

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

16 June 1947

To All Attorneys:

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS  
Paper No. 7

Re: Decisions of Imperial Conferences, Cabinet Meetings, and Other Conferences and Meetings Which appear in the Prosecution's Evidence.

There is distributed herewith the work prepared by Mr. Joseph F. English entitled: "Decisions of Imperial Conferences, Liaison Conferences, Privy Council Meetings, Cabinet Meetings, Four Ministers' Conferences, Five Ministers' Conferences, Senior Statesmen's Meetings, Supreme War Plans Council, Joint Conferences and Miscellaneous Conferences, as Found in the Prosecution's Evidence."

The preface and table of contents give in broad outline the nature and scope of this work. There is a full and complete index. This should prove exceedingly helpful in giving immediate reference to and making easily available all of the material in the Prosecution's case concerning attendance, discussions and decisions at these important conferences and meetings.

It is suggested that the attorneys make full use of the information given in this work in preparing reports on witnesses. It is further suggested that an exhaustive study of this report should be promptly made as to the information given on each defendant or defendants as to whom the attorney is now preparing a factual statement of the Prosecution's evidence.

*A. M. S. [Signature]*  
D. N. SUMNER  
Assistant Counsel

Attachment

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DECISIONS OF

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES, LIAISON CONFERENCES,  
PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS, CABINET MEETINGS,  
FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCES, FIVE MINISTERS'  
CONFERENCE, SENIOR STATESMEN'S MEETINGS,  
SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL, JOINT CONFERENCES  
AND MISCELLANEOUS CONFERENCES.

AS FOUND IN THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.

June, 1947

## PREFACE

In the compilation of these decisions from Prosecution's Exhibits only, attempt has been made to set forth the substance of what was decided, said, contended or argued, as the case may be, as well as the attendance at each meeting.

The material suggested a chronological structure based upon the nature of the conferences or meetings.

The index has been prepared according to a chronological as well as alphabetical arrangement with the necessary cross-references.

Many names appearing in the material identify deceased persons; hence, in the index, except where the importance of the name suggests otherwise, this fact is noted with no further reference to the text.

The attendance at each meeting, if found in the exhibits, is set forth as well as the Cabinet members on particular dates; consequently, each exhibit relating to a decision of a meeting or conference during the period of time an Accused held a responsible position should be examined.

It was the practice for each Cabinet member to sign the decision at or subsequent to a meeting, thereby ratifying it.

For attendance at Liaison Conferences subsequent to 21 July 1941 resort must be had to the interrogations of TOJO, NAGANO and TOGO. (see p. 34)

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Privy Council Meetings:

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Declaration of War

Liaison Conferences:

o/a 30 Nov 41, delivery of final note re . . . . . 54,58  
30 Nov 41, approval and explanation of final note re . . . . . 60

Privy Council Meetings:

8 Dec 41, Investigation Committee approved draft  
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DOIHARA, Kenji (Accused)

Cabinet Meetings:

12 Aug 32, mentioned, furnished collaborators for  
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Supreme War Plans Council Meetings:

30 Jun 41, attended, which discussed international  
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EGI, Chiyuki (Privy Councillor) Deceased

EMBARGO

Cabinet Meetings:

3 Mar 40, Discussed plan to obtain essential materials  
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Cabinet Meetings:

18 Jan 38, decision of plan regulating importation of,  
with reference to unfavorable foreign trade balance . . . . . 191,192

3 Mar 40, decision re economic policy towards U.S. and  
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Imperial Conferences:	
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Cabinet Meetings:

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Four Ministers' Conferences:

18 Jun 40, decided to negotiate with, but if unsuccessful possibly to use force . . . . .	237
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Supreme War Plans Council Meetings:

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Decisions of Imperial Headquarters:

Apr 41, decided to establish close relations with . . . . .	280
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FUJITA (Capt. Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30, attended re London Naval Treaty . . . . .	68
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FUJISAWA, Ikunosuke (Privy Councillor) Deceased.

FUJIWARA, Ginjiro (Minister of Commerce in  
Yonai's Cabinet) (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
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Cabinet Meetings:

3 Mar 40, attended economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on U.S. for materials . . . . .	158
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FUKAI, Eigo (Privy Councillor) Deceased

FUKUDA, Misaturo (Privy Councillor) Deceased

FUNADA (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	95
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . . . .	97
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution that agreement for cultural cooperation with Germany . . . . .	100

FURUICHI, Ken (Privy Councillor) Deceased.

FURUUCHI, Hiroo (Explainer, Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

10 Dec 41, attended as 'Explainer' at the meeting which decided the treaty to ratify against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan . . . . . p. 147

FUSHIMI, Prince

Liaison Conferences:

30 June and 3 Feb 41, accompanied Premier Konoye and the Chief of Army General Staff to Palace to report policy toward F.I.C. and Thailand decided upon . . . . . 35

FUTAKAMI, Heijo (Secretary of Privy Council) Deceased.

GERMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Imperial Conferences:

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5 Nov 41, decided measures toward Germany at outbreak of Jap-American war . . . . . 19

Liaison Conferences:

o/a 30 Oct 41, discussed what can be expected if Japan attacks America . . . . . 43  
13 Nov 41, decided to disclose to Germany, Japan's intention to start war against U.S.A. and Britain . . . . 50

Privy Council Meetings:

2 Nov 38, decided to cultural cooperation with Germany . . 100  
26 Sep 40, Tripartite Pact proposed by Germany . . . . . 113,117  
Assistance to be rendered by Germany . . . . . 113  
Advantage of aligning with Germany . . . . . 118-119  
In re Mandated Islands . . . . . 123  
10 Dec 41, Ratified, no separate peace treaty . . . . . 147

Five Ministers' Conferences:

6 May 39, decided on compromise regarding cooperation with for a Tripartite Pact . . . . . 246  
8 Aug 39, decided concessions from necessary for a Tripartite Pact . . . . . 250



GERMANY-JAPANESE RELATIONS (Cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

9 Aug 38, discussed proposal to reinforce by providing military aid if one attacked, European situation analyzed . . . . .	193
26 May 38, discussed refusal of Ambassador to Germany to advise Japan would reserve entrance in event of European war and that German Ambassador had advised this attitude was causing mistrust . . . . .	195
2 Jul 41, continue foreign policy and close unity with . . . . .	213

Joint Conferences:

12 Jul 40, discussed strengthening harmony with . . . . .	282
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Decision of Imperial Headquarters:

16 Jul 40, agreed on intensifying coalition with . . . . .	280
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GODO, Takuo (Minister of Commerce in ABE's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

24 Oct 39, attended, changed external value of yen from sterling to dollars . . . . .	197
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GOTO, Fumio (Minister of Agriculture in SAITO's Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

13 Sept 32, attended, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo protocol . . . . .	73
3 Jul 35, attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee . . . . .	81

Cabinet Meetings:

12 Aug 32, attended, acquire and develop aviation rights in Manchuria . . . . .	172,173
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GREATER EAST ASIA

Imperial Conferences:

10-26 Sept 40, Matsuoka queries of Ott Germany's attitude towards Japan realization of . . . . .	6-9
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Liaison Conferences:

11 Nov 41, U.S. and Britain trying to obstruct . . . . .	48
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GREATER EAST ASIA (Cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings:

9-20 Oct 42, discussed creation of Greater East Asia Ministry . . . . .	p. 150-153
12 Oct 42, scope of, according to Tojo . . . . .	152
1 Nov 42, Imperial Ordinance 707 organizing . . . . .	153

Cabinet Meetings:

26 Jul 40, decision to change policy to construct new order in, by planned economy over production, distribution and consumption of essential materials . . . . . for <u>3 Oct 40</u> see attached "Finance"	199,200
5 Nov 40, decision, national policy of establishing, for economic development of, by conclusion of Tripartite Pact which revised principles of productive trade and planned economy of each country in . . . . .	204
22 Jan 41, decision, increase quality of population and redistribute for leadership of . . . . .	205
3 Oct 40, decision to establish self sufficient economy in, by industrial, labor, racial, commercial and financial control of industries and essential materials to national defense . . . . .	201,202
22 Aug 41, National Mobilization Law decided for . . . . .	215
3 Mar 40, discussed economic policy for, plan to eliminate dependence on U.S. for essential materials . . . . .	195
3 Oct 40, decision to establish self-sufficient economy in East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere by new policy in foreign exchange for payment of essential material in economic construction . . . . .	201, 202

HACHIYA (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperation agreement with Germany . . . . . 100

HAGA, Shiro (Adm. Off-Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 June 41 - Attended as Explainer, the meeting which approved Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation, trade and tariff system in FIC. . 127

HAGIWARA (Secy-Great Asia Ministry)

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Aug 43 - Attended, to explain on the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Burma . 154

HARA, Shujiro (Railway Minister & Overseas Minister in WAKATSUKI's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

19-23 Sept 31 - Attended, which discussed Mukden Incident . . . . . 161-2

HARA, Yoshimichi (Pres-Privy Council)  
Deceased

Imperial Conferences:

2 July 41 - Attended, which adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 10

6 Sept 41 - Attended, same as above . . . . . 13

5 Nov 41 - Attended, decided policy towards U.S., England and Netherlands . . . . . 18

1 Dec 41 - Attended, decided to declare war on US., Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

Privy Council Meetings:

13 Sept 32 - Attended, approved bill re signing of Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 74

3 July 35 - Attended, approved Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee . . . . . 81

HARA, Yoshimichi

Privy Council Meetings: (Cont'd)

- 20 Nov 36 - Attended, approved transfer of negotiations re Anti-Comintern Pact from General Staff to Foreign Ministry . . . . . 85
- 25 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 89
- 20 Jan 37 - Attended, approved Naval Officers be appointed as administrators of South Sea Islands. 91
- 6 Nov 37 - Attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 94
- 7 2 Nov 38 - Attended Investigation Committee and also Council meeting, approved resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . . . . 97
- 22 Nov 38 - Attended, approved resolution for cultural cooperation with Germany . . . . . 100
- 22 Feb 39 - Attended, agreed to participation of Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 106
- 26 Sept 40- Attended, Investigation Committee which approved Tripartite Pact . . . . . 111
- 26 Sept 40 - Attended, approved Tripartite Pact 116
- 18 Dec 40- Attended, discussed about Czech. & Roumania's joining in Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125
- 16 Jan 41- Attended Investigation Committee, approved ratification of two treaties between Japan & France for residence and navigation, tariff system and trade in FIC . . . . . 127
- 3 July 41 - Attended, and voted to ratify Franco-Japanese Protocol on guaranty and political understandings . . . . . 133
- 28 July 41 - Attended, agreed to conclude Protocol with France for common defense of FIC & military cooperation . . . . . 138
- 21 Nov 41 - Attended, decided to prolong Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 142
- 8 Dec 41 - Attended, Inquiry Committee and Plenary Session, approved declaration of war against America and England . . . . . 145

HARA, Yoshimichi

Privy Council Meetings: (Cont'd)

- 10 Dec 41 - Attended, approved treaty against a separate peace between Tripartite parties . . 147
- 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42 - Attended Investigation Committee, discussed about organization of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149
- 18 Aug 1943 - Same as above . . . . . 154

HARAGUCHI, Takeo (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 26 Sept 1940 - Attended, approved Tripartite Pact 111
- 16 June 41 - Attended the meeting which approved Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation, trade & tariff systems in FIC . . . . 127
- 8 July 41 - Attended to explain on two protocols: France-Japanese and Thai-Japanese, on guaranty and political understandings . . . . . 133-4

HASHIDA, Kunihiko

Imperial Conferences:

- 1 Dec 41 - Attended, decided to declare war on US, Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

HASHIMOTO, Kingoro (Accused)

Cabinet Meetings:

- 12 August 32 - Mentioned, claimed credit for idea of setting up government of Manchukuo . . . . . 175

HATA, Shunroku (ACCUSED)

Cabinet Meetings:

- 24 Oct 39 - Attended, changed value of yen from sterling to dollar . . . . . 197
- 3 Mar 40 - Attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US for materials . . . . . 198

HATA, Shunroku (Cont'd)

Four Ministers' Conferences:

18 June 40- Attended, which decided to negotiate with  
FIC, but if unsuccessful possibly to use force 237

Five Ministers' Conferences:

12 July 40- Attended, which decided to push war pre-  
parations . . . . . 251

HATA, Toyosuke (Overseas Minister in  
INUKAI Cabinet)

Deceased

HATOYAMA, Ichiro

Privy Council Meetings:

13 Sept 32 - Attended, approved signing of Japan-  
Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 74

Cabinet Meetings:

13-17 Dec 31- MC, policy Manchurian occupation dis-  
cussed . . . . . 166-7

12 Aug 32- Attended, acquire rights and develop  
aviation in Manchuria . . . . . 172-3

HATA, Yoshiaki

Privy Council Meetings:

2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolutions to end coop-  
erative relations with League Of nations . . 97

22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolutions for cultural  
cooperation agreement with Germany . . . . . 100

8 Dec 41 - Attended, approved ratification for declar-  
ation of war against America & England . . . 145

HAYASHI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

14, 15, 19, 21 Oct 42 - Attended to explain the esta-  
blishment of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149

HAYASHI, Gonsuke (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

HAYASHI, Raizaburo

Privy Council Meetings:

- 15 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact  
. . . . . 89
- 20 Jan 37 - Attended, decided appointment of naval  
officers as administrators of South Sea Islands  
. . . . . 91
- 2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolutions to end coop-  
erative relations with League of Nations . . 97
- 22 Feb 39 - Attended, agreed to participation of Hungary  
& Manchukuo on Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 106
- 26 Sept 40- Attended, approved Tripartite Pact .111

HAYASHI, Senjuro (Deceased)

Four Ministers' Conferences:

- 20 Feb 37- Attended, which decided Third Administrative  
policy toward North China . . . . . 235

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

- 17 July 40- Attended, which decided to recommend KONOYE  
to succeed YONAI . . . . . 252
- 17 July 41 - Attended, which approved KONOYE as Premier  
for third time . . . . . 254
- 17 Oct 41 - Attended, which approved TOJO to succeed  
KONOYE. . . . . 255
- 29 Nov 41 - Attended, which discussed war with United  
States . . . . . 257
- 1 Dec 41 - Attended, which discussed war with United  
States . . . . . 259

HIGASHIKUNI, Prince

Supreme War Council:

- 30 June 41- Attended, which discussed international  
situation . . . . . 281

HIRANUMA, Kiichiro (Accused)

Imperial Conferences:

2 July 41 - Attended, adopted resolution re Japanese-American negotiations . . . . . 10

Liaison Conferences:

13 Jan - 21 July 41 - Attended all meetings except that of 13 Jan and 22 May; no reference to subjects discussed . . . . . 32

30 Jan & 3 Feb 41 - Attended, decision re policy towards FIC and Thailand . . . . . 35

6 June 41 - Attended, discussed report HITLER to attack Russia . . . . . 37

25 June 41 - Attended, decision, accelerate preparatory measures in Thailand and FIC . . . . . 38

4 Aug 41 - Attended, decision, re principle of negotiation with Soviet . . . . . 40

10-18 Oct and 2 Nov 41 - Attended, discussed final decisions on American-Japanese policy . . . . . 41

29 Oct 41 - Attended, discussed political situation . . . . . 42

30 Oct 41 - Attended, discussed amount of cooperation to be expected from Germany in event of war . 43

4 Nov 41 - Attended, counter proposal for American-Japanese negotiations but to be last . . . . . 47

11 Nov 41 - Attended, principal reasons for hostilities with Britain and U.S. . . . . 48

13 Nov 41 - Attended, decisions, measures relative to outline for execution of national policies . . 50

20 Nov 41 - Attended, decision, details of administration in southern occupied territory . . . . . 51

30 Nov 41 - Attended, decision, approve final note to US . . . . . 55



HIRANUMA, Kiichiro

Liaison Conferences (Cont'd)

- 30 Nov 41 - Attended, decision, chief of staff and foreign minister to decide time of delivery of final note . . . . . 58
- 30 Nov 41 - Attended, decision, substance of final note approved by . . . . . 60
- 12 Dec 41 - attended, decision, heard report by Sixth Committee on economic measures in southern areas . . . . . 62

Privy Council Meetings:

- 18 Aug - 26 Sept 30 - Attended, re London Naval Treaty . . . . . 65
- 1 Oct 30 - Attended, re London Naval Treaty . . . 68
- 9 Dec 31 - Attended, report China Incident . . . 70
- 17 Dec 31 - Attended, decision, policy to pacify and occupy Manchuria and budget for same . . . . . 72
- 13 Sept 32 - Attended, approved Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73
- 3 July 35 - Attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo agreements for Joint Economic Committee . . . 81
- 25 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 89
- 20 Jan 37 - Attended, decided appointment of naval officers as administrators for the South Sea Islands . . . . . 91
- 6 Nov 37 - Attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 94
- 2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . . . . 97
- 22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution that an agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan & Germany be concluded . . . . . 100
- 22 Nov 39 - Attended, Hungary & Manchuria to participate in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 106  
as State Minister,
- 3 July 41 - Attended, Ratified French-Japanese & Thai-Japanese protocols of guaranty & political understandings . . . . . 133

HIRANUMA, Kichiro (Cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

- 28 May 39 - Attended, telegram from German Foreign Minister to German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated 28 May 1939, requesting information regarding new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference . . . 195
- 28 Aug 39 - Attended, explained reason for cabinet resignation . . . . . 196

Five Ministers Conferences:

- 6 May 39 - Attended, at which secured a compromise regarding cooperation for a Tripartite Pact . 246
- 8 Aug 39 - Attended, at which according to OTT's cablegram concessions from Germany decided necessary for Tripartite Pact . . . . . 250

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

- 17 July 40 - Attended, which decided to recommend KONOYE to succeed YONAI . . . . . 252
- 29 Nov 41 - Attended, which discussed war with US . . . . . 257
- 1 Dec 41 - Attended, which discussed war with US . . . . . 259
- 17 July 44 - Attended, which discussed resignation of TOJO Cabinet . . . . . 261
- 18 July 44 - Attended, which decided that TERAUCHI KOISO or HATA succeed TOJO . . . . . 263
- 20 July 44 - Attended, which approved coalition cabinet of KOISO and YONAI . . . . . 267
- 5 April 45 - Attended, which decided that SUZUKI succeed KOISO . . . . . 274

HIRAO, Hachisaburo (Minister of  
Education in HIROTA Cabinet)  
Deceased

HIROHITO, The Emperor

Privy Council Meetings:

- 25 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 89
- 22 Nov 38 - Attended, ratified agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan & Germany . . . 100
- 22 Feb 39 - Attended, Decision that Hungary and Manchuria to participate in Anti-Comintern Pact .106
- 3 July 41 - Attended, ratified two protocols - France-Japan; & Thai-Japan on guaranty & political understanding . . . . . 133

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

- 1 Dec 41- Attended, which discussed war with United States . . . . . 259

HIROSE, Hisatada (?) Vice Welfare Minister '38

Privy Council Meetings:

- 2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . 97

HIROTA, Koki (Kooki)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 3 July 35- Attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee . . . 81
- Stated that Japanese member of Committee would make no decision disadvantageous to Japan . . 84
- 25 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 89
- 20 Jan 37 - Attended, decided the appointment of naval officers as Administrators of the South Sea Islands . . . . . 91
- 6 Nov 37 - Attended, decided to allow Italy to Join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 94-5

Cabinet Meetings:

- 11 July 37- Attended as Foreign Minister in KONOYE Cabinet, increase North China Army . . . . . 183

Four Ministers' Conferences:

- 7 Aug 36- Attended, which decided foreign policy of Empire . . . . . 233

HIROTA, Koki (Kooki) Cont'd.

Five Ministers' Conferences:

30 June 36 - Attended, which decided basis of national policy . . . . .	242
7 Aug 36- Attended, which decided basic principle of national policy . . . . .	243
11 Aug 36- Attended, which decided fundamental of national policy . . . . .	244

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

17 July 40- Attended, which decided to recommend KONOYE to succeed YONAI . . . . .	252
17 July 41 - Attended, which approved KONOYE as Premier for third time . . . . .	254
17 Oct 41 - Attended, which approved TOJO to succeed KONOYE . . . . .	255
29 Nov 41 - Attended, which discussed war with United States . . . . .	257
1 Dec 41 - Attended, which discussed war with United States . . . . .	259
17 July 44- Attended, which discussed resignation of TOJO Cabinet . . . . .	261
18 July 44 - Attended, which decided that TERAUCHI, KOISO or HATA succeed TOJO . . . . .	263
20 July 44 - Attended, which approved coalition cabinet of KOISO & YONAI . . . . .	264
5 April 45 - Attended, which decided to recommend SUZUKI to succeed KOISO . . . . .	265

HITLER, Adolph

Liaison Conferences:

6 June 41- decision of Hitler to attack Russia discussed at, . . . . .	37
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HONDA (Chief of Armed Forces Bureau)

Military Service Bureau Conferences:

April 42- Attended, which decided that POWs engage in forced labor . . . . .	275
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HONDO (Inspector)

Privy Council Meetings:

21 Oct 42- Attended, to explain the establishment of Great Asia Ministry . . . . .	149
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HONJO, Shigeru (Commander-in-chief of  
Kwantung Army; Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

HORI, Teikichi

Privy Council Meetings.

1 Oct 30- Attended, re London Naval Treaty 68

HORIE, Hideo

Privy Council Meetings.

18 Aug - 26 Sept-30 Attended, discussed London Naval  
Treaty . . . . . 65  
1 Oct 30 - Attended, re ratification London Naval  
Treaty . . . . . 68  
9 Dec 31- Attended, Report of China Incident . . . 70  
13 Sept 32- Attended, approved signing of Jap-Manchukuo  
protocol . . . . . 73  
25 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 89  
6 Nov 37- Attended, decided to allow Italy to join  
Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 95  
2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution to end cooper-  
ative relations with League Of Nations . . . . . 97  
22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution for cultural  
cooperation agreement with Germany . . . . . 100  
22 Feb 39 - Attended, agreed to participation of Hungary  
and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 106  
26 Sept 40 - Attended, approved Tripartite Pact . 111  
18 Dec 40 - Attended, discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia,  
& Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125  
16 June 41 - Attended as Chief Sec'y, Japanese-France  
treaties for residence, navigation, trade and tariff  
system in FIC . . . . . 127  
3 July 41 - Attended as above, which ratified two  
protocols between France & Japan, between Thailand  
Japan on guaranty & political understandings . 133  
24 Nov 41 - Attended as above, which decided to postpone  
the Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 143  
10 Dec 41 - Attended as above, which decided to ratify  
the treaty against separate peace between Japan-  
Germany - Italy . . . . . 147  
9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42 - Attended as above,  
discussed organization of Great East Asia . . 149-153  
18 Aug 43 - Attended as above, ratified conclusion of  
treaty between Japan & Thailand concerning territory  
in Malaya & Shan areas . . . . . 154

HORIKIRI, ZembeI

Privy Council Meetings.

13 Sept 32- ..ttended, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo  
protocol . . . . . 73

HORINOUCI, Kensuke (Explinator)

Privy Council Meetings:

25 Nov 36 - ..ttended, approved Anti-Comintern  
Pact . . . . . 89  
6 Nov 37 - Attended, decided to allow Italy to join  
Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 95

HOSHINO, Naoki (Accused)

Imperial Conferences:

5 Nov 41 - Attended, decided policy towards U.S.,  
England and Netherlands . . . . . 18  
1 Dec 41 - Attended, decided to declare war on U.S.,  
Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

Liaison Conferences:

o/a 30 Nov 41 - Attended, re composition and delivery  
of final note . . . . . 52

Privy Council Meetings:

26 Sept 40 - Attended, as "explainer", approved  
Tripartite Pact . . . . . 111  
26 Sept 40 - Attended, statement regarding Japan's  
resources . . . . . 112  
8 Dec 41 - Attended as "Explainer", the meeting which  
approved the ratification pertaining to declaration  
of war against America & England . . . . . 145  
9, 12, 14 Oct 43 - Attended as "Exponent" the meeting  
for organization of Great East Asia Ministry . 149

Cabinet Meetings:

26 July 40 - Attended as M/W/P, established Greater  
East Asia policy and planned internal economy . 199-200  
22 Jan 41 - Attended as above, increase population to  
secure leadership in East Asia . . . . . 205  
1 Dec 41 - Attended as Chief Secretary of Cabinet,  
member of Liaison Conference responsible for basis  
of last note to U.S. . . . . 226

HOTTA, Masaoki

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30 - Attended, London Naval Treaty . . . . . 68

Hungary

Privy Council Meetings:

6 Nov 37 - Admittance of Hungary to Anti-Comintern  
Pact . . . . . 95  
22 Feb 39 - Approved participation of Hungary and  
Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 106  
18 Dec 40 - Joining Tripartite Pact discussed . . 125

IDE (Adm. Official, Foreign  
Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 21 Nov 41 - attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact, p. 142-3  
10 Dec 41 - attended as "explainer", which decided to  
ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany,  
Italy and Japan . . . . . 147

IIJIMA

Privy Council Meeting:

- 20 Oct 42 - attended to explain establishment of Great  
Asia Ministry. . . . . 149

IKEDA, Seihin

Privy Council Meetings:

- 21 Nov 41 - attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact.. 142  
8 Dec 41 - attended as councillor, approved ratifi-  
cation of declaration of war against America and  
England..... 145  
10 Dec 41 - attended as above, which decided to ratify  
no separate peace treaty between Germany, Italy and  
Japan . . . . . 147  
9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42 - attended as coun-  
cillor, for organization of Great Asia Ministry .. 149-151  
12 August 43 - Attended as councillor, conclusion of  
treaty between Japan-Thailand concerning Thai terri-  
tory in Shan areas . . . . . 154

Five Ministers' Conferences:

- 25 Nov 38 - Attended, which decided to capture Hainan  
Island. . . . . 245

IMANATSU (Director of Police Bureau,  
Home Ministry)

Privy Council Meeting:

- 21 Nov 41 - Attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact 142-3



IMAYOSHI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

9, 12, 15 Oct 42 - attended to explain establishment of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149

IMPERIAL AVIATION POLICY

Cabinet Meeting:

12 Aug 32 - Decision, after acquiring control of Manchukuo to organize Japanese controlled aviation company to operate in . . . . . 172-3

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES

Dec. 31 - Occupation of Kirin, Mukden, Heilungking and Jehol, decided at, according to Araki. . . . . 2

11 Jan. 38 - decided the basic policy of disposition of China Incident . . . . . 4

10-26 Sept. 40- Matsuoka's explanation of Tripartite Pact. . . . . 6-9

2 July 41- Adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 10-12

6 Sep 41 - Adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 13-17

5 Nov 41 - Decided policy towards U.S., England and Netherlands . . . . . 18-22

1 Dec 41 - Decided Japan would declare war on U.S., Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

31 May 43 - decided to incorporate West Indies areas into Japanese territories. . . . . 25

INO, KINOYA (Signature Minister, 1933 Cabinet)

Imperial Conferences:

1 Dec 41 - Attended, decided to declare war on U.S., Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

Liaison Conferences:

o/a 30 Nov 41 - Attended, completion of plans for war with U.S. . . . . 57

IMAYOSHI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meeting:

9, 12, 15 Oct 42 - attended to explain establishment of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149

IMPERIAL AVIATION POLICY

Cabinet Meeting:

12 Aug 32 - Decision, after acquiring control of Manchukuo to organize Japanese controlled aviation company to operate in . . . . . 172-3

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES

Dec. 31 - Occupation of Kirin, Mukden, Heilungking and Jehol, decided at, according to Araki. . . . . 2

11 Jan. 38 - decided the basic policy of disposition of China Incident . . . . . 4

10-26 Sept. 40- Matsuoka's explanation of Tripartite Pact. . . . . 6-9

2 July 41- Adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 10-12

6 Sep 41 - Adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 13-17

5 Nov 41 - Decided policy towards U.S., England and Netherlands . . . . . 18-22

1 Dec 41 - Decided Japan would declare war on U.S., Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

31 May 43 - decided to incorporate East Indies areas into Japanese territories. . . . . 25

INO, Hirono (Agriculture Minister, TOJO Cabinet)

Imperial Conferences:

1 Dec 41 - Attended, decided to declare war on U.S., Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

Liaison Conferences:

●/a 30 Nov 41 - Attended, completion of plans for war with U.S.A. . . . . 57

INO, Hiroya (Cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 16 June 41 - Attended as Agriculture & Forestry  
Minister, ratification of Japanese-French treaties  
for residence & navigation & trade and tariff systems  
in FIC . . . . . 127  
State
- 8 Dec 41 - Attended as Minister which approved ratifi-  
cation of declaration of war against America and  
England . . . . . 145
- 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42 - Attended as State  
Minister, meetings, 1st/7th for organization of Great  
Asia Ministry . . . . . 149-154
- 3 July 43 - Attended as State Minister, to ratify France-  
Japanese, and Thai-Japanese protocols, both refer to  
guaranty and political understandings . . . . . 133

Cabinet Meetings:

- 22 Aug 41 - Attended, National Mobilization Plan to  
maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new inter-  
national situation . . . . . 215-16
- 4 Nov 41 - Attended, Policy of press and speech  
regulation . . . . . 223
- 8 Dec 41 - Attended, report of war progress and war  
policy . . . . . 231

INOUE, Junnosuke (Finance Minister in  
HAMAGUCHI Cabinet)

Deceased

INOUE, Hajiro (Explainer, Director  
Europe & Asia Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 6 Nov 37 - Attended, decided to allow Italy to join  
Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 95

INOUE, Tsuyoshi (Prime Minister)

Deceased

IRIYE, Toshiro (Councillor of  
Legislation Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

9, 12, 21 Oct 42 - Attended, to explain establishment  
of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149

ISHIGURO, Tadaatsu (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ISHIGURO, Tadashige (Director of Trade  
Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 June 41 - Attended as Explainer, which approved  
Japan-French Treaties for residence and trade and  
tariff system in FIC . . . . . 127

8 Jul 41 - Attended to explain two protocols: France-  
Japanese & Thai-Japanese on guaranty and political  
understandings . . . . . 133-4

ISHII, Kikijuro (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ISHIKAWA, Junkichi (Sec'y of Foodstuff  
Control Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 June 41 - Attended to explain Japanese-French  
treaties for residence & navigation and trade &  
tariff system in FIC . . . . . 127

ISHIWATA, Sotaro

Four Ministers' Conferences:

2 Sept 44 - Presumably attended, which decided in-  
dependence of NEI to be announced . . . . . 240

Five Ministers Conferences:

6 May 39 - Attended, which decided on compromise re  
garding a Tripartite Pact . . . . . 246

8 Aug 39 - Attended, at which, according to OTT's  
telegram, it was decided German concessions nec-  
essary for Tripartite Pact . . . . . 250

ISHIWATA, Toshiichi (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ISHIZAWA (Sect. Chief)

Joint Conferences:

- 12 July 40 - Attended, which discussed strengthening Axis harmony . . . . . 282
- 16 July 40 - Attended, which agreed to intensify Axis coalition . . . . . 282

ISHIZUKA, Eizo (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ITAGAKI, Seishiro (Accused) (War Minister)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . . 97
- 22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution to conclude agreement for cultural cooperation with Germany . . . . . 100
- 22 Feb 39 - Attended, agreed to participation of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . 106

Cabinet Meetings:

- 24 Sept 31 - SAKAGAKI is name in re Mukden Incident, probably means ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Accused . .164
- 12 Aug 32 - Mentioned, controlled policies & activities of Manchukuo government . . . . . 174-5
- 18 Jan 38 - Discussed plan to regulate import and export of essential materials . . . . . 191-2
- 9 Aug 38 - Reported on Changkufeng Incident . . 193
- 28 May 39 - Attended, Japan advised that entrance to European war would be reserved . . . . . 195
- 28 Aug 39 - Attended, Discussed bloc resignation of cabinet . . . . . 196

ITAGAKI, Seishiro (Cont'd)

Five Ministers' Conferences:

- 25 Nov 38 - Attended, which decided to capture Hainan Islands . . . . . 245
- 6 May 39 - Attended, which decided on compromise regarding Tripartite Pact . . . . . 246
- 8 Aug 39 - Attended, at which O'T's cablegram shows concessions from Germany needed for a Tripartite Pact . . . . . 250

Italian- Japanese Relations

Imperial Conferences:

- 5 Nov 41 - Decided measures towards, after outbreak of Jap-American war. . . . . 19

Liaison Conferences:

- /a 30 October 41 - Discussed what cooperation could be expected if war broke out with America . . 43
- 13 Nov 41 - Decided to disclose to, Japan's starting war against USA and Britain . . . . . 50

Privy Council Meetings:

- 2 Nov 38 - Decided on agreement for cultural cooperation with . . . . . 101
- 10 Dec 41 - Ratified no separate peace treaty . 147

Five Ministers' Conferences:

- 6 May 39 - Decided on compromise regarding cooperation with, for a Tripartite Pact . . . . . 246
- 8 Aug 39 - Decided concessions from, for a Tripartite Pact necessary . . . . . 250

Joint Conferences:

- 12 July 40- Discussed strengthening harmony with-282
- 16 July 40- Agreed upon intensification of coalition with . . . . . 283

ITO, Hachiro (Explainer from  
Finance Ministry)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 June 41- Attended as explainer the meeting which  
approved Japanese-French treaties for residence and  
navigation, trade and tariff systems in FIC . 127

ITO, Miyoji (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ITO, Seiichi (Vice Chief of Navy  
General Staff)

Imperial Conferences:

6 Sept 41 - Attended, which adopted resolution re Jap-  
American negotiations . . . . . 13

5 Nov 41 - Attended, decided policy towards US,  
England and Netherlands . . . . . 18

1 Dec 41 - Attended, Decided to declare war on US,  
Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

Liaison Conferences:

o/e 30 Nov 41 - Attended, re complete war plans  
against USA . . . . . 57

Cabinet Meetings:

1 Dec 41 - Attended, <sup>partly</sup> responsible for composition of  
final note to US . . . . . 226

IWAMURA, Michiyo (Justice Minister in  
TOJO's Cabinet)

Imperial Conferences:

1 Dec 41 - Attended, decided to declare war on US,  
Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30- Attended, re London Naval Treaty . . 68

21 Nov 41 - Attended as Justice Minister, decided to  
prolong Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 142

8 Dec 41 - Attended, ratified declaration of war  
against America & England . . . . . 145

IWAMURA, Michiyo (Cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

- 22 Aug 41 - Attended, national mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation . . . . . 215-6
- 4 Nov 41 - Attended, policy of press and speech regulation . . . . . 223

IZAWA, Takao (Councillor)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 3 July 41 - Attended, ratified Franco-Japanese & Thai-Japanese Protocols on guaranty & political understandings . . . . . 133
- 21 Nov 41 - Attended, prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 142
- 8 Dec 41 - Attended, approved ratification pertaining to declaration of war against America and England . . . . . 145
- 10 Dec 41 - Attended as above at the meeting which decided to ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan . . . . . 147
- 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42 - Attended as councillor and committee man, discussed organization of Great East Asia Ministry & other matters. 149-154



KADOWAKI (Exponent)

Privy Council Meetings:

19 & 20 Oct 42, attended to explain  
the establishment of Great Asia  
Ministry . . . . . p. 149

KAMATA, Eikichi (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

KAMETARA, Shinichi (Political Affairs Bureau  
Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Aug 43, attended to explain the treaty  
that Thailand should annex Shan State  
from Burma . . . . . 154

KANIVAMA, Mitsunoshin (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

KAN, (Chief of Ordnance Bureau)

Military Service Bureau Conferences:

Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's  
engage in forced labor . . . . . 275

KANEKO, Kantaro (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

KANEMITSU, Tsuneo (Minister of Overseas Affairs in  
ABE's Cabinet, Minister of Welfare  
in 2nd Konoye Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Czech,  
Hungary and Rumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . 125  
3 Jul 40, attended, ratified two Protocols,  
Franco-Japanese and Thai-Japanese to  
guaranty and political understandings . . . . . 133

Cabinet Meetings:

24 Oct 39, attended, changed value of  
yen from sterling to dollars . . . . . 197  
22 Jan 41, attended, increase population  
to secure leadership in East Asia . . . . . 205

KINAMORI (Councillor, Bureau of Legislation)

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30, attended, London Naval Treaty . . . . .	p. 68
13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing Japan-Manchukuo protocol . . . . .	73

KANAYA, Hanzo (Chief, Army General Staff)

Cabinet Meetings:

19-23 Sep 31, attended, discussed Mukden Incident . . . . .	161, 162
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KANROJI, Osanaga

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

17 Jul 40, attended, decided to recommend Konoye to succeed Yonai . . . . .	252
17 Jul 41, attended, approved Konoye as Premier for third time . . . . .	254

KISAGI, Ryousei

Cabinet Meetings:

12 Aug 32, testified government of Manchukuo planned, controlled and financed by Japan . . . . .	174, 175
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KATSU, Masuori (Minister of Communications in Yonai's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

3 Mar 40, attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US for materials . . . . .	198
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KIWADA, Retsu (Finance Minister)

Privy Council Meetings:

26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
18 Dec 40, attended, discussed Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
16 June 41, attended, approved Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation, and trade & tariff system in FIC . . . . .	127

KAWADA, Retsu (cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings: (cont'd)

- 3 Jul 41, attended, ratified 2 protocols -  
France-Japanese, and Thai-Japanese, of  
guaranty and political understandings . . . . . p. 133

Imperial Conferences:

- 2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution  
re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 10

KAWAI, Misao (deceased)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 3 Jul 41, attended, as councillor,  
ratified France-Japanese, and Thai-  
Japanese protocols, treaty of guaranty  
and political understandings . . . . . 133

KAWAMOTO, Kunio (Secretary of Colonial Dept.)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 16 Jun 41, attended to explain Jap-French  
treaties for residence & navigation, and  
trade & tariff system in F.I.C. . . . . 127
- 15, 19, 20 & 21 Oct 42, attended to explain  
establishment of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149

KAWATSUMI, Hiroshi (Director of Southern Area  
Colonial Dept.)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 16 Jun 41, attended to explain Jap-  
French treaties for residence &  
navigation, and trade & tariff  
system in F.I.C. . . . . 127
- 8 Jul 41, attended to explain 2 protocols -  
France-Jap., and Thai-Jap., on guaranty  
and political understandings . . . . . 133-

KAWARADA, Kakichi (Minister of Education  
in ABE's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

- 24 Oct 39, attended, changed external  
value of yen from sterling to dollars . . . . . 197

KAWASAKI (Dir. of Bar. Leg.)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 1 Oct 30, attended, re London Naval  
Treaty . . . . . 68

KAWATA, Isao (Minister of Finance in  
2nd Konoye Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

- 26 Jul 40, attended, established Greater East Asia policy and planned internal economy . . . . . P. 199, 200

MIYA, Okinori (accused) (Finance Minister in Tojo Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 94-5  
8 Dec 41, attended as state minister, ratified declaration of war against America and England . . . . . 145

Imperial Conferences:

- 5 Nov 41, attended, decided policy towards US, England & Netherlands . . . . . 18  
1 Dec 41, attended, decided to declare war on US, Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

Liaison Conferences:

- o/a 30 Nov 41, attended, re composition and delivery of final note . . . . . 52  
See generally pages 32-63.  
For attendance from 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41 see page 32.  
For attendance after 21 Jul 41, see pages 33 (acc to Tojo); page 34 (acc to Togo and Nagano)

Cabinet Meetings:

- See generally pages 213 to 281--Index refers to attendance as shown in Exhibits only  
11 Jul 37, attended, increase north China army . . . . . 183  
4 Nov 41, attended, policy of press and speech regulation . . . . . 223  
1 Dec 41, attended, member of liaison conference responsible for basis of last note to U.S. . . . . 226

KAZAMI, Akira (Chief, Cabinet Secretary)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 18 Dec 40, attended, discussed re Hungary, Czech & Rumania join Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125

KAZAMI, Akira (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

- 18 Jan 38, discussed plan to regulate import and export of essential materials . . . . . p. 191, 192
- 26 Jul 40, attended, established greater East Asia policy and planned internal economy . . . . . 199, 200

KIDO's DEMY (See Kido, Koichi)

KIDO, Koichi (Accused) (Minister of Welfare)

Imperial Conferences:

- 2 Jul 41, stated that it was decided at Imperial Conference to cope with situation caused by Russo-German War . . . . . 12
- 6 Sep 41, stated Emperor wanted to ask questions at Imperial Conference & that Supreme War Command did not answer questions re diplomatic moves . . . . . 13-14
- 6 Sep 41, extract from, re decision of council in Imperial presence on 6 Sep 41 . . . . . 17
- 5 Nov 41, extract from, re policy towards USA, England and Netherlands decided . . . . . 18
- 1 Dec 41, extract from, Imperial conferences decided to declare war against US, Great Britain, NEI . . . . . 24
- 31 May 43, extract from, saying that gist of principle on subjugation of Greater East Asia decided in Imperial Presence . . . . . 26

Liaison Conferences:

- 30 Jan, 3 Feb 41, reported Chiefs of Army and Navy General Staff and Premier reported to Emperor policy towards French Indo-China & Thailand . . . . . 35
- 6 Jun 41, extract from, conference to discuss Hitler's decision to attack Russia . . . . . 37
- 25 Jun 41, according to KIDO, Prime Minister, Chiefs of Army and Navy General Staff reported to palace Japanese troops entry into French Indo-China . . . . . 38
- o/a 29 Oct 41, extract from, reports the extension of Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 42

Privy Council Meetings:

- 2 Nov 38, extract from, stating that KIDO attended meeting of Privy Council and it was decided to cease cooperating with League of Nations . . . . . 99

Privy Council Meetings: (cont'd)

22 Nov 38, attended, decided to cease cooperation with League of Nations . . . . . n. 100

Cabinet Meetings:

27 Oct 37, attended, considered invitation to 9 power pact conference . . . . . 185  
 19 Nov 37, attended, considered IG Hq regulations covered incidents as well as war . . . . . 186  
 21 Dec 37, attended, discussed negotiations with and counter measures against China, as well as draft answer to German Ambassador . . . . . 187  
 14 Jan 38, attended, considered establishing and recognizing provisional Chinese government . . . . . 188,189  
 9 Aug 38, attended, discussed Changkufeng incident as well as German-Jap. relations with reference to European situation . . . . . 193  
 28 Aug 39, attended, discussed reason for cabinet resignation and composition of new cabinet . . . . . 196  
 28 Jun 41, Tojo advised Kwantung Army to prudently watch German-Russo war . . . . . 212  
 16 Jul 41, received Imperial order to confer with president of Privy Council re next premier . . . . . 214

Home Meeting at KONOYE Home:

12 Oct 41, reason for recommending TOJO as premier after fall of KONOYE Cabinet . . . . . 222

Five Ministers' Conference

12 Jul 40, asked by Emperor if an order by Chief of General Staff for artillery mobilization for South China had been cleared with the government. Means of YONAI-ARITA Cabinet downfall, shown. . . . . 251

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

17 Jul 41, attended, approved Konoye as Prime Minister for 3rd time . . . . . 254  
 17 Oct 41, attended, approved Tojo to succeed Konoye . . . . . 255  
 29 Nov 41, attended, discussed war with US . . . . . 257  
 17 Jul 44, discussed necessity of resignation of Tojo cabinet and composition of new cabinet . . . . . 261, 262  
 18 Jul 44, attended, decided that Terauchi, Koiso, or Hata succeed Tojo . . . . . 263  
 20 Jul 44, attended, approved coalition cabinet of Koiso and Tonai . . . . . 264  
 5 Apr 45, attended, decided to recommend Suzuki to succeed Koiso . . . . . 265

KIMURA, Heitaro (Attorney General)

Supreme War Plans Council Meetings:

30 Jul 41, attended, discussed international situation . . . . . 281

KIMURA, Heitaro (cont'd)

Military Service Bureau Conferences:

Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's  
engage in forced labor . . . . . p.275

KIMURA, Shotatsu (Minister of Justice in  
Yonai's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

3 Mar 40, attended, economic policy to  
relieve Japan of dependence on US  
for materials . . . . . 198

KISHI, Nobusuke (Minister of Commerce and  
Industry, Tojo's Cabinet)

Imperial Conferences:

1 Dec 41, attended, decided to declare  
war on US, Britain & Netherlands . . . . . 23

Cabinet Meetings:

4 Nov 41, attended, policy of press and  
speech regulation . . . . . 223

KIYOURA, Keigo

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

17 Oct 41, attended, approved Tojo  
to succeed Konoye . . . . . 255

KOBAYASHI

(Vice Minister of Navy)

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30, attended, re London  
Naval Treaty . . . . . 68  
18 Dec 40, attended, discuss re  
Hungary, Czech and Rumania joining  
Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125

KOBAYASHI, Ichizo (Minister of Commerce in  
2nd Konoye Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

26 Jul 40, attended, established greater  
East Asia policy and planned internal  
economy . . . . . 199  
200

KODAMA, Hideo (Overseas Minister)  
(Home Minister in Yonai's Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:  
 3 Jul 35, attended, approved Japanese-  
 Manchukuo Agreement for Joint  
 Economic Committee . . . . . p.8

Cabinet Meetings:  
 3 Mar 40, attended, economic policy  
 to relieve Japan of dependence on  
 US for materials . . . . . 198

KOISO, Kuniaki (Chief Military Affairs Bureau)

Cabinet Meetings:  
 19-23 Sep 31, attended, discussed  
 Mukden Incident . . . . . 161  
 162  
 8 Aug 33, describes method for Japan  
 guidance of independent Manchuria . . . . . 178  
 179  
 3 Mar 40, attended, economic policy to  
 relieve Japan of dependence on US for  
 materials . . . . . 198

Conferences of Senior Statesman:  
 18 Jul 44, Emperor decided to appoint,  
 succeeding Tojo . . . . . 263  
 20 Jul 44, attended, approved coalition  
 cabinet of Koiso and Yonai . . . . . 264  
 5 Apr 45, decided to appoint successor to . . . . . 265

KOIZUMI, Chikahiko (Welfare Minister,  
 Tojo Cabinet)  
 Deceased

Imperial Conferences:  
 1 Dec 41, attended, decided to declare  
 war on US, Britain & Netherlands . . . . . 23

KOIZUMI, Matajiro (Communications Minister  
 in 2nd Wakatsuki's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:  
 19-23 Sep 31, attended, discussed  
 Mukden Incident . . . . . 161  
 162



KONDO, Nobutake (Vice Chief, Navy General Staff)

Imperial Conferences:

2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution  
re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . p. 10

Liaison Conferences:

13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings  
except those from 10 Apr to 25 Jun incl. . . . . 33

KONOYE, Hidemaro

Privy Council Meetings:

2 Nov 37, attended Investigation  
Committee & Privy Council, passed  
resolution to terminate cooperative  
relations with I. of N's. . . . . 97

6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow  
Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 95

22 Nov 38, attended, passed agreement  
for cultural cooperation with Germany . . . . . 100

22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to partici-  
pation of Hungary & Manchuria in  
Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 106

26 Sep 40, attended, Investigation  
Committee replied to question re  
German alliance . . . . . 111  
113  
116

26 Sep 40, attended, approved the  
Tripartite Pact . . . . . 116

18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re  
Hungary, Czech & Rumania's joining an  
Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125

28 Jul 41, attended, Investigation Committee  
& Plenary Session, ratified Protocol with  
France regarding common defense of F.I.C. . . . . 139

KONOYE (KONOE), Fumimaro (Prince, Premier)  
Deceased

Imperial Conferences:

2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution  
re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 10

6 Sep 41 (same as above) . . . . . 13

6 Sep 41, attended, own account of fall  
of his cabinet . . . . . 16

Liaison Conferences:

13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings . . . . . 32

30 Jan, 3 Feb 41, accompanied Chief of Army  
General Staff to Palace to report outline  
of policy towards FIC & Thailand decided  
upon to Emperor . . . . . 35

KONOYE (KONOE), Fumimaro (cont'd)

Liaison Conferences: (cont'd)

- 6 Jun 41, attended, according to Kido  
diary, rec'd telegram from Oshima  
stating Hitler decided to attack Russia . . . . . p.37

Cabinet Meetings:

- 11 Jul 37, attended, decision, send  
larger army to north China . . . . . 183
- 22 Oct 37, attended, decision, establish  
and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo . . . . . 184
- 27 Oct 37, attended, decided to answer  
invitation to 9 power pact . . . . . 185
- 19 Nov 37, attended, decision, liaison  
between Imperial GHQ and government . . . . . 186
- 21 Dec 37, attended, discussed counter  
measures for China affair and answer to  
German Ambassador drafted . . . . . 187
- 14 Jan 38, attended, decided on fixed  
policy re Chinese National government . . . . . 188
- 16 Jan 38, attended, considered Germany  
should change policy toward Japs in China . . . . . 190
- 18 Jan 38, attended, decision, regulate  
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- 9 Aug 38, attended, discussed Changkufeng  
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- 12 Dec 38, attended, decision, increase  
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- 28 Aug 39, told Kido that Abe ordered to  
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- 26 Jul 40, attended, decision, defined  
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- 3 Oct 40, attended, decision, outline for  
economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo  
and China . . . . . 201
- 25 Oct 40, attended, decision, measures for  
economic development of NEI . . . . . 203
- 5 Nov 40, attended, decision, summary for  
economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo  
and China . . . . . 204
- 7 Mar 41, attended, decision, Nat'l. Mobil.  
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- 2 May 41, to enforce Nat'l. Defense Security  
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- 28 Jun 41, attended, decision, tighten grip  
on Indo-China . . . . . 212
- 2 Jul 41, attended, continue policy of 2nd  
Cabinet on basis of Tripartite Pact . . . . . 213
- 16 Jul 41, attended, decision, 2nd cabinet  
to resign "en bloc" . . . . . 214
- 22 Aug 41, attended, decision, Nat'l.  
commodity mobilization plan . . . . . 215

KONOYE (KONOE), Fumimaro (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings: (cont'd)

- 5 Sep 41, attended, decision, land and sea transportation placed on war basis . . . . . 2
- 12 Sep 41, attended, decision, workers mobilization plan . . . . . 2
- 12 Oct 41, attended, decision, not to change re demands on troops in China and to secure results of China incident . . . . . 2

Four Ministers Conferences:

- 4 Sep 40, attended, decided outline of basic national policy . . . . . 1
- 5, 21 Nov 40, attended, decided on assistance to and relation of Thailand in New Order . . . . . 1

Five Ministers Conferences:

- 25 Nov 38, attended, decided to capture Hainan Island . . . . . 4

Conferences of Senior Statesman:

- 29 Nov 41, attended, discussed war with US . . . . . 2
- 1 Dec 41, attended, discussed war with US . . . . . 2
- 17 Jul 44, attended, discussed resignation of Tojo Cabinet . . . . . 4
- 18 Jul 44, attended, decided that Terachi, Koiso, or Hata succeed Tojo . . . . . 4
- 20 Jul 44, attended, approved coalition cabinet of Koiso and Yonai . . . . . 4
- 5 Apr 45, attended, decided that Suzuki succeed Koiso . . . . . 4
- 17 Jul 40, attended, decision, recommend as prime minister . . . . . 2
- 17 Jul 41, approved as P.M. for 3rd time . . . . . 2
- 17 Oct 41, Tojo approved as successor to . . . . . 2

KONUMA

Cabinet Meetings:

- 11 Apr 32, transfer raw opium from, to Manchukuo and to increase growing acreage . . . . . 2

Five Ministers Conference:

- 11 Aug 36, decided to complete military forces in . . . . . 2

KOYAMA, Matsukichi (Minister of Justice in Saito's Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing Japan-Manchukuo protocol . . . . . 2

KOYAMA, Matsukichi (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

12 Aug 32, attended, acquire and develop  
aviation rights in Manchuria . . . . . p. 17  
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KUBOTA, Yuzuru (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

KURATOMI, Yuzaburo

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Aug - 26 Sep 30, attended, discussed  
Japan's national defense . . . . . 65-67  
1 Oct 30, attended, re London Naval Treaty . . . . . 68  
9 Dec 31, attended, report of China Incident . . . . . 70  
13 Sep 32, attended, approved Japan-Manchukuo  
protocol . . . . . 73

KURIHARA                   Exposition (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to par-  
ticipation of Hungary & Manchuria  
in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 106

KURIHASHI                   (Chief of Security Bureau)

Military Service Bureau Conferences:

Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's  
engage in forced labor . . . . . 275

KURINO, Shinichiro (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

KURIYAMA                   (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

25 Nov 36, attended, approved  
Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 89

KURODA, Naganari (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

KUROSAKI

Exposition (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to participation of Manchuria & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . p.106

KWANTUNG ARMY

Privy Council Meetings:

- 3 Jul 35, Chief of as permanent member of Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee . . . . . 82

Cabinet Meetings:

- 8 Aug 33, to administer plan for guiding Manchukuo prepared by General Staff Headquarters . . . . . 178,  
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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Privy Council Meetings:

13 Sep 32, could not agree to settle Sino-Japan dispute under Article 15 of . . . . .	p.79
3 Jul 35, basic policy of Japan towards Manchukuo, found Rescript of March 1933 on withdrawal from League . . . . .	81
19 Jul 37 (Manchukuo) approval new laws forbidding the sale, etc. of narcotics without license as result of action of . . . . .	93
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25 Jun 41, decided to accelerate all preparatory measures towards Thailand & FIC . . . . .	38
4 Aug 41, decided principle of negotiations w/Soviet Union . . . . .	40
Between 18 Oct & 2 Nov 41, discussed policy for improvement of relations w/America . . . . .	41
o/a 29 Oct 41, Kido refuses extension of Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	42
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4 Nov 41, last counterproposal for resumption of Jap-American negotiations decided upon . . . . .	47

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Privy Council Meetings:

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3 Jul 35, basic policy of Japan towards Manchukuo found Rescript of March 1933 on withdrawal from League . . . . . 81

19 Jul 37 (Manchukuo) approved new laws forbidding the sale, etc. of narcotics without license as result of action of . . . . . 93

2 Nov 38, decided to terminate cooperative relations with, because League adopted resolution to apply economic sanctions to Japan re Sino-Japanese Incident . . . . . 98

LIAISON

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LIAISON CONFERENCES

27 Jul 40, decided main points in re dealing with situation to meet change in world conditions . . . . . 28

19 Sep 40, decided to strengthen Jap-Germany-Italy axis . . . . . 29

13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, decided P.M., Foreign Minister & other ministers concerned should attend office of High Command occasionally & exchange views & project national policies w/war, Navy & Staff of H.C. "no more press announcements of L.C or I.C. . . . . 33

30 Jan, 3 Feb 41, decided policy towards Thailand & F.I.C. . . . . 35, 36

6 Jun 41, Hitler decided to attack Russia . . . . . 37

25 Jun 41, decided to accelerate all preparatory measures towards Thailand & FIC . . . . . 38

4 Aug 41, decided principle of negotiations w/Soviet Union . . . . . 40

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EMBAISON CONFERENCES (cont'd)

11 Nov 41, set forth principle reasons for outbreak of war . . . . .	p.48
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30 Nov 41, I.C. agreed to final note . . . . .	60
12 Dec 41, reported on economic plan for southern area . . . . .	62
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MAGUIDA, Chieji

Privy Council Meetings:	
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MAEDA, Yonezo (Railways Minister in Hirota's Cabinet & Hiranuma's Cabinet  
Minister of Commerce in Inuaki's Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:	
25 Nov 26, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	89



MAEDA, Yonezo (cont'd)

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occupation . . . . . p.166-  
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MANCHURIA-MANCHUKUO

Imperial Conferences:  
Dec 31, occupation of Kirin, Mukden,  
Heilungking & Jehol, decided at,  
according to Araki . . . . . 2

Privy Council Meetings:  
9 Dec 31, in re discussion independence of . . . . . 71  
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4 provinces of . . . . . 72  
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Military budget of Manchukuo . . . . . 77,  
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3 Jul 35, approved Japanese-Manchukuo  
agreement for Joint Economic Committee . . . . . 81  
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without license . . . . . 93  
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order in East Asia through mutual col-  
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budget to pacify and occupy four  
provinces of . . . . . 166  
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12 Aug 32, decision to control all aviation in, thru control of a company organized by Japanese and Manchurians . . . . .	172 173 174
12 Aug 32, decision to formally recognize . . . . .	174
9 Dec 32, decision to conclude treaty re communications with . . . . .	176
11 Apr 33, decision to transfer opium from Korea to . . . . .	177
8 Aug 33, decision that Manchukuo while nominally independent would have policy prepared by General Staff Headquarters and administered by Kwantung Army though Manchukuoan officials would outwardly appear to be in charge . . . . .	178 179
22 Dec 33, decision to change government of Manchukuo from regency to constitutional monarchy though no change of policy of guidance by Japan . . . . .	180 181
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22 Oct 37, decision to form national company to organize and develop heavy industries and mining industry of . . . . .	184
12 Dec 38, decision to approve plan of increased opium shipments to . . . . .	194
26 Jul 40, decision to establish new national defense policy in, by economic control over production, distribution and consumption of essential materials and welfare measures for living conditions . . . . .	199 200
3 Oct 40, decision to develop chemical and heavy industries and supply essential materials to Japan under national defense policy . . . . .	201 202
5 Nov 40, decision to develop mining and electrical undertakings for new policy of GEA resulting from Tripartite Pact . . . . .	204

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Four Ministers Conferences:

- 11 Aug 36, decided North China to be  
base for cooperation with . . . . . p.234
- 20 Feb 37, decided to make pro-Japan  
and anti-Comintern . . . . . 235

Five Ministers Conferences:

- 30 Jan 36, decided to develop for Japan-  
Manchukuoan national defense . . . . . 242
- 7 Aug 36, decided to intensify defense of . . . . . 243
- 11 Aug 36, decided to develop & complete  
military force in . . . . . 244

MANDATED ISLANDS

Privy Council Meetings:

- 20 Jan 37, decided naval officer to be  
appointed as administrator of South  
Sea Islands . . . . . 91
- 26 Sep 40, in re German-Japanese relations . . . . . 123

MANO, Bunji

Privy Council Meetings:

- 26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . . 111
  - 18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Czech,  
Hungary & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125
  - 3 Jul 41, attended as councillor, ratified  
France-Japanese & Thai-Japanese protocols  
on guaranty and political understandings . . . . . 133
  - 8 Dec 41, attended as councillor, approved  
ratification of declaration of war against  
America & England . . . . . 145
  - 10 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, decided to  
ratify no separate peace treaty between  
Germany & Italy . . . . . 147
- MATSUDA, Genji (Overseas Minister in  
Hamaguchi Cabinet)  
Deceased

MATSUDAIRA, Koto (Secretary, Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 18 Aug 43, attended to explain treaty  
re Thailand annexing Shan State from  
Burma . . . . . 154

MATSUI, Keishiro (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Jun 41, attended to explain Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation and trade and tariff system in FIC . . . . .	n. 127
8 Jul 41, attended to explain France-Japan political understandings . . . . .	133-134

MATSUMOTO, Shunichi

Privy Council Meetings:

26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
6 Dec 41, attended as "Explainer" at the meeting which approved the ratification pertaining to declaration of war against America & England . . . . .	145
10 Dec 41, attended as above at the meeting which decided to ratify treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy & Japan . . . . .	147
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attended as "Exponent" the meetings - 1st through 7th - for organization of Great Asia Ministry . . . . .	148-153
8 Jul 41, attended to explain on 2 protocols - France-Jap., and Thai-Jap., on guaranty and political understandings . . . . .	133-4
21 Nov 41, attended to explain on Anti-Comintern . . . . .	142-3

MATSUMURA (Chief of Army Press Section)

Military Service Bureau Conferences:

Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's engage in forced labor . . . . .	275
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MATSUJAGA (Chief, Treaty Bureau, Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30, attended, London Naval Treaty . . . . .	68
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MATSUO, Tsuruhei (Minister of Railways in Yonai's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

3 Mar 40, attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US for materials . . . . .	196
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MITSUOKA, Yosuke (accused) (Foreign Minister in  
Deceased 2nd Konoye Cabinet)

Imperial Conferences:

- 10-20 Sep 40, attended, explanation  
of Tripartite Pact . . . . . p.6-9
- 2 Jul 41, attended, approved resolution  
re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 10

Liaison Conferences:

- 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings  
except that of 11 Apr 41 . . . . . 32
- 30 Jan, 3 Feb 41, according to Kido Diary,  
intends to concentrate whole Japanese  
strength in South; also opposed limiting  
of time re F.I.C. & Thailand policy . . . . . 36
- 6 Jun 41, reported on recognition of Croatia -  
told Kido his opinion as to future outlook  
of relations between the Soviet & Germany . . . . . 37

Privy Council Meetings:

- 2 Sep 40, defines "New Order" . . . . . 112,  
113
- Stated Japan would compensate Germany for  
her former colonies . . . . . 112
- Discusses Tripartite Pact . . . . . 113
- Stated war between Germany & Russia not  
anticipated; even though Russo-Jap  
relations adjusted they will not last;  
after 2 years relations among Japan,  
Germany & Russia need adjustment . . . . . 114
- 26 Sep 40, attended Investigation Committee,  
approved Tripartite Pact . . . . . 111
- 26 Sep 40, attended, agreed to draft of  
Tripartite Pact . . . . . 116
- 18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary,  
Czech & Roumania's join Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125
- 16 Jun 41, attended Investigation Committee,  
ratified treaties with France for residence  
& navigation and tariff system & trade . . . . . 127
- 3 Jul 41, attended, ratified 2 protocols -  
France-Jap and Thai-Jap, on guaranty and  
political understandings . . . . . 133

Cabinet Meetings:

- 26 Jul 40, attended, established Greater  
East Asia policy and planned internal  
economy . . . . . 199,  
200
- 16 Jul 41, views toward Jap-American  
understanding caused cabinet resignation . . . . . 214

MATSUOKA, Yosuke (cont'd)

Four Ministers Conference:

- 4 Sep 40, attended, decided outline of basic national policy . . . . . p.238
- 5,21 Nov 40, attended, decided on assistance to and relations of Thailand in New Order . . . . . 239

MATSUURA, Chinjiro (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

MATSUZAKA, Hiromasa (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 95

MIKAMI (Councillor)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 15 Oct 42, attended to explain establishment of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149

MIKI (Chief, Surgeon General's Bureau)

Military Service Bureau Conferences:

- Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's engage in forced labor . . . . . 275

MILITARY ADVISERS

Cabinet Meetings:

- 11 Apr 32, Manchukuo to appoint Japanese advisers to leading positions . . . . . 170
- 9 Dec 32, secret treaty annexed to treaty with Manchukuo re communications giving Japan control of all decisions affecting . . . . . 176
- 16 Jan 38, discussed new policy of Germany withdrawing military advisers from China . . . . . 190

NIMMI, Hiroshi (Councillor)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73

MINAMI, Hiroshi (cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings: (cont'd)

20 Jan 37, attended, decided appointment of naval officers as Administrators of South Sea Islands . . . . .	p.91
6 Nov 37, attended, allowed Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	95
2 Nov 38, attended, Investigation Committee and Privy Council adopted resolution to cease cooperative relations with L. of N's. . . . .	97
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for agreement for cultural cooperation with Germany . . . . .	100
22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to participation of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	106
26 Sep 40, attended, Investigation Committee, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
26 Sep 40, attended committee meeting, approved a draft for Tripartite Pact . . . . .	117
18 Dec 40, attended, discussed Roumania's joining the Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
3 Jul 41, attended, ratified France-Jap protocol of guaranty & political understandings . . . . .	134
28 Jul 41, attended, conclusion of protocol with France regarding common defense of FIC . . . . .	139
21 Nov, 41, attended, prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	142
8 Dec 41, attended, Investigation Committee, approved bill declaring war; at the plenary session ratified declaration of war . . . . .	145
10 Dec 41, attended, ratified treaty against a separate peace between Tripartite parties . . . . .	147
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attended, discussed organization of Great Asia Ministry . . . . .	149
18 Aug 43, attended, Investigation Committee, conclusion of treaty with Thailand that Thai should annex Shan State . . . . .	154

