GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FOWERS INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

16 June 1947

To All Attorneys:

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS Paper No. 7

Re: Decisions of Imperial Conferences, Cabinet Meetings, and Other Conferences and Meetings Which Appear in the Prosecution's Evidence.

There is distributed herewith the work prepared by Mr. Joseph F. English entitled: "Decisions of Immerial Conferences, Liaison Conferences, Privy Council Meetings, Cabinet Meetings, Four Ministers' Conferences, Five Ministers' Conferences, Senior Statesmen's Meetings, Supreme War Plans Council, Joint Conferences and Miscellaneous Conferences, as Found in the Prosecution's Evidence."

The preface and table of contents give in broad outline the nature and scope of this work. There is a full and complete index. This should prove exceedingly helpful in giving immediate reference to and making easily available all of the material in the Prosecution's case concorning attendance, discussions and decisions at these immortant conferences and meetings.

It is suggested that the attorneys make full use of the information given in this work in preparing reports on witnesses. It is further suggested that an exhaustive study of this report should be promptly made as to the information given on each defendent or defendants as to whom the attorney is now preparing a factual statement of the Prosecution's evidence.

D. N. SUMMON

Assistant Counsel

Attachment

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DECISIONS OF

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IMPERIAL CONFERENCES, LIAISON CONFERENCES, PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS, CABINET MEETINGS, FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCES, FIVE MINISTEFS' CONFEPENCES, SENIOR STATESMEN'S MEETINGS, SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL, JOINT CONFERENCES AND MISCELLANEOUS CONFERENCES.

AS FOUND IN THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.

June, 1947

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PREFACE

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In the compilation of these decisions from Prosecution's Exhibits only, attempt has been made to set forth the substance of what was decided, said, contended or argued, as the case may be, as well as the attendance at each meeting,

The material suggested a chronological structure based upon the nature of the conferences or meetings.

The index has been prepared according to a chronological as well as alphabetical arrangement with the necessary crossreferences.

Many names appearing in the material identify deceased persons; hence, in the index, except where the importance of the name suggestscherwise, this fact is noted with no further reference to the text.

The attendance at each meeting, if found in the exhibits, is set forth as well as the Cabinet members on particular dates; consequently, each exhibit relating to a decision of a meeting or conference during the period of time an Accused held a responsible position should be examined.

It was the practice for each Cabinet member to sign the decision at or subsequent to a meeting, thereby ratifying it.

For attendance at Lisison Conferences subsequent to 21 July 1941 resort must be had to the interrogations of TOJO, NAGANO and TOGO. (see p. 34)

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4

CONTENTS

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES	
LIAISON CONFERENCES	
PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS	
CAPINET MEETINGS	
FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCES	
FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCES	
ELDER STATESMEN	A
SUPREME WAR FLANS COUNCIL	
POW INFORMATION BUREAU ,	
MILITARY SERVICE BUREAU CONVERFNCES	
CONFERENCES IN WAR MINISTRY ON POWs	
DECISIONS OF IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS	
SUPREME WAR COUNCIL	
JOINT CONFERENCES	
INDEX	

I

4

XYCMI

ABE, Nobuyuki (Premier)

Privy Council Meetings: 1 Oct 30, attended, re Iondon Maval Treaty 26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripertite Pact 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow •••• ••• p. 111 Cabinet Meetings: Conferences of Senior Statesmen: 17 Jul 41, attended, approved Konoye as Premier for third time . . . •••• p. 254 17 Oct 41, attended, approved Tojo to 29 Nov 41, attended, discussed war with U.S. 1 Dec 41, attended, discussed wer 17 Jul 44, attended, discussed resignation Koiso, or Hata succeed Tojo p. 263 20 Jul 44, attended, approved coalition cabinet of Koiso and Yonai p. 264 ABO, Kiyotane (Navy Minister in Wakatsuki's Cabinet) Cabinet Meetings: 19-23 Sep 31, attended, discussed Mukden Incident ••• p. 161 ADACHT, Kenzo (Home Minister in Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki Cabinets) Privy Council Meetings: 1 Cov 30, ettended, relandou Naval Treaty 60 . g p. 08 Cabinet Meetings: 19-23 Sep 31, attended, discussed Mukden Incident 162

AIDA (Explainer)

I

ļ

Ű,

> AVIMAGA, Tukizo (Chief of 1st Section Planning Board)

3

AKITA, Kayoshi

Amorican-Jeparese Relations

Imperial Conferences:	
2 Jul 41, re resolution adopted	2
6 Ser 41, re adopted resolution	4
Liaison Conferences:	
27 Jul 40, decided gist of main points	
in dealing with situation to meet	
change in world conditions	
19 Sep 40, decided to strengthen Japan-	
Germany-Italy Axis	11
18 Oct, 2 Nov 41, discussed policy to	·
improve relations with	
o/e 30 Oct 41, discussed essential	
questions for prosecution of	
	c
netional policies	.)
4 Nov 41, decided upon last counter-	
proposel to resume	
11 Nov 41, set forth principle reasons	
for wer against USA and Pritain	
Privy Council Meetings:	
18 Aug, 26 Sep 30, discussed Iondon	
Navel Treaty of 1930	7
13 Sep 32, American attitude towards	
Manchukuo discussed	-

American-Japanese Relations (cont'd)
Privy Council Meetings: (cont'd) 16 Sep 40, discussed questions regarding danger of economic pressure from USA and preparations to be made for wer with US if Tri- partite Pact signed
Cabinet Meetings: 16 Jul 41, resignation of over del- ferences in opinion re method of replying to Hull's statement
Five Ministers' Conferences: 30 Jun 36, decided to develop Manchukuo while preparing against & to maintain commend of West Pacific against
Conferences of Senior Statesmen: 29 Nov 41, discussed wor with
Decisions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided that arms be resorted to in case of encirclement by
ANDO, Yochinaga (Director, Trade Bureau, Foreign Office)
Privy Council Mactines: 18 Aug 43, attended to explain on the treaty that Thailand social as an Shen State from Burma
Joint Conferences: 12 Jul 40, ettended, discussed strength- ening Axis hermony ,

١

ŧ

- •

AMTI-COMINTERN PACT (See Russian-Japanese Ralations; Communism) Iieison Conferences: Privy Council Meetings: 20 Nov 36, negotiation for Anti-Comintern Pect transferred from General Staff to Foreign Ministry • • • 85 20 Nov 36, Investigation Committee spproved German-Jepenese Pact against Comittern, and the secret pact against the Sevier Union . . . 86 25 Nov 36, approved anti-Combrace a Pect 89 and Manchuria in (see Exhibit 494, protocol admitting Spain and 496 edmitting China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovokia, Croatia and Denmark; see elso p. 108 for offices held by defendants at date of renewal of pact 106 AOKI, Kazuo (Minister of Finence in ABT Cibinet) Privy Council Meatings: 18 Aug 43, attended as State Minister on conclusion of Treaty between Japan & Theiland concerning Thai territory in 154 Cabinet Meetings: 24 Oct 39, attended, changed value of yen from sterling to dollars 197 ARAI, Kantaro (V. Pres. of Privy Council) Deceased ARAKI, Mokuji (not accused) Explainer Privy Council Meetings: 12 Oct 42, attended to explain the establishment of the Great Asia Ministry 149 ARAKI, Sedao (socused) (Mar Minister in Inuaki's Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: Dec 31, attended occupation of Kirin, Mukden, Heilungking and Jahol, decided at, according to Araki 2

ANTI-COMINTERN PACT (See Russian-Japanese Ralations; Communism) Liaison Conferences: o/a 29 Oct 41, Kido diary reports Privy Council Meetings: 20 Nov 36, negotiation for Anti-Comintern Pect transferred from General Staff to Foreign Ministry 85 20 Nov 36, Investigation Committee spproved German-Japanese Pact against Comittern, and the secret pact against the Sevier Union . . . 86 25 Nov 36, approvad anti-Combran Pect 89 6 Nov 37, decided to ellow Incly to join 95 22 Web 39, epproved perticipation of Hungary and Manchuria in (see Exhibit 494, protocol admitting Spein and 496 edmitting China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovokia, Croatia and Denmark; see elso p. 108 for offices held by defendants at date of renewal of pact 106 AOMI, Mazuo (Minister of Finance in ABE Cabinet) Privy Council Meetings: 18 Aug 43, attended as State Minister on conclusion of Tracty between Japan & Theiland concerning Thai territory in ••••154 Cabinet Meetings: 24 Cct 39, attended, changed value of yen from starling to dollars ••••• ARAI, Kantaro (V. Pres. of Privy Council) Decassd ARAKI, Mokuji (not accused) Explainer Privy Council Meetings: 12 Oct 42, attended to explain the establishment of the Great Asia Ministry 149 ARAKI, Sedao ("coursed) (Mar Minister in Inuaki's Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: Dec 31, attended occupation of Kirin, Mukden, Heilungking and Jehol, decided at, according to Araki2 10

Ē

1

ARAKI, Sadao (cont'1)

Privy Council Meetings:

1 3

17 Dec 31, attended, decided to approve military budget and policy of occupying 4 provinces in Menchuria p. 72 13 Sep 32, attended, cpproved Japan-Manchukuo Protocol 73 2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to 97 end cooperative relations W/L of N. 22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution that agreement for cultural cooperation Cabinet Meetings: 24 Sep 31, mentioned re Manchurian Incident 165 13-17 Dec 31, attended, discussed policy of 165-Manchurian occupation 167 12 Mar 32, MC, mentioned re plan to supervise domestic and foreign relations of Manchukuo ... 168-169 12 Aug 32, attended, to acquire and develop 173 12 Aug 32, attended, decision to recognize 174, Manchukuo 175 ARAKI, Torazaburo (Privy Councillor) Deceased ARIMA, Ryoketsu (Privy Councillor) Deceased ARTMA, Yoriyasu (Minister of Agriculture lst Konoye Cabinet) Privy Council Meetings: 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact . . • 95 2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution 22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution that egreement for cultural cooperation Cabinet Meetings: 11 Jul 37, attended, decided to increase

V

ARITA, Hachiro (Foreign Minister in Yonai's Cabinet
Privy Council Meetings: 13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing Japanese-Manchukuo Protocol
 20 Jan 37, attended, decided appointment of naval of ficers as administrators of South Sea Islands
Cabinet Meetings: 3 Mar 40, attended, decided economic policy to relieve Jepan of dependence on US for materials
Four Ministers Conference: 7 Aug 36, attended, decided foreign policy of Empire
18 Jun 40, attended, decided to negotiate with FIC, but if unsuccessful possibly to use force
Five Ministers Conference: 30 Jun 36, attended, decided Basis of National Policy
Principles of Nat. Policy
25 Nov 38, attended, decided to capture Painan Island
regarding a Tripertite Pact
decided necessary for a Tripartite Pact
war preparations
ARIAMENTS (see Wer Preparations)
Cabinet Meetings: 26 Jul 40, decision; national policy to increase, by aconomic control over production, distribution and
consumption of essential materials

Ì

-

vi

ASAKA, Prince

1

Supreme Wor Plans Council Meetings: 30 Jun 41, attended, discussed inter-FADA, Fiichi (Finance Minister Firota Cobinet) Daceased British-Japanese Relations Imparial Conferences: Iisison Conferences: 19 Sep 40, decided to strengthen Germany-Itely-Jopen Axis by cooperating o/a 30 Oct 41, questions discussed re ••••••••• 30-31 essentials for prosecution of na-11 Nov 41, sets forth reasons for out-Privy Council Meetings: 29 Nov 38, British Ambussedor unofiicially prepared to mediate re China Crbinet Meetings: 12 Oct 41, decided to complete Five Ministers Conferences: 30 Jun 36, decided to develop Manchukuo 11 Aug 36, decided to be prepared against 244 8 Aug 39, decided Tripartite Prot to prevent on aconomic settlement with Decisions of Imperial Handquerturs. Apr 41, decided that arms are to be resorted to in event of envirolement by 280 BURNA-JAPAN RELATIONS Iigison Conferences:

E

BURMA-JAPAN RELATIONS (cont'd)

 v_{12}

BURMA-JAPAN RELATIONS (cont'd)

ł

4

ļ

. .

bur	Ministers Conferences:							
	7 Aug 36. decided foreign policy regarding	٥	¢	٠	٥	٠	, D 4	
	11 Aug 36, decided to prepare against							
	Russia	ų	•				~ <u>}</u> .	
	Russie 20 Feb 37, decided to prepare against USSR	•	¢	"			. 205	
ive	Ministers Conferences: 30 Jun 36, decided to promote conomic development by getting rid of and							
	7 Ug 36, decided to eradicate Soviet	C	•	ţ	•	L	: 31,2	
	menses	÷	<i>.</i> •		•		·	
	menace and to strike a hit spainst Russie at outsat of war	.,		v	à		: 244	

 c_{12}

Cabine: Meetings

ł

ţ

19-20, 21-03 Sep 31, discussed Mukden Incident	161-167
24 Sep 31 decision, no territorial ambitions	163
24 Sep. 34, discussed Mukden Incident, re-no territorial	
17 17 Lec. 31. decision, approved #PAKI budget to occupy	•••
	•. • . <i></i>
Liaoving, Karin, Heilungkiang and Jehol provinces	Act: ACF
12 Mar 32, decision, foreign relations and collection and	
disbursements of customs duties in Manchukuo	$(2^{-1})^{-1}$
11 Apr 32, decision, policy of assistance and guidance to	
Manshaimo	7.1
May he decision, re management and construction of	
Kiras Sunghus Railway Extension Line	5 M.L
12 Aug 22, decision, to acquire and develop aviation rights	J .
to May 20, accision, to acquire and develop aviation rights	
in Anadaria	178-176
12 Aug 52, docusion, recognize Manchukuo	176-176
9 Dec 33, decision, by treaty to control communication	
system of Manchuvia	176
11 Ape 33, decision, to transfor opium from Korea to	
Manchukyo and to control screege	19
3 AGE 33. decision, Menaboria to be independent with policios	-
gaided by Layen	178.175
	7.0007.60
22 Dec 03, doction, to change government of Memohakun from	
regardy to monarchy	180-151
20 Mar 34. decision: to control Manchurup by industry	
development	<u>185</u>
31 Jun 57, documents, to send larger army to North Calma	183
22 Con 37, domining establish and develop heavy industry	
in Manchukuco	184
27 Ce. 37, considered in Ataxion to 9 power pact conference	183
19 Nov 37. liaison between 16 Hq and government	186
21 Dec 37, negotiations with and counter measures for China	100
	• • • •
effair discussed	162
14 Jan 38. Alecuased ceveblishing and recognizing provisional	
Chineze government	195
16 Jul 38, discussed necessity of Germany reorientating her	
policy toward dapan in China	190
18 Jan 33, decision, re import and emport of essential	
matazoals in 1938 and vegulation thereast	101-105
9 Aug 38, distussed Changkuling inclaont as well as German-	
Japanese relations with reference to Surgean situation	
12 Dec 30, decision, increase poopy cultivation and supply	
vo lauchukuo	194
28 Mey 39, discussed dermar dap relations with reference to	
Sepan resouring entrance we pending European conflict	195
28 Aug 29, discussed cabinet resignation, and composition	
of proposed cabinet	196
24 Oct 39, decided to change external value of yen from	
sterling to doilard	197

Cabinet Meetings (cont'd)

3 Mar 40, decision, of economic policy to accompany diplomacy	
to relieve Japan of dependence on U.S.	768
26 Jul 40, decision, established Greater East Asia Policy	
Es well as planned internal economy	<u> 1 00- 500</u>
3 Oct 40, decision, determined besic policy for economic	
construction of Japan, Chine and Manchukuo to	
establish a self-sufficient conomy	2014003
25 Oct 40, decision, program under which political and	
cconomic control of Netherlands East Indies would be	
sequired by Japan	202
S New 40, decision, established GEA simed at new economic	
orde: in Japan. China and Manchukuo guided and developed	
by Jepan as a result of Tripartite Pact	204
22 Ja: 4], decision, to increase quantity and quality of	
population to insure Jep. leadership in East Asia	×05
7 Mar 41, decision, national mobilization law made effective	
under which all invididual activities and all phases of	
industrial production were subject to government regulation	S06-510
2 May 41, decision, to enforce National Defense Society Act	811
28 Jun 40, decision, to maintain Indo-China position	
2 Jul 41, 3rd ZONOYE Cebinet formed with TOYODA contains	
MAISVOKA as Foreign Minister, no change in foreign policy	
wich reference to Tripertite Fact and Jap troops in	
Freich Indo China and Thailand	2.1.0
10 Jul 41, Louvin, MONOYS Calinet rearried by realon	
or aboltale of Malsoula towards Jap-American understanding	214
32 Aug 41, decision, expend a mamonial maintain resources	
in Jast Asia poll regulate living noor-sities to meet	
the international situation	815
5 Sep 41. decision, to place land and see traffic on	
wartime basis	277
12 Sep 42, decision, to insure labor for munitions	
production	218
12 Oct 41, decision, to maintain troops in China and Indo	
China and proprie for war and at some time continue	CH 0. 000
negotiations with U.S. for a settlement	5/19-225
4 Nov 41, decision, policy of press regulation	223
28 Nor 41, decision. sixth committee organized from	
memours of plending board, foreign, finence, wer	
and navy ministries to plan economic and military control of resources in southern area.	
	234 DDE
23 Nov 41, decision, press placed under wartime basis 1 Dec 41 Secision, fivel note to U.S. commerced by TOGO,	552
I dec 41. decusion, fired hold to to to composed by Togo,	000
discussed by Liggeon Conference and approved by Calinet . 1 or 2 Dec 41, decision, tire and manner of delivery	536
of lecteration of war to he to comply with diplomatic	
	000-003
end strategic requirements	237283
Britain and adoption of war policy	~ ~~
minari and adoption of well DULICY	371

x

ŧ

CHIANG Kai-Shek

۱

	. 102
CHINA JAPANESE Relations	
meerial Conferences.	
11 Jan 38, decided the basic policy of the disposition	
of the China Incident	4
10-26 Sep 40, MATSUOVA tells OFT Jeven intends to	
sottle China Incident by herself	6
2 Jul 41, resolution re Jap-American relations adopted	
5 Nov 41, measures towards	51-55
liaison Conference	
19 Sep 40, Germeny and Itely to esciat Jap's sottling	
China Incident	S 9
11 Nov 40, set forth principle reasons for war with	
USA and Britain	48
Privy Council Meetings:	
9 Dec 31, report of Chana Incident	70
13 Sop 33, in re Menchuria	78
11 Jan 38, decided to declare war and deny Marking	•••
govt. if Janan's torms were refused	96
2 Nov 38, after outbreak of Incident, China wrasented	U
formel appeal to Bacque of Nations which downday to	
anoly senctions egainst Japan	or
	103
avinet Moorunge	
18 Mag 33, ausaccessfal negotiations for synathor rights	
in Manchuria with; after control of Manchuria a	
Japanese controlled aviation company organized	172,17
11 Jul 37, decision, to increase arry in North Chine	18%
21 Dec 37, discussed counter measures to	187
14 Jan 58, discussed announcement of fixed policy with .	188
16 Jan 38, discussed new policy with Germany in reference	
to, Germany to stop arms shipmonts to and withdraw	
military advisers from	190
9 Aug 38, discussed Changkufeng Incident, Itageki	100
a confi and and the analytical of a second a second and	193
made report	
made report	
26 Jul 40, decision, establish new defense policy by	
26 Jul 40, decision, establish new defense policy by economic control over production, distribution	199.20
26 Jul 40, decision, establish new defense policy by economic control over production, distribution and consumption of essential meterials	199,20
26 Jul 40, decision, establish new defense policy by economic control over production, distribution and consumption of essential meterials	199,20
 26 Jul 40, decision, establish new defense policy by economic control over production, distribution and consumption of essential meterials	199,20
26 Jul 40, decision, establish new defense policy by economic control over production, distribution and consumption of essential meterials	199,20

ł

xi

CHINA-JAPANESE Relations (cont'd)

ł

	et Meetings: (cont'd)	
	5 Nov 40, decision, to develop mining, salt and chemical	
	industries and production of raw materials under new	
	policy of GEA resulting from Tripartite Pact	ൗ. 204
	military position not injured in	515
	government if Manking government continued resistance 12 Oct 41, decision, continue perleys on besis of not	188
	altering demands on troops in Chine, and results of, should be secured	219
Four	Ministers' Conferences:	
	7 Aug 36, decided to make North China Pro-Japanese	A T 4
	and Anti-Communistic	274
	towards	234
	20 Feb 37, decided Third Administrative Policy towards .	235 236
	16 Apr 37, decided Plans for Guiding	500
Five	Ministers! Conferences:	
••••	25 Nov 38, decided on centure of Hainan Islands if	
	necessary and to adjust new relationship with	S 7 5
	8 Aug 39, decided that Army's urgent desire to conclude	
	conflict with made Tripartite Pact necessary	250
Deals		250
Decis	sions of Imperial Headquarters:	250
Deci		-
Deci	aions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	-
Deci	sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in	-
	Sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	280
	<pre>sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by</pre>	280
	<pre>sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by</pre>	280 233 234
Four	<pre>sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by</pre>	280 233 233
Four	<pre>sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by</pre>	280 233 231 231
Four	 Sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	280 230 231 230 257
Four	 Sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	280 233 234 254 254
Four	 sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	280 233 231 234 254 254 254
Four	 sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	280 233 231 236 257 254 254 255
Four	 Sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	280 230 231 230 257 254 257 259
	 Sions of Immerial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	280 233 234 254 254 254 255
Four	 Sions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	280 237 236 252 254 254 257 259 261
Four	 Sions of Immerial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in event of encirclement by	250 280 233 235 252 254 255 257 259 261 263 264

Czechoslovakia

ţ

ł

1 1

-

I

18 Dec. 1940 - discussion re joining Tripartite Pact p.	
Declaration of War	
Liaison Conferences: o/a 30 Nov 41, delivery of final note re	54,58 60
Privy Council Meetings: 8 Dec 41, Investigation Committee approved draft of declaration of war	145
DOIHARA, Kenji (Accused)	
Cabinet Meetings: 12 Aug 32, mentioned, furnished collaborators for Japan plans in Manchukuo	174,175
Supreme War Plans Council Meetings: 30 Jun 41, attended, which discussed international situation	281
EGI, Chiyuki (Privy Councillor) Deceased	
EMBARGO	
Cabinet Meetings: 3 Mar 40, Discussed plan to obtain essential materials from other sources if U.S. put, into effect ESSENTIAL MATERIALS	198
Cabinet Meetings: 18 Jan 38, decision of plan regulating importation of.	

18 Jan 38, decision of plan regulating importation of, with reference to unfavorable foreign trade balance . 191,192
3 Mar 40, decision re economic policy towards U.S. and
plan to be free of dependence on U.S. for, 198

FINAL NOTE

Liaison Conferen	1068:						
o/a 30 Nov	41, delivery cf,	declaring we	r	• • •	• •	• •	54,50
30 Nov 41,	exproval of,		• •	• • •	• •	• •	60
	explanation of,	• • • • • •	• • •	• • •	• •	• •	60

FIVE MINISTERS' JOAPERENCES

Functions of	~, <i>232</i>
30 Jun 36, decided the "Basis of Netional Policy"	242
7 Aug 36, decided the "Basic Principles of National Policy.	04Z
11 Aug 36, decided the "Fundamentals of National Policy	24
25 Nov 38, decided to cepture Hainan Islands	245
6 Nev 39, Hirenume obtained a compromise in re closer Alliance with Germany	246
Germany ro Allienco	250 251

FOUR MINISTERS! CONTERFNCE

Functions of	525
7 Aug 36, decided foreign policy of Empire	233
11 Aug 36, decided "Second Administrative Policy	
toward North China	234
20 Feb 37, decided "Third Administrative Policy	
towerd North Chine	235
16 Apr 37, decided "Plans for Guiding North China	236
18 Jun 40, decided to weit for a realy before	
resorting to force, in re F.I.C.'s pro-Chiang Acts	237
4 Sept 40, decided "Outline of Basic National Policy	238
5, 21 Nov 40, decided to essist Theiland in	
recovering lost territory	239
2 Sent 44, proposed plan for independence of	
Dutch East Indics	240

FRENCH IFDO CHINA

Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 41, decided to execute schemes against	11-12
Ligison Conferences:	
30 Jan-3 Feb 41, decided policy towards	35,36
25 Jun 41, docided to accelerate all measures towards.	38,39
20 Nov 41, decided administration of	51
12 Dec 41, reported on economic plen for	62
Privy Council Meetings:	
16 Jun 41, Investigation Committee ratified treaty	
between France and Japan for residence and	
nevigetion and a tariff system, including a	
secret protocol	127-132
3 Jul 41, ratified France-Japanese Protocol on	
Guaranty and political understanding;	134
outling of Japanese-F.I.C. relations 1940-41	134-136
Germany agrees that Japan modiate border dispute	
between F.I.C. and Theiland	125
and Japan regarding common defense of	139-41

ERICHARD FRANCOSta)

- --- .

	Cebinet Meetings:	
	Re Jun 41, decision, 3 divisions premared to tichten grip on . 0. 2 Jul 41, policy of stationing troops in, and stabilize	
	Diracture for southern advence	21.9 21.9
	Four Ministers! Conferences: 18 Jun 40, decided to negotiate with, but if unsuccessful	0/78
	possibly to use force	237
	Supreme War Plars Council Meetings: 1 Feb 45, decided measures toward	271
	Peciaions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided to establish close relations with	58 0
	FULITA (Capt. Explainer)	
	Privy Council Moetings:	
	1 Oct 3C, attented re London Neval Treaty	68
	FUJISAWA, Ikunosuke (Privy Councillor) Deces	eend.
	FUJIWARA, Ginjiro (Minister of Commerce in Yonai's Cebinet) (Explain	ne r)
	Privy Council Meetings: 18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovskia, and Rumania, joining Tripartite Pact	125
	Cabinet Meetings:	
-	3 Mar 40, attended economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on U.S. for materials	198
	FUKAI, Eigo (Privy Councillor) Deceased	
	TUKUDA, Misstero (Privy Councillor) Deccesed	
	FUNADA (Expleiner)	
	Privy Council Meetings: 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact	95 97 100

xv

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FULDICHI, Kai (Isivy councillor) Deceased.

UURUUCHI, Hiroo (Explainer, Foreign Office)

FUSHIMI, Prince

Ligison Conferences:

30 June and 3 Feb 41,	, accompanied Premier Konoye and the	
Chief of Arry Gener	el Staff to Palace to remort molicy	
towerd F.I.C. and T	Cheiland decided upon	35

FUTAKAMI, Heijo (Secretary of Privy Council) Decemeed.

GERMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Imperial Conferences:	
10-26 Sep 40, Matsuoka explains, in re Tripertite Pact	6-9
5 Nov 41, docided measures toward Germany at outbreak	
of Jap-American wer	19
Ligison Conferences:	
o/a 30 Oct 41, discussed what can be expected	
if Japan attacks America	43
13 Nov 41, decided to disclose to Germany, Japan's	
intention to start war against U.S.A. and Britain	50
Privy Council Meetings:	
2 Nov 38, decided to cultural cooperation with Germany	100
•	113,117
26 Son 40, Tripartite Pact provosed by Germany	
Assistance to be rendered by Germany	117
Advantage of aligning with Germany	118-119
In ro Mandatod Islands	123
10 Dec 41, Ratified, no separate peace treaty	147
Five Ministers' Conforences:	
6 May 39, decided on compromise recerding cooperation	
with for a Tripartite Pact	246
8 Aug 39, decided concessions from necessary for a	× •V
	250
Tripartite Pact	600

GERMAL-JAPARESE HLALIJOIS (Cont'd)

Cebinot Meetings:

ł

 9 Aug 38, discussed proposal to reinforce by providing military aid if one attacked, European situation analyzed	193
mistrust	195 213
Joint Conferences:	
12 Jul 40, discussed strengthening harmony with	2 65
Decision of Imperial Headquarters: 16 Jul 40, agreed on intensifying coalition with	5 80
GODO, Takuo (Minister of Commerce in APE's Cabinet)	
Cabinet Meetings: 24 Oct 39, attended, changed external value of yen from	
sterling to dollars	197
GOTO, Fumio(Ministor of Agriculture in SAITO)	s Cabinet)
Privy Council Meetings: 13 Sopt 32, attended, approved signing of Japan-Manchukue	
protocol	73
for Joint Economic Committee	81
Cabinet Meetings: 12 Aug 32, attended, acquire and develop aviation rights in	
Menchuria	172,173
GREATER EAST ASIA	
Imperial Conforences: 10-26 Sept 40, Matsueka queries of Ott Germany's attitude towards Japan realization of	69
Liaison Conferences: 11 Nov 41, U.S. and Britain trying to obstruct	48

xvii

GREATER HAST ASIA (Cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings:	
9-20 Oct 42, discussed creation of Greater East Asia Ministry	150-153 152 153
Cabinet Meetings:	
26 Jul 40, decision to change policy to construct new order in, by planned economy over production, distribution and consumption of essential materials	199,200
5 Nov 49, decision, national policy of establishing, for economic development of, by conclusion of Fripartite Pact which revised principles of productive trade and planned economy of each country in	204
22 Jan 41, decision, increase quality of population and redistribute for leadership of	205
3 Oct 40, docision to establish self sufficient economy in, by industrial, labor, racial, commercial and financial control of industries and ossential materials to national defense	301,203
22 Aug 41, National Mobilization Law decided for	215
3 Mar 40, discussed economic policy for, plan to climinate dependence on U.S. for essential meterials	195
3 Oct 40, decision to establish self-sufficient oconomy in East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere by now policy in foreign exchange for payment	
of ossontial material in economic construction	201, 202

xviii

HACHIYA (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperation agreement with Germany 100

HAGA, Shiro (Adm. Off-Foreigr Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 June 41 - Attended as Explainer, the meeting which approved Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation, trade and tariff system in FIC. . 127

HAGIWARA (Secy-Great Asia Ministry)

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Aug 43 - Attended, to explain on the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Burma . 154

> HARA, Shujiro (Railway Minister & Overseas Minister in "WAKATSUKI's Cabinet)

Cabinet Meetings:

> HARA, Yoshimichi (Pres-Privy Council) Deceased

Imperial Conferences:

Privy Council Meetings:

HARA, Yoshimichi

Privy Council Meetings:	(Cont'd)
re Anti-Comintern	d, approved transfer of negotiations Pact from General Staff to Foreign
25 Nov 36 - Attende	d, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 89
	d, a proved Naval Officers he ap- strators of South Sea Islands. 91
6 Nov 37 - Attended Anti-Comintern Pa	, decided to allow Italy to join ct
Council meeting,	Investigation Committee and also approved resolution to end cooper- ith League of Nations 97
	d, approved resolution for cultural Germany100
22 Feb 39 - Attende and Manchuria in A), agreed to participation of Hungary Anti-Comintern Pact 106
26 Sept 40- Attended approved "riparti	l, Investigation Committee which te Pact 111
26 Sept 40 - Attende	ed, approved Tripartite Pact 116
18 Dec 40- Attended joining in Tripar	, discussed about Czech. & Roumania's tite Pact 125
ratification of the formation of the formation residence and	I Investigation Committee, approved wo treaties between Japan & France navigation, tariff system and
Protocol on guara	d, and voted to ratify Franco-Japanese ty and political understandings
France for common	ed, arreed to conclude Protocol with defense of FIC & military cooperation
21 Nov 41 - Attended Pact	d, decided to prolong Anti-Comintern
Session, arproved	, Inquiry Committee and Plenary declaration of war against America

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XX

H'.RA, Yoshimichi

vrivy Council Meetings: (Cont'd)

10 Dec 41 - Attended, approved treaty against a separate peace between Tripartite parties . . 147

18 Aug 1943 - Same as above 154

HARAGUCHI, Takeo (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

26 Sept 1940 - Attended, approved Tripartite Poct 111

- 16 June 41 Attended the meeting which approved Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation, trade & tariff systems in FIC 127

HASHIDA, Kunihiko

Imperial Conferences:

HLSHIMOTO, Kingoro (Accused)

Cabinet Meetines:

12 August 32 - Mentioned, claimed credit for idea of setting up government of Manchukuo 175

HATA, Shunroku (ACCUSED)

Cabinct Meetings:

3 Mar 40 - Attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US for materials 198

. .~

HAMA, Shunroku (Cont'd)

Four Ministers' Conferences:

18 June 40- Attended, which decided to negotiate with FIC, but if unsuccessful possibly to use force 237

Five Ministers' Conferences:

12 July 40- Attended, which decided to push war preparations 251

> HATA, Toyosuke (Overseas Minister in INUKAI Cabinet)

Deceased

HATOYAMA, Ichiro

Privy Council Meetings:

Cabinet Meetings:

HATTA, Yoshiaki

Privy Council Meetings:

2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolutions to end cooperative relations with League Of nations . . 97

22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolutions for cultural cooperation agreement with Germany 100

8 Dec 41 - Attended, approved ratification for declaration of war against America & England . . . 145

HAYASHI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings:

14, 15, 19, 21 Oct 42 - Attended to explain the establishment of Great Asia Ministry 149 HAYASHI, Gonsuke (Privy Councillor) Deceased

HAYASHI, Raizaburo

Privy Council Meetings: 15 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 20 Jan 37 - Attended, decided appointment of naval officers as administrators of South Sea Islands 2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolutions to end coop-erative relations with League of Nations . . 97 22 Feb 39 - Attended, agreed to participation of Hungary & Manchukuo on Anti-Comintern Pact 106 26 Sept 40- Attended, approved Tripartite Pact .111 HAYASHI, Senjuro (Deceased) Four Ministers' Conferences: 20 Feb 37- Attended, which decided Third Administrative Conferences of Senior Statesmen: 17 July 40- Attended, which decided to recommend KONOYE 252 17 July 41 - Attended, which approved KONOYE as Premier for third time 17 Oct 41 - Attended, which approved TOJO to succeed 29 Nov 41 - Attended, which discussed war with United 1 Dec 41 - Attended, which discussed war with United HIGASHIKUNI, Prince

Supreme War Council:

xxiii

HIRANUMA, Kiichiro (Accused)

2 July 41 - Attended, adopted resolution re Japanese-

Imperial Conferences:

American negotiations 10 Liaison Conferences: 13 Jan - 21 July 41 - Attended all meetings except that of 13 Jan and 22 May; no reference to subjects 30 Jan & 3 Feb 41 - Attended, decision re policy 6 June 41 - Attended, discussed report HITLER to 25 June 41 - Attended, decision, accelerate preparatory 4 Aug 41 - Attended, decision, re principle of negotiation with covist 40 10-18 Oct and 2 Nov 41 - Attended, discussed final decisions on American-Japanese policy 41 29 Oct 41 - Attended, discussed political situation ••••••••••••••••• 30 Oct 41 - Attended, discussed amount of cooperation to be expected from Germany in event of war . 43 4 Nov 41 - Attended, counter proposal for American-Japanese negotiations but to be last 47 11 Nov 41 - Attended, principal reasons for hostilities with Britain and U.S. 13 Nov 41 - Attended, decisions, measures relative to outline for execution of national policies . . 50 20 Nov 41 -Attended, decision, details of administration 30 Nov 41 - Attended, decision, approve final note

HIRANUMA, Kiichiro

Liaison Conferences (Cont'd) 30 Nov 41 - Attended, decision, chief of staff and foreign minister to decide time of delivery of -58 30 Nov 41 - Attended, decision, substance of final note approved by 60 12 Dec 41 - attended, decision, heard report by Sixth Committee on economic measures in southern areas Privy Council Meetings: 18 Aug - 26 Sept 30 - Attended, re London Naval 65 1 Oct 30 - Attended, re London Naval Treaty . . 68 9 Dec 31 - Attended, report China Incident . . . 70 17 Dec 31 - Attended, decision, policy to pacify and 13 Sept 32 - Attended, approved Japan-Manchukuo -73 3 July 35 - Attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo agreements for Joint Economic Committee . . . 81 25 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact <u>.</u>89 20 Jan 37 - Attended, decided appointment of naval officers as administrators for the South Sea 91 6 Nov 37 - Attended, decided to allow Italy to join 2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution to end cooperative rclations with League of Nations 97 22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution that an agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan & Germany be concluded • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 100 22 Nov 39 - Attended, Hungary & Manchuria to participate in Anti-Comintern Pact 106 as State Minister, 3 July 41 - Attended, Aatified French-Japanese & Thai-Japanese protocols of guaranty & political under-XXV

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HIRANUMA, Kiichiro (Cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

28 May 39 - Attended, telegram from German Foreign Minister to German Amhassador in Tokyo, dated 28 May 1939, requesting information regarding new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference . . 195

Five Ministers Conferences:

- 6 May 39 Attended, at which secured a compromise regarding cooperation for a Tripartite Pact. 246
- 8 Aug 39 Attended, at which according to OTT's cablegram concessions from Germany decided necessary for Tripertite Pact

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

> HIRAO, Hachisaburo (Minister of Education in HIROTA Cabinet) Deceased

> > xxvi

HIROHITO, The Emperor

Privy Council Meetings:

Conferences of Senior Statesmen:

HIROSE, Hisatada (?) Vice Welfare Minister '38

Privy Council Meetings:

2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with League of Nations . . 97

HIROTA, Koki (Kooki)

Privy Council Meetings:

3 July 35- Attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo
Agreement for Joint Economic Cormittee Pl
Stated that Japanese member of Committee would
make no decision disadvantageous to Japan 84
25 Nov 36 - Attended, approved Anti-Comintern
Pact
20 Jan 37 - Attended, decided the appointment of
naval officers as Administrators of the South Sea
Islands
6 Nov 37 - Attended, decided to allow Italy to Join
Anti-Comintern Pact

Cabinet Meetings:

Four Ministers' Conferences:

7	Aug 36-	At	ter	nde	ed,	V	vhi	lcł	n (dec	2 1 0	led	f	`or	ei	gr	ן ו	po]	Lic	y of
	Empire																			

HIROTA, Koki (Kooki) Cont'd.

Five Ministers' Conferences:

Conferences of Senior Statesmont

252 17 July 43 - Attended, which approved KONOYE as 254 ceed KONCYE .. 255 29 Nov 41 - Attended, which discussed war with United States 257 1 Dec 41 - Attended, which discussed war with United States 259 17 July 44- Attended, which discussed resignation of TOJO Cabinet . 261 18 July 44 - Attended, which decided that TERAUCHI, KOISO or HATA succeed TOJO 263 20 July 44 - Attended, which approved coalition cabinet of KOISO & YONAL 5 April 45 - Attended, which decided to recommend

HITLER, Adolph

Liaison Conferences:

HCNDA (Chief of Arrorod Forces Bureau)

Military Service Bureau Confedences.

HONDO (DAplaster)

Privy Council Meetings:

i

xxviii

HOMJO, Shigeru (Commander-in-chief of Rwantung ..rmy; Privy Councillor) Deceased

68

HORI, Teikichi

Privy Council Meetings.

1 Oct 30- Attended, re London Naval Treaty

HORIE, Hideo

Privy Council Meetings.

18 Aug - 26 Sept-30 Attended, discussed London Naval Treaty . 65 1 Oct 30 - Attended, re ratification London Naval 68 Treaty . 9 Dec 31- Attended, Report of China Incident . 70 13 Sept 32- Attended, approved signing of Jap-Manchukuo 25 Nov 36 - ttended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 89 6 Nov 37- Attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact 22 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperation agreement with Germany 100 22 Feb 39 - Attended, agreed to participation of Hungary and Marchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact 106 26 Sept 40 - Attended, approved Tripartite Pact . 111 18 Dec 40 - Attended, discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia, & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact 125 16 June 41 - Attended as Chief Sec'y, Japanese-France treaties for residence, navigation, trade and tariff system in FIC . 127 3 July 41 - ...ttended as above, which ratified two protocols between France & Japan, between Thailand Japan on guaranty & political understandings . 133 24 Nov 41 - Attended as above, which decided to postpone the Arti-Comintern Pact . . 143 10 Dec 41 - Attended as above, which decided to ratify the treaty against separate peace between Japan-147 discussed organization of Great East Asia . . 149-153 18 ... ug 43 - Attended as above, ratified conclusion of treaty between Japan & Thailand concerning territory in Malaya & Shan areas 154

HORIKIRI, Zembei

Privy Council Meetings.

HOSHINO, Naoki (Accused)

Imperial Conferences:

5 Nov 41 -	Attended, decided policy towards U.S.,
England	and Netherlands
1 Dec 41 -	and Netherlands
Britain	and Nethérlands

Liaison Conferences:

o/a 30 Nov	41 -	Att	ended	, re	composition	and	delivery
of final	L not	e.		• •		• •	• • • 52

Privy Council Meetings:

26 Sept 40 - Attended, as "explainer", approved
Tripartite Pact
26 Sept 40 - Attended, statement regarding Japan's
resources
8 Dec 41 - Attended as "Explainer", the meeting which
approved the ratification pertaining to declaration
of war against America & England 145
9, 12, 14 Oct 43 - Attended as "Exponent" the meeting
for organization of Great East Asia Ministry . 149

Cabinet Meetings:

HOTTA, Masaoki

Privy Council Meetings:

1 Oct 30 - Attended, London Naval Treaty 68

Hungary

Privy Council Meetings:

IDE (Adm. Official, Foreign Office)

Privy Council Meetings:

21 Nov 41 - attended to explain Asti-Cominters Pact.p.1444 10 Dec 41 - attended as "explainer", which decided to

IIJIMA

Privy Council Meeting:

IKEDA, Seihin

Privy Council Meetings:

21 Nov 41. autender to suplain Ants-Comintern Pact., 142

9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42 - attended as councillor, for organization of Great Asia Ministry .. 149-15:

Five Ministers' Conferences:

Home Ministry)

Privy Council Meeting:

21 Nov 41 - Autended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact 142-3

rxxii

IMAYOSHI (Explainer)

¶°.

