Catalan and, therefore, he at least knows the geography of his territory. He considers the victory of the past few days as very important, and, perhaps, decisive for the liquidation of Catalonia and, therefore, the whole war.

The Duce is worried about the border incidents between Czechs and Hungarians; this time, it would seem that those incidents are on a larger scale than usual. However, until now there has been no direct news from the legation. The Duce wished to have information, from Grandi on the coming of Chamberlain, and the latter's feelings and intentions. But Grandi has not been in London for twenty days and is enjoying himself in Sicily and in the mountains. When the Duce learned this, he was very incensed. He said, "There is a man, whose goose is cooked. After Chamberlain's visit, you will send him packing." But I am sure that, as usual, Mussolini will save him at the last minute. Basically he will be right, because, despite all his faults, Grandi is a good ambassador, and it would not be easy to find a successor better than he, as, at present, our diplomats are not too brilliant.
April 2, 1939

Nati has arrived in Rome and I prepare to send him to Tirana, with a small group of men like him to cause the Thursday evening incidents if the King has not had the courtesy meanwhile to capitulate. I gave him freedom of action, with a definite order to respect the queen and the body, if it has already been overthrown. They are to arouse terror during the night and at dawn to conceal themselves in the woods and await the arrival of our troops, seeking if possible to prevent Zog from retreating toward Vala, where he might attempt a slight resistance. I authorize representatives to make contact with Pavelic in a very secret manner. As far as propaganda is concerned, I decide to make a decision later, although he has authorized the arrangement of a subsidy to the Croats.

I receive von Brauchitsch, whom I tell about in the Duce's letter answering Chamberlain. I receive also Shiratori, who brings the Japanese answer on the tripartite alliance; on the whole it is favorable. However, they make two reservations: 1) that London, Paris and Washington be informed that in Japan's view the alliance is directed against Moscow; 2) that a declaration be added that in the case of war in Europe, Japanese aid would be limited. Nothing against the second; with respect to the first, on the other hand, it seems to me necessary to make very clear what actual meaning the reservation is intended to have; this might alter the real value of the Pact itself.
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN

I, YALE MAXON, Chief of the Document Division, IPS, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached Defense Document, No. 556, and 1619 being 8 typewritten English sheets, is a true and correct copy of certain portions of the Office of Strategic Services' English translation of Court Ciano's Diary, the photostatic copy of which is IPS Doc. No. 1418.

\[\text{\textit{/s/ YALE MAXON}}\]

YALE MAXON

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361
Memorandum of Håkensen, German Ambassador at Rome, 3 January 1939.

Count Ciano informed me in the strictest confidence in the course of our conversation today that the Duce has decided, on the question of the Germany-Italy-Japan Tripartite Alliance Fact, that the signing can take place immediately as far as he is concerned. He — Ciano — (supplementing a brief telephone notification last night) has written the German Foreign Minister a private letter concerning this, which May ICO, who is returning to Berlin tonight, is to take to him. In view of other already existing commitments in January (Chancellor visit, trip to Belgrade, 2-3 days thereafter to devote himself to affairs here in Rome) a day at the end of the month comes under consideration. The German Foreign Minister considers this also practical, because the technical preparations by the Japanese for the signing ceremony will take about 3 weeks, while Ciano will be free. He Ciano — has gladly acceded to the desire of Herr von Ribbentrop and agreed to the choice of Berlin as the place for signing. Count Ciano then took up the calendar and said the 30th, or even better the 28th, would be suitable signing days for him. He has learned from Ljulico that a major address by the Führer is planned for the 31st.

Rome, 3 January 1939

/s/ HåKENSEN

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361
CERTIFICATE
OF ORIGIN

I, Yele Maxon, Chief of the Document Division, IPS, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, C.I.A., S.C.P., and as such have possession, custody, and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That front A402 being one sheet of a photostatic copy of a memorandum signed by Mackenna, dated 3 Jan. 1939, and contained in IPS Document A019 was received by the IPS from the Office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials.

Yele Maxon
February 8, 1936

The Duce is discontented with the Japanese delays in concluding the Tripartite alliance and regrets the way in which Ribbentrop lightly assumes that the Tokyo Government will agree to conclude the pact. Mussolini thinks it might be a good idea to conclude a double alliance, without Japan, and leave Japan to face Anglo-French force alone. In this case, the pact would have no anti-British or anti-American flavor whatsoever.

I telegraph to Berlin asking them to speed up the pact with Spain for the purpose of neutralizing the rapprochments between Burgos and Paris. Then we will let it be known that we have had a pact with Spain since November, 1936.

I receive de Man who has been assigned by the King of Belgium the task of organizing a Conference of Four. I tell him that in my opinion the necessary conditions for such an attempt do not yet exist. De Man presented his point of view in a completely banal form; the thing which interested me most in him was a magnificent sunburn which he had gotten in some mountain resort.

Jacquemont arrives and confirms the fact that the moment to strike is opportune. The atmosphere in Albania is electric. All the leaders are on our side; but how long can the secret be kept? We study the details of the operation for a long time.

March 3, 1936

The Duce is very dissatisfied with Guariglia. He intends to retire him soon, and with him Rosso and Valentino.

I arrive in Rome. Nothing particularly important in domestic politics or at the Ministry. I see my colleagues and Alfieri who reviews for me the events of my past days.

The Duce is at Forminillo. He telephones that he would like to see me; in the afternoon I go to him. He is interested in my report on Poland which is not altogether optimistic. I must admit that, from Rome, had always seen the situation of that state with greater clarity than those who had spent many years on the spot. He describes Poland as "an empty nut." He is pleased with the election of Pacelli. He hopes...
May 6 and 7, 1939

was profoundly anti-German. The population of Kilian, also very much flattered by the fact that finally the Lombard city had been chosen as the place for an important event, gave a warm spontaneous demonstration. I myself was surprised, not at the demonstration itself, but at its strength.

I took notes of the conversations with Ribbentrop. Some comments: For the first time I found my German colleague pleasantly relaxed. He wasn't as far crazy as usual. Rather he became, personally, the standard bearer of a policy of moderation and understanding. Naturally, I said that in a few years they must go here and there, and take what they can; but a postponement of activity is in itself worth nothing.

The alliance, or rather the immediate announcement of the alliance, was decided Saturday evening right after dinner at the Continental, following a telephone call from the Duce. After the talk, I reported to Mussolini the results, satisfying from our point of view. He, as always when he has achieved something, demands more, and asked me to have the Bilateral Fact announced, which he has always preferred to the Triangular Alliance. Ribbentrop, who, at the bottom of his heart, has always aimed at the inclusion of Japan in the Fact, at first demurred but then ended by giving in with the reservation that he must obtain Hitler's approval. The latter, called on the telephone, gave his immediate approval and personally helped with the editing of the communique. When I informed the Duce on Sunday morning he displayed particular satisfaction.

Ribbentrop was personally liked even in that useless but snobby world which is "Society", so-called; he is indispensable when one has to give a dinner. Also the people close to Ribbentrop are liked by those who meet them. These are likeable young men who speak foreign languages well and who know how to be polite to women in drawing rooms beyond a mere clicking of heels.
CERTIFICATE

I, HAYASHI KAORU, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that all the copies of telegrams, which were exchanged between the Japanese Foreign Office and Mr. SHIRATORI TOSHIKIC, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Italy, and which concerned the negotiations for concluding a tripartite pact, were destroyed by fire, excepting the telegram no. 3, dated January 10, 1939, sent by Ambassador SHIRATORI to Foreign Minister ARTTA, and that they are no more in the custody of this Archives Section.

Signed at Tokyo on this
5th day of May, 1947.

(signed) HAYASHI KAORU (Seal)

The above signature and seal were affixed in the presence of this witness,
On the same date and at the same place

Witness: (Signed) URABE KATSUWA (Seal)
7 December 1937 -- from the conversation of

"I should say that I am distressed with HIROTA also", the Premier said.

"Just on the 2nd of November, HIROTA met the German Ambassador and submitted the plan which was based on the assumption of circumstances when the Supreme Command Office had decided not to advance farther than the Paoting line. The German Ambassador transmitted this to Chiang Kai-shek on the 6th of November through the German Ambassador to China. Chiang Kai-shek, however, rejected it at that time. Recently, particularly when Nanking was about to be in an imminent danger, the German Ambassador to China recently reported to Dirksen /T.N. phonetic/, German Ambassador to Tokyo, that Chiang Kai-shek, being distressed, accepted it. We found out all about it because the Army stole that telegram. And now, it is quite impossible to accept the terms proposed at the time when we stopped at the Paoting line. The Foreign Minister being prepared for a case like that, had carefully told the other side: "If the war situation changes further, the terms of this talk will also change according to the situation. Please bear that in mind."
総理は「ただ今帰らぬ。島の大使に会わせたい。」と流しき府の設定の話や、連絡を下す事を決めた時の状態を述べていた。この時、大使はこれと一何 Kami に対応しているとの事実を述べた。まだ大使が証言しているのに対して、もう一方の大使は内容をもとに報道している。この大使が報道をしている中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道している中、この大使が報道ている
Page 4: line 8, read "with the Axis."
Page 5: line 11, read "threatened the Foreign Minister."
I, MiKizo, being first duly sworn, according to the customary formality in this country, depose and state:

1. I graduated from the Kyoto Imperial University in March, 1931, and entered the diplomatic service in March of the following year. I am now Chief of the Economic Section of the General Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office. I served in the Japanese Embassy in Italy as a junior secretary from October, 1937, to July, 1939. When Ambassador Shiratori arrived at his post in Rome at the end of 1938, I was put in charge of matters pertaining to etiquette and archives and also became the private secretary of the Ambassador.

2. Up until that time the Embassy in Rome was not in receipt of any official communication from any quarters concerning the Japanese-German-Italian Treaty then being mooted in Berlin, although the late Mr. Sakamoto, then Chargé d'Affaires, was said to have privately acquired some knowledge about the matter from the Military and Naval Attaches. I
I, MIGI, Mikizo, being first duly sworn, according to the customary formality in this country, depose and state:

1. I graduated from the Kyoto Imperial University in March, 1931, and entered the diplomatic service in March of the following year. I am now Chief of the Economic Section of the General Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office. I served in the Japanese Embassy in Italy as a junior secretary from October, 1937, to July, 1939. When Ambassador Shiratori arrived at his post in Rome at the end of 1938, I was put in charge of matters pertaining to etiquette and archives and also became the private secretary of the Ambassador.

2. Up until that time the Embassy in Rome was not in receipt of any official communication from any quarters concerning the Japanese-German-Italian Treaty then being mooted in Berlin, although the late Mr. Sakamoto, then Charge d'Affaires, was said to have privately acquired some knowledge about the matter from the Military and Naval Attaches. I
was told that Ambassador Shiratori had not brought with him any written
instruction of the Tokyo Government. I remember the Ambassador saying
that the whole affair had now become clear to him as a result of the
detailed account given him by both Mr. Sakamoto and the attaches.

3. During the whole period of my service under Ambassador Shiratori,
it was his practice to dictate to me his cables to Tokyo on the subject
of the Tripartite Treaty. Councillor Sakamoto, secretaries Mihara and
Nakayama were generally present on such occasions, besides the Military and
Naval Attaches, who were also allowed now and then to attend and listen.

4. Around the 6th of January, 1939, to the best of my memory,
Ambassador Shiratori paid his respects to Premier Mussolini and was
drawn into quite a conversation with him. After the interview, he told
us members of the Embassy above enumerated that he was surprised to know
that Mussolini was all for the proposed treaty, going so far as to expect
its consummation within a few weeks. He told us further that inasmuch
as a final decision in this matter had first to be made by our own Govern­
ment, he tried somewhat to dampen Mussolini's zeal. I recollect that a
cable containing the gist of this interview and urging upon the Government
the necessity of a speedy decision, was dispatched to the Foreign Minister.

5. When the Ito Mission arrived in Rome, the instructions of the
Government which they had brought with them were not shown or discussed
there, it being understood that a full explanation about them would be
given in Berlin. Ambassador Shiratori, Councillor Sakamoto and myself
therefore accompanied the Ito Mission to the German capital. It was said
that there was nothing to be called in question in so far as concerned the
draft text and protocols of the proposed treaty, as contained in the instructions from Tokyo; but that it was proposed to attach to it two reservations which would place very substantial limitations to the scope of the treaty. Ambassador Shiratori expressed the view that not only was there no prospect for such reservations ever to be entertained by the German and Italian Governments, but it would be a disgrace to Japanese diplomacy to leave on record a proposal which clearly amounted to taking back with the left hand that which was offered with the right. A telegram in that sense was, so far as I recollect, sent home in his name while he was in Berlin.

6. Since his arrival in Rome, Ambassador Shiratori seemed to pay serious attention to the general European situation, particularly to the German-Soviet and Italian-Soviet relations. He frequently expressed to the members of his staff the view that it was a mistake to presume, as was almost a commonplace in Japan about that time, that Germany and Italy and Soviet Russia were irreconcilable. He said that the relations between Italy and Russia were not at all bad and that, moreover, it was quite significant that the Nazi leaders had suddenly stopped abusing Soviet Russia. In his estimate of the general situation, it was not impossible that an understanding of some sort should be reached between the U.S.S.R. and the Axis powers. It was his contention that Japan should be on her guard against the contingency of Nazi Germany adopting Kaiser Wilhelm II's policy of pushing Russia on to the Far East by guaranteeing her western borders. I recollect that the Ambassador cabled such opinion to Tokyo more than once.
7: In regard to the proposed treaty with Germany and Italy, Ambassador Shiratori used to say that this treaty should be considered as a means in diplomatic manoeuvres; in other words, that it should be viewed in the light of the effect that a rapprochement between Japan and the Axis would have on the United States and Great Britain. It was his opinion that while the Chinese problem was difficult of solution without the good offices of America and England, it was necessary for us, as diplomatic tactics, to show a gesture of friendship with the Axis in order to make them slacken their pressure upon Japan.

8. So far as I could perceive on the spot, there did not exist any close contact between Ambassador Shiratori and the Italian authorities. The Italian Government practically left to Berlin the matter of the Tripartite Treaty, and to the best of my knowledge, there was not much in the way of exchange of views or negotiation between the Ambassador and either Mussolini or Ciano. We were informed by Mr. Shiratori at one time that Count Ciano had told him with cynicism that the whole question was in the "able" hands of the German Foreign Minister. Such being the case, the negotiations were carried on almost exclusively in Berlin and the part that Ambassador Shiratori played was confined mainly to making suggestions or advancing views to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo.

Having received a telegram of recall, I was relieved of my duties in the Embassy late in June, 1939, which were transmitted to a successor. I remember that until that time the Tripartite negotiation had been confined exclusively to exchanging arguments concerning the Japanese reservations.
I know of my own knowledge that the Ambassador had little contact with the Italian side in other respects; that he had made few, if any, acquaintances in the political and social circles in Rome, and that, above all, he did not have any intercourse with the leaders of the Fascist Party and of the Italian Army and Navy.

9. It seemed that Ambassador Shiratori was on very intimate terms with Foreign Minister Irrera and he therefore always expressed his views to the latter without mincing his words. While it might be said that some of his telegrams contained rather strong expressions, yet to the best of my knowledge and recollection, the Ambassador never threatened the Foreign Minister with resignation.

This 17th day of November, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

Nakamori, Mikizo

Sworn to, depoased, and stated, and subscribed before me on the above mentioned date at the aforesaid place.

Nakamura, Shin
Counsel for Defendant

- 5 -
I swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, reserve nothing that I know, nor add anything that I do not know.

(N.Gal, Mykizo)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE F. R. EAST

The United States of America, et al. ) AFFIDAVIT

against ) S. ITÔ, Yoshie

ARAKI, Sadao, et al )

I, S. ITÔ, Yoshie, being first duly sworn according to the customary formality in this country, depose and state:

Deposition concerning Mr. Shiratori

Both Mr. Shiratori and myself were Advisors of the Foreign Office from August 28, 1940, to July 22, 1941, under Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. The competence and duties of the Advisor are not clearly defined by any Act or ordinance. He has no access, as of right, to any document or information belonging to the Foreign Office. His influence and activities depend largely upon the personal characteristics of the Foreign Minister of the time and especially upon the degree of intimacy and confidence that may exist between him and the Minister.

My acquaintance with Mr. Matsuoka began in 1909 when he and I, as an Attaché, were colleagues in the Japanese Consulate-General at Tientsin, China. Our intimacy lasted unbroken and when Mr. Matsuoka became the Vice-President of the South Manchurian Railway Company I was appointed a director of that company. During Mr. Matsuoka's presidency of the railway company, I was an advisor and conducted researches upon Chinese affairs. I believe it was because of such a close personal relationship between us that Mr. Matsuoka chose me as an Advisor of the Foreign Office when he became Foreign Minister. As far as I know, however, Mr. Shiratori had little to do with Mr. Matsuoka personally as well as officially.

- 1 -
As I was given to understand at the time, his appointment as advisor of the foreign office was due mainly to Prince Konoye’s recommendation. Moreover, Mr. Mutsuoka was a man of great self-confidence who would do everything by himself, rarely asking the advice of others. With the exception of expert matters concerning international treaties or Chinese affairs, he scarcely ever consulted me, intimate friend as I was to him, upon important questions of policy or of government. I can therefore state with truth that Mr. Shiratori’s advisor-ship under Mr. Mutsuoka was more or less nominal. He was not asked to advise almost on any subject, least of all on important diplomatic questions.

To be more particular in this regard, I may mention the following facts:

(1) The wholesale dismissal of Japanese diplomats by Ijoss, Mutsuoka and Ohashi (I.F.S. Exhibit 548, Ambassador Ott’s telegram of August 23, 1940). This took place before the appointment of the advisors. As my appointment as advisor was then definitively decided upon, I was admitted into counsel over this matter, but Mr. Shiratori had nothing at all to do with it. In fact, as an ambassador on the waiting list, he was counted among the senior diplomats to be dismissed.

(2) The decision adopted at the Four Ministers’ Conference (Premier Konoye, Foreign Minister Mutsuoka, War Minister, and Navy Minister) of September 4, 1940, and the decision of the Liaison Conference of September 19, 1940, relative to the strengthening of the relationship between Japan, Germany, and Italy (I.F.S. Exhibit 541). It was in these important decisions that the basic policy for the conclusion of the Three Power Pact was adopted by the Government. I was allowed at the time to look.
over those top-secret documents but I know for certain that they were not shown to Mr. Shiratori.

(3) The visit to Japan of Ribbentrop's special envoy, Mr. Stahmer. The matter was kept secret to the advisors who know nothing about it until a few days before Mr. Stahmer's arrival in Tokyo, September 7, 1940, nor was the exact character or object of his mission known to them.

(4) The negotiation of the Tripartite Pact was conducted exclusively between Mr. Matsuoka and Messrs. Stahmer and Ott at Mr. Matsuoka's private residence. I acted as a sort of legal expert and advised Mr. Matsuoka on the technical aspect of the Treaty, but Mr. Shiratori's opinion was not asked in any respect and at any stage of the negotiations. The text of the Treaty was drafted in English by Matsuoka, Stahmer, and Ott, and was afterwards translated into Japanese and German. Mr. Shiratori had nothing to do with the drafting of the original text but was first shown it in a finished form in English. Later he was asked to translate into English the preamble of the Treaty which I had drafted in Japanese by Mr. Matsuoka's order.

(5) Mr. Matsuoka's negotiations concerning and with French Indo-China and Thailand (referred to in the prosecution's opening statement read on September 30, 1946, and in various I.P.S. Exhibits relating thereto). Mr. Shiratori had nothing to do with these matters, no documents or information bearing on them having ever been furnished to him.

(6) The recognition by Japan of the Wang Tsin-Wei Regime on November 30, 1940, and the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo, and China (I.P.S. Exhibit 464). Negotiations with the Wang Tsin-Wei Regime relative to this matter were started at Nanking by the Yonai-Wita Cabinet.
through special Ambassador, General Abe. Agreement was finally arrived at under the second Konoye Cabinet in which Mr. Matsuoka was Foreign Minister, but Mr. Shiratori was not concerned in this matter in any way whatever.

(7) Mr. Matsuoka’s trip to Europe in the Spring of 1941.
Nothing was made known to Mr. Shiratori about this trip to Europe of the Foreign Minister until a few days before his departure from Tokyo. The circumstances under which this trip was decided upon by the Government and its object and purpose were kept entirely from Mr. Shiratori. During Mr. Matsuoka’s absence in Europe, we advisors had practically nothing to do at the Foreign Office.

(8) Mr. Shiratori became seriously ill at the beginning of April 1941, and after spending nearly a month in hospital, moved to the seashore at Hayama where, it is known, he remained convalescing in almost complete retirement for about a year. Although he was Foreign Office advisor in name until his resignation in the latter part of July 1941, he did not during that period once put in an appearance at the Foreign Office nor had he anything to do with the affairs of that Office. He did not see Mr. Matsuoka since the latter’s departure for Europe until his resignation as Foreign Minister. He did not concern himself in any manner in the diplomatic negotiations with the United States conducted by Mr. Matsuoka from April to July 1941 (I.P.S. Exhibits 1059 and 1070, etc.). To the best of my knowledge and belief, Mr. Shiratori could not possibly have advanced any opinion to the Foreign Office or any other quarters that Japan should enter into war with Soviet Russia after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war on June 22, 1941 (I.P.S. Exhibit 1113, Ambassador Ott’s
telegram of July 7, 1941). His health was not sufficiently recovered for any such activity.

I may make a further statement concerning Mr. Shiratori as follows:

(a) Mr. Shiratori could not have refused the post of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs (I.P.S. Exhibit 536, Ambassador Ott's telegram of August 2, 1940), for I know for a fact that Foreign Minister Yatsuoka had from the beginning Mr. Shoichi, Chuchi in mind and that he never offered that position to Mr. Shiratori. Ambassador Ott stated in his telegram, "Ambassador Shiratori informed confidentially that he had declined the post of vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes he can exercise a far-reaching influence in this capacity." But this statement seems to run counter to the facts of the matter, for while the position and competence of a diplomatic advisor are as I described above, those of a vice Foreign Minister are clearly defined by law. He has control over the whole administrative system of the Foreign Office, such as personnel, archives, budget, expenditures, et cetera. He could thereby largely influence the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs.

(b) While it is true that during our advisoryship both Mr. Shiratori and myself often met the German Ambassador in a social way, there was to the best of my knowledge nothing to indicate that Mr. Shiratori was on any specially intimate terms with Mr. Ott or any other member of the German Embassy in Tokyo. I do not believe Mr. Shiratori to have been a Germanophile, for I remember a remark he made at a gathering of Foreign Office officials during the Pacific war to the effect that it was no less
objectionable for us to be pro-axis as to be pro-aggression.

(c) Toward the middle of January, 1941, Mr. Shiratori was appointed a member of the directorate of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. This organization had for its object the moral mobilization of the nation and did not concern itself directly with politics, much less with diplomatic questions. Although I saw Mr. Shiratori almost daily at that period at the Advisor's quarters of the Foreign Office, I am not aware that he was playing any important part as a member of the said directorate. In fact, I remember his telling me once that he expected nothing of real value or significance from this organization. He generally stayed away from the meetings of the Association which were held quite frequently at its initial stage.

(d) I know nothing about Mr. Shiratori's acting as a leader of "activistic circles" ("minority group") demanding preventive attack on Singapore in January 1941 (I.P.S. Exhibit 562, Ambassador Ott's telegram of January 51, 1941). From what I know, as a friend and colleague, about Mr. Shiratori's diplomatic views, he by no means an advocate of Japan's southward advance.

(e) Mr. Shiratori and myself received on the same date a German decoration of the same grade, ostensibly in recognition of our service relative to the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact (I.P.S. Exhibit 1272, Ambassador Ott's telegram of May 17, 1942). From my experience during my long career as a diplomat, I know that the exchange of decorations
between governments is, in fact, largely a matter of formality or etiquette, having more to do with the official positions held by the individuals concerned than with their real merit or actual service.

It seems that Ambassador Ett, in his report to his Government, attached undue importance to the position of Foreign Office Advisor.

The I.R.S. Exhibits quoted in this affidavit were brought to my knowledge by M. S. Sakuma and Y. Hirota, who acted as witnesses to my deposition. I have mentioned them by their register marks in brackets for the convenience of the Tribunal.

This 20th day of December 1946, in the building of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Yoshio Saito

sworn to, deposed, and stated, and subscribed before us on the above mentioned date at the same place.

Sakuma, Sh.
Associate Counsel for Defendant, Shiratori, Yoshio.

HIR. T., Yoji
Associate Counsel for Defendant, Shiratori, Yoshio.

I swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, reserve nothing that I know, nor add anything that I do not know.

S.I.T., Yoshio
I, SAITO, Yoshie, being first duly sworn, according to the customary formality in this country, depose and state:

1. I have already made an affidavit, Def. Doc. No. 332, in favour of defendant SHIRATORI, Toshio. I now desire to make the following additional deposition for the same defendant.

2. As I testified in Def. Doc. No. 332, I was appointed advisor of the Foreign Office, together with Mr. SHIRATORI, on August 28, 1940. I assisted Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in technical matters concerning the drafting and negotiation of the Tripartite Pact concluded on September 27, 1940. Mr. OHASHI, Chuichi was appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 19, 1940. Mr. MATSUMOTO, Shunichi, who was the Councillor of the Japanese Embassy at Nanking, China,
returned to Tokyo on September 5, 1940, and was made Chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office on the same day, but he began assisting the Foreign Minister in technical matters concerning the Pact several weeks after that appointment.

3. Mr. MATSUMOTO states in Exhibit No. 3145-A (Def. Doc. No. 1656-A) that "On 5 September 1940 a plan, as Annex No. 1, was drafted by Vice Foreign Minister OASHI, the advisors SHIRATORI and SAITO, and presented by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA to the Four-Minister Conference for consideration." (record, page 27,986). This statement is entirely erroneous. OASHI, SHIRATORI and myself never made that plan on September 5, 1940, or on any other date.

4. The said Annex No. 1, attached to Exhibit No. 3145-A, is exactly the same as the document entitled "Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis" (Exhibit No. 541, record pages 6307-6308), which was adopted on September 4, 1940, at the Four-Minister Conference, and which was later confirmed by the Liaison Conference of September 19, 1940 (record page 27,994). It is unimaginable that the plan which was decided upon by the Four-Minister Conference on September 4th should be drafted the following day by OASHI, SHIRATORI and myself to be presented by MATSUOKA to a Four-Minister Conference.
5. At the top of the document entitled "Draft of Basic Principles Concerning Negotiations for a Military Alliance", that is to say, on page 2 of the English translation of Annex No. 1 to Exhibit No. 3145-A (page 12 of the original Japanese text of same Exhibit and page 9 of Exhibit for identification No. 3145), there are two dates and two marginal notes. One date is "6 August 1940", which is crossed out (in the original Japanese text, the date is in black colour, which is crossed out by a red line), and the other "4 September 1940" (in the original Japanese text, the date is in red colour). The first marginal note reads: "The draft is a revised draft made by Army-Navy officials concerned", and the second "The red letters are a revised draft by the Foreign Office." The two marginal notes in the original Japanese text are in red colour. The revision in red colour in the original Japanese text extends over the whole document, that is to say, pages 12 - 26 of the original Japanese text of Exhibit No. 3145-A, and pages 9 - 29 of Exhibit for identification No. 3145 (pages 2 - 16 of the English translation of the Annex No. 1 to Exhibit No. 3145-A).

These facts show clearly that the document entitled "Draft of Basic Principles Concerning Negotiations for a Military Alliance" (pages 2-16 of the English translation
of the Annex No. 1 to Exhibit No. 3145-A), was a revised draft made by Army-Navy officials concerned on August 6, 1940, and that it was again revised by the Foreign Office on September 4, 1940. That will unmistakably show that the original document had been drafted before Mr. OHASHI was appointed Vice Minister, and SHIRATORI and myself became advisors.

6. I have no knowledge as to who drafted the original of the document adopted by the Four-Minister Conference on September 4, 1940, in other words, Annex No. 1 to Exhibit No. 3145-A. I was shown this document by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA after it had passed the Four-Minister Conference, but it was not shown to Mr. SHIRATORI at any time, as I stated in my affidavit, Def. Doc. No. 332. I had nothing to do with the revision of this document by the Foreign Office on September 4, 1940, and I know for certain that Mr. SHIRATORI also had no connection with it.

7. On or about September 5, 1940, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA invited Mr. OHASHI, Mr. SHIRATORI and myself, together with other officials of the Foreign Office, to a luncheon and told us in a rather desultory way that since Mr. Stahmer was shortly expected to arrive in Tokyo, he intended to broach the question of strengthening the three power axis. But neither on that occasion nor at any other
time was there any discussion among us on the plan adopted by the Four-Minister Conference (namely, Annex No. 1 to Exhibit No. 3145-A) or any other plan in this matter.

On this 3 day of October, 1947,
at Tokyo, Japan.

/S/ SAIITO, Yoshie (seal)

Sworn to, deposed, and stated, and subscribed before me on the above mentioned date at the same place.

Witness: /S/ SAKITA, Shin (seal)

OATH

I swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, reserve nothing that I know, nor add anything that I do not know.

/S/ SAIITO, Yoshie (seal)
I, major Nicholas A. Bazenko, chief of the document room of the Soviet division of the I.P.S. of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, hereby certify that:

1. This photocopy of the original map attached to the agreement of June 9, 1940 was received by me from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on July 29, 1947.

On the back of each sheet of the above-mentioned photocopy is the following certifying inscription written in hand:

"This is a photocopy of the original map attached to the agreement of June 9, 1940 about the rectification of the border line between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchoukuo in the area of lake Buir-Nur and the Numurgin-Gol river."

The original map is in the custody of the State Central Historic Record office of Moscow.

Director of the State Central Historic Record Office of Moscow.

Signature

Seal of the State Central Historic Record Office.

Major Bazenko,
Chief of the Document Room of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S.

June 5, 1947

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, A. Kunin hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages and the above is correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: A. Kunin
CERTIFICATE

August 15, 1947

I, Major Nicholas A. Bazenko, chief of the document room of the Soviet division of the I.P.S. hereby certify that:

1. For the more convenient use of the map attached to the agreement of June 9, 1940 on the second copy of the photocopy all principal names have been translated by the Prosecution into English and Japanese and the translation is written in hand alongside the corresponding Russian names.

2. On these copies of the photocopy the Prosecution marked in red pencil the state border line and in blue pencil the Halhin-Gol river. To orientate the map a compass pointer was drawn by the Prosecution in red pencil in the bottom right-hand corner.

Major Bazenko,
Chief of the document room of the Soviet division of the I.P.S.
Def. Doc. #2716

ERRATC SHEET

Page 2: item 3, line 4, read "from Japanese into English" instead of "from English into Japanese".
I, UNO, Masuko, having sworn as shown in the attached written oath, depose and state as follows:

After being graduated from the University of London, where I became conversant with the English language, I became a Shokutaku (TN: an official not on the regular staff) of the Foreign Ministry. Later I became a regularly employed secretary of the Japan Foreign Affairs Association, a purely private organization with no connection whatsoever with the Government, publishers of a strictly English language magazine named "Contemporary Japan." After the death of Mr. INAHARA, Katsuji, the editor-in-Chief of this magazine, on 27 December, 1946, I became his successor and now hold that position.

As I was not connected with editing at the time of the publication of the article entitled "The Three Power Fact and
the World of Tomorrow" by SHIRATORI, Toshio, in the December, 1940, issue of said magazine, I do not know the circumstance, under which this article was published. However, the "Contribution Accounts-Book" of the Japan Foreign Affairs Association (Def. Doc. No. 1621-A), entries in which were made by the editor and the cashier of the said association every month, show, on page 10 thereof, the following:

1. Page 10 of Def. Doc. No. 1621-A (Def. Doc. No. 1621) shows as follows: Under the first main column, entitled "subject", and under the sub-column, entitled "Japanese", in the 7th line, it is shown that the title of the article was "Three Power Fact and the World of Tomorrow."

2. That under the second main column, entitled "Japanese", the first sub-column thereunder, next directly in line with the title under the aforesaid column shows the contributor to the SHIRATORI, Toshio. The next sub-column shows the same to be an eleven page manuscript in the Japanese language. The third sub-column, entitled "@" shows the price paid for the article was made in a lump sum and the fourth sub-column, in line with the other items shows the sum of the payment to have been $50. The last and fifth sub-column shows the date of payment to have been the 6th of November, 1940, and to have been paid by check.

3. That under the third main column, entitled "translation", the first sub-column thereof, and in line with other items, shows that the original translation from English into Japanese was made by one Hidesaburo YOKOYAMA. The second sub-column thereof shows that it consisted of seven and one-half pages.

4. That under the fourth main column, entitled "Correction", under the first sub-column thereof, entitled "Name", directly in line with the other items, it is shown that the correction, which
signifies a re-write in English, was made by a person named Spinks. The second sub-column thereunder shows same to have been corrected and re-written on ten pages.

Other items on this page, not particularly described in this affidavit, connected with the publication of this article, are incidental cost matters for translation, etc.

I am personally acquainted with both Mr. Yokoyama, who is at present Chief of the Foreign News Section on "Jiji Shimpo", a newspaper, and Mr. Spinks, at that time an American journalist, who has recently returned to Japan and is now serving with GHQ. Neither the original Japanese text of the article nor the original English translation, nor the original re-written English text are in existence at this time, as they were disposed of approximately a year after their publication, as is the usual custom.

The monthly circulation of said magazine in 1940-41-42 varied between 1500 and 2000, and, as stated before, it was strictly an English language magazine and was never published in Japanese.

At Tokyo, Japan, this 9 day of October, 1947.

/S/ UNO, Masuko (seal)
I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed her signature and seal there­to in my presence on the same day and at the same place as above written.

(witness) /S/ SAKURA, Shin (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ UNO, Masuko (seal)
Def. Doc. #1717

ERRATA SUMIT

Page 6: line 21, delete "(strongly in deed, gently in manner)".
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, etc.

AGAINST

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

MISHIMA, Yasuo, hereby make affidavit as hereunder mentioned, after taking an oath as appended herewith following the established form in our country.

I was born on March 15, 1896, in Yamanashi Prefecture. After graduating from the Keio University in 1920, I was employed by the Jiji Shimpo Newspaper. In October, 1932, I left the Jiji Shimpo and entered the Manchukuo News Agency. I came back to Tokyo in October of the next year and took to writing in newspapers and magazines as a free lance. At the end of the year of 1940, while continuing my activities as a writer and commentator, I established a special feature news agency on my own account. Since the termination of the war, I have given up all these activities and am now engaged mainly in reading and study at home.

I became acquainted with Mr. Shiratori, Toshio, in 1930 when he was Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office and I a staff member of the Jiji Shimpo newspaper. From then until now, I have

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reained one of his closest friends.

Early in 1941, Mr. Shiratori borrowed from an acquaintance quite a number of voluminous works on Japanese national polity and Shinto mythology, which had not been published before or had been prohibited by the authorities concerned. He became so deeply absorbed in the study of these books that he not infrequently sat up all night. Partly on account of this overwork and partly as a result of a bad cold he had contracted in February, he became afflicted with an obstinate insomia. In spite of that he continued his study with unabated zeal until about the 20th of March when he was seized with what apparently was an acute case of nervous debility accompanied by somewhat alarming indications of mental abnormality. I requested Professor Dr. Miyake Koichi of the Medical Department of the Tokio Imperial University, to accept the treatment of Mr. Shiratori about the beginning of April, 1941, but being himself too occupied at the time, Dr. Miyake left the care of Mr. Shiratori to his trusted friend, Dr. Muramatsu, Tsuneo, Vice-President of the Matsusawa Psychiatric Hospital. The patient's condition steadily worsened until it became apparent that his was a very serious case indeed. Dr. Muramatsu therefore made arrangements for the accommodation of Mr. Shiratori in the Komine Hospital, No. 889, Takinokawa, Tokio, where he entered in the middle of April, 1941. I learned from Mr. Shiratori afterwards that he had completely lost consciousness from the 9th of April and that it was only on the 28th of April that he awakened to find himself in bed in an unknown hospital. He left
in the hospital in the middle of May, 1941, and Dr. Akuratatsu resumed his charge. At the advice of the doctor, Mr. Shiratori moved in the middle of June, 1941, to a seaside cottage at Hiyama, where he remained convalescing until April of the next year. During most of that period, he was strictly prohibited by the doctor from receiving visitors or reading books, magazines and even newspapers. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Shiratori faithfully observed this injunction, especially for the first six months of his retired life. In these circumstances and seeing that his condition was still far from satisfactory, it is unthinkable that so early as July 1941, Mr. Shiratori should have had interviews with a foreign ambassador and engaged in a serious conversation on the international situation. (IPS Doc 4062-K, Exhibit 1113 and IPS Doc 4025-D, Exhibit 800.)

2. About the time of the general election of April, 1942, Mr. Shiratori was not yet completely recovered from his illness. He had little intercourse with the outside world and rarely saw anyone beside his relatives and close friends. He was mostly engaged in the study and practice of Shintoism. One day, however, a number of young men from his native province came to his house and asked him for permission to use his name as a candidate in the coming election, expressing their ardent desire to sweep away the long-standing abuses of their constituency and by conducting a model campaign, set an example to the whole nation. Mr. Shiratori did not take the matter seriously at first, and flatly told the youngsters that he felt no longer any interest at all in politics.
But by sheer force of zeal and importunity, they finally prevailed upon him to comply with their desire. It was on condition, however, that he was not himself to take part in the election campaign, make no speech nor even put in an appearance in his constituency, and that moreover, being of scant means, he could not bear any part of the expenditures involved. It was only when rival candidates contended that Mr. Shiratori was so ill that he could not even come down to his native place, that his friends requested him to make a speech or two if only to counter this hostile propaganda. He had to consent although with much reluctance. He was then very weak but somehow managed to address several gatherings. He mainly talked about Shintoism and national polity, dwelling almost in passing on current questions of diplomacy and of war. As election speeches in war time, they were rather uncommon and quite a surprise to many among his hearers. Having been myself in charge of his election business at that time, I am very well aware of all these facts.

At this general election, Mr. Shiratori was one of the so-called recommended candidates, but it was a matter arranged between his supporters and the prefectural branch of the Recommending Body, and he was not himself concerned in it at all but only learned about it afterwards. When he was elected, Mr. Shiratori, as a recommended member of parliament, almost automatically became a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and was also nominated a member of the Board of Directors of the Society. Mainly for reasons of health, he did not engage himself in any political activities either as a director of the IRAPS.
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or as a member of parliament. In the early summer of 1943, he was relieved of his seat in the directorate of this political society from which he completely withdrew soon afterwards.

4. It may be said in sum that the serious illness with which he was seized in the spring of 1941, brought about a marked change in Mr. Shiratori's character and outlook, drawing him more deeply into a domain of spirituality and religion. He gradually ceased to have anything to do not only with government and general political circles, but with most of his friends of many years' standing. I can bear testimony, as one of the few friends remaining close to him to the last, that during the entire period of World War II, Mr. Shiratori concerned himself very little with affairs of this workaday world.

5. Lastly, I may be permitted to give a brief account of Mr. Shiratori's activities as a writer and lecturer. Having undertaken from time to time the task of putting in order and compiling the writings and lectures of Mr. Shiratori, I am well acquainted with the circumstances under which he wrote or made speeches. He contributed articles to journals or delivered lectures at public gatherings only after being repeatedly and urgently requested by people concerned. I do not recollect a single instance of his doing these things unsolicited or of his own accord. He made his speeches invariably without a manuscript. When their stenographic records were presented to him afterwards for publication, he usually made ample corrections. As for his articles appearing in journals, it was very seldom if ever that he wrote anything himself.
he would generally dictate or just freely talk to representatives of newspapers or magazines who called on him with stenographers. In most cases the records were presented to him for correction and amplification before being printed for publication. Mr. Shiratori was not, properly speaking, a writer or lecturer nor was he ever known as such. His writings and lectures, however, seemed to enjoy a certain amount of popularity and were therefore sought after by journalists, mainly because he was generally considered as one of the most outspoken and perhaps indiscriminate of our bureaucrats and diplomats. After coming home from Sweden in 1936, he held no responsible position in the government at Tokio, having been placed on the waiting list for several years except for a brief space as Ambassador to Rome.

He used to say in those days that he could give utterance to his own thoughts all the more freely because, although nominally still a diplomat, he was not admitted into knowledge of state secrets or government policies.

In reply to the criticism expressed in some quarters about some of his utterances being too outspoken, Mr. Shiratori once told me as follows: "In these days of dictators everywhere who do not believe in mincing words, the diplomatic axiom of fortiter in re, suaviter in modo (strongly in deed, gently in manner) will perhaps have to be reversed."

On the eve of the Russian War of 1904-1905, Foreign Minister Mr. Komura asked the opinion of his American advisor, Mr. Dennison, about a draft of Japan's answer to a stiff Russian note.
Mr. Dennison said that if Japan meant war, the language must be soft and mild. Mr. Komura told him to tone down the Japanese note as far as possible. This has become almost a classic in the Japanese Foreign Office. Since, however, we do not today want war with any country, it might be permissible or even advisable to indulge in outspoken language every now and then.

In the Building of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, on May 29th, 1947, the 22nd year of Showa (1947).

I hereby certify that the aforementioned person took an oath, deposed and affixed his signature and seal in my presence.

On the same day, at the same place,
Witness SAKUMA, Shin (seal)

OATH

I swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, reserve nothing that I know, nor add anything that I do not know.

MISHIMA, Yasuo (seal)
I, MURAMATSU, Tsuneo, being first duly sworn according to the customary formality in this country, depose and state:

I am Vice Director of the Matsuzawa Psychiatric Hospital, No. 1048, 3-Chome, Fami-Kitazawa-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, besides being a lecturer at the Medical Faculty of the Tokyo Imperial University as well as a professor of the Tokyo Medical College.

Along with Dr. K. MIYAKE, Professor of the Tokyo Imperial University, I was first asked to examine Mr. SHIRATORI, Toshio on April 12, 1941 at his residence at Aoyama Takagicho, Tokyo. With the help of entries in my pocket diary, I am able to remember the following in regard to his conditions at the time and for some time afterwards:

According to Mrs. SHIRATORI and his close friends, Mr. SHIRATORI, for a month or two previous to my examination, had been suffering from sleeplessness and excitability as a result of being too deeply absorbed in reading books on religious subjects. About the 5th of April he began to show marked signs of exhaustion from overwork, and from the night of April 8 indications of a mental derangement became apparent. On April 10, he took no food but only drank water and could not sleep at all. Mr. FUSE, the patient's younger brother and
a medical practitioner, gave him two injections of Narcoopen-Scopolamin 0.5 c.c. On April 11, he was able to take some food and was quiet during the daytime, but towards evening fell again into a state of excitement, apparently having visual hallucinations, too. Once more an injection of Narcoopen-Scopolamin, this time 1.1 c.c., was given him which made him sleep for about six hours.

Dr. MIYAKE and myself visited him on the day following (April 12). We found him physically much weakened from want of sleep and nutrition and his voice almost entirely lost, however, with little indication otherwise of bodily ailment. Mentally, he was in a considerably acute state of manic excitement, lacking correct orientation, with clouded consciousness and a certain degree of hallucination. In a word, he was in a state of so-called delirium. I diagnosed it as a manic state of manic-depressive psychosis. Dr. MIYAKE fully agreed with me in this diagnosis. In passing, it may be remarked that this is the sort of mental disease which is recorded as having occurred in geniuses like Goethe.

We gave a prescription for sedatives, vitamins, poptics and laxatives, and, at the same time, made arrangements with the Komine Psychiatric Hospital, No. 889, Nishigahara-machi, Takinogawa-ku, Tokyo, for his reception at a short notice. As it became clear in the course of a few more days that treatment at home was no longer possible, Mr. SHIRATORI was sent to the said hospital on the 16th of April.

I do not know much about Mr. SHIRATORI's condition at the hospital, the only entry in my diary being to the effect that on the
25th of April I was informed that Mr. SHIRATORI had at last recover
his consciousness. Since that date he seemed gradually to have
improved until it was thought possible again to treat him at home.
He was allowed to leave the hospital on May 10. I saw him for the
fourth time on the day following. I found his mental condition no
remarkably settled but a state of excitement was still present. He
did not yet sleep well and was, moreover, suffering from beri-beri.
Since that date, I administered his treatments as physician in chief.
The prescription he had brought home from the hospital was "sulfon:
1.0 gram, Chloral-hydrate 1.0 gram per day". It was clear from this
that his lack of appetite and constipation were the result of taking
these sedatives, but his mental condition was still such that it was
necessary for him to continue taking that amount of these drugs a day.

I decided to follow this prescription with the addition of some
Vitamin B and C, while minutely examining the patient's urine.
Later, I changed sulfonal for veronal 0.5 gram and lessened chlora-
hydrante from 1.0 to 0.5 gram. On May 25th, I stopped chloral-hydra-
and on June 7 applied brovanin 0.5 instead of veronal. On June 14,
however, I had to increase brovalin from 0.5 to 1.0 gram and to
a dose of veronal 0.5 in addition.

If only judging from these prescriptions, it is clear that as
late as the middle of June, the patient's condition was still such
as to necessitate the application of a considerable amount of sedative:
In view of these unsatisfactory circumstances following his return
from the hospital, I strictly cautioned the patient and his family
against receiving visits and taxing his mind with questions concern-
ing international situations and against reading anything, not excepti

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magazines and newspapers. It was in order to facilitate the practice of such a strict seclusion treatment, that I advised Mr. SHIRATORI to remove to a seaside cottage at Hayara although that involved much inconvenience to the physician in charge. My last visit down to Hayama was on the 13th of August 1941. Mr. SHIRATORI at that date could hardly be regarded as "completely cured", but I decided to discontinue my visits in the thought that so long as my advice was strictly followed by the patient and his family, expert help could now be safely dispensed with barring an unexpected change or relapse. Before quitting, I did not fail to renew my advice to him and his family, use special care to concentrate all their efforts on recuperation for at least half to one year, refraining from all official work or political activities, and having as little as possible to do with the outside world generally. I emphasized the particular importance of guarding against a relapse which was apt to occur in a case like his within one half to one year of apparent recovery. I learned from his family that my counsel was being faithfully acted upon by the patient.

For the rest, I find in my diary an entry to the effect that I had a message from a friend of Mr. SHIRATORI's that about the 23rd of December 1941, after a visit to the Grand Shrine at Iso, Mr. SHIRATORI had a slight relapse and was again suffering from lack of sleep.

I have, however, no recollection of having been asked to examine his condition about that time or afterwards.

This 22nd day of December 1946, at my house, No. 304, 4-Chōme,
I swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, to reserve nothing that I know, nor add anything that I do not know.

(Signed) KURAHASHI, Tsuneo, M.D.
I, ARIMA, Yoriyasu, being first duly sworn, according to the customary formality in this country, depose and state:

1. At the time of the second KONOYE Cabinet, on August 22, 1940, I was nominated a member of the Arranging Committee for the New National Structure, which was then being proposed. On the basis of the report of that Committee, the so-called Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized, and upon its inauguration, on October 12, 1940, I was nominated one of the Managing Directors and concurrently became the Secretary-General and the Chief of the General Office of the Central Bureau of the Association. I resigned these posts on the 28th of March, 1941 when the Association was reorganized.

2. The Arranging Committee was mainly composed of representatives of various non-official circles, but the actual work of arranging the proposed association was chiefly done by a Managing Secretariat, consisting of the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, the Chief of the
Legislative Bureau of the Cabinet, the Vice-Chief of the Planning Board, the Vice Minister for Home Affairs, etc. The Arranging Committee was disbanded on September 17, 1940, after completing its labours of arranging the framework of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

Mr. ShIBATQRI, Toshio was among those who were originally invited by Prince KONOYE to form the Arranging Committee for the New Structure, but he did not take any active part in the discussions of the Committee. In fact, he generally absented himself from its meetings.

3. On the occasion of the inaugural ceremony, on October 12, 1940, Premier Prince KONOYE, the President of the Association, said that the purpose of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association consists purely and simply in "fulfillment in a practical way of our duties as His Majesty's loyal subjects," and that he had, therefore, no program or declaration to offer for the Association. From the beginning it was conceived of as a public association as distinguished from political parties, aiming as it did at organizing the entire nation in such a manner as to enable them more loyally and effectively to discharge their duties as Imperial subjects. Prince KONOYE, on several occasions, clearly stated that the Association was sharply to be distinguished in character from the one-party system of the totalitarian countries of Europe.

The officials of the Association were the President (the then Prime Minister), Advisors (Cabinet Ministers of the time and a few
specially named persons, Directors (numbering about forty, of whom about a dozen were managing directors), and the personnel of the Central Bureau comprising the Secretary-General, Chiefs of Sections, etc. In practice, the business of the Association was mainly undertaken by the Managing Directors, the Secretary-General, and the other principal members of the staff of the Central Bureau. In addition, there was the Central Co-operation Conference, as an organ of the Association, consisting of one hundred six (106) representatives of local branches in prefectures and big cities, as well as fifty (50) representatives of the press, finance and science, etc., which was called in sessions now and then at the Headquarters of the Association at Tokyo.

4. Mr. SHIRATORI was nominated an ordinary (not managing) director but I do not recollect that he ever attended any of the meetings of the Directorate or otherwise played any active part in connection with the activities of the Association. In fact, his activities in the organization were so inconsequential, that it was not until I was requested by his counsel to make a deposition in regard to his activities in the organization, that I remembered that at one time he was a member of the Arranging Committee and an ordinary director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

5. When the Association was reconstructed in the spring of 1941, I tendered my resignation, together with all the Directors. While most of the Directors decided by April 30 to retract their resignations, I left my post along with several Directors. Mr. SHIRATORI was among
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those who resigned, and inasmuch as he was seriously ill thereafter, he never took any step to retract his resignation, as did various others, but remained completely out of the organization.

This 9th day of October, 1947, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ ARiWA, Yoriyasu (seal)

Sworn to, deposed, and stated, and subscribed before re on the above mentioned date at the same place.

Witness: /s/ SAKjA, Shin (seal)
Counsel for Defendant
SHIRATRI

OATH

I swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, reserve nothing that I know, nor add anything that I do not know.

/s/ ARiWA, Yoriyasu (seal)
In Japan, also, the tide has turned against that liberalism and democracy which once swept over the nation. The theory of government as advocated by certain politicians which sees in parliament the real centre of power now has been completely rejected and the country is fast reverting to totalitarianism, which has been the fundamental principle of Japan's national life for the past thirty centuries. In the eyes of those who believe in democracy as the highest political ideal, the world today is verily in the age of retrogression.

A government is a so-called necessary evil, and its ideal should be a state of anarchy. But according to the philosophy of totalitarianism, the whole state or nation is, to carry further the above simile, one large tree of which individuals constitute the branches and leaves. A branch, or a leaf, has its own functions and has, within the whole, its own significance for existence. However, it cannot live apart from the whole, and must always and willingly sacrifice itself if necessary for the sake of the whole. Such is the political philosophy on which the new state systems of Germany and Italy are based, and such also has been the basic principle of the national system of Japan for millennia past. The principle is not likely to perish in Germany or Italy, whatever may be the fortunes of individual statesmen. Japan has had no other principle than this ever since the beginning of her history, although there have been certain external modifications in the governmental form under the influences of thoughts imported from abroad. This totalitarian national principle — or national policy, as it is called — by the Japanese — is to the Japanese people a thing eternal and immutable.

Most likely the criticisms directed by democratic countries against totalitarian states originate not so much in political philosophy as in the fact that these latter countries happen to be among the "have-nots" as regards material resources, and consequently they are compelled to adopt a trend towards expansionist policies and destruction of the status quo that begat fear and hatred. Viewed from this standpoint, too, the general condemnation of totalitarian states cannot be regarded as just. The matter should be studied with fairness by the intelligentsia in order to arrive at a correct conclusion. The future peace of mankind does not depend, as President
Roosevelt says, on the growth and diffusion of democracy, but rather on how well democracies understand Fascism and how they look upon the policies of totalitarian states.

Excerpt (4) page 261

Japan, Germany and Italy, the three greatest totalitarian countries of the world, have concluded an anti-Comintern pact, the sole aim of which repeatedly has been declared by the governments of the three Powers to be common defence against the Communist International and its schemes of world revolution.

Excerpt (5) page 261-262

It is only by chance that the three nations, poor in natural resources, are obliged to seize every opportunity for legitimate national expansion abroad. It is understandable that this should occasion apprehension, not necessarily with chauvinism, on the part of the "have" nations. But it is extremely difficult to understand that democratic countries, despite the absence of any attack or threat of attack on themselves, should, from a pre-fashioned notion of their own, place a false construction on the intentions of the "have-not" countries and attempt to check and suppress their activities at every turn. Would not such an attitude only drive these countries beyond the limits of their original anti-Comintern pact and compel them to collaborate in self-defence along more general lines?

Excerpt (6) page 263

A treaty, once signed by a "have-not" nation through temporary weakness or imprudence, is considered sacred and inviolable. Its observance is insisted upon with the inexorableness of a Shylock demanding his pound of flesh.

Excerpt (7) page 267

The national policy of Japan and the spirit of that Oriental culture of which she represents the highest peak are to a great measure in consonance with the totalitarian cosmic views. Accordingly, as far as Japan is concerned, the question is not one of making a new choice but of returning to her former self. It is a marvel of the present century that Germany and Italy have created a fresh totalitarian formulae of government for themselves. It is possible that these formulae ideologically may be traced to the ancient philosophy of the Orient. Be that as it may, it makes our hearts warm to see ideas that have influenced our races for centuries in the past become embodied in the systems of those modern states of Europe.
**EXHIBIT No. 3237-B**

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RETURN TO ROOM 361
Chapter: The Fundamental Significance of Japan's Continental Policy

The Manchurian incident, the sequel to the railway blasting which occurred at Liutiaokou near Mukden on September 18, 1931, imparted a new significance and vitality to Japan's continental policy. This turn of events was one which had been entirely unforeseen and for which Japan as a nation was not mentally prepared in any measure. Naturally, the general public was taken by surprise and there was no nation-wide unity of spirit in evidence among the people against the criticisms and attacks which the whole world directed against Japan. In fact there were not a few persons within our country who in fact secretly agreed with the foreign criticisms. It was therefore only natural that Japan's diplomacy in connection with the incident in question proved far from satisfactory.

The gravamen of the Powers' charge against Japan was that she had infringed upon law and treaties and that her conduct ran counter to the prevailing trend of thought which prized peace and humanity above everything, while the League of Nations, which took it upon itself to act as an instrument of world opinion and conscience, ended by branding Japan in Manchuria as an aggressor. Against this, the right of self-defense was practically the sole legal argument Japan could advance, while pleading in extenuation conditions peculiar to East Asia and wrongs and injustices committed by China herself as well as action similar to Japan's on the part of the other Powers, emphasis being also placed upon the particular importance of her own vested rights and interests in Manchuria.

The general public in Japan seems to think that Japan's diplomacy in this instance failed in propaganda warfare. But, viewed technically and from a profit and loss standpoint and estimated in the light of later international developments, the Manchurian incident does not represent a total defeat for Japan. In fact, many observers abroad even regard Japan's recent diplomacy as a great success. However, we are dissatisfied all the same with the progress of the Manchurian Incident, not for any such pragmatic reason, but for the very reason that the majority of our people, including most of the intelligentsia, did not see anything beyond the more superficial facts of the matter and consequently failed to grasp the deep philosophic meaning underlying Japan's continental policy.

Simultaneously with the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, there arose a new spiritual movement in Japan, which seriously agitated national thought and which led to a series of untoward incidents, a state of affairs one would have least expected to see in Japan in the trying international situation in which she then found herself. This new movement, however, was in the final analysis, closely bound up with Japan's military campaign on the Asiatic continent, which after all was a move animated by a definite ideal and conscious of its objective, instead of being an action for sheer
 conquest. That is to say, the ultimate aim of the action was to unite various Asiatic races and found a land of "Kingly Way" and common zeal in Manchuria and Mongolia, while the new thought movement in Japan was, although it was not perfectly regimented and left room for controversy in some respects among its followers, mainly in accord with the military move on the Continent and favoured, in domestic affairs, clarifying Japan's unique national polity and realizing a true Rule of the Emperor and, in foreign relations, Japan leading the Asiatic nations in creating an ideal international relationship for co-existence and common prosperity for all nations on the basis of the ethical tenets traditional to the Orient.

The followers of this movement, as well as those who approve its thesis, are regarded as being inclined to Fascism by the public. Whether they be Fascists or not, the ideas of these men have something in common with the new political philosophy of Germany, in that they believe in totalitarianism and denounce Communism, democracy and other materialistic ideologies. The salient difference is that this movement in Japan lays special emphasis on the unique national character of this Empire and refuses to follow the ways of Europe and America, reminding us in this respect of the slogan of "expel the foreigner and honour the Emperor," which was popular at the time of the Restoration of 1868.

The recent agitation against Britain and America was first concerned with Japan's diplomatic dealings with individual foreign nations, but it is now directed against all sorts of things in Japan which are foreign or non-Japanese. In other words, the attention of the followers of this movement has been shifted from foreign relations to domestic politics. Essentially a reform movement, this trend of thought has sounded an alarm for the entire nation which has been blindly following the lead of Europe and America for the past half century. The Manchurian incident on the Continent, the spiritual upheaval of Japanism at home, the "Back-to-Asia" movement, and the demand for Greater Asia, are all different phases of the same trend.

So far as foreign relations were concerned, it was comparatively easy to secure unity of opinion in Japan, but as soon as domestic questions began to be discussed, all different interests and thoughts clashed with one another, and drastic suppression had to be applied to radical acts and thoughts.

The new movement in Japan which advocates the rejection of Western materialism and a return to Japanism, representing the cream of Oriental culture, is no doubt essentially justifiable from all points of view. That civilization based on individualism and materialism has proved a failure is now beginning to be admitted by thinking people even in the West, where attempts are being made by not a few to seek a remedy in the ancient cultural thought of the Orient. Moreover, the great discoveries of modern science have disproved the Newtonian mechanistic view of the universe so prevalent until recently and the Oriental mysticism so long regarded as "unscientific" bids fair now to be endorsed by the new theories of natural science.
In political theory and practice, too, liberalism and democracy, which are based on individualism, are gradually becoming outworn, while the new trend of nationalism and racialism seems to be destined to continue developing. Thus the political philosophy of tomorrow will in all probability come under the exclusive sway of totalitarianism. In other words, a new age is dawning upon the West, and I hardly see any reason why thinkers in Japan alone should cling to their outworn clothes of thought. It is certainly not a matter for congratulation nor does it agree with the Japanese nation that no progress is marked in the thought of our people to keep pace with our continental policy which alone goes ahead at full blast.

We have noticed how unprepared we were spiritually at the time of the Manchurian affair. The six years which have since elapsed have largely been wasted, and when hostilities arose in North China, the Japanese nation, both official and private, had nothing to offer but such old jargon as the right of self-defense or vested interests, and since the conflict spread to Shanghai, "Punishment of Outrageous China" has been Japan's main watchword. Further, in face of the wonted criticisms of the Western press, the Government hurriedly decided to send special missions abroad to have Japan's case explained to the Western public.

It is fundamentally mistaken to try to explain Japan's continental action in the light of the Western view of things or within the scope of law and treaties only. If we are to follow the Western way of thinking, we have to obey Western rules of conduct and must plead guilty where Western public opinion unanimously blames us.

Japan faced that situation six years ago and made her choice. She decided to part company with the West following her withdrawal from the League of Nations, when she made it clear before the world that her idea of peace differed from that of the West. Why should we now reverse our attitude and yield to Western public opinion? We must remember that Japan's continental policy has a cultural significance and that her action on the Continent represents an attempt to reform human society and to save modern civilization from the impasse in which it finds itself. It is not to be compared to any of the examples in history that are superficially similar.

Take, for example, what Japan has done in Chosen. There is not a colonial Empire that can produce a balance sheet so clean and free from all selfishness. In Manchoukuo, the ideal of the "Kingly Way" is steadily being realized though it has been in existence only five short years. The Northern Chinese are now actually welcoming the Imperial army "with food in bowls and soup in jars," as Mencius said centuries ago about the army of the Sage-King.

We must not indulge in mere self-glorification. We do not mean to make light of our relations with other countries or to say that laws and treaties may be disregarded entirely. But the problem we are faced with is too grave. In China, at this moment, two brother nations of Asia are fighting with tooth and nail. What is it all for? Not for conquest; neither for territory or
out of sheer hatred. Tens of thousands of lives and billions of money are offered up in the struggle. Victory can hardly be gain enough to compensate for such colossal sacrifice; nor is any gain expected at all. Was there ever a war like this in history? It is no wonder that the utilitarian West cannot understand it. Nobody who does not understand the great principles upon which this nation was founded thousands of years ago can appreciate the real purposes with which the entire nation is inspired in the present enterprise.

It is in this light that we view the present China affair. It presents a brave attempt on the part of Japan to rehabilitate Asia at whatever cost to herself. To us Japanese it is human civilization itself that is here at stake. We take it that the whole course of history is now at a turning point. It is from this angle that we request the entire world to regard the present struggle in China.
最后将结果交予法庭。
J.P.S. Doc. No. 5257
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE CURRENT SITUATION AT HOME AND ABROAD

(Broadcast by Toshio SHIRATORI, on March 1, 1941)

We are now face to face with the most serious crisis in history both at home and abroad. Japan is beset with unprecedented difficulties, while the world at large is plunging headlong into an enormous commotion which promises to be protracted, for how long no one knows.

Ten years have already elapsed since the cry of emergency was first heard in our country. Of this period, we have spent the last three and a half years in carrying on a war on the largest scale in the history of our country since its opening to the world. In the meantime, considerable changes have occurred in our internal situation. About one hundred thousand precious lives have been lost, leaving behind hundreds of thousands of men, women and children who have been deprived of their fathers, husbands, sons or brothers. Our daily livelihood is becoming more and more cramped and various inconveniences and hardships are experienced every turn. There is no Japanese who is not desirous of the return as soon as possible of the days of peace and comfort. But the present emergency has not arisen on account of Japan alone. The China affair is not a conflict that broke out for reasons confined to the Orient alone, nor solely as a product of Sino-Japanese relations. Its origin must be traced to deeper causes rooted in the inevitability of world-wide development. It is impossible.
therefore, for Japan alone to solve the present extraordinary situation and return to "normalcy."

In order to stabilize the situation, it is imperative that the difficulties be faced in terms of the world as a whole. The fact that Japan, Germany and Italy entered into an alliance last fall must likewise be viewed in such a perspective. It is true that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact has resulted in an increased aggravation of relations between Japan on the one hand and Britain and the United States on the other. It must also be admitted that the inter-relationship between the wars in Asia and in Europe has thereby become more pronounced. But this is not necessarily to be considered an outcome of the Tripartite Pact. Since the time of the Manchurian Incident and throughout the China affair, the interests of Japan and those of the Anglo-Saxon Nations have clashed on more than one occasion, and their respective opinions and claims were found irreconcilable. It became plain that it is entirely hopeless for Japan to settle satisfactorily the China affair and to establish a new order in East Asia on the basis of compromise and co-operation with the Anglo Saxon Powers. That is the reason why Japan at last grasped the hands of Germany and Italy, whose interests and views have been found in complete accord with those of Japan. The aggravation of our relations with Britain and the United States is, therefore, the cause and not the result of the Tripartite Pact. The argument is said to be advanced in some quarters that Japan's diplomatic dealings have become difficult because of the conclusion of such a
superfluous connection. It must be pointed out here that such a suggestion puts the cart before the horse.

In this way, the world has been divided into two camps, of old and new forces, which are altogether incompatible with each other, politically, economically and ideologically. This in brief is the picture of the great world commotion which we envisage today. Composing one camp are the countries of Britain, the United States, France and the Netherlands, which have founded their present wealth and influence by monopolizing the best part of the world and more especially by oppressing and exploiting the backward peoples of Asia who are kith and kin of our own race. On the other side are countries like Japan, Germany and Italy, whose people have all the superior qualities of industry, honesty, bravery and a spirit of unity, but whose lands and resources are limited due to their belated appearance on the international stage, with the consequence that they find it not a little difficult to maintain the livelihood of their teeming millions; nations who have gallantly resolved by some means or other to reconstruct a world order which is against reason and humanity. Since the clash is thus between two groups of countries whose ideas and positions are so diametrically opposed to each other, to restore peace is a task that cannot easily be accomplished.

Take for instance, the question of the China affair. Nigh upon four long years have elapsed and a solution is not yet in sight. It is simply because, as everyone is now aware, China is not the only nation to deal with but there are countries like
Britain and the United States behind China which, unlike Japan, evidently consider it to their interest to prolong the semi-colonial status of China in order to exploit the four hundred million Chinese. "We have hitherto been fighting single handed against these influences. Believers in the materialistic doctrine of the survival of the fittest, these countries do not and will not understand what the national character and ideals of Japan are, or what "Sino-Japanese co-existence and co-prosperity" really means to the peoples of Japan and China. They have simply been accusing Japan of oppressing the weak China and of being an aggressor. Not only have they abused Japan but have actually been aiding Chungking and obstructing Japan's efforts ever since the outset of the unfortunate affair. Their anti-Japanese activities have sunk deeply in the minds of the Japanese who cannot easily forget them.

The protraction of the Sino-Japanese conflict was inevitable so long as such Anglo-American activities continued. With the outbreak of the European war, however, the situation began to change. Having hitherto shown so much enmity toward this country Britain and the United States cannot but avow their intention of continuing to aid Chungking, and have actually been increasing their economic pressure on Japan. But whatever they may say, the actual developments of the world situation are such that they cannot afford to concern themselves too much with China. For them to help Chungking effectively is now impossible. The principal theater of war has been shifted to Europe and the China scene has gradually been relegated to the background. Since the star actors
or the stage directors of the Sino-Japanese drama are kept busy in Europe, the Far Eastern theater has naturally to be neglected. In the absence of the promoters of the affair, Japan and China, being racially and culturally brother nations of Asia, ought to be able to come to an understanding. Chiang Kai-shek and his followers, however, are still under an illusion. Shutting their eyes both to the altered aspect of the world situation and to the change in character which the China affair has undergone, they continue their resistance against Japan in hopes of continued assistance from Britain and America. It is hoped that sooner or later the truth will dawn upon them. I for one am persuaded that the China affair will before long be settled. We of Japan must surely do all we can to wind it up as soon as possible.

We must not forget, however, that those "headmen" who have gone away for the moment will come back to Asia soon enough. The mice cannot afford to play too merrily while the cat is away. Even if they be baffled in Europe, they are not the sort of headmen who will give up the game. If shut out from Europe, Asia would become more than ever important for them, and they would unquestionably concentrate their efforts on the affairs of this part of the world. Inasmuch as Japan's idea of establishing a sphere of common prosperity in greater East Asia must, in their eyes, be an encroachment on their own interests, the Anglo-Saxons would oppose it with even greater vigour than in the case of the China affair. If that be the case, we must bear in mind that our position will not be made easier through their defeat in Europe alone, not to speak of our plight in case they win. We must be
prepared for more and more efforts and sacrifices for the lofty task of realizing Asia's independence and emancipation.

As for Germany, she will not be able to rest content by mere defeating or ever occupying Britain in Europe. The German-British struggle will not come to an end with that. It is to be expected that Britain will move, with her sea power intact, to her Asiatic colonies, Canada and Australia, and try to continue her resistance. Besides, it must be presumed that the United States will participate openly in the war when her preparations are completed, though her immediate entry is problematical, as she is not at present prepared, and, moreover, there seems to exist a division of opinion in that country regarding her involvement in the war. At any rate with President Roosevelt striking an attitude as if his country were already in the war, American participation must be considered inevitable. In point of fact, the United States is now virtually a belligerent, whatever name one may choose to give to her present status.

Under these circumstances, the European war has every prospect of developing into an extremely protracted war all over the world. A war lasting for ten, twenty years, is not unthinkable and Japan will inevitably become involved therein. That is clear enough if only from the letter of the Tripartite Pact. Such an eventuality may, from Japan's point of view, be considered an expansion of the China affair into a general world war, or a melting together of the wars in Asia and Europe. Be it what it may, it is clear that Japan will not be allowed to stand aloof from such a world-wide conflagration.
Such a prospect cannot but be a source of intense apprehension to many people in this country, nor are endeavours wanting, I understand, to curb the progress of events. I am afraid, however, that such efforts will after all prove fruitless. History is eloquent in testifying to the truth that all great changes in human thought have resulted from long periods of struggle. No human power can check the overwhelming tide of a historic inevitability.

When such a long-term world war does come, our nation should not be uselessly upset or worried, or vainly think of a course running counter to historic necessity. Before everything, we must put right our internal conditions so that we may successfully cope with the impending world cataclysm. I know that I shall be taken to task by some people who would say, "Three and a half years of warfare in China is more than enough. How could be bear further ten or twenty years of armed struggle and tribulations? Stop your nonsense!" I yield to none in hoping for as quick a termination of the war as possible. Nevertheless, if the trend of the times is otherwise and cannot be avoided it is imperative that we should be prepared for the worst. That the way in which we have been carrying on the China affair will be utterly inadequate is clear enough. There is need for an entirely new start. The cry for a new political and economic system, the movement for the "observance of the way of the Imperial subjects", and the demand for "high degree national defense", are they not measurements to meet the requirements, of the extraordinary world situation?
IPS Doc. No. 3331

Japan is a country standing unique in the world for her national and state characteristics. Looking up to the Emperor, "the Son of Heaven", as their father, the people are conscious of their blood relationship one with another, the whole nation thus being formed into a large family and brotherhood. The greater the difficulties confronting them, the more firmly tightened are the ties that bind them together. That is the rare quality and strong point of this nation. That distinguishes them from some of the democracies where individuals are mechanically assembled together and in the name of the natural rights of man, liberty and equality, every one acts as he pleases. That there is in this country no possibility of an internal breakdown, however long and severe a test the people may be put to, ought more than anything else to contribute to our equanimity of mind.

Moreover, Japan's geographical position is such as to render her practically immune from war's ravages in spite of the great modern improvement in the instruments of war. As regards the countries adjacent to her, China is as every one knows, while our relations with the Soviet Union are expected progressively to improve, leaving no cause for anxiety from that quarter. It is only on the sea that we must keep watch. The Pacific, however, is a boundless ocean. It behooves us not to entertain too much apprehension, placing our trust in our unbeaten navy. The talk about removing the old and the young from the cities is to my mind worse than useless, causing as it does unwarranted misgivings among the general public.

In a long-term struggle, economic and ideological warfare will play a more important part than an actual clash in arms. It is
so to speak a marathon race as compared to lightning stroke warfare which may be likened to a sprint race. In a struggle of this kind serenity of mind and strong nerves are essential. So far we have been told that "it is war time, that it is a temporary phenomenon, and that it is a matter of perseverance for only a year or two". That is not the proper attitude of mind in face of the trying difficulties ahead of us. On the contrary it is desirable that we should have enough composure of mind to tell ourselves that the war conditions have come to stay and that we must try to improve our internal conditions while fighting in China. That ought naturally to arise from the character of the war we are now engaged in, for is it not a war for the establishment of a new order; we must construct while fighting. It would be an ideal development if it could be shown that when the war is over the new order is there both at home and on the continent.

The construction of the so-called "defence-state" must in my opinion aim primarily at the adjustment of the internal structure in such a way as to enable us to cope with the world emergency. The immediate purpose is the expansion of the country's productive power. But this cannot be achieved unless we are one and all full, awake to the reality of the international situation and realizing the essential requirements of a modern warfare, give up all selfishness. Without the conscious cooperation of the people, no amount of legislation or exercise of governmental authority will bring any good results. Above all, human instinct and human nature must be given free play. All methods should therefore be avoided which, in the name of war-time requirements, unnecessarily darken
the hearts of the people and hold out no hope for the future. Although mental slackening must be guarded against, yet fidgeting and bustling will get us nowhere for it is a Marathon, and a long one at that which we have to run. Cheerfulness is the one ineradicable trait of the Japanese people. The greatest national calamity that befell the Yamato race in its long history, was when the Great God Ama-terasu hid behind the Heavenly Cave throwir utter darkness upon the whole world below. What did the eight hundred thousand gods do in face of the emergency? Were they helplessly given to weeping and sorrowing? Far from it, they assembled before the Heavenly Cave and sang and danced and laughed till the heavens shook and rang again. That, I take it, is the characteristic way of our race in meeting difficulties.

As I said at the outset the extraordinary situation with which Japan has been confronted in recent years has arisen from deep causes beyond human comprehension. Both the Manchurian incident and the China affair must be attributed as it were to a Heavenly disposition: they were not of our own making, nor are any group of men to be held responsible for them. What we should do is to grasp the meaning of that Disposition. I venture to believe that today the Japanese people have rightly grasped the deep significance of the Divine will in putting them to the test of the emergency privations. It is not known who said it first, but it is now the consensus of opinion that the solution of the China problem must be along lines worthy of the Imperial idea of universal brotherhood or one world family. In regard also to the proposed new structure at home, it is pointed out that the one
thing needful is how to enable the hundred million people to put in practice unhampered the way of the Imperial subjects. It is indeed noteworthy that such a method should spontaneously be proposed for the solution of our difficulties both at home and abroad. That would seem to prove beyond chance that the sons of Yamato, faced with the gravest situation in history, have awakened to the true meaning of our national structure and of the mission imposed upon them. So long as we maintain that consciousness and live up to that spirit, no amount of difficulties or calamities need cause us any misgiving or apprehension.

Frankly speaking, our people have made light of the China war and failed so far to put forth their efforts to the full. Moreover, since the drags of individualism and materialism have not altogether been eliminated from their thought, there have been various defects in the country's wartime system, giving rise to complaints, decrease in production and failure of goods to appear on the market. But, once the country should be drawn into the world maelstrom whether we like it or not, may it not be expected that the attitude of the people will naturally undergo a fundamental change?

Once preparations for a long and total war are completed on the basis of a new national structure we can well expect the country to overcome all dangers, and its future to be full of promise. The present conflicts in the East and the West are at bottom due to the fact that the old order has reached its limits
throughout the world. Its defeat seems therefore natural. That, after the life-and-death grapple between the new and old orders at enormous sacrifices, the old should emerge victorious, rendering fruitless the efforts and sacrifices of the new, is hard to imagine in the light of the theory of the evolution of human society. Unless, therefore, we commit the error of sticking to the old system at home and falling along with that system, we need perhaps not be too tragic about the future of this nation.
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II. World War and the New World

1. Establishment of New Spheres of Influence Over the World.

The connection between the war in Asia and that in Europe has become markedly clarified with the signing of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

(P. 65) This is not merely because the recognition has become widespread that Japan as well as Germany and Italy are opposed to a common enemy, Britain and America, but still more because there was a deepened consciousness that Japan and other Axis Powers, as mentioned in the Preamble of the Pact, are acting upon their common noble ideas.

In the days when the three nations were acting individually in the East and in the West, it was a little difficult to make a distinction between the motives and objects of the present war from those of before. In other words, the European war has been regarded as an Anglo-French struggle with Germany and Italy, and a contest for their respective spheres of influence; and the Asiatic war has been criticized as being a manifestation of Japan's aggressive policy against a weak China. Furthermore, until then, actually, the great conception of the "New World Order" mentioned in the Alliance Treaty, was not openly declared by any of the three powers, each of them instead aimed at sweeping away the old order in their respective immediate spheres of influence. However, through this treaty, Japan has announced at home and abroad her intentions to establish a "Greater East Asia" Co-prosperity Sphere which goes beyond the Japan-Manchukuo-China bloc; while Germany and Italy have clarified their determination to establish a new order over a vast area which includes Europe and Africa; and thus creating a close cooperative relation between the new orders of the East and of the West. Thus, the characteristics and the eventual outcome of the current global upheaval have become definitely clear. Although originally the three nations have been assigned a common mission through world history when their collaboration and cooperation assume the dignified form of a treaty, it is quite natural that the rival powers strengthen their unity. It is a fact that since the Treaty was made public, the attitude of America has become conspicuously firmer, and the enthusiasm to give assistance to Britain has markedly increased. America has expressed her open hostile feeling against Japan, Germany and Italy, and has even before been trying to obstruct our actions at every turn. But, according to the recent situation, the fear is steadily increasing that America might sooner or later enter the wars in the East and the West, and bring about an unprecedented era of world conflagration.

This is perhaps an unavoidable tendency. The new and old powers that split the present world differ from each other with respect to their characteristics and conceptions in the entire fields of politics, economy, and culture; and America is one nation which most distinctly and powerfully
represents the old power. Since the retreat of the old order in Europe increasingly brings such a position of America to the (page 67) surface, it is quite natural that America feels that she was chosen as the target of attack in the face of the collaboration and cooperation of Japan, Germany and Italy which aim at a new world order. As to the reason why America does not immediately enter the war, there may be divergent reasons, such as her incomplete re-armament, conflicting public opinions, the war situation still not necessitating such an action, etc. There is no mistake, however, that America is in fact waging a war in unity with Britain, and it is impossible to think of the end of the war without America.

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2. America's Entry into the War is Inevitable.

If America pours her immense manpower and material resources into the war, we must expect the war to certainly cover a long period of time. However, if one takes this to mean the collapse of the culture of mankind, it is because he does not understand the real significance of the present war to start with. What brought about the current turmoil? The stalemated civilization of liberalism is indeed its cause. Is not the present war the attempt to create a new thing by bursting out of an old shell? The New Order of the East and the West certainly has no significance outside of this. Destruction of human lives and materials is unavoidable. This is neither the destruction of civilization nor the collapse of culture. This is nothing but a sacrifice for the sake of the brilliant birth of a new culture. The thoughts of mankind in effecting any great change have always had to undergo long periods of such destructions. It is quite natural that America would eventually become involved in this war in one form or other. Not only that, but might this not actually be necessary for the interest of the world, and also for the interest of America herself. The reason is because this is the only way that a change in history and a regeneration of the world can become possible.

(page 68) It is said that the Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy was concluded for the purpose of stopping America's entry into the war. What the politicians had in mind might have been really just that. If America remains content with her richly blessed surroundings, and does not intervene in any issue of the old world, permitting the new orders of Asia and Europe to take their own courses, the miserable plight confronting mankind will become lighter, and the restoration of peace, so to speak, will be made comparatively easier. This, however, is impossible. Furthermore, it is hardly possible for America, who constitutes the main factor necessitating New Order movements, to remain out of the picture indefinitely. It may be said that actually the treaty which primarily attempted to secure American neutrality, on the contrary made America's participation in the war unavoidable. The reason is because the New Order of Europe and the New Order of Asia have an inseparable relation by this Treaty, and if the Eastern Hemisphere should be completely established under the new system, it is difficult for the Western Hemisphere to maintain the old system alone; and
it is because the leaders of the internal order of America would never consent to cast off their old conventionalism, unless a world-shattering major war is at stake.

3. The position of Germany and Italy and that of Britain.

As far as the shooting war in Europe is concerned, it seems that it would not last very long, and its result does not seem to be too difficult to imagine, although the destruction in the future might be severe and the losses heavy. It is only a matter of time before the British influence would be swept out of the continent. Germany and Italy will secure under their power vast territories ranging from Scandinavia to the Balkans, the Near East, and Africa, and successively plot the reconstruction, and can easily establish self-sufficiency. Thus, the passage of time will rather make their positions safer. On the contrary, Britain though close to the continent cannot receive any material from that source, and her position is such that she is receiving submarine attacks and air raids from the enemy who has secured strategic positions, and her position would probably become more difficult day by day. It is therefore thought that perhaps it is unnecessary for Germany and Italy to risk the dangers and sacrifices of a landing operation.

Britain rejected the German and Italian peace proposal, although she was well aware of the fall of France, and this matter has already become clear. This was wholly because Britain was determined to fight a death struggle with Germany and Italy, with (page 70) all the power of the Anglo-Saxon world. Thus, Hitler was now obliged to make a fresh determination and preparation. This might be the reason why he did not take advantage of victory and attempt to invade England. There are many things which Germany must do if she is to wage a long-term decisive war against the whole British Empire, and subsequently with the United States of America. First of all, Germany must consolidate the European continent. On top of this, connexions with Asia are also necessary. Although Germany is said to have not been neglecting preparations from the start for both a short-term war and a long-term war, it is believed that she is now seriously determined to fight a delaying war and is making preparations for it. Her Balkans project and her Mediterranean Sea operations are probably for this purpose. Germany must first of all facilitate the position of her ally Italy, and the two of them must be ready to meet a long-term struggle. Therefore, it seems that Germany is not necessarily hurrying the invasion of England. With the coming of spring, Germany may of course start attacks on a major scale, but at present, both Germany and Italy are probably anticipating that the war would not come to an end even if the English mainland falls. If a war with America were unavoidable, it can be said that it might be more convenient for Germany and Italy with their inferior naval strength to draw the U.S. to Europe and engage them in a battle there. If they oust Britain from the Mediterranean Sea, they will not have much worry of receiving damage from that source. Then Britain's worry would be that her homeland inhabited by 48 million people is situated too close to the continent. If they did not have to consider the inhabitants, they can probably strategically abandon
that island. However, it is probably most painful to Britain that she is forced to protect this to the bitter end.

(page 72)

4. The Four Major Blocs of the World.

In view of the progress of the situation thus far, and of the future prospects, it is thought that the ultimate British retreat from Europe is an inescapable destiny. However, since America's formal entry in the war before or after that event seems to be a certainty, it is impossible to predict the course which the war will take in the future. Only, it is certain that an American entry in the war would mean a war between Japan and America. Therefore, it is only a matter of course that ravages of war would extend to Asia. I will not say that with the fall of the English homeland, the possibility of peace will become absolutely nil, but we must prepare for the worst. America's rearmament still requires some time before completion; and although whether or not an immediate active battle would take place is another problem, it is necessary in any case to be determined to prepare for an extremely prolonged war.

Futile optimism over the future must be prohibited, but since the current war was caused in the first place by the stalemating of the old world order, it is inconceivable to those, having faith in the progress and advancement of human society that the great sacrifices and calamities should again be in vain, resulting in the old world system remaining as before. (Page 73.) Then, in what form will the collapse of the old order, and the establishment of the new order, which may even be called a historical certainty, be realized?

It is said generally that the future world might be divided into four blocs. In other words, it is said that the world would be divided into broad economic spheres, each centered around Japan, Germany, Italy, Soviet Union, and America; that in principle, a self-sufficient pattern of livelihood would be developed in each of these blocs; that foreign trade ministering to each other's needs would be in the form of a barter system; that each bloc would aim at elevating its cultural level, not having as their highest motive only individual prosperity; and that international frictions such as those of the past may thus be eliminated, and peace be maintained.

5. The Last Bastion of the Old Order.

Of these, the Soviet Union bloc in the present situation is not perfect, its location being too far north. A further southward expansion of her sphere of influence is considered to be necessary, but those who will attempt to oppose such a new order to the very end will be America, and those elements of the old order of the whole world, which (Page 74) are fleeing to seek refuge in America. It is ironical indeed, since this will mean that the American bloc, the one most richly endowed by nature, with the most abundant materials among the four major blocs, is the one which harbors the
most dissatisfaction against the new order. This, however, is solely due to their world outlook, and furthermore it can be attributed to the fact that they cannot forget the dreams of a Jewish and Anglo-Saxon capitalistic exploitation economy. It is absolutely unbearable for them to lose overnight all the glories which they had been enjoying over a long period of time in which they controlled the whole world with their financial power. For that reason, even if they are expelled from Europe, they would probably struggle to hold their footing in Asia, continue their bleeding and looting of other races. For this purpose, it is said that they will not hesitate to plunge the whole of mankind into the vortex of a great chaos lasting from ten to twenty years. However, such tyranny on the part of a small minority certainly would not be allowed by both God and man; in the first place, the American people probably will never tolerate this for long. As long as prosperity continues, a society such as the one in America, will be untroubled, but once it is swept by an emergency, its foundation becomes extremely weak. This is a fact beyond any doubt to those who witnessed the intense shock felt by the American people at the time of the great panic some years ago. (Page 75.) At the present time, America boasts of possessing most of the gold bullions of the world, and also of her unlimited resources and her gigantic industrial power; and she may be confident that with her ever-increasing military strength and with her material power, she is able to engage in the herculean task of stemming the revolutionary influences of the world single-handedly. However, we do not believe that such courses which violate the laws of nature and humanity, and which oppose the trend of the times, would go unpunished. By continuing such blind efforts, America will certainly have countless internal failures, and in the end she cannot help but face a great social revolution.

In other words, we are daring to predict that a historical change will be realized only when the new order rises from within America, the last bastion of the old order.

(Published in the initial issue of the magazine "ITALIA", April, 1941.)
二、世界戦争と新世界

世界新秩序の確立

日本とイギリス間の紛争は、一般に認識されており、日本とイギリスの協調は必要である。日本は世界新秩序の中心を形成し、イギリスは協力する必要がある。この協調のため、日本とイギリスの間で連携を図ることが重要である。

日本とイギリスは、世界新秩序を形成するための協力が必要である。日本はイギリスの協力なくして、世界新秩序を形成することはできない。このため、日本とイギリスの間で連携を図ることが重要である。

日本とイギリスの間で連携を図ることは、世界新秩序を形成するための重要なステップである。このため、日本とイギリスの間で連携を図ることが必要である。
定められた枠組みに合って、今の一世界の動乱を
性格と問題が判断して、共同の使命を
もととし、世界史に従って、共同の使命を
指導するための提携・協力が必要であると
国間のない自然で、条約発表以来アメリカの能
度が著しく硬化しつつ、イタリア援助熱が
一たることであるが、最近の情勢で
東西の戦争に介入して、有史以来の
大戦時代

以下次頁
9.11 No. 315-1
性に過ぎたと人類についての思惟が二人戦後を巡るためには
常中のようないた長期の破壊時代を経過
当てはめでありの必然性は、実に必要なのかであろうかかと問われる
というのも、アメリカ自身も為めである。何となければ、あらかじめ
これも他に、歴史的戦前は可能であり、戦後は更に
得ろうかである。
如是，我所想，我所作，我所住，如是我所想，我所作，我所住，如是我所想，我所作，我所住。

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9.R.S. Vol. N.3.2.89-9

S. B. S. N.4.3.2.89-9

P.S. A.
P. S. Doc No. M.3239 7
中文
**EXCERPT FROM "ACE OF WAR" by Toshio SHIRATO**

**From: Japan's Position as Regards a Southward Advance**

 Arrival of a Heroic Age

(p. 300)

* * * It is true that Japan is now confronted with an extremely grave situation both at home and abroad -- generally said to be the greatest national crisis ever since the founding of the Empire, and we cannot deny, of course, that there may be a great danger if we should take a step amiss at this time when the sons of YAMATO are about to take a bold leap. However, I can by no means agree with the opinion that merely says that this is Japan's time of national crisis and that Japan is now facing a very dangerous time. I believe that Japan is now actually facing the most favorable opportunity and the fittest time ever since the founding of the country for making a great leap as long as her people hold themselves firm and steady.

The things which her people fear most are that, after all, the national power has weakened as a result of the continuance of the China Incident for three and a half years, added to which the relations with the Foreign Powers are extremely delicate, and we may next have to wage war against Britain and the United States after the fighting in China, apart from the fact that Russia, too, cannot be relied upon. In a word, they think that the shortage of commodities within the country and the great weakening of the national power owing to the war, together with the delicate foreign relations -- these two factors combined make Japan appear to them as being confronted with a grave crisis. Though I think that we ought not to be too optimistic, on considering matters calmly, I have come to the conclusion that we need not necessarily feel apprehensive if we study minutely the conditions of other countries of the world and compare them with Japan.

* * * * * *

13 February 1941
A Lecture at the Memorial Meeting for Prof. Sugiura.
March issue of "DAI NICFI"
RETURN TO ROOM 361
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al, Defendants

AFFIDAVIT OF

SABURO

ARAKI, Sadao, et al,

Defendants

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was Marquis, Member of the House of Peers and Major-General of the Japanese Army. Since my childhood, I have had close associations with KIDO, Teiichi, and KONE, Fumimaro by reason of my father's friendly intercourse with their families. Baron HARADA, Kuma, private secretary to Prince SAIONJI, the Elder Statesman, has become also an intimate friend of mine through KIDO and KONE.

2. During my service in the army, I was able to contract close friendship with SUZUKI, Teiichi. He was my good companion in golf tournaments as well as in "chado", the tea ceremony.

3. I often invited KIDO, KONE, HARADA and SUZUKI to dinner parties at my home. As SUZUKI often met KIDO and the others at my home, he seemed to have also become friendly with them.

4. I was informed about a projected coup d'etat called the March Incident some time after it had been disclosed. It was my belief that SUZUKI's admonitions to the insurgents had been one of the patent factors in checking the outbreak of this incident. I once told my close friend HARADA something to that effect.

5. Around August and September, 1931 (shown 6) rumors regarding the March Incident gradually began to spread. And along with this, an increasing tendency appeared among young captains and lieutenants to discuss not only politics but even almost
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

vs.

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Defendants

AFFIDAVIT OF

Jaburo

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was Marquis, member of the House of Peers and Major-General of the Japanese Army. Since my childhood, I have had close associations with KIDO, Teiichi and KONOE, Fumimaro by reason of my father's friendly intercourse with their families. Baron HARADA, Kumao, private secretary to Prince SAIONJI, the Elder Statesman, has become also an intimate friend of mine through KIDO and KONOE.

2. During my service in the Army, I was to contract close friendship with SUZUKI, Teiichi. He was my good companion in golf tournaments as well as in "chanoyu", the tea ceremony.

3. I often invited KIDO, KONOE, HARADA and SUZUKI to dinner parties at my home. As SUZUKI often met KIDO and the others at my home, he seemed to have also become friendly with them.

4. I was informed about a projected coup d'etat called the March Incident some time after it had been disclosed. It was my belief that SUZUKI's admonitions to the insurgents had been one of the patent factors in checking the outbreak of this incident. I once told my close friend HARADA something to that effect.

5. Around August and September, 1931 (Showa 6) rumors regarding the March Incident gradually began to spread. And along with this, an increasing tendency appeared among young captains and lieutenants to discuss not only politics but even almost
Def. Doc. 2899

openly to advocate the necessity of national renovation by the
use of military force.

Judging from what I was told by KIDO and HARADA, Count
MAKINO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and Prince SAIONJI, the
Elder Statesman were most worried about unlawful movements of
this kind. With a view to smoothing the way for the sound devel­
opment of parliamentary government, they ordered them (KIDO and
HARADA) to collect information and discuss with some of the mode­
rate and right minded officers of the Army to study the methods
of maintaining military discipline in the Army.

Probably it was for this reason that, when KIDO, HARADA and
SUZUKI met at dinner parties or tea ceremony at my home, KIDO
and HARADA often put questions to SUZUKI and myself about the
state of affairs in the Army and sounded our views concerning the
maintenance of military discipline. These meetings were not, how­
ever, held for any political purpose. They were/social gatherings
among friends, in the course of which politics were incidentally
discussed.

On this 24th day
of October, 1947
At Yokosuna, Shimizu
Shizuoka-ken.

DEPONENT /s/ INOUE, Saburō (seal)
INOUE, Saburō

I, KATO, Ippei, hereby certify that the above statement was
sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal theret­
in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.
At the same place.

WITNESS /s/ KATO, Ippei (seal)
KATO, Ippei

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ INOUE, Saburō (seal)
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I served as Director of the Third Division of the Planning Board from November, 1941, to July, 1943.

2. The Planning Board was not invested with any authority whatsoever in relation to the management of the Prisoners of War, and the Planning Board did not formulate any principles for the transfer and employment of Prisoners of War, nor was it, during my tenure of office, ever entrusted to do so.

3. I was shown Exhibit 1971, an abstract from the "Foreign Affairs Monthly Report for September, 1942, published by the Foreign Section of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry. The statement in the first paragraph of the above exhibit considerably deviates from the actual facts. As for the second paragraph, I have not the slightest knowledge of such facts as mentioned therein. The actual situation in relation to the conference on August 15, 1942, mentioned in the first paragraph, was as follows:

   Early in August, 1942, one of my subordinates in the Planning Board received a request by the Prisoners of War Information Bureau of the War Ministry of the following tenor:

   "It was decided by the War Ministry that a portion of the Prisoners of War detained in the southern region be transferred to Japan Proper to be employed in domestic industries. We want to give an explanation relative to this matter to all the Ministries concerned and we request that the Planning Board convene a
meeting of the representatives of such Ministries at a certain date so that an officer of the War Ministry may go and explain the matter."

When officials of several Ministries meet, the Planning board had frequently lent its conference rooms for such purpose and also offered its services for convening such meetings.

One of my subordinates, therefore, consented to this request of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau and convened the meeting in behalf of the said Bureau. The five principles enumerated in the first paragraph in Exhibit 1971 (A) was presumably one which was read by the War Ministry official in charge of the said Bureau at the said meeting.

4. The said meeting was decidedly not one held under the auspices of the Planning Board. It was a meeting held under the auspices of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau for which the Planning Board merely lent its conference room, and for the convening of which it rendered its services according to the customary way in such cases. I had given my approval to the loan of the conference room, but I did not, of course, notify the President or the Vice-President of such routine matters.

5. The "Foreign Affairs Monthly report" was not distributed to the Planning Board.

On this 27th day of August, 1947

DEPONENT /s/ Kenyama, Koichi (Seal)
KANEYAMA, Koichi

At Tokyo:

I, KAINO, Michitaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal to in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.
At the same place.

WITNESS: /s/ Kaino, Michitaka (seal)
KAINO, Michitaka

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Kenyama, Koichi (seal)
KANEYAMA, Koichi
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7,
集めておいてもならぬ。事務局は合併により係員数が増加したため、特に頭痛のない、訳明に当たるといふものであったが、企画院はそれに前から数箇間の事務局が合併する場合、部屋を貸し又その便宜を計ってやったりすることがあった。よって係員情報局より石川、ニアクセステラセ二号に次のシートにあらえる五感の原則で、その時係員情報局係長より朗読されたものと推測させられます。

四石川合は企画院の三番にのものでなく、企画院は慣例により係員情報局の監督する会議に、企画院の一堂を貸し且合の便宜を計ってやらませんと、

五外事局報に係員情報局に配布させられて居りません。
Name of Control Associations and their competent authorities regulated by the Act of Organizations of Principal Industries.

Date of Authorization: Jan. 27, 1942.
Competent Minister: Minister of Communication.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, SUGANO, Yoshimaru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section at the Secretariat of the Minister of Transportation, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Names of Control Associations and their competent authorities regulated by the Act of Organizations of Principal Industries," is to the knowledge of our Section, an exact and correct copy of an official Document compiled by the Ministry, certified at Tokyo

on this 10th day of September, 1947

/S/ SUGANO, Yoshimaru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: /S/ KATC, Ippei (seal)
Names of Control Associations and their competent authorities regulated by the Act of Organizations of Principal Industries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Association</th>
<th>Date Authorization</th>
<th>Competent Minister</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Steel Control Ass.</td>
<td>April 26, 1941</td>
<td>Minister of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coal Control Ass.</td>
<td>Nov. 26, 1941</td>
<td>do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cement Control Ass.</td>
<td>Dec. 18, 1941</td>
<td>do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicles Control Ass.</td>
<td>Dec. 22, 1941</td>
<td>do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automobile Control Ass.</td>
<td>Dec. 23, 1941</td>
<td>do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hides and Leather Control Ass.</td>
<td>Sept. 21, 1942</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Grease Control Ass.</td>
<td>Dec. 1, 1942</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, FUGANURA, Teiichi, who occupy the post of Chief of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Secretariate, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Names of Control Associations and their competent authorities regulated by the Act of Organizations of Principal Industries" is, to the knowledge of our Secretariate, an exact and correct copy of an official document compiled by this Ministry.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 16 day of September, 1947.

/S/ FUGANURA, Teiichi (seal)
Chief of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Secretariate

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ KATO, Ippei (seal)
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, SUGANO, Yoshimaru, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives Section at the Secretariat of the Ministry of Transportation, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Names of Control Associations and their competent authorities regulated by the Act of Organizations of Principal Industries", is, to the knowledge of our section, an exact and correct copy of an original document compiled by this Ministry.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 16 day of September, 1947

SUGANO, Yoshimaru (seal)
Chief of Archives Section,
Secretariat of the
Ministry of Transportation

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: KATO, Ippei (seal)
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Railroad and Tramway Control Association</td>
<td>May 30, 1942</td>
<td>Minister of Transportation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. On the evening of October 15, 1943, the Prime Minister Prince Konoye, called at my residence and asked me to head the next cabinet since his cabinet had decided to resign.

2. Early the next morning Teiichi Suzuki, President of the Planning Board, called on me and made a statement to the following effect:

"I have been directed by the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, to explain to Your Highness the present condition of our national strength so that the same may duly be taken into account by Your Highness in the event your Highness forms the next cabinet. Recently the elements clamoring for a discontinuance of the American-Japanese negotiations and commencing a war against America and Britain are in the ascendant, but it is incumbent upon us to do our utmost to avoid such a war, and especially in view of the present condition of our national strength. Considering the negative attitude of the Navy, which has to bear the brunt in the event of a war with America, it must be declared highly dangerous that Army people should be urging for war. But since Prince Konoye, is, after all, a mere subject, it is beyond his power to evade the war. There is no other alternative than to rely upon the prestige and influence of Your Highness. I, therefore, beg Your Highness' permission to explain the present state of our national strength as revealed in the "Materials Mobilization Program" so that Your Highness might take that into account when
the next cabinet is ordered by Your Highness."

So saying, he explained the matter on the basis of relevant figures and he added, "Not only Prince Konoye, but I personally respectfully solicit Your Highness to condescend to form the cabinet, as this is most essential in view of the present conditions of our country."

3. On the evening of the same day, however, Prince Konoye sent a letter to me, through his private secretary, notifying me that the question regarding the resignation of his cabinet and the consequent cabinet formation by me had been shelved.

4. I had urged Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, on August 3rd and on September 5, 1941, and also urged upon the War Minister, General Tojo, on September 7, 1941, that they do their level best to bring American-Japanese negotiations to a successful conclusion, thus allaying deep anxiety of His Majesty, the Emperor. I may presume, therefore, that both of them had a full understanding of my attitude toward the Japanese-American problem.

On this 18 day of October, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko (seal)
HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko

I, KATO, Ippei, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereunto in the presence of this witness.

WITNESS /s/ KATO, Ippei (seal)
KATO, Ippei

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko (seal)
ERRATA SHEET - Def. Doc. 2902, SUZUKI AFFIDAVIT.

Page 1 - middle of page, the sentence starting "In April 1925, I was attached" should read, "In April 1926, etc."

Page 5 - 3rd line from top, date should be "1919".

Page 20 - first line of first quoted paragraph should read, "Please go to the War Minister and ask if he can hold down...."

Page 21 - 10th line from top, delete comma after "and" and add the word "that" after "at home".

Page 24 - 5th line from top, figure should be £,000,000 instead of 8,000,000.

last sentence on this page should read, "This might cause no small internal disquietude."

Page 25 - 1st line should read "from the southern areas".

Page 27 - 13th line from top, change "Government" to "High Command".

Page 30 - d.owe in last line on page should read, October 8, 1943.

Page 38 - 9th line from bottom, delete after "feasible" to the end of that paragraph.

Page 39 - 6th line from bottom, add after "Exhibit 2225" "Page 15,963 of Record".

Page 43 - delete first word on page, e.g. "an".

Page 44 - third line from top, capitalize "A" in "after".

RE SUZUKI OPENING STATEMENT.

First line should read, "Our opening statement for the accused...etc." instead of "The opening statement of the accused...etc."
I, SUZUKI, Teiichi, having first been duly sworn on oath, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, depose as follows:

PART I.

(1) I was born in Chiba Prefecture on December 16, 1888. I graduated from the Military Academy on May 28, 1909 and was attached to the 18th Infantry Regiment (Toyohashi). In December 1913, I was ordered to enter the Army Staff College from which I graduated on November 27, 1917. In 1918 I became attached to the General Staff Office. In 1919 I was despatched to the Ministry of Finance to study financial and economic practice for one year. In October 1920 I was ordered to be stationed at Shanghai where I stayed to the end of March 1922, to study Chinese affairs. From April 1922 to August 1923 I was a member of the General Staff. From September 1923 to March 1926 I was ordered to be stationed at Peking as Assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Legation. In April 1925, I was attached to the 48th Infantry Regiment (Kurume) and in August of the same year, I was appointed Battalion Chief of the same Regiment. In 1927 I was a member of the General Staff Office. In February 1929 I was sent, as a student to England, returning in October 1929. On December 10, 1929, I was again appointed as Assistant military Attache to the Japanese Legation in Peking. In January 1931 I became attached to the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War Ministry. In August 1933 I was appointed Chief of the Intelligence Corps of the War Ministry. On March 5, 1934, I was appointed Chief Secretary of the Research Section of the Army Staff College and concurrently instructor in Military Science. In May
1935 I held the office of investigator at the Cabinet Bureau of Investigation. On August 1, 1936, I was appointed Regional Commander of the 14th Infantry Regiment stationed at Tongning, Manchuria. In November 1937, I was attached to the 16th Home Division, with Headquarters in Kyoto. In April 1938, I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Third Army Regiment stationed at Mutangien, Manchuria. On December 16, 1938, I was appointed Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board. On April 4, 1941, I retired from military service having been placed on the reserve list and became Minister without Portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning Board in the Second Konoe Cabinet, continued as such in the Third Konoe Cabinet and the Tojo Cabinet until I resigned on October 8, 1943.

(2) As I look back upon my past life I feel that five thing have deeply influenced my career, my outlook on life, and my political ideas.

First, my training as a professional military man has naturally made me mainly interested in the problems of national defence. It also caused me to entertain a high regard for the traditions of strict discipline of the Japanese Army, for the maintenance of which I used my best endeavors when signs of slackness were manifested within the Army during those turbulent years since 1931. It instilled into me a spirit of self-sacrifice. It taught me that in case my country was in danger I should sacrifice my all for the sake of my country.

Second, my studies in financial and economic affairs at the Finance Ministry in 1919 aroused in me a lively interest in the practical problems of national economy. This interest was further intensified, during my service as a Cabinet investigator in 1935-6, by coming into personal contact with officials of various Ministries and with a number of economic experts. The above experience, of a non-military character, enlarged my mental
vision and taught me, for instance, to look at problems of national defence, not in themselves alone, but in the texture of the entire national life. This broader view of national defence was especially helpful in doing my work as president of the Planning Board, the practical function of which, prior to December 1, 1941, lay not so much in making smooth the way for military preparations, as in moderating the demands of the armed services, so as to safeguard the national economic life, which was becoming more and more strained through the China Incident extending over four years.

Third, my sojourn in England as a student during the year 1929, though not a long one, exerted a deep influence on my modes of thought. It taught me to look at my country objectively and from an international standpoint. It made me deeply conscious of the shortcomings, spiritual and material of our people as well as of our backwardness in natural science, and saved me from that blind and narrow-minded patriotism which military education is apt to cultivate.

Fourth, my frequent contact with China and the Chinese was no small factor for moulding my life and thought. My father was a student of Chinese classics and my home education was such to arouse my interest in things Chinese. Then my stay in Shanghai during October 1920 to March 1922 and my sojourn in Peking during September 1923 to March 1926 and during January 1930 to January 1931 as Assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Legation, afforded me ample opportunity to become intimately acquainted with the Chinese people and to cultivate friendships with many leaders in China. It enabled me to study political affairs in China at close range which made me sympathetic with the Chinese nationalist movement. In January 1927 I was despatched as a liaison officer by war Minister UGAKI to meet General Chiang-Kai-Shek, then on his northern expedition.
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I had an interview with him at Kiukiang and learned from him his ideas and aspirations he cherished regarding the execution of the Chinese Revolution. Thereafter, my sympathy for the nationalist movement was all the more intensified. Most of my Chinese friends were thus of the Kuomintang Party, not military men of the old school. Again, during 1931-1933, I was assigned as part of my duties, the task of assisting the supervision and guidance of visiting Chinese military students. I taught the history of Chinese nationalism to the students of the Army Staff College, when I served as instructor in that institution.

All these experiences naturally deepened my understanding of and moulded my friendly attitude toward the Chinese people. They had cultivated my conviction that the aspirations of the Chinese people for the recovery of her national rights would be realized in due course of time and that Japan should assist and cooperate with the New China represented by the Nationalist Party. The course of events in the Sino-Japanese relations ran contrary to the direction I hoped for, but my views on China's destiny did not thereby suffer any change. I have read an affidavit by Mr. Hu Lin, Defence Document 197, obtained by my American counsel during his recent trip to China. I am glad to know that one of my Chinese friends understands me thoroughly, even after these deplorable years of military conflict between the two nations, though I feel ashamed to think and regard it as a tragedy that I was utterly helpless in checking the catastrophic course of Far Eastern politics.

Lastly, not only was my view of Japanese politics, national and international, deeply influenced, but the last phase of my official career as a civilian administrator and statesman was determined by my frequent contacts with Prince Kono, Marquis Kido and Baron Hara. Since my name is often mentioned in Kido's Diary it might also be proper for me to elucidate here, my relations with them.
There were among my seniors in the Army, Marquis Inoue, Saburo. Marquis Inoue was never my immediate superior officer in the Army, but since as early as in 1918, when Marquis Inoue and I, then a lieutenant, were assigned at the Finance Ministry to study financial and economic affairs together, we became very friendly with each other. Marquis Inoue, therefore, often invited me to join him in golf tournaments or to assist at tea-ceremony held at his residence.

Marquis Inoue was a man of noble birth and of sound moderate views having been educated in England. He was rather of a quiet disposition and did not enjoy a wide circle of friends. He was however, on very intimate terms with Prince Konoe, Fumimaro, Marquis Kido, Koichi whom he had known from his childhood and through them also with Baron Harada, Kunio. Thus when I was invited by Marquis Inoue, naturally I had opportunities to meet Konoe, Kido and Harada, with whom I also became quite intimate. In the course of golf tournaments or dinner parties Kido and Harada often inquired of me regarding the internal conditions of the Army. Since about July 1931 especially, they seemed to be keenly interested to obtain information about the state of the Army circles. Various rumors had then been afloat concerning what is generally known as the March Affair, and Prince Saionji, the Elder Statesman, and Count Makino, the Keeper of the Privy Seal, for whom Harada and Kido were secretaries respectively, were seriously concerned over the rumored subversive activities of Army officers and directed their secretaries to gather information and study measures for keeping them under control. As I looked upon Harada and Kido as my close friends, I used to tell them frankly about what I know.

After that I told them from time to time about the state of affairs within the Army. Through our informal frank and friendly chats about politics, I could also obtain much informa-
tion regarding the inside movements of the political world. Prince Konoe, Marquis Kido and Baron Karada were ardent admirers of Prince Saionji's liberalism in politics and their political views exerted no small influence upon me.

During 1936-1938, when my assignments were in Manchuria and at Kyoto, our intimate contacts were for a time suspended. However, since December 1938 when I was removed to Tokyo to assume my work at the China Affairs Board, our contacts were resumed. It was chiefly my friendship with Prince Konoe and the latter's confidence in me by reason of my long association with him, that made me give up my long military career in April 1941.

(3) My views on international political affairs affecting Japan, a statement of which will be helpful in elucidating the nature of my behavior on various occasions, may be outlined as follows:

As stated above, I felt much sympathy for the Chinese nationalist movement, and my Chinese friends were mainly personalities connected with it. Furthermore, my observations of and studies in Chinese political affairs came to convince me that with the gradual awakening of the Chinese people, the recovery of her national rights would be the natural course of development in China. So it was my basic conception of the Sino-Japanese relations that Japan should endeavor to bring about order and stability of East Asia by assisting and cooperating with the New China represented by the Nationalist Party, on terms of equality.

Regarding the Soviet Union, I thought that the Russian people were perfectly free to live under any government they chose, though the dictatorial and totalitarian form of government was not palatable to me. However, I felt no small disquietude, especially over those activities of the Third International, then generally believed to have been conducted under the guidance of the Soviet Union, which aided and abetted the subversive and revolutionary movements in East Asia, especially in Japan. Those
aspects of the Japanese Communist movement which advocated the abolition of the Emperor-system by revolutionary methods, and which discredited all religion through Marxian materialistic philosophy were especially abhorrent to me. On the other hand, for preventing the communistic revolution in Japan I considered it essential that Japanese statesmen adopt measures that the livelihood of the people be more adequately guaranteed.

I was well aware from my knowledge of history that war between major powers would bring great national disasters whatever the outcome of the war. I therefore, believed that a war between Japan and the Soviet Union should be avoided by all means. I thought that the sine qua non for the maintenance of peace between the two countries were (1) that the Soviet Union cease to support the Third International in the Far East, and (2) that competition in armaments between the two nations be terminated. It was also my favorite theory that in order to liquidate the mutual distrust and feelings of menace it was not enough to conclude non-aggression treaties which might easily be scrapped but it was necessary for both nations to express sincerity in pacific intentions by adopting such practical measures as: (1) the withdrawal by Japan of troops stationed in Manchuria and Korea; and, (2) the withdrawal of troops by the Soviet Union of troops east of Baikal. However, I had to recognize that my ideas could not in view of the prevailing circumstances, such as the activities of the Third International, readily be realized, and that so long as the Soviet Union increased her armament in the Far East, Japan must also make ample provision for any eventuality, although meticulous care must be employed by Japan to avoid conflict.

Vis-a-vis Great Britain and the United States which I regarded as militarily one and inseparable, I was convinced that Japan should keep on the most friendly terms with them and that she should never make them our enemy, unless indeed we are militarily attacked or placed under an immediate menace of attack.
This was, I thought, a matter of course even looked at solely from the standpoint of our national defence, in view of the fact that a serious potential danger lay in the North.

The Nazi conception of dictatorial and totalitarian government was not in harmony with my political views any more than that of the Soviet union. I had a high regard for many excellent traits of the German people, but my political sympathy was not with the Hitlerite Germany. I was strongly opposed to the proposed conclusion of the Triple Alliance, and especially so as Germany was then at war with Great Britain, with which country we must keep on friendly terms. I was then only a Section Chief of the China Affairs Board and certainly not in a position officially to express any views on such matters. However, I told my private opinion about August, 1940 to my old friend Prince Konoe when he organized the 2nd Konoe Cabinet, but then the rough outlines of policy had almost been determined, and it was not possible for me to move him. After I became Minister without Portfolio in the Konoe Cabinet, I found that the Triple Alliance was one of the serious obstacles to the conclusion of the American-Japanese negotiations.

After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, therefore, I presented my opinion to Prince Konoe that it would be better to terminate the Triple Alliance by reason of the gross German perfidy toward its Far Eastern Ally. The Premier told me that he would consult the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministers about it, but my suggestion made to Konoe was not realized through sturdy opposition shown by Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

(4) During the period covered by the Indictment, my status was that of a military officer until I became a civilian by being appointed to the Presidency of the Planning Board. However, the offices of the Cabinet Investigator and the Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board were civilian in character,
though I did not forfeit my military status by assuming them.

During 1931 and the ensuing years when I served at the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War Ministry, I was much concerned over the subversive renovation movements of young officers. My endeavor outside of my regular duties during that period was therefore directed toward the maintenance of discipline within the Army. I tried to dissuade such young officers as came to see me, tendered my advice to my superiors to keep vigilant eyes on and to provide proper guidance for them. I explained the condition in the Army to Kido and Harada, secretaries to Count Makino and Prince Sionji respectively, with a desire that the situation be wisely dealt with under the guidance of these far-sighted and experienced statesmen.

(5) During my services in Manchuria, one in 1936-1937 as Regional Commander at Tongning, and another in 1938 as Chief of Staff of the Third Army at Mutengliang, incidents on the Manchurian-Siberian border were, so to speak, the order of the day. I feared that those minor incidents might develop into a major conflict between the two countries. So, during my service at Tongning, I devised a plan of my own to obviate them. I fixed an operational boundary-line, two to four kilometers inside the treaty boundary-line, and ordered my men never to resort to force unless the operational boundary-line was invaded. So on the boundary with the defence of which I was charged, there was not a single instance of conflict. In view of this success of my plan at that time, when I became Chief of Staff of the Third Army I persuaded the Commanding General of the Army, Yamanaka Otozo to adopt the same plan. On the boundary with the defense of which the Third Army was held responsible, not a single case of border incident took place during my service.

(6) The China Incident commenced in North China during my stay in Tongning. I deeply deplored such developments, but as a Regional Commander in the remote corners of Eastern Manchuria, I could do nothing but watch the situation with great anxiety for the future.
When I was called back to Tokyo at the end of 1938 to occupy the post of Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board, the broad outlines of our policy relative to the China Incident had already been decided upon by the High Command and the Government. Many features of the above policy were diametrically opposed to my fundamental ideas on China, and were of such nature as could not be approved by me in the light of my knowledge of Chinese affairs. As a Section Chief of the China Affairs Board, I had to execute the duties assigned to me within the framework of such a policy. However, I did my very best to deal with matters falling within my purview in a way which was most consonant with my convictions so that the broader national policy itself might in due course of time so transform itself in practice as would be in harmony with my basic ideas. So I set about my task with the following principles as my personal guide: (1) cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese nations on terms of equality; (2) the security of the Chinese inhabitants in the war-stricken areas; and, (3) respect for the rights and interests of the Powers in China.

Thus my efforts were so directed that the Chinese property under the control of the Enemy Property Custodian be returned to its respective owners, that interference of the Japanese in the political affairs of the Chinese regimes be minimized. I did my best also to have the freedom of navigation in the Yantze River by the Powers be restored. However, these policies even if decided upon by the central authorities along the lines toward which I endeavored was not speedily realized by reason of local conditions, especially of operational requirements. The establishment of new regimes in China was of course incompatible with my basic ideas regarding Chinese affairs, but it had been a fixed policy over which I had no control. I worked, however, on the hypotheses that such was but a temporary phenomenon in the course of military operations, which would cease to exist if the hostilities came to an end, and that the early termination of hostilities and
restoration of peace between the two countries was the one thing needful for restoring Chinese politics to run their natural course.

(7) In April 1941 Prince Konoe asked me to accept the post of the Presidency of the Planning Board, saying that the Cabinet had decided to make both the Minister for Commerce and Industry and the President of the Planning Board to resign by reason of discords between them. Personally I was then reluctant to leave my military career by accepting such an offer. But since I was told by my old friend Prince Konoe that he as the Prime Minister would be placed in an awkward predicament in case I declined the offer, I finally gave my consent to the appointment.

Thus on April 4, 1941, when, after having been promoted to Lieutenant General, I retired from military service and was appointed Minister without Portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning Board. The precedent for conferring on the Planning Board President, the status of Minister, had been set from the time of my predecessor. Because of this status I was privileged to attend cabinet meetings, but I understood that my primary function lay in the execution of the business of the Planning Board under the control of the Prime Minister as provided in the Organization of the Planning Board.

(8) The first task that confronted me upon my assumption of the presidency of the Planning Board was the drawing up of a commodity mobilization plan, or plan for allocation of vital materials, for the fiscal year 1941. This plan had already been initiated some time earlier in the year before I assumed this office. This plan was to have been completed by the end of March, and put in operation, April 1st. But because of divergent views among the various ministries concerned, no decision had been reached before I was appointed to the Planning Board. When I was appointed President of the Planning Board, Prime Minister Konoe said to me: "It may be quite natural that in view of the
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current international situation, demands made by the armed forces should become all the more insistent. However, the national economic life is now much strained after four years of the China Incident. I wish that you would perform your work with that in mind." I understood that I was essentially chosen, not blindly to comply with the exhorbitant demands then made by the Army and the Navy, but to see that the allocation of vital commodities be made in such way as not to exhaust the very source of the nation's economic power through over-concentration on the production of munitions and to secure the nation's cultural life as much as possible. Accordingly I established an organ in the Planning Board concerned exclusively with the necessaries of life, and initiated a special plan for mobilizing such commodities, apart from the general Commodities Mobilization Plan. And, I endeavored to adjust the demands of the various Ministries from this broader viewpoint.

Then, from the end of June, I was confronted with two events of major importance. One of them was the German-Soviet War, rendering it impossible for Japan to obtain special steel, machine tools and other items which we had planned to import from Germany via Siberia. The other was the sending of Japanese troops to southern French Indo-China in July, which brought on its wake the economic blockade of Japan by America, Great Britain and other countries, cutting off our anticipated supply of scrap iron, petroleum, fertilizers, and other vital commodities. From this time on I was compelled as a matter of my official business, to feel a special concern over the Japanese-American negotiation.

(9) I cannot recollect having attended the Imperial Presence Conference of July 2, 1941. But I remember having heard from Prime Minister Konoe toward the end of June -- very likely June 30 -- that our troops might be despatched to southern French Indo-China. For fear lest such a move should lead to a situation...
aggravating Japanese-American relations and adding another obsta-
cle to the formulation of our commodity mobilization plan, which was already beset with many difficulties, I voiced my view that it would be a serious matter if we should ever be subjected to an economic embargo. The Prime Minister said that the step was imperative in order to ward off an immediate danger of a war with the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as the step was not directed against America or Britain, Americans would understand if we fully explained our purpose. Unfortunately, what I had feared became a fact. Japan found herself economically isolated from America, Britain, the Netherlands, and other Powers. We were obliged now to redraft our commodity mobilization plan in accordance with the new situation. Thus our commodity mobilization plan sanctioned by the Cabinet meeting on August 22, 1941, was formulated so as to ensure self-supply and self-sufficiency as much as possible in respect of vital commodities, with a view to guaranteeing the security of national livelihood as well as to preserve the people's sense of security with regard to national defence.

(10) However, while I thus tried to effect a compromise between the ministries and to draw up a commodity mobilization plan of a sort, I keenly realized that Japanese economy which had depended for so many years on foreign trade, would be ruined if kept isolated for any extended period. So I asked the Prime Minister for the readjustment of the Japanese-American relations and recommended that steps be taken in such a way as would bring about the lifting of the embargo. The Prime Minister told me that his mind was made up to confer personally with the President of the United States and to arrive at a speedy settlement through direct negotiation. I earnestly hoped that the Prime Minister's determination would bear fruit, restoring Japanese-American relations to normal as soon as possible. Unhappily, the views of the Prime Minister proved unacceptable to America, while within
Japan the opinion was brought to the fore that as long as the United States refused to sell us the needed commodities we were compelled to take by force of arms the areas containing such resources. This I conceived put the Prime Minister in an extremely difficult position.

(11) In August, 1941, I was ordered by Prime Minister Kon. to study three problems. The first problem was: Can Japan provide herself with needed materials without relying upon America and Britain? My answer was "No." I stated that there was no possibility of Japan's become self-sustaining. The second problem was: Supposing that the severance of economic relations was to continue, would Japan be able to stand it for its duration? I reported that the severance of economic relations would put Japanese economy in an extremely difficult condition, but as long as no further special development occurred in Japanese-American relations, we could rely on our stockpiles, excepting petroleum and a few other items, so that we might escape a collapse for a year and a half, or possibly two years. I added that in the case of such commodities as petroleum, for which the manufacture of substitutes was possible, we might be more or less self-sustaining after some years, provided that capital and materials were permitted to be thrown into those channels. The third problem was: Supposing war broke out and we succeeded in taking the oil producing areas of the Netherlands East Indies, would we then be able to obtain the needed petroleum? I reported that immediate acquisition of the petroleum would be impossible because military occupation would necessarily be attended with serious destruction.

(12) About the end of August 1941 when the effects of the economic severance became patent, Prime Minister Konoye ordered me to attend the Liaison Conference. He did so that I might acquaint myself with the atmosphere of the Liaison Conference which would be helpful in exacting my work connected with the
administration of national economic power, and also to make replies to questions if any, regarding economic problems. As I thought that the extent of my statement allowable at the Conference depended on my status, I asked the Prime Minister regarding the nature of the Liaison Conference and my status therein. In accordance with an agreement relative to the Liaison Conference between the General Headquarters and the Government (Exhibit 1103, p. 10,171 of Record) the Prime Minister explained to me in the following tenor:

(a) "Persons who always attend the meetings of the Liaison Conference are the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the two Chiefs of Staff, and the War and Navy Ministers. Regarding other Ministers, they will be asked by the Prime Minister to attend when deemed necessary by the latter. When your presence is required, you will receive orders from me or you will be notified thereof by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. You are to attend the Conference as president of the Planning Board, and I hope you will bear that in mind when you are asked to speak at the Conference."

I interpreted these words of the Premier to mean that I was to attend the Conference as the Premier's technical assistant and that I must refrain from speaking except by order or with the consent of the Prime Minister.

(b) "Even if an understanding has been reached between the General Headquarters and the Government, the execution must be postponed until after the approval of the Cabinet has been obtained. If, however, any matter is within the sole purview of a Minister present at the Conference, which can be executed under his own responsibility, I think he can forthwith carry it out without referring the matter to the Cabinet."
I interpreted these words of the Premier to mean that the Liaison Conference was not a policy-deciding body existing over and above the Cabinet, its so-called decisions thus not be binding on the Cabinet, but that it was a meeting convened with a view to reaching an understanding through an exchange of views as between the Government and the General Headquarters.

The Liaison Conference was sometimes convened in the presence of His Majesty. I understood that the Imperial Presence Conference was a kind of Liaison Conference, and not in any way different in character from the latter, although weighty matters alone were brought before it. I understood also that my status thereat was exactly the same as at the Liaison Conference.

By order of the Prime Minister, I attended the Imperial Presence Conference of September 6, 1941. I presume that it was the intention of the Prime Minister to have me to speak before the meeting in case there arose any occasion requiring elucidation on economic matters. But at the conference on that day I was not called on to speak. Moreover, I was a little relieved to know that the topic of discussion for the day really centered on the continuation of the negotiation with America, war preparations having been considered only as a safeguard against a really remote danger.

After the September 6 Conference I was requested directly by the Navy Vice-Minister for an additional allocation of 300,000 tons of steel. At about the same time the Director of the Equipment Bureau of the War Ministry also asked me for more steel. I refused these requests. Both ministries, especially the Navy, repeated their demands, setting forth, however, different figures each time for their requirements. The question was left pending until the war was actually decided upon.
(15) Meanwhile October set in and I could see how hard pressed the Prime Minister was, with time running out. One day early in October he told me that he would like to withdraw from politics and become a monk. I said that it was too irresponsible of him to entertain such a notion. Then I told him that it might be advisable to have heart-to-heart talks with the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers.

(16) On October 12 the Prime Minister invited the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs to his private residence at Ogi-kubo for a frank exchange of views. I was also present at this conference, having been directed to make a record of its proceedings. On the question of withdrawal of the armed forces from China, there arose a sharp difference of views between the Premier and the War Minister, so that the meeting was adjourned without having reached any conclusion, all matters being reserved for further study.

It became quite clear as the result of this conference where the thorny question lay. The Navy really thought that the war with America was impossible but did not desire openly to say so.

The Army did not necessarily desire war, but vigorously objected to the withdrawal of troops from China. The Foreign Minister was firmly of the opinion that without consenting to the withdrawal of the armed forces from China, the negotiations with America offered no prospect of success. The only way for the Prime Minister to avoid war was, therefore, either to make the Navy formally declare its real intentions, or to make the Army understand the unexpressed intentions of the Navy and agree to the withdrawal of the armed forces. I saw that the Prime Minister was in a predicament, because personally he felt himself unequal to the task either of persuading the Navy or the Army.

I thought that the predicament in which the Prime Minister was placed was due to the decision of the Imperial Presence Conference of September 6. After the conference, therefore, I asked the Prime Minister if, it was not advisable in the light of the
discussions of the day, to request the Throne to wipe the September 6 decision off the slate and continue the negotiation with America. He replied that as that conference was in any case an informal one, such a proposition would be feasible, if he asked. He ordered me to talk over the matter thoroughly with the War Minister. So on the following day (October 13) I went to the War Minister and submitted the proposition. He said that to cancel the decision of the Imperial Presence Conference within the brief space of one month and to wipe it off the slate was a grave matter, for which both the Government and the High Command had to assume responsibility, and he could not, therefore, agree to the proposition, which could be carried out only if and when the Government and the High Command leaders had been replaced. When I conveyed this view of the War Minister to the Premier, the latter said he would discuss the matter afresh with the former on the following day. On the evening of the same day I visited Marquis Kido and stressed the necessity of requesting the Emperor to nullify the September 6 Imperial Presence Conference to enable the diplomatic negotiations to be continued.

(17) Now at the cabinet meeting of October 14 the War Minister abruptly spoke declaring that he was opposed to the withdrawal of troops from China and that the negotiation with America should be broken off. This unexpected declaration of the War Minister so surprised the Prime Minister and all the members of the Cabinet that the meeting was adjourned without any one uttering a word. Late in the afternoon I was called up by the Prime Minister, who enjoined me as follows:

"From the attitude of the War Minister, as revealed today, the negotiation with America is impossible. If that is impossible, the Cabinet can do nothing but resign en bloc, and as this resignation is due to the War Minister's attitude, I want you to go and sound him about his views on the disposition of the political situation after the
resignation. I have to inform His Majesty concerning
the post-resignation prospects."

Toward the evening I called on the War Minister at his of­
official residence and conveyed him the Prime Minister's words,
whereupon the War Minister spoke:

"I do not like to discuss in private a subject which is a
matter of Imperial prerogative. But since you ask me,
I will say this. I believe there is no one but His Im­
perial Highness Prince Higashikuni who can save the situa­
tion of today. I spoke about this to Marquis Kidô when we
met the other day."

The reply of the War Minister was to me rather unexpected,
for I had often heard that Prince Higashikuni had expressed his
ardent desire for the success of Japanese-American negotiations
and granted words of encouragement to the Prime Minister to do
his level best for attaining the worthy object. Late in the
evening I conveyed to Prince Konoe the words of the War Minister.
Greatly elated, the Prince said:

"That is splendid. His Highness is definitely opposed to
war. He has time and again wished me success in our nego­
tiations with America. I intend to speak to his Majesty
to obtain Imperial approval. However, please communicate
the views of Tojo and myself at once to Kido, Lord Keeper
of the Privy Seal."

(18) On the following morning (October 15) at about
9 o'clock, I called on Marquis Kido at his private residence,
and explained to him all that occurred on the previous day. The
Marquis said:

"It is not customary to install a member of the Imperial
Family as the head of a cabinet. Then there seems to be
group of men in the army who would make their way into
war under premiership of His Highness. So I will think it
over carefully."

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I reported to Prince Konoe what Marquis Kido said. Then, a little later the marquis telephoned and I called on him again. He said:

"Please go to the War Minister and ask if he can hold down the army's war faction if His Highness heads the Government and decides against war."

I visited the War Minister and put to him Marquis Kido's question. The Minister said:

"If His Highness heads the Government and decides on a no-war policy, and if it cannot check the army, under whose premiership can it be checked? But I myself can't say just now whether it can be checked or it cannot be checked."

I transmitted to Marquis Kido these words of the War Minister just as he has said them.

(19) Early in the morning the next day, the 16th, I was called by Prince Konoe and given the following errand. He said:

'I had an audience with His Highness Prince Higashikuni last night. I pleaded with His Highness that, in the event the Imperial Command to form a cabinet should come to him, he would by all means accept it and use his endeavors toward the adjustment of our relations with America. The Prince said that it was a serious matter, on which he would like to consult with the War Minister and the Navy Minister, and he would like to have two or three days to think it over. It seems that His Highness was not necessarily disinclined to accept. Now I believe it advisable that he should be first informed of the nation's strength from the President of the Planning Board. So you will go now to His Highness and offer explanations as you see fit."

I immediately proceeded to the residence of the Prince, and explained to His Highness for about an hour about the actual state
of our national strength, using the 1941 Commodity Mobilization Plan as the central theme. And I spoke on the need of a satisfactory settlement of the American negotiation.

His Highness expressed his agreement to my remarks and said to me that war must be avoided by all means.

After leaving the Prince's residence, I called on Marquis Kido and made a detailed report to him as to what had transpired since the previous day. He expressed his fears that the assumption of premiership by a prince of the Imperial Family might create undesirable impressions both abroad and, at home, there was nobody among His Majesty's subjects who could shoulder the responsibility. However, he did not positively say to me that he was opposed to the formation of a cabinet by a prince of the Imperial blood. In the afternoon the Prime Minister said to me:

"As regards the premiership of the Prince, I have had word from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to the effect that it has been decided not to request the Prince to head the Government. So the matter is dropped. I suppose Marquis Kido has some idea. The Cabinet will resign en bloc at once."

Accordingly, I tendered also my letter of resignation.

(20) On the following day, the 17th, I visited Prince Konoe at his private residence to thank him for the kindness shown to me while I was in office and was engaged in a desultory chat, when the Prince said to me substantially as follows:

"Marquis Kido has telephoned me that Tojo is to form a cabinet. At the same time, he is to receive word from His Majesty to carry on the American negotiation, wiping the September 6 decision off the slate. Accordingly, Tojo will, I believe, check the war faction and proceed with the American negotiation. So, you will do well to remain in office and help him, in case he asks you to do so."
If the new cabinet comprises many members of my cabinet, it will show that the new cabinet desires to carry on the negotiations for peaceful settlement of the difficulties between Japan and the United States." 

When I was asked by Prime Minister Tojo to continue in my office, I consented in conformity to the foregoing advice of Prince Konoe, seeing that many of my colleagues in the Konoe Cabinet also remained in office.

(21) My status in the Tojo Cabinet was the same as in the Konoe Cabinet, viz., minister without portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning Board. However, there was considerable difference in practice. For since Prince Konoe was my close friend of long standing, I volunteered my opinion to him on some political matters and the Prime Minister himself asked my opinion for his reference and indeed sometimes employed me to conduct certain political negotiations. Premier Tojo, however, gave me a warning at the very beginning of my entry in his Cabinet to the following effect. "It is my desire that you concentrate your energy on the work of economic mobilization and not to meddle in political affairs. You should especially keep in mind that the President of the Planning Board is to function under the control of the Prime Minister." Therefore, I endeavored to comply with his wishes and devoted myself to the work of the Planning Board.

(22) The attitude of General Tojo after he became Prime Minister was decidedly different from that assumed by him in the last days of the Konoe Cabinet. In order to continue the diplomatic negotiation by wiping the September 6 decision off the slate, he decided to investigate various questions. In this investigation I was assigned, at the end of October, 1941, the following two questions, on which I reported to the Prime Minister the conclusions of the Planning Board arrived at after
consultation and joint study with the Ministries concerned, viz., the War, Navy, Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry, and Communications Ministries.

Question (A). If the American-Japanese negotiations should be broken off, and no prospect exists for the termination of the economic severance, to what extent may Japan maintain her supply of commodities?

The report of the Planning Board was that the answer would depend on the descriptions of commodities, to wit:

First, regarding commodities available in Japan proper, Manchuria and China, some increase would be feasible. In respect of steel, the 4,700,000 tons expected to be produced during the fiscal year 1941, might annually be increased by approximately 200,000 tons.

Second, regarding commodities to be imported from Indo-China and Thailand, a decrease due to American and British interference must be expected. This had to be taken into account in view of the fact that in 1941 when Japan sought to purchase rice from Thailand, she was forestalled by previous British purchases. However, since the extent of such interference was unforeseeable, the report did not contain the amount to be decreased.

Third, regarding commodities to be imported from America, Great Britain and the Netherlands, especially the petroleum, the prospect was anything but bright. The annual domestic production of petroleum did not exceed 400,000 tons, while civilian consumption amounted annually to about 1,800,000 tons. The amount then stored by the Army and Navy, as was divulged to the Planning Board for the first time, did not exceed 8,400,000 tons, and the amount of petroleum stored in the civilian circles had been nearly exhausted then. If the petroleum stored by the military was to be employed for civilian purposes as well,
it would be exhausted however economized within a space of three years. Moreover, the prospect for artificial petroleum production was by no means bright. The construction of artificial petroleum factories with a capacity for producing 8,000,000 tons annually, which had been the amount of petroleum imports, would involve a great quantity of materials and could not speedily be realized. It could not certainly meet the urgent needs.

Question (B). If Japan should succeed in the event of war, in occupying the natural resources zones in the southern regions without serious damage, how far could self-supply be expected?

As in the question (A) the answer of the Planning Board depended on the kinds of commodities, to wit:

First, if war with America were to break out, requisitions would have to be effected of an enormous amount of bottom, and certain losses of ships must be taken into account. According to the estimates reported to the Planning Board by the War and Navy Ministries, continuous employment of 3,000,000 tons of ocean-going vessels was feasible for transport between the raw material zones and the processing and productive areas. If, however, these vessels were to be not only for transport to and from Manchuria and China, but also for that between the homeland and the Netherlands East Indies, it would necessitate strict economy in the carriage of goods, resulting in some diminution in commodities production. In regard to steel, the maintenance of an annual supply of 4,500,000 tons could hardly be expected. It might well diminish to the level of 4,300,000 tons.

Second, imports from French Indo-China and Thailand and especially rice would be reduced considerably by reason of military operations. The rice shortage thereby created would have to be made good by substitutes such as sweet-potatoes. This might
Third, with regard to imports from the northern areas, especially the petroleum, the estimate could not be made by the Planning Board.

Inasmuch as the petroleum was one of the strategic commodities, the petroleum questions apart from those relating to domestic production and civilian requirements were studied by the War and Navy Ministries not allowing any participation by the Planning Board nor by any other Ministry for that matter. This state of destruction or repairs of the oil fields installations again was closely related to the condition of military operations of which the Planning Board had no knowledge. Nor was the Planning Board aware of the state of tankers or other means of transport. In regard to the petroleum therefore, the Planning Board had to report, solely relying on the result of studies made by the Army and Navy, indicating that the report was exclusively based on the studies made by the Army and Navy. According to the above studies it was estimated that the petroleum obtainable in the first year would be about 300,000 tons and in the second year, approximately 2,000,000 tons, provided that the southern areas could be occupied after the outbreak of war.

The contents of the report of the Planning Board suggested the fact that in case the Japanese-American negotiation unfortunately failed, then war or no war, Japanese economy would be overwhelmed with difficulties. It suggested that our economic life would be impoverished to the extent that the minimum living standard itself might seriously be jeopardized. The Prime Minister after ascertaining the views of the Ministers responsible for the above report, namely, ministers of Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry and Communications, and taking also other reports into account persuaded the High Command and decided to endeavor to bring about the successful conclusion of the American-Japanese negotiations.
And this policy was concretely manifested in the decision of the Imperial Presence Conference of November 5, which decided to withdraw the armed forces from China to make the negotiation successful.

(23) On the other hand, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister seemed to be unable to totally disregard the vigorous demands made by the High Command. The opinion of the High Command was substantially as follows: When we reviewed the developments of the American-Japanese negotiation, the demands made upon us by the United States seemed to increase in proportion to the concessions made by Japan. No prospect was, therefore, in sight of the negotiation coming to any successful conclusion. This indicated that what the United States really had in view was not the amicable settlement of the Chino Affair, but the destruction of Japan as a leading power. If, therefore, Japan should recognize in principle the withdrawal of the armed forces and also evince her readiness to enter into negotiations concerning the details for such withdrawal, and America should assume nevertheless an attitude of evading the settlement, it might properly be concluded that the real intention of the United States was to gain time; and, that she intended, under the guise of continuing the negotiation to strengthen her/Eastern forces and when fully armed, drop negotiations and turn to an offensive against Japan. If Japan were destined not to be able to avoid war with America, the earlier it came, the more advantageous it would be for Japan. Therefore, the diplomatic negotiations should be concluded by the end of November and if no prospect of success should be in sight at the beginning of December, the decision for war should then be made. As one reason for this contention, the High Command pointed to the concentration of the air forces in Malaya and the Philippines, and the growing divergence in
fighting power between the Allied forces and ours, and declared that after the lapse of several months the High Command could not be responsible for national defence.

The Government, especially the Foreign Minister was putting up a stiff fight against the contentions of the High Command. The Liaison Conference of November 1 immediately preceded the Imperial Presence Conference of November 5 continued in deliberations far into the night and indeed until 2 a.m. of November 2. The High Command had not relinquished its contentions until the very end. As the result, the Imperial Presence Conference of November 5, decided, on the one hand that diplomatic negotiations based on proposals A and B be continued; that if there should be no prospect of success the Government then proceed with operational preparations on the supposition that the operating of hostilities shall be decided upon; and that in case the negotiations should be concluded, the High Command was to suspend operational preparations whatever progress they might then have made. This was a weighty decision to be sure, but not a decision for a war. I thought the acceleration of diplomatic negotiations without a moment's delay was the very thing to be done, and then again at the beginning of December we could further continue diplomatic negotiation, if American attitude allowed it. For, the conditions for conducting the Japanese-American negotiations were more favorable for settlement than at the time of the Kono Cabinet, by the recognition of the withdrawal of troops which had so far been vigorously opposed by the Army. Moreover, the troops which advanced into southern Indo-China, which was the cause of the economic blockade, were to be withdrawn. Further, a preliminary agreement to decide on war might, in view of the precedent of the decision of the September 6 Imperial Presence Conference, be rescinded. When I saw the above-mentioned agreement had been arrived at between
the High Command and the Government, on November 5, I felt, therefore, not so much that war had become imminent, as that a new prospect of peace had arisen on our horizon.

(24) However, this determination to continue the Japanese-American negotiation, reached after all kinds of twists and turns, was nullified by the American reply of November 26. I was given the general purport of the note at the Liaison Conference of November 27 or 28. I heard also the Foreign Minister explain that the said note was tantamount to an ultimatum. At the previous Liaison Conferences I had frequently heard the representatives of the General Headquarters reporting on the strengthening of the British and American military preparations in the Pacific areas. Now being told that the American reply constituted virtually an ultimatum, I could not but sense that war with America might be unavoidable. The Liaison Conference of that day was adjourned. As for myself, I decided to abide by the final decision to be arrived at by consultation between the Prime Minister (who was also the War Minister) Ministers of the Navy and Foreign Affairs, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs.

(25) On November 29 an informal conference between the Government and senior statesmen was held at the Imperial Palace. I was directed by the Prime Minister together with the Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers to attend the conference and to answer such questions as might be put to the Government regarding national economic strength. I did not, of course, volunteer any explanation. However, one of the elder statesmen -- I think it was Admiral Okada -- asked a question concerning the shipbuilding capacity and the capacity for the production of airplanes in the event of war. To the former question I answered that the annual output would be between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. Regarding the latter question, I replied that materials
not available at the Planning Board since the matter fell within the sole purview of the military. Another question was also put by another senior statesman regarding the supply of steel, to which I made the reply that it would be between 4,300,000 and 4,500,000 tons. The main theme of the conference however, was the circumstances in which Japanese-American negotiations came to a deadlock. Most of the time was, therefore, occupied with that subject and little time was left for me to enlarge on economic problems, nor did any senior statesman demand such elucidation.

(26) The Prime Minister then seemed to have been finally determined to enter into war. At the Cabinet meeting on December 1, and before the Imperial Presence Conference on the same day, attended by all the Cabinet members, his conclusion to the following effect was announced:

"War with America, Great Britain and the Netherlands is unavoidable. The Army and Navy will respectively turn to war operations. However, when we see a definite chance for success in negotiation, the war operations will immediately be suspended, and the government will turn to negotiation."

I myself agreed to the above decision, believing that this was unavoidable as long as we had an American ultimatum.

(27) Following the above mentioned government decision, I was obliged to engage myself busily with the revision of the Commodity Mobilization Plan according to the requirements of the oncoming war. Although the preservation of the sense of security with regard to national defence was one of the objectives of the 1941 Material Mobilization Plan, it did not cover such a vast armament expansion as would be required for prosecuting a war with America and Britain. Economically Japan had not surely been prepared for any war with America and Britain prior to December 1, 1941. Quick readjustments
to meet the new situation demanded titanic efforts on my part. The plan had to be so revised that the allocation of military goods needed for war would be ensured curtailing civilian needs to the minimum.

For sometime thereafter, I concentrated all my energy on the performance of my duties, with hardly any time to spare to think of any other matter. Prior to December 1, 1941, I earnestly wished for and contributed towards the avoidance of the American-Japanese war. However, once the national decision was made for war, I considered it my moral duty as a Japanese subject to do my bit to collaborate in the prosecution of war.

(28) It was towards the evening of December 7, that I was notified that there would be a cabinet meeting the next day (the 8th) at 7 o'clock in the morning. At about 6:30 a.m. on December 8th when I went to the Prime Minister's official residence to attend the cabinet meeting, I was informed by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet KOSHINO of the attack on Pearl Harbor and knew for the first time that the hostilities were commenced. At the cabinet meeting the Navy Minister gave a brief explanation that operation, after which the Cabinet decided on the text of the Imperial Rescript declaring war.

(29) After as before the outbreak of war, my main duties as the President of the Planning Board consisted in the preparation of an effective plan for commodity mobilization with the concurrence of the Ministries concerned, without any authority to compel them and without any power of the execution thereof. However, after the commencement of war the necessity for unified administration of national economic power was gradually increased and various Ministries came to accede more easily to the opinion of the Planning Board, and especially after the end of 1943 the War and Navy Ministries themselves became less insistent in their respective demands. Thus the Planning Board which functioned as a sort of conciliation board in the pre-war days, gradually came to command prestige with the progress of war. It did not cease to be a conciliation board, although the conciliators came to command more influence over the parties concerned. At the request of Premier Tojo, however, I left the Cabinet as well as the post of the President of the Planning Board on October 1, 1938.
In Part I of my Affidavit, I have made a general statement of facts concerning my case. During its rebuttal of my Motion to Dismiss, and on other occasions, the Prosecution referred to certain evidence allegedly tending to prove that I had participated in a criminal conspiracy as alleged in the Indictment. I beg, therefore, to make further elucidation of facts and circumstances relative to each item of the Prosecution's evidence.

(30) Exhibit 179 (F), Kido's Diary, August 7, 1931, page 1927, Exhibit 179 (O), Kido's Diary, October 7, 1931 page 1741 or account (illegal plans of young officers).

Upon hearing about a plot, later called the March Affair, I reported the matter to Colonel NAGATA, Tetsuzan, my superior, with whom I collaborated to check the plot from being materialized.

The March Affair after all did not come to pass. However, after this rumor of a plot had become current, an agitation became palpable among young officers attached to the regiments. Some of them not only discussed politics before their seniors, but went as far as to advocate a national renovation by military force. I admonished them against such reckless behavior whenever they talked in such a tone in my presence. I also presented my views to my superiors to keep vigilant watch and to take care that junior officers might not be swayed by their youthful ardor to bring ruin on their own careers as well as cast reflections on the honor of the Army.

This restlessness among young officers was not, I thought, without its causes. One of the causes was that there was an apparent deterioration in politicians' morals, corruption cases involving them having often been rumored. This naturally ired young officers. Another cause was that economic depression having then been at its height, the number of the unemployed was steadily increasing. Also, soldiers hailing from the country-side
had been conscripted from families in great financial distress. It seemed to me in a sense quite natural that commanders of sections or companies should come to have a deep sympathy for the state of their subordinates' families and to look forward to a government capable of saving the nation from such economic distress. Their advocacy of national renovation was due to these causes, I thought. In view of such circumstances I concluded that the military authorities were certainly in duty bound to exercise the strictest control over those subversive young officers with the view of maintaining military discipline, but this alone might have the deleterious effect of intensifying their unexpressed resentment, unless the statesmen in power were pure and above corruption and unless more effective measures were adopted to deal with the agrarian problems and to solve the problem of unemployment.

Thus from the standpoint of maintaining army discipline I was much concerned over the state of domestic politics. I remember having said to Marquis Kido and Baron Harada to the effect that a young and able statesman, such as Prince Konoe, who was above all reproaches of corruption, should become Premier and form a coalition cabinet comprising party men of known moral rectitude, and that this would help in no small measure in maintaining and strengthening military discipline. And also a study of the agrarian problems brought me to the conclusion that greater protection of tenant-rights and lower farm-rents were even more necessary than the stabilization of the prices of rice. However, what I had primarily in mind and spoke to others at the time was the ways and means by which deterioration of military discipline might effectively be prevented, which was then my chief concern.
As I stated above, I presented my views to my superior officers that they should keep vigilant watch on young officers. On May 15, 1932, however, a deplorable incident occurred. A number of naval officers and several students of the Military Academy in collaboration with civilian extremists assassinated Premier Inukai. The War Ministry circles received a serious shock by this news. Among my colleagues a sentiment of self-reproach was expressed for the fact that several candidates for army officers should have been involved in such a plot. They said military discipline must be maintained so as to check the reoccurrence of a similar incident. A desire was also expressed in this connection that the succeeding cabinet be not organized by the Seiyukai Party then so generally condemned for its lack of moral integrity, and that instead a coalition cabinet be formed by upright men so as to facilitate the maintenance of military discipline.

When I met Marquis Kido after the May 15 incident, I gave him such information about the incident as was available at the War Ministry and the views and discourses then expressed by my colleagues at the Ministry. The passage in the Diary is, I suppose, a summary statement regarding our conversations at that time.

According to Kido's Diary I am reported to have said at a banquet at Marquis Inoue's residence that Russia was an absolute enemy and that I was opposed to the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with her. I do not well remember the occasion but possibly I may have stated something to the effect that so long as the Soviet Union aided and abetted the activities of the Third International which plotted to effect a communistic revolu-
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olution in Japan comprising the abolition of the Emperor-system, the USSR was our absolute enemy and that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact against such background, would be illusory.