MINAMI, Jiro (accused) (War Minister)

Privy Council Meetings:

9 Dec 31, attended as War Minister, report of China Incident . . . . .	70
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attended, discussed establishment of GEA Ministry . . . . .	150
18 Aug 43, attended, Investigation Committee, re conclusion of Japan-Thailand treaty concerning Thai territory in Malaya and Shan areas . . . . .	154

MITSUBI, Jiro (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

19-23 Sep 31, attended, discussed Mukden Incident (see pages 163--165) . . . . .	p. 161- 162
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MITSUBI, Takanobu (Exposition)

Privy Council Meetings:

22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to participation of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	106
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	95
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations w/I of M . . . . .	97
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperative agreement of Germany . . . . .	100

MITSUICHI, Chuzo (Minister of Communications in Inuaki's Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

13 Sep 32, attended, approved Japan-Manchukuo protocol . . . . .	73
26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
16 Jun 41, attended, approved Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation and trade and tariff system in F.I.C. . . . .	127
3 Jul 41, attended as councillor, ratified France-Japanese and Thai-Japanese protocols on guaranty and political understandings . . . . .	133
8 Dec 41, attended as councillor, ratified declaration of war against America & England . . . . .	145
10 Dec 41, attended as councillor, decided to ratify treaty against separate peace among Germany, Italy & Japan . . . . .	147
18 Aug 43, attended as councillor, conclusion of treaty between Japan-Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan areas . . . . .	154
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 43, attended as councillor for organization of Great East Asia Ministry . . . . .	149

Cabinet Meetings:

13-17 Dec 31, M.C. policy Manchurian occupation discussed . . . . .	166- 167
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MITSUO, Woshio (Administration Official,  
(MITSUFOJI) Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Jun 41, attended to explain Jap-French  
treaties for residence & navigation, and  
trade & tariff system in F.I.C. . . . . p.127

MIURA, Naohiko (Vice Minister Agriculture  
and Forestry)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Jun 41, attended to explain Jap-  
French treaties for residence &  
navigation, and trade & tariff  
system in F.I.C. . . . . 127  
8 Jul 41, attended to explain 2  
protocols - France-Jap and Thai-Jap,  
on political understandings . . . . . 133-4

MIYAGI, Chagoro (Minister of Justice in  
Abe Cabinet)  
Deceased

MIVAKE (Administrative Official,  
Great Asia Ministry)

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Aug 43, attended to explain the treaty  
that Thailand should annex Shan State  
from Burma . . . . . 154

MIYAUCHI, Kan (Councillor Legislation Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Jun 41, attended to explain Japanese-  
French treaties for residence & navi-  
gation, and trade & tariff system in FIC . . . . . 127  
21 Nov 41, attended to explain Anti-  
Comintern Pact . . . . . 142-3  
12,14,15,19,20 Oct 42, attended to explain  
the establishment of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149  
18 Aug 43, attended to explain treaty that  
Thailand should annex Shan state from Burma . . . . . 154-5

MIZUMACHI, Kesaroku (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

MIZONO, Isaro (Director of Trade Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Jun 41, attended to explain Jap-French treaties for residence & navigation, and trade & tariff system in F.I.C. . . . .	p.127
3 Jul 41, attended to explain 2 protocols - France-Jap and Thai-Jap on guaranty and political understandings . . . . .	133-134
18 Aug 43, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex Shan State from Burma . . . . .	154

MORI, Kaku (Secretary of Inukai Cabinet)  
Deceased

MORISHIMA, Morito

Privy Council Meetings:

13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo protocol . . . . .	73
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MORIYAMA, Wichi (Exposition) (Councillor  
Legislation Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to participation of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	106
26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	95
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations w/I of N . . . . .	97
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperative agreement w/Germany . . . . .	100
16 Jun 41, attended as explainer the meeting which approved Japanese-French treaties for residence & trade & tariff system in FIC . . . . .	127
3 Jul 41, attended to explain 2 protocols - France-Japanese and Thai-Jap on guaranty and political understandings . . . . .	133-134
21 Nov 41, attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	142-143

MORIMOTO, Eiichi (cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings: (cont'd)

8 Dec 41, attended as "Explainer" the meeting which approved the ratification pertaining to declaration of war against America & England . . . . .	p.145
10 Dec 41, attended as above at the meeting which decided to ratify treaty against separate peace among Germany, Italy & Japan . . . . .	147
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attended as "Exponent" for organization of Great Asia Ministry . . . . .	149-153
18 Aug 43, attended as exponent; conclusion of treaty between Japan & Thailand concerning their territory in Shan areas . . . . .	154

MOROHASHI, Jo

Privy Council Meetings:

26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
18 Dec 40, attended; discussion re Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Pact . . . . .	125
16 Jun 41, attended as secretary; the meeting which approved Japanese-French treaties for residence & navigation and trade & tariff system in FIC . . . . .	127
3 Jul 41, attended, ratified 2 protocols-- France-Japan and Thai-Japan on guaranty and political understandings . . . . .	133
21 Nov 41, attended, decided to prolong Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	143
10 Dec 41, attended, decided to ratify the treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy & Japan . . . . .	147
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attended, for organization of Great East Asia Ministry . . . . .	149-153
18 Aug 43, attended, conclusion of treaty between Japan & Thailand concerning Thai territory in Malaya and Shan areas . . . . .	154

MOTODA, Hanime (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

MURAKAMI, Seichi (Clerk or Secretary)

Privy Council Meetings:

25 Nov 36, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	p. 89
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	95
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations w/I of N . . . . .	97
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperative agreement w/Germany . . . . .	100
22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to participation of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	106

MURASE, Chokuyo (Director of Legislation Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
16 Jun 41, attended as explainer, approved Japanese-French treaties for residence & navigation & trade & tariff system in F.I.C. . . . .	127
7 Jul 41, attended to explain ratification of France-Japanese protocol on guaranty and political understandings and of Thai-Jap protocol on guaranty & political understandings . . . . .	133

MURATA (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
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MURATA, Shozo (Minister of Railways and Communications in 3rd Konoye Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

3 Jul 41, attended as State Minister; ratified France-Japanese and Thai-Japanese protocols of guarantee and political understandings . . . . .	133
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MURATA, Shozo (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

- 26 Jul 40, attended, established greater East Asia policy and planned internal economy . . . . . p.199, 200
- 22 Aug 41, attended, national mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation . . . . . 215, 216

MUTO, Akira (accused)

Imperial Conferences:

- 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 13
- 5 Nov 41, attended, decided policy toward US, Netherlands & England . . . . . 18
- 1 Dec 41, attended, decided to declare war on US, Britain & Netherlands . . . . . 23

Liaison Conferences:

- 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings except those of 16,17,19,23 Jan 41 . . . . . 32
- c/a 30 Nov 41, attended, re composition & delivery of final note . . . . . 52
- 30 Nov 41, attended, re complete plans for war w/USA . . . . . 57

Privy Council Meetings:

- 26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . . 111
- 28 Jul 41, attended as "Explainer"; agreed to resolution that there should be concluded between France & Japan a protocol regarding the common defense of French Indo-China and military cooperation . . . . . 138
- 8 Dec 41, attended as "Explainer"; ratified declaration of war against America & England . . . . . 145
- 10 Dec 41, attended as "Explainer"; ratified treaty against separate peace among Germany, Italy & Japan . . . . . 147

Cabinet Meetings:

- 1 Dec 41, attended, member of liaison conference responsible gist of final note to US . . . . . 226

MUTO

(not the accused)  
(Secretary)

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Aug, 26 Sep 30, attended IC meetings . . . . .	p. 65
1 Oct 30, attended, re ratification of London Naval Treaty . . . . .	68
9 Dec 31, attended, report of China Incident given . . . . .	70
13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing Jap-Manchukuo protocol . . . . .	73
25 Nov 36, attended, approved Anti- Comintern Pact . . . . .	89
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	95

MAGAI

(A Secretary of Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Jun 41, attended as explainer approved Japanese-French treaties for residence & navigation and trade & tariff system in F.I.C. . . . .	127
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NAGAI, Ryutaro  
(Minister of Communications) Deceased

NAGANO, Osami (Accused)  
(Explainer, Head of Peace Preservation Bureau)  
(Navy Minister)

Imperial Conferences:

2 Jul 41, attended, which adopted resolution re Japanese-American negotiations . . . . .	10
6 Sep 41, attended, (same as above) . . . . .	13
5 Nov 41, attended, decided policy toward United States, England and Netherlands . . . . .	18
5 Nov 41, attended, issued 1st order which caused Pearl Harbor attack plan put into execution . . . . .	22
1 Dec 41, attended, decided Jap. would declare war on United States, Britain and Netherlands . . . . .	23

Liaison Conferences:

13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings except those from 13 Jun to 11 Mar, incl. . . . .	33
25 Jun 41, attended, decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China . . . . .	38
o/a 30 Nov 41 attended re composition and delivery of final note . . . . .	52
o/a 30 Nov 41 attended, approved plan to attack Pearl Harbor . . . . .	53-54

Privy Council Meetings:

25 Nov 36, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 Nov 36 . . . . .	89
20 Jan 37, attended, decided naval officers could be appointed as Administrators of the South Sea Islands . . . . .	91
21 Nov 41, attended to explain anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	142-3

Cabinet Meetings:

o/a 1 Dec 41, attended, approved gist of final note to U.S.A. . . . .	226
1 or 2 Dec 41, task of setting a time prior to attack for delivery of final note to U.S. . . . .	227

Four Ministers' Conferences:

7 Aug 36, attended, decided foreign Policy of Empire . . . . .	233
11 Aug 36, attended, decided "Second Administrative Policy towards North China . . . . .	234

Five Ministers' Conferences:

30 June 36, attended, decided Basis of Nat. Policy . . . . .	242
7 Aug 36, attended, decided Basic Principles of Nat. Policy. . . . .	243
11 Aug 36, attended, decided Fundamentals of Nat. Policy . . . . .	244

NAGATA, Hidejiro  
(Minister of Overseas Affairs in HIROTA Cabinet) Deceased

NAKABASHI, Tokuguro  
(Home Minister in INUZAI CABINET) Deceased

NAKAJIMA

Military Service Bureau Conferences:  
Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's engage in  
forced labor . . . . . p. 275

NAKAJIMA, Chikuhai  
(Railway Minister in 1st Konoye Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:  
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join  
Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 94-5

Cabinet Meetings:  
11 Jul 37, attended, increase north China army . . . . . 163

NAKAJIMA, Kunakichi  
(Minister of Commerce and Industry, Saito Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:  
13 Sep 32, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73  
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join  
Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 95  
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative  
relations with League of Nations . . . . . 97  
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural  
cooperative agreement with Germany . . . . . 100

NAKAMURA (Commander of Gendarmerie)

Military Service Bureau Conferences:  
Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's engage in forced  
labor . . . . . 275

NAKANO (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:  
15, 19, 20 and 21 Oct, 42, attended to explain establish-  
ment of Great East Asia Ministry . . . . . 149



NARA, Tekeji (Councillor)

Privy Council Meetings:

6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	p. 95
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . . . .	97
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperative agreement with Germany . . . . .	100
22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to participation of Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	106
26 Sep 40, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
3 Jul 41, attended, as Councillor, ratified France- Japanese, and Thailand-Japanese Protocols, on guaranty and political understanding . . . . .	133
2 Nov 41, attended as Councillor, prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	142
8 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, ratified declaration of war against America and England . . . . .	145
10 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, ratified treaty against separate peace among Germany, Italy and Japan . . . . .	147
18 Aug 43, attended as Councillor, conclusion of Treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thailand territory in Shan areas . . . . .	154

NARITA (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . . . .	97
21 Nov 41, attended, explain Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	142-3

NATIONAL DEFENSE SECURITY LAW

Cabinet Meetings:

2 May 41, decision, to enforce, and to publish detailed regulations . . . . .	211
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NATIONAL MOBILIZATION LAW

Cabinet Meetings:

7 Mar 41, decided that detailed regulations of revised law put into effect . . . . .	206
Outline of law . . . . .	206-208
22 Aug 41, decision, key points of . . . . .	215
28 Nov 41, decision, placed press on war basis . . . . .	225

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES RELATIONS

Imperial Conferences:	
5 Nov 41, measures towards . . . . .	p. 20
31 May 43, decided to incorporate East Indies area into Japanese territory . . . . .	25-26
Liaison Conferences:	
o/a 30 Oct 41, discussed important item re shaping of national policy towards . . . . .	43
13 Dec 41, reported an economic plan for . . . . .	62
Cabinet Meetings:	
25 Oct 40, decision, to control financial, economic and political life of, by liquidating relations with other countries, preferential treatment, control of production and export of essential materials from, and exchange control . . . . .	203
12 Oct 41, complete preparation for war with . . . . .	219
Court Ministers' Conferences:	
2 Sep 44, decided Independence to be announced . . . . .	240
Supreme War Plans Council Meetings:	
5 Sep 44, decided to make statement in re independence of . . . . .	268
17 Jul 44, decided independence of should be recognized .	269
Decision of Imperial Headquarters:	
Apr 41, decision to resort to arms in case of encirclement by, and on policy to be taken for economic relations with . . . . .	280
NEMICHI (Explainer)	
Privy Council Meetings:	
21 Nov 41, attended to explain anti-Comintern Pact . . . .	142-3
Cabinet Meeting:	
25 Oct 40, established to control political and economic life of East Indies, by liquidation of foreign relations, control of production and export of essential materials, control of domestic and foreign exchange . . . . .	203

NINE POWER PACT

Privy Council Meetings:

13 Sept 32, Violation of, in re Manchukuo . . . . .	n. 76, 79
2 Nov 38, League of Nations resolved that actions of Japan were violations of . . . . .	93

Cabinet Meetings:

27 Oct 37, decision re invitation to conference to . . . . .	185
3 Mar 40, discussed U. S. maintaining of, and ignoring new order in East Asia, and of ways to make Japan free of U. S. for essential materials . . . . .	196

NINOMIYA, Horushige  
(Vice Chief of Army General Staff)  
Deceased

NISHIMURA, Kunsō (Secretary - Foreign Office)  
(Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Jun 41, attended as "explainer", approved Japanese- French treaties for residence and navigation and trade and tariff system in French Indo-China . . . . .	127
21 Nov 41, attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	142-3
10 Dec 41, attended as "explainer", ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan . . . . .	147

NOMURA, Kichisaburo  
(Foreign Minister in ABE's Cabinet)

Imperial Conferences:

5 Nov 41, attended, telegram sent to, from TOGO re policy towards U.S., England and Netherlands . . . . .	19
5 Nov 41, attended, telegram sent to, from TOGO re counter-proposal to US. discussed and approved at Imperial Conference 5 Nov. . . . .	22
5 Nov 41, attended, telegram to TOGO urging that agreement be signed by 25 Nov 41 . . . . .	22

Cabinet Meetings:

24 Oct 39, attended, changed value of yen from sterling to dollars . . . . .	197
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OBATA, Torikichi

Privy Council Meetings:

26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	p.11
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion of Hungary, Czechoslovakia & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
3 Jul 41, attended as councillor, ratified France-Japanese, and Thai-Japanese protocols of guaranty and political understandings . . . . .	133
21 Nov 41, attended as councillor, prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	142
8 Dec 41, attended as councillor, ratified declaration of war against America and England . . . . .	145
10 Dec 41, attended as councillor, ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan . . . . .	147
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attended as councillor & committeeman, organization of Great East Asia Ministry and 8 other matters . . . . .	149
18 Aug 43, attended as Councillor, conclusion of Treaty between Japan-Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan areas . . . . .	154

OGAWA, Kataro (Minister of Commerce & Industry in Hirota Cabinet)

OGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoye Cabinet)

Imperial Conferences:

6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations . . . . .	13
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Cabinet Meetings:

22 Aug 41, attended, national mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation . . . . .	215, 216
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OHARA, Naoshi (Minister of Interior in Abe's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

24 Oct 39, attended, changed value of yen from sterling to dollars . . . . .	197
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OHASHI

(V. Member of  
Foreign Ministry)

Liaison Conferences:

Attended meetings of 10,11 Apr;  
26,27 Jun . . . . . p. 33

OIKAWA, Koshiro (Navy Minister,  
Tojo's Cabinet)  
Deceased

Imperial Conferences:

2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution  
re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 10  
6 Sep 41 (same as above) . . . . . 13

Liaison Conferences:

13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings . . . . . 33

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Sep 40, attended, discussion re danger  
of economic pressure by US because of  
signing of Tripartite Pact & preparations  
to be made if war breaks out . . . . . 109  
26 Sep 40, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . . 111  
18 Dec 40, discussion re Hungary, Czech  
& Roumania, joining Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125

Four Ministers Conference:

5,21 Nov 40, attended, decided on aid to  
and relations of Thailand in New Order . . . . . 239

OKA, Yoshizumi (accused) (Chief of Naval  
Affairs Bureau)

Imperial Conferences:

2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution  
re Jap-American negotiations . . . . . 10  
6 Sep 41 (same as above) . . . . . 13  
5 Nov 41, attended, decided policy  
towards US, England & Netherlands . . . . . 18  
1 Dec 41, attended, decided to declare  
war on US, Britain & Netherlands . . . . . 23

Liaison Conferences:

13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings  
except that of 16,17,19,23 Jan; 2,6,7,  
11 Mar . . . . . 32  
6 Jun 41, attended, conference re Japan  
participation in war on Russia . . . . . 37  
25 Jun 41, attended, decided to accelerate  
all preparatory measures in Thailand & FIC . . . . . 38  
o/a 30 Nov 41, attended, re complete plans  
for war w/USA . . . . . 57

OKA, Yoshizumi (cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 28 Jul 41, attended, resolution that there be concluded between France & Japan a Protocol regarding common defense of French Indo-China and military cooperation . . . . . p-J
- 3 Dec 41, attended, declaration of war on America & England . . . . . 145
- 10 Dec 41, attended, decided to ratify treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy & Japan . . . . . 147
- 20, 21 Oct 42, attended, deliberation of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry . . . . . 149
- 18 Aug 43, attended, meeting of the Investigation Committee relative to the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Malaya and Shan areas . . . . . 154

Cabinet Meetings:

- 12 Oct 41, except for Navy General Staff war with US not wanted by Navy but decision of premier would be accepted . . . . . 220
- 1 Dec 41, attended, member of liaison conference responsible for basis of last note to US . . . . . 226

OTADA, Katsuke (Premier)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 13 Sep 32, attended, as Navy Minister, approved signing Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73
- 3 Jul 35, attended as Premier, approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee . . . . . 81

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

- 17 Jul 40, attended, decided to recommend Konoye to succeed Yonai . . . . . 252
- 17 Jul 41, attended, approved Konoye as Premier for 3rd time . . . . . 254
- 17 Oct 41, attended, approved Tojo to succeed Konoye . . . . . 255
- 29 Nov 41, attended, discussed war with US . . . . . 257
- 1 Dec 41, attended, which discussed war with US . . . . . 259
- 17 Jul 44, attended, discussed resignation of Tojo Cabinet . . . . . 261
- 18 Jul 44, attended, decided that Terauchi, Koiso, or Hata succeed Tojo . . . . . 263

OKADA, Keisuke (Cont'd)

Conferences of Senior Statesmen: (cont'd)

- 20 Jul 44, attended, approved coalition cabinet of Koiso & Yonai . . . . . p. 26
- 5 Apr 45, attended, decided to recommend Suzuki to succeed Koiso . . . . . 254

OKADA, Pyohai (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

OKAMURA, Yasuji (General)

Supreme War Plans Council Meetings:

- 30 Jun 41, attended, discussed international situation . . . . . 283

OKUBO (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 94

ONO (Capt., Naval General Staff)

Joint Conferences:

- 12 Jul 40, attended, discussed strengthening Axis harmony . . . . . 284

OPEN DOOR POLICY

Cabinet Meetings:

- 12 Mar 32, decided to let Manchukuo keep Open-Door Policy . . . . . 16
- 8 Aug 33, to be maintained toward Soviet and US by Manchukuo under plan for guiding Manchukuo prepared by Japan . . . . . 17

OPPIUM

Cabinet Meetings:

- 11 Apr 33, decided to transfer Korean opium to Manchukuo . . . . . 17
- 12 Dec 38, decision to increase acreage of, and to increase shipments to Manchukuo to meet increasing demand for . . . . . 194

OSHIMA, Hiroshi (accused)

Liaison Conferences: *planned*  
6 Jun 41, attended, sent treaty to  
Kunoya stating Hitler decided to  
attack Russia . . . . . P.37

Cabinet Meetings:  
9 Aug 38, Von Ribbentrop proposed to,  
that relations be reenforced . . . . . 25  
20 Jun 41, acc. to Ott, advised Japan  
to attack Russia . . . . . 25

OSHIMA, Ken-ichi (Privy Councillor)  
Deceased

OSUMI, Minro (Minister of Navy in Imperial Cabinet)  
Deceased

OTANI, Sonyu (Overseas Affairs Minister)  
Deceased

Privy Council Meetings:  
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow  
Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 9  
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow  
Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 9

OTT, Eugen

Imperial Conferences:  
10-26 Sep 40, attended, conversation  
with Matsuoka & Stahmer re Tripartite Pact . . . . . 6

Cabinet Meetings:  
o/a 28 Jun 41, telegram from in re  
Japan's decision to tighten grip  
on Indo-China . . . . . 2

OYAMA (Chief of Legal Affairs Bureau)

Military Service Bureau Conferences:  
Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's  
engage in forced labor . . . . . 2



PEARL HARBOR

Imperial Conferences:

- 5 Nov 41, Nagano issued 1st order which caused plan for attack to be put into execution . . . . . 19
- Time Chart for 6,7,8 Dec 41 shows the differences between Tokyo time and local time of attacks . . . . . 21

Privy Council Meetings:

- 8 Dec 41, Investigation Committee approved draft of declaration of war . . . . . 21

PHILIPPINES

Mission Conferences:

- 12 Dec 41, reported on economic plan for . . . . . 62
- 4 Jan 43, decided on independence for . . . . . 63

PLANNING BOARD

Cabinet Meetings:

- 22 Apr 41, decided plan of rational mobilization law . . . . . 21
- 12 Sep 41, formulated Workers Mobilization Plan to insure labor supply and to increase production . . . . . 21

POPULATION

Cabinet Meetings:

- 22 Jan 41, Decision, increase quality and redistribution of, for establishment of GEA co-prosperity sphere . . . . . 20

POW INFORMATION BUREAU

- On or after 7 Dec 41, established . . . . . 272

Military Service Bureau Conferences:

- Apr 42, decided that POW's engage in forced labor . . . . . 27

Conferences in War Ministry on POW's

- 1942-43, decided that observation of Geneva Convention could not be observed . . . . . 277

POW INFORMATION BUREAU (cont'd)

Decisions of Imperial Headquarters:  
 Apr 41, decided policy on measures  
 to be taken in the South . . . . . p. 2

Supreme War Council (Army Members):  
 30 Jun 41, discussed international  
 situation . . . . . 287

Joint Conferences:  
 12 Jul 40, discussed strengthening  
 Tripartite harmony . . . . . 287  
 16 Jul 40, agreed upon intensification  
 of Tripartite coalition . . . . . 288

PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS

18 Aug - 26 Sep 30, discussions of national  
 defense & Jap Navy ratio compared to USA . . . . . 66

1 Oct 30, re ratification of London Naval  
 Treaty . . . . . 68

9 Dec 31, report on China Incident . . . . . 70,  
 c/a 17 Dec 31, decided policy of occupying  
 4 provinces of Manchuria & also approve  
 military budget . . . . . 72

13 Sep 32, approved bill re signing of  
 Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 74-

3 Jul 35, approved Japanese-Manchukuo  
 agreement for Joint Economic Committee . . . . . 81

20 Nov 36, approved negotiations for Anti-  
 Comintern Pact be transferred from General  
 Staff to Foreign Office . . . . . 85

20 Nov 36, Investigation Committee approved  
 German-Japanese Pact against Comintern,  
 and secret pact against the Soviet Union . . . . . 86

25 Nov 36, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 89

20 Jan 37, decided naval officer be appointed  
 administrator of South Sea Islands . . . . . 91

19 Jul 37, (Manchukuo) approved new laws  
 forbidding manufacture, sale, etc. of  
 narcotics without license . . . . . 93

6 Nov 37, decided to allow Italy to join  
 anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 95

21 Jan 38, decided to deny Nanking Govt  
 & continue military operation if  
 Japanese conditions were refused . . . . . 96

2 Nov 38, passed resolution to end  
 cooperative relations w/I of Nations . . . . . 97-

22 Nov 38, passed resolution for agreement  
 for cultural cooperation w/Germany . . . . . 100

29 Nov 38, reported Japan's foreign policy  
 towards China . . . . . 102  
 105

PRIVATE COUNCIL MEETINGS (cont'd)

22 Feb 39, approved participation of Hungary in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	p.106
16 Sep 40, discussed questions regarding danger of economic pressure from US and preparations to be made for war with US if Tripartite Pact signed . . . . .	109
26 Sep 40, Investigation Committee approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
26 Sep 40, passed draft re conclusion of Tripartite Pact . . . . .	117-119
18 Dec 40, discussed Hungary, Czechoslovakia & Roumania's joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
16 Jun 41, approved ratification of treaty w/France for residence & navigation re FIC & treaty concerning tariff system & trade & method of settlement w/FIC . . . . .	127
3 Jul 41, voted to ratify Franco-Japanese protocol on guaranty & Political Understanding & Thai-Japanese on same subject . . . . .	134
28 Jul 41, agreed to resolution that a protocol re common defense of FIC & military cooperation be concluded w/France . . . . .	139
21 Nov 41, decided to prolong Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	143-144
8 Dec 41, approved Emperor's reference bill re declaration of war . . . . .	145
10 Dec 41, decided to ratify treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy & Japan . . . . .	147
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, discussed establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry . . . . .	150
18 Aug 43, discussed conclusion of treaty w/Thailand re Thai territory in Malaya & Shan areas . . . . .	154-155

PUBLIC OPINION

4 Nov 41, decision, regulate speech and press . . . . .	223
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III-VI, Henry

Cabinet Meetings:

12 Mar 32, mentioned in plan to govern Manchukuo . . . . .	169
12 Aug 32, mentioned, installed as puppet regent of Manchukuo . . . . .	174, 175

Rescript of March 1933 on withdrawal from League of Nations

Privy Council Meetings:

- 3 Jul 35, basic policy of Japan towards Manchukuo found in, so stated at meeting . . . . . p. 81

ROMANIA

Privy Council Meetings:

- 18 Dec 40, discussion re joining Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125

RUSSIAN-JAPAN RELATIONS

Imperial Conferences:

- 2 Jul 41, decided to secretly prepare arms against . . . . . 11
- 6 Sep 41, Japan will not take initiative if Soviet respects Russo-Jap Neutrality Pact . . . . . 15
- 5 Nov 41, measures toward . . . . . 20

Liaison Conferences:

- 19 Sep 40, decided to strengthen Axis by cooperating re . . . . . 30
- 4 Aug 41, decided principle of negotiations with . . . . . 40
- o/a 30 Oct 41, discussed important items re shaping of national policy toward . . . . . 45,46

Privy Council Meetings:

- 20 Nov 36, negotiations for Anti-Comintern Pact transferred from General Staff to Foreign Ministry . . . . . 85
- 20 Nov 36, Investigation Committee approved German-Japanese Pact against Comintern & secret pact against Soviet Union . . . . . 86
- 25 Nov 36, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 89
- 22 Feb 39, approved participation of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact (see Anti-Comintern Pact this index) . . . . . 106
- 26 Sep 40, Investigation Committee approved Tripartite Pact . . . . . 111
- Military preparations against . . . . . 120
- 18 Dec 40, forcing Russia to make concessions . . . . . 126

Cabinet Meetings:

- 28 Jun 41, time considered necessary to prepare attack on, urged by Germany to attack . . . . . 212
- 2 Jul 41, secretly prepare for war against, but reserve entrance into German-Russo war . . . . . 213

SAITO (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30, attended, re London Naval Treaty . . . . . p. 68

SAITO, Mahoto

(Prime Minister in 1932-34) Deceased

SAITO, Tatsuo

Privy Council Meetings:

3 July 1941, attended to explain two protocols,  
France-Japan and Thailand-Japan, on Guaranty  
and Political Understandings . . . . . 133-  
134

21 Nov 1941, attended to explain on Anti-Comintern  
Pact . . . . . 142-  
143

12, 14, 15, 19, 20 & 21 Oct 1942, attended to  
explain on the establishment of Great Asia  
Ministry . . . . . 149

SAKAGAKI  
(See ITAGAKI)

Cabinet Meeting:

24 Sept 1931, probably ITAGAKI, accused, re  
Mukden Incident . . . . . 164-  
165

SAKAI, Tadamasa  
(Minister of Agriculture in ABE's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meeting:

24 Oct 1939, attended, changed value of yen from ster-  
ling to dollars . . . . . 197

SAKAKIBARA  
(Explainer, Army Affairs, Section Chief)

Privy Council Meeting:

18 Aug 1943, attended to explain Treaty that Thailand  
should annex SHAN state from Burma . . . . . 154

SAKAMOTO, Ryuki (Tatsuki)

Privy Council Meeting:

8 Dec 1941, attended as "Explainer" - Declaration  
of war against America and England . . . . . 145

10 Dec 1941, attended as above, ratified treaty  
against separate peace among Germany, Italy  
and Japan . . . . . 147

21 Nov 1941, attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact 142-3

SAKAMOTO, Sannosuke  
(Privy Councillor)  
(Deceased)

SAKONJI, Seizo  
(Minister of Commerce in 3rd KONOYE Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

22 Aug 1941, attended, National Mobilization Plan to  
maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new  
international situation . . . . . p 215-  
216

SAKURAI, Joji  
(Privy Councillor)  
(Deceased)

SAKURAUCHI, Yukio  
(Commerce Minister in 2d Wakatsuki's Cabinet  
and Finance Minister in Yonai's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

19-23 Sept 1931, attended, which discussed Mukden  
Incident . . . . . 161-2

3 Mar 1940, attended, economic policy to relieve  
Japan of dependence on U.S. for materials . . . 198

Five Ministers' Conference:

12 July 1940, attended, which decided to push war  
preparation . . . . . 251

SATO

(Explainer, Secretary, Legislation Bureau)

Privy Council Meeting:

1<sup>st</sup> Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that  
Thailand annex Shan States from Burma . . . . 154

SATO, Kenryo (Accused)

Imperial Conference:

11 Jan. 1938, attended, referred to and quotes  
Emperor on . . . . . 5

Privy Council Meeting:

1<sup>st</sup> Aug. 1943, attended to explain the treaty that  
Thailand should annex Shan State from Burma . . 154

Military Service Bureau Conference:

Apr. 1942, attended, which decided that POW's  
engage in forced labor . . . . . 275

SATO, Naotake  
(Foreign Minister)

Four Ministers' Conference:

16 Apr. 1937, attended, which decided Plans  
for Guiding North China . . . . . n. 236

SEKO (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

1<sup>st</sup> Dec. 1940, attended, discussion re. Hungary,  
Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tri-  
partite Pact . . . . . 125

SELF-GOVERNMENT GUIDING BOARD

Cabinet Meeting:

12 Aug. 1932, set up at Mukden and controlled  
and financed by Japan to foster independence  
movement of Manchukuo . . . . . 174,5

SHIBA, Cdr.  
(Navy Office)

Joint Conferences:

12 July 1940, attended, which discussed streng-  
thening Axis' harmony . . . . . 282  
16 July 1940, attended, which agreed to inten-  
sify Axis' coalition . . . . . 283

SHIDEHARA, Kijuro

Privy Council Meetings:

1<sup>st</sup> Aug. - 26 Sept. 1930, Attended all meetings  
of Investigation Committee, discussed rati-  
fication of London Naval Treaty . . . . . 66  
1 Oct. 1930, re. London Naval Treaty . . . . . 68

Cabinet Meetings:

19-23 Sept. 1931, attended, which discussed  
Mukden Incident . . . . . 161-2  
24 Sept. 1931, mentions telegram from HAYASHI  
re. Mukden Incident . . . . . 164

SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Aug. 1943, attended as State Minister, re.  
conclusion of treaty between Japan and  
Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan  
arcas . . . . . 154  
6 Nov. 1943, attended meeting of Assembly of  
Greater East Asiatic Nations re. joint  
declaration . . . . . 153

SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru (cont'd)

Four Ministers' Conference:

2 Sept 1944: presumably attended, which decided independence of NEI to be announced . . . . . p 240

SHIMADA, Shigetaro (accused)

Imperial Conferences:

5 Nov. 1941, attended, decided policy toward U.S., England and Netherlands . . . . . 18  
 1 Dec. 1941, attended, decided to declare war on U.S., Britain and Netherlands . . . . . 23

Liaison Conferences:

30 Nov. 1941, attended, re. composition and delivery of final notes . . . . . 52  
 30 Nov. 1941, attended, re. complete plans for war with USA . . . . . 57

Privy Council Meetings:

8 Dec. 1941, attended as State Minister, the ratified declaration of war against America and England . . . . . 145  
 10 Dec. 1941, attended as above, ratified treaty against separate peace among Germany, Italy and Japan . . . . . 147  
 9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 1942, attended as State Minister, discussed organization of Great Asia Ministry . . . . . 149-154

SHIMADA, Shigetaro (accused)

Cabinet Meetings:

4 Nov 1941, attended, policy of press and speech regulation . . . . . 223  
 Placed newspapers on wartime basis . . . . . 225  
 1 Dec 1941, approved gist of final note . . . . . 226,7  
 1 or 2 Dec 1941, whole cabinet attended Imperial Conference re. declaring war on US, Great Britain . . . . . 227  
 8 Dec 1941, attended, reported on war progress War policy adopted . . . . . 231

SHIMADA, Toshio (not the accused)  
 (Minister of Agriculture and Forestry)

Privy Council Meetings:

25 Nov 1936, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 89  
 20 Jan 1937, attended, decided the appointment of naval officers as administrators of South Sea Islands . . . . . 91  
 3 Mar 1940, attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US for materials . . . . . 198



SHIMIZU, Toru (Cho)  
(Councillor)

Privy Council Meetings:

3 July 1935, attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee . . . . .	p. 81
20 Jan 1937, attended, decided appointment of naval officer as Administrator of South Sea Islands . . . . .	91
6 Nov 1937, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	95
2 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . . . .	97
22 Feb 1939, attended, agreed to participation of Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	106
26 Sept 1940, attended, approved Tripartite Pact . . . . .	111
18 Dec 1940, attended, discussed re. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . .	125
16 June 1941, attended, approved Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation and trade and tariff system in French Indo China . . . . .	127
3 July 1941, attended as councillor, and ratified France-Japanese, and Thai-Japanese Protocols, guaranty and political understandings . . . . .	133
8 Dec 1941, attended as Councillor, ratified declaration of war against America and England . . . . .	145
10 Dec 1941, attended as councillor, ratified treaty against separate peace among Germany, Italy and Japan . . . . .	147
18 Aug 1943, attended as councillor, conclusion of treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan areas . . . . .	154

SHIMOMURA (Capt.)

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 1930, attended, re. London Naval Treaty . . . . .	68
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SHIONO, Suehiko  
(Justice Minister in Hayashi Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

6 Nov 1937, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	95
2 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . . . .	97
22 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolutions for cultural cooperation agreement with Germany . . . . .	100

SHICNO, Suehiko (cont'd)

3.7, attended, increase North China Army p. 183

SHIOZAKI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meeting:

1 Oct 1930, attended, re London Naval Treaty . . . 68

SIXTH COMMITTEE

Liaison Conference Meeting:

12 Dec 1941, reported on outline of economic counter plan for southern areas . . . 62

Cabinet Meeting:

28 Nov 1941, decision, to create, composed of planning board, foreign ministry, finance, war and navy ministries, to discuss control and acquisition of resources in southern areas . . . 224

SONE (Explainer, Secretary - Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meeting:

18 Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Burma . . . 154

SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY

Cabinet Meeting:

12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria . . . 172,3

SOUTH SEAS

Privy Council Meetings:

9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to civil administration . . . 151

Five Ministers' Conferences:

30 June 1936, decided to promote racial and economic development of and to expand overseas . . . 242  
7 Aug 1936, decided to advance toward . . . 243  
11 Aug 36, decided to develop in . . . 244

Four Ministers' Conference:

Background, from Japanese viewpoint, of frontier dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China, (Exhibit 612-A (6868-6874) . . . 239

STAMMER

Imperial Conference:

10-26 Sept 1940, attended, conversation with Matsuo and Ott re Tripartite Pact . . . 6-9

SHIONO, Suehiko (cont'd)

11 July 1937, attended, increase North China Army n. 183

SHIOZAKI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meeting:

1 Oct 1930, attended, re. London Naval Treaty . . . 68

SIXTH COMMITTEE

Liaison Conference Meeting:

12 Dec 1941, reported on outline of economic counter plan for southern areas . . . . . 62

Cabinet Meeting:

28 Nov 1941, decision, to create, composed of planning board, foreign ministry, finance, war and navy ministries, to discuss control and acquisition of resources in southern areas . . . . . 224

SOME (Explainer, Secretary - Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meeting:

18 Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Burma . . . 154

SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY

Cabinet Meeting:

12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria . . . 172,3

SOUTH SEAS

Privy Council Meetings:

9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to civil administration . . . . . 151

Five Ministers' Conferences:

30 June 1936, decided to promote racial and economic development of and to expand overseas . . . 242  
7 Aug 1936, decided to advance toward . . . . . 243  
11 Aug 36, decided to develop in . . . . . 244

Four Ministers' Conferences:

Background, from Japanese viewpoint, of frontier dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China, (Exhibit 612-A (6862-6874) . . . . . 239

STAHMER

Imperial Conference:

10-26 Sept 1940, attended, conversation with Matsuo and Ott re Tripartite Pact . . . . . 6-9

SUITSUGU, Nobumasa  
(Minister for Home Affairs in 1st KONOHE Cabinet)  
(Deceased)

SUGAWARA, Michitaka

Privy Council Meetings:

2 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolution to end co-operative relations with League of Nations	97
22 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolutions for cultural cooperation agreement with Germany	100
22 Feb 1939, attended, agreed to participation of Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact	106
26 Sept 1940, approved Tripartite Pact	111
18 Dec 1940, attended, discussed re. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact	125
16 June 1941, attended, approved Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation and trade and tariff system in F.I.C.	127
3 July 1941, attended as councillor, ratified France-Japanese and Thai Japanese protocols of guaranty and political understandings	133
8 Dec 1941, attended as councillor, ratified declaration of war against America and England	145
10 Dec 1941, attended as councillor, ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan	147
18 Aug 1943, attended as councillor, conclusion of treaty between Japan-Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan areas	154

SUGIYAMA, General  
(Chief of General Staff)  
(Deceased)

Imperial Conferences:

2 July 1941, attended, which adopted resolutions re. Japanese-American negotiations	10
6 Sept 1941, attended, which adopted resolutions re. Japanese-American negotiations	13
5 Nov 1941, attended, decided policy toward U.S., England and Netherlands	18
1 Dec 1941, attended, decided to declare war on U.S., Britain and Netherlands	23

Liaison Conferences:

13 Jan - 2 July 1941, attended all meetings except that of 16 Jan	32
30 Jan - 3 Feb 1941, Kido relates, was received by Emperor to report outline of policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand decided upon	35
30 Nov 1941 o/a, attended, re complete plans for war with USA	57

SUGIYAMA, General (cont'd)

Four Ministers' Conference:	
20 Feb 1937: attended, which decided Third Administration Policy toward North China . . . . .	235
16 Apr 1937: attended, which decided Plans for Guiding North China . . . . .	236
2 Sept 1944: Presumably attended, which decided independence of NEI to be announced . . . . .	240
Supreme War Council:	
30 June 1941: attended, which discussed international situation . . . . .	281

SUITA, Daizapuro  
(Explanator)

Privy Council Meetings:	
25 Nov 1936, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . .	89

SUPREME WAR COMMAND

Imperial Conference:	
6 Sept 1941, did not answer questions re. diplomatic moves according to Kido . . . . .	13-14
31 May 1943, opposed independence of East India . . . . .	25

SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL

17 July 1944: decided Empire should recognize independence of East Indies at earliest possible moment . . . . .	269
5 Sept 1944: decided to make statement in re independence of East Indies . . . . .	268
1 Feb 1945: decided measures toward French Indo-China . . . . .	271
9 Aug 1945: decided to accept Potsdam declaration with reservations . . . . .	270

SUYAMA (Explainer - Administrative, Official, Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meeting:	
18 Aug 1943: Attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Burma . . . . .	154

SUZUKI, Kantaro (not the accused)

Privy Council Meetings:	
1 Oct 1930, attended, re London Naval Treaty . . . . .	68
13 Sept 1932, attended, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . .	73
3 July 1935, attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee . . . . .	81

SUGIYAMA, General (cont'd)

Four Ministers' Conference:  
 20 Feb 1937: attended, which decided Third Administration Policy toward North China . . . . . 235  
 16 Apr 1937: attended, which decided Plans for Guiding North China . . . . . 236  
 2 Sept 1944: Presumably attended, which decided independence of NEI to be announced . . . . . 240

Supreme War Council:  
 30 June 1941: attended, which discussed international situation . . . . . 281

SUITA, Daizaburo  
 (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:  
 25 Nov 1936, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact . . . . . 89

SUPREME WAR COMMAND

Imperial Conference:  
 6 Sept 1941, did not answer questions re. diplomatic moves according to Kido . . . . . 13-14  
 31 May 1943, opposed independence of East India . . . . . 25

SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL

17 July 1944: decided Empire should recognize independence of East Indies at earliest possible moment . . . . . 269  
 5 Sept 1944: decided to make statement in re independence of East Indies . . . . . 268  
 1 Feb 1945: decided measures toward French Indo-China . . . . . 271  
 9 Aug 1945: decided to accept Potsdam declaration with reservations . . . . . 270

SUYAMA (Explainer - Administrative, Official, Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meeting:  
 18 Aug 1943: Attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Burma . . . . . 154

SUZUKI, Kantaro (not the accused)

Privy Council Meetings:  
 1 Oct 1930, attended, re London Naval Treaty . . . . . 68  
 13 Sept 1932, attended, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73  
 3 July 1935, attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee . . . . . 81

SUZUKI, Kantaro (cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings (cont'd)

25 Nov 1936, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact p;	89
20 Jan 1937, attended, decided to appoint naval officers as administrators for South Sea Islands	91
6 Nov 1937, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact	95
2 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations	97
22 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolutions for cultural cooperative agreement with Germany	100
22 Feb 1939, attended, agreed to participation of Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact	106
26 Sept 1940, attended, Instigation Committee and Plenary Session approved Tripartite Pact	111, 116
18 Dec 1940, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania's joining the Tripartite Pact	125
3 July 1941, attended, ratified French-Japanese and Thai-Japanese Protocols, guaranty and political understandings	133
28 July 1941, attended, agreed to Protocol with France re common defense of French Indo-China	139
21 Nov 1941, attended as Vice-President, prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact	142
8 Dec 1941, attended, ratified declaration of war against America and England	145
10 Dec 1941, attended, ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy & Japan	147
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 1942, attended Investigation Committee, discussion re establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry	149
18 Aug 1943, attended, Investigation Committee, conclusion of treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Malaya and Shan areas	154

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

20 July 1944: Lost cabinet office	264
5 Apr 1945: Attended, which decided to recommend Suzuki to succeed Koiso	265

SUZUKI, Kisaburo  
 (Minister of Justice in INUKAI Cabinet)  
 (Deceased)

SUZUKI, Sarohu  
 (Privy Councillor)  
 (Deceased)

SUZUKI, Teiichi (Accused)

Imperial Conferences:

2 July 1941, attended, which adopted resolution re Japanese-American negotiations . . . . .	10
6 Sept 1941 (same as above) . . . . .	13
5 Nov 1941, attended, decided policy toward US, England and Netherlands . . . . .	18
1 Dec 1941, attended, decided to declare war on US, Britain and Netherlands . . . . .	23

Liaison Conferences:

(See Page 32 for attendance at from 13 Jan to 21 July 1941. Those who usually attended Liaison Conferences subsequent to 21 July 1941, according to Tojo, are set forth on Pages 33 and 56 Suzuki is named; therefore references in the index are made only to the Exhibits showing attendance. See Pages 37 - 63)

29 Oct 1941, reported to Kido on progress of o/a 30 Nov 1941, attended, re composition and delivery of final note . . . . .	42 52, 56
Knew time and day of attack . . . . .	56
Complete war preparations . . . . .	57
12 Dec 1941, attended, re economic counter-plan for southern areas . . . . .	62

Privy Council Meetings:

28 July 1941, attended, concluded protocol between Japan and France re common defense of French Indo-China . . . . .	139
8 Dec 1941, attended as "Explainer", ratified declaration of war against America and England . . . . .	145
10 Dec 1941, attended as above, ratified the treaty against separate peace among Germany, Italy and Japan . . . . .	147
12 Oct 1942, attended as "exponent" except as indicated in text for organization of Greater Asia Ministry . . . . .	149- 153

Cabinet Meetings:

(See generally pages 211-231)	
2 May 1941, decided National Defense Security Law enforced May 10, 1941 . . . . .	211
o/a 28 June 1941, decided to tighten grip on Indo-China . . . . .	212
16 July 1941, decided that 23 Konoye Cabinet resign	214
22 Aug 1941, attended, explained national commodity mobilization plan to meet international situation and import difficulties . . . . .	215, 216
5 Sept 1941, attended, decided Traffic Mobilization Plan . . . . .	217



SUZUKI, Teiichi (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings (cont'd)

12 Sept 1941, attended, insure labor for munition production . . . . .	p. 218
12 Oct 1941, attended, maintain armies in China and Indo-China and prepare for war and continue negotiations with US for a settlement . . . . .	219, 222
4 Nov 1941, attended, policy of press and speech regulation . . . . .	223
28 Nov 1941, attended, functions of sixth committee was to center acquisition and control of resources in southern areas in order to strengthen Japan's economy . . . . .	224
Approved new system in press circles aimed at placing newspapers on wartime basis . . . . .	225
o/a 1 Dec 1941, attended, approved gist of final note . . . . .	226
Responsible for study of note . . . . .	226
1 or 2 Dec 1941, whole Cabinet attended Imperial Conference . . . . .	227
Knew time and date for attack . . . . .	227
International Law would not impede attack . . . . .	227
8 Dec 1941, attended, decided policy to be adopted following attack on Pearl Harbor . . . . .	231

TAJIPI (Section Chief) Foreign Office.

JOINT CONFERENCES

16 Jul 40. Attended. Agreed to intensify Axis coalition. . .p.283

TAKAHASHI, Koreikiyo (Finance Minister, INUKAI Cabinet)

Deceased

TAKARABE, Takeo

PRIVY COUNCIL MEETING:

18 Aug - 26 Sep 30. Attended meeting of 23 Aug in regard  
London Naval Treaty . . . . . 66

1 Oct 30. Attended meeting re London Naval Treaty. . . . . 68

TAKATSUJI, Masami (Secretary to Privy Council)

PRIVY COUNCIL:

2 Nov 38. Attended. Passed resolution to end cooperative  
relation with League of Nations. . . . . 97

22 Nov 38. Attended. Passed resolution for cultural coopera-  
tion agreement with Germany . . . . . 100

22 Feb 39. Attended. Agreed to participation of Hungary  
and Manchukuo in Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . . 106

26 Sep 40. Attended. Approved Tripartite Pact . . . . . 111

18 Dec 40. Attended. Discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia  
and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact. . . . . 125

16 Jun 41. Attended as a secretary the meeting which approved  
Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation and  
trade and tariff in French Indo-China. . . . . 127

3 Jul 41. Attended as a secretary the meeting which ratified  
two protocols between France-Japan, and between Tai-Japan  
on guarantee and political understandings. . . . . 133

21 Nov 41. Attended as above the meeting which decided to  
prolong the Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . . 143

TAKATSUJI, Masami (Con'd)  
PRIVY COUNCIL

- 10 Dec 41. Attended as above the meeting which decided to ratify treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan. . . . . p. 147
- 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42. Attended as above the meetings, 1st/7th for organization of Greater East Asia Ministry . . . . . 149-153
- 18 Aug 43. Attended as above the meeting for conclusion of treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Malaya and Shan areas. . . . . 154

TAKAYAMA, Lt. Colonel, Army office.

JOINT CONFERENCES:

- 12 Jul 40. Attended. Discussed strengthening Tripartite harmony. . . . . 282
- 16 Jul 40. Attended, Agreed to intensify Axis Coalition. . . 283

TAKEGOSHI, Yosaburo

PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS:

- 26 Sep 40. Attended. Approved Tripartite Pact. . . . . 111
- 18 Dec 40. Attended. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact discussed. . . . . 125
- 16 Jun 41. Attended. Approved Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation, trade and tariff system in French Indo-China . . . . . 127
- 3 Jul 41. Attended. As Councillor ratified France-Japanese, and Tai-Japanese protocols, guaranteed and political understandings. . . . . 133
- 21 Nov 41. Attended. As Councillor prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . . 142
- 8 Dec 41. Attended. As Councillor ratified declaration of war against America and England . . . . . 145

TAKEGUCHI, Yosaburo (Con'd)  
PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS:

- 10 Dec 41. Attended as councillor. Ratified the treaty  
against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan . . p. 14
- 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42. Attended as above,  
Organization of Great East Asia Ministry . . . . . 149-15
- 18 Aug 43. Attended as Councillor conclusion of treaty  
between Japan-Thailand concerning Thai territory in  
Shan areas . . . . . 15

TAKEUCHI, Kakichi

PRIVY COUNCIL MEETING:

- 16 Jun 41. Attended as "Explainer". Approved Japanese-  
French treaties for residence and navigation, trade and  
tariff systems in French Indo-China. . . . . 12
- 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42. Attended as Exponent,  
Organization of Great East Asia Ministry . . . . . 149-15
- 18 Aug 43. Attended as Exponent conclusion of treaty  
between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory  
in Shan areas . . . . . 15

TANABE, Harumichi

LIAISON CONFERENCES:

- o/a Nov 41. Attended. Re complete plans for war with  
U.S.A. . . . . 5

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES:

- 6 Sep 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japanese-  
American negotiation . . . . . 13
- 1 Dec 41. Attended. Decided to declare war on U.S.,  
Britain and Netherlands. . . . . 20

CABINET MEETING:

- 22 Aug 41. Attended. National mobilization plan to maintain  
co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation..215

TANAKA, Ryukichi, Military

Military Service Bureau Conferences:

Apr 42. Attended. Decided that IOW's engage in forced labor. . . . . p. 275

TANAKA, Ryuzo (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

TANAKA, Ryuzo (Member of Education in 2nd  
Watanabe Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

19-23 Sep 31. Attended. Discussed Mukden Incident . . 161- 162

TANEMURA, Major (Army General Staff Office)

Joint Conferences:

16 Jul 40. Attended. Agreed to intensify Axis' coalition . . . . . 283

TANI, Masayuki (Director, Bureau of Asia  
Foreign Ministry)

Privy Council Meetings:

12 Sep 32. Attended. Approved signing of Japan-  
Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73  
8 Dec 41. Attended as Explainer. Ratified declaration  
of war against America and England . . . . . 145  
12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, Oct 42. Attended as State  
Minister. Organization of Greater East Asia  
Ministry . . . . . 149-153

TANOMOGI, Koikichi (Minister of Communications  
in HIROTA Cabinet)

Deceased

TANAKA, Magoichi

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30. Attended. Re London Naval Treaty. . . . . 71

TERAJIMA, Hirohumi (Sec'y, Foreign Office)

PRIVY COUNCIL:

13 Sep 32 Attended. Approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo  
Protocol . . . . . 73

TERAUCHI, Hisaichi (War Minister in HIROTA  
Cabinet)

Deceased.

TERAJIMA, Ken

PRIVY COUNCIL:

8 Dec 41. Attended as State Minister. Ratified declaration of  
war against America and England. . . . . 145

LIAISON CONFERENCE:

30 Nov 41. Attended. Re complete plans for war with U.S.A. . . . . 57

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE:

1 Dec 41. Attended. Decided to declare war on U.S.A., Britain and  
Netherlands . . . . . 23

CABINET MEETINGS:

4 Nov 41. Attended. Policy of press and speech regulation.. . . . 223

TERAUCHI, Juichi (War Minister)

FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE:

7 Aug 36. Attended. Decided Foreign policy of empire. . . . . 233

11 Aug 36. Attended. Decided Second Administration Policy  
towards North China . . . . . 234

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCES:

30 Jun 36. Attended. Decided Basis of National Policy. . . . . 242

7 Aug 36. Attended. Decided Basic Principles of National  
Policy . . . . . 243

11 Aug 36. Attended. Decided Fundamentals of National Policy.. . . . 244

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL:

30 Jun 41. Attended. Discussed international situation. . . . . 281

THAILAND

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES:

- 2 Jul 41. Decided to execute schemes against. . . . . pl1.-12
- 5 Nov 41. Measures toward . . . . . 20

LIAISON CONFERENCES:

- 30 Jan, 3 Feb 41. Decided policy toward . . . . . 35-36
- 25 Jun 41. Decided to speed-up all measures toward . . . . . 38-39
- 13 Nov 41. Japan's policy toward . . . . . 50
- 20 Nov 41. Decided administration of . . . . . 51
- 12 Dec 41. Reported economic plan for . . . . . 62

PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS:

- 3 Jul 41. Ratified Thai-Japanese Protocol on Guarantee and Political Understanding. . . . . 134
- Germany agrees that Japan mediate border dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand . . . . . 135
- 18 Aug 43. Investigation Committee approved treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory, Malaya and Shan areas; discussed territorial rights under international law of occupying nations. . . . . 154-55

FOUR MINISTERS CONFERENCE:

- 5, 21 Nov 40. Decided on assistance to and relation of, in New Order. . . . . 239

DECISIONS OF IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS:

- Apr 41. Decision to establish close relations with. . . . . 280

TIME CHART

- December 6, 7, 8, 1941, shows differences between Tokyo time and local time when certain events occurred. . . . . 230

TOGO, Shigonori (Accused)

PRIVY COUNCIL MEETING:

- 25 Nov 36. Attended, Approved Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . . 89
- 21 Nov 41. Attended as Foreign Minister. Prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . . 142

TOGO, Shigenori (Accused) (Con'd)

PRIVY COUNCIL MEETING:

8 Dec 41. Attended as State Minister. Ratified declaration of war against U.S.A. . . . . . p. 145

10 Dec 41. Attended as State Minister. Ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan. . . . . 147

LIAISON CONFERENCES:

18 Oct, 2 Nov 41. Attended. Sent telegram to NOMURA saying that policy to improve relation with America were discussed. . . . 41

4 Nov 41. Attended. Sent telegram to NOMURA re counterproposal for resuming Japanese-American negotiations, discussed. . . . . 47

c/a 30 Nov 41. Attended. Re composition and delivery of final note. . . . . 52

c/a 30 Nov 41. Attended. Complete plans for war with U.S.A. . . . . 57

30 Nov 41. Attended. Explained final note to U.S.A. . . . . 60

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES:

5 Nov 41. Attended. Decided policy toward US, England and Netherlands . . . . . 18

5 Nov 41. Attended. Telegram from, to NOMURA re Japanese policy toward America . . . . . 19

Attended. Telegram from, to NOMURA re counterproposal of Japan which was discussed 5 Nov 41. . . . . 22

Attended. Telegram from, to NOMURA urging signing of agreement by U.S.A. . . . . 22

1 Dec 41. Attended. Decided Japan would declare war on U.S. Britain and Netherlands. . . . . 23

CABINET MEETINGS: \*\*

4 Nov 41. Attended. Policy of press and speech regulation . . . 223

1 Dec 41. Composed final note to U.S. on basis of views of Liaison Conference . . . . . 226

1 or 2 Dec 41. Attended. Time of attack known to; gave instructions to Washington Embassy re time of delivery and excused late delivery of note to Great Britain . . . . . 227-229

8 Dec 41. Attended. Resigned as Overseas Affairs Minister, report of war progress and policy . . . . . 231

\*\* See generally pages 224 to 231. References in the Index are to exhibits showing attendance. C



TOJO, HIDEKI

PRIVY COUNCIL:

16 Sept 40. Attended. Discussion re economic pressure by U.S. on signing of Tri-Partite Pact and preparations to be made if war breaks out . . . . .	109
26 Sep 40. Attended. Approved Tri-partite Pact . . . . .	111
26 Sep 40. Attended. Replied to questions re Japan-German Alliance . . . . .	116
18 Dec 40. Attended. Discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact. . . . .	125
3 Jul 41. Attended as State Minister. Ratified France-Japanese and Thai-Japanese Protocols of guarantee and political understandings . . . . .	133
28 Jul 41. Attended. Agreed to resolution that there be concluded between France and Japan a Protocol regarding the common defense of French Indo-China and military cooperation . . . . .	138
21 Nov 41. Attended as premier. Prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . .	142
8 Dec 41. Attended as Premier. Ratified declaration of war against America and England . . . . .	145
10 Dec 41. Attended as Premier. Ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan. . . . .	147
9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42. Attended as Premier. Meetings (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 7th) organization of Great East Asia Ministry . . . . .	149-154
18 Aug 43. Attended as Premier. Conclusion of treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan areas. . . . .	154

LIAISON CONFERENCES

13 Jan to 21 Jul 41. Attended all meetings. Record does not set forth matter discussed . . . . .	32
See Exhibit 1119-A, Extract from Tojo's interrogation as to usual attendance at. . . . .	33
21 Jul 41. A meeting of the Prime Minister and other ministers concerned. Decided they should meet with the Navy and War Ministers and staffs of the High Command at the office of the High Command to project national policies . . . . .	33

TOJO, Hideki  
LIAISON CONFERENCES (Con'd)

6 Jun 41. Refers to meeting to be held which he attended. . . . 37

25 Jun 41. Attended. Decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China . . . . . 38

4 Aug 41. Attended. Decided "Principle of Negotiation with Soviet Union . . . . . 40

18 Oct 41 to Nov 2 41. Telegram from Tojo to Nuzura re meetings of fundamental policy. . . . . 41

c/a 30 Oct 41. Attended. Questions and answers re ratification of Tri-Partite Pact and its effects upon relations with U.S., Britain and Netherlands East Indies. . . . . 43

4 Nov 41. Attended. Re counter-proposal to U.S. . . . . 47

11 Nov 41. Attended. Set forth reasons for attacking U.S. and Britain . . . . . 48

13 Nov 41. Attended. Adopted measures re foreign countries as decided at Imperial Conference of 5 Nov 41. . . . . 50

20 Nov 41. Attended. Decided military administration in Southern occupied areas. . . . . 51

c/a Nov 30, 41. Attended. Re composition of final note and its delivery . . . . . 52

30 Nov 41. Attended. Approved the gist of the final note to America . . . . . 55

c/a 30 Nov 41. Attended. Approved plan to attack Pearl Harbor. 57  
to chiefs of

30 Nov 41. Attended. Decided to delegate staff and Foreign Minister the time of delivery final note . . . . . 58

30 Nov 41. Attended. Approved substance of final note . . . . 60

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES:

2 Jul 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japan-American negotiation . . . . . 10

6 Sep 41. (Same as above) . . . . . 13

TOJO, Hideki (Con'd)  
IMPERIAL CONFERENCES:

6 Sep 41. Interrogation of, re stating purpose of Imperial Conference, 6 Sep 41.. . . . .	15
6 Sep 41. Interrogation of, re attitude toward war with U.S. . . . .	16
5 Nov 41. Attended. Decided policy toward U.S., England and Netherlands. . . . .	18
1 Dec 41. Attended. Decided to declare war on U.S., England and Netherlands . . . . .	23
1 Dec 41. Extract from Interrogations re declaration of war on U. S. Britain and Netherlands. . . . .	24

CABINET MEETINGS: (See generally pages 188 to 231. References in the Index are to exhibits showing attendance.)

26 Jul 40. Attended. Established Greater East Asia Policy and planned internal economy. . . . .	199-200
22 Jan 41. Attended. Increase population to secure leadership in East Asia. . . . .	205
22 Aug 41. Attended. National mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation . . . . .	215-216
12 Oct 41. Attended. Troops should not be withdrawn from China and that decision to continue negotiations should not be left to the Premier since time for war was opportune. . . . .	219-222
4 Nov 41. Attended. Policy of press and speech regulation. . . . .	223
1 Dec 41. Attended. Liaison conference furnished basis of final note to U.S. Composed by TOJO. . . . .	226
1 or 2 December 41. Attended, by reason of self-defense an attack was not impeded by treaties and delivery of note should be shortly followed by attack . . . . .	227-229
8 Dec 41. Attended. Report on war progress and adopted war policy . . . . .	231

TOJO, Hideki (Con'd)

FOUR MINISTERS CONFERENCE

- 4 Sept 40. Attended. Decided Outline of Basic National Policy. p.238  
5, 21 Nov 40. Attended, Decided on aid to and relations of  
Thailand in New Order . . . . . 239

CONFERENCE OF SENIOR STATESMEN

- 7 Dec 41. Attended. Discussed war with U.S. . . . . 259  
5 Apr 45. Attended. Decided to recommend Suzuki to  
succeed Koiso . . . . . 274  
17 Oct 41. Approved as Premier . . . . . 255  
17 Jul 44. Resignation of cabinet discussed. . . . . 261  
18 Jul 44. Successor to, discussed . . . . . 263  
20 Jul 44. Lost office . . . . . 264

MILITARY SERVICE BUREAU COUNCIL:

- Apr 42. Attended. Decided that IOW's engage in forced labor. . 275

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

- 30 Jun 41. Attended. Discussed international situation. . . . 281

TOKONAMI, Takejiro (Minister of Communications  
in OKADA Cabinet)

Deceased.