Privy Council Monting:

TEMBLAN AVIATION POLICY

Cabinet Meeting:

IMPERUAL CONFERENCES

Dec. 31 - Occupation of Kirin, Mukden, Heilungking and Jehel, decided at, according to Araki.2

11 Jan. 38 - decided the tasic policy of disposition of China Incident
10-26 Sept. 40- Matsuoka's explanation of Tripartite Pact
2 July 41- Adopted resolution re Jap-Arerican nego- tiations
6 Sep 41 - Adopted resolution re Jap-American nego- tiations
5 Nov 41 - Decided policy towards U.S., England and Netherlands
1 Dec 41 - Decided Japan would declare war on U.S., Britain and Netherlands
31 May 43 - decided to incorporate Fast Indies areas into Japanese territed.
INO, ELPOYA (Sgrioviture Minister, FOLU Ochinet)
Imperial Conferences:
1 Dec 41 - Attended, doulded to declars war on U.S., Britain and Notherlands
Liaison Conferences:
o/a 30 Nov 41 - Attended, completion of plans for war with U.S.F

IMAYOSHI (Explainer)

Privy Council Meeting: 9, 12, 15 Oct 42 - attended to explain establishment of Great Asia Ministry 149 IMPERIAL AVIATION POLICY Cabinet Meeting: 12 Aug 32 - Decision, after acquiring control of Manchukuo to organize Japanese controlled aviation IMPERIAL CONFERENCES Dec. 31 - Occupation of Kirin, Mukden, Heilungking and Jehrl. decided at, according to Araki.2 11 Jan. 38 - decided the basic policy of disposition of China Incident 4 10-26 Sept. 40- Matsuoka's explanation of Tripartite 6-9 2 July 41- Adopted resolution re Jap-American nego-6 Sep 41 - Adopted resolution re Jap-American nego-13-17 5 Nov 41 - Decided policy towards U.S., England and 18-22 1 Dec 41 - Decided Japan would dcclare war on U.S., 23 Britain and Netherlands 31 May 43 - decided to incorporate East Indies areas ING, Eiroya (Agriculture Minister, 1050 Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: 1 Dec 41 - Attended, doubled to deplace war on U.S., 23 Britain and Netherlands Liaison Conferences: •/a 30 Nov 41 - Attended, completion of plans for war

xxxiii

ING, Hiroya (Cont'd)

Privy Council Mantines:

16 June 41 - Attended as Agriculture & Forestry Minister, ratification of Japanese-French treaties for residence & mavigation & trade and tariff systems in FIC ••••127 State 8 Dec 41 - Attended as/Minister which approved ratification of declaration of war against America and England · · · · · · · · · · 145 . 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Con 42 - Attended as State Minister, meetines, 190/75h for organization of Great 3 July 43 - Attended as State Minister, to ratify France-Japanese, and Thai-Japanese protocols, both refer to guaranty and political understandings 133 Cabinet Meetings: 22 Aug 41 - Attended, National Mobilization Plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new inter-4 Nov 41 - Altended, Folicy of press and speech 8 Dec 41 - Attended, report of war progress and war INOUE, Jonnosuka (Finance Minister in HAMAGUCHI Cabinet) Deceased INCUER, Vojiru (Explainer, Director Europe & Asia Bureau) Privy Council Meetings: 6 Nov 37 - Attended, desided to allow Italy to join

GPRAI, Isnyoshi (Drime Minister)

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IRIYE, Toshiro (Councillor of Legislation Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

ISHIGURO, Tadaatsu (Privy Councillor)

Deccased

ISHIGURO, Tadashige (Director of Trade Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

ISHII, Kikijuro (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ISHIKAWA, Junkichi (Sec'y of Foodstuff Control Bureau)

Privy Council Meetings:

ISHIWATA, Sotaro

Four Ministers' Conferences:

Five Ministers Conferences:

XXXV

ISHIWATA, Toshiichi (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ISHIZAWA (Sect. Chicf)

Joint Conferences:

ISHIZUKA, Eizo (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ITAGAKI, Seishiro (...ccused) (War Minister)

Privy Council Meetings:

2 Nov 38 - Attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations with Leage on Nations . . . 97

22 Feb 39 - Attended, agreed to participation of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact . 106

Cabinet Meetings:

24 Sept 31 - SAKAGAKI is name in re Mukden Incident, probably means ITAGAKI, Scishiro, Accused . .164

9 Aug 38 - Reported on Changkufeng Incident . . 193

xxxvi

ITAGAKI, Seishiro (Cont'd) Five Ministers' Conferences: 25 Nov 38 - Attended, which decided to capture Hainan 6 May 39 - Attended, which decided on compromise re-8 Aug 39 - Attended, at which O'T's cablegram shows concessions from Germany needed for a Tripartite Italian- Japanese Relations Imperial Conferences: 5 Nov 41 - Decided measures towards, after outbreak of Liaison Conferences: . •/a 30 October 41 - Discussed what cooperation could be expected if war broke out with America . .43 13 Nov 41 - Decided to disclose to, Japan's starting war against USA and Britain 50 Privy Council Meetings: 2 Nov 38 - Decided on agreement for cultural cooperation 10 Dec 41 - Ratified no separate peace treaty . 147 Five Ministers' Conferences: 6 May 39 - Decided on compromise regarding cooperation 8 Avg 39 - Decided concessions from, for a Tripartite Joint Conferences: 12 July 40- Discussed strengthening harmony with-282 16 July 40- Agreed upon intensification of coalition

xxxvii

ITO, Hachiro (Explainer from Finance Ministry)

Privy Council Meetings:

16 June 41- Attended as explainer the meeting which approved Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation, trade and tariff systems in FIC . 127

ITO, Miyoji (Privy Councillor)

Deceased

ITO, Seiichi (Vice Chief of Navy General Staff)

Imporial Conferences:

6 Sept 41 - Attended, which adopted resolution re Jap- American negotiations
5 Nov 41 - Attended, decided policy towards US, England and Netherlands
1 Dec 41 - Attended, Decided to declare war on US, Britain and Netherlands
Liaison Conferences:
o/e 30 Nov 41 - Attended, re complete war plans against USA
Cabirot Meetings:
partly 1 Dec 41 - Attended,/responsible for composition of final note to US
IMAMURA, Michiyo (Justice Minister in TOJO's Cabinet) Imperial Conferences:
1 Dec 41 - Attended, decided to declare war on US, Britain and Netherlands
Privy Council M stings:
1 Oct 30- Attended, re London Naval Treaty 68
21 Nov 41 - Attended as Justice Minister, decided to prolong Anti-Comintern Pact
8 Dec 41 - Attended, ratified declaration of war against America & England

IWAMURA, Michiyo (Cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings:

22 Aug 41 - Attended, national mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation • 215-6 4 Nov 41 - Attended, policy of press and speech regula-tion IZAWA, Takto (Councillor) Privy Council Meetings: 3 July 41 - Attended, ratified Franco-Japanese & Thai-Japanese Protocols on guaranty & political 133 21 Nov 41 - Attended, prolonged Anti-Comintern 142 8 Dec 41 - Attended, approved ratification pertaining to declaration of war against America and 10 Dec 41 - Attended as above at the meeting which decided to ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan 147 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42 - Attended as councillor and committee man, discussed organization of Great East Asia Ministry & other matters. 149-154

İ

KiDCWL'I (Exponent) Frivy Council Meetings: 19 & 20 Oct 42, attended to explain the establishment of Greet Asia Finistry •••• p. 149 KAMATA, Eikichi (Privy Councillor) Deceased KAMIMURA, Shinichi (Political Affairs Bureau Foreign Office) Privy Council Meetings: 18 Aug 43, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex Shan State KINIYAMA, Mitsunoshin (Frivy Councillor) Decessed K/M. (Chief of Ordnance Bureau) Military Service Bureau Conferences: Apr 42, ottended, decided that POW's KANEKO, Kantaro (Privy Councillor) Deceased KAMMNITSU, Tsuneo (Minister of Overseas Affairs in ABE's Cabinet, Minister of Welfare in 2nd Konoys Cabinet) Frivy Council Meetings: 18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Czech, Fungery and Rumania joining Tripertite Pact 125 3 Jul 40, ettended, retified two Protocols, Franco-Japaness and Thai-Japanese to Cohinet Meetings: 24 Oct 39, attended, changed value of ••••197 to secure leadership in Test Asia 205

KAMAMORI (Councillor, Bureau of Legisletion) Privy Council Meetings: 1 Oct 30, attended, London Neval p. 68 Treaty 13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing 73 Japan-Manchukuo protocol 1 KAMAYA, Hanzo (Chief, Army General Staff) Cabinet Meetings: 19-23 Sep 31, attended, discussed 161, Mukden Incident 162 KANROJI, Osanaga Conferences of Senior Statesmen: 17 Jul 40, ettended, decided to recommend 252 Konoye to succeed Yonni 17 Jul 41, ottended, approved Konoye as KASAGI, Ryousei Cebinet Meetings: 12 Aug 32, testified government of Manchukuo planned, controlled and 174, financed by Japan 175 KATSU, Mosauori (Minister of Communications in Yonai's Cabinet) Cabinet Meetings: 3 Mar 40, attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on •••••198 US for materials KAWADA, Retsu (Finance Minister) Privy Council Meetings: 26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Pact 111 Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Pact 125 16 June 41, attended, approved Japansse-French Treaties for residence and navigetion, and trade & teriff system in FIC 127

xli

KAWADA, Retsu (cont'd)

Trivy Council Meetings: (cont'd) 3 Jul 41, attended, retified 2 protocols -France-Japanese, and Thai-Japanese, of gueranty and political understandings p. 13 Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 4], attended, adopted resolution KAWAI, Misao (decessed) Privy Council Meetings: 3 Jul 41, attended, as councillor, ratified France-Japaness, end Thai-Japanese protocols, treaty of guaranty and political understandings . . 133 KAMATOTO, Kunio (Secretary of Colonial Dept.) Privy Council Meetings: 16 Jun 41, attended to explain Jap-Franch treaties for residence & navigation, and trade & tariff system in F.I.C. 127 15,19,20 & 21 Oct 42. attended to explain KAMATURA, Hiroshi (Director of Southern Area Colonial Dept. Privy Council Meetings: 16 Jun 41, attended to axplain Jap-Franch treaties for residence & navigation, and trade & tariff systam in T.I.C. 8 Jul 41, attended to explain 2 protocols -France-Jan., and Thei-Jap., on guaranty and political understandings •••••••••••• KWARADA, Makichi (Minister of Education in ABF's Cetinat) Cabine: Mestanes: 22 Oct 39, attended, changed external velue of you from scorling to dollars 197 KATASATI (Dir. of Bur. leg.) Privy Council Fastings: 1 Oct 30, attended, re Tondon Navel

KAWATA, Isao (Minister of Finance in 2nd Konoya Cabinat) Cabinet Meetings: 26 Jul 40, attended, established Greater Tast Asia policy and planned internal .p. 199, sconomy . . . 200 MAYA, Okinori (accused) (Finance Minister in Tojo Cabinet) Privy Council Meetings: 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact • • • 94-5 8 Dec 41, attended as state minister, ratified declaration of wer against America and England 145 Imperial Conferences: 5 Nov 41, attanded, decided policy towerds US, England & Matherlands 18 1 Doc 41, attended, decided to declare war Iisison Conferences: o/a 30 Nov 41, attended, re composition and delivery of final note 52 • • • • • See generally pages 32-63. For attendance from 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41 see base 32. For attendance after 21 Jul 41, see pages 33 (acc to Tojo); page 34 (acc to Togo and Nagano) Cabinat Meetings: See generally pages 213 to 281--Index refers to att indence as shown in Exhibits only 11 Jul 37, accended, increase north China-. . . . 183 army • • • • 4 Nov 41, attended, policy of press and speech regulation 223 1 Dec 41, attended, member of liaison conference responsible for basis of last note to U.S. . 226 KAZAMI, Akira (Chief, Cabinat Secretary) Privy Council Maetings: 18 Dec 40, attended, discussed re Hungary, Czech & Rumania join Tripartite Pact 125

xliii

KAZAMI, Akira (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings: 18 Jan 38, discussed plan to regulate import and export of essential meteriels p. 191, 192 26 Jul 40, actended, established greater East Asia policy and planned invernal 199, sconomy 200 MIDO'S DIARY (See Fide, Moishi) ELDO, Koishi (Accused) (Minister of Welfere) Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 41, stated that it was decided at Imperial Conference to cope with situation coused by Russo-German War 12 6 Sep 41, stuted Enperor wanted to esk questions at Imporial Conference & that Supreme Mar Command did not enswer questions re diplometic moves . . . •••••13-14 6 Sep 41, extract from, redecision of council in Imperial presence on 6 Sep 41
5 Nov 41, envire from, re policy towards USA. England and Mutherlands decided 17 . 18 1 Dec 43, extract from, Importal conferences decided to decive war against US, Groat Critain, NEI 24 31 May 43, extends incur saying that gist of gravelplo of subjugation of Greater Mast Asia decided in Imperial Presence . . . 26 Iiaison Conferences. 30 Jun, 3 Feb 41, manorted Chiefs of Army and Nevy General Scaff and Premiar reportid to Emperor policy towards French Indo-Chilas & Theiland • 35 6 Jun 42, extract from, conference to lisonas Hitler's decision to attack Russia 37 25 Jun 21, Bur ording to XTDD, Prime Minister, Chieve of ermy and have leasted Staff reported to balace Jugamede unomus entry artes French Info-Chines 5 • 38 o/a 29 Oct AL, andream from, reserves the extension of auti-dominatorn Prot Privy Council Mostings: 2 Nov 38, extract from, stating that KIDO attended meeting of Privy Council and it was decided to cease cooperating with Isagua of Nations 99 xliv

المستحجب الارابي ال

$\mathbf{\tilde{k}}^{TT}$ u, $\mathbf{\tilde{k}}^{T}$ u, curt, ,	
Privy Council Meetings: (contid)	
32 Nov 38, attended, decided to cease cooperative with	
League of Nations	n. 100
Cabinct Meetings:	
27 Oct 37, attended, considered invitation to 9 power	
pact conference	185
19 Nov 37, attended, considered IG Hg regulations covered incidents as woll as wer	200
21 Dec 37, attended, discussed negotiations with and counter	186
messures against China, as well as dreft answer to	
German Ambassador	187
14 Jan 38, attended, considered establishing and recognizing	207
provisional Chinose government	188,189
9 Aug 38, attonded, discussed Changkufeng incident as well as	,
German-Jap. relations with reference to European situation .	193
28 Aug 39, attended, discussed reason for cabinet resignation	
and composition of new cabinet	196
28 Jun 41, Tojo advised Kwentung Army to prudently watch	
Gormen-Russo war	515
16 Jul 41, roceived Imperial order to confer with president	~~ <i>*</i>
of Privy Council re next premier	214
Hone Meeting at KONOYE Home:	
12 Oct 41, reason for recommending TOJO as premier after	
fall of KOMOYE Cabinet	555
Rine Vinterant Conference	
Five Ministers' Conference 12 Jul 40, asked by Emperor if an order by Chief of General	
Staff for artillery mobilization for South China had been	
clearcd with the government. Means of YOFAI-ARITA Cabinet	
downfall shown.	251
Conferences of Sonior Statesmen: 17 Jul 41, attended, approved Konove as Prime Minister for	
and time	254
17 Oct 41, attended, approved Tojo to succeed Konoye	265
89 Nov 41, attended, discussed war with US	257
1.7 Jul 44, discussed necessity of resignation of Tojo	
cabinet and composition of new cabinet	267, 262
18 Jrl 44, attended, decided that Terauchi, Koiso, or	·
Hata succeed Tojo	26%
20 Jul 44, attended, approved coelition cabinet of Koise and	
Tonei	264
5 Apr 45, attended, decided to recommend Suzulti to succeed	
,	265
a second second second by the second s	
KIMURA, Heitaro (Ultraged)	
Supreme War Plans Council Meetings:	
30 Jul 41, attended, discussed international situation	281
•	
and the second	•
са и стали стали и стал	

n an an an an an an ann an Arland an an Arland an Ar Arland an Ar

i

KIMJRA, Heitaro (cont'd) Militery Service Bureau Conferences: Apr 42, attended, decided that FCW's engage in forced labor p.275 MINURA, Shotetsu (Minister of Justice in Yonai's Cabinet) Cabinet Meetings: 3 Mar 40, attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US . 198 for materials . . . KISHI, Nobusuke (Minister of Commerce and Industry, Tojo's Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: 1 Dec 41, attended, decided to declare Cabinet Meetings: 4 Nov 41, attended, policy of press and KIYOURA, Keigo Conferences of Senior Statesmen: 17 Oct 41, attended, approved Tojo to succeed Konoye 255 KOBLYASHI (Vice Minister of Navy) Frivy Council Meetings: 1 Oct 30, attended, re Iondon Neval Treaty 18 Dec 40, attended, discuss re Hungary, Czech and Rumania joining Tripartite Past . 68 125 FOBAYASHI, Ichizo (Minister of Commerce in 2nd Konoya Cabinat) Cabinet Meetings: 26 Jul 40, attended, established greater East Asia policy and planned internal economy 199 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 200

KODAMA, Hideo (Overseas Minister) (Home Minister in Yonai's Cabinet
Privy Council Meetings: 3 Jul 35, attended, approved Jopansse- Manchukuc Agreement for Joint Economic Committee
Cabinet Meetings: 3 Mar 40, attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US for materials
KOISO, Kunicki (Chief Military Affairs Bureau)
Cabinet Meetings: 19-23 Sep 31, attended, discussed Mukden Incident
8 Aug 33, describes method for Japan guidance of independent Manchuria
3 Mar 40, sttended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US for materials
Conferences of Senior Statesman: 18 Jul 44, Mmperor decided to appoint, succeeding Tojo
KOJZEMI, Chikahiko (Welfere Minister, Tojo Cabinet) Deceased
Imparial Conferences: 1 Dac 41, attended, decided to declare wer on US, Britein & Netherlands
KOTZUMI, Matajiro (Communications Minister in 2nd Wakatsuki's Cebine
Cebinet Meetings: 19-23 Sep 31, atterded, discussed Mukdan Incident

Ī

xivii

KOMDO, Nobutaka (Vice Chief, Navy Gemeral Staff)

ļ

Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations
Iiaison Conferences: 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings except those from 10 Apr to 25 Jun incl
CONCYE, Hidemero
<pre>Privy Council Meetings: 2 Nov 37, attended Investigation Committee & Privy Council, passed resolution to terminate cooperative relations with I. of N's</pre>
for cultural cooperation with Germany
pation of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact
German elliance
26 Sep 40, attended, approved the
Tripartite Fact
Hungary, Uzeeb & Roomania's joining an Tripervite Pectory and a second state of the second s
& Flanary Session, ratified Protocol with France regarding common defense of F.I.C
KONDYE (KONDE), Fumimaro (Prince, Premier) Deceased
Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution
re Jac-American negotiations
of his cebinat
<pre>Lisison Conferences: 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings</pre>
upon to Emperor

KONOYE (KONDE), Fumimero (cont'd) Liaison Conferences: (cont'd) 6 Jun 41, sttended, according to Kido diary, rec'd telegram from Oshima Cabinet Meetings: 11 Jul 37, attended, decision, send larger army to north China 183 22 Oct 37, attended, decision, establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo . . . 184 27 Oct 37, attended, decided to answer invitation to 9 power pact • • • • • -185 19 Nov 37, attended, decision, liaison 21 Dec 37, attended, discussed counter measures for China affair and answer to German Ambassador drafted . . 187 14 Jan 38, attended, decided on fixed policy re Chinese Netional government . 188 16 Jan 38, attended, considered Germany should change policy toward Japs in China 190 18 Jan 38, attended, decision, regulate supply and demand of essential materials . 191 9 Aug 38, attended, discussed Changkufeng incident and German-Jap relations 12 Dac 38, attanded, decision, increase poppy acreage . 194 28 Aug 39, told Kido that Abe ordered to form new cabinet 196 26 Jul 40, sttended, decision, defined basic national policy 199 . . . 3 Oct 40, attended, decision, outline for economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo . . 201 aconomic devalopment of NEL 203 5 Nov 40, attended, decision, summary for economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China 204 7 Mar 41, attended, decision, Nat'l. Mobil. lew to be effective on 20 Mar 41 and to be used only in an emergency 206 2 May 41, to enforce Nat'l. Defense Security law on 10 May 41 • • > • • • 211 28 Jun 41, attended, decision, tighten grip on Indo-China . . . 212 2 Jul 41, attended, continue policy of 2nd Cabinet on basis of Tripartite Pact . . . 213 16 Jul 41, attended, decision, 2nd cabinet to resign "en bloc" . . 214 • • 22 Aug 41, attended, decision, Nat'l. commodity mobilization plan . . . • • • • • 215

KONOYE (KONDE), Fumimaro (cont'd)	
Cabinet Meetings: (cont'd) 5 Sep 41, attended, decision, land and sea transportation placed on war basis 12 Sep 41, attended, decision, workers mobilization plan	
Var Maisters Conferences: 4 Sup 40, attended, decided outline of basic national policy	L
Five Ministers Conferences: 25 Nov 30, attended, decided to capture Hainan Islan:	4 .
Conferences of Senior Statesman: 29 Nov 42, attended, Siscus sed war with US 1 990 41 ettinded, Siscus sed war with US 17 Jul 44 attended, Siscus sed war with US	;
of Tojo Cabinet	
cabinat of Kolso and Yonai	
<pre>cicceed Koiso</pre>	• • • • • •
TI DOD HTT INTO REPUTORAN WE RUCCERRATE PO	

ļ

RONNA

Capinst Meetings: 11 Apr 33; treasfer New Spium from, to Marchalac and to increase growing acreage () Flve Millelers Contevence 11 ang 36, leoided to complete military forces in KOVAMA, Matsukichi (Miniguar of Jastice ar Sentors Gabinet) Frivy Council Mestings; 13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing Japan-Manchukuo protocol

· 2 . 6

KOYAMA, Matsukichi (cont'd)

> KUBOTA, Yuzuru (Privy Councillor) Deceased

> > KURATOMI, Yuzeburo

KURIHARA

Exposition (Explainer)

(Explanator)

KURIHASHI (Chief of Security Burgau)

> KURINO, Shinichiro (Privy Councillor) Deceased

FURIYAMA

Privy Council Meetings: 25 Nov 36, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact

> KURODA, Naganari (Privy Councillor) Deceased

FUROSAKI

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ł

1

s . . .

. .

Exposition (Explainer)

KUANTUNG ARMY

Privy Jouncil Meetings: 3 Jul 35, Chief of as permanent member of Japen-Manchukuc Joint Teonomic Committee	32
Cabinat Meetings: 8 Aug 33, to administar plan for guiding Manchukuo prepared by General Staff Heedquarters	178, 179

lii

ili'

ITAGUT OF NUTIONS

Drivy Council Meetings:

13 Sep 32, could not agree to settle								
Sino-Japan dispute under Articla 15 of .	•	•	•	•	٠	٠	•	p.79
3 Jul 35, basic policy of Japan towards								
Manchukuo found Rescript of March 1933								
on withdrawal from Isague	•	•	•		•	٠	٠	81
19 Jul 37 (Manchukuo) approval new laws								
forbidding the sale, stc. of nercotics								
without license as result of action of .	•	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	93
2 Nov 38, decided to terminate cooperative								
reletions with, because league edopted								
resolution to apply economic sanctions								
to Japon re Sino-Jepanese Incident	•	•	•	•	٠	٠	•	98

IILISON

Cabinet Meetings: LIAISON CONFERENCES 27 Jul 40, decided main points in re dealing with situation to meet change in world conditions 28 19 Sep 40, decided to strengthen Jap-Germany-Italy axis 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, decided P.M., Forsign Minister & other ministers concerned . . 29 should sttend office of High Connand occesionally & axchange views & project national policies w/war, Navy & Staff of H.C. "no more press announcements of ••• 33 35, 36 Theiland & F.J.C. 37 6 Jun 41, Hitler Iscided to sttack Russia 25 Jun 41, decided to eccelerate all pre-paratory measures towards Thailand & FIC -38 4 Aug 41, decided principle of negotiations w/Soviet Union Between 18 Oct & 2 Nov 41, discussed policy 770 for improvement of relations w/America 41 o/n 29 Oct 41, Kido refuses extension of Anti-Comintern Dect 42 c/c 30 Oct 41, cuestions discussed reessentials for prosecution of national policies 43-. . . 46 4 Mov 41, lest counterproposal for resumption of Jop-American negotia-

. 47

tions decided upon

ITAGUT OF MUTIONS

Privy Council Meetings:

13 Sep 32, could not agree to settle	
Sino-Japan dispute under Articla 15 of	p.79
3 Jul 35, basic policy of Japan towards	
Manchukuo found Rescript of Earch 1933	
on withdrawal from Isague	81
19 Jul 37 (Manchukuo) approvel new lews	
forbidding the sale, stc. of nercotics	
without license as result of action of	93
2 Nov 38, decided to terminate cooperative	
reletions with, because league edopted	
resolution to apply aconomic sanctions	
to Japon re Sino-Japanese Incident	98

ILLISON

Cabinet Meetings: LIAISON CONFERENCES 27 Jul 40, decided main points in re dealing with situation to meet change in world conditions 28 19 Sep 40, decided to strengthen Jap-. 29 should attand office of High Command occasionally & exchange views & project national policies w/war, Navy & Staff of H.C. "no more press ennouncements of L.C or J.C. • 33 • • • • 30 Jan, 3 Feb 41, decided policy towards Theiland & F.J.C. 35, • • • • • • • • 36 6 Jun 41, Hitler Bocided to ottack Russia 37 4 Aug 41, decided principle of negotiations w/Soviet Union Between 18 Oct & 2 Nov 41, discussed policy 40 for improvement of relations w/America 41 o/n 29 Oct 41, Kido refuses extension of Anti-Comintern Pact • 42 o/c 30 Oct 41, questions discussed reessentials for prosecution of national policies -43-46 4 Mov 41, lest counterproposal for resumption of Jop-American negotiations decided upon • 47

JIAISON CONFERENCES (cont'd)

!

<pre>11 Nov 41, set forth principle reasons for outbreak of war</pre>
toward for sign countries in relevelue tion of metional policies
southern occupied territories
o/a 30 Nov 41, foco affixes racronsi- bility of final note to USA
to \mathbb{TSA}
o/a 30 Nov 41, complete plans for wor ageinst USA
30 Nov 41, decided time of delivery of final note
12 Dec 41, reported on sconomic plan for southern crea
4 Jen 43, decided on independence for Burma & Philippinos

IONDON MAVAI TREATY OF 1930

Frivy Counci 18 Aug nevy	1 Meetings: - 26 Sep 30, ratio compari	discus sion ng w/USA	. of ••••	• •	• • •	• •	• •	•	66-
1 Oct 3	0, re retific	etion		• •		• •		•	67 68

÷

i

IVTTON REPORT

Japanese force brought into action over								
whole area of South Manchurian Railway		•	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	162
Successive military movements into Manchuria .	•	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	164
Describes how Self Government Guiling Board								
developed Inferendence mevement in Nanchukuo	•	•	٠	•	٠	٠	٠	174

MACHIDA, Chieji

Privy Council Meetings:] Oct 30, attended, re London Naval Treaty
MAEDA, Yonezo (Reilways Minister in Hirota's Cabinet & Hirenama's Cabinet Minister of Commerce in Inugki's Cabinet)
Frivy Council Meetings: 25 Nov 36, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Tect

MAEDA, Yonazo (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings: 13-17 Dec 37,	3		٦	э <i>х</i> .	of	• •	e n. s	e'ni	ri	an							
occupation		•	•	•	•	•	•	ч с	•	ø	•	•	•	•	•	٠	p.166- 167

MANCHURIA-MANCHIKUO

Imperial Conferences: Dec 31, occupation of Mirin, Mukden,
Heilungking & Jahol, decided at, seconding to Araki
Frivy Council Meetings: 9 Dec 31, in rediscussion independence of
4 provinces of
Fretocol
3 Jul 35, approved Jepenese-Manchukuo agreement for Joint Economic Committee
without license
cultural fields with
Hungary & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact 106
Cabinet Meetings: 19-20;21-23 Sep 31, discusses Mukden Incident
Jepen had no territorial ambition in
regarding
provinces of
accompanying foundation of Manchuria- Mongol State
& guidance towards Manchukuo
positions

 $\mathbf{1}\mathbf{v}$

MANCHIRIA-MANCHIMUO (cont'd)							
<pre>Gabinst Neetings: (cont'd) May 32, adopted policy of construction, management and payment for Mirin- Tunghua Railway Watansion Line 12 Aug 32, decision to control all aviation in, thru control of a com- pary organized by Japanese and Manchurians</pre>	•	•	•				172 173
12 Jug 32, decision to formally recognize . 9 Dec 32, decision to conclude treaty re	•	•	•	٠	٠	•	
communications with	•	•	•	•	•	•	176
<pre>11 Apr 33, decision to transfer opium from Korea to</pre>	•	•	•	•	•	•	177
' pear to be in charge	•	•	9	٠	٠	٠	178. 179
22 Dec 33, decision to change government of Manchukuo from resency to constitutional monarchy though no change of policy of guidance by Japan	•	•	•	•	•	•	180 181
20 Mar 34, decision to organize and develop industries of, to meet Jeponese demands of							
national defense 22 Oct 37, decision to form national company to organize and develop heavy industries	•	•	•	•	•	•	182
and mining industry of	•	•	•	٠	٠	•	184
12 Dec 38, decision to approve plan of increased opium shipmonts to	•	•	•	•	•	•	194
welfare measures for living conditions	•	•	•	•	•	•	199 200
3 Oct 40, decision to develop chemical and heavy industries and supply essential materials to Japan under national defence policy							201
policy	•	•	•	• .	•	•	201
electrical undertakings for new policy of GEA resulting from Tripartite Fact	•	•	•	•	•	•	204

lvi

,

1

6 A

F

۶ ÷

ŧ

i

4 8

MANCHURIA-MANCHURUO (cont'd)

MINDATED ISLANDS

Trivy Council Meetings:					
20 Jan 37, decided naval officer be					
appointed as administrator of South					
Sea Islands	•	•	•	٠	91
26 Sep 40, in re German-Japanese relations					

MANO, Bunji

Privy Council Meetings:

18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Czech, Hungary & Roumania joining Tripartite Fact	í	26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Fact	•	٠	•	•	•	111
 3 Jul 41, attended as councillor, ratified France-Japanese & Thai-Japanese protocols on guaranty and political understandings 8 Dec 41, attended as councillor, ap proved ratification of declaration of war against America & England 10 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, decided to ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany & Italy MATSUDA, Genji (Overseas Minister in Haraguchi Cabinet) 		18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Czech,						
 France-Japanese & Thai-Japanese protocols on guaranty and political understandings			9	•	¥		•	125
on guaranty and political understandings		3 Jul 41, attended as councillor, ratified						
 8 Dec 41, attended as councillor, ap proved ratification of declaration of war against America & England 10 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, decided to ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany & Italy MATSIDA, Genji (Overseas Minister in Hanaguchi Cabinet) 		France-Japanese & Thai-Japanese protocols						
 8 Dec 41, attended as councillor, ap proved ratification of declaration of war against America & England 10 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, decided to ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany & Italy MATSIDA, Genji (Overseas Minister in Hanaguchi Cabinet) 		on guaranty and political understandings .			•			1.33
ratification of declaration of war against America & England 10 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, decided to ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany & Italy MATSIDA, Genji (Overseas Minister in Hanaguchi Cabinet)	8	B Dec 41, attended as councillor, ap proved						
ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany & Italy MATS'DA, Genji (Dverseas Minister in Hamaguchi Cabinet)								
ratify no separate peace treaty between Germany & Italy MATS'DA, Genji (Dverseas Minister in Hamaguchi Cabinet)		America & Ingland	•		•			145
Hamaguchi Cabinet)	1	O Dec 41, attended as Councillor, decided to						
Hamaguchi Cabinet)		ratify no separate peace treaty between						11.7
Hamaguchi Cabinet)		HATS'DA, Genji (Overseas Mar	iis	ste	r	ir	1	141
		Hamaguchi Ca	ib i	ne	t))		
		,						

> MATSUI, Keishiro (Trivy Councillor) Decessed

رمهم سرد ما مالك مارك فالكفي مافات ومسرمة مناطر

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French ti	rattended to exclain								
	reaties for residence	and navigati	on						
and trade	e and tariff suctor i	n FIG	· • •	• •	• •	•	٠	• 1	n. 1
8 Jul 41, g	a tter i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	· · · · · ·							
France-Ja	ep ar -								
nolitical	Lunce statings.				• •	•	•	•	. 13
									13
	MATSUMOTO), Shunichi							
Privy Council Me			,						• •
	attended, approved 1		5	• •	• •	• •	•	٠	• 11
	attended, discussion								1 7
	Roumania joining Trip		• • •	• •	• •	•	•	•	• 10
	attended as "Exclaine								
	which approved the re								
taining	to declaration of war	erainst Amer	ica						٦.1
& Englen	d	• • • • • • •		• •	• •	• •	•	•	s 1*±
	attended as shove at								
	cided to ratify treat								7 47
	peace between German		pan .	• •	• •	•	•	٠	• Tử
9,12,14,15	,19,20,21 Oct 42, ett	ended as							
	t" the meetings - 1st								
for organ	nization of Great Asi	e Ministry .	• • •	• •	•	• •	•	•	• 15 15
France-Ja nolitica	attended to exclaim o ap., and Thai-Jan., o 1 understandings attended to explaim	en euaranty en	d ••••	••	•	• •	•	•	. 13 . 14
21 YOV 41,	attende of explain			• •	•	••	•	•	• •
		10.1.6	of Arr	vР		- C	4		n)
	MATSUMURA	(Cuiei	·)1 311.	~	1 622	., .	ec	510	11)
•	e Bureeu Jonferences	: :	01 1 11.	v	1 691	.,	ec	510	11 /
Apr 42, at	e Buresu Conferences tended, decided that	B I WOR	·)1 211.	v	1621	5 , 7	ec		
Apr 42, at	e Bureeu Jonferences	B I WOR	••••	• •	•	• •	• •		. 27
Apr 42, at	e Buresu Conferences tended, decided that	PCW's	, Treat	••• ••	•	• •	•		
Apr 42, at enceme i	e Bureau Conferences tended, decided that n forced labor MATSUMAGA	PCW's	· · · ·	••• ••	•	• •	•		
Apr 42, at enceme in Privy Council M	e Bureau Conferences tended, decided that n forced labor MATSUMAGA	PCW's (Chief Forei	', Treat en Offi	y B ce)	• ure	•••	• •	•	. 27
Apr 42, at encere in Privy Council M	e Buresu Conferences tended, decided that n forced labor MATSUMAGA eetings:	PCW's (Chief Forei	, Treat en Offi	y B ce)	ure:	•••	•	•	. 27
Apr 42, at encere in Privy Council M 1 Oct 30, 4	e Burezu Jonferences tended, decided that n forced labor MATSUFAGA eetings: Attended, London Nava MATSUNO, Tsur	PCW's (Chief Forei al Treaty nhoi (Minister	, Treat en Offi	y B ce)	ure:	•••	•	•	
Apr 42, at encere i: Privy Council M l Oct 30, Cabinet Meeting	e Buresu Jonferences tended, decided that n forced labor · · · MATSUMAGA eetings: attended, London Nava MATSUNO, Tsuru	PCW's (Chief Forei al Treaty ahei (Minister Yonai's	, Treat en Offi	y B ce)	ure:	•••	• •	•	. 27
Apr 42, at enceme is Privy Council M 1 Oct 30, a Cabinet Meeting 3 Mar 40, a	e Burezu Jonferences tended, decided that n forced labor MATSUFAGA eetings: Attended, London Nava MATSUNO, Tsur	PCW's (Chief Forei al Treaty ahei (Minister Yonai's plicy to	, Treat en Offi	y B ce)	ure:	•••	•	•	. 27

ļ

MATSUOKA, Yosuke (accused) (Foreign Minister in Deceased 2nd Konoye Cabinet)
<pre>Imperial Conferences: 10-20 Sep 40. ***********************************</pre>
Liaison Conferences: 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings except that of 11 Apr 41 30 Jan, 3 Feb 41, according to Kido Diary, intends to concentrate whole Japanese
strength in South; elso opposed limiting of time re F.I.C. & Thailand policy
of relations between the Soviet & Germany 37
Trivy Council Meetings: 2 Sep 40, defines "New Order"
Steted Japon would compensate Germany for her former colonies
relations adjusted they will not last; after 2 years relations among Japan, Germany & Russia need aljustment
26 Sep 40, attended Investigation Committee, approved Tripartite Fact
Tripertite Ject
Czech & Roumania's join Tripartite Dact
ratified treaties with France for residence & navigation and tariff system & trade
political understandings
Cabinet Meetings: 26 Jul 4C, attended, esteblished Greater East Asia policy and planned internal
economy
16 Jul 41, views toward Jap-American understanding caused cabinat resignation

lix

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• ! ;

MATSUCKI, Yosuka (cont'd) Four Ministers Conference: 4 Sep 40, attended, Seried out ine of basic national poli . p.238 ن 5,21 Mov 40, sttended, scilled on assistence to and relations of Thailand in ••••239 M.TSUURA, Chinjiro (Trivy Councillor) Decensed MATSUZAKA, Hiromasa (Explainer) Frivy Council Meetings: 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Tect • 95 (Councillor) MIK MI Trivy Council Meetings: 15 Oct 42, attended to explain establishment of Great Asia Ministry 149 (Chief, Surgeon General's Bureau) MIKI Military Service Bureau Conferences: ÷ Apr 42, attended, decided that TOW's engage in forced labor MILTIARY LOVISTRS Cabinet Meetings: 11 Apr 32, Manchukuo to appoint Japanesa advisers to leading positions ••••170; 9 Dec 32, secret treaty ennexed to treaty with Manchukuo re communications diving Japan control of all decisions affecting . 176 16 Jan 38, discussed new policy of Germany withdrawing military advisers from China 190 MININI, Hiroshi (Councillor) Trivy Council Meetings: 13 Sep 32, attended, approved signing Japan-Manchukuo Protocol • • 73

ļ

MINAT, Hiroshi (contid)

<pre>Trivy Council Neetings: (cont'd) 20 Jan 37, attended, decided appoint-</pre>
of South Sea Islands
Anti-Comintern Tect
and Trivy Council edopted resolution to cease cooperative relations with L. of N's
earsement for cultural cooperation with Germany
22 Feb 39, attended, egreed to participation of Hungary & Menchuria in Anti-Comintern Tact 106
26 Sep 40, attended, Investigation Committee, approved Tripartite Pact
26 Sep 40, strended committee meeting, approved s dreft for Tripartite Tect
18 Dec 40, attended, discussed Roumania's joining the Tripartite Tect
3 Jul 41, attended, ratified France-Jap protocol of guaranty & political under-
stendings
with France regerding common defense of FIC 139 21 Nov, 41, attended, prolonged Anti-
Comintern Dect
plenery session retified decleration of war 145 10 Dec 41, attended, ratified treaty against
e separate perce between Tripartite parties 147 9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attended, dis-
cussed organization of Great Asia Ministry 149
18 Aug 43, attended, Investigation Committee, conclusion of treaty with Theiland that Thai
should annor Shan State

MIMANI, Jiro (accused) (War Minister)

Trivy Council Meetings: 9 Dec 31, attended as War Minister,	
report of China Incident	
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attanded.	
discussed establishment of GEA Ministry 150)
18 Aug 43, attended, Investigation Committee,	
re conclusion of Japan-Theiland treaty	
concerning Thai territory in Malaya and	
Shan areas	ŀ

MIMANI, Jiro (cont'd)

MITUNI, Tekenobu (Exposition)

Trivy Council Meetings: 22 Feb 39, attended, agreed to par-	
ticipation of Hungary & Monchuria in Inti-Comintern Thet)
6 Nov 37, ottended, decided to allow	
Italy to join Anti-Comintern Fact	
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations w/I of M	
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperative agreement of	
Germany)

MITSUCHI, Chuzo (Minister of Communications in Inuaki's Cabinet)

Trivy	Council Meetings:	1
	1.7 Mar 10 044 and	

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TIVY COUNCIL MEGGINS:	
13 Sep 32, attended, approved Japan-	
Manchukuc protocol	3
26 Son 40, attended, approved Tripartite Tact 1]	11
18 Dec 40, sttended, discussion re Hungary,	
Czech & Roumania joining Tripartits Fact 12	25
ló Jun 41, attended, approved Jepanese-French	-
trecties for residence and navigation and	
trade and tariff system in F.I.C.	7
3 Jul 41, sttended as councillor, ratified	- 1
France-Ispance and What Tenance method	
France-Japanese and Thei-Japanese protocols	` `
on gueranty and political understandings	53
8 Dec 41, attended as councillor, ratified	
declaration of war against America & Ingland 14	+5
10 Dec 41, attended as councillor, decided	
to retify treaty against separate peace	
among Germany, 1tely & Japan	۶7
18 Aug 43, attended as councillor, conclusion	
of treaty between Jepen-Theiland concerning	
Thai territory in Shan areas	14
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Cct 43, ettended as	
councillor for organization of Great	
Test Asia Ministry	.9
Cebinet Neetings:	
13-17 Dec 31, M.C. policy Memburian	
couption discussed	6-
10	1

• • •

MITS TO. Moshio (Administration Official, Foreign Office) (MITSUFULL) Frivy Council Meetings: 16 Jun 41, ettended to explain Jar-French treaties for residence & navigation, and trade & tariff system in F.I.C. • p.127 MIURA, Nachiko (Vice Minister Agriculture and Forestry) Drivy Council Mastings: 16 Jun 41, attended to explain Jap-French treaties for resilence & nevigation, end trade & tariff system in F.I.C. 8 Jul 41, attended to explain 2 127 protocols - France-Jep and Thei-Jep, on political understandings •••••133-4 MIYGH, Chagero (Minister of Justice in Abs Cabinet) Deceased MINAKE (Administrative Official, Great Asie Ministry) Trivy Council Meetings: 18 Aug 43, attended to explain the treat y that Thailand should annex Shan State from Burna 154 MTYAUCHI, Kan (Councillor Legisletion Bureau) Trivy Council Maetings: 16 Jun 41, attended to explain Japanese-French treaties for residence & navi-21 Nov 41, attended to explain Anti-••••••142-3 MIZUMACHI, Kesaroku (Frivy Councillor) Deceased

MIZDNU, Itaro (Director of Trade Bureau) Trivy Council Meetings: 16 Jun 41, attended to explain Jap-French treaties for residence & nevigation, and trade & tariff system in F.I.C. • • • •••p.127 3 Jul 41, sttended to explain 2 protocols -Frence-Jap and The 1-Jap on guaranty and political understandings 133-134 18 Aur 43, attended to explain the treaty that Theiland should minex Shan State from Burma • 154 MORI, Kaku (Secretary of Inukai Cabinet) Deceased MCRISHIMA, Morito Trivy Council Meetings: 13 Sap 32, attended, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo protocol • 73 MORIY.ML, Michi (Mxposition) (Councillor Legisletion Bureau) Trivy Council Meetings: 22 Web 39, attunded, agreed to participotion of Hungery & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Dect 106 26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripertite Fact • • ÷. 111 18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungory, Ozech & Roumenia joining Tripertite Fact 125 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Fact 95 2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations w/L of N 97 22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperative agreement w/Garmany 100 16 Jun 41, attended as explainer the meeting which a proved Japaness-French treaties for residence & trade & tariff system in FIC 127 3 Jul 41, attended to explain 2 protocols -Frence-Japanese and Thai-Jap on guaranty and political understandings 133-134 21 Nov 41, ottanded to explain Anti-Comintern Dect 142-. 143