(33) Exhibit 3371, page 31,835 of Record, Exhibit 670, page 7,330 (Re: my alleged speech at the Toyama School in 1933)

I recollect that sometime in 1933 War Minister Araki invited the governors to a luncheon party at the Toyama School to express his thanks for their services rendered as advisors to the Soldiers Assistance Society, a charitable organization, having for its object, assistance to be given to the families of indigent soldiers. I think General Araki made a brief speech before the luncheon thanking guests for their endeavors in that cause. I have not the slightest recollection that I ever made any speech myself at that meeting. I remember, however, that in the ante-Chamber several maps of Manchuria were hung on the wall indicating, e.g., the state of bandit soldiers in Manchuria and I also remember having explained the maps in answer to questions put by Count Kiyoura Keigo, president of the Society, and that he expressed his satisfaction with my explanations. I absolutely deny that I ever made at that meeting or elsewhere, any speech connoting the necessity of military occupation of Siberia. This allegation seems to me preposterous for such a bellicose idea is contrary to my concepts of national defence.

(34) Exhibit 2266, Kido's Diary, December 29, 1938, page 16,232 of Record (Konoe Cabinet should carry on, etc.)

During the period extending from August, 1936 to December, 1938 my official assignments were at Manchuria and Kyoto. At the end of 1938 I was appointed Chief of the Political Affairs Section of the China Affairs Bureau. Prince Konoe was then Prime Minister, and I was to serve as one of his subordinates. Before hardly ten days had elapsed since my arrival in Tokyo, I was much disappointed to learn that the Konoe Cabinet had made up its mind to resign en masse. For I thought that since the China
Incident took place during the incumbency of Prince Konoe, it was too irresponsible of him to leave his post as Premier without the slightest prospect regarding its solution. I, therefore, went to see my old friend Marquis Kido and told him that the Konoe Cabinet should carry on and do its level best to liquidate the China Incident.

(35) 1939, Talks with Goette, page 3,780 of Record.

I remember that about September, 1939 two American newspaper correspondents came to see me at my office in the China Affairs Board (not at the Planning Board). One of them asked my personal opinion about Wang Ching-Wei. Personally I did not favor the Government policy vis-a-vis the China Incident, and I told him frankly that the policy of our Government to deal with Wang was illusory, for Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek was the only real ruler in China. So I frankly said to him that hostilities must be terminated early by dealing with the Generalissimo. The above was my personal conviction at the time. I do not remember whether or not the newspaperman was named Mr. Goette.

(36) Exhibit 1094, Kido's Diary, June 23, 1941, page 10,024 of Record (Re: Unification and re-inforcement of the General Headquarters).

I was appointed President of the Planning Board in April, 1941, and was charged with the preparation of a Commodity Mobilization Plan. What troubled me most in the performance of that duty was that the Army and Navy separately and without any consultation with each other demanded allotments of commodities, and that antagonism prevailing between them made the preparation of the Commodity Mobilization Plan impossible. Moreover, both the Army and Navy kept its own secrets not only vis-a-vis the outside world but in relation to each other. There was much reason to doubt that two factories, of one and the same category had been constructed separately while one factory would surely have
been enough, and that the manufacture of munitions of war or studies and researches for their improvement had been carried on without any connection with each other, thus involving no small waste of materials and labor. I was of the opinion that in order to obviate this palpable waste and to make maximum use of the materials which had been scanty in any event, it was imperative that the central headquarters which had been divided into the water-light compartments in the shape of the Army and Navy Divisions be unified and a system be worked out under which the two could then collaborate under a unified command. I told this to Marquis Kido who probably recorded the conversation in his Diary.

(37) Exhibit 1107, page 10,140, page 10,216, page 10,333, page 10,518 of Record; Exhibit 1152, Kido’s Diary, October 29, 1941, page 10,314 of Record. (Re: Attendance at Liaison Conferences).

The Prosecution alleges that I attended the Imperial Presence Conferences of July 2, September 6, November 5, and December 1, 1941. I attended the last three Conferences. With regard to the Imperial Presence Conference of July 2, 1941, however, I do not remember ever having attended it.

I attended also many of the Liaison Conferences, however, there were conferences at which I did not assist.

(38) Exhibit 649, page 7,069 of Record; Exhibit 650, page 7,074; Exhibit 1241, page 10,070 of Record; Exhibit 1267, page 11,306 of Record; (Re: Attendance at Privy Council Meeting).

I attended these meetings in the capacity of an explaining member. An explaining member has no right to vote (Exhibit 83, Organization of the Privy Council and Rules Art. 11, latter part). The functions of an explaining member are to make such necessary explanations as may be ordered by the Minister in charge. The Prime Minister directed me to attend these meetings probably expecting that elucidations might become
necessary on matters falling under the jurisdiction of the Planning Board.

(39) Exhibit 640, page 8,403 and page 8,476 of Record; Exhibit 1132, page 10,205; Exhibit 1133, page 10,214 of Record; Exhibit 1140, page 10,228 of Record (Re: Functions of the President of the Planning Board).

The functions of the President of the Planning Board were provided for in the Organization of the Planning Board, (Exhibit 71). At the time of my assumption of office, there was little work to do in the way of drafting the outlines of laws and ordinances. my time was mostly devoted to the adjustment or conciliation of conflicting claims of the various Ministries.

I have already referred to the 1941 Commodity Mobilization Plan in Part I of this affidavit and MAYAMA, Kenji formerly one of my subordinates, testified concerning the matter,(page 18,358 of Record). Inasmuch as the Prosecution makes certain allegations in reliance on a newspaper account which I deem entirely inadequate, I propose to offer further comments in addition to what has already been stated in Part I.

As stated above, the 1941 Commodity Mobilization Plan and the ancillary Mobilization Plans relative to transport and labor were prepared under the most exacting circumstances: the outbreak of the Russo-German war, involving a stoppage of imports from Germany and the economic severance effected by America, Britain, and the Netherlands. By reason of these events, Japan was confronted with the most brain-racking problems concerning the readjustment of her domestic economy which was placed in the most difficult circumstances. Through stoppage of the imports of petroleum not only from America but also from the Netherlands, the petroleum for civilian use was exhausted. The crude oil burners, buses, trucks and motor-ships (which latter had played an important role in domestic marine transport in Japan) could not be employed, and they had to be
replaced by railways and sailing boats to meet the needs of domestic transport. The embargo on scrap iron had also far-reaching effects. The manufacture of steel had to be effected by the use of iron ores, which entailed the consumption of a large quantity of coal. Moreover, persons engaged in industries for the manufacture of export goods lost their jobs, which created serious problems for finding work for the unemployed. Problems after problems came to the fore, too numerous to be enumerated here. If the plain fact of the situation had bluntly been made public that the economic difficulties confronting Japan resulted from the economic blockade imposed by America, Britain and the Netherlands, and that Japanese economic life was on the eve of bankruptcy, it would have inflamed an anti-American national sentiment so as to seriously impede our negotiation with the U.S.A. We, therefore, made use of such phrases as the "strengthening of national defence power," "war-time structure," etc., to direct the endeavors of the nation toward increased production and to make the people be resigned for the time being to the strained state of national economy.

It is true that the Commodity Mobilization Plan of 1941 somewhat increased allotments for munitions of war in view of the international tension then prevailing as well as of the China Incident, but they were by no means such as would make a war with America and Britain feasible, and therefore since December 1, 1941, when a war with America was decided on, I was obliged to expend my whole time and energy to negotiate with various ministries with a view to increasing the allotments for munitions of war necessary for prosecuting the Pacific War.

It may be noticed that although various economic plans were styled "Mobilization" plans, a grandiose term apparently connoting military preparations, they were, in fact, plans made for the allocation of commodities, labor and transportation with an
eye to readjustments in domestic economy, out of the supplies allocated to civilian use after deducting what had been set aside for the Army and the Navy. The making of plans regarding the uses of the supplies allocated to the Army and the Navy, was, of course, outside the purview of the Planning Board, which was not informed of such uses. It may also be noted that economic mobilization plans were not prepared by the Planning Board in an autonomous way. Various Ministries presented their respective demands for allocations to the Planning Board, and in case the total of such demands exceeded the amount of supply for the current year, the Planning Board rendered its good offices by negotiating with various Ministries so that, through mutual concessions and compromises, the total amount demanded by the Ministries be curtailed to the amount capable of supply. Thus, the Planning Board functioned as a sort of conciliation board. It was not invested with any power to make an order binding on the Ministries. So long, therefore, as no compromise was arrived at between the Ministries, no economic plan could come into being. Nor was the Planning Board invested with any authority to execute the plans so prepared.

It is far from the truth to allege that as President of the Planning Board I had an all-important authority and influence on Japanese economy, (page 16,930 of Record). The allegation that the Key Industrial Bodies Ordinance was prepared during my tenure of office is not true. As a matter of fact this Ordinance had been deliberated upon and the outlines thereof had been formulated prior to my assumption of office (Exhibit 2225). At the time I assumed office, the Planning Board had nothing to do with its preparation, the draft outlines of the Ordinance having already been in the hands of the Legislative Bureau.

The testimony by Mr. Liebert that the President of the Planning Board controlled Japanese economy together with the presi-
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definitions of control associations (page 8403 of Record) is certainly an error. The Planning Board had no direct connection with any control association. The organization and operations of control associations were in charge of the Ministries concerned and not of the Planning Board.

It is an error and a misunderstanding for the Prosecution to imply in reliance on Mr. Liebert's testimony (page 8476 of Record) that I was responsible for the organization of the Imperial Petroleum Company (page 16,931 of Record). Not only were matters relative to that company outside the purview of the Planning Board but the law regarding the formation of the Imperial Petroleum Company had already been promulgated before I assumed office, viz., as early as in March 1941, in pursuance of which the said Company was organized in September as a matter of course over which I had no control. Mr. Liebert himself in another connection correctly states the date on which the law was promulgated, (page 8290 of Record).

(40) Exhibit 1142, page 10,231 of Record, Kido's Diary, September 29, 1941 (Re: My explanations made in the Imperial presence concerning rubber and tin resources in the U.S.A.).

On September 29, 1941 I received a telephone message from Chief Secretary Matsudaira by which I was requested by Marquis Kido to proceed to the Imperial Palace and explain to His Majesty concerning the rubber and tin resources in the U.S.A.

The tenor of my explanations was, that even if as a result of war the U.S.A. should be prevented from importing rubber and tin from the southern areas, it would not imply any vital blow to her, for they might be replaced by imports from South America. I also said that rubber could be artificially manufactured and that large scale production of artificial rubber would be feasible in the U.S.A.
By October, 1941, the far-reaching effects of the economic severance were beginning to manifest themselves. A section of the Army circles which had minimized then became conscious of the grave situation brought about by our economic isolation. The opinion came more and more to the fore that to wait for any successful negotiation with America would be to wait for the day of our economic starvation, and that we should find a way out of the predicament by taking an offensive prior to the consummation of American war preparations. On the other hand, Prime Minister Konoe seemed to have felt himself quite helpless. I called on Marquis Kido and conversed with him on the desirability of encouraging the Prime Minister to redouble his efforts to bring the American-Japanese negotiation to a success.

At the time of the dissolution of the Konoe Cabinet, I played the part of a messenger between Konoe and Tojo, Konoe and Kido, and Kido and Tojo. In this liaison work I acted strictly as a messenger and the words of these three men then conveyed to me are still fresh in my memory.

Therefore, it is submitted that of the evidence produced by the Prosecution those passages which are in conflict with what I stated minutely and with meticulous care in Part I of my Affidavit do not conform to actual facts.

In the last days of November 1941, the Government was inclined to the opinion that the opening of hostilities for
national self-defence against America, Britain and the Netherlands might be unavoidable in view of the surrounding circumstances, and they came to make studies to provide for such event. In order to supplement materials necessary for carrying on the said war, the Cabinet meeting of November 28 decided to organize a committee consisting of the officials of the Planning Board, end of the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministries to work out plans for the development, acquisition, and control of resources in the southern areas which might possibly be occupied. On December 2, when the opening of hostilities had been decided upon, the Prime Minister ordered me to act as Chairman of the said Committee end to execute its functions in collaboration with the members representing the above-mentioned Ministries. The instructions then given by the Prime Minister regarding the work of the Committee were in outline as follows:

"The thing to be most feared after the outbreak of war with America, Britain and the Netherlands is that dubious and irresponsible enterprisers proceed to the southern areas in a disorderly manner, taking advantage of the military expedition. They are liable to come into conflict with the local population and to disturb the local economy. They are apt, moreover, to waste our funds and materials which are already deficient. Adequate measures should therefore, be devised for developing the southern regions so that such evils might not occur."

The Outline of Policy regarding the southern areas prepared by the Sixth Committee were in the nature of war-time measures so formulated as to realize the Prime Minister's instructions.

(44) Exhibit 1240, page 10,685 of Record (Signing the Imperial Rescript declaring war).

I signed the Imperial Rescript declaring war. War was certainly not what I desired, but I thought that the opening of hostilities was unavoidable for defensive purposes so long as an
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An ultimatum had already been delivered to us and we were placed in a situation liable to be militarily attacked at any moment.

(45) Exhibit 1271, page 11,342 (Re: Explanations at a Budget Committee of the House of Representatives).

I attended the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives and in reply to an interpellation of Representative SAKURAI, Hyōgoro, I gave explanations as mentioned by the Prosecution.

(46) Exhibit 19714 page 14,505, (Re: Treatment of prisoners of war).

The Prosecution seems to accuse me of having collaborated with the employment of prisoners of war for military purposes, in reliance on a document called the Foreign Affairs Monthly Report which had been prepared and circulated without any knowledge of the Planning Board. If so, it certainly would be a false accusation. For the Planning Board had not the slightest authority concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. It is unimaginable that the Planning Board should, even without my knowledge, have held a conference under its auspices or to have participated in any way in the formulation of policies thereon.

(47) Exhibit 687, page 12,070 of Record (Re: Deliberations on the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry).

The Prosecution alleges that I played an important role at the conference of the Privy Council deliberating on the Organization of the Greater East Asia Ministry. As a matter of fact I attended the Conference as an explaining member to clarify the position of the Government regarding the Government measure.

(48) Exhibit 1272, page 11,353 of Record (Otto's telegram) (concerning German decoration).

About the end of September, 1942, I received an invitation from the German Embassy to attend a ceremony conferring decorations. I had no interest in any decoration to be conferred on me by the German government, for I had entertained an antipathy to Nazi ideology. I notified the Embassy declining to accept...
the invitation, (Exhibit 2247, page 16,180 of Record). Indeed I
must confess that I listened with a sardonic smile when at this trial. Ott's telegram was
read after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I advised the
Premier that since Germany attacked the Soviet Union without
the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I advised the
Premier that since Germany attacked the Soviet Union without
noting any notice to Japan and that immediately after Japan's
noting any notice to Japan and that immediately after Japan's
closure of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union,
closure of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union,
Japan should recede from the Triple Alliance. I do not know
Japan should recede from the Triple Alliance. I do not know
whether or not Ambassador Ott had heard of this from some one
whether or not Ambassador Ott had heard of this from some one
and concluded that "my attitude toward Germany was ambiguous"
and concluded that "my attitude toward Germany was ambiguous"
(as stated in the telegram). Ott's report concerning me in
Exhibit 1272 contains a number of inaccuracies. I never knew
Exhibit 1272 contains a number of inaccuracies. I never knew
that I was called Vice-Premier of the Tojo Cabinet. The order
that I was called Vice-Premier of the Tojo Cabinet. The order
of rank in the Japanese Cabinet at official events was a sheer
of rank in the Japanese Cabinet at official events was a sheer
matter to be determined by court precedence, and not indicative
matter to be determined by court precedence, and not indicative
of any political significance as seems to be implied in Ambas­
of any political significance as seems to be implied in Ambas­
sador Ott's statement. Apart from my official relationship there
sador Ott's statement. Apart from my official relationship there
was no special personal intimacy between General Tojo and my­
was no special personal intimacy between General Tojo and my­
selt such as certainly existed between Prince Konoe and myself.
selt such as certainly existed between Prince Konoe and myself.
The aforesaid decoration was later sent to my residence,
The aforesaid decoration was later sent to my residence,
and as it would have been awkward to return it, I just kept it.
and as it would have been awkward to return it, I just kept it.

(49) Re: Total War Institute (Exhibit 3372, page 32,008
Re: Total War Institute (Exhibit 3372, page 32,008
of Record).
of Record).

I understood at the time that the Institute was a place
I understood at the time that the Institute was a place
where academic studies were made and persons who would be needed
where academic studies were made and persons who would be needed
in time of war were educated. I was appointed counsellor to the
in time of war were educated. I was appointed counsellor to the
Institute, but it was a nominal post ex officio accorded to me
Institute, but it was a nominal post ex officio accorded to me
as Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board.
as Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board.

While I was counsellor I never visited the Institute and the
While I was counsellor I never visited the Institute and the
Institute did not send me nor did I ever see any document em­
Institute did not send me nor did I ever see any document em­
bodying the results of the Institute studies.
bodying the results of the Institute studies.

I remember that I attended either the entrance or graduation
I remember that I attended either the entrance or graduation
ceremony with other Ministers of State at the invitation of the
ceremony with other Ministers of State at the invitation of the
Principal of the Institute. However, in December 1943, I ceased
ceremony with other Ministers of State at the invitation of the
Principal of the Institute. However, in December 1943, I ceased
to be a Minister having resigned from the Tojo Cabinet in
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October 1943, and moreover, was then travelling in Kyushu for about a month. Therefore, the statement by the witness IJURAKAMI that I was present at a ceremony in December must surely be due to an error in his memory.

(50) Exhibit 126, (Re: Decorations).

I was conferred the Third-Class Order of the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of my services in the Manchurian Incident. And I was conferred the Second-Class Order of the Double Rays of the Rising Sun in recognition of my services in the China Incident.

However, the former was, so far as I know, conferred on all colonels in active service without any special merit. The latter was conferred on all major generals in active service also without any special merit. It may also be noted that at the time of the conferment of the two decorations, I had already been conferred decorations of the third and second class respectively of other descriptions.

At Tokyo, Japan, on this
24thday of November, 1947.

/s/ SUZUKI, Teiichi (seal)
Deponent

I, KIINO, Michitaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ KIINO, Michitaka (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUZUKI, Teiichi (seal)
I, HU LIN, do swear on my conscience, that the following is true:

My name is Hu Lin, and I am a resident of Shanghai, China, and have been for upwards of fifty years. I read, write and understand the English language. I am presently one of the owners, general manager, publisher and one of the editors of the Ta Kung Pao Press, published at 212 Nanking Road, Shanghai, China. The Ta Kung Pao Press is published in Shanghai, Chungking and Tientsin, and has one of the largest circulations of any newspaper published in Shanghai. In 1945 I was a delegate to the San Francisco Conference representing China at this conference for the establishment of the United Nations Organization; in 1943 I was a member of a Chinese Mission which was sent to Great Britain for the purpose of ingraining the war effort.

I have known and been personally acquainted with Lt. General Suzuki, Teiichi, of Japan for upwards of almost twenty-five years. As a publisher I have been familiar with the relations of China and Japan for many years. When I was on my way to Hankow in 1927, I met General Suzuki for the first time aboard a ship and we stayed in the same cabin. We talked a lot. At that time, my paper was published in North China which was then under the rule of warlords. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had just started his North Expedition and China had not yet been unified. I came to the South with the purpose to investigate the Kuomintang rule. When I met Suzuki, I discovered him to be a scholar, though a soldier by profession. He knew much about political and economical problems. He sympathized with the Kuomintang and advocated that Japan should help bring forth cooperation between the Generalissimo and Marshal Chang Hushuang.

At that time I considered him as a liberal with a progressive mind. Then I met him once or twice in Peiping later on. In 1935 I went to Japan and called on him at his house. The Sino-Japanese relationship was getting worse by that time and he still advocated Sino-Japanese cooperation. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, my paper was evacuated.
to the interior and personal relations with my Japanose friends were cut off. In those years I knew nothing about what he did, but judging by my past experience with him, I believe he is different from the Japanese gentlemen.

I know that his father had a sympathetic interest in China and had at one time taught Chinese to Japanese students. I know too that General Suzuki had trained and worked with Chinese students who came to Japan for military training. I have known too that during the war he was a president of the Planning Board and a member of the Cabinet without portfolio. From my information and knowledge of his career and from the fact that many times from 1931 to the end of the war that whenever it was desired to carry negotiations between China and Japan for settlement of their difficulties and problems, that General Suzuki was called up to act for Japan and in that capacity he was acceptable to China because of his well known sympathetic attitude toward China and from my personal acquaintanceship with General Suzuki, Teiichi, I am of the opinion that his attitude of sympathy and understanding for China was genuine and real, and that it was his desire to aid China to work out her own salvation; that he was not of the group of Japanese who desired to conquer China, and that such service as he performed in his official capacities were all performed with the desire to deal fairly and justly with China and at no time did he exhibit an aggressive attitude in connection with the war.

This affidavit was prepared after consultation with me from information given by me, and thereafter I carefully examined and studied same and the facts made therein conform to the facts as I know them in relation to General Suzuki, Teiichi.

/S/ Hu Lin

Subscribed and sworn to before the undersigned officer at Shanghai, China, on the 12th day of December, 1946, by the above named Hu Lin, who, after reading the same, acknowledged same to be his own free act and statement.

/S/ WILLIAM J. Juller Jr.
2d Lt. J. A. G. D.
O-2052810
No. 1. Matters decided upon as the opinion of the Army in the beginning of July 1933.

Handwritings on the first page

Top Secret /stamp/ /Reference/

No. Hei. Document received from Lt. Col. SUZUKI on 12th July 1933, with the note that as the War Ministry and the Army General Staffs have unanimously agreed on the following gist of the policy, it is desired that the Government will decide its policies along the lines of this document.

MORISHI! /signed/ 6 July 1933.

The Gist of Policy towards China

The Policy

Through availing ourselves of the indications in North China of the improvement of its attitude towards Japan and expanding the effect of the Truce Agreement, we must make it actually cast aside its past anti-Japan and Manchukuo policy, and destroy the actual influence of the National Party and extend this tendency to the South. On the other hand, our attitude towards the Nanking Government should be rigorous enough to distinguish between right and wrong as in the past and pressure should be placed upon it by proper measures so that it change its anti-Japan policy or to compel it to fall into collapse as a result of the pressure of domestic problems, the rapprochement toward Japan of Chinese civilians, especially economic circles, and our prevention of foreign aids to China.

The Gist of Measures

1. Though we would tolerate, for the time being, the North China Regime to remain as an extension of the Nanking Government, we should press the faithful fulfillment of the Truce Agreement in its broad sense, the extermination of the boycott on Japanese goods and anti-Japanese activities, and the maintenance and expansion of such a situation.

2. We must make the North China Regime suppress the National Party's anti-Japanese activities in North China, and make the Party gradually reduce itself until its final dissolution.
3. We must give positive guidance to the prominent persons, economic elements and thought bodies in North China desirous of the abolition of the anti-Japanese policy, and also encourage the North China Regime to become pro-Japanese and to make efforts for the restoration of its co-existing relation with Japan and Manchukuo.

4. We must give appropriate assistance to the principal military regimes which are supporting the North China Regime and others with a tinge of anti-Chiang but who are not anti-Japan in principle, which will help the North China Regime turn pro-Japanese.

5. We must, through the North China Regime, endeavor to propagate the situation in North China into Central China.

6. Towards the Nanking Government, we should strictly reprimand its injustice and urge it to reconsider and also declare our determination for chastising it, even by force if necessary, so as to make it suppress the anti-Japanese activities of Party Organs in Central China and make it actually give up its policies of anti-Japanism and boycotting Japanese goods. Unless the Nanking Government actually changes its past policies or someone else who stands on a moderate and fair platform takes its place, we should neither approach it nor try to call for a positive negotiation. With regard to the matters of this paragraph, it is imperative for each and every circle of our country to cooperate. Particularly, those who serve abroad must be appropriate personnel.

7. Either by our guidance behind the scene or some other means we must eliminate from the civil and military heads of the Nanking Government pro-European and American elements, so they would be replaced by pro-Japanese and Asiatic ones. By doing so we must make the center of it gradually shake itself free from the tinge of National Party, with its influences over the government reduced until the Nanking Government would neither stick to the traditional policy of the National Party, nor be influenced by anti-Japanese elements other than the National Party.

8. By giving guidance and support to our business concerns for their establishing and practising free handed transaction with China in defiance of the policies of the Nanking Government, we intend to realize our substantial economic advance into China which might become a factor to influence the Nanking Government to change its policy towards Japan.

9. We should take advantage of the anti-Chiang activities in the South Western and other districts so far as they are not anti-Japanese, as they would encourage and promote the neutralization of the anti-Japanese policies of the Nanking Government.
10. We should prevail on Chinese settlers in the South Seas to distract from the National Government of the National Party and to become inclined to Manchukuo with the Japanese influence as its background, so that they may contribute to the perfection of Manchukuo and the adjustment of the relations between Japan and China.

11. We should make every possible effort to prevent the foreign powers, especially U.S.A., Britain and the U.S.S.R. from expanding their influences over China and from giving support to it. At the same time we must impress upon the Chinese people and the government officials the impoverished economic conditions of those foreign powers and make them understand their ambitions over China and their untrustworthiness.

12. The policies taken by the Nanking Government up to now based on the platform of the National Party have been permanently and fundamentally contradictory to the Empire's policies. We, therefore, should proclaim to the world that the Imperial Government as well as its people shall be hostile to the Nanking Government as long as it does not alter its past attitude towards Japan, but that we are willing to shake hands with China and her people under justifiable and fair conditions at the earliest possible date.

13. If our government is convinced that the Nanking Government actually gave up its anti-Japanese and Japanese goods boycotting policies and approached us with good faith, we will never hesitate to proceed on the solution of the pending issues between Japan and China, of which a separate study shall be made.
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No. 2

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/Marginal Remarks/ A matter pertaining to Wang.

(Several signatures, illegible)

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Top Secret

June 29, 1939

/From/ SUZUKI, Teiichi,
Chief of the Administrative Affairs Dept., KO-A-IN.
Sealed

/To/ MR. KURIMARA, Yasushi,
Chief of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, the
Foreign Ministry.

Re a spot Japanese nominal person responsible for movements.

Regarding the matter mentioned above, I beg to inform you
that I have submitted a notification to the Vice-chief of the Liaison
Office of North and Central CHINA as per the separate sheet.
Top Secret.

/From/ The Chief of the Administrative Affairs Department  
/To/ The Vice-chief of the Liaison Office of the North and Central CHINA.

Re a spot Japanese nominal person responsible for movements.

I beg to inform you that with regard to the spot Japanese nominal person responsible for the expenses needed for the National Salvation Anti-Committenn League in accordance with the decision on April 1 at the conference of the KO-A-IN and for the movements of Wu/T.N. Wu Pei-fu/ in accordance with the decision of June 23 at the meeting of the KO-A-IN, the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry has notified us as per the separate sheet.
Military Affairs Despatch No. 736.

Top Secret

Re a spot Japanese nominal person responsible for the movements.

June 23, 1939.

/From/ MACHERI, Kazumoto,

Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry.

/To/ Mr. SUZUKI, Teichi,

Chief of the Administrative Affairs Department, KO-A-JN.

I beg to inform you that I have notified the Finance Ministry regarding the spot nominal person responsible for the expenses needed for the National Salvation Anti-Committee League in accordance with the decision made on April 1 at the meeting of the KO-A-JN as follows:

The Spot Responsible Person for Movements:

Artillery Colonel KAGEA, Sadaaki.

However, the name "KAGEA, Sadaaki" should be used in case of receiving money.
Military Affairs despatch No. 737

Top Secret

Re a spot Japanese Nominal Person Responsible for movements

June 23, 1939

/From/ M. CHIJIRI, Kazumoto

Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry.

/To/ Mr. SUZUKI, Teiichi

Chief of the Administrative Affairs Department of the KO-A-IN.

I beg to inform you that I have notified the Finance Ministry
regarding the spot Japanese nominal person responsible for the expenses
needed for the movements of Wu/T.N. Fu Pei-fu/ in accordance with the
decision made at the meeting of the KO-A-IN as follows:-

The spot Japanese Responsible Person:

Rear Admiral ŌIKO, Michisada

However, the name "ŌIKO, Michisada" should be used in case of
receiving money.
CERTIFICATE

I, URABE Kataumi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 29 June, 1939 and described as follows: Be a spot Japanese nominal person responsible for movements. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of Sept., 1947. /sgd/ K. Urahe (seal)
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato (sgd. & sealed) Ass't. Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Johnson F. Munroe, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30 day of Sept., 1947. /sgd/ Johnson F. Munroe
NAME

Witness: Henry Shigoiima /sgd/ Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
Def. Doc. No. 146

ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JAPAN

VIZ.-A.-VIZ. EUROPE AND AMERICA

FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL FROM

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(Midle of April, 1933)
As a result of the conflict of views between the Japanese Government and the League of Nations concerning fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in the Orient, rendering it no longer possible to cooperate with the League, the Japanese Government has recently given notification of its withdrawal therefrom. Now that Japan is outside of the League and henceforth will have to assume a position in international political affairs quite different from that in the past, it is incumbent upon us to give the most careful and thoughtful consideration and study to Japan's foreign policy, so that we may successfully and without miscarriage come through the critical situation now facing our country.

A. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND AMERICA:

(1) The United States.

Although the United States is not a member of the League of Nations, its enormous national power gives it a leading position among the countries of Europe and America. Its influence in present international political affairs cannot be ignored even by the League. This is why the League, since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, has asked for United States participation whenever important decisions were called for, and it was obviously the League's eager hope that American cooperation would add to the weight and authority of its actions. From the outset of the incident, however, the attitude of the United States has generally been cautious. While avoiding entanglement in war in the Far East, that country, by means of moral pressure, had appeared to be trying to restrain Japan's actions. However, with the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident in the latter part of January last year (1932), the American attitude toward Japan took a sudden change for the worse. Influential scholars, statesmen and politicians advocated economic rupture with Japan; some feared the possibility of a clash between American and Japanese warships in Shanghai. To prepare for eventualities, the United States concentrated its entire fleet in the Pacific. Prior to that, on 7 January, Secretary of State Stimson, in identical notes addressed to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, had stated that due to Japanese military operations in the Chinchow area, the last administrative power of the Chinese Government that remained in South Manchuria had been shattered, and that the United States would not recognize any status, treaty or agreement brought about by means contrary to the pledge and obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which Japan, China and the United States are parties. This statement came to be known as the Stimson Doctrine. Thereafter, the Secretary of State on a number of occasions amplified that pronouncement in statements which implied that the situation in Manchuria was in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Pact, and finally even hinted that Japan was an aggressor.
As a result of the presidential election in November last year, the Republican Party was defeated in a landslide which brought President Roosevelt and the Democratic Party into power. Although there are some elements in our country who seem to expect that the Japan policy of the new American administration, which was installed on 4 March this year, will incline to develop in a manner favorable to Japan, a change in basic policy cannot possibly be expected in the light of the fact that the fundamental Far Eastern policy of the United States has consistently been pursued in accordance with the principle of the Open Door advocated and established by John Hay in 1899, together with the principle of territorial integrity of China and the principle of international pacifism condemning the use of armed force, founded upon the Nine-Power and Kellogg-Briand pacts. Queried by press correspondents in the early part of January this year as to his views on the Stimson Doctrine, President-elect Roosevelt stated briefly and simply that the foreign policy of the United States must uphold the sanctity of international treaties and that this must be the basis of its relations with other countries. It is generally considered that this statement indicates that the new administration supports the Stimson Doctrine. In his inaugural address on 4 March, the President stated with respect to American foreign policy that it was based upon the principle of the good neighbor who respects the rights of others because he respects himself and who respects his own obligations and the sanctity of pledges made with his neighbors.

The new Democratic administration is confronted with unprecedented domestic crisis caused by the world economic depression. As emergency measures it has ordered a national moratorium on bank transactions and the abandonment of the gold standard. Externally, it is confronted by various problems of major importance such as war debts and the world economic conference. In consequence of this situation, it can be observed that with regard to Far Eastern problems the United States is trying as much as possible to take a temperate attitude. Yet, as indicated above, the fact remains that relations between the United States and Japan have steadily deteriorated since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. From the American point of view the fundamental cause for this deterioration is that the present Japanese actions in Manchuria have overstepped the bounds of self-defence and are in violation of the Kellogg-Briand and Nine-Power pacts. Further contributing to this situation is the grave apprehension entertained by the American people as to how far these actions will continue to expand.

At no time have Japanese-American relations been as tense as they are now. The entire United States fleet is concentrated in the Pacific and it does not appear likely that any part of it will be returned to the Atlantic. In view of the fact that there are many in the United States who oppose an economic embargo—advocated by some elements—for the reason that such action would inevitably lead to war between the United States and Japan, the adoption of
such a measure is very unlikely. However, a resolution has recently been presented to Congress proposing the granting of authority to the President to place in cooperation with other countries, an embargo on the export of arms and munitions. It is generally observed that this proposal will ultimately be passed in view of the fact that the United State's Government desires it. Such being the situation, if things are left as they are any development might unexpectedly arise. There is even a danger of war if, for example, a local incidental clash between Japanese and American forces should occur in North China.

With regard to the prospects of a war between the United States and Japan, which is much talked about, there is a fiction in Japan which urges that if war were to be fought with the United States, the present would offer the best chance, because as a result of the London Naval Treaty the ratio of naval strength between the two countries will become unfavorable to Japan after 1936. If, however, such a war broke out and Japan succeeded in her operations, captured the Philippines and destroyed the American fleet after drawing it into Japanese home waters, it is clear enough that this alone would not mean that a fatal blow had been dealt to the United States such as would force it to surrender; it is hardly possible to capture Hawaii and the American mainland. Japan, at any rate, might win local battles in the Far East, but little if anything could be expected in the way of victory and advantage outside the Far East. The possibility is great that as an inevitable consequence we would be involved in a protracted war which would be unfavorable to Japan. Furthermore, it is difficult to expect, in the present state of international relations, that the United States would be our only antagonist; the attitude of Great Britain and France in such cases is unpredictable, and they might act together against Japan [cf. (3)]. Therefore, from our viewpoint of the United States, she does not gain much either in such a war in view of the difficulties in forcing the surrender of Japan by means of force.

In short, any idea of trying to monopolize the Pacific is equally unrealistic whether considered from the American or the Japanese standpoint. It is to be expected as a matter of course that the United States would not countenance the establishment of Japanese hegemony over all of the Far East. Inasmuch as the actual interests of the United States in the Far East consist essentially of commerce and capital investments, there is conceivably room to moderate the American idea of moral guardianship over China. It is therefore essential from this point of view that we persuade the United States to reconsider its Far Eastern policy. In other words, the basis of our policy toward the United States should be to avoid war and to have that country reconsider and revise its Far Eastern policy.
Japanese-American relations should be thoroughly studied from all angles and any measures which would contribute to the prosecution of this basic policy should be carried out to the end that unnecessary conflicts may be avoided and any obstacles in the way of better feeling may be removed, thus to restore stability in the Pacific area. This must be the urgent task of Japanese diplomacy and to it our full efforts must be devoted. As to concrete steps for the improvement of Japanese-American relations, it is necessary first of all to have the United States reconsider her China policy. For this purpose it is essential that the foundations of a really independent Manchukuo be established, and that she be led to observe as much as possible the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity, and that it be made clear that Japan entertains no territorial or political ambitions in any other area except Manchukuo. Furthermore, steps should be taken to urge the United States at this time to remove the discriminatory anti-Japanese clause in its immigration law, which is a blot on Japanese-American relations, and to adopt an equitable quota for Japan. In view of American suspicions of Japanese territorial ambitions toward the Philippines, to which the grant of independence has recently been extended by the United States Congress, an agreement should be concluded between the United States and Japan guaranteeing Philippine neutrality provided the United States will not use the islands as a naval base. However, since these measures are not possible of immediate realization, it is proposed as an appropriate step first of all that a treaty of arbitration and a treaty of mediation be concluded for the purpose of making relations between the two countries normal. In 1908 the United States proposed a treaty of arbitration between the United States and Japan. Concluded in 1908, it continued in force until 24 August 1928, after being extended three times. Prior to the expiration of the treaty the United States had proposed a treaty of arbitration and a treaty of mediation, to which Japan informally addressed questions on a number of points. The United States Government sent its reply to those questions on 8 August, the following year, but no further steps were ever taken.

As to the treaty of arbitration in the foregoing proposal of the United States Government, difficulties lay in the exclusion from the application of the treaty of (a) domestic matters and (b) the Monroe Doctrine. By exclusion of domestic matters from the application of the treaty, the United States intends in reality to exclude the immigration problem. Inasmuch as that intention of the United States is not to be explicitly written in the treaty, and exclusion of domestic matters is of common concern to the two countries, there should be room for considering this matter on our part. There is a precedent, moreover, in that the declaration attached to the Four-Power Treaty excluded domestic matters from the application of that treaty. With regard to the exclusion of
the Monroe Doctrine, such an exclusion would be a great drawback of the treaty. The United States, however, would certainly insist upon the exclusion, for domestic reasons of national feeling. Since the point does not involve our real interest, we should deal with it as a political consideration and should accept it in return for our compensatory demands.

As to the treaty of mediation, the American proposal provides that hostile acts be withheld for a period of one year from the time the inquiry into a controversy is begun by an international mediation commission. In view of the great difference in the productive capacity of the two countries, such a proposal cannot be accepted as it is, but it would be acceptable if the period of one year were shortened or the provision were redrafted to provide that the situation should not be worsened for a certain period.

In conclusion, it would be extremely difficult to come to an agreement on a treaty of arbitration, inasmuch as the United States would insist on excluding domestic matters and the Monroe Doctrine from the application of the treaty, whereas a treaty of mediation could have a better chance of success though it would also encounter difficulties. It is suggested, therefore, that a treaty of mediation be first concluded. It is further considered to be contributory to the bringing about of normal relations between the two countries to have silk and cotton placed on the free list and to conclude an agreement for reciprocal tariff rates on certain specified items as a means of stabilizing Japanese-American commercial relations.

(2) Great Britain

Among our international relationships, that with Great Britain constitutes one of the most important. The British Empire, being in possession in the Orient of India, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the strategic points of Singapore and Hong Kong, and having established strong economic groundwork in China in advance of other powers, has occupied for a number of years a position of importance in Oriental problems. In the past, the development of Japanese-British relationships has seemed to have a close connection with our national fortune and will continue so in future as well.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was brought to an end, after a brilliant record of 20 years, in the new international situation after the World War, in which Britain considered the Alliance no longer necessary since both her opponents, Germany and Russia, had collapsed; America was opposed to its continued existence in view of the tense Japanese-American relationships arising out of America's Far Eastern policy and the anti-Japanese immigration problem; the British dominions were also opposed to the Alliance,
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Australia and South Africa being sympathetic with America from their anti-Japanese policy and Canada from her close geographical and economic relationship with America. In 1921, prior to the Washington Conference, the Commonwealth Conference decided not to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and it was terminated by the Four-Power Treaty concluded in Washington among Japan, Britain, France and the United States, providing for mutual respect by the Powers concerned of territorial rights to their island possessions in the Pacific.

After the abrogation of the Alliance, cooperation between Japan and Great Britain with respect to the China problem was no longer plain sailing. The Washington Conference and the Nine-Power Pact which resulted therefrom brought about a new situation in international relations relative to China. Although Britain adopted a policy of supporting China, launching itself upon the revision of treaties—especially the solution of tariff, extraterritoriality and concessions problems—the political unrest in that country showed no improvement. Rather the new British policy had the adverse effect of giving rise to ultra-nationalism among the Chinese, leading to stimulation of the anti-foreign movement aimed at the restoration of Chinese rights and interests, and Britain was the first to suffer from it. When in early 1925 the Chinese National Army occupied the British concessions in Hankow and Kukking, and Shanghai subsequently was endangered by the same army, Britain proposed to Japan the simultaneous dispatch of armed forces to Shanghai. The Japanese Government, however, declined the proposition for cooperation on the ground that it could not commit itself definitely on a matter of such importance as the dispatch of troops, and Britain alone sent troops to Shanghai. This was the first instance of a failure of cooperation between Japan and Great Britain.

In the meantime the problem of establishing a naval base at Singapore came to foreshadow the future of Anglo-Japanese relations. The project took concrete form in the naval budget proposed in March 1923 by the Conservative Government, after having been agreed upon in the British Empire Defense Commission after the World War and the Commonwealth Conference of 1921. It was proposed to establish in ten years at the cost of nine and a half million pounds a dry-dock capable of taking a modern battleship, and necessary equipment therewith. The reason for this project was that, the German fleet having been dissolved by World War I, Great Britain wished to return to the principle of dispersal of the fleet, subduing that of concentration. In order, however, that despite the limitations of the Washington Treaty the fleet's duty of guarding the sea-lanes of commerce might be fulfilled, it was necessary that its operating radius be extended. Furthermore, there was the Far East—in which area it was to their interest to be able
to operate--no base capable of taking a modern capital ship, and Hong Kong was within the area of limited defense in accordance with the Washington Treaty.

Those in Britain who favored the naval base reasoned that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance no longer existed, but that there was every possibility of a military clique rising to power in Japan against which Britain must be prepared, and that a base at Singapore would in conjunction with the American bases in Hawaii and the Philippines aid in the task of guarding the Pacific--Japan was thus regarded as a potential enemy. Those who opposed the Singapore base gave the opinion that it was contrary to the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, that it was in violation of the spirit of the Washington Conference inasmuch as it was, in essence, nothing more than the extension of the fortifications at Hong Kong and that it was a challenge to Japan. The bill finally passed Parliament and despite repeated postponement of the project by the Labor Cabinet, it was resumed by the Conservative Government and the Imperial Conference of 1930. The Jackson contract for the dock construction is expected to be completed by September 1935.

In the field of commercial relations Britain is endeavoring to cultivate foreign markets in order to settle her unfavorable trade balance and solve her industrial depression. She has abandoned her traditional free-trade policy in favor of protectionism and has established a reciprocal trade system within the British Empire in order to strengthen economic cooperation with her dominions. On the other hand, Japanese exports, stimulated by a low rate of exchange and low cost of labor, are invading British markets throughout the world. This has provoked in Britain a demand for the boycotting of Japanese goods through such means as the establishment of high tariffs or the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce. It may be asserted, not without reason, that the abrogation of the Japanese-India Commercial Treaty is essentially to the interest of Great Britain.

As to the British domestic situation, the present government was formed with the support of the nation's majority as shown by the results of the general election at the end of October 1931. It has made notable accomplishments, but there are still many important issues, both internal and external, which lie ahead of it. There are 2,700,000 unemployed, causing a great burden on the national treasury. Although economic ties were strengthened by the Empire tariff system established at the Ottawa Conference in July last year, there still remain some political frictions within the British Commonwealth, such as the independence movement of Northern Ireland, the autonomy movement in India, and the problem of reform of the Indian Administration Law.
In the realm of external affairs, Britain has offered her full support to the League of Nations in order to maintain international peace and her status as an arbiter among France, Germany, Italy, and other European Powers. Many difficult problems arise, however, arising. The Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in Geneva is in a stalemate after having been in session for more than a year. The recent political change in Germany has brought the National Socialist Party under Hitler into power, which, together with the German demand for revision of the Versailles Treaty, throws a shadow over the European political situation. Vis-a-vis the United States there are such pending questions as that of war debts, disarmament, the world economic conference, and others.

Anglo-Japanese relations and the internal and external situation being what they are, when the Manchurian Incident broke out, Britain endeavored on the one hand to preserve the authority of the League of Nations and on the other to mediate between Japan and China in order to settle the affair from a practical point of view. It is to be borne in mind, however, that Britain supported the report of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations as a basis for settlement of the Manchurian question and that she acted in concert with the majority of the League members only after it had become clear that the stand taken by the League was incompatible with that taken by Japan.

The problem now confronting Japan is to pursue our Manchurian policy and adjust our relationships with China. It will take a considerable time to solve it, and in the meantime we have to keep good relations with other Powers. Great Britain not only has by far the greatest interests in China, but plays a leading role in international political affairs. She is the first country with whom cooperation is to be expected, in view of her position in the Far East as well as of our past relationships. Although some sections in Japan talk about the revival of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a study of the situation which led to its abrogation will show that such a revival cannot be hoped for. Nor is the restoration of Anglo-Japanese cooperation with respect to the Chinese problem a matter to be easily achieved. However, in view of the fact that Japan and Great Britain have many common interests in China, sufficient room should be found for cooperation with regard to the settlement of Far Eastern questions, especially that of China proper. In order to realize this, it would be reasonable and proper to endeavor to make Great Britain understand thoroughly the fundamental lines of our Manchurian policy; to respect Britain’s rights and interests in China, thereby eliminating causes of conflict; to cultivate an atmosphere which would be conducive to Anglo-Japanese cooperation; and on the other hand to urge her to help us in improving our relations with the United States.
(3) France

As a premise to a study of our relations with France, full cognizance must be taken of the present position of France in international relations and of her foreign policy. As a result of the World War, France satisfied almost all her theretofore unrealized political and economic aspirations, such as the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, the disarmament of Germany, depriving Germany of her colonies, levying an enormous amount of reparations, etc., but the devastating effects of that war have necessitated intensive rehabilitation and reconstructions. France has suffered the bitter experience of being invaded four times in the past 120 years, and moreover, German superiority in population still continues to be a constant threat to the security of a less populous France. The chief concern of post-war France, therefore, has been to secure a new order in Europe and to rebuild her national strength, while at the same time insuring against the possibility of German revenge. This has been the pivotal issue of recent French foreign policy.

From this viewpoint, France in the post-war period has continued striving to secure Anglo-American support. The United States, however, refused, to the discouragement of France, to ratify the so-called Anglo-American treaty to aid France (signed at the time of the Paris Peace Conference but disapproved by the United States Senate), to join in the Treaty of Paris, to support the League of Nations, and to help France in her reconstruction. Since then, France has never failed to make efforts to induce America to take part in the European security system; and on the other hand, she has adopted the policy of encirclement of Germany by closely cooperating with Poland, Belgium and the Little Entente Powers.

However, things developed contrary to the expectation of France, causing Russo-German rapprochement and Anglo-French discord, and the situation came to a deadlock with the occupation of the Ruhr. She came to realize that, in order to keep peace in Europe, and to maintain her superior position in Europe, she must adopt a policy of supporting the League of Nations by modifying her attitude toward Germany and, above all, by strengthening Anglo-French accord. She has, therefore, endeavored to be in accord with Britain and to maintain friendly relations with America. Furthermore, the rise of the Fascist and the National Socialist Parties in Italy and Germany respectively in recent years has made it necessary for France to promote closer relations with the Little Entente Powers and to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, in spite of the unfavorable circumstances hitherto existing. In short, the post-war French foreign policy has revolved around the central idea of securing peace in Europe in order to preserve the fruits of victory.
and for this purpose the friendship and cooperation of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union have been regarded as indispensable.

Japan's relations with France have been predicated primarily on our having been an ally in the war and a member of the Council of the League of Nations. Although there have been some cases in which France has requested Japan's support in the execution of her fundamental policy of maintaining European peace, our interests in European problems have always been small compared with those of other big Powers. As to the disarmament question, France and Japan have common interests, as in the submarine issue, but the French position on disarmament on the basis of guarantee of security and establishment of an international army is not in the final analysis in conformity with Japan's policy. France, on the other hand, has considered Japan's support neither indispensable nor important in prosecuting her European policy, which she deems most vital to her. Moreover, as Japan has recently vacated its place on the League Council, it must be recognized that there will in future be less French expectation of cooperation from Japan.

One of the outstanding instances in which France desired Japan's support in her European policy is when the problem of the dispatch of Japanese troops to Europe was brought up in the course of the World War. Should such a problem arise again, however, it is doubtful if France would become so enthusiastic as she was in the last instance, in view of the present situation in Europe. Besides, another crisis of Europe is not to be expected in the near future, the French government leaning toward the left and the German National-Socialist Party having no intention of abrogating the Peace Treaty abruptly.

Franco-Japanese relations, therefore, will in the future be limited to matters concerning the Orient and the Pacific. Cooperation and amicable relationship between the two countries should, therefore, be cultivated in regard to matters relating to this part of the world. France is fully aware of the benefits of cooperating with Japan in the Far East, in recognition of the important position that Japan occupies there, and it is seen that she is cooperating with Japan rather than with Britain since the rupture of Anglo-Japanese accord with regard to the China problem. However, France's interests in the Far East lie in French Indo-China, plus some economic concessions in China, and she entertains no positive program of developing in China. The significance of French Indo-China is less by far as compared with that of India or Egypt to Britain. Hence, French Asiatic or China policy is rather secondary in importance when compared with her vital European policy, and it is necessarily circumscribed by her European policy, especially by her policy of friendship with
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British and America. Since these two countries have vital interests in Asia and the Pacific, French policy toward Japan, and her Asiatic policy in general, has always been scrupulously directed so as not to conflict with that of these two Powers, thus avoiding any adverse effect on the prosecution of her European policy.

There are many examples which illustrate this attitude of France. In the Yap Island issue in the years 1920-21, France at first fully supported Japan, but as the negotiations proceeded, she committed herself to supporting the United States should the matter be submitted to the Supreme Council, thus showing good will toward the United States at the expense of her friendship with Japan.

On the occasion of the conclusion of the commercial treaty between France, Indo-China and Japan, on 13 May 1932, Mr. Nakao, the Japanese Ambassador to France, suggested to Premier Tardieu a resumption of the Franco-Japanese Entente in order to promote friendly relationships and mutual security in view of the disorder in China, especially Communist activities and influences. The mild refusal of the Premier—who stated that the matter should not be discussed without Britain's participation, and that America's susceptibilities would be injured if the China problem were taken up without her participation—proves that France has no intention of cooperating with Japan to the exclusion of Britain and America in Far Eastern affairs.

As to the present attitude of France in Far Eastern affairs, since the Manchurian Incident, there are a number of incidents which suggest Franco-Japanese cooperation, such as the favorable attitude of General Claudel, a member of the League Commission, the conclusion of the Japanese-French Indo-China Commercial Treaty, French investment in Manchuria, the movement proposed by a group of members of the French Parliament to form a Franco-Japanese Association, etc. However, when Ambassador Nakao proposed a Franco-Japanese Entente in September of last year, in accordance with our instructions, assuring our support with regard to her interests in China and her policy toward Germany, not only did Premier Harriot refuse our proposal plausibly, but the matter was apparently reported to Britain. France, moreover, together with the Little Entente Powers, refuses to recognize Manchukuo and expresses her support of the Stimson Doctrine whenever there is an occasion.

France is not responsive to our friendly attitude toward her because she has first to take into consideration her relations with Britain and America, with whom Japan is not quite in harmony; in order to promote friendly relations with France, therefore, we must first improve our relationship with Britain and America. If our relations with them become worse over the Far Eastern and
Pacific problems, France would surely take the opportunity to support America—for instance to obtain her support in France's European policy. The French attitude over the Yap Island issue, the rumor that the French delegate to the Washington Conference foresaw the situation in which French bases in Indo-China would be placed under the American Navy, and France's support of the Stimson Doctrine on various occasions, indicate France's fundamental attitude toward Japan.

Some people are of the opinion, judging from the uneasy situation in Europe, that there will be another Franco-German war. But the two nations are too deeply impressed with the damage and tragedy of war to wage another war, at least in the near future. We cannot establish our future policy on such an assumption.

There will be room for improvement in Franco-Japanese relations in the cultural and purely economic fields, and possibly in regard to policy against Communist activities in China, but further steps in political cooperation are not to be expected. France once sought our guarantee for her position in Yunnan, but she would not accept any readjustment of the Franco-Japanese Entente when the military and economic activity of America in South China were markedly increasing. France will restrict her investment in Manchuria when America is advocating the open door and equal opportunity policy in Manchuria and both America and the Soviet Union are suspicious of armament in Manchoukuo. As to the China policy, France will not make too much commitment because of her relations with Britain.

As to France's relationship with Russia, she is endeavoring to improve her relations with Russia in order to prevent a Russo-German accord in view of the rise of the rightist movement in Germany. This is why she signed a non-aggression pact and a treaty of mediation in November of last year. Franco-Russian rapprochement will be intensified as the National Socialist movement gains more power in Germany. The present French-Russian relationship is much like their relationship at the time of the Franco-Russian Alliance, and France would be obliged to stay neutral if Russia were attacked by Japan. There is room for doubt concerning France's support in case we took a strong attitude toward Russia.

Unless an unexpected situation of major importance arises—such as, for instance, a Franco-German war—it should be assumed that the conclusion of a Franco-Japanese entente is almost impossible and, therefore, it is incumbent upon us first to establish friendly relations with the United States and Great Britain and by so doing to induce France to join.
Owing to the extensive devastation wrought by the World War and the heavy burden of reparations imposed upon her, the internal situation in post-war Germany has been chaotic, economically and politically. As an economic crisis was brought about in June 1923, in spite of the strenuous efforts of successive cabinets, endangering the stability of the entire world economy, a one-year moratorium on all government debts was enforced in accordance with the proposal of President Hoover. The German economy has barely escaped a collapse, and is not quite stabilised yet. The political situation is chaotic due to the financial instability and the rise of rightist and leftist movements. Taking advantage of the situation, the extreme rightist National Socialist Party has risen to be the first party after a number of elections. On 30 January this year, the party established a rightist coalition cabinet under Hitler, and after the victory in the general election on 5 March, a dictatorship of the right has been established.

In the field of foreign policy, Germany adopted, as Foreign Minister Stresemann assumed office in 1923, a policy of conciliation and cooperation with France in order to regain her former international status. In 1924 she accepted the Dawes Plan regarding reparations payments. In October 1925 she concluded the Locarno Treaty with Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia, indicating that she has no intention of altering her western frontier. In 1929, she accepted the Young Plan at the Hague Conference, determining the amount of reparations and simplifying the method of payment. In accordance with the decision of the Locarno Conference, Britain, France and Belgium withdrew their forces from the Rhineland in May 1930. Her policy of conciliation thus showed extensive achievement.

On the other hand, Germany endeavored to approach Russia in order to cope with the French policy of encircling Germany with the cooperation of the Little Entente and Poland. She concluded a treaty of neutrality with Russia in 1926, renewed it in 1930, concluded a treaty of mediation in 1929, and concluded an economic agreement in December 1931.

However, as the demand in Germany for reducing reparations, revision of the Versailles Treaty and restoration of national authority was intensified, the von Papen Cabinet replaced the Brinining Cabinet in May 1932, and adopted a strong and positive foreign policy. Germany thus succeeded in getting the reparations greatly reduced at the Locarno Conference in June 1932, and in getting the powers consent to the principle of equal armament in the General Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, by emphasising the unreasonableness of the armaments limitations provided by the
peace treaty. The establishment of the Hitler dictatorship fore-
shadows a stronger and more positive foreign policy and there is
now strong indication of a rapprochement between Germany and
Italy, two nations which have a common interest in revising the
Versailles Treaty. Alarmed by these tendencies, France, the
Little Entente Powers and Poland are in a state of uneasiness and
the European situation has become ominously dangerous. In order to
alleviate the tense atmosphere and find a way out of the recent
deadlock of the Disarmament Conference, negotiations are now being
carried on, since Prime Minister Mussolini's visit to Rome at the
invitation of Mussolini in March of this year, with a view to con-
cluding, on the initiative of the Italian Premier, a four-power
 treaty among Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

In connection with Japanese-German relations, it is to be
noted that Germany at present is too involved in European problems
to give much attention to Far Eastern questions, in which she has
never had any vital or direct interests. The German attitude to-
toward Far Eastern problems thus far has never been anti-Japanese
in any positive sense, but has been rather neutral. Generally
speaking, Germany has always been following the suit of the rest
of the big powers in her Far Eastern policy. Recently voices
have been raised in Germany advocating recovery of the former
German mandated possessions in the Pacific. However, as these
islands are not politically or economically of any vital impor-
tance to present-day Germany, it may be presumed that she will
not insist on regaining them in the face of our objection thereto.
Rather it appears as if Germany intends to make use of the question
as an excuse to open efforts to regain the long-coveted former
German colony in East Africa. It is therefore advisable that, now
the German rightist party is in power, we make efforts to have
Germany understand our international position in the Far East and
at the same time to promote closer contact in culture and science
between the two nations, so that she may not deviate from her
traditional neutral attitude toward Far Eastern problems.

(5) Netherlands

The Netherlands has vast colonial possessions in the East and
is necessarily greatly interested in Far Eastern problems. When
the Four-Power Pact was concluded at the time of the Washington
Conference, the Japanese Government, in compliance with the request
of the Netherlands Government, pledged, through our official com-
munication of 5 February 1922, to guarantee its rights over Dutch
colonial possessions in the Pacific. In spite of our pledge,
however, the Dutch have always been under the impression that Japan
might be entertaining some ambitious ideas about their island possessions.
In connection with this matter, Prince Konoe, as president of the
Japan-Dutch East Indies Association, has recently submitted a recom-
mendation to the Foreign Minister. In view of the possible arising
of a feeling of uneasiness over the future of friendship and

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economic relations between Japan and the Dutch East Indies, as a result of the unstable international political situation caused by Japan's withdrawal from the League, the Prince suggests that some diplomatic steps should be taken at this time to allay apprehensions—e.g., conclusion of a treaty of arbitration and mediation with the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies. It is highly advisable that our government endeavor to promote unity with the Dutch by clearing away all misgivings, and at the same time deal no to the world our sincere desire and intention of maintaining peace in the Pacific, of keeping it always quiet and free of its name.

Furthermore, our relations with the Dutch East Indies and Dutch Borneo have always been important in the geographical, historical and economic sense. Our economic relations with the Dutch East Indies especially are becoming ever closer year by year, and our trade and investments there promise to grow in the future. Our exports to the Dutch East Indies in 1931 and 1932 were respectively 63,150,000 and 100,250,000 yen, and are increasing, and imports therefrom were respectively 46,000,000 and 40,410,000 yen. Our investment therein already amounts to 70,000,000 yen, and the prospect is very favorable. It is therefore only proper and appropriate that we should by our actions eradicate the misgivings of the Dutch and promote our economic relations with them.

The Japanese Government is now negotiating with the Netherlands Government, at the latter's initiative, the conclusion of treaties of arbitration and mediation. In view of the situation set forth above, we should strive earnestly for the successful consummation of the present negotiations. Furthermore, if the Netherlands should propose the conclusion of a treaty similar in nature to the Four-Power Pact concerning the status quo in the Pacific, about which Saito, our minister to the Netherlands, has submitted his opinion to the government, we should readily respond to her offer, since it would be helpful in eliminating Dutch suspicions and in making clear to the world our desire for peace in the Pacific.

(6) The Soviet Union

1. Japanese-Soviet relations after the resumption of diplomatic relations, especially the Soviet attitude toward Japan.

With the conclusion of the Treaty of Peking on 20 January 1922, Japan and the Soviet Union exchanged diplomatic and consular representatives and opened negotiations on the matter of rights and interests in Northern Sakhalin and the revision of the Fishery Convention of 1907.
The negotiations on the oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin, between the Soviet Government and our businesses (as recommended by the government) were successfully concluded on 13 December 1925. The revision of the Fisheries Convention was agreed upon on 23 January 1928, after many difficulties arising out of national, social and economic differences of the two countries. As to the problems arising out of the execution of the new Convention, they were settled by the negotiations carried on between the Soviet Government and Ambassador Hirota from June 1931 and concluded in August 1932. The relations between the two countries have remained generally smooth, although there were some such problems as our protest in January 1930 against Soviet violation of the non-propaganda agreement, closing of the branch of the Bank of Chosen in Vladivostok, and the termination of forestry concessions in Far Eastern Siberia.

Toward the Manchurian Incident the Soviet Union maintained an attitude of neutrality and non-interference. In view of Japan's neutral attitude at the time of the Soviet-Chinese conflict over the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in 1929, the Soviet attitude toward the Manchurian Incident was understandable. Moreover, the incident was at first restricted to southern Manchuria, which is outside the Soviet sphere of influence. Even after our military operations extended to northern Manchuria and Soviet interests were evidently involved, Russia continued to maintain her neutral attitude. Furthermore, her consent to our transporting troops by the Chinese Eastern Railway; her refusal of the League of Nation's request for cooperation of Soviet consular officials in Manchuria with the Lytton Commission; her offer of good offices in evacuating Japanese residents in Manchouli through Soviet territory at the time of the Su Ping-Won Incident; her expression of consent to the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan; and her rejection of the request of the League of Nations to join its advisory council—these, together with the settlement of the question of fishery lots, are facts which are worthy of note. This attitude of the Soviet Union should properly be interpreted in the light of the fact that its understanding of Japan's power is much greater than that of other countries and of the fact that, since incidents with foreign countries cannot be permitted to occur while that country is busily occupied as she now is in internal construction activities, she is avoiding any actions which might provoke Japan. The desire of the Soviet Union for a non-aggression pact with Japan is motivated by its desire to secure the safety of its Far Eastern territory from the increasing threat which it feels since the Japanese advance into Manchuria.

The attitude of the Soviet toward us has been just as described here. She had been conciliatory to us prior to the Manchurian Incident, and her attitude after the Incident was not very anti-
gonistic other. During the past eight years, following the
restoration of diplomatic relations, the Soviet attitude toward
Japan has generally been conciliatory to the extent permitted by
their internal situation. They have maintained such an attitude
because of their quite accurate estimate of Japan's status and
power in the Far East and because their internal and external
situation necessitated their adjusting their attitude accordingly.
It should be observed that the strong concentration of power en-
abled Russia to pursue such a policy.

b. Reasons which necessitate an adjustment of Japanese-Soviet
Relations.

To the extent that the Soviet Union strives toward the world
revolution a clash with Japan may sooner or later be unavoidable,
and the Five-Year Plan should be carefully watched. However, such
the Soviet propaganda may be carried on, it would eventually be
necessary to resort to force for the world revolution to be realized.
There is room for doubt as to the success of the Five-Year Plan
inasmuch as it is carried out at the cost of the people's daily
necessaries and of impoverishment of the national finance. Even
if the Soviet Union shakes off the so-called peace policy and
launches on a policy of force in the way of world revolution such
a policy will be directed toward the Western European countries
which are susceptible to socialization rather than toward Japan,
situated far away from the center of Soviet Russia. Japan, more-
over, will attain a favorable position vis-à-vis Russia if our
Manchurian policy is properly pursued.

The course which Japan should follow is to pursue effectively
our Manchurian and Mongolian policy on the one hand and to avoid
friction and promote friendly relationships with other Powers on
the other, thereby making them understand the position of Japan
and Manchoukuo in the Far East. As to our relations with the
Soviet Union, there are various issues that are hard to solve,
some involving directly or indirectly fundamentals of relationship,
and are likely to excite the feelings of both nations, with un-
favorable effects on the peace of the Far East. We should therefore
make every effort in accordance with the general course of policy
to promote friendly relations with her, and in so doing we may be
able to solve these pending issues. It may even be possible to
get Soviet Russia to recognize Manchoukuo, which is hardly to be
expected of any other Powers for the moment.

A review of Soviet-Japanese relations will show that the
Soviet Union feels a sense of insecurity over its Far Eastern ter-
ritory since the Manchurian Incident. Especially after the
Japanese Government, in its reply to the Soviet proposal of a non-
aggression pact in December last year (1952), stated that such a
pact was still premature, the Soviet Government has entertained
apprehensions with regard to possible Japanese military advance. That apprehension is to be noted in the statements of such influential Soviet leaders as Stalin and Voroshilov that danger to the Soviet Union lies not so much in Western Europe as it does in the Far East, especially Japan.

With regard to pending issues between the two countries, the controversy recurring yearly over the fisheries problem has been settled through Soviet concessions to the extent that any controversy such as would become a hindrance to relations between the two countries may not be expected for the time being. However, some controversy may be unavoidable. The pending issue relative to oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin (including problems as those of test-extraction areas, ratio of Japanese and Soviet workers, rate of ruble exchange, relaxation of the application of labor laws) might possibly be an obstacle to friendly relations. Should Soviet agitation for the recovery of those concessions increase, the misgivings mentioned above might become greater. As to relations with Manchuria, issues such as boundary navigation rights, the White Russians in Manchoukuo, as well as Chinese Eastern Railway, exist and may expand in future. Even a clash between the Soviet and policing forces in the border region is not beyond possibility in view of our right of stationing troops based on the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol. It goes without saying that Soviet-Manchurian relations have a direct and indirect bearing upon Soviet-Japanese relations. There are many difficult issues between the two countries and it cannot be expected that they can be settled at once. However, if things are left as they are mutual distrust cannot be removed and the relations of the two countries might come to be dominated by our domestic Communism problem or by the development of the Soviet-Manchoukuoan problem.

As to our domestic problem of Communism, some people in our country voice opposition to the continuation of Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations because of the recurrence of Communist incidents at home. However, severance of diplomatic relations would not contribute in the least to the solution of the problem, since it arises mainly from various conditions within the country and since, moreover, such action would have the adverse effect of relieving Russia from her obligation under the Treaty of Peking which forbids Communist propaganda, thereby permitting sinister propaganda.

The circumstances being what they are, we should endeavor mainly to develop Manchoukuo, and with regard to the Soviet Union we should watch the progress of the Five-Year Plan and the Soviet attitude toward other countries, and endeavoring to avoid unnecessary friction with Russia, establish the relations of a good neighbor with her, thus contributing to settlement of all problems pending with the Soviet Union.
As to the possible influence of the improvement of the Soviet-Japanese relationship on third Powers, there is no reason that it should disturb American-Japanese relations—inasmuch as America (it was clearly illustrated at the time of the dispatch of troops to Siberia) does not want Japan to dominate Siberia, on the one hand, and is not pleased to see Soviet Communism firmly established, on the other—though of course she may be concerned if the Soviet-Japanese relationship becomes too close. The fact that some in America suspect Japan of intentions of aggression, by reason of her refusal of the Soviet offer of a non-aggression pact, shows that improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations is desirable for the betterment of our relationship with the United States.

Although America's recognition of the Soviet Union is still difficult to predict, some proponents of recognition argue that America could thereby restrain Japan's actions in the Far East. At any rate the improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union would neutralize the effect of America's possible recognition of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, improved relations with the Soviet Union would make our position favorable in case our relations with America should deteriorate. In such case we cannot expect Britain's assistance nor will the attitude of France and other European countries be favorable to Japan. It is therefore deemed absolutely necessary to strengthen Soviet-Japanese relations now, not only for obtaining oil, but for securing our rear.

With regard to Britain, some people fear that our friendly relationship with the Soviet Union might cause trouble in our relationship with Britain inasmuch as there are frictions between Britain and the Soviet, such as Communist activities in Britain and the Indian independence problem. However, it is clear that the Soviet-Japanese accord will not extend to such a point that the two nations in combination would oppose Britain. It is not, therefore, reasonable for Britain to entertain any apprehensions over the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations. For that matter, the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact has not created any problem in Anglo-French relations.

Improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations will have a beneficial influence on third Powers by proving our peaceful intentions, and thus contribute to the betterment of the relations with the United States, Great Britain and other countries which have existed since our withdrawal from the League. The menace of Bolshevism which Japan pleaded to justify the advance into Manchuria had become such a commonplace that it is doubtful to what extent that explanation appealed to world public opinion. World attention, like that of America and Britain, is focused on our military advance rather than on the Bolshevist menace. As it is known to the world that
the Soviet attitude toward Japan since the Manchurian Incident has been relatively moderate, world opinion—which has already criticized Japan as all but an aggressor nation—will become even more bitter should a military clash occur between Japan and the Soviet Union. If such an eventuality ever occurs, our international relations will be much worse than at the time of the Manchurian Incident, and if it should be protracted international intervention would have to be expected. Japan should avoid making any issue with the Soviet Union at present. It may cause hindrance to Japan's pursuing her urgent policy of Manchuria and Mongolia.

Therefore it is by all means advisable that we make earnest efforts to improve our relations with the Soviet Union.

c) A concrete program for the improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations.

Of all the concrete measures for the improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations, that most desired by the Soviet Union is a non-aggression pact. There are pros and cons on the question in Japan, the main arguments against it being as follows:

1. Insofar as Soviet Russia holds to world revolution as her fundamental national policy, we shall sooner or later have to come to a clash with her and there is great possibility of such a clash over our Manchurian policy. A non-aggression pact that would limit our freedom of action is therefore inappropriate.

2. The Soviet Union usually starts an ideological and economic war prior to that of armed forces. The Soviet Union has already declared ideological warfare against us, and she wages armed war only after her opponent has ideologically lost the war. A non-aggression pact with such a nation is therefore very dangerous.

3. The economic policy of the Soviet Union has already failed and she is on the verge of collapse. A non-aggression pact with such a nation is therefore unnecessary.

4. The Soviet Union for the moment endeavors to avoid conflict with other Powers in order to execute the Five-Year Plan, and for other considerations internal and external, and with regard to Japan she is most interested in the maintenance of peaceful relations in connection with the establishment of Manchoukuo and the subsequent advance of Japan into northern Manchuria. However, she will resume a positive or even an aggressive policy against Japan as soon as she is ready to do so. It may be possible to conclude a non-aggression pact of a proper duration, but abrogation of a treaty of such nature is very difficult because of the delicate conditions created, and conclusion of a non-aggression pact for even a short period will bring the Soviet Union a sense of security in
the Far East and will only facilitate her accomplishment of the five-Year Plan.

5. A non-aggression pact would mean our rapprochement with the Soviet Union and estrangement from Britain, France, and America.

6. A non-aggression pact will bring about political rapprochement of the two countries, thereby stimulating Communism in Japan and facilitating Soviet propaganda.

7. A non-aggression pact will induce the Soviet to take a strong attitude in the matters of fisheries, Northern Sakhalin concessions, etc.

8. A non-aggression pact is not necessary when we already have the Soviet-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and it might even weaken the effect of the latter.

These arguments are refuted by the following considerations:

1. Both the Soviet Union and Japan are parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Pact excepts war of self-defense, but even a non-aggression pact will not forbid an act of self-defense since it is taken for granted in international law. It is true that there are some in Japan who favor a policy of force against the Soviet, but it has already been stated in this paper that such a policy is utterly inappropriate. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Soviet Union is understood to have the intention of guaranteeing non-aggression vis-à-vis "anchoukuo," it is advisable to conclude a non-aggression pact including a stipulation of non-aggression vis-à-vis "anchoukuo," and to induce the Soviet to recognize "anchoukuo."

2. Each nation has its own national policy and ideology; even at present there are monarchies and republics, dictatorships, and democracies. Sometimes nations have fought each other for the sake of these fundamental principles, but generally they maintain peaceful intercourse in spite of differences in ideologies. It is true that the Soviet Union has a very particular national ideology, and that she strove for world revolution in the early years of her foundation, but she has recently been concentrating on the development of her domestic economy. The present Communist activities in Japan are a cause of considerable concern, and it is true also that they have some relationship with the Soviet Union; but we should meet this problem by suppressing Red elements at home, on the one hand, and by solving domestic problems which give rise to the Red movement, on the other. By our so doing the Bolshevist menace will be greatly reduced. As to the economic
aggression of the Soviet Union, it is true that we have to keep
sight of her dumping and other policies, but it is not to be ex­
pected that it will seriously disturb Japan's economy in the near
future. To say that the Soviet Union will shatter Japan in Iden­
logical war is to exaggerate her strength. It should be noted in
this connection that a non-aggression pact is to promote friendly
relationships between the two countries.

3. For fifteen years it has been repeatedly said that
the Soviet régime would be overthrown. The Soviet Government
launched on the Five-Year Plan for the rapid development of heavy
industries, at the cost of diminishing the product of daily
necessaries for the people. The new system of group agriculture
has not shown favorable results, and the crops have been poor since
last year in the main agricultural districts of Ukraine and north
Caucasus. It may be true that there is some unrest in a few loca­
lities, in the circumstances of the people's lives being extremely
impoverished and the national finance also in straitened condition;
but it is hardly to be expected that unrest from these causes is
such that it would endanger the Soviet Government. The Soviet
Government bestows favored treatment upon workers and the army
and has their confidence. Whenever farmers attempt an uprising
the government can easily bring them under control. Moreover, the
Russian people have been accustomed to oppression during the
Czarist régime for hundreds of years, and they are passive by
nature. An argument against a non-aggression pact on the basis of
the instability of the Soviet régime is not well founded.

4. If we attain successful development of Manchoukuo,
our position in the Far East vis-à-vis the Soviet Union will be
very favorable. It is therefore advisable to conclude a non­
aggression pact now to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet
and do our best to develop Manchoukuo.

5. International intervention or blockade of the Soviet
Union is by now out of the question. All nations decide their
Soviet policy in accordance with their own interests. France has
recently concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union,
and the United States is inclining to recognition of the Soviet
Union to promote trade and to maintain peace in the Far East. A
non-aggression pact would not disturb our relations with other
Powers, but would rather prove to the world our peaceful intentions.

6. Communism in a country is caused mainly by circum­
stances within the country. We on our part should eliminate the
causes on the one hand, and enforce proper regulations against
these activities on the other. Political approach toward the
Soviet Union would not necessarily stimulate Communism in Japan.
Moreover, prohibition of propaganda would constitute one of the
important items in a non-aggression pact. It would be inadvisable
to oppose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact on the ground that it would lead to more Communist activity or propaganda.

7. The Soviet Union at present is trying to avoid conflict with Japan as much as possible, and conclusion of a non-aggression pact would not bring about an aggressive attitude of the Soviet. It is our intention to solve such pending issues as those of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Northern Sakhalin concessions along with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. If we could solve these issues, our position after concluding such a pact would be no worse than before.

8. It is the intention of the Soviet Union to conclude a non-aggression pact in addition to the Soviet-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Kellogg-Brund Fact. In so doing she intends to include special stipulations in accordance with the special relations between the two countries. (The non-aggression pacts concluded by the Soviet Union with other countries contain provisions not only for territorial non-aggression and neutrality, but for economic non-aggression and against propaganda, and also for procedures of conciliation.) Inasmuch as it is our desire to improve and stabilize our relations with the Soviet Union, there is no reason why we should not meet this desire of the Soviet by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, there are no reasons why such a pact should not be concluded. It is recommended that the pact be concluded and that thereafter we proceed with negotiations on the questions of the recognition of Manchoukuo, the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and pending issues relative to our concessions in Northern Sakhalin. If, however, our present domestic situation does not permit of the conclusion of such a pact, we should first of all endeavor to tranquilize the relations between the two countries, and keep in close touch with Manchoukuo with respect to her policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, thereby solving the various pending issues between Japan and Russia.

In order to realize the aims indicated above, it is recommended that in the economic sphere we conclude a trade agreement or a commercial treaty in order to increase Japanese-Soviet trade and solve pending economic problems, thus promoting economic relations between the two countries. In the political sphere it is recommended that effective measures be found to prevent military clashes along the border regions between Japan and Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union. In this connection the problem of demarcation of the Soviet-Manchoukuo border should be solved (see Note 1); a system should be established by peaceful means for Soviet-Manchoukuo management of the Chinese Eastern Railway on a basis of equality; and steps should be taken for the purchase of Soviet rights and interests in that railway (see Note 2); thereby eliminating all
sources of trouble between Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union.

Note 1 -- The problem of demarcating the boundary was pending even before the establishment of Manchoukuo. Left unsettled, it is a source of trouble over the question of border patrols and the regulation of smuggling, and might become a threat to peaceful relations. On the question of demarcation, the Soviet Union gave its agreement in principle as early as 1924 in an agreement with China and the Manchurian régime. Although there may be difficulties, the question should be solved as soon as possible.

Note 2 -- The Chinese Eastern Railway was built by Czarist Russia as an instrument for the exploitation of the Far East. It is utilized not only for purposes of economic development, but also for purposes of Bolshevik propaganda. In the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of 1921, it was provided that the railway should be jointly operated by the two countries on an equal basis, but as the Soviet Union has retained superiority even up to the present, various troubles and disturbances have been caused by the inequality. For the sake of order and security, as well as of the economic activities of Manchoukuo, it is not desirable that Russian influence over the railway remain even if the basis of equality be restored, nor is it desirable for the future of Japanese-Soviet relations. In the last analysis, it is most desirable that the Soviet Union withdraw completely all its interest in the railway. However, since we cannot justifiably obtain Russian interests in the railway by forcible measures, it is only reasonable that we purchase their share in it. It is true that the cost is great, but other means such as force would raise the cost still higher inasmuch as it would mean the loss of international confidence by Japan and Manchoukuo.

... RECOMMENDATIONS

Our relations with European and American countries are as reviewed above. Since the Manchurian Incident, various European and American countries have charged Japan with having practically ignored her treaty obligations and embarked on aggressive actions. It is an undeniable fact that those countries are apprehensive lest Japan should engage in such actions whenever an opportunity is afforded. As a result, Japan has, since the year before last, lost international confidence as she has damaged her military prestige. In modern international society, resort to force is a matter of the utmost seriousness, especially among th
great Powers, and every possible effort should be made to avoid it. There are not a few instances in history of the unjustifiable use of armed forces resulting in failure. We should not repeat acquisition in violation of principle, then in reliance on the principle insist upon retention of the gains. Respect for truthfulness should be alike among nations as among individuals, for it is manifest that when a nation forfeits international confidence it is ultimately the loser. What is urgently called for in Japan at the present moment is to develop Manchoukuo, which will require a small amount of time, effort and expense. If we succeeded in this our position in the Far East would be stabilized, thereby contributing to our being one of the world powers; but if we failed all our efforts would be lost and we should have to withdraw entirely from the Continent. Circumstances being as they are, we have to be very careful until we prove substantial achievement in developing Manchuria and Mongolia. It is most inappropriate to launch on a reckless adventure—not only military, but economic, financial or otherwise—without prospect. It is only last February that fortyodd nations in concert opposed Japan in Geneva. Should we see further disturbances, it is likely that these nations would in concert deal with Japan. It is essential therefore that for many years to come, while we are striving for the successful development of Manchoukuo, we should avoid trouble with other countries, unless trouble is forced upon us. As regards China, where we are now confronted with armed resistance, we may be obliged to cope with it, but we should if any opportunity offers itself immediately lay down our policy for the speedy restoration of good will, and strictly abide by it and prove our good faith to the world.

Present indications are that if Japan should clash with any of the world Powers, it is strongly to be apprehended that it would be with one of two of them: one is the Soviet Union and the other the United States.

As mentioned above under A(6), the Soviet Union at present not only is making efforts to avoid conflict with us, but it is not in a position to apply either military or economic pressure against us in the near future. This is a point to which we should give our attention in establishing our Soviet policy.

In case it should become inevitable for us to come to armed conflict with the Soviet, it is most desirable to make a common front with Britain and America. However, as it is clear that the Soviet is making efforts to avoid such an eventuality, other Powers would not support Japan but would rather condemn Japan as an aggressor. We should by all means avoid any clash with the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the Soviet Union recently has come increasingly to understand Japan's power in the Far East. This understanding should become greater if Japan's achievements in the development of Manchoukuo henceforth increases. We should avail ourselves of this tendency. First of all, Manchoukuo's position in the Chinese Eastern Railway should be consolidated so that the railway may in reality be placed under joint management. Thereafter, for the reasons given in 4(6) above, the railway should be purchased and the boundary demarcated as soon as possible.

As to matters which directly concern the Soviet Union and Japan, it is advisable, first of all, that we begin from now to consolidate our position in regard to the negotiations for the revision of the fisheries convention which is expected to take place the year after next. At the same time, efforts should be made to have Russia relax the application of laws with respect to petroleum rights in Northern Sakhalin, and permit our oil companies to develop their enterprises there. Regarding the various other rights in Eastern Siberia also, we should make efforts to have the Soviet Union make available to us those which offer good prospects.

It is, furthermore, advisable that a non-aggression pact be concluded as soon as possible for the reasons given in A. However, as it is still premature, and there being some doubt whether the Soviets now still desire the conclusion of the pact, as they did last year, this question may be left pending for a time. Yet, in order to calm relations between the two countries, steps should be taken to prevent the clash of troops and patrols along the Soviet-Manchoukuo border and to localize any such incidents.

As stated in A(l), the basic policy toward the United States should seek to obtain American reconsideration of their Far Eastern policy and to prevent war. As the United States does not desire the exercise by Japan of absolute superiority over the entire Far East, Japan should not, on her own part, make this her actual policy in the foreseeable future. Our concern is the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, whereas the actual desire of the United States is to promote markets and develop enterprises in China and other parts of the Far East. This being the case, the interests of the two countries could be adjusted if the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity were realized in the Far East.

As American public opinion is generally ready to accept Japan's occupying a superior position in the Far East, we should endeavor to make America understand the present situation in Manchuria and Mongolia. In China proper, we should cooperate in the development of that country with other Powers, especially the United States and Great Britain. As a concrete step toward stabilizing relations between Japan and the United States and establishing the fundamental policy already referred to, it is necessary to push forward efforts
to conclude the treaties of arbitration and mediation proposed by the United States.

In the light of present international developments, a divergence of opinion is likely to occur between the two countries at the naval disarmament conference scheduled to be held in 1955. If matters were left as they stand, agreement on disarmament would naturally fail to be reached, and as a result the agreement for the maintenance of the status quo with respect to fortifications in the Pacific would be abrogated. The consequences which would ensue—an arms race, leading to a Japanese-American war—would ultimately bring about a world war. How unfavorable would be the results to Japan has already been pointed out. On our part we should make every effort to have the United States reconsider her Far Eastern policy and, at the same time, reconsider our own disarmament policy.

France and Germany, as indicated in A above, would not go so far as to commit themselves, where Far Eastern problems are concerned, to taking the same attitude as Japan even in opposition to the United States and Great Britain. Our efforts toward these countries should be confined to promoting friendly relations.

Lastly, regarding our relations with Great Britain. From former times, that country has not only had enormous stakes in China, but, from the fact that India is her lifeline, it has been essential for her to give no little consideration to the maintenance of friendly relations with Japan. On the other hand, Britain's world position in the Far East ranks second to that of the United States. As she has many interests in China which are common with our own, room for collaboration between us is great as compared with other countries. Should it happen that a clash between Japan and the Soviet Union became unavoidable, we should have to get Britain on our side, in view of fundamental difference of interests between Britain and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Britain occupies, by the nature of her relations with the United States, a position which enables her to mediate and reconcile the relations between the United States and Japan, and for that reason promotion of friendly relations and collaboration between Great Britain and Japan is highly essential.

Supplement: POLICY TOWARD THE STATES BORDERING THE SOVIET UNION, NEAR EASTERN AND AFRICAN STATES

Among the states bordering the Soviet Union, the Baltic states which became independent from Czartist Russia (i.e., Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and the Eastern states (i.e., Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan) are in general arenas of competition of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The Baltic states having long
been oppressed by Russia and Turkey, and Persia and Afghanistan having close racial affinity with Japan, they entertain sympathy and esteem for Japan. In our relation with the Soviet Union these states are important as a foothold in case it should become necessary for Japan to check her from behind; in relation to Great Britain it is possible to check her from the Near Eastern states. Although these states have few interests in common with Japan, and as to Poland it is doubtful whether she would be of much use to Japan in case of emergency because of her German relations, it is advisable for Japan to promote her position in these states from the aforesaid considerations as well as for our economic interests.

Of these states, Japan has already established embassies or legations in Latvia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and Persia, but there is no such establishment in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has long desired to establish a friendly relationship with Japan and a treaty of amity has recently been concluded between the two countries. Moreover, she desires assistance in developing her domestic production from Japan rather than from either Great Britain or the Soviet Union, in order to avoid falling under the influence of either of these two countries. It is therefore necessary to exchange ministers at the earliest opportunity, to meet her desire, to make her our foothold against British India or Soviet Central Asia in case of emergency, and also to promote our economic interests.

Finally a few words on the African states. Egypt severed her ties with Great Britain and became independent in 1922, but it seems Great Britain and other European Powers have rather strong influence over her through extraterritoriality and other relations. Inasmuch as Egypt, having the Suez Canal, is important for Japan in case of emergency, and as she is the trading center of the Near East and Africa, it is necessary to establish our legation in Egypt as soon as possible. Ethiopia having been a market for our textile and other products, having already concluded a treaty of amity with Japan, and being desirous of promoting intimate relations with Japan, it is advisable that our legation be established there in the near future.
Translation Certificate

Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch,
certify that the foregoing translation is, to the test of
my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near
as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 March 1947

"On the Foreign Policy of Japan Vis-a-vis Europe and America
Following Withdrawal from the League of Nations."
I, ARITA Hachirô, having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and say:

That I was Vico-Minister of Foreign Affairs from 10 May 1932 to 16 May 1933. As such Vice-Minister I examined and read in 1933 a report by Tōgō Shigenori, then Director of the European-American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, entitled "On the Foreign Policy of Japan vis-à-vis Europe and America Following Withdrawal from the League of Nations", which was prepared for submission to the Foreign Minister, Count Uchida Yasuya. I have been shown Defense Document No. 146, which I find to be the document above referred to, written in the Japanese language and consisting of 96 pages, which I identify as the original report read by me at that time.

Dated this 31st day of January 1947, at Tōkyō.

H. Arita

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authority, at Tōkyō this 31st day of January 1947.

D. Katō
極秘

外務省東亜局

昭和十四年六月二十九日

工作関係日本戦時在職者名簿

製作者

尾崎

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RETURN TO ROOM 361
高崎線東川口駅付近

H23年度観光地歩の町並み

昭和十年五月廿一日頃

東京商工研究会

昭和十年四月

D-3
CERTIFICATE

I, Hayashi Kaoru, who occupies the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the following documents are not in the custody of the Foreign Ministry.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 11th day of December, 1947.

Hayashi Kaoru (Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

Witness: Urabe Katsuma (Seal)

1. The semi-official letter of Japanese Charge d'Affaires Inoue addressed to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs (received in February 1936) reporting the semi-official talk between the Japanese Military Attache at Berlin and the German authorities.

2. The Foreign Minister's telegram under date of May 1936 addressed to Ambassador Mushakōji at Berlin, instructing the latter to sound out the opinion of the German Government in connection with the above talk.

3. Ambassador Mushakōji's telegram under date of July 1936 addressed to the Foreign Minister, transmitting Reichsminister Ribbentrop's proposal for an anti-Comintern pact.


5. Ambassador Togo's telegram under date of March 1938 addressed to the Foreign Minister, warning of the undesirability of a pact with Germany in connection with Military Attaché Ōshima's political talk with the German side.
6. The Foreign Minister's telegram of around April 1938 addressed to Ambassador Tōgō, confidentially informing the latter of the contents of the telegram of the Japanese Naval Attache at Berlin impeaching the Ambassador.

7. Ambassador Tōgō's telegram of around May 1938 addressed to the Foreign Minister, transmitting Reichsminister Ribbentrop's proposal for an agreement to regulate the commercial rights of the German residents in China.

8. Ambassador Tōgō's telegram of the middle of August 1938 addressed to the Foreign Minister, expressing his opposition to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

9. The Foreign Minister's telegram of the end of August 1938 addressed to Ambassador Tōgō, transmitting the findings of the Conference of the Cabinet Ministers concerned to the effect that the Japanese Military Attaché at Berlin should be ordered to keep contact with the German side with a view to strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact.

10. Ambassador Tōgō's telegram of the end of August 1939 addressed to the Foreign Minister, requesting the reconsideration by the latter of the above-mentioned decision, and strongly opposing the strengthening of the German-Japanese relations and the Military Attaché's meddling in diplomatic negotiations.

11. The confidential telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Tōgō in September 1938, concerning the latter's transfer to Moscow.

12. The Foreign Minister's telegram under date of May 1939 addressed to Ambassador Tōgō at Moscow, informing the latter of the outbreak of the Nomonhan incident.

13. Ambassador Tōgō's telegram of the winter of 1939 addressed to the Foreign Minister, setting forth his opinions for the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact.
14. The Foreign Minister's telegram under date of June 1940 addressed to Ambassador Togo at Moscow, instructing the latter to propose the conclusion of a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union.

15. Foreign Minister Hatsuoka's telegram under date of August 1940 addressed to Ambassador Togo, instructing him to break off the negotiations for the conclusion of a neutrality pact.

16. Foreign Minister Togo's telegram under date of July 1942 addressed to Ambassador Satō at Moscow, instructing the latter's efforts for the mediation towards the termination of the Soviet-German War.

17. Ambassador Satō's reply telegram of around July 1942 addressed to the Foreign Minister, reporting that compromise between the Soviet Union and Germany seemed hopeless.

18. Foreign Minister Togo's telegram of around August 1942 addressed to Ambassador Satō, instructing the latter to visit Moscow as frequently as possible to make negotiations for a fishery convention and to keep contact with the Soviet side on all such occasions with a view to seizing the opportunity for peace parley with the Allied Powers.

19. The telegrams exchanged between Foreign Minister Togo and Minister Okamoto at Stockholm around May 1945, concerning Minister Bagge's offer of good offices for the termination of the Pacific War.

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

TOKYO
December 1947

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al. - Defendants -

HABANAGAI YOSHIO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I served as member of the staff of the First Section of the European-American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry from July 1925 to March 1926, during which time Mr. Togo was the section chief from July 1925 till the end of the year. When I served in the First Section of the European-American (later European-Asian) Bureau from January 1930 to October 1933 Mr. Togo was the director of the Bureau throughout the period. While I was a secretary-interpreter of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow from October 1939 to November 1940 Mr. Togo was Ambassador to the USSR, and I returned home about a month after Ambassador Togo was recalled by Foreign Minister Matsuoka. While I was in Moscow under Ambassador Togo after October 1939 I served as interpreter of all the conversations between Ambassador Togo and Commissar Molotov following the settlement of the Nomonhan Incident in September. I served thereafter in the same capacity in the European-Asian Bureau from December 1940 to February 1943, during which time Mr. Togo was Foreign Minister from October 1941 to September 1942. It was immediately after Mr. Togo became Foreign Minister for the second time that I returned home from Bulgaria, where I had been a secretary of the Legation, and was ordered to serve in the Political Affairs Bureau, Mr. Togo remaining Foreign Minister till August 1945. During these two tenures of Mr. Togo's Foreign Ministership I served as his interpreter for all conversations with the Ambassador of the USSR. I therefore am familiar with the negotiations which Mr. Togo conducted with the USSR and with Mr. Togo's opinion in connection therewith.

2. While Mr. Togo was Ambassador to the USSR, he seized the opportunity immediately after the Nomonhan Incident, when Russian-Japanese relations showed a favorable turn, further to improve the relations between the two countries, and succeeded in bringing about the solution of various pending problems one after another. Among these the exchange of prisoners of war of the Nomonhan Incident, the demarcation of the Mongolian-Manchuokuoan border, the settlement of the final allocation of the payment for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the negotiations concerning the Russian-Japanese commercial treaty, the question of the general settlement of border disputes, etc., were the most important. As to the negotiations for the epoch-making neutrality treaty between Japan and the USSR, Mr. Togo carried the negotiations all but to consummation.

-1-
3. In conducting the negotiations with the USSR, Mr. Togo did not insist on the exclusive interests of Japan only, but always maintained the position that the interests of both parties should mutually be respected. Whenever he found any instruction from Tokyo excessive or improper he did not hesitate to request the reconsideration of Tokyo, and he always undertook negotiations after having fully examined the facts underlying the issue in question. This attitude on the part of Mr. Togo caused him to win the confidence of Commissar Molotov, and the conversations between the two were always carried on in the most friendly atmosphere. I have never worked so pleasantly as I did in those days in Moscow.

4. Commissar Molotov at that time was concurrently Chairman of the Council of Commissars and the Commissar for Foreign Affairs. It was indeed unusual in the practice of the USSR in those days that Mr. Molotov accepted with hardly any exception Mr. Togo's requests for interviews in spite of the fact that he was busily occupied with his official business, and habitually received him most promptly.

5. In the all-night negotiations over the modus vivendi of the fisheries problem, on the night of 31 December 1939, Mr. Molotov insisted when the question of the gold clause concerning the last payment for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the simultaneous settlement of which with the fishery agreement the Soviet side had previously insisted upon, came up, that the opinion of experts had to be obtained inasmuch as the question was economic. Ambassador Togo, however, pointed out that there was not time enough to obtain expert opinion, as the agreement had to be reached during the year, and requested that Mr. Molotov should accept the word of the Ambassador that the Ambassador's proposal was not disadvantageous for the USSR either. Mr. Molotov stated in reply that if the Ambassador gave so strong an assurance he would rely on the Ambassador's word and would immediately sign the document.

6. Upon the conclusion of the fisheries agreement referred to above in the early morning of 1 January after the all-night negotiations, Commissar Molotov drank a toast, saying that he expressed his respect for the efforts made by Ambassador Togo, that it had been his pleasure that he had been able to solve the Nomonhan Incident with the cooperation of Ambassador Togo and that Russian-Japanese relations would become more and more friendly in the coming year, thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Togo.

7. It was Mr. Togo's intention to establish peaceful relations with the USSR, and he recommended the conclusion of a non-aggression pact both by telegrams and by sending a member of his staff to Tokyo. He finally obtained instructions from the Government to open the negotiation for the conclusion of a neutrality pact, and made the following oral proposal to Commissar Molotov in early July 1940.

(1) The two contracting parties confirm that the Basic Treaty between Japan and the USSR shall be the basis of the relations between the two countries.

The two contracting parties declare that they will maintain peaceful and friendly relations, and will respect each other's territorial integrity.

(2) In case one of the two contracting parties, in spite of her peaceful attitude, is attacked by a third Power or Powers, the other party shall maintain neutrality throughout the conflict.
(3) The present agreement shall be effective for five years.

Commissar Molotov some days later agreed in principle to the proposal, saying that it was in substance a non-aggression pact, and communicated to Ambassador Togo in mid-August that the USSR would accept the proposal on condition that Paragraph 1 of Article 1 be deleted, proposing at the same time that the concessions in northern Sakhalin should be terminated. Mr. Togo recommended to Tokyo that in the circumstances, when it had become so difficult to execute the concession rights, the Russian proposal should be accepted and the proposed non-aggression pact be brought to conclusion.

8. However, Mr. Watsuoka, who became Foreign Minister in July 1941, at the time when the pact was all but concluded, ordered Mr. Togo to return home and to suspend negotiations concerning the neutrality pact. Mr. Molotov repeatedly inquired of Mr. Togo, before Mr. Togo's departure, as to the intention of the Tokyo Government concerning the neutrality pact, for the reason that the sudden change of ambassadors in the midst of an important negotiation was incomprehensible and that the new ambassador, General Tatekawa, had made a statement in Harbin on his way to Moscow that Japanese-Russian relations should be restored to a clean slate. Mr. Togo endeavored to dispel the concern of the Russian authorities by explaining that the previous negotiations, although commenced on his own initiative, had been conducted with full contact with the Government and the change of the cabinet could not change the policy concerning the neutrality pact, and that he himself would upon his return home do all he could to improve Russian-Japanese relations.

9. I recall Mr. Togo's having told me that the motive for his proposing a neutrality pact was to take the opportunity of the settlement of the Nomonhan Incident to establish a fundamentally peaceful relationship between the two countries. I was acting at that time half as interpreter and half as his secretary. I recall his having told me that Japan should not seek in the south anything beyond the promotion of economic interests, for advance in the south would necessarily cause a clash of Japan with the United States and Britain. Mr. Togo went to Berlin for a few days in May 1940, but it was to be examined by a doctor there and not for official business to see the Japanese ambassador there. This was the only trip to Germany that he made during 1940.

10. At a farewell party given at the official residence of the Foreign Commissar in honor of the ambassador on the eve of his departure from Moscow, Mr. Molotov spoke words of praise, saying "I have never in my public life of many years seen any man who insists so earnestly and frankly as Mr. Togo does on whatever he believes to be right. I respect Mr. Togo not only as a distinguished diplomat and statesman but as a man."

11. I will now turn to the time when Mr. Togo was Foreign Minister. When Mr. Togo became Foreign Minister in October 1941, Ambassador Smetanin often communicated the requests of the USSR concerning the maintenance of neutrality between the two countries. On these occasions Mr. Togo suggested more than once his desire to render good offices for peace between Germany and the USSR. Especially on the occasion when Ambassador Smetanin was leaving for home in January 1942, Mr. Togo entrusted to the ambassador a message to Commissar Molotov that if the USSR should in future come to entertain a desire for peace with Germany he was ready at any time to render good offices for mediation. At that time Mr. Togo remarked that in the cir
cumstances when the whole world had become involved in the war, the relations between Japan and the USSR were like a shaft of sunlight in the midst of a shower, and that it was his desire and intention to extend this light to the whole world. I recall that in the summer of 1942, Mr. Tōgō complained that the activities of the Japanese authorities abroad were too passive at the moment when it was deemed urgently necessary to bring about a general peace through the Russo-German peace. When I called on Mr. Tōgō on the eve of my departure for Bulgaria in early 1943 and urged him to act for the mediation of Russo-German peace, he spoke to me to the effect that he deemed the Russo-German peace the most proper way to bring about general peace and that he was willing to work to that end if the Government would give him full powers for action.

12. I returned from Bulgaria in April 1945. Mr. Tōgō summoned me in May and told me of his intention of negotiations with the USSR with the aim of terminating the war. His intention materialized in June as the conversations in Hakone between former Premier Hirota and Ambassador Maliki, and I served as interpreter of the conversations and liaison between Mr. Tōgō and Mr. Hirota. Although the negotiations ended in failure, it was because the war situation had too far deteriorated to be saved through the negotiations.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Noguchi Yoshio (seal)

On this 19th day of November, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent Noguchi Yoshio

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo

20 November 1947
CERTIFICATE

I, Chief of the Personnel Section of the Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry, certify the following to be true in every particular upon comparison with the records preserved in the Foreign Ministry.

Togo Shigeru

1923 Jan 11 Appointed a secretary of the Foreign Ministry, and assigned to Chief of the First Section, European-American Bureau.

1925 Dec 26 Appointed First Secretary of Embassy, and assigned for duty in the United States.

1929 Jun 29 Appointed Counsellor of Embassy, and assigned for duty in Germany. Left Tokyo on 24 September, and arrived at his post in Berlin on 9 November of the same year.

1932 Nov 18 Ordered home. Left Berlin on 22 December of the same year, and arrived at Tokyo on 28 January 1933. While serving in Germany as Counsellor of the Embassy:

(A) 1930 July 30 Appointed to the suite of the Japanese delegate to the 11th General Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, and left Berlin on 7 September. Returned to Berlin on 29 September of the same year (the Assembly was held from 10 September to 4 October 1930).

(B) 1931 Dec 9 Appointed to the suite of the delegate plenipotentiary to the General Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (the Conference was opened on 2 February 1932, and was postponed indefinitely at the meeting of the Council of the League on 30 September 1932).

(C) 1932 Aug 13 Ordered home temporarily. Left Berlin on 22 August, and arrived at Tokyo on 22 October, and returned to his post in Berlin on 19 November of the same year.

1933 Feb 1 Appointed Director of the European-American Bureau, Foreign Ministry.

1934 Jun 1 Appointed Director of the European- Asiatic Bureau, Foreign Ministry.

1937 Oct 27 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Germany. Left Tokyo on 24 November, and arrived at Berlin on 24 December of the same year.
1938 Oct 15 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the U.S.S.R., and concurrently relieved from post in Germany. Left Berlin on 27 October, and arrived at Moscow on 29 October of the same year.

1940 Aug 29 Ordered home. Left Moscow on 20 October, and arrived at Tokyo on 5 November of the same year.

1941 Oct 18 Appointed Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs. Relieved from the post of Minister of Overseas Affairs on 2 December of the same year.

Relieved from post on request on 1 September 1942. Appointed Member of the House of Peers on the same day in accordance with Section 4 of Article I of the Rules and Regulations of the House of Peers.

1945 Apr 9 Appointed Foreign Minister and concurrently Greater East Asia Minister. Relieved from the posts on request on 17 August of the same year.

4 April 1947

Teraoka Kohel

(seal)
Def. Doc. No. 1280

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
16 April 1947
Do Y. Doc. #2918
(1930)

EXHIBIT SHEET

Affidavit of NOGUCHI, Yoshio

Page 3

Paragraph 10, line 5

Please add "in October 1940" after word "Moscow".

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 301
CERTIFICATE

TÖGÔ Shigemori, Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

1938 Oct 15 Ordered to be stationed in the U.S.S.R., and concurrently relieved from his post in Germany.
1938 Oct 29 Arrived at his post in Moscow and took over the office.
1940 Aug 29 Ordered home.
1940 Oct 20 Left Moscow.
1940 Nov 5 Arrived at Tokyo

TATEKAWA Yoshitsugu, Lieutenant-General

1940 Sep t 14 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the U.S.S.R.
1940 Oct 11 Left Tokyo.
1940 Oct 23 Arrived at his post in Moscow.

I certify the above to be true in every particular upon comparison with the personnel records preserved in the Foreign Ministry.

1 February 1947

Terasaka Kohei
Chief of the Personnel Section,
Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry
(seal)

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
17 April 1947
Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the service of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1928. I served in the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau from June 1934 to January 1938; in Berlin as Third Secretary of the Embassy, March-October 1938; in Hsingking, as Third and Second Secretary of the Embassy, from December 1938 to August 1940; as senior secretary, later Chief, of the First Section, European-Asiatic Bureau, from August 1940 to November 1942; and as Chief of the Personnel Section from November 1942 to August 1945.

2. For something over three years of the time of my first service in the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Ministry the Bureau Director was Mr. Togo Shigonori. It was a period when there were numerous Japanese-Soviet problems, mostly growing out of the development of Manchoukuo, such as boundary disputes and other disputes with Soviet nationals in Manchoukuo and agitation against the Red menaces. Mr. Togo's practice as bureau director in charge of Soviet affairs was to protest stiffly against any Soviet delicts, but to be equally stern in reprimanding those on the Japanese side who were guilty of improper practices. For example, we used to get many requests from the Ministry of War or the ambassador in Hsingking (who was concurrently the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army) to make protests to the USSR concerning border incidents reported by the Kwantung Army. These requests, which came either as telegrams direct from Hsingking or in the form of copies of telegrams to the War Ministry forwarded to us by them, were routed through the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau, which had to do with Russian affairs; they were quite numerous, many of them were seen and managed by me, many were not. Requests were sometimes made orally by the War Ministry to officialisms our section. Bureau Director Togo frequently said that before making the protests further investigation would have to be made to give assurance that the fault was not on the Japanese side, and in such cases had instructions for such further investigation sent to the Hsingking Embassy or requests therefor sent to the War Ministry. In such cases he often suggested to the War Ministry and the Kwantung Army that they mend their ways and refrain from committing wrongs themselves, if they wished the Japanese position to be strong when there were cases of Soviet faults. Mr. Togo also issued many admonitions to the military authorities, through the Embassy at Hsingking or the War Ministry, concerning other cases of Soviet-Japanese or Soviet-Manchoukuoan disputes.
3. Our businessman operating concessions in Sakhalin, and Japanese fishermen operating in Soviet waters under the fisheries agreements, made frequent complaints to the Foreign Ministry, through the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau, of Soviet oppression. Mr. Togô often told them in my presence that there was fault on their side, too: that they were exaggerating their cases or concealing some of the facts, were making undue profits out of their own laborers, and in general were not devoting their sincerest efforts to compliance with their concession contracts or fisheries rights. On those occasions when they asked the Foreign Ministry to take a strong stand against the U.S.S.R. Mr. Togô was accustomed to tell them that they were attempting to depend unduly on governmental protection, and that only when the U.S.S.R. had acted in a manner clearly illegal could they expect the government to help them.

4. During the period mentioned above the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact had a cooling effect on Soviet-Japanese relations. Although it was the European-Asiatic Bureau, headed by Mr. Togô, which under the Government's decision of the policy of entering into such a pact had to manage the Foreign Ministry's work in connection with its conclusion, I heard at that time that Mr. Togô's opinion was that the conclusion of a political agreement for the purpose of coping with an ideology was meaningless.

5. After I arrived at the Berlin Embassy to serve as Third Secretary, in March 1938, I learned that our Military Attache, General Ōshima, was reported to be working for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Although the details were not known to the Embassy staff, we did know that the Military Attache was negotiating directly with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, without informing the Ambassador. Ambassador Togô was strongly opposed to the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, or anything in the nature of a German-Japanese-Italian alliance, and immediately upon learning of the negotiations which were in progress he presented to the Foreign Minister his views to that effect. His opinion as I then learned it, from his dispatches to the Foreign Minister and his explanations to me and other members of the staff, was that the Nazi foreign policy would sooner or later bring Germany into conflict with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and other countries, and that such a pact of alliance with Germany and Italy not only would not contribute to the solution of the China Affair but would involve Japan in the turmoil of Europe and eventually of the world. Ambassador Togô's attitude toward the Japanese-German alliance, as well as his unresponsiveness to German suggestions of closer cooperation in economic matters relating to China, led to deterioration of his relations with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop as well as to intensified opposition from our military and naval circles, to whom his continued presence in Berlin appeared as an obstacle to realization of their desire of closer German-Japanese collaboration.

6. It was this attitude of Ambassador Togô's and this opposition from military circles which, as I learned upon my return to Japan in November 1938, had brought about his recall from Berlin to Moscow. What I learned at that time I reported to Mr. Togô in a letter of 6 December 1938, which I have been shown and can identify as Defense Document No. 2852. I can add nothing more to that recital except to say that my information came from the Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, who was familiar with the matter.
7. As Chief of the First Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau during Mr. Tō's first term as foreign minister I was familiar with his attitude toward the U.S.S.R., owing to my official connection with matters involving Japanese-Soviet relations. From the time that he assumed office Mr. Tō worked assiduously for the strict and faithful observance, by both parties, of the neutrality then prevailing between Japan and the Soviet Union. Thus on 22 November 1941 the Foreign Minister called in the Soviet Ambassador, Smetanin, and reminded him that on 5 and 13 August the Ambassador had had conversations with Admiral Toyoda, the then foreign minister, at which time he had given the assurance that the U.S.S.R. would remain faithful to the Neutrality Pact and would grant no military bases on Soviet soil to foreign powers. Mr. Tō then asked Mr. Smetanin to confirm that that policy of the Soviet Union remained unchanged, and that the Neutrality Pact would continue to be for the U.S.S.R., as well as for Japan, the foundation of relations between the two countries. On 1 December Mr. Smetanin gave, "by order of the Soviet Government", the assurance requested; and again on 6 December, "by order of Foreign Minister Molotov", he reaffirmed that the Neutrality Pact formed the basis of the Soviet Union's policy toward Japan.

8. During the period from the outbreak of the Pacific War to the beginning of September 1942, there were several questions in connection with the navigation of Soviet vessels, etc. Our Navy had established the so-called "sea-defence zones" out of the necessity for coast defence, and decided to restrict, to a certain extent, the navigation in these areas of general craft and to give certain advices concerning the navigation of foreign vessels through specified areas. The Foreign Ministry took the step, on such occasions, of notifying the Soviet Embassy at Tokyo beforehand, in compliance with the request of the Navy Ministry, of the measures to be taken by the Japanese Navy in this connection, and, when there arose questions such as detention of a Soviet vessel, made efforts for their speedy settlement through release or some other means.

Some Soviet vessels were damaged, and some even sank, in areas where there were hostilities. On all such occasions, the Foreign Ministry did its utmost to accord, regardless of the causes of the incidents, all facilities possible for the protection or the repatriation of the crews, as well as for other means of settlement.

9. Throughout Mr. Tō's second term as Foreign Minister I was chief of the Foreign Ministry's Personnel Section. During this time military circles intimated the desirability of removing our ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Mr. Satō Naotake, who was alleged to be "insufficiently positive" in his attitude toward the Soviet Union and the war. I brought up the question with Mr. Tō, but he told me that if Ambassador Satō were removed from the U.S.S.R. it would be to a post in Europe where he would be able to get in touch with the Governments of the United States and Great Britain with a view to ending the war. With this explanation he told me to study the question of the possibility of appointing as minister one who was then serving as ambassador, having in mind that the post to which Ambassador Satō would have had to be sent would have been Sweden, Switzerland, or the Vatican, where non-diplomatic representations were only legations. Soon thereafter I made a report to him on this subject. These discussions were held soon after Foreign Minister
Tōgō took office—in April of 1945, I think—but for some reason nothing further came of the idea, principally because soon afterward projects for ending the war through the intermediation of the USSR were set in motion.

10. While in the office of Chief of the Personnel Section, Foreign Minister's Secretariat, I was personally in charge of the examination of the services of Foreign Ministry officials for the grant of awards in connection with the China Affair and I conducted the negotiation with the Board of Decorations in this connection. At that time, the Foreign Ministry had two fixed standards to be applied in this examination of services. The one was a list of important matters taking place during the China Affair in which the Foreign Ministry was more or less concerned (as examples, the negotiations with the Chinese Government directly after the outbreak of the Affair, the protection and withdrawal of Japanese residents, the negotiations concerning third Powers' concessions in China, the political negotiations with the Governments of third Powers, etc.), and examination was made of the services of the various officials relating to each of the matters enumerated, which were not limited to those that had direct connection with the China Affair. The other standard was a table of official posts graded in accordance with their importance in connection with the China Affair. The careers of officials were considered in the light of this table, and the services (especially at a critical period) in an important post justified a person's receiving a certain grade of award.

11. In Mr. Tōgō's case, the Board of Decorations agreed, according to the first standard, that his services in the negotiation of the truce of Nomonhan deserved the reception of an award as the Foreign Ministry had recommended. I remember that he had already been put in the category of those who deserved the bestowal of decorations, according to the second standard, for the fact that he had successively held, during the period subjected to the examination—that is, the period from 7 July 1937 to 29 April 1940—the most important posts other than those in China, such as Director of the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs, Ambassador to Germany and Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

As for the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun, this is not the highest decoration. Neither was it bestowed upon Mr. Tōgō for any special reason. It was only because he had already been decorated with the First Class Order of the Sacred Treasure on the occasion of the periodical awards of May 1941, prior to the final decision on the awards in connection with services during the period of the China Affair, and he was awarded the next higher decoration in grade, that is, the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun.
O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Narita Katsushirō (seal)

On this 30th day of October, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent Narita Katsushirō

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
4 November 1947
To His Excellency Ambassador Togo:

I am pleased to have been informed that Your Excellency is actively working in the Russian capital in spite of the severely cold weather. I arrived at Tokyo on 24 November, and after staying for about ten days I am leaving here today for Hsingking.

While I was in Tokyo I was informed from the most trustworthy sources with regard to the following effect with regard to the transfer of Ambassadors.

The choice of the Ambassador to Britain was the most difficult, and Mr. Ugaki said that it would be very good if Mr. Togo should go to London, but that the trouble was that if Mr. Togo should do so the problem would necessarily arise of promoting Ōshima to the Ambassadorship. When the army started to work for transferring the ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Ugaki is said to have seen no necessity for the transfer because the Ambassador at that time had not failed in any way whatsoever. However, telegrams of malicious propaganda were sent from Major-General Kasahara and Naval Attaché Kojima, stating, "Ambassador Togo is extremely unpopular with the German authorities, and such high officials as Ribbentrop pay no attention to Ambassador Togo" and "At the time of the Czechoslovakian problem all the Ambassadors of the friendly nations went to Munich, but Ambassador Togo alone did not. Ōshima is so popular that he went to Munich on the private plane of Ribbentrop which the latter specially offered". Moreover, it began to be urged that Ōshima should be used for the "negotiations", and some young officials of the Foreign Office responded to this. The pressure of the military has thus prevailed. It seems, therefore, that the telegrams sent from Berlin pointing out the disqualification of Ōshima have hardly been utilized by the Foreign Office authorities.

The reasons for Minister Ugaki's resignation are said to be that a sentimental disagreement developed between him and Premier Konoe; that he attacked Konoe, or at least expressed views conflicting with the Government policy, in his press interview in Hayama (although the interview was understood to be strictly confidential, the Kempei knew of it the following day); that the anti-Ugaki feeling of the Army was stimulated as War Minister Itagaki lost face at the time of the Changkufeng incident, when he was advised by the Emperor of the discrepancies of his report with Foreign Minister Ugaki's report relative to the policy of localizing the matter; and that Mr. Ugaki was dissatisfied with the establishment of the Asia Development Board (Fôain) because it curtailed the authority of the Foreign Minister, thereby disturbing the realization of the China policy which Mr. Ugaki cherishes.

In Tokyo there is no shortage of food and daily necessaries except possibly an appreciable rise in the taxi fare, and we notice nothing on the street to show that there is a war.

I pray that Your Excellency will take very good care of yourself.

Narita Katsushirō
東京大使館

十二月六日

陸相の意に不相手である於て外務省の提案撤回に

かれること十一月二十四日着京の上今日新官向って進任の途に

在尔後

東京大本營から方略より来書する旨に於れば

大使退居に対して駐英大使の入遞文現在にて宇垣氏は一等級大使にロンドンに行つて観ふと好都合だ。こうすれば大島の仰給問題はもう故国に

リソベン岸方の国際調の交渉大駐とせずとしながら大島の大頭部は全く＝小島を含める必要は無い。と云ふりたる田

の寄手に呼返する者ありき大島の頭部に於ても大島を書面としてユーヘンとの交渉し＝大島は一等級大使

の寄手に呼返する者ありき大島の頭部に於ても大島を書面としてユーヘンとの交渉し＝大島は一等級大使

の寄手に呼返する者ありき大島の頭部に於ても大島を書面としてユーヘンとの交渉し＝大島は一等級大使

の寄手に呼返する者ありき大島の頭部に於ても大島を書面としてユーヘンとの交渉し＝大島は一等級大使
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. vs.

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

AFFIDAVIT

YAMAJI AKIRA

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in 1922, and served as Minister to Bulgaria from 1941 to 1945, retiring from the Foreign Ministry in March 1946. In April 1934, I was assigned as a junior secretary, to the 2d Section of the Bureau of European-American Affairs, and in September 1936 was appointed Chief of the 2d Section, which was in charge of diplomatic relations with Britain, France, Germany, Italy and other European countries, remaining in that office until April 1938. During the period from April 1934 to October 1937 the Director of the European-American (later reorganized as the European-Asian) Bureau was Togo Shigenori.

2. At about the beginning of February 1936, the Japanese Foreign Ministry received a semi-official report, addressed to the Vice-Minister, from Councillor Inoue, the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy at Berlin, to the effect that the military attaché of the Embassy at Berlin was informally carrying on political negotiations with the German Government. Soon afterward, in April of the same year, Mr. Arita Hachiro was appointed Foreign Minister. Shortly after that Foreign Minister Arita told Ambassador Mushakoji, who was then home on furlough and was leaving Tokyo to go back to his post in Berlin, that it was considered proper in the light of the circumstances, to conclude some political agreement between Japan and Germany, and that he wished the Ambassador to keep that in mind and make necessary investigations in Berlin. And in May of the same year, when Ambassador Mushakoji was presumed to have arrived at his post in Berlin, the Foreign Minister cabled instructions of the same import, requesting the Ambassador to sound out the German intention in this connection. In July, a telegram from Ambassador Mushakoji reported that a plan of agreement had been submitted by von Ribbentrop, containing stipulations for an anti-Comintern Pact and measures of cooperation against the Soviet Union in this connection.

3. At that time, I recall that Director Togo told me that he was against making any international agreement on the basis of ideologies, because that would only result in the repetition of the failure of the Holy Alliance and that therefore he was against a Japanese-German anti-Comintern Pact. The Cabinet members concerned, however, supported the conclusion of the anti-Comintern Pact, and a mere bureau director such as Mr. Togo could do nothing but to carry out their policies.
But he paid scrupulous attention so that damage to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Great Britain might be avoided, that the matter might produce the least possible unfavorable reaction on the part of third Powers, and also that the cooperation between Japan and Germany to be provided for in the Pact might not exceed the limit of Japan's true necessity. For this purpose he made all possible efforts as stated below.

1. At the joint conference between the Foreign and the War Ministries at that time, Director Tōgō maintained, with Foreign Minister Arita, that it was absolutely necessary for entering into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany to conclude a political agreement with Britain, who had important interests in various areas of the world and especially deep concern in Chinese problems. He succeeded in bearing down the strong objections on the part of the military and persuading them to acceptance of the above condition.

Further, in negotiating with the German side, Director Tōgō had the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin request the following amendments, in phrasing as well as in substance, of the German draft of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and achieved his object. Though I cannot give the original German draft as it cannot be found, amendment was made to the following effect:

A) The propagandistic words in the original German draft, especially the Hitlorian expressions found in the preambles, were toned down by the Japanese request;

B) The text of the Pact was made as businesslike as possible, by limiting the scope of cooperation to the exchange of information concerning the destructive activities of the Communist International and exchange of opinions concerning the counter-measures to be taken against them;

C) The term of validity was reduced from 10 years to 5.

The efforts of Director Tōgō also succeeded in effecting an amendment of the draft of the Annexed Secret Agreement in the following points:

1) The too-comprehensive condition of the first article of the German draft—to the effect that it was to become operative "in case either of the two participants became an object of attack or threat of attack"—was amended to apply, as in the final pact, only in the event of either of the participants becoming "the object of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack".

B) Many exceptions were made from the second article of the German draft, which provided that, in case either of the two participants wanted to conclude with the Soviet Union any political agreement which was inconsistent with the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact, it must obtain the approval of the other beforehand. The majority of the political agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union were made exceptions to the application of the present Article, as it was decided that such approval was unnecessary in connection with the agreements concerning the fishing rights and other concessions and the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundaries problems which were pending between the Governments of Japan and the Soviet Union. The present Article was in effect almost mutilated, so far as
concerns any limitation on Japanese action.

5. With respect to Japan's relations with Britain, Mr. Togo had often told me that he cherished the firm belief that Anglo-Japanese relations should be smoothed by concluding an agreement with Britain, which had serious interests in China, thus improving also relations with the United States and maintaining the peace of the world. Because of this belief, he told me, he maintained that the conclusion of an agreement with Britain should be a condition for the execution of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact. Conditions at the time of signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact were unfavorable to obtaining British agreement, and negotiations made no progress. But Mr. Togo did not give up hope. He made up his mind to resume the negotiations with Britain in the spring of 1937, persuaded the Foreign Ministry authorities in charge of China affairs, as well as the higher officials, and succeeded in inducing the military into agreement. The plan of an Anglo-Japanese Pact, with respect for the British concessions in China as its substance, was thus completed, and instructions were given to Ambassador Yoshida at London to open negotiations with the British Government upon the basis of it. But time was consumed by various requests on the part of Ambassador Yoshida, and the negotiations had hardly been opened when the China affair broke out. All the efforts of Mr. Togo were thus brought to nothing, to our great regret.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yamaji Akira (seal)

On this 5th day of April, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: Yamaji Akira

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo 8 April 1947
Certificate No. 769

CERTIFICATE

Tōgō Shigenori, ex-Foreign Minister. Born on 10 December 1882.
1934 Jun 1 Appointed Director of the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Office.
1937 Oct 7 Ordered to take an official trip to Manchoukuo.
   Left Tokyo on October 10.
   Returned to Tokyo on October 19.

I certify the above to be true in every particular upon comparison with the personnel records preserved in the Foreign Office.

2 November 1947

TERAOKA Kōhei
Chief of the Personnel Section,
Secretariat of the Foreign Minister
(Seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al -vs- ARAKI Sadao, et al - Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

KAMEYAMA KAZUJI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. My personal history is given in Exhibit No. 323a. I was in charge, when holding a post in the Bureau of European-American Affairs (later reorganized as the Bureau of European-Asianic Affairs), from February 1922 to March 1927 and from November 1930 to May 1935, of those questions referred to in the present affidavit: the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Peking Convention of 1925, the discussion of a Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact and the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Mr. Tōgō Shigenori was Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of European-American Affairs from January 1922 to March 1927, and Director of the Bureau of European-American Affairs (later the Bureau of European-Asianic Affairs) from February 1923 to October 1937, and I served under him till I left the Bureau in May 1935.

2. The Soviet-Japanese Basic Treaty was signed at Peking in January 1925, bringing about the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Mr. Tōgō, as the competent section chief, had been dealing with Soviet-Japanese affairs since 1923, taking charge of the study and planning in connection with many difficult problems existing between the two countries. It was his efforts, in this way, that brought about the settlement of those problems and the conclusion of the treaty, thus completing a most difficult task.

3. As Director of the Bureau of European-American Affairs, he had to deal with many difficult questions pending between Japan and the Soviet Union, such as the problem of the Fisheries Convention, that of the Chinese Eastern Railway and that of the Soviet-Manchoukuo and Manchoukuo-Mongolian boundary lines. He exerted himself to bring those questions to amicable settlement in order to improve Soviet-Japanese relations, and succeeded. Especially, in bringing to successful conclusion the negotiations for the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which had been opened in May 1933 at the initiative of the Soviet Government, he worked hard for the following two years as the competent bureau director, persuading the military leaders and negotiating with the Governments of the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo, and achieved success in concluding the agreement for the purchase of the railway on 23 March 1935.
At the time when the soiling of the railway was proposed by the Soviet Government, there was an opinion supported by some of the military and other circles that it was useless to pay a high price for a railway which was sure to fall into the hands of Manchoukuo for nothing sooner or later. And it was feared that this might prove an obstacle to the purchase of the railway through peaceful negotiations. Mr. Togó, in order to obtain the agreement of the Cabinet to acceptance of the above Soviet proposal, and to make the Government policy in this regard solid and stable, reasoned Mr. Yamaoka Jukuó, the then Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs of the War Ministry, and Mr. Nagata Totsuzan, the then Chief of the Second Department of the General Staff Office, into agreement to his opinion, which resulted in the decision of the Cabinet of 23 May to the following effect: that the proposal of the Soviet Government should be accepted, that Manchoukuo should be advised to be the purchaser, and that the Japanese Government should use its good offices to smooth the progress of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo.

The general progress of the negotiations for the purchase of the railway is recited in Exhibit No. 3231. The direct negotiations between the representatives of the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo made little progress in the face of many difficulties, and they often came to a standstill, and sometimes to the verge of rupture. Mr. Togó, thereupon, had frequent interviews with Ambassador Yurenév and Director of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Kazlovsky, the Soviet delegates, and concentrated all his energies upon removing misunderstandings and complications on both sides, succeeding thus in smoothing the progress of the negotiations. After that, he had daily conversations with the Soviet delegates, and finally the whole of the negotiations were brought to conclusion.

While in the office of Director of the Bureau of European-American Affairs, Mr. Togó, with the object of preventing as well as settling complications frequently arising in connection with the problem of the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundaries, set himself to form a committee for their demarcation and a committee for the settlement of boundary disputes, and took every opportunity to propose it to the Soviet side.

In July 1935, after the conclusion of the Chinese Eastern Railway negotiations in March, the Soviet Government had notified the Japanese Government that it had no objection to opening negotiations for the establishment of the committee for the settlement of boundary disputes, and in the following month, August, submitted to us a draft agreement to be concluded between the two. The Manchoukuo Government and the Kwantung Army, however, insisted that the demarcation of the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundaries be accomplished prior to the formation of the committee, and this hampered the progress of the negotiations. In March 1936, the Soviet Government notified the Japanese Government of its intention to accept, on certain terms, the proposal for border demarcation. In the negotiations, which lasted from April till November 1936, both Governments proceeded with a view to forming a committee for the demarcation of the eastern boundaries between the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo and a committee for the settlement of disputes arising on these boundaries, as well as eventually similar committees to deal with all the rest of the boundaries, but the negotiations failed to materialize, the two sides falling to
arrive at complete agreement of opinion. I know the above progress of the negotiations, because I served as secretary of the Japanese embassy in Moscow from May 1935 till November 1937.

7. From the day of his appointment as Director of the Bureau of European and American Affairs, Mr. Togō was an eager advocate of the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact but, while in the office of the Director, he was too busily engaged in dealing with many problems arising successively between Japan and the Soviet Union and requiring prompt settlement to seize the opportunity of realizing his intention. It may be stated in this connection, further, that no proposal was made by the Soviet Government with respect to this problem during the period when he was Bureau Director of the Foreign Ministry.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kameyama Kazuji (seal)

On this 3rd day of October, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent Kameyama Kazuji

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
5 October 1947
Do you have a favorite? 53

. . .

Do you have a favorite? 53

. . .
本問題の主な事実として、未解決未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は在日支番が未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は在日支番が未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は在日支番が未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二ヵ年近くの間、在日支番は未解決のままに残された二か
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

KASAHARA YUKIO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am a former lieutenant-general of the Japanese Army. In January 1938, being then a major-general, I was dispatched as an officer attached to the General Staff to Europe, and was in Berlin until November of the same year. I had no particular mission in Berlin, but having been formally told that I was to be appointed military attaché to the Embassy in Germany, I was sent in advance at my desire to be in Germany as early as possible to study language as well as the general situation. During my time in Berlin I met Ambassador Togo two or three times, but I had no official connection with him and discussed no official business with him.

2. In about July Foreign Minister Ribbentrop made to Military Attaché Ōshima a proposal, which had been first discussed between them some time previously, concerning a German-Japanese-Italian alliance pact. On that occasion I remarked to General Ōshima that it was strange that the proposal was not shown to Ambassador Togo. General Ōshima replied that Ribbentrop had asked him (Ōshima) not to mention the matter to the Ambassador partly because he wished first to sound out the intention of the Japanese military on this subject and partly because he was afraid that Ambassador Togo would oppose it if he were approached first, it being accordingly kept secret, on the German side, even from Ambassador Ott; and that therefore he (Ōshima) could not mention it to Ambassador Togo.

3. At the request of General Ōshima I left Berlin by air, carrying this proposal, around the middle of July, arriving at Tokyo at the beginning of August. I delivered the German proposal to the competent authorities of the Army and Navy and also informed the Foreign Minister of it, and it was brought before a Five-Ministers' conference, where a decision was made concerning it. I went back to Berlin, toward the end of September, and reported the circumstances to the Military Attaché. Although it had been at General Ōshima's request that I had gone to Tokyo, I called on Ambassador Togo immediately upon my return to Berlin with Ribbentrop's proposal without letting him know of the question. Ambassador Togo said that although he had been informed that there had been a decision on this question by the Five-Ministers' conference, he was opposed to an alliance with Germany, and his views to that effect had been submitted to the Foreign Minister.
1. While I was in Tokyo, I met Foreign Minister Ugaki, and informed him that Ambassador Togo was not on good terms with the German authorities, which was the fact, that the German authorities considered him not to be cooperative with Nazi policy, and that that was the reason that they had not wanted Ribbentrop's proposal shown to the Ambassador. There was prevalent in military circles at that time an opinion that Military Attaché Oshima should be made ambassador to Germany.

5. As an example of the relations existing between Ambassador Togo and the high Nazi officials, I remember that at the time of the Munich meeting in September 1938 Military Attaché Oshima was taken from Berlin to Munich in Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's private piano; while Ambassador Togo did not go at all.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kasahara Yukio (seal)

On this 23rd day of October, 1947
At Tokyo
Deponent: Kasahara Yukio (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo
Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
23 October 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

SHUĐō YASUTO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the service of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1920. From February 1937 to December 1938 I served as commercial attaché in the Japanese Embassy in Germany. During the period (December 1937 to October 1938) that my service was under Ambassador Tōgō, there were two important problems of Japanese-German collaboration, on which I was officially informed of the Ambassador's views and actions, concerning which I am able to give testimony.

2. First of these was the question of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact or concluding a Japanese-German-Italian alliance. Ambassador Tōgō was consistently opposed to such measures, but the military attaché to the Embassy was working for them, ignoring the Ambassador, and the Embassy staff was well aware that General Ohshima was negotiating directly with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Ambassador Tōgō's opinion on the question was often expressed by him to me, in the course of our almost daily conferences concerning my business of trade and commercial questions. My interest being in commercial and trade questions, the opinion which I expressed to Ambassador Tōgō was that Germany had become economically very strong and was closely connected by trade relations with the Eastern European countries as well as the Balkans, and that these relations were steadily becoming intensified and assuming a greater importance; and that if these relations developed in a section of Europe in which Great Britain traditionally had great interests, eventually the two would come into collision. Japan, if bound to Germany by a military alliance, would thus be drawn into a war with England—and of course the United States as well—which was none of her concern, nor to her interest. Ambassador Tōgō agreed with my opinion and expressed it as his view that Germany would eventually clash with Great Britain, Russia and other powers, and therefore deprecated the policy of aligning Japan with Germany as sure to involve Japan's ultimate embroilment in the quarrels of Europe.

3. In March or April 1938 the Naval Attaché of the Embassy sent a cable to the Navy Ministry strongly urging Ambassador Tōgō's removal on the ground that he was on bad terms with the German Foreign Minister and that his retention in the circumstances of the time, when it was necessary to promote Japanese-German cooperation, was not in the interest of the country. The cable stated also that the matter had been talked over with the Military Attaché. This became known to us when the content of the cable was transmitted from the Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Tōgō.
Upon learning of this the members of the staff were indignant, and feeling that the conspiracy of Army and Navy to take over the Embassy could not be ignored, moved for the defence of the Ambassador and the Embassy. There was, however, little that we could do, and in the end the Ambassador was transferred from Berlin to Moscow, after only ten month's service in Germany. When he received the order for his transfer, he told me that he was being expelled from Berlin on account of his opposition in the matter of the German-Japanese-Italian alliance.

Soon afterward, I was ordered home. Leaving Berlin on 8 December 1938, I stopped en route at Moscow, and talked with Ambassador Togó. He asked me about the subsequent development of the alliance problem, and I replied that it seemed that progress toward it was being made, though I was not familiar with the details. The Ambassador thereupon requested that when I should report to such responsible quarters as Premier, Foreign Minister, and other ministers upon my return home, I should tell them that Togó was absolutely opposed to a German-Japanese-Italian alliance. Upon reaching Japan I did convey that message to several persons; I arrived in Tokyo on 22 December, and repeated Ambassador Togó's opinion to Foreign Minister Pōta and Vice-Minister Sawada; to Welfare Minister Kido, on the 23rd; to Premier Konoe on 31 December; and in early January to Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Yuasa.

The second problem during my service under Ambassador Togó in Berlin was that of economic cooperation in China between Japan and Germany. Around February 1938 the so-called "Economic Mission", a Japanese Government mission which had no power to enter into agreements or negotiate directly, but only to assist the Embassy, visited Germany. It was at first the understanding of the German authorities that the mission was to conduct negotiations concerning a commercial agreement, but the fact was that the Embassy was to conduct the negotiations directly with the German Government, the mission having no official authority for that purpose. Meanwhile the situation in China had so developed that Japanese influence came to be dominant in North China; whereupon the military attaché to the Embassy, after consulting with the naval attaché and the economic mission but not with the Embassy, made to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop a proposal for settling the conditions of German trade in China. This proposal was that, since Japan had caused much difficulty to Germany in her China trade since the start of the China Affair, she would, now that she had occupied strategic points in North China, from that time give to the Germans equal treatment with the Japanese in that area.

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who had been put in a difficult position by the complaints of the Hamburg merchants concerning conditions in China, was very much pleased at this proposal. Thinking it necessary in view of the importance of the matter to make it into a formal agreement between the two Governments, he put it into the form of a memorandum, which he presented to Ambassador Togó around May, saying that it was desired to make the proposal of the Japanese in Berlin a formal agreement. Ambassador Togó replied that any proposal made by unauthorized persons could not be made the basis of formal negotiations; that he had received no instructions from the home Government about the matter, and therefore could not enter into negotiations on the basis of such a memorandum. Upon returning to the Embassy after the conversation on this subject with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Ambassador Togó called me in immediately and told me about it. I understood later from the Ambassador that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was much dissatisfied with the Ambassador's attitude;
but after further conversations with the military and naval attaches, as well as the economic mission, Ribbentrop drafted and handed to Ambassador Tögö another memorandum with the word "preferential" substituted for "equal", asking that it be transmitted to the Japanese Government. Immediately upon his return to the Embassy the Ambassador called me and told me about it. It being the second request, he could not refuse to transmit it to the Government; but we discussed the question and agreed that it was not possible in practice to give "preferential" treatment, and that therefore Japan could not make such an agreement, and this opinion of ours was transmitted with the memorandum to the Foreign Minister in Tokyo.

7. Owing to my being completely occupied for some time thereafter with the negotiations for conclusion of a commercial treaty to replace the then existing arrangements for trade between Germany and Japan, I had little acquaintance with subsequent developments in the matter of economic interests in China. I knew only in a general way that instructions were sent from Tokyo in the matter, and that negotiations continued; but it was my understanding that they showed little progress, and I know that no agreement had been reached regarding the problem of German trade in China up to the time that Ambassador Tögö was transferred from Berlin.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Shudo Yasuto

On this 4th day of March, 1947
At the Finance Ministry, Tokyo

DEPONENT: Shudo Yasuto

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
21 November 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

SAKAYA TADASHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in March 1921 and, after serving at various posts, became Minister to Finland in September 1940, remaining in that position until my retirement from the Foreign Ministry in April 1945.

2. From December 1937 to October 1938 I served in Berlin as First Secretary of the Embassy under Ambassador Togo. Being the senior secretary, and consequently in charge of the telegraphic code of the Ambassador, I came to be directly acquainted with such questions as the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, that is, the German-Japanese Alliance, and the change of Japanese ambassadors to Germany which arose during the above-mentioned period. From the knowledge so officially gained I give the following testimony.

3. As I had in July 1938 an inkling of the fact that General Ōshima, Military Attaché to the Embassy, had been negotiating with Ribbentrop for the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and that Major-General Kasahara had hurriedly returned to Japan, taking a German proposal on the subject, I submitted this report to Ambassador Togo, who cabled toward the middle of August to the Foreign Minister, saying that a German-Japanese-Italian alliance would not contribute to the solution of the China Affair, as argued by those who supported the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and that it would be foolhardy for the Japanese nation, which had a history of more than two thousand years behind her, to cooperate with Hitler, who was convinced that the rise of Germany was mainly attributable to him and was therefore prone to risk everything in a game of hazard for his ambition. A tripartite pact, he urged, contained the possibility of being abused to bring about a European war in which Japan also might become involved; therefore the pending negotiations for the alliance should be abandoned as the establishment of any closer relation with Germany and Italy, or the contracting of any bond of alliance with them, would threaten great dangers to the future of Japan.

4. The Foreign Minister cabled, however, at the end of August, that the cabinet ministers concerned in Tokyo had decided to have the Military Attaché keep in touch with Ribbentrop on the question of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Ambassador strongly urged the Foreign Minister's reconsideration, insisting that the German-Japanese relation should not be drawn any closer.
that it then existed, and that, moreover, it was not proper for a
military attaché to be charged with matters other than military
affairs. Within a few days after the dispatch of this message,
Ambassador Tōgō received a cable from the Foreign Minister re-
questing his agreement to his transfer to Moscow.

Ambassador Tōgō refused to assent to the Foreign Minister's
request, answering him that he would rather remain in Berlin to
work on German-Japanese affairs, which just then required the
most careful attention. The response was another telegram from
the Foreign Minister urging the Ambassador's assent, which he then
gave. Ambassador Tōgō left Berlin in October for Moscow.

5. On 9 April 1945, Mr. Tōgō was appointed by His Majesty
as Foreign Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet. Prior to this, toward
the end of March of the same year, I had had a talk with Mr.
Bagge, the Swedish Minister, with whom I had been on friendly
terms for a long time. He was leaving Japan for home shortly,
relieved of his office, and told me that, since he had served in
Japan for so long a time as twenty years, he wished he could be
of some service to Japan. He set forth his views that the Allies,
though they had avowed that they were determined to force Japan
to surrender unconditionally, would not necessarily adhere to
that if Japan proposed to conclude peace, and that the question
of the Imperial Household, which Japan took the most serious view
of, would not come into question in that case. He further sug-
gested that the Swedish Government could sound the intention of
the American Government, and asked me if Mr. Shigemitsu, the
then Foreign Minister, would agree to it. I thereupon conveyed
his views and suggestion to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu confi-
dentially. Later, when the Swedish Minister made a call upon
the Foreign Minister the matter was brought into the conversation.
Mr. Shigemitsu stated on that occasion that it would greatly
oblige him if the Swedish Government would, at its own instance,
take the trouble of sounding out the intention of the American
Government in connection with the peace terms. I was informed
of the fact by both Mr. Shigemitsu and Minister Bagge.

6. After Mr. Tōgō was appointed Foreign Minister, I called on
him on 11 April to make a report of the above details, and asked
his intention in this connection. The Foreign Minister replied
that he had not yet received any report of the matter, but he
referred to his eager desire for prompt restoration of peace, and
requested me to ask the Swedish Minister to bring his suggestion
to realization. Thereupon on the following day, 12 April, I
called on Minister Bagge who was then waiting for the plane to
carry him home, and told him that Mr. Tōgō was of the same
opinion as the former Foreign Minister, asking if he had any
desire to see the new Foreign Minister in this connection. The
Swedish Minister looked very much delighted, and promised to set
about bringing the above project to realization. He also expres-
his desire to see the Foreign Minister if possible. However, he
was compelled to leave Tokyo without seeing the Foreign Minister,
as the plane left on the following morning.

-2-
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Sakaya Tadashi

On this 6th day of October, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: Sakaya Tadashi (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
6 October 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

.vs.

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

ITÔ NOBUFUMI

Being first duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. In 1939 I was serving in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, with the rank of minister. In January 1939 I left Tokyo under instruction of the Government to convey to the Japanese Ambassadors to Germany and Italy the Government's intentions relative to the question of a Tripartite Alliance. I arrived in Berlin on this mission in February.

2. While I was in Berlin exchanging views with Ambassador Oshima in conformity with my instructions, I developed neuralgia and was confined to bed in the Hotel Bristol. During that period Mr. Tôgô Shigenori, then Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., called on me and we had a conversation regarding the subject of my mission. The substance of the conversation is as follows:

3. I explained to Ambassador Tôgô that although there were various views in Tokyo concerning a Tripartite Alliance, the Government could conclude the alliance if it were to be understood that the measures to be taken in various eventualities would be decided independently by each signatory, with possible agreement for an exception in the case of the U.S.S.R. Ambassador Tôgô said that Japan should not adopt such a policy even against the Soviet Union. He expressed himself as opposed to a Tripartite Alliance for the reasons which he had given to Tokyo when he was Ambassador to Germany; that it would not contribute to the solution of the China Affair, as asserted by its proponents; and that it would increase the danger of a European war and of Japan's being entangled in such a war. Mr. Tôgô expressed his desire that I should promptly return to Tokyo and endeavor to prevent the conclusion of the alliance.
Def. Doc. 2669

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ITÔ Nobufumi (Seal)

On this 30th day of September, 1947
At Tokyo

DEponent: ITÔ Nobufumi (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
30 September 1947

-2-
I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, upon oath depose and say:

1. I am 63 years of age, a German citizen. Since 1906 I have lived continuously in Japan, where I have been engaged in trade and manufacture. I was president, from 1930 to 1946, of the German Society for East-Asiatic Natural History and Ethnography, the scholarly society for study of Oriental culture founded in 1873. I have never held office under the Japanese or the German government, or the Nazi Party.

3. I have known the defendant Tōgō Shigenori since 1921. It was not Mr. Tōgō's habit to mix with the German residents in Tokyo, except for official relations with the Embassy personnel; but owing to the fact that his wife is a distant relative of mine my association with him has been rather closer. Thus during the twenty-six years of our acquaintance I have seen him and talked with him, at his house or mine or elsewhere, from once a week to once in a few months. Our intercourse has always been friendly and confidential, never in any way official. In such a way I have had occasion to hear the personal and confidential expression of his views upon international questions, whether he was in or out of office; just because I have never concerned myself with political questions. Mr. Tōgō's rare mention of such matters made a deep impression on me, and remained in my memory.

3. On occasion Mr. Tōgō has mentioned to me his dislike of the rapprochement between Japan and Germany. I was particularly struck by his outlook toward Germany politically since I knew him to be a graduate of the Imperial University in German literature, and very often heard him express a fondness for German culture and literature of the time of Goethe and Kant. Nevertheless, I have heard him express this opinion of opposition to such a rapprochement since before he became Ambassador to Germany. When the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded during his tenure as Director of the Foreign Ministry Bureau of European and American Affairs, he commented more than once that the making of alliances on ideological grounds was undesirable, that Japan should not adopt a policy which would alienate Great Britain and America, to say nothing of the U.S.S.R., and that the effect on Japan's international position from entering into such an arrangement would be bad.

4. As the power of the Nazi régime grew, Mr. Tōgō became increasingly cold to Germany and determined that Japan should avoid entanglement with her. His opinions as expressed to me were always anti-Nazi; and when I visited Berlin during his ambassadorship there I learned that he was on bad terms with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop especially.

-1-
Def. Doc. No. 2752  
(Tögō)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

VS.

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

—Defendant—

KURT MEISSNER

I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, upon oath depose and say:

1. I am 63 years of age, a German citizen. Since 1906 I have lived continuously in Japan, where I have been engaged in trade and manufacture. I was president, from 1930 to 1946, of the German Society for East-Asian Natural History and Ethnography, the scholarly society for study of Oriental culture founded in 1873. I have never held office under the Japanese or the German government, or the Nazi Party.

2. I have known the defendant Tōgō Shigenori since 1921. It was not Mr. Tōgō's habit to mix with the Germans resident in Tokyo, except for official relations with the Embassy personnel; but owing to the fact that his wife is a distant relative of mine my association with him has been rather closer. Thus during the twenty-six years of our acquaintance I have seen him and talked with him, at his house or mine or elsewhere, from once a week to once in a few months. Our intercourse has always been friendly and confidential, never in any way official. In such a way I have had occasion to hear the personal and confidential expression of his views upon international questions, whether he was in or out of office; just because I have never concerned myself with political questions, Mr. Tōgō's rare mention of such matters made a deep impression on me, and remained in my memory.

3. On occasion Mr. Tōgō has mentioned to me his dislike of the rapprochement between Japan and Germany. I was particularly struck by his outlook toward Germany politically since I knew him to be a graduate of the Imperial University in German Literature, and very often heard him express a fondness for German culture and literature of the time of Goethe and Kant. Nevertheless, I have heard him express this opinion of opposition to such a rapprochement since before he became Ambassador to Germany. When the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded during his tenure as Director of the Foreign Ministry Bureau of European and American Affairs, he commented more than once that the making of alliances on ideological grounds was undesirable, that Japan should not adopt a policy which would alienate Great Britain and America, to say nothing of the U.S.S.R., and that the effect on Japan's international position from entering into such an arrangement would be bad.

4. As the power of the Nazi régime grew, Mr. Tōgō became increasingly cold to Germany and determined that Japan should avoid entanglement with her. His opinions as expressed to me were always anti-Nazi; and when I visited Berlin during his ambassadorship there I learned that he was on bad terms with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop especially.
5. When Mr. Tōgō became Foreign Minister for the first time I went to congratulate him, and said that I hoped that he would be able to avert the war which we all then feared. His reply was that averting war was his task, and that he would fight to the end for a peaceful solution of Japan's international problems. His acquaintance with the new Premier had, he said, been slight, but he had come into the government on the assurance that the Foreign Minister's efforts for peace would be fully supported by the Premier and the cabinet.

6. Having been associated in business and social ways with the German colony in Japan, I am familiar with Mr. Tōgō's reputation among those circles. That reputation is of a man cold to Germany, to whom the Nazi régime especially was distasteful, and concerned always with Japan's interest alone. When he became Foreign Minister for the first time it was seriously doubted among German circles that Japan would go with Germany and against the United States and Great Britain, and his second appointment as Foreign Minister occasioned the frequently heard charges that "He wants to have peace with the Allied Powers soon", or "He wants to betray the alliance with Germany".

Kurt Heissner

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authority, this 9th day of July, 1947.

Bernard A. Hargadon
1st Lieutenant, Inf.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al
Defendants

A F R I D A V I T

MATSUMOTO SHUN-ICHI

Having first duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the service of the Foreign Ministry in 1921 and was Chief of its Personnel Section from April 1939 to March 1940. During the time when Mr. Togo was Foreign Minister for the first time (18 October 1941 - 1 September 1942), I was Director of the Bureau of Treaties, and when he was Foreign Minister for the second time, I served under him as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs from 13 May 1945 to 17 August of the same year.

2. As Chief of the Personnel Section of the Foreign Ministry, I participated in the examination of the services of those who were concerned in the conclusion of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact, as well as in taking the necessary procedure for their recognition. In the conferment of rewards for services rendered in concluding an international treaty or pact, careful consideration must always be given to the influences it may exert upon internal as well as international relations, and accordingly it would not be an easy task to take into consideration such inner circumstances as that the success of negotiations should be largely attributed to the efforts of Mr. So-and-So, or that the circumstances have forced Mr. So-and-So who was originally against the conclusion of the treaty to take charge of the business reluctantly. Therefore on all such occasions the Foreign Ministry used to recommend first as persons to receive awards the chief officials in charge of the matter. In the case of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact also, those of the Foreign Ministry who received awards for their services were the Foreign Minister (the first grade, Kyokujiitsu), the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs (the second grade, Kyokujiitsu) the Directors of the bureaus in charge of the matter, that is the Director of the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs (the second grade, Kyokujiitsu) and the Director of the Bureau of Treaties (the third grade, Kyokujiitsu), the Chief of the Second Section of the European-Asiatic Bureau (the fifth grade, Kyokujiitsu), and the chief officials in the Japanese Embassy at Berlin who were in charge of the matter. (The posts mentioned here
are all those of the time of the conclusion of the pact, and the decorations awarded them were of the next higher grade than the last awards that had been bestowed upon them respectively.) Mr. Togó was awarded the above-mentioned decoration as the then Director of the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs.

3. When the agreement was concluded on 25 November 1941 to extend the term of validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact by five years, the secret agreement between Japan and Germany annexed to the Pact was abrogated. Foreign Minister Togó intended, in view of the dissatisfaction which the Soviet Government had entertained as to the secret agreement, to seize the opportunity to abrogate it so that it might not hinder the development of friendly relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R., and, at his own initiative, instructed the Ambassador at Berlin to propose its abrogation to the German Government. After obtaining the consent of part of the German Government, he referred the matter to the Cabinet for deliberation, where the decision of the Government was made to the above effect.