TOKUNAGA (Secretary)

JOINT CONFERENCES:

- 12 Jul 40. Attended. Discussed strengthening Axis harmony . . 282  
16 Jul 40. Attended. Agreed to intensify Axis coalition. . . 283

TOMII, Masaaki (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

TOMINAGA (Chief of Personnel Bureau)

MILITARY SERVICE BUREAU CONFERENCE:

- Apr 42. Attended. Decided that IOW's engage in forced labor. . 275

TCMITA, Kenji (Chief Secretary of Cabinet, (KONOE))

LIAISON CONFERENCE:

1941 Attended all meetings between 13 Jan and 21 Jul except that of 16, 17, 19, 23 Jan; 20, 23 Feb. . . . . 32

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES:

2 Jul 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japan-American negotiations. . . . . 10  
6 Sep 41. Same as above . . . . . 13

TOYOTA, Teijiro (Foreign Minister TOJO Cabinet)

TRIVY COUNCIL MEETING:

16 Jun 41. Attended as Commerce and Industry Minister. Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation and trade and tariff system in French Indo-China. . . . . 127  
3 Jul 41. Attended as State Minister. Ratified French-Japanese and Thai-Japanese Protocols of guarantee and political understandings. . . . . 133

LIAISON CONFERENCE:

13 Jan 41. Attended . . . . . 32

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE:

6 Sept 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japan-American negotiations. . . . . 13

CABINET MEETINGS:

2 Jul 41. Intended to continue close cooperation with Germany and Italy and to maintain troops in French Indo-China. . . . 213  
22 Aug 41. Attended. National mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation . . . . . 215-216  
12 Oct 41. Attended. Agreement with U.S. could be reached in principle to withdraw troops from China but keep them there by agreement . . . . . 219-222

TRAFFIC MOBILIZATION PLAN

CABINET MEETING:

5 Sep 41. Decision to put land and sea traffic on war basis. . 217

TRIPARTITE PACT (See German-Japanese Relations)

Imperial Conferences:

- 10-26 Sep 40. Matsucka's explanation of; will act under  
if U.S. participates in war . . . . . 11
- 6 Sep 41. Japan's attitude toward . . . . . 15

Liaison Conferences:

- 19 Sep 40. Strengthening Axis . . . . . 29
- c/a 30 Oct 41. Discussed cooperation Germany and Italy would  
give in view of war between America and Japan; advan-  
tages and disadvantages . . . . . 43-46

Privy Council Meetings:

- 16 Sep 40. Discussed questions regarding danger of economic  
pressure from U.S. and preparation to be made for war  
with U.S. if Tripartite Pact signed. . . . . 109
- 26 Sep 40. Investigation Committee approved Tripartite  
Pact. . . . . 111,117,120  
Effect of . . . . . 117,118
- 26 Sep 40. Privy Council approved. . . . . 116-124
- 18 Dec 40. Discussed Hungary, Czechoslovakia  
and Rumania's joining. . . . . 125

Cabinet Meetings:

- 5 Nov 40. Decision, new national policy for Greater East Asia  
and new world order with conclusion of, old economic  
system of free trade disintegrating and Japan to con-  
trol economic production, manufacture and distribution  
of essential materials over all Greater East Asia. . . . . 204
- 2 Jul 41. 3rd KONOYE Cabinet to continue to be based on  
spirit and aims of . . . . . 213

Five Ministers Conferences:

- 6 May 39. Hiranuma obtained compromise regarding . . . . . 246  
Hiranuma's declaration . . . . . 247  
Protest because of German-Russian Non-Aggression  
Pact . . . . . 249

TSUJI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

- 26 Sep 40. Attended. Approved Tripartite Pact. . . . . 111

TSUKADA, Osamu

Liaison Conferences:

6, 26, 27, 28, 30 Jun 41. Attended. . . . . p. 22

Imperial Conferences:

2 Jul 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japanese-American negotiation. . . . . 10

6 Sep 41. (same as above) . . . . . 13

5 Nov 41. Attended. Decided policy toward U.S., England and Netherlands. . . . . 15

Cabinet Meetings:

1 Dec 41. Member of Liaison Conference responsible for basis of last note to U.S. . . . . 226

Supreme War Council:

27 Jun 41. Attended. Discussed international situation . . . . . 281

UCHIDA, Yasuya (Foreign Minister & Chief Cabinet

Secretary)

UFUKU (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

15, 19, 20 and 21 Oct 42. Attended as Explainer the establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry. . . . . 149

UEMATSU (Explainer: Commodities Adjustment official in Commerce and Industry Ministry)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 Jun 41. Attended as Explainer. Approved Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation, trade and tariff system in French Indo-China . . . . . 127

UGAKI, Kazushige

Liaison Conferences:

13 Jan 1942. Attended. . . . . 32-34

UNITED STATES - JAPANESE RELATIONS

See American-Japanese Relations

USAMI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

15 and 19 Oct 42. Attended as Explainer -- the establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry. . . . . 119

ISHIO, Keinosuke (Education Minister)

Privy Council Meetings:

25 Nov 36. Attended. Approved Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . . 110  
 22 Feb 39. Attended. Agreed to participation of Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . . 110  
 26 Sep 40. Attended. Approved Tripartite Pact. . . . . 111  
 18 Dec 40. Attended. Discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact. . . . . 125  
 3 Jul 41. Attended. Ratified French-Japanese, Thai-Japanese protocols of Guarantee and Spheres of Understanding. . . . . 133  
 8 Dec 41. Attended. Ratified declaration of war against America and England. . . . . 140  
 10 Dec 41. Attended. Ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan. . . . . 147  
 9 to 21 Oct 42. Attended. Organization of Greater East Asia Ministry and 3 other matters. . . . . 149-153  
 18 Aug 43. Attended. Conclusion of treaty between Japan-Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan areas. . . . . 154

YAKATSUKI, Reijiro (Prime Minister)

Cabinet Meetings:

19-20, 21-23 Sep 31. Attended. Discussed Mukden Incident. 161-162  
 24 Sep 31. No territorial ambitions. . . . . 161  
 12 Dec 31. Resigned as Prime Minister. . . . . 162

Conference of Senior Statesmen:

17 Jul 40. Attended. Decided to recommend Konoye to succeed Yonai. . . . . 252  
 17 Jul 41. Attended. Approved Konoye as Premier for third time. . . . . 254  
 17 Oct 41. Attended. Approved Tojo to succeed Konoye. . . . . 255  
 29 Nov 41. Attended. Discussed war with U.S. . . . . 257  
 1 Dec 41. Attended. Discussed war with U.S. . . . . 259  
 17 Jul 44. Attended. Discussed resignation of Tojo Cabinet. . . . . 261  
 18 Jul 44. Attended. Decided that Terauchi, Koiso or Hata, succeed Tojo. . . . . 263  
 20 Jul 44. Attended. Approved coalition cabinet of Koiso and Yonai. . . . . 264  
 5 Apr 45. Attended. Decided to recommend Suzuki to succeed Koiso. . . . . 265



WAR PREPARATIONS

Imperial Conference  
 2 Jul 41. Decided to prepare for war with U.S. and G.P. . . . p.12  
 5 Nov 41. Order issued by Nagano to Yamamoto re defense  
 general operational preparations. . . . . 22

Liaison Conferences:  
 c/a 30 Nov 41. Complete plans for war with U.S.A. . . . . 27

Privy Council Meetings:  
 20 Sep 40. Discussed war preparations when Tripartite  
 Pact signed. . . . . 110, 123  
 8 Dec 41. Negotiations with U.S. continued for sake  
 of strategy. . . . . 145

Cabinet Meetings:  
 2 Jul 41. Decided to secretly prepare for war against U.S. . . . 213  
 26 Jul 40. Decided to increase armaments by economic  
 control over production, distribution and consump-  
 tion of essential materials. . . . . 198, 200  
 12 Oct 41. Decided to complete war preparations with U.S.,  
 and Netherlands East Indies. . . . . 210

WAR SUPPLEMENTS

Cabinet Meetings:  
 16 Jan 38. Discussed new German policy with reference to  
 China of stopping war shipments to, . . . . . 190

YATANABE, Chifuyu (Justice Minister in  
Hamaguchi's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:  
 19-23 Sep 31. Attended. Discussed Mukden Incident, . . .161-162

WELFARE OFFICE

Cabinet Meetings:  
 12 Sep 41. Formulated Workers Mobilization Plan to  
 insure labor supply and increase production. . . . . 218

WORKERS MOBILIZATION PLAN

Cabinet Meetings:  
 12 Sep 41. Decision to insure supply of raw and to  
 increase production. . . . . 218

YAMADA (Explainer-Secretary, Greater East Asia Ministry)

Privy Council Meeting:

2 Oct 39. London Naval Treaty. . . . . p. 63  
18 Aug 43. Attended to explain the Treaty that Thailand should annex Shan state from Burma . . . . . 154

YAMADA, Otozo (Inspector General of Army Education)

Supreme War Council:

30 Jun 41. Attended. Discussed international situation . . . . .

YAMAGATA (Explainer)

Privy Council Meeting:

3 Oct 39. Attended. Re London Naval Treaty. . . . .

YAMAJI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meeting:

6 Nov 37. Attended. Decided to allow Itay to join Anti-Communist Pact. . . . . 95

YAMAMOTO (Explainer, Director, Greater East Asia Bureau, Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meeting:

8 Dec 41. Attended as Explainer. Ratified declaration of war against America and England. . . . . 145

YAMAMOTO, Tatsuo (Home Minister in SAITO Cabinet)

Deceased.

YAMAMOTO, Teijiro (Minister of Agriculture in INOUE Cabinet)

Deceased

YAMAOXA, Director of Military Affairs Bureau

Privy Council Meeting:

13 Sep 37. Attended. Approved signing Japan-Manchukuo protocol . . . . . 73

YAMASKI, Tetsunosuke (Agriculture and Forestry Minister, OKADA's Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:  
3 Jul 35. Attended. Approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee. . . . . 81

YAMAZAKI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:  
21 Oct 42. Attended as explainer. Establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry . . . . . 149

YANAGAWA, Heisuke (Vice Minister of War)

Privy Council Meetings:  
13 Sep 32. Attended. Approved signing Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73

YANAI (Explainer, Secretary of Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meeting:  
13 Sep 32. Attended. Approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73

YANAKAWA, Heisuke (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

YASUI, Eiji (Prime Minister on 2nd Kono Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:  
18 Dec 40. Attended. Discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125

Cabinet Meetings:  
26 Jul 40. Attended. Established Greater East Asia policy and planned internal economy . . . . . 199-200

YEU

Cabinet Meeting:  
24 Oct 39. Decision, change from sterling to dollars for external value of, . . . . . 197

YAMASAKI, Tatsunosuke (Agriculture and Forestry Minister, OKADA's Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:  
3 Jul 35. Attended. Approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee. . . . . 81

YAMAZAKI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:  
21 Oct 42. Attended as explainer. Establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry . . . . . 149

YANAGAWA, Heisuke (Vice Minister of War)

Privy Council Meetings:  
13 Sep 32. Attended. Approved signing Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73

YANAI (Explainer, Secretary of Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meeting:  
13 Sep 32. Attended. Approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo Protocol . . . . . 73

YANAKITA, Heisuke (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

YASUI, Eiji (Home Minister on 2nd Kono Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:  
18 Dec 40. Attended. Discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact . . . . . 125

Cabinet Meetings:  
26 Jul 40. Attended. Established Greater East Asia policy and planned internal economy . . . . . 199-200

YEU

Cabinet Meeting:  
24 Oct 39. Decision, change from sterling to dollars for external value of, . . . . . 197

YOH.I, Mitsumasu (Premier)

Privy Council Meeting:

6 Nov 37. Attended. Decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . .	95
2 Nov 38. Attended. Passed resolution to end coopera- tive relation with League of Nations . . . . .	97

Cabinet Meetings:

11 Jul 37. Attended. Increase North China Army. . . . .	183
3 Mar 40. Attended. Economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on U.S. for materials. . . . .	198

Four Minister's Conference:

20 Feb 37. Attended. Decided Third Administration Policy toward North China . . . . .	235
16 Apr 37. Attended. Decided Plans for Guiding North China . . . . .	236
18 Jun 40. Attended. Decided negotiations with French Indo-China should be conducted, but if unsuccessful possibly to use force. . . . .	237
2 Sep 44. Presumably attended. Decided independence of Netherlands East Indies to be announced . . . . .	240

Five Ministers Conferences:

25 Nov 38. Attended. Decided to capture Hainan Island . .	245
6 May 39. Attended. Decided on compromise regarding a Tripartite Pact . . . . .	246
8 Aug 39. Attended. Which Otto's cablegram shows German concessions requested for a Tripartite Pact . . . . .	250
12 Jul 40. Attended. Decided to push war preparations. .	251

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

17 Jul 41. Attended. Approved Kenryo as Premier for 3rd time . . . . .	254
17 Oct 42. Attended. Approved Tojo to succeed Kenryo . .	255
29 Nov 42. Attended. Discussed war with U.S. . . . .	257
1 Dec 42. (Same as above) . . . . .	259
17 Jul 44. Attended. Discussed resignation of Tojo Cabinet.	261
18 Jul 44. Attended. Decided that Terauchi, Koiso or Hata succeed Tojo . . . . .	262
20 Jul 44. Attended. Approved coalition Cabinet of Koiso and Yonai . . . . .	264
17 Jul 40. Discussed successor of, . . . . .	252

YOSANO (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

21 Nov 41. Attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact. . . 142-3

YOSHIDA, Shigeru (Welfare Minister, Yenai's Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30. Attended. London Naval Treaty. . . . . 68

Cabinet Meetings:

3 Mar 40. Attended. Economic policy to relieve Japan  
of dependence on U.S. for materials. . . . . 198

YOSHIDA, Zengo (Navy Minister in Yenai Cabinet)

Deceased

YOSHIKAWA, Shinji (Minister of Commerce and Industry,  
1st Konoze Cabinet)

Privy Council Meetings:

6 Nov 37. Attended. Decided to allow Italy to join  
Anti-Comintern Pact. . . . . 94-5

Cabinet Meetings:

11 Jul 37. Attended. Increase North China Army. . . . 183

YOSHIZUMI (Chief of Procurement and Mobilization  
Bureau )

Military Service Bureau Conference:

Apr 42. Attended. Decided that ICW's engage in forced  
labor . . . . . 275

YUKAWA (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

8 Jul 41. Attended to explain 2 protocols; France-  
Japan, and Thai-Japan on Guarantee and Political  
Understandings . . . . . 13344

YUKI, Toyotaro (Finance Minister)

Four Ministers Conferences:

30 Feb 37. Attended. Decided Third Administrative Policy toward North China . . . . .	235
16 Apr 37. Attended. Decided plans for guiding North China . . . . .	236

YUZAWA, Michio (Home Minister, Tojo Cabinet)

Privy Council Meeting:

9-21 Oct 42. Attended as Stat. Minister. Organization of Greater East Asia Ministry . . . . .	149 -154
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## IMPERIAL CONFERENCES

Although no authority can be found in the Constitution, laws or ordinances for the Gozen Kaigi or Conference before the Throne, it has existed as an institution in the Japanese Government for hundreds of years. It has continued to function as the organ for reconciling the conflicts arising from the division of authority in various spheres. As a body it meets only under the gravest of conditions to determine matters of gravest policy. (681)

The membership of the conference in addition to the Emperor has varied both in size and in the nature of the membership. During 1940 and 1941, when five such conferences were held, the membership consisted of the Premier, the President of the Privy Council, the Navy Minister, the War Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff and the Directors of the Military Affairs Section of the Army and the Naval Affairs Section. Occasionally other cabinet ministers attended. (682)

Such conferences did not meet at regular intervals but only at times of grave national importance. Some meetings were publicized and others have been kept secret. During the year preceding the outbreak of war on December 7, 1941, the conference met on petition for such meeting from the liaison conference. The interested parties would agree on a subject and plan which was presented to the liaison conference, which would in turn request a Conference before the Throne. Ordinarily, in practice, no formal decision was made at the time of the conference, but the consensus of the conference is made the formal decision of the Cabinet. (682)



IMPERIAL CONFERENCE  
(1931)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
188-C			
188-E	late Dec.	2,234-5; 2,240	--
		<u>Present</u>	

Decision

According to Araki, the Conference decided upon the occupation of the four provinces of Korea, Mukden, Heilungking and Jehol.

Remarks

ARAKI was asked, in an interrogation, certain questions and he gave the following answers:

"Q General, what I want to know now is -- after the decision of the Imperial Conference, how did you order the completion of the occupation of these four provinces?

"A We immediately decided to send the troops to Fengtien Province. The principal plan was made in the War Ministry's order to General Headquarters, and they took the procedure of sending the troops for operation.

"Q Who signed the order? Did you, General? The order to General Headquarters?

"A The principal plan approved by the conference as a matter of procedure I signed.

"Q General, can you recall what was in the order that you signed?

"A I don't remember.

"Q Would it be in the files of the War Ministry?

"A I don't know that. It was so long ago that I am not sure whether we could find the document or not.

"Q It was approved by the Emperor, was it not?

"A The Emperor knew about the plan, however, the order was issued by the Advisor, and as to the written order a document as old as ten years they would usually destroy."  
(2,240)

And at page 2,235:

"Q What was your answer in the preliminary meeting to their questions on the violation of the Nine-Power Treaty?

"A I do not think this matter was discussed at the preliminary meeting.

"Q It was discussed at the Imperial Conference, was it not?

"A No, it was not discussed. The only subjects discussed were the area of occupation and the object of the occupation. The violation of the Nine-Power Treaty might have been discussed at other Privy Council meetings but at this meeting the important question was the settlement of the affair." (2,235)

See Exhibit 188-C, o/a 17 December 1931, herein, for a reference to a cabinet meeting on the same subject matter, and the same Exhibit herein for a reference to a Privy Council meeting on the same subject matter.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
463-A	11 January	5302; 3623	60

Present

No names mentioned in Exhibit.

Decision

Decided the basic policy of the disposition of the China Incident.

Remarks

Exhibit 463-A is an excerpt from a document "Document purporting to establish Provincial Government at Peiping and Restoration Government at Nanking." (5296) The Exhibit refers to an Imperial Conference of 11 January 1938, (5302) and states that "According to the 'Fundamental Principles to manage the Incident (a)' which was decided soon after the establishment of the Provisional Government at the Cabinet meeting, the Japanese Government will cooperate with the Nanking Government to save the situation if the Nanking Government reconsiders. However, if the Nanking Government does not reconsider and continues the so-called long-term resistance, Japan will not expect to negotiate with the Nanking Government in the future, and furthermore to meet the necessity to manage the vast areas occupied by the Japanese forces, henceforth Japan will take separate measures. (5301)"

.....

"Based upon 'the basic policy on the disposition of the China Incident decided by the Imperial Conference met on the 11th of January 1938, our Government has set up its policy to the effect that as regards the Central Government, we reserve a right to negotiate with the old Nanking regime on the basis of the peace terms drawn up separately in case it makes reflection, changes its mind and approaches us with sincerity, seeking peace: that, if on the contrary it makes no peace offer to us we drop our idea to seek a solution of the conflict through further negotiation with it; that we help create a new Chinese regime and cooperate with it to build up a new reform China by making an arrangement with it to regulate the relations between the two countries; that we on the other hand endeavor either to crush the old Nanking Regime or to get it merged into a new central regime." (5301-2)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
463-A	11 January	5302; 3623	60

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(5301-2)

"On or about January 15th (Japan) has ceased to entertain any hope for a peace out of our negotiations with the Nanking Government, and the Cabinet has decided its policy to start the second phase of our measure in line with the policy decided by the Imperial Conference of January 11th, i.e. to take steps to help create and develop a new Chinese regime. In this connection our Government has on the 16th made public a statement domestically and abroad as to the foregoing and at the same time notified the Chinese to terminate our peace negotiation between us." (5303)

Exhibit 270 is "The Gist of the Talk by SATO, Kenryo" at the Contemporary Conference of Police Bureau Chiefs in the Home Office August 25 to August 30, 1938 on the "Policy in dealing with the China Incident." (3612) SATO referred to the Imperial Conference of January 11, 1938 stating that it was called because China had failed to reply to the demands of Japan regarding the terms of the truce. I understand, he said, that "the Emperor had decided to go into a prolonged endurance war should the Chinese (not) give up." (3623)

Exhibit 463-A also sets forth the movement for Establishment of a new Government in Central China; (5303-5307) the Structure of the Restoration Government and its Platform; (5308-5311) the Program for the direction of the Central China Administration; (5311-5314) and the Program for the Establishment of Central China New Regent in accordance with the program for the Administrative direction; (5315-5317).

See Exhibit 2260, herein, under Cabinet Meetings 1938 for the Cabinet decision on this matter. (16,223)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
550	10 - 26 Sept.	6328	146

Present

(No names mentioned in Exhibit or Record)

Decision

(See Remarks).

Remarks

Exhibit 550 is MATSUOKA's explanation regarding the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact at an Imperial Conference that "must have been (held) between 10 September and 26 September, 1940."

His explanation was as follows: That he thought of strengthening Japan's relations with Germany and Italy at the time Germany conquered France and when "Britain, too, seemed to be easily conquered in less than a decade." (6331); that Germany's enthusiasm for cooperation with Japan was at a low ebb, but even if Germany and Italy could subjugate the British Isles the war for the destruction of the whole British Empire would not be an easy matter (6331); that Germany and Italy would have to cope with America and the surviving parts of the British Empire and Soviet Russia (6331); that (at that time) Japan had the strength to tip the balance of the world as she liked (6332); that HITLER was aware of this; that, such being the case, he (MATSUOKA) thought it unnecessary to ask for German cooperation and decided "to postpone the negotiations until after the surrender of the British Isles, if he was obliged to do so, and that in that case he would take his own time" (6332); that "Japan must show the attitude that she would stand pat on her independent position, that she had no need to cope with Germany and Italy and she would join hands with America or even dare to save Britain, if it was necessary or convenient for her existence and mission." (6332)

He invited Ambassador OTT to tea on August 1 and told him that the time was not ripe for a strengthening of the Axis and that Japan intended to settle the China Incident by herself, which statement silenced the German Ambassador who had come to talk about mediation (6332); that he told OTT that Japan "was seriously determined to realize the ideal of hakko-ichiu (the whole world - one house), which was her traditional ideal since

her foundation, and that he was going to try it first within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (6333); that OTT agreed with him that, "Even though the British Isles might succumb it would only be the beginning of the collapse of the British Empire, and not the end." (6333)

He concluded his talk with OTT by asking him (1) "What attitude Germany was going to take regarding Japan's above mentioned realization of her ideal within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, how Germany could assist Japan, whether Germany intended to assist Japan or not, what Germany desired within this sphere (6333); (2) What Germany thought about Soviet-Japanese relations, what Germany could do about the situation (6334); (3) What Germany thought about Japanese-American relations, what Germany could do about the situation." (6334) He requested OTT to wire the above mentioned three items immediately to Fuehrer HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP for their answer (6334) but OTT was unwilling to do so. (6334)

In the meantime, continued MATSUOKA, RIBBENTROP "promoted Consul-General Heindrick STAHRER reportedly his right hand man in oriental problems to the post of Minister and ordered him to start from Berlin on August 23 and quickly come to Japan via Moscow" (6334); that he (MATSUOKA) met STAHRER and OTT at his private residence for the sake of secrecy and after three meetings agreed on a draft treaty similar to the draft submitted to the Imperial Conference. (6335)

MATSUOKA's explanation of the gist of the pact is as follows:

Japan would recognize and respect the leading position of Germany and Italy in the building of the New Order in Europe (6335). (MATSUOKA "thought that Germany would speak of the building of the new order in Africa, but the German Ambassador did not speak of it, so this item was confined to the recognition of the position of Germany and Italy in Europe." ) (6335); that "Greater East Asia" means "for the present, French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Strait Settlement, and such Oceanic Islands as NEI, New Guinea, New Caledonia and C; that it did not "at present contain Australia, New Zealand and (areas) to the South" although it would gradually extend itself with time; (6336) that he did not refer to India; that the German Ambassador said that Germany recognized Japan's political leadership in Greater East Asia but "that Germany might be given as many facilities as possible in the economic field, in trade, enterprise and acquirement of materials," (6336) to which MATSUOKA responded that Japan also

expected the cooperation of Germany and Italy in the economic exploitation of that area. (6336)

MATSUOKA then explained that Article 3 of the proposed draft contained the words "in case one of the three powers is (publicly or secretly) attacked" (6330) and that "one power" as used in Article 3 referred implicitly and chiefly to America (6336); that the words "publicly and secretly" were inserted by Germany but ST. AHNER and OTT agreed to strike out the expression and wired RIBBENTROP for instructions (6337); that such words, being difficult to interpret correctly, he asked ST. AHNER what was meant by such words and ST. AHNER replied that "what America had done up to that time did not come within the meaning of the expression," (6337) as the expression referred to "such cases as America's using important British bases in the Pacific under a secret Anglo-American Treaty, or the American Fleet directly entering Singapore" (6337); that, as regards Germany and Italy, the expression "probably meant such cases as Britain allowing America to occupy some strategic British bases in a region near the European battlefield, for example, in the Mediterranean Sea" (6337); that the interpretation of such an expression was to be left for decision by consultation among the Three Powers. (6337) Note: The Tripartite Pact as ratified did not contain the words "secretly attack" - see Exhibit 43 for the Tripartite Alliance. (6391)

Regarding the U.S.S.R., MATSUOKA explained that the Pact stipulates that it is not directed against Russia, (6339) because "he felt that there was room for doubt if the words "One Power" did not apply to the Soviet Russia and that it is made clear that the Pact in no way affects the existing agreements, views or situation between the U.S.S.R. and Germany regarding Poland and other European countries. (6339)

MATSUOKA also said that he wanted to draw up notes annexed to the Pact stipulating that "after the conclusion of this Pact, joint military and economic committees shall be formed immediately in Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, which shall study detailed arrangements regarding the carrying out of this pact, based upon its purport, and that agreed arrangements shall be submitted to the government for approval" (6340).

MATSUOKA thought that Germany would promise to supply Japan with war materials and technique, and, at her request, technicians and other personnel. (6340) Germany would also promise to help us to acquire oil from the U.S.S.R. and other countries. (6340) Japan, on her part, would promise Germany to supply raw materials, foodstuffs and other necessities of life, and technique, if she were able to do so. (6340)



MATSUOKA then concluded his explanation saying that "Germany wants to prevent America's entry into the war and, Japanese-American conflict"; (6341) that, judging from recent movements, America "may now be trying to acquire strong military bases, in great numbers and in a hurry, within important British possessions in Australia, New Zealand, India and Burma and other regions and may be preparing a battle array for encircling Japan." (6342) "There is some reason to suppose," he said, "that America, considering that Japan has suffered greatly through war of attrition in the China Incident, and that her strength has suffered remarkable decrease may, use intimidating language" (6342); that "Japan-American relations now leave little room for improvement through courtesy or desire for friendship" (6342); and so "there is nothing left for us to do but to stand firm" and "cope with America by firmly joining hands with as many countries as possible, to back up our firm attitude, and by making the fact known at home and abroad as quickly as possible." (6343)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
588	2 July	6,566; 10,145	219
779	"	7,904	219
1107	"	10,140-1	219
1110-A	"	10,151-2	---

Present

KONOYE, Prime Minister  
MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister  
TOJO, War Minister  
OIKAWA, Navy Minister  
KAWADA, Finance Minister  
SUZUKI, President of Planning Board  
HIRANUMA, Home Minister  
SUGIYAMA, Chief of Army General Staff  
NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Staff  
TOMITA, Chief Secretary of Cabinet  
OKA, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry  
TSUKADA, Vice Chief of Army General Staff  
KONDO, Vice Chief of Navy General Staff  
HARA, President of Privy Council

Decision

Resolutions concerning Japanese-American negotiations were adopted.

Remarks

Prosecution's Document 1652 consists of four resolutions including the resolution adopted at the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941. It was presented to show that, with the Soviet Union involved in war with Germany, Japan grasped the opportunity immediately to execute her plan of military aggression in the south, which all hazards she was determined to pursue. (Introductory Remarks 6566)

Exhibits 588, 779, 1107, 1135 and 1110 refer to the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941.

Exhibit 588, "Resolution Adopted Through the Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941" contains "a summary of the Empire's policy according to the changes in situation". (6567)

It was determined that, "regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosp erity Sphere' and accordingly contribute to the establishment of world peace" (6567); that "Japan will continue the disposition of the China Incident and will step up the southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self defense" and "the Northern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situation". (6567) "Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose. (6567)

A summary of the Empire's policy decided at this conference is as follows: (This Exhibit also appears in the Record at p. 10,146)

"a. In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, further pressure through the Southern regions will be strengthened to the changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chungking Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the every concessions in China. (6567)

"b. For the sake of her self-existence and self-defense Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also execute other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand following the 'Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand,' and 'Matters concerning the Promotion of our Southern Policy,' thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will not hesitate to have a war with Britain and the United States. (6568)

"c. Though the spirit of the Tripartite Axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. (W.B.: - This paragraph read by Russian Section - see record p. 7904)

"d. In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especially in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States. (6568)

"e. We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the War through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently. (6568)

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"f. We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense. (6569)

"g. As to the details measures we shall decide separately." (6569)

Exhibit 1107 shows that the above-mentioned individuals were present in the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941.

Exhibit 1108 is an extract from KIDO's Diary stating that the Conference was held and that it decided to "cope with the new situation accompanying the outbreak of the Russo-German War." (10,144)

Exhibit 1110-A is an extract from the interrogation of TOJO of 13 February 1946 to the effect that TOJO, as Minister of War, called the first Imperial Conference of July, 1941.

"Q Who requested this Imperial Conference of July 1941?

"A Since the problem of stationing troops in southern French Indo-China was the principal problem, it may have been the War Minister, I believe.

"Q Do you not recall whether or not you called this meeting? You were War Minister.

"A Actually, I think I probably requested it. However, things were decided usually at the Liaison Conference where they were decided practically by common consent. You asked me who requested this conference and I cannot answer because usually the War Minister, the Navy Minister, Foreign Minister and the Premier got together and agreed on a subject. Then the actual drafting of the plan was left to the three secretaries, to whom I have referred in previous interviews. The plan was then presented to the Liaison Conference from which the decision to request an Imperial Conference might come. Just now you looked very solemn when you asked me the question of who called the conference. It was called by the process I have described, but the responsibility in connection with the movement of troops into southern Indo-China was my responsibility as War Minister. It is distasteful to me to try to avoid responsibility." (10,151-2)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1135	6 September	10,215	241
1107	"	10,216	---
588	"	10,217	---
1136-A	"	10,220	---
1137-A	"	10,221	---
1148	"	10,252	---

Present

KONOYE, Prime Minister  
 TOYODA, Foreign Minister  
 TOJO, War Minister  
 OIKAWA, Navy Minister  
 OGURA, Finance Minister  
 SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board  
 TANABE, Home Minister  
 SUGIYAMA, Chief of Army General Staff  
 NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Staff  
 TOMITA, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet  
 MUTO, Director of Military Affairs Bureau - War Ministry  
 OKA " " " " " " Navy "  
 TSUKADA, Vice Chief of Army General Staff  
 ITO, Vice Chief of Naval General Staff  
 HARA, President of Privy Council

Decision

The Imperial Conference of 6 September 1940 adopted resolutions concerning the Japanese-American negotiations.

Remarks

Exhibit 1135 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of 6 September 1941 stating that on 6 September 1941 he visited the Emperor in response to an Imperial summons. (10215) The Emperor told KIDO that he would like to ask some questions at the Conference. KIDO said that he advised him to give only a warning that "the Supreme War Command should exert every effort in order to bring about a diplomatic success inasmuch as the present decision was such an important one that it might lead to a war in which our national fortunes would be staked." (10216) KIDO also stated that the Supreme War Command did not answer the questions put by President HARA of the Privy Council concerning diplomatic moves. (10,216) At the close of the meeting,

the Emperor, stated KIDO, declared "it was regrettable that the Supreme War Command did not give any reply." (10,216)  
(The questions asked are not in the Exhibit)

Exhibit 1107 contains the names of those who attended the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941 as set forth above. (10216)

Exhibit 588 contains, inter alia, the resolution adopted through the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, the following portion of which was read in evidence: (10217)

"Resolution adopted through the Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941.

"Summary. Execution of the Empire's policy.

"In view of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assured; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the suppression of our national power; Japan will execute her Southern advance policy, related in the 'principles of Japan's Policy According to the Change of Situations,' as follows:

"a. In order to secure self-existence and self-defense, Japan, with a determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands), will have completed her preparations by the end of October. (10,218).

"b. Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain. (10,218)

"The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain) and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet. (10,218)

"c. If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October; we shall immediately determine to wage war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands). (10,218)

"All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavor to check the formation of a Russo-American combined force against Japan." (10,218)

(The second paragraph of "b" of Exhibit 588 above-mentioned refers to the "Limit Japan is able to come to an Agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet". (10218) This Limit is found in Exhibit 588 which contains an "Attached Document," Section II of which is as follows: (Page 5 of Exhibit 588)

"Sect. II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement.

If the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section I: (See p. 3 of Exhibit 588)

(1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China.

(2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

(3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

(NOTE)

a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the Axis Agreement. We shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States toward the European War.

b In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria." (P. 5 "Attached Document" Exhibit 588)

Exhibit 1136-A is an excerpt from the interrogation of TOJO of 23 February 1946:

"Q For what purpose was the Imperial Conference of 6 September called?

"A It was called to decide the question of what national policy should be adopted in view of the situation at that time. As I recall, the main question was that of war or peace and what attitude should be decided upon in either case.



"Q At this conference, it was decided to continue negotiations with America and hope for a break by the middle ten days of October, was it not?

"A Yes, of course I think so, but I have no materials here and it is difficult for me to make categorical statements.

"Q It was also decided that if the break did not come by the middle ten days of October that war would be undertaken against America?

"A It was decided to plan for a break by the middle ten days of October. The decision for war was not made at this conference." (10,220-1)

Exhibit 1137-A is an excerpt from the interrogation of TOJO of 11 March 1946:

"Q It is not true, that, during the period between 6 September 1941 and 10-20 October 1941, preparations for war were pushed?

"A As I said before, at that conference which dealt with peace or war, it was decided that both peace preparations and war preparations would be pushed. (Read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness). It was only after that decision that preparations were pushed." (10,221)

Exhibit 1153-A is an excerpt from TOJO's interrogation of 11 February 1946:

"Did you feel, at the time the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941, that war should be declared against the United States and the other three nations?

"A At that time I felt, as War Minister, that the opportune time for fighting was in danger of being lost and the Imperial Conference (N.B. 6 September 1941) had set the middle ten days of October as the limit for waiting for a favorable diplomatic break." (10,289-10,290)

Exhibit 1148 is Premier KONOYE's own account of his resignation of his cabinet. Regarding the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, he said "Recently the negotiation reached a state of temporary deadlock due to the occupation of French Indo-China by our troops, but as it became known that we wouldn't go any further, the situation eased somewhat and the negotiation was again resumed. Hence, a message was sent to President Roosevelt on August 28 proposing

a conference. Nevertheless, since President Roosevelt, in reply to this, stated that he was willing to hold a conference, but would like to have a general agreement reached in regard to the important matters, at least, as a premise, an Imperial Conference was held on September 6 to determine the basis of the counter-measure for this.

"As a result of the Imperial Conference, it was decided to direct all our efforts toward the diplomatic negotiation to the end, but to resolutely assure a war policy in the event no means for the conclusion of the negotiation is reached by early October." (10,251-2)

See Exhibit 2250 (Pres. Doc. 2-A) for an extract from KIDO's Diary dated November, 1941 regarding, inter alia, "The Decision of the Council in the Imperial Presence on September 6 and the Developments later." (16200) This Exhibit contains a more complete account of this Conference and its results. KIDO said that he told OIKAWA and TOJO on orders from the Emperor that "it is the Emperor's wishes that, in deciding the fundamental national policy, it is necessary to investigate the domestic and foreign affairs more broadly and to carry out an earnest study of things without being bound by the decision of the Council in the Imperial Presence of September 6) Communicate this to you by Imperial order." (16210). KIDO reported that by this order "the decision of the Council in the Imperial Presence of September 6 was completely withdrawn" (16210)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1107	5 November	10,332	260
1163	"	10,316	259
1168	"	10,332	262
1169	"	10,333	260
1170	"	10,343	262
1176	"	10,373	---

Present

TOJO, Prime Minister and War Minister, concurrently  
 TOGO, Foreign Minister  
 SHIMADA, Navy Minister  
 KAYA, Finance Minister  
 SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board  
 SUGIYAMA, Chief of the Army General Staff  
 NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Staff  
 HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of Cabinet  
 MUTO, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry  
 OKA, " " " " " " Navy "  
 TSUKADA, Vice Chief of Army General Staff  
 ITO, Vice Chief of Naval General Staff  
 HARA, President of Privy Council

Decision

Decided the policy towards the United States, England and the Netherlands.

Remarks

On November 5, 1941, there was held a most important Imperial Conference.

Exhibit 1168 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of November 5, 1941 which states that "the Council in the presence of the Emperor was held at 10:30 a.m. and continued until 3:10 p.m. and a policy towards the U.S.A., England, and the Netherlands was decided. At 3:40 p.m. Premier TOJO visited me to inform me of such matters as the formation of the Southern Army and the dispatch of Mr. KURUSU to the U.S.A. Mr. HIROSE visited me at 7 p.m."

Exhibit 1163 is a telegram from TOGO to NOMURA dated 2 November 1941 showing that this conference was held. The telegram stated that "Since the formation of the new Cabinet, the Government has been holding conferences for a number of days with the Imperial Headquarters. We have carefully considered and discussed a fundamental policy for the improvement of relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision at the meeting in the presence of the Emperor, on the morning of the 5th, and will let you know the result immediately. This will be our government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, every aspect of the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is to be strictly kept only for your information. Now we trust your most prudent attitude towards handling everything before we take up the negotiations once more in the very near future." (10316)

Exhibit 1107 contains the names of those who attended this Conference as set forth above. (10,332)

Exhibits 1169 and 878 refer to a document entitled "Measures Towards Foreign Countries in Relation to the 'Principle of Execution of National Policy of the Empire' which was Decided at the Meeting in the Presence of the Emperor on November 5." (10,333) This document is divided into six parts:

I. Measures Towards Germany and Italy.

When the Japanese-American negotiations end and warfare is inevitable, "after November 25 probably" (10,333) we will inform Germany that "Japan has an intention to open hostilities against the United States and Britain before long as soon as the preparation will be completed and being a part of the preparation, we negotiate on the following items: (10334)

"A. Germany's (Italy's) participation in the war against the U.S.A.

"B. Non-separate peace making.

"Note: In case when Germany demands Japan's participation in the war against Soviet, we answer Japan cannot do it for the present. Even if the Germany's participation in the war, because of it, would be postponed, it cannot be helped.

II. Towards Britain.

"We take measures previously so as to get Britain to accept and to cooperate positively the subjects concerned to

Britain in the understanding which is the fruit of the negotiation with America. We will not adopt any other diplomatic schemes purposely to keep the intention in secret. (10334)

### III. Towards Dutch Indies.

"In order to hide and camouflage our intention, we shall open the diplomatic negotiation at the earliest opportunity with her one by one, after the manner of continuing the former negotiation, principally aiming at the supply of necessary materials for the Empire. (10334)

### IV. Towards the Soviet Union.

"We continue the negotiations founded on the clause No. 1 of the 'Principle of negotiation with the Soviet Union' decided at the Liaison Conference between the Government and the Imperial Headquarters on August 4, 1941." (10,334-5)

### V. Towards Thailand.

Just before dispatching troops, Japan will request from Thailand the following: Passage of and facilities for Japanese military forces (even if she does not consent to it) and the conclusion of a joint defense Pact. (10335)

Soon after the dispatch of troops Japan will make arrangements regarding the following items: (10336)

- "1. Concerning the passage and occupation of the Japanese forces.
- "2. Offering for the use of the Japanese forces new construction and strengthening of the military establishments.
- "3. To furnish the necessary communication and transportation measure and factory establishments.
- "4. Billets and supplies for the military forces passing and stationing.
- "5. To give a loan for the necessary military expenses.

"Note: In order to make those negotiations favorable, at the negotiation of Item Nos. 1 and 2, we will promise to respect her sovereignty and territory and, further, we will suggest in the effect that 'according to her attitude, we will consider to give a portion of Burma or Malay to her in the future.' (10,336)

VI. Measures Towards China.

A. The armed forces of the United States and Britain will be cleared out of China. (10,337)

B. Hostile concessions in China, including the Peking Legation area, as well as important rights and interests, (customs, mines, etc.) of the hostile countries will be secured under Japan's power, materially. (10,337)

C. The commencement of these measures shall be postponed until after we open the war against the United States and Great Britain, for the purpose of not exposing our intention. (10,337)

"D. The notion of belligerent rights against Chungking shall not be taken in such a special manner as to declare it, but we shall gain its real effect materially by beginning war against the U.S. and Britain. (10,337)

"E. Even hostile countries' rights and interest which are concerned with the National Government shall be secured under our power, for the present, according to our necessity, and measures to arrange their interests shall be taken on another occasion. (10,337)

"F. Through measures to induce and accelerate as strong as possible the activities of influence of the Chinese in the occupied area, and endeavoring to gain the people's feeling in cooperating with Japan and China. We will realize gradually partial peace, district by district, beginning from the possible area. (10,338)

"G. As for the economical relations to China we attach importance in gaining goods from the unoccupied area and we adjust reasonably the existing various controls." (10,338)

The Exhibit also contains the "Principle of Acceleration of Termination of the War against the USA, Britain and Holland and CHIANG." (10,338) According to this principle, Japan will conclude an arrangement with Germany and Italy not to cease war individually (10,338); she shall assist in making peace between Germany and the Soviet, according to results of talks between Germany and Japan and will "take measures so as to help the Soviet to advance to the direction of India and Persia" (10,339); the Burmese and Hongkong CHIANG-supported route shall be cut and the concessions for China shall be restored (10,339); Japan shall "admit the Philippines' independence after our occupation" (10,339); a portion of the Dutch

East Indies shall become independent and Japan shall "secure the necessary portions for the Empire" (10,339); Japan "shall make Burma independent and stimulate and assist the independence movement of India" (10,339); Japan shall support the restoration of Thailand's lost territory from Britain. (10,339) We shall "make it clearly known that we shall be ready to secure impartial supply of tin and rubber in the South Sea region" (10,340); that it is impractical and ineffective to utilize Americans of German descent in order to make the public opinion of America disunited as was shown in the example of a former World War (10,340); Japan cannot expect such in maneuver towards Central and South America. (10,340) (For same see Exh. 1176-10,373)

Exhibit 1170 is a telegram from TOGO to NOMURA dated 5 November 1941 concerning the counter-proposal of Japan which was discussed at the Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941 and approved. NOMURA was instructed to begin talks. (10,343)

Exhibit 1171 is also a telegram from TOGO to NOMURA dated November 5, 1941 stating that "Because of various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only." (10,346).

On November 5, the same date on which the deadline was set as November 25 and on the same date that the Imperial Conference was held, the defendant NAGANO issued the first order which caused the Pearl Harbor attack plan to be put into execution. (Introductory Remarks 10,346)

Exhibit 809 is the order dated 5 November 1941 issued by NAGANO to YAMAMOTO stated that; A. Because it is feared that war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first part of December. (10,347)

"B. The Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary operational preparations. (10,347)

"C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff." (10,347)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
588	1 December	10,519	277
1107	"	10,518	277
1204	"	10,494	277
1153-A	"	10,289;10,522	--
1207-A	"	10,510	--
1210	"	10,523	

Present

TOJO, Prime Minister and War Minister, concurrently  
TOGO, Foreign Minister  
SHIMADA, Navy Minister  
KAYA, Finance Minister  
SUZUKI, President of Planning Board  
ITANURA, Justice Minister  
HASHIDA, Education Minister  
INO, Agriculture Minister  
KISHI, Commerce Minister  
TERAJIMA, Communication Minister  
KOIZUMI, Welfare Minister  
SUGIYAMA, Chief of Army General Staff  
NAGANO, Chief of Navy General Staff  
HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of Cabinet  
MUTO, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry  
OKA, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry  
TANABE, Vice Chief of Army General Staff  
ITO, Vice Chief of Navy General Staff  
HARA, President of Privy Council

Decision

It was decided that Japan would declare war on the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.

Remarks

Exhibit 1107 contains the names of those who attended this Conference as set forth above.

Exhibit 1204 is TOJO's Interrogation of 19 February 1946. He stated "that the whole Cabinet attended the Imperial Conference on the first or second which made the decision for war." (10,494)



Exhibit 1153-A is an excerpt from TOJO's interrogation of 8 February 1946. He said that he presided at this conference as Prime Minister and explained the purpose of the meeting, after which "each of the ministers and the Chiefs of Staff discussed the question from the standpoint of his own responsibility." (10,522)

Exhibit 1207-A is an extract from TOJO's interrogation of 11 March 1946 containing the admission that "December 1 was the date of the Imperial Conference at which the decision for war was made." (10,510)

Exhibit 1210 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of 1 December 1941 stating that "At 2 p.m. the Council in the presence of the Emperor was held and at last the war between Japan and the United States was decided upon. At 4:30 p.m. the Premier visited me to consult about the Imperial Proclamation of war." (10,523)

Exhibit 588 is the resolution adopted through the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941 and is as follows: "Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5 have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain and the Netherlands." (10,519)

Exhibit 1216 is a telegram from Togo to Numura dated 6 December 1941 stating that "the government has given careful deliberation in the Imperial presence to the proposal of the U.S. of the 26th of Nov. and has decided upon the memorandum to America (in English) as per telegram No. 902" (10534) This Exhibit shows the detailed steps which were taken by the Japanese Government in connection with transmitting its final note to the United States.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE  
(1943)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1344	31 May	17992	-

Present

Attendance not stated.

Decision

"Then, at the Imperial Conference of 31 May 1943, it was decided to make it their policy to incorporate the East Indies areas into Japanese territory, and to allow the participation in politics of native inhabitants according to their abilities." (17992)

It was also decided not to announce this reversion plan so that the Allied Powers might not take advantage of it for propaganda purposes. " (17992)

Remarks

Exhibit 1344 is entitled "Course of Events Leading Up to Decisions on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." The part of the Exhibit read in evidence does not contain a reference to this Conference.

The Exhibit states (p.2) that "At the time of this decision Prime Minister TOJO was rather in favour of independence and the Foreign Ministry also supported the plan, but the Supreme Command maintained strong opposition, as mentioned above; while others again, took the stand that once independence was granted, Japan, for the sake of her personal honour would have to respect the independence to the last, and would be in a difficult position when negotiation, peace, etc., came one day to be considered, and that for this reason the status quo should be maintained. Territorial incorporation was thus finally decided on."

It also states that (p.1 of exhibit) "The government at home, too, had no alternative but the extreme policy of bringing the Dutch Indies under Japan's direct control and checking the policy of racial liberation, in order to secure the resources necessary for the execution of the war. For this reason, the Supreme Command emphasized its strong opposition to the independence of the East Indies."

See Exhibits 1344 and 1350 and DeWeerd, herein, under Supreme War Plans Council (1945) for further information on this subject. (12,115; 12,121; 12,236)

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During the cross-examination of YAMMOTO, he admitted that the decision of the Imperial Conference had been communicated to the Ministry of which he was Vice Minister. (Ministry for Greater East Asiatic Affairs) (17,993)

KIDO's Diary contains an entry dated May 31, 1943 that "the council in the presence of the Emperor was opened and decided on the gist of the guiding principle on the subjugation of Greater East Asia."

See Exhibit 1344, herein, under heading of Liaison Conference, 1943, for reference to a Liaison Conference decision on this matter. (Page 1 of exhibit - not read in evidence.)

## LIAISON CONFERENCES

With the intensification of the situation following the outbreak of the China War in 1937, the need for a device to coordinate the activities of the ministers of state and the high command in their overlapping spheres of authority became readily apparent. Several devices were set up to meet this need. First the "Four Minister" meeting of the premier, war, navy and foreign ministers was established. Later the finance minister was added to this group making a "Five Minister" Conference. In these meetings the views of the Supreme Command were transmitted through the war and navy ministers. However the situation developed in such a manner that the Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that this method of working through the war and navy ministers was unsatisfactory and the liaison conference plan was adopted to adjust the difference between the civil government and the high command. (679-680)

This group which met more or less regularly, consisted of the premier, foreign minister, war minister, navy minister home (?finance) minister, chiefs of staff, vice chiefs of staff and the directors of the military affairs and naval affairs bureaus. In addition at times, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board and the Chief Cabinet Secretary attended. (680)

Inasmuch as the personnel of these meetings was, with the exception of the Emperor, practically identical with the personnel of the Conference before the Throne, and since liaison conferences always preceded Conferences before the Throne, the decisions reached in the liaison conference were of the utmost importance in relation to the decisions of the more formal conference. (680)

LIAISON CONFERENCES  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1310	27 July	11,794	103

Present

The Exhibit does not set forth the attendance.

Decision

Decided the "Gist of Main Points in Regard to Dealing with the Situation to Meet the Change in World Condition".

Remarks

On 27 July, at a Liaison Conference decisions were made concerning policies to improve conditions at home and abroad. A swift settlement of the China Incident and the settlement of the southern problem within limits so as not to cause a war against a third power were two policies decided upon. While fostering relations with the Axis, it was decided to adjust diplomatic relations towards the USSR, maintain firm diplomatic front with the United States and to strengthen the diplomatic policy towards the Netherlands East Indies to obtain important raw materials. (11. 794).

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
541	19 Sept.	6,307	144

Decision

The Liaison Conference of 19 September 1940 decided to strengthen the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis.

Remarks

On 19 September discussion was held concerning the strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis. (6271-6307)

It was decided that the three countries would cooperate by all possible means for the construction of the respective new orders and that "Japan should be resolved, if need be, to take any action, including recourse to armed force" (6309); because, "unless we are resolved on the employment of armed force, it will be impossible for us to carry on any useful talks with Germany" (6309).

The basic principles concerning negotiations for a Military Alliance (6310) and for close economic cooperation were determined (6311). An understanding was to "be reached with respect to consultation or to the action to be taken in the event of a danger of either Japan or Germany or Italy entering upon a state of war with the Soviet Union, if, in the course of negotiations with Germany and Italy, it turns out that such desire is entertained by the two countries" (6311); the three countries would cooperate "in order not to allow the United States to interfere in regions other than the Western Hemisphere and the United States possessions" (6311).

Regarding the China Incident, Japan would meet the desires of Germany and Italy regarding the acquisition of natural and material resources existing in East Asia, including the South Seas, and would cooperate "in intensifying the pressure upon British influences in East Asia, including the South Seas; and in facilitating the prosecution of war by Germany and Italy against Britain" (6313). On the other hand, Germany and Italy would cooperate regarding the supply of such machinery and similar articles, and in regard to such technical assistance as may be desired by Japan; (6313) they would give as much political and economic cooperation as possible in the settlement of the China Incident (6313).

Japan's sphere to be envisaged in the course of negotiations was to comprise:

"The former German Islands under Mandate, French Indo-China and Pacific Islands, Thailand, British Malaya, British Borneo, Dutch East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, India, etc., with Japan, Manchuria and China as the backbone." (6314)

"It is understood, however, that the South Seas Region to be indicated by Japan in conducting the negotiations with Germany and Italy will be the region from Burma eastward, including the Dutch East Indies, and New Caledonia northward. It is further understood that India may be recognized, for the immediate purposes as being included in the Sphere of Living of the Soviet Union". (6315)

Concerning Japan's attitude toward Japan-Germany-Italy cooperation in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States, the basic aim was stated as follows: "Being destined to be the leader of East Asia in the postwar new order of things wherein it is anticipated that the world will be divided into the four large fields of East Asia, the Soviet Union, Europe and the American Continent, Japan, acting in close collaboration with Germany and Italy which will constitute the guiding force of Europe, will

"a. Restrain the Soviet Union on the east, west and south, and, inducing the Soviet Union so to act as to align with the common ground of Japan, Germany and Italy, endeavor to cause the advance of the Soviet sphere of influence to be oriented toward a direction where the advance has little direct effect upon the interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, a direction such as the Gulf of Persia (it being also possible that, in case of need, Soviet advance toward India may have to be recognized); and,

"b. While peaceful means will be adhered to as far as possible in dealing with the United States, contrive to bring about a posture of things wherein Japan can, as occasion may require, bring pressure to bear upon the United States through political and economic collaboration with Germany and Italy in the East Asian and European fields, so that such posture of things can contribute toward the attainment of Japan's aspirations.

"In taking these steps, Japan will keep it in mind to make the best of inducing the Soviet Union". (6316-6317)



Concerning the possible use of armed force against Britain and the United States, Japan will make decisions independently in accordance with the following principles:

"(1) In the event that the China Incident has nearly been settled, Japan will use armed force by taking as favorable an opportunity, as may be afforded by the situation prevailing at home and abroad.

"(2) In the event that the China Incident has not yet been settled, it will be Japan's guiding principle to take action within limits short of war. If, however, domestic and foreign conditions take a decidedly favorable turn, or if it is deemed that, irrespective of whether our preparations are complete or not, the development of the international situation permits of no further delay, Japan will resort to armed force.

"(3) The 'domestic and foreign conditions' signify the European situation, especially the state of adjustment of our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States' attitude toward us, our preparations for war, and so forth, as well as the state of disposal of the China Incident. (6319-6320).

LIAISON CONFERENCES  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1103	13 Jan	10,057	169
1103	16-17-18 Jan	10,057	170
1103	23 Jan	10,057	172
1103	30 Jan	10,057	173
1103	3 Feb	10,057	174
1103	13 Feb	10,057	178
1103	20 Feb	10,057	180
1103	23 Feb	10,057	181
1103	2 Mar	10,057	184
1103	6-7 Mar	10,057	185
1103	11 Mar	10,057	186
1103	10 April	10,057	198
1103	17 April	10,057	199
1103	3 May	10,057	200
1103	8 May	10,057	201
1103	12 May	10,057	202
1103	15 May	10,057	203
1103	22 May	10,057	204
1103	29 May	10,057	206
1103	6 June	10,057	209
1103	11,12 June	10,057	211
1103	23 June	10,057	216
1103	26,27,28 "	10,057	217
1103	30 June	10,057	218
1103	21 July	10,064	229

Present

Exhibit 1103 (R-10,057-10,063), an abstract by the Foreign Office from news items in Asahi, refers to Liaison Conferences held between 13 January and 21 July 1941.

The Exhibit does not contain the names of those who attended the conference of 21 July 1941. With this exception, the following attended all conferences as noted below:

KONOYE	Attended all meetings	
TOJO	" " "	
SUGIYAMA	" " "	except that of 16 January.
TOMIDA	" " "	" those of 16,17,19,23 of January; 20,23 of February.
MUTO	" " "	except those of 16,17,19,23 of January.
OKA	" " "	except those of 16,17,19,23 of January; 2,6,7,11 of March.
HIRANUMA	" " "	except those of 13 January and 22 May.
MATSUOKA	" " "	except that of 11 April.

CIKAWA	Attended all meetings.
KONDO	" " " except those from 10 April to 25 June incl.
NAGANO	" " " " except those from 13 January to 11 March incl.
ANAMI	" the meeting of 13 January.
TSUKADA	" meetings of 6, 26, 27, 28, 30 June.
TAMAYA	" " meeting of 13 January.
TOYODA	" " " " 13 January.
UGAKI	" " " " " "
OHASHI	" " meetings of 10, 11 April; 26, 27 June.
SAKAMOTO	(Dir. of Euro-Asiatic Bureau, Foreign Ministry) Attended the meeting of 28 June.

According to Exhibit 1119-A, an extract from TOJO's interrogation of 15 March 1946, those who normally attended the Liaison Conferences subsequent to 21 July 1941 were:

"The ones who normally had this right were, on the cabinet side, the Premier, Foreign Minister, the War Minister, the Navy Minister the President of the Cabinet Planning Board. On the Supreme Command side, there were the two Chiefs of Staff. As necessary, other cabinet members from the cabinet side, and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff from the Supreme Command side, also attended with this power, but the decisions were not by majority. They were unanimous. Discussions were continued until there was unanimous agreement" (10,173-10,174)

TOJO also said that probably "the Commerce and Industry Minister (KISHI) attended because raw materials were involved for factories and shipping was involved" (Ex 1202\_A - 10,484).

#### Decision

Exhibit 1103 in only one case states what was discussed or decided; in all other cases, it merely remarks that views were exchanged on important problems of the day. However, at the meeting of 21 July 1941, held at the office of the High Command situated at the Imperial Grounds, it was decided that "the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and other Ministers concerned, should attend this place occasionally and exchange views and project national policies with War, Navy Ministers and Staffs of the High Command". (10,064). This meant "no more press announcements of Liaison or Imperial Conferences, as had previously been made" (Carr's Summary p.229).

#### Remarks

Regarding the meetings referred to in 1103 of which nothing is reported, see Exhibit 1303 herein for matter relating to the conference of 30 January and 3 February 1941; 1084 herein for matter relating to the conference of 6 June 1941; and 1095 and

1306 for matter relating to the meeting of 25 June 1941. No other evidence appears in the record concerning the Conferences set forth in Exhibit 1103 as to the Liaison Conferences held between 13 January and 21 July 1941.

Exhibit 1113 herein shows that from the time TOJO's Cabinet came into power, October 18, 1941, until 2 November 1941 many liaison conferences were held.

For information as to attendance at the Liaison Conferences held subsequent 21 July 1941 resort must be had to the interrogations of NAGANO, TOJO and TOGO.

Exhibit 1119-A, interrogation of TOJO of 15 March 1946, shows those who normally attended the Liaison Conferences subsequent to July 21, 1941 (10,173). (See above)

Exhibit 1207-A, herein, contain the names of those who attended the conference of o/a 30 November 1941, according to NAGANO.

Exhibit 1207-A, herein, contains the attendance, according to TOGO, of the conference of o/a 30 November 1941.

LIAISON CONFERENCES  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1303	30 Jan	11,744	- -
	3 Feb	11,746	- -

Present

None stated.

Decision

Decided the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand.

Remarks

Exhibit 1303, an entry from KIDO's diary of 1 February 1941 states that he "went to the office at 10 AM and spoke with Premier KONOYE. Prince FUSHIMI, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Premier KONOYE and SUGIYAMA, Chief of the Army General Staff came to the Palace together. They were received in audience by His Majesty and reported in outline to the Emperor the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand decided at the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government on 30 January. It is a new precedent for the Chiefs of Staff, and the Premier to be received in audience by His Majesty and to report at the same time. Up to the present, important decisions of the Liaison Conferences have been reported to the Throne at Imperial Conferences, and other decisions individually by the government and Imperial Headquarters. However, this time as an intermediate way both parties have presented a report to the Throne at the same time. I was told that in this connection the Premier proposed that an Imperial Conference be held, but as the broad principle had already been approved by the Emperor, they asked Him in this way. At 10:10 the Chief Aide-de-Camp visited me and spoke approximately as follows:

"Re the general principle of the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand: The purpose of this plan is to establish the leading position of the Empire in French Indo-China and Thailand by utilizing the opportunity presented by their having accented our arbitration; in order to contribute to the preparation for the Southward policy. The Navy aims to use Camranh Bay and the air bases near Saigon. But as this cannot be stated openly it has been decided to represent the action taken as aimed at the preservation of trade and communications, and security against war between French Indo-China and Thailand. In case military force is to be used to attain the objective, it has been decided to ask the further approval of the Emperor." (11,744-11,745)

KIDO also said that Matsuoka visited him and stated that, "When the broad policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand was decided, the Army planned to limit the time to the end of March, but he had opposed it as being impossible, and had made the Army cancel it. He intends to conduct future diplomacy on the following lines as reported today to the Emperor. It is assumed that the liaison conference on the third will decide on the plan which he will take with him on his visit to Germany and Soviet Russia. He will shortly visit Germany and find out the actual state of German policy towards Britain from HI /T.N.Hitler/ RI /T.N. Ribbentrop/ and others, and he will make full arrangements with them. At the same time he would like to adjust our relations with the Soviet Union and to contrive a general peace with China by the end of April. Then he intends to concentrate our whole strength toward the South. Without a solution of the Southern question, no real solution of the China Incident can be attained; therefore, the Southern question is an important one, one on which the nation's fate hangs. For this reason, he continued, it would be necessary to bring about a state of things which would enable the whole energy of the nation to be concentrated on it." (11,745 - 11,746)

LIAISON CONFERENCES  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1084	6 June	9,979	- - -

Present (from Exhibit 1103)

KONOYE  
TOJO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
TSUKADA

OKA  
HIRAYAMA  
MITSUDA  
OGAWA  
NAGANO

Decision

None reported.

Remarks

Exhibit 1084 is an entry from KIDO's diary, 6 June 1941, that "at 9 AM Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that Ambassador OSHIMA had an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden and that Germany had at last decided to attack Russia. Hitler had intimated his desire for Japan's participation in this war against Russia, though he did not say so. Prince KONOYE also said that the Liaison Conference in this connection would be held this morning, and he asked me to report this fact to the Throne. (9979) I proceeded to the Palace in response to a summons from His Majesty, and was received in audience from 10:20 AM to 11:05 AM. His Majesty discussed at full length the matter mentioned above during the whole period. I had a talk with the Chief Aid-de-Camp at 11:10 AM and asked him to keep in close touch with me with regard to the same. Premier KONOYE made Mr. HOSOKAWA, Secretary to the Premier, bring the telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA to me, and he asked me to study it. I read it and returned it. I was granted an audience with the Emperor from 1:10 PM to 1:30 PM to report on the substance of the telegram. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace, and was received in audience by the Emperor to report on the recognition of Croatia and on the telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA intimated to me his opinion as to the future outlook of the relations between the Soviet and Germany. According to his opinion as regards the German-Soviet relations, the conclusion of an agreement was sixty percent possible and the outbreak of war forty percent in spite of Ambassador OSHIMA's observations." (9979-9980)

LIAISON CONFERENCE

(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1095	25 June	10,027	---
1306		11,753	217

Present

(From Ex. 1103)

KONOYE  
TOJO  
SUGIYAMA  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA  
HIRANUMA  
MATSUOKA  
OIKAWA  
MAGANO

Decision

The Liaison Conference of 25 June 1941 decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China.

Remarks

Ex. 1095 is an entry from KIDO's Diary, 25 June 1941. He refers to a Liaison Conference as follows: "At 1 p.m. I consulted the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Throne as to the holding of the Liaison Conference and on other problems.... At 2 p.m. the Premier, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and Chief of the Naval General Staff proceeded to the Palace to report on the decisions of the Liaison Conference regarding the Japanese troops' entry into French Indo-China. I met Prince KONOYE at 4:30 p.m. and had a talk with him."

Ex. 1306 is the decision of the Liaison Conference held on 25 June 1941 to accelerate the Empire's measures toward French Indo-China and Thailand. Regarding the joint military relations with French Indo-China, the following essential factors were to be stressed:

"a) The establishment or use of Air Bases and Harbour facilities in specified areas in French Indo-China, and stationing of the necessary troops in the southern part of French Indo-China.

"b) Furnishing of facilities in connection with the stationing of Imperial troops.



"2. To open diplomatic negotiations for the purpose of the preceding paragraph.

"3. In case the French Government or the French Indo-China authorities do not comply with our demands, we shall attain our objective by force of arms.

"4. In order to deal with such circumstances as mentioned in the above paragraph, preparations shall be commenced beforehand for the despatching of troops."

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1169	4 August	10, 335	---

Present

See Exhibit 1103 herein for those usually present according to TOJO (Ex. 1119-A; 10,173)

Decision

Decided the "Principle of Negotiation with the Soviet Union" on August 4, 1941.

Remarks

Exhibit 1169 is the "Measures Towards Foreign Countries in Relation to the 'Principle of Execution of National Policy of the Empire' which was decided at the Meeting in the Presence of the Emperor on November 5." (See Exhibits 1163, 1168, 1169, 1170 and 1176 herein, which are concerned with matters decided at this Imperial Conference.

Exhibit 1169 states that the Imperial Conference of November 5, 1941 decided to "continue the negotiation founded on the clause No. 1 of the 'Principle of negotiation with the Soviet Union' decided at the Liaison Conference between the Government and the Imperial Headquarters on August 4, 1941." (10,335)

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Comm'n. Summary</u>
1163	betw. Oct 18 10, 316 & Nov 2nd		---

Present

Attendance not reported. (But see Ex. 1103 herein for those normally present according to TOJO's Interrogation of 13 March 1946, Ex. 1119-A, p. 10,173).