MORLEMA, Luichi (cont'3)

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<pre>Trivy Council Meetings: (cont'd) 8 Dec 41, ettended as "Explainer" the meeting which approved the retifica- tion pertaining to declaration of war acciect (marice & Fralend</pre>
war against America & England p.145 10 Dec 41, attended as above at the meeting which decided to ratify treaty against separate peace among Germany,
Italy & Japan
Asia Ministry
18 Aug 43, attended as exponent; con- clusion of treaty between Japan & Thailand concerning their territory in Shen ereas

MOROHASHI, Jo

26 Sap 40, attended, approved Tripartite Dect
Czech & Roumania joining Tact
meeting which approved Japanese-French
trade & tariff system in FIC
3 Jul 41, attended, ratified 2 protocols- France-Jepan and Thai-Japan on gue renty
and political unlerstandings
21 Nov 41, attended, decided to prolong Anti-Comintern Tact
10 Dec 41, attended, decided to ratify
between Germany, Italy & Japan
organization of Great East Asia Ministry 149-
18 Aug 43, attended, conclusion of treaty between Japan & Theiland concerning Thai
territory in Malaya and Shan areas

MOTODA, Hanime (Frivy Councillor) Deceased

· lav

MURAKAMI, Seiichi (Clerk or Secretery)
Trivy Council Meetings:
25 Nov 36, attended, approved Anti- Comintern Fact
6 Nov 37, ettended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Tact
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end cooperative relations w/I of N
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural cooperative agreement
w/Germany
tion of Hungary & Manchuria in Anti- Comintern Fact
MURASE, Chokuyo (Director of Legislation Bureau)
Trivy Council Meetings:
26 Sep 40, attandad, approved Tri- partite Tect
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re
Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Fact
Tripartite Jact
approved Japanese-French treaties for
residence & navigation & trade &
tariff system in F.I.C. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
of France-Japenese protocol on guaranty
and political understandings and of Thai-
Jap protocol on guaranty & political understandings
MURATA (Explainer)
Trivy Council Meetings:
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re
Hungary, Czech & Roumania joining Tripartite Fact
Tripertite Fact
MURATA, Shozo (Minister of Railweys and
Communications in 3rd Konoya Cabinat)
Trivy Council Meetings:
3 Jul 41, attended as State Minister;
ratified France-Japeness and Thai- Jepaness protocols of guarantee and
political understandings • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• •

MURATA, Shozo (contid)
Cabinet Meetings: 26 Jul 40, attended, established greater Tast Asia policy and planned internal sconomy
200 22 Aug 41, attended, national mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation
NUTO, Mira (accused)
<pre>Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations</pre>
<pre>Iiaison Conferences: 13 Jan - 21 001 41, attended all neet- ings except those of 16,17,19,23 Jan 41</pre>
<pre>Trivy Council Meetings: 26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite Fact</pre>
among Germany, Italy % Japan Cabinet Meetings: I Dec 41, attended, member of liaison conference responsible gist of final note to US

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lxvii

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мито	(not the accused) (Secretary)
 Oct 30, attended, re ra Iondon Naval Treaty 9 Dec 31, attended, repor Incident given 13 Sep 32, attended, appr Jap-Manchukuo protocol 25 Nov 36, attended, appr Conintern Dact 6 Nov 37, attended, decid 	t of China
NAGAI	(A Secretary of Foreign Office)
Trivy Council Meetings:	

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; -

ry, councry woodanigo,
16 Jun 41, attended as explainer
approved Jepenese-French treaties
for residence & navigation and
trade & tariff system in F.I.C

lxviii

NAGAI, Ryutero (Minister of Communications) Deceased

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NAGANO, Osemi (Accused) (Explainer, Head of Peace Preservation Bureau) (Navy Minister)

Imper	dal Conferences:	
	2 Jul 41, attended, which adonted resolution re	
	Japanese-American negotiations	10
	6 Scp 41, attended, (same as above)	13
	5 Nov 41, attended, decided policy toward United States,	
	England and Netherlands	18
	5 Nov 41, attended issued 1st order which caused	
	Pearl Herbor ettech plan put into execution	S 3
	1 Dec 41, attended, decided Jap. would declare war on	
	United States, Britain and Icthorlands	23
Tinia	on Conferences:	
	13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended Ell meetings except those	
	from 13 Jun to 11 Mar, incl.	33
		00
	25 Jun 41, attended, decided to accelerate all	70
	proparetory measures in Thuiland and French Indo-China .	38
	o/a 30 Nov 41 attended re composition and delivery	F O
	of final note	5?
	o/a 30 Nov 41 ettended, emproved plen to attack Pearl	
	Harbor	53-54
	Council Mecting:	
	25 Nov 36, attended, appreved Anti-Comintern Pact	
	on 25 Nov 36	89
	20 Jan 37, attended, decided nevel officers could be	
	appointed as Administrators of the South Sea Islands	91
	21 Nov 41, ettended to explein anti-Comintern Pect	14?-3
	et Mcctings:	
L.	o/a 1 Dec 41, attended, approved gist of final	
	note to U.S.A.	<u> 226</u>
	1 or 2 Dec 41, task of setting a time prior to	
	attack for delivery of final note to U.S.	227
	Ministers' Conferences:	
1	7 Aug 36, attended, decided foreign Policy of Emmire	233
	11 Aug 36, attended, decided "Second Administrative	
	Policy towerds North China	234
	•	
Five 3	Ministers [†] Conferences:	
	30 June 36, attended, decided Besis of Nat. Policy	242
	7 Aug 36, attended, decided Basic Principles of	
	Nat. Policy	243
	11 Aug 36, attended, docided Fundamentals of Nat. Policy	244

NAGATA, Hidejiro (Minister of Oversees Affeirs in HIROTA Cabinet) Deceased

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NANABASHI, Tokuguro (Home Ministor in INUXAI CABINET) Decessed

MAKAJIMA

Military Service Bureau Conferences: Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's engage in forced labor	275
NAXAJINA, Chikuhoi (Railwey Minister in 1st Konoye Cebinet)	
Privy Council Meetings: 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Pact	94-5
Cabinet Meetings: 11 Jul 37, attended, increase north China army	163
MAKAJIMA, Kumakkchi (Minister of Commerce and Industry, Spito Cabine	t)
Privy Council Meetings: 13 Sep 32, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo Protocol 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to join	73
Anti-Comintern Pect	95
relations with League of Mations	97 100
NAKAMURA (Commander of Gondarmerie) Military Service Bureau Conferences: Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's engage in forced labor	275
NAKANO (Explainer)	
Privy Council Meetings: 15, 19, 20 and 21 Oct, 42, Attended to explain establish- ment of Great East Asia Ministry	149

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MARA, Tekeji (Councillor) -		۰
Privy Council Meetings:		
6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to		
	95	
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end		;
cooperative relations with League of Mations	97	
22 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution for cultural		1
cooperative agreement with Germany	100	
Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Fact	106	
26 Sep 40, approved Tripartite Pact	111	į
18 Dec 40, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovekia		٠
and Roumanie joining Tripartite Pact	125	
3 Jul 41, ettended, as Councillor, ratified France- Jepanese, and Thailand-Japanese Protocols, on		•
guerenty and political understanding	133	ì
2. Lov 41, attended as Councillor, prolonged		ł
Anti-Comintern Pact	142	
8 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, ratified declaration		
of war against America and England	145	
10 Dec 41, attended as Councillor, ratified treaty against	147	:
scoarate peace among Germany, Italy and Japan 18 Aug 43, attended as Councillor, conclusion of Treaty	141	
between Japan and Theiland concerning Thailand		
territory in Shen arces	154	1
NARITA (Explainer)		I
		•
Privy Council Meetings:		;
2 Nov 38, attended, passed resolution to end conversive		:
relations with League of Nations	97	ŧ
21 Nov 41, attended, explain Anti-Comintern Pact	142-3	•
NATIONAL DEFENSE SECURITY LAW		
Cabinet Mcotings:		1
2 May 41, decision, to enforce, and to publish detailed regulations	211	•
	611	
		ί
NATIONAL MOBILIZATION LAW		۰.
		i
Cabinet Meetings:		;
7 Mar 41, decided thet detailed regulations		1
of revised law rut into effect	S 06	;
Cutline of law	306-50	8
22 Aug 41, decision, key noints of	215	:
28 Nov 41, decision, placed press on war basis	225	1

lxxi

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ITTHERLANDS TAST INDIES FILATIONS

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Imperial Conferences:	
5 Nov 41, measures towards	50
area into Japanese territory	2526
Liaison Conferences:	
o/a 30 Oct 41, discussed important item re shaning	A 17
of national policy towards	<u>43</u> 62
Sebinet Moetings:	
25 Oct 40, decision, to control financial, economic and political life of, by liquidating relations with other countries, preferential treatment, control of	
production and export of essential materials from, and exchange control	203
12 Oct 41, complete preparation for war with	31 0
Cour ^t Ministers [†] Conferences:	
2 Scp 44, decided Independence to be announced	240
Supreme War Plans Council Meetings:	
5 Sep 44, decided to make statement in re	
independence of	563 563
Decision of Imperial Headquarters:	
Apr 41, decision to resort to prms in case of	
encirclement by, and on policy to be taken for economic relations with	280
	2.50
NEWICHI (Explainer)	
Privy Council Meetings: 21 Nov 41, attended to explain anti-Comintern Pact	142-3
Cabinct Meeting:	
25 Oct 40, established to control political and economic life of East Indies, by liquidation of foreign relations, control of production and export of essential materials, control of domestic	
and foreign exchange	203

lxii

NIND POWTR FACE Privy Council Meetines: 13 Sept 32, Wiolation of, in re Manchukuo n. 76, 79 2 Nov 38, League of Nations resolved that actions of Japan were violations of 93 Cabinet Meetings: 27 Oct 37, decision re invitation to conference to . 185 3 Mar 40, discussed U. S. maintaining of, and ignoring new order in Last Asia, and of weys to make Japan free of U.S. for essential materials 198 MINOMIYA, Horushize (Vice Chief of Army General Staff) Decensed MISHIMUTA, Kumeo (Secretary - Forcign Office) (Explainer) Privy Council Meetings: 16 Jun 41, attended as "explainer", approved Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation and trade and teriff system in French Indo-Chine . . . 127 21 Nov 41, attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pect . . 142-3 10 Doc 41, attended as "explainer", ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and 147 NOMURA, Kichiseburo (Foreign Minister in ABE's Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: 5 Nov 41, attended, telegram sent to, from TOGO re policy towards U.S., England and Netherlands . . . 19 5 Nov 41, attended, telegram sont to, from TOGO recounter-proposal to US. discussed and approved at Imperial Conference 5 Nov. 22 5 Nov 41, ettended, telegram to TOGO urging that egreement be signed by 25 Nov 41 22 Cabinet Meetings: 24 Oct 39, attended, changed value of yen from 197

lxxiii

OBATA, Torikichi

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Privy Council Meetings:
26 Sep 40, attended, approved Tripartite
Fact
Czechoslovakia & Roumania joining Tri-
Dartite Pact
3 Jul 41, attended as councillor, ratified
France-Japanese, and Thai-Japanese
protocols of guaranty and political
understandings
21 Nov 41, attended as councillor, pro-
longed Anti-Comintern Pact
declaration of war against America and
England
10 Dec 41, attended as councillor, ratified
treaty against separate peace between
Germany, Italy and Japan
9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 42, attended as
councillor & committeeman, organization
of Great Eest Asia Ministry and 8 other matters
18 Aug 43, attended as Councillor, conclusion of Treaty between 154
Japan-Theiland concerning Thei territory in Shan areas 154
OGAWA, Kataro (Minister of Commerce & Industry in Hirota Cabinet)
in Hirota Cabinet) OGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoye Cabinet)
in Hirota Cabinet) OTURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoye Cetinet) Imperial Conferences:
in Hirota Cabinet) OGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoye Cabinet)
in Hirota Cabinet) OGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoya Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations
in Hirota Cabinet) OGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoye Cetinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations
in Hirota Cabinet) CGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoye Catinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations
in Hirota Cabinet) CGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoya Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations
<pre>in Hirota Cabinet) OFURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoya Catinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations</pre>
in Hirota Cabinet) CGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoya Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations
in Hirota Cabinet) OCURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoya Cetinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations
<pre>in Hirota Cabinet) OFURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoya Catinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations</pre>
in Hirota Cabinet) OGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoys Cabinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations
in Hirota Cabinet) OGURA, Masatsune (Finance Minister in 3rd Konoya Catinet) Imperial Conferences: 6 Sep 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations

lxxiv

2 4 44

OHASHI (V. Member of Foreign Ministry) Iiaison Conferences: Attended meetings of 10,11 Apr; 26,27 Jun p. 33 OTKAWA, Koshiro (Nevy Minister, Tojo's Cabinet) Deceased Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations . . . 6 Sep 41 (same as above) Liaison Conferences: Privy Council Meetings: 16 Sep 40, attended, discussion re danger of economic pressure by US because of signing of Tripartite Pact & preparations to be made if war breaks out 109 26 Sep 40, approved Tripertite Pact . 111 18 Dec 40, discussion re Hungary, Czech & Roumania, joining Tripartite Pact 125 Four Ministers Conference: 5,21 Nov 40, attended, decided on aid to and relations of Thailand in New Order . 239 OKA, Yoshizumi (accused) (Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau) Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 41, attended, adopted resolution re Jap-American negotiations 10 6 Sep 41 (same as above) . . . 13 • • 5 Nov 41, attended, decided policy towards US, England & Netherlands 18 1 Dec 41, attended, decided to declare war on US, Britain & Metherlands • • • • • • • **Iiaison** Conferences: 13 Jan - 21 Jul 41, attended all meetings except that of 16,17,19,23 Jan; 2,6,7, ll Mar • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 32 6 Jun 41, attanded, conference re Japan participation in war on Russia . . . -37 25 Jun 41, attended, decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Theiland & FIC ... -38 o/a 30 Nov 41, attended, re complete plans for war w/USA 57 lxxv

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OKA, Yoshizumi (cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings:
28 Jul 41, attendad, resolution that there be concluded between France &
Japan a Protocol regarding common
defense of French Indo-China and
military cooperstion
S Dec 41, attended, declaration of war on America & England
10 Dec 41, attended, decided to ratify
traety against separate peace between
Germany, Italy & Japan
20, 21 Oct 42, attended, deliberation of the establishment of the Greater East
Asia Ninistry
Investigation Committee relative to the
conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thei territory in
Malaya and Shan areas
Cabinet Meetings: 12 Oct 41, except for Navy General Staff
war with US not wanted by Nevy but de-
cision of premier would be accepted
1 Day 41, attended, member of liaison con-
ference responsible for basis of last note to US
OFADA, Keisuke (Premier)
Privy Council Meetings: 13 Sep 32, ettended, as Navy Minister,
approved signing Japan-Manchukuo Protocol
3 Jul 35, attended as Fremier, approved
Jepanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Teonomic Committee
Reonomic Committee
Conferences of Senior Statesmen:
17 Jul 40, attended, decided to recommend
Konoye to succeed Yonai
Premier for 3rd time
17 Out 41, attended, approved Tojo to
succeed Koncys
29 Nov 41, ettended, discussed war with US
17 Jul 44, attended, discussed resignation
of Tojo Cebinet
18 Jul 44, attended, decided that Terauchi,
Koiso, or Hata succeed Tojo

lxxvi

OKADA, Ksienka (JULLIA) Conferences of Senier Statesmen: (cont'd) 20 Jul 4k, attended, approved coalition • • • p, 26 orbings of Voiso & Yonai 5 Apr 45, sttended, decided to recurment Suzuki to succeed Hoiso • • • • • • 25⁻¹ ONADA, Pyohei (Privy Councillor) Decessed OKAMURA, Yasuji (General) Suprems War Plans Council Meetings: 30 Jun 41, attended, discussed inter-· · · · · · · · · 283 national situation **CKIBO** (Explainer) Trivy Council Meetings: 6 Nov 37, attended, decided to allow Italy to foin Anti-Conintern Fect - G4, OTO (Capt., Neval General Staff) Joint Conferences: 12 Jul 40, sttanded, discussed strengthening Axis hermony 28 OFEN DOOR FOIICY Gabinet Maetings: 12 Mar 32, decidad to let Manchukuo Lasp Open-Door Policy • • • • • • 10 8 Aug 33, to be meiatuinel toward Soviet and US by Manchukac under plan for guiding Manchukuo prepared by Jepan 17/-17. GFIUM Gebinet Meetings: 11 Apr 33, decided to transfer Korean opium to Menchultuo. 17 12 Dec 38, decision to increase acreage

lxxvii

Manchukuo to meet increasing demand for 19!

of, end to increase shipments to

CSHIMA, Hiroshi (accused)

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on Conferences: μ and β Jun 41, attended, sent treaty to Liaison Conferences: Remova stating Hitler decided to 3 Linet Meetings: 9 Aug 38, Von Ribbentrop proposed to, that relations be reenforced •••• . 20 Jun 41, acc. to Ott, advised Japan 12. OSHIMA, Kan-ichi (Privy Councillor) Deceased OSIMI, Minro (Minister of Nevy in Iunsai Osbing Dacessed OTAMI, Sonyu (Oversees Affeirs Minister) Decoased Triy Council Measurgs: 6 Nov 37, attendal, decided to allow . 9 OTT, Eugen Imperial Conferences: 10-26 Sep 40, attended, conversation with Matsuoka & Stahmer re Tripartite Pact 5. Cebirct Meetings: o/a 28 Jun 41, telegram from in re Japan's decision to tighten grip • C · OYA!'A (Chief of legal Affairs Burg. Military Service Bureau Conferences: Apr 42, attended, decided that POW's engage in forced labor •••••••

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FEARI FARBOR

Imperial Conferences:									
5 Nov 41, Nagano issued 1st order which									
caused plan for attack to be put into									
execution	•	•	0	٠	•	¢	0	,	р
Time Chart for 6,7,8 Dec 41 shows the									
differences between Tokyo time and									
local time of attacks	٠	٠	•	•	٥	e.	,	v	2.
Privy Council Meetings:									
- TAA OCOUCIT MEEDINGS:									
8 Lec 41, Investigation Committee									
approved draft of declaration of war		•	c.	•	>	6			

FHII IPPINTS

liaison Conferences:							
12 Dec 41, reported on economic plan for	3		ړ	,	•	r	. 63
4 Jan 43, decided on independence for .		,		,		,	. 63

FIANNING BOARD

Vebinet Meetings:							
22 Aug /1, decided plan of metional							
mobilization lev	•				•		21
12 Sep 41, formulated Workers Mobilization	-	-	-	•	•	•	
Flan to insure labor supply and to in-							
crease production	•	0	٠	•	J	•	21

POPULATION

Cabinet Meetings:	
22 Jan 41, Jecision, increase quality	
and redistribution of, for establishment	
of GFA co-prosperity sphere	Û

POW INFORMATION BUREAU

On or after 7 Dev 41, established	• •	• •	•	•	٠	0	272
Military Service Euroeu Conferences: Arr 42, doc Med that FuW's engage in forced labor	•	•	•	•	• •	. 5	2'7.
Conferences in War Ministry on FOW's 1942-43, decided that observation of Geneva Convention could not be observed	•	•	•	•	• •	•	277

POW INFORMATION FUREAU (cont'd)

Decisions of Imperial Headquarters: Apr 41, decided policy on measures to be taken in the South	• F.
Supreme War Council (Army Members): 30 Jun 41, discussed international situation	•• - •
Joint Conferences:	
12 Jul 40, discussed strengthening Tripartite hermony	
of Tripartite coalition	: :)

TRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS

18 Aug - 26 Sep 30, discussions of national
defense & Jap Navy ratio compared to USA
1 Oct 30, re ratification of Tondon Naval
Treavy
9 Dec 31, report on Chins Incident
o/a 17 Dec 31, decided policy of occupying
4 provinces of Lanchuria & also approve
milivery budget
L) Sep 32, spproved bill re signing of
Japan-Manchukuo Protocol
3 Jul 35, spproved Japaness-Menchukuo
egreement for Joint Economic Committee
20 Nov 36, approved nagotiations for Anti-
Comintern Dact be transferred from General
Staff to Foreign Office
20 Nov 36, Investigation Committee approved
German-Jeponese Fact against Comintern,
and secret pact against the Soviet Union
25 Nov 36, approved Anti-Comintern Fact
30 Jan 37, decided neval officer be appointed
administrator of South Saa Islands
19 Jul 37, (Menchukuo) approved new laws
forbidding manufacture, sale, etc. of
rarcotics without license
a Nov 37, ducidad to allow Italy to join
Anti-Comintern Poct
I. Jan 38, decided to deny Manking Govt
a continue military encontion if
& continus military operation if
Japanese conditions were refused
2 Nov 38, passed resolution to end
cooperative relations w/I of Mations
22 Nov 38, passed resolution for agreement
for cultural cooperation w/Garmany
29 Nov 38, reported Japan's foreign policy
towards Chine
105

lxxx

TRIVE UP 1011 HEEPINGS (cont'd)

22 Yeb 39, sporoved perticipation of Hungery in Anti-Comintern Pact	96
if Tripartite Pact signed	
Tripartite Pact	
Tripartite Fact	-
<pre>18 Dec 40, discussed Hungary, Czechoslavakia & Roumania's joining Tripartite Fact</pre>	
FIC & treaty concerning tariff system & trads & method of settlement w/FIC	
stending & Thai-Japanese on same subject	
tary cooperation be concluded w/France	
Fect	•
re declaration of war	
Japan	
lishment of Greater West Asia Ministry	
Shen ereas	

TUBLIC OFINION

4	Nov	41,	decision,	regulate	speech	and	press	٠	٠	•	•	٠	•	•	223	
---	-----	-----	-----------	----------	--------	-----	-------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----	--

TU-VI, Henry

Cabinet Meetings:											
12 Mar 32, mentioned in plan to											
govern Manchukuo	• •	• •	٠	•	٠		٠	٠	•	•	169
12 Aug 32, mentioned, installed	ຄຣ										
puppet regent of Menchukuo .	• •		•		•	•	•	•	٠		174,
											175

lxxxi

Rescript of March 1933 on withdrawal from Isague of Nations Trivy Council Meetings: 3 Jul 35, basic policy of Japan towards Manchukuo found in, so •••• p. 81 stated at meeting ROUGANTA Trivy Council Meetings: 18 Dec 40, discussion ra joining . . . 125 Tripartite Fact RUSSIAN-JATAN RELATIONS Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 41, decided to secretly prepare erms against . 11 • • 6 Sep 41, Jopan will not take initiative if Soviat respects Russo-Jap Neutrality Pact . . . 15 5 Nov 41, measures toward . . 20 . . . Iiaison Conferences: 19 Sop 40, decided to strengthen Axis by cooperating re -30 4 Aug 41, decided principle of negotistions with -40 o/a 30 Oct 41, discussed important items re shaping of netional policy toward . . . •••••45,46 Trivy Council Meetings: 20 Nov 36, negotiations for Anti-Comintern Pect transferred from General Staff to Forsign Ministry 85 • • • • • 20 Nov 36, Investigation Committee approved German-Japanese Fact ogainst Comintern & secret pact against Soviet Union ••••••••• 25 Nev 36, approved Anti-Comintern Pect 22 Feb 39, approved participation of 89 Hungery & Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact (see Anti-Comintern Pact this index) 106 26 Sep 40, Investigation Committee approved Tripartite Tect ••••••111 Cabinat Meetings: 28 Jun 41, time considered necessary to prepare attack on, urged by Germany to attack 212 2 Jul 41, secretly prepare for wer egainst, but reserve entrence into German-Russo war . 213

1

lxxxii

SAIIO (Explainer)

Privy Council Meetings: 1 Oct 30, attended, re London Naval Treaty p. 68 SAITO, Mahoto (Prime Minister in 1932-34) Deceased SAITO, Tatsuo Privy Council Meetings: 3 July 1041, attended to evolain two protocols, France-Jápan and Thailand-Japan, on Guaranty 133and Political Understandings () 134 21 Nov 1941, attended to explain on Anti-Comintern 142-Pact a construction of the construction of the 143 12, 14, 15, 19, 20 & 21 Oct 1942, attended to explain on the establishment of Great Asia 149 Ministry concernence concernen SAKAGAKI (See ITAGAKI) Cabinet Meeting: 24 Sent 1931, probably ITAGAKI, accused, re 164-Mukden Incident 165 SAKAI, Tadamasa (Minister of Agriculture in ABE's Cabinet) Cabinet Meeting: 24 Oct 1939, attended, changed value of yen from ster-197 ling to dollars SAKAKIBARA (Explainer, Army Affairs, Section Chief) Privy Council Meeting: 18 Aug 1943, attended to explain Treaty that Thailand 154 should annex SHAN state from Purma SAKAMOTO, Ryuki (Tatsuki) Privy Council Meeting: 8 Dec 1941, attended as "Explainer" - Declaration 145 of war against America and England 10 Dec 1941, attended as above, ratified treaty against separate beace among Germany, Italy and Javan 147 142-3 21 Nov 1941, attended to explain Anti-Comintern Pact lxxxiii

SAKAMOTO, Sannosuke (Privy Councillor) (Deceased)	
SAKONJI, Seizo (Minister of Commerce in 3rd KONOYE Cabinet)	
Cabinet Feetings: 22 Aug 1941, attended, National Mobilization Plan t maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation P	0 215- 216
SAKURAI, Joji (Privy Councillor) (Deceased)	
SAKURAUCHI, Yukio (Commerce Minister in 2d Wakatsuki's Cabinet and Finance Minister in Yonai's Cabinet)	
Cabinet Meetings: 19-23 Sent 1931, attended, which discussed Mukden Incident	161-2
3 Mar 1940, attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on U.S. for materials	198
Five Ministers' Conference: 12 July 1940, attended, which decided to bush war preparation	251
SATO (Explainer, Secretary, Legislation Bureau)	
Privy Council Meeting: 19 Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand annex Shan States from Burma	154
SATO, Kenyro (Accused)	
Imperial Conference: <u>11 Jan</u> , 1938, attended, referred to and quotes Emperor on <u>Emperor on</u> <u>Emperor on <u>Emperor</u> <u>Emperor on</u> <u>Emperor on <u>Emperor</u> <u>Emperor</u> <u>Emperor on</u> <u>Emperor <u>Emperor</u> <u>Emperor</u> <u>Emperor <u>Emperor</u> <u>Empror</u> <u>Emperor</u> <u>Emperor</u> <u>Empror</u> <u>Empror</u> <u>Empror</u> <u>Empor</u> </u></u></u></u>	5
Privy Council Meeting: 18 Aug. 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex Shan State from Burma .	154
Military Service Bureau Conference: Apr. 1942, attended, which decided that POW's engage in forced labor	275

:

ļ

· •_----

0

lxxxiv

SATO, Nnotake (Foreign Minister)

ļ

Four Ministers' Conference: 16 Apr. 1937, attended, which decided Plans for Guiding North China and the second states of the	236
SEKO (Explainer)	
Privy Council Meetings: 1º Dec. 1940, attended, discussion re- Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tri- partite Pact	125
SELF-GOVERNMENT GUIDING BOARD	
Cabinet Meeting: 12 Aug. 1932, set up at Mukden and controlled and financed by Japan to foster independence movement of Manchukuo	174,5
SHIBA, Cdr. (Navy Office)	
Joint Conferences: 12 July 1940, attended, which discussed streng- thening Axis' harmony 16 July 1940, attended, which agreed to inten- sify Axis' coalition	282 283
SHIDEHARA, Kijuro	
Privy Council Meetings: 1 ^R Aug 26 Sept. 1930, Attended all meetings of Investigation Committee, discussed rati- fication of London Naval Treaty 1 Oct. 1930, re. London Naval Treaty	66 68
Cabinet Meetings: 19-23 Sept. 1931, attended, which discussed Mukden Incident 24 Sept. 1931, mentions telegram from HAYASHI re. Mukden Incident	161-2 164
SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru	
Privy Council Maetings: 18 Aug. 1943, attended as State Minister, re- conclusion of treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan	1 54
6 Nov. 1943, attended meeting of Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations re. joint declaration	154 153

. .

lxxxv

SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru (cont'd)

Four Ministers! Conference: 2 Sept 1944: presumably attended, which decided independence of NEI to be announced 240 n SHIMADA, Shigetaro (accused) Imperial Conferences: 5 Nov. 1941, attended, decided policy toward U.S. England and Netherlands 1 Dec. 1941, attended, decided to declare war 18 on U.S., Britain and Netherlands 23 Liaison Conferences: 30 Nov. 1941, attended, re. composition and delivery of final notes 30 Nov. 1941, attended, re. complete plans 52 for war with USA 57 Privy Council Meetings: ⁸ Dec. 1041, a tended as State Minister, the ratified declaration of war against America and England 145 ~ 10 Dec. 1941, attended as above, ratified treaty against secarate bence among Germany, Italy and Japan 147 9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 1942, attended as State Minister, discussed organization of Great Asia Ministry 149-154 SHIMADA, Shigetaro (accused) Cabinet Mcetings: 4 Nov 1941, attended, policy of press and speech regulation concernence . 223 Placed newspapers on wartime basis . . . 225 226,7 1 Dec 1941, approved gist of final note 1 or 2 Dec 1941, whole cabinet attended Imperial Conference re- declaring war on US, Great Britain 227 8 Dec 1941, attended, reported on war progress 231 War policy adopted 231 SHIMADA, Toshio (not the accused) (Minister of Agriculture and Forestry) Privy Council Meetings: 25 Nov 1936, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 20 Jan 1937, attended, decided the appointment of naval officers as administrators of South Sea 29 Islands 3 Mar 1940, attended, economic policy to relieve Japan of dependence on US for materials **91** 108

lxxxvi

SHIMIZU, Toru (Cho) (Councillor)

í

Privy Council Meetings:

Trivy Council Meetings:	
3 July 1935, attended, approved Japanese-	
Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic	
Committee	p. 81
20 Jan 1937, attended, decired appointment of	
naval officer as Administrator of South	
Sea Islands	91
Sea Islands 6 Nov 1937, attended, decided to allow Italy	/
to join Anti-Comintern Pact	95
? Nov 1938, attended, passed resolution to	
end cooperative relations with League of	
Nations	07
Nations 22 Feb 1939, attended, agreed to participation	97
ac rep 1959, Accepted, Agreed to participation	
of Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern	7.0/
Pact	106
20 Sept 1940, attended, approved Tripartite Pact	111
18 Dec 1940, attended, discussed re. Hungary,	
Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tri-	
partite Pact and	125
16 June 1941, attended, approved Japanese-	
French Treaties for residence and naviga-	
tion and trade and tariff system in French	
Indo China and a concerned a concerned a	127
3 July 1941, attended as councillor, and rati-	
fied France-Japanese, and Thai-Japanese	
Protocols, guaranty and political under-	
standings	1.33
8 Dec 1941, attended as Councillor, ratified	0.5
declaration of war against America and	
England , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	145
10 Dec 1941, attended as councillor, ratified	
treaty against separate peace among Germany,	
Italy and Japan	147
18 Aug 1943, attended as councillor, conclusion	± • 7
of treaty between Japan and Thailand concern-	
ing Thai territory in Shan areas	154
the mar cerroory in onan mens a a a a	1) 4
SHIMOMURA (Copt.)	
DILINOMOTIA (O () (x)	
Privy Council Meetings:	
1 Oct 1930, attended, re. London Naval Freaty	68
I occ 1730, totelded, ler boldon MAVAL leavy r	00
SHIONO, Suchiko	
(Justice Minister in Hayashi Cabinet)	
(ousside Minisser in hypother)	
Privy Council Meetings:	
6 Nov 1937, attended, decided to allow Italy to	
join Anti-Comintern Pact	95
2 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolution to end	~)
cooperative relations with League of Nations	97
22 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolutions for	71
cultural cooperation agreement with Germany	100
CELCUERT COOPERACION REPRESENT WITH DEPENDING	T()()

SHTONO, Suehiko (cont'd)

SOME (Explainer, Secretary - Foreign Office) Privy Council Meeting: 18 Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Eurma SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY Cabinet Meeting: 12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria SOUTH SEAS Privy Council Meetings: 9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to	183 62 62
Privy Council Meeting: 1 Oct 1930, attended, re London Naval Treaty . SIXTH COMMITTEE Limison Conference Meeting: 12 Dec 1041, reperted on outline of economic counter plan for southern areas	62
<pre>1 Oct 1930, attended, re. London Noval Treaty SIXTH COMMITTEE Linison Conference Meeting: 12 Dec 1941, reported on outline of economic counter plan for southern areas</pre>	62
Linison Conference Meeting: 12 Dec 1941, reported on outline of economic counter plan for southern areas	
 12 Dec 1041, reported on outline of economic counter plan for southern areas	
28 Nov 1041, decision, to create, composed of planning board, foreign ministry, finance, war and novy ministries, to discuss control and acquisition of resources in southern areas SOME (Explainer, Secretary - Foreign Office) Privy Council Meeting: 18 Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Eurma SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY Cabinet Meeting: 12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria SOUTH STAS Privy Council Meetings: 9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to	224
Privy Council Meeting: 1 ⁸ Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Eurma SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY Cabinet Meeting: 12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria SOUTH SEAS Privy Council Meetings: 9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to	
18 Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Eurma SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY Cabinet Meeting: 12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria SOUTH STAS Privy Council Meetings: 9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to	
Cabinet Meeting: 12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria SOUTH SEAS Privy Council Meetings: 9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to	154
12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria SOUTH SEAS Privy Council Meetings: 9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to	
Privy Council Meetings: 9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to	172,3
9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to	
civil administration	.51
7 Aug 1936, decided to advance toward	243 243
Four Ministers' Conference: Background, from Japanese viewpoint, of frontier dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China, (Exhibit 618-A (6868-6874),	39
STAHMER	
Imperial Conference: 10-26 Sept 1940, attended, conversation with listsuoka and Ott re Tripertite Poet 6 lxxxviii	

...

. .

.

SHIONO, Svehiko (cont'd)

ļ

7

Ĩ

11 11 19 1997, attended, increase North China Army p.	
SHIOZAKI (Explainer)	183
Privy Council Meeting: 1 Oct 1930, attended, re. London Naval Treaty SIXTH COMMITTEE	6R
Liaison Conference Meeting: 12 Dec 1941, reported on outline of economic counter plan for southern areas a contract for the	62
Cabinet Meeting: 28 Nov 1941, decision, to create, composed of plan- ning board, foreign ministry, finance, war and navy ministries, to discuss control and acquisition of resources in southern areas	224
SONE (Explainer, Secretary - Foreign Office)	~C4
Privy Council Meeting: 18 Aug 1943, attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Eurma	154
SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY	
Cabiret Meeting: 12 Aug 1932, to furnish subsidies to Japanese controlled aviation company in Manchuria	172,3
SOUTH SEAS	
Privy Council Meetings: 9-21 Oct 1941, discussed changes from military to civil administration	151
Five Ministers' Conferences: 30 June 1936, decided to promote racial and economic development of and to expand overseas 7 Aug 1936, decided to advance toward 11 Aug 36, decided to develop in	242 243 244
Four Ministers' Conference: Background, from Japanese viewpoint, of frontier dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China, (Exhibit 612-A (626-6874)	239
STAHMER	
Imperial Conference: 10-26 Sept 1940, attended, conversation with liatsuoka and Ott re Tripartite Pact	6- <u>0</u>

SUFTSUGU, Noburasa

(Deceased)

SUGAWARA, Michitaka

Privy Council Meetings: 2 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolution to end cooncrative relations with Learne of Nations 97 22 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolutions for cultural cooperation agreement with Germany 100 22 Feb 1939, attended, agreed to narticipation of Hungary and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact 106 26 Sept 1940, approved Tripartite Pact 111 18 Dec 1940, attended, discussed re. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact - -125 16 June 1941, attended, approved Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation and trade and tariff system in F_I_C. 127 3 July 1941, attended as councillor, ratified France-Japanese and That Japanese protocols of guaranty and molitical understandings . 133 8 Dec 1941, attended as councillor, ratified declaration of war against America and England 145 10 Dec 1941, attended as councillor, ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan and a second second second 147 1° Aug 1943, attended as councillor, conclusion of treaty between Japan-Thailand concerning That territory in Shan preas 154 SUGIYAMA, General (Chief of General Staff) (Decensed) Immerial Conferences: 2 July 1941, attended, which adopted resolutions re. Japanese-Imerican negotiations 10 6 Sept 1941, attended, which adouted resolutions re, Japanese-American negotiations 13 5 Nov 1941, attended, decided policy toward U.S., England and Netherlands 18 1 Dec 1941, attended, decided to declare war on U.S., Britsin and Netherlands 23 Liaison Conferences: 13 Jan - 2 July 1941, attended all meetings except that of 16 Jan 32 30 Jan - 3 Feb 1041, Kido relates, was received by Emmeror to report outline of policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand decided upon 35 30 Nov 1941 o/a, attended, re complete plans for war with USA and a concerned on the concerned of the conc 57

lxxxix

SUGIVIA, General (contid)

Four Ministers' Conference: attended, which decided Third Admin-20 Fcb 1937: istration Policy toward North China p. 235 16 Apr 1937: attended, which decided Plans for Guiding North China 2 Sept 1944: Presumably attended, which decided 236 independence of NEI to be announced 240 Supreme War Council: 30 June 1941: attended, which discussed international situation 281 SUITA, Dizapuro (Explanator) Privy Council Meetings: 25 Nov 1936, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 89 SUPREME WAR COMMAND Imperial Conference: 6 Sept 1941, did not answer questions re. diplomatic moves according to Kido - -13-14 31 May 1943, opposed independence of East India 25 SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL 17 July 1944: decided Empire should recognize independence of East Indies at earliest possible moment 269 5 Sent 1944: decided to make statement in re inde-268 ~ ~ ~ 1 Feb 1945: decided measures toward French Indo-271 9 Aug 1945: decided to accept Potsdam declaration 270 SUYAMA (Explainer - Administrative, Official, Foreign Office) Privy Council Meeting: 18 Aug 1943: Attended to explain the treaty that 154 Thailand should annex SHAN State from Burma SUZUKI, Kantaro (not the accused) Privy Council Meetings: 68 1 Oct 1930, attended, re London Naval Treaty 13 Sept 1932, attended, approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo Protocol 3 July 1935, attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee 73 81

SUGIYLA, General (contid)

Four Ministers' Conference: 20 Feb 1937: attended, which decided Third Administration Policy toward North China p. 235 16 Apr 1937: attended, which decided Plans for Guiding North China 236 2 Scot 1044; Presumably attended, which decided independence of NEI to be announced 240 Supreme War Council: 30 June 1941: attended, which discussed international situation 281 SUITA, Dizapuro (Explanator) Privy Council Meetings: 25 Nov 1936, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact 89 SUPREME WAR COMMAND Imperial Conference: 6 Sept 1941, did not answer questions re. diplomatic moves according to Kido 13-14 31 May 1943, opposed independence of East India 25 SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL 17 July 1944: decided Empire should recognize independence of East Indies at earliest possible moment 269 5 Sent 1944: decided to make statement in re inde-268 1 Feb 1945: decided measures toward French Indo-271 270 SUYAMA (Explainer - Administrative, Official, Foreign Office) Privy Council Meeting: 18 Aug 1943: Attended to explain the treaty that Thailand should annex SHAN State from Burma 154 SUZUKI, Kantaro (not the accused) Privy Council Meetings: 1 Oct 1930, attended, re London Naval Treaty 13 Sept 1932, attended, approved signing of 68 Japan-Manchukuo Protocol 3 July 1935, attended, approved Japanese-Manchukuo Agreement for Joint Economic Committee 73 81

SUZUKI, Kanthro (cont'd)

Privy Council Meetings (cont'd)

!

.

25 Nov 1936, attended, approved Anti-Comintern Pact p; 20 Jan 1937, attended, decided to appoint naval	89
officers as administrators for South Sea Islands 6 Nov 1937, attended, decided to allow Italy to	<u>91</u>
join Anti-Comintern Pact 2 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolution to end	95
cooperative relations with League of Nations	97
22 Nov 1938, attended, passed resolutions for cul- tural cooperative agreement with Germany 22 Feb 1930, attended careed to participation of	100
22 Feb 1939. attended, agreed to participation of Hungary and Hanchuria in Anti-Comintern Pact 26 Sept 1940. Attended in Institution Comintern Pact	106
26 Sept 1940, attoreed, Instigation Committee and Plenary Session approved Tripartite Pact	111, 116,
18 Dec 1940, attended, discussion re Hungary, Czechoslavakia and Roumania's joining the Tri- partite Pact	125
3 July 1941, attended, ratified French-Japanese and Thai-Japanese Protocols, guaranty and politi- cal understandings	133
28 July 1941, attended, agreed to Protocol with France re common defense of French Indo-China	139
21 Nov 1941, attended as Vice-President, pro- longed Anti-Comintern Pact	142
8 Dec 1941, attended, ratified declaration of war against America and England	145
10 Dec 1941, attended, ratified treaty against sepa- rate peace between Germany, Italy & Japan 9 12 14 15 19 20 21 Oct 1942, attended Investiga	147
 9,12,14,15,19,20,21 Oct 1942, attended Investigation Committee, discussion re-establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry 18 Aug 1943, attended, Investigation Committee, conclusion of treaty between Japan and Thailand 	149
concerning Thai territory in Malava and Shan areas	154
Conferences of Senior Statesmen: 20 July 1944: Lost cabinet office	264
5 Apr 1945: Attended, which decided to recommend Suzuki to succeed Koiso	265
SUZUKI, Kisaburo (Minister of Justice in INUKAI Cabinet) (Deceased)	

SUZUKI, Sarohu (Privy Councillor) (Deceased)

SUZUKI, Teiichi (Accused)

1

Imperial Conferences:

erial Conferences:	
2 July 1941, attended, which adopted resolution	
	10
6 Sept 1941 (same as above)	13
5 Nov 1941, attended, decided policy toward	-
US, England and Notherlands	זנ
1 Dec 1941, attended, decided to declare war on	
US, Britain and Nétherlands	23
	-

Liaison Conferences:

T

(See Page 32 for attendance at from 13 Jan to 21 July 1941. Those who usually attended Liaison Conference subsequent to 21 July 1941, according to Tojo, are set forth on Pages 33 and 56 Suzuki is named; therefore references in the index are made only to the Exhibits showing attendance. See Pages 37 - 63)	2 S
29 Oct 1941, reported to Kido on progress of o/a 30 Nov 1941, attended, re composition and	42
delivery of final note	<u>5</u> 2,
Knew time and day of attack	56' 56 57
12 Dec 1941, attended, re economic counter-plan for southern areas	62
Privy Council Meetings:	
28 July 1941, attended, concluded protocol between Japan and France re common defense of French	
8 Dec 1941, attended as "Explainer", ratified de-	139
10 Dec 1941, attended as above, ratified the	145
treaty against separate peace among Gormany, Italy and Japan	147
12 Oct 1942, attended as "exponent" except as indi- cated in text for organization of Greater Asia	149-
Ministry and the second second second	153
Cabinet Heetings:	
(See generally pages 211-231) 2 May 1941, decided National Defense Security Law	
enforced May 10, 1941 o/a 28 June 1941, dccided to tighten grip on	211
Indo-China 16 July 1941, decided that 2d Konoye Cabinet resign	212
22 Aug 1941, attended, explained national commodity	214
mobilization plan to meet international situation and import difficulties	215,
5 Sept 1941, attended, decided Traffic Hobilization	216
Dlan contraction and the second secon	217

SUZUKI, Teiichi (cont'd)

Cabinet Meetings (cont'd)

12 Sept 1941, attended, insure labor for munition	07.0
production	218
tinue negotiations with US for a settlement	219, 222
4 Nov 1941, attended, policy of press and	
speech regulation	223
28 Nov 1941, attended, functions of sixth com-	
mittee was to center acquisition and control	
of resources in southern areas in order to strengthen Japan's economy	224
Approved new system in press circles himed at	224
placing newspapers on wartime basis	225
o/a 1 Dec 1941, attended, approved gist of final	<i>e.e. j</i>
note	226
Responsible for study of note	226
1 or 2 Dec 1941, whole Cabinet attended Imperial	-
Conference concernence concern	227
Knew time and date for attack	227
International Law would not impede attack	227
8 Dec 1941, attended, decided policy to be adopted	
following attack on Pearl Harbor	231

•

T

xciii

TAJIRI (Section Chief) Foreign Office.