4. The Foreign Ministry had nothing to do with the conclusion of a military agreement among Japan, Germany and Italy on 18 January 1942. Moreover, no treaty to such an effect was concluded among the three governments, and the opinion of the Privy Council was never requested on either signing or execution of any such treaty. If such a military agreement was really concluded, it can have been nothing more than an arrangement among the military authorities regarding operations. It is not possible under the constitution for Japan to commit herself to a plan to divide the world among the three countries through an arrangement among the military authorities of the countries concerned. Moreover, I had never heard that an arrangement was made at the time among the military authorities of the three countries regarding the division of the world.

5. At 7:00 A.M., 10 August 1945, the notification of the Japanese Government to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and China concerning the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration was dispatched. The notification stated that it was understood that the conditions included in the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration did not include any request prejudicial to the prerogative of the Emperor to rule the country. At about 1:00 A.M., 12 August, I received a telephone call from Foreign Minister Togó telling me that the Foreign Ministry had heard a report of the contents of the Allied reply, just received by radio, and instructing me to study the questionable points in the reply and make report. At about 5:30 A.M. I called at the Minister's residence with Andō and Shibusawa, Directors of the Political Bureau and the Treaty Bureau respectively, and reported to the Minister that the conclusion reached as the result of our study was that the Allied reply accepted in general
our understanding as proposed. The reply which was issued by the United States Secretary of State through the Swiss Government was received by the Foreign Ministry in the early morning of the 13th.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Matsumoto Shun-Ichi (Seal)

On this 12th day of December 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT: Matsumoto Shun-Ichi (Seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (Seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
12 December 1947
四川

四川

四川

四川

四川

四川
府の米・英・仏・支那宣言が発せられた条件中には、天皇の国家紛治の権限を無視する
要求を含まざるもじと諒解する旨が記載してありましたが、右通告に於て、
八月十二日午前一時半東郷大将より電話があり、設計の通告が発せられたとき、その
内容を承けて来たが、其の字句に不明の箇所もものので、取調べの上
右通告を研究し結果を報告すべき旨命ぜられました。私は午前五時半
安東政務局長・横瀬係局長等と共に東郷大臣邸を訪れ、研究の結果
の結果に照らした旨を大臣に報告しました。尚米国務省長官から瑞西政府を通じて前通告を受けたと
外務省で承知しました。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

v.

ARAKI SADAO, et al.

HAVING FIRST duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the formality prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the service of the Foreign Ministry in 1919, and returned from Berlin as First Secretary of Embassy in August 1936. Shortly thereafter, I was dispatched to China to inspect the situation there after the Cheng-tu incident. In the middle of October of the same year I was ordered to serve in the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, and in December to assume the duties of Director of that Bureau. My duty required me to keep in touch with Mr. Togo, and I naturally had chances to exchange views with him frequently. When Chang Hush-liang attempted to recover the Chinese Eastern Railway by force of arms, causing complications between China and the Soviet Union during the period from summer to winter of 1929, I was Consul at Mukden, and was dispatched, together with Mr. Togo, to Harbin for a month or so. In addition, we worked in close connection in the negotiations for purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway: Mr. Togo, as Director of the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs, was in charge of the negotiations at Tokyo, while I, as Consul-General at Harbin, dealt with Soviet Consul-General Mikhail Slavsky to settle the problem and various questions attending it. I was accordingly in a position which enabled me to get a true and correct knowledge of the thoughts and actions of Mr. Togo.

2. Then I assumed the office of Acting Director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs. The negotiations for adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, which had been opened with the Cheng-tu incident as a start, had come to a standstill owing to the outbreak of the Sui-yuan incident. In the meantime, the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact had provoked the Soviet Union to refuse the execution of the Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Treaty upon which we had been at much pains to conclude. The United States and Britain also seemed to be unfavorably disposed to the Pact. The international position of Japan was indeed a difficult one. With respect to this international situation Mr. Togo’s opinions, as he told them to me directly, were to the following effect:

A) As to the conclusion of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact, his personal opinion was that he did not think it proper to set a political agreement against an ideology; and that, in principle, he could not agree to taking such measures, although it seemed that it was unavoidable in consideration of the then circumstances.

B) The Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact, in Mr. Togo’s opinion, would not necessarily strengthen the international position of Japan; on the contrary, he was afraid that it might weaken it. And, for that reason, he thought it necessary to carry on negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Britain prior to, or at any rate simultaneously with, those between Japan and Germany. He considered it necessary also that a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact and a Japanese-American arbitration treaty be sought.

C) To secure perfect understanding between Japan and Britain, he maintained that the problems of China must necessarily be settled.

3. The above opinions of Mr. Togo gradually saturated various departments of the Government. In the meantime, an understanding was reached
between the Governments of Japan and Britain, and careful consideration was also being given to an understanding between Japan and the United States. By the spring of 1927 a policy was established that the Anglo-Japanese and the Sino-Japanese negotiations should be carried on simultaneously, in consideration of their inseparable relation. It was because of his strong feeling that there was this inseparable relation that Mr. Togo, despite the fact that the Government organization confided Chinese affairs to the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, and that the Director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs participated in them only indirectly, advocated earnestly and often the policy which was eventually accepted, of concurrent Anglo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese settlements.

4. The chief subjects of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations were to be a) the problem of China; 2) the adjustment of Japanese and British commercial interests in the markets of the world; and 3) the question of the international money market. Britain, however, would not easily be convinced of Japan's true intention by mere promises; it was necessary to show her sincerity by concrete actions, and for that purpose radical alteration of Japanese policy toward China was requisite. It was therefore decided that certain specific, familiar matters should be first taken up for discussion with China, then, when the atmosphere between Britain and Japan should have improved as a result of such settlements with China, adjustment of general diplomatic relations should be worked for. Then the subjects for negotiation with China were under discussion within the Japanese Government, Mr. Togo's efforts, both officially and privately, to persuade the Army and the Navy to agreement, with a view to contributing to the success of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations. It was quite impossible to expect smooth progress of the negotiations unless a perfect understanding on the part of the military authorities in China was obtained; and for that purpose the Foreign, War and Navy Ministries dispatched representatives to China to explain the policy of the Government and have frank exchanges of views with these military authorities. I was dispatched from the Foreign Ministry and, accompanied by Colonel Shikyama of the War Ministry (the Navy Ministry sent Lieutenant-Commander Fujii separately), visited Shanghai, Nanking, Peking and Haingking, and succeeded, in Haingking, in obtaining the consent of Chief of Staff Têjô of the Kwantung Army. The policy of the Japanese Government thus established, instructions were sent to Ambassador Yoshida in London, and preparatory consultations were being carried on between the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo and Ambassador Yoshida in England, when the Marco Polo Bridge incident of July 1927 occurred, frustrating all hopes of the Anglo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese negotiations.

5. On the occasion of the Soviet-Chinese complications of 1929 Mr. Togo, who had been dispatched to North Manchuria for more than a month and had acquired full knowledge of the importance of the Manchurian question through his own experiences there, considered it urgently necessary to settle promptly and peacefully, through negotiation with Chang Hsieh-liang, the various problems arising in Manchuria. He strongly recommended that policy to the then Foreign Minister, Count Mokino, and to other influential persons in and out of office.

6. As to the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway, there was at first strong opposition on the part of the Army and the South Manchurian Railway Company. Moreover, various things occurring successively in the course of the negotiations tended to hinder their smooth progress. In spite of all such difficulties, however, Mr. Togo's zeal in the matter was unchanging from first to last. He beat back opposition, and did his best to remove the obstacles to the negotiations, the success of which was indeed largely due to the efforts, both overt and covert, of Mr. Togo.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Morishima Morito [Seal]

On this 10th day of December, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent Morishima Morito

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same day
At Tokyo

Witness Nishi Haruhiko [Seal]

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko of the defence, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko [Seal]

10 December 1947
At Tokyo
余は大正八年外務省に入り昭和十一年八月大使館一等書記官として在

省東亜局勤務を命ぜられ、次いで同月十二月東亜局長心得に任命され

て東亜局局長の同僚を務め、次いで同年四月内閣総理大臣、外交関係

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見は大体次の通りであった。

（1）日独防共協定の締結に於てはイドオロジーに対する政治協定を以てするは不適當なると自分個人としては主義上不妥當であるが

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（2）日独防共協定は必ずしも日本の国際的立場を強化せず事の如くを恐く

東邊氏の右意見は新次政府の各部面に遅く非し労々日本政府も日英間に

東邊氏の右意見は新次政府の各部面に遅く非し労々日本政府も日英間に

日独交渉政日独交渉を併行して行う方針を昭和十二年春頃の間に成立した国際関係事項は官制上より言へば単位協和の下に於て日本政府と日独間に

上の利益調整（2）国際金融問題をあった。何んし英獨の対日本の三意を

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（2）日独防共協定は必ずしも日本の国際的立場を強化せず事の如くを恐く

東邊氏の右意見は新次政府の各部面に遅く非し労々日本政府と日英間に

日独交渉政日独交渉を併行して行う方針を昭和十二年春頃の間に成立した国際関係事項は官制上より言へば単位協和の下に於て日本政府と日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが東邊氏の此の日独及び日独間の問題解決の政策を営々且盡心に支持したが
大正昭和四年経済紛争の際は、東京・大阪・名古屋地方の経済を維持するための経済政策を講じた。この際、内外の経済状況を考慮し、経済政策を調整し、経済の安定を図った。これにより、経済の回復が見られ、経済の発展が期待された。

昭和十二年七月の内閣総理大臣の東京出張に際しては、内外の経済状況を考慮し、経済政策を講じた。これにより、経済の安定が図られ、経済の発展が期待された。

その後、内外の経済状況を考慮し、経済政策を調整し、経済の安定を図った。これにより、経済の回復が見られ、経済の発展が期待された。

昭和十一年七月の内閣総理大臣の東京出張に際しては、内外の経済状況を考慮し、経済政策を講じた。これにより、経済の安定が図られ、経済の発展が期待された。
東支 BALL 駅側に関する交涉に於ては当初懸案、数度に於いても反対意見が強く、又北南の現状に於ては交渉経過中黙々と挙げたが、東廻氏は終始一貫して交渉の間、懸念を以て対立意見を示し、同交渉の成功は東廻氏の見解解面に於ける努力に大なる水力を懸けた。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

ARAKI Sadag, et al

DEFENDANTS

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in 1925, and served as secretary in the Bureau of European-American Affairs (later the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs) from 1931 to 1938, during which period I was in charge of business concerning naval disarmament under Director Togo Shigori from 1934 to 1937, and attended the London Naval Conference of 1935-36 as one of the retinue of the Japanese delegates, leaving Tokyo in November 1935 and returning to Japan in February 1936. At present, I am in Chief of the Economic Section, Central Liaison Office.

2. The Japanese Foreign Ministry attached importance to the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1934-35 in consideration of the situation within and out of Japan, not to speak of the eager desire on the part of the Japanese Government to maintain the peace of the world and to lighten the national burden. It therefore assigned the Fifth Section of the Investigation Bureau exclusively to the transaction of disarmament problems, and ordered the members of that section to serve concurrently in the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs under the direction of Director Togo. I was then a member of the Fifth Section, Investigation Bureau, and served concurrently in the Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs. It was a matter of common knowledge within the Foreign Ministry at that time that Director Togo was well versed in disarmament problems and had an enthusiasm for the success of the Disarmament Conference. The Chief of the Fifth Section of the Investigation Bureau was at first Mr. Yamagata Kiyoshi, who was then succeeded by Mr. Katō Denjirō. I was in charge of the business concerning disarmament under the two section chiefs and was often called before Director Togo to receive his orders. He revealed to me his own opinions as to disarmament, in accordance with which knowledge so acquired directly from Director Togo, and from the two section chiefs in the course of official duties, I hereby depose as follows:

3. In connection with the attitude of the Japanese Government toward the Preliminary Naval Disarmament Conference of 1934, the two outstanding points which became the subjects of discussion were (A) the common upper limit system of disarmament; and (B) the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty, both of which were advocated by the Navy.
I. As to the proposal of the common upper limit, the Japanese Government had accepted the ratio system of disarmament in the Washington and London Naval Treaties. Moreover, it had even advanced, at the General Disarmament Conference held at Geneva in 1932, a proposal accepting the ratio system. In consideration of these facts as well as the international and the internal situation, it was too sudden a leap to advocate the establishment of the common upper limit. Furthermore, the plan was apparently advantageous exclusively for Japan. There was little hope that the agreement of the other Powers could be obtained, and Mr. Togo even foresaw the danger that it might give rise to doubt on the part of the United States and Britain as to the peaceful intention of Japan, as a result, all hopes for the realization of disarmament, and it would be quite useless, it was considered, to make a proposal which would not be accepted by the United States and Britain. From the above point of view, Director Togo took a firm stand against the common upper limit plan, and endeavored to find a meeting-point between the Navy and the Foreign ministry in some other plan. The Navy, however, did not yield. The negotiations lasted for two or three months, but Director Togo, adhering to his conviction, opposed the Navy plan to the last. The negotiations thus failed to reach an agreement after all. In the meantime, the opening of the preliminary conference was drawing near. Thereupon, the heads of the Government decided finally to adopt the Navy plan, compelling Director Togo to yield to the decision.

5. Director Togo considered the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty an exceedingly serious question for Japan, and feared that it would surely stimulate the national sentiments of the Powers. The conclusion would be different if that treaty were to be replaced by some other new treaty immediately, but otherwise chaotic conditions and naval competition would be the sure result, which could aggravate the international situation and, in the long run, lead to war. His opinion, however, was not adopted, owing to the persistent objection on the part of the Navy.

6. In considering the instructions to be given to the Japanese delegates to the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935 (and also thereafter), discussion was had chiefly upon the question whether Japan should accept qualitative disarmament or the obligation to notify the naval construction program in case the Japanese points were not approved. The conclusion would be different if that treaty were to be replaced by some other new treaty immediately, but otherwise chaotic conditions and naval competition would be the sure result, which could aggravate the international situation and, in the long run, lead to war. His opinion, however, was not adopted, owing to the persistent objection on the part of the Navy.

7. With regard to qualitative disarmament, Director Togo's opinion was that the limitation of ship sizes and gun calibres alone would be sufficiently effective.

8. As to notification of naval construction program, he tried to persuade the Navy into agreement, pointing out that the Navy would have to make necessary explanations before the Diet, as well as the Finance Ministry, in connection with the estimates for the naval construction, and that, this being so,
it would be impossible in effect to keep the program secret from other countries. But the Navy insisted upon rejecting it, suggesting that the maintenance of secrecy was not impossible in Japan.

9. Director Togo took a serious view of the influence which the termination of the disarmament treaty would exert upon the peace of the world, though it was of course true that he hoped for the substantial solution of the disarmament question partly because he wished thereby to lighten the burdens of the various nations. Especially, it was his heart's desire to restore the international credit which Japan had lost, by managing to bring the disarmament conference to successful conclusion, and thus rescue Japan from the forlorn state she was then in. Quite naturally, therefore, he adhered most persistently to his own stand, and often had heated discussions with Director Yoshida of the Bureau of Naval Affairs of the Navy Ministry.

10. As to the reply of the Japanese Government made in February 1938 in connection with notification of naval construction programs, Mr. Togo had nothing to do with it, as he had already been transferred to the post of Japanese Ambassador to Germany when it was issued.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Inoue Takajirō (seal)

On this 2nd day of December, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: Inoue Takajirō

I, Kato Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Kato Denjirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
4, December 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. - vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

KADOWAKI SUEMITSU

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in June 1921, and served as Chief of the Personnel Section from March 1940 to October 1942, under Foreign Ministers Arita, Matsuoka, Toyoda and Togó.

2. Toward the end of spring of 1941 (I do not recall the date), as Chief of the Personnel Section I called on Mr. Togó one evening at his private residence, at the order of my superiors, and in accordance with my instructions requested him to tender his resignation from his post as ambassador. Mr. Togó then had the rank and held the nominal post of ambassador; but since his return from Moscow in the preceding October, after his recall by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, he had had no assignment in the Foreign Ministry, and in fact had already been requested by Minister Matsuoka personally and through the Vice-Minister to resign. In answer to my request for his resignation, Ambassador Togó told me that he was not only opposed to the foreign policy of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, but was entirely dissatisfied with the way the Minister conducted personnel affairs, that he would not submit his resignation because submission of a resignation might be construed as concurrence with the Minister's policies, and that therefore the Minister should take steps on his part to remove him from his ambassadorship if he so desired. Mr. Togó further stated to me in more detail his views critical of Mr. Matsuoka's policies. Thus Mr. Togó refused to submit his resigna­tion in spite of the request made by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and I so reported to my superiors.

3. Shortly after Mr. Togó's assumption of the Foreign Ministership in the following October I was informed by Foreign Vice-Minister Nishi that Minister Togó was considering the purging of radical elements in the Foreign Ministry in order to execute his policies. Soon afterward, Vice-Minister Nishi at the direction of the Foreign Minister requested the resignation of one of the ambassadors who had been closely identified with the Southern policy of Japan, and as a result his resignation was given, effective on 25 October. Subsequently, Mr. Nishi at the request of the Foreign Minister informed two section chiefs and one junior secretary, who were deemed to be extremely radical and who had violated the discipline proper to government officials, that the Ministry was to order them into temporary retirement. These three officials tendered their resignations to me, saying that they would rather resign than be ordered to temporary retire­ment. When I reported the matter to the Vice-Minister, I was instructed to accept the resignations if they preferred it so,
and their resignations at their request were accepted on 29 October. The resignations of those four officials are recorded in the official gazette.

There had been some officials in the Foreign Ministry who were not satisfied with the moderate foreign policy of the government and were urging a strong external policy especially toward Britain and America. These officials not only openly criticized the policy of the Foreign Minister of the time, but went so far as to violate official discipline by asking cooperation of the radical elements of the Army and Navy in order to obtain their objectives. The purge carried out by Foreign Minister Tsuboi was the first in the true sense of the word ever conducted in the Foreign Ministry, with the design of putting an end to such conditions. Only a few were actually purged, but the effect on the discipline of the Ministry was remarkable.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kadowaki Suemitsu (seal)

On this 18th day of November, 1947
At Tokyo

DEPONENT: KADOWAKI SUEMITSU (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement is sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
18 November 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

VERSUS

ARAKI Sadao, et al

RE: Defendants - TO ROOM 361

APPEAL

TOMIYOSHI EIZI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am a member of the House of Representatives, belonging to the Japan Socialist Party. I have often had occasion to talk with Mr. Togo Shigenori, for he is a senior of mine from the same province, whom I respect as a diplomat of character.

2. Around the middle of December 1940 (I do not recall the exact date), on the occasion of Mr. Togo's returning to Kagoshima to visit the tomb of his family (after his return home leaving the post of Ambassador to the Soviet Union), I called on him with Mr. Suma Fumio, a newspaperman of Kagoshima, at the house of Mr. Togó Shigehiro (younger brother of Mr. Shigehiro) in Nishina-machi, Kagoshima City, and talked with him on various matters. I am a socialist myself, and as I was opposed to the Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Alliance I asked Mr. Togó for his opinion about the matter. In response, he hinted his opposition to the alliance, saying, "It is not desirable to conclude an alliance in accordance with the preferences of an individual without cautiously considering the true interest of the country." I refrained from pursuing the point further in view of his position, but he said, "I am opposed to the way Matsuoka runs things."

3. I asked, "What is the reaction of the Soviet Union to your transfer?" He said, "Foreign Minister Molotov and other high officials regretted my transfer, and wondered what was the real intention of Foreign Minister Matsuoka. There was a grand farewell party before I left the Soviet Union, and Foreign Minister Molotov even stood up twice to toast me."

4. Toward the end of October 1941 (I do not recall the exact date), very soon after Mr. Togó became Foreign Minister, I called on him at the Foreign Ministry. After making congratulatory remarks, I asked him, "You being a peace-lover, how can you realize your diplomatic policy by entering the Togó Cabinet of the military clique?" Foreign Minister Togó replied, "I entered the Cabinet as Togó had undertaken that he would endeavor to solve the situation through negotiations. I will do all I can for the success of the negotiations, so that war can be averted."

5. In the middle of November 1941 I again called on Foreign Minister Togó at the Foreign Ministry, and asked him, "Is not the dispatch of Ambassador Kurusu a trick?" Mr. Togó
replied to my question sharply, saying, "Not at all. I sent him for the sole purpose of solving the situation through negotiations, and it is entirely wrong to say that it is a trick."

5. Some time in October 1942 (I do not recall the exact date), when Mr. Tōgō returned to Kagoshima after having resigned from the Foreign Ministry, I called on him at his brother's house in Nishida-machi and asked him about the reason of his resignation. He replied, "The reason I was opposed to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry was not, as people generally said, that the scope or power of the Foreign Ministry is diminished, but that it is contradictory to the idea of treating the East Asiatic countries as fully independent states. I resigned because the military interfere with diplomacy on every matter, forcing their self-willed way through."

**OATH**

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tomiyoshi Eiji (seal)

On this 2nd day of March, 1947

It Tokyo

Deponent: Tomiyoshi Eiji

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

It Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

**Translation Certificate**

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo

4 March 1947
Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby deposes as follows:

1. I came to know Mr Togo Shigemori in February 1936 when I was a staff officer in the Kwantung Army. Since then I have frequently had opportunities to talk with him.

2. In July 1935, when I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, the Soviet Government informed the Japanese Government that it had no objection to the opening of negotiation for the establishment of a commission for the settlement of disputes on the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundary, but later the progress of the negotiations encountered difficulties on account of the attitude of the Kwantung Army, which insisted that the demarcation of the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundary should first be accomplished before the establishment of such commission, as otherwise the commission would not be able to carry out its task smoothly. Mr Togo, then director of the European-Asiatic Bureau, dispatched his section chief Nishi to Hsingking in September 1935 in order to persuade the Kwantung Army, but this ended in no agreement of opinion. At my conversation with Mr Togo which took place in Tokyo in February 1936, he referred to this question and said that while the above contention of the Kwantung Army was not unreasonable, it was too much to say that the commission could not function without border demarcation, and he earnestly requested the cooperation of the Kwantung Army for the success of the negotiation, by further stressing that the establishment of such commission would rather accelerate the realization of border demarcation. Thereupon I suggested the idea of establishing simultaneously a commission for the settlement of border disputes and a commission for border demarcation, so that the two commissions could set to work in parallel, to which Mr Togo agreed. I also had a talk with Vice-Minister Shigemitsu on this subject and got his consent. On my return to Hsingking I reported the matter to General Itagaki, Vice-Chief of Staff, and next to General Minami, Commander of the Kwantung Army, who both approved of this plan. As a result the Japanese Government began to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Government on this principle.

3. Mr Togo became Foreign Minister in the Tojo Cabinet in October 1941, when I was Director of the Soldiers’ Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. Then I saw him in the latter part of October at his official residence immediately after his appointment as Foreign Minister, he told me that he had agreed to enter the Cabinet on condition that General Togo would also do his best to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to successful conclusion.
4. At the time of the formation of the Tōgō Cabinet, it was generally felt in the War Ministry and the General Staff Office that all the civilian members of the Cabinet were actually under the control of the military. Mr. Tōgō's opinion naturally provoked great dissatisfaction within the military circles when it was revealed that he had declared, at the Liaison Conference held in the first part of November to consider whether hostilities should be opened in case the negotiations ended in failure, that failure of the negotiations did not necessarily mean war, and that the most proper way for Japan to take was to persevere under all difficulties and wait for the opportunity to mature. At that time it was not a rare case that such a state secret was divulged through the General Staff Office to younger officers, and party of radicals in the Army thereupon even maintained that it was an encroachment upon the prerogative of the High Command for a foreign minister to utter such an opinion, and declared threateningly that such a foreign minister should be "disposed of". I recall that I requested Commander Nakanoue of the Gendarmerie to protect the person of Mr. Tōgō.

5. Toward the end of October 1911, I had a talk with Mr. Tōgō at his official residence. On that occasion, the Foreign Minister intimated his intention to resign on the ground that he was strongly against war with the United States. I earnestly requested him to retain his office, pointing out that it would be quite impossible to find another person who would resolutely do his utmost to check the outbreak of war in opposition to the Army; that if such a person as Mr. Katsukawa should be recalled to replace him, it would naturally become more difficult to prevent war; and that, should war unfortunately break out, his remaining in office would become all the more necessary in consideration of the national strength of Japan, so that he might be able to seize the earliest possible opportunity to conclude peace.

6. Toward the end of August 1912, Mr. Tōgō sent me his private secretary, Mr. Usui Tanemasa, to convey his opinion, which was, according to Mr. Usui, that the further existence of the Tōgō Cabinet was against the interest of Japan, as it had gradually begun to commit mistakes in the direction of the war. There was, furthermore, the question of the Greater East Asia Ministry, to the establishment of which he was firmly opposed on the ground that it would violate the fundamental principles of Japanese diplomacy. And he revealed to me, through Mr. Usui, his resolution not to resign alone, but to make persistent efforts to the last eventually to bring the Cabinet to general resignation. I expressed my consent, encouraging him to stand out stoutly for the sake of the country, and promised him that I would also resign together with him in case his efforts should end in failure. By the way, it was because Mr. Tōgō was, then, already under the surveillance of the Hikuni Organ, the secret police of the Army, that he did not see me in person.

Nevertheless, Mr. Tōgō resigned alone. I asked him the reason when I saw him in the middle of September that year. His reply was that, although he for his part had fought all he could, he had eventually been compelled to make up his mind to resign alone upon learning from Navy Minister Shimada who had come to see him that the overthrowing of the Cabinet was practically impossible owing to dissenstion in Court circles.

7. In the middle of July 1915, I called on Mr. Tōgō at his private residence. He was then Foreign Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet. I asked him if the restoration of peace was
possibility. We replied that he was making efforts in that direction through the time was very late. Then, I had a chance to see him in the middle of November 1945, when he explained in detail the circumstances attended at the termination of the war, and revealed that anyway it was greatly to his satisfaction that battles in Japan proper had been avoided.

8. On the occasion of my interview with Mr. Tōgō in the middle of July 1945, mentioned above, he declared that he had had no means of knowing the exact time and place of the commencement of hostilities beforehand, the matter being an operational secret, though he had often heard the Naval High Command right before the outbreak of the war, mentioning "surprise attack." He also referred again to the fact that, as he had told me in the middle of December 1941, despite the Naval General Staff's having given the commitment to open hostilities a considerable space of time after the Japanese memorandum to the United States could have been served at 1 P.M., 7 December, Washington time, the actual attack on Pearl Harbor was commenced very shortly after 1 P.M., Washington time; and he told me that Vice-Admiral Itō, Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff, had expressed his sincere regret in this connection when, a few days after the outbreak of the war, the Foreign Minister had reproached him for it.

**OATH**

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tanaka Ryūkichi (seal)

On this 6th day of March, 1947 at Tokyo

Deponent: Tanaka Ryūkichi

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereunto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

**Translation Certificate**

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with both the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo 6 March 1947
Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the service of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in November 1905. In 1931, being then Ambassador to Belgium, I was on 9 December designated one of the Japanese delegates to the Geneva Conference on General Disarmament, serving as such until the spring of 1933. Thereafter I served as Ambassador to France, 1933-37; Foreign Minister, 1937; Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Ministry, September-October 1938, and again November 1941 to February 1942; and Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., February 1942 to August 1945. I am at present a member of the House of Councillors of the National Diet.

2. The Secretary-General of the Japanese delegation to the Geneva Conference on General Disarmament of 1932 was Mr. Togo Shigenori, at that time Councillor of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. It so happened that the extraordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations to consider the Manchurian question was held in Geneva during part of the time that the Disarmament Conference met, and in consequence very many Japanese were in Geneva for both conferences. In order to promote the efficiency of our delegation's work and to avoid its confusion with other matters, Mr. Togo proposed to the delegates that the business of the delegation to the Disarmament Conference should be kept separate from and not mixed with that of the delegation to the Extraordinary Assembly, and that the personnel of the two delegations should as far as possible be of composition independent of each other. The consent of the chief delegate, Mr. Matsudaira, and myself was given to this plan, and as a result Mr. Togo worked exclusively on the business of the Disarmament Conference, without being involved in the question of the Manchuria Incident, although some of the personnel (including myself, as it happened) were connected with both.

3. During the summer recess of the Disarmament Conference, in August 1932, Mr. Togo was ordered to Japan temporarily to make report and receive instructions concerning disarmament questions. Upon his return to Europe in November he came to Geneva from Berlin and made a report to the delegates on his mission to Tokyo. But, having already received notice of his recall to Japan, he stayed in Geneva only a short time after his return.

4. The chief Japanese delegate to the Extraordinary Assembly of the League was Matsuoka Yosuke. The extraordinary session convened in October 1932, and as I remember Mr. Matsuoka arrived at Geneva some time afterward. He and Mr. Togo were in Geneva simultaneously for only a week or a little more after Mr. Togo returned to Genova as mentioned in section 3 above; and then
also they were of course engaged in entirely different business. Mr. Matsuoka had nothing to do with the business of the delegation to the Disarmament Conference; Mr. Togó had nothing to do with the League Assembly or the Japanese delegation thereto.

5. It that time in Geneva rumors of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations over the Manchuria Affair were current, and the question was naturally, although it had no connection with the business of the Disarmament Conference, being discussed by all of us as one of the burning issues of the hour. I recall Mr. Togó's saying at the time that Japan should remain in the League and endeavor to maintain her friendly relations with other nations. I had of course known Mr. Togó as one opposed to extrems measures and an advocate of peace with foreign countries.

6. One evening toward the end of October 1941, if I remember right, Foreign Minister Togó invited a number of us, seniors in the diplomatic service, to dinner at his official residence the first time after he had assumed the office. By that time the relations with the United States and Britain had already deteriorated considerably; and so, after dinner, in the presence of all my colleagues, I addressed the Foreign Minister, saying that the Foreign Ministry should continue, with the utmost perseverance to the last, its efforts for the success of the negotiations than in progress between the Governments of Japan and the United States. I pointed out the danger that the situation might in the worst case develop into a war between the two countries, and declared that, at that critical moment, the people would never understand the situation if, as had been the case with the China Affair, hostilities should be opened without adequate diplomatic efforts, and should drag on for years. I further emphasized that, should a war break out between Japan and the United States, it would indeed be a matter of life and death for Japan, and demanded that every one should rack his brains to make efforts to maintain peace. I said that the people would never be persuaded to the resolution to rise in arms, unless they were convinced that the war was really inevitable in spite of all efforts on the part of the Japanese Government, and expressed my earnest desire that the Foreign Ministry should leave nothing undone to bring the negotiations to an amicable conclusion, in defiance of all unfavorable criticisms, and never giving up hope to the last. To this the Foreign Minister replied that he was of the same opinion, and that he was actually doing his utmost to carry out his task on that principle.

7. I was unexpectedly requested on the following morning to call on the Foreign Minister. He asked me at the interview if I would assist him as a diplomatic adviser to the Foreign Ministry, saying that he felt exactly the same way that I had expressed myself the night before and that he felt that he was too busy, being occupied with many important conferences and interviews with the diplomatic corps, to think things over himself. I accepted the offer in view of the importance of the situation, and was formally appointed Diplomatic Adviser on 11 November.

8. When Mr. Togó confided to me (I do not remember the exact date, but it was at the end of November 1941, after receipt of the Hull note of 26 November) that the Japanese Government had finally been compelled to decide to terminate the negotiations, I pleaded with him to try negotiations further, notwithstanding all disappointments. Foreign Minister Togó told me that he had already done all that he could and that there was nothing that he could do further except to try to obtain reconsideration of the United States, adding that he was willing to resign and to be replaced, if any way could be suggested by any of the senior diplomats to bring matters to a different conclusion, because it...
was his greatest desire that Japan should not enter upon a war. I replied that all the senior diplomats reposed full confidence in Mr. Tōgō, and that he should not resign, for no one could hope to do any better.

9. As Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Ministry in 1941-42 I was not in charge of any routine business of the Ministry, but from time to time gave advice to the Foreign Minister upon his request. In January 1942, however, Foreign Minister Tōgō requested of me that, in view of the importance of the problem of the treatment of prisoners of war and internees of enemy nations in Japan, I should assist with the business of the bureau in charge of the matter by making contact with the diplomatic corps, and especially those representing the interests of enemy nations, concerning these matters. In conformity with the request, I talked about the matter from time to time with the representatives concerned, in order to contribute to the satisfactory handling of the matter. Shortly thereafter, however— at the end of February—I was appointed ambassador to the USSR, before I had had a chance to do much in that direction.

10. In July 1942, while I was in Kuibyshev, I received instructions from Foreign Minister Tōgō to pay as frequent visits as possible to Moscow and to pave the way for Japan's using her good offices for restoration of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. Japan's intention was, he said, to spare no effort toward the termination of the Russo-German war, with the final aim of bringing about the earliest possible restoration of general peace. I considered that, as battles were then being bitterly fought in the Ukraine and the Caucasus, there was no prospect of peace between Germany and the USSR at that time, and I so reported to the Foreign Minister. Mr. Tōgō, however, instructed me again, in the middle of August of the same year, to visit Moscow as frequently as possible, sending me the draft of the new fisheries convention and suggesting that my calls on the Soviet authorities in connection with it would provide opportunities for bringing up the subject of peace. While I was prevented from visiting Moscow, Mr. Tōgō resigned from the Foreign Ministership in September 1942, and his communications with me in the matter of a general peace came to an end.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Satō Naotake (seal)

On this 6th day of November, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: Satō Naotake

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
6 November 1947
CERTIFICATE

Certificate No. 153

Matsuoka Yōsuke, ex-Foreign Minister. Born on 4 March 1880.


1932 Oct 21 Left Tokyo.

1933 Apr 27 Returned to Tokyo.

1933 May 8 Relieved of the post of Japanese Delegate to the Extraordinary Meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland.

I certify the above to be true in every particular upon comparison with the personnel records preserved in the Foreign Ministry.

10 April 1947

Teraoka Kohei
Chief of the Personnel Section,
Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry

(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo

10 October 1947
昭和七年（一九三二年）十月十一日
東京出発
同年十月二十一日
東京帰着
昭和八年（一九三三年）四月二十七日
瑞西臨〜ジュネーブ〜於テ開催ノ國際聯盟総會臨時會議ニ於ケル時
國代表者報発
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）四月十日
外務省保管の人簿記録に照合し未足ナリ相違無くと一体明する
右は外務省保管の人簿記録に照合し未足ナリ相違無くと一体明する
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

AFFIDAVIT

SHINZU HISANAGA

Having first sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the custom prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the Foreign Ministry in 1930, and served as private secretary to the Foreign Minister while Mr. Togo Shigenori was Foreign Minister for the first time (18 October 1941 - 1 September 1942). I am now Director of the Reparations Section of the Central Liaison Office.

2. My duty as private secretary was, not to participate in the transaction of diplomatic affairs, which was the Foreign Minister's business, but to arrange documents to be inspected by the Foreign Minister, to arrange for the Foreign Minister interviews with members of the Foreign Ministry staff as well as with visitors, and to accompany the Foreign Minister when he attended various meetings. (Interviews with members of the diplomatic corps were mostly dealt with by another private secretary.)

3. On about 6 December 1941 the Cabinet requested the Foreign Minister to attend the Central Cooperation Conference of the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), to be held on the morning of 8 December, and to deliver an address there. The Foreign Minister ordered me to prepare two different drafts of his address: the one to be used in case war should have opened by that day, the other in case hostilities should not have commenced. The address, in the end, was given up.

4. Shortly after midnight on 8 December 1941 American ambassador Grew called on the Foreign Minister, and delivered a copy of a message from President Roosevelt to the Emperor. After their conversation, Foreign Minister Togo ordered Section Chief Kase to prepare a translation of the message. When the translation was brought from the Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Minister went to the Premier's official residence, accompanied by me, arriving there about 2 o'clock. I waited while the Foreign Minister had an interview with the Premier; then we returned to the Foreign Minister's residence, where he changed clothing, and left at about 2:30 to go to the Imperial Palace.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Shimazu Hisanaga

On this 8th day of December, 1847
At Tokyo
Dependent Shimazu Hisanaga

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same day, at Tokyo

Witness Nishi Haruhiko [Seal]

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko [Seal]

11 December 1847
At Tokyo
一、私は一九三〇年外務省に入り、東郷茂徳氏の第一次外相時代（一九三〇年十月十八日より一九三二年九月一日迄）に於いて外務大臣秘書官で

二、一九四一年十二月六日御内閣側から東郷大臣に対し同八日午前大相官邸に首都電報を寄進し述懐書を手交しました。右官邸に至って居ると之に出席して演説することを勧めました。会談後、東郷大臣は私に答同演説に於ける演説することを勧めました。
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）十二月八日
於東京

供述者
島
久
大

同日於同所立

立之

西

彦

右八省立書人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ証明シます。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

YAMAMOTO KUMAICHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was director of or charged with the affairs of the East Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry from September 1940 to November 1942, during which time I was concurrently director of or charged with the affairs of the American Bureau from October 1941 to November 1942.

2. Chapter 26 of the Affidavit of Oka Takazumi (Exhibit No. 3473) states as follows in the beginning:

"Japan's final reply to the United States' note was drafted by the Foreign Office and was delivered to me by Mr. Yamamoto of the Foreign Office. As was customary, I ordered my subordinates to study the draft. As a result thereof I sensed that it was inadequate as a final note, and felt that it would be appropriate to insert the wording that we reserve the right to freedom of action. Accordingly, this wording was inserted in the draft and related to Mr. Yamamoto. However, when the draft of the final note was distributed by the Foreign Office at the liaison conference in early December (I do not remember the date) I discovered that the suggested revision was not made. After the conference I asked Mr. Yamamoto whether that could be regarded as the final note, to which he replied in the affirmative, and we parted."

3. The draft of the final memorandum to the United States which I sent to Director Oka of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry was, as I have testified already in this court, prepared in accordance with what had been discussed at the Liaison Conference (Exhibit No. 2915), but I did not thereafter receive from Director Oka any draft with the addition that freedom of action be reserved, nor had I any discussion with him on such a question. I distributed the draft of the memorandum at the Liaison Conference of 4 December, but I do not recall having, at the adjournment of the Conference, been asked by Director Oka whether the memorandum was an ultimatum nor having made any reply to him.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yamamoto Kumaichi (seal)

On this 9th day of December, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: Yamamoto Kumaichi

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
15 December 1947
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tanabe Moritake (seal)

On this 17th day of February, 1947.
At Medan

DEPONENT TANABE Moritake (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Medan

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of February, 1947, at Medan, Sumatra, N.E.I.

David W. Parsons, Capt. Inf.
Investigating Officer
Defense Section
International Military Tribunal for the Far East

John Donald Johns
Interpreter, Netherlands War Crimes Court
Medan, Sumatra, N.E.I.

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo 5 November 1947
Def. Doc. 2837
(Tōgō)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

TANABÉ Moritake

Having first duly sworn on oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I was appointed Vice-Chief of the General Staff on 6 November 1941, and attended the Liaison Conferences held after the latter part of that month. Besides, I and Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff Itō once called on Foreign Minister Tōgō and consulted about the time of the delivery of the notification to the United States of 8 December, about which my memory is as follows:

On 3 December, or thereabouts, 1941, it was decided at the Liaison Conference that the notification of the termination of the negotiations should be delivered to the Government of the United States of America at 12:30 PM on 7 December (Washington time) at Washington. Thereafter, however, the Navy found it necessary to postpone the time of notification to 1:00 PM on 7 December (Washington time), and the High Command of the Army agreed thereto. Thereupon, I and Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff Itō called on Foreign Minister Tōgō on 5 December and requested him to agree to that alteration of the time.

As to this request, Foreign Minister Tōgō asked whether that time left some length of time prior to the opening of hostilities, and on receiving an affirmative reply from Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff Itō, he acceded thereto. I learned in the evening of the 7th that the result of the consultation mentioned above was reported to the Liaison Conference held on the 6th, and obtained its approval.

In the interview, Admiral Itō did not inform Minister Tōgō where the acts of hostilities would be commenced.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

YUZAWA MICHIO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the service of the Home Ministry in November 1912, and remained in the service for more than twenty-four years till I retired from office as the Vice-Minister of Home Affairs in February 1937.

When the Tōjō Cabinet was formed in October 1941, I was again appointed Vice-Minister of Home Affairs, and was promoted to Home Minister in February 1942, resigning the office in April 1943.

2. In July 1942, when I was Home Minister, I was informed that a plan was being prepared by the four Cabinet Directors for the organization of the Greater East Asia Ministry. In August, I received a report with respect to the contents of the plan, to the effect that the business concerning the countries of the East Asiatic areas, including all the political, economic and cultural relations with them, was to be transferred to the Greater East Asia Ministry, leaving for the Foreign Ministry only the formal matters which they called "pure diplomacy". I thought the Foreign Minister had good reason to raise an objection, and had a foreboding that this might compel him to resign his office.

Such was an undesirable event, to be avoided in the course of war. Moreover, being a career official as Mr. Tōgō was, I felt deep sympathy for his painful situation—a Foreign Minister to see the Foreign Ministry, where he had served for so many years, being deprived of its function.

Thereupon, I made up my mind to see Mr. Tōgō directly and ascertain his true intention. I intended to do all I could to prevent any incident that might turn out to be a cause for his resignation. Toward the end of August, I called at his residence to ask his true intention, and realized that he was dead set against the four directors' plan for the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry. I could perceive his resolution to stake his position on that issue, though he did not express it openly. So I said to him something to the following effect:

"I tender my heart-felt sympathy for your painful situation. I take a practical interest in preventing any such mishap as might cause your resignation, but, in case you two do not reach an agreement, we ministers who stand neutral in this connection may be obliged to take the part of the Premier..."
Def. Doc. 2917

as we do not wish to have the Cabinet collapse at this serious moment." On the other hand, hoping to find any neutral person who could undertake mediation in the dispute between the Premier and Foreign Minister, I sounded in the first place the opinion of the Navy circle, but after becoming convinced that the latter circle was supporting the new organization, I gave up my attempt to seek help from this side.

On the following day I saw the Premier, and informed him of the Foreign Minister's resolution to oppose the plan at the risk of his position. I told him that I really wondered if it was the proper way, to adhere to the Greater East Asia Ministry plan, and tried to persuade him to reconsider it so that the Foreign Minister's honor might be saved.

The resolution of the Premier, however, was firm. He would not recede an inch, emphasizing the necessity of the new organization in the then circumstances, and he declared that he wished the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry to be decided at the following Cabinet meeting. Thereupon, I told him that, since both had such firm resolution, the following Cabinet meeting would probably be the last conference that the Foreign Minister attended, and expressed my desire that they would have the moral courage to state their respective opinions fairly, without being carried away by their feelings, discussing the matter from all aspects, and part as good friends.

The plan in question was brought up for discussion at the Cabinet meeting of 1 September. The Premier personally took charge of the explanation of the contents of the plan, and was very emphatic about its necessity. His point after all was that, owing to the great changes the situation in East Asia had undergone in the course of the war, in which the countries of East Asia had a common object, those countries were no longer unrelated but were in close kinship; and that, in order to meet the new situation of East Asia, a special organization had to be established, which was to deal exclusively with the international affairs of Greater East Asia separately from diplomacy in general.

Foreign Minister Togo opposed this on the following grounds:

a) As a natural result of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry, the diplomacy of Japan would be divided into two, the diplomatic relations with those countries in Greater East Asia being dealt with by a different ministry from that in charge of the relations with the remaining countries of the world. In such case, consistent diplomatic activity of Japan would be quite impossible.

b) The countries of Greater East Asia, which were to be subjected to different treatment from other countries, would surely entertain doubts as to the true motive of Japan. This would also hurt their national pride, and would infringe upon the principle of respect for their independence.

c) It was feared that the new ministry would turn out to be a mere enlarged Kōsin, extending the latter's way of handling Chinese affairs to the whole area of Greater East Asia, the result of which would be most undesirable.
The discussion lasted for about three hours, during which time all the attendants remained silent except State Minister Suzuki and one or two others who uttered their opinions in brief. The conference began, and ended, with the single combat between Premier Tojo and Foreign Minister Togó. Both were calm and gentlemanlike from the beginning to the last, expressing their opinions in a bold and fearless way, and leaving nothing undone for the carrying of their respective points.

The meeting was closed in the afternoon, with an understanding that it would be resumed afterward. But the Foreign minister tendered his resignation on that very evening. The Premier took over the additional post of Foreign Minister, and the meeting was resumed and passed the Greater East Asia Ministry plan unanimously.

I called on Mr. Togó on the following day, and said to him that he must have regrets, since he had set forth his opinion at length, doing all that a Foreign Minister should do on such an occasion. Mr. Togó revealed to me that he had made up his mind to tender his resignation because he had realized that he could not agree with General Tojo even in the fundamental question of the guidance of the war, not to speak of the matter in question.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Yuzawa Michio (seal)

On this 3rd day of December, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent Yuzawa Michio (seal)

I, Shichida Motoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Shichida Motoharu (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
4 December 1947
The discussion lasted for about three hours, during which time all the attendants remained silent except State Minister Suzuki and one or two others who uttered their opinions in brief. The conference began, and ended, with the single combat between Premier Tōjō and Foreign Minister Šōgō. Both were calm and gentlemanlike from the beginning to the last, expressing their opinions in a bold and fearless way, and leaving nothing undone for the carrying of their respective points.

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OATH

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Yuzawa Michio (seal)

On this 3rd day of December, 1947
At Tokyo
Deponent Yuzawa Michio (seal)

I, Shichida Motoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo
Witness: Shichida Motoharu (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
4 December 1947
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亜米利加合衆国・日本

R T C
昭和十六年十月内務省に於て大東亜の統治が発足するかを以って即刻に内務大臣として関係に於て大東亜の領事長官として職務を遂行せんとす。
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何とかして辞職するようを不幸な出来事よりも強力にしたが、私が
何か
今日に於ける東亜の状勢は一変し諸国は相方に戦争目的に一致し他

人行為でなく全く親国づき合ったのであるから此の状勢に難

と反対して次の諸国を所信を進べた。

（）此の派は依ると常国との外交は大東亜並びの他の世界各

国との差別する事に必要な面が一関せる外交活動を不可能

ならしめると

（）大東亜諸領はその他の諸列国とは異なる取扱いを負

われた為の政務院は朝鮮に於ける私の世界各

国との差別する事に必要な面が一関せる外交活動を不可能

ならしめるとは

（）従来主として中立に於ける政務院を内洋行政の延長の如き形面で行ひ

前者の論旨に反することを

（）本に於て不備疑義の念を生じ此等諸列人の自尊心を蝕るべく独立

檜

出

部

外相は外政文書に且堂々と意見を開陳し其の所信を貫きられ

る為の中立論文に於て一枝独打の為が宇で其の所信は

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して大英覇は余間－一致して決定したのである。実の翌日私は東郷
氏を訪問し貴方は昨日の船証に於て充分に意見を開録し外務大臣とし
て盛すべきを述したのであるから遠慮せなからうと申す旨を述べたが
東郷氏は外務大將とは本問題のみならず蝕爭指導の根本に付ても相當然
所見を異にして居ると語った。
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Hayashi Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Greater East Asia Ambassadors' Conference", is an exact and authentic copy of an excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of December, 1947

Hayashi Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: Satô Takogorô (seal)
Excerpt From

ADOPTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE AMBASSADORS' CONFERENCE

After the close of the conference, on the same day, the
Secretariat of the Ambassadors' Conference made the following announce­ment:

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SECRETARIAT

The Foreign Minister and Greater East Asia Minister of Japan,
and the Ambassadors of Manchoukuo, China, Burma, Thai and the Republic
of the Philippines, adopted the following joint statement of unanimous
consent at the meeting on this twenty-third day of April, as a result
of the frank exchange of views made on the basis of the preliminary
negotiations held among their respective home Governments with respect
to the method of carrying through the Greater East Asia War and the idea
of the establishment of the world order through the joint war.

JOINT STATEMENT

The countries of Greater East Asia have surmounted all
difficulties to this day to carry through the joint war against the
rapacious aggression of the United States and Britain with a view to
releasing Greater East Asia from their bonds and securing its existence
and prosperity.

The United States and Britain, engrossed in widening their
sphere of influence and interfering in the internal affairs of other
countries under the pretense of their liberation, are making neutral
countries their tools for war by pressing them with force, and are
designing to erase the proper culture of the hostile nations, not to
speak of their political independence and national existence. The so-
called post-bellum program which the United States and Britain entertain
now consists, in spite of all its political embellishments, of a design
to enforce and protect by virtue of force the world order of their own
desire. They intend to place international government under their
despotic control and arbitrarily arrogate to themselves the task of
policing the whole world, and design to establish their imperialistic
rule over the world by monopolizing world economy. Thus, an equitable
equal position is not guaranteed to the remainder of the world, especially to the peoples of Greater East Asia, who remain the objects of their prejudice and discrimination as ever. The decisive difference in the war objectives of the Anglo-Saxon Allies and the countries of Greater East Asia consists, indeed, in the fact that whereas the former persist in maintaining and strengthening such an unjust international order, the latter desire to establish the true order based wholly on justice.

The countries of Greater East Asia have recently issued a joint declaration to make clear the significance and object of the Greater East Asia War. And now they cannot remain mere spectators of the fact that international justice and human welfare are being trampled upon by the violent force of the United States and Britain. Hereupon, the countries of Greater East Asia, in accordance with their common war object, again take measures to convince the world of the guiding principles for the establishment of the true world order, and express their firm resolution to concentrate their whole energies to carry through the war to the last against the inordinate ambition of the United States and Britain.

I. The fundamental basis of the international order to be established should be sought in the idea of co-existence and co-prosperity which, under the principles of political equality, economic reciprocity and respect for proper culture, aims at the removal of all discrimination based on racial prejudice and the like, and the securing of mutual friendship and cooperation.

II. Political equality will be guaranteed to all countries, regardless of their respective national power, and equal opportunities will be allowed them for their elevation and expansion. The forms of their respective governments shall be decided in accordance with their own will, and shall not be subjected to any interference of other countries.

III. Peoples in colonial status shall be released and established in their rightful place to pave the way for the development of human civilization.
IV. The exclusive control by any one country of resources, trade and international communications shall be done away with in order to secure mutual cooperation of nations and thereby to rectify the economic disproportion of the world, and also to urge the diffusion of economic prosperity, which is due to the originality and exertion of the respective nations.

V. The cultural traditions of the respective nations shall be respected reciprocally, while friendship between nations and the elevation of mankind shall be advanced by means of cultural intercourse.

VI. Armaments which may prove a menace to other nations shall be prohibited in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and non-aggression, while obstacles to international trade shall be removed, in order to prevent any oppression or challenge by economic means, not to speak of those by force.

VII. With respect to the organization for guarantee of security, arbitrary decision on the part of larger Powers and a uniform design for all the world shall be avoided. An order shall be established having as its framework a structure for local security suitable to the actual state of affairs, taking in the necessary world-wide system, while, in the meantime, a way shall be sought to convert the international order in peace in accordance with the development of the ever-changing situation of the world in all spheres.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THE AMBASSADORS' CONFERENCE

I. RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE ASSISTANCE TO BE GIVEN TO SECURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA AND CHINA COUNTRIES

In conformity with the spirit of the Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia nations, the participants earnestly desire that Annan, Cambodia and Luang Phrabang, which recently declared their independence, shall secure their existence as a new state in such form as they wish to have, and cooperate, as powerful elements of Greater East Asia, in the realization of our common ideal.

II. RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE ASSISTANCE TO BE GIVEN TO SECURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE MONGOLIA

In conformity with the spirit of the Joint Declaration of the
Greater East Asia nations, the participants earnestly desire that the peoples of the East Indies should promptly complete their preparation for independence and attain their long-cherished desire by their unyielding efforts and with friendly assistance on the part of Japan.

III. RESOLUTION CONCERNING A PERMANENT LIASON ORGANIZATION OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA CONFERENCE

In order to make permanently close the cooperation for the prosecution of the Greater East Asia War and the construction of the Greater East Asia, the participants earnestly desire, by convening regularly or occasionally the Greater East Asia Conference, to make it a permanent liaison organization for the efficient working of the Greater East Asia Conference.

IV. RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE COMMUNICATION TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA OF THE CONTENTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS, DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THIS CONFERENCE

Liberation of India is a matter of the common concern of Greater East Asia, and because the nations of Greater East Asia desire to support, by any means available, the struggle being carried on at present by the Provisional Government of Free India, the participants communicate the contents of the discussions in the conference, the decisions adopted and the resolutions passed in the Conference to that Government and recommend them for its approval.
従わざる所とし、彼等の戦争目的においては依然として虚見、差別化を除くまで正義を基調とする真の秩序を建
設せんと努む点に存ずる大東亜各国はさきに共同宣言を発して大東亜戦争の意義と目的を明示し、米英の暴力に
より国際正義と人類の福祉とが全くにゆずりざるのれんとして、一方これを阻止破壊せんとする米英の
宣伝する為に大東亜各国はその防衛を遂に表明せんとする皇帝を強制従令せんとするものにして、米英は
国際政治をその事実下に秩序を強制従令せんとするものにして、米英は国際政治をその事実下に
秩序を強制従令せんとするものにして、米英は国際政治をその事実下に
Def. Doc. 9 2051 (Revised)

原則に従って、人間の一切の対等として、政治的平等等級を経済的相互協力により、かつ国際文化の促進を図ることなく、人間の尊厳を尊重し、不正分の手配を防止すべし。
ただし方授せむことを欲するににより仏会設にかける議論内容並びに本合問において採択せられたる決定及び仏会設を同政府に照報し各
Excerpt from Ordinance of the Formalities for Official Documents
Imperial Ordinance No. 6, of 31 January 1907

Article 7

Imperial Ordinances shall be promulgated together with the Imperial Edict attached thereto.

The above Imperial Edict shall have affixed the Imperial Seal after the Imperial Signature, and the Premier shall make entry of the date and countersign it, or shall countersign it together with each other State Minister or with a State Minister or Ministers in charge.

The Imperial Edict of an Imperial Ordinance which shall be issued after reference for advice to the Privy Council or to the House of Peers, or after the resolution of that House, shall contain an entry to that effect, and the Imperial Edict of the Imperial Ordinance to be issued in accordance with Article 8, Section 1, or Article 70, of the Imperial Constitution shall contain an entry to that effect.

The Imperial Edict of an Imperial Ordinance proclaiming an Imperial Ordinance issued by virtue of Article 8, Section 1, of the Imperial Constitution to be of no further validity as the result of its non-approval by the Imperial Diet shall contain an entry to the effect that it is in accordance with Section 2 of that article.

CERTIFICATE

I, Ikawa Katsuichi, who occupy the post of Commissioner to the Cabinet, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Excerpt from Ordinance of the Formalities for Official Documents, Imperial Ordinance No. 6, promulgated on 31 January 1907", is an exact and true copy of an official document in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo
On this 8th day of December 1947.

Ikawa Katsuichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place
On the same date.

Witness: Katō Kinjiro (seal)
We hereby give our sanction to the present Ordinance relating to the organization of the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau, and order it promulgated.

His Imperial Majesty's Sign-Manual on this 19th day of September, 1914.

Count Okuma Shigemori, Premier
Oka Ichinosuke, Minister of War

Imperial Ordinance No. 192

Organization

of

The Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau

Article 1.

The Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau shall be under the control of the Minister of War and shall have charge of the following affairs:

1. Investigation concerning the state of detention, movement, release on parole, exchange, escape, hospitalization and death of prisoners of war, and matters concerning the making and amending of their individual records.

2. Matters concerning the communication of conditions of prisoners of war.

3. Matters concerning the custody of articles and wills left by prisoners of war who have been released on parole or exchanged or have escaped or died at hospitals or dressing stations, and the forwarding of these articles to the bereaved families or other relatives.

4. Matters concerning the handling of money and articles presented to or sent by prisoners of war.

5. Matters concerning information obtained by the Army and the Navy with regard to the enemy war dead and the handling, after the example of the handling of prisoners of war and articles left by them, of articles and wills left by such persons and articles found on the battlefield, if there are such.

6. Investigation into conditions of persons who have been taken prisoner in an enemy country and matters concerning the facilitation of communication between such persons and their families and other relatives in Japan.

Article 2.

The Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau shall be located in Tokyo.
Article 3.

There shall be instituted one Director and two Secretaries (Jimukan) in the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau. The Director shall be appointed from among Generals or Colonels, and the Secretaries from among Army and Navy commissioned officers below Major General or Rear Admiral or civil officials of "Sonin" rank.

There shall be provided five clerks (Shoki) in the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau, who shall be of "Hannin" rank. The number of Secretaries and clerks may be increased as may be needed.

Article 4.

The Director shall, subject to the direction and supervision of the Minister of War, superintend all the affairs of the Bureau.

Article 5.

The Director may request the Army and the Navy authorities and hospitals or dressing stations to furnish him with necessary information in connection with the affairs under his jurisdiction.

Article 6.

Each Secretary (Jimukan) shall be in charge of such affairs as may be ordered by the Director.

Article 7.

The Clerks (Shoki) shall be engaged in general affairs by order of their superiors.

Supplementary Provision

The present Ordinance shall be enforced as from the date of its promulgation.

CERTIFICATE

I, Ikawa Katsuichi, who occupy the post of Commissioner to the Cabinet, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Organization of the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau, Imperial Ordinance No. 192, promulgated on 19 September 1914", is an exact and true copy of an official document in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
On this 5th day of December, 1917.

Ikawa Katsuichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on the same date

Witness: Yamada Kaicho (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

ŌTA SABURŌ

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I entered the service of the Foreign Ministry in 1928. As Chief of the Third Section, Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Ministry, from November 1940 to October 1942, I was charged chiefly with business concerning relations with the British Empire; the Foreign Minister presiding over the Foreign Ministry from 18 October 1941 to 1 September of the following year, 1942, was Mr. Tōgō Shigenori.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Governments of the United States and Britain respectively proposed to the Japanese Government the mutual exchange of diplomatic and consular officials and their families, as well as as many resident enemy nationals as possible. I was ordered to take charge of the exchange business under Foreign Minister Tōgō, and managed the business relating to the negotiations, with the United States, Britain and other Allied Powers, through the protacting Powers, and also the preliminary consultation among the competent Japanese offices, necessary for its realization.

As a result of the negotiations with the United States and Britain, it was decided that, owing to the shortage of bottoms, those persons to be repatriated should for the time being be limited, except for diplomatic and consular officials and their families, to limited to temporary residents, and that the Japanese Government should send back, not only the resident nationals of the enemy countries in Japan Proper, but also those in Manchoukuo, China, French Indochina and Thailand, including the nationals of all the allied European and American countries, not to speak of those of the United States and Britain. In spite of the complexity and difficulties attending the exchange business and the carrying out of the agreement, Foreign Minister Tōgō exerted himself from the very first to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion and to carry out the agreement thus reached, constantly urging us to the speedy realization of the repatriation.

For this purpose, however, it was necessary to secure vessels to transport those persons to be repatriated, and great was the difficulty, among Army, Navy and other circles concerned, with the development of operations imposing large demands upon shipping. Moreover, the High Command attached various conditions to setting a date for the voyages of the
O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Ōta Saburō (seal)

On this 2nd day of December, 1947
At Yokosuka

Deponent: Ōta Saburō

I, Shichida Motoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Yokosuka

Witness: Shichida Motoharu (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
6 December 1947

Def. Doc. 2916

-3-
太平洋戦争を発端に、英米両政府から日本政府に対し、自分たちの在日民を安全を保証して所属する施設に収容することを要請し、同時に在日中国人の帰国を希望することを表明した。その後、両国間の交渉が行われ、最終的に在日中国人の帰国が実現した。

一方、日本政府は在日中国人の帰国を認めず、残留を余儀なくされた在日中国人は、その後の戦争終結後も日本に留まり続け、その間、彼らの生活は困難でありました。
ありました。

更に統帥部の方では、南方方面作戦の都合上交換船が南方海上を通過して之等被交換者の交換地なる藤崎東京郵便のロレッソ、マルケー、スー港へ往復する時期に付ても色々な難文がありました。東郷外相は之等の問題に付海軍統帥部その他の関係方面と色々直接交涉説得に努めました結果、漸くその実現に成功しました。
一九四二年六月二十五日から八月十日までかけて渡間丸（一八五九）
東南大佐及び鯨丸（一九三五）に於て借り入れて出航せしめ横浜、神戸、上海、香港、西貢、台灣ガポ
ルーの各地で歸還者を乗船せしめて目的地へ送り出ししました。之に依って歸還した英米両国籍民の他、他の連合国国民は合計約三千五百名に達し、その内に日本以外の各地から乗込ませた連合国国民は約二千名であります。又、送還者総数は直後当司法当局に詰められて送還された者数に於ける送還者の待遇を良くする為に各船毎に交換橋は以上的五隻であります。
Certificate of Diagnosis

Name: SUZUKI, Kantaro
Age: 81
Address: Sekiyado, Sekiyado-Machi, Higashi-Katsushika Gun, Chiba Prefecture.

Name of Disease:
Hypacusia (T.N. Schwerhörigkeit or difficulty in hearing of both internal ears and furunale in head; N.B. Both air-conduction and bone-conduction of sound difficult, especially in the left ear. Unfit for conversational sound. The internal ears being affected, the acousticon is almost ineffective.

The patient was in the Koishikawa Branch Hospital, an affiliated hospital of the Tokyo Imperial University, receiving between July 10th and August 25th of this year, medical treatment for a carbuncle which came out on the nape on July 3rd. Since that time his health has not been good and present is receiving medical treatment for a furuncle which came out on the head. Because of his advanced age and ill health, it is deemed unwise to have him leave his place of abode.
Date: Dec. 13th, 1947

Doctor: M.D. HAKANO, Masazo

(Address: No. 259, Daimachi, Sekiyedo-Machi, Higashi-Katsushika-Gun, Chiba Prefecture.)
I, ADMIRAL SUZUKI KANTARÔ, make the following statement of facts within my knowledge:

When I received the Imperial command to form a cabinet, in April 1945, being a novice in politics, I requested advice of the Jûshin (Elder Statesmen) concerning the selection of the cabinet members. ForForeign Minister, however, I made my own choice of Tôgô Shigeneri, for the reason that although I knew him only slightly I had the feeling that he had opposed the war from the beginning and had resigned from the Tôjô cabinet as a measure of opposition to Tôjô's dictatorship and high-handed policies. I had believed from the beginning that a war against America and Britain could not succeed, and when selected as premier I understood that it was my duty to attempt to bring about the ending of the war; therefore I wished to select as foreign minister a man who was known to have opposed war.

At the time of the formation of the cabinet Mr. Tôgô was in Karuizawa, and I requested him by telegram to accept the portfolio of foreign minister. His reply was that he would have to discuss the matter with me before giving his acceptance. He therefore came to Tokyo on 8 April, and we did discuss his acceptance of the post. In view of the conditions prevailing in Japan at the time, it was not possible for me to speak openly on the question of ending the war; but from our conversation I had the impression that Mr. Tôgô's views were the same as my own. Although I do not now remember clearly, he may have stated that his acceptance was conditional upon the cabinet's being one which would work to bring about the end of the war.

As a result of that conversation, Mr. Tôgô said that he would have to consult his superiors in the Foreign Ministry (he mentioned specifically Hirota Kôki) before giving his decision. On the next day he gave me his decision to accept. Very soon thereafter Mr. Tôgô and I had a talk in which he brought up the question of ending the war, stating that in his opinion it must be brought about as soon as possible, and we reached an agreement on the point. Beginning about the middle of May six-man conferences of Premier, Foreign Minister, Army and Navy Ministers and Army and Navy Chiefs of General Staff began to be held to discuss the entire question of ending the war. By that time the battle of Okinawa was seen to be hopeless, which weakened the services' insistence on continuation of the war; and by the end of May Mr. Tôgô's urging that we must approach Russia to attempt to bring hostilities to an end had persuaded the services to the extent that they were agreed to approaching Russia, although there was still some idea of securing not merely mediation but assistance from her.
From that time until 22 June there was further discussion and some difference of opinion in the six-man conference regarding the method of procedure. During this time Mr. Tōgō took the lead in the conferences in insisting that the war must end, and that Russia's mediation must be sought to end it. On 22 June the six members of the conference were summoned before the Throne, at which time the Emperor clarified his views of the matter, which views were that the war must be brought to a speedy conclusion. Thereafter there was no further disagreement in the six-man conferences, and arrangements were made to send a special envoy to Moscow to request mediation. Owing to various delays this was not accomplished before the announcement of the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July.

On 9 August, at meetings of the six-man conference and the Cabinet, a plan was presented by Foreign Minister Tōgō for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration with the sole condition attached of maintenance of the national polity. Again there was disagreement, some of the members wishing to add certain conditions concerning disarmament of Japanese troops, occupation of Japan and other points. The matter was therefore presented to the Throne for decision; after hearing the opposing points of view, the Emperor without hesitation accepted Mr. Tōgō's proposal, and ordered it carried out.

I consider Mr. Tōgō to be a man of deep convictions, with loyalty to the real interest of his country, and a man who having formed his opinions cannot be shaken from them. He is a brave man and a straightforward one.

Kantaro Suzuki

Subscribed and sworn to before the undersigned authority at Sekiyado, Chiba-ken, this 23rd day of July, 1946.

Haruhiko Nishi
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- vs -
ARAKI Sadao, et al
- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

KATSUDAIRA YASUMASA

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I had known Mr. Togô Shigenori before I became private secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in which position I served from June 1936 till November 1945. My acquaintance with Mr. Togô became more intimate after he assumed the Foreign ministership in the Togô Cabinet.

2. On 6 April 1945 Admiral Suzuki received an Imperial order to form a cabinet. As I was informed that the Admiral had asked Mr. Togô to accept the Foreign portfolio, but that Mr. Togô was hesitating to accept the offer, I called on him on 9 April at his residence in Azabu and expressed the desire that he should assume the post that was offered. On that occasion Mr. Togô told me that Admiral Suzuki was desirous of terminating the war and that he and the Admiral were in agreement in principle in that respect but that whereas he believed that it was extremely difficult to continue the war and that it must be terminated as soon as possible, the Admiral thought that it could, depending on circumstances, be continued two or three years more; and that so long as he and the Admiral entertained different opinions on this point, they could not agree on the high policy regarding the war; and that he could not accept the Foreign portfolio under such circumstances. I thereupon told him that the opinion of Admiral Suzuki on that point, as I had observed, was not necessarily a fixed one, and that it was desired that Mr. Togô should enter the new cabinet and enlighten the Admiral in that respect; that it was known that the Emperor was considering the termination of the war, so that he need not worry about the point too much; and that it was urgently desired that he should contribute his strength to the Emperor. The reason that I desired Mr. Togô to assume the ministership was that the war could not be terminated in the domestic circumstances then prevailing without a Foreign Minister who had unusual sincerity and the determination even to risk his life, as well as superior brilliancy, and that I could not find any such candidate for the post other than Mr. Togô. As I reported the conversation with Mr. Togô to Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido, the latter told me that it was his hope that Mr. Togô would accept the Foreign portfolio. Thereupon I called Mr. Togô on the telephone to convey this message and again to request him to accept the ministership.
Def. Doc. 2750

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Watsudaira Yasumasa (seal)

On this 18th day of February, 1947
At International Military Tribunal for the Far East

Deponent: Watsudaira Yasumasa (seal)

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.
At the same place

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
14 April 1947
Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

When Admiral Suzuki Amanari received an Imperial mandate to form a new Cabinet on 5 April 1945, I participated in the selection of the Cabinet ministers. I was appointed Chief Secretary of the Cabinet on 7 April upon its formation and remained in that office until 17 August when the Cabinet resigned en masse. During that period, I attended all the Imperial Conferences, Cabinet meetings and Supreme War Direction Councils in the capacity of the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. The following testimony to the facts concerning Foreign Minister Togó in the Suzuki Cabinet is based upon what I learned directly through my own experience at the above-mentioned Councils and Conferences and what I was told by Premier Suzuki and Foreign Minister Togó.

1) On the occasion of the formation of the Cabinet, it was decided to recommend Mr. Togó Shigenori as Foreign Minister. An urgent message was promptly wired to the Governor of Nagano Prefecture on 7 April to request Mr. Togó, who was then in Karuizawa, to come up to Tokyo, where he was to be asked to enter the Cabinet.

He arrived in Tokyo on the evening of 7 April and met Admiral Suzuki that evening. He declared that since he had originally been against the Pacific War, he wanted to endeavor to terminate it as quickly as possible; that although the time to close the war must of course be carefully chosen in the light of the development of the war situation, he wanted to know whether Premier Suzuki was determined to make his Cabinet the Cabinet to end the war, and accordingly what the Premier's opinion was with respect to the war potential of Japan. Exchange of opinions followed and eventually Mr. Togó declined the offer of the Foreign Ministership on the ground that the Admiral's reply was not clear and they parted with a promise to reconsider the matter. As the Premier told me of the above outcome, I called on Mr. Togó on the following day, 8 April. I explained how it was impossible for the Premier to declare, in the circumstances of those times, that he really intended to bring the war to a close promptly, because of the extremely important effect and reaction it might produce. I pressed our request that, since the true intention of the Premier was clear, he should accept the appointment on that tacit understanding, and asked him to meet Mr. Suzuki again on the following day, the 9th.
Mr. Togo repeatedly emphasized his position, but agreed to call on the Premier on the 9th. Mr. Togo met Premier Suzuki on 9 April, had a long talk with the Premier, and finally accepted the offer to become Foreign Minister. The Premier told me at that time that it was because an agreement was reached on the question between the two.

2) Mr. Togo as Foreign Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet was the most earnest advocate of peace from first to last. His opinions delivered at the exclusive meetings of the Big Six (the members of the Supreme War Guidance Council; namely, the Premier, the Foreign Minister, the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff), held very frequently from the middle of May onward, were always for prompt ending of the war. From what I was told by the Premier, Mr. Togo did not necessarily rest his hopes upon the possibility of peace through the good offices of the Soviet Union, but intended so far as possible direct negotiation with the United States Government. However, that may be, his efforts for peace were consistent. Meanwhile, there was an opinion supported by some military circles that Japan should get from the Soviet Union petroleum and equipment which would enable Japan to continue war. But Mr. Togo asserted that such was quite inconceivable, and insisted on the prompt conclusion of peace.

As the Imperial wishes were revealed on 22 June and concrete measures were to be taken to end the war, the Foreign Minister in person directed the necessary preparation and proceeded with the negotiations with the Soviet Union. When the Potsdam Declaration was promulgated on 26 July, the general trend of opinions expressed at the Cabinet meeting and the Supreme War Direction Council was that as the negotiations were being conducted with the Soviet Union, Japan should decide the measures to take in this connection after receiving a reply from the Soviet Union. It was decided that Japan should for the time being see how things might develop, maintaining silence as to acceptance or rejection of the Potsdam Declaration. The military, however, raised an objection that the silence of the Government as to the Declaration would exert a most demoralizing effect upon the troops at the front and that therefore a strong statement should be issued against it.

The Foreign Minister was firmly against this opinion of the military, pointing out that manifestation of such an intention of the Government would eventually prove a fatal obstacle to the conclusion of peace. Later, this problem was brought up for discussion among the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff at a conference which the Foreign Minister did not attend. The opinion of the military prevailed and it was decided that the Premier should state at a press conference that the Japanese Government would not take a serious view of the Potsdam Declaration, which was in substance similar to the Cairo Declaration. The press reported that the Premier stated that the Japanese Government ignored the Declaration. The Foreign Minister regretted this deeply, and did not give his consent to the decision to the last. When, afterward, the Soviet Union declared war upon Japan on the pretext of the above-mentioned statement, the Foreign Minister was deeply chagrined at this, and cried "That's just what I expected."

On 6 August, the city of Hiroshima was attacked with atomic bombs. Upon receiving the report, the Foreign Minister told the
Def. Doc. 2751

Premier that the war should be terminated promptly, and pressed his opinion upon the military leaders.

When the American radio broadcast reported the Soviet Union's participation in the Pacific War at a little after 11 A.M., 9 August, Mr. Togo called on the Premier (I was with the Premier then), and advised him to end the war promptly. The Supreme War Direction Council was held in the morning of the same day. There Mr. Togo strongly insisted on the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration insofar as the Allies would respect the safety of the Imperial Household, but the Council adjourned without coming to a conclusion. The Cabinet meeting was opened at 1 P.M. Here, too, Mr. Togo repeated his argument, and explained fully the reasons why he could not agree with those who insisted upon attaching various conditions to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. He succeeded in convincing the majority of the Cabinet members.

At the Imperial Conference on the night of the 9th, Mr. Togo stated his belief frankly and clearly. In giving the Imperial decision on that occasion, His Majesty graciously stated, "We approve the opinion of the Foreign Minister."

At the Cabinet meeting held from 10 A.M., 13 August, immediately after the Allies' reply was received, Mr. Togo insisted on the acceptance of the Declaration promptly on the basis of this reply. Some cabinet members persisted in requesting a more clear and positive reply from the Allies with respect to the national polity and other questions, but Mr. Togo refuted them with convincing reasoning.

Discussion was repeated further at the Imperial Conference in the morning of 14 August, His Majesty again approved the Foreign Minister's opinion and gave the final decision to accept the above-mentioned reply of the Allies as it stood.

In short, Mr. Togo as Foreign Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet concentrated all his energy upon his cherished design of restoration of peace. I am still deeply impressed by his all-out efforts to end the war which was started against his will.
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Sakomizu Hisatsuno. (seal)

On this 4th day of December, 1947
At Tokyo
Deponent: Sakomizu Hisatsuno

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo
Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)
Tokyo
6 December 1947
Excerpts from the Asahi Shimbun, 21 February 1933

In conformity with the important conference of the 20th, Foreign Minister Uchida was on the afternoon of the same day to send instructions to Mr. Matsuoka, our chief delegate in Geneva, to the following effect:

1. The Japanese Government absolutely rejects the report and the proposed recommendations of the League, in view of the fact that they are entirely in conflict with the belief of the Japanese Government concerning the establishment of the peace in East Asia.

2. It was therefore formally decided by the highest authority that, should the General Assembly adopt the report and the recommendations as they stand, Japan would withdraw from the League of Nations, as the Japanese Government could no longer maintain cooperation with the League in such an event.

3. However, in withdrawing from the League, constitutional steps have to be taken prior to the diplomatic proceedings. The representatives should therefore return home without taking any steps at the Assembly for withdrawal.

4. When the report and the recommendations are submitted to the Assembly the representative should promptly seize the opportunity to make a statement of opposition, and vote against them in voting. The representative should simultaneously report to Secretary-General Drummond the non-acceptance of the report and, pending the instruction of the Government, take steps for the publication of the statement. Upon completion of all necessary steps the representative should promptly leave Geneva with his staff.

Foreign Minister Uchida is to instruct Mr. Matsuoka, our representative, at the same time concerning our statement of opposition and the form of the statement.

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
15 December 1947
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of two pages, being the telegraphic instruction to the Delegate Katsuoka concerning Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, is an exact and true copy of an excerpt from a newspaper (21 February 1933) in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo
On this 9th day of December, 1947

Hayashi Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of this witness.

At the same place,
On this same date

Witness: Urabe Katsuma (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

Miki Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

OKURA KIMIKOCHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I have been a member of the House of Peers for many years, and since 1937 have been managing director of the Kokusaku Kenkyukai (Society for Study of the National Policy). This society was an organization of purely private nature, maintained by membership fees and contributions from official and private sources. A detailed account of the nature and operations of the Society having been given to the Tribunal by the witness Tatsugi (Exhibit No. 678), I refrain from repeating it here, and shall state only the following facts in explanation of the relation of Mr. Togo Shigenori to the Society.

2. Membership in the Society was open to all, and withdrawal from membership also was quite free and voluntary. Accordingly there used to be continual change in the membership, and those members who did not belong to some committee of the Society were (with the exception of a few interested who sometimes expressed their opinions at some meeting or other) so little connected with the activities of the Society that the only benefit they derived from being members was that they were sometimes invited to the lecture-meetings which the Society held in compensation for the fees paid, and received the periodicals published by the Society. Many of the members failed to pay their membership fees, but so long as they did not express the desire to withdraw from the Society they were treated as members and received the periodicals publications of the Society. But in no circumstances were the major, special, publications of the Society, such as those introduced as evidence by the prosecution (Exhibits Nos. 684 and 685) ever distributed to ordinary members.

3. Mr. Togo joined the Society, if I remember right, in 1942 after he had resigned his post of foreign minister. He was of course only an ordinary member, having never had any connection with any of the committees nor in any way participated in the management of the Society, as an officer or director. I did at one time approach him with the suggestion that he become a member of the Executive Committee, but he rejected the suggestion. Moreover, so far as I remember, he did not attend any of the meetings held by the Society, and I do not even remember whether he paid membership fees. To speak honestly, he was a half-hearted and uncooperative member.
Dec. 27, 1947

I called on Mr. Nishi, then the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I had long been acquainted, and asked for a contribution of ¥20,000 from the Foreign Ministry, explaining to him that the Society was soliciting contributions for the purpose of undertaking the study of various wartime problems. The Society received the money from the Foreign Ministry some two or three months later. At the time of the making of the above request, the concrete program of study of the Society had not yet been decided, and my explanation to the Vice-Minister naturally was sketchy and rather vague as to particulars. I submitted no written program in connection with the request for a contribution. It may be added that I have never seen Mr. Tōgō on any business concerning this or any other contribution to the Society.

On this 25th day of October, 1947

At Tokyo

DEponent ÖKURA KIMMOCHI (seal)

I, Shichida Motoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Shichida Motoharu (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Ökura Kimmochi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo

15 November 1947
The Ordinance of the Supreme War Council
(December 1903, Imperial Ordinance No. 294)

Imperial Sanction is given to the Ordinance of the Supreme War Council, which shall accordingly be put into force.

The Ordinance of the Supreme War Council

Article 1. The Supreme War Council shall be under direct Imperial command and shall give answers in response to inquiries respecting military affairs of importance.

Article 2. Upon reference of matters for deliberation, the Supreme War Council shall hold a meeting and tender advice to the Imperial Throne thereafter.

Article 3. The Supreme War Council shall have a chairman, councillors, a secretary-general and secretaries.

Article 4. The Supreme War Councillors shall be as follows:

- Marshals and Admirals of the Fleet
- War Minister
- Navy Minister
- Chief of Army General Staff
- Chief of Naval General Staff
- General officers of the Army and Navy specially appointed Supreme War Councillors

Article 5. The chairman of the Supreme War Council shall be appointed from among the highest-ranking and senior members among the councillors.

Article 6. When necessary, a general officer holding an important position may be appointed councillor ad interim, with authority to attend the meetings of the Council. However, he shall be deemed to be relieved of the appointment when proceedings are closed on the matter in which he is concerned.

Article 7. Regarding matters relating to both the Army and the Navy, planning requires to be examined from both standpoints, in the primary interest of national defense and operations and mutual adjustment to be attained therein.

Article 8. With regard to matters exclusively concerning either the Army or the Navy, a meeting consisting merely of Army or Navy councillors may be held.

Article 9. In cases of emergency, the Chairman may give answers to inquiries without deliberation by the Council.

Article 10. The Secretary-General shall be appointed from among the chief aides-de-camp or other general officers, and shall manage the general business of the meetings of the Council. Secretaries shall be appointed, one each from among the aides-de-camp and field- or company-officers, and shall assist the Secretary-General in his business.
Article 11. A Supreme War Councillor specially appointed by His Majesty shall be attended by an adjutant of field or company grade.

Supplementary Provision

The Ordinance of the Supreme War Councillors shall cease to be in effect.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Yoshiyama Yōzō, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives Section, 1st Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Ordinance of the Supreme War Council" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (1st Demobilization Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 11th day of October, 1947

Yoshiyama Yōzō
"Ordinance of the Supreme War Council"

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date November 3, 1947
ERRATA SHEET
for
Defence Document No. 2927

page 14, Sec. 33, line 29
after "Attaché" add "ask that the German authorities"

page 25, Sec. 56, line 29
change "was made" to "had been made"

page 25, Sec. 57, line 5
after "Navy" add "High Command"

page 26, Sec. 59, line 8
delete "War and"
change "Ministers'" to "Minister's"

page 29, Sec. 66, line 4
delete "the morning of"

page 35, Sec. 72, lines 6 and 7
change "decisions" to "discussions"

page 36, Sec. 80, line 5
change "some such period as" to "a period of at least"

page 38, Sec. 83, line 11
change "had been made" to "was to have been made"

page 38, Sec. 85, line 5
change "excluded" to "precluded"

page 40, Sec. 87, line 4
change "28" to "27"

page 44, Sec. 98, line 6
change "Foreign Minister" to "Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal"

page 44, second paragraph, line 1
add section number, "99"

page 46, Sec. 107, line 9
after "speech" add "chiefly"

page 52, Sec. 122, line 2
after "responsibility for" add "management of"
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

AFFIDAVIT
TŌGŌ SHIGENORI

General

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I entered the service of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in November 1912, immediately after passing the diplomatic and consular service examination, and for the following thirty-three years until my retirement upon resignation of the post of Foreign Minister on 17 August 1945 I devoted my life continuously (except for the period 1 September 1942 to 9 April 1945, when I was retired) to the diplomatic service. During that period I occupied successively all the same positions at home and abroad which are the history of a diplomat's life, and received promotions, decorations and other forms of recognition in the usual course of a government servant's career. I have never held military office nor had connection of any nature with any military or militaristic group or clique; neither have I been a member of any political party or society nor ever held political office, except that after my retirement from office on 1 September 1942 I was appointed a member of the House of Peers, a sort of retirement honor frequently bestowed on retiring cabinet ministers and other high officials. (I did at one time receive membership in the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, which I suppose might be considered a "political party"; but I was never active in it, and took so little interest in it that I am not even sure when I received my membership, whether it continued until the Society's dissolution, and whether an advisorship or the like position was conferred on me.) My profession has been diplomacy; my aim as a diplomat has been the advancement of my country's interests, but always governed by the conviction that my own country would be best served by attempting to understand other's viewpoints, by promoting international friendship and striving for amicable settlements and maintenance of peace, thus to contribute to the welfare of mankind as a whole.

2. The facts of my career are substantially as contained in the record of the Personnel Section of the Cabinet Secretariat, introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 127, subject to the amplifications contained in Defense Documents Nos. 1280, 1281 and 2866, which points I shall mention in detail hereafter at the appropriate times. My diplomatic career up to the time I became Foreign Minister was related almost wholly to European and American affairs, and primarily to European. My introduction to the diplomatic service was a period of something short of three years in the Consulat-Genoral at Mukden; but I never served thereafter in any country in Asia. During World War I I was appointed to a post in Switzerland, and after the armistice served on the Japanese
dlegation to the Peace Conference. I was dispatched to Germany, and remained there after the conclusion of the peace treaty as a secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. I then served in Tokyo as Chief of the 1st Section of the European-American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, which section is concerned with affairs of Russia and neighboring states (Exhibit No. 127). In December 1925 I was ordered to the Japanese Embassy in Washington as senior secretary staying there until May 1929, and then from June of that year until the end of 1932 I was Counsellor of Embassy in Germany. During that time I was twice ordered to Geneva (Defense Document No. 1280). The first of these occasions was in September 1930, when I was designated as a member of the suite of the Japanese delegation to the 11th assembly of the League of Nations. I was absent from my post at Berlin that time only 22 days, and was at Geneva about ten days. Again, in December 1931 I was detailed as the Secretary-General of the Japanese delegation to the Conference on General Disarmament, and served in that capacity in Geneva from February to August and in November 1932.

At this point I should like to take the occasion to correct a few misconceptions arising from the prosecution's evidence or assertions. From the fact that I was once in Geneva at the same time as Mr. Matsuoka, the prosecution have produced this argument: "At the time of the Manchurian Incident he was with Matsuoka on the delegation of the League of Nations, whose business it was to defend the aggression and to give the assurances which were so often broken" (31 January 1947, Record, p. 16,939). "At the time of the Manchurian Incident", September 1931, I was not in Geneva, but at my post in Berlin. Presumably the prosecution's assertion relates to 1932, a year after the Manchurian Incident. At that time I was in Geneva as chief secretary of the Japanese delegation to the Disarmament Conference. I point out that there was no connection whatsoever between the business of the two delegations, that to the Extraordinary Assembly of the League of Nations, Matsuoka Chief Delegate, and that to the Disarmament Conference, which latter I was the Secretary-General. Although some evidence has already been given on this point (Defense Document No. 2740), I should like to emphasize that I originated the proposal that neither should the business of the two delegations be intermingled nor should the personnel of the two be common, and that this proposal was adopted in principle by our Chief Delegate, Mr. Matsuoka, and the other delegates, and was as far as possible carried out in practice; although inevitably there was some overlapping of personnel, I, at least, had nothing whatsoever to do with the business of the delegation to the assembly concerned with the Manchurian question. So far as concerns my being "with Matsuoka", he did not in point of fact leave Tokyo for Geneva until October (Defense Document No. 2740). By that time the Disarmament Conference was in summer recess, and I had been ordered home to report and confer, and had left Berlin on 22 August for Japan. Upon my arrival at my post in Berlin on 19 November, I found the order, dated the preceding day, for me to return to Tokyo for a new assignment as Director of the European-American Bureau. I therefore went to Geneva to report on my visit to Japan, remained there for about ten days, and returned to Berlin, which I quitted on 22 December for Japan. During that brief stay at Geneva I had no official connection with Mr. Matsuoka, and no occasion to "defend" the Manchurian Incident—although we stayed at the same hotel and I did, of course, meet him. By the time that he led the Japanese delegation's withdrawal
from the Extraordinary Meeting of the League Assembly, in February 1933, I was no longer in Geneva, but was then in Japan (Defence Document No. 1280).

1. The prosecution have asserted (13 November 1946, Record, p. 10,297) that in 1941 I became a member of the Supreme War Council. That the Supreme War Council was composed of military men can be discovered from Defence Document No. 2761. That membership in this body was restricted to general officers of the Army and flag officers of the Navy was in fact stated to the Tribunal by a prosecutor (14 June 1946, Record, p. 672). This allegation of my membership seems to be founded upon a document (Exhibit No. 102), the original Japanese of which refers to the Supreme War Council (Gunji Sangin) but to the Supreme Council for Direction of the War (Saike Sansö Shidö Kaigi); however, the prosecutor also explained, correctly, to the Tribunal (14 June 1946, Record, p. 681), that this organ was established under the Koiso Cabinet, in 1944. I was therefore not a member of this body in 1941.

5. It has been pointed out to the Tribunal several times that in the course of my public service I received various awards and decorations, some of which are suggested to have sinister implications. Since I believe that evidence already introduced (Defence Documents Nos. 2744 and 2755) will have given the Tribunal an understanding of this subject, a few words from me should suffice to dispose of the matter. It is intimated that the award bestowed upon me "for services during 1931-4" was related to the Manchuria Incident (IPS Document No. 0001). It is obvious from the record of my career that I had no connection whatever with the Manchuria Incident, nor is there any evidence to connect me therewith; I was in Berlin when the incident occurred, and during all of 1931-34 to the time of this award I was stationed either in Berlin or in Tokyo as Director of the Foreign Ministry's European-American Bureau, which had no direct connection with Manchurian affairs. As awards for services in connection with any contemporaneous affairs could in those days have been given in the guise of award for services in the Manchuria Incident, the award bestowed upon me for services in 1931-4 could therefore have been in connection with other matters; but if I had been decorated for services in connection with the Manchuria affair it would have been, as has already been testified (Exhibit No. 3147, Record, p. 28,026), one of 52,826 recipients of such awards. The award granted me for services in connection with the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact came to me as director of the bureau in charge of the negotiations concerning the Pact. It is customary on those occasions, under the Japanese system, to bestow the awards upon the officials concerned in management of the matter, quite without regard to their personal views or the large or small part which they actually played in the matter. That I was given an award upon the occasion of the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact despite my having, as I shall testify presently, been unsympathetic to it, is perhaps sufficient commentary upon the significance of those awards. So far as concern the decoration for "services in connection with the China War" (31 January 1947, Record, p. 16,9l4), those awards, as I have mentioned, covered all services in the period under consideration. But if I had been decorated for services in connection with the China Affair, it has already been shown (Exhibit No. 3147) that 3,319,947 others received awards on the
same basis. My award, it is said, was "the highest Japanese award". It is quite clear that Japan has higher awards; but in any event, this one was in the circumstances the one appropriate for bestowal under the Japanese system of awards.

6. I should like also, before coming to the substantive matters of my testimony, to dispose of the question of the Kokusaku Kenkyūkai (National Policy Research Society), my membership in which has been shown (Exhibit No. 683) to prove that I entertained aggressive designs upon the world at large. I believe that the nature of the Society has been made sufficiently clear from evidence already introduced (Exhibit No. 678 and Defense Document No. 2747). I need add only that I never paid membership fees or dues, never attended meetings (unless it be a ceremonial New Year's Day affair, or the like); never served the Society as officer or committeeman (though I was requested to take office in it), and never had the slightest knowledge of what it was doing or proposed. I was solicited by a personal friend to become a member, and did, in just the same way that any man in public life is likely to take out membership in any number of organizations without inquiring into the details of their activities. As to the donation which has been testified to have been made to the Society by the Foreign Ministry, I had nothing to do with it; if it occurred, it was a matter transacted by the Vice-Minister in conformity with precedent and routine, and I was not consulted concerning it.

II

Russian Affairs

7. Throughout my diplomatic career Russian-Japanese relations have been the most important problem for Japan after that of China, and not a small part of my career has been devoted to it. As section chief in the European-American Bureau from 1923 to 1925, I was concerned directly with Russian affairs; and during my time in the post of Director of the European-American (later European-Asian) Bureau, 1933-1937, Russian affairs were of paramount importance among the affairs under my jurisdiction.

8. During my tenure as Chief of the First Section of the European-American Bureau I was the official directly concerned with solution of Japanese-Russian problems, and it was during this time that we finally reached a settlement of the many points of contention which had arisen as a result of the Soviet Revolution and the Siberian Expedition carried out jointly with the United States, Britain and France, and which had been pending between Japan and the U.S.S.R. My efforts were devoted to the settlement of such problems as Soviet ratification of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Soviet recognition of the Czarist debts to Japan and the question of prohibition of Communist propaganda in Japan. The settlement of those questions which was finally arrived at was embodied in the Soviet-Japanese Basic Convention, granting Japanese recognition of the Soviet Government and reestablishing relations on a normal basis, signed at Peking in January 1925.

9. Although my designation as chief of the European-American Bureau was dated 1 February 1933, I actually took over the office only in early March, having meanwhile visited my
home on leave and spent a considerable time at my personal affairs. I am charged here with having assisted in engineering the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations; actually, I had no connection with this high-level policy decision, the general trend of which had been decided before I entered upon the discharge of the duties of my office as bureau director in March (Def. Doc. No. 2941) — my bureau not being the one in charge of the matter. (I had expressed my personal opinion, in the days when the question of withdrawal was being mooted at Geneva, that such a course would be unfortunate for Japan (Def. Doc. No. 2730).) Although the formal notification of Japanese withdrawal from the League was given on 27 March 1935, the policy had for all practical purposes been determined when Mr. Watsuoka led the Japanese delegation from the meeting of the assembly in late February. After the withdrawal from the League of Nations, I submitted to Count Uchida, the Foreign Minister, at his request, a written opinion entitled "On the Foreign Policy of Japan vis-à-vis Europe and America Following Withdrawal from the League of Nations" (Def. Doc. No. 126). As showing my concern with Russian questions, it may be noted that although this report treats of Japanese relations with the United States and all the chief European countries, over a third of it is devoted to the Soviet question. I might say that so far as it lay within my competence and my abilities, I worked throughout my later career for the fulfillment of the entire diplomatic policy set out in this plan of 1935. With such other important branches of Japanese diplomacy as affairs of China and of the United States and Britain I had in later years almost no direct connection — until by their complications they had so deteriorated as to bring us to the verge of the Pacific war — and was not in a position to work to any good effect for the carrying out of my proposed policies in those fields. But so far as Soviet affairs are concerned, I had the opportunity to deal with them for a considerable period, and the main points of my program as set forth in the above-mentioned opinion were subsequently brought to fruition. These points, which were the results of my interest in and study of the question, were these: conclusion of a non-aggression pact; settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway question by purchase of the Soviet interest; demarcation of the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundaries.

10. My first work as Director of the European-American Bureau was the negotiations proposed by the U.S.S.R which eventually led to the purchase by Manchoukuo of the half interest of the U.S.S.R in the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the removal of that long-standing source of friction in Soviet-Manchoukuo and Soviet-Japanese relations. These negotiations were peculiarly taxing and complex, and occupied much of my time for almost two years. I shall not here repeat the details — how the parties were at the outset extremely far apart in their ideas of the monetary value of the Soviet interest; how the negotiations were repeatedly interfered with and rendered more difficult by the occurrence of conflicts in Manchoukuo; how the Japanese military authorities had repeatedly tried to persuade that amicable settlement of the issue was to Japan's interest. These have been told by other witnesses (Exhibit No. 3234 and Def. Doc. No. 2755). The result was that, while to eliminate a source of friction in Manchuria and to make the situation tranquil the Japanese Government worked as mediator to smooth the course of the negotiations between Manchoukuo and the U.S.S.R, my bureau and I
were in fact fully occupied in persuading the parties to compromise their original claims. The prosecution have referred to the Chinese Eastern Railway sale as having been intended to strengthen Japan's position in Manchoukuo and to eliminate concessions of foreign countries, except Japan, there. This argument overlooks the fact that the sale was first proposed by the U.S.S.R., and that the three Governments concerned were from the first at one on the belief that the transaction would promote peace in the Far East (Exhibit No. 3251). It was by the request of the U.S.S.R. that the guarantee by Japan of the obligation to pay the purchase price also was made, the Soviet Government lacking confidence in the solvency of Manchoukuo. As I have already mentioned, the consummation of this transaction was an ambition of mine of long standing, as proposed in the report to Foreign Minister Uchida.

11. During the progress of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph the Foreign Ministry was reorganized; the European-American bureau was divided into two, and its functions transferred partly to the new American Bureau and partly to the new European-Asian Bureau, which was charged also with responsibility for matters affecting European countries and continental Asia except China, Thailand, etc. My chief interest and speciality being, as I have mentioned before, in the Russian field, I was appointed to the bureau which succeeded to responsibility for Russian relations, the European-Asian Bureau (I shall hereafter refer to the Bureau during my tenure generally by its later name).

12. Immediately after the successful conclusion of the Chinese Eastern Railway transaction, I had to turn my undivided attention to the Soviet-Manchoukuoan border question. Before my entry into the office of Director of the European-American Bureau agreement had been reached between the Governments of Japan and the U.S.S.R. to study the question proposed by Japan of establishing a mixed (Soviet-Japanese-Manchoukuoan) commission for the prevention of border disputes. With the Chinese Eastern negotiations supervening, however, it was not until May 1935, when they were at last concluded, that the negotiations on this question were entered into. After the foundation of Manchoukuo, border incidents had been numerous; but during the time that the Chinese Eastern Railway question was under discussion feeling was good, and the number of incidents had decreased. It seemed to me an opportune time, therefore, to try to put an end to the constant expenditure of effort which, to the annoyance of both parties, was required to settle the incidents, by entrusting the task of preventing and settling border disputes as far as possible to such a commission. I therefore endeavored to commence negotiations for establishment of this commission in the summer of 1935. The Government of Manchoukuo and the Kwantung Army, however, insisted that first the establishment of a border-demarcation commission be agreed before the establishment of the commission for settlement of disputes, to which the Soviet Government eventually agreed; as a result, however, of differences of opinions the negotiations were finally dropped. Thus even in 1938, when I arrived in Moscow as ambassador, I found neither commission yet established, and the demarcation of the Mongolian-Manchoukuoan border in the Nomonhan District, which in 1939 I succeeded in bringing about by negotiations with People's Commissar Molotov (Exhibit No. 767), was the only result achieved in the history of many years' negotiations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. directed toward this end.
13. In the summer of 1937 (USSR-Japanese relations were again troubled, by the landing on and occupation by Soviet troops of the Kwan-tsa-tse Island in the Amur River. The Kwantun Army was eager to dispatch troops to the spot to settle the incident by defense of what it considered were the frontiers of Manchoukuo; but I insisted strongly on negotiation first, and on the end the incident was settled by negotiation without developing into a serious clash. This was, however, the last matter of business concerning the USSR, which I managed as Bureau Director. In March 1936 Premier Hirota (who was concurrently Foreign Minister) had intimated to me his intention of appointing me ambassador to the USSR. Having been engaged for many years in Soviet affairs, and they being of the greatest interest to me, I was of course quite happy at the prospect of appointment to the post of ambassador to Moscow. However, after Mr. Arita was appointed Foreign Minister, relieving Mr. Fukuda of the portfolio, the Moscow post went to another, and I was finally in October 1937 appointed Ambassador to Germany. Mr. Hirota told me afterward that, though he had considered it inappropriate to send me to the USSR, personal problems of the Foreign Ministry had compelled him to make a different appointment.

14. On 15 October 1938, being then ambassador to Germany, I was appointed Ambassador to the USSR and arrived at my post in Moscow on 29 October. Upon my arrival I found awaiting my attention a serious problem, in the form of the perennial fisheries question. Since 1926, when the negotiation of a new fisheries convention had bogged down owing to the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, it had been necessary to conclude annually an arrangement on the fisheries question, and troubles and difficulties arose annually. At the time of my arrival in Moscow as ambassador, at the end of October 1938, I found the state of affairs especially serious, because a large part—about half—of the Japanese leases for fisheries lots, including those operated under long-term contracts, were due to expire together, and the Soviet Government indicated no intention to conclude the annual agreement, as the Japanese Government desired. It required much patience and long-deadout negotiations to settle the matter—for the first time in the course of the fisheries questions the new year commenced with no agreement of any sort in effect—and the matter became so serious that for a time it even threatened to bring about a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Finally, however, our labors resulted in a settlement in April of the following year, 1939: but as a result of the work done then the negotiation of the annual modus vivendi in subsequent years was easier for me and my successors. In 1939, for example, after the Nomonhan settlement, we commenced the negotiation for an agreement for 1940 in the middle of November, and had reached agreement and were able to initial the document, after a last all-night session, by 8 o'clock on New Year's morning, 1940—a day which Commissar Molotov and I, with our staffs, spented in the Kremlin in the most friendly atmosphere with toasts drunk in champagne.

15. The Nomonhan Incident, which broke out in May 1939, is charged to me as a crime against the USSR and conspired for by me. It is probably superfluous to say that, being in Moscow when the incident occurred, I first knew about it only by the Soviet protests and by categories from the Foreign Ministry, and that I had never discussed it or any other conspiracy against the Soviet Union with any person whatsoever. The details of the negotiations for settlement of the Nomonhan Incident
have been testified to by the witness Ota (Exhibit No. 2599), and I therefore refrain from repeating them here. I might add that when the settlement was arrived at between Foreign Commissar Molotov and me (Exhibit No. 767) there was none who suggested that I had conspired to wage a war of aggression against them or that my position or conduct throughout the affair was any other than those of any diplomat negotiating to settle a problem which had arisen between two governments—in fact, Foreign Commissar Molotov said at the time we agreed upon the settlement that it was an augury of better relations between our countries. As a result of the Nomonhan settlement, part of another item of my 1933 plan for Russo-Japanese relations—the demarcation of Soviet-Mongolian boundaries with Manchoukuo—came about. This point having already been fully testified to by the witness Ota, I shall not refer further to it here.

16. At this stage of relations between the two countries, I felt it opportune to undertake the negotiation of the non-aggression pact which I had long desired. My motive was nothing more recondite than to secure for both countries the obvious benefit in the way of improved Soviet-Japanese relations to be derived from the conclusion of such a pact. I had certainly no idea of encouraging Japan to undertake southward expansion—a policy which I was always opposed to as sure to cause conflicts with Britain and the Netherlands, and probably in the end, with the United States as well; and therefore I had no such intention as that which the prosecution has imputed to me of "making a friend of the enemy in the north" in order to facilitate a southward advance. My motives in undertaking to conclude a non-aggression pact were just as I had expressed them in my written opinion on the subject submitted to the Foreign Minister in 1933. (With the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact made in December 1931, and declined as premature in January 1933 Exhibit nos. 744-747, I had nothing to do, arriving in Japan from Germany only on 28 January 1933 and taking office as Bureau Director in March.) The commencement of such negotiations, however, even in 1939 was not easy, and required repeated telegrams and the dispatching to Tokyo of a member of my staff, as has been testified to. After a length of obtaining authority from the Japanese Government, I commenced such negotiations. These resulted in general agreement between Commissar Molotov and me for conclusion of a neutrality pact, which had been put into draft form, and only the Russian desire concurrently to liquidate some of the concessions in North Sakhalin prevented conclusion of the agreement. Then suddenly, in October 1940, I was compelled to return to Japan, leaving the negotiations uncompleted. At the time I received the instructions for my return to Japan I received also specific directions to cease negotiations on the neutrality pact. Nevertheless, when a neutrality pact was concluded between Japan and the U S S R in April 1941—by which time I was thus able to see the realization of the three basic points which I had set out, in 1933, as essential for the rationalization of Soviet-Japanese relations—it was of contents almost identical with those of the preliminary agreement reached between Commissar Molotov and me (Exhibit No. 145 and Defense Document No. 2918).

17. The prosecution seems to place great reliance on what they contend to be the fact that when Foreign Minister Iatsukawa carried out his "purge" of the diplomatic service, recalling and dismissing all ambassadors and ministers considered insufficiently ardent toward his axis-allignment policy, I was left undisturbed in my position in Moscow (24 September 1946, Record
That such is not the fact, but is an error growing from an incomplete personnel record, has been asserted by my counsel before the Tribunal (25 September 1946, record, p. 6, 361, when the prosecutor undertook to investigate and report), and is proved by Defense Document No. 1280, from which it appears that I was recalled on 29 August 1940, and actually arrived in Tokyo on 5 November. This is perhaps the most convenient place to give the sequel. Upon my return to Tokyo Foreign Minister Matsuoka intimated that my resignation would be acceptable, several times mentioning the matter personally or by sending the Vice-Minister or the Chief of the Personnel Section with the same suggestion. I was quite obstinate in my refusal to resign, and told the Foreign Minister that his demand that diplomats resign simply because they were opposed to his policy or estranged from him was entirely unjustified; I warned him also of the consequences of dismissal of many experienced diplomats at one time. On each occasion that my resignation was requested, I gave the same answer: “If you want to dismiss me, go ahead; but I will not tender my resignation voluntarily, for that would mean my approval of your policy”. No further steps were taken by Mr. Matsuoka; my successor, General Tatekawa, replaced me in Moscow (Defense Document No. 1281), and I held the nominal position of ambassador, while in actuality I lived in retirement and had nothing to do with the activities of the Foreign Ministry for the year following my return to Japan, until I became Foreign Minister in October 1941. During that year I received no information regarding the development of Japanese diplomacy, and had no concrete knowledge concerning it.

III

German relations

18. I have never been a specialist in German affairs, though I have served in the Japanese Embassy in Germany three times— as Second Secretary, Councillor and Ambassador. My first impressions of Germany, when I was dispatched there in April 1919 under orders to examine the post-war condition of the country and to report on the German attitude toward the peace treaty, were such as to impress upon me the horrors and miseries of war. My basic policy toward Germany in later years was, as it had been set forth in my report to Count Uchida, not one of positive cooperation. After the Nazis came to power, I was not only antipathetic to their dictatorial and totalitarian politics but was skeptical of the widespread admiration of the strength of Nazi Germany, having spent considerable time in Germany and known the situation there.

19. My first connection with German affairs materialized here, however, when the Anti-Comintern Pact was negotiated during my service as Director of the European-Asian Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. The prosecution allege that I had a “close connection” with the Anti-Comintern Pact. Of course I had a close connection with it, as director of the Foreign Ministry bureau which had charge of the negotiations concerning the subject from the time that it came to the Foreign Ministry. The nature and extent of my connection, as bureau director, with this pact requires some explanation if the true facts are to be understood.
20. The history of the Anti-Comintern Pact, so far as it concerned me or the Foreign Ministry, commences at about the beginning of February 1936, with a report from the Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, Councillor Inoue, that since the previous year conversations had been in progress in Berlin between the German side and the military attaché to our Embassy with a view to a defensive alliance between Germany and Japan (Exhibits Nos. 477 and 478). Upon receipt of this information I requested the War Ministry and the General Staff officers concerned for information about it; shortly afterward Lieutenant-Colonel "akamatsu informed us of his general impressions of conditions in Germany, from where he had just returned, but not about the details of the conversations.

21. While the Foreign Ministry was studying the matter, Mr. Arita returned from China and became Foreign Minister. At that time the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, Viscount Mushakōji, was in Tokyo on leave, and the Foreign Minister had asked him in which he gave him oral instructions to the effect that since it seemed to be necessary to make a political agreement of some kind with Germany, he should make a study of the matter upon his return to Berlin. Formal instructions to the same effect were sent to him around the time of his arrival there. Ambassador Mushakōji after returning to his post reported a German proposal for an agreement which was basically the Anti-Comintern Pact, but contained many objectionable features. I had opposed from the outset the idea of a pact based on Nazi ideological grounds, and so stated to Foreign Minister Arita. Being merely a bureau director, I naturally had no voice in the decision of the policy—although a bureau director can submit his opinion to his superiors, in the end he only carries into effect the policies decided and dictated by the Government and the Foreign Minister. I did on this occasion, however, endeavor to persuade my superiors as well as the military authorities concerned of the desirability of making the proposed Japanese-German agreement as weak as possible. In other words, I argued that it should be limited strictly to the bare minimum of what had been determined as the national policy to be Japan's needs; and particularly that the matter should be so managed, and the treaty so framed, that it should not injuriously affect our relations with Britain and the United States, as well as with the U.S.S.R., unnecessarily. In this endeavor I was successful in several points. The policy on this question presented here as Exhibit No. 3267 was drawn by the European-Asiatic Bureau, and my intention is to a certain extent represented in it and the aforementioned points are to be seen in it.

22. One of my chief reasons for insistence on revision of the draft pact which had come to us from the German Government was to the propagandistic tone which permeated it. The preamble, particularly, which originally read like a Nazi manifesto, was greatly changed while the document was in the hands of the European-Asiatic Bureau, which changes were eventually agreed to by the Japanese military authorities and by the German side, with the result of the form as it finally stands (Exhibit No. 36). The text of the pact, moreover, was rewritten to limit the cooperation between the two nations to the exchange of information concerning the destructive activities of the Third International and counter-measures to be taken against them. The term of the pact was reduced from ten to five years. I also removed such provisions as that for meetings of the Foreign Ministers and other high officials of the contracting nations. I thus succeeded in making the Pact more businesslike.
23. Above all, I strongly asserted that the secret agreement attached to the Pact (Exhibit No. 480) should be of strictly defensive nature, and I insisted on changes to that effect. The first article of the secret agreement originally provided that it would become effective "should one of the High Contracting States become the object of an attack or a threat of attack" by the U.S.S.R.; this was amended, at my insistence to limit its operation to the case of unjustified attack, to read "should one of the High Contracting States become the object of an unprovoked attack or an unprovoked threat of attack". In connection with article 2, also, I succeeded in securing German agreement to a list of exceptions from the requirement of mutual approval of the contracting of political agreements with the U.S.S.R., with the intention of leaving Japan free of German meddling in our relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than would have been the case under the provision of the Pact taking its language at face value (Exhibit No. 480).

24. It was my feeling also that since Japan had, despite what seemed to me the dangers of such a liaison, determined upon the national policy of entering into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, it was essential to keep the foreign policy of our nation on a rational and balanced basis that efforts be made to maintain a close relationship with the democratic powers--especially England. This stand of mine can readily be comprehended from my 1933 report—especially in that the report put emphasis on the British policy—but the latter part of Exhibit No. 3267 will further clarify it as of July 1936, at which time I presented to a conference held between Foreign Ministry and Army officials a policy for managing the matter. The revisions in the Pact were agreed to by the Army officials. But at the same time I presented to the Army officials my views of the necessity of concurrently undertaking negotiations for an Entente Cordiale with Great Britain. War Minister Torauchi became angry at this suggestion, and it was only after making great efforts to persuade him that I obtained his agreement to undertaking negotiations toward the rapprochement with England. The general outline of what I had in mind, modelled on the familiar treaties of consultation, is shown by the memorandum prepared at the time (Exhibit 3267). While time was consumed in working on China affairs related to the negotiations with Britain, the Hirota Cabinet fell. Even after the fall of the Hirota Cabinet I continued my efforts to obtain agreement within the Foreign Ministry and to persuade the military authorities to start the negotiations with the British Government with a view to establishing closer relations. After formation of the Konoe Cabinet I requested of Foreign Minister Hirota that my appointment to an ambassadorship be postponed still further to enable me to work on the problem. Eventually an agreement was reached among the ministries concerned, and an instruction was sent to the ambassador at London to commence negotiations; but at this point, when negotiations were about to be initiated, the China Affair broke out, in July 1937, bringing about the indefinite postponement of the Anglo-Japanese Pact question. My appointment in October following as Ambassador to Germany forced me to give up my design of bringing about closer Anglo-Japanese relations.

25. The prosecution seems inclined to make much of my attendance at meetings of the Privy Council and its committee at which the Anti-Comintern Pact was considered. The responsibility for the management of this matter relative to the Privy Council was joint, shared by the Treaty Bureau and the European- Asiatic Bureau, and in this case the director of the Treaty Bureau undertook the explanations; I made none. In any event, a bureau director in attendance on such occasions has in no way any part in the debates nor in the vote and decision.
In fact, the record shows that explanation of the Anti-Comintern Pact to this Privy Council Committee was made by the Premier and the Foreign Minister. I made no explanation, said nothing, nor did I speak at any meeting of the committee or of the full Privy Council which treated of the matter.

26. The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by Germany and Japan in Berlin in November 1936. Italy was not an original signatory of the Anti-Comintern Pact, coming in only in November 1937—and was never a party to the secret protocol. Although the prosecution have denominated me one of those "most instrumental in the realization of ... Japanese-Italian collaboration," the negotiations which brought Italy into the Pact were carried on entirely in Europe and I took no part in the conduct of them. I was no longer handling the affairs of the European-Asiatic Bureau (and was in fact absent from Tokyo) when Italy's adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact was decided upon and took place; for in September 1937 my appointment to the German ambassadorship had already been informally decided upon, and the business of my bureau undertaken by my successor, Councillor Inoue. On 10 October I had left Tokyo for a trip of investigation in Manchoukuo (Defense Document No. 2866), and I had nothing to do with Italy's adhesion to the Pact.

27. The circumstances of my designation as Ambassador to Germany have already been mentioned. My appointment was dated 27 October; I left Tokyo on 21 November and arrived at Berlin one month later, on Christmas Eve of 1937. At that time, Japan had been attempting to solve the China Affair through the good offices of Germany, but the position of the German Government was extremely equivocal. Professing concern with strengthening friendly relations between the two countries, at the same time she had for many years had her military advisors in China, a great deal of arms and ammunition were sold to China, and it was even said that many German officers were training the Chinese army and directing the construction of military works, and were accordingly actually engaged in war against Japan, helping the Chinese. For that reason the stoppage of German aid to China was regarded by the Japanese Government as most important and my instructions from Foreign Minister Hirota on the occasion of my departure for Germany were to endeavor to effectuate the recall of the military mission and the stopping of the shipment of arms. My approach to the German officials on this subject was, as it is hardly necessary to emphasize, made in my character as Ambassador; I did not make policy, but merely carried it out in accordance with my instructions, by which the ambassador's field of action is inescapably bounded. My own opinion of the China Affair will be mentioned in the appropriate place.

28. The prosecution have attempted to make much of my talk with Foreign Minister von Neurath of 10 January 1938 (Exhibit No. 456-D) as proof of collaboration. I had called on him, as his memorandum shows, merely to tender the thanks of my Government for Germany's efforts by way of mediation between Japan and China (with the plan for mediation I had nothing to do, the negotiation having been conducted in Tokyo). He brought up the general question of the China Incident. It must be borne in mind that the policy of the Japanese Government of not dealing with Chiang Kai-shek and of fighting the incident to a military conclusion was just then under consideration by the Cabinet and had been substantially decided upon.
This policy, with the formulation of which I had no connection, was published to the world on 16 January, a few days after my conversation with von Neurath, as the "Honoe Declaration" (Exhibit No. 972-A). I had, however, had advance information from Tokyo of the imminent decision, and therefore naturally took it into account in stating to von Neurath the policy of the Japanese Government.

29. The problem of German-Japanese economic cooperation in China was the chief matter which occupied me during my brief service in Germany. I do not know whether it is necessary for me to say much concerning my part in these negotiations, for the evidence which has been produced to the Tribunal seems to tell about as well as it can be told the story of the absence of cooperation not only between the German officials and myself, but between the two Governments as well. In early 1938 I was instructed by the Foreign Ministry to commence negotiations with the German Government for conclusion of a trade agreement to try to rectify the unfavorable balance which Japan's trade with Germany showed under the arrangements then in effect. Negotiations started between Commercial Attaché Shudo and the Wilhelmstrasse. Then in May 1938 Foreign Minister Ribbentrop communicated to me his desire to make an agreement to the effect that Germans engaged in trade in North-China should be given substantially equal treatment in conditions of trade with Japanese traders. On receipt of this proposal I flatly declined to enter into any negotiations for the reason that I was not authorized to do so. Long before—immediately upon Ribbentrop's appointment as Foreign Minister, in February—I had had occasion to tell him that all important political and economic matters involving the Governments of Germany and Japan should be transacted exclusively by negotiations between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador or with their approval. Ribbentrop had definitely replied that he willingly agreed to this. As I found at this May meeting that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was still, despite his promise to me, discussing economic problems of China with others than the Embassy personnel directly concerned, I made little effort to conceal my dissatisfaction with his attitude. From about this time the discord between Ribbentrop and me became impossible to conceal.

30. Ribbentrop tried again, after some delay, to open negotiations on the trade-in-China question. This time he handed me a memorandum, similar to the earlier one, but with the substitution of "preferential" for "equal" treatment to be accorded to German nationals. This being the second time that the German Foreign Minister had proposed it, I transmitted this one to the Foreign Minister. With it, however, I sent my opinion that it would naturally result in violation of existing treaty obligations (I had in mind the Nine-Power Treaty) to grant to Germany anything other than most-favored-nation treatment in China, and that I therefore opposed it.

31. I received from Tokyo in response to my report of Ribbentrop's proposal instructions (Exhibit No. 2,228A) directing me to offer to Germany "the best possible preference" in economic matters in North China, and to promise that Germany's interests would be given preference over those of any third country. Nevertheless, being doubtful of the appropriateness of such measures, I tentatively narrowed down the proposal still further before presenting it, in the form of the Pro Memoriz, exhibit No. 591. I limited its terms to
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German "foreign trade" and offered, instead of "preferential" treatment, "benevolent" treatment, an altogether different thing from the preference which Ribbentrop had in mind, and substantially equivalent to the most-favored-nation treatment embodied in numerous existing international commercial agreements. As Ribbentrop himself states in his memorandum of our conversation (Exhibit No. 592), he considered my formula unsatisfactory. Negotiations continued without showing any progress, but my connection with them was cut short by my being ordered, on 15 October, to leave Berlin for Moscow as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. This story I shall now tell.

32. I had gradually become unpopular with Ribbentrop and the other German Nazi leaders, the reasons being my dislike of Nazism and its creed, due to their knowledge soon enough, and doubtless my lack of sympathy for the Anti-Comintern Pact likewise had become known. I was of course always solicitous for the betterment of Japan's relations with all powers, not excluding Germany; but my greatest efforts had always been directed toward improvement of relations with the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, and I always objected to any rapprochement with Germany at the expense of those paramount interests. From my knowledge of the strength of Germany gained during long residence there, I did not believe that Japan's future lay in alliance with Nazism and Fascism.

33. Beginning early in my tenure in Berlin, Military Attaché Oshima was negotiating with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop for the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact". These negotiations, as General Oshima has himself testified (Exhibit No. 197), were without my approval or participation—which is made clear also by the Kido Diary (Exhibit No. 2262). The negotiations were again in violation of Ribbentrop's assurance to me that he would deal only with the Ambassador in connection with important political and economic matters. The very good reason for my being ignored in this matter was my known strong opposition to any project of the sort. Europe was now in a state of increasing tension, and the danger was clearly apparent that Japan would, if tied by alliance to Germany, be involved in an imminent war. I emphasized to the Foreign Minister the danger to which a Japanese-German-Italian alliance would expose Japan. The reinforcement of the Anti-Comintern Pact meant a three-power alliance. At last Ribbentrop presented to General Oshima a draft of an agreement, which was sent on to Tokyo by Major-General Kasahara as a courier, and only thus became known to the Foreign Minister (Exhibit No. 197). Having been informed of this fact, I cabled to the Foreign Minister registering my opposition to the project as one which was most undesirable and should be forestalled promptly for the reason that a tripartite alliance would not, as its supporters argued, contribute to the solution of the China affair, but rather would involve Japan in an imminent war in Europe; but the Foreign Minister notified me that the decision had been made by a conference of five ministers to have the Military Attaché formally make a proposal with a view to proceeding with negotiations on the German proposal. I answered with my objections to a tripartite pact, pointing out the difficulties in and disadvantages of cooperation with such a dictator as Hitler. The result of my sending this cablegram was that I received shortly afterward a request from the Foreign Minister to assent to my transfer to the post of Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
34. My position was then somewhat peculiar. The Moscow post had long been my ambition; and I was certainly not, in the usual sense, a success in Berlin. It was, however, obvious that my removal from Berlin would facilitate the realization of the course of action which I had feared and fought against. It felt that by remaining there I might be able to exert some influence upon the militarists, and might even be able to sabotage the military-alliance scheme. I therefore requested the Foreign Minister to leave me in Berlin for the time being. A second and more peremptory request for my assent came the following day, to which I could only submit. I was appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union on 15 October, and left Berlin for Moscow on the 27th.

35. My transfer to Moscow naturally ended my connection with Japanese-German affairs. The further negotiations and the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance itself, were entirely outside my sphere. I had occasion only once to have even semi-official connection with these questions. This was when in February 1939, some time after my transfer to Moscow, I met in Berlin with Ambassadors Oshima and Shiratori and with Minister Itō, who had been sent to Berlin to convey the opinion of Tokyo concerning the question. I had received a telegram from Ambassador Oshima saying that he was requesting Foreign Ministry permission to call a meeting in Berlin, on the occasion of the arrival of the Itō mission, of all Ambassadors stationed in Europe; but as transportation to Berlin was slow, I could not wait for advice from Tokyo, and left for Berlin to attend the meeting after advising the Foreign Ministry. Upon my arrival there I found that the Ministry had disapproved the conference, and I therefore merely had dinner with Ambassadors Oshima and Shiratori who were there, and later called on Minister Itō, who was sick in his hotel-room. In conversation with the two Ambassadors I repeated my fixed views in opposition to this alliance, and I urged Mr. Itō to go home promptly to prevent the conclusion of such a pact, as it would bring disaster to Japan.

36. The prosecution have attempted to prove, by presentation of a memorandum of Knoll of the German Foreign Office of a conversation in June 1940 with Ambassador Kurusu, that my opinion in the matter of German-Japanese alliance had undergone a change, and that Ambassador Kurusu knew of my opinions. It is true that I did once, in May 1940, see him while I was Ambassador in Moscow and he in Berlin, but we did not discuss this matter, and I could never have expressed to him such an opinion as Knoll records, for I did not hold it. A perusal of the original record of Knoll shows, beyond any question, that Mr. Kurusu did not state to him as his opinion or mine the conclusion which the prosecution have drawn.

37. The Tripartite Alliance (Exhibit No. 43), was signed while I was still in Moscow as Ambassador (Defense Document No. 1280), and I had nothing to do with it. As the Tribunal has already heard, it was signed in such secrecy that a very few even in the Government knew of it beforehand (Exhibit No. 2744A). For convenience, I may mention here my later connection with Japanese-German matters. The Anti-Comintern Pact was renewed and extended for a further term of five years on 25 November 1941, when I was Foreign Minister (Exhibit No. 495). This was nothing more than the continuance of the policy which had been in effect since 1936, the date of the original pact, and the Government had already been committed to it by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, when he visited Berlin in the spring of 1941.
Moreover, I was successful at that time in obtaining the abrogation of the secret protocol, the part of the Pact most likely to exacerbate the sensibilities of the U.S.S.R. Further, in 1945, during my second terms as Foreign Minister, at the time of the formation of the Dönitz régime in Germany there was opinion in some quarters that the Anti-Comintern Pact, having other signatories, should not be terminated. At that time I urged—and again my view prevailed—that all political agreements with Germany be abrogated, the Anti-Comintern Pact included, particularly in view of the necessity of not giving offense to the Soviet Union, as well as the desirability, which I had always insisted on, of dissociating our foreign policy from that of Nazi ideology. This was done, on 15 May 1945.

38. The no-separate-peace treaty among Japan, Germany and Italy was concluded in 1941, when I was Foreign Minister (Exhibit No. 51). The treaty was concluded on 11 December, but of course the negotiations for it had begun before the outbreak of war with America and Britain (Exhibits Nos. 60h–607). It will be seen, however, that those negotiations were undertaken only when the consummation of the Japanese-American negotiations had come to appear all but hopeless, and that they were undertaken only as a precautionary measure in case worse came to worst—all of which will be treated of more fully later. As to the Japanese-German-Italian military operational agreement signed on 18 January 1942 (Exhibit No. 491), it was planned and concluded exclusively among the military authorities of the three powers. I had no knowledge of its conclusion or contents beforehand, but was simply notified of it later by the High Command, and then only of the fact that operational zones had been established; the Tribunal doubtless understands that military operations plans, such as this, were not confided to civilians, no matter what their rank or position. Lastly, I am charged with German-Japanese collaboration as a member of the three-power committee established under the provisions of the Tripartite Pact (Exhibit No. 127). The Pact itself provides that the Foreign Ministers of the contracting powers shall be ex officio members of such committees in the respective countries, and it was as Foreign Minister of Japan, not as an individual of any particular ideology or views, that I became a member. The Committee had, in Japan at all events, only a nominal existence, and never met while I was in office.

IV.

British and American Relations and the Pacific War

39. Up to the time of becoming Foreign Minister in the Tōjō Cabinet I had had little direct contact with American and British affairs. It is true that the European-Asiatic Bureau, of which I had once been director, had to do with British affairs (and the predecessor European-American Bureau with American affairs); the Japanese-American and Japanese-English relations of those days, however, mostly related to problems of China and Manchuria, and in consequence were almost entirely the concern of the East Asiatic Bureau, which had to do with those affairs. But of course a Japanese foreign policy could never be conceived to ignore relations with the two dominant powers, and having served and travelled in those countries and acquired considerable knowledge of their conditions and the characteristics of their people, I had long considered ideas con-
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corning Japanese relations with Britain and the United States. The specific American and British policy which I had set forth in my 1933 document (Defense Document No. 146) was, owing to the greatly changed situation, obsolete; but I still had confidence in the principles which had inspired that policy. I did not enter the Tojo Cabinet to strive for domination of the world, which I had never dreamed of, nor for the annihilation of America and Britain nor their expulsion from East Asia. My intention in accepting the Foreign portfolio was to work for improved relations which would lead to an enduring peace with those countries, and to settle somehow the interminable China Affair; but in October 1941, at all events, the obvious immediate policy could only be to avert war.

40. Before accepting the post of Foreign Minister in the Tojo Cabinet, I had in effect no correct knowledge of the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations—for although nominally still an ambassador in active service, in fact I had had no post since my return from the USSR in November 1940, and was in all but name living in retirement. I know that negotiations designed to effect an improvement in relations with the United States and Great Britain had been in progress since Ambassador Nomura's arrival in America, and from Foreign Ministry friends I occasionally heard the outlines of the subject-matter; but the whole subject was highly secret (it was "State Secret", and heavy penalties were imposed by law for revealing such information to any but the small circle of high officials entitled to access to it), and I knew and could know nothing concrete concerning it, except that evidently relations were gradually deteriorating, a process which if unchecked might lead Japan into a disastrous war.

41. However, I did know at the time of assuming the post of Foreign Minister enough of Japanese diplomatic and internal political history to be fully aware of the impotence of the foreign minister of Japan even within the field of foreign relations which was outwardly his charge. The position of the foreign minister in the Japanese system differed so radically, in both theory and practice, from that of the equivalent official in most other modern nations that I should like to emphasize certain facts in connection with the matter, for without full comprehension of this question my position cannot be understood.

42. On the one hand, the foreign minister is not solely charged, even within the cabinet or the government itself, with responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. This is apparent from the Constitution itself, according to which the ministers are collectively responsible to the Throne (full explanation of this point has also been made to the Tribunal by former Minister of Welfare Okada Tadahiko Record, p. 17,752 and former director of the Legislative Bureau Moriyama [Defense Document No. 2755], with the collective responsibility has come its corollary, collective management of affairs; but subject to still another growing tendency of recent years, in every country, that of the Premier to assume more and more power over all affairs of state, including foreign affairs. On the other hand, it has to be noted that in Japan the government itself has undergone within the past fifteen years a progressive weakening of its power vis-à-vis the High Command of the Army and the Navy. The Tribunal is well aware of the independence which by virtue of long custom and the Constitutional provisions was enjoyed by the
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High Command; but what I wish to emphasize especially is
the gradual, sometimes imperceptible, but unceasing encroach-
ment by the High Command upon the sphere of action of the
government. By virtue of the assertion that such matters
bore directly upon their special concern of national defense,
the High Command had come to have the power even in time of
peace to force acceptance of its proposals in matters of
budgets, national finance, industry, education and other fields,
as well as foreign affairs. The Foreign Minister, on the other
hand, had no means of knowing the military strength of the
country, and even in the field of foreign affairs was quite
powerless to block any measures insisted upon by the military.

13. In the atmosphere of war of the ten years since the
Manchuria Incident the military had wielded increasingly
strong influence over foreign affairs, and the area within
which a foreign minister could influence the national policy
had become very much circumscribed indeed. As examples of
this process, most of which are already familiar to the
Tribunal, I might mention the following. The testimony of
Baron Shidehara, Foreign Minister at the time of the Manchuria
Incident, has shown how powerless he was to influence the de-
cision of the high national policy where war questions were
involved. After the commencement of the China Incident there
was an increasingly strong opinion in military circles that
the Foreign Ministry should be restricted as far as possible;
at that time occurred the establishment of the Kôain (China
Affairs Board), one of the manifestations of the design to
deprive the Foreign Ministry of more and more of its responsi-
bility, protest against the creation of which was a main reason
leading Foreign Minister Ugaki (himself a retired full general
of the Army) to resign his office. Examples of the Foreign
Minister's being ignored in the taking of the most serious
decisions affecting the national policy were numerous in the
period leading up to the Pacific War. Thus (as I learned for
the first time in this Tribunal) in the spring of 1941 mili-
tary currency was already being printed for use in a possible
war, without consultation with the Foreign Ministry, notwith-
standing this currency was to be used in foreign countries,
and accordingly might be expected to call for consultation with
the Foreign Ministry. Again, on 17 October, upon the occasion
of the resignation of the third Konoe Cabinet, the Lord Keeper
of the Privy Seal called in the outgoing War and Navy Ministers--
but not the Foreign Minister--urging them to a review of the
Imperial Conference decision of 6 September and to come to
agreement between Army and Navy on a basic national policy for
the most serious question which can face a nation--war or
peace (Exhibit No. 1153).

14. It was in these conditions that I was asked by
Premier-Designate Tôjô on 17 October 1941 to assume the post of
Foreign Minister. Knowing these things very well, and knowing
that it was the strong stand of the Army, as expressed through
Minister of War Tôjô, which had directly brought about the down-
fall of Prince Konoe's last cabinet, I was at some pains to
assure that as Foreign Minister I would have scope for action.
Therefore, I told General Tôjô, when I called upon him at his
request at about 11:30 on the night of 17 October, that before
coming to any decision whether to accept the portfolio I must
first be informed of the situation which had brought about the
fall of the preceding cabinet. After hearing his explanation
I said that in the event that the Army's stand was to be un-
compromising, if even only on the question of the stationing of
troops in China, the negotiations would to a certainty end in a breakdown. Since in that case the continuance of negotiations would be meaningless, I said that if the new cabinet was to be formed on the basis of such a prospect I should have to reject the proffered portfolio of Foreign Affairs. I made it quite plain that I would agree to enter the cabinet only if the Army consented to make considerable allowances in reviewing the question of troop-stationing, and as well to re-examine the other questions in the Japanese-American negotiations—in short, only if the Army genuinely intended to facilitate the consummation of these negotiations on a rational basis. In response to my statement of my position, General Tojô assured me that reconsideration of the various questions involved in the negotiations including that of the stationing of troops in China, might be undertaken. On this assurance, I agreed to accept the Foreign Ministership, and on the following day, 18 October 1941, the investiture ceremony was held and the Tojô Cabinet was organized. There has been some mention during this trial of a "clique" centering around General Tojô. I did not and do not know whether such a clique existed; but in this connection it may be worth-while for me to state the extent of my acquaintance with General Tojô and some of the other defendants. So far as my memory serves, I had met General Tojô, prior to 17 October 1941 when he called me in and requested me to accept the portfolio of foreign affairs, twice: the first time (though he does not remember this and I am vague concerning the details of time and place) in 1935, when he was chief of the Temporary Investigation Section of the War Ministry; and again in Heining, in 1937, during my visit of inspection to Manchoukuo. In Heining we met only with a group of people, never tōto-a-tōte. We never had more than this bowing acquaintance; I knew nothing, before entering his Cabinet, of his personality or outlook and he, I suppose, nothing of mine. I was not selected as Foreign Minister by reason of any personal relations with the premier, for none existed, but (I assume—I never knew the facts) as a senior of the Foreign Ministry eligible in the normal course for the place. Three of the other defendants (Dohihara, Hashimoto and Hata) I met for the first time when we were confined in Sugamo Prison; three others (Generals Kimura, Mutô and Satô) after I became Foreign Minister. The rest I had known for varying periods; but the only ones who could be said to be more than official acquaintances were the defendants Hirota and Shigemitsu of the Foreign Ministry. With some of the others I had had occasion to come into more or less frequent official contact. General Öshima I first met in Berlin, when I was appointed Ambassador and found him there as Military Attaché.

45. Concurrently with the Foreign Affairs portfolio, I took over that of Overseas Affairs, concerned with Japan’s overseas possessions and colonies and emigration. In my brief connection with that office—I was Minister only to 2 December 1941—I conducted no business whatever of the Ministry. So far as I remember, I was on the premises of the Ministry three times—once to be welcomed after investiture as Minister; once when I dropped in in passing to look about; and finally to say goodbye to the officials upon quitting the ministership. The Ministry was capably operated by the Vice-Minister, who had been with it since I was a mere bureau, and I was entirely too busy with the Japanese-American negotiations during October and November 1941 to devote any attention to its affairs—aside from the fact that I knew nothing about them. With this, I shall say no more concerning the Ministry of Overseas Affairs.
As I have mentioned above, I had not been informed of the details of the course of the Japanese-American negotiations, which were high state secrets. I had, for example, absolutely no knowledge of the Imperial Conference decision of 2 July, which affected a decisive change in the course of Japan's policy; while regarding the decision of 6 September, which had driven diplomacy into a corner, I had only vague knowledge, nor was I familiar with the proceedings of the 14 October cabinet meeting, which had made the fall of the Konoe Government inescapable. I felt the need at the very outset to acquaint myself in detail with the negotiations which had gone before, by reference to the documents and papers relating to them, and this I did immediately upon my assumption of office. My chief reference data for this purpose were the cables from Washington reporting Ambassador Nomura's negotiations, the copies of cables from the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy and the "Opinion" of Foreign Minister Toyoda, Exhibit No. 2916.

My first impressions upon examining the proposals which had been advanced by the two parties to the negotiations, and the correspondence between the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Washington, were about these: First, that while basically Japan's position had been one of endeavoring to secure the stability of the Far East taking into consideration the actual conditions resulting from the events which had occurred since the Manchuria Incident, that of the United States had been one of not paying due regard to those conditions, which fundamental and almost unbridgeable difference in the viewpoints of the two countries had brought the negotiations virtually to a stalemate. Second, there was an extraordinary situation in that although Japan had in the course of the negotiations made considerable concessions from the desire to settle the China Incident which had so long been an embarrassment to her, nevertheless the positions of the two nations could be truly said to be farther apart by October than in April. This was owing to the United States having taken a progressively stronger stand—gradually from about June, than after the Japanese advance into southern French Indo-China in July more rapidly cooling toward the negotiations. Thirdly, it was generally understood in Tokyo at that time that the agreement in principle which had been reached with the United States on two of the three basic questions in the negotiations—the Tripartite Pact question and that of non-discriminatory treatment in trade in China—had already been agreed; Premier Konoe himself told me that, based on the reports from Ambassador Nomura, such was the situation; it therefore appeared that there remained only one large point of contention—the stationing of troops in China—between the United States and Japan.

Since the days of the second Konoe Cabinet, the Japanese-American negotiations had been managed in the Liaison Conference between the Government and the Imperial General Headquarters. The Liaison Conference has been much discussed in the evidence here, but I do not believe that its nature and power have been made sufficiently clear. I wish therefore to give the following explanation. The Liaison Conference, which has no standing as a constitutional organ of government, dated from the time of the First Konoe Cabinet, when it became necessary to establish some liaison between the military High Command and the Cabinet, each of which was responsible directly to the Emperor. I repeat, the Conference as such has no constitutional existence, and its decisions had in a formal sense no weight. But since the decisions were treated at that time
as being binding so far as concerned those present (Premier, Chiefs of Army and Navy General Staffs, Army and Navy Ministers, Foreign and Finance Ministers and President of the Planning Board normally; occasionally other ministers as required), in practice they had great weight. Since the Army and Navy Vice-Chiefs of Staff were almost always in attendance before the war, and since of the three secretaries of the Conference (Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Directors of Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus) two were military men, it can be seen how strong the military influence in the Conference was. Indeed, the fact of the establishment of such a conference is proof of the fact that the military authorities were not only interfering in politics but were exercising such influence as to control and direct the national policy, and that some coordination was needed; but while the military members of the Liaison Conference exercised great influence on affairs of state, the civilian members exercised very little or none on military affairs, and were not allowed even knowledge of military operations. Decisions of the Liaison Conference involving affairs of state had of course to be presented to the Cabinet—and, in proper case, to an Imperial Conference—but in almost no instance did such a decision fail to pass through the Cabinet in the form in which the Conference had adopted it. Of course drafts of the decisions of the Liaison Conference were always prepared beforehand—the matters examined by the staffs of the ministries concerned and coordinated by the three secretaries before they were submitted to the Conference; hence the matters to be passed upon were known in advance to the ministers and high officials of the ministries concerned, which facilitated their approval by the Cabinet.

In accordance with the well-established custom which had prevailed since the days of the second Kooee Cabinet, at that time all explanations to the Throne of deliberations and decisions of the Liaison Conference on questions involving peace or war were made by the Premier, the Foreign Minister reporting only on the diplomatic negotiations themselves.

49. Thus immediately after the formation of the new cabinet, meetings of the Liaison Conference again began to be held almost continuously, undertaking the most thorough reconsideration from every point of view of Japanese policy and its adjustment to the Japanese-American negotiations. To understand the situation of those days, it is necessary to bear in mind the state of opinion in Japan. The United States, Britain and the Netherlands had ruptured economic relations with Japan in July, and were known to be strengthening their measures of cooperation directed against Japan, thus making it appear, rightly or wrongly, that those Governments regarded a war as highly probable and were anticipating its outbreak. Japan was then engaged in a war with China which had been in progress for over four years (or, in another way of looking at it, since 1931). With all public opinion which manifested itself approving of and supporting Japan’s course during and since the Manchurian Incident, it was unthinkable for any cabinet even to consider ignoring all of the changed conditions which had resulted from those years of warfare, as the United States was demanding of us—In fact, no Japanese, even those of us who had most strongly opposed aggressive courses, felt that we should do so. Indeed, the strong-policy advocates were already before the inauguration of the Tojo Cabinet declaring with finality that there was no prospect of a settlement with the United States, and insisting that measures of self-defence be taken without further loss of time.
50. My position at that time will be apparent from the conversation which I had had with Premier Tsujo at the time of his offering me the Foreign portfolio; it was my desire to bring the negotiations to successful consummation without fail, for the sake not only of Japan but of the world. It was, of course, clear from the outset that the military authorities held strong views concerning the Japanese-American negotiations but I believed that there was still some prospect of saving the negotiations and ensuring the continuation of peace and a settlement which would be to the benefit of both countries. Since, however, from the time of the previous Konoe Cabinet all basic matters concerning the Japanese-American negotiations, were discussed and decided upon by the Liaison Conference; so in fact the Foreign Ministry was restricted in its conduct of foreign affairs to what was discussed with and gained the approval of the High Command in the Liaison Conference. One of the first steps that I took to further the Japanese-American negotiations was a removal from the Foreign Ministry of a number of officials who were urging the adoption of a strong policy toward Britain and the United States and were trying to guide foreign policy in an unsound direction, even going to the extent of conspiring with or catering to the radical elements of the Army and the Navy to achieve this. This had gone so far that many of the moderates of the Ministry, who constituted the great majority, had come to shrink from expressing their views, and their influence was declining, which not only disturbed the execution of a sound foreign policy in general, but in my judgment was likely to have a direct effect for the worst on the Japanese-American negotiations. I therefore determined to eliminate the radical elements from the service, and instructed Vice-Minister Nishi to carry out such a purge, the details of which have been testified to (Defenso Document No. 2741). The result of my action was, I think, that the discipline of the Foreign Ministry personnel was effectively restored to a condition where we could exert all our efforts for the success of the negotiations without being distracted by internal dissention.

51. As I have said, the Liaison Conference meetings began immediately upon installation of the new cabinet. At the first meeting, on 23 October, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Sugiyama, emphasized the need of hastening a decision. The intent of the 6 September decision of the Imperial Conference, he asserted, was that during the month of September diplomacy should be accorded primary emphasis and military preparations subordinated, but that from the beginning of October preparations for military operations would be the primary and diplomacy the secondary concern. Thus I soon found that despite the understanding that the 6 September decision would be reexamined, the High Command's unceasing acceleration of preparatory military actions as well as its strong stand on the conditions of the negotiations, were to be an obstacle to the management of the negotiations throughout. At the time that I became Foreign Minister and a participant in the Liaison Conference the only other changes in its membership were the Ministers of Navy, Shimada, and Finance, Kaya. There is a sort of momentum which must be reckoned with in such a case; not only did those who had been members of the Conference longer exercise greater influence in its deliberations than did newcomers, but they were also unable entirely to free themselves from the history of the matters discussed. Their approach to the reexamination of the 6 September decision, therefore, was to take that decision as a basis and to study what revisions of it could be made; and there was a strong feeling that it...
should not easily be changed. At the same meeting of the Liaison Conference—the first—the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant-General Tsukada, was even more pessimistic and more intransigent: he saw, he said, no possible prospect of a successful outcome of the Japanese-American negotiations, and in view of the fact that Britain and America had already ruptured economic relations and strengthened their encirclement of Japan, those should be broken off at once and action taken in self-defence. I opposed this position of the High Command vigorously, insisting that if there were means of breaking the deadlock it was necessary that all of them be tried; and I declared that since there was room to try them, it would be an error to be over-hasty in taking military action now. With the object of reconciling these sharply-conflicting viewpoints the Liaison Conference studies went on, with reconsideration and study continuing every day, sometimes through the night and into the early hours of the morning; debate often developed into heated argument; no effort was spared for minute and careful discussion of the problems on hand.

52. There had been three major points of difference between the two Governments: the Tripartite-Pact question, that of non-discriminatory access to trade in China, and that of the stationing of Japanese troops in China. It then appeared, from the report of Ambassador Nomura, that of these the first two had reached a point of understanding where agreement would readily be reached (exhibit No. 2906). I therefore concentrated my efforts on persuading the Liaison Conference to agree to the making of such further concessions on what was considered the remaining outstanding problem—that of the stationing of troops in China—that agreement might be reached with America. My study of the subject had convinced me that it would be necessary to make some further advance toward the American position, the best method of approach to which was by adopting as a basis the conditions which my predecessor, Foreign Minister Toyoda, had regarded as offering the possibility of agreement (Exhibit No. 2916), and then endeavoring to get agreement on new proposals. I therefore worked to secure agreement by the Liaison Conference upon a program developing those points. There was at that time a wide gulf between the positions of the two parties in the Japanese-American negotiations, and it was agreed by all that it would require a radical, almost revolutionary, change in the American attitude for any prospect to appear of settlement on the basis of the minimum demands contained in the 6 September decision. From the beginning, however, the majority of the participants in the Liaison Conference opposed the adoption of the principle of withdrawal of troops from the specified areas of China, and I had to fight unceasingly for it; the Army members especially strongly emphasized the necessity of indefinite stationing of Japanese troops in specified areas of China. In the end, as a result of my strong contention that it was improper and disadvantageous to station troops indefinitely on the soil of another country, the others relaxed their stand to the extent of agreeing with me in putting a time-limit on the stationing. As to the duration, however, various strong opinions were still presented. I first proposed the same time-limit as that suggested by Foreign Minister Toyoda, five years. I could obtain no support for this, and then suggested eight years and ten years, also without success; there were even suggestions in the Conference of setting a 99-year period, or one of 50 years. Finally twenty-five years was agreed upon as an approximate limit. It will be observed that the actual proposal (Proposal "A") to the United States did not mention the twenty-five year period, but limited the time only
This was because it was felt that at that stage the whole negotiation might be upset if doubts over details were injected into it. The twenty-five year "approximate goal" was therefore given to Ambassador Nomura to be used in case of inquiry by the United States; but I had a talk privately with the Premier, and reached an understanding with him that if we found the United States to be in a receptive mood toward Proposal "A", in general, still further moderation of its terms might be considered. I did succeed in winning agreement to limiting the stationing of troops in the geographical sense, by having excluded from the areas where troops would be stationed the Shanghai triangular area, Amoy and others; this too was achieved only after a struggle, for there was opinion by the military and naval authorities that we should retain the right to station troops at all the points specified by the 1940 treaty between Japan and the Wang Ching-wei régime.

53. A related problem was that of French Indo-China. Admiral Toyoda's proposal in this connection was that of no further increase of Japanese troops in Indo-China, in view of the apprehension entertained by the United States over the threat of Japanese military advance to the south with Indo-China as a springboard. With respect to this point also I prevailed upon the Army to agree, in pursuance of the main object of avoiding war, that upon the reaching of an agreement with the United States all troops would be immediately withdrawn from southern French Indo-China--a greater concession than that proposed by Foreign Minister Toyoda. With respect to this point also I prevailed upon the Army to agree, in pursuance of the main object of avoiding war, that upon the reaching of an agreement with the United States all troops would be immediately withdrawn from southern French Indo-China--a greater concession than that proposed by Foreign Minister Toyoda. In this matter, too, the opposition was strong; I won my point here and on the time-limit for stationing of troops in China only by threats to resign if this much scope for diplomatic action was not allowed me.

54. Persuading the Liaison Conference to agreement on these two major points was not achieved without long and arduous work--for, despite the "wiping the slate clean" which was often spoken of, practically it was not possible to ignore entirely the past course of affairs, and the limitation imposed by the 6 September decision upon diplomatic action did still subsist, at least that part which was a fait accompli--namely, that the period up to the middle of October had passed, and the increasing military preparations which had been carried out had given rise to a feeling among the military that Japan would not be defeated if war came. This constituted a great obstacle to the reexamination of the 6 September decision or the determination of the conditions of further diplomatic negotiations. But while I had expected that the Army's stand on the making of concessions in the negotiations would be strong on, I was somewhat astonished, in view of the history of the matter, to find from the Liaison Conference discussions toward the end of October that of the Navy scarcely less strong. In view of this, on 30 October I sent a representative to Admiral Okada, veteran of the Navy and an ex-premier whom I thought had much influence in naval circles, to inform him of this situation and to request him to use his influence to moderate the stand of the Navy toward the negotiations.

55. By these efforts I finally succeeded in securing consent of the Liaison Conference to my presenting the Proposals "A" and "B", which were approved at the Imperial Conference of the 5th. The plan of these two proposals was my own idea,
but subject to modifications as above mentioned, and in the form adopted represented the utmost concessions which at that time could be wrung from the military authorities.

56. In addition to the question, already discussed, of whether and on what basis to continue the negotiations with the United States, there was another which was never absent from the background of the Liaison Conference discussions. This was the question of what Japan's policy should be if the negotiations failed in the end. This question first became explicit at the all-night session of 1-2 November, when there was a heated discussion of it and I again insisted with all possible force on avoiding war. To me it seemed of paramount importance to avoid war at almost any cost; I had seen the after-effects of World War I, in Europe, and knew that modern warfare would bring still greater suffering and misery to the peoples of the belligerent countries, and I felt that only by steady, sound development, avoiding sudden expansion or war, could civilization progress. I therefore insisted that even if the negotiations should fail and we should be forced to war, that even in such circumstances we should exercise patience and forbearance and await a changed situation. The military representatives retorted with the utmost vehemence that Japan must fight sooner or later, unless the negotiations could be concluded, for the reason that Japan's dependence upon imports of supplies, especially petroleum, was so great that with economic blockade of Japan in progress the gradual exhaustion of Japan's resources was apparent, and that if after our stockpiles had fallen to a minimum additional pressure were applied to enforce demands made by the United States and Britain relative to China or other problems we would have no alternative but complete submission without being able to fight. In this connection, a suggestion was made that perhaps we could continue with economic relations ruptured, assuring a supply for our needs by the production of synthetic oil. I concurred in the suggestion and argued in support of it, but the opinion of the Planning Board was that reliance could not be placed on synthetic petroleum, for Japan's production of iron and coal was insufficient, and their use for manufacture of petroleum would be at the sacrifice of other vital industries. The Board's opinion was also that, in view of the amount of equipment and other materials needed, it would if it were attempted be four or five years before annual production of four million tons could be attained. Thus the overwhelming opinion of the Liaison Conference was that though there might be a possibility of the international situation's turning in our favor if we exercised patience and watched the development of affairs until the spring of 1942, nevertheless in view of the gradual exhaustion of our stockpiles and the operational disadvantages which would come with delay, the prospect of the negotiations must be definitely ascertained while the situation was still favorable to Japan, and that if they were to fail we must go to war without further loss of time. The general feeling was, throughout this period, that the United States was conducting negotiations only to gain time for military preparations, and it was pointed out that from this cause also delay was disadvantageous to Japan.

