Title and Nature: Excerpts from Speeches in Bound Volume, "Proceedings of Seventh Biennial Conference of W.F.E."

Date: 1937 Language: English
Translation in full? No Excerpt? Yes - Eng & Jap
Type of Analysis: Full routine

PERSONS IMPlicated: None

INCIDENT, PHASE OR ROLE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Education: Preparing Japanese Opinion for War

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

This book contains speeches by noted delegates and proceedings at the Seventh Biennial Conference of the World Federation of Education Associations, held in Tokyo, Japan, 2 Aug - 7 Aug of 1937.

Excerpts introduced were expressions of praise for the Japanese people from other nations' delegates, on the one hand, and hope for cooperation and good will among all peoples, from the Japanese on the other.

Remainder of volume similar, containing typical convention addresses, none applicable to the defendants or relevant as testimony.

analyst: E.T.G. RDEN

Analysis No. 1
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

ANALYSIS NO 2

DEFENSE DOC NO 148

(St... 2354 p. 18164)

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION of Document

Title and Nature: Minutes of the Budget Committee Meeting, House of Representatives, 76th Session of the Diet (shorthand record) No 7

Date: 28 Jan 1941 Language: Japanese

Translation in full? Excerpt: Yes

PERSONS TITLIC.ED: KONOYE, HIRAKAWA

INCIDENT, PHASE, OR CR.IE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparing Public Opinion for War; Nationalistic Societies and Organizations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Committee member HIRAKAWA said that he would like to know more about the Diet Bureau of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association because its existence would arouse the suspicion of the nation if it discusses laws and budget beforehand. It also would make the Imperial Diet unnecessary.

Defense excerpt (p. 160) brought out reluctance of HIRAKAWA to admit that it was a political association; but he maintained it as a public association. These further excerpts reveal that Diet members did not share this opinion and feared the association would muzzle and make the Diet. They also feared its connection with certain nationalistic organizations. He added that the Imperial Diet is an essential organ based on the Imperial Constitution, thus the laws and budget should be discussed there and not elsewhere. To this, KONOYE replied that the inner organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association would be studied as to its improvements after the Diet session is over. (p. 160)
Committee member HIRAJIN inquiry as to the type of association the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is and whether it is subject to the Public Peace Police Law or not. Home Minister HIRAJIN replied that it is subject to the said law as a public association but that he has no intention of supervising it as a political association under the same law. (p. 161, also used by the Defense as Defense Document 148)

Committee member TSUGU.IO gave specific instances where the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association have gone unrestricted by the police authorities. He charged that they are openly attacking the officials in the government. He also charged that the members of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association are propagandizing about the internal conditions of Japan in a bad light to foreign and enemy countries. He charged that some are lecturing a foreign policy that is directly opposite that of the government. He requested something be done about it but there was no reply. (p. 171)

Committee member TSUGU.IO took up the issue again and said, "It is most regrettable that an opinion contrary to government policy is being given in Japan under the nose of the police bureau because of the reason that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association which supposed to be in unison with the government has hitherto been an association which is not a political association and therefore not subject to thorough control." (p. 191)

Committee member ISHIZUKA (Yutaka) said that the Greater Japan Patriotic Society (D.I NIKUTEN NENSHI) has a close connection with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. He cited an example where there was a pamphlet disseminated by the Greater Japan Patriotic Society stating that only the police authorities and the Greater Japan Patriotic Society can nominate candidates for the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. In primitive villages, it is believed that these two are the same, he stated. (p. 195) (T.N. This is an organization founded and run by KENDO, Kingoro and followers. See also Anti-Doc 2987)

Committee member IGUMITSU expressed relief at fact that according to HIRAJIN, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is subject to the Public Peace Police Law. He asked if HIRAJIN was of the same opinion as HIRAJIN.
KONOYI said yes. He further stated that unless it is subject to the Imperial Constitution and other laws, it would not be in union with the government. He pressed the charge that it is a political association and requested clarification from HIM. He was interrupted by committee member SII&L who terminated further discussion from him. (pp 201-202)

Committee member ISII (Yutaka) charged that the people are not permitted to criticize the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. The Diet is the only place one can do that, he said. (p. 208)
DESCRIPTION of Document

Title and Nature: Minutes of the Budget Committee Meeting, House of Representatives, 76th Session of the Diet (shorthand record)

Date: Feb. 1941
Language: Japanese
Translation in full ( ) Excerpt: (x)

PERSONS IMPlicated: TOJO, IJUTO, HIRANUMA, KONOE

INCIDENT, P.L.62, O: CALL TO MEET 1: DOCUMENT...Preparation Public Opinion for War; Ultra-Nationalistic Societies.

SUMMARY OF RELLEANT POINTS:

Defense excerpt gave statement by KONOE that IRA...was an organization designed to enable the whole nation to participate in the government, and to communicate the government's will to the people.

Subsequent questioning by committee members is covered below, as well as two speeches pledging support to the Association by Generals IJUTO and TOJO.

Committee member KOIZU charged that at the time of the inauguration of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association War Minister TOJO said that as a result of the conference with the Navy, "The army will give positive support to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association as before, and with fiery spirit and sincere effort, it will contribute toward the speedy accomplishment of its mission." Also IJUTO, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and Counsel for the Imperial Rule Assistance Association said, "In the past, the army and the Navy have given great support to the development of this organization (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) and I wish to inform you that we intend to give our fullest support in the future also." (p. 256)
In answer to post queries made in regard to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Premier KOROYL. made a statement saying that it is a body organized for the purpose of mutual cooperation between the government and the people. (p. 260-261. Also used by the Defense as Defense Doc. 179)

Committee member S:TO requested information on:

(1) Laws and by-laws of the programs of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association

(2) Detailed report for year 1940 on the finances and businesses of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association

(3) Detailed report on the budget and business of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association for the year 1941 (p. 264)

Committee member N:K.D. complained about the Imperial Rule Assistance Association advocating compulsory farm duties for school children from age of 8 or 9. He said the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is going too far. (p. 281)

Committee member H:SU: called HIR:SU: 's attention to the constant violation by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association of its character as a public association. HIR:SU: stated that if such a thing is done, the government would exercise strict control. H:SU: also charged that the avowed objectives of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association are essentially political anyway. (pp. 462-463)

Committee member ICHIL:T:O charged the government with calling constitutional what is truly unconstitutional. He charged that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association is unconstitutional; that the said organization is avowedly political when it shouldn't be; that it has a political organization and bureau in its set-up which functions to set up by itself the policy of the nation. (p.467)
DEFENSE Document Series ... 13 Mar 1947

DESERIBN OF Document

Title and Nature: Book, "My Twenty-five Years in China", by J.B. Powell

Date: 1945 Language: English

PERSONS INVOLVED: DOIIHit, Kenji; CH'NG, Tso-Lin;

INCIDENT, P.L.S. or C. in the same volume:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Defense Document excerpts from this volume have been and are being presented during various phases. In the paragraphs following, an attempt is made to relate certain excerpts with conflicting or additional evidence from the same volume.

Many other excerpts in the book are marked, but may or may not be introduced.

Doc. No. 202-D-1 - Defense excerpt (p. 73) is related to the "Open Door" Policy and other powers' concessions.

Dr. Soo-Ko, Alfred SZ., Chinese Ambassador, is quoted as saying, on differences between Japanese and Germans, and why China had made no objections to Germany in Shan-Tung, that the Japanese were destructive while the Germans were constructive.

The Japanese did not adhere to the original treaty.
but went beyond it, overrunning the entire province. (SH.-N-TUNG), and introduced the dope trade into a widespread area."


"But, (p. 327) Powell says Fessenden outfitted Japanese when they tried to stuff the ballot boxes in the elections, and when they did gain control, their reign "had all the earmarks of a marauding expedition."

Vice of all kinds, especially gambling and narcotic dens, were established on the borders of the International Settlement in an area supervised by the Japanese "Imperial Service Section" of the kwa. (pp. 328 - 330) They created a "Shanghai Supervised Service Department."

Doc. Nos. 202-L-1, F-1, and E-2 are either complete chapters or there is nothing relevant in the surrounding material.

Doc. No. 202-L-2 - This excerpt discusses a proposed pact between China, Russia, and the United States to block Japan in the Pacific. (pp. 193 - 195) However, on the following pages (197 - 201) Powell reveals Japanese military activities in Manchuria which inspired such suggestions. Japanese gendarmes also inspired kidnappings of certain Russians, in one case arresting Chinese judges who had sentenced some of these kidnappers. Critical journals were banned (in Harbin). DOI-X was mentioned in connection with his negotiations with Chinese General M., who attempted to buy M. holding out for a post as Minister of War in the puppet L.-CHUKI.-N. government. The terms were all set and M. accepted payment from the Japanese of a million dollars in gold bullion, then again defied the Japanese. They attacked a force of his troops, and then were tricked into believing they had killed General M. DOI-X participated in ceremonies celebrating M.'s death. Discovery that M. and his army were still intact led to DOI-X's transfer to the Japanese Air Force, Powell states.
Doc. No. 202-0-1 through 0-4 cover Chapter 24 almost completely, cutting out only the following:

P. 257: Notes that Japan had secretly been exceeding naval building quotas and had fortified islands.

P. 259: Reveals that Japan and Germany pressing for China to sign a pact (about Dec. 1936) providing for employment of Japanese advisers to the Chinese Government, suppression of all anti-Japanese activities in China, and revision of Chinese textbooks, and for Japanese control over political and military affairs in North China.


Host interesting additional information: In Chapter 18, "Real Start of World War II", in which Powell gives his story of the Sep. 18, 1931 Incident at NUKDOLN, the following is charged:

That in spite of a Foreign Office proviso not to bomb CHINGCHO, young army officers carried it out.

That while the Japanese showed correspondents bodies of three Chinese near the tracks where they had allegedly set the explosion, there were no bloodstains on the ground indicating their bodies had been planted.

That an express train passed over the spot of the supposed explosion twenty minutes after the Japanese had said it occurred.

That NUKDOLN had been overrun for several days prior to 18 Sep. by large groups of Japanese "tourists" wearing civilian clothes; trains carrying Japanese troops in uniform had already crossed the Korean border into Manchuria several hours before the NUKDOLN Incident occurred; and that concealed batteries had been built in a Japanese compound, trained on the NUKDOLN arsenal, all pointing to a carefully prearranged plan to occupy strategic points in NUKDOLN and other parts of Manchuria. Powell himself saw the guns.
P.N.Y Incident (and the L.O.Y.E.A.W Incident) are also covered (p. 305 - 319) (excerpts include 202-1 to U-A) and it is brought out that the Japanese were clearly informed of the position of the P.N.Y by maps as a standard procedure. H.S.H.I.070 is described as being responsible for the attack a deliberate one. (pp. 317 - 319) (Note: These particular excerpts have not yet been introduced by the Defence, and may not be).
DEFENSE Document Series .. 14 Mar. 1947

 ANALYSIS NO. 5

DEFENSE DOC. NO. 410

 ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Printed pamphlet, "Brief History of the Japan Communist Party" Dictated by IC.KY., Shoichi

Date: 20 Oct. 1946 Language: Japanese

Excerpt (x) Translation in full ( )

Faction Reproduced by DEF

PERSON'S IMPlicated: ------

INCIDENT, PPL., or CALLS TO HIGH DOCUMENT ...PLIC.BIL:

Relations with USSR; Ultra-Nationalistic Movements, Preparations for War

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Defense excerpts gave outline history of Japanese Communist party and particularly tried to emphasize its connection with the Comintern. No material directly bearing on the subject or contradicting his statements can be found in the volume. The remainder of the volume consists of penetrating but unsupported charges against the aggressive and imperialistic nature of Japanese foreign policy. Few examples:

Pp. 20 - 21: Already Japanese imperialists ...d been perpetrating a robbery war against C.I.S. for several years. Not only that, but a World War II across the Pacific! Japanese imperialists are destined to play a leading part in it. Already they have a world-scale, more destructive, and cruel war for World Imperialism on the actual agenda of the Japanese Army, Navy and other Imperialists.

Pp. 27 - 28: As the result of the London Conference Japan is said to have saved 500,000,000 yen, but 374,000,000 out
of that suit is to be used in Naval Repletion program. All the peace propaganda cannot deny the fact that J.P.N.'s preparations for Imperialistic war is progressing every moment, and that any moment might light the train which will cause instant explosion.

Pp. 149 - 150 The so-called TIA-N Incident was capital of by the Japanese bourgeoisie for aggression against CHIN... The then T.N.K. Cabinet had already spent 40,000,000 yen for military interference in CHIN., and sent to CHIN. and exposed to gunfire thousands of Japanese soldiers. On top of that, they dared to resort to such an audacious imperialistic policy as to use freely an additional sum of 130,000,000 yen out of the "reserve" for aggression against CHIN.. Such aggression against CHIN. on J.P.N.'s part aggravated, on the other hand, friction with the U.S. It that time the U.S. openly protested declaring that the American government did not recognize the so-called special interests of J.P.N. in CHIN. and VICOL., and that J.P.N.'s sending troops to CHIN. was illegal. The Japanese government naturally expected American protest, and was determined to stand fast on its contention and fight with U.S. on the CHIN. theater............ At that time the TOKYO ...m. employed 650 extra hands, and began manufacture of weapons hastily. J.P.N. Iron Works in FUKUOK. hastily began to manufacture torpedo tubes, and N.K.I.L. Airplane Manufacturing Factory, t... Internal Combustion Engine Factory in N.C.O.L., and N.. Shipping Yard suddenly began to build 500 army planes. These few examples may give a general idea of J.P.N.'s war preparations.
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DEFW Document Series A

ANALYSIS No. 6

DEF Doc. No. 268

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Pamphlet, "Youth and Culture" (SHUKU TO SHUKU) by ARAKI, Baron Sadao

Date: Aug 1937

Language: Japanese

Transcription in full? Excerpt? (x)

PERSONS IMPlicated: ARAKI, Sadao

EXPLICATlON OR CALL TO ACTION: DOCUMENT REPLICA: Relations with USSR; Preparing Public Opinion for War

SUMMARY OF RELIABLE POINTS:

Defense excerpts comprised roughly half the book; the theme ARAKI stresses is the need for young men inside and outside the army to cultivate character, spurn luxury, inspire morality, and live spiritually pure lives. There is little emphasis on militarism anywhere in the pamphlet, except to point out proper conduct in military life. An advertisement on the back cover plugs another ARAKI book, called "Why Is War Unavoidable?" This advance notice hints that Russia is feared most in this connection.

Chapters in "Youth and Culture" not processed by Defense included the following, none of which contained any usable passages:

Chapter II - Go Forward Toward an Ideal
Chapter V - Youth and Vigor
Chapter VI - Instructions given by General NOGI

Analyst: L. HERSCHLER

Analysis No. 6
The excerpts, taken from speeches and reports made at the Washington Disarmament Conference, refer to Japan's position and attitude in justifying the maintenance of troops in China, Japanese police in Manchuria and the treaty ports of China, the aims of Japan in Siberia, and her interpretation of the "Twenty-One Demands" of the Sino-Japanese Treaty and Notes of 1915. A study of the remaining parts of the original meeting notes from which the excerpts are taken does not reveal any basic change in her arguments. There is no specific contradiction in the remaining material which is in direct conflict with the excerpts but China's answer to Dr. Manheima's argument re Japan's stationing of troops in China on p. 1014 is an example of the kind of argument China used during the Conference in answering Japan's legal arguments for self-protection of Japanese nationals in China. Japan's attitude during the conference was consistent in its use of any aggressive aims in the Far East and in maintaining that Japanese troops in China and Japan's holding of leased territory and the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur were within her legal rights, either by treaty or for reasons of self-defense.
DEF. DOC. NO. 598 (3) Ct. Exh. No. 2361 (page---)

DESPICABLE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Book entitled Government in Japan by Charles B. Fans

Date: 1940 Language: English

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)


INCIDENT, PHASE OR CHI LE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Japanese Constitution, Written and Customary; Preparation for War, Economic

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

The Defense excerpt taken from the book is a discussion of the legislative and executive branches of the Japanese government. The Diet is discussed from the standpoint of its support of the civil service in Japan. The army and navy organizations are discussed and compared to the civil services, although it is admitted that their political influence has increased since from 1930 to 1940 and that their record shows participation by active or reserve officers in assassinations against important statements. The author concludes that "in general, the power of the administrative branch of the government has increased while that of the legislature has decreased, but this is a universal phenomenon."

From a cursory appraisal of the entire book and detailed reading of the chapter on "Political and Administrative Reorganization", there does not appear to be any conflict of the excerpt processed with the generally pro-Japanese attitude of the book. The author emphasizes that his study is aimed
at discussing what the Japanese are trying to do and why and that Japan's trend toward government economic control is caused by her progress toward accomplishing a modern state.

The book is written in two parts: Expansion of Governmental Responsibilities, which includes chapters on: Foreign Trade, Economic Recovery, Overseas Development, National Defense, Social Welfare, and Finance; Part II, Political, and Administrative Reorganization includes chapters on: Administrative Problems, Legislative and Executive (from which the Defense Excerpt is taken), and Education, Information and Propaganda. Development and expansion of government responsibility and control over industry is analyzed and discussed quite completely from the end of World War I to 1940. Included in this section is the tracing and detailing of the high points in the evolution of "co-operation" between Japan and Manchukuo in economic matters from 1932-1939 (pp. 40-44). Of particular value for background study is the list of over 100 statutes passed by the government to insure increasing economic control, especially from 1932 to 1940. (pp. 111-114)
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DEFENSE DOCUMENTS

ANALYSIS No. 9 21 Mar. 1947
DEF Doc. No. 401

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: U.S. State Department Publication, Peace and War, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1931-1941

Date: 1931-1941 Language: English and Japanese

Translation in full? ( ) Excerpt only? (x)

PERSONS ELICITED: HIROT., Koki; YOSID., Shigeru; Ambassador S.ITO, (Japanese Ambassador to U.S.); IT., Hachiro; Ambassador (to U.S.) HUKINOBU; H., Hirobumi; KURUSU, Saburo

INCIDENT, PHASE 0: CRISIS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Preparations for War - Military, Economic; Economic aggression in China; Relations with U.S.; U.S. Military aggression, 1937-1945

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

The first Defense excerpt (401-12) refers to the emergence of the U.S. National Defense program, based on recommendations of their Chief of Staff, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, in his annual report of 1933 to the War Department appropriation act of April 1935 authorizing an increase of the army to 165,000 enlisted men, and to the 1934 Vinson Naval Bill authorizing the construction of ships up to the limits of the Washington and London Naval Treaties.

It is stated in the foreward of this publication that the text of the book is an "introduction to a collection of documents concerning the foreign relations of the U.S. during 1931-1941, especially the policies and acts of the U.S. toward promoting conditions of peace and world order and toward meeting the world-wide dangers resulting from Japanese, German and Italian aggression." The outline of
world events which forced the U.S. to a slow but progressively "proactive" foreign policy begins with the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, the U.S. subsequent refusal to recognize the puppet government in Manchuria and Secretary of State Hull's statement of agreement with the Lytton Commission which placed "major responsibility upon Japan for the international conflict in China."

Relations with Japan -- 1934 are reviewed from the standpoint of the imminent threat to American interests in the Pacific and to world peace. Japan's expansionist program in this period is surveyed and in ambassador Greer's appraisal of the situation in Japan. Japan's ultra-nationalistic societies are described as having the aim of "obtaining trade control and eventually pronounced political influence in China, the Indies, the Straits Settlements, Siam, and the Dutch East Indies. The "militarist" provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force." (p. 20) Further evidence of Japan's attitude toward expansion is the statement of Saburo Kurusu, then a member of the staff of the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, on 23 Dec. 1935, that "Japan was destined to be the leader of the Oriental civilization and would in course of time be the 'boss' of a group comprising China, India, the Netherlands East Indies, etc." (p. 36) Next, the background of events leading to the German-Japanese anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 is outlined and appraised.

The Japanese attack on China in 1937 is discussed as well as the American policy of self-restraint which was urged on the Japanese and Secretary of State Hull's Statement of Principles of U.S. international policy was sent to Japan, Germany, and all governments of the world (16 July 1937). From Jul. to Dec. 1937 the U.S. offer to mediate the sino-Japanese dispute was ignored by Japan. The U.S. attended the Brussels Conference to consider "peaceful means" for ending the conflict between China and Japan; Pres. Roosevelt delivered his "quarantine" address which hinted at a more active future U.S. foreign policy, and the Panay Incident occurred --- this succession of events is surveyed as major points in American-Japanese relations and as indicative of the trend of those relations.
Relations with Japan from 1938-1940 and the principles of U.S. policy which sought to protect U.S. nationals and to uphold peaceful conduct are discussed and analyzed completely, still from the standpoint of the effect the events in the Pacific were having on U.S. foreign policy and national defense. Measures taken by the U.S. at this time were "moral embargo" aimed at discouraging extension of credit by U.S. nationals to Japan, termination of the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan, and Secretary Hull's conversations with the Japanese ambassador in which the U.S. position of its support of "friendly international intercourse as against use of armed force" was applied to Japan. In the discussion in April 1940, concerning the status of the Netherlands Indies, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed "concern on the part of his Government for the maintenance of the status quo". Secretary Hull, in the course of these conversations, pointed out the difference between the U.S. Monroe Doctrine and the "New Doctrine" of Japan --- that the U.S. doctrine encompassed only "physical safety", while Japan's doctrine was "seemingly applicable to all other purposes and objectives, including economic, political, and social objectives." By Sept. 23, 1940 Japanese forces had penetrated into Indo China and the U.S. announced that the export of iron and scrap steel would be prohibited and a total embargo went into effect on 16 Oct. 1940.

The last phase of American-Japanese relations and the formulation of U.S. policy toward Japan are outlined in Chapter XIV, "Discussions with Japan 1941 --- Pearl Harbor" (pp. 113-143). It is seen from this fact that American foreign policy became more active and consistent in proportion to the U.S. increase in her national defense and in the U.S. public's realization of Japan's aims in Indo China. References were being made in Japan during the course of the diplomatic conversations to the "new order of Asia" with Japan as the leader and Japan's move into southern Indo China brought the U.S. Government to a freezing of Japanese assets in the U.S. The subsequent conversations of NOV. and KURUSU with Sec'y of State Hull revealed that Sec'y Hull was aware that "Japan may snap suddenly" and as progress in negotiations became increasingly unfavorable, on 29 Nov. 1941, Hull conferred with the British ambassador.
and the secretary said, "The diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the latter will now go to the officials of the army and the navy," Freo. Roosevelt's message to the Emperor of Japan on 8 Dec. is given and the account closes with a description of the negotiations in progress at the time of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

U.S. foreign policy in relation to the European conflict is also traced from 1935 to 1941, but is not included in the above summary. It should be noted that one of the major issues in the last stages of the negotiations between the U.S. and Japan centered around Japan's adherence to the Tri-Partite Pact; and therefore, any settlement of the Pacific area could not be found while Japan was underlining Hitler's objectives in Europe.

Analyst: E.T. Garden
The Defense excerpt from the above named document is from a report made to the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation by H. Foster Bain in May 1933. The report, the author admits, is a compilation of data "collected by others and only digested and interpreted" by H.

Information on mineral resources and facts of a geological nature regarding Manchuria are given and statements such as those listed below are examples of the kind of information found in the report.

1. "The plans of the Manchukuo government call for early increase in domestic consumption to 25,000,000 tons per year which will be roughly equivalent to adding 50,000,000 people to the population without calling for any additional food, clothing, housing, or other individual requirements." (The conclusion drawn further is that higher standards..."
of living will be the result in Manchuria.)

2. "The Japanese have added materially to the knowledge of all three (coal, coal) fields, in particular having extended the limits of the ruling field and developed practically a new field north and east of the old working which they call Itzusan."

Some conclusions drawn as to the reserves and utilization of principal mineral resources of Manchuria as of 1938 (date of report) are: (1) the country is especially well supplied in coal—large enough to support a "widespread and varied industrial development" for a long period; (2) iron ore is found in sufficient quantities for "immediate purposes" with the probability of additional reserves; (3) materials for making bricks, cement, refractories, brick, tile and structural materials "as a whole, are abundant"; (4) the magnesite resources are of world rank; (5) raw materials for chemical industries are present but there is a deficiency in sulphur; (6) non-ferrous metals are not present in any quantities—gold is present and "increasing production is to be anticipated."; (7) petroleum findings have been slight, but a domestic supply is possible.

In summary, this report attempts to show the value of Manchuria to Japan from an economic and productive standpoint.
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 11 24 March 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Published Article (Pamphlet form) of Theodore Roosevelt entitled "What the Japanese Stood for in the World War"

Date: 1918-1920 Language: English & Japanese

Translation in full? Excerpt? Yes

PERSONS CITED: None

INCIDENT, ALSO OR CABLE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with the US -- World War I

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

The Defense excerpt is the introduction written by Viscount K. Kaneko in Sept 1920, to the publication of the article. Kaneko reports that after the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty, he talked with (then) President Roosevelt about the future of the U.S. and Japan and that the "watchwords" which President Roosevelt gave him were "substantially" as follows:

1. Japan should guard against the danger of over-confidence after her victory in the Russ-Jap-War.

2. To prevent future trouble which will arise from Japanese immigration in California, Japanese immigrants should be sent to the continent of Asia and the South Sea Islands instead of to the Pacific Coast.

3. To insure future good relations between the U.S. and Japan, the Pacific Ocean should be set up as a dividing zone with America on the one side maintaining her Monroe Doctrine towards the American continents and Japan, on the other, adopting her Monroe Doctrine for the Asiatic continent.
It should be pointed out that on reading the published article by Theodore Roosevelt no statement made by Col Roosevelt to the effect that Japan should establish a Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific was found. The article consists chiefly of a description of the part Japan played in World War I — the number of ships she furnished, her financial aid to England, France and Russia, her loyalty to the U.S. and her participation in Red Cross Relief. Col Roosevelt states at the end that his article is not meant as a discussion of U.S. relations with Japan but he would remind his readers that "there is not the slightest real or necessary conflict of interest between the U.S. and Japan in the Pacific; her interest is in Asia, ours in America".
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION

DEFENDANT DOCUMENT SERIES

DEF Doc. No. 626 1-2, 3-4, 5-7 (being IPS Doc. No. 4163, 4164, 4166, 4168, 4170)

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogations of Gen TOJO, Hideki

Date: 1946

Language: English

Translation in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS ILLUSTRATED: TOJO, Hideki

INCIDENT, PLACE OR CIRCUMSTANCE DOCUMENT ILLUSTRATED: Preparations for War - Political and Military, Manchurian Military Aggression, Japan-China Military Aggression, Japanese Constitution, customary and functions of the defendants

SALIENT OF RELEVANT POINTS

DEF Doc. No. 626 1-2 (IPS 4163) Extract from Interrogation of 1 Feb 1946

TOJO denies that there was "very much urging" of the army's views in the cabinet meetings but admits that the Chief of Staff kept the Foreign Minister and Premier "similarly informed". (p 5)

The remaining parts of the interrogation of this date have to do with questioning TOJO on his knowledge of Germany's "new order" in Europe and the length of time prior to the signing of the Three-Power Pact in 1940. The matter of Japan's joining with Italy and Germany in promoting a "new order" had been under consideration. TOJO states that the cabinet "was constantly aware" of the pro-Axis sentiments of the army.

DEF Doc. No. 626 2-3 (IPS 4164) Extract from Interrogation of 4 Feb 1946 (pp 2-3)

In answer to the question, "would China not have been all right without any closer relations with Japan?" TOJO gives three reasons why Japan was "impelled toward closer ties with China": (1) European powers and America
threatened China with partition and so the Orient could never have been stabilized. (2) A common culture, a common race unites China and Japan. (3) Treaty obligations of the two countries require close relations.

The remainder of the interrogation concerns the China Incident and TOJO rejects responsibility in any way for it since he was not the responsible official at that time.

DEF Doc. No. 626 A-4 (IPS 4166) Interrogation of 6 Feb 1946 (pp 1-2)

This excerpt gives TOJO's answers as to the organization, function, and duties of the cabinet and ministers of state. He says that there were no records kept of cabinet meetings and no written account of who had that view or who voted on each question. The official proposals of the various ministers were kept at the official residence of the Prime Minister.

The rest of the interrogation concerns the custom of Imperial Conferences and the procedure used in Imperial Conferences. It is revealed that in 1941 two Imperial conferences were called while TOJO was Premier.

DEF Doc. No. 626 A-5 (IPS 4166) Interrogation of 6 Feb 1946 (pp 3-4)

Excerpt is from same interrogation as above and the extract concerns Imperial Conferences which has already been summarized above.

DEF Doc. No. 626 A-7 (IPS 4150) Interrogation of 14 Jan 1946 (pp 5-7)

Excerpt consists of TOJO's interpretation and answers to the meaning of the Japanese phrase, "eight corners of the earth under one roof". TOJO insists that he and other responsible leaders interpreted the slogan in the spiritual sense of spreading virtue throughout the four seas and holding to virtue in relations with other countries.

The entire interrogation refers to many phases of the defendant's career -- his family background, his military education, his army posts and commands, his role in the Manchurian Incident, his opinions on Japan's policy of expansion, and the army's viewpoint concerning the Nine Power Treaty and Japan's subsequent dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty. He states that in the opinion of the Japanese Government, the Manchurian Incident and the China Incident were regarded as national self-defense.
The author presents a chaotic picture of China and her internal affairs emphasizing the internal conflict and civil wars, the power of the bandits and warlords, the misery of the people and the Communist influence. Dr. Sun Yat-sen is presented as a "disillusioned and disappointed man, haunted by the dread of Communist domination of his country" and the author states that he twice asked the U.S. Government to organize a form of friendly intervention in China to combat Russian Communism.

The author goes on to describe in detail that Dr. Sun made elaborate arrangements through Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman (American Minister to China) in 1923 for a five-year period of foreign intervention during which time China would adopt modern methods in government.

The author's style of writing is generally emotional and propagandistic, specific dates and incidents are rarely given. The tone is anti-Chinese, and his general purpose seems to be to show that China's internal chaos (1930) warrants foreign intervention, and specific references such as the following, are made to Japan: (p 11)
All through the Far East the agents of Communism have been busy with propaganda amongst the poor and the oppressed; and unfortunately the native population of almost all of Eastern Asia, except Japan, belong to one or another...of those categories.

(p 24) "If a Communist China comes into existence, and particularly if China works in harmony with Russia, Japan's position in Manchuria will at once become dangerous and precarious in the extreme."

(p 64) "If this visitor goes northward.....into Manchuria he will be struck and puzzled by a sharp contrast. He will be in an area which, by comparison with China proper, is abundantly prosperous and hopeful. The reason for this sharp difference is that Japan has announced to all Chinese factions that civil war will not be tolerated in Manchuria."

Summary of Defense Excerpts

Excerpt 7 (p 63) This excerpt describes the plight of the Chinese ton of Kwantin which suffered from Chinese bandit raids.

Excerpt 3 (p 70) Figures are given showing a loss of population of 4,000,000 in Kansuh province in China due to civil war, brigandage and Communist uprisings.

Excerpt 9 (p 71) Bandit and pirate "outrages" are described in the vicinity of Shanghuai and Nanking.

Excerpt 10 (p 73) Further bandit raids on Chinese towns of Yamen, Taiho, Yungti, Nancun, etc., are described.

Excerpt 11 (p 78) It is stated that the Communists ban all forms of religion and, specifically, the Kansuh Communists who destroy all idols, temples, niches, etc.

Excerpt 12 (pp 79 and 80) Several Chinese cities are cited as being under Communist and bandit control.

Excerpt 18 (pp 203, 204, 205) This excerpt contains a quotation from the British reply of 10 Aug 1929 to Nanking's proposals (which urged the abolition of extra-territoriality rights) which criticized the Nanking Govt for permitting local organizations "to set up arbitrary and illegal tribunals" to usurp function of Chinese courts.

Excerpt 19 (pp 203, 204, 205) Two cases of "maladministration of justice" in Shanghuai are given -- cruel punishments given to offenders by Communist party leaders.

Analysis No. 13 Page 2
Excerpt 20 (pp 224, 225) Japan's position in Manchuria, the author says, is misunderstood and that she is not attempting to "colonize" Manchuria. The author points out that Japan is only fulfilling her treaty rights in Manchuria.

Excerpt 21 (p 257) A surprise attack by Chinese soldiers on the Moslem population of the town of Taecho in 1929 is described.

Excerpt 22 (pp 270, 271) A young Chinese aviator is quoted as saying that the Chinese Air Force will not be "bought over" by factions as the Army and Navy have reportedly been bought but that the Air Force will control China "to suit themselves. (Dec 1929) Excerpt meant to show further the unity of China.

Excerpt 23 (pp 267, 269) A rebellion led by General Chu Yu-pu, ex-warlord of China, at Fushan in May of 1929 is described. General Chu Yu-pu was not punished by the Nationalists, it is said, permitted him to escape to Korea in spite of the atrocities he was known to have committed in Fushan.

Excerpt 24 (pp 269, 270, 271) Further raids by Nationalist troops against "robola" at the city of Changsha in 1923 are related.

Excerpt 25 (pp 97, 98, 99, 100) The opium production of China is said to be due to "militarism", and the author says that the opium evil in China is not due to other nations but to the Chinese profiteers and corruption of government officials.

Excerpt 26 (pp 113-119) Examples of anti-foreign Kuomintang propaganda are given and the author points out that the Kuomintang ignores in its propaganda any mention of the good which foreign capital has brought to China -- modern hospitals, libraries and universities.
M.L. RELATIVISTIC THEORY
DEFENCE DOCUMENT NO. A

ANALYSIS NO. 14

27 March 1947

L.L. Doc. No. 237

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT NUMBER

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Book entitled "Treaty Series No. 1 (1922) -- The Washington Conference, 1921-1922, Treaties and Resolutions"

Date: 1921-1922

Language: English, French, Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

SOURCE MATERIAL

DOCUMENT, PUBLICATION TO WHICH DOCUMENT RELATES:

1. TREATIES

1. Treaty Series (2) -- Resolutions adopted by the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments at Washington, 1921-1922

2. 3. The Last of the Modern Question provides that the nine Powers shall establish in China a Board of Reference to consider and investigate questions arising in connection with Articles III and V of the Treaty.

4. (A.) -- Article. III of Treaty has to do with the methods by which the Contracting Powers carry out the Open Door policy in China -- no nation will claim any "general superiority of rights" economically or commercially, or to participate with the Chinese Government in any category calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

5. Article V provides that China agrees in the railways of China that there shall be no unfair discrimination as to "charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers, or the origin of goods, or the Contracting Powers shall have a corresponding obligation in respect of the railways of China over which they exercise any control in virtue of any concession.

Analysis No. 14
Page 1
Resolution No. 9, Resolution to the Reduction of Chinese Military Forces

This resolution recognizes the problem of maintenance by China of military forces in various parts of her country and the resultant severe drain on the public revenue of China for maintenance of these forces and therefore the resolution expresses, "the urgent hope that insalute and effective steps may be taken by the Chinese Government to reduce the aforementioned military forces and expenditure".

The Defence Secretariat soon to point out that the World Powers recognized even intervention in China and that Resolution No. 9 introduced "an admission of China's unity". The treaty, in addition to the Limitation of NavalArmament, Rule for Scrapping Vessels of Tonnage and the Use of Submarines and Poisonous Gas, contains treaties between the Nine Powers to China, and the Chinese Customs Tariff and traction between the Four Powers (U.S., Britain, France and Japan) for their Pacific Possessions. Japan gave up territory in China -- KI ISLAND and agreements as reached is to the treatment of Japanese troops in China and for the settlement of the Shantung question, i.e., the Japanese military force of any kind will remain in any part of Shantung (p 19). Japan also agreed to allow U.S. ships to visit any of the mandated islands under the "usual custom" in note of 11 Feb 1922 (p 29).

Resolutions adopted by the Conference (twelve in all) are given at the end of the treaty section together with the treaty between Japan and the U.S., concerning the Island of Yap and other mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean.
EXHIBIT PRODUCTION SECTION

DEFEND DOSSIER SERIES

EXHIBIT No. 15

3 April 1947

DEF Doc. No. (22 A-1)

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Extract from Interrogation of Admiral SHINDÔ, Shigetaro, on Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Date: 25 Jan 1946

Language: English

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS IMPlicated: SHINDÔ, Shigetaro; TOJO, Sadao

EXCERPT, FULL OR EXCERPTS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; Aggression; Ultra-Nationalism

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Extract introduced by Defense quotes SHINDÔ as saying that meaning of G2A Co-prosperity Sphere was "peace throughout Greater East Asia, and ...... no oppressive power".

Other themes on which SHINDÔ was quizzed were the SHINTO religion, Divinity of the Emperor, and the Divine Mission of Japan to conquer the world, the charge being made that certain leaders in Japan from 1930 to 1941 used these ideas to support enthusiasm for world conquest by Japan.

SHINDÔ takes stand that Japanese people didn't really think Emperor divine, but merely as a descendant of God (p.53 of interrogation in case file), and that while there were groups of "wild" authors interpreted EMOTOKU, Ichihara to be a slogan for divine aggression, they were in minority. (p. 53-54) But he would not name these special persons and disclaimed knowledge of any organized attempts to encourage such ideas in the people, especially that the Japanese Emperor is ruler of all nations.

Then ARAI, Sadao was quoted to him as having said "If the actions of any of the powers are not conducive to our imperialism, our bloc shall descend on that power", and other similar statements, SHINDÔ admitted that ARAI sometimes said such things, but not KONNO or TOJO. Admits ARAI also an extremist. TOJO only meant Japan should guide Asia, but not control or govern countries in Asia. Admitted that ARAI represented ARMY when he made statements, and said, "I always frowned upon what he had to say". (p. 62 of case file)

Analyst: M. NAGASAKI

Analysis No. 15

DATE: 1902 - 1935

ORIGINAL PROCESSED IN FULL ( ) EXCERPTS ONLY (X)

PERSONS DEPICTED: Fu-Yi (Emperor of Manchuria); Shido Kora, Kijure; Matsuda, Yosuke; Nishi, Kunihiko

INCIDENT, ISSUE OR CRIME TO WHICH DOCUMENT RELATES: Manchurian Military Aggression, 1931-1935

EXTRACT OF RELEVANT POINTS

In Defense Excerpt (pp. 134 - 138 of book) the writer describes his interview with the 'Manchukuo' Emperor, Mr. Fu Yi, in September 1932. The writer reports he asked Mr. Fu Yi if "he were really happy in his present position" as Chief Executive of Manchukuo and if he had been "coerced into his present position".

Mr. Fu Yi replied he was happy and "strongly denied that he was not a free agent in any respect". He went on to say, the writer reports, that he /Fu Yi/ was actuated by obvious political and personal motives in assuming his new office.

Mr. Goodhead goes on to report that a restoration movement was known by the Nanking Government and that Mr. Fu Yi refused that government's offer to repudiate his rights in return for more favorable treatment. In addition, it is reported that Mr. Fu Yi vehemently denied any truth in the report that he had been kidnapped by the Japanese.
In general, other parts of the book relating to Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria and North China are favorable to Japan and Japanese 'rights' in Manchuria. The author, who at date of publication, had spent thirty-three years as a British journalist in China (during which time he edited the China Year Book) writes of his experiences as a journalist in China from 1902 until 1935. His record includes observations on Chinese Court justice, anti-foreign campaigns, narcotic activities, piracy and slavery in China, the Nationalist Govt., extraterritorial problems and Chinese personalities of that period.

It is interesting to note that in his analysis of Japan's "21 Demands" on China, he reveals that he felt Japan violated the "principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." (p. 68) and that the Demands greatly weakened the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The writer also goes on to report that he advocated China's right to be a member of any new future Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 17  4 April 1947

DEF Doc. No. 333

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Records of Proceedings in the House of Peers at the 60th Session of the Imperial Diet

Date: Dec 1931, Jan 1932  Language:

Original processed in full ( )  Excerpts only ( )

PERSONS IDENTIFIED:

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRISIS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

A resolution of thanks to the members of the Japanese Armed Forces for meritorious service to the country was voted, and the Navy Minister, OSUJI and the War Minister ARAKI each thanked the House for the resolution and promised to convey the message to the men at the front. (p. 4)

Prime Minister NAKAYAMA told of the disgraceful Sakurada-Men Incident and of the cabinet decision to resign en masse which was prevented by the Emperor. He said the cabinet has decided to remain to settle the Manchurian Incident and to control economic disorder. He said Japan intended to make Manchuria and Mongolia a permanent link between Japan and China. (p. 5)

Foreign Minister YOSHIHARA spoke on the causes of the Manchurian Incident (attributing it to anti-Japanese movements in military, economic, social, and every aspect of Chinese activities); on Japan’s diplomatic effort to settle the Incident; and on Japan’s action for self-defense. (p. 6) (Used by Defense as DEF Doc. No. 333)

Finance Minister T. KUSAKABE spoke on the depression in Japan, attributing it to the removal of the embargo on gold by the Harauchi cabinet, and told of the cabinet plan for removing the embargo for economic reconstruction. (p. 7)
Count Y.N. G13. inquired if all the members of the present cabinet were fully conscious of their responsibility to the Emperor for the Senkakun Incident. (p. 10) The ministers all gave their respective answers. (p. 11)

Finance Minister T.K. SHI charged that member INUTS's opinion is based only on capitalists and traders. The national policy, he asserted was to develop domestic industries firstly and to promote foreign trade secondly, for which purpose the gold embargo must be imposed. (pp. 15-16)
ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES

N. ANALYSIS No. 18

N. 8 April 1947

DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES

DAF Doc. No. 331

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Excerpt from the Shorthand Record of the Proceedings of the 72nd Diet Session

Date: Sep 1937

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS DELIVERED: NAKANO, Sei; HIROTA, Foki

INCIDENT, FEASTS OR EVENTS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with

China; 1931-China Military Aggression

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

Defense Document 331 dealt with the address of Foreign Minister HIROTA in which he spoke on the various efforts made by the Japanese Govt to effect a speedy solution of the China Affair and on various hostile action taken by the Nanking Govt which developed the incident.

In regard to the above speech, the following remarks or questions were made:

Member KITAH, Kiyoshi: "I, a member of the Cabinet, Foreign Minister HIROTA, once declared in a Diet speech that there would be no war while he is in office. I think that the cabinet, of course, would not dare to carry out such inadequate measures inapplicable to the fact in this or that respect, but there are some suspicions on that. If the cabinet will insist that this situation is entirely a sort of an incident and that diplomatic relations are continuing as usual, why couldn't our diplomatic organs endeavor to negotiate with the Nanking Govt in order to settle the China Incident? (p. 32)
The aim is as above stated. Namely, it is, as a matter of course, obvious that our measure to wage war lies in wiping out with one stroke the backbone of the Nanking Govt, a puppet of foreign influence, after the decision of the following two principles, viz, the establishment of the principle of coexistence in the Far East and the elimination of foreign principles in the political field. In the reply of the last interpellation, Prime Minister KOJYRE stated that it was too early to consider the Nanking Govt as an enemy, and that there were some persons in that government who understood us. As long as the Nanking Govt is officially taking part in anti-Japanese activities, and as long as its overall trend is harmful to us, I believe that we should not hesitate at all to deal it a decisive blow. (p. 39)
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 19

4 Apr. 1947

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only ( )

PERSONS INVOLVED: HAYASUKI, Yosuke

DATE: 4 Nov 1929

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRISIS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLIES: Manchurian Incident

CONCLUSION OR RELEVANT POINTS

In the first speech (defense excerpt), HAYASUKI emphasized the unique position of Manchuria in the pattern of power in Asia, and how Japan had "made it a paradise" in a short time, while the rest of China was in a state ofarchy. He touched upon Manchurian history and life and how Japan was responsible for it. He stated that Manchuria's status compared to the rest of China was entirely due to Japan. (Cited by the Defense, Doc. No. 175)

In the second speech, HAYASUKI refuted the charges which Professor HSU made in his first speech. The charges by Professor HSU and the replies by HAYASUKI are given respectively:

Charge: HAYASUKI insisted that the public peace and welfare in Manchuria was secured only by the Japanese troops stationed along the South Manchurian Railway. True?

Reply: Mainly peace is guaranteed by the special characteristics of the land. Japan also has such important interests in Manchuria and has such concern for peace and order there, that the weight of the Japanese government behind the troops secured peace directly or indirectly in Manchuria.
Analysis No. 19 - Page 2 - SUMMARY Cont'd

Chargé: Increase in Manchurian population was not caused by Japan's development and maintenance of public welfare but was a phenomenon occurring in the rest of China at the time.

Reply: Great advantages to be had in Manchuria in contrast to the rest of China is one factor which cannot be ignored.

Chargé: Increase in the amount of foreign trade was not the gift of Japan's development of Manchuria but was a phenomenon true in the rest of China.

Reply: Presented statistics on foreign trade in 1907 and 1925 to disprove the charge.

Chargé: Japan was hostile to the legal action of China in constructing railroads with foreign capital other than Japan's.

Reply: Under the Portsmouth Treaty, (TW, between Japan and Russia) China could not construct any parallel railroads disadvantageous to the South Manchurian Railway.

Chargé: Japan already had received full compensation for her sacrifices in Manchuria.

Reply: Japanese sacrifices were 100,000 casualties and ¥2,600,000,000. She "inherited" the South Manchurian Railway which required a ¥1,600,000,000 investment. She demanded of China a guarantee that she would defend the northern front by herself from the Sino invasion so that Japan would not have her existence and national safety threatened again.

The foreword to this pamphlet was written by OKAZAKI, Shuzo, who was highly laudatory of MITSUOKA and spoke contemptuously of Professor HSU whom he called ungentlemanlike in behavior. He gave a picture of the atmosphere and circumstances under which these two speeches were delivered.

Analyst: Lt. Suzukiwa
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DEFENSE DOCUMENT FILES

N.LYSIS NO. 20
11 Apr. 1947

DEFENSE DOC. NO. 253
Ct. Exh. No. 2418

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT


Date: 24 Mar. 1932
Language: Japanese

Translation in full? Yes

PRINCIPAL ACCUSED:

KONOYE, Fumimaro; ARAI, Sadao;
OSUGI, Mineo; YOSHIHARA, Ritsui

INCIDENT, PHASE OR ORIGIN TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Manchurian Incident; Shanghai Incident; All-China Military aggression, 1931-1945

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Prince KONOYE submitted to the House a resolution of thanks to the members of the armed forces for restoring peace and order in Manchuria and for protecting lives and property in China. This was accepted by the Navy Minister and the War Minister respectively. (pp 5)

Prime Minister INUKAI outlined Japan's foreign policy in regard to China and the world as a result of the China Incident. (p 6) (Used by Defense as Def. Doc. No. 253)

Foreign Minister YOSHIHARA said that the Japanese Government has protested frequently to China for anti-Japanese activities but that the matter is getting worse. He said that the Shanghai Incident and the Manchurian Incident are in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations but that Article 15 of the Covenant is not applicable in both cases. He mentioned that European unfriendliness to Japan is caused by false propaganda. (pp 6-8)
Minister said: "As to the dispatch of troops to Shanghai, the condition was different from the Manchurian Incident. From the beginning, as it was our desire to solve the Incident without bloodshed, we have had many negotiations with the Chinese authorities. But the attitude of China was so unfaithful that they bombarded us in answer to our negotiations, and at last we were compelled to fight with her to my regret. It was our aim to protect the lives and the properties of Japanese people and to maintain public peace in the International Concession in Shanghai. Since the Chinese army would not come at us with a mass attack, we determined to withdraw Japanese troops from Shanghai, as we had wanted to avoid a war over the entire front with China. It was Japanese policy to want to settle the Incident by cooperation in political policy and strategy from the beginning to end. However, judging by the situation, we must appeal to arms, if unwillingly."

Navy Minister OUMI gave a detailed account of the anti-Japanese activities which culminated in the Shanghai Incident. He said that the mayor of Shanghai accepted the Japanese demand but was unable to control the 19th Route army which made a sudden attack and caused the employment of force by the Japanese for self-defense. He said additional forces were sent from Japan which made possible the restoration of peace and order. (p 9)

Member KO inquired as to the use of the secret service funds of ¥6,500,000 and the minister replied that it was for war expenditure, saying, "...If you have no objection that I answer you regarding the finances of the War Ministry as well as that of the Finance Department next time, that will be all right. But, roughly speaking, with respect to the Secret Service Funds of ¥6,000,000; it differs from those /funds/ of other Ministries. It is a kind of war expenditure that I don't like to make known."
I say only this. The Minister or a member of the Government will explain to you about it in detail afterwards, anyway........

Baron Yebuki made a speech attributing anti-Japanese movements for the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents. He made three suggestions for solution: special agreement concerning anti-Japanese movement, international movement against anti-Japanese movement, and dissolution of revolutionary diplomacy of China. (pp 15 - 16)

Foreign Minister Yosii agreed with Baron YEBUKI and said he would try his best to demand the Chinese Government's consideration. (pp 18 - 19)

Finance Minister T.K. said on the deficiency of the expense of the Manchurian Incident by issuing public loans for the third time through Imperial Ordinance. (pp 21 - 22)

Mr. SHILOH said that since the House of Representatives has been dissolved, there was no way other than reliance on extraordinary disposition. (p 23)

Mr. S.U. inquired if there was any reason for the immediate dissolution of the Diet. (p 23)

Mr. M.T. made a speech saying that public peace and order must be maintained. He talked on the assassination of Mr. INOUE and Baron D.N. which came from disagreement of the Diet. He asked if any measure was taken to prevent repetition. (pp 25 - 26)

The Minister said that there were some plans but there were also other problems such as foreign relations, educational systems, and unemployment which must be settled. (pp 26 - 27)

Mr. KIKUKAI said that stringent regulation on the explosive law has been made for public peace and order. (p 27)

Mr. Minister KAI said that the causes for the disturbance were being removed. He emphasized that the Japanese soldiers were all unalterably loyal. (pp 27 - 28)
Mr. SHELIZU demanded explanations on the military movements in Shanghai and Manchuria, the armistice agreement in Shanghai, and on the problems of Manchuria as a new state. (pp 28 - 29)

Foreign Minister INUKI answered that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn from China, and that the is yet, inopportune to decide whether Japan should recognize Manchukuo or not. (p 29)

War Minister MUKAI answered Mr. SHELIZU that the main purpose of the military operation was to protect Japanese Nationals and establish peace and order there. Since these were realized, troops were withdrawn. (pp 29-30)

Mr. SHELIZU said he could not understand the withdrawal when anti-Japanese movements were the root of the Incident. (p 30)

War Minister MUKAI said that anti-Japanese movements should be completely destroyed in order to establish friendly relations between Japan and China. (pp 30 - 31)

Count Hotta said that the motive for the dispatch of naval forces to Shanghai was to protect the lives and properties of the Japanese Nationals and to protect the International Settlements. (p 31)
ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT SERIES

ANALYSIS NO. 21

DEF. DOC. NO. 831 (z - L)

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT


Date: 1930

Language: English

Criminal processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS INCULPATED:

INCIDENT, THREAT OR CRIME TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Narcotics

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Summary of Defense Excerpts:

Def. Doc. No. 831-1 - The main features of the Government's opium policies are outlined and it is emphasized that the basis for control of opium smoking is a Government monopoly.

Def. Doc. No. 831-2 - Conclusions of the Commission and its suggestions to the governments concerned and to the League of Nations. The conclusions pertain to (1) the necessity for concurrent measures in policy, (2) complete opium monopoly for retail distribution, (3) measures to control individual consumption, (4) smoking establishments, (5) control and disinfection of opium pipes, (6) cure of opium smokers.

Def. Doc. No. 831-3 - Short historical resume of the control of opiate-smoking in Formosa under Japanese administration is given from 1895 to 1930.

Analysis No. 21
Page 1
Def Doc. No. 831-D - Table showing the licensed opium smokers by sex (native Peruvians -- 1897 - 25) is given.

Def Doc. No. 831-D - Excerpt pertaining to information on total prohibition of opium smoking and states that total prohibition is enforced only in the Philippine Islands. The commission advocated Government control rather than total prohibition which does not lead to total suppression of the habit.

Volume II (from which no excerpts are taken) is entitled Detailed Memoranda on each Territory Visited by the Commission. A more detailed study of the East countries and of Japanese governed territories -- Kwangtung, Leased Territory, South Manchuria Railway Zone, Taiwan, and Chosen -- does not reveal any more the information more unfavorable to Japan than to any other country. The memoranda on each territory includes the following data:
(1) description of the geographic, ethnographic, political and economic conditions, (2) short historical resume of the control of opium smoking, (3) general system of opium control at present in force, (4) details of present control system, (5) opium revenue, (6) illicit traffic and consumption, (7) poppy growing, (8) moral and social questions relating to opium smoking, (9) relation between opium smoking and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs other than raw or prepared opium.

That in the whole of Chosen (Korea) in 1928 only 20 were arrested as noted. (p 438)
DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES

ANALYSIS No. 22

DEF Doc. No. 637 A to 637 I

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT

INTRODUCTION

Title and Nature: Publication Entitled "The Manchoukuo Yearbook 1942"

Date: 1 March 1942

Language: English

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only ( )

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HISTOMO, Toranosuke; FUKUJI, Tadayuki;
KIMURA, Hitotaro

INCIDENT, ISSUE OR CRIME TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian
Military Aggression

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

This document is, as its title suggests, a Yearbook of MANCHOUKUO, but is
joined out in the foreword by the publishers ("The Manchoukuo
Yearbook Company"), that the issue does not present only the "occurrences
of a given year but also a brief historical background of the 
multifold
affairs of the Manchoukuo Empire".

The yearbook includes maps showing the topography, mineral resources,
arable production centers, and charts and graphs showing economic
progress. All phases of government, economic, and agricultural life are
outlined. In the back of the book is chapter giving the text of bulletins,
laws, regulations and treaties. An appendix (pp 917-959) entitled "Who's
Who" gives a brief biographical sketch of the prominent figures in
MANCHOUKUO, including H. SHIBOTO, Toranosuke; FUKUJI, Tadayuki; and
KIMURA, Hitotaro.

In general, the yearbook is aimed at showing the progress of
Manchuria in the past ten years (1932-1942) under Japanese rule and facts
and figures are marshaled to show record of improvements made since "the
disorderly and backward conditions of pre-incident days". (quote from
foreword)
Summary of Defense Excerpts follows:

6.371 Opium Monopoly Law of Manchoukuo is explained to show the government is controlling the opium problem.

6.378 The program of currency stabilisation whereby the Manchoukuo Yuan finally reached parity with the Japanese Yen in September 1935 is outlined.

6.370 In this excerpt, the improvement by the Japanese personnel in the judicial system of government is discussed with the intent of showing the marked improvement through government examination in the judicial service of the government.

6.370 Excerpt intends to show the improvement of agriculture through farm improvement program embodied in Five-Year Industrial Development Plan.

6.373 Poppy growing in Manchoukuo is said to be in decline and in Jehol, the largest poppy growing region, a steady decrease is shown from 1932 to 1936.

6.374 Statistics (tables) of Primary Educational Organs are given showing number of schools, teachers, and pupils from 1932 to 1940 in Manchoukuo.

6.374 Statistics showing the number of religious temples and followers by religions are given for 1936.

6.378 The sanitation program outlined by the Japanese is discussed and a partial survey of the medical facilities up to 1937 is included in the excerpt.

6.374 The Government Program for the Control of Opium and narcotic addicts is reviewed. Information is given concerning the government program for the registration of addicts, measures for the relief of addicts, statistical data of the program, and opium smoking in relation to national problems.

Analyst: ST G.H. HUN
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DEF.DOC. No. 671

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT

DATE: 15 MAY 1947

ANALYSIS NO. 23

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Book entitled Records of International Diplomacy by Sugihara, Yosuke

Language: Japanese

Date: 1933

ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS:

PERSONS LISTED:

K. T. J., Yosuke; K. T. J., Jiro (Chief Minister)

INCIDENT, REL. OR CABLES TO WHICH DOCUMENT ATTACHED:

Manchurian Incident; Relations with League of Nations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Defense Excerpt No. 671 - Sugihara, Chief of the Political Affairs section of the League, reports that at the time of the Mukden Incident (Sep. 18, 1931) the Japanese delegation were taken completely by surprise at the turn of events. He asserts that the Japanese delegation at the League had not been diplomatically prepared for such an event; and, therefore, it had been impossible for them to have appealed to the League for permission for the use of troops in Manchuria since the situation had developed before diplomatic negotiations could be made.

Summary of the remainder of the book: The book itself gives Sugihara's arguments for Japan in defense of her withdrawal from the League of Nations, and an analysis of Japan's reasons for her actions in Manchuria. The arguments presented are in favor of Japan and her Manchurian policy, and attack the Western nations' lack of understanding of Oriental problems and their insistence on the maintenance of a "status quo" policy for their own interests in world diplomacy which, he says does not take account the actual conditions in Manchurian China.
Some of the observations and additional arguments given by SUGIWARA re Japan's military leaders, her aims, and his analysis of other world powers seem hardly justified as seen inconsistent with actual events. Examples follow:

"Japan's actions conform to the fundamental objective of the Nine Power Pact, which is the maintenance of peace in the East." Hence, the implication is that the establishment of Manchukuo was based on the Nine Power Pact.

"League members fear that Japan has added Manchukuo her protectorate, but this occurs from the misunderstanding on their part that Japanese military is something like the German military clique before the War." Yet, in the defense excerpt quoted, SUGIWARA points out that negotiations with the League re the Manchurian problem was impossible because the military had taken control.

The writer goes on to show that in the U.S. and other "modern civilized states" which sanction general elections, a chaotic political situation develops because the "majors" succumb to demagogues and hence the government becomes tyrannical. Such an argument does not seem reasonable in the light of the writer's experience and background in government.

SUGIWARA concludes his book by emphasizing that international relations must undergo constant evolution and Japan must "forge ahead" to work out her destiny.

N.LYST: Z.T. Garden
INTRODUCTION

DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES

N.LYSIS No. 24

DEF Doc. No. 231

16 Jul 1937

GL. Sah. II

NLYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Shorthand Notes of the Proceedings of the Nine
Session of the Diet, 21 January 1937

Date: 21 Jan 1937

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS DELICITED: HIROTA, Koki; INOUE, Rokiro; T. H. OHBA, Count Mifunai;
USHIO, Shigecuake

INCIDENT, ISSUES OR CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT ADDRESSES: Military and
Political Aggression; Manchukuo; Preparing Public Opinion for War;
Conscription; Ultra-Nationalism; Army Influence in Politics; Military
Aggression, China; Anti-Comintern Pact; February 26 Incident

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Prime Minister HIROTA gave his opinions on many important points in
this session.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

HIROTA outlined the programs of the new cabinet. They were, first,
to make national defense impregnable. He said, "... the
army must be completed in order to fortify the country..." and as for the Navy, in view of the non-existence of an armament treaty
after January 1st, the necessary preparation for national defense must be completed on the basic policy of 'a non-aggressive, non-expansionist...

The second program was the reformation of education so as to serve the needs of the time.
The third program was the stabilization of livelihood.

The fourth program was the encouraging of Japanese emigre to Manchuria....a short-cut to economic union between Manchuria and Japan.

The fifth was the reorganization and reform of the administrative body and the consideration of reforming the parliamentary system in order to better the nation and contribute to the prosperity of the people.

He said the above were emergency measures for "guaranteeing the future of advancing Japan". (pp. 18-20)

ANTI-COMMUNIST

Next, Foreign Minister ARTA spoke on the foreign situation of Japan, saying that the international situation is not only still lacking in stability, but is progressively growing worse due to the war. He spoke on Communist activities, Sino-Japanese relations, and relations with various nations. (pp. 20-24) Used by Li on D8F Doc. No. 231. The above speech was interrupted frequently by outbursts of "I object" or "Lies, lies, nothing but lies".

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Member S.KURUKO agreed with the Prime Minister's speech, elaborating on the matter of Sino-Japanese relations. He said that with the announcement of the Japanese desire to establish friendly relations with China, anti-Japanese activities in China flared up more violently. S.KURUKO said that at the time when Japan had been negotiating with China for harmonious relations, Foreign Minister ARTA stated that "The result of the negotiation will determine whether Sino-Japanese relations will be very good or very bad, and it has therefore will not be left undecided as in the past. Accordingly, China is now at an important crossroad of choosing between shaking hands with Japan or not.

Member S.KURUKO expressed regret at the speech of Foreign Minister ARTA. He said, "It seems that his (ARTA) explanation was a mere expression of an ultimatum demanding a fixed answer from China as to whether she will cooperate with Japan or take action as an enemy of Japan. I'm sorry to say that the Foreign Minister, a representative of Japan, had said such a serious thing". (34)
On the matter of domestic issues, he said, the actual situation now is that the government tends to cover the people's eyes and ears, stop their mouths, and try to take away their opportunity to make a fair judgment. Especially, foreign news and publications were stopped from being brought in, and the freedom of the Japanese press is being subjected to pressure. On the other hand, rumors are riot and are causing social unrest. (pp. 25-30)

Minister of Education KUMA replied in regard to another SAKURA a charge of throttling public opinion and banning foreign publication. He said that there are times when restrictions must be placed on free speech, as for foreign publication, he said most of them cannot be agreed upon by Japan so that they must naturally be banned. (p 33)

Prime Minister HIROTA replied to a question on what has been done to the program of renovating the government in general. He said that the February 26 Incident was a grave affair which necessitated renovation in various parts of the government. On the subject of national defense, he said that it must be made to agree with diplomacy. Also, diplomacy must aid national defense and vice versa. The anti-Comintern pact between Japan and Germany is a definite example of this, he stated. (p 30)

Foreign Minister ARITA said that Japan was negotiating with China on the settlement of the incidents, elimination of anti-Japanese activities and establishment of friendly relationship. He said that Japan is trying her utmost to have China understand her position and that he feels that China must not be unwilling to make self-reflection.

On the matter of the Pacific, he said that Japan must face the Far East and the Pacific with peaceful diplomatic measures in order to cope with the treatyless situation in the Pacific. (pp 32-33)

Member HIJYU spoke on the power of the army cliques in politics. He said that from the standpoint of the Army's spirit and the political soul of the Army, the army officers have a notion that they are the propelling power of our government. He said: "There were several cases where the ministers of the military have said officially in a public-meeting that they hold a propelling power in the government....In the
fifty-seven years of its history, such a sentiment always prevailed. When opportunity presents itself, it will rear its head in politics, economics, society. This was especially true in the May 15 Incident and the February 26 Incident. (p 36)

HAMADA continued, "......We have kept our eyes on the army which was considered itself the propelling power of the government, and we taught that it will discriminate from unreasonable and excessive demands and accept only what can be adopted, and reject what cannot be adopted. However, War Minister TERAUCHI explained this concept before us in the previous session of the Diet and covered everything under the vague totalitarianism of the military. In the reformation of the administrative organs, he is trying to foster and set up a revised administrative setup born on the basis of Fascism......" (p 37)

.....The person who announced that all political organizations other than the KYOWAKAI will be banned in Manchuria, and that a one-party structure will be forced was the person who was connected with the so-called 'Proclamation of the KYOWAKAI Spirit' of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, dated 18 September 1936. .....In it, it says 'The governing of Manchukuo is done by the Manchukuo Government on the surface and by the KYOWAKAI from behind, and it will conform with the spirit of Japan'. (p 40)

Prime Minister HIROTA replied to Member HAMADA's charge of totalitarianism as mistaken, and War Minister TERAUCHI answered the charge of military control as voicing the need of the army within the prescribed scope of duty of the War Minister. (p 43)

(Editor's Note: The following is from the LANCHE-CHUO YEAR BOOK, 1941, p 786)

It can be seen how closely the KYOWAKAI resided the LANCHE, or a Fascist party.

Chapter XX

"THE CONCORDIA ASSOCIATION" (Heihō-hei-hui)

The CONCORDIA ASSOCIATION, or the Heihō-hei-hui, is it is formed in the LANCHE-CHUO tongue and not the KYOWAKAI in Japanese, is a national organ which has for its object the union of the various races in LANCHE into an association devoted to the attainment of the common object of building up an ideal state. Its members are composed of scholars, lawyers, merchants, peasants, workers, etc.
The CONCORDIA ASSOCIATION is headed by the president who is the premier, and directly under him is the Central Headquarters located in Harbin. The latter in turn control the principal headquarters in each province and the Metropolitan Headquarters in Harbin, with headquarters in each major prefecture (PREFECTURE), basin (in the Mongol provinces a prefecture is called a basin) and city, and under them numerous branches.