Decision

None stated.

Remarks

Exhibit 1163 shows that from the time TOJO's Cabinet came into power until 2 November, 1941 a number of Liaison Conferences were held.

Exhibit 1163 is a telegram from TOGO to NOMURA, 2 November 1941 stating that "Since the formation of the new cabinet, the Government has been holding conferences for a number of days with the Imperial Headquarters," (10316) and that "we have carefully considered and discussed fundamental policy for the improvement of relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision at the meeting in the presence of the Emperor, on the morning of the 5th." (10,316)

See Exhibits 1163, 1168, 1169, 1170 and 1176 herein, for references to the Imperial Conference of 5 November.

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record name</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1162	o/a 29 Oct.	10, 14	257

Present

None stated in the Exhibit but see Ex. 1119-A, p. 10,173 for those usually present and set forth in Ex. 1103 herein.

Decision

See Remarks

Remarks

Exhibit 1162 is an entry from KIDO's Diary 29 October 1941. KIDO states that "at 9 a.m. General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board called on me, reported on the progress of the liaison conference /Renreku Kaigi/ and we had a talk. Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council, visited me at 10:30 a.m. to consult about the recommendation to the Throne of Mr. Seihin IKEDA as a member of the Privy Council. At 11:30 a.m. I heard from Premier TOJO of the progress of the liaison conference, the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and our maneuvers vis a vis Yen Hsi-Shan. The Chief Aide-de-camp visited me at 12:45 p.m. and we talked about the latest political situation. Had an audience with his Majesty from 1.15 to 1.55. The Juichi-Kei /T.N. Literally: The Party of Eleven/ was held to exchange views regarding the recent political situation. Those present were Prince KONOYE, NISHIMURA, URAMATSU, OTSUKI, YAMAGUCHI, SAKAI, ODA and YAMAGISAWA."

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Garr's Summary</u>
1328	o/a 30 Oct	11, 923	257
1329		11, 928-11,935	---

Present

None set forth in the Exhibit. See Ex. 1119-a, 10173 for those usually in attendance according to TOJO, and whose names appear in Ex. 1103 herein.

The Exhibit states that the matter was considered by the ministries headed by CHIKADA, TOJO, TOGO and KAYA.

Decision

See remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 1328 entitled "Major Items to be Re-examined Concerning Essentials for the Prosecution of National Policies." It contains a list of questions drawn up for the Liaison Conference at the end of October, 1941. (11, 923)

Exhibit 1329 is the answers to these questions, not all of which were read in evidence.

Regarding the degree of cooperation to be expected from Germany and Italy in case of the outbreak of war against Britain, America and the Netherlands, it was answered that "it is impossible to expect a great deal." (11,923) The answer was amplified under three headings, viz. in case war broke out in the (a) autumn, of 1941, (b) the spring of 1942 or (c) later:

a) In view of the Tripartite Pact, Japan can expect Germany and Italy to begin war against America by intensifying the attack on American vessels and warships in the Atlantic, thereby diverting America in its landing operations on the British mainland; it will be impossible however to expect economic assistance from Germany because contact with the Siberian Railway has been cut off. (11929) If Japan advanced to the Dutch East Indies, the effect of Germany's pressure on the Dutch people in Holland is doubtful since a considerable number of German prisoners still remain in the Dutch East Indies. (11,929)

b) We cannot affirm that landing operations on the British mainland will be carried out in the spring of 1942; consequently, it is dangerous to rely upon the landing operations. In (a) and (b) "the greatest help that we can expect from Germany and Italy will be the advance of the German and Italian forces to the Near

East, Central Asia and India" (11,930) but, "in this connection, as our advance must be carried out in accordance with them, a full arrangement is required beforehand." (10,930)

(c) "When Germany has consolidated her occupied areas and established a new order in Europe, her attack upon Britain will be much more intensified. and consequently it may bring considerably advantageous effect upon us to fight America, but we must take into consideration the possibility of peace between Germany and Britain." (11,930)

Question No. 8 asked if Japan's opponents could be restricted to the Netherlands or both to Britain and the Netherlands. (11,931)  
The answer was as follows:

"A. No possibility of restricting them only to the Netherlands or to Britain and the Netherlands. As for the attitude to be taken by Britain and America provided that Japan advances by force to the South, namely, Thailand, Burma, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, we have certainly not yet heard of any military alliance nor any settlement concerning cooperation among Britain, America, and the Netherlands (or the Chungking regime). But it is almost of no doubt that they have mutual understanding concerning this joint defense in case Japan carries out an armed advance to any one of these countries. The attitude of Britain and America will also be affected to a great degree by the time and manner of our military advance to the south, the international situation at the time, and the internal situation of both Britain and America. It is necessary to take into consideration all probable cases which may take place in this connection, but at any rate we cannot restrict our opponents only to the Netherlands or to Britain and the Netherlands in case of our southward advance, and we must also be ready for Russia's entering the war." (11,931)

The following general forecast concerning each country was made based upon the situation as of the end of October, 1941:

"1. Britain (including Australia, Canada, etc.) "When we advance to the Dutch East Indies we might expect Britain to carry out, first of all, a diplomatic campaign regarding us and the Dutch Indies, but we can expect that she probably will make up her mind to take up arms for her self-defense. (Whether she will take up arms immediately or not will depend on the situation thereof.) Judging from Britain's reports and behavior until the present, we are considerably sure of this view.

"2. America. In a case as pointed out above, Britain may at once ask for American assistance. Therefore, even if America does not participate in the war immediately, she will, of course, accelerately strengthen her military preparations. Then we can suppose that in such a situation she will take the following steps:

"a. Diversionary measures against us by way of diplomacy.

- "b. Close her consulates.
- "c. Recall ambassador.
- "d. Severance of her diplomatic relations."
- "e. Demonstrations by her navy and air forces.

"But it is dangerous to form such a view that America would take gradual steps toward us, judging from her attitude towards Germany. For we cannot but expect America to take much more prompt steps in case we advance to the south, compared with the case when Germany swept over the European countries. America would presumably be unable to overlook the Japanese southward advance as 'another's business' because of the following reasons:

"a. In a sense she considers the southwestern Pacific area as within the zone over which she has the power of utterance (as seen in the Japanese-American negotiations.)

"b. Some materials of the above-mentioned area are necessary in America (gum, tin, etc.)

"c. She fears lest she would entirely lose her right of utterance in Chinese problems.

"d. She is afraid of our occupation of the Philippines.

"e. The American public opinion would be more excited than in the case of the European War." (11,932-.)

Question No. 9 considered the advantages and disadvantages of Japan's foreign relations in case war broke out about March, 1942 as follows:

"a. Advantages.

"1. As a result of the Russo-German War, the Soviet forces in European Russia may suffer a crushing blow and be very busy with reconstruction from this winter until next spring. Consequently, a considerable transfer of the strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Army and an increasing unrest within the country are anticipated. Therefore, we think that for us the threat and burden in the north will be less than at present.

"2. Depending on the situation there may also be some slight chance of taking diplomatic measures regarding Russia so as to mediate Russo-German peace.

"3. As German winter operations are expected to be directed toward Africa, the Near East, and Central Asia, Britain must exert herself to defend these areas. With the preparations to meet German land operations on the British homeland, etc., the European theatre will become busy; consequently her position in East Asia will be weakened and Germany's diversionary role will be more effective than at present.

"4. Even if America does not participate in the war by next March, her preparations for entering the war will be further advanced; consequently internally she will be increasingly troubled by difficult problems of domestic administration and finance; militarily there is a possibility that she will have to divide her strength in the Pacific; while diplomatically there is the possibility that she will have to soften her attitude toward us.

"5. We shall get time to improve and strengthen our diplomatic position in the Thailand and French Indo-China areas.

"b. Disadvantages.

"1. We think that our economic difficulties will rather increase by March of next year.

"2. Militarily there may be danger in also giving the opponents time for preparation." (11,934-5)



LIATSON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1164	4 November	10,318	259

Present

None stated in Exhibit. See Exhibit 1119-A, page 10,173 for those who usually attended, according to TOJO, whose names are contained in Ex. 1103 herein.

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 1164 is a telegram from TOGO to NOMURA November 4, 1941 stating that the "Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for a few days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the government and the Military High Command." (10,318)

It also stated that "this and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the Conference to be held on the morning of the 5th." (10,319) (The Imperial Conference of November 5).

The telegram also stated that "Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die."

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
919	11 November 9,361		263
1175	" " 10,363		263

Present

None stated in the Exhibit. See Exhibit 1103 herein for those who usually attended, according to TOJO (1119-A - 10,173)

Decision

Set forth the "Principal Reasons Alleged for the Commencement of Hostilities against the United States and Britain", 11 November 1941.

Remarks

Ex. 1175 is a draft adopted at a Liaison Conference. It states that (1) the national policy of Japan is to establish permanent peace by creating a new order in East Asia (10,363); (2) That the China Affair aims to do away with all causes disturbing the stability of Greater East Asia and to bring Co-Prosperity to all the peoples on the basis of the New Order (10,363); (3) That the United States and Britain have been trying for a long time in the Far East to obstruct the measures and actions of the Japanese Empire, and have openly increased their measures of assistance to the Chungking regime and "stealthily gave rein to their inordinate ambition to dominate the Far East at the expense of China. In addition, they have persuaded other powers to strengthen the encirclement of Japan, and also adopted such measures as the direct disruption of economic relations with our Empire, and reinforced military preparations. Thus they have threatened the security of our Empire by deigning to conduct virtual war operations against us," (10,364); (4) That Japan has proposed to the United States the peaceful settlement of the situation and has been negotiating with United States for eight months but there is a fundamental opposition between the assertions of Japan and United States regarding the establishment of peace in the Far East so Japan cannot realize her national policy nor "bring about the stability of Great East Asia if we once accede to the assertions of the United States" (10,364); (5) That in the attitudes of the United States and Britain we can read nothing but a hasty move to set their own inordinate ambitions, and see no trace of a sincere desire on their part for world peace, and to risk mankind (from) unfortunate disaster." (10,364)

The draft concluded by stating that "Greater East Asia is now on the brink of a crisis, and the existence of our Empire is in jeopardy. Such being the situation we are compelled to rise up, to take up arms on the side of our allies to smash all the obstacles in our way." (10,365)

Exhibit 919 is the Liaison Conference Decision Plan of 11 November 1941. (9261) It is to be noted that Exhibit 1175 was a draft while Exhibit 919 states that it is the Liaison Conference Decision Plan. The parts read in evidence are as follows:

#### "Policy

"I. We shall endeavor to overthrow quickly the American, British, and Dutch bases in the Far East, establish our self-sufficiency, and at the same time hasten the surrender of the Chungking regime. Further, we shall endeavor to cooperate with Germany and Italy in planning for the submission of the England first, and then to deprive America of her will to continue war.

#### "Principal Points

"I. Japan will execute a swift war by force of arms and will overthrow the American, British, and Dutch bases in East Asia and in the Southwestern Pacific, thereby ensuring herself a strategically dominant position. At the same time she will secure areas of vital natural resources and principal communication lines, thereby facilitating self-sufficiency of long duration. We shall exhaust every effort to lure out at an opportune time the main naval force of the United States and destroy it." (9261-2)

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
878	13 November	8,995	264

Present

None stated in Exhibit. See Ex. 1103 for those usually in attendance, according to TOJO (1119-A, p. 10,173)

Decision

The Liaison Conference of 13 November 1941 adopted the measures to be taken towards Foreign Countries relative to the Outline for the Execution of National Policies, which was decided at the Council in the presence of the Emperor held on November 5."

Remarks

The exhibit was introduced for the purpose of showing that the Liaison Conference decided to disclose to Germany and Italy Japan's intention to start war against the United States and Britain as soon as her war preparations were ready, and that Japan notified Germany and Italy that the participation by them in the war against the United States and Britain was part of Japan's war preparations. It was also offered to show Japan's policy towards Thailand as decided by this Conference regarding the passage and stationing of troops, the construction of military establishment, the billeting and feeding of Japanese troops, and the loans necessary to defray military expenditures. (Introductory remarks 8993-4)

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
877	20 November	8,988; 11,937	267

Present

None stated. See Exhibit 1103 herein for those in attendance according to TOJO (Ex. 1119-A, 10,173)

Decision

The details of the execution of Administration in the Southern occupied Territories were decided at the Liaison Conference of 20 November 1941.

Remarks

Exhibit 877 relates to the setting up of a military administration in occupied areas using existing organs as much as possible and ordering co-operation of United States and Dutch nationals with Japan's military. Final disposition of such territories was to be decided later. The occupation forces would control all facilities and communications. All important matters on local administration were to be decided at Liaison Conferences. In French Indo-China and Thailand, a military administration was not to be set up, but measures were to be taken later, in the event of any sudden change in their status. (8988-8992)

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1026-A 1207-A	o/a 30 November	10,506-10,513	275

Present

According to TOGO, the following attended the Liaison Conferences regarding the composition and delivery of the final note: (10,510 - ex. 1207-A)

TOJO  
SHIMADA  
KAGANO  
KAYA

SUZUKI  
HOSHINO  
MIYTO

Decision

(See Remarks)

Remarks

Exhibits 1206-A and 1207-A are extracts from TOGO's interrogation of 26 March 1946 and 11 March 1946 respectively.

In Exhibit 1206-A TOGO states that:

"A. The note was written by the Foreign Office but in accordance with the views expressed in the discussions in the liaison and other conferences and the note was a general summary of those views. Therefore, the Foreign Office and I, as Foreign Minister, cannot take the responsibility. Furthermore, as the matter was related to the question of war, the high command naturally had to be consulted and various matters discussed with them in regard to the note. Such being the case, the government alone cannot take the responsibility, for the high command is also connected with the matter. And that being the case, even within the government, I alone as Foreign Minister cannot take sole responsibility on a matter of such supreme or major importance.

"Q. Would you name the individuals who you would consider as equally responsible with you for the contents of the note.

"A. All members of the liaison conference and even some members of the Cabinet who were familiar with this question." (10,506)

Exhibit 1207-A relates to the questions and answers asked and given by TOGO concerning responsibility for the contents of the final note as well as information regarding those in attendance at the conference. (10509-10512)

"Q. Who would be considered responsible, who would you consider responsible for the composition of that note?

"A. That notification, as I have previously explained, was a summation of the results of the studies and discussions which took place at the liaison conferences regarding negotiations with the United States. The note itself was written by the Foreign Office, but the responsibility for the composition rests with the participating members of the liaison conferences. The responsibility for the contents of the notification rests with the members of the liaison conferences. Furthermore, the matter was also reported to the Cabinet and passed the Cabinet without objection.

"Q. Could you give me the names of the individuals at the liaison conferences and the Cabinet members who would be considered responsible for the contents of the note?

"A. As I have said at a previous meeting, members of a liaison conference who were responsible for the study and discussions on the matter were TOJO, SHIMADA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TSUYADA, ITO, KAYA, SUZUKI and the three secretaries, OSHINO, MITO and OKA. As to the members of the Cabinet, under the constitution they are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, even on matters outside of the competence of their respective offices.

"Q. I understood from you that the note was composed by the Foreign Office after the contents of what the note should contain had been decided upon at the liaison conferences. I also understand that after the note was composed by the Foreign Office it was presented for approval to the Cabinet on December 1, 1941, at which time the Cabinet approved it. Is my understanding correct?

"A. The first part of your understanding is correct, that is, that the writing of the note took place in accordance with the decision of the liaison conference as to its contents. However, I should like to make some correction as to the date. December 1 was the date of the Imperial Conference, at which the decision for war was made. However, previous to the Imperial Conference the main points of the note to be sent were reported to the Cabinet; but as to the drafting of the note, that came afterwards, and at a later Cabinet meeting the main points were further explained and the continuation of the explanation that was made at the former Cabinet meeting. I cannot recall definitely, but it seems to be around November 30, but I could have the date more definitely confirmed later. (10510)

"Q From what you have stated would you consider that the members of the Cabinet and members of the liaison conference, whose names you have mentioned, are equally responsible with you as regards to the contents of the note and its delivery?

"A As to the contents of the note, I think it is but natural that all the members of the liaison conference are responsible. As to the Cabinet, they would have at least a final responsibility in that they expressed no objection, that is, from the legal point of view. Of course, it all depends whether you view the matter superficially or formally, or whether you would like to view it more profoundly. But, practically speaking, in the light of actualities it might be said that there is a difference in the degree of responsibility by the liaison conference and the Cabinet because not all the Cabinet members attended the liaison conference, but the situation was such that whatever was approved by the liaison conference was approved by the Cabinet. Although there may be a difference in degree of responsibility, the Cabinet might have at least a nominal responsibility.

"Q Who knew and approved of the details concerning the manner of the delivery of the note?

"A As to the delivery of the note, instructions were sent previously to the Embassy in Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1:00 p.M. December 7, Washington time, as much as possible to the Secretary of State, and that all preparations be made for the purpose of delivering the note at the specified time. The instructions themselves were dispatched by the Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Office. Regarding the sending of such instructions, all members of the liaison conference knew. It is naturally a matter on which there should be no objections, and, therefore, it was approved as a matter of course." (10,509-12)



LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Gerr's Summary</u>
1201-A	30 November	10,480-2	275
1202-A	30 "	10,482-3	275

Present

See Exhibit 1103 herein.

Decision

Approved the gist of the final note to America.

Remarks

Exhibit 1201-A is an extract from TOJO's interrogation of 20 February 1946 wherein he stated that he thought the "last Liaison Conference before the Imperial Conference (of 1st or 2nd December) was on the 30th of November. (10,480)

Exhibit 1202-A is an extract from the interrogation of TOJO of 18 March 1946. The following questions and answers were asked and given:

"Q The text of the final note to America was approved, first by the Liaison Conference, and later by the Cabinet, was it not?

"A The gist of it was approved by the Cabinet, but the final text was the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. Of course, it is my responsibility, too.

"Q Did not also the Liaison Conference first approve the gist of it?

"A Yes, of course, they did.

"Q TOJO says that he composed the text of that note on a basis of the views furnished by the Liaison Conference and that the text, after being written, was presented to and approved by the Liaison Conference. Is this correct?

"A Yes.

"Q After this had happened, the cabinet also approved it, did it not?

"A As I recall it, after the Liaison Conference had approved it, the gist of it was given to the Cabinet by the Foreign Minister, after which they approved it. In any case, if my memory is correct, I do not believe that the text was distributed to all the members of the Cabinet.

"Q After TOGC and the two Chiefs of Staff had decided that 1:00 P.M., 7 December 1941, Washington time, was to be the time for the delivery of the final note, this fact was reported to and approved by the Liaison Conference, was it not?

"A No. The Liaison Conference, which I was, you might say, head of, delegated to the two Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Minister the task of setting a time prior to the attack. The three-man committee did not report back to the Liaison Conference. I don't remember that the three-man committee reported back to the Liaison Conference on the time. I am reporting to you the facts, but the results of those facts are my responsibility.

"(p.3)

"Q Did the Foreign Minister know of the time and the day set for the attack? /Referring to the Pearl Harbor attack./

"A Yes, the Foreign Minister knew it, too. The President of the Planning Board also knew."

"Q As you recall it, the Liaison Conference did not approve the time set for the delivery of the note nor approve of the length of time between the delivery of the note and the attack?

"A The Liaison Conference delegated the carrying out of this matter to the Foreign Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff and, in that sense only, approved.

"(p.4)

"Q In addition to the Minister of War and Foreign Minister, were there any other cabinet members present at the Liaison Conferences immediately preceding the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?

"A I do not remember exactly, but I suppose that the Commerce and Industry Minister and the Communications Minister attended because raw materials were involved for factories and shipping was involved. Of course, the President of the Planning Board and the Navy Minister were also there.

"Q Was the Minister of Finance there?

"A Yes, he was always at Liaison Conference meetings. Those five were always there - War, Navy, Planning Board, Foreign and Finance Ministers." (10,482-4)

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1197-A	o/a 30 November	10,464	---

Present

(According to NAGANO's Interrogation)

TOJO, Premier	KAYA
TOGO	NAGANO
SUZUKI, President of Planning Board	
SUGIYAMA	
TANABE, General - Army Vice Chief Staff	
SHIMADA, Navy Minister	
ITO, Rear Admiral Vice Chief Navy Staff	
TERASHIMA, Communications Minister	
INO-Agriculture Minister	
HOSHINO, Cabinet Secretary	
MUTO, Head Military Affairs Section	
CKA, Vice Admiral, Head Navy General Affairs Section	

(Correct designation, according to NAGANO "Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry" (10,465)

Decision

Exhibit offered to show that important Liaison Conferences were held during the late days of November 1941 (Introductory Remarks, 10,460) to complete determination for war upon the United States. (10,464)

Remarks

According to NAGANO at the end of October or the beginning of November, 1941, he approved the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. There was disagreement between the Fleets and the Naval Operational Bureau which preferred the conservative method of waiting for the American Fleet in the South Pacific Islands. (10,462) YAMAMOTO threatened to resign if his plan to attack Pearl Harbor was not approved. He admitted that preliminary maneuvers at sea and on paper had been carried on to perfect the YAMAMOTO Plan (10,462). NAGANO admitted that his approval of the Plan was the decisive factor in carrying through the attack. (10,463)

NAGANO admitted responsibility of the attack (10,463). He also stated that until the very last "we were hoping that peace could be established and were prepared to abandon the Plan until the very last, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. (10,464)

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1158-A	30 November	10,485	---

Present

See Exhibit 1103 herein, 1941.

Decision

Decided to delegate to the Supreme Command (Chief of Staff) (10,486) and the Foreign Minister, the authority to meet and decide the time for delivery of the final note "which would comply with the diplomatic and also the strategic requirements." (10,485)

It was also decided that the delivery of the final note should precede the attack. (10,486)

Remarks

TOJC in his interrogation of 12 March 1946 answered in reply to questions as follows:

"Q Were there any differences between TOGO and the others relative to this? (Referring to the delivery of the final note to the United States.)

"A No, there were not. They were the same -- to deliver it before the attack.

"Q Was any decision arrived at in the Liaison Conference as to how long it was to be delivered before the attack?

"A I have explained this before. The decision as to the time was not made at the Liaison Conference. The Supreme Command and the Foreign Minister were to meet together and decide the time which would comply with the diplomatic and also the strategic requirements.

"Q Was this delegation of authority decided upon at this same final Liaison Conference?

"A Yes.

"Q Do you know that such meeting or meetings were held pursuant to this delegation of authority?

"A No, I don't know.

"Q Did you learn what decision had been arrived at in regard to timing by these men to whom the authority had been delegated?

"A I did not learn precisely the time set, but it was decided that the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Minister would settle that so as to comply with both the diplomatic and military requirements. It was settled at the Liaison Conference that the delivery of the final note would precede the attack. (Last sentence of this answer read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness)." (10,485, 10,486)

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1203-A	30 November	10,488-9	---
1244-A	" "	10,708	---

Present

See Exhibit 1103 herein, 1941.

Decision

The Liaison Conference agreed to the substance of the final note.  
(Ex. 1203-A)

Remarks

The gist of the final note was explained by TOGO and approved by the Liaison Conference - "The Cabinet all heard it." (10,488) This Conference was the last one before the Imperial Conference of 1 or 2 December 1941. (10,489)

TOJO said he first learned Pearl Harbor was to be attacked at this Conference.

"Q Did not you and the members of the Cabinet see the contents of the note before it was sent?

"A I heard the gist of it. The cabinet all heard it at the Liaison Conference just preceding the Imperial Conference.

"Q Did not you and the cabinet agree with the contents of that message?

"A Yes, we did agree. The gist of the note was explained by the Foreign Minister at the Liaison Conference meeting. The whole text was not read and passed about. After the meeting, the matter became the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry.

"Q This Liaison Conference, at which the gist of the final note was read, was the last one before the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd, was it not?

"A Yes.

"Q And all members present agreed with the substance of the message as it was read to them?

"A Yes.

"Q Why was it that that message was not sent to NOMURA until practically a week later?

"A I can't help it if you keep asking me questions about specific matters like that that were the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. I can't answer them."

Exhibit 1244-A is an extract from TOJO's Interrogation of 1 March 1946. He said that he knew of the attacks which were to be made on Malaya, Hongkong and the Philippines some five or six days before the Conference, as these were "joint operations" (10,707). At this Conference he learned for the first time of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. (10,708)

"Q Did you not know of any of the other attacks which were going to be made on December 8th simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack?

"A The Pearl Harbor attack was a Navy operation and I knew only that if the attack went smoothly that it would begin at such and such a time. The Malaya, Hongkong, and Philippines attacks were joint operations, and, hence, as War Minister, I knew about them.

"Q How early did you know about each of them, that is Pearl Harbor and the others?

"A I knew about the Pearl Harbor attack from the time of the Liaison Conference just preceding the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941. I knew about the other attacks some five or six days before the Liaison Conference met.

"Q Did you not, as Premier, know of and approve the attacks which were made on Pearl Harbor, Hongkong, Malaya and the Philippines on or about 7 or 8 December 1941?

"A Of course. I did know about them and approve." (10,707-8)

LIAISON CONFERENCE  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Garr's Summary</u>
1332	12 December	11,946-8	289-290

Present

None Stated. SUZUKI, the Accused, was Chairman of the Sixth Committee.  
(11,944) See Remarks.

Decision

Reported on the "Outline of the Economic Counter-Plan for the Southern Area."

Remarks

The "Sixth Committee" was organized in the Cabinet with the personnel of the government offices concerned (the Planning Board, the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the War and Navy Ministries) for the purpose of discussing and drafting matters pertaining to the economic plans and control centering around the acquisition and development of the resources in the Southern Areas. (11,946)

The first report of the Committee was dated 12 December 1941 and gave full details concerning the economic measures to be taken in the N.E.I. and the other Southern Areas after the occupation. The measures taken by Japan in the N.E.I. after their occupation closely followed the program worked out in the above-mentioned report. (Introductory Remarks - 11,947) The Exhibit shows that the matter was considered by a Liaison Conference. (11,948)

According to the report, the principal aim of the policy was to fill the demand for important national resources, to establish a self-sufficient system for the co-prosperity sphere, and to strengthen Japan's economy. (11,948)

"Two areas are named for this purpose: one to include Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Borneo, Philippines, and the other French Indo-China and Thailand." (11,949)



LIAISON CONFERENCES  
(1943)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1344	4 January	17992	

Present

Exhibit does not set forth the attendance.

Decision

The Liaison Conference of 4 January 1943 decided on independence for Burma and the Philippines only; independence for other areas would be decided at a later date. (P. 1 of Exhibit)

Remarks

See Exhibit 1344, herein, under heading Imperial Conference 1943 (P. 1 of the Exhibit: 17,992)

See also Exhibit Nos. 1344 and 1350 as well as the testimony of DeWeerd (12,115; 12,121; 12,236 respectively) for further information on this matter.

## FUNCTIONS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

The Privy Council, composed of a president, a vice-president, and twenty-four councillors appointed for life and the members of the Cabinet ex officio, serve as the supreme advisory body to the Emperor. The Ordinance defining its power, promulgated in 1890, stipulated that, generally speaking, its advice was to be solicited by the Emperor only on constitutional questions, international treaties and agreements, and prior to the issuance of emergency Imperial Ordinances. (640)

Gradually, however, the Council has extended its activities and increased its power until in recent decades it has come to resemble a "Third Chamber" with broad supervisory powers over the executive in both foreign and domestic matters. It has frequently opposed the Cabinet on policy questions and on several occasions has forced the downfall of Cabinets possessing the confidence of the Diet. Owing no political responsibility to the Diet or to the people for its activities, and yet exerting important influences over the entire affairs of the State, the Privy Council has proved an important barrier to the development of a sound parliamentary system. (640)

The Privy Council shares with the Cabinet a vast part of the legislative power. On the one hand it has, in conjunction with the Cabinet the powers exercisable when the Diet is not in session, including the approval of Imperial Ordinances under Articles VIII and LXX of the Constitution; and on the other hand exercises the legislative powers, exercisable irrespective of the sitting of the Diet, including international treaties and agreements, declarations of martial law, and Imperial Ordinances having penal provisions. In addition, every project of law or bill introduced into the Diet by the Cabinet is previously submitted to the Privy Council for its approval. (662)

While the Council has no power to initiate legislation, it has a wide veto and amending power. On bills which have been introduced by a Diet member and have passed the Diet, it can only recommend approval or disapproval in toto. On the other hand, with respect to projects of law submitted to it by the Cabinet before introduction in the Diet, it may not only veto but freely exercise its amending power. (663)

Since the members of the Cabinet are all ex-officio members of the Privy Council, the realm of disagreement between the two bodies, as a matter of fact and a matter of practice in the period covered by the indictment, has been small. (663)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1930)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
910-A	18 August to 26 September	9161	1

Present

The meeting of 23 August sets forth the full membership as follows:

President KURATOMI  
Vice-President HIRANUMA  
Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee

Councillor KAMEKO	Councillor DEN
" KUBOTA	" ARAI
" YAMAKAWA	" KA'AI
" KURODA	" MIZUNACHI

Ministers of State

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAKARABE  
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MUTO

Absent:

HAMAGUCHI  
TAKARABE  
SHIDEHARA from the meetings of 18 August and 26 September  
1930.  
KUBOTA, from the meeting of 28 August 1930.  
DEN, from the meetings of 3, 5, 8, 10, 15, September 1930.

Decision

None.

### Remarks

Exhibit 910-A is the Minutes of the First to the Thirteenth Meetings of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council on the ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. The dates of the meetings extend from 18 August to 26 September 1930. The accused HIRANUMA was present at each of the meetings, serving in the capacity of Vice President of the Privy Council.

Councillor KANEKO referred to a speech by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs NAGAI who said that if the Privy Council interfered with the ratification of the London Treaty the Cabinet must fight them as the public enemy of the nation. (9161) KAWAI asked on what grounds the Premier, regardless of the objections of the military, determined that the military strength decided upon by the Treaty was sufficient for Japan's national defense, and how could the Premier say, with a military strength of which the Chief of the Navy General Staff did not approve, that Japan's national defense was secure. (9162) He also referred to a statement of the Premier in the Diet that the Government held the right to decide military strength.

The Premier answered that he had not stated that the Government held the right of decision, but had only said that the matter of concluding treaties should be decided by the Cabinet. (9163) The Premier also answered that he could not state the scope and extent to which he took the military's opinion into consideration as that was a confidential matter. (9163)

KAWAI referred to the Navy Minister's statement in the House of Peers that "the age when the strength of force determines all had already passed," and then he argued that Japan's armaments should be based upon the possibility of a crisis in the peace of the Orient, with America or other Third Powers interfering in Sino-Japanese relations over rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, and he demanded to know the Government's opinion on the matter. (9164)

The Premier replied that it was a fact that the ratio of strengths, vis-a-vis America provided in the treaty would become more unfavorable for Japan the nearer she got to 1936, but he believed that friendly relations with other powers, financial adjustments and other such matters were likewise the essentials of national defense. Japan, he continued, would have to bear with the unfavorable ratio until the end of 1936, the expiration date of the Treaty, at which time she could start to build ships again in order to hold 70% as against America. Japan, of course, he concluded, should make preparations within the scope permitted by the treaty. (9165)

The Navy Minister said that, if the treaty failed to be concluded, the United States would be hostile to Japan and she might undertake direct competition with Japan in warship construction. (9165)

KANEKO noted that, according to the report of the United States Senate, the United States feared most the submarine. He felt that, as long as Japan possessed submarines, "there was nothing to be afraid of from the United States, that world peace and international faith were merely outward courtesies, and that peace was untenable without repletion of military strength." (9166)

KANEKO stated that Japanese-American relations would be at their most dangerous point about 1937; therefore, Japan should supplement the lack of military strength caused by the London Treaty. "Justice", he said, "was only superficial courtesy between nations, and the last resort was military power alone." (9167) He referred to the Netherlands, saying that at one time she was the world's wealthiest country who had fallen to the position of a third rate country because of the limitation of her armaments. (9167) He pointed out that it was the military men of Japan who had advanced Japan into the world as one of the five great powers. (9168) He also said that, on the basis of the speeches in the United States Senate, the London Treaty was a preparation by the United States to put pressure against Japan after 1936. (9168)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1930)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
911-A	1 October	9169	2

Present

President KURATOMI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

State Ministers

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI	Commerce & Industry Minister TAWARA
Navy Minister TAKARABE	Home Minister ADACHI
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA	Agriculture & Forestry Minister MACHI-
Railway Minister EGI	Overseas Minister MATSUDA DA
Justice Minister WATANABE	Education Minister TANAKA
Finance Minister INOUE	Temporary Acting War Minister ABE

Councillors

ITO	MATSUMURO	ISHII
KANEKO	EGI	MIZUMACHI
KUBOTA	SAKURAI	OKADA
TOMII	DEN	FUKUDA
ISHIGURO	ARAI	
YAMAKAWA	KAWAI	
KURODA	KAMATA	
FURUICHI	SUZUKI	

Government Delegates

Director of the Bureau of Legislation KAWASAKI  
Councillor of the Bureau of Legislation KANAMORI  
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs YOSHIDA  
Chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office MATSUNAGA  
Chief of the Bureau of European & American Affairs of  
the Foreign Office HOTTA  
Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Office SAITO  
Secretary of the Foreign Office YAMAGATA  
Secretary of the Foreign Office SHIOZAKI  
Administrative Official of the Foreign Office FUKADA  
Administrative Official of Foreign Office YAMADA  
Vice Minister of Navy KOBAYASHI  
Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau HORI  
Secretary of Navy Department ENOMOTO  
Captain SHINOMURA Captain IWANURA  
Commander FUJITA  
Reporter - Chief of the Judging Committee - ITO  
Chief Secretary - Chief Secretary FUTAGAMI  
Secretaries - Secretary HORIE  
" MUTO

Decision

No decision reached at the meeting.

Remarks

Exhibit 911-A is a book entitled "A Record of the Privy Council concerning Ratification of the London Naval Treaty 1930" dated 1 October 1930.

HIRANUMA was present in his capacity as Vice President of the Privy Council.

HAMAGUCHI stated the position of the government on the problem of ratification. He said that the object of the London Naval Treaty was to prevent dangerous competitive armament for the sake of world peace and to reduce the burden of taxation.

TAKARABE, Navy Minister, referred to the so-called "three great principles", which were not in existence in 1927, at the time of the Geneva Conference, and which were concerned with the military strength necessary for the execution of the plan of operations based on the national defense policy decided in 1923. These principles were: 70% in total tonnage, 70% in cruisers with eight inch guns and the present (1930) strength in submarines. (9171) The so-called "three great principles" were really three demands made by Japan at the London Naval Conference. (9171) He also made mention of the steps taken by "young officers" to unify public opinion behind the "three great principles" saying that their endeavors had "much to do with our success at the conference in obtaining the ratio of 70% in total tonnage." (9172)

HAMAGUCHI pointed out that the "general public was driven to an indescribable sort of unrest and unhappiness" and that "as long as the destiny of this treaty remains undecided, it will not only be impossible to eradicate this type of unrest, but it is evident that there will be a tendency for the unrest in public feeling to gradually increase, incited by daily articles in newspapers and all the other scandalous propaganda. The problem of the financial world in particular is what the government cannot help but be mostly concerned about." (9174)

Nothing further was read regarding this matter.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1931)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Gen's Summary</u>
2205-A	9 December	15,765-7	

Present

Chairman KURATOMI  
Vice Chairman HIRANUMA

Ministers-  
War Minister General MIYAMA

Councillors

KURODA  
EGI  
SAKURAI  
KAWAI  
MIZUNOCHI  
OKADA  
FUKUDA

Chief Secretary FURUKAWA

Secretaries: HORIE  
MITO

Decision

None referred to in the Exhibit.

Remarks

Exhibit 2205-A is the minutes of the Privy Council at which a report was given on the China Incident.

War Minister MIYAMA reported on conditions in the Chinchow district, stating that in the concentration of any army it was a principle in military tactics to send one unit ahead. The Japanese forces were distributed over Tsitsihar, Sauping-kai and other places; one unit was therefore sent to the Chinchow district. However on 27 November, 1931 an order was issued that the unit should return to a position east of Hsin-Min-Tun. Word was received that, if Japan demanded it, (15764-5) the Chinese would evacuate Chinchow, thus eliminating the necessity for a strong offensive (15765). Perhaps, continued MIYAMA, this might have led to the report which appeared in the newspapers, etc. that the Chief of Staff, the Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had come to an agreement that the attack on Chinchow should not be carried out. (15765)



Councillor EGI remarked that "it is reasonable that attack [redacted] of Chinchow where Cheng [redacted] has his headquarters." (15765) But, if they do, attack Chinchow, Japan's "loss of credit with the League of Nations and the Great Powers" will be very great. (15765) He also remarked that "though it might be very convenient for Japan to have Manchoukuo an independent state, I do not believe the Great Powers would accept it. It might be well for Manchurian people to work for their independence on their own accord, but are we not losing general confidence as a result of continually taking action under the pretext of self defense. (15765)

Councillor SAURAI expressed the same thoughts as EGI and referred to the bombing of Chinchow by Japanese forces (15766) as regrettable, stating that Japan "quickly lost the confidence of the League of Nations." (15766)

War Minister MINAMI replied that "We do not wish to give the impression to foreign countries that we have attacked Manchuria and Mongolia." (15766) "I, too," he continued, "consider it regrettable. However, apparently Europeans and Americans are mistaken in thinking that we made use of the large bombs such as used in the European War. Moreover, the contrast between this incident and the frequent government announcements that the affair would be extended has caused a strong reaction amongst them." (15766)

EGI then referred to "the improper action taken by some of the young officers of our Army," stating that in maintaining military discipline, the matter of punishment should not be ambiguous. (15767)

War Minister MINAMI replied that the question of punishment was still under consideration but the maintenance of discipline should be left to the Army. (15767)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1931)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
188-C	o/a 17 December	2,222	13

Present

ARAKI stated in his interrogation that All members of the Privy Council and Cabinet were present. No other record of those present.

Cabinet then in power was the INUKAI Cabinet.

Decision

Decided the policy of pacifying and occupying the four provinces under General CHANG in Manchuria, including Jehol (2222; 2234) and also decided to approve the military budget for this purpose. (2219)

Remarks

This was an extraordinary meeting of the Privy Council as the matter was very urgent, the Diet not being in session at the time.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1932)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
241	13 Sept	2,072	19

Present

Chairman KURATOMI  
Vice-Chairman HIRANUMA

State Ministers

Premier SAITO	Education Minister HATOYAMA
Finance Minister TAKAHASHI	Navy Minister OKADA
Home Minister YAMAMOTO	Justice Minister KOYAMA
Foreign Minister UCHIDA	Communications Minister MINAMI
Railway Minister MITSUCHI	Commerce & Industry NAKAJIMA
Was Minister ARAKI	Agriculture & Forestry GOTO
	Overseas Affairs NAGAI

Councillors:

KOBOTA	ISHII
TOMII	MIZUMACHI
ISHIGURO	OKADA
KURODA	ARIMA
FURUICHI	HARA
SAKURAI	KUBOTA
ARAI	KURINO
KAWAI	HOTODA
KAMADA	SUZUKI (Soroku)
SUZUKI (Kantaro)	

Committee Members:

Director of the Bureau of Legislation HORIKIRI  
Councillor KANAMORI  
Vice-Foreign Minister ARITA  
Director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry MATSUDA  
Director of the Bureau of Asia, Foreign Ministry TANI  
Secretary of Foreign Office YANAI  
Secretary of Foreign Office MORISHIMA  
" HARIMA  
" TERAJIMA

Vice Minister of War YAMAGAWA  
Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, YAMAOKA

Reporters:

Chairman of the Judging Committee HIRANUMA  
Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
" MUTOH

### Decision

Unanimously approved the bill regarding the "Matter on signing of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol".

### Remarks

Exhibit 241 is the Proceedings of the Privy Council on the signing of the protocol between Japan and Manchukuo. HIRANUMA, the Accused, was Vice Chairman of the meeting and ARAKI, the Accused, was present as War Minister.

The meeting was called at the request of the Cabinet. The reporter (HIRANUMA, the Accused) presented a report on the matter as follows:

When the old North Eastern Regime was destroyed at the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, influential persons in Manchuria and Mongolia, after consultation, declared on March 1, 1932, the establishment of Manchukuo and broke off relations with the Republic of China. (2973)

The Manchukuo Government then requested formal diplomatic relations with Japan and other countries. The Government of Japan, "in order to use prudence and caution watched for half year since then the developments in Manchukuo as well as the attitudes of the League of Nations and other countries." (2974) Since then Manchukuo has shown steady progress and indications are that Japan's recognition of Manchukuo, though it will "as may be easily imagined, cause for a time no small shock to the world, will not bring about any international crisis. Under the circumstances our country considered it advisable at this juncture to give Manchukuo our formal recognition and open freely relations with her." (2975) Accordingly, with a view to regulating the basis of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Japan decided to take measures for recognizing Manchukuo by concluding an arrangement through a protocol and certain notes which were exchanged between the two countries. (2975)

#### 1. Protocol.

The Protocol contained two clauses which provided (1) that, unless special arrangements are made between Japan and Manchukuo in the future, "all rights which Japan and her subjects possessed heretofore in Manchukuo territory under various Sino-Japanese arrangements and public and private contracts shall be confirmed

and respected by Manchukuo," (2976) and (2), "that both Japan and Manchukuo shall consider every menace against the territory and peace and order of one party as a menace against the tranquility and existence of the other party" and they therefore agreed to jointly defend themselves, for which purpose the necessary number of Japanese troops shall be stationed in Manchukuo. (2976)

2. Notes exchanged - (Between the two countries)

There were four notes exchanged: one between the Commander of the Kwantung Army of Japan and the Regent of Manchukuo and three between the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo. The notes were to be deemed as international agreements having legal validity "in addition to the virtual effectiveness they hitherto possessed", and were to be retroactively effective from the days on which they were exchanged or concluded," (2977) and the "arrangements were to be made strictly confidential by mutual understanding between Japan and Manchukuo." (2977)

In the first note addressed to HONJO, Commander of the Kwantung Army, by the Regent of Manchukuo on March 10, 1932, he asked for the consent of Japan to "the undermentioned items" inasmuch as Manchukuo was convinced that her development could not be expected without the support and guidance of Japan. (2978)

HONJO replied setting forth "the undermentioned items" as follows:

A.- Manchukuo shall entrust to Japan her national defense and the maintenance of peace and order and shall bear all the necessary expenses therefore. (Clause I) (2978)

B.- The control of the existing railways, harbours, waterways, air routes, etc., as well as the construction of new routes so far as the same are required by Japan's Army for national defense, shall be wholly entrusted to Japan or such organization as she may designate. (Clause II) (2978)

C.- Manchukuo shall give every possible assistance in connection with various establishments deemed necessary by the Japanese Army. (Clause III) (2979)

D.- Japanese shall be appointed state councillors of Manchukuo and Japanese shall also be appointed officials of central as well as local governments. The selection of such officials shall be made on the recommendations of the Commander of the Kwantung Army and their dismissals shall be subject to his consent. (Clause IV) (2979)

The second note referred to the agreement regarding control of rails, harbors, etc. between HONJO and Prime Minister CHENG dated August 7, 1932. (2980)

The third note referred to an agreement between HONJO and Prime Minister CHENG August 7, 1932, relative to the establishment of an airway company. (2980)

The fourth note referred to an agreement, relative to the establishment of mining rights necessary for national defense, between Commander MUTO (not the Accused) of the Kwantung Army and Prime Minister CHENG dated September 9, 1932. (2980)

In the event doubt arose as to the interpretation of the protocol and notes, it was determined that the decision on this question should be made according to the Japanese text. (2981)

HIRANUMA concluded his report by stating that the Judging Committee unanimously agreed that the bill be passed without modification. (2982)

#### Discussion by the Councillors

Councillor OKADA raised three points:

1) Whether or not the recognition of Manchukuo was in violation of the Nine-Power Pact. In this connection, he referred to the statement in the Diet of the Foreign Minister UCHIDA that Manchukuo "had become independent by the free will of her people and that Japan had not agreed by the Nine-Power Pact to prevent the independence of the Chinese people." (2983) He pointed out that the Foreign Minister referred to what might happen if, for example, Canton wished to become independent, he (UCHIDA), being of the opinion that the countries signatory to the Pact were not under an obligation to prevent this independence. (2983) OKADA felt, however, that America might be of the opinion that it would not be in violation of the Pact, if Manchukuo became independent of her own free will, but that it would be such a violation and disregard of Chinese sovereignty for Japan to assist and maintain this independence. (2983) OKADA thought that the Foreign Minister's explanation on this point was inadequate. (2983)

The second point raised by OKADA referred to the conflict between the secret agreements in the bill under discussion and the Nine-Power Pact, and the third point related to the arrangement whereby the agreements were to be strictly confidential - pointing out that if the secret agreements were to be divulged China would demand convocation of a conference of the countries signatory to the Nine-Power Pact. (2984)

In reply to the points raised by OKADA, the Foreign Minister UCHIDA stated that, regarding the Nine-Power Pact, the action of

the Japanese Army in coping with the Incident of September 18, 1931 was nothing but the exercise of Japan's right of self-defense; (2985) that the Nine-Power Pact provided that China's territorial integrity should be respected, but it made no provisions at all for a case where a part of China became "independent as a result of China's own disintegration;" (2985) that various views were held in the United States and other countries but that he presented the views of Japan. (2985) He referred to the fact that Ambassador DUBUCHI had recently informally asked the American authorities if they would protest in case Japan should recognize Manchukuo, and "they replied that they had not the slightest intention of making a protest or convoking a Nine-Power Conference, inasmuch as there was no hope of such a conference reaching any conclusion." (2985) Besides, he continued, the convocation of the Nine-Power Conference "would be opposed by some of the European countries. (2986)

UCHIDA made reference to the statement of the American Government in order to show that "the motive and process of the creation of this new state have come to be generally understood and the feelings of the powers also have been eased to no small degrees." (2985)

As to OKADA's second question (whether there is doubt that the contents of the strictly secret treaty were incompatible with the Nine-Power Pact), UCHIDA said that there was no conflict between the two as the signatories to the Pact "are concerned with the Open Door principle, principle of equal opportunity, etc." (2986) He saw no objection to Japan's being entrusted by Manchukuo with such matters as that country could do for herself. (2986)

In answer to the third question, (as to what would be done in the event that the secret agreements became divulged), UCHIDA said that Japan should take special care to prevent leakage and, if by any chance the secret agreements should become known he believed that there was nothing in them to be ashamed of. (2986)

OKADA doubted if the explanation given by the Foreign Minister would satisfy the signatories to the Pact. (2986)

ISHIGURO referred to the second note exchanged (the letter addressed to the Commander of the Kwantung Army by Premier Cheng), which stated that Japan shall be entrusted with the national defense and maintenance of the public peace of Manchukuo for which purpose all necessary expenditures shall be borne by Manchukuo. He then asked if there was any time limit fixed regarding the expenditures and whether Manchukuo was then paying for such expenditures. (2987)

In reply, ARAKI stated that no budget had been provided for this purpose by Manchukuo but that she would be able to defray some part of the expenditures after 1933, if her internal

conditions become stabilized, since she had reliable income from railways. (2987) He also stated that he thought Manchukuo would be able to defray the necessary expenditures after an elapse of about five years. (2987)

ISHIGURO then asked if it would be impossible to obtain payment for the expenses before the lapse of five years, (2987), to which ARAKI replied that, since the national defense of Manchukuo is at the same time the national defense of Japan, he did not consider it fair and reasonable to make Manchukuo alone bear the whole amount of expenses necessary for national defense. (2988) ARAKI further replied that, although it was merely planned, he thought it would be possible for Manchukuo to pay annually 9,000,000 yen from the year 1933, if the country became stabilized, and 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 yen after five years. (2988)

KURODA said that the government would give careful consideration to the maintenance of amicable and harmonious diplomatic relations with other powers and that, inasmuch as the present action of Japan was to exalt the fundamental spirit of the Empire he desired that the whole people should do their utmost to settle the Manchurian question. (2939)

ISHII endorsed the signing of the protocol and said that "on looking back, the past one year has been really a year of so-called extraordinary emergency in which our country trod a very critical path. However, thanks to proper measures taken by the present Cabinet since its formation, we have now arrived at the stage of concluding a Japan-Manchukuo Alliance treaty, whereby Manchukuo has been recognized. This is a matter for congratulations to our country." (2989)

ISHII continued by saying that the "Japan vs. the Manchurian question and Japan vs. the international problem were the two problems over which he had deeply worried because many doubts have not been dispelled throughout the previous Cabinet and the one before it. Japan possessed from the outset special rights and interests in Manchuria. Therefore, our position was a special one. Since last year, while we were repelling Chinese infringement of those rights and interests, we inadvertently perceived an intention on the part of the Manchus and Mongols of gaining independence and gave them facilities for realizing their aspirations. This was only proper for us to do." (2989-2990) But, he continued he was not sure as to the future attitude of the Manchurians and the Mongolians after they became independent because they might change their attitudes and ignore Japan's rights and interests. (2990) He referred to Bulgaria as being a nation which met with unexpected calamity because of its failure to make necessary preparations in international negotiations. (2990) He said, however, that Japan's vested rights were fully secured by the notes executed. (2990)



ISHII further said he felt uneasy about Japan's contention in regard to the Manchurian problem and the League of Nations. He pointed out that the main point of Japan's contention was that she could not agree "to the disposition of the Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria by the Council of the League of Nations under Article 15 of the League's Covenant." (2991)

(Article 15 of the League's Covenant provides, inter alia, that "if there should arise between members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the members of the League agreed that they would submit the matter to the council," and it further provides "that if a dispute is not thus settled the Council, either unanimously, or by a majority vote, shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.")

ISHII feared that "inasmuch as some countries among the members of the League had laid before the League, prior to resorting to war, disputes arising inside their own territories and had received deliberation (sic) under Article 15, Japan's contention could not be carried through after all." (2991) In this connection, ISHII considered that, "should the dispute over Manchuria, which is not Japanese territory, be disposed of according to article 15 Japan's contention would be rejected by the world's public opinion as well as the International Court of Justice," (2991) but he pointed out "when Manchukuo is recognized by Japan and becomes an independent state and also (when) Japan-Manchukuo Alliance is concluded, according to the proposal now under consultation, the point most disadvantageous to Japan will be thereby almost removed. This, I think, will be the most desirable result of our formal recognition of Manchukuo and the conclusion of the Japan-Manchukuo Alliance." (2991)

ISHII also said that "it was an established view of a large number of people of the United States and other countries that Japan's action in Manchukuo had violated the Anti-War Pact and the Nine-Power Pact." (2991) But, he reasoned, now that Japan has formally recognized Manchukuo and entered into an alliance with her "Japan will be able in the future to assert that the independence of Manchukuo was due to the disintegration of China and that the territorial integrity of the Republic of China was broken by none other than Manchukuo. This will nullify the argument that Japan violated the Nine-Power Pact." (2992) (Underlining not in original.) "Now that Japan has concluded an alliance with New Manchukuo for joint national defense, I believe there will be no room for opposing the stationing of Japanese troops in Manchuria, thus making the League's past resolution a dead letter." (2992)

ISHII further said that "It is for Manchukuo herself to assert that an independent state should not be placed under the sover-

eighty of any other country. In regard to the connection between Japan and America and also other countries, Manchukuo herself will bear the brunt of the attack or back up Japan to ease Japan's position. At any rate, in consequence of the independence of Manchukuo, it has become unnecessary for the League of Nations to deliberate on the Manchurian question under Article 15 of the League's Covenant." (2993)

ISHII noted that it was rather strange that the Manchurian and Mongolian races had started no independence movement up to 1932. In this regard, he said that "it was a matter of course that Manchukuo had become independent as soon as the old regime under CHANG HSUCH-LIANG collapsed." (2993) He pointed out that "Manchuria became a part of China when it was bought as a dowry by AICHIN CHAENLO who subjugated China proper." (2993) He also said that Lord Lytton's party must have studied the history of Manchuria and Mongolia and therefore, it would not be difficult to make it understand the creation of Manchukuo as well as the problem of racial self-determination. Consequently, he concluded, "through the independence of Manchukuo, Japan's position has been improved considerably in respect to foreign relations." (2993)

ISHII ended his discussion of the matter by saying that "the present Japan-Manchukuo Treaty will prove effective in fully maintaining and expanding our special rights in Manchuria and Mongolia on the one hand and in elevating, on the other hand, Japan from a position of predicament full of troubles at home and abroad to a triumphant one." (2993)

The bill was passed unanimously and the meeting adjourned.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1935)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
850	3 July	8,417	30

Present

Chairman ICHIKI  
Vice Chairman HIRANUMA

Members of the Cabinet

Premier OKADA	Communication Minister TOKONAMI
Home Minister GOTO	Commerce & Industry Minister KACHIDA
Navy Minister OSUMI	Agriculture & Forestry Minister
Foreign Minister HIROTA	YAMASAKI
War Minister HAYASHI	Overseas Minister KODAMA

Councillors:

KUBOTA	HARA
SAKAMOTO	ARAI
KUBOTA	HAYASHI
KAWAI	TCMII
ISHII	ISHIWATA
KURODA	MOTODA
SHIMIZU	SUZUKI, Kantaro
SUZUKI, Soroku	ARIEA
ISHIZUKA	SAKURAI
	FUJISAWA

Decision

The Privy Council unanimously approved the bill to conclude an agreement between Japan and Manchukuo regarding the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee.

Remarks

HIRANUMA, the Accused, was Vice Chairman of the meeting.

After the establishment of Manchukuo, an agreement was entered into between Japan and Manchukuo which politically and practically bound the economies of the two nations. (Direct testimony of Liebert, R. 8417.)

The reporter ARAI said that the Empire's basic policy towards Manchukuo is found in the Rescript of March 1933 on the withdrawal from the League of Nations, and in the Japanese-Manchurian Agreement of September 1932, whereby Japan recognized

and respected Manchukuo's independence and agreed to help her progress and development by maintaining an inseparable relationship between the two countries. (8419) He said that Japan had established the right to garrison Japanese troops permanently in Manchukuo; that, in the diplomatic field, it was agreed in the official documents exchanged at the time of the establishment of the Manchurian Empire, that "Manchuria should submit beforehand all diplomatic and military matters to the Japanese Government for thorough and unreserved deliberation." (8420)

ARAI noted that the Japanese Government had no formal voice in the management of the economic problems in Manchuria which had important relations with that of Japan, especially in the supervision of the Japanese-Manchurian joint concerns relating to the important industries of that country. (8420) He said that it was necessary for Japan to gain a formal voice in the economic field in Manchukuo through the establishment of cooperative measures based upon an organization. Consequently, a pact was concluded providing for the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee with an "annex" giving the precise details of the agreement. (8421)

I. The agreement provided: 1) A Joint Economic Committee will be established permanently in Hsinking, Manchukuo. (8421) 2) The committee will deliberate on and answer all questions on all important matters concerning the economic tie of the two countries and the supervision of the business of the Japanese-Manchurian joint special corporation. The two governments can not settle any of the above matters until they have been submitted to the committee for deliberation. (8422) 3) The Committee may make proposals to the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo on any matter concerning the economic unification of the two countries. (8422) 4) The organization and operation of the committee will be prescribed in the Annex. 5) In case of difference in interpretation, the matter will be settled according to the Japanese text. (8422)

II. The Annex provided: 1) The committee shall consist of eight members, four from each country. (8422) 2) The Chairman of the committee will be elected at every meeting by mutual vote among the members. (8423) 3) Not material. 4) All matters will be decided by a majority vote, the chairman having the right to vote as a member, and in case of a tie, he has the right to make the decision. (8423)

III. The agreement also provided for certain "understood matters": (8423)

1) Japan's permanent members of the committee shall consist of the Chief of Kwantung Army, the Chief Councillor in full service at the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo, the Chief of the Kwantung Bureau and one member specially appointed by the government. (8423)

The Manchukuo members shall consist of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Finance, and the Head of the General State Affairs. (8424)

2) The important matters to be deliberated by the committee are connected with the economies of the two governments and are the export-import and tariff problems; the development and control of the important industries; the enactment and amendment of laws concerning the establishment of a special Japanese-Manchurian Joint Corporation; investment; and other important problems concerning the economic connection of the two governments which are within the power of the Manchurian Government. The matters important to the economic ties of both governments, but which are within Japan's power, will not be taken up by this committee but will be made into unilateral contracts binding only the Manchurian Government. (8424)

3) The important matters to be deliberated by the committee concerning the supervision of the business of the special Japanese-Manchurian Joint concern include: "the important amendments in the regulations of corporations, the purpose of which is to materialize important industries concerned with economic unity of both governments, and which have been established according to the laws of one of two countries and more than half of whose capital has been raised by the government, citizens, or juridical persons of the opposite government; the disposition of the profit of said corporation and the recognition of the decision to amalgamate or dissolve." (8425)

The reporter pointed out that the agreement bound only the Manchurian Government on this point (preceding paragraph) because, at that time, there was no corporation established according to Japanese law with more than half of Manchurian investment. (8425)

The Reporter concluded by saying that "Due to the existence in the document of such one-sided articles binding only Manchukuo, the authorities have declared, after an agreement brought forth by the two governments, to have this point kept secret." (8425)

The investigation committee unanimously approved the proposed agreement. (8426)

MOTODO, in discussing the agreement, wanted to know if it was proper to set the investments in both countries in the Japanese-Manchurian joint concerns on an equal basis, and he noted that the chairman not only had a right to vote but also had the power of decision. (8426) He thought that the agreement was not complete because questions could be decided by the chairman alone. (8427)

Foreign Minister HIROTA (the Accused) replied that "three out of the four from Manchukuo are ministers and the remaining one is the Chief of the General State Affairs who is, and will be a Japanese forever, I am confident." (8427) Therefore, "in case of a difference of opinions between the two countries, it cannot be imagined that he will make any decision that will be disadvantageous to Japan." (8428) While "the set up of the committee may apparently seem equal on the part of both countries but in reality, it is not." (8428)

SAKAMOTO agreed with Councillor MOTODA and said that, since a Japanese is to be appointed as Chief of the General State Affairs for Manchukuo, he would do his duty as a Japanese, but if he should act in favor of Japan, in case of an opposition of the two countries' interests, he would incur the ill-feeling of the Manchukuoan people. Therefore Japan could not be too sure that he would not act against her interests. (8429)

HIROTA replied that the Chief of the General State Affairs in Manchukuo, who is the general manager of the Japanese officials there, is employed by the Manchukuoan Government to guide it, and he is, at the same time, a leading instrument dispatched to Manchukuo by Japan; therefore, "he must perform both duties, and it is his primary duty to see that there will not be any opposition between Japan and Manchukuo." (8430) Consequently, he continued, if the "Manchukuo members of the committee should scheme to act against Japan's interest after the committee is formed, the Chief of the General State Affairs will take proper measures after giving due consideration to the interests of both countries. It will be his duty to lead Manchukuo in such a way that such fear would be unnecessary." (8430)

The discussion ended and the whole council decided in favor of the agreement which was signed on 15 July 1935.

Exhibit 851 sets forth the agreement regarding the establishment of the Joint Economic Committee of Japan and Manchukuo. (8433-8435)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
479	20 November	5,931	40

Present

Vice President of Privy Council KAWA, Kentaro

Councillors:

Count KATO, Kentaro  
KAWA, Misao  
Viscount ISHII, Kikujiro  
AFUKI, Ryokitsu  
KAWA, Yoshimichi  
KOTODA, Hajime  
ISHIZUKA, Eizo  
Baron HAYASHI, Gonsuke

Decision

Decided that the conduct of negotiations for an alliance with Germany (Anti-Comintern Pact) was to be transferred from the general staff of the Japanese Army to the Foreign Ministry.

Remarks

Shortly after the conclusion of the Mongolian-Union of Soviet Socialist Pact of mutual assistance in April 1936, the conduct of negotiations for an alliance with Germany was transferred from the general staff of the Japanese Army to the Foreign Minister. (Introductory Remarks - 5930)

The Investigation Report on the conclusion of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact said that "Therefore, as the first step for executing the above foreign policy, the Government planned coordination with Germany and since the spring of this year has instructed the Japanese Ambassador to Germany to carry on negotiations with the representative officials of the German Government along the line of joint defense against the red peril. As a result of this negotiation, both governments have come to an understanding that such a Pact should be established for the above mentioned coordination." (5931)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
484	20 November 5, 1936		40

Present

Vice President of Privy Council ARAI, Kentaro

Councillors:

Count KANEKO, Kentaro  
KAWAI, Misai  
Viscount ISHII, Kikujiro  
ARIMA, Ryokitsu  
HARA, Yoshimichi  
MOTODA, Hajime  
ISHIZUKA, Eizo  
Baron HAYASHI, Gonsuke

Decision

The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council unanimously recommended that the German-Japanese Pact against the Communist Internationale and the secret attached Pact against the Soviet Union be approved by the Privy Council. (Exhibit 485, herein, is the record of the Minutes of the Privy Council on 25 November 1936, at which meeting the Pact was approved by the Council. (5967)

Remarks

According to the report of the Investigation Committee, the Japanese-German Pact was comprised of two pacts: A Pact against the Communist Internationale and a secret attached Pact against the Soviet Union.

1. The Pact against the Communist Internationale had for its object cooperation for the defense against the destructive communistic activities of the Communist Internationale. The powers agreed "to exchange information on the activities of the Comintern, consult with each other in adopting necessary defensive measures and achieve these defensive measures through close cooperation." (5958) They also agreed to take defensive measures against third countries whose internal peace was threatened by the Comintern's destructive activities. (5959) A standing committee was to be established to study and discuss various measures necessary for preventing the Comintern's destructive operations. (5959) The duration of the Pacts was set for five years. (5959) (See R 5934 for The Pact)



II. The Secret Pact attached to the Pact against the Communist Internationale had for its object "the protection of the common interests of Japan and Germany against the armed pressure exerted by the Soviet Union." (5960) It was agreed that "in case one of the signatory powers is attacked or threatened with attack by the Soviet Union without provocation, the other signatory party shall refrain from taking any measure likely to result in any diminution of the burden of the Soviet Union's position, and the two signatories shall immediately discuss measures to be taken for the protection of their mutual interests." (5960) They also agreed not to conclude during the continuation of the Pact any political treaties with the Soviet Union which contravened the spirit of the Pact without mutual consent. (5960) (See R 5936 for the "Secret Attached Agreement To The Agreement Against The Communist INTERNATIONALE")

In the Appendix to the Pact, Nos. 1 and 2 of the official notes exchanged prescribed that the political treaties mentioned in Article 2 of the Pact do not include the Fishery Treaty, the Concession Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union, and the treaty concerning boundary line problems between Japan, Manchuria and the Soviet Union.