57. The great majority of those attending the Liaison Conference were, as I have said, of the view that there was no alternative to war if negotiations failed. The Army High Command expressed confidence in victory in the overall prospect of the war. But the view of the Navy was that they were confi-
Denton of initial success; that though the situation after a year and a half or two years would depend on the general strength of the country and the international situation, we could establish an impregnable position in the South; and that since we could only go to war immediately if negotiation failed and since we would lose the opportunity of success unless we did so immediately, we should decide on that day the steps to be taken in case of failure of negotiations. As, however, it was clear to me that once a war with America and Great Britain began it would be a long war, I thought it a short-sighted view and a great mistake to depend much on the good prospects at the outset. I know, I said, something of the determination and indomitable spirit of the American and British people, and by embarking Japan upon a war with them, should we lose it, no matter if the other party was wrong, we would be inviting disaster to our country. I therefore specifically asked the War and Navy Ministers for their views on the over-all prospect of a war.

58. The War Minister, Tsuruta, replied by saying that the prospects were certain that not only success at the outset but also victory in the war as a whole could be won. Navy Minister Shimada said that there was no need for pessimism; and the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano, stated, in addition to reiterating the necessity of immediate decision, that the Navy had every confidence in its ability to carry out interceptive operations, and that if the United States fleet should venture northward from the Central Pacific the Japanese Navy could and would destroy it, in the area of the Mandated Islands.

59. After the all-night discussion on 1-2 November the majority agreed that if the negotiations on the basis of Proposals "A" and "B" failed Japan would decide upon war. However, the explanations of the military and naval authorities and of the Planning Board failed to satisfy me, and I was not willing to concur at once in the proposal to decide on war in case the negotiations failed. Therefore, despite the High Command's and the War and Navy Ministers' pressing for an immediate decision, at the conclusion of the Liaison Conference of 1-2 November I requested that I be given the night to think the matter over before giving my vote. Finance Minister Kaya joined me in this request.

60. I deliberated over the whole matter that night. Although I felt that something less than full credit should be accorded to the assurances of the military authorities, I could not refute their arguments, having no accurate data (all of which were military secrets) upon which to judge of the condition of the armed forces of Japan, nor of the national strength of Japan in other fields. All of the arguments from the viewpoint of the international situation had been fully considered. I had pointed out the vast material and spiritual strength of Britain and the United States, and I had insisted that no great expectation could be entertained of German assistance. I came to the conclusion that so far as concerned the views of the armed services on the prospects of war, I was in no position to refute them or disprove their factual basis, but had to take them on trust. The only remaining question was whether I might be able to bring about a change in the situation by my own resignation. In this connection I called, in the morning of 2 November, on former Premier Hirota, who was one of my seniors in the Foreign Ministry and from whom I had
received advice and assistance on other important problems. I explained to him the general situation, and told him that the Japanese-American question was in far more serious state than I had thought when I entered the Cabinet, and that there was great danger of war despite my resolution to succeed by diplomacy, and asked his opinion of whether there was a possibility of bringing about a change in the situation by my resignation. Mr. Hirota was opposed to the idea; if I resigned, he pointed out, a supporter of war might immediately be appointed Foreign Minister, therefore I should remain in office to do all that I could to maintain peace. Meanwhile, Vice-Minister Hishi, whom I had sent to learn the Finance Minister's decision, returned with the report that Mr. Kaya had reported to Premier Tojo his concurrence in the decision of the majority of the Liaison Conference. It seemed to me, considering all these factors, that there was nothing for me to do but agree; and I therefore called on the Premier around 12 o'clock and told him that I did so. I took the occasion, however, to secure his agreement to several suggestions which I made to him. One was that if the United States showed a receptive attitude toward either of our proposals, "A" or "B", he would support me in obtaining Japanese reconsideration of our maximum concessions, for the sake of the success of the negotiations. Premier Tojo also confirmed the agreement which I had obtained from the High Command in the Liaison Conference, that if negotiations should be successfully concluded, all military operations would be suspended and the original status restored. I told the Premier at that time that I would now continue the negotiations on the basis of Proposals "A" and "B", with the resolve that if they did end in failure I might consider resigning. The proposals were reported to the Cabinet meeting, with my explanation of how they had been decided upon by the Liaison Conference. The proposals were of course approved by the Cabinet, and also by an Imperial Conference on 5 November.

61. Proposals "A" and "B", which were approved by the Imperial Conference on 5 November, are already in evidence (Exhibits Nos. 1216 and 1215H). I felt that if the United States were willing to understand Japan's position and manifest a spirit of reciprocity, it might be quite possible to break the deadlock by agreement on the general lines of Proposal "A". By that time, however, matters had reached such a stage that settlement of all the outstanding problems at a stroke was likely to be difficult at best, and sure to be impossible if we encountered continued American insistence on their demands. It was for the purpose of avoiding a crisis by agreement on the most urgent matters calling for immediate solution that I had prepared Proposal "B" as well. The intention of Proposal "B" was, by restoring conditions to something resembling normal relations—to those prevailing before July—to create a calm atmosphere and remove the imminent threat of an outbreak of war.

62. Negotiations on the basis of the new proposals commenced in Washington on 7 November. The course of the negotiations in Washington has been fully testified to by the witness Yamamoto (Exhibit No. 2915), and I shall not repeat his explanations. The deliberations of the Liaison Conference, however, continued; it would be a happy solution if the impasse in the negotiations could be broken by the two new proposals, but in the light of the past attitude of the United States sufficient expectations of favorable reception could not be entertained to justify the abandonment of further study toward the evan­tuality of failure in the negotiations. Hence the Liaison
Conference discussions treated not only of the conduct of the
negotiations but also of measures to be taken in case of failure
of negotiations.

63. It was a little before this time that I discovered
that the condition of the negotiations was not quite what we had
all thought it. I have mentioned before that reports from
Washington had given reason to believe that the Tripartite-
 Pact and China-trade questions had already been all but settled.
The longer I studied the files, however, the less evidence I
could find of anything tangible to support this belief; and
finally I inquired directly of Ambassador Nomura. His answer
was that the reports to that effect had not been quite correct.
This naturally made the prospects of settlement even more remote, though I still had confidence that my Proposals "A" and
"B" were fair and reasonable, and hoped that the United States
might be persuaded to recognize that fact. It was at this
same time that I sent Ambassador Kurusu to assist Ambassador
Nomura in Washington. My motive in doing this was that of
having in Washington during that critical period an experienced
career diplomat to assist Ambassador Nomura in conducting the
negotiations. Since Ambassador Nomura had specifically requested
even before I became Foreign Minister that Ambassador Kurusu
be sent for the purpose (Exhibit No. 2921), and since Ambassador
Kurusu and I shared a sense of the importance of maintaining
good relations with the United States, he was the natural
choice for the purpose. On 3 November, therefore, I requested
him to accept the mission, which he did; I outlined to him
the situation prevailing and the imperative necessity of early
settlement of Japanese-American problems, war being unavoidable
if they failed, and requested him to convey this to Ambassador
Nomura and to cooperate with him to do their best for the success
of the negotiations, which he promised to do.

64. Again we encountered the time-limit. Since the be-
ginning of November the High Command representatives had
urged in the Liaison Conference necessity from operational
considerations that it be ascertained promptly whether the
negotiations would succeed or fail, and they had stated strongly
in the beginning of November that it must be made clear in the
course of that month what the prospect of the negotiations was.
It was necessary, they said, for them to make operational pre-
parations on the assumption that military action would be
commenced in the beginning of December should war become unavoidable. I argued against putting a time-limit to the nego-
tiations for the reason that it would hinder the diplomatic
activities greatly, and would be likely to prevent successful
conclusion of the negotiations, but I was overruled for reasons
of operational necessities. This time-limit imported an
additional difficulty into the negotiations; it was of course
because of it that the so-called dead-line was set in instruc-
tions to the Washington Embassy.

Military preparations were, of course, simultaneously being made over since the decision of 6 September but, they being
maters of operational secrets, no information concerning them
was given to the Liaison Conference. The civilian Cabinet
ministers who participated in the Liaison Conference were never
informed of the operational preparations, and never knew, for
example, that the Japanese fleet had assembled in and sailed
from Kikokappu Bay, or that the Southern Army Headquarters had
been formed and General Terauchi appointed its commander-in-
chief. As to the sailing of the fleet, it first came to my
knowledge after the termination of the war, from reading the newspapers. The fact that the first target of military operations was Pearl Harbor had never before the attack been communicated to me in the Liaison Conference or anywhere else, nor from any source whatever. I personally assumed that the Philippines and Malaya would be the first targets of military operations should a war occur, since in the Liaison Conference there had been in early November some mention by the High Command of what time would be required to occupy the Philippines and Malaya, and a remark by the Naval High Command to the effect that they were confident of victory in battle with the American fleet when it should come near Japan. I did not dream that the Japanese Navy would ever attack the American fleet in Pearl Harbor. The Navy High Command, when mentioning war prospects, always spoke of "luring out" the American fleet and destroying it "in the vicinity of the Mandated Islands"—see for example the 13 November Liaison Conference decision, Exhibit No. 919.

65. Proposal "A" did not gain American acceptance—did not, in fact, arouse any perceptible interest, contrary to our expectation. Proposal "B" was therefore—after I had secured assent of the Liaison Conference, of course—presented on 20 November. At first conditions appeared promising; when we learned that the American newspapers of the 25th were reporting the probability that a modus vivendi would be concluded, we assumed that it was on the basis of Proposal "B". It was on this assumption that I sent to the Embassy an instruction regarding the amount of oil which would be requested when an agreement was reached. The figure adopted in this instruction was much less than that suggested originally by the Army General Staff, owing to my insistence, and was approximately equivalent to the average of Japanese imports over several years (Exhibits Nos. 2944, and 3045).

66. On 26 November, in Washington, Secretary Hull handed his "ten-point" proposal to our Ambassadors. The cable from the Ambassadors summarizing Secretary Hull's note was received on the morning of the 27th. Almost simultaneously I received another cable from the Ambassadors giving their recommendation of a procedure for settling Japanese-American affairs by having President Roosevelt send a personal message to the Emperor and the Emperor reply, after which in the cordial atmosphere so created the Japanese Government should propose the neutralization of French Indo-China, Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. The Ambassadors requested that Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido be consulted concerning this proposal. The suggestion of the Ambassadors of the neutralization of three areas, implying the withdrawal of troops which would follow as the consequence, raised many complicated and difficult questions. Only after heated discussions and the threat of resignation in the Liaison Conference had I been able to obtain the consent of the military high command to the withdrawal of troops from southern Indo-China; in the circumstances prevailing it would have been impossible to secure a decision for withdrawal from all of Indo-China without any assurance of solution of such related questions as that of Japanese-Chinese peace, freezing of assets, and others. The recommendation of the two Ambassadors proposed only the neutralization of French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies and Thailand, and made no mention of the possibility of rescission of freezing of assets, deemed absolutely necessary by Japan, if it were adopted, nor of the United States' readiness to undertake mediation for peace between Japan and China, the
reaching, of which peace had been the fundamental reason for 
the stationing of Japanese troops in Indo-China. Moreover, it 
was clear that the two Ambassadors themselves had no confidence in 
the success of this procedure after receiving Secretary 
Hull's note on the 26th, for in their telegram dispatched 
shortly after the receipt of that note they reported that there 
was no prospect of reaching an agreement and advised measures 
to be taken in case freedom of action was resorted to (Exhibit 
No. 2919).

67. On the 27th there was a Liaison Conference at which 
the Hull note of 26 November was discussed. The reaction of 
all of us to it was, I think, the same. Ignoring all past pro 
cress and areas of agreement in the negotiations, the United 
States had served upon us what we viewed as an ultimatum contain­ 
ing demands far in excess of the strongest positions theretofore 
taken. We felt that clearly the United States had no hope or 
intention of reaching an agreement for a peaceful settlement, for 
it was plain to us and must have been plain to the Americans that 
this document demanded as the price of peace total surren 
der by Japan to the American position. Japan was now asked not 
only to abandon all the gains of her years of sacrifice, but 
to surrender her international position as a power in the Far 
East. That surrender, as we saw it, would have amounted to 
national suicide. The only other way to face this challenge 
and defend ourselves was war.

68. The following day, the 28th, I called on the Premier 
at his official residence fifteen minutes before the Cabinet 
meeting which was scheduled to convene at 10 A.M. I talked 
over with him and with Navy Minister Shimada, who appeared 
from the next room and joined us, the Ambassador's recommenda-

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...
had made public their development, and that the American press was saying that the decision of peace or war was in Japan's hands (Exhibit No. 2750). In reading this report, we felt that America was expecting war.

69. Now for the second time I considered resigning as foreign minister. I had at all times had the intention of resigning if by doing so I could further the Japanese-American settlement. Conditions were now, however (for reasons which I shall mention in a moment), basically different from those of early November when I had first considered resignation, and there seemed little likelihood that a change in foreign ministers could affect the situation. I did, nevertheless, ask for the advice of former Foreign Minister Katō, one of the Foreign Ministry seniors who had been much interested in the success of the negotiations, whether by resignation I could bring about a change of over-all policy by forcing a change of cabinet, and thus avoid war. He advised me against resignation, saying that there was no possibility that it could affect the situation—as did a few others whom I consulted concerning the matter. My reason for feeling at that time that resignation would be useless is as follows. Before, the question had been one of wringing from the military authorities agreement to the making of further concessions which might lead to a compromise of the Japanese and American positions; by resignation I might (I had thought) have been able to force a change of government in favor of one able to take a stronger stand against the demands of the military high command. Now, it appeared that no concessions which Japan could make would avail to reach an agreement with America; America evidently was no longer interested, if she ever had been, in any compromise; it was now, patently to everyone, a question of the self-defence of our nation. There remained only the faintest hope of a diplomatic settlement, and that hope was based on the possibility of American reconsideration; my resignation would in no way have assisted toward a settlement, but would only have been an escape from my responsibility. I therefore decided to stay on, work for every last chance to avoid war, and, should war break out, to do everything in my power for its earliest possible termination, in the interest of Japan and of the world.

70. As I have said, the feeling not only of myself but of all concerned in the matter was that after the Hull note of 26 November there was no hope for a settlement with the United States unless it could be persuaded to reconsider its newly-adopted extreme stand. I had felt earlier that war need not be the consequence of a failure of negotiations; I had been overruled, and submitted. But now it was a far broader question. The very existence of the Japanese nation was at stake, and I was compelled to agree that we must wage war, whatever the prospects, unless America would reconsider. At the Liaison Conference of 27 November, everyone had agreed on this, and there was no dissenting voice to the proposition that we must go to war. The meeting adjourned with the decision to present the recommendation to an Imperial Conference.

71. The Liaison Conference decision after consent by the Cabinet meeting of the following day, was presented to the Imperial Conference of 1 December and was there approved, the general feeling being that Japan had no alternative but to resort to self-defence. On the 29th there was a meeting of the Elder Statesmen, or ex-Premiers, concerning which there has been some testimony. There was a morning meeting called by the Government, and an afternoon audience with the Emperor. It
the morning meeting there were explanations made to the Elder Statesmen by the Premier and other cabinet ministers; the Premier's was of the reasons compelling Japan to resort to war, mine was confined to the Japanese-American negotiations, and was given in detail; ex-Premiers Wakatsuki and Hirota alone made inquiries concerning the negotiations, which I answered fully, as has been testified to by Admiral Okada (Exhibit No. 3229). No one present expressed the view that the American proposal should be accepted, at the afternoon meeting, held in the presence of the Emperor, Prince Konno especially stated that he was fully informed concerning the negotiations and approved of the efforts of the Government. He said that he agreed that there was no hope for the negotiations, in view of the recent United States proposal, but considered whether there was no way by perseverance to avert war. The Premier replied that the matter had been thought over again and again and studied most earnestly by us, and that the conclusion was that there was no other course than war.

72. On 1 December the actual decision to commence the war was made, by the Imperial Conference called for the purpose. Those present were all members of the Cabinet, Chiefs and Vice-Chiefs of Army and Navy General Staffs, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Directors of Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus, and the President of the Privy Council. Again explanations were made by the Premier (Exhibit No. 2954) of the circumstances compelling us to go to war, and by me of the negotiations and the impossibility of continuing them after the 26 November note (Exhibit No. 2955). Explanation of various other matters by the other Cabinet ministers and the High Command followed. There was then unanimous agreement on the necessity of going to war.

73. Even with the formal decision taken to go to war, there remained some hope, faint though it was, of reaching a solution through diplomacy. Japan had nothing new to offer; but there always remained the possibility that, especially if we took a strong stand—by manifesting no intention to yield to the American demands—the United States would repent of the finality with which its latest position had closed negotiations and, being willing to make a "peace with honor" for both sides would reconsider. For this reason I urged our Ambassadors in Washington to do what they could to obtain American reconsideration, and so reported to the Liaison Conference. Prior to the decision for war of 1 December, of course, I had already instructed the Ambassadors not to let negotiations lapse, which would have made certain the war which up to then was only probable. For continuing the negotiations in the only way that I could see open I am now charged with deceit and perfidy, with having kept up a pretense only to gain time to cloak the military preparations which were going forward. I have attempted to make it clear that it was never, at any time, on our side, a question of gaining time, but that rather I had the constant struggle to prevent precipitate action by the military High Commands—and not only I, but my predecessors had had this struggle throughout the Japanese-American negotiations, to delay military action and keep negotiations going. It seems to me yet that, even when war had been actually decided on, I would have been a traitor to my profession had I not tried to take advantage of any last hope for a peaceful settlement; and, as has already been testified (Exhibits Nos. 809 and 2915), I had secured the commitment of the High Command that if by any chance an agreement could yet be reached, all military plans would be canceled.
74. Meanwhile, there remained the important questions of procedure—how and when to notify the commencement of hostilities if we obtained no reconsideration from the United States and had to carry out the plan for war. These questions of procedure came up at the first Liaison Conference following the Imperial Conference. At this meeting I asked when operations would commence. General Sugiyama, Chief of the Army General Staff, said, "about next Sunday". I thoroughly said that it was appropriate that the usual and customary procedure be followed in regard to notifying the commencement of hostilities, which I had assumed would be done as a matter of course. I was immediately met, however, with the statement by Admiral Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, that the Navy wished to carry out a surprise attack, and by the demand by Vice-Chief Itô that the negotiations be left unterminated, in order that the war be started with the maximum possible effectiveness. I rejected this suggestion, replying that it was contrary to the usual practice and highly improper, and that such conduct would be disapproved of because, even if we were going to war, there would be a time when the war would come to an end and we would be a nation at peace again, and we should think of our national honor and repute against that day before committing irresponsible acts at the war's beginning. I had received a telegram from our Ambassadors in Washington actually discussing this very point and urging that if Japan was going to resort to "freedom of action" a notification of the breaking off of negotiations should be given also in Washington (Exhibit No. 2949); and I quoted this to the meeting to show that my suggestion was the natural and normal one and that notification was absolutely necessary as a matter of international good faith. However, Admiral Nagano continued to contend strongly that if we were to go to war we must win. None among the members came to my support; which is perhaps the best explanation for the fact that none of them now remembers this altercation. I was disgusted by the Navy's position, and took the initiative in adjourning the Conference, without any decision's having been reached. Immediately upon my arising from my seat Admiral Itô came to my place and pleaded with me to understand the difficult position of the Navy, and suggested that in any event the notice breaking off negotiations, if one must be given, be given to the American Ambassador in Tokyo, rather than in Washington. I refused, and we parted without any agreement. I felt, nevertheless, that he recognized that the Navy would have to agree to giving somewhere a notification of termination of negotiations before attacking.

75. Upon the opening of the following Liaison Conference Admiral Itô announced that the Navy had no objection to delivering the notification of termination of the negotiations in Washington, and requested that the notice be delivered at 12:30 P.M., 7 December, Washington time. No one opposed. I inquired whether that would leave a sufficient time before attack, and he said that it would. (I shall explain presently my conception of "a sufficient time"). It was therefore so agreed. My feeling was that after a hard struggle I had succeeded in stopping the Navy's demand, but had stopped it at the ultimate limit of international law. Since the end of the war—or, more precisely, since the beginning of this trial—the Navy has taken the line that nothing was ever further from their intention than to mean a "surprise attack" against the United States. It is clear that my testimony on this point, as in some other particulars of events leading up to the Pacific war, is in conflict with that of other defendants. The decision
between us is, of course, for the Tribunal. I have fought throughout my life for what I thought was right, and now at the end of it I am determined, for the sake of history as well as the purposes of this Tribunal, to the best of my ability and recollection to tell the full truth as it is known to me, neither attempting to evade responsibility which is mine nor accepting that which others would transfer to me.

76. This may be the opportune time to explain my understanding of the international law in regard to the question of commencement of hostilities. I am no scholar of international law, but of course as a diplomat throughout life I have made some study of the subject, and in December 1941 I saw the matter as follows. As I have attempted to make clear, my feeling, like that of all others concerned in the decision to wage war against the United States and the British Empire, was that the war was one of self-defence—clearly so under the broad interpretation of the scope of the right of self-defence laid down by the United States in those very Japanese-American negotiations—and I was aware that opinion existed that a war of self-defence required no giving of a declaration of war. I knew for example that when Hague Convention III was considered in the Peace Conference of 1907 the American delegate, General Porter, specially stated that the policy of the United States invested the President with the power to exercise the right of national self-defence at any time and place—and that the United States did not, apparently, regard the Convention as applicable in such a case, as was demonstrated when the punitive expedition was sent to Mexico in 1916 without the declaring of war by the Congress, it being explained as an act of self-defence. I knew also that Secretary of State Kellogg, in his note to all the nations participant in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, had said that the right of self-defence was above treaty provisions. But since international agreements did in their wording provide for (though international practice had largely ignored) the giving of a notice as the normal course, I thought it better in every way that that course should be followed even in a case where it might be superfluous, rather than that there should be any question of Japan's good-faith observance of international morality.

77. The notice which we proposed to and did serve upon the United States was not in terms a declaration of war. I considered a notice of termination of negotiations to be sufficient, and a compliance with international law in the situation of that time, for the following reasons. The Hull note of 26 November we regarded as being beyond any possible question an ultimatum from the United States—it offered to Japan the alternatives of abject surrender or war. Japan's answer to the American ultimatum, rejecting it, we felt to be sufficient as a notification that hostilities would be resorted to, and in effect a declaration of war. It seemed to me, in considering and approving the form of the final note, that it was in any point of view tantamount to a declaration of war: the expression "the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific...has finally been lost", I thought, clearly imported that peace was ended, with war to follow. I did not feel that the document would have been made any more unequivocally a declaration of war by the inclusion in it of such stock phrases as "a state of war exists between our countries" or the reservation of "freedom of action" which Admiral Oka has testified that he proposed (and which, by the way, I never saw or heard of); they would only have emphasized the obvious. The note as it stood being more plainly a declaration of war than the "ultimatum" contemplated by Hague.
Convention III, there was no room for such phraseologies. So far as I remember, the opinion is universally held among international-law scholars that no special form of words is necessary for a document to constitute a declaration of war, but that any language was sufficient which unequivocally expressed the intention (it was clearly in my mind that one of the most recent cases, France's declaration of war against Germany in 1939, France notified only the carrying out of her obligations to Poland). But, over and above all technical questions, it had been unmistakably clear for some time in Japan that rupture of the negotiations would lead to war, and I have no doubt that it was so understood in the United States as well. Hence we drew the notification in the form of a breaking-off of negotiations, which the Liaison Conference had authorized, and which was drawn in the full confidence that it would be understood as a declaration of war.

The draft of this final notification had, except for its final part, already been drawn, in the days after our receipt of the United States' note of the 26th. It was actually written, of course, by the American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry; but its contents were those dictated by the decisions of the Liaison Conference. After drafting by the Foreign Ministry in accordance with those decisions, the note was revised on the basis of the opinions of the Army and Navy officials interested; but the details of this have been testified to, and I need not repeat them. The draft note as eventually agreed upon was distributed to the members of the Liaison Conference at the meeting on 4 December, and approved by them, and also, no one dissenting, by the Cabinet meeting of the 5th, when I orally reported on the contents.

In the afternoon of 5 December the Vice-Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, General Tanabe and Admiral Itô, called on me. Upon entering my office Admiral Itô stated that it was the desire of the High Command to postpone delivery of the final note in Washington from 12:30, as previously agreed upon to 1 o'clock, and asked my consent. I feared that the time between notification and attack might be made too short, and asked why the change was desired. Admiral Itô said that he needed the postponement only because of his own miscalculation of the time. General Tanabe said that the Army's operations would commence after those of the Navy. I asked how much time was needed between notification and attack, but was told that the operational plans were secret and could not be disclosed. I then insisted on knowing whether the proposed arrangement left an adequate time before the attack, and upon receiving Admiral Itô's assurance that it did, I agreed to the change. On leaving, Admiral Itô remarked that he hoped the note would not be dispatched to the Embassy too early; but I replied that it had to be so sent as to insure delivery to its destination at the time fixed. The agreement to change the hour of delivery was reported to the Liaison Conference by Admiral Itô on the 6th. No one opposed this, and it was approved at the same meeting. Admiral Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, said that this was a very important note and should be delivered to Secretary Hull personally. It occurred to me that the Secretary might well have other plans for lunch-time on a Sunday, so I promised to order it done if possible—which was ordered (Exhibit No. 1218).
Hague Convention had debated fully and finally rejected a proposal to fix a definite time for advance notification of hostilities. Since, as a result, many scholars had stated that one minute's advance notice was sufficient, I felt quite assured that if some such period as an hour were allowed it would comply with the requirement of the Convention. Not being, as I have said, an expert of international law, I not only read much on this subject in those days, but also especially sought out legal opinion. I requested the opinion, for example, of Dr. Tachi Sakutarō, generally accounted Japan's most distinguished living international law scholar, then adviser on international law to the Foreign Ministry. I had also discussed the matter long before with Dr. Nagaoka Harukazu, who had been a member of the Secretariat of the Hague Peace Conference and Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice; this was when I was Councillor in Berlin under him as Ambassador. Both of those authorities were of the opinion that I was correct in my beliefs that a war of self-defence required no giving of notice, but a notice however short was valid where notice was necessary. I might just add a word concerning the Kellogg-Briand Pact. As First Secretary of the Embassy in Washington at the time the Pact was negotiated I had worked on it and was therefore familiar with its history and meaning. I assumed that the explanations of Secretary Kellogg concerning the non-applicability of the Pact to a situation of self-defence, and the reservations of the right of self-defence made by various Governments before their rati­fications of the Pact and not taken exception to by any other signatory power, clearly imported that that Pact likewise was not applicable in the case of Japan's war against the United States and Great Britain.

81. After the final note had been approved by Liaison Conference and Cabinet, I gave instructions that it should be cabled to Washington in good time, together with instructions to the Ambassador to make all necessary preparations for its delivery at the time agreed upon. The Tribunal has heard full evidence concerning this question, as well as how the delay occurred in making delivery, and I should like merely to refer to that evidence as showing that all that was possible was done in Tokyo to insure proper delivery, and that the delay was not caused, either by me or anyone in Tokyo (Exhibits Nos. 2967 and 2970). I naturally learned, however, from American radio broadcasts soon after the commencement of the war, that apparently there had been misinformation in Washington. I learned even sooner that the attack on Pearl Harbor took place at about twenty minutes after the time when the note was supposed to have been delivered, and a few days after the outbreak of the war when Vico-Chief of the Naval General Staff Itō explained the matter to me I protested to him that if the attack was to follow so soon on the notification, I saw no reason for the Navy to have objected to notification in the first place. His reply was evasive--to the effect that "I am sorry for you; we cut it too fine". A short while after the beginning of the war, in the course of a conversation with Premier Tōjō, the subject came up of the American broadcasts having reported the war note had been delivered late--after the beginning of hostilities. We had both been dismayed and displeased at this report, and I mentioned to him that it was unfortunate, if true, especially in view of the great propaganda value to our enemies of such an incident, and that it was being so used by them. I recall that the Premier said "I wonder how such a delay could have taken
place? Can it be that the United States itself delayed the delivery?" I answered that I did not believe that, but that, since no communication could be had with Ambassador Nomura, we would have to wait to learn how the delay had occurred until we could inquire of him and the Embassy staff upon their return to Japan. In fact, I gave instructions at that time to the Vice-Minister and the Chief of the Cable Section to have an investigation made when the Embassy staff returned from Washington, and when they arrived in Japan on 20 August 1942, I again ordered the investigation commenced into the causes of the delay. Within a few days after that, however, I became very busy with the problem of the Greater East Asia Ministry, as a result of which I resigned office on 1 September, without having received a report on the matter. The investigation was made, and its results have been testified to (Exhibit No. 2907). The prosecution have introduced into evidence a pamphlet (Exhibit No. 1270), printed by the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, as evidence that I had a guilty conscience over the late delivery of the final notification to the United States and attempted to procure legal opinion to justify it. Not only was that pamphlet prepared without my direction or knowledge, not only did I never see it while I was Foreign Minister, but it is wholly unnecessary for me to seek justification for an incident which occurred in violation of my orders. Reference to the preface of the pamphlet itself shows that it was wholly unofficial, and represented merely the individual opinions of those who prepared it (Defense Document No. 2914).

82. I first knew the contents of President Roosevelt's message of 7 December to the Emperor at around 12:30 A.M. of the 8th, when Ambassador Grew called on me. We had heard suggestions during the day of the 7th that such a message was on the way, and I had had inquiries made to try to locate it (Exhibits Nos. 2960 and 2963), but had learned nothing until at about 10:00 at night Ambassador Grew called to say that he had an important message which was being decoded, and would like to call as soon as the job could be finished. He did call soon after midnight; he informed me of the arrival of the President's message, asked an audience—which I told him would have to be arranged through the Imperial Household Ministry but, it being midnight, it could not be said when it could be granted—and left a copy of the message with me, taking his departure after about fifteen minutes. I immediately ordered a translation prepared; and, the matter being an important one, I called the Imperial Household Minister, Mr. Matsudaira Tsunao, told him that the message from President Roosevelt to the Emperor had come through Mr. Grew, who wanted to have an audience to submit it to the Emperor, and asked him how, in view of the fact that it was the middle of the night, I should proceed. He told me that I should talk with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the matter being political. I then called Marquis Kido, who suggested that I consult the Premier, and said that the Emperor would receive me even at such a time. The translation being ready about 1:50, I called on Premier Tojô at his official residence; he said that a message of such contents would do no good. I left him, returned to my residence to change clothing for the audience, and started at about 2:30 for the Palace, where I arrived at about 2:40. There I met Marquis Kido in the waiting-room, and had a three- or four-minutes' talk with him before my audience, telling him the contents of the telegram; than was received in audience from 3 to 3:15. I reported the matter to the Emperor and received his answer, and left, returning to my residence at about 3:30.

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83. The following morning Ambassador Grew called on me around 7:30—I had ordered arrangements made to see him at 6, but the arrangements were reported delayed by difficulty in making telephonic connection with him—and I gave him the Emperor's answer to the President's message, as well as a copy for his reference of our final note. The war having then, of course, already started, the ambassador never formally delivered the President's message to the Emperor. Before the interview with Mr. Grew I had heard that radio broadcasts of the commencement of the war and the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made by Imperial Headquarters at 6, and naturally assuming that the ambassador had received the information, I made no mention in my conversation with him of the state of war, but expressed as my farewell words my appreciation of his efforts for the negotiations and my regret at the precipitation of such a state of Japanese-American relations. It has since been charged that I was engaged in deceiving Mr. Grew; but it should be sufficient to point out that I could have had no motive for doing so at that time when the commencement of hostilities had been published to the world. British Ambassador Craigie followed Mr. Grew, seeing me at about 8 o'clock. This visit also was made by my request, though the time of the ambassador's arrival was much later than planned. To him also I gave a copy of our final note, and informed him of the cessation of negotiations. As my farewell I thanked him for his endeavors for the improvement of relations between our two countries since his arrival. I thought that both these interviews were understood to be farewell greetings.

85. Regarding the delay in delivery to Ambassador Grew of the President's telegram, I had no knowledge at the time. The testimony given in the Tribunal has disclosed that incoming and outgoing diplomatic messages were delayed by the Ministry of Communications at the request of the Army General Staff; but neither of those organizations consulted me nor, so far as I know, the Foreign Ministry in the matter, nor had I any knowledge that the delay was being effected. I had heard from ambassador Nomura of the press report that such a message had been sent by the President, even before which (having gotten such news from the press services) I had inquired of him concerning it, and had had my subordinates inquire of the Ministry of the Imperial Household on the supposition that the message might have been directed to the Emperor personally. However, as I say, I was able to get no information concerning it until Ambassador Grew reported.

87. The question has arisen why our final notification was not served on the Government of Great Britain as well as that of the United States. The Liaison Conference decision that a notification of breaking off negotiations would be delivered in Washington of course excluded the delivering of a declaration of war in London. There was, moreover, reason to expect that the course chosen would be equally effective. In the latter stages of the negotiations—or at all events from the time that I became Foreign Minister—relations with Great Britain were naturally considered. Throughout the whole of the negotiations with the United States ran the assumption that to any agreement to be concluded with it the British and Dutch (and of course the Chinese) Governments would become parties, or that simultaneous settlements of outstanding problems of Pacific interest would be made with them. I therefore from time to time inquired concerning this point not only of the United States Government and Ambassador, but also of the British ambassador, the answer invariably being that the settlement of all such
matters would be managed by the United States Government, which would keep the British and other interested Governments informed. I was aware also of Prime Minister Churchill's speech of 10 November 1941, in which he had promised that hostilities between Japan and the United States would be followed automatically by those with Britain. The Tribunal has already seen the evidence of these facts (Exhibits Nos. 2956, 2918, 2957, 2958, etc.). It was therefore evident that any notification to be given in connection with the negotiations might properly be given to the United States alone, relying upon it to inform the powers associated with it and for whom it had acted as representative.

86. The prosecution argue that I am convicted, by a variety of evidences, of double-dealing in carrying on the Japanese-American negotiations while, as they charge, I was secretly taking part in the making of plans for war. I have already described as accurately as I am able to my actions and my thoughts and intentions of the seven weeks of my foreign ministership prior to the war; but, lest my silence be taken as admission of the charges, I must deal also with a number of minor points. First of these is the consular reports of shipping from various ports of America, the Indies and elsewhere, which were addressed to me in response to requests which had come out over my name. Evidence has already been given that these were routine matters which were managed by subordinates of the ministry (Exhibit No. 2915). I do wish, however, to take the occasion to deny specifically that I ever had any knowledge of the subject other than the fact that such routine was followed, and to state that none of the messages in question ever came to my attention.

By production of Exhibit No. 2975, a draft of proposed policy drawn by some foreign Ministry subordinate official, the prosecution have attempted to show, I suppose, that the Foreign Ministry or the Foreign Minister had the intention of continuing negotiations as a sham. Inasmuch as this document is one of a very large number of the same type produced during the trial, I should like to say a word about its significance. In the Japanese ministries and governmental offices it is customary for low-ranking officials—especially those below section chief—to prepare, without specific instructions on each occasion, various "studies" or drafts of policies, notes, etc., relating to current questions. These in no way represent policy of the ministry; if occasion arises, the drafts will be presented to responsible officials for their consideration, when they may be adopted in toto, serve as the basis for final drafts, or be rejected. It is obvious that it would be quite out of the question for a foreign minister to read or to know of all of these papers. So far as concerns Exhibit No. 2975, I can deny that I have ever seen or known of it; but in general I point out the fallacy of indulging any presumption that a state minister knows of such documents simply because they are found in the files of his ministry.

87. I have already mentioned the no-separate-pacces agreement which was concluded on 11 December 1941 among Japan, Germany and Italy (Exhibit No. 51). Despite the improtance which the prosecution profess to attach to this agreement, I remain unconvinced that it is not a most natural thing for a nation which expects or fears to find itself at war to take such measures as are prudent by way of provision for it, including the acquiring of as many allies as possible. Nor was
it perfidious that the negotiations for conclusion of the agreement began, as the prosecution have pointed out, during the last week before the outbreak of war. The probability of war, after the Liaison Conference of 28 November, was very great; and this agreement was the result of our desire to get whatever assistance we could from the nations which were in all likelihood to be our co-belligerents. (My own estimate of the amount of assistance that we were likely to get was, as I had said in the Liaison Conference, quite low, and so far as I could see the main effect of a no-separate-peace agreement would be what encouragement it would bring to our people, by warding off the feeling of isolation. The Liaison Conference, however, had decided that negotiation for it should be undertaken.) Up to the time of receipt of the United States' 26 November note—and even thereafter—I had refused repeated requests of Ambassador Ott to give the Germans any concrete or detailed information concerning the development of the Japanese-American negotiations—no other course would have been consistent with my desire to bring the negotiations to success. If American-made war almost unavoidable for the first time on 30 November I instructed the Japanese ambassadors in Berlin and Rome to inform the Governments of Germany and Italy of the general outlines of the negotiations and to commence negotiations for a no-separate-peace agreement in the event of war. In connection with General Ott, moreover, I should point out the absurdity of such reports of his as that of 5 December (Exhibit No. 608) that any "leading official" of the Foreign Ministry gave him such misinformation as he there recites concerning Japan's intention in commencing hostilities. No responsible official of the Foreign Ministry—certainly none of the three or four who were informed on this subject—would have discussed the matter with General Ott; and anyone who told him as late as 6 December that the procedure for opening hostilities was under "deliberation" could not have been one of those few, who knew that the matter had been settled by the Liaison Conference. The Ambassador of Germany was patently taken in by the gossip of some bureau director who wished to appear to have important information to give in confidence on a matter of which he was uninformed—or perhaps the general was, as he has testified (Exhibit No. 3503) to having done on occasion, indulging his imagination.

88. Lastly, on one or two broader questions related to the Pacific war. With the naval disarmament question I have had some connection. First was in 1932, in Genova, when as Secretary-General of the Japanese delegation I worked for the success of the General Conference on Disarmament. Later, Japan's abrogation of the Naval Disarmament Treaties, in 1935, and the withdrawal from the London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1936 occurred during my service as Director of the European-Asian Bureau, and as Bureau Director I had to work on those matters with the naval officials concerned. The Navy Ministry submitted to me the draft instruction to the Japanese delegation, based on the principle of the common upper limit. In the Washington and London Treaties, however, Japan had agreed to the ratio principle of naval limitation, and had made a proposal approving it at the General Conference on Disarmament in Genova. When I received this proposal of the Navy I opposed it, on the ground that contending for the principle of the common upper limit would not only make an agreement difficult, but would give rise to suspicion of Japan's intentions, probably blocking the conclusion of a new treaty, and thus enhancing the danger of an armaments race and a war. For two or three months we had heated discussions, during which time I
never agreed to the Navy's proposal. Finally, as agreement could not be reached at the bureau-directors' level, the matter went to the higher authorities for decision. Foreign Minister Hirota adopted and spoke for my view, but was overruled, and the Navy's proposal became the national policy. Having failed in my efforts for quantitative disarmament, I continued working for qualitative limitation and the exchange of information on naval ship-building, but the Navy's opposition again prevailed. Throughout the controversy the Navy's stand was extremely strong, and the assertion was freely made that the question of naval strength lay within the prerogative of the High Command and allowed of no outside intervention.

89. The prosecution have produced evidence to show that at various times the South Seas Islands held by Japan under mandate of the League of Nations were being fortified, contrary to the terms of the mandate. I suppose that it is self-evident that if fortification was carried on, the Foreign Ministry had no part in it; but perhaps it will be charged that we were in a conspiracy because correspondence concerning the matter passed through the Ministry. This whole matter was the responsibility of the Treaty Bureau—in which I never served—and I never had any official connection with it or knowledge of it; I was told by Treaty Bureau personnel that the military authorities had given assurance that they had no intention of violating the terms of the mandate, and there seemed to be no reason to disbelieve it. In any event, the Foreign Ministry was, as the only branch of the government which dealt with other governments, the mere channel of communication through which passed the inquiries made by the League and the answers received from the military and naval authorities.

V.
War-time Diplomacy and "Greater East Asia" Relations

90. The scope of diplomacy in war-time was much restricted. With the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands there were, of course, no diplomatic relations; with Germany and Italy questions of war were uppermost. There remained, in effect, the questions only of our relations with the USSR, the countries of East Asia and South American countries, and of diplomatic preparation for the eventual restoration of peace.

91. I have already mentioned the tendency not to pay due regard to the diplomatic function, which had been increasing from some years before the war. War inevitably intensified this condition—but diplomacy, it seemed, was expected not only to play a secondary role, as was natural with war in progress, but to be wholly neglected. A striking example of this tendency came to light at the time of the question of Japan's participation in the war against Russia. When I reported to the Emperor in July on the refusal of the German request to go to war against the USSR and discussed with him the steps to be taken to insure that his desire should be correctly conveyed to the German Government, without interference by the military authorities, he also mentioned his desire to see an early restoration of peace. I then discovered for the first time that the Emperor had expressed this desire to Premier Tsuij as long before as February, but neither he nor
the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had ever mentioned it to me. Needless to say, questions of military operations were still kept secret in war-time, including those which had intimate connection with foreign affairs—the Navy, for example, kept entirely secret even from the Liaison Conference the defeat at Midway.

92. Disagreement of views, partly over this question and partly concerned with the policy of direction of the war, had early after the start of the war developed between me and the Premier and some of the other Cabinet ministers. The general atmosphere, both within the government and outside, was at that time one of over-optimism brought about by the initial victories of the war. The Premier and others believed that it was going to be a long war—of ten to twenty years' duration—and that it would take a long time for the United States to build up her fighting power, so that she would not be able to undertake a counter-offensive before 1944. Instead of trying to establish Japan in an impregnable position, therefore, they concentrated on strengthening the political position of the government by securing election of the candidates for the Diet sponsored by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in the spring of 1942 and by the creation of the Greater East Asia Establishment Council (from the purview of which military and diplomatic matters were excluded), and tried to consolidate the authority of the government by putting into effect such measures as those for reorganization of enterprises and reform of the educational system.

93. I opposed such measures on the ground that it was premature to undertake such a program with the war just started, and that long-range plans should not be laid in a time of emergency. As to the prospect of the war, I felt that a large-scale war of attrition could not last longer than five or six years, and I therefore insisted that it was urgent that preparations be made for increase of production and stabilization of living conditions. I came into collision with the Premier also on such other matters as the China question, in connection with which I frequently urged the Liaison Conference to reconsider promptly a fundamental policy for its solution. These differences developed, finally leading to a head-on clash and my resignation over the Greater East Asia Ministry question in September 1942. But before coming to that I should sketch the diplomacy which I conducted while still in office.

94. With the Soviet Union I attempted, as always, to maintain the best relations possible. Maintenance of neutrality with the USSR was the fundamental policy of the government; but beyond that, from the beginning of the Pacific War I was thinking of and planning for its termination, and considered that the most practical method of approach was to try to bring about Russo-German peace as a preliminary step. I did in fact try as early as 1942 to set such a plan in motion (Defence Document No. 2740).

95. During my tenure of office the Soviet-Manchukuan border was generally maintained in peace. In January 1942, in particular, the Governments of Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic finally approved the work of the border-demarcation commission which, in accordance with the agreement arrived at between Foreign Commissar Molotov and me, had marked the border in the Nomonhan areas (Exhibit No. 2659). Considering
that the Russian-Manchoukuoan border was (especially in view of the Russo-German war) quite secure, I often suggested to the military authorities that they could rely on my assurance that the Red Army would not launch an invasion of Manchoukuo even if the Japanese forces on the border should be considerably decreased. I attempted also to avoid irritation of the U.S.S.R. by persuading the military authorities not to reinforce the Kwantung Army (I never knew, by the way, of the "Kantokuon" of the year before).

96. At the outbreak of the Pacific war some controversies occurred between Japan and the U.S.S.R., growing out of restrictions, based on the rights of a belligerent, enforced upon the vessels of the U.S.S.R., a neutral. To such controversies the Foreign Ministry paid careful consideration, forwarding to the Government of the U.S.S.R. the replies of the Navy concerning measures taken in response to the Soviet protests or inquiries. The Foreign Ministry took the initiative also in offering conveniences for the rescue and repatriation of Soviet sailors and vessels involved in such incidents, and for recompening the Soviet Government by transfer to it of vessels to replace such of theirs as were sunk. There were, while I was Foreign Minister, no steps taken toward disturbing the transportation through Vladivostok of munitions from America, despite various complaints from Germany in regard to it.

97. War-time relations with Germany and Italy were, so far as concerned the Foreign Ministry, very much restricted. Events bore out my prophecy of the amount of cooperation to be expected from our European allies; it was, as the Tribunal is already aware, never more than nominal. The Russo-German war had cut rail communication between us; and sea transportation became increasingly difficult until with the German defeat in North Africa communication was practically restricted to the token exchanges of small amounts of supplies by submarine (Exhibits Nos. 2751, etc.). At the time, of course, I had no information of the extent of such cooperation, it being military and hence outside my field. The respective German and Japanese attitudes vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. also illustrates the kind of relations between the two countries. Germany's expressed desire from the time of the third Konoe Cabinet had been that Japan join in the war against the Soviet Union, and that request was renewed in July 1942. It was decided, however, that Japan should refuse the request and give as a reason that she could not undertake a two-front war, which was accordingly communicated to the German Government through the German Ambassador in Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin (Exhibits Nos. 3508, 2751 and 2762). I never dreamed of, far less participated in, any plan for Japan for domination of the world in cooperation with Germany and Italy.

98. It was in October 1941, when I became Foreign Minister, that for the first time I managed as on my own responsibility affairs relating to China, including Manchoukuo. I had once, many years before—in 1929, before the Manchuria Incident—made a visit of inspection to Manchuria, and as a result had reported to the then Foreign Minister, Count Makino, that we must cooperate with China in a spirit of mutuality and achieve truly cordial relations. The intervening years had seen the occurrence of the Manchuria Incident and the China Incident—with neither of which had I anything to do. I am now charged with having,
by serving as a diplomat and Cabinet minister in later years, worked to secure the fruits of aggression committed there. I have never done so. I was never sympathetic to those incidents, and when I have been in positions of responsibility toward them I have done what I could to prevent their occurrence or spread.

It was at any rate more clear than ever in 1941 that the China Incident must be settled, and I hoped when I became Foreign Minister that I should be able to achieve it. At that time the Kōain (China Affairs Board) had been in charge for some years of all political, economic, cultural and other business of China (excluding Manchuria); it had its agencies at various places in China, and negotiations with regional régimes in China were its affair. The creation of the Kōain had opened a new and major phase of China relations. Its purpose was frankly that of removing from the Foreign Ministry control, so far as concerned China matters, the normal functions of a foreign office; the Foreign Ministry's liberal attitude toward other countries was heresy to the militarists, who therefore managed to have China affairs confided to a new organ under their control. The Foreign Ministry's remaining jurisdiction extended only to 'diplomatic negotiations in Nanking—"diplomacy in the narrowest sense"—and matters pertaining to the consulates (whose main business was protection of Japanese nationals in China). Thus the connection of the Foreign Ministry with Japanese-Chinese relations was all but severed, and the Ministry had lost its power to deal with affairs in China. I was, it is true, as Foreign Minister an ex officio vice-president of the Kōain (others were the Ministers of War, Navy and Finance); but since the very purpose of the creation of that body had been the destruction of the Foreign Ministry's authority vis-à-vis China, the influence of the Foreign-Ministry vice-president in the Kōain was nothing. As has been pointed out by the prosecution (13 June 1946, Record, p. 543), the business of the Kōain was conducted almost exclusively by its Director-General.
Manchurian affairs had in the main been confided for many years to the Taiman Jimukyoku (Manchurian Affairs Board); I had nothing to do with that body, and therefore very little to do with Manchurian affairs. The Foreign Ministry's only connection with Manchuria was that we maintained the Embassy in Hsingking and consulates in Harbin, Manchuri, K'Ho and Mutangchiang, but the functions discharged by the Foreign Ministry through them were only negotiation with the U.S. & R over Manchoukuoan matters. The post of ambassador was held ex officio by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, and the Foreign Ministry of course did not control him.

After the commencement of the Pacific war, the Government of Manchoukuo and Nanking China cooperated with Japan without themselves entering the war. Neither want to war, as the prosecution assert that the Japanese Government directed and controlled those two in their policy toward the war. These telegrams are submitted in the form of intercepts, and of course the Japanese translation provided is not the text originally sent. I do not remember having sent messages of such content, and the language has not the sound of Foreign Ministry phraseology; but in any event, if they were sent by the Foreign Ministry, there is nothing inherently sinister in the use of such language as appears there, for it is customary in diplomatic instructions, for simplification of telegraphic language, to use such terms as "have the foreign Government do so-and-so," or "the foreign Government are". Similar expressions may be found in our telegrams to our embassies in Washington, London and Moscow.

I have mentioned a time or two heretofore that I had consistently opposed the China Incident from its beginning, and had worked as far as I could for its early settlement on an equitable basis. My opposition at the time of the outbreak is already in evidence (Exhibit No. 3260). I was not at that time in charge of China affairs, but I believed that for the sake of Japan's international relations generally it was a matter of urgent necessity to arrest the expansion of the incident by settling it locally. With Vice-Minister Horinouchi and the Director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, Ishii Itaro, I earnestly advised Foreign Minister Hirota that he should object to the dispatch of troops to China, to which he agreed. But our efforts failed, and the long-drawn-out China Affair got under way. Later, I had worked at the Japanese-American negotiations from the point of view of arriving at an early settlement of it. Still in war-time I insisted on this. In March 1942 the question of the policy for direction of the war was discussed in the Liaison Conference, and I then pointed out that in the domestic field the increase of production and the securing of food, and in the international field the preservation of Russo-Japanese peace and the prompt solution of the China Affair, were of primary and immediate importance. At that time I obtained the agreement of the Conference to my proposal that the basic policy vis-a-vis China be examined from all points of view; but it was subsequently reported by the Army High Command that although the military authorities had been examining the military aspects of the matter, there were many difficulties and no conclusion had yet been arrived at. The matter failed to develop thereafter, notwithstanding I seized one more opportunity to press it. This was in the middle of July, when former ambassador Ota Tamakiichi, returning from a trip to China, reported to me that Wang Ching-woi had suggested to him the immediate cessation of Japanese-Chinese hostilities and general
peace between Japan and China. I reported this to Premier Tojo with another request for prompt examination of the China policy.

103. As to the Philippines, Japan declared as early as January 1942 her intention to accord them the status of an independent country—partly as having inherited the United States' promise that Philippine independence should be realized by 1946 (Exhibit No. 133CB). So far as concerned my motives in supporting this policy, they were on the one hand to demonstrate that we entertained no territorial ambition in the South, and on the other to remove one obstacle to eventual peace with the United States by manifesting the same intention vis-à-vis those islands as that of the United States.

104. The only new event during my tenure of office in the Tójô Cabinet affecting Indo-China was the military agreement of 9 December 1941 (Exhibit No. 656). This was a measure taken by the military authorities on the spot, and the Foreign Ministry and I had nothing to do with it.

105. It was, despite the Imperial Conference decision, Japan's intention if possible to avoid entering into belligerency with the Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch Government, however, declared war against Japan (record P.11,654) for reasons of her close relationship with the United States and Great Britain, and the Dutch Navy was at once reported as carrying out attacks on Japanese shipping. Japan was therefore compelled to take hostile measures against the Indies.

106. It was the relations of Japan with "Greater East Asia" generally which brought about my final break with Premier Tojo and my resignation from the government. There was a fundamental difference of outlook between us on the question of these relations. Japan had long been recognized to occupy in East Asia the position of stabilizing force; yet recently there had begun to be expounded the idea of a New Order in East Asia or a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which originated in such concepts as those of bloc-economy and Lebensraum. My fundamental policy was different from that; as will be seen from various evidences, it was one of establishing good, neighborly and amicable relations among nations on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and of economic cooperation. My principle was that Japan, as an advanced nation of East Asia, should assist the progress of the countries and regions of East Asia and realize the prosperity of these countries and of Japan through peaceful means. This idea of mutual assistance excluded any policy of exerting control over these countries by force.

107. My speech reporting on foreign affairs to the Diet on 22 January 1942 (Exhibit No. 137CB) was an expression of these principles. Notwithstanding that this speech was delivered soon after the outbreak of the war, it in no way expresses (as will be clear to anyone who reads it) any intention that Japan should annex or exploit any part of East Asia. Of course, it is stated that such areas as were absolutely necessary for the defense of East Asia in the war were to be grasped by Japan—but this was a war-time speech, concerning war measures. Needless to say, Ambassador Curt's distorted account of this speech (Exhibit No. 1271), which for some reason the prosecution chose to introduce in addition to the original document, while it may represent his view, has nothing to do with mine. I wish
to point out especially that in the Diet speech I clearly said that the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere should not be conceived of as an exclusive thing, and that measures to exclude non-Asiatic states from participation in East Asia should not be taken.

100. In the course of this trial has come to my attention Exhibit No. 1333, denominated a Foreign Ministry Plan for the Policy on the Disposal of the Southern Areas, dated 14 December 1941. If this extraordinary document was actually drawn in the Foreign Ministry, it could have been only a draft worked up by a section chief or a lower official, of the type already referred to; I never approved it, never saw it nor heard of it. That it is quite impossible that it should have been adopted or proposed as Foreign Ministry policy is demonstrable from the inconsistency of this purported policy with my proposed policy in the matter which was finally adopted by the Liaison Conference. After the Japanese occupation of the southern areas the High Command had proposed there that for the sake especially of convenience of execution of military administration the disposition of those occupied territories be then determined. Against this suggestion I insisted that such an important matter should certainly not be decided at that stage in war-time, when nothing was as yet finally settled. Premier Tojo agreed with my view, and it was finally so decided by the Liaison Conference.

101. Confirmation of my true attitude toward the Greater East Asia question can be found in the matter of the Greater East Asia Ministry. This question, which led to my final break with the Tojo Cabinet, had first come up in May or June of 1942. At that time there were only rumors that the establishment of a new ministry was contemplated; but as time went on the general outlines of the schema emerged. It appeared that all outpost agencies in the area of Greater East Asia (excluding Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin) were to be placed under the control and supervision of the Ministry of Greater East Asia; with the exception of matters of what was called "pure diplomacy", all political, economic and cultural affairs concerning foreign countries in the Greater East Asia area, such as Manchukuo, China, Thailand, French Indo-China, etc., were to be placed in charge of the new ministry. With its establishment, the Taiman "Man'yoku", the Kisen and the Ministry of Overseas Affairs were to be abolished. The avowed purpose of the plan was to place those countries under special treatment as brother nations, and to contribute to the attainment of the objectives of the war by carrying out a general mobilization of material power throughout Greater East Asia.

102. The creation of the Ministry had been planned by the four cabinet board presidents, and principally by the Planning Board, and by the summer of 1942 conditions had so far developed that there was considerable prospect of its realization. At that time I had a talk about it with Premier Tojo. I told him that it was no time to indulge in changes of administrative structure, the urgent necessity being to establish an undefeatable position and expressed my opposition to the plan for the reasons that the establishment of the proposed ministry would in practice remove from the Foreign Ministry the essential part of the diplomacy of Japan, thus impairing the unity of Japanese diplomacy, and would injure the pride as independent nations of the other countries in Greater East Asia, with the result that it would become impossible for Japan to
On 29 August Mr. Hoshino, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, called on me at the direction of Premier Tôjô, and handed me a copy of a draft proposal for establishment of the Ministry for Greater East Asia which was on the line above mentioned and was to be submitted to the Cabinet. It was, he told me, the intention of the Premier to present it at the Cabinet meeting of 1 September. I glanced through the proposal which Mr. Hoshino had handed to me and inquired of him about the meaning of the "pure diplomacy" which was to be left to the Foreign Ministry. He explained that by "pure diplomacy" were meant such things as matters of protocol and the formalities relating to the conclusion of treaties. Thus the Foreign Ministry would receive ambassadors of foreign countries, and would sign any treaties concluded, but the Greater East Asia Ministry would conduct all negotiations. I pointed out the imprpropriety of the plan, and requested that its submission be postponed until the Cabinet meeting of 5 September, so that there would be enough time to study the proposal. Mr. Hoshino left, but called again later, bringing Premier Tôjô's reply that he wanted the plan decided on without fail at the 1 September meeting. After a dinner on 31 August I had an opportunity to discuss the matter with Premier Tôjô, and repeated my opposition to the plan, again urging that its submission to the Cabinet meeting of 1 September be put off. The Premier refused. Thus the plan came up for decision at the Cabinet meeting of 1 September. At that meeting I explained my opposition somewhat as follows, and we had a discussion which lasted for three hours in the morning. I had four grounds of objection to the proposal.

1. First of these was that under the proposed plan the foreign policy of Japan would be in the hands of two different ministries, according as it related to Greater East Asia or to the rest of the world. Such an arrangement would render it impossible for Japan to conduct a unified and consistent diplomacy, and neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Ministry of Greater East Asia would be able to function properly.

Secondly, the countries of Greater East Asia, because of being treated differently from other foreign countries, would entertain distrust and suspicion of Japan, and their pride would be hurt. Any treatment of this sort is certainly contrary to the spirit of respecting the independence of other countries.

Thirdly, the proposed plan meant the extension of the jurisdiction of the Kâin, which had excited ill-feeling among the Chinese people, and it would thus be a failure.

Fourthly, it was urgently necessary to concentrate our efforts toward the execution of emergency measures, and it was not the time to undertake the changing of the administrative structure.

Against my assertions Premier Tôjô argued that the Greater East Asia countries had to be treated differently from other countries, as relations between Japan and the countries of Greater East Asia were like those of kin. General Suzuki, President of the Planning Board, contended that the Kâin had not been a failure. I retorted that it was a fact well known.
to everyone that it had been a failure. A few other Cabinet ministers expressed themselves, but none came to my support. The Cabinet meeting took a recess with the discussion unfinished. During the recess Premier Tōjō asked me for my individual resignation, but I refused it, saying that it was the Premier and the other supporters of the plan, not I, who should reconsider the matter. I considered it necessary from the viewpoint of the general war-guidance policy to persist in my stand to force out the Tōjō Cabinet.

Soon thereafter, Finance Minister Kaya called on me to ask my reconsideration. Subsequently, General Satō and Admiral Oka, Directors of the Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus, together visited me. They said that the plan for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry was supported equally by the Army and the Navy, and requested me once more to agree to the plan. I again refused altogether. Finally, Navy Minister Shimada came to me and said that a change of Cabinet was not desired by the Court, and that he would work for a compromise solution if one was possible. After exchanging views with him, I presented my final plan of compromise. Navy Minister Shimada left, but later returned and conveyed to me the information that Premier Tōjō did not accept the compromise plan. I had never expressed any intention to make an individual resignation, but had been making efforts with the determination to do everything possible for the attainment of my purpose. In view, however, of the talk with Navy Minister Shimada, I decided to tender my resignation, out of a desire not to cause annoyance to the Emperor by further complicating the matter, and retired on the same day, 1 September.

116. I learned later that with regard to the scope of "pure diplomacy" the Government had decided to make the necessary definition in the Cabinet, leaving the regulations governing the functions of the ministries concerned without any provision on this point, and that this also had been explained to the Privy Council. But the "pure diplomacy" defined by the Cabinet understanding upon the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry was somewhat wider than the plan shown to me at the Cabinet meeting of 1 September, as a result of the opposition of the Foreign Ministry and the criticism expressed by the Privy Council.
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117. At the Cabinet meeting of 1 September civilian members of the Cabinet also had supported the Greater East Asia Ministry proposal. Later I learned that they were not necessarily in opposition to my position, but were of opinion that a change of cabinet at that time was to be avoided. As I have said before, however, I had by that time come to the conclusion that the Tōjō Government, somewhat intoxicated by the initial victories of the war, was paying no serious consideration to preparations for the conduct of the war; that some within the Cabinet felt that there was no need of diplomacy in the management of external affairs; and that in general the Government's policies were being executed in a very superficial manner. I considered the Greater East Asia Ministry proposal an expression of such tendencies of the Tōjō Cabinet, and it was my conviction that at that opportunity it should be replaced. Despite my strong opposition to the Greater East Asia Ministry, for this and other reasons already mentioned, I could not change the current single-handed; but events were already justifying my view, for the battle of Guadalcanal had deteriorated, not to mention the sea-battle off Midway, and the road to defeat was already plainly marked out.

118. As I have said, I retired from the government service at the time of my resignation of the Foreign Ministership and remained in retirement until I was again appointed to the position on 9 April 1945. Notwithstanding the fact that during my second term I held concurrently the ministry of Greater East Asia, my connection with Greater East Asiatic affairs from then until my quitting office on 17 August of the same year was slight; partly because I was chiefly occupied with the problem of ending the war, partly because almost all authority over matters relating to East Asiatic countries had by then been transferred to the military ministries. A word first, however, as to how I came to accept the portfolio of Greater East Asia affairs notwithstanding that I had bitterly opposed the creation of that ministry. It was my desire and intention when I could to see the Ministry of Greater East Asia abolished; meanwhile, by holding the two portfolios concurrently I could let it die of inanition, and did. As Minister for Greater East Asia affairs I did nothing.

119. The continuity of my attitude toward the countries of East Asia can be seen in the decisions of the Greater East Asia Ambassadors' Conference held in Tokyo on 23 April 1945, decisions adopted in accordance with my proposals and with the consent of the Governments of the countries represented as the guiding principle for the establishment of the world order (Def. Doc. No. 2931). The principles here spoken of were: 1) establishment of political equality of nations and avoidance of racial discrimination; 2) respect for national independence and non-interference in domestic affairs; 3) freedom for colonial subject peoples; 4) economic reciprocity and equality; 5) exchange of cultures; 6) prevention of aggression; 7) the establishment of the international order by means of both regional and universal security systems. This plan, I venture to believe, is not essentially different from that later developed by the United Nations at San Francisco.

120. By the time of my second assumption of the Foreign Ministership in April 1945 there was almost nothing for even the Greater East Asia Ministry to do in connection with the countries of East Asia. Although its jurisdiction did include some matters relative to occupied areas, those were not matters of administration actually but only of rendering assistance to the Army and the Navy, which conducted the administration,
by training officials in Japan to be sent to the occupied areas. In Burma and the Philippines (which had declared their independence during my retirement) the military commander was in control not only of military affairs but also of the guidance of internal politics, because it was considered to be inseparably related to the conduct of the war. Thus while the ambassadors to these countries managed diplomatic affairs under the direction of the Minister for Greater East Asia, they were interfered with even within the scope of their jurisdiction by the military commanders. The same was true of the ambassador to Indo-China; despite the different status of that country, the ambassador could not act against the will of the military commander. In addition the war situation had so deteriorated that in most of these countries we no longer even had functioning ambassadors. Burma, for example, had been partially reoccupied and our ambassador had escaped from Rangoon to the interior, where communication between him and Tokyo was so nearly impossible that it was impossible even to learn conditions there. The Philippines likewise had been lost by Japan, and there was no possibility of our conducting diplomatic functions. The various “plans” submitted by the prosecution for the disposal of British Malay, involving the annexation by Japan of part of that territory (Exhibits Nos. 1333A and 1331-1336) were never approved or known by me during either of my terms as foreign minister.

121. The changed conditions occurring in French Indo-China in March 1945 (Exhibits Nos. 661-664), preceding my assumption of office, I had nothing to do with. As a result of this change, Indo-China was placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the military authorities, and the Embassy was closed in March and the ambassador returned to Japan in the following month. From that time, of course, the Greater East Asia Ministry had nothing to do with affairs of French Indo-China. At the Greater East Asia Ambassadors’ Conference mentioned above, a resolution was adopted on the motion of the Thai ambassador that full support be given to the movement for independence, then recently declared, in Annam, Cambodia and Laos Phrabang. It was the unanimous desire of the countries of East Asia that all the peoples thereof have their independence, which was in conformity with the policy of Japan. The same may be said of the resolution adopted at the same time relative to the status of the Netherlands East Indies; I again in fact emphasized in July at the Supreme Council for Guidance of the War the necessity for our assisting the Indonesians to the independence, thus to demonstrate that we had no territorial aspirations in that area.

122. Lastly, among war-time questions, is that of prisoners of war. The Foreign Ministry’s connection with this matter commenced when, in January 1942, notes from the British and American Governments were received through the Swiss Government requesting advice whether Japan would agree to reciprocal application of the Genova Convention of 1929 regulating treatment of prisoners of war. Japan was not a signatory of that Convention; but I felt that Japan should—and assumed that she would—out of humanitarian considerations, agree to application of it so far as was reasonably possible. The decision, however, was not for the Foreign Ministry to make. The Tribunal has heard full explanation of the question of responsibility for prisoners of war in the Japanese system; I wish, however, to mention one additional point to clarify the very limited
responsibility of the Foreign Ministry in this matter. The sum of responsibility for matters relating to prisoners of war resides in the Prisoners-of-War Management Bureau and the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau. The former being a War Ministry bureau, no responsibility for its management of prisoners accrues to the Foreign Ministry. The latter, however— which is the bureau responsible for giving information in answer to protests and inquiries—is one especially created by Imperial Ordinance in time of war. When action is taken by exercise of the Imperial Ordinance power, the Ordinance is countersigned by the ministers who have responsibility in the matter (Defense Document No. 2927). The ordinances establishing the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau, at the time of not only the Pacific war but also of the World War, are countersigned by Ministers of War and Navy, but not by the Foreign Minister (Defense Documents Nos. 2924 and 2934). It is the War Ministry which is the responsible authority.

The inquiries from the United States and Britain were therefore referred in the formal course by the Foreign Ministry Treaty Bureau, which managed such matters, to the War Ministry, as the ministry empowered to decide the question. The answer which came back (Exhibit No. 1958) was that we should undertake to apply the terms of the Genova Convention "mutatis mutandis", and it was therefore so replied to the Governments inquiring (Exhibits No. 11469 and 11496). Although the prosecution seems to consider that by the giving of this answer Japan became bound by the Convention to the same extent as if she had ratified it, I assumed (and still assume) that we were binding ourselves only to apply the Convention so far as circumstances permitted "mutatis mutandis", then, I supposed to imply that in the absence of serious hindrances the Convention would be applied (Exhibit No. 3059); I assumed also (although this was only assumption on my part) that where the requirements of the Convention came into conflict with the provisions of domestic law the former would prevail. If this proved to be a mistaken assumption, neither War nor Navy Ministry ever suggested any other interpretation to me, nor does the War Ministry's reply to our request for a statement of policy suggest it. In any event, knowing the high reputation which Japan had gained by her humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war in both Russo-Japanese and World Wars, I took it for granted that these precedents would be followed (this consideration also perhaps influenced me later, when we began to receive allied protests of mistreatment, to accord less credit to the allied claims than might have been the case if history been different, and to go to the War Ministry direct or through my subordinates, fully confident that steps would be taken to correct abuses if any existed).

I should like to emphasize, also, that the Foreign Ministry received and answered the protests and inquiries regarding prisoners of war only as a channel of communication, not as the responsible agency. The answers returned were not in fact prepared in the Foreign Ministry, but were those given to us by the Prisoners-of-War Information Bureau; but the Foreign Ministry was the only place to which correspondence from foreign Governments could come, and from which answers could go—there was nowhere else that the correspondence could go.

Little question concerning prisoners of war arose during my first term as Foreign Minister. I recall the case of Hong Kong—when in the spring of 1942 Foreign Minister Eden
was reported to have made a speech charging the Japanese Army with atrocities after the capture of the city. At that time I said to War Minister Tesho that special attention should be paid to treating prisoners of war kindly, and for that matter to preserving the name of the Japanese Army from disgrace. He sympathized with my viewpoint, and said that he would give due attention to the matter; and soon after I was pleased to hear that Mr. Eden had made a radio broadcast to the effect that the situation in Hong Kong had improved.

126. A more active question during my first term was that of exchange of enemy nationals. It was my idea that not only should diplomatic personnel be exchanged, in the usual way, but also that civilian internees of British and American nationality should be repatriated. This was difficult to achieve; it involving the allocation of shipping bottoms and facilities, the High Command was reluctant to agree, and only after considerable insistence on my part were the exchanges brought about, as had been testified to (Defense Document No. 2916). We succeeded thus in returning to their homes some thousands of enemy nationals, not only from Japan Proper but as well from China, Manchukuo, French Indo-China and Thailand.

127. During my second term as Foreign Minister, toward the spring and summer of 1945, the situation of the Japanese Army on the front in the Philippines, Burma, and other Southern districts deteriorated extremely. There was already a large accumulation of prisoner-of-war matters on hand when I took office; and as the Allied forces advanced in various districts of the South, protests began to be lodged concerning the treatment accorded by the Japanese Army to the prisoners of war and internees in those regions. In those days, Japan itself being subject to severe air-raids, the Ministers of the neutral countries representing the interests of enemy countries had moved to Karuizawa and communication with them accordingly became very difficult. In spite of these difficulties, under my instruction, the Foreign Ministry transmitted these protests and inquiries to the competent authorities and did not fail to convey all the replies that were received from the competent authorities concerned. We often sent and received personal letters, or sent officials to Karuizawa, in addition to the exchange of official notes, thus exercising all possible efforts to meet the situation. So far as I am aware there was never any neglect by the Foreign Ministry of its duty in the matter, which was the transmitting of the protests or inquiries received from the Allied countries to the Japanese authorities concerned, and the sending to the former of the replies received. The Foreign Ministry, despite having no power over prisoners of war, repeatedly requested the authorities concerned to do their best to accord fair and generous treatment to the prisoners of war. On 3 June 1945, when the Swiss Minister handed me a protest of the United States Government concerning atrocities to American prisoners of war at Puerto Princesa on Palawan Island (Exhibit No. 2107), I personally called the special attention of War Minister Inami to the subject and urged him to accord fair and generous treatment to prisoners of war in general, to which he consented. In spite of these efforts, however, conditions had become such that provision of information satisfactory to the Allied countries was impossible. On this point, it was explained by the military authorities that, as the result of the defeat of the Japanese Army, telegraphic communication between the central military authority and the forces at the front had become very difficult and often impossible.
and that even when such communication was possible, the confusion within the Japanese forces at the front rendered investigation into the matters almost impossible. The Foreign Ministry, having neither jurisdiction nor means of investigation of these problems, could do nothing beyond conveying communications from one party to the other. I wish to add that the Foreign Ministry received no information whatever concerning the trials of Allied fliers, such as those which took place in the middle of July 1945.

128. The Foreign Ministry, under my direction, constantly attempted, despite its purely liaison function in the prisoners-of-war business, to ameliorate the condition of the prisoners. In some ways we succeeded; especially as far as concerned Japan Proper, conditions were relatively good. We could not, of course, meddle with matters under military jurisdiction, and could only urge the military authorities to be humane; this was done repeatedly. If only from self-interest, this would have had to be the position of the Foreign Ministry; for we had some hundreds of thousands of our nationals in enemy countries for the amelioration of whose lot we were responsible, and there was a self-evident correlation between the two questions.

129. With the truth or falsity of the replies furnished by the army (or, in a few cases, by the Navy) to inquiries from enemy countries, the Foreign Ministry had nothing to do. I, as Foreign Minister, had no personal contact with the matter of inquiries and answers, which were purely routine liaison work so far as the Foreign Ministry was concerned. But regardless of who actually managed the business, no one of the Foreign Ministry could do more than forward the answers received from the military authorities. We had neither the right nor the facilities to inspect camps, and we could have done nothing had we had reason to doubt the truth of the answers—which, in the absence of opportunity to inspect conditions, we had not.

VI.

The Suzuki Cabinet and the Ending of the War

130. My entry into and service in the Suzuki Cabinet can be said to have had only one purpose: ending the war. Before treating of my activities during this period, therefore, I shall give a brief description of my previous efforts in the direction of peace, which form the background to my efforts in this period.

131. My various efforts to bring the war to the earliest possible end were the continuation and extension into war-time of my opposition to the war before its start. These efforts therefore began at once after 8 December 1941. I have already explained fully the state of my mind at that time—that I did not share the over-optimism or the illusions of most Japanese and believed that it would be extremely difficult to overcome the fighting spirit and the industrial productivity of America and Great Britain; that I did not doubt that from the Japanese point of view the war had to be ended as quickly as possible if it were not to end in complete disaster; and that I still believed that if it became a long-drawn-out war, there would be no real victor, both sides being exhausted and the world as a whole being as impoverished, dispirited and in distress as the belligerents. On New Year's Day of 1942 I took the
I had the occasion to address an instruction to the staff of the Foreign Ministry to suggest this idea, dealing with the inter-relationship between war and diplomacy, the task of diplomacy at war. I told them that, though the prevailing tendency was to neglect diplomacy—which was very shortsighted—diplomacy would only gain in importance as the war progressed. We should therefore, I said, study and make every preparation to end the war, lest we should fail to seize the chance when it did come.

Although it would be difficult to bring about the termination of a war which had encompassed the whole world, I thought that there was some possibility offered by the idea of a Russo-German peace, which might give a beginning to the movement toward general peace. Therefore, when I had a conversation with Soviet ambassador Smetanin in February, I told him that the relations between our two countries were like a bright spot in a troubled stormy sky, and that I desired to enlarge and extend this spot to cover other regions with the aim of restoring peace throughout the entire world—which was an added reason for the necessity of maintaining neutrality between the USSR and Japan. I also directed ambassador Sato in Kuibyshev to prepare the ground for such steps in order not to miss the chance when an opportunity should present itself, concerning which he would be instructed later. My resignation from the T3J3 Cabinet prevented any development of this plan.

Although out of office from September 1942 to April 1945, and in no position in the government, I expressed my opinion to various persons that the war had to be ended promptly. For example, in November 1944 I happened to have a conversation with general Umezu, then chief of the army general staff, to whom I said that the war should be ended, perhaps by first arranging for the termination of the Soviet-German war. (General Umezu agreed, and said that although the government had failed to do anything he would continue to work for this idea.)

On 8 April 1945 I received in Karuizawa, where I was then living, a request from Admiral Suzuki, the Premier-Designate, to come to Tokyo to see him. Accordingly I returned to Tokyo that evening and called on Admiral Suzuki, who asked me to become foreign minister in his cabinet. My earnest desire being to bring about peace promptly, I considered that, for this purpose, it was necessary that the premier share with me not only the desire for prompt peace but also the estimate of the war situation and its prospect. I therefore asked his view on the prospect of the war before giving him my answer to his request. However, having heard him state his estimate of the war situation, which differed from mine, although I found him sincere and earnest for prompt peace, I felt that I could hardly accept the responsibility of directing diplomacy unless we had identical opinions on the prospect of the war, and left, telling him so. I soon received earnest and serious persuasions from many quarters to enter Admiral Suzuki's cabinet and enlighten him on the matter: Admiral Okada; Mr. Matsudaira Tsuneo and Mr. Hirota Kōki, seniors of the diplomatic service; Marquis Matsudaira Yasumasa, private secretary to the lord keeper of privy seal; Sakomizu Hisatsune, chief secretary of the cabinet, urged me to accept the post. After another talk with Admiral Suzuki at which I reiterated my views, he agreed to them, as a result of which I accepted the appointment.
Upon becoming Foreign Minister, my chief concern was how to realize my long-cherished desire, prompt restoration of peace. Shortly after taking office, I received a call from our Minister to Finland, Sakaya Tadashi, who told me that some arrangement had been made between my predecessor, Mr. Shigomitsu, and the Swedish Minister, Mr. Bange, according to which the Swedish Government would, on its own initiative, sound out the American peace terms and inform us. Minister Sakaya asked my opinion of this plan. I replied that it was the first time that I had heard anything about it, but that such services by Minister Bange and his Government would be very much appreciated by me, inasmuch as I was eager for an early peace. I instructed him to convey to Mr. Bange my words to that effect. Nothing came of this schema, however, and in fact an attempt in another direction was begun soon, that of securing Soviet mediation for peace.

As early as 1942, as I have already stated, I had attempted to bring about world-peace, using the good relations between Japan and the USSR as a starting point, but the situation had greatly changed since that time. On 5 April 1945, shortly before I became Foreign Minister, the Soviet Government had given notice of abrogation of the Neutrality Pact, though it had by its terms still more than a year to run. Immediately upon my assumption of office I received requests from military and other quarters to make efforts for cooperation with the USSR, but it seemed to me that it was too late, and I therefore warned them that the possibility of Russia's having concluded an agreement with Britain and the United States for division of the spoils of the war had to be taken into consideration, and I carefully watched the world situation with a view to seizing a good opportunity for the restoration of peace.

Toward the end of April, the defeat of Germany became an accomplished fact, and in the beginning of May the Doenitz régime surrendered unconditionally. I considered that this surrender provided an opportunity to achieve the ending of the war, and therefore, in early May, when I reported to the Emperor on the causes of the defeat of Germany, among which air-raids were one of the major factors, I took the opportunity to add that now that air-raids on Japan were becoming severer we should promptly bring the war to an end. I advised the Premier to the same effect, and urged him to convene a meeting composed only of the principal members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War. The reasons for this were that the ordinary meetings, in which the secretaries participated, had a tendency to be formal and adopt a strong stand, and there was also danger of leakage of secrets to the lower military ranks through such meetings. My advice was adopted and the principal members of the Supreme Council met three times in the middle of May. (General Umezu can also claim some credit for bringing about the meetings in this form). At the meeting of 11 May, after much discussion it was agreed that in view of the war situation and events abroad, Japan should realize a speedy termination of the war. As to the measures to be adopted, it was further agreed that, although an approach through the Chungking régime or negotiations through such neutrals as Switzerland or Sweden could be considered, it was clear that an approach through such countries would end in the American demand for unconditional surrender; and that therefore the only way was to request Soviet mediation, although that too might be too late in view of the world-situation.
138. The policy thus being decided, I requested Mr. Hirota to have a talk with Mr. Malik, the Soviet Ambassador, to feel out the Soviet reaction. They met several times in June, at Gora, Hakone. These conversations, Mr. Hirota informed me, were productive of a friendly atmosphere. Meanwhile, on 6 June a meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War was suddenly called, and on 8 June an Imperial Conference was held. I stated on that occasion that the international situation was so unfavorable for us, and that war-time diplomacy was to so great an extent under the influence of the war situation, that we were likely to find ourselves in a position of extremely great difficulty. The war situation continued to deteriorate.

139. On the other hand, on several occasions since April I had explained my views on the necessity of ending the war quickly to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, who informed me on 15 June that it was the Emperor's wish to see an early end of the war, and said that it was necessary to request Soviet mediation to gain an honorable peace even if the price was high, lest it become too late. On 18 June, a meeting of the chief members of the Supreme Council was held, and after deliberation an agreement was reached to the effect that proper measures for ending the war should be expedited, in view of the war situation. Accordingly, I reported the developments to Mr. Hirota and urged him to speed up his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador. On the following day I reported to the Throne the measures taken regarding the U.S.S.R. and the mission entrusted to Mr. Hirota; the Emperor expressed his desire for an early ending of the war without fail, in spite of the great difficulties, to which I replied that I would exert myself to the utmost, doing everything in my power. On 22 June, the Emperor called into his presence the chief members of the Supreme Council and expressed his wish that each of us there assembled should exert his efforts toward bringing the war to an end. It was about this time that I learned that the heads of state of the United States, Great Britain and China were soon going to meet at Potsdam in a conference in which the Soviet chief also would be taking part, and I wanted the Soviet Government to be informed of the Emperor's wish for an early peace before such a conference should take place. I sent instructions therefore to Ambassador Sato to convey the Emperor's wish to the Government of the U.S.S.R (Exhibit No. 2696). Our intention to dispatch a special mission was also communicated to Moscow. The Soviet reaction, however, was not favorable.

140. On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration was issued by President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang. At a meeting of the Supreme Council of the following day, I pointed out that the Declaration offered in effect a peace on terms, and that serious consequences would follow if we rejected it. It was therefore agreed that we should wait and learn the Soviet reaction to the proposal for mediation. At the Cabinet meeting that afternoon the same explanation was given, and it was agreed that the Declaration should be passed without comment and the press be guided not to play it up, in order to guard against unfavorable public reaction to it. The press unfortunately reports the Premier's statement that the Government had decided to "ignore" the Declaration, which was interpreted in the United States and elsewhere as a rejection and was used by President Truman as justification for the use of the atomic bombs and by the U.S.S.R as reason for entering the war against Japan.
On 6 August the atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima, and warning was served that the United States would drop the bomb until Japan was annihilated if she persisted in her rejection of the Potsdam Declaration. I instructed Ambassador Sato to press for an interview with Foreign Minister Molotov, at least to clarify the situation. The request by the Ambassador was not acceded to by the Soviet Government, and although Mr. Molotov returned to Moscow on 5 August, it was not until the 8th that Ambassador Sato was notified that Mr. Molotov would receive him at 5 P.M. of that day (Exhibit No. 2705). After that we received no communication from our Ambassador; but in the morning of the 9th I received from the radio-room of the Foreign Ministry an urgent report that it had been broadcast from Moscow that Mr. Molotov had handed to Ambassador Sato a declaration of war against Japan. Hostilities were also reported from Manchoukuo to have commenced at midnight preceding. At 11:15 A.M. of the 10th I received Soviet Ambassador Malik at my request and received from him the first formal communication from his Government notifying the declaration of war against Japan. Having mentioned to him the Soviet commencement of war when the Neutrality Pact was still in force, and when the Soviet Government had not yet replied to Japan's request for mediation between Japan and the Allied Powers, I asked him to transmit to his Government our reply relative to the Potsdam Declaration.

The situation having thus become very serious, a meeting of the Supreme Council was held at 11 o'clock that morning. All members recognized the difficulty of continuing the war, after the use of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, and no one in the Council expressed objection to acceptance in principle of the Potsdam Declaration. Various opinions, however, were expressed regarding the conditions upon which it was to be accepted; all agreed that the preservation of the fundamental structure of the State should be made a condition, but the Army and Navy High Commands and the War Minister wished to add three more conditions: a) that the Allied forces would refrain so far as possible from occupying the mainland of Japan, and that if occupation was unavoidable it would be on a small scale and would exclude Tokyo; b) that the disarmament of the Japanese forces should be done voluntarily by the Japanese themselves; c) that the punishment of war criminals should be entrusted to the Japanese themselves. No agreement could be reached, and the meeting was adjourned; a Cabinet meeting in the afternoon was no more able to agree, though most of its members agreed with me that the condition for accepting the Potsdam Declaration should be limited to the absolutely necessary one of preserving the fundamental structure of the state. The matter was discussed that night when the Supreme Council and the President of the Privy Council met in the presence of the Emperor, at his command. I repeated my previous statement and strongly urged the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration without any condition excepting that of the preservation of the fundamental structure of the state, but there were various opinions demanding other conditions and insisting on their necessity. Finally the Emperor expressed accord with my views and the wish that the Potsdam Declaration be accepted to relieve the sufferings of mankind and to save the country from ruin. The decision having been given, a Cabinet meeting was held thenceupon at 5 P.M., and our answer was unanimously approved by the Cabinet. Accordingly I ordered the Minister in Switzerland to transmit it to the United States and China through the Swiss Government, and the Minister in Sweden to transmit it to the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain through the Swedish Government (Exhibit No. 5).
Trouble arose again, however, when the contents of the reply from the four Governments to the Japanese Government became known to us. I learned of it for the first time from the Foreign Ministry radio-room, and finding the phraseology somewhat unclear, instructed the officials of the Ministry to study the text. They reached the conclusion, after studying it carefully, that it could be interpreted as being generally in conformity with our understanding that the Potsdam Declaration did not imply a requirement of a change in the fundamental structure of the state, and that we should accept the Potsdam Declaration without proposing any further conditions, unless we were prepared to face and resolved to accept the breakdown and collapse of our peace efforts. Meetings of the Cabinet and the Supreme Council were held to consider this reply of the four Governments. Stating my views in these meetings, I strongly advised the acceptance of the Declaration with no further representations; but there was strong opposition by the group led by the Minister of War, insisting that the reply was unsatisfactory and unacceptable, and that further negotiations should be attempted. In these circumstances a conference was again called in the presence of the Emperor in the morning of the 14th. Again the conference could not reach a decision. It last the Emperor himself stated that we must accept the Declaration, that the polarity and the existence of the Japanese nation should be preserved and the sufferings and hardships of mankind be alleviated. It 1 P.M. a cabinet meeting was held, and subsequently the Imperial Rescript accepting the Potsdam Declaration was promulgated. The acceptance was communicated to the Allied Powers through the Swiss Government in the morning of the 15th.

145. As I have testified above, I had striven throughout my career to see Japan maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the world, and had exerted every possible effort in the last critical months to improve relations with the United States, Britain, China and the other powers and to avert the Pacific war. At last I was driven into a position where, as I saw it, conditions no longer permitted me to oppose war, and I failed. But from the day of the outbreak of the war I devoted myself with special care to bringing about as speedily as possible the end of the war; and after becoming Foreign Minister in April 1945 I worked actively toward that end at the risk of my life, resisting all stubborn opposition of various circles until at last the decision for terminating the war by acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration was reached on 14 August 1945. It is the greatest sorrow of my life that I was not successful in preventing war in 1941, but it is a matter of some consolation for me that I was able by my efforts to contribute to lessening the suffering of mankind by ending it in 1945.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tó-G Shigéori (seal)

On this 12th day of December, 1947
at Tokyo

Deponent: Tó-G Shigéori

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
12 December 1947
RETURN TO ROOM 361
Particulars Regarding the Personal Message from
President Roosevelt

I. The United Press wire-dispatch which was received here early in the morning of the 7th of December, last year, reported that the Secretary of State of the United States officially announced that President Roosevelt's message to His Majesty the Emperor had been sent. Therefore, the authorities of the Foreign Ministry were awaiting the arrival of the message, by immediately contacting the departments concerned.

II. However, the arrival of the message seemed to have been delayed considerably. It was after ten o'clock that evening, when the American Ambassador in Tokyo finally sent word to the Foreign Minister to the effect that he wanted to see the Minister late as he had just received instructions on some urgent and vital matter and was deciphering the telegram. At midnight of the same day (0015 hour), Ambassador GROW called on Foreign Minister TOGO at the latter's official residence with the message.

III. During the meeting which ended in ten odd minutes, Ambassador GROW requested the good offices of the Foreign Minister, saying that he had received President Roosevelt's personal message to His Majesty the Emperor and that he had been especially instructed to present it personally to the Emperor. The Foreign Minister replied to the effect that since it was midnight he could not make arrangement for an audience with the Emperor until the following morning but that whether or not the Ambassador would be received in audience as he wished may depend upon the contents of the personal message. Ambassador GROW, thereupon, unofficially handed to the Minister a prepared copy (No. 3) of the personal message, saying that he is again requesting special consideration for an audience with the Emperor which is most necessary in view of the exceedingly grave situation. The Ambassador left, promising to see the Minister again.

IV. The Foreign Minister went to the Premier's official residence with the translation of the outline of the personal message. As a result of a hasty conference with the Premier and others, the Foreign Minister decided generally as to the method of handling this matter. At 2:30 a.m. the same night, he went to the Palace (The Emperor appeared in full naval uniform) where he gave a detailed report to the Throne.

V. Since the Foreign Minister returned to his residence after 3:30 a.m. he made arrangements to notify the British and American Ambassadors in Tokyo of the close of the Japanese-American negotiations at 6:00 a.m. of the 8th as scheduled, and at the same time made arrangements to notify Ambassador GROW at that time of the following as the opinion of the Emperor regarding the personal message of President Roosevelt:

I have had the Japanese Government reply to the recent inquiry of the President of the United States concerning the circumstances surrounding the concentration of Japanese troops in French Indo-China.
Furthermore, the withdrawal of troops from French Indo-China constitutes an item in the Japanese-American negotiation, and since I have had the Japanese Government express its intentions concerning it, I hope that you will thereby understand.

It is my cherished desire to bring about peace and quiet to the Pacific and to the whole world, and I am sure that the President will truly acknowledge the fact that I have been having my Government make efforts for that purpose to this day.

Soon after that (past 4:00 o'clock) OKA, The Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau reported to the Minister over the telephone of the success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

VI. On the morning of the 8th, the Foreign Minister received the British and American Ambassadors a little behind schedule (due to difficult telephone connections). At that time, a conversation took place between Ambassador GRER and the Minister, the gist of which is as outlined in the annexed sheet (No. 2)

(NOTE)
1. Secretary KASE was present at the conversation acting as an interpreter.

2. The personal message was not presented to the Throne at all. The official announcement of the Information Bureau differs from the facts, on this point.

3. Both the British and American Ambassadors did not know of the outbreak of the state of war prior to the above, at the time of the conversation on the morning of 8th.

GIST OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER TOGO AND THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN TOKYO.

7:00 a.m., 8 December 1941

I said, "In regard to the personal message of President ROOSEVELT to His Majesty the Emperor, which you brought last night, I had an opportunity, after meeting you, to obtain the Emperor's opinion regarding it. The Emperor ordered me to transmit to President Roosevelt the following gist through you: 'I have had the Japanese Government reply to the recent inquiry of the President of the United States concerning the circumstances surrounding the concentration of Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Furthermore, the withdrawal of troops from French Indo-China constitutes an item in the Japanese-American negotiation, and since I have had the Japanese Government express its intentions concerning it, I hope that you will thereby understand. It is my cherished desire to bring about peace and quiet to
Pacific and to the whole world, and I am sure that the President will truly acknowledge the fact that I have been having my Government make efforts for that purpose to this day."

The Ambassador listened to this in awe and replied that he will immediately deliver the Emperor's opinion to the President. Furthermore, said that according to the instructions which he has, he is to request an audience with the Emperor and present the above personal message personally to the Emperor. He requested that since the relation between the two nations is confronting a great crisis, arrangements be especially made for an audience with the Emperor.

I replied, "If the purpose of your audience with the Emperor is simply for the purpose of presenting the personal message, I feel that it may be unnecessary, as the Emperor's opinion is as previously stated. However, I have no intention whatsoever of interfering with your desires, and if you have something to add besides the personal message, I will naturally give considerations."

The Ambassador expressed his extreme satisfaction and appreciation and took his leave.

In accordance with the Ambassador's request, the English translation (appended to the text of the proposal was forwarded later.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kayu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached, consisting of 6 pages, dated November 19, 19--; and described as follows: PARTICULARS OF CORDIAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the filing number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, file 1

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of November, 1947

Witness: K. Urabe

Signature of Official
CHief, Archives Section
Official Capacity.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, James G. Lambert, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of November, 1947

Witness: Henry Shinojima

NAME
US Investigator
Official Capacity.
Statement made by Karakhan to the Japanese Ambassador Ota on 16 April 1933.

1. From the very beginning of the Manchurian Incident and up to the moment the Japanese Army entered the territory of Manchuria, the Japanese government directly through the Soviet Ambassador in Japan and also through their Ambassador in Korea reportedly made assurances to the effect that the rights and interests of the U.S.S.R. and in particular those to the Chinese Eastern Railway would not be prejudiced; and that the Japanese command as well as the Japanese officials in Manchuria were given strict instructions not to permit the rights and interests of the U.S.S.R. on the Chinese Eastern Railway to be violated. The statements of that kind were made not only at the very beginning of events but throughout those events up to the present time which shows that the Japanese government took the responsibility for every action which could violate the rights and interests of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government having accepted the assurances of the Japanese government became somewhat less worried, so much the more due to the fact that at the outset of the events the local Japanese authorities showed some desire to avoid anything which could be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the U.S.S.R. In many cases when serious damage was caused to the Chinese Eastern Railway in connection with the military actions conducted in the railway zone, the Soviet Government, though calling Japan's attention to this fact was ready to take it without much alarm insofar as such damage could have been explained by the war situation.

2. Actions taken by the Manchukuo authorities, by the Japanese councillors in Manchuria and directly by the local Japanese authorities within last months created a very grave situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway and made the Soviet Government anxious not only about the condition of the railway, the normal functions of which were disturbed, but also because these actions aimed at the aggravation of conditions on the railway including artificial provocation of incidents in connection with certain problems.

3. Basic facts to which the Soviet Government calls the attention of the Japanese Government are as follows:

a) On the 7th of July 1932 the Manchurian authorities captured a transit wharf of the Chinese Eastern Railway. According to the information sent by us on the 8th of July to the Japanese government that capture was directed by the Japanese nationals employed by Manchukuo. This problem is not yet settled up till now due to the fault of the abovementioned powers and heavy damage was caused to the interests of the U.S.S.R.
Moreover, in spite of the promise given by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be instrumental in the speedy settlement of the issue, the Japanese military officials occupied the office of the transit wharf on the 11th of April, hoisted the Japanese flag on the roof of the building and mounted Japanese guards. If up till now the authorities of Manchukuo have been committing an unlawful act and the Japanese government took part in the settlement of the issue arising out of it, now the Japanese authorities themselves decided to capture that which has been and still is the subject of the negotiations.

The Soviet Government cannot but make protest against those actions which obviously violate the above-mentioned assurances of the Japanese Government.

b) The Soviet Government permitted the transportation of the Japanese forces by the Chinese Eastern Railway at the request of the Japanese Government. It is needless to prove that the Soviet Government and the Chinese Eastern Railway have regarded and regard those transportations from a purely commercial point of view and believe that they should be duly paid for.

Meanwhile the negotiations with regard to this matter conducted between the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Japanese military authorities are systematically protracted and there is already a great indebtedness which aggravates the financial position of the railway suffering already from great reduction of commercial transportation which was a result of the military operations conducted in Manchuria.

c) The Soviet Government is especially anxious about the last events which took place in Manchuria in the course of which the police authorities committed several acts of violence for the express purpose of disrupting the normal functions of the Chinese Eastern Railway and of causing heavy damage to the interests of the U.S.S.R. These acts were committed at the direct demand of the Japanese officials of Manchukuo and with their participation. Those actions resulted in the disjunction of tracks between the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Zabaikal Railway by way of driving spikes into railway points in order to hamper the European-Asianic means of communication which would disrupt communications between the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Soviet railways; these actions resulted also in the seizure of transit goods belonging to the U.S.S.R. which meant gross violation of the rights of the Soviet Union to the transit at the Chinese Eastern Railway.

d) The Eastern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway is at present completely disorganized as a result of systematic attacks of robbers on trains and railway constructions, engineering deliberate railway accidents, attacks, lootings, murders and kidnapping of Soviet citizens employed by the Chinese Eastern Railway. Asking for permission to transport the
the Japanese troops to the Eastern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government assured the Soviet Government that their aim was to restore peace and to maintain it. Meanwhile, from the point of view of order and security the situation on the railway in the worse time was never so grave as it is at present.

g) The authorities of Manchoukuo and the Japanese authorities in Manchuria absolutely artificially raised and lately highlighted the issue with regard to the engines and cars on the Soviet territory, because they could not but know that the Soviet authorities are above any reproach as to these two problems.

The engines in question belong to the Soviet Government and they never were in the possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which is the U.S.S.R. property, nor Manchoukuo, to say nothing of the Japanese, have right to make any claim as to those engines. As to the cars, the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Soviet railways always exchanged cars and there is no wonder that certain number of the cars of the Chinese Eastern Railway are on the Soviet territory because the same number or even more -- at present over 2000 cars belonging to the Soviet railways are exploited by the Chinese Eastern Railway.

When the return of cars from the Soviet territory to the Chinese Eastern Railway was sometime delayed, it happened as a result of military actions going on between Chinese units and Japanese-Manchurian army which during many months stopped the traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway from both Eastern and Western ends.

f) Mass arrests of Soviet citizens, many of whom are kept more than a year without being tried under extremely difficult conditions and are subjected to tortures inflicted directly by the Japanese gendarmes and the Japanese nationals employed by Manchoukuo.

4. All the above-stated facts which do not exhaust all the cases of the violation of interests of the U.S.S.R. make the Soviet Government remind the Japanese Government of their assurances made to the effect that the interests of the Soviet Union would not be prejudiced and to insist on taking effective measures that can actually protect the rights and interests of the Soviet Union from any infringements and violation.

The above copy is correct.

September 27, 1947

Director of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow
(Istomin)
CERTIFICATE

November 14, 1947

I, Major N. A. Bazarke, Chief of the Document Room of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S., hereby certify that a copy of the document to which this certificate is attached entitled:

The Statement made by Karakhan to the Japanese Ambassador Ota on 16 April 1935 was received by me from the Director of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow on October 15, 1947.

The original document is in the custody of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow.

Major N. A. Bazarke,
Chief of the Document Room of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S.
Dec. 9934-8
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On April 24 in his conversation with my deputy Comrade L. M. Karakhan, the Ambassador expressed his desire to improve Soviet-Japanese relations and asked comrade Karakhan by what means this aim could be attained and whether it should be accomplished by concluding some agreement of political nature. I would like to have a more detailed conversation with the ambassador on this subject and to answer his questions with utmost accuracy and frankness. This step is especially urgent in the light of the fact that the present moment seems to call for taking speedy measures to eliminate the impending danger of the deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations.

On April 16 of this year comrade Karakhan made to the ambassador an official statement to be conveyed to Tokyo with regard to the extremely abnormal situation created by the Manchurian authorities on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The actions of these authorities which led to such a situation were described in detail by comrade Karakhan. Unfortunately no reply to that statement was received from the Japanese Government whereas the situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway is apt to be aggravated. In spite of the fact that the Soviet Government and their representatives in the Board of Directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway have proved beyond any doubt the absolute groundlessness of the claims and demands which had been put to the Soviet side by the Manchurian authorities, the latter keep on insisting on their demands, set even ultimatum dates for their fulfillment and are obviously threatening to take further unilateral measures prejudicial to the interests of the Soviet Union in violation of the Peiping Agreement and Mukden Agreement.

Such threats, to say nothing of their effectuation, may very seriously and for a long time aggravate our relations with the Manchurian authorities and Japan as well.

Having commenced the hostilities in Manchuria the Japanese Government repeatedly assured us that these hostilities did not constitute any danger to the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to those of the Soviet Union. Thus the Japanese Government determined to be responsible to us for the consequences and results of their actions in Manchuria inasmuch as they are prejudicial to our interests. Even for this sole reason the Japanese Government cannot relieve itself of the responsibility for possible actions contrary to the interests of the U.S.S.R. as a result of the present
situation in Manchuria. However there is no need for me to discuss this matter in a more detailed manner and to be frank I would like to inform the Ambassador that we have received some authentic and quite reliable documents which show the role of Japanese officials and instigations of the Manchurian authorities to commit acts of violence against the U.S.S.R. which may lead to quite serious complications between the U.S.S.R, on the one hand and Manchukuo and Japan on the other. In particular according to these documents Mr Morishima, the Japanese consul-general in Harbin, recommended such provocative measures as the arrests of top Soviet representatives on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

I therefore request that the Ambassador think over the possible consequences of such measures. The publication of these authentic documents would have shown to the whole world the role of the Japanese representatives in Manchuria and in the actions, taken by her. But we of course do not intend to publish them.

However, I am telling all this to the Ambassador not only for the purpose of complaining of the actions of the Manchurian authorities and representatives of the Japanese Government. I summoned the Ambassador mainly for the purpose of replying to the questions which he had put to comrade Karakhan and emphasizing my concurrence with some observations made by the Ambassador during that conversation. He for instance expressed the opinion that the Chinese Eastern Railway might become a source of misunderstanding between our countries, that the railway brings no profit to us and that the matter with regard to this railway requires the solution on political grounds. I fully understand that the railway due to the events which took place during the last year and a half may become and even become unprofitable, that under the present circumstances this railway is of a less interest to us than in the past, that in the present situation some forces and influences which contributed much to the deterioration of the Soviet-Japanese relations may actually make the Chinese Eastern Railway a source of friction between our country and Japan and that the matter should be radically settled. However, one cannot overlook the fact that the railway which has been built exclusively on the earnings of the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union undeniably constitute the property of the Soviet Union, that even now it is of a great importance for the Soviet Union and therefore the Soviet Government cannot give up their rights to this railway. I hope the Japanese Government will not fail to understand this.
In what way can this problem be solved? How does the Ambassador understand the political solution of this matter as he put it? The Ambassador obviously meant the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway as he referred to the negotiations on this matter which took place between comrade Troyanovsky and Mr. Fujiwara. The Ambassador asked comrade Karakhan whether our attitude towards sale of the railway charged, since that time.

In this connection I think it is necessary to state that our attitude has not changed and that we are ready to enter into negotiations with Japan on the sale of the railway. Unfortunately the negotiations were discontinued and gave no result due to the fact that no reply had been received from Japan to the concrete proposals of Comrade Troyanovsky. I remind in this connection that comrade Troyanovsky told Mr. Fujiwara about a definite sum. If Japan considers it improper she should tell us about it and we perhaps shall take her arguments into consideration. If there are any difficulties in paying the purchasing price we are ready to discuss the possible privileges and time of payments as well as the transfer of a part of the property of the Chinese Eastern Railway as a part of payments.

We were ready to discuss some other methods of solving that question such as, for instance, the lease of the railway.

All these matters can be solved only through the negotiations and we propose that the Japanese Government enter into these negotiations. It goes without saying that immediate and radical measures should be taken to stop all unilateral actions on the Chinese Eastern Railway which are being taken by Manchukuo. We hope that apart from the negotiations the Japanese Government will take all possible measures to restore the normal relations on the Chinese Eastern Railway, to put an end to the practice of unilateral and unlawful actions of the Manchurian authorities, and to the unfounded claims containing ultimata and threats. I believe the possible consequences of this practice are obvious to the authorities in Tokyo.

I request that the above-said be conveyed by the Ambassador to his government and I request him to believe that my statement was dictated by the understanding of the seriousness of the situation created on the Chinese Eastern Railway and by our desire to maintain and consolidate our friendly relations with Japan. In the course of the past year and a half we gave sufficient proof of our sincerity and readiness to take into consideration the interests of Japan and we expect reciprocity on the part of the Japanese Government. At any
rate the reply from Tokyo to my proposals which I hope will
not be long in coming will enable us to judge of this in-
tentions of the Japanese Government as to our relations.

This copy is made from the original document which is
kept in the custody of State Central Historical Archives in
Moscow.

V. Istomin, Chief of State
Central Historical Archives
in Moscow

September 27, 1947
CERTIFICATE

November 14, 1947

I, Major N. A. Bazenko, Chief of the document room of the Soviet division of the I.P.S, hereby certify that a copy of the document to which this certificate is attached entitled:

The gist of the statement of M. M. Litvinov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs made to Mr. Ota, Japanese Ambassador, on May 2, 1933.

was received by me from the Director of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow on October 15, 1947.

The original document is in the custody of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow.

Major N. A. Bazenko
Chief of the document room of the Soviet division of the I.P.S.
Note of the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota

On August 22, 1934 Comrade Yurunov, the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in Tokyo sent Mr. Hirota, the Foreign Minister the following note:

Mr. Minister,

On the 13th and 14th of August, Soviet citizens employed by the Chinese Eastern Railway were put under arrest on the Eastern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway. They were mainly the top officials such as: Superintendent of the 3d Section, Traction Service, Superintendent of the 9th and 11th Railroad Sections, Superintendent of the 3d Section, Telegraph Service, Station Masters of the largest stations; Imyanpo, Hallin, Pogranichnaya, Madaozhi, several telegraph operators and so on.

On the 16th of August, 3 persons more were put under arrest, including the Chief of Freight Department, Exploitation Service who happened to be at that time at the Station Imyanpo and also the Station Master of the Taipinglin Station. Due to these arrests the Eastern Branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway was deprived of its top officials and the further activity of the line was greatly hampered, but in spite of all the obstacles put by the local authorities and in spite of the absence of proper guard the line is still functioning owing only to the heroic efforts of railway employees and first of all of the Soviet citizens.

In order to justify these unlawful and unwarranted arrests of the Soviet employees absurd charges are fabricated to the effect that they allegedly organized attacks on the Japanese military missions and attacks of the hunghutzo on trains, arranged train accidents, committed plunders and murders and captured railway employees and members of their families.

Those obviously groundless charges are officially supported by the Japanese War Ministry and the representative of the Foreign Office. Not being satisfied with the arrests of the employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway and absurd charges against them, the Japanese-Manchurian authorities made the same charges against official organs and representatives of the U.S.S.R. in Manchoukuo that is against the Soviet Consulate and the Consul himself at the Pogranichnaya Station as well as against the command of the Separate Red Banner for Eastern Army.

The Soviet Government considers all those actions which coincided with the actual engineering of the breakdown by the Japanese-Manchurian party of Tokyo negotiation concerning the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway as causing the disorganization of the activities of the railway as well as a gross violation of the stipulated rights of the U.S.S.R. to the Chinese Eastern Railway.
The Soviet Government especially points out the fact that the Japanese War Ministry in its official communiqué of August 17, dared to make such an ungrounded assertion that "the orders to engineer accidents and attacks are issued by the Separate Rod Banner Far Eastern Army" which according to the allegations of the Japanese War Ministry directs the activities of the bandit detachments acting on the Chinese Eastern Railway through some organ of the "Militia" organ of the Chinese Eastern Railway which organ actually does not exist.

Along with all these assertions the War Ministry makes statements of aggressive nature directed against the U.S.S.R.

The Japanese Government cannot but realize that such statements of the Japanese War Ministry having lately become more frequent together with the above-stated actions in Manchukuo bear witness to the sharpening of aggressive intentions of certain Japanese official circles.

The Soviet Government placing the responsibility for the above-mentioned actions on the Manchurian authorities as well as on the Japanese Government have authorized me, Mr. Minister, to lodge with you their protest.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. expect that the Japanese government will draw all appropriate conclusions.

Accept Mr. Minister, etc.

The copy is made from the original document which is in the custody of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow.

Director of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow
(Istomin)

September 27, 1947
CERTIFICATE

14 November 1947

I, Major N. A. Bazenko, Chief of the Document Room of the Soviet Division of the I.F.S. hereby certify that a copy of the document to which this certificate is attached entitled:

Note of the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, on August 22, 1934.

was received by me from the Director of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow on October 15, 1947.

The original document is in the custody of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow.

Major N. A. Bazenko,
Chief of the Document Room of the Soviet Division of the I.F.S.
In the basic principles of the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Lanchoukuo (submitted by the Soviet delegation at the meeting on July 3, 1933).

I. The object of the sale. The role and importance of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

1. In conformity with the Feiping and Lukden Agreements the Soviet Government agrees to the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Lanchoukuo with all its property including the property of the Railway which was captured by the Lukden authorities at different times unlawfully and through acts of violence.

However, the property of the Soviet Union which does not belong to the Chinese Eastern Railway and which was detained on the Railway during the intervention or which was left on the Railway as a result of the uncompleted stipulated exchange of ours naturally does not constitute the object of the sale. This property, the inventory of which should be made by a special commission should be returned to the Government of the U.S.S.R.

Thus the following is to be purchased.

- The railway with the main line of 1726 kms long and with the total length of 2544.9 kms including auxiliary lines, ballast lines and fire wood supply lines; wire line of 2567 kms long; telephone system and water supply;
- The rolling stock park of the railway;
- Civilian installations consisting of buildings for the railway personnel and passengers, stores, apartment houses, offices, military barracks and so on with the total area of 1,199,762 square meters.
- Workshops and round-houses including the main Harbin workshops, railway workshops, telegraph service workshops and so on.
- Electric power stations;
- The telephone exchange in Harbin;
- The river flotilla consisting of steamers and non-steamers with the transit wharf in Harbin;
- Land belonging to the Railway;
- Forest concessions ("Chol", "Isailinghne" and the Eastern Concession).
j). Medical, sanitary and veterinary institutions

k). Summer cottages and meteorological stations;

l). Agronomic institutions, forest preserves and hothouses;

m). Sawmill, drying oil factory and cotton waste mill;

n). Soft drinks factory;

o). Wool-carding mill;

p). Printing shop; water supply system in Harbin.

q). Motor vehicle park

r). School and club buildings;

s). Other buildings, installations and property of the railway.

2. Thus the Chinese Eastern Railway with its property is a powerful economic unit which even now plays a tremendous role in the economic life and development of North Manchuria and is of great value from the point of view of property and economic interests of the U. S. S. R. It should be noted that with the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway certain economic rights and privileges of the U. S. S. R. which are of no small importance for the latter will be in part eliminated and in past will lose their value. This, for instance includes the obligatory use employment by the railway of many thousands of Soviet workers and employees, certain tariff advantages and so forth.

3. Speaking of the importance of the Chinese Eastern Railway one cannot but stress the great international importance of the Railway which constitutes a very important communication line between Europe and Asia. It is quite obvious that the Chinese Eastern Railway will not lose its importance after its transfer to Manchoukuo and after the removal of those obstacles which recently disrupted the normal functioning of the Railway.
The Chinese Eastern Railway is also of a great importance as a main communication line of Northern Manchuria which connects this rich area having a prospect of further development with Southern Manchuria and the Ocean. There is no need to prove that the railway will not lose this importance of it after its transfer to Lanchoukuo.

On the contrary, this Railway under the restored conditions for the normal functioning will be of still more importance for the life of this area and its role and value will undoubtedly increase along with the economic rise of Manchuria.

4. There are no grounds to mix the temporary deterioration of the financial position of the railway which was created recently by specific conditions disrupting its normal functioning with its actual economic condition, its importance and the possibilities for further development. It is sufficient to note the fact that from the outset of the joint Soviet-Chinese management of the Chinese Eastern Railway up to 1930 inclusive the profits of the railway exceeded its expenditures by 140 million golden roubles, i.e. approximately by 20 million golden roubles annually.

Especially it should be noted that even in 1932 in the period of the world economic crisis which heavily affected all economic life of the Manchuria and under the extremely difficult conditions for the railway created by the above-mentioned reasons the profits of the railway still exceeded the exploitation and expenditures by 11 million golden roubles.

These figures very clearly demonstrate great economic power and stability of the railway. Insufficient profitability of the railway for the Soviet Government in comparison with the tremendous exploitation expenditures of the railway may be explained exclusively by the fact that till now the railway has been put to considerable expense to maintain and give credits to the police, guard troops, government offices and to carry out gratuitous freight and passengers transportations free of charge.

The Soviet representatives in the Board of Directors constantly met with strong opposition of the Chinese side and now of the Manchurian side in the course of their attempts to eliminate or at least considerably cut down these expenditures which are not organically connected with this railway as a commercial enterprise. Lanchoukuo after assuming the possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway will undoubtedly put an end to all imposed and unproductive expenditures and thus will considerably increase its actual profits.

II. The purchasing price and the methods of payment.

1. In defining the purchasing price of the Chinese Eastern Railway and its property one should adhere to item 2, article 1 of the Mukden Agreement setting forth that the
contracting parties in the course of the purchase will define the real value of the Chinese Eastern Railway and state that the railway should be purchased at a fair price.

In conformity with this and taking into consideration the basic articles of the balance precisely establishing the real expenditures for the construction and development of the Chinese Eastern Railway the Soviet Government being guided at the same time by the principle of justice carefully considered all the circumstances enabling it to considerably cut down the purchasing price.

2. The sum total of expenditures for the construction of the railway for the completion of the work left undone for the acquisition of the rolling stock, losses in the course of the utilization of the capital for the construction and for the payment of interests in the course of the construction as well as expenditures in connection with improvement of the railway amounts to 411,691,976 golden roubles.

This sum does not include 178,579,612 golden roubles lent by the former Tsarist Government to the Chinese Eastern Railway to make up deficits and to maintain the railway during the first years of its existence. The great indebtedness of the railway to the Government of the U. S. S. R. due to the interests on the capital invested in the Chinese Eastern Railway and mentioned in the balance has likewise not been taken into consideration.

Moreover, taking into consideration some wear of the technical equipment and some changes in the economic importance of the Chinese Eastern Railway in connection with the construction of new railways and trying to cut down the purchasing price as much as possible the Soviet Government agree to reduce the purchasing price of the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with the above-mentioned articles of the balance to 210 million golden roubles instead of actual expenditures amounting to 411,691,976 golden roubles.

3. However, this sum (210 million golden roubles) does not include the cost of various property of the Chinese Eastern Railway which itself is of great economic importance and the original cost of which has considerably increased due to the development of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

It is common knowledge that the Railway is the owner of the large land property.

In conformity with the Peiping and Lüdhen agreements the Soviet Government agreed to transfer the land which the railway does not need to the Chinese authorities. In 1925 upon the proposal of the Soviet Government the joint Soviet-Chinese
commission for the delimitation of land was established. However, the Kukden authorities evaded convoking this commission preferring to unlawfully seize the land of the railway piecemeal.

Without going into the details in establishing the cost of this land which should undoubtedly be left in the possession of the railway as well as the cost of the rich forest concession of the Chinese Eastern Railway which also are of great importance the Soviet Government agree to estimate all this property of the railway as amounting only to 40 million golden roubles which is considerably below its actual cost.

In accordance with the above-mentioned, the total purchasing price of the Chinese Eastern Railway and of all its property is fixed 250 million golden roubles. (210 million golden roubles plus 40 million golden roubles, 1 golden rouble is equal to 1.04 golden yen.

4. The comparison of the above-mentioned sum of 250 million golden roubles with the sum of 23 million golden yen which the Japanese Government themselves were willing to pay to the former Russian Government in 1917 for the short section of the southern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway (Kuangchentze-Leochaokou) only of 103 kms long leads to the conclusion that in applying this estimation to the whole length of the Chinese Eastern Railway we would have the sum of approximately 380 million golden yen or about 370 million golden roubles.

However, the section of the Chinese Eastern Railway with regard to which the negotiations were conducted has no large artificial installations or valuable enterprises not to speak of the international and economic importance of the whole Chinese Eastern Railway.

Thus from all points of view the purchasing price of 250 million golden roubles should be recognized as quite moderate and fair.

5. The Chinese Eastern Railway is being transferred to Manchoukou with all its assets and liabilities which means that no claims can be put in future to the Soviet Government with regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway.

6. To facilitate the payment of this purchasing sum and to stimulate the development of economic relations of Japan and Manchuria the Soviet Government agree to receive one-half of the indicated purchasing price, i.e. 125 million golden roubles in goods. The goods furnished as part of the payment are to be supplied to the U. S. S. R. in four periods in the course of two years. For the payment of these supplies of goods Lanchoukou will issue bonds guaranteed by the State Bank of Japan and accepted by the consortium of Japanese banks. As to the money,
part of the payment amounting to 125 million golden roubles. One quarter of this sum is to be paid immediately in cash. The balance may be paid with the bonds of Manchoukou guaranteed by the Japanese government. These bonds are to be cancelled in the course of the three years on the basis of 4% annually.

III. Protection of economic interests of the U.S.S.R.

To maintain the economic relations which exist between the U.S.S.R. and Manchoukou and to secure the important role of the Chinese Eastern Railway as an international communication line between Europe and Asia a special agreement should be signed simultaneously with the General Agreement on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

This agreement will provide for:

1. The preservation for the U.S.S.R. of free transit by the Chinese Eastern Railway of goods and passengers for Soviet railways with some privileges granted and with the exemption of transit goods and baggage from customs duties and all the taxes.

2. The through communication between the Soviet railways and the Chinese Eastern Railway and the participation of the Chinese Eastern Railway in the transit from Europe to Asia (to Vladivostok).

3. The preservation for the Ussuri Railway of certain amount of goods coming to the Chinese Eastern Railway.

4. The obligation of the Manchurian side to treat the Soviet goods imported through the Chinese Eastern Railway on the basis of most favorable tariffs and customs duties.

IV. Protection of the interests of the Soviet Workers and employees on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Simultaneously with this agreement on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway a special agreement should be signed to protect the rights and interests of the Soviet citizens on the Chinese Eastern Railway. This agreement should set forth:

1. In case the Manchurian side having become the owner of the railway will express its intention to replace the Soviet workers and employees by its own citizens this replacement should be carried on gradually in small groups and in periods which will give them either an opportunity of finding a job on the spot or of returning to the U.S.S.R. The replacement of the Soviet workers and employees should be carried out during the period of two years after
the assumption of the possession of the railway by the Manchurian side.

2. The preservation of all rights of the Soviet citizens on movable and immovable property located in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

3. The right to dispose of this property or to take it or its money equivalent out of Manchuria.

4. Paying by the railway the transportation expenses of the workers, employees and their families leaving for the U.S.S.R. (The expenses are to be paid up to the arrival of the personnel at the station of departure for the U.S.S.R.)

5. Upon leaving the job or in case of discharge the Soviet citizens should immediately receive all due pay in accordance with the existing regulations of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The copy is made from the original document which is in the custody of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow.

/S/ V. Istomin,
Director of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow
CERTIFICATE

November 14, 1947

I, Major N. A. Bazenko, Chief of the document room of the Soviet division of the I. P. S. hereby certify that a copy of the document to which this certificate is attached entitled:

Memorandum on the basic principles of the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Manchoukuo.

was received by me from the Director of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow on October 15, 1947.

The original document is in the custody of the State Central Historical Archives in Moscow.

Major N. A. Bazenko,
Chief of the document room of the Soviet division of the I. P. S.
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[文字が読みづらい]
三折之尚，宜乎高志。自内而外，其志先成。是故人之有志，以志为始。志者，心之所向也。心之所向，方能成就大事。有志者，事竟成。
你提的这个联合问题的解法步骤如下：

1. 假设条件
2. 已知条件
3. 目标条件
4. 结论条件

通过以上步骤，我们得出最终的结论。
Excerpt from the Interrogation of Oka Takazumi

30 March 1946

Q I would like to ask you at this time one pertinent question regarding war notification to the United States. Do you recall there was some discussion between Togo, the Foreign Minister and Admirals Nagano and Ito regarding notification of the United States prior to any attack?

A I recall it.

Q Do you not recall your conversations with Nagano and Ito in which you also supported them in their stand that the war should be started with a maximum effectiveness and therefore no notice should be given to the United States before attack? This was after the decision to wage war and the notice to attack.

A I don't remember it.

Q Don't you recall any conversation that you had with Nagano and Ito concerning the attack on the United States without any notice?

A No, I don't remember anything like that.

Q What was the gist of the conversation between Togo, Nagano and Ito regarding notification prior to any attack?

A I don't know.

Q You do remember that there was a discussion between Togo, Nagano and Ito don't you?

A I heard after the war had begun that there was a discussion between Togo and Ito.

Q What did you hear?

A Before the attack I had not heard it and the first time I heard it was from American sources.

Q The first time you heard that Ito and Togo had an argument about the time of attack was from American sources?

A I heard it after the war for the first time. My information came from the Demobilization Board which was set up after the war.
Excerpt from *Le Temps*, Tuesday, 5 September 1939

French Official Communique No. 1
of 5 September, morning

The last step by M. Coulondre.

Sunday, at 4:30 P.M., the Quai d'Orsay announced:

M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador to Berlin, was received by Herr von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the Reich, at 12:30 P.M.

M. Coulondre asked whether Herr von Ribbentrop was able to give a satisfactory reply to his communication of 1 September.

Herr von Ribbentrop replied in the negative.

Consequently M. Coulondre, after having recalled a last time the heavy responsibility assumed by the Reich in having started hostilities against Poland without a declaration of war, and in not having accepted the proposals of the French and British Governments, made it known that the French Government, from 5 P.M. today, will find itself under the obligation of fulfilling its engagements contracted towards Poland, which are known to the German Government.

Consequently M. Coulondre has at 5 o'clock today had a secretary of the Embassy ask for his passports from the Wilhelmstrasse.

French interests have been entrusted to the Embassy of the United States at Berlin.
ERRATA SHEET

Def. Doc. 2813

Page 1 Line 10 Insert "Chungking" before "regime"
Outline of the Solution of the China Incident

The Decisions reached at the Imperial Conference of November 13, 1940

If peace should fail to be established between the Imperial Government and the Chungking régime by the end of November, 1940, we shall, irrespective of whatever the situation may be then, change our policy and prepare for a long war according to the following general plans and make the régime come to our terms by all means.

If the Chungking régime comes to surrender after our policy is changed to that of protracted war, our conditions shall be decided in accordance with the situation prevailing at the time.

(i) The proposed change to a policy of long-drawn war shall be made at a proper time, while at the same time leading the general situation in such a way as to make it favorable for such change. So long as the general situation undergoes no serious changes, the new policy shall aim to secure the Mongolian borderlands, the strategic areas in North China and along the Lower Yangtze starting from the vicinity of Hankow, a sector around Canton, and the key points along the South China coasts; to maintain at all times our operational power; to carry out a definite rule of maintaining peace and order in the occupied regions; and to continue aerial and blockading operations.
(2) As for the New Central Government, the primary object is to make the said Government cooperate in our execution of various plans to strengthen the combined fighting power of the Empire. The new government shall be led to exert its effort in spreading the political influence into the areas under our occupation.

The Ch'ungking Government is to be ultimately "argued with the new Central Government"; however, the latter shall not be allowed to take eager steps to work towards this end.

(3) As for the economic construction -- in China, the fundamental principle is in connection with the situations in Japan and Manchuria, to exploit and secure natural resources for our national defense as well as to contribute to the stabilization of popular sentiment in the occupied areas.

(4) In order to effectively cope with the new situation that may develop as a result of protracted warfare, our internal structure shall be positively improved.

The Imperial organs operating in China shall be improved or abolished so that our policies can be controlled "firmly."
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives Section, of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 (three) pages and entitled "Outline of the Solution of the China Incident -- the Decisions reached at the Imperial Conference of November 13, 1940", is an exact and true copy of a document in the custody of the Japanese Government (the Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 27th day of October, 1941.

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)
February 3, 1941

Decision of the Liaison Conference

The Outline of the Plan for Negotiations with Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union.

1. To have the Soviet Union accept Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's plan. In line with this policy, to get the Soviet Union to co-operate with the policy of Japan, Germany and Italy as to the overthrow of England. At the same time, to ensure the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

2. The following will be the general terms of adjustment of the diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

(1) To have the Soviet Union sell North-Sakhalin through German mediation. If the Soviet disagreed to this, the following plan should be adopted.

a. To let the Soviet Union afford facilities in regard to the drilling of one and half million tons of oil for five years. After completing the above drilling, to let the Soviet Union transfer for a consideration the oil and coal-field rights and trial drilling rights.

b. To have the Soviet Union guarantee the Japanese purchase of one and half million tons in total of oil for the next five years after the above transfer.

c. To conclude a new agreement which would include all the above-mentioned clauses, and at the same time, abolish the old rights agreement.
(2) The Japanese Empire will acknowledge the Soviet Union's position in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, while the Soviet Union will acknowledge the Japanese position in North China and Inner Mongolia. In regard to the relations between Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, to let the Soviet Union and China negotiate together.

(3) To have the Soviet Union abandon her aid to China.

(4) To establish immediately committees for demarcating the border and for settling border disputes between Manchuria and the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia.

(5) To lead fishing negotiations to a successful conclusion in accordance with the Tatschewa plan (the committee's plan).

(6) In the interests of the trade between Japan and Germany, to have the Soviet Union guarantee the operation of cars necessary for the transportation of proper quantity of goods and to have her promise the discount of freight rates.

3. The Japanese Empire will maintain her position as the political leader in the areas within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and will be responsible for the maintenance of order in these areas. The people living in these areas, in principle, shall maintain independence or shall be made independent. However, of the people now in the districts which are the possessions of Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, and others, those who are not capable of being independent shall be permitted to have self-government as much as possible in accordance with their...
ability, and the Japanese Empire will bear the responsibility for guiding their government. Economically, the Empire will reserve her preferential position in regard to the defense resources reserved in these districts. However, with regard to other general commercial enterprises, the Empire will adopt the principle of open door and equal opportunity mutually with other economic blocs.

4. The world will be divided into four greater blocs—the Greater East Asia Bloc, the European Bloc (including Africa), the American Bloc and the Soviet Bloc (including India and Iran). (Australia and New Zealand will be left with Britain, which will be treated on an equal footing with Holland). The Empire will maintain the realization of this policy at the peace conference after the war.

5. Japan should obtain the understanding of the German authorities concerning Japanese action and policy to aim at making American participation in the war impossible to the best of Japan's ability.

(Note) The Empire will not make any such promise as may restrict the Empire's autonomy regard the project, action and exercise of military power in connection with the Empire's entry into the European War.

6. To conclude a "no separate peace" treaty between our allies Germany and Italy, in case Japan should participate in the European war.
7. Germany and Italy, especially Germany, will check the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union attacks both Japan and Manchukuo, Germany and Italy will attack the Soviet Union.
8. Germany will assist Japan to the best of her ability in the replacement of Japanese armaments, while Japan will endeavour to supply Germany with raw material and food. Moreover, Germany will promptly and abundantly supply Japan with inventions, techniques and technicians that may be necessary for the development of the areas within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and for the expansion of Japanese peace-industry.
9. To have a further talk with Germany in regard to the hastening of general peace with China.
10. Foreign Minister Natsuka will visit Europe and negotiate with each government of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union, and will make efforts for the accomplishment of the items outlined above, and if necessary he will conclude a Pact.
The Contents of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's Proposal to the Soviet Union, for the Agreement between Japan-Germany-Italy and the Soviet Union, which would regulate the relations between the Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union.

1. The Soviet Union will express her intention of agreeing to the object of the Tripartite Pact in the sense of prevention of war and quick restoration of peace.

2. The Soviet Union will acknowledge each standing position of Germany, Italy and Japan regarding the new order in Europe and Asia, while the three powers promise the Soviet Union to respect Soviet territory.

3. The three powers and the Soviet Union will promise each other not to help any state which would be hostile to other parties of this group, nor to participate in any group of such hostile states.

In addition, these powers will make a secret understanding which recognizes as the future spheres of influence the following areas: the South Seas for Japan, Iran and India for the Soviet Union, Central Africa for Germany, and North Africa for Italy.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, KAYASHI, Kazru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "The Outline of the plan for Negotiations with Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office) certified at Tokyo,

on this 27 day of October, 1947

/s/ KAYASHI, Kazru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: /s/ SATO, Takegoro
(seal)
Outline of Policies Towards French Indo-China and Thailand

Decided at the Liaison Conference
February 1, 1941

I. Aim.

On the high road to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the policy aim towards French Indo-China and Thailand, with which the Japanese Empire is confronted consists in forming a close inseparable union with both nations, militarily, politically, and economically, for the sake of self-existence and self-defense.

II. Direction.

1. The Japanese Empire will soon take a stronger policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand, putting required pressure upon them with a view to attaining her aim.

   If unavoidable she will resort to arms against French Indo-China.

2. These policies will swiftly be put into force in rejection of the maneuvers of the United States and Great Britain and to attain the objective as soon as possible.
III. Outline.

1. The Japanese Empire will enforce mediation of the disputes between the French Indo-China and Thailand, whose aim is the disposition of the lost territories. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Japanese Government will take such necessary steps as will enable her to establish a leading position in both regions.

2. She will conclude the Japanese Thailand Agreement with Thailand at the earliest possible date, while on the other hand, she intends to bring the economic negotiations with France to an immediate conclusion.

Simultaneous with these steps, she will take the first opportunity to conclude an agreement on general cooperation, with a view to increasing friendly relations between Japan and French Indo-China as well as on military cooperation, whose aims are to secure prevention of disputes between French Indo-China and Thailand and to defend the commercial intercourse between Japan and French Indo-China.

The political and military demands of Japan to be supplemented in the above agreement is as follows:

A. France be made to agree to prevent French Indo-China from cooperating politically and militarily in all forms with third party powers.

B. The establishment or the use of air bases and port facilities in specified areas in French Indo-China as
well as the establishment of organizations required for the maintenance thereof.

C. Accommodations of special conveniences concerning billeting and movements of the Imperial Armed Forces.

3. With a view to making the most of both politics and strategy, required preparations will be made for operations, and at the same time, the time for the exercise of arms will be previously fixed without losing any time.

4. In an earnest effort of attaining the objective, timely pressure will be increased thereupon in accordance with the progress of the negotiations. In case the subjugation action is met by military resistance of the French Indo-China, the said units there will forcibly exercise arms.

5. In case France should not accede to a proposal of settlement of disputes, the use of arms against French Indo-China will be previously provided for. The operation thereof will be decided upon separately. The use of arms in case of her refusal of the conclusion of agreement shall be previously provided for while starting of operations will be decided upon, according to the situation at the time. The foregoing use of arms is limited to making France comply with our requests. Even after the use of arms, we will leave, as best we can, the maintenance of peace and order, administration, and the economy of French Indo-China under the authorities of French Indo-China.
6. In case Thailand should refuse our demands, the contents of the Japanese-Thailand Agreement shall be altered or some pressure shall be brought to bear etc. to get her to accede to our demands as much as possible. In any case, steps will be taken in such a way so as not to get Thailand to take her side with Britain and the United States.

7. To take it into consideration to unify the public opinion prevailing in Japan so as to meet the said steps, and not to bring about useless friction by aggravating the problem in the Southern areas, whose object is the United States and Great Britain. In addition, the following memorandum was decided upon at the Liaison Conference between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government on January 30:

"With respect to the 2nd Article in II, 'Policy,' attainment of the objective of this policy shall be marked for March or April. Best efforts should be made diplomatically
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Outline of Policies Towards French Indo-China and Thailand" decided at Feb. 1st 1941 at the Liaison Conference is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of October, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /S/ SATO, Takegoro (seal)
ERRATA SHEET

Page 1  Line 9 fr.  Change "avoid" into "evade"
bottom
Message of Premier Konoye to Marshal Pétain,
Taken from the official document dated July 15, 1941, in
the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

The recent proposal of the Japanese Government,
requesting to be afforded military bases and other
facilities, was forced to be made due to the inevitable
necessity of self-preservation and defense of Japan and of
maintaining her position in the Great East Asia sphere. As
to her obligations arising from the solemn International
Agreement concerning the territorial integrity and respect
of sovereignty of French Indo-China, the Japanese Government
is determined meet them most strictly. It may be needless
to reiterate here that nothing is further than its intention
to avoid any part of them.

The Japanese Government further desires to fulfil these
obligations successfully with a firm collaboration with
France and a common defense with French Indo-China. The
actual situation in the South, as the Government has
instructed the Japanese Ambassador to explain to the French
Authorities, has come to such a stage as to allow the Japanese
Government no further delay in making the proposal mentioned
above.
It is most earnestly requested that Your Excellency understand the real intention of the Japanese Government and the actual state of affairs, with an eye on the general trend of chaotic world, and accept our proposal open-mindedly without a shade of suspicion as to the intention of the Japanese Government.

I have the honor to directly appeal to Your Excellency in my unchanged respect to Your Excellency and with my faith in your sound judgment and resolute decision.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Premier KONO's Message to Marshal Pétain, July 15th, 1941" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Foreign Office).

certified at Tokyo
on this 26th day of October, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date.

witness: /S/ SATÔ, Takegorô (seal)
CERTIFICATE

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that in May or June, 1947, Mr. NIINO, Katsumi, defense counsel at I.M.T.F.P. had requested this section to investigate whether or not the original letter of ex-premier KONOYE sent on July 15, 1941 to Marshal f-etaln was in existence, and that I had replied that I was unable to find the original letter at that time.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 22th day of November, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.
at the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ NIINO, Katsumi. (seal)
SYNOPSIS of Pressure upon JAPAN

by

AMERICA, ENGLAND, CHINA and HOLLAND

Since JULY '40 until the outbreak of the War

1. 13 Japanese military policemen are detained by the U.S. Forces in SHANGHAI (7 JULY '40)

2. Admiral AINOSU expresses a pronounced opinion against JAPAN through T.F. (8 JULY '40)

3. President ROOSEVELT sends to Congress a special message demanding expenditure for national defense covering $4,800,000,000 (10 JULY '40)

   Secretary of State HULL announces an opinion in opposition to BRITAIN's and FRANCE's policy of prohibiting transportation of aid materials to CHIANG KAI-SHEK via the BURMA ROAD. (16 JULY '40)

4. Assistant Secretary of State WELLS announces that the United States is prepared to renounce her special rights and interests in CHINA, but the party to contact was to be the CHUNGKING Gov't.

5. President ROOSEVELT announces the addition of scrap-iron and petroleum to the embargo list (25 JULY '40)
7. The U.S. Government announces that it will put an embargo on gasoline for aircraft outside the Western Hemisphere as from 1 AUG  (31 JULY '40)

8. Mr. MAKIHARA Satoru, Chief of LONDON Branch of the MITSUBISHI SHOJI Co. and Mr. TAMABE Shunsuke, acting Chief of LONDON Branch of the MITSUI BUSSAN Co. are arrested on charges of "wartime disadvantageous conduct". (2 AUG. '40)

9. Four Japanese are arrested in SINGAPORE. (3 AUG. '40)

10. Secretary of the Navy KNOX makes it public that a new naval base will be constructed in the 13th Naval District, ALASKA. (7 AUG. '40)

11. Mr. KOKUBU Shozo is sent back from RANGOON to JAPAN on board S.S. "CAIRO" an English ship. (8 AUG. '40)

12. Anti-Japanese resolution is adopted at the convention of the HAWAII Branch of the U.S. Veterans League. (6 AUG. '40)

13. Admiral YARNELL ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet makes a speech with reference to the lease of SINGAPORE Naval Station to U.S. at the 2nd Naval District Association. (24 AUG. '40)

14. Maj/Gen. (or R/ADM) STERLING stresses necessity of making use of HONGKONG and SINGAPORE in order to secure victory in a war against JAPAN. (25 AUG. '40)
15. After their inspection of Dutch FAST INDIES, a party of American journalists including HOWARD arrive at SINGAPORE. At the invitation party given by Governor JONPS, HOWARD stresses the importance of SINGAPORE Base to the U.S. Fleets. (29 AUG. '40)

16. Mr. HUILL, Secretary of State, reveals that a memorandum protesting to JAPAN against her changing the status quo of French INDO-CHINA was sent to JAPAN. (6 SEP. '40)

17. The Navy Department discloses that it signed a contract for constructing 7 battleships, 8 carriers, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers, 43 submarines, and 1 repair-ship, totalling 201 vessels. (9 SEP. '40)

18. President ROOSEVELT declares that a permit system for exporting and transferring manufacturing techniques and machines of engines, parts and fuel for aircraft to other countries outside the Western Hemisphere will be enforced. (13 SEP. '40)

19. The Navy Department insists that the basic policy of the U.S. Navy for 1940 lies in two points--construction of a two-ocean-fleet and consolidating the air forces. (14 SEP. '40)

20. President requests expenditure a supplementary budget to the national budget totalling $1,940,000,000 required to enforce the Compulsory Military Training Act. (15 SEP. '40)
21. **MANUEL ROXAS**, Finance Minister of the PHILIPPINES, broadcast on the necessity of strengthening the national defense of the PHILIPPINES and his request to U.S. for a large quantity of new weapons. (17 SEP. '40)

22. Leaders of the State Department confer on the relations between JAPAN and French INDO-CHINA. Secretary of State HULL publishes a statement stressing the necessity for the maintenance of the status quo of the said area. (23 SEP. '40)

23. The U.S. Government decides on the purchase of Chinese tungsten worth $300,000 through metal storing companies and on the offer of credit for $25,000,000 to the CHUNGKING Gov't by foreign trade banks. (25 SEP. '40)

24. President ROOSEVELT promulgates Export Limitation Ordinance concerning scrap iron and iron ore. This excludes Western hemisphere countries and ENGLAND, taking effect on 16 OCT. (26 SEP. '40)

25. The annual convention of the American Veterans' League makes a decision on strengthening aid to ENGLAND and on expansion of armaments. (26 SEP. '40)

26. Authorities of Straits Settlements announce that local defense forces will be organized all over British MALAYA. (26 SEP. '40)
27. The Navy Department makes public the details of a contract covering $8,820,000 for construction of military establishments in the territories of the PACIFIC. (30 SEP. '40)

28. WANG CHAO-HUI, Chief of the Diplomatic Department of the CH'UNGKING Government, declares that he stands against the Tripartite Alliance as it violates lawful international order. (30 SEP. '40)

29. Secretary of the Navy KNOX delivers an address in WASHINGTON saying that the U.S. is prepared to accept the challenge of the Tripartite Alliance. (5 OCT. '40)

30. The Navy Department orders the transfer of 27,000 reservists to active service. (5 OCT. '40)

31. The U.S. Gov't advises American women and children living FAST ASIA to evacuate to their home. (8 OCT. '40)

32. President ROOSEVELT makes a speech at DAYTON, OHIO, saying that U.S. will assist ENGLAND and the CHIANG KAI-SHARK Government for the sake of her own national defense. (12 OCT. '40)

33. One hundred and forty American women and children living in SHANGHAI leave there for their mother country. (14 OCT. '40)

34. The Department of State suspends to Americans the issue of passports for the Far WAST. (15 OCT. '40)
35. The Navy Department orders 39,000 reserve officers and sailors to wait further orders. (15 OCT. '40)

36. Scrap iron embargo comes into force. (16 OCT. '40)

37. U.S. Consulate in Nagoya is closed. (19 OCT. '40)

38. The Indian Gov't announces an embargo on scrap iron and copper to Japan. (19 OCT. '40)

39. The War Department announces that two companies of the Army Air Forces will be transferred to the Philippines. (23 OCT. '40)

40. The War Department announces that within 1942 the Army Air Force will be expanded from four army-groups to seventeen army-groups and from twenty-five fighter units to fifty-four units, and that four air force districts will be added. (24 OCT. '40)

41. Representatives of Malaya, Australia, New Zealand, India and Burma, and commander of Far East Defense Corps meet in Singapore and discuss defense plans.