The ideals of the CONCORDIA ASSOCIATION are: (1) the establishment of inescapable relations between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO -- oneness in spirit and virtue; (2) the concord of races; (3) the creation of a moral world through racial concord, and (4) the bringing into practice of an original WARRIOR government."

Foreign Minister MEXT replied to the charges that the German-Japanese treaty would give Japan a bad reputation. He said it was undertaken as a diplomatic measure for executing a national policy of stabilizing the Far East. (p 44)
Title and Nature: Printed Book entitled "Twilight in the Forbidden City" by Reginald F. Johnston, published by Victor Gollancz, London

Date: 1934

Language: English

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only ( )

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Henry PO-YI

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRISIS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLIES: Manchurian Incident -- 1931

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

About the author: Professor of Chinese in the University of London; last British Commissioner of 'KIHN-TE'; Tutor to His Majesty the Emperor Hsuan-T'ung; author several other books on China.

Book dedicated to Emperor PO-YI by author who know Henry PO-YI for fifteen years and was his tutor.

In his introduction to the book, the author explains that his main purpose in writing the book "has been to give some account of what I have called the Twilight period of the Manchu occupation of the Forbidden City -- the thirteen years that elapsed between the establishment of the so-called Republic at the beginning of 1912 and the expulsion of the Emperor PO-YI from the Imperial Palace by the 'Christian General', his associates in November 1924". He then goes on to say however, that in order to make his story clear he is including political events from 1898 to the return of the last of the Manchu Emperors (Henry PO-YI) to Manchuria in 1931.
References to Japan's role in establishing the Emperor Henry FU-YI in Manchuria are few and deny any argument of Japanese imperialism. In 1924, when FU-YI found refuge in the Japanese legation, the author vigorously denies that the Japanese minister knew anything about the Emperor's arrival in the Legation Quarter until he (the author) informed the Japanese minister of it. The author also maintains that an independence movement arose in Manchuria and that the power of the warlord Chang Tse-Lin in Manchuria was of 'cultured semblance' (p 445) and that his death in the train bombing at Harbin in 1930 was a signal for the independence movement.

The Defense excerpt (pp 449-450) points out very emphatically that the Chinese report that the Emperor had been "kidnapped by the Japanese and carried off against his will" was wholly untrue, and that he "left Tientsin and went to Manchuria of his own free will."
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 26 21 April 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Book entitled "Behind the Japanese Mask" by Sir Robert CRAIGIE, British Ambassador to Japan

Date: 1937 - 1942 Language: English

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only ( )

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, DOIHARA, 'INAMI, OSHIMA, TOJO

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRISIS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with Great Britain; Preparation for War

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

CRAIGIE makes following observations on defendants listed above (not included in Defense excerpts of which there are 70, mostly defense of HIROTA):

ARAKI (p 28) is described as "idealistic, fiery, impetuous, valuable and likeable", as the "idol" of the young officers, and as one who "should be relied upon to carry forward the work of KINAMI, though perhaps not with quite the same ruthless efficiency". It is stated that he (ARAKI) believed another Russo-Jap war inevitable and that Japan's position in MANCHURIA must be strengthened.

DOIHARA - In writing of the Sino-Japanese war, CRAIGIE calls attention (p 39) to Col (later General) DOIHARA's "ceaseless activity... to prepare the way for Japanese dominance in Manchuria and China". To him, says Craigie, is given the credit for the "rape of MANCHURIA" although he paid "lip service" to idea of independence. It is also stated that DOIHARA was particularly skillful in creating dissension in the Chinese ranks.

INAMI is described (p 24) as a "believer in forceful measures at all times and in all places" and as one "who believed Japan's territorial expansion to be a matter of urgency". Craigie says he enjoyed the support of the young officer element and that he must bear heavy responsibility for the Manchurian affair and for the consequences following it.

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TOJO (pp 127-128) is contrasted to KONOYE and described as a man of "directness, insularity, narrowness of outlook, and decisiveness". A brief review of his military career is given, with emphasis on his appointment as head of the KAMPEIKAI from 1935-37. He is also described as acknowledged leader of the extremist element of "young officers" of the KAMPEIKAI Army.

Some examples of the author's opinions on Japan's basic policy are given below and may be studied in connection with the defense excerpts from book.

(p 39) In speaking of the anti-Japanese feeling in China as a cause of the Sino-Japanese war, Craigie says, "It is therefore idle to speculate whether in this or that incident a Chinese soldier had offered provocation or a Chinese politician had expressed anti-Japanese sentiments. That history will clearly establish is that it was the settled policy of the Japanese Army to provoke incidents and to exploit provocations. It was a policy of aggression no less calculated and methodical than was Hitler's course in Europe after the occupation of the Rhineland".

(p 117) The author expresses the belief that "had Hitler's attack on Russia been delivered three months earlier, no Neutrality Pact would have been concluded with the USSR and Japanese troops would not have marched into Southern Indo-China in July 1941". Instead, he says, Japan would have first attacked the USSR from the north.

(p 155) In his discussion of Japan's treatment of prisoners of war in Singapore, the author points out that while some parcels and supplies reached them and while the Japanese government could be excused to some degree because of lack of shipping space for failure to distribute parcels regularly, the result was "needless suffering and malnutrition". He states that the Japanese Army showed itself "incredibly obstructive and evasive in the long negotiations for the setting up of some machinery to insure their regular distribution".

Analyst: ET CORDEN
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 27

DEF Doc. No. 685

29 April 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Record of Trial on Second Appeal, TOKYO DISTRICT Court, Re The May 15 Incident, Vol 63 of 65

Date: 1934 - 35

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only ( )

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OKAWA, Shuns; TOYAMA, Hideza; HOMA, Kenichiro; YAMOTO, Sadayoshi; NAKAZAWA, Toru; YOSHIOKA, Nebutake

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLIES:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

These are the court records of the trial proceedings in the second appeal with the defendants as OKAWA, Shuns; TOYAMA, Hideza; HOMA, Kenichiro; YAMOTO, Sadayoshi; NAKAZAWA, Toru, and YOSHIOKA, Nebutake, who were tried for various crimes relative to the May 15 Incident.

Extract No. 1 of the third trial depositions gives an interrogation of OKAWA in which he revealed that he had made a great study in Indian philosophy and was highly influenced by the former grandeur of India in contrast to the present India whose conditions he attributed to the exploitation of the Europeans. Then he vented his feeling toward the present politico-economic and ideological trend, putting the greatest emphasis on the harm that capitalism is causing on the lives of people.

On the Manchurian question, he lamented the national disunity of Japan and free-lance diplomacy. The Manchurian Railway was doing its best to construct the Klin-Hailung Railway and negotiations were being made with CHANG HSUEH-LIN. OKAWA testified, "The day, CHANG HSUEH-LIN showed me a letter from CHANG HSUEH-LIN which was written as follows:

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Recently, a parliamentary member of the Minseito Party came to see me and told me that the T'U-KA Cabinet will collapse soon. Then, not only the railway problem but all the problems of Manchuria will be settled suitably for us by the cabinet of the Minseito Party, so let the T'U-KA Railway problem slide along and wait until our cabinet is formed. He asked me to tell you so. And besides that, one more parliamentary member of the Minseito Party came to tell me the same thing as I want to tell it to you.'

CHUNG HSIU-LI NO showed this to me with a grin. Having detected such a moderate attitude, he became more and more aggressive, and thus, he was obliged to become anti-Japanese.

OK... testifield that because of disunity, Japan would not be able to expand, and so, he sought to bring about unity in the nation for this reason.

He also cited cases where negotiations for the solution of the Nanking Incident were suspended by political struggle in Tokyo and where the manipulations of the Japanese capitalists have meddled with the military's negotiation in Manchuria. He testified that ever since 1929, he had been propagandizing throughout the country of the fact that Japan could not survive alone and should make, for the time being, an economic colonization of Manchuria. (From Record of Trial Proceedings, OK., Shumci, May 15 Incident, Vol 63 of 65, also IPS Doc.No. 1908.)

Extract No. 2 of the third trial depositions gives an interrogation of KOT., Kiyoshi (Tinness) who took a direct and an active part in the May 15 Incident. He testified that his intention was to cause disorder in the Capitol and break down the old system which was controlled by the political parties, plutocrats, and the privileged classes. He further testified that OKAH was not connected with the May 15 Incident except for the fact that the latter supplied him with pistols and ammunition.

The same document contains an extract from an interrogation of T'U-KI, Taku, also a participant in the May 15 Incident. He testified that the incident would have gone on without OKAH anyhow, and that things would have gone along better without the letter. (Used by the Defense as DEF Doc. 685. Extracted from Record of Trial Proceedings, OK.A.), Shumci, May 15 Incident, Vol 63 of 65, also IPS Doc 1908.)

In the remainder of the above volume 63 of 65, a motion of incompetency was filed for OKA by his defense attorneys, KIYOSBE, Ichirite, and ten others.
They said that the conspirator KOO, whom OKA had aided was convicted by the Court of Admiralty for rebellion, and thus, murder was not a purpose but a means to an end. The end was a reformation of the national administration.

Prosecutor ITI stated that OKA finally took an unlawful means of carrying out his (OKA’s) purpose because he thought that it was very difficult to bring forth an opportunity for reformation without a stimulus in the present crisis. (pp 767-768)
INTRODUCTION

DEFEALED DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 28

Dev. Doc. No. 558

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Book, "Report of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Consultation Society"

Date: July 1938

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only

PERSONS INFLUENCED: K.Y., Okinoru; H.O.I.; Yatsuji

INCIDENT, FACT OR EVENTS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLIES:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

An extract used as Defense Doc. No. 558 is a lecture delivered by the Vice-Head of the Industrial Department of Manchukuo. He said that the goal set in the original Five-Year Plan was found to be too low so a revised plan with a higher goal has been set. (pp 182-184)

The book contains also speeches delivered by various Japanese and Manchurian officials. Some are as follows:

K.Y., Okinoru (chairman of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Consultation Society) said, "Needless to say, the great aim of the attack of the Imperial Army is to destroy the political power of CHI-CHI Kai-Shek who does not understand the position of the Chinese people and the real meaning of their mission in East Asia....

For establishing the foundation of peace in East Asia, a firm international union of Japan, Manchukuo and China must be fixed beyond the extent of friendship and coalition. This is no doubt the dawn of a new East Asia and it may be said that this period will be the days of the establishment of a new East Asia. As a stabilizing power of the Far East, we must establish a strong military power and a strong economic power to support it for the accomplishment of that purpose.......

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It is also natural that the main emphasis of Japan's future national policy is the fulfillment and the expansion of the combined economic power of Japan-Manchukuo-China bloc.\* (pp 1-3)

LtCol K.O.I., Yatsuji (Representing the Bureau of Military Affairs of the War Ministry) made a speech containing the following remarks:

\*........I wish to emphasize strongly here that the center of it (T.N. Japan-Manchukuo-China economic expansion) will be Japan's capital, Japan's technology, Japan's personnel, and Japan's spiritual power........? (pp 5-6)

K.I., Chinori:

........The aim of the incident is to break down the anti-Japanese and pro-Communist policy and establish a new order of eternal peace of East Asia. This is to be found in the mutual relations and cooperation by Japan, Manchukuo and China in national defense, politics, economy, and culture........* (p 42)

*........Of course, the aim of the incident is for construction, not for destruction........Thus, we are trying to establish a new East Asia for which the intimate relationship of the three governments is necessary. The economists want to have an economic union first of all........? (pp 288-289)
INFORMATION PRODUCTION SECTION
DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 29

DEF Doc. No. 1274

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Printed Pamphlet, "Officers and Men of the CHINA Expeditionary Forces in the Greater East Asia War", published by Supreme Headquarters, China Expeditionary Forces

Date: 8 Dec 1942

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS IMPlicated: HATA, Shunroku (As C-I-C, China Forces)

INCIDENT, PHASE OR OFFENSE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: China Military Aggression

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Booklet attempts to explain Japan's war in China as fight to throw out treacherous Anglo-Saxons and reform and awaken a corrupt CHINA, as represented by the forces of CHIANG, Kai-Shek. Defense excerpt was an exhortation to the troops to maintain discipline and treat Chinese well.

Only a few excerpts below, are of interest enough to single out from the material harping on the above themes.

/JAPANESE/ Officers and Men of the CHINA Expeditionary Forces in the GREATER EAST ASIA War. 8 Dec 1942

1. Thorough Execution of the GREATER EAST ASIA War and the Settlement of SINO-JAPANESE Relations (pp 1-3)

It is evident that the outbreak of the GREATER EAST ASIA War was directly brought about by the outrageously insolent Anglo-Saxon challenge, based on the world policy aiming at hegemony, to our peerlessly fair and just Imperial way, aiming at the settlement of the current political situation surrounding the CHINA Incident.

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3. Mental Attitude of the Officers and Men of the CHINA Expeditionary Forces (pp 8-10)

Then the fundamental significance of the GREATER EAST ASIA War in our theater of war, as mentioned above, is clearly contemplated, the mental attitude of the officers and men of our CHINA Expeditionary Forces must shape itself.

Furthermore, the officers and men of the Expeditionary Forces, have not only the grand constructive mission to establish the foundation of SINO-JAPANESE unity by fighting out the GREATER EAST ASIA WAR, but also are in a position to exert upon popular minds an influence different from that exerted by Japanese troops in other areas. (T.N. Underlining supplied)

In view of this circumstance, it is most necessary for us to thoroughly realize that we are the peerless Imperial Army, and to translate that idea into our action with all our ardour. We must impress it deeply upon our minds that we cannot carry through the great task charged upon the Expeditionary Forces so long as both officers and men do not embody Divine Force.

Let me describe some points thereof item by item in the following pages: pp 10-11 (1) Establish Strict Military Discipline (T.N. Excerpt translated in DEF Doc. No. 1274)....... But those who give up anti-Japanese activity and want to cooperate with Japan are not only innocent, law-abiding citizens, but also our good comrades on the home front of this Holy War, who will share joys and sorrows with us and fight out the GREATER EAST ASIA War with us. If we treat these people with mistaken sense of superiority, it is nothing but the betrayal of the holy cause.

pp 13-14 /Translated in DEF Doc. No. 1274/.

pp 14-16 (3) Respect the Tradition and the manners and customs of the CHINESE /Translated in DEF Doc. No. 1274/.
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

ANALYSIS No. 30

DEFE D OCU EN T SE RIES A

20 May 1947

DEF Doc. No. 1462

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Printed Pamphlet, "Collection of Announcements and Statements Concerning the China Incident, No. 5" (SHINA JIHEN KANKEI KOTO SHU DAI 50) Published by the Foreign Ministry

Date: Dec 1940

Language: Japanese (Part English)

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: YONAI, Mitsumasa; ARITA, Hashiro; ABE, Nobuyuki; MATSUDA, Yoeke

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with France; French Indo-China; All-China Military Aggression.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Following is an index of statements and addresses by Japanese Foreign Ministry officials in 1940 on the events of that year in China and French Indo-China.

Defense excerpts are noted in brackets.

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21. Joint Communique of the Foreign and Army offices relating to the Foreign Minister ARITA’s Radio Address on June 29. July 3 (p 31)

22. Statement of the Foreign Office spokesman concerning the British reply to the Japanese Representation on the Question of Transportation of materials and goods through Burma and Hongkong in aid of the CHUANG Kai-Shek Regime. July 5 (p 32)

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28. Announcement of the Foreign Office regarding the Conclusion of Negotiations with reference to French Indo-China. September 23 (p 40)

29. Statement of the Foreign Office spokesman SUMA concerning the Border Dispute in the French Indo-China. September 23 (p 41)

30. Summary of the Talks of the Foreign Office spokesman SUMA concerning the French Indo-China Dispute. (FPA Doc. 1462-A) Sept 23 (p 42)
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31. Statement of the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial Headquarters concerning the Peaceful Entry of the Japanese Forces into the Northern Part of French Indo-China. September 23 (p 43)

32. Joint Communiqué of Japanese and French Governments concerning the Entry of the Japanese Forces into French Indo-China. (DEF Doc. 1462-B) September 27 (p 44)

33. Announcement of the Information Section concerning the Question of the Burma Route. October 8 (p 44)

34. Statement of Mr. Matsuoka, Foreign Minister, concerning the Reopening of the Burma Route announced by the British Prime Minister. (DEF Doc. 1462-0) October 10 (p 44)


37. Announcement of the Information Section of the Congratulatory Telegrams despatched by the Foreign Minister MATSUOKA to President IWAN and others on the occasion of the Conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Fundamental Treaty and the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. November 30 (p 69)

APPENDIX

1. The Current Situation and the Spiritual Power. (Speech by the Foreign Minister ARITA on June 1) (p 71)

2. Speech of the Foreign Minister ARITA on the 3rd Anniversary Day of the China Incident. July 7 (p 74)


4. Matters pertaining the Entry of the Japanese Forces into French Indo-China. September 27 (p 83)

5. View of the International Political Situation. (Radio Speech of the Foreign Office Spokesman SUMA) November 29 (p 84)

6. Speech on the Conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Fundamental Treaty. (By the Foreign Office Spokesman SUMA) November 30 (p 95)
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DLFNSL Document Series

ANALYSIS NO. 31

DLFNSL DOC. NO. 1560 (being LNS DOC. NO. __________)

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION of Document


Date: 1933 - 1938 Language: English

Translation in full— No.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

TOGO, Shigenori; Japanese Ambassador to Germany 1937-38

NAGAI, Mutsu; Japanese Ambassador to Germany 1934-35

INCIDENT, PHASE, or CREED TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Preparations for War; Relations with Germany and USSR

SUMMARY OF RELLENT POINTS:

This book is an account of Ambassador DODD'S five years from 1933 through 1937 as U.S. Ambassador to Germany. Although the diary is chiefly an account of State Department & U.S. diplomacy re: The Hitler Regime and the European situation of that period. There are several references to German-Japanese relations of this period and, as early as 1934, Mr. Dodd predicted a secret Japan-Germany Treaty of Alliance against Communism.

Significant references to German-Japanese relations are given in the following excerpts from Mr. DODD'S diary:

(pp 137-38) Aug. 2, 1934: The day of Von Hindenburg's death, Mr. DODD went to the German Foreign office to leave his card, and met the Japanese Ambassador (NAGAI, Mutsu) there. DODD comments:

"As I stood in the room, the Japanese Ambassador came in, very obsequious in bearing toward me. In a little while he told me of his visit to Von Hindenburg a week or two before end of a long talk. It was astonishing. No member of the German Cabinet except Von Neurath had been allowed to visit Neudeck since July 11, not even his close friend Von Papen. When we had signed the book, I noticed the Japanese had arranged to see Von Neurath. None of the other ambassadors or ministers had appointments to see the Foreign Secretary.

Analysis No. 31

Page 1
March 25, 1935. "This morning the Japanese ambassador called. He pressed me to call with him at the British Embassy and ask for an interview with Sir John Simon to learn what was being planned about the German navy and a possible Russian pact.

I talked as agreeably as I could but declined an immediate answer.

It was clearer than ever to me that there is an agreement between Germany and Japan. The ambassador spoke of dining or lunching with Göring, Goebbels, and other high German officials the last few days."

April 25, 1935. "The Japanese ambassador talked again of his close relations with Göring and Goebbels, whom nearly all diplomats dread to see."

(p. 240) May 25, 1935. "Louis Loonner sent me information from someone in the Foreign Office with whom he talks intimately that the German Government has a military alliance with Japan and that seventy army officers are coming here to coordinate their activities with German Army officials. Illner of I.G. Farben --- who has been in the Far East for a year, is said to have negotiated part of the pact and to have sold Japan vast supplies of war chemicals and gases. I have believed there was a secret pact of this kind for several months. While this story may not be true, I am enough impressed to have telegraphed the State Department."

July 6, 1935. "Then the Secretary Van Neuruth referred again to a British-German entente and I asked about the coming naval conference, he expressed much hope that all nations would meet together and agree on naval reductions, but we cannot join the conference if Japan refuses to attend. This surprised me a little because I had not expected such an open hint of a German-Japanese entente."

(July 29, 1936. "At 12:30, I had a long talk with Secretary Van Neuruth, entirely unofficial. I asked him if Germany were about to make a special alliance with Japan, which had been so often rumored recently. He evaded this with, "It might as well commit suicide as enter another war," but insisted that there was no sort of entente between Germany and Italy; also that Germany would not be drawn into a war with Russia even if Japan did attack the Soviet Union. So I got an answer to an important query without direct question."

Further allusions to Japan and relations in the Far East with China and Russia are mentioned in diary entries the letter part of 1937."
ANALYSIS NO. 32  8 Oct 1947

DEF Doc. No. 1940
Ot Exh No. 305b (page 8) (Excerpt fi Doc. page 8, Def Doc No. 1940)

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Naval File of Loose Sheets, Gist of Naval General Directives (Tai Kae II) Nos. 1-35; (No title page to file)

Date: 1941

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full? ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS DIRECTED: Admiral YAMAMOTO, Admiral NAGANO, Osami KUGA, (Comdr of Fleet in Chinese Waters) and Chiefs of Naval Stations and Fortresses

INCIDENT, PHASE or CIRCUMSTANCE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Class B Offences - Naval

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Document contains Naval General Directives for latter half of 1941 and includes Directives numbered 1 to 35.

Excerpts from document (made Def Doc. No. 3177 for identification purposes) analyzed include only the most important directives which are summarized below. Directive No. 31 (Excerpt Def Doc. No. 3177-A) is significant in that restrictions regarding neutrality of ships and areas of non-notice sinking are ordered removed as early as 19 Dec 1941. Other directives concern naval action to be taken in warfare against AMERICA, ENGLAND and the NETHERLANDS in the "first ten days of December" as early as beginning of November 1941.

Directive 1 - 5 Nov 41 - To: Adm YAMAMOTO; Cdr of the Combined Fleet
From: Adm NAGANO, Chief of the Naval General Staff

"In preparation against the circumstance when we are driven to open warfare against America, England and Netherlands in the first ten days of December, advance, at a proper time, the necessary units to the preparation points before the start of operation."

Analysis No. 32
Page 1
Directive 5 - 21 Nov 41 - To: YAMAMOTO
From: NAGANO, Chief of Naval Staff

"The use of armed force under the Great Naval Order (M1 K1 X1) will be restricted to the following occasions:

1. When marine forces invade our territorial waters and carry out scouting.
2. When marine forces approach our territorial waters and take some actions which are dangerous to us.
3. When marine forces take positive actions endangering us, even outside our territorial waters."

(A similar directive is given to KOGA and Chiefs of naval stations and fortresses.)

Directive 17 - 30 Nov 41 - To: Chief of Naval Stations
From: NAGANO, Chief of Naval Staff

"In case of the opening of war with America, England and Netherlands, the disposition of enemy ships and ships belonging to neutral countries will be executed in accordance with the policies stated in the separate volume."

Directive 20 - 1 Dec 41 - To: YAMAMOTO, KOGA and YAMAMOTO at Makò in Formosa
From: NAGANO, Chief of Naval Staff

"If the American, British or Dutch airplanes make repeated reconnaissances of our important operation bases and transport ships, they may be shot down."

Directive 31 - 19 Dec 41 - To: YAMAMOTO
From: NAGANO, Chief of Naval Staff

"The restriction regarding the area of non-notice sinking in executing the marine transportation destruction operation of the submarine is removed. Also, the restriction regarding the respect for the neutrality of the ship is removed. The same will be applied regarding the destruction operation of airplanes. However, when a ship belongs to the Soviet, it should not be attacked. In Japanese waters off the Soviet coasts and the South American coasts south of Peru, the neutrality of the ships belonging to neutral countries will be respected."
ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Bound File, Secret Great Diary (MITSU DAI NIKKI), 1931, Vol. 6 War Ministry.

Date: 1931

Language: Japanese

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MINE, YUKINATSU; MINAMI, JIRO; MONJO, Shigeru.

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRIME TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLIES: Manchurian and Mongolian Affairs; Preparation for Manchurian Aggression.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Document contains numerous communications classified "secret". Of interest may be the following items indicating preparation for the Manchurian aggression.

Section 3, Item 1.

From: Commander of KEMPEITAI, MINE, Yukinatsu
To: War Minister MINAMI, Jiro
Date: 25 July 1931

STUDY CONCERNING ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY POWER OF KEMPEITAI (Military Police) IN MANCHURIA.

It is needless to say that the security of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA is a vital necessity for the maintenance of war power of Japan in future war.

On this matter, the problems of how to dispose of MANCHURIAN and MONGOLIA and how to rule them, have already been undergoing studies by the respective responsible organs.
In that connection the study of the Military police has come to our minds. The necessity of the activities of Military police is growing especially in such territories as MANCHURIA where the situation is becoming worse in connection with the Sino-Japanese relations.

If we plan a complete military occupation of a certain territory of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA we will need a minimum Military police strength of 5,000 men in addition to the garrison army in the occupied territory. It is necessary in this connection to increase the number of the Military police at once, so that they could work in an emergency.

STUDY CONCERNING RULE OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA.

Kwantung Army Headquarters

Military Police and Civil Police

I. Civil police will take charge of police affairs in the zones of direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, Kwantung-Chou and the South Manchurian Railway zones. The military police will take charge of other districts of military administration.

2. The Police Affairs Section shall be established under the headquarters in order to supervise police affairs in the occupied zones. A general shall be the chief of the section and shall supervise all the affairs relating to the military and civil police.

3. Good Chinese and Koreans shall be chosen to be employed as assistant military police.

4. There shall be about 5,000 MP's, including 200 officers, 1,500 non-com. officers, and 3,000 privates. Besides the regular MP's, 20,000 assistant MP's shall be needed.

II. Military police in respective military administration districts.

I. Each military administration district shall have one military police unit. The headquarters shall be in a city having an administration office. There shall be MP squads in important cities, counties, railways, and harbors. They shall be called City MP Squad, County MP Squad, and Railway MP Squad respectively.

ANALYST: FRED F. SUZUKIWA
1st Lt.
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES

ANALYSIS No. 34

DEF Doc. No. 2295
Or Exh. No. 3038-J

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT:

Title and Nature: Cover File, Secret General Plan (KITZU DAI NIKI), 1931, Vol. 5, War Ministry.

Date: 1931

Original process in full ( )

Language: Japanese

Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS INVOLVED: SUGIYAMA, Gen; KASHII, Echio.

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRITICS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparation for Manchurian Aggression.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Document contains numerous communications classified "Secret", of interest may be the following that shows how the secret funds were used.

Section 3, Item 38.

Telegram to Vice War Minister (SUGIYAMA, Gen) from the Commander of the China Garrison Army, (KASHII, Echii)

Date: 5 January 1931.

Subject: Plan for use of secret funds in the Manchurian Incident.

Contents:

¥17,000.00 For bribing and guaranteeing witnesses.
¥3,000.00 For bribing high officials who command those witnesses above-mentioned, and for related matters.
¥7,000.00 For bribing persons or using spies to get testimonies and witnesses from Chinese and French. For cost of testimonies and special allowances to witnesses.
¥20,000.00 Total

ANALYST: FRED F. SUZUKAWA

1st. Lt.

Analysis No. 34
ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Bound Volume, File of Navy Dept. Directives (DAI KAI SHI TSUZURI), General Headquarters, No. 1, 1942.

Date: 1942  Language: Japanese
Original processed in Excerpts only (x)
full ( )

PERSONS IMPLICATED:
YAMAMOTO (Fleet Commander); NAGANO, Osami; and various Commanders-in-chief of Naval and Navy Defense Stations.

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:
Naval Warfare

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Document contains Naval Department Directives Nos. 36 to 1F2, covering the period from 3 January to 29 December 1942. A complete index, attached to the original document, has been prepared for reference.

Directives No. 77 and 86 of April 1942, pertaining to dispatching of designated submarine to Europe and revision of strategic operations are given below.

Directive No. 77

6 April 1942
TO: YAMAMOTO, Fleet Commander
FROM: NAGANO, Osami, Chief of Naval Headquarters
Despatch submarine No. 30 "I" Class to Europe for strategical operations, leaving home at middle of April and bound home about the end of September.

Directive No. 86
16 April 1942:

TO: TOYODA, Commander-in-Chief of KURE Naval Station.
    HIRATA, " " " " YOKOSUKA " "
    KOBAYASHI, " " " " MAIZURU " "
    TANIMOTO, " " " " SASEBO " "
    SAKAMOTO, " " " " CHINKAI Navy Defense Station.
    YAMAMOTO, " " " " BAKO Navy Defense Station.
    OKUMA, " " " " O'INATO Navy Defense Station.
    KOBAYASHI, " " " " OSAKA Navy Defense Station.

FROM: NAGANO, Osami, Chief of Naval Headquarters

"The Principles of Strategic Operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Warfare Against the American, the British and the Dutch" is revised in the part designated as Second Stage Operations as described in the accompanying separate volume.

Analyst: Evelyn T. Garden

DATE: 1943 (1st Half) LANGUAGE: Japanese

ORIGINAL PROCESSED IN FULL? ( ) EXCERPTS ONLY (x)

PERSONS DELIGHTED: NAGANO, Osami; YOSHUTO (Commander of the Combined Fleet); YOSHIDA (Commander of China Waters Fleet)

INCIDENT, K.S.E. OR ORDERS TO WHICH DOCUMENT ATTACHED: Naval Warfare

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Document contains Navy Department Directives No. 183 to 255, covering the period from 1 January to 28 June 1943. A complete index has been prepared and is attached to the original document for reference.

Directives 194, 210, 211 and 221 pertaining to operations in South American Coast area, operations by China Waters Fleet, and espionage activity in Pacific and Indian Ocean Areas are given below.

Imperial General Headquarters Navy Department Directive No. 194
20 Jan 1943
Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami
Issued to Commander of the Combined Fleet YOSHUTO

Parts of stipulations in Item 2 of the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Department Directive No. 107, to be observed in dealing with shipping, are hereby revised as follows:

1. From among the countries to be regarded as strictly neutral, as stipulated in Paragraph (1), "CHILE" is deleted.

Analysis No. 36
Page 1
2. From latter part of Paragraph (3) "and South American coast south of Peru" is deleted.

(Imperial General Headquarters Naval Dept Directive Top-Secret Telegram No. 271513)

Imperial General Headquarters Naval Department Directive No. 210
25 March 1943
Chief of Naval General Staff NAEGASHI, Osami
Issued to China Waters Fleet Commander YOSHIDA

1. Greater East Asia War, 3rd Stage Operations, Imperial Navy Operations Plan, is decided on as indicated in Annexed Document No. 1.

2. China Waters Fleet Commander is hereby instructed to conduct operations according to operations plan as indicated in Annexed Document No. 2.

Annexed Document No. 1 is omitted, being the same as the one annexed to I.G.H.N.D. No. 209.

Annexed Document No. 2

A. Operations against AMERICA, BRITAIN, and CHINA.

1. Stabilization of occupied areas, and continuation of the blockade.
2. Strict watch against enemy air forces, with bases in China.
3. Protection of Japanese sea transportation along CHINESE coast, and prevention of enemy shipping and aircraft from utilizing Chinese coast.
4. Cooperation with French authorities in defending Kunghow Bay French-leased Territory, and cutting off Hainan Island from Chinese proper.
5. Cooperation with the army or the Combined Fleet, if required, in conducting above-mentioned operations.

B. Operations in case hostilities are begun while operations against AMERICA, BRITAIN and CHINA are still in progress.

1. Assistance to transport by sea army units to be transferred from the China theater.
2. Shortening of the fighting line in keeping with the army's relinquishing part of the occupied areas.

Analysis No. 36
Page 2
Imperial General Headquarters Naval Pont Directive No. 21
25 Mar 1943
Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami
Issued to Commanders of various Naval Districts and Guard Districts

1. Greater East Asia War, 3rd Stage Operations, Imperial Navy Operations Plan, is decided as indicated in Annexed Document No. 1.

2. Each Naval District force and each Guard District force are hereby instructed to conduct operations according to Annexed Document No. 2.

Annexed Document No. 1 is omitted, being the same as the one annexed to I.G.H. P.D. No. 205.

Annexed Document No. 2

A. Operations against JAPAN, BRITAIN and CHINA.

1. Defense of strategic points, protection of sea transportation and cooperation with Combined and China Fleets.
2. Strict watch against air-raids on Jap homeland.
3. Cooperation with protection of islands along the homeland, especially those to the North and the South.

B. Operations in case hostilities are launched operations against JAPAN, BRITAIN and CHINA are still in progress.

1. Strict watch against Soviet submarines and aircraft.
2. Cooperation with Japanese fleets fighting away from the homeland, by sending air units and other required forces.
3. Other operations shall be according to Annexed Document No. 1.

Imperial General Headquarters Naval Pont Directive No. 221
17 Apr 1943
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami
Issued to Combined Fleet Commander YAMAMOTO

The commander of the Combined Fleet is hereby instructed to put into effect measures to communications and espionage pertinent to Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

Notification of required details throughout shall be from the Chief of the Special Service Section of the Naval General Headquarters.
Analyses No. 36 - Page 4. - SUMMARY Cont'd

Imperial General Headquarters Naval Dept Directive No. 232
4 May 1943
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGNO, 00 ml
Issued to Combined Fleet Commander

You are hereby instructed to dispatch Submarine "1" No. 8 to EUROPE in order to conduct operations, the schedule being to leave Japan during the last few days of May and to return by about the end of October.

Analyst: ET GARDEN

Analysis No. 36
Page 4
DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Bound Volume, File of Navy Dept Directives, General Headquarters (DAL-KI-SHI TSUKURI), No. 3, 2nd Half of 1943

Date: 1943 (2nd Half) Language: Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only ( )

PERSONS IMPLICATED: NAGANO, Osami; KOCHI (Commander of the Combined Fleet)

INCIDENT, FACTS OR CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Class B Offences - at Sea

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Document contains Naval Department Directives No. 256 to 315, covering the period from 7 July - 23 December 1943. A complete index to the volume has been prepared and is attached to the scanning notes, found in Room 863 (Scanning Unit).

Directivo No. 273, regarding the dispatching to Europe for special operations submarines "1" No. 29 (Nov 1943 - May 1944) and "1" No. 34 (Oct 1943 - April 1944) is translated in full as follows:

Imperial General Headquarters Naval Department Directivo No. 273
7 Sept 1943
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami
Issued to Commander of the Combined Fleet KOCHI

Commander of the Combined Fleet is hereby instructed to dispatch submarines "1" /to be read in a Japanese way like a short "1" in English/ No. 29 and "1" No. 34 to EUROPE generally according to the following schedule and cause them to engage in special duties re the special duties, separate instructions shall be given.

Analysis No. 37
Page 1
Submarine "1" No. 29 shall leave Japan during the first decade of November and return about the first decade of May next year.

Submarine "1" No. 34 shall leave Japan during the middle decade of October and return about the middle decade of April next year.

(Imperial General Headquarters Naval Department "Top Secret"
Telegram No. 071151)
Title and Nature. Bound File, Manchurian Secret Great Diary (MAN HITOKU DAI JI YOKU; 1931, War Ministry, Vol. 1 of)

Date: 1931

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full? ( ) Excerpts only (v)

PERSONS INVOLVED. MIYAKE, Mitsuharu, V.C., Gen

Incident Phase or Crisis to Which Document Applies. Manchurian and Mongolian Aggression

Summary of Relevant Points

Contains various secret communications exchanged between the Kwantung Army and the War Ministry.

The following document indicates that the Kwantung Army ruled Manchuria and Mongolia with despotism:

Item 251 - Re sending of documents relative to temporary measures for dealing with Mongolia and Manchuria (p. 149).

The document was sent by MIYAKE, Mitsuharu, Vice-chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to Vice Minister of War MYOSHI, Gen, on 5 Dec 1931.

Chart giving temporary organization (until the establishment of the New Regime) shows that all functions of the government were under the control of the Commander-in-Chief (of the Kwantung Army). Reasons for having the Temporary Organization:

1. Under the present circumstances, a powerful despotic organization is necessary to effect active leadership.

Analysis No. 30

Page 1
2. It is not a wise policy to have a big organization since it will unnecessarily stimulate popular opinion at home and abroad. Moreover, such a big organization is very likely to cause diversities in opinions among the officials concerned, thereby bringing about poor results in leadership and difficulty in the maintenance of security.

3. Chinese leaders are presently relying upon the Japanese Army and constructive work is already progressing to a certain extent; therefore, it is not a good policy to set up another new administrative organization.

4. Joint conference system of various organizations cannot effect a settlement of outstanding matters in Manchuria and Mongolia.

5. In view of the above, the most reasonable way is to establish a new Administration Department within the present organization of the Army. The various other organizations in Manchuria are to cooperate with it. When a new regime is established, the authority of leadership shall be taken over by the Advisory Government, and the Army Headquarters shall join it.
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION JUXTA

DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS NO. 39

DEFENSE DOCUMENT No. 2931

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DATE: 29 January 1948

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Resume of Foreign Minister Togo's Greetings (at Conference of the Ambassadors of the East Asiatic Countries in Tokyo)

Date: 23 April 1945

Language: English, Japanese

Original processed in full? ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS ILLUSTRATED: Togo, Chigoro

INCIDENT, ISSUE OR EVENTS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Prosecution of Aggressive War

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT EVENTS

Togo outlines the recent history of the Far East and the causes of the Greater East Asia War. He attributes the cause of the war to America's and Britain's military and economic pressure on the Empire and blames them also for the China Incident through their application of the "divide and conquer" strategy.

Japan's noble war aims — the establishment of co-prosperity and peace in East Asia — are emphasized, as against the post-war plans of the U.S.A. and Britain to establish world military bases, to dominate the international police, and to monopolize international politics.
ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Excerpt from *Memoirs of Prince Konoye* (p. 3991 of Part 20, the Joint Committee Exhibits of the Hearings of the Pearl Harbor Investigation, Ex. 2850 for Identification Only)

Date: 1941 (Jan-Mar) Language: English, Japanese

Original processed in full? ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS MENTIONED: OHIMA, Hiroshi; KONOYE, Fumimaro; MITSUWA, Yosuko

INSTRUCTIONS OR CRITICS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with Germany; Relations with U.S. - Jap-American Negotiations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CONTEXT

Excerpt describes Germany's desire for total participation in the Jap-American negotiations and for an immediate report regarding the American reply during the early part of 1941, in keeping with the articles of the Tripartite Pact. OHIMA, it is stated, declared "in strong language" his opposition to the Jap-American proposal and regularly, in cables, reported the German antipathy.

Concerning the joint Jap-American Conferences held on May 15th and May 22nd in Tokyo, KONOYE states that there was only an exchange of information and that because of the influence of German opinion and the objections of Ambassador OHIMA, the Foreign Minister's (MITSUWA) attitude remained "vague" and he stood opposed, as against the other Cabinet members who were hopeful of settlement.

Analyst: MT GARDEN Analysis No. 40
ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Typewritten, loose pages on Foreign Office Stationery entitled "Extracts from Minutes of the Committee Investigating the Treaty for the Renunciation of War", marked "Top Secret".

Date: 17 June 1929

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) 
Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS IMPlicated: HIRJNUMI, Vice-President; Secretary ITTO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELVANT POINTS

Document deals in a wide discussion of right of self-defence, especially in relation to Anti-War Pact.

Councillor Tomii states "...In Japan's reply concerning the right of self-defense it is stated that she takes substantially the same view as the Government of the United States...."

Director of the European and American Bureau Hotta comments "...The extent of future actions our government may take in Manchuria will vary depending on the increase in our rights and interests in our position. Therefore even if today we should reserve the right to take action in that area according to a certain definite form it may be that this form will be found inadequate in the future when our rights and interests have increased, and it may even be that our actions will be restricted because of this...."

Analyst: A.L. KOBEL

Analysis No. 41
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 42

7 June 1948

76 Doc. No. 679

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT


Date: 22 June 1929

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full ( ) Excerpts only (x)

PERSONS INVOLVED: Saito, Makoto Viscount

INCIIDENT, PHASE OR CRISIS TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Report to Baron Kuramoto, Yuzaburo, Chairman of the Privy Council, dated 22 June 1929, signed by members of the Investigation Committee on the Inquiry on the Ratification of the Treaty for Renunciation of War - speaks of two draft treaties, amendments of original French bill, introduced by the United States Government with the aim of recognizing war as illegal between the two countries. On 27 August, 1928, in Paris, France, the Treaty was concluded in the presence of the delegates of the fifteen original signatory powers.

An excerpt from the report reads as follows: "The United States Government interpreted the right of self-defense in a broader sense, that its functions included not only actions to be taken to defend the homeland but also to defend our important rights and interests in China, especially in Manchuria and Mongolia as well. She only considered it pertinent not to declare such view at the time."

Analyst: HOBEL, A. L.

Analysis No. 42
The following pages contain a summary in chronological order of such parts of the oral and documentary evidence given by the Prosecution up to December 19, 1946, as are reasonably capable of being dealt with in that way. Dated events are brought together into one story regardless of the phase in which they were introduced, including the various offices from which they were held by the accused, which the Prosecution contends make them in a greater or less degree responsible for what took place during their tenure of office.

These are all cases extracted from Exhibits 102-129 inclusive, in which appointments have been omitted from the personnel record of the individual are to be found in Exhibit 102, where the name is listed under the office. It does not purport to cover the whole case for the Prosecution, although the following matters are omitted and can be separately treated if necessary:

1. Evidence dealing generally with a subject not having a particular date.
2. Evidence relating to Class B and C offences.
3. Supplementary evidence introduced at the close of the case relating to individual accused.

The effect of the evidence or document is of course much condensed in the page of the record, name of the witness or number of the exhibit in each case given, so that it can be checked or supplemented from the original.

The names of the accused only, wherever they appear, are in block capitals.

At the end of the summary there is:

1. A list of subjects not fully covered by the summary with reference to pages and exhibits in which they are dealt with.
2. An index giving the pages of the summary on which each accused is named and those covering the periods during which he held a major office, with in some cases other notes concerning him.
The following pages contain a summary in chronological order of such parts of the oral and documentary evidence given by the Prosecution up to December 10, 1946, as are reasonably capable of being dealt with in that way. Dated events are brought together into one story regardless of the phase in which they were introduced, including the various offices from time to time held by the accused, which the Prosecution contends made them in a greater or lesser degree responsible for what took place during their tenure of office. These are in all cases extracted from Exhibits 102-129 inclusive. In some cases appointments have also been omitted from the personal record of the individual, but are to be found in Exhibit 102, where the name is listed under the office.

It does not purport to cover the whole case for the Prosecution. In particular the following matters are omitted and can be separately treated if necessary:

1. Evidence dealing generally with a subject but not related to any particular date.
2. Evidence relating to Class B and C offences.
3. Supplementary evidence introduced at the close of the case relating to individual accused.

The effect of the evidence or document is of course much condensed, by the page of the record, name of the witness or number of the exhibit is in each case given, so that it can be checked or supplemented from the original.

The names of the accused only, wherever they appear, are in block capitals.

At the end of the summary there is:

1. A list of subjects not fully covered by the summary with reference to pages and exhibits in which they are dealt with.
2. An index giving the pages of the summary on which each accused is named and those covering the periods during which he held a major office, with in some cases other notes concerning him.
Document 0001

On page 67 delete the entry "On 15 Mar HATA was appointed Military Councillor".

On page 86 insert "On 15 Dec HATA was appointed Military Councillor".

On page 86 delete "KIMAMI" after Gov. Gen. of Formosa.

On page 154 delete "in command Expeditionary Force China" after HATA, General and substitute "Military Councillor".

On page 324 delete "and Minister of State" after "HOSHINO", Chief Secretary of Cabinet.

On page 321 delete opposite entry of Military Councillor "15 Mar 1938 - 25 May 1939" and substitute "15 Dec 1938 - 25 May 1939".

On page 331 delete "1 April 1939" opposite Governor General of Chosen and substitute "May 1943", also delete page "39" and substitute "238".
On 4 June 1928 a clique of officers planned the murder of General Chang Tso Lin when the train in which he was riding was wrecked by explosives. Tanaka stated in his testimony that he had seen Japanese reports on this incident which placed guilt on the Japanese.

The Tanaka Cabinet conducted a peaceful policy as shown by Tanaka's speech to the Diet on 22 January 1929, in which he states Japanese contributions to world peace in respect to Manchurian interests and Chinese sovereignty will not be jeopardized. The Tanaka Cabinet was forced to resign on 1 July 1929 due to Army opposition and overwhelming problems and was succeeded by the Hamaguchi Cabinet.

The Hamaguchi Cabinet, in power from 2 July 1929 to 4 April 1931, adhered to the peaceful policy of the Tanaka Cabinet and Okada stated measures such as decreasing the Army and Navy budgets and ratification of the London Naval Treaty in opposition to the military group were affected. The Hamaguchi Cabinet fell as a result of an attempt on the life of the Premier as testified by Shidehara.

On 15 November 1929 KISUZU KISUZU who was one of the leaders of the militaristic group (as testified by Shimizu and Tanaka) wrote a report concerning the "Situation in the Caucasus and Its Strategic Use for the Purpose of Sabotage Activities," in which he stated that since Caucasus are little affected by Soviet in view of geographical location it should be an important area from the standpoint of strategy against the USSR. A force of military occupation would be necessary to unite the Caucasus in view of diverse races.

Between 18 August and 26 September 1930, thirteen meetings of the Irivvy Council were held to discuss the ratification
of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. Defendant HIJIMUTSU was vice-president at all the meetings.

On 1 October 1930 a Privy Council meeting was held to discuss the Imperial Ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. HIJIMUTSU was vice-president.

On 14 April the Nakatsuki Cabinet succeeded the Hara Cabinet. Their policy was conciliatory, but was greatly strained by the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. A group of young Army officers led by HASHINO and OKA were planning occupation of Manchuria and overthrow of the government at this time.

In April, OKA and others participated in a plot to overthrow the government, which failed due to withdrawal of the military.

The Nippon Times of 6 August quotes a speech by INAI in which he stated some people are advocating limiting armaments in view of the international attitude to Japan’s desires in Manchuria. Such mistakes should be corrected and points out the close relations between Manchuria, Mongolia and Japan. He hoped training of troops would be executed with enthusiasm and sincerity so the cause of His Majesty might be served to perfection. (Certificate confirming the speech's existence is contained in Exh. 185.)

On 9 September KIDO, Konoye and others conferred and discussed the secret arch plot of the militarists to overthrow the government and that these affairs might not disappear. OKA's faction is advocating socialistic nationalism under Imperial rule.

On 10 September a discussion was held at Prince Konoye's house stating that self-defensive action might in future be unavoidable in the China situation.

-2-
1940 Takke

In general line of the installation of arms at Haiphon under
the pretext of building - oil. Strict secrecy was being ob-
served up to the completion date was 10 September.

1935 179-D

On 12 September Kido and his associates met to discuss the
latest understandings of the U.S. Army.

1936 Takke

On 15 or 16 September, Shidohara wrote from the Japanese
Consul in Haiphon that he was commander of a patrol unit
that within a short time a big incident would break out.

On 18 September the positions of the accused were as follows:

Akihi, Saido, Chief of General Affairs Department of
Inspectorate; Gen. of Military Training;

DAI KUJI, Koji, Lt. C. M. attached to Headquarters Kwantung
Army; Major of Japan;

Yoshikawa, Kinsoro, Lt. Gen. General Staff (for Ministry)
and Military Science Instructor;

Harada, Shunroku, Lt. C. M. Inspector of artillery;

Hiita, Kichiro, Vice-President of Privy Council;

President of Kokura (founder);

HIIRA, Koki, Ambassador to USA;

NOSHING, Kunio, various posts in Finance Ministry;

IT. G. KI, Seishiro, Colonel on Staff Kwantung Army;

K. N., Okinori, Secretary of Special Administration and
Financial Council (Finance Ministry);

KIDO, Keishi, Chief Secretary to Lord Keeper of Privy Seal;

KIRA, Hidetsugu, Colonel in command 22nd Field Artillery
Regiment;

KOKU, Kunikido, Lt. General, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau,
War Ministry; Chief Secretary, Supreme War Council;

AKUMI, Isamu, Lt. General, Commander in Chief of 11th
Division;
On 16 September a Cabinet meeting was held and attended by Mr. Minister Ichikado, who did not know of the incident.

On the morning of 19 September, between six and seven o'clock, Mr. Minister Ichikado informed Nakatsuki by telephone that hostilities had broken out between Japan and China at Mukden.
On 19 September H.I.DO attended a meeting at which Harada reported that the Premier was worried about the strong attitude of the army and wanted to find some way to control that.

When witness Fujita congratulated H.SHI-TTO on the Manchurian Incident on 19 September H.SHI-TTO replied, "Yes, things have come to pass as they should have done."

The preparation and planning of this incident was the work of a group including OK., a civilian, H.SHI-TTO in the General Staff in Tokyo, and IT.J.KI in the staff of Kwantung Army, all of whom, as well as other conspirators, had related this to Tanka in conversations before and after the incident.

On 19 September the Consul General at Mukden telegraphed Foreign Minister, Shidehara, that the Mukden Incident seems to point to the fact that it was planned by the army. He also cabled on the same day the attempts he had made to settle the incident peacefully and emphasized the fact that the army was preparing to carry out an actual anti-Manchurian plan.

On 21 September H.I.DO met and conferred with some of his associates on the subject of Manchuria. The advance of the Korean army into Manchuria without Imperial sanction was mentioned.

On 21 September a representative of the Chinese Government, including OK., a civilian, and H.I.DO in the event to Geneva wrote the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, asking him to bring the attention of the Council to the situation and appeal to the Council to take immediate steps to prevent further development of the situation.

On 22 September H.I.DO stated in his diary that the army had planned to be ready to take immediate steps if it was strong enough to determine its policy toward Manchuria and Kwantung.

On 21 September H.I.DO met with some of his associates on the subject of Manchuria. He stated that he was determined in his policy toward Manchuria and Kwantung, adding that the army must be ready to act if necessary.
carried out. The army is angered at the Emperor's approval of the governmental policy.

On the night of 22 September Hayashi, Commander-in-Chief of the Korean army, moved his army across the Yalu River into Manchuria. This was done without Imperial sanction and by permission of Kanji, minister of war.

A memorandum from Stimson of September 1931 related to the conversation with Japanese ambassador Dobashi about the situation in Manchuria and his concern regarding arms.

In a memorandum of 22 September from Stimson to the Japanese ambassador, he again expressed concern about the Manchurian situation and the sanction of principal strategic points in South Manchuria.

On 23 September when Powell arrived in Mukden, Japanese were in full control of the town.

On 24 September the Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order was declared formed under Mr. Yuan Chin Kai. The Japanese press claimed this as a separatist movement, but Mr. Yuan publicly disclaimed this intention on October 1 and stated it was to preserve peace and order and it had no intention of organizing a provincial government or declaring independence.

In a telegram of 24 September Stimson requested Neville, U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Japan, to deliver a note to the Foreign Minister, stating a similar note had been dispatched to China. The note expressed regret at the Manchurian situation and the United States' desire for a swift, amicable settlement of Japan and China's differences.

In a statement issued by the Japanese Embassy after the Extraordinary Cabinet meeting of 24 September, it was stated
that it was superfluous to report that Japan harbors no territorial designs on Manchuria.

1939 Shih-hua. On 24 September the Cabinet issued a resolution stating that Japan has no territorial designs and he believed that in fact, honestly speaking, the Cabinet itself had no idea of territorial expansion.

On 24 September after the Extraordinary Cabinet meeting, a statement was issued that the antagonistic attitude of the Chinese in the Mukden area, the conduct of officials and the alleged destruction of the railroad line were the reasons for the Mukden attack. The Japanese are maintaining in control of the railroad line and Kjirin merely as a precaution to guard against further attacks.

On 29 September 1939 the note from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the U.S. Embassy in Japan of 28 September stated that Japan could exercise every effort to avoid any actions which might prejudice amicable relations between Japan and China and observe international law requirements.

On 29 September 1939 Lord Keppel's diary that the Lord Keppel had reported that Ito had told him that the Chief of the Army's General Staff had told the Premier that the Army may be compelled to send troops to the Yangtze River area and that if this happened he did not wish the government to interfere with the directives of the Supreme Command of the Army.

On 29 September General Tang Ju Lin took over the responsibility of the Province of Jehol.

On 30 September a proclamation was made that Hai Hea was chairman of the provincial government of Kjirin and the organic law of a new provincial government of Kjirin was announced.
A resolution of the League of Nations of 30 September acknowledged the receipt of the Japanese and Chinese replies to its appeal and noted the Japanese statement that she had no territorial designs in Manchuria. The Council was convinced that Japan and China sought peaceful settlement and requested restoration of normal relations and the continuance of completion of its undertaking.

1940 179-1
On 1 October KIDO stated in his diary that he heard a discussion with Shintarō and Konoye on the militarist secret plot and the danger of a coup d'état to set up a dictator regime.

1941 179-2
On 5 October KIDO stated in his diary that a meeting was held with Konoye and Ichiki to discuss the army's stubbornness and its intrigues and requested Ichiki to think up a solution to the matter.

1941 179-3
On 6 October the Prime Minister discussed the matter with the Lord Kuras and fears a risk of a head-on collision with the army on the question of with whom to negotiate the Manchurian problem.

1941 179-4
On 7 October KIDO and others met with Suzuki, who stated that they do not intend to carry out a national reformation immediately but it is to save the situation if something does happen such as a rebellion among the younger officers.

In a telegram from Stimson to Gilbert, the Consul at Geneva, on 9 October, it is stated that the United States will reinforce what the League does and makes clear that it is definitely interested in the matter and not oblivious to the obligations which the parties have assumed to the signatories of the Pact of Paris and the 9-Power Pact, when it should a national rebellion among the younger officers.
Thus, the United States would not embarrass the League in the course to which it is now committed.

Goto testified that on 10 October there was an outbreak of fighting in Manchuria.

On 11 October...Umay, a Japanese representative at the Extraordinary Meeting of the League of Nations.

On 14 October Kido held a meeting with Otomo and others regarding the rapid progress of spy plots and a proposition of nationalization of Shishokukai, an association planned by Hase, which should be a permanent countermeasure.

On 15 October Kido met with Ohkura and Hayashi on the subject of the Manchurian situation. It requires prompt action and the creation of a new regime in Manchuria and that the authorities should give approval and facilitate the problem.

On 17 October Katsuki stated that he had been told of an order to arrest the young officers who were participating in an attempt on Kato's life.

This plot, known as "the October incident" was also the work of the same group including Ohkura and Kato, as revealed to Tanaka in conversations by them and other conspirators. The object was to set up a new government to give stronger support to the Manchurian incident. The ultimate object according to Ohkura was to drive the white races out of Manchuria.

On 19 October the Committee for Peace and Order opened the Board of Finance with Japanese advisors assisting.
On Oct 20 the ruins of the municipal government at Mudan were restored to a qualified Chinese body with Dr. Choo Hsin-lo as Mayor of Mudan.

On Oct 21 the Board of Industry was opened by the Committee for the Militaries of Peace and Order, who now changed their name to the 'Liaoning Province Self-Government Office.'

In a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations on Oct 21, referring to the Manchuria situation, Japan's plagues regarding no territorial designs on Manchuria were set. It calls upon Japan to withdraw her troops from the railroad zone and for a representation of both countries to be done in order to settle the incident.

On Nov 1 Shidehara cabled the Consul General Kunishima at Tientsin stating the indivisibility of setting up an independent state of Manchuria under Ku-Yi at the present time.

On Nov 2 Kunishima cabled Shidehara concerning a conference held at Tientsin between representatives of the three eastern provinces to discuss the bill regarding autonomy of these provinces. On this day the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai telegraphed Shidehara concerning - musor of DOHIKIN attempts to take in-Yi to Mudan.

On Nov 3 Japana Consul General Kunishima cabled Shidehara concerning their attempts to persuade DOHIKIN, but he is insisting on the abduction of the Emperor Ku-Yi, while pretending it is nothing to do with Japan. DOHIKIN has contemplated the method of removing Ku-Yi via Hin-hou and he refused advice to give up this plan.

DOHIKIN's work in having the deposed Emperor Ku-an Tung brought to Manchuria. On the same day he cabled again.
On November, a华北电报 Shishihara concerning news it, which stated that DOHMA's visit to Tianjin was (a) to form an independent government, and (b) to direct Japan to cause trouble with China as a excuse for re-evacuation of troops.

On November, the Chinese started anti-taliban unrest under the cover of certain generals established a new regime provisional government in Harbin.

On November, the living wine of Self-Government Office transferred to Liaoning provincial Government, severed relations with the former Kanto States Governments and the Central Kuomintang Government.

On November, the Liaoning provincial Government was publicly opened.

On November, Consul General at Tianjin, cabled Shishihara quoting a Chinese newspaper report of the abduction of the emperor (Lu-Yi).

On November, Japanese Consul at Yinsen, cabled Shishihara concerning the transmission of the emperor Lu-Yi to the emperor "Shuji Imura" at Tianjin. On this day, a Chinese telegraphed Shishihara concerning the part taken by the Japanese army in the abduction of Lu-Yi and gave him further details of this abduction. On November, Lu-Yi arrived at Fengtian.

On November, a telegram from Yannai to Shishihara pointed out that it is better to eliminate Lu-Yi from politics in Manchuria for the moment and establish him ostensibly according to the wishes of the Manchurians and Mongolians. This
will stop any intervention by the United States or council of powers.

On 17 November Kawasaki telegraphed Shidohara concerning Dohihara's action to set up a separate government in Kuchuri by plotting and rioting, with knowledge that it is against national policy.

On 22 November Governor General Tsukamoto of the Kwantung sent a telegram to Shidohara dealing with the desire of the Kwantung army to keep Kiu-Mei's location a secret.

On 24 November the U.S. Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) sent a telegram to the Secretary of State stating assurance by Shidohara that the incident would be halted.

On 26 November Yang at Wuji telegraphed Shidohara that Kawasaki on the request of F.K. had arrived in Tientsin to abduct the Express. Dohihara confirmed this to the attendants of the Express.

On 27 November Hushiri, Consul General at Tientsin, telegraphed Shidohara regarding the army's report that the Express had left Tientsin for P'eiorn.

On 6 December 'Bishiri, Consul General at Mukden, telegraphed Shidohara reporting the activities of the National Guard, a Japanese sponsored organization to cause trouble behind the scenes and formulate a plan for the taking over of provinces east of Shanghai.

On 9 December K.G.I.O and H.T.S. were appointed plenipotentiaries to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. TOGO was a delegate.

A resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of 10 December stated that it reaffirmed the resolution of 30 September by which the two parties were solemnly bound
and requested withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the zone, and decided to appoint a commission of five members to study the situation on the spot and report to the Council.

In a note from Stimson to Johnson, U.S. Minister in China, on 11 December, the United States' gratitude for the adoption of the resolution of 10 December is expressed. The United States is interested in the objectives sought by the League to prevent war and the immediate cessation of hostilities and reaffirms Japan's pledge to withdraw her troops from the railroad zone. The United States approves of the appointment of a five-man commission to study the problem.

On 10 December, Inukai was attached to General Staff Headquarters. On 12 December the Inukai Cabinet took office.

On 15 December, General Tsung Shih-yi, who was arrested on 20 September for his refusal to organize a provincial government, was finally released. General Tsung Shih-yi replaced Chin-hai as head of Liaoning Provincial Government.

On 17 December, Japan abandoned the gold standard.

On 17 December the Cabinet approved the proposed military budget to be used to pacify and occupy the four provinces under Ch'ing Hua-sh Li ng (so Inukai stated in his admissions).

On 22 December Forbes telegraphed the Secretary of State, stating that Inukai reiterated that Japan would never impair Chinese sovereignty and merely desired to protect Japanese nationals.

According to an extract from the Lytton Report, 23 December was the date of the concentrated Japanese attack which forced the 19th Chinese Brigade to surrender its position.
on 27 December extract from Lytton report stating that
Injuriel sanction had been obtained for the dispatch of the
staff of the 20th division and another brigade from Korea.

on 31 December Litvinov suggested to Yoshizawa (in the
presence of Hirota) that steps might be taken to conclude a
non-aggression pact between Russia and Japan. Yoshizawa said
he would forward the proposal to the government.

on 7 January 1932 the Kirin Independent declared that
General Ching Chin-hui was appointed governor of Heilun­
king on 1 January.

On 7 January an objection was sent by Stimson of the
U.S. Government to the Japanese Government regarding the
Japanese aggressive policy in Manchuria.

In a telegram from Stimson to Ambassador Forbes on
7 January he requests Forbes to deliver an enclosed note to
the Japanese Government. The note stated that with the
military operations near Chinchow, the last remaining authority
of the Chinese Government in Southern Manchuria (as it
existed prior to 18 September 1931) had been destroyed.

The United States is hoping the League will find a settlement
to this problem; will not recognize any treaty or agreement
entered into by these governments which would impair the
treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China;
and it does not intend to recognize any situation or agree­
ment brought about by means contrary to the pact of paris
of 1928.

In a telegram from Forbes to Stimson of 16 January he
stated that Japan, in answer to Stimson’s note, said with
respect to the open door policy that in so far as Japan can
secure it, the open door policy will always be maintained in

-14-
On 26 January General Doull D. was sent to Harbin to take over the office of the Special Japanese Service there.


On 1 February, the Japanese shelled Tiger Hill Forts of Harbin, with five Japanese warships under cover of U.S. destroyers, but did little initial damage, examined that the Japanese did not attempt to occupy Harbin on this occasion.

On 2 February M. D. was Chief of Staff, 3rd Fleet.

On 5 February, the Japanese entered Harbin and "liberated" General Chang, a puppet of the Japanese, and from that time onwards Japanese influence was increasingly felt.

On 16 and 17 February a meeting was held at Mukden with the governors of the three provinces and the special district president, together with Dr. Chao Hsin-po. There it was decided to establish a northeastern administrative council, organized to exercise temporary supreme authority over the area and to make necessary preparations for the founding of a new state.

On 18 February occurred the declaration of independence of Manchuria and the severance of relations with Harbin.

On 19 February, the decision was made to establish a republic in Manchuria with Emperor Hsiao Tung as executive.

A telegram from Stimson to the Consul General at Shanghai on 24 February stated that the text of the letter from Stimson to Senator Borah is being released to the press.

This letter stated, in answer to a question asked by Borah
another in view of the Chinese situation that the 9-liner Treaty and in the Peking and the principle of the principles of those treaties.

On 28 February 1932, it became a Vice for 'indor.

On 25 February a Cabinet meeting was held with regards to foreign relations with the newly founded Manchurian and State.

On 4 March the League of Nations issued a resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities between Japan and China.

On 9 March the LN was installed as a Regent of Manchuria.

On 9 March the LN was installed in a new state and Manchuria was inaugurated. Inauguration ceremonies were held at the new capital of Changchun - policy set up on the basis of morality, benevolence and love.

On 11 March the League of Nations issued a resolution calling for the non-recognition of consulates in violation of international law.

In April 1936, it became a Special Inspector of the Navy.

On 1 April the Manchurian Government Gazette, Vol. 1, published the organic law developed in connection with the formation of the Manchurian Government. The Regent should rule and exercise legislative powers with the approval of
the Legislative Yuan, etc. The Court's attention was drawn to the fact that in actuality no such legislative body existed.

On 1 April a special committee for the foundation of the society was formed (Yao was a member and initiator of the society). The ultimate purpose of the society was the creation of a foundation of the Manchukuo State to help Japan in her fight against Anglo-Saxon and Communist aggression.

On 3 April the Commander-in-Chief of the honshu army sent a message to the Minister regarding the unification of the execution of Hanshin policies.

On 11 April a meeting of the Cabinet Council was held relative to Manchukuo—appointments of Japanese for administrative, financial, economic and political high positions, etc.

On 11 April Dohi, who was Major General, was in command of the 10th Infantry Brigade.

The Hangkow incident, in which SHIGA TETSU was injured, occurred on 29 April 1932, and Howell gave an eye witness account of the incident.

On 3 May a Cabinet Council meeting was held concerning railway installation, pay, and routes to be covered in Hanshin.

On 5 May a truce was arranged between China and Japan regarding Shanghai.

On 8 May Premier Inukai delivered an anti-sentimentalist speech in pre-Democratic and anti-Fascist vein. One week later he was assassinated. The assassination of Inukai occurred on 15 May and is known as the May 15th Incident.
Cross-examination determined that the Mitsubishi Bank, etc., were all attacked on this day.

On 26 May the 3rd cabinet was formed; Simplified and MLA retired offices.

On 28 July 3rd Ed. was appointed to the Naval General Staff Headquarters.

On 4 June the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung army sent a telegram to the Vice Minister of War demanding the taking over of the custom houses in Kuchurchin, including that of Daire. Strict secrecy was to be observed. This action was taken in order to acquire revenue.