JC INT CONFERENCES

16 Ju⁷ 40. Attended. Agreed to intensify Axis coalition. . . p.283

TAKAHASHI, Koreikiyo (Finance Minister, INUKAI Cabinet)

Deceased

S

TAKARABE, Takeo

PRIVY COUNCIL NEETING:

18 Aug - 26 Sep 30. Attended meeting of 23 Aug in regard London Naval Treaty	6
1 Oct 30. Attended meeting re London Naval Treaty 6	8
TAKATSUJI, Masami (Secretary to Frivy Council)	
PPIVY COUNCIL:	
2 Nov 38. Attended. Fassed resolution to end cooperative relation with League of Nations	7
22 Nov 38. Attended. Fassed resolution for cultural coopera- tion agreement with Germany	0

22 Feb 39. Attended. Agreed to participation of Hungary and Manchukuo in Anti-Commintern Fact	106
26 Ser 40. Attended. Approved Tripartite Fact	111
18 Dec 40. Attended.Discussion re Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact	125
16 Jun 41. Attended as a secretary the meeting which approved	
Japanese-French treaties for residence and navigation and trade and tariff in French Indo-China.	127

3 Jul 21. Attended as a secretary the meeting which ratified two protocols between France-Japan, and between Tai-Japan 133 21 Nov 41. Attended as above the meeting which decided to

prolong the Anti-Comintern Pact. 143

xciv

TAKATSUJI, Masami (Con'd) PRIVY COUNCIL

TAKAYAMA, Lt. Colonel, /rmy office.

JOINT CONFERENCES:

		Discussed strengthening Tripartite			
harmony	• • • • • •	• • • • •	• • • • • • •	• • • • • • • •	282
16 Jul 40.	Attended,	Agreed to	intensify Axis	s Coalition	283

TAKECOSHI, Yosaburo

PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS:

26 Sep 40. Attended. Approved Tripartite Fact	111
18 Dec 40. Attended. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania joining Tripartite Pact discussed	125
16 Jun 41. Attended. Approved Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation, trade and tariff system in French Indo-China	127
3 Jul 41. Attended. As Councillor ratified France-Japanese, and Tei-Japanese protocols, guarantee and political under- standings	133
21 Nov 41. Attended. As Councillor prolonged Anti-Comintern Pact.	142
E Dec 41. Attended. /s Councillor ratified declaration of war against America and England	145

TAKEGCSHI, Yosaburo (Con'd) PRIVY COUNCIL MEETINGS:

. .

10 Dec 41. Attended as councillor. Ratified the treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Jaran . . p. 14

18 Aug 43. Attended as Councillor conclusion of tready between Japan-Thailand concerning Thai territory in Cham areas

TAKEUCHI, Kakichi

FRIVY COUNCIL MIETINC:

TANABE, Harumichi

LIAISON CONFERENCES:

IMPTRIAL CONFERENCES:

6 Sep 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japanese-

CABIN'ET MEETING:

22 Aug 41. Attended. National mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation..215 TANAKA, Ryukichi, Military

يستاح المستنيه

Ś.

Military Sorvice Pureau Conferences: Apr 42. Attended. Decided that 1051's engage in forced TANAKA, Ryuzo (Irivy Councillor) Deceased TANAKA, Ryuze (Member of Education in 2nd Watatsuki Cabiret) Crbinet Meetings: 19-23 Sep 31. Attended. Discussed Mukden Incident . . 161-162 TANEMURA, Major (Army General Staff Office) Joint Conferences: 16 Jul 40. Attended. Agreed to intensify Axis! TANI, Masayuki (Diroctor, Burbau of Asia Foreign Ministry) Irivy Council Meetings: 12 Sop 32. Attended. Approved signing of Jepan-73 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21,0ct 42. Attended as State Minister. Organization of Greater East Asia TANCHOGI, Koikichi (Minister of Communications in HIROTA Cabinot) Doconsed

TAWARA, Magoici

xcvii

TERAJIMA, Hirobumi (Sec'y, Foreign Office)

> TURAUCHI, Hisaichi (War Minister in HIROTA Cabinet)

Deceased.

۳.

TERAJINA, Ken

PRIVY COUNCIL: 8 Dec 41. Attended as State Minister. Ratified declaration of 145 LIAISON CONFFRENCE; 30 Nov 41. Attended. Re complete plans for war with U.S.A. . 57 IMPERIAL CONFERENCE: I Dec 41'. Attended. Decided to declare war of U.S.A. Britain and 23 CABINET MEETINGS: 4 Nov 41. Attended. Policy of press and speech regulation ... 223 TERAUCHI, Juichi (Mar Minister) FOREIG' MINISTERS! CONFERENCE: 11 Auf 36. Attended. Decided Second Administration Policy FIVE MINISTERS CONFERINCES: 30 Jun 36. Attended. Decided Basis of National Policy. 242 7 Aug 36. Attended. Decided Brsic Principles of National 11 Aug 36. Attended. Decided Fundamentals of Mational Policy., 244 SUPREME FAR COUNCIL: 30 Jun 41. Attended. Discussed international situation. 281

xcviii

TFAILAND

<u>____</u>

	RIAL COMFFRENCES: 2 Jul 41. Decided to execute schemes against	1112
	5 Nov 41. Masures toward	20
	COM CONFERENCES: 30 Jan, 3 Feb 41. Decided policy toward	35-3 €
	25 Jun 41. Decided to speed-up all measures toward	3 8-39
	13 Nov 41. Japan's policy toward	50
	20 Nov 41. Decided administration of	51
	12 Dec 41. Reported economic plan for	62
	COUNCIL MEETINGS: 3 Jul 41. Ratified Thei-Japanese Protocol on Guarantee and Folitical Understanding.	134
1	Germany agrees that Japan mediate border dispute between French Ind:-China and Thailand	135
ł	18 Aug 43. Investigation Committee approved treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory, Malaya and Shan areas; discussed territorial rights under international law of occupying nations.	154-55
	MINISTYRE CONFERNCE: 5, 21 Nov 40. Decided on assistance to and relation of, in New Order	239
	IONS OF IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS: Apr Al. Decision to establish close relations with	280
	TIME CHART	
Decem ⁾ local	her 6, 7, 8, 1941, shows differences between Tokyo time and time when certain events cocured	2 3 0

TOGO, Shigonori (Accused)

TOGO, Shigenori (Accused) (Con'd) PRIVY COUNCIL MEETING: 8 Dec 41. At the Print to Viristor. Patified declaration of war agains . 10 Dec 41. Attended as State Minister. Ratified treaty against separate perce between Cermany, Italy and Japan. . . . 147 LIAISON COMPERENCES: 18 Oct, 2 Nov 41. Attended. Sent telegram to NONDRA saying that policy to improve relation with America were discussed. . . .41 4 Nov 41. Attended. Sent telegram to NOMURA re counterproposal o/a 30 Nov 41. Attended. Re composition and delivery cf 52 final note. c/a 30 Nov 41. Attended. Complete plans for war with U.S.A. 57 30 Nov 41. Attended. Explained final note to U.S.A.. . . . 6C INF TRIAL CONFIDENCES: 5 Nov 41. Attended. Decided policy toward US, England 18 5 Nov 41. Attended. Telegram from, to NCMURA re Japanese 19 Attended. Telegram from, to NOMURA re counterproposal of Japan which was discussed 5 Nov /1, 22 Attended. Telegram from, to NOMULA urging signing 22 1 Dec 41. Attended. Decided Japan would declare var on U.S. CAPINET MEETINGS: ** 4 Nov 41. Attended. Policy of press and speech regulation . . 223 1 Dec 41. Composed final note to U.S. on basis of views of] or 2 Dec 41. Attended. Time of attack known to; gave instructions to Weshington Embassy re time of delivery and excused late delivery of note to Great Britain 227-229 8 Dec 41. Attended. Resigned as Oversees Affairs Minister, 231

** See generally pages 22% to 231. References in the Index are to exhibits showing attendance. TOJO, FIDEKI

FRIVY COUNCIL: 16 Sept 40. Attended. Discussion re economic pressure by U.S. on signing of Tri-Fartite Fact and preparations to be 20 Sep 40. Attended. Roplied to cuestions re Jagan-German 18 Dec 40. Attended. Discussion re Pungary, Czechoslavia and " Roumania joining Tripartite Fact. 125 3 Jul 41. Attended as State Minister. Ratified France-Japanese and Trai-Japanese Protocols of guerantee and political under-133 28 Jul 41. Attended. Agreed to resolution that there be concluded between France and Japan a Frotocol regarding the common defense of French Indo-China and military cooperation 138 21 Nev 41. Attended as premier. Frelonged Anti-Comintern Fact. 1/2 8 Dec 41. Attended as Fremier. Ratified declaration of war 145 10 Dec 41. Attended as Fremier. Ratified treaty against separate peace between Germany, Italy and Japan. 147 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 Oct 42. Attended as Fremier. Meetings (1st, 2nd, 34d, 4th, and 7th) organization of Great 18 Aug 43. Attended as Fremier. Conclusion of treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shar areas. 154 LIAISON CONFERENCES 13 Jar to 21 Jul 41. Attended all meetings. Record does not 32 See Exhibit 1119-1, Extract from Tojo's interrogation as to 21 Jul 41. A mosting of the Frime Minister and other ministers concerned. Decided they should meet with the N vy and War Ministers and staffs of the Figh Command at the office of the Figh

ci

TOJO, Hideki UIAISON CONFERENCES (Cor'd)

ļ

i

.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	E Jun 41. Refers to meeting to be held which he attended	37
2.00	25 Jun 41. Attended. Decided to accelerate all prepara- tory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China	<u>?8</u>
	2 'ug 41. Attended. Decided "Frinciple of Negotiation with Soviet Union	40
	18 Oct 41 to Nov 2 41. Telegram from Togo to Numura re moetings of fundamental policy.	41
	c/a 30 Oct 41. Attended. Questions and answers re ratifica- tion of Tri-Tartitie Pact and its effects upon relations with U.S., Britain and Netherlands Tast Indies	43
	4 Nov 41. Attended. Re counter-proposal to U.S	47
	11 Nov 41. Attended. Set forth reesons for attacking U.S. and Brita in	<i>1</i> ,8
	13 Nov 41. Attended. Adopted reasures re foreign countries as decided at Importal Conference of 5 Nov 41	5C
	20 Nov 41. Attended. Decided military administration in Sou- thern compiled areas	51
	c/a Nov 30, 41. Attended. Pe composition of final note and its delivery	52
	3C Nov 41. Attended. Ipproved the gist of the final note to America	55
	c/a 30 Nov 41. Attended. Approved plan to attack learl Harbor. to chiefs of	57
	30 Nev 41. Attended. Decided to delegate staff and Foreign Minister the time of delivery final note	58
	30 Nov 41. Attended. Approved substance of firs' note	60
IM H	RIAL CONFERENCES: 2 Jul 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japan-American negotiation	10
		13

4

cii

TOJC, Fideki (Con'd) IMPERIAL CONFERENCES:

; ,

6 Sep 41. Interrogation of, restating purpose of Importal Conference, 6 Sep 41	15
E Sop 41. Interrogation of, reattitude toward war with U.S	16
5 Nov 41. Attended. Decided policy toward. U.S., England and Netherlands	18
l Dec 41. Attended. Decided to declare war on U.S., England and Netherlands	23
1 Dec 41. Extract from Intorrogations re declaration of war on U. S. Britain and Netherlands	24
CABINET MERFINGS: (See generally pages 188 to 231. References in the Index are to exhibits showing attendance.)	
26 Jul 40. Attended. Esteblished Greater East Asia Folicy and planned internal economy	199-20(
22 Jan 41. Attended. Increase population to secure leadership in East Asia	205
22 Aur 41. Attended. National mobilization plan to maintain co-prosperity sphere and to meet new international situation . 21	5- <u>21(</u>
12 Oct 41. Attended. Troops should not be withdrawn from Chine and that decision to continue negotiations should not be left to the Framier since time for war was opportune 21	9-222
4 Nov 41. Attended. Folicy of press and speech regulation	223
l Dec 41. Attended. Julaison conference furnished basis of final note to U.S. Composed by TOGO	226
] or 2 December 41. Attended, by reason of self-defense an attack was not impeded by treaties and delivery of note should be shortly followed by attack	7-229
8 Dec 41. Attended. Report on war progress and adopted war policy	231

ŀ

TOJC, Hideki (Con'd)

TOUR MINISTARS COLFER

4 Sept 40. Attended, Decided Outline of Besic National Iclicy. r.238 5, 21 Nov 40. Attended, Decided on aid to and relations of COTTRAC & CF SENICE STATESHEN Dec 41. Attended. Discussed war with U.S. 259 5 apr 45. Attended. Decided to recommend Suzuki to 274 255 17 Jul 44. Resignation of cabinet discussed. . . . 261 ٠ 18 Jul 44. Successor to, discussed 26.3 20 Jul 44. Lost office 264 MITITARY SERVICE FUREAU COUNCIL: Apr 42. Attended. Decided that 10"'s engage in forced labor. . 275 SUTREME WAR COUNCIL 30 Jun 41. /ttended. Discussed international situation. . . 281 TOKONAMI, Takejiro (Minister of Communications in OKADA Cobinet) Deceased.

TOKUNAGA (Secretary)

JOINT CONFERENCES:

12 Jul 40. Attended. Discussed strengtheing Axis harmony . . 282 16 Jul 40. Attended. Agreed to intensify Axis coalition. . . 283

TOMII, Masaaki (Irivy Councillor)

Deceased

TOMINAGA (Chief of Personnel Turoau)

I

MILITARY SERVICE BURFAU CONFERENCE:

Apr 42. Attended. Decided that TOW's engage in forced labor. . 275

TCMITA, Kenji (Chief Secretary of Cabinet, (KONOE)) LIAISON CONFERENCE: 1941 Attended all meetings between 13 Jan and 21 Jul except that IMTERIAL CONFERENCES: 2 Jul 41. Attended. .. dopted resolution re Japan-American 10 13 TOYOTA, Teijiro (Foreign Minister TOJO Cabinet) IRIVY COUNCIL MEETING: 16 Jun 41. Attended as Commerce and Industry Minister. Japanese-French Treaties for residence and navigation and trade and 3 Jul 41. Attonded as State Minister. Ratified French-Japanese and Thai-Japanese Tretogols of guarantee and LIAISON CONFERENCE: 13 Jan 41. Attended 32 IMTERIAL CONFERINCE: 6 Sept 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japan-American negotiations. 13 CABINET MEETINGS: 2 Jul 41. Intended to continue close cooperation with Germany and Italy and to maintain troops in French Indo-China. . . .213' 22 Aug 41. Attended, National mobilization plan to main-×. tain co-prosperity sphere and to most now international in principle to withdraw troops from China but keep TRAFFIC MOBILIZATION TLAN

CABINET MEETING: 5 Sep 41. Decision to put land and sea traffic on war basis. . 217

cv

TRITARTITE LACT (Sec German-Japanese Relations)

Imperial Conferences: 10-26 Sep 4C. Matsucka's explanation of; will act under • • • 11 Liaison Conforences: c/a 30 Oct 41. Discussed cooperation Germany and Itay would give in view of war between America and Japan; advan-Irivy Council Meetings: 16 Sep 40. Discussed questions regarding danger of economic pressure from U.S. and preparation to be made for war 26 Sep 40. Investigation Committees approved Tripartite Cabinet Meetings: 5 Nov 40. Decision, new national policy for Greater East Asia and new world order with conclusion of, old economic system of free trade disintegrating and Japan to control occnemic production, manufacture and distribution of essential materials over all Greater East /sia. 204 2 Jul 41. 3rd KONOYE Cabinet to continue to be based on Fivo Ministers Conferences: Frotest because of German-Russian Non-Aggression TSUJI (Explainer) Trivy Council Meetings:

cvi

TSURADA, Osamu

Liaison Conferences: Imperial Conferences: 2 Jul 41. Attended. Adopted resolution re Japanese-:1) e . . 23 5 Nov 41, Attended Decided policy toward U.S., Enthann Cabinet Mostings: 1 Pos 41. Member of Liaison Conference responsible for Suproma War Council: 57 Jun 41. Attended. Discussed interneticity saturation UCHLDA, Yasaya (Foreign Minuster of Selle Gaba DECARERA UFB: (Explainer) Livy Council Meetirgs. 15, 19, 20 and 21 Oc: 42. Attended as Explainer the ustablishment of Greater Fast Asia Ministry. 149 UEMATSU (Explainer: Commodities Adjustments official in Commerce and Industry Ministry) Mivy Council Meetings: 16 Jun 41. Attended as Explainer. Approved Japanese-French Troaties for residence and navigation, trade and wriff UGAXI, Kazushige Liaison Conferences: UNITED STATES - JATANESE RELATIONS See Imerican-Japanese Relations

cvii

USAMI (Explainer)

Irivy Council Meetings:

15 and 19 Oct 42. Attended as Explainer -- the establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry.

LSHIO, Keinosuke (Education Ministry)

11

frivy Conneil Mootings:

75 Nov 36. Attended. Appreved Anti-Comintern Fact.
22 Feb 39. Attended. Agreed to participation of Hangary
and Manchuria in Anti-Comintern lact.
16 cap 40. Attended. Approved Tripartite Tack
18 Dec 40. Attended. Discussion re Hungary, Czochoshovakia,
and Romania joining Tripartite Lect ,
3 Jul /1. Attended. Ratified Franch-Japaners, Thsi-
Japaness protocols of Guarantee and Follinto
Understandurgs
8 Dec 41. Attended. Ravified feelaration of west against
America and Englands
10 Dec 41. Attended. Redified treaty against separate reace
between Germany, It ly and Japan
9 to 21 Oct 42, Attended. Organization of Greater Mast
Asia Ministry and 3 other rattors
18 Aug 43. Attended. Conclusion of treaty between Japan-
Thailand concerning Thai territory in Shan areas 134

WAKATSUKI, Reijiro (Frime Minister)

Cabinet Meetings: 19-20, 21-23 Sep 31, Attended. Discussed Mukden Incident. 161-1(2 161 162 Conference of Senice Statesmen: 17 Jul 40. Attended. Decided to recommend Koncye 252 2.1, 17 Oct 41. Attended. Approved Tojo to succeed Konoye . . . 255 27 Nov 41. Attended. Discussed war with U.S. 257 1 Dec 41. Attended. Discussed war with U.S. 259 17 Jul 44. Attended. Discussed resignation of Tojo Cabinet 261 18 Jul 44. Attended. Decided that Terauchi, Koiso or 263 20 Jul 44. Attended, Approved coalition cabinet of Kolso 264 5 Apr 45. Attended. Decided to recommend Suzuki to succeed Koiso 265

TAR INTALATIONS

ļ

r

<pre>Imperial Conference 2 Jul 41. Decided to prepare for war with U.S. and G.F p.12 5 Nov 41. Order issued by Nagano to Yamamoto re defense general operational preparations</pre>
Liaison Conferences: o'a 30 Nov 41. Complete plans for war with U.S.A
Irity Council Meetings: 20 Sep 40. Discussed war preparations when Tripartity Tact signed
 Cabiant Moetings: 2 Jul 41. Decided to secretly propare for wor against USUL, 213 26 Jul 40. Decided to increase arraments by economic control over promotic pressure and schrung then of essential materials. 12 Oct 41. Decided to complete war preparations with 13, 52 and Netherlands Fest Indies.
WE SHILLINTS
Cabinet Meetings: 16 Jan 38. Discussed new German policy with reference to China of stepping war shipments to,
WATAMAPE, Chifuyu (Justice Minister in Hamaguchi's Cabinot)
Cabinet Meatings: 19-23 Sep 31. Attended. Discussed Mukden Incident161-162
ULFARE CFFICE
Cebinot Meetings: 12 Sep 41. Formulated Work as Mobilization Flam to insure labor supply and increase production
WIKITS FOBILIZATION FLAN
Cabinet Meetings: 12 Sep 41. Decision to insure supply of law and to increase production

cix

÷

YAMADA (Explainer-Secretary, Greater Erst Asia Ministry)

> YAMADA, Otozo (Inspector General of 1997) Education)

Suprome War Council: 30 Jun 41. Attended. Discussed international structure of fill

YAMAGATA (Explainer)

Z.M.JI (Explainer)

Trive Council Monting: 6 Nov 37. Attended. Decided to allow Itay to join Acti-Commenn Fact.

> YAMAMOTO (Explainer, Director, Greater East Asia Pureau, Foreign Office)

> YAMAMOTO, Tatsuc (Home Minister in SAITO Cabinet)

Deceased.

≜.

YAMAMOTO, Teijiro (Minister of Agriculture in INEXAI Schinet)

Decrased

YAMACKA, Director of Military Affairs Bureau

YAMASKI, Tetsuncsuke (Agriculture and Forestry Minister, OKALA's Cabinet Irivy Council Meetings: 3 Jul 35. Attended. Approved Japanese-Manchukuc and the second sec · · · · YMZAKI (Explainer) Trivy Council Meetings: 21 Oct 42. Attended as explainer. Establishment cf YANACAWA, Heisuke (Vice Minister of war) Trivy Council Meetings: 13 Sor 32. Attended. approved signing Japan-Manchukuc 73 MAMAI (Explainer, Secretary of Foreign Office) Irivy Council Meeting: 13 Sep 32. Attended. Approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo 73 MANAKAWA, Feisuke (Frivy Counciller) Deceased YASHI, Eiji (Fons Minister on 2nd Koneye Cabinet) Frivy Council Meetings: 18 Dec 20. Attended. Discussion re Fungary, Czechoslovakia Cabinet Meetings: 26 Jul 40. Attended. Established Greater East Asie policy YEU Cobinet Meeting: 24 Oct 39. Decision, change from sterling to dollars 197

•• YAMASKI, Tetsunosuke (Agriculture and Forestry Minister, OKALA's Cabinet Irivy Council Meetings: 3 Jul 35. Attended. Approved Jaranese-Manchukuc - 81 L.M.ZAKI (Explainer) Trivy Council Meetings; 21 Oct 42. Attended as explainer. Establishment of YANACAWA, Heisuke (Vice Minister of war) frivy Council Meetings: 13 Ser 32. Attended. approved signing Japan-Manchukuc 73 MAMAI (Explainer, Secretary of Foreign Office) Irivy Council Meeting: 13 Sep 32. Attended. Approved signing of Japan-Manchukuo 73 YANAKATA, Feisuke (Trivy Councillor) Deceased YASUI, Eiji (Pons Minister on 2nd Koneye Cabinet) Frivy Council Meetings: 18 Dec 10. Attended. Discussion re Fungary, Czechoslovakia Cabinet Meetings: 26 Jul 40. Attended. Established Greater East Asie policy YEU Cobinet Meeting: 24 Oct 39. Decision, change from sterling to dollars 197

cxi

the second s

9

YON.I, Mitsumasu (Iremier)

Irivy Council Meeting: E Nov 37. Attended. Decided to allow Italy to join 95 2 Nov 38. Attended. lassed resolution to and cooperative relation with Loague of Mations 97 Cabinet Meetings: 11 Jul 37. Attended. Increase North China Army. 3 Mar 40. Attended. Economic policy to relieve 183 Japan of dependence on U.S. for materials. 198 Four Minister's Conforence: 20 Feb 37. attended. Decided Third Administration 235 16 Apr 37. Attended. Decided Flans for Guiding North 236 Indo-China should be conducted, but if unsuccessful 237 of Netherlands East Indies to be announced 240 Fivo Ministers Conferences: 25 Nov 38. Attended. Decided to cepture Hainan Island . . 245 6 May 39. Attended. Decided on compromise regarding a 248 concessions requested for a Tripartite Lact 250 12 Jul 40. Attended. Decided to push war preparations. . 251 Conferences of Sonier Statesmen: 17 Jul 41. Attended. Approved Keneye as trenter for 254 17 Oct 41. Attended. Spreved Toje to succeed Keneye . . 255 29 Nov 41. Attenaca. Discussed war with N.S..... 257 17 Jul 44. Attended. Discussed resignation of Tojc Cabinet.261 18 Jul 44. Attended. Decided that Terauchi, Koisc or 262 20 Jul 44. Attonded. Approved coalition Osbinet of 264 cxii

۲

YOSANO (Explainer)

Privy Council Meatings: 21 Nev 41. Attended to explain Anti-Comintern Fact. . . 142-3 203FUDA, Shigeru ("elfare Minister, Yonai's Gabinet) Trivy Council Meetings: Cabinet Meetings: 3 Mar 40. Attended. Tecnemic pelicy to relieve Japan MCSHIDA, Zenge (Navy Minister in Yonai Cabinet) Deceased YUSFINO, Shinji (Minister of Commerce and Industry, lst Konoye Cabiret) Trivy Council Mustings: 6 Nov 37. Attended. Decided to ellow Italy to join Anti-Comintern Fact. 94-5 Cobinet Meetings: 11 Jul 37. Attended. Increase North China Army. . . . 183 YOSFIZUMI (Chief of Frocurement and Mobilization Bureau) Military Service Bureau Conference: Apr 42. Attended. Decided that IOW's engage in forced labor..... 275 YUKAWA (Explainer) Trivy Council Mosting: 8 Jul 41. Attended to explain 2 protocols; France-Japan, and Thai-Japan on Guarantus and Volitical 13344

cxiii

r

exiv

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES

Although no authority can be found in the Constitution, laws or ordinances for the Gozen Knigi or Conference before the Throne, it has existed as an institution in the Jepanese Government for hundreds of years. It has continued to function as the organ for reconciling the conflicts arising from the division of authority in various spheres. Is a body it mests only under the gravest of conditions to determine matters of gravest policy. (681)

The membership of the conference in addition to the Enperor has varied both in size and in the nature of the membership. During 1920 and 1921, when five such conferences were held, the membership consisted of the Fremier, the President of the Privy Council the Nevy Minister, the Wer Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Army Staff and the Directors of the Military Affairs Section of the Army and the Naval Affairs Section. Occasionally other cabinet ministers at ended. (682)

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Such conferences did not meet at regular intervals but only at times of grave national importance. Some meetings were publicized and others have been kept secret. During the year praceding the outbreak of war on December 7, 1941, the conference met on petition for such meeting from the lieison conference. The interested parties would agree on a subject and plan which was presented to the liaison conference, which would in turn request a Conference before the Throne. Ordinarily, in practice, no formal decision was made at the time of the conference, but the concensus of the conference is made the formal decision of the Cebinet. (682)

- 1 -

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE (1931)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
188-C 188-E	late Dec.	2,234-5; 2,240	

Present

Decision

According to Araki, the Conference decided upon the occupation of the four provinces of Korea, Mukden, Heilungking and Jehol.

Remarks

ARAKI was asked, in an interrogation, certain questions and he gave the following answers:

"Q General, what I want to know now is -- after the decision of the Imperial Conference, how did you order the completion of the occupation of these four provinces?

"A We immediately decided to send the troops to Fengtien ` Province. The principal plan was made in the War Ministry's order to General Headquarters, and they took the procedure of sending the troops for operation.

"Q Who signed the order? Did you, General? The order to General Headquarters?

"A The principal plan approved by the conference as a matter of procedure I signed.

"Q General, can you recall what was in the order that you signed?

"A I don't remember.

"Q Would it be in the files of the War Ministry?

"A I don't know that. It was so long ago that I am not sure whether we could find the document or not.

"Q It was approved by the Emperor, was it not?

"A The Emperor knew about the plan, however, the order was issued by the Advisor, and as to the written order a document as old as ten years they would usually destroy." (2,240)

- 2 -

And at page 2,235:

"Q What was your answer in the preliminary meeting to their questions on the viclation of the Nine-Power Treaty?

"A I do not think this matter was discussed at the preliminary meeting.

"Q It was discussed at the Imperial Conference, was it not?

"A No, it was not discussed. The only subjects discussed were the area of occupation and the object of the occupation. The violation of the Nine-Pomer. Treaty might have been discussed at other Privy Council meetings but at this meeting the important question was the settlement of the affair." (2,235)

See Exhibit 188-C, c/a 17 December 1931, herein, for a reference to a cabinet meeting on the same subject matter, and the same Exhibit herein for a reference to a Frivy Council meeting on the same subject matter.

INPERIAL CONFERENCE (1938)

Record page

5302; 3623

Exhibit No.

Talana

Carr's Summar

463**-**A

11 January

60

Present

No names mentioned in Exhibit.

Date

Decision

Decided the basic policy of the disposition of the China Incident.

Remarks

Exhibit 463-A is an excerpt from a document "Document purporting to establish Provincial Government at Peiping and Restoration Government at Nanking." (5296) The Exhibit refers to an Imperial Conference of 11 January 1938, (5302) and states that "According to the 'Fundamental Principles to manage the Incident (a)' which was decided soon after the establishment of the Provisional Government at the Cabinet meeting, the Japanese Government will cooperate with the Nanking Government to save the situation if the Nanking Government reconsiders. However, if the Nanking Covernment does not reconsider and continues the so-called long-term resistance, Japan will not expect to negotiate with the Nanking Government in the future, and furthermore to meet the necessity to manage the vast areas occupied by the Japanese forces, henceforth Japan will take separate measures. (5301)"

•••••

"Based upon 'the basic policy on the disposition of the China Incident decided by the Imperial Conference met on the 11th of January 1938, our Government has set up its policy to the effect that as regards the Central Government, we reserve a right to negotiate with the old Nanking regime on the basis of the peace terms drawn up separately in case it nakes reflection, changes its mind and approaches us with sincerity, seeking peace: that, if on the contrary it makes no peace offer to us we drop our idea to seek a solution of the conflict through further negotiation with it; that we help create a new Chinese regime and cooperate with it to build up a new reform China by making an arrangement with it to regulate the relations between the two countries; that we on the other hand endeavor either to crush the old Nanking Regime or to get it merged into a new central regime." (5301-2)

INPERIAL CONFERENCE (1938)

Exhibit No.

Record page

5302; 3623

Carr's Surmar

60

463-A

ll January

Date

Present

No names mentioned in Exhibit.

Decision

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Exhibit 270 is "The Gist of the Talk by SATO, Kenyro" at the Contemporary Conference of Police Bureau Chiers in the Home Office August 25 to August 30, 1938 on the "Policy in dealing with the China Incident." (3612) SATC referred to the Imperial Conference of January 11, 1938 stating that it was called because China had failed to reply to the demands of Japan regarding the terms of the truce. I understand, he said, that "the Emperor had decided to go into a prolongel endurance war should the Chinese (not) give up." (3623)

Exhibit 463-A also sets forth the Hovement for Establishment of a new Government in Central China; (5303-5307) the Structure of the Rescoration Government and its Platform; (5308-5311) the Program for the direction of the Central China Administration; (5311-5314) and the Program for the Establishment of Central China New Regent in accordance with the program for the Administrative direction; (5315-5317).

See Exhibit 2260, herein, under Cabinet Mectings 1938 for the Cabinet decision on this matter. (16,223)

INPERIAL CONFERENCES (1940)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Summary55010 - 26 Sept.6328146

Present

(No names mentioned in Exhibit or Record)

Decision

(See Remarks).

Remarks

Exhibit 550 is MATSUOKA's explanation regarding the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact at an Imperial Conference that "must have been (held) between 10 September and 26 September, 1940."

His explanation was as follows: That he thought of strengthening Japan's relations with Germany and Italy at the time Germany conquered France and when "Britain, too, seemed to be easily concuered in less than a decade." (6331); that Germany's enthusiasm for cooperation with Japan was at a low ebb, but even if Germany and Italy could subjugate the British Isles the war for the destruction of the whole British Frpire would not be an easy matter (6331); that Germany and Italy would have to cope with America and the surviving parts of the British Empire and Soviet Russia (6331); that (at that time) Japan had the strength to tip the balance of the world as she liked (6322); that HITLER was aware of this; that, such being the case, he (WATSUCKA) thought it unnecessary to ask for German cooperation and decided "to postpone the negotiations until after the surrender of the British Isles, if he was obliged to do so, and that in that case he would take his own time" (6332); that "Japan must show the attitude that she would stand pat on her independent position, that she had no need to cope with Germany and Italy and she would join hands with America or even dare to save Britain, if it was necessary or convenient for her existence and mission." (6332)

He invited Ambassador OTT to tee on August 1 and told him that the time was not ripe for a strengthening of the Axis and that Japan intended to settle the China Incident by herself, which statement silenced the German Ambassador who had come to talk about mediation (6332); that he told OTT that Japan "was seriously determined to realize the ideal of hakko-ichiu (the whole world - one house), which was her traditional ideal since her foundation, and that he was going to try it first within the Greater Fast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (6333); that OTT agreed with him that, "Even though the British Isles might succumb it would only be the beginning of the collapse of the British Empire, and not the end." (6333)

He concluded his talk with OTT by asking him (1) "What attitude Germany was going to take regarding Japan's above mentioned realization of her ideal within the Greater East Asis Co-Prosperity Sphere, how Germany could assit Japan, whether Germany intended to assist Japan or not, what Germany desired within this sphere (6333); (2) What Germany thought about Soviet-Japanese relations, what Germany could do about the situation (6334); (3) What Germany thought about Japanese-American relations, what Germany could do about the situation." (6334) He recuested OTT to wire the above mentioned three items incediately to Fuehrer HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBELTROP for their answer (6334) but OTT was unwilling to do so. (6334)

In the meantime, continued MATSUOKA, RIBBENTROP "promoted Consul-General Heindrick STAHMER reportedly his right hand man in oriental problems to the post of Minister and ordered him to start from Berlin on August 23 and quickly come to Japan via Moscow" (6334); that he (MATSUOKA) met STAHMER and OTT at his private residence for the sake of secrecy and after three meetings agreed on a draft treaty similar to the draft submitted to the Imperial Conference. (6335)

MATSUOKA's explanation of the gist of the pact is as follows:

Japan would recognize and respect the leading position of Germany and Italy in the building of the New Order in Europe (6335). (MATSUOKA "thought that Germany would speak of the building of the new order in Africa, but the German Ambassador did not speak of it, so this iter was confined to the recognition of the position of Germany and Italy in Europe.") (6335); that "Greater East Asia" reans "for the present, French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Strait Settlement, and such Oceanic Islands as NEI, New Guinea, New Caledonia and C; that it did not "at present contain Australia, New Zealand and (areas) to the South" although it would gradually extend itself with time; (6336) that he did not refer to India; that the German Ambassador said that "ermany recognized Japan's political leadership in Greater East Asia but "that Germany might be given as many facilities as possible in the econoric field, in trade, enterprise and acquirement of materials," (6336) to which l'ATSUOKA responded that Japan also

- 7 -

expected the cooperation of Germany and Italy in the economic exploitation of that area. (6336)

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MATS"OKA then explained that Article 3 of the proposed draft contained the words "in case one of the three powers is (publicly or secretly) attacked" (6330) and that "one power" as used in Article 3 referred implicitly and chiefly to America (6336); that the words "publicly and secretly" were inserted by Germany but ST. AHTER and OTT agreed to stri out the expression and wired RIEDEFT'HOP for instructions (" 1 that such words, being difficult to interpret correctly, he asked ST AHMER what was meant by such words and ST AHMER replice that "what America had done up to that tire did not core within the meaning of the expression," (6337) as the expression referred to "such cases as America's using i portant British bases in the Pacific under a secret Anglo-Averian Treaty, or the American Fleet directly entering Singapore" (6337) that, as regards Germany and Italy, the expression "probably meant such cases as Britain allowing America to occupy nore strategic British bases in a region near the European battlefield, for example, in the Mediterrean Sea" (6337); that the interpretation of such an expression was to be left for decision by consultation among the Three Powers. (6337) Note: The Tripartite Pact as ratified did not contain the words "secretly attrck" - see Exhibit 43 for the Tripartite Allianc . (6391)

Regarding the U.S.S.R., MATSUOKA explained that the Poet stipulates that it is not directed against Russia, (6339) because "he felt that there was noom for coubt if the words "One Power" did not apply to the Soviet Russia and that it is made clear that the Pact in no way affects the existing agreements, views or situation between the U.S.S.R. and Germany regarding Polend and other European countries. (6339)

FATSPOKA also said that he wanted to draw up notes annexed to the Pact stipulating that "after the conclusion of this Pact, joint military and economic corrittees shall be formed immediately in Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, which shall study dotailed arrangements regarding the carrying out of this prot, based upon its purport, and that agreed arrangements shall be submitted to the government for approval" (6340).

MATSUOKA thought that Germany would promise to supply Japan with war motorials and technique, and, at her request, technicians and other personnel. (6340) Germany would also promise to help us to acquire oil from the U.S.S.R. and other countries. (6340) Japan, on her part, would promise if grany to supply raw materials, foodstufis and other necessaries of life, and technique, if she were able to do so. (6340) MATSNOKA then concluded his explanation saying that "Germany wants to prevent America's entry into the war and, Japanes-American conflict"; (6341) that, judging from recent movements, America "may now be trying to accuire strong military bases, in great numbers and in a hurry, within important British possessions in Australia, New Zealand, India and Burma and other regions and may be preparing a battle array for encircling Japan." (6342) "There is some reason to suppose," he said, "that America, considering that Japan has suffered greatly through war of attrition in the China Incident, and that her strength has suffered remarkable decrease may, use intimidating language" (6342); that "Japan-American relations now leave little room for improvement through courtesy or desire for friendship" (6342); and so "there is nothing left for us to do but to stand firm" and "cope with America by firmly joining hands with as many countries as possible, to back up our firm attitude, and by making the fact known at hore and abrood as cuickly as possible." (6343)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCES (1941)

Exhibit No.	<u>Dr te</u>	Rccord page	Carr's Surrary
588 779 1107 1110-A	2 July " "	6,566; 10,145 7,904 10,140-1 10,151-2	219 219 219

Present

KONOYE, Prime Minister MATSUCKA, Foreign Minister TOJO, War Minister OIKAWA, Navy Minister KAWADA, Finance Minister SUZUKI, President of Flanning Board HIRANUMA, Home Minister SUGIYAMA, Chief of Army General Staff NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Staff TOMITA, Chief Secretary of Cabinet OKA, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry TSUKADA, Vice Chief of Army General Staff KONDO, Vice Chief of Navy General Staff HARA, President of Privy Council

Decision

Resolutions concerning Japanese-American negotiations were adopted.

Rem^rrks

Prosecution's Document 1652 consists of four resolutions including the resolution adopted at the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941. It was presented to show that, with the Soviet Union involved in war with Germany, Japan grasped the opportunity immediately to execute her plan of military aggression in the south, which all hazards she was determined to pursue. (Introductory Remarks 6566)

Exhibits 588, 779, 1107, 1135 and 1110 refer to the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941.

Exhibit 588, "Resolution Adopted Through the Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941" contains "a summary of the Empire's policy according to the changes in situation". (6567) It was determined that, "regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and accordingly contribute to the establisheert of world price" (6567); that "Japan will continue the disposition of the Chira Incident and will step up the southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self defense" and "the Morthern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situation". (6567) "Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose. (6567)

A surrary of the Empire's policy decided at this conference is as follows: (This Exhibit also appears in the ! Record at p. 10,146)

"a. In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Pagice, further pressure through the South in regions will be similar thered to the changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chunking Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the energy concessions in China. (6567)

"b. For the sake of her self-existence and sel -differse Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also and the other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand following the 'Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand,' and 'Matters concerning the Promotion of our Southern Policy,' thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will not hesitate to have a war with Britain and the United States. (6568)

"c. Though the spirit of the Tripartile Axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing area against the Soviet Union. (W.B.:-This paragraph read by Russian Section - see record p. 7904)

"d. In the accomplishment of the above, all mensures, especially in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States. (6508

"e. We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the War through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan will set according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently. (6568) It was determined that, "regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' and accordingly contribute to the establishment of world pince" (6567); that "Japan will continue the disposition of the Chira Incident and will step up the southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self defense" and "the Morthern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situation". (6567) "Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose. (6567)

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"e. We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the War through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan Will set according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently. (6568) "f. We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense. (6569)

"g. As to the dolf it monumes up shall decide separately." (6569)

Exhibit 1107 shows that the bove-mentioned individuals were present in the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941.

Exhibit 1108 is an extract from KIDO's Diary stating that the Conference was held and that it decided to "cope with the new situation accorpanying the outbreak of the Russo-Gerran War." (10,144)

Exhibit 1110-A is an extract from the interrogation of TOJO of 13 February 1946 to the effect that TOJO, as Finister of War, called the first Imperial Conference of July, 1941.

"Q who reduested this Imporial Conference of July 1941?

"A Since the problem of stationing troops in southern French Indo-China was the principal problem, it may have been the War Minister, I believe.