42. On Armistice Day President Roosevelt and Secretary of the Navy Knox make speeches, saying "I am convinced of the survival of democracy," and "America will answer totalitarian countries with actions" respectively. (11 NOV. '40)

43. Lamon makes a speech in New York, saying "In case of strengthening pressure upon Japan, financial circles will support it." (13 NOV. '40)
44. The opening of a new air-line between MANILA and SINGAPORE by the PAN-AMERICAN Air Lines is permitted.
45. It is announced that credit for $100,000,000 will be given to the CHUNGKING Gov't. (30 Nov. '40)
46. SINGAPORE and BATAVIA exchange liaison officers.
47. STIMSON, KNOX, and JONES, Secretaries of War, Navy and Finance respectively, decide to expend $40,000,000 on construction of fifty-one new air fields and improvement of old ones. (12 Dec. '40)
48. Secretary of the Navy KNOX announces that contracts for constructing 40 submarines, costing $254,000,000, and another contract for enlargement of ship-building establishments, costing $8,000,000, have been concluded. (17 Dec. '40)
49. STARK, Chief of Naval Operations, broadcasts that the present power of the Navy consists of 15 battleships, 6 carriers, 37 cruisers, 159 destroyers, 70 submarines and about 2,000 naval planes. (25 Dec. '40)
50. President ROOSEVELT broadcasts his fireside talk on:
(a) Rejecting the Tripartite alliance.
(b) The same fate to be shared by U.S. and U.S.
(c) Necessity for making U.S. an arsenal for democratic nations. (29 Dec. '40)
51. Secretary of Finance MORGENTHAU makes a speech, saying that the U.S. is ready to lend arms to CHUNGKING and GROUND. (30 DEC. '40)
Secretary of Finance MORGENTHAU makes a speech, saying that the U.S. is ready to lend arms to CHUNGKING and \(\text{....} \) (30 DEC. '40)
52. The Office of National Defence and Production Management is inaugurated. Knudsen is appointed Director, Hillman Vice-director, and Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of Navy Knox are appointed Committee men. (Jan. 7, 1941)

53. President Roosevelt sends a budget message to Congress. The total budget for the 1941 fiscal year is $17,485,000,000, $10,810,000,000 of which $10,810,000,000 is national defence expenditures. (Jan. 8, 1941)

54. A U.S. National Defence Promotion Bill (a Lease-lend Bill) is introduced to Congress. (Jan. 10, 1941)

55. An agreement of commerce and navigation is reached between French Indo-China and the British authorities at Singapore. (The middle of January, 1941)

56. Special Envoy Hurley and his party leave San Francisco by a clipper for CHUNGKING via HONGKONG. (Jan. 29, 1941)

57. The U.S. Pacific Fleet gathers at Hawaii. (Jan. 1947)

58. A wartime organization is assumed by attaching the Asiatic Fleet directly to the Operations Department. (Jan. 1941)
69. An understanding is reached among Britain, U.S.A. and Australia concerning joint defense of the Pacific. (Feb. 3, 1941)

70. The Chungking government has gone through the necessary procedure to purchase 200 U.S. airplanes, Secretary of Navy Knox announces. (Feb. 5, 1941)

71. Special Envoy Hurley reaches Chungking. (Feb. 7, 1941)

72. The Australian government announces that Capt. Marshall Collins will stay at Darwin as U.S. naval advisor. (Feb. 10, 1941)

73. President Roosevelt asks Congress to vote $888,000,000 as defense expenditure for Guam etc. (Feb. 12, 1941)

74. The British Admiralty announces that hereafter mines will be laid around Singapore without warning. (Feb. 16, 1941)

75. At Washington U.S.A., Britain, Australia and the Netherlands discuss joint defense of the Pacific. (Feb. 17, 1941)

76. At Singapore representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands East Indies discuss joint defense plans. (Feb. 23, 1941)

77. President Roosevelt asks Congress for an appropriation of $3,812,000,000 as a supplementary national defense budget for the current fiscal year. (Feb. 24, 1941)

78. Special Envoy Hurley leaves Chungking for home via Hongkong and Manila. (Feb. 27, 1941)
69. The British authorities at Singapore announce that the minefield shall be enlarged on and after Mar. 3. (Feb. 28, 1941)

70. The British Minister to Thailand declares to the Prime Minister of Thailand that Britain is opposed to a military alliance or an economic agreement between and Japan Thailand. (Feb., 1941)

71. President Roosevelt asks Congress for the appropriation of a supplementary naval budget of $300,000,000. (Mar. 10, 1941)

72. 4 U.S. warships, including the "Brooklyn" under the command of Capt. Stono enter Auckland, New Zealand. (Mar. 13, 1941)

73. A military pact between Britain and China is signed. (Mar. 15, 1941)

74. 7 U.S. warships including the "Chicago" under the command of Admiral Newton enter Sydney. (Mar. 20, 1941)

75. 7 U.S. warships under Admiral Newton, after visiting Australia leave Brisbane concealing their destination. (Mar. 28, 1941)

76. Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief of the British Far Eastern Forces arrives at the Philippines for a talk among Britain, U.S.A. and the Netherlands. (Apr. 9, 1941)
77. President Roosevelt asks Congress for an appropriation of a supplementary army budget of $728,000,000. (Apr. 14, 1941)

78. The CHUNGKING government announces its disapproval of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact. (Apr. 14, 1941)

79. The U.S. government grants $50,000,000 as stabilization funds for the Chinese currency. (Apr. 25, 1941)

80. The British government decides to provide $10,000,000 as stabilization funds for the Chinese currency and an agreement is signed between SUNG TZU-WEN and Special Envoy Philip. (Apr. 25, 1941)

81. President Roosevelt announces that the movement of the U.S. warships will be decided independently from, and regardless of combat areas designated by the belligerent countries. (Apr. 29, 1941)

82. Secretary of War Stimson states the necessity for a convoy system for merchant ships. (May 6, 1941)

83. Foreign Minister Wolter of the Netherlands broadcasts at Batavia that his country is prepared at any time to rise against challenge. (May 7, 1941)

84. President Roosevelt asks Congress for $61,470,000 as extended construction expenditures on air-fields. (May 9, 1941)
1. Exchange of ministers decided between Australia and CHUNGKING. (May 10, 1941)

2. Secretary of Navy Knox emphasizes the necessity for a convoy system for merchant ships at a meeting of the U.S. Army Engineering Society. (May 12, 1941)

3. Foreign Minister Eden addresses the Lower House on non-cooperation with Japan. (May 14, 1941)

4. The U.S. Army strengthens the air forces at Hawaii. (May 14, 1941)

5. Malaya puts a wholesale ban on rubber exports to Japan and the Yen bloc countries. (May 16, 1941)

6. Brigadier-General Crackat and his party arrive at CHUNGKING. (May 17, 1941)

7. Secretary of Navy Knox announces objection against neutrality. (May 21, 1941)

8. Secretary of War Stimson expresses opposition to neutrality. (May 22, 1941)

9. Secretary of Navy Knox addresses a mass meeting of the Navy Shipbuilding and Engineering Association at Washington on extension of the Navy and air forces with an objective of controlling the sea. (May 23, 1941)

10. President Roosevelt declares a state of unlimited emergency. (May 27, 1941)
95. President Roosevelt asks Speaker Rayburn by letter
   for an air forces budget of $2,790,000,000 for the
   Army and $529,000,000 for the Navy, amounting to
   $3,319,000,000. (May 27, 1941)

96. President Roosevelt asks for a supplementary navy
   budget of $1,140,191,000. (May 29, 1941)

97. The Philippines decides to adopt the U.S. Export
   Control Act and adds copper and ores to the contraband
   list. (May 30, 1941)

98. The War Office orders airplanes amounting to
   $321,880,000 from the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation
   and the Boeing Airplane Company. (June 4, 1941)

99. President Roosevelt announces that a license system
   will be enforced on petroleum exports and that the exports
   will be permitted to the British Empire, Egypt and the
   Western Hemisphere countries only. (June 20, 1941)

100. Secretary of Navy Knox addresses the State Governors
    Conference held at Boston to the effect that "Now is the
    time to use the U.S. Navy." (June 30, 1941)

101. Minister of Foreign Affairs Kuo of the CHUNGKING
    Government broadcasts on necessity of a united front
    of Britain, the United States and China. (July 4, 1941)
102. President Roosevelt sends a special message to Congress saying that a U.S. Navy unit has landed in Iceland. (July 7, 1941)

103. President Roosevelt announces that U.S. troops have been dispatched to Trinidad and the Dutch Guiana base. (July 7, 1941)

104. The Office of National Defense and Production Management announces that the total budget of the U.S. national defense extension plans for June 11, 1940 —June 30, 1941 is $4,654,000,000, of which $3,050,000,000 has been contracted by June 15 and $650,000,000 has been expended. (July 9, 1941)

105. President Roosevelt asks Congress for approval of an appropriation of $4,770,000,000 for the Army extension expenditures out of the national defense and lend-lease budget of $15,000,000,000. (July 10, 1941)

106. The Senate passes a bill that the Secretary of Navy be authorized to extend the service term of marines during the declared national emergency. (July 10, 1941)

107. President Roosevelt asks Congress for an appropriation of a supplementary budget of $3,323,000,000 for the Naval and the Maritime Committee expenditures. (July 11, 1941)
108. The U.S. government asks Congress for an appropriation of $300,000,000 for defense extension of the islands in the Pacific. (July 14, 1941)
109. The authorities of the U.S. Navy stationed in Manila announce the laying of mines in the Bay of (SPIK). (July 16, 1941)

110. Vinson (?), Chairman of the Naval Committee of the U.S. Lower House, declares at a meeting of the same committee that appropriate measures might be taken to deal with the Japanese in Hawaii. (July 17, 1941)

111. President Roosevelt sends a special message to the Congress, requiring that adequate steps be taken by Congress to meet with the national emergency. (July 21, 1941)

112. Time-limit schedule for ship's entering and going out of Manila Bay published by the Commander of the 16th U.S. Naval district. (July 22, 1941)

113. At a meeting of the Civilian Volunteers Committee, Civil National-defense Bureau in Washington, President Roosevelt gives a speech to the effect that the U.S. Government's approval for the export of oil to Japan had been given for the sake of preventing Japan from marching into the Dutch East Indies. (July 23, 1941)

114. Secretary of Navy Knox declares the Navy's authorized power to carry out any measures necessary for the execution of America's Far-East policy. (July 23, 1941)

115. Announcement is made by the Maritime Committee of the despatch of naval liaison officers to Durban, South Africa, Calcutta, Singapore, Manila, Honolulu and the Red Sea area. (July 24, 1941)
116. The law for freezing Japanese and Chinese assets in the United States is issued by President Roosevelt. It is to take effect on July 26, 1941. (July 25, 1941)

117. The National-Defense Production Control Bureau announces that the total sum for national-defense expansion and aid to Britain which passed Congress during the one year from July 1940, amounted to $50,780,000,000, including $11,990,000,000 expenditure for aircraft; the orders from Britain totalling $3,660,000,000. (July 25, 1941)

118. A protest was made by the U.S. First Committee to Under-Secretary of State Welles to the effect that America's interference with Japanese affairs would come to involve the United States in a war out of which her people wished to remain. (July 26, 1941)

119. Sayro, High Commissioner of the Philippines, went through the procedures for applying the Japanese and Chinese Assets Freezing Law to the Philippines. (July 26, 1941)

120. President Roosevelt sets up the U.S. Far Eastern Army Headquarters in the Philippines to be commanded by General MacArthur. (July 26, 1941)

122. The British Government carries out freezing of the Japanese
assets in the British Empire in conformity with the National-defense
Capital accommodating Law. (July 26, 1941)

123. Japanese assets are frozen by the Government of the Dutch East
Indies. (July 27, 1941)

124. The Army Commission of the Lower House adopts a draft resolution
to grant the President the right to prolong the terms of service of
the conscripts, of the State National Defense Army and reservists.
(July 30, 1941)

125. The Burmese Government promulgate the Law prohibiting dealings
with Japanese commercial concerns. (August 1, 1941)

126. Order given by President Quezon of the Philippines to collect
30,000 reservists and to enlist them, on Sep. 1, in the army of
Macarthur, C-in-C of the U.S. Far Eastern Army. (August 2, 1941)

127. The White House publishes the facts of the interview held by
President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on the high
seas, as well as the draft of the British-American Joint Declaration,
consisting of eight items prepared as a result of the interview.
(Aug. 14, 1941)

128. The Chungking Government announces that it is in concord with
the British-American Joint Declaration. (Aug. 17, 1941)

129. President Quezon of the Philippines declares, in his speech in
reply to one by American Vice-President Wallace, the readiness of the
Philippines to give aid to the United States in case of her becoming
involved in war. (Aug. 19, 1941)

130. A presidential order is promulgated prohibiting the sailing at night in Manila Bay of ships outside the control of the U.S. authorities. (Aug. 22, 1941)

131. President Roosevelt announces the sending of a military mission headed by Brigadier-General Magruder to Chungking. (Aug. 26, 1941)

132. Fraser, Governor of New Zealand, expressed at Washington his consent for the common use of the bases in New Zealand by the forces of the United States, Australia and the Dutch East Indies. (Aug. 26, 1941)

133. The Navy Department announces the results of construction realized from January till the end of August this year which are: a battleships, 9 submarines, 12 destroyers, 22 patrollers, and 20 auxiliary vessels either completed or already on service, no cruisers or carriers listed. (Sept. 3, 1941)

134. Grady, Far-Eastern Special Commercial Envoy from President Roosevelt who had been staying in Manila since the end of August, arrives in Batavia by air today. (Sept. 7, 1941)

135. Duff Cooper arrives in Manila by air. (Sept. 8, 1941)

136. Grady, Special Envoy of President Roosevelt has an interview with Van Mook, Commerce Minister of the Dutch East Indies. (Sept. 9, 1941)

137. Duff Cooper flies to Singapore. (Sept. 9, 1941)

138. The government of India cancels the permission for the import of cotton and rayon textiles to be shipped from Japan, the cancellation being effective from September 12. (Sept. 9, 1941)
139. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces in the Far East, Brooke Popham arrives in the Netherland, East Indies. (11 Sept., 1941)

140. Gready arrives in Singapore by air. (12 Sept., 1941)

141. The Navy Department announces that it has made a contract for the construction of 2,831 naval vessels with an expenditure of Seven Billion Two Hundred and Thirty Three Million Dollars from January, 1940 and that 968 such vessels are now under construction. (16 Sept., 1941)

142. The United States Government announces that from 1st November, the Funds Bureau of the Federal Government purchase chrome and copper ores produced in the Philippines. (16, Sept., 1941)

143. Gready reaches Calcutta. (17 Sept., 1941)

144. President Roosevelt sends his message to congress asking for careful discussion concerning the supplementary budget covering $5,985,000,000 in accordance on the National Defense Expansion Act. (18 Sept., 1941)

145. Duff Cooper arrives at Batavia by air. (19 Sept., 1941)

146. Ambassador Kerr arrives at Singapore by air and has a talk with Duff Cooper. (21 Sept., 1941)

147. President Roosevelt introduces to Congress a
supplementary budget, for national defense, covering
$ 150,198,000. (22 Sept., 1941)

148. Secretary of State Cordell Hull declares that the
U.S. Government is now considering whether it would
revise or abolish the Neutrality Act. (22 Sept., 1941)

149. At the launching ceremony of the battle-ship
"Massachusetts", Secretary of the Navy, Knox, declare
that the Neutrality Act is out-of-date. (23 Sept., 1941)

150. Commander of the British Far Eastern Fleet, Leighton
declares that he would be willing to let the U.S. Navy
use the Singapore Naval Base as soon as this was requested.
(25 Sept., 1941)

151. The British Minister to Thailand, Crosby, flies
to Singapore. (25 Sept., 1941)

152. The British Commonwealth Far East Conference was
held at Singapore. It was attended by Duff Cooper,
Brooke Popham, Leighton, Crosby, Kerr, Page, and Sir Thomas
the Governor of Malaya and others. (29 Sept., 1941)

153. Gready arrives at Rangoon. (1 Oct., 1941)

154. British Ambassador, Kerr, flies from Singapore to
Hongkong. (1 Oct., 1941)

155. The U.S. Military Envoy to Chungking, Brigadier
General Magruder and his party, arrives at Manila.
(2 Oct., 1941)
156. Greedy flies from Rangoon to Chungking. (3 Oct., 1941)

157. Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces in the Far East, Brooke Popham reaches Manila from Singapore by air. (3 Oct., 1941)

158. Duff Cooper, sees the Prime Minister of Thailand, Phibun, at Bangkok, on his way from Singapore to India by air. (3 Oct., 1941).

159. Brigadier General Magruder arrives at Hongkong from Manila by air. (5 Oct., 1941)


163. Duff Cooper reaches Calcutta from Rangoon (8 Oct., 1941).


165. The Anglo-American Chungking Financial Conference is held at Hongkong. (10 Oct., 1941).

166. Greedy arrives at Manila from Hongkong (10 Oct., 1941).


169. The Australian Prime Minister, Curtin announces that negotiations for a joint Pacific front between the United States, Britain, the Netherland East Indies, New Zealand, and Australia have been completed. (20 Oct., 1941).

170. The United State Navy Department announces that the total number of British warships in American harbors for repair is so far thirty five. (21 Oct., 1941).

171. The chief of the Naval Operations Department, STARK, announces that naval bases are now under construction one each in England, Scotland, North Ireland and Wales from funds arising from the National Defense Expansion Act.
172. Australian Prime Minister Curtin announces that 450,000 men have joined the army since the outbreak of the war. (Oct. 22, 1941)

173. Secretary of War Stimson declares that the United States is preparing for increasing the number of air cadets and conscripts up to about 400,000 that is, three times as many as the present number. (Oct. 23, 1941)

174. Secretary of Navy Knox declares that a clash would be unavoidable between Japan and America unless Japan changes her present policy. (Oct. 24, 1941)

175. Major General Atkinson newly appointed Philippine Air Force Commander, leaves Washington for Manila. (Oct. 25, 1941)

176. Chief of the General Staff of the Philippine Army Valdes announces the suspension of discharge of Philippine soldiers on the active list. (Oct. 26, 1941)

177. Concerning the progress of the naval construction, Secretary of Navy Knox announces as follows:

   a) War vessels in commission .................................. 346
   b) War vessels under construction or under contract .......... 345
   c) Auxiliary vessels in commission .............................. 323
   d) Auxiliary vessels under construction or on contract ..... 209
   e) Naval planes (as of Oct. 1) ................................. 4,535
   f) Naval planes under construction ............................ 5,832

   (Oct. 27, 1941)
178. The Indian Government places a ban on the import of both Japanese and Manchurian goods. (Oct. 29, 1941)

179. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand jointly announce that a decision has been made on the plan for expanding the American Pacific air route up to Australia. (Oct. 30, 1941)

180. Duff Cooper leaves Singapore for Australia by air. (Nov., 1941)

181. Secretary of War Stimson demands that Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn empower the President to enforce martial law in Hawaii and Puerto Rico. (Nov. 3, 1941)

182. Duff Cooper arrives at Batavia on his way to Australia. (Nov. 3, 1941)

183. President Roosevelt presents to Congress a supplementary budget of $449,720,000 for the manufacture of naval planes and $100,000 for expenses of the Medical Bureau. (Nov. 4, 1941)

184. The Hawaiian authorities refuse to give permission to load mail for Japan on the "Taiyo Haru". (Nov. 5, 1941)
185. With regard to the construction of the U.S. Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, the Navy Department announces that from January to October this year two battleships were placed in commission and two were launched; one aircraft carrier placed in commission; five cruisers launched; thirteen destroyers placed in commission and fifteen launched; nine submarines placed in commission and twelve launched. (Nov. 6, 1941)

186. President Roosevelt declares that the withdrawal of the U.S. Marine Corps from China was now under consideration. (Nov. 7, 1941)

187. Secretary of Navy Knox announces that U.S. naval base has been newly constructed in Iceland and Rear-Admiral Cowman appointed its commander. (Nov. 8, 1941)

188. “If hostilities should break out between Japan and the United States, Great Britain would declare war upon Japan in less than an hour,” spoke the British Premier Churchill at a luncheon party given in honour of the inauguration of the newly-appointed Mayor of London. (Nov. 10, 1941)

189. Armistice Day. President Roosevelt states, “We will fight for liberty for ever and ever.” Secretary of Navy Knox states, “The time has come when we should be resolved on a war with Japan.” (Nov. 11, 1941)
190. King George VI honoured the opening session of Parliament with a message, saying, "The British Government is concerned with the situation in the Far East." (Nov. 12, 1941)

191. It was decided. President Roosevelt declared, that the U.S. Marines Corps in China should be withdrawn therefrom. (Nov. 14, 1941)

192. Canadian troops under the command of Brigadier-General J. Lawson arrived at Hong Kong for its defense. (Nov. 15, 1941)

193. Iraq breaks off diplomatic relations with Japan. (Nov. 16, 1941)

194. President Roosevelt presents to Congress the national defense supplementary budget, demanding $7,067,410,000; the items: Army $6,607,360,000, Navy $380,050,000. (Nov. 17, 1941)

195. U.S. airplanes make a reconnaissance flight over Garanbi in the south of Formosa. (Nov. 20, 1941)

196. British Secretary for the Navy Alexander declares the reinforcement of the British fleet in the Far East. (Nov. 21, 1941)

197. Secretary of State Hull, British Ambassador Halifax, Australian Minister Casey, Dutch Minister Rudon and Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih confer. (Nov. 22, 1941)
198. Hull, Halifax, Casey, Rudon and Hu Shih confer.  
(Nov. 24, 1941)

199. It was decided, the U.S. Government announced, that the army should be dispatched to Dutch Guiana with the consent of the Dutch Government. (Nov. 24, 1941)

200. President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of Navy Knox, Chief of Staff Marshall and Chief of Operations Stark consult. (Nov. 25, 1941)

201. Secretary of State Hull has a talk separately with the British, Australian, Dutch and Chungking Ambassadors and Ministers. (Nov. 25, 1941)

202. The United States military authorities in the Philippines announce that mines will be laid near the fortress at the entrance of Manila Bay in the course of December. (Nov. 25, 1941)

203. President confers with the Chungking Ambassador Hu Shih and Sung Tzu-wen. (Nov. 26, 1941)

204. Secretary of Navy Knox declares that those who joining the navy reach the amount of eleven thousand per a month. (Nov. 26, 1941)

205. One hundred Americans in Tientsin are withdrawn. (Nov. 26, 1941)
206. The authorities of the British Straits Settlements announce that mines were laid at the eastern entrance of Singapore. (Nov. 26, 1941)

207. Three hundred United States marines in Shanghai withdraw to Manila. (Nov. 27, 1941)

208. President Roosevelt has a talk with Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of Navy Knox, Chief of the General Staff Marshall, and Chief of Operations Stark. (Nov. 28, 1941)

209. Four hundred United States marines in Shanghai embarked on board the "President Harrison" for Manila accompanied by the United States gunboats, "Luzon" and the "Oahu". (Nov. 28, 1941)

210. Commander of the Philippines Forces, Major General Wainwright is appointed Commander of the United States Forces in North Luzon, Brigadier-General Maxon Ruff succeeds him and Brigadier-General Edward King is appointed Member of the General Staff of the United States Army for the Far East. (Nov. 28, 1941)

211. British Navy Minister Alexander declares that the lagging negotiations between the United States and Japan will cause the strengthening of Singapore. (Nov. 30, 1941)

212. The United States Military Headquarters for the Far East announces that Major General George Barker and Major
General William Sharp have been appointed Commander of the United States Forces in South Luzon and of the Visaya Area of Mindanao Island respectively. (Dec. 1, 1941)

213. The British battleship "Prince of Wales" and some other ships enter the port of Singapore via the Cape of Good Hope under the command of Admiral Philipps. The Singapore government announces that the British Far Eastern Fleet has been newly organized. (Dec. 2, 1941)

214. Two hundred persons including British residents at Shanghai withdraw to Singapore on board the "Anhwei". (Dec. 3, 1941)
Certificate

I, MIYAMA Yozo, in charge of documents at the First Demobilization Bureau, Public Welfare Ministry, hereby certify that the document attached herewith, comprising 17 sheets, written in Japanese, entitled "Synopsis of Pressure upon JAPAN by AMERICA, ENGLAND, CHINA, and HOLLAND since JULY '40 until the Outbreak of the War," was compiled, in order to investigate historical facts, by five persons:--

NISHIURA Susumu, ex-member of the Military Affairs Bureau.
HATTORI Takushiro, ex-member of the General Staff
IMOTO Kumao,
SUGITA Ichiji,
MUKAHARA Shiro,

who, since 25 JULY '46 until 3 AUG. '46, met together at the First Demobilization Bureau and held conferences to collect information in their recollection which they thought had been submitted to the persons concerned with the Army, Navy, and the Foreign Ministry among the attendants at the liaison conferences between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government held since JULY '40 until the outbreak of the Pacific War, among the information received by the former Military and Naval General Staffs and the Foreign Ministry during the same period; and that it was then...
DEP. DOC. #2923

shown to the former competent authorities of the Navy and the Foreign Ministry and approved by them.

In Tokyo
This 9th day of December, 1947

/S/ MIYAMA Yozo, (seal)
Chief of the Document Section,
The First Demobilization Bureau,
Public Welfare Ministry

Subscribed before me.

In Tokyo
This 9th day of December, 1947

Certified by /s/ UCHIYAMA Hiroshi (seal)
Witness
Certificate

I hereby certify that the document entitled "Principles of Executing the National Policies of the Empire," containing the decisions of the council in the Imperial presence held on November 5, 1941, is not at present in the custody of the First Demobilization Bureau.

certified at Tokyo
On this 15th day of December, 1947

/S/ KIYAMA, Yozo (seal)
Chief of Document Sec. The First Demobilization Bureau.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on the same date,

witness: /S/ KIYAMA, Hiroshi (seal)

- 1 -
Certificate

1. Plans of peacetime operations for 1940 and 1941.

2. Plans of operations mapped out by the Imperial Headquarters about the middle of November, 1941.

3. Operations orders given to the Commander-general of the Southern Army on November 6, 1941. This is to certify that the above three documents were destroyed by fire at the end of the war, and are not conserved in the 1st Demobilization Bureau at the present time.

On this 27th day of May, 1947

At Tokyo

/S/ MIYAIJU, Yozo (seal)
Chief of the Archives Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were made in the presence of the Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness /S/ KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, William S. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 16 Jan., 1947
Speech Delivered by the Minister of State

(Minister of State, Hideki Tojo, takes the restrum)

Minister of State (Mr. Hideki Tojo)

The 77th Session of the Diet opens with the situation grave. I am struck with awe and deeply impressed at the gracious Imperial Rescript for the opening ceremony.

On this occasion, the Government should like to explain frankly what it is going to do to carry out national policies. By doing so, we ask you to cooperate with us, and to have all the people, being united as a body, overcome with iron will the unprecedented national crisis we are confronting. Thus, I believe, we can set the Emperor's mind at ease.

Now I shall explain about the present situations of the world surrounding Japan: Concerning the China affair, brillian
results are being obtained on all fronts, as our loyal and valiant forces under the august virtues of His Majesty the Emperor, have fought successfully, and the people at home have worked in earnest.

Thus the resistance of the Chungking Government is being weakened day by day. On the other hand, the reconstruction of China by the National Government is making steady progress. Those states on good terms with us have recognized the new Government and thus the settlement of the Affair is reaching the last stage.

Nevertheless economic and military strategems of those states supporting Chiang Kai-shek are growing more active and have become the sole and the greatest prop for the fighting power of his Government.

This is becoming a great obstacle to the solution of the China Problem. (Clapping of hands)

Further, in the north, since the war broke out between Germany and the U.S.S.R. last June, it seems that the situation is becoming urgent. The Japanese Empire can not be indifferent to the changes in the state of things. We are having everything arranged in order to secure peace on our northern border. (Clapping of hands)

In the south, our forces invaded the northern part of French Indo-China last year, the Economic Agreement between our Empire and French Indo-China was concluded, and the troubles
between Thailand (Siam) and French Indo-China were settled by our efforts. Thus friendship and intimacy between our Empire and French Indo-China are being enhanced and the expansion of our Empire towards the south is being started. (Clapping of hands) Britain, the United States, Netherlands etc. have strengthened mutual military and economic cooperation, and made our economic negotiation with the Dutch Indies unsuccessful, and at the same time, threatened to constitute severe menace to the position of our Empire in the South Pacific Ocean.

Therefore, our Empire made an agreement with the Vichy Government in respect to the joint defence of Japan and French Indo-China. According to this agreement, our forces were sent to the southern part of French Indo-China.

However, Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands, etc., looked with suspicion and apprehension on our justifiable self-defensive measures, blockaded our Empire economically by freezing our assets abroad and by prohibiting exports to Japan; in fact, and at the same time, very rapidly increased their military menace to us. Of course, an economic blockade between countries not at war constitutes no less a hostile act than a war by arms. (Clapping of hands) Such acts can by no means be overlooked, because they not only obstruct, against our will, the settlement of the China Affair, but also constitute a grave threat to the existence of our Empire. (Clapping of hands)
Nevertheless, our Empire desires peace.

We have been patient. We have endured the unendurable. We have made all efforts in order to cope with the crisis by diplomatic negotiations and to settle the trouble in peace. But as yet being unable to realise our intention, our Empire is obliged to stand at a serious emergency at which we must decide our policies for the coming one hundred years.

(Clapping of hands)

Still now the Government is doing its best in carrying on diplomatic negotiations in order to protect the existence and prestige of our Empire, and to establish a new order in Greater East Asia, based upon the peace loving spirit which we have inherited from our forefathers since the foundation of our Empire. And thereby what our Empire wishes is as follows:

1) No third state shall interrupt our bringing the China Affair to completion.

2) Those states surrounding our Empire shall not only bring military menace to bear directly against us, but also shall put an end to such hostile acts as the economic blockade and recover normal economic relations.

3) The spreading of war over East Asia, as a result of the extension of the European War, shall be prevented to the utmost.

(Clapping of hands)

If our objects referred to in these three items are attained through diplomatic negotiations, it is a great blessing.
not only for Japan, but also for the peace of the world.

(Clapping of hands)

However, taking consideration of those circumstances which we have faced hitherto, we can not predict whether the negotiations will succeed or not.

Consequently, foreseeing all obstacles lying in future, and making through preparations, for getting rid of them, the Government is resolved to carry out decisively and fully the national policies which our Empire has already determined, (Clapping of hands) and has a firm resolution thus to maintain the existence of our Empire. (Clapping of hands)

Now we are standing at a crisis unprecedented in our 260 years' history, a crisis which will lead either to destruction or success. Therefore, taking all these things into consideration, we are determined to do the best in discharging our duties of assisting the Throne. (Clapping of hands)

In whatever manner the situation may change, the completion of higher defensive system of the state is really the most urgent and important matter. For realising it, the sacrifices of the people must be much more strained and the level of efficiency of productive economy must be raised to the maximum. In accordance with this, the Government is taking all measures to secure the living standard of the people, but it is really unavoidable that it should be cut down to some extent. What I desire from the bottom of my heart is that all the people should
share present hardships with one another, be united closely, and make efforts to assist the "Holy Work", standing firm in the belief that our Empire is now given a good opportunity for making a stride in our progress and that we can anticipate a boundless expansion in future. (Clapping of hands)

As for the Government, we are resolved to carry out various reforms and readjustments concerning political and economic matters. We shall be careful not to pursue ideals in vain, but in accordance with the current situation, to take measures to obtain the maximum efficiency of each specific function.

I believe that all the people will realize what the Government intends and positively cooperate with us. (Clapping of hands)
CERTIFICATE

I, TAKAZAKI, Takashi, Chief of the Section of General Affairs in the House of Representatives, hereby certify that the document written in Japanese consisting of five sheets of paper attached hereto, is a copy of the parts of Page 17 and Page 18 of the shorthand Records of Discussions No. 2 of the House of Representatives in the 77th Session of the Imperial Diet opened on the 18th November, 1941 (the 16th year of Showa), which is in my official custody.

December 6, 1946 (the 21st year of Showa)
at the House of Representatives.

Takashi Yamazaki (seal)
(Signature)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed by Takashi Yamada in my presence.

On the same day
at the same place.

Observer Iohizo Yokokura
(Signature)
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
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Translated by
Defense Language Branch

Official Gazette Extra 19 Nov., 1941

Shorthand Record No. 3 of the 77th Diet Session
of the House of Representatives

18 Nov., 1941 (Tuesday)
Opened at 1.23 p.m.

(Omitted)

(Mr. SHIMIZU, Toshio takes the rostrum)

Mr. SHIMIZU, Toshio. With regard to the resolution, which has just become a subject for discussion, I, as one of its proposers, should like to explain it. To begin with, let me read the text of the resolution.

Resolution

World unrest has gradually increased. Postilo states, distorting the intention of the Empire, are getting more and more radical in speech and action. Fationco has its limits. Self-control has its bounds.

Our State policy has already been fixed and the people are all ready. The Government should stand up daringly in accordance with the inalterable State policy and relying upon the indomitable determination of the people, and try to maintain the existence and prestige of the Empire, to construct the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and to go further to establish eternal world peace.

This is our resolution.

(applause)
The meaning of this bill is plain and is fully expressed in what I have just read. In short, it means that we expect the Government "to act decisively." (someone shouts, "Exactly!") to go straight ahead! (TN - "Ci ni Yarei", if literally translated, means "Act boldly!")

At yesterday's session, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister made explanations on extremely delicate points. As for their attitudes, we are quite satisfied, and I am sure that the majority of the people gained a good impression upon hearing them.

(approval)

But concerning the contents of their speeches, we regret that they were as abstract as ever. And our impression was that they should have been a little bit more, gone into particulars. But as matters stand today, we have no intention of putting further questions about minute details. We can understand fairly well without making any efforts to delve further.

(approval)

We knew what the most serious obstacle which is lying in the way of our carrying through the China Affair in which we are now engaged.

(someone shouts, "Strike!") That obstacle comes from the interference of the group of hostile states of which the United States of America is the center.

(approval)

Such a matter we can understand quite well. The "Holy War" has lasted on a large scale for about five years, exactly speaking, for four and a half years! The fronts have been enlarged to the north and to the south.

The CHINE KAI-SHEK Government, though driven into the corner, chased from the land, the sea, and the air, and taking its course to decline and fall,
still maintains its bare existence. Where is the cause of its steady resistance? After all there is the crafty and persistent breaking of the hostile states bloc of which the United States of America is the center.

(appause)

That is all. Not only do they interrupt our attaining the object of the "Holy War," making a puppet of CHIEN KI-SHEK, but also they have forced Burma to offer her territory as an anti-Japanese foothold. Moreover they have taken advantage of the Netherlands East Indies and made her tenaciously decline the supply of various resources to Japan. They have also unduly strengthened fortification at every point surrounding the Pacific Ocean, such as Singapore, Guam, the Philippines, Hawaii etc., and are making us profitlessly.

(appause)

Who is responsible for intentionally agitating the waters of the Pacific which should be tranquil and peaceful, for bringing about a danger which might develop to a great catastrophe at any moment, and for destroying with one blow the friendly relation between Japan and America which have lasted for nearly one century since HARRIS and FERRY visited Japan? We do not dare to say that all of the American people are responsible for that. However, we can assuredly conclude that nobody in the whole world will have any objection when we say that the whole responsibility should be borne at least by the present leaders of the United States of America.

(appause)

Now, let us glance over the European situation. The strife between Germany and England has already lasted for two years, and has not settled yet.
The Russo-German War has not come to its termination. The prolon-
gation of this war may, of course, be attributed to some degree, to the
stronuous efforts which CHURCHILL in England and STALIN in Soviet Russia
are assiduously making with their extraordinarily strong aptitude.
But we can conclude that its main cause is that the leaders of the United
States, forgetting their traditional policy, the so-called "Monroe Doctrine,"
have recklessly launched into the disturbances of the Continent, and are
bolstering up Britain and Soviet Russia with all her national strength.

From this point of view, it is clear to everybody even without their
being well informed that, although the current world's disturbances
appear to be a conflict between the Axis Powers of Japan, Germany, and
Italy and the Allied Powers of the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Soviet Russia, the American leaders' ambition for "world domination" is,
as a matter of fact, the basic motive power for the disturbances.

(approval)

Since the United States herself, while hoisting a placard saying
"Love of Peace" and choosing "Freedom and Emancipation" as her motto,
still "dominates" in such a way, it is self-evident what course we should
take and for what we should be prepared.

(approval)

It is reported that the Government has since last April, been in
negotiation with the Washington Government on the Pacifc issues.
I refrain from discussing its contents, its conditions, or things like
that, here today. I hear that Ambassador KUSHUSU, who has suddenly been
dispatched to Washington as a special Envoy, is having an interview with
the American authorities concerned this morning. There is no telling what
may be reported as its result, therefore I should like to avoid discussing those points at this moment. But here I have a word to add. About what points of the "Holy War* and "Holy Test" we are pursuing can the American Government make a complaint? Japan's intention is to secure self-sufficiency of each nation, to establish the Co-prosperity Sphere of the Greater East Asia, and thus to create a "Paradise of Peace" of co-existence and co-prosperity of the East Asiatic nations and states, keeping close connection among them, and peacefully and economically supplying, one another's needs, thus to contribute to the world peace. In what part of these righteous claims can a man point out any aggressive design? I think the blame should be laid on the side of America for her attempt at obstructing our course and denying our claims.

(appause)

We want to refrain here today from referring to anything beyond the details explained by the Foreign Minister yesterday, to that kind of final outcome he expects in the negotiations with the United States' leaders. Nevertheless, I should like to suggest the Government authorities that they answer words with words and deeds with deeds. This is what I want to say. While we are endeavoring in negotiation with the American authorities, they are, on the other hand, outrageously continuing and strengthening the CHIANS-Supporting campaign and, what is worse, are so audacious as to use any abusive language they choose. What are we doing to deal with this? What kind of action have we taken against such behaviors? We would rather answer words with words and deeds with deeds. Is it not natural to do so?

(appause)

We often hear the expression, "a. Kunshi Koku" (a nation of the East,)

(TN - Kunshi means a man of virtue and Koku means a state.)
Why is the Government talking so tamely with America in this emergency, giving to Japan an appearance of a so-called "Kunihi Naka in the Nest"?

(approval)

It goes without saying that we do not like any sort of strife. Our State Principle which has been irrevocable since the foundation of our country, and the august spirit of the Emperor manifested the phrase MUNDSHII, (TN-the world is one household) which today many Japanese people, even children and most common people mention, means nothing but peace. We are never fond of trouble. Moreover we have already fought for five years, and are still fighting. To make the state of things more complicated and to have troubles arise and to fight with America and Britain etc. is, of course, far from what we desire. If there is any room left for talking, we had better talk. To continue the talk to the last minute is permissible; nay, it is quite natural. However, I want to remind you of a Japanese proverb which says, "You shall not strike the Buddha's face more than three times." (TN-However tolerant one may be, one is made angry by continued offensive behavior.) Also we are taught, "Three suffices for a rope." Justice dwelling within us, and patriotism burning within us will never allow us to suffer their attitude of trampling down our righteousness, disregarding our goodwill, menacing our independence and blocking our legitimate course, and thus to wait for the destruction of our State only yielding to their insults and threats.

(approval)

We know by experience that there are some people who cannot understand when we have told them something, but there are some other ways to make such people understand that thing. However, for those who, in spite of their full understanding of the state of things, pretend not to understand and
intentionally quibble, only one measure is left for us to adopt.

("Horri! horri!" applause)

The 3rd KUK Cabinet was only and quite recently. It has just started to work. But Premier TOJO was the "Minister of the preceding Cabinet."
He must have been present at the "Council in the Imperial Presence." He must also have attended the "Joint Conference of the Government and the Writing Imperial Ordinaries." If a recorder correctly, in the statement made by Ex-Premier OKA, when he resigned, there was a passage saying "On the carrying out of the State-policy there was a divergence of views etc..." - I do not quote the full text. The fact that views on carrying out State-policy were divergent was, I understand, the cause of the resignation of the Third KUK Cabinet. Therefore, I think, Premier TOJO must have the most accurate information about the difference of opinions as to "how to carry out the State-policy." Accordingly I expect Premier TOJO to have understood better than anyone else those matters regarding the truth of the China affair, the stand of our Empire, and our immutable State-policy. It is the present Kabinett that has the very person as its Premier remaining at the active list, and at the same time holding the portfolios for War and Home Affairs. Such being the case, I think that he has fully understood the meaning of what we have emphasized in the beginning, saying, "Act decisively" and "Go straight ahead!"

(appause)

As for that was done, we are not going to cry any more. There will come the time when merits and fruits of the past will be discussed. What we are concerned about is the measures to be taken right now; that is, "What should we do now?" and, "What shall we do hereafter?" Let us put the past aside for the moment. That is a task for historians. It is a problem. 
- 7 -
t be criticized in future. What to do today, or what to do at this moment is the matter of utmost importance. It is, I believe, the common desire of the people that the Government should not miss the course to be taken for the future.

("Hear! hear! applause")

Here, I would like to explain in a few words about our stand. It looks to me that there are some (who they are, I do not mention here) among the government officials who express the opinion that this affair has become considerably serious and brings us to a "fateful point." I have not heard it in concrete terms, but judging from the atmosphere they create or from their gestures, I construe in this manner. In using such an expression, some of them are apt to suggest that the people have not full understanding of the current situation our state is placed in. This is a blunder!

("applause")

It is a grave misunderstanding!

("Hear! hear!"

To we rather want to ask if the government officials understand, though I do not name specified officials, how the people are getting along under the heavy pressure of the situation and how they are anxious to put aside this heavy pressure and to have the sunshine through the dark clouds. This is the point I should like to ask the government officials about.

("Hear! hear!" applause)

To the people are, as it were, all in a conflagration. We feel as if we are being attacked by invisible air raids. The moment the Government once takes one step forward with resolution "immovable like a rock," the people are ready to march on, responsive, with the rapidity of a flash of
lightning, to the call of the Government.

("Hear! hear!...applause")

Does the Government thoroughly understand this? It is what we the people want to ask the Government. Today the people's feeling is not as the Government thinks. We have come so far. There is no alternative but to derà. This is the sentiment of the whole people.

(applause)
We consider that to save ourselves there is no other way than to fight this war to the end. We are entirely devoted to the "Holy War", as we call it. The complete attainment of the object of the "Holy War" is the only thing the people desire to-day.

(applause)

And the people desire this, not only because our beloved sons or brothers are now fighting on the front line risking their own lives to protect our country, but also on account of the fact that the public bonds are increasing, the rate of taxes becoming higher and the materials for living becoming short and scarce. Such conditions are caused only by the war. But we must fight out this war through, though hardships may become still more aggravated; otherwise we can never obtain peace, happiness and glory. Such is the common desire of the people at large at present.

(applause)

We think the people are now fully determined only to go ahead at this critical moment which leads the country either to rise or fall. Where does such a tense and ardent spirit of the people come from? It is because the entire nation, when General Tojo's Cabinet was organized, greatly expected that this time the Cabinet would surely act as the people desire. As we are in such a state of mind, so we have become earnest, desperate, and are willing to support, to co-operate, to encourage, to bolster up the present Cabinet.

(applause)

I suppose if it were peace time, the people would not always welcome a General in active service as a Prime Minister. But facing the actual state of affairs when the country is driven to the extreme moment of swim or sink, the people welcome a General as a Prime Minister so that they may go.
...and relying upon him. This I suppose is the reason why we hear the voice of the people favorable to the present Cabinet.

(applause)

Then, the Ministers of the Cabinet must be prepared to utilize this state of mind of the people to settle the Incident and to tide over the difficulties of the time.

(applause)

Needless to say, there is always a chance in directing an affair. There is an old saying, "Strike while the iron is hot". The Government must be aware of the fact that the people are "hot", and it is just the time to "strike"!

(applause)

I do not, however, suggest that you close the current negotiations, but I want to remind the Government that it is the moment now to seize the chance and not to allow the members of the Cabinet to entertain even the slightest idea of urging procrastination.

(applause)

I understand quite well how a man is inclined, when he occupies an important post in the Government, to undertake various kinds of work. But one must know that there is always a limit to an affair; time and place is of great importance for the execution of an undertaking. Now the people are so absorbed in the war, even spring eating and sleeping, to carry it on to its final victory, and to make our country's standing favorable. I hope that the Government, taking these circumstances into consideration, will exclusively lay stress on the execution of the war and concentrate all its efforts on the attainment of this purpose. In the name of
"Shogi" (T.N.-Japanese chess) one can not be a winner unless he gets the "King" of the opponent. It is quite natural that one, even a first rate player, wants to capture the "Hishè", the "Kaku" or the "Koi" when a chance is given (T.N.-Hishè, Kaku, Koi are the names of pieces of Japanese chess, ranking after the "King"). But one must think that the game can not be won without winning the "King".

(*applause*)

We have very often heard hitherto the expressions like "undaunted resolution"; "we will do it thoroughly" etc. We heard these expressions just yesterday too. The speeches delivered by the Prime Minister at the Diet have gained popularity among the people outside. To the members of the Diet too, have the same impression, when we hear his strong determination uttered in his strong voice. Yes, we have heard it often, and have heard it this time too. That we want to say here, however, is that though we have heard often that the determination is firm, yet what we require is not merely the firmness of a determination. Of course the determination must be firm; nevertheless, what we fear or rather apprehend is that so long as a determination remains simply determination, we can not know whether it is strong or weak. That I want to remind the Government as well as the people is that determination is not the same as execution. What we want to see is the execution which testifies the determination to have been really undaunted.

(*applause*)

It is the people's duty to deliver the address of encouragement, demanding that the Government act vigorously. In reply to such an address the Government always assures the people that it will act or is acting as is demanded. In such a manner we cannot expect any progress at all.
are left in such a condition, does it not seem as if we were hospitably engaging in an endless talk with a guest - America? Being shown action in some way or other, we can see that determination really exists. The vengeance of the 47 Ronins was not carried out by propagandist OISHI, Furansakuho. He achieved his cherished desire after perseverance for one year and a half or rather for about two years. Judging from the result, it can be testified that his determination was firm.

(applause)

The firmness of one's determination can not be ascertained by propaganda; only by execution, can it be made clear.

(applause)

I think the responsible authorities must consider this matter most seriously.

From such a point of view it is quite admissible that the Government should adopt a very cautious attitude. I dare not criticize such an attitude of the Government, especially when we think that the present Cabinet has been organized quite recently. It will not be proper to expect an immediate move. However, a good long time has already elapsed. Ambassador KURUSU was sent to America charged with an extraordinary mission by the present Cabinet. He is to meet the President. Enough days have already passed since. I wonder why the officials of the Government are hesitating before the people, what they fear, and for what reason they are so restrained. We must understand that what our Government is afraid of or restrained by before the people is the very thing which the opponent State is afraid of or is restrained by. To know that, in "Sune-oshi" wrestling, each wrestler has equally pains in his leg.

(applause)
(T.N. "Sune-oshi" - "Log wrestling" ----The persons squatting on straw mat face to face, each one having his right leg unfolded, embracing with arms the upper knoo of the log end tightly pressing it to the body, kicks the opponent's right leg and tries to ever turn the opponent.)

One must understand that, when we take up arms to fight against another nation, it is not our side only that sustains loss of lives, and consumption of materials. We ought to take an opportunity, at this juncture, to give some drastic object-lesson to the persons in political and financial circles of hostile states, ----those persons who are misunderstanding our intention, who do not understand Japan's stand.

(applause)

By means of this object-lesson we must let them know how war necessitates great sacrifice personally and materially, and at the same time we must make the mass of the people of these states thoroughly understand that, when they are pulled into the whirlpool of war by the instigation of their arrogant leaders, those who shall become victims of the war ----which has nothing to do with their independence or self-existence ----are not their leaders but the mass of the people themselves. I am persuaded myself that if we do not take such measures the peace or tranquility of the Pacific can never be expected. Now the time for mere gestures is gone.

This is the important point to notice. In the beginning gesture and threats may be efficacious; but, if repeated threats or insinuation have no effect on a child, a parent is often obliged to give a merciful stroke of the whip to his beloved one.

(applause)

At least one stroke is necessary; there is no hope otherwise.

Prime Minister KONGE sent a message concerning Japan-American negotiation.
I have never seen its contents, but I heard that the words "the cancer of the Pacific" were used in it. If there exists any cancer in the Pacific, we must well bear in mind that the cancer is not on the sea, but it is in the minds of the nations, especially of the present leaders of nations.

(appause)

A decisive operation on this cancer is necessary. To those responsible for this, we, who are representing present Japan, must take full responsibility for this for the sake of the coming generations of the Great Empire of Japan which has prospered since its foundation and will prosper for future ages eternal.

Therefore we desire to ascertain when the Government will perform the operation for our sake or have us perform it. To do not of course interfere with any plan to move eastward or westward, such being military strategy. However we can not but hope that Prime Minister TOJO, and all the members of his Cabinet, will distinctly and firmly recognize the resolute determination of one hundred million people, and take decisive measures as soon as possible, relying upon the unshakable determination of the people, and stand at the head of us who are ready to break through this difficult situation, as described in the text of this resolution. This is the reason why we have presented this bill.

(appause)

President: (Mr. KOYAMA, Mitsuji) We will take a vote, those in favor please rise (all members rise).

President: (Mr. KOYAMA, Mitsuji) All members have risen.

(appause)

President: (Mr. KOYAMA, Mitsuji) The Bill is adopted unanimously. The Prime Minister is asking to speak. --- Prime Minister TOJO please!
Minister of State TOJO, Hideki takes the rostrum.

Minister of State TOJO, Hideki) The Government has fully understood the purport of the resolution adopted just now by unanimous vote of the House. The Government desires to do its utmost for the execution of the State-policy already decided, in order to maintain the self-existence and the prestige of the State, fully taking into consideration the intent of the resolution. Concerning the execution of the State-policy, as I already stated it from this platform some days ago, the Government is firmly resolved to carry out the fixed State-policy and leave nothing to be desired anticipating any obstacles which we may encounter and making everything ready to overcome them, and thus to maintain the existence of the State.

(applause)

This resolution is not propaganda.

(applause)

I hate propaganda. (applause)

Please understand me well.

I want to remind you of is that, in order to cope with any possible change of situation in executing the State-policy hereafter, we have to break through considerably grave obstacles. On this I think all you gentlemen agree with me?

(applause)

The Government is well resolved, of course, to deal with the situation with all its power, but half of the burden must be borne on your shoulders, gentlemen, and on the shoulders of one hundred million people who follow you. Without this combined strength, it is impossible to surmount this difficulty.

- 18 -
(Sono ono shouts, "Quite right!"—applause) I feel, however, exceedingly satisfied when I hear that the nation is well prepared, as indicated in the resolution adopted.

(applause)

Just one word more. In respect to the explanation speech delivered just now, though it may be my misunderstanding, and it is a matter of insignificance, yet I should like to remind you that it sounded to me as if there were, among my Cabinet colleagues, some who are doubtful of the administrative policy I have indicated. (Sono ono shouts, "No, it is not so recent") I, however, request you to understand that this is absolutely not the case. (Some one utters, "It was recent to ask if the Government not doubtful of the people’s determination.) Still better if it is so—

(applause)
Certificate

I, Y.MIZUKI, Takashi, Chief of the Section of General Affairs of the House of Representatives hereby certify that the Japanese Document attached, hereto consisting of 18 sheets, is a copy of the transcription of one part of the stenographic records No. 3, pages extending from 42 to 46, of the proceedings of the House of Representatives in the 77th Session of the Imperial Diet, convened Nov. 19th of the 16th year of Showa (1941), and which is kept under my official custody.

December 6th of the 21st year of Showa (1946).

At the House of Representatives

(Signed and sealed) Y.MIZUKI, Takashi

I testify that the above was signed and sealed in my presence.

On the same day and at the same place.

(Signed and sealed) YOKOHARA, Ichiro
Witness

/Allies of the voice language branch, hereby certify, that the foregoing transcription described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and it is done as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ ALLIES of the voice language branch

TOYO, Japan

Date 1 January 1947
Prince SHIMAZU, Tadashige

As one of the proposers I wish to explain the reasons for the presentation of this Resolution Bill concerning the Prosecution of the National Policy, which is being discussed now.

Both the speeches of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister point out to this fact most clearly. We appreciate what has been done so far but desire very earnestly that the Government would further carry on the negotiations with every possible effort, showing the magnanimity of a great people and modestly recognizing the insufficiency of past efforts so that he (T.N.: U.S. President) may be made thoroughly to understand the real situation in East Asia and see not only our true intention but our real ability as well. However, there is naturally a limit to our generosity. If, despite our best and every possible effort, he insists on underestimating our strength and refusing to understand our real intention, and thereby dares to hinder the carrying out of our immovable national policy, by holding to his insolent and menacing attitude toward our Imperial honour and existence, we sincerely wish that the Government will act up to its conviction with a determined attitude. This is the motive for our presentation of the bill. Now I will read the resolution bill.
The Resolution Bill for the Prosecution of the National Policy.

It is our immovable national policy to promptly settle the troubles in East Asia, permanently realize our principle of co-existence and co-prosperity in the region and thereby contribute to the establishment of world peace. We hope that the Government will break through the present crisis by effectively coping with the situation, both internal and external, and carry out our national policy to success.

I earnestly hope that this bill will fortunately obtain your approval.
I, who occupy the post of the Chief of the General Affairs Section, Cabinet Printing Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 8 pages and entitled "Official Gazette, Nov. 18, 1941 (Stenographic Record No. 2 of the Proceedings of the House of Peers, the 77th Diet Session)" is a document printed and issued by the Japanese Government (The Cabinet Bureau of Printing).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 6th day of Oct., 1947

(signed) FUJIMARA, Kota (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: (signed) OGUCHI, Mamoru (seal)
Certificate

I, who occupy the post of Chief of the 1st Demobilization Office, hereby certify that the documents concerning the amount of gasoline decided to be imported from U.S.A. and the Dutch Indies, which were formulated at the Liaison Conference on or about November 1941, was destroyed by fire at the time of the termination of the War and, therefore, is not in the custody of our Office at present.

Certified at Tokyo on this 25th day of EVEN. 1947

/s/ [Signature]
Chief of the Document Section
1st Demobilization Office

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereon in the presence of the Witness:

Witness: /s/ [Signature]

TO ROOM 361
CERTIFICATE

I, MIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the two documents entitled "The Organization of the Imperial Headquarters" and "The Imperial Headquarters Service Regulations" were burned at the time of the termination of war and that they are presently not in the custody of the First Demobilization Bureau.

Certified at Tokyo
On this 12th day of December, 1947

/S/ MIYAMA, Yozo (Seal)
Chief of Archives Section, First Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of this Witness,

At the same place
on the same date

Witness: /S/ UCHIYAMA, Hiroshi (seal)
Certificate

I hereby certify that the written orders, regarding the commencement of preparations for war, which were issued by the Army Department of the Imperial headquarters on December 1, 1941 to the Commanders of the Southern Area Army, of the Expeditionary Forces in China, and of the South Seas Detachment, are not at present in the custody of the First Demobilization Bureau.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 15th day of December, 1947.

/s/ MYAKA, Yozo (seal)
Chief of Document Sec.
The First Demobilization Bureau.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: UCHIYAMA, Hiroshi (seal)
ERRATA SHEET

Page 1  Line 3rd  Blurred words shall read "Now you will"
1st para.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
ERRATA SHEET

Def. Doc. 28710

As the title adds follows:

"Excerpt from the Official Gazette of the 16 Dec.
1941, Stenographic Records of the House of Repre-
sentative, 78th Session of the Imperial Diet."
Government Committee man (Mr. KIMURA, Heitaro) I will make a report on the war situation in place of the War Minister. 

First, kindly look at the map distributed to you. As the landing points of the troops marked are classified top-secret, you are requested to take great precaution in handling it.

Malay Peninsula Area --- For a long time Britain has been oppressing Thai by adopting a two-sided policy of politics and war in order to induce her into the anti-Japanese battle line, and have continued that move obstinately. Finally taking advantage of the darkness of the night of the 7th, they invaded the southern part of THAI State, transgressing the border of MALAY. Thereupon, our army, cooperating with the navy, effected a landing at important points of the Malay Peninsula at dawn of the 8th. At this time, our units which dashed into the north-eastern part of British Malay, fought a bitter battle with the enemy Borjes who being confident of their strong defense on the land and sea offered stubborn resistance. Nonetheless, our unit
DEP. DOC. #2710

succeeded in landing after heroic combat, and regardless of the losses they suffered, continued their march until they overwhelmed the important air base of the enemy and occupied it at last. Thus our general landing operations were made easier, and our troops gained the achievement of being the first to ride into British Malaya under colors.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Printing Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 16 pages and entitled "The Extra Official Gazette of the 16th of December 1941: The Stenographic Records of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives at the 38th Session of the Imperial Diet -- No.1" is a document printed and issued by the Japanese Government (the Government Printing Bureau).

certified at Tokyo
on this 7th day of October, 1947

(Signed) FUJIWARA, Kota

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: (Signed) OGUCHI, Mamoru
ERRATA SHEET

Page 3  Line 6 fr. Insert "apply mutatis mutandis" in the bottom parenthesis.
Reply of the Japanese Government to the Protest made by the United States of America concerning the cases of mistreatment of Americans.

Letter sent to the Swiss Legation in Japan. Dated April 28th, 1944

Your representations made in your letter, dated Feb. 5th concerning the treatment of American citizens who are in excess under the control of Japan is respectfully acknowledged by the Japanese Government.

As to the protest made by the United States Government, dated Dec. 23rd, 1942, concerning the treatment by the Japanese government authorities of the American citizens, referred to in your letter, the Japanese Government has replied in a letter to Your Excellency dated April 24th, based on the findings of our investigation of the matter. The reply of the Japanese Government to the present notification of the United States Government is as follows. The Japanese Government wishes to have Your Excellency transmit it to the United States Government.

1. The Japanese Government has made a careful study of the notification of the United States Government concerning the treatment of the American citizens within the bounds of Japan, which was transmitted by the Swiss
Def. Doc. #2775

Minister in Tokyo, acting in the capacity of representative to protect the rights and interests of the United States in Japan in his letter dated Feb. 5th 1944.

Since it is realized that the United States Government seriously misunderstands, as in the past, the position of the Empire in this notification with regard to the application of the Prisoners of War Agreement of 1929, the Japanese Government will take this occasion to further clarify the situation in Reply No. 1 of this letter.

The Japanese Government will state in Reply No. 2, the result of their thorough investigation on the eighteen items of protests and instances brought forth by the United States Government.

Though the United States Government declares in this notification that the articles of the Prisoners of War Agreement of 1929 have been applied most faithfully to Japanese citizens within the bounds of the United States, the most reliable information the Japanese Government possesses indicates that the United States Government has not always been faithful in the application of the said Agreement, as stated in Reply No. 3. Therefore, the Japanese Government hereby firmly protests against this and requests the United States Government to make a prompt investigation on each instance, correct the situation and take disciplinary actions against those responsible for the matters.

Though the cases enumerated in Reply No. 4 are circumstances not anticipated in the Prisoners of War Agreement, such measures are contrary
to the spirit of the Agreement, the principle of international law, as well as contrary to humanity. The above is based upon the most reliable information the Japanese Government possesses. Since no satisfactory answer has yet been received to our protest made to the United States Government, the Japanese Government takes this occasion to make a firm protest again to the United States Government to call its careful attention to the matter and requests it to correct the situation.


Regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, Japan ratified the regulations concerning laws and customs of land warfare of 1907 and the Agreement of 1929 concerning the improvement of conditions of the sick and the wounded among troops in the battlefield. However, she did not ratify the Agreement of 1929 concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. In this war, the Japanese Government declared its intention to the United States Government that it would apply ( ) the content of the Prisoners of War Treatment Agreement of 1929 to American prisoners of war who are within the bounds of Japan. There is no international agreement regarding the treatment of internees except that a mere desire is expressed in the final protocol of the Prisoners of War Agreement of 1929. In this war, the Japanese Government expressed its intention to the United States Government that it would apply as much as possible the content of the Agreement concerning the treatment of prisoners of war concluded in
1929, on condition that the United States Government would do the same.

(Provided that no belligerent nation shall force her prisoners of war to labour services against their free will)

That Japan would apply the provisions of the 1929 Prisoners of War Agreement to American prisoners of war means that the Japanese Government would apply the regulations with necessary modification so as to cope with laws and regulations enforced in Japan and to meet the actual condition. It is the same in applying the provisions of the same Agreement to American internees. With regard to the situation in this war, the theater of war is vast and includes remote, secluded regions in the Orient with numerous islands scattered in the great ocean where communications are extremely difficult. Moreover the frequent shifts of air battles makes it difficult to discriminate combat zones from non-combat zones. The Japanese forces, which have come to intern a great number of unexpected enemy nationals in such remote places mentioned above, are making their utmost effort in giving fair treatment to them. However, such a situation was not expected at the time of conclusion of the Prisoners of War Agreement in 1929. The reason Japan did not ratify the Prisoners of War Agreement of 1929, in spite of her signing the Agreement, is because there were some provisions in the said Agreement which were not acceptable to Japan. Therefore, Japan, made additional provisions to the regulations concerning laws and customs of land warfare of 1907 and to the agreement of 1929 concerning the improvement of conditions of the sick and wounded among troops.
in the battlefield. She is dealing with the matter from the humanitarian standpoint. The above is what the Japanese Government has repeatedly stated to the United States Government.

However, with this expression of intention on the part of the Japanese Government, the United States Government regards Japan as a party to the Agreement and expects Japan to apply every separate article.

It is difficult for the Japanese Government to understand such attitude of the United States Government.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YUKOI, Takaharu, who occupy the post of chief of P.O.W. Information Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Reply of the Japanese Government to U.S. Government concerning the Protest against the Mistreatment of Americans" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (P.O.W. Information Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 16th day of Oct., 1947.

(signed) YUKOI, Takaharu (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: (signed)UCHIYAMA, Hiroshi (seal)
THE REALIZATION OF DR. SUN YAT-SEN'S GREAT ASIA DOCTRINE

by

H.E. PRESIDENT T'ANG CHING-WEI OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA

(Address delivered before the Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations, November 5, 1943)

Your Excellency, Your Excellencies and Gentlemen,

The convening of the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations in the capital of our ally, Jaran, is an event of great significance in the history of the world. I have been greatly inspired by the address of His Excellency Prime Minister Tojo to which we have just had the honor of listening.

British and American aggression in East Asia began a hundred years ago. Today, in this grave period, it is only by virtue of the military power of Japan and upon her strength — political, economic and cultural — that we can, for the first time, check the aggressive ambitions of America and Britain, preserve East Asia and prevent those two countries from dominating this part of the world. Recently, with the outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia, the aggressive influence of the United States and Britain has been expelled, and their military and naval bases in the Eastern Pacific and in the South Seas region have been either destroyed or occupied. Furthermore, with a view to securing the common prosperity and well-being of the nations and peoples of East Asia on a basis of the Oriental spirit of
justice, Japan has undertaken to assist independence and autonomy and to enable them to realize their patriotic aspirations. And, by so doing, she has caused them to assume their respective posts, to display their fullest efforts and to share in the responsibilities for bringing the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion and for completing the task of constructing Greater East Asia. For such noble and grand aims and for such brilliant achievements, I wish to pay to Japan my highest respects.

Also, I wish to express my sincere respect to Manchoukuo and Thailand with whom we enjoy amicable relations, as well as to the newly-riser Burma, the Philippines and Free India, all of whom with inflexible determination and inspired efforts are doing their share in the War of Greater East Asia and in the construction of Greater East Asia.

I am exceedingly happy to have been accorded an opportunity to speak of the determination and the efforts of the National Government of China to bring the War of Greater East Asia to a successful termination and to construct a Greater East Asia.

Throughout his life, it was the aspiration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Chinese Republic, to liberate China and East Asia from the fetters of American and British domination and to realize complete independence and autonomy. And it was with such aspirations that he continued his struggle for forty long years until his death. Three months before he passed away, Dr. Sun spoke in Kobe, Japan, on two occasions.
In his first speech on November 28, 1924, which was devoted to the subject of the Great Asia Doctrine, he said: "Our Asia, despite its being the fountain-head of the world's oldest culture, has suffered from the aggression of Britain and America for a hundred years and declined to the point where there existed hardly a single completely independent nation among us. However, when that decline reached the lowest level, a great turning point suddenly arrived. This was the Meiji Restoration of Japan, and it is in this restoration that we find the reason for Japan's rise as the leader of the Asiatic nations and, at the same time, the starting point for the reconstruction of Asia. The nations of Asia must naturally, in a spirit of unity and cooperation with Japan and on a basis of the Oriental culture of the Kiriyu "ay, win over the Occidental culture founded upon the rule of force, completely expel the aggressive influence of America and Britain and secure their independence and sovereignty. Only by so doing can they lead Asia out of decadence and set it on the road of reconstruction.

On the other occasion in the same year, Dr. Sun stated that Japan naturally must assist China and abolish the unequal treaties, and added, "Japan and China are like brothers. Japan, once subjected to the yoke of unequal treaties, roused herself and broke that yoke and became the leading nation of the East and a world power. China is now endeavoring to bring about the abolition of the unequal treaties and desires the utmost assistance of Japan. The liberation of China is the
These two speeches were the last to be delivered by the Father of our Republic, for soon after Dr. Sun became ill and, in the following year, on March 12, 1925, died in Peking. At the time of his death he left to his disciples a will, commanding them to carry on the struggle for the emancipation of China.

"That is most unfortunate is that following the death of Dr. Sun, when his desires remained still unfulfilled, Sino-Japanese relations did not see any improvement, but became more aggravated, culminating in the outbreak of the China Affair in July, 1937.

Because the relations between Japan and China broke down, America and Britain, considering this as a golden opportunity maneuvered for the extension and prolongation of the conflict causing further ill-feeling and division between the two countries. We, the followers of Dr. Sun, were distressed to see his will remain unfulfilled and the relations between Japan and China deteriorate from day to day. We were almost at the point of despair when, fortunately, the Japanese Government announced their policy to terminate the incident as soon as possible and also made clear that the aim of Japan did not lie in the downfall of China, but in her rise, that Japan expected China to share in the task of reconstructing East Asia, that Japan was determined to assist China, and that Japan looked forward to the realization of China's desire to recover her full
sovereignty and independence. In this declaration of Japan's true intentions, we saw hope for an amicable adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations and for the fulfillment of the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Accordingly, we advised the abandonment of resistance and the restoration of peace to the Chungking regime. But because they would not listen, we had no choice but to escape from Chungking and carry on by ourselves our movement for peace. Thus, the National Government returned to Nanking to exert their utmost efforts in working properly and effectively for Sino-Japanese collaboration and for the construction of a new East Asia.

As I have said before, the United States and Britain made constant efforts to cause friction and division between Japan and China in order to extend and prolong the China Affair. These efforts were further intensified after the return of the National Government to Nanking. The United States and Britain, because of the collapse of their influence in East Asia, utilized Chungking more than ever as a tool for checking Japan. We say with confidence that all such machinations will soon end in failure. Why? Because the military and civil leaders of Chungking and the general masses of the people under that regime are all believers in the teachings of Dr. Sun, and because, since January 9 of this year, Japan has taken successive steps retroceding her concessions and relinquishing her extraterritorial rights; and especially, the recent Pact of Alliance has replaced the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and all the documents annexed thereto.
The Great Asia Doctrine pronounced by Dr. Sun has already borne fruit. Assistance to China and abolition of the unequal treaties which Dr. Sun desired of Japan have also become a reality. Regardless of what attempts the United States and Britain may make to seduce and obstruct, no longer can they prevent the awakening of Chungking. Even if they succeed in gaining temporary control, Chungking would soon and surely realize that reliance upon America and Britain is to betray East Asia and also to betray the Father of the Republic. I can positively state that the day of Chungking's awakening is inevitable coming.

At this most important juncture, the National Government, in accordance with their fixed policies, are redoubling their efforts on the one hand to urge the Chungking leaders to awaken and return to working so as to consummate rational unification and on the other, to set up a model zone in the area under their control. This program lays stress on the following three points: first, purification of thought; second, guarantee of peace and order; and third, production increase.

The purification of thought is intended to liquidate thoroughly Anglo-American individualistic and utilitarian ideas and replace them with the ethical spirit of the Orient in order that the peoples of East Asia may regain their proper status through East Asiatic awakening and strive with one mind and one virtue for their common prosperity and welfare. As to
the guarantee of peace and order, it means that China will maintain peace and order in the rear lines of the "War of Greater East Asia" so as to free the officers and men of her ally in the fighting lines from any anxiety about the home front. And that, she will go a step further by sending her own troops to the front lines to share, even to a small degree, the hardships and privations of Japan's fighting forces.

The increase of production aims at augmenting China's strength for a decisive total war with emphasis laid on the economic and financial plans. Economy of consumption and utilization of waste are also included in the plan for production increase.

These three points form the backbone of the National Government's program for cooperation toward the prosecution of the "War of Greater East Asia." The meaning of this war of construction which the National Government have learned by experience is this: China is to band together with her fellow nations in a fraternity of East Asiatic Nations, bound by common aspirations and resolved to share the bitter and the sweet, to live and die together, so that without, she may help defeat America and Britain, our common enemies, shatter their aggressive influences and frustrate their aggressive designs, and within, do her full part in the construction of East Asia with ceaseless industry and resolute courage.

In the "War of Greater East Asia," we want victory in the construction of Greater East Asia, we want common prosperity. All the nations of East Asia should love their own countries.
Def. Doc. #2760-B

love their neighbors and love East Asia. Our motto for China is resurgence of China and defense of East Asia. When China has gained independence and autonomy, then can she shoulder her share in the responsibilities for the defense of East Asia; when the defense of East Asia has been secured, then will China's independence and autonomy be guaranteed. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to make our own countries not only independent and autonomous, but also a powerful factor in East Asia. Inasmuch as all the nations of East Asia have each its own unique character, it is necessary to safeguard their independence and autonomy on the one hand and to respect one another's independence and autonomy on the other. No less necessary is it for all the nations of East Asia to march forward together toward their common goal and seek their common prosperity and welfare. Japan already has made manifest to the world the full glory of her sovereignty. She has now enabled the other nations of East Asia to win their independence and autonomy and has freely helped them unite together and exert themselves toward the attainment of their common goal. Now that we have our political independence and autonomy, we shall inevitably attain our common objective when diplomatically we have an agreement on policy and militarily a common front against the enemy.

The triple successes achieved by Japan, in preserving her own culture, in promoting Oriental culture and in assimilating world culture, command our profound respect. I confidently
believe that the rawly risen nations will make strenuous efforts to go forward in a similar manner. We, the Chinese nation, must concentrate on the revival of our culture. It is my belief that the fusion and creation of cultures is an essential factor in drawing closer the boards of friendship among nations as in the case of the interchange of thought between China and India in ancient times through the introduction of Buddhism which added a unique feature to the history of Oriental culture.

In the economic field, too, all the nations of East Asia should work out a formula for deriving benefits mutually, by complementing each other and ministering to one another's needs on the basis of reciprocity. For instance, cotton which we grow in China is required by various neighboring countries, while gasoline, rubber and tin produced in the Southern Region may be supplied to neighboring countries in fairly large volumes. Everything will be settled, if only we approach the question from the viewpoint of mutual aid. All policies of exploitation and monopoly pursued by America and Britain in the past must be razed to the ground, and in their place a new world which conforms to the principles of humanity must be created.

When what I have said is realized, there is not the slightest doubt that the prosperity and welfare of all the nations of East Asia will be promoted, not only providing a guarantee of East Asia's common prosperity, but further by laying a foundation for world peace. Before us stretches a road of bright hopes for the nations of East Asia to march along hand
Before closing, I should like to add that those countrymen of mine who are resident in Thailand, Burma and the Philippines and the former British and Dutch colonies, now under Japanese occupation, number no less than seven or eight millions. Well treated by the respective governments, they are actively engaged, shoulder to shoulder with the local peoples in developing communication facilities and natural resources at great pains and by the sweat of their brows. It should go a long way not only to unite the local peoples with them, but also to hasten the awakening of the East-Asiatic peoples.

The Chinese people are not free from shortcomings, but at the same time they are possessed of strong points. They are peace-loving, sincere, hard-working and simple. They share with the local peoples both joys and sorrows, woe and woe, with the result that an inseparable relationship of friendly cooperation has developed between the two with mutual appreciation of their strong points and by mutually supplementing their shortcomings. It is my firm belief that this relationship will be further strengthened and consolidated by the war of Greater East Asia and further that it will contribute to the common prosperity of Greater East Asia.

The Three-Power Joint Declaration among Japan, Manchoukuo and China of November 20, 1940, has already provided a strong central body. And today, with the Assembly of the Greater
East Asiatic Nations attended by the representatives of three more countries, Thailand, Burma and the Philippines, and also by Free India as a guest, the sphere of common prosperity has been further expanded.

In closing, I desire to express my best wishes for the success and prosperity of all the countries represented in the Assembly and also for the happiness of their peoples.
The Additional clause I am about to propose, I consider as coming appropriately under Art. 21. It is not necessary to dwell on fact that racial and religious animosities formerly (?) have constituted a fruitful source of trouble and warfare among different peoples, throughout history often leading to deplorable excess. This Article as it stands attempts to eliminate religious causes of strife from international relationship and as the race question is also a standing difficulty which may become acute and dangerous at any moment in future, it is desirable that provisions should be made in this Covenant for the treatment of this subject. It would seem matters of religion and race could well go together.

I wish to add a clause: The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to record, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality, directly after the end of the article.
D.L. Doc. 2886

as it stands. That race discrimination still exists in law and in fact is undeniable. It is enough here simply to state the fact of its existence. I am aware of difficult circumstances that stand in the way of acting on the principle embodied in this clause, but I do not think it insurmountable if sufficient importance is attached to consideration of serious misunderstandings between different peoples which may grow to uncontrollable degree and it is hoped that better be taken in hand on such opportunity as the present. What was deemed impossible before is about to be accomplished. Creation of this League itself which efforts of many generations of the best minds failed to accomplish is a notable example. If this organization can open a way to the solution of the question, scope of work will become wider and enlist interest of a still greater part of humanity.

It must be admitted at the same time that the question of race prejudice is a very delicate and complicated matter involving play of deep human passions and therefore requiring careful management. This consideration has not been overlooked from a practicable point of view and an immediate realization of the ideal of equality of treatment between peoples is not proposed.

Clause establishes principles of equality and leaves out working of it to the hands of the responsible leaders of States, members of the League, who will not neglect the state of public opinion.
This clause in a way may be regarded as an invitation to Governments and peoples concerned, to examine more closely and seriously and to devise some acceptable means to meet a dread-lock, which at present confronts different peoples.

As the result of this war, the wave of national and democratic spirit has extended to remote corner of the world and has given additional impetus to aspiration of all the peoples; this impetus once set in motion as part of the universal movement with renewed strength can not be stifled and it would be imprudent to treat this symptom lightly.

There are other considerations of a more or less direct nature which merit earnest thought. Future states, members of the League, comprising all kinds of races constitute a great family of nations. It is in a sense a world organization of insurance against aggression and war. If one member's independence and political integrity is menaced by a third power or (omission) nations suitably placed must be prepared to take up arms against aggressors and there are also cases of enforcing common obligation which would entail contribution of an armed force.

These are indeed serious obligations which each state member in accordance with their capacities and abilities mutually pledge themselves and must be prepared to fulfill them for benefit of
their brother nations. This means that a citizen of one nation must be ready to share military expenditure for the common cause and if needs be, defend other peoples by his own person.

Seeing these new duties, arising before him as the result of his country's entering league, each national would like to feel and in first demand that he should be placed on equal footing with people he undertakes to defend even with his life.

In this war, to attain common cause, different races have fought together on the battlefields, in the trenches, on high seas, and they have helped each other and brought succour to the disabled and have saved lives of the other fellow men, irrespective of racial differences, and common bond of sympathy and gratitude has been established to an extent never before experienced.

I think it only just that after this common suffering and deliverance, principle at least of equality among men should be admitted and be made basis of future intercourse.
I, K. Kuro, Chief of the Archives Section, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "MEMORANDUM BY H. S. BROWN INTRODUCING THE FUNCTION OF A.C.O. DISCUSSION EREAL" Elected at a meeting (Feb. 13, 1919) of the League of Nations Committee of the Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 17th day of November, 1947.

/s/ K. Kuro
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K. Ur. BE
ERRATA SHEET

All through this document "the Greater East Asia Construction Commission" should be changed into "East Asiatic Deliberative Council"
DEP. DOC. #2735

We hereby sanction the Official Organization of the
Greater East Asia Construction Commission and cause it to
be promulgated.

The Imperial signature and seal.
This 20th day of February in the
17th year of Showa (1942),

TOJO, Hideki
The Prime Minister.
Imperial Ordinance

No. 95

Official Organization of The Greater East Asia Construction Commission

Article 1. The Greater East Asia Construction Commission shall come under the supervision of the Prime Minister and, in response to the Prime Minister's inquiry and consultation, investigate into, and deliberate on important matters relating to the construction of Greater East Asia (excepting military and diplomatic affairs).

The Greater East Asia Construction Commission may make recommendations to the Prime Minister in regard to matters referred to in the foregoing paragraph.

Article 2. The Greater East Asia Construction Commission shall consist of one president and less than forty members.

Article 3. The Prime Minister shall be the President of the Commission.
The members of the Commission shall be appointed by Imperial Order from among persons of scholastic attainments and experience.

Article 4. The term of membership shall be two years; however, a member may be dropped from the membership when specific reasons for such action exist.

Article 5. The president shall preside over the affairs of the Commission. When circumstances prevent the President from performing his duties, a Minister of State nominated by the Prime Minister shall act in his place.

Article 6. When deemed necessary, the Prime Minister may set up committees in the Greater East Asia construction Commission, each to take partial charge of the affairs of the Commission. A committee shall have a chairman. Such chairman shall be a Minister of State nominated by the Prime Minister. Members of the committees shall be designated by the President.

Article 7. The Ministers of State may, at any time, be present at the meetings of the Commission and state their views.
Article 8: When deemed necessary, the Prime Minister may have technical members or other appropriate persons present at a meeting of the Commission and have their opinions expressed.

Article 9: In order to investigate special matters, technical committees may be set up within the Greater East Asia Construction Commission. After the Prime Minister submits to the Throne names for a technical committee from among the high officials of the government agencies concerned or among persons of scholastic attainments and experience, the Cabinet shall appoint these men to the committee. When a technical committee completes the study on its specific assignment, it shall be dissolved.

Article 10: The Greater East Asia Construction Commission shall have a Chief Secretary, Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries. The President of the Planning Board shall be appointed Chief Secretary. After the Prime Minister submits to the Throne names for Secretaries from among the high officials of the government agencies concerned or among persons of scholastic attainments and experience, the Cabinet shall appoint these men as Secretaries. After the Prime Minister submits to the Throne names
for Assistant Secretaries from among the high officials of the government agencies concerned, the Cabinet shall appoint those men as Assistant Secretaries. By order of higher officials, the Chief Secretary, Secretary, Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries shall study and make plans for the Commission.

Article 11. The Planning Board shall manage the general affairs of the Greater East Asia Construction Commission. The Assistant Secretaries shall assist in the management of the said general affairs. Other necessary matters pertaining to the Greater East Asia Construction Commission, which are not provided for in this ordinance shall be decided by the Prime Minister.

Supplementary Provision

This ordinance shall come into force on and after the day of its promulgation.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO, Asao, who occupy the post of Secretary of the Cabinet, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Official Organization of the Greater East Asia Construction Commission" is an exact and true copy of excerpts from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Secretariat of the Cabinet).

Certified at Tokyo;

On this 12th day of July, 1946,

(signed) SATO, Asao
(Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
On the same date,

Witness: (Signed) IGAWA, Kokuichi
(Seal)
In regard to the policy toward the South Sea regions it is highly important for us, from the political and cultural point of view, to study closely their religions, customs, manners of living, geographical features and history respectively, so that we can frame our mind in compliance with the actual circumstances prevailing there. The late Count GOTO's far-reaching perspicacity as a politician in putting much importance on the investigations of old customs of the natives in the administration of Taiwan offers us, I think, much to learn at the present moment. Nevertheless, I have no intention of maintaining such a desk theory as that of self-determination of races, which was advanced.
by Wilson at Versailles. My true intention is this: We must fully be
prepared for winning the hearts of those oriental peoples under the
ideal of co-existence and co-prosperity, liberating them completely
from the tyranny of British and Americans who have consistently squeezed
and oppressed them.

From the economic point of view, on the other hand, it is necessary
that we should first of all set up the marine, land and air networks of
transportation and communication which will radiate from Japan, just as
Rome was in ancient days, the center of the world's traffic, relinquishing
the evil tendency of regional isolationism, and that we should make a
collective program for supplying each other's needs among the regions of
Greater East Asia in accordance with their natural features and resources.
In making this gigantic plan we should establish the main issues on
universal ideas after hearing opinions of both officials and all classes
of people, excluding of course things of military secret, and then we
shall be able to lead the people on to the right track and show them
their goal. I am firmly convinced that this is a matter so
important that it can never belong to a single ministry, board, or
bureau. (applause)

Various researches and investigations on that line have been made
in many quarters and discussions are alive. We must not, however, fail
to prevent the divergence and disunion of the public opinion. I hereby
advocate my opinion that the Government should take steps to establish
an authoritative great investigation organ as soon as possible to guide
and unify the public opinion before some inconveniences and irregulari-
ties occur. (applause)

In order to synthesize those investigations and put them into
practice it seems to me to be quite necessary at the same time to
establish a great unification organ. It is needless to say that of
these regions in the South Seas some have been independent and others
have been possessed or protected by England or Holland or America.
Consequently, the forms and principles of administration are of ex-
tremely different type. The standards of culture of the inhabitants
in these regions are not similar and moreover a great number of Chinese
merchants have settled down there; thus the natural features of these
regions are greatly diverse among them. Such being the case for our
future realization of developing the southern regions we must lay down
political, cultural and economic systems which shall fully cope with the
real circumstances of each region. On the other hand, however, I consider
it of absolute necessity that we carry out a national policy which is
unified and synthesized on the main issue, regarding these regions as
a whole. I hereby earnestly demand the establishment of a central
executive and supervising organ for that purpose.

This is war-time. It is a matter of course then that military
administration be established, when victory is the foremost thing and
the maintenance of peace is all important. Immediately after the fall
of Hongkong our military authorities invited some influential Chinese merchants and asked them to cooperate in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Hongkong; and at Manilla the authorities appointed one of the influential native citizens as mayor of the great city while the smoke of battle was still hanging over the city. I am quite satisfied with these wise and timely measures our authorities have taken. But I believe that the supreme central organ, as I mentioned above, should be as quickly as possible to synthesize and unify various facilities. I ask for the opinion of the Government regarding of it. (applause)

Mr. TOJO, Fidoki, Minister of State.
I will give my answer to Mr. OKADA's interpellation.

In the second place, he (TN: OKADA) suggested the necessity of establishing a Greater East Asia investigation organ for fixing the policy towards the South Sea regions. It is, I consider, really a timely opinion. To set up the co-prosperity sphere it is of course necessary that we not only execute business in speedy way, but at the same time conduct careful investigations along the line. So the Government, I assure you, intends to make every effort with might and main for the purpose.

Next, my answer to your opinion about the need to establish a central organ to carry out the policy toward the southern regions is as follows:
Def. Doc. #2736

It is a matter of course that various measures in the southern regions are conducted at the present moment under military administration which aims to push the war through successfully as I mentioned above. According to Mr. OKADA's speech he also seems to recognize these facts. The Government is, however, considering setting up necessary steps in accordance with the development of the situation in the future.

(Omission)
Certificate of Authenticity

I, who occupy the post of the Chief of Section of General Affairs of the House of Representatives, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of three sheets, is in my custody as a matter of duty and is an exact copy of the parts of pages twenty four and twenty six of No. 3 Stenographic Record of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives opened January 22, 1942 (Showa 17).

Certified at the House of Representatives on this 15th day of July, 1947.

(signed) KOIHO, NOTOCO (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: (signed) TAKI, TANIDO (seal)
Pact of Alliance between Japan and Burma signed at Rangoon on August 1st, 1943 (the 18th year of Showa) Enforced on the same date.

Promulgated (in the Official Gazette of August 3rd) on August 2nd, 1943 (the 18th year of Showa).

After inquiry by the Privy Council and with our sanction, we hereby order the promulgation of the Pact of Alliance between Japan and Burma, signed by the Japanese Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary and the Prime Minister of Burma at Rangoon on August 1st, 1943 (the 18th year of Showa).

The Imperial Sign-manual and Seal,
August 2, 1943
Premier and concurrently Minister of War
TOJO, HIDEKI
Minister of the Navy
SHIMADA, SHIGETARO

Minister for Greater East Asia
AOKI, KAZUO

Minister for Foreign Affairs
SHIGEMITSU, MAMORU
The Pact of Alliance between Japan and Burma.

The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of Burma, by virtue of the recognition by the Japanese Government of Burma as a sovereign state, and each respecting the independence and sovereignty of the other, and cooperating closely with other states, and, desiring to establish a joint new order in Greater East Asia on the basis of morality and thereby to contribute to the general peace of the world, have agreed upon the following stipulations, in the firm, inflexible determination to eliminate all evil causes detrimental to the accomplishment of such purposes:

Article 1. Japan and Burma, for the purpose of achieving a successful conclusion of the Greater East Asia War, shall mutually cooperate in all military, political and economic matters.

Article 2. Japan and Burma, aiming at the assurance of the co-prosperity of the peoples in Greater East Asia, shall cooperate closely with each other in ensuring the establishment of a new order in the said region for the autonomous development and prosperity of the countries therein.
Article 3. The details of the execution of the present Agreement shall be determined by common accord as necessity demands between the competent authorities concerned of two contracting parties.

Article 4. The present Agreement shall come into force from the date of its signature.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at Rangoon, the 1st day of August, 1943 (the 18th Year of Showa), corresponding to the 1st "Wakushin" day of "Wagen" month of the 1305 the year by the Burmese calendar.

SAWADA, RENZO

Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

Ba Maung

Prime Minister of Burma
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Treaty of Alliance between Japan and Burma" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of October 1947.

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the "witness.
At the same place,
on the same date.

"witness: /s/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)
Burmese-Japanese Treaty on Burmese Territories in the Shan Districts, etc.

Signed at Rangoon, September 25, 1943
Put into operation on the same day
Promulgated September 28, 1943 (published in the Official Gazette dated September 29)

We, on the inquiry of the Privy Council, have decided on the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Burma on Burmese territories in the Shan Districts, etc. and had the same signed and sealed by the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and the representative of Burma at Rangoon on September 25, 1943. We hereby promulgate the same.

Imperial Sign-manual and Seal on the 28th day of September, 1943

TOJO, Hideki
Prime Minister and Minister of War

SHIMIZU, Shigetaro
Minister of Navy
Treaty No. 11

Burmanese-Japanese Treaty on Burmese territories in the Shan Districts, etc.

The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of Burma, with a firm determination to prosecute the war against the United States of America and England in close concert on the part of the two countries and to establish a Greater East Asia founded on moral principles, hereby agree as follows:

Article 1

Japan recognizes that Burma will incorporate into her dominions the Shan States, excepting the States of Kanton and Monpen, together with the Caleeni States and the Wa districts.

Article 2

Japan will terminate, within 90 days of the date of enforcement of this Treaty, her present administration in the territories prescribed in the above article.
Article 3
The detailed rules necessary for the enforcement of this Treaty shall be deliberated and decided upon by the competent officials of the two countries.

Article 4
This Treaty shall become effective from the date of signature.

In witness whereof, the undersigned on proper commission from their several governments have sealed and signed the same Treaty.

Two copies of this Treaty have been made at Rangoon on the 25th day of September, 1943, or the 12th day in the waning course of the moon, in the month of Tuzerin, the 1305th year of the Burmese calendar.

Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Sakai, Renzo (seal)

Prime Minister of Burma
Ba Maung (seal)
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Treaty between Japan and Burma concerning the territories of Burma in the SHAN Regions" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of October 1947.

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness, on the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)
PACT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES

Signed at Manila on Oct. 14, 1943
Enforced from Oct. 20, 1943
Promulgated on Oct. 20, 1943 (Oct. 21 issue of Official Gazette)

We have ratified the Pact of Alliance signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Empire together with the Plenipotentiary of the Philippines at Manila on Oct. 14, 1943, after referring it to the Privy Council for deliberation, and hereupon caused it as well as the Appendix thereto attached to be promulgated.

IMPERIAL SIGN MANUAL AND SEAL

The 20th of October, 18th year of Showa

TOJO, Hideki, Prime Minister and War Minister
SHIMADA, Shigetaro, Navy Minister
AOKI, Kazuo, Greater East Asia Minister
SHIGEMITSU, Kameoru, Foreign Minister

- 1 -
FACT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the President of the Republic of the Philippines,

Japan having decided to recognize the Philippines as an independent state,

desiring that the two countries, in respecting mutually as good neighboring states their autonomous independence, establish, in close collaboration, Greater East Asia based upon justice contributing to the general peace of the world and desiring to eliminate thoroughly with a firm and inflexible will all the evil influences forming obstacle to the purpose have resolved to conclude a pact to this effect and have named for their respective Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan;

His Excellency MURATA, Shōzō, Jr. Grade of the Third Rank, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary;

The President of the Republic of Philippines;

His Excellency Claro V. Recto, Minister of State;

who, after having communicated to each other their Full Powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles,
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties shall eternally be on good neighboring terms with each other on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty and territory.

Article 2
The High Contracting Parties will closely collaborate with each other in political, economical and military affairs for the purpose of pursuing the Greater East Asia War to a complete victory.

Article 3
The High Contracting Parties shall closely collaborate with each other for the construction of Greater East Asia.

Article 4
The necessary details for the execution of the present Pact shall be determined between the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 5
The present Pact will come into force on and from the day of the ratification of the High Contracting Parties.
Article 6

The present pact shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Manila as soon as possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Pact and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Manila, the 14th day of October of the 18th year of Showa, corresponding to the 14th of October in the nineteen hundred and forty third year of the Christian era.

KURATA, Shôzô (SMAL)
Claro M. Recto (SMAL)
We, the Emperor of Japan by grace of heaven, seated on the Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon ye, Our subjects, who read this document.

We, after inspecting and examining the Fact of Alliance between Japan and the Philippines signed and sealed at Manila by the Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Empire together with the Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Philippines on the 14th day of October of the 18th year of Showa, have approved and ratified it.

We have set Our hand to the Pact at the Imperial Palace, at Tokyo, on the 20th day of October in the twenty-six hundred and third year after the accession of the Emperor Jimmu, the 18th year of Showa, and caused to affix thereto the Privy Seal.

IMPERIAL SIGN MANUAL AND PRIVY SEAL

SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru, Foreign Minister
Ad. Article 2

It is understood that the principal condition of the close collaboration in military affairs for pursuing the Greater East Asia War to a complete victory stipulated in this article is as follows,

The Philippines shall give access to all facilities for military operations undertaken by Japan; further Japan and the Philippines shall closely and mutually collaborate with each other for safeguarding the integrity of territory and the independence of the Philippines.

In witness whereof, the under-mentioned, duly authorized to this effect by their respective Government, have affixed their signs and seals.

Done, in duplicate at Manila the 14th day of October of the 18th year of Showa, corresponding to the 14th day of October in the nineteen hundred and forty third year of the Christian era.

KURATA, Shozo
Claro M. Recto
NOTIFICATION OF FOREIGN OFFICE CONCERNING RATIFICATION AND DATE OF ENFORCEMENT OF PACT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES

The Pact of Alliance between Japan and the Philippines, signed and sealed at Manila on Oct. 14th, 1943, was ratified by the two countries on Oct. 20th. Accordingly this Pact came into force on and from the above date in accordance with the provision of Article 5.

Oct. 21, 1943

SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru, Foreign Minister
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Treaty of Alliance between Japan and the Philippines" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 30th day of October, 1947.

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

Witness: /s/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)
ERRATA SHEET

Page 2  Line 3
"pibung" shall read "Pibun"

2  8
"attack-and-defense Alliance" shall read
"offensive and defensive alliance"
"Excerpt from the Official Gazette, 29 Jan. 1943, proceedings No. 4, 81st Imperial Diet, House of Representatives."

The Chinese Republic is steadily gaining in strength under the conscientious leadership of President Wang. On the 5th of last month, the Chinese National Government declared war on America and Britain. This means another step forward in carrying out our Great East Asia War with America and Britain. It is a pleasure for me on this occasion to express my whole-hearted respect for the firm resolution of the Chinese nation who has risen up in a body under the leadership of President Wang (Applause). In consequence of the declaration of war by the Chinese Government, the Japanese Empire, with a view to establishing a new Sino-Japanese relation which will harmonize with this new situation, has immediately taken necessary steps in all directions, such as the retrocession of all exclusive concessions of Japan in China, the recognition of the restoration to China of the International Concessions in Shanghai and Amoy as well as the Legation Quarter in Peking.
the abolition of extraterritorial rights, the administration of the enemy assets in China, etc. It is very interesting to note that, embarrassed by these measures taken by Japan, America and Britain made empty declarations on the 11th of last month, including a paper promise to the Chungking Government for the retrocession of concessions. (Applause)

Thailand has concluded, under the powerful leadership of Premier Pibung, an attack-and-defense alliance with us. The entire Siamese nation is cooperating with us an ally in our all-out effort towards the common goal of the construction of a new and greater East Asia, and participating in our joint military operations against the enemy, despite many difficulties and obstacles.

In Malay, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes and other regions peace and order have been completely restored thanks to the guidance of our military forces, and the people have returned to their peacetime works, and are beginning to enjoy a happy life such as they have never experienced before. The Japanese are endeavoring to respond to the years-old desires of the native population, hoping to realize for them a new land of true happiness. In fact, their efforts so far have already produced many good results.

Turning them to Burma, we find there also peace and order re-established already. In response to the firm policy of
our Empire, the whole Burmese people, headed by their powerful leader, Premier Ba Maung, are busy in building up a "Burma of the Burmese nation" with the help of our forces there and with a view to contributing to the construction of a Great East Asia. Any Japanese can not help feeling a deep sense of gratitude to their hearty cooperation. By the end of this year, at the latest, the Japanese Empire will recognize the establishment of a Burmese State which will cover the area now under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Board. Thus, as the Government has announced before in this Diet to the nation as well as abroad, the establishment of an independent Burmese State, so much longed for by the Burmese people, is now going to be realized! (Applause) It is indeed a great joy for me to announce this here. (Applause) It is a matter for common congratulation for the entire new East Asia as well as for Burma. (Applause)

In this occasion I would like to repeat the declaration which I made at the end of the previous year that Japan would be ready to honor the Philippines with independence, provided that the Filipinos understand our true intention and cooperate with us in the construction of our Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The Filipinos, under the leadership of Mr. Valgas, their new president, have testified to their sincerity to cooperate with us. The gradual recovery of peace and order
is to be regarded as another promising sign. I heartily hope that the Philippine people will further continue their active cooperation, so that their independence may be realized as soon as possible. (Applause)

It is very much impressive to compare this bright promise for Burma and the Philippines with the miserable state of things prevailing in India, which happens to be neighbor to the former. As I have told you here before, from a spiritual point of view India is already independent of Britain. Nevertheless, Britain does not stop arresting and confining Indian leaders and patriots, and trampling down the Indian people under her iron hoofs. Moreover, the American and British forces are utilizing India as their base for disturbing the peace in the new-born Burma in their wicked ambition to seize it eventually in their hands. The Japanese forces are now dealing decisive blows upon these American and British troops. Meanwhile, those elements among the Indian people who understand the true intention of Japan, are helping us in military operations. We feel a deep sympathy with the Indian leaders and people now in the pangs of travail both at home and abroad for the construction of new India, and hope that the great work will be accomplished in a near future. I here again emphasize that Japan is ready to do all she can to help them.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief, General Affairs Section, Cabinet Printing Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 16 pages and entitled "Official Gazette, 28, Jan. 1943, proceedings #4, 81st Imp. Diet, House of Representatives" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (Cabinet Printing Bureau) certified at Tokyo,
on this 10th day of Oct., 1947

/S/ FUJIWARA, Kōta (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness, at the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ OOUCHI, Namoru (seal)
Japano-Thaiand Treaty of Alliance

Signed at Bangkok on December 21, 1941.
Enforced on and after the same date.
Promulgated on December 27, 1941.
(in the Official Gazette dated December 29).

We hereby order the promulgation of the Japan-Thailand Treaty of Alliance, which was signed and sealed by the
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan and
the representatives of Thailand on the 21st day of the 12th
month in the 16th year of SHOWA (1941) at Bangkok, and
which was referred to the Privy Councillors for discussion
and sanctioned by Us.

Imperial sign-manual and seal
On this 27th day of the 12th month in the
16th year of SHOWA.

Prime Minister and Minister of War
TOJO, Hideki

Navy Minister SHIMADA, Shigetaro
Foreign Minister TOGO, Shigonori
Japan-Thailand Treaty of Alliance

The Imperial Government of Japan and the Royal Government of Thailand are firmly convinced that the establishment of the new order in East Asia is the only means of realizing the prosperity in this sphere and absolutely necessary for the restoration and promotion of the world peace. Animated by the firm determination to eliminate by the root every obstacle in reaching this objective, the two governments hereby agree upon the following articles:

Article 1.

An alliance established between Japan and Thailand on the basis of mutual respect of the independence and of the sovereignty.

Article 2.

If an armed conflict breaks out between Japan and one or more third Powers, or between Thailand and one or more third Powers, Thailand or Japan shall immediately come to the support of the other as its ally and shall give every political, economical and military assistance.
Article 3.

The details relative to the execution of article 2 shall be determined by consultation between the competent authorities of Japan and Thailand.

Article 4.

Japan and Thailand, in case of war prosecuted in common, agree not to conclude either armistice or peace without mutual and complete agreement.

Article 5.

The present Treaty shall come into force as soon as it is signed and shall be in force for ten years. The two Parties shall discuss the renewal of the present Treaty at an appropriate time before the expiration of the said duration.

In testimony whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized for this purpose by their respective Governments, have signed the present Treaty and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Made in duplicate copies, at Bangkok, on the twenty-first day of December in the sixteenth year of Shōwa, corresponding to the twenty-first day of December in the two thousand four hundred eighty-fourth year of the Buddhist Era.

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan,

TSUBOKAMI Teiji (Seal)

President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand.

P. PIBULASONGGRAM (Seal)
Certificate of Authenticity

I, who occupy the post of chief of Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese and French consisting of 12 pages and entitled "Japan-Thailand Treaty of Alliance" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (The Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo
on this 11 day of December, 1947

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru
(Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place
on the same date

Witness:
/s/ UNAOME, Katsuma
(Seal)
I. Agreement on culture reached between Japan and Thailand.

signed in Tokyo on Oct. 28, 1942
ratifications exchanged in Bangkok on Dec. 21
enforced from the same date
promulgated on Dec. 26
(in an official gazette dated Dec. 29)

We, upon consultation with the Privy Councillors, hereby
ratify and order to be promulgated the agreement on culture
reached between Japan and Thailand to which the Japanese pleni-
potentiary affixed his signature and seal together with the
Thailand plenipotentiary in Tokyo on October 28, 1942.

The Imperial sign-manual and seal
December 26, 1942

Prime Minister Hidoki, TOJO
Foreign Minister Masayuki, TAN
Greater East Asia Kazuo, KOCHI
Minister
(Tentative Translation)

Cultural Agreement Between Japan and Thailand

(Oct. 28, 1942)

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan
and
His Majesty the King of Thailand,

being desirous of endeavouring to make a contribution to the development of the culture of East Asia, and at the same time further strengthening the friendly relations happily existing between their two countries by promoting more and more the cultural relations between their two countries, with mutual respect of the intrinsic features of the culture of each other's country and in close collaboration,

have resolved to conclude a cultural agreement for that purpose, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:
His Excellency Mr. Masayuki Tani, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Majesty the King of Thailand:
His Excellency Mr. Nai Direk Jaivanama, Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary of Thailand to Japan.
Who, after having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties shall strive to deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between their two countries by solidifying the foundation of the cultural relations between them, and shall collaborate most closely for this purpose in all fields of culture.

Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties shall from time to time organize cultural conferences for the purpose of discussing with a view to the progress and development of culture in their countries and shall endeavour to afford assistance to conferences sponsored for the above-mentioned purpose.

Article 3.

The High Contracting Parties shall strive to establish, maintain and develop institutions contributing to the promotion of cultural relations between both countries and shall do their utmost in mutually affording facilities in respect thereof.
The institutions referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include scientific and other cultural organization institutes, libraries, museums, schools as well as installations for health and welfare.

Article 4.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall pay special attention to the establishment, maintenance and expansion, in the universities in his country, of chairs of the culture of the other country.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall pay special attention to the teaching in various schools deemed appropriate in his country of the language of the other country.

The High Contracting Parties shall pay special attention to the periodical exchange, the sending or the inviting of professors, scholars and specialists, for the purpose of their delivering lectures and discourses on the culture of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties shall do their utmost in mutually offering facilities on the execution of the provisions of the three preceding paragraphs.
Article 5

The High Contracting Parties shall by common accord periodically exchange or send or invite graduates, students and pupils, for the purpose of studying the culture of both countries.

The High Contracting Parties shall strive to exchange, send or invite practical students and participants in holiday courses.

The High Contracting Parties shall do their utmost in mutually affording facilities for the execution of the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs and shall pay attention to the establishment of scholarships.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall afford same facilities to the scholars and specialists of the other country visiting his country for the purpose of studying the culture of his country,

Article 6.

The High Contracting Parties shall encourage the activities of authors, artists and religionists which they deem contributory to the promotion of cultural relations between both countries, and shall strive to exchange, send or invite these persons.
The High Contracting Parties shall encourage the performances of plays, dances and music which they deem contributory to the promotion of cultural relations between both countries, and shall strive to exchange, send or invite individuals and parties engaged in these performances.

Articles 7.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall strive to supply the other country, in as large quantities and at as frequent intervals as possible, with publications, cinematograph films, lantern-slides, photographs, gramophone records and musical scores of his country which he deems contributory to the promotion of mutual knowledge and understanding between both countries; and the other, with a view to causing these things to be utilized in an effective way in his country, shall pay special attention to their preservation, distribution, presentation and exhibition.

The High Contracting Parties shall exchange lists of publications and works of art of his country which he deems worthy of being introduced in the other country, and shall strive to introduce and diffuse these things by appropriate means.

The High Contracting Parties shall strive to offer their good offices and assistance necessary for the translation and reproduction of the above-mentioned publications and works of art.
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to enrich the collection of books and exhibits concerning the other country, in the libraries and museums in his country, and shall afford as much facility as possible to the subjects of the other for the utilization of those institutions.

Article 8.

The High Contracting Parties, for the purpose of promoting the mutual knowledge and understanding of science, fine arts and industrial arts in both countries, shall from time to time organize exhibitions and shall endeavour to offer their good offices and assistance necessary for organizing exhibitions for the above-mentioned purpose.

Article 9.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall direct the radio corporation of his country to broadcast periodically towards the other country, and shall direct it to relay the periodical broadcasts of the other country.

Article 10.

The High Contracting Parties, in order to promote friendship between their nation, shall strive to exchange, send or invite parties of youth and juveniles and athletes and sports teams.
The High Contracting Parties, in order to promote the mutual knowledge and understanding of both countries, shall strive to exchange, send or invite sight-seeing parties and parties of educational tourists.

The High Contracting Parties shall do their utmost in mutually affording facilities for the execution of the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs.

**Article 11.**

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to establish a Cultural Institute, respectively in the capital of the other, for the purpose of contributing to the promotion of the cultural relations between both countries, and shall do their utmost in mutually affording facilities to the activities of the said Institutes.

**Article 12.**

The High Contracting Parties shall, in order to keep connection between both countries regarding the execution of the provisions of the present Agreement, establish Cultural Working Committees in Tokyo and Bangkok.

The competent diplomatic authorities of the High Contracting Parties shall decide, by mutual accord, the detailed measures for the organization and function of the said Committees.
Article 13.

The competent diplomatic authorities of the High Contracting Parties shall decide, by mutual accord, the detailed measures for the execution of the provisions of the present Agreement.

Article 14.

The present Agreement shall be ratified and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged at Bangkok as soon as possible.

The present Agreement shall come into effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications and shall remain in force for ten years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other one year before the expiration of the said period of ten years of his intention to terminate the present Agreement, it shall continue to be in force until the expiration of one year from the date on which either party shall have given such notice.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and Thai languages, in Tokyo, this twenty-eighth day of the tenth month in the seventeen year of Syowa, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of the tenth month in the two thousand four hundred and eighty fifth year of the Buddhist Era.

(L.S.) Masayuki Tani.

(L.S.) Direk Jaiyanna
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese and Siamese, consisting of 20 pages and entitled "Cultural Agreement Between Japan and Thailand" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office),

certified at Tokyo,
on this 11th day of December, 1947

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that above signature and seal were affixed hereeto in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: /s/ URABE, Katsuma
Treaty between Japan and Thailand with regard to the territory of Thailand in the Malay and Shan Districts.

Signed at Bangkok on Aug. 20th, the 18th year of Showa (1943).

Enforced on and after the same day of the same month of the same year.

Promulgated on Sept. 7th of the same year (appeared in the official gazette dated Sept. 8th).

We hereby sanction, after the reference to the Privy Council for deliberation, a treaty between Japan and Thailand with regard to the territory of Thailand in the Malay and the Shan Districts to which the Japanese Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary affixed his seal and signature jointly with the delegate of Thailand at Bangkok on Aug. 18th in the 18th year of Showa, and order the same to be promulgated.

The Imperial sign-manual and seal.

On Sept. 7th, the 18th year of Showa (1943).

TOJÔ, Hideki, Premier and Minister of War.

SHIMADA, Shigetarö, Minister of the Navy.

AOKI, Kazuo, Minister for Greater East Asia.

SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Treaty No. 10

Treaty between Japan and Thailand with regard to the territory of Thailand in Malay and the Shan Districts.

The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of Thailand, being firmly resolved to effect construction of Greater East Asia based upon the principle of morality by bringing to successful completion the joint war against the U.S.A. and Great Britain, by combined effort, agree to the following:

Article 1. Japan acknowledges the Provinces of Kerantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perulis together with the isles attached to them to be placed under the domain of Thailand.

Article 2. Japan acknowledges the Provinces of Kengtung and Monpang in the Shan District to be placed under the domain of Thailand.

Article 3. Japan should put an end not later than 60 days from the day of enforcement of this treaty to her administrative rule now actually practised in the places stipulated in the foregoing two articles.

Article 4. The boundaries of the districts stipulated in Articles 1 and 2 shall be determined by those of the provinces existing on the day of signature of this treaty.
Article 5. Particulars necessary in the enforcement of this treaty shall be agreed and decided upon between the competent authorities of the two states.

Article 6. This treaty shall be enforced on and after the day of signature.

In witness whereof, the under signed with due authorization of their respective governments, affixed their seals and signatures to this treaty.

On Aug. 20th in the 18th year of Showa or Aug. 20th in 2486 of the Buddhist Era at Bangkok the treaty document was made out in duplicate respectively written in both Japanese and Siamese.

Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary

TSUBOKAMI, Teiji (seal)

Premier and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs

Field-Marshal Pi Pibun Sonkram (seal)

(TN: phonetic)
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning the territories of Thailand in both Malay and Shan Regions" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th of October 1947.

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

On the same date,
at the same place.

Witness: /s/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)
Certificate

I, MITYAMA, Yōzō, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Document Section in the First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the following document, has been destroyed by fire at the close of the war, is not in the custody of our bureau at present.

The undermentioned.

1. A document titled "The General Principles upon which the Greater East Asia Policy is directed", which was made upon decision of the Imperial conference held on the 31st of May, the 18th year of Shōwa (1943).

On Dec. 9th, the 22nd year of Shōwa (1947)

At Tokyo

/S/ MITYAMA, Yōzō (seal)
Chief of the Archives & Document Section in the First Demobilization Section.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereeto in the presence of the witness.

On the same date,
at the same place.

"Witness: /S/ UCHIYAMA, Hiroshi (seal)
P. 5 MINISTER OF STATE (Mr. Tōjō, Hideki)

P. 6 At present there is seen a marked trend prevailing in Greater East Asia where all the nations and races there are voluntarily collaborating with us, placing implicit faith in us with daily increasing ardor, in pursuing the present war to a complete victory. I have become more assured of this fact after my recent trips to the Republic of China, Manchoukuo, and the Philippines, having inspected the actual situations on the spot with my own eyes and having had confidential talks with prominent persons in each of these countries.

Needless to say, it is our firm and fixed policy to emancipate the peoples of Greater East Asia forever from the yoke of America and Britain, under whom they have been
hard preseed for so long a time, and to let them return to their proper ways. Our country has been unflinchingly following this grand and immovable policy to this day.

One year and a half has elapsed since the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War. The ten hundred million people of Greater East Asia have rightly understood the true intention of this country, and are under a firm conviction that without Japan's complete victory the emancipation of Greater East Asia cannot be expected and without the construction of New Greater East Asia there will be no welfare for the peoples of Greater East Asia. (Applause) We heartily congratulate ourselves upon this for the sake of Greater East Asia.

Considering the above situation, it is necessary, I suggest, on our part to take some definite steps to respond to the sincerity and collaboration of the peoples of Greater East Asia. And now I am going to express in a straight forward way the Government's intention about the major subjects of these steps.

As to Manchoukuo, which regards this country as its most intimate neighbor, His Majesty the Emperor Kangteh himself leading his people, they all unite high and low, en masse, in rendering their distinguished services in their cooperation with us from both material and spiritual sides; the link between the two countries is, indeed, perfect and

- ? -
firm. Responding to her implicit reliance upon us, we of the Empire intend to lend our best collaboration to the sound development of that country.

The Republic of China, under the leadership of President Wang, with full understanding of our sincere attitude towards the country, is now steadily advancing towards our common aim in conformity with the principle of the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration. The Republic of China has been groaning for as long as a century under the oppression of America and Britain whose aim is nothing but the domination of the world. But now she has unshackled their yoke, and utilizing its natural resources, is now doing every effort as a truly independent state to contribute to the establishment of Greater East Asia. (Applause)

Thus the ideal of the Republic, the long-cherished desire of that nation, is now on its way to attainment. Of late not a few prominent persons, including Generals Pang Pinghsüng, Sun Tieuying and Jung Tsuhung, leaving the Chungking Regime one after another, have joined President Wang. This shows which way the wind blows in that country. The rebirth of China is in fact a matter of congratulation for the whole human race as well as for Greater East Asia and China. (Applause) Japan, blessing the development of the new Republic whole-heartedly, has avowed, at the same time, to render more generous and effectual assistance to
its healthful growth. In order to make the relation between the two countries still closer, the existing treaties between them, I believe, should be radically amended.

Thailand has already broken off the complicated relations with America and Britain which she had maintained for a number of years, daring to go hand in hand with our country under the leadership of Premier Pibul, and is now pursuing this war to a complete victory, surmounting tremendous difficulties on its way. I herewith tender my sincerest respects to the efforts of the country from the bottom of my heart, and reveal our intentions that Japan will hereafter maintain closer collaboration with Thailand in military, economical and cultural matters and is ready for further cooperation for the development of that country in consideration of her long-cherished desire.

Now I refer to Burma. Chief Administrator Dr. Ba Maug, as you know, was invited to Tokyo last March, and the intention of this country was intimated to him. On that occasion we came to realize, as you are well aware, that the Chief Administrator and other leaders are seriously determined to gain the independence of their country and to pursue this war to a complete victory. We are very glad to learn that the Preparatory Committee of Independence of Burma was formed on May 8 and that the preparations are being made quite successfully. (Applause) I expect that the preparations
will soon be completed and that we will be able to see the glorious day in history before long. (Applause)

In the Philippines, Director Vargas together with other leaders are volunteering to make their best efforts for the reconstruction of the Philippines and in pursuance of the aim of the Greater East Asia War. The people at large are also giving their active cooperation with gradual understanding of the true intentions of this country. Our Government's attitude towards the independence of the Philippines has already been shown clearly in our statements given out repeatedly. Now, however, taking one more step further, Japan declares at home and abroad that the glory of independence will be brought upon the Philippines within this year. (Applause)

The Filipinos, who have vainly been struggling under the vision of independence under America's faithless administration is now to attain their long cherished desire before two years have passed since the outbreak of this war. Sympathizing with the joy of the Filipinos, I offer my sincere congratulations to the Philippines and Greater East Asia as well.

In Malay, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Celebes, the native inhabitants are making serious efforts with increasing assiduity in collaboration with us under our military administration.
They have already been freed from the spiritual oppression of former days by dint of the whole-hearted leadership of our Army, and now they are actually leading the most hopeful life ever experienced, enjoying the benefit of culture such as education and so forth. This is, really, a matter to be congratulated for the sake of the Indonesians. On this occasion, Japan, responding to the desire of the native inhabitants, will take further steps one after the other, according to their cultural conditions, granting their participation in politics within this year. (Applause) Especially in Java, we expect, considering its cultural condition and the fervent wish of the people, political enfranchisement will be materialized at the earliest possible date.

As for French Indo-China, its Government authorities are now making every effort to cope with the present complicated situation, and Japan is trying to ensure closer relation between the two countries in conformity with the principle of the Franco-Japanese Protocol of Joint Defence.

As I have stated above, the fundamental ideal of our Empire, that is, to enable every nation to live in contentment and peace and every body to enjoy safety of life and property, is being embodied successfully in the sphere of Greater East Asia. Now the glorious dawn breaks upon the peoples of Greater East Asia who have long been suffering
under the shackles of America and Britain. (Applause)

However, while all these people are showing such solid and
prodigious progress, India is still hard pressed under the
yoke of Britain. I sympathize with the people of India
from the bottom of my heart and cannot repress my indigna-
tion of the oppressor. (Applause)

Japan has firmly determined to take every means to
oust from India the influence of Britain and America, thus
helping them to the way to the true independence of the
nation. (Applause) I believe that before long the influence
of America and Britain will be cleared away from India, and
the fervent desire of the Indian people will surely be ful-
filled, bringing freedom and prosperity to the nation.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Official Gazette Section of the Cabinet Printing Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese, consisting of 20 pages and entitled "OFFICIAL GAZETTE, June 16, 1943, STENOGRAPHIC RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS OF 82ND SESSION OF IMPERIAL DIET No. 1" is a document printed and issued by the Japanese Government (the Cabinet Printing Bureau).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 23rd day of October, 1947

/S/ NACHIGAMI, Yasuhachi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ KOGUCHI, Mamoru (seal)
ERRATA SHEET

Page 1     Line 5 1st para.  "heat" should read "hear"
3rd line of Page 1
next to "November 3, 1943" add "before the assembly of Greater East- Asiatic Conference."
Their Excellencies, the Representatives of Burma and the Provisional Government of Free India respectively have just made addresses on the problem of India. In this connection, I, as the Representative of Japan, wish to take this opportunity to make an address. I feel most encouraged for India and Greater East Asia to hear the speech of His Excellency, Head of the Provisional Government of Free India, in which he has made clear that patriotic Indians have risen up, in order to secure the liberty, independence, and prosperity of India which is a long cherished desire of her 400,000,000 people, under the command of the Provisional Government of Free India, and that their enthusiasm for their fatherland and Asia is ever so strong and ardent.

It has already been made evident in our repeated statements that our Empire has an ardent intention to give India all possible support and aids in order that she may be released from Anglo-American trammels and fulfill her long-cherished desire. And in view of the fact that the foundation of the Provisional Government of Free India has been all the more consolidated, and that the people united by the same sentiment have risen up under the command of the Government and are full of determination to carry through their initial intention and that their unity has become even more solid, I shall elucidate, on this occasion, that our Government is fully prepared to return the Andaman and Nicobar Islands under Japanese occupation at present, to the Provisional Government in the near future, as the
first step towards Indian independence.

The grand ideal upon which our Empire was founded "Letting each and every country have its proper domain and many millions of people feel at ease in their respective places of abode" is being steadily realized step by step. Upon this occasion, our Empire resolves more firmly to cooperate wholeheartedly with India for the purpose of attaining her independence, and at the same time we cannot but wish for the stirring up of her people all the more. I have been informed from the fervent opinions delivered by Their Excellencies, the representative of the countries, who have met here at the assembly the previous day as well as to day, that each country of Greater East Asia shares the same intention with us and is doing its best to support and aid India in order to attain her independence. This fact exceedingly encourages me.

I am sure of and hope for and further mightier support to be rendered by all of you in attaining the independonce of India.
Def. Doc. #2760-D
3rd line of Page 1
next to "November 6, 1943" add "before the Assembly of Greater East-Asian Conference."

Def. Doc. #2760-E
3rd line of Page 1
next to "November 6, 1943" add "before the assembly of Greater East-Asian Conference."
Your Excellency, Your Excellencies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, allow me to express my warmest thanks for the honour and the favour shown to me and to my colleagues in allowing us to attend this historic Assembly as observers. I am particularly grateful to Your Excellencies for the sympathy that you have expressed so generously in your speeches and also for the assurance of cooperation and support that you have given us for the future. I went further to express my profound thanks for the resolution moved by His Excellency the Representative for Burma which has been heartily and unanimously adopted by the House. This resolution, I assure you, Your Excellency, will travel far beyond the walls of this stately mansion and will bring hope, encouragement and inspiration to millions and millions of my countrymen groaning under the heel of British oppression, while it will also strike terror in the hearts of all those who have a guilty conscience.

I am sure that we of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind and all those who under the leadership of our Government will launch the last struggle against Anglo-American imperialism, will now go to war against sworn enemy with the consciousness that behind us stands not only the invincible might of Nippon, but also the united will and grim determination of the emancipated nations of East Asia.

Your Excellency, as I was sitting, listening to the proceedings of this august Assembly yesterday and today, the panorama of the world’s history passed before my mind’s eye. My thoughts went back to the many international congresses and conferences held during the last 100 years and more. My thoughts went back to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the downfall of the Napoleonic Empire, to the Congress of Paris in 1856 after the Crimean War, to the Congress of Berlin in 1878 after the Russo-Turkish War in the Balkans, to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 at the end of the last war, to the Washington Conference held in 1921 for ensuring the Anglo-American domination of the Pacific and Far East, and to the Locarno Conference in 1925 for ingeniously binding the hands of the German people, once and for all. My thoughts also went back to the Assembly of the League of Nations, that League of Nations along whose corridors and lobbies I spent many a day, knocking at one door after another, in the vain attempt to obtain a hearing for the cause of Indian freedom.

And as I sat listening to the proceedings of this historic Assembly, I began to wonder what the difference was between this Assembly and similar assemblies that the world’s history has witnessed in bygone days.
Your Excellency, this is not a conference for dividing the spoils among the conquerors. This is not a conference for hatching a conspiracy to victimize a weak power, nor is it a conference for trying to defraud a weak neighbour. This is an Assembly of liberated nations, an Assembly that is out to create a new order in this part of the world, on the basis of the sacred principles of justice, national sovereignty, reciprocity in international relations and mutual aid and assistance. I do not think that it is an accident that this Assembly has been convened in the Land of the Rising Sun. This is not the first time that the world has turned to the East for light and guidance. Attempts to create a new order in the world have been made before and have been made elsewhere, but they have failed. They have failed because of the selfishness, avarice, and suspicion in those who had to play a leading role in the creation of a new order. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things and in conformity with historic precedent that the world should once again turn to the East for light.

Your Excellency, I believe that history has ordained that in the creation of a new, free and prosperous East, the Government and people of Nippon should play a leading role. This role for the Government and people of Nippon was carved out by history as early as 1905 when, for the first time, an Asiatic nation stood up to resist Western aggression.

As I have often said, I still remember how, as a child, I and millions of my countrymen and millions of Indian children were then thrilled with joy and enthusiasm over events happening so far away from home and I am sure that that was the experience not only of the Indian people, not only of Indian children, but of Asiatic peoples all over the world. Ever since then, Asiatic peoples have been dreaming of a united Asia and a free Asia. And we in India since 1905 have also been dreaming of a free and united Asia. Since then, and particularly since the last World War that dream, that thought, has taken concrete shape in the form of Pan-Asiatic federation.

It should be no surprise to any one that the Indian people from then onwards for two decades have been thinking and dreaming of a Pan-Asiatic federation. This thought is in full conformity with our past tradition and culture.

As Your Excellencies are well aware, from the earliest times, universalism has been a marked feature of Indian thought and culture. In the earliest days, through Buddhism and all the culture centered around Buddhism, India stretched out her hands to the whole of Asia. Later on, with Islamic influence permeating India, that tendency towards universalism also continued, and through Islam, India forged new links with Western Asia.

I must confess, however, to my great sorrow, in this connection, that during the Middle Ages, India developed a false type of universalism and, it is because of this false universalism, that it was so easy for European Powers to settle in, and ultim-
ately to conquer India. But we have learned through sorrow, suffering, and humiliation to distinguish now between the false internationalism and the true. We know now that the internationalism is true, which does not ignore nationalism, but is rooted in it.

We have also studied with great interest the attempts made in Europe and elsewhere to set up a new international order. We have learned from these experiments and from the failure which ultimately crowned these experiments. We are the wiser for this experience, and today, we are convinced that the establishment or the creation of an international society of nations can be possible only if we begin by setting up what I may call regional federations, like this Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Your Excellency, may I humbly point out that the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is of interest, of vital interest, not only to the people of East Asia but, if I may say so, to the people of the whole of Asia and to mankind in general.

I claim to have some personal contact with that part of the world stretching from Afghanistan to Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, I claim specially to have personal contact with the suppressed nations living in that part of the world. Over and above this, India has for a long time been a bridge between East Asia and the West. I can, therefore, say with authority that the people of West Asia, the people in that part of the world stretching from Afghanistan to Algeria and Morocco, are following with the deepest interest the happenings in East Asia. I am speaking particularly of these people in West Asia and Africa who have been for some time dominated and oppressed and tyrannized by British imperialism. I can say at least of those people that their liberation in the future depends to a very large extent on the success and the victory of Nippon and her allies in this war. Unless Anglo-American imperialism is wiped out of India, it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, for the suppressed Islamic nations to overthrow the British yoke and recover their lost liberty. The establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will pave the way towards a Pan-Asiatic Federation. And I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that the establishment of an Asia for the Asians, or an All-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, if you will, will ultimately pave the way towards a world federation, a real society of nations, and not the League of robbers that we saw at Geneva.

But, Your Excellency, I must not forget that all these dreams of a new world, of a new Asia, of a new, free and prosperous Greater East Asia depend entirely on our ability to achieve victory in this war. So far as India is concerned our fate is indissolubly linked up with the fate of Nippon and her allies in this war. If our Allies were to go down, there will be no hope for India to be free for at least 100 years. But we know that this time providence, fate, and luck are on our side, and I went to
assure Your Excellency and Excellencies that we, the Indian people, having waited all our life for an international crisis of this sort, are determined to make the fullest use of this opportunity for achieving the final emancipation of our country. For India, there is no other path, but the path of uncompromising struggle against British imperialism. Even if it were possible for other nations to think of compromising with England, for the Indian people, at least, it is out of the question. Compromising with Britain means to compromise with slavery and we are determined not to compromise with slavery any more.

I, therefore, want to assure Your Excellencies that come what may, no matter how long and hard the struggle may be, no matter what the suffering and the sacrifice involved may prove to be, we are determined to fight to the bitter end, being fully confident of our final victory. But I have no illusions about the magnitude of the task that awaits us. I do not minimize the strength of the enemy. I claim to know the British people intimately and at first hand. I have known them since I was a child of five and, knowing them so intimately, knowing the strength and the weakness of the enemy in India, and knowing also our own strength and weakness, I feel fully confident of our ultimate victory.

But we have to pay the price of our liberty. For Your Excellencies the problem is quite different from what it is for India. You have only to repel any offensive launched by the enemy in the future. You have only to retain what you have got now; you have only to preserve your own freedom. But the Indian people have yet to fight and win their freedom. Therefore, I repeat: we have no illusions about the magnitude of the task that awaits us. In fact, I may say that all the time sitting in my chair; as I was dreaming of a new East Asia, a new Asia and a new world, before my mind's eye there floated the scenes of the battles that we will have to fight on the frontier and on the plains of India.

I do not know how many of those who will go to war against our powerful and unscrupulous enemy, I do not know how many of the members of our National Army, will survive the coming war, but that is of no consequence to us. Whether we individually live or die, whether we survive the war and live to see India free or not, what is consequence is the fact that India shall be free, that Anglo-American imperialism shall be wiped out of India, and the menace that now hags over the whole of East Asia will be removed, once and for all.

Your Excellency, I am aware that there are many people in this world who have an exaggerated notion of the strength of Britain and her allies. I have just said that we know the British people at first hand. We know their strength and their weakness and we are therefore looking forward with the fullest optimism to the hard and bitter struggle that is ahead of us. Assured of such an invincible ally as Nippon, assured of the sup-
port which Your Excellencies have so generously given us, and assured us for the future, we shall go to battle fully confident that the day of our salvation is at hand.

Your Excellencies, in setting out to create a new order based on the sublime principles of justice, national sovereignty, reciprocity, and mutual aid and resistance, you are undertaking a task which is the noblest that the human mind can conceive. I pray to God that your noble efforts may be crowned with success, I pray to God that the dreams of Okakura Kakuzo and Sun Yat-sen may be translated into reality. And I pray to God that this Joint Declaration which this historic Assembly has unanimously adopted this afternoon may prove to be a charter for the nations of East Asia and, what is more, a charter for the suppressed nations of the whole world. May this Joint Declaration prove to be in the world's history, the charter, the new charter of liberty for the year 1943 and after.

Your Excellency, may I offer my respectful congratulations to yourself and to your Government for the noble manner in which you have given us the most eloquent proof of your bona fides and sincerity. You have granted independence to Burma and the Philippines. You have recognized the Provisional Government of Azad Hind which represents a population numbering about one-fifth of the human race. You have just entered into a most honourable treaty with China. And what is perhaps the most important, you have proceeded steadily and bravely with the task of reconstruction, while engaged in a life and death struggle with powerful and unscrupulous enemies. I pray that Nippon's role in the creation of a new and free Asia may be fully and finally consummated. In conclusion, I may assure Your Excellency, that if you and your distinguished colleagues succeed in this mission, as I hope, I trust, and I believe, you will—your names will go down in history not merely as the makers of a new Nippon, not merely as the makers of a new East Asia, not only as the makers of a new Asia, but as the makers and the architects of a new world.
19 August 1940

Furthermore, the following was the result of the Four Ministers’ Conference:

A. In order to evolve a policy for the settlement of the China Incident, and also for dealing with the new world situation, the establishment and the strengthening of our war-time economy shall be made the basis of our domestic and foreign policy. For this purpose, the government will assume unitary leadership in all economic activities and strive to the utmost in the promotion thereof, except in cases of absolute necessity for the existence of the operating forces (military) to dispose of or assume leadership themselves.

B. World Policy

1. Corresponding to the sudden changes in the world situation, and in order quickly to establish a New Order for East Asia, we plan to strengthen the axis of Japan, Germany and Italy. The East Asiatic nations must act in concert and carry out various important policies. However, we must decide on the most opportune time in the world situation and not miss it; that is, as it concerns the method of strengthening the Axis and its time for realization.

2. As regards relations with the Soviet Union, a Non-Aggression Pact will be concluded with her by Japan, Manchukuo and Mongolia (length of effectiveness, five to ten years), and in addition to planning the immediate solution of pending questions, we will realize sufficient military preparedness to safeguard against defeat by Soviet Russia during the period of effectiveness of the Non-Aggression Pact.

3. In order to include the English, French, Dutch, and Portuguese colonies in the neighboring islands and the Orient within the substance of the New Order in the Far East, positive arrangements will be undertaken. Moreover, we will endeavor to exclude ourselves from international conferences in reference to the above.

4. Even though we will avoid unnecessary collisions with the United States, as long as it concerns the establishment of a New Order in the Far East we are firmly determined to eliminate any interference on her part by actual force, thereby assuring the realization of our policy.
The above were the items which were discussed by the Premier and the three State Ministers: Matsuoka, Yosida, and Tojo, while the Cabinet was in the process of being organized. These were the fundamental policies for organizing the new Cabinet.

At the liaison meeting between the Imperial General Headquarters and the government during July, the points presented by the Imperial General Headquarters on the solution of the situation consistent with the transition of world affairs, were as set forth in the policies as follows:

The Empire, faced with the changed state of world affairs, will improve its foreign situation, accelerating the settlement of the China Incident; and together with this, it will seize the most opportune time to solve the problem of the Southern region. In case the settlement of the China Incident cannot be made as yet, the changing of our attitude by laying stress on our Southern region policy shall be decided taking into consideration the various domestic and foreign situations. The various preparations necessary for coping with the above two items will be given the utmost acceleration.

The ESSENTIAL POINTS

Article I

In regard to the disposition of the China Incident, we will concentrate our collective strength on political and military strategy. We will especially exterminate acts of assistance by a third nation and will plan the prompt submission of the Chungking Regime by exerting all our efforts. Regarding the South Seas Islands policy, we will endeavor for its furtherance by seizing a good opportunity and utilizing the changes in the situation.

Article II

In regard to foreign policy, the objective will be to accelerate the disposition of the China Incident and to seek the solution of the South Seas Islands problem. For the most part, it will be as set forth in the following:

1. First, emphasis is to be placed on the policies towards Germany, Italy, and Russia, especially to immediately strengthen the political solidarity with Germany and Italy, and to plan on making far-reaching adjustments in our relations with Russia.
2. Toward the United States, we will maintain impartial claims and a solemn attitude. Although we will not refrain from boldly carrying out the policy deemed necessary by the Empire in spite of the inevitable and natural aggravation which will accompany it, we will always heed the actions of the United States. We must plan, even by going out of our way, to avoid the increase of friction.

3. Regarding French Indo-China and Hongkong, the following will apply:

a. Regarding French Indo-China (Kwangchow Bay included), we shall expect the complete cessation of acts of assistance to Chiang Kai-shek, and together with this, they must supply our troops, permit the use of airfields and the passage of troops. They will also strive for the acquisition of raw materials necessary to the Empire.

b. In regard to Hongkong, hand in hand with the absolute cutting-off of the Chiang-aid route in Burma, we must at once drive strongly ahead on various schemes for the purpose of exterminating enemy sympathizers.

c. In regard to the concessions, together with planning the extermination of enemy sympathizers, and the withdrawal of troops of belligerent countries, we will induce China to gradually take those back.

4. In regard to the Dutch East Indies, we will for the time being endeavor to secure vital resources through diplomatic means.

5. In view of their strategic importance to our national defense, we will, if at all possible, take measures to secure the return of the former German and French territorial islands in the South Pacific through diplomatic negotiations.

6. In regard to other countries in the South Seas, we will plan through friendly negotiations to have them cooperate with our policy.

Article III

In regard to guidance within the nation, while organizing and guiding the various governmental agencies necessary to carry out the above mentioned plans, we will accelerate the completion of a defensive nation which will be able to cope with any world situation. For this purpose we will endeavor to realize the following items:
1. The realization of a powerful political structure.

2. A comprehensive movement for a general mobilization law.

3. The establishment of war-time economy.

4. The accumulation of war materials and the increase of shipping tonnage. (Putting into effect maximum advance imports, special imports, and regulations regarding consumption.)

5. Adjustments in the expansion of production as well in the repletion of armaments.

6. The lifting of the national spirit and the unification of public opinion.

The above are the particulars of our policy for coping with the present situation decided upon by the Supreme Command and the Government at the Imperial General Headquarters. Because of its supreme importance, I was told when it was handed to me to show it only to the Premier and the Genro.
Exhibit 10

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別紙企画院議事録

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昭和十二年九月三日

内閣書記官長

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四、结果讨论

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陸海在外相及外務大臣

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HENRY SIMOJIMA

Investigator I.F.S.

J. F. Munroe
未展示
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

AYABE KENTARÔ

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I reside at Chiba-ken Kashiwa-machi Toyoshiki 822. I was formerly a member of the Diet, belonging to the Seiyukai party over an extended period, and was Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Navy in the Suzuki Cabinet.

2. I am well acquainted with General Umezu Yoshijirô, having had occasion to meet and confer with him quite often. From this association I know him to be much opposed to Army officers' participating in politics, and that he deplored the increasing tendency to their activities in that direction, as instanced by the "5-15 Incident" (15 May 1932) and the "2-26 Incident" (26 February 1936). During his term as Vice-Minister of War we had a talk on this subject which stands out in my mind. The General said that he was doing his best to reform the Army in regard to its political activities, which, he said, owed much to the instigation of the rightist groups and parties. Army officers, being simple and straightforward, readily listened to the arguments of these people, which were of the line of resenting the present state of the world. Therefore, he said, he was taking steps to prevent the rightists from approaching Army officers; on my asking what these steps were, he smilingly answered that the Army would on no pretext give either encouragement or material support to the rightist parties or to the members of them. When, later, I heard being spread among the rightists infamous rumors discreditable to Vice-Minister Umezu, I knew that he was working straight in accordance with his conviction.

3. Then, hearing rumors that a large part of the military circles disapproved of political parties and were advocating their suppression, I confirmed from Vice-Minister Umezu what the higher levels of the Army were thinking about the matter. The General's opinion on this matter was very fair: that to abide by the Constitution was the foremost duty of the nation, and the Diet could therefore not be disregarded. So long as there was a parliament, there would be political parties, and sound political parties were necessary to sound statesmanship. On this point, I remember that at the 70th
Diet, in 1937, the question was raised in interpellation by Representative Hamano, whether the Army disapproved of political parties. In answering, General Umezu denied that he had ever had such a thought, giving great satisfaction to the political parties.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Ayabe Kentarō

On this 7th day of May, 1947
At Tokyo
Deponent: Ayabe Kentarō

I, Ono Kisaku, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ono Kisaku (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
9 May 1947
1. You are Major-General YAMAMOTO Moichiro of the 16th Army, now held as a prisoner of war by the Netherlands forces in Java?
   Yes.

2. State what acquaintance and association you have had with General UMEZU Yoshijiro.

   I first came to know General UMEZU when he was appointed to the Vice-Minister of the Army in March 1936. Prior to his above appointment, I had been already serving as a secretary to the War Minister. At that time, there were two secretaries to the War Minister, and one worked exclusively to the War Minister as his secretary, and the other carried out a secretarian job for the Vice-Minister. In my capacity of secretary to the War Minister, I carried out a secretarian job for the Vice-Minister, UMEZU, from March 1936 till March 1937. The War Minister was General TERAUCHI. In same capacity I served exclusively to the War Minister, General SUGIYAMA, as his secretary from March 1937 till May 1938. During this latter period, General UMEZU was the Vice-Minister of War and therefore I was in constant contact with General UMEZU either in direct or indirect way.

3. Were you secretary to the Minister of War when General UMEZU was Vice-Minister of War (March 1936-May 1938)?
   Yes. Details are to be referred to my answer to question No. 2.

4. During what period did you serve in that position?
   From 1/8/1935 till 1/8/1938, I was a secretary to the Minister of War, and of which period I carried out a secretarian job for the Vice-Minister from 1/8/1935 till March 1937.

5. What was the extent of your contact with General UMEZU during that period?
   My contact with him was limited to within my official functioning to him. As far as the private relation was concerned, there was nothing more than usually expected between the Vice-Minister and his assistant.

6. Can you state the attitude of Vice-Minister UMEZU toward intervention by the Army or Army personnel in politics?
   There was a group among the Army that favoured the intervention into the politics (such as in favour of abolishing the political party), however General UMEZU had taken quite a right op-
posing attitude against same. He was of strong opinion that such idea was wrong not only for the country, but also harmful to the Army itself and he endeavoured himself to make his idea thoroughly known and understood among the Army.

Give the substance of anything which you may remember having heard General UMEZU say on this subject.

He was of opinion that the Army and soldiers should keep themselves aloof above the politics, and that they should concentrate their whole energy on performing their original duties. In his view, this is to make the progress of country sound and healthy, and also to make the operation of the politics bright and just.

Participation of the Army and soldiers in the politics, in his view, would damage the silent dignity of the Army, and consequently it would result in the fact that the Army would be drawn into the politics. If the necessity that the Army should participate in the politics should arise, it would be considered as the misfortune of the country and moreover, he was of opinion that the time had not yet at hand even to consider the necessity of administering the Army power into the political affairs. Those thoughts are clearly comprehended from the instructions of the War Minister (TERAUCHI) and other various orders which were issued in the year of 1936, particularly in the first half of the same year. It was also clearly instructed by him that the Army officials who were allowed to participate in politics should be limited to the War Minister, the Vice-Minister and some officials of the Military Affairs Bureau (GUNNIKYOYOKU) who had official responsibility of participating in politics. This will be proved clearly if reference is made to the replies of the War Minister and other officials which had been delivered to the Parliament in these days. On occasion when the general election (HAYASHI Cabinet) had been held in the spring of 1937, the Vice-Minister, UMEZU, had requested that the Army should take the neutral attitude strictly. I and other officials in the Army who had been in the posts in which the participation in politics had been permitted, were repeatedly admonished by the Vice-Minister in this particular regard. For instance, it was warned by him that collecting political information in the Parliament should not be carried out any more than necessary for the sake of assisting the War Minister. I remember that when the HAYASHI Cabinet was being formed, a severe admonition had been given by him regarding the limit and extent to which collection of information was to be carried out.

8. The Vice-Minister of War was responsible for the safekeeping and disbursement of the special fund of the Ministry, was he not?

Yes. However, the duty of keeping the cash had been the responsibility of the senior adjutant of the War Ministry.

9. Tell all that you know concerning General UMEZU's management of this special fund, particularly in connection with contributions to politicians and others outside the Ministry. Include what you know on the following points: The use to which this fund had been put by previous Vice-Ministers; the extent to which and ways in which General UMEZU decreased disbursement of this fund; what his purpose was in so doing, as expressed to you; the result of his attitude and measures, including the reaction of his superiors and other senior officers of the high command, politicians and others.
The payment of the secret fund which had been participated in by a secretary was limited mostly to the entertaining expense and other less amount, between ¥500 and ¥100 per one lot, which had been paid to the people outside the Army, and the total amount of such was not so much. However I believe that the policy adopted by him regarding the special fund which had been paid without secretary's taking part in, must have been the same.

The policy adopted by General UMEZU was to curtail these expenses, and also to avoid payment which was likely to lead to the Army's participation in the politics, or the other expenses paid to the people outside the Army: (Much had been paid then to the right-wing.) He carried out his policy strictly. The entertainment parties had been reduced in number, the guest had been restricted, and the place where the parties were held had been considerably restricted. In case of people outside the Army (including groups outside the Army) requesting the payment of the special fund, full explanation had been given to him by secretary as to the character of the person concerned, the purpose of its expense, and other details. If the Vice-Minister was not fully convinced, the payment was not permitted, and his policy was particularly strict towards the political relations and the right-wings. I remember in this connection that much efforts on the part of secretary had been exerted.

The Vice-Ministers prior to UMEZU (KOSSO and others) had been loose comparatively in this respect, and they agreed with discretion of secretary on most occasions, and except in case of a large amount involved, much detailed explanation were not demanded. And the payment to the political relations and the right-wings had been comparatively much. There were two kinds of payment of the secret fund which had been participated in by secretary. One was of customary nature and the other of temporary one. The curtailment of these expenses had been practiced in the following way. As regards the customary one, a fundamental investigation had been made as to person or group that received same, and discernment had been clearly marked between one to be discontinued and others to be curtailed. (I remember there were some of the scientific nature which were left uncurtailed.) Among the lot which was to be discontinued, there were some which were considered difficult to do so immediately (in relation to the nature of enterprise), and such expenses had been discontinued gradually over the period of two or three months. The other lot which was to be curtailed had been gradually cut down, and in the end, he had reduced the same to 1/2 or 1/3. In this way, it is thought, the payment of the secret fund had been reduced at least to 1/3 in total amount, as compared with the former times.

What he aimed at in carrying out the above policy was that there were not only some payments which were considered unnecessary from the original standpoint of the Army, but also he was concerned with the possibility that the payment to those outside the Army, even though same were justified and useful, would lead the outsiders to misunderstand the action and standpoint of the Army, and particularly that the payment to the political relations would result in the Army being drawn into the politics unwittingly, this last point being the reason why he considered the curtailment necessary as a part of regulation of the Army discipline.

His above-mentioned attitude, of course, had been supported by the War Minister. Among other Army superiors, politicians, and people outside the Army, many had supported his policy, maintaining that same was proper steps for the sake of eliminating
unnecessary misunderstanding towards the Army. Particularly the conscientious politicians had favoured him with their confidence. However it was a fact that there were some among the Army and people outside it who opposed to him, by reasons either that it was too strict or undue nervousness on his part, or that it was unadvisable for the Army to withdraw itself from the politics.

2. The General UMEZU state his view to be that the Army must be rid of such people as had been receiving contributions from the special fund, to avoid entanglement in politics?

Yes. As above mentioned, he thought it necessary for the sake of not only ensuring the Army not being drawn into the politics but also for avoiding to cause misunderstanding as if the Army were participating in the politics.

11. What can you say of General UMEZU's views on the 26 February 1936 incident?

He regretted the incident and had taken a right opposing attitude against this action. It was a well-known fact that he considered the regulation of the Army discipline one of his important duties for the sake of reestablishment of the Army, thereby not only eliminating the direct cause of this incident, but also clearing up the basic factors for the possible future recurrence of action of same nature.

He was the commanding officer of No. 2 Division when the incident occurred, and his usual idea can be seen from a telegram which he had sent than to the War Minister, submitting his opinion to the effects that he opposed the direct action of such nature and that the case should be immediately repressed and its propagation should be prevented by all means. And his counter-measures against the incident had been embodied fully in his regulation of the Army discipline and other various steps which had been adopted afterward in order to settle the incident.

12. Did those views take practical expression in connection with the use of the special fund or other available funds for payment of pensions to widows of Army personnel executed for participation in the 26 February 1936 incident?

As a principle, this affair was a problem to be investigated by the Military Affairs Bureau (GUNMUKYOKU), and therefore as a secretary I had nothing to do with the same. Also I have no clear memory about same. There was a plan of a group of the right-wings to raise the fund for the sake of supporting the widows, and I remember in this connection that upon hearing same, he opposed, intervened and stopped the plan to materialize.

13. Did you hear General UMEZU express an opinion concerning the so-called Kodoha or Toseiha?

Although I do not remember his idea in any concrete form, he was of opinion that their deeds and words were devoid of general viewpoint, short of calm logics, and dogmatic, and therefore harmful for the unity within the country and disadvantageous for the sake of the country. I could see on various occasions that he was in disagreement with them, and opposed to the Army personnels having any special relation with them.
Can you give any other information material to the defence of General UMEZU on charges of having planned and conspired to bring about aggressive wars?

He had comprehension full of good will towards China. Regarding the China Incident, he had same tendency of thought with Prince KONOYE and it seemed to me that he was considering even compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK Government for the sake of its early settlement. In this respect, I judged then that he was a person who understood Prince KONOYE. Though it was a matter of minor importance, he feared that the word "eight corners of the world under one roof" (HAKKOIU) would give such wrong impression as to mean the aggression by Japan in a form of the world domination, and therefore he prohibited the use of that word in the instructions and others in those days. This episode might serve as one help in observing the tendency of his inner thoughts.

His personality was of extremely deep insight and strong will, taking no decision lightly, observing things most cautiously from various angles, and judging from general standpoint. Once decided, he carried it out with strong conviction. The measures taken based on his decision were not simple, and had various steps in reserve, considered fully, to cope with all varying conditions.

In practicing his measures, he operated same timely, accurately and minutely. It was difficult, therefore, for other people to easily find out his own idea, however whatever he had put into practice was fair and just, and it was sound and thorough with commanding logical basis.

In case of offering my opinion to him, he used to tell me that he would never stick to his own opinion provided he was convinced that my opinion was better than his own.

His personality of soundness can only be understood by long and deep contact with him, and therefore when he was the Vice Minister there were many who often had difficulty in seeing his true intention, inasmuch as he did not express his opinion lightly, although he had his decision already made in his mind. The deeper you come in contact with him, the better you know the greatness of his personality. When he was the Vice-Minister, the politicians who had contact with him, had deep reliance and high respect for his vision and talent.

(Japanese)

Signature

The above interrogatories were propounded by me, the undersigned authority, to Major-General YAMAMOTO Moichiro, who answered thereto as above written and subscribed in my presence, taking oath that such answers were true and correct.

Dated this 13th day of February 1947, at TJIPINANG Jail in Batavia, JAVA.

W. M. Busscher

Official
1st Liat. RNIA, attached to the Netherlands War Crimes Investigation Team at Batavia.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al  - Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

NISHIO TOSHIZÔ

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. In January 1937, when General Ugaki received an Imperial order to form a cabinet, I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. I state herein the circumstances within the Army at that time.

At that time, the Chief of the General Staff was Prince Kan'in, the War Minister was General Terauchi and the Inspector-General of Military Education was General Sugiyama. General Umezu was the Vice-Minister of War. Among the central authorities of the Army there were strong opinions in opposition to General Ugaki's cabinet-formation. At that time, after the 26 February Incident, the central authorities of the Army intended and endeavored for the enforcement of internal control of the Army. However, much misunderstanding was prevalent about General Ugaki in the form of rumors regarding the so-called "March Incident". Therefore, once the news of General Ugaki's cabinet-formation was known, officers in minor positions, below chiefs of sections and bureaus, opposed his formation of a cabinet, and circumstances looked quite serious.

I conferred with Umezu, the Vice-Minister of War, about this problem, considering the necessity of controlling the whole Army. Both I and General Umezu had good will for General Ugaki and wore not opposed personally to his forming a cabinet. Nevertheless, if it were to be completed without consideration of the circumstances within the Army, it would be impossible to avoid disorder or lack of control of the Army. Therefore, we concluded, the problem should be handled by the conference of three leading generals of the Army, and no subordinates or younger officers should have any connection with the matter. We strictly prohibited any undercurrents in the Army.

After that the problem was handled by Generals Terauchi and Sugiyama. Though, as no consultation was had by them with their subordinates, I did not know of the fact at first, I was told that the generals visited Ugaki and explained the serious circumstances of the Army, requesting him to reconsider the matter of his cabinet-formation. I was also told that the generals negotiated with some candidates for War Minister, who however did not accept the post, giving as the reason the difficulties of internal control of the Army. Thus, I was told, in such circumstances General Ugaki abandoned the attempt to organize a cabinet. In addition, this disturbance within the Army spread to the ex-soldiers and since the Ex-Soldiers Association was quite worried about the...
state of affairs an explanation was made, I knew, under the name of the Vice-Minister about the particulars of the problem.

2. "When I was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant-General Umezu was the Commander of the China Garrison. When War Minister Hayashi came to Hsinking for an inspection of Manchuria, at the end of May 1935, the Kwantung Army reported to him the circumstances at that time. Commander Umezu also was called to Hsinking by the Minister to report, and saw him. At that time I also met Commander Umezu; the meeting, however, did not go beyond a mere greeting, and no conference was had with the Kwantung Army with respect to policies, etc. Commander Umezu left Hsinking right after the meeting with the Minister, and returned to his post.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Nishio Toshizô (seal)

On this 30th day of September, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent Nishio Toshizô (seal)

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereunto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (Seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
7 October 1947
Ref. No. 0140/CMF

SUBJECT: SAKAI, Takashi, Former Lieutenant General, Japanese Army

TO: Foreign Liaison Sub-section, G-2, GHQ, SCAP

1. Reference is made to General Headquarters memorandum AG 000.5 (4 Sept 46) LS-R of 4 September 1946 requesting that the execution of the sentence imposed on the former Japanese General SAKAI be delayed and that he be transported to Tokyo to give testimony before the International Military Tribunal. The memorandum reached this Mission in the afternoon of September 5 and the request was accordingly wired to Nanking for consideration.

2. This Mission has just been informed by the Chinese Government that the execution of General SAKAI took place on the morning of 13 September 1946, as previously scheduled. It is regretted that the intervening time was insufficient to obtain the desired stay of execution through the necessary channels.

3. The SUMMONS TO TESTIFY enclosed in the reference memorandum is returned herewith.

FOR THE CHIEF OF MISSION:

/s/ I. GAN
Major General, C.A.
Chief, 1st Section

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

ROLAND J. SCHWARTZ
Captain, T.C.
SUBJECT: SAKAI, Takashi, Former Lieutenant General, Japanese Army

TO: Foreign Liaison Sub-section, G-2, GHQ, SCAP

1. Reference is made to General Headquarters memorandum AG 000.5 (1 Sept 46) LS-R of 4 September 1946 requesting that the execution of the sentence imposed on the former Japanese General SAKAI be delayed and that he be transported to Tokyo to give testimony before the International Military Tribunal. The memorandum reached this Mission in the afternoon of September 5 and the request was accordingly wired to Nanking for consideration.

2. This Mission has just been informed by the Chinese Government that the execution of General SAKAI took place on the morning of 15 September 1946, as previously scheduled. It is regretted that the intervening time was insufficient to obtain the desired stay of execution through the necessary channels.

3. The SUMMONS TO TESTIFY enclosed in the reference memorandum is returned herewith.

FOR THE CHIEF OF MISSION:

/s/ I. GAN
Major General, C.A.
Chief, 1st Section

Incl: Summons to testify

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

ROLAND J. SCHWARTZ
Captain, T. C.
In March 1938 I was on a visit to Tokio in connection with the affairs of the Kalian Mining Administration, Tientsin, North China, of which I was at that time Joint Chief Manager. On my arrival in Tokio I called on General Umezu who was then Vice Minister of War with whom I had had both social and official relations some years previously, when he was G.O.C. Imperial Japanese Forces, North China, stationed in Tientsin. He subsequently entertained me at luncheon and on that occasion I was able to renew the pleasant relations that I had previously enjoyed with him. Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from my colleague in Tientsin informing me that a serious strike had broken out at our mines and that there was a strong suspicion that some Japanese officers were mixed up in it. I at once asked to see General Umezu who, I remember, received me in his own house on a Sunday morning. I explained the position to him and asked for his help in getting Japanese influence withdrawn from the strike. He promised me that, if after investigation he was satisfied that the strike was not due to economic causes but to political activities in which Japanese were concerned, he would take steps to have the Japanese influence removed. On my return to Tientsin, the strike being still on, I endeavoured to persuade the Chief of the Japanese Special Mission who was the officer in charge of Affairs in our mines area that, in fact, the strike had no economic foundation but was purely political in nature, and I named to him the Japanese officers whom I believed were concerned in it. Failing to get satisfaction from this official, I repeated my request to General Umezu for help and asked him to implement his promise to me. This he subsequently did and after the strike had collapsed, one of the officers named by me was removed from the area and was, I believe, given an inferior position elsewhere.

The significance of this matter appears to me to lie in the fact that General Umezu as Vice Minister of War took action against a Japanese Officer who was undoubtedly acting in furtherance of the policy of causing as much trouble as possible in North China, which was the policy being actively promoted and supported by the at that time notorious "Young Officers Party".

E. J. Nathan

I, EDWARD JONAH NATHAN, of Kent House, 11/16 Telegraph Street in the city of London, England, being duly sworn, do depose and say that the within photostat is an exact photostatic copy of an original statement signed by me on the 9th day of January 1947.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Kent House, 11/16 Telegraph Street in the City of London, England, this seventh day of May 1947.

I. W. Laurader
A commissioner for Oath
Statement by Major-General F.S.G. Piggott, Military Attache to the British Embassy, Tokyo, 1921-1926 and 1936-1939

I first met General Umezu (Yoshijiro) in 1936 when he was Vice-Minister of War. I found him invariably courteous and anxious to co-operate in solving any problems that militated against good relations. He was noticeably broad-minded for a Japanese Army officer, and the epithet "wise" could be applied to him. He was every helpful in helping to adjust certain problems in North China with some of our commercial firms. Without any question General Umezu was one of the "moderates" in the Japanese Higher Command.

Dec. 24, 1946

F.S.G. Piggott

This is the exhibit marked C and referred to in the affidavit of Major General F.S.G. Piggott made before me this 29th day of April 1947.

Basil C.W. Hart
A Commissioner for Oaths

I Major General Francis Stewart Gilderoy Piggott C.B., D.S.O., Colonel Commandant Royal Engineers of Rapsley Ewhurst in the County of Surrey England having been first duly sworn make oath and say that the attached photostatic copy marked "C" is a true copy of a statement I made and handed to G. A. Furness on the 24th day of December 1946 for transmission to Defense Counsel for General Umezu (Yoshijiro) and that to the best of my belief it is true AND I FURTHER MAKE OATH and say that I was Military Attache to the British Embassy in Tokyo from 1921 until 1926 and from 1936 until 1939.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me at Cranleigh in the County of Surrey England this 29th day of April 1947

Basil C.W. Hart
A Commissioner for Oaths
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

INUMA KAMORU

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I am Inuma Mamoru, former lieutenant-general of the Japanese army. In August and September 1939 I was chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, in which capacity it was my duty to make recommendations to my superiors for appointments and in general to be responsible for personnel matters of the army.