Official Notes Nos. 3 and 4 confirmed the German Government's view that the articles in such political treaties as the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 and the Neutrality Pact of 1923 between Germany and the Soviet Union did not "conflict with the spirit of this Pact and Germany's obligations arising from this Pact as long as the object is not lacking in the situation at the time of the enforcement of this Pact." (5961)

It was agreed that the Pact and the attached official notes were to be kept secret. (5961)

The reporter referred to the explanation of the Competent Ministers: (1) "Japan's cooperation with Germany for this particular object through this Pact in no way whatever implies that Japan fully approves of that country's principles in respect to her internal affairs or that Japan will act in concert with her. In order to prevent any suspicion and misunderstanding at home and abroad regarding this point, the Government will clarify the purport of the Pact and also do its best to take other appropriate measures at the same time as it publishes such parts of the Pact as are to be made public....(2) Since the object of this Pact is, as mentioned above, simply to make it an instrument for preparing for the Comintern and the Soviet Union, we on our side should of course refrain even after the conclusion of this Pact, from taking any positive measure which might aggravate relations with the Soviet Union." (5962) 3) Regarding Sino-Japanese negotiations which were in progress at that time, "The fact that the conclusion of the Pact will further strengthen Japan's position ought to prove quite effective in making China decide her attitude. We are not without expectations, therefore,

of being able to use this situation for promoting developments in the Sino-Japanese negotiations favorable to ourselves. The Government is resolved to leave nothing undone in its measures for coping with the situation." (5963) 4) The conclusion of the Pact is "due to the recent political changes in Germany and the establishment of the Nazi regime," (5964) which is "steadily achieving success in both internal administration and diplomacy, and has won a firm hold on the confidence of a large number of people, thanks to its unique principle, without resorting to revolutionary behavior." (5964) There is no likelihood of its collapse. Consequently, effective results from the Pact will be secured in the future. (5964) 5) The wording of the statements contained in Official Notes Nos. 2 and 3 of the Appendix to the second Pact is somewhat deficient in clarity but "they confirm the view of the German Government that among the articles in the Rapallo Pact and the Neutrality Pact existing between Germany and the Soviet Union, those which conflict with the spirit of the present Japanese-German Pact and Germany's obligation arising thereunder will become invalid as the result of the extinction of their object in the light of the situation prevalent when the Pact is enforced. There is no doubt on this point, as may be judged from the fact that during the course of the negotiations on the present Pact, our ambassadors to Germany wired the following telegram to our Foreign Minister after obtaining the assent of the representative of the German Government. 'I have the firm conviction that the spirit of this pact will prove to be the sole basis of Germany's future policy towards the Soviet Union.'" (5965)

The reporter concluded by stating that, "although serious consideration should of course be given to the various probable internal as well as external influences of this Pact, it is rather a timely measure for Japan, in consideration of the present international situation, to conclude the present Pact and cooperate with Germany as one of the counter-measures for defending themselves from and checking the aggressive pressure of the Communist Internationale and the Soviet Union." (5966)

See Exhibit 485 herein for the Minutes of the Privy Council on the Pact.

The Secret Attached Pact appears on Page 5936 of The Record. The Substance of the Secret Pact can be found in II above.

Exhibit 483 A, an issue of the Tokyo Gazette, contains a statement of the Bureau of Information showing that Japan proclaimed to the world that the Japanese-German agreement was not directed toward any particular country. (5957)

Exhibit 484, above, proves that the Pact was aimed at the U. S. S. R. and was designed to strengthen the hand of Japan in China. (5957)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
485	25 November	5,967	40

Present

HIROHITO, The Emperor  
HIRANUMA, President  
ARAI, Vice-President

State Ministers

HIROTA  
NAGANO  
TERAUCHI  
HAYASHI  
BABA  
MAEDA  
USHIO

SHIMADA  
TANOMOGI  
NAGATA  
HIRAO  
OGAWA  
ARITA

Councillors

KANEKO  
KURODA  
SAKURAI  
KAWAI  
SUZUKI, Kantaro  
ARIMA

HARA  
KUBOTA  
MOTODA  
SUZUKI, Soroku  
ISHIZUKA  
SAKAMOTO

ISHIWATARI  
SHINUZU  
FUJISAWA  
HAYASHI  
KAMIYAMA

Explainers

SUITA  
HORINOUCHI

KURIYAMA  
TOGO

Reporter - ARAI

Clerks or Secretaries

MURAKAMI  
HORIE  
MUTO

Decision

The Privy Council unanimously approved the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1936.

Remarks

See Exhibit 484 for the report of the Investigation Committee concerning this Pact.

Councillor ARIMA feared that the Soviet Union would bring about "the worst results to counteract the Japan-Germany Pact if the substance of it became known to Russia." (5968) To this Foreign Minister ARITA said that the government's policy was to strenuously avoid any outbreak of an affair with Soviet Russia after the conclusion of the Pact, (5968) but that, if there should arise any danger of an outbreak of war between Japan and Soviet Russia, there was still room to push the discussion beyond the provisions of the Pact. (5969) He pointed out that Soviet Russia "had to consider the fact that she has to face both Japan and Germany, and for that reason I believe that even if Japan's military preparations should not be adequate, Russia will not initiate any affair." (5969)

ARITA replied to Councillor HARA's question, regarding the plan not to announce the Pact until the signing of the Russo-Japanese Fishery Treaty was complete, by saying that there were many rumors about a coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy and because of these rumours the Soviet Ambassador called at the Foreign Ministry and inquired whether or not they were true. (5970) ARITA said that he did not deny the rumors entirely and explained Japan's policy of defense against communism, in furtherance of which policy negotiations were going on, and that, since the cooperation was to be confined to the checking of Bolshevistic operations, it would be no obstacle to the friendly relations of Japan and Russia. (5970) ARITA also said that he was of the opinion that the Soviet Government had conjectured the existence of some form of secret agreement other than that against communism, (5970) pointing out that Russia postponed the signing of the Fishery Treaty; but, concluded ARITA, when the Pact is announced and it becomes clear to Russia that the Pact is intended to be against the Comintern, Russia would sign the Fishery Treaty, particularly as the Pact was not entirely unexpected by her (5971).

Chairman HIRANUMA, the Accused, announced that the draft was unanimously approved. (5972)

Exhibit 36 is a basic document, being the Pact against the Communist International and Accessory Protocol, parts of which appear on pages 5934-5938.

See Exhibit 484 herein for a more complete discussion of the matter.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
909-A	20 January	9,158-B	42

Present

Chairman HIRANUMA  
Vice Chairman ARAI

Ministers

HIROTA	NAGATA
HAYASHI	ARITA
TANOMOGI	TERAUCHI
OGAWA	SHIMADA
NAGANO	HIRAO
BABA	

Councillors

KANEKO	KURODA	SAKURAI
KAWAI	SUZUKI, Kantaro	ISHII
ARIYA	HARA	KUBOTA
MOTODA	SUZUKI, Soroku	ISHIZUKA
ISHIWATA	SHIMIZU	FUJISAWA
HAYASHI	MINAMI	TANAKA

Decision

Decided that naval officers could be appointed as Administrators of the South Sea Islands.

Remarks

The Exhibit was offered to show that the decision was made in furtherance of Japan's plan for fortifying the Mandated Islands.

Reporter MURAKAMI said that "Upon investigating this bill prudently, we find that the South Seas Government, in conformity with a fixed plan covering several years, is executing various measures concerning the expansion of colonization, promotion of industries and good organization of communications for the purpose of developing the South Sea Archipelagoes that are under its jurisdiction. In view of the fact that the South Sea Archipelagoes have come to hold an important position at this time in the national defense of the Empire in the light of the recent international situation, and because there are many installations concerned with the navigation routes, harbours, roads, aviation and communications of the said archipelagoes, which will require a special consideration of the archipelagoes, convenience and military circumstances of

our Navy, it is necessary to provide a way to enable the special appointment of naval officers as the administrative officials who are to be in charge of the transportation and communication affairs in the said government." (9158-B, 9158-C)

. . . . .

"And in appointing the naval officers in active service as administrative officers in the South Seas Government in accordance with this provision, a special rule will be established through the Imperial Ordinance concerning this bill in order to prevent them from being subjected to the restriction of rank of senior civil officials and be lowered in their official ranks. The rule will provide that in case of appointing a higher official on duty for the administrative office of the South Seas Government in accordance with the aforementioned rule of appointment, his rank will be made an exception in accordance with the Senior Civil Service Official Transfer Rule." (9158-C, 9158-D)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
384	19 July	4,735	49

Present

Attendance not stated in Exhibit

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 384 is a communication from the Undersecretary of Treasury, Washington, D.C., May 31, 1946 to the Secretary of War regarding the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration, being particularly a report from a Treasury Attache at Shanghai dated October 27, 1937 entitled "Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration, its organization, activities and opium conditions in Manchukuo in 1937." (4731)

The report makes reference to a meeting of the Privy Council of Manchukuo on July 19, 1937 at which meeting new laws were approved by the Privy Council in Manchukuo according to which the manufacture, sale, importation and exportation of various narcotics were strictly forbidden without permission from the government of Manchukuo. These laws were passed as the result of "'noise" started by the League of Nations when it openly placed the responsibility for the manufacture of 'illegal' narcotics in the Far East on the Japanese-Manchukuo Governments." (4734-4735) They were issued mainly to assist the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration in controlling the use of narcotics, and not as a drive against the opium and narcotic habits as was claimed by Manchukuoan Premier CHANG CHING-HUI in his official declaration published in Hsingkiang on August 11, 1937. (4736) The new laws brought no new restrictions but did give more power to the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration. (4738)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
492	6 November	6,034	56

Present

President HIRANUMA  
Vice President ARAI

State Ministers

KONOE  
HIROTA  
BABA  
YONAI  
SHIONO  
SUGIYAMA

NAGAI  
KAYA  
ARIMA  
YOSHINO  
NAKAJIMA  
OTANI

Councillors

SAKURAI  
KAWAI  
SUZUKI, Kantaro  
ARIMA  
HARA

KUBOTA  
MOTODA  
SUZUKI, Soroku  
ISHIZUKA  
SHIMIZU

FUJISAWA  
HAYASHI  
MINAMI  
TANAKA  
NARA  
ARAKI

Committee

FUNADA  
MORIYAMA  
HORIUCHI  
MITANI

INOUE  
OKUBO  
YAMAJI  
ABE  
MATSUZAKA

Reporter - ARAI

Secretaries

MURAKAMI  
HORIE  
MUTO



Decision

Decided to allow Italy to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Remarks

This treaty was foreshadowed by Article 2 of the Japan-German Anti-Comintern Pact. As a matter of form a new treaty was agreed to between Japan, Germany and Italy separately from the original Pact between Japan and Germany, so that, if Italy receded from the new Treaty, the former one would still be in effect. (6035) The Provisions of both Pacts are virtually the same. (6036) Italy did not agree to the secret Pact annexed to the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded between Japan and Germany. (6038; 6039)

See Exhibit 485 herein for the records of the Minutes of the Privy Council on 25 November 1936, at which the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany was approved.

Exhibit 36 is the Protocol admitting Italy to the Anti-Comintern Pact dated 6 November 1937. (6036)

See Exhibit 491 (1939) herein for the record of the Minutes of the Privy Council on the bill admitting Hungary and Manchuria to the Anti-Comintern Pact. (6037) This Exhibit also shows a qualitative strengthening of the Pact.

Exhibit 493 is the protocols admitting to the Pact Manchukuo on 24 February 1939, and Spain on the 27th March, 1939. (6045)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
486-D	11 January	5,995	60

Present

Attendance not stated in Exhibit.

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 486-D is a telegram from Dirksen to the German Reich Minister dated 11 January 1938 stating that he had a "reliable report, that today's Privy Council (Defense contended that it should be 'Imperial Council'; matter referred to Language Section) is said to have decided upon the following action in case the Japanese conditions are refused: Declaration of war, denial of the NANKING Government and substitution of the provisional government of Peking, the continuance of military operations. To support this operation, new supply-shipments are now going to the front." (5995)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
271	2 November	3,641	80

Present

President HIRANUMA  
Vice President HARA

State Ministers

NOINOYE  
YONAI  
SHIONO  
ARAKI  
NAGAI  
ARIMA

NAKAJIMA  
KIDO  
SUETSUGU  
ITAGAKI  
HATTA  
ARITA

Councillors

KANEKO  
SAKURAI  
KAWAI  
ISHII  
ARIMA  
KUBOTA

SUZUKI  
ISHIZUKA  
SHIMIZU  
FUJISAWA  
HAYASHI  
MINAMI

TANAKA  
NARA  
ARAKI  
MATSUE  
SUGAWARA  
MATSUURA

Committee

FUNADA  
MORIYAMA  
MITANI

HIROSE  
HAYASHI  
NARITA

Reporter - HARA

Secretaries

MURAKAMI  
HORIE  
TAKATSUJI

Decision

The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council and the Privy Council unanimously passed the resolution to terminate the cooperative relations between the Japanese Empire and the various organs of the League of Nations.

Remarks

HIRANUMA, the accused, opened the meeting.

The reporter was HARA whose report was as follows:

The Japanese Empire notified the League of Nations of its withdrawal therefrom in March, 1933. However, the Japanese Government continued to cooperate in the various peaceful and humane undertakings of the League in compliance with the aims of the Imperial Rescript which was promulgated at the time of the withdrawal of the notice. (3644) The Government of Japan or individuals in a private capacity, continued to participate in the League's Permanent Mandate Commission, Advisory Commission on Traffic and Opium, Central Opium Commission, Advisory Commission on Social Problems, Joint Commission on Arts and Science, Economic Commission, Health Commission, and Oriental Epidemic Information Bureau. They were also affiliated with the International Labor Office and participated in the organization of the International Court of Justice, as well as in the General Disarmament Conference and the World Economic Conferences which were sponsored by the League of Nations. (3645)

However, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident, China presented a formal appeal to the League of Nations on 12 September 1937. The Assembly and the Council of the League resolved that the actions of the Japanese Empire against China were direct violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Anti-war Pact. (3645) The League promised moral support to China and encouraged every nation in the League to give individual assistance to China. It adopted various resolutions intended to censure the Japanese Empire because Japanese forces bombed defenseless cities and utilized poisoned gas. (3646) The effect of the resolutions was insignificant because of the indifferent attitude of the various countries and the impotency of the League itself. (3646)

The Council of the League, in compliance with China's request, made the "stipulations of the 17th Article of the Covenant applicable to the Sino-Japanese Incident; specifically, for the settlement of disputes, nations which are non-members of the League will bear the same responsibility as nations which are Members of the League." (3646)

On 30 September 1938 the Japanese Government refused the invitation of the Council which, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 17 of the Covenant, adopted a resolution whereby each member of the League could resort to sanctions against Japan individually, as provided in the 16th Article of the League Covenant. (3647) Consequently, as long as the decision of the Council stands, from the standpoint of national honor, the further cooperation of the Japanese Empire with the various organs of the League of Nations could not be tolerated. (3647)

Japan will continue the mandatory rule of the South Sea Islands in accordance with the 22nd Article of the League Covenant and the mandatory rule article. Therefore, in accordance with paragraph 7, Article 22 of the League Covenant, the annual report to the League Council had been made as usual. Hereafter, however, government representatives will not attend the sessions of the Permanent Mandates Commission, an organ of the League. (3648)

There was no discussion on the bill which was passed unanimsly.

Article 17 of the League Covenant provides that, in the event of a dispute between a member of the League (China, in this case) and a state which is not a member of the League (Japan), the state not a member of the League shall be invited to accept the obligation of membership for the purpose of any dispute. It further provides that, if a state so invited shall refuse the invitation and shall resort to war against the member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable.

Article 16 provides for the adoption of sanctions against a nation which resorts to war.

Article 22 of the League Covenant refers to the Mandated Islands and provides that, in every case of mandate, the mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge, it also provides that a permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and review these reports.

Exhibit 2264 is an extract from Kido's Diary of 2 November 1938 stating that he attended a meeting of the Privy Council where it was decided to cease cooperating with the various bodies of the League of Nations. (16231)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
589	22 November	6,573	83

Present

Emperor HIROHITO  
President HIRANUMA  
Vice-President HARA

State Ministers:

KONOE  
SHIGEO  
ARAKI  
NAGAI  
ARIMA

YAMAGUCHI  
KIMOTO  
GUTSUGU  
IBAGAKI  
HATA

Councillors

SAKURAI  
KAWAI  
SUZUKI, Kantaro  
ISHIJI  
ARIMA  
KUBOTA

SUZUKI, Soroku  
ISHIJIMA  
FUJISAWA  
HAYASHI  
MIRAMI  
TANAKA

YAMAGUCHI  
KIMOTO  
GUTSUGU  
IBAGAKI  
HATA

Explainers

FUNADA  
MORIYAMA  
MITSUHASHI

MACHIDA  
YAMAGUCHI

Reporting Member - HARA

Clerks or Secretaries

MURAKAMI  
HOKI  
TAKATSUJI

Decision

The Privy Council passed a resolution that an agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany be concluded.

Remarks

It was pointed out that the German Government proposed the cultural agreement so as to "legalize the enlightenment

of cultural relationship between the two nations, thus leading to furthering the promotion of the cause and provoking to strengthen (sic) all the more our tie of friendship." (6574)

ISHIZUKA wanted to know what was embraced in the term "the racial and national life of Germany." He said that, according to German nationalism or Naziism, the "German race is attempting to unify and assimilate even those people who inhabit other nations while banning another race even though living in her own country." (6575) He also said that, although nothing directly was stated in regard to politics, the agreement might bring about some kind of influence politically. (6576)

Foreign Minister ARITA replied that "the racial and nationalistic life of Germany is none other than the singular spirit of Germany. The reason for the adoption of the term was because of the firm insistence on the part of Germany at the outset of negotiations, explaining that their characteristic spirit being phenominized (sic) in the racial and national life of Germany, it should be made the essence of her culture." (6576) He further replied that the agreement recognized that cultural relations of Japan and Germany formed the basis of the characteristic spirits of each respective nation; therefore, it was unlikely that there would be any political influence. (6576)

ISHIZUKA said that it was conceivable that during the long life of the agreement there is a possibility that politics will be influenced, and he pointed out that there was a tendency in Japan at that time "to go with the German stream"; therefore, there should be some means to guard against all possible mistake on the part of Japan before the agreement was concluded. (6577)

Exhibit 38 is the agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Italy concluded on 23 March 1939 and its provisions are virtually the same as those of the cultural agreement between Japan and Germany. (6578)

Exhibit 37 is the treaty concluded on 25 November 1938 between Japan and Germany pertaining to cultural cooperation. (6579)

Exhibit 390 is the Program for the Opening Session of the German-Japanese Cultural Committee. (6579)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
269	29 November	3,585	84

Present

No names mentioned in the Exhibit.

Decision

See remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 269 is the report of the Foreign Minister ARITA to the Privy Council at its meeting on 29 November 1938 dealing with Japan's foreign policy towards China.

ARITA reported that, as to the policy regarding the adjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations, the government intended to proceed on the basis of the following three points, with a view to establishing a new order in East Asia through mutual collaboration in political, economic and cultural fields among Japan, Manchukuo and China:

I - The problem of making peace with the CHIANG KAI-SHEK regime.

The British Ambassador to Japan unofficially proposed to Premier KONOYE the mediation of the China problem. It is Japan's policy not to mediate at this time, whether the proposal is made through the mediation of a third party or directly from the CHIANG KAI-SHEK government. However, Japan, as previously stated on November 3, 1938, will give a different consideration to the matter "if the CHIANG KAI-SHEK government should abandon its pro-Comintern and anti-Japanese policy, reform the composition of its organization, and voluntarily dissolve its regime and merge with the New Central Government a different consideration would be given to the matter." (3591)

II - The adjustment of diplomatic relations with the New Central Government.

Japan will foster "the establishment of a solid new central republic on the basis of a pro-Japanese regime which has been already established and others which are scheduled to be newly established in Hankow and Canton, and, after the



New Central Government has been firmly established, we hope to achieve the following programs with the New Central Government": (3592)

A. The realization of the principle of general collaboration among Japan, Manchukuo and China, and particularly the principles of neighborly friendship, joint defense against the Comintern, and economic cooperation. (3592) Neighborly friendship involves the following points:

(1) The recognition of Manchukuo by China and the establishment of new diplomatic relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China. Both Japan and Manchukuo shall respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China. (3593)

(2) In the fields of politics, diplomacy, education, propaganda and trade, Japan, Manchukuo and China shall remove and prohibit, in the future, measures and causes which mutually destroy the friendly relations among them. (3593) The three countries shall cooperate with each other to create and develop their culture. (3593)

B. The establishment in North China and Mengchiang (that is, Mongolia and Singkiang) of a zone of a high degree Sino-Japanese unity in defense and economic spheres, especially in the development and utilization of natural resources. In addition, there will be established in Mengchiang a special military and political zone for anti-Comintern purposes. (3592)

Regarding the principle of joint defense the following program will be adopted:

(1) Cooperation against the Comintern. (3594)

(2) The Japanese Army will be stationed in North China and Mengchiang for the purpose of enforcing the joint defense against the Comintern. (3594)

(3) The conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance against the Comintern. (3594)

(4) The early withdrawal of Japanese troops, except the stationing of troops in special zones, points and islands for the purpose of guaranty and the maintenance of public peace and order. (3594)

(5) Financial cooperation on the part of China with respect to the stationing of Japanese troops. (3594)

(6) The reservation of military demands and the right of supervision of railways, aviation, communication, principal harbors, waterways, etc., and cooperation in the improvement and adjustment of the Chinese Army and police force. (3595)

(7) Regarding the principle of economic cooperation, the three countries shall, in order to make up each other's deficiencies and so as to supply each other's needs in respect to industry and economics, conclude agreements concerning the development of resources, customs, trade, aviation, transportation, communication, meteorological observations and surveys in the three countries. In the development and utilization of natural resources, emphasis shall be laid on the securing from North China and Mengchiang of those resources, especially underground resources, which Japan and Manchukuo lack. (3595) Japan shall render such financial aids to China as may be required to establish her financial and economic policies and, in order to promote fair trade among the three countries, appropriate customs and maritime customs system shall be adopted. (3596)

### III - Interests and Rights of other Powers in China.

Due to military necessities, some restrictions have been imposed respecting the rights and interests of other powers in China. Regarding Great Britain's and the United States' recent representations, based on the principle of open door and equal opportunity, it is the intention of the government to re-examine this "principle from the standpoint of the establishment of a Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc based upon the necessities for the existence and defense of our Empire, and of not recognizing such a principle within the extent that it is incompatible with this standpoint." (3579) In this respect, concretely, our chief objects are that a), Japan shall control, in substance, the development of natural resources in North China and Mengchiang, b) the currency system, customs and maritime customs system in new China shall be adjusted from the standpoint of the Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc. (3597) "So long as the powers' rights and interests in China do not conflict with the foregoing two objects, we will not exclude and restrict them." (3597) We will welcome the participation in the economic development of new China of countries which, like Germany and Italy show a friendly attitude towards Japan. (3597)

Regarding the "diplomatic policy towards the third powers, in view of the attitude of Britain, the United States and France of interfering with Japan's policy towards China by bringing out the Nine Power Treaty, we shall endeavor to reject the idea of disposing of the Chinese problem by the Nine-Power Treaty and other collective machinery." (3598)

"At the same time, with the object of forcing the powers individually to understand the facts of our policy toward China and either voluntarily support our country's attitude or at least stand by idly through the reinforcements of the anti-Comintern axis of Japan, Germany and Italy, and disposing of the China Affair as quickly and clearly as possible, we wish to adopt measures according to the following outline": (3598)

(1) To strengthen the political relations among Japan, Germany and Italy, and the economic cooperation among Japan, and Manchukuo on the one side and Germany and Italy on the other. (3598)

(2) "To strive, through the powerful and clear disposition of the China Affair, to make Britain, the United States and France understand de facto our policy toward China and individually abandon their past policy of aiding the Chiang Kai-shek regime and their idea of disposing of the East Asiatic question by means of collective machinery. As the instrument of these moves against the above three countries, particularly Britain, utilization should be made of the guarantee of their rights and interests in China, besides the adoption of great diplomatic measures, such \*especially\* against Britain, besides big diplomatic\*as the reinforcement of the anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy. However, in order to avoid unnecessary frictions, those individual pending cases which are harmless to the superior position occupied by Japan in East Asia shall be settled one after another." (3599,

(3) To carry out every possible measure for making the Soviet Union refrain from actively participating in the present Affair. (3599)

\*\* words between asterisks not in original.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1939)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
491	22 February	4,037	91

Present

The Emperor HIROMITO  
President KOMEI  
Vice-President HARA

State Ministers

HIRANUMA	ITAGAKI
SHONO	ARITA

Councillors

KIKUCHI	SUZUKI, Soroku	TAJIKI
SUZUKI, Kantaro	SHIMIZU	MIYASUE
ISHI	FUJISAWA	SUGIYAMA
YAMAMOTO	MINAMI	MIYASUURA
KUSUDA	TANAKA	USHIO
ISHIZUKA	HARA	MIYASHI, Re: Saburo
FUJIE		

Opposition

KURODAKI	KURIHARA
HOYAYAMA	MIYANI
HARA	

Secretaries or Clerk

MURAKAMI	HORIE	TAKATSUJI
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Decision

The Privy Council unanimously agreed to the participation of Hungary and Manchuria in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Remarks

The Exhibit was offered for the purpose of showing a quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. (6030)

HIRANUMA was present as Premier and ITAGAKI as War Minister.

ISHIZUKA asked if there was any intention to strengthen qualitatively the substance of the Pact, beside increasing the number of participating countries; and whether, because of the changed international situation, Japan urged Italy to

take part in the secret pact, pointing out that a secret pact with Hungary and Manchukuo was unnecessary because their borders were contiguous to the Soviet Union. (6038)

ARITA replied that the Pact was to be strengthened quantitatively by the addition of Manchukuo and Hungary and possibly by some other third power in Europe; it will be strengthened in substance by not only exchanging information but also by cooperating in economic and financial relations, a study of which is being made; negotiations to this end are to commence shortly with the countries concerned (6038, 6039)

He also replied that, at the present time, the Government is only considering strengthening the substance of the Pact as above mentioned. Neither Italy, Manchukuo or Hungary are to participate in the secret pact. (6039)

ISHIZUKA inquired whether Italy, when she joined the Pact between Japan and Germany did not join it because she did not know of its existence, or because she did not want to take part in it, although she knew of its existence. He pointed out that according to the bill, Manchukuo and Hungary are to conclude separately a pact with Japan, Italy and Germany each (6041). There can be no close relations between Manchukuo and Hungary, he continued, because there is no direct agreement between them. He noted that, "according to the explanation of the Foreign Ministry, Manchukuo and Hungary will take part in the already existing Comintern Pact through separate arrangements, as a matter of form, but in consequence of it these five countries will form a single body in respect to that Pact." (6041). He wanted to know how that could be so? Or, if it was intended to have a separate agreement made between Manchukuo and Hungary. (6041)

ARITA replied by saying that, since he was not a State Minister at the time, he did not know the details regarding the signing of the Pact, but he heard that Italy did not join the secret Pact because she did not know of its existence. (6042) Regarding the substance of the Pact, he said its strengthening will be planned among Japan, Italy and Germany (6042) Manchukuo, Hungary and any other countries, which may join the Pact in the future, will not be considered when the matter of the strengthening of the Pact is under consideration. (6042) He also said that he believed close relations could be maintained between Manchukuo and Hungary, even though they have concluded no direct agreement with each other. As a result of the participation of the two countries in the Japan-German Pact and the protocol attached thereto and also the anti-Comintern Pact consisting of the protocol among Japan, Germany and Italy, to which Italy joined as an original signatory power, the five countries have been bound together by the Anti-Comintern Pact. (6043)

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Exhibit 494 is the Protocol admitting to the Anti-Comintern Pact Manchukuo on 24 February 1939 and Spain on 27 March 1939. The material provisions of these Pacts are virtually the same as those of the original Anti-Comintern Pact. (6045)

Exhibit 496 is an official announcement of the Board of Information concerning new participants in the Anti-Comintern Pact: (6046) "In accordance with the procedure for adherence, newly provided in article 2 of the Protocol concerning the extension of validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiaries of the six countries, namely, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary and Spain, on the 25th of November, 1941; seven countries, namely, China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia and Denmark, have joined the Pact under today date (November 25, 1941)." (6048)

On 25 November 1941 the date of the renewal of the anti-Comintern Pact the accused herein after mentioned held certain offices as follows:

YOSHINO, Naoki, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and Councillor of the Planning Board.

KAYA, Okinori, Finance Minister.

KIMURA, Heitaro, Vice-President of War and Councillor of the Planning Board.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi, Ambassador to Germany.

SHIRATORI, Tachio, Adviser to the Foreign Minister.

SHIMADA, Shigetaro, Minister of the Navy.

SUZUKI, Teiichi, State Minister and Chief Director of the Cabinet Planning Board.

TOGO, Shigenori, dual posts of Foreign Minister and Minister of Overseas Affairs.

TOJO, Hideki, concurrently the posts of Prime Minister, War Minister and Home Minister.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
551	16 Sept	6,345	147

Present

Exhibit shows that only the War and Navy Minister were present.

At this time TOJO was War Minister and OIKAWA Navy Minister

Decision

No decision on the above date.

Remarks

Exhibit 551 is a recital of the salient points of questions at a Privy Council meeting on 16 September 1940. Two questions were asked: (1) Is there danger of economic pressure by the United States on Japan as a result of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and (2) what preparations will be made if war breaks out between the United States and Japan? (6345)

It was replied that Japan should be ready for that occasion and should take the precautions of strengthening her international position by the conclusion of the Pact; she should also take diplomatic, economic and military measures for the purpose of procuring natural resources from the South Seas and other places which had been procured from the United States. (6345-6)

Questions asked of the Government by the Supreme Command of the Navy at an Imperial Conference regarding the Pact were also discussed. Four questions were asked:

(1) To what degree will the Pact contribute to the adjustment of Japan-Soviet relations? (6346)

(2) Since, by concluding the Pact, Japan's trade relations with the United States will deteriorate, and because a Japanese-American war will probably be a prolonged one, and for the reason that Japan's resources have been used up in the war with China, what are the precautions taken by Japan in order to maintain her resources? (6346)

(3) What principle does the Government have regarding co-operation with the Navy, in view of the fact that, by the conclusion of the present alliance, it is imperative that the preparation of the Navy for "a Japanese-American war be accelerated and strengthened?" (6347)



(4) In the event Japan is compelled to engage in the European War, because of the participation in this war by the United States, what measures have the Government regarding Japan's choosing the time of outbreak of hostilities, independently. (6347)

The War Ministry said in answer to the questions, that the United States is encouraging the Chungking Government and that the Pact would prove to be a restraint upon the United States. On the other hand, through the good offices of Germany she can bring about rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Japan as a result of which Japan can quickly end the Sino-Japanese conflict. (6347-8)

The Navy Minister replied that should the Pact be concluded Germany would use its good offices in ironing out Soviet-Japanese relations in view of the then amicable relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. (6348)

As to the time to start the war, should Japan be compelled to enter it, the Government will consult the Army and Navy authorities and will confer with the German and Italian Governments. However, Japan will act independently as a matter of fact in determining the choice of time to start the war. (6348)

(4) In the event Japan is compelled to engage in the European War, because of the participation in this war by the United States, what measures have the Government regarding Japan's choosing the time of outbreak of hostilities, independently. (6347)

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PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
552	26 September	6,350; 7,926	152

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI

State Ministers

KONOE	KAYADA
TOJO	OKAWA
MATSUOKA	

Explainers

HOSHINO	MURASE
MATSUMOTO	MUTO
TSUJI	AIDA
KARAGUCHI	MORIYAMA
	ABE

Secretaries

HORIYE	TAKETSUJI
HOROHASHI	

Privy Councillors

KAWAI	HARA	FUKAI
ISHII	ARAKI	FUTABAMI
ARIMA	MATSUI	MANO
KUBOTA	SUGAWARA	OSHIDA
ISHIZUKA	MATSUURA	OBATA
SHIMIZU	USHIO	TAKEFOSHI
MINAMI	HIYASHI	MITSUCHI

Decision

The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council unani-  
mously approved the Tripartite Pact.

Remarks

MATSUOKA stated that Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP had  
told him that all affairs pertaining to Italian-Japanese rela-  
tions had so far been entrusted to Germany. (6353)

KAWAI asked about Japan's preparations to meet the situa-  
tion "when the worse turns up." TOJO replied that as far as

the Army was concerned, only a part of its strength would be employed in a war against the United States. (6353) He also said that the present treaty acted as a check on Russia but so long as Russo-Japanese relations had not been satisfactorily adjusted, Japan could not afford to delay preparations. (6354) He further said that Japan had enough reserve to last for "quite a while," (6354) but that he had no confidence in that respect if the war should continue "three to four years further" (6365)

Navy Minister OIKAWA said that preparations of Japan's ships for battle had already been completed and that she had enough war materials, crude oil, in particular, to last "for quite a while," (6354) (on the basis of full scale fleet-to-fleet clashes Japan's "stock will be exhausted in the course of half a year or one year" - 6365). However, he continued, if war became prolonged Japan faced a major difficulty regarding replenishment and to meet such a possibility, facilities for the production of synthetic oil had to be expanded. (6354)

HOSHINO said that Japan was not as yet complete in the matter of self-supply and self-sufficiency of resources. According to Japan's resources mobilization plan for this year (1940), out of a total amount of ¥45,000,000,000 worth of material necessary, she had to depend on ¥2,000,000,000 worth from abroad, of which ¥1,900,000,000 worth had to come from the United States and Great Britain. He thought that if the war became prolonged supplies could be obtained from the Dutch Indies and Saghalin. (6354)

ISHII asked about the meaning of the term "the New Order in Europe" used in article I of the Treaty. MATSUOKA said that the New Order as he interpreted it, meant "a materialization representing the preface of the treaty which embraces the spirit of Hakko-iai (all the world under one roof) recommended by the Imperial Empire." (6355)

Regarding the scarcity of oil, Navy Minister OIKAWA said that Japan could not expect much from the production of synthetic oil and thought that oil could be imported from the Dutch East Indies and northern Saghalin through peaceful means. (6356)

MATSUOKA said that Japan would make some compensation to Germany - a nominal sum - for her former German colonies. (6359)

MINAMI (not the Accused) wanted to know, inter alia, the real meaning of the term "greater East Asia," who proposed the present treaty, and whether or not the Government of Japan made any effort to reach an agreement with the Soviet. (6359)

MATSUOKA replied:

(1) The term "Greater East Asia" refers to the area which includes French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Straits, Settlements and the Asiatic group comprising the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Caledonia, etc. (6360)

(2) The Treaty under review was proposed by Germany. (6361)

(3) Japan should "at this moment" ally herself with Germany and Italy, adjust her international relations with the Soviet Union and avoid an outbreak of hostilities between Japan and America. (6361) MATSUOKA referred to the 20,000,000 Americans of German descent "already in influential positions in the United States" and who could be manipulated in the interests of Japan. (6361) MATSUOKA further replied that if Japan did not bind herself in an alliance with Germany, Britain and Germany might conclude one, thereby creating a new situation in Europe whereby they might attempt to rule over the South Seas area and other regions for their own purposes. (6362)

(4) As to why the Government did not reach an agreement with the Soviet Union as well as with Germany, MATSUOKA said that the Soviet-Japanese Pact had already been planned by the preceding Cabinet but the Soviets made excessive demands. (6363)

"The Pact under review," said Matsuoka, "forms the basis of the future foreign relations of our Empire." (6363)

MINAMI inquired about finances "when hostilities between Japan and the United States break out before the China Incident is ended." (6366) Finance Minister KAWADA replied that Japan would have to look to bonds and taxes as the source of revenue and if the situation grew worse, she would have to raise funds to cover war expenditures by exercising the utmost economy in general expenditures. (6366)

SUGIWARA inquired about the relations between the treaty under review and the Anti-Comintern Pact. MATSUOKA replied that "the Anti-Comintern Pact shall be retained, (6368) and that the adjustment of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union would be considered separately. (6368)

MUKAI asked four questions to which MATSUOKA, TOJO and KONOUE replied:

(1) Germany's assistance will consist of the supply of superior arms and materials. (6371)

(2) No answer had been received from Germany regarding a protest which was supposed to have been made in connection with the Soviet-Germany Non-Aggression Treaty on the ground that it

infringed on the secret Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. (6371) "It is an open question whether the protest was made to Germany officially." (6371)

(3) They agreed with Hitler's statement that "against other races the survival of the fittest is the grand highroad of heaven and earth" (6371), saying that the words of the preface of the Pact that "this enables each nation of the world to have a proper place in the world" did not contradict Hitler's statement because "any race that dies out under the rule of survival of the fittest is not worth existing on this earth." (6372)

(4) The war to avoid a crisis with the United States was by taking a firm stand instead of by courting America. (6372)

FUTAGAMI asked four questions to which Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied.

(1) (Not material).

(2) (Not material).

(3) The term "mixed expert commission" as used in the Pact means the economic expert commission and the military commission. (6373)

(4) FUTAGAMI inquired if Article 5 of the Pact means that Germany will not attack the Soviet Union even when the latter assaults Japan; whether Japan is bound to fight the Soviet Union, if a Soviet-German hostility breaks out; if such be the case would not the arrangement be unilateral, and whether the word "existing" means the date of signing. (6373) MATSUOKA replied that although there exists a non-aggression Treaty, Japan will aid Germany in the event of a Soviet-German War and Germany will assist Japan in the event of a Russo-Japanese war. (7927) Regarding the word "existing" as used in Article 5 MATSUOKA said that the present status of the Soviet Union will not be modified by the Treaty but that Japan's relations with the Soviet Union should be readjusted at a future time. (7928)

OSHIMA (not the Accused) said that in three or four years Germany might enter into hostilities with Russia and he wanted to know whether Japan and Germany were combining to cope with Russia. (6374)

MATSUOKA replied "We do not anticipate a war with Russia. Even though the Russo-Japanese relations may be adjusted, it will hardly last for three years. After two years, it will be necessary to reconsider the relations among Japan, Germany and Russia." (7928)

SUZUKI (not the accused) said that irrespective of whether the Pact would be concluded or not, the Japanese people must realize the inevitability of a Japanese-American war. He noted that the United States was engaged in a naval expansion program and wanted to know the opinion of the Navy Minister on these points. (6376)

Navy Minister OIKAWA said that Japan would win a short and decisive war. However, he said that he wished to improve the quality of the Navy and expand her armaments as much as possible. (6376)

MITSUCHI wanted to know what measure the Government would take in order to cope with American economic pressure and the internal economic difficulties bound to follow the signing of the Pact. HOSHINO and KONOYE said that there would be Anglo-American pressure as a result of which those engaged in importing and exporting would suffer. They said that they were taking up this matter with a view to obtaining some adequate measures to deal with it. (6378)

The deliberations ended. The Investigation Committee unanimously approved the Pact. (6378)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Cair's Summary</u>
553	21 Sept	6,379	153
1050		9,756	

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI

Ministers

Prime Minister KOJIMA	Gen Minister & Minister for Colonization MATSUOKA
War Minister TOJO	Minister of Justice TAJIMA
Minister of Education HASEGAWA	Minister of Communication & Railway MIYATA
Finance Minister KAWADA	Minister of Agriculture & Forestry ISHICURO
Navy Minister OKUMA	

Councillors

KAWAI	NARA	FUKUI
ISHII	ARAKI	YATABE
MIYAMA	MATSUI	MIYANO
KANEOKA	SUGAHARA	OSHIMIZU
ISHIZUKA	MATSUURA	OHKAWA
SHIMIZU	USHIO	TAKEKOSHI
MURAKAMI	HAYASHI	MIYAZAKI

Committee Men

President of Planning Board HOSHINO  
President of the Bureau of Legislation MURASE  
Councillor of the Board of Legislation MORIYAMA  
Chief of the Board of Treaty, Foreign Office MATSUMOTO  
Chief of the Administrative Board, Ministry of Commerce  
& Industry TSUJI  
Chief of Financial Bureau, Finance Ministry, AIDA  
Chief of Banking Bureau, Finance Ministry MATSUKURA  
Chief of Exchange Bureau, Finance Ministry HARAUCHI

Reporting Committee

SUZUKI, Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry  
HORIYE, Executive Secretary  
Secretaries - MOROHASHI  
TAKATSUJI



### Decision

The Privy Council unanimously passed a draft concerning the conclusion of a Three-Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, ("Tripartite Pact")

### Remarks

SUZUKI (not the Accused) Chairman of the Investigation Committee reported as follows:

That the recent attitude of the United States towards Japan had gradually stiffened, and the attitude of the Chiang Government and other countries antagonistic to Japan have been influenced by this attitude; that, as the international position of Japan has become more and more difficult, the only way to strengthen our international position is by cooperating with countries having the same interests as Japan; that Germany, Italy and Japan are eager to prevent the United States' entry into the war, so our interests coincide; that the German proposal gives an opportunity to strengthen our cooperation with Germany and Italy without entering the present European war; that for these reasons the treaty now being deliberated was agreed to. (6380-6381)

(The Reporter then proceeded to outline the Alliance. Exhibit 43, Record 6391 is the Tripartite Alliance. Article 3 thereof provides, inter alia, that "if and when anyone of the signatories be attacked by any Third Power not presently engaged in the present European War, or the China Incident, the other two shall aid her in any way, politically, economically or militarily.") (6392)

The Reporter continued: "We think that the proposed Japan-Germany-Italy Three Power Treaty is based on the common interests of the three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy, and will strengthen all the more the cooperation of the three countries in working together and pushing forward in constructing a new order respectively in Greater East Asia and Europe. Furthermore it is proposed that the three countries promise to aid each other in every way against the attack of another country not at present in the war. This is indeed of unprecedented gravity for our country and there is need for deep and mature deliberation on the influence it will have on our national destiny. Nevertheless, in view of the present situation, we are forced to recognize that it (the treaty) was truly unavoidable. But there is need to take steps to prevent as far as possible, the inciting of Great Britain and America as a result of the conclusion of this treaty. At the same time, we must also make ample preparations in case by any chance worst should come to worst. The Government has said it will make ample efforts concerning these several points. Also, as to our country's relations with the Soviet Union, we need to make special efforts for smooth relations, and on this point also the government had declared it will exert itself for the accomplishment of its object through Germany. Hereupon, I and my colleagues place our trust in

the government's declarations and furthermore earnestly desire the government to do its utmost. Thus I and my colleagues unanimously voted that this draft should be passed at its stands, together with the above mentioned requests." (6384-6385)

ISHII then said that "It is a conspicuous fact that there is not a single country that has gained any benefit from aligning itself with Germany and her predecessor, Russia. Not only so, but there are countries which, because of this alliance, have suffered unforeseen disaster and have finally lost their national entity." (6386) He also said that "I believe that Chancellor Hitler of Nazi Germany is a character of no little danger. He is said to have taken Machiavelli as a model and always has his book Il Principe as his right hand. Verily, he has declared that international alliances are a temporary expedient and has publicly stated that one should not hesitate in breaking them as soon as the time comes. For instance the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact last August, which clearly conflicts with the anti-Comintern pact that country had previously concluded with us, should from the first have occasioned no surprise. From early years he (HITLER) had studied about the Orient, and held from the first that Japan should not be allowed to become a strong power, and it is said he often spoke of this to those close to him. From whatever angle we view it, we cannot believe that Nazi Germany under the leadership of HITLER can be a loyal friend of Japan for a long time. Next, when we consider Italy, we find her national character just as unreliable as that of Germany. From early days she has thought of herself as being the king (queen) of power politics among the European powers. Probably this is why she received no heavy damage from Germany in the last European war. (6386-6388)

"To sum it up, both Germany and Italy should not be trusted too much. Then what is my reason for agreeing to this draft, the purpose of which is to conclude an alliance with these two untrustworthy countries? In spite of the reasons I have here stated, I believe that the proposal of allying ourselves with these two countries is opportune. When one thinks of the position of Germany and Italy in recent years, from the economic viewpoint of haves and have-nots, or from the connection of the balance of power, it may be considered that there are no countries whose interest are as similar as those of Japan, Germany and Italy. The alliance can be said to be based on common national interests, rather than on their national character or the personality of their leaders. Thus the Germany of today must be called a truly invaluable ally for the Japan of today. However as I have said before, as the national character of Germany is such as would suck the blood of others, we must pay deep attention lest she should boast of being the only horse rider. Both in modern science and in her capacity for the production of munitions Germany shows a degree of progress one step ahead of ours. Since we are concluding an alliance with her we should of our own accord make efforts to take advantage of those points in which she is superior. I am in favor of the conclusion of this treaty of alliance as a timely step, but in the light of past history, I earnestly hope that when this treaty is realized, the honorable members of the government will not neglect to take

exhaustive and scrupulous care so that we need have no future regrets." (6388-6389)

President HARA announced that the draft was passed by unanimous vote. (6389)

Exhibit 554 is the Imperial Rescript issued on 27 September 1940 regarding the Alliance; exhibit 555-A, 555-B, 555-C and 556 refer to letters exchanged between MATSUOKA and OTT regarding the Pact.

Exhibit 557 is an article by SHIRATORI (the accused) taken from Contemporary Japan entitled "The Three Power Pact and the World of Democracy by Toshio SHIRATORI."

Exhibit 558 is a radio speech of the President of the Board of Information in commemoration of the First Anniversary of the conclusion of the Pact, September 26, 1941. (6412)

Exhibit 550 (see Imperial Conferences herein) is MATSUOKA's explanation of the Pact at an Imperial Conference held between 10 - 21 September 1940. (6331)

Decision (Exhibit 1030 - For attendance see P. 116)

The exhibits do not show that a decision was reached at this meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council. However, see Exhibit 553 herein for a meeting of the Privy Council which unanimously passed the draft of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

Remarks

Councillor KAWAJI said that although he did not believe in a Japanese-American war he thought that "if worst comes to worst, the War and Navy Ministers may have something in readiness to avert defeat," and he also said that the government cannot say definitely that "USSR would not start "something" against Japan. In such a case what attitude, he asked, will Germany take? (9756)

War Minister TOJO, giving his answer chiefly from the standpoint of the Army, replied that "If the worst comes to worst, only a small part of the military strength will be necessary to carry out the operation against the U.S.A. I think that you need not worry on this point. However, an operation against the U.S.A. cannot be said complete unless we consider an operation against the U.S.S.R. Therefore, adjustment of JAPAN-SOVIET relations is a very important matter. I think that, if we could accomplish this effectively, military preparation would be eased considerably, but when we consider the character of the U.S.S.R., JAPAN cannot neglect her own preparation. As to the CHINA Incident, we intend to bring it to a conclusion by making efficient use of this treaty before we find ourselves in the worst situation." (9756-9757)

Navy Minister OTSUKA replied that "Since the war preparedness of our present Navy is complete, we will definitely not be beaten by the U.S.A., but in event of a prolonged war, it is necessary that we make sufficient preparations to keep up with the realization of the American plan for repletion of her navy. On this point, the Navy is adopting a policy prudent in every respect." (9757)

KAWAJI then asked how long the resources of Japan would last, in case of a protracted war. (9757)

President of the Planning Board HOSKINO replied as follows:

"As I explained yesterday (the President gave a detailed explanation of the material mobilization plan at the regular meeting of the Privy Council on the previous day), our country has for the last few years been making preparations for self-sufficiency as regards materials."

"Out of 2,100,000,000 yen in imports, 1,000,000,000 yen is received from ENGLAND and the U.S.A. If, therefore, the

economic pressure is strengthened, it is necessary that we act prudently considering the activation of Article III of the treaty. As for iron, this year's output is expected to be 5,200,000 tons, and even at the worst we can expect an output of 4,000,000 tons. At present, 1,500,000 tons are used for armaments and military purposes, and the rest is allotted for the repletion of productive power and for private and governmental use. If we manipulate the repletion of productive power, and restrict private and governmental demands, giving consideration to cases when imports of scrap iron and iron material may be stopped, we shall not find ourselves in so serious a situation. As regards metals other than iron, the case is different, but I think that you need not be seriously concerned, for we are now endeavoring to collect them from all parts of the world. Most important is petroleum. We are at present depending greatly on AMERICA, especially for aviation gasoline, almost all of which we must import from AMERICA. We must try to increase its production at home and, at the same time, must find means to secure it from places other than AMERICA. Recently, we have accumulated a considerable 'stock' of aviation petroleum. However, in case of a prolonged war with the U.S.A., a self-sufficient supply cannot be obtained solely in JAPAN, MANCHURIA and CHINA, whereas iron and other metals can be so obtained. Therefore, it is necessary that we speedily secure the right to obtain oil in the DUTCH EAST INDIES or NORTH KAPAPUTO. This matter has been touched upon in the recent talk with GERMANY. Furthermore, you must understand that at present negotiations are being carried on for the peaceful acquisition of oil in the DUTCH EAST INDIES." (0757-0759)

KAWAT recalled that at the previous meeting the military and naval authorities implied that considerable preparations had been effected. (0750)

Regarding this point, Navy Minister OIKAWA said that the Navy had been preparing for a considerable length of time and that measures were being taken regarding synthetic oil; War Minister TOJO also said that the Army had prepared so that its materials may last for a considerable period, but if an unusually prolonged war should occur consideration must be given to oil for aircraft and mechanized units. (0762)

ABTMA stated that "if Japan and the United States are destined to fight, I think now is the best time." (0760) He doubted, if hostilities began between Japan and the United States, they would terminate in one or two years, particularly since great quantities of petroleum are used in modern wars. Consequently, he asked the Navy Minister whether or not synthetic petroleum will suffice in critical times. (0760)

Navy Minister OTAWA replied that, since Japan had just started using synthetic petrolum, he could not say that it would suffice in critical times. (0760) "Therefore, there is no other way than to acquire it from the Dutch East Indies or North Karafuto through peaceful means, and it is quite likely this will occur." (0760) However, if war becomes prolonged, the Navy must consider the economic use of the petrolum. (0760) He also said that the Navy recently established a special research organ for the production of high octane rating petrolum. (0761)

Councillor FUKAI pointed out that, if Japanese-American war is inevitable, "emphasis in diplomacy must be laid to either Germany or the Anglo-Americans at this time, but the result of concluding this treaty may hasten the Japanese-American war." (0762) He then asked the Prime Minister whether or not he could overcome the "shortage of munitions and general commodities; the demoralization of thoughts, etc., when he faces them in the most aggravated times." (0762)

Premier KONOUE replied "The basic idea of this pact, of course, lies in the aversion of a Japanese-American clash. However, I think that it is necessary for us to show a firm attitude, because if we act humbly, it will only make the UNITED STATES presumptuous. /Translator's Note: May also read '...if we make a blunder, the UNITED STATES will become presumptuous.'/ If worst should come to worst, I think that the government must adopt policies with firm resolutions on both diplomatic and domestic affairs. The other day when I presented myself at the Imperial Palace to report on this matter, I found his Majesty, the Emperor, also to have possessed a very firm resolution which was most impressive. I hope that this treaty will be satisfactorily executed, even at the risk of my very life." (0762)

Councillor ORATA said that, if Japan is under obligation to aid Germany and Italy in case the United States should participate in the European War, she would be placed under a very heavy responsibility; but he inquired, since the possibility of war breaking out between Japan and America is small, is not the treaty very one sided? (0763)

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied "Whether America will participate in the European War or not, or whether war between America and Japan will break out or not, I think, is a 50-50 possibility. Therefore, I do not believe it to be one sided." (0763)

Councillor TANIGUCHI inquired as to the kind of support Germany could give Japan and, in case the Japanese Navy aids Germany and Italy, what kind of aid it could give? (9763)

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied "that such problems as the kind of help that can be mutually given should be thoroughly investigated at the joint special committee." (9763)

Chief of the Investigation Committee SUZUKI (not the accused) said that "I think a Japanese-American war is inevitable, regardless of whether this treaty is concluded or not. We, therefore, must carefully observe the expansion of the United States Navy and must not neglect our preparations corresponding to this." (9764)

Councillor ISHII noted that the South Sea Islands under Japan's Mandate were to remain a territory of Japan provided she paid compensation for them. He referred to MATSUOKA's explanation of this to the effect that "Since the Versailles Treaty has already expired, Japan is still continuing a military occupation of the South Sea Islands," (9764) Therefore, said ISHII, "according to the Versailles Treaty, the possession of the Mandated Islands were transferred to the Five Powers from which powers Japan acquired them. Therefore, I think it is proper to interpret that the islands are already the possession of Japan and; therefore, I cannot agree to the verbal declaration of the German ambassador. Since I admit that this problem is not a subject for Imperial inquiry I am just expressing my opinion for your information." (9765)

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA said "According to the opinion of famous scholars of international law, as Dr. TACHI, a mandate is not a transfer of territory. Therefore, aside from the standpoint of legal theories, and viewing it from the standpoint of practical politics, it has been my opinion for the past three years that it is a better policy to receive these islands from GERMANY through some means. From what I have heard, three years ago, the Japanese Navy had proposed to GERMANY through the naval attaché in BERLIN the cession of these islands under certain compensatory terms." (9764)

Councillor ISHII said that he had discussed the matter with Dr. TACHI and Dr. TACHI's opinion was that a "mandate is not a cession of territory." (9765) In respect to the point, that Germany transferred them to the Five Powers, ISHII believed that there was no dispute." Therefore, he continued, "I can hardly agree to having Japan pay a compensation to Germany for the cession of these islands." (9765)

Councillor HITSUCHI said that after the treaty was concluded America's critical sanctions against Japan would be greatly increased and the subsistence problem of the people

would become serious. (9766) He pointed out that "when a treaty of this sort is concluded, the Japanese people are apt to follow Germany blindly and there is danger that some may attempt anti-America movements, etc." (9766)

President of the Planning Board HOSHIRO replied that the government was most concerned over the problems of the people's livelihood and would try to meet the situation most satisfactorily. (9766)



PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
787-A	18 December	7,931	167

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI

State Ministers

KONOYE	HOSHIDA	MURATA
KANEHITSU	KOBAYASHI	ISHIGURO
AKITA	KAWADA	OKAWA
TOJO	YASUI	OGAWA
MATSUOKA	KAJIAMI	

Councillors

KAWAI	NARA	FUJAI
ISHII	ARAKI	FUTAGAMI
ARIMA	MATSUI	MANO
KUBOTA	SUGAWARA	OSHIMA
ISHIZUKA	MATSUJIMA	OBATA
SHIMIZU	USHIO	TAKAKASHI
MINAMI	HAGASHI	MITSUCHI

Government Delegates

AMURASE	SEKO
MORIYAMA	MURATA
SAHAMOTO	FUJIMARA
MATSUMOTO	

Secretaries

HORIE  
MOROHASHI  
TAKATSUJI

Decision

None referred to in the Excerpt. The matter of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania's joining the Tripartite Pact was discussed.

Remarks

The document was offered in evidence to show how Japan interpreted the term "adjustment of Soviet-Japanese relations"

as well as to substantiate the contention that the Japanese Government based its relations with the Soviet Union on the methods of forcing her to make concessions even up to resorting to threats of military attack. (Introductory Statement - 7930)

MATSUOKA said: "I deem it a good policy to aggrandize the German menace to Soviet Russia availing ourselves of the situation to regulate our relations with Soviet Russia, seeing that Soviet Russia does not find any menace in Japan and is inclined to reject the adjustment of Russo-Japanese relations. From this point of view the Government has agreed to the proposal in question from a conviction that it will be favorable to our diplomacy." (7931)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Statement</u>
660	16 June	7,155-6	212

Present

President H.R.  
Councillor & Chairman of Committee: ISHIZUKA

Councillors

SHIMIZU	FUKUI
MATSUI	TAKEGOSHI
SUGAWARA	MITSUCHI

State Ministers

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA  
Commerce and Industry Minister TOYOTA  
Finance Minister KAWADA  
Agriculture & Forestry Minister INO

Explainers

MURASE	HAGA	ISHIKAWA	AKOYAMA
NAGAI	ISHIGURO	MIYUCHI	MITSUTO
UEMATSU	TAKEUCHI	MATSUKUMA	KAWAMURA
MATSUMOTO	HARAGUCHI	KAWAMOTO	MIZUNO
ITO	NISHIMURA	MIURA	

Secretaries

HORIE	MOROHASHI	TAKATSUJI
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Decision

The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council unanimously approved the ratification of the treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China and the treaty between Japan and France concerning the tariff system and trade and the method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China.

Remarks

On 16 June 1941, a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held concerning the treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China, and the treaty between France and Japan concerning the tariff system and trade and method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Number</u>
660	16 June	7,155-6	212

Present

President H.R.I.  
Councillor & Chairman of Committee: ISHIZUKA

Councillors

SHIMIZU	FUKUI
MATSUI	T.KEGOSHI
SUGAWARA	MITSUCHI

State Ministers

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA  
Commerce and Industry Minister TOYOTA  
Finance Minister KAWADA  
Agriculture & Forestry Minister INO

Explainers

MURASE	HAGA	ISHIKAWA	MORIYAMA
NAGAI	ISHIGURO	MIYAUCHI	MITSUTO
UEMATSU	TAKIUCHI	MATSUKUMA	KAWAMURA
MATSUMOTO	HARAGUCHI	KAWAMOTO	MIZUNO
ITO	NISHIMURA	MIURA	

Secretaries

HORIE	MOROHASHI	TAKATSUJI
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Decision

The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council unanimously approved the ratification of the treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China and the treaty between Japan and France concerning the tariff system and trade and the method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China.

Remarks

On 16 June 1941, a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held concerning the treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China, and the treaty between France and Japan concerning the tariff system and trade and method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China.

According to Exhibit 637, in 1911 a Commercial Navigation Treaty was concluded by the French and Japan but France refused to apply the treaty to French Indo-China fearing the pouring in of Japanese and Japanese goods into that area. (7134)

In 1932 a commercial treaty was concluded whereby Japan and French Indo-China granted to each other the advantage of customs, but this was a provisional agreement placing numerous items of Japan's important exports beyond the scope of its application and making no provisions whatsoever in respect to the prohibition and restrictions of exports and imports, import quotas, and the modification of the rates. And so by the raising of the custom tariff by France, the advantages of the agreement were greatly reduced and by the reinforcement of this quota system, the enforcement of exchange control, etc., Japan's trade with French Indo-China fell into a slump. (7135)

On August 30th, after France's surrender to Germany the French Government acknowledged Japan's political and economic supremacy in East Asia and agreed to give to Japan as much as possible an advantageous position in French Indo-China superior to that enjoyed by any other states under any circumstances. Thereupon, delegates of the two countries started negotiations on economic problems of French Indo-China and Japan on December 30, 1940. (P 5 of Exhibit 637)

The first problem discussed was the buying of Saigon rice which Japan urgently needed. Negotiations were completed at the end of April being aggravated by the border dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand which was mediated by Japan. Accordingly, the treaty, protocol, agreement and other related documents were signed and sealed by or exchanged between the delegates of the two nations on May 6, 1941. (Exhibit 637, p. 5)

There were three "arrangements" considered by the Privy Council. (1) The treaty of Residence and Navigation concerning French Indo-China was made up of traditional provisions. (2) A protocol, forming an inseparable whole with the treaty was composed of several clauses defining Japan's special position in French Indo-China.

The Exhibit states: 22. The Protocol.

"This protocol, together with the above-mentioned treaty, forms an inseparable whole, and has the same term of validity. It is composed of several clauses defining Japan's special position in French Indo-China. That is, the treaty provides as follows: (1) The fees for foreigners' identification cards shall be reduced in the case of Japanese Nationals; (2) Japanese Nationals shall be specially permitted to engage in certain occupations which are prohibited to foreigners now; (3) the maximum percentage of employees who may be employed in Japanese enterprises shall be raised up to a specified percentage; (4)

the acquisition by Japanese of the ownership of immovables and Annam and Tonking shall be given consideration, subject to the consent of the king of the protectorates; (5) concessions in agricultural, mining and hydraulic power enterprises shall be granted in Indo-China to Franco-Japanese joint concerns under special terms; (6) Japanese Nationals shall be permitted under fixed conditions to open and manage Japanese schools for giving Japanese education; (7) to discuss economic problems of both countries, an economic conference composed of the government and civilian representatives of the two countries; (8) the problems concerning coastal trade in Indo-China, navigation and fishing in the inland seas or territorial waters, and problems of aviation wireless stations, and undersea cables, shall be settled through consultations between the two governments; as regards the problems of marine transportation, the governments of the two countries shall encourage their solution through the cooperation of the shipping interests." (7161-3)

The protocol was to be secret (not published) "lest third powers will share equally with us the above mentioned various privileges by virtue of the most favored clause". (7163) (3) Franco-Japanese agreement concerning the customs system, trade and the modalities of settling accounts between Japan and French Indo-China (7149)

A: The Customs System: (7150)

- (1) Japan enjoyed the most favored nation treatment in respect to taxes, fees and other levies.
- (2) Japanese goods were subject to minimum tariff rates and goods listed in Annex A (no record of) shall be either exempted or given reductions from the minimum rates.
- (3) No raise in rates on goods listed under (2) was allowed after one year from the date of the agreement.
- (4) and (5) Concern direct shipment, certificates of invoices by a special organ and freedom from taxation in respect to transit.

B: Trade: (7152)

- (1) Each year is shall be determined by agreement.
  - (a) The articles of Indo-Chinese origin and their quantity which are to be imported to Japan;
  - (b) The import quotas allowed to Japan which are placed on an import quota basis in F. I. C.;
  - (c) Japanese goods and their quantities to be imported to F. I. C.

At the signing of the agreement the list contained 22 items,

including rice and crude rubber of Indo-China origin. 700,000 metric tons of polished rice and 15 metric tons of crude rubber were guaranteed by the French Government. (7152)

(2) Concerning the agreed articles referred to in B (1) (a) and (c), permits were to be issued up to the quantities agreed upon, and friendly consideration was to be given to the exportation and importation of articles in excess of the agreed quantities, to those not agreed upon and to the granting of additional quotas for goods of Japanese origin not agreed upon. (7153)

C: The mode of settling trade accounts: (P 8 of Exhibit 637)

(1) Goods of Japanese origin were to be paid for in yen and those of Indo-Chinese origin in Indo-Chinese Piastres. Payment for crude rubber during the current year (1941) was to be in American dollars;

(2) Concerned the financial arrangement between the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de l'Indo-Chine.