"Q Do you not recall whether or not you called this meeting? You were War Minister.

"A Actually, I think I probably reducated it. However, things were decided usually at the Liaison Conference where they were decided practically by common consent. You asked me who reducated this conference and I cannot answer because usually the War Minister, the Navy Minister, Foreign Minister and the Premier got together and agreed on a subject. Then the actual drafting of the plan was left to the three seer taries, to whom I have referred in previous interviews. The plan was then presented to the Liaison Conference from which the decision to request an Imperial Conference might come. Just now you looked very solemn when you asked me the question of who called the conference. It was called by the process I have described, but the responsibility in connection with the revenue of troops into southern Indo-China was my remonsibility as War Minister. It is distasteful to me to try bo avoid responsibility." (10;151-2)

- 12 -

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE. (1941)

Exhibit No.	Drte	Record page	Carr's Summary
1135	6 September	10,215	241
1107 588	11	10,216	
1136-A	11	10,217 10,220	
1137-A 1148	\$1	10,221	***
1148	H	10,252	

<u>Present</u>

KONOYE, Prime Minister TOYODA, Foreign Minister TOJO, War Minister OIKAWA, Navy Minister OGURA, Finance Minister SUZUKI, President of the Planning Borrd TANABE, Hore Minister SUGIYAMA, Chief of Army General Staff NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Stoff TO"ITA, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet NUTO, Director of Military Affairs Bureau - War Ministry n n Ħ OKA 11 11 Navy " TSUKADA, Vice Chief of Army General Staff ITO, Vice Chief of Navel General Staff HARÁ, President of Privy Council

<u>Decision</u>

The Imperial Conference of 6 September 1940 adopted resolutions concerning the Japanese-American negotiations.

Remarks

Exhibit 1135 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of 6 September 1941 stating that on 6 September 1941 he visited the Emperor in response to an Imperial summons. (10215) The Emperor told KIDO that he would like to ask some questions at the Conference. KIDO said that he advised his to give only a warning that "the Supreme War Command should exert every effort in order to bring about a diplomatic success inasruch as the present decision was such an important one that it might load to a war in which our national fortunes would be stalled." (102°6) KIDO also stated that the Supreme War Command did not answer the questions put by President HARA of the Privy Council concerning diplomatic moves. (10,216) At the close of the maeting,

- 13 -

the Emperor, stated KIDO, declared "it was regrettable that the Supreme War Cormand did not give any reply." (10,216) (The questions asked are not in the Exhibit)

Exhibit 1107 contains the names of those who attended the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941 as set forth above. (10216)

Exhibit 588 contains, inter alia, the resolution adopted through the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, the following portion of which was read in evidence: (10217)

"Resolution adopted through the Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941.

"Summary. Execution of the Empire's policy.

"In view of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assured; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the suppression of our national power; Japan will execute her Southern advance policy, related in the 'principl' of Japan's Policy According to the Change of Situations,' as follows: A BURNER TO

"a. In order to secure self-existence and self-defense, Japan, with a determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands), will have completed her preparations by the end of October. (10,218).

"b. Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillrent of her derands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Fritain. (10,218)

"The minimum matters of der and to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain) and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet. (10,218)

"c. If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October we shall immediately determine to wage war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands). (10,218)

"All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavor to check the formation of a Russo-American combined force against Japan." (10,218) (The second paragraph of "b" of Exhibit 538 above-mentioned refers to the "Limit Japan is able to come to an Agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet". (10218) This Limit is found in Exhibit 538 with contains on "Astended Document," S ction II of which is as f llows: (Page 5 of Exhibit 588)

"Sect. II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement.

If the United States and Britain will consert to our depends in Section I: (See p. 3 of Exhibit [])

(1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China.

(2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an importial peace will have been established in the Far East.

(3) Jepon will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

(NOTE)

•

a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's execution of her oblightions to the Axis Agreement. We shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Fact or the attitude of the United States toward the Eurogean Jar.

<u>b</u> In case of an interrogation as to Japan's actitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrelity Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria.") (P. 5 "Attached Document" Exhibit 588)

Exhibit 1136-A is an excerpt from the interrogation of TOJO of 23 February 1946:

"Q For what purpose was the Imperial Conference of 6 September called?

"A It was called to decide the question of what notional policy should be adopted in view of the situation at that the is I recall, the main question was that of war or provide what attitude should be decided upon in either case.

- 15 -

"Q At this conference, it was decided to continue negotiations with America and hope for a break by the middle ten days of October, was it not?

"A Yes, of course I think so, but I have no meterials here and it is difficult for me to make categorical statements.

"Q It was also decided that if the break did not core by the middle ten days of October that war would be undertaken against America?

"A It was decided to plan for a break by the middle ten days of October. The decision for war was not made at this conference." (10,220-1)

Exhibit 1137-A is an excerpt from the interrogation of TOJO of 11 March 1946:

"Q It is not true, that, during the period between 6 September 1941 and 10-20 October 1941, preparations for war were pushed?

"A As I said before, at that conference which doilt with peace or wor, it was decided that both peace preparations and war preparations would be pushed. (Read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness). It was only after that decision that preparations were pushed." (10,221)

Exhibit 1153-A is an excerpt from TOJO's interrogation of 11 February 1946:

"Did you feel, at the time the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941, that war should be declared against the United States and the other three nations?

"A At that time I felt, as War Hinister, that the opportune time for fighting was in danger of being lost and the Imperial Conference (N.B. 6 September 1941) had set the middle ten days of October as the limit for writing for a favorable diplomatic break." (10,289-10,290)

Exhibit 1148 is Premier KONOYE's own account of his resignation of his cabinet. Regarding the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, he said "Recently the negotiation reached a state of temporary dendlock due to the occupation of French Indo-China by our troops, but as it became known that we wouldn't go any further, the situation eased somewhat and the negotiation was again resured. Hence, a message was sent to President Roosevelt on August 28 proposing

- 16 -

a conference. Movertheless, since President Repsevelt, in reply to this, stated that he was willing to hold a conference, but would like to have a general agreement reached in regard to the important matters, at least, as a premise, an Imperial Conference was hold on September 6 to determine the basis of the counter-measure for this.

"As a result of the Imperial Conference, it was decided to direct all our efforts toward the diplometic negotiation to the end, but to resolutely assume a war policy in the event no means for the conclusion of the negotiation is reached by early October." (10,251-2)

See Exhibit 2250 (Pros. Doc. 2-A) for an extract from KIDO's Diary dated November, 1941 regarding, inter alia, "The Decision of the Council in the Imperial Presence on September 6 and the Developments later." (16200) This Exhibit contains a more complete account of this Conference and its results. KIDO said that he told OIKAWA and TOJO on orders from the Emperor that "it is the Emperor's wishes that, in deciding the fundamental national policy, it is necessary to investigate the domestic and foreign affairs more broadly and to carry out an earnest study of things without being bound by the decision of the Council in the Imperial Presence of September 6) Communicate this to you by Imperial order." (16210). KIDO reported that by this order "the decision of the Council in the Imperial Presence of September 6 was completely withdrawn!" (16210)

IUPLRI/L CONTERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
1107 1163 1168 1169 1170 1176	5 Noverber " " " "	10,332 10,316 10,332 10,333 10,343 10,343 10,373 <u>Present</u>	260 259 262 260 262

TOJO, Prime Minister and War Minister, concurrently TOGO, Foreign Minister SHIMADA, Mavy Minister KAYA, Finance Minister SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board SUGIYAMA, Chief of the Army General Staff NAGANO, Chief of Neval General Staff HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of Cabinet MUTO, Director of Military 'ffeirs Bureau, War Ministry OKA, 11 11 11 11 Navy TSUKADA, Vice Chief of Army General Staff ITO, Vice Chief of Naval General Staff HARA, President of Privy Council

Decision

Decided the policy towards the United States, England and the Netherlands.

Perris

On November 5, 1941, there was held a most important Imperial Conference.

Exhibit 1168 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of November 5, 1941 which states that "the Council in the presence of the Emperor was held at 10:30 a.m. and continued until 3:10 p.m. and a policy towards the U.S.A., England, and the Netherlands was decided. At 3:40 p.m. Fremier TOJO visited me to inform me of such matters as the formation of the Southern Army and the dispatch of Fr. KURUSU to the U.S.A. Mr. HIROSE visited me at 7 p.m."

- 18 -

Exhibit 1163 is a telegram from TOGO to NONURA dated 2 November 1941 showing that this conference was held. The telegrom stated that "Since the formation of the new Cabinet, the Government has been holding conferences for a number of days with the Imperial Headquarters. We have carefully considered and discussed a fundamental policy for the improvement of relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision at the meeting in the presence of the Emperor, on the morning of the 5th, and will let you know the result immediately. This will be our government's last effort to improve diplometic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, every aspect of the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is to be strictly kept only for your information. Now we trust your most prudent attitude towards handling everything before we take up the negotiations once more in the very norr future." (10316)

Exhibit 1107 contains the names of those who attended this Conference as set forth above. (10,332)

Exhibits 1169 and 878 refer to a document entitled "Measures Towards Foreign Countries in Relation to the 'Principle of Execution of National Policy of the Empire' which was Decided at the Meeting in the Presence of the Emperor on November 5." (10,333) This document is divided into six parts:

1. <u>Measures Towards Germany and Italy.</u>

When the Japanese-American negotiations end and warfare is inevitable, "after November 25 probably" (10,333) we will inform Germany that "Japan has an intention to open hostilities against the United States and Britain before long as soon as the preparation will be completed and being a part of the preparation, we negotiate on the following items: (10334)

"A. Germany's (Italy's) participation in the war against the U.S.A.

"B. Non-separate peace making.

"Note: In case when Germany demands Japan's participation in the war against Soviet, we answer Japan cannot do it for the present. Even if the Germany's participation in the war, because of it, would be postponed, it cannot be helped.

II. Towards Britain.

"We take measures previously so as to get Britain to accept and to cooperate positively the subjects concerned to

- 19 -

Britain in the understanding which is the fruit of the negotiation with America. We will not adopt any other diplocatic schemes purposely to keep the intention in secret. (10334)

IJI. Towards Dutch Indies.

"In order to hide and canouflage our intention, we shall open the diplomatic negatiation at the earliest opportunity with her one by one, after the manner of continuing the former negotiation, principally aiming at the supply of necessary materials for the Empire. (10334)

IV. Towards the Soviet Union.

"We continue the negotiations founded on the clause No. 1 of the 'Principle of negotiation with the Soviet Union' decided at the Jiaison Conference between the Government and the Imperial Hendquarters on August 4, 1941." (10,334-5)

V. Towards Thailand.

Just before dispatching troops, Japan will request from Thailand the following: Passage of and facilities for Japanese military forces (even if she does not consent to it) and the conclusion of a joint defense Pact. (10335)

Soon ofter the dispatch of troops Japan will make arrangements regarding the following iters: (10336)

"1. Concerning the passage and occupation of the Japanese forces.

"2. Offiring for the use of the Japanese forces new construction and strengthening of the military establishments.

"3. To furnish the necessary communication and transportation measure and factory establishments.

"4. Billets and supplies for the rilitory forces passing and stationing.

"5. To give a loan for the necessary military expenses.

"Note: In order to rake those negotiations favorable, at the negotiation of Iter Nos. 1 and 2, we will promise to respect her sovereignty and territory and, further, we will suggest in the effect that 'according to her attitude, we will consider to give a portion of Burra or Malay to her in the future.' (10,336)

- 20 -

VI. Mersures Towards (1300)

A. The armed forces of the United States and Britada will be cleared out of China. (10,337)

B. Hostile concessions in China, including the Polity Legation area, as well as important rights and interests, (customs, mines, etc.) of the hostile countries will be secured under Japan's power, materially. (10,337)

C. The commencement of these mensures shall be postponed until after we open the war against the United States and Great Britain, for the purpose of not exposing our intention. (10,337)

"D. The motion of belligement mights against Chungking shall not be taken in such a special manner as to declare it, but we shall gain its meal effect materially by beginning wor against the U.S. and Britain. (10,337)

"E. Even hostile countries' rights and interest which are concerned with the National Government shall be secured under our power, for the present, according to our necessity, and measures to arrange their interests shall be taken on another occasion. (10,337)

"F. Through reasures to induce and eccelerate as strong as possible the activities of influence of the Chinese in the occupied area, and endervoring to gain the people's feeling in cooperating with Japan and China. We will realize gradually partial peace, district by district, beginning from the possible area. (10,338)

"G. As for the economical relations to China we attach importance in gaining goods from the unoccupied area and we adjust reasonably the existing various controls." (10,338)

The Exhibit also contains the "Principle of Acceleration of Termination of the War against the USA, Britain and Holland and CHIANG." (10,338) According to this principle, Japan will conclude an arrangement with Germany and Italy not to cease war individually (10,338); she shall assist in making peace between Germany and the Soviet, according to results of talks between Germany and Japan and will "take mersures so as to help the Soviet to advance to the direction of India and Persia" (10,339); the Burmese and Hongkong CHIANG-supported route shall be cut and the concessions for China shall be restored (10,339); Japan shall "admit the Philippines' independence after our occupation" (10,339); a portion of the Dutch East Indies shall become independent and Japan shall "secure the necessary portions for the Empire" (10,339); Japan "shall make Burna independent and stimulate and assist the independence rovement of India" (10,339); Japan shall support the restoration of Thailand's lost territory from Britain. (10,339) We shall "make it clearly known that we shall be ready to secure impartial supply of tin and rubber in the South Sec region" (10,340); that it is impractical and ineffective to utilize Americans of German descent in order to make the public opinion of America disunited as was shown in the example of a former World Mar (10,340); Japan cannot expect much in maneuver towards Central and South America. (10,340) (For same see Exh. 1176-10,373)

Exhibit 1170 is a telegram from TOPO to NOMURA dated 5 November 1941 concerning the counter-proposal of Japan which was discussed at the Imporial Conference of 5 November 1941 and approved. NOMURA was instructed to begin talks. (10,343)

Exhibit 1171 is also a telegram from TOGO to NOMURA dated November 5, 1941 stating that "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only." (10,346).

On November 5, the same date on which the deadline was set as November 25 and on the same date that the Imperial Conference was hold, the defendant NAGANO issued the first order which caused the Pearl Harbor attack plan to be put into execution. (Introductory Remarks 10,346)

Exhibit 809 is the order dated 5 November 1941 issued by NAGLNO to YLMAMOTO stated that; A. Because it is forred that war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first part of December. (10,347)

"B. The Commander-in-Chief Combined Floet will carry out the necessary operational preparations. (10,347)

"C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff." (10,347)

- 22 -

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Record page	Carr's Summary
588 1107 1204 1153-A 1207-A 1210	l December " " " "	10,519 10,518 10,494 10,289;10,522 10,510 10,523	277 277 277

<u>Presen</u>t

TOJO, Prime Minister and War Minister, concurrently TOGO, Foreign Minister SHIMADA, Navy Minister KAYA, Finance Minister SUZUKI, President of Planning Board IWANURA, Justice Minister HASHIDA, Education Minister INO, Agriculture Minister KISHI, Commerce Minister TERAJIMA, Communication Minister KOIZUMI, Welfare Minister SUGIYAMA, Chief of Army General Staff NAGANO, Chief of Navy General Staff HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of Cabinet MUTO, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry OKA, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry TANABE, Vice Chief of Navy General Staff HORA, President of Privy Council

Decision

It was decided that Japan would declare war on the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.

Remarks

Exhibit 1107 contains the names of those who attended this Conference as set forth above.

Exhibit 1204 is TOJO's Interrogation of 19 February 1946. He stated "that the whole Cabinet attended the Imperial Conference on the first or second which made the decision for war." (10,494)

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- 23 -

Exhibit 1153-A is an excerpt from TOMORS interrogation of 8 February 1946. He said that he presided at this conference as Prime Minister and explained the purpose of the meeting, after which "each of the ministers and the few Chiefs of Staff discussed the question from the standpoint of his own responsibility." (10,522)

Exhibit 1207-A is an extract from TOJO's interrogation of 11 March 1946 containing the admission that "December 1 was the date of the Imperial Conference at which the decision for war was made." (10,510)

Exhibit 121° is an extract from KIDO's Diary of 1 December 1941 stating that "At 2 p.m. the Council in the presence of the Emperor was held and at last the war between Japan and the United States was decided upon. At 4:30 p.m. the Premier visited me to consult about the Imperial Proclamation of war." (10,523)

Exhibit 588 is the resolution adopted through the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941 and is as follows: "Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5 have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain and the Netherlands." (10,519)

Exhibit 1216 is a telegram from Togo to Numura dated 6 December 1941 stating that "the government has given careful deliberation in the Imperial presence to the proposal of the U.S. of the 26th of Nov. and has decided upon the memorandum to America (in English) as per telegram No. 902" (10534) This Exhibit shows the detailed steps which were taken by the Japanese Government in connection with transmitting its final note to the United States.

IMPERIAL CONFERINCE (1943)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record pase	Cerr's Campry
1344	31 May	17992	-

Fresent

attendence not stated.

Decision

"Then, at the Imperial Conference of 31 May $19b_{\odot}$, it was decided to make it their policy to incorporate the East Indies eress into Japanuse territory, and to allow the participation in politics of native inhebitants according to their abilities." (17992)

It was also decided not to ennounce this reversion plan so that the allied Powers might not take advantage of it for propagande purposes. # (17992)

Remarks

Exhibit 1344 is entitled "Course of Events Leading Up to Dicisions on Political Control and Peversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." The part of the Exhibit read in evidence does not contain a reference to this Conference.

The Exhibit states (p.2) that "At the time of this decision Prime Minister TOJC was rather in favour of independence and the Foreign Ministry also supported the plan, but the Supreme Command maintained strong opposition, as mentioned above; while others again, took the stand that once independence was granted, Japan, for the sake of her personal honour would have to respect the independence to the last, and would be in a difficult position when negotiation, peace, etc., came one lay to be considered, and that for this reason the status que should be maintained. Territorial incorporation was thus finally decided on."

It also states that (p.1 of exhibit) "The government at home, too, had no alternative but the extreme policy of brinking the Datch Indies under Japan's direct control and checking the policy of racial liberation, in order to secure the resources necessary for the execution of the war. For this reason, the Supreme Command emphasized its strong opposition to the independence of the East Indies."

See Exhibits 1344 nd 1350 and DeWeerd, herein, under Supreme Wer Plans Council (1945) for further information on this subject. (12,115; 12,121; 12,236)

ı İ

IMPERIAL CONTEPI SCT (1943)

Exhibit No.DateRecord paseCerr's Sumpry134431 May17992-

Fresent

attendence not statei.

Decision

"Then, at the Imperial Conference of 31 May $15E_{\odot}$, it was decided to make it their policy to incorporate the East Indies erees into Japanuse territory, and to allow the participation in politics of native inhabitants according to their abilities." (17992)

It was also decided not to announce this reversion plan so that the allied Powers night not take advantage of it for propagende purposes. * (17992)

Remarks

Exhibit 1344 is entitled "Course of Events Leading Up to Dicisions on Politicel Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." The part of the Exhibit real in evidence does not contain a reference to this Conforance.

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See Exhibits 1344 and 1350 and DeWeard, herein, under Supreme War Plans Council (1945) for further information on this subject. (12,115; 12,121; 12,236) During the cross-examination of YANAMOTO, he admitted that the decision of the Imperial Conference had been communicated to the Ministry of which he was Vice Minister. (Ministry for Greater East Asiatic Affairs) (17,993)

KIDO's Diary contains an entry dated May 31, 1943 that "the council in the presence of the Emperor was opened and decided on the gist of the guiding principle on the subjugetion of Greater East asia."

See Exhibit 1344, herein, under herding of Lisison Conference, 1943, for reference to a Liaison Conference decision on this metter. (Fage 1 of exhibit - not read in evidence.)

LIAISON CONFERENCES

With the intensification of the situation following the cutbreak of the China Var in 1937, the need for a device to coordinate the activities of the ministers of state and the high command in their overlapping spheres of authority became readily apparent. Several devices were set up to meet this need. First the "Four Minister" meeting of the premier, war, navy and foreign ministers was established. Later the finance minister was added to this group making a "Five Minister" Conference. In these rectings the views of the Supreme Command were transmitted through the war and navy ministers. However the situation developed in such a manner that the Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that this method of working through the war and nevy ministers was unsatisfactory and the listson conference plan was adopted to adjust the difference between the civil government and the high command. (679-680)

This group which net more or less regularly, consisted of the premier, foreign minister, war minister, navy minister home (?finarce) minister, chiefs of staff, vice chiefs of staff and the directors of the military affairs and naval affairs bureaus. In addition at times, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board and the Chief Cabinet Secretary attended. (680)

Inastuch as the personnel of these meetings was, with the exception of the Emperor, practically identical with the personnel of the Conference before the Throne, and since liaison conferences always preceded Conferences before the Throne, the decisions reached in the liaison conference were of the utmost importance in relation to the decisions of the more formal conference. (680)

LIAISON COMPERENCES (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Carr's Summary
1310	27 July	11,794	1.33

Pre sent

The Exhibit does not set forth the Attendence.

<u>Decision</u>

Decided the "Gist of Main Points in Regard to Dealing with the Situation to Meet the Carnee in World Condition".

Remarks

On 27 July, at a Liaison Conference decisions were mede concerning policies to improve conditions at home and abroad. A swift settlement of the Chine Incident and the settlement of the southern problem within limits so as not to cause a war against a third power were two policies decided upon. While fostering relations with the Axis, it was decided to adjust diplomatic relations towards the USSP, maintain firm diplomatic front with the United States and to strengthen the diplomatic policy towards the Netherlands East Indies to obtain important raw materials. (11. 794).

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Carr's Summary
541	19 Sept.	6,307	144

Decision

The Liaison Conference of 19 September 1940 decided to strengthen the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis.

Renarks

On 19 September discussion was held concerning the strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis. (6271-6307)

It was decided that the three countries would cooperate by all possible means for the construction of the respective new orders and that "Japan should be resolved, if need be, to take any action, including recourse to armed force" (6309); because, "unless we are resolved on the employment of armed force, it will be impossible for us to carry on any useful talks with Germany" (6309).

The basic principles concerning negotiations for a Military Alliance (631C) and for close economic cooperation were determined (6311). An understanding was to "be reached with respect to consultation or to the action to be taken in the event of a danger of either Japan or Germany or Italy entering upon a state of war with the Soviet Union, if, in the course of negotiations with Germany and Italy, it turns out that such desire is entertained by the two countries" (6311); the three countries would cooperate "in order not to allow the United States to interfere in regions other than the Western Hemisphere and the United States possessions" (6311).

Regarding the China Incident, Japan would neet the desires of Germany and Italy regarding the acquisition of natural and material resources existing in East Asia, including the South Seas, and would cooperate "in intensifying the pressure upon British influences in East Asia, including the South Seas; and in facilitating the prosecution of war by Germany and Italy against Britain" (6313). On the other hand, Germany and Italy would cooperate regarding the supply of such machinery and similar articles, and in regard to such technical assistance as may be desired by Japan; (6313) they would give as much political and economic cooperation as possible in the settlement of the China Incident (6313).

- 29 -

Japan's sphere to be envisaged in the course of acgotiations was to comprise:

"The former German Islands under Mandate, French Indo-China and Pacific Islands, Thailand, British Halaya, British Borneo, Dutch East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, India, etc., with Japan, Manchuria and China as the backbonc." (6314)

"It is understood, however, that the South Seas Region to be indicated by Japan in conducting the negotiations with Germany and Italy will be the region from Burma costward, including the Dutch East Indies, and New Caledonia northward. It is further understood that India may be recognized, for the immediate purposes as being included in the Sphere of Living of the Soviet Union". (6315)

Concerning Japan's attitude toward Japan-Germany-Italy cooperation in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States, the basic aim was stated as follows: "Being destined to be the leader of East Asia in the postwar new order of things wherein it is anticipated that the world will be divided into the four large fields of East Asia, the Soviet Union, Europe and the American Continent, Japan, acting in close collaboration with Germany and Italy which will constitute the guiding force of Europe, will

"a. Restrain the Sovict Union on the east, west and south, and, inducing the Soviet Union so to act as to align with the common ground of Japan. Germany and Italy, endeavor to cause the advance of the Soviet sphere of influence to be oriented toward a direction where the advance has little direct effect upon the interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, a direction such as the Gulf of Persia (it being also possible that, in case of need, Soviet advance toward India may have to be recognized); and,

"b. While peaceful means will be adhered to as far as possible in dealing with the United States, contrive to bring about a posture of things wherein Japan can, as occasion may require, bring pressure to bear upon the United States through political and economic collaboration with Germany and Italy in the East Asian and European fields, so that such posture of things can contribute toward the attainment of Japan's aspirations.

"In taking these steps, Japan will keep it in mind to make the best of inducing the Soviet Union". (6316-6317)

- 30 -

Concerning the possible use of armed force against - "tain and the United States, Japan will make decisions independently in accordance with the following principles:

"(1) In the event that the China Incident has nearly been settled, Japan will use armed force by taking as favorable on opportunity, as may be afforded by the siturtion prevailing at home and abrord.

"(2) In the event that the China Incident has not yet been settled, it will be Japan's guiding principle to take action within limits short of war. If, however, domestic and foreign conditions take a decidedly favorable turn, or if it is deemed that, irrespective of whether our preparations are complete or not, the development of the international situation permits of no further delay, Japan will resort to armed force.

"(3) The 'domestic and foreign conditions' signify the European situation, especially the state of adjustment of our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States' attitude toward us, our preparations for war, and so forth, as well as the state of disposal of the China Incident. (6319-6320).

LIAISON CONFERENCES (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Carr's Summary
1103	13 Jan	10,057	169
1103	16-17-18 Jan	10,057	170
1.103	23 Jan	10,057	172
1103	30 Jar	10,057	173
1103	3 Feb	10,057	174
1103	13 Feb	10,057	178
1103	20 Feb	10,057	1 <u>9</u> C
1103	23 Feb	10,057	121
1103	2 Mar	10,057	184
1103	6-7 Mar	10,057	185
1103	il Mar	10,057	186
1103	10 April	10,057	198
1103	17 April	10,057]09
1103	3 May 8 May	10,057	500
1103		10.057	201
1103	12 May	10,057	202
1103	15 May	10,057	203
1103	22 May	10,057	204
1103	29_May	10,057	206
1103	6 June	10,057	209
1103	11,12 June	10,057	211
1103	23 June	10,057	216
1103	26,27,28 "	10,057	217
1103	30 June	10,057	218
1103	21 July	10,064	<i>></i> 29

Present

Exhibit 1103 (R-10,057-10,063), an abstract by the Foreign Office from news items in Asahi, refers to Liaison Conferences held between 13 January and 21 July 1941.

The Exhibit does not contain the names of those who attended the conference of 21 July 1941. With this exception, the following attended all conferences as noted below:

KONOYE Tojo	Attended	all "	meetings	3
SUGIYAMA	11	11	11	except that of 16 January.
TOMIDA	t1	11	11	" those of 16,17,19,23 of
MUTO	st	11	17	January; 20,23 of February. except those of 16,17,19,23 of
OKA	**	11	11	January. except those of 16,17,19,23 of
HIRANUMA	tr tr	st	rt	January; 2,6,7,11 of March. except those of 13 January and
MATSUOKA	11	ſt	it	22 May. except that of 11 April.

- 32 -

OIKAWA	Attended	all reetings,
KONDO	11	" except those from 10 April to
		25 June incl.
NAGANO	H 11	" " except those from 13 January
		to 11 March incl.
ANAMI	11	the meeting of 13 January.
TSUKADA	11	meetings of 6, 26, 27, 28, 30 June.
TANAYA	11	" meeting of 13 January.
TOYODA	17	" " <u>13</u> January,
UGAKI	11	
OHASHI	**	" meetings of 10, 11 April; 26, 27 June
SAKAMOTO	(Dir, of	Euro-Asiatic Bureau, Foreign Ministry)
		the meeting of 28 June,

According to Exhibit 1119-A, an extract from TOJO's interrogation of 15 March 1946, these who normally attended the Liaison Conferences subsequent to 21 July 1941 were:

"The ones who normally had this right were, on the cabinet side, the Premier, Foreign Minister, the War Minister, the Navy Minister the President of the Cabinet Planning Board. On the Supreme Command side, there were the two Chiefs of Staff. As necessary, other cabinet members from the cabinet side, and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff from the Supreme Command side, also attended with this nower, but the decisions were not by majority. They were unanimous. Discussions were continued until there was unanimous agreement" (10,173-10,174)

TOJO also said that probably "the Commerce and Industry Minister (KISHI) attended because raw materials were involved for factories and shipping was involved" (Ex 1202_A - 10,484).

Decision

Exhibit 1103 in only one case states what was discussed or decided; in all other cases, it merely remarks that views were exchanged on important problems of the day. However, at the meeting of 21 July 1941, held at the office of the High Command situated at the Imperial Grounds, it was decided that "the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and other Ministers concerned, should attend this place occasionally and exchange views and project national policies with War, Navy Ministers and Staffs of the High Command". (10,064). This meant "no more press announcements of Liaison or Imperial Conferences, as had previously been made" (Carr's Summary p.229).

Remarks

Regarding the meetings referred to in 1103 of which nothing is reported, see Exhibit 1303 herein for matter relating to the conference of 30 January and 3 February 1941; 10⁸⁴ herein for matter relating to the conference of 6 June 1941; and 1095 and 1306 for matter relating to the meeting of 25 June 1941. No other evidence appears in the record concerning the Conferences set forth in Exhibit 1103 as to the Liaison Conferences held tetweer 13 January and 21 July 1941.

Exhibit 1113 herein shows that from the time TOJO's Cabinet came into nower, October 18, 1941, until 2 November 1941 many liaison conferences were held.

For information as to attendance at the Liaison Conferences held subsequent 21 July 1941 resort must be had to the interrogations of NAGANO, TOJO and TOGO.

Exhibit 1119-A, interrogation of TOJO of 15 March 1946, shows those who normally attended the Liaison Conferences subsequent to July 21, 1941 (10,173). (See above)

Exhibit 1207-A, herein, contain the names of those who attended the conference of o/a 30 November 1941, according to NAGANO.

Exhibit 1207-A, herein, contains the attendance, according to TOGO, of the conference of o/a 30 November 1941.

LIAISON CONFERENCES (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Carr's Summary
1303	30 Jan 3 Feb	11,744 11,746	

Present

None stated.

Decision

Decided the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand.

<u>Remarks</u>

Exhibit 1303, an entry from KIDO's diary of 1 February 1941 states that he "went to the office at 10 AM and spoke with Premier KONOYE. Prince FUSHIMI, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Premier KONOYE and SUGIYAMA, Chief of the Army General Staff came to the Palace together. They were received in audience by His Majesty and reported in outline to the Emperor the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand decided at the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government on 30 January. It is a new precedent for the Chiefs of Staff, and the Premier to be received in audience by His Majesty and to report at the same time. Up to the present, important decisions of the Liaison Conferences have been reported to the Throne at Imporial Conferences, and other decisions individually by the government and Imperial Headquarters. However, this time as an intermediate way both parties have presented a report to the Throne at the same time. I was told that in this connection the Premier proposed that an Imperial Conference be held, but as the broad principle had already been approved by the Emperor, they asked Him in this way. At 10:10 the Chief Aidede-Camp visited me and spoke approximately as follows:

"Re the general principle of the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand: The purpose of this plan is to establish the leading position of the Empire in French Indo-China and Thailand by utilizing the opportunity presented by their having accepted our arbitration; in order to contribute to the preparation for the Southward policy. The Navy aims to use Camranh Bay and the air bases near Saigon. But as this cannot be stated openly it has been decided to represent the action taken as aimed at the preservation of trade and communications, and security against war between French Indo-China and Thailand. In case military force is to be used to attain the objective, it has been decided to ask the further approval of the Emperor." (11,744-11,745)

KIDO also said that Matsuoka visited him and stated that, "When the broad policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand was decided, the Army planned to limit the time to the end of March, but he had opposed it as being impossible, and had made the Army cancel it. He intends to conduct future diploracy on the following lines as reported today to the Emperor. It is assumed that the liaison conference on the third will decide on the plan which he will take with him on his visit to Germany and Soviet Russia. He will shortly visit Germany and find out the actual state of German policy towards Britain from HI /T_N.Hitler/ RI /T.N. Ribbentrop/ and others, and he will make full arrangements with them. At the same time he would like to adjust our relations with the Soviet Union and to contrive a general peace with China by the end of P_{12} Then he intends to concentrate our whole strength toward the South. Without a solution of the Southern question, no real solution of the China Incident can be attained; therefore, the Southern question is an important one, one on which the nation's fate hangs. For this reason, he con-tinued, it would be necessary to bring about a state of things which would enable the whole energy of the nation to be concentrated on it." (11,745 - 11,746)

LIAISON CONFEPENCES (1941)

Exhibit No.	<u>De te</u>	Record Page	Corr's Summery
1084	6 June	9,979	
		<u>Present</u> (from Exhi	ibit 1103)
Konoye Tojo Tomid Luto Tsukad		OKA MIPATUTA MIPATUTA MIRANA NIGRANA NIGRANA	
		Decision	

None reported.

Remarks

Exhibit 1084 is an entry from KIDO's diary, 6 June 1941, that "At 9 AM Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that Ambassador OSHELA had an interview with Hitler at Eerch^tesgaden and that Germany had at last decided to attack Russia. Hitler had intimated his desire for Japan's participation in this war against Russia. though he did not say so. Prince KONOYE also said that the Liaison Conference in this connection would be held this morning, and he asked me to report this fact to the Throne. (9979) I proceeded to the Pelace in response to a summons from His Lajesty, and was received in sudience from 10:20 AV to 11:05 AV. His Mejesty discussed at full length the matter mentioned above during the whole period. I had a talk with the Chief Aid-de-Camp at 11:10 AM and asked him to keep in close touch with me with regard to the same. Premier KONCYE made Mr. HOSOKANA, Secretary to the Premier, bring the telegram of Ambastador OSHINA to me, and he asked me to study it. I read it and returned it. I was granted an audience with the Emperor from 1:10 PM to 1:30 PM to report on the substance of the telegram. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Falace, and was recoived in audience by the Emperor to report on the recognition of Crostia end on the telegrem from Ambassedor OSHINA. Foreign Minister MATSUCKA intimated to me his opinion as to the future outlook of the relations between the Soviet and Germany. According to his opinion as regards the German-Soviet relations, the conclusion of an egreement was sixty percent possible and the outbreak of war forty percent in spite of Ambassador OSHIA's observations." (9979-9980)

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1941) Exhibit No. Date Record pare Carr's Surmary 1095 25 June 10,027 ---1306 11,753 217 Present (From Ex. 1103)

KCMOYE TOJO SUGTYAMA TOMIDA MUTO OK.. HIRANUMA MATSUOKA OIKAWA NAGANO

Decision

The Lisison Conference of 25 June 1941 decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China.

Remerks

Ex. 1095 is an entry from KIDO's Diar, 25 June 1941. He refers to a Liaison Conference as follows: "At 1 p.m. I consulted the Ohief Aide-de-Camp to the Throns as to the holding of the Liaison Conference and on other problems... At h p.m. the Fremier, the Chieftof the Army General Staff, and Chief of the Nevel General Staff proceeded to the Felsce to report on the decisions of the Liaison Conference regarding the Japanese troops' ontry into French Indo-Chine. I met Prince KONOVE at 4:30 p.m. and hed a talk with him."

Ex. 1306 is the decision of the Liaison Conference held on 25 June 1941 to accelerate the Empire's measures toward French Indo-Chine and Thailand. Regarding the joint military relations with French Indo-Chine, the following essential factors were to be stressed:

*a) The establishment or use of Air Peses and Harbour facilities in specified areas in French Info-China, and stationing of the necessary troops in the southern part of French Indo-China.

"b) Furnishing of fecilities in connection with the stationing of Imperial troops.

- 38 -

"2. To open diplomatic negotiations for the purpose of the preceding paragraph.

"3. In seas the French Government or the French Indo-China suthorities do not comply with our demands, we shall attain our objective by force of arms.

"4. In order to deal with such circumstances as mentioned in the above paragraph, preparations shall be commenced beforehand for the despetching of troops."

LIAISON CONFERINCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Fecord pare	Cerr's Sumary
1169	h meust	10, 335	

Present

See Exhibit 1103 herein for those usually present according to TOJO (Ex. 1119-A; 10,173)

Decision

Decided the "Principle of Negotiation with the Soviet Union" on August 4, 1941.

Remarks

Exhibit 1169 is the "Measures Towards Foreign Countries in Relation to the 'Principle of Execution of National Policy of the Empire ' which was decided at the Meeting in the Presence of the Emperor on November 5." (See Exhibits 1163, 1168, 1169, 1170 and 1176 herein, which are concerned with matters decided at this Imperial Conference.

Exhibit 1169 states that the Imperial Conference of November 5, 1941 decided to "continue the negotiation found d on the clause No. 1 of the 'Principle of negotiation with the Sovict Union' decided at the Liaison Conference between the Government and the Imperial Headquerters on August 4, 1941." (10,335)

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record pase	Carris Sumar
1163	betw. Oct 18 10, & Nov 2nd	316	

Present

Attendance not reported. (But see Ex. 1103 herein for those normally present according to TOJO's Interrogation of 1) March 1946, Ex. 1119-A, p. 10,173).

Decision

None stated.

Remarks

Exhibit 1163 shows that from the time TOJO's Cabinet came into power until 2 November, 1941 a number of Lisison Confere ces were held.

Exhibit 1163 is a telegram from TOGO to NONNRA, 2 November 1941 stating that "Since the formation of the new cabinet, the Government has been holding conferences for a number of drys with the Imperial Headquarters," (10316) and that "we have carefully considered and discussed fundamental pilicy for the improvement of relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision at the meeting in the presence of the Emperor, on the morning of the 5th." (10,316)

See Exhibits 1163, 1168, 1169, 1170 and 1176 herein, for references to the Imperial Conference of 5 November.

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1°41)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record De 6	Carr's Sumary
1162	o/a 29 Cet.	10, 14	257

Present

None stated in the Exhibit but see Ex. 1119-A, p. 10,173 for those usually present and set forth in Ex. 1103 herein.

Decision

See Remarks

Remarks

Exhibit 1162 is an entry from FIDO's Diary 29 Cotober 19/1. KIDO states that "At 3 a.m. General SUZUMI. President of the Planning Board called on me, reported on the progress of the liaison conference /Renreku Ke gi/ and we had a tal. Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council, visite? me at 10:30 c.m. to consult about the recommendation to the Throng of Ur. Seihin INEDA as a rember of the Privy Council At 11:30 a.m. I herrd from Premier TOJU of the progress of the liaison conference, the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and our maneuvers vis a vis Yen Hsi-Shan. The Chief Aide-de-comp visited me at 12:45 p.m. and we talked about the latest political situation. Had an audience with his Majesty from 1.1% to 1.55. The Juichi-Kei /T.N. Literally: The Party of Eleven/ was hold to exchange views regarding the recent political situation. Those present Jere Frince KONOYE, HIRCHATA, URAMAISU, OFABI, MIRCHAT, SAKAI, ODA and YANACISA MA."

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Lege	Carr's Sumpery
1328 1329	o/a 30 Oct	11, 923 11, 928-11,935	25 7

Present

None set forth in the Exhibit. See Ex. 1119-a, 10173 for these usually in attendance according to TOJO, and whose names appear in Ex. 1103 herein.

The Exhibit states that the matter was considered by the ministries headed by CHILADA, TOJO, TOGO and KAYA.

<u>Decision</u>

See remarks.

<u>Remarks</u>

Exhibit 1328 entitled "Major Items to be Re-examined Concerning Essentials for the Prosecution of National Policies." It contains a list of questions drawn up for the Liaison Conference at the end of October, 1911. (11, 923)

Exhibit 1329 is the answers to these questions, not all of which were read in evidence.

Regarding the degree of cooperation to be expected from Germany and Italy in case of the outbreak of var against Britein, America and the Netherlands, it was answered that "it is impossible to expect a great deal." (11,923) The answer was amplified under three headings, viz. in case war broke out in the (a) autumn, of 1941, (b) the spring of 1942 or (c) later:

a) In view of the Tripertite Pact, Japan can expect Germany and Italy to began war against America by intensifying the attack on American vessels and warships in the Atlantic, thereby diverting America in its landing operations on the British mainland; it will be impossible however to expect economic assistance from Germany because contact with the Siberian Railway has been out off. (11929) If Japan advanced to the Dutch East Indies, the effect of Germany's pressure on the Dutch people in Holland is doubtful since a considerable number of German prisoners ε^{+4} ll remain in the Dutch East Indies. (11,922)

b) We cannot affirm that lending operations on the British mainlend will be carried out in the spring of 1942; consequently, it is dengerous to rely upon the lending operations. In (a) and (b) "the greatest help that we can expect from Germany and Italy will be the advance of the German and Italian forces to the Near

- 43 -

East, Central asia and India" (11,930) but, "in this connection, as our advance must be carried out in accordance with them, a full arrangement is required referenced." (10,930)

(c) "When Germany has consolidated for occupied erges and established a new order in Europe, her attack upon Fritain will be much more intensified. And consequently it may bring considerably edventsgeous effect upon us to fight America; but we must take into consideration the possibility of peace between Germany and Eritain." (11,930)

Question No. 8 asked if Jepan's opponents could be restricted to the Netherlands or both to Eritain and the Netherlands. (11,931) The answer was as follows:

"A. No possibility of restricting them only to the Netherlands or to Britsin and the Netherlands. As for the attitude to be taken by Britain and America provided that Japan advances by force to the South, namely, Thailand, Burma, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, we have certainly not yet heard of any military alliance nor any settlement concerning cooperation enong Eritain, America, end the Netherlands (or the Chungking regime). But it is elmost of no doubt that they have mutual understanding c noerning this joint defense in case Japan carries cut an armed advance to any one of these countries. The attitude of Britain and America will elso be effected to a great degree by the time and menner of cut military advance to the south, the international cituation at the time, and the internal situation of both Bratein and America. It is necessary to take into consideration all probable cases which may take place in this connection, but at any rate we cannot restrict our opponents only to the Metherlands or to Britain end the Netherlands in case of our southward edvance, and we must also be readys for Pussia's entering the war." (11,931)

The following general forecast concerning each country was made based upon the situation as of the end of October, 19/1:

"1. Britein (including Australie, Cenada, etc.) "When we advance to the Dutch East Indies we might expect "ritein to carry out, first of all, a diplomatic compaign regarding us and the Dutch Indies, but we can expect that she probably will make up her mind to take up arms for her self-defense. (Whether she will take up arms immediately or not will depend on the situation therefor.) Judging from Fritein's reports and behavior until the present, we are considerably sure of this view.