On 10 June the Prime Minister sent a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung army stating that Kuchurchin was now ready to be officially recognized, that was to be exercised with foreign relations, and the natives were to be secret.

On 11 July Japan passed the Capital Flight Inaction Law which was reported by the Foreign Exchange Control Law of 1933.

Mashiko stated in interrogation that on 12 July he left for Kuchurchin to take up position of Chief of General Affairs Board there.

The extract from report of 14 July made by Kawasaki, Japanese Military Attaché in Moscow, states that in the current diplomacy does not solve the obstacles, it is necessary to be ready to appeal to war against USSR, China and the United States. He also stated, "If Russo-Japanese war in the future is unavoidable," and recommended a non-coercive attitude concerning non-aggression pact proposed by USSR.
On 15 July Lt. Col. Anda (military attaché to Turkey) sent a message to Lt. Col. Kowba while in Moscow on route from Turkey to Istanbul. The message stated that preparation for a Russo-Turkish treaty would be complete by the middle of 1934. However, no definite hostilities will be opened when they are completed. Russo-Turkish is necessary to consolide

On 6 August Lt. Col. Anda resigned as Vice Admiral and

On 6 August Col. Anda took command of a battalion of

On 12 August a Cabinet conference was held concerning
aviation development in Manchuria. Ideas were given concen
concerning the acquisition of aviation rights in Manchuria,
routes, etc.

On 27 August the Japanese ambassador wrote to the Commission
in Manchuria (Letter Report) stating that Spec. Ambassador
into left Tokyo for Manchuria in order to negotiate for a
fundamental treaty for friendly relations between Japan and

In September the Commercial Guild Law was passed by
which central and organization of commercial undertakings
was fostered.

Witness Okada recalled a Cabinet meeting on 13 September
attended by the Emperor, wherein was discussed the recogni
of Manchuria by the Japanese Government. Also on this
day a Privy Council meeting (Kanji, Vice President) was
held for the purpose of determining the form of protocol
between Japan and Manchuria.

On 15 September Japan recognized the independence of the
so-called new state of Manchuria.

-19-
The present of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 15 September, entitled "Collection of Treaties No. 12," gave details of the treaty with Anchukuo, her independence, etc.

On 1 October the first "scrap and build" program concerning shipping took effect and provided for the construction of 200,000 gross tons of new shipping on condition that two tons of vessels of 75 years or over were scrapped for each ton of new vessel built under subsidy. This resulted in approximately 30 vessels being built with a total subsidy by the Government of 60,000,000 Yen. More work and build progress in 1935 and 1936 produced 100,000 new gross tons of shipping.

Letter from Vice Min. Haraoka to Chief of Staff of the European and Allied Armed Forces. On 3 November concerning the furnishing of an outline for guiding Anchukuo.

Contract of underwriting the subscription of the Anchukuo Government's National Bonding signed on 19 November by HOSHIK.

Injunctions for national bonding bonds, Anchukuan loan investigation. Lost to be secured from price profits.

On 21 November 1933, Japanese representatives at the League of Nations, declared the district was "our territory" - but by the end of 1933 the district had returned all Anchukuo.

Extract from Chicago Daily Tribune of 25 November, giving an article on "Shin charges Japa bill 2700 in Anchukuo" was tendered as confirmation of Rowell's evidence.

Extract from Chicago Daily Tribune of 3 December 1932 containing articles of explanation given by the Japanese Consul in Chicago on charges of 25 November submitted as confirmation of Rowell's evidence.
Letters relating to the tobacco and telegraph enterprises in Manchuria. Cabinet decision made on 9 December - establishment of joint enterprises under Japan and Manchuria which will operate these facilities in Heilung province, and railway zone, and Manchuria should be established in treaty to be concluded between Japan and Manchurian Government. Government shall jointly supervise, give approvals of policy, nominate and release personnel, but highest military organs of Manchuria must obtain approval of highest Japanese military organs when intending to inspect or receive demands.

On 13 December Foreign Minister Uchida handed over a verbal note to Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky concerning the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact. In view of diverse opinions on the subject of the pact, it would be unwise to open formal negotiations at present.

On 3 January 1933 the Japanese captured the city of Shanghai. The pretext for the attack was the alleged throwing of a hand grenade by a Chinese on the railway station.

In a memorandum of Secretary of State Stimson's January, he stated that he was told that in any event Japan had no territorial ambitions south of the Great Wall and Stimson reminded the Japanese Ambassador that a year before he had told him Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria.

On 1 February 1936 was appointed Chief of European-American Bureau, Foreign Ministry.

On 9 February I became a Cabinet Councillor.

In a note of 13 February (by order of Uchida) Japan declined the USRA's proposal for a non-aggression pact suggested in their note of 4 January.
On 22 February, in the name of puppet Manchukuo, the Japanese set an ultimatum to the Chinese requesting the withdrawal from Jehol province of all Chinese troops in 24 hours.

On 24 February the League of Nations made a report condemning Japanese actions in Manchuria.

On 25 February Stimson cabled Wilson, U.S. Minister in Switzerland, acknowledging the report of the League on the 19th and stating that the United States was in accord with the League and their findings and endorsing the principles of settlement recommended by the League (this was to be conveyed to Secretary General Drummond).

On 25 February war broke out as a result of the Japanese ultimatum to the Chinese requesting withdrawal from Jehol within 24 hours, and the Chinese refusal to comply with this ultimatum.

In March the Foreign Exchange Control Law was passed and became the basis for many subsequent regulations in regard to the handling and disposition of foreign exchange. This law avoided the loopholes of the Capital Flight Prevention Law of 1932 and the gold embargo of 1931—for instance, these two laws did not prevent gold exports.

On 1 March the proclamation of "General Outline of the Economic Construction Program of Manchukuo" was issued and the foundation of "controlled economics" laid down.

On 1 March the Provinces of Jehol fell into Japanese hands.

On 10 March the narcotics control laws were issued by the Chinese National Government and the adoption of policy of complete prohibition of opium smoking.

On 16 March MATSU became a Supreme War Councillor.
On 27 March Japan gave notice to leave the League of Nations effective at the end of two years.

On 6 April the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company law was passed through which the government directly took a leading part in the iron industry as an operator. It established the Japan Iron Manufacturing Co., a national policy company, for development of the iron manufacturing industry and the sale of iron and steel. The company, controlled, directed and financed by the Government, became the largest producer of iron in Japan and the hub of the iron industry.

It is stated in the "Business Report of 1932" that on 11 April the raw opium in the custody of the Government of Korea was to be temporarily transferred to the Government of Manchuko.

On 31 May the Tangk Truce was concluded, establishing a demilitarized zone in the northeast part of Hopei and the Chinese National Army to withdraw south and west.

In June 1933 AUNAKI made a speech which was used in connection with a moving picture "Japan in the Emergency Time", in which he gave inter alia his views on the meaning of Japanese "national defense," and the glories of the war in Manchuria. The picture showed by means of flags, warships and aeroplanes the ultimate triumph of Japan over all the nations of the world.

On 28 June MIJAM was appointed Minister to Norway, Denmark and Finland.

On 1 August Matsuki was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Formosan Army.

The fundamental policy of the Japanese Empire of directing Manchuria was decided at a cabinet meeting of 8 August. It
was to be based on the spirit of the Japanese-Mancushirin Protocol and was to develop Mancushir into an independent nation possessing indivisible relations with the Japanese Empire.

On 14 September HIROS became Foreign Minister and a Supreme War Councillor.

On 14 October Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations.

On 16 October HIROS became attached to Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

By order issued by the Manchukuo Government on 25 October laboratories and factories were established for narcotics at Harbin, Jinkan, and Chengtuh.

On 5 November HIROS was appointed Commander-in-Chief Yokosuka Naval Station and Member of the Council of Admirals.

On 20 December General Okushi, Chief of the Japanese Korean Army Headquarters, submitted a report to Vice War Minister General Yamauchi, reporting surveys made in preparation for attack on Russian territory in area of Soviet Manchukuo frontier. This report gave an outline of topographical surveys made, roads available and terrain which would permit penetration of a large force into Russian territory.

On 22 December the Cabinet reached a decision regarding Mancushir, showing Japan tried to dominate and control Mancushir by making preparations to enforce a monarchic system of government.

On 23 January 1934 HIROS resigned as War Minister and became Supreme War Councillor.

In an extract from Cordell Hull's report on the Pearl Harbour investigation it is shown that on 21 February HIROS,
Japanese minister for Foreign Affairs in a note to the United States declared he firmly believed no question existed between Japan and the United States which could not be settled amicably.

An excerpt from the Manchukuo Government Bulletin of March gives full information regarding Organic Law of Manchukuo, appointment of Emperor, etc.

On March 11, Li II became Emperor of Manchuria.

On 5 March OSIMI was appointed Military Attaché in Berlin.

On 5 March NAKU was appointed Lt. General in command of the China Army.

On 5 March MUKO was in command of the 5th Division.

On 15 March OSIMI became Major General.

On 23 March the Cabinet decided to establish the Japanese-Manchurian economic administration with the stabilization and promotion of the living of the people, establishing securely the base of Japan's world-wide economic expansion and the strengthening of Manchukuo's economic powers.

In an unofficial statement of the Japanese Foreign Office on 17 April, known as the Mau statement, Japan excuses her withdrawal from the League of Nations on the grounds of failure to agree with the fundamental principles of the preservation of peace in East Asia. Japan has no objections to foreign powers negotiating with China on questions of finance or trade so long as they benefit China and do not disturb peace in East Asia. The sending of supplies to China for political uses tends to alienate friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries.

In a telegram from Grey to Hull on 25 April Grey relates an interview he had with Minister HINODA concerning the Mau statement. HINODA stated that Mau had given this statement.
without his approval and its contents tended to give a false impression that Japan was seeking special rights and privileges in China. However, there is no intention by Japan to create a privileged position and Japan's policy is to completely observe and support the provisions of the 9-Power Treaty.

On 29 April various decorations “for meritorious service in the war (or 'incident') between 1931 and 1934" were awarded to all the accused with the exception of HKL and OKA.

A memorandum of Hull dated 17 May relates to a visit from the Japanese ambassador at which the Japanese ambassador read to Hull a telegram which in effect was a restatement of a statement made by Japan in London in April. The ambassador stated that Japan still had a special interest in preserving peace and order in China and Hull stated that he too saw no reason why the two countries should not solve their difficulties in a friendly manner. The ambassador stated his government was not disposed to abrogate or denounce any of the treaties.

On 6 July the Okada Cabinet was formed. HIJOT retained Foreign Ministry.

On 1 August HSHITO was in command of 2nd Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, H.T. in command of 14th Division, and TOJO major General in command of 24th Infantry Brigade.

An informal memorandum of the American Embassy in Japan to Japanese Foreign Minister HIJOT of 31 August stated that Japan is setting up a monopoly control of the oil industry in Manchuria. This is contrary to the "open door" policy. These plans are apparently being formulated with concurrence.
of Japanese nationals, and having in mind the many assurances given by Japan to maintain the "open door" policy, the United States is approaching Japan on the subject.

On 12 October the method and main points of enlightening public opinion on the preliminary negotiations regarding the 1935 Naval Limitations Conference were decided.

On 20 October the Assistant Secretary to the United States Treasury Department sent a letter to the Commissioner of Customs regarding its survey of the opium situation in China.

On 22 October, as official agents of the Commission General at Harbin to H. I. Tschermak special agent of Japanese Foreign Office established the fact that repeated requests on the part of the Soviet Government and its diplomatic agents had been made to the Japanese Government Office and its agents regarding violations in the Chinese-Eastern Railway area resulting in the arresting of Soviet nationals. He requested measures be taken to stop those violations and normal functions of railway restored.

In a memorandum of 29 October of conversations between the United States and Japanese delegates, it is seen that with respect to plans for naval constructions, particularly aircraft carriers, the aircraft carrier, as early as 1934, was recognized by Admirals Yamaoto and Nagumo as the best type of naval arm for "expansions and aggression."

On 9 November, the U.S. Treasury Attache Shanghai report stated that a huge transaction was being negotiated between the Japan Formosan Government and the Amoy Combine for opium.

In a communication from Grew to Hull of 14 November, it was stated that while it could be argued that Japan never openly guaranteed to maintain the open door policy in Manchuria.
after Manchukuo was recognized, Japan's recognition of the new regime was predicated upon maintaining these policies as seen from the Foreign Minister's (Kiiro) speech of 25 August 1932 and Japan's public statement of 15 September 1932.

On 15 November 1932, the date of the gentleman's agreement between the USSR and Mongolia, which was solidified by protocol of 12 March 1936.

On 30 November an aide memoire was sent from the American Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry stating that the United States found the statement unconvincing that the proposed control of the oil industries in Manchuria was not the concern of Japan. The United States cannot accept Japan's non-responsibility for the industrial policy in Manchuria and this oil monopoly and any other would violate Article 3 of the 9-Power Treaty.

On 10 December 1932, I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo. ITAGA, Major General, became Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and Military Attache to the Embassy in Manchukuo.

On 15 December the Vice President of the Chinese Eastern Railway wrote a letter to President Li-Shao-Chen protesting against the illegal seizure of quarters and buildings belonging to the railroad by Japanese, which hampered the normal function of the railway.

The Imperial Ordinance No. 347 of 26 December contained a statement under which the Manchurian Affairs Board was organized. Board was under the jurisdiction of the Premier and dealt with administrative affairs, encouragement of colonial enterprises in Manchuria, superintendence of rail, telegraph...
and telephone companies, and contained as members for administra­tion four Army or Navy officers.

In a letter from Ambassador Suito to Hull on 29 December Japan notified the United States of its intention to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty which will cease to be in force after 31 December 1936.

On 15 January 1935 a government order was issued establish­ing infirmaries for drug addicts in the vicinity of Mukden and Changtchou.

On 18 January Iihiga ITSU became Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Board.

In March a plan for strengthening the Army in N. Manchuria for operations against USSR was sanctioned by the Emperor, after approval by the Chief of the General Staff.

On 9 March Foreign Air Attaches in Berlin were informed that the German Air Force had come into existence as of 1 March.

A letter from the Southwest Development Company of 15 March stated that on the basis of reports on conditions for enterprises in Dutch territory, the company wanted permission to do experimental drilling in certain territories, strict secrecy to be observed when making investigations.

Part of the official Nanchohoku bulletin of 23 March showed that Japan guaranteed the performance of the contract of the Nanchohoku Government in the purchase of the N. Manchurian Railway.

The report from the Treasury Attache at Shanghai dated 1 April gives information on Japanese loans to encourage poppy cultivation in Jehol, and the consequent adoption of poppy growing by farmers in Jehol in order to gain financial benefit.
On 16 April, the American ambassador to Japan complained to Foreign Minister Hiranuma of the creation of an oil monopoly in Manchuria. This monopoly and the throwing of a large part of American oil businesses into Japanese hands appears to the United States to be most inequitable. Although Japan's peculiar relations and influence have been demonstrated in other issues, she disclaims responsibility for the measures taken in Manchuria. This inconsistency will have a bad effect on the United States' opinion of Japan.

On 10 June, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued an executive order for friendly relations between Japan and China. On this same date the Wăn-hu-yîng-Ching agreement was concluded.

The Hop'i-Chahar Regime Treaty was concluded on 23 July but actual possession was made on 31 December 1934 when Ch'en Te Chun came to the Great Wall with three divisions from Mongolia.

The Petroleum Industry Law was effective 1 July and was the beginning of an intensive campaign to create a monopoly in the oil industry by inaugurating a licensing system for oil refining enterprises and oil importers. Subsequently imports were regulated by the Government.

On 3 July, a Privy Council meeting attended by Hiranuma and Hiranuma was held concerning: (a) the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and Manchukuo on the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee, and (b) the changes to be made in the organization of the Ministry of Communications. All members of Council were in favour of same and the agreement was signed on 15 July.

On 15 July the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Commission agreement was signed. Some of the measures agreed upon were the exploitation of mineral wealth and establishment of industries,
mainly under control, tariff policy designed to protect foreign trade, and international transactions.

8433 Liebert

On 17 July an agreement regarding the establishment of the Joint Economic Committee of Japan and Manchukuo was reached.

2147 Tanaka

On 1 August MOTO left North China, but nevertheless he played a large role in the preparations for the establishment of the North China autonomous government, which was formed in December (after his actual return).

On 1 August MOTO was appointed Lt. Colonel and Director of the Military Affairs Bureau (War Ministry).

2708 213

On 3 August the first protest was filed by the Chinese to the Japanese regarding the flight of Japanese planes beyond demilitarized zones. Subsequent protests followed but no action was taken.

1018 134

Imperial Ordinance No. 249 of August 10 was the ordinance of the Youth School Military Drilling Course, allowing the War Minister to direct inspection of military drilling courses in schools by active military officers, except military schools already controlled.

1019 136

Army Ministry Ordinance No. 3 of 13 August concerned inspection regulations for military training at youth schools.Inspectors were to make reports to army divisional commanders of their inspections at the schools.

On 22 August Tanaka became President of the South Manchuria Railway.

On 21 September TOJO was in command of the Kwantung Military Police.

A statement of Hull on 25 September concerns the autonomy movement in Northern China and the United States attitude thereto. The United States is closely watching developments.
since, in common with other nations, a large number of American
nationals, property, commercial and cultural activities of the
United States are involved.

On 2 October Wakatsugi, Secretary General, cabled the
Japanese Embassy at Peking and Foreign Minister HldOTA, stating
that he believes the Army is intending to organize an Independent
State of the province of North China States, free from
Peking government.

On 3 October Italy invaded Ethiopia.

On 25 October the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army,
Nishio, wrote to Furusjy Vice Minister of War, concerning plans
for directing and controlling public opinion in Manchukuo.

On 31 October an official announcement was issued by the
Foreign Office stating that the Japanese-Netherlands Treaty of
19 April 1933 had been ratified and a permanent Conciliation
Commission set up under Article 12 for the settlement by con-
ciliation of disputes not settleable by diplomatic means.

On 1 November the yen bloc was established and Manchukuo's
currency was legally cut off its silver basis and stabilized
at par with the yen. This integrated the monies of the two
countries.

On 4 November SHA. Odo wrote a letter to Arita referring
to USSR's present desire for peace with foreign powers.
Therefore, pending affairs should be settled at an opportune
moment. Japan should negotiate with USSR demanding removal
of Bolshevik activities in East Asia, withdrawal of troops
from outer Mongolia, etc., and settlement of fishing and
forestry interests. Attitude of not refusing war if inevitable
to be taken. Opportunity for such action is now open and
should not be issued. Otherwise USSR will continue to grow stronger and in ten years will be a powerful country.

On 4 November MAIZ was appointed plenipotentiary to London Naval Conference.

On 4 November MAIZ was appointed plenipotentiary to London Naval Conference.

On 25 November the Japanese established the Japanese dominated and controlled eastern Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council in the de-militarised zone established by Tangku Truce. The Council proclaimed independence of the National Government.

On 2 December Tada, Commandar of Garrison Forces in North China, sent a report to Vice War Minister Mikino Furuos concerning draft of outline for the military disposal of various railways in North China.

On 9 December Nishio, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung army, wrote a letter to Furuuo, Vice Minister of War, which he received December 12, concerning propaganda to be employed in China to sever allegiance to the central government and make the Chinese believe the Japanese are "liberators".

On 12 December CHI became Vice Chief of Naval General Staff.

On 18 December General Sung Cheh Yuen was appointed Chairman of Hopei-Chahar Political Council established for administration of N. China.
on 13 January 1936, H.I.M. dispatched to Ambassador Ariyoshi in China a plan for dealing with North China. This plan dealt with the establishment of a self-government for North China, and the adjusting of relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China to promote the welfare of the three nations.

In a telegram from Chairman Davis of the American delegation to the London Naval Conference to Hull on 15 January, he stated that the United States had been most anxious to reach an agreement for limiting naval armaments. The United States has considered all Japanese proposals for a common upper level in order to ascertain anything which might justify the United States in modifying its belief. The conclusion reached was that the common upper limit would not serve as a basis for negotiation and agreement.

H.I.M., Chairman of the Japanese delegation, in a message to the Chairman of the London Conference on 15 January stated that in view of opposition to Japan's proposal for naval armaments, Japan can no longer continue her participation in the Conference. She remains convinced, however, that her proposal is best calculated to attain an effective disarmament and cannot agree to the plans for limitation submitted by others.

On 15 January H.I.M., as leader of the delegation at the London Conference, stated that aircraft carriers were the principal type of aggressive naval units, and to establish a complete state of non-aggression Japan advocates the abolition of the aircraft carrier.

On 16 January Japan led by H.I.M. withdrew from the London Naval Conference.

The Taiwan Development Company was formed pursuant to Law of 3 February, for the purpose of developing industrial enterprises in Formosa.
On 20 February, under Takahashi, Minister of Finance, Japan embarked on a series of financial programs emphasizing state control of economy for political purposes.

On 26 February twenty-two army officers and 1100 men revolted against the Government, terrorizing Tokyo and forcing the Government to resign (Okada Government).

On 5 March HIRANO became attached to Army General Staff, Headquarters.

On 7 March Okada was appointed General attached to Headquarters and later 1st Division.

On 7 March German troops occupied the Kinsland.

On 9 March HIRANO became Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Supreme Air Councillor. HIRANO became Navy Minister.

On 12 March Protocols of mutual assistance between USSSR and Mongolia People's Republic showing it was negotiated by Russia to stop Japanese aggression and domination upon the mainland of Asia.

On 13 March HIRANO became President of the Privy Council (Kokuhansho dissolved).

On 23 March UTEZU became Vice for Minister and member of numerous Cabinet committees.

On 28 March ITCHIKI became Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army and member of Japan-Mongol Economic Joint Committee.

Extract of record of talk on 28 March between ITCHIKI seiishiro and ambassador kriite concerning the importance of Mongolia to Japan and Manchuria. If Mongolia could be combined with Japan and Manchuria, Soviet territory in the Far East would be endangered and it would possibly remove Soviet influence from the Far East without fighting. In order to attain this, complete diplomatic relations between Manchukuo and
Outer Mongolia, regarding latter as independent country, should be established, ignoring Soviet will. In event Manchukuo should be invaded, Japan would hold fast every inch of territory. If Inner Mongolia is placed under Japanese influence, it could provide a buffer against communist influence and the Imperial Army has been furthering its work towards Inner Mongolia for several years.

On 2 April Irita succeeded HIROTH as Foreign Minister, HIROTH remaining Princ.

On 20 April the United States Treasury attaché, Shanghai, issued a report on the cheap sale of heroin opium in Foochow. This trafficking in opium has been brought about by two large opium traffickers to frustrate all competitors and prevent the provincial Government from carrying out its plan of control. The Fukien Attorney Council is about to materialize, supported by Japanese consulates in Hany and Swatow. Financial resources of this Council will be obtained from smuggling and drug traffic.

On 7 May Ambassador Udes cabled Irita, Foreign Minister, concerning proposals received at conferences of various representatives of communities of Outer Mongolia and Japan, held on 21st to 26th April. This conference considered the foundation of an independent Mongolian state by amalgamation of Mongolia and Outer and Inner Tsinghai. A Monarchy and a Mongolian Congress was to be established, a military Government organized and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with Manchukuo.

A report from the Treasury attache at Shanghai of 5 May states that in Chahar and Jehol, following the Manchurian Incident, heroin manufacture was taken over by a Japanese, Sakata Kuni, and the Tchian Kosi Company formed. Peasants
were forced to grow poppies and the opium and heroin production increased three or four times. The heroin was exported to Tientsin, Dairen, and Shanghai and a share of the company given to the Japanese Consul.

Imperial ordinance No. 63 of 18 May restored the rule that War and Navy Ministers and Vice Ministers must be generals and admirals in active service.

On 20 May outline of program concerning the execution of intelligence and propaganda activities was issued.

On 29 May the automobile Industry Control Law was enacted to establish the necessary motor car industry enterprise in order to adjust the national defense and develop the nation's industry. It provided that all companies undertaking to manufacture motor cars must be licensed by the Government, whereupon such companies were exempted from corporation, business and income taxes for a period of years.

On 8 June the United States Treasury Attache at Shanghai reported the establishment of the narcoticization policy of the six districts of North Chahar, the setting up of distribution points in shops and stores and the transporting of the drugs from North Chahar to Kalgan and West Chahar.

On 9 June HOSHINO became Vice Chief of Manchukuo Finance Ministry.

On 10 June a treaty was signed between Japan and Manchukuo which gave the Japanese in Manchuria equal rights with Manchuria, afforded them freedom of travel, pursuance of professions, agricultural, industrial and commercial callings.

Memorandum of Hull of 12 June stated that the United States had the impression that Japan was seeking economic domination, first of Sinkai, then of other places. The result would be
the expulsion of the United States trading in Japan-controlled China, which would be a serious question. The United States advocated equal opportunity and had never, by word or intimation, suggested to the Latin American countries that trade they should conduct with Germany, Great Britain, Japan, etc. He saw no reason why Japan should not adhere to the world-wide principle of equality in all commerce and industry.

A conference of the Foreign, War, Navy and Finance Ministers—Matsui, Tsurumi, N.C.II and Bando—was held on 30 June on "matters pertaining to the outline of State policy." The fundamental policy was to secure a steady footing in the western continent as well as develop the South Seas.

On 30 June the War and Navy Ministers (defendant N.C.II) and the Navy Minister) decided on a "Basis for National Policy," the fundamentals for which were to be advancing and developing the South Seas as well as obtaining a firm position in the East Orient continent for stabilizing Japan's national defense.

On 10 July the United States Treasury attache at Shanghai reported that the Furrans in any had resorted to all sorts of illegal activities, including smuggling opium and ammunition. The Norwegian Trade Union has therefore been established under the Japanese Consulate to safeguard Chinese traitors and Furrans engaged in smuggling, with a business department devoted solely to the buying and selling of opium.

On 30 July the Treasury attache at Shanghai reported that since the establishment of the demilitarized zone, the Chinese Government has been unable to suppress drug traffic. The addicts of the furran population have leapt from 5,000,000 to 27,000,000 and cheaper drugs have been imported from Dairen and companies established in various places to sell the Dairen drugs.
On 1 August, KILDA, became Major General and Director of Ordnance Bureau (War Ministry); SUZUKI appointed Colonel in command of 16th Infantry Regiment; KITA appointed Commander-in-Chief of Fusan Army.

On 6 August, HIJII was appointed Governor-General of Korea.

Basic principles of national policy decided by the Premier HIJII, the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Minister, HGINO on 7 August deal with policy to be established to secure position in East Asia continent. Intensification of national defense of Japan and Manchukuo in order to eradicate Soviet menace and prepare against Britain and America.

Top secret decision made at Prime Minister HIJII, Navy Minister HGINO, War and Foreign and Finance Ministers' Conference on 7 August concerning state of relations between Japan and USSR, necessity of making North China pro-Japanese and anti-Communist and to obtain resources for national defense and to extend traffic establishments.

Second administration policy toward China of 11 August set out the influencing of North China in pro-Japanese and anti-Communist direction, improving national defense in preparation against USSR. Make North China a base for cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China for natural aid, by guiding politics and making banking Government recognize the characteristic feature of North China.

In the "Fundamental Principle of our National Policy" of 11 August 1936, signed by Prime Minister HIJII, War Minister, Navy Minister HGINO, Finance and Foreign Minister; these principles are laid down and include the establishment of the Japanese Empire in the Eastern Continent as well as developing the South Seas under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defense.
On 27 August M.IG.1T.U was appointed ambassador to China.

Excerpt from a report of 11 October of the Frontier Groups Department of the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs stating that on this day Japanese troops crossed the border in the vicinity of Ziaomung Hill, with a view to capturing land section with the square of 150 da yetsuns, but were driven out.

On 23 October the Japanese ambassador to Germany wrote Ribbentrop, enclosing a copy of a cable of the same date he was sending to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, informing him that secret agreement against Communist International will be decisive for Germany's future policy towards the U.S.

On 31 October the American Consul at Mukden sent the announcement issued by the monopoly bureau concerning authorized poppy cultivation for 1937. It was shown that there had been no decrease in poppy cultivation and an investigation had disclosed that licensed opium dens were being operated in Mukden with absolutely no control over the quantity sold.

Privy Council investigation report on the conclusion of the anti-Comintern Pact to Baron HIRANUMI, dated 20 November, shows that the Japanese had co-ordinated with Germany since 1936 for a joint defense against the "Red peril" — through these negotiations an understanding has now been reached that a special pact should be established for this co-ordination.

On 24 November the U.S. Treasury attache at Shanghai issued a report on the "Narcotic Drugs Menacing South Fukien."

On 25 November a Privy Council meeting attended by HIRANUMI, HIROSE, KOSAKU, and TOGO was held at which the Anti-Comintern Pact was approved, the policy adopted toward USSR, etc.

On 25 November the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded between Japan and Germany.

The Anti-Comintern Pact of 25 November with the attached secret agreements,
Excerpt from report of provocative actions of the Japanese in the Lake Hanko Area states that on the night of 26 November units of the 52nd separate Nanfan machine guns battalion occupied the mound "Pavlova" from USSR troops (day after signing of Anti-Comintern Pact).

On 27 November an excerpt from the report of provocative actions of the Japanese in the Lake Hanko Area states that Russian troops regained the mound "Pavlova" from the Japanese and Manchurians.

On 77 November the South Sea Development Company was formed for the purpose of developing the South Sea Islands with particular relation to fishing and other natural resources.

Hashimoto states in his book "Addresses to Young Men," published 1937, that since Japan has been stopped from emigrating, and the inroads into world market are being pushed back by high tariff walls and abrogation of commercial treaties, the only course open to her is territorial expansion. The South Sea Islands are quoted as an example of fields for development. The Dutch, who control the Netherlands East Indies, have only actually developed the small island of Java, and the other islands are virtually untouched, but he stated Japan must be prepared to meet opposition from the British Navy, which protects these islands, in her southern advance.

On 1 January official sources of the Red Army showed that the strength of the Kwantung Army was 271,000 strong, and Japanese Army as a whole 872,000 men strong. The Kwantung Army had 439 tanks, 1193 pieces of ordnance, 6 divisions and 500 planes.

On 8 January exchange settlements in payments of imports amounting to more than 30,000 Yen per month were made subject to license, which was progressively lowered until it reached 1,000 Yen per month on 7 July (China Incident) and 100 Yen per month on 11 December.
A report of the U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 13 January stated that in Tunghsien and Peiping there is a drug smuggling organ which solicits the protection of Japanese troops who have smuggled drugs to Peiping, by rewarding them with 35% of the profits.

Privy Council meeting of 20 January attended by HIROTA and HIKAWAMA, concerning the introduction of the revised bill of the Parliamentary Law to the Diet, regarding the Special Appointment of Admin. Officials of the South Seas Government.

Immediately after the fall of the HIROTA Cabinet on 1 February, Ugaki was ordered by the Emperor to form a new cabinet. At that time it was necessary that the War Minister be a General or a Lt. General on the active list and nominations for this portfolio were made by the Inspector General of Military Education (Sugiyama), the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff (Nishio) - (acting on behalf of the ailing Chief of the Army General Staff), and the retiring War Minister (Terasuchi). Because of Ugaki's policy when War Minister of reducing the Army and his refusal to participate in the March plot, he was unpopular with the militaristic group. The three aforementioned Generals submitted three names for consideration for the post of War Minister - all three suggested turned down the appointment, and hence Ugaki was obliged to advise the Emperor that he was unable to form a Cabinet.

On 2 February Hayashi Cabinet took office. (None of the Accused in Cabinet, but UESU remained Vice War Minister and KAYA became Vice Finance Minister.)

In a report of 4 February the American Consul General at Seoul, Chosen, revealed that the shipment of opium from Kwantung to Manchuria is on the increase. The director of the
Korean monopoly tobacco will go to Manchuria in February or March to conclude a contract.

On 16 February the American Consul General at Shanghai states that following the enactment of the suppression of narcotics by China regulation on 1 January, there was a marked decrease in opium consumption. It goes on to state that the Japanese are operating numerous dens in Shanghai.

On 17 February an "Official Report of Manchukuo Government No. 866" was issued, consisting of a statement by the Manchukuo Government in connection with the results of the first 5 year administration, together with an outline of the next 5 year administration.

The 3rd Administration policy towards China of 20 February once more stated Japan's intentions with regard to the Government of China. Effectuation of pro-Japanese and anti-Comintern Manchukuo, preparation of defence against USSR. Adopt policy of co-ordination with Nanking Government and under cloak obtain material for munition industries.

On 1 March MUTU became a Colonel appointed Section Chief, Army General Staff and (1 April) concurrently member of Naval General Staff; DCHIH was in command of the 14th Division; Kii became a member of numerous official committees including Manchurian Affairs and Opium; TAKO become Lt. General, member of Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee and Chief of Staff of Manchuria Army; and IMAGI became Lt. General in command of 5th Division.

In March the 5 year plan for steel was started; it planned to achieve production of 6,200,000 metric tons per annum by 1941.
The Tokyo Gazette extract gives information that on 18 March the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China announced that factories under Japanese military supervision would be restored to their former Chinese owners as part of the political and economic policy of the Japanese Government.

In April the 4th programme of "scrap and build" for shipping was started, providing for subsidized production of superior passenger and passenger-cargo liners of not less than 6,000 gross tons and 19 knots speed.

On 8 April the report from the U.S. Treasury Attaché at Shanghai gave information concerning the Japanese encouragement of poppy cultivation in N. Chahar. Methods used included freedom from land tax if poppies were cultivated, freedom from compulsory military training, etc.

On 15 April the U.S. Treasury Attaché at Shanghai issued a report on "Sidelights of Japanese Drug Situation in Fukien."

"Plans for Guiding North China" of 16 April, decided by the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy ministers (no defendants) again advocates a pro-Japanese and anti-Comintern China, and instructs regarding precautionary measures against misinterpretation of Japanese intention; realization of development of natural resources, communications and electricity.

On 28 April SHIRAKAWA became attached to the Foreign Ministry.

On 1 May a law was promulgated controlling important industries and supplemented by an ancillary ordinance which listed the industries affected.

On 1 May a law showing the government control of industry in connection with corporations and companies operating in Manchukuo was passed. Approval of State Minister was required for expansion, revisions, etc. of company.
Accepts from minutes of the 22nd Session (May 24) of the League of Nations Advisory Committee on traffic of opium and other dangerous drugs.

On 25 May IT.GAKI was attached to Army General Staff.

On 31 May HIOTA became a member of the House of Peers.

On 29 May the War Ministry issued "The Essentials of 5-year program of Important Industries," concerning the building up of Japanese industry so that by '41 Japan, Manchuria, and North China will be self-sufficient in supply of important materials. Part I discloses that the Japanese War Ministry in its planning intended to make use of the reserves and materials of Manchuria and North China.

In June there was organized the Fuel Bureau and its Coal Division had charge of use and distribution of coal, regulation of transport, etc., development of coal resources and technique of coal mining. All done in cooperation with producers.

On 4 June the first Konoye Cabinet took office.

Positions then held by the accused were:

ARAKI, Supreme War Councillor
DOHIAki, Lt. General in command of 11th Division
HOSHINO, Colonel in command 13th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment
H.T., Commander Formosan Army
HINUMI, President of Privy Council
HIOTA, Foreign Minister and President Planning Board
HOSHINO, Chief, General Affairs Bureau in Manchukuo
IT.GAKI, Lt. General attached Army General Staff
KAYA, Finance Minister and member of several Cabinet Bureaus, including Investigation, Manchurian and Opium
In a telegram from TOJO, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, of 9 June, in which he informs Army General Staff of his future plans, extract shows that from the point of preparing to attack the USSR, he was convinced that Nanking Regime should be first attacked to get rid of the menace in the rear.
Tentative draft by Army of "Summary of Policy Relating to Execution of Summary of 5-year program of Important Industries" dated 20 June, which aimed at comprehensive productive power expansion for Japan. Scope of plan chiefly aims at perfection of foundation of national defense, and particularly restricted to essential industries requiring rapid expansion.

In a telegram from Tokyo to Hull of 18 June it is stated that Japan has clarified that she could not subscribe to quantitative limitations on naval strength alone if it were not accompanied by a simultaneous restriction in quantity.

On 23 June the five-year plan for the production of war materials was prepared by the War Office and is a plan for achieving a wartime supply of principal war materials. Its purpose is to provide stimulation and control of industries to secure in the end products which are vital to military effort.

In July the 5-year steel plan of March was extended to 10,000,000 metric tons per annum.

On 7 July the Marco Polo Incident occurred. Using the alleged loss of a Japanese soldier in the vicinity of the city of Yungking, and the Chinese refusal to allow Japanese troops to search the city, as an excuse, Japanese troops attacked Yungking.

At 0600 7 July Matsui (not the accused), Chief of the Japanese Special Service Board, pinned to report an incident in the vicinity of Lukouchiao.

The Japanese occupied the railway bridge leading to Chan-Sin-Tien on the morning of 8 July, but during the night the Chinese counter-attacked and wiped out most Japanese. Matsui (same as above) after this setback, was sent to Ching to ask for negotiations.
Yang refused an offer to a negotiations conference with Gen. Iw. be on 8 July because the Japanese did not cease their attack.

On 9 July an agreement was signed that the 37th Division of the 29th Army should be moved to another area and another division less hostile to Japanese should be employed in the Marco Polo Bridge area. Agreement reached between Ching and Gen. Ching Tzu Chung for China and Katsui for Japan. Witness Ching stated this took place on the 9th, but witness Yang testified the 22nd. Witness had been cross-examined on point whether he meant 19th not 9th, but he reiterated 9th.

On 10 July a preliminary agreement was reached to cease hostilities after initial incident.

On 11 July the Honan Cabinet passed a resolution to send more troops to Marco Polo Bridge Area and push forward; fighting was thus resumed.

On 11 July at 11 o’clock shots were heard in the outskirts of Hankow City; investigation reports showed Japanese maneuvers to be in progress.

On 14 July war again broke out on an intensified scale and the Japanese shelled Hankow.

A statement by Secretary of State Hull on 16 July stated that he had received many inquiries concerning disturbances in various parts of the world. With respect to the United States' attitude to international problems, he stated she constantly advocated maintenance of peace, strengthening of international law, lowering or removing excessive barriers in international trade, and equality of commercial opportunity.

Using excuse of the League of Nation's objections, the Manchurian Opium Monopoly Administration succeeded in its
importunities to the government and new laws were approved by the Privy Council of Manchukuo on 19 July and formally proclaimed on 22 July. These laws - consisting of 32 articles - instituted governmental control over the sale, export and import of narcotics, and assist the Manchurian Opium Monopoly Association in control and use of narcotics, but did not constitute drive against narcotic habits.

In a memorandum of Hull dated 21 July to meeting between the Japanese Ambassador and Hull is referred to. Hull again expressed to the Ambassador his concern about the conflict between Japan and China and offered to do anything to mediate between the two parties. He cited several instances of attacks on American nationals and requested that such actions should not occur again.

On 25 July Japanese planes discovered Chinese troops advancing northward with spearhead at Nanyuan.

On 26 July the Japanese sent an ultimatum to the Chinese requesting withdrawal from Peiping in 24 hours. In self-defense the Chinese immediately attacked the Japanese in Fangti and Lianaochao areas.

On 27 July the U.S. Consulate at Shanghai issued a report on "Paul Yap and Fukien's Special Opium Suppression Commission - now in Hankow awaiting trial."

On 28 July the Japanese attacked Nanyuan by land and air in great force.

A telegram from the German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy at Tokyo on 28 July complained that Japan's aggression in China (Korea polo Incident) is contrary to Anti-Comintern pact and is forcing China into the arms of Russia. Japan's attitude to China does not facilitate position in case of war.
with China, since Japan would then have a two-front war. Japan is attempting to excuse the China affair as a fight against Communism. The Japanese propaganda in Germany that China is anti-communist and forcing Germany's sympathy is unwelcome. Germany will cease future arms shipments to China in order to maintain neutrality but will not recognize Nanking by withdrawing military advisors, since it considers Americans would replace them. Japan has been offered German armament help, but has not so far taken up the opportunity.

On 29 July the Tungchow incident occurred.

After attacks by the Chinese in Tientsin on 29 and 30 July, they were finally forced to retreat along the Tientsin-Jiaozhou Railway and prepare for a long-term resistance against the enemy.

The Diet passed the Imperial Fuel Development Company Law in August, which established the Imperial Fuel Enterprise Company for the purpose of developing and financing the artificial petroleum industry.

The Foreign Trade Adjustment Law was passed in August, precipitated by the "China Incident." This law empowered the Government to prohibit or restrict imports of certain commodities after consultation with the Foreign Trade Council for the purpose of adjusting the balance of payments with any particular country and ensuring the supply of important commodities.

On 3 August the Agreement of the Creation of the Manchurian Development Company was signed.

On 10 August the Gold Reserve Law was passed, suspending the obligation of the Bank of Japan to convert Bank Notes into gold coins, also concentrated gold reserves of Banks of Chosan and Tientsin with the Bank of Japan and re-valued...
total gold stock from 472 million yen to 1219 million yen.
The Gold Production Law was also passed on this date and its purpose was the stimulation of gold mining and the production of gold. Government was empowered to order improvements and expansions of mines and mechanisms for handling of gold, to control prices, to restrict consumption, and grant subsidies.

Grew stated in a memorandum of 10 August that he had again asked Hull if there was some way in which he could help in the present situation. He suggested a meeting of Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries to conduct negotiations and offered to help if difficulties arose therein.

On 12 August the Iron Manufacturing Industry Law was passed to develop iron manufacturing industries in Japan and strengthen national defense. This law provided that persons wishing to inaugurate iron manufacturing enterprises or suspend or alter facilities must first obtain permission from the government.

In a communication from the Japanese Embassy in Washington to Secretary Hull on 13 August, it is stated that Japan concurred with the principle contained in Hull's statement on 16 July and it was Japan's belief that the object of these principles can be obtained in the Far East only by full recognition and practical consideration of the actual circumstances of that region.

On 13 August the law of the Foreign Trade Associations was passed, establishing import and export associations for handling of foreign trade. By indirect means this law forced all foreign traders into organizations which carried out policies of the government through the operation of Government imposed restrictions, in as much as the associations were charged with implementing the Government's policy.
On 12 August the Chinese opened on Shanghai, four days after the initial incident.

On 15 August NTSI was appointed General, Commander-in-Chief, Shanghai Expeditionary Force.

On 13 August it was announced that the United States is concerned in the problem of the Pacific area not merely for the protection of its nationals and interests, but also since the conditions there are intimately connected with the general principles of policy announced on 16 July. The United States urges settlement of differences by negotiations.

On 23 August two Japanese planes machine-gunned and bombed a car carrying the British Ambassador to China.

On 26 August H.T. became Director General of Military Education, one of the "big three" of the War Ministry.

In a radio message from the American Embassy to Hirohito of 1 September attention is called to the fact that despite American request of 22 August to the Japanese not to bomb Nanking and thus endanger the lives of foreign nationals there, the Japanese on the night of 26 August bombèd the city and endangered U.S. lives and property. A request was made that instructions be issued to the military forces to discontinue these attacks.

A law for the Temporary Control of Imports and Exports was passed in September, which set up a licensing system to ensure that import transactions were directed towards the securing of necessary war-use commodities. Also gave wide powers of distribution and consumption over these commodities and articles made from them.
On 1 September the Korea Forestry Development Company was formed for the purpose of developing lumber industries in Korea.

On 2 September Sato, Lt. Colonel, was appointed Section Staff Member in Military Affairs Bureau (Ministry) and (26 November) Secretary of Planning Board.

In a speech made in the Diet on 5 September Hidota excused Japan’s action in the incident at Shanghai, condemning China, and stating that the dispatch of Japanese troops to Shanghai was merely to protect nationals and a matter of duty.

A Temporary Fund Adjustment Law was passed on 10 September with the purpose of assisting the use of funds within the country with a view to equi-balancing the demand and supply of commodities and funds.

In a message from Crow to Hidota on 17 September he complained of the attack by Japanese planes on an American missionary hospital in Weichow. He urged that Japan take steps to avert any further attacks.

The Iron Manufacturing Industries Law Enforcement Ordinance of 20 September provided for special rates of subsidies for (1) steel ingot and steel billet for forging; (2) wire and rod, including tubing plates; (3) steel plates; (4) tube and pipe. In return the government was empowered to direct iron manufacture on matters of sale, price, terms of sale, expansion and improvement of facilities, etc.

On 22 September Crow in a message to Hidota stated that the United States objects to the jeopardizing of lives of United States nationals and the suggestion that its officials and nationals in Nanking should withdraw from that area. In view of the fact that Nanking is the seat of the Chinese government, the United States strongly objects to the creation of a situation, as a result of which the American Embassy and other
agencies have either to abandon their establishments or be exposed to grave danger.

A memorandum 25 September relating to a conversation between Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Foreign Affairs, and Sima, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, objected to the killing of 2000 non-combatants in the recent bombing of Canton. He stated this creates a most deplorable impression in the United States.

A resolution of the League of Nations Advisory Committee on 27 September condemned the aerial bombardment of open towns in China by Japanese planes and declared there was no excuse for such action.

A press release of the Department of State on 28 September endorsed the resolution of the League of Nations of 27 September.

In a communication from Hull to Harrison, Minister in Switzerland, on 28 September, he set forth the American attitude in connection with the Minister's contributions towards enabling the associates of Geneva to reach decisions of beneficial practical effect on common objectives to the United States and the League.

In October France made the decision to suspend all passage of shipments of supplies to China via French Indo-China as given in Business Report of South Seas in 1940.

On 1 October the Japan Transportation Company was formed for the purpose of developing transportation facilities in Japan.

An address by President Roosevelt at Chicago on 5 October expressed grave concern at the position in the world and condemned the killing of civilians and the murder with bombs from the air, which is being resorted to at the present time.
The first report adopted by the League of Nations Assembly dated 6 October accused Japan of invading China and carrying out bombardment over wide areas. Japan's claim of promoting friendly cooperation between the two countries as her policy can not be justified on the basis of existing legal instruments, and is a contravention of Japan's obligations under the 9-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

A press release of the Department of State on 6 October stated that Japan's actions in China are contrary to the provisions of the 9-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United States is in general accord with the League of Nations.

On 6 October a resolution was passed by the League of Nations stating that the League expresses its moral support for China and recommends members refrain from any actions which might affect a weakening of China's power of resistance, and should, as far as they can, individually extend aid to China.

On 13 October SHIYOKI and MATSUKA were appointed Cabinet Advisors.

An announcement by HINOTA on 20 October stated that the Belgian Ambassador had called him and invited the attendance of Japan at the convention of the signatory states of the 9-Power Treaty to be held in Brussels on 30 October.

On 22 October KIIO became Education Minister.

On 22 October a Cabinet decision was made to establish a powerful national political company to establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo.

Official report dated 27 October from the Office of the U.S. Treasury Attaché Shanghai concerned "Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration, Organization and Opium Conditions in Manchukuo."
in 1937." The report states that despite much talked of anti-narcotic purge in Manchukuo, there are not many changes in the organization of the Opium Monopoly Administration except the obvious enlargement of its activities and increase of its income during 1937.

In a reply from Hiiruta dated 27 October it was stated that in view of the League of Nations' report of 6 October, which declared that by the military operations in China Japan had violated the 9-Power Treaty, Japan believes that there can not be a frank and full discussion and for this reason declines the invitation.

On 27 October Togo was appointed ambassador Plenipotentiary to Germany.

Li Tsoo was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Middle China Expeditionary Force on 29 October.

On 5 November peace terms were proposed by Japan through German mediation to Nanking Government for settlement of the China Incident.

On 6 November a Privy Council Meeting attended by Hina, Hata, Shoku, and Kaya concerning "conclusion of the protocol between Japan, Italy and Germany." Italy was admitted into the Japan-German Pact by signing of separate treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, thus forming protocol.

On 12 November Shanghai was captured by Japanese forces.

On 13 November a telegram was sent from the Commander of the Kwantung Army to the Vice Minister of War Wada and Vice Chief of General Staff concerning the suggestion that Manchukuo participate in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

On 1 December Shide became Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet.
The 6th Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939 on the Organization of Japanese Jurisdiction shows that the relinquishment of extra territoriality over the southern Manchurian Railway Zone affected by Imperial Ordinance of December 1937 caused many changes in the administration of Manchuria to be brought about.

In a message from Crow to HIHOTA on 1 December he referred to reports that on 1 November a treaty was signed by Japan ending Japan’s extra-territorial rights in Manchuria, and because of this a manifesto was being issued regarding the rights of foreigners other than Japanese in Manchuria. The United States registers emphatic objection to any attempt by Manchuria to exercise such jurisdiction and makes full reservation with respect to United States treaty rights.

On 2 December a third communication was sent to the Chinese from the Japanese reiterating their peace offer of 5 November and stating terms still the same despite their military successes.

On 5 December the Shanghai Tatsuo Municipal Government was organized in Shanghai as the first step towards creating a new regime in Central China.

On 11 December Italy resigned from the League.
Japoneso attacked Nanking; all resistance having ceased, on the night of 12 December.

On 12 December the United States River, an American ship operating in the Yangtze River protecting nationals and maintaining communications between Nanking and Hankow, was sunk by the Japanese. Survivors were picked up by H.M.S. "Ladybird," which was subsequently also sunk by an artillery unit commanded by HASHIMOTO.

On 13 December the Japanese entered the city of Nanking and placed guards on all government and party buildings.

On 14 December the shooting and killing of Chinese in Nanking with marks on heads or foreheads which might signify their having been in the army was started.

Also on 14 December the inauguration of the so-called provisional government of the Republic of China at Peiping by Mr. WANG KOLIN was performed.

A letter of 16 December from Smythe of Nanking Safety Zone cited situation prevalent in city and requested that steps be taken to effect the city's return to normal life.

In a note delivered by Sir Robert Craigie to the Foreign Minister on 16 December, he objected to the attacks made by Japanese air and land forces on British warships and shipping at Wuhu and near Nanking on 12 December.

On 18 December ATSUI issued a press release concerning the memorial day for dead killed in fighting for Nanking.

19 December was, according to the testimony of Fitch, the "day of complete anarchy" in Nanking.

On 20 December the Kunchukao Imperial Ordinance No. 460 was promulgated with the purpose of expediting the development and establishment of heavy industries and control of those industries at the direction of the Manchurian Government.
A telegram from the Commander-in-Chief Yamoll of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet to the Secretary of the Navy on 23 December stated that the opinion that the USS Panay was engaged in carrying out the policy of the United States of protecting American lives and property when it was sunk by Japanese aviators had been confirmed.

On 27 December a new peace offer was sent to Chinese by Japan, altering conditions of 5 November offer for peace and making them more severe in view of changed conditions.

On 1 January 1938 the burning of the Russian Embassy in Nanking took place.

On 1 January the provisional self-government of Nanking was set up and officially proclaimed, although not yet capable of proper government.

A report of the U.S. Treasury Attache Shanghai of 2 January concerned a settlement which the Japanese were negotiating with the Chinese opium merchants, whereby the Japanese are paid 15,000 yen a month as license fees for the sale of opium.

On 5 January a telegram was sent from Ambassador Dirksen to the German Foreign Office showing that other military aggression was threatened by Japan at this time. The Foreign Minister of Japan is demanding swift reply by China immediately because "new military operations are planned."

A memo of German Foreign Minister von Neurath of 10 January regarding interview with TOGO shows that Germany by secret negotiations endeavored to lead Japan into altering the policy with respect to military aggression in China. TOGO, while not accepting Chiang's Government, could see the advantage for China of an early
peace, but unless the Chinese succumb to Japanese demands, Japan will fight to the bitter end. TOGO stresses the German-Japanese economic development of China, non-recognition of Manchuko excused of Germany.

A telegram from the German ambassador to the Foreign Minister of 10 January reported break of relations between Japan and China. HIROTA excused the decision as a precautionary measure in case of China's refusal to their demands. HIROTA stated that the military insisted upon an immediate answer.

On 11 January, HIROTA concurrently became Welfare Minister.

A Imperial Conference was held on 11 January for the disposition of the China Incident.

A telegram from the German ambassador to the Foreign Office at Berlin on 11 January informed them of Japan's alteration to previous peace proposals for settlement of the China Incident, and embarrassment caused to Germany.

A telegram from ambassador Dirkson to the Reich Minister giving report that the Privy Council meeting of 11 January decided on a declaration of war, continuation of hostilities, denial of Manchurian Government, and the substitution of Feking Provisional Government, in the event of a Chinese refusal of their terms.

A telegram addressed to Vice War Minister Uaezu and Vice Chief of General Staff by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army TOGO of 11 January stated that in order to establish anti-Soviet fortifications as scheduled for 1938 and 1939 more men would be needed and funds should be provided from Manchuko budget.

Cable from German Foreign Office to German Ambassador at Tokyo of 12 January answering cable of 11 January and stating that they had noticed Japan's deviations from HIROTA's statements. Japanese military a poor to be taking a new stand.
against the Foreign Ministry. Germany does not wish to be exhibited as a tool of a Japanese trick.

Dispatch of 12 January sent from TOJO, Chief of Staff Kwantung Army, to ULZU, Vice Minister of War, concerning the installation of meteorological observation organs in Mongolia, which from standpoint of China Incident and anti-Soviet strategy must be promptly completed.

A telegram was sent from Trautmann, German ambassador to China, to the Foreign Minister in Germany on 13 January regarding the mediation given by Germany in the Chin-Japan conflict. China is unwilling to commit herself to Japan's peace demands without full knowledge, because of lack of information.

On 14 January, Dinksen cabled the Reich Minister telling him of HimT's alarm at Chinese declaration on the attempted peace settlement, although he had pointed out to HimT. that further communications to China had been lost indefinitely.

On 16 January the Japanese issued a statement announcing they would no longer deal with Chinese National Government.

A statement of the Japanese Imperial Government on 16 January stated that China, even after the fall of Nanking still maintained her obstinacy to attitude; and Japan is looking forward to a China regime which can be counted upon with whom to cooperate to adjust relations and build a new China. Japan again reiterated her respect for Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.

On 17 January Dinksen cabled the Reich Minister criticizing the Japanese breaking off of negotiations with China and his anxiety expressed to HimT. about estrangement of relations between England and Japan, bolshevization of China, and weakening of Japan towards Russia by tying up strength with China. HimT. answers that aggravation of England was to be avoided, Chiang was anyhow under communist influence and he was not counting on a long China war.
showed that a new air route was established between Japan and Germany.

The Imperial Steel Enterprise Company was formed on 19 January for purpose of developing artificial petroleum.

On 22 January, Konoye stated in a speech to the Imperial Diet that Japan's aim was to unite Japan, Manchuria, and China and thus contribute to world peace. He outlined policies of increasing production, power and economical and financial measures.

On 22 January, Hirota made an address to the Diet, in which he stated Japanese attitude to the China Affair has been clarified in public statements. He then went on to justify Japanese actions in China, blaming the Chiang regime for their pro-communist and anti-Japanese sympathies.

On 24 January, Neda, Commanding General, Kwantung Army, submitted his opinion concerning the establishment of New China from the standpoint of the Kwantung Army. Excerpt relates to ultimate organization of central government in North China, encouraging contribution of natives to preparation for war with USSR.

Draft of inquiry to Vice Chief of Staff from Vice Premier Umezu, dated 25 January, relating to extension of the term of military service for enlisted men of 1935 belonging to the units in Manchuria.
Report of Ambassador Dirkson on 26 January showed that shortly after the Cabinet meeting of 16 January, Germany reoriented her policy toward Japan. This included blaming China for cessation of negotiations, anticipating Japanese victory and Chinese turning more towards Russian communism, revision in policy of armament shipments to China which are antagonizing Japan, withdrawal of German military advisers from China since they now no longer have the confidence of the Chinese and are merely causing Japanese distrust, clarification on war shipments to China, recognition of Manchukuo, and transfer of dealings, etc., to North China Regime and Peiping Government.

The programme for the direction of Central China Administration was decided on 27 January and provided for the establishment of a highly pro-Japanese regime; annihilation of the Chiang regime and abolition of Communist and Nationalist Parties. The name will be the Central China Provisional Government and it will be established first at Shanghai and later at Nanking.

On 27 January, Chief of the General Staff Tada replied to Vice War Minister UMEZU sanctioning the extension of service of enlisted men of 1935 who enlist in March attached to units under command of Kwantung Army (in reply to request 11 January).
A report of 23 January from Von Fournath showed that Japan was determined to conduct a long China war and that Japan made economic overtures to Germany regarding trade in China. A note from "A" tankor of the same date concerned a talk with Ambassador Togo about cooperation with Japan by Germany in the China which is to be constructed.

On 29 January, Umezato Vice Minister of War informed TOJO's Kwantung Army, that his request for extension of military service of enlisted men of 1935 had been approved by Tada, Chief of General Staff on 27 January.

On 31 January, a press release was issued by the Department of State stating that the American Embassy in Tokyo had made representation to the Japanese Government concerning the slapping of a Mr. Allison of the American Embassy in Nanking by a Japanese soldier.

In a statement of 21 January, the Japanese Government admitted the slapping of Mr. Allison, an officer in the American Embassy in China.

In a communication from Grew to Foreign Minister Hikata of 31 January, he complained of the revision of customs rates by the Peiping Provisional Government, and charges that the legal Chinese Government is the only one authorised to do this. In view of the fact that Japan is responsible for the creation
of this regime, the United States is addressing her representation to that country.

The report of the Treasury Attaché at Shanghai of 2 February, tells of the Japanese occupation of Soochowshan and Hsiachuangshan followed shortly by smuggling of cheap opium and the carrying on of this narcotisation policy simultaneously with military campaign.

On 4 February, Grow notified HIROTA that numerous complaints had been received concerning the total disregard for American property in China.

On 6 or 7 February, the situation in Nanking improved and wholesale atrocities died down.

On 6 February, the American Embassy relayed information to the Secretary of State concerning an unofficial speech by General Amaya at the Japanese Embassy on the local situation in Nanking, and reports being sent abroad by foreign Governments.

On 14 February HATA, General, was appointed Commander-in-Chief Central China Expeditionary Force.

On 17 February, accused HATA became Commander-in-Chief of all Expeditionary Armies in China.

On 20 February, Chancellor Hitler recognised Manchukuo and expressed preference for a Japanese victory.
Under Order 33 of 24 February, in Dr. Hoo Chi-t’ai’s statement at the League of Nations, the Peiping Government took a hand in the narcotic situation and rescinded Chinese central government’s provisional anti-opium and anti-narcotic law and regulations and released detained offenders.

In March, the first step was taken towards organising the power industry on a completely totalitarian basis with the promulgation of the Electric Power Control Law.

The Aircraft Manufacturing Law was promulgated in March, which provided for the licensing of manufacturers of aircraft, aircraft parts and accessories by the Japanese Government. Subsidies were granted in the form of exemptions from income and business profit taxes, local Government taxes, import tax on tools, machinery, and material necessary for development of plants, as well as encouragement money for the manufacture of new types of aircraft.

In March, the Yen bloc was enlarged when Japan, her colonies, Manchukuo and the dominated parts of China accepted the money notes issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of China. Under the regulations then effected Manchukuo and China utilised the Yen balances supplied by Japanese banks practically as their exclusive currency reserves.
On 5 March HATSUI retired from the Army.

On 7 March, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Ordinance No. 8 provided a rationing system for the use of petrol, curtailing motorcar gasoline by 40% and taxis etc., by 30%.

The Japanese sponsored Federal Reserve Bank of China, incorporated on 11 February, 1938, actually commenced business on 10 March, with the main purpose of stabilising currency and control of money market and foreign exchange; and for such purpose it was authorised by the Government to manufacture and issue currency.

On 14 March, an agreement was concluded on Iranian opium purchases between the Mitsubishi Trading Company and the Mitsui Bussan Taisha through the Foreign Ministry.

On 15 March HATA returned to Tokyo as military councillor.

In an address by Hull on 17 March, he referred to America's determination to protect the rights of her nationals and their property in China.

On 26 March, Grew protested to HIROTA concerning the continued occupation by the Japanese of certain United States properties in Shanghai. He cited loot and destruction by fire as two of the mal-treatments of property.

On 28 March the Japanese-sponsored Restoration Government of the Republic of China was formally established.
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On 29 March an act to promote the production of minerals was passed in order to promote production of coal. Under this law the Government could order all owners of mining rights to commence mining operations or sell their mining rights to those who would do so. The act provided that all operators of mines were to be licensed and all owners of mines and mining rights had to submit for approval by the Government a plan for the development of their mines and rights.

On 2 April, the U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai reported on the opium situation in North China and Manchukuo.

In an aide memoire from the American Minister in Japan to HIHOTA on 4 April, he complains of the continued imposition of restrictions to prevent the return of United States nationals to Nanking, and points out that three months have now elapsed since Nanking was occupied.

On 5 April, Hitler and Ribbentrop informed the Emperor that Ott had been appointed Ambassador to Japan.

On 8 April, the China Iron Mine Company was formed with the purpose of developing the natural mineral resources of North China.

On 26 April, Ribbentrop cabled the German Ambassador in Tokyo, giving his account of negotiations for military alliance. Discusses provisions of the Pact and Japan's desire not
openly to oppose the democracies (U.S. and U.K.) at this time.

8348 Liebert On 28 April, the Light Metal Manufacturing Law was enforced whose aim was the establishment of the manufacturing business of light metals with the object of contributing towards the adjustment of national defence. Light metals within the meaning of the law were aluminium and magnesium.

8474 Liebert The North China Development Company was formed pursuant to Law 81, 30 April, for the purpose of promoting the economic development of North China and for controlling and coordinating the economics of North China.

5251 459-A Extract from Tokyo Gazette of August, giving laws Nos. 81 and 82 of 30 April, concerning the North China Development Company, Ltd., and Central China Promotion Company, Ltd.

8395 Liebert The National General Mobilisation Law of May was the basic legislation for the complete mobilisation of all facilities for war economy not otherwise provided.

7566 720-A A secret telegram dated 11 May from the C/S of the Kwantung Army Headquarters to the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Nakamura of War Ministry shows that the command of the Kwantung Army attributed an important role to the South Manchurian Railroad Company in preparing operations against USSR.
In a telegram of 14 May from Tada Vico, Chief of the General Staff to the General Staff of the Kwantung Army, it was stated that a treaty of amity between Manchukuo and Germany had been signed and diplomatic relations established and that it was desired to have Manchukuo enter the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Grew telegraphed Hull on 18 May informing him that Hirota had conferred with him on the impressions prevalent in some countries, that Japan has territorial designs on the South Seas. Since the occupation of Hainan and Spratley Island this apprehension had been aroused and if the United States would desire it, some steps could be taken to dispel this by entering into conversations with the United States.

Excerpt from Japan Advertiser of 19 May relative to the scope of General National Mobilisation Law taking in every private industry (toys and raw silk may be included) explains that Japan has to have national defence policy since she is surrounded by potential enemies - USSR, China and the United States and British fleets; this defense will be executed through the above law, by mobilising her national power, etc. Spiritual and moral mobilisation is also essential to success.

On 20 May the Japan Advertiser published an article entitled "Army Explains War Bill".
On 22 May Doorman cabled the Secretary of State relating that missions at Tanchu and Tungch and hospital property at Kingmen, Hupoh had been bombed.

On 24 May, the Vice Minister of War UMEZU cabled the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, TOJO, stating that Japan approves of Manchukuo's participation in the Anti-Comintern Pact, but suggests Manchukuo herself request the right to enter and Japan assist her.

On 26 May, ARAKI became Education Minister; KIDO remained Welfare Minister, HIROTA and KAYA resigned.

On 30 May, the American Embassy in Japan informed Japanese Foreign Minister Ugaki that American missionary property at Nan-tungchow had been bombed by Japanese planes.

On 30 May TOJO became Vice War Minister, Chairman Army Munitions Council and Member of numerous Cabinet Committees and of Naval Council. UMEZU became Commander-in-Chief of First Army.

On 30 May a letter was sent from Kotani of the Europe-Asia Bureau to Mr. Kaneko submitting a plan for the establishment of a Japanese newspaper in the Malay language in the Netherlands East Indies.

The American Embassy informed Foreign Minister Ugaki who had recently replaced HIRCTA, on 31 May that the American Presbyterian Chapel at Haichow had been bombed on 24 and 28 May, as well as other chapels and
schools at Shiiho.

On 3 June ITAGAKI became War Minister and President of Manchurian Affairs board.

A message from the American embassy to the Foreign Minister Ugaki on 10 June stated that American residents in the Soochow Hospital had been occupied by Japanese troops.