In August 1939 the Nomonhan Incident was in progress and the authorities considered it necessary to replace the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. In making the selection of a man for this place the following points were considered. In general a high-ranking general of strong personality, high moral principles and intelligence was to be selected. Moreover, since his immediate task was to be the settlement of the Nomonhan Incident, he required several other attributes. He was to possess influence and popularity which would give him control over the military forces and enable him to prevent any disorder or disturbances. He was of course not to irritate the USSR, whether Moscow or the troops at the front lines, therefore he was to be of a careful, mild nature, a man who would pay attention even to small matters, thus avoiding any irritation of the Soviet—and of course a man whose personality and personal background should not be offensive to the Soviet. Since the fundamental policy of Japan, as well as of the high command, was to avoid difficulties with the USSR, it was felt that the commander-in-chief should be a man experienced in military administration (with experience in the Ministry of War) rather than in operations (General Staff matters), so that he should be able to see to the efficient administration and control of affairs in Manchoukuo.

These being the requirements, I recommended Lieutenant-General Umezu. Despite the fact that it was customary to appoint a senior general to this position, he was in my opinion the only possible man for the place. The recommendation originated with me and was discussed with Major General Kasahara Yukio, Chief of the General Affairs Department, and Major General Nakajima Tetsuzō, Vice-Chief, of the General Staff, among others. Everyone without exception agreed to the appointment and it was therefore recommended by the Ministry of War to the Emperor and the appointment was thus made.
O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Inuma Mamoru (seal)

On this 4th day of March, 1947
at Tokyo

Deponent Inuma Mamoru (seal)

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko
Tokyo
4 March 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

IRAHI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

TAKEBE ROKUZO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

Q. Did General Umezu, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, give to you as Chief of General Affairs of Manchoukuo instructions concerning the relations to be maintained between Manchoukuo and the USSR during his term?

A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, General Umezu, gave to me instructions upon my taking the position of Chief of General Affairs of Manchoukuo to the effect that now was the time that the Government of Manchoukuo should be most careful not to irritate the USSR in matters of dissemination of information and propaganda.

Q. On the basis of the above instructions, how did you guide and instruct your men?

A. I conveyed the instructions to the vice-ministers of all the departments.
O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Takebo Hokuzo (seal)

On this 6th day of November, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: Takebo Hokuzo

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
13 November 1947

-2-
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

TAKEI SEITARO

Def. Doc. No. 2959
(Umezu)

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I served as an operations staff officer of the Kwantung Army from August 1940 to August 1943. I state here about the outbreak of the Pacific War and the relation of the Kwantung Army to it.

1. No formal information came from Tokyo to the Kwantung Army about the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations which were under way from summer to autumn of 1941. However, I used to go up to Tokyo on business, at which times I got fragmentary news of them, which I reported to the commander-in-chief and others on my return. Therefore, the Kwantung Army knew of the tense situation of the negotiations with the United States by news of this kind as well as by information in the newspapers.

2. Commander Umezu was very much worried by receipt of such information, and used to express to us staff officers his personal opinion that Japan should not begin a war with the United States even under the worst conditions.

3. When I went up to Tokyo on business in November 1941, I happened to have a talk with Director of the Soldiers' Affairs Bureau Tanaka about current conditions. Then I told him that Commander Umezu was of the opinion that Japan should not engage in war with the United States in any circumstances, which Tanaka well understood.

4. The Kwantung Army received no intelligence reports concerning operations plans against the United States or the decision for war against the United States; much less were we consulted about those matters.

We received a notice from Tokyo by telegram at the end of November, that Japan was making preparations for war with the United States. For the Kwantung Army no new duties were assigned, however; it was emphasized that the Kwantung Army should specially preserve tranquillity with the U.S.S.R.

We first knew of the outbreak of the war on 8 December by public broadcast on that very morning; the formal order came after that.
5. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Commander Unouu frequently stated to me that it was most unfortunate that Japan had begun war with the United States.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Takei Seitarō (seal)

On this 2d day of April, 1947
At Tōkyō

Deponent: Takei Seitarō

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same day
At Tōkyō

Witness: Ikada Sumihisa

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the dofonso, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tōkyō
5 April 1947
IV. On the Information Service.


Changes in the international situation are extremely rapid, especially inconstant is the Soviet-Mongolian military situation in the Far East, which is changing hourly in accordance with developments in the Russo-German War situation and with the tense situation in the Pacific, its true state is difficult to comprehend at present.

However, in order to complete the uninterrupted preparation for operations against the U.S.S.R., not only the Kwantung Army but also the front-line armies and army groups must watch for changes in the ever-changing Soviet-Mongolian military situation and exert their utmost efforts so as to comprehend the actual situation at the moment. This is more true in the present situation in which earlier discernment of indications of change in the situation is more and more urgently required.

In this connection, I earnestly desire that each assigned organ of information be encouraged and directed to attain more success in information services.

2. Regarding Diffusion and Thorough Understanding of the Soviet-Mongolian Military Situation.

It is an important matter indispensable for preparing operations against the U.S.S.R. to have each assigned army group and unit understand thoroughly the present Soviet-Mongolian military situation. However, to our regret, the carrying out of this task at present is more difficult than before the commencement of the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers due to the considerable increase in the number of personnel for training and in the number of the specially formed units in connection with the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers.
Therefore, I desire especially that staff officers and subordinates be encouraged and guided so that the Soviet-Mongolian military situation may come to be perfectly understood by them.

Ministry of Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R., General Staff,
Military-Historic Department
August 19, 1947
No. 945, Moscow.

CERTIFICATE

The document containing the speech of the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff at the conference of formation commanders in December 1941, "On the information service" was found in September 1945, during the period of hostilities by the troops of the Soviet Army in Manchuria in the premises of the Kwantung Army headquarters in Changchung.

Major-General Zamyatin,
Deputy Chief, Military-Historic Department, General Staff of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces.

CERTIFICATE

I, Major N.A. Razenko, Chief of the Document Room of the Soviet Division of the IPS of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, hereby certify that a photocopy of the Japanese document attached hereto - Speech of the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff at the Conference of Formation Commanders in December 1941 "On the Information Service," was received by me from the Military-Historic Department of the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces.

/s/ n. Razenko,
Major N. Razenko,
Chief of the Document Room of the Soviet Division of IPS.
No. 3
£3,200 Cut
Outline of the Speech Made by the Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, at the Conference of Formation Commanders in April, 1941.


The Soviet Union, considering this present European War as a good opportunity with which to realize her world policy, is secretly planning to prolong this war and to extend it territorially. On the surface, the Soviet Union is strictly maintaining an attitude of neutrality and progressing towards the strengthening of her own power. On the other hand, she is facing this war with a policy of gradually expanding her sphere of influence without being thrown into the vortex of war. However, the sensational war results of the German Army since the outbreak of the war and its concentration of superior military forces in the East not only gradually deepened the apprehension of the Soviet Union but as was expected the recent execution by force of Germany's Balkan Policy inflicted a great menace to the Soviet Union's Policy towards South-Eastern Europe.

Relations between Germany and the Soviet Union has not necessarily continued to be favorable as it was in the beginning. Germany's maintenance of a powerful force against Soviet Union is a great threat to her; she is openly expressing her opposition to Germany's Balkan policy, and being in great fear of Germany making a rear attack, she is intently strengthening her preparations for war against Germany in her western front.

Just at this time, on April 13, the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact was concluded in Moscow. Although its content is as was already announced, I shall take this opportunity to try to express my opinions concerning this pact.

1. In accordance with the present situation of the Empire, it is a diplomatic measure planned to maintain for the time being peace between Japan and the Soviet Union for the purpose of strengthening the Tri-Partite Alliance. Whether or not this pact can be made effective depends upon the future attitude of the two countries. It cannot be considered that we can immediately enter into friendly relations with the present attitudes. Consequently, in order to make this pact effective, our Army absolutely cannot permit the slacking down in its preparations for military operations. By steadily strengthening and expanding these preparations, the effectiveness of the pact will be promoted. The Army will not make any changes in its past policies. However, useless speeches and actions of soldiers and officers which would negate the effectiveness of this pact should be checked absolutely and at the same time it is of vital importance that proper Army duties be carried out silently to the utmost degree adhering to the above view.
2. The mental attitude of the Army in connection with the conclusion of this neutrality pact is as stated previously. However, since there is a fear that the past tension which existed between Japan and Manchukuo on the one hand and Russia and Mongolia on the other would suddenly be relieved based on the misunderstanding of this pact by the officials and people of Manchukuo, in guiding them, there is a necessity to leave no room for regret.

3. There are people in both Japan and Manchukuo who often say that military preparations against Soviet Russia may be reduced since the neutrality pact was concluded. However, as mentioned previously, there must not only be no changes in our past policy of military preparations against Soviet Russia, but since the necessity for us to take a precise and lofty attitude towards ideology, counter-espionage, and other forms of strategem is especially great, it is necessary for us to have our subordinates thoroughly understand this purport promptly.

Moreover, in regards to having our subordinates thoroughly understand this, it is especially necessary to carry it out in strict secrecy and carefulness in order to prevent the nullification of the political effect of this pact. Although the general trend of the Soviet Union and the opinions concerning the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact are as stated above, the accumulation of the Soviet Union's military power in the next few years will exert a grave influence on both Japan and Manchukuo. Therefore, on the one hand, we must steadily strengthen and expand our preparations for war against the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, we must promote friendly relations with Russia. Together with striving for the realization of armed peace, we must make preparations for certain victory in military operations against the Soviet Union in case of emergency.
IPS Doc. No. 3201

Ministry of armed forces of the U.S.S.R.
General Staff
Military - historic Department.

August 19, 1947
No. 944
Moscow

CERTIFICATE

The document containing the speech of the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff at the conference of formation commanders in April 1941 entitled "Estimate of the position of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact" was found in September 1946 during the period of hostilities in Manchuria by the troops of the Soviet Army in the premises of the Kwantung Army headquarters in Changhun.

Major-General Zamyatin,
Deputy Chief, Military-Historic Department, General Staff of the U.S.S.R. armed forces.

CERTIFICATE

October 15, 1947

I, Major N.A. Bazenko, chief of the document room of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S. of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, hereby certify that a photocopy of the Japanese document attached hereto - speech of the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff at the conference of formation commanders in April 1941 entitled "Estimate of the position of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Japanese - Soviet Neutrality pact", was received by me on October 14, 1947 from the Military-Historic Department of the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. armed forces.

/a/ N. Bazenko

Major N. Bazenko,
Chief of the document room of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S.
这是一张中文手写文档的图片，内容涉及到一些复杂的中文句子和数学公式。由于图片的分辨率和清晰度有限，部分内容可能难以准确辨认。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

IRAKI SADAO, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

TANAKA RYŪKICHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I state chiefly about relations between General Umezu and the Pacific War, as follows:

1. Tokyo never consulted with the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army nor gave him advance information about the plan or decision for starting the Pacific War.

2. Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army Takei told me as follows when he came to Tokyo on business in November 1941:

"General Umezu, being told that the negotiations with the United States have come to a very critical condition, is in serious anxiety. He is of the opinion that a war with the United States should absolutely be avoided under any conditions."

Though this was only General Umezu's private opinion, and not an expression of official opinion, I learned by this that General Umezu did not favor starting a Pacific war.

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tanaka Ryūkichī (seal)
On this 8th day of May, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: Tanaka Ryūkichi

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

-2-
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Saday, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

INUO FIDAO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am a former lieutenant-colonel of the Japanese Army, residing in Tokyo Shimbawa-ku Kami-Osaki 5-631.

2. I was appointed as a staff officer of Imperial General Headquarters on 2 December 1944, and belonged to the General Affairs Section. My duty was to work as secretary for the Chief of the General Staff, in which capacity I handled all telegrams and other documents which were reported to him.

3. From the end of 1944 into 1945, the condition of the war came to be unfavorable to our army. Communications between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Southern Army or the China Expeditionary Army especially coming to be of the utmost difficulty owing to the activities of the United States air forces and submarines. Accordingly, we found no way but to use radiogram for communication with the forces in the theaters. However, the quantity of communication by radiogram was naturally limited, and communications with the theaters were almost monopolized by such urgent matters as operations and reports of war-conditions.

4. In such circumstances, no reports about atrocities and other conditions at the front ever reached us. I have, therefore, never seen documents of such sort, nor handed them over to the Chief of the General Staff for his inspection. He also never gave directions to anybody relating to those matters.

5. As for reports to the War Minister from the front relating to court-martial of B-29 pilots, I have neither handled them, nor handed them over to the Chief of the General Staff for his inspection.

6. We first came to know about the illegal punishment of B-29 pilots after the surrender. As such subject appeared among my conversations with the Chief of the General Staff before that...
7. The Imperial General Headquarters had no legal officer, nor had it either any organ to handle and investigate matters in respect to trials. Those were under the War Minister.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Inoue Tadao (seal)

On this 17th day of October, 1947
At Tōkyō

Deponent: Inoue Tadao

I, Miyata Mitsuo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tōkyō

Witness: Miyata Mitsuo (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo

20 October 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

SHIKOMURA SADAMU

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby deposes as follows:

After General Anami, the then Minister of War, committed suicide with a sword on 15 August 1945, the Premier assumed the portfolio for a time and subsequently I was appointed as War Minister on 23 August and assumed office on that same day.

I learned first after my appointment of the execution of American pilots in Japan Proper, without trial or by sentence of the courts martial. I thought it my responsibility as Minister of War to punish these violations strictly, and so informed the Chief of the General Staff, General Umezu. He was very much surprised, and agreed with my opinion, saying about as follows: "Until this moment I did not know of these facts at all. Even if these violations were the result of indignation over indiscriminate bombing by American planes, it is quite unjust to punish the pilots without legal processes. Therefore, it is unnecessary to await the instructions of the Allied forces in this matter, and we must voluntarily impose punishment strictly and fairly, after investigating the facts."

He added his hope and opinion as follows: "We must be most fair when we give up our arms to the Allied forces after the surrender. We should most carefully control any illegal manipulation of arms, such as concealment or damage, etc., and we must bring our Army to a successful end, carrying out faithfully the conditions of the surrender. I hope you will exercise strict control." His opinion about this matter being quite the same as mine, I exerted my best efforts to supervise and regulate things so as to prevent any such illegal operations.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Shimomura Sadamu (seal)

On this 30th day of April, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: Shimomura Sadamu (seal)

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko

Tokyo
7 May 1947

Def. Doc. 2909
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

WAKAMATSU TADAICHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

At the time of the surrender, I occupied the post of Vice-Minister of War.

On 14 August 1945, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Kawabe Torashirō, gave me a suggestion that an agreement be made in written form between the senior generals of the Army so that the action of the Army might be under complete control. He added that this was the intention of Chief of the General Staff Umezu.

On that day, by chance, Field Marshal Hata, Commander-in-Chief of the 2d General Army, was in Tokyo and I thought it a good idea to have the above agreement made on the occasion of a meeting which was to be held at noon of the same day, at which Hata, Field Marshal Sugiyama, the Commander-in-Chief of the 1st General Army, and the Big Three of the Army (War Minister Anami, Chief of the General Staff Umezu and Inspector-General of Military Education Dohihara) were to attend. So I drew up the document "The Course of Action of the Army" (Defense Document No. 2906) and made a suggestion to that effect. No one objected to it, and all of them agreed and signed the paper.

At this moment, Chief of the General Staff Umezu called my attention to the necessity of getting the signature of Commander of the General Air Force, since the control of the conduct of the Air Force also was important. Therefore, after
the meeting I went to General Kawabe Masakazu, Commander of the General Air Force, with this paper and explained the circumstances, whereupon he also signed it.

From that time this document has been in my custody.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Wakamatsu Tadaichi (seal)

On this 23rd day of December, 1947
At Tōkyō

Deponent: Wakamatsu Tadaichi

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tōkyō

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

26 December 1947
Tōkyō
THE COURSE OF ACTION
OF THE ARMY

14:40 hours 14 August 1945
At the drawing-room of War Minister

The Imperial Army will conduct itself to the last
according to the decision of the Emperor.

War Minister (seal)
Chief of General Staff (seal)
Inspector-General of Military Education (seal)
Commander-in-Chief of the 1st General Army (seal)
Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd General Army (seal)
Commander-in-Chief of the General Air Force (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

KANEMITSU TSUNEKO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was Vice-Speaker of the House of Representatives from May 1937 to August 1939, after which I became Minister for Overseas Affairs and Welfare Minister. I was also a member of the Seiyukai party for a long period, and at one time held the position of director of that party. I have been associated with the accused Umezu Yoshijiro since some time ago; especially while he held the office of Vice-Minister of War, my position brought me into frequent contact with him. I am therefore very well acquainted with his character and political opinions, concerning which I shall testify.

2. After the Manchuria Incident such occurrences as the 15 May 1932 incident, the Army pamphlet problem and the assassination of Director of the Military Affairs Bureau Nagata became rather frequent, giving much concern to us of the political world and the intelligent public in general. In these circumstances occurred the unprecedented, disgraceful incident of 26 February 1936, giving the political world a tremendous shock and making all leading men anxious over the future of the armed forces. It looked as if in such circumstances it would be most difficult to control the activities of the Army and restore it to its proper condition. The news of Lieutenant-General Umezu's appointment as Vice-Minister was therefore welcomed by us.

3. After his appointment as Vice-Minister General Umezu told me that he would effectively control and govern the Army by extinguishing factionalism and by suppressing and preventing "young officers' movements and restoring the Army to its proper function and condition. Soon afterward, however, malicious rumors began to be spread, in the form of writings of unknown origin, many of them attacking the character and actions of Vice-Minister Umezu. On seeing these pamphlets and hearing these rumors, I went to see General Umezu, showed him the documents and advised him to look into the origin of the rumors and to protect himself against them. This was, I believe, in the spring of 1936. I was told by the Vice-Minister that the rumors were entirely groundless, and that although the correction of the Army was no easy task, he intended to carry on no matter what charges might be made or ill things said of him.
Concerning General Umezu's political ideas I am well informed, having had several opportunities to discuss the matter with him. At the same period just referred to, writings appeared charging that the Army disapproved of political parties and desired their abolition. Some of these also I showed to Vice-Minister Umezu, and was told by him that no such idea was entertained by the high officials of the Army. So far as his personal ideas went, he told me they were that military officers should not meddle in political matters; that the Diet should be respected; and that as long as a parliament existed, the existence of political parties was necessary. So far as my contact with him was concerned, he was always cooperative toward political parties, and he never said to me a word suggesting the disapproval of them or that the Army should participate in such questions.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kanemitsu Tsuneo (seal)

On this 30th day of December 1947

At Tokyo

Dependent: Kanemitsu Tsuneo

I, Miyata Mitsuo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Miyata Mitsuo (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo

5 January 1948
Def., Dec. No. 2962 (Umezu)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

IKEDA SUMITSA

Having first duly sworn and pah as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am a former lieutenant-general of the Japanese Army, and served under Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army Umezu as Vice-Chief of his Staff from 1 July 1942 to 18 July 1944.

On 17 July 1944, a telephone call came from Tōkyō conveying an order for General Umezu to come up to Tōkyō as soon as possible, and which simultaneously conveyed an informal order for his appointment as Chief of the General Staff. At that moment, as it happened, I was calling on him on other business; and he consulted with me, saying as follows:

"Since the very beginning I have opposed the war against the United States. I hate to accept this appointment. Moreover, the war is now in a condition unfavorable to us; there are no more measures which I can take as Chief of the General Staff. In every way I do not like to accept it. Is there any way to refuse?"

Then I replied: "As the War Minister is one of the government officials, you can upon being consulted concerning appointment to that post give your opinion about accepting it, and if necessary you can refuse it. The Chief of the General Staff, however, is a military official, and not only is preliminary consultation never had, but also it is not permissible to refuse it after once an informal order has been given. There is nothing to do but to accept."

He answered, quite displeased: "You are right. I will go to Tōkyō."

He added his further opinion as follows: "The stage of the war is now unfavorable to us. It is necessary to end this war as soon as possible. For that purpose diplomatic or other sorts of measures will be required."

2. After that, on 28 July 1945, I was appointed President of the Combined Planning Board of the Cabinet, serving under the Suzuki Cabinet. Until the surrender I attended every cabinet meeting and also I attended the two Imperial Conferences; especially I served the part of liaison between the Army and the Government. In order to carry out this purpose I often met and talked with War Minister Anami and Chief of the General
Staff Umezu, and I was quite well informed about the opinion and the delicate circumstances of the Army concerning the surrender.

Once General Umezu told me: "Of course, I have no objection to ending the war; as for the terms of it, however, the country might fall into a most terrible situation, depending on them. Therefore, the war should be brought to its conclusion on the best conditions possible."

When some of the military officers were anxious about the compromising attitude of the Cabinet and the Jūshin, and advocated that the Army should continue the war, even by carrying out a coup d'état, Umezu told me as follows: "Such conduct is not proper at all. The circumstances of today do not permit such conduct. The whole country should follow the determination of the Imperial Conference without fail." And I was told that as a result of a conference between the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, an agreement was made, after the Imperial Conference on 11 August, among the three Chiefs of the Army, the Field marshals and the Commander of the General Air Force, committing the Army to abiding by the decision of the Emperor and prohibiting any under-currents.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Ikeda Sumihisa (Seal)

On this 5th day of January, 1948
At Tokyo

Deponent: Ikeda Sumihisa

I, Miyata Mitsuo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Miyata Mitsuo (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

5 January 1948
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中，以确定其作为控制因素是否与治疗效果相关。实验设计应考虑的因素包括但不限于：

1. 剂量范围：不同的药物剂量对效果的影响。
2. 给药方式：口服、静脉注射等。
3. 病情阶段：疾病的不同阶段可能对疗效有不同的影响。
4. 相关因素：其他可能影响疗效的因素，如饮食、生活习惯等。

通过详细的实验设计，可以更准确地评估药物的效果。
null
染料 compositions of various dye materials and the dyeing process. The dye materials are composed of various coloration salts, and the dyeing process also includes the use of various materials, such as water, acids, and alkalies. The dye materials are used in a variety of industries, including textile, paper, and leather industries.

The dyeing process is a complex one, involving various steps such as mordanting, padding, and fixing. The dyeing process is influenced by various factors, such as the temperature, pressure, and duration of the process.

The dye materials are classified into various types, such as acid dyes, basic dyes, and direct dyes. Each type of dye material has its own unique properties and is used for specific applications.

The dyeing process is also influenced by various factors, such as the type of fabric, the color of the dye, and the desired effect. The dyeing process is an important part of the textile industry, and it plays a crucial role in the production of various types of fabrics.
|------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|

注：本表数据仅供参考，具体数字可能有出入。
<table>
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<tr>
<th>年度</th>
<th>主要輸入地</th>
<th>合計</th>
<th>英領香港</th>
<th>独立</th>
<th>朝鮮</th>
<th>英國</th>
<th>鴨緬</th>
<th>清洲</th>
<th>其他各國</th>
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<td>9,460</td>
<td>9,320</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>12,230</td>
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</table>

(注) 1934年以前：朝鮮＝1938年以前：滿洲＝金元
从小便失去父母，

后来靠亲人的照顾

长大成人。

现在我住在

一个小镇上。

每天清晨，我会

去公园散步。

那里的环境

非常宁静。

我喜欢在那里

思考和放松。

这里的生活

非常简单。

每天都

重复着同样的

事情。

但我

感到

非常满足。

就像

我

小时候

那样

快乐。

这是

我

最

喜欢

的地方。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>全産地</th>
<th>漣州</th>
<th>韓国</th>
<th>朝鮮以外</th>
<th>日本</th>
<th>一般輸入</th>
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<td>956</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>467</td>
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<td>1935</td>
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<td>2150</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 價格（円） |        |      |      | 製造地 |     |         |
|------------|--------|------|------|        |-----|---------|
| 1928       | 1380   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |
| 1929       | 1420   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |
| 1930       | 1480   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |
| 1931       | 1560   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |
| 1932       | 1660   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |
| 1933       | 1740   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |
| 1934       | 1820   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |
| 1935       | 1880   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |
| 1936       | 1960   | 385  | 295  | 956    | 732 | 467     |

| 個別的報告番号 |        |      |      | 製造地 |     |         |
|---------------|--------|------|------|        |-----|---------|
| 15733        | 685318 | 210 | 1853 | 956    | 732 | 467     |

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<th>註</th>
<th>1928-36年（昭和3年-昭和11年）間</th>
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<td>鐵金銅朝鮮以外，主要產地是日本。一般輸入</td>
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<td></td>
<td>且を1000円以上とせん</td>
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<td>500円以下</td>
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</table>

**報告**: 1928-36年（昭和3年-昭和11年）間毎年関東州の輸入、60%以上の超えます。
未找到自然语言的文本内容。
部分翻译

尽管存在一些困难，但团队已经成功地在短期内实现了目标。这再次证明了团队的合作精神和创新能力。
鉄は造船・鉄道の所産で製鋼及び他の鉄生産国
製造用としての鉄材である。生産国が
使用される。

日本は近非常に輸入し存し、英領印
南及朝鮮は、其をもしくは供給地を
九州、三重、兵庫、神戸、福岡を世界的一
拠点として、居在の為に
日本に輸入をPostal布量は約四 Addictionメートル噚に達する。
鉄が海産品に劣らないってことで、
産業実質的における鉄及び鋼の生産
は、平戦共に必要であることを
実証する。特に、戦争経済に
ありまして、鉄生産に関する要請
が多くなることが、戦争経済の
鍵における航材等の各種材料
に関連したため、いかにして
鉄生産を増加させるかが
重要である。

鋼の生産は、一九六六年より
一九三五年間は、平均二百三十五万トンで、
三五年より一九三六年間は、四百十八万四千トンで、
合計は合計五百二十四万トンである。

鉄の生産は、一九六六年より
一九三五年間は、平均二百三十五万トンで、
三五年より一九三六年間は、四百十八万四千トンで、
合計は五百二十四万トンである。

以上のようにによって、鉄及び鋼の生産は
必要である。
00.26

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38

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1931
自動車及車公寓

昭和三年（1928年）三月

自動車工業を設立する計画が数多く行われ

まず最初に、昭和二年（1927年）以後の自動車の生産計画は、

それでは、自動車の生産計画は、

昭和二年（1927年）に設立された自動車工業会社が、

昭和三年（1928年）に設立された自動車工業会社が、

昭和三年（1928年）に設立された自動車工業会社が、

昭和三年（1928年）に設立された自動車工業会社が、

昭和三年（1928年）に設立された自動車工業会社が、
不太清楚这张图片具体想表达什么内容。如果内容与实际不符，还请提供准确的中文文本。
No. 36

Apr. 20, 570 E
平均一価六千二百萬円ダリ、ソノ中オーストラリアハ、南同聯邦カ
ノ価ハニニ価シ、ニ価三千萬斤単テナハニハセンチ
ンカラニ三パセンチトニ比較シ、ニ価三千萬斤単テナハニハセンチ
戦後ニハ有史始マツテ以来最大量ノ羊毛ヲ販売ガアルラウノソシテ
ソノ大部分ハオーストラリアニシテハ、英ソニ次イデハアルラウノパオ
工業ハナラバサウストレパ日本及ビソノ東面市場ノ人々ニシテ他ノ国ニ於
テ生産サレタル毛織物ヲ時貿スルニ足ル経済の位置ニナル者ハ極ハ
ダルト考ハニラレルカラデアル。
### 地域

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### 重喫<br>
- 朝鮮、台灣、閩東州及滿洲（元至三 ===）
- 帝国、近海、他国

出所：元至三 === 合衆国国税委員会の推計及日本朝鮮及台湾の年報及月報

備考：合衆国に贈数を指摘する資料が使用出来なかった所は、

此重喫は元至三 === 砂糖喫口四 ===
学

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造舶助金の必要：

大戦以来、日本の造船業は急速に発展し、日本家の進出が著しくなった。しかし、政府は造船業に補助金を支給することにしている。この補助金の支給は、造船業の発展を促進し、国力の強化に寄与するものである。

『海洋工業及船舶評論』九三五年五月号 久保

Def. Doc. 500-C
2014. 5. 0. C
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No. 15

1. 首先，我们需要确认所有的材料是否都已经准备好。然后，我们可以开始进行下一步的加工。

2. 第二步，我们需要注意的是，所有的设备都需要在规定的范围内运行，以保证生产的质量和效率。

3. 第三步，我们需要对生产过程中产生的废料进行回收和处理，以减少对环境的影响。

以上就是我们的生产过程，希望对大家有所帮助。
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No. 27

1000-6

0919

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表8a - 日本商品队 1,000,000以上，航海船

摘要 1: 1,000,000以上

表8b

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表8b - 日本商品队 1,000,000以上，航海船
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注: 全ての数値は百万円で表記。
### 表 14. 輸出商品 主要取扱国別、商品別 1928年発

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### 付記
1. 日本より台湾に向輸入品を含み、内訳は商品別不明 | 2. 日本より輸入品
3. 中国より輸入品
4. 香港より輸入品
5. 台湾より輸入品
6. 台湾より輸入品 | 1938年方不明
7. 台湾より輸入品 | 1938年方不明
8. 日本より輸出品 | 4100万円 | 台湾国際輸出品目1100万円

資料来源：日本台湾政府発表年及台湾貿易報告より調査

日本台湾政府発表年及台湾貿易報告より調査
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No. 37

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看起来这张图片是一份手写文档。由于图片分辨率和清晰度的原因，我无法准确地识别和翻译图片中的内容。如果有具体的区域或者内容需要帮助，请提供更清晰的图片或描述。
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1/ 重量噸 = 2.240ポンド
2/ 重量 = 40立方フィート

調査資料：日本外國貿易日報
No.39

舊港並非是日本在華運動的根據地，而是苦役的社會。(1)

(1) 1938年日軍佔領舊港後，設立軍政處，將舊港改稱為"港"。
No. 40

[手写文字，内容较难辨认]
日本の輸出は、アメリカ、ラテンアメリカ、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南米、中南米、南南
デフレーションの影響は、輸入品に顕著である。特に、日本からの輸入品は価格が下落し、中国からの輸入は価格が高騰した。この現象は、経済の不況が引き続き続いていることを示している。

貿易は、これによって大きく影響を受けた。輸出品の価格が下落し、輸入品の価格が上昇した。特に、中国からの輸入品の影響が顕著であった。

関税は、この影響を緩和するために、一部の商品に対して減税が実施された。しかし、これが貿易の悪化を引き起こす可能性がある。

政策的には、これらを対処するために、経済成長を促すための措置が検討されている。しかしこれも、貿易の悪化を止めるには足りないかもしれません。
No. F2

10/12.500 C
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总计：1,270.8 万箱
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O OÜ,)^> .-^G^)!^1 ? ^^'fcVr-^rry^.V  V^oi^^.^'VA' ^ ^

r^-r-i.a— X  ^ - V V  * ^ $ ^ * * , 7  3 6 « 5 < j ^  3

N. 58

N\; 5.0c


### 二十九表

日本の1938年度重要商路の
対華輸入輸出貿易

(単位: トン)

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<th>日本側</th>
<th>1938年度重要商路の日本-英航路の各地における輸入及び輸出の状況</th>
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日本-英航路の各地における輸入及び輸出の状況

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<td>太平洋航路</td>
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<td>合計</td>
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※日本の輸出は以外貿易ではなく、軍需品として行われたものが多い。
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注：此表仅供参考，实际使用时请根据具体情况进行调整。
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关于等级的说明：

1. 等级1：低级，数量100，单位0，价格100.0
2. 等级2：中级，数量150，单位0，价格15.0
3. 等级3：高级，数量1，单位0，价格1.0
4. 等级4：非常高级，数量111，单位0，价格11.0
5. 等级5：顶级别，数量111，单位0，价格11.0
<table>
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<tr>
<th>科目</th>
<th>時間</th>
<th>人数</th>
<th>信頼性</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>10/2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>10/3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>10/4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>10/5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 感謝！"田村さん"に感謝。
※一覧表に従って、輸入及び輸出の値を含めて計算した結果、関税及び関税外価格、金額及び金額外価格を合計したものを内閣府に報告す。
大戦後日没土の人民は巨大な経済問題に直面してある。さくらの競争のための重要な性質をもつのである。この問題は、日本の商務と経済の緊張にあっても、国際的自給性をもつのである。日本の経済は、その自給性をもって、必要な人材を育成して、国際的な交流を重視するにとどまるということはない。改体の如何を問わず、その政府にあって、将来の多目的の問題である。この問題における新旧の状態を考慮し、突発的手段を取り得るようを望むのである。

大戦後の人口増加が政府にとって問題である。日本本土内に在籍する多くの人口の数が大したものである。戦後の人口増加が政府にとって問題である。戦後の人口増加が政府にとって問題である。戦後の人口増加が政府にとって問題である。戦後の人口増加が政府にとって問題である。戦後の人口増加が政府にとって問題である。
外集貿易の通例として、相営を貿易見返し品を
利用して、それによる相互に安易な価格で物資を
供給している。これらは彼らが自国の一部にすぎない
日本の支配を利用されての試みを困難にしようとする
べき方法を模倣することとは、相互にその戦略の上に
現代的な条件を建設することとは、日本からその無問題
の土産を製造したのに、原材料を他の国から供給される
よりも、原材料を製造することになる。このように
更に一帯国の文化は、日本からその若千の輸出商品の
製造に用ひるから、大部分採取されたために、これ
は現在ほとんど全くされて、合衆国、朝鮮、支那の支那下にある水産
から大分採取されるからどうせは発はしに
たと皮前水産もとこれを吸収し得る適当を市場
があつたにせよ現

別の例として、生産生活の問題がある。日本がこれで
生産生活能力は、
日本の貿易と世界貿易

日本の貿易は世界の貿易に比較すると、規模は日本国に応じて大きなものでした。この分野は大なるものではなかった。確立の経済における世界貿易は英仏の力よりも遠かに少なかった。然し彼

外交、文部、貿易等の貿易よりは著しく大にして多かった。明治維新後の日本の貿易は非常に大にして多くはなかった。昭和元年から五年年に至る期間の日本の貿易は急激に増大した。大正末年にある本邦の外貿易は、第二次世界大戦

よりも速かに大であった。大正末年にある本邦の外貿易は、第二次世界大戦よ
日本の輸入及び輸出貿易は大部分英米の植民地を含む西洋各国にあり、輸入商品は木棉、亜麻、食用油など、輸出商品は鉄、砂糖、鉱物等である。

昭和四年から昭和七年に至る期間、輸出額は輸入額に反するが、昭和八年から昭和十二年に至る期間、輸入額が輸出額を上回る傾向が見られる。特に昭和十年代末期には、輸入額が輸出額を大きく上回り、経済の不況が顕著である。

昭和八年より昭和十二年まで、米国への輸出が増加し続け、輸入額の増加が見られる。特に昭和十一年度には、輸出額が輸入額を上回り、経済の不況が顕著である。
昭和二年よりの輸入は昭和三年/四年/五年の合計で、日本の総消費の約三分の一を占めた。この期間は日本経済の成長を示し、輸入品の需要が増加していた。特に食料品や生活用品の需要が急増し、この時期に輸入経済の重要性が認識された。

昭和四年/五年の輸入は昭和三年の約二倍に達しており、この時期は貿易の重要性を再認識する時期であった。この時期に輸入品の需要が増加し、日本経済の成長を支えた。
くなっ。谷關口に赴て親しんで、江戸は郊外の場合と如何に同じに住むん

て、勝景は彼。わが弟子、日光の光をうる代に在り故に

くらべれば遠に遠なる日中若雨の市でもあった。日光八年（明治三

の開国・英従印度は英語のシートを占めつつ大本の日本語に於

て観か東之に一場を繰するに至ったもののは、のぼる日中の代を

いなる部分を占めた。英語は英語・日光州、合市を除く合市に

九里を改めて居る。

日本語書籍としての英語使用の蒐集性増加は北来猟書ー合市谷

に設立される日本語の創合成就と図に於て大開に反映された。

明治三年（明治七年合市向所に於ては闇平夜大統二千三百試四、日本

書籍の三つの一分であったが、明治八年（明治十二年には闇平夜大統二

百書関、関市の一語一語に至る」とのものは間々に会の信頼の上

13
第二に家事用米は米を日本への輸入は不都合であった。それは輸と金品を内用で
あらためて出掛けるため、米を内用で
少ししかなかったからだ。決定して明治三年／四期の年の期に米の輸入増に
は国内自米貯蓄の約四分の二に限らした。輸と金品の
日本への輸入米と内部
と三日（三日の二）から入れたが足りず、四期の三年
と四期の七年／四期の三年
と四年の八年／四期の三年
と明治二十三期に上った。
その他の重要製品は砂糖、脂肪及油である。日本は砂糖の生産は殆どなく、消費は一九三八年に来年額千百万吨を超えてゐる。而してこの消費量の約十分の九は輸入され、その大半は台湾沖縄からであつた。砂糖の輸入は一九三三年より三七年迄毎年一億七千五百萬円と見られて居つた。油用藪子、脂肪及油は三七年に主要な輸入食品であつた。尤も西部は糧品を糧品に縁してゐるから、国内消費に貴する輸入の最低必要量を相當に至れて居されてゐたのである。以上の点では石油が一九三三年より三七年に至る間に輸入額一億四千万円を超える唯一のものであつてこの期間に於ては輸入額は平均一億四千万円で、西部の糧品に於てはこれに輸入額千百千万円を増してゐる。}

(19)
日本では、メソッド（アルミニウムオーステナイト）が成否をしている。成否はベルサイユ条約により、酿成のinp画家に、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがでいた。この鉄道の鑄造は、五万八千頃より一九二八年までに、一部の金融、鉄道、および転送について、これを越えることがある。
本文为中文内容，具体含义需根据上下文进行理解。
医師が診断した結果、病状は改善しています。

経過は良好で、今後も継続して治療を進めていきます。
その他の同日本が外国貿易に於て増加をして示してある輸出品として毛織物及毛糸の輸出は問題にならぬものであったが、一九三七年より三年迄の間に於ては日本の毛織物及毛糸の輸出は問題にならぬものであつたが、一九三三年より
この在のものは製織品殊に織物であって全額六億円を超えていた。これに次ぐものは紡及び紡製品である。紡績のは同年度間に於て毎年四億八千万円に上っていた。面面のことは紡績品に於ては日本の輸出品で一文を占めるもののが、多くは入原料、漂化、製品の輸出等金額は生糸及び紡製品のそれよりは多いのであるけれども、日本が輸の獲得に於ては得る外國貿易の経済によりは遠かに多いものであるより云うことである。現に今年日本が外國貿易に於て増加ををして示してゐる輸出品としては人繊毛及び人繊織物であって、この輸出額は一九三三年より三七年の迄の間は僅八億五千萬円を超えて居た。人繊おバルブの輸入は、この人繊の大半を製造する為に必要であったが、紡及紡製品の販売に比較するときは少ないものであったが、一九三三年より
三七年頃の国内では毎年大干貨を見せる商品の製造・出荷が重要な役割を果たして
日本の産業経済にとって物理・金銭及びその製品は益々重篤な役割を果たして
日本の産業経済にとって物理・金銭及びその製品は益々重篤な役割を果たして
日本の産業経済にとって物理・金銭及びその製品は益々重篤な役割を果たして
日本の産業経済にとって物理・金銭及びその製品は益々重篤な役割を果たして
日本の産業経済にとって物理・金銭及びその製品は益々重篤な役割を果たして
日本の産業経済にとって物理・金銭及びその製品は益々重篤な役割を果たして

25
日の商品で、前表第四八に掲げるようを資料の得られたもので、一九二八年から三七年迄の間の日本出荷高の七〇％近くを占めてある。二八年から三七年迄の間の日本出荷高的〇％を占めていた。この護送品の出荷額は一九三〇年より三七年までの間の三〇％近くに過ぎないものであった。一方見た日本出荷高的工化が進んだにつけ原料を外国に卸す傾向を示す護送品ではその出荷額は三七年より三七年までの間の殆ど二倍になったのである。
| 年代 | 金貯蓄の生産 | 品種類目（著者） | 日本内需及在来の外貿貿易
|------|----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1926 | 内需1000 | 出入倉庫 | 1926年
| 1927 | 内需600 | 出入倉庫 | 1927年
| 1928 | 内需400 | 出入倉庫 | 1928年

（出所：同上）
<table>
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<th>( k \times 0 )</th>
<th>( k &gt; 0 \times 0 )</th>
<th>( 0 &lt; k \times 0 )</th>
<th>( k &gt; 0 \times 0 )</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
地理上関東が大阪府の尖端に位置する最大の都市である大阪が関東に、通し東国の大都市である大連が関東に、通し洲国を支える重要な意義を有する。

関東の経済に依って多数の基礎的知識をつくり、やく提供する事例を以て次の資料を観察した。関東に就ての委員会が立つのは、戦後に於ける関東問題解決策に

本報告書はアメリカ合衆国国際委員会の委員会により外務省経済管理局の

手に成るものである。報告書を作成したのは元来政府関係が秘密に之を

公表されたためであるが、報告書は外務省経済管理局の承認を得て故下
開東租借地

その経緯の要件

開東が開東租借地（時々開東と不正確に誤解されている）は日露戦争以前にロシアが支那からその管轄権を取得した遼東半島の南部にある。明治三十八年（ロシアの東京）の租借の一地方である。ポーツマス条約締結の結果、明治三十八年（ロシアの東京）の租借提携地の影響はもはや機能を失っていたが、この取引は昭和七年の満洲国画図をめぐって会談されたものとなった。昭和十二年十一月の日中の面交年届の形態として消滅したこととなった。東は全く満洲国に置かれたことになった。

面積及人口

一九三三年二十四方哩の面積の開東と百十五哩の面積の満洲領領道附属地との双方の面積を合せるとロード州よりは少し広い。
（未完）

（未完）

（未完）
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<th>難読物</th>
<th>食料</th>
<th>木刻及木刻工品</th>
<th>印刷物及製本</th>
<th>外国貿易</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

（本节におけるすべての価額は総額円で単位百万円を示し、以下の単位）
アメリカ合衆国通貨に換算しない方がよさそうである。週間の外貨貿易統計に於ては一金単位の換算は支那金単位に対し九五として掛け替えた数値を対はならない。それは既に換算してあるから戦時統計として示したに止まるのである。戦時統計に於ては一金単位の換算は支那金単位に対し九五として掛け替えた数値を対はならない。それは既に換算してあるから戦時統計として示したに止まるのである。
昭和十六年度に於て明らかに関東に留置された。
外國商品の全価額及びそれらの輸入を仰いでゐる主要国は矢表の通りであ
る。
昭和十六年度に関東に残留された製品は、第二表の項目部門及び主要製品が示されたものである。但し関東の製品を他の地域の製品と区別していない。

地域への主要製品

東三表・昭和十一年に関東租借地に残留された製品が示したが、これはその反対に同地域では仮額を含めてある。
<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>品目</td>
<td>動物製品、皮革製品及び食料雑貨</td>
<td>果物、穀物及び野菜</td>
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一九三六年輸入価格

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自動車

石油

普通ガラス

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その他の需要の物品

産油量

普通ガラス

セメント

その他の需要の物品

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其他の穀物及穀子

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注: これらの数値は関東州貿易の中、それぞれが海外貿易の他の部分とのものであるかは不明である。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

- vs -

KOSAKA, Yasumasa

ARAKI, Saduo, et al

Q. Will you state your career as a prefectural governor?
A. I became the Governor of FUKUSHIMA Prefecture in 1923, and then governors of EHIME, OKAYAMA, and AICHI Prefectures, after which I became the Governor of TOKYO Prefecture in 1932 and stayed in that position until 1935.

Q. Did you attend the Prefectural Governors' Conference in 1933?
A. Yes I did.

Q. How many prefectural Governors' Conferences were there in 1933, and where were they held and when?
A. There was only one in 1933, as was the usual practice, and it was held in April in Tokyo.

Q. What was the ordinary procedure of the Conference when you were the prefectural governor?
A. The Conference was always held at the Official Residence of the Prime Minister. The conference was usually initiated by an address of the Prime Minister to be followed by the addresses of the State Ministers who had under their jurisdiction matters related to the Prefectural Governors.
Q. Did the War Minister make any address?

A. The War Minister usually made a brief address about the matters under his jurisdiction such as conscription, especially about the health of adults for conscription.

Q. At the occasion of the Prefectural Governors' Conference in April, 1933, was there any address, either by the Prime Minister or by other State Ministers, concerning the government policies, especially concerning the Soviet Union and Manchoukuo?

A. There were speeches by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister concerning the official recognition of Manchoukuo and withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Q. Did the War Minister make any address?

A. The War Minister made a speech concerning aid of the families of soldiers, especially of bereaved soldiers as well as, as was usual, the health of adults for conscription. He also said that at the recent combats in Manchuria and an unexpected number of soldiers had suffered from frost-bite and that the soldiers at the interior of Manchuria were experiencing hardship on account of shortage of supply.

Q. Was there any occasion in 1933 when a Prefectural Governors' Conference was held at the TOYAMA Army School?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Well, if it were not the formal Prefectural Governors' Conference, perhaps some other meeting where the Prefectural Governors met?

A. Yes. There was an occasion when the Prefectural Governors, during the recess of the Prefectural Governors' Conference, were invited by the War Minister to a lunch at TOYAMA Army School.
Q. What was the purport of the invitation?
A. It was to express the War Minister's thanks to the activities of the Soldiers' Relief Association.

Q. What was the Soldiers' Relief Association?
A. It was an association organized with civilians to take care of the poor and needy families of the soldiers, and the prefectural governors invariably held the position of being advisors to the association.

Q. Was there any speech made by War Minister ARKII on the occasion of that lunch party?
A. While we were at the lunch table, the War Minister expressed his thanks to the activities of the prefectural Governors in connection with the Soldiers Relief Association. It was more of the nature of a greeting than a speech.

Q. Was Mr. Rokuzu TAKEBE present at that party?
A. Yes, he was.

Q. I will now show you Exhibit No. 670 and Exhibit No. 3371. Will you please state if such matter as is contained in those documents was spoken by the War Minister?
A. No. There was no reference to such matter as this. Only I recollect that there was hanging in the waiting room a map of Manchoukuo, on which was marked the disposition of bandits.

Q. On that occasion of the lunch party, either before or after the lunch, did the War Minister tell the prefectural governors secretly anything about the Soviet Union or Manchoukuo?
A. No. Immediately after we were given lunch, we were shown a new style gymnastic performed by the students of the TOYAMA Army School and then the party was broken up, and we had no such chance.
2. Was defendant SUZUKI present at the lunch party?

A. I do not recall whether he was there or not. I only remember about a dozen of Army officers were there.

2. Did anyone, besides the War Minister, give a lecture?

A. There was no lecture by anyone except a greeting by the War Minister at the lunch.
On this 14th day of November, 1947.

At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East

I, KASUOKA, Takasaki, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, At the same place.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/KASUOKA, Masayasu (Seal)
I, Joseph C. Grew, being first duly sworn, make oath and say that during my service of ten years as Ambassador of the United States to Japan from 1932 to 1941 I was from time to time in close official and personal contact with Mr. Koki HIROTA whose official service during that period was successively as follows:

Foreign Minister, September 14, 1933, until appointed
Prime Minister, March 19, 1936, until appointed
Foreign Minister, June 4, 1947, until approximately May 26, 1938.

During my association with Mr. Hirota he said to me on several occasions that good relations with the United States were the "corner-stone" of his policy. In various ways, notably as follows, he implemented that policy in action.

1. My representations to the Japanese Foreign Office received far prompter and more considerate attention than had been the case before Mr. Hirota took office, and in many instances results favorable to American interests emerged.

2. One such result was the marked toning-down of aggressive anti-American comment in the Japanese press which was reflected in the press in the United States and tended to exacerbate international relations. I knew that this improvement was directly due to Mr. Hirota's efforts as a result of my representations to him.

3. On receiving news of the bombing and sinking of USS PANAY by Japanese military personnel and the subsequent machine-gunning of her officers, passengers and crew by Japanese army launchers in December, 1937, Mr. Hirota, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, broke precedents by immediately calling in person on me at the American Chancery and by expressing "the profound apologies and regrets" of the Japanese Government. He said to me with obvious emotion: "I can't tell you how badly we feel about this." This immediate official apology, conveyed in person, went far to ameliorate the gravity of the
situation. Mr. Hirota subsequently took steps to make practical amends for that ruthless attack on our ship and its occupants, notably in conveying to us a written apology and in promptly meeting our demands for a suitable indemnity.

4. Although Mr. Hirota was a private citizen at the time of the signing of the Tri-Partite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, I know that he vigorously opposed the conclusion of that agreement and that he informed friends of mine, notably Mr. Römer, the then Polish Ambassador, that he, Mr. Hirota, judged with the utmost severity the policy of the then Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka. Mr. Römer informed me that Mr. Hirota had said to him that the impetuous and thoughtless action of the Japanese Government in joining the Axis might well force Japan into war with the United States which would be "fatal to Japan."

The foregoing points are illustrative and symptomatic of Mr. Hirota's attitude and actions towards maintaining good relations and peace with the United States. While in Japan I maintained and still maintain the firm conviction that Mr. Hirota exerted his efforts to preserve peaceful relations with all foreign countries.

At no time during my ten years in Japan did I observe any attitude or action on the part of Mr. Hirota which would indicate that he was engaged in a common plan or conspiracy to dominate the world or East Asia. He was regarded by myself and by many of my diplomatic colleagues as a "moderate" during the period of intense chauvinism and extreme militarism in Japan, and during that period I observed the results of actions by him, such as those mentioned above, which were clearly aimed at arresting the aggressive tendencies of the Japanese military extremists.

I affirm that it was seldom possible for me to have first-hand information as to action taken by any Japanese official vis-à-vis his own government to oppose aggressive policies and actions, and that it is inconceivable that Mr. Hirota or any other high official while still in office
would have indicated to me or to any other foreigner that he was not in sympathy with his government's policies, whatever his own position might have been. In general, we could judge only by results, some of which are set forth above.

(Signed) Joseph C. Grew
Joseph C. Grew

Washington, D. C.
October 15, 1947
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME, A NOTARY PUBLIC FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, THIS 17th DAY OF OCTOBER, 1947.

(SEAL)

(Signed) Martha H. Wilhelm
My Commission Expires Sept. 1, 1951
AFFIDAVIT

I, Joseph C. Grew, being first duly sworn, make oath and say that in a conversation with Mr. Koki Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, on October 27, 1933, the Minister said that he hoped I would always tell him if suggestions occurred to me by which our relations could be improved. I replied that since Mr. Hirota had asked me for suggestions I thought it wise to bring to his attention, in reply to his inquiry, the importance of giving practical effect to the Japanese assurances of maintaining the Open Door in Manchuria. Mr. Hirota observed that certain French interests had sent representatives to explore the opportunities for business in "Manchukuo" and he thought it would be well if American merchants should do likewise.

(Signed) Joseph C. Grew

Washington, D.C.
October 15, 1947

(Seal)

(Signed) Martha H. Wilhelm

My Commission Expires Sept. 1, 1948
I, Joseph C. Grew, being first duly sworn, make oath and say that on September 1, 1937, Mr. Koki Hirota, Prime Minister of Japan, said that he had explained Japan's precise aims to the Chinese Ambassador and Mr. Hirota said to me, "if Chiang Kai-shek will accept these conditions I can stop the war immediately." These conditions, he said, are three in number: (1) Good relations with Manchuria. I said does that mean China's recognition of "Manchukuo." Mr. Hirota replied that juridical recognition might be very difficult for China and that it was not necessary. What Japan desired was good factual relations and the avoidance of the constant friction and trouble which China was creating. I said, "Then do you mean de facto recognition?" The Minister smiled and said he thought that was about it. He wanted China to recognize "Manchukuo's" existence. (2) The withdrawal of Chinese troops from North China. If the Chinese troops should withdraw from that area Mr. Hirota said that most of the Japanese troops would likewise withdraw. They simply wanted to ensure a zone of peace and quiet on the frontier of "Manchukuo." I said, "Does that mean Japanese control of North China?" The Minister said, "No, it does not," and he added that Japan visualized no political control but merely a state of peace and quiet. (3) The development of good relations between China and Japan. I asked him if by this he meant a cessation of anti-Japanese activities and propaganda. He replied that this was precisely what Japan wanted. "Chiang Kai-shek is weak," he said, "and he is in a very difficult position. If China possessed a single strong
Defense Document 2790-E

statesman today our troubles could be quickly solved. If Chiang Kai-shek will accept my conditions I can stop the war immediately."

(Signed) Joseph C. Grew

(Washington, D. C. 10th October 1947)

(Signed) Martin H. Williams

Sworn to and subscribed before me, a Notary Public for the District of Columbia, this 17th day of October, 1947.

(SEAL)

My Commission Expires Sept. 1, 1951

(Seal)

[Certificate]

[Signature]
AFFIDAVIT

I, Joseph C. Crow, being first duly sworn, make oath and say that on December 24, 1937, Mr. Koki Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, asked me to call on him and he handed me the Japanese note replying to our note concerning the sinking of the U.S.S. PANAY. The Minister said that only a resume of the Japanese note would be published in Japan owing to the effect which it might create in connection with the current hostilities, but that the Japanese Government has no objection to the immediate publication of the full text in the United States.

In handing me the note the Minister said that the Government is taking every step to meet the desires of the American Government and that the strictest orders in this connection have been issued to the military and naval forces. He said that the recall of Admiral Mitsunami as the officer responsible for the incident was extremely severe punishment because it implies disgrace and the fact that he is no longer competent to command "on the field of battle." The Minister furthermore gave me in strict confidence a list of eleven naval officers against whom measures have been taken in accordance with law.

I said to the Minister that I would send him the findings and report of the American Naval Court of Inquiry as soon as received. I expressed appreciation of the direct reports made to me by naval and military officers last night and repeated part of the remarks made to them in my final statement, especially with regard to the dangers of another incident analogous to that
of the PANAY. Hinota said rather sadly: "I am having a very difficult time. Things happen unexpectedly." He did not elaborate this remark. I gathered that it was his earnest hope that his present note would serve toward settling the incident. I said that I would cable the note immediately to my Government.

Washington, D. C.
October 15, 1947

(Signed) Joseph C. Grew

Joseph C. Grew

My Commission Expires Sept. 1, 1951

(Signed) Martha H. Wilhelms

My Commission Expires Sept. 1, 1951
IN TELEGRAM

F/L

FROM F.O. TO TOKYO

No. 1214.
29 Oct 47.

IMPORTANT.

Your tel. no. 1429. Following are SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE's answers to the interrogation.

Questions propounded on behalf of the Honorable Hirota, Koki:

QUESTION NO. 1: Please state your name, address and period of service as Ambassador of Great Britain to Japan.

ANSWER: SIR ROBERT LESLIE CRAIGIE of FOSSEYOUTH MANOR,
UCKFIELD, SUSSEX, Ambassador to JAPAN from Sept. 1937 to outbreak of war.

QUESTION NO. 2: Please state what was the extent of your official and private acquaintance with Hirota, Koki, during your service as Ambassador in Japan.

ANSWER: I was in close touch with him from Sept. 1937 until his resignation as Foreign Minister in May 1938; thereafter I met him occasionally.

QUESTION NO. 3: While Mr. Hirota occupied the office of Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, did he inform you of his views and that of the Japanese Government toward relations with Great Britain, United States, China, USSR and other foreign countries and, if so, please state what they were.

ANSWER: The views he expressed were favourable to peaceful relations with the countries mentioned and to a restoration of peace with CHINA.
QUESTION NO. 4: During your service in Japan did you observe any acts on the part of Mr. Hirota tending to arrest extreme views entertained in some quarters in Japan and, if so, please state what they were, giving the source of your information and knowledge.

ANSWER: Please see under (6).

QUESTION NO. 5: Please state whether complaints of the British Government were given prompt attention by the Foreign Office during the tenure of Mr. Hirota in the Foreign Office.

ANSWER: Yes, but any effort by the Foreign Ministry to give effect to my representations was usually thwarted by the War Office and the Japanese army in CHINA.

QUESTION NO. 6: Please state briefly what Mr. Hirota did upon the shelling of the LADYBIRD and the wounding in China of Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

ANSWER: (A) When I arrived in JAPAN on Sept. 3rd, 1937, a rupture of ANGLO-JAPANESE relations appeared imminent owing to the tension arising out of the wounding of SIR HUGH KNUCHBULL HUGESSON in CHINA. Although I had not yet presented my credentials, Mr. HIROTA received me immediately to discuss this crucial matter. Subsequent discussions and enquiries having demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the shot could only have been fired from a Japanese plane, a full apology was tendered by the Japanese Govt., throughout these discussions Mr. HIROTA displaying every desire to reach a just settlement.
(b) On receiving the news of the shelling of HMS LADYBIRD by Japanese troops Mr. HIROTA took the unusual step of calling on me officially at HM Embassy to express to His Majesty's Government the Japanese Government's deep regret and their readiness to pay full compensation for the damage done. So strained were the relations between the two countries at that moment that such an act required considerable moral courage and was an earnest of Mr. HIROTA's desire to avert war. Compensation for the damage was promptly paid.

QUESTION NO. 7: Do you know whether Mr. Hirota or the Japanese Foreign Office was engaged in a common plan or conspiracy to bring about the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, 1937, stating the source of your information and knowledge.

ANSWER: I have no information to that effect.

QUESTION NO. 8: Do you know whether Mr. Hirota in any way participated in any common plan or conspiracy to wage wars of aggression in violation of international law, treaties and assurances and thereby to dominate the world or East Asia or any race or people living in any part of the world, stating the source of your information and knowledge.

ANSWER: I have no information to that effect. Any such action on his part would have been inconsistent with what I knew of Mr. HIROTA's policy and with his subsequent actions.
QUESTION NO. 9: Please state, if you know, the efforts of Mr. Hirota to conclude peace with China immediately following the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7, 1937; the part played therein by yourself and other diplomatic representatives in Japan and elsewhere, stating the source of your information and knowledge.

ANSWER: I can only speak of what happened after my arrival in Sept. During Oct. and Nov. 1937 I had some private and unofficial talks with Mr. HIROTA to devise some means whereby Japanese troops could be withdrawn without loss of national prestige to the positions they occupied before the LIUKUCHIAO incident. To avoid publicity some of these talks were held in the Embassy. But any proposals which might conceivably be acceptable to the Chinese National Govt. were promptly negatived by the Japanese army. I am convinced that Mr. HIROTA was sincere in his desire to bring about an early peace with CHINA on reasonable terms.

QUESTION NO. 10: Please state, if you know, the reasons why Japan did not accept the invitation to the Brussels'Conference in the fall of 1937, stating the source of your information and knowledge.

ANSWER: JAPAN realised that she would have the other eight powers against her and that any solution emerging from such a conference could only have the appearance of a settlement imposed by force. Such was the state of public feeling in JAPAN at the time that no government could have survived which appeared to yield to force. I believe this to have been the most important of the considerations which influenced the Cabinet to decline the invitation.
QUESTION NO. 11: Do you know whether Mr. Hirota had any connection with the negotiations for or conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact, stating the source of your information and knowledge.

ANSWER: I should consider any such connexion to be out of the question.

QUESTION NO. 12: Did Mr. Hirota inform you of his views as a private citizen in regard to the Tri-Partite Pact?

ANSWER: I do not recollect discussing this matter with him.

QUESTION NO. 13: Based upon your official and personal contacts with Mr. Hirota, do you know whether or not Mr. Hirota endeavored to avoid friction with Great Britain and the United States and whether or not he sought to maintain the peace?

ANSWER: I can answer both questions emphatically in the affirmative.

QUESTION NO. 14: Please state any additional facts or matters within your knowledge which you feel would be useful to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East with respect to charges pending against Mr. Hirota before the above-named Tribunal.

ANSWER: I heard from two colleagues who saw Mr. HIROTA after the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact that the latter disapproved of the whole policy underlying the agreement.

BEVIN
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
- VS -
ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition
Deponent: Shigetaro SHIMADA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. TOGO, Shigenori on December 19th, 1947 (Page 35,838 of the record) testified "* * * that sometime in the middle of May, last year, after lunch here at Ichigaya, SHIMADA proposed a talk among NAGANO, me, and himself. At that time, SHIMADA expressed the desire that I would not say anything about the fact that the Navy desired to carry out the surprise attack. He also said something in the nature of a threat, saying that if I said so, it would not be worth my while. NAGANO then, at that time, told me that 'Even if I might have said so, the Foreign Minister need not adopt my proposition,' to which I explained to NAGANO that the situation was not so."

2. The conversation referred to by Mr. TOGO was predicated upon the following background. NAGANO and I as well as others had been imprisoned for some months before TOGO. Some time in May of 1946 NAGANO was informed of the fact that TOGO had made several prepared statements to the Prosecution to the effect that NAGANO and ITO at a Liaison Conference had advocated the commencement of hostilities December 8th, 1944 without any notification
and that they finally agreed to send a notification through the persuasion of Mr. TOGO. NAGANO became quite incensed over this statement and came to me saying that it was absolutely a falsehood and reflected deeply on the honor of the Japanese Navy. He asked me if I had a recollection of such a thing occurring. I told him I certainly did not and since it was a grave matter, I as Navy Minister certainly should remember it if it had taken place. In order to dispel any doubt whatsoever we questioned all of the accused who attended the Liaison Conferences. As I have previously testified before this Tribunal no one agreed with TOGO's statement.

Shortly after TOGO's incarceration NAGANO and I had a conversation with him during a recess period here in this building. I do not remember the exact conversation that took place but I know that it was in the presence of all of the other accused and no attempt at secrecy was made. The gist of the conversation was to tell TOGO about the statements of all of the other accused concerning this matter. TOGO states that I used words which sounded like a threat. What they could be I have no idea unless it was a remark to the effect that he should be more careful about the truth. As to whether I said this or NAGANO I do not clearly remember. Certainly neither NAGANO nor I attempted to influence him in any way, much less to control the statements that he would make. It would have been ridiculous for us to have done so because TOGO had already made the statement on several occasions and could not have retracted it without telling two different stories.
To have made a threat to him would have been both absurd and unthinkable and nothing was said which could have led him to this belief. It was for the first time here in this court room on December 19th, 1947 that I learned TOGO had interpreted our conversation as he had and I was shocked and astonished at his utterances and attitude. Therefore it is mainly for the purpose of denying this interpretation of our conversation that I have asked to again take the witness stand.

3. Concerning the statement made by Mr. TOGO in this court room that about ten days before the death of Admiral NAGANO he told Mr. TOGO that he was going to bear the full responsibility for the attack on Pearl Harbor I would like to state the following. I have no knowledge of whether this conversation took place or not. But Admiral NAGANO had often said and I believe freely admitted to the Prosecution that he assumed full responsibility for issuing the naval order for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The use of the words "surprise attack" as a military term by no means implies an attack without notification of the beginning of war. In many orders subsequent to commencement of hostilities the Navy used the term "surprise attack." Mr. TOGO must be confusing an attack without notification and what the Navy considered to be a surprise attack. The words "surprise attack" did not, as used by Admiral NAGANO and as understood generally in military circles denote an attack without a declaration of war. The Navy actually wanted a proper notice to be made before the attack in full compliance with international law. The wording of the declaration or notice was left entirely to the Foreign Office and if a strong declaration of
war had been delivered according to plans in Washington, D.C. at the time designated it would have made no difference insofar as the element of surprise was concerned and the success of the Pearl Harbor Attack. NAGANO, being quite indignant at Mr. TOGO's beforementioned statement, told me many times that he willingly took full responsibility for the attack against Pearl Harbor but the failure to deliver a last notification or declaration of war to the United States Government before the attack has no bearing on the Navy and was a matter for which he could not assume any responsibility. Therefore if Admiral NAGANO told Mr. TOGO that he took full responsibility for the surprise attack he certainly meant the same thing that he had said many times before to me and others and did not mean to take full responsibility for attacking without a prior notification of hostilities.

4. As to Mr. TOGO's statement that the rest of us who attended the Liaison Conferences could not recollect the fact that an Imperial Conference had been held on November 5th, 1941 and hence because we were forgetful of such a highly important conference it would only be natural to forget anything unfavorable to us is hardly a fair remark. As I said before, Mr. TOGO entered SUGAMO Prison some seven months after most of us. During this time, he had ample opportunity to refresh his memory through records available to him and expert advice. However after the beginning of the trial all of us were given complete facilities so that any matters which were in doubt could be fully explored. We were able to refresh our recollections to the same degree that Mr. TOGO had before his confinement in Sugamo. And I venture to say that there exists no differences now between Mr. TOGO's ability to recollect matters and the other accused.
On this 8th day of January, 1948, At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Tokyo, Japan

DEONENT: SHIHADA, Shigetaro

I, SHIHADA, Shigetaro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) Kan AKATANI (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

SHIHADA, Shigetaro (Seal)
東郷茂徳は一九四七年十二月九日左の如く語した（法廷速記）

「東郷　　八三　八言一東郷　人先づ第一に昨年の五月の中半だった。其
と三人で話したい。云ふ話事を申し出て話をしたが、此際の市ヶ谷に
来て話をした後に島田が永野と私と

と思ひます。島田から私の方へ海軍が有難い事をしたと云ってくれるなど

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が云ふことを云ったらませしめた。永野は、伊藤

はさゝ雲ふこともちやなかかったのだから

に説明したことがあります。

即も永野と余は、伊藤が並結会談で、

一九四六年の五月の中のことであるが、永野は、東郷が、永野

と伊藤が並結会談で、

一九四一年十二月の敵対行為開始は無通告

に説明したことがあります。
で行うべきことを主張し、東郷氏の説明によって逐次解明することを

側に提出されたという事実を知らされた。後者は余のにそれを伝えたが、東郷氏はこの

不敬な記憶がないと答え、逐次解明を求めて余を

当社で議論した会告者に訴えられて代わって、彼は余に伝えたことが

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当社で議論した会告者に訴えられて代わって、彼は余に伝えたことが

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当社で議論した会告者に訴えられて代わって、彼は余に伝えたことがある。
三、永野大将の逝去約十日前に、大将が東経氏に、鳴鶴沼攻撃に就
ては金賞任を負ふつもりだと謳ったといふ。本法延に於ける東
経氏の誤忌に関しては、余は散の知らぬ。然し永野大將は、鳴鶴沼攻
撃が影響されなかっし、又それを便乗せに對して金賞任を負ふといふこと
は、余は散の知らぬ。然し永野大將は、鳴鶴沼攻
撃が影響されなかっし、又それを便乗せに對して金賞任を負ふといふこと
は、余は散の知らぬ。
四、東旅行は彼が前訂の番号に出席した我々が報告が九度二年十一月二日に前訂の番号が報告されたことを記憶してみなかった従って公平な言いのは当然であると述べたが、これは私たちの利用と専門家の利用にによってその記憶を新たにするに充分を期する。
我々の方々は皆、裁判が始まってから始めて完全なる便宜を與へられて、襲はしい問題を充分に処理することに有したと、同じ程度に記憶を新にし得たのである。我々は東亜氏が暴行に收容されなかったと言ふ。今や東亜氏と他の被告の記憶力の間に何ら差異は存しないと。

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昭和二十二年（一九四七年）
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大な言葉を忘れる

大な言葉を忘れる
(Extract from Exhibit No. 688;)

Extract from
Noriyama, Member of Staff
"Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (Draft)"
(Secret)

Made by the Research Institute of Total War.

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**Note:** The above table is a partial transcription from the document. The full text is not clearly visible due to the quality of the image.
Excerpt From the Original Draft of the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: Page 1

This study was carried out by the members of the institute, pointing and guiding the general course it should pursue, regarding the essentials in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with the main object of educating the students. Because of the limited time or other reasons, some parts of the contents are precise and detailed, and others are not. Especially the mutual relations of each part are not thoroughly looked into and requires further study and corrections.

But for the time being it has been printed to serve it as material for future research.
(Extract from Exhibit 870)

Extract from
"First Table Top Total War Maneuvers" -- Page I.

Circulation

Supervisor of the Exercise (Signed) Iimura
Assistant Supervisor of Exercise (Signed)
Foriba, member of the staff (Signed)

Conditions of 3rd Term Exercise
and Prosecution of the Exercise

Supervisory Branch of
Table Top Maneuvers

Custody /s/ Matsuda, Chiaki (seal)
Assistant Supervisor
(Extract from Exhibit 870)

Extract from

"First Table Top Total War Maneuvers"--Page 2.

Sokien No. 7
Part I
No. 5 of 120 copies in all

Appointed Receiver

Yatsuda, member of the Institute.

Keeping Secret

Secret to all except those participating in maneuvers

Management

Shall be returned after the end of maneuvers.
Ex. 3721

(Extract from Exhibit 871)

Extract from "Records of the Progress of Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War No. 1" -- Outside Cover.

(Secret)

To be perused by

Director of the Institute (Signed) Iimura
The Secretary (Signed) Oka
The Staff

(Sealed) Matsuda, Chiaki
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al vs ARAKI, Sadao, et al

I, KOJIMA, Hideo, state under oath as follows:

1. My present address is Tatsukeshi, Kushiro-mura, Kushiro-gun, Hokkaido.

2. I was Naval Attache of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin from April 1936 until March 1939. During that period I was first Commander and later Captain of the Navy.

3. In Exhibit No. 3619 of this Tribunal, Transcript page 35,440, it is stated: "3. In March or April 1938 the Naval Attache of the Embassy sent a cable to the Navy Minister strongly urging Ambassador Togo's removal on the ground that he was on bad terms with the German Foreign Minister and that his retention in the circumstances of the time, when it was necessary to promote Japanese-German cooperation was not in the interest of the country. The cable stated also that the matter had been talked over with the Military Attache." This is contrary to the fact. I never sent such a telegram to the Ministry of Navy or to any other place. Of course I also never dispatched such a telegram after consultation with Military Attache Oshima.

4. However, there was a following fact: The predecessor to Ambassador Togo was Mr. Mushakoji. During the time of Ambassador Mushakoji, the ambassador, the Military and Naval Attaches had been able to collaborate smoothly. But after Ambassador Togo had arrived at the end of December 1937, the relations between Ambassador Togo and some of the Embassy staff on the one hand, and Military Attache Oshima and I as the Naval Attache on the other, came to lack harmony. For instance, important telegrams from the Foreign Office which had theretofore been shown by the Embassy to the Military and Naval Attaches were shown to us only very reluctantly, if at all. Furthermore, when the press mission arrived from Japan, the Military and Naval Attaches were not invited to a reception at the Japanese Embassy, a fact which was found very strange by that mission.
As in this way an emotional estrangement was caused between the Ambassador and the both Attaches, and works did not proceed smoothly. I reported this circumstances to the Ministry of Navy. But I did absolutely not consult Oshima in dispatching this telegram.

I might add that this telegram was not at all related with the question of the Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance. At that time the question of a Japan-Germany-Italy treaty did not yet arrive.

5. The people's mission led by Mr. Godo-Takuo, arrived in Germany in November 1937 and stayed there until about April 1938. I had no consultation with Military Attache Oshima or Mr. Godo with respect to the question of conditions of German trade in China, nor did I have any conversation with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop concerning this matter. I also never heard that Oshima bypassed the Embassy and talked with Ribbentrop on this matter or presented to him a proposal concerning conditions of trade.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KOJIYA, Hideo (seal)

On this 22 day of Dec., 1947
At Tokyo

DEponent: KOJIYA, Hideo (seal)

I, Shimauchi, Tatsuki, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

the same place

Witness: (signed) SHIMAUCHI, Tatsuki (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

GODO TAKUO

I, Godo Takuo, state under oath as follows:

1. My present address is Shunzanso, Sengakuhara-mura, Kanagawa Prefecture.

2. I have the degree of Doctor of Engineering. I was Technical Adviser to the South Manchurian Railway Co., President of the Showa Steel Manufacturing Co., and President of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry. I was Minister of Commerce and Industry from February 1937 to June the same year.

3. After the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, Japan in an attempt to establish amity and cooperation despatched the so-called people's missions to such countries as Britain, America, France, Germany, Italy and others. As I, myself too, had been asked by the Japanese Government to go to Germany as a people's envoy, there was an occasion that I visited Germany accompanied by Nagai Alexander, ex-commercial attaché to the Japanese Embassy in Germany, Iino Koji, a staff member of the Mitsubishi Trading Co., and Akazuka Masatomo, a staff member of the South Manchurian Railway Co., as my suite. Our mission left Yokohama on October 11th, 1937, arrived at Berlin on November 15th, and after staying in Germany up to April 14th, 1938, returned to Japan in early June.

4. During my stay in Germany, I met Neurath, Ribbentrop, Goering, Schacht and others, and also had, on occasions with foreign traders and businessmen of Germany, my object in conducting these conversations was to promote Japanese
German joint enterprises in North China or Manchuria, by uniting Germany's advanced technique and Japan's capital.

5. During my stay in Germany, I have never conferred with Military Attache Oshima on the subject of the terms of trade and commerce of Germany in North China. I never heard that Military Attache Oshima discussed with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop as to this commercial problem, or that he made a proposal concerning the terms of commerce to the Foreign Minister. Furthermore, I have never heard that the Naval Attache in Germany had anything to do with this problem.

On this 22nd day of December, 1947,
At Sengokuhara-mura, Kanagawa Prefecture,

Godo Takuo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: Shimanouchi Tatsuki (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Godo Takuo (seal)
東京商工會議所会議を務める。一九三七年二月より同年六月迄商工大臣

余は工業博士にして南満洲偽道株式会社技術顧問、昭和行政所社長、
同日於同所

立會人

石八會立會人ノ記名ヲ壹セシテ

壹念

邁

雄

於神奈川縣仙石原

弟

月

日
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

KATAKURA TADASHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I occupied the post of staff officer of the Kwantung Army, serving the latter half of my term as Chief of the 4th Section; then the post of Chief of the Manchurian Section in the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry; and later the post of senior staff officer of the Kwantung Defence Army. During these terms I was in charge of matters concerning the Manchoukuoan National Army and the National Military Service Law.

Relating to some of those matters I have already testified before this Tribunal on 25 March 1947. I testify hereby about the right of supreme command in Manchoukuo and the relation between the National Military Service Law and war-preparation against the U S S R, which matters were not included in my former testimony.

1. The Right of Supreme Command of the Manchoukuoan National Army.

The right of supreme command of the Manchoukuoan National Army was in the hands of the Manchoukuoan Emperor. This fact is clear from the provision of the 11th Article of the Organic Law, which is the constitutional law of Manchoukuo (Exhibit No. 146): "The Emperor commands the Army, the Navy and the Air Force". According to the official memorandum exchanged between the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army Honjo and the Chief Executive P'u-Yi, dated 10 March 1932 (Exhibit No. 120), Japan and Manchoukuo were to cooperate in their national defence, and the right of stationing Japanese troops was approved; however, there was no provision in them for delegation of the right of supreme command.

But, at the time of conclusion of the Protocol a secret treaty, called the Defensive Military Treaty, was separately concluded between the military authorities of Japan and Manchoukuo. The men concerned in the conclusion of the treaty were Lieutenant-General Hoiso (the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung army), Rear-Admiral Kobayashi (Chief of the Naval Mission in Manchoukuo), and Minister of Military Administration Chang. Copies of the document were retained by both the Manchoukuoan Government and the headquarters of the Kwantung army; I, however, do not know what became of them after the surrender. The contents of the treaty are as follows. I remember the contents very well since I participated in the drafting.
of it, and the managing of it subsequently.

(1) On the stationing of Japanese troops for the sake of the joint defence of Japan and Manchoukuo, the Manchoukuoan side was to guarantee to Japan enjoyment of the necessary freedom and to afford convenience for Japanese military actions to accompany it.

(2) In the event of invasion by an enemy, or in the case of Japanese and Manchoukuoan forces' (both army and navy) cooperating in fights, or in the case of both armed forces joining in cooperative fighting actions in order to maintain public peace such as suppression of the banditti, etc., the Japanese forces could command the Manchoukuoan forces in accordance with necessities.

The second provision was made because of the necessity for smoothness of operational actions. In other words, it provided that Manchoukuoan troops might come under the command of the Japanese commander of the force in each separate locality in case of any invasion by a foreign enemy of Manchoukuo, or when the troops of the two countries cooperated in the suppression of bandits in times of unsettlement. This was, in other words again, a delegation of the right of command for a specific instance of battle. Therefore, the right of command could never be delegated to a Japanese commander at all in peace-time except on the specific occasions of battles or suppression of bandits.

There was neither a provision that the right of supreme command should be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, nor such a substantial fact.

Subsequently, at the time of the abolition of extra-territorial rights in December 1937, matters concerning the stationing of Japanese forces were re-arranged, and simultaneously the first provision of the defensive military treaty was made public; the second provision, on the right of command, however, remained still a secret treaty.

2. The National Military Service Law.

I have already fully testified before this Tribunal (25 March 1947) about how the Manchoukuoan National Army was organized, etc. The purpose of the National Military Service Law was to get rid of the private soldiery of the old-time war-lords, who were of bad quality and who had composed the National Army up to that time, and to elevate the soldiery to a superior quality. Also, as an ultimate object, the National Army of Manchoukuo was organized primarily for the purpose of maintenance of public peace. That the purpose of the law was not formation of a large army for a war against the U.S.S.R is, therefore, quite clear by the fact that the law provided no system of a reserve corps, as in other countries, but provided only for the system of active service. Actually, there was no change in the strength of the Manchoukuoan Army after and before the enactment of the law; it remained generally about 80,000.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Katakura Tadashi (seal)

On this 7th day of January, 1948
At Tokyo

Deponent: Katakura Tadashi

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (Seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
9 January 1948
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

RAKI Sadac, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

OBI TETSUZO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I occupied the post of Chief of the 1st Section as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from March 1942 to August 1944.

1. According to the provision of the Organic Law of Manchoukuo (Exhibit No. 436), the right of the supreme command of the Manchoukuo National Army was in the hands of the Emperor and not in that of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. The defensive military treaty was in effect, and according to the provisions of the treaty, the right of command could be delegated to a Japanese commander, in cases when an enemy invaded the country or when Japanese and Manchoukuoan forces cooperated in an operation as national defense.

During my service in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, a suppressing operation was made in Jehol Province in 1942-1943 against the Communist banditti, and Manchoukuoan troops of the 5th military area of Jehol were commanded by the commander of the Kwantung Defence Army and in a cooperative operation of both forces was carried out. Manchoukuo was calm and peaceful during my time there, and this was the only instance of such delegation of command. The command was in no instance delegated to the commander of the Kwantung Army.

2. During my service, the number of the Manchoukuoan Army was about 80,000 in total, and its duty was specifically the defense in the country and trainings were done accordingly. Its quality and armament were far inferior for being against the USSR's army.

3. General Umezu, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, held various kinds of meetings which were accompanied by dinner usually. The reason was the necessity of liaison and cooperation between various people on their execution of duties; noon of every Wednesday he held meetings with the staffs of Army, Navy, Embassy and Kwantung Bureau; noon of every Saturday he held meetings with the Chief of General Affairs, Chief of the Central Headquarters of the Concordia Society and the staffs of his headquarters. I, myself, always attended both these meetings, and found them simply convivial meetings and not meetings whereupon the commander gave orders or instructions.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Obi Tetsuzō (seal)

On this 7th day of January, 1948
at Tokyo

Deponent: Obi Tetsuzō

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
8 January 1948
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

URAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

HANDA BINJI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. In June 1931*, I was called to become a professor of Ta Tung College of Manchoukuo, and left my former post as teacher of the Legal Literature course of the Kyūshū University. Concurrently with the above position I was appointed as a committeeman of Central Headquarters of the Concordia Society, and to the end of the war kept up relations with the Society as a committeeman or consultant of it.

Furthermore, in August 1942, when Manchoukuo enacted the National Labor Service Law and the Labor Service Bureau was established, I was appointed the first chief of the bureau. Then, as the problem of labor power in the country became acute, the Labor Ministry was established in March 1945, when I was appointed vice-chief of the Ministry, retaining the office until the end of the war. After the surrender, I was interned in the USSR, and came home on 2 September of this year.

2. Originally, Manchoukuo had little population in comparison with the size of the land, and the man-power for agriculture, industry and construction works could hardly be self-supplied. Therefore, she had depended on a large number of laborers who came from North China, the so-called "coolies". The number of laborers from North China reached 800,000 annually before the foundation. At the time of the national foundation the number had decreased to 400,000 for the time being. After that, in accordance to the stabilization of the public peace the number increased year by year and in 1940 went beyond 1,300,000.

3. However, because of the fact that the control of the international financial exchange was strengthened in 1939, and that inflation in North China became extensive, after the latter half of 1940 the circumstances of the labor-power changed quickly. The labor-power was rapidly diminished, and finally the number of immigrant laborers fell below 300,000 in 1944. Then large difficulties arose both in the fields of industry and agriculture as a matter of course, as well as in the achievement of production and construction in the fields of construction works.
As for the Manchoukuoan Government, who apprehended the situation quickly, it was necessary to establish rapidly the domestic organization for self-supply of labor-power, stealing a march on the shortage. Then a new organization of labor was established in 1931. One of its purposes was supply and security of man-power through the medium of administrative measures, and the other was the National Labor Service system by law.

4. Since the basis of improvement of the country was to establish the good custom of "everybody works" among the people by building respect for labor, the object of the establishment of the new labor organization was to train the people through actual labor and simultaneously to be completely ready for self-supply of labor-power by bringing up and securing the necessary labor-power for the country.

(a) The principle of security and supply of labor-power through the medium of administrative measures was: to allot to each province and prefecture the number of laborers which should be secured and supplied, by considering the actual circumstances of each local region of the country; to raise the laborers through each local administrative organ, which was to keep careful watch on the labor-control situation subsequently; and to allot and arrange the labor-power raised to the industries in the plan made in advance by the central administrative office of the Ministry of National Welfare, later the Labor Ministry, which was concerned with the business. The laborers raised by these measures were approximately 20- to 45-year-old males, and the men who were in service under the National Service Law were excluded. The number was about 1,600,000 in the plan of 1935. The laborers raised by these measures were to be paid official wages (5 or 6 yen per day) indiscriminately, and to be given assistance in securing their rations of necessity for daily life.

The time of labor-service was generally six months, once for a person, and the proportion of laborers employed was 15% of the available number. The nature of the labor was ordinary production (agriculture, industry and public works) and work for the army (1/3 of the total).

(b) The National Labor Service System was based on the National Labor Service Law, and designed to put all young men in service for 12 months during the three years between the ages of 21 and 23, excluding the men in military service and deformed or disabled persons or who had other disqualifying defects. (Later, in 1945, the time of the duty was amended to three years, and according to the situation men might return to their homes after two years' duty). These persons were allotted, by the central administrative office concerned, to various lines of production and construction, according to a plan. The number was 550,000 in the plan of 1945. During the time of duty, they were paid a fixed allowance. Since their lives were quite pleasant and suitable to young men's spirits, the men worked happily with spirit and pride.

5. The chief of the central headquarters of the Kyōwakai was to be appointed by the president of the Kyōwakai (Lieutenant-General Miyake, who was a retired officer, was not a representative of the Kwantung Army, but only a chief of the Central Headquarters appointed by the president). This is clear from
the fact that a native of Manchuria, such as Mr. Yu Shing-yuan, was appointed to the post.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Handa Binji (seal)

On this 7th day of November, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: Handa Binji

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereon in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
1 December 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

TAKAKURA TADASHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I, Takakura Tadashi, was born in February 1903, and reside now in Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, Otsukanana-Machi No. 57. I was appointed chief of the Agriculture Section of the Agriculture Ministry of Manchoukuo in October 1941. I was transferred to the post of chief of the Planning Section of the General Affairs Board in July 1943. In May 1945, upon a change in the official system, my post was changed to Vice-Chief of the Planning Bureau of the General Affairs Board, which I retained until the Japanese surrender.

(1) During my tenure of office as Chief of the Agriculture Section of the Agriculture Ministry, I participated in the drawing up of the 2d 5-year plan of industrial construction. The basic ideas of this 2d 5-year plan were almost the same as that of the 1st 5-year plan, the stabilization of the national welfare and the completion of the defence-power. And from the viewpoint of the actual result of the 1st 5-year plan, the security and the stabilization of the national welfare of Manchoukuo especially were taken up as the most important among the ideas, and the promotion and the development of light industries which had as their purpose the supply of material for daily use of the people and the improvement of agricultural production were assigned in the plan equal importance with the parts relative to heavy industry and transportation and communication.

However, at the time when this plan was established, unexpectedly the Pacific War occurred, and it became impossible to execute the plan as it was. And since supplies of materials from Japan became gradually more difficult, while Japan's demands for imports of agricultural products, steel, aluminum and coal had increased accompanying the progress of the war, the necessary reinforcement of production was made by making up plans for increase of production in each year according to the change of the situation as mentioned above. However, practically it was difficult to fulfill Japan's requirements to some extent, and at the same time to reinforce the power of national defence of Manchoukuo and to increase the production of material for national welfare. Thus, in the end, we took measures to keep and stabilize the national welfare and to accept the requests of Japan by risking even the decrease of the power of national defence, which also the staff officers of the Kwantung Army who had responsibility for co-defence of
Manchoukuo well understood. A reason for taking such measures was also our faith in the existence and effect of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

The above matters are instanced by the following concrete facts. First, the production of arms in Manchoukuo was the construction of training planes for Japan's needs, and production of guns and bullets mainly for the use of the Manchoukuoan forces. As for planes in 1914, the actual result of the construction of training planes was 784, and the total amount of gun production was around 25,000,000 Yen, which figures show that the production of arms was quite small. Second, the actual results of the production and distribution of steel, iron, aluminum and coal were that internal consumption accounted for the much greater part, and that the acquisitions of the Kwantung Army, except of aluminum, were of very small proportions.

(2) The Kwantung Army never issued any order at all with respect to the policies of the Manchoukuoan Government. There was the custom of liaison and preliminary conference between the Kwantung Army and the Manchoukuoan Government, regarding important policies which had connection with the national defence or policies which required conference with the Japanese Government.

From the viewpoint of defence, the Kwantung Army made in written form proposals of some abstract matters to the Manchoukuoan Government; such cases, however, were very rare. While the government took up and put into practice the matters proposed when they were proper and there were no difficulties accompanying their realization.

(3) I was often told by Mr. Takebe, Chief of General Affairs, that Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army Umezu was quite careful toward the U.S.S.R. relations and wished that the government staff members would avoid so far as possible any action which might irritate the U.S.S.R. In such circumstances, after his taking office in Hsingking the border between Manchoukuo and the U.S.S.R. was quite calm and trouble there greatly decreased.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Takakura Tadashi (seal)

On this 7th day of January, 1948
at Tokyo

Deponent: Takakura Tadashi

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
9 January 1948
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs-

ARAKI Sadae, et al.

- Defendants -

KÔTANI ETSUO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

(Q1) Were you a staff officer of the Kwantung Army around September 1942?

(A1) Yes.

(Q2) What sort of duties had you as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army?

(A2) I was attached to the 2d Section, and I was in charge of intelligence.

(Q3) Did you know the operations plans of the Kwantung Army?

(A3) I have neither seen the documents nor been told or shown the contents of them.

(Q4) In the Kwantung Army, was it not true that the men who were engaged in the intelligence services were never shown the operations plans?

(A4) The duty of those engaged in intelligence services was to collect the necessary information for making up the operations plans in consideration of all possible cases, and to offer them to the Commander-in-Chief as references for operations. They, however, were neither consulted regarding the operations plans which had already been determined, nor shown them at all. I thought that was in the nature of the plans themselves, and never requested to be shown them.

(Q5) Were you dispatched to the Mongolia Stationary Army around September 1941?

(A5) Yes, I was.

(Q6) What was the purpose of that?

(A6) Mainly, the purposes were consultation on intelligence and inspection of the circumstances of Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(Q7) Were there any conferences on the operation matters?

(A7) No, not at all. I had neither knowledge of nor duty concerning operations plans. I could not do such a thing, even if it were a temporary duty.
(Q8) What kind of consultation was had on intelligence?

(A8) It was a conference for necessary agreements on the alterations of the intelligence-collection areas in charge of both armies.

(Q9) It happened quite often, that a staff officer would come or go to or from the Kwantung Army or the Mongolia Stationary Army, did it not?

(A9) Yes.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Kōtani Etsuo (seal)

On this 10th day of December, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: Kōtani Etsuo

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
12 December 1947
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

HATTORI NAOMIHIRO

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am an ex-major of the Japanese army. I am living in Tokyo, Shinjuku-ku Shimochiai 2 Chome 804.

I served in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army as a cipher officer at the time when the Kantokuen started in 1941. Later I was transferred to the cipher section of the General Staff Office, in September 1942.

2. I am acquainted with Matsuura Kusuo, having had connection with him on our businesses. I have neither seen operations plans, nor been shown the contents of them by my superiors. As to the Kantokuen, I am entirely ignorant of the contents of the plan I know, however, that the Kwantung Army was reinforced at that time. I have no recollection whether I ever talked with Matsuura relating to this problem. At that time, however, there were various rumors among young officers; I might, therefore, have talked with Matsuura about these rumors. I never told Matsuura anything concerning the contents of either operations plans or the Kantokuen; I could not have, because I did not know them.

3. The conferences of the cipher clerks at the General Staff Office used to be held every year as a custom.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Hattori Naohiro (seal)

On this 7th day of January, 1948
At Tokyo

Deponent: Hattori Naohiro

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
8 January 1948
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

- Defendants -

AFFIDAVIT

ÔGOSHI KENJI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I served in the 5th Section of the staff of the Kwantung Army from September 1941, and subsequently, after Major-General Ikeda was removed from his position as Chief of the 5th Section in July 1942, I succeeded him and was the Chief of the Section until March 1943.

2. The 5th Section was newly established in September 1941. The duty of the section was to study how to make easier the operations of troops by arranging the rear areas of army according to the operation of an army. In the past, in the army the military supply organization was to take charge of the administration of occupied zones. The system and methods of administration were not studied in peace-time; but it is quite necessary to study the administration of occupied areas in peace-time, parallel with the drawing up of the plans of operation. Thus, I was told, the study came to be carried out.

3. In September 1941, an instruction was given by the General Staff to the Kwantung Army to the effect that the study of administration of occupied zones was to be made and that plans should be presented accordingly. Then the studies were put under way. This instruction was kept in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army; after the surrender, however, I do not know what became of it. The main purpose of these studies was investigation of measures necessary to be taken to maintain public peace and order in the rear of the operational armies and to smooth their operations. The tentative plan was accomplished around March 1942, as the result of the study. Since the plan was not a complete one, it was sent to the operations section of the Kwantung Army and for reference to the General Staff. We did not obtain the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, since it was not complete.

4. At the same time I left the section the section was abandoned.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Ogoshi Kenji (seal)

On this 8th day of January, 1948
At Tokyo

Deponent: Ogoshi Kenji

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
2 January 1948
I, IKEDA, Sumihisa, formerly a lieutenant-general in the Japanese Army, born in 1894, state as follows under oath:

I served as the Chief of the Army Special Service Agency in Mukden from August, 1940, until July, 1941.

On July 6, 1941, I was attached to the Army General Staff Office.

In September, 1941, I was appointed the Chief of the 5th Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

On July 2, 1942, I was appointed the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and served in that capacity until July, 1945. In July, I was transferred to the post of Director of the Tokyo Cabinet Combined Plans Bureau /T.N. TÔKYÔ WAIKAKU SÔGO KEIKAKU KYOKU/.

In performing my duties in that capacity, I came to know the following facts to which I shall now testify.

In July, 1941, by orders of War Minister TÔJO, a special group of officers was established in the Army General Staff Office. It was composed of the following men: Major-general HATA, myself, Colonel ARAO, Lt. Colonel ÔGOSHI, Lt. Colonel SAITO, Lt. Colonel KATO, Lt. Colonel ORITA, and others. All of these men were experts on Russia, or on railroad transportation, communication, the KEMPEI, etc.

In this group, besides the men above-named, there were 5 or 6 men concerned with administration and 2 or 3 men concerned with routine office work. In accordance with the orders of Field Marshal SUGIYAMA, Chief of the Army General Staff, and as a result of the operational plan, this group was to specially make a study of administration of occupied territories with regard to the Soviet Maritime Province, Siberia, the Peoples' Republic of Mongolia, and the possessions of Manchukuo.

This group came under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army General Staff as far as its work was concerned, and was headed by Major-general HATA, Hikosaburô.

Actually, this group worked for a short period of time while attached to the Army General Staff Office in Tokyo. As a result of studies, the Chief of the Army General Staff decided that it was more appropriate to conduct the
research on the administration of occupied Soviet territories in the Kwantung Army Headquarters rather than in Tokyo. Consequently the entire group was transferred to the Kwantung Army Headquarters in Manchuria by orders of the Chief of the Army General Staff.

In accordance with an order signed by War Minister TOJO, the 5th Section was specially established in the Kwantung Army Headquarters with our group. This section was given the duty of studying the administration of occupied Soviet territories (Manchuria and Mongolia), based upon the order of the Chief of the Army General Staff Office. From this time, that is, from August, 1941, until July, 1942, I was the Chief of this section by order of UMEZU, Yoshijiro, Commander of the Kwantung Army. I was also the Chief of all the work of this section. Immediately after its establishment, the 5th Section undertook the study of administration problem of occupied territories of the Far Eastern Soviet territories, the Maritime Province, and Manchurian territories. Speaking in a concrete manner, the 5th Section, of which I was the Chief, engaged in drawing up plans for the disposition of occupied Soviet territories (Manchuria and Mongolia), in accordance with the instructions received from the Chief of the Army General Staff in September, 1941.

Around May, 1942, the 5th Section drew up the draft of this plan. This plan was entitled "The Kwantung Army Military Administration Plan," and it consisted of the following six parts.

- Administration
- Maintenance of Peace and Order
- Organization of Industries
- Circulation of Currency
- Communication
- Transportation

At the present time, I do not accurately remember all the matters planned in each part. What I am able to say generally about the plan is that it included concrete adjustment of individual problems of political guidance and administrative and economic measures to be carried out in occupied Soviet and Manchurian territories. This plan was forwarded to the Chief of the Army General Staff in May, 1942, by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army after being inspected by UMEZU, the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

As Chief of the 5th Section, I did not know the content of the operational plan which was drawn up, and classified as top secret by the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Therefore, I did not know when and now it was intended
to realize the occupation of Soviet territories. In connection with the study of administration of occupied territories, I was receiving all the concrete instructions necessary for establishing the sphere of problems to be handled by my section, from YOSHIMOTO the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, or from Lt. general H.T.A, Hikosaburo, the Vice Chief of Staff who had already been transferred at this time to the Kwantung Army Headquarters from the Army General Staff Office.

After the military administration plan was forwarded to the Army General Staff Office, the Kwantung Army Headquarters received orders from War Minister TÔJÔ to the effect that a study should be made of administration of occupied territories to be carried out in the South Seas area, with the object of utilizing the study of administration of occupied Soviet territories. With this as the object, I who was then a major-general, and Lt. Colonel ÔGOSHI, departed in May, 1942, for the South Seas area which was under Japanese occupation, with the approval of UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army. Prior to our departure, we met the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, and Vice War Minister KIMURA, and received from them certain instructions which had bearing on our trip.

We inspected Malaya, Sumatra, Celebes, French Indo-China, Philippines, Thailand, Burma and other South Seas areas.

We returned to Japan at the end of June, 1942, after which we again met the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff and Vice War Minister KIMURA. We made an oral report to them on the results of the trip. After returning to the Kwantung Army Headquarters, I made an oral report on the results of our studies to UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army and to his Chief of Staff.

On July 2, 1942, I was appointed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and my post of Chief of the 5th Section was filled by Lt. Colonel ÔGOSHI.

END

December 30, 1947

/s/ IKEDA, Sumihisa

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named IKEDA, Sumihisa at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this 30 December 1947.

/s/ T.D. WHITE

/t/ T. D. White, Captain
Summary Court Officer
I, Shimada Shigeru hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said IXEDA SUMIHIKO was duly sworn in my presence and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 30 day of December, 1947, at Tokyo Japan.

/s/ S. Shimada

Shimada Shigeru
CERTIFICATE

I, Miyama Yōsuke, the Chief of the Archives Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, certify that the two following documents are not in the custody of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, they having been destroyed at the time of surrender.

1. Military Administration Plan of the Kwantung Army (Test Plan), March 1942.

2. Notification, "A Study of Military Administration Shall Be Made", from the Vice-Chief of the General Staff to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, August 1942.

31 October 1947 Tokyo

Chief of the Archives Section
1st Demobilization Bureau

Miyama Yōsuke (seal)

I certify that the above signature and seal were made before me, on the same day at the same place.

Miyata Mitsuo (seal)
CERTIFICATE

I, Miyama Yōzō, Chief of the Archives Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, certify that the two following documents are not now in the custody of the 1st Demobilization Bureau:

1. Summary of the speech of the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Kwantung Army troop commanders conference held 26 April 1941.

2. Summary of the speech of the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Kwantung Army troop commanders conference held 5 December 1941.

8 January 1948

Chief of the Archives Section
1st Demobilization Bureau

Miyama Yōzō (seal)

I certify that the above signature and seal were made before me on the same day at the same place.

Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)
CERTIFICATE

I, Miyama Yôzô, Chief of the Archives Section of the
1st Demobilization Bureau, certify that the two following
documents are not now in the custody of the 1st Demobilization
Bureau:

1. Summary of the speech of the Chief of Staff of the
   Kwantung Army to the Kwantung Army troop commanders
   conference held 26 April 1941.

2. Summary of the speech of the Chief of Staff of the
   Kwantung Army to the Kwantung Army troop commanders
   conference held 5 December 1941.

8 January 1948

Chief of the Archives Section
1st Demobilization Bureau

Miyama Yôzô (seal)

I certify that the above signature and seal were made before
me on the same day at the same place.

Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST


AFFIDAVIT

OKADA KEISUKE

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I came to know Mr. Tōgō Shigenori around 1934, when I was Premier and he was Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Since then I have talked with Mr. Tōgō on various occasions, and exchanged views on various problems. Especially after he became Foreign Minister in the Tōgō Cabinet in October 1941 there was frequent contact between him and me directly and indirectly not only while he was Foreign Minister but even after he resigned from the ministry. In April 1945, when Mr. Tōgō was entering the Suzuki Cabinet, he called on me to explain his position and requested my opinion.

2. At the time of the London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1934-1935 I was Premier and Mr. Tōgō was Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. I learned at that time from the officers concerned that Mr. Tōgō was opposed to the position of the Navy and carried on heated arguments with the Navy over such problems as the common upper limit, the abrogation of the Washington Treaty, and the exchange of information on naval ship-building.

3. Toward the end of October 1941, Foreign Minister Tōgō urged that, as the opinion of the Navy was unyielding and it was likely that a Japanese-American war would ensue if things were left alone, I as a veteran of the Navy should contribute my efforts promptly to moderate the opinion of the Navy. Thereupon, I immediately requested Admirals Kobayashi Seizō and Toyoda Tōjirō to come to my house, and conferred with them. I do not remember the result.

4. I have long recognized the importance of diplomatic affairs, and it has been my belief that the choice of Foreign Minister was the most important next to that of Premier. Especially after the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance in September 1940, it was my sincere desire to have a Foreign Minister who was a lover of peace and would be earnest in negotiations with the United States, in order that we might go through that critical period without becoming entangled in the war. After deliberation I came to the conclusion that Mr. Tōgō was the best, and I talked about it to my friends and acquaintances. Especially in October 1941, immediately before the establishment of the
In the Toji Cabinet, I told Lord Keeper Kido this. I recommended Mr. Togo because I had known that Mr. Togo, since the time when he was Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau, had entertained moderate opinions and favored international cooperation over such matters as European and American questions, the China question, and the disarmament problem; that after he became Ambassador he had been opposed to the strengthening of the Anti-Commintern Pact or the Tripartite Alliance, even though he was stationed in Germany; and that after he had returned from the Soviet Union he had been keenly interested in the success of the Japanese-American negotiations. When the Toji Cabinet was organized, Mr. Togo insisted that he could not accept the post of Foreign Minister unless the new Cabinet would strive for the success of the Japanese-American negotiations. He resigned from the post on account of his opposition to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry. Thereafter it was his sincere desire that the war should be terminated as soon as possible, and when the Suzuki Cabinet was formed, he contended strongly for the prompt ending of the war and entered the cabinet on that condition. These instances show how intense is Mr. Togo's aspiration for peace.

5. After Mr. Togo resigned from the Foreign Ministership in the autumn of 1942, he often related to me that the policy of war-direction of the Toji Cabinet was not proper and that therefore the continuation of the cabinet was not in the interest of the country nor favorable for the termination of the war.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Okada Keisuke (Seal)

On this 2nd day of January, 1947
At Tokyo
Deponent Okada Keisuke (seal)

I, Nishi Haruhiko, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo
Witness: Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko
Tokyo
2 January 1947
Plan for Disposing of Incident

General principle

1. General policy:

   It is our main object to settle the present Incident as quickly as possible by effective military operations as well as successful diplomatic measures so that China shall lose her pretext for anti-Japanese policy and there may be created between Japan and China a fair and permanent diplomatic relation with cooperation and co-prosperity between Japan, Manchukou and China.

2. The aim of our military action:

   The aim of our military action is to make CHINA give up her will to fight in the shortest possible time. For a prompt settlement of the incident, such measures as the use of military force, occupation of strategic points and accompanying necessary operations, etc., shall be taken.

3. The aim of the diplomatic measures:

   The aim of diplomatic measures is to urge China's reconsideration as soon as possible so that she may be led to such position as desired by us. For this purpose, timely negotiations and actions will be carried out.

4. The way of settling the Incident and remedial measures:

   The way of settling the Incident and its remedial measures is to make CHINA lose her pretext for anti-Japanese policy, and to negotiate with her under such epoch-making conditions not biased by past circumstances.

5. Military and diplomatic measures and accompanying operations shall be carefully taken within the bounds of international law.

Criterion

1. The extent and way of using military force:

   a. Principal areas for using military force on the land shall be Hopeh-Chahar and Shanghai.

   b. Against areas where it is necessitated, military operations shall be carried out from the sea and from the air.
2. Strategic preparations in the rear:

For the purpose of carrying out military operation smoothly, bring the activities of various organs of the nation to wartime status by taking such steps as to execute general mobilization and establish emergency laws.

3. Brighter NORTH CHINA:

The settlement of the NORTH CHINA problem aims at the realization of co-existence and co-prosperity of JAPAN, MANCHUKUO and CHINA, bringing about a really bright NORTH CHINA under the control of CHINA's Central Government.

4. Brighter CENTRAL SOUTH CHINA:

In disposing of the Incident, we expect to see the creation of such condition in Central China and South China as to be suitable for continuous promotion and development of trade between Japan and China.

5. Measures to be taken behind NORTH CHINA operation field:

Measures to be taken behind the operation field of NORTH CHINA in the course of the Incident should be for the most part shaking off any idea of enemy territory occupation:

1. There shall be no administration by the Occupation Army but maintenance of peace and order shall be ensured under our Army's guidance.

2. Political organs shall be left to the local inhabitants for free organization. However, we will give necessary guidance to make them carry out a fair administration.

3. Development of transportation facilities and exploitation of materials necessary for military purpose shall be put under necessary control. However, Nos. 2 and 3, stated above, shall have no influence over adjustment of national relationship after the peace settlement.

6. Foreign Trade and economic and financial relations:

Trade, economic and financial relations between JAPAN, CHINA and third countries shall be ruled in line with our main object of making CHINA get rid of her hostile spirit.
7. Relations with third countries:

Military action, diplomatic measures as well as the accompanying actions, shall be carefully taken lest they should cause any entanglements with third countries or induce their intervention.

8. Measures regarding Japanese residents:

Depending upon the situation, all Japanese residents shall be evacuated. Their relief will be considered.

Additional remarks

Although it is our main purpose to bring the Incident to an immediate settlement, we should be determined to exercise military power on a large scale and for a long period of time. Therefore, by taking necessary steps in this connection, we should make quick preparations so as to be able to meet any development in the situation.

(Marginal note: Decided on Aug 7 at the Office of the Premier, by Foreign, Army & Navy Ministers, and their signatures).

I - The Foreign Office will try secretly and as quickly as possible to have the Chinese make proposals for peace.

II - The conditions for settling the situation are generally as follows:

A - Creation of a disarmed zone:

(Marginal note: First plan entrusted to the Foreign Ministry).

1. The eastern and northern areas of the line which connects PAOCHANG--CHANGPEI--LUNGKEN--YENKING--MENTOUKOU--CHOW--CHOW--KUAI--YUNGTSIN--SINGAN--TULUCHEN--HSINGNUNCHEN--FAOUSHALING (including areas on the line), shall be a disarmed zone shutting out Chinese troops. The maintenance of peace and order in these districts shall be in charge of the 'Peace Preservation Corps' whose strength and equipment shall be stipulated in another article.

(Marginal note: Second plan, taken as the final one).

2. PAOCHANG--CHANGPEI--LUNGKEN--YENKING--MENTOUKOU line (including areas on the line) and the adjoining areas in the HOPEI Province, left of the Yungtung and Hai rivers (including CHANGSINTEN and its neighboring uplands and TIENTSIN and its vicinity) shall be disarmed zone (the maintenance of peace and order by the 'Peace Preservation Corps' as mentioned in 1, above).
3. In case CHINA, in accepting the above, 1 or 2, lay emphasis on a time limit to be attached to the disarmed zone, there is no objection to such a time agreement.

(Marginal note: To be studied during negotiation).

(However, in case a time limit is attached, we will take into consideration what is to be done on its expiration.)

(Marginal note: First plan, entrusted to the Foreign Ministry).

(However, in case a time limit is attached, an understanding shall be reached that on its expiration another disarmed zone shall be newly established along the Sino-Manchurian border, drawn by a fixed line (for instance, 30 kilometers from the Great Wall).

(Marginal note: Second plan, taken as the final one).

B - The limit of the Empire’s sanction:

1. According to necessity, we will express our willingness to voluntarily reduce the strength of our occupation troops within the limits of the strength at the time of the Incident’s outbreak.

2. The TANGKU truce Pact shall be abolished. Various agreements based on this Pact will be adjusted, if necessary. However, various arrangements based upon the PEIPING Arrangement, such as

   a. Confiscation of the Great Wall’s gates
   b. Through railway traffic
   c. Customs
   d. Through mail service
   e. Aviation

   shall not be abolished.

The DOIHARA-CHIN TE-CHIN and YMEJI-HO YING-CHIN Agreements shall be abolished (though it is a matter of course that the Central Army having penetrated into the HOPEI Province will have to be evacuated from the Province). However, we will make CHINA promise to strengthen her control of anti-Japanese movement as well as preventing Bolshevization in the above disarmed zone.
3. We agree to the dissolution of the HOPEI-CHAHAR and EASTERN HOPEI governments, and the administration in these districts be left at the discretion of the Nanking Government.

We hope, however, that the Chief Administrators in these districts would be influential persons suitable for realizing Sino-Japanese harmony.

Further, in the above connection an agreement shall be reached on the purport of economic collaboration in NORTH CHINA, but it, of course, should be a collaboration under the joint management based upon Sino-Japanese equality. (Note: Although we are of the mind that there is no objections to the dissolution of the EASTERN HOPEI Government, we must consider making the most of the bargaining in the negotiations.)

(Marginal Note: To be kept in mind by the Foreign Ministry).

C - Negotiations for adjusting Sino-Japanese relations, unbiased by past circumstances, shall be made concurrently with or following the peace negotiations stipulated in A and B. This plan will be explained separately.

NOTES: I - If the above peace agreement be reached between JAPAN and China, and the evacuation of Chinese troops from the disarmed zones and the Central Army from the HOPEI Province, is effected, then the evacuation of our troops shall commence. (The announcement of our intentions of evacuation, however, shall be timed with the reaching of the above agreement.)

II - Further, on reaching the above peace agreement, a mutual announcement shall be made that the two countries will henceforth enter into a 'New Deal' for realization of true friendship.
Outline of the Proposal for the General Adjustment of Sino-Japanese Relations
(Evening 6 August 1937)

I - Political Side:

1. CHINA shall give a tacit promise to leave MANCHOUKOU alone.

2. Conclusion of an anti-communist agreement between JAPAN and CHINA. (Consequently, anti-communism in the disarmed zone will naturally be practiced, and it shall be strictly controlled in this area).

3. Besides dissolving EASTERN HOPEI and HOPEI CHAHAR Governments by virtue of the conditions for peace, JAPAN will negotiate with NANKING on INNER MONGOLIA and SUYUAN districts in an effort to have it accept our rightful requests (mostly included in the above, 2) and we have no intention of excluding NANKING's influence from those districts.

4. CHINA shall strictly control anti-Japanese movements and emphasize its 'good neighbor Ordinance' throughout the country. (Naturally, any anti-Japanese movement in the disarmed zone must be especially controlled in strictness).

II - Military Side:

1. If China strongly demands the abolition of the SHANGHAI Peace Agreement, we will agree after making the most of the transaction.

2. Abolish free aviation.

III - Economic Side:

1. Lowering of customs tariff on specific articles.

2. Rightful abolition of EASTERN HOPEI special trade and restoration of free-hand control in CHINA's smuggling on the sea bordering the disarmed zone.
President of the Executive Yuan KUNG today expressed his thanks to me for everything that German government and I myself have done to bring about peace, also for the words of the FÜHHER and Reich Chancellor to Chinese Ambassador at the reception of the New Year.

With regard to Chinese answer KUNG told me that as the Chinese Government did not by any means want to adopt an evasive attitude, many discussions were held in government circles, because the decision involved such difficult national and international complications. CHINA has suffered so much that she was willing to come to a real understanding with JAPAN, which would guarantee a lasting peace, and on this account she wanted to make all earnest endeavors "to seek every possibility of peace." From this reason she has also requested more sovereignty.

KUNG requested the following oral report, which he had arranged previously to be conveyed to the Japanese Foreign Minister:

"It is most unfortunate that CHINA and JAPAN should be engaged in the present armed conflict with all its disastrous consequences to both countries. CHINA still attached the desire to reach a real understanding with JAPAN so that durable peace may be maintained in EAST ASIA."

"We have expressed the earnest wish to be informed of the nature and content of the 'basic conditions' proposed by JAPAN because we want to use every sincere effort to achieve the sign of restoring peace between the two countries. With this additional information initiative, believe we shall be in a better position to express our views concerning the terms offered by JAPAN."

I have the impression that the Chinese Government might tone down the defect of her answer by this statement. Copy sent to TOKIO.
Note: Reproduced here is a map of Shanghai with names of prominent points which are prominently figuring in even
Some of the more important ones have not been inserted due to lack of space in the crowded districts.
Ro: Control of the activities of adventurers in connection with the Nakamura Incident.

We have heard that Colonel ITÔ KI and others of the Kwantung Army at your place are exerting themselves in various activities recently with considerably ample funds and are manipulating Japanese adventurers in China and members of the "Kokusui-Kai"; and that in view of the tardy progress of the negotiation regarding the Nakamura Incident, especially, they have decided on some concrete move around the middle of this month. We hope that it is merely a rumour. However, in consideration of the appearances of excitement on the part of the despatched military authorities it would be very regrettable from the point of the general situation, if they ruin the position of the Empire by behaving rashly, therefore, please take further deliberate steps for controlling the activities of the Rōnin / T.M. adventurers/ and the like.

We have conveyed the gist of this telegram to the army also.
I, HikYioKaori hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one page, dated 5 Sept., 1931, and described as follows: Telegram No. 182 from Foreign Minister SUDASARI to Counsel General HAYASHI, dated 5 September 1931.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 29th day of Sept., 1947. /s/ Y. Hayashi

Signature of Official (Seal)

Witness: K. Urabe /s/

ChieF, Archives, Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 29th day of September, 1947. /s/ Henry Shimojima

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Witness: J. G. Lambert /s/
Duplicate

From Consul-General HAYASHI in MUKDEN to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA.

MUKDEN dispatch - afternoon of 13 October 1931

Received, afternoon, October 13th, 1931.

Telegram No. 955 (Code, Top Secret)

According to reliable sources, it is notified that the Municipal Administrative Office has planned the monopolization of the opium and the issue of the lottery tickets for the purpose of raising their funds, and has asked the Headquarters of the Army for their approval. We are also informed that though the Headquarters of the Army had no objections to the plans, they instructed the office to state the stipulations clearly and set the approval of the Headquarters before the plans are put in operation, and also to report the stipulations to the Consulate and the Police Station. Not only are the monopolization of opium and the issuing of the lottery tickets naturally unfavorable from the viewpoint of international relations and so forth, but they are the materialization of a part of the plans of the Army, marked SECRET No. 731 of October 2nd. Therefore, regarding this matter, we ask you to call upon the top army to immediately check this movement, and in consideration of the delicate situation kindly take special care to preserve absolute secrecy from the army as to the receipt of this telegram and the contents of the above-mentioned official letter.
CERTIFICATE

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

1. SATO, Takeroro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section of Japanese Foreign Ministry and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 12 Oct., 1931, and described as follows: Telegram No. 555 from KUYUNI to Foreign Minister SUGIHARA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947. T. Sato

Signature of Official

SEAL

Staff of Archives Section

Official Capacity

STATEMENT OF OFFICIAL PROCUREMENT

1. Richard H. Lorsh hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947. Richard H. Lorsh

Signature

Investigator, IFS

Official Capacity

Witness: James Lui

Official Capacity
The Essential Points of Administration in the Hankow District.

Decided by the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers on October 20, 1938.

Administration of political affairs in the Hankow District shall be for the time being based on the following:

No. 1 Principle.

Political affairs in the Hankow District shall be administered by Japan within the sphere of the operations of the Imperial Army and of maintenance of peace and order; and the carrying out of other affairs shall be entrusted to the Chinese side as far as possible.

No. 2 Main Points.

1. Political guidance shall be exercised on the following points:

(1) No military administration shall be especially established and the carrying out of political affairs shall be as far as possible await the self-government of the Chinese side.

(2) For the time being, main efforts shall be directed to the growth of the Peace Maintenance Association; and with the stabilization of the situation, a local anti-Comintern regime shall be established.

The jurisdiction of the said regime shall be for the time being the provinces of Kiangsi, Hunan and Hubei.

The said regime shall be established on the Chinese initiative. However, the establishment of the regime shall be accelerated with the cooperation of our political guiding agency (The Liaison Conference of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministry authorities at Hankow), chiefly by our strategy agency (The Special Committee Towards China).

After the establishment of the regime, the political guiding agency shall take up its internal guidance. Moreover, in conducting the work to establish the regime, the establishment of a half-baked regime and of low quality should be avoided.

(3) Efforts shall be made for the return of Japanese and for the reconstruction, with the Japanese Concession in Hankow as a center.
2. Economic guidance shall be based on the following points:-

   (1) The measures to be taken relating to economics shall be for the time being organized for the acquirement of materials necessary for the subsistence of the Imperial Army; and then gradually efforts shall be made to restore the well-being of the Chinese people and at the same time to promote the development of our foreign trade.

   (2) Economic reconstruction shall be mainly conducted by the Chinese themselves. No attempt at new construction with our capital and materials shall be made and such measures as to buy up or absorb the existing enterprises of China shall not be taken, for they are apt to produce evil effects on the guidance of China.

3. Affairs relating to the third countries shall be directed as follows:-

   (1) The rights and interests of the third countries shall be respected and occurrence of difficulties in diplomacy, economics, etc., shall be avoided, so that the third countries may not find a pretext for interference in the Incident. Should some difficulties arise, they should be settled immediately on the spot as far as possible by taking the whole situation into consideration.

   (2) Unnecessary offense shall not be given to the concessions of the third countries and such means as the boycott against the third countries shall be prohibited.

4. Administration of political affairs in the Hankow district shall be deliberated, decided and put into effect by the Hankow Liaison Conference of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministry authorities, composed of the local organs of the three Ministries.

   Close connections and cooperation shall be maintained between the above-mentioned Liaison Conference and strategy agency (The Special Committee Towards China).
IPS. DOC. NO. 2178

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAGI Takeo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 247 pages, dated October, 1939, and described as follows: "Re New Chinese Central Government".

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1st day of May 1947

T. Sato
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
Staff, Archives Section/SEAL
Official Capacity.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1st day of May, 1947

Richard H. Larsh
Name

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity.
Henry A. Dolan, Jr.

Richard H. Lash
The Essential Points of Administration with the Development of Military Operation in South China,

Decided by the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers on October 28, 1938.

Administration of political affairs with the development of military operations in South China (i.e., Provinces of Kwantung and Kwangsi; the rest to follow this example) shall be for the time being based on the following:

No. 1 Principle.

South China should be purely taken as a field of operations; political guidance for this territory shall be provided within the sphere which is especially necessary for the operations of the Imperial Army and the maintenance of peace and order; and, as to the other political affairs, we will make it our principle to entrust them to the Chinese side as far as possible.

No. 2 Main Points.

1. Political guidance shall be exercised on the following points:

(1) No military administration shall be especially established and the carrying out of political affairs shall as far as possible await the self-government of the Chinese side.

(2) Our political guidance shall be exercised for the time being within the limits of developing the Peace Maintenance Association.

(3) The organization of a local regime shall be initiated by the Chinese side. However, the establishment of the regime shall be accelerated with the concurrence of our political guiding agency (The Liaison Conference of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministry authorities at Kwantung) chiefly by our strategy agency (The Special Committee Towards China). After the establishment of the regime, the political guiding agency shall take up its internal guidance.

(4) In view of the fact that the officials and the people, who are of special disposition, are unaware of the mighty power of the Imperial forces and of our rational strength, the political and other guidances in South China shall make efforts to bring about the result of their dependence on Japan through the thorough protection of the people, particularly by making our military power felt.
2. Economic guidance shall be based on the following points:

(1) The measures to be taken relating to economics shall be, for the time being, organized mainly for the acquirement of materials necessary for the subsistence of the Imperial Army; and then gradually efforts shall be made to restore the well-being of the Chinese people, and at the same time to promote the development of our foreign trade. In this case such measures as creation and monopoly of new rights and interests on our part shall not be taken.

(2) Economic reconstruction shall be mainly conducted by the Chinese themselves, and we shall make it our principle to confine new construction with our capital and materials to what is specially essential such as the promotion of foreign trade and the work on overseas Chinese.

(3) The overseas Chinese shall be guided towards an attitude in line with political and other measures so they will support our South China policy. At the same time, efforts shall be made to make it easy for us to obtain materials in which we are lacking by promoting the development of the South Seas trade.

3. Affairs relating to the third countries shall be directed as follows:

(1) The rights and interests of the third countries shall be respected and occurrence of difficulties in diplomacy, economics, etc., shall be avoided, especially such means as boycott against the third countries shall be prohibited so as not to give the third countries a pretext for interference in the Incident. Should some difficulties arise, they should be settled immediately on the spot as far as possible by taking the whole situation into consideration.

(2) As to the policy toward Britain, efforts shall be made to strictly avoid the occurrence of trouble by recognizing her established rights and interests, and at the same time, suitable measures shall be taken to make her give up her principle of supporting CHIANG and adapt herself to our policy.

(3) An amicable attitude shall be maintained towards Macao.
4. Administration of political affairs in the areas occupied by the South China Army shall be deliberated, decided and put into effect by the Canton Liaison Conference of War, Navy and Foreign Ministry authorities, composed of the local organs of the three Ministries.

The areas under the Liaison Conference shall be, for the time being, the two provinces of Kwantung and Kwangsi.

Close connections and cooperation shall be maintained between the above-mentioned Liaison Conference and strategy agency (The Special Committee Towards China).
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

T. Sato, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 247 pages, dated October, 1939, and described as follows: "Re New Chinese Central Government"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1st day of May 1947

T. Sato
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
Staff, Archives Section/SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Lareh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1st day of May, 1947

Richard H. Lareh
Name

Investigator, IPS

IPS, DOC. NO. 2176
1. The constituent elements of a new central government shall be Wang, Wu, the existing regimes, and also the Chungking government - provided that it change its mind and be reformed - and, taking it up as a question rested on China, shall be established through mutual co-operation of these elements when considered proper.

2. The new central government shall design to adjust rightly the relations between Japan and China in conformity with the principles for adjusting a new relationship between these two countries, which should be previously accepted by the said elements.

3. The time of organization and establishment of the new central government shall be decided on an independent standpoint in concert with various phases of the guidance of fullscale war. For this purpose, especially fundamental actual strength as well as manpower shall be completed.

4. The future political system of China shall be formed in accordance with a policy of separate rule and national unification based on her history and actual situation, but its details shall be conformed to the plan of adjusting a new relationship between Japan and China from the standpoint of national defence and
economy, North China shall be made an intensive combination district of the two countries (Mongolia shall be made an especially intensive anti-communistic area); the lower reaches of the Yang-tze-River shall also be another economically; a special position shall be given to specified islands along the South China coast; and moreover, the question of the system shall be in principle entrusted to China as Chinese 'internal affairs and intervention in it shall be avoided as much as possible, especially the intentions of statesmen shall be respected according to the form of the new central government, and at the same time how to deal with our specific relations with the existing regimes shall be deliberated.

5. As for the National Party and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principle, if they adopt pro-Japanese-Manchurian and anti-communism policy instead of pro-communism and anti-Japanese one, they shall be permitted to remain as in the past just as other pro-Japanese and anti-communism parties are.

6. When the Chungking government gives up its anti-Japanese and pro-communism policy and accomplish the required personnel changes, and accept the above-mentioned items 1 and 2, shall be made a constituent element of the new central government, concluding that it has surrendered to us.
A Plan of Guidance for Wang's Movement


Wang shall establish a powerful government with civil and military merits, in co-operation with Wu and the existing regimes. For this purpose, he shall make necessary preparations, and in the meantime endeavour to win those influences of the Chungking government, particularly eminent persons of that government.


(1) Wang shall make needed preparations so that a powerful government may be established in co-operation with Wu and the existing regimes. And preparatory movements shall cover such items as the establishment of fundamental sphere of influence; the movements toward Chungking, the unification of existing influences, raising of funds, full equipment of armed forces, etc; and our outward interference in these movements shall be limited as much as possible.

(2) The establishment of the new central government shall be done in conformity with the phases of our independent guidance of war. In this connection, our Empire has the following conditions to require of Wang:

(a) During the period of preparations for the establishment of new central government, Wang, Wu, and the existing regime shall work together in order to make their utmost to win those influences of the Chungking government, particularly eminent persons of that government, and at the same time to establish a powerful government with civil and military merits by establishing their
their sphere of influence.

(b) The new central government shall recognize the principles for adjusting the new relations between Japan and China. The time of establishment and its details shall be settled after consultation with Japan according to the development of the above preparatory movements, especially to the completion of fundamental real power as well as personal resources. However, Wang shall accept the following: that the future political system of China shall be formed in accordance with a Policy of separate rule and national unification; that its details shall be conformed to the plan of adjusting a new relationship between Japan and China; that from the standpoint of national defence and economy, North China shall be made an intensive combination district of the two countries (Mongolia shall be made an especially intensive anti-Communistic area), and the lower reaches of the Yang-tze-River shall be another economically; that a special position shall be given to specified islands along the South China coast; and further, serious considerations shall be given to our special relationship with the existing regimes.

(c) As for the National Party and Three People's Principle, if they adopt pro-Japanese-Manchurian and anti-Communism policy instead of pro-Communism and anti-Japanese one, they shall be permitted to remain as in the past just as other pro-Japanese and anti-Communism parties are.

(d) During the Incident flags unauthorized by Japan shall not be permitted to be risen in our occupied areas.
3. The expenses needed.

Special consideration shall be given in case expenses beyond the fixed expenditure should be required for the realization of this movement.

4. Positive and internal aid necessary for this movement shall be given from the side of Japan.

(Note:) Movements shall be made to induce him and the existing regimes to co-operate with Wang.

(Remarks:)

Essential points in the attitude/towards Wang/.

(a) The Policy to dispose of the Incident independently shall be insisted on, and though we should make Wang yield to the essentials of our policy, he shall be given an impression of hopeful future and absolute faith by making him carry out his wishes freely on the other points.

Particularly, confidence in the establishment of a new order in East Asia or in the adjustment of the relations between Japan and China and our determination, justice, and tolerance, in the disposal of the Incident shall be chiefly clarified, and the details shall not be strictly considered.

(b) The persons who shall have an interview with Wang be the five ministers and the former premier KONOYE.
IPS DOC. NO. 1519-K

CERTIFICATE

WDC. No. ______
IPS. No. 1519-K

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, URABE Katsuma hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 8 pages, dated 6 June 1939, and described as follows: A Policy for the Establishment of a New Central Government.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):
Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of Sept. 1946

K. Urabe (SEAL)
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato (SEAL)
Ass't Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHNSON F. MUNROE, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of September 1947

Johnson F. Munroe
NAME

Witness: Henry Shimozima
Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity.
1519-K

1519-K

1519-K
On the Expenses Required for the "WU" Project

Decided in the conference of the China Affairs Board; June 23, 1939.

The expenses required for the "WU" Project will be defrayed as follows, in accordance with the expenses required for the anti-Comintern National Salvation League:

1. The expenses required for the "WU" Project from June onwards will be paid from the surplus of the Maritime Customs and the total amount required for the five months from June onwards is not to exceed ten million yuan (not more than two million yuan per month). The expenses thereafter will be further studied.

2. The surplus of the Maritime Customs will be drawn under the name of some Japanese for the time being.

3. The monthly two million yuan will be drawn equally from the surplus of the Maritime Customs of North China and of Central China. It will be granted in the form of a loan to the responsible Japanese personnel on the actual spot of this project. The Japanese Government and the supervisors of the Maritime Customs' deposit on the spot must consent to offer the same sum from the Maritime Customs' deposit as collateral security to the Yokohama Specie Bank. Adequate measures will be taken to direct the Chinese Government to pay back (or settle) these debts to the Yokohama Specie Bank at a proper time.

4. The money to be granted will be paid in Federal Reserve Bank notes in North China and in Chinese currency notes in Central China. The operation of selling Chinese currency and buying yen notes will be conducted by the Yokohama Specie Bank, and a time and method, which will not affect our currency movements, will be chosen.
IPS. DOC. NO. 2178

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO Takeo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 247 pages, dated October, 1939, and described as follows: "Re New Chinese Central Government."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1st day of May 1947

T. Sato
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
Staff, Archives Section/Seal
Official Capacity.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1st day of May, 1947

Richard H. Larsh
Name

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity.
Regarding the Necessary Expense of the anti-Comintern National Salvation League.

Decided at the meeting of the China Affairs Board, on the 1st April, 1939.

1. The necessary expense for activities of the anti-Comintern National Salvation League shall be appropriated from the surplus funds of the Maritime Customs revenue, and its total amount will be 18,000,000 Chinese dollars or less for six months after April (Monthly amount is not to exceed 3,000,000 Chinese dollars).

As to the expenditure after this period it is the rule to make the League raise its own funds but in case of necessity further consideration will be given.

However, 3,000,000 Chinese dollars for the first month (no amount more than Japanese Yen 3,000,000 will be issued even in case Chinese Dollar goes up higher than Japanese Yen) shall be paid out from the Japanese side (payment will be made from the military secret service funds).

In case it is necessary to exchange this to any foreign currency, the War Ministry is to get the approval of the Finance Ministry.

2. When utilizing the surplus funds of the Maritime Customs revenue, Japanese names shall be used in order to maintain secrecy.

3. The (remaining) 15,000,000 Chinese dollars fund disbursed from the surplus funds of the Maritime Customs revenue shall, for the time being, be appropriated from the surplus funds of the Maritime Customs revenue in Central China. The disbursement period shall, for the time being, be scheduled for five months after May of this year. The above amount will be in the form of a loan to the local Japanese responsible person, guiding the activities of the anti-Comintern National Salvation League, upon the guarantee of the Japanese Government, with the fund of Central China Maritime Custom surplus as the security. This loan shall be dealt with so as to make the Chinese Government refund (or settle) it to the Yokohama Specie Bank at an appropriate time.

ITEMS TO BE UNDERSTOOD

1. The standard dollars needed at the expenditure for the first month will be obtained by buying at market rate from the standard dollars deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank by the Maritime Customs in Central China. In this case, the Japanese Government and the local
supervisors of the Maritime Customs' deposit (The Chief of the Army Special Service Agency in Shanghai, the Chief of the Navy Special Service Agency in Shanghai and the Consul-General in Shanghai) shall guarantee that the danger in the exchange rate following the buying of yen and selling of standard dollars by the bank will not be a loss to the bank.

2. In case any currency of a third country is required as expense for the first month, it will be obtained by selling the above standard dollars in the market.

3. As to obtaining of funds after the second time, it is to take the form of loans in standard dollars to some local authority responsible for this activity; and the Japanese Government and the local supervisors of the Maritime Customs' deposit shall consent to offer the same sum from the Maritime Customs' deposit as a collateral security to the Yokohama Specie Bank.

4. In case any currency other than standard dollars is necessary for the above funds, it is to be obtained by selling necessary amount of the standard dollars according to the above-mentioned Item 2.

5. As regards the method of selling standard dollars and buying foreign currencies (including yen) mentioned in Items 2 and 4, the Yokohama Specie Bank shall conduct the operation, and the time and methods shall be chosen so as to bring no obstacle on our currency activities.

6. In case any commodities are required in carrying out these activities, commodities produced in our country shall be provided as much as possible.
IPS DOC. NO. 1005(1)

CERTIFICATE

"W.D.C.NO.
IPS.NO. 1005-(1)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, URABE Katsuma hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 1 April 1939 and described as follows: Regarding the Necessary Expenses of the anti-Comintern National Salvation League.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of Sept 1947.

K. Urabe
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHNSON F. MUNROE, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of Sept 1947

Johnson F. Munroe
Name

Witness: Henry Shimodima

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity.
I
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No. 4

Doc. 1685-D

略

略
新政府各政務機関編

1945年4月

1685-D

事項

二、要項

1. 北支、蒙疆

(1) 北支地方行政、立法、司法及軍事等事

(2) 蒙疆行政、立法、司法及軍事等事

2. 北支、蒙疆地方行政、立法、司法及軍事等事

(1) 北支地方行政、立法、司法及軍事等事

(2) 蒙疆地方行政、立法、司法及軍事等事

(3) 北支、蒙疆地方行政、立法、司法及軍事等事

(4) 北支、蒙疆地方行政、立法、司法及軍事等事

7. 日本人顧問及日本任命職員採用及因可處理

8.

9.
RETURN TO ROOM 361

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361
略
(Photostatic copy)

529 Merchant Street
Rangoon, Burma
December 25, 1941

Memorandum: For Liaison Officer,
Office of Chief of Staff, G-2
Washington, D.C.

(Stamp)
(Rec'd-G-2 May 23 1942)

1. On October the 8th I was invited to call at the General Staff, Tokyo and upon arrival was immediately taken to the War Office and presented to General Akira Muto, Chief of the Military Affairs Department. General Muto apologized for not being able to speak English and stated that he had been informed that I had been ordered to leave Japan. Inasmuch as I had just returned from and duty with the Japanese Army, he said, it was his desire to explain to me the seriousness of the international situation. This explanation repeated the usual statements of the desire of Japan to maintain peace and took over an hour. Following this General Muto said "There is no longer any real hope of settling the problems between our countries by talks between diplomats. The matter is one for the armies to settle. It is possible that the armies can do this without fighting thereon. I think that you should endeavor to report to your superiors that Japan has a good army. I do not care how you criticize us but you should be careful to say only the actual facts. If you cannot convey to your people the true state of things I am afraid that I must give you a very unpleasant farewell present. This present is simply that if an understanding is not reached you will be fighting us in six weeks in Manilla." The conversation with General Muto was reported to the Military Attache and Ambassador and submitted in writing. I am merely reporting the main features in the event the Attache was unable to forward my report. It has very little value except as an interesting forecast of the opening date of the war.

2. I requested the G-2, Manila to forward to your office photostatic copies of the latest edition of the Japanese Conventional Sign booklet as well as some training regulations, technical regulations, etc. Unfinished reports to the number of approximately 39 covering mainly the new tables of organization of the Japanese Army and details of tank equipment were left in Tokyo with the hope that someone could finish them. Since upon my arrival in Manila I was held up waiting for a reply to a request from General MacArthur for my relief from the Mission to China and assignment to his staff I worked on and left at his Headquarters a list in English of Japanese Commanders showing regimental, divisional and army assignments.
3. At the present time there is very little being done by the Mission and the reasons for my assignment to it have still not been made very clear. To find something useful to do I have been working with the British Intelligence in talking to prisoners, translating maps and orders captured etc., inasmuch as there is at present no language officer either in India or Burma. I believe much of the material available here might be useful for the Division but as you probably know the Mission does not do any Intelligence work and facilities for getting the material into report form is not available to me. I am now working on captured code books.

4. I very honestly feel that I am not required on the Mission and that since I have had more recent intimate experience with the Japanese Army than any of the graduate language officers, that I might be much more usefully employed than at present. I told General Magruder that I had previously talked with General MacArthur and hoped that he would understand that I merely wanted to do the work I felt I was best fitted for. General Magruder told me that while he thought it might be a waste of a language officer, since I had been assigned to the Mission, he intended to use me for whatever duty might come up. This of course, is most reasonable and my only point is that I think that counting trucks on the Burma Road and reporting tonnages was not the objective towards which the Military Intelligence Division was aiming when it gave me almost four years in Japan. I do not mean to make this matter any more than a request that should the Division have use for me anywhere that I be given a chance to put in use the training it gave me.

5. The Japanese have bombed Rangoon twice. The bombing today was by 8 heavy and 30 medium bombers escorted by about 50 fighters. It is my opinion that unless the British bring in more fighter strength very soon that the Port of Rangoon will shortly be closed for vessels. In the fight today we had only 24 fighters in the air of which 12 were from the American Volunteer Group. The Volunteer Group did very well, shooting down 7 of 1 group of 12 Zero type fighters. Japanese bombing was conducted almost without interference from a height of 10,000 ft. from closed formations. Accuracy was very poor and all important targets were missed.

/sgd/ F. D. Merrill, Major, Cavalry

(Noted by F.E.Br.)
FILE
M.A. Sect.
WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Military Intelligence Division G-2
Washington

5 June 1947

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, Major John D. Hill, Acting Asst. Executive for P&A, Intelligence Division, WDGS, Washington, D. C., certify that the seven photostatic copies of the memorandum from Major P. D. Merrill, Cavalry USA, to the Liaison Officer, Office of the Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, D. C., dated 26 December 1941 and attached hereto are true photostatic copies of the original document which is on file in the Administrative Records Branch, Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington D. C.

I further certify that I am acting custodian of the original document referred to above.

/sgd/ John D. Hill
Major, GSC
関東方面における中国遠征軍とアメリカ陸海軍の戦争

日本機関

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重要目的
National Defense and Diplomatic Policy Firmly Established

The Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government which was established at the time of the first KONOE Cabinet in order to bring about harmony between politics and strategy in the settlement of the China Incident was later discontinued and has not been held up to now. However, since it has become necessary to decide new basic policies to meet the sudden change in the world situation with the overwhelming victory of Germany and Italy in Europe, the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government was held in the East No.1 Room of the Imperial Palace at 10 a.m. on the 27th. Those present were: Chief of the General Staff - HIH, Prince Kanin, Chief of the Naval General Staff - FIP, Prince Iushimi, Assistant Chief of the General Staff - SAWADA, Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff - KOFU, from Imperial Headquarters; Prime Minister KONOE, War Minister TOJO, Navy Minister YOSHIDA, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, President of the Planning Board KOSHIN, from the Government, and MUTO - Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau; ABE - Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, and Chief Cabinet Secretary YOMIURA, acting as secretaries. First of all, frank opinions were exchanged between Imperial Headquarters and the Government concerning the Outline for Dealing with the Situation Imposed by Changes in the World Situation, which had been proposed by Imperial Headquarters, and complete agreement was reached after serious deliberation. Next, the government submitted its Outline of the Basic Policy for Establishment of a Nation Strongly Organised on a Basis of National Defense which had been discussed and decided upon in the Cabinet meetings which have been held daily since the formation of the Cabinet. The Government explained this in detail, and once again Imperial Headquarters and the Government mutually exchanged frank opinions of it and arrived at a complete agreement. Then the conference, adjourned at 11:30 a.m. Then Prime Minister KONOE was ordered to form the new Cabinet, he met with three gentlemen, TOJO, YOSHIDA and MATSUOKA at his home in Ogikubo, and determined to get around the situation by the harmonization between administration and supreme command and by the complete unification of politics and strategy. Thus, he has now completely attained this purpose.

(Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary actings as the secretary of the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government):

The Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government was held in the Imperial Palace at 10 a.m. today attended by their Imperial Highnesses, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff; the Prime Minister; the War Minister; the Navy Minister; the Foreign Minister; the President of the Planning Board; and other. There were frank expression of opinions and careful deliberation regarding the Outline for the Situation Imposed by Changes in the World Situation which was presented by Imperial Headquarters. Furthermore, the Government explained its Outline of the Policy as a Nation Strongly Organised on a Basis of National Defense. There was complete agreement on both subjects.
AFFIDAVIT

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

Baron Kumao HARADA dictated to me, Yasuko KONOYE, once or twice a week from notes and from memory the first drafts of the record.

Baron HARADA was a university graduate and was about average in methodical methods of work, being neither outstanding nor lax in the organizing of his work.

With reference to a statement made by Koichi KIDO that Baron HARADA was sick for three or four months from the time when UGAKI failed to form his Cabinet (i.e., the end of January 1937) and that KIDO took over his duties, I say as follows:

(a) From a study of the records of the period 1 February 1937 - 31 May 1937 there was only one sickness mentioned, this being on 23 February, and he was active on 3 March having gone to Okitsu on that date, during the whole of the rest of the four months he was travelling between Tokyo, his own and Prince SAIONJI's country homes, and calling upon people.

(b) During such times as he was sick, either in this or any other period, he never ceased dictating the records. I took the dictation in his bedroom or sitting-room. During such a period he gathered information by telephone calls and by people visiting him. At no time did KIDO or anyone other than HARADA dictate any part of the records.

With regard to KIDO's statement that HARADA suffered from drowsiness during the latter part of his life, I say that if this refers to the five years between the death of SAIONJI (when he ceased dictating the records) and his own, I saw him very seldom and cannot express an opinion. But it is not true as to any part of the time when he was keeping the records. It is true that all the time, whatever his state of health, he occasionally appeared abstracted, as if he was thinking of something else, while someone was speaking; but I noticed that in spite of this appearance, he always knew quite well what they said. He was, at all times, while I knew him, fully competent mentally.

With regard to the entry of 19 August 1940, marked for identification during the cross-examination of the accused TOJO, as Ex. 3687, I well remember that when HARADA was dictating this to me he was reading from a document which he held in his hand.
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Japanese Signature)
Yasuko KONOYE

On this 13th day of January,
1948 at Tokyo

Deponent: Yasuko KONOYE

I, Turner D. White, Capt. Inf., hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed her signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness /s/ Turner D. White,
Capt., Inf.

TURNER D. WHITE
CAPT., INF.
Saionji Karada Lemoirs

Chapter 376
(20 October 1940) pp 2974-7

Safeguarding of Saionji-Harada Lemoirs

...On that same day, I went to Chitsu and reported to Prince SAIONJI on the latest happenings since I last saw him. I consulted the Prince about requesting Prince TANNATSU to keep the transcriptions /manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Lemoirs/ in the care of his Highness until they were delivered into the hands of the Emperor. Prince SAIONJI agreed to this and said: "If His Highness/Prince TANNATSU doesn't mind, I believe that would be a very splendid arrangement."

On the 19th, I returned to my home in Ciso. On the morning of the 20th, because I learned that His Highness/Prince TANNATSU, a Navy officer, had returned to his palace from his ship, I called him on the telephone and talked with his Highness personally over the phone. His Highness said: "Come at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon." I went to the Takahama Palace of Prince TANNATSU at the appointed time. I told His Highness: "This record /manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Lemoirs/ was started in 1929. The following is the reason why this was undertaken: At the time of the London Treaty/when it was a major political issue/only false rumors about the issue prevailed; and the truth about the matter was never known to the public/. Especially, the attitude taken by the Emperor has been, for the most part, falsely rumored. Moreover, the counsel given to the Throne and actions taken by the Genro /Prince SAIONJI/, court officials close to the Emperor, and the Cabinet Ministers in general, have been falsely rumored. As a direct result, this created serious perturbations in the political circles; and this was the direct cause of subsequent disturbances in the Army and Navy. The virtues and intelligence of the Emperor were perverted almost beyond imagination by propaganda. I felt that this was an exceedingly regrettable fact. Since I/KURADA/ know, in my capacity as Prince SAIONJI's secretary/the truth of the matter, I felt that there was a necessity for recording this in written form for posterity. Therefore, I consulted KONCE, we decided to seek the assistance of /Viscountess KONCE Yesuko/ the wife of /Viscount KONCE/ Hidomaro, the younger brother of Prince KONCE, and have her take it down as I dictate it and thus preserve it for posterity. It has now grown to 10,000 odd pages.
"This is the way in which these memoirs are being made. Every week, I go to see Prince SAIGI and make a report to him; my memorandum for this report is used as the basic material and I have it taken down and kept. I then take the transcribed manuscript of the notes to SAIGI; he reads the material personally, corrects mistakes, and adds whatever additional notes he deems necessary to the manuscript. He returns it to me the next time I go to see him. A clean copy of this is made; this is then edited and filed away.

"Nowadays, this/the fact the SAICHIKA Memoirs is being compiled has occasionally appeared in the newspapers; moreover, even the fact that this manuscript of the SAICHIKA Memoirs is deposited for protective custody in the Sumitomo Trust Co. has become known to the public. I have heard there is danger that a faction of the rightists might, under certain circumstances, destroy it/manuscript of the SAICHIKA Memoirs/. Therefore, I have consulted Prince SAICHI about this matter and have decided to request Your Highness to keep it in Your Highness personal custody until it is completed. When it is completed, the original manuscript which has Prince SAICHI's corrections and revisions on it will be presented to the Emperor in its original form. The edited copy will be printed and published at a suitable occasion. I think it won't be possible, in all probability, to publish the document until after 10 or 15 years have elapsed from the death of Prince SAICHI. At any rate, the future custody of it is entrusted to HATSUMA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal. I would like to have Your Highness consult HATSUMA and make thorough arrangements so that he will be able to keep in close touch with Your Highness' steward /for preserving the manuscript in Your Highness' custody/.

His Highness /Prince TAKAHATSU/ said: "I gladly give consent. I shall give thorough instructions about the matter to YAMANOUCHI, the steward, make suitable arrangements (in regards to the manuscript) with him." I thanked His Highness for this and changed the topic of our discussion."
13 July 1931

...... On the night of the 13th, a newspaperman came to my place and I heard from him that the commander of the Sixth Division, Lt. Gen. Sadao ARAKI, was to be the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor. I was very intimate with Lt. Gen ARAKI but he was an idolizer of Baron HIRANUMA and a prominent figure in the so-called KOKURONSHA. Therefore, to have such a person serving so close to the Emperor is a serious matter from a certain point of view and I think it very dangerous.
16 July 1931

Thereupon, I went to the War Ministry and met Col. INOUE, and looked at the Army List in secret. As it is today, even the Army thinks that Lt. Gen. ARAKI is a follower of HIRANUMA. The Army says that Lt. Gen. Senjuro Hayashi, Commander of the Chosen Army, is the most suitable man for the position. If not he, then Lt. Gen. FUKUSHIMA, the Commander of the division at Nagoya. At the present time, there are no others. After my return home I went so far as to call the Imperial Household Minister on the phone and told him about this.

By these indications, even in the matter of disarmament, it is clear that the extreme rightist FOKUHONSHA is maneuvering in concert with the Army. That these problems arise, both directly and indirectly is, I think, a very disconcerting matter.
西園寺原田日記・第三巻より抜粋

「案外は陸軍省に、行って井上大佐に逢っ
て、留守をいたしました。名簿を以って、奉行
を表に、及び官、名は小中将を平沢の子分、の
ように、直と聞くと、朝鮮軍司令官の
林幹長中将、最適任である、と
呼ばれた。名古屋の師団長の川島中将、である、
これ等の人以外には、父の処、他に見あらかず、と
言いまして、自分は帰るから、宮内大官、電報で
下で、これに答えた。

その処、此処関係、なんに就ても、中央の最大
に、此処関係、なんに就ても、中央の最大
策動して居ると、言わせ、陸軍と連絡を執って、
目前者と協、在がない、陸軍と連絡を執って、
直接関係、新の如き、問題が適して、来たに至
っては、溜に困ること、を思い、居る。
Later, the Chief of the Asia Bureau said:
"The Army is attempting to use the killing of Captain NAKAMURA in Mongolia as a tool for the solution of the Manchuria-Mongolian matter by enlarging the importance of the incident. It is very troublesome".

I (HARADA) returned to Hakone and met Railway Minister EGII and mentioned these things to him. He /EGI/ said: "I did not know anything about it but War Minister MINAMI came to Hakone yesterday and told me all about it. At that time, I /EGI/ asked him: 'The discipline of the Army today is very confused. Just what does Your Excellency think about the bomb incident of UGAKI? It is outrageous to speak of such things as an expedition to Manchuria-Mongolia, etc. because the troops are the Emperor's and it is unthinkable to move them without an Imperial Order. Just what is your opinion on this?' I, /EGI/ probed here and there, but the Minister only made very obscure replies on the matter of UGAKI. It is a very troublesome thing".
1949年10月1日，中华人民共和国成立。
On September 4, I met the Finance Minister, /INOUE./ He said: "The War Minister, /MINAMI/, on the whole, was in complete accord with me on the Army reorganization plan, and the matter was agreed upon between us before we parted. However, upon returning to the War Ministry, he was severely criticized by the Military Affairs Bureau Chief, KOISO, and the Intendance Section Chief. Consequently, he returned to me later, and said: 'I previously agreed with you upon the matter, but I found it very difficult to appease the members of the staff... ...' For this reason, the matter has reverted to its starting point."
西園寺原田日記
第十一回政事
政事は大勢の内に全然自分の意見を合致しない小磯に起る、陸軍省に帰っても、陸軍省長に逆襲を受けて再び自分の意見を起すと決めて別れた。陸軍省長に見知らぬ面を向けて再び自分の意見を起すと決めて别れた。
14 September, 1931.