*2. America. In a case as pointed out above, Britein may at once each for American assistance. Therefore, even if America does not perticipate in the ver immediately, she vill, of course, accelerately strengthen her military preparations. Then we can suppose that in such a situation she will take the following steps:

"a. Diversionary measures against us by way of diplomacy.

- 44 -

"b. Close her consulates.

"c. Proall ambassador.

"d. Severance of her diplomatic relations."

"e. Demonstrations by her navy and sir forces.

"But it is dangerous to form such a view that America would take gradual steps toward us, judging from her attitude towards Germany. For we cannot but expect Amorica to take much rore prompt stops in case we advance to the south, compared with the case when Germany swept over the European countries. America would presumebly be unable to overlook the Japanese southward advance as 'enother's business' because of the following reasons:

"a. In a sense she considers the southwestern Pacific area as within the zone over which she has the power of utterance (as seen in the Japanese-American negotiations.)

"b. Some materials of the above mentioned area are necessary in America (sum, tin, ets.)

"c. She fears lest she would entirely lose her right of utterance in Chinese problems.

"d. She is afraid of our occupation of the Philippines.

"e. The American public opinion ould be more excited than in the case of the European War." (11,932-_)

Question No. 9 considered the elventeges and disedventeges of Jepan's foreign relations in case wer broke out about March, 1942 as follows:

"a. advantages.

"1. As a result of the Russo-Cerman dar, the Soviet forces in European Russia may suffer a crushing flow and he very bury with reconstruction from this winter until next spring. Convequently, a considerable transfer of the strength of the Soviet For Eastern Arry and an increasing unrest within the country are enticipated. Therefore, we think that for us the threat and burden in the north will be less than at present.

"2. Depending on the situation there may also be some clight chance of taking diplometic measures regarding Pussie so as to mediate Russo-German peace.

- 45 -

"3. As German winter operations are expected to be directed toward africa, the Near East, and Central Asia, Fritain must exert herself to defend these errors. With the proparations to meet German is what operations on the Fritich horseand, etc., the European thestre will become busy; consequently ber position in East Asia will be weltened and Germany's diversionary role will be more effective than at present.

"4. Even if America does not perticipate in the var by next March, her preparations for entering the war will be further advenced; consequently internelly she will be increasingly tro bled by difficult problems of domestic administration and finance; militarily there is a possibility that she will have to divide her strength in the Pacific; while diplomatically there is the possibility that she will have to soften her attitude toward us.

"5. We shall get time to improve and strongthen our diplomatic position in the Thailand and French Indo-Clina crees.

"b. Disadvanuegos.

"1. We think that our economic difficulties will rather increase by March of next year.

"2. Militarily there may be danger in also viving the opponents time for proparation." (11,934-5)

LIATSOU CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Carr's Summary
1164	4 November	10,318	259

Present

None stated in Exhibit. See Exhibit 1119-A, page 10,173 for those who usually attended, according to TOJO, whose names are contained in Ex. 1103 herein.

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 1164 is a telegram from TOGO to NONURA November 4, 1941 stating that the "Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for a few days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the government and the Military High Command." (10,318)

It also stated that "this and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the Conference to be held on the morning of the 5th." (10,317) (The Imperial Conference of November 5).

The telegram also stated that "Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counterproposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die."

- 47 -

LL.ISON CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
919	11 Novembe:		263
1175	n n		263

Fresent

None stated in the Exhibit. See Exhibit 1103 herein for those who usually attended, according to TOJO (1119-4 - 10,173)

Decision

Set forth the "Principal Reasons Alleged for the Cormencement of Hostilities against the United States and Eritain", 11 November 1941.

Remarks

Ex. 1175 is a dreft edopted at a Liaison Conference. It states that (1) the national palicy of Japan is to establish permanent peece by creating a new order in East Asia (10,363); (2) That the China Affair aims to do away with all causes disturbing the stability of Greater East Asia and to bring Go-Prosperity to all the peoples on the basis of the New Order (10,363); (3) That the United States and Britain have been trying for a long time in the Fer East to obstruct the measures and actions of the Japanese Empire, and have openly increased their measures of essistance to the Chungking regime and "stealthily gave rein to their inordinate ambition to dominate the Far East at the expense of China. In addition, they have persuaded other powers to strengthen the encirclement of Japan, and also adopted such measures as the direct disruption of economic relations with our Empire, and reinforced military preparations. Thus they have threatened the security of our Empire by deigning to conduct virtual war operations against us," (10,354); (4) That Japan has proposed to the United States the peaceful settlement of the situation and hes been negotiating with United States for eight months but there is a fundemental opposition between the assertions of Jepen and United States regarding the establishment of peace in the Far East so Japan cannot realize her national policy nor "bring about the stability of Great East Asia if we once accede to the assertions of the United States" (10,364); (5) Thet in the attitudes of the United States and Pritein we can read nothing but a hasty move to set their own inordinate ambitions, and see no trace of a sincere desire on their part for world peece, and to risk mankind (from) unfortunate lisaster." (10,364)

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- 48 -

The draft concluded by stating that "Greater East Asia is now on the brink of a crisis, and the existence of our Empire is in jeoperty. Such being the situation we are compelled to rise up, to take up arms on the side of our allies to smash all the obstacles in our way." (10,365)

Exhibit 919 is the Liaison Conference Decision Flam of 11 November 1941. (9261) It is to be noted that Exhibit 1175 was a draft while Exhibit 919 states that it is the Liaison Conference Decision Flam. The parts read in evidence are as follows:

"Policy

"I. We shall endeavor to overthrow quickly the American, British, and Dutch bases in the Far East, establish our selfsufficiency, and at the same time hasten the surrender of the Chungking regime. Further, we shall endeavor to cooperate with Germany and Italy in planning for the submission of the England first, and then to deprive America of her will to continue war.

"Principal Points

"I. Japan will execute a swift war by force of arms and will overthrow the American, British, and Dutch bases in East Asia and in the Southwestern Pacific, thereby ensuring herself a strategically dominant position. At the same time she will secure areas of vital netural resources and principla communication lines, thereby facilitating self-sufficiency of long luration. We shall exhaust every effort to lure out at an opportune time the main naval force of the United States and destroy it." (9261-2)

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
878	13 November	8,995	264

Present

None stated in Exhibit. See Ex. 1103 for those usually in attendance, according to TOJO (1119-A, p. 10,173)

Decision

The Liaison Conference of 13 November 1941 adopted the "Measures to be taken towards Foreign Countries relative to the Outline for the Execution of National Policies, which was decided at the Council in the presence of the Emperor held on November 5."

Remarks

The exhibit was introduced for the purpose of showing that the Liaison Conference decided to disclose to Germany and Italy Japan's intention to shart war against the United States and Britain as soon as her war preparations were ready, and that Japan notified Germany and Italy that the participation by them in the war against the United States and Britain was part of Japan's war preparations. It was also offered to show Japan's policy towards Thailand as decided by this Conference regarding the passage and stationing of troops, the construction of military establishment, the billeting and feeding of Japanese troops, and the loans necessary to defray military expenditures. (Introductory remarks 8993-4)

- 50 -

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Carr's Summary
877	20 November	8,988; 11,937	267

Present

None stated. See Exhibit 1103 herein for those in attendance according to TOJO (Ex. 1119-A, 10,173)

Decision

The details of the execution of Administration in the Southern occupied Territories were decided at the Liaison Conference of 20 November 1941.

Remarks

Exhibit 877 relates to the setting up of a military administration in occupied areas using existing organs as much as possible and ordering co-operation of United States and Dutch nationals with Japan's military. Final disposition of such territories was to be decided later. The compation forces would control all facilities and communications. All important matters on local administration were to be decided at Liaison Conferences. In French Indo-China and Thailand, a military administration was not to be set up, but measures were to be taken later, in the event of any sudden change in their status. (8988-8992)

LIAISOM COUMERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Cerr's Summary
1026 1207	o/a 30 November	10,506-10,513	275

Present

According to TOGO, the following ettended the Lieison Conferences regarding the composition and delivery of the final note: (10,510 - ex. 1207-4)

TOJO SHIMADA Magano Kaya

SUTUKI HOSHINO MUTO

Decision

(See Remarks)

<u>Penerks</u>

Exhibits 1206-A and 1207-A are extracts from TOGC's interrogation of 26 March 1946 and 11 March 1946 respectively.

In Exhibit 1206-A TOGO states that:

". The note was written by the Foreign Office but in accordence with the views expressed in the discussions in the lisison and other conferences and the note was a general summary of those views. Therefore, the Foreign Office and I, as Foreign Minister, cannot take the responsibility. Furthermore, as the matter was related to the question of war, the high command naturally had to be consulted and various matters discussed with them in regard to the note. Such being the case, the government alone cannot take the responsibility, for the high command is also connected with the matter. And that being the case, even within the government, I alone as Foreign Minister cannot take sole responsibility on a matter of such supreme or rejor importance.

"G Would you name the individuals who you would consider as equally responsible with you for the contents of the note.

"A All members of the lie ison conference and even some members of the Cabinet who were familiar with this question." (10,506)

- 52 -

Exhibit 1207-A relates to the puestions and answers esked and given by TOGO concerning responsibility for the contents of the final note as "ell as information regarding those in attendance at the conference. (10509-10512)

"G Who would be considered responsible, who would you consider responsible for the composition of that note?

*A That notification, as I have previously explained, was a summation of the results of the studies and discussions which took place at the liaison conferences regarding negotiations with the United States. The note itself was written by the Foreign Office, but the responsibility for the composition rests with the participating members of the liaison conferences. The responsibility for the contents of the notification rests with the members of the liaison conferences. Furthermore, the matter was also reported to the Cabinet and pessed the Cebinet without objection.

"Q Could you give me the names of the individuals at the liaison conferences and the Cabinet members who would be considered responsible for the contents of the note?

"A As I have said at a previous meeting, members of a liaison conference who were responsible for the study and discussions on the matter were TOJO, SHIMADA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TSUYADA, ITO, KAYA, SUZIKI and the three secretaries, OSHINO, MITO and CKA, As to the members of the Cabinet, under the constitution they are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, even on matters outside of the competence of their respective offices.

"Q I understood from you that the note was composed by the Foreign Office efter the contents of what the note should contain had been decided upon at the lisison conferences. I also understand that after the note was composed by the Foreign Office it was presented for approval to the Cabinot on December 1, 1941, at which time the Cabinet approved it. Is my understanding correct?

"A The first part of your understanding is correct, that is, that the writing of the note took place in accordance with the decision of the lisison conference as to its contents. However, I should like to make some correction as to the date. December 1 was the late of the Imperial Conference, at which the decision for war was made. However, previous to the Imperial Conference the main points of the note to be sent were reported to the Cabinet; but as to the drafting of the note, that came afterwards, and at a later Cabinet meeting the main points were further explained and the continuation of the explenation that was made at the former Cabinet meeting. I cannot recall definitely, but it seems to be around November 30, but I could have the date more definitely confirmed later. (10510)

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"? From that you have stated would you consider that the aumburs contact of the state of the ligiton conference, whose names you have mentioned, are equally responsible with you as regards to the contents of the note and its delivery?

"A As to the contents of the note, I think it is but netural that all the members of the lisison conference are responsible. As to the Cabinet, they would have at least a final responsibility in that they expressed no objection, that is, from the legal point of view. Of course, it all depends whether you view the matter superficially or formally, or whether you would like to view it more profoundly. But, practically speaking, in the light of actualities it might be said that there is a difference in the degree of responsibility by the liaison conference and the Cabinet because not all the Cabinet members attended the liaison conference, but the situation was such that whatever was approved by the liaison conference was approved by the Cabinet. Although there may be a difference in degree of responsibility, the Cabinet might have at least a nominal responsibility.

*Q Who knew and approved of the details concerning the manner of the delivery of the note?

"A As to the delivery of the note, instructions were sent previously to the Embassy in Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1:00 p.M. December 7, Washington time, as much as possible to the Secretary of State, and that all preparations be made for the purpose of delivering the note at the specified time. The instructions themselves were dispatched by the Chief of the Cable Section of the Formign Office. Pegarding the sending of such instructions, all members of the lisison conference know. It is naturally a matter on which there should be no objections, and, therefore, it was approved as a matter of course." (10,509-12)

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LI.ISON CONFERENCE (1921)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Cerr's Summery
1201-л	30 November	10,480-2	275
1202-а	30 "	10,482-3	275

Present

See Exhibit 1103 herein.

Decision

Approved the gist of the final note to America.

Remarks

Exhibit 1201-A is an extract from TOJO's interrogation of 20 February 1946 wherein he stated that he thought the "last Liaison Conference before the Imperial Conference (of 1st or 2nd December) was on the 30th of November. (10,480)

Exhibit 1202-A is an extract from the interrogetion of TOJO of 18 Earch 1946. The following questions and answers 'ere asked and given:

"Q The text of the finel note to America was approved, first by the Liaison Conference, and later by the Cabinet, was it not?

"i. The gist of it we® approved by the Calinet, but the final text was the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. Of course, it is my responsibility, too.

"Q Did not also the Lieison Conference first approve the gist of it?

"A Yes, of course, they did.

"Q TOGO says that he composed the text of that note on a hasis of the views furnished by the Liaison Conference and that the text, after being written, was presented to and approved by the Liaison Conference. Is this correct?

🏽 Yes.

"G after this had happened, the cabinet also approved it, did it not?

"A As I recall it, after the Liaison Conference hed approved it, the gist of it was (iven to the Cabinet by the Foreign Minister, after which they approved it. In any case, if my memory is correct, I do not believe that the text was distributed to all the weedlers of the Cabinet.

- 55 -

"Q after TOGO and the two Chiefs of Staf: hed decided that 1:00 F.M., 7 December 1941, Jashington time, was to be the time for the delivery of the final note, this fact was reported to and approved by the Liaison Conference, was it not?

"A No. The Lisison Conference, which I was, you might say, head of, delegated to the two Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Minister the task of setting a time prior to the attack. The three-man committee did not report back to the Lisison Conference. I don't remember that the three-man committee reported back to the Liaison Conference on the time. I am reporting to you the facts, but the results of those facts are my responsibility.

"(p.3)

"Q Did the Foreign Minister know of the time and the day set for the attack? /Referring to the Pearl Herbor attack./

"A Yes, the Foreign Minister knew it, too. The President of the Flanning Board also knew."

"Q ...s you recall it, the Liaison Conference did not approve the time set for the delivery of the note nor approve of the length of time between the delivery of the note and the attack?

"A The Lisison Conference delegated the carrying out of this matter to the Foreign Minister and the two Chief; of Staff and, in that sense only, approved.

"(p.4)

"Q In addition to the Minister of War and Foreign Minister, were there any other cabinet members present at the Liaison Conferences immediately preceding the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?

"A I do not remember exactly, but I suppose that the Commerce and Industry Minister and the Communications Minister attended because raw materials were involved for factories and shipping was involved. Of course, the Presilent of the Flanning Board and the Navy Minister were also there.

"Q Was the Minister of Finance thore?

"A Yes, he was elways at Lieison Conference meetings. Those five were elways there - Ner, Navy, Flanning Board, Foreign and Finance Ministers." (10,482-4)

- 56 -

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Carr's Summary
1197-A	o/a 30 November	10,464	

Present

(According to NAGANO's Interrogation)

TOJO, Premier KATA TOGO EAGANO SUZUXI, President of Planning Board SUGIYAMA TANABE, General - Army Vice Chief Staff SHIMADA, Navy Minister ITO, Rear Admiral Vice Chief Navy Staff TERASHIMA, Communications Minister INO-Agriculture Minister HOSHIMC, Cabinet Secretary MUTC, Head Military Affairs Section CKA, Vice Admiral, Head Navy General Affairs Section (Correct designation, according to MAGANO "Kilitary Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry" (10,465)

Decision

Exhibit offered to show that important Liaison Conferences were held during the late days of November 1941 (Introductory Remarks, 10,460) to complete determination for war upon the United States. (10,464)

Remarks

According to NAGANC at the end of October or the beginning of November, 1941, he approved the plan to attach Pearl Harbor. There was disagreement between the Fleets and the Naval Operational Eureau which preferred the conservative method of waiting for the American Fleet in the South Pacific Islands. (10,462) YAMAMOTO threatened to resign if his plan to attack Pearl Harbor was not approved. He admitted that preliminary maneuvers at sea and on paper had been carried on to perfect the YAMAMOTO Plan (10,462). AGANO admitted that his approval of the Plan was the decisive factor in carrying through the attack. (10,463)

AGANC admitted resuonsibility of the attack (10,463). He also stated that until the very last "we were hoping that peace could be established and were prepared to abandon the Plan until the very last, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. (10,464)

- 57 -

LIAISCN CONFERENCE (1941)

Record Page

Carr's Summary

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30 November 10,485 1158-A

Tate

Exhibit No.

Present

See Exhibit 11C3 herein, 1941.

Decision.

Decided to delegate to the Supreme Command (Chiefscof Staff) (10,486) and the Foreign Minister, the authority to meet and decide the time for delivery of the final note "which would comply with the divlomatic and also the strategic requirements." (10,405)

It was also decided that the delivery of the final note should precede the attack. (10, 486)

Remarks

TOJC in his interrogation of 12 March 1946 answered in reply to questions as follows:

"Q Were there any differences between TOGO and the others relative to this? (Referring to the delivery of the final note to the United States.)

No, there were not. They were the same -- to deliver it before "A the attack.

"Q Was any decision arrived at in the Liaison Conference as to how long it was to be delivered before the attack?

I have explained this before. The decision as to the time was not нA made at the Liaison Conference. The Supreme Command and the Foreign Minister were to meet together and decide the time which would comply with the diplomatic and also the strategic requirements.

Was this delegation of authority decided upon at this same final "Q. Liaison Conference?

II A Yes.

Do you know that such meeting or meetings were held pursuant to "Q this delegation of authority?

- 58 -

....

"A No, I don't know.

"Q Did you learn what decision had been arrived at in regard to timing by these men to whom the authority had been delegated?

"A I did not learn precisely the time set, but it was decided that the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Einister would settle that so as to comply with both the diplomatic and military requirements. It was settled at the Liaison Conference that the delivery of the final note would precede the attack. (Last sentence of this answer read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness)." (10,485, 10,486)

LIAISON CONFEIENCE (1341)

Exhibit No.	Date	<u>Record Page</u>	Carr's Summary
12C3-A	30 November	10,488-9	
1244-A	11 11	10,708	

Present

See Exhibit 1103 herein, 1941.

<u>Jecision</u>

The Liaison Conference a_{ST} ed to the substance of the final note. (Ex. 1203-A)

<u>Remarks</u>

The gist of the final note was explained by TOGO and approved by the Liaison Conference - "The Cabinet all heard it." (10,488) This Conference was the last one before the Imperial Conference of 1 or 2 December 1941. (10,489)

TOJO said he first learned Pearl Harbor was to be attacked at this Conference.

"Q Did not you and the members of the Cabinet see the contents of the note before it was sent?

"A I heard the gist of it. The cabinet all heard it at the Liaison Conference just preceding the Imperial Conference.

"Q Did not you and the calinet agree with the contents of that message?

"A Yes, we did agree. The gist of the note was explained by the Foreign Minister at the Liaison Conference meeting. The whole text was not read and passed about. After the meeting, the matter became the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry.

"Q This Liaison Conference, at which the gist of the final note was read, was the last one before the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd, was it not?

"A Yes.

- 60 -

"Q And all members present agreed with the substance of the message as it was read to them?

"A Yes.

"Q Why was it that that message was not sent to NOMURA until practically a week later?

"A I can't help it if you keep asking me questions about specific matters like that that were the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. I can't answer them."

Exhibit 1244-A is an extract from TCJO's Interrogation of 1 March 1946. He said that he knew of the attacks which were to be made on Malaya, Hongkong and the Philippincs some five or six days before the Conference, as these were "joint operations" (10,707). At this Conference he learned for the first time of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. (10,708)

"Q Did you not know of any of the other attacks which were going to be made on December 8th simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack?

"A The Pearl Harbor attack was a Navy operation and I knew only that if the attack went smoothly that it would begin at such and such a time. The Malaya, Hongkong, and Philippines attacks were joint operations, and, hence, as War Minister, I knew about them.

"Q How early did you know about each of them, that is Pearl Harbor and the others?

"A I knew about the Pearl Harbor attack from the time of the Liaison Conference just preceding the Imperial Conference of 1 December 194b. I knew about the other attacks some five or six days before the Liaison Conference met.

"Q Did you not, as Premier, know of and approve the attacks which were made on Pearl Harbor, Hongkong, Malaya and the Philippines on or about 7 or 8 December 1941?

"A Of course. I dia know about them and approve." (10,707-8)

- 61 -

LIAISON CONFERENCE (1941)

Exhibit No.	<u>Dat</u> e	Record page	Car:'s Summary
1332	12 December	11,946-8	289-291

Present

None Stated. SUZUXI, the Accused, was Chairman of the Sixth Committee. (11,944) See Remarks.

<u>Lecision</u>

Reported on the "Outline of the Economic Counter-Flam for the Southern Area."

Remarks

The "Sixth Committee" was organized in the Cabinet with the personnel of the government offices concerned (the Planning Board, the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the "ar and Navy Ministries) for the purpose of discussing and drafting matters pertaining to the economic plans and control centering around the acquisition and development of the resources in the Southern Areas. (11,946)

The first report of the Committee was dated 12 December 1941 and gave full details concerning the economic measures to be taken in the N.E.I. and the other Scuthern Areas after the occupation. The measures taken by Japan in the N.E.I. after their occupation closely followed the program worked out in the above-mentioned recort. (Introductory Remarks - 11,947) The Exhibit shows that the matter was considered by a Liaison Conference. (11,948)

According to the report, the principal aim of the policy was to fill the demand for important national resources, to establish a self-sufficient system for the co-presperity sphere, and to strengthen Japan's economy. (11,948)

"Two areas are named for this purpose: one to include Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Eorneo, Philippines, and the other French Indo-China and Thailand." (11,949)

- 62 -

LIAISON CONFERENCES (1943)

Record Page

Carr's Summary

1344 4 January 17992

Date

Exhibit No.

Present

Exhibit does not set forth the attendance.

Decision

The Liaison Conference of 4 January 1943 decided on independence for Burma and the Philippines only: independence for other areas would be decided at a later date. (P. 1 of Exhibit)

Remarks

See Exhibit 1344, herein, under heading Imperial Conference 1943 (P. 1 of the Exhibit: 17,992)

See also Exhibit Nos. 1344 and 1350 as well as the testimony of DeWeerd (12,115; 12,121; 12,236 respectively) for further information on this matter.

FUNCTIONS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

The Privy Council, composed of a president, a vice-president, and twenty-four councillors appointed for life and the members of the Cabinet ex officio, serve as the supreme advisory body to the Emperor. The Ordinance defining its power, promulgated in 1890, stigulated that, generally speaking, its advice was to be solicited by the Emperor only on consitutional questions, international treaties and agreements, and prior to the issuance of emergency Imperial Ordinances. (640)

Gradually, however, the Council has extended its activities and increased its nower until in recent decades it has come to resemble a "Third Chamber" with broad supervisory nowers over the executive in both foreign and domestic matters. It has frequently opposed the Cabinet on policy questions and on several occasions has forced the downfall of Cabinets possessing the confidence of the Diet. Owing no political responsibility to the Diet or to the people for its activities, and yet exerting important influences over the entire affairs of the State, the Privy Council has proved an important barrier to the development of a sound parliamentary system (640)

The Privy Council shares with the Cabinet a vast part of the legislative power. On the one hand it has, in conjunction with the Cabinet the powers exercisable when the Diet is not in session, including the approval of Imperial Crdinances under Articles VIII and LAA of the Constitution; and on the other hand exercises the legislative powers, exercisable irrespective of the sitting of the Diet, including international treaties and agreements, declarations of martial law, and Imperial Ordinances having penal provisions. In addition, every project of law of bill introduced into the Dict by the Cabinet is previously submitted to the Privy Council for its approval. (662)

While the Council has no power to initiate legislation, it has a wide veto and amending power. On bills which have been introduced by a Diet member and have parsed the Diet, it can only recommend approval or disapproval in toto. On the other hand, with respect to projects of law submitted to it by the Cabinet before introduction in the Diet, it may not only veto but freely exercise its amending power. (663)

Since the members of the Cabinet are all ex-officio members of the Privy Council, the realm of disagreement between the two bodies, as a matter of fact and a matter of practice in the period covered by the indictment, has been small. (663)

- 64 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1930)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Carr's Summary
910-A	18 August to 26 September	9161	1

Present

The meeting of 23 August sets forth the full membership as follows:

President KURATOMI Vice-President HIRANU A Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee

Councillor KALEKO Councillor DEN 11 KUBOTA ARAI 11 11 YAMAYAWA Ħ KA 'AI 11 KURODA " MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI Navy Minister TAKARABE Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

> Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI Secretary HORIE Secretary LUTO

Absent:

HAMAGUCHI TAKARABE SHIDEHARA from the meetings of 18 August and 26 September 1930. KUBOTA, from the meeting of 28 August 1930. DEN, from the meetings of 3, 5, 8, 10, 15, September 1930.

Docision

None.

- 65 -

Remarks

Thirteenth Meetings of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council on the ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. The dates of the meetings extend from 18 August to 26 September 1930. The accused HIRANULA was present at each of the meetings, serving in the capacity of Vice President of the Privy Council.

Councillor KANEKO referred to a speech by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs NAGAI who said that if the Privy Council interfered with the ratification of the London Treaty the Cabinet must fight them as the public enemy of the nation. (9161) KAWAI asked on what grounds the Premier, regardless of the objections of the military, determined that the military strength decided upon by the Treaty was sufficient for Japan's national defense, and how could the Premier say, with a military strength of which the Chief of the Navy General Staff did not approve, that Japan's national defense was secure. (9162) He also referred to a statement of the Premier in the Diet that the Government held the right to decide military strength.

The Premier answered that he had not stated that the Government held the right of decision, but had only said that the matter of concluding treaties should be decided by the Cabinet. (9163) The Premier also answered that he could not state the scope and extent to which he took the military's opinion into consideration as that was a confidential matter. (9163)

KAWAI referred to the Navy Minister's statement in the House of Peers that "the age when the strength of force determines all had already passed," and then he argued that Japan's armaments should be based upon the possibility of a crisis in the peace of the Orient, with America or other Third Powers interfering in Sino-Japanese relations over rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, and he demanded to know the Government's opinion on the matter. (9164)

The Premier replied that it was a fact that the ratio of strengths, vis-a-vis America provided in the treaty would become more unfavorable for Japan the nearer she got to 1936, but he believed that friendly relations with other powers, financial adjustments and other such matters were likewise the essentials of national defense. Japan, he continued, would have to bear with the unfavorable ratio until the end of 1936, the expiration date of the Treaty, at which time she could start to build ships again in order to hold 70% as against America. Japan, of course, he concluded, should make preparations within the scope permitted by the treaty. (9165) The Nevy Minister said that, if the treaty failed to be concluded, the United States would be hostile to Japan and she might undertake direct competition with Japan in warship construction. (9165)

KANEKO noted that, according to the report of the United States Senate, the United States feared most the submarine. He felt that, as long as Japan possessed submarines, "there was nothing to be afraid of from the United States, that world peace and international faith were merely outward courtesies, and that peace was untenable without repletion of military strength." (9166)

KANEYO stated that Japanese-American relations would be at their most dangerous point about 1937; therefore, Japan should supplement the lack of military strength caused by the London Treaty. "Justice", he said, "was only superficial courtesy between nations, and the last resort was military power alone." (9167) He referred to the Netherlands, saying that at one time she was the world's wealthiest country who had fallen to the position of a third rate country because of the limitation of her armaments. (9167) He pointed out that it was the military men of Japan who had advanced Japan into the world as one of the five great powers. (9168) He also said that, on the basis of the speeches in the United States Senate, the London Treaty was a preparation by the United States to put pressure against Japan after 1936. (9168)

PRIVY COUNCIL (1930)

Exhibit No. Date

Record nage

Carr's Summary

2

911-A 1 October

9169

Present

President KURATOMI Vice President HIRANUMA

State Ministers

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI	Commerce & Industry Ministor TAWARA
Navy Minister TAKARABE	Home Minister ADACHI
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA	Agriculture & Forestry Minister MACHI-
Railway Minister EGI	Overseas Minister MATSUDA DA
Justice Minister WATANABE	Education Minister TANAKA
Finance Minister INOUE	Terporary Acting War Minister ABE

Councillors

ITO KANEKO KUBOTA TOMII ISHIGURO YAMAKAWA KURODA FURUICHI MATSUMURO EGI SAKURAI DEN ARAI KAWAI KAMATA SUZUKI ISHII MIZUMACHI OKADA FUKUTA

Government Delegates

Director of the Bureau of Legislation KAWASAKI Councillor of the Bureau of Legislation KANAMORI Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs YOSHIDA Chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office MATSUNAGA Chief of the Bureau of European & American Affairs of the Foreign Office HOTTA Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Office SAITO Secretary of the Foreign Office YAMAGATA Secretary of the Foreign Office SHIOZAKI Administrative Official of the Foreign Office FUKADA Administrative Official of Foreign Office YAMADA Vice Minister of Navy KOBAYASHI Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau HORI Secretary of Navy Department ENOMOTO Captain SHINOMURA Captain IWAMURA Commander FUJITA Reporter - Chief of the Judging Committee - ITO Chief Secretary - Chief Secretary FUTAGAMI Secretaries - Secretary HORIE MUTO

Decision

n se se al

No decision reached at the meeting.

Remarks

Exhibit 911-A is a book entitled "A Record of the Privy Council concerning Ratification of the London Naval Treaty 1930" dated 1 October 1930.

HIRANUMA was present in his capacity as Vice President of the Privy Council.

HAMAGUCHI stated the position of the government on the problem of ratification. He said that the object of the London Naval Treaty was to prevent dangerous competitive arrament for the sake of world peace and to reduce the burden of taxation.

TAKARABE, Navy Minister, referred to the so-called "three great principles", which were not in existence in 1927, at the time of the Geneva Conference, and which were concerned with the military strength necessary for the execution of the plan of operations based on the national defense policy decided in 1923. These principles were: 70% in total tonnage, 70% in cruisers with eight inch guns and the present (1930) strength in submarines. (9171) The so-called "three great principles" were really three demands made by Japan at the London Naval Conference. (9171) He also made mention of the steps taken by "young officers" to unify public opinion behind the "three grea principles" saying that their endeavors had "much to do with our success at the conference in obtaining the ratio of 70% in total tonnage." (9172)

HAMAGUCHI pointed out that the "general public was driven to an indescribable sort of unrest and unhappiness" and that "as long as the destiny of this treaty remains undecided, it will not only be impossible to eradicate this type of unrest, but it is evident that there will be a tendency for the unrest in public feeling to gradually increase, incited by daily erticles in newspapers and all the other scandalous propaganda. The problem of the financial world in particular is what the government cannot help but be mostly concerned about." (9174)

Nothing further was read regarding this matter.

PRIVY COUNCIL (1931)

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Carr's Survey

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2205-A 9 December 15,765-7

Dete

Present

Chairman KURATOLI Vice Chairmen HIFLUNIKA

Edit to No.

Ministers-Nor Minister General MINAMI

Councillors

KURODA EQI SAKUFAI KAMAI MIZUMACHI OKADA FUKUDA

Chief Secretery FULAKALI

Secretarics: HCRIE MITO

<u>Decisien</u>

None referred to in the Exhibit.

Remarks

Exhibit 2205-A is the minutes of the Privy Council at which a report was given on the China Incident.

War Minister MINAMI reported on conditions in the Chinchow district, stating that in the concentration of any army it was a principle in military tagtics to send one unit absed. The Japanese forces were distributed over Tsitsihar, Ssupingkai and other places; one unit was therefore sent to the Chinchow district. However on 27 November, 1931 an order was issued that the unit should return to a position cast of Hsin-Min-Tun. Word was received that, if Japan demanded it, (15764-5) the Chinese would evacuate Chinchow, thus eliminating the necessity for a strong offensive (15765). Perhaps, continued MINAMI, this might have led to the report which appeared in the newspapers, etc. that the Chief of Staff, the Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had come to an agreement that the attack on Chinchow should not be cerried out. (15765)

- 70 -

Councillor EGI remerked that "it is reasonable that attack

attack Chinchow, Japan's "loss of credit with the Leegue of Nations and the Great Povers" will be very great. (15765) He elso remarked that "though it might be very convenient for Japan to have Manchoukuo an independent state, I do not 'slieve the Great Powers would accept it. It might be well for Levachurian people to work for their independence on their own accord, but are we not losing general confidence as a result of continuelly taking action under the protext of self defense. (15765)

Councillor SANURAI expressed the same thoughts as EGI and referred to the bombing of Chinchow by Japanese forces (15766) as regrettable, stating that Japan "quickly lost the confidence of the League of Nations." (15766)

Ner Minister MINNEI replied that "We do not wish to give the impression to foreign countries that we have attacked Menchuria and Mongolia." (15766) "I, toc," he continued, "consider it regrettable. However, apparently Europeans and Americans are mistaken in thinking that we made use of the large bands such as used in the European War. Moreover, the contrest between this incident and the frequent government announcements that the affair would be extended has caused a strong reaction amongst them." (15766)

EGI then referred to "the improper action taken by some of the young of licers of our army," stating that in maintaining military discipline, the matter of punishment should not be ambiguous. (15767)

War Minister MINAMI replied that the question of punishment was still under consideration but the maintenance of discipline should be left to the Army. (15767)

PRIVY COUNCIL (1931)

Exhibit No	! ~	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
188-C	o/a 17	December	2,222	13

Present

ARAKI stated in his interrogation that All members of the Privy Council and Cabinet were present. No other record of those present.

Cabinet then in power was the INUKAI Cabinet.

Decision

Decided the policy of pacifying and occupying the four provinces under General CHANG in Manchuria, including Jehol (2222; 2234) and also decided to approve the military budget for this purpose. (2219)

Remarks

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This was an extraordinary meeting of the Privy Council as the matter was very urgent, the Diet not being in session at the time.

PRIVY COUNCIL (1932)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
241	13 Sept	2,072	19

Present

Chairman KURATOHI Vice-Chairman HIRANUMA

State Ministers

Premier SAITO	Education Minister HATOYAMA
Finance Minister TAKAHASHI	Navy Minister OKADA
Home Minister YAMAMOTO	Justice Minister KOYAMA
Foreign Minister UCHIPA	Communications Minister MINAMI
Railway Minister MITSUCHI	Commerce & Industry NAKAJIMA
Was Minister ARAKI	Agriculture & Forestry GOTO
	Oversens Affnirs NAGAI

Councillors: KOBOTA TOMII ISHIGURO KURODA FURUICHI SAKURAI ARAI KAWAI KAMADA SUZUKI (Kantaro)

ISHII MIZUMACHI OKADA ARIMA HARA KUBOTA KURINO HOTODA SUZUKI (Soroku)

Committee Members:

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Director of the Bureau of Legislation HORIKIRI Councillor KANAMORI Vice-Foreign Minister ARITA Director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry MATSUDA Director of the Bureau of Asia, Foreign Ministry TANI Secretary of Foreign Office YANAI Secretary of Foreign Office MORISHIMA 11 HARIMA 11 TERAJIMA Vice Minister of War YANAGAWA Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, YAMAOKA Reporters: Chairman of the Judging Committee HIRANIMA FUTAKAHI Chief Secretary HORIE Secretary # MUTOH

Decision

Unanirously approved the bill regarding the "Matter on signing of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol".

Remarks

Exhibit 241 is the Proceedings of the Privy Council on the signing of the protocol between Japan and Manchukuo. HIRANUMA, the Accused, was Vice Chairman of the meeting and ARAKI, the Accused, was present as War Minister.

The meeting was called at the request of the Cabinet. The reporter (HIRANUMA, the Accused) presented a report on the matter as follows:

When the old North Eastern Regime was destroyed at the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, influential persons in Manohuria and Mongolia, after consultation, declared on March 1, 1932, the establishment of Manchukuo and broke off relations with the Republic of China. (2973)

The Manchukuo Government then requested formal diplomatic relations with Japan and other countries. The Government of Japan, "in order to use prudence and caution watched for half year since then the developments in Manchukuo as well as the attitudes of the League of Nations and other countries." (2974) Since then Manchukuo has shown steady progress and indications are that Japan's recognition of Manchukuo, though it will "as ray be easily imagined, cause for a time no small shock to the world, will not bring about any international crisis. Under the circumstances our country considered it advisable at this juncture to give Manchukuo our formal recognition and open freely relations with her." (2975) Accordingly, with a view to regulating the basis of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Japan decided to take measures for recognizing Manchukuo by concluding an arrangement through a protocol and certain notes which were exchanged between the two countries. (2975)

1. Protocol.

The Protocol contained two clauses which provided (1) that, unless special arrangements are made between Japan and Manchukuo in the future, "all rights which Japan and her subjects possessed heretofore in Manchukuo territory under various Sino-Japanese arrangements and public and private contracts shall be confirmed

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and respected by Manchukuo," (2976) and (2), "that both Japan and Manchukuo shall consider every menace against the territory and beace and order of one party as a menace against the tranquility and existence of the other party" and they therefor agreed to jointly defend therselves, for which purpose the necessary number of Japanese troops shall be stationed in Manchukuo. (2976)

2. Notes exchanged - (Between the two countries)

There were four notes exchanged: one between the Comrander of the Kwantung Army of Japan and the Regent of Manchukuo and three between the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo. The notes were to be deemed as international agreements having legal validity "in addition to the virtual effectiveness they hitherto possessed", and were to be retroactively effective from the days on which they were exchanged or concluded," (2977) and the "arrangements were to be made strictly confidential by mutual understanding between Japa' and Manchukuo." (2977)

In the first note addressed to HONJO, Commander of the Kwantung Army, by the Regent of Manchukuo on March 10, 1932, he ask for the consent of Japan to "the undermentioned items" inasmuch as Manchukuo was convinced that her development could not be exbected without the support and guidance of Japan. (2978)

HONJO replied setting forth "the undermentioned iters" as follows:

 Λ_{\star} - Manchukuo shall entrust to Japan her national defense and the maintenance of peace and order and shall bear all the necessary expenses therefore. (Clause I) (2978)

B.- The control of the existing railways, harbours, waterways, air routes, etc., as well as the construction of new route so far as the same are required by Japan's Army for national defense, shall be wholly entrusted to Japan or such organization τ she may designate. (Clause II) (2978)

C.- Manchukuo shall give every possible assistance in connection with various establishments deemed necessary by the Japanese Army. (Clause III) (2979)

D.- Japanese shall be appointed state councillors of Manchukuo and Japanese shall also be appointed officials of central as well as local governments. The selection of such officials shall be made on the recommendations of the Dommander of the Kwantung Army and their dismissals shall be subject to his conse-(Clause IV) (2979)

- 75 -

The second note referred to the agreement regarding control of rails, harbors, etc. between HONJO and Prime Minister CHENG dated August 7, 1932. (2980)

The third note referred to an agreement between HONJO and Prime Minister CHENG August 7, 1932, relative to the establishment of an airway company. (2980)

The fourth note referred to an agreement, relative to the establishment of mining rights necessary for national defense, between Commander MUTO (not the Accused) of the Kwantung Army and Prime Minister CHENG dated September 9, 1932. (2980)

In the event doubt arose as to the interpretation of the protocol and notes, it was determined that the decision on this question should be rade according to the Japanese text. (2981)

HIRANUMA concluded his report by stating that the Judging Committee unanimously agreed that the bill be bassed without modification. (2982)

Discussion by the Councillers

Councillor OKADA raised three points:

1) Whether or not the recognition of Manchukuo was in violation of the Nine-Power Pact. In this connection, he referred to the statement in the Diet of the Foreign Minister UCHIDA that Manchukuo "had become independent by the free will of her people and that Japan had not agreed by the Nine-Power Pact to prevent the independence of the Chinese people." (2983) He pointed out that the Foreign Minister referred to what might happen if, for example, Canton wished to become independent, he (UCHIDA), being of the opinion that the countries signatory to the Pact were not under an obligation to prevent this independence. (2983) OKADA felt, however, that America right be of the opinion that it would not be in violation of the Pact, if Manchukup became independent of her own free will, but that it would be such a violation and disregard of Chinese sovereignty for Japan to assist and maintai: this independence. (2983) OKADA thought that the Foreign Minis ter's explanation on this point was inadequate. (2983)

The second point raised by OKADA referred to the conflict between the secret agreements in the bill under discussion and the Nine-Power Pact, and the third point related to the arrangement whereby the agreements were to be strictly confidential pointing out that if the secret agreements were to be divulged China would demand convocation of a conference of the countries signatory to the Nine-Power Pact, (29^{P4})

In reply to the points raised by OKADA, the Foreign Minister UCHIDA stated that, regarding the Ninc-Power Pact, the action of the Japanese Army in coving with the Incident of September 18, 1931 was nothing but the exercise of Japan's right of selfdefense; (2985) that the Nine-Power Pact provided that China's territorial integrity should be respected, but it made no provisions at all for a case where a part of China became "indeper ent as a result of China's own disintegration;" (2985) that various views were held in the United States and other countric but that he presented the views of Japan. (2985) He referred t the fact that Ambassador DUBUCHI had recently informally asked the American authorities if they would protest in case Japan should recognize Manchukuo, and "they replied that they had not the slightest intention of making a protest or convoking a Nine-Power Conference, inasmuch as there was no hope of such a conference reaching any conclusion." (2985) Besides, he continued, the convocation of the Nine-Power Conference "ould be opposed by some of the European countries. (2986)

UCHIDA made reference to the statement of the American Govern ment in order to show that "the motive and process of the creation of this new state have come to be generally understood and the feelings of the powers also have been eased to no small degrees." (2985)

As to OKADA's second question (whether there is doubt that the contents of the strictly secret treaty were incompatible with the Nine-Power Pact), UCHIDA said that there was no conflict between the two as the signatories to the Pact "are concerned with the Open Door principle, principle of equal opportunity, etc." (2986) He saw no objection to Jacan's being entrusted by Manchukuo with such matters as that country could do for herself. (2986)

In answer to the third question, (as to what would be done in the event that the secret agreements became divulged), UCHIDA said that Japan should take special care to prevent leakage and, if by any chance the secret agreements should become known he believed that there was nothing in them to be ashamed of. (2986)

OKADA doubted if the explanation given by the Foreign Ministe would satisfy the signatories to the Bact. (29%6)

ISHIGURO referred to the second note exchanged (the letter addressed to the Commander of the Kwantung Army by Premier Cheng), which stated that Japan shall be entrusted with the national defense and maintenance of the public beace of Manchukuo for which prupose all necessary expenditures shall be borne by Manchukuo. He then asked if there was any time limit fixed regarding the expenditures and whether Manchukuo was then paying for such expenditures. (2987)

In reply, ARAKI stated that no budget had been provided for this purpose by Manchukuo but that she would be able to defray some part of the expenditures after 1933, if her internal conditions become stablized, since she had reliable income from railways. (2987) He also stated that he thought Manchukuo would be able to defray the necessary expenditures after an elapse of about five years. (2987)

ISHIGURO then asked if it would be impossible to obtain payment for the expenses before the lapse of five years, (2987), to which ARAKI replied that, since the national defense of Manchukuc is at the same time the national defense of Japan, he did not cor sider it fair and reasonable to make Manchukuo alone bear the whole amount of expenses necessary for national defense. (2988) ARAKI further replied that, although it was merely planned, he thought it would be possible for Manchukuo to pay annually 9,000, yen from the year 1933, if the country became stabilized, and 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 yen after five years. (2988)

KURODA said that the government would give careful consideration to the maintenance of amicable and harmonious diplomatic relations with other powers and that, inaspuch as the present? action of Japan was to exalt the fundamental spirit of the Empire he desired that the whole people should do their utmost to settle the Manchurian question. (2539)

ISHII endorsed the signing of the protocol and said that "on looking back, the past one year has been really a year of so-callextraordinary emergency in which our country trod a very critical pain. However, thanks to proper measures taken by the present Cabinet since its formation, we have now arrived at the stage of concluding a Japan-Manchukuo Alliance treaty, whereby Manchukuo has been recognized. This is a matter for congratulations to our country." (2989)

ISHII continued by saying that the "Japan vs. the Manchurian question and Japan vs. the international problem were the two problems over which he had deeply worried because many doubts hav nct been dispelled throughout the previous Cabinet and the one before it. Japan possessed from the outset special rights and interests in Manchuria. Therefore, our position was a special Since last year, while we were rebelling Chinese infringeone. ment of those rights and interests, we inadvertently perceived an intention on the part of the Manchus and Mongols of gaining independence and gave them facilities for realizing their aspira-tions. This was only proper for us to do." (2989-2990) But, he continued he was not sure as to the future attitude of the Manchurians and the Mongolians after they becare independent becat they might change their attitudes and ignore Japan's rights and interests. (2990) He referred to Bulgaria as being a nation which met with unexpected calamity because of its failure to make necessary preparations in international negotiations. (2990) He said, however, that Japan's vested rights were fully secured by the notes executed. (2990)

- 78 -

ISHII further said he felt uneasy about Japan's contention in regard to the Manchurian problem and the League of Nations. He pointed out that the main point of Japan's contention was that she could not agree "to the disposition of the Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria by the Council of the League of Nations under Article 15 of the League's Covenant." (2991)

(Article 15 of the League's Covenant provides, inter alia, that "if there should arise between members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the members of the League agreed that they would submit the matter to the council," and it further provides "that if a dispute is not thus settled the Council, either unanimously, or by a majority vote, shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.")