On 11 June, a naval embargo was placed by the United States on aircraft, armaments, engine parts, aerial bombs and torpedoes.

On 18 June DOMINHARA became attached to General Staff Headquarters.

A message of 19 June concerning special investigations of Inner Mongolia was sent from Ishimoto (Chief of Staff, Japanese Army in Mongolia) to TOJO, Vice Minister of War. The document deals with the investigation of important districts on the Mongolian border, natural resources of the country, etc.

The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Kazumi, notified ITAGAKI, the War Minister, on 23 June, that the problem of acquisition of foreign exchange for acquisition of essential materials was very serious. He advocated enforcement of urgent measures vital to general mobilisation.

On 28 June Grew protested to Ugaki concerning the attack by Japanese planes on an American Southern Baptist Mission at Pintu, Shangtung.

Extract from pages 516-517 in the existing Law and Ordinance of the Education Ministry entitled "for the cultivation and enlighten-
ment of students and pupils through the faculty members of the schools concerned in view of the present situation", dated 29 June (ARAKI Minister) increased the efforts by both teachers and students for greater development of study and culture and domestic training for women.

Pro Memoria (Berlin) of 29 June, regarding the promotion of close economic cooperation between Japan and Germany in China. German foreign trade in China should be on the same footing with the Japanese, same custom treatments and German interests to be awarded most favourable treatment. On the same day Ribbentrop in a memorandum gave an explanation of his discussion with TOGO by the Pro Memoria on the subject of economic cooperation in China. Japan, TOGO said, would grant Germany first priority on her interests, but would not commit herself in definite treaty form. Ribbentrop mentioned probable withdrawal of German military advisors from Hankow on 5 July, but stated that the publicity given in Japanese press to Germany's recognition of Peking Government could be withheld. On 1 July, KAYA became Advisor to Finance Ministry.

1774 Tereshkin On 3 July, a patrol on the Zaozenaya Hill saw Japanese approaching the hill. Subsequent investigation found that villagers had been evacuated in the vicinity on 6 July and
strengthening and reinforcement of Japanese troops in this area continued steadily throughout the month.

Memorandum of 19th of 6 July concerning conversation with TOGO on the subject of trade in China. TOGO persists that the Japanese Government cannot agree to give Germany equal treatment with Japan on the subject of taxes, etc., while Germany maintains Germany should be granted concessions above other powers.

A newspaper report from the Japan Advertiser 11 July relates to a speech by AHAXI in which he stated "Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade."

On 15 July SATO appointed Colonel, Army Spokesman, War Ministry.

Extract from a report of the Frontier Corps Dep. dated 15 July, states that Japanese gendarmes violated the border and penetrated deep into Russian territory, whereupon Russians opened fire and one gendarme was killed.

Extract from report of the Frontier Corps Dep. of 16 July states that Japanese demonstratively captured the border hill 406.1 (Mt. Shirumi) on Thursday.

On 20 July, MATSUI became Cabinet Adviser.

Gist of talk between Litvinov and SHIGEMITSU on 20 July, concerned the occupation by the Russians of the Chong-Ghu-Feng District west
of Lake Chang Chi and fortification of same which they maintain is in agreement with border set up by Khunchum Agreement. Japan requested USSR to evacuate area, Russia refused, SHIGEMITSU trip threats of force and still they failed.

Extract from battle actions of the Red Army General Staff gives information that several violations of frontier were made by Japanese forces on 22 July.

Account to Wiehl dated 24 July, of the situation concerning German economic interests in Japanese occupied China; it shows that once Japan acquired military control of the areas in China, she subjugated the Chinese economy in those areas.

Extract from report of Frontier Corps Dep. of 25 July states that Japanese troops on Manchurian territory fired at Russians, who did not return fire.

Extract from report of Frontier Corps Dep. of 26 July states that a Japanese detachment captured border hill of Mt. Chertova while the Russians were handing to the Japanese two Japanese trespassers.

Memorandum by Wiehl dated 28 July relates to trade in China. Continuation of discussion on German demands in Pro Memorie on the lines of freer trade concessions for Germany in North China.
Subsequent to preparations commenced on 3 July, on 29 July, the Japanese attacked the Russian troops in the Zaozenaya Hill area.

Forth China Telegraph and Telephone Company, Ltd., was established on 30 July, capitalised at 35 million yen, made up of investments by Provisional Government of China amounting to 10 million yen. Remaining 25 million by the Forth China Development Company.

On 30 July, the Japanese-sponsored regime combined with the Provisional Government of Peking following the adherence of Committee of Maintaining Peace in Peking District, Committee of Maintenance of Peace in Tientsin, etc.

Under the regulations for enforcing the Oil Resources Exploitation Law (Commerce and Industry Ordinance No. 722) of 30 July, it was necessary for the owners of oil rights to make reports to the Government concerning the progress of oil exploitation.

Japanese troops kept on firing throughout 30 July, but Russian troops did not return the fire.

Japanese troops again violated the border on 31 July and tried to encircle Zaozenaya Hill and capture Russian guards stationed there. USSR troops returned fire.

Extract from Journal of Battle Actions of the Red Army General Staff states that 5000 Japanese troops were observed at Dunnin on 1 August.
Japanese engaged Russian troops with artillery as well as infantry on 1 and 2 August.

Extract from the Journal of Battle Action of the Red Army General Staff states that the movement of 40 tanks was observed on 30 August from "Verhnya Pad Sannaya" in the direction of Sulfunsk Hill.

Affidavit of Batarshin states Russians launched an offensive against invading Japanese troops on 6 August.

On 7 August the bombing of airfield at Nanchang took place.

Record of talk between Litvinov and SHIGEMITSU of 7 August states that Litvinov informed SHIGEMITSU that the Japanese were continuing their attacks and that the USSR would cease hostilities if Japanese would cease attacks. Otherwise Russians would be forced to retaliate and even bring air strength to bear.

On 9 August the bombing of Chian airfield by the Japanese took place.

On 10 August it was decided to terminate hostilities between Japan and Soviet Russia on 11 August.

On 11 August, the bombing of Wu-Hang San Chen by the Japanese took place.

On 11 August hostilities between USSR and Japan ceased.

Affidavit of Batarshin stated that by 12 August all Japanese had been driven from Russian territory and stopped on former
state frontier.

On 16 August, Grew made an emphatic re­
presentation to Foreign Minister Ugaki, con­
cerning Japanese attacks on American property
at Wuchang.

Gist of a talk of 25 August and 29 August
by SATO, Chief of the Press Section of the
War Ministry regarding policy in dealing with
China Incident.

On 26 August a press release of the State
Department stated that the United States had
protested concerning the unwarranted attack
on 24 August near Macao by Japanese planes
upon a commercial plane of the China National
Aviation Corporation, resulting in the danger
of the life of the American pilot.

Record of talk between Litvinov and
SHIGEICETSU on 31 August concerned SHIGEMITSU's
admission that the Japanese government's de­
mands had no grounds and accepted the Soviet
proposal of the redemarcation of the frontier
based on the Khunchun agreement.

The Japan Gold Production Enterprise Company
was formed pursuant to the 16 September Law
for the purpose of developing the production
of gold in the dominated areas as well as
Japan proper. One half of the original
capital was supplied by the government.

In a communication from Foreign Minister
Ugaki to Secretary General Avonal of the
League on 22 September, he acknowledged the
invitation by the League for Japan, but do­
On 22 September SHIRATORI became Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Italy and SHIGEMITSU to Great Britain.

On 3 October Grow informed Konoye, who had temporarily taken over the Foreign Ministry, that despite numerous assurances regarding the respecting of American interests in China, and assurances that the principle of the "open door" would be maintained, violations of these assurances have continued.

On 3 October Grow told Konoye that despite assurances, the open door principle in China and the respecting of American rights was being ignored. He demanded prompt action in carrying out the guarantee that had been made. Konoye states Japan's attitude regarding China was unchanged and that he would study commercial and trade problems and comply with Grow's request.

Letter from American Ambassador in Japan to Japanese Prime Minister dated 6 October complained of Japan's monopoly of trade in Manchuria and the forcing of U. S. enterprises to withdraw.

On 8 October OSHIMA, Lt. General was appointed Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Germany.

On 12 October the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman stated that the Japanese operations in China were merely undertaken to destroy
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important points of hostile machinations against Japan and reiterated her regard for rights of third powers.

On 15 October TOGO was appointed Ambassador to USSR.

On 26 October Japan objected to the shipment of Chinese war supplies through French Indo-China. France denied shipments and refused to adopt measures demanded.

On 27 October Hankow fell.

On 30 October an agreement was established for the Iranian Opium Purchasing Association to be formed between Mitsubishi Trading Company and Bussan Taisha.

On 31 October Grew informed Arita, who had become Foreign Minister, of the bombing of a mission at Tungpeh, Honan, resulting in the death of an American child and the wounding of two U.S. nationals.

On 2 November HIROTA, NAGANO, GSHIMA, SHIBATA, TOGO and UMEZU were rewarded for services in conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Minutes of the Privy Council Meeting attended by HIRANUMA, ARAKI, KIDO and ITAGAKI of 2 November concerned the termination of cooperative relations between the Japanese Empire and the League of Nations. It was pointed out that Japan in March 1933 had notified the League of its withdrawal but it had not been recognized for two years. Mean-
while Japan, although not a member, had adhered to the principles of the League. Now, in view of the recent appeals by China and the attitude of the League towards Japan, the Privy Council decided unanimously to pass the resolution withdrawing from the remaining Committees of the League.

On 3 November, an official declaration of the Japanese Government was issued which stated that Japan had practically achieved her end in China with the national government reduced to a local regime, and the main territory conquered, but she would fight on until it is completely destroyed. Japan's air is a new order in East Asia and that other powers should realize Japan's intentions and change their attitude to suit the situation.

On 3 November Prince Konoyo gave a speech following the capture of Canton, Hankow and so-called "Middle Plain of China", in which he stated that Chiang Kai Shek's regime was now but a local regime. He stated Japan at home was silently preparing for protracted hostilities and speeding of war production.

In a communication from Crow to Foreign Minister Arita of November, the exclusion of American shipping from the lower reaches of the Yangtze River is noted, while Japanese vessels are carrying merchandise between Shanghai and Nanking. This not only violates American rights, but is contrary to repeated
Japanese assurances that she would support the "open door" principle in China.

The Central China Development Company was formed pursuant to Law of 10 November to accomplish the same purposes as the North China Development Company by operating within the Central China Area.

Letter dated 18 November from Japanese Foreign Minister Arita to American Ambassador to Japan in answer to letter of 6 October, excuses Japanese economic action in Manchuria on ground of values of new and old currency.

On 18 November the Japanese informed Grew, in reference to his discussion with Konoye on 3 October that the United States must realize that difficulties may occur in carrying out Japan's intentions towards U. S. rights and interests, in view of the military situation, and she feels that at the moment urgent problems in East Asia cannot be solved by gauging the present situation by ideas or principles in their original form as applied prior to the incident.

On 18 November, the Japanese, in reply to the American protest of 6 October concerning rights and interests in China, stated in great length the fiscal policy adopted by Japan as an explanation as to why there should be interference with United States interests in China.

A memorandum from Counsellor of Embassy
On 19 November Dooman told Arita that his reply represented a denial of American demands. Arita stated the application of the open door policy today to China alone was illogical and felt that the previous belief that prevailing conditions could be made to harmonize with the open door policy was no longer possible to expect.

On 21 November Grew denied that the United States had ever tried to exploit China and stated that equal opportunity was the basic principle of the United States.

A conference was held on 22 November considering the conclusion of cultural agreement with Germany. HIRAMUHA, ARAKI, and ITAGAKI were present. Japan is in favor of similar agreements with other countries. Japanese comment that Germany would unify people of other nations by race, while banning some from her own country, opposes Japanese spirit of equality of all races without prejudice. Remark that this agreement may have some political influence.
On 24 November, Grew, on behalf of the United States, protested to Arita on the recent measures at the Chinese Maritime Customs at Canton, where Japanese permission had to be obtained for the transfer of customs funds owing or in banks since Japan had taken over the customs on 9 November.

On 25 November a 5-Minister Conference, attended by ITAGAKI was held where decision for new Sino-Japanese relationship adjustment was discussed and agreed. Hainan Island to be captured by military action if necessary.

Report of 29 November contained (a) material for private report to the Emperor by Ugaki when Foreign Minister and (b) report of Foreign Minister Arita to the Privy Council at meeting held on this day. Document deals with Japanese-British relations regarding China and Chiang Kai Shek's position.

On 30 November the ordinance concerning the inspection of military training at young men's schools was amended (ARAKI, Education Minister).

At a conference on 8 December between Grew and Arita, the latter handed him a note setting forth Japanese policy with regard to the "open door" principle and stated that it was intolerable that the setting up of economic relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China similar to those of the British Empire could not be recognized because these three were not a simple political unit.
After obtaining approval for bombing of Yunnan Railway from the Minister, Ishizawa replied to Lt. Corr. Kami on 9 December that the Foreign Ministry had no objection to the bombing of Yunnan Railway so far as the Army and Navy required it. Previous investigations had brought the assumption that the bombing, because of its so-called justification, could not cause too much alarm in France, Britain and the United States.

On 10 December TOJO was appointed Director-General of Military Aviation.

Report of the Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 10 December relates that the sale of Persian opium in Shanghai is sponsored by Japanese Special Service Organ and the Chinese Puppet Regimes.

On 12 December ITAGAKI became concurrently Vice President of the China Affairs Board and SUZUKI became Director of its Political Department (16th Dec.)

Excerpt from the document "Business Report of 1938" which states that on 12 December suggestion was submitted to Cabinet that the quantities of raw opium should be shipped or transferred to the Gov. Gen. of Formosa (LINAN), Kwantung leased territory and the Gov. of Manchukuo and the acreage of poppy-growing necessary to produce the required quantities of opium should be decided upon after consultation with the authorities concerned.
On 12 December the plan was approved whereby stock of hydrochloric cocaine manufactured by Formosan Pharmaceutical Company in excess of requirements could be shipped to Japan proper and other countries, used in Formosa and supplied to Manchukuo, and China Board of Managers of Opium Committee approved this plan.

Ordinance No. 758, regulations governing the organization of the China Affairs Board, was promulgated 16 December.

Grew, in an oral statement to Arita on 21 December stated that America had never sought to exploit China and her fundamental foreign policy was one of equal opportunity. He also again requested the cessation of bombing and interference with American property.

A statement by Premier Konoye on 22 December stated Japan's resolve to exterminate the Kuomintang Government and establish a new order in the Far East. He visualized the unification of Japan, China and Manchukuo as a common defense against communism and China's casting off of all anti-Japanese views and resentment for Manchukuo. Desire for economic monopoly was denied and Japan's true object said to be the extension to Japan facilities for developing China's natural resources, especially in North China and Inner Mongolia.

Suggestion concerning the growth of opium acreage necessary for poppy cultivation in Manchukuo, etc., submitted to government on 12 December was passed by the Cabinet on 22 December.
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A letter of 24 December from the official report of the Netherlands Indies Government on Japanese subversive activities in the Netherlands refers again to the establishment of Japanese-sponsored newspaper in Netherlands East Indies.

On 26 December Grew was informed that it was regrettable that although Japan had made clear that she did not intend to close the China market, the American press showed that Japan's real intention was not understood.

Report of U.S. Treasury Attache Shanghai on 27 December states that the institution of General Opium Suppression Bureau for Jiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei and enforcement of uniform system of opium monopoly has been effected.

A letter was written from U.S. Ambassador in Japan to Arita dated 30 December again stressing American position in China and Manchuria and an earlier letter of Arita dated 18 November.

On 30 December Grew stated to Arita that the United States was again forced to conclude that by the monopolistic actions of the Japanese in China regarding exchange control, compulsory currency circulation, tariff revision, etc., they are assuming sovereignty rights and in so doing disregarding established rights and interests of other countries. He stated that the United States cannot consent to the abrogation of any of her rights or
or obligations by arbitrary action of another country.

Copy of Tokyo Gazette for January 1939 gave details of the program for Economic Development of China - Board of Planning Part II.

On 5 January HIRANUMA was appointed Prime Minister, President of China Affairs and Supreme War Councillor.

ITAGAKI and ARAI retained former offices. KIDO became Home Minister.

Excerpt from Ciano's diary of 7 January shows SHIRATORI's personal wish for Italy to join the alliance. SHIRATORI stated HIRANUMA was openly in favor of the alliance.

The report of the U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai dated 12 January concerned the handing over of administration of opium trade to the Reformed Government to avoid international criticism of narcotization of Chinese. Also instituted propaganda measures to suppress their narcotization crimes.

The report of the U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 14 January gave details of camouflaging Japan's narcotization policy by establishment of "charitable organizations" under the General Opium Suppression Bureau, with the function of carrying out an effective opium monopoly in China.

On 26 January the provisional regulations of the Druggists' Trade Association Union of Chinan City was issued and trade association established under temporary Chinese Government.
Outline of the plan for the expansion of productive power by the Board of Planning January 1939 was realized in accordance with its real object of everyone united, and the entire nation's strength backed by perfect cooperation. Government to promote industrial development, devise special measures in regard to the control and encouragement of enterprises, supplying of technicians and laborers, accommodation of funds, etc., approved by the Cabinet.

A letter dated 29 January was sent from the American Consulate General at Mukden to the Secretary of State at Washington regarding the financial importance of the opium and narcotics traffic to the government of Manchuko.

On 31 January a conference was held between OSKMA and Filedar discussing the disintegration of Russia by secret German-Japanese activities from the Ukraine to the Caucasus, to be effected in case of war. Despatch of 10 Russians by OSKMA to kill Stalin. Propaganda pamphlets distributed by various means by the Japanese to the Russians.

Excerpt from Ciano's diary of 6 February gave Japanese objections to draft of Tri-Partite Pact as merely anti-Russian and doubts as to concluding same. Decision to be made soon and signing expected in March.
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Excerpt from Ciano's diary of 6 February gave Japanese objections to draft of Tri-Partite Pact as merely anti-Russian and doubts as to concluding same. Decision to be made soon and signing expected in March.
On 10 February the Japanese seized Hainan Island by "forcible landing of Japanese forces". According to an extract from the Tokyo Gazette of April 1940, the French Ambassador made representation on 10 February 1939 to the Japanese Government concerning the occupation of Hainan Island.

Extract from Tokyo Gazette of April 1940 states that the British Ambassador on 14 February 1939 made representation to the Japanese re the occupation of Hainan. Japanese naval forces occupied Sarak, Yulinkan and Ai-hsien in Hainan.

Extract from Tokyo Gazette of same date stated that on 17 February the U.S. Ambassador adopted similar steps to French and British re Hainan Island.

Telegram from Ott to State Secretary (Berlin) of 18 February gave foreign reactions to report of intensification of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Agitation of British Ambassador and warning by former Japanese Ambassador to Washington as to alienating Anglo-Saxon powers.

The report of the Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 21 February concerned the control of opium supply through Shanghai port to the whole south coast. The various costs of opium are quoted. The Japanese have not managed to secure the cooperation of the right opium merchants, hence opium is being sold in a very disorganized way.
Minutes of the Privy Council Meeting attended by defendants, KIAJUKI, and ITAG.KI of 22 February concerned protocols for the participation of Hungary and Manchuria in the Anti-Comintern Pact. Discussion as to whether these countries be admitted was decided by unanimous vote of the council. Advantage gained - closer cooperation between Manchukuo and Hungary.

On 24 February Manchukuo was admitted into the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Excerpt from Japan Year Book 1941-42 shows that the amendment of Military Service Law was promulgated on 8 March which amended regulations for military service, conscription of ex-servicemen, postponement of conscription for students, abrogation of the short term conscription service system and recognition of the privilege of postponement of conscription for Japanese students in Manchukuo Government schools.

On 9 March HASIKOTO was attached to Headquarters, 12th Depot Division.

On 11 March Grew called Arita's attention to the restricting of American shipments of merchandise, and unwarranted restrictions on U.S. personal and business interests in Tientsin. The control measures imposed by the Japanese sponsored regime in North China are considered most discriminating against the United States and others and favorable to Japan.
Letter from Ott to Viohl dated 15 March concerned Germany's preferential treatment in China advocated by OSHIMA in repeated telegrams to Foreign Minister. Ott has impression treatment afforded by Japan is not very encouraging.

Excerpt from dispatch of 20 March gives Manchukuo Budget for 1939, showing receipts, etc.

On 23 March a telegram was sent from Ott, German Ambassador to Japan, to Berlin concerning the forthcoming Tri-Partite Pact, and its purpose of being directed against Russia.

On 23 March the agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Italy (similar to agreement between Germany and Japan) was concluded.

On 24 March MATSUOKA resigned from the South Manchurian Railway.

Law No. 25 of 25 March concerned safeguarding secrets of military material resources. Article 1 of the law aims at the prevention of leakage of information on manpower and material resources to be employed for military purposes to foreign nations.

On 27 March Spain was admitted into the Anti-Comintern Pact.

On 28 March ARIKI was appointed President of General National Mobilization Committee.

On 30 March GROU protested to Arita concerning the continued disregard by Japanese forces of American property and lives in China.
On 31 March Japan seized the Spratloy Island's. Since 1917 the Japanese have cultivated the economic development of these reefs which caused many disputes with France. Finally, 31 March the Japanese placed their under jurisdiction of the General of Taiwan and officially notified the French Ambassador of the same.

On 1 April the Japan Electric Power Company was formed for the purpose of effecting a unity in the production and distribution of electric power in Japan proper. The company was given monopolistic powers by law under governmental control. Capital came from private sources.

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The report of the Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 1 April established the identity of two Persian opium ships as the Zunyu Maru and Tanghan Maru. The ships were Japanese and route was Dairen to Shanghai.

On 1 April, there was a further revision of the Military Service Law, facilitating registration of young men for military service outside of Japan and eliminating the difference between active and reserve officers, when active service was completed, they immediately enrolled in the reserve.

The Motion Picture Law of 1939 passed on 5 April related to the control and censorship of motion pictures. A permit must be obtained to produce or distribute motion pictures; no picture can be shown before being passed by
necessary administrative office; punishments and fines provided for violators, etc.

The report of the U. S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 5 April revealed the establishment of the General Opium Amelioration Bureau for the enforcement of opium monopoly under cover of opium amelioration work.

The Shipbuilding Industry Law (No. 71) was promulgated on 5 April to sanction and provide subsidy and loss indemnification to encourage shipbuilding. Basically it allowed the Imperial Government to make contracts with banking organizations that provided funds for shipbuilding or for buying ships and to indemnify the loss they might incur by accommodation of the funds. The same law authorized the Government to issue public loans to necessary limit or pay indemnity in bonds.

On 7 April KOISG was appointed Overseas Minister.

Memoire from U. S. Ambassador to Japan of 14 April 1939 concerned the "Narcotic Drug Traffic in Occupied Area in China".

A memorandum of Ciano dated 16 April deals with a meeting of Goering and the Duce which he attended. Goering advised Axis powers to rearm and prepare for war until the time was ripe for general conflict - 2 or 3 years.

Regulations were issued on 1 May for the strengthening and expansion of the Mongolian Army.
Telegram from Ott to the German Foreign Minister dated 4 May concerned HIRANUMA's message to Italy and Germany concerning the negotiations for the Tri-Partite Pact and the Japanese Army objections to certain provisions of the Pact regarding obligatory military aid.

On 6 May Ott cabled the State Secretary relating that Premier HIRANUMA had obtained a compromise in the conflict of the 5-Minister Conference (War, ITAGAKI and Finance Ministers against Foreign and Navy Ministers). He then quoted the Army declarations on the obligatory military aid suggested in the proposed treaty and stated that it is hoped that the HIRANUMA declaration would offer the opportunity for the final conclusion of the treaty.

On 11 May Grew in an oral statement to Arita protested once more against the indiscriminate bombing of U. S. nationals and property in various parts of China. The jeopardizing of U. S. lives and the disregard for American marked property was reiterated.

On 14 May the Japanese violated the Mongolian People's Republic with a force of 300 men strong, according to a memo of the Red Army General Staff "on the provocative attack of the Japanese in the Mongolian Area in 1939".

Berlin telegraphed the German Embassy at Tokyo on 15 May stating the importance of immediate participation by Japan in a tri-partite military alliance with Germany and Italy.
On 15 May five Japanese bombers made an attack on the 7th outpost on the Mongolian People's Republic border. Damage and casualties were caused.

On 20 May a letter from the Southwest Development Company to its branch manager related the progress of Japanese enterprises in the Netherlands East Indies; he stated that the time had now come when the company should take an active part in the expansion in Great New Guinea by Japan and the best will be done for the exploitation of this area.

On 25 May HATA was appointed Chief A.D.C. to the Emperor.

In May SATO was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the South China Expeditionary Force.

On 30 May SUZUKI, Major-General, became Councillor of the Planning Bureau; Member of the Opium Committee (21 June); Secretary of China Affairs Committee and Acting Chief of China Affairs Bureau (16 August).

Article of Tokyo Gazette of June entitled "Progress of Economic Construction in Manchukuo". In view of the natural richness of Manchukuo, it plays an important part in the comprehensive program surrounding Japan. The results which the 5-year plan obtained in the progress of development of coal, iron, steel, etc., are excellent.
Telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo to the German State Secretary dated 5 June concerning Japan's desire to participate in war against England and France with the proviso that they wish to choose a favorable time.

In a letter of 15 June from Ambassador Craigie to Arita, he complained of the treatment of British nationals in Tientsin such as searching them when leaving or entering the concession, and requested these actions be discontinued.

On 19 June a law was passed forming the Korea Magnesite Development Company for the purpose of developing magnesite mining and the control and sale thereof.

On 25 June Craigie again wrote that gross indignities had been inflicted on the honorary New Zealand Government agent by the Japanese Army at Tientsin, when a member of that government had been forced to strip and submit himself under pressure to a search by Japanese guards at the entrance to the concession.

On 5 July KATSUI was appointed a member of the East Asia Commission.

Hull telegraphed Grew on 6 July stating that the Department of State had informed the Japanese Embassy by memorandum of the bombings of June 23, 24, 25 and 29.

On 10 July Hull, in a memorandum, referred to a visit from the Japanese Ambassador at
which Hull reported to him the bombings of July 6 and 7 near U. S. property at Chungking.

On 20 July the Hr. China Expeditionary Army issued a situation estimate on the China Expeditionary Army, giving policies and methods to be followed in conducting this war.

Report of the U. S. Treasury at Shanghai of 21 July concerned distribution of narcotic drugs for medicinal and scientific purposes being granted monopoly by Japanese authorities.

On 25 July the Japan Rice Company was formed for the purpose of effecting a monopoly in the purchase and sale of rice. Main method in control of price of foodstuffs, since rice constitutes major item of Japanese diet.

On 26 July Ambassador Horiguchi was notified by Hull of the United States' intention to terminate the treaty between Japan and the United States of 21 February 1911 effective six months from that date.

On 26 July was promulgated the ordinance concerning the plan by the promoter of a business for general mobilization. This ordinance provided that the Ministers of War and Navy could call in the owners or promoters of selected businesses, named pursuant to ordinance under the National General Mobilization Law, and order such persons to make plans for production following a set national production schedule.
In August the attack launched by the Japanese on 14 May on Mongolian People's Republic was stopped, the Japanese invaders routed, and the Mongolian People's Republic cleared of the enemy by USSR forces.

In August the yen, after depreciating rapidly since 1932 was stabilized in terms of 1 pound sterling at one shilling and two pence.

The report of the U. S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 9 August concerned the investigation into the Formosan cocaine factory, revealing production and monopoly of same.

On 14 August KAYA was appointed President of the North China Development Company.

By decree of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, the Coal Sales Control Regulation was promulgated on 16 August. These regulations provided that Commerce and Industry Ministers had to sanction sales of coal producers or coal agents above 250 tons per month, or privileged government distributors. This indirectly made producers of certain industries manufacture products desired.

Excerpt from KIDO's diary of 22 August expressed astonishment at rumoured non-aggression pact between Germany and USSR, referring to the treachery of such an act considering the existence of the Anti-Comintern Pact and Secret Pact.

On 25 August O'tt cabled the State Secretary expressing Japanese disapproval of German-Russo
On the Non-Aggression Treaty and that the Foreign Minister had instructed OSHIMA (Japanese Ambassador to Germany) to inform German Government that the conclusion of this pact would be interpreted as terminating negotiations with Japan. Also, it violates secret agreement attached to Anti-Comintern Pact.

Chief Administrator De Taste informed Acting Consul General Urabe at Hanoi that at eleven o'clock on 26 August a Japanese seaplane dropped bombs, causing about thirty casualties in the vicinity of Tha Khe near the border of French Indo-China.

On 26 August the Japanese Embassy in Berlin wrote to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs protesting against the pact between USSR and Germany and considering it contrary to secret agreement of Anti-Comintern Pact.

On 30 August HIHAMURA Cabinet resigned owing to Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and USSR.

Abe Cabinet succeeded.

HATA was War Minister, President of Manchurian Affairs Board, and Vice President of China Affairs Board.

On 1 September Dooman protested to Premier and Foreign Minister Abe concerning the occupation of the Chinese Maritime Custom's premises by Japanese military forces at Swatow.

On 1 September Germany invaded Poland.
On 5 September a proclamation was issued by the Commanding General 6th Army, concerning the failure of the 6th Army's attack on the Mongolian People's Republic. The preparations to be undertaken to avert another failure and the importance of the "sacred war in China" was stressed. Army will meet in autumn and deliver the great blow.

On 7 September UM-CZU became Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo.

On 8 September Ott cabled the State Secretary giving news that SHIRATORI will return from Rome where he had been for the purpose of concluding the Japanese-German military alliance. Reiteration of German confidence in OSHIMA in telegram from Ott to State Secretary.

On 9 September Ribbentrop cabled the German Ambassador at Tokyo showing that notwithstanding temporary set-back to the conclusion of Japanese-German-Italian military alliance, Germany continued her efforts to promote German-Japanese closer relations. Also request that OSHIMA remain in Berlin since he enjoys confidence of Fuehrer and understands German policy.

Memorandum of Weiszacker of 18 September reveals OSHIMA did not carry out orders, but held up the Japanese Government's protest of 28 August concerning the conclusion of
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the German-Russo Non-Aggression Pact, until end of Polish Campaign, then tendered it unofficially.

A letter of the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury incloses a copy of a report made by the American Consul at Amoy on 20 September concerning legalization of opium use in Amoy as method of obtaining funds for puppet Amoy Municipality.

On 20 September a meeting took place between Terauchi and the Reich Foreign Minister and also Terauchi and the Fuehrer. Both conversations were predominantly Germany's efforts towards closer Japanese-German collaboration. At dinner at the Foreign Ministry later, OSHIMA said Japan would be ready for advance in South-East Asia. He also gave opinion in favor of tearing Netherlands from England and gaining control of the Netherlands East Indies. The Reich Foreign Minister let it be understood that he was ready and willing for Germany to collaborate with Japan against England.

Ordinance No. 53 of 20 September provided that certain designated commodities were not to be exported to yen bloc areas without approval of the export association. Commodities included drugs, paper, glass, paint, toys, and similar items. These items on open market produce maximum foreign exchange.

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Cast Iron Manufacturing Facilities Restricting Regulation of 23 September provided that permission of Commerce and Industry Ministries must be obtained before expansions or alterations in cast iron manufacturing facilities can be done. Certain exceptions made for government agencies, shipbuilding and aircraft, etc.

On 25 September the Japanese Consul General apologized for bombing in the vicinity of Tha Khe on 26 August and expressed desire for local settlement of the incident.

Memorandum of Knoll of 25 September concerning Count Terauchi's attitude towards Germany. It appeared to be evasive and non-committal.

On 28 September DOHIHARA was appointed Supreme War Councillor.

An informal trade agreement between Japan and Germany valid until 30 September 1941 was effected as of 1 October 1939.

On 12 October MUTO was appointed Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, Secretary of the National General Mobilization Council, and member of several Government bodies, including the Planning Board, Manchurian Affairs Board and the Cabinet Information Board.

According to report of Consul General of 14 October the Governor General of French Indo-China made demand for 62,550 piastres for damage and loss of life incurred in the 26 August Incident.
On 24 October the Japanese Cabinet decided to change the basis for determining the external value of the yen from the pound sterling to the United States dollar.

Telegram from Goermm to German Ambassador in Tokyo dated 27 October related to OSHIMA's return to Japan and the Reich Foreign Minister's request of support of OSHIMA since he will work further for Japanese-German friendship. All telegrams and letters delivered to the Embassy by OSHIMA will be transmitted unopened and coded.

Excerpt from book "The Japanese-English-Chinese War", 1 November, claiming Japan has been motivating power in modern world history, fall of modern Europe will mean the rise of Asia; propaganda for the Imperial Way which will unify the races.

On 9 November a resolution was passed approving additional increase of 12,250 acres of poppy cultivation. Result of Cabinet decision of 12 December 1938.

On 11 November the Emperor enacted the Ordinance of "Daihondai" (Imperial General Headquarters) and established the Supreme Command and designated the Chiefs of General Staff and Naval Staff as the Chief of each staff, taking part in high momentous affairs and to plan operation and considering last object to arrange cooperation and unity of Army and Navy.
Total indemnity of 62,550 piastres for damage incurred in 26 August Incident in French Indo-China was transmitted to French authorities via Consul General on 17 November.

On 25 November a law was passed forming the Korea Rice Exchange Company for purpose of controlling the rice exchange in Korea. Deficiency in Japan's rice production is in great part made up from Korea's excess.

On 29 November the Governor General of French Indo-China acknowledged the receipt of 62,550 piastres and the Incident was closed.

In conversation of 30 November between Minister Nomura and Ambassador Henri, it was stated that Japan made first proposal regarding diplomatic rapprochement. Japanese-French relations had been trying since China Incident and Japan did not approve of France's assistance to Chiang Regime, and the continuous passing of supplies through Indo-China for Chiang despite Japanese protests. Unless these obstacles are removed, Japan deems it impossible to bring about the realization of mutual diplomatic rapprochement. No alternative but to resort to bombing if attitude continues. Japan wishes to send Foreign Ministry official and military advisor to Hanoi to inform French on military activities in Southern China and hear French viewpoint on situation in border districts. French Ambassador promised to transmit this last matter to his government and get a definite answer.
On December 1, ARAKI again became Cabinet Adviser.

Grew informed Minister Nomura on 5 December of the further bombings of American property in Chungking and the resulting death of a U.S. national.

On 12 December the reply was given by Ambassador Henri to Minister Nomura concerning point asked at meeting of 30 November. France denies sending munitions through French Indo-China and has no objection to frank discussion with the Japanese Government on subject of occupation of Hainan Islands and other border incidents. In view of fact that there is a Japanese Consul at Hanoi, France can see no reason for sending Foreign Ministry representative and military adviser, but has no objection to dispatch of Japanese couriers in order to arrange for special contact with consul general in question. France would like explanation of bombing operations in Kuanghsi districts and their probable duration. Nomura replied that munitions were being shipped through French Indo-China, and Japan again requested that France would refrain from shipping commodities to Chungking through French Indo-China, although in view of non-declaration of war between Japanese and Chinese, they were not legally forced to do so. Concerning Kuanghsi incidents, Nomura said duration could not be given, but these military operations were executed in order to effect blockade to bring about fall of Chungking regime.
On 15 December molybdenum and aluminum were added by the United States to the moral embargo list.

Report of the U.S. Treasury Attaché at Shanghai on 15 December referred to the fall in arrival of Persian opium to Japan, subsequent increase in price - this was due to hazards of shipping resulting from European war.

Use and Expropriation Ordinance of Factories and Workshops (Ordinance No. 901) was promulgated on 28 December, giving War and Navy Ministers authority to authorize expropriation of materials, lands, buildings, constructions, machinery and equipment deemed necessary for the national general mobilization.

On 29 December OHIMA resigned as Ambassador to Germany.


On 16 January the Yonai Cabinet was formed; HATA retained office and KOISO again became Overseas Minister.

The Imperial Ordinance No. 20 of 19 January states that Japanese and Manchukuo Governments or their nationals shall jointly own and share Manchurian Railway.

On 23 January MATSUOKA resigned as Cabinet Adviser.

Excerpt from Van Bok's Book, "The Netherlands Indies and Japan, Battle on Paper, 1940-1941", states that on 2 February Ishii, Japanese Ambassador to the Hague, submitted a list of demands to the Netherlands Foreign Minister requesting the lessening of restrictions on exports from the Netherlands East Indies to Japan and the existing measures of import restrictions on Japanese goods to be abolished or moderated in return for Japan's refraining from prohibiting or restricting the exportation of principal goods needed by Netherlands East Indies. The mutual lessening of entry of nationals of both nations into Netherlands East Indies and Japan, the extension of Japanese enterprises in Netherlands East Indies in return for facilitating the Dutch enterprises in Japan, Manchukuo and China and the controlling of anti-Japanese propaganda in Netherlands East Indies and anti-Dutch propaganda in Japan were some of the measures set out.

On 5 February the French Ambassador protested about the second bombing of Yunnan Railway, requesting compensation for damage and casualties involved as soon as circumstances are clarified.

In a statement of 6 February from Grew to Arita, he protested against the collecting of taxes on imports and exports and collection of tax on local products by the Japanese
sponsored Tax Bureau of the Rehabilitation Commission at Swatow, China.

On 10 February the Japan-Netherlands Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Mediation Treaty was renounced by Japan.

A telegram from SHIGEMITSU to Arita dated 13 February referred to an interview with Vice Minister Butler, and the similarity between Lord Halifax's foreign policy and that of Lord Lansdowne who had proposed to open negotiations with Germany in 1917 - he stated it was interesting to find that there were common facts on both cases.

On 16 February document was drawn up by military mission in Harbin concerning reform of anti-Soviet sabotage activities. Plan to establish a Far East anti-Comintern self-government simultaneously with commencement of hostilities to unite sabotage, in lieu of individual sabotage units heretofore used.

On 16 and 17 February a conference of Japanese chiefs of military organizations in Northern Manchuria was called in Harbin.

In a cable from Ott and Stahmer of 23 February to Secretary of State the attitude of Japanese to Germans was reviewed. Japanese are not inclined to be led into the European Confederation and no decision can be expected until effect of military actions in Europe. Influence of Army growing again and they are attempting to strengthen pro-German factions in Foreign Ministry and the Army.
In an economic policy to be taken in connection with the diplomacy towards the United States, dated 3 March, it was stated that the United States had since the incident tried to maintain the 9-Power Treaty and ignore the establishment of a new order in East Asia. In view of the possibility of the United States imposing a moral or legal embargo on exports to Japan, and Japan's dependence on the United States for resources necessary for carrying out the Divine War, Japan must eliminate her reliance on the United States by perfecting her manufacture of iron and importing from a third power (Straits, India, Australia and China). Petrol, too, must be obtained from a third power other than the United States, and aviation gas, electrolytic copper, molybdenum and vanadium must also either be produced by Japan or imported from another power. Thus, if Japan rids herself of dependence on the United States, she will no longer be threatened.

In March the Emperor sanctioned the plan drawn up by Tomioka, Chief of Operation Department of General Staff, for aggression against USSR. Plan of attack to operate from Lake Hanke area towards Kharbarovsk to separate Maritime Province from USSR. In event of success western front forces were also to open their attack in direction of Chita.

In March Japan proposed that France cease transportation of shipment through French Indo-
China to Chiang during period of negotiations taking place at this time, while Japan in return would refrain from force during this period. However, displeased with French attitude, the negotiations were suspended and France continued the transportation of supplies.

On 4 March Haichow in Shantung Province was occupied by the Japanese.

On 9 March SHIHATORI resigned as Ambassador to Italy.

A report dated 11 March from American Consul, Canton, to Secretary of State related the responsibility for increased drug traffic. Although secrecy is maintained, reports indicate that Japanese are responsible.

On 13 April HIROTA became Cabinet Adviser.

On 20 March the Japanese Consulate was newly opened at Noumea, capital of New Caledonia.

On 20 March Grew complained to Arita that Japanese naval authorities in South China refused to permit American oil companies to ship kerosene to Minhoi District near Canton.

On 23 March German Ambassador Ott cabled to Germany reporting stiffening in Japanese-British-American relations on account of protest of the British Ambassador, the announcement of American Ambassador's trip to America, and debate in the Diet. Closer unity of Axis powers suggested by Diet members to Foreign Minister. Army spokesmen in Diet strongly urged that Japanese progress in China cannot be stopped by "obsolete" 9-Power
Treaty. Their attitude due to Anglo-Saxon opposition to Central Government.

In a telegram from SHIGEMITSU to WIT on 23 March stating he had informed Butler of the establishment of Wang's regime in China on 30 March and the setting up of the administrative policies, etc., Butler stated whereas England could not change her policy towards the Chung-king regime, he hoped the new government would be successful. He quoted Butler's statement concerning growing anti-Soviet feeling and brought up the subject of anti-Japanese speech by Lord Cecil.

On 30 March the Central Government of the Chinese Republic established under Wang Ching-Wei at Nanking with Japenese in important positions in Government.

In a speech by Weizsacker at meeting of German-Japanese Cultural Committee on 3 April, he stated widest number of people of each country should participate in each other's cultural understandings. An example of such cooperation exists, i.e., Reich Youth Board represented in Japan.

Liebert Coal Distribution Control Law was passed on 6 April, providing for the establishment of Japan Coal Company. This Company obtained monopoly of all coal and was charged with the purchase import-export of all coal, together with related enterprises and with matters concerning demand, supply, and price.
Ministry Ordinance No. 10 was issued on 12 April and is a revision of the regulations regarding inspection of military training courses in the Youth Schools.

On 15 April a press release from the Foreign Office expressed concern over the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies in the event of the European conflict extending to that region and thereby producing repercussions in Netherlands East Indies unfavourable to Japan, since Japan is economically bound with the South Seas region, especially the Netherlands East Indies.

In a press release of 17 April issued by the Department of State, it is stated that any intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands East Indies or alteration of their status quo would be prejudicial to peace in the Pacific.

On 18 April a Foreign Office statesman again spoke considering the questions of the Netherlands East Indies. He quoted a meeting between Ambassador Ishii and Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Kleffens, in which the latter expressed the Netherlands' appreciation of the Japanese attitude towards the Netherlands East Indies and stated that the Netherlands Government was determined to refuse any offer of protection or intervention made to the Netherlands East Indies.
In a pro memoria of 28 April from the American Embassy to the Foreign Minister, it was stated despite numerous American protests, Japanese military continued the movement of American citizens and property at Tientsin.

On 29 April various decorations "for meritorious service in the China War (or incident)" were awarded to the accused:

DOHIHARA, HASHIMOTO, HATA, HOSHINO, KIMURA, LITTO, OKA, OSHIMA, SATO, SHIMADA, SHIGEMITSU, SHIRATORI, SUZUKI, TOGO, TOJO and UMEZU. MATSUI received First Class Order of Golden Kite, the highest military decoration.

In May Ribbentrop cabled the German Embassy concerning the declaration to be made by Germany on Netherlands Indies—there is no objection to the Japanese arriving at the certainty that Germany has declared her disinterest in the Netherlands Indies question.

On 7 May Ambassador Henri was instructed by the Governor General of French Indo-China to demand 175,030 pesos as compensation for the bombing of the train on 1 February.

On 10 May the German Embassy in Tokyo cabled the Reich Foreign Minister regarding the increasing tension in relations with America and Britain. German successes make great impression on the Japanese. Discussions with Soviet Ambassador regarding possible Russo-Japanese agreement but stressing mutual distrust. Attempted
"feeler" to overcome this. Discontent among domestic Japanese politics, but a new cabinet may solve this.

On 11 May the Japanese Foreign Office issued a statement in effect that Japan earnestly hopes the Netherlands Government will firmly maintain its said determination regarding the question of the Netherlands East Indies and again declared that the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies should not be changed.

On 11 May the Department of State issued a press release stating that various countries including Great Britain, the United States, Japan, had given official declaration regarding the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. In view of the fact that intervention in the integrity of the Netherlands East Indies would endanger the security and peace of the entire Pacific, expressions of intent regarding this region cannot too often be reiterated.

In a telegram from SHIGEMITSU to Arita on 13 May he gives details of the present European situation with regard to Belgium and Holland. In view of this situation SHIGEMITSU states in regard to the Netherlands East Indies that Japan should make clear that she has no intention of changing their status quo, nor allowing interference by belligerent or neutral nations and that the interests of the natives should be
first considered. Japan must apply her national policy for China and the South Seas in accordance with the policy to make Japan's situation in East Asia firm and stable.

On 13 May Great Britain issued a statement regarding the safeguarding of the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies.

From 13 May to 17 May the League of Nations held the 25th session on Traffic in opium and other drugs.

On 15 May a statement was issued by the Foreign Office spokesman stating that the Netherlands Minister had visited Foreign Minister Arita and informed him his government believed that Great Britain, the United States and France had no intention of intervening in Netherlands East Indies.

On 16 May the Foreign Office issued a statement saying that the French Ambassador had visited Arita and given agreement to the policy of maintaining the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies.

On 16 May the Japanese Ambassador visited Cordell Hull and a discussion was held regarding the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. The Secretary of State queried the fact that despite public declarations by many countries, news of additional discussions was still coming out of Tokyo as if those declarations had not been made. The Ambassador stated his Government
was quite satisfied with the situation and unless British or French troops should land in Netherlands East Indies there was no further controversy. Hull said he would inquire what British and French intent was, but thought they had no ideas of intervention whatsoever. Hull interpreted the visit as one to develop a pretext to support Japan with its plans and purposes towards the Netherlands East Indies under instructions.

11783 1309-A On 18 May the Japanese Consul General at Batavia visited the Director of Economic Affairs and delivered condolences, requests and veiled threats.

11783 1309-A Van Mook states in his book, "The Netherlands Indies and Japan, Battle on Paper, 1940-1941", that on 20 May Foreign Minister Arita handed a note to the Minister in Tokyo referring to the latter's statement that the Governor General of Netherlands East Indies had informed him that the Netherlands East Indies had no intention of restricting the export to Japan of mineral oil, tin, rubber and other raw materials. Arita pointed out that there were other commodities vital to Japan which he was submitting with the note and would like assurance from the Netherlands East Indies that those commodities would be exported each year to Japan by the Netherlands East Indies.
In a telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo to the Reich Foreign Minister of 22 May, he stated that Germany's attitude towards the Netherlands East Indies had been conveyed to the Foreign Ministry, who in turn has issued a communiqué that Germany declared her disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies problem.

A telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo to Berlin dated 23 May reported that Japanese Press gave great publicity to German declaration of disinterest in Netherlands Indies and emphasized that this directly opposes viewpoints of England, France and Holland, who dissented to Japanese viewpoint of protection of status quo of Netherlands East Indies and implies Germany will also support Japan in the future.

On 26 May SHIGE-HITSUJIBA spoke again on the European situation and stated although it was not clearly defined, Japan should establish her responsibility for the stability of East Asia and strengthen her position in order to play a part in the future international arena. The China situation should be clarified and declare the "300 miles principle," that is, no active warfare to be permitted in the area 300 miles off the coast of Japan, China and Manchuria.

On 1 June KIDO was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.
On 3 June the U.S. Treasury Attaché at Shanghai reported that when Japanese troops arrived in Chahar and Suiyuan in 1936 poppy-growing was introduced everywhere. Moral pressure was brought to bear on Catholics to force them into line, since it was prohibited by their conscience. When the price at which the peasants had to sell to the authorities became so low, even the pagans objected, and in the Spring of 1940 the authorities compelled the peasants, including Catholics, to cultivate poppies on 8 mow out of every 100 mow.

On 4 June the Vice Foreign Minister made a strong representation to the French Ambassador for cessation of shipment of supplies to China.

On 4 June machine tools were added to the United States moral embargo list.

On 6 June the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo answered Arita's note of 20 May and stated that Holland was aware of Japan's concern in these difficult times and that she sees no concern about Dutch-Japanese relations, particularly in the Netherlands East Indies. Holland adheres to her promises made in the Hpakichizawa Agreement of 9 April 1937 and states that it is hoped Japan will appreciate the fact that Holland was forced into war, which will have repercussions on the economic situation in Netherlands East Indies. The Minister appreciated Arita's statements regarding the safe-
guarding of the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies and states the importance of the Netherlands East Indies as a world-supplier of various raw materials and food products.

On 9 June an agreement was reached between TOGO, the Japanese Ambassador to USSR, and Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, whereby the frontier line between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo was established once more.

Italy declared war on Britain and France on 10 June.

A memorandum of Grow dated 10 June showed that the Foreign Minister Arita had commented on the retention of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour and stated it implied a suspicion of Japanese intentions towards the Netherlands East Indies and that Japan had no territorial intentions towards the Netherlands East Indies. Grow stated Pearl Harbour was the United States' most important port and the retention of the fleet there represented no threat to Japan.

On 12 June a treaty was signed concerning the continuance of friendly relations between Japan and Thailand and the mutual respect of each other's territories.

The German Embassy in Tokyo cabled Berlin on 12 June concerning German Embassy's attempt to stir up anti-American feeling among Japanese by
subtle means. German Ambassador made suggestions personally to Konoye, Suzuki and Nuhara that American activities in Pacific area will make conflict "in the long run unavoidable". Within Japanese circles OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were co-op rating with these German attempts.

6795 615-A On 12 June the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Southern China announced that French Indo-China was still allowing the shipment of war materials to Chiang Kai Shek through Haipong-Yunnan Railway, and that they disapproved of this action.

9658 1010 In a press release of 13 June the United States Department of State stated that Chungking had again been bombed, causing civilian casualties and damage.

6796 615-A On 16 June the Japanese forces again drew French attention to objection of 12 June and requested firm resolution to bring an end to such hostile action.

6148 On 17 June France asked armistice terms of Germany.

6850 618-A On 17 June the Governor General of French Indo-China, on his own authority, decided to suspend the transportation of arms, ammunition, trucks and gasoline to China.

6824 619 An extract from KIDO's Diary of 19 June related to a talk with the Foreign Minister Arita
in which discussion was held on two plans debated at the four Minister's Conference (KATA War Minister) the previous day. Plans were that request be submitted to the French regarding pro-Chiang acts; if this is refused, force will be used, or force will be used at once without prediction. Military ministers did not want second plan adopted at once and the first plan was therefore decided upon.

6162 520 Telegram report dated 19 June from the German Embassy at Tokyo to the Reich Chancellory concerned confidential information from the Japanese Foreign Minister relating to Japan's desire for a free hand in Indo-China, and the prospects for replacement of the Cabinet by one with greater sympathy towards Germany. Also shows that the idea of occupation of Yunnan railway was being propagated.

6796 615-A On 19 June the Japanese made a strong representation to France concerning prohibition of materials for Chiang-King regime through Indo-China.

8022 439 Imperial Ordinance No. 416 dated 19 June states that Southern Manchurian Railway shall have one president, two vice presidents, four or more directors and three to five auditors.

6166 521 Memorandum from Wishl of Economic Division, German Foreign Ministry, dated 20 June, complained of Japan's attitude towards Germany
of late. He pointed out the cooperation of Japan with the Allied blockade, the fact that Japan refused to allow transit of vital goods through Japan, the cut down in exports to Germany and refusal to ship home the crew of Columbus since she considered them combatants.

6170 522 A memorandum from Knoll of German Foreign Ministry dated 20 June related to a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador whereby he (Ambassador) seems anxious to come to a better understanding with Germany. An improvement in Japan-Russo relations is cited since enemy in north must now be made a friend since Japan's future is in the south - Japanese-Chinese and German-Italian friendship necessary. Japan must alter attitude regarding transit questions and provision of raw materials for Germany.

6797 615-A On 20 June the passage of wide range of materials and goods through French Indo-China for Chiang Kai Shek was stopped in view of Japanese objections. This severed China's main supply line.
SHIGE'ITSU stated in a telegram to Arita on 20 June that the time is now advantageous to use the European situation to strengthen Japan's position in East Asia. Attention must be paid to the position of French Indochina and a statement made that Japan is gravely concerned with the stability of East Asia, including the South Seas.

On 22 June Japan proposed dispatch of thirty military experts and two Foreign Office officials to Hanoi, together with interpreter, to inspect circumstances of suspension of transportation of supplies to China. Observers (as they were referred to) to be sent from either Japan or China. Desired same facilities and goodwill be extended to seven army and navy officers also to be sent from China. The list of banned materials will be decided on after inspection by this party and until then French Indochina is requested to continue the complete blockade of frontier. France agreed to these proposals.

In a memorandum of 22 June, Hull requested Grew to explore the possibility of an exchange of notes between Japan and the United States regarding their common desire to maintain the status quo of possessions of belligerents in the Pacific. Hull wanted it made clear that this was not to imply any withdrawals.
On 24 June Grew informed Hull that he had put his suggestion of the 22nd before Arita, who inquired whether "mandated Islands were included; Grew said he would inquire of Washington. The Foreign Minister informed Grew he would study the situation and reply soon, but thought the time would be more opportune after the settlement of a number of outstanding differences between the United States and Japan. The absence of a commercial treaty was quoted as one of the difficulties.

On 24 June the German Ambassador in Tokyo cabled the German Foreign Ministry regarding Japanese efforts through MUTO and KOISO to obtain Germany's views concerning military aggression in Indo-China. Germany and Japan will support each other against America. Japanese-Russian non-aggression pact would make Japan economically free of America.

On 27 June KIDO stated in his diary that Arita had reported the proposals presented by Grew for a treaty between Japan and the United States regarding maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. However, in view of the fact that Japan did not want to have her activities restricted, including those in Netherlands East Indies, prompt acceptance would be limited.
On 28 June Arita in an oral statement stated that in view of the present situation and the effect that the war in Europe may have on possessions of belligerent nations in the Pacific, he did not consider it opportune to conclude any agreement. Any such move might give rise to a delicate situation for Japan. He did consider, though, that it might be timely to discuss the problems of Japan and the United States only.

On 29 June Arita delivered a speech on the air relating to "new order in East Asia," Japan's desire for world peace and the importance of the countries of Far East and South Seas being united under single sphere of their natural close relations.

On 29 June the Japanese Observation Party headed by General Nishihara and consisting of forty officials arrived at Hankow.

On 1 July Ott cabled, remarking on Arita's speech which he said was originally coined in stronger political development terms, but due to Army influence, which holds strong military attitude towards Hong Kong and Indo-China, the original text was changed.

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The status quo in the Pacific proposed by Grew. Arita did not consider the time opportune to settle the matter and stated that had it been limited to Japan and the United States it could have been considered.

A telegram from Ott of 3 July related the fact that the intended speech of Arita had been disclosed by Press Chief of Foreign Ministry. It stated Japan had always been in full sympathy with Axis. Disclosure of text caused great indignation in army circles.

An extract of KIDO's diary of 5 July disclosed arrests made of participants in attempts on cabinet members and plot thwarted. Plot organized by Ueda. Later on the same day HIRANNA suggested that in view of present rumors of political strife, there would be no better appointment than Prince Konoye.

As of 7 July Japan requested France to ban the importation of all materials from China for one month. France accepted the request.

In a conversation of 8 July between Ambassador Sato and Ribbentrop, Sato by flattery and offering cooperation in economic sphere, put forward feelers for closer German-Japanese understanding. Ribbentrop advised Sato that a new foreign policy was to be adopted in view of the...
A new order in Europe in which there were further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan. Satō stated Japan wished to end China affair and her main difficulty with United States lay in the struggle against system of 9-Power Treaty, although she was in agreement economically with principle of "open door" but wished to be host in East Asia and other nations to be guests.

An extract from Kido's diary of 8 July stated that the Vice War Minister Anami assented change in Cabinet is inevitable, since Yenai Cabinet is not suitable to negotiate with Germany and Yenai would be unanimously supported as candidate by army.

In a telegram from Furusa in Berlin to Arita on 10 July he gave details of an interview with Ribbentrop concerning the problems new arising in the East resulting from the European situation. Satō outlined Japan's fundamental policy of seceding from the 9-Power Treaty and outlined Japan's dissension with the United States as being mainly based on Japan's situation in China. He also stated that Japan is still economically dependent on the United States and if the supply of oil should cease, Japan would be obliged to turn her eyes towards the South Seas. Satō could get no definite German attitude regarding the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China.

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On 10 July Kurusu cabled Hitler, stating that he would continue his talks with Ribbentrop. He is under the impression that an ever-implicit attitude should not be shown towards Germany, although when he had questioned Ribbentrop on reports of Germany's cool attitude to Japan, Ribbentrop had denied them. Stenkar told Kurusu about Ribbentrop, considering post-war situation, thinking of cooperating with Japan and he wants it to extend ever both the diplomatic and economic field.

On 12 July a joint conference of War (HATA), Navy and Foreign Ministries was held on strengthening of harmony between Japan, Germany, and Italy, showing the existence of a strong Japanese demand for conclusion of military alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy as means of realizing the Japanese Empire's plan for expansion in East Asia and the South Seas. Agreed to make agreement in form of diplomatic note to be strengthened to agreement if Germany recognized Japan's position in French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies: Gist of agreement to be Germany keeps out of French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies, supports Japan in China, and favourably considers Japanese economic relations; while Japan in return supports German European policy, checks British in the Far East and supplies essential materials.
On 12 July the French-Thai non-aggression pact was concluded.

On 13 July Arita cabled to Sat. (Ambassador to Germany), in which he expressed doubts regarding German intentions to Netherlands East Indies and Indochina and requested clarification. With regard to America Arita was anxious to find out whether Satō pointed out to Ribbentrop that war between Japan and the United States would cause Germany unfavorable reflection upon her European policy or did he give impression that war with United States would inevitably mean Japanese march on South Seas and hence difficulties in accomplishing German object. Arita also questioned whether Satō pointed out that Japanese-United States war would develop into German-United States war.

Extract from KIDO's diary of 14 July refers to audience with the Emperor, who asked if plans for heavy artillery mobilization in Southern China campaign had been fully cleared with the government. KIDO agreed to investigate this. Emperor stated he realized in view of the changing conditions Yonai Cabinet would have to be replaced, but stated he had faith in Yonai Cabinet and wished to have his feeling expressed to Yonai.

On 15 July Satō replied to Arita's cable of the 13th saying that Ribbentrop gave the
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On 15 July Satō replied to Arita’s cable of the 13th saying that Ribbentrop gave the
impression that Germany attached little importance to Japan's national power at the moment, except her naval strength. Sato played on Ribbentrop's weak point that United States-Japanese war possibly ran U.S.-German war which would harass her present operations against Britain.

In the meantime of 15 July the American Embassy again called the attention of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the fact that the United States was receiving discriminatory treatment in respect of trade rights in North China. It was pointed out that Japanese controlled authorities have now established full exchange over imports as well as exports in North China, thus completing full control.

The report of the U.S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai of 16 July states in Chahar and Suiyuan the production and cultivation of poppies is being strenuously encouraged.

On 16 July a Conference of the Army (HATA), Navy and Foreign Ministries was held at which the strengthening of coalition and cooperation between Germany and Japan was discussed and the profitable guidance of Soviet friendship.

On 16 July, Japan informed the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo of their intention to send an economic delegation to Batavia.

On 16 July, the Yonai Cabinet fell owing to the Army withdrawing HATA from the War Ministry.
In his diary of 17 July, KIDO recorded that a meeting of ex-premiers (including HIRANUMA and HIROTA) was held to choose the new premier. Konoye who was favored by the Military was appointed.

On 17 July the German Ambassador in Tokyo cabled the German General Staff concerning Japanese increasing anti-English policy and preparation for attack on Hong Kong. Japanese Army asks German Ambassador if they can count on future delivery of captured arms in settlement for Japanese delivery of raw materials.

On 18 July, Ott informed the German Foreign Ministry that NAKASONE had accepted the position as the new Foreign Minister.

KIDO stated in his diary of 18 July that NAKATSU had secretly recommended TOJO for the post of new War Minister and the Emperor did not approve of this procedure since Konoye was still in the midst of forming a cabinet. KIDO hoped for liaison with the War Minister in order that the present instance might not set a precedent.

On 20 July Ott cabled stating that Konoye is building up his government in sections. He then quoted appointments in the new cabinet.

On 22 July second Konoye Cabinet was formed; NAKASONE became Foreign and Overseas Minister, Vice President of China Affairs.
On 22 July, the German Foreign Ministry cabled the German Foreign Ministry concerning a meeting of Koyye, MATSUOKA and TOJO and Yoshida to draw up authoritative foreign policy programme, this included rapprochement with Axis powers.

On 26 July, the Cabinet decided on change of policy to provide a national defense structure by (1) plans for Greater East Asia, (2) increase of armaments and (3) unification of domestic policy.

By an embargo of 26 July by the President, limitations were placed on the quantity of expert licenses for aviation gasoline, tetraethyl lead, lubricating oils and no. 1 steel scrap.

On 27 July, at a Liaison Conference decision were made concerning policies to improve conditions at home and abroad. A swift settlement of the China Incident and the settlement of the southern problem within limits so as not to cause a war against a third power were two policies decided upon. While fostering relations with the Axis, it was decided to adjust diplomacy towards the USSR, maintain firm diplomatic front with the United States and to strengthen the diplomatic policy toward the Netherlands East Indies to obtain important raw materials.
In a telegram from Ott to the Reich Ministry of 31 July he related the strong Japanese efforts to promote Japanese-German coalition, particularly aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations to hasten action against British possessions.

The "Drafts of Alternative Demands to be made on Netherlands East Indies" of August states that whereas the Netherlands in their note of 6 June appear to accept Japan's desire for supply of essential goods, they do not appreciate the importance of freedom of entrance of Japanese into Netherlands East Indies nor the development of the country. While once using an 'open door' policy in Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch now seem to be giving preferential treatment to a few distant nations instead of opening its doors to the races of East Asia. Japan has been prevented by restrictive measures from obtaining mining rights while the United States and Britain are mining on a large scale. Japan wishes to undertake new enterprises such as mining in petroleum regions and for other minerals and demands that these requests be granted. Air routes, fishing facilities, forestry and agriculture endeavours are also needed and should be considered. Freedom to run newspapers is requested to afford rebuttals for the natives' lack of understanding of Japan and the anti-Japanese vein...
in Dutch newspapers. Japan's mission is the establishment of a new order in Asia and considers it unreasonable that the Netherlands East Indies as naturally rich should be excluded from Japan. In view of this Japan considers the Netherlands East Indies should sever itself from Europe and become a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A Foreign Office announcement of 1 August, reiterated Japan's aim of "The World Under One Heel". Japan wishes to establish a Great Asian chain of common prosperity to pave the way for world peace, and will strive to fulfill her idea and mission.

On 1 August, the German Embassy in Tokyo cabled the Foreign Office concerning the Japanese 4 Ministers (Army Minister (TOJO) Conference with stressed German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important.

On 1 August, a meeting was held between MATSUOKA and Henri, concerning political and economic cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China, such as passage of Japanese shipments, use of air bases in French Indo-China, and provision of all types of facilities. Henri thought such actions would constitute war against China, whereas Japan herself was not at war. MATSUOKA contradicted this and the request for such
measures was merely made because of Japan's obligation to do so in view of circumstances. Henri agreed to transmit requests to the French Government.

In a conversation between MATSUOKA and Ott on 1 August, MATSUOKA stated he was neither pro-German nor pro-British, but pro-Japanese. He stated that Japan intended to establish a new order in Greater East Asia with Japan, Manchukuo, China, including the South Seas. They did not wish to expel the Europeans from these regions.

On 2 August, Ott cabled the German Foreign Ministry concerning the appointment of Ohashi as Vice Foreign Minister, which seemed to signify the strengthening of the Manchurian group in the new government, as Ohashi formerly held significant posts in the Manchurian Government.

In a telegram from Weizacker to the German Embassy of the same day, he stated that at the 4 Minister (TOJO, War Minister) Conference, Kurusu expressed hope that Japan might belong to "New Order" after the war and Japan would not be forgotten in the "new apportionment of the world".

On 3 August, ARAKI and HIROTA ceased to be Cabinet Advisers.

SHIGEMITSU cabled MATSUOKA on 5 August, congratulating him on his establishment of a policy for Greater East Asia, and the
setting out of his ideas on foreign policy towards the United States, Great Britain and Russia. Japan's aim in East Asia will benefit more if directed at small or weak nations first (e.g. France and the Netherlands) and his advice is to dispose of enemies one by one.