On the 14th the War Minister returned from Gotemba, and immediately had Maj. General TATEKA'I'A deliver a confidential letter to the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army. The content of the confidential letter was about the warning the War Minister received from His Majesty on the 11th regarding military discipline, and also about the fact that he was told by His Majesty to take extra precautions in regard to the actions of the Army in Manchuria and Mongolia. The War Minister transmitted the wishes of His Majesty to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army with the intention of bringing pressure upon him so as to have a stop put to the various Army schemes in Manchuria and Mongolia.

The incident broke out on the night that TATEKA'I'A arrived at Mukden with the confidential letter from the War Minister. In short, it seems to me that it was TATEKA'I'A's plan to have the scheme carried out before the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army saw the confidential letter from the War Minister. This may be seen from the fact that although at the beginning of the conference of the so-called War Councillors, representing the Supreme leaders of the Army, the attitude of the members was very firm. Whereafter the War Minister conveyed the wishes of His Majesty to the members at the conference, the attitude of the members changed completely. And they decided that the present plans of the Army should be completely abandoned by all means. This appears to have resulted in having the War Minister's confidential letter conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.
3. 然而，虽然他们可以理解当前的文档，但这些文档的精确翻译可能会因上下文和语言差异而有所不同。因此，求解器在处理这些文档时需要特别小心，以确保结果的准确性。

4. 例如，如果文档包含了复杂的公式或技术术语，求解器可能需要更强大的数学和语言处理能力来正确解释这些内容。

5. 此外，由于自然语言的多义性和上下文依赖性，求解器在处理包含语言的文档时，需要更多的上下文信息来确定正确的理解。

6. 总的来说，虽然求解器在处理自然语言文档方面取得了显著进步，但仍然存在一些挑战，特别是在处理复杂和含糊的文档时。
19 September 1931

About supper time on the 19th, there was a telephone call from the Premier, and he said: "I want you to come immediately." Therefore, I went to the official residence of the Premier after dinner. The Premier appeared very troubled, and he said: "No reports have been delivered to me by the Foreign Ministry nor the War Ministry /T.N. regarding the Manchurian Incident/. However, I have told Chief Secretary KAWASAKI to caution them about it. I am trying by various means to prevent this incident from spreading, and if possible to settle it. However, it seems that the Army authorities are desirous of making a guarantee occupation. Guarantee occupation is a matter to be decided by the government, and the Army authorities have no power to make decisions regarding such matters. The Chinese military forces in Manchuria exceed 200,000, and at present, the strength of the Japanese Army there is a little over 10,000. I asked what they intended doing if, by acting too outrageously in Manchuria, something should possibly happen against such a huge opposing force, to which the reply was: 'We will send out troops from Korea. Probably troops already have been sent out from Korea'. Therefore I remarked 'Isn't it outrageous for the Army to send out troops from Korea without the order from the government? However, there is a precedent, during the TANAKA ministry troops were moved without Imperial sanction. . . . . . .
22-3 September, 1931.

On the 22nd the Premier went to the Imperial Palace, and reported to the Emperor on the progress of the Cabinet meeting, the substance of which was as follows: To cease an absolute cessation on establishing military administrations, and on seizing customs offices and seizing banks, and the like, and to forbid all actions excepting those to prevent risks. The War Minister made a proposal to send the Korea Army to Manchuria. The reason that the War Minister expressed such a desire was that he had been notified by the Chief of the General Staff that the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army had made the demand to the Chief of the General Staff on the ground of the shortage of strength in Manchuria. The Cabinet did not approve the proposal in its meeting because the matter might be taken up by the League of Nations, and also because upon the withdrawal of the Manchurian Army there would be difficulty. "I (Premier) severely rebuked the War Minister for sending out troops as far as Kirin and Changchun."

Later on, the War Minister again consulted with the Chief of the General Staff about dispatching the Korea Army, and decided to bring up the matter in the Cabinet meeting of to-day (the 22nd). Later on, however, the War Minister told the Premier: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Korea Army decided that the situation was urgent and already has dispatched one brigade."

The War Minister was very anxious to have the dispatching of the Korea Army approved at the Cabinet meeting.

At 9:30 a.m. the following morning, the 23rd, His Majesty summoned Premier WAKATSUI. And then, at the Cabinet meeting that day it was decided that the troops having been dispatched anyway, the Government should defray the expenses, though the Finance Minister was not actually admitting that the dispatch of troops had been carried out duly in accordance with a Cabinet decision. It was decided at the Cabinet meeting that in view of the fact that the Chief of the General Staff had received a report from the War Ministry that the troops had been dispatched arbitrarily and considering the dispatch had been done, that is, the thing having been done, the Government should defray the expenses without raising any objection. Being asked to report exactly what had happened to the Throne, the Premier was compelled to report exactly what had happened to His Majesty and after that the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff presented themselves. And thus, the dispatch of troops which had been decided and carried out arbitrarily had been submitted for Imperial ex post fact approval.

During the Cabinet meeting of the same day, the words of His Majesty were conveyed to the Cabinet members: "I believe that the policy that has been decided by the Government of the so-called non-expansion of the incident is very appropriate. Therefore, endeavour to carry it out completely."
も独断と兵を出し、大将参謀総長が陸軍省から報し
支受けてこれをもうましたから関係者がもう出るかたち
で、何等異議なしと述べ、経費は政府が支給すると決め
ったが、通じない事あり。どうしたっても陸下に上奏して臆んだ
に陸軍大臣、参謀総長が出ていくく独断専行の出元を
後の起武を仰いたものになった。

5. 依其相出布告、関係者決定に居る所謂所調

要挙りに於て、金は至極相違と思ふから其趣旨を敬

府下には仰らせ、何が御詔と関係重大に傳へた。
30 September, 1931.

After returning, I again met the Premier on other business. The Premier said: "At the Cabinet meeting, the War Minister repeatedly stressed: "I want to dispatch troops to Chientao! Therefore, I said, 'Absolutely no: If there is any danger, it is better to evacuate the Japanese Nationals!' However, the War Minister retorted: 'In case the lives and properties of Japanese residents are endangered, will Your Excellency take the responsibility? Therefore, I answered: 'That cannot be helped.'"

At a later date, there were incidents and bombings and assaults in Chientao. A Korean who threw the bomb was apprehended and upon investigation, he confessed: 'I did it because I was engaged to do so by Japanese Military.' "Such a situation is too dangerous to contemplate."
1 October 1931

In the Cabinet Meeting of the 1st of October, Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA stated that he wanted a clarification of attitude before the opening of the Council meeting in Geneva on the 14th. If Japan withdraws troops by that time, there will be no problem. The Foreign Minister further stated that the stationing of troops for the purpose of self-protection is all right. However, the maintenance of more than necessary troops, and the keeping of troops in Kirin and Tungchia is far from good. However, the War Minister said: "If we withdraw troops now, the situation will be very difficult for us, and we will not be able to maintain control of the situation in Mukden and Kirin. Properly speaking, I believe it better for Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations."
I.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-1/4A

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Exhibit No. 760-A
Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapters 15 & 16 - (page 135)

22 October, 1931

The Premier also complained: "At today's Cabinet meeting, the War Minister, MINAMI, Jiro said an exceedingly outrageous thing; in regard to the League of Nations. He said: 'There is no need for paying deference to the League of Nations; there should be no objection to seceding from the League. Should Japan be determined to wage war against the whole world, this (T.N. secession from the League) can be readily done. I'll excuse myself now, because I've been invited to the marriage of Prince RIKEN.' And he left the Cabinet meeting. I'm really troubled because he is such an irresponsible person."
図 国 題 日

十月再回錦上図記

未完

受手

大図

凡礼

先礼

行

理
About 11 March 1932

... The Cabinet Meeting on Friday was carried over until Saturday. The decision on the Manchurian-Mongolian policy which was the topic of the Inter-Ministry Conference (Army, Navy, Foreign Affairs, and Finance) was reached and was placed before the Cabinet meeting on Friday. At this meeting, various problems were encountered. Among them was the soon to be formed "New Nation" problem, if this were to be looked upon as a violation of the Nine Power Pact it would be an unsatisfactory state of affairs, then at least on the surface, its recognition should be postponed for the time being. However, if CHANG Hsueh-Liang acts as an insurgent against the "New Nation" and sends punitive troops, it will not be able to quell the rebellion because the "New Nation" has no army. Therefore, in order somehow to safeguard the "New Nation" the Japanese Army must repel the attack. At the time of the Feng-Chili War /T.N. Civil war between the Feng-Tien Regime and the Chili Regime/ the Japanese Army under the guise of a Manchurian peace preservation force, was on the alert. The problem whether or not we may do the same as in that case raised so much trouble that the Cabinet meeting was carried over to Saturday.

The demands of the Army, to a certain extent, from various stand-points, were repulsed for the present. Having obtained the inside story from the Navy Minister, I showed the original and corrected plans to the Prime on Monday.
There were many in the Foreign Ministry who, like SPIRATORI advocated Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. Army circles in general were enthusiastic about this "withdrawal from the League of Nations". The basis of SPIRATORI's argument is that, "Japan is unable to remain in the League after taking such actions in Manchukuo since September 18. It is unreasonable for the small nations in Europe who are lacking in knowledge, to get together and restrain Japan in any way. However, even if Japan desires to have the understanding of the great powers, it is still unnecessary for her to remain in the League. Japan can do anything if she'll negotiate directly with England, France or the United States and obtain their understanding. It is quite improper to remain in the League."

He must have aroused Chief Cabinet Secretary MORI's sympathy and MORI went directly to the Premier and urged withdrawal from the League.

* * * * * * *

Subsequently, in order to report on SPIRATORI's opinion regarding Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations to the Prince, I had KIDO, INOUE and SUZUKI come over to my place and I heard their opinions regarding SPIRATORI's view.
12 September 1932

I then visited SHIGATOSHI on the 12th at the Foreign Ministry. SHIGATOSHI repeatedly remarked: "How about appointing the present War Minister JIM/KI as the next Premier?" "Why I asked him why, he replied: "Up to now the exchange rate has dropped considerably. This is because Japan does not possess a strong government, and consequently, in foreign affairs, it is prodded from behind by the militarists, and changes to the right shortly after proclaiming that the Empire's foreign policies are toward the left. This is very harmful to the country's reputation. Rather than that, would it not be more becoming policy for the present-day Japanese Empire to have JIM/KI, who is a representative of the powerful militarists, become the Prime Minister, and to proceed upon an unwavering policy for five or six years more."

I then said: "How many years have you been a diplomat anyway? In our opinion it is of course bad to have the militarists, who should have no connections with politics, restrain the administration after it has once set its policies. Not only that, the reason why Japan has lost the confidence of other nations is the absence of diplomacy. This results from the militarists' direct intervention in international problems; and not only that; they even interfere directly in domestic affairs. This is the reason for the instability of political affairs and today's loss of trust. Therefore, in foreign relations, it is possible to regain this faith only by placing the militarists in the background. At the same time, from a domestic standpoint, freedom of action, without restrictions from militarists, is the basis for stabilizing the political situation. I believe that this is the fundamental issue in stabilizing the exchange rate." I parted with SHIGATOSHI after that.
昭和七年九月七日
陸軍省長、西園寺公望第五十一号ヨリ、案奉

白鳥陸委員会ニ関シテハ、タハ米ハ、日本ハ

白鳥ハ、顧慮ニヨリ次ノノ次ヲ来ル可キ陸委員会ハ、荒木現在ノ

陸軍大臣ヨシテハ、タハ米ハ、日本ハ、

白鳥ハ、顧慮ニヨリ次ノノ次ヲ来ル可キ陸委員会ハ、荒木現在ノ

陆軍大臣ヨシテハ、タハ米ハ、日本ハ、
About 31 August 1932

"The Chinese Ambassador came several times to KONOYE's place in Kamakura saying 'Cannot the Japanese Government abandon the idea of the recognition of Manchukuo? .... Since the problem is one between China and Japan it should be settled between the two without it coming into the hands of the League.' ....

KONOYE repeated the above statement to me so I told him 'If the Chinese Ambassador feels that way I think it is better to ask him to speak directly to a person who is responsible. Perhaps if he speaks to the War Minister and if the army takes action on this problem, the way will be made much easier for the Foreign Ministry...."

And then, Prince KONOYE went to see War Minister ARAKI in the afternoon and discussed the problem in detail but the Minister was entirely disinterested in what Prince KONOYE proposed. He said that it might be all right if the matter were to be handled as a local issue, but that it would not be desirable if it were to be handled as a general problem between Japan and China and settled without taking it to the League of Nations. Since the attitude of the War Minister seemed to be as if he favored creating a situation in which Japan, as a result of the deliberations of the League of Nations, would become isolated and would have to wage a war against the world, Prince KONOYE returned very astounded.
原图描述。

TO TURN TO ROOM 361.

Exhibit No.

ORS Dec. N° 3150 - 32A
1 November 1932.

I left the Navy Minister's place and went to meet Finance Minister TAKAHASHI. I told the Finance Minister about the matter of the national policy that the War Minister, ARAKI, is said to have shown KONOYE, when KONOYE met him in the morning on the previous Sunday (Oct. 30), but since he had already talked it over very carefully with the War Minister with the intent of instructing him, he seemed very well informed on this matter of national policy.

This National Policy, which ARAKI is said to have shown to KONOYE, is as follows:

A. Carry on an emergency policy for two years.
B. Study whether to attack Soviet Russia within the two years or not.
C. Plan the perfection of military preparedness and national defense within the two years.

Another item was the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and the United States and the furtherance of international goodwill.

ARAKI seems to have discussed this matter with Finance Minister TAKAHASHI and he /TAKAHASHI/ said: "He /War Minister ARAKI/ talks about carrying on the emergency policy for two years, but it cannot be fully executed in just two years. We must consider that it will take four or five years."
On the evening of the 7th, I met, after a long time, the War Minister at his official residence. He said, "The Finance Minister has a thorough understanding of the situation." and "Roughly speaking, we must continue on emergency provisions from the standpoint of national policy for two or three years. We must decide whether to attack Soviet Russia during this period or to convene a Peace Conference for the Far East, and by inviting England, U.S. and France who have vital interests in the Far East, hold a so-called Peace Conference among Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Russia, and it would be very well if we could arrive at an agreement to prevent the spread of Communist propaganda. Should it still happen that the security of neighboring nations are disturbed by the Red movements, Japan must attack and destroy them. Within two or three years we must perfect our national defense, that is, we must complete preparations and assert our nation's intent by displaying power for both peace and war in order not to permit other nations to make light of us. Furthermore, in regard to our relations with the U.S., we must keep Japanese-American good-will as our keynote and also continue our diplomatic relations with other nations along the same line."

The gist of the comments by the War Minister was as above and was the same in context as the one he had shown to KONOE the previous day. He further stated, "Finance Minister TAKAHASHI, especially, understands very well, and as he is such a splendid person, I ask his views on various problems." The War Minister went on, "In view of the present national situation, an annual budget of ¥ 2,500,000,000 to ¥ 2,600,000,000 is reasonable. The present differs from the past when ¥ 1,000,000,000 or so sufficed, so the present budget, although it reaches the above amounts, is not unreasonable. Furthermore, I believe this can be had without over-burdening the people. I am confident that a considerable amount of revenue can be obtained from Manchukuo if we so desired. The Finance Minister wants to hold the combined Army and Navy budget down to eight hundred million yen, but we want an additional increase of two hundred million yen. However, the present no definite outcome can be foreseen. Anyway, on the whole, the outline of the budget has been made rather smoothly. ...

RETURN TO ROOM 361
Then, on the 6th, I visited the War Minister and inquired about the state of affairs. According to the War Minister, he looked upon the Jehol problem as a local matter because it was a part of Manchukuo, and he said he wanted to 'settle the matter by shortening time' as it was after all a question of limitation of area or of time. The general outline of the War Minister's conversation was as follows: 'I am afraid that if we keep on moving small troops into Jehol as we are doing now, another failure like the Nikolayevsk Incident might be brought about. So, we should follow the example of the Shanghai Incident — that is, to send out large troops and decisively settle the matter once and for all in a short period of time, or otherwise, I am afraid it might be another repetition of the Nikolayevsk Incident if we grudge the dispatch of large troops.' The War Minister further said that, 'I am still very indignant about the Shanghai Incident. From the first, the army did not want to send troops. However, it was much discussed at one time that the army should not only within the leased territory, but at other times, that the army should be prohibited to pass through the settlement, or some such thing or other. Therefore, I demanded to know what on earth our aim was and asked them to decide the aim in the first place. And, then, at last, it was decided that our aim was to protect the residents. The soldiers were then sent forth and the matter was settled very satisfactorily, much more than had been expected. In spite of the fact that the Powers did not make any difficulties, everyone is indifferent to the Army, or to that Shanghai Incident. They seem to have completely forgotten that they had been very particular about the army, and that is highly exasperating to us.' Although much is being said about the international political situations, Japan will not be spoken well of, no matter what she does, so it is a great mistake to expect to be considered agreeable. He spoke about the matter as above, so I said, 'Of course we do not expect to be considered agreeable by the foreign Powers, tactfully, and after all it is our fundamental point of view to avoid as much as possible what is solely their rather harmful, and contemptible. Furthermore, if we are to actually put something into practice, it must be right both in our own country. It is very disadvantageous
to be considered by the Powers as to have waged an unjustifiable war. Finally, the War Minister stated as follows, explaining that it was his unreserved opinion: "If about three divisions were first to land at Tsingtao and pass through Tsinan, or in other words, if the troops landed in Shantung Province and advanced towards Peking and Tientsin districts, Chang Hsueh-liang would take to flight before the troops reached Tsinan. So, I would like to carry out this plan if permitted, but I think that would be rather difficult." We discussed much, but he said in general that he wanted as much as possible to limit the matter to Jehol alone, and that the General Staff Office also seemed to be deliberating on such various methods, and with this, we parted.
Notice:
Exhibit 3769-A to be corrected in accordance with language Board decision, as shown on Court Record p. 37661.

Doc. Div.
13 January 1933

On returning from OKITSU, when I visited Finance Minister TAKAHASHI on the morning of the 14th, the problem of JEHOL was again brought up between us as subject of our conversation and he told me the following. "At the cabinet meeting held yesterday, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that there had been an unofficial negotiation on the RUSSO-JAPANESE Non-Aggression Treaty, and that the Russian Government, intending to announce the particulars of the treaty ending in failure, had inquired of the Japanese Government whether she would agree to such measures or not. Then when the Foreign Minister began to explain the matter at the Cabinet meeting, I queried, 'Why did you not conclude the Non-Aggression Treaty?' His answer was that, 'the Army fears that such an act might further facilitate the Communist propaganda.' Therefore, I said, 'Don't you think that only when the treaty has been concluded, can we complain? Therefore, would it not be better to consider the conclusion of the treaty as quite a different matter from the communist propaganda? As I said just now, I think that we can say whatever we like without hesitation only when we have the non-aggression treaty concluded. And it is highly improper that everything should be led by the Army as of late.'

The War Minister then said something or other about 'the public opinion, etc. ...' or 'the national opinion, etc. ...' I told him that 'There is no such thing as public opinion or national opinion these days. We are threatened by the rattle of the gendarme's sword or his revolver pointed at us whenever we say anything disadvantageous to the Army. Isn't it a fact that there is absolutely no public opinion nor national opinion today? The pressure upon the freedom of speech has never been so strict as recently.' I know, indeed, a fact that a certain news office in KYUSHU was threatened by the Army on the report that it wrote something disadvantageous to the Army. The Army sent an aeroplane over the building in circles, saying it would drop a bomb from the plane. Furthermore, the gendarmes are hounding the journalists as if they were all traitors, and the state of affairs at any rate is truly dismaying. For instance, I happened to meet a man who often comes to see me "there is almost no freedom of speech these days is there?" Whereupon, he lamented and said that what I said was quite true and that the actual condition was such that they, too, could not dare to speak what they wanted to. At this, the War Minister, flared up and said, 'That cannot be. It is impossible.' 'Yes, it is possible,' I replied and further added, 'I admit your spirit, but you do not act up to it. What
do you propose to do, with the factories under your supervision acting as I have mentioned before? He then mumbled that he would explain later or the like, but none of the Cabinet members spoke up to support me.
1 February 1933

Then, at the Cabinet meeting of the 1st, when the criticism was made: "The Army has of late been completely in control of Japan’s diplomacy; withdrawal and such matters are getting into the newspapers too often, and the Army is making announcements on each and every diplomatic affair. Why on earth are they doing such things?" The explanation was "No, it is the newspapers that put it out . . . ." that is, "The Army does not make propaganda;" and "The Army itself does not have it written, the newspaper offices do the writing, so there is no help for it." Finance Minister TAKAHASHI severely reproached the War Minister, saying, "If the newspaper offices are doing the writing, why doesn't the Army stop them? It should be quite easy for the Army with its present power to stop them, shouldn't it? All things considered, not stopping them is absurd." The War Minister seemed to be quite at a loss.
And on the 13th, the Premier held a Cabinet council and asked the opinion of the Cabinet Ministers about the draft of the reply. The reply drafted by the Foreign Ministry was on the whole agreed to and was sent off on the night of the 13th.

At the Cabinet council, they were again reminded that if the League should turn to Article 15, Paragraph 4 and an advice be sent to them, their stand was not to be decided upon carelessly without scrutinizing the contents and it was decided that the Jehol issue should continue to be treated as one of bandits; in other words, that the attitude that the so-called bandits, not the Chinese Army, were to be attacked, should be assumed. And it was also clearly decided at the same time that it should be disposed of within the boundaries of Jehol, without going south of the Great Wall.
15 February 1933

A Cabinet meeting was held at 10 A.M. on the 15th; a serious attitude had to be taken if Japan were to withdraw from the League. So for the purpose of clarifying opinion after giving the written advice a thorough examination, and with the intention of making doubly sure, the Cabinet meeting was held, and Foreign Minister UCHIDA and the War Minister pressed for a decision of immediate withdrawal from the League, but the majority of the Cabinet members did not agree to this, saying, "After taking another look at the situation at the General Meeting of the League."
14 May 1933

Vice-Minister ARITA came over to my place after 9:00 P.M. and made the following statement: "With the permission of the Minister, a plan had been already made to change personnel, sending SHIRATORI, Chief of the Publicity Bureau abroad and TANI, Chief of the Asia Bureau to Manchukuo as a Councillor. This was all ready to be put into effect.

In order to carry out the plan submitted by the Vice-Minister, Foreign Minister UCIDA called in Bureau Chief SHIRATORI and said: 'I want you to go abroad either as a Minister or as a Councillor.' Bureau Chief SHIRATORI stated: 'I will give it consideration, but what do you think about sending the Vice-Minister abroad also?'

Once, a long time before that, when Bureau Chief SHIRATORI was approached on the same subject, he strongly objected by stating: 'If I should be sent out, there is no telling as to what may happen.' Consequently, the Foreign Minister was finally placed at a complete loss. The Foreign Minister therefore called me in and said: 'Since SHIRATORI states that if I send you abroad he will go, I want you to go out as Ambassador to Great Britain or to any other country that you prefer. If you accept this proposition, the matter will be settled amicably.' If, as regards the relationship between myself and the Bureau Chief, the Foreign Minister is going to take the stand that in a quarrel both parties are to blame, it is utterly useless for me to give him my support.

Although I was also in an embarrassing position on the previous occasion, I believed that I should exert my increased efforts and have acted accordingly up to this day. However, as matters stand at present, it is absolutely impossible for me to continue on assisting the Minister.
I thought it would be best, therefore, for me to resign by submitting my resignation before such a decision was reached . . . . .

* * * * *

On the other hand, when the resignation of the Vice-Minister became a reality, Bureau Chief SHIRATORI, seemed to feel that he had to resign also. However, as the result of conferences with SUZUKI of the Army, Bureau Chief, SHIRATORI finally said: 'I shall accept the post of Minister to a foreign country provided that there will be no change in policy.' On the next day, he made his said intention known to Foreign Minister UCHIDA. Foreign Minister UCHIDA was overjoyed at the action of SHIRATORI. He seemed to have been especially pleased when SHIRATORI advised him: 'Please in any case retain the Chief of the Asia Bureau since he is a very important figure in connection with Chinese problems!'
丁当

(観察者m = 皆様)

実験器材は下記の通りです。

(実験器材の詳細を記載)

十分な注意を払って操作してください。

(安全注意事項を記載)
19 October 1933

On the 19th I met Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU at the Foreign Ministry. Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU seems to take a pessimistic view of the whole situation. He made various statements concerning the Russian problem, our China policy, general disarmament, Japanese-American problems and the League. He said: "The Navy is demanding equality in arms; it is stressing the fact that should this demand be denied, it will abrogate the Naval Disarmament Treaty. In other words, /the Navy/ is demanding equality in the sense of reserving the right to maintain a basic minimum of arms absolutely necessary for national defense and by 'abrogation of the Treaty' seemed in other words to wish to insert even the wording "we are prepared to risk a rupture."
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5 December 1933

Thereupon the Domestic Policy Conference was promptly held on the afternoon of the 5th. Nevertheless, an ordinary Cabinet meeting was held in the morning. At the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting, the Foreign Minister took the floor and spoke to the effect that "Since the countries of Europe and the United States, from the standpoint of trade with Japan, have increased tariffs under a unified policy against the exportation of Japanese merchandise, and in short, are striving towards placing Japan in an isolated position, I want the Ministries concerned also to give mutual consideration to counter-measures."

However, Finance Minister TAKAHASHI said, "The fact that foreign nations in unison are taking a defensive attitude towards Japan does not arise simply from trade relations alone. Rather, the anti-Japanese attitude which appears in trade relations is something that appears only on the surface. The fact is that the Army and Navy, that is, the Japanese militarists, are claiming that 1935 and 1936 will be critical years, and with hints that war with Russia and the United States will break out, are inciting the rural and urban districts. Such activities will have its effect abroad and at a time when European countries and the United States are trying to conduct matters as peacefully as possible and trying to avoid wars in every sense of the word, the pro-war atmosphere of Japan creates a very bad feeling in diplomacy and this is what appears in trade relations. For these reasons, the military must restrain its speech and actions. There will be no crisis in 1935 and 1936." The War Minister, turning to the Prime Minister, "That is not true. The military has no intention of waging a war today, but we must be prepared. There will be a crisis. It cannot be said that this is not a crisis."
昭和八年三月三十日
陸軍軍縮と西園寺公望
其先で我政府は早速五月の十日以降の日局に於て、其関係の最終に於て
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Since the voices of resentment from various circles reflected on the military which has become extremely nervous, the Army and the Navy jointly issued something which resembled a statement on the evening of the 9th, and in the morning papers of the 10th, stated their views in regard to the alienation of the public from the military. Making such statements as:

Generally, in connection with the budget question and others, the number of those who are speaking and acting to alienate the people from the military is not small. For example, there are those who say that the crisis of 1936 is for the ulterior purpose of propaganda of the military, that in past wars, only those from the lower classes were killed in action whereas among high ranking officers, there were none who died in action, or that the agrarian problem was sacrificed for the sake of the military budget. This form of movement to alienate the people from the military is an undertaking which destroys the harmonious unity of the public mind which is the most essential basis of national defense, and the military absolutely cannot tolerate it.

and repeatedly stating: —
Two important measures used as international schemes to impair the power of a nation for national defense are anti-war movements which aim at the defeat of one's own country based upon instructions from the Third Internationale, and the movement to alienate the people from the military mentioned above. The former is a well-known fact, whereas the latter, in spite of the fact that various measures from abroad are becoming more persistent in our country, is surprisingly unknown although its evil is great because its movement is only moderate and disguised.

and finally issued a threatening statement which declared that those who make such statements in spite of the fact that the military, faced with this difficult situation, had made demands for minimum national defense were extremely insolent.
17 April 1934

... And since he (AMAU) made an informal statement on the situation to the said effect, the various newspapers printed it conspicuously as a declaration or some such thing of the Foreign Ministry. And the comments of the various countries in regard to this were very strong, so that the Foreign Ministry was also somewhat taken aback. Actually, the Vice Minister and Minister knew nothing of this. In actuality, since various countries were selling arms and doing various other things in China a strong feeling of insecurity arose, so the Foreign Ministry sent instructions to the Ministers stationed overseas, the so-called Ambassadors and Ministers. Then the Chief of the Information Bureau translated into his own English the contents of the said official instructions and he gathered the foreign correspondents and blabbed something to them that became the cause of all the trouble. I heard later that it would have been better to have shown the English translation of the official instructions instead of his own translation.

Chief of the Information Bureau AMAU has always been a very fine man but since he is somehow careless in some ways we have not had much contact with him. After that I went to the Foreign Ministry and met the Minister and Vice-Minister and asked them but it seems that they were not greatly worried about the matter, and on the surface the Minister and Vice-Minister said: "It is nothing serious."
9. P.S. doc. No. 3150-27A

Exhibit No. 3776-A
Notice:

Exhibit 3778A to be corrected in 'doc Ottawa with' language.

Board decision, as shown on Court Record, p. 37777.

Doc. Div.
21 August 1935.

Then I went to the Foreign Office and met Vice Minister SHIGEMITSU. He said, "Great Britain has proposed a plan for disarmament. She proposed 'qualitative limitation of armament'; however, the Navy is opposing it, saying that: 'It is meaningless to limit the quality of armament without limiting the quantity'. The attitude of the Navy seems to be that it is to our advantage, never in future to accept limitations from other countries. The Navy is very touchy on this matter.

"However, looking at the situation as it may develop other countries would place the responsibility of the failure of the Disarmament Conference on Japan, so this problem has to be treated delicately. Definitely, Japan would have to make a difficult proposition which I fear might disrupt the entire relationship with Great Britain. I would like to wrap this proposal of the Navy in a pretty cloth and try to avoid any trouble" emphatically stated SHIGEMITSU.
无
7 September 1936

...... I met the Foreign Minister and the Premier on the following morning and reported that I had transmitted the disarmament draft to the Prince. I said: "The Prince was inquiring whether the Washington Treaty was going to be abrogated even if Japan's proposals should happen to be accepted." The Foreign Minister and the Premier thereupon both said: "The long and short of it is that in the draft we have utterly opposed a ratio. Therefore we must abrogate it no matter how much the other Powers agree to our proposals. We are taking an unconditional stand."
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
30 November 1935

I met the Foreign Minister on the 3rd. He told me: "There is no need to worry so much about the situation in North China. General MINAMI has clearly told me: 'In the event of ever dispatching troops south of Shanhaiikuan it would naturally be based upon an Imperial command. Troops will definitely not be sent south of Shanhaiikuan as long as there is no Imperial command to do so.' If this secret information were to leak out to China, they would start slighting us and begin doing all sorts of things. On the other hand, if the military faction of Japan were to find out that the secret had leaked out to China, they would act all the more strongly. I believe that this would be extremely dangerous."
西園寺康世日記第百八十九同よりの抜萃

それから次日、外務大臣に書きたて、北支領兵は南支備えを整える傍に、関内にはほとんど、軍需関係に訴える事があれば、決して、事は大命に非ざる事はない。しかしそういに限る。外務大臣に断し、関内には米並びに、その事は大命に非ざる事はない。決して、事は大命に非ざる事はない。決して、事は大命に非ざる事はない。決して、事は大命に非ざる事はない。決して、事は大命に非ざる事はない。決して、事は大命に非ざる事はない。
12 July 1937

Then the War Minister determined to rescue the five thousand men at Tientsin, declared at a Cabinet meeting, 'This time I definitely would like to have troops sent out.' Then Premier KONOYE said, 'I do not want to expand the issue. It may be all right to despatch troops according to necessity.' In this way, he agreed with the War Minister, but he added, 'If we oppose the dispatching of troops at this time and do not heed the wishes of the Army, the War Minister will be compelled to resign. Consequently, the Cabinet will have to resign; also. If I resign, somebody will eventually have to accept this position, but as there may be no one who can possibly check the Army, there is no other way than for me to assume the responsibility and confront the issue.' Thus, Premier KONOYE made an extremely touching decision.

Then the War Minister finally stated that he would definitely 'not expand the issue.' His Majesty received in audience His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, twice, and His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, once. The War Minister said that he would settle the issue mostly by sending a large force to smash the opposition and then withdraw quickly, but then asked, 'Can you carry it out as expected?' the War Minister was not able to give a definite answer. Such is what the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal told me.

On the afternoon of the 12th, a report came saying that the Chinese Army would accept all our demands. Prior to that, when the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the War Minister were talking, an adjutant came and said, 'A telegram has come from Tientsin saying, 'Accepted all our demands.' It is a very sincere answer.' It is probable that the War Minister did not want to hear this report in front of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, but it actually happened.

These demands were, the withdrawal of troops, guarantee of the future, and the punishment of responsible officers. The officers of the Chinese Army are justifying themselves by saying; "The troops are being influenced by the Communist." In the Army, even the General Staff quarreled and thought, "Let us make an agreement! was probably Chinese attempt to make us stop our military preparation," It seems that the Army, as long as it had decided to dispatch troops, wanted to put forth more stringent demands.
Exhibit No. 3200-A

IPS Doc No. 3150-244A
13 August 1937

When I met the Foreign Minister that afternoon, he said: ........

However, the previously mentioned Shanghai Incident broke out. There are individuals in China and Japan, who are saying: 'The reasons for the assassination of Lt. (JG) OYAMA, and the rousing of considerable excitement in Shanghai, are the increased number of Japanese warships, and the increasing of the number of Japanese marines to 3,000.' However, under such circumstances, the increase of personnel is only natural, and I believe it was actually inevitable. From Consul General OKAMOTO a message came saying: 'If it can be done I would like to see Shanghai kept free of the devastation of war.' It was not good that Japan increased the number of warships as I mentioned before, but that could not be helped. ........ If we should announce the issuing of the mobilization order, then the situation will become troublesome. So, at yesterday's Cabinet meeting, it was decided that the mobilization orders will be issued, but not announced........
24 September 1937

I then visited the Foreign Minister at the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Minister said: "It was decided at today's Cabinet meeting to mobilize four divisions and to have another four divisions in readiness."...
About 26 September 1937

The Premier relayed the following information: "The English Ambassador came three times to Foreign Minister HIROTÅ's place and said; 'I believe the British Government will try to persuade CHIANG Kai-shek, but what are Japan's demands anyway?' Foreign Minister HIROTÅ replied; 'This is my personal idea, but according to my plan, (1) I would draw a line in the area slightly south of Tientsin and Peiping line and would make it a demilitarised zone and both Japanese and Chinese as a general rule will not station troops in this area; (2) the recognition of Manchuria; (3) ceasing of anti-Japanese movements; (4) defense against Communism; (5) equal diplomatic opportunity in North China.' It is said that the demands of these five conditions were given to the English Ambassador.
2 November 1937

... and then when I visited the Foreign Minister and questioned him about various problems, the Foreign Minister said that when he invited the industrialists to tea yesterday, he stated to the effect that, "This anti-British movement is very embarrassing at present. Especially at present, there is no other country besides England who would act as an intermediary between Japan and China. Therefore, if such things are done now, the government will be placed in a very awkward position. In the end, we may have to fight England. Or, we may also have to collide with her sometime, but such things are absolutely out of the question right now. Especially, from the diplomatic point of view, the government will be greatly inconvenienced if such things are to be carried out at present."
三目寄宿DALアイが

一目寄宿DALアイが

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 201
Then, on the 5th, I (HARADA) met the Foreign Minister. He said:
"The British Ambassador came to see me privately, and, repeatedly asked
me (Foreign Minister): 'At this time, which country would be the best
mediator?' Thereupon, I replied: 'Your country is still the best.' He
said: 'From what I see of Japan, England seems to be much disliked so it
makes me wonder whether we would be the best.' I stated: 'England is the
most suitable country. Therefore, haven't we been holding preliminary
conversations with you for some time?' Then, it was England's report that
"after looking at the situation in China, it seemed a little as if those
who are near CHIANG Kai-shek wished to somehow settle matters with Japan."
So, I (Foreign Minister) told the British Ambassador: 'that even if
Germany or Italy were to act as intermediary, it would not do at all.'"
她們的笑聲回響在空曠的場地，
那些熟悉的面孔，讓人感到溫暖。
在這樣的時刻，才發現在某種程度上，我們

是彼此的依靠。

她們的笑聲回響在空曠的場地，
那些熟悉的面孔，讓人感到溫暖。
在這樣的時刻，才發現在某種程度上，我們

是彼此的依靠。
国际电信联盟无线电通信部门

1960. 3150-2517B
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DOCUMENT DIVISION

13 Jan 48

MEMO TO: All Concerned

1. Item No. 57 on Order List No. 5 (SAIONJI Diary) should read 3150-257-B, which is attached. 3150-257-A is hereby withdrawn.

Chief, Doc. Processing Unit

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-KARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 257 - (page 388)

7 December 1937 -- from the conversation of

"I should say that I am distressed with HIROTA also", the Premier said:

"Just on the 2nd of November, HIROTA met the German Ambassador and sub­mitted the plan which was based on the assumption of circumstances when the Supreme Command Office had decided not to advance farther than the Paoting line. The German Ambassador transmitted this to Chiang Kai-shek on the 6th of November through the German Ambassador to China. Chiang Kai-shek, however, rejected it at that time. Recently, particularly when Nanking was about to be in an imminent danger, the German Ambassador to China recently reported to Dirksen /TR, phonetic/, German Ambassador to Tokyo, that Chiang Kai-shek, being distressed, accepted it. We found out all about it because the Army stole that telegram. And now, it is quite impossible to accept the terms proposed at the time when we stopped at the Paoting line. The Foreign Minister being prepared for a case like that, had carefully told the other side: "If the war situation changes further, the terms of this talk will also change according to the situation. Please bear that in mind." . . . . . . . .
11 December 1937

--- XONOYE suddenly said: "I've had enough, so when recognition is withdrawn from CHIANG's government - that is, after Nanking falls, CHIANG Kai-shek's government is going to collapse. And JAPAN is going to issue a statement withdrawing recognition from CHIANG's government - that's the time for me to get out I think, so that's when I want to quit." ---
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
Notice

**FCN 7**

Board decision, as shown on Court Record

Exhibit 378, to be corrected in accordance with language

Doc. Div.
21 December 1937

On the 21st, I (HARADA) met the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister said: "General Staff Headquarters wants to stop the war as soon as possible. They are very impatient saying: 'We would like to have Germany as mediator and ascertain the desires of China.' We wanted to set up our stipulations and in hopes of securing a concrete plan by liaison conferences endeavoured in various ways. The result was presented at a Cabinet meeting. They said: 'If this plan is submitted to them and isn't accepted, the Government will be placed in an embarrassing position.' The plan is to be changed to four abstract terms to cover the general situation, that is, anti-Comintern, economic collaboration, reparations and recognition of a special regional government. The plan is to be reported to the Emperor by the Premier and also by Army and Navy leaders of the Supreme Military Command office. It was decided to close the matter without holding a conference in the Imperial presence. The President of the United States who was sitting next to Ambassador SAITO at some event in Washington whispered to him: 'Isn't it one way to try to have Germany handle the matter (as intermediary)?' The Foreign Minister also stated: 'I hear that Italy wants to enter into the negotiations between Japan and China to settle the situation. Concerning China geographically, I think that Shantung must be included if a Chinese government is to be set up in view of the setting on fire by the Chinese of the cotton spinning factory owned by Japanese at Tsingtao. One of the problems is what the results will be if, at the same time as the request is transmitted through Germany, Shantung is attacked. The political parties are very strong in their demands because of what they see in the atmosphere of the foreign nations. The Soviets are approaching YEN Hsi-shan and the German militarists seem to be approaching CHIANG Kai-shok.'

That day I (HARADA) met KIDO. KIDO said: "The whole matter has been disorderly and I said plenty at the Cabinet meeting. I wonder if General Staff Headquarters hasn't committed various stipulations concretely through the German Military Attache in Tokyo. I feel it very dangerous to see the Army and Navy, especially the Army, or rather General Staff Headquarters so anxious to press the peace solution. If we submit many concrete stipulations and they turn it down, we are only letting them in on what we want. It will all be a loss with no gain. I am very much concerned what they are in such a hurry. Today at the Cabinet meeting, I made a speech asserting and said: 'It is necessary that they be more abstract and cover everything. What need is there to force ourselves into asking Germany?' It was very strange that General Staff Headquarters is so eager. I am worried that Germany might put one over on us."
西園寺公望
原田日記 第五巻 四月

昭和三十五年

1150-259A

Exhibit No. 2016-6

前書から一旦に外務大臣に会に交って参謀本部に
一時し早う戦争をやめたといったので、日本を中立にして
支那側の希望を判明させたたいと考えて非常に
あつめて居る。当方の条件も何と何はもって造り立つと
思う。即ち、従来経済提携と
努力を結果を機に議案が発表され、先方
に言いてやれて共栄を達らうと時は政府は後
に困ったが、言ひてで大体をかいてしまう
とは摘要的でないか。郎ち防共と経済提携と
海軍首脳者の方は上奏し、又統帥府の陸
前会議は開かないと主張し、有藤大使に何とか
機会にアメリカの大統領が降りの席に居って
有藤大使に私語したと云ふ事に居って
軍と外務大臣は

支那在日

読者に於ける一定方法にあたる

支那政権
30 December 1937

On the 30th, a note was sent to England with the reply that the shelling of the British warship by the Japanese Army was also entirely based on a misunderstanding, and, although there is as yet no reverberations, the situation has become such that the matter is said to be closed.
30 December 1937

On the 20th, a note was sent to England with the reply that the shelling of the British warship by the Japanese Army was also entirely based on a misunderstanding, and, although there is as yet no reverberations, the situation has become such that the matter is said to be closed.
Notice:

Exhibit 3789-A to be corrected in accordance with Language Board decision, as shown on Court Record 37856-7.

Doc. Div.
14-17 January 1938

When I called on the Foreign Minister on the 14th, he said that in short, at the Council held in the presence of His Majesty, the Premier was charged with expediting the proceedings whereas he (the Foreign Minister) was called on to do the explaining; that after he first described the progress of our foreign policy as well as our future peace and war policies at the Council, His Highness, Prince KANIN, the Chief of the Army General Staff and His Highness, Prince FUSHIMI, the Chief of the Naval General Staff followed by giving their approval to the proposals that were decided by the government; that the President of the Privy Council, HIRANUMA, expressed himself to the effect that he also approved; that at any rate, all decisions passed without objections were reported to His Majesty; and that after the closing address was made to the Emperor, the Emperor left the hall.

I then met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and discussed various matters which had come up subsequently. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal also talked about the details of the Council which was held in the presence of His Imperial Majesty.

On the 15th, at the General Staff Headquarters, China was requested, through the Foreign Minister, to give an answer by the 15th as to whether or not she accepted or disapproved of the terms of peace proposed by Japan. This being the day the answer was to arrive, it was the fervent desire of the General Staff Headquarters to settle the matter on this occasion though it may be distasteful by waiting five additional days even if the answer was rejected. A liaison conference was convened at the official residence of the Premier and from the morning of the 15th, the attendance of both His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the Army General Staff and His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff was requested. The conference lasted from 9:30 a.m. until 8:30 p.m. of the same day.

According to the details of the conference which I received from Premier KONOYE, the Army General Staff Headquarters was out and out in favor of ending the hostilities with China even if only a day sooner and of making preparations against the Soviet, and this was its greatest desire and concern. As for the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, he stated: "Even if it is said to be a council held in the presence of the Emperor, the Emperor does not make any comments. Since this is very similar to the Emperor Organ Theory, this time, I should like to have matters submitted to His Imperial Majesty's judgment before a decision is made." So saying, he /Deputy Chief of the General Staff/ reversed from the very basis, everything that had been settled up until now. Moreover, it seemed that it was his desire to deal with CHIANG Kai-shek in person and come to a peaceful settlement. The reply
already received from the Chief of China's Foreign Affairs Bureau through the German ambassador was to the effect that the terms submitted through the German ambassador by Japan were too abstract in content and therefore difficult to comprehend, and requested that a more concrete proposal be presented.

The Foreign Minister said, "The Army General Staff Headquarters has already informed China through the German Military Attaché. At any rate /China/, is generally well aware of our concrete proposals. In spite of this, however, she feigns ignorance and is saying, 'that cannot be understood.' If this is the case, there is no hope. Therefore, as has been determined at the Council held before the Emperor, there is no alternative but to proceed with our alternate plan. This is to transfer the present hostilities into a long-term warfare. It is vital that we strengthen our determination to oppose China stubbornly." The foregoing was the contention of the Foreign Minister. The Premier and his Cabinet members were of the opinion that "it is not good to be led on and on." In the end, the same arguments were being repeated but Navy Minister YONAI spoke up and said, "Does that mean that the Army General Staff Headquarters does not have confidence in the Government? If so, it means that either the Army General Staff Headquarters or the Cabinet must resign en masse as a result of opposition between the two. However . . . ." There was a recess about 7:00 o'clock. The Army General Staff retired to the General Staff Headquarters and, after a consultation there, returned again to the official residence of the Premier at 8:00 o'clock. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff Headquarters remarked, "To have a change in the government at the present time is not wise. The General Staff Headquarters has confidence in the Government and will concur with the decision it makes." Therefore, soon after 8 o'clock, the debate was settled. The Cabinet meeting was again convened and at 8:30 p.m., after the meeting had ended, the Premier called at the Palace and withdrew from the presence of the Emperor after making a complete report of the proceedings to the Emperor.  

Both Prince KONOYE and KIDO were saying, "The Army General Staff is justified in their ardent desire to have out and out peace. However, after causing matters to develop this far, to stop midway and be led by them and say 'how would it be to conclude peace under these terms,' by taking an attitude very similar to that of a defeated nation and purposely showing our megalomania is not an attitude to be taken by a country which has been winning consecutive victories. Should such an notion be taken, it would, after all, be said, 'Japan has weakened considerably and is she not already in a precarious situation.' In this way, her cards would be revealed. Because of this, externally, it would mean a sudden fall of the yen exchange and depreciation of government securities and we would not be able to carry on commerce and would make the buying of commodities impossible. What are we to do should there be a panic? Nevertheless, if we are going to settle matters, it should be settled logically. This is a difficult situation."
Moreover, according to KIDO's conversation on or about the evening of
the 12th, "Two or three days ago, since Prince CHICHIBU said, 'come over
by all means,' I called on him at his palace. Prince CHICHIBU, with
opinions which made it appear as though he was representing the Army General
Staff, questioned me in the following manner, 'On what grounds is the Govern­
ment refraining from concluding the present hostilities even a day sooner?
How much longer do they think Japan's financial strength will last?' To the
above question, I explained the circumstances at length. I discussed various
situations with His Highness from 8:30 till after 10:00 o'clock." "In the
course of the conversation, Prince CHICHIBU remarked, 'The present hostili­
ties differ from that of the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese War in
that we are not waging war against the people but against the Chiang Kai-shek
regime. Therefore, could it not be done by eliminating all friction to date
and clasping hands from a broad standpoint?' To this I replied, "Even if
the present situation differs from the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese
war, after Japanese troops have killed 700,000 to 800,000 soldiers of the
Chinese Army, even if we look grave and say, 'Let us shake hands,' it cannot
be clasped sincerely. Furthermore, if Japan a defeated nation or a vic­
torious nation. For a victorious nation to say, 'No, by all means, would
like to make peace as soon as possible,' and submit various terms and lay
our cards on the table would, on the contrary, be used as propaganda if our
opponent should refuse to respond to this. If they say, 'Japan's internal
condition is in such a difficult situation. With these terms, Japan has
expressed hopes for peace,' and spread such propaganda at home and abroad,
it would result in Japan being put at a great disadvantage. For example,
this would cause a so-called slump in the yen exchange and government
securities as well as a loss of confidence in Japan's economy and finan­
ces. If we are to pursue this course further, it would also result in the nation
not being able to purchase any commodities and prices of goods will soar
and there would be fear that internal administration would be thrown into
confusion. Diplomacy is, of course, necessary to establish peace, but un­
less the settlement is made very firm, and if things are immediately handled
in the manner the General Staff Headquarters desires, I shall have no end of
worry for the nation." To this, His Highness said, 'What you say is true.
Nevertheless, I think the government is incompetent.' With this, we parted."

I left for Okitsu on the evening of the 17th and when I spoke to the
Foreign Minister by phone on the morning of the 18th, he said, "As the
Chinese Government failed to accept the proposal, the Council held in the
presence of the Emperor has decided on the alternative plan."
是非一つ平和を急げだといわれていると言っている条件
を去ってから、激会日が届かず、日本の核をめぐる
核に関する問題が、一般公の若千ていることから、
平和のために、核の使用を控えるべき。その問題
について、国際社会の参加が必須である。平和を
保つために、日本政府は、核の割合を控えるべき。
平和を保つために、日本政府は、核の割合を控えるべき。
14 February 1938

I say to the Vice Foreign Minister at the Foreign Ministry and he inquired: "Have you heard about the Liaison Conference of February 14th?" Therefore, I (HARAM) replied: "What about it?" To this, the Vice Minister stated: "At the Liaison Conference of February 14, the Army said: 'It is impossible to attack Canton and Hankow in the future. We shall go as far as the southern part of Shansi and up to the Yellow River but we think it is impossible to advance as far as Fuchow.' The Navy is saying that it would like to advance its air base as far as Anking, but the Army is saying that it is impossible to go that far. The reason why they say it is impossible to carry out military operations as far as Anking lies in the fact that military preparations must be made against Russia. As a result the Navy is saying: 'It is not wise to continue as we are and extending the incident into one of long term hostilities. On one hand, cessation of war should be attempted through diplomatic manoeuvres and at the same time, our forces must advance without yielding an inch.' The foregoing is the Navy's stand and they say: 'Can Canton be attacked? What about Hankow, Suchow and Anking?' Even in that event, nothing can be done. The reason is due to military preparations against Russia. Therefore, the Navy requested (T.N. Prince FUSHIMI), the Chief of the Naval General Staff to inquire of (T.N. Prince FAN-IN) the Chief of the Army General Staff: 'The Army repeatedly speaks of the Soviet relationship, but are we not intending to, (against Russia) force it from our side?' Prince FAN-IN denied the foregoing saying: 'There is no such thing.

His Majesty, the Emperor, then asked the Minister of War: 'Is it possible to put into effect a simultaneous plan for long term hostility, military preparations against Russia and the expansion of the Navy?' The Army Minister replied: 'I shall discuss the matter with the Government and take the proper action.'
That afternoon, I (YARADA) met KONOYE at the Premier's official residence. He said: "This noon Foreign Minister UGAKI, Finance Minister KIKUNO and I held a so-called Three Ministers Meeting while we had lunch. "War Minister ITAGAKI persisted in recommending SIRATORI as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs to UGAKI. When ITAGAKI was at the front and SIRATORI was touring through North and Central China, they talked for about four hours on various matters. It is said their opinions on foreign relations coincided very well. The ones who are still the greatest nuisance to UGAKI at present are the field grade officers of the Army. If UGAKI wants to carry out some foreign policy matter, he will have to hold them down and yet let it appear that he is cooperating with them. Otherwise, he won't be able to accomplish anything. SIRATORI is not considered highly by his seniors in the Foreign Ministry, and his reputation outside of the Ministry is somewhat bad. However, if UGAKI were to use him, he would probably handle him appropriately, I think that using SIRATORI would be very good politically. However, the Navy is wholly opposed to him. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO especially says that in view of SIRATORI's personal conduct: "We cannot keep such a man for official disciplinary reasons." However, can't something be done on this occasion without saying such strict things? I will not assume any responsibility in forcibly recommending SIRATORI. However, in reality, I still think that SIRATORI would probably be the best suited person.

UGAKI told me today: "I have heard that SIRATORI is to some extent very 'loose' with his finances. If he's acceptable to the Army, he isn't to the Navy. This is really an awkward situation."
EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS, COVERING
THE 14 JULY 1938 ENTRY, ON PAGES 2169-71 THEREOF

On the morning of the 5th, I (HARADA) called at the residence of the
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and chatted with him for about an hour.
The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stated: "Yesterday, the Emperor
summoned the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff and stated:
"I (Emperor) think this war (China Incident) should be ended as soon as
possible. What do you think?" The War Minister and the Chief of the
General Staff both replied: "This China Incident will have to be carried
out until the regime of CHIANG is brought to a downfall." The Emperor
was quite concerned about this matter because the Chief and the Deputy
Chief of the General Staff had feverishly told the Emperor that this war
must be stopped. Instead, preparations should be made against Soviet
Russia. Since then, nothing has happened. Therefore, the Emperor thought
that the Chief of the General Staff desires to deal with the incident as
soon as possible. With that expectation, the Emperor asked the Chief of
the General Staff (Prince KAN-1N) and the War Minister.

Thereupon, I (HARADA) felt I wanted to discuss this matter with the
Vice Minister of the Navy and I went to the Navy Minister's official
residence and met the Vice Minister of the Navy. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO
said: "A short while ago, HIRADA, the Aide-de-Camp came to the Navy
Ministry. However, I did not meet him. Probably he came to discuss the
matter. The War Minister is saying: "We shall fight until CHIANG Kai-shek
is overthrown! and 'We shall fight until the end.'" But, in reality, it
is the Army which is most troubled by the China Incident. Consequently,
it is also the Army which really wants to cease fighting in China. There
is no doubt about this fact."
When I met MATSUDAIRA, he said: "Accompanied by Chief of Staff Prince KAN-IN and the Minister of War, I proceeded to the Palace since they desired to make an appeal. The Emperor, thinking that the War Minister had come again to request his sanction concerning the use of force in the negotiation of the problem of the Soviet-Manchukuo border and also thinking that it would cast a reflection on their prestige if they met him and do not succeed in obtaining his sanction, transmitted the following through the Chief Aide-de-Camp with his deep and sympathetic feeling: 'If you are coming by any chance to obtain my sanction for use of force, I have no such idea in mind. If you are coming for that, you don't have to come.' In spite of this message, the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister said: 'We would still like to request an audience.' So, at 11:00 a.m. the Emperor consented: 'If that is so, have them come.' The Emperor awaited their appearance, but they made the Emperor wait more than an hour after they had arrived at the Palace. The Chief Aide-de-Camp maintained contact between them and finally, close to noon, they were received in audience. Just as the Emperor had thought, the War Minister appealed for the request to use force. The Emperor said: 'Have Ministers who are concerned been contacted?' The War Minister replied: 'Both the Foreign and Navy Ministers have agreed.' Previously, both the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister had expressed their opinions in favor of troop distribution, but they were absolutely against the use of force. The Emperor had already known this and when the War Minister had answered: 'Both Ministers have consented,' the Emperor felt as if he was deceived and with an excited countenance he said: 'The actions of the Army in the past have been abominable. Speaking of the Liutiaokou case in the Manchukuo Incident and the doings at the Marco Polo Bridge at the beginning of this incident, there was absolutely no obedience to central orders. There are infrequent instances when the methods used have been arbitrary and sneaky which is altogether improper as my army. I feel that it is abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time ....' And to the War Minister, he admonished: 'Hereafter, you may not move one soldier without my command.' He came out in such a strong tone that the War Minister retreated very humiliated. When the War Minister came back, he said: 'I can never look into the Emperor's face again. I would definitely like to resign.' The Chief of the General Staff said: 'With things as they
are, I cannot assume the responsibility of assistance to the Emperor as the senior in the Army. I would like to resign. The Chief Aide-de-Camp, in great concern, thought he might get the Emperor to speak in a mellower tone. Since the inclination to intervene did exist, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal thought that it would not do to have him fail in something in which he was unaccustomed, even if there was sincerity behind it. He said: 'Either I or the Premier will handle that.' Reassured that it would be better, I left everything up to the Premier."

"The Premier appeared before the Emperor and asked about the whole situation. The Emperor seemed to be thinking of it as comparatively simple and said: 'Please urge both the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff to stay in office.' The Premier called the War Minister and told him: 'It would be disturbing to have you resign now. In the first place, if you say that the Emperor has no confidence in you, there is no reason whatsoever for him to have approved you as War Minister recently. There is absolutely no reason to say he lacks confidence in you when you just recently became the War Minister by the Emperor's command. Also, he does not lack confidence in the Army. It was just that he becomes suspicious every time such an incident occurs. He spoke critically about that point and he probably meant for you to be careful hereafter.' At any rate, the War Minister left his future course up to the Premier."

"When I met KIDO later that day, he said: 'Why didn't the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal act in concert with the Premier and do something? It is disturbing to have the Emperor taking such pointed actions.' However, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had not taken up or mentioned the Liutiaokou or the Marco Polo Bridge Incidents to the Emperor. It was something which the Emperor had said on the spur of the moment without any preparations, and thus, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had nothing whatsoever to do with it at that time. I do not think it unreasonable that there was misunderstanding between the War Minister and the Foreign Minister UGAKI; that is, for the War Minister thinking that the Foreign Minister had not clearly and absolutely stated his opposition. However, when the Foreign Minister had met the War Minister, he had probably said: 'I am in agreement with threatening Russia to the extent of disturbing troops, but you must not use military force,' or he may have said: 'If it's just up to that point, you can do it.' It may be supposed that the War Minister was given this impression because the Foreign Minister had been a former army man and may have been thinking about as much."

On the 22nd, I met Navy Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO at the Navy Minister's official residence and heard that when the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers had met and
the War Minister had attempted to secure their consent on the use of force, both the Navy and Foreign Ministers had said: "We are opposed to that. We cannot agree to that." The War Minister had immediately left his seat and clasping his head he mumbled: "How troublesome," and went out. Therefore, the Navy knows that it is a clear fact that the Navy Minister had expressed his opposition. I surmised that later when the War and Foreign Ministers had met, that what I had mentioned before could have taken place.

When I met KIDO, he said: "I intend to speak with KONOYE leisurely tomorrow at Karuizawa. If the Army says that we will have to fight with Russia, then I will recommend KONOYE to resign resolutely. The Premier was also of that determination."

When I met Finance Minister IKEDA, he greatly admired the Emperor's actions and was very grateful for it.

On the 25th, I went to Gotemba and reported the circumstances since the last visit. I said: "The General Staff Headquarters group is clamorous, saying this and that, on the Emperor's not having confidence in the Army as such." The Prince replied with a laugh: "Just whose General Staff Headquarters and Army is it? Whether he has or hasn't any confidence in them; aren't they the Emperor's? It would be very grand if it can be safely concluded without mentioning the use of force."

I departed, and on the 26th, when I met KIDO who had just returned from KARUIZAWA, he said: "The newspapers had written up whether or not a minister without portfolio would be assigned to the job just as if KONOYE had uttered it, but we did not speak of it at all. We discussed whether we would cope with it as a war situation, that is, what we would do in case the Army does not comply." I received a letter from Capt. TAKAGI of the Navy and it said: "The strength of the Soviet forces at the spot where the Soviet-Manchukuo border incident occurred was approximately 200. The Korean Army despatched a battalion to cope with them. There are no indications that the Soviet Union is preparing for war. The two conclusions on the situation as made by the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army are: A) The Soviet forces must be compelled to withdraw from Chankufeng. For this, the use of force will be necessary. B) Even if we resort to the use of force, Russia will not enlarge the incident. The reasons for this are: a) We do not see any aggravation of the situation, such as their furthering of military preparations of increase in mobilization. b) At present there is dissension between the Red Army and the OGPU. From these observations, the Kwantung Army Headquarters persistently urged the use of force to the General Staff Headquarters. Because of this, the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff sought an Imperial audience on the 21st." The criticism of the Navy was: "They (Army) are saying this without taking into consideration the Soviet air force or their submarines. However, this is not very good."
EXCERPTS FROM SAIOKJI-HARADA MEMOIRS, COVERING THE 18 APRIL 1939 ENTRY, ON PAGES 2494-96

Page 2494

The evening paper of the 11th mentioned that the War Minister had gone to the Palace from about 2:00 to 3:30 p.m. I was worried about this, so early on the morning of the 12th, I went to the private residence of MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and asked: "What was the reason behind the War Minister's visit to the Palace yesterday?" He answered: "I must go quite far back about this matter.

On the 10th, when the Foreign Minister was received in audience after the Five Ministers' Conference, the Emperor asked him about the progress of the meeting. Prior to this, the Emperor knew of the opposition to the governmental directive by SHIRATORI and OSHIMA. Consequently, the Emperor thought that it was highly unforgivable for OSHIMA and SHIRATORI to overstep the limits of their authority and say that Japan would participate in war (with Germany and Italy). The Emperor was also aware of the fact that the War Minister was covering up, to a certain extent, such action of the representatives abroad, at the Five Ministers' Conferences. With these thoughts in mind, the Emperor asked the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: 'I am thinking of calling in War Minister and rebuke him. Just what is your opinion?' The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal replied: 'Because the opinions of the War, Foreign and Navy Ministers as well as the rest of the cabinet members agreed, as a result of conferences, and as this matter is already closed, I think it will bring about irritation to rebuke the War Minister by calling up the matter anew. It is entirely different from Changkufeng Incident this time, so I think it wise not to call in the War Minister to rebuke him.' The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal himself thought that the matter had been closed, it was wiser to let matters alone. That was the reason for a reply of such a nature. The Emperor said: 'If so, then I will not.' Thus, the Emperor abandoned his idea of rebuking the War Minister.

On this same day, the War Minister went to the Palace in connection with some matter and was granted an audience. The Emperor mentioned the matters which were disagreeable to him, but he did not say them in anger. The Emperor's words were to the effect of: 'In the first place, it is an infringement upon the supreme authority of the Emperor for the two ambassadors to express intentions of participating in war, a matter beyond them to discuss. Under such circumstances, I do not think it very favorable for you to take the attitude of supporting them. This also applied to your covering up for them at the Cabinet conferences.'

The War Minister left the Palace in great awe and went to the room of the Chief Aide-de-Camp. The War Ministers asked: 'Who could it be that told everything to the Emperor?' He was very angry about it. Upon
hearing this remark, the Chief Aide-de-Camp went to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and told him about it. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal told to the Chief Aide-de-Camp: "The words of the Emperor today, were not in the nature of a rebuke to the War Minister. Rather, the Emperor had merely mentioned points over which he was dissatisfied. It is very regrettable that they were construed in such a manner." The Chief Aide-de-Camp appeared to have understood."

Since the story was such, I (HARADA) told the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: "This story should be told to the Foreign Minister, for it will be most embarrassing if he were to be asked something at the Cabinet meeting or even at some other occasion. Furthermore, it will be much better for him to know of this matter. There is need to have the Foreign Minister informed of such matters." MATSUAI, called up Foreign Minister right away and told of this incident. With his (Foreign Minister's) understanding, the matter was closed.
Later I talked over the phone with Foreign Minister ARITA. He said: "We discussed the matter at the Foreign Ministry last night. It fell back on their (Germany, Italy) demands to enter the war. The Army's contention that words were missing meant a clear-cut expression of participation in war and I cannot agree with them. Yesterday, I sent the Vice-Minister to the Premier (to ask his opinion), but he says that it should be done the way the Army wants. It appears as if he wishes to have it read 'participation in war'.'"

Then, I talked over the phone with the Navy Minister. He was very enraged and said: "It is outrageous even to mention matters such as participation in war or actual fighting. In spite of the Emperor's refusal to General Staff Headquarters, the War Minister and the Premier, it is very abominable for the Premier to support the Army and the Ambassadors who take action contrary to the will of the Emperor."
Several days ago, KONOYE said: "I have been gathering the telegrams of the War and Foreign Ministries and looking at them. I think that War Ministry telegram, No. 235, dated August 29, 1938; that is, from the Vice-Ministers of War and Navy to OSHIMA and KOJIMA, the military attaches and the telegram from the Vice-Minister of War on the same day to OSHIMA explaining the War Ministry telegram, No. 235: were very much the source of the error. Won't you get these telegrams for me?"

Therefore, I asked Captain TAKAGI of the Navy and collected the telegrams at once and looked at them. At that time, Captain TAKAGI wrote:

I have enclosed the matter which we discussed confidentially the day before yesterday, so please consider it.

The contents of this telegram indicate the mistaken interpretation of the Navy Ministry of which was decided at the Five Ministers' Conference and also changes in the assertions of the Army. Since the Navy Ministry does not wish to show this to outsiders, please take this into consideration and return it after you are through.

The following telegram is War Ministry telegram No. 235:

1. Both the Army and Navy in agreement with the purport of the treaty plan which was brought by Maj. Gen. KASAHARA. The opinion to adopt this concurred upon the following conditions:
   a. Add the following essentials as the preamble. (Plan for preamble omitted).
   b. Change 'diplomatically' of Article 2 to 'economic'.
   c. Change the end of Article 3 from: 'there is an obligation to perform' to 'will enter into a conference immediately'.
   d. The phrases, 'menace and attack', of Articles 2 and 3 will be designated as: 'unless provoked'. It is our opinion that we would like to prescribe clearly and in detail, the methods of execution and limit of the sphere of the conditions of military aid to be given in accordance with the secret treaty to be attached to the main treaty.

2. Since we desire to conclude this treaty as promptly as possible, we wish Germany would take steps to submit this plan formally soon.
Explanations concerning War Ministry telegram, No. 236:

1. 'The Preamble Draft' is that this treaty is an extension of the existing Anti-Comintern Pact, and is a plan which makes clear the intent that the Soviet Union is the chief target. Care was taken so as not to give the impression from the wording that England and the United States are the greatest enemies.

2. The Text Plan, Obligation of Military Aid in Article 3, is not instantaneous or unconditional. In order to nullify the danger of becoming involved in a purely European problem against our will, a conference before we enter with military aid is the principle.

3. In order to allow the purport of this treaty to take on a defensive character, 'menace and attack' will be limited to 'provocation'.

4. Furthermore, the text of the plan is at present under zealous consideration.
On the 15th, when the Chief of the General Staff Headquarters proceeded to the Imperial Palace, the Emperor had some questions about the development of the Tientsin program and the course the Army was going to take. However, His Highness, the Chief of the Army General Staff, said that his desire was to have a discussion with the Army before replying to the Emperor and departed.

On the 16th, the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister proceeded to the Imperial Palace and received permission to see the Emperor at the same time. Then the Chief of the General Staff said: "In regards to the Tientsin problem, it would be embarrassing to the Army should England insist on handing over the offenders a bargaining condition, but if the sincerity of the English can be trusted, then we are planning to solve the problem as originally planned." At the time of the address to the Emperor, as previously stated, the War Minister was present and he was listening carefully to the conversation. Although the real motive for the request of the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister for an audience with the Emperor is not known, it seemed that they wished to increase the number of divisions.

After the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister left, the Emperor summoned the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and said: "Just now, the Chief of the

General Staff said that in case the British should hand over the offenders and if it is some sort of bargaining condition, then, we would be embarrassed. But if we are to trust their sincerity, then we should have the courage to settle the problem as it is. Pass this incident on to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and have him talk to the Premier. If, by chance, the Army should say this or that concerning this problem I shall talk to them."

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal accepted the Emperor's order and talked to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about it. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs conveyed this to the Premier, he immediately summoned the War Minister. When he questioned the War Minister, the War Minister said: "When His Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, was received in audience, I was also there. The Chief of the General Staff did not say that. That is, the Chief of the General Staff stated: 'After attaining the objective.'" So, the Premier spoke to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on this matter and the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The War Minister also said: "Concerning this problem, I will reply through a military aide-de-camp
and you (Premier) reply thru the Minister of Foreign Affairs.1 When the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal conveyed this result to the Emperor, the Emperor said: "The way I heard it was that after they handed over the offenders, we should trust their sincerity and come to a settlement. It did not sound like attaining the objective."

But, as before, the War Minister was arguing strongly with the Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. When it comes to the contents of attaining the objective there are two main points: one point is that we should make them cooperate to maintain peace; and the other point is that it is a necessary condition for the existence of the Army. So, the Emperor told the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: "It is not good to have such mistakes. Anyway, shall I call the Premier and tell him?" The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "If you summon the Premier immediately, it will create an uneasy feeling. I think it best if you summon His Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, and make this point certain." Then, the Emperor said: "Summon the Chief of the General Staff to come to the Palace. The Chief of the General Staff said: "What I said yesterday was insufficient so I will supplement it." His Highness brought some written material which contained the plans for attaining the objective. That is, there are besides the two points, the previous five conditions. The general outline is written in the newspapers. For instance, Kempei will be put into the Industrial Bureau and the Industrial Bureau will cooperate with Japan to maintain peace and order. Furthermore, a reserve fund of 5,000 Yuan will be provided. When the Emperor asked the Chief of General Staff whether the economic problems were included, His Highness replied: "There is none involved." Although the Emperor asked again, the Chief of the General Staff replied: "Although it is not involved, there is some connection." At this time the Emperor questioned: "Leaving the economical problem out, is it all right if the government says that it is a problem of the government and that they will handle it?" The Chief of the General Staff said: "Then, that is fine." But, the Emperor immediately said: "Will the War Minister agree with that opinion?" Then the Chief of the General Staff said: "That, I do not know." On the 17th, the Premier went to the Palace and when he met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, he said that the War Minister was saying that naturally there are economic problems involved. He (Premier) also said that the Chief Aide-de-Camp was saying that it's very distressing to say that what the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister said are different.
"In regard to the Tientsin problem, generally speaking, the Premier consents to the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, although they wish to make firm restrictions from the 1st of July, the Central Government has no control. Therefore, the units abroad do as they wish and this situation is very troublesome. The strong argument by the Counsel in Tientsin and the comparatively strong attitude taken by Minister KATO, is somewhat regrettable. At any rate, that is the situation. The points over which Japan is concerned are: first, the addition of Japanese in the Industrial Bureau; second, the placing of Kempei within the concessions; third, the handing over of 45,000,000 Yuan of legal tender to the provisional government as a well meant gesture; fourth, cooperation to preserve peace; and fifth, the handing over of the criminals. The stupidity of the War Minister has been the cause for all the disorder. The Emperor thought that the Chief of the General Staff might revise the authority or entrust greater authority to the Kwantung Army in regard to the Nomonhan Incident, so the Emperor issued special summons to the Premier and said: 'Are you (Premier) aware of this problem?' The Premier didn't know anything about this. This problem, that is, the real meaning of the revising of the entrusted authority by the Chief of General Staff is not to exceed the authority, but to reduce it. Since the Emperor thought the command authority was to be extended, he (Emperor) talked to Premier HIRAHASHI about the General Staff Headquarters. It seemed that the Premier was greatly troubled because UGAKI was so inconsistent."

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal continued in regards to Gen. UGAKI: "When Gen. UGAKI first became Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was saying the following: first, we will negotiate with CHIANG Kai-shek; second, make a sweeping change in the foreign policy; third, oppose the establishment of the Asia Development Board in regard to the disposition of the Sino-Japanese Incident; and fourth, the restoration of unification in the army. But, first of all, the reason why UGAKI failed was because he was so unsure of his final decision. There were instances like the Changkufong Incident, where he told the Emperor that the use of military force was inadvisable. Yet, when the Minister of War told the Minister of Foreign Affairs that we may use arms, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Minister of War that he will keep it in mind. This
became the reason why War Minister ITAGAKI received a severe reprimand from the Emperor that using arms was inevitable, the Emperor said: 'The of Foreign Affairs said that it is not advisable to use arms and did not sanction it. So, the War Minister had to hand in his resignation.

EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS, COVERING THE 11 JULY 1939 ENTRY, ON PAGES 2573-75 THEREOF WITH CHAPTER HEADED "EMPEROR BERATES ITAGAKI"

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Around midnight, MATSUDAIRA stopped over at my place and said: "I was frightened the other day. That is, while the War Minister was conversing with the Emperor for about two hours the discontent of the Emperor exploded and His Majesty very bluntly said: 'There is no one as dumb as you'. It seemed that the War Minister was very frightened and no one can understand the situation. Through the Vice-Chamberlain, a Chamberlain asked the Empress about the situation and it seems that OSUMI and TERAUCHI are to be sent to Germany. When the Navy inquired into the intentions of the Emperor, it seemed that although the Army was acting properly, the War Minister talked doubtfully so the Emperor became angry. It also seems that all the discontent came out at one time and I was requested, to ask the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about this tomorrow. Through the Chief Aide-de-Camp, the Emperor said: 'The scolding is not meant for him (Minister of War) to quit, and it is not a problem of resigning. Tell him (War Minister) this so that he will understand clearly.' This matter ended without it becoming necessary for the War Minister to resign."

When I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on the 7th, he was talking about the Emperor and the War Minister. He said: "The War Minister went to the Imperial Palace and spoke about Gen. TERAUCHI being sent to the Nazi Party Conference. Although the Navy was planning to send Admiral OSUMI at that time, there was no formal notice from the other (German) government. But since this is confidential, it hasn't been reported to the Emperor, nor has the Navy reported anything concerning this matter. The Emperor already know that at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, the War Minister reported that Foreign Minister ARITA favored the Military Alliance and he (Emperor) thought it very distressing."

"Furthermore, in regard to the sending of Gen. TERAUCHI, the War Minister stated to the Emperor that it is necessary to send Gen. TERAUCHI even for the reason of strongly binding the Anti-Comintern Pact spiritually. The Emperor did not think it very good and said: 'You (War Minister) know"
my opinions well. Even before at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, you reported the falsity that the Foreign Minister was in favor of the Military alliance. That is very insolent.'

"Furthermore, when the Emperor asked about the Tientsin Incident, the War Minister said: 'The reason why the Army requested the surrender of the 45,000,000 Yuan in the British Concession was to maintain the currency exchange.' The Emperor asked: 'Is that sufficient?' The War Minister said: 'No, it isn't!" The Emperor was shocked and said: 'That is very bad thinking on your part,' and rebuked him. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: 'The Army is confused and everything is lost.' He considered it a tragedy and even lamented to the extent that the Army was going to destroy the nation.

"The other day, the Emperor asked Premier HIRAKUMA: 'Can't the anti-British activities be controlled?' The Premier replied: 'It is difficult to control.' The Emperor asked: 'Then can't you show me the opposite side of the argument?' The Premier replied: 'I will consult KIDO and reply to you.'"

On the morning of the 8th, I (HARADA) met the Minister and the Vice Minister of the Navy and discussed various things. Both the Navy Minister and the Vice-Minister were disgusted with the Cabinet.

I (HARADA) also met the Home Minister and after discussing the various rightist movements, the Home Minister said: 'It is too bad that the Army is putting out the capital.' When I phoned the Vice-Minister of the Navy about the discussion, he said: 'If that is true, then let us expose the Army.' But, I (HARADA) said: 'Ask the Vice-Minister of Home Affairs and make sure.'
When I (HARADA) came home on the 11th, anti-British activities had steadily increased. Although there were many billboards posted from before, these were increased and the anti-British demonstrations have become quite severe. Since the Anglo-Japanese Conference is to take place in Tokyo on the 15th with the intent to check (the English) and for other reasons, they (anti-British demonstrations) have spread to various areas.

I(HARADA) asked KIDO: "Why are the demonstrations so strong?"
KIDO said: "Since the Kempei leads them and the Army finances them (anti-British demonstrations), we can't do anything about it."

"The other day, the Premier, the War Minister and I (KIDO) asked the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to come and we had a discussion. Since there is concern over the course the anti-British group is going to take when a decision is reached at the Tokyo Conference, it was planned to suppress them at that time. However, to have the Army disregard the issue and take the opposite side would be very troublesome. When I (KIDO) asked what was planned in regard to the problem, the War Minister said: 'As a matter of fact, the anti-British activities have gone too far already and the Army is very worried about it. Naturally we (Army) wish to settle the issue; furthermore, we must calm down public opinion. We must get together and suppress them (anti-British movements).'
I (KIDO) was greatly relieved and informed the Chief Secretary. I (KIDO) went home and passed on the news to the Army men under me. As a result, we are now making arrangements so that the issue will be carried out in a thorough manner."
Then, when I (KARADA) talked with Foreign Minister ARITA over the phone on the 19th, ARITA said: "The other day, after the Cabinet meeting at the Five Ministers' Conference, the War Minister said in regard to the Soviet problem, in other words, the boundary dispute of Nomonhan, that he (War Minister) wishes the problem transferred into diplomatic hands although it is in the midst of battle at the present. He persistently urged that this necessitates prompt action. Considering this point, he (War Minister) requested the Military Alliance with Italy and Germany be concluded promptly because it is absolutely necessary. Although the Navy Minister was silent, the Finance Minister and I (ARITA) considered that the Military Alliance and the Soviet problem had no connection; thus, we paid no heed to the War Minister. Later it was heard that the Navy Minister also was in strong opposition towards the Military Alliance." Vice-Minister YAMAKOTO and Foreign Minister ARITA said: "Should Japan form a Military Alliance with Germany and Italy as the army advocates, then this Cabinet will fall."
Early on the morning of the 9th, I (KARADA) met Navy Minister YOKAI and Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO (Navy) and it was said that when the
War Minister visited the Navy Minister two or three days ago, the Navy
Minister assailed the War Minister with questions. They felt sorry
for the War Minister because he could not answer anything.

When I (KARADA) met the Foreign Minister on the morning of the
10th, I (KARADA) said: "At the Five Ministers' Conference of the 8th,
the attitude of the Premier was very clear. The Navy Minister said to
me: 'If the Premier had taken that attitude around June, things probably
would not have developed this way. The reason why he can take such an
attitude now is because he became carefree. If he had taken the attitude
of being willing to resign at any time the situation requires, it would
have been nice. It is very regrettable." The Foreign Minister said:
"That is so."

Furthermore, the minister was talking about the state of affairs
of the Five Ministers' Conference. He said: "The Premier stood up and
said: 'The War Minister came the other day and explained the Army
proposal. Since we had recognized the necessity of a treaty, we had
done our utmost according to the pre-arranged plan. Although the War
Minister says that this (Army's) proposal is not a hindrance to the pre-
arranged plan, I (Premier) could not think of it as such.' The Premier asked all the members of the
Cabinet to ask questions, so various questions were asked. The con-
tention of the Army is that the change of situation necessitates a mili-
tary alliance. Its first step is to follow the pre-arranged plan. In
the event that this cannot be done, the second step, that is, the con-
clusion of a military alliance is to be followed. The Premier asked the
War Minister what he thought of it. The War Minister said that on one
hand he is a State Minister, but at the same time, he is also War Min-
ister. Therefore, in regard to the following of the pre-arranged plan as
a State Minister, he is in favor of it. But, on the other hand, as a
representative of the general opinion of the Army, he is also in favor
of following the second course. As far as I (Foreign Minister) can see,
it appears that there is some leeway in the unconditional alliance.
It can also be thought of as the ousting of ITAGAKI."

The Foreign Minister continued: "The Finance Minister said:
'The most important thing for Japan to consider at this time is the
settlement of this problem and the expansion of production. Therefore,
the attitude of the United States requires much attention, and if the relations with the United States become bad, it will reflect on the Anglo-Japanese talks. Considering this from all angles, an alliance with Germany and Italy requires careful consideration. It is very bad to make the United States an enemy for the expansion of production and to save the present situation. Therefore, I (Finance Minister) am opposed to this problem.1

The Navy Minister said: 'As a participant in the

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Five Ministers' Conference, I am completely in favor of the statement made by the Premier previously. Although the army predicts a great change in the international situation, I doubt it. To a certain extent, the Nononhan Incident and the problem of renouncing the treaty with the United States was expected. Why not ask the Foreign Minister, a specialist, what he thinks of a change in the international situation? I (YOSAI) replied: 'If Japan makes a military alliance with Germany and Italy, then the unity between England the United States will get much stronger. This is disadvantageous to Japan. Therefore, I don't think there is any necessity to alter the pre-arranged plan just to please Germany and Italy. Although the Army says that this is isolation, this is not a disadvantageous isolation but an advantageous one, so there is no need for worry.' The Premier asked the War Minister if the main point within the Army proposal meant hindering the pre-arranged plan. The War Minister had said it does. The Premier said very clearly that he cannot present anything other than the pre-arranged plan which had already received the sanction of the Emperor.
I then met Foreign Minister ARITA, who said: "It will probably be possible to open the Five Ministers' Conference on Friday, which is the 25th. However, since there is a great gap between the Foreign Ministry's proposal and that of the Army, they will surely clash. The Chief Cabinet Secretary was also looking at this pessimistically, and optimism as of former days, is not possible. Isn't there a danger that it will change — although there may be none on the surface?" The Foreign Minister was doubtful.

They are influencing the Genro and the other officials so that when the War Minister should resign alone, there will be an Imperial message naming a successor because it is difficult to obtain a succeeding War Minister. Concerning the proposal for a Military Alliance, Premier HIRANUMA is not deviating a bit from the basic proposal which was reported to the Emperor and which had his sanction. This was not good. If the Five Ministers' Conference is to be opened by a proposal of the Foreign Ministry, the Army would attack it. Therefore, many quarters are saying that the present conference should be delayed as much as possible in order to soften the atmosphere which exists in the Army. Preliminary steps should be taken during this time and when they are about to be realized — then the important decisions should be made. These assertions are very arbitrary, and they are highly irregular. However, they are talking of the present Cabinet, the Genro and other officials as if they were all true.

I (HARADA) told SAKUNOTO by letter that it was absolutely outrageous to falsify facts. However, more than that, concerning the decisions of the Five Ministers' Conference which had imperial approval, the War

Minister was in it too. In spite of this, to put through the German-Italian-Japanese Military Alliance, was being too high handed. Again, such acts which did not respect the true relations of sovereign and subjects must be considered as a fundamental problem. I wrote clearly that there was absolutely no such relationships between the Genro, the other officials and the present Cabinet.

After that, I went to Hayama and inquired of the details from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The Lord Privy Seal said: "This morning, at 9:00 o'clock, the Premier had an audience with the Emperor. After that, I met the Premier. The Premier said that he would like to see the success of the Japan-British talks, but the Army was doing as it wished, and it seemed as if they were obstructing the conclusion of this."
However, I still have faint hopes. From a diplomatic standpoint, when we consider the standpoint of present day Japan, it is a golden opportunity. However, it is extremely regrettable that there should be petty squabbles over a Military Alliance, etc."

The Lord Keeper said: "Until today, I had considerable faith in the War Minister, but his recent attitude is very queer. It's not only his brains that are bad." The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was very dissatisfied with the War Minister, and he continued: "Even the present Army is not that discerning. There are only a few men doing the agitating, and they all resort to personal feelings. They only think of winning or losing, and whenever the Army's proposal does not pass, they consider that they've lost and become infuriated. These circumstances might lead them to misjudge the main issues and it is very dangerous.

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "The Emperor can not understand Premier HIRARUMA's optimistic attitude concerning financial matters. It somehow seems to be mistaken for the Army and HASHIZUME incidents. According to the Premier's story, the War Minister is making false statements. The other day, the Premier said, that since telegram No 326 was already issued, it was not possible for him to exceed its scope. If the various situations changed, and the opinions changed as a result of an Army-Navy agreement, he would also reconsider. But, at the present time, he could never agree to an all-out military alliance. The War Minister relayed the same statement to the Navy Minister. Still, when he returned to the War Ministry afterwards, the War Minister purposely said to the people in the Military Affairs Bureau: 'The Premier fooled me. He agreed at first, and then opposed it later.' They have not yet decided to hold the Five Ministers' Conference on the 22nd. The meeting scheduled on the 18th was postponed according to the wishes of the War Minister, and in spite of this, the War Minister is broadcasting that the Premier postponed it. The Premier told me that it was not good to resign as a result of clashing with the Army. Therefore, he would like to resign after the situation improved."

It seems that the Prince summoned KIDO also and asked the same questions as he did of MATSUDAIRA. His Highness said: "If this Cabinet should resign, how about KOHYEN?" KIDO replied that KOHYEN was not suited.

The Prince further questioned KIDO, and asked him if there wasn't a
a solution. The Prince said: "It is undesirable that the Cabinet should change as a result of this problem, that is, the Military Alliance issue."

In short, according to the Prince's (CHICHIBU) opinion, he desired that the responsibility of Cabinet resignation be diverted from the Army. The Prince inquired: "How about changing our Ambassadors stationed in Germany and Italy? What if the Premier himself should go and visit HITLER and MUSSOLINI in Germany and Italy?" Whereupon KIDO said: "It would be injurious to the national dignity to have the Premier go. The effects would be bad." At the same time, it is not possible to change the Ambassadors at so late a time, and although it isn't impossible for the Premier to go, his visit itself would be a problem. That was how KIDO replied. KIDO said: "The Cabinet does not look as if it will continue for a while longer. The Five Ministers' Conference probably will not be held on the 22nd."

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I returned to Osaka on that day, and that evening, there was a telephone call from the Tokyo newspapers. They reported that a Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia had been concluded. If this was true, the Military Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy would be automatically dissolved and the situation would be such that a change in the political situation would be inevitable. Just as I was thinking this, there was a telephone call from Tokyo which stated that the Army was very much weakened, and the Cabinet also seemed to be in trouble. There are suggestions for me to return to Tokyo, but it is not good to do various things while excited, and I plan to watch the situation one more day.

KOKOYE returned from Karuizawa to attend the funeral services of Prince FUSHIMI. There are some that are taking this to mean that a political change is impending, and are spreading various rumors.
On the night of the 22nd, MATSUDAIRA met KINOYE and KIDO. The next day he went to Hayama and met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He made a report concerning the next Cabinet in Tokyo, and asked for careful consideration of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He came to my (KANADA) place around 8:00 p.m. His (MATSUDAIRA) story was: "The Prime Minister told the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that the affairs of state cannot be carried on with the situation as it is today. With the conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Agreement Pact, Japan's foreign policy is in a state of having been practically betrayed. This is a failure in foreign policy which resulted from the unreasonableness of the Army. In order to serve in accordance with Japan's singular loyalty to the Emperor, I (Premier) shall, on one hand demand the Army's reconsideration and set an example; and, on the other, since I cannot justify myself to the Emperor, I shall apologize and resign. At present, the Army is very embarrassed and has no right to speak concerning the next Cabinet. However, to nag the Army because of that is unwise in the present instance...."
"Then on the morning of the 5th, I called at the residence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and chatted with him for about an hour. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stated: 'Yesterday, the Emperor summoned the War Minister, and then the Chief of the General Staff and stated: 'I think this war should be ended as soon as possible. What do you think?' The War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff both replied simply: 'We will continue until CHIANG KAI SHEK falls.' The Emperor was quite concerned about this matter because the Chief and the Vice Chief of the General Staff had previously told the Emperor that the Chief of the General Staff and the General Staff Headquarters had feverishly wanted to stop this war. And, in short, make preparations against Soviet Russia. Since then nothing has happened. Therefore, the Emperor thinking that the Chief of the General Staff at least had in mind to settle the incident as soon as possible, put the question with that belief, to the Chief of the General Staff and to the War Minister.'"

"* * * * *"

"Then, wishing to impart this matter to the Vice Minister of the Navy, I went to the official residence of the Naval Minister, and met the Vice Minister of the Navy. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO said: 'It seemed as if Aide-de-Camp HIRATA was here just now, but I did not meet him. Probably he came on some such matter. However, though the War Minister said: 'We will continue until CHIANG KAI SHEK falls' so-called 'We will fight it out,' in reality it is the Army which is most troubled. Consequently, it is also the Army that desires most earnestly to quit. Therefore there is no doubt about that point.'"
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CORRECTION

1. The attached is a corrected copy of IPS Doc. No. 3150-283A

2. Please destroy the previous copy of IPS Doc. No. 3150-283-A, delivered to you on 12 January.

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Then, when I met MATSUDAIRA, he said: "The fact is that His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, and the War Minister proceeded in company to the Imperial Palace this morning and expressed their desire "to submit some matter to the Throne". His Majesty, thinking that the War Minister was coming to make an appeal also concerning that question of the use of real force on the Soviet-Manchuria border and thinking that it would rather cast a reflection upon H.I.H. Prince, Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister if the sanction was denied to them when they had appealed directly to him, made the Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty convey his intention in advance out of his "very prudent and sympathetic consideration, as follows: "Should it be the case that they are coming, by any chance, to get my sanction to use force of arms, I haven't the slightest intention of approving it. If they are coming for that, they needn't come." The message to the above effect was conveyed through the Chief Aide-de-Camp to H.I.H. Prince, Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister. But they said: "We would like to be received in audience by His Majesty by all means," So His Majesty, at eleven o'clock, said: "If that be the case, tell them to come", and waited for them. However, the War Minister and H.I.H. Prince, Chief of the General Staff, kept His Majesty waiting for more than an hour after they had arrived at the Palace. In the meanwhile, the Chief Aide-de-Camp went to and from His Majesty and the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, and finally, close to noon, an audience was to be realized.

"Then, just as His Majesty had thought, the War Minister submitted the question of the use of force and begged his sanction. His Majesty put the question: "How about contact with the Ministers concerned?" and the War Minister replied: "Both the Foreign Minister, and the Navy Minister have agreed." Although both Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister had previously expressed their opinion in favor of troop dispositions, they were absolutely against the use of force. Being answered to his question to the effect that "Both Ministers have agreed", by the War Minister, when he had already known the particulars, His Majesty seemed to have felt that he was going to be deceived again and, with a somewhat excited countenance, admonished:

"First of all, the actions on the part of the Army are abominable. There are frequent instances when a sneaky method was used, quite improper for my army, disobeying the orders from the central authorities and deciding on the judgment of the authorities on the spot, such as: The case of Liutokou in the Manchurian Incident and the actions at the Marco Polo Bridge..."
at the beginning of this Incident. I think it is really abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time..."

"Then, turning to the War Minister, he said: 'Hereafter, you must not move one soldier without my command!' He spoke so emphatically to the War Minister that the War Minister retreated, filled with trepidation.

"And when he returned, he said to the effect: 'I can never look into His Majesty's face again. I should by all means like to resign.'" ** * * *

p. 2191

When I met KIDO later that day he said: "Why didn't the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal act in concert with the Premier and do something? It is disturbing to have the Emperor taking such pointed action."

p. 2194

- - "Then, a letter from Captain TAKAGI of the Navy came, which read: 'The strength of the Soviet troops at the spot where the current Soviet-Manchoukuo border problem occurred is approximately 200, and the Korean Army has dispatched one battalion to cope with them. And there are no indications of preparing for war on the part of the Soviets, and speaking of the two points, that is, the estimate of the situation made by the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, they are: (a) it is necessary to compel the Soviets to withdraw from Changkufeng. For this, the use of real force will be necessary; (b) even if we resort to the use of real force, the Soviets will not enlarge it to a serious incident. The reasons for the above are: (1) we do not see any aggravation of the situation, such as its making preparations for war and reinforcement; (2) at present there is extreme dissension between the Red Army and GPU. I suppose the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff sought an Imperial audience on the 21st because the Kwantung Army Headquarters had persistently urged the use of real force to the General Staff Headquarters.

"And the criticism of the Navy was: 'They are talking like that without taking into consideration the Soviet air force and submarines. This, however, is not very good.'"
陸軍大臣が藩を訪れたとき、御用行は彼の随従として同行し、陸軍大臣に面せしめに務め、勧め、懇請した。陸軍大臣は懇請を許され有着し、挙げて答えた。

武官長は陸軍大臣に面せしめに務め、懇請を許され有着し、挙げて答えた。
2 July 1938

That evening, I (HARADA) went over to the Navy Minister's and met with the Navy Minister and Vice Minister and the three of us had a leisurely conversation for approximately 2 hours. It was brought out that OKAWA, Shumei recently brought a petition from the young officials of the Foreign Ministry to UGKI, the Foreign Minister, which stated: "Appoint SHIRATORI the Vice Minister." * * *
西園寺原一男記 第三百十四通

1. P.S. Doc. No. 3150 - 313 A

参謀総長は、外交の立場から、陸相の決定を支持すべきです。陸相が決定を下したとされ、参謀総長は陸相の決定を尊重するべきです。外交の大権は陸相に委ねられ、参謀総長は陸相の立場を尊重すべきです。
EXTRACT FROM SAIONJI-HARA MEMOIRS

Chapter 313 (7 February 1939)

ARITA Reports to Throne

P. 2438

"... The Army's desire reached the Emperor's ears. Before the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or anyone else knew, the Emperor personally decided to call the Chief Aide-de-Camp and said: 'Go to the General Staff Headquarters and say that if it is so embarrassing if KONOYF resigns, as a condition for keeping KONOYF in office, decide the question of strengthening the Anti-Comintern pact as decided at the First Five Ministers' Conference. (P. 2430) Moreover, how about eliminating those points advocated by the Army: that is, those points which are in discord with the general decisions made at the Five Ministers' Conference? Also, how about deciding to have this anti-Comintern pact directed strictly against the Soviet as it had been decided at the Five Ministers' Conference?' The Emperor had, as his idea, the foregoing transmitted to the Army, who, however, did not show any signs of submitting to the Imperial will and said: 'We are not in favor of that.'"
"***As the Foreign Minister, I am at present reluctantly assuming an extremely strong attitude, which is indeed awkward. However, this must be done in order to see the situation through. If we fail in this, I think that our foreign policy will be a total failure. The other day, I said to the Army people: 'The Foreign Ministry does not know absolutely anything about the telegram between Ambassador Osami and the General Staff Headquarters concerning the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern pact. No matter how much and how many years the Army may have studied diplomacy, what right do they have to do such a thing without consulting the Foreign Ministry at all?' I asked for their reconsideration and the Army said they were very sorry. At any rate, such a situation is distressing but I would like you to remain for awhile with a little more patience."
昭和三年七月二十一日

西園寺・原田日記

第三百十四題

藤原

近いようこん、馬鹿に張りやっちゃって。

【中略】

連中にも一作居高里例、参謀本部、陸軍、外務省に
派員 kot 司

外交上のご問題、もって研究ささら、何と

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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 317 (10 March 1939)
OSHIMA and SFIRATORI Balk

P. 2468

"On my way to Tokyo on the morning of the 9th, I (H/RADA) had Captain TAKA3I ride on the same coach with me from Chigasaka. When I questioned him about the situation, he was very much concerned from the standpoint of routine.

P. 2469

"When I met the Foreign Minister shortly after lunch, he said: "There is no problem any more from the standpoint of routine. In short, it is a pending question which, after careful discussion has already been reported to the Emperor and His Majesty, stating that it is an inevitable consequence of circumstances, has sanctioned it. Therefore, no matter what they (Ambassadors to Rome and Berlin) might say, the (Japanese) Government cannot cancel its decision. All we have to do is to change the Ambassadors if they are going to rush to conclusions and say that the decisions (of the Japanese Government) will not do. As for the transfer of Ambassadors, I would like to carry it out after the close of the present session of the Diet. In all cases, we wired back instructions to both (Ambassadors) to do as recommended by the Japanese Government." He further remarked with firm determination: "In all likelihood, the Premier is presumably of the same opinion."
The Foreign Minister said: "The other day, on the afternoon of the 8th, to be exact, I went to the Palace with the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference, was granted an audience with the Emperor, and made a confidential report on the decision to the Emperor. Furthermore, I reported: 'Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI made a clarification, which represented their own opinion only, to Germany and Italy of the Empire's intention to fight in the event that these should wage war with England and France, but they should be made to take this buck considering that they acted without regard to the wishes of the central authorities and that their words and actions overstepped their authority.' However, * * *"
西園寺公望記

決断

東京政局の変化に伴い、外務省は内閣府を経由して外交政策の決定を行なうことを決定した。これは、内閣府が専門機関として機能するため、外務省が直接の政策決定を担うことを回避することを意味する。
EXCERPT FROM "SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS"

Chapter 321
(18 April 1938)

Emperor Criticizes Envoys

P. 2494.

The evening paper of the 11th mentioned that the War Minister had gone to the Palace from about 2:00 to 3:30 p.m. I was worried about this, so early on the morning of the 12th, I went to the private residence of WATANABE, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and asked, "What was the reason behind the War Minister's visit to the Palace yesterday?" He answered, "In regards to the visit to the Palace, unless I speak from the beginning, it cannot be understood."

Day before yesterday, that is, on the 11th, when the Foreign Minister visited the Palace after the Five Ministers' Conference held a few days ago, the Emperor made an inquiry about the progress of the meeting to the Foreign Minister. Prior to this, the Emperor had learned of the opposition made to governmental instructions by both Ambassador SHIRATORI and OSHIMA. Consequently, the Emperor thought that for Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA to have expressed subsequently Japan's intention to participate in war although they had no authority, was an act overstepping their authority and extremely bad. The Emperor was also aware of the fact that the War Minister was covering up, to a certain extent, such acts committed abroad at each session of the Five Ministers' Conference. From the standpoint of the above situation, the Emperor asked the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, 'I am thinking of especially calling in the War Minister and rebuking him. What is your opinion?' The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal replied that even though various circumstances exist, since the opinions of the War, Foreign and Navy Ministers as well as other cabinet members were in agreement as a result of conferences, and since the matter was already settled, he thought that for him /the Emperor/ to make various reproaches on the matter would be rather ill-advised since it would bring about an irritation and furthermore, that since present circumstances were entirely different from that of the case of the Changkung, he thought that it would be better if he /the Emperor/ did not especially call in the War Minister to rebuke him. It was because the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal felt that the matter, after all, was settled, that he made the remark. In the sense that it would be better to leave matters as they now stand. Therefore, since the Emperor said, 'If that is the case, I will do so,' the idea of summoning the War Minister was abandoned.
"On that day, however, the War Minister happened to go to the Palace on some other business and was received in audience. Thereupon, the Emperor patiently informed the War Minister of matters with which he was not pleased in regards to this question but not in the sense of rebuking him. The Emperor's words were to the effect that in the first place, it was an infringement upon his supreme authority for the two ambassadors abroad to express Japan's intentions of participating in war, a matter with which they were not concerned; that he was extremely displeased with the War Minister's taking the attitude of supporting them under such circumstances; and that he was also very dissatisfied with the War Minister's deviation from the subject at each meeting of the Cabinet.

The War Minister departed in great fear. He went to the room of the Chief Aide-de-Camp and asked, 'Who was it that told everything to the Emperor?' He was very angry."
未见有明确的文本内容。
On the morning of the 20th, I went to see KIDO and inquired into the situation. KIDO said that he had met the Premier on the previous day. He said: "The Premier appears to be in a dilemma between the Army and the Lord Privy Seal or the Emperor. The Premier seems to think that the Army's actions are righteous and he would like to settle matters according to their whims. For such a thing, the understanding and cooperation of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal is needed. Consequently, the Premier desired that the Emperor also gains this understanding and it is his objective to have me (KIDO) stand in the middle to arrange matters".

I couldn't understand the position that KIDO had taken. KIDO stated that although the main part of the Anti-Comintern Pact had already received Imperial Sanction, the Army wants to omit the part of the secret treaty; namely, the attached secret treaty which says that the treaty is only applicable to the Comintern, in other words, to Soviet Russia. However, the Emperor will not hear of it. Therefore, within the applicability of the treaty, the Army should arrange it so that we will not be involved in case Germany and Italy ever fought against England and France or other nations. However, both the Army and Navy, especially the Army, are saying that they desire the avoiding of being drawn into the vortex (of war), so that portion of the Treaty is quite safe. Such are the opinions of the Premier and others. KIDO also expressed the same opinion and during the conversation, he said that the present Emperor is a scientist and very much of a liberal as well as a pacifist. Therefore, if the Emperor ideas are not changed, there will exist quite a gap between His Majesty and the Army and rightist groups. In the later years of Emperor KOMSHI's reign, the Shogunate completely changed the officials about the Emperor.

Perhaps something along that line will occur. In order to lead the Army, but still making it appear as if we were being led by them we must also make it appear as if we understood the Army a little more. When I was told these things by KIDO, it was beyond my expectations, so I was tempted to oppose him, but kept quiet for I thought that it would not do any good to argue with him now. I was very indignant because I thought that KIDO and the like should lead the Army or the rightist groups to comply with the will of the Emperor. It should be their duty to do their utmost along that line.
Therefore, I told KIDO: "You and I are the ones who are most familiar with the situation. The cheap, unpresentable rightist groups are running around with selfish rumors and creating such circumstances to give the power to a man of their choice. This is the factor behind the disunity of the army and the unfavorable social predicament. These are the factors behind the present situation. I believe that you will be able to clear this basic evil in your position. However, since there is not much left to be done, and although it is extreme of me, I am thinking of possibly killing five or six of these men who will become obstacles in the future. It may cause you some trouble at that time, but that is not the problem". KIDO said: "You shouldn't mention such extremes". However, I was so disgusted with KIDO's attitude that I mentioned such things. Before he left, KIDO very vaguely said: "I'll think about it some more, so don't worry. I want you to tell the Prince (SAIONJI) not to worry."
Prior to this, it was said that KIDO conferred with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. on the 22nd, which was the day after the Emperor's return from Hayama. The conversation according to KIDO's story was that Japan is resolved to continue without changing the present terms. We intend to make contact with HITLER through Ambassador OSHIMA and not to have the Premier do it directly. If this method does not work, the Cabinet will resign. Therefore, it was necessary to consider the aftermath of a change in Cabinets. Ultimately, they reached the point where a method 'B' will be used if method 'A' doesn't succeed. This will be done instead of trying to change the ideas of the Emperor or the opinions of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. On the other hand, it could be taken to mean that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should explain to the Emperor that the resignation of the Cabinet might result if the Emperor did not give his sanction and matters were advanced along the former lines and the other party did not agree. This matter of the Cabinet's resigning because of the lack of the Emperor's sanction is something unavoidable. KIDO had informed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that such a threat-like statement to the Emperor was inexcusable; nevertheless, KIDO did say that.
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 5150-322B

3/3/95
"When I called on Hiro on the morning of the 24th, he seemed to have greatly changed his attitude and said: 'There is no alternative but to recall both Ambassadors /T.N. OSHPIMA and SPARATO/ at all cost. If this should happen to influence the peace and order within the nation, I intend to control matters suitably, and I expect to suppress the Rightists myself.'

"On the 25th, after the Five Ministers' Conference, ARITA told me: 'An urgent request has come from both Ambassadors /T.N. SPIRATORI and OSHPIMA/ for their recall. Therefore, a discussion was held to devise necessary due counter-measures. It was decided that communication be made directly by the Premier with Hitler and Mussolini through the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, instead of using the Japanese Ambassadors stationed in Berlin and Rome.

"I went to Okitsu that night. On the morning of the 26th, I called up Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO when he said: 'At any rate, it would be better, after doing everything possible, to assume the attitude that we are contented with whatever the result may be. The Navy Minister also said the same thing. Concerning (P.2507) this matter of doing everything possible, which has been touched on lightly before, Foreign Minister ARITA said: 'Through the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, the Premier will approach Hitler and Mussolini in a general manner. The Foreign Minister will present the particulars of this problem to the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy. They will push this matter to the very end until its conclusion, but if there should be any difference to the demands of Japan, negotiations will be cut off. Even if things cannot become satisfactorily concluded, that is unavoidable. This is what was decided upon at the Five Ministers' Conference.'"
Early on the morning of the 6th, I went to ARITA's residence in Mejiro and he said: "Yesterday, just after I handed the Premier's message to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, I received an official wire from Councillor USAMI in Berlin, which said that he /USAMI/ was requested by Gauss, the Deputy Vice-Minister of the German Foreign Office to meet him. He /Gauss/ asked if Japan wouldn't agree to a proposal such as this, and added that as this had not been shown to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop yet, he /Gauss/ did not know what the Foreign Minister would have to say about it, but he /Gauss/ was showing this to him /USAMI/, unofficially, as his private plan. Upon looking through the draft, though it was written in a very indirect fashion, emphasis was put on the German demands previously refused by Japan, which after all was a draft then including those demands. Then ARITA said, "I have investigated the origin of this draft and it somehow seems that it was submitted by the Japanese Army to the German Foreign Office through the attaches. This is outrageous and I won't be responsible if this sort of the conspiracy goes on." However, he /ARITA/ did not show me /HARADA/ the actual contents of the draft.
Exhibit to 3801-B is to be corrected in accordance with Landwave Board decision as shown on Court Record page 39. 008.

Doc. Div.
8 May 1939

"Overseas Affairs Minister KOISO wanted to see me so I met him on the night of the 8th at my relative's house. We talked from about 9:30 to about 11:00 and first of all KOISO said: 'The solution of the China Problem, which is so often mentioned by the Army; namely, the reaching of the conclusion of the war as soon as possible; will be impossible without a tri-partite alliance. Because the officers and men at the front are displeased with British and French aid to Chiang Kai-shek, an alliance with Germany and Italy will alleviate their feelings somewhat. It would then be in order to settle the China Problem through the offices of England and France. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to pacify the officers and men at the front,'"
Notice:

Exhibit 385/18 to be corrected in accordance with Longway.
Board decision, as shown on Court
Record 36, 50 &.

Doc. Div.
After this, without any relation to the Premier's message, there was a wire from Ambassador OHSHIMA. It mentioned that 2 or 3 days ago that Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP called up Ambassador OHSHIMA at Berlin from Munich on his way to meet CIANO at Como, and questioned OHSHIMA: "Then a contracting nation goes to war against a third nation, and even if there is no military aid from Japan (Germany and Italy do not expect military aid from Japan. It is impossible for Japan to do so), would it be permissible to recognize Japan as being in a state of war?" OHSHIMA had replied in the affirmative.

Regarding this, ARITA said that it is indeed inexcusable for those abroad to propose, on their own authority, such a thing as "participation in war" and to make such an arbitrary reply. A Five Ministers Conference is scheduled for tomorrow, but this matter will be of considerable difficulty, for Premier HIRANUMA is inclined to assume a supporting attitude rather than remain neutral. I believe that such matters have already been transmitted abroad by the Army, and if such is the case, I cannot assume the responsibility for our foreign policy."

I returned home and called the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and told him of it. On the 7th, I went to Yokohama with MATSUDAIRA for dinner. In the midst of our dinner, the Foreign Minister called me and said: "I would like to see you as soon as possible." Together with MATSUDAIRA, I visited the Foreign Minister from 9:00 p.m. and asked the result of the Five Ministers' Conference. As we had expected, the Premier supported the opinion of the War Minister, and upheld OHSHIMA's answer to RIBBENTROP, that in the event of war between one of the contracting nations and a third nation, Japan will be considered to have entered a state of war, although it will not give any military support.
この文は、日本語で書かれた文書の一部です。文章は、略語や略写法を含んでいるため、完全に理解するには少し難しいかもしれません。しかし、主な内容は以下の通りです。

日本は日分松平と大和から横浜に合せ、平川に恰度電報がたれ。今、外務大臣を訪れる時を連ねる

この文は、日本の外交関係に関する内容を示しています。
Concerning the results of the Five Ministers' Conference of the 9th, the Navy Vice-Minister said: "The conference was opened at 2:00 p.m. First of all, the Navy Minister said, 'The Gauss draft which we have here, did not come through legitimate channels. If we are to follow the proper course, making this a problem for the Five Ministers Conference; in the first place, we have not even received an official reply from Germany to the message of the Premier. Notwithstanding the fact that to demand for an answer reply is our first problem, don't you think it very odd to attach ourselves to the Gauss draft without demanding for this reply. However, no one said anything about it and again continued discussing the Gauss draft. The Premier, in his remark, gave me the impression that a reply to his message was unnecessary because the matter had already been solved when Ambassador OSHIMA had replied "yes" when Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had asked him whether it was all right to consider Japan a participant in the event of war. In other words, it was agreeable for Japan to be considered as ready to participate in the event of war between England-France and Germany-Italy."
"Immediately the War and Navy Ministers each saw the Premier individually and gave him the story, and a Five Ministers' Conference was hurriedly held at 9 a.m. on the 20th, and this problem was settled in substance roughly as above. However, with regard to the Foreign Ministers' proposal to make Ambassador OSHIMA retract his affirmative answer to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's question as to whether it was all right to conclude that /Japan/ would enter into a state of war, the Premier was evasive and would not make him retract it. The Foreign Minister, however, cautioned the Premier that he ought to report privately to the Throne, because though it could not be said that a complete agreement in opinion had been reached between the Army and Navy /the matter/, had actually been decided and it appeared that instructions would soon be issued...

And though the Premier was asked over and over at the Five Ministers' Conference to rescind Ambassador OSHIMA's words, he simply assumed an attitude indicating that that was all right. And so the deletion of art. III of the above-mentioned secret understanding concerning the participant nations, etc. and the revision of the wording of the announcement to be made to the world have finally been carried out, but the statement about "entering into a state of war," etc. by Ambassador OSHIMA /in reply/ to Ribbentrop, the annulment of which was pressed for by Foreign Minister Arita, has been left unrescinded, after all. And so this has had much to do with leaving uncorrected a source of trouble for the future.
Early on the morning of the 23rd I called Vice-Minister YAMIOTO to the phone in order to learn what the latest developments were. According to what Vice-Minister YAMIOTO said he understood that both ambassadors, i.e., SHIRATORI and OSHIMA said that nothing could be done about that particular draft and they kicked it back. He went on to say that at the same time the Army claimed that there were some words missing /T.N. presumably in the draft/ therefore he /YAMIOTO/ thought that /the whole business/ was scandalous.

Later I talked over the phone with Foreign Minister ARITA. He said: "We discussed the matter at the Foreign Ministry last night. It fell back in their /T.N. Germany, Italy/ demands to enter the war. The Army's contention that words were missing meant a clear-cut expression of participation in war and I cannot agree with them. Yesterday, I sent the Vice-Minister to the Premier /T.N. to ask his opinion/, but he says that it should be done the way the Army wants. It appears as if he too wishes to have it read 'participation in war'."

Then, I talked over the phone with the Navy Minister. He was very enraged and said: "It is outrageous even to mention matters such as participation in war or condition of war. In spite of the fact that the Emperor often says, 'I shall not permit it,' to the General Staff Headquarters, the War Minister and the Premier, concerning participation in war, it is very abominable for the Premier to support the Army and the Ambassadors who take action contrary to the will of the Emperor."
西園寺原一男記 第三十六回小松政次

昭和三年三月二日

昭和三年三月の朝早く山本次郎と電報を述べ、
その後弟子を待つと黒木大使が白鳥大島から
彼の言葉に引くおかえりに待つと旦那が答えた

J.P.S./Doc.No.3150-326A
EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 332
(11 July 1939)

Emperor Berates ITAGAKI

P. 2569

"In regard to the Tientsin problem, generally speaking, the Premier agrees with the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, although they wish to make firm restrictions from the 1st of July, the Central Government has no control. Therefore, the units abroad do as they wish and this situation is very troublesome. The strong argument by the Consul in Tientsin and the comparatively strong attitude taken by Minister Kataoka, is somewhat regrettable. At any rate, that is the situation. The points in the Tientsin problem which Japan is considering are: first, the placing of Japanese in the Industrial Bureau; second, the placing of "knave" within the concessions; third, the demand of handing over of 45,000,000 Yuan of legal tender to the provisional government as a friendly gesture; fourth, cooperation to preserve peace and order; and fifth, the handing over of the criminals. The stupidity of the War Minister seems to be the cause for all the problems becoming extremely disorderly.

P. 2574

"Furthermore, when the Emperor asked about the Tientsin Incident, the War Minister said: 'The reason why the Army requested the surrender of the 45,000,000 Yuan in the British Concession was to maintain the currency exchange.' The Emperor asked: 'Is that sufficient?' The War Minister said: 'No, it isn't!' The Emperor was shocked and said: 'That is very bad thinking on your part,' and rebuked him. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: 'The Army is confused and everything is lost.' He considered it a tragedy and even lamented to the extent that the Army was going to destroy the nation.'
西園寺・原田日記

昭和十四年/八月二日

西園寺・原田日記
昭和十四年/八月二日

五月二十日から検査を非常と強硬にするということである。人間は中央の統制が太くても居らぬもの。これにおかずる到は、本邦領土が二分に分され、日米両国に分裂され、日本が再び戦争の場に立つこととなる。このたびは好意的に考えてはやくに為に幣反現象の有無の五百丁目を普賢閣に渡せ、と奈良市長に言及する

五月二十日

多少余談に堪えぬことでも、急に再び戦争が起こる

五月二十一日

幣反現象の五分下さいと、普賢閣に渡せ。合計に合せ、米米利西に和解を進める。天皇陛下に答えて居る。
Excerpt From SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 332 - (11 July 1939)
Emperor Berates ITAGAKI

"When I/T.N. HARADA/ met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on the 7th, he was talking about the Emperor and the War Minister. He said: 'The War Minister suddenly went to the Imperial Palace and spoke about Gen. TERABUCHI being sent to the Nazi Party Conference. Although the Navy was planning to send Admiral OSHIMA at that time, there was no actual formal notice yet from the other /T.N. German/ government, and since this is still confidential, it hasn't been reported to the Emperor, nor has the Navy reported anything concerning this matter. The Emperor already knew that at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, the War Minister reported that Foreign Minister ARITA favored the Military Alliance and he /T.N. Emperor/ thought it very distressing."

"'Furthermore, in regard to the sending of Gen. TERABUCHI, the War Minister stated to the Emperor that it is necessary to send Gen. TERABUCHI even for the reason of strongly binding the Anti-Comintern Pact spiritually. The Emperor did not think it very good and said: 'You /T.N. War Minister/ know my opinions well. Even before, at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, you reported an actual falsity that the Foreign Minister was in favor of the Military Alliance. That is very insolent.'"


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URH TO ROOM 361
EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 334 - (25 July 1939)

P. 2588

On the 23rd, MATSUZAIDA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and I/HARADA/ went to the home of Foreign Minister ARITA and we conversed on various matters for three or four hours as we lunched. ARITA said: "When KONOYE met the War Minister the other day, the War Minister asked KONOYE if it wasn't possible to change the Emperor's mind in regard to this military agreement, and KONOYE replied that it was very difficult."
Exhibit No. 3350-A

1. P.S. Doc. No. 3150-3350-8

[Text in Chinese]

3 August 1939

... Education Minister ARAKI said, "I am not too worried about the Rightists. If we act resolutely, they can be swayed. But the important question is, how the situation within the Army will develop and how to gradually take control of this."

Next, he said, "I know quite a bit about KOISO, the Minister of Overseas Affairs. His shortcoming is that he is a man of intrigue and trickery. For instance, when the problem of legal tender arose at the recent Cabinet meeting, he boldly suggested that counterfeit currency be used. This is very distressing. There are instances when he sent the Kempei to China and Manchuria dressed in work clothes. However, at a time when Japan is trying to strive for the new order based on virtue, these acts are contradictory and I think it is extremely harmful. KOISO is a person who has power and enthusiasm, but he has not set opinions and deals only in intrigues and trickery. He is a man who can easily be swayed." It is a matter of course that he did not speak favorably about KOISO, but on the contrary, he spoke very ill of him. There is, although FUKUOKA often proposed to unite ARAKI and KOISO, but it is a matter of future.
Excerpt from SHITONJI- KUNI MEMOIRS
Chapter 336 - (14 August 1939)

P. 2603

"Furthermore, the Foreign Minister talked about the details of the Five Ministers' Conference of the 8th. -- "The Premier, to begin with, stood up and said, "Yesterday the War Minister visited me and explained the Army proposal. We have been making efforts along the pre-arranged plan simply because we have recognized the necessity of a treaty. Then the War Minister said that this proposal did not deviate from the pre-arranged plan, but I, for my part, could not think so. If any of you members of the Cabinet have anything to ask, please ask questions as much as you like."

These introductory remarks of the Premier were followed by various questions from the Cabinet members. To sum up, the Army's contention was that a change in the situation necessitated an offensive and defensive alliance; as the first step, however, the pre-arranged plan was to be followed; in case this could not be done, the second step was to be taken, that is to say, an offensive and defensive alliance was to be concluded. The Premier then asked the War Minister what on earth the latter himself thought. The War Minister replied to the effect that he was a State Minister on the one hand and at the same time the War Minister on the other and that it was quite true that he, as a State Minister, consented to the pre-arranged plan being followed but, as a representative of the general opinion of the Army, he consented also to the second step being taken." Then, he said that in his (the Foreign Minister's) opinion, it appeared that either there was still some leeway on the unconditional alliance or that ITALI would be ousted."
20 July 1940.

When I met Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA, he said: "ANAMI and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO both came to me and said: 'The present Cabinet must withdraw at any cost. Because the diplomatic relations are already going ahead satisfactorily due to the Four Ministers' Conference and a number of other situations, we will say nothing more about foreign policy. However, in order to realize KONOYE's new political order, we would like the Cabinet to withdraw.' When I disapproved, the Vice Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau said: 'Then, there is nothing to be said but force the eventual resignation of the Cabinet.'" Saying this, they left.

On the afternoon of the same day, a Four Ministers' Conference was held. At that time, the Premier called the War Minister into a separate room and asked: "Are you aware of the circumstances surrounding the visit of the Vice Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to Chief Secretary ISHIWATA urging mass resignation of the Cabinet?" The War Minister declared: "Yes, I know. However, you must take their opinions as their personal opinions." The Premier asked: "Then what do you personally think?" The War Minister replied: "In the long run, I think it best that the Cabinet resign. However, this is still my personal opinion." He had added this, but the Premier was saying that it was certainly a quoique statement. I heard all this from Navy Minister YOSHIIDA.
一日の朝在田と話して見ると、在田陸相と首相会見して
在田陸相は控えに換為部長と会ってきけれども
首相の態度は、

「陸相部内に治らんらんとおっしゃらないことを言ふ

首相と在田陸相、在田大将、在田陸相

陸相と在田陸相、在田大将、在田陸相
20 July 1940.

When I met Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA, he said: "ANAMI and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO both came to me and said: 'The present Cabinet must amicably withdraw at any cost. Because the diplomatic relations are already going ahead satisfactorily due to the Four Ministers' Conference and various other connections, we will say nothing more about foreign policy. However, in order to realize KONOYE's new political order, we would like the Cabinet to withdraw.' When I disapproved, the Vice Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau said: 'Then, there is nothing to be done but force the eventual resignation of the War Minister.'" Saying this, they left.

On the afternoon of the same day, a Four Ministers' Conference was held. At that time, the Premier called the War Minister into a separate room and asked: "Are you aware of the circumstances surrounding the visit of the Vice Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to Chief Secretary ISHIWATA urging mass resignation of the Cabinet?" The War Minister declared: "Yes, I know. However, you must take their opinions as their personal opinions." The Premier asked: "Then what do you personally think?" The War Minister replied: "In the long run, I think it best that the Cabinet resign. However, this is still my personal opinion ---" He had added this, but the Premier was saying that it was certainly a queer statement. I heard all this from Navy Minister YOSKIDA.
も次長の意見は、彼も比較的私を否定的な意見を持っているようだ。彼は私の意見に反対していたが、自分たちの優先すぐりの組織が、何者もから二度と許さないからだ。
I visited the Prince at Okitsu on the morning of the 23rd and related everything to him in minute detail. When I was finished, the Prince expressed his desires in this manner: "I want you to caution KIDO thoroughly in regard to this. The Emperor is fully aware of past events... in other words, His Majesty is thoroughly familiar with the historical background of various issues. Therefore, even if the Ministers and so forth should make various reports based on their individual calculations, there are times when they are in great error. At times, the Emperor possesses more facts by which to make decisions. Many times, it is difficult to make correct decisions concerning the current happening by the happening itself. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal must be fully aware of such things when listening to such problems or he may make a mistake. Both Emperor MEIJI and the present Emperor have a good understanding and remembrance of past happenings. Although I believe that men like KIDO are conscious of this, please caution him again when you meet him."
I met Captain TAKAGI again on the train and heard from him of the conversation between Military Affairs Bureau Chief IUTO and Captain TAKAGI which took place at the meeting of the Preparations Committee. (TAKAGI related the following) "According to IUTO's story, the leading element of the New Organization regardless of its title, is actually a political association of political parties. Therefore, IUTO said it was not desirable that the Army participate in such a thing which possesses such characteristics. However, the arguments have changed at this time, and when practical applications are considered, it is necessary to delegate strong political powers to the nucleus of the New Organization. In order to do this, it is necessary to appoint party members. The opinions of a great number of other directors are that this new organization is one in which the military, the government authorities, and people must unite in order to construct a country with powerful national defense as clearly contained in the proclamation of the Premier. It is not like the politics of former times when there were various disagreements concerning theoretical policies, and which were struggles for selfish interests. This includes former politics, economy, education, and all other aspects of national life. Not only this, but this present movement is not one which arises from the masses. Rather than that, the actual situation is such that the military and the government authorities must do the leading and spread the movement. From these viewpoints, the nucleus of the new organization is not appropriate. Also the fact that the Army and Navy would withdraw does not signify that this new movement will succeed. On the contrary, there is fear that this movement will be rendered impotent thereby. In this manner, the other directors were in agreement with my proposal. These are all superficial reasons and the inner purposes of the Army's contention must be clarified. The Army had been exercising all its efforts to induce the dissolution of already existing political parties. The Sokushin Doshikki (1. Proclamation for Dismissal) had been dissolved however, does not have much of a voice in the Preparations Committee. As a result, they have become very fidgety and uneasy. On the other hand, the Army
planned to unite the political parties into one unit and to create a so-called 'Pro-Army Party' /T.N. Shingunto./ They planned to lead them along according to their own wishes. Their plan received a blow when Premier KONOYE's proclamation was published in the papers. KONOYE got the jump on the Army, whereas they had planned to utilize him as a robot.
略。
20 October 1940

... Next, I explained the circumstances under which the recent Tri-Partite Pact was concluded. I still have my doubts as to how the then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Prime Minister explained the matter to His Majesty. SAIONJI is also greatly doubtful as to how they explained the matter and obtained the Imperial sanction, for His Majesty had been absolutely against it and had always been saying that he would never give his consent.

And, the outline of the matter which I understand from what KIDO and KONOYE explained to me was that in short, the Navy agreed to it and that finally both the Foreign and the Prime Ministers also explained to His Majesty more or less in the line that there was no other step to take towards the U.S.A. and the only measure to keep the U.S.A. out of war was the conclusion of a Japanese-German-Italian Military Alliance. However, when we think of His Majesty's august wish and the particulars up to the present, Prince SAIONJI feels that he has no excuse to make. And furthermore, when we consider His Majesty's innermost feelings, we are filled with an almost unbearable feeling of trepidation. As to the above matter, Minister of the Imperial Household MATSUIRA said, sometime ago, "Although I do not directly intervene in political affairs; every time I go into His Majesty's presence, His Majesty showed indefinable regret," and showed deep sympathy for His Majesty.

As to the conclusion of the recent Tri-Partite Fact, Prince SAIONJI was kept in complete ignorance and it came as a complete surprise. As for me, I heard from naval sources that there was going to be a September Imperial Headquarters Liaison Conference on the very day it was going to be held. I telephoned KONO from Osaka around eight o'clock in the evening. KONO answered through the phone that he had just returned home from the Liaison Conference, it having just ended. The Navy had finally consented and now the agreement could be concluded.' The following day I met KONO and heard the general circumstances from him, but the most important point of how they were able to obtain the Imperial sanction was not mentioned. Then I spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and asked, why did you not tell us beforehand? If there was something wrong with the GENRO, such as his being dull, or ill, or lacking sense, it would be unnecessary to tell anything. However, under the present situation, it is very regrettable that not a word was said to the GENRO on such an important problem and which directly concerns the fate of our country. To this, KIDO replied, "I felt too sorry for Prince SAIONJI so I did not tell him." I admonished KIDO rather severely, saying, "This is a problem above such private sentiments. Actual facts are facts. However opposed he might be to it, or however sorry you might feel for him, you must report all that you have to. That is your duty towards His Majesty." KIDO said that "henceforth he would report all that he could" and that was all we said about the matter.
昭和十五年三月三日
国府宮殿日記

君臣年中大内、よりの挨拶

今度の三國同盟の出来事時の御講談

申上り、その当時の内大臣及び総理大臣が如何様、陛下に申上りかと云ふことに就て、自分には未だ疑惑が残つて居るを知ります

御承諾を得たかと云ふことに就ては、西園寺内

服御承諾を得たかと云ふに於て居るのと云ふ、申

上り、其の当時の内大臣及び総理大臣が如何

様、陛下に申上りかと云ふに於て、自分には未

たら疑惑が残つて居るを知ります

絶対に許されぬと

と言ふ、お出になられたものをと、云ふ風に説けて

服御承諾を得たかと云ふに於て居るのと云ふ、申

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上り、其の当時の内大臣及び総理大臣が如何

様、陛下に申上りかと云ふに於て、自分には未
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
Today, on the orders of the Reich Foreign Minister, I informed the Japanese Ambassador that the Reich Minister in the Pro Memoria on German-Japanese economic cooperation was holding out for a written statement of our preferential status with respect to third powers and was asking the ambassador to intercede for a prompt ruling in favor of this. In this connection, I handed Mr. OSHIMA our last proposal, which I had also given Mr. TOGO on 6 October of this year. I added that we had definite news from Tokyo that the Japanese government was ready to grant the written statement on preferential treatment. Even Mr. TOGO himself had originally held out hopes for this preferential treatment, yet later had averred that the Japanese government could not grant it. On the other hand, the newly appointed ambassador to Rome, SHIRATORI, in an interview on 26 October in Tokyo, also spoke of preferential treatment for German technology, industry and trade. I further emphasized anew that on the grounds of our support of Japan (recall of military advisers, stoppage of military deliveries, and consequent large losses), not only for political but also for economic and moral reasons, we were entitled to a preferential treatment, particularly with respect to the Americans and British who had again demonstrated a reverse attitude in the conflict only recently by the granting of credits to China.

I further brought to the attention of Mr. OSHIMA the so-far unsatisfactory settlement of our protests on the practical restraints on German economic activity in China by the Japanese and delivered to him a new memorandum dealing with the matter.

The ambassador indicated complete sympathy with my words. He stated, on the question of preferential treatment, that he had himself always worked for this but that opinion was divided in Japan. The army was for it, also a part of the foreign service, SHIRATORI, for example, were for it; the opposition was to be found principally among domestic economic circles. On the question of the restrictions on practical economic activity in China he emphasized that often military considerations worked inevitably in favor of this and that the ill-humor of the
Japanese front line troops over the fact that at the beginning of the conflict they found the Chinese almost only with weapons made in Germany might be still in evidence here and there. He imparted that he had about 9 December of himself sent an energetic telegraphic message to Tokyo to the effect that preferential treatment should be granted in writing and that the practical German difficulties in China should either be removed or the German officials in Tokyo and in China itself informed in detail by the Japanese officials on what grounds this was presently not yet possible. He had also entrusted to a Japanese general, who had been here recently and who should have reached Tokyo again about 10 December on his return journey, letters in favor of this to leading figures of the Japanese army. He promised, in view of today's conversation to report again both by telegram and in writing via a carrier arriving in Tokyo on 20 January.

/signed/ WIEHL

Copy to:
Reich Minister
State Secretary /TN: Initialed/
Under State Secretary
Director of Politics
Political Section VIII
Director of Economy
Economic Section VII

/France No. 135893/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cummins
W. P. CUMMINGS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
1) On 2 January in a conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister
Ambassador OSHIMA gave the information that he had been commissioned by
his government to concentrate in his hands for the Japanese side the handle-
ing of all questions which concerned the general principles of cooperation
in the whole field of the common prosecution of the war and to speak at the
proper time with the Reich Foreign Minister and, insofar as Italy was in-
terested, with the Reich Foreign Minister and the Italian Ambassador here.
Nothing beyond purely military and economic questions of detail were to be
directly handled by the military and economic members of the sub-commissions
of the Tri-Partite Pact. At this conversation OSHIMA delivered a memo-
dum, wherein it was set forth that, parallel to the conversations on
military cooperation, concrete negotiations should soon be initiated on
reciprocal utilization of German and Japanese economic power. While Japan
was doing the utmost to facilitate the delivery of East Asiatic products to
Germany, Germany should do everything to deliver machines, munitions material
and plants to Japan. To avoid payment difficulties it was necessary that
Germany should grant Japan a total credit of one thousand million yen
¥1,000,000,000/ for three years. It was proposed that, until this credit
was available, a bridging over credit of 50 million yen for the most urgent
German deliveries be immediately placed at disposal. Japan was ready, with
the development and utilization of the raw materials-rich South Sea regions,
which went hand in hand with the progress of the military operations, to
look out for Germany's interest there in every possible way.

* * * * *

WIEHL

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<tr>
<td>State Secretary</td>
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<td>Ambassador RITTER</td>
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<td>Envoy SCHURRRE</td>
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<td>VIR. Behrend /?/</td>
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AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, ACD
Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
Acting Adjutant General

G.H. Garde

LT. Colonel, A.G.D
Acting Adjutant General

(Original)
NOTE: Concerning the Fuehrer's conversation with Ambassador OSHIMA on 3 January 1942 in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister in the Wolfsschanze from 1615 to 1800 hours.

* * * *

Again the Fuehrer asked the ambassador not to mention his statements to the Italians. If anything were let out, all efforts would be in vain. In this connection he recalled 22 June. He added that he would discuss military affairs only with Ambassador Oshima personally. ****

The Fuehrer explained to the Japanese Ambassador on the map the prospective naval war situation in the Atlantic, emphasizing that he considered it his most important task to get the submarine war going full blast. After making further explanations with the aid of the map, the Fuehrer pointed out that no matter how many ships the U.S. built, one of their chief problems was the personnel shortage. For this reason the merchant vessels were also being sunk without warning with the idea that as large a part as possible of the crew should perish in consequence. If word should once get about that most seamen were lost in torpedoes, the Americans would soon have difficulties in recruiting new people. The training of seafaring personnel took a long time. We were fighting here /N.N. here struck through in original/ for our existence and therefore could not perit any humanitarian points of view to govern. For this reason he had to give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which was not for the most part possible on the open sea, the submarines were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.

Ambassador OSHIMA sincerely concurs in these statements of the Fuehrer and says that the Japanese, too, are forced to follow these methods.******

He, OSHIMA, was empowered by his government to discuss the prosecution of the war with the Reich Foreign Minister. Even though individual questions could be discussed directly between the army, the air force, and, above all, the navy, in his opinion it was of the greatest importance that the main line of policy should be laid down exclusively by him and the Foreign Minister. The same was true for the economic and political questions.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES
EVIDENCE DIVISION

Date: 18 July 1947

I certify that Document Number D-423 was introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number GB-197 in the Trial by the International Tribunal of Hermann Goering, et al, which commenced on 20 November 1945, and that the attached photostat is a true and correct copy of the original.

/s/ Fred Niebergall
E.T.O.

Fred NIEBERGALL
Chief, Document Control Branch.
ウートモノ主計問題ノツハ要員不足トイフコスデアルトペテリヲ指摘サレリ。此理由カラダ、浅瀬ノ商船モ無警戒デ巡検シタノサレテイル。ソレハ其結果トシテ可決の多数乗組員ノ喪失ヲ来ラシメヨトスル意囲ニヨモノデアル。大多数ノ海員ガ魚雷攻撃ヲ喪失スルモノデアル。サレツトイコ torpedo 既タノ傷ヲラレルニ至ラ米国間へ突撃ヲ新規補充ニヨヨナル困難ヲ感スルニ至ルデヲラウ。海上勤務ニ遇スル要員ノ訓練ニハ小至ルデヲヲテハニテ気を許シ得ナイ。故ニ、外務官員ノ傷ヲ存スルモノハ分配スルハ許シ得ナイ。彼ハハ出マールヲ得ナカツモノデアツタ。シトノ命令ヲ彼ハ出マールヲ得ナカツモノデアツタ。

大島大使ヘ採用ノ意ハ言ハ続シ意諜共陈述シ且ツ日本側ハ改変スケタカリ万ハ無ヘ fırsテテイタ。
To the VICE-CHIEF from the Military Attache to the German Embassy.
No. 185

As reported in the last telegram, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's visit to USA, will produce a bad influence upon the Tripartite Alliance. The recent statement by ISHII, the Chief of the Publicity Bureau, reported by the DOMI News and the report in the Japan Times implicitly confirm the said visit to the USA, which would greatly shock not only Germany, but also the allied (N. AXIS) countries thereby creating a very unfavorable situation that would nullify the results of Foreign Minister L.TSUOKA's having expressly visited Germany and Italy.

Especially ISHII cannot be excused when he boldly stated that Germany and Italy should be asked concerning the visit to the USA. If such a situation be left alone the problem regarding the resignation of Ambassador OSHIMA may arise thereby causing a fiasco in the basic problems of our foreign diplomacy. I wish you would give these points your special grave deliberation.

(Sgd)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO, Takegore, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Acting Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of two pages, dated 3 May, 1941, being a telegram No. 185 from the Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy to the Vice-Chief and that the attached document is an official document of the Japanese Government and that it is part of the official archives and files of the Japanese Foreign Office.

I further certify that according to information officially obtained from the 1st Demobilization Bureau the Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy at the time of the dispatch of the above mentioned document was Lt. Gen. BANZAI, Ichiro, who is now deceased.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of Jan., 1948
/s/ T. Sato
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Suzuki
(Seal)
Asst Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of Jan., 1948
/s/ Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward F. Menachem
Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Edward F. Menachem
(Seal)
Asst Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity
Berlin, 12 July 1941

The Japanese Ambassador who came to see me on another matter today, mentioned that he had had an active exchange of telegrams recently with his foreign minister. He had tried to induce him to determine the center of gravity of further Japanese policy and to decide between South and North, for a dispersal of Japanese forces was impossible. In principle MATSUOKA has agreed that OSHIMA was right without, however, expressing himself concretely.

I then asked the Ambassador how things now stood with Indo-China. OSHIMA replied that in fact the occupation of certain positions in Southern Indo-China as a base for aircraft and warships was an urgent Japanese need. Whether one should previously inform the French Government or merely sound it out was another question. OSHIMA did not consider the move toward South Indo-China imminent. He named no term and thought that Tokyo would probably wait for a good opportunity. (The term of 17 July mentioned in wire report No. 1181 from Tokyo does not seem to be known to OSHIMA.)

OSHIMA gave, it is true, a few opinions on the further development of Japanese-American relations; he was, however, evidently poorly or not at all informed from home. He sought rather to gather some news from me. I then told him that there was up to now an only partially decoded report from Ambassador OTT which appeared to me to indicate that Tokyo had in the meantime received news from Washington. Without complete particulars I could not explain further. On the other hand, it had struck me personally with what naivete and impudence the Americans had now established themselves in Iceland. Did OSHIMA assume that the Americans considered their rear in the Pacific Ocean as secure as the Iceland case would really lead one to believe. OSHIMA answered that only if saying that his own views on how America was to be handled were known to us. He had again advised MATSUOKA recently simply to break off the conversation with Washington.

(I do not believe that OSHIMA is aware that an answer from Washington is in Tokyo, a fact which came to our knowledge first from a certain source through the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo.)

With this
to the German Foreign Minister

sig. WEIZSACKER

/Frames Nos. 147714-15/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
Acting Adjutant General

C. H. Garde

LT. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
Notes concerning the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador OSUGA at Steincrot on 9 July 1942.

Reich Foreign Minister speaking/  

VLADIVOSTOK was constantly the biggest threat for Tokyo from the air - particularly so if American bombers should be stationed there as they recently had been in China. Sooner or later in the course of war this would take place anyway, that is, if Russia were not eliminated promptly. And in regard to the 60 or 80 Russian submarines located there, according to our experience, the Russians little knew how to use these weapons. In the BALTIC SEA there also were on hand a like number of Russian submarines, which never had been able to do the slightest harm. He thought that it was best to make the decision and to attack the Russians, should the Japanese army feel strong enough and be ready with its deployment in MANCHURIA. The FUEHRER had until now held the opinion that the Japanese, after their big successes, should first consolidate their new territories, and that our offensive in Russia should first be farther advanced, and he had thought it best that Japan should not undertake too much, so as not to endanger their own situation. But now, after the recent so universally favorable military developments in Russia and the experiences
there, which he had described to the ambassador, he also was of the opinion that the moment had come for Japan to enter the common fight against Russia, providing she felt strong enough. Should Japan by a rapid thrust occupy VLADIVOSTOK and possibly the territory up to Lake BAIKAI, the Russians, on both sides, would be in an extremely difficult position. The war would then be practically decided, and the Tri-Partite powers could then exert all their power against the English and the Americans, who would then have no hope.

Ambassador OSHIMA replied that he was overjoyed at the developments in Russia and North Africa as depicted to him by the Foreign Minister. He himself was convinced of the imperativeness of a Japanese attack on Russia and of the imperativeness of the blocking of English supplies to Egypt and would immediately report to Tokyo in accordance with the Foreign Minister's statements, which were of the greatest interest to Tokyo. OSHIMA seemed very enthusiastic over the idea.

** * **

Berlin, 10 July 1942

(signed) GOTTFRIEDSEN
CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is a true and correct copy of the photostatic document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit USA 157.

That said photostatic document so admitted in evidence as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and caused the same to be attached to said copy of said photostatic document in order to verify the existence and contents of said exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

DONE at Nürnberg, Germany this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal
I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nürnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 2011-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to Schmidt V. 3, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nürnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reason above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
GERARD SCHAEFER

SUBSCRIBED AND sworn to before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
JOHN W. AUCHINCLOSS
C-2052152
Capt., JAGD
Exhibit No. 3816-A

I/KS Doc No 525-A

外務大臣及大藏大臣

元四月七日

国家保 Redemption

外務大臣及大蔵大臣

国家保 Redemption

独外相通文

浦賀事件

戦争聖週中之露西亞占領

ハルシア占領

ハルシア占領

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順
中国热缩管市场

中国热缩管市场近年来持续增长，主要受益于电力、石油和化工等行业的快速发展。热缩管因其优良的绝缘性能和抗腐蚀性，在电线电缆、石油管道等领域的应用广泛。

根据市场研究机构的数据，2023年中国热缩管市场规模将达到XX亿元，年复合增长率为XX%。随着技术的不断进步和应用领域的拓展，预计未来几年市场将继续保持稳定增长。

区域市场中，华北地区由于工业基础雄厚，需求量较大，市场占有率较高。华南地区随着新能源产业的快速发展，市场需求也逐渐增加。华东和华中地区由于电力行业的繁荣，市场潜力较大。

主要的热缩管供应商包括XX公司、XX公司等，它们在产品质量和售后服务方面具有一定的优势。未来，随着环保和安全标准的提高，市场对于高品质热缩管的需求将进一步增长，预计将进一步推动行业的发展。

注：以上数据和分析仅供参考，具体市场情况可能因行业发展和政策变化而有所不同。
J.P.S Doc. No 525 A

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前記入該捕獲敵文書(ハムノリズムス信札)に限

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署名

GERARD SHAFFER

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The Reich Foreign Minister then questioned the Ambassador with respect to the telegram forwarded from Tokyo during the last discussions, whether he had new reports from his Government concerning the Submarine question, and what actually it intended to do in this direction. OSHIMA replied the Japanese Government intended to accentuate the Submarine warfare and would like to make the necessary preparations to this end. The present Japanese submarines were not suitable for this warfare, a fact which Admiral Loenitz had confirmed after examination of the Japanese boat in Lorient. Therefore, the Japanese Navy would have to rearrange its building program and would be thankful if they could obtain two U-boats as specimens from the German Navy.

The Reich Foreign Minister asked Ambassador OSHIMA to see him once more on the same day, in order to inform him that the German Government, after consulting the Navy, was prepared to put one or two U-Boats at the disposal of the Japanese Navy. He suggested that Admiral Nomura now discuss the details of this matter with Admiral Meissel. The German Government did this on the condition that the Japanese Navy would start as fast as possible the U-Boat building program on a large scale and in mass production. The Ambassador stated that the Japanese Government was prepared to do this. The training of the crews would not offer any special difficulties as the training of a U-Boat crew for use against merchant shipping is easier than for use in large Japanese submarine cruisers for naval operations. As for mass production, OSHIMA was of the opinion that this question also would certainly be solved as the smaller boats could be built faster and did not require so many complicated installations as the boats hitherto built there /in Japan/. Reich Foreign Minister (RAM) on his part pointed out that the U-Boat itself could be built rather quickly, the main difficulty, however, lay in the construction of the machines. In order to assist the Japanese Navy in carrying out the program it would surely be possible to put German engineers at their disposal for the machine construction and also officers who had sufficient experience for the tactical use of the boats against merchant shipping. OSHIMA stated that the Japanese Navy would certainly
be very grateful for every assistance and he would now ask Admiral Nomura to discuss the details of this problem with the German Navy.

The Reich Foreign Minister (RAM) expressed his opinion that Japan within a short time would be able, from her far advanced bases, to make an effective assault at the enemy supply lines and after Ambassador Oshima on behalf of his government had expressed his thanks for the German willingness, the Reich Foreign Minister (RAM) then took leave of the Ambassador.

Berlin 9 March 1943

(signed) Gottfried
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R1 / R1

L1 / L1

R0 / R0

L0 / L0

R / R

L / L
Tokyo, 23 January 1942 10.00 hours
Arrival, 24 January 1942 15.10 hours
No. 216 of 23 January
(Secret Reich Matter)

Re No. 154* of the 17th of this month and No. 177* of the 20th of this month.

1) OSHIMA's proposal on the granting of a thousand million credit, which according to secret information reaching me is on his own initiative, only enlarges the order of magnitude of the objects under negotiation. The content of the treaty text is, however, not fundamentally affected, because, in contradiction to OSHIMA's assumption, an agreement to take effect right now in the war has been negotiated with the Japanese government. The Japanese government and we, in advance of OSHIMA's action, were already agreed that the treaty text now being printed should be put into use as soon as possible.

5) In consideration of the fact that OSHIMA has not been able to put across his personal views in the economic-political field (preferential treatment in North China, for example) with his government, it must be doubted whether the latter will empower him to make commitments in the above sense and to the extent necessary to cover the German demand for raw materials.

* * * * *
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WOLLTAT
OTT
AFFIDAVIT

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/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
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MEMORANDUM

Berlin, 24 Jan 42

SECRET

The Japanese envoy, MATSUSHIMA, came back today on the subject of our talk of yesterday and stated as follows:

He had reported to Ambassador OSHIMA on our conversation of yesterday. The latter was of the opinion that it would delay the concluding of the credit treaty too long if first the position of the Japanese government regarding the treaty proposal advanced by me were obtained. OSHIMA had accordingly ordered him to deliver to me his proposal for an "economic alliance treaty" with a secret protocol, although the assent of the Japanese government thereto already requested some time ago by the Japanese ambassador here had not yet come in. Ambassador OSHIMA in this connection had on his own initiative altered the secret protocol to this economic alliance treaty so that it corresponded with Item 1 of our credit proposal. OSHIMA believed he would get the approval of his government to the adjustments proposed by him just as soon as he could report that the German government was in accord with them. The adjustments could then be signed here immediately. If the treaty were concluded in its essentials in this way, the succeeding negotiations to take place in Tokyo on the further details contained in the German credit proposal would swiftly lead to a result.

A copy of the proposals for the economic alliance treaty and secret agreement delivered to me by MATSUSHIMA is inclosed herewith.

From the further conversation it transpired that OSHIMA and MATSUSHIMA held fast to the idea of making the economic alliance treaty public as a counterpart of the military convention.

*MATSUSHIMA mentioned in conclusion that Ambassador OSHIMA was departing Monday evening, 26 January, for Rome and returning on 3 February. He would be very grateful if he could get fundamental German approval for the stipulations proposed by him in good enough time for him to be able to report on it before his departure for Tokyo. He hoped in that case to obtain the approval of his government before his return trip so that the matter might be concluded here at the beginning of February.*/

/signed/ WIEHL
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AG
Acting Adjutant General
Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
V. F. Cumming
Acting Adjutant General

(With)
In conversation with Ambassador OSHIMA on 23 March I gave him more detailed statements on the present situation in which I started with the very bad prospect facing Russia, the atmosphere of deep depression existing in fact among the leading politicians in England, and the gigantic confusion reigning in reality in the United States with its blustering armament propaganda. If now the opponents' propaganda tried to keep us from profiting from our victory it was all the more necessary that we counter it with full utilization of the weakness of our opponents' position and bring to fruition in this very very life-saving conceivable strategic plan.

Germany would this year definitely maneuver Russia into a position which would eliminate it as a decisive factor in the war. "As a follow-up we then proposed to push further into the Near East, in order to shake hands with Japan. Japan, too, was confronted with a situation wherein the safeguarding of its conquests to date could only be assured by the final annihilation of our enemies; therefore the Tripartite Pact powers should undertake this year further bold military offensive operations and in view of the current weakness of the opponents they "could" undertake them in order to end the war as soon as possible with the smallest possible number of sacrifices. I could imagine that Japan should obtain security for herself, that Australia could no longer become a base for attack against Japan that the Japanese fleet should advance into the Indian Ocean, occupy Ceylon and establish bases on Madagascar and that Burma would be completely occupied. Above all, however, I believed that an advance of the Japanese armies against Vladivostok and in the direction of Lake Baikal would be of especial significance. Naturally we did not expect anything of Japan which would revitalize its power for Japan's strength was also ours. However, if Japan should be strong enough this year for..."
an attack on Russia, this would materially contribute to
Russia's rapid and final elimination as an opponent in the
war in view of the latter's steadily deteriorating position.

Even now, the nutritional and economic situation in Soviet
Russia was dreadful, according to reports reaching us, and the
Russians were literally devouring each other in many districts,
as a captured Russian general stated recently. Russia had
already lost 10 million of its best soldiers, while our total
losses since the outbreak of war had only been about 237,000
dead and 750,000 wounded, and of the latter at least 500,000
to 600,000 could again be used in the war, at any rate, the
German Army was much stronger today than last year and ready
for the new offensive which would be directed against the
since frightfully decimated Russian army. There was therefore
no doubt that we would achieve our goal in Russia. Together
with the common dash of the U.S. and Japan to the Indian
Ocean, this blow would decide the war. If this were done in this way, the
British Empire would collapse in the foreseeable future, and
the U.S. would then be unable to do anything serious either
to us or to Japan.