ISHII feared that "inasmuch as some countries arong the member. of the League had laid before the League, prior to resorting to war, disputes arising inside their own territories and had received deliveration (sic) under Article 15, Japan's contention could not be carried through after all." (2991) In this connection, ISHII considered that, "should the dispute over Manchuria, which is not Japanese territory, be disposed of according to article 15 Japan's contention would be rejected by the world's public opinion as well as the International Court of Justice," (2991) but he pointed out "when Manchukuo is recognized by Japan and becomes an independent state and also (when) Japan-Manchukuo Alliance is concluded, according to the proposal now under consultation, the point most disadvantageous to Japan will be thereby almost removed. This, I think, will be the most desirable result of our formal recognition of Manchukuo and the conclusion of the Japan-Manchukuo Alliance." (2991)

ISHII also said that "it was an established view of a large number of people of the United States and other countries that Japan's action in Manchukuo had violated the Anti-War Pact and the Nine-Power Pact." (2991) But, he reasoned, now that Japan has formally recognized Manchukuo and entered into an alliam e with her "Japan will be able in the future to assert that the independence of Manchukuo was due to the disintegration of China and that the territorial integrity of the Republic of China was broken by none other than Manchukuo. <u>This will nullify the argument that</u> <u>Japan violated the Nine-Fower Pact.</u>" (2992) (Underlining not in original.) "Now that Japan has concluded an alliance with New Manchukuo for joint national defense, I believe there will be no room for opposing the stationing of Japanese troops in Manchuria, thus making the League's past resolution a dead letter." (2992)

ISHII further said that "It is for Manchukuo herself to assert that an independent state should not be placed under the sovereignty of any other country. In regard to the connection between Japan and America and also other countries, Manchukao herself will bear the brunt if the attack or back up Japan to ease Japan's position. At any rate, in consequence of the independence of Manchukuo, it has become unnecessary for the League of Maxions to deliberate on the Manchurian question under Article 15 of the League's Covenant." (2993)

ISHII noted that it was rather strange that the Manchurian and Mongolian races had started no independence movement up to 1932. In this regard, he said that "it was a matter of course that Manchukuo had become independent as soon as the old regime under CHANG HSUCH-LIANG collapsed." (2993) He pointed out that "Manchuria became a part of China when it was bought as a dowry by AICHIN CHAEHLO who subjugated China proper." (2993) He alrous it that Lord Lytton's party must have studied the history of Manchuria and Mongolia and therefore, it would not be difficult to make it understand the creation of Manchukuo as well as the problem of racial self-determination. Consequently, he concluded, "through the independence of Manchukuo, Japan's position has been improve! considerably in respect to foreign relations." (2993)

ISHII ended his discussion of the matter by saying that "the present Japan-Manchukuo Treaty will prove effective an fill; maintaining and expanding our special rights in Manchuria and Mongolia on the one hand and in elevating, on the other hand, Japan from a position of predicament full of troubles at home and abroad to a triumphant one." (2993)

The bill was bassed unanimously and the meeting adjourned.

PRIVY COUNCIL (1935)

Exhibit No.	Date	<u>Record Page</u>	Carr's Summary
850	3 July	8,417	30

Present

Chairman ICHIKI Vice Chairman HIRANUMA

Members of the Cabinet

Premier OKADA Home Minister GOTO Navy Minister OSULI Foreign Minister HIROTA War Minister HAYASHI

Communication Minister TOKONAUI Commerce & Industry Minister MACHIEL Agriculture & Forestry Minister YAMASAKI Overseas Minister KODAMA

78

Councillors:

KUBOTA SAKAMOTO KUBOTA KAWAI ISHII KURODA SHIMIZU SUZUKI, Soroku ISHIZUKA HARA ARAI HAYASHI TCMII ISHIWATA MOTODA SUZUKI, Kantaro ARIMA SAKURAI FUJISAWA

Decision

The Privy Council unanimously approved the bill to conclude an agreement between Japan and Manchukuo regarding the estrblishment of a Joint Economic Committee.

Remarks

HIRANUMA, the Accused, was Vice Chairman of the meeting.

After the establishment of Manchukuo, an agreement was entered into between Japan and Manchukuo which politically and practically bound the economies of the two nations. (Pipes testimony of Liebert, R. 8417.)

The reporter ARAI said that the Empire's basic policy towards Manchukuo is found in the Rescript of March 1933 on the withdrawal from the League of Nations, and in the Japanese-Manchurian Agreement of September 1932, whereby Japan recognized and respected Manchukuo's independence and agreed to help her progress and development by maintaining an inseparable relationship between the two countries. (8419) He said that Japan had established the right to garrison Japanese troops permanently in Manchukuo; that, in the diplomatic field, it was agreed in the official documents exchanged at the time of the establishment of the Manchurian Empire, that "Manchuria should submit beforehand all diplomatic and military matters to the Japanese Government for thorough and unreserved deliberation." (8420)

ARAI noted that the Japanese Government had no formal voice in the management of the economic problems in Manchuria which had important relations with that of Japan, especially in the supervision of the Japanese-Manchurian joint concerns relating to the important industries of that country. (8420) He said that it was necessary for Japan to gain a formal voice in the economic field in Manchukuo through the establishment of cooperative measures based upon an organization. Consequently, a pact was concluded providing for the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee with an "annex" giving the precise details of the agreement. (8421)

I. The agreement provided: 1) A Joint Economic Cormittee will be established permanently in Hsinking, Manchukuo. (8421) 2) The committee will deliberate on and answer all questions on all important matters concerning the economic tie of the two countries and the supervision of the business of the Japanese-Manchurian joint special corporation. The two governments can not settle any of the above matters until they have been submitted to the committee for deliberation. (8422) 3) The Committee may make proposals to the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo on any matter concerning the economic unification of the two countries. (8422) 4) The organization and operation of the committee will be prescribed in the Annex. 5) In case of difference in interpretation, the matter will be settled according to the Japanese text. (8422)

II. The Annex provided: 1) The committee shall consist of eight members, four from each country. (8422) 2) The Chairman of the committee will be elected at every meeting by mutual vote among the members. (8423) 3) Not material. 4) All matters will be decided by a majority vote, the chairman having the right to vote as a member, and in case of a tie, he has the right to make the decision. (8423)

III. The agreement also provided for certain "understood matters": (8423)

- 82 -

1) Japan's permanent members of the committee shall consist of the Chief of Kwantung Army, the Chief Councillor in full service at the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo, the Chief of the Kwantung Bureau and one member specially appointed by the government. (8423)

The Manchukuo members shall consist of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Finance, and the Head of the General State Affairs. (8424)

2) The important matters to be deliberated by the committee are connected with the economies of the two governments and are the export-import and tariff problems; the development and control of the important industries; the enactment and amendment of laws concerning the establichment of a special Japanese-Manchurian Joint Corporation; investment; and other important problems concerning the economic connection of the two governments which are within the power of the Manchurian Government. The matters important to the economic ties of both governments, but which are within Japan's power, will not be taken up by this committee but will be made into unilateral contracts binding only the Hanchurian Government. (8424)

3) The important matters to be deliberated by the committee concerning the supervision of the business of the special Japanese-Manchurian Joint concern include: "the important amendments in the regulations of corporations, the purpose of which is to materialize important industries concerned with economic unity of both governments, and which have been established according to the laws of one of two countries and more than half of whose capital has been raised by the government; citizens, or juridical persons of the opposite government; the disposition of the profit of said corporation and the recognition of the decision to amalgamate or dissolve." (2425)

The reporter pointed out that the agreement bound only the Manchurian Government on this point (preceding paragraph) because, at that time, there was no corporation established according to Japanese law with more than half of Manchurian investment. (8425)

The Reporter concluded by saying that "Due to the existence in the document of such one-sided articles binding only Manchukuo, the authorities have declared, after an agreement brought forth by the two governments, to have this point kept secret." (8425)

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The investigation committee unanimously approved the proposed agreement. (8426)

- 83 -

MOTODO, in discussing the agreement, wanted to know if it was proper to set the investments in both countries in the Japanese-Manchurian joint concerns on an equal basis, and he noted that the chairman not only had a right to vote but also had the power of decision. (8426) He thought that the agreement was not complete because questions could be decided by the chairman alone. (8427)

Foreign Minister HIROTA (the Accused) replied that "three out of the four from Manchukuo are ministers and the remaining one is the Chief of the General State Affairs who is, and will be a Japanese forever, I am confident." (8427) Therefore, "in case of a difference of opinions between the two countries, it cannot be imagined that he will make any decision that will be disadvantageous to Japan." (8428) While "the set up of the committee may apparently seem equal on the part of both countries but in reality, it is not." (8428)

SAKATOTO agreed with Councillor MOTODA and said that, since a Japanese is to be appointed as Chief of the General State Affairs for Manchukuo, he would do his duty as a Japanese, but if he should act in favor of Japan, in case of an opposition of the two countries' interests, he would incur the ill-feeling of the Manchukuoan people. Therefore Japan could not be too sure that he would not act against her interests. (8429)

HIROTA replied that the Chief of the General State Affairs in Manchukuo, who is the general manager of the Japanese officials there, is employed by the Manchukuoan Government to guide it, and he is, at the same time, a leading instrument dispatched to Manchukuo by Japan; therefore, "he must perform both duties, and it is his primary duty to see that there will not be any opposition between Japan and Manchukuo." (8430) Consequently, he continued, if the "Manchukuo members of the committee should scheme to act against Japan's interest after the committee is formed, the Chief of the General State Affairs will take proper measures after giving due consideration to the interests of both countries. It will be his duty to lead Manchukuo in such a way that such fear would be unnecessary." (8430)

The discussion ended and the whole council decided in favor of the agreement which was signed on 15 July 1935.

Exhibit 851 sets forth the agreement regarding the establishment of the Joint Economic Committee of Japan and Manchukuo. (8433-8435)

- 84 -

FRIVY COUNCIL (1936)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record pare	Corr's Summery
479	20 November	5,931	40

Present

Vice President of Privy Council JPAI, Mentaro

Councillors:

Count KANTHO, Kentero Manal, Miseo Viscount ISHII, Kikujiro aFIMA, Ryokitsu MAPA, Yoshimichi MOTODA, Hejime ISLITAKA, Eizo Paron HAYASHI, Gonsuke

<u>Decision</u>

Decided that the conduct of negotiations for an alliance with Germany (Anti-Committern Pact) was to be transferred from the general staff of the Japanese army to the Foreign Ministry.

Romarks

Shortly efter the conclusion of the Fongolian-Union of Soviet Socialist Fact of mutual assistance in April 1936, the conduct of negotiations for an alliance with Germany was transferred from the general staff of the Japanesé Army to the Foreign Minister. (Introductory Remarks - 5930)

The Investigation Report on the conclusion of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Fact said that "Therefore, as the first step for executing the above foreign policy, the Government planned coordination with Germany and since the spring of this year has instructed the Japanese Ambassedor to Germany to carry on negotiations with the representative officials of the German Government along the line of joint defense against the red peril. As a result of t is negotiation, both governments have come to an understanding that such a Fact should be established for the above mentioned coordination." (5931)

- 85 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1936)

Exhibit No. Date

Record rage

Carr's Summary

i.

40

484 20 November 5,958

Present

Vice Finident of Privy Council ARAI, Kentaro

Councillors:

Count KANEKO, Kentaro KAWAI, Misai Viscount ISHII, Kikujiro ARIMA, Ryokitsu HARA, Yoshimichi MOTODA, Hajime ISHIZUMA, Eizo Baron HAYASHI, Gonsuke

Decision

The Investigation Committee of the Frivy Council unani 100 Fr ly recommended that the German-Japanese Fact against the Communist Internationale and the secret attached Pact against the Soviet Union be approved by the Frivy Council. (Exhibit 485, herein, is the record of the Minutes of the Frivy Council on 25 November 1936, at which meeting the Fact was approved by the Council. (5967)

Remarks

According to the report of the Investigation Committee, the Japanese-German Pact was comprised of two pacts: A Pact against the Communist Internationale and a secret attached Pact against the Soviet Union.

1. The Pact against the Communist Internation be had for its object cooperation for the defense against the destructive communistic activities of the Communist Internation 16. The powers agreed "to exchange information on the activities of the Comintern, consult with each other in adopting necessary defensive measures and achieve these defensive measures through close cooperation." (5958) They also agreed to take defensive measures uses against third countries whose internal peace was threatened by the Comintern's destructive activities. (5959) A standing committee was to be established to study and discuse various measures necessary for proventing the Comintern's destructive operations. (5959) The duration of the Pacts was set for five years. (5959) (See R 5934 for The Pact) II. The Secret Pact attached to the Fact against the Communist Internationale had for its object "the protection of the common interests of Japan and Germany against the armed pressure exerted by the Soviet Union." (5960) It was agreed that "in case one of the signatory powers is attacked or threatened with attack by the Soviet Union without provocation, the other signatory party shall refrain from taking any measure likely to result in any diminution of the burden of the Soviet Union's position, and the two signatories shall immediately discuss measures to be taken for the protection of their mutual interests." (5960) They also agreed not to conclude during the continuation of the Pact any political treaties with the Soviet Union which contravened the spirit of the Pact without mutual consent. (5960) (See R 5936 for the "Secret Attached Agreement To The Agreement Against The Communist INTER-NATIONALE")

In the Appendix to the Pact, Nos. 1 and 2 of the official notes exchanged prescribed that the political treaties mentioned in Article 2 of the Fact do not include the Fishery Treaty, the Concession Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union, and the treaty concerning boundary line problems between Japan, Manchuria and the Soviet Union.

Official Notes Nos. 3 and 4 confirmed the German Government's view that the rticles in such political treaties as the Rapello Treaty of 1922 and the Neutrality Pact of 1923 between Germany and the Soviet Union did not "conflict with the spirit of this Fact and Germany's obligations arising from this Pact as long as the object is not lacking in the situation at the time of the enforcement of this Pact." (5961)

It was agreed that the Pact and the attached official notes were to be kept secret. (5961)

The reporter referred to the explanation of the Competent Kinisters: (1) "Jepan's cooperation with Germany for this particular object through this Pact in no way whetever implies that Jepan fully approves of that country's principles in respect to her internal affairs or that Japan will act in concert with her. In order to prevent any suspicion and misunderstanding at home and abroad regarding this point, the Government will clarify the purport of the Fact and also do its best to take other appropriate measures at the same time as it publishes such parts of the Pact as are to be made public...(2) Since the object of this Pact is, as mentioned above, simply to make it an instrument for preparing for the Comintern and the Seviet Union, we on our side should of course refrain even after the conclusion of this Fact, from taking any positive measure which might aggravate relations with the Soviet Union." (5962) 3) Regarding Sino-Japanese negotiations which were in progress at that time, "The f ct that the conclusion of the Pact will further strengthen Japan's position ought to prove quite effective in making China decide her attitude. We are not without expectations, therefore,

- 87 -

I boing able to use this situation for promoting developments in the Sino-Japanese negotiations favorable to ourselves. The Government is resolved to leave nothing undere in its measures for coping with the situation," (5963) 4) The conclusion of the Fact is "due to the recent political changes in Germany and the establishment of the Nazi regime," (5964) which is "stoadily chieving success in both internal administration and diplomacy, and his won a firm hold on the confidence of a large number of people, thanks to its unique principle, without resorting to revolutionary behavior." (5964) There is no like-lihood of its collapse. Consequently, effective results from the Fact will be secured in the future. (5964) 5) The wording of the statements contained in Official Notes Nes. 2 and 3 of the Appendix to the second Pact is somewhat deficient in clarity but "they confirm the view of the German Government that among the articles in the Rapallo Pact and the Neutrality Fact existing between Germany and the Soviet Union, those which conflict with the spirit of the present Jepanese-German ' Fact and Germany's obligation arising thereunder will become invalid as the result of the extinction of their object in the light of the situation prevalent when the Pact is enforced. There is no doubt on this point, as may be judged from the fact that during the course of the magnituding on the present Pact, our embassiders to Germany wired the following telegram to our Equipped minister after obtaining the assent of the representative of the Gorman Government. 'I have the firm conviction that the spirit of this pact will prove to be the sole basis of Germany's future policy towards the Soviet Union. " (5965)

The reporter concluded by stating that, "although serious consideration should of course be given to the v ricus probable internal as well as external influences of this Fact, it is rather a timely measure for Japan, in consideration of the present international situation, to conclude the present Fact and cooperate with Germany as one of the counter-measures for defending themselves from and ch cking the aggressive pressure of the Communist Internationals and the Soviet Union." (5966)

See Exhibit 435 herein for the Minutes of the Frivy Council on the Pact.

The Secret Attached Pact appears on Fage 5936 of The Record. The Substance of the Secret Pact can be found in II above.

Exhibit 483 Z, an issue of the Tokyo Gazotte, contains a statement of the Bureau of Information showing that Japan proclaimed to the world that the Japanese-German agreement was not directed toward any particular country. (5957)

Exhibit 484, above, proves that the Fact was nimed at the U.S.S.R. and was designed to strongthen the hand of Japan in China. (5957)

PRIVY COUNCIL (1936)

Exhibit No. Date Record Page Carr's Summary 485 25 November 5,967 40 Present HIROHITO, The Emperor HIRANULA, President

ARAI, Viće-President

State Ministers

HIROTA NAGANO TERAUCHI HAYASHI BABA MAEDA **USHIO**

SHIHADA TANO! OGI NAGATA HIRAO OGA^{yr}A ÀRITA

Councillors

KANEKO KURODA SAKURAI KAWAI SUZUKI, Kantaro ARIMA

HARA **JSHIWATARI** KUBOTA SHIPUZU MOTODA FUJISAWA SUZUKI, Soroku ISHIZUKA HAYASHI KAMIYAMA SAKAMOTO

Explanators

KURIYA!'A TOGO

Reporter - ARAI

Clerks or Secretaries

MURAKAHI HORIE HUTO

SUITA

HCR1NOUCHI

Decision

The Privy Council unanimously approved the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1936.

Remarks

See Exhibit 484 for the report of the Investigation Committee concerning this Pact.

- 89 -

about "the worst results to counteract the Japan-Germany Pact

this Foreign Minister ARITA said that the government's policy was to strenuously avoid any outbreak of an affair with Soviet Russia after the conclusion of the Pact, (5968) but that, if there should arise any danger of an outbreak of var between Japan and Soviet Russia, there was still room to push the discussion beyond the provisions of the Fact. (5969) He pointed out that Soviet Russia "had to consider the fact that she has to face both Japan and Germany, and for that reason I believe that even if Japan's military preparations should not be adequate, Russia will not initiate any affair." (5969)

ARITA replied to Councillor HARA's question, regarding the plan not to announce the Pact until the signing of the Russo-Japanese Fishery Treaty was complete, by saying that there were many rumors about a coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy and because of these rumours the Soviet Ambassador called at the Foreign Ministry and inquived whether or not they were true. (5970) ARITA said that he did not deny the rumors entirely and explained Japan's policy of defense against communism, in furtherance of which policy negotiations were going on, and that, since the cooperation was to be confined to the checking of Bolshevic operations, it would be no obstacle to the friendly relations of Japan and Russia. (5970) ARITA also said that he was of the opinion that the Soviet Government had conjectured the existence of some form of secret agreement other than that against communism, (5970) pointing cut that Russia postponed the signing of the Fishery Treaty; but, concluded ARITA, when the Pact is announced and it becomes clear to Russia that the Pact is intended to be against the Comintern, Russia would sign the Fishery Treaty, particularly as the Pact was not entirely unexpected by her (5971).

Chairman HIRANUNA, the Accused, announced that the draft was unanimously approved. (5972)

Exhibit 36 is a basic document, being the Pact against the Communist International and Accessory Protocol, parts of which appear on pages 5934-5938.

See Exhibit 484 herein for a more complete discussion of the matter.

- 90 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1937)

20 January

Exhibit No. Date Carr's Summary Record page

909-A

9,158-B

42

Present

Chairman HIRANUMA Vice Chairman ARAI

Ministers

HIROTA HAYASHI TANOMOGI OGA"'A NAGANO BABA

NAGATA ARITA TERAUCHI SHILADA HIRAO

Councillors

KANEKO KA"'AI ARIMA MOTODA ISHIWATA HAYASHI

KURODA SUZUKI, Kantaro HARA SUZUKI, Soroku SHILIZÚ MINAN'I

SAKURAI ISHII KUBOTA ISHIZUKA FUJISAWA TANAKA

Decision

Decided that naval officers could be appointed as Administrators of the South Sea Islands.

Renarks

The Exhibit was offered to show that the decision was made in furtherance of Japan's plan for fortifying the Mandated Islands.

Reporter MURAKAHI said that "Upon investigating this bill prudently, we find that the South Seas Government, in conform-ity with a fixed plan covering several years, is executing various measures concerning the expansion of colonization, promotion of industries and good organization of communications for the purpose of developing the South Sea Archipelagoes that are under its jurisdiction. In view of the fact that the South Sea Archipelagoes have come to hold an important position at this time in the national defense of the Empire in the light of the recent international situation, and because there are many installations concerned with the navigation routes, harbours, roads, aviation and communications of the said archipelagoes, which will require a special consideration of the archipelagoes, convenience and military circumstances of

our Navy, it is necessary to provide a way to enable the special appointment of naval officers as the administrative officials who are to be in charge of the transportation and communication affairs in the said government." (9158-B, 9158-C)

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"And in appointing the naval officers in active service as administrative officers in the South Seas Government in accordance with this provision, a special rule will be established through the Imperial Ordinance concerning this bill in order to prevent them from being subjected to the restriction of rank of senior civil officials and be lowered in their official ranks. The rule will provide that in case of appointing a higher official on duty for the administrative office of the South Seas Government in accordance with the aforementioned rule of appointment, his rank will be made an exception in accordance with the Senior Civil Service Official Transfer Rule." (9158-C, 9158-D)

PRIVY COUNCIL (1937)

Record page

4,735

Carr's Summary

49

Present

Attendance not stated in Exhibit

Date

19 July

Decision

See Remarks.

Exhibit No.

384

Remarks

Exhibit 384 is a communication from the Undersecretary of Treasury, Washington, D.C., May 31, 1946 to the Secretary of War regarding the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration, being particularly a report from a Treasury Attache at Shanghai dated October 27, 1937 entitled "Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration, its organization, activities and opium conditions in Manchukuo in 1937." (4731)

The report makes reference to a meeting of the Privy Council of Manchukuo on July 19, 1937 at which meeting new laws were approved by the Privy Council in Manchukuo according to which the manufacture, sale, importation and exportation of various narcotics were strictly forbidden without permission from the government of Manchukuo. These laws were passed as the result of "'noise" started by the League of Nations when it openly placed the responsibility for the manufacture of 'illegal' narcotics in the Far East on the Japanese-Manchukuo Governments." (4734-4735) They were issued mainly to assist the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration in controlling the use of narcotics, and not as a drive against the opium and narcotic habits as was claimed by Manchukuoan Premier CHANG CHING-HUI in his official declaration published in Hsingkiang on August 11, 1937. (4736) The new laws brought no new restrictions but did give more power to the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administration. (4738)

- 93 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1937)

1

Exhibit No.	Date	Record	oare	Carr's Summary
492 6	November	6,034		56
		Present		
Vice	President President	HIRANUMA ARAI		
	Sta	te Ministers		
KONOE HIROTA BABA YONAI SHIONO SUGIYAMA			NAGAI KAYA ARIMA YOSHINO MAKAJIMA OTANI	
	Co	uncillors		
SAKURAI KAWAI SUZUKI, Kantaro ARIMA HARA	ISH			IKA
	Co	ommittee		
FUNADA MORIYAMA HORIUCHI MITANI			INOUYE OKUBO YAMAJI ABE MATSUZAKA	

Reporter - ARAI

Secretaries

MURAKAMI HORIE MUTO

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- 94 -

Decision

Decided to allow Italy to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Remarks

This treaty was foreshadowed by Article 2 of the Japan-German Anti-Comintern Pact. As a ratter of form a new treaty was agreed to between Japan, Germany and Italy separately from the original Pact between Japan and Germany, so that, if Italy receded from the new Treaty, the former one would still be in effect. (6035) The Provisions of both Pacts are virtually the same. (6036) Italy did not agree to the secret Pact annexed to the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded between Japan and Germany. (6038; 6039)

See Exhibit 485 herein for the records of the Minutes of the Privy Council on 25 November 1936, at which the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany was approved.

Exhibit 36 is the Protocol admitting Italy to the Anti-Comintern Pact dated 6 November 1937. (6036)

See Exhibit 491 (1939) herein for the record of the Minutes of the Privy Council on the bill admitting Hungary and Manchuria to the Anti-Comintern Pact. (6037) This Exhibit also shows a qualitative strengthening of the Pact..

Exhibit 493 is the protocols admitting to the Pact Manchukuo on 24 February 1939, and Spain on the 27th March, 1939. (6045)

PRIVY COUNCIL (1038)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	<u>Carr's Summary</u>	
486-D	ll January	5,995	60	
Present				

Attendance not stated in Exhibit.

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Frhibit 4°6-D is a telegram from Dirksen to the German Reich Minister dated 11 January 1938 stating that he had a "reliable report, that today's Privy Council (Defense contended that it should be "Imperial Council'; matter referred to Language Section) is said to have decided upon the following action in case the Japanese conditions are refused: Declaration of war, denial of the NANKING Government and substitution of the provisional government of Peking, the continuance of military operacions. To support this operation, new supply-sniorants are now going to the front." (5995)

96

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PRIVY COUNCIL (1938)

Exhibit Nc.	Date	Record rage	Carr's Sumary
271	2 November	3,641	80

Present

President HIRANULA Vice President NARA

State Ministers

MENUYE	NAKAJ11'A
YCNAI	KIDO
SHIONO	SUETSUGU
ARAKI	ITAGAKI
NAGAI	HATTA
ARIMA	ARITA

Councillors

KANEKO	SUZUKI	TAMAKA
SAKURAI	ISHIZUKA	NARA
KAWAI	SHIMIZU	ARGEI
ISHII	FUJISAWA	LATSUI
ARIMA	HAYASHI	SUGAWARA
KUBOTA	MINAMI	MATSUUTA

Committee

FUNADA MORIYAMA MITANI

.

HIRCSE HAYASHI NARITA

Reporter - HARA

Secretaries

MURAKAFI HORIE TAKATSUJI

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Decision

The Investigation Committee of the Frivy Council and the Privy Council unanimously passed the resolution to terminate the cooperative relations between the Jay mess Eng reaction various organs of the League of Mations.

Remails

HIRANUMA, the decused, op ded inc modelag.

The reporter was HARA whose report was as follows:

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The Jepanese Empire notified the League of Nations of its withdrawal therefrom in March, 1933. However, the Japanese Government continued to cooperate in the various peaceful and humane undertakings of the League in compliance with the aims of the Imperial Rescript which was promulgated at the time of the withdrawal of the notice. (3644) The Government of Japan or individuals in a private capacity, continued to participate in the League's Permanent Mandate Commission, Advisory Commission on Traffic and Opium, Central Opium Commission, Advisory Commission on Social Problems, Joint Commission on Arts and Science, Economic Commission, Health Commission, and Oriental Epidemic Information Bureau. They were also affiliated with the Internattional Labor Office and participated in the organization of the International Court of Justice, as well as in the General Disarmament Conference and the World Economic Conferences which were sponsored by the League of Nations. (3645)

However, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident, China presented a formal appeal to the League of Nations on 12 September 1937. The Assembly and the Council of the League resolved that the actions of the Japanese Empire against China were direct violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Antiwar Pact. (3645) The League promised moral support to China and encouraged every nation in the League to give individual assistance to China. It adopted various resolutions intended to censure the Japanese Empire because Japanese forces bombed defenseless cities and utilized poisoned gas. (3646) The effect of the resolutions was insignificant because of the indifferent attitude of the various countries and the impotency of the League itself. (3646)

The Council of the League, in compliance with China's request, made the "stipulations of the 17th Article of the Covenant applicable to the Sino-Japanese Incident; specifically, for the settlement of disputes, nations which are non-members of the League will bear the same responsibility as nations which are l'embers of the League." (3646)

On 30 September 1938 the Japanese Government refused the invitation of the Council which, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 17 of the Covenant, adopted a resolution whereby each member of the League could resort to sanctions against Japan individually, as provided in the 16th Article of the League Covenant. (3647) Consequently, as long as the decision of the Council stands, from the standpoint of national honor, the further cooperation of the Japanese Empire with the various organs of the League of Nations could not be tolerated. (3647)

- 98 - .

Japan will continue the mandatory rule of the South Sec Islands in accordance with the 22nd Article of the League Covenant and the mandatory rule article. Therefore, in accordance with paragraph 7, Article 22 of the League Covenant, the annual report to the League Council had been nucle as usual. Hereafter, however, government representatives will not attend the sessions of the Permanent Mandates Commission, an organ of the League. (3648)

There was no discussion on the bill which was pessel unanimously.

Article 17 of the league Covenant provides that, in the event of a dispute between a member of the League (Chira, Fr this case) and a state which is not a member of the League (Japan), the state not a member of the League shall be invited to accept the obligation of membership for the purpose of any dispute. It further provides that, if a state so invited shall refuse the invitation and shall report to war against the member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable.

Article 16 provides for the adoption of sanchuons commute a nation which resorts to war.

Article 22 of the League Covenant refers to the <u>Handebed</u> Islands and provides that, in every case of mandal, the mandatories shall render to the Council in annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge, it also provides that a permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and review these reports.

Exhibit 2264 is an extract from Kidd's Diary of 2 November 1938 stating that he attended a meeting of the Privy Council where it was decided to cense cooperating with the various bodies of the League of Nations. (16231)

- 99 -

		F	PRIVY CCUN (1938)	CIL		
SXL	<u>ibit No</u> .	Date	Record	Para	Carr	3 SUBRIERY
589	9	22 November	6,573		83	
			Fresent			
		Fra	osror HIRO sident HI e-Preside	RANCEA		
		Sta	te Linist	er:		
		KONON SHIONO ARANI NAGAL ARIMA			N. FAJINA RUDO GUDTSUGU IFAGANI HATTA	
			Councillo	r 3		
KAV	URI, Kant UII MA	ero	SUZUKI, S ISHIJUNA FUJISINA HAMASHI LIRAGI TANAKA			o del Calei Alteu Cegutari Llebora

Explainers

FUNADA MORIYADA MITANI

!

MICHIYI YAYIKIWI

Reporting Member - HARA

Clerks or Secretaries

LURAKAMI HORIE TAKATSUJI

Decision

The Privy Council passed a resolution that an agroement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany be applied.

Remarks

It was pointed out that the German Generanish proposed the cultural agreement so as to "leg, lize whe solid htenmest of cultural relationship between the two nations, thus leading to furthering the promotion of the cause and provoking to strengthen (sic) all the more our tie of friendship."(6574)

ISHIZUK. wanted to know what was embraced in the term "the racial and national life of Germany." He said that, according to German nationalism or Naziism, the "German race is attempting to unify and assimilate wen those people who inhabit other nations while banning another race even though living in her own country." (6575) He also sold that, although nothing directly was stated in regard to politier, the agreement might bring about some kind of influence politically. (6576)

Foreign Minister MRITA replied that "the racial and nationalistic life of Germany is non-other than the singular spirit of Germany. The reason for the adoption of the tolwas because of the firm insistence on the part of Germany at the outset of negotiations, explaining that their characteristic spirit being phenominized (sic) in the racial and national life of Germany, it should be made the essence of her culture." (6576) He further replied that the agroement recognized that cultural relations of Japon and Germany formed the basis of the characteristic spirits of each respective nation; therefore, it we unlikely that there would be furpolitical influence. (6576)

ISHIZUKA said that it was concervable that during the long life of the agreement there is a possibility that politics will be influenced, and he pointed out that there was a tendency in Japan at that time "to go with the German stream"; therefore, there should be come means to guard teather all possible mistake on the part of Japan before the agreement was concluded. (6577)

Exhibit 38 is the agreement for cultivel cooperation between Japan and Italy concluded on 23 March 1939 and its provisions are virtually the same as those of the cultural agreement between Japan and Germany, (6577)

Exhibit 37 is the treaty concluded on 25 November 1958 between Japan and Germany pertaining to cultural cooperation (6570)

Exhibit 590 is the Program for the Opening Session of the German-Japanese Cultural Committee. (6579)

- 101 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1938)

Record page

3,585

Exhibit No.

259

Data Record

Carr's Summary

84

Fresent

No names mentioned in the Exhibit.

29 Hovember

Decision

See remarks.

Renerks

Exhibit 269 is the report of the Foreign Minister ARITA to the Privy Council at its meeting on 29 November 193d dealing with Japan's foreign policy towards China.

ARITA reported that, as to the policy regarding the adjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations, the government intended to proceed on the basis of the following three points, with a view to establishing a new order in East Asia through mutual collaboration in political, economic and cultural fields among Japan, Manchukuo and China:

I - The problem of making peace with the CHIANG KAISHEY regime.

The British Ambassador to Japan unofficially proposed to Premier KONOYE the mediation of the China problem. It is Japan's policy not to mediate at this time, whether the proposal is made through the mediation of a third party or directly from the CHIANG KAISHEK government. However, Japan, as previously stated on November 3, 1939, will give a different consideration to the matter "if the CHIANG KAISHEK government should abandon its pro-Comintern and anti-Japanese policy, reform the composition of its organization, and voluntarily dissolve its regime and merge with the New Central Government a different consideration would be given to the matter." (3591)

II - The adjustment of diplomatic relations with the New Central Government.

Japan will foster "the establishment of a solid new central republic on the basis of a oro-Japanese regime which has been already established and others which are scheduled to be newly established in Hankow andCenton, and, after the New Central Government has been firmly established, we how e to achieve the following programs with the New Central Government": (3592)

A. The realization of the principle of general colleboration among Japan, Manchukuo and China, and particularly the principles of noighborly friendship, joint defense against the Comintern, and economic cooperation. (3592) Neighborl friendship involves the following points:

(1) The recognition of Manchukuo by China and the establishment of new approxitic relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China. Foth Japan and Manchukuo shall respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China. (3503)

(2) In the fields of politics, diplomary, education, propaganda and trado, Japan, Manchukuo and China shall remove and prohibit, in the future, measures and causes which mutually destroy the friendly relations among them. (3593) The three countries shall cooperate with each other to create and develop their culture. (3593)

E. The ostablishment in North China and Mengchiring (that is, Mongolia and Singkiang) of a zone of a high degree Elno-Japanese unity in defense and economic scheres, especially in the development and utilization of natural resources. In addition, there will be established in Mengchiang a special military and political zone for anti-Comintern purposes. (3592)

Regarding the principle of joint defense the following program will be adopted:

(1) Cooperation against the Comintern. (3594)

(2) The Japanese Army will be stationed in North China and Mengchiang for the purpose of enforcing the joint defense against the Comintern. (3594)

(3) The conclusion of a Sino-Japonese military alliance against the Comintern. (3594)

(4) The early withdrawal of Japanose troops, except the stationing of troops in special zones, points and islands for the purpose of guaranty and the maintenance of public peace and order. (3594)

(5) Financial cooperation on the part of China with respect to the stationing of Japanese troops. (3594)

(6) The reservation of military demands and the right of supervision of railways, aviation, communication, principal harbors, waterways, etc., and cooperation in the improvement and adjustment of the Chinese Army and police force. (3595)

(7) Regarding the principle of economic cooperation, the three countries shall, in order to make up each other's deficiencies and so as to supply each other's needs in respect to industry and economics, conclude agreements concerning the development of resources, customs, trade, aviation, transportation, communication, meteorological observations and surveys in the three countries. In the development and utilization of natural resources, emphasis shall be laid on the securing from North China and Mongchiang of those resources, ospecially underground resources, which Japan and Manchukuo lack. (3595) Japan shall render such financial aids to China as may be required to establish her financial and economic policios and, in order to promote fair trade among the three countries, appropriate customs and maritime customs system shall be adopted. (3596)

III - Interests and Rights of other Powers in China.

Due to military necessities, some restrictions have been imposed respecting the rights and interests of other powers in China. Regarding Great Britain's and the United States' recent representations, based on the principle of open door and equal opportunity, it is the intention of the government to ro-examine this "principle from the standpoint of the establishment of a Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc based upon the necessities for the existence and defense of our Empire, and of not recognizing such a principle within the extent that it is incompatible with this standpoint." (3579) In this respect, concrately, our chief objects are that a), Japan shall control, in substance, the development of natural resources in North China and Mengchiang, b) the currency system, customs and maritime customs system in new China shall be adjusted from the standpoint of the Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc. (3597) "So long as the powers' rights and interests in China do not conflict with the foregoing two objects, we will not exclude and restrict them." (3597) Wo will welcome the carticipation in the economic development of new China of countries which, like Germany and Italy show a friendly attitude towards Japan. (3597)

Regarding the "diplomatic policy towards the third powers, in view of the attitude of Britain, the United States and France of interfering with Japan's policy towards China by bringing out the Nine Power Treaty, we shall endeavor to roject the idea of disposing of the Chinese problem by the Nine-Power Treaty and other collective machinery." (3598)

- 104 -

"At the same time, with the object of forcing the powers individually to understand the facts of our policy toward China and either voluntarily support our country's attitude or at least stand by idly through the reinforcements of the anti-Comintern exis of Japan, Germany and Italy, and disposing of the China Affair as quickly and clearly as possible, we wish to adopt measures according to the following outline": (35.8)

(1) To strengthen the political relations emong Japan. Germany and Italy, and the economic cooperation emong Japan, and Manchukup on the one side and Germany and Italy on the other. (3598)

(3) "To strive, through the powerful and clear discosition of the China Affair, to make Britain, the United States and France understand do facto our policy toward China and individually abardon their past rolicy of aiding the Chiang Kat-sher regime and their idea of disposing of the dest Asiavia question by moune of collective machinery . As the problement of these moves against the scove three countries, purticularly Britain, utilization should be made of the guarantee of their rights and intersets in China, besides the edepsion of great diplusatic measures, such *especially waisst Britain, besides big diplomatic "was the relatorconent of the anti-Comintern Fact emong Japan, Guinang, and Italy. However, in order to evoid unnecessary frictions, those individual junding cases which are harmless to the superior position occupied by Jepan in East Asia shall be settled one after enother." (8599,

(3) To carry out every possible measure for making the Soviet Union refrain from actively participating in the present Affair. (3599)

#* words botween asterisks not in original.

- 105 -

FRIVY COUNCIL (1939)

Exhibit No.	Date	<u>Record Page</u>	Carris Summary
491	22 February	4,037	91

Present

The Emperar HIRAHITO President KOROZ Vics President H.R.

State Ministers

HIRANUMA SHIONO JTAGAKI APITA

deancillors

RAMA SU2UKI, Aentaro IGHCII ARIKA AUBOTA IGNIZUKI FUHDI

BUZURT, Soroan Shimiyu Pujisaya Minami Tanasa Ahasa CALKI JULTSUI SUOUMIRI MATSUURI USHIO MAYASHI, Rat Zaburo 1

Linear Strategy

1 1

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<u>Se oosition</u>

NUROSIKI KU MORIYALA MI HARA

KURIHARA MIPANI

Secretaries or Clerk

MUPAKANT

HORIE

TAKATSUJI

<u>l'ecision</u>

The Privy Council unanimously agreed to the participation of Hungary and Menchuria in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Romarks

The Exhibit was offered for the purpose of showing a quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Fact. (6030)

HIRANUMA was present as Premier and ITAGAKI as War Minister.