On 7 August, the German Foreign Office cabled Tokyo stating that Kurusu's main point was not Japan's relationship to Russia, United States, or the United Kingdom, but the new order in East Asia. Kurusu repeated MATSUOKA's statements in greater detail, namely that Japan wants to organize the East Asia Sphere including the South Seas. Sato had been given impression of unchanged friendly German attitude, but methods of encouraging this friendship were not clear. Before MATSUOKA and Konoye could adjust their foreign policy, they would clearly have to see how Germany stood on these matters. While he did not refer to the German expression of disinterest in Overseas problems in May, it was clear what he was aiming at.

On 9 August, Grew informed Welles of the anti-American attitude of Japan in China, especially in Shanghai, where Japanese controlled papers have conducted an anti-American and anti-foreign campaign.
On 9 August, a meeting was held between MATSUOKA and French Ambassador concerning Japanese demands for stopping shipment of supplies to China, bases etc. Japanese stand firm in requests and Henri points out that the utilization of air fields etc. anywhere in French Indo-China may result in Japanese landings about Cambodia, therefore, he would like clarification on actual points Japan desires to use. Japanese consider this impossible and stated they have no intention of abusing French concessions to them.

KIDO stated in his diary of 10 August, that he had received a report that the Government wishes to avoid force against Netherlands East Indies and Singapore at present, and since 8 months are needed to prepare, after a decision for war is made, the later war comes the better.

In a conversation between the French Ambassador and the Japanese Vice Minister on 10 August, Ambassador Henri was given notice that the Japanese wished to "pass through Province of Tonkin". When he complained of the broadness of this request, Japanese stated secrecy of actual airfields etc., to be used had to be observed and French Indochina would play a large part in the establishment of the New Order.
in East Asia. The Vice Minister then reiterated that Japan had no intention of transgressing on French Indochinese territory and hoped the French Government would grant their request. If it is refused Japan may be forced to take military action. Henri feared that the Chinese may come down into Indochina from the north and make the country a Sin-Japanese battlefield.

On 15 August, Ott cabled the German Foreign Ministry and reported that MATSUOKA had advised him that the French Ambassador had changed the previously announced basic acceptance of the 3 Japanese demands regarding Indochina, to the position that France first wanted a Japanese guarantee of renunciation of all territorial demands. They had been advised to maintain their previously announced basic agreement and the territorial guarantee would be adjusted. The Foreign Minister requested Germany to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French Government.

On 20 August, the French Ambassador handed to MATSUOKA the French counter-proposals which Japan would consider. After investigating them Ohashi visited the Ambassador on the evening of the same day and after stating Japan's objections to
On 21 August, a meeting took place between the French Ambassador and the Chief of the Western Eurasian Bureau, who stated that although it is not preferable to reveal Japanese secret military items since France was doubtful of Japan's military demands as a result of conference with the Army to speedily dissolve French suspicion, Japan had decided unofficially to notify her the outline of her request. He asked for quick approval without alterations.

On 23 August, Otto cabled the Reich Foreign Ministry concerning recall of various Japanese Ambassadors and Consuls in order to coordinate Japanese foreign policy, mainly, to eliminate pro Anglo-Saxon diplomats. SHIGEMITSU and TOGO survived this purge.

On 25 August, Ambassador Henri held another conference with Ohashi on second French counter-proposal regarding French Indo-China. France will accept Japan's three military requests regarding (1) use of airfields, (2) number of troops to be stationed in Tonkin Province and
(3) course of passage for these units—but for reasons of prestige cannot put this in an official letter.

On 26 August, the Keren Mining Development Company was formed for the purpose of controlling mining and sale of all minerals except manganite, already controlled on 19 June, 1939. This company was the effective instrument by which the Government more rigidly controlled the output of mines in Korea.

On 27 August, Japan informed the Netherlands Minister that Kobayashi, Minister of Commerce and Industry would head the economic mission to Batavia, to establish closer economic relations aided by 24 assistants and would leave on 31 August.

On 28 August, SHIRATORI, Toshio was appointed as Diplomatic Councillor in the Foreign Office.

On 30 August, MATSUOIA sent a letter to Henri regarding acceptance of French proposals which satisfy Japan's demands in French Indo-China.
In an oral statement by I ATSUKA on the same day it was said Japan agreed to accept the letter as France's intention to comply with terms of their agreement. General Nishihere is to become representative of the Supreme Commander of Army and Navy to be sent.

On 30 August, the I ATSUKA-Henri Agreement was concluded whereby Japan's predominant interests in political and economic circles in East Asia was recognised.

On the same day an official report was issued by the Japanese Foreign Minister concerning advance into French Indo-China and final signing of agreement concluded by Japanese persuasive efforts.

On 31 August, Major General Nishihere called on Governor General of French Indo-China and proposed to start military negotiations. The Governor had received no instructions from France. If French failed to answer by 2 September, Nishihere had orders to evacuate Japanese nationals. I ATSUKA wired to the Japanese Ambassador in France to urge the immediate giving of instructions.

On 2 September, Nishihere again visited the Governor, who could not give him an answer since although he had received
instructions they were very complicated and he asked leave to give them to Nishihara on the next day. Governor declined to accept immediate negotiations. Nishihara then handed Governor notice that Japanese residents would be withdrawn and troops stationed after 5 September. After perusing instructions, Governor sent note to Nishihara stating that they differed from Japanese and advocated a revision to begin from the 3rd. Nishihara tiring of further delay informed him that his instructions for 5 September still remained.

On 3 September Hull cabled Grew instructing him to confer with the Foreign Minister concerning current rumors that Japan was presenting an ultimatum to French Indochina demanding passage of troops and air bases for military operations against China. On 3 September, a telegram was sent by order of Matsuoka to Seito Constable General at Batavia instructing him in the oil negotiations with Netherlands East Indies to emphasize the acquisition of oil fields and if the Netherlands East Indies lay stress on Japan's oil purchases he was to distinguish clearly the acquisition of oil fields and the purchase of oil.
On 3 September, Nishibei met the Commanding General of the French Indo-China Army and the letter told him he had wired Vichy that the negotiations had ended in failure, he had no authority to negotiate, and that a counterproposel is being drafted, meeting with the Governor-General is desired. Counter proposal was submitted the same evening and further negotiations postponed to next day.

At a 4-Minister Conference on 4 September and a liaison conference of 19 September discussion was held concerning the strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy axis. TOJO attended the first meeting.

On 4 September, the Japanese Consul General retained 2 ships to prepare for evacuation of Japanese from French Indo-China, and once more Japanese tried to make the Ambassador to France exert pressure on the French Government to accept terms. Finally at eight o'clock on 4 September an agreement was signed between Nishibei and the French Commanding General.

On 6 September, a unit of the Japanese Army crossed the border and on the next day the Governor proposed to drop
negotiations, on the grounds that this was a contravention of the Fret. Nishioka said it was a front line incident by unit which did not know of Fret, but Governor would not change his attitude. Japan then again requested the Ambassador to France to hurry French Government in instructing the Governor-General of French Indo-China to settle negotiations immediately.

On 9 and 10 September, IATSUOKA and Steinhe held an informal conversation re importance of keeping the United States out of war, Japan to restrain and prevent United States intervention while Germany will restrain United States in the Atlantic. War materials to be supplied to Japan for arming in preparation for conflict and Germany hopes Japan will safeguard her interests in Greater East Asia. Although United States Axis conflict is to be avoided if possible, all preparation must be made to face possible strife. Axis must stand united against Anglo-Saxondon.

Entry from KIDO's diary of 9 September, states Chief Hide-De-Charp reported the military agreement perley, which had been making smooth progress with the Governor-General of French Indo-China took a turn
for the worse when one battalion of Japanese troops moved into French Indo-China.

Between 10 and 26 September, an Imperial Conference was held regarding the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact. Draft of Pact was drawn up, and discussions conducted concerning Japan and America's differences in opinion.

On 11 September, the French Ambassador visited Ohashi and stated that he had received information that the Thailand Army was likely to invade French Indo-China along with the Japanese and he asked that Japan stop Thailand's plan.

On 12 September, Ohashi told the French Ambassador that Japan would not intervene between French Indo-China and Thailand and French proposal was merely move to postpone negotiations.

Thailand demanded in note of 13 September that the Mekong river frontier be revised by ceding to Thailand the areas along the right of River Mekong across from Luang Prabang and Bakuase, which were ceded by Thailand to French Indo-China in treaty of 1904, also hoped that a guarantee would be given to return Cambodia and Laos to Thailand when France renounces sovereignty over French Indo-China. These requests were made in view
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ON 13 September, Kobeyashi cabled NATSUMO stating that he had interviewed the Governor-General who kept to diplomatic formulas and stated that the Netherlands saw no serious situation and that in Netherlands East Indies an equal opportunity was afforded all in that country. Kobeyashi stated it was useless to negotiate with such a Governor-General who evaded political problems and was not interested in sounding out Japan's intention towards Netherlands East Indies.

On 13 September, a Presidential embargo was placed on equipment for production of aviation motor fuel and tetra-ethyl lead or any plans of specifications useful in the design, construction or operation of such.

Grew protested to M. TSUOKA on 13 September concerning the destruction on 19 August of a Methodist Episcopal Mission in Chungking by the Japanese forces. He asked for a prompt report.

Entry from KIDO's diary of 14 September, states that TSUOKA plans to send ultimatum to French Indo-China.

Meeting of the Privy Council of 16 September, discussed the effect upon Japan of the proposed Tri-Partite
On 16 September, the French Ambassador accused the Japanese of delaying negotiations because they had backed Thailand. Choshi denied this and said the situation was critical and Japan might well walk in at any moment without an agreement.

On 18 September, Governor-General of French Indo-China and Commanding General of the Army gave Japanese general consent to request on 17 September, but in view of uncertainty of clashes, it was decided to evacuate Japanese residents on the 20th.

On 18 September, General Nishihara notified the French that in view of wide differences in opinions between French and Japanese on negotiation subject, all members of Japanese Observation Party would leave Hanoi on the 20th.

18 September was the basic date for conclusion of Japanese-French military agreement. No Japanese troops may enter Hanoi; French administrative and military to retain posts; Japanese to bear all expenses of any occupation or carrying...
of troops and reimburse for damages; Japan may select certain strategic bases and use specified railroad and highways; three airfields to be used by Japanese. Then cites threatening actions on part of Japanese.

On 18 September Kobayashi cabled KATSUOKA requesting that in view of Japan's urgent need for oil, and the failure of the Tokyo negotiations, hurry on negotiations in Batavia. If this is done, the Netherlands East Indies would gain for their success since a failure would mean that world opinion would charge the Netherlands East Indies with moral responsibility for failure. Failure to make the purchase could be utilised to browbeat the Netherlands East Indies on the enterprises problem. For these reasons he advocated that the negotiations be changed to Batavia.

On 18 September Grew complained to KATSUOKA concerning widespread interference with U.S. trade in China in particular products, despite numerous representations to Japan by the U.S.

On 19 September, Grew complained to KATSUOKA concerning the use of air bases and passage of troops through French Indo-China in order to aid the Japanese war against China.
On 19 September, France agreed to establish a committee for resolution of pending questions, but flatly refused territorial demands made by Thailand on 13 September.

Excerpt from Ciano's Diary of 19 September stated that Ribbentrop arrived with the Japanese military alliance which was to be signed in Berlin. Alliance will be stroke against Russia and the United States according to Ribbentrop, but Ciano is of the opinion that anti-Russian sanctions are fine but anti-American one will merely induce Washington to increase commitments to Britain.

Memorandum by United States Under Secretary of State Wells of 20 September concerning ultimatum of General Nishihara to the French Governor-General of French Indo-China to the effect that if it did not permit occupation by the Japanese troops, such troops would on 22 September stage an invasion of French Indo-China.

Memorandum of same date by Grew concerned a conversation with MATSUOKA, who defends this ultimatum by stating Japanese and French Government had signed agreement permitting occupation by Japanese troops and French Indo-China was not complying therewith; such occupation was merely
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for the purpose of striking against Chiang's army to close China conflict and upon such event troops would be withdrawn. Grew advised HATSUMO such occupation would be considered by the United States as infringement of the "status quo" which Japan was pledged to preserve in Asia. In a telephone conversation between German and French delegates to Armistice Commission on the same day the landing of Japanese troops in French Indo-China was discussed. French wished to negotiate first, but had ordered Admiral Decoux to resist by force if necessary should large numbers of Japanese troops march in.

On 22 September, after negotiations between France and Japan, France agreed to allow all military facilities required by the Japanese Navy and Army in Northern French Indo-China for execution of campaign in China.

On 23 September, the Foreign Office issued a statement concerning conversations at Tokyo in August between HATSUMO and the French Ambassador on basic letters regarding the question of French Indo-China. As a result of these conversations an agreement was reached between French Indo-China and Japan on 22 September.
The announcement went on to say that despite a local skirmish in the border region, due to a misunderstanding by French Indo-China, it is expected that the agreement will be carried out.

On 23 September, all Japanese residents and diplomats evacuated from Saigon arrived in Fukuoka after evacuation from French Indo-China by Japanese authorities.

On 24 September, the final plans were made by General Nishibara with representative of French Indo-China Army re Japanese forces landing in Indo-China; evacuation of Japanese residents.

A Conference of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held on 26 September - TOJO, MUSHINO and KUTO were present. Members discussed the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact, the fact that in the event of war with the United States and Japan although Army was in good position, supplies of oil and petrol might prove troublesome in long war. Conclusion of Japanese-USSR pact was discussed and also watch to be paid on USSR-US relations. Pact was unanimously approved with attention to be paid not to incite the United States and Britain and improve USSR and Japanese relations.
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On 26 September, a Privy Council Meeting attended by TOJO and HOCHINO, was held subsequent to the meeting of the Investigation Committee discussing the Tri-Partite Pact and approving draft with unanimous vote.

On 26 September, a Japanese bomber dropped 4 bombs on the City of Haipong, causing 33 killed and injured at time of entry of Japanese into French Indo-China.

Extract from KIDO's Diary of 26 September related that a Japanese unit under orders to make a peaceful landing in French Indo-China carried out a landing, in face of enemey and bombed Haipong in spite of orders from Navy Support Command to contrary.

On 26 September, Kurusu, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin sent a telegram to MATSUOKA - excerpt shows that at time of signing of Tri-Partite Pact, Japan had already been informed that Germany had begun military preparations for war against USSR.

27 September is the official date of signing of Tri-Partite Pact and secret letters.

On 27 September the following positions were held by the Accused: ARAKI, no office, DOMINARA, Lt. General in
Cabinet: 20th January

1940

REPLACEMENT

CURRENT 5th Army, Supreme War Councillor (28 September) WADTA, General in command Expeditionary Force, Central China;

WAGASHI, no office (Minister of State, 6 December, Prime Minister 21 December);

WATO, Ex-Prime; POSHINO, President Planning Board; ITAGAKI, Lt. General - no appointment; KAYE, President North China Development Company; KIDO, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal; KIYAMU, Lt. General in-191 and 32nd Division; KOISO, General on reserve list; IATSUI, General retired; Advisor to East Asia Promotion Federation;

KATSU, Foreign Minister and Overseas Affairs Minister; Vice President, Overseas Affairs Board, Supreme War Councillor; IMAI, Governor-General of Korea; UTRI, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau (War Ministry); NAGASAKI, Special Inspector of Navy; OKA, Rear Admiral, Member of Naval Staff Imperial Headquarters; OKADA, Director General, East Asia Research Bureau, South Manchuria Railway; OSABA, Ex-Ambassador to Germany (re-appointed 20 December) SATO, Colonel, Deputy Chief of Staff South China Expeditionary Force;

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An extract from Matsuoka's speech at the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact on 27 September was quoted to show that the Pact divided the world into two camps between which war would inevitably be waged.

As of 27 September United States exports of iron and steel scrap to Japan equals 8½ million tons for the past 6 years.

Letter from Ott to Matsuoka of 27 September promised that Germany "will do their utmost to aid Japan" with all means in their power in the event of war between Japan and England in Greater East Asia. A letter from the German Ambassador to Matsuoka of the same date refers to Japanese mandated territory in South Seas concerning which Matsuoka had requested confirmation of German government's agreement that
Germany be compensated for loss of
Japanese mandated territories but Japan
should return them. Ambassador confirmed
this.

Imperial rescript issued on 27 September
was addressed to the Japanese people and
attempted to gain support of Tri-Pactite
Pact, giving the impression it was
concluded for peace and security
amongst nations. TOJO, and FROSTINO's
names appeared as principal officers
of the government. On the same day
the German Ambassador in Tokyo thanked
MATSUOKA for favorable participation
in Pact negotiations and generally
extending bond of friendship.
On 28 September MATSUOKA resigned as
Overseas Minister but retained other
posts.
On 28 September Thailand again requested revision of River Makong boundary but dropped subject of Laos and Cambodia until the position of French Indo-China is altered.

Statement of Japanese foreign policy was made by Japanese foreign ministry on 28 September concerning establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; economic agreement with French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies; increased coalition with Thailand; plans for Japanese control of areas in southern Asia; instigate independence movement in French Indo-China so France will renounce its right therein; plans for bases in Thailand; Straits Settlements to be placed under direct control of Japan.

On 1 October the Total War Research Institute was proclaimed under the Prime Minister’s administration to control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war; personnel requirements, etc.

On 1 October HOSHINO was also Director of Total War Institute.
On 7 October a counsellor of the French Embassy at Tokyo notified the Japanese of the 26 September bombing and they paid French 33,000 pesos compensation money.

From ichi of German Foreign Ministry of 8 October related to trade between Japan and Germany, it shows close economic cooperation between Japan and Germany in various material field and also that Japan contemplated at time of signing the "Treaty Seat between Japan and Germany" would react unfavourably against Japan's trade.

On 10 October in a message from the Japanese Embassy to the United States Department of State, the former stated that it is difficult to concede that U.S. measures with regard to iron and steel scrap were modified adversely in the interests of national defense - in view of the situation of iron and steel, their supply and demand, and the volume shipped to Japan.
On 11 October, France again refused Thailand's demands of 13 September; thus situation grew tense and Thailand concentrated troops on the French Indochina border.

Grew informed KITSCUK on 11 October that the setting up of a complete and discriminatory control of exchange had caused American trade in North China to come to a virtual halt. American enterprise had been driven from Manchuria, reduced to insignificant proportions in North China, and now it appears Japan intends to force the United States out of Shanghai.

On 15 October, Gk., Rear Admiral, was appointed Chief of General and Military Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry and assistant to Navy Minister in the Imperial Headquarters; also (3 November) Secretary of the National General Mobilization Council.

The Van Mook book states that the Dutch and Japanese delegations met from 14-16 October under the chairmanship of Kobayashi and Van Mook. The Japanese delegation stated that despite the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan wanted firm friendly relations with the Netherlands East Indies and wishes for co-existence and co-prosperity. The Netherlands, stated that while the Tri-Partite Pact raised serious misgivings, they were willing to continue negotiations if it could be understood Japan had no hostile intentions nor claims leadership over Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands requested
Japan to submit a list of points to be discussed but oil could be treated separately if desired.

On 16 October by Presidential proclamation an embargo was placed on all iron and steel scrap except to Western powers and Great Britain.

October 10 telegram from Kobayashi to Matsuoka regarding the urgency of joining the Netherlands East Indies within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and in order to accomplish this Japan's economic powers should be deeply implanted in the Netherlands Indies. Certain items requested in the budget of the next fiscal year should be authorized.

An ordinance concerning operation of funds of banks and other financial institutions were promulgated on 13 October and provided that all financial institutions were required to adjust their investment policies in accordance with the directives of the Minister of Finance.

On 20 October, two days after accepting the Netherlands proposals regarding negotiations, Kobayashi, the Chief Japanese Delegate, left for Japan.

On 21 October a note was given by the Japanese delegation to the Netherlands, stating their appreciation for the Netherlands explanation of the petroleum situation on 7 October. It went on to state that Murai had found wide differences in the proposals of the two countries and that the proposed quantity of aviation gas and crude
On 24 October Goro informed Murai that since 1 October Japanese regulations governing control of inspections and shipments of raw materials for light industries in North China are destined to result in large financial losses unless modified.

A Cabinet decision of 25 October stated that the Netherlands East Indies must from the economic standpoint become a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Measures must be taken to stop Netherlands East Indies depending on the European-American economic bloc and all restrictions removed which hinder Japan's economic activities. Japan must be allowed to purchase agricultural products, obtain special cooperation from Netherlands East Indies in export of merchandise, obtain entry to unopened ports, have more freedom in fishing industry, inaugurate an air service, and although not including Netherlands East Indies in the zone bloc, must try to place exchange control under Japan's guidance and Netherlands East Indies

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banks should establish credit to the Japanese and give them financial facilities. Third Powers' interest in the Netherlands East Indies must be stopped and anti-Japanese propaganda on anti-Japanese view ceased. Various measures such as inviting influential natives to Japan and by propagandas are to be resorted to, and the economic policy is aimed to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere and expand Japanese interests.

On 25 October Saite cabled M. T. U. referring to Kurai's telegram to the Chief of Fuel Affairs Bureau that from the standpoint of the industrialist it is most reasonable, but it is necessary that further consideration be given from the strategic standpoint. The application for prospecting in indicated areas may arouse Netherlands East Indies' suspicion, and those in Batavia think it necessary that Japan fortify certain areas in Dutch New Guinea etc. with planes and plain-clothes troops for a strategic base for operation against the Dutch. A large investigation is necessary and Saite advocated that prospecting rights be acquired for whole areas, taking into consideration strategic standpoint when selecting districts.
EXHIBIT

11734 1299-..n

... article in Yomiuri newspaper of 27 October written by CHIKI justifying the Tri-Partito alliance as a peaceful instrument and stating that Japan must establish a new order in East Asia. A relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity must be established with French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and the South Sea Islands to be settled with the new order in Europe and consultations with Germany and Italy. The axis must unite in their efforts since the prosecution of the war in Europe is closely bound with the new order in East Asia.

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On 27 October Murai requested that certain uncultivated oil territories in Borneo, Celebes, Dutch New Guinea, Aru archipelago and the Schouten archipelago be considered as Japan's Sphere of interest. Japan would like acknowledgment of these spheres of interest for her in order to explore and exploit them and requests that the necessary steps according to the mining law be taken. Japan may consider the capital participation of Netherlands East Indies in these enterprises. Japan would also like shares in the N.V. Nederlandsch Indische Mijnbouwmaatschappij and requests terms and conditions.

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THE MINISTRY

EXHIBIT P-1576

N. 5, November stated that new a new phase has been entered since the signing of the Tri-Partite Pact, Cabinet Council have decided on summary of the program for economic construction embracing Japan, Manchukuo and China.

At a ministers' conference on 5 November (TOJO Minister), it was decided to help Thailand in her boundary fight with French Indo-China and work cooperatively politically and economically in establishment of new order in East Asia.

The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on 5 November cabled the Vice Minister of War Annex concerning change of ambassadors to Manchukuo.

On 7 November KIMURA was appointed to Japan-Manchukuo Economic Joint Committee, and Land Development Committee.

Vice War Minister telegraphed to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on 8 November stating change in ambassadors to Manchukuo was approved.

On 15 November Grew complained to MITSUKA that merchandise owned by U.S. interests is being refused to re-export permits from Indo-China as a result of Japanese pressure, and requested steps be taken to put an end to this interference.

On 15 November the Netherlands Minister recommended to the Vice Foreign Minister in Tokyo that the negotiations be discontinued, since they were at a standstill for lack of subject matter.
On 17 November France refused Japan's request to cede territory to Thailand.

On 20 November a verbal note stated that a new special envoy had been appointed by the Japanese for the Netherlands negotiations in order to speed up the proceedings.

On 21 November Okada was appointed Councillor to the Cabinet Planning Board.

A telegram from Ott to German Foreign Ministry of 21 November was introduced to show how Germany did to Japan against French Indo-China and Siam served as a springboard for attack on Singapore. Discusses Japanese and Anglo-French efforts to win Thailand over to their side.

The second Four-Minister (Togo, War Minister) conference was held on 21 November where it was decided to help Thailand to gain control of Koh Lanta and Pukau as well provided she agreed to Japanese demands.

On 22 November, Sir Robert Craigie in a memorandum to the Japanese Foreign Minister, gave a survey of the very large number of outstanding Anglo-Japanese cases in China, some dating back to 1938, and Japanese laxity in settling them, he enumerated many by acto and location.

On 25 November, Grew protested to MATSUOKA on the arresting of the American Vice Consul and United Press correspondent in Hanoi.

On 23 November a clash occurred between French Indo-China and Thailand troops in the vicinity of Laos.
On 26 November, Yoshizaké was appointed Japanese special envoy for the Netherlands negotiations.

A conference between Jojaokor and ambassador Kurusu of 27 November showed that within several months after the conclusion of the Tri-Partite alliance, collaboration between the three powers was taking the definite course of preparation for Japanese advance through the region south of China as a prerequisite for an attack on Singapore. Conclusion of Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese agreement would pave the way for these advances.

On 30 November a joint treaty was concluded between Japan and the new Japanese controlled government of China, and joint declaration of Vermacht of Japan, Manchukuo and Japanese controlled China, as part of plan of establishing a "New Order in East Asia."

On 9 December, the U. S. consul at Tsinan made a report on the cultivation, sale and use of opium in the Tsinan Consular District.

On 10 December, the U. S. embargo on iron and steel was placed under licensing system.

A telegram from Ott of 13 December concerned the invaluable work OSIMA and SHIRATORI have done and can do as ambassadors in Berlin and Rome, and urged OSIMA to once more accept post as ambassador to Germany because of his understanding of German-Japanese policy.
In December 1940 SHIRATORI, Toshio wrote an article entitled, "The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" which was published in the publication "Contemporary Japan", regarding the treaty between Japan-Germany-Italy concluded in Berlin on 27 September.

A telegram was sent on 16 December from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice Minister of War and Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff concerning trade pact between Japan, Manchukuo and China and Germany.

On 17 December Gozo reiterated to MATSUQKA his complaint of 15 November concerning export permits from Indo-China for United States goods.

A Privy Council meeting attended by TOJO was held on 18 December at which MATSUQKA stated that relations with USSR should be regulated at the moment when USSR does no menace in Japan.

Telegram from Ctt to Reich Ministry on 19 December tells of Japanese Foreign Minister's plans to visit Rome and Berlin to coordinate Tri-Partite Pact and overcome deadlock in negotiations with China and Russia.

On 20 December OHISHA was reappointed Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Germany.
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On 20 December OSHIMA was reappointed Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Germany.
On 20 December an agreement was made providing for the establishment of a general commission and two technical commissions to be formed under the provisions of Article IV of the Tri-Partite Pact.

On 21 December HIRANUI was appointed Home Minister. SUZUAI, Lt. General, was appointed Director General of China Affairs Board and Councillor of Foreign Research Bureau.

On 26 December MUTO was appointed Councillor of the South Seas Bureau of the Overseas Affairs Ministry and CMA was appointed Councillor of the Bureau of Southern Colonization, the Overseas Affairs Ministry.

Telegram from Otis to Reich Ministry of 31 December stated that the Foreign Minister was preparing to leave for Berlin.

SHIMAMOTO stated in interrogation that YAMEOTO submitted his plan for Pearl Harbor to the General Staff in January 1941.

Sejima stated in direct examination that he incinerated plans for the Japanese attack on the USSR planned to take place in 1939. From the plan, it appeared that Japan had contemplated an attack against "Far East-Russia" occupying Voroshilov, Vladivostock, etc. His position at the time was in Military Operation Section where he was in charge of the safeguarding and burning of secret papers; in this capacity he was told in the Spring of 1941 to destroy afsossed plans, which he read before doing; sc.
Sejima testified to the plan for the attack on the Maritime Provinces and against Russia prepared in 1941. Offensive to be taken in Sui Ren Ho district and extended towards Blagoveshchensk and Rubyshovsk. Plan was an offensive plan, and the one for the following year was on the same lines.

The orders of Restriction of Publication in newspapers and others, otherwise known as Imperial Ordinance Number 37 was enacted on 10 January and prohibited publication of any news which might hinder conduct of foreign affairs or national policies, or conduct of financial and economic policies and that which must be kept secret from foreign countries.

On 13 January a Liaison Conference was held attended by TOJO, MUTO and CKÀ.

Address made by MATSUOKA on the occasion of a farewell party for GÔSHI on his departure for Germany on 15 January. MATSUOKA wished GÔSHI well and reiterated the confidence GÔSHI had gained from the German government, their pleasure at his appointment and the importance of his mission to further cement German-Japanese relations.

Communication from Chief of Intendance Bureau, War Ministry to Ministry of Finance - Chief Finance Bureau, 16 January, requested confidential preparation of original plates of military currencies to be used in unspecified areas.
On 16 January, the new Japanese delegation to the Netherlands East Indies headed by Yoshizawa presented a memorandum on their requests. It stated that in view of the fact that the Netherlands East Indies is thinly populated and undeveloped, Japan is of the opinion that if she participates in the exploitation and development of these islands, great benefit will be reaped by both countries, therefore she makes the following proposals:

- That the entry of Japanese nationals into Netherlands East Indies be greatly facilitated.
- Restrictions on medical practice be removed so Japanese doctors can practice in Netherlands East Indies.

Liaison Conferences were held on 16, 17 and 19 January, attended by HIRANUMA and TOJO.

TOJO stated in interrogation, that at the time he had agreed with MATSUO's speech in January when he stated the Tri-Partite Pact was the realization of the ideal of Hakkoku Ichiu.
On 21 January the U. S. Treasury Attaché in Shanghai issued a report on the c.i.a.i. m.n.p. e.
distribution there. He attached a Chinese
inclusion signed by Lee Ming.

In a speech to the Diet by MATSUOKA on 21
January he stated that the Netherlands East
Indies and French Indochina should be intimately
and inseparably related with Japan. Kobyoshi
(Minister of Commerce and Industry) had been sent
to the Netherlands East Indies to discuss nego-
tiations for purchase of oil, but had been
obliged to return when the negotiations were at
a definite stage and had been replaced by
Yoshizawa.

On 22 January, Ambassador Nomura was instructed
to try to make the President and other people
appreciate the fact that if, as it seems, there is
no means of finding mutual understanding between
Japan and the United States, then Japan has to
join with countries other than the United States
and Great Britain. Japan, in order to prevent
war, and for her own defense, had decided to
contract an alliance with the Axis. Whereas,
Japan's actions in China were considered to be
aggressive and unjust, her actions there were
based entirely on the desire to build the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the
principle of "The World Under One Roof" and she
was not thinking of excluding foreigners from
this region.

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On 22 January, the Cabinet decided to enforce a population increase policy to ensure a source of military strength as part of Japan's General Military Preparations. The goal was set to 100,000,000 domestic population by 1960.

On 23 January, MATSUOKA, MUTO and OKA were appointed Japanese members of the joint Japan-German-Italy Committee in Tokyo, and OSHIMA to a similar Committee in Berlin.

Memo of Weizsecker dated 23 January which stated the Japanese Ambassador mentioned a conversation between Ott and the Vice Foreign Minister, the British influence on Vichy must be prevented since Japan's advance in the direction of Singapore necessitates use of Malacca Peninsula, and the passage through Indochina and Siam.

Liaison Conference of 23 January attended by HIRANUMA and TOJO.

An extract from the Japan Times and Advertiser of 23 January stated that the fundamental principles of Japan's population policy were decided at Cabinet meeting after HOSHING, President of the Cabinet Planning Board and the Welfare, Education and War (TOJO) Ministers gave explanations and decisions.

Communication No. 2. Top Secret Sanctioned, 24 January bearing seals of several prominent officials referred to the subject of preparation and printing of military currency notes.
and is acknowledgment of the communication and the matters contained therein by the several officials.

On 27 January 1941, Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA that since the more favorable position of the allies through the defeat of Italy in the Mediterranean and increased United States aid, Netherlands East Indies had evidenced a strange attitude towards Japan and is even expressing her opposition on every measure. Unless Japan adopts determined measures not only the negotiations development, but also the development of relations would be difficult.

MATSUOKA instructed the Japanese delegate in Batavia on 28 January that Yoshizawa should absolutely refrain from using expressions that would deny Japan's hegemony within the Greater East Asia Sphere when speaking to outsiders.

A Liaison Conference was held on 30 January attended by TOJO, HIRAMA, MUIR and OKA.

Telegrams from Leahy in Paris to Secretary of State, Washington, of 26 January re German refusal to allow French troops to enter French Inde-Chine, as if they do not wish to have French defense strengthened there.

Telegrams from German ambassador in Tokyo to the Reich Foreign Minister, dated 31 January, showing that the Japanese Government and people were united behind the Tri-Partite Pact and SHIRATORI led the demand for attack on Singapore.
and thus inspired the making of a research study of such an attack by the Military Socialists of the German Embassy in Tokyo. Conflict with United States and Russia...

KIDO stated in his diary of 1 February that Prince Fushimi, Premier Konoye and General Sugiyama reported to the Emperor the policy which was decided at the Liaison Conference of 30 January regarding French Indo-China and Thailand.

The use of naval and air bases was decided and the grasping of the opportunity offered Japan by French Indo-China and Thailand having accepted arbitration would contribute to the preparation for the southward policy.

A Liaison Conference was held on 3 February attended by TOJO, HIRUMI, MUTO and OKA.

On 3 February the Netherlands answered the Japanese proposal of 16 January. This memorandum stated that while the Netherlands wished to afford neutrals improved economic relations, consideration must be given to the progress and emancipation of the Netherlands East Indies people and the maintenance of strict non-discrimination offering no preference or foreign activity in any economic field. The Netherlands refuted the Japanese statement that the Netherlands East Indies were not developed and stated it was self-supporting. While there is naturally room for improvement, it was pointed
out that agricultural emigrants to Java were
50,000 persons a year and still increasing and
Netherlands East Indies is not in need of immi-
giration. Japan's share in imports is larger due
to the buying power by exports by Netherlands
East Indies to third countries.

On 3 February copper, brass, zinc, nickel, and
potash were placed on the embargo list by Presi-
dential proclamation.

On 5 February MATSUKA was appointed Japanese
mediator in dispute between France and Siam.

Telegram from Ott to German Foreign Office,
dated 6 February regarding Japan's plans to obligate
President K. Ikeda to sign a secret agreement whereby they
will join in military or political agreement with a/

Yoshizawa cabled MATSUKA on 6 February reporting
that MATSUKA's speech on the Co-Prosperity Sphere
had caused a great shock in the Netherlands East
Indies and has been greatly publicized. He went
on to complain of other irritating press re-
leases and stated that the Dutch Minister, doubt-
ing Japan's intent, has requested recognition by
Japan of the exiled government as the de jure and
de facto government. Armed force seems to be the
only way to make the Netherlands East Indies a
member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and full
preparations must first be made to meet this
eventuality. Otherwise Japan will have to choose
peaceful economic negotiations, however unsatis-
factory. If the latter case is so then speeches
and actions must conform to this policy to aid negotiations. The most recent developments in Tokyo do not cover this aim.

In a proposal from Anthony Eden to Shigemitsu on 7 February, it is stated that although at the outset the British Ambassador had hoped the new cabinet would cooperate and settle problems peacefully, subsequent happenings reported to him did not illustrate this intention. The signing of the Tri-Partite Pact and the attitude that only Japan is entitled to mediate in affairs in the Far East can not be overlooked. In regard to the Far Eastern situation, Britain wishes to make it clear that although she has territories in the Far East, she harbors no aggressive intent, and has no objection to Japan formulating her own policy, but hopes that it will not lead to a terrible disaster.

On 7 February Shigemitsu replied to Eden, stating that he was not aware of such a critical situation and that England failed to understand Japan's intentions. While Britain accused Japan of cooperating with her enemies, she had consistently cooperated with Japan's enemies. Geographically, Japan should lead Asia, and this does not differ from the special interests which Britain and the United States favor to their neighbours and in the Far East.
Telegram MATSUOKA to Nomura of 7 February tells him to impress upon the U. S. that Japan is not so exhausted by the China fighting as is supposed there. Japan has no intention of fighting the U. S. and they should co-operate lest the U.S.S.R. should bolshevizo all China.

Telegram from German Ambassador, Tokyo, dated 9 February regarding Japanese desire to assist Germany in getting rubber and other raw materials; telegram from Berlin approving Japanese intention in agreement with France and Thailand and these countries would make no agreements with third powers, awaiting further news on affairs in Indo-Chine.

Telegram from Ott to Reich Minister dated 10 February states that MATSUOKA is to leave shortly for Berlin to discuss mainly: (1) attitude of Tri-Partite partners to America; (2) attempts to keep America out of the war. If this is unavoidable, Japan is considering a preventive attack on Singapore to eradicate the United States from the Pacific. (3) termination of China conflict.

On 13 February Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA, stating that the Netherlands East Indies were now much closer to the United States and Great Britain and that the South Seas problem, particularly Netherlands East Indies, is an important cause for United States expansion of naval ships. Netherlands East Indies is more inclined towards being in United States hands than Japanese, since they
can expect positive aid from United States and Britain. Success of the negotiations, due to Netherlands East Indies following United States attitude, seems remote and the only means of settlement left is for Japan to exercise her real power. No success can be obtained in negotiations by Japan shouting for a co-prosperity sphere under her leadership.

An article from the Japanese-owned newspaper "Little Critic" of 13 February gives indication that Japanese residents at Tsingtao were opposed to present Japanese narcotic policy.

On 13 February MATSUKA cabled SHIGEMITSU, informing him that he intended to see Craigie in a few days and asked SHIGEMITSU to hand Eden his telegram No. 47 and explain the reason he expressed so unreserved an opinion is that he felt so close to him. He stated Craigie's report was a fantasy and groundless. SHIGEMITSU is to make verbal representation that Japan has no intention to make trouble with England.

A Liaison Conference was held on 13 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and others.

In a memorandum of 14 February of Hull, he stated that the President had informed the new Japanese Ambassador on his visit to him that Americans were concerned about Japanese movements south to French Indochina, etc., and her entry into the Tri-Pact. In view of these situations, it might be wise for the State
Department officials to frankly conf r with him (the ambassador) to see if relations could be improved.

MATSUOKA informed MATSUI on 13 February that Japanese officials in Indo-China continued their interference in granting permits to United States firms.

On 14 February MATSUI cabled Nomura in Washington and stated that he had urged at a recent Diet session reconsideration of Japan's attitude towards the United States. He set out a list of points which Nomura was to make clear to the United States Government. These points embraced the national policy of Japan and her determination to carry it out, also the fact that the China war had not exhausted Japan's supplies.

Telegram from German Ambassador, Tokyo, to German Foreign Ministry of 17 February concerning difficulty or arranging treaty due to Thailand's excessive demands. Hope to effect compromise and press Vichy Regime to accept.

MATSUOKA, in a reply to Eden of 17 February, stated that Japan is surprised at Britain's concern over the Far Eastern situation, based on reports of Ambassador Craigie. He stated that Japan was also anxious over British and United States movements in the Pacific and South Seas, and some quarters are advocating that Japan take steps to meet the worst in these regions. He again stated Japan's peacefull intentions and her
Motto is "no acquisition, no oppression, no exploitation." Japan is ready to act as a mediator anywhere, and he hoped England would agree that there is a grave responsibility to restore peace, which can only be fulfilled by a wise and courageous statesmanship willing to be accommodating and generous.

MATSUOKA stated in a telegram to SHIGEMITSU on 17 February that Craigie's report seemed to be based on the idea that Japan wanted military bases in French Indo-China and Thailand, and he did not know on what grounds Craigie had based this report. When the Vice-Minister stated this was based on speeches and actions of military men who controlled Japan's diplomacy, MATSUOKA stated he could find nothing to substantiate this.

On 18 February MATSUOKA cabled SHIGEMITSU concerning a conversation with Craigie to discuss Japanese-English relations. Japan accused England of misinterpretation of her actions and when Craigie inquired if Japanese mediation policy in the French Indo-China-Siam conflict would not reap exorbitant compensation, MATSUOKA stated that Japan's real reward would be in the restoration of peace.

On 19 February SHIGEMITSU was appointed Ambassador to China.

A Liaison Conference was held on 20 February attended by TOJO, KIRYU, KITA and SAWA.
Craigie wrote MATSUMA on 21 February with respect to the presence of British troops near the Malaya-Thailand border. A communiqué which had been issued by Thailand regarding their presence stated in effect 'both countries still respect the Treaty and pact of non-aggression concluded between one another', while the Japanese press had misquoted this by stating, 'Great Britain should respect the Non-Aggression Treaty which she concluded with Thailand.'

Report of conversation at Berlin between Goebbels and Weissacker on 22 February shows close German-Japan collaboration plans for Russian Pact, settlement of China matters, and plans for capturing Hong Kong and Singapore.

Liaison Conference of 23 February attended by TOJO, HIRANIMA, MUTO and OKA.

Excerpt from conference of Ribbentrop and Goebbels of 23 February in which Ribbentrop refers to Germany's victory on continent as conclusion of Tri-Partite Pact being great advantage to Japan. Horrors in former times Japan's friendship enabled Germany to re-arm after Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany's victory has eliminated France as a power in Asia and greatly weakened English strength, allowing Japan to advance closer to Singapore.

An interchange of communiques between Japan and Britain on 23 February stated that Churchill was pleased to see that MATSUMA sees
no reason to feel any untoward developments in the East. There is no question of Britain's attacking in the Far East and Britain's concern was not only based on Craigio's reports, but on events in the Far East. Britain is fighting to overthrow a system of lawlessness and violence abroad and tyranny at home and to gain no personal advantage.

SHIGEMITSU cabled MATSUOKA on 24 February and related a conversation with Premier Churchill in which the latter expressed regret at the present worsening of Anglo-Japanese relations. He stated that measures in Singapore were merely defensive, and Britain had never taken any offensive policy towards Japan. England would emerge victorious from the present conflict and the mediation suggested by MATSUOKA would not arise.

OSUMA informed MATSUOKA in a telegram of 25 February that he had stressed various matters concerning Japanese-German relations with Ribbentrop. He told the latter that Japan is absolutely faithful to the Tri-Partite Pact and everyone is moving forward to the realization of the national policy with the pact as a keynote to foreign relations.

On 25 February SHIGEMITSU cabled MATSUOKA and told him that he had informed Churchill that MATSUOKA's offer was not one of mediation. SHIGEMITSU pointed out that most problems between England and Japan had arisen out of the China situation and he regretted England had
been giving concrete assistance to China. The time had come for a constructive policy in the Pacific through goodwill and mutual understanding. Churchill stated that Britain had kept strictly neutral in this situation and that Japan's intentions after the Tri-Partite Pact had been so vague that both Britain and the United States had become suspicious.

Report from American Consul Taingtso to Secretary of State on 26 February regarding New Opium Prohibition Bureau inaugurated at Taingtso. Criticism of enforcement of opium restrictions.

Proposition of 27 February by Shigéit-su to Churchill stated that Matsukawa wished to state that there was no hint of his readiness to act as mediator. Matsukawa wished to reiterate what he had said before on the Tri-Partite Pact; it was a ploy to prevent a third power from entering the European War or Sino-Japanese conflict.

On 27 February Grew cabled Hull and related a conversation with Matsukawa, who had interpreted the stationing of British troops on the Malaysia-Thailand border, and the reinforcement of Singapore, as offensive measures. Grew expressed amazement at this and stated that the United States should be guided by facts and actions relating to Japan's southward advance and her occupation of many parts of Indo-China.

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Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador, Tokyo, dated 27 February regarding encouraging Japan at all costs to take early possession of Singapore.

Extract from report of conversations between Oshima and Ribbentrop on 28 February states that after agreement made with Russia, Germany felt herself secure on the continent; bombing of England caused serious retard in her war effort; Japan needed by Germany in order to cut off England's possessions in the Far East, advocacy of early attack on Singapore.

On 1 March HATA was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Army.


Liaison Conference of 2 March attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA & MUTO.

Directive issued by Hitler's headquarters, 3 March, concerning collaboration between Germany and Japan, showing directives for cooperation with Japan which directly resulted from the Oshima-Ribbentrop conference: (1) mutual plans of action; (2) Japanese seizure of raw materials; and (3) conquest of Singapore.
MATSUOKA cabled Nomura on 4 March desiring that Nomura, in answering certain types of questions not in concert with him since he had answered affirmatively when asked whether Japan would participate in the war if the United States should attack Germany.

Letter from German Ambassador to Vice Foreign Minister of 5 March showing that Bolzto replaced Ott as German Ambassador, when latter was absent in Germany.

Liaison Conference of 6-7 March attended by MUTO, HIROHITO, TOJO.

A newspaper announcement with respect to the law mobilization law of 8 March stated that detailed regulation of the National Mobilization Law will be enforced on March 20.

On March 8 new Peace Preservation Law was promulgated.

A memorandum of Hull of March 9 related to a conversation with Nomura in which Hull inquired whether he considered the United States could sit back and watch two or three large military forces being assembled. Nomura was evasive and played on the subject of U.S. embargos. Hull expressed the United States concern at Japanese aggressive policies.

Exchange of letters of 11 March between MATSUOKA and Henri to Henri: Japanese offer to mediate dispute between French Indochina and Siam. To
MATSUOKA: French Government accepts plan of mediation by Japan and for protection of its colonies will not enter into agreement with third powers.

Promulgation of the National Savings Association Law 12 March, under pressure of National General Mobilization Law, with purpose of providing for establishment of Savings associations to encourage thrift accounts, and associations in turn bought up national bonds with their assets.

 Liaison Conference of 11 March attended by TOJO, Hiranuma, MUNO.

On 12 March MATSUOKA was appointed to visit Europe.

Telegram from German ambassador, Tokyo, to German Foreign Ministry of 12 March re visit of Choshi to express thanks for German support in mediation of Thailand-French Indo-China dispute.

14 March memorandum of conversation between the President and Konura, stresses American anxiety as to Japanese intentions due to MATSUOKA's loud talk, and the unexplained presence of Japanese forces near Saigon and Thailand.

The Imperial Oil Company Law of 15 March (Law No. 73) established the Imperial Petroleum Company, a national policy company, to survey and develop oil fields and to control the purchase and sale of all petroleum and oil products.
Report dated 13 March of Commander-in-Chief of German Navy to Hitler, giving suggestion that Japan should speedily attempt to eliminate Singapore.

Japan is making such plans but withholding action until Germany invades England; Japan wishes to avoid war with the United States and can do so if she takes Singapore soon, says Commander-in-Chief.

MATSUWA should be advised regarding the designs on Russia.

On 18 March ADTO was appointed Chief of Military Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau (War Ministry), Secretary of Manchurian Affairs Board and Liaison Committee of East Asia Development Board.

Report Treasury attaché, Shanghai, dated 19 March, giving information that two Chinese were controlling numerous heroin dens operated by Chinese in Peiping. They work in cooperation with Japanese.

In a memorandum of 21 March for the German Foreign Minister, it is stated that the subject of obtaining rubber and tin for Germany from Netherlands East Indies and Thailand through Japan in exchange for foreign bills of exchange will have to be discussed with MATSUWA. Germany feels that freest possible trade should be afforded her, and as yet no aggravation has arisen to the Japanese conception that Germany deal with China, Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies through Japan alone, since Germany is dependent on Japanese imports during the war.
On 24 March the U. S. Ambassador to Russia cabled the U. S. Secretary of State regarding a conversation with Matsuoka, who stated emphatically:

Japan had no territorial ambitions and would make no account attack Singapore, or any United States, British or Dutch possessions. Japan would not go to war with the United States, and Matsuoka stated that such a conflict would take place only as a result of affirmative action by the United States.

Memorandum from Weizsäcker to Reich Foreign Minister dated 24 March, regarding debate on when Japan will enter war against England. Germany will agree to forfeit the Netherlands East Indies claim and other South Seas possessions, but Japan apparently awaits further German success against England. Matsuoka is still friendly to Russia but should be advised of change in German policy towards Russia in order to control Japanese policy through him after his European journey.

Memorandum by Ott for German Foreign Minister of 25 March regarding situation of Japan. Japanese Army and Navy planning for attack; air force attack of Singapore aided by German dive bomber specialists advising Japanese; promote good terms with Russia to avoid fighting on that side; suggest German specialists assist Japan's war economy in conquered areas to maintain free flow of raw materials from Netherlands East Indies and Malay.

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Minutes of conference between Hitler and Matsuoka of 27 March, Ott and Oshima present, outline of
points favorable to an attack; MATSUOKA's mention of circles in Japan opposing this until actually forced to it - he believes only matter of time till Japan will attack and cannot promise anything for his Government, but will promote to the utmost the goals indicated. MATSUOKA insists 3-Power Pact was not concluded on basis of expectation Germany could win, but rather on belief in a new order. This belief was his life's labour and he devoted all his energies to it. MATSUOKA then wishes to discuss his visit to Stalin in Moscow - he impressed Stalin that Japan was opposed to Anglo-Saxon capitalism in China and also that the Anglo-Saxons were greatest menace to New Order in Asia. The Anglo-Saxons were a mutual enemy of Japan, Germany and Russia. Conference ended with MATSUOKA's praise of Hitler's leadership and the unity of German people behind him.

Record of conversation between Reich Foreign Minister and MATSUOKA of 27 March, in which Reich Foreign Minister gave survey of situation from Germany's point of view as follows: Germany has had high successes on land and sea and her own production is likewise high; she has practically subdued her enemies. Smaller countries of Europe are agreeable to Tri-Pertite Pact. Food in Germany will never become critical; raw materials have certain setbacks, such as rubber. Reich Minister believes Axis have practically won the war - he expects English capitulation this year.
England might have given up sooner except Roosevelt gave them much hope. America promises aid to England, but it will be long time till she can produce war materials. Tri-Partite Pact aims mainly at frightening America to keep her out of war. Hitler discusses advantage Japan's entering war, especially to strike at Singapore which would also restrain Roosevelt. Hitler believes it advantageous for Japan to enter the war. The seizure of Singapore would be a decisive factor.

Excerpt of a talk between MATSUGA and Ribbentrop of 27 March, in which it is stated that Germany concluded pact with Russia because Japan at the time could not join in pact with Germany. In view of approaching war had to conclude pact with USSR.

Report of 28 March from American Consulate at Tainan regarding Japanese army profits through sale of heroin to renegade Chinese troops.

Notes on conversation between German Foreign Ministry and MATSUGA on 23 March, regarding closer co-operation between Germany and Japan. Hitler pleased with MATSUGA's activity in this matter. Great Britain must be utterly defeated particularly Singapore must be taken to insure Japan's control of the South. Germany would help Japan in event of attack by Russia. As to the United States, it would not risk its fleet beyond Hawaii, attack on Singapore would ensure American
EXHIBIT

Neutralism. Germany was four times her strength in 1st World War, she and Italy would rule Europe. England might collapse sooner than expected. MATSUOKA asks Germany's attitude to America if England were beaten. Reply: If England were beaten, Germany has no interest in war with United States.

If England were beaten, Germany-Italy would control Europe, Japan control Far East and United States limit herself to the American continent. MATSUOKA plans commercial treaty with Russia, but Japan is against Russia joining Tri-Partite Pact. Germany agrees to commercial treaties, but would not have Russia in 3-power pact. Japanese look with concern at war with the United States as it might last 5-10 years. If Japan conquered Singapore and took the Philippines, she would control the Far East.

MATSUOKA favours German Minister's line of thought and said if Japan did not risk attack on Singapore, she would be relegated to being third-rate power, so that blow would have to be dealt one day. If she kept United States quiet for six months, all difficulties would be overcome.

On 28 March Konoye cabled Yoshizawa, stating that he agrees that Yoshizawa's ideas on the settlement are only reasonable ones, but states that if the negotiations fail the impression that Japan is easily dealt with will be given to the enemy, and the latter will thus intensify operations. In view of the changed situation since MATSUOKA's visit to Germany, and the proposed visit of the
Foreign and Colonial Ministers, Japan's original demands for acquiring resources should be pushed. Care must be paid to the fact that the negotiations do not fall into the Dutch plan to get rid of the Japanese representatives, since their presence there is imperative.

Top secret communication of 29 March referred to printing of "Ha" and "Hi" series currency notes, pursuant to conference of 24 January.

Report of conversation between Reich Foreign Minister and MATSUOKA dated 29 March, regarding pending discussion of MATSUOKA with Russians. Germany asks he not go too far. Germany promises aid to Japan should Russia overstrike. Germany's largest army was on the eastern front and should Russia conflict with Germany, it would be beaten in a matter of months. Japan could always attack Singapore without fear of having Russia at her back. Also regarding such an attack, Japan need have no fear of the British Fleet as it was already tied up in home waters. Japan states no fear of British or American Navy, as she could smash either, but battle with the United States Navy might drag five years. Germany insists America could do nothing if Japan attacked Singapore. If Japan took the Philippines, Paris, because of individual. MATSUOKA meanwhile was doing everything to assure England she had no designs on Singapore. Germany believes Japan's declaration
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of war on England should be attack on Singapore.

Looking to trade after the war, Germany and Japan would co-operate as between European and Far Eastern spheres; America would be self-sufficient in her own sphere. Possibility of three powers trading with South America. Japan would need German assistance in development of China potentialities.

Japan's business feared German competition more than American or British; German business felt exactly the same way. MATSUOKA brings up his discussion with Russia regarding Japan-Russia non-aggression pact. Also, Japan desired to purchase part of Sakhalin for oil resources which Russia took "as a joke." Germany did not care to go deeply into Japanese-Russian affairs but again pressed the point that Japan could best assist 3-powers pact by attack on Singapore.

With a resultant joint victory, Japan would then have all she desired. MATSUOKA asks if Germany would assist her in attack on Singapore; Germany would have to study maps, refer it to Hitler; her aerial advices would always be available to Japan. Japan was assured she would also get control of the Netherlands East Indies upon the fall of Singapore. Germany would do as much as possible to assist Japan in the Far East, but it must be remembered that she was fighting Britain and the British fleet in the Mediterranean, whereas Japan was only fighting on the surface.

-17-
Discussion between Göring and MITSUKA of 29 March. Germany will make available to Japan all her military tactics, and especially air force improvements made during the war. Germany requests promised shipment of rubber, which she says she needs to supplement her synthetic rubber. MITSUKA said he had done as much as he could to expedite this letter and did not know the exact situation just now.

Extract from "The Day of a Subject," 31 March - denunciation of Anglo-American imperialistic union since World War I; national development and expansion of Japan gave rise to jealousy among European and American nations and they attempted economic pressure on Japan. A decision by Imperial Headquarters of April states that Japan must establish close military, political, and economic relations with French Indo-China and Thailand and close economic relations with the Netherlands East Indies. These are only to be resorted to in the event of embargoes from anti-Japanese encirclement of United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China because so tense they cannot be tolerated.

On 1 April the Chief of Cabinet Printing Bureau ordered the manufacture of "A" and "B" series of 452 and 852 currency immediately in Dutch and English, to be completed in early April. 1941.
Law concerning Extraordinary Exception from Application of Convertible Bank Note Law was passed on 1 April, which suspended the provisions which governed the monetary reserve of the Banks of Japan, Chosen and Taiwan and dissolved the distinction between specie reserve (gold and silver) and judiciary reserve (commercial paper and government bonds). These provisions and others had the effect of giving completely artificial value to yen.

Excerpt Japan Year Book 1941-1942, giving details of further revised Military Service Law of 1 April with main points: (1) enrollment of new conscripts in overseas districts into garrisons near to their residences; (2) abrogation of 2nd reserve Service System; (3) prolongation of days of call for the education of supplementary reservists.

Extract from KIDO's diary of 3 April refers to the appointment of SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board and Toyoda as Minister of Commerce, with which KIDO agreed.

On 4 April SUZUKI was appointed Minister of State and Chief Director Cabinet Planning Board; HOSHINO became a member of the House of Peers.

Conversation between Hitler and Matsuoka of 4 April, in which Matsuoka expresses thanks for gifts and friendliness that he received during his stay in Berlin, and upon his return to Japan would seek to assure his people that they are treated by Germans with "honest friendliness and respect."
MATSUOKA requested German help in submarine warfare. In the event of war with England and the United States they would fight guerrilla warfare in the Pacific and also request Germany's aid on this. Hitler promised this, and said Germany likewise considered war with the United States undesirable. Such war would depend on transportation, and Germany had extensive plans for U-Boat and Luftwaffe to prevent American landings in Europe. Germany would strike in the event of war between Japan and America. MATSUOKA again requests Germany's inventive aids as Japan feels Japanese Navy must prepare for immediate conflict with America. He has always believed conflict with America unavoidable, sooner or later. He personally argued Japan should strike now and decisively and then perhaps avoid war with America for generations. She would then have firm hold in the South Seas. If she waited, she would have to fight anyway, and perhaps under less favourable conditions. MATSUOKA says America implies by notes she will not fight Japan unless Japan attempts to aid in the destruction of England. Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the United States and England would always help each other against the world. MATSUOKA requested no cables be sent regarding Singapore matter, but he would advise by courier of Japan's decision in the latter.
Conference of Reich Foreign Minister and Matsuoka in Berlin of 5 April, where the Foreign Minister assured Matsuoka that Germany is full of vitality and absolutely certain of victory. Matsuoka replies that he saw in Germany and Italy for exceeded his expectations; he was convinced Germany and Italy were united and would always remain so, remarked on high German morale. Matsuoka questions Reich's intentions towards smaller states; refuly that they would be independent within the European whole, even maintain small armies and police forces; England never again to meddle in the affairs of smaller nations. A basic mistake of the Versailles Treaty was increasing the number of European states; they should have been decreased. Reich Minister asked Matsuoka to bring these points back to Japan: (1) Germany had already won the war; (2) there were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany; Germany-Italy rule Europe; Japan rule the East; (3) Germany would win the war, but Japan's entry into the war would hasten this.

On 9 April Higashino was appointed Chief of Naval General Staff.

On 9 April a proposal was presented to the Department of State through the medium of private American and Japanese individuals. This plan outlined methods to reach a peaceful settlement of the present difficulties between the two countries.

On 10 April Kimura was appointed Vice War Minister.
In a letter from Churchill to M. KISOKA on 12 April, he stated he had certain questions to ask.
They were: will the Germans, without command of the sea or daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Britain in the first nine months of 1941?
Will the Germans try to do so, and would it not be better for Japan, until these questions are answered, to wait? Etc. He then said that the answer to these questions might enable Japan to avoid a serious catastrophe and bring about an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations.

On 13 April the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact was signed.

Telegram from Boltz of German Embassy in Tokyo, dated 14 April, regarding the signing of the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Russia. It would facilitate Japan's expansion policy in South Asia and attack on Singapore.

Gröf complained to Konoyo on 14 April of the aerial bombardment of Kunming, China, and the resultant damage to United States property.

On 14 April a memorandum of Hull stated that Nomura might like to explore the question of improving United States-Japanese relations. Hull informed Nomura of the document of 9 April submitted by private individuals and suggested that it could be used as a basis for preliminary negotiations. Nomura agreed and stated his desire to do it.
anything within his power to preserve peace.

In a memorandum of Hull dated 16 April he
again referred to the document of 9 April, being
a basis for negotiations, and there were many
points on which the United States agreed, and none
which would require further discussion. Nomura
stated he could answer the questions, or submit
them to his government for answer. Both agreed
that they had not reached the stage of negotiations,
but were only exploring in a preliminary and unof­
ficial way the action which might pave the way for
later negotiations. The four principles as to which
the questions were submitted by Hull were;
1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the
   sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference
   in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including
   equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific
   except as the status quo may be altered by
   peaceful means.

Liaison Conference was held on 17 April attend­
ed by TCHO, HIRNUMA and HANAGUSA.
An extract from KIDO's diary of 19 April stated that after reporting to the Throne and conversing with Konoye concerning Nomura's instructions, they concluded that every effort must be made to keep good faith with Germany and Italy, while realizing new order in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

In a telegram from HATSUGA to Churchill of 22 April, he acknowledged his note of 12 April and stated that Japan's intent was to bring about the Heiko Ichu, and there would be no conquest, oppression or exploitation, and that Britain may rest assured concerning Japanese Foreign policy.

Top secret communications of 23 April referring to arrangements for the manufacture of "Ko" and "Ni" series military currency notes.

Draft of a work programme for the economic sub-committee of the Tri-Partite Pact in Berlin dated 28 April covering cooperation by directorates of Tri-Partite Pact in economic field, war and post-war period, exchange of economic information between governments, mutual support in procurement of raw materials, etc.

KIDO's diary of 28 April relates to a question by the Emperor concerning who should be consulted on diplomatic matters when the Premier, Foreign Minister and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal were ill, and asked about the progress on deliberation on Germany's policy towards the United States. KIDO expressed his opinion on these questions and had the Chief Secretary submit them to the throne.

On 3 May KOSEITTO became Councillor of Total War Institute.
8607 1068
On 5 May the U. S. State Department revoked all licenses for shipment of some rubber to Japan and occupied China.

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On 6 May Grew reported to Ribbentrop of 5 May reported a conversation with MATSUOKA, the general outline of which was the proposal by America, which MATSUOKA thought originated through a report from the United States Ambassador to Russia, whom MATSUOKA had told that Japan would join with the Axis if the United States joined the war. Dealing with the United States proposal will lead to strained relations in economic circles and MATSUOKA wants to make the United States pledge not to participate in the European War.

Regarding Russia, MATSUOKA stated the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact was an offshoot of Russian fear of Germany and in the event of German-Russo conflict, Japan would be forced to attack Russia, and no neutrality pact could change this.

On 6 May Grew reported to MATSUOKA that the Consulate of Kunming had been seriously damaged in a raid of 9 April.

On 6 May treaties of residence, navigation and customs system were concluded between Japan and French Indo-China, giving Japanese equal rights with nationals of that country.

On 9 May peace agreement between France and Thailand was signed.

Memorandum from Chief of Staff, French Indo-China Expeditionary Force to KIMURA, dated 10 May, concerned incident of assault on Japanese military employed by French Indo-Chinese soldier as one which might cause

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severing relations of the two countries (reference to outbreak of China incident in any way). Southwest Japan demand right to increase troops and area of its activity, freedom of housing and travel and free use of airfields.

Liaison Conference 12 May attended by KOYO, HIRANUMA, OKI, TOJO.

On 10 May the National Defense Security Law was enforced to safeguard the secrecy of high state secrets regarding diplomatic, financial and economic matters.

On 12 May Nomura submitted to Hull a draft proposal of an agreement between the two countries. This draft concerned policies to be followed; that the United States should request Chiang Kai Shek to negotiate peace with Japan along the lines of Konoye's plan, bearing in mind that Japan's expansion in the southwest Pacific is of a peaceful nature; and declare the Philippines independent with non-discriminatory treatment for Japan. These are some of the main points brought out.

On 14 May the Japanese delegation to the Netherlands East Indies presented a new order, stating in reconsidering their Memorandum of 16 January they are presenting a new proposal by which to clarify that the Japanese viewpoint expressed in the preamble was still firmly held.

On 15 May Ribbentrop cabled the German Ambassador to Tokyo concerning the fact that the present time was the most opportune moment to seize the Siborian Coastal Province and Vladivostock, since Russia's combined strength is strained to the utmost on the European front. Japan must be made aware of this fact without directly forcing the issue.
showed that the United States would certain amendments
to the draft plan. They wished a clause whereby Japan
would declare the purpose of the Axis alliance defensive,
and would only adhere to the military obligations in the
event one of the parties hereto were aggressively attacked
by a power not involved in the European War, whereas the
United States would declare its attitude based on con-
siderations of protection, self-defense, and national
security. An amendment concern was the termination
of the China War was submitted and a guarantee of equal
opportunity for economic activity in the southwest
Pacific.

Union Conference of 15 May attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA
MUTO, OKA.

Grew informed MATSUOKA on 17 Nov that the consulate
at Zanzibar had again been damaged on 12 May.

Ott in a cable to Ribbentrop of 19 May reported on
a conversation he had had with MATSUOKA. Ott told
MATSUOKA that Germany wished America to give a clear
assurance that she would not participate in the
European conflict. MATSUOKA stated he would not jilt
the Tri-Partite Pact and his motive in the negotiations
is to postpone or prevent the entry of the United States
into war and eliminate the increase of United States
assistance to England. MATSUOKA stated he would inform
Germany of the United States reply and as far as possible
consult with Germany and Italy on further negotiations.
MATSUOKA stated there were elements who are uncertain
of Russia's actions, to whom he had to yield in the face
of allowed United States entry into the War. HIRANUMA.
he stated, had to resign when the German-Russian non-aggression pact was signed.

OSHIMA cabled KATSUOKA on 30 May stating that he was deeply troubled concerning the many rumors of negotiation between Japan and the United States and finds it his duty to inform KATSUOKA of the opinion of the German Staff and himself. He then gave a long survey of German reactions and decisions on the proposed pact between the United States and Japan and stated in conclusion that such a pact might cause bewilderment concerning Japan's true policy. If it had to be, he suggested that Japan should make clear her adherence to the principles of the Tri-Partite Pact and demand the United States neutrality in the European War. In order to avoid any misconception regarding Japan's intentions, she should thoroughly convince the Axis about the meaning of the agreement.