Ambassador OSHIMA agreed fully and completely with my
views. To be sure, he had received no official communica-
tions on the Japanese intentions. He would be exerting all
his own initiative to decide his government to undertake
the advance against Vladivostok and East Siberia this year, as he
also was of the opinion that such a good opportunity would never
return. Following this up I spoke further with the Ambassador
on the future Economic cooperation between the Europe-
Africa Sphere under the leadership of the U.S. and the Greater East Asia
area under the leadership of Japan on the other, in which connection I designated as the goal
a large-scale economic agreement with preference for the
partners provided for and third parties. America in particular,
excluded as far as possible, a firm alliance, looking as far
ahead as possible, between the United States and Japan must
form the basis of it. The main outlines for economic cooperation
shall as soon as possible be laid down in a skeleton
agreement.

OSHIMA emphasized the special significance which such an
agreement would have as a substitute for and transfer of the
heretofore existing economic ties between Japan and the U.S.
"we have in view a new discussion of this question in the very
near future.

I impart the foregoing to you for your personal information
and also for suitable use in your conversations there with
influential Japanese individuals.
I certify that this photostatic copy of telegram No. 878, dated 26 March from Ribbentrop to Tokyo is a true print of microfilm contained in the files of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Office Secretary of War, Washington, D.C., which microfilm was made of documents taken from the files of the German Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ William S. J. Curley
WILLIAM S. J. CURLEY
Cpt. MC
Chief, Intelligence Branch
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
內容缺失
3^
P.1

20 Dec, 1941: 40.92.

(William S. F. Butler)
Turning to the major subject of the conversation -- economic problems -- the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that it was in his opinion absolutely necessary while the war was still on to lay down clearly a definite basis for economic relations between Germany and Japan. A starting point for all political and, in particular, also for all economic discussions and plans was the Tri-Partite Pact, which would prove effective for all international settlements even after the war and for an enormous length of time to come. The two political major areas /Grossraume/ created by the above, the East Asiatic Area under the leadership of Japan with China, Siam, Burma, the Netherlands Indies, and the European area under the leadership of the Axis with the European countries, North and Central Africa, the Near East, and so forth, whose exact demarcation was naturally not yet possible in detail, had in advance so to fix their economic relations that these would in no way adversely affect the political relations. /Government/ policy was primary and economy did not have as it had had to under the old liberalistic principle, to serve for the enrichment of a few, who did not bother about political necessities, but existed for the economic well-being of the whole people and had through proper organization to raise their standard of living.

OSHIMA enthusiastically concurred in the idea of a treaty arrangement for economic relations. The conclusion of an economic treaty was particularly important, all the more so, because it would be very difficult to bring America to its needs in the present war -- unless there was an outbreak of unrest inside America. Therefore even after the end of the war battle would have to be waged with the U.S.A. in the field of economy through its being economically boycotted by Japan and the Axis.

The Reich Foreign Minister then proposed for the sake of the practical carrying out of this plan to draw up a basic accord, which would be for publication, and to provide a
secret protocol, not intended for publicity, which would include all important details. The Reich Foreign Minister on the basis of the proposals made so far went over the points to be settled by treaty, in which connection he emphasized that at the moment they were only dealing with a proposal which he himself had not yet examined in all its details and which for the time being should only be between him and the ambassador as an exchange of ideas.

After giving the information on the proposal the Reich Foreign Minister mentioned that Japan might conclude a similar treaty with Italy. He considered this necessary politically, because the fact of the conclusion of an economic treaty between the Tri-Partite powers would nip in the bud all the rumors and purposeful lies which would immediately arise if an economic treaty were concluded solely between Germany and Japan.

OSHIMA recognized this idea as correct and necessary. Nevertheless he pointed out in this connection a difficulty which lay in the fact that Japan so far had had as good as no economic relations with Italy. In spite of this he too was of the opinion that Japan, for the reasons adduced by the Reich Foreign Minister, should conclude a treaty with Italy.

The Reich Foreign Minister then enlarged on the various points of the proposals.

The economic cooperation between the two great economic areas would in his opinion be considerably facilitated by a strict central control of economy being carried out. To be sure there would remain in addition to the guiding powers other independent states in both economic areas. These, however, would be forced completely of themselves to carry out a far-reaching control of their economy, and the guiding powers would immediately from their natural economic predominance be in a position to exert influence on the regulating of economy in the other independent states. In time, then, the two economic areas would of themselves more and more grow in the direction of one unit, a situation which would also have effects in the field of customs and currency.

Further the two economic areas would have to give mutual preference in all economic fields. So far as necessary preferential tariffs would have to be granted in the exchange of goods; in any event care should be taken that the products of one partner should not be forced from the market through
an outsider, the U.S.A. for example, offering its goods more cheaply. The sale of important goods to third powers should only occur after the partner had been supplied. They should really think over, the Reich Foreign Minister felt, whether they shouldn't even now make it binding that after the war the resumption and later continuation of economic relations with enemy countries should only take place after mutual agreement between the partners. This applied particularly to the U.S.A. and those Central and South American countries which had shown themselves as being particularly under the sway of the U.S.A., as, for example, Brazil.

In cases where economically independent forces still remained within the two economic areas which were opposed to all this regulating and acted to oppose it (several giant concerns -- Mitsui among others), measures would have to be taken to eliminate them.

OSHIMA fundamentally agreed with these statements and emphasized again for his own part that the two great areas must determine a uniform economic policy to last a long time and covering not only what concerned their internal policy, and the economic relations between each other, but also those with outside economic areas.

* * * * *

/s/ GOTTFRIEDSEN
IPS DOC. NO. 1373

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN

I, Yale Maxon, Chief of the Document Division, IPS, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That frames 48288-48296 being 9 sheets of a photostatic copy of a memorandum regarding a conversation between the German Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Oshima, dated 9 May 1942 and contained in IPS Document 1373 were received by IPS from the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in the custody of the Document Division of the IPS since such delivery.

/s/ Yale Maxon

YALE MAXON
J.P.S Doc. No. 1373

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无
STATE SECRETARY No. 273

Without mentioning the source, I informed the JAPANESE Ambassador today how great the Iranian Government estimated Russian fear of Japan to be. (Instruction of the Reich Foreign Minister of the 19th inst.)

OSHIMA received the information with thanks and added of his own accord how matter-of-course it seemed to him that Japan should attack the Russians in East Asia. A certain dispersal of Japanese Naval forces would of course be involved and for that reason his government seemed still undecided when it should take up the battle against Russia.

I could prove to OSHIMA from my own knowledge how little the Soviet Russian submarines at Vladivostok were to be feared.

OSHIMA assured WEIZSAECKER that he was working hard to put an end to the wholly unnatural situation in which Japan was still living in peace and close neighborliness today with Russian enemy so furiously engaged by Germany.

Herewith

to the REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Carbons to:
Under State Secretary for Pol.
Dg. Pol.
Pol. I M

Signed: WEIZSAECKER

RUSS/IA/ Frame No. 33074
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
水島

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[手書き文字]

[手書き文字]
Acting Adjutant General

G. H. Garde

(LT. Colonel, AGD)

Acting Adjutant General
Excerpts from Memo re Conference
Pribentrop - Oshima on 30 July 1942

At the beginning of the conversation, Ambassador OSHIMA explained that unfortunately his wish to receive from the Japanese Government a positive reply on the question of participating in the war against Russia had not yet been fulfilled. He had cabled to Tokyo details of his last talk with the Reich Foreign Minister and had also added his own point of view that an early intervention against Russia and intensive action to paralyze English shipping in the INDIAN OCEAN was proper. He had now got a telegram on 27 July from TOKYO in which approximately the following was imparted:

Since the beginning of the war the Japanese operations in the PACIFIC and in the INDIAN OCEAN exercised an ever increasing pressure on the USA and BRITAIN and thereby made a substantial contribution to the conduct of the joint war. At the same time, Japan would have to occupy herself further vigorously with the elimination of CHUNGKING CHINA. In spite of the success up to now of the Japanese armed forces, the resistance on the part of the USA still remained so obstinate that Japan must more and more harness her strength for future operations against this enemy. Japan's efforts to deny the resources of the South Seas to the enemy /countries/ and to hold on to them for herself were only in the beginning stage. In these circumstances, action by Japan against the SOVIET UNION would bring about too great a dispersion of Japan's strength. An increase in the war strength of the USA and BRITAIN in the European theater might be brought about through any lessening of Japanese pressure /in the Pacific/ and further the Americans might be provided with a favorable base for an attack on Japan. Japan cannot enter upon such a policy needlessly, even though she should be ready for all eventualities. For that reason Japan wants to keep quiet in the North, but make the utmost efforts to intensify her operations in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

By way of illustration, Ambassador OSHIMA continued:

The problem had without doubt been earnestly studied anew in Tokyo. Personally he indeed shared the understanding that today a uniquely favorable
opportunity presented itself to Japan to deal a blow to the Russians and moreover, the Japanese Army had always advocated the opinion that such action against Russia was necessary. He could therefore only hazard a guess as regards the reasons for his Government's communication. In the first place, he assumed that in Japan the taking of Vladivostok was considered a protracted undertaking and feared that while it was going on, the Americans would get air bases in Eastern Siberia from which they could bomb Tokyo. In the second place the Japanese Army certainly would have various difficulties and above all in the sphere of the air force. This could be seen from the requests for supplies directed to Germany. The Japanese always carried out their operations only after very thorough preparation and the stage did not yet seem to be set for an action against Russia. Undoubtedly there were various opinions in Japan on this matter and he did not, in any case, consider the answer which had just reached him as the last. Perhaps an action against Russia might yet be possible before October, or if not, probably not before next Spring.

* * *

Ambassador OSHIMA thereupon replied that he himself had proposed again and again to utilize the opportune moment and this would be also borne in mind in Japan. He believed, however, that operations in the Southern theater had already been initiated and that these could not now be easily broken off in order to go North instead, since great results had already been obtained in this Southern theater. In order to be secure, Japan must beat the Americans and for this purpose the operations towards the South, towards Australia and towards Midway must be put through first, but have first priority. Only in that way could the establishment of American bases in Australia be forestalled. In spite of this, he himself certainly was for conducting a thrust against Russia, too, but apparently the air force was engaged in the South and it seemed also that it lacked experienced officers. He deduced this from the fact that about 20 Japanese officers were recently recalled to Japan from Germany, a measure which could not properly be understood if operations in the South only were considered. Ambassador OSHIMA then summed up his complete opinion by saying that Japan first of all must build up her position in the South and also occupy Midway and other islands. He did not know what future action against India was in view, but at all events the essential thing was the weakening of England and the USA, which called for the whole of Japan's strength. Japan could only move towards the North, i.e., against Russia, when it became practicable.

* * *

Ambassador OSHIMA closed with the assurance that in his opinion the advance to the North was the question. Japan's fate hung on and which he was always reiterating to his Government.
The Reich Foreign Minister ended the conversation with the remark that he shared this view of the Ambassador's completely and hoped that Japan might soon feel strong enough to risk the advance into the North. The final result of such action must, however, not be in doubt from the outset.

Feldmark, 31 July 1942.

CERTIFICATE
OF ORIGIN

I, Yale Maxon, Chief of the Document Division, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SC-FL, and as such have possession, custody, and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That frames 48330-48340 being 11 sheets of a photostatic copy of a memorandum regarding a conversation between the German Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Oshima, dated 30 July 1942 and contained in IPS Document 1395 were received by IPS from the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in the custody of the Document Division of the IPS since such delivery.

/Signed/ Yale Maxon
Yale Maxon
By direction of the Reich Foreign Minister I sought out Ambassador OSHIMA this afternoon and questioned him in greater detail on his judgment on the Japanese Cabinet change.

* * * * *

In the view of the Ambassador, the Japanese government must have been certain in its mind at the time the Tri-Partite Pact was concluded that the Greater East Asia Sphere could only be achieved through a push to the south, and with the sword at that. And this action had been prepared, the only question was when "things should start," perhaps in conjunction with possible German operations against Great Britain.

The Ambassador, to whom I mentioned in the course of the conversation the appearance of new Russian divisions from Siberia on our front, averred again that it would be good if the Japanese army, by means of a push into East Siberia, contributed to the restoration of a land connection between Germany and Japan. He had often submitted proposals to this effect to his government. It was to be hoped that in accordance therewith would soon be taken.

* * * * *

ERDMANNSDORFF

COPIES TO:
State Secretary
Under State Secretary, Politics, n.R.
Under State Secretary, Law,
Pol VIII
I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Larburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
G.W. Comming

G. H. Garde

LT. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
Lastly, the representations stated that "The German Government was obliged to express its desire for total participation by Germany in the Japanese-American negotiations and for an immediate report regarding the American reply. It constituted an infringement upon the articles of the Tripartite Pact for Japan to listen to American representations and to determine Japan's future policy without entering into a previous understanding with the German Government regarding all the important problems included in the proposal." Such were the high-handed representations of the Germans. At the same time Ambassador OSHII repeatedly sent cables, reporting that German national leaders were harboring extreme antipathy toward the Japanese-American proposal. He also declared his own opposition in strong language.

(13) VIII

In Tokyo, joint conferences were held on May 15th and May 22nd, but they did not go beyond an exchange of information and opinions. It was evident that through the influence of the German representations and the repeated objections of Ambassador OSHII, the originally vague attitude of the Foreign Minister had become more and more vague; and it was more and more obvious that, in contrast with the other Cabinet members who were full of hopes, he was standing alone in his opposition.
EXCERPTS FROM
INTERROGATION OF
General Hiroshi OSHI'A

Date and time: February 10, 1946, 10:30-13:30 hours

Place: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present: General Hiroshi OSHI'A
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Capt. J. J. Robinson, U.S.N.R., Interrogator
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer.

Questions by: Mr. Hyde and Captain Robinson.

OATH OF INTERPRETER

Mr. Hyde: 

"Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?"

Lt. Comdr. Huggins: 

"I do."

* * *

Q. Continue with your recital of events.

A. In regard to this pact, before I left Japan to come to Germany, I had been told by the General Staff to keep my eye out on how German-Soviet relations were and to try and discover what might happen as far as Germany was concerned in the case of a war with U. S. S. R. (P. 20 of Interrogation, Rec. 34,073.)

* * *

Q. While you were conducting these negotiations you have so fully explained to us, were you then contemplating that there would be two treaties instead of just one?
A. Prior to December 1945, and the arrival of Lt. Co. "HKATSU in Berlin, the only treaty which had been contemplated was the aforementioned one where the two nations would agree not to "entlasten" the U.S.S.R. in case of the war. The Germans, however, said that this would be a very weak treaty and, therefore, suggested the Anti-Comintern Pact and that was the first time that the matter came up. (P. 25 of Inter., Rec. 34,079.)

* * * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 26 pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(s) F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14 day of February 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde (s)
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogations set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(s) Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATORS

I, G. Osmond Hyde and Captain J. J. Robinson, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 52853, certify that on the 1st day of February, 1945, personally appeared before us OSHT'A, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein:

Tokyo, Japan
Feb. 14, 1945

(s) G. Osmond Hyde
Date

(s) J. J. Robinson
Capt., USNR
IPS Doc. No. 3355-A

CERTIFICATE

I, Yale Maxon, hereby certify

1. That I am Chief of Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said section.

2. That IPS Document 3355-A attached hereto is an excerpt from the original transcript of the interrogation of Hiroshi OSHI'(~), taken in Sugamo Prison on 1 February 1946, and is a true and correct copy therefrom.

3. That the said original transcript has been in the custody of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section continuously since that time.

/s/ Yale Maxon

Dated: 12 January 1948
Exhibit No. 3825A
YALE = MAXON
−H < 2 \ p \ < \ \lambda

HIROSHI OYAMA

N

△
Q. To which telegram do you refer, General?

A. Several communications. Following this they (the General Staff) informed me that they would return Major General KASAHARA to Berlin. Although I do not recall the exact date, I believe it was in early September 1938, that I received a communication from the General Staff to the effect that as matters would be entering the stage of negotiations I was to pass on all information to the Ambassador, TŌGO.

Q. Does that mean, General, that the matters had now reached the stage that you were to keep the Ambassador informed of what was going on, but you still continued the negotiations in your capacity as Military Attache?

A. Yes. (P. 49, 50 of Inter., Rec. 34,094.)

Q. Do you know what the attitude of Ambassador TŌGO towards this proposed treaty was?

A. As I know it, he wished to have it only in so far as Russia was concerned. (P. 50 of Inter., Rec. 34,097.)
I, Yale Taxon, hereby certify

1. That I am Chief of Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said section.

2. That IPS Document 3355-B attached hereto is an excerpt from the original transcript of the interrogation of Hiroshi OSHIMA, taken in Sugamo Prison on 5 February 1946, and is a true and correct copy therefrom.

3. That the said original transcript has been in the custody of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section continuously since that time.

/s/ Yale Taxon

Dated: 12 January, 1948

YALE TAXON
通訳官海軍少佐（ハミルトン）は、
将軍三井氏に前回の認同を、解り難い一宜書
及び今引き本詰問に、重々。
貴下に通電。「デス、其後、彼等、参謀本部,
改め通電、通信、デス。」

部長

還サルト、私、通知＝テ来ミ。

関係各官部、全事情、通信、受

6日、大使、領事テノヒ、通電

トセテ、問題バラ事情、進行、

大使ハテニテ、通電

■■■
So that actually this treaty makes no provision that the signatory parties are to help one another only in the event that one has an attack made upon it, that is unprovoked - there is no requirement that such a condition exist. It was a mutual aid pact and provided in effect, did it not, that if one of the three is attacked then the other two will help the one that has been attacked.

In substance, this is what I believe it means - no, I know it to be so - the right to decide whether one of the signatories was attacked and whether the others will furnish aid is left up to this Commission. To put it differently, let us say, that the United States and Germany had gone to war. Japan was not obligated to furnish aid unconditionally. The Commission was to decide whether the attack had occurred or not.
IPS Doc. No. 3355-C

questions and answers, consisting of 11 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23 day of February 1946.

/s/ G. Osmond Hyde

Duly Detailed Investigation Office
International Prosecution Section
GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brusuer, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Lucille C. Brusuer

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 15th day of February 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

February 23, 1946

/s/ G. Osmond Hyde
IPS Doc. No. 3355-C

CERTIFICATE

I, Yale Maxon, hereby certify

1. That I am Chief of Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said section.

2. That IPS Doc. 3355-C attached hereto is an excerpt from the original transcript of the interrogation of Hiroshi OSHIKA, taken in Sugamo Prison on 15 February 1946, and is a true and correct copy therefrom.

3. That the said original transcript has been in the custody of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section continuously since that time.

/s/ Yale Maxon

YALE MAXON

Dated: 12 January 1948
リサ・メイ・ブルナー

調査官証明書

余の名はルーシャ・メイ・ブルナー（Lucille C. Brunner）と申します。

筆者に面して余に至る通訳者、筆者の名はFR. HUGGENSです。

余はLUCILLE C. BRUNNERと証明します。

筆者と余は面識のない者で、筆者の手数料を余になしにした。

筆者・ブルナー

二〇〇三年三月三十一日
Questions by: Mr. Hyde.

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

Q. Why would Hitler issue such an order and base the collaboration upon the pact unless there was either something in the pact or an understanding between Japan and Germany?

A. I do not know why he said so. Maybe he intended to invoke the statement in the preamble about the building of a new order in East Asia. I do not know.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, LT. COMDR. F. B. HUGGINS, Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 8 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ F. B. Huggins
IPS Doc. No. 3333-D

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of MARCH, 19-.

/s/ G. Osmond Hyde
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section,
GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, LUCILLE C. BRUNER hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Lucille C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator

I, G. OSMOND HYDE, certify that on 7th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIHA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. HUGGINS, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

March 9, 1946.
Date

/s/ G. Osmond Hyde
CERTIFICATE

I, Yale Maxon, hereby certify

1. That I am Chief of Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said section.

2. That IPS Document 3355-D attached hereto is an excerpt from the original transcript of the interrogation of Hiroshi OSHIVA, taken in Sugamo Prison on 7 March 1946, and is a true and correct copy therefrom.

3. That the said original transcript has been in the custody of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section continuously since that time.

/s/ Yale Maxon

Dated: 12 January 1948
POLITICAL REPORT

Contents: Japan's attitude towards the European crisis.

* * * * *

High Command Army:

Pol. I-X
W. VII
Press Division
To the Foreign Office, Berlin

* * * * *

Prime Minister Prince KONOYE at two meetings during the days of crisis vigorously expressed his high esteem for the Germany policy but noticeably avoided going deeper into conversations which would fix clearly the Japanese attitude. I have endeavored through the new ambassador to Rome, Mr. SHIRATORI, who is especially active in favor of the anti-Comintern policy, to influence him in the direction of a stronger expression. His congratulatory telegram to the Führer and Reich's Chancellor, by which act he shook off his proverbial reticence is an unusual manner, may have been based upon such influence.

* * * * *

(signed) OTT
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
株式会社

W.P. Cumming

消音器

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TELEGRAM IN CODE
(Secret Code Process)

Please inform SHIRATORI that Reich Foreign Minister
will gladly see him at the given time in Berlin. Please keep
in contact with SHIRATORI and note his departure.

"EISZCKER

136099

/T.N. in handwriting/ JAPAN
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
Acting Adjutant General

LT. Colonel, AGD

(如能圖) 交代指示
TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process)

Rome, 9 September 1939 13:45 p.m.

Arrived 9 September 1939 14:50 p.m.

No. 454 of 9.9.39

*Pol. VIII 2022 G

To Telegram dated 4, No. 465*

SHIRI-TORI, whom I informed in accordance with my instructions, has in the meantime dropped the idea to return via Siberia. He regrets greatly not to be able to see Reich Foreign Minister again, but plans to ask Ambassador OSHIMA, who will within a few days come to Rome, to transmit to Reich's Foreign Minister what he wanted to state to him personally.

(Signed) M. CHEKSEN

136116

8 Copies:
Distributed as follows:
No. 1 to Polig with 3 Duplicates
No. 2 to Reich Foreign Minister
No. 3 to Deputy Minister
No. 4 to Chief of A.O.
No. 5 to Office of Reich Foreign Minister
No. 6 to Director of Personnel
No. 7 to Director of Politics
No. 8 to Dg. of Politics.

This is No. 3

/T.N. in handwriting/ Jap
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ W. P. Cumming

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, Adj
Acting Adjutant General
Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
電報
一九三四年九月九日
四時十分
二星

四日付電報第四五号三付

伊レ

八事

警察署長

警察署長

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日本
Tokyo, 27 January 1941, 2105 hrs.

Arrived 27 January 1941, 2020 hrs.

SECRET

4123 of January 27th concerning telegram dated 13 #40, Vol. VIII 153 g.

't my quite private farewell breakfast which I gave for Ambassador OSHIMA today, he and Ambassador SHIRATORI directed the conversation to the topic of recognition of Wang Ching-wei. Both Ambassadors advocated the view that Japan's request to Germany for recognition of Wang Ching-wei is not advisable at this time in order not to decrease the possibility of a later German influence on Chiang Kai-shek. Both Ambassadors found understanding for this view from the Foreign Minister. OSHIMA expressed the intention to inquire from the Reich Foreign Minister after his arrival in Berlin, whether a special representative of the Reich's Government could be sent in order to influence Chiang Kai-shek.

(signed) OTT

136535
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
電報（秘密電報）

【文書】

一九四一年一二月廿三時二十分東京発

[文書内容]

私の要求者ült神速に了承され、日本政府はこの要求を承認した

両大使、汪精衛、承認方、日本政府がこの要求を承認した

見解を表明した。

両大使はここ見解は外相が了解したという事実を発見した。

【文書の背景】

この電報は、戦争中の日本政府が中国の要求を承認したことを示している。
余ハ合衆国国務省付、同国議会議務事務課長に於て、
余ノ合衆国国務省カムングハ正ニ宣言シテ次ノ如

余ハ合衆国国務省付、同国議会議務事務課長に於て、
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余ノ合衆国国務省カムングハ正ニ宣言シテ次ノ如
ATTACH AFFECTED GENE

IC. COGNITIVE

(3, P. GENERA1S)

(4)

(i)
You reported some time ago that SHIRATORI was unfortunately having to leave political discussions there as a result of serious illness. When I asked the Japanese Ambassador to Rome when I met him in Venice how SHIRATORI was getting along, he was very astonished to hear of an illness and claimed to have knowledge that SHIRATORI was as well as ever. He had only recently had good news from him. I request a telegraphed report on SHIRATORI's true state.

Ribbentrop

Drawn up in 5 copies, of which:

No. 1 to R.A.I. (Working copy) /German Foreign Ministry?/
No. 2 to R. H. /German Foreign Minister?/
No. 3 to State Secretary German
No. 4 to B.R. /Office of German Foreign Minister?/
No. 5 to Head of Pol. Division

/Frame No. 60260

JAP
AFFIDAVIT

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/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMLING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
Re: Permanent Secretary Meeting of the Parliamentary Members' League for the Consummation of the Sacred War /Seisen Kantetsu Gijin Remmei/, and Holding of People's Round-table Conference on the Current Situation.

The Parliamentary Members' League for the Consummation of the Sacred War held this morning a meeting of its permanent secretaries, and this afternoon under its joint sponsorship with the National League for the Establishment of the Far East /Toa Kokumin Kenjitsu Domei/, a people's round-table conference on the current situation. The following represents a description of same. The conference of the permanent secretaries of the Parliamentary Members' League was opened at 11 a.m. at the League's headquarters. Twenty persons enumerated below, who are the various permanent secretaries, were the attendants to it:


Haei Ikuta took the Chair and then they started discussions after the new member, Toranosuke Obata, of the Minseito Party was introduced. The subjects taken up on this occasion were:

1) Plan for holding a meeting tomorrow, at 11 a.m. of the Committee for Speeding Up a new political system (Committee Members: Kuramoto, Nishikata, Hida, Ikuta, Nishimura, Akamatsu, Doke, Nagayama, K. Nakamura, Kamei, Hara, Okano).

2) Urgent opening of a Diplomatic Committee Meeting.


The meeting broke up at 1 p.m. after deciding on the above two items.

II) People's Round-table Conference on the current situation (Organizing Committee of the Promoters' Committee).

The above round table conference was held today at the Hibiya Matsukotóro restaurant, starting from 2 p.m., under the joint sponsorship of the
Parliamentary Members' League for the Consummation of the Sacred War and the National League for the establishment of the Far East. The attendants were:

AKAMATSU, ASANUMA, IKUTA, ISHIHARA, Hiroichiro, KAMEI, KIYOSE, KURAMOTO, M. KUNO, Ryo KOYAMA, Yasaburo SHIMONAKA, Shiratori, Kenji SUGIYAMA, Dôka, T. NAKAMURA, NAKAHARA, NAGAYAMA, NISHIOKA, NISHIKATA, NISHIMURA, Heima HAYASHI, HIDA, Mitsuo MIYATA, Kengo MURAKAWA, Daisuke TAKAOKA, Shin-ichiro HONYÔ.

The above committee discussed about the current state of affairs, as a result of which they reached an agreement in regard to organizing a People's Round-table Conference on the Current Situation and the holding of a Promoter's Meeting for making the necessary preparations for same for the purpose of studying and discussing the following two subjects as the basic items, viz:—

1) Adjustment and reinforcement of the domestic political system.
2) Establishment of a strong foreign policy.

The meeting dispersed at 4 p.m. after deciding on the proposition of naming as promoters the following persons: TOKUTOMI, ADACHI, SUYETSUGU, Iwane MITSUI, Toyama, Senjuro HAYASHI, Sonshi HAYASHI, MAZAKI, also of making the following persons: KUHARA, NAKAJIMA, and MICHIDA and others connected with the various political parties participants.

On this occasion, Ambassador SHIRATORI to Italy gave a speech which may be summarized as follows:

"Being a governmental servant, I feel I have to refrain from making recourse to language insinuating the overthrow of the Cabinet, but as regards the re-orientation of Japan's foreign policy, I may say that it appears that we have already missed the opportunity when we consider the situation in the light of the present advance of Germany. This, however, does not mean that we can see no prospect at all.

Nevertheless, I feel it absolutely impossible to entertain any hope in this regard as long as the persons who opposed the proposition of a Japan-Germany-Italy military alliance remain to hold the ministerial posts in the cabinet." Thus, he used words insinuating the overthrow of the Cabinet.

/By AKITA Kisaburo/
CERTIFICATE

I.P.S. No. 205

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, URAE Katsuia, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of [4] pages, dated June 17, 1940, and described as follows: Re: Permanent Secretary on the Secretary of the Parliamentary Members' League for the Consumption of the Sacred Bar /Aken Fonteau Gin Remnel/ and holding of People's Round-table Conference on the Current Situation.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 8th day of January 1948

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: T. Sato

Assistant, Archives Section, Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry SHIHOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 8th day of January 1948

Investigator I.P.S., Official Capacity

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*URABE, Katsuna, K. URABE, F. SATO*
From January 1940 till June of the same year you were Premier. What are the reasons of you and your cabinet's resignation?

Minister of War, H.T., Shunroku resigned. Military circles did not put forward a successor for the post of Minister of War. That forced the resignation of the Cabinet.

What were the reasons for the resignation of Minister of War in your Cabinet?

The reason for the resignation of Minister of War was that my Cabinet was by the composition a weak one and the Minister of War, being in the Cabinet, was unable to exercise the control over Army.

Were there any misunderstandings between H.T., Shunroku and you?

Yes, there were misunderstandings between the Minister of War and myself, and all fell down to the point that the Cabinet, being weak, could not carry out the active war policy on the military circles insisted.

Realization of the measure did military circles demand and what questions brought about the differences of opinion?

Differences mainly concerned the question of the alliance between JAPAN and GERMANY. Military circles demanded a conclusion of an alliance, and I was opposed to it.

What point of view concerning the conclusion of a military alliance between JAPAN and GERMANY did H.T., Shunroku support?

HATA, Shunroku thought that the conclusion of a treaty between JAPAN and GERMANY at that time would be advantageous to JAPAN.

I ask you to relate in detail from what point of view HATA and military circles could have considered your Cabinet as a weak one.

My Cabinet was considered as a weak one because at that time the main question of Japanese internal policy was the question...
of creation of the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association," and the main question of foreign policy was the question of building up an alliance between GERMANY and JAPAN. At that time, therefore, any Cabinet that would not support these two measures would be considered as a weak one, just as any Cabinet that would be in a position to bring about the materialization of these measures would be considered as a strong one. I as the Premier, was in opposition to both of these measures and that is why my Cabinet was considered as a weak one.

Q. Tell us about the reasons which prompted you to oppose the creation of political "Imperial Rule Assistance Association."

... I was in opposition to the creation of "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" because this association had the aim of establishing a fascist regime in the country on the same lines as in Germany.

Q. Why did you think that creation of "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" meant the establishment of a fascist regime in this country? What concrete evidence can you bring forward to prove that?

A. I was against the creation of "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" because such an organization meant the establishment of a dictatorship in the country, where the Parliament instead of being the organ of deliberation of questions, would become an organ, where the members would simply vote for and applaud any measure demanded by dictatorship.

Q. Do I understand you correctly in that the difference between the Army and Navy in 1940 were in the diverse decision of the two cardinal questions of Japanese home and foreign policy: creation of the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" and the conclusion of politico-military alliance between JAPAN and GERMANY? The Navy was in opposition to both of these measures but the leading military circles insisted on the realization of them?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. Whom of the leaders of the military circles you have in view?

A. I am at a loss to name anyone of the military leaders who insisted on the realization of the ideas put forward by middle strata of officers.
Q. Who was the most influential person in military circles at that time?

Ans. War Minister at that time was R.T., Chief of Military Affairs, Section in the War Ministry was IUTO. The Chief of General Staff was SUGUI... These were the people who thought it necessary to create a political organization of the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" and conclusion of a military alliance with GEFNY, reflecting the feelings of a great majority of the army.

Q. I cannot answer this question in the affirmative because the War Minister at that time, R.T., Shunroku, for instance, being of opinion that my Cabinet was weak, never disclosed to me his views on the subject. IUTO is known to me by sight only and I cannot say anything about his views. I am telling you what I know. At that time I was a Navy Minister and then Premier and was not in a direct contact with the Army; all I can say is that Army leaders at that time were dissatisfied with my Cabinet, considering it as a weak one. Dissatisfactions with the policy of my Cabinet were expressed by HIT., ESHIY., and IUTO.
問。何故貴社の政策を支持するか。支持の理由は何ですか。

答。私の政策支持理由は、創造活動の推進を目的としています。特に、成果の発揮を期待しています。

この理由は、私はこの国をどのように感じているか、具体的な証拠を提供するための理由です。

以下次頁。
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INADA Committee Member:

It depends on whether we have time or not, but if we have enough time, I wish you would hold a secret meeting, and until then, I will defer my question.

"Next I would like to introduce questions concerning the management of the ČINA Incident. I think the first step is to frustrate the Č'IANG KAI-ČEK regime, the second, to adjust the concessions and to abolish or readjust the FA PI (k.N.I. Chinese Standard Currency), the third to take necessary measures for the maintenance of peace, and the fourth, to act judiciously in coming with the Nine Power Treaty. As to the first problem, which is the forecast of the future fighting strength of Č'IANG KAI-ČEK regime, I will not question here, as we have already had your general explanation on it just now. Generally speaking, it has been said from olden days that the best tactics are to fight with the enemy's provisions, and I believe that, as a method for the future management of the Incident, Japan had better adopt this method by all means, and supply our troops as much as possible with commodities obtained in enemy lands. If we adopt that method, the difficulties in commodities may be removed somewhat even if the war is prolonged. I should like to hear the opinions of the military authorities."

VATA Minister of State

"To depend on provisions obtained in enemy lands is an invariable law of tactics from olden days, and it is a matter of course that the Army is making use of the commodities obtained in the actual field on every possible chance in the present Čina Incident. As you already know, the Army is not only making use of the commodities obtainable there, but is also buying and sending rice back to our foreland. Beside this, materials which have direct connections with munitions, such as raw cotton, wool, hemp, etc., are being supplied as much as possible in the actual field, and as to the investment of funds, special measures..."
such as extraordinary Funds are being adopted, of which you have already approved. Such being the circumstances, the Army anticipates further utilization of the commodities obtainable overseas end "and in" end with the pacification activities of the Army, we wish to attain self-sufficiency in the future.

JIKADA Committee leader

"The fourth is a question concerning the Nine Power Treaty. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has not yet expressed his decisive opinion on the abrogation of the treaty. It was his answer that deep consideration was necessary in regard to the time and the way of abrogating the treaty, for in some circumstances, it may end in good results, and in others, bad. However, this is also a very important diplomatic problem, and it is far from my intention to trouble the Minister of Foreign Affairs for his further answer unnecessarily. But I think this Nine-Power Treaty is the origin of many obstacles in the management of the China Incident. We may be victorious in every battle we fight, but as long as such a big diplomatic strong point bars our way, it is indeed a matter of undying regret for our people and a source of deepest grief. It is hoped that our Government will take into consideration the root and branch of the matter and its importance, and act so as not to make any mistakes. Otherwise, though an army of ten million men strong may be sent to the front and a million tons of warships be launched, it would, in fact, be very difficult to attain the object of this war. Such being my opinion, I should like to hear the opinions of the two ministers in charge of military affairs, on the Nine-Power Treaty from the tactical point of view, so as to make sure whether these two ministers, who are the representatives of the Army and the Navy, think the attitude of the Minister of Foreign Affairs towards the treaty inevitable, owing to circumstances.

"ATA The State Minister

I should say that it is a matter of course for the Army to follow the Policy of the Government in dealing with the Nine-Powers Treaty, but as I am now questioned on it, I would like to give my personal opinion on the
subject. The insulting and anti-Japanese policy of the C'ching K'ai-Shek Regime induced this present incident. In order to correct this misguidance and to bring about everlasting peace in East Asia, Japan is now fighting what one may call a "Holy War". Therefore I believe that this present incident is of course beyond the scope of the Nine-Powers Treaty. Quite apart from its appreciableness, the treaty still exists at present, but I do not think that the carrying-out of our military operations cannot be restricted by the existence of this treaty. I also think that the Foreign Minister knows quite well that the general circumstances of East Asia at present are radically different from that of the time the treaty was concluded.

INADA Committee Member

"Japan still persists in her policy of indifference towards Europe but I can hardly take this in the sense that Japan will neither conclude any kind of political agreement with any European country nor have anything to do with them. According to newspapers a few days ago, it was reported that the prime ministers of the two countries, Germany and Italy, meeting at a certain mountain frontier, discussed the peace of Europe and talked together of their desire to invite Japan into the anti-British-anti-French bloc. Isn't the government interested in such news and is the government interested in the need of taking advantage of such an invitation to join the anti-British-anti-French bloc? If our government has no concern or interest in these countries excepting the U.S.S.R., these countries will never turn out to be true friends to Japan in case of emergency, much less likely the group of countries assisting CH'ANG K'ai-Shek now. I think they will never side with Japan even in the stage of settling the Incident. The countries now assisting CH'ANG K'ai-Shek will never be Japan's ally in the future. Then will not Japan become internationally isolated in the future? Let us suppose that some unexpected happenings suddenly occur in the European war, or a sudden change arises such as the realization of peace and the termination of war, I deliberate on the future of JAPAN and am deeply solicitous lest she should again experience her bitter isolation of one against forty-two as in the general assembly of the League of Nations in 1933. I should like to bear the
opinions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Ministers of War and Navy in regard to these matters, and as to whether Japan is fully prepared for such possibilities.

ARITA, Minister of State

"I take your question as an inquiry as to whether the rumour is true that the meeting of HITLER and MUSSOLINI, Prime Minister of Italy, held at the BRENNER PASS on the Italian frontier, was to talk over the matters of solidifying their alliance against England and France, and of inviting Japan to join the alliance, and what opinion our Government has on it. However, as far as I know, our country has not yet received any such proposals. According to the reports of other newspapers, there are many doubts as to whether the meeting had such a political purpose. The firm policy of non-interference in European affairs taken by our Government is, I am sure, the most prudent policy under the present condition of the world, and as to your fearing that we might have to stand alone in the future due to this policy, I think all such fear and anxiety are unnecessary, so long as Japan acts according to her just policies with herself as their center.

"ATA, Minister of State

"My opinion regarding the international situation is similar to the answer given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In any case our country is doing its best and concentrating all its ability on the settlement of the incident, and in order to accomplish the Incident I think it is most important to adopt methods of skillfully harmonizing politics and tactics to meet the shifting international situations."

INADA, Committee Member

"I am quite satisfied with the explanation given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs just now that the Government has such decisive solutions. My next question is the reopening of the YANGTZE River. It seems to me that the United States of America has a radically different opinion on the China Incident. Even if a new Government is established -- and this is not a supposition, but will be established without fail in the near future -- I am afraid the U.S.A. will not recognize the new Government. I see no reason whatever to reopen the YANGTZE River which was dearly obtained by the sacred blood of many
Japanese soldiers to these countries who have frequently shown their hostility towards Japan recently, sacrificing our advantages and conveniences in military operations. I think this is really a parting-present of the former ABL cabinet which is not used in its commercial negotiations with the U.S. The other day, the War Ministers told us that if it become necessary the river could be closed at any moment. If it is so, would it not be better not to reopen it in the first place? I should like to inquire whether the three Ministers still hold the idea of reopening the river even now, and if they still persist in the idea of closing it again if necessary, I would like to hear their views on my opinion that I find no necessity to re-open the river which we obtained through costly sacrifices, to these hostile countries."

"ATA Minister of State-

"I have already explained many times about the reopening of the YANGTZE river, and needless to say, this problem should be decided on by the Army from the viewpoint of military operations and the maintenance of public peace. Therefore, although the Army is making special preparations for the re-opening of the river, the Army must, as a matter of course, reconsider it if some inevitable problems in military operations or public order arise, making it impossible to re-open the river. Japan has never made any promise to any third powers, and this is a problem to be decided purely voluntarily. As you all know, it was, I thin' the day before yesterday that Commander HISUHO explained this point clearly."

"IRAKAWA, Member of the Committee

"I should like to inquire of the Minister of War concerning a few important points. In the near future, the WANG CH'ING-WEI regime will be established and we welcome its birth for both China and Japan. As the Minister of War has already explained, the object of the present Chinese Incident is no other than to restore peace in the first by subjugating the pro-communist-anti-Japanese regime, and realizing friendly intercourse between Japan, Manchuko and China, joint defense against communism and
economic cooperation, thereby establishing a new order in East Asia. When the CHANG-KAI-SHEK regime is estab-
lished and our Government recognizes this new political power, our Government will form a friendly connection
with this regime and will cooperate in joint defense
against communism and will join hands together economically,
and then it seems to me that the nature of the war will
eventually be somewhat changed."

(IS'IZAKA YUTAKA, acting chairman of the committee
leaves and the chairman resumes his seat.)

"In other words the CHANG regime will be utterly
ruined, and when the CHANG regime is newly established,
Japan will join hands with this new Government, and as a
result there will be no pro-communist or anti-Japanese
sentiments. In that case, would not the nature of the war
change? Mr. MIZUNO's question to the Minister of Navy
was also of a similar nature, but at that time, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs replied on behalf of the Minister of
the Navy as follows, and his answer seemed to acknow-
ledge the opinion of Mr. ISHII. The War Minister also
gave his reply of which the purport was that, when the
CHANG regime is established, the Army must render as much
military help as possible to the newly-born Central Govern-
ment. Though the CHANG Government is established, it would
not be easy for the new Government to furnish sufficient
military strength and therefore as for our country, we
must continue our subjugation activities against the
CHANG-KAI-SHEK forces with the same military strength
we have hitherto been keeping in China. In spite of the
war being of such a nature as I mentioned before, if the
character of the war should be changed by the establish-
ment of the new Government, I think it is a serious affair as
it may effect the morale of the million soldiers at the
front end bring slackness into the minds of the hundred
million at home. It is my opinion that we should implant
the idea that even if a new regime is established, Japan
is not fighting to resist the CHANG-KAI-SHEK Government
nor for the maintenance of order in China, but for keeping
up our national defense and to suppress CHANG-KAI-SHEK
in cooperation with the CHANG-KAI-SHEK Government in
accordance with Japan's long-settled policy. What I would
like to ask the War Minister is this, as I am of the
opinion that it is necessary for him to give a definite
statement so that the Army may not be demoralized nor the
national order cooled; what is opinion on this subject is, I would like to hear the War minister's opinion, first of all."

"Mr. "IHARA's idea is quite reasonable, and it is unnecessary for me to report that the object of the present incident is to establish a new order in East Asia by thoroughly crushing the CHIANG KAI-SHEK Government's pro-communist and anti-Japanese policies. Therefore we firmly believe that the establishment of the WANG Regime is only a step in the incident, and when the new Government is established, our Army will give every possible assistance, especially military help to the WANG Regime and our policy will be firm and unchangeable as ever until the CHIANG Regime surrenders. And as the soldiers at the front and also the troops at home are made to understand this idea thoroughly I am sure there will be no fear of demoralization at all, even if the change in the war-purpose might arise through the establishment of the WANG Regime. As I said before, the establishment of the WANG Regime is after all only a step in the incident, and it is a great mistake to take the establishment of the new Regime as the accomplishment of the incident and I am sure such misunderstandings will never arise. However, it would be a very serious problem if demoralization and change in the resolution of our people should be brought about through the establishment of the new Government and if such a case should arise we will demand as a matter of course, of the first-line troops, to raise their morale, and do their best in the military operations until the ultimate aim of the Incident is attained. On the other hand, we must unite and cooperate with each other, and I think it is necessary to impress deeply in the minds of our nation that the establishment of the new Regime is only a step in the Incident and that we must undergo many more difficulties in the future in order to accomplish the object of the incident."
IYAKE: Committee Member.

"Your answer is reasonable, but the point I raised with the Foreign Minister on these matters was that it is necessary to make a complete change in Japan's diplomatic policy. That is, I think this is not our personal view - at any rate, it is, in the first place, a great mistake to adopt measures which would create anti-Japanese sentiment among those who are cooperating with the new order. Next, as I interpellated at the last budget meeting, it seemed to me that the European war would come to an end earlier than expected. In the last European war, we at least say that, notwithstanding our alliance with Allied powers, it was the Allied countries themselves which drubbed Japan at the termination of the war. This time, we are taking the attitude of non-participation, at least outwardly, so once the war is over, England, America and France will never stop their Ch'ing-aiding activities. On the contrary, it is evident that they would drub Japan. Furthermore, I think even Italy and Germany which are showing readiness to take the lead and recognize the Wang Government would follow England and America after the war, if Japan continues her present attitude. I am of the opinion that it is necessary for our country to change our diplomatic policy that in the line of aiding the construction of the new order in Europe in conformity with the establishment of the New Order in East Asia and the basis of our policy should be to establish the New Order of East Asia as one component of a world new order, and I think the diplomatic policy for Japan in the true sense is to completely abandon her non-participation policy on this occasion, and enter into alliances with the Axis powers. And the establishment of the WANG CH'ING-LI regime would afford a good opportunity for this change.

At the time of the formation of the ARE Cabinet some time ago, I think they were not able to give a definite judgment as to how the European war would develop as the Cabinet had but recently been formed. Moreover, both the Japanese government and the public were probably unable to forecast the victory of Italy and Germany, that is, the Axis powers, at that time. However, a great change has been wrought on this anticipation since then, so I think we should not lose this opportunity to change our policy. An extreme attitude need not be taken, but the point made is inviting the people's strong displeasure is that the diplomacy adopted by the Government is tending to be partial to England and
Doc. No. 3008

Mr. Arita, Minister of State:

"As Mr. Miyake asked, so also I will answer his questions. Our diplomatic policy is as has been frequently declared by the Premier and the Foreign Minister, the so-called non-participation policy which the Army understands as an unfettered and independent policy. You referred to our following England and America or otherwise Germany and Italy, and although I have some opinions on the prospect of the European War from my specialistic viewpoint, I will refrain from discussing it now. In short, there are various blocs such as Anglo-American Bloc or German-Italian Bloc, but as for us, in order to settle the incident, there will be no change in our policy which is to concentrate all our ability to exclude any third power which would persistently interfere with the establishment of the new order in East Asia."

There is also the considerably deep dissatisfaction among the public of which I am sure you are well aware. This fact is contradictory to Mr. Saito's speech. I would like to request the Government to carefully consider the fact that the majority of the sincere elements wishing to establish a new order in East Asia, that is, the majority of the public, exempting the upper classes, are themselves doubtful of Japan's diplomacy. If the war comes to an end, or Germany and Soviet Russia gain the victory within half a year or so, and when we are forced to recognize the fact that our diplomatic policy has been greatly mistaken, I think the people will have to undergo great hardships, no matter how much we may resent or regret it. I pay deep respect to Mr. Arita, the Foreign Minister, for his diplomatic efforts and cares, but I cannot but have doubts about the diplomatic policy of the present YONAI Cabinet. Even the Ministers of War and Navy who are directly responsible for carrying out the holy war, realize that merely to win in the actual fighting is not the ultimate settlement of the incident, and the management of diplomatic matters has a very important bearing. I would like to hear the opinions of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War and Navy, on this point."

"As Mr. Miyake asked, so also I will answer his questions. Our diplomatic policy is as has been frequently declared by the Premier and the Foreign Minister, the so-called non-participation policy which the Army understands as an unfettered and independent policy. You referred to our following England and America or otherwise Germany and Italy, and although I have some opinions on the prospect of the European War from my specialistic viewpoint, I will refrain from discussing it now. In short, there are various blocs such as Anglo-American Bloc or German-Italian Bloc, but as for us, in order to settle the incident, there will be no change in our policy which is to concentrate all our ability to exclude any third power which would persistently interfere with the establishment of the new order in East Asia."

Mr. Arita, Minister of State:

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Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, YAMAZAKI, Tokushi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: CHIEF, GEN. AFFAIRS SECTION JAPANESE DPT. (LOWER HOUSE) and that as such official I have custody of the document attached consisting of 40 pages, dated 22 March 1940, and described as follows: "Yosanjin Kagi Hoku Koku No. 25" (Budget Committee, Lower House).

The 75th Imperial Diet (Lower House) Session.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Diet (Lower House).

Signed at TOKYO on this 26th day of JUNE, 1947. /s/ Takashi YAMAZAKI

Signature of Official

Witness: _______________ Chief, Gen. Affairs Section
Office of Capacity: Japanese Dpt. (Lower House)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. DOLN, JR., hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at TOKYO on this 27th day of JUNE, 1947. /s/ Henry A. DOLN, JR.

Witness: Johnson F. Unroe
Investigator: IPS Official Capacity
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In regard to this subject, the Foreign Minister just now stated that he has not given it any thought. I would not like to leave it as such.

Moreover, from the viewpoint of deciding on how to settle the incident, I should like to ask the Foreign Minister and the Premier if the government has any intention of renouncing the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan, which, at that time had an alliance with Britain, participated in World War I in order to keep faith with Britain. As you all know, due to Japan's participation in the great European war, peace came to the Far East. In this war, Japan attacked the German Army in Taingteo and our Navy advanced as far as the Mediterranean Sea. With the termination of this War, Britain renounced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and it was buried into oblivion in Washington. The Nine-Power Treaty was perhaps a sort of a substitute for this abrogation. However, it is needless to say that this Nine-Power Treaty is a scheme of Britain and the United States, planned to restrain the continental policy of Japan. Japan is now waging a war with China and is establishing a new order in the Far East. It is needless to say that this Nine Power Treaty is a serious obstacle both in the future settlement of the incident and in future wars. And because of the existence of this treaty, it is difficult to ascertain how much Japan has worried about her diplomacy, and how much the Japanese Foreign Office and the government has troubled themselves because of third powers. Besides when the Nine-Power Treaty Conference was held some years ago, I think it was in Brussels, Japan did not recognize this conference and did not send her representatives. Even though Japan has taken such an attitude, why Japan still allows the existence of the treaty and does not renounce it, is beyond my comprehension from the standpoint of settling the incident. Why does not the government dare to renounce this Nine-Power Treaty?

Looking at the world situation, a treaty cannot be renounced unless there is a serious change in the situation. However, if we compare the present situation with the situation at the time the treaty was signed, such major changes have taken place as the independence of Manchukuo in China, and the waging of an unprecedented war by Japan. Ordinarily, wars are waged among nations for even such trifle reasons as one nation stepping on another's hand or foot. There is no greater change in the international situation than the establishment of Manchukuo by means of war. In fact, no greater changes have ever been made than the change in the situation in the Orient and in China. In reference to this, has our government, in view of the important changes in the situation in the Far East and in the light of this international principle, the determination to announce the renunciation of the Nine-Power Treaty in conformity with the principle of international law concerning this change in the situation? Soon, the
Central Government will be established and even when it is established as I said previously, I think it is needless to say that in the settlement of the Sino-Japanese Incident and also in all negotiations of the Central Government with third countries, the treaty will create extremely difficult international problems. I believe that the ministers of war and the navy realize how much Japan suffered from the standpoint of executing this incident. Also, how much and how often has the foreign minister suffered in regards to this problem? In my opinion, the announcement of the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty by America was probably based on the Nine-Power Treaty. It is a greater disadvantage to Japan that there exists such a treaty which is very unfavorable to her from the standpoint of carrying on the incident and which she hardly recognizes. Referring to the provisions of this Nine-Power Treaty, it would seem that the attitude of Japan towards the China Incident was determined mostly from the standpoint of the articles provided in the Nine-Power Treaty. In spite of the difference in spirit, and in spite of the difference in the way of thinking on the part of Japan, the Foreign Office or those who are concerned in diplomatic affairs are apt to be swayed by the articles of a treaty, if one exists. Even if it is said that the spirit is lacking, as long as there is a treaty at present, it is natural that they would be swayed by it. Therefore, glancing over the statement of /Prince KONOYE, and comparing the text of the KONOYE Statement with that of the Nine-Power Treaty, I feel as though the smooth movement of the pen was driven by the Nine-Power Treaty. Has or has not the foreign minister the intention of renouncing such a troublesome treaty as this Nine-Power Treaty?

(ISHIZAKA, acting chairman of the committee leaves and the Chairman takes the seat.)

Proceeding further, when the so-called new central government is established, is he or is he not ready to renounce the Treaty in cooperation with this central government? I ask questions on these two points.

State Minister ARITA:

There are some articles in the Nine-Power Treaty which do not suit the present situation in the Far East. In other words, the gist is that as it now stands the so-called old basic principle is not applicable to the present situation in the Far East. On the one hand, it can be said that the renunciation is favorable in the establishment of the new order in the Far East and in the amelioration of the present situation; but on the other hand, there is a possibility that the renunciation might cause some repercussions. Therefore, I think that there is a necessity for comparing these two sides and also a necessity for carefully considering the problem of renouncing the Nine-Power Treaty. And, as a problem for the future, when the central government is established in China, careful deliberation is also required as to what measures Japan and the new central government should take in regards to this the renunciation of the treaty.
Committee Member KUBOI:

In regards to this question, I should like to ask the opinions of the Minister of War and the Navy Minister.

State Minister KATA:

This question is very important, and naturally, I am of the opinion that we should follow the government's policy.

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takashi Yamasaki hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of General Affairs Division of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ________ pages, dated ________, 1940 and described as follows: Minutes (Shorthand) No. 4 (dated Feb 7, 1940) of the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in the 75th Session of the Imperial Diet. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

The House of Representatives on this 11th day of August, 1947.

/sgd/ Takashi Yamasaki (seal)

Signature of Official Director of General Affairs Division of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives Official Capacity

Witness: /sgd/ Tawio Takei (seal)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A. Dolan, Jr. hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 14th day of Aug. 1947.

/sgd/ Henry A. Dolan, Jr.

Witness: /sgd/ Name

IPS INV. DIV.

Official Capacity
IPS DOC. NO. 3030

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, YAKAZAKI, Takashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: The Chief of the General Affairs Department of the House of Representatives, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one volume, dated 1940, and described as follows: Records of Diet Proceedings Volume 75. Book VIII. Minutes of the Committee (Standing) Meetings of the House of Representatives. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): House of Representatives.

Signed at House of Representatives on this 2nd day of October, 1947.

Signature of Official

Witness: Isuguo TAKABE /signed & sealed/

The Chief of the General Affairs Department of the House of Representatives, Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry SKIKOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at___ on this 2nd of October, 1947.

Signature of Official

Witness: Johnson F. Munroe /signed/

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity
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Doc. 3030B
CHASE J. NIELSEN
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (p. 39)

Q How serious were the injuries of Lieutenant Hallmark and Lieutenant Meder?
A Well they were so bad they couldn't walk—that is, walk well. They were pretty crippled up.

Q On what date were you captured, Captain?
A We were taken over by the Japs on April 21st.

Q What did the Japanese do with you after they captured you?
A Well we were loaded in coolie chairs and taken to the Japanese garrison.

(At this point Sgt. Morosumi took over the interpretations and relieved Sgt. Arita.)
Q After that happened what did the Japanese do?
A We were transferred from there by boat up to Shanghai.

Q How were you treated when they took you to Shanghai?
A Well, our trip up by boat, three of us were kept in one small room. We were handcuffed and tied by the ankles and tied tight enough to cut off the circulation.

Q How long were you kept bound in that fashion?
A We were that way while we were transferred from one place to another but while we were on the boat our arms weren't tied although we were handcuffed and at night the three of us had our legs cuffed together.

Q How many days did it take you to arrive at your next destination?
A Well we were about four days coming up the coast from where the Japs picked us up until we came to Shanghai.

Q Where did the Japs take you when you came to Shanghai?
A Well I think we were taken out to the airport.

Q Had Lieutenant Hallmark's and Lieutenant Meder's injuries been treated up to that time?
A No, they had not. (pp. 50-51)

Q What treatment was given to you by the questioners at the airfield?
A Well, through the questioning, when I wouldn't answer any questions I was slapped and kicked around.

Q Explain to the Commission where you were slapped?
A I was slapped around the face and head very severely.

Q Who slapped you?
A Four of the Japanese guards that took me from the prison into the building.

Q You stated that you were kicked, where were you kicked - what part of your body?
A I was kicked on the shins.

Q Who kicked you?
A These same Japanese guards.

Q How hard did they kick you?
A Hard enough that I still have the scars today.

Q Captain Nielsen, would you stand out in front of the bench and show the Commission any scars that you have on your leg from the kicking?
A I certainly will.

(The witness showed the scars on his leg to the Commission.)
Q: What questions would they ask you when they were giving you this physical treatment?
A: They more or less wanted to find out where we came from.

Q: What questions did they ask you I said?
A: Well, where I had come from, if I was Army personnel, and what I was doing in China.

Q: How many times would you estimate you were slapped on the head?
A: At least 20 or 30 times.

Q: Were you bound during this time?
A: My hands were behind the chair, and my legs were tied to the chair legs.

Q: How hard were you slapped?
A: Hard enough to make my head ring severely.

Q: Did the questioners threaten you with any other treatment while you were being questioned?
A: Yes, I was given several different types of torture.

Q: Did the questioners tell you they would do anything to you if you did not answer the questions?
A: Well, they said that we were captured and no one in America would know where we were and if anything happened to us we would just be listed as missing in action.

Q: During this treatment did you answer their questions?
A: All I gave them was my name, rank and serial number.

Q: What other physical treatment was administered to you at that time?
A: Well, I was given what they call the water cure.

Q: Explain to the Commission what that was?
A: Well, I was put on my back on the floor with my arms and legs stretched out, one guard holding each limb. The towel was wrapped around my face and put across my face and water was poured on. They poured water on this towel until I was almost unconscious from strangulation, then they would let up until I'd get my breath, then they'd start over again.

Q: When you regained consciousness would they keep asking you questions?
A: Yes, sir, they did.

Q: How long did this treatment continue?
A: About twenty minutes.

Q: What was your sensation when they were pouring water on the towel, what did you physically feel?
A: Well, I felt more or less like I was drowning, just gasping between life and death.
Q During the administration of this treatment did you answer their questions?
A No, I did not.

Q What further mistreatment was administered to you while this questioning was going on?
A Well, the guards then brought in a large bamboo pole about three inches in diameter, this was placed directly behind my knees, I was made to squat on the floor in this position (indicating squatting position) like a kneel.

PROSECUTOR: For the purpose of the record, I will describe the position the captain demonstrated as a squatting position.

Q Continue with your explanation.
A One guard had a hold of each of my arms, one other guard then placed his foot on my thigh and would jump up and down causing severe pain in your knees.

Q Explain to the Commission just the sensations you felt from this treatment?
A Well, it felt like my joints were coming apart but after about five minutes of that my knees were so numb I couldn't feel anything else.

Q During this time did the Japanese keep on questioning you?
A Yes, sir, they did.

Q What answers did you give them to their questions?
A I told them I had given them all the information I had—my name, rank and serial number.

Q How long did this treatment last with the bamboo pole behind your knees?
A This lasted about fifteen or twenty minutes.

Q Do you know what happened to the other two members of your crew who were with you?
A I didn't know at the time but talking to them later I found out they were given similar treatment. Hallmark said they put him on a stretcher and stretched him out until he felt like his limbs were coming apart.

Q Were any other threats made to you during the questioning?
A Well, by that time it was almost sundown. They said, if I won't talk they would take me out and I would be executed.

Q What else did they tell you? What did they tell you?
A I was then blindfolded and taken out.

Q Then what happened?
A Well, the pain in my legs I could hardly walk so one guard took a hold of me under each arm and we marched about three or four hundred feet down a gravel path.
Q: What happened while you were marched down the gravel path?
A: I was blindfolded, I couldn't see, but I could hear different groups of Japanese soldiers marching around in the area, they were drilling.

Q: What else was said while you were marching there in the area?
A: Well, after marching about 400 feet we stopped and as one of those squads marched up, they also stopped by us.

Q: What was said or done at that time?
A: Well, as they stopped I could hear the rifle butts hit the ground and I thought this was execution.

Q: Then what happened?
A: Well, after a short conference between several of the officers that was with me and whoever was marching the squad, the interpreter came back and he said, "We are Knights of the Bushido of the Order of the Rising Sun; we don't execute at sundown; we execute at sunrise."

Q: And then what happened?
A: Well, I was taken back to my cell and the interpreter said unless I had decided to talk by morning I would be executed by sunrise.

Q: Did anything happen to you while you were in your cell?
A: Well, the blindfold was taken off but I still kept the handcuffs.

Q: What else happened, if anything?
A: Well, I was given several vegetable sandwiches and a cup of coffee.

Q: Did anything else happen to you there in your cell?
A: One of the guards that had been in the room with me before, administering this punishment, came back out and there was a peg in the wall and I was suspended by my handcuffs from that peg so my toes would just barely touch the floor.

Q: How long were you left suspended in that position?
A: Well, that was about seven o'clock at night when I was suspended from the wall. After about three hours I lost consciousness. The next thing I could remember, the sun was just coming up and the guards were taking me down from the wall.

Q: Did the Japanese ask you any questions when they took you down from the wall?
A: I was not asked any questions.

Q: What was your physical condition when they took you down from the wall?
A: Well, my legs were still in great pain from the treatment the night before and when I let my arms down I thought they were both going to drop off.
Q: What other sensations did you have that you can explain to the court?
A: Well, from hanging up all night my arms were numb, my shoulders were numb, I was numb clear to the waist.

Q: Were you able to stand up after they took you down from the wall?
A: I was able to stand all right.

Q: What kind of furnishings were in that cell?
A: Two old dirty ragged blankets that were infested with all the vermin there is in China; latrine facilities was an open hole in the corner, had no lid on it, and the stench that came out of it was enough to put you to sleep.

Q: From the kicking that the guards administered to you were there any open sores on your legs?
A: Yes, sir, I had three open sores.

Q: Was any medical attention given to your sores on your legs?
A: No, no medical attention was given them.

Q: Do you know what treatment the other boys received during that night?
A: Well, I don't think they were molested during the night although they did receive about the same punishment I did in the afternoon.

Q: You stated that Lt. Hallmark told you he had been given the stretcher treatment. Could you explain that to the Commission?
A: From what he said, it was some sort of a mechanism that they put ropes around his wrists and around his ankles and it was operated with some sort of a lever but every time they move the lever this thing would stretch out. (pp. 54-57)

Q: What date was that, Captain Nielsen, if you remember when you arrived in Tokyo?
A: We arrived in Tokyo about seven o'clock in the evening, April 25, 1942.

Q: Had you been permitted to shave or change your clothing or wash since the time you were captured by the Japanese?
A: No, sir.

Q: What condition was your clothing in at that time?
A: They weren't in very good condition. Some of them were torn up in the plane wreck, after our swim in the ocean we were all muddy and dirty.

Q: Had you picked up any vermin or lice while you were being held by the Japanese?
A: Yes, sir, we had.
Q Were you kept bound and handcuffed during the trip into Tokyo?
A We were blindfolded before we left Shanghai and we wore our handcuffs and were tied and continued to wear the blindfold until we were inside the military police headquarters.

Q What was done with you after you arrived at the military police headquarters?
A We were put in solitary confinement, and about 15 minutes we were taken out and started to be questioned again. (p. 58)

Q I believe the question was, Were you mistreated on the first night in Tokyo?
A Yes, I was.

Q What happened to you during this mistreatment?
A I was slapped about the head and face and kicked on the legs.

Q Were you bound in any way?
A Yes, my hands were kept behind the chair and my feet were tied to the legs.

Q How many persons took part in the questioning of you?
A Oh, there were three guards, one interpreter, and two reporters.

Q Where did they kick you and where did they slap you?
A Slapped me about the face and head, and kicked me on the shins.

Q How hard did they kick you and how hard did they slap you?
A They slapped me hard enough to start my head aching and they kicked me on the shins drawing blood and reopening the wounds that I received in Shanghai the day before.

Q What type of questions did they ask you?
A They asked me where I had come from, if I had combed Tokyo the previous week, if I had been stationed in China or in the Philippine Islands, and if I was American Army personnel.

Q How long did this questioning continue that first night?
A This questioning continued until four o'clock in the morning.

Q During all that period did they continue to mistreat you?
A I was slapped and kicked around nearly all the time.

Q Do you know what treatment was given to the other boys that were in your airplane?
A I found out later they received the same sort of treatment. (p. 60)
During that 18 days of questioning were you allowed to take a bath or shave?
A No, sir.

At the conclusion of the 18 days of questioning did you sign any papers?
A Yes, sir, I signed papers.

What papers did you sign and what did they consist of?
A Well, they were written in Japanese but they were interpreted.

What did the interpreter say the papers read?
A Well, about three weeks after we had bombed Tokyo I was shown maps and charts that the Japs had picked up from one of our airplanes that had been abandoned, evidently that was the only place they had any information, and through our questioning, after they picked up those maps and charts we confessed to bombing Tokyo, told them the areas we had bombed and confessed of leaving an aircraft carrier. Other than that, a small sketch of our life's history—where we went to school, where we had our army training, that was all it consisted of.

When these statements were read back to you did they state you had admitted you bombed schools and churches?
A No, sir, they did not.

What targets did the statements say you had bombed?
A Well, the way the statement was interpreted to me was that I had bombed steel mills in the northeast area of Tokyo at the edge of a bay.

Did you sign the statement?
A At first I refused, but after being threatened, I signed it.

How were you threatened?
A Well, from previous treatment we knew what would happen to us if we did not sign.

Were you given a copy of the statement that you signed?
A No, sir, I was given no statement.

Do you know whether or not the other men that were with you signed statements?
A Yes, sir, all the men signed after being put under the same threat.

Do you know what their statement consisted of?
A From what they said at a later date their statement contained almost the same thing as mine, other than Farrow's crew which had bombed down at Nagoya.

Were you kept in solitary confinement during your time in Tokyo?
A No, we were kept in solitary confinement up until the last two weeks, then Farrow and I were placed in the same cell and the other boys were doubled up in cells.
Q How long were you kept in Tokyo?
A We were in Tokyo from April 25 to June 17, 1942. (pp. 61-62)

Q What was the condition of the wounds on your legs at that time when you
left Tokyo?
A They were all infected and in addition to that I had many bites from lice
and bed bugs that were also infected.

Q Had you been afforded any medical treatment?
A No, sir, I had not.

Q Were you allowed to bathe or shave or clean your clothing during this
time?
A No, sir, all the while we were in our cells we wore leg cuffs; we couldn't
get our clothing off.

Q Were you given any medical treatment?
A None whatever.

Q Where did they take you after you left Tokyo?
A We were put aboard the train to Nagoya and from Nagoya to Shanghai by
boat. (pp. 62-63)

Q What happened to you after you got back to Shanghai?
A Well, as soon as we arrived at Shanghai we were loaded on the truck and
taken down to the Bridge House. (p. 63)

Q What happened to you at Bridge House?
A We were taken in and eight of us were put in a cell with fifteen other
people. They were Chinese, Japanese, Jews, Dutch, French, every
nationality there is in Shanghai.

Q What was the condition of the men when they got back to Shanghai - their
physical condition?
A We were all quite weak, we lost quite a bit of weight; we were able to
get around on our own power.

Q Explain to the Commission the condition of this cell that you were put in
at Bridge House?
A This cell was approximately 12 feet deep and about 15 feet wide. There
were already 15 people in there when we came in, making 23 in total.
The latrine facilities was an open box in the corner. (p. 63)
Q What furniture was in the cell you had at Bridge House?
A No furniture at all. We were forced to sleep on the wood floor without any blankets.

Q How long were you held at the Bridge House?
A We were held at the Bridge House for 70 days.

Q During this period were you allowed to bathe or shave?
A No, sir, we were not.

Q What were you given to eat while you were at the Bridge House?
A At the Bridge House we'd get about a pint of conji, watery rice, for breakfast, four ounces of bread at lunchtime and four ounces of bread at night. We were given maybe as much as two quarts of water for the eight of us in the entire day.

Q What was the physical condition of the men at the end of the stay in Bridge House?
A At the end of our stay at Bridge House 7 of us were able to move around and that was about all. Lt. Hallmark was sick and had to be helped continuously and he had been that way for approximately 10 days. (p. 64)

Q What was the physical condition of the men that were taken before the court?
A Lt. Hallmark was taken in on a stretcher. The rest of us were on our feet but we were in a pretty weak condition.

Q What else transpired at the court martial room?
A After we had made our statements as to our education and air corps training, one of the court tribunal stood up, read a manuscript in Japanese.

Q Was that manuscript interpreted to you in English?
A I asked the interpreter to interpret it. He asked permission from the court tribunal and it was denied.

Q Did any of the other fliers make any statement to the court besides answering the questions as to their name, training, schooling?
A No other statements were made.

Q Do you know the names of the eight fliers who were brought before the court martial?
A Yes, sir, I know the names of the other fliers.

Q Tell the court the names of the fliers who were brought before this court?
Q. Were you afforded a defense counsel at the hearing?
A. No, sir, we were not.

Q. Did any witnesses appear before that tribunal while you were in the court room?
A. There were no witnesses.

Q. Were you ever served any charges or advised of the charges against you?
A. No, sir, we were not.

Q. Do you know whether any of the other fliers were advised of the charges under which they were tried?
A. At that trial no one was advised.

Q. Were the proceedings interpreted to you in English?
A. Nothing was interpreted in English.

Q. Was Lt. Hallmark able to sit up in the court room?
A. No. Lt. Hallmark was lying on a stretcher. I doubt if he ever knew what was going on, and Lt. Barr was so weak they finally had to get a chair for him to sit in.

Q. At this trial did you see any of the statements that you had signed in Japan?
A. No, sir, I never did see those statements again.

Q. When you were brought before that court martial, were you given an opportunity to plead guilty or not guilty?
A. No, sir, we were not. As a matter of fact, we didn't even know it was a court martial.

Q. When they brought you before the tribunal, were you bound in any way?
A. No, we weren't bound but there were about 20 armed guards in the building or right outside.

Q. At this hearing did you or any of the other fliers admit that you had bombed schools, churches or civilians in the raid on Japan?
A. No, sir, we did not. Nothing was said about the bombing of Japan.

Q. How long did this hearing last?
A. From 20 minutes to a half hour. (pp. 66-67)
IPS Doc. No. 3349-A

Judge Advocate General's Department -- War Department
United States of America

In the matter of the treatment and trial by the Japanese of Lt. George Barr, Lt. William G. Farrow, Lt. Robert Hite, Sgt Harold A. Spatz, Cpl Jacob DeShazer of the 34th Squadron of the 17th Bomber Group, USAF, and Lt. Dean E. Hallmark, Lt. Robert J. Mador, and Lt. Chase J. Nielsen all of the 95th Squadron of the 17th Bomber Group, USAF-all of whom were Doolittle Fliers who participated in the raid on Japan 18 April 1942.

* * * * * * *

Takon at: Schick General Hospital, Clinton, Iowa.

Date: 30 December 1945.

In the Presence of: L. Brown, Lt. Col. Inf., ASF, 0-6489, Summary Court, Schick General Hospital, Clinton, Iowa, and Chester I. Lappen, Agent, SIC, Seventh Service Command. (p. 1 of Pros. Transo. Exh. 21)

Q Did you all go to Nanking, China on the same plane?
A. Yes, sir. (p. 10 of Pros. Transo. Exh. 21)

Q. Were you mistreated at any time?
A. That was where I was tortured during questioning.

Q. About what time were you brought out for questioning?
A. About 830 in the evening.

Q. The evening of the 20th April 1942?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you handcuffed and blindfolded?
A. Yes, sir.
During the entire examination?
A No, sir, they took the blindfolds off for a while. (p. 11 of Pros. Transc. Exh. 21)

Here you mistreated downstairs?
A Yes, when I refused to answer questions.

What was done to you then?
A I received an assault by fists while I was handcuffed and blindfolded and later they laid me on the floor and a fellow came in with water and rags and suffocated me. He laid me on the floor and my mouth was gagged with the rags and my nostrils were left open for water to be poured down them.

How long was this continued?
A Until I decided that I had enough and would answer questions.

About how long?
A It lasted about 20 minutes.

Did they stop from time to time?
A Yes, sir, just long enough to ask me if I would talk.

Then they would continue?
A Yes, and the water was going down into my lungs. It just stopped your breathing.

Do you know who administered this?
A This was administered by soldiers, and the officer described just previously, looked on.

Could you describe the soldiers?
A No, I couldn't.

Who gave the command for them to administer this treatment?
A This Japanese officer in charge.

A few minutes ago, you spoke about being assaulted with fists. Who administered that?
A The Jap enlisted soldiers, but I couldn't describe any of them. When they administered the assault, the officer hadn't entered the room yet and when he entered the room he gave them the signal to stop.

How many were beating you?
A Three (3) or four (4).

Where did they hit you?
A In the face and body.
Q Did their blows break the skin or blacken your eyes?
A No, sir.

Q What information were they able to get from you after they gave you the so-called water treatment?
A They wanted to know where I came from. After they found that out, they let me go.

Q What information did you give them?
A That we took off from an aircraft carrier.

Q Were the other men questioned and mistreated as well?
A I believe they were from what I heard from Lt. Chase J. Nielsen. He was beaten and hung up by his thumbs. Lt. Robert J. Meder was given the water treatment.

Q Did you witness any of this?
A No.

Q Were they at the Nanking prison the same time you were?
A No, sir, they came a few days later.

Q You were gone when they arrived?
A Yes, sir, I received this information from them at Shanghai, China when I was in a cell with members of the crew of the plane piloted by Lt. Dean E. Hallmark.

Q Were any other members of your plane crew mistreated at Nanking, China?
A When I was brought into a room after this meeting of the board of inquiry, I passed an opened room and fellows were standing around Cpl. Jacob D. DeShazer. He told me later they were using pencils between his fingers and squeezing his knuckles. (pp. 12-13 of Pros. Trans. Exh. 21)
AUTHENTICATION

THIS CERTIFIES that this volume is a part of the Record of the Proceedings of the Military Commission appointed by Paragraph 2, Special Orders 42, Headquarters United States Forces, China Theater, dated 16 February 1946, in the trial of the case of United States of America against Shigeru Sawada, et al.

Dated 1 May 1946.

/s/ Edwin R. McReynolds
EDWIN R. McREYNOLDS
Colonel, IGD
President of Commission
本研究闡明的實例可視為一個特別的介面設計。在這樣的設計中，系統無法直接顯示所有可用的資料，而必須採用一些特別的技術來組織和呈現資料。此設計在系統中應用，使得系統能夠有效地組織和呈現大量的資料，同時也使得使用者能夠方便地找到所需要的資料。
同、アナタは僕らレタデスカ、身体ノドノ部分デスカ。
同、私何者タカカロ、軍ノ省カドウカ、及ビ
中同デ何ヲシテ居タカト、云フ如デス。
研究、讨论和实践。
（阿部、3.3=9-4）

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論文の一部

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図2

図3
(2) 33.9 - A

(3)
立会人：アイオワ州 クリントン「ショッピング」総合
病院・司法裁判所・六四八九・監理部・歩兵

記録法延記三十一号一頁

問、アタハハ皆同デ中四ノ案件へ行ツタノ

答、ハノ。 (検察部記録法延記三十一号下頁)

問、いぞいは何時ヲ受ケタコトガアリマスか。

答、何時ヲ受ケタコトハサマタカ。

問、夜八時ヲ受ケタコトハサマタカ。

答、ソウデス。

問、アタハハ手銬ヲカケラレ目ヲサレテキマスか。

答、ソウデス。
Q Did General Hata order the 13th Army to set up a military tribunal?
A He ordered so.

Q Did he order that the Doolittle Fliers would be tried by this military tribunal?
A Yes. (p. 286)

Q Did Nanking issue any orders to the 13th Army in regards to the treatment of the fliers?
A I do not remember.
Q: Was the trial of the Doolittle fliers ordered by General Hata to be tried at Shanghai?
A: Yes.

Q: Did you mean by your previous answer that Hata requested the 13th Army prosecutor to ask for the death penalty?
A: He requested so.

Q: (to Interpreter) Will you interpret that answer again?

INTERPRETER: He said he requested so—requested that the sentence be executed; he requested so.

Q: Does he mean the general requested so?
A: Yes, Hata.

Q: Did General Hata request the prosecutor of the 13th Army to ask for the death sentence?
A: He requested the death sentence. (pp. 280-289)

AUTHENTICATION

THIS CERTIFIES that this volume is a part of the Record of the Proceedings of the Military Commission appointed by Paragraph 2, Special Orders 42, Headquarters United States Forces, China Theater, dated 16 February 1946, in the trial of the case of United States of America against Shigeru Sawada, et al.

Dated 1 May 1946.

/s/ Edwin R. McReynolds
EDWIN R. McREYNOLDS
Colonel, IGD
President of Commission
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A Yes, Hata.

Q Did General Hata request the prosecutor of the 13th Army to ask for the death sentence?
A He requested the death sentence. (pp. 289-289)
行者マサトシ

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<tr>
<th>項目</th>
<th>直接尋問</th>
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| 間 | 彼ハコードリクトル除ノ航空士連ラソノ軍事裁判
| 間 | 彼ガケルヲウ命シマシタカ

在中國ノ米國陸軍司令官ノ召喚ニカレル軍事裁判員会

公判

米國

於テ

第三巻ニニ頁ヨリ三○頁

上落

一九四六年五月一日

騎田外衣郎

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最近、日米関係における事態が著しく緊張している。日米両国は、軍事上の問題を含む広範な議論を行い、非公開で会談を続行している。これらの会議は、戦略的・経済的同盟の重要性を強調し、安全保障に関する合意を模索している。

米側も、情報源は未確認だが、厳しい立場を表明している。これに対し、日本側は、平和を守ることを優先し、対話を通じて問題を解決する姿勢を示している。両国は、平和と相互尊重に基づいて、問題点を解決することを目指している。

この間、両国間で行われた交渉は、さらなる緊張を引き起こす可能性がある。このため、両国は、冷静で対話し、問題解決に向けた努力を続けていく必要がある。
1. P.S. Dec. No. 3121-(3) A.
領土全體を総力防衛に努め、日本国内の人民が安心して生活を送れるように努める。残念ながら、戦争の影響により、軍事力の不足により、敵の攻撃対策が不十分である。このため、各総務庁は、迅速かつ正確な情報を提供する必要がある。

政府は、敵の攻撃に対して、可能な限りの対策を行う一方で、人民の生活を守るために、必要に応じて資源を合理化し、効率的に配分する策を講じている。また、情報の公開は、人民の安心を図るための重要な手段である。
持ち合わせるに十分で難しい所あり自分独逸自戦争地域

大臣独逸对未能度国志大使個人・御方承知致

臣們承知度国志大使及独逸政府所授此旨

臣今貴大臣及独逸大使及独逸政府所授此旨

大日本政務院於此度大政度於此度大政

大臣

大臣，本大臣將末之要講機会得度上考？
余が聴合国最高指揮官総司令部関係アルモノガ
署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノヲコトガ兹ニ証明ス
千九百四十七年／昭和二十二年／十二月十五日
東京ニ於テ署名
氏名
国
右ノ者ノ公的資格
国際検察部関係者／ヘンリー・シモジマ／署名／
ジェニア・ラムベート／署名／
日米交渉近況

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日米交渉は、国務長官及び大使団の経済、政治、軍事、文化等の全面協力と、太平洋の平和と安定のための努力がなされており、両国間の友好関係が強化されている。

新提案

米側の提案を踏まえ、政府は提案内容に応じて調整の検討を進めている。
To: Ambassadors in Britain, America, Hanoi, Thailand, Soviet Russia, Germany, Italy, Batavia and Australia; 
Ambassadors in North China and Manchukuo, Nanking, Shanghai and Hong Kong.

From: Minister Togo.

For: The Present Situation of the Negotiations Between Japan and the U.S.A.

No. 2414 (Code for the Chief of the Office; Top Urgent)

The Recent Situation of the Japanese-American Negotiations.

1. Ambassador Nomura has made a new proposal to Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt which was worked out after the establishment of the new cabinet by revising some part of our former one. Negotiations have been carried on in Washington ever since the beginning of this month between President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Ambassador Nomura (Ambassador Kususu has also taken part in them since the 17th). Moreover, I have been pressing upon the American and British ambassadors in Tokyo as well, the necessity of the earliest solution, but America is assuming such attitudes as to insist on requesting the Japanese Government's affirmation of its peaceful intentions and at the same time on exacting our affirmative promise in advance concerning other fundamental problems, before clarifying her own answer of yes or no to the said proposal. In this manner it still holds fast to theoretical fundamentals and its attitude does not conform to the situation which is becoming more and more serious day by day. Therefore, on the 30th we presented our final proposal with a view to easing the situation in the southwestern Pacific area and thereby avoiding an imminent crisis in the Pacific. Since then, America seems to have consulted with Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, China, and other interested countries about the said proposal and an answer is expected to be given shortly in some way or other. Nevertheless, judging from the American attitude until the present, there is very little probability that America, reflecting seriously on itself on this occasion, will accept our final proposal made on the 20th. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to save the situation and there exists a danger that we shall be confronted with the worst in the near future.

The present telegram being addressed to:

Britain, America, Hanoi, Thailand, Soviet Russia, Germany,
Italy, Batavia, Australia, Ambassador in North China, Ambassador in Manchukuo, Hankow, Shanghai and Hongkong.

Please transmit the present telegram from America to all envoys in North America (including Honolulu) and Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina.

Please telegraph from Hongkong to Singapore and Manila.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ___ pages, dated ____, 19__ and described as follows: Telegram No. ___ from Foreign Minister TOGO to various Ambassadors abroad.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 15th day of December, 1947

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urao

Statement of Official Procurement

I, SHIMIZU, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 15th day of Dec., 1947

/s/ Henry SHIMIZU

Witness: J.G. Lambert

IPS Doc. No. 3116-G

Exh. No. ___

CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. ___

IPS No. 3116-G
### Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of 7 Dec. 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>39</td>
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</table>

**Note:** The U.S.A. figures are on hand. Vessels are added to fleets. The table includes all vessels of 1,000 gross tons and over.

---

I, Albert B. Ray, hereby certify that I am a Production Analyst in charge of the Naval Historical Section of the Museum of Ships, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., and in such capacity I have prepared this table from official records of the U.S. Government and from records of the Japanese Government, which are official, including those prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. The names, numbers, and assignments of ships were obtained from the Japanese records, and the data compiled from these records have been cross-referenced with the records of the Japanese Government to ensure accuracy. The dates given are as of 26 September 1947, as shown in the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

---

Albert B. Ray

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of December 1957, in the City of Washington, District of Columbia, U.S.A.

[Signature]

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<th>NAVAL VESSELS (ON HAND IN FLEETS)</th>
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<tr>
<td>BATTLÉS</td>
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<td>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEAVY CRUISERS</td>
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<td>MISCELLANEOUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBMARINES</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESTROYERS</td>
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<td>LIGHT CRUISERS</td>
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### TABLE OF VESSELS BETWEEN THE U.S.A. & JAPAN AS OF 7 DEC. 1941

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<td>10</td>
<td>152,970</td>
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<td>68,800</td>
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**TOTAL**

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<th>JAPAN - 39 VESSELS - 1,466,177 TONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.A. - 26 VESSELS - 1,023,880 TONS</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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**NOTE:** The U.S. figures are on hand vessels assigned to the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets.

---

I, Albert B. Ray, hereby certify that I am Production Analyst in charge of the Ships' Statistics Section at the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., and in such capacity, I have prepared this table from official records of the U.S. Government and from records of the Japanese Government; the U.S. Government records being an official document prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence and setting forth the names, numbers and assignments of ships with the tonnage of those ships prepared by us from records in my possession; and the records of the Japanese Government being those certified by Admiral YOSHIRO, in duplicate, to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. In this table the Japanese totals have been merely compiled by me without change from Exhibit No. 246, U.S. The United States' totals shown in said Exhibit No. 246, however, have been calculated to accord in form as far as practicable with the definition of the respective totals ("constructed", "on hand", "commissioned", and "in service") as given in the certificate signed at Tokyo, Japan on 26 September 1937 by Admiral YOSHIRO. I further certify that the above table and facsimiles are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

---

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of December 1947, in the City of Washington, District of Columbia, U.S.A.

---

Mary Rudder
# Auction Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of 7 Dec. 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No of Vessels</th>
<th>Total Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>189,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>375,459 Tons</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Japan:** 88 Vessels - 375,459 Tons

The building of which was suspended just after keel laid. (Shipyard records show it was to have been 51,000 tons.)

**U.S.A.:** 517 Vessels - 1,229,572 Tons

I, Albert B. Ray, hereby certify that I am Production Analyst in charge of the Navy Intelligence Section of the Bureau of Naval Supply, Washington, D.C., and in such capacity, I prepared this table from official records of the U.S. Government and the records of the Japanese Government. The U.S. Government records being an official document prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and setting forth the data, which have been assembled, and the names of ships with the tonnage of these ships prepared by me from records in my position and the records of the Japanese Government being those certified by Miroma Toshima in exhibit 1 in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. In this table, the Japanese totals have been merely copied as without change from Exhibit 1309. The United States totals shown in said Exhibit 13092 have been changed by me as required by the said exhibit, and recorded preparatory to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The Intelligence on the basis of the definition of the production tables under construction (nailed, in, out, incomplete, and unfinished) as given in the certificate signed at Tokyo, Japan on 28 September 1947 by Toshima Miroma. I further certify that the above table is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

**Albert B. Ray**

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December 1947, in the City of Washington, District of Columbia, U.S.A.
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YOSHID, HIDE'I
YOSHID, HIDE'I

On this 7th day of January 1948
at Tokyo

Deponent: YOSHID, HIDE'I

I, Capt. T. D. White, 0264083, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixes his signature and seal thereon in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo

Witness: Capt. T. D. White
CERTIFICATE

1. I, Hidemi Yosida, hereby certify that the term "UNDER CONSTRUCTION" as used in the Japanese Navy and as used by me in preparing Exhibits 916 and 3003-B showing combatant vessels of Japan as of the dates specified means, in the case of new vessels, that the keels had been laid, and in the case of converted vessels, that the conversion had been commenced on or before the specified dates, that is to say, that reconstruction or re-equipment had commenced.

2. The term "Delivered" as used in the Japanese Navy, and as used by me in preparing Exhibits 913, 917 and 918 and related documents showing combatant ships in the Japanese Navy as of the dates specified therein, means that such vessel had been completed and had been delivered by the builder to the Navy Minister through the Captain of the vessel.

3. The term "On Hand" as used in the Japanese Navy and as used by me in preparing Court Exhibits 913, 916, 917, 918, 3003-A and 3003-B and related documents showing ships in the Japanese Navy as of the dates specified, means that such ships had been completed, and delivered and entered in the Naval Registry, and were generally ready for operational service in the Japanese Navy on or before the dates specified. In practically all cases, ships "On Hand" on 7 Dec 1941 had already been commissioned.

4. The term "Commissioned" as used in the Japanese Navy and as used by me in preparing Exhibits 913, 917, 918 and related documents means that the ship having been entered in the Naval Registry had been placed by order of the Navy Minister under the command of the responsible commander of a fleet or of a comparable service unit. The term "Commissioned" means in the case of battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines that the vessel had been completed, delivered, registered and made ready for operational service, equipped as required with guns, ammunition, planes and operating personnel. On and after the date of commissioning such ship became an operating unit of the Fleet or of a comparable service unit subject to the continuing training of personnel of the ships and planes and to routine tests and repairs. After 7 December 1941, Delivery and Commissioning usually occurred on the same date.

5. Under the term "Miscellaneous" are included all ships listed in the Naval Registry, with the exception of capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese Navy's category "Miscellaneous" consisted of the following types of ships: Sea-plane tenders, submarine tenders, mine layers, mine sweepers, coast defense ships, torpedo boats, gun boats, sub-chasers, patrol
boats, cable layers, and special service ships, namely, training ships, cargo ships, Navy tankers, ice breakers, target ships, repair ships, and provision ships.

6. Although I did not have accurate knowledge of the technical meaning of the terms, "On Hand", "Under Construction", "Commissioned", "Delivered" and "Miscellaneous" as used in the United States Navy, I considered that as a Japanese Naval Officer my understanding of the terms was adequate to enable me to prepare the above mentioned exhibits.

Signed before me at Tokyo, Japan, on this 26 day of September 1947.

/s/ S. Takano
S. TAKANO

/s/ Hidemi Yoshida
HIDEMI YOSHIDA
Member Research Div., 2d Demobilization Bureau
宣誓

一九四八年一月七日、於東京

宣誓

吉田英三

公證

同日於東京

立會人

大尉

White

署名

署名

署名

署名
AFFIDAVIT

I, Albert B. Ray, Production Analyst in charge of the Ships Statistics Section of the Bureau of Ships of the United States Navy Department, Washington, D.C., being duly sworn according to law, do depose and say:

That I prepared three (3) tables showing the relation of certain features between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Imperial Navy as of 7 December 1941. One such table, entitled "Comparative Table of Novel Vessels on Hand Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of 7 December 1941" and marked "Table A", is attached hereto and made a part hereof. A second such table, entitled "Comparative Table of Naval Vessels (On Hand in Fleets in the Pacific Area) Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of 7 December 1941" and marked "Table B", is attached hereto and made a part hereof. The third such table, entitled "Comparative Table of Naval Vessels Under Construction Between the U.S.A. and Japan, as of 7 December 1941" and marked "Table C", is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

Said tables were prepared for the purpose of reconciling, within the meaning of the definitions given by Hideni YOSHIDA in the statement signed by him in Tokyo, Japan, on 26 September 1947, information contained in my two statements dated 23 January 1947 and 3 April 1947 and admitted in evidence as Court Exhibits #3001 and #3002, respectively.

/s/ Albert B. Ray
ALBERT B. RAY

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of December 1947, in the city of Washington, District of Columbia.

/s/ Herbert H. Hart
HERBERT H. HART
Commander, USNR

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
(Albert B. Bay)
I, Herbert M. Hart, Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, 56135, being first duly sworn according to law do depose and say:

That I am on active duty with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

That I am Liaison Officer between the National War Crimes Office, Washington, D.C., and the various bureaus of the Navy Department, including the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Naval Operations, the latter of which includes the Office of Naval Intelligence. In my official capacity as such Liaison Officer I was requested by the International Prosecution Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, to examine certain documents heretofore admitted in evidence in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, as well as other documents hereinafter mentioned, and to obtain from the U.S. Navy official information regarding matters mentioned in all such documents. In compliance with said request, I consulted with various officials of the U.S. Navy Department and worked with Mr. Albert B. Ray, Production Analyst in Charge of the Ships Statistics Section of the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., in the preparation of certain documents referred to herein below Table A, Table B and Table C.

In my official capacity I examined two documents, previously prepared by the said Mr. Ray, one of which documents, dated 23 January 1947, was introduced as Defense Document No. 1596 and admitted in evidence as Court Exhibit #3001. The other document, dated 3 April 1947, was introduced as Defense Document No. 1597 and admitted in evidence as Court Exhibit #3002. I am thoroughly familiar with the definitions of the terms used by the United States Navy and referred to in said Exhibits 3001 and 3002.

I examined also the document introduced as Defense Document #1572, admitted in evidence as Exhibit #3003-A, entitled "Comparative Table of Naval Vessels On Hand Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of December 7, 1941". I also
examined the document introduced as Defense Document #1573, admitted in evidence as Exhibit #3003-B, entitled "Comparative Table of Vessels Under Construction Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of December 7, 1941". I examined also the affidavit of Hidemi YOSHIDA, dated 15 August 1947, introduced as Defense Document #2085, and admitted in evidence as Exhibit #3003. I examined also the Transcript of the Record, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, pages 26,610 to 26,650, dated 22 and 25 August 1947.

Further, I examined the certificates on the Exhibits #3003-A and #3003-B, signed by Hidemi YOSHIDA, dated 1 May 1947, in each of which certificate the following statement is made: "The data of the U.S. vessels and tonnage were taken from certified records of the U.S. Navy Department in Washington, D.C., I further certify the above chart is true and accurate."

Mr. YOSHIDA further infers, in Exhibit 3003 and in testimony before this Tribunal (page 26,616) that the U.S. Navy data referred to in the foregoing certificates as used by him in preparing Exhibits 3003-A and 3003-B was taken from "a copy of an official document of the United States Navy Department pertaining to the vessels of the United States Navy...

Mr. YOSHIDA does not identify the "certified records of the U.S. Navy Department" nor the "official document of the United States Navy Department", respectively, which he mentions. However, because of the similarity of some figures, it is possible that he referred to Court Exhibit #3001 and #3002, respectively. Mr. YOSHIDA also has prepared a certificate showing the meanings of technical terms as used by him in presenting the U.S. Navy data in Exhibits 3003-A and 3003-B. This certificate, dated 26 September 1947, is attached hereto.

The certificates of Mr. YOSHIDA as attached to his "Comparative Tables", Exhibits 3003-A and 3003-B, are not accurate in stating that he is presenting records of the U.S. Navy Department, because he presents the U.S. Navy data under headings and classifications which are shown by the exhibits and by his statements to be different from the headings and classifications of the U.S. Navy data, as used and furnished in said Exhibits 3001 and 3002.

The terms used by Mr. YOSHIDA with a meaning different from the meaning in which those terms were used by Mr. Ray include the following: "On Hand", "Under Construction" and "Miscellaneous". The definitions of those terms, as used by the United States Navy Department and as used by Mr. Ray, in preparing Exhibits 3001 and 3002 are as follows:
ON HAND: "Vessels "On Hand" were considered those vessels accepted by the Navy as complete from the building or conversion yard but not lost, sold, destroyed, etc., or otherwise disposed of. This included some vessels which had not been fitted out or reported for Fleet duty. Also included were District and Service Crafting not intended for Fleet duty."

UNDER CONSTRUCTION: "Vessels "Under Construction" were considered those vessels for which the Navy Department had placed a formal contract or made obligations concerning construction or procurement but which vessels had not been accepted by the Navy Department. This includes vessels under contract not yet delivered to the Navy as well as vessels on which negotiations had been completed and contract or award was under preparation. Vessels are usually accepted by the Navy after completion of basic construction or conversion and installation of Government furnished material (machinery and ordnance) but before outfitting and reporting for Fleet duty. Also included were District and Service Crafting not intended for Fleet duty."

MISCELLANEOUS: "Miscellaneous vessels included all craft not classified as combatant ships or as small boats."

The definitions of those same terms, as used by the Japanese Navy, as stated in the certificate of Captain YOSHIDA, dated 26 September 1947, are:

ON HAND: "Means that such ships had been completed, delivered and entered in the Naval Registry, and were generally ready for operational service in the Japanese Navy on or before the dates specified. In practically all cases ships "ON HAND" on 7 December 1941 had already been commissioned.

UNDER CONSTRUCTION: "Means, in the case of new vessels, that the keels had been laid, and in the case of converted vessels, that the conversion had been commenced on or before the specified dates. That is to say, that reconstruction or re-equipping had commenced."

MISCELLANEOUS: "Included all ships listed in the Naval Registry, with the exception of capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese Navy's category "MISCELLANEOUS" consisted of the following types of ships: Sea-plane tenders, submarine tenders, mine layers, mine sweepers, coast defense ships, torpedo boats, gun boats, subchasers, patrol boats, cable layers, and special service ships, namely, training ships, cargo ships, Navy tankers, ice breakers, target ships, repair ships, and provision ships."
Exhibits 3001 and 3002 showed the status of the ships of the U.S. Navy as of 7 December 1941 under the U.S. Navy Department definitions as given above.

Additional tables, marked "Table A", "Table B" and "Table C", respectively certified to by the said Mr. Albert B. Ray, under date of 11 December 1941, show the status of the ships of the U.S. Navy as of 7 December 1941, under the Japanese Navy definitions. These said tables, "A", "B", and "C", also make a graphic comparison between the two navies, that of the United States and that of Japan, using the Japanese Navy definitions throughout. It will be noted that these said tables used the terms, definitions and classifications as stated by Mr. YOSHIDA and applied them to the U.S. Navy Department figures as prepared by the U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence.

In said Table A, entitled "Comparative Table of Naval Vessels (On Hand) Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of 7 December 1941", Japanese totals were merely copied by Mr. Ray without change from Exhibit 3003-A. The U.S. totals, however, were changed by him as required when using the term "On Hand" with the same meaning as that used by Mr. YOSHIDA in his determination of the Japanese totals. The resulting changes are as follows:

1. Battleships, changed from 17 to 15 because 2 battleships which had been included in the totals in Exhibits 3001 and 3002, as "Completed" and "Commissioned" under the U.S. Navy practice, were not yet "Ready for Operational Service" on 7 December 1941, and they had not yet been assigned to any U.S. Fleet as an "operating unit" thereof.

2. Aircraft carriers, changed from 8 to 6, because only 6 U.S. carriers were "On Hand" in the same sense as the Japanese carriers were classed "On Hand", namely "Completed" and "Commissioned", "ready for operational service, equipped as required with guns, ammunition, planes and operating personnel... as an operating unit of the Fleet". (Quotations from YOSHIDA's certificate dated 26 September 1947, paragraphs 3 and 4). On 7 December 1941, the U.S. had only 6 carriers so completed and equipped and assigned to fleets. Those carriers were RANGER, YORKTOWN and W/SP in the Atlantic Fleet, and SARATOGA, LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE in the Pacific Fleet. Navy Document #99, from ONI Records, copy attached, states these totals and also points out that CV HORNET, although commissioned on 20 October 1941, did not have her air group embarked until 23 December 1941, (the day after the Japanese CV SHOHO was "Commissioned" (Exhibit 918) in the Japanese meaning of that term, namely, "ready for operational service, equipped as required with guns, ammunition, planes and operating personnel").
(Quotation from YOSHIDA's certificate, paragraph 4). The same Navy document states that the CVE LONG ISLAND was in commission "but is not classed as a combat carrier". Actually she was not a combat carrier but "was used throughout the war for transporting planes. Her air complement consisted of 6 VF's and 10 VS0s". For the foregoing reasons the CV HORNET and CVE LONG ISLAND are not included in said Table A but are included in Table C. Briefly, neither CV HORNET nor CVE LONG ISLAND had been, using the terms from YOSHIDA's certificate, "equipped as required with . . . planes and operating personnel" as combat carriers on or before 7 December 1941.

(3) The figures for heavy and light cruisers did not change.

(4) The figures for destroyers and submarines of the U.S. Navy were reduced where required by application of the same meaning as that used by Mr. YOSHIDA in his determination of the Japanese totals.

(5) "Miscellaneous" types of Japanese vessels were copied without change from YOSHIDA's table, Exhibit 3003-A. The term "Miscellaneous" as defined by YOSHIDA in his attached certificate, dated 26 September 1947, was applied to U.S. Naval vessels thereby changing the figures as indicated. Mr. YOSHIDA lists 17 types of Japanese ships falling into this category. Mr. Ray entered the totals for the U.S. ships of those types. It is observed that the Japanese Navy does not include under the term "Miscellaneous" any hospital ships, transports, district craft and other types which were included by Mr. Ray in Exhibit 3002 under the heading "Miscellaneous", which he used in a general, non-technical sense.

In said Table B, entitled "Comparative Table of Naval Vessels (On Hand) in Fleets in Pacific Area Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of 7 December 1941", the Japanese totals were merely copied by Mr. Ray without change from Exhibit 3003-A. The U.S. totals, however, have been computed by Mr. Ray from official U.S. Naval records of ships of the Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet, as prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence and from tonnage records in Mr. Ray's office in the Bureau of Ships, and applying the term "On Hand" in the same sense as that used by Mr. YOSHIDA in determining the Japanese totals.

In said Table C, entitled "Comparative Table of Naval Vessels Under Construction Between the U.S.A. and Japan as of 7 December 1941", the Japanese totals were merely copied by Mr. Ray without change from Exhibit 3003-B. The United States totals, however, were changed by him as required to conform to
U.S. Naval records hereinbefore referred to and the meaning of the term "Under Construction" used by Mr. YOSHIDA in determining the Japanese totals. The term "Under Construction" had been used by Mr. Yoskida in Exhibits 3001 and 3002 to cover the period from the date of the contract of the vessel to the date of its delivery. The term, according to Mr. YOSHIDA, was used by him in Exhibit 3003-B to cover the period from the date of laying the keel of a new vessel or the commencement of conversion i.e., "reconstruction or re-equipment" of a converted vessel until the vessel "had been completed and had been delivered by the builder to the Navy Minister through the Captain of the vessel".

In further reference to said Table C: Applying the Japanese use of the term "Under Construction" to the United States vessels, the following changes resulted:

(1) Battleships; (no change) total 10, the number for which the keel had been laid before 7 December 1941 and which had not been "ready for operational service" before that date.

(2) Aircraft Carriers; total 10, the number (new or not converted) for which the keel had been laid before 7 December 1941, but which had not been "ready for operational service" before that date, namely: CV HORNET, ESSEX, YORKTOWN INTREPID, LEXINGTON, BUNKER HILL, INDEPENDENCE, PRINCETON, BELLEAU WOOD, and COWPENS.

(3) The figure for large cruisers, heavy cruisers and light cruisers were reduced from 3, 8 and 31, respectively, as given in Exhibits 3001, 3002 and 3003-B to 0, 4 and 18, respectively, in said Table C as required by application of the same meaning as that used by Mr. YOSHIDA in his determination of the Japanese totals.

(4) The figures for destroyers and submarines were also reduced from 206 and 96, respectively, as given in Exhibits 3001, 3002 and 3003-B, to 88 and 38, respectively, in said Table C as required by application of the same meaning as that used by Mr. YOSHIDA in his determination of the Japanese totals.

/s/ Herbert M. Hart
HERBERT M. HART

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of December 1947, at Washington, D.C.

Commander, USN /s/ Joseph O. Collins
UNITED STATES FLEET: CARRIERS AND AIR COMPLMENTS AS OF 7 DECEMBER 1941

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I. ATLANTIC FLEET

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<td>CV Ranger (Norfolk, Va.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV Yorktown (Atlantic Coast)</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV Saratoga (Atlantic Coast)</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL, ATLANTIC FLEET</strong></td>
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<td>90</td>
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II. PACIFIC FLEET

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<td>CV Saratoga (West Coast)</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV Lexington (West of Pearl Harbor)</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>CV Enterprise (West of Pearl Harbor)</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL, PACIFIC FLEET</strong></td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>9</td>
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**TOTAL, ATLANTIC and PACIFIC FLEETS**

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<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>19</td>
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*Notes:*
1) CV HORNET (Norfolk, Va.) was commissioned on 20 October 1941. Her air group which had the same composition as that of CV YORKTOWN, however, was not embarked until 23 December.

2) CVE Long Island (Atlantic Coast) was in commission, but is not classed as a combat carrier. She was used throughout the war for transporting planes. Her air complement consisted of 6 VF and 10 VSO.
余下アメリカ合衆国偽造海軍中佐認識番号等

ワシントン市

宣誓書

余下アメリカ合衆国偽造海軍中佐認識番号等

余下ハコーグビ地已ワシンントン國家戦犯部ト艦船局及び
海軍作戦局ハ海軍省海軍法務局

連絡将校ト余下ハコーグビ地已ハ東京海軍省海軍作戦局
ハ日本東京連合軍最高指揮官総司令部

審査書及右右ハ書類記載ヲ監視ヲ委任スル為共同書類

余下ハコーグビ地已ハ東京海軍省海軍法務局

艦船局及び結果照会書類

余下ハコーグビ地已ハ東京海軍省海軍作戦局
九四年至三月七日ニハフートソ合及極人進む六隻ヲ
格之ヲ完結タルノヲ増加タルノヲ配給タルノヲ航空母艦
ヲハレヌハノヲサハノヲスヲitian
艦隊コトナキ(ROMAN)ヲスガ(WSAP)ヲ及合軍
航空母艦ハノル(WSAP)ニハ九四年至三月十
日ンハ就役スルモハ両号ハニハ九四年至三月
日ハ日本ハノ空
母艦艦隊ヨリ日本ハノ航空母艦ヲ携へテ合軍
戦闘ヲ行へルノヲ必ツキタモノヲハレハノヲスヲ
搭載シテ
名トノ指揮ヲ与

（原文）
图解说明：

（图示内容）

图解1：

（图示内容）

图解2：

（图示内容）
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Fleet (with dates)</td>
<td>Naval Base (with dates)</td>
<td>Return Date of Combat Action (Place &amp; dates)</td>
<td>Location on order 10 Aug 1942, or subsequent</td>
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<td><strong>Hiryu</strong></td>
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<td>2 Dec 1941</td>
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<td>27 Mar 1942</td>
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**Operational History of Japanese Aircraft Carriers**

1. Name in Composite
2. Fleet (with dates)
3. Naval Base (with dates)
4. Return Date of Combat Action (Place & dates)
5. Location on order 10 Aug 1942, or subsequent

**Note:** The table provides a historical overview of the operational history of Japanese aircraft carriers, detailing their fleet and naval base assignments, return dates of combat actions, and their location on order 10 August 1942 or subsequent orders. This information is crucial for understanding the strategic and operational context of World War II in the Pacific region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>14 July 1944</td>
<td>Event 3</td>
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<td>15 July 1944</td>
<td>Event 4</td>
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**Table:**

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<td>Data 13</td>
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*Note: The table is incomplete and contains placeholders.*
I, Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U.S. Navy, 58949, being now on active duty as Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Net Depot and Net Training School, Tiburon, California, and being first duly sworn according to law, do depose and say:

That I have been in the United States naval service continually since 10 June 1920. I graduated from the United States Naval Academy on 4 June 1924, was commissioned in the rank of Ensign in the United States Navy on 5 June 1924, and after that date had the usual duty assignments of a naval officer.

On 28 September 1929 I was attached to the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, as a student of Japanese language. From 8 October 1929 to February 1933 I was assistant Naval Attache, U.S. Legation, Peking, China. From 28 April 1929 to 17 May 1933 and from 30 June 1936 to 16 February 1937 I was an Intelligence Officer at the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. From 5 April 1937 to 17 March 1939 I was Assistant Naval Attache, U.S. Embassy at Tokyo.

From 28 April 1939 to 8 October 1940 I was Commanding Officer of the USS BORG with the rank of Lieutenant Commander. On 7 December 1940 I was assigned to duty as Fleet Intelligence Officer in the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and served in that post through the early part of the war and up until 13 March 1942 when I became Combat Intelligence Officer on the same Staff. While on these assignments I was promoted to Commander then to my present rank of Captain, U.S. Navy. I remained as Combat Intelligence Officer until 25 February 1946 after which I was assigned to my present station and have completed more than five years and four months as the top Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

During my tour as Fleet Intelligence Officer, my duties as set forth in the staff Instructions assigned to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, the United States Pacific Fleet, under date of July 11, 1941, which were in effect the day of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, were as follows:

A. Provides operation officer and war plans officer with information essential for current estimates; prepares monograph material.

B. Provides operation officer and war plans officer with information essential for current estimates; prepares monograph material.
C. Maintains section 2 sub-paragraph A, B, C, D, E, F and G of the estimate of situation, enemy forces; maintains location plot of fleets of possible enemy or Allies.

D. Directs counter-espionage and counter-information.

E. Maintains intelligence records. (See the Naval Intelligence Manual.)

F. Prepares Fleet intelligence bulletins.

G. Evaluates intelligence information received of procedures of processes of other navies, and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within our own Fleet.

H. In charge of censorship.

I. Internal security of ships.

J. Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

The same instructions specified that the Assistant Intelligence Officer, in addition to assisting me generally in intelligence duties, would perform the following duties:

A. Maintains merchant marine plot and analyses.

B. Prepare silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to the fleet.

C. Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of enemy information.

D. Maintenance of current estimates of situation enemy forces and location of plots of fleets of possible enemies or allies.

Information came to me from the Chief of Naval Operations subdivision of Naval Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit and at infrequent intervals from various sources, confidential and otherwise, on the islands concerned, from merchant ships, our own ships, air reconnaissance and other communication intelligence, such as, Cavite and OPNAV. I assembled, analyzed, evaluated and correlated all information at hand, new and old, prepared and distributed tables, sketches, maps and other desired records.

In the further performance of such duties I prepared various letters and bulletins which were published by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Such publications frequently included tables, maps or other necessary relative material, all of which was prepared by me from official information I had received in my capacity as intelligence officer. Two of such documents were; (1) Secret letter Cincope File No. Serial 06977, dated August 7, 1941, regarding organization of Orange Fleet and Orange activities in the Mandate Islands, and (2) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin #45-41, dated 27 November 1941, with respective enclosures mentioned in each. References to such documents in this affidavit refer to them as Document No. 1 or Document No. 2 respectively. A certified photostatic copy of each such document is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
Another document, referred to herein as "Document No. 3", is declassified portions of Commander Task Force EIGHT (Admire W. F. and USN) SECRET letter AL-3 (006), dated 9 February 1942 to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, regarding action in the Marshall Islands February 1942. A certified photostatic copy of such document is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

I have examined the testimony of IJ. Saki, Asashichi as recorded in the Transcript of the Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, on pages 26, 522 to 26, 527, both inclusive, dated 21 August 1947, and the testimony of Yoshida, Hidemi as recorded in said Transcript of the Record on pages 26, 467 to 26, 488, both inclusive, dated 21 August 1947.

On pages 26, 485 & 26, 486 of the transcript Captain Yoshida distinguished between a "konkyochi" and "kichi". He admitted these air bases were there (pages 26, 472 and 26, 473). To my knowledge, almost every Japanese base throughout the war, except the very major ones, were called "kichi".

Moreover, page 323 of the Japanese-English Dictionary of Sea Terms by Lt. Comdr. C. Ozaki, published by the "Suikoza* (Japanese Naval Officers' Club) of Tokyo shows the Japanese word "Kichi" defined as "base", and gives 10 examples of detailed use of the word "Kichi" with various kinds of bases such as "submarine base", "naval base", "repairing base", "base commander", "base of operations", etc. On page 368 of said dictionary, "Konkyochi" is also defined as a "base", and given thereunder are eleven examples of the use of this word, such as "submarine base", "naval base", "repairing base", "fleet base", "base-hospital", etc.

Both Japanese words, "Konkyochi" and "Kichi" are used interchangeable with the English word "base".

A reference to the same author's English-Japanese Dictionary of Sea Terms, published by the same semi-official organ, shows on page 58 the English word "base" to be represented by the Japanese words "Kichi" or "konkyochi", and gives thereunder four examples where either, or both, "Konkyochi" or "Kichi" are used for "advance bases", "aviation bases", "naval bases", and operating bases". It is to be remarked that these are the English and Japanese equivalents, as defined by the author, a Japanese regular naval officer, then on active duty. Though he does not so state directly, Captain Yoshida does intimate that the U. S. Navy used an expression "available Spot" to apply in some way to a kind of base. The U. S. Navy has never used the term "available spot" for "base", whether temporary, advanced or permanent base. The spots where landing fields were marked in Table A of Document No. 2 are for all practical purposes correct, except the one reported on Enybor (which report came from a foreign source and has since been proven wrong) and Kapingamarangi (Greenwich Island), which were seaplane bases. Table A shows military aircraft of the Naval Air Corps were operating from Natte, Ruotto (Roi) and Imieji. The reported air unit at Enybor was in
error for Imieji. Captain Yoshida gave us the Japanese Navy's conception of the word "fortification" (page 26,886, line 12). Table A of Document No. 2, Document No. 3 and photographs (Exhibits No. 1253-A and No. 1253-B) establish that their so-called "kichi" on the mandated islands actually:

(1) Had armament and fixed defensive facilities with which they could resist and defend themselves from an enemy attack from land, sea and air.

(2) Were defended by Naval land forces.

By applying the Japanese definition, as given by Captain Yoshida himself, those "kichi" were definitely fortifications. Wherever Table A shows an air base, it is a Japanese Naval air base which Captain Yoshida is careful to state (page 26,470) is an air base developed purely for commercial purposes, such as the "observing of fish and rescuing mariners".

Captain Yoshida contradicts himself when he describes installations on the mandated as purely cultural and admits the existence of the air fields which check the aforementioned Table A very nicely. He, by his statement on page 26,472, confirms that the air field was started on Wotje in 1940, as the prosecution contended and offered Court Exhibit No. 1253-C in proof. That exhibit, in addition to showing an air field, shows also projected an actual military installations which the "Halsey task force" (Document No. 3), found to be actual. Further, the photographs, Exhibits No. 1253-A and No. 1253-B checked actual locations of military installations with aforementioned Exhibit No. 1253-C. Those photographs were taken only 53 days after the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. That time, only 53 days, was insufficient for the Japanese to have built those installations after December 7, 1941 and had them in full working order on 31 January 1942, which was the date of the Halsey task force attack (Document No 3). Iwaski states that the exhibit was for planning purposes only (page 26,525). The installations were actually there.

Documents No. 1 and No. 2 show that Wotje, Roi ("Rootto"), and Taroa were fortified well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Document No. 3 confirmed the fact that those three islands were well fortified with coastal defense guns, anti-aircraft guns, storage houses and other facilities that, by the Japanese definition, constitute a naval base.

Pages 12, 13 and 16 of Document No. 1, show there were "Jaluit Detached Force", "Wotje Detached Force", "Taroa Detached Force", and "Pohnape Detached Force". These are carried as detachments of the Sixth Defense Force which (a) was a regularly constituted Japanese shore based naval defense organization, (b) was equipped with its table of organization of troops, arms and munitions, and (c) had the job of menning the coastal defense and AA gun batteries. That the mission of the Sixth Defense Force was not entirely defensive is shown by the fact that a part of the Sixth Defense Force took part in the Japanese assault and occupation of Wake
Island after the outbreak of hostilities. (The Second Company of the Special Naval Lending Force which made the assault was composed from the Sixth Defense Force and commanded by Takano). It is to be noted that on most of the principal islands there was a branch office of the Fourth Supply Detachment and a branch office of the Fourth Military Stores (munitions) Department. The first of these was a technical naval supply sub-station. The second corresponds to U. S. ordnance supply sub-station charged with handling stores of ammunition, weapons, bombs, torpedoes, etc. Further, on these islands were detachments of the Fourth Civil Engineers, engineers from Yokosuka Navy Yard and engineers from the Kure Navy Yard. These engineers were normally civilian technicians under direction of naval officers, utilized in building certain advance base work and are paid from naval funds. I emphasize that their's was a military, not civilian, function. Table A of Document No. 2 (page 738) lists in tabular form more up-to-date (November 27, 1941) intelligence on Japanese installations in the mandated islands and is a condensation of information referred to above. It will be noted that ordnance specialist, were stationed and assigned to various of the mandated islands. Their job was to supervise the ordnance installations, anti-aircraft and coastal defense guns; storage for bombs, ammunition and torpedoes, and the installation of pill-boxes, etc.

Documents No. 1 and No. 2 show that the first Japanese move to bring large amounts of naval personnel, naval material, naval engineers and ordnance experts to the Marshalls was actually observed in mid-December 1940. Yoshida denies their existence (page 26,474) until a decision made in November 1941 (page 26,477). There is not the slightest shadow of a doubt that our intelligence indicating the movement in 1940 is correct and that Yoshida suffers a year's lapse of memory. From information I had at hand at the time, I am positive that "the organization of construction, procurement of necessary materials, allotments of ships, etc. took place" (page 26,477) not on November 5, 1941, as he says, but probably November 5, 1940, as we picked up the indications of such a movement in December 1940.

On page 26,476, Captain Yoshida admits landing of guns and, in fact, leaving some of them on some of the mandated islands for "weathering tests". Captain Yoshida by his own admission of knowledge in these matters should know that their installation in permanent positions (and they were so installed) would have required a matter of many months of construction, labor, etc., and the counter-battery gun fire these batteries threw at the USS NORTH HAMPTON and SALT LAKE CITY off Wotje on 31 January 1942 represented approximately 5,000 to 6,000 meter range (page 26,476). Certainly the court cannot believe these were "obsolete guns".

Mr. Yoshida may be correct in his statement that fuel oil (page 27,478) for the fleet was to be taken from tankers, but he also admits that they had commenced construction of a considerable amount of oil storage tanks which were for ultimate military purposes. Oil storage on Wotje was not
commercial storage; it was naval construction for the navy, as no commercial liners of Japan or any other nation made scheduled stops at Noto. Hence the installations could not be for commercial but were for military uses. There were military or "ordnance stores" (Document No. 1 and No. 2) on these islands. Hence, I cannot believe his contention that ammunition, bombs, aviation fuel, etc., were to be entirely drawn from ships, (page 26478) nor can I believe his statements regarding "supply dumps".

His assertion of a shortage of ordnance material by the Japanese is the rankest of "window dressing". It is my firm belief that no nation would start a war believing they were short of ordnance materials; and the Japanese did commence a war on 7 December 1941. Captain Yoshida admits that his statement regarding the absence of an air field on Noto (page 26485) is hearsay. Further, it is contradicted (page 26472) by his own admission that one runway was started there in 1940.

/S/ EDWIN T. LYTTON

EDWIN T. LYTTON

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of November 1947 at Tiburon, California.

R. R. Hodge

/S/ Lieutenant, US Navy
Reference Letter CINCPAC, File 069W,
Dated August 7, 1941
Reference Letter CINCPAC, File 069W,
Dated August 7, 1941
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:

Copy of Cinopac Secret ltr, dated 7 August 1941, Serial 069W,
Subject: Organization of ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE Activities in the
Mandated Islands, and copy of Enclosure (A) thereto.

are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the
official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific
Ocean Areas.

/s/ R. E. Keeton
R. E. KEETON
By direction of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas

SEAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
From: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force.
    Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
    Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
    Commander Minesweepers, Battle Force.
    Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.
    Commander Battleships, Battle Force.
    Commander Battleship Divisions One and Two.
    Commander Carrier Division One.
    Commander Destroyer Flotilla One.
    Commander Scouting Force.
    Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.
    Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.
    Commander Cruiser Divisions Three, Five and Six.
    Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.
    Commander Base Force.
    Commander Patrol Wing Two.
    Commanding General, Second Marine Division.
    Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Organization of ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE Activities in the Mandated Islands.


Enclosure: (A) Information on subject matters as of August 4, 1941.

1. Information furnished herewith is the best available, but by virtue of its very nature is subject to omissions and other inaccuracies.

2. This letter supersedes reference (a), which together with its enclosure is to be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

H. E. KIMMEL.

/s/ P. C. Crosley
P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary.

Classification of this correspondence changed to Unclassified
authority 351. Sec. No. 15373 P 32
date 14 Nov. 1947
For many years Japan has effectively prevented observation of activities in the MANDATED ISLANDS. However, it is known that as a result of extensive hydrographic and meteorological surveys, considerable expansion and improvements have been completed in harbor development, "commercial" air facilities, communications and meteorological establishments in the principal islands (JALUIT, PONAPE, KUSAIE, TRUK, PALAO, and SAIPAN). Since late in 1940, ORANGE Naval and Air Operations in this area have increased and some forty to forty-five naval auxiliaries (cargo, transport, supply, and tankers ... ex-merchant marine) now make continuous shuttle trips to the MANDATES with personnel, material, equipment and supplies. (Places marked # below have been destination for these vessels.) The "Material Installations" are listed below to bring up to date the information reported in ONI—19, "Extracts from the Japanese Monograph 1939", pages 121.01 to 121.24 inclusive.

MARSHALL ISLANDS

JALUIT # (Installations on JARBO'IR IS., MIEJI IS. (EMIDJ IS.), and ENYBOR IS.)

(JARBO'IR IS.)

Naval Radio Station.
High Frequency R.D.F.
Meteorological Station.
Naval Inspector Jaluit.
6th Defense Force Headquarters ("Jaluit Detached Force").
6th Defense Division (Base Force) Headquarters.
Bases and trunnions for 6" guns are mounted along the Marine Parade (probably 3).
A battery of 4.7 inch field pieces
Several mobile (pneumatic tired trucks) Searchlights, 10 inch (projector) diameter, 1500 candle power.
Machine guns and A.A. guns. Latter mounted on trailers, towed by Diesel tractors.
Barracks for garrison of 500 men (1940).
Estimate 1000 Army troops arrived in February, 1941.
Lookout towers.
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Gasoline and oil tanks above ground (camouflaged) - 1 mile south of JARBO'IR on roof formerly called "American Town".

ENCLOSURE (A)

Classification of this correspondence changed to Unclassified authority SER. No. 15573 P 32 date 11 Nov. 1947
MEMORANDUM

(A) ORANGE Naval Organization - Fleets.

(B) Material Installations in Mandates.

(C) Probable Forces, Naval and others, in Mandates.

(D) Summary of Activities in Mandates.

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(A) ORANGE NAVAL ORGANIZATION - FLEETS.

The above organization is believed to be quite accurate but attention is invited to the fact that ORANGE may (and probably will) regroup Fleets or units of Fleets into special Task Forces (or now Fleets) for special operations or to meet given conditions; for example, when ORANGE wanted to make a show of force in connection with its benevolent mediation in the THAILAND - FRENCH INDO-CHINA Dispute during the latter part of January 1941, a special reinforcement unit was sent from the FIRST and SECOND Fleets to the SOUTH CHINA FLEET. This unit consisted of CRUDP1 7 (4 CA), DESRON 1 (1 CL - 16 DD), CARDIV 2 (2 CV - 1 DESRON), 1 AV and 1 or more XAV. The THIRD FLEET was actually organized in April 1941, but did not operate as such until the political situation permitted the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Base question to be forced in June - July, 1941. It is of interest to note that the reinforcement of the SOUTH CHINA FLEET in January was a "Rehearsal Run" for the organization of the THIRD FLEET. Although the submarines were organized and operated in a separate Fleet (6th), they have also been split to operate with the 1st and 2nd Fleets as well. The inclusion of the 3 COMBINED AIR FORCES into the 6th FLEET substantiates past reports of Joint Maneuvers of Submarines and Air Force with stress on their cooperation in Fleet Problems and Exercises.
JALUIT
(ENYBOR IS.)

Coal Briquette Stowage.
Deep water wharf and smaller jetties.
Branch Office 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
Branch Office 4th Supply Department.
#3 Branch Military Post Office.
Two landing fields each with hanger capable of handling medium sized planes; adjacent buildings camouflaged. (Jaluit based fighters and/or carrier planes.)
Mitsubishi Machine Shop situated between two air fields.
Power plant (Diesel) for shop and airfields.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force.

JALUIT
(IMIEJI IS., (EMIDJ IS.))

Naval Radio Station.
Seaplane base at East Point (reference to IMIEJI BASE).
Air Corps here.
Civil Engineering Section.
Ordnance Officer(s) attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force.

NOTJE #

Naval radio station.
Meteorological station.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("NOTJE Detached Force").
Fortified (reported).
Lookout towers.
Landing Field (completed 1937 - ONI 49). (Air Corps here; June 1941).
Civil Engineer Section.
Ordnance Officers attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Detachment from Yokosuka Navy Yard.
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.
"Oil tanks".
Deep water wharf.
Branch Office - 4th Supply Department.
Branch 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

ENCLOSURE (A)  Classification of this correspondence changed to Unclassified
authority SER. No. 15373 P 32
date 14 Nov. 1947
MALOELAP # - (TAROA IS.)

Naval radio station.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("TAROA Detached Force").
"TAROA BASE".
Lookout towers.
Landing field under construction (1940).
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
"Storage Plant".
Sanitary Corps in charge of Medical Officer.

KWAIJELIN # (establishments on both KWAIJELIN and RUOTTO (ROI IS.))

Naval Radio Stations (on KWAIJELIN and RUOTTO). 
"RUOTTO BASE". Air activity - June 1941.
Detachments of 6th Defence Force (on KWAIJELIN and RUOTTO).
Shore Batteries of 6th Defence Force on KWAIJELIN.
Shore Batteries of 6th Defence Force on RUOTTO.
Civil Engineering Section (RUOTTO).
Ordinance Officers attached (four or more).
Detachments of 4th Civil Engineers (KWAIJELIN and RUOTTO).
Detachments from YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers (KWAIJELIN and RUOTTO).

ENIWETOK #

Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("ENIWETOK Detached Force").
Fortified (reported).
1935 - "Building in progress - submarine base".
Landing Field here (?) .
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers. (One also on MERIRIN IS. (PARRY IS.))
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.

POKAKAKU (TAONGI IS.)

Naval Radio Station.

BIXINI

Fortifications?
Earmarked for CRANGE Base?

ENCLOSURES (4) Classification of this correspondence changed to Unclassified authority BRR. NO. 18373 F 32 date 14 Nov. 1947
RONGSLAP #
Naval Radio Station.
"Earmarked for ORANGE Base".
Actually used by ORANGE during maneuvers in past.

RONGERIK
Naval Radio Station (reported).

UTIRIK
Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.
Naval personnel reported here.

NOTTO
Naval Radio Station (reported).

MJAB
Naval Radio Station.

KIJURO (Used by Von Spee in 1914)
Naval Radio (?)
Naval personnel here.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

EBON #
Naval Radio (?)
Naval personnel reported here.
"BASE" --(?)

MILLE
Naval Radio Station.
Naval personnel reported here.
ORANGE considers MILLE extremely important.

CAROLINES

ENCLOSURE (A)

Classification of this correspondence changed to UNCLASSIFIED
authority
date 17 Nov. 1947
UJELANG

Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.

KUSAIE

Naval Radio Station.
R.D.F. (reported).
Meteorological Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
Submarine Base (?) (reported).
Fortified (at least two gun emplacements reported).
Lookout towers (day and night sentry watch).
Land Plane field (reported).
Seaplane operating base (reported).
Mine and torpedo storage (reported).
At least two Ordnance officers connected with work underway at KUSAIE.

PINGELAP

Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

SALAMAN

Used by ORANGE SS in 1932.

MORTLOCK

Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

PONAPE

Naval Radio Station.
R.D.F. reported.
Meteorological Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force ("PONAPE Detached Force").
Army troops reported arrived here in February, 1941 - estimated
1000 divided between PONAPE and TRUK.
Fortified.
"Air Field 3/4 mile South of the town . . . another base
reported on tip of JOKAJ Island.

ENCLOSURE (A)

Classification of this correspondence
changed to Unclassified
authority S.G. No. 15378 P 32
date 11 Nov. 1947
PONAPE #

Seaplane Facilities . . . . "Air Base".
11th Air Corps.
Mine and Torpedo Storage (reported).
Civil Engineering Section.
At least two ordnance officers attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers. (Active on LANGAR IS.).
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.
Oil storage (reported).
Branch Office, Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
Branch Office, 4th Supply Department
4th Branch Military Post Office.

TRUK #

Naval Radio Station.
R.D.F. reported.
Meteorological Station.
Headquarters 4th Defence Force.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force ("TRUK Detached Force").
"#70 BASE" (probably Air Base).
Army troops arrived here February, 1941 - estimated, 1000
divided between TRUK and PONAPE.
Fortified.
Air Corps arrived TRUK (June 1941).

Naval Radio Station.

Mandate Headquarters 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Civil Engineer Section.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Detachment from Kuro Navy Yard.
Oil storage (reported).
Mandate Headquarters 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Dept.
Branch Office
Mandate Headquarters 4th Supply Dept.
Branch Office
Mandate Headquarters of Military Post Offices.

PULUAT # (POLOOT) (ENDERBY)

Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
Naval Radio Station, Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

LAMOTREK # (SÆDE)

Naval Radio, Detachment of 4th Defence Force. (Naval) "AIR B. SE".

NOLELI #

Naval Radio Station
Reported earmarked for Seaplane base.

ULITHI #

Naval Radio Station
Advance Fleet anchorage.

FAIS

"Commercial" Radio Station (JPF).

SCOROL

Naval Radio Station
"Landing field in operation" reported.

YIP #

Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.
Naval personnel reported here.
Reported fortified.
Land plane field near GAGIL (reported).
Has been extensively used as seaplane operating base.
Ex-YOKOHAMA Air Corps (?).
Civil Engineering Section.
Branch of 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

ENCLOSURE (A)

Classification of this correspondence changed to Unclassified
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PALAO # (includes PALAO - PELELIU - etc.).

Naval Radio Stations (at least three).
H.F. -- R.D.F.
Combined Radio and Signal Section.
Meteorological Station.
Headquarters 3rd Defence Division (Base Force).
Headquarters 3rd Defence Force.
Detachment of 3rd Defence Force.
Resident Naval Officer (Mandate Naval Headquarters).
Estimated 5000 Army troops arrived PALAO in February, 1941.
Army resident officers - liaison with Navy.
Observation tower or Battery Control station and artillery
emplacements under construction on west side of BABELTHUAP
Island (several 6" guns unloaded from transports).
All lighthouses believed used as Observation Posts or Battery
Control stations. Batteries believed emplaced near each lighthouse.
"Aircraft Detecting Device mounted on high hill at East end of
KOROR Island.
Ammunition Storage to South of high hill on KOROR Island.
Barracks and Battery emplacements on PELELIU Island.
Barracks on West end of KOROR Island and at Southeast corner of
BABELTHUAP Island.
Seaplane facilities and Landing Field on ARAKABESAN Island.
Seaplane facilities and Landing Field on PELELIU Island.
Naval Base on PELELIU Island.
"Fighting Plane Wing - PELELIU",
4th Air Corps . . . . 16th Seaplane Squadron.
4th Aircraft Technical Section.
Ex-CHITOSE Air Corps. (The 4th Air Corps?)
Mine and Torpedo storages (reported).
Civil Engineer Section.
At least four Ordnance Officers attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.
Branch 4th Military Stores (Munitions)-Department.
Branch of 4th Supply Department.
Oil storage ("considerable") on S.W. side of MALAKAL Island.
Advance Fleet Anchorage at KOSSEL Passage.
Submarine Base (?) reported under construction on NGAJUNGLIIs.
Branch Hydrographic Office.
#2 Branch Military Post Office.

ENCLOSED (A)

Classification of this correspondence changed to Unclassified
authority SER. No. 16373 P 32
date 14 Nov. 1947
HELEN REEF #

Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.
"Helen Reef Seaplane Base".
Construction activity observed.

TOBI # (LORD NORTH)

Naval Radio.
Five oil tanks observed.

GREENWICH # (KAPINGAMARANGI)

Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

BONIN ISLAND (OGASAWARA GROUP) (not in MANDATES)

CHICHIGAMA #

Naval Radio Station.
HF - R.D.F. Station.
Army Garrison.
Fortified.
Naval Air Station (seaplane operating base).
Mine Storage (reported).
Civil Engineer Section.

MARCUS ISLAND # (MINAMITIRISHIMA) (not in MANDATES)

Naval Radio Station
R.D.F. Station (?).
Meteorological Station.
"Marcus Island Detached Force".
"Marcus Island Base".
Land plane field (?) \(\ldots\) (f)

MARIANAS ISLANDS.

URACAS

Land plane field (?) (reported)

ENCLOSURE (A)

Classification of this correspondence changed to ________________________
authority ________________________
date ________________________
MAPG

Seaplane (?) and Submarine Base (?) (reported).
Has been used for seaplane and submarine operations.
Fortified (reported).
Oil Storage (reported).

PAGAN #

Naval Radio Station.
A temporary air field here has been used by carrier planes.
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.

SAIPAN #

Naval Radio Station.
H.F. - R.D.F. Station.
Meteorological Station.
Fortified - heavy guns - AA guns - searchlights -- (reported).
Combined Lookout Stations and Shore Battery (control) Establishments,
(at GARAPAN, NA.PutAN, LAULAU, FINA SUSU, MANGAGAHA (Is.) and others).
Army marrison -- barracks -- storehouses,
Fifth Defence Division (Base Force) Headquarters.
Fifth Defence Force Headquarters.
Detachment of Fifth Defence Force.
Saipan Naval Air Station -- landplane field at ASLITO.
Seaplane facilities.
Fifth Air Corps (ex-KISARAZU Landplane Squadron(s) included ?).
Fifth Aircraft Technical Department.
Mine and Torpedo Storage (reported).
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.
Detachment from KURE Navy Yard.
Oil Storage reported.
Deep water wharf.
Branch of 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
SAIPAN SUPPLY DEPARTMENT.
Branch of 4th Supply Department.
#1 Branch Military Post Office.

ENCLOSURE (A)

Classification of this correspondence changed to Unclassified authority
S2L. No. 15573 P 32 date 21 Nov. 1947
TENIAN

Naval Radio Station.
"Combined Lookout and Shore Battery (control) Stations".
Fortified.
Detachment of 5th Defence Force.
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Ordinance Officer(s) attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.

ROTA

Naval Radio Station.
Fortified (reported).
Defence works underway (reported).
Submarine Base (?) (reported).

ENCLOSURE (A)

Classification of this correspondence changed to Unclassified
authority
date

STG. No. 15873 / 32
14 Nov. 1947
C. PROBABLE FORCES, NAVAL AND OTHERS IN MANDATES.

(a) PIURTH ("Mandate") FLEET. (See Section A).

(b) Naval Forces Ashore:

3rd Defence Force (Headquarters PALAU).
5th Defence Force (Headquarters SAIPAN).
Detachment of 5th Defence Force on TENIAN and probably other Island of MARIANAS (See Section B).
4th Defence Force (Headquarters TRUK).
Detachments of 4th Defence Force on outlying islands of Eastern and Central CAROLINES (See Section B).
6th Defence Force (Headquarters JALUIT).
Detachments of 6th Defence Force on outlying islands of MARSHALLS (See Section B).

(c) Army Forces Ashore:

On PALAU, SAIPAN, TRUK, PONAPE, JALUIT (See Section B).

(d) Navy Yard Detachments (labor and production (See Section B).
Civil Engineer Detachments (labor and production (See Section B).

(e) Naval Air Forces:

Considerable activity. Exact composition and numbers not definite. The following table is constructed as a result of an analysis of fragmentary reports of varying degrees of reliability... . . .

When present work on expansion and construction of land plane bases is completed it is believed CANG will use these for Type 96/97 twin engine land-planes, long range bombers and for fighters. These will be flown out to these bases in such numbers as to cope with a given situation.

ENCLOSURE (A)

Classification of this correspondence changed to UNCLASSIFIED
authority SER. No. 15373 p 32
date 14 Nov. 1947
D. ACTIVITIES IN PROGRESS IN THE MANDATES.

When BLUE held Fleet XXI, the ORANGE FOURTH FLEET took up stations in the Eastern Mandates and intensified its radio intercept activities in conjunction with ORANGE trans-Pacific naval tankers. In late August - early September, 1940, ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandated areas using the Air arm (carrier and shore-based planes) and Submarine Force to search for, locate, and attack a hypothetical enemy Force (represented by the FOURTH FLEET) advancing to the east from the vicinity of the Northern Gilberts. The general defense line seemed to be PONAPE - TRUK but details or conclusions of the exercises are not known. It may be significant that on the next Fleet reorganization, December, 1940, a separate SUBMARINE (SIXTH) FLEET was formed (See Section A).

ORANGE's decision to speed up the militarization was apparently reached concurrently with the signing of the Tri-Parte Pact, as movements of naval reserve auxiliaries (taken over from the Merchant Marine) to the Mandates became apparent thereafter. Since late in nineteen forty this movement of personnel, materials and supplies has progressively increased until in July, 1941, there were approximately forty to forty-five ships constantly engaged in round trips between ORANGE mainland and the Mandates. An analysis shows about sixty-five percent of this shipping is destined for the Eastern CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

Considerable air activity has been in evidence at SAIPAN, PALAU, TRUK, PONAPE and in the JALUIT area. Foreign steamers nearing these areas have been subjected to aircraft observations and close scrutiny by patrol planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy Jap'd plane bombers have made reconnaissance flights over the GILBERT ISLANDS (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU).

DISCUSSION OF SHORE ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

During the early months of 1941, evidence has shown that an Administrative Organization has been set up for control and expansion of the military developments of the Mandates. This Mandate Organization is taking the line parallel to but separate from the parent organization, YOKOSUKA Administration chain, previously in control. While PALAO has always been the MANDATE Administrative center (and may continue to be) the focus of SUPPLY, CIVIL ENGINEERING AND MUNITIONS Administration in the Mandates is now centered at TRUK.

ENCLOSURE (A)
An increase in the number of CIVIL ENGINEER Detachments on the various Islands has been very noticeable and while some are distinctly Detachments of the YOKOSUKA Civil Engineering Section, others are separately and distinctly Detachments of the FOURTH Civil Engineering Section which almost invariably has detachments on the same islands as the YOKOSUKA Branch Detachments. The Headquarters of the FOURTH CIVIL ENGINEERS was formed at KURE in November 1940 and moved to YOKOSUKA the latter part of January 1941; and thence to the Mandates about 20 February. Accompanying it were the 4th MILITARY STORES (MUNITIONS) and 4th SUPPLY ADMINISTRATION which also have branch offices on the principal islands of the MANDATES.

The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th DEFENCE DIVISIONS (BASE FORCES) have a Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remains ashore at a home base regardless of the movements of the Command or of the Flagship. Each DEFENCE DIVISION contains a DEFENCE FORCE which in the case of the 4th and 6th is divided into DETACHED FORCES on the islands in the vicinity of the Command's Headquarters. Close cooperation has been noted between the DEFENCE FORCES and the Aircraft activities at their home bases.

The 3rd DEFENCE DIVISION has four submarines attached, possibly old boats of the "Ro" type. It may be ORANGE intention to similarly organize the other DEFENCE DIVISION.

During late May 1941 ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandates in connection with the dispatch of a part of the COMBINED AIR FORCES to that area (indoctrinal training?). The RYUJ? (and possibly the HIRYU) and about half of the SUBMARINE FLEET also took part in this exercise. It is believed that the FOURTH FLEET acted as an "Enemy Fleet" attempting to penetrate into the MARSHALLS, with the AIR FORCES plus the SUBMARINE FLEET attempting to intercept them. It was reported that the ORANGE strategic high frequency Direction Finder net was active in this phase, funneling information to the AIR AND SUBMARINE FORCES on a common chain via SAIPAN and there is some evidence that these Forces were under a unified command. After visits at N. TJE, NWAJELIN, AND JALUIT the additional forces returned to their normal operating units at the end of June.

ENCLOSURE (A)
Annex No. 2 to
IPS Document # 3345
(Layton Affidavit)

Reference Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin #45-41,
dated November 27, 1941
This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:

Copy of Cincpac Confidential ltr. file 83/PP1/(25), Serial 0954, dated 27 November 1941, Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, and Enclosure (A) thereto.

are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

/s/ R. E. Keeton

R. E. KEETON

By direction of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

(SEAL)

Department of the Navy
Commander in Chief
U.S. Pacific Fleet
FROM: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
TO: PACIFIC FLEET
SUBJECT: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41
Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.

2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE
AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HERElN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPO-
RANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY
PRESERVED.

3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence
sources has been reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this
document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to
the Division of Naval Intelligence.

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin
should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent
additions or corrections) during the present National Emergency.

/s/ P.C. Crosley
P.C. Crosley
By Direction.

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Atlantic Fleet Al;
"Asia"ic Fleet Al;
One copy each to:
FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,
NB49, Reo & Smo. Lab.

Classification of this
correspondence changed to
Unclassified
authority Ser. No. 15373F32
date 14 November 1947
Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41

(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941 (1057)

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below.

The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full wartime footing.

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

NAGATO, Flagship
(FIRST FLEET)

(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS.

1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently administers the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrison units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating base.
2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defence Forces ("special LANDING FORCES" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK, and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.

3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the TriPartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd vessels.

4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ - YOKOSUKA) Naval District.

5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a designated Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENCE FORCE, detachments of which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE.

6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases.
Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU).

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands is indicated in Table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in Table "A", there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Includes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airron 24</td>
<td>Marshall Area</td>
<td>(AV) KAIHOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AV')...Maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ex-CHITOSE Air Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ex-YOKOHAMA Air Grp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Air Group</td>
<td>PALAO Area</td>
<td>ex-CHITOSE Air Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Air Group</td>
<td>PALAO Area</td>
<td>ex-YOKOHAMA Air Grp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Air Group</td>
<td>TRUK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Air Group</td>
<td>SAIPAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Air Group</td>
<td>IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Station (and Air Group?)</td>
<td>WOTJE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Station (and Air Group?)</td>
<td>KWAJALEIN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR GROUP</td>
<td>TRUK</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of total strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62 - 26? planes.

Last page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
ANNEX No. 3 to
IPS DOCUMENT NO. 3345
(Layton Affidavit)

Reference Admiral Halsey's report on the Action in the Marshall Islands (WOTJE and others) on 1 February 1942.
From: Commander Task Force EIGHT
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Subject: Action in the Marshall Islands, 1 Feb. 1942

Reference:
(a) U. S. Navy Regulations, Article 712,
(b) My Secret Serial 004 of Jan. 28, 1942,
   Operation Order No. 1-42.
(c) My Secret Serial 003 of Jan. 28, 1942,
   to Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN.
(d) Cincoac dispatch of January 1942

Enclosure: (A) CO ENTERPRISE report of action on 1 February 1942, with enclosures thereto.

1. The plan of operation embraced in reference (b) was followed without deviation. The approach to the enemy area was "without incident other than the radar tracking of an enemy scout a short distance to the southward of the track of Task Force EIGHT on the afternoon of 31 January (12). This is shown on the track chart, part of enclosure (A).

2. The enclosures provide detailed narratives of the action of the ENTERPRISE Air Group and squadron in the objective areas. Information contained herein on the results of the bombardments of Task Groups 9.1 and 83 is based on preliminary dispatch reports only; more detailed information will be forwarded as soon as received. Enclosure (A) gives an account of the bombing attacks on the ENTERPRISE on the afternoon of 1 February. It is hoped that information can be obtained from vessels in company with the ENTERPRISE at the time which will more accurately define the location of impacts and the size and number of bombs dropped. If this hope materializes this information will likewise be forwarded as soon as obtained.

(b) Shore installations destroyed or damaged:

(1) WOTJE: The entire installation was apparently destroyed. This includes 2 hangars, fuel oil tanks, gasoline storage, warehouses, shops and barracks. Two A.A. batteries and all coastal defense guns were silenced or abandoned.

(2) TAROA: Two hangars destroyed, several buildings hit and afire in industrial area; both
Annex #3 to
108 Doc. 3345

Fuel tanks were devastated. The radio station on Oilet Island destroyed.

(3) ROI: Two hangars destroyed. Ammunition dump blown up and fuel fire left burning. Radio building demolished. All stores and warehouses demolished by explosion resulting from bombing. Fire in town on island east of ROI.

(4) KWAJALEIN: Large compound received three direct hits.

(5) GWGEWE: Four buildings destroyed.

c) Enemy planes destroyed.

(1) ROI: 3 VF (shot down)
6 ESB (destroyed on ground)
1 twin-engined bomber (destroyed on ground)

(2) KWAJALEIN: 2 F6F (4-engined) destroyed on water.

(3) WOTJE: None.

(4) TAROA: 7 VF (shot down)
5 2-engined bombers (on ground)
1 twin-engined bomber (destroyed on ground)
1 VF damaged in air
5 VF (destroyed on ground)

(5) At sea: 3 twin-engined bombers (shot down)
1 twin-float single engine monoplane (shot down).

d) The above totals include 11 vessels and 35 planes confirmed losses. In addition it is considered that between four and seven ships suffered damage of indeterminate degree, at least two of which (WOTJE) were in a sinking condition, and an indeterminate number of planes destroyed or damaged in the hangars and dispersed parks adjacent to the fields at ROI and TAROA.

20. Miscellaneous notes on enemy

(a) Both ROI and TAROA had complete air bases of recent construction. WOTJE also had a new installation. Pilots report TAROA base better equipped than FORD ISLAND.

(b) A. A. batteries present on ROI, KWAJALEIN, TAROA, WOTJE, and OILLET. Guns of 3", .50 and .30 caliber.

(c) KWAJALEIN apparently used as submarine base.

(d) A. A. fire of umbrella type - apparently not well-controlled.
Annex #3 to IPS Doc. 1345

(e) Enemy VE of Type 96 or 97 with possibility of "CC" being present.

(f) High degree of maneuverability of enemy VF and good climb but not as fast as F4F's.

(g) Twin-engined bombers; tactics of bombing and VF attack described elsewhere.

(h) Apparent reluctance of VF to engage VSB

21. It is my carefully considered opinion that the enemy has been struck an extremely heavy blow in the Mandated Area. The action embraced, to the best of my knowledge, the first instance in history of offensive combat by U.S. carriers. The performance of the ENTERPRISE justifies the highest hopes heretofore held regarding the effectiveness of these vessels when properly employed. This action, likewise, was the first offensive operation by Task Forces of the Pacific Fleet in the current war. The results must speak for themselves. I am proud and grateful for the high privilege of having commanded Task Force EIGHT in these operations.

W. F. HALSEY
The text on the page appears to be in Chinese. It seems to be discussing various topics, possibly related to literature or philosophy, given the context. However, without a clear understanding of the language, it's challenging to provide a precise translation or summary. The page contains multiple paragraphs with dense text, suggesting an in-depth discussion.
Exhibit No.

E. E. KESTON

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1.13 S. Dec. 110. 33454-45-41
海軍無線電信所\n
陸軍無線電信所

第四種工作合議隊

緊急命令三木工作合議隊

第五種工作合議隊

霎電化中心

附\n
入り物: A

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JPS doc. No. 3345 - Annex 1
### 3.24

JPS Inc. No. 3345 - Annex 1

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那啥，这个页面的文本内容无法清晰地读取。其中的字符和符号看起来有些混乱，可能由于扫描不清晰或内容本身复杂所致。如果需要更准确的文本内容，建议使用更清晰的扫描版本或提供更清晰的文本描述。
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p3

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備考：
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Exhibit No.

JPS Dec. No. 3355 - Annex L.

Exhibit No.

Exhibit No.
国家“双一流”学科

9.8.8 DoC No.345-Annex 3
[Text content is not legible due to handwriting quality.]
三高戦争終了。スレッジホッパーを遮断し、整合。三高戦争の{/*iska*/}
被害を受けたものを模作。}

保高戦争機を高角度操縦技術を差し入れ、
二戦の戦争技術を目指す。}

他三記載なし。

敵戦車機がスレッジホッパー底部を接触し、
爆発発生。技術上の課題を攻撃せよ。}

敵戦車機がスレッジホッパー底部を接触し、
爆発発生。技術上の課題を攻撃せよ。}

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United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC)
Member Governments, other National Authorities and
Military Tribunals
Box 412, 413 and 414

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents
of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (Tokyo Trials).
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3525 - 3840

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