The agreement superseded the agreement of 1932. (P 9 of Exhibit 637)

Secret documents to be exchanged provided for the admission into FIC Import Association of not more than ten Japanese commercial firms. (P 9 of Exhibit 637)

The Exhibit states that "the enforcement of these arrangements will promote greatly our economic penetration into FIC... and it will bring many advantages in the acquisition of materials urgently needed by our country." (p. 9 of Exhibit 637)

During a discussion concerning the ratification of this treaty ISHII noted that France acknowledged Japan's political and economic supremacy in East Asia and that France pledged to give Japan the most advantageous position possible in French Indo-China which was superior to that of any three powers under any circumstances. In this connection he recalled negotiating with Secretary of State Lansing in regard to Japan's interest in China. He proposed the use of the word "superior" but such word was flatly rejected by President Wilson and Japan was obliged to use the word "special". ISHII also noted that in the above mentioned treaty that the word "superior" and not the word "special" is used. He also pointed out that the terms are generally reciprocal and there is nothing especially favorable to Japan and that he asked for an explanation of this. (p. 10 of Exhibit 637)

MATSUOKA said that Japan made France acknowledge Japan's political superiority and as a result of it, agreed to permit Japan's troops to advance into French Indo-China, France also

submitting herself to Japan's mediation, the dispute with Thailand. These two points, according to MATSUOKA, were the most conspicuous embodiments of Japan's political superiority. Regarding economic problems, which constituted the substance of the above mentioned treaty, protocol and agreement, he pointed out that Japanese nationals enjoyed in French Indo-China the same treatment as French nationals in regard to specially designated matters. These, said MATSUOKA, are the results of the acknowledgement of our superiority. We find, MATSUOKA also said, "almost no example of it in the history of colonization." (7024)

MATSUOKA pointed out that under the treaty France agreed to export to Japan the full quantity of polished rice as demanded by Japan and that Japan succeeded in getting 80% of her demands. (7025)

ISHII remarked that, whereas Germany is getting 25,000 tons of rubber from French Indo-China, Japan only obtained about 15,000 tons, in spite of the fact that Japan should be given a superior position. ISHII approved the agreement because it was several times superior to past treaties. (P 11 of Exhibit 637)

KIZUNO, Director of Foreign Office Trade Bureau, in reply to SHIMIZU and MATSUI's (not the accused) question regarding the development of Japanese trade with French Indo-China said that French Indo-China is being affected by the European War and her imports have considerably decreased, but by the arrangement of the treaty the supply of commodities from Japan such as cotton, yarn or cloth, as well as dry goods, etc. would be remarkably increased, so as to reach a total of 70,000,000 or 80,000,000 yen (7156) He also said that "because the products excepting rubber which grow in French Indo-China cannot be exported generally to third countries, their export to Japan will be carried out smoothly and among these exports rice will amount to 80,000,000 yen and the others to 80,000,000 yen". (7156)

Chairman ISHIZUKA inquired of the relationship between the reason why this protocol should not be officially announced and the actual effect, and on this question Director of the Foreign Office Trade Bureau KIZUNO replied, "We intend to gradually enforce the purports of this protocol and to extend Japanese influence by degrees and it will be inevitable that this protocol will eventually come to the knowledge of third powers." (7157)

INO, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry said that "the shortage in the supply of rice for the current fiscal period on rice was at the outset estimated to be 12,000,000 koku. In view hereof, we have made a plan to cover this shortage of these with 9,000,000 koku to be imported from French Indo-China, Thailand and Burma, the rest by making a cut of the consumption



or by decreasing the quantity to be carried over to the next year..." (p. 3 of Exhibit 660)

Regarding the marine transport program, Commerce and Industry Minister TOYOTA said that "marine transportation was in a critical state owing to the marked decrease of charter ship...increase in the number of ships commandeered for military purposes and decrease in newly built ships, and we are now exerting all our efforts in transporting chiefly rice, coal and iron. (p. 4 of Exhibit 660)

See Exhibit 654-A (R 7157) a telegram dated 1 October 1941 and signed by HEIMEL, a member of the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs (Paris) concerning Indo-China rubber. The telegram mentioned the release of 5,000 tons of rubber requested by Japan in September, 1941. France was endeavoring to get German support of the French effort to obtain Japanese approval for the delivery of 5,000 tons of rubber to the U. S. A. as the proceeds from such sale was urgently needed for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else. The French request was turned down as the U. S. A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold. (R 7158) The telegram further stated that neither the Japanese nor the Germany Government would countenance further export of raw rubber from Indo-China to the U. S. A., and that the German Commissioner IERLE requested that an additional release of 5,000 tons to Japan be secured for October (7,159)

Exhibit 652 (R 7163), a document found in the German Foreign Office dated at Bangkok 1 September 1941, refers to the increasing activity of Japan, particularly regarding rice and rubber, in Indo-China. According to the telegram Japan seized all valuable raw materials. The Exhibit states that "in Saigon there are twenty Japanese newspaper correspondents. There are 24 Japanese firms as compared with 14 before the war. Competition between the new and the old Japanese firms has already set in. Japanese agents swarm over the country in all directions. There is marked economic espionage, e.g., careful inspection of rubber plantations. In Cambodia, the Japanese now buy rice fields and kapok plantations. Attempts to buy small rubber plantations in the vicinity of Saigon from Annamite and Chinese owners have failed thus far. It is, however, foreseeable that in case of a continued worsening of the market, the Japanese will obtain large rubber plantations, even from French owners, since the economic agreement with Indo-China stipulates them unlimited right of settlement as well as the right to acquire real estate. According to information here a rubber syndicate has been formed or is forming in Japan, chiefly supported by MITSUI, for buying rubber plantations in Indo-China." (7163-7164)

A vote was taken and it was unanimously carried. The above meeting was in the presence of the Emperor. The document was signed by President HARA (deceased), Secretary HORIE, Hideo, MOROHASHI, Jo and TANAKA, Masami.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
637	3 July	7.C11; 7.C14	220

Present

The Emperor, HIROHITO  
President HARA, Yoshimichi  
Vice President SUZUKI

State Minister

HIRANUMA  
KANAMITSU  
ARITA  
TOJO  
MATSUOKA  
HASHIDA

KAWADA  
MURATA  
OIKAWA  
OGAWA  
YANAGAWA  
TOYOTA  
INO

Councillors

KAWAI  
ISHII  
ARIMA  
KUBOTA  
ISHIZUKA  
SHIMIZU  
MINAMI

HARA  
ARAKI  
MATSUI  
SUGAWARA  
MATSUURA  
USHIO  
FUJAI

FUTAGAMI  
MANO  
OSHIMA  
OBATA  
TAKEKOSHI  
MITSUCHI  
IZAWA

Committeemen

MURASE  
MORIYAMA  
MIZUKI  
MATSUMOTO

SAITO  
MATSUJUMA  
HARAGUCHI  
MIURA

YUKAWA  
ISHIGURO  
KAWAMURA

Reporters

ISHII

ISHIZUKA

Secretaries: -

HORIE, Hideo  
MOROHASHI, Jo  
TAKATSUJI, Masami

### Decision

On July 3, 1941, the Privy Council voted to ratify the France-Japanese Protocol on Guaranty and Political Understanding and of the Thai-Japanese protocol on Guaranty and Political Understandings. (7011, 7022)

### Remarks

In June 1940, Japan requested Germany to give her a free hand in Indo-China. (Exhibit 520-6825, and Exhibit 523-6825)

On 19 June 1940 Japan demanded that the Indo-China frontiers be closed to prevent transportation of supplies to CHIANG KAI-Shek and that she be permitted to place Imperial officers along the frontiers to ensure that it remained closed. (6796; 6850) The acceptance of these demands was requested before the evening of 20 June 1940. This was the first ultimatum that Japan delivered to Indo-China. General CATROUX, Governor-General of Indo-China was compelled to comply. (6797; 6850) The Japan Mission was under General NISHIHARA who arrived in Hanoi on June 29, 1940. (6853)

On 1 August 1940, MATSUKA issued an ultimatum to the French Ambassador in Tokyo in regard to passage of troops through the Province of Tongking, the use of airfields in Tongking and the stationing of troops and provision for the transportation of arms and ammunition. (6886) The ultimatum said that if no immediate answer was received, Japan would use force. (6887)

On September 20, 1940, Under Secretary of State Welles gave the Japanese Ambassador 'an oral statement' stating that the Japanese military representative in French Indo China, General NISHIHARA, was instructed on August 29th, to present an ultimatum to the French Governor-General making what was tantamount to a demand for complete occupation of French Indo-China with a threat that if these demands were not accepted before 10 p.m., September 22, the Japanese military forces would at once invade Indo-China. (6958) The French Governor-General refused the demand. (6958) For six months prior to this time (September 20, 1940) various official utterances of Japanese statesmen repeatedly reiterated that the official position of the Japanese Government was a desire to maintain the status quo in the Far East (6959 - Welles to the Japanese Ambassador). The Japanese Ambassador said that the latest demands were in compliance with the agreement of August 30th. Welles replied that this was not the case as the demands were refused on the specific grounds that they were outside the agreement of August 30th. (6961)

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On 30 August 1940, MATSUOKA and the French Ambassador HENRY entered into an agreement the terms of which were to be confidential, (6967) whereby Japan would obtain military facilities in Tongking. The terms of the agreement were to be settled at a later date by joint agreement of the French and Japanese military authorities. (6965) The agreement was concluded on 4 September 1940. (6928) The Military Agreement was to become effective only after the approval of the governments concerned. To avoid delay, an ultimatum was presented on September 19 by General HISHIHARA. (6932) MATSUOKA acknowledged the fact that these demands were made. (6965) During these negotiations MATSUOKA at various times requested the German Government to support Japanese demands.

In a memorandum from GREW (20 Sept 1940) he said MATSUOKA confirmed that the ultimatum had been sent (6965) and explained that the French Governor-General on September 5 refused to sign an agreement implementing the one signed August 30th for reasons not evident to Japan. MATSUOKA further explained that Japanese forces would be withdrawn from Indo-China after peace had been restored in China. (6966)

On 3 September 1940 Japanese forces crossed the border. (6929) On 22 September 1940, the Japanese Army started the attack on the Tongking border constituting the first act of military aggression by Japan against French Indo-China. (6933) On the same day, French Indo-China yielded to force and agreed to the Japanese terms. (6933) On 26 September the Japanese forces bombed the harbor of Haiphong. (6865)

On 12 June 1940 Siam signed a treaty of non-aggression with France (513; 6147) but refused to ratify it as soon as the Armistice in France was known and then started a campaign of claims against Indo-China. (France asked Armistice terms on 17 June 1940).

Japan signed a treaty of friendship with Siam on December 6, 1940 and transferred to Siam 38 fighter planes and 25 bombers. She then intervened to impose her mediation and the conclusion of an Armistice. (6992-6998)

Exhibit 564, a telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo dated 6 February 1941, shows that Japan intended to obligate France (FIC) and Thailand by a secret agreement during the negotiations concerning the settlement of the boundary dispute of France and Thailand to make no political or military agreement with a third power. (6446) Germany agreed to this. (6990) In a letter from MATSUOKA to Ambassador Henri (11 March 1941) MATSUOKA proposed mediation of the dispute between France and Thailand and enclosed a mediation proposal which he expected the French Government to accept unconditionally. (6994) The letter stated that Japan believed that the French Government would not conclude any treaty or agreement between French Indo-China and a third power that would presuppose the nature of political, economic or military cooperation to oppose Japan directly or indirectly. (6995) HENRI replied on 11 March 1941, (letters were exchanged) that the French Government yielded to the insistence of Japan (6997) and on 9 May 1941 an agreement was signed in Tokyo, where, in

payment for its good offices, Japan imposed a protocol of political guaranty and understanding. (Exhibit 47-6913)

Under the solution, Indo-China ceded 69,000 square kilometers and 334,000 inhabitants while the previous claims of Siam did not exceed a territory of 23,000 square kilometers and 64,000 inhabitants. Japan imposed the establishment under Japanese supervision of demilitarized zones. (French Opening Statement)

On 14 July 1941, Japan decided to acquire military positions in and to advance into south Indo-China. The Japanese Foreign Minister gave detailed instructions that Japanese troops would advance on 27 July 1941 and said if the French accept by then it will be a peaceful advancement; if not, an armed advance. (7042)

Under duress of Germany and pressure from Japan the Vichy Government complied with these demands. Thus the plan for the complete occupation of Indo-China by the Japanese was realized. On July 28, 40,000 Japanese troops landed in the south of Indo-China. (7068; 7072) On 9 December 1941, Japan imposed a new military agreement which completed her control over the occupied territories by her military, naval and air forces. (The agreement - a local military one between the French authorities and the Japanese Army for the joint defense of French Indo-China appears on p. 7121-7132 of the Record).

The Privy Council met on 3 July 1941 for the purpose of ratifying the Protocol of Political Guaranty and Understanding which Japan imposed upon F.I.C. for using her good offices in mediating the dispute between French Indo-China and Siam. (7014)

Under the first Protocol the Japanese Government guaranteed that the peace treaty settling the dispute was definite and unalterable, that the French Government agreed to promote intimate economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China. France agreed that she would not conclude with third powers any agreement concerning French Indo-China of a political, economic or political nature opposed to the interests of Japan. (7015)

The contents of the second protocol are practically the same as the first except that Thailand was not bound to refrain from concluding agreements with Third Parties. This protocol referred to the Treaty of Neutrality concluded on 12 June 1940, by France and Thailand. (7015)

ISHII said MATSUKA's achievements were a victory for Japan, since they placed "Britain in the shade" in Indo-China. (7018) He also said that the right to mediate gave Japan the position of leadership in East Asia and he pointed out that the most valuable advantage from the treaty to Japan was its indefinite period of duration. (7019)

SHIMIZU wanted to know the attitude of Thailand towards Nanking. MATSUCKA replied that he could not expect Thailand to recognize Nanking, it being farther from Thailand than Chungking, but he believed that when Japanese political and economic power steadily penetrated into Thailand, Japan will grasp the opportunity then to take the proper measures. MATSUCKA also said that, even though Japan's mediation proved successful, "British influence in Thailand remains unshakeable." (7020)

SHIMIZU wanted to know of Japan's attitude as to who was the "breaker of the treaty" between Germany and Russia. MATSUCKA said Germany, facing the crisis of war with Britain, concluded the treaty as a temporary expediency lest Russia be won over to Britain's side. (7021) He said Germany's "real intention was to detest and suppress, when opportunity presented itself, not only the soviet Union's aggressive principle, but also the ideology embraced by that country". (7021)

FUKAI noted that third powers might take it as a symbol of Japan's aggressive policy, if Japan looked upon herself as the stabilizing force of East Asia, pointing out that the agreement of August 31, (30) 1940 was not submitted to the Privy Council because, as the Prime Minister explained, he had to seize a moment when France was fearful of Japan's actions, therefore he was unable to take the formalities for submission of the documents to the Privy Council. (7022)

The Council unanimously agreed to ratify the protocol.

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The Council unanimously agreed to ratify the protocol.



PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1921)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
649	28 July	7,069	231
650	28 July	7,075	---

President HARA  
Vice-President SUZUKI

Councillors

KAWAI  
ISHII  
ARIMA  
KUBOTA  
ISPIZUKA  
SHIMIZU  
MINAMI

NARA  
ARAKI  
SUGAWARA  
MITSUURA  
USHIO  
HAYASHI  
FUKAI

FUTAKAMI  
OSHIMA  
OBATA  
TAKEGOSHI  
MITSUCHI  
IZAWA

Cabinet Members

KONOE  
TANABE  
TOJO  
HASHIDA

MURATA  
OIKAWA  
OGURA  
TOYODA

INO  
SAKONJI  
KICIZUMI  
IWAMURA

Explainers

MURASE  
IRIYE  
MIYAUCHI  
SUZUKI  
MIYAMOTO  
UYEFARA  
SAITO

MATSUMOTO  
MIZUNO  
SAKAMOTO  
TERAZAKI  
NICHIMURA  
OTA  
TOYODA

TOKO  
HAGA  
MUTO  
OKA  
FARACUCHI  
KOJIMA  
COKA

Secretaries

HORIE  
MOROHASHI  
TAKATSUJI

Decision

The Privy Council unanimously agreed to the resolution that there be concluded between France and Japan a Protocol regarding the common defense of French Indo-China and military cooperation.

Remarks

The Investigation Committee met to discuss the Protocol between France and Japan for a common defense of French Indo-China and the exchange of official documents regarding military cooperation.

ISHII asked if France had been intimidated. (7070) TOYODA replied that an intimation had been given to the French Government that an undesirable situation would likely develop if France failed to accept the Japanese proposal. He also said Germany and Italy were asked to cooperate with Japan in realizing the conclusion of the protocol. He further stated that Japan was forced to take effective and forcible steps against the De Gaulle party in southern French Indo-China. (7071)

Questioned as to the relation between Japan's foreign policy and the Government's declaration re conclusion of the recent declaration made by the Government had given the impression to Third Powers that Japan had penetrated into F.I.C. by force and to prevent the U.S.A. from taking unjust measures, the Government wishes to make it clear quickly that it was upon mutual agreement, and therefore made an announcement that an understanding had been made between the two governments. (7071)

Questioned as to the relationship between Japan's penetration into northern FIC during 1940 and the present measure, TOJO answered that the 1940 penetration concerned the Chiang regime, its aim being different from that of the measures under discussion, and although Japan would be responsible for common defense with FIC by the present agreement, the area of Japan's military activities should not be restricted. (7072)

NARA wanted to know if the size of the Japanese Army would be restricted under the arrangement regarding the currency to be placed at the disposal of Japanese troops as provided for in the Article of Exchange. TOJO replied that the amount of money estimated with an ample margin to cover the necessary expense (all accounts to be settled by piastres except for the pay to soldiers) for about 40,000 troops which are planned to be sent over and therefore there was no fear that the size of the forces would be restricted on account of expense. (7072)

SUGAWARA inquired as to why the NISEIHARA-MARTIN agreement had not been submitted to the Privy Council, to which TOYODA and TOJO explained that this agreement was a military agreement involving the Supreme Command, although based upon the MATSUOKA-HENRY agreement and therefore it was not submitted to the Privy Council. (7073)

To this explanation FUTAKAMI added that he understood the agreement to be a thoroughly international agreement concluded by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of both countries, but the matter was so urgent that there was no time to submit it to the Council as had been explained by the Premier at the time. (7073)

#### Second Meeting

Exhibit 650: - The Privy Council met to deliberate on the ratification of the Protocol.

Reporter SUZUKI referred to the MATSUOKA-HENRY Agreement of August 30, 1940 and the economic agreement concluded on the substance of the same. He pointed out that Japan could never feel easy if French Indo-China cooperated with the policy of Anglo-American encirclement against her. So, he said, Japan must prevent this and keep French Indo-China secure from invasion by Third Nations and at the same time bring about cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China which are very important to the self-existence and self-defense of Japan as well as to her southward drive policy. (p.4 of Exhibit 650)

SUZUKI also said that the existing political understanding between the two nations was not sufficient; therefore, Japan had to make France closely cooperate with her in the military field. (7076) Consequently, he concluded, Japan ordered the Japanese Envoy to France to negotiate with the French Government as a result of which the protocol and the plan for the exchange of official documents were obtained. (p. 4 of Exhibit 650)

The preamble of the protocol states that, in case the security of French Indo-China was threatened, both countries "shall recognize the reason to think that Japan's general peace and the security of the Far East also are not free from danger." The preamble also refers to the promises made by France not to conclude any agreement of a political, economic or military nature with a Third Nation opposing directly or indirectly Japan. The necessary steps for military cooperation was to have been decided by special agreement. (page 5 of Exhibit 650)

Official documents were to be exchanged concerning the measures to be taken for military cooperation based upon the protocol. The following clauses were decided upon: (7077-7078)

- I. Towards the Japanese Government the French Government shall admit:
  - A. The dispatch of a necessary force of Japanese Army troops, war vessels and air forces to the southern Indo-China.
  - B. The use of Sienreap and seven other places as air bases and Saigon and Camrang Bay as naval bases. The Japanese Army shall construct the facilities at these places for military purposes.
  - C. The right of quartering and training the Japanese Army. Various restrictions on Japan stipulated in the NISHIHARA-MARTIN Agreement were to be abolished.
  - D. The French Government shall offer to the Japanese Army 23,000,000 Indo-China piastres for the current year which the Japanese Government agreed to repay with free yen, U.S. dollars or gold.
- II. The French Government shall approve the fundamental principles of the Japanese Army's advance.
- III. The details concerning the activities of the Japanese Army shall be discussed and decided on the spot. (7077-7078)

Reporter SUZUKI pointed out that the "tendency of dependency upon Anglo-American still remains in FIC" and that in the interior of FIC and expressly in the southern region, some do not cooperate with Japan but are trying to collaborate with Anglo-America. Therefore, he said, political understanding must be supplemented by a military cooperation.

Exhibit 651 (7080) is a copy of the Protocol for the Common Defense of FIC signed July 29, 1941 and copies of two letters dated at Vichy July 29, 1941. (Japanese troops landed at Saigon July 29, 1941). The two letters confirm the agreement. (7079) The Protocol appears on page 7104 of the Record.

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1182	21 November	10,391	268

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI  
Chairman of Committee of Inquiry ISHII

Councillors

ARIYA	FUTAGAMI
ISHIZUKA	OBATA
MINAMI	TAKEKOSHI
NARA	IZAWA

Ministers present

TOJO, Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs & War Minister  
IWANURA, Minister of Justice  
TOGO, Minister of Foreign Affairs & Minister for Colonization

Explainers

MORIYAMA, Chief of the Bureau of Legislation  
SATA, Councillor of " " " "  
MIYAUCHI " " " " " "  
MATSUMOTO, Chief of the Bureau of Treaty, Foreign Office  
SAKANOTO, Chief of Bureau of European & Asiatic Affairs, Fgn.  
Office  
NISHIMURA, Head of 2nd Section of Bureau of Treaty, Fgn Office  
NEMICHI, Head of 3rd Section of Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs,  
Foreign Office  
MARITA, Head of 1st Section of Bureau of European & Asiatic  
Affairs, Foreign Office  
YOSANO, Head of 2nd Section of European & Asiatic Affrs., Fgn  
Office  
IDE, Administrative Official of Foreign Office  
HAYASHI, Director of the Police Bureau, Ministry of Home  
Affairs  
NAGANO, Head of Peace Preservation Section of Police Bureau,  
Ministry of Home Affairs  
IKEDA, Chief of Bureau of Criminal Matters, Ministry of Justice

Executive Secretary - HORIYE  
Secretary MOROHASHI  
Secretary TAKATSUJI

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1182	21 November	10,391	268

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI  
Chairman of Committee of Inquiry ISHII

Councillors

ARINA	FUTAGAMI
ISHIZUKA	OBATA
MINAMI	TAKEKOSHI
NARA	IZAWA

Ministers present

TOJO, Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs & War Minister  
IWANURA, Minister of Justice  
TOGO, Minister of Foreign Affairs & Minister for Colonization

Explainers

MORIYAMA, Chief of the Bureau of Legislation  
SATA, Councillor of " " " "  
MIYAUCHI " " " " " "  
MATSUMOTO, Chief of the Bureau of Treaty, Foreign Office  
SAKAMOTO, Chief of Bureau of European & Asiatic Affairs, Fgn.  
Office  
NISHIMURA, Head of 2nd Section of Bureau of Treaty, Fgn Office  
NEMICHI, Head of 3rd Section of Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs,  
Foreign Office  
MARITA, Head of 1st Section of Bureau of European & Asiatic  
Affairs, Foreign Office  
YOSANO, Head of 2nd Section of European & Asiatic Affrs., Fgn  
Office  
IDE, Administrative Official of Foreign Office  
IFANATSU, Director of the Police Bureau, Ministry of Home  
Affairs  
NAGANO, Head of Peace Preservation Section of Police Bureau,  
Ministry of Home Affairs  
IKEDA, Chief of Bureau of Criminal Matters, Ministry of Justice

Executive Secretary - HORIYE  
Secretary NOSHASHI  
Secretary TAKATSUJI

### Decision

Unanimously decided to prolong the Anti-Comintern Pact, with a request that the Government make every effort to make it successful and to positively make the most of its provisions. (10,398)

### Remarks

The meeting was called to discuss the prolongation of the original Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 which was about to expire. A secret attached protocol was to be abrogated.

ISHIZUKA asked about the relations between Japan and Germany regarding the South Seas. TOGO replied that Germany had already recognized Japan's construction of a new order in East Asia and that in dealing with such a problem consultation was to be effected by degrees. (10,395)

FATSUMOTO, Director of the Bureau of Treaties replied that OTT had exchanged letters to make the islands Japanese territory for a nominal compensation by Japan to Germany. (10,395)

MINAMI (not the Accused) said the Pact had lost its vitality so far as Germany was concerned because the Treaty between Germany and Russia regarding territorial inviolability was an infringement of the spirit of the preamble of the Pact.

TOGO replied that although there is a close connection between the Third International and the Soviet Government, still there is a slight difference between them, so it is not impossible to think of them separately, from which viewpoint, Japan concluded the Neutrality Treaty with Soviet. (10,396) (N.B. - The Anti-Comintern Pact was against the Third International).

MINAMI also asked about the change of circumstances which made the Secret Protocol between Japan and Germany unnecessary and thinking about the possibility of a reconciliation between Germany and the Soviet, doubted if it would be better to continue the Secret Pact. (10,396)

TOGO responded that the changed circumstances are (a) the German-Russian War and the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Russia, (b) Formation of alliance between Japan and Germany. (10,396)

IZAWA asked about the concrete results of the Anti-Comintern Pact during the five years since it was concluded. TOJO stated that he would utilize more and more the Anti-Comintern Pact to control communism. (10,397)

After discussion, the resolution to prolong the Pact was agreed to unanimously. (10,398)



TRIVY COUNCIL  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1241	8 December	10,690	287

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI

Councillors

ISHII  
ARIMA  
KUROTA  
TAKIZUMI  
SHIMIZU  
MITSU  
MURA

ARAKI  
MITSUI  
SUGAWARA  
MITSUJIMA  
USHIO  
HAYASHI  
FUJII

FUDAKI  
KANE  
OSHIMA  
OHATA  
TANIGUCHI  
MITSUOKI  
IZAWA  
IKEDA

State Ministers

TOJO  
HASHIDA  
INO  
KOIZUMI

YAMAGATA  
SHIMADA  
TOGO  
TERAJIMA

KAWA  
FUSHI  
HATA

Explainers

HOSHINO  
NOGUCHI  
SUZUKI  
TANI  
YAMAMOTO

SANJIMOTO  
MATSUMOTO  
MUTO  
OKA

Decision

The inquiry committee concerning the declaration of war against America and England met and unanimously decided to approve the Emperor's reference bill regarding the declaration of war (10,695); the Plenary session of the council unanimously approved the draft of the Imperial ratification pertaining to the declaration of war. (10,699 - 10,700)

Remarks

The document was offered because it related to events transpiring at the meeting of the Investigation Committee on 8 December 1941 which prove that at least from December 1, 1941 on, the negotiations with the U.S. were continued only "for the sake of Japanese war strategy." (10,690)

TRIVY COUNCIL  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1241	8 December	10,690	287

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI

Councillors

IGENII	ARAKI	FURUKAWA
ARIMA	MATSUI	KONO
KUNOHA	SUGIYAMA	OSHIMA
TERAZUMA	MATSUURA	ORATA
SHIRIZU	USHIO	INAGOSHI
MITSUI	HIYASHI	MIYAGUCHI
NAKA	FURAI	IZAWA
		IKEDA

State Ministers

TOJO	I. MATSUDA	KAWA
HASHIDA	SHIMADA	MISHI
INO	TOGO	MIYATA
KOIZUMI	TERAJIMA	

Explainers

HOSHINO	SANJONIC
NOBITAKA	MITSUKOTO
SUZUKI	MIYAO
TANI	OKA
YAMAMOTO	

Decision

The inquiry committee concerning the declaration of war against America and England met and unanimously decided to approve the Emperor's reference bill regarding the declaration of war (10,695); the Plenary session of the council unanimously approved the draft of the Imperial ratification pertaining to the declaration of war. (10,699 - 10,700)

Remarks

The document was offered because it related to events transpiring at the meeting of the Investigation Committee on 8 December 1941 which prove that at least from December 1, 1941 on, the negotiations with the U.S. were continued only "for the sake of Japanese war strategy." (10,690)

In answer to a question by KUFOTA as to the time of the declaration of war, TOJO replied it shall be done as soon as the Imperial sanction is obtained. He also said that since 1 December, the negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy, and that Japan would not declare war against Holland in view of future strategic convenience. TOJO and TAKAOTO, Chief of the Europe and Asia Bureau, in reply to HIRAKI's (not the accused) question as to what attitude Germany would take in relation to the Tripartite Pact, said that when Japan declares war, Germany and Italy will do likewise and they will not make a separate peace, pointing out that they were then preparing the draft of an agreement to this effect. (10,692) See Exhibit 51 for this Treaty.

TOJO said Japan should keep a close watch over Russia. (10,693)

HIRAKI said that according to the draft for an Imperial edict which accompanied the project for reference, it seems as though action of war is started from our side and so, he asked, did it not give America an excuse for declaring war. To this Premier TOJO answered that "action of war may have been started from our side, the cause of the war is really nothing but the fact that America gave various economic pressures to Japan." (10,694)

KAWA said there would be a Special Emergency War Expense account drawn up for the expenses of the war. (10,695) The Cabinet Secretaries reported that at 8 p.m. on 7 December they were informed at Premier's residence that the action would begin in the early morning next day, and that during the day the declaration of war against America and England would be presented for Imperial sanction. (10,696)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1266	10 Dec	11,304	288
1267		11,305	

Present

President IZUMI  
Vice President SUZUKI

Councillors

ISHII	NAKANO	OGATA
ARIMURA	SUGIWARA	SHIBUYAMA
FUJIOKA	YAMAGUCHI	YAMAGUCHI
ISHIYAMA	YAMAGUCHI	YAMAGUCHI
SATO	YAMAGUCHI	YAMAGUCHI
MIYAGAWA	YAMAGUCHI	YAMAGUCHI
NAKANO	YAMAGUCHI	YAMAGUCHI
ARIMURA	YAMAGUCHI	YAMAGUCHI

State Ministers

TOJO	SHIRAKAWA
KONO	TOJO

Explainers

MORITOMI	NISHIMURA	MUTO
MITSUMOTO	FUJIOKA	OKA
S. MIYANO	IDE	SUZUKI

Reporting Member - SUZUKI

Clerk or Secretaries

HOPE  
MOROHASHI  
T. MATSUJI

Decision

The Privy Council unanimously decided to ratify the treaty against a separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan. The treaty is Exhibit No. 51. (11,308)

Remarks

Exhibit 1226 refers to the meeting of the Investigation Committee. SUGAMURA asked if it would not be more appropriate for Japan to sign the agreement after Germany and Italy had actually entered the war. To this question TOJO and TOGO replied that it had been arranged that Hitler would announce their participation in the war in the Reichstag as soon as he had signed this agreement, and that Japan could trust the words of the German Government. (11304) TOGO in reply to a question by HAYASHI concerning the circumstances of the negotiations with Italy, said that negotiations had been carried on mainly at Berlin but there was complete understanding with Italy. (11,304) The Investigation Committee decided to accept the draft as it stood and the meeting adjourned. (11,305)

Exhibit 1267 is the meeting of the Privy Council concerning the treaty against the separate peace. According to the outline of the draft of the agreement, the Three Powers, Japan, Germany and Italy promised not to suspend hostilities or to make peace with either the United States of America or the United Kingdom until complete victory was achieved. The draft also states that the Three Powers "shall collaborate with the utmost intimacy after the war terminated in victory in order to establish a righteous new order in significance of the Three-Powers-Treaty." (11307)

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1942)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
687	9,12,14,15, 19,20,21 October	12,071 to 12,095	301

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI

Councillors

ISHII  
MINAMI, Hiroshi  
USHIO  
FUTAGAMI

OBATA  
TAKEGOSHE  
MIKAMI  
MITSUCHI

IZAWA  
MINAMI, Jiro  
IKEDA

Ministers of State

Premier and War Minister TOJO  
Agriculture & Forestry Minister INO  
Home Minister Yuzawa  
Foreign Minister TANI  
Navy Minister SHIMADA

Exponents

HAYASHI  
Chief Sec'y of Cabinet HOSHINO  
Chief of Legislation Bur. MORIYAMA  
Councillor of " " IRIYE  
" " " " SATO  
" " " " MIYAUCHI  
" " " " ARAKI

USAMI  
MATSUMOTO  
UEBA  
IMAYOSHI  
NAKANO  
KAWAMOTO  
KADOWAKI

President of Planning Board SUZUKI  
Chief of 1st Sec., Planning Bd. AKINAGA  
Vice-Chief of Manchurian Affairs TAKEUCHI

Chief Secretary HORIYE

Secretary MOROHASHI  
" TAKATSUJI

ARAKI attended meeting of 12 October  
OKA " " " 20,21 October  
IIJIMA attended the meeting of 20 October  
YAMAZAKI " " " " 21 October  
HONDO " " " " 21 October  
MIKAMI " " " " 15 October  
AKINAGA " " " " 9, 12 October

PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1942)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
687	9,12,14,15, 19,20,21 October	12,071 to 12,095	301

Present

President HARA  
Vice President SUZUKI

Councillors

ISHII  
MINAMI, Hiroshi  
USHIO  
FUTAGAMI

CBATA  
TAKEGOSHE  
MIKAMI  
MITSUCHI

IZAWA  
MINAMI, Jiro  
IKEDA

Ministers of State

Premier and War Minister TOJO  
Agriculture & Forestry Minister INO  
Home Minister Yuzawa  
Foreign Minister TANI  
Navy Minister SHIMADA

Exponents

HAYASHI  
Chief Sec'y of Cabinet HOSHINO  
Chief of Legislation Bur. HORIYAMA  
Councillor of " " IRIYE  
" " " " SATO  
" " " " MIYAUCHI  
" " " " ARAKI

USAMI  
MATSUFOTO  
UEBA  
IMAYOSHI  
NAKANO  
KAWAMOTO  
KADOWAKI

President of Planning Board SUZUKI  
Chief of 1st Sec., Planning Bd. AKINAGA  
Vice-Chief of Manchurian Affairs TAKEUCHI

Chief Secretary HORIYE

Secretary MOROHASHI  
" TAKATSUJI

ARAKI attended meeting of 12 October  
OKA " " " 20,21 October  
IIJIMA attended the meeting of 20 October  
YAMAZAKI " " " " 21 October  
HONDO " " " " 21 October  
MIKAMI " " " " 15 October  
AKINAGA " " " " 9, 12 October

USANI attending meeting of 15, 19 October  
 SHIMADA " " " 20 October  
 KADOWAKI " " " 19, 20 October

Absentees

SATO absent from meeting of 9 October  
 MIYAUCHI " " " " 9, 21 October  
 HAYASHI " " " " 9, 12, 20 October  
 USHIO " " " " 14, 19, 21 October  
 TOJO " " " " 15, 19, 20 October  
 HOSHINO " " " " 15, 19, 20, 21 October  
 IRIYE " " " " 15, 19, 20 October  
 IKEDA " " " " 12 October  
 USUI " " " " 12, 15, 19, 20 October  
 MATSUMOTO " " " " 9, 12, 14, 21 October  
 UEBA " " " " 9, 12, 14, 21 October  
 IMAYOSHI " " " " 9, 12, 14, 21 October  
 NAKANO " " " " 9, 12, 14, 19 October  
 KAWAMOTO " " " " 9, 12, 14 October  
 SUZUKI (Accused) Absent from meeting of 9, 19, 20, 21 October  
 TANI " " " " 2, 9 October

Decision

No decision.

Remarks

At these meetings the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry was deliberated.

9 October 1942

TOJO said that the new Ministry was to be established  
 "In order to achieve victory, which is an absolute necessity for  
 Japan, the combined fighting power of East Asia must be streng-  
 thened. However, the various organs of Japan in the Co-Prosp-  
 erity Sphere at present are confusedly set up and find  
 difficulty in maintaining unified and active measures. Therefore  
 it is desired to establish a ministry and to appoint a responsibl



minister, thereby establishing an appropriate national policy in achieving the aforementioned aims, and to be sure of a swift and decisive execution of this policy. Moreover, Japan had already openly declared to the world the construction of Greater East Asia, so there is no need of restraint in using the term 'Greater East Asia Ministry' at this time. It is preferable to use this term voluntarily." (12072)

MINAMI (not the Accused) asked if it would not alienate the people within the sphere if Japan treated the independent countries "as mandates of Japan or as occupied territories." (12073)

TOJO replied that "this draft, from the viewpoint of achieving victory, is intended to establish an organization for the construction of Greater East Asia. In its operation close attention should be paid in regard to the alienation of the relative countries." (12073)

12 October 1942

USHIO queried into the relations of the proposed Ministry with the administration of the Southern occupied zone, stating that "it would be better to have administration in occupied zones in the interim replaced immediately by a permanent Greater East Asia Administration and thereby create a fait accompli." (12075)

In reply TOJO said "that the Southern Occupied Areas are now under military administration and, therefore, the authority of the Greater East Asia Ministry is excluded; but eventually full preparations will be made providing for the time when the Southern Occupied Area detaches itself from military administration onto civil administration. Furthermore, the military itself is desirous of having the military administration in the Southern Occupied Areas speedily replaced by civil administration; and even now designs are being made to have the Inspector General and the Inspectors of the Military Administration gradually replaced by Civil Service Officials."

TOJO also said that the scope of the Greater East Asia Sphere "will include the KWANTUNG PROVINCE, SOUTH SEA ISLAND GROUP, MANCHURIA, CHINA, SIAI, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, and the newly occupied areas brought about by the Greater East Asia War." (12,075-12,076)

14 October 1942

IZAWA pointed out the fact that in Formosa only a few native Formosans were being accepted as government and municipal officials. Now, he asked, can one expect to assimilate the different people of the Greater East Asia Sphere, in order to bring about the sound establishment of Greater East Asia, when even in quasi-homeland Formosa, such discrimination exists.

TOJO replied "that the establishment of Greater East Asia is based on the spirit of Hakko Iu (T.M. Gathering the eight corners of the world under one roof) and that it would not be difficult to assimilate even the different peoples if dealt with this spirit." TOJO continued "that subjects of territories should not purposely be excluded from being appointed as government and municipal officials and that it should gradually be reformed in accordance with the aforementioned spirit." (12,082)

15 October 1942

MINAMI (Hiroshi) inquired if it was necessary to have the Greater East Asia Minister supervise the extranormal diplomacy with countries within the Greater East Asia region.

Chief of Legislative Bureau HORIYAMA replied "that countries in the Greater East Asia Sphere are mutually in a family relationship. Therefore, the diplomacy between these countries and the diplomacy between other independent countries differ in character markedly. Moreover, since there is an intimate and inseparable relationship between foreign policies and /extranormal diplomacy/ in the Greater East Asia area, it was decided to leave the Greater East Asia Minister take charge." (12,084)

19 October 1942

At this meeting, the discussion centered around the distinction between customary and extranormal diplomacy, the former, as it affected the Greater East Asia Sphere, being under the command of the Foreign Minister; the latter being under the command of the Greater East Asia Minister. (12,086)

Foreign Minister TANI stated, in this connection, that "the relations of our Empire with the countries in the Greater East Asia sphere are somewhat the relations between relatives and it is the ideal of our Empire to have this further strengthened and developed into the relations of a single large family, and that during this period it could be eventually led to a point where diplomacy would not be needed any more. But at the present stage, due to need for respect of dignity and the exchange of documents, it is necessary that customary diplomacy be continued. Within this extent will the overseas organs come under the superintendence of the Foreign Minister." (12,086)

On the same question, the Chief of the Legislative Bureau, MORIYAMA, as well as Foreign Minister TANI, said that "the Greater East Asia Ministry, after all, assumes charge of affairs on the establishment of the Greater East Asia, and since its contents cover the various fields in politics, economy and culture, extending over the whole area of Greater East Asia, it is necessary to have all the various items of diplomatic policy toward independent nations in the Co-Prosperity Sphere be charged to the care of Greater East Asia Ministry. Moreover, it would be appropriate to have international treaties and conclusion of international treaties, etc., which are customary diplomacy, be charged to the care of the Foreign Ministry." (12,087)

20 October 1942

Nothing material.

21 October 1942

"Chairman SUZUKI proceeded to give an account of his interview with Prime Minister TOJO concerning the negotiations for the amendment of the original proposal agreed upon at the previous Committee meeting. He said that the Prime Minister was firmly determined to adhere to the original proposal, and could under no circumstances agree to the amendment, and that the Committee, therefore, had no choice but to express its views frankly when reporting the results of the investigation. All committee members expressed thanks to the chairman and decided to drop the problem."

Exhibit 90 is Imperial Ordinance 707, dated 1 November 1942 providing for the organization of the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs (12,095). Exhibit 1346 is the joint declaration of the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations, adopted on 6 November 1943. (12,098) Representatives of "the six independent nations of Japan, China, Thailand, Manchukuo, the Philippines and Burma" attended the conference, as well as "Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, as observer" (12,100). TOJO, SHIMADA, SHIGEMITSU, HOSHINO, SATO, and OKA (all accused) were present at the meeting. (12,101)

Foreign Minister TANI stated, in this connection, that "the relations of our Empire with the countries in the Greater East Asia sphere are somewhat the relations between relatives and it is the ideal of our Empire to have this further strengthened and developed into the relations of a single large family, and that during this period it could be eventually led to a point where diplomacy would not be needed any more. But at the present stage, due to need for respect of dignity and the exchange of documents, it is necessary that customary diplomacy be continued. Within this extent will the overseas organs come under the superintendence of the Foreign Minister." (12,086)

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20 October 1942

Nothing material.

21 October 1942

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PRIVY COUNCIL  
(1743)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1275	18 August	11,364	304

Present

President HATA  
Vice President SUZUKI

Councillors

APIYA	MATSUMURA	KANEKOSHI
KUROTA	USHIO	MITSUCHI
SHIMIZU	HAYASHI	ICEDA
MINAMI, Hiroshi	FUKUI	MIYAMA, Jiro
HATA	FUTAGAKI	YOTOJI
SUGAWARA	OPAEI	KURO

State Ministers

TOJO  
AOKI  
SHIGEMITSU

Expositors

NOBIYAMA	SONE	OKA
SATO	MITSUDAIRA	YAMAGUCHI
MIYANISHI	SUYAMA	MIZUNO
KIMURA	SATO	HAGIWARA
ANDO	S.KAMETARA	YAMADA
		MIYAKE

Secretaries

HOFIE  
MORCHISHI  
TATEUCHI

Decision

No decision stated in the record.

Remarks

Exhibit 1275 is the record of the meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council relative to the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Malaya and Shan areas.

MINAMI became a Member of the Privy Council on 29 May 1942.

The treaty provided that Thailand should annex the Shan states from Burma.

TOJO said that "because only a few years had passed since Thailand's cession of the territories, which she was about to re-acquire, her desires had been very strong" and for this reason "Japan was trying to recognize Thailand's reacquisition of these territories...." (11,365)

In answer to a question regarding the effect of the treaty on international law, MORIYAMA, Director of the Bureau of Legislation replied "that it was the popular opinion according to International Law that occupying nations had no territorial rights in occupied areas, and, therefore such treaties for territorial cession in the occupied area should not be concluded. However, on the other hand as an occupying nation was conducting the administration for occupied areas, in other words, military administration, and there was no special regulation stipulating that we should continue this condition forever, it should be perfectly all right to agree that there would be no objections to our abolishing the military administration in the occupied area and letting a third power annex such territories!" (11366) He explained that the "treaty between Japan and Thailand would be concluded in this spirit." (11366)

In answer to a similar question by HAYASHI, TOJO said that "International Law should be observed so long as the enemy observed it; but that International Law should be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according to our own opinions, and that he considered the present measure as being perfectly justified by International Law." (11367)

MIYAMA became a Member of the Privy Council on 29 May 1942.

The treaty provided that Thailand should annex the Shan states from Burma.

TOJO said that "because only a few years had passed since Thailand's cession of the territories, which she was about to re-acquire, her desires had been very strong" and for this reason "Japan was trying to recognize Thailand's reacquisition of these territories...." (11,365)

In answer to a question regarding the effect of the treaty on international law, KOFIYAMA, Director of the Bureau of Legislation replied "that it was the popular opinion according to International Law that occupying nations had no territorial rights in occupied areas, and, therefore such treaties for territorial cession in the occupied area should not be concluded. However, on the other hand as an occupying nation was conducting the administration for occupied areas, in other words, military administration, and there was no special regulation stipulating that we should continue this condition forever, it should be perfectly all right to agree that there would be no objections to our abolishing the military administration in the occupied area and letting a third power annex such territories" (11366) He explained that the "treaty between Japan and Thailand would be concluded in this spirit." (11366)

In answer to a similar question by HAYASHI, TOJO said that "International Law should be observed so long as the enemy observed it; but that International Law should be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according to our own opinions, and that he considered the present measure as being perfectly justified by International Law." (11367)

## FUNCTIONS OF THE CABINET

Although the Cabinet is the chief executive organ of the government, there is no specific reference to the Cabinet in the Constitution. If included at all, it is only by implication. The only article which may be said to have application to that body is article LV which provides:

"The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. All laws, Imperial Ordinances and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the State, require the counter-signature of a Minister of State." (650-651)

Yet notwithstanding these facts, the Cabinet exists as a collective body composed of departmental ministers under the presidency of a minister president for the purpose of initiating, directing and carrying out the general policies of the government and to serve as a channel through which the Imperial prerogative over general affairs is placed in operation....(651) .... Article I of the Imperial Rescript on the Functions of the Cabinet provides: "The Cabinet is composed of the various Ministers of State." (651)

According to article LV of the Constitution, the Cabinet Ministers, or Ministers of State, are responsible for the advice which they give to the Emperor. The Constitution, however, as Prince ITO in his Commentaries explains, is silent about the person or persons to whom they are responsible and for what they are responsible, and the nature of the responsibility. (652)

As to the person to whom there is responsibility, there is unanimity among the constitutional jurists that in legal principle, the ministers of state are primarily directly responsible to the Emperor and that no other organ of the State may question their legal responsibility or remove them from office. (652)

This primary responsibility to the Emperor is inescapable as to matters of state, even though the Emperor has sought out the advice of other constitutional and extracconstitutional bodies. (654)

While there has been some dispute as to whether cabinet responsibility is an individual responsibility or a collective one, the majority of experts have tended to regard the responsibility as that of the individual minister of state. In practice, the Cabinet has actually assumed collective responsibility under the leadership of the Premier. (654)

The Cabinet as the chief administrative organ with respect to general affairs of state has wide legislative powers, a portion of which is exercised in conjunction with other governmental bodies.



### Functions of the Cabinet (Cont'd)

Under the provisions of Article LV of the Constitution, the Cabinet exercises the legislative powers of the Emperor under Article V, VII, VIII, IX and X of that instrument. (654)

The Cabinet exercises the legislative power conferred upon the Diet together with the Diet in one of the following manners: (656)

1. Through initiation of legislation. Since the elimination of political parties, initiation by the Cabinet has been the sole method used for the introduction of legislation.

2. Through the exercise of the power to approve or disapprove legislation introduced by a member of the Diet.

In addition the Cabinet exercises control over the legislative power of the Diet by the provisions of the Constitution wherein the Diet is denied the power to convene of its own accord and wherein the Diet may be prorogued, or in the case of the House of Representatives, dissolved by the Cabinet.

3. The Cabinet, however, exercises power either by itself or in conjunction with governmental organs other than the Diet.

When the Diet is not in session, the Cabinet exercises the legislative power through the issuance of Imperial Ordinances as provided in Article VIII of the Constitution. This power is an extensive one and is shared in part with the Privy Council. As the Diet Session ordinarily does not exceed three months in length, as provided in the Constitution, Article XLII, the Cabinet exercises the legislative power without Diet concurrence for the greater part of the year. Although the Diet has the power of disapproval of Imperial Ordinances, the power has been rarely exercised, and even if exercised can be obviated by the reissuances of the disapproved ordinance immediately after the adjournment of the Diet. (657)

In addition the Cabinet has legislative powers over and above those of the Diet in the treaty-making power, which is in no way shared with the Diet, and through the general ordinance power. (657)

One other phase of power which is shared by Cabinet and the Diet is the financial power. (657)

While generally the Diet has legislative power with respect to finances, that of the Cabinet is much broader. (661-662)

First, the Diet, except in the case of an increase, cannot touch the funds allotted to the Imperial household.

Second, the Cabinet can prevent the Diet from reducing or rejecting any of the following items:

### Functions of the Cabinet (Cont'd)

(i) Expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor.

(ii) Expenditures which have arisen by the effect of law such as treaty obligations.

(iii) Expenditures that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government.

Third, the Cabinet has wide financial powers not subject to prohibitory control of the Diet in the following instances:

(i) The use of a Continuing Expenditure Fund which may be set up by a friendly Diet for use in adverse times.

(ii) A reserve fund which the Diet must mandatorily provide.

(iii) The right to make expenditures in excess of the Budget subject to the subsequent approbation of the Diet, which is of little value after an expenditure has been made.

(iv) The right to issue an Imperial ordinance for all financial measures in the event the Diet is not in session and cannot be convoked subject only to subsequent approval by the Diet which is of little value in the case of a fait accompli.

(v) The right to always use the Budget and appropriations of the previous year regardless of the decision of the Diet. (661-662)

Like the legislative branch of the government, the executive department of the Japanese government is not a single agency. Basically, all executive power is vested in the Emperor. It is exercised, in fact, by the Cabinet and its agencies, the composite of the military and naval agencies known as the "Supreme Command" and the Privy Council. Conflicts of jurisdiction exist within and between these bodies. (663)

While the Cabinet exercises the chief governmental functions of formulating general policy, determining the modes of the exercise of the authority vested in the Throne formulating the legislative program and by leading the Diet, its effectiveness as the chief governing organ of Japan is severely limited by its dual nature. This "duality" of the Cabinet is due to two factors: (1) the peculiar position held by the ministers of war and navy within the cabinet; and (2) the nature of the personnel holding the offices of the ministries of war and navy. (664)

The ministers of war and navy possess the important right of iaiku joso or the right of direct access to the Throne. In this respect it should be noted that all Cabinet Ministers have the right of access to the Throne. However, the right of the war and navy

### Functions of the Cabinet (Cont'd)

ministers to approach the Throne is greater than that of other ministers and is coequal with that of the Prime Minister. While the other ministers of state are responsible in every way to the cabinet for the carrying out of their duties and for advice given to the Throne, the Cabinet does not have such complete control over the war and navy ministers since they have the right of access to the Throne on matters on matters which are kept secret from the other members of the Cabinet except the Premier. (664) This superior right is recognized in Article VII of the Imperial Ordinance on the Functions of the Cabinet which provides: (665)

"Such matters as concern military secrets and military orders and are reported to the Emperor, unless referred to the Cabinet by the Emperor, shall be reported to the Prime Minister by the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy." (665)

The importance of the right is further intensified by the fact that the Premier is limited by law in the choice of qualified personnel in the filling of these positions. By Imperial Ordinance 193 of May 9, 1900, the war minister must be a general or lieutenant general and the navy minister must be an admiral or vice-admiral in active service. On June 13, 1913, Admiral Yamamoto succeeded in widening the qualification to include those on the reserve lists, but since the administration of Premier HIRATA in 1936 the qualifications have been limited to those in active service. Because of the requirement of active service, the army and navy have control of the appointment of the respective persons to the war and navy ministries. This power is exercised for the army by a triumvirate consisting of the outgoing Secretary of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Director General of Military Education; and for the navy by a similar group holding the correlative offices in that branch of the service. (665)

The results of this duality of organization have been as follows: (666)

First, by failing to appoint a war minister or a navy minister, either the army or navy could prevent the formation of a cabinet or control the naming of the personnel thereof.

Second, by compelling the war or navy ministers, subject to the orders of the high command because of their active service status, to resign, either the army or the navy could bring about the resignation of the Cabinet.

Third, through the use of the right of direct access to the Throne, the war and navy ministers have been able to obtain the establishment of policy which is contrary to the opinions of the Premier and the other members of his cabinet or which is kept entirely secret from them.

Functions of the Cabinet (Cont'd)

The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and the Navy but he does not exercise it through the Cabinet but through the minister of war, the minister of the navy, the chiefs of the general staff and the chief aide-de-camp to the Emperor, all of whom have direct access to the Emperor and who are directly responsible to him. The Emperor is also assisted in the exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command by organs which are separate from, and independent of, those which advise the Throne over general affairs of state. (669)

CABINET MEETING  
(1931)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
162	19-20 September	1554; 1555	--
	21-23 September	1562	

Present

(At the time of the Mukden outbreak the following held the positions indicated. (1556))

SUGIYAMA, Vice War Minister  
KANEYAMA, Hanzo, Chief, Army Gen. Staff  
MIYACHIYA, Harushige, Vice Chief Army General Staff  
KOISO, Kuniaki, Gen., Chief, Military Affairs Bureau

Cabinet Members

2nd WAKATSUKI Cabinet

- ministers -

(Prime) WAKATSUKI, Reijiro  
(Foreign) SHIDEMARU, Aijuro  
(Home) ADACHI, Kenzo  
(Finance) INOUE, Junnosuke  
(War) MINAMI, Jiro  
(Navy) ABO, Kiyotane  
(Justice) MATSUZAKI, Chifuyu  
(Education) TANAKA, Ryuzo  
(Commerce) SAKURAI, Yukio  
(Communication) KOIZUMI, Matajiro  
(Railway) HARA, Shujiro

Decision

No reference to a decision.

Remarks

Premier WAKATSUKI in his direct examination (his affidavit) stated inter alia as follows:

The first his Cabinet knew of the Mukden Incident was on September 19, 1931, the day after the outbreak; MINAMI (accused) on September 20, 1931, at a Cabinet meeting, reported that "for strategic and tactical reasons it had been necessary for the Japanese Imperial Forces to pursue the Chinese troops a certain distance into Chinese territory as a protection measure which would, in no sense be expanded;" on 22d and 23d September 1931, MINAMI reported further

expansion, saying that on the night of 22 September 1931 General HAYASHI, Commander-in-Chief of Korean Army, moved across the Yalu River, hereby invading Manchuria; MINAMI said it was true that General HAYASHI moved without Imperial Sanction or without authority from the Cabinet or the War Minister or the Chief of Staff; but that he, General HAYASHI, had received an urgent request from the Kwangtung Army for aid; though MINAMI agreed to put into effect the Cabinet policy (cease operations in Manchuria) day after day expansion continued; MINAMI showed maps daily containing a line of boundary beyond which the Army would not go, but daily this boundary line was ignored and further expansion was reported but always with assurance that each expansion was the final one; MINAMI "failed to control the Army in Manchuria and had not carried out the unanimous policy of the Cabinet in this matter, therefore, I resigned as Prime Minister and my Cabinet with me" (1557) Affidavit signed "R. WAKATSUKI."

See Ex. 57, Lytton Report, Page 71 "all the forces in Manchuria, and some in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of September 18th over the whole area of the South Manchurian Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur."

CABINET MEETING  
(1931)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
923	24 September	9350; 1339	6, 7

Present

Cabinet Members - 24 September 1931

2nd WAKATSUKI Cabinet (See Exhibit 162 herein - Cabinet Meetings 1931)

Decision

Adopted a resolution that Japan had no territorial ambitions. (Cross examination of SHIDEHARA (1339))

Remarks

Stimson sent a telegram that a note should be delivered to the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 24, 1931, stating that the American Government hoped that Japan and China would refrain from further hostilities.

The Japanese Government replied that "it may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria." (9350)

CABINET MEETING  
(1931)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Serial</u>
189	24 September	2241	7

Present

Cabinet Members - 24 September 1931

2nd WAKATSUKI Cabinet (See Exhibit 162 herein - Cabinet Meeting 1931)

Decision

No reference to any decision.

Remarks

(Excerpts from Exhibit 58, being a telegram showing certain assurances given by Japan to the United States and being a statement issued after the Extraordinary Cabinet Meeting of 24 September 1931.)

The Statement said inter alia:

There were some detachments in Mukden and Korea and a small number of men in a few other places, but "nowhere does a state of military occupation as such exist." (2243)

A mixed brigade of 4,000 men were sent from Korea to join the Manchurian garrison but the total number of men didn't exceed the number set by treaty; the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria. (2244)

But see Exhibit 181 (2180) a telegram from General HAYASHI at Mukden on 19 September to SHIDEHARA stating that although China had declared that she would act on the non-resistance principle absolutely, Staff Officer SAKIGAKI (T.N. probably a mistake for ITAGAKI) said "it was the Army's intention to see it through thoroughly" because the Chinese Army had attacked the Japanese Army and because the matter "concerned the prestige of the State and the Army..." (2180)

See also Exhibit 181--another telegram from General HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA stating that the Army was planning to start positive operations simultaneously throughout the various places along the Manchurian Railway Zone. (2183)

See also Lytton Report, Exhibit 57, for the Japanese Army's successive military movement into the interior of



Manchuria at Chenchun, Karan, Nenki Bridge, Tsitsihar,  
Chenchow and Harbin.

When L.R.M.I became War Minister on 13 December 1931 reinforcements were sent to Manchuria until the country was completely overrun by Japanese forces and in the spring of 1933 Jehol was invaded and made a part of Manchukuo. (See Summary of Proof--"Japanese military aggression in Manchuria" page 25)

CABINET MEETING  
(1931)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
188-B	Between 13-17 December	2218	---
188-C	Between 13-17 December	2219-2221	13

Present

INUKAI, Prime Minister  
ARAKI, War Minister  
OSUMI, Navy Minister (deceased)  
TAKAHASHI, Finance Minister (deceased)  
MORI, Secretary of the Cabinet (deceased)  
and all other members of INUKAI's Cabinet (2221; 2223)

Cabinet

INUKAI Cabinet

(Prime)	INUKAI, Takeshi
(Home)	NAKABASHI, Tokugoro
(Finance)	TAKAHASHI, Korekiyo
(War)	ARAKI, Sadao
(Navy)	OSUMI, Mineo
(Justice)	SUZUKI, Kisaburo
(Education)	HATOYAMA, Ichiro
(Agriculture)	YAMAMOTO, Teijiro
(Commerce)	YAYEDA, Yonezo
(Communication)	MITSUCHI, Chuzo
(Railway)	TOKONAMI, Takejiro
(Overseas)	HATA, Toyosuke

Decision

Approved ARAKI's military budget to pacify and occupy the four provinces of Manchuria then under Chang Hsueh-Liang viz. Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol. The matter of the budget was referred to the Privy Council (with the Emperor present) which also approved it on 17 December 1931. (2219)

Remarks

The meeting of the Privy Council on 17 December 1931 was an extraordinary one. (2222) In answer to a question as to why it was so ARAKI replied, "It was really an emergency session, as expenditures were required which would ordinarily have to be passed by the Diet and the Diet was not in session at the time." (2232)

ARAKI in his interrogation stated that, "After I became War Minister, I discussed the policy of the occupation of General Chang's four provinces to clear up the Manchurian situation. After I had made the plan up myself with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister, all agreed with me. The Prime Minister approached the Privy Council for approval." (2218)

He further stated that, "Until this time (17 December 1931) there had been no fixed policy, and it was realized that the absence of policy would result in the spreading of hostilities. It had been decided that the three provinces comprising Chang Hsueh-liang's territory required pacification, but a statement by Chang Hsueh-liang to the effect that his jurisdiction extended over four territories expanded the scene of activities to Jehol. Chang Hsueh-liang was originally at Ching Chow (Chinchow). He later withdrew to Jehol from where he conducted his government." (2221)

In the middle of July 1932 under the pretext that a Japanese officer named ISHIMOTO was missing, the Japanese started to invade Jehol. They were repulsed. After occupying certain key points the strategical situation of Jehol became very critical. On 22 February 1933 the Japanese Army sent to the Chinese an ultimatum stating that Jehol was not Chinese territory and demanding that Chinese forces in the Jehol Province be withdrawn within 24 hours. On 25 February 1933 war broke out and Jehol fell into Japanese hands on 2 March 1933. (KOISO--accused--was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army from August 1932 to March 1934; ARAKI--accused--was Minister of War during this time.) (2269-70). The conquest of Jehol was concluded by the Tang-ku Truce of 31 May 1933 (Exhibit 193 - 2273-2274)

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1932)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
222	12 March	2817; 2784	16

Present

Cabinet Members - 1 March 1932

INUKAI Cabinet (See Exhibit 188-B, herein, Cab. Meeting 1931)

Decision

The basic plan for Management of Foreign Relations accompanying the foundation of the New Manchuria-Mongol State.

Remarks

On 15 September 1932 Japan recognized Manchukuo.

Exhibit 222 is Part II of "Outline for Management of Foreign Relations with the Foundation of the New Manchuria-Mongol State" decided by the Cabinet around 1 March 1932. By the provisions of this outline Japan hoped to lead the new Manchuria-Mongol State to gradually develop, first internally and then in matters of foreign relation.

Under this outline Japan was to render "all sorts of aids," and to "let her declare the plans of keeping with the Open-Door and Equal Opportunity principles so as she can avoid the intervention of powers;" Manchukuo was to gain control of Customs by tactful means in order not to create unfavorable influence upon Japan's foreign relations, especially since the Pairen customs were located in an area controlled by Japan. Japan was to establish factual contact with the new state by unofficial means, e.g. by private law contracts and by local agreement between Japanese officials in Manchukuo and the new state or its officials; Manchukuo was to be allowed to "appoint small number of Japanese as the officials or councillors at first which may be enlarged gradually later." (2817-2819) The seizure of military power was to be justified upon the "right of subjugating bandits and the policy of protecting Empire subjects which were recognized by the League Council." (2819)

Two plans were devised regarding the disposition of the Manchurian Maritime Customs. The existing maritime customs in China were organized upon the basis of agreements on several occasions since 1854 between China and foreign countries and China had the obligation not to change the customs until 1943. The other powers, especially Britain, attached great

importance to the Chinese Customs system. The Customs' income was used as security for Chinese debts to foreign countries. Japan could not instruct the Kwantung Government to approve the seizure of Dairen customs by the new State before Japan's recognition of it because of the Established Fact of Dairen Customs in 1907. (2819-2520 - Excerpt also)

According to the First Plan the Customs organization in Manchuria could be preserved but, aside from the security for foreign loans, the income from maritime customs, including those from Dairen, should be seized by the new State. According to the Second Plan all customs should be seized except that of Dairen but the income allotted for security for foreign debts should be sent to the Customs General or deposited in a bank in view of respecting foreign security rights. The Second Plan was to be used only if the first failed. (2820)

ARAKI in his interrogation refers to a Cabinet meeting of February or March 1932 to form the Administration Committee to set up the new State (2784). The Commander-in-Chief (KONJ) of the Kwantung Army requested that Henry Fu-Yi be made head of the new government. ARAKI said various Japanese Government officials had been sent to help in the organization of Manchuria. (2784)

CABINET MEETING  
(1932)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
223	11 April	2825 <u>Present</u>	15

Cabinet Members - 11 April 1932

INUKAI Cabinet (See Exhibit 188-b herein, Cab. Meeting 1931)

Decision

On April 11, 1932, the Cabinet decided "The Empire's Practical Assistance and Guidance Towards the New State of Manchuria and Mongolia."

Remarks

To bring about a single self-sufficient economic unit of Japan and Manchukuo by effecting control over the industries of the two countries, authoritative leaders were required, according to this Exhibit. To effect this two measures were to be taken: (1) The new State was to employ authoritative advisers from Japan who were to be the highest advisers in connection with financial, economic and general political problems; (2) The new State was to appoint Japanese Nationals to the leading posts in the Privy Council, the Central Bank and other organs of the new State. (2826)

CABINET MEETING  
(1932)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
224	3 May	2827	17

Present

Cabinet Members - 3 May 1932

INUKAI Cabinet (See Exhibit 182-B, herein, Cab. Meetings 1931)

Decision

Adopted "The General Principle of the Policy Concerning Construction of the Kirin-Tunghua Railway Extension Line." (2827)

Remarks

This decision concerned the construction of the extension and the method of payment therefor. (2828) This shows Japan was in May 1932 determining the policy of management and construction of railways in Manchukuo.