OSHIMA cabled KATSUOKA on 21 May and stated that the new agreement is thought to be an important change in Japan's policy and it is of great concern to the plans of the Japanese military and naval attaches in Germany. (Attaches received copies)

Liaison Conference held 22 May attended by TOJO, MUTO and OK.

On 23 May KATSUOKA cabled Yoshizawa, SHIGEMITSU and Nomura regarding an interview with the British ambassador, Cressida. KATSUOKA told him that Netherlands East Indies still refused to supply the demanded tin and rubber to Japan, stating former supplies could be cut since Japan obtains some from French Indo-China. Holland claims that there is danger of Japan re-exporting these commodities to Germany. But while KATSUOKA insisted that the exports from French Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies together
ere insufficient for Japan's needs, Japan considers it humiliating to give assurance to a small country like Netherlands East Indies that she will not re-export. If the negotiations fail, then the situation may incite not only anti-Dutch but anti-British and anti-United States sentiment.

Secret in tractions of 24 Key from Headquarters Germany, may bear on report by attaché in Tokyo:
(1) if United States and Japan are to fight, question of how Japan should open the war;
(2) possible war between Germany and USSR caused United States to join war;
(3) conclusion of China conflict before any other new tasks for Japanese army.

Ballentine
On 26 May Hull made it clear that the proposed formula with respect to the Axis did not adequately clarify Japan's peaceful intention towards the United States should the United States become involved in a war with Germany.

A memorandum dated 28 May concerning a conversation later: Ambassador Nomura and Hull related that Hull had informed Nomura that HAT FCZ, on his return to Japan had been telegraphing Japan's support of Germany in the event of war between Germany and the United States, and stated that, unless Japan clarifies
her obligations under the Tri-Partite Pact if the United States enters the war, there is no assurance of Japan's position. Hull also asked if Japanese troops were to be retained in China and Nomura replied he thought a permanent force would be stationed there, but he did not know how strong. Hull stated this would not aid Japanese-United States friendship, since their presence might tend to produce incidents.

A Liaison Conference was held on 29 May attended by TOJO, HIRAYUKI, MITO and OLA.

On 30 May, Chew at British Penang wrote to Heveshi, President of the Japan South Seas Association, Batavia, reporting on his activities to stir up trouble by spreading rumours and committing sabotage. They have decided to corrupt soldiers and organize 5th column activities in readiness for when the fighting begins.
An informal oral statement by Hull to Nomura on 31 May stated that the U.S. will at some proper time prior to any definite decision talk over in strict confidence with China the general subject matter of the discussions, especially as it relates to China.

On 31 May another American draft of the proposal to adjust relations was handed to Ambassador Nomura, bringing out the same points mentioned in previous drafts and stating in regard to China that the U.S. will, on the basis of the Konoye principles, suggest to China she enter into negotiations with Japan. A statement was also handed to Nomura at the same time as the draft, saying that they were giving an unofficial exploratory and without commitment oral explanation to the amendments proposed.

Hull in a memorandum of 2 June stated that he had asked Nomura if he seriously believed Japan was seeking a peaceful settlement with the U.S. on Pacific matters, or whether the negotiations were merely a method of finding a way to get out of China. Nomura stated that Japan was honest in her intent and that an earnest and fair settlement was desired.

Grew complained to Latsuoka on 4 June that on the 1st of June the Episcopal Mission at Chungking had been seriously damaged for the fifth time.
A memorandum of Hull dated 4 June referred to a conversation between Hull, Nomura and others regarding the pact negotiations. It was stated that Japan was prepared to drop the suggestion that the U. S. state that it would not resort to any aggression aimed to assist one nation against another, if the U. S. would drop the statement in its draft requiring Japan to state that the provisions of the Tri-Partite Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of defense. Amendments regarding cooperative defense of China against injurious communist activities were suggested by the Japanese, as well as the acceptance by the U. S. of Japan's declaration as to their peaceful aims in the southwest Pacific.

In an informal statement of 6 June from Hull to Nomura he stated that Japan, by her many revisions to the original text of the proposed pact, seems to have strayed from the fundamental points which the U. S. considers involved in establishing peace in the Pacific. Japan has stressed alignment with the Axis to avoid giving a clear indication of its intentions to make peace with China on a lasting basis.

On 6 June Hull told Nomura that he had the impression from the various revisions to the proposal and from recent manifestations that Japan was disposed to stress her alignment with the Axis.
In a memorandum of 6 June the Netherlands answered Japan's memorandum of the 4th and 22 May. While stating that Japan had modified some of her demands she still adhered to the principle of the 16 January memorandum, which advocated a special position for Japan in Netherlands East Indies since it was not adequately developed. The Netherlands reiterated her policy in Netherlands East Indies as stated on 3 February 1940 and stated that during war economic activities in the Netherlands East Indies would inevitably be affected since the defense of N.E.I. must be safeguarded and the Dutch war effort promoted.

Liaison Conference 6 June attended by KIMURA, TOJO, JUTO and OSAKI.

An extract from KIDO's diary of 6 June referred to GSI's report from Hitler that Germany would attack Russia and Hitler had initiated a desire for Japan's participation. Konoye called a Liaison Conference that morning to consider this. KIDO reported this to the Prime Minister. METUOKA told KIDO that he did not think an outbreak of war very likely in spite of GSI's message, and the War Minister endorsed this.

On 7 June Yoshizawa cabled METUOKA stating that although the Netherlands reply of 6 June had some points in favor of Japanese demands,
the prospects for obtaining the full demands on immigration, important commodities, etc., were not bright. In view of Japan's protests to the British and Dutch, it is impossible to accept the Dutch reply but it appears that the Netherlands will not accept Japanese demands since their attitude is firm. Failure of the negotiations would result in the loss of many vital supplies, such as petroleum, and only strengthen the bond with the United States and England and the situation would be grave. The probability that the Japanese delegation may be asked to leave must be considered and Yoshizawa asked for instructions immediately.

On 9 June DOHMA, General, was appointed Chief of the Air Inspectorate General, remaining Supreme War Councillor.

On 10 June in a telegram from Wehrmehn to the Reich Foreign Minister, it is shown how execution of Japan's plans of aggressive action in southern areas had progressed by this date. The Japanese army desired bases in south Indo-China for the purpose of strategic position with Singapore.

The Netherlands delegation met the Japanese delegation on 10 June at the latter's request. Technical matters were discussed and it was clear that Japan wished to wind up the business.
On 11 June in a telegram from Otto to Ribbentrop he stated that General Umezu welcomed the Japan-Russo Neutrality Pact at the moment, but when German-Russo relations changed Japan's attitude must do so, too, since the Tri-Partite Pact is basic for Japan's foreign policy.

Liaison Conference of 11, 12 June attended by TOJO, Hiranuma, HUOTO, Oka.

On 14 June, TSUOKI cabled Yoshizawa stating that Japan had decided to break off the conference and withdraw the delegation.

On 15 June, a draft of a proposal was received from Joma, wherein it was proposed that the United States and Japan jointly conclude a declaration for resuming traditional relations, it being the desire of both governments that the deterioration of relations between them be corrected, and that by such cooperation establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific could be realized. Both agree on isolation from European War, except where it affects their own national defense, and a resumption of trade negotiations of all commodities except those needed for their own security and defense.

Liaison Conference of 16 and 17 June attended by TOJO, Hiranuma, HUOTO and Oka.

Japan declares its willingness to enter into treaty with the U. S. at any time for neutralising Philippines Islands when they become independent.
On 16 June, a meeting of Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held concerning Treaty between Japan and France for residence and a provision relating to French Indo-China, and the Treaty between France and Japan concerning the Tariff System and trade and method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China, was presented for ratification. The non-official proclamation of the protocol was explained by the fact that it was to be enforced gradually and Japanese influence to be extended by degrees.

On the 16th of June, Grew in a telegram to Hull stated that at an appointment with M. TSUOK., he had delivered a note in regard to the recent bombing of Chungking, which had resulted in heavy damage to the U. S. Embassy and jeopardized lives of the U. S. Ambassador and others, pointing out the grave danger to U.S.-Japanese relations in consequence of such action.

On 17 June, Yoshizawa visited the Governor General of Netherlands East Indies and both concurred that an agreement could not be reached. The negotiations, while not having been unproductive, would have to be discontinued. Yoshizawa presented a joint communiqué which was agreed upon and stated both nations' regret at the failure in the negotiations, but the discontinuation would
On 18 June, KIDO stated in his diary that at a visit with Konoye and TSUJIKAWA, the latter had told him that instructions had been sent to Germany to negotiate with Vichy in connection with the French Indochina problem.

On 19 June, KIDO was appointed member of the Thought Control Committee.

On 20 June, KIDO in his diary stated that Konoye informed him in view of strained international relations and outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR, it was difficult to understand TSUJIKAWA's opinion. When Konoye referred to Cabinet responsibility, KIDO promised they would discuss matter with HIRANUMA, Home Minister, at earliest opportunity.

On 20 June, an executive order was issued banning all petroleum exports except to Great Britain and South America (by the US).

On 20 June, KIDO relates a discussion between Konoye, HIRANUMA and himself in which Konoye said that if war broke out between Germany and the USSR his Cabinet would have to take the responsibility and resign, as the HIRANUMA Cabinet had done in 1939 when Germany made a pact with the USSR while the Tri-Partite Pact was under negotiation. KIDO opposed this, saying that the circumstances were different.
Foreign Minister, 21 June concerning conversation with Ito and plans for air bases in France, Indo-China in preparation for attack on Netherlands East Indies.

On 21 June, in a statement to Nomura, Hull said although he had no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders shared Nomura's views, accumulating evidence showed some influential official Japanese leaders support Nazi Germany and its policies, envisaging Japan's fighting with Hitler in the event of U.S. becoming involved in the European war. The U.S., in view of Japan's wish to provide in its settlement with China the stationing of troops in parts of Inner Mongolia and North China to cooperate in resisting communism, while not desiring to enter into the merits, did not feel that the policies to which the U.S. is committed would permit it to associate itself with a course inconsistent with those policies and must await a clearer indication from Japan to pursue a course of peace. Nomura was then handed a revision dated 21 June to the document handed to him on 31 May.

On 21 June the draft proposal of a settlement between the U.S. and Japan was handed by Hull to Nomura. This draft was substantially the same as the one of 31 May with certain amendments - one being that with regard to the European war there be an exchange of letters.
in place of the annex and supplement. Also that question of economic cooperation between China and Japan could be more advantageously settled when all points in that respect had been worked out and that the entire Pacific area be substituted for the western area.

On 22 June, KIDO stated in his diary that he was informed of the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany and he spoke to the Emperor presenting his opinion based on talks with Konoye and HIRANUMA and there had been, difference of opinion between Konoye and MITSUKA regarding Japanese foreign policy in case of war between Germany and Russia.

It was desirable that the Emperor ascertain whether MITSUKA had consulted the Premier and upon try to prevail his to follow Konoye's opinion. KIDO again saw the Emperor after MITSUKA had had audience when the Emperor was doubtful whether government and Supreme Command would agree that MITSUKA's policy for Japan's advance to north and south would ever be appropriate. MITSUKA explained to Konoye that his report to the Emperor was his report for the future.

Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June.

Telegram from Ott to Berlin, 22 June, it was shown that on first day of German attack on the USSR, MITSUKA refused hostile attitude to USSR. MITSUKA received telegram from OSKUL stating rumours Russia had withdrawn her forces from the Far East; MITSUKA explained he would immediately propose counter-measures.
On 23 June AIK in his diary stated that at an audience with the Emperor he had expressed his opinion on the Foreign Minister’s report. He also discussed with Konoye and SUZUKI on the Planning Board the changed situation caused by the German-Russian War and agreed in principle with SUZUKI’s opinion on the unifying and reinforcing of the Imperial General Headquarters.

On 25 June KIDO stated in his diary that Konoye had discussed privately with Wang Ching Wei his opinion with regard to the question of general peace. U.S. assistance would be needed to win over certain Chinese and carry out political demarche to Chiang, but in order to meet the situation and avoid pro-American politicians again gaining influence, they would have to properly post people in the government. The adjustment of relations between Chiang and Wang would be placed in Toyama’s hands. Although senior officers in
the Japanese army HQ in China understood Chinese policies, contacts between superiors and inferiors were bad and corrupt practices of any sort. Hideki, the Emperor and Kono, and Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs reported to the Emperor on decision of Liaison Conference as to entry of Japanese troops into French Indo-China.

11753 1306 Liaison Conference attended by TOJO, Hiranuma, AUTO and OK. on 25 June decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China, such as stationing of troops in the southern part, acquisition of air and naval bases. Diplomatic relations will be opened to accomplish this; failing that, Japan will obtain her object by arms.

11057 1103 Liaison conferences were held on 26, 27 and 28 June attended by TOJO, Hiranuma, AUTO and OK.

10029 1096 On 28 June telegram from Ribbentrop to German Embassy at Tokyo stating that Ribbentrop had agreed with GORPL that he should influence his government towards speedy military action against Soviet Russia, and requesting German Embassy at Tokyo to use their influence to the same end. Ribbentrop outlined arguments to be used.

10034 1097 On 28 June Ott cabled Ribbentrop stating that so far no clear cut decision had been reached by the Cabinet regarding Japan's
attitude to the German-Russian war. Preparations for an attack will take at least 6 weeks until JNR’s response. OTT asks for instructions regarding activity in the north in view of the fact that southern expansion may be limited to FIC and thus hinder Japan’s activity in the north; he also stated that OUNA had advised Japan to attack Russia soon.

Aubuchon cable OTT on 28 June stating he agreed with OUNA that Japan should attack Russia soon. He should use as arguments to further this the fact that the annihilation of Russia would make Germany’s victory over England possible, would solve the China problem, would protect Japan’s role in order to expand southwards, and be the best way of convincing the United States of the futility of entering the war.

In his diary of 26 June HIO stated that TOJO had explained the Manchurian army should be calm and prudent in dealing with the German-Russian war. They also discussed the China war, political moves in China and the strengthening of the IGO.

Lisbon Conference held on 30 June attended by HIRAHA, TOJO, JUJO and OKA.

On 1 July in a telegram from Seckner, German ambassador in Rome, sent to Berlin, he relates a conversation with the Japanese ambassador who said that Japan’s intention was to advance actively against Russia out...
that such a policy would necessitate the resignation of A. TSUOKA, since the latter had recently concluded a pact of non-aggression with Soviet Russia. M. NOYO's politics should aim at preventing America from entering the war.

On 2 July KIDO stated in his diary that that morning the national policy regarding the Russo-German war had been decided at an Imperial Conference. M. NOYO complained to KIDO that he found it difficult to understand A. TSUOKA's true intent. KIDO also had a conference with the Emperor and arranged to establish headquarters within the Imperial Court.

At the Imperial Conference of 2 July attended by TOJO, SUZUKI, I. MUNEM, and OK., relating to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the disposition of the China Incident, and dealing with the northern problems according to the situation; Japan will remove all obstacles in attaining this policy. Japan will pursue her schemes against FIC and Thailand, continue negotiations with relevant nations in the south and take measures. While not taking up arms against the Soviet, Japan will secretly arm - and if that war progresses favorably, Japan will take steps to solve the problem. Japan must prevent U.S. intervention in the war, and if this
fail to follow the Tripartite Pact, deciding independently the time and method.
Japan will continue pressure through southern regions to bring surrender of China's regime and prepare for war with Britain and the United States.

Telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo to Canadian Foreign Minister dated 3 July concerning Japanese plans to secure "points" in French Indo-China to strengthen her pressure on Britain and America; that Japan has and will continue vigilance over the southwest Pacific against these two powers.

- maintenance of friendly relations between two countries; respect one's integrity;
- no regional restrictions on plans with third powers; maintain the peace of East Asia, etc. M.TSUKO: explains Germany's treaty of non-aggression with Russia was or expediency only. M.TSUKO: mentions political superiority over France, since its defeat in war in Europe and giving of 80% damages made by Japan.

On 3 July, Ott cabled the German Foreign Minister stating that immediately upon receipt of his telegram of the 2nd, he had called on M.TSUKO personally and brought his attention to the Cabinet resolution, which will certainly not be understood by the people.
that the reason for the formulation of the Japanese statement to the Soviet ambassador was the necessity to deceive the Russians or at least to keep them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments still being incomplete.

At present Svetunin (U.S.R. ambassador) was not aware of speedy preparations being made against the USSR as it hinted at in the government resolution.

Weizsäcker in a report to Ribbentrop on 3 July stated that when he had drawn OSSDM's attention to a periodical describing Japan's attitude as irredentist; OSSDM stated that he had received reports from Tokyo indicating that Japan wanted to continue fighting the communists with Germany, strengthen her military preparation, and bring pressure to bear on British and U.S. possessions in the southwest Pacific to tie them down. Japan's foreign policy was still based on the Tripartite Pact.

Telegram dated 4 July from Thomas at Bangkok concerned the preparation and carrying out of certain military operations in the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China by Japanese forces. Failure of economic negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies would necessitate use of force to take over oil resources. Military occupation of French Indo-China envisaged in order to provide a stepping-off point for Netherlands East Indies attack. Occupation of Thailand not envisaged.
Telegram of 4 July from the German Ambassador in Tokyo concerned personal impression received by military attaché in conversation with Japanese General Staff. Impressions are that Japanese Army is secretly and zealously preparing. The occupation of Saigon is imminent, which is preliminary condition for further southward move which is not yet discernible.

Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador in Tokyo on 5 July concerning his talk with MatsuoK on 28 March on the subject of Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact. MatsuoK is quoted as saying in event of German-Russian war, nothing, neither Japanese ministers nor a Neutrality Pact, could keep Japan neutral.

Affidavit of Matsuzuma states that on the return of Lt. General Arakawa, General Okamura and Colonel Kaburagi from Peiping on 5 July, they called all the commanders of forces together. Arakawa had apparently received directives at the meeting concerning preparations for war against the USSR.

Kudo's diary of 5 July stated that the negotiations regarding entry of Japanese troops into Southern French Indo-China has been postponed for five days in view of the fact that the information had leaked out, and the British had lodged a protest with the Vice Foreign Minister, considering this a serious problem.

Memo of Kranovets, Foreign Ministry official, composed in Berlin, dated 6 July, states that Colonel Yamanoto called on German Counter-Intelligence Section, and advised Japan was ready to carry out sabotage attacks against the USSR in the Far East, especially from Mongolia and Manchukuo against area adjoining Lake Baikal.
On 7 July Ikeda, General, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army.

On 7 July Grew cabled Ribbentrop stating that Ikeda had said that on his recovery he would advocate an active course for Japan and that he regarded Japan's entry into the war against Russia as the most important goal.

Grew again cabled to Matsuoka on 8 July concerning an air raid on Chungking on 29 June.

On 8 July Grew cabled to Matsuoka regarding the seizure of certain cargo at Hanoi and Haiphong by the Japanese, that it was impossible to check it because the owners were not permitted to inspect the warehouses. However, a substantial amount of American cargo had been taken away.

A telegram from Grew's ambassador in Tokyo on 10 July concerned the imminent Japanese move against French Indo-China. Utterances by MATSUOKA demonstrate that Japanese will first ask German Government to obtain Vichy consent to move. Excuse to be used will be proposition of joint defense of French Indo-China by Japanese and French. Anglo-Saxon countries are not expected to interfere and no serious French resistance is anticipated.

A law founding the Karafuto Development Company was passed on 10 July with the purpose of developing and controlling mining, forestry and agriculture of that territory.
On 7 July I.M.C.F., General, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army.

On 7 July I.M.C.F. cabled Ribbentrop stating that Akashi had said that on his recovery he would advocate an active course for Japan and that he regarded Japan's entry into the war against Russia as the most important goal.

Grow again protected to MATSUOKA on 8 July concerning an air raid on Chungking on 29 June.

On 8 July Grow cabled to MATSUOKA regarding the seizure of certain cargo at Hanoi and Haiphong by the Japanese, that it was impossible to check it because the owners were not permitted to inspect the warehouses. However, a substantial amount of American cargo had been taken away.

A telegram from G.-O. from Ambassador in Tokyo on 10 July concerned the imminence of a Japanese move against French Indochina. Utterances by MATSUOKA demonstrate that Japanese will first ask German Government to obtain Vichy consent to move. Excuse to be used will be proposition of joint defense of French Indochina by Japanese and French. Anglo-Saxon countries are not expected to interfere and no serious French resistance is anticipated.

A law forcing the Karafuto Development Company was passed on 10 July with the purpose of developing and controlling mining, forestry and agriculture of that territory.
Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German Ambassador in Tokyo dated 10 July showed how participants of pact considered that with the collapse of Russia the Tri-Partite Pact powers would be so strong that the annihilation of the British Isles would only be a matter of time, and the United States would be left to face the world alone, cut off from the rest of the world.

On 12 July in a telegram from Ott, German Ambassador in Japan, to Berlin he enumerated the Japanese preparations for war believed to have been taken.

Telegram to Ambassador Kato of 12 July concerned the Government's decision to occupy military bases in French Indo-China and dispatch Japanese forces to Southern French Indo-China. Kato was requested to open negotiations at once with the French on the point and request an answer of Yes or No. In the event of "Yes" a peaceful advance will be effected, and if "No" a military occupation. Keep these plans secret from the British and Americans otherwise difficulties may arise.

On 13 July, Ambassador Ott cabled Ribbentrop stating that there were perceptible symptoms that Japan was taking mobilization measures. By influencing MATSUOKA and the military elements, the Military Attache is endeavoring to inveigle Japan into war with Russia. Preparations reveal Japan's participation will soon take place, the only obstacle being the disunity of the activist groups.
Intercepted message from Canton to Tokyo of 14 July concerned peaceful occupation of France, Inde-China if possible; if resistance is offered it will be crushed by force. Navy will play main part in Singapore occupation. With air and submarine fleet crushing of Anglo-U.S. power will be effected. Military headquarters for Japanese forces will be at Singapore.

On 14 July a memo was sent by the Japanese to France demanding bases, etc., and requesting answer by 22 July 1941.

On 15 July cabled Berlin stating that the Russian ambassador called on MTSUK, to ask if Japanese would apply the Neutrality Pact in view of the (present) German-Russo war. Was much taken aback by MTSUK's refusal based on the fact that Japan had concluded the pact when German-Russo relations were essentially different.

Takubo, stated that he had heard of the existence of the Kwangtung army Special Maneuver (Kan Toku En) from Korokawa and UMEJ, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung army in July. He knew that Kan Toku En was the Kwangtung army reinforcement plan and UMEJ had told him about the increase of troops of Kwangtung army and demanded food for these troops.
10159 1114 Ott cabled Berlin on 15 July, stating that
the Vice Foreign Minister asked him to
send on a request to influence Vichy in the
matter of French Indo-China. He stated that
negotiations were going on to obtain naval
bases in Southern French Indo-China and
Saigon and several air bases. Japan has no
territorial intentions in French Indo-China
out still suffer no interference from England
and the United States with regard to her
desires, and if France asks German help
against these requests, Japan would like
Germany to influence Vichy towards a
peaceful settlement.

10162 1115 In his diary of 15 July, KIDO stated
that while M.TSUOK. wanted to reject Hull's
oral statement as disastrous to Japan, and
to send the compromise formula; he (KIDO)
wanted the formula to be aired simultaneously,
lest the United States take it as Japan's
intention to discontinue negotiations. KIDO
sent Saito to M.TSUOK. to try to persuade
him, and when no answer had been received
by the morning of the 15th, it became clear
after a visit to M.TSUOK. by Furuizi, that
M.TSUOK. had sent instructions to Saito by
himself and not through the competent
director. KIDO wanted M.TSUOK. to resign, and
if he refused the whole Cabinet to resign.
As reported this plan to the Emperor, but
Konoye thought that if T. Tsuoka resigned he
would use it to make propaganda that his
resignation had been compelled by pressure
of the United States on Japan.

On the 16 July the 2nd Konoye Cabinet
resigned.

On 16 July Kido in his diary related a
telephone conversation with ... which the letter informed him that the
resignation of the Cabinet "en bloc" had been
decided upon at a special Cabinet meeting.

Lord Caernarvon had been ordered to
invite the President of the Privy Council
and the Ex-President to meet and the Lord
Comer of the Privy Seal would consult them
as to a suitable person to select as Premier
of the next cabinet.

On 17 July, Kido stated in his diary that
a conference of ex-Presidents and the President
of the Privy Council (including Hirota.) was
held. Kido was advised when to recommend to
the Emperor as the new Premier. Konoye was
the choice and that evening he received the
Imperial Command.

On 17 July the Third Konoye Cabinet was
formed; T. Tsuoka was replaced by Toyoda,
K. Ituma reverted to minister of State and
the other Defendants retained their former
offices.
Telegram from London dated 18 July dealing with
a defensive front being erected aimed at suppression
of De Gaulle's views through the occupation of
French Indo-China.

Telegram signed Maitland to German Foreign Minister
of 19 July concerning negotiations with French Govern-
ment for a valued air base in French Indo-China.
This plan is the first move in southern Asia and
JapaneseGovernment believes Germany and Italy will
unhold Japans accord since in pursuing this end
Japan will create diversion for Anglo-United States
forces and render valuable assistance to Germany,
therefore any directy to Germany by France for
intervention would be useless. Japan wishes billeting,
foreign exchange facilities, etc., to be provided
for her forces.

In a telegram from Ott to Berlin on 20 July, it
was stated that the policy of new government, as
revealed by the new Foreign Minister, was to be
the same as previously, based on the Tri-Parte
Pact. The new Foreign Minister will continue
Matsuoka's foreign policy and strengthen the close
unity with Germany and Italy.

Telegram from German Ambassador to Tokyo of
30 July which deals with inquiry by Ambassador whether
change in government might alter Japanese policy
towards French Indo-China. Japan denied this.

Regarding Vichy answer to Japanese demands on
French Indo-China, in event of refusal, Japan will
resort to force.

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On 21 July, it was decided that the Prime Minister and the Foreign and other Ministers should meet with the High Command occasionally and exchange views and national policies with the Navy and War Ministers and staffs of the High Command. This meant no more press announcements of Liaison or Imperial Conferences, as had previously been made.

On 21 July a telegram was sent from Tokyo quoting Japanese demands on 14 July on French Indo-China and Japanese regard for French integrity. Further stated that France, although forced by violence to accept Japan, thought England and U.S. would interpret this as hostile action and asked Japan to consent to terms very confined limited occupation for duration of operations only.

On 22 July SEMPACHI resigned from the Foreign Ministry owing to ill health.

Telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo on 22 July states that the Foreign Minister states that unconditional acceptance of main Japanese demands was imminent. Estimated occupation would take several weeks.

On 23 July Nomura cabled Toyoda stating that the situation was now nearing a diplomatic break. The change in U.S. opinion is due to the southward moves by Japan, which is considered as a step towards Netherlands East Indies and Sumatra. He suggested Japan dispel United States doubts by informing Great Britain of Japan's real intentions in occupying French Indo-China.
On 24 July, the U. S. Department of State issued a press release stating that although Japan had expressed a desire that no disturbance should extend to the Pacific and the U. S. had made it clear that she occurred, Japan was establishing bases in French Indo-China and making changes there under duress. This seems to point to the fact that Japan is obtaining bases in French Indo-China for further and more obvious movements of conquest into adjacent areas.

Ott informed Berlin on 24 July that an agreement had been reached between Vichy and Japan regarding the occupation of bases in French Indo-China on 20 July 1941.

Ott sent telegrams to Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs concurrently to High Command (OKW) and Army General Staff (OKH) on 25 July. This telegram concerned itself with multiple Japanese mobilization preparations, granting of men under arms and due for call up, drafting of Russian speaking men and technicians, limitation of use of foreign languages in communication, restrictions on travel, and transportation of troops to Seoul, Tashir, and Shanghai. Information from conversations is that besides Manchuria and Korea, parts of North China are to be used for action against the USSR. Goal not clear, but it does not appear it will be an attack limited to Vladivostok area, but will start simultaneously in direction of Lake Baikal. Time of start unknown, but possibly on the arrival of German troops at the Volga.
Japanese assets in the U. S. were frozen on 25 July.

On 28 July, the Netherlands announced the suspension of the Japan-Netherlands Financial Agreement and the freezing of Japanese assets in the whole Netherlands East Indies.

On 30 July, Privy Council meeting was held. Among those present were: ~, ~, ~, and ~. Discussions regarding protocol between France and Japan concerning military cooperation were conducted. Clarification was made that cooperation was in agreement with France and not executed by force, so as to avoid misunderstanding by foreign powers, especially U. S. A. Currency at disposal of forces as provided by French Indochina would be adequate.

2nd Privy Council meeting concerning exchange of official documents on military cooperation and the necessity of close France relations in military field. Agreement with France unanimously approved.

Protocol between France and Japan of 29 July concerning joint defense of French Indochina and two letters from Vichy. Japanese demands for air and naval bases granted, quartering of troops and freedom of movement to be arranged and recognized.

An official statement of the Bureau of Information on 29th July reported that Protocol between Japan and France had been ratified, the signing had been done on 29 July at Vichy—the it will be effective immediately.
In a talk presented 31 July from Tokyo to Washington it was indicated that Japan was alreadly with the view to a war -- war was given, since it was her add time for preparations.

In his diary 31 July, KIDO stated that NAGANO had concurred with former Chief of General Staff Field that Japan should try to avert war as much as possible. KIDO is opposed to the Tri-Power Pact, since it took the adjustment of US-Japanese relations impossible. If those relations cannot be adjusted, Japan will be cut off from her allies would have only sufficient supplies fail to last for 14 years; in the event of war with the U.S., NAGANO told the Emperor a decisive victory is doubtful. KIDO disagreed with NAGANO and stated that if the Tri-Power Pact was cancelled the United States would not lose any more faith in Japan than before.

NAGANO stated in interrogations that the fleet had started training for Pearl Harbor in the Summer of 1941--possibly July.

The record of Table Top maneuvers held by the Total War Research Institute in the first half August 1941, showed that under the maneuvers the general policy of Japan concerning third power problems was that Japan did not give to the United States proposal - clear expression of her position nor expect a peaceful settlement, but would adopt a delaying policy by diplomatic negotiations, while preparing for war.

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Records of the Progress of Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War No. 1, being the results of the third period, August 1941—the ninth period, October 1942, showed that during the third period (Aug 1941) Japan through the Cabinet decided to take measures to delay U.S. conciliatory proposals to Japan and to inform Soviet that as long as the observance of the Neutrality Pact, Japan will not attack her. The strengthening of relations with French Indo-China and Thailand was accentuated as well as the acceleration of imports from U.S., Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, and preventing further deterioration regarding the latter. Censorship measures, regulations of food consumption, increased production and revised capital mobilization plans were also accounted for.

Telegram from Ott to Berlin of 1 August, concerning: remarks of Colonel Yamamoto to the effect Japan's new power in Asia worries Anglo-Saxon powers, particularly since increasing her pressure in favor of Axis powers. Japan is mobilizing for action against USSR. SHIRATORI said Japan intended to start active advance on Russia through front missions such as for territory which Russia could not concede; it was all Japan could do now in face of the neutrality pact.
KIDO stated in his diary on 2 August, that Konoye was annoyed at the tendency of the tough naval elements to become strong. There must be no mistake in Japan's diplomacy to allow Japan's oil supply to be cut off. An understanding must be reached between the War and Navy Ministers and if this could not be reached the government would have to resign and the Navy and Army assume charge of the administration of the country.

In his diary of 7 August, KIDO stated he had met with Konoye and discussed the current problem. KIDO stated that oil was the most serious problem. Japan must occupy the Philippines and Singapore before a successful landing on Netherlands East Indies. Since Oil wells would be destroyed during action, it would be 1½ years before Japan could obtain oil in sufficient quantities. If Japan attacks Netherlands East Indies, then the U.S. would declare war and make the shipment of oil from these islands virtually impossible. Japan must restore friendly relations with the U.S. The ultimate aim of Japan is to advance south and to attain this, a 10-year plan has been mapped out to establish every machine tool industry, Synthetic oil industry and expansion of ocean lines and shipping.
The newpapre cltting frorm Hokuim Shinbun of 14 August cmtained recod of General ARAKI's talk with Ishii, Secretary General of Imperial Rule Association, showing that ARAKI regretted that during their intervention in the cest against the Soviet Union in 1922, the Japanese failed to accomplish their plans in Siberia. Also shows that ARAKI felt in 1941 that time was ripe to carry out that which failed in 1922.

On 14 August, the 6th Pres of
Theoretical heneuvers for Total War was prepared which again set forth the imaginary advances of the Axis forces and recounted the declaration of war by the United States on the Axis as 1 November 1941.

A telegram from the Japanese Government to Berlin on 15 August concerned conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in which he inquired as to Japan's attitude to the German-Russo War. In reply Japan stated she was following the Neutrality Pact; however, if (1) Russia ceded, sold or leased any property in East Asia to a third power, or (2) did any steps to extend sphere of a 3rd power into East Asia, Japan would
consider this a threat. The Soviet Ambassador replied that Russia was strictly observing the Neutrality Pact and gave assurance that Russia would never act in the two courses outlined above. Japan still adhered to the three-power pact as MIYASUKI had told the Soviet Government on 2 July.

In a telegram of 15 August from the Japanese Foreign Minister to Berlin, he said that in response to a question by Odt about the talk between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Soviet Ambassador, whether the Soviet does not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war, he had told Odt that in view of the military expansion by Japan under present conditions the present arrangement with the Soviet is the best means of taking first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, together with the German Government and that it is in harmony with the Tri-Partite Pact. He hoped that the German Government would fully understand that Japan's action is a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed.

Excerpts commencing 16 August from the first table top maneuvers, a top secret symposium of the first total-war
EXHIBIT

8895   656:

Military Gen's of the Total War Research Institute, inspecting and forecasting the events leading up to the December attack on subsequent gains by Japanese.

Relates tactical, strategic moves, preparations and precautions in visualising the attacks.

Return informed Toyoda on 16 August that relations between the United States and Japan were critical and the next move by Japan might lead to a sudden change which both Japan and America fear might happen in case Japan advances into Thailand.

Telegram from Foreign Ministry to Japanese Ambassador in Washington of 20 August, stating that if the United States is shipping iron, plants, etc. to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this would endanger American-Japanese relations and for the Ambassador to call American attention to the fact that Japan would like such further action restrained.

A newspaper item of 23 August, shows that at a Cabinet meeting of 22 August, the national commodity mobilisation plan for the second quarter of 1941-2 proposed by SUZUKI, president of the Planning Board, was decided. The plan's key points encompassed expansion of war material production.
On 27 August, the Japanese Government issued a statement which was handed to the President on 26 August. Referring to the U.S.'s reply of 17 August, it stated that Japan's policy was determined by considerations of self-protection for meeting national requirements and removing obstacles against national security. Japan is eager to exchange views on basic policies with the United States and a meeting of the two heads of the countries would aid to solve the problems. Japan stated that her actions in Indo-China were to solve the China Incident, and that as long as the USSR maintains the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, Japan will take no military actions in that direction.

Promulgation of key industries Control Ordinance on 30 August, based on provisions of Article 18 of National General Mobilisation Law was to serve as foundation for the complete control by government of all major industries, using the existing cartel structure as guiding principle.

The Imperial Petroleum Co., formed on 1 September, had purpose of surveying and developing oil fields in Japan and dominated territories and the control
of purchase and sale of all petroleums and oil products. This company was effective government instrument for complete control of petroleums.

Telegram from Neumann at Bangkok of 1 September states that occupation of French Indo-China shows signs of being for a long period, contemplated that 45,000 Japanese will be there within several weeks, all strategic points, large towns, etc. are occupied. Attack on Sian is envisaged in November when additional troops have arrived and rainy season ends. Seizure of raw materials and economic measures parallel to military occupation have been effected. The Japanese are attempting to buy rubber and rice plantations, to acquire real estate, etc. in French Indo-China.

On 2 September Ishizawa in Batavia cabled Tokyo the increased anti-Japanese tendencies in the NLI pursuant to the occupation of French Indo-China; the strengthening of schemes with regard to the Chinese and a plan whereby influential Chinese be sent to NLI to advocate the doctrine that the Chinese and Japanese are one and influence Chinese opinion are some measures suggested. It was requested that Ambassador Fonda be informed of this message.
On 3 September the President replied to Konoye's message of 27 August expressing his appreciation of Japan's desire to improve Japanese-U.S. relations. The U.S. recognize the swiftly moving character of world events and is proceeding as rapidly as possible towards consummating arrangements for a meeting at which Konoye and Roosevelt could exchange views and adjust relations.

Telegram from Ott to Berlin of 4 September, after MATSUKA's dismissal as Foreign Minister, states the third Konoye Cabinet still planned far-reaching mobilization. Japanese Army was reserved on the subject of attack on Russia due to being weakened in Chinese War and not expecting to be able to make decisive victory before winter sets in. Plan to take action when numerical force of Japanese Army is increased.

On 5 September, KIDO stated in his diary that Konoye advised the Emperor to summon a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff. This was done.

On 6 September, KIDO, in his diary related a visit he paid to the Emperor in response to the Imperial summons. KIDO advised the Emperor that since Poro, the President of the Privy Council, would
ask important questions on His Majesty's behalf, the Emperor should only issue a warning, in conclusion, to the effect that as the present situation was one which might lead to war, the Supreme War Command should make every effort to bring about a diplomatic success. KIDO visited the Emperor again later in the day and learnt that the Supreme War Command had not answered the questions put by President Ferea concerning diplomatic moves but that the Navy Minister Oikawa had made an answer to Ferea. The Emperor had expressed regret that the Supreme War Command did not give a reply and emphasized the need for whole-hearted efforts in diplomatic negotiations with the United States.

At Imperial Conference of 6 September, attended by TOJO, SUZUKI, MUTO and OKA, it was decided that Japan would execute her Southern advance policy. Japan would therefore, complete her preparations by the end of October aiming at war with the U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands. In the meantime and in pace with this decision, Japan would strive to obtain fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic means. If the negotiations did not lead to success by
the beginning of October, Japan would immediately determine on war against U.S., Great Britain and the Netherlands. There would be a strong endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

On 6 September, Nomura tended to full another draft proposal setting out the various concessions which Japan will agree to including not advancing in French Indo-China or resorting to military action in the southern region, and withdrawing troops from China as soon as possible. The United States reciprocal measures were set out and included suspension of any military measures in the Far East and in the South West Pacific area.

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of 7 September, showed that concrete plans were being drafted by the Communications and Railway Ministry, based on the traffic mobilisation plan for 1941-1942. The Railway Ministry will embark upon construction of freight cars and the Communications office will establish the shipbuilding control association to systematise the shipbuilding industry. On 5 September, the Cabinet decided a traffic mobilisation plan to place land and sea transportation on a wartime basis.
On 11 September, KIDO stated in his diary that TOJO visited him after seeing the Emperor and explained the results of an investigation concerning the preparations for war with the United States.

In a telegram from Nomura to Toyoda on 12 September, it was stated that the main problem in the United States-Japanese negotiations was Japan's wish to keep troops stationed in China. The United States wants Japan to completely withdraw from China within two years. Since there is a possibility of the negotiations failing in the final stages of this problem, Nomura suggested that Toyoda deliberates on the proposal how to evacuate troops within 2 years after the peace.

On 12 September, the Cabinet adopted a plan, formulated by the Planning Board and Welfare Office, for the people's labour mobilisation.

Toyoda's reply to Nomura on 13 September, stated that he understood the United States wanted Japan to acknowledge the so-called 4 principles. Japan is not in a position to swallow the evacuation problem, since the world might think it was due to United States pressure. It seems that the United States have
conferred with Britain, Holland and China beforehand, and although Japan can not hinder the United States from negotiating with others, she will refuse to be induced into a council or an agreement among numerous countries.

Secret communication dated 13 September contained request to make arrangements immediately for the manufacture of "Po" series notes in denominations of pesos, and "Ni" military currency in denomination of dollars. Again requested preparation of notes in denomination of guilders. Manufacture of pesos to be completed by 20 October, dollars one half by 30 October and guilders by 20 November (one half).

UMEZU, the Commanding-General of the Kwantung Army, issued a directive on 16 September, which ordered that students of foreign language schools who have been Army Russian interpreters under Kan Toku En should be given supplementary education.

Top Secret communication of 16 September, concerned the manufacture of "Ho" and "Ni" series military currency, gives order to manufacture these notes and is technical communication regarding the printing of them.
On 22 September, Japan communicated to Grew a statement of the terms of peace which it is proposed to offer to China.

From 24 September onwards, Japan ordered her consuls to make reports concerning vessels along certain routes embracing Pearl Harbour.

On 25 September, Japan presented Grew a completely new draft of Japan's proposal and requested an early reply.

On 26 September, KIDO stated in his diary that Konoye had told him that he had no confidence and there was no choice but for him to resign if the military insisted on starting the war on 15 October. KIDO hoped for prudence.

Radio speech by Dr. Nobumi on 26 September, first anniversary of Tri-Partite Pact, enumerated Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Croatia as having joined the pact, restating the peaceful intentions of the pact and the realization of new world order as ultimate aim.

On 29 September, KIDO stated in his diary that the Emperor had requested an estimate of the U.S.'s rubber and tin resources and stock. KIDO contacted the President of the Planning Board.

President of the Privy Council advocated
that in the event of failure of the Washington parley, the Imperial Conference should not be so formal and a full discussion should be held with the senior statesmen present. KIDO promised to look into the matter.

NAGANO stated in interrogation that he had heard of the plan to attack Pearl Harbour in October.

Excerpts from report of the Committee for the Administrative Measures, October, show that limits of Japanese aggressive plans of expansion into Soviet territory depended only upon place German expansion would stop; plans to run transcontinental railway partly by Japanese and partly by Germans; complete annihilation of USSR and dividing territory between Germany and Japan.

The 8th all-Japanese Congress of the Kyo Wro Kei was held in October. Amongst those present was UMÉZU. This was the first congress since the beginning of the Russo-German War and Russian delegates were invited.

A telegram signed Hemmen, a member of the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs dated 1 October, stated that the French had requested German support in order to obtain Japanese approval to deliver 5,000 tons of raw
rubber to United States in exchange for vital goods obtainable only in the United States. Germany upheld Japan's objection, pointed out that German requests for rubber were urgent and requested the release of additional 75,000 tons be obtained for Japan during October.

On 2 October Hull gave Nomura a memorandum of an oral statement reviewing the developments in the conversations and explaining the United States attitude towards various points in the Japanese proposal which did not appear to the United States to be consistent with U.S. principles.

An excerpt from telegram, Ott to Berlin, of 4 October, states that from careful sounding of the Army leaders it has been concluded that the inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to overpower the British Empire, keep the United States at bay and eliminate USSR, thus bringing about new distribution of power in Europe and the Far East.

In his diary of 7 October, KIDO stated that there was dissonance between the Army and Navy concerning the Washington policy which the Navy wanted to continue and the Army to stop. The Navy wanted Konoye to declare his policy and a
A meeting o. the Premier, War and Navy Ministers was held to settle Japan's national policy with respect to war with the United States.

In a telegram from Washington to Tokyo on 9 October, the United States expresses dissatisfaction at the negotiations since Japan does not appear to express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The United States adheres to the 4 principles and wishes to bring about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which the two have failed to see eye to eye, then turn to other matters.

On 8 October Nomura cabled Tokyo regarding the curtailing of guarantees concerning the principles in the proposal of the 6th. The Americans are still making demands on the question of stationing and evacuating troops in French Indo-China to which Japan objects in principle.

KIDO expressed Konoye's concern regarding the failure of the Washington talks in his diary of 9 October and KIDO stated that 6 September Imperial Conference resolution was too outright. War with the United States would have little hope for victory at the moment, and KIDO advocated completion of the China Incident followed by 10 - 15 years preparation.
It is shown in the document "Japan's Decision to Fight" that on 10 October, Colonel Ryuto, Commander of an anchorage group, wrote a report on conditions showing that the mobilization order had been issued on 12 September. They reached Palau on 10 October and established anchorage headquarters and prepared for loading operations to accompany war.

It is shown that on 11 October, in a diary of Pvt. Ishino of an Infantry Regiment, his unit landed at Shanghai and prepared for the Malaya operation from 12-14 leaving for Thailand on 22 November and arriving there on 8 December.

In a diary of an unknown soldier of the 41st Infantry Regiment, it is revealed that his unit arrived at Shanghai on 12 October, was given jungle training and left on 2 December for Sano, and on 13 December was the first unit to enter Gubun Street.

On October 12th KIDO gave details of a meeting of the War Minister TOJO, Navy Minister Oikawa, Foreign Minister Toyoda, President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI, and Premier Konoye. 'The War..."
Minister TOJO called for a great resolution since there was no hope of an understanding with the United States while the Navy wanted to avoid war. A strong leadership by the Premier was urgent. The Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that he was unsure of the outcome of the talks. They had agreed, on the advice of TOJO, that Japan's demands for stationing of troops in China should not be altered. The successful results of the Chinese Incident should be made secure by all means; and the perley should be further based on the fact that these agreements should cease Japan's preparations for war. Konoye also wrote a full account of the meeting and other events leading up to the resignation.

(Soon after it took place.) The effect is substantially the same, except that, according to him, no decision was reached on this occasion.

TOJO recalled in an interrogation, the fact that the War, Navy, Foreign Minister and Premier attended the meeting of 12 October. At this meeting United States negotiations were discussed and the fact that the middle 10 days of October which had been set for a time limit for a favourable diplomatic turn
Year: 1941
Cabinet: 3rd Konoye

EXHIBIT

Reference

He had arrived. The United States had turned down the meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt and the situation was tense. TOJO felt that there was no hope for a diplomatic success and time had come to make up Japan's mind for war.

Telegram from Neumann at Saigon on 12 October concerning 5th columnist activities of Pan Asiatic League as a tool of Japanese expansionist policy in French Indo-China. French offices of league ordered to advocate agitation for Annamite independence, encourage anti-French uprisings, foster pro-Japanese sentiment through picked units of Japanese Army and to spy on French troop movements and locate raw material and foodstuff storage place. Annamites to be incorporated into Japanese occupation army; time for striking appears to be the end of the year or early spring. The leaders and a great part of the Annamite fighting units were ex-convicts. The heir to the Annamite throne fled to Japan at the beginning of this century and as early as 1935 presided over the Pan-Asiatic congress.

KIDO stated in his diary of 13 October that he conferred with SUZUKI on the political situation and their conclusion...
was that the Premier should make an effort to promote mutual understanding with the War and Navy Ministers.

Before a cabinet meeting on 14 October TOJO maintained the same view, and there was a deadlock. But later the Army (through KUTO) offered to give way if the Navy would call out definitely against war. OKA, for the Navy, refused to do this and left it to Konoye, which TOJO and KUTO would not accept.

On 15 October, KIDO stated in his diary that SUZUKI delivered War Minister TOJO's message to him, which stated that unless Konoye changed his mind the general resignation of the Cabinet would be unavoidable. The succeeding Premier should be able to unite the Army and Navy and follow the Imperial will. Prince Togashikuni's name was mentioned as a possibility. KIDO replied that this would involve a working-out of a common policy between the Army and Navy beforehand and asked whether War Minister TOJO had any accurate forecast to make on the fact that the establishment of a prudent policy would take precedence over all other questions. The Premier, Prince Konoye, visited KIDO and asked his opinion on the Togashikuni Cabinet. Prince Konoye said
that the breach between himself and the War Minister TOJO was very great. Later President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI, telephoned to KIDO to say that TOJO's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and the Navy by the influence of Prince Pigoshikuni, and KIDO objected to the plan. Later, the Premier, Prince Konoye, said he wished to secure the informal consent of Prince Pigoshikuni and KIDO said he had no objection so long as Konoye acted in his capacity as Premier. Prince Pigoshikuni, however, wanted a few days for consideration and wished to have a meeting with War Minister TOJO and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO.

Telegram from German Ambassador to Tokyo on 15 October, concerned Japanese occupation of French Indo-China which, according to reports was not without friction. Japanese intend to increase strength there to 40,000 and wrest concession from French colonial administration through local military authorities. He says open conflict will be avoided despite all this. The Japanese Foreign Ministry denied a Japanese-Siamese argument concerning the border zone.

Secret communication from Chief of Intendance Bureau, War Ministry, to Chief of Financial Bureau of 15 October, requested the forwarding of certain currencies to the
Cabinet of Japan

Cabinet of Japan, Shanghai agency, to arrive by 22 October.

C. 16 October, Toyoda telegraphed Mutsu that
Japan had repeatedly affirmed the aim of the Tri-
Partite Pact to the United States, which is the
prevention of the European war's spreading. However,
should German and United States relations become
magnified, there would be a distinct danger of war.
It is desired that German-United States relations
etc., deterioration and Japan requests the considera-
tion of the United States.

C. 16 October, Mitsu stated in his diary that he
was opposed to the Higashikuni Cabinet, such a
Cabinet would show that Japan lacked suitable per-
sons, and in the event of war a problem would
arise. He told TOJO of this opposition and urged
a rescission of the previous decision and a unified
policy of the Army and Navy. Konoye telephoned
to say he was resigning and did so at 5 o'clock.
Mitsu, in his talk with TOJO, urged a revision of
the 6th September decisions.

C. 16 October the Konoye Cabinet resigned and
Konoye issued a statement on his resignation. This
stated that Army Minister TOJO judged negotiations
with the United States on friendly terms could not
possibly materialise before the desired time
(middle or latter part of October); that it was
impossible to consent to the withdrawal of troops
from China and that the time had come to open war
against the United States. Prime Minister Konoye,
however, thought that all negotiations with the
United States were not hopeless and that the
stationing of troops in China could be achieved in
substance while appearing to yield to the United
States.
TCO stated in an interrogation that on or about 17 October he felt the time was opportune for fighting was in danger of being lost, and that the Konoye Cabinet fell because TCO favoured war with the United States while Konoe still thought a diplomatic solution possible.

TCO stated in his diary of 17 October, that an "ex-premiers'" conference (preparatory to on 17 July 1941) attended by Kiyoura, Ishiwara, Okada, Yamada, IPO, Abe, Yonai, and Saka, it was finally decided on TCO's suggestion that he should recommend TOJO as the new Premier with additional position of War Minister.

On 15 October the Assumed held the following positions:

DOMA, General, Chief of Air Inspectorate, Supreme War Councillor; FAKA, Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, General China; KIRA, Ex-Premier; KITA, Ex-Premier; OSA, Chief Secretary of Cabinet; IMAMOTO, General in command, Korean Army; KATA, Finance Minister, Vice President China Affairs Board; KIM, Ford No of Privy Seal; KINZAI, Lt. General, Vice Minister of War; KOISO, General on reserve list; KATSU, General, retired; LIMAMAI, Governor-General of Korea; OKO, Chief, Military Affairs Board (War Ministry); ASAI, Chief of Naval General Staff, Supreme War Councillor; O'A, Chief Bureau of Naval and Military Affairs in Navy Ministry, Assistant to Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters, Councillor, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs, Imperial Member of German-Italian-Japanese mixed experts Committee in Tokyo; OZAKA, Director-General of East Asia Research Institute, South Manchurian Railway;
On 18 October KIDO recorded in his diary that the Emperor sanctioned the petition to allow TOJO to remain on active service and promoted him to a full general.

On 20 October KIDO recorded the Emperor's congratulations to him on the new Cabinet. KIDO told the Emperor that one mistake might have meant war, this was the only way to give the situation a new turn and so he had recommended it.

On 22 October Homuru requested that TOJO grant permission for him to return to Tokyo. He felt that to resign was the only way open for him as a man of honor.

- 256 -
An official report by the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies on the organisation of the Japanese Intelligence Service in the Netherlands East Indies, 27 October, stated that the Japanese Intelligence service of the Netherlands East Indies consisted of 4 organisations, the FOO, PGO, PAI, and COO. These organisations were under the Foreign Office, Naval Information Service Tokyo, Military director in Central Formosa and Japanese Consul General as receiving centre respectively.

On 28 October, KIDO stated in his diary that Suzuki had reported on the progress of the Liaison Conference, the extension of the anti-Comintern Fast and Maneuvers against China.

A top secret communication No. 10, dated 31 October, referred to the institution of procedures for handling military currency notes in foreign denominations for the southern regions. System of military currency will defray expenditure in event of operations in the south Seas area. Issuance of such currency decided by Foreign (TOCJ), Finance (FAYA), War (TOG), and Navy (SHI.USA) ministries.

A report from magazine "Kaiso" (Reconstruction), written by Tanaka (not the witness) entitled "The New Development in the Russo-German War and Japan", states worldwide struggle between Axis and anti-Axis is gradually approaching; Japan rejoices in and hopes for victory of Germany over Russia and Britain.

A list of questions was drawn up for the Liaison Conference between the Government and Imperial
Headquarters at the end of October. Those questions relate to reactions to Japan’s Foreign Policy and that repercussions will result from war, particularly.

11928 1329 11971

if Japan attacks in the south, what help can be expected from the Axis etc. After consideration by the Navy, Army, Foreign, and Finance Ministries under the Acquiescent SHINADA, "CO, KO, and KAYA, respectively, answers to those questions were decided.

11462 11971

SHINANO stated in an interrogation that he approved the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbour either at the end of October or the beginning of November.

5105 409

Tokyo Gazette extract, Vol. V, No. 5 of November, entitled "Ten Years of the New State", relates to the richness of Manchuria, its abundance of iron, coal, and non-ferrous metals and its natural resources, the success of the five-year industrial development plan and the industrial and cultural development in border districts.

8960 874A

The monthly Wartime Report No. 5 of the H. A. Corps, November, gives details of the preparations for operations against Hong Kong and intensification of the blockade.

8482 853

Procedure for dealing with military currency expressed in Southern Region Foreign Currency Order from Finance Minister KAYA to Bank of Japan on 1 November.

The Bank of Japan was to acknowledge receipt of notes from the Cabinet Printing Bureau and notify the Finance Ministry when they had disbursed any of these notes.

9043 805

The diary of Imoto of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army shows that his unit reached Saigon on
1 November, left on 27 November on route to Hainan, leaving there on 6 December. They reached Singora (in Siam, near Hainan border) on 7 December, landing at 0600 on 8 December.

10315 809 On 1 November, the final text of Combined Fleet Secret Operational Order No. 1 had been agreed upon and was being printed. It contained schedules and plans for attacks on Pearl Harbour and various British and Dutch possessions.

10316 1163 TOGO cabled KOMURA on 2 November stating that the Imperial Conference scheduled for 5 November expected to reach a final decision for improving relations between the United States and Japan. He would inform Komura of the results, which would be Japan's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. When negotiations were resumed it was urgent that a decision should be reached at once. This information was strictly for Komura's information and TOGO trusted him to exercise great prudence in handling everything before negotiations were taken up.

10317 609 On 3 November, it was decided to attack Pearl Harbour and Chief of Naval General Staff HAGANO set the date.

10318 1164 TOGO cabled KOMURA on 4 November, stating that Japan–United States relations were very critical. The Cabinet and Imperial Headquarters had decided on a counter proposal for resuming negotiations which was to be submitted to the conference for sanction on 5 November. The telegram then goes on to justify Japan's attitude and accuses the United States of shunning and overlooking Japan's position.
On 4 November, Togo cabled, urging concern-ning the revised ultimatum to meet the wishes of the United States. Togo was to make clear that Japan did not intend to or and the sphere of self-defence and desired to avoid the European War's encroachment into the Pacific. Re China: Japan would withdraw her troops from North China over a period of two years except for the areas of the Mongolian border and on Hainan, where they were to remain for a suitable period (if questioned to be vaguely quoted as 26 years). He went on to give the idea that unlimited occupation does not mean permutual occupation.

On 4 November, Togo informed Momo that Kurusu was being demoted to help him in the parlour. Kurusu's activities were being kept secret for the time being.

A cabinet decision of 4 November, agreed on the Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on British and American Problems. This policy is to provide for the suppression of any war preparation information, etc., and to make the people hold hope for the future.

At the Imperial Conference of 5 November, attended by YOJO, TOGO, SHIOTA, ZAHA, SHIBUKI, HOSHINO, MIZU, and CKE, national policy was again decided. It showed that at the London Conference, a decision was made to notify Germany and Italy of Japan's intention to start war against the United States and Britain when the present negotiations with the United States break down and war is inevitable (proposed to be 26 November) and as soon as preparations are ready they will open negotiations for participation by the Axis in
the war against the United States and for a no-surrender pact. The advance through Thailand was decided, first passage of troops to be demanded, if this is refused they will advance without it, but Japan will respect Thailand's sovereignty (in regard to decision of Liaison Conference of 1 February) and will try to turn negotiations to her advantage by suggesting the session in the future of part of Burma or Malaya, this depending on Thailand's attitude. Plan for dealing with International situation to mediate, and a decision not to declare war against China, but obtain same effect by a declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain.

On 5 November, the ambassador at Bangkok reported to TOGO on measures to be taken in the event of Japan taking decisive action in the south. The co-operation of Thailand (on which he had already undertaken work) is important and although in the event of an attack on Burma and Malaya, temporary infringement of Thailand might happen, the independence of Thailand would be more respected after the objective had been obtained.

On 5 November, Yamamoto issued the Combined Fleet Top Secret Order No. 1, which stated that operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands will be conducted in accordance with the provisions for preparations for war, communications, supply, allocation of forces, etc.

TOGO wired Tanaka on 5 November, informing him that arrangements for the agreement were to be completed by 25 November.
On 6 November, "GOO cabled Nomura that the counter proposals were to be submitted on the 4th had been approved by the Imperial Conference and talks were to begin. He then advised Nomura on the policy to be adopted in submitting the proposals.

Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order of 5 November stated that I Day would be 23 November, and Order 3 of 10 November stated that I Day would be 6 December.

On 5 November KIDO stated in his diary that an Imperial Conference decided the policy towards the United States, England and the Netherlands. TOJO advised KIDO of the formation of the southern army and the dispatch of Kurusu to the United States.

On 7 November Nomura stated in a memorandum to Hull that withdrawal of troops stationed in China will be completed within 2 years, to proceed gradually according to special arrangements. Japan will guarantee territory sovereignty of French Indo-China and withdraw troops as soon as China affair is settled. Japan will recognize non-discrimination of trade in China and Pacific areas provided principle will apply to rest of world.

On 7 November Admiral Yamamoto issued an order which stated that the Task Force would gather at Hitokappu Wan and remain there under great secrecy until 22 November (a combined Fleet Order on operation was issued simultaneously).

German Foreign Office cabled Washington on 8 November that "GOO had stated that Kurusu had been instructed to take a firm attitude and was given a
On 10 November Striking Force Operation Order No. 1 was issued to all ships to complete battle preparations by 20 November. Rendezvous of fleet to be at Kuriles; strict secrecy to be maintained.

Captured copy of a pamphlet entitled, "Just read this and the war will be won," stamped 10 November (although actual date of preparation is thought to be prior to this date) gives a map of Southern China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malay States, Bataan and the East Indies, and a small section of the northwest Australian coast on the front. This was issued to each soldier before he left for overseas.

Group of charts and telegrams show that quantities of munitions, ammunition, machinery, fuel, oil, grease for motor cars and parts for repairing munitions were to be delivered to various seaports in Japan and distributed on 10, 12, 15 and 15 November to the 55th, 56th and 16th Divisions, and that in October notification was dispatched to various governmental agencies to keep secret the general plan for operation which was to be put into effect in French Indo-China.

At a Liaison Conference of 11 November the principal reasons alleged for the commencement of hostilities against the United States and Great Britain stated that it is Japan's mission to establish a new order in Greater East Asia. Although for eight months Japan and the United States have negotiated for a peaceful settlement, they can not occur, and Japan can not
realize her policy and bring about stability if she accedes to the United States. Greater East Asia is at a crisis and Japan's future is in jeopardy and she is compelled to take up arms to reach all obstacles.

10336 1174

A telegram from TOGO to Fumuru on 11 November related a conversation between Craigie and TOGO on the matter of United States negotiations. Craigie was of the opinion that they were still at the preliminary stages while TOGO pointed out they had reached the realm of actual negotiations.

The Ambassador is to make the United States realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

10362 1173

On 12 November Tokeichi Nichi printed Churchill's declaration that England was ready in the Pacific and will fight if America does.

8985 8761

Report of military administrative measures to be taken in event of Japan's entering the war, dated 12 November gives plans for military operations in

(a) Sino-Japanese War, (b) Russo-Japanese War, and

(c) First World War, (d) Siberian Expedition, to be taken into consideration as a guide.

10375 1176

The general outline for hastening the conclusion of war against the United States, Britain, Netherlands and China, dated 12 November, provides in essence the plan to be adopted towards foreign powers of 5 November.

8993 878

On 13 November a Liaison Conference considered the measures to be taken towards foreign countries decided at the Council in the presence of the Emperor on 5 November.
Nomura cabled TOJO on 14 November, stating that he would fight to the end and believed he would win out in the negotiations. American policy was based on stopping Japanese expansion in the Pacific and if Japan moves to the South, she will have to fight England and the United States, and possibly Russia.

Secret telegram dated 14 November, from Nanking (Chief of Third Air Group) to Vice Ministers of War and General Staff regarding plans for aerial group to leave Nanking on 16 November, to establish command post at Saigon in South Indo-China on or after 16 November.

In a telegram from TOJO in Tokyo to Kiyoji at Honolulu, dated 16 November, it is stated that in view of the critical situation between the United States and Japan, report on ships in harbor should be sent twice a week, observing secrecy.

On 16 November, a pamphlet entitled "Message to Warriors in the South Seas" was issued by General Horii, Commander of the South Seas establishment destined to attack Guam.

TOJO cabled Komo on 16 November requesting Nomura fight harder than ever before. "In Nomura's opinion Japan ought to wait and see what turns the war takes and remain patient." TOJO was sorry but he had set the deadline for solving the negotiations as 26 November.

On 19 November, Erdmannsdorff, former member of German Legation at Bangkok, orbled Foreign Minister of Reich the 1st time in 18 months.
concerning conversation with OSHIMA on possibility of Japanese action in northern and southern direction. After initial expression of ignorance, OSHIMA said there was a possibility of invasion of Thailand in order to secure a springboard for attack on Singapore, but increase of Japanese troops in French Indo-China would have to be effected first.

On 18 November Kita in Honolulu cabled Tokyo reporting ship movement in the harbour.

On 18 November Kurusu cabled TOGO expressing faith in Roosevelt's desire to continue negotiations, and stated that Japan might give the United States sufficient security so that they could concentrate more closely in the Atlantic, enabling Japan to occupy a more favourable position in the post-war international situation.

The diary of a member of the South Seas Detachment shows that on 18 November group war exercises were held under General Forii. The unit arrived at Hashima on 26 November, landing there on 3 December. On 4 December there was an announcement of a Japanese-American war.

TOGO telegraphed Nomura on 19 November, giving more amendments to the past proposal, one of which was that Japan could not agree to non-discrimination in trade being applied only to China, and also that Japan wished to decide independently whether there had been an attack and was not bound by the interpretation of other parties to the Tri-Potentate Pact, in the event the United States should enter the European War.
In his diary of 19 November 1945, it was pointed out to the Emperor various conditions which might arise if the Emperor resolved on war by the end of November. For war to come just because the Emperor had resolved might be very difficult with public opinion, and Hirohito suggested that when the Premier took a final decision he order a congress of senior statesmen to convene before the Emperor.

In a Liaison Conference of 20 November a decision regarding "Details of the Execution of Administration in the Southern Occupied Territories" was made. It relates to the setting up of a military administration in occupied areas using existing organs as much as possible and ordering co-operation of United States and Dutch nationals with Japan's military. Final disposition of territories is to be decided later. The occupation forces will control all facilities and communications. All important matters or local administration are to be decided at Liaison Conference. In French Indochina and Thailand a military administration is not to be set up, but measures are to be taken later.

On 20 November Komura handed in all another draft proposal incorporating the various points of the previous proposals.

On 20 November it was decided at a Cabinet Conference to establish a new Committee within the Cabinet — the Sixth Committee under Chairmanship of the President of the Planning Board, S.25X1. This committee was to draft plans for the economic exploitation of the southern areas. The establishment of the committee and its dealings were secret. The regulations
for the establishment of this committee were approved by the Premier on 2 December.

On 2 November an Investigation Committee meeting of the Privy Council attended by 1040 and 200 was held on Prolongation of the Anti-Countertest Act. It was decided unanimously to approve the Act "A" to request the government to make every effort to make it effective.

Telegram from Hirten sco 21 November, showing that on 18 November Japan sought advice from Germany as to whether Germany would or not to conclude a separate peace with the United States in event of the United States-Japanese War, and that Germany would not conclude a separate peace in regard to reason for war and in the event Japan commenced it.

In a cable from Taubade, Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, to KIMMA, Vice Minister of War 22 November, it is stated that the Southern Army will leave Tokyo on 22 November, landing at Keelung on 29 November and the establishment of the headquarters at Tainhoku on 2 December.

1040 1163 1060 in a cable to Osaka on 22 November explained the difficulty of altering the deadline date of the
a request, but stated that it the signing could be completed by the 20th, and an exchange of notes by that date, Japan would consider arrangements to wait. Later that date will not be acceptable.

6663 6:2 Telegram from German ambassador at Tokyo

Secret: Foreign Minister of 26 November states

Japanese War Minister's gratitude for the fact that Germany would not leave France in the lurch in case of United States military intervention, and also inquired if Japan—United States war would end. Germany: United States war operations intentions of Japan in the event of war gave the impression that China, North and West Germany would be occupied, but Philippine decision has not been received.

10-22 1136

On 23 November London called Togo that he had met with full and Bellantine concerning the negotiations. Britain, Australia and the Netherlands representatives had been conferred with on the 22nd and their opinions on Japan's proposals obtained. He gave a general survey of the conversations, ending by informing Togo that the United States would submit a counter proposal on Monday.
10406 1185 TOGO cabled Honolulu on 24 November, telling him of a conference with Chiang concerning the evacuation of troops in French Indo-China. Japan objected to intervention with Japan's efforts for peace when Roosevelt acts as mediator in connection with the Chinese problem and Chiang Kai-shek proposed peace with Japan. Clarification must be obtained on this point before negotiations between United States and Japan can be settled.

10411 1187 On 25 November the Japanese Ambassador at Hanoi stated that he had been advised that the United States was to reply by the 26th; failing this, he presumed war will result. However, if they fail, Japan's forces are ready to move. He queried whether status quo of TIC would be maintained in war.

6048 195 The law entitled, "Law Concerning Industrial Equipment Corporation" was passed on 25 November, by virtue of which the Government created a special equipment corporation, having as its object in times of war to have war and essential industries equipped with necessary plants for increased production on definite lines of the government plan.

6048 495 On 25 November the Anti-Comintern Pact was renewed with the provision for admission of new participants—Japanned-controlled China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia and Denmark.

10418 1169 France and Russia cabled Honolulu on 26 November, stating that there was hardly any hope of the United States accepting the "B" proposal in toto.
Situation was tense and all they could suggest to save it was that Peary would say Japan stating that he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate in maintaining peace and Japan replying with a cordial reply. If Japan approved, they would begin negotiations on receipt of the wire. It comes to them that the rupture, although possibly not causing war, would result in the occupation of Netherlands East Indies, with which Japan would be forced to attack. They asked TOGO to consult KIDO (at least) on this point.

10429 1190

In his diary for 26 November KIDO stated that he conferred with the President of the Privy Council about a senior statesmen's conference. The Emperor feared the worst and said that final decision for war should be carried out after another senior statesmen's conference with a broader discussion of the matter.

10432 1191

Record of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto of the Foreign Office on 27 November reveals that the negotiations do not seem to be getting along any better. Yamamoto told Kurusu not to break the off and that he would carefully read the President's message. Kurusu said they wanted to keep on negotiating but the Army is champing at the bit and there is a crisis.
On 28 November the Cabinet approved a plan for establishing a new system in press circles. An Imperial Ordinance creating a new system will be issued under the National Mobilization Law. It is aimed at placing the newspapers on a wartime basis.

TOGO informed Nomura on 28 November that in view of the latest United States proposal, there is practically nothing left but to break off the negotiations. However, Nomura and Kurusu are not to convey the impression that the negotiations are broken off and to say that they are awaiting instructions from home, and while not clarifying the Government's intent, they are to give personal opinion that Japan's claims have been just and the United States has not co-operated. The measures suggested in their telegram are considered improper, although they had been referred to the parties mentioned.

Intercepted message from Berlin to Tokyo of 29 November stated that if Japan should fight the United States, Germany would join war immediately, also no possibility of Germany entering into separate peace with the United States.

Excerpt from interrogation of OSHIMA in which he stated that around 29 or 30 November he received word that Hull's reply of 26 November with regard to Japanese—United States negotiations had been extremely severe in tone.

TOGO cabled Nomura on 29 November, instructing the Ambassadors to make one more verbal attempt by
statin—traditional United States fairness, and Japan can not understand why United States rejects her new proposals. They were to ask careful reflec-tion on what has become of the basic objectives that the United States has made the basis for negotiations for 7 months (with this shown of front on the China problem) and to exercise care that this does not lead to breaking off relations.

On 29 November the Japanese Consul General in Batavia instructed all Japanese consuls in Netherlands East Indies to report the arrival, departure, nationality, port, etc. of all foreign merchant men or vessels operating in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and South China Sea zones.

On 29 November KIDO in his diary described a meeting of Senior Statesmen (ex-premiers etc., including HIRANUMA and KINOTO) to give the Emperor their individual views on the question of peace or war. The Government explained that in their view war was inevitable. According to TOJO the members of the Government present besides himself were SHIMADA, TOJO, and SUZUKI at the first part of the conference when the explanations were given; himself only in the later stages when the Senior Statesmen spoke. KIDO summarizes the views of the Senior Statesmen: none dissented from the Government view.

KIDO stated in his diary of 30 November that in view of the Emperor's statement that the Navy wished to know war, he advised the Emperor to ask opinions of the Navy Minister (SHIMADA),
Chief of Naval General Staff (MAGANO), and
the Premier. Later, the Emperor told XIJO
that in view of the fact that the Navy Minister
and Chief of Navy General Staff had given
affirmative answers as to the success of war,
he had told the Premier to act accordingly.

Telegram from Tokyo to Berlin of 30 November
showed that the Japanese were ready to turn on
Soviet Russia should it join with England and
America.

On 30 Nov. 1940 cabled Nomura setting out the
lines along which Nomura is to make one more
attempt with the negotiations. The Imperial
Government cannot understand the proposal of the
26th and holds a doubtful attitude towards the
fundamental plans of the United States government
in the negotiations.

10469 1199 1290 cabled OSIMA on 30 November and informed
him that the Tri-Partite Pact had throughout formed
the cornerstone of Japanese Foreign Policy. Rec-
cording the negotiations, the question of evacuation
of troops on which the negotiations rested had
been violently opposed, and it has become clear
that Japan could no longer continue negotiations.
The American proposal of 26 November which aimed
at attempting to trick Japan into agreeing that
if United States enters the European war Japan
cannot assist Germany and Italy has made their
attitude clearer than ever. The United States is
now in collusion with Australia, England, Holland
and China and has decided to regard Japan as well
as Italy and Germany as an enemy.
Record of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto on 29 November showed that Kurusu stated that a reported speech by TOJO had caused much publicity and concern in the United States and the President was returning, possibly on account of it. Yamamoto told Kurusu to continue negotiations and Kurusu said to stretch them out they would need help from home. Kurusu said that more discretion should be exercised in speeches by the Premier and Foreign Minister and that he would see Hull the next day.

TOJO in his interrogation stated that the contents of the final note from Japan to the United States were decided at a series of Liaison Conferences on or before 30 November as confirmed by the Cabinet shortly afterwards, and that the instructions as to the time of its delivery were known to all the members of the Liaison Conference. These included in both cases the accused TOJO, SHIMADA, KIGAI, SUZU, HOSHI, NUTO, and OKA. The accused members of the Cabinet were TOJO, SHIMADA, KIGAI, SUZU and HOSHI. He claimed that all the above mentioned were responsible in both respects. TOJO admitted and excused the non-delivery of any warning whatever to Great Britain until after 0700 hours on 8 December when he handed a copy of the note to Ambassador Craigie, by saying that he thought Washington would pass it on to London.

According to TOJO it was decided at one of these Liaison Conferences to leave it to TOJO, HAGANO and Sugiyama to decide the time of delivery of the note.

In accordance with the repeatedly expressed wishes of the Emperor it was to be before the attack. He agrees
that the draft of the contents of the note was approved both by the Liaison Conference and the Cabinet; he denies that the time of delivery was reported to the Liaison Conference, but says that SUZUKI also knew it.

Ideas as to the length of the interval between the delivery of the note and the attack varied from half an hour to one and a half hours, but it was not to be such as to interfere with the success of the "surprise attack".

TOJO admitted that the note was not a declaration of war, but he says he thought it was a breaking off of diplomatic relations. He and the Cabinet studied the relevant treaties and he says they thought they were justified, in spite of the Nine-Power Convention and the Keloep-Priand Pact, because Japan had been challenged militarily and economically by the other countries and was acting in self-defense. He and TOGO expressed the same opinions to the Liaison Conference and they all agreed.

TOJO agreed that owing to the shortness of time allowed there was danger of a hitch, but trusted the Foreign Ministry to see that it did not occur.

The War (TOJO), Navy (SHIMADA), Planning Board (SUZUKI), Foreign (TOGO), and Finance (YAMA) Ministers were among the members of the Cabinet who were always present at Liaison Conferences.

The decisions of the Imperial conferences as a rule merely confirmed decisions previously taken at Liaison Conferences, according to TOJO.

TOJO said that the Pearl Harbour plan was kept secret in the Navy Ministry until it was disclosed at the Liaison Conference of 30 November.
On 1 December 1940, a电缆 to the United States, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that the deadline for the declaration of war had been extended. The situation was increasingly difficult for Japan, as the United States had advised the Japanese that there were wide differences between the United States and Japan, and that negotiations were continuing.

On 1 December 1940, an Imperial Conference was held at which it was decided that since the negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of national policy had failed, Japan would open hostilities against Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands. According to YOZO (as shown in Exhibit 1107), there were present on this occasion himself, all or nearly all the Cabinet members (who included Shidekura, Togo, Eiichi, and Tikku) Nakano, Hosino, Muto, and Oku. KIKU's diary of 1 December stated that the Council, in the presence of the Emperor, was held that day and decided on war between Japan and the United States; the
Prinzler consulted KIDO about the declaration of war.

On 2 December OGO instructed Nomura and consul in
the United States territory by cable to burn all codes,
secret documents, etc., without raising suspicion from
outsiders.

Bernard Lubin admitted that on 2 December he gave
Kite, Consul General Honolulu, documents concerning
full details of United States shipping information in
Pearl Harbour.

On 2 December Combined Fleet Top Secret Order No. 7
was issued.

In a cable sent on 2 December from OS:IMA to
OGO he stated he had been unable to get Hitler's
opinion on the subject of German participation in
American War with Japan, but would do so as soon as
possible. OS:IMA had assured Gans that the agreement
would be mutual. OS:IMA suggested that a German-
Italian-Japanese declaration of joint non-conclusion
of separate peace would be best.

On 2 December OGO ordered to be opened Minister, but
retrieved other offices.

Intercepted message from Rome to TCGO of 5 December
concerned the fact that United States-Japanese nego-
tiations are not working out and Mussolini backs up
Detachment of troops to Manchukuo

11318 1231 In a cable from GGO to Fushih on 4 December steps to be taken by Manchukuo in case the situation becomes critical are stated, reversing previous instructions. When Japan commences war, Manchukuo will not participate.
for the moment. Since she is closely bound with Japan, and England, United States and Holland have not recognized her, she will consider them as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly.

In December, Shira stated that on orders from the War Ministry he issued written instructions to all branch offices in Tokyo and to other sections of his censorship staff concerning 5-hour delay for cables to end from abroad.

Extract from Chino's diary of 4 December states that Berlin does not like the idea of United States intervention in war, while Mussolini appears pleased about it.

Telegram from German Ambassador Tokyo to Reich Foreign Minister of 5 December, concerning impending break-off in United States-Japanese negotiations. Deliberations in Foreign Ministry on how Japan will open conflict, whether by declaration of war simultaneously with, or after the beginning of hostilities.

On 5 December, Omura handed a statement to Hull, giving the explanations regarding troop movements in French Indo-China as instructed by Togo in his cable of 3 December.

A message from Honolulu to Togo dated 5 December gave specific mention of the movements of ships in and out of the Harbour.

Extract from Chino's diary of 5 December related that Ribbentrop, after two days' delay, sent a message and submitted a plan for triple action on Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace.

Telegram from Tokyo to Berlin of 6 December states that
Japan hesitates to bring about a clash with Soviet until circumstances are right and waits this explained to German Government so it will not insist on exchange of notes on this matter at the present time.

TOG cabled Nomura on 6 December and stated that the Government had deliberated on the United States proposal of 25 November and had decided on a memorandum. This memorandum may be delayed until the next day and the exact time for handing it will be telegraphed later.

On 6 December a G4 informed Nomura again of the strict secrecy of the memorandum.

A message was sent from Honolulu to TOG on 6 December, giving the location of ships in the Harbour and that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm.

On 6 December the President of the United States telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor that the tragic possibilities in the situation be avoided. By the President's instructions the telegram was in gray code, easy to decipher. The alerting message was dispatched at 2000 hours on 6 December and the message at 2100 hours on the same day, all Washington time.

A message of December from Honolulu to TOG gave direct information for the surprise attack and dealt with important subjects of barrage balloons and torpedo nets.

On 6 December Shirao, Chief of Censorship Department, Communications Ministry, stated his orders to
decy telegrams were changed from 6 hours' delay to
5 and 10 hours on alternate days. 7 December became
a "ten-hour" day.

On 7 December (6 December in Washington) Hirohito
cabled TOGO that the reply was to be given to the
United States at 1:00 PM on 7 December, Washington time.

A telegram from TOGO of 7 December stated measures to
be taken in the event of a national crisis, in regard
to China. British concessions to be occupied, Shanghai
International Settlement, Peking Legation compounds to
be taken over. On declaration of war the banking
Government is to be directed (contrary to previous in-
structions) not to participate, but to maintain close
relations with Japan.

KIJO stated in his diary on 7 December that HOU-KIJO
visited him to consult about the war with the United
States and England.

At 7:40 PM on 6 December the White House informed
the Press that a note was being dispatched to the
Emperor.

Synchronized Time Chart for 5, 7, 8 December showed
that events occurred in the following order, according
to Tokyo time:

December 7 0940 American Press told telegram on way to
Emperor
1000 Hull cabled Grew: the cable was on way
1100 Hull sent President's message to Emperor
and message sent in easily decipherable
code
1200 President’s message received in Tokyo
1500 U. S. radio announces message on way
1800 by this time at latest the contents of the
President’s message were known in Japanese
Government offices.
2330 Grew received the message.

December 6 Grew sees TC GO, reads message to him, and asks
for appointment to deliver it to the Emperor personally.

0045 The Shanghai Bund occupied
0140 Kota Bahru shelled
0200 Nomura asks to see Hull
0205 Japanese land at Kota Bahru
0300 Nomura asks for postponement of meeting with Hull
0305 Japanese land at Singora and Patani (Siam)
0330-25 attack on Pearl Harbour
0405 Nomura arrives at Hull’s office
0420 Nomura hands Hull the document terminating
negotiations.

“52” H.M.S. Peter I sunk
0530 Japanese troops invade Siam from French Indo-China
0610 air raid on Singapore
0700 Tokyo radio gives first notice that hostilities
have begun.

0730 Grew calls on TOGO, who hands him copy of
document handed by Nomura to Hull, stating it
was Emperor’s answer to President’s message.
0800 Craigo sees TOGO at his request and is handed
a copy of the last-mentioned document.

0805 Juan attacked.
0900 Hong Kong attacked

between 1145 and 1200 Imperial Rescript issued.

11552 1254 Affidavit of Joseph Clark Grew stated that about 1500 on 7 December it was announced by radio in the United States that the President had sent a message to the Emperor, but no instruction was given as to its substance or the channel of transmission. At 2100 he received a telegram marked "Triple Priority" from Hull, sent at 2000 6 December, Washington time (1100 7 December Tokyo time), stating that a telegram was then being encoded containing a message from the President, which Grew was to communicate to the Emperor at the earliest possible moment. About 2230 the actual message was delivered at the Embassy. It was stamped as having been received in Japan at 1200 and was marked "Triple Priority" sent at 6 December, 2100 Washington time (1100 7 December, Tokyo time). Grew immediately telephoned to TOGO asking for an urgent appointment at midnight. TOGO attempted to put it off until the next day, but made the appointment.

As soon as the telegram was decoded and typed, Grew took it to TOGO's residence and saw him on 8 December at 0015. He requested an audience with the Emperor to present the message, which he read aloud, and of which he gave a copy to TOGO. TOGO said at first he would study the document, but when Grew asked if this meant some doubt as to whether he would ask for the audience, he replied he would present the matter to the Throne.

TOGO made some further remarks about the Washington conversations, but when Grew said he had not received a report of the 5 December talk and it would complicate
in matters if he tried to repeat talks in his comments to
the Department, TOJO said it was not necessary.
Crow left at 0300. At about 0700 Crow received a telephone
call requesting him to come and see the Minister at once.
The person speaking said he had tried to get Crow since
0600. Crow arrived at the Minister's residence at about
0730. TOJO said he had seen the Emperor and handed
Crow a copy of the memorandum entitled, "Memorandum
issued by the Acting Ambassador to the Secretary of
State at 3:20 PM on December 7, 1941." TOJO said he had
seen the Emperor at about 0300, and this memorandum is
the Emperor's reply. Crow reminded TOJO that he had asked
for an audience and still wished to present the President's
message personally. TOJO said he had no desire to stand
between the Throne and Crow. He then thanked Crow for
cooperation during the conversations and saw him off.
TOJO said nothing to Crow about war having broken out any­
where, or about Pearl Harbor. Shortly after returning
to the Embassy Crow learned through a newspaper bulletin
that Japan was at war with the United States and Great
Britain. Later that morning an official of the Foreign
Office called at the Embassy and read the official announce­
ment that war had broken.

Shirao stated that on 7 December before 6:00 PM, possibly
between 4 and 6, he knew of the contents of Roosevelt's
message to the Emperor from the War Ministry.

Text of the memorandum handed on 7 December at 3:20 PM.

Ballantine Washington time, by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary of
State Hull, breaking off negotiations with the United
States.
At 1:20 PM, 7 December, Washington time, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour.

Nomura and Kuruwu arrived to see Hull at 2:06 PM on 7 December (Washington time) and were received by him at 3:20 PM. They presented the memorandum breaking off negotiations and apologized, saying it should have been delivered at 1:00 PM, but decoding had delayed its delivery.

Shirao stated that at 0430 on 8 December he was told by the Chief of the Foreign Telegr. Section to stop all communications with foreign countries.

At 0645 on 8 December, General Nalty was informed that war existed between Japan and Britain and at 0800 Japanese aircraft bombed Hong Kong airfield.

Witness Tatono, radio announcer, stated that at 0700 on 8 December he broadcast the first publication of Japan's attacks. It was not true as stated in the broadcast that there had been a previous announcement at 6:00.

At 0800 on 8 December (Tokyo time) Togo handed the memo reply to Craigie at which time Craigie stated he had received no information of any state of war or attack on Britain or the United States, and was relieved to find the document did not suggest it.

At 1130 on 8 December an official of the Japanese Foreign Office informed Craigie that war existed between Great Britain and Japan.

At 12 o'clock midday on 8 December the Imperial Rescript was read according to testimony of Shirao.

On 8 December HiTo in his diary stated that at 12:40 AM Foreign Minister Togo reported that Ambassador Grew had brought a personal telegram from President to the Emperor.
KIDO advised TOJO to deliberate carefully with Premier TOJO as regards its diplomatic effect. The Emperor would grant an audience even at midnight. KIDO went to the palace at 11:00 AM and talked with TOJO, back home at 3:30 AM. As he was returning to his office, which he reached at 7:15 AM, he saw a fine sun rise and reflected that this was the day on which Japan was to enter the war against the United States and Britain, and that at day-break a mass air attack had been carried out at Hawaii.

Knowing this, and being anxious about the result, he prayed. At 7:30 AM on arrival at the office, he heard of the grand success of the surprise attack from TOJO, NAGASATO and Sugiyama. From 11:40 to 12:00 midday, KIDO was received in audience. The Imperial Proclamation of War was issued.

10648 1235-A 8 December 1140 Japan announced her attack on Hong Kong
1160 " " " on Malaya
1300 " " air raid on Hawaii
and others
1700 " " air raid on the Philippines
2100 " " air raid on airdromes in the Philippines and advance into Thailand.

10690 1241 At an Inquiry Committee Meeting of the Privy Council at 7:30 AM on 8 December, attended by TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, KAYA, SUZUKI, MUTO and OKA, while SHIMADA was reporting on the starting of war against the United States and England, the Emperor's reference bill for their deliberation on the subject arrived. In answer to a question as to the time of declaration of war, TOJO replied it shall be done as soon as the Imperial Sanction
is obtained. He also said since 1 December the negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy, and that Japan would not declare war against Holland in view of future strategic convenience. KAYA said there would be a Special Emergency War Expense Account.

Togo spoke of the form in which the announcement would be made to enemy countries. The Secretaries reported that at 8:00 PM on 7 December they were informed at Premier's residence that the action would begin in the early morning next day, and that during the day the declaration of war against America and England would be presented for Imperial Sanction.

10700 1242 On 8 December Berlin cabled Tokyo reporting that Oshiki had stated to Ribbentrop Japan's wish for a formal declaration of war by Italy and Germany. Ribbentrop agreed to transmit Togo's wish to Hitler.

7122 656 Local Military Treaty between French authorities and the Japanese Army was enacted on 9 December concerning the joint defense of French Indo-China. By this agreement Japanese troops are granted all facilities of movement, etc. France and Japan agree to collaborate for defense of French Indo-China with all their resources and various measures concerning air defense, ship movements, plane movements, transport communications and counter-espionage adopted, all of which benefit Japanese and give them virtual control.

11304 1266 On 10 December the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council met to discuss the matter of co-separate peace. Togo, Shikada, Toko, Mito and Oka were present when it was queried whether the treaty should not be deferred until Germany and Italy had actually entered
the war; TOGO and TOJO answered that it had been arranged with Hitler to announce German participation as soon as he signed the agreement and they could trust the Germans.

On 10 December a Privy Council Meeting was held attended by TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, KIYA and SUZUKI on the latter for the conclusion of the agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy regarding the war. Of a common war against the United States of America and the United Kingdom, non-separate peace and collaboration for the establishment of the new order.

On 11 December the Board of Information announced the conclusion of an agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy with respect to their joint prosecution of war against the United States and British Empire, abstention from concluding peace and cooperation for the establishment of a new order.

Excerpt from newspaper "Asahi" of 12 December giving text of statement of TOJO on occasion of declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the United States and of the conclusion by Japan of the military agreement with Germany and Italy. TOJO states the world is divided into two groups, one fighting to maintain the status quo and the other for a new order; he believes victory will come to the latter. Offers hearty congratulations on the alliance of the three countries.

On 12 December the first report of the Sixth Committee (SUZUKI, Chairman), "Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern Areas," was made. Principal policy stated to be meeting demand for important national resources so as to help war, to establish self-sufficient system for co-
prosperity sphere, and to strengthen Japan's economy.

Two areas are named for this purpose: one to include Netherland East Indies, Malaya, Formosa, Philippines, and the other French Indo-China and Thailand.

On 14 December a summarized plan for the management of the southern area was made. Purpose to guarantee Japan's security and establish necessary organization for Co-Prospor-
ity Sphere with Japan as leader. Basic policies are acquisition and utilization of military bases, acquisition of resources for national defense, tightening economic cooperation, severing European and American political shackles and respecting local desire for emancipation and independence. The plans for the independend or occupation of the southern areas are then set forth, taking into consideration the cooperation afforded to Japan.

At a meeting between OSHIMA and Hitler on 14 December, at which Hitler decorated OSHIMA with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold, Hitler expressed his delight at the method Japan used to declare war. Hitler stated that if the other party only puts one off when negotiating, then one should strike and not waste time declaring war. The entry of Japan into the war was a great relief to Germany; it facilitated her submarine warfare now that the United States position was clear. Hitler excused the set-back in Russia as due to weather and gave information on contemplated Mediterranean attack with U-boats. OSHIMA gave the Führer a survey on the Pacific war situation, stating that after the fall of Singapore, Japan will turn on India; he also revealed
that Japan had been carrying out landing exercises on Midway Island for some time.

9073 879-A On 16 December TOJO made a ministerial address to the Diet, stating that Japan owes the Army and Navy debts of gratitude and unbounded admiration for the demonstration of their great prowess. For years they had been silently preparing for this great day.

11308 1268 On 16 December KIDO stated in his diary that Prince Konoye visited him and expressed his feelings about political responsibility. KIDO asked him to be prudent.

11309 1269 On 18 December KIDO stated in his diary that the Chief of the Naval General Staff (NAGANO) reported to the palace the results at Hawaii.

11315 1270-A Soon after 8 December, a collection of Essays on Problems of International Law related to the Greater East Asia War was prepared by a committee of well known Japanese international lawyers in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry. Among these was "A Report of Study concerning Hostilities on the Outbreak of War." It was delivered on 26 December.

12184 ReWeerd In 1942 the Japanese initiated the AAA Movement, the theme of which was Asia for the Asiatic.

12243 1339 In January Major G. L. Reindershoff was taken prisoner by the Japanese in Tarakan. He states in his affidavit that he and two other Dutch officers were sent by the Japanese Commanding General to the Dutch Commander of Balikpapan. He was informed that if the oil wells in Balikpapan were destroyed or a Japanese landing resisted, all soldiers and all Europeans of both sexes in Balikpapan would be killed.

8141 Natsumura stated in affidavit existence of plan of operation for 1942 against USSR which contained:
(1) general tasks of Kwantung Army; (2) distribution of military strength; (3) tasks of different fronts and armies. Plan was signed by UJIZII, Commander Kwantung Army, and others and witness stated it was not clear to him whether war against USSK would actually be carried on.

In the book "Thailand", of January, a map is shown encircling territory which Japan expects to encompass under her control of the now East Asia, including Kritine Province, Aleutians, Hawaiian Islands, Australia and New Zealand.

According to Red Army reports, the strength of the Kwantung Army on 1 January was established as 1,100,000 men strong, 22 times the strength in 1932 and 4 times the strength in 1937; 1000 tanks, 500 pieces of ordnance; 7 divisions; and 1500 planes.

Excerpt from newspaper "Tokyo Dai Nippon" of 5 January states that Greater East Asia Sphere includes these countries: Japan, Manchoukuo, China, Soviet Far East, French Indo-China, Burma, Malay, Dutch East Indies, India, Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines and islands of Pacific and Indian Oceans; they may not be included at once, but for purposes of defense Japan includes them in its sphere of influence. This article, which is entitled "The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence" by H. SHIJO10 goes on to state that careful consideration should be given to the divisions and administration of the countries in the Sphere. The principles to be followed were independence to be given to each race in its proper place and incorporation into Japan for those areas where the inhabitants have no
capacity for independence or where the areas were of strategic importance. There should also be a supreme Council for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Japan's leadership to be set up in Tokyo. The article advocated the launching of anti-American and British movements and the development of superior races in preparation for the great future fight between white and colored races.

On 12 January there was a declaration by the Board of Information concerning the opening of hostilities against Netherlands forces. This stated that, in spite of the previous declaration of war on the United States and Great Britain, Japan had wished to avoid war against the Netherlands East Indies, but Holland had notified Japan that, in view of Japan's war against the United States and Great Britain, a state of war did exist between Japan and the Netherlands. In view of the need for protecting Japanese interests, therefore, Japan opened hostilities against the Netherlands forces on 11 January.

On 18 January a military agreement was signed by Germany, Italy and Japan in which the Axis, acting in the spirit of the Tri-Partaite Pact, divided the world into zones of military operation.

Excerpt from secret publication of the Institute of Total War of 27 January entitled, "Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," defines extent of co-prosperity sphere as within limits of Pacific Ocean, Central Asia and Indian Ocean; plans for development of Manchukuo and fortifying it for military operations against USSR; plans for annihilation of Soviet Maritime Provinces; provisions for Mongolian defense wall against USSR.
On 21 January the Dutch Commander of the town of Balikpapan received from Captain Reinderlof the Japanese ultimatum. He replied that he had received the necessary order and that the oil installation would be destroyed.

On 24 January the Japanese occupied Balikpapan as is stated in the affidavit of J. T. Aanstel. On 20 February it was rumoured that all Europeans would be murdered by the Japanese on 24 February and this was duly carried out, the number of Europeans killed being from 80 to 100. The native population was compelled to attend.

On 22 January Foreign Minister TOGO made a speech in the Diet. In this speech, TOGO stated that Japan's task was the emancipation and prosperity of East Asia and the setting up of a new world order. The Axis connection had become increasingly tight and there was close economic, military and diplomatic cooperation. The Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union remained unchanged. Japan wished to keep on good terms with neutral states but Japan was watching the situation in South America. Japan had begun fighting against the Netherlands East Indies because Britain, Holland and Chungking had made the Netherlands East Indies their strategic base. TOGO then outlined the aim of the war, which was to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere and decide the destiny of all East Asia. It was, therefore, natural that areas necessary for defending East Asia should be grasped by Japan.

On 22 January TOGO made a speech in the Diet. TOGO stated that the cardinal principle for directing the war was to secure strategic points in Greater East Asia and
Main control of areas containing important resources, to fight out the war until the United States and Britain were defeated. Japan would carry out aggressive operations closely with Germany and Italy. While Japan was pushing her military operations, she was engaged in establishing the East Asia Sphere. Japan would establish eternal peace in East Asia and construct a new world order absolutely indispensable for the defense of Greater East Asia. TOJO then enumerated the territories captured and outlined Japan's intentions towards them.

On 27 January the Total War Research Institute drafted the basic plan for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It stated that the States, Citizens and Resources belonging to the Pacific, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean, were to be established as an autonomous zone on behalf of the peoples of East Asia. The area was to include Japan, Manchuria, North China, lower Yangtze River and the Russian Maritime Province. It was Japan's duty to be leader of this Union. There would be the Inner Sphere, vital for Japan. The Smaller Co-prosperity Sphere would be the smaller self-supplying Sphere of East Asia, and the Greater Co-prosperity Sphere would be the larger self-supplying sphere and would include the smaller one plus Australia, India and the Islands in the Pacific. The points which should be made the primary starting points for political construction were explained.

On 29 January OTT reported to Berlin the various speeches made by TOJO, Togo and SUZUKI at the Diet and Budget Commission recently which brought forth many interesting and important declarations concerning Japan.
airst and the execution of the war. Future moves towards
the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and the Soviet
are mentioned. The military occupation of the conquered
countries is to be a beneficent one (Greater East Asia
under Japanese management) and the main object to be
the acquisition of sources of raw materials. The countries
conquered, or to be conquered, were divided into groups:
some (Hong Kong; and Malay) to remain in the possession
of Japan, and others (Philippines and Burma) to be
created independent on the model of Manchuria if they
cooperate with Japan; Netherlands East Indies, Australia
and China, to be conquered if they persist in
resisting. TOJO stated relations towards Russia to be
unchanged, but very confidential information showed
military preparations against USSR to be already underway
in Manchuria. Japan must turn against Russia, seize
Vladivostok, the coastal provinces and North Sakhalin
in order to feel secure in the north.

Article by Tanaka, Naokiti in paper "Osaka Ji Ji," dated
31 January, stated the purpose of Great Union of Asia is
first to unite morally Japan, China, and Manchuria under
Japanese leadership; second, then include Thailand; Annam,
Philippines and Burma; and third, to effect emancipation
of Australia, India and Siberia.

Excerpt from symposium of Institute of Total War en-
titled, "The Program of Total War in the First Period,"
The Construction of East Asia" of February 1942: If prospec
t of peace between Germany and USSR would cause Soviet
alienation from England and America and thus reduce
threat to Japan, Japan would attempt to mediate, or she
nicht threaten to attack Russia if Russia refused to suspend hostilities. If war situation is unfavorable to Germany, no efforts will be made to bring about peace.

All Manchurian Extraordinary Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai (General Umezu was present) was held on 8 February. Umezu's speech relates to Japan's aim to liberate East Asia from baneful influence of England and the United States and delegates must contribute to cause of national defense so Nippon might be sure as far as rear is concerned.

On 17 February TOJO resigned from Home Ministry, remaining Premier and War Minister.

An extract from the plan concerning scope and structure of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of 18 February plans for German-Japanese occupation of Russia and Japanese counter plans to keep Slavs from German occupied territory out of Japanese section of the USSR.

A top secret publication of the Total War Research Institute dated 18 February entitled, "Outline of the First Period of the Total War for the Establishment of East Asia", introduced to show Japanese plans for war against USSR and capture of Soviet territory east of Lake Baikal.

In March Sato in his speech made clear that prior to 1941 Japan had expanded her production far in excess of need for China War, and had carefully gathered all controls in hands of government, effectively chaining all industry to the national policy of industrial preparation for a far greater conflict.

7 March Japanese military paper currency was introduced and the guilder reduced to the value of the yen.
The discussion and agreement of the surrender of troops to
in Netherlands East Indies to Japan was conducted on 8 March.

On 3 March the Japanese prohibited discussion or
activities in the organization and structure of government
and certain Indonesian leaders were arrested. In December
1942 to January 1943 there was a large scale round-up of
Indonesians and those who were not executed or who did not
die in prison remained in captivity until September 1945.

In April a ban on listening to the radio from outside
Netherlands East Indies was enforced, and in July some
persons who had listened to broadcasts and spread news
were sentenced to death by court martial.

In April all existing law courts were abolished and
Ordinance Nos. 2 and 3 of March 1942, all meetings and
associations were forbidden in the Netherlands East Indies.

On 20 April 1942, Togo became Chief of the Military Affairs
Bureau, War Ministry, he then being appointed Commander of
the Imperial Guards Division in Tokyo.

On 29 April the first daily newspaper in the Malay
language appeared and all forms of propaganda came under
Japanese control.

Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador in Tokyo
of 15 May stated that if Japan feels unable to capture
Vladivostock and penetrate into Siberia successfully,
without weakening her position against England and
America (as in Burma), then she should maintain friendly
attitude to Russia. By maintaining neutrality the risk
of long-drawn out war and attack on Japanese home islands
may be avoided. In short, a sudden and successful
attack against Soviet Russia would be a great boon for
further conduct of war, but should only be undertaken if success can be assured.

On 17 May Oto cabled Ribbentrop suggesting that SUZUKI, SHIRATORI, Sugiyama, KIMURA, ITO, SITO, Kusahara, and OHIMURA be recommended for decorations by Germany, in view of the important contributions they had made towards German-Japanese cooperation, details being given in each case. On 29 May KIMURA was appointed a Privy Councillor.

On 1 July so-called private estates in the Netherlands East Indies were appropriated without payment and public utilities seized.

In a talk between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA on 24 June Ribbentrop stated that the strength of the Tri-Partite powers had been in their offensive war. OSHIMA agreed and stated that neither he nor his government believed in defensive war, but that victory was based on further attacks.

In Imperial Order 613 of 14 July it is shown that the Government had power to issue orders for supervision of enterprises of South Manchurian Railway; the Kwantung Army may direct military affairs concerning business affairs of company, and in wartime, may issue orders involving business affairs of company.

On 5 August an entirely new system of local administration was set up. The composition of the Administration Corps was later modified according to TOJO's promise but leading positions remained with the Japanese and they did not hand over authority until August 1945. Witness do Weerd then explained the reorganization of the Judicial System.
KIDO related in his diary on 1 September that friction had arisen between TOJO and TOSHO, who objected in principle to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry. TOJO had been asked to resign, and after intervention by SHIMADA he agreed to do so, thus averting a resignation of the Cabinet on the.

On 1 September TOJO resigned; TOSHO temporarily was also appointed Foreign Minister.

On 1 October KAWABE, General, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army (previously Commander).

On 9 October there was a meeting of the Privy Council on the Greater East Asia Ministry at which MIKAMI, TOJO, HOSHIRO and SUZUKI were present. TOJO made a report and explanation of the draft bill and made a statement to the effect that victory was an absolute necessity for Japan and that in order to achieve this the combined fighting power of East Asia must be strengthened. It was, therefore, desired to establish a Ministry which should be known as the "Greater East Asia Ministry." TOJO then gave his opinion as to the effect of this on foreign countries which was that their misunderstanding would be solved since the draft aimed for the benefit for all, but that close attention should be paid to the alienation of the relative countries. At the fourth meeting of the Privy Council on 14 October, there were present MIKAMI and CUMOKU, the question of naming the new Ministry, Greater East Asia Ministry was discussed and SUZUKI approved of this name. The extranormal diplomacy with countries within the Sphere was discussed as well as the intimate relationship between foreign policy and
extranormal diplomacy in the area, and it was decided
that the new Minister should take over. At the fifth
meeting on 14 October, which MINAMI attended, the
relations of Japan with countries in the Sphere and the
diplomacy to be used were discussed. The overseas affairs
would come under the superintendence of the Foreign
Minister. At the meeting on 20 October, MINAMI, SUTSUMI,
and ODA were present; at the 6th meeting on 31
October MINAMI, TOJO, and ODA were present. Record of
second conference of "Ministry" attended by HOSHINO,
MINAMI, SUTSUMI and TOJO on 12 October- concerning Greater
East Asia Ministry-except on Japan's plans for
economic advancement by diplomatic means, last resort
would be armed forces, Greater East Asia Sphere defined
as including Borneo, South Sea Islands, Manchuria,
China, Siam, French Indo-China and any new occupation
area resulting from Greater East Asia War.

Imperial Ordinance No. 734 of 1 November concerning
establishment and organization of the Greater East Asia
Ministry. Greater East Asia Ministry established to
execute various political affairs concerning Greater
East Asia protect commercial interests, affairs
concerning Japanese subjects resident there.
Extract from "Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations, 1942", concerning East Asiatic Affairs refers to statement by Aoki, Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs on 1 November, concerning the establishment of Greater East Asia as a new order based on morality and righteousness, on basis of "Hakko Ichin" (World Under One Roof). Necessary to win war and urgently required that nation's power be replenished and strengthened to do this in cooperating with high command. Hoped for cooperation from French Indochina, China and Thailand. On 1 November Greater East Asia Ministry was created; took over all duties of Overseas Ministry and Manchurian and China Affairs Boards and some of Foreign Ministry (reason for TOJO's resignation).

On 25 November TOJO was also again appointed temporarily Home Minister.

On 21 January 1943 the Board of Information announced the conclusion of economic agreements between Germany, Italy and Japan; also they are considering an extension of the Tri-Partite Pact to enable three countries to prosecute war against their common enemy and promote permanent economic cooperation after the war.

Excerpt from record of Ribbentrop's talk with OSS/L/2 of 6 March in which the latter reported to the German Foreign Minister that the Japanese Government did not feel strong enough to open up hostilities against Russia at that time as such action might endanger operations on other fronts. Germany points out that all forces under the Tri-Partite Pact should join forces against Russia as all is agreed and decided, Japan should make full use of her strength now as Germany is already strained to the limit. If Germany becomes weak, Japan alone would face a world...
coalition of not only England, America, and Russia, but all bolshevized Europe. OSS24 replied Japan did not have sufficient army and material to successfully engage Russia and also did not wish to split her army. Japan would prejudice the Southern front if she fought Russia.

On 9 March the "Future" covenant was begun whose aim was to arouse the strength of the people for victory, to establish a new Japan, and eliminate accidental influences.

On 11 March Kido was appointed a Supreme War Councillor on resignation as Vice Minister.

Samarai Research Papers for Year 1942, published by the Research Institute of Total War on 30 March 1943, introduced to show Japanese made plans for possible occupation of Siberia.

Talk between Reich Minister and Ambassador OSS21 of 18 April shows that Germany considers this the best time for Japan's assault on Russia, who was now weakened by assault from west. Germany estimates Russian forces in Siberia as considerably less than Japan's estimates. OSS24 did not know his Government's views on the subject and for the past 20 years Japan had been preparing to attack USSR.

On 20 April SHIGEMITSU became Foreign Minister.

On 1 May DOHMA was appointed Commander of the Eastern District Army (in Japan) and a Supreme War Councillor.

On 13 May KIDO recorded that SHIGEMITSU visited the palace and spoke of the critical situation in Germany. The overwhelming of the Nazi Party by the Army may cause a similar situation to that which arose at the end of the last war, and SHIGEMITSU suggested that a powerful person be sent from Japan to establish liaison between the two countries.
On 16 June TOJO made a speech at the 92nd Session of the Diet and stated that Japan was making arrangements to launch decisive operations. TOJO then outlines Japan's intentions towards the populations of Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes and other places.

Conference of Army Information Department, Harbin was conducted on 16 June by Major General Doi, Chief of Information Department, showing that the war of sabotage against the USSR was continued by Japan even in 1943 when Japan was bound by the Neutrality Pact.

On 21 June M.O. became Supreme War Councillor and Admiral of Fleet.

On 16 August a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held to discuss the treaty between Japan and Thailand. INOHI, TOJO, SHIGAITSU, SCHO and OKA were present. This provided that Thailand should annex the Shan States from Burma and this although this was contrary to International Law, Japan would overcome the difficulty by releasing her military occupation and allowing Thailand to annex these. TOJO said Japan would recognize International Law as long as the enemy did as said but would interpret it from the viewpoint of the war according to her own opinions.

On 5 September by Ordinance No. 37 the Advisor System was set up which was established to advise the Resident on local government in the Netherlands East Indies.

Radio address by SHIGAITSU on 27 September, the occasion of the second anniversary of the Tri-Partite Pact, which states that the Axis Alliance remains unshaken, despite British and American maneuvers to induce the Papaglio regime to fresh acts of betrayal, and the Pact of Alliance shines forth illuminating the road to victory.
In October a. army of volunteers for the defence of the home-
land was set up to persuade the Indonesians to defend Java as
part of the joint defence of Greater East Asia.

On 8 October 1943, the temporarily also Commerce and Indus-
try Minister.

On 30 October 1943, a pact of alliance between so-called Republic
of China and Japan was concluded. This affected non-validity
of former treaty of 30 November 1940.

On 5 November 1943, give an address at the Assembly of the
Greater East Asiatic Nations in which he stated that a success-
ful conclusion of the war meant the completion of the construc-
tion of the new order. TOJO then gave his views on the condi-
tions necessary for world peace and the ties which bound the
nations of Greater East Asia together. While the nations of
the Sphere mutually recognize their autonomy and independance
there must be mutual trust and cooperation.

On 5 November, at the time of the decision of the Assembly
of the Greater East Asiatic Nations, TOJO was in favor of ind
pendance and was supported by the Foreign Minister. The
Supreme Command and others, however, were against it and it was
finally decided that the territories should be incorporated.
The Japanese army on the spot was dissatisfied with the deci-
sion but made no representations of their position. Soon after,

Deduced Sukarno, who visited Japan after the Conference, requested TOJO
to grant East Indies their independence. The meeting got no
definite reply. Later, Suzuki supported a request for the inde
pendance of the East Indies. At the first War Supervision
Conference it was decided to make a statement of independence.
The Navy still maintained such strong opposition that the pro-
motion of independance was deferred entirely so far as areas
under the Navy's Administration were concerned.
The Cairo Conference was held on 1 December.

In December an organization for the training of the youth of Java was established.

On 11 December Sisik II Su stayed a radio speech in which he accused Britain and the United States of being "forces of aggression" and having been driven out of East Asia during the past two years by the "irresistible might of the Japanese army and navy."

By the end of 1943 it was stated by witness that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands East Indies had been interned except people of 65 and over. All Occidental military personnel, some 45,000 men, were also interned.

In 1944, although witnesses did not see the atrocities to 1,200 Indonesians, he had learned of them from hundreds of reports and seen confessions by the Japanese chiefly responsible for them.

During 1944, Japanese propaganda was increased and all sections of the community were worked upon, using the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" and an increase of the campaign of hate against the west.

On 6 January KIA discussed with his Chief Secretary measures Japan must take in the event the situation in Germany grows worse. The TOJO Cabinet, in their opinion, would not be able to cope with the situation. A plan was envisaged for the settlement of the Pacific war by coming to an understanding with the Allies which would not be too drastic for Japan.

In February TOJO became Chief of Army General Staff.

On 19 February K.IA resigned and became Adviser to Finance Ministry.

On 21 February SII.EDA became Chief of Naval General Staff and Suprema for Councillor.
On 9 March the "Futura" was officially dissolved and the
corporation for civilian services in Java, comprising all
activities, was installed. The organization was to enlist
everyone in support of the military. The new organization
abolished all others and anyone who attracted suspicion was
tortured.

On 22 March DOHJU became Commander-in-Chief of 7th
Army in Java.

On 15 April Prime Minister TOJO made a speech at a meeting
of Mixed specialists' commission, convened in accordance with
the provisions of the Tri-Partite Pact, in which he stated
that although the Allies were harassing the Axis powers in
East and Eastern Europe, firm conviction of victory still
remains. Japan's solid core has not even shown the slightest
stir. Despite separation of western and far eastern battle-
fields, close concert must be maintained between Axis powers
and Japan must smash all plots to segregate Japan from other
Axis nations.

On 2 June H.TA became Field Marshal.

Witness Wang, Shi Ziang stated in his affidavit that on
4 July Japanese Kojo troops arrived in the village of Hienh
Duong of the Shan District and subsequently indulged in arson,
robbery, slaughter and other atrocities.

On 17 July an unofficial Senior Statesman's Council was
hold at HIRUJI's house to discuss the reorganization of the
Cabinet. HIRUJI and Yonai declined to join the TOJO Cabinet
(Yonai had been asked by OKI and S.IO) and Nakatsuki stated
that the present Cabinet had lost the sympathy of the public
and the situation was serious. Decision: "to build a powerful
national cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly."

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On 19 July KIDO reported the meeting of the 17th to the Emperor. TOJO informed KIDO that he had decided on a resignation of the cabinet in bloc.

On 18 July Uezu became Army Chief of Staff; OKa became Vice Navy Minister.

At an official meeting of the Senior Statesmen convened by KIDO, a long discussion centered around the reconciliation of differences between the Army and Navy. HIMETO proposed the Imperial Prince; IKAN objected and insisted on a military man, so did KIDO. Shikoku suggested Ukita but got no support, except from Konoye. HIMOTO said the prosecution of the war was the first and foremost and no one dissented. They recommended Terazaki, KOISO or H.T. On TOJO's advice the Emperor selected KOISO.

On 19 July Konoye suggested to KIDO the new cabinet should be a coalition between KOISO and Yamai; KIDO agreed to this proposal.

On 20 July the Senior Statesmen met and KIDO explained the development regarding the coalition. KOISO and Yamai were ordered by the Emperor to form a cabinet.

On 27 July KOISO became Prime Minister; SHIGA became Foreign Minister and became Great East Asia Minister; TOJO, SUZUKI and KOSHINO lost Cabinet office.

On 2 August SHIGA ceased to be Chief of Naval General Staff and became Supreme War Councillor.

On 30 August KIMURA became Commander-in-Chief, Burmese Army.

In September an order from the Chief of Staff of the 16th Army stated that based on KOISO's proclamation on granting independence of the East Indies the army would meet the situation with cert in stipulations. The interpretation of
independence and the time that it would come into operation were set forth.

12109 1342 On 2 September the Minister concerned proposed that the policy in regard to the independence of the East Indies was to ensure that the East Indies would be made independent in the future. The Navy's approval was reserved. The form and time of independence would be determined separately.

12110 The measures to be taken in Java were then set forth.

12221 De facto

12215 On 2 September KOISO made a speech before the 85th Diet Session, on the occasion of his appointment as Premier.

12226 The measures to be taken in Java were then set forth.

12226 On 7 September KOISO's promise that the East Indies would have independence, although it was not made clear what region, was announced in Java. In this he said that the matter would be a link in the Co-Prosperity Sphere and contribute to the development of Greater East Asia under Japan's leadership. It the same time the 16th Army was instructed to advise the War Ministry as to the areas to be declared independent and the time when it would be put into operation.

1353 On 7 September an order from the Military Administration stated that the policy was to promote racial consciousness and incite feeling against the United States and Great Britain. Measures for independence would be left to the Army.

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1243 Tanaka

2143 Discussion took place between MINAMI and Tanaka on 19 November, regarding the dissatisfaction in Mongolia. Tanaka asked MINAMI to become President of a Mongolian Society. MINAMI refused on grounds of his being a Privy Councillor.

2143 Tanaka

2143 On 22 November H.I.T. became Director-General of Military Education.
A telegram was sent by SIGAITSU to Ribbentrop on 11 December (contained in copy of Nippon Times of 12 December). This telegram stated the determination of Axis to fight for common idea of establishing new order. Japan has faith in Europe's salvation by Germany and Italy and is confident of victory of Japan in Far East, and as long as the Axis is united there is no doubt of successful outcome of the war.

In December, SIGAITSU became Deputy Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Force.

At Shareholders Extraordinary General Meeting of Southern Manchurian Railway on 20 January, it was decided to allot the Manchukuo Government 175,000,000 yen (in addition to 50,000,000 yen of 2 January 1930) and issue 3,500,000 shares for them.

SHIGAITSU made a speech at the 86th Diet Session on 21 January, saying that the combination between Japan and her allies was becoming firmer and firmer, and that it is their sacred mission to continue fighting to make clear and accomplish cause for all of international justice in war of self-existence and self-defense. (This shows the tenacity in the realization of the aims of the conspiracy and the unity in aggressive war, despite fact that it was only three months prior to Germany's unconditional surrender.)

On 1 February "Measures towards French Indo-China to meet the sudden change in the situation" were decided at the Supreme War Leadership Council.

Telegram from Saigon, Ambassador Hatsuno to SHIGAITSU dated 3 March, referred to the ultimatum to be handed to the Governor-General of Indo-China, with a view to placing the whole of French Indo-China under the Japanese army control.

On 5 March KIMURA became General.
7177  643  Jt. Under-Attache visited by Major-General of French
Indo-China on 9 March, and requested strengthening of common
defence of French Indo-China by France and Japan, in view of
possibility of "secret" landings. France rejected the proposal,
and so the Japanese therefore set about disarming French troops
and using force.

7183  644  Proclamations were issued by the Japanese on 10 March,
relating to measures Japanese took to obtain control of
military and administration of French Indo-China. Orders
were issued to civilians regarding behaviour, and the fact
was impressed upon them that this "coup" was merely directed
against the anti-Japanese Government and not the people as a
whole.

11385  1281  On 4 April KIDO reported in his diary that KISU stated
his intention to resign. KIDO suggested he postpone it
until next day in order to give the Emperor time to consider and he
agreed.

28  Laos denounced the Neutrality Pact on 5 April.

11390  1282  KIDO stated in his diary of 5 April that KISU tendered
his resignation because Cabinet must be strengthened in view
of war situation and it was to be announced that night. KIDO
first interviewed (among others) ANZU, who stressed need of
fighting it out to the bitter end, and need of a special
cabinet for that purpose. He then called a Senior Statesmen's
Conference. TOJO said there was now a section of opinion in
favour of accepting unconditional surrender and demanded a
decision on that. HIRANUKI said several times that Japan must
fight to the bitter end, HIROTI agreed and was hopeful of
victory. No one expressed dissent openly. HIRANUKI wanted
to recommend cabinet members as well as the Premier. He
a ambassador visited Governor-General of French Indochina on 9 March, and requested strengthening of common defense of French Indochina by France and Japan, in view of possibility of American landings. France rejected the proposal, and so the Japanese therefore set about disarming French troops and using force.

Proclamations were issued by the Japanese on 10 March, relating to measures Japanese took to obtain control of military and administration of French Indochina. Orders were issued to civilians regarding behavior, and the fact was impressed upon them that this "coup" was merely directed against the anti-Japanese Government and not the people as a whole.

On 4 April KIDO reported in his diary that KOISO stated his intention to resign. KIDO suggested he postpone it until next day in order to give the Emperor time to consider and he agreed.

KOISO denounced the Neutrality Pact on 5 April.

KIDO stated in his diary of 5 April that KOISO tendered his resignation because Cabinet must be strengthened in view of war situation and it was to be announced that night. KIDO first interviewed (among others) HIRAHATA, who stressed need of fighting it out to the bitter end, and need of a special cabinet for that purpose. He then called a Senior Statesmen's Conference. TOJO said there was now a section of opinion in favor of accepting unconditional surrender and demanded a decision on that. HIROSHIMA said several times that Japan must fight to the bitter end, HIROSHIMA agreed and was hopeful of victory. No one expressed dissent openly. HIRAHATA wanted to recommend cabinet members as well as the Premier. He
finally suggested Admiral Isoroku Kuzushita, President of the Privy Council, who spoke of being prepared to die fighting for the Empire and country. Akiyoshi supported and he was recommended. Akiyoshi suggested that if the army was not satisfied it might "at any cost" — to the general indignation.

On 7 April Suzuki became Prime Minister; Kido again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor; akiyoshi, Lt. General in command of the 9th Division in Indo-China and (later) Siam; Doi Shunji, became Chief Inspector of Military Training and again Supreme War Councillor; Itagaki, General, Commander-in-Chief 7th Army (Malaya); Hatoyama, Commander-in-Chief 2nd Army.

On 9 April Hiai was again became President of the Privy Council.

On 11 April the Provisional Government of French Republic issued a warning to the Japanese Government concerning the treatment of French and Allied nationals in French Indo-China, any people who persist or perform injuries to nationals will be considered as war criminals.

On 15 May the Japanese troops in French Indo-China finished the “cleaning up” and ceased operations against French troops in French Indo-China, although in view of activities of Viet Nam Party, Japanese were forced to employ considerable strength in cleaning this up until the surrender.

On 15 May Marshal Tsuruichi’s Headquarters requested views on independence and on May 25 a meeting was called of all Chiefs of Staff at Singapore. Recognizing that the war was going against Japan, it was decided to allow Java to study preparations for independence, but the territory was narrowed down to Java as the naval territories were not represented at the Conference.
On 17 July there was a decision of the Supreme War Plans Council No. 7 regarding the measures for the East Indies independence, stating that preparations for independence should be instigated. The area to be independent was the Netherlands East Indies and the independence of a new nation would be proclaimed as soon as preparations were completed. In areas where preparations were not completed, steps would be taken to transfer them by degrees to the jurisdiction of the new nation.

On 17 July, in the Dutch Foreign Ministry's explanation on measures for Netherlands East Indies independence, movements which had existed in the East Indies since the Dutch occupation had cooperated wholeheartedly with the Japanese in the expectation of realizing that independence. The Greater East Asia Joint Declaration was issued in November 1943 and this clarified Japan's position with regard to the independence of each country in Greater East Asia, and Japan considered it proper to carry out the spirit of this declaration.

On 17 July the Supreme War Direction Council decided to grant independence to the East Indies as soon as possible to comprise all Netherlands East Indies.

The Petition Declaration was signed on 26 July.

On 7 August, on orders from Tokyo, Torauchi set up a preparatory committee for independence.

On 9 August Torauchi received three leading nationalists and transmitted to them the contents of the Imperial Decree. The Decree stated that Japan was setting up a committee to prepare for the independence of the Netherlands East Indies.
The day of independence was to be decided by Japan and the Government would be installed first in the place where preparations were complete and other areas would follow when they were ready.

On 9 August KIDO recorded in his diary that Premier Suzuki informed him that the Supreme War Guidance Council had decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration with four reservations:

1. preservation of the Imperial Dynasty;
2. Independent evacuation of troops;
3. handling in our own country of persons responsible for the war; and
4. no guarantee occupation.

The Japanese qualified acceptance of 10 August contained only the reservation with regard to the Emperor.

The Allies replied on 11 August.

Final Japanese acceptance was 14 August.

On 14 August a Committee was formed with representatives from the various areas and the first meeting was fixed for 19 August.

On 15 August they were secretly informed of Japan's capitulation. Japan's defeat was kept secret until 21 August.

On 17 August Prince Higashikuni became Prime Minister.

SKIGASHI again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor.

On 25 August DoNi lla became Commander-in-Chief 12th Area Army, and again ofreater District Army (Japan), and Supreme War Councillor.

The Instrument of Surrender was signed 2 September.

On 9 October Shidohara became Prime Minister.

The Moscow Conference Agreement was signed 26 December.
CHAPTER A.

The following phases of the prosecution case are not fully dealt with in the summary, owing to their general character. Oral testimony relating to these and other phases is only covered so far as it records a stated event. The following exhibits are not referred to for the above reason. There are also a number of exhibits mentioned in the summary which bear upon phases in addition to those in which they were introduced.

I. Treaties; Exhibits 12 - 35.


3. Preparing Japanese opinion for war; Record pp. 307 - 1673. Exhibits 130-163 (of which only 135-3, 141, 148, 151, 155, 163 are mentioned in the summary), 182, 267.

4. Harbours; Record pp. 407-122. Exhibits 17, 365, 372-333. All of these are mentioned in the summary except 17, 309, 511-12, 423(2), 429, 130-2, 434-5.

5. Economic aggression in China (including Manchuria); Record pp. 4999-5350. Exhibits 436-471, 474, of which the following are omitted from the summary, 441, 447-3, 454-4, 467 - 472, 473.

6. Preparations for war; Record pp. 8152 - 9263. Exhibits 816-919, of which the following are omitted from the summary, 843-8, 856-6, 858-60, 866, 868, 860-908, 913-13.

7. Class 2 and C offences: (a) in China; Record pp. 2527-2703, 3353-3428, 4415-4734. Exhibits 204-10, 213, 249 - 54, 306-347.


(c) All evidence given after December 10th, 1946.

II. In addition the following exhibits, dealing generally with other phases, have been omitted or only incidentally mentioned; 174-6, 199-201, 220, 221, 245, 247, 267, 275, 377, 389, 665, 668-70, 670-31, 683, 685, 691-700, 707-18, 722-30, 732-5, 735, 738-43, 750, 755, 763-5, 811, 813, 815-24, 831, 835-9, 1029, 1103-6, 1249, 1253-5, 1265, 1342, 1351.

III. The following is a list of extracts (in order of date) from
"Foreign Relations Series, United States and Japan" (Exhibit 58), which relate to the negotiations in 1942, the break-down of which led to the Pacific War. Exhibits 1059, 1060, 1061, 1070, 1071, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1083, 1085, 1091, 1092, 1245 (comparisons of 1070 and 1092), 1132, 1245b-1 inclusive, 1215, 1245j, 1221, 1225l, 1232, (1245, 1247, put in by defence from Pearl Harbour Report Exhibit 174). Affidavits and statements Exhibits; pull 1106, Gallant 1245, Crow 1105 and 1224, Craigie 1236, Lyman 1237, Sergeant 1231.
The following pages contain under the name of each accused, where applicable:

1. All the pages of the Summary on which he is named.

2. A list of some of the offices, etc., held by him, with the dates, and the pages of the Summary recording the events of that period. (The degree of his responsibility for all or some of those events will of course vary greatly with the circumstances, both of the office and of the events.)

3. The exhibit numbers of extracts from his interrogation.

4. Speeches and writings (other than correspondence) by him.

5. Decorations which he is recorded to have received in respect of specific matters dealt with in the Summary.
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

3, 13, 17, 18, 23, 24, 26, 45, 55, 56, 71, 73, 74, 80, 83, 84, 88, 92, 106, 136, 153, 235, 256.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 103.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices, etc.</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Minister</td>
<td>13 Dec 1931-23 Jan 1934</td>
<td>13-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Councillor</td>
<td>15 Oct 1937-26 Nov 1938</td>
<td>55-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Minister</td>
<td>26 Nov 1938-30 Aug 1939</td>
<td>71-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Also Pres. General National Mobilization Committee)</td>
<td>(28 Nov-30 Aug 1939)</td>
<td>(92-100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Councillor</td>
<td>1 Dec 1939-3 Aug 1940</td>
<td>106-136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. Speeches and writings by him are Exhibits 148A, 760.

5. Created baron 26 Nov 1936.
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
3, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 24, 35, 43, 45, 72, 103, 114, 153, 210, 255, 299, 303, 307, 312, 314.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 104)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices, etc.</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel employed by Chinese Government</td>
<td>17 Mar 1928-15 Mar 1929</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached Army General Staff</td>
<td>22 Dec 1930-1 Aug 1931</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached H. Q. Kwantung Army</td>
<td>1 Aug 1931-11 Apr 1932</td>
<td>2-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General attached H.Q. Kwantung Army</td>
<td>16 Oct 1933-7 Mar 1936</td>
<td>24-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General 1/c 14th Division</td>
<td>1 Mar 1937-18 Jun 1938</td>
<td>43-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached General Staff</td>
<td>18 Jun 1938-19 May 1939</td>
<td>72-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 5th Army</td>
<td>19 May 1939-9 Jun 1941</td>
<td>96-210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme War Councillor</td>
<td>28 Sep 1940</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Air Inspectorate General</td>
<td>9 Jun 1941-1 May 1943</td>
<td>210-303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander Eastern District Army in Japan</td>
<td>1 May 1943-22 Mar 1944</td>
<td>303-307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 7th Area Army in Malaya</td>
<td>22 Mar 1944-7 Apr 1945</td>
<td>307-312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Inspectorate General of Military Training</td>
<td>7 Apr 25 Aug 1945</td>
<td>312-314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 12th Area Army</td>
<td>25 Aug-14 Sep 1945</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "incident"; also 29 April 1940 for services in the China "incident". Recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 41, 45, 58, 91, 114, 256, 292.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibit 105).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer, etc.</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major, Military Attaché, Embassy in Turkey</td>
<td>28 Sep 1927-30 Jun 1930</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel, Member Army General Staff</td>
<td>3 Jul 1930-12 Dec 1931</td>
<td>2-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel, Commander 2nd Heavy Field Artillery</td>
<td>1 Aug 1934-1 Aug 1936</td>
<td>26-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 13th Heavy Field Artillery in China</td>
<td>before December 1937-9 Mar 1939</td>
<td>57-91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 258.

4. Extracts from his writings and speeches are Exhibits:
   177A, 264, 675-a, 866, 1290.

5. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "disturbances" and 29 April 1942 for services in the China "disturbances".
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 106).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices, etc.</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General, Inspector of Artillery</td>
<td>1 Aug 1931-1 Aug 1933</td>
<td>2-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 14th Division</td>
<td>1 Aug 1933-2 Dec 1935</td>
<td>23-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Army Air Force Headquarters</td>
<td>2 Dec 1935-1 Aug 1936</td>
<td>33-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Formosan Army</td>
<td>1 Aug 1936-2 Aug 1937</td>
<td>39-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General of Military Education and Military Councillor</td>
<td>26 Aug 1937-14 Feb 1938</td>
<td>52-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(also Cabinet Councillor)</td>
<td>(13 Dec 1937-14 Feb 1938)</td>
<td>(58-65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander in Chief Expeditionary Force to China</td>
<td>14 Feb 1938-15 Mar 1938</td>
<td>65-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Councillor</td>
<td>15 Mar 1938-25 May 1939</td>
<td>67-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief A.D.C. to the Emperor</td>
<td>25 May-30 Aug 1939</td>
<td>96-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Minister</td>
<td>30 Aug 1939-22 Jul 1940</td>
<td>100-132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Councillor</td>
<td>22 Jul 1940-1 Mar 1941</td>
<td>132-184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-in-C Expeditionary Force to China</td>
<td>1 Mar 1941-22 Nov. 1944</td>
<td>184-309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Marshal</td>
<td>2 Jun 1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General of Military Education</td>
<td>22 Nov 1944-7 Apr 1945</td>
<td>309-312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 256.
4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incident" and 29 April 1941 for services in the China "affair".
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (see Exhibits 102 and 107.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office, etc.</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice President, Privy Council</td>
<td>12 Apr 1926-13 Mar 1936</td>
<td>1-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President, Privy Council</td>
<td>13 Mar 1936-5 Jan 1939</td>
<td>35-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(also Cabinet Councillor)</td>
<td>(6 Apr 1936-5 Jan 1939)</td>
<td>(36-88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>5 Jan-30 Aug 1939</td>
<td>88-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State</td>
<td>6-21 Dec 1940</td>
<td>166-168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Minister</td>
<td>21 Dec 1940-17 Jul 1941</td>
<td>168-227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State</td>
<td>18 Jul-17 Oct 1941</td>
<td>227-255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President, Privy Council</td>
<td>9 Apr-15 Dec 1945</td>
<td>312-314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 768.