CABINET MEETING  
(1932)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
225	12 August	2830	---

Present

Cabinet Members - 12 August 1932

SAITO Cabinet

(Prime)	SAITO, Makoto
(Foreign)	UCHIDA, Yasuya
(Home)	YAMAMOTO, Tatsuo
(Finance)	TAKAHASHI, Korekiyo
(War)	ARAKI, Sadao
(Navy)	OSUMI, Mineo
(Justice)	KOYAMA, Matsukichi
(Education)	HATOYAMA, Ichiro
(Agriculture)	GOTO, Furio

Decision

The document refers to a decision of the Japanese Government of 18 November 1930 to open negotiations with China concerning the acquisition of aviation rights in Manchuria and Mongolia. Negotiations were unsuccessful. On November 11, 1931 the Cabinet decided to make the Japan Air Transportation Company temporarily open the regular Chang Chung-Dairen-Mukden air route and the Seoul-Pinghsiang-Mukden route on the pretext of military communication and for the purpose of establishing the foundation for acquiring aviation rights in Manchuria and Mongolia and at the same time insuring communications between Kwantung Army Units. (2831) But after Japan got control of Manchukuo it decided to turn the military air service into a standing business organ and give it permanency. It was also decided that the management of aviation in Manchuria and Mongolia should be operated so as to contribute to the execution of the Imperial aviation policy, viz. the accomplishment of European-Asiatic air line, the development of industries and the preparation of acquiring aviation rights in China proper. (2832) The Cabinet decided that a Joint Company of Japanese and Manchurians should be organized --a corporation organized in Manchukuo with total control in Japan's hands. Subsidies were to be supplied by the Manchurian Government and the South Manchurian Railway Company. (2832-3)



Rerarks

The policy of the aviation corporation was to meet the demands of national defense and to contribute to the advance of Japan's aviation enterprise and the economical development of Manchukuo. (2833)

CABINET MEETING  
(1932)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
229	12 August	2900	19

Present

All of SAITO's Cabinet (acc. to ARAKI) (2900)

Cabinet Members - 12 August 1932

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1932)

Decision

Decided to formally recognize Manchukuo on 15 September 1932.

Remarks

According to ARAKI the Foreign Minister proposed the resolution to recognize Manchukuo.

Long before the military occupation of Manchuria was completed, puppet governments were set up in the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. The machinery for performing this function was planned long in advance. The Self-Government Guiding Board was set up in Mukden as early as the latter part of September 1931, according to the testimony of KASAGI, Ryomei (2791). Although the board had a Chinese Chairman, it was controlled by the Japanese and financed by the Kwantung Army. KASAGI testified that all of its policies and activities had to be approved by ITAGAKI (accused) and the information as to which Chinese would be friendly to Japan's plans and would serve as willing collaborators was furnished by DOIHARA (accused). (2971) He also testified that of the 120 members of this guidance board only about 15 were Chinese or Manchurians (2793).

The Lytton Report (Pages 88-99) shows in detail how the board fostered and developed the so-called "Independence Movements" of the various cities and provinces and finally the establishment of the independent State of Manchukuo.

On March 9, 1932, Henry Pu-Yi was installed as Regent but he became a mere puppet, every department of his government being under the control of Japanese advisers, secretaries or assistants (Lytton Report p. 106).

See Exhibit 234 for a decision of the Cabinet, dated 22 December 1933 that the Government of Manchukuo should be changed from a regency to a constitutional monarchy.

To give a color of legality to Japan's actions, in view of her part treaties, the independent State was set up. HASHIMOTO claimed credit for this suggestion (1969). At the insistence of ITAGAKI and ARAKI and others, the State was set up before the Lytton Report had been filed. By treaties and secret agreements with the new government Japan acquired full control of Manchukuo. See the testimony of OKADA, TANAKA and MORISHIMA and McKensie's Summary, p. 32.

CABINET MEETING  
(1932)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
231	9 December	2919	21

Present

(Cabinet Members - 9 December 1932)

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1932)

Decision

Decided the policy of controlling the communication system of Manchuria and that a treaty to this effect should be concluded with Manchuria.

Remarks

In order to carry out the policy of the government regarding communications for the purposes of national defense and the economic development of Manchuria the Cabinet decided that a treaty relating to the establishment of a joint enterprise to establish and operate under Japanese and Manchurian control the communications systems of Manchuria should be concluded between Ambassador MATO (not the accused) and delegates of the Manchurian Government. (2920)

To the treaty there was an "annexed paper of the secret official exchange document" the matters concerning which were to be "prescribed in the secret command relating to the company of both the governments." (2922) The annexed document was to provide that in case the Japanese and the Manchurians differed, the opinion of the Japanese was to prevail; that the highest military authorities of both countries (in Manchuria) could give instructions to the company of a military nature and could dispatch to the company a necessary number of men and inspect the communicating organs, the execution of business etc.; that the highest military authorities in both countries (in Manchuria) were to be given the right to employ all personnel of the company, "to practice supervision and inspection when necessary from the view point of national defense or the maintenance of public order ..." (2923) But "the highest military organs of Manchuria must obtain previously, approval of highest military organs of Japan stationed in Manchuria when intending to indicate an inspection or to make demands of the said company. (2923-4)

The treaty was concluded on 26 March 1933.

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1933)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
381	11 April	4708	23

Present

Cabinet Members - 11 April 1933

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1932)

Decision

Cabinet decision of 11 April 1933 decided that the raw opium in the custody of the Government-General of Korea could be transferred to the Government of Manchukuo as a temporary measure (4709). The Cabinet decision of 23 December 1938 decided that the acreage necessary for increased poppy-growing should be increased. (4709)

Remarks

According to the decision of the Cabinet on April 11th, Showa 8 (1933), the raw opium in the custody of the Government-General of Korea was allowed to be transferred to the Government of Manchukuo as a temporary measure; thereafter raw opium produced in Korea may be transferred to the Government of Manchukuo for the sake of cooperation with its monopoly system, besides being supplied as materials for the opium monopolies of the Government-General of Formosa and the Kwantun Bureau. Accordingly, it was submitted to the Opium Committee for deliberation on December 12, Showa 13 (1938), that the quantity of raw opium to be supplied or transferred to the Government-General of Formosa, the Kwantung Leased territory and the Government of Manchukuo, and the acreage for poppy-growing necessary to produce the required quantities of opium should be decided upon after consultation by the authorities concerned. It was passed by the Committee on the same day, and it was decided upon by the Cabinet on December 23rd of the same year. (4709)

It was estimated that there would be an increase of 4900 acres during the fiscal year of 1939 and the total acreage was expected to amount to about 17,150 acres. (4709)

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1933)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
233	8 August	2926	23

Present

Cabinet Members - 8 August 1933

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1932)

Decision

Decided the fundamental policy of Japan of guiding Manchuria based upon the Japanese-Manchurian Protocol. Manchuria was to become an independent nation possessing indivisible relations with Japan.

Remarks

Exhibit 241 gives the terms of 15 September 1932 treaty (recognition).

In a letter to the Vice Minister of War dated 3 November 1932 KOISO (accused)--Exhibit 230 (2903-2911), Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, enclosed "An Outline for Guiding Manchukuo" prepared by the staff section of the Kwantung Army, based upon a draft for such a plan prepared by the Second Section of the General Staff Headquarters. This policy provided that Manchukuo should be supported and developed as an independent state but should adapt herself to the Japanese national policy for the purpose of realizing full prosperity and harmony between the two countries. It further provided that the government of Manchukuo in the future should nominally be a constitutional Empire but substantially was to be autocratic, and the participation of the people in the legislature was to be only by those people selected by the Government. (2904)

The gist of the plan was that the administration of Manchukuo should be backed for the time being by the inner leadership of the Commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army and carried out by officials of Japanese lineage, although officials of Manchukuoan lineage would outwardly appear to be in charge. (2904) When an organ of civilian administration was established, the commander of the Kwantung Army should be

chief of that organ. (2905) Arrangements shall be aimed at the maintenance of peace and order.(2907) Economically, there was to be established a "bloc" between Japan and Manchukuo.(2907) Diplomatically, her attitude was to be anti-Chinese in principle, although outwardly it was to be one of non-interference. For the time being, Manchukuo was to advocate the Open Door Policy toward the United States and the Soviet Governments. (2908)

Regarding the adjustment of relations between Japan and Manchukuo were set out in detail, the plan provided for the joint defense of both countries; that each industry was to be given a suitable locality either in Japan or Manchukuo, with the aim of abolishing mutual customs barriers and for purposes of joint defense (2905); that for some time political parties should not be permitted to exist, and Japan should lead the general situation skillfully according to the principle of "Let the people follow blindly." (2909) Japanese were to occupy key positions (2909) and racial struggle was to be avoided if possible (2910); but, if unavoidable, military power should be used (2910); "under the direction of the Army, preventive measures shall be taken against political and ideological movements for national destruction which may arise from the inside or outside of the country." (2909)

Exhibit 233 (Cabinet decision of above date) is actually a combination of Exhibit 241 (Treaty of Recognition) (above) and Exhibit 230 (Outline for Guiding Manchukuo--prepared by the Kwantung Army)(above)but it has greater official sanctions since it was decided by the Cabinet with some elaborations on items mentioned in the other documents.

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1933)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
234	22 December	2933	24

Present

Cabinet Members - 22 December 1933

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cabinet Meeting 1932)

Decision

Decided that the Government of Manchukuo should be changed from that of a Regency to that of a constitutional monarchy.

Remarks

The decision says in part (2934-2935) that

"when preparations are completed, Manchukuo will be directed to enforce the monarchy."

"I. It must be made clear that the enforcement of monarchy is not a restoration of the Shin regime, which was an autocracy of followers of the monarch, but the foundation of national constitution of a new Manchukuo, and all causes of hindrances to the development of the Manchurian state affairs and the execution of the national policy must be nullified, especially to contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the Japanese and Manchurian national defense power necessary to overcome the international crisis which we may encounter before long. Accordingly, the enforcement of the monarchy must act upon the following three essential points." (2934)

Point one: When enforcing the monarchy necessary reforms shall be made so that there will be no hindrance or check-up on the development of state affairs of Manchukuo and upon the execution of our national policies." (2935) Point three, states that: "It shall be kept in mind that though the monarchy will be carried into effect, there will be no change in the policy or spirit of directing Manchukuo and that there shall be no hindrance whatever



to the execution of national policies." (2935)

The instrument then provided for an exchange of letters between the two governments and outlined the details for setting up the new monarchy.

Exhibit 235 is a certificate from the Japanese Foreign Office showing that the notes referred to were actually exchanged between the Japanese Ambassador and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo, on March 1, 1934, the very day the monarchy was inaugurated.

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1934)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record name</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
236	20 March	2030	25

Present

Cabinet Members - 20 March 1934

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cab Meetings 1932)

Decision

Japan decided to dominate and control Manchuria by unifying and developing her principal industries.

Remarks

Exhibit 236 sets forth how the industries of Manchukuo should be controlled. It shows that Manchukuo was so much a puppet government of Japan that the Japanese Cabinet determined how the principal industries of Manchukuo should be organized and developed to meet the "demands of the Japanese Empire's national defense."

CABINET MEETING  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
260	11 July	2455	48

Present

Cabinet Members - 11 July 1937

1st KONOYE Cabinet

(Premier)	KONOYE, Fumimaro
(Foreign)	HIROTA, Koki
(Interior)	BABA, Yeichi
(Finance)	KAYA, Okinori
(War)	SUGIYAMA, Gen
(Navy)	YONAI, Mitsunasa
(Justice)	SHIONO, Suehiko
(Agriculture)	ARIMA, Yoriyasu
(Commerce)	YOSHINO, Shinji
(Communication)	NAGAI, Ryutaro
(Railway)	NAKAJIMA, Chikuhei
(Overseas Welfare)	OTANI, Sonyu

Decision

According to Ching Teh-chun's cross-examination, the Japanese Cabinet under KONOYE on 11 July 1937, passed a resolution to send "a bigger number of Army to North China."

Remarks

No other reference to this meeting in the record.

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
239	22 October	2960	55

Present

Cabinet Members - 22 October 1937

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

Decision

Decided to form a powerful national political company to establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo.

Remarks

One half of the capital needed was to be invested by the Manchurian government and the other half "will be investigated by the Privates." This company was to invest and take leadership in the iron, steel, light metal industries as well as in heavy industries concerned with the construction of motor cars and airplanes (2963). It could also invest in and manage "annexedly" the enterprises relating to gold, mining, zinc, lead, copper and other mining industries. Companies then in existence were to be transferred to and managed by the new company.

CABINET MEETING  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Supp. Summ.</u>
2255	27 October	16,218	9

Present

Cabinet Members in 27 October 1937

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

KIDO stated in his diary that on 27 October 1937, he attended the extraordinary session of the Cabinet where a decision was made on the statement and answer to the invitation to the Conference in connection with the Nine-Power pact. (16,218)

CABINET MEETING  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Supp. Summ.</u>
2258	19 November	16,221	9-10

Present

Cabinet Members - 19 November 1937

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

Decision

The Cabinet decided the liaison between Imperial General Headquarters and the Government.

Remarks

KIDO stated in his Diary of 19 November 1937, that at a Cabinet session on that day they decided the liaison between the Imperial General HQ and the Government. KIDO was of the opinion that Imperial General HQ regulations covered incidents as well as war. When he asked the War Minister if the degree and extent of an incident had been studied, the War Minister replied that he considered that Imperial General HQ would only be established if the incident had extended to the point of a declaration of war or the Army mobilization had been ordered. (16,221)

CABINET MEETING  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Supp. Summ.</u>
2259	21 December	16,222	10

Present

Cabinet Members - 21 December 1937.

1st KONOYE Cabinet (see Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

Decision

See remarks.

Remarks

KIDO stated in his diary that on 21 December 1937, he attended a Cabinet Meeting where negotiations with China, draft answer to the German Ambassador, and counter measures for the China Affair were discussed. KIDO urged the necessity of creating cultural measures in North China. (16,222)

CABINET MEETING  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Supp. Summ.</u>
2260	14 January	16,223	10

Present

Cabinet Members - 14 January 1938

First KONGYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1937)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

KIHO recorded in his diary a Cabinet meeting on 14 January 1938, where the epoch making announcement concerning the China Affair was discussed. Chiang Kai-Shek's answer was considered as lacking sincerity, and the Cabinet decided to announce a fixed policy that they would have nothing to do with the National Government, but would negotiate with the new Chinese Government and join in the promotion of a newly rising China and the peace of Asia. (16,223)

Exhibit 463-A is "Document purporting to establish provisional Government at Peiping and Restoration Government at Nanking" (5296). It refers to a Cabinet meeting held "soon after the establishment of the Provisional Government" (5301) which decided the "Fundamental Principles to Manage the Incident (5301). According to these principles, the "Japanese Government will cooperate with the Nanking Government to save the situation if the Nanking Government reconsiders. However, if the Nanking Government does not reconsider and continues the so-called long-term resistance, Japan will not expect to negotiate with the Nanking Government in the future, and furthermore to meet the necessity to manage the vast areas occupied by the Japanese forces, henceforth, Japan will take separate measures." (5301)

Exhibit 972-A is the "Announcement of the Japanese Government Relative to the China Incident," 16 January 1938. It said that "the Japanese Government will cease from henceforward to deal with that Government, and they look forward to the establishment and growth of a new Chinese regime, harmonious coordination with which can really be counted upon. With



such a régime they will full cooperate for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations and for the building up of a rejuvenated China." (9567)

See Exhibit 463-A, herein, under Imperial Conference, 1938, for a reference to the decision of the Imperial Conference regarding the disposition of the China Incident. (5302)

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
486	16 January	6002	63

Present

Cabinet Members - 16 January 1938

1st KONOIE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

Decision

The Exhibit refers to but does not set forth any decision.

Remarks

Exhibit 486 shows that shortly after a cabinet meeting of 16 January 1938, it was considered necessary that Germany's policy regarding the Japanese aggression in China be re-oriented. (Introductory remarks 601). A Japanese victory should be anticipated as well as China's turning more towards Russian communism. The policy of armament shipments to China, which was antagonizing Japan should be revised, and the German military advisers should be withdrawn from China, since they no longer have the confidence of the Chinese and are merely causing Japanese distrust. War shipments to China should be suspended and Manchukuo should be recognized; Dealings, etc., should be transferred to North China Regime and Peiping Government. (6002-6015)

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Cable's Summary</u>
486	16 January	6002	63

Present

Cabinet members - 16 January 1938

1st KONOIE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

Decision

The Exhibit refers to but does not set forth any decision.

Remarks

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CABINET MEETING  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
856	18 January	8492	--
857		8497	--

Present

Cabinet Members-18 January 1938

(See Exhibit 260, herein, Cabinet Meetings, 1937)

Decision

The Cabinet decided the plan for regulating the supply and demand of essential materials during 1938.

Remarks

Exhibit 857 is a communication from K.2.M.I, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to I.T.A.G.M.I, the War Minister, outlining the type of revision deemed necessary by the Cabinet to achieve the national plan. The plan for regulating the supply and demand of essential materials during 1938 had been decided at the cabinet meeting of 18 January 1938 according to which decision "imports shall be 3,000,000,000 yen and the total sum of imported materials shall be 2,000,000,000 yen by decreasing both military and domestic demands (including Manchuria and Kwantung Province)." (8498)

However, it was found that exports would probably not exceed 1,-700,000,000 yen regardless of the efforts made to increase them. (excluding Manchuria, Kwantung Province, North and Central China). (8499)

Consequently, other than the following imports were not to be allowed:

"1. Those to be allotted for military demands and raw materials, materials, machine tools, fuel, etc. which are necessary for production and supply of war munitions.

"2. Raw materials and materials for exports.

"3. The minimum amount of medicine, fertilizer, etc., which are absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the nation's livelihood.

"4. The minimum amount of articles which are necessary for barter trade." (8499-8500)

The exhibit then sets forth details of the revised plan.

Exhibit 856 is likewise a communication from KAZUHI to ITAKAMI, War Minister, dated 23 June 1938 referring to the Cabinet decision "re possible enforcement of the urgent measure vital to the general mobilization." (8492)

The exhibit states that the cabinet has just opened a meeting on General mobilization, which deliberated on enforcement of the general mobilization by acquiring the reports from all ministries. Judging from the result of that meeting, the plan of the mobilization of commodities for 1938 (13th year of Showa) decided before, has become difficult to realize because of the extremely unfavorable foreign trade balance owing to the decrease in export and other reasons. (8493)

Both the above exhibits were read in evidence by Mr. Liebert to show how serious the problem of acquisition of foreign exchange had become to the acquisition of essential materials, so serious in fact, Liebert stated, that when the export trade fell off the cabinet called for a severe curtailment of plans as well as severe restrictions on civilian economy. (8491)

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CABINET MEETING  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Sum. Summ.</u>
2262	9 August	16,226	11-12

Present

Cabinet Members - 9 August 1938

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

KIDO stated in his diary of 9 August 1938 that he attended a Cabinet meeting where he heard about the progress of the Changkufong incident from War Minister ITAKI and the Foreign Minister. After, he heard of a proposal to reinforce the German-Japanese relations which had been made by Von Ribbentrop to OSHIMA. It contained a clause providing that in the case of one nation being attacked, the other would render military aid. Italy was to join and negotiations with her were under way. Ribbentrop analysed the European situation as: war with Russia would be inevitable, peace moves towards Czechs, Anglo-French relations strong, possibly backed financially but not militarily by the United States, Rumania neutral and Hungary could be made an ally. (16,226)

CABINET MEETING  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Sum. Summ.</u>
2262	9 August	16,226	11-12

Present

Cabinet Members - 9 August 1938

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

KIDO stated in his diary of 9 August 1938 that he attended a Cabinet meeting where he heard about the progress of the Changkufeng incident from War Minister ITAGAKI and the Foreign Minister. After, he heard of a proposal to reinforce the German-Japanese relations which had been made by Von Ribbentrop to OSHIMA. It contained a clause providing that in the case of one nation being attacked, the other would render military aid. Italy was to join and negotiations with her were under way. Ribbentrop analysed the European situation as: war with Russia would be inevitable, peace moves towards Czechs, Anglo-French relations strong, possibly backed financially but not militarily by the United States, Rumania neutral and Hungary could be made an ally. (16,226)



CABINET MEETING  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
381)	12 December	4709)	85)
382)		4711)	104)

Present

Cabinet Members - 12 December 1938

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260 herein Cab. meetings 1937)

Decision

Ex. 382: Decided to increase poppy cultivation by 12,250 acres.

Remarks

Ex. 381: - This exhibit is discussed under the same exhibit number for 1933, Cabinet meetings.

on 12 December the plan was approved whereby the stock of hydrochloric cocaine manufactured by Formosan Pharmaceutical Company in excess of requirements could be shipped to Japan proper and other countries, used in Formosa and supplied to Manchukuo. The China Board of Managers of Opium Committee approved this plan. (4709)

Ex. 382: - In order to meet the increasing demand for opium in excess of its production in Chosen, Manchukuo, Kwantung Leased Territory, and Formosa, and in accordance with the Cabinet's decision of December 12, 1938, the Opium Management Board on November 9, 1939 passed a resolution approving an additional 5,000 chobu (12,250 acres) increase of poppies cultivation in Chosen for 1940. This increase plus the previous year's 7,060 chobu raised the total acreage under cultivation to 12,060 chobu (29,547 acres)."

CABINET MEETING  
(1939)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Supp. Summ.</u>
2230	28 May	15,990	18

Present

Cabinet Members - 23 May 1939

HIRANUMA CABINET

(Premier)	HIRANUMA, Kiichiro
(Agriculture)	SAKURAUCHI, Yukio
(Commerce)	HATTA, Yoshiaki
(Communications)	TANABE, Harumichi
(Education)	ARAKI, Sadao
(Finance)	ISHIWATARI, Sotaro
(Foreign Affrs.)	ARITA, Hachiro
(Home)	KIDO, Kooichi
(Justice)	SHINO, Suehiko
(Navy)	YONAI, Mitsumasa
(Overseas)	KOISO, Kuniaki
(Railways)	MAEDA, Yonezo
(War)	ITAGAKI, Seishiro
(Welfare)	HIROSE, Hisatada

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Telegram from the German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated 28 May 1939, requesting information regarding the new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference. In a confidential and unofficial conversation OSHIMA reported that, according to a telegram he had received from ARITA, the Japanese Government wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in the event of European conflict. OSHIMA, having refused to pass on this information to the German Government he had been requested to hold the matter over pending result of discussion among the various factors. The German Ambassador was asked to make it clear that this attitude was causing distrust among the Germans and Italians. (15990)

CABINET MEETING  
(1939)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Supp. Summ.</u>
2272	28 August	16,240	20

Present

Cabinet Members - 28 August 1939

HIRANUMA Cabinet (See Exhibit 2230 herein Cab. meetings 1939)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

KIDO recorded in his diary that on 28 August 1939 a Cabinet Meeting was held regarding the bloc resignation of the Cabinet. After HIRANUMA's explanations, all agreed and tendered their resignations but the Emperor requested that all Cabinet Ministers retain their posts until further notice. KIDO was informed that TADA might become the new War Minister and that this would only intensify friction between different army groups. KONOYE told KIDO that ABE had been ordered by the Emperor to form a Cabinet, who instructed him to appoint either UMEZU or HATA as War Minister, follow a policy of cooperation with the U.S. and Britain and use discretion in choice of Home and Justice Ministers. KIDO thought the last two instructions of the Emperor could be disposed of by ABE at his discretion. Regarding the appointment of the War Minister, in order to avoid a clash with military circles, KIDO thought it best that the Emperor either summon the War Minister or convey to the Army his choice and let the three Chiefs of the Army recommend the War Minister. (16,240)

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1939)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
840	24 October	8605	104

Present

Cabinet Members - 24 October 1939

ABE Cabinet

(Premier)	ABE, Nobuyuki
(Foreign)	NOMURA, Kiehisaburo
(Interior)	OHARA, Naoshi
(Finance)	ACKI, Kazuo
(War)	HATA, Shunroku
(Navy )	YOSHIDA, Zengo
(Justice)	MIYAGI, Chogoro
(Education)	KAWARADA, Kakichi
(Agriculture)	SAKAI, Tadaru asa
(Commerce)	GODO, Takuo
(Communication)	NAGAI, Ryutaro
(Overseas)	KANAMITSU, Tsuneo

Decision

The meeting is mentioned in the cross-examination of Liebert.

Remarks

On 24 October the Japanese Cabinet decided to change the basis for determining the external value of the yen from the pound sterling to the United States dollar.

CABINET MEETING  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1007	3 March	9634	110

Present

Cabinet Members - 3 March 1940

YONAI Cabinet

(Premier)	YONAI, Mitsurasa
(Foreign)	ARITA, Hachiro
(Interior)	KODAMA, Hideo
(Finance)	SAKURAUCHI, Yukio
(War)	HATA, Shunroku
(Navy)	YOSHIDA, Zengo
(Justice)	KIYURA, Shotatsu
(Education)	MATSUURA, Ginjiro
(Agriculture)	SHIMADA, Toshio
(Commerce)	FUJIWARA, Ginjiro
(Communication)	KATSU, Masanori
(Railway)	MATSUO, Tsuruhei
(Overseas)	KOISO, Kuniaki
(Welfare)	YOSHIDA, Shigeru

Decision

A "Top Secret" document setting forth the "Economic Policy which should be taken in connection with Diplomacy toward USA" dated 3 March 1940. (Apparently, though not so stated, a Cabinet decision).

Remarks

Regarding the economic policy to be taken in connection with diplomacy towards the United States, of 3 March, 1940, it was stated that the United States had since the incident tried to maintain the 9-Power Treaty and ignore the establishment of a new order in East Asia. In view of the possibility of the United States imposing a moral or legal embargo on exports to Japan, and Japan's dependence on the United States for resources necessary for carrying out the Divine War, Japan must eliminate her reliance on the United States by perfecting her manufacture of iron and importing from a third power (Straits, India, Australia and China). Petrol, too, must be obtained from a third power other than the United States, and aviation gas, electrolytic copper, molybdenum and vanadium must also either be produced by Japan or imported from another power. Thus, if Japan rids herself of dependence on the United States, she will no longer be threatened. (9635-9643)

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
541	26 July	6271	133

Present

Cabinet Members - 26 July 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet

(Premier)	KONOYE, Tadamasa
(Foreign)	NAKAGAWA, Kozo
(Interior)	YASUI, Eiji
(Finance)	KAWATA, Ise
(War)	TOJO, Hideki
(Navy)	YOSHIDA, Zengo
(Justice)	KAZAMI, Akira
(Education)	HASHIDA, Kunihiko
(Agriculture)	ISHIGURO, Tadatsugu
(Commerce)	KOBAYASHI, Ichizo
(Communication)	MURATA, Shozo
(Without P.F.)	HOSHINO, Naoki

Decision

On July 26, 1940 the new cabinet (2nd Konoye) defined Japan's basic national policy. The decision was published on 1 August 1940 as an official declaration of the Japanese Government.

Remarks

The decision changed the basic national policy to provide a national defense structure by (1) plans for Greater East Asia, (2) increase of armaments and (3) unification of domestic policy.

According to the basic policy, Japan was to secure "an unshakable national structure such as conforms to the new world situation" and to realize this policy Japan must "mobilize the total strength of the nation." (6272)

Armaments were to be increased "on the basis of a state structure for national defense through manifestation of the nation's total strength". (6273)

The fundamental aim of her foreign policy was to be in the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia. (6273)

As to the renovation of the internal structure Japan was (1) to establish national loyalty which attached first importance to the idea of service to the state; (2) set up a new national political structure by reorganizing the nation upon the basis of "service to the state", every man according to his occupation, and by reforming the Diet System so as to conform to the new national political structure; (3) establish a national defense economy on the basis of autonomous construction of the economies of Japan, Manchoukou and China, with the Empire as the center. (6274)

Japan was also to execute a planned economy and to perfect a unified control system over production, distribution and consumption of vital goods (6275) and to effect an "epochal expansion of important industries, especially heavy, chemical and machine industries." (6275) It was also decided that welfare measures would be carried out and living conditions improved "so as to ensure a living standard truly befitting a stout-hearted and strong bodied people capable to survive ten years of trials and hardships and surmount the national crisis." (6276)

CABINET MEETING  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
861	3 October	8560	158

Present

Cabinet Members - 3 October 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541 herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Decided the "Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchoukou and China."

Remarks

The program concerned the use of the war production and war production potentials to dominate East Asia.

According to the basic policy, the aim of the economic construction of Japan, Manchoukou and China was to establish a self-sufficient economy by about 1950 and to accelerate the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. (8562)

Japan was to "guide and nurture the economic construction of Manchoukou and China." (8563)

Manchoukou was to develop her heavy and chemical industries and at the same time supply Japan with a portion of the raw materials for her heavy industries. (8564)

A labor plan "based on the foundation of racial cooperation will be established and 'Gesamt politisch' control and redistribution will be undertaken". (8564)

The "financial ideology will be so changed as to enable the acquisition of the necessary quantity and quality of materials as a state primarily (sic) without placing the financial foundation solely on the certainty of collection." (8565)

In regard to foreign exchange, the aim of control was to be directed not solely upon the economy of overseas payment but also on the acquisition of national defense materials from foreign countries. Japan was to be the center of finance and settlement for the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. (8566)



As to commerce, the past conception of commercial trade was to be changed to that of a trade policy based upon the principle of production economy with the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a unit. (8566)

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1317	25 October	11,838	161

Present

Cabinet Members - 25 October 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Decided the "Measures for Economic Development of N.E.I."

Remarks

On 25 October the Japanese Cabinet discussed the Japanese attitude toward the Netherlands Indies and decided upon a program by which Japan would take over virtual control of the whole economic and political life of the Netherlands Indies. (11838-11843) The first measure to be taken would be the liquidation of Netherlands Indies economic relations with the European and American Continents; (11838) the seeking of preferential treatment for Japan; (11838) the placing under Japanese control of the production and export of essential war materials; (11839) the placing of the exchange control of the Netherlands Indies under Japanese guidance; (11840) the liquidation of foreign financial holdings in the Netherlands Indies and the placing of the formulation and execution of all economic policies under the control of a joint Japanese-Netherlands Economic Commission. (11841) In general this Cabinet's decision was an elaboration of the rough draft of initial demands which had been drawn up in August, going into much greater detail as to the various measures to be taken. Had these demands been fulfilled, they would have resulted in the establishment of full Japanese control of the Netherlands Indies and the expansion of Japan to those regions without an actual war being fought. That the Japanese Government at this time took it for granted that the Netherlands Indies would fall to Japan shortly was clear. The demands on the Netherlands Indies were an attempt to achieve this end without full scale aggression. (NEI Summary p. 10-11).

CABINET MEETINGS  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1317	25 October	11,238	161

Present

Cabinet Members - 25 October 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Decided the "Measures for Economic Development of N.E.I."

Remarks

On 25 October the Japanese Cabinet discussed the Japanese attitude toward the Netherlands Indies and decided upon a program by which Japan would take over virtual control of the whole economic and political life of the Netherlands Indies. (11838-11843) The first measure to be taken would be the liquidation of Netherlands Indies economic relations with the European and American Continents; (11838) the seeking of preferential treatment for Japan; (11838) the placing under Japanese control of the production and export of essential war materials; (11839) the placing of the exchange control of the Netherlands Indies under Japanese guidance; (11840) the liquidation of foreign financial holdings in the Netherlands Indies and the placing of the formulation and execution of all economic policies under the control of a joint Japanese-Netherlands Economic Commission. (11841) In general this Cabinet's decision was an elaboration of the rough draft of initial demands which had been drawn up in August, going into much greater detail as to the various measures to be taken. Had these demands been fulfilled, they would have resulted in the establishment of full Japanese control of the Netherlands Indies and the expansion of Japan to those regions without an actual war being fought. That the Japanese Government at this time took it for granted that the Netherlands Indies would fall to Japan shortly was clear. The demands on the Netherlands Indies were an attempt to achieve this end without full scale aggression. (NEI Summary p. 10-11).

CABINET MEETING  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
462	5 November	5,284	---

Present

Cabinet Members - 5 November 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Decided on the "Summary of the Programme for Economic Construction Embracing Japan, Manchukou and China".

Remarks

Exhibit 462 states that the fundamental national policy of establishing GEA and aimed at the construction of a new world order entered upon a new phase with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact (5,284). To cope with the new situation, the new policy was adopted based upon the economic development of Manchoukou, China and Japan "in accordance with the new outlook on the economic order." (5285)

It was stated that the world economic system of free trade was disintegrating, so the old system, based upon the old order was to be discarded. (5285) The new economic order was to be established within about 10 years (5286). Japan was to develop the highest type of precision and mechanical industry and at the same time to develop her basic industries; Manchukuo was to develop the mining industry and electrical undertakings and China was to develop her mining and salt industries and to undertake large-scale production of raw materials as well as her heavy and chemical industries. (5290)

Skilled workers and technicians were to be supplied by Japan to China and Manchoukou. (5292). Japan was also to furnish financial assistance. (5293) The principal commercial trade of the pact was to be revised so that the principle of productive trade would emerge which would enable each country, region and economic sphere to supply the others with goods required by them in exchange for the goods necessary for its own planned production. (5294)

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1067 865	22 January	9,879, 9880 8,810	172

Present

HOSHINO, Naoki  
HASHIDA, K., Education Minister (Deceased)  
TOJO, Hideki, War Minister  
KANAMITSU, Tsuneo, Welfare Minister

Cabinet Members

2nd Konoye Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Draft of bill re population policy was unanimously approved by the members of the Cabinet.

Remarks

The new population policy was to increase the population of Japan quickly and incessantly, to enhance the quality of the Japanese, and to correct the distribution of the Japanese race so as to secure the leadership of Japan over East Asia. (9,880)

"In this connection, Dr. Nobumi ITO, president of the Board of Information, told Dorei that since the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere is the greatest mission ever delegated to the Japanese, they must hold the responsibility as the leaders of East Asia. (9,882)

In view of present conditions of rapid increase in the population of the cities, the physical and spiritual training of youths in the cities especially shall be intensified, so as to make them a good source of military and labour forces. (8810)

CABINET DECISION  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1055	7 March	9,842	185

Present

Cabinet Members on 7 March 1941  
(See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

It was decided that the detailed regulations relative to the application of the revised National Mobilization Law, which were approved in the 76th session of the Diet, would be put in force on March 20.

Remarks

"The most important action of the 73rd session of the Diet in March 1938 was the passage of the National General Mobilization Bill. Fearing that the enactment of this law would mean complete loss of individual liberty even in peace-time, members of the Lower House opposed it. Passage was assured, however, when Premier KONOYE promised that it was applicable only in time of extreme emergency and that the Government would appoint a majority of Diet members to the National Mobilization Council. This Council, composed of thirty Diet members and twenty Government officials, scholars and experts, was responsible for the formation of Imperial Ordinances which would make the law more effective or more applicable to changing conditions and circumstances. From the time the bill was passed the question of its application, as a whole or in part, created a definite split within the Konoye Cabinet and was perhaps partially responsible for its final downfall on January 3, 1939." (1)

To quote from the Tokyo Gazette, the law provided for "control and operation of human and material resources in such a way as to enable the State to give full scope to the efficient use of its strength for ...national defense in time of war, including ...incidents or affairs (external affairs)...which may not be called a war as a matter of policy, but one which is virtually the same as war." (2)

The objects of the National Mobilization Bill were further elaborated in a pamphlet issued by the War Department:

- (1) Borton, Japan since 1931, p. 60
- (2) id. p. 61.

.....

By the National General Mobilization Law, Japan aims to control and operate her entire personal and material resources to the fullest possible extent in order to enable her to demonstrate her national power most effectively for her national defense in time of emergency ..... to supply her army and navy with the vast amount of war materials they require in time of war, to secure smooth economic operation for the stability of national life, and at the same time to demoralize the enemy on the battlefield as well as on the economic and propaganda fronts. (1)

More specifically, this new law was made necessary by the limited character of the Munitions Industry Mobilization Law already in force. Since the re-enactment of the latter, it had been necessary to pass numerous emergency measures to supplement it, such as the Temporary Capital Adjustment Law, temporary measures on exports and imports, and a temporary shipping control law. This new mobilization law was all-inclusive and thus eliminated the need for further specific legislation. It was divided into two general parts, war-time and peace-time measures. Under the former, such vital aspects of national life as labor, materials, institutions, enterprises, capital, prices and the press might be controlled. The provisions regarding labor and other services required of all subjects a defense duty to the State which gave the right to employ or discharge workers, and regulate their wages, labor conditions and working hours. Labor disputes were prohibited or prevented by compulsory arbitration while landowner-tenant problems had to be settled under provisions of the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law. As explained by the War Department pamphlet:

With the outbreak of a war, a large number of young men who are working in mines and factories will be called to the colors, and those establishments must be replenished with a greater number of operatives than before... All organizations engaged in peace industries may have to curtail their activities or even suspend them altogether...with the result that a large number of operatives will be put out of work. The object of personnel mobilization is to adjust the demand and supply of labor to cope with the situation. ..It calls for close cooperation between labor and capital as well as the cooperation of women. (2)

To ensure adequate supplies, Article Eight provided for the control of the production, consumption, use, movement, transfer, export and import of important goods. For this

(1) id. p. 61  
(2) id. p. 61-62

purpose the Government had to make up any shortage in war materials by their purchase abroad and by stimulating the increase of their production at home, and "have them in store to provide for any possible contingency. The government could limit or prohibit the consumption of certain war materials for ordinary purposes or to encourage the people to use substitutes for them." For the smooth operation of business enterprises using these materials, provision was made for direct control of vital industries, including the installation of new equipment. Industrialists operating in the same field had to cooperate in the importation, purchase and sale of goods to eliminate waste. In the field of capital investment, necessary regulations were provided to balance the supply and demand of capital with that of labor and materials. These include the restriction or prohibition of the formation of new companies, the control of capital increase or debenture issues, and finally the supervision of investments of banks, both national and private, to ensure the supply of capital. To raise sufficient funds for the execution of war, it was necessary to establish a war-time tax system and a policy of floating public bonds to prevent financial inflation. Thus all money circulation organizations could be controlled. "It will also make efforts, in order to buy necessary raw materials, to increase export trade, to arrange financial credits, to manage foreign bonds held by Japanese, to increase the output of gold." The government was empowered to restrict or prohibit the publication of articles on military and diplomatic affairs as well as important financial, economic and other matters, and had the power necessary to prosecute those who violate these provisions. (1)

Beginning with Article Twenty-One, the provisions concern general peacetime measures. A national registration of people in the professions and with technical ability was provided for, and this was to be supplemented by government training of necessary technicians. Factory owners were expected not only to formulate plans for increased production in war-time and to conduct training and exercises in operation on this scale, but had to hold reserve supplies of petroleum, iron and other essential materials. Profits were assured through the Government guarantee of certain rates of business profit for industries affected by the National Mobilization Law, and the National Mobilization Indemnity Commission had charge of compensations for losses incurred under the working of the Law. (2)

(1) id 62-63

(2) id 63



Another important feature, emphasized by the War Department pamphlet, is the necessity for flexible plans in its execution. This aspect also reveals the extreme breadth of the scope of the law.

The Government ... must be equipped with far-reaching plans to raise efficiency promptly in production of necessary materials, their transportation and other activities to facilitate the general mobilization. The plans and preparation will differ in their scope according to the magnitude of war... The Government, therefore, must be equipped with plans and preparations applicable to various conditions.

Such regulations, which may require revisions in the future, should be fixed by Imperial ordinances for the sake of convenience instead of being made provisions of the National General Mobilization Law... But the basic principles on which such regulations may be established should be embodied in the law ... In the application of the law, the government is to consult with the National General Mobilization Research Commission, thus preventing it from abusing its power of causing the issuance of Imperial ordinances.

Thus with far-reaching provisions assured in the Law itself and provision made for its implementation by Imperial ordinance, the National General Mobilization Law made possible, with the least amount of effort, the formation of a completely totalitarian state in Japan. (1)

In spite of the earlier promises by Government officials that the Law would not be applied during the immediate emergency, it became necessary by May 5, 1938, to invoke it in part, by decree, the articles defining the general purpose of the Law and the industries coming under its control were promulgated. The Government likewise exercised its right to expropriate private enterprises under Article 12 of the Law. National registration was ordered to ascertain the extent of the nation's resources in professional, vocational, and technical ability. The general requirements that factory owners formulate plans for war-tire production and obtain reserve supplies were enforced, as was the guarantee of profits to industries affected. A supervisory commission was established consisting of Diet members and representatives from the Cabinet Planning Board. It should be pointed out, however, that most of the articles made effective at this time were those considered as peacetime measures. As hostilities continued, Japan found it more and more essential to consider the application of all phases of the Law, a consideration which has in no small

degree upset the smooth running of the Japanese Government, so much so, in fact, that Prince Konoye, was forced to reorganize his cabinet and strengthen it against both internal and external criticisms.(1)

.....

The articles of the law were enforced increasingly by Imperial Ordinances. By June 1939 these included: the compulsory registration of all males between the ages of 16 and 50; the adoption of Article 11 authorizing the Department of Finance to control profits in industry and to appropriate property for war purposes if desired; the training of skilled workers; and compulsory mediation in all labor disputes, the regulation of employment of workers to prevent too high wages in important industries and the requisition of citizens for work in vital ones. Thus the real aim of the law, the control and operation of Japan's entire personal and material resources slowly became a reality.(2)

(1) id. p. 64

(2) id. P. 121-122

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1038	2 May	9781	--

Present

Attendance not stated.

Cabinet Members - 2 May 1941

2nd KOJOYE Cabinet, (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet meeting 1940)

Decision

The Cabinet decided that the National Defense Security law would be enforced on May 10, 1941.

Remarks

Exhibit 1038 is an extract from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. Detailed regulations governing the enforcement of the above mentioned law were to be published on 10 May 1941.

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1097	c/a 28 June	10,035	217

Present

2nd Konoye Cabinet SUGIYAMA, Hajima, Chief of Staff  
(See Exhibit 541 herein, Cab. Meeting 1940)

Decision

According to OTT: It was decided that Japan should tighten her grip on Indo-China for which purpose three divisions were (allegedly) prepared.

Remarks

Premier KONOYE and the majority of the Cabinet Ministers agreed that nothing must be done to injure Japan's military position in China. Only preparatory measures for various possible actions on the part of Japan were prepared. An Army memorandum confirmed that preparatory measures were being taken. (Record p. 10,035). The preparations for attacking Russia would take at least six weeks unless a decisive material and moral weakening of Russia in the Far East took place beforehand. RIBBENTROP urged that Japan attack Russia (10,033) in order to protect her rear for a move South. Germany attacked Russia 22 June 1941.

According to OTT, OSHIMA urgently "advised the Japanese Government to attack Russia soon." (10,036).

According to KIDO, (10,037) TOJO said that the attitude of the Kwantung Army towards the German-Russo War should be calm and prudent.

Cabinet Meeting  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1118	2 July	10,171	

Present

Cabinet Members

2nd Konoye Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cab. Meeting 1940)

Decision

(No information)

Remarks

Konoye's Second Cabinet resigned 16 July 1941 and on 18 July 1941, his third Cabinet was formed. Konoye's 3rd Cabinet, with Admiral Toyoda replacing Matsuoka as Foreign Minister continued the policy of the 2nd Konoye's Cabinet which rested upon the basis of the spirit and aims of the Tripartite Pact (10,171). No change took place in Japan's attitude towards Germany and Italy. Germany was so informed by Matsuoka on the basis of the Cabinet decision of 2 July. (No record of Cabinet meeting).

Upon the resignation of Matsuoka, Admiral Toyoda became Foreign Minister and a translation of his declaration on becoming Foreign Minister was sent by OTT to Berlin. According to the declaration, Toyoda intended to continue Matsuoka's foreign policy and to strengthen the close unity of Japan, Germany and Italy. (10171)

At the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941, the Empire's policy was established following the outbreak of the German-Russian War. The Conference decided the policy of stationing troops in French Indo-China which, according to Tojo (10,152) was the principal problem at that time. According to the resolution adopted at this conference Japan was to, first of all, "accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand"; stabilize her structure for the Southern advance and, while the "spirit of the Tripartite will form the keynote of our attitude towards the German-Russian War", she would not intervene in the war for a while but would secretly prepare arms against Russia. (10,147)

See Exhibit 644: Ott wired Berlin that the Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda denied that the Indo-China action was influenced by the Cabinet change; Ohashi said that Vichy had been pressed for a reply to Japan's measures and if the French answer was not in the affirmative, the Japanese Government would resort to force. (7,052-3)

Cabinet Meeting  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1118	2 July	10,171	

Present

Cabinet Members

2nd Konoye Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cab. Meeting 1940)

Decision

(No information)

Remarks

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CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1116	16 July	10,164	

Present

Cabinet Members

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cab. Meeting 1940)

Decision

Marquis MATSUDAIRA called KIDO on 16 July 1941 saying that the resignation "en bloc" of the second KONOYE Cabinet had been decided at a special cabinet meeting. KONOYE tendered the general resignation at 9 p.m.

Remarks

MATSUOKA's views as Foreign Minister towards the proposal formula for a Japan-American understanding brought about the Cabinet resignation. MATSUOKA wanted to instruct NOMURA that the Japanese Government would reject HULL's oral statement as being of a disgraceful nature for Japan; later MATSUOKA would wire a compromise formula to NOMURA. But KONOYE was of the opinion that the formula should be wired with the rejection so that the U.S. would not conclude that Japan intended to discontinue negotiations. (10,162) According to KIDO, MATSUOKA sent instructions to NOMURA by himself and not through the medium of the competent director. KONOYE disagreed with KIDO's suggestion that MATSUOKA resign to avoid a Cabinet change because MATSUOKA and his party would make propaganda to the effect that pressure from the USA on the Japanese Government was the cause of MATSUOKA's resignation. (10,164)

KIDO received an imperial order to invite the President of the Privy Council and the ex-Premiers to gather at the palace to ask their opinions as to who would be the suitable person for the post of Premier in the succeeding Cabinet.

See Exhibits 642, 644 and 118 for evidence of the continuation by the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet of the policy of the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet.

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1132	22 August	10,204	237

Present

SUZUKI, Teiichi - Governor of Planning Board

Cabinet Members

3rd Konoye Cabinet

(Premier)	KONOYE, Fumimaro
(Foreign)	TOYODA, Teijiro
(Home)	TANABE, Harumichi
(Finance)	OGURA, Masatsune
(War)	TOJO, Hideki
(Navy)	OIKAWA, Koshiro
(Justice)	IWAMURA, Michiyo
(Education)	HASHIDA, Kunihiro
(Agriculture)	INO, Hiroya
(Commerce)	SAKONJI, Seizo
(Communication)	MURATA, Shozo
(Welfare)	KOIZUMI, Chikahiko
(State)	SUZUKI, Teiichi

Decision

Decided the national commodity mobilization plan.  
"The key points of the scheme are: (1) Prompt expansion of armaments; (2) Establishment of a system of autarchy for important resources in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, especially the maintenance of steel and coal production; (3) Maintenance of the lowest limit for the nation's living necessities; and (4) Strict harmony between the commodity mobilization scheme and the marine transportation plan."

Remarks

The plan had been studied by the Planning Board and the related offices in order to establish a strong war time system in the midst of the complicated international situation.

SUZUKI introduced and explained the Plan.

The government issued a communique in the form of a verbal statement by SUZUKI to the effect that the Government attaches importance to the four points aimed at the complete execution of the China emergency and the prompt completion of the war time system to meet the new international situation.



SUZUKI also said that "as regards the supply of commodities for the 1941-2 fiscal year various counter measures have been taken in anticipation of a situation in which imports from third powers might become difficult. Accordingly, there is no fear that a hitch will occur in the execution of this commodity mobilization scheme.

. . . . .

"The enforcement of the commodity mobilization scheme depends upon a strong war sense and the cooperation of officials and the people."

N.B. - SUZUKI's verbal statement was not read but is in evidence.

CABINET MEETING

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1133	5 Sept 1941	10,214	242

Present

Cabinet Members

3rd Konoye Cabinet (See Exhibit 1132, herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

Decision

Decided the Traffic Mobilization Plan in order to place land and sea transportation on a wartime basis.

Remarks

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of 7 September, showed that concrete plans were being drafted by the Communications and Railway Ministry, based on the traffic mobilization plan for 1941-1942. The Railway Ministry will embark upon construction of freight cars and the Communications office will establish the shipbuilding control association to systematize the shipbuilding industry.

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1140	12 September	10,228-9	243

Present

SUZUKI, Teichi

Cabinet Members

3rd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 1132, herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

Decision

Adopted the 1941 Workers' Mobilization Plan

Remarks

This plan was a preparatory step for the establishment of the people's total labor service system and was jointly formulated by the Planning Board and the Welfare Office for the purpose of insuring the supply of sufficient labor for the increased production of munitions.  
(10,229)

MEETING AT KONOYE'S HOME (OGIGAIISO)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1147	12 October 1941	10,246	249

Present

Premier KONOYE  
President of the Planning Board SUZUKI  
Foreign Minister TOYODA  
Navy Minister OIKAWA  
War Minister TOJO

Decision

On the advice of the War Minister TOJO, they decided that the demands regarding the stationing of troops in China should not be altered; that the successful results of the Chinese Incident should be made secure; and that they should further their parley based on these agreements.

Remarks

Exhibit 1147, an extract from KIDO's Diary of 12 October 1941. He said that a meeting was held in KONOYE's home at 2 p.m. to discuss the adjustment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan. The information was given to KIDO by TOMITA, First Secretary of the Cabinet. (10246)

According to KONOYE's own account of the meeting, negotiations between Japan and the United States reached a deadlock because Japanese troops occupied French Indo-China. On August 28th, KONOYE proposed a conference to Roosevelt who stated that he favored such a conference if a general agreement could be reached as a premise. (10251)

On September 6th, 1941, an Imperial Conference <sup>was</sup> called to determine the basis of a counter-measure and it decided that Japan should complete her preparations for a war with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands by the end of October, 1941. In the meantime, she would try to secure her demands through diplomatic measures. (10,218). According to TOJO, it was decided that both peace preparations and war preparations would be pushed. (10,221) At the beginning of October the Supreme Command "became boisterous" stating that they would not wait beyond October 15th for the success of diplomatic negotiations. (10,252)

The day before the meeting of October 12th, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau OKA told KONOYE that with the exception of the Naval General Staff, the Navy did not want a war with America but that since the Navy herself, approved the decision of the Imperial Headquarters, the Navy Minister would propose to leave the decision with the Prime Minister, i.e., continuation of negotiations. (10253)

KONOYE, opening the meeting, said we must now decide for war or peace but that it should be determined if there is any hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiations. (10253)

TOJO said there was absolutely no hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiations; Navy Minister OIKAWA said that they should comply with the decision of the Prime Minister. TOJO replied that the decision could not be left solely in the hands of the Premier and asked the Foreign Minister if he had confidence in the success of the negotiations. Foreign Minister TOYODA said that an agreement could be reached regarding (1) the Tripartite Alliance and (2) the economic problem in China but that (3) the question of keeping troops in China is the difficult one, America being emphatic in demanding the complete withdrawal of such troops. TOYODA further said Japan could agree to withdraw in principle and station troops by agreement between Japan and China. TOJO objected saying he couldn't yield on the question of the withdrawal of troops. The meeting ended without any decision. (10,251-10,257)

TOJO's interrogation contained the following questions and answers regarding the meeting of October 12th. (10272-10274)

"Q What was the purpose of the meeting and what occurred there?

"A As I recall them, I think the reasons for the conference were as follows: In the first place, the middle ten days of October, which had been set as the time by which we would strive for a favorable diplomatic turn, were upon us. The Japanese proposal for a meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President of the United States had been turned down by America. The international situation was becoming more tense all the time. In these circumstances, it was necessary for the Government of Japan to decide more definitely just what its policy was to be, and I believe that was the basic purpose of the conference at Prince KONOYE's home.

"Q Did you not quarrel with KONOYE at that meeting?

"A No, it was not a quarrel. Our opinions differed.

"Q Differed on what?

"A My opinion was as follows: Japan was making concession after concession in the effort to effect a diplomatic break before the middle ten days of October, but on the other hand, America refused to budge from her position and make no concessions. The meeting between Premier KONOYE and the President, by which it had been hoped that a political settlement could be reached had been turned down. As War Minister, my opinion was that there remained practically no hope of a diplomatic break and I suggested that the time had come when we had better make up our minds for war. The longer we delayed in making this decision, the more disadvantageous the situation would be for Japan if war were decided upon later. I felt thus because we were now in the middle ten days of October."

For KONOYE's letter of resignation addressed to the Emperor see Exhibit 1152 - K. 10,284. In substance it said that "Army Minister TOJO judged negotiations with the United States on friendly terms could not possibly materialize before the desired time (middle or latter part of October); that it was impossible to consent to the withdrawal of troops from China and that the time had come to open war against the United States. Prime Minister KONOYE, however, thought that all negotiations with the United States were not hopeless and that the stationing of troops in China could be achieved in substance while appearing to yield to the United States."

In this connection TOJO's interrogation (Ex. 1153-A - R 10,289) is as follows:

"Q Did you feel, at the time the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941, that war should be declared against the United States and the other three nations?

"A At that time I felt, as War Minister, that the opportune time for fighting was in danger of being lost and the Imperial Conference had set the middle ten days of October as the limit for waiting for a favorable diplomatic break."

Page 5 of the interrogation extract:

"Q Was it not because of the fact that you, as War Minister, favored war with the United States that the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941?

"A Theoretically yes. KONOYE thought that a diplomatic solution was still possible if Japan would withdraw troops from China, but the Army felt that there would be no guarantee that the unlawful acts of the Chinese, which had caused the Incident, would not be resumed if the troops were withdrawn before their purpose had been achieved, and the Army could not bear to so withdraw the troops."

See Exhibit 2250 (Pros. Doc. No. 2 A) for a fuller and more considered account than appears in KIDO's Diary, Exhibits 1147, 1150, 1151, 1154, and 1156, of the fall of the Third KONOYE Cabinet and KIDO's reasons for recommending TOJO as the new Premier. (16198)

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1167	4 November	10,330	240

Present

Cabinet Members

TOJO Cabinet

(Premier)	TOJO, Hideki
(Foreign)	TOJO, Shigenori
(Finance)	KAWA, Okinori
(Navy)	SAITO, Shigetaro
(Justice)	IMAMURA, Michiyo
(Education)	HASHIDA, Kunihiko
(Agriculture)	INO, Hiroya
(Commerce)	KISHI, Nobusuke
(Communication)	TEPASHIMA, Ken
(Welfare)	KOIZUMI, Chikahiko
(State)	SUZUKI, Teichi

Decision

The Cabinet agreed on the Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on British and American problems.

Remarks

"The following types of news and speeches were excluded:

"(A) Such news and speeches as will enable the enemy to perceive our war preparations and strategic activities.

"(E) Such sensational speeches and activities as will cause the public to lose the pride of a great people and take direct actions against residents of third powers."



CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1167	4 November	10,330	260

Present

Cabinet Members

TOJO Cabinet

(Premier)	TOJO, Hideki
(Foreign)	TOJO, Shigenori
(Finance)	KAWA, Okinori
(Navy)	SAITO, Shigetaro
(Justice)	INAMURA, Michiyo
(Education)	HASHIDA, Kunihiko
(Agriculture)	IIC, Hiroya
(Commerce)	KISHI, Nobusuke
(Communication)	TERASHIMA, Ken
(Welfare)	KOIZUMI, Chikahiko
(State)	SUZUKI, Teiichi

Decision

The Cabinet agreed on the Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on British and American problems.

Remarks

"The following types of news and speeches were excluded:

"(A) Such news and speeches as will enable the enemy to perceive our war preparations and strategic activities.

"(B) Such sensational speeches and activities as will cause the public to lose the pride of a great people and take direct actions against residents of third powers."

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1331	28 November	11,943	367

Present

Cabinet Members

TOJO Cabinet (See Exhibit 1167 herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

Decision

Decided to establish in the Cabinet the Sixth Committee organized with the personnel of the Planning Board, the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the War Ministry and the Navy Ministry for the purpose of discussing and drafting matters pertaining to the economic plans and control centering around the acquisition and development of the resources in the Southern Areas (French Indo-China, Thailand and other southern areas).

Remarks

SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board was Chairman of this Committee which was to draw up plans for the economic exploitation of the southern areas. The Vice President of the Planning Board was the Chief Secretary of the Committee. Committee men and temporary committee men were appointed by the Prime Minister from among high civil officials. The general affairs of the Committee were to be handled by the Planning Board. The establishment of the committee and other matters pertaining to it were to be kept secret. The committee was established to carry out the economic plans and control a centering around acquisition and development of the resources in the southern areas through a controlled activation of the composite national power under a united political and strategical policy. (11,946-11,947)

The first report of the Sixth Committee was dated 16 December 1941 and gave full details concerning the economic measures to be taken in the Netherlands Indies and the other southern areas after the occupation. The economic measures taken by Japan in the Netherlands Indies after their occupation by Japan closely followed the program worked out in this report. (11,947). The report is found in Exhibit 1332. (11,948)

According to the report the principal aim of the policy is to fill the demand for important natural resources and to establish a system of autarchy for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and to find means of strengthening the Imperial economic strength. See also Exhibit 1333-A, Record 11,959, an excerpt from the document entitled "Summarized Plan for Management of the South Sea Areas" dated 14 December 1941.

According to this excerpt, the basic policies of the plan concern the acquisition and utilization of military bases, the stationing of troops, the acquisition of petrol, tin and rubber, the severing of the political shackles of Europe and America in the South Sea areas, etc. (11,961)

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1192	28 November	10,438	272

Present

Cabinet Members

TCJO Cabinet (See Exhibit 1167, herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

Decision

Approved a journalistic plan proposed by newspaper leaders for establishing a new system in press circles aimed at placing newspapers on a war time basis.

Remarks

An Imperial Ordinance concerning the creation of the new system was to be issued under Articles 16 and 18 of the National Mobilization Law. (10,438-9)

CABINET DECISION  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1202-A	o/a 1 December	10,482	275

Present

TOJO  
SHIMADA  
NAGANO  
KAYA

SUZUKI  
HOSHINO  
MIYANO  
OKA

Cabinet Members

TOJO Cabinet ( See Exhibit 1167, herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

Decision

Approved gist of final note to USA ( 10,482, 10,503)

Remarks

TOJO confirmed that TOGO said that he, TOGO composed the text of the note on the basis of views furnished by the Liaison Conference and that text, after being written, was presented to and approved by the Liaison Conference. The text of the note was also approved by the Cabinet. (10,482-3)

CONTENTS OF THE FINAL NOTE

According to TOJO, the gist of the final note to America was approved by the Cabinet and the Liaison Conference but the final text was the responsibility of the Foreign Minister TOGO who composed the text of the note on the basis of the views furnished by the Liaison Conference. The text was approved by this Conference and the Cabinet (10,482; 10,506); hence, the responsibility for its composition rests with the participating members of the Liaison Conference and the Cabinet. (10,509)

TOJO stated that the members of the Liaison Conference who were responsible for the study and discussion of the matter were TOJO, SHIMADA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TSUKADA, ITO, KAYA, SUZUKI and the three secretaries HOSHINO, MIYANO and OKA. The members of the Cabinet under the Constitution are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, even on matters outside the competence of their respective offices. (10,510)

TOGO contends that neither he, the Foreign Office nor the Government can take the sole responsibility for the contents of the final note since it involves a question of war and had to be considered by the High Command. (10,506) "All members of the Liaison Conference and even some members of the Cabinet who were familiar with the question" are responsible for the contents of the note, said TOGO. (Ex. 1206-a, R. 10,506)

CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1204-A	1 or 2 Dec	10,493-4-5-6	

Present

Whole TOJO Cabinet (See 1167 herein, Cab. meetings 1941. TOGO resigned as Minister of Overseas Affairs 2 Dec 1941, replaced by INO, Hiroya)

Decision

The whole Cabinet attended the Imperial Conference on the 1st or 2nd of December, 1941 which decided to wage war against the United States and Great Britain.

Remarks

Problem of how the final note was to be dispatched was handled by the Foreign Minister. The Cabinet and TOJO agreed that since Japan had been challenged and was acting in self-defense, they would not be impeded from attacking the U.S. and Great Britain because of international law or treaties.

TIME OF DELIVERY OF FINAL NOTE

The Liaison Conference delegated to the two Chiefs of Staff, SUGIYAMA and NAGANO, and Foreign Minister TOGO the task of setting a time prior to the attack for the delivery of the final note - a time which would comply with diplomatic and strategic requirements. (10,483-6)

The time and the date set for the attack was known by the Foreign Minister TOGO and the President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI. (10,483)

However, the responsibility of delivering the note prior to the attack is the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. (10,488)

According to TOJO (10,487), he and the Cabinet realized that the shorter the notice given to the United States the more probability there was of a mishap. However, Ambassador NOMURI being a very responsible official, was relied upon to carry out this grave responsibility perfectly. (10,488)

According to TOJO, instructions had been sent to the Embassy in Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1 p.m., December 7th, Washington time (3 a.m., December 8th, Tokyo time) (10,512)

In a telegram from Tokyo to Washington, December 7th, 1941, it was stated "Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible, to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States on 7 December, 1 p.m. your time). (10,537)

All members of the Liaison Conference knew of the sending of such instructions. (10,512)

In a telegram dated 1 December 1941, from Tokyo to Washington, it was decided to withhold submitting the note to the United States Ambassador to Tokyo so that the United States would not know of the real status of the negotiations. (10,517)

TOGO admitted and excused the non-delivery of any warning whatsoever to Great Britain until after 0700 hours on 8 December when he handed a copy of the note to Ambassador Craigie by saying that he thought Washington would pass it on to London.

#### DECLARATION OF WAR

As to why a declaration of war had not been made prior to the attacks on United States and Great Britain, TOJO stated that Japan's final note broke off diplomatic relations foreclosing further action under treaty procedure, giving to Japan freedom of action from the standpoint of international treaty and international law. (10496-7)

In this connection TOJO also said that Japan was acting in self-defense in response to a military and economic challenge by various countries, especially England and America, thereby threatening her existence and necessitating the right of self-defense. (10,502)

TOJO further stated that from the standpoint of strategy, the necessity for victory had to be considered as well as diplomatic procedures, since the possibility of victory was intimately related to the question of time. (10499) TOJO was extremely anxious for the success of the surprise attack and he thought that there should be at least thirty minutes' notice before the attack. (10500) He knew, in his capacity as War Minister, that four surprise attacks were to be executed at the same time against the possessions of the United States and Great Britain. (10499)

The whole matter of responsibility under treaties and international law had been considered and studied by the Cabinet, the matter, according to TOJO, being the grave responsibility of the Foreign Minister. The entire Cabinet agreed with TOJO's views as to the effect of the final note. (10,493-4)

TOJO contends that Japan was not bound by the Kellogg-Briand Pact nor by any other treaty provisions because it was acting in self-defense. (10,503-4)

Admiral NOMURA does not consider that the final note was a declaration of war. (10,502)

"TITLE CHART  
"for December 6, 7, 8, 1941"

It is divided under headings:

	<u>TOKYO TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>LOCAL TIME</u>	<u>EVENTS</u>
<u>December</u>				
8th	0045	Shanghai	2345 - 7th	The Shanghai Bund (International Settlement) occupied by Japanese troops.
8th	0140	Kota Bahru	2400 - 7th	The British beach defenses shelled from the sea.
8th	0205	Kota Bahru	0025 - 8th	Japanese landing at Kota Bahru in Northern Malaya.
8th	0305	Singora	0125 - 8th	About this time at Singora and Patani in Southern Siam, Japanese landed and advanced towards Malayan border.
8th	0320-25	Pearl Harbor	0750-55 7th	Attack at Pearl Harbor
8th	0520	Shanghai	0420 - 8th	H.M.S. Peterel sunk with casualties.
8th	0610	Singapore	0430 - 8th	Air Raid on Singapore.
8th	0700	Tokyo	0700 - 8th	Tokyo Radio gives first announcement that hostilities have begun.
8th	0730	Tokyo	0730 - 8th	Mr. Grew calls on Foreign Minister TOGO at his request and TOGO hands him copy of document handed by Mr. NOMURA to Mr. HULL, describing it as Emperor's answer to President's message.
8th	0800	Tokyo	0800 - 8th	Sir Robert Creigie calls on Foreign Minister TOGO at his request and is handed a copy of the same document.
8th	0805	Guam	0805 - 8th	Guam attacked.
8th	0900	Hong Kong	0800 - 8th	Hong Kong attacked
		Between	Between	
	1140 and 1200 Tokyo		1140 and 1200 Imperial	
	Prescript issued"			



CABINET MEETING  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1235-C	8 December	10,654 <u>Present</u>	

TOJO  
SHIMADA

All Ministers of State except TOGO

Cabinet Members

TOJO's Cabinet (See Exhibit 1167 herein, Cab. meetings 1941.  
TOGO resigned as Minister of Overseas Affairs 2 Dec '41, succeeded  
by INO, Hiroya)

Decision

Navy Minister SHIMADA gave a report of the process of  
the battle with USA and Great Britain and based on this re-  
port, the Government of Japan decided on the policy to be  
adopted. (No further reference to the policy).

#### FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Following the outbreak of the China War in 1937, the "Four Ministers" meeting of the Premier, War, Navy and Foreign Ministers was established. Later, the Finance Minister was added to this group making a "Five Ministers" Conference.

At these meetings the views of the Supreme Command were transmitted through the War and Navy members. This method proving unsatisfactory to the Chiefs of Staff, the Liaison Conference plan was adopted to adjust the differences between the civil government and the High Command. (680)

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
704	7 August	7,523; 7,878	39

Present

Prime Minister HIRATA, Kooki  
Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro  
War Minister TERAUCHI, Juichi  
Navy Minister NAGANO, Osami

Decision

Decided the "Foreign Policy of the Empire."

Remarks

The exhibit is a top secret decision concerning the state of relations between Japan and USSR; the necessity for making North China pro-Japanese and anti-Communist; the obtaining of resources for national defense and the extension of traffic establishments. (7524)

The exhibit also states that "The developments in the European political situation have a great influence on the East Asia, and so Japan must exert every effort in bringing European powers to its advantage, especially in restraining the Soviet Union." (7878)

See Exhibit 216 herein, Five Ministers Conference of 7 August 1936 for discussion of the same subject matter.

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
217	11 August	2,740	39

Present

Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro  
War Minister TERAUCHI, Juichi  
Navy Minister NAGANO, Osami  
Finance Minister BABA, Eiichi

(N.B.- Decision of the competent members, presumably the above.)

Decision

Decided the "Second Administrative Policy Towards North China," August 11, 1936. See Exhibit 979 herein for the decision of the same date of Five Ministers Conference on this matter. (9549)

Remarks

Second Administration policy toward China of 11 August set out the influencing of North China in a pro-Japanese and anti-Communistic direction, and the improving of national defense in preparation against USSR; North China was to be made a base for cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China for mutual aid, by guiding politics and making the Nanking Government recognize the characteristic feature of North China. (2740-2743)

See Exhibit 216 herein for the Four Ministers' Conference decision of 20 February 1937 on "The Third Administrative Policy towards North China." (2745)

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
218	20 February	2,745; 2,746-7	43

Present

Foreign Minister HAYASHI, Senjuro  
Finance Minister YUKI, Toyotaro  
Army Minister SUGIWARA, Gen  
Navy Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa

Decision

The ministries concerned decided "The Third Administrative Policy Toward North China." (2745)

Remarks

The Third Administrative Policy Towards North China decided 20 February 1937 once more set forth Japan's intention regarding the administration of North China. The principal object of this policy was to make Manchukuo pro-Japanese and pro-anti-Comintern, to procure defense materials and to prepare the defense against U.S.S.R. (2747)

To accomplish this objective Japan should assist in furthering the economic policy in North China, "aid in secret the government of North China and make the Nanking Government recognize the speciality of North China and aid the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China." (2747)

Japan must "abstain from all the actions as give other powers misunderstanding of our intention" as the "measures which we took in North China made the Foreign Powers think that we were aggressive in China." (2747)

Japan shall develop the economy of North China by welcoming the "investment of private capitalists and by the extension of our rights and interests in North China, we establish the close friendship between Japan and China. By thus establishing the friendship not only 'in time of peace but in time of war we may procure the materials for munition industries.'" (2747)

See Exhibit 217 on Four Ministers' Conference, decision of 11 August 1936 on "The Second Administrative Policy Towards North China." (2740)

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1937)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
219	16 April	2,748	44

Present

Foreign Minister SATO, Naotake  
Finance Minister YUKI, Toyotaro  
War Minister SUGIYAMA, Gen  
Navy Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa

Decision

Decided the "Plans for Guiding North China," 16 April 1937.

Remarks

According to these plans, the foreign policy shall be to make North China a firm anti-Communist and pro-Manchu Japanese region and to acquire communication facilities in preparation against the "Red Threat." (2748) When carrying out this policy the Nanking Regime must be guided so that it will recognize the special position of North China. (2749)

Since the Japanese policy towards North China gave rise to "the erroneous impression to China and other Powers that our Empire has the intention of enlarging the truce zone, advancing the frontier of Manchukuo or else realizing the independence of North China," in our future policy, "It is vitally important to attend solely to the execution of cultural and economic measures having as main objects secure and facile life and work for the North China populace, thus contributing to the achievement of our expected aims." (2749)

Regarding the economical development of North China, Japan shall advocate the free advance of civilian capital, as well as Chinese capital, "Thereby constructing an inseparable Sino-Japanese situation based on the economical profits of Chinese and Japanese in accord, and to contribute to the maintenance of North China's pro-Japanese attitude both in peace time and in war, especially the development of those military resources vital to national defense (iron, coal, salt, etc.) and the establishments of communication, electricity, etc. connected to this shall be speedily realized by special capital, if necessary." (2750)

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
619	18 June	6,824	122

Present

Prime Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa  
Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro  
War Minister HATA, Shunroku  
Navy Minister YOSHIDA, Zengo

Decision

Decided that, regarding French Indo-China's pro-Chiang's acts, negotiations should be conducted and, after waiting for a reply, it should be determined if force should be resorted to or not. (6824)

Remarks

Exhibit 619 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of 19 June 1940 referring to a talk he had with Foreign Minister ARITA about two plans debated at the Four Ministers' Conference of the previous day.

The two plans are "(1) That a request be submitted regarding the pro-Chiang acts, and in case the request is refused by the French, that force be employed; (2) That force be employed at once from the beginning on the idea that negotiation is unnecessary." (6824)

The Military Ministers favored the first plan as "It was their idea to have the first part of the first plan put into effect at once and to decide after waiting for a reply whether to resort to force or not." (6824)

The Conference adopted the plan of the military ministers. (6824)

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
541	4 September	6271; 6307; 7920	144

Present

Prime Minister KONOYE, Fumimaro  
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, Yosuke  
Army Minister TOJO, Hideki  
Navy Minister YOSHIDA, Zengo

Decision

The Four Ministers' Conference decided the "Outline of the Basic National Policy" on 4 September 1940. (6271)

Remarks

This Exhibit refers to a decision of a Liaison Conference of 19 September 1940. For a discussion of this, see Liaison Conference heading, Exhibit 541, 1940 herein.



FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
618-A	5 November	6,873	164
	21 November	6,873	164

Present

Prime Minister KONOYE, Fumimaro  
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, Yosuke  
Army Minister TOJO, Hideki  
Navy Minister OIKAWA, Koshiro

Decision

Decided to "assist Thailand in her recovery of lost territory and plan to make Thailand cooperate both politically and economically in the establishment of the New Order in East Asia." (Four Ministers' Conference of 5 November 1940 - 6873) and decided "that when Thailand accents our demands we would immediately assist her in the recovery of Luang Prabang and Pakuse." (Four Ministers' Conference of 21 November 1940 - 6873)

Remarks

Ex. 618-A is a "Business Report of South Seas Section in 1940." (6844) It refers to the above two meetings and contains the background, from Japan's viewpoint, of the frontier dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China. (6868-6874)

FOUR MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
(1944)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1348	2 Sept.	12,110	309

Present

Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU  
Finance Minister ISHIWATA, Sotaro  
War Minister SUGIYAMA  
Navy Minister YONAI

(N.B. - This was a meeting of the competent officials of the ministries concerned, presumably from the ministries set forth above. The exhibit does not contain the attendance.)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

on 2 September 1944 the competent officials of the ministries concerned proposed that the independence of the East Indies be announced in a special Diet session; (12,110) that "the former Netherlands Indies; (excluding New Guinea) shall be the scheduled territory to be made independent (The Navy's approval reserved)" (12,111); that the form and time of Independence and the relations with the Empire shall be determined separately. (12,111); that, regarding Java, radical changes in the status of the military administration shall be avoided, but the participation of the people in politics shall be strengthened. (12,112)

See Exhibit 1344 entitled "Course of Events Leading up to Decision on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." (12,065; 12,068; 12,107; 12,113; 12,114)

Exhibit 1349 is entitled "Measures for the Netherlands East Indies Independence - Data for Foreign Minister's explanation, 17 July 1945. (12116)

FOUR MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
(1944)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1348	2 Sept.	12,110	309

Present

Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU  
Finance Minister ISHIWATA, Sotaro  
War Minister SUGIYAMA  
Navy Minister YONAI

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Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

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See Exhibit 1344 entitled "Course of Events Leading up to Decision on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." (12,065; 12,068; 12,107; 12,113; 12,114)

Exhibit 1349 is entitled "Measures for the Netherlands East Indies Independence - Data for Foreign Minister's explanation, 17 July 1945. (12116)

In order to show what the Foreign Ministry and other Japanese authorities meant by the use of the term "independence" in connection with the occupied territories, see Exhibits 628, 1334, 1333-A, 1336 and 1335.

See also Exhibit 687, herein, for a series of meetings of the Privy Council on the proposed establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry in the period of 9 - 24 October, 1942, (12071 - 12095)

See Exhibit 1346 for the joint declaration of the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations, adopted on 6 November 1943, as well as for an account of the proceedings of the Assembly on 5 and 6 November 1943. (12098-12102)

Exhibit 277 is the speech of Premier KOISO before the 85th Diet session on 7 September 1944, (12,113), regarding East Indies Independence. (12113)

On July 17, 1945 it was decided that "the Empire shall recognize the independence of the East Indies at the earliest possible opportunity" (12,115) (Less than a month later Japan surrendered and the decision was never put into effect.

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
977	30 June	9,542	38
978	" "	9,548	39

Present

Prime Minister HIROTA	/Navy Minister YAGANO
Foreign Minister ARITA	Army Minister TERAUCHI
Finance Minister EIWA	(Two Ministers' Conference of
Navy Minister NAGANO	30 June)/
Army Minister TERAUCHI	

(Both Conferences on same day and same subject matter).

Decision

Decided the "Basis of National Policy."

Remarks

Exhibit 977 is the outline of the National Policy as decided by the War and Navy Ministers.

The fundamental policies are as follows; (1 a) a consistent policy of overseas expansion (9543); (b) Completion of Japan's national defense armament to "secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia in fact as well as in name" (9543); (c) Develop Manchukuo to stabilize the Japan-Manchukuo national defense, promote Japan's economic development by getting rid of Russia "while preparing against Britain and the U.S." (9544), (d) promote "our racial and economic development in the Southern Seas, especially in the outer Southern Seas." (9544)

The aim of Japan's military preparations was to enable Japan to cope with any force which the USSR can mobilize in the Far East, "so that we may smash her Far Eastern force at one blow from the beginning." (9545) Regarding the Navy, Japan "must complete its armaments sufficiently to maintain the command of the Western Pacific against the U.S. Navy." (9545)

Exhibit 978 is a discussion of the same matter later in the day at a Five Ministers' Conference of 30 June 1936.

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
977	30 June	9,542	38
978	" "	9,548	39

Present

Prime Minister HIROTA  
Foreign Minister ARITA  
Finance Minister EIRA  
Navy Minister NAGANO  
Army Minister TERAUCHI

/Navy Minister NAGANO  
Army Minister TERAUCHI  
(Two Ministers' Conference of  
30 June)/

(Both Conferences on same day and same subject matter).

Decision

Decided the "Basis of National Policy."

Remarks

Exhibit 977 is the outline of the National Policy as decided by the War and Navy Ministers.

The fundamental policies are as follows; (1 a) a consistent policy of overseas expansion (9543); (b) Completion of Japan's national defense armament to "secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia in fact as well as in name" (9543); (c) Develop Manchukuo to stabilize the Japan-Manchukuo national defense, promote Japan's economic development by getting rid of Russia "while preparing against Britain and the U.S." (9544), (d) promote "our racial and economic development in the Southern Seas, especially in the outer Southern Seas." (9544)

The aim of Japan's military preparations was to enable Japan to cope with any force which the USSR can mobilize in the Far East, "so that we may smash her Far Eastern force at one blow from the beginning." (9545) Regarding the Navy, Japan "must complete its armaments sufficiently to maintain the command of the Western Pacific against the U.S. Navy." (9545)

Exhibit 978 is a discussion of the same matter later in the day at a Five Ministers' Conference of 30 June 1936.

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
216	7 August	2,727	39

Present

War Minister TERAJUCHI, Juichi  
Navy Minister NAGANO, Osami  
Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro  
Finance Minister IMAI, Eiichi  
Prime Minister HIROTA, Koki

Decision

Decided the "Basic Principles of National Policy" 7 August 1936.

Remarks

Basic principles of national policy decided by the Premier HIROTA, ARITA, RABA, TERAJUCHI and NAGANO on 7 August deal with the policy to be established to secure the position of the Empire in East Asia continent and to advance towards the South Seas. Intensification of national defense of Japan and Manchukuo in order to eradicate Soviet menace and prepare against Britain and America. (2727)

See Exhibit 704 for Four Ministers Conference of August 7, 1936 for a discussion of the same subject matter.

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
(1936)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record base</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
979	11 August	9.549	39

Present

Prime Minister HIROTA, Kooki  
Foreign Minister ARIYA, Kachiro  
War Minister TERAUCHI, Juichi  
Navy Minister UGAKA, Osami  
Finance Minister RAJA, Eiichi (absent)

Decision

Decided the "Fundamental of our National Policy", 11 August 1936.

Remarks

The fundamental principle of administering the State lies in "making the Japanese Empire develop into the stabilization power, nominal and virtual, in the East Asia," (9549) and in "securing a steady footing of our Empire in the Eastern continent as well as developing in the South Seas under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defense." (9550) The general principles are: (1) Exclude the "military rule policy of the powers," (9550); (2) complete "our defensive armament," (9550), strive "to eradicate the Russian menace on the north, in order to realize a steadfast development of Manchuria," (9550) and at the same time we should "be prepared for Britain or America", (9550) and (4) try to "fulfill our national strength correlative with the completion of Manchuria." (9551)

The outline of the new policy is as follows:

(1) Aim "to counteract all the military forces that Russia can furnish to employ in the Far East" and, so as to be able "to strike a hit at the very outset of the war upon the Russians, we should complete our military force in Korea and Manchuria," and at the same time we should (9551-2) secure the command of the sea on the Western Pacific counter to the American Navy, (9552);

(2) The military authorities must assist the diplomatic organ "from within in order to have it act fully and advantageously, evading all the time to act from without as far as possible," (9552)

(3) Public opinion should be led and unified, the administrative and economic organs should be improved; the people's livelihood should be stabilized; measures should be taken in order to make a drastic progress in air and sea transportation; a self-sufficient policy should be established for the important resources and material essential to national defense and industry; the diplomatic function should be quickened and Japan's national culture should be enhanced abroad. (9553)



FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1938)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
612	25 November	6,731	84

Present

Prime Minister KONOYE, Fumimaro  
Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro  
Finance Minister IKEDA, Seihin  
Army Minister ITAGAKI, Seishiro  
Navy Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa

Decision

Decided that Hainan Island would be captured by military action in case of necessity and discussed and agreed to the principle of adjusting the new Sino-Japanese relationship.

Remarks

The matter read in evidence contains no other remarks on the decision except as set forth above. (6731)

Exhibit 613-A, a copy of the Tokyo Gazette, Volume III, No. 10, reads as follows:

"February 10. Hainan Island, off the South China Coast is surprised by the Japanese landing forces under Vice-Admiral Nobutake KONDO, Commander of the Imperial Naval Forces in South China. Kiungchow and Haikow fall into the hands of the Japanese." (6733)

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
(1939)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
504	6 May	6,103	95

Present

Premier HIRANUMA  
Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro  
Finance Minister ISHIWATARA, Sotaro  
War Minister ITAGAKI  
Navy Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa

Decision

HIRANUMA "obtained a compromise, which the Army indicates is the highest possible offer under present conditions, in the conflict of the Five Ministers' Conference, (War and Finance Ministers against the Foreign and Navy Ministers)", regarding closer cooperation with Germany and Italy, i.e. for a Tripartite Pact.

Remarks

On 6 May OTT cabled the State Secretary relating that Premier HIRANUMA had obtained a compromise in the conflict of the 5-Minister Conference (War, ITAGAKI and Finance Minister ISHIWATARA against Foreign and Navy Ministers). He then quoted the Army declarations on the obligatory military aid suggested in the proposed treaty and stated that it was hoped that the HIRANUMA Declaration would offer the opportunity for the final conclusion of the treaty. 6108

Concerning the main points of the declaration, the Army explained "1). Regarding obligatory aid, the army had further proposed to lay down more clearly the 'change in circumstances' which would later make effective aid possible, and to declare in short that the neutrality of Japan would not in any way enter into the question. The army attributed the present wording to the Foreign Minister. The War Vice Minister declared that the treaty bound Japan definitely to the Axis Powers. We must, however, understand that Japan was isolated in the Far East and was in a considerably worse position than the Axis bloc in Europe which could cooperate directly. In case of war, however, independent of the outbreak and extent of Japanese acts of war, just the plain fact of the treaty would exert effective pressure on the enemy." (6108-6109)

"2). Re the 'Explanation', the army emphasizes that the present proposal was more elastic, contained no specific formulation, and left open negotiations for which there were supposed to be favorable prospects, according to OSHIMA'S telegram received yesterday. (6109)

"3). Explanations concerning 'Sincerity of my Country' were indicated as a particularly important personal word of honor of the Prime Minister, after I had referred to the wording which could be easily misunderstood. (6109)

"The whole statement had been delivered to the Emperor by the Foreign Minister, which fact also follows from the indications made in the press. In case an agreement is not reached, the army expects a resignation of the cabinet, which would be quite undesirable at the present time for foreign and domestic reasons. (6109-6110)

"Declarations from navy circles not yet obtainable. Main opposition of the navy comes evidently from Navy Vice Minister YAMAMOTO. (6110)

"From the Foreign Ministry a senior official, who stands especially close to Ambassador SHIRATORI, let me know personally that in the entire government a deep cleft between friends and enemies of the alliance had formed. The situation was very serious and complicated. By his personal initiative, the Prime Minister had achieved a declaration of compromise which accepts the principle of an unlimited alliance, limiting this, however, by two significant reservations. This attitude of Japan must, it is true, astonish the Axis Powers, who are accustomed to unequivocal decisions, but it arises necessarily from the lack of unified leadership. Should negotiations collapse, cabinet crisis is threatening with serious consequences. (6110)

"General impression is that most active preliminaries of the treaty idea stress extraordinary difficulties and (one word apparently lacking) urgently hopes that HIRANUMA'S declaration would offer the opportunity for the final conclusion of the treaty." (6110)

"This is signed 'OTT'" (6108-6111)

Exhibit 503 is a telegram dated 4 May 1939 from OTT to the Reich Foreign Minister relating to what is known as the HIRANUMA Declaration, the text of which is as follows:

"I cherish great admiration for the lofty wisdom and iron will with which His Excellency, Chancellor of the German Government, HITLER, is working at the noble task of the reconstruction of his country and at the establishment of an international peace founded upon principles of justice.

"2). Re the 'Explanation', the army emphasizes that the present proposal was more elastic, contained no specific formulation, and left open negotiations for which there were supposed to be favorable prospects, according to OSHIMA'S telegram received yesterday. (6109)

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"I, for my part, as Japanese Prime Minister, am likewise occupied with the strengthening of peace and with the maintenance of a New Order in East Asia founded on the principles of justice and morality.

"In this splendid hour it is a confirmed joy to me how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement between our two countries proves itself in the execution of the tasks placed before them. And today if I have in view the conclusion of an agreement, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and to make closer the co-operation between Japan, Germany and Italy, this does not occur just out of a consideration of the mere expediency of it, but in the hope that in that way we may contribute to the consolidation of a world peace founded upon justice and morality in consciousness of our common tasks now. As far as the strengthening of our relations is concerned, I can affirm that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even if one of those two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political and economic aid, to the extent possible to her power, military assistance.

"In spite of this Japan is ready, in accordance with the provisions of such an agreement to take up the military support of Germany and Italy; however, Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical manner any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances.

"I should especially like to receive Germany's and Italy's express consent to the foregoing point.

"Furthermore, in consequence of the international situation which confronts it, Japan would be compelled to exercise the greatest caution in regard to the explication which it would give at the time of the publication of this agreement. I would be glad to receive the unequivocal assent of Germany and Italy on this point also.

"I may add that the planned agreement rests upon the foundation of mutual confidence, and that to doubt the sincerity of my country in the slightest would be tantamount to destroying the real basis of the agreement and would make its execution impossible.

"The thoughts which I have just portrayed arise from reflections of a moral and spiritual nature and cannot be influenced by reasons of expediency. If I undertook to express them with all frankness, it was because I was guided exclusively by the sincere desire to bring our endeavors to a satisfactory conclusion!" (6104-6106)

On August 23, 1939 the German-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty was signed. (By Tribunal Order No. 400 the Tribunal took judicial notice of this fact.) (6120)

On May 22, 1939, Germany and Italy signed a formal treaty of military alliance. (6120)

Exhibit 486-L relates to the Japanese protest over the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty (6122) and it is a telegram from OTT stating that the Japanese Foreign Minister handed him copies of the following instructions sent to OSHIMA:

"(1) To inform the German government that the Japanese government had interpreted the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact as finally terminating the present negotiations between Japan and Germany for a Tripartite Pact with Italy;

"(2) The Japanese Government declares that the German act of making a non-aggression pact with Russia constitutes a serious violation of the secret agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. Therefore she files a solemn protest with the German Government.

"The Foreign Minister added, that Japan had been forced to make the enclosed declaration, but that she was willing to continue friendship for Germany and was seeking a suitable way."

(Signed "OTT")" (6123)

But OSHIMA was dissuaded by WEIZAECKER from making the sharp protest regarding the "inconsistency of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact with the secret treaty between Germany and Japan" (6124) and "merely telegraphed to his government, saying he had followed its order. But in fact he - OSHIMA - had postponed the fulfillment of the demarche till now, 18 September 1939." (6125)

Exhibit 507 shows that notwithstanding the temporary setback to the conclusion of a Germany-Italy-Japanese Alliance, Germany continued her efforts to develop closer German-Japanese relations.

On 30 August 1939 the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned because of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia, and it was succeeded by the Cabinet of ABE.

FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
(1939)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Supp. Summ.</u>
2198	8 August	15, 744	21

Present

Navy Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa  
War Minister ITAGAKI, Seishiro  
Foreign Minister Arita, Hachiro  
Finance Minister ISHIWAZAKI, Sotaro  
Prime Minister HIRANO, Kiichiro

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Cablegram sent by Ambassador OTI to the Army High Command and Air High Command on 6 September 1939 regarding Five Ministers' Conference on 8 August in which Army's urgent desire was stressed for early conclusion of China conflict; alleviate present tension by conforming to wishes of masses and prevent dangerous reaction in direction of an economically tempting settlement with England. These reasons being so compelling War Minister ITAGAKI was resolved, as a last resort to risk his resignation. A decision was to be reached by 15 August and ITAGAKI requests that Berlin and Rome Governments be apprised of the situation and suggest they help by concessions. These provided that there would be no mental reservations behind the wording and that a verbal form of Japanese supplementary statement be found. The new alliance was chiefly a domestic political weapon but the Army was the chief supporter of the Alliance. The plans of the Foreign Minister who attaches great importance to successful negotiations with England would be cancelled out if Germany shows initiative in a spirit of concession. (15,744)

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
(1840)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Character Summary</u>
534	12 July	6,259	---

Present

Premier YONAI  
Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro  
Army Minister HATA, Shunroku  
Navy Minister YOSHIDA, Zengo  
Finance Minister SAKURAUCHI, Yukio

Decision

See remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 534 is an excerpt from KIDO's Diary of 14 July 1940. KIDO said he was asked by the Emperor "whether an order (which had been secretly reported by the Prince, the Chief of the General Staff, for heavy artillery mobilization for the purposes of the South China campaign) had been fully cleared with the Government." (6259) In this regard he said that he "Learned from the Aide-de-Camp that he had heard as follows from the War Minister: At the Four Ministers' Conference on the 12th (which the Finance Minister was specially invited to attend) the results of a careful study were that since in any case any preparations at all would require a month and a half, they had agreed to push preparations." (6259)

Exhibit 534 was offered to show the military activity of the General Staff at the time of the fall of the YONAI Cabinet which "was forced by the Army." (6257)

Exhibit 533 is a telegram from OTT to the German General Staff dated 17 July 1940 stating that he had "information from Japanese General Staff that siege batteries have been already mobilized for attack on Hongkong in the case that it might be necessary." (6257)

Exhibit 532 consists of excerpts from KIDO's Diary showing the downfall of the YONAI-ARITA Cabinet, the means by which it was accomplished, and the reasons therefore. (6240-6256)



## FUNCTIONS OF THE "GENRO" AND THE "ELDERS STATESMEN"

The body of Elder Statesmen called the GENRO was an extra-constitutional and extra-legal institution. This body was more or less informally constituted from among the councillors and leaders of the Meiji Restoration and had no status within the constitution, laws or ordinances. However, there gradually developed the custom that those statesmen who played leading roles in the Restoration of 1868 and in the early period of the Constitutional history of Japan were to be consulted on matters of paramount importance in domestic and foreign matters including the naming of a new cabinet, war declarations, conclusions of peace and negotiations of treaties and international agreements of importance. For many years one or another from among the Genro occupied the important governmental positions of Prime Minister, President of Privy Council or Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Beginning informally, the group began to be recognized as a governmental institution and finally in December 1926, when Prince Saionji was appointed a Genro, the institution was formally recognized by an Imperial Rescript making the appointment. (677)

The group met and functioned on direct order from the Emperor that they should meet and advise on the solution of the question submitted. While they advised on grave matters of state such as the declaration of war, conclusion of peace and matters involving international relations, their most important function was in serving as the medium through which a new cabinet was named, thus filling up one of the major gaps in the Japanese Constitutional system occasioned by the fact that as a matter of legal principle the cabinet is responsible only to the Emperor. Upon the death of Prince Saionji in 1940, the Genro disappeared as an institution. (678)

The second of these groups is the group known as the Elder Statesmen or Jushin. (679)

With the passing of the function of advising the Emperor on the matter of the selection of a new cabinet from the Genro to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Lord Keeper instituted the practise of consulting individually with the ex-premiers and the President of the Privy Council. This group of Elder Statesmen, an extra-legal body came to be known as the Jushin. In July 1940, this body was officially formalized by being convoked and meeting as a group to advise the Lord Keeper on the selection of a new premier. While the conference of ex-premiers has the primary function of advising on the selection of a premier, on occasion it has been summoned to advise the Emperor on matters of state of grave importance. (679)

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MEETING OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
532	17 July	6,249	132

Present

HARA, President of Privy Council  
WAKATSUKI  
OKADA  
HIROTA  
HAYASHI  
KONOYE  
HIRANUMA  
KANROJI, Vice Lord Grand Chamberlain

Decision

The Senior Statesmen decided to recommend that Prince KONOYE succeed YONAI as Prime Minister.

Remarks

Exhibit 532 is an extract from the diary of KIDO 17 July 1940 recording that a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held to choose a new Prime Minister to succeed YONAI. KONOYE, who was favored by the military, was recommended.

The Exhibit gives the background of the downfall of the YONAI-ARITA Cabinet and the means by which it was accomplished and the reason therefor. KIDO stated that "I don't know the details but the gist of what I learned of the situation from Premier YONAI yesterday at HAYAMA is as follows: The Army thinks that the present cabinet is not adequate to carry out a policy which will suit the present ever-changing world situation and which will not be regretted later. It seems to show also a tendency to favor a political rapprochement with Germany and Italy. It also feels that even in domestic affairs the government, being separated from the people, will be unable to obtain satisfactory results in a number of policies, and that unless the political structure is strengthened, the government will be unable to cope with the present emergency. In a word since the War Minister's opinion is different from that of the present cabinet, he cannot fulfill his duty as the leader of the Army. Hence he has come to the point of resigning." (6250)

WAKATSUKI suggested Prince KONOYE; HARA, HIRANUMA, HAYASHI and OKA agreed to this. (6251)

HIROTA said that "It seems the China Incident cannot be easily settled if the cabinet is as weak as it has been, and there is no other way but to continue the present state of affairs. Judged from this view point, it would also be a good thing to have a suitable military man capable of working closely with the Army and Navy. However, there is no such man. Besides, since the military themselves wish it there is no problem about asking Prince KONOYE to take the field." (6252)

CONFERENCES OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1117	17 July	10,166	227

Present

HARA, President of Privy Council  
WAKATSUKI  
OKADA  
ABE  
YONAI  
HAYASHI  
HIROTA  
KANROJI, Vice Lord Grand Chamberlain  
KIDO

Decision

The Senior Statesmen on 17 July 1940 approved KONOYE as Prime Minister for the third time. 1941

Remarks

Exhibit 1117 is an excerpt from KIDO's Diary regarding this meeting:

"WAKATSUKI questioned me as to the purpose of the resignation and the diplomatic problems (i.e. the clash of opinions between the Premier and Foreign Minister). ABE stressed the necessity of having Prince KONOYE as Premier; OKADA recommended Prince KONOYE, saying that no other person could exercise general control over both the Army and political circles; HAYASHI held the same opinion as ABE and OKADA; HARA did not differ from the above-mentioned; HIROTA laid stress upon the reinforcement of G.H.Q. and the formation of a military Cabinet, but he consented to the opinion of the rest upon my explanation of the establishment of G.H.Q. YONAI said that Prince KONOYE was the most suitable man to cope with the present difficulty. WAKATSUKI supported Prince KONOYE though his attitude was not positive. We recommended Prince KONOYE unanimously and closed our meeting at 2 p.m. The Emperor and Empress returned to Tokyo from their Hayama Villa. I visited the Emperor from 3:30 p.m. to 4:10 p.m. to report on the progress of our meeting, while the Lord Chamberlain telephoned to Prince KONOYE to request his presence at the Palace. At 5:05 p.m. Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Palace to receive the Imperial command to form a cabinet. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, visited me at 5:50 p.m. to explain the draft understanding between the U.S.A. and this country."  
(10,167-8)

CONFERENCE OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1154	17 October	10,291	255

Present

KIYOURA  
WAKATSUKI  
OKADA  
HAYASHI  
HIROTA  
ABE  
YONAI  
HARA, President of Privy Council  
KIDO

Decision

The Senior Statesmen approved TOJO as successor to Premier KONOYE.

Remarks

On 17 October 1941, the Senior Statesmen met and approved TOJO as Premier. KIDO proposed TOJO's name. The excerpt says:

"At 11 a.m. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me to make arrangements for a senior statesmen's conference. It was held from 1:10 p.m. to 3:45 p.m. in the west ante-chamber of the Palace. Those present were Viscount KIYOURA (92 years old), Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, General HAYASHI, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, Admiral YONAI, all ex-Premiers and President of the Privy Council HARA. I explained the situation of the general resignation. Mr. WAKATSUKI recommended General UGAKI as the succeeding Premier, and General HAYASHI discussed the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet.

"I asserted that the most important things were the revision of the decision of the last Council in the Imperial presence and the unity of opinion between the Army and Navy. I suggested a TOJO Cabinet as a solution of these problems, with TOJO as Premier and War Minister, even though he is on military service. I met no objection to my proposal, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, and Mr. HARA, giving me positive approval. The meeting broke up at 4 p.m. I reported to the Emperor the details of the progress of the ex-Premiers Conference and talked with him until 4:15 p.m. The War Minister proceeded to the Palace at the request of the Emperor to receive the Imperial Order for the formation of a new Cabinet.

This was followed by the visit of Navy Minister OIKAWA to whom the Emperor gave advice to the effect that the unity of opinions between the Army and the Navy were very desirable. I passed on to them in an ante-room the following message as ordered by the Emperor. In deciding the fundamental policy of our country we need not necessarily follow the decisions of the Council in the Imperial presence on the 6th of September, but should study carefully conditions both at home and abroad." (10.291-2)

Exhibit 1155 shows that TOJO remained in active military service after he became Premier; he also became a full general (10,293). The Emperor sanctioned this. (10293)

CONFERENCE OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1196	29 November	10,452	272

Present

WAKATSUKI  
OKADA  
HIRANUMA  
KONOYE  
JOMAI  
NAROTA  
HAYASHI  
ABE  
KIDO

Decision

The Senior Statesmen's Conference of November 29, 1941 discussed the matter of war with the United States.

Remarks

Exhibit 1196 is an excerpt from KIDO's Diary of 29 November, 1941. The Emperor asked the Senior Statesmen's opinion concerning the present political situation. What was said was as follows:

"The Emperor remarked on the difficult times we were going through.

"Baron WAKATSUKI said that we were equal to a prolonged war with the U.S.A. in spiritual power, but regarding material power we must make a careful study.

"Admiral OKADA said that he had grave doubts as to our supply capacity in regard to war materials, and thought the Government's statement about this matter to date was quite incomplete.

"Baron HIRANUMA agreed with Mr. WAKATSUKI's opinion as regards the spiritual strength of the Japanese nation, and urged further measures to awaken patriotic sentiment.

"Prince KONOYE stated that it was quite regrettable that our negotiations were going to be a failure in spite of our strenuous efforts since last April. But he was of the opinion that there would be no need to resort to a hasty war just because of the rupture of the negotiations as we might be able to reach



a wise solution in some way or other, while continuing our struggle against difficulties.

"Admiral YONAI said that he could not base his opinion on definite data but it was his desire that we should be careful not to lose what little we possess by trying to avoid becoming poorer by inches.

"Mr. HIROTA said that although our policy had been to prevent Anglo-American interference in the China Incident, this had reached their present situation. We should be able to seize an opportunity to solve the pending problems between the two countries even after the commencement of hostilities, if we were sincere enough in our diplomatic efforts.

"General HAYASHI stated that as he had no data for his opinion, he could do nothing but believe the decisions of the Imperial Headquarters and the Government.

"General ABE said that according to the Government statement the negotiations had come to a deadlock in spite of strenuous efforts on our part. He was sure that the Government had studied the world political situation from various angles with laborious minuteness, for which we were thankful. But it would be quite necessary to pay much more attention to the attitude of the Chinese people than to the war with the U.S.A., otherwise we would lose the fruits of victory in the Chinese Incident.

"Mr. WAKATSUKI said that the war should be fought to the end even if there was no chance to win, if it was a defensive one for the cause of our national existence and self-defense, but we should avoid the war if we intended to realize our ideals such as 'the Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere' or 'the stabilizing of power in Asia', because such a war would be very dangerous. (10,452, 10,453, 10,454)

But see Exhibit 1396 in its corrected form (16187). (No material change in meaning as set forth above).

CONFERENCE OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1158-A	1 December	10,513-10,515	---

Present

HIROHITO, The Emperor  
WAKATSUKI  
OKADA  
HAYASHI, Senjuro  
YONAI  
ABE, Nobuyuki  
KONOYE  
HIRANUMA  
TOJO  
HIROTA

(SHIMADA, TOGO and TOJO met with the Senior Statesmen during the morning before the meeting and explained the situation to them.)  
(10,515)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 1158-A is an extract from TOJO's interrogation of 11 March 1943 which reads as follows:

"Q When and why was a meeting of ex-premiers held prior to the last Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?

"A You mean the Senior Statesmen?

"Q Yes.

"A That was convened by the Emperor.

"Q When?

"A It was either on the 1st or the 31st.

"Q What was the purpose of calling that meeting?

"A The Emperor was very anxious about the question of war with America and he convened them in order to hear each man's opinion.

"Q Who presided at that meeting?

"A Let's see -- those were WAKATSUKI, OKADA, Senjuro HAYASHI, YONAI, Nobuyuki ABE, KONOYE, HIRANUMA.

"Q You still have not answered who presided.

"A I think perhaps WAKATSUKI presided. I don't really know.

"Q Did you make any statements at that meeting?

"A Of course, I was there, too, as the Premier at that time. Yes, I did. The Emperor was there and heard each man's opinion in turn. I was there and from time to time spoke, giving the government's point of view.

"Q What did you state as the government's point of view?

"A I explained various things, but I don't remember the details now. I explained the inevitableness of war.

"Q Did the Emperor make any statement at all at that meeting?

"A No, he only listened. This was not a conference. It was only that the Emperor wished to hear the opinion of each man.

"Q Did you express your opinion before any of the others expressed theirs?

"A It was this way: The Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers, President of the Cabinet Planning Board, and I, as Premier, met with the Senior Statesmen in the morning and explained the situation to them. Then after a Court dinner with the Emperor, the former Premiers and I met with the Emperor who heard each man's opinion in turn. The other cabinet members were not present at that time, only I from the government. There was one other former Premier present - HIROTA." (10,513-15)

MEETING OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1944)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1277	17 July	11,372	307

Present

WAKATSUKI  
OKADA  
HIRANUMA  
HIROTA  
ABE  
KONOE  
YONAI

Decision

Discussed the resignation of TOJO's Cabinet at HIRANUMA's home. They decided "to build a powerful national cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly."

Remarks

This was an unofficial conference.

Exhibit 1277 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of 17 July 1944 stating that OKADA talked with him about the meeting as follows:

WAKATSUKI said that the "Cabinet has completely lost the sympathy of the public." (11,372)

YONAI said he refused to join TOJO's Cabinet. He had discussed the matter with OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau. (11,372)

ABE said that the people "are completely out of sympathy with this Cabinet" and that he "must decide my attitude according to the attitude of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society." (11,373)

HIRANUMA said it is not a question of whether the Cabinet is overthrown or not, or whether the next cabinet will be a weak one or not. The point is "that we are really concerned about our country, and we must make up our minds to do something." (11,373)

HIROTA said he would not join the Cabinet. (11,374)

Later TOJO called and explained to KIDO his cabinet's policy regarding changes therein (11,374). He said that the Supreme Command would be consolidated and the Navy Minister changed; that the Liaison Conference would be renovated and strengthened as so to consist of two Ministers of State of the Premier class (ABE and YONAI considered)

besides both Chiefs of Staff and the Ministers of War, Navy, Munitions, Finance and Foreign affairs. KISHI would request to retire as Minister of State so that FUJIWARA, in order to strengthen the air force, could serve full time as Member of Munitions; MAEDA or SHIMADA would be appointed Welfare Minister in order to have a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society in the Cabinet, and General ABE and Admiral YONAI would be asked to join the cabinet as Ministers of State in order to reinforce the Imperial Headquarters; the Cabinet Advisory System would be revived, if the Senior Statesmen desire it and the Cabinet members would keep close contact with the Senior Statesmen; the advisory setup of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society would be divided into two departments, technical and political, with five advisers to be appointed from among the House of Peers and the House of Representatives, respectively. (11,376)

MEETING OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1944)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1278	18 July	11,378	308

Present

WAKATSUKI  
OKADA  
HIROTA  
KONOE  
HIRANUMA  
ABE  
YONAI  
HARA, President of Privy Council  
KIDO, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal

Decision

Decided that TERAUCHI, KOISO or HATA be recommended to the Emperor as successor to TOJO.

Remarks

Exhibit 1278 is an excerpt from KIDO's Diary of 18 July 1944 and refers to an official meeting of the Senior Statesmen convened by KIDO, to select a successor to TOJO. HIROTA proposed the Imperial Prince, HIRANUMA objected and insisted on a military man, so did KIDO. WAKATSUKI several times suggested UGAMI but got no support, except from KONOYE. HIROTA said the prosecution of the war was first and foremost and no one dissented. They recommended TERAUCHI, KOISO or HATA. TOJO opposed TERAUCHI on military grounds and the Emperor decided to appoint KOISO. (11377-11380) But see Exhibit 1280 herein (1944) as to coalition cabinet composed of KOISO and YONAI

MEETINGS OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1944)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1280	20 July	11,383	308

Present

General ABE	KONOYE
General KOISO	HATANUMA
NAKATSUKI	YONAI
OKADA	HARA
HIRATA	KIDO

Decision

Approved a coalition cabinet to be formed by KOISO and YONAI.

Remarks

According to Exhibit 1279 on 19 July KONOYE suggested to KIDO that the new Cabinet should be a coalition between KOISO and YONAI; Kido agreed to this proposal. (11381)

Exhibit 1280 refers to the Senior Statesmen meeting of 20 July 1944. KIDO explained the development regarding the coalition. KOISO and YONAI were ordered by the Emperor to form a cabinet. (11383)

On 22 July KOISO became Prime Minister; SHIGEMITSU remained as Foreign Minister and became Great East Asia Minister; TOJO, SUZUKI and HOSHINO lost Cabinet office.

MEETINGS OF SENIOR STATESMEN  
(1945)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1282	5 April	11,390	311

Present

KONOYE  
HIRANUMA  
SUZUKI  
HIROTA  
WAKATSUKI  
OKADA  
TOJO  
KIDO  
Lord of Grand Chamberlain

Decision

Decided to recommend SUZUKI, Kantaro, President of the Privy Council as the successor to Premier KOISO.

Remarks

Exhibit 1282 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of 5 April 1945. (N.B.—This Exhibit was read in the Record in its corrected form. Only pages 1 and 2 were read. Pages 3,5,7, 11 and 12 were corrected. The following matter is taken from the Exhibit as corrected. See Record 16,195).

KIDO reported the following conversation as having taken place at the meeting:

TOJO remarked that frequent changes in cabinet in war time are deplorable. "I think", he said, "the San Francisco Conference of April 25 is especially the most important period. The Cabinet to be formed should be the final one. Within the country at present, there exists, on one hand, the opinion that we should fight to the last to provide for the future developments of the country and on the other hand, the opinion to accept the unconditional surrender terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is necessary to decide on this first." (p. 5 of excerpt)

HIRANUMA stated that "There is no way out but to fight to the end."

HIROTA said that "We must win by any means. Although there are pessimistic views, in this current war, no country has so far been winning straight through from the start. All of them have been, one time or another, on the verge of being defeated and have rallied back again. The next Cabinet should be one that would fight through to win the war." He thought that the Conference should ascertain the intentions of the Army and Navy authorities. (p. 6 of Excerpt)



HIRANUMA then pointed out that KOISO's Cabinet formation was a failure and that he, KOISO, should have consulted the Elder Statesmen "a little more without being apprehended by theories." (p. 6 of Excerpt)

WAKATSUKI said that "If the opinions of Baron HIRANUMA should be adopted (select principal cabinet members beforehand) nobody will be willing to accept the premiership and it will not be possible to form a cabinet. It will thoroughly restrict the activities of the Premier." (p. 9 of Excerpt)

HIROTA said that "It is better to have either the War Minister or the Navy Minister be the Chief of the new Cabinet." (p.10 of Excerpt)

HIRANUMA stated that "There are two phases of opinion at home in regard to the conclusion of the War. At this time, we must have a person who will fight it out. We cannot recommend any peace advocator who favors cessation of hostilities. From this import, the choosing of a Premier has important bearings. Incidentally, I am unable to voice any opinion if it means that all we have to do is to appoint the premier and the rest to be left to him. I am strongly opposed to any advocacy for peace and cessation of hostilities." (p. 10 of Excerpt)

SUZUKI remarked that "Since the Premier must be physically strong to stand the strain, I suggest Prince KONYE who is the youngest." (p. 12 of Excerpt)

HIRANUMA replied that "The candidate should be a military man" and therefore "It is my wish to have Admiral SUZUKI accept the premiership." (p. 12 of Excerpt)

KIDO said that "As I had said previously, now that the Japanese is on the verge of becoming a battlefield, strengthening of the government had become all the more necessary, and therefore, an imposing and sedate Cabinet which has the confidence of the people must be established. From this point, I think the opinion of his Excellency TOJO is plausible, but, personally, I hope to have his Excellency SUZUKI rise to the occasion." (p. 12 of Excerpt)

TOJO pointed out that "At the present when our land is about to become a battlefield we must take special care, or else there is a fear that the Army might take an aloof standing. If the Army takes an aloof standing, the Cabinet will collapse." (p. 13 of Excerpt)

KIDO responded to this by asking if there is any omen or premonition regarding the Army's taking an aloof standing. (p. 13 of excerpt)

TOJO replied that "Can't say there is none." (p. 13 of Excerpt)

KIDO then said "As I have said a little while ago, the anti-militaristic sentiments are quite strong and there are possibilities of having the people take an aloof standing." (p. 13 of Excerpt)

OKADA wanted to know what was meant by "'taking an aloof standing' to a person who received the Imperial Command" and who is responsible for the national defense? "Are they not the Army and Navy?" (p. 13 of Excerpt)

TOJO again replied that "Because of that apprehension I said to take care." (p. 13 of Excerpt)

The meeting adjourned.

On 7 April SUZUKI became Prime Minister, TOGO again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor; SATO, Lt. General became Commander of the 37th Divisions in Indo-China and (later) Siam; DCHIHARA became Chief Inspector of Military Training and again Supreme War Councillor; ITAGAKI, General, became Commander-in-chief 7th Army (Malaya); HATA became Commander-in-chief of 2nd Army.

On 9 April HIRANUMA again became President of the Privy Council.

Miscellaneous Meetings

SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL

a/k/a/

Supreme War Advisory Council  
Supreme War Direction Council  
Supreme War Leadership Council

(1944)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1349	5 September	12,117-8	----

Present

(Attendance not stated in Exhibit).

Decision

"After deliberation at the Supreme War Supervisory Conference of September 5, last year (1944) former Prime Minister KOISO in his declaration of the government's policies at the 85th Extraordinary Session of the Diet on September 9th, made a statement that 'The Empire is ready to recognize independence for the East Indies in order to secure everlasting welfare for her people,' thereby clarifying the Empire's intentions on this problem." (12,117)

Remarks

The Council "merely decided that the above statement was to be made at the Diet Session." (12,118) No time for the recognition of their independence was, however, stated. (12,118)

Miscellaneous Meetings

SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL

a/k/a Supreme War Advisory Council  
Supreme War Direction Council  
Supreme War Leadership Council

(1945)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1344	17 July	12,115	313
1350	17 July	12,121	313
DeWeerd	17 July	12,236	313

Present

Attendance not stated in the Exhibit.

Decision

The Supreme Advisory Conference of 17 July 1945 decided that "The Empire shall recognize the Independence of the East Indies at the earliest possible moment." (12,115)

Remarks

Exhibit 1344 is entitled "Course of Events Leading Up to Decision in Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." (12068) It refers to a decision of the Supreme Advisory Conference of 17 July 1945 that the independence of the East Indies should be recognized at the earliest possible moment and "for this purpose, preparation for independence shall be immediately promoted and intensified," (12,115) but "less than a month later the Empire had surrendered and this was never put into effect." (12,115) The Potsdam Declaration was signed on 26 July 1945.

Exhibit 1350 (12,121) and the testimony of DeWeerd (12,236) also refer to this decision regarding the measures for the East Indies independence stating that preparations for independence should be hastened. The area to be independent was the Netherlands East Indies and the independence as a new nation would be proclaimed as soon as preparations were completed. In areas where preparations were not complete, steps would be taken to transfer them by degrees to the jurisdiction of the new nation. (12,122)

Miscellaneous Meetings

SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL

a/k/a Supreme War Advisory Council  
Supreme War Direction Council  
Supreme War Leadership Council

(1945)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1283	9 August	11,393	314

Present

(Attendance not stated)

Decision

Decided to accept with four reservations the Potsdam Declaration.  
See Remarks.

Remarks

On 9 August KIDO recorded in his diary that Premier SUZUKI informed him that the Supreme War Guidance Council had decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration with four reservations: (1) preservation of the Imperial Dynasty; (2) Independent evacuation of troops; (3) handling in our own country of persons responsible for the war; and (4) no guarantee occupation.

The Japanese qualified acceptance of 10 August contained only the reservation with regard to the Emperor.

The Allies replied on 11 August.

Final Japanese acceptance was 14 August. Japan's defeat was kept secret until 21 August.

On 17 August Prince HIGASHIKUNI became Prime Minister; SHIGEMITSU again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor.

The Instrument of Surrender was signed on 2 September.

On 9 October SHIDEHARA became Prime Minister.

The Moscow Conference Agreement was signed 26 December.

Miscellaneous Meetings

SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL

a/k/a. Supreme War Advisory Council  
Supreme War Direction Council  
Supreme War Leadership Council

(1945)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
661	1 December	7,166; 7,173	310

Present

(Attendance not stated)

Decision

The Supreme War Leadership Council decided on the "Measures towards French Indo-China to meet the sudden change in the Situation, February 1, 1945." (7,166)

Remarks

According to the decision Japan "shall request the Governor-General of French Indo-China to agree" .. that the military and armed police forces of French Indo-China should be placed under the joint command of the Japanese Army" (7,167) and "immediate orders shall be given to all organs in French Indo-China to cooperate fully and loyally in accordance with the requests of the Japanese Empire." (7,167) The "aforesaid two items shall be accepted in toto within six hours." (7,167) The "Japanese forces on the spot shall elevate and support the independent positions Annam, etc., as they deem fit, and devise plans so as to make them cooperate with us actively." (7,168)

Miscellaneous Meetings

PRISONER-OF-WAR INFORMATION BUREAU  
(1942)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1980-B	on or after	14,558	---
1980-C	7 December	14,562	---
1980-D		14,563-5	---

Present

None stated in Exhibit, but see Exhibit TA AKA herein under heading "Military Service Bureau Conference, 1942." (14,289)

Decision

Immediately after the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, according to TOJO (Exhibit 1980-D, 14,558), the Prisoner of War Information Bureau was set up in the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry. (14,558)

Remarks

The War Minister (TOJO) ordered the formation of the Prisoner of War Bureau. (14,559)

Regarding the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, TOJO said in his interrogations as follows:

(From Ex. 1980-B)

"Q Were you, from 7 December 1941 on, familiar with the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war?

"A I knew of these at the time.

"Q At that time did you, as Premier and War Minister, believe that the provisions of those conventions applied to Japan and should be followed by her in war?

"A Naturally.

"Q In addition to the provisions of those conventions, there are also other recognized rules and customs of war followed by civilized nations, are there not?

"A As a civilized nation, we would follow the principles of humanism.

"Q I suppose by humanism, you mean that prisoners would be treated humanely, as by civilized nations?

"A Yes.

"Q So that, in general, from 7 December 1941 on, you, as Premier and War Minister, felt that Japan was bound by the Hague and Geneva Conventions with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war and also bound by the rules and customs of civilized nations with respect to treating prisoners of war humanely, did you not?

"A Yes." (1-1,559-60)

(From Exhibit 1980-C)

"Q But you, as Minister of War during the period when those atrocities were committed, are the responsible party for their commission, are you not?

"A Yes.

"Q What explanation can you give for the fact that you did not learn of them when they were so widespread and of such a serious nature?

"A I was always under the impression that army commanders in the field who were responsible for the treatment of prisoners understood what was required of them in this connection.

"Q During this entire period from 7 December 1941 on, you were aware of the fact, were you not, that the United States and Great Britain, through friendly nations, had warned the Japanese Government that Japanese officials and the Japanese Government would be held responsible for violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and for violations of the rules of war with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war?

"A Yes, and if these atrocities are true, treaties have been violated.

"Q During this same period, were you not aware that the United States and Great Britain, through friendly nations, had made numerous and repeated complaints, giving specific data and charging that there had been, in each instance, violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and of the rules of war in connection with the mistreatment of prisoners of war?

"A I do not remember details, but I think these came through the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.



"Q Such complaints would first come to the Foreign Ministry and then be routed to the Minister of War's Office, would they not?

"A Yes.

"Q How many of these complaints were made, that you recall, of your personal knowledge?

"A I cannot recall just now how many were received.

"Q What, if anything, did you do with respect to those which were received?

"A These were passed on to the various army commanders through the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

"Q Were reports then made back by those bureau heads or individuals to you, as Minister of War, relative to these complaints?

"A No, no replies or reports were sent back. These complaints were sent to the various people concerned calling the matter to their attention." (14,562-4)

(From 1980-D)

"Q Were these complaints, which were made during this period by the United States and Great Britain through friendly nations with respect to the mistreatment of their prisoners by the Japanese Government, taken up at the weekly meetings of the Prisoner Bureau that you have referred to?

"A Yes. These matters were taken up at the bi-weekly meetings." (14,565)

Miscellaneous Meetings

MILITARY SERVICE BUREAU CONFERENCES  
(1942)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
Tanaka	April	14,288-90	---

Present

According to TANAKA, those present were:

TOJO, War Minister  
KIMURA, Vice Minister  
TOMIHAGA, Chief of the Personnel Bureau  
SATO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau  
TANAKA (the witness)  
KAN, Chief of Ordnance Bureau  
YOSHIZUMI, Chief of Procurement and Mobilization Bureau  
KURIHASHI, Chief of the Security Bureau  
MIKI, Chief of the Surgeon General's Bureau  
OYAMA, Chief of the Legal Affairs Bureau  
NAKAJIMA  
NAKAMURA, Commander of Gendarmie  
HONDA, Chief of the Armored Forces Bureau  
MITSUMURA, Chief of the Army Press Section  
(Private secretaries of War Minister and Vice War Minister)

Decision

According to TANAKA, it was decided by TOJO at the meeting of bureau chiefs of the War Ministry (meetings were held twice a week - 14,288) that "All prisoners-of-war engage in forced labor." (14,290)

Remarks

TANAKA, in his direct examination on this matter said, inter alia:

"Q Was there a discussion at that time in connection with how prisoners of war should be treated?

"A At the request of MUMURA, Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, TOJO, War Minister, gave his decision.

"Q What was his decision?

"A In the light of the prevailing situation in Japan at that time, which was to enhance the labor efficiency of the country, and in the light of the slogan then current, "No work, no food," the first point that was decided at this meeting was to make all prisoners of war engage in forced labor.

With regard to this decision, YUEMUIA, Chief of the Military Affairs - Prisoners of War Information Bureau, said that making prisoners of war of the rank of warrant officers and above work would be in violation of the Geneva Convention. But in spite of the view thus expressed by YUEMUIA, War Minister TOJO gave the decision of utilizing these officers for labor purposes in the light of the fact that Japan had not ratified the Geneva Convention, although it was the government's position to respect the spirit of the convention.

It was decided that prisoner of war camps be established not only in the southern areas but also in Japan proper, in Formosa, Korea, China, and Manchuria, and to send prisoners of war to these areas as a means of enhancing the trust and confidence of the peoples of Asia in Japan." (14,238 - 14,290)

Miscellaneous Meetings

CONFERENCES IN WAR MINISTRY ON P.O.W.s  
(1942) (1943)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Rec rd page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1958	1942-43	14,299-14,303	—

Present

None stated in Exhibit, but see TAFUKI, herein, under heading "Military Service Bureau Conferences, April 1942-43.

Decision

At a conference in the War Ministry it was decided that as "The Geneva Convention relating to Prisoners-of-war was not ratified by his Majesty, we can hardly announce our observance of the same." (14,301)

Remarks

Exhibit 1958 is a communication to IPS from the Central Liaison Office of 18 April 1946 regarding decision not to apply the Geneva Convention. (14,299) The communication is as follows:

"There is no data to confirm whether or not there was held any conference in the War Ministry on May 6, 1942. However, as regards the matter of (14,299) non-application of the Geneva Convention the following decisions of the War Ministry may be cited:

"1. The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under date of January 13, and 16, (1942) transmitted to the War Ministry the inquiries of American, British and other governments. The Ministry, following several conferences, reached a decision (Annex I) and communicated the same to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 23. However, there are no records of the conference.

"2. On January 27, 1943, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs sent an inquiry regarding the application of the Prisoner of War Convention to non-combatant internees. As a result of a conference, the Ministry reached a decision (Annex II). The same was communicated by the Vice Minister of War to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under date of February 6, however, there is no record of the conference.

"3. The Foreign Office, under date of December 12, 1941, transmitted to the War Ministry the communication of the International Red Cross Committee Chairman, Max Hudar, concerning collection and transmission of information regarding prisoners of war. After a conference, the Ministry reached a decision (Annex III), which was communicated to the Foreign Office.

"4. The above decisions being entirely in line with the fundamental principles and policy, according to which the War Ministry had always directed the conduct of the affairs relating to prisoners of war, no orders seem to have been issued in consequence of the decisions. (Existing data have been examined, but it cannot be ascertained whether any order was issued or not.)

"Annex I.

"Reply from Vice Minister of War to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 23, 1942. (Translation)

"In answer to your inquiries in clear No. 52 and No. 53, dated January 13 and No. 85, dated January 16, the views of this Ministry are as follows:

"I. Concerning No. 52:

"1. In view of the fact that the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war was not ratified by His Majesty, we can hardly announce our observance of the same. But it would be safe to notify the world that we have no objection to acting in accordance with the Convention in the treatment of prisoners of war.

"2. As regards providing prisoners of war with food and clothing, we have no objections to giving due consideration to the national or racial habits and customs of the prisoners.

"II. Concerning No. 53 and No. 85, the above views will be applicable."

"Annex II.

"Application of the Prisoner of War Convention to Non-Combatant Internees. (Army, Ordinary No. 753, February 6, 1942) (Translation)

"Referring to your communication, No. 149, dated January 27, 1942, on the above subject, the views of this ministry are as follows:

"The 1929 Geneva Convention relating to Prisoners of War has no binding power whatsoever on Japan. But this ministry has no objection to applying the principles of the Convention to non-combatant internees within such limits as it is applicable, provided, however, that no person be subjected to labor against his will.

"Annex III.

"Communication of the International Red Cross Committee Chairman concerning collection and transmission of information regarding prisoners of war dated December 28, 1941 (Army Ordinary 9392) (Translation)

"Referring to your communication No. 4585, dated December 12, 1941, on the above subject, the views of this ministry are as follows:

"The Ministry agrees to the proposal.

"However,

"a. It is not that we 'declare that we are prepared to apply in practice' the provisions of the Prisoner of War Convention of 1929, but that we 'utilize them for the convenience of transmission of information.'

"b. Information is to be transmitted by telegram and other means." (14,299-14,303)

DECISIONS OF IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1305	early April	11,751	194

Present

(Exhibit does not contain the attendance).

Decision

Decided the "Gist of Imperial Headquarters, Army and Navy Department Policy Concerning Measures to be taken in the South."

Remarks

A decision by Imperial Headquarters of April states that Japan must establish close military, political and economic relations with French Indo-China and Thailand, and close economic relations with the Netherlands East Indies. Arms are only to be resorted to in the event the embargoes or anti-Japanese encirclement of United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China became so tense they cannot be tolerated. (11751-11753)

Miscellaneous Meetings

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL (Army Members)  
(1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Supp. Summ.</u>
2246	30 June	16,178	27

Present

T.I.H. Marshall Prince KAN-IN  
General Prince ASAKA  
General Prince HIGASHI-KUNI  
General Count TERAUCHI, Hiseichi  
General DOHARA, Kenji  
General OKAMURA, Yasuji  
War Minister TOJO  
General SUGIYAMA, Gen, Chief of General Staff  
General YAMADA, Oozo, Inspector General of Army Education  
War Vice Minister KIMURA  
Vice Chief TSUKATA

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

On 30 June 1941 the Army called a conference of Army members of the Supreme War Council TOJO and related officials explained the fast changing International situation, after which Japan's future attitude was discussed. Defendants TOJO, DOHARA and KIMURA were present at the meeting. (16,178)



JOINT CONFERENCES  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
527	12 July	6,191	129

Present

Army Office - Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA  
Navy Office - Commander SHIBA  
Naval General Staff - Captain ONO  
Foreign Office - Section Chief ANDO  
                  "          "      ISHIZAWA  
                  Secretary TOKUNAGA

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

A joint conference of War, Navy and Foreign Ministers discussed, at length, the matter of strengthening the harmony between Japan, Germany and Italy, on 11 July 1940.

Exhibit 527 is the minutes of this conference and shows the existence of a strong Japanese demand for conclusion of military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy as means of realizing the Japanese Empire's plan for expansion in East Asia and the South Seas. They agreed to make agreement in form of a diplomatic note to be strengthened to agreement, if Germany recognized Japan's position in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Gist of agreement was to be that Germany keep out of French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies, support Japan in China, and favorably consider Japanese economic relations; while Japan in return would support Germany's European policy, check Britain in the Far East and supply essential materials. (6191-6211)

See Exhibit 528, herein, Joint Conferences 1940 for the minutes of the adjourned Conference unifying the opinions of the three ministers on this matter. (6214)

August 5, 1947.

RE: IPS DOCUMENT NO. 2006  
(RULINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST)

The following changes are to be made in the above Document:

1. Page v (Index) Headnote 25 reads:  
"ON EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE GIVEN IN REBUTTAL -DOCUMENTS  
NOT MENTIONED AS SUCH BY COUNSEL".
2. Page xi (Index) Headnote 35 and 36:  
Insert "SECONDARY EVIDENCE" after the word "COMPETENCY".
3. Page xx (Index) Under "TRANSLATIONS", Headnote 1:  
Change "BOARD BY REFEREES" to "BOARD OF REFEREES"
4. Page III -27 (CROSS-EXAMINATION). End of third paragraph,  
reference should read:  
"(pp 22058-9- May 14, 1947)".  
PAGE III -27 (CROSS-EXAMINATION) Last paragraph, second  
line, last three words should read:  
"disallow without any"
5. Page VI -3 (DOCUMENTS), Sixth Paragraph:  
Change "FURNIESS" to "FURNESS"  
Second sentence, same paragraph, should read:  
"we do not need them" instead of "We do need them"
6. Page VI - 19 (DOCUMENTS). After Fifth Paragraph, "(See also  
CROSS-EXAMINATION 22 and 23) should read:  
"(See CROSS-EXAMINATION 22 for case where document used by  
way of surprise and CROSS-EXAMINATION 23 for necessity  
of tendering for identification)".

ERRATA SHEET #1

August 5, 1947.

RE: IPS DOCUMENT NO.0006  
(RULINGS OF THE IMTFC)

7. PAGE VII-88 (EVIDENCE) At end of second paragraph, under Rule 103 instead of "(P.1243, June 24, 1936)", reference should read:  
"(P.1243, June 24, 1946)"
8. PAGE XI-5 (MOTIONS), second line, under Rule 12, change "34d of May"  
to:  
"3rd of May".
9. PAGE XIV-3 (REDIRECT EXAMINATION). After last line of page, under "(p.1386, June 26, 1946),"add:  
"See also REDIRECT EXAMINATION 4"

NOTE: Missing or blurred pages may be replaced by contacting Room 340.

JOINT CONFERENCES  
(1940)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Record page</u>	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
528	16 July	6,214	---

Present

Foreign Office - Section Chief ANDO  
" " ISHIZAWA  
" " TAJIPI  
Secretary TOKUNAGA  
Army Office - Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA  
Army General Staff Office - Major TANEMURA  
Navy Office - Commander SHIBA

Decision

The conference of subordinate members of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries agreed upon the intensification of the coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy on 16 July 1940. (6214)

Remarks

See Exhibit 527, herein, Joint Conferences, 12 July 1940. (6191)