HIJOTA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   3, 14, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 45,
   51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71,

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 108.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to USSR</td>
<td>15 Oct 1930-19 Nov 1932</td>
<td>2-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>14 Sep 1933-2 Apr 1936</td>
<td>24-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>9 Mar 1936-2 Feb 1937</td>
<td>36-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>4 Jun 1937-29 May 1938</td>
<td>45-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Councillor</td>
<td>13 Mar-3 Aug 1940</td>
<td>111-136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Speech by him is Exhibit 972-G.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the "Shova 6-7 Incident," and 2 Nov 1938 for services re the Anti-Comintern Pact.
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   3, 18, 20, 37, 45, 114, 133, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 172,
   195, 200, 255, 260, 275, 277, 282, 300, 301.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 109.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of General Affairs</td>
<td>17 Jul 1936-16 Dec 1936</td>
<td>19-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of General Affairs</td>
<td>16 Dec 1936-21 Jul 1940</td>
<td>41-132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President, Planning Board and</td>
<td>22 Jul 1940-4 Apr 1941</td>
<td>132-195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(also Acting Director of the Total War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength Experimental Station)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor of the Total War Strength</td>
<td>2 May 1941-22 Jul 1944</td>
<td>200-308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Station</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Member National Mobilization Investigation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Secretary of Cabinet and</td>
<td>18 Oct 1941-22 Jul 1944</td>
<td>255-308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extracts from his interrogation are Exhibits:
   453A, 454A.

4. Decorated 23 Feb 1937 for services in 1931-4 "affair",
   and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair".
IT.XX

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   3, 5, 12, 17, 28, 35, 43, 45, 72, 80, 93, 84, 85, 88, 91, 95, 154, 222, 255, 312.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 110).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices, etc.</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Various posts on Staff of Kwantung Army (Colonel rising to Lt. General), (rising to Chief of Staff)</td>
<td>14 July 1929-1 Mar 1937</td>
<td>1-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached Army General Staff</td>
<td>(23 Apr 1936-1 Mar 1937)</td>
<td>35-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tar-Minister and President Manchurian Affairs Board</td>
<td>25 May 1937-3 Jun 1938</td>
<td>45-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General, Commander Korean Army</td>
<td>3 Jun 1938-30 Aug 1939</td>
<td>72-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 7th Army (Malaya)</td>
<td>7 July 1941-7 Apr 1945</td>
<td>223-312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Apr 1945-2 Sep 1945</td>
<td>312-314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Speech by him is Exhibit 761.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "war", 7 Jul 1937 higher decoration for same service, and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "war".
KAYA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   3, 42, 43, 45, 56, 71, 73, 99, 154, 255, 257, 258, 260,
   275, 276, 277, 287, 288, 289, 306.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 111.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary and other posts in Finance Ministry</td>
<td>10 Mar 1930-2 Feb 1937</td>
<td>1-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Minister of Finance and Member of many official committees including Opium</td>
<td>2 Feb 1937-4 Jun 1937</td>
<td>42-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Minister</td>
<td>4, Jun 1937-26 May 1938</td>
<td>45-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adviser to Finance Ministry</td>
<td>1 Jul 1938-14 Aug 1939</td>
<td>73-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President, North China Development Company</td>
<td>14 Aug 1939-18 Oct 1941</td>
<td>99-254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Minister</td>
<td>18 Oct 1941-19 Feb 1944</td>
<td>254-306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adviser to Finance Ministry</td>
<td>4 Mar 1944-29 Sep 1945</td>
<td>307-314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incidents".
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 1C2 and 132).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Secretary to Lord Keeper of Privy Seal</td>
<td>28 Oct 1930-22 Oct 1937</td>
<td>2-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Minister</td>
<td>22 Oct 1927-26 May 1938</td>
<td>55-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Minister (concurrent until 26 May 1938)</td>
<td>11 Jan 1938-5 Jan 1939</td>
<td>60-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Minister</td>
<td>5 Jan 1939-30 Aug 1939</td>
<td>88-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Keeper of Privy Seal</td>
<td>1 Jun 1940-10 Oct 1945</td>
<td>118-314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extracts from his diary (Exhibit 178) are Exhibits (in order of date):

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "affair".
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   3, 39, 46, 114, 154, 164, 197, 201, 255, 268, 299, 303, 308, 310.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

   (See Exhibits 102 and 113)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel, Commander 22nd Field Artillery</td>
<td>1 Aug 1931-8 Aug 1932</td>
<td>2-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-General, Director of Ordinance</td>
<td>1 Aug 1936-9 Mar 1939</td>
<td>39-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General, Commander 32nd Division</td>
<td>9 Mar 1939-7 Nov 1940</td>
<td>91-164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Japanese-Manchurian Committees</td>
<td>7 Nov 1940-10 Apr 1941</td>
<td>164-197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice War Minister</td>
<td>20 Apr 1941-11 Mar 1943</td>
<td>197-303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor, Planning Board, Total War Strength Institute, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-in-C Burma Area Army</td>
<td>30 Aug 1944-2 Sep 1945</td>
<td>308-314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incident", and 29 April 1942 for services in the China "incident". Recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:  
3, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, 33, 40, 94, 107, 125, 154, 255, 
308, 309, 311.

2. Offices, etc., with dates on pages of the Summary:  
(See Exhibits 102 and 114.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General, Director, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, Chief Secretary, Supreme War Council</td>
<td>1 Aug 1930-29 Feb 1932</td>
<td>1-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General, Vice War Minister</td>
<td>27 Feb - 8 Aug 1932</td>
<td>16-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army</td>
<td>1 Aug 1932-5 Mar 1934</td>
<td>19-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, 5th Division</td>
<td>5 Mar 1934-2 Dec 1935</td>
<td>25-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Korean Army</td>
<td>2 Dec 1935-15 Jul 1938</td>
<td>33-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General, Overseas Minister</td>
<td>7 Apr-30 Aug 1939</td>
<td>94-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General, Overseas Minister</td>
<td>16 Jan-22 Jul 1940</td>
<td>107-132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor-General of Korea</td>
<td>29 May 1942-22 Jul 1944</td>
<td>298-308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>22 Jul 1944-7 Apr 1945</td>
<td>308-312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Speech by him is Exhibit 277.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "affair".
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   3, 12, 13, 22, 23, 46, 51, 56, 58, 67, 74, 97, 114, 154, 255.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 115)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General, Commander, 11th Division</td>
<td>1 Aug 1929-1 Oct 1931</td>
<td>1-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plenipotentiary to the Geneva Conference</td>
<td>9 Dec 1931-4 Feb 1933</td>
<td>12-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(concurrently Army General Staff)</td>
<td>(1 Oct 1931-18 Mar 1933)</td>
<td>(8-22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme War Councillor</td>
<td>18 Mar 1933-15 Aug 1937</td>
<td>22-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General, Commander Shanghai Expeditionary Force</td>
<td>15 Aug-30 Oct 1937</td>
<td>52-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander China Expeditionary Force</td>
<td>30 Oct 1937-5 Mar 1938</td>
<td>56-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Councillor</td>
<td>20 Jul 1938-23 Jan 1940</td>
<td>74-107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 257.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "war" and 29 April 1940 (with 1st class Order of Goldon Kite) for services in China "incident".
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   2, 4, 6, 13, 16, 21, 28, 35, 39, 46, 85, 154, 255, 299, 300, 301, 304, 309.

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 117.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General, War Minister</td>
<td>14 Apr-13 Dec 1931</td>
<td>2-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme War Councillor</td>
<td>13 Dec 1931-10 Dec 1934</td>
<td>13-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(also Cabinet Councillor)</td>
<td>(9 Feb 1933-10 Dec 1934)</td>
<td>21-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Kwantung Army, and</td>
<td>10 Dec 1934-6 Mar 1936</td>
<td>28-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to Manchukuo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor-General of Chosen</td>
<td>5 Aug 1936-1 Apr 1939</td>
<td>39-93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privy Councillor</td>
<td>29 May 1942-29 Mar 1945</td>
<td>299-311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Speech by him is Exhibit 185 (see also 184).

4. Decorated 29 April 1940 for services in China "affairs".
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
4, 31, 43, 46, 103, 114, 125, 157, 154, 168, 169, 172,
173, 174, 178, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 198, 200, 201,
202, 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 216, 217, 218, 231, 240,

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 118.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major, Member Army General Staff</td>
<td>27 Nov 1930-5 Mar 1934</td>
<td>2-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel, Staff Officer Kwantung Army</td>
<td>29 Jun 1936-1 Mar 1937</td>
<td>38-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Chief, Military Affairs Bureau (also Member Naval General Staff)</td>
<td>1 Apr 1934-date unknown</td>
<td>43-?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chief of Staff, North China Army</td>
<td>date unknown-30 Sep 1939</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, and Chief Secretary, Supreme War Council</td>
<td>30 Sep 1939-20 Apr 1942</td>
<td>103-298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Imperial Guard Division</td>
<td>20 Apr 1942-5 Oct 1944</td>
<td>298-309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, 14th Area Army (Philippines)</td>
<td>5 Oct 1944-2 Sep 1945</td>
<td>309-314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 255.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "war", and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair". Recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:


2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 120.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Member of Naval General Staff</td>
<td>10 Oct 1931-25 Oct 1932</td>
<td>9-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain, Member of Naval General Staff</td>
<td>15 Nov 1933-1 Dec 1936</td>
<td>24-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of No. 1 Section, Bureau of Naval Affairs</td>
<td>15 Jan 1938-15 Oct 1940</td>
<td>61-153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(also Secretary, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs, etc.)</td>
<td>(25 Jan 1938-21 Oct 1939)</td>
<td>(62-103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Bureau of Naval Affairs, attached to Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters</td>
<td>15 Oct 1940-2 Sep 1945</td>
<td>153-314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(also Secretary, National General Mobilization Council and numerous other posts)</td>
<td>(8 Nov 1940-18 Jan 1941)</td>
<td>164-170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1931-4 "incidents", and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "incident".
OKAYA

1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   2, 4, 5, 9, 26, 46, 154, 255.

2. Throughout the period he was Director-General, East Asia Research Bureau of the South Manchuria Railway.
1. Pages of the Summary on which he was named:
   4, 25, 46, 79, 80, 89, 92, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107, 114, 121, 154,
   163, 166, 167, 169, 161, 182, 184, 186, 204, 209, 215, 217, 218, 221,
   256, 266, 272, 274, 278, 288, 290, 299, 302, 303

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 121.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section Chief Army General Staff,</td>
<td>1 Aug. 1931-9 Mar. 1934</td>
<td>2-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and US Army General Staff</td>
<td>1 Aug. 1931-9 Mar. 1934</td>
<td>2-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Attaché, Berlin</td>
<td>5 Apr. 1934-8 Oct. 1938</td>
<td>25-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to Germany</td>
<td>8 Oct. 1938-29 Dec. 1999</td>
<td>79-107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy to Germany</td>
<td>20 Dec. 1940-19 Feb. 1945</td>
<td>167-310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extracts from his interrogation are exhibits:
   477, 478, 487, 488, 490, 497, 674, 776.

4. Writing by him is Exhibit 1299.

5. Decorated 25 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "Incident",
   2 November 1938 for services in the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern
   Pact, and 29 April 1940.
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   4, 19, 46, 53, 74, 76, 96, 114, 14, 187, 256, 297, 298, 299, 304, 307, 310, 312

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 122.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major, Commander 8th Medium Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>Aug. 1932-1 Aug. 1933</td>
<td>19-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel, Kember Military Affairs Bureau</td>
<td>Aug. 1936-May 1939</td>
<td>39-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Secretary, Planning Board)</td>
<td>(23 Nov. 1937-29 July 1938)</td>
<td>(56-76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Colonel, Army Spokesman, Cabinet Information Board)</td>
<td>(15 July-12 Dec. 1938)</td>
<td>(74-86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, South China Expeditionary Force</td>
<td>May 1939-July 1944</td>
<td>95-176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of 1st Section, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry</td>
<td>Mar. 1941-20 Apr. 1942</td>
<td>176-298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry</td>
<td>20 Apr. 1942-Dec. 1944</td>
<td>298-310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Force</td>
<td>Dec. 1944-7 Apr. 1945</td>
<td>310-312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 37th Division in Indo-China and Siam</td>
<td>7 Apr.-2 Sept. 1945</td>
<td>312-314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Speeches by him are Exhibits 270, 349.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services 1931-4, and 29 April 1934 for services in the China "affair", recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).
1. Pages of the Summary on which is in named:
4, 17, 29, 40, 46, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 109, 112, 114, 115, 118, 124,
136, 140, 154, 176, 178, 180, 182, 183, 204, 256, 303, 304, 305, 306,
306, 310, 314

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 123.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Councillor of Embassy and Consul-General, China</td>
<td>21 Jan. 1930-10, July 1934</td>
<td>1-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor, Board of Manchurian Affairs, etc.</td>
<td>10 Jan. 1935-10 Apr. 1936</td>
<td>29-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to Great Britain</td>
<td>2 Jan. 1938-19 Feb. 1941</td>
<td>79-180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to China</td>
<td>19 Feb. 1941-20 Apr. 1945</td>
<td>180-303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>20 Apr. 1943-7 Apr. 1945</td>
<td>303-312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(also Greater East Asia Minister)</td>
<td>(27 July 1944-7 Apr. 1945)</td>
<td>(308-312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister and Greater East Asia Minister</td>
<td>17 Aug.-17 Sept. 1945</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Speeches by him are Exhibits 7734, 829A.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in 1941-"affairs", and 29 April
1940 for services in China "affair".
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 132 and 134.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff of 1st and 2nd Combined Fleets</td>
<td>1 Dec. 1930-2 Feb. 1932</td>
<td>2-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, 3rd Fleet</td>
<td>2 Feb.-28 July 1932</td>
<td>15-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval General Staff (rising to Vice-Chief)</td>
<td>28 July 1932-1 Dec. 1937</td>
<td>19-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 2nd Fleet</td>
<td>1 Dec. 1937-15 Nov. 1938</td>
<td>56-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander China Fleet</td>
<td>1 May 1940-1 Sept. 1941</td>
<td>114-237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Naval General Staff</td>
<td>19 Feb.-17 July 1944</td>
<td>306-307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 1128.

4. Decorated 29 April 1934, and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "incident."
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   4, 6, 9, 23, 32, 44, 46, 79, 80, 101, 111, 114, 121, 143, 154, 166, 167,
   173, 223, 249, 233, 256, 279

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibit 125.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Information Dept.,</td>
<td>31 Oct. 1933–2 June 1933</td>
<td>2–33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Foreign Ministry</td>
<td>28 Apr.–22 Sept. 1938</td>
<td>69–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to Italy</td>
<td>22 Sept. 1938–9 Mar. 1940</td>
<td>79–111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor in Foreign Ministry</td>
<td>26 Aug. 1940–22 July 1941</td>
<td>141–229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Writing by him is Exhibit 557.

4. Decorated 27 April 1934 for services in the "Manchurian affair", and
   29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair". Recommended 17 May
   1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
4, 8, 39, 46, 63, 96, 114, 155, 168, 195, 213, 216, 219, 231, 237, 240,
251, 254, 255, 256, 260, 261, 272, 275, 276, 277, 287, 297, 295, 299,
300, 301, 308

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
(See Exhibits 102 and 126.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions and Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col., Major of Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry, etc.</td>
<td>1 Aug. 1931-1 Aug. 1936</td>
<td>2-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel, Commander 14th Infantry</td>
<td>1 Aug. 1936-1 Nov. 1937</td>
<td>39-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-General, 16th Division Headquarters</td>
<td>1 Nov. 1937-10 Nov. 1938</td>
<td>56-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Chief in China Affairs Bureau rising to Commissioner General</td>
<td>10 Dec. 1938-4 April 1941</td>
<td>86-185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Member of Opium Committee)</td>
<td>(21 June 1937)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State and President, Planning Board</td>
<td>4 Apr. 1941-8 Oct. 1943</td>
<td>185-305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(also Councillor of the Total War Investigation Laboratory)</td>
<td>(21 Dec. 1940-8 Oct. 1943)</td>
<td>168-305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Member Thought Control Committee)</td>
<td>(19 June 1941)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Councillor</td>
<td>17 Nov. 1943-28 Oct. 1944</td>
<td>305-309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incident".
Recommended 17 May 1942 for German decoration (Exhibit 1272).
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:


2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 127.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of delegation to League of</td>
<td>30 July 1930-1 Feb. 1933</td>
<td>1-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nations and Disarmament Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of European-American Bureau,</td>
<td>1 Feb. 1933-1 June 1934</td>
<td>21-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of European-Asianic Bureau</td>
<td>1 June 1934-27 Oct. 1937</td>
<td>26-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to Germany</td>
<td>27 Oct. 1937-15 Oct. 1938</td>
<td>55-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign and Overseas Minister</td>
<td>18 Oct. 1941-1 Sept. 1942</td>
<td>255-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister and Greater East Asia</td>
<td>7 Apr.-17 Aug. 1945</td>
<td>312-314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extract from his interrogation is Exhibit 1207.

4. Speech by him is Exhibit 1338:

5. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services during 1931-4, and 29 April 1940.
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:


2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:

(See Exhibits 102 and 126.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel, Section Chief, Army General Staff</td>
<td>1 Jul. 1931-5 Mar. 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-General, Commandant 24th Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>1 Aug. 1934-1 Aug. 1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Kwantung Military Police</td>
<td>1 Sept. 1935-1 Apr. 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army</td>
<td>1 Mar. 1937-30 May 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and numerous posts connected with other Departments</td>
<td>30 May-10 Dec. 1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice War Minister</td>
<td>10 Dec. 1938-22 July 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Minister</td>
<td>22 July 1940-12 Oct. 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier and War Minister</td>
<td>1 Oct. 1941-22 July 1944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Extracts from his interrogation are Exhibits:

1110A, 1119, 1123-4, 1136-7, 1153, 1157-8, 1231-6, 1209, 1243-4

4. Speeches by him are Exhibits:

626, 827, 879, 1335B, 1345, 1347.

5. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in "Manchurian incident, 1931-4," and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair".

-362-
1. Pages of the Summary on which he is named:
   4, 25, 30, 31, 35, 42, 46, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 71, 80, 101, 111, 151, 210, 225, 245, 246, 256, 292, 297, 300, 308, 311

2. Offices, etc., with dates and pages of the Summary:
   (See Exhibits 102 and 129.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office/Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General, Chief, General Affairs Dept., Army General Staff</td>
<td>1 Apr. 1931-5 Mar. 1934</td>
<td>2-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander of the Army in China</td>
<td>5 Mar. 1934-1 Aug. 1935</td>
<td>25-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General, Vice War Minister (and on numerous committees of other Departments)</td>
<td>23 Apr. 1936-30 May 1936</td>
<td>35-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, 18th Army</td>
<td>7 Oct. 1938-7 Nov. 1939</td>
<td>71-103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchuria</td>
<td>7 Sept. 1939-18 July 1944</td>
<td>101-308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1 Aug. 1940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Army General Staff</td>
<td>15 July 1944-2 Sept. 1945</td>
<td>308-314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Decorated 29 April 1934 for services in the 1931-4 "incident", 2 November 1938 for services in the Anti-Comintern Pact, and 29 April 1940 for services in the China "affair".
SUPPORT TO ECOLOGICAL STUDY

DOCKET NO. 0001

1. Attached hereto is an addendum to Prosecution Document No. 0001.

2. It covers all additional documents put in at the close of the Prosecution Case relative to individual defendants, and any errors which have been found in the original document.

3. The additions to Appendices A and B will be drawn up from these new documents and circulated later.
Before entry of 6 August on page 2 insert:-

Minutes of the Third Trial of OKA’s Shumei before the
Third Criminal Department of the Tokyo Court of Appeal.
OKA was charged with violation of the Explosives Control
Act and for the offences of murder and attempted murder.
OKA in his trial testimony stated that KOISO then chief of
the Military Affairs Bureau andHASHIMOTO were involved in
the so-called March Incident (1931) to overthrow the
government. UGAKI was of the opinion that the plot should
be abandoned, so it was officially given up for the time
being, although OKA stated that he had decided to carry
on by himself until Tokugawa dissuaded him from doing so.
He explained in detail the objects of this and the October
Incident and said they were closely connected with the
Manchurian Incident.

Excerpt from ‘The Osaka Asahi’, dated 1 July 1931, in
which it shows that the War Ministry invited Manchurian
Railway authorities to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems.
President and directors of the South Manchurian Railway,
representatives of the Army, andHIDAI and KOISO attended.
HIDAI made a statement in which he said the Army had long
recognized the necessity of increasing their divisions in
Korea, but that this question had not been decided upon at
the Big Three Conference. Governor UGAKI said that this
depended on the financial situation of the Army as the
Government of Korea could not afford to share the expense
with the Army.

Before entry for 21 September on page 5 insert:-

Telegram No. 623 dated 19 September 1931 from Consul-
General Hayashi at Mukden to Foreign Minister Shidehara
regarding an attempt to convince ITAGAKI that as Japan and
China had not formally entered into a state of war, and
China had declared her adherence to the non-resistance
principle, an endeavour should be made to arrange the
Minutes of the Third Trial of OKA'A Shumpei before the
Third Criminal Department of the Tokyo Court of Appeal.
OKA'A was charged with violation of the Explosives Control
Act and for the offences of murder and attempted murder.
OKA'A in his trial testimony stated that KOISO then chief of
the Military Affairs Bureau and HAKIHAKI were involved in
the so-called 'March Incident' (1931) to overthrow the
Government. Ugaki was of the opinion that the plot should
be abandoned, so it was officially given up for the time
being, although OKA'A stated that he had decided to carry
on by himself until Toluana dissuaded him from doing so.
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which it shows that the War Ministry invited Manchurian
Railway authorities to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems.
President and directors of the South Manchurian Railway,
representatives of the Army, and MINAH and KOISO attended.
MINAH made a statement in which he said the Army had long
recognised the necessity of increasing their divisions in
Korea, but that this question had not been decided upon at
the Big Three Conference. Governor Ugaki said that this
depended on the financial situation of the Army as the
Government of Korea could not afford to share the expense
with the Army.

Before entry for 21 September on page 5 insert—

Telegram No. 623 dated 19 September 1931 from Consul-
General Hayashi at Hakodate to Foreign Minister Shidehara
regarding an attempt to convince ITAGAKI that as Japan and
China had not formally entered into a state of war, and
China had declared her adherence to the non-resistance
principle, an endeavour should be made to arrange the
matter through diplomatic channels. ITAMI, however, did not show any signs of compliance with this expectation, saying that the prestige of the state and army were involved.

Before entry for 22 September on page 5 insert:-

Cable from Consul-General Hayashi to Foreign Minister Shidehara dated 21 September, 1931 regarding a proclamation of the municipal administration of Tsukiji to be issued by the Commander of the Army. Hayashi visited the Army HQ when the proclamation was shown. ITAMI was present. Later Hayashi met the Commander and pointed out the error of establishing a municipal administration by the Japanese with a military man as Mayor but the Commander, although appearing to agree with this, stated that it could not be altered as the proclamation was already issued. The measure was only temporary as eventually it was intended to hand over the administration to the Chinese.

On page 9, Part 1, Exhibit 179-1 after the word "situation" and before the beginning of the next sentence insert the words "Hayashi stated that..."

Before entry for 13 November on page 11 insert:-

Cable No. 1523 dated 12 November, 1931, sent by Consul-General Hayashi at Tsukiji to Foreign Minister Shidehara about the infeasibility of Emperor Pu-ji coming to Manchuria. The Commander of the Army said that not only had he no information about this, but had instructed Staff Officer ITAMI to notify the Tientsin Garrison they were not to hurry this matter as the hour was not ripe for such a move. Then Hayashi pointed out how impolitic it would be to reinstate the monarchy at a time when the regimes in the various districts were unsettled and the International relations tense, the Commander of the Army agreed with this in general and promised to exert his efforts so as not to put this move in motion.

Before entry for 13 December on page 13 insert:-

Cablegram No. 1532 sent by Consul-General Hayashi at Tsukiji to Foreign Minister Mukai dated 13 December, 1931 stated that the Army Authorities were intending to summon all
Provincial Governors there with a view to saving the situation and that with a view to this, Staff Officer ITAMI is said to have met and negotiated with Tsung Shi on the 14th.

Before entry for 16 January on page 14 insert:

In an extract from Kido’s diary of 11 January 1932, he relates a conversation at the Imperial Palace between himself and Itami. The latter told him of the conditions in Manchuria and Manchuria and explained Japan’s intentions regarding the establishment of a new State in Manchuria. The participation of the Japanese people in the management of this new state was also explained.

Before entry for 26 January on page 15 insert:

In an article dated 17 January 1932 entitled “The Reform of Parliamentary System”, published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon, Hashimoto condemned parliamentary government as running contrary to the Constitution. He advocated the dissolution of the political parties immediately and the prohibition of party Cabinet by enacting a political party law or a State Minister’s limitation ordinance.

Before entry for 23 January on page 15 insert:

On 23 January, 1932, Kido stated in his diary that General Itami had that day attended a meeting before the Emperor on the Manchurian situation. His conclusions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian questions were:

(c) Revolutionize national defence by expediting completion of Kirin-Koanai Railway and by making the Sea of Japan into a lake to facilitate Japan’s advance into North Manchuria.

(b) Prevent economic blockade from abroad.

(e) Establish a colonial trooping system and give emigrants same protection as in South America.

Kido thought it advisable to unify Japanese organs in Manchuria and Mongolia under one Japanese organ under a Governor-General.
Before entry for 26 May on page 18 insert—

16215 2252  
On 17 May, 1932, KIDO recorded in his diary that during a meeting with Lieut. Colonel SJUNTU, who expressed the fear that the formation of a new cabinet under political parties might result in a second or third incident, he suggested that a cabinet of experts, comprising political parties, might solve the situation. SJUNTU reported that Vice Premier KIDO was hopeful for KIDO to be appointed the next premier, and he thought that the incident was eliminated this time by the declaration of the anti-seccession of political parties.

Before entry for 11 July on page 18 insert—

15309 2210  
Record: Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident, Record of payment of ¥20,000 to the accused KIDO, Vice minister of War, 5 July 1932.

Before entry for 3 August on page 19 insert—

15310 2211  
Record: Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident, Record of payment of ¥20,500 to the accused KIDO, 2 August, 1932.

Before entry for 31 May on page 23 insert—

16216 2253  
KIDO stated in his diary that on 16 April, 1933 he met Lieutenant Colonel SJUNTU and Chief of the Information Bureau, KIMURAI. The former stated Russia as an absolute enemy and said that a non-aggression pact with that country would be nothing more than an utilitarian calculation and must be denounced by all means.

Before entry for 29 December on page 29 insert—

15311 2213  
Record: Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident, Record of payment of ¥1,970,000 to the accused KIDO, 27 December 1934.

Before entry for 1 July on page 30 insert—

15723 2192  
KIDO's Diary on 30 May, 1935, relates a claim reported to have been lodged by the Japanese Garrison in North China against the Chinese Government, Vice minister SHIENSHU.
made a general observation on this explaining that the step against China was based on the idea of "harmony and order" who have been intending to let the military take the lead instead of the diplomatic circles, just as in Manchuria.

After entry for 3 February on page 34 insert:-

Excerpt from the Imperial statement of Foreign Minister HEIKO on the occasion of Japan’s secession from the London Naval Conference (January 16th, 1936). In this statement HEIKO affirmed that Japan participated in the Naval Conference at London as it was her policy to contribute and maintain international peace. In setting forth the reasons why Japan withdrew from the Conference, HEIKO stated that this was because the proposals of the Japanese delegates for a reduction of armaments and a common upper limit for all navies to be fixed at the lowest possible level were not accepted; nor were the proposals for abolition or limitation of certain armaments and ships; moreover Japan’s proposal to conclude such agreements as might be possible at the Conference were also rejected.

After entry for 27 November on page 41 insert:-

On 17 December, 1936, HASHIMOTO published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon, an article entitled "A Message to Young Men". In this Article he advocated the renovation of Japan by its youth for which blood and enthusiasm were the essentials. Casting aside the old people, HASHIMOTO hoped that the ardent young people would succeed in the second creation of the world.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:-

A declaration issued by the Seiyukai Party mass meeting (20 January 1937). Excerpt from pages 5 - 8 of "Details regarding movements of Rightist Bodies in connection with Change of Government", published by Peace Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, April, 1937. This declaration stated
that owing to the multiplicity of the government's diplomatic policy, it is not clear where responsibility rests. The government persistently adhered to secret diplomacy. The purport of the Japanese-German Pact was defence against the Comintern, but the government bungled the matter so as to cause other powers to suspect the formation of a rightist dictatorial state. Many government plans formulated were on the assumption that a semi-war time organisation was necessary. Measures adopted by the present cabinet were in the interests of the military and not of the nation.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:

Statement by the Army authorities (Night of 21 January 1937). These views expressed the army's dissatisfaction with the present day political parties saying that any plans they had for administrative reform were of a negative nature. The existence and expansion of the Japanese people with Japan as the stabilising power of East Asia had always been the cry of their 100,000,000 compatriots and the abandonment of a positive policy would surely imply being cramped within Insular Japan. The expected collision between the advocates of the status quo and those who advocated the destruction of the status quo had come. Japan now stood at the turning point where she should realise an all-out administrative policy to overcome present difficulties and tide over the international crisis.

Before entry for 1 February on page 42 insert:

Excerpt from Exhibit 2233 which is a notice to ex-soldiers organisations from the Vice War Minister, regarding on matters pertaining to the measures taken by the army authorities in connection with the present political changes. This stated that on receipt of the report that the Imperial mandate had been given to General Ugaki on the evening of the 24th January 1937, the army took the view that, because of Ugaki's
reputed connection with the incident which occurred while he was Mr. Minister, and his reputed connection with the class struggle in the Army, whoever might be nominated as Mr. Minister in the Cabinet would be unable to bear the responsibility of controlling the Army. The Three Chiefs' meeting was held to decide on a choice of candidate for succeeding Mr. Minister, but none of them felt they could assume the position of Mr. Minister in the present situation, and Ugaki was called on to reply accordingly to the Emperor. General Ugaki then declined the Imperial Mandate. The Army's behavior in the present political situation was based on its hope to complete the control and maintenance of the Army.

Excerpt from Exhibit 2206 which is a publication of Mr. Minister Teranishi's talk concerning his resignation on 23 January, 1937. His reasons for this were the difference in his beliefs with the present political parties. He had ascertained that there was a fundamental difference between his views and those of the party which had some members sitting as cabinet members for the purpose of co-operating with the execution of the policy of the present cabinet. He felt it impossible to tide over the present situation by compromise and believed it to be impossible under the circumstances to enforce the military discipline and reform to which he had devoted his efforts.

Excerpt from Exhibit 2206 giving a talk on 27 January 1937 by General Uchiki. This stated that the Army would not take any particular measures to check the formation of a cabinet by General Ugaki. The rumors circulating about General Ugaki's efforts to form a new Cabinet even by drastic measures were intentional and made by those who did not understand the real intentions of the Army. UCHIKI expressed his belief that Ugaki would not leave the Army in the march and to his regret
he was unable to disclose the true state of affairs and until
that day had not published the reasons why the Army was
opposed to General Ugami. He could, however, that the
objection was for the sake of completion of the maintenance
of discipline and the control of the cliques. The objection
was against Ugami himself and not his policy.

On 17 March 1937, HASEMOTO published an article entitled
"From the Point of View of National Defence, it is the Duty
of the Military to Mix in Politics" in the Tokyo Dai Nippon.
In this Article he criticises the recent liberalists outcry
against the military mixing in politics and their quotation
of the Expostional Rescript's statement 'do not be misled by
public opinion and do not meddle in politics'. HASMOTO
interpreted this quotation to mean 'not to be a stickler for
politics' and felt that there was no reason why politics should
be taboo and entrusted only to professional politicians.

Outline sent to MINISTRY, Foreign Minister, for approval of
Japanese Army's Five Year Plan dated 10 June 1937 in which it
shows that the plan was designed to enlarge the production of
such commodities as automobiles, machinery, iron, minerals,
pig-iron, steel and other materials and industries to more
than ten times during the fiscal year 1931. The policies for
this are outlined under the following headings: Financial
Policies; Trade and Exchange Policy; Price Policy; Industrial
Control Policy; Measures to be taken towards technicians and
labourers; Measures for machine tool industry; Transportation
Policy; National life stabilisation policy; Reform of Adminis-
trative organisation. This is similar to Exhibit 342.

In this article entitled "Powers are ESPECIALLY BUILDING
up Air Force," Build up Invincible Air Force", appearing in
the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 1 July 1937, HASMOTO stated the
necessity of Japan building up an invincible Air force as part of the State instead of belonging to the Army.

Before entry for 15 July on page 43 insert:-

16217 2254

On 15 July 1937, KIDO recorded in his diary a visit from one Matsu who talked on discontinuing the dispatch of troops to North China and became indignant.

Before entry for 30 October on page 56 insert:-

16218 2255

KIDO stated in his diary that on 27 October 1937, he attended the extraordinary session of the Cabinet where a decision was made on the statement and answer to the invitation to the conference in connection with the Nine-power Pact.

Before entry for 5 November on page 56 insert:-

16219 2256

An entry in KIDO's diary for 3 November 1937 revealed that War Minister Sugiyama and KIDO had that day discussed saving the situation, the establishment of the Imperial General Headquarters and the question of declaration of war.

Before entry for 1 December on page 56 insert:-

16220 2257

KIDO stated in his diary that in a talk with Premier Konoye on 16 November, 1937, he (KIDO) expressed concern that a situation in interior politics now when they were on the offensive, might turn the operation into a defensive one and thus the attitude of foreign countries, which had finally turned serious, would be affected. This he thought must be avoided. KIDO told Konoye that even if he were to resign he would no doubt be ordered to form another Cabinet.

Before entry for 1 December on page 56 insert:-

16221 2258

KIDO stated in his diary on 19 November 1937, that at a Cabinet session on that day they decided the liaison between the Imperial General HQ and the Government. KIDO was of the opinion that Imperial General HQ regulations covered incidents as well as war. When he asked the War Minister if the degree and extent of an incident had been studied, the War Minister replied that he considered that Imperial General HQ could only...
be established if the incident had extended to the point of a
declaration of war or if the army mobilisation had been ordered.

Before entry of 23 December on page 59 insert:-

KIDO stated in his Diary that on 21 December 1937, he attended a Cabinet Meeting where negotiations with China,
draft answer to the German Ambassador, and counter measures
for the China Affair were discussed. KIDO urged the necessity
of creating cultural measures in North China.

Before entry for 16 January on page 61 insert:-

KIDO recorded in his Diary a Cabinet Meeting on 14 January
1938, where the epoch making announcement concerning the China
Affair was discussed. Chiang Kai-shek's answer was considered
as lacking sincerity, and the Cabinet decided to announce a
flexible policy that they would have nothing to do with the
National Government, but would negotiate with the new Chinese
Government and join in the promotion of a newly rising China
and the peace of Asia.

Insert at bottom of page 66:-

Secret Expenditure for the Manchurian Incident. Record
regarding payment of Y150,000 to the accused UHEJU, March, 1933.
Before entry for 26 April on page 63 insert:-

Transfer of secret funds from the Manchurian Incident
Expenditure Account, 13 April, 1933. The accused UHEJU
received Y77,300.

Before entry for 20 May on page 70 insert:-

KIDO related in his Diary of 19 May 1938 a conversation
with President Honjo concerning the preparations for the
battle of Suchow. Honjo did not anticipate any striking
changes from the Suchow battle and stated there was some peace
talk at present in China. Honjo advocated an attitude of
advancing to Hankow after Suchow while taking steps to settle
the Incident. He also thought that if things did not turn out
right it would be necessary to enter into protracted warfare.

-10-
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KIDO related in his Diary of 19 May 1938 a conversation with President Honjo concerning the preparations for the battle of Suchow. Honjo did not anticipate any striking changes from the Suchow battle and stated there was some peace talk at present in China. Honjo advocated an attitude of advancing to Hankow after Suchow while taking steps to settle the Incident. He also thought that if things did not turn out right it would be necessary to enter into protracted warfare.
by planning to continue for about three years. KIDO promised to do his best and agreed generally with Honjo's opinion.

Extract from 'The Japan Advertiser', Tokyo, Sunday 26 June 1938, (page 3) entitled 'Honjo, preparedness is urged by War Minister ITAGAKI', states that as it may be the intention of General Chiang Kai-Shek to resist Japan for the rest of his life, the Army should be ready to continue fighting 'perhaps for ten years'. War Minister ITAGAKI expressed his confidence that with unanimity and support Japan could cope with protracted warfare over almost any length of time. There was no need to move against China at present and that no decision has been reached about the mobilisation law. General Chiang Kai-Shek's tactics in wearing down Japan's resources were reviewed. Comments were made on the Five-Minister Conference when the war situation was discussed as well as the projected establishment of a central organ for directing policy towards China. The International situation was commented upon.

On 1 July 1938, the Education Ministry Review published a speech by ARAKI entitled 'On the First Anniversary of the China Incident'. ARAKI gave a survey of the past year's successes and strategy, pointing out that Japan would not lay down arms until anti-Japanese China had been completely crushed and Chinese territory cleared of Communist devils. The nation must be spiritually mobilised and with deep understanding of national thought, the national constitution should be clarified as absolutely superior and the unification of the world under one roof must pervade the world.

KIDO stated in his diary of 9 August 1938 that he attended a Cabinet Meeting where he heard about the progress of the
Changchun Incident from Mr. Minister ITAGAKI and the Foreign Minister. After, he heard of a proposal to reinforce the German-Japanese relations which had been made by von Ribben-trop to GERMIA. It contained a clause providing that in the case of one nation being attacked, the other would render military aid. Germany was to join and negotiations with her were under way. Ribbentrop analysed the European situation as; war with Russia would be inevitable, peace moves towards Czechs, Anglo-French relations strong, possibly backed financially but not militarily by the United States, Rumania neutral and Hungary could be made an ally.

Before entry for 31 August on page 73 insert:-

16059 2235 Outline of speeches by SATO delivered by him on the 25th and 29th August 1938. They concerned the Policy for the Disposition of the China Incident etc.,

Before entry for 16 September on page 73 insert:-

16227 2263 KIDO stated in his Diary on 7 September 1938 that he had learned the state of affairs regarding the head of the new political party from Hondo. He said it might be necessary to deal with Chiang Kai-Shek in view of the changed situation brought about by the fall of Hankow. The domestic condition were causing concern and many groups were participating in a drive for a one-party system to which Hondo had given an ambiguous answer. Hondo had come up against the China Incident and many matters had gone contrary to expectations. If the culmination of these problems should lead to having to do with Chiang Kai-Shek, Hondo thought he would have to resign. KIDO was against the latter action which would cause a new political situation dealt with by Ugaki's policies. KIDO thought it might be unavoidable for Hondo to accept leadership of a new party although after discussion they agreed that the selection of the Secretary General would be extremely
difficult. The scientists apparently were of the opinion that
peace between Japan and China could be brought about by dealing
with Chiang Kai-Shek, while the military generally agreed.
IMAGI first opposed it but later gave way. The fact that the
situation seemed to be the result of the opposite opinions of
TOJO and IMAGI.

Before entry for 7 October on page 79 insert:

Extract from the Japan Advertiser of 2 October 1938, enti-
tled: "General Cables: Hitler's congratulatory Cables to Splendid
Successes." Mr. Minister IMAGI sent a telegram to Hitler
expressing the Emperor's admiration and felicitations
for Germany's successful conduct of the Sino-Japanese War and hoped
that the German Reich's armies would unite on the Anti-Yenan-
term front. The Japanese Navy in Tokyo was instructed by
Naval Minister Youmi to send similar congratulations to the
Reichsmarine.

Before entry for 9 November on page 81 insert:

On 2 November 1938, MEXT stated in his diary that he attended
a Privy Council meeting where it was decided to cease co-
operating with the various branches of the League of Nations.

Before entry for 10 November on page 82 insert:

List of a broadcast by MEXT on 7 November 1938 on the
occasion of the 15th anniversary of the issuance of the Imperial
Rescript on the awakening of the Imperial Spirit. One
phase of the Incident had been made by the capture of Canton
and the three principal cities near Harbin. The period for
actual activities in long-term construction had arrived.

MEXT interpreted the spirit of the Imperial Rescript and
regarded the people of the Emperor's exhortations to bring
about practical results, saying that the present time was
vacant and significant. The fundamental question of the
present situation did not lie in the Chino Incident but in the
dawn of a new world peace. The occupation of some strategic
points in China would not harm the settlement of the present
situations. Japan must push forward towards the construction of a new world. Japan did not stand at a deadlock and the people were urged to tide over present difficulties to exhibit the glory of Japan to the world. In excerpts from the Second Speech on Instruction at the National Conference of Principals of Agricultural Schools, APAM as Education Minister stated that at the present time the most important thing was to strengthen national spirit. The people must be educated to carry out the great mission of the Empire in the future.

Regarding education in agricultural schools, in the present situation of Japan, she should strive for an expansion in production power. It was also very important to devise the overseas expansion of the people in order to carry out the unity policy of Japan, Manchuria and China. The women of Japan were also urged to join in these efforts.

Before entry for 3 December on page 84 insert,-

Excerpt from pages 332-355 of book "Business Reports 1938", Volume I, Economic Relations in China, published by East Asia Ministry, 1 December, 1938. This consists of Item 2 Instruction by Minister IINDO and concerns the German proposal for economic cooperation in China. As for the participation of Germany and Italy it will mean that special consideration is required from the political point of view. The cooperation of Germany and Italy in the economic development of North China will be accomplished chiefly by Germany's cooperative investment in important industries. The methods for this were enumerated as: Investment in the Development Company, subscription of debentures, supply of machinery on credit or by delivery of shares, joint management of Japan and Germany or by Japan, Germany and China of same kind of enterprise. Germany's interests will be fully respected and given preference over any third country.
Before entry for 27 December on page 37 insert:-

KIDO recorded in his diary that on 26 December 1938, he met HIRAMATSU who was insistent that the Konoye Cabinet should not resign. His reason was that an escape of Chunuk and that the plot was proceeding steadily.

Before entry for 30 December on page 38 insert:-

KIDO in his diary of 29 December, 1938 stated that Major General Kunitsune SUGIMURA insisted that the Konoye Cabinet carry on. Later, he saw Mr. Minster ITAJI at Konoye's house and he (ITAJI) explained the development of the scheme and the International situation.

Before entry for 7 January on page 38 insert:-

In his diary for 5 January 1939, KIDO stated that on that day he saw HIRAMATSU who asked him to accept the position of Home and Welfare Minister. KIDO agreed as long as he could dispose of the pending Home Ministry problems at his own discretion. HIRAMATSU approved KIDO's recommendation for Vice-Minister Hirose's promotion and this was carried out.

Before entry for 8 March on page 41 insert:-

Excerpt from address of Baron HIRAMATSU, Prime Minister, on 21 January, 1939, taken from the March 1939 issue of the Tokyo Gazette dealing with the feelings of HIRAMATSU on the China Affair. This expressed the view that the present Cabinet was committed to the same policy as the previous one and is determined to carry it out. This was to lay the foundation of the prosperity and progress in East Asia through the cooperation of Japan, Manchuria and China in political, cultural and economic spheres. There must be a new order to replace the old and it was hoped that the Chinese would understand this correctly, and co-operate with the Japanese. There was no alternative but to exterminate those who persisted in opposition against Japan.
Before entry for 20 March on page 92 insert:-

Japanese press comments published in Japan Advertiser of 17 March 1939 stated that ITAGAICI and Yonai had stated in the Diet that the policy for a new period in Asia would undoubtedly cause friction from third powers. They resented, England, U.S.S.R. and France's attitude to the China Affair and argued that unless these powers were ejected, settlement of the China Incident would be impossible. Britain's loan and fund to stabilise Chinese currency was an hostile act and in confirmed by representations made by Britain, U.S. and France protesting against exchange control in North China. Those countries harass the new order in East Asia and will probably further attempt to provide obstacles as Japan and China's community of interests increase.

Before entry for 1 April on page 93 insert:-

KIICO stated in his Diary on 31 March 1939 that he had conferred with Premier KIRINUI on problems of a military alliance between Germany and Japan and the appointment of new Cabinet members.

Before entry for 1 May on page 94 insert:-

KIICO stated in his Diary on 19 April 1939, that he advised KIRINUI to exert increased efforts for the Military Alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, since failure would have dangerous domestic effects and would be a decisive disadvantage to settling the China Incident.

Before entry for 1 May at top of page 95 insert:-

HASENAGI stated in an article entitled "Clear the Clouds from the East Asia Sky", which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 1 May 1939, that England and to a lesser extent Russia must be destroyed since they are the main supporters of Chiang-Kai Sek and while they assist him a solution to the China Incident is impossible. He wanted to overthrow England first, leaving the Soviet alone. One method he cited was the
strengthening of the Tripartite Pact and inclining democracy as well a colonial as the subject of attack.

KIDO recorded in his diary on 2 May 1939 that the last Navy Minister Tonomi had conferred on the Military Alliance. KIDO again emphasized that failure would have a bad influence on the Sino-Japanese dispute and bring about dissatisfaction and uneasiness on the part of the people, especially if the failure were a result of a Navy-Army dispute. KIDO impressed that the public opinion must be unified even if they should fail to conclude the treaty.

Before entry for 11 May on page 95 insert:-

In an interview presented by Homei Radio between ITAGAKI and KOISO on 3 May 1939, Mr. Minister ITAGAKI welcomed that Germany and Italy through their Military Alliance had bound themselves still more firmly to the maintenance of peace and the establishment of a new order in Europe and stated that it was not impossible that Japan might conclude a Military Alliance with the Axis powers. Minister of Colonies KOISO stated that apparently negotiations directed towards the conclusion of a Military Alliance among the three Axis powers were being conducted. The success of these negotiations depended upon Germany's and Italy's understanding of Japan's position and the realization that it would be difficult for Germany and Italy to carry out their encirclement policy without the aid of Japan.

Before entry for 20 May on page 96 insert:-

An excerpt from an article entitled "Expel the British Influence from the Far East," written by HASHimoto, which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon of 15 May 1939 gives the conclusion that the balance would be on Japan's side if she used 300,000-yen planes to destroy 100,000,000-yen British battleships in the east. He cited the simplicity of beating
England if Japan threatens to occupy Manchuria and Shanghai and prevent the Fleet entering Singapore by their 'peerless aviators' and the fleet.

Before entry for 30 May on page 96 insert:

Teleg. from the German Foreign Min. to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated 23 May, 1939, requesting information regarding the new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference. In a confidential and unofficial conversation OSEMA reported that according to a telegram he had received from Kita, the Japanese Government wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in the event of European conflict.

OSEMA, having refused to pass on this information to the German Government he had been requested to hold the matter over pending result of discussion among the various factors. The German Ambassador was asked to make it clear that this attitude was causing distrust among the Germans and Italians.

Insert at top of page 97:

On June 1st 1939 some "Short cutting Remarks on the Present Situation" by HASIDOTO were published in the Tokyo Dai Nippon. These remarks were in an anti-English vein and advocated her expulsion and definition as an enemy.

Before entry for 5 July on page 97 insert:

HASIDOTO published an article in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 20 June 1939 entitled "The Solution of the Incident Depends upon the Expulsion of England". In this article he made it clear that the only solution to the China Incident would be an attack on England - not to be stopped at Tientsin but extended to Shanghai and Hong Kong. He stated that the Premier (MIYAMA) and the Foreign Minister were hesitant to conclude a Military Alliance with the Axis because of their fear of England, although they say it is necessary to strengthen the Axis collaboration.
before entry for 1 July on page 97 insert:

Excerpt from the 7 July 1939 issue of "The Daily Times and Mail", source unknown from "KAWA" and "KONAI" warning of China Affair coal. Unjust interference by third powers in the operation of Japan's mission of constructing a new order in East Asia must be stopped. China's resistance was being aided by third powers and Japan's immediate enemy was not limited to the Chiang Kai-shek Government. The crushing of the anti-Japanese policy by third powers which aided the resistance of the Chiang regime must not be carried out at all cost, but the China Affair must not be ended even if China's regime collapses. The third year of the China Affair will see Japan accomplish her mission of establishing a new order in East Asia stop by stop and any interference by third powers with the execution of Japan's mission should be drastically rejected.

Excerpt from an article entitled "Organise a class A wartime Cabinet that has no fear of England and the Soviet Union" by "KASHINO" published on 10 July 1939 in the Tokyo Dai nippon. He stated in this article that Japan needed a wartime cabinet with the highest authority, which would win through with a complete wartime system. Once again England and the Soviet were "KASHINO's" idea of Japan's real opponents.

Before entry for 21 July on page 98 insert:

KASHINO stated in his article "Build a State Union of China and Manchuria with Japan as its leader" published in the Tokyo Dai nippon on 20 July 1939 that the Japanese public opinion had not taken an anti-British turn. He now wanted Japan to destroy the Manchuria Government and organise China and Manchuria with Japan as a leader, into a self-supplying defensive block bending all commercial relations with
Before entry for 8 August on page 99 insert 1.

KIDO stated in his diary on 4 August 1939 that he had talked to an 'Minister ITOKI on the Military Alliance with Germany and Italy and had obtained agreement. The 'Minister was determined to resign if the Cabinet did not accept the Military Alliance. This would result in a Cabinet resignation en bloc. KIDO thought it best that no political change should take place until the Tripartite Regime had been established in China. Any failure of the establishment of the Tripartite Regime, as in the case when the escape from Chungking bringing about the fall of the Konoza Cabinet, would result in a serious situation. KIDO wanted any attempt to form a Military administration resisted, and a solution brought about to the Army-Army deadlock.

Before entry for 30 August on page 100 insert 1.

KIDO recorded in his diary that on 28 August 1939 a Cabinet meeting was held regarding the bloc resignation of the cabinet. After HIRAMATSU’s explanations all agreed, and tendered their resignations but the Emperor requested that all Cabinet Ministers retain their posts until further notice. KIDO was informed that Toda might become the new 'Minister and that this could only intensify friction between different army groups. Konoye told KIDO that Abe had been ordered by the Emperor to form a Cabinet, who instructed him to appoint either UMEZU or HATA as 'Minister, follow a policy of co-operation with the U.S. and Britain and use discretion in choice of Home and Justice Ministers. KIDO thought the last two instructions of the Emperor could be disposed of by Abe at his discretion. Regarding the appointment of the 'Minister, in order to avoid a clash with military circles, KIDO thought it best that the Emperor either summon the 'Minister or convey to the Army his choice and let the three Chiefs of the Army recommend
the War Minister.

1609 2232

Telegraph from Mackeson in Rome to the Foreign Minister in Berlin date 2 September 1939 to say that he had received a visit from Japanese Ambassador SUTSUJI to announce that he had received his expected recall. He would seize the opportunity to talk with the German Foreign Minister on his way home which might be via Russia. SUTSUJI thought that with a change of Cabinet in Japan there was a chance of continuing the rapprochement with the Axis. There was an opinion growing in Japan for settlement with Russia and if this came about the tendency of the U.S. to intervene in Europe would be reduced.

Insert before entry for 7 September on page 101.

15744 2193

Cablegram sent by Ambassador Gtt to the Army High Command and Air High Command on 5 September 1939 regarding five Ministers' Conference on 3 August in which Army's urgent desire was stressed for early conclusion of China conflict; alleviate present tension by conforming to wishes of masses and prevent dangerous reaction in direction of an economically tantalizing settlement with England. These reasons being so compelling War Minister ITAGAI was resolved, as a last resort to risk his resignation. A decision was to be reached by 15 August and ITAGAI requests that Berlin and Rome Governments be apprised of the situation and support they help by concessions. These provided that there would be no mental reservations behind the wording and that a verbal form of Japanese supplementary statement be found. The new alliance was chiefly a domestic political weapon but the Army was the Chief supporter of the Alliance. The plans of the Foreign Minister who attaches great importance to successful negotiations with England could be cancelled out if Germany shows initiative in
Before entry for 11 November on page 104 insert:

KIDO stated in his diary of 10 November 1939 that he had talked with Konoye on the system of appointing a new Premier. KIDO, who at that time was out of office, thought that the method at present used, i.e., the recommendation of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to the Emperor, was from the political viewpoint, undesirable since high officials close to the Emperor should not hold reins of political power. He wanted to restrict the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to that of adviser to the Emperor and in case of en bloc Cabinet resignation let the ex-Premiers and possibly ex-Ministers of State consult with the Emperor on the choice of a successor. He thought the ex-Premiers should confer, and not decide by vote but report all opinions (both dissent and assent) to the Emperor. KIDO then consulted with Konoye, who assented to his opinions. Then Konoye asked KIDO if his feelings were that the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should be abolished. KIDO rejected this since he thought there would be too many important affairs of State left for him as adviser to the Emperor.

Before entry for 20 March on page 111 insert:

Excerpt from the Minutes of Second Joint Conference of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Committee of Accounts of the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet on 17 March 1940, with comments by KOSIX. In this KOSIX endorsed remarks made by Fukuda regarding the importance for Japan to advance and seize territories in the Southern Regions and put forth the same effort and financial power as required in overcoming the North China Incident, and have both North and South as Japan's objectives. The Overseas Affairs Ministry, who were to carry out the policy of having both North and
South as objectives, assumed that movement of population and economic expansion must accompany one another, but whereas on the continent the movement of population was of primary importance, in the Southern regions it was economic expansion which took precedence.

Before entry for p. 117, insert:

An excerpt from the "Japan Times and "Kii" for March 21st, 1940, entitled: "W.N. Notsu Bureaucrats and Parties" states that the political organisations to reconsider attitudes. Stated that "IT", Director of the military affairs bureau gave the army opinion of favouring the dissolution of political parties if they seek to further their interests in the present emergency. This was in answer to interpolations put to Mr. Minister "IT" in the House of Representatives.

Before entry for p. 115, insert:

In his diary of May 10th, 1940 Kido expressed his allegiance to Honnoye stating that as long as Honnoye stays in the political field he would support him to the last and would like Honnoye to take the leadership. Kido expressed this opinion to Kihara when he called to sound Kido's opinion on the new political party of which Honnoye was to be President and Kido Vice President.

Before entry for p. 118, insert:

On May 26th, 1940, Kido stated in his diary that he had conferred with Honnoye and Arima on the new political party. Then the Imperial Mandate was issued the following points were to be considered: (1) Supreme National Defense Conference established between Chiefs of General Staffs (Army and Navy) Premier and the War and Navy Ministers; (2) Consideration given to desires of Army and Navy re national defense, foreign affairs and finances; (3) Dissolution of all political parties requested by announcement of resolution for establishment of a new political party. The cabinet composition was...
set out stating that all Ministers appointed prior to the establishment of a new party should be made to join.

At bottom of page 113 insert:

16243 2276

KIDO stated in his diary on 1 June 1940, that he had been asked to accept the appointment of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. After consultation with Kono he decided to accept the office. Alternately Ikeda had urged KIDO to refuse the post saying how important his position would be in connection with the new party.

Before entry for 22 July on page 132 insert:

15644 2134

OKA in a letter to Togo dated 21 July 1940, stated that all efforts should be directed to the U.S. Loan Agreement. The conclusion of this agreement would obliterate Chiang Kai Shek's only hope, bring about the end of the China Incident, and make Japan's southward advance possible.

Before entry for 22 September on page 151 insert:

15250 2277

It is recorded in KIDO's Diary of 22 September, 1940, that a settlement with the French Indo-China authorities regarding Japanese penetration was possible. KIDO then stated he had reported to the Emperor his opinion that if a German-Italian-Japanese Military Alliance was concluded, England and America would eventually have to be opposed. In view of this, Chinese relations should be adjusted as soon as possible.

Before entry for 3 November on page 164 insert:

-15027 2234

Discussion of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis by SIRIOT, Yosio, published November, 1940. This consists of a series of Articles under the following headings:

I. The necessity of the Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance.
II. The European War and the Attitude of Japan.
III. Soviet-German Coalition Problem and German Power.

IV. The Trend of the Great War.

V. The New Order in Europe and Japan's Politics.
   1) Japan's Spiritual Assistance to Germany and Italy
   2) The New Order in Europe and the opposition of the U.S.
   3) The Combined Power in England, France and the U.S.
   4) England after her defeat and the Crisis in the U.S.
   5) The position of the pro-British faction in Germany.
   6) Origin of European Civilization.
   7) Japan's Lestatirnoua and her Bloc Theory.
   8) Character of German Race.
   10) Methods of Reform and National Structure.
   11) Shortcomings of the Reform faction in our Country.
   12) Objectives and Reform of the New Government.
   13) Conversion of the Foreign Policy of our Country.
   14) Relations between Hakko-Ichiki and the Sphere of liveli-
   15) Forecast of the World War.

VI. Comment on Japan's Non-Interference.

VII. Conclusion of Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance (Asahi Shimbun
     September 29, 1939):
   1) Everlasting Mutual Reliances.
   2) Treaty of the New World Order.
   3) Accomplishment of the Three Countries Ideal.
   4) Reformation of the National Structure.
   5) Significance of Funk's declaration.

Before entry for 15 November on page 164, insert:

Article published in the newspaper "Yomiuri" on 8 November
1940, entitled "The Outline of Ten-Year Plan for Block Economy
of Japan-Hinshu-China". This was an announcement from the
Cabinet Intelligence Bureau stating that by the conclusion of
the Tripartite Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, Japan's fundamental policy to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia had entered on a new stage. Japan's economic policy for the future was outlined, especially the extension of the economic reciprocal dependence to Greater East Asia and establishment of a Co-Prosperity Sphere. In ten years, the new economic order in East Asia should be established with Japan as leader. The main points of outline of this policy were set forth. The development of basic industries of Japan, Manchukuo and China and a plan for the related economy of the three countries were set forth as well as the division of Industries; Labour, Finance, Trade, Communications.

On page 166 of Part II, Exhibit 560, after the words 'have done' delete the words 'and can do'. After the words 'Rome' insert words 'and which OTHEA can still do'.

Before entry for 13 January on page 169, insert:

An excerpt from the 10 Day Report from the Home Ministry of 11 January 1941, referred to a meeting of the ultranationalists in the Central and Western Districts. HATTOMOTO, who was President of this Society delivered lectures at both meetings in which he strongly urged the overthrow of England and America, the southward advance and the construction of East Asia under Imperial influence. HATTOMOTO, who was then on a lecture tour of E.ansen, had directed that a campaign be relayed throughout the Country to instigate a powerful national movement and begin sweeping campaigns against the U.S. and British sympathisers while inspiring an "Advance Southward" program throughout the country.

Before entry for 31 January on page 173 insert:

Excerpts from HATTOMOTO's book "The Second Creation" (14th Edition) of 30 January 1941 show his urgent call for the establishment of the Hakkoku Ichiu. He proposed measures...
in order to accomplish this new national structure which included diplomatic strides and strides in military preparations. In the latter he called for absolute war preparation to be exploited to enable us (Japan) to crush at my time countries which, under different ideologies, may interfere with us when we carry this national structure into operation.

Before entry for 1 July on page 213 insert—

On 30 June 1941 the Army called a conference of Army members of the Supreme War Council. TOJO and related official explained the fast changing international situation, after which Japan's future attitude was discussed. Defendants TOJO, DOHTAN, and KISHINA were present at the meeting.

On Page 233 of Part II, Exhibit 300, after the word action against USSR delete remainder and read as follows—

"The Soviet Government although reserved is increasingly anxious. SHIBATA had pointed out these rumors to be serious. YANAGI, on being questioned by OTT as to Japan's intentions regarding Russia, replied that Japan considered the best way to start an attack on Russia as to make demands to which she could not concede, such as demands for territory; it was all Japan could do now in face of the neutrality pact."

Before entry for 26 September on page 245 insert—

HARIMOTO stated in his article "No more Compromise" which appeared in the Tokyo Dai Nippon on 23 September 1941, that the recent economic embargoes and freezing of assets by the English and Americans is a declaration of war. Japan should no. follow what is expressed in the Tri-Partite Pact since both Germany and Italy have already gone into a state of war with the two countries. He objected to the solution of the China Incident by compromise with England and America, since China would still be dependent on America and England.

KIDO stated in his diary on 25 September 1941, SHIGEMITSU visited him regarding U.S. Japanese negotiations. The Chief
side de Gaulle also visited him and told him about the report of the Chief of the Army General Staff to the Throne.

Before entry for 2 October on page 247 insert:-

15273 2230

The stated in his diary that on 1 October 1941, he talked with SHIY, President of the Planning Board on the National policy towards the U.S.,

Before entry for 17 October on page 255 insert:-

16193 2250

In a fuller account written in November, 1941, the revised the story contained in Exhibits 1147, 1150, 1151, 1154 and 1156, of the fall of the 3rd Domo and formation of the TNK Cabinets and stated that on 16 October 1941, Shimo collected the resignations of his Cabinet and presented them to the Emperor. The information board stated the reasons for the resignation was disagreement of opinion regarding execution of present National Policy. The actual facts which were not really so simple, are set out in this document.

Before entry for 27 November on page 271 insert:-

15196 2249 (corrected version of 1109)

On 26 November, 1941, Hiranuma and Nishimura cabled Foreign Minister TOG0 statin, that there was no hope of the U.S. accepting Plan 7 in its entirety. They recommended that the President cabled the Emperor of this hope for peace in the Pacific and the Emperor replied, thus clearing the air. If TOG would sanction this action they were prepared to attempt it. Alternately if they were given more time, they felt that they might propose the establishment of neutral countries including French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Although a break in the negotiations might not mean war, there was a possibility that the U.S. would occupy the Netherlands East Indies and a conflict would inevitably start. They requested that since this telegram might well be their last that it be shown to KIDO and an answer be sent by return.

Before entry for 12 January on page 293 insert:-

15946 2135

An excerpt from the Article by HANSHINO entitled "The
Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence: which appeared in the Tokyo Nihon no 5 January 1942, stated that the war to end European-American culture had been started and that world culture based on domination would meet its doom. HIROHITO stated that it was a war for establishing a guillotine principle - that of HADDO KIGOKU.

Before entry for 13 February on page 297 insert-

15103 2236-Z Excerpts from statement made by Major General SHINOBU KATO, head of the First Section of the Division of Military Affairs and a Government Delegate at a Diet Committee Meeting on the 79th Session of the Imperial Diet February 10th 1942. This concerned the necessity of making people understand the gist of the direction and progress of the Greater East Asia War.

On 10 February 1942, HIROHITO delivered a speech at the Accounts Committee Meeting of the Diet in which he stated that Japan must be the leading power in East Asia and any element not conforming to the Japanese will must be eliminated completely. In the future, he said, concrete matters will be decided by the Government and not by the Navy alone. All economy must be directed towards winning the war and he believed that an announcement of various measures to win the war and the building of a foundation to enable future Japanese expansion would soon be made, since appropriate organs were now ready.

Before entry for 29 May on page 299 insert-

15133 2243 On 1 October 1942, the Defendants DOMAFE, HIZUMA and SAT...
among others received German decorations from the German Ambassador. Ott who acknowledged their merits in having, by their joint efforts won glorious victories in the joint execution of the war. Oniyama on behalf of the Generals pledged their belief in final victory of the Axis.

Draft entry for 6 March on page 502 inserts:

Except from statement made by Major General Henry SKO...

...at a Joint Committee meeting of the 31st Session of the Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, February 19th, 1943, which stated that there was no change in the policy of dealing resolutely with those who made any statements which might hinder the war. The reports of Anglo-German peace and Soviet-German peace were enemy propaganda.

On page 313 of Appendix D under ANNEX, after Item 5 add the following:

6. Decorated 15 January, 1932 with the 1st Order of Merit of the Sacred Treasure.

Decorated 15 December, 1932, with the 3rd Court Rank,
Senior Grade.

Decorated with the Grand Cross of Rising Sun 29 April, 1934.

Created Baron for meritorious service 26 November, 1935.
Supplement to Document #0001.

1. On page 6, 5th line delete "and by permission of KIMAM", "Minister of War" and substitute "by Hayashi on his own initiative".

2. On page 9, 5th line from bottom of page, delete from "the ultimate — Asia".

3. On page 20, delete lines 13, 14 and 15.

4. On page 300 and 301, delete "KIMAM" in Exhibit 607.

5. On page 330, Exhibit 1273, line 13, after the word "UTA", delete the following sentence and read as follows: "The Emperor stated that he would have the Chief of the General Staff TOJO consulted and on the strength of TOJO's objection the Emperor abandoned Terauchi as a candidate and selected TOJO."

6. On page 331 delete pages 85, 900 and 901 from paragraph 1.
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