ISHIZUK. asked if there was any intention to strengthen qualitatively the substance of the Fact, beside increasing the number of participating countries; and whether, because of the changed international situation, Japan urged Italy to take part in the secret pact, pointing out that a secret pact with Hungary and Hanchukuo was unnecessary because their borders were contiguous to the Soviet Union. (6038)

ARITA replied that the Pact was to be strongthened cuantitatively by the addition of Manchukuo and Hungary and pessibly by some other third power in Europe; it will be strengthened in substance by not only exchanging information but also by cooper ting in economic and financial relations, a study of which is being made; negotiations to this and are to commence shortly with the countries concerned (6038, 6039)

He also replied that, at the present time, the Government is only considering strengthening the substance of the Fact as above montioned. Neither Italy, Manchukup or Hunger: are to participate in the secret pact. (6039)

ISHIZUKA inquired whother Itely, when she joined the Pact between Japan and Cormany did not join it because she did not know of its existence, or because she did not want to take part in it, although she knew of its existence. He pointed out that according to the bill, Menchukue and Hung v are to conclude separately a pact with Japan, Italy and Cermany each (6041) There can be no close relations between Manchukue and Hungary, he continued, because there is no direct ogreement between them. He noted that, "according to the explanation of the Fireign Ministry, Manchukue and Hungary will take part in the already existing Comintern Pact through separate arrangements, as a matter of form, but in consequence of it these five countries will form a single bedy in respect to that Pact." (6041). He wanted to know how that could be performed between Manchukue and Hungary. (6041)

ANTL replied by saying that, since he was not a State minister at the time, he did not know the details regarding the signing of the Fact, but he heard that Italy did not join the secret Yact because she did not know of its existence. (6042) Regarding the substance of the Fact, he said its strongthening will be planned among Japan, Italy and Germany (6042) manchukuo, Hungery and any other countries, which may join the Fact in the future, will not be considered when the matter of the strongthening of the Pact is under consideration. (6042) He also s id that he believed close relations could be maintained between Manchukuo and Hungery, even though they have concluded no direct agreement with each other. Inside result of the participation of the two countries in the Japan-German Pact and the protocol attached therate and also the anti-Comintern Fact consisting of the protocol among Japan, Germany and Italy, to which Italy joined as an original signatory power, the five countries have been bound together by the inti-Comintern Fact. (6043)

- 107 -

take part in the secret pact, pointing out that a secret pact with Hungary and Manchukuo was unnecessary because their borders were contiguous to the Soviet Union. (6038)

ARITA replied that the Pact was to be strongthened cuantitatively by the addition of Manchukuo and Hungery and pessibly by some other third power in Europe; it will be strengthened in substance by not only exchanging information but also by cooper ting in economic and financial relations, a study of which is being made; negotiations to this and are to commence shortly with the countries concerned (6038, 6039)

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ARITA replied by saying that, since he was not a State Linister at the time, he did not know the details regarding the signing of the Fact, but he heard that Italy did not join the secret Fact because she did not know of its existence. (6042) Regarding the substance of the Fact, he said its strongthening will be planned among Japan, Italy and Germany (6042) Lenchukuo, Hungery and any other countries, which may join the Fact in the future, will not be considered when the matter of the strongthening of the Pact is under consideration. (6042) He also s id that he believed close relations could be maintained between Manchukuo and Hungary, even though they have concluded no direct agreement with each other. As a result of the participation of the two countries in the Jepen-German Pact and the protocol attached therato and also the enti-Comintern Fact consisting of the protocol among Japan, Germany and Italy, to which Italy joined as an original signetory power, the five countries have been bound together by the Anti-Comintern Pact. (6043) Exhibit 494 is the Protocol admitting to the Inti-Comintern Pact Manchukuc on 24 February 1939 and Spain on 27 March 1939. The material provisions of these Pacts are virtually the same as those of the original Inti-Commutern Pact. (6045)

Exhibit 496 is an official announcement of the Board of Information concerning new participants in the Anti-Comintern Pact: (6046) "In accordance with the procedure for adherence, newly provided in article 2 of the Protocol concerning the extension of validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was signed and scaled by the Plenipotentiaries of the six countries, namely, Japan, Germany, Italy, Lenchuk Hungary and Spain, on the 25th of November, 1941; seven countries, namely, China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Findand, Slovakia, Chestia and Denmark, have journed the Pactander today date (Keyember 25, 1941)." (6048)

On 25 November 1941 the date of the renewal of the inti-Comintern Post the incused howeinsfter mentioned heid certain offices as follows:

SUSHINO, Nacki, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and Councillor of the Flanning Board.

K.Y., Okinori, Finnace Minister.

AllaORA, Hoitard, Vice-President of War and Councillor of the Flanning Board.

CSETMI, Hiroshi, Imbassador to Germany.

SHIRATCRI, Tushio, Adviser to the Foreign Minister.

SHIM.DA, Shigotaro, Manister of the Navy.

SUZUKI, Teiichi, State Minister and Chief Director of the Cabinet Planning Board.

TOGO, Shigenori, dual posts of Foreign Minister and Minister of Overse's Affairs.

TOJO, Hideki, concurrently the posts of Prime Minister, Dar Minister and Home Linister.

- 108 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
551	16 Sept	6,345	147

<u>Present</u>

Exhibit shows that only the War and Navy Minister were present.

At this time TOJO was War Minister and OIKAWA Navy Minister

Decision

No decision on the above date.

Remarks

Exhibit 551 is a recital of the salient points of questions at a Privy Council meeting on 16 September 1940. Two questions were asked: (1) Is there danger of economic pressure by the United States on Japan as a result of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and (2) what preparations will be made if war breaks out between the United States and Japan? (6345)

It was replied that Japan should be ready for that occasion and should three the precautions of strengthening her international position by the conclusion of the Pact; she should also take diplomatic, economic and military measures for the purpose of procuring natural resources from the South Seas and other places which had been procured from the United States. (6345-6)

Questions asked of the Government by the Supreme Cormand of the Navy at an Imperial Conference regarding the Pact were also discussed. Four questions were asked:

(1) To what degree will the Pact contribut - to the adjustment of Japan-Soviet relations? (6346)

(2) Since, by concluding the Pact, Japan's trade relations with the United States will deteriorate, and because a Japanese-Arerican war will probably be a prolonged one, and for the reason that Japan's resources have been used up in the war with China, what are the precautions taken by Japan in order to raintain her resources? (6346)

(3) What principle does the Government have regarding cooperation with the Navy, in view of the fact that, by the conclusion of the present alliance, it is imperative that the preparation of the Navy for "a Japanese-American war be accelerated and strengthened?" (6347)

1.1

(4) In the event Japan is compelled to engage in the European War, because of the participation in this war by the United States, what measures have the Government regardin. Japan's choosing the time of outbreak of hostilities, independently. (6347)

The War Ministry said in answer to the questions, that the United States is encouraging the Chungking Government and that the Pact would prove to be a restraint upon the United States. On the other hand, through the good offices of Germany she can bring about rapprochment between the Soviet Union and Japan as a result of which Japan can quickly end the Sino-Japanese conflict, (6347-8)

The Navy Minister replied that should the Pact be concluded Germany would use its good offices in ironing out Soviet-Japanese relations in view of the then amicable relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. (6348)

As to the time to start the war, should Japan be compelled to enter it, the Government will consult the Army and Navy authorities and will confer with the German and Italian Governments. However, Japan will act independently as a matter of fact in determining the choice of time to start the war. (6348) (4) In the event Japan is compelled to engage in the European War, because of the participation in this war by the United States, what measures have the Government regarding Japan's choosing the time of outbreak of hostilities, independently. (6347)

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PRIVY COUNCIL (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Corr's Summary
552	26 September	6,350; 7,926	152

Fresent

Fresident HAFA Vice President SUZJEI

State Ministers

KONOE TOJO MATSUOKA ka 14da Olkawa

Explainers

HOSHINO MATSUMOTO TSUJI HARAGUCHI MURASE MUTO AIDA MORIYAMA ABE

Secretaries

HORIYE MOROHASHI

TAKATSUJI

Eaivy Councillors

Mapa

ARAKT

USHIO

MATSUI

SUGAWARA

MATSUURA

H.YASHI

KAWAI ISHII ARIMA KUEOTA ISHIZUKA SHIMIZU MINAMI FUKAT FUTA DAMI MANO CSHILA OBATA TAKEFOSHI MITSUCHI

<u>Decision</u>

The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council unanimously approved the Tripartite Pact.

Remarks

MATSUOK. stated that Foreign Minister RIBPENTFOF had told him that all affairs partaining to Italian-Japanese relations had so far been entrusted to Germany. (6353)

KAWAI esked about Japan's preparations to meet the situation "when the worse turns up." TOJO replied that as far as the Army was concerned, only a part of its strength would be employed in a war against the United States. (6353) He also said that the present treaty acted as a check on Russia but so long as Russo-Japanese relations had not been satisfactorily edjusted, Japan could not afford to delay preparations. (6354) He further said that Japan had enough reserve to last for "quite a while," (6354) but that he had no confidence in that respect if the war should continue "three to four years further" (6365)

Navy Minister CIKAWA said that preparations of Japan's ships for bettle had already been completed and that she had enough war materials, crude oil, in perticular, to last "for quite a while," (6354) (on the basis of full scale fleat-tofleet clashes Japan's "stock will be exhausted in the course of half a year or one year" - 6365). However, he continued, if wer baceme prolonged Japan feeed a major difficulty regarding replenishment and to meet such a possibility, facilities for the production of synthetic oil had to be expanded. (6354)

HOSHINO said that Japan was not as yet complete in the matter of self-supply and self-sufficiency of resources. According to Japan's resources mobilization plan for this year (1940), out of a total amount of 745,000,000,000 worth of material necessary, she had to depend on ¥2,000,000,000 worth from abroad, of which ¥1,900,000,000 worth had to come from the United States and Great Britain. He thought that if the war became prolonged supplies could be obtained from the Dutch Indies and Saghalin. (6354)

ISHII asked about the meaning of the term "the New Order in Europe" used in article I of the Treety. MATSUCKA said that the New Order as he interpreted it, meant "a materialization representing the preface of the treaty which embraces the spirit of Hakko-iui (all the world under one roof) recommended by the Imperial Empire." (6355)

11

Regarding the scarcity of cil, Navy Minister OIVALA said that Japan could not expect much from the production of synthetic oil and thought that oil could be imported from the Dutch East Indies and northern Saghelin through peaceful means. (6356)

MATSUOKA said that Jepan would make some compensation to Germany - a nominal sum - for her former German colonies. (6359)

MINAMI (not the Accused) wanted to know, inter alia, the real meaning of the term "greater East Asia," who proposed the present treaty, and whether or not the Government of Japan made any effort to reach an agreement with the Soviet. (6359)

- 112 -

MaTSUCKa replied:

(1) The term "Greater East Asia" refers to the area which includes French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Straits, Settlements and the Asiatic group comprising the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Caledonia, etc. (6360)

(2) The Treaty under review was proposed by Germany. (6361)

(3) Japan should "at this moment" ally herself with Germany end Italy, adjust her international relations with the Soviet Union and avoid an outbreak of hostilities between Japan and America. (6361) MATSUCKA referred to the 20,000,000 Americans of German descent "already in influential positions in the United States" and who could be manipulated in the interests of Japan. (6361) MATSUCKA further replied that if Japan did not bind herself in an allience with Germany, Britain and Germany might conclude one, thereby creating a new situation in Europe whereby they might attempt to rule over the South Seas area and other regions for their own purposes. (6362)

(4) As to why the Government did not reach an agreement with the Soviet Union as well as with Germany, MATSUOKA said that the Soviet-Japanese Fact had already been planned by the preceding Cabinet but the Soviets made excessive demands. (6363)

"The Fact under review," said Matsucke, "forms the basis of the future foreign relations of our Empire." (6363)

MINAMI inquired about finances "when hostilities between Japan and the United States break out before the China Incident is ended." (6366) Finance Minister KAWADA replied that Japan would have to look to bonds and taxes as the source of revenue and if the situation grew worse, she would have to reise funds to cover war expenditures by exercising the utrost economy in general expenditures. (6366)

SUGIMARA inquired about the relations between the treaty under review and the Anti-Comintern Pact. MATSUOXA replied that "the Anti-Comintern Fact shall be retained, (6368) and that the adjustment of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union would be considered separately. (6368)

FUKAI asked four questions to which MATSUOKA, TOJO and WONVE replied:

(1) Germany's assistance will consist of the supply of superior erms and meterials. (6371)

(2) No answer had been received from Germany regarding a protest which was supposed to have been made in connection with the Soviet-Germany Non-Agression Treaty on the ground that it infringed on the secret Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. (6371) "It is an open question whether the protest was made to Germany officially." (6371)

(3) They agreed with Hitler's statement that "against other races the survival of the fittest is the grand highroad of heaven end earth" (6371), saying that the words of the preface of the Pact that "this enables each nation of the world to have a proper place in the world" did not contradict Hitler's statment because "any race that dies out under the rule of survival of the fittest is not worth existing on this earth." (6372)

(4) The war to evoid a crisis with the United States was by taking a firm stand instead of by courting America. (6372)

FUTAGALI asked four questions to which Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replie1.

(1) (Not material).

(2) (Not material).

(3) The term "mixed expert commission" as used in the Fact means the economic expert commission and the military commission. (6373)

(4) FUTAGAMI inquired if Article 5 of the Fact means that Germany will not attack the Soviet Union even when the latter assaults Japan; whether Japan is bound to fight the Soviet Union, if a Soviet-German hostility breaks out; if such be the case would not the arrangement be unilateral, and whether the word "existing" means the date of signing. (6373) MATSUOKA replied that although there exists a non-eggression Treaty, Japan will aid Germany in the event of a Soviet-German War and Germany will assist Japan in the event of a Russo-Japanese war. (7927) Regarding the word "existing" as used in Article 5 MATSUOKA said that the present status of the Soviet Union will not be modified by the Treaty but that Japan's relations with the Soviet Union should be readjusted at a future time. (7928)

OSHIMA (not the Accused) said that in three or four years Germany might enter into hostilities with Russia and he wanted to know whether Japan and Germany were combining to cope with Russia. (6374)

MaTSUOKA replied "We do not anticipate a war with Russia. Even though the Russo-Japanese relations may be adjusted, it will hardly last for three years. After two years, it will be necessary to reconsider the relations among Japan, Germany and Russia." (7928)

- 114 -

SUZURI (not the accused) said that irrespective of whether the Fact would be concluded or not, the Japanese people must realize the inevitability of a Japanese-American war. He noted that the United States was engaged in a naval expansion program. and wanted to know the opinion of the Navy Minister on these points. (6376)

Nevy Minister OIKAWA said that Japan would win a short and decisive war. However, he said that he wished to improve the quality of the Nevy and expand her ermements as much as possible. (6376)

MITSUCHI wanted to know what measure the Government would take in order to cope with American economic pressure and the internal economic difficulties bound to follow the signing of the Fact. HOSHINO and KONOYE said that there would be Anglo-American pressure as a result of which those engaged in importing and exporting would suffer. They said that they were taking up this matter with a view to obtaining some adequate measures to deal with it. (6378)

The deliberations ended. The Investigation Committee unanimously approved the Pact. (6378)

- 115 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1940)

Exhibit Mo.	Data	Record pare	Carr's Summery
553 1030	21 Sept	6,375 9,756	259

Tresent

Fresident HARA Vice President STRUKE

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Frime Hidister FOLOYEFign Minister & Minister for
Colonization MATSUCHAWer Minister TOJOColonization MATSUCHAMinister of Education MASFIDAMinister of Sustice FALAMAFinance Minister AdWADAMinister of Communication %Navy Minister OlkulaReilway MUMATAMinister OlkulaMinister of Ariculture &
Porestry TCHICURO

Councillors

kawat	NARA	AUXAJ
Ishii	ARAKI	JUTACAMI
Af Ima	MATSUI	NANO
Kufota	SUCAHARA	OSFILIA
ishizuka	NLATSUURA	oratu
Shimizu	USHIO	Takeroshi
Mirjin	Hayashi	Mfeuchi

Committee Men

Tresident of Flamming Board HOSHINO Tresident of the Lureau of Legislation MURAGE Councillor of the Board of Legislation MORIYANA Chief of the Board of Treaty, Foreign Office MATSUMOTO Chief of the administrative Board, Ministry of Commerce & Inhustry TSUJI

Chief of Financiel Bureau, Finance Ministry, AIDA Chief of Banking Fureau, Finance Ministry MATSUKUKA Chief of Exchange Fureau, Finance Ministry HARACUGHT

Reporting Committee

ITT, Class SUZUKI, Cheirman of the Committee of Inquiry HORIYE, Executive Secretary Secretaries - MOFOH/S/II TAKATEUJI

- 116 -

Decision

The Privy Council unanimously passed a draft concerning the conclusion of a Three-Lower Treaty between Japan, Germany and Itely, ("Trepartito Feet")

Remarks

SJIKI (not the Accused) Chairman of the Investigation Committee reported as follows:

That the recent attitude of the United States towards Japan had gradually stiffened, and the attitude of the Chieng Government and other countries antagonistic to Japan have been influenced by this attitude; that, as the international position of Japan has become more and more difficult, the only way to strengthen our international position is by cooperating with countries having the same interests as Japan; that Germany, Italy and Japan are eager to provent the United States' entry into the war, so cur interests coincide; that the German proposal gived an opportunity to strengthen our cooperation with Germany and Italy without entering the present European war; that for these reasons the treaty now being deliberated was agreed to. (6380-6381)

(The Reporter than proceeded to outline the Alliance. Exhibit 43, Record 6391 is the Tripertite "Iliance. Article 3 thereof provides, inter alia, that "if and when anyone of the signatories be attacked by any Third Power not presently engaged in the present European War, or the China Incident, the other two shall aid her in any way, politically, economically or militarily.") (6392)

The Reporter continued: "We think that the proposed Japan-Germeny-Italy Three Power Treaty is based on the common interests of the three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy, and will strenthen all the more the cooperation of the three countries in working together and pushing forward in constructing a new order respectively in Greater East Asia and Europe. Furthermore it is proposed that the three countries promise to aid each other in every way against the attack of another country not at present in the war. This is indeed of unprecedented pravity for our country and there is need for deep and meture deliberation on the influence it will have on our national destiny. Nevertheless, in view of the present situation, we are forced to recognize that it (the treaty) was truly unavoidable. But there is need to take steps to prevent as far as possible, the inciting of Great Britain and America as a result of the conclusion of this threaty. At the same time, we must also make ample preparations in case by any chance worst should come to worst. The Covernment has said it will make ample efforts concerning these several points. Also, as to our country's relations with the Soviet Union, we need to make special efforts for smooth relations, and on this point also the government had declared it will exert itself for the accomplishment of its object through Germany. Hereupon, I and my colleagues place our trust in

the government's declarations and furthermore earnestly desire the government to do its utmost. Thus I and my colleagues unanimously voted that this dreft should be passed at its stands, together with the above mentioned requests." (6384-6385)

ISHII then said that "It is a conspicuous fact that there is not a single country that has gained any benefit from aligning itself with Germany and her predecessor, Trussia. Not only so, tut there are countries which, because of this alliance, have suffered unforeseen disaster and have finally lost their national entity." (6386) He also seid that "I believe that Chancellor Hitler of Nazi Germany is a character of no little danger. He is said to have taken Machiavelli as a model and alvasy has his book <u>Il Frincipe</u> as his right hand. Verily, he has declared that international alliances are a termporary expedient and has publicly stated that one should not hesitate in bracking them as soon as the time comes. For instance the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact last August, which clearly conflicts with the snti-Comintern pact that country had previously concluded with us, should from the first have occasioned no surprise. From serly years he (HITLER) had studied about the Orient, and held from the first that Japan should not be allowed to become a strong power, and it is said he often spoke of this to those close to him. From whatever angle we view it, we cannot believe that Mazi Germany under the leadership of HITLER can be a loyal friend of Japan for a long time. Next, when we consider Italy, we find her national character just as unreliable as that of Germany. From early days she has thought of herself as being the king (queen) of power politics among the European powers. Probably this is why she received no heavy damage from Germany in the last European War. (6386-6388)

"To sum it up, both Germany and Italy should not be trusted too much. Then that is my reason for agreeing to this draft, the purpose of which is to conclude an alliance with these two untrustworthy countries? In spite of the reasons I have here stated, I believe that the proposal of ellying ourselves with those tro countries is opportune. When one thinks of the position of Germany end Italy in recent years, from the economic viewpoint of haves and have-nots, or from the connection of the balance of power, it may be considered that there are no countries whose interest are as similar as those of Japan, Germany and Italy. The elliance can be said to be based on common national interests, rether than on their national character of the personality of their leaders. Thus the Germany of today rust be called a truly invelueble ally for the Japan of today. However as I have said before, as the national character of Germany is such as would suck the blood of thers, we must pay deep attention lest she should boast of teing the only horse rider. Both in modern science and in her capacity for the production of munitions Germany shows a degree of progress one step shead of ours. Since we are concluding an ellience with her we should of our own accord make efforts to take edvantage of those points in which she is superior. I em in favor of the conclusion of this treaty of alliance as a timely step, but in the light of past history, I eernestly hope that when this treety is realized, the honorable members of the government will not neglect to take

- 118 -

exheustive and scrupulous care so that we need have no future regrets." (6388-6389)

President BaFa announced that the draft was passed by unanimous vote. (6389)

Exhibit 554 is the Imperial Rescript issued on 27 September 1940 regarding the Allience; exhibit 555-A, 555-B, 555-C and 556 refer to letters exchanged between MATSUCK, and OTT regarding the Fect.

Exhibit 557 is en erticle by SHIR.TOPI (the accused) taken from Contemporery Japan entitled "The Threee lower lect end the World of Democracy by Toshio SHIR.TORI."

Exhibit 558 is a radio speech of the Fresident of the Board of Information in commemoration of the First Anniversary of the conclusion of the Fect, September 26, 1941. (6412)

Exhibit 550 (see Imperial Conferences herein) is MITSJOK.'s explanation of the lact at an Imperial Conference held between 10 - 2' September 1940. (6331)

Decision (Exhibit 1030 - For attendance see P. 116)

The exhibits do not show that a decision was reached at this meeting of the Transfigstion Committee of the Trivy Conneil. However, see Exhibit FF2 herein for a meeting of the Prive Counce 1 which unanimously passed the draft of the conclusion of the Trinartite Pact.

Pemarks

Councillor "A"AI said that although he did not bolieve in a Jananese-American war he thought that "if worst comes to worst, the "an and Navy Ministers may have something in readiness to avert defeat," and he also said that the government connot say definitely that WSCP would not start "something" against Janan. In such a case what attitude, he asked, will Germany take? (9756)

"ar Minister more; giving his enswer chiefly from the standmoirt of the Army, realied that "If the worst comes to monst, only a small mart of the military strength will be necessary to caury out the oneration against the U.S.A. I think that you need not worny on this noint. "owever, an oneration against the U.S.A. cannot be setd complete upless we consider an operation against the U.S.S.P. Therefore, adjustment of JADAY-SQUIPT relations is a very immortant matter. I think that, if we could accomplish this effectively, military menaration would be eased considerably, but when we consider the character of the U.S.S.R. JADAY cannot neglect her own menaration. As to the CUTMA Incident, we intend to hring it to a conclusion by making efficient use of this treaty before we find ourselves in the worst situation." (9756-9757)

Navy Minister OTMAWA replied that "Since the war rrenaredness of our present Navy is complete, we will definitely not he resten by the U.S.A., but in event of a prolonged wir, it is necessary that we make sufficient preparations to keen up with the poslization of the American plan for verletion of her navy. On this point, the Navy is adopting a policy product in every respect." (2757)

marrat then asked how long the resources of Japan would lest, in case of a protracted war. (0757)

prosident of the Planning Board HOGWINO renlied as collows:

"Is T conlained vosterday (the President gave a detailed exrianation of the material mobilization nlan at the regular menting of the Privy Council on the previous day), our country has for the last few years been making preparations for selfsurficiency as regards materials."

unit of 2,100,000,000 von in imports. 1,000,000,000 von is received from ENGLAND and the U.S.A. If, therefore, the

economic pressure is strengthened, it is necessary that we act "mudently considering the activation of Article III of the treaty. As for iron, this year's output is expected to the treaty. As for iron, the worst we can exact an output of 4,000,000 tons. At present, 1,500,000 tons are used for armaments and military purposes, and the rest is allotted for the repletion of productive nower and for private and governmental use. If we manipulate the repletion of productive nower, and restrict nrivate and povernmental demands, giving consideration to cases when immorts of scran iron and iron material may be stonned, we shall not find ourselves in so sortous a situation. As regards matels other than iron, the case is different, but I think that you need not be prices y concerned, for we are now endeavoring to collect them from all perts of the world. Most immortant is netroleum. T'0 ere at present demonding greatly on APTOR, especially for aviation gasoline, almost oll of which we must import from Aumpted. "o must the to increase its production at home and, at the same time, must find means to secure it from places other than AmpureA. Recently, we have accumulated a consider-able 'stock' of aviation netroleum. Powever, in case of a prolonged war with the U.S.A., a self-sufficient supply cannot be obtained solely in JAPAN, MANCHURIA and CHINA, whereas from and other metals can be so obtained. Therefore, it is necessary that we sneedily secure the right to obtain oil in the DIMONT TACE THITTE OF NOPEL KARAFITE. This matter has been touched upon in the recent talk with GEDMANY, Furthermore, you must understand that at present negotiations are being carried on for the neaceful scouisition of oil in the DUTCH TRACT TRATE, " (9757-9759)

"M"AT recalled that at the previous meeting the military and paval authomities implied that considerable preparations had been affected. (0750)

Perarding this noint, Navy Ministor OFAWA said that the Navy had been preparing for a considerable length of time and that measures were being taken regarding synthetic oil; War Ministor TOTO also said that the Army had prepared so that its materials may last for a considerable period, but if an unusually prolonged war should occur consideration must be given to oil for aircraft and mechanized units. (977)

APTMA stated that "if Japan and the United States are destined to fight. I think now is the best time." (0760) He doubted, if bestijitles began between Japan and the United States, they would terminate in one or two years, perticularly since preat quantities of netwoleum are used in modern wars. Consequently, he asked the Nawy Minister whether or not synthatic netroleum will suffice in critical times. (0760)

- 121 -

Navy Minister OTTAWA realied that, since Japan had just stanted using synthetic netrolour, he could not say that it would suffice in critical times. (07(0) "Therefore, there is no other way than to acquire it from the Dutch Test Indias or North Yarafuto through neaceful means, and it is quite likely this will occur." (0760) However, if var becomes prolonged, the Neuv must consider the account use of the metroloum. (0760) We also said that the Navy recently est blished a special research organ for the production of high occurs rating netroloum. (9761)

Councillor WWMI nointed out that, if Jananeso-Meridan wer is inovitable, "emphasis in dialor are must be laid to ofther Gormany or the Anglo-Americans at this time, but the result of concluding this treaty may hister the Jananess-American war." (9762) He then asked the Trime Minister whether or not be could overcome the "shortage: of munitions and general commodifies; the demonalization of thoughts, etc., when he faces them in the most aggravated times." (9762)

Premier VOTOVE realied "The basic idea of this mact, of course, lies in the aversion of a Tananese-American clash. However, I think that it is necessary for us to show a firm attitude, because if we act humbly, it will only make the inverses presumptuous. /Translater's Note: May also read '...if we make a blunder, the UNITED STATES will become presumtuous.'/ If worst should come to worst, I think that the government must adopt policies with firm resolutions on both diplomatic and demostic affairs. The other day when I presented myself at the Imperial Palace to report on this matter, I found his Matery, the Emperor, also to have ness said a very firm resolution which was most impressive. I here that this treaty will be satisfactorily executed, even at the risk of my very life." (0762)

Councillor CRAMA said that, if Janan is under chlightion to and Germany and Italy in case the United States should nerticinate in the Euronean War, she would be reaced unler a very heavy responsibility: but be inquired, since the possibility of war breaking out between Janan and (merica is small, is not the treaty very one sided) (0763)

Fondan Ministor MARSUCKA renjied "Thether America will barticinate in the European "er or not, or whether war between America and Janap will break out or not, I think, is a 50-50 possibility. Therefore, I do not beli we it to be one sided." (0743)

- 122 -

Councillor TAREGO inquired as to the kind of support Germany could give Japan and, in case the Japanese Navy aids Germany and Italy, what kind of aid it could give? (9763)

Foreign Minister MATSUOK. replied "that such problems as the kind of help that can be mutually liven should be thoroughly investigated at the joint special committee." (9763)

Chief of the Investigation Committee SUZUKI (not the inccused) said that "I think a Japanese-American war is inevitable, regardless of whether this treaty is concluded or not. We, therefore, must carefully been the expansion of the United States Nevy and must not neglect our proparations corresponding to this." (9764)

Councillor ISHII noted that the South Son Islands under Japan's Mandate were to remain a territory of Japan provided she paid compensation for them. He referred to MATSUCHA's explanation of this to the effect that "Since the Versailles Treaty has already expired, Japan is still continuing a military occupation of the South Sea Islands," (9764) Therefore, said ISHII, "according to the Versailles Treaty, the possession of the Mandated Islands were transferred to the Five Powers from which powers Japan acquired them. Therefore, I think it is proper to interpret that the islands are already the possession of Japan and; therefore, I cannot agree to the verbal declaration of the German ambassador. Since I admit that this problem is not a subject for Imperial inquiry I am just expressing my opinion for your information." (9765)

Forcign Einister EATSUCKA said "According to the opinion of famous scholars of international law, as Dr. TACHI, a mandate is not a transfer of territory. Therefore, aside from the standpoint of legal theories, and viewing it from the standpoint of practical politics, it has been my opinion for the past three years that it is a better policy to receive those islands from WERENY through some means. From what I have heard, three years that attach in BERLIN the cossion of these islands under certain compansatory terms." (976)

Counciller ISFII said that he had discussed the matter with Dr. TACHI and Dr. TACHI's opinion was that a "mandate is not gression of territory." (9765) In respect to the point, that Germany transferred them to the Five Howers, ISHII believed that there was no dispute." Therefore, he continued, "I can hardly agree to having Japan pay be compensation to Germany for the cession of these islands." (9765)

Councillor HITSUCHI sold that after the treaty was concluded America's critical senctions gainst Japan would be greatly increased and the subsistence problem of the papple would become serious. (9766) He pointed cut that "when a treaty of this sort is concluded, the Japanese people are apt to follow Germany blindly and there is danger that some may attempt anti-America movements, stc." (9766)

President of the Flanning Board HOSTING replied that the government was most concerned over the problems of the people's livelihood and would try to most the situation most satisfactorily. (9766)

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PRIVY COUNCIL (1940)

Date	Fecord are	Carr's
Date	FECULT AFE	<u>V 31 1 1</u>

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NUPATA

CIENA

OGAILA

FULAI

OSHIMA

OBATA

FUTAGAMI MALO

TAY DRASHT

MITSUCHI

TSHTGURO

7,931 787-A 18 December

Iresent

President HARA Vice President SUZUKI

State Ministers

FONCYE IAMENITSU AKITA TOJO MATSUOKA

Exhibit No.

KAWAI ISHII ARIMA **EJBOTA** ISHIZUKA SHIMIZU MINMI

HOSHIDA KOBAYASHI KAJADa YASUI KAJAMI

MARA

Councillors

ARAKI MATSUT SUGALAFA MATSUJPA US.HIO FAGASHI

Government Delegates

MUFASE MORIYANA SAHAMOTO MATSUMOTO

SEKO MURATA **FUJI**ARA

Secretaries

HORIE FORCHASHI TAXATSUJI

<u>Decision</u>

None referred to in the Excerpt. The matter of Hungary Czechoslovakia and Ronmanin's joining the Tripartite Fact was discussed.

Remarks

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The document was offered in evidence to show how Japan interpreted the term " adjustment of Soviet-Jananese relations" as well as to subtantiete the contention that the Japanese Government based its relations with the Soviet Union on the methods of forcing her to make concessions even up to resorting to threats of military attack. (Introductory Statement - 7930)

MATSUOKA said: "I deem it a good policy to aggrendize the German menace to Soviet Russia availing curselves of the situation to regulate our relations with Soviet Russia, seeing that Soviet Russia does not find any menace in Japan and is inclined to reject the algustment of Russo-Japanese relations. From this point of view the Government has agreed to the proposel in question from a conviction that it will be feverable to our diplomacy." (7931)

PRIVY COUNCIL (1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>D: to</u>	<u>Record Page</u>	Carris Shiring
660	16 Juno	7,155-6	212

Present

President H.R. Councillor & Chairman of Committee: ISHIZUK.

Councillors

SHILIZU	FUKI
MATSUI	TKEGOSHI
SUGR.	LITSUCHI

State Ministers

Foreign Minister M.TSUOK. Commerce and Industry Minister TOYOTA Finance Minister K.W.D. Agriculture & Foresty Minister INO

<u>Explainers</u>

LURASE	HLG.	ISHIK.W.	A.ORIY.L.
N.G.I	ISHIGURO	LIY.UCHI	LITSUTO
UEM.TSU	T. AEUCHI	M.TSUKUM.	K. W. W. WR.
MATSUMCTO	H.R.GUCHI	K. W. MOTO	LIZUNO
ITO	NISHILUR.	LIUR.	

Secretaries

HORIE

MOROH.SHI

T.X.TSUJI

Decision

The Investigation Committee of the Privy Council unanimously approved the ratification of the treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China and the treaty between Japan and France concerning the tariff system and trade and the method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China.

Remarks

On 16 June 1941, a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held concerning the treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China, and the treaty between France and Japan concerning the tariff system and trade and method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China.

PRIVY COUNCIL (1941)

<u>IxLibit No.</u>	<u>D: to</u>	<u>Rucorá Pago</u>	Carris Elitado
660	16 June	7,155-6	212

Fresent

President H.R. Councillor & Chairman of Committee: ISHIZUK.

Councillors

SHI: IZU	FUKI
M.TSUI	TKEGOSHI
SUGR.	LITSUCHI

State Linisters

Foreign Linister L.TSUOK. Commerce and Industry Linister TOYOT. Finance Linister K.W.D. Agriculture & Foresty Linister INO

Explainers

AURASE	H.G.	ISHIKAWA	MORIY L.
N.G.I	ISHIGURO	MIY.UCHI	LITSUTO
UEHTSU	T.AEUCHI	L.TSUKUMA	K. W. LURA
MATSUMCTO	HR.GUCHI	KIVIIMOTO	LIZUNO
ITO	NISHILUR.	LIURA	

Sccretaries

HORIE

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- 127 -

According to Exhibit 637, in 1911 a Commercial Navigative Trutty was concluded by the French and Japan but France referento apply the treaty to French Indu-China f aring the percussion of Japanese and Japanese goods into that area. (7134)

In 1932 a commercial treaty was concluded whereby Japan and French Indo-Chin: granted to each other the saventage of customs, but this was a provisional agreement placing numercus items of Japan's important exports beyond the scope of its application and making no provisions whatsoever in respect to the prohibition and restrictions of exports and imports, import quotes, and the modification of the rates. and so by the raising of the custom tariff by France, the advantages of the agreement were greatly reduced and by the reinforcement of this quota system, the enforcement of exchange control, etc., Japan's trade with French Indo-Ching full into a slump. (7135)

On Lugust 30th, fter France's surrender to Germany the French Government acknowledged Japan's political and economic supremacy in East Asia and agreed to give to Japan as much as possible an advantageous position in French Inde-China superior to that enjoyed by any other states under any circumstances. Thereupon, delegates of the two countries started negotiations on economic problems of French Inde-China and J pan on December 30, 1940. (P 5 of Exhibit 637)

The first problem discussed was the buying of Saigon rice which Japan urgently needed. Negotiations were completed at the end of muril being aggravated by the border dispute between French Indo-Chint and Theiland which was modiated by Japan. Accordingly, the treaty, protocol, agreement and other related documents were signed and souled by or exchanged between the delegates of the two nations on May 6, 1941. (Exhibit 637, p. 5)

There were three "arrangements" considered by the Frivy Council. (1) The treaty of Residence and Navigation concerning French Indo-Chine was made up of traditional provisions. (2) A protocol, forming an inseparable whole with the treaty was composed of sever 1 classs defining Japan's special position in French Indo-China.

The Exhibit states: 22. The Protocol.

"This protocol, together with the Ageve-Methioned treaty, forms an inseparable whole, and has the same term of validity. It is composed of several clauses defining Japan's special position in French Indo-Ching. That is, the treaty provides as follows: (1) The fees for foreigners' identification cards shall be reduced in the cas of Japanese Nationals; (2) Japanese Nationals shall be specially permitted to engage in certain occupations which are prohibited to foreigners now; (3) the maximum percentage of employees who may be employed in Japanese enterprises shall be reised up to a specified percentage; (4)

- 128 -

the acquisition by Japaness of the conorship of immovables and annah and Tanking shall be given consideration, subject to the consent of the king of the protocorates; (5) concessions in agricultural, mining and hydraulic power enterprises shall be granted in Indo-China to Franco-Japanese joint concerns under special terms; (6) Japanese Fationals shall be permitted under fixed conditions to open and man ge Japanese schools for give ing Japanese education; (7) to discuss economic problems of both countries, an economic conference composed of the government and civilian representatives of the two countries; (8) the problems concerning coastal trade in Indo-China, navigation and fishing in the inland suce or territorial waters, and problems of eviation wireless stations, ind undersea cables, shill be sattled through consultations between the two governments; as regards the problems of main transportation, the governments of the two countries shall encourage their solution through the cooperation of the shipping interests." (7161-3)

The protocol was to be secret (not published) "lest third powers will share equally with us the above mentioned various privileges by virtue of the most favored clause". (7163) (3) France-Japanese Agreement concerning the customs system, trade and the modalities of settling accounts between Japan and French Indo-Chine (7149)

- .: The Customs System: (7150)
- (1) Japan enjoyed the most fevered nation treatment in respect to taxes, fees and other levies.
- (2) Japanese goods word subject to minimum tariff rates and goods listed in Annox A (no record of) shall be either exempted or given reductions from the minimum rates.
- (3) No raise in rates on goods listed under (2) was allowed after one year from the date of the agreement.
- (4) and (5) Concern direct shipment, cortificates of invoices by a special organ and freedom from taxation in respect to transit.

B: Trade: 17152)

- (1) Each year is shall be deturmined by agreement.
 - (a) The articles of Indo-Chinese origin and their a quantity which are to be imported to Japan;
 - (b) The import quotes allowed to Japan which are placed on an import quota basis in F. I. C.;
 - (c) Japanese goods and their quantities to be imported to F. I. C.

.t the signing of the agreement the list contained 22 items,

including rice and crude rubber of Indo-China arigin. 700,000 Latric tens of polished rice and 15 metric tens of crude surface were guaranteed by the French Government. (7152)

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(2) Concerning the agreed orticles referred to in B (1)
(a) and (c), permits were to be issued up to the quantities agreed upon, and friendly consideration wis to be given to the expertation and importation of articles in excess of the agreed quantities, to these not agreed upon and to the grant-ing of additional quotes for goods of Japanese origin not agreed upon. (7153)

C: The mode of settling trade accounts: (P 8 of Exhibit 637)

(1) Goods of Japanese origin word to be paid for in yen and those of Indo-Chines: Uvigin in Indo-Chinese Piastres. Payment for crude rubber during the current year (1941) was to be in American dollars;

(2) Concerned the financial arrangement between the Yothe kohama Specie Bank and the Banque del'Indo-Chineso.

The agreement superseded the agreement of 1932. (P 9 of Exhibit 637)

Secret documents to be exchanged provided for the admission into FIC Import Association of not more than ten Japanese commercial firms. (P 9 of Exhibit 637)

The Exhibit states that "the enforcement of those errangements will promote greatly our economic penetration into FIC... and it will bring many advantages in the acquisition of materials urgently needed by our country." (p. 9 of Exhibit 637)

During a discussion concerning the ratification of this treaty ISHII noted that France acknowledged Japan's political and economic supremacy in East usia and that France pledged to give Japan the most advantageous position possible in French Indo-China which was superior to that of any three powers under any circumstances. In this connection he recalled negotiating with Secretary of State Lansing in regard to Japan's interest in China. He proposed the use of the word "superior" but such word was flatly rejected by President Wilson and Japan was obliged to use the word "special". ISHII also noted that in the above mentioned treaty that the word "superior" and not the word "special" is used. He also pointed out that the terms are generally reciprecal and there is mething especially favorable to Japan and that he asked for an explanation of this. (p. 10 of Exhibit 637)

MATSUOKA said that Japan made France acknowledge Japan's political superiority and as a result of it, agreed to permit Japan's troops to advance into French Indo-China, France also submitting herself to Japan's mediation . The dispute with Thailand. These two points, according to MATSUOKA, were the most conspicuous embodiments of Japan's political superiority. Regarding economic problems, which constituted the substance of the above mentioned treaty, protocol and agreement, he pointed out that Japanese nationals enjoyed in French Indo-China the same treatment as French nationals in regard to specially designated matters. These, said MATSUCKA, are the results of the acknowledgement of our superiority. We find, MATSUCKA also said, "almost no example of it in the history of colonization." (7024)

E.TSUOKA pointed out that under the treaty France agreed to export to Japan the full quantity of polished rice as demanded by Japan and that Japan succeeded in getting 80% of her demands. (7025)

ISHII rem rked that, whereas Garmany is getting 25,000 tons of rubber from French Indo-China, Japan only obtained about 15,000 tons, in spite of the fact that Japan should be given a superior position. ISHII approved the agreement because it was several times superior to past treaties. (P 11 of Exhibit 637)

MIZUNO, Director of Foreign Office Trade Bureau, in reply to SHILIZU and METSUI's (not the locused) question regarding the development of Japanese trade with French Indo-China said that French Indo-China is being affected by the European War and her imports have considerably decreased, but by the arrangement of the treaty the supply of commodities from Japan such as octton, yarn or cloth, as well as dry goods, etc. would be remarkably increased, so as to reach a total of 70,000,000 or 80,000,000 yen (7156) He also said that "because the products excepting rubber which grow in French Indo-China cannot be exported generally to third countries, their export to Japan will be carried out smoothly and among these exports rice will amount to 80,000,000 yen and the others to 80,000,000 yen". (7156)

Chairman ISHIZUKA inquired of the relationship between the reason why this protocol should not be efficially announced and the actual effect, and on this question Director of the Foreign Office Trade Bureau MIZUNO replied, "We intend to gradually enforce the purports of this protocol and to extend Japanose influence by degrees and it will be inevitable that this protocol will eventually come to the knowledge of third powers." (7157)

INO, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry said that "the shortage in the supply of rice for the current fiscal period on rice was at the outset estimated to be 12,000,000 koku. In view hereof, we have made a plan to cover this shortage of these with 9,000,000 koku to be imported from French Indo-China, Thailand and Burma, the rest by making a cut of the consumption or by decreasing the quantity to be carried over to the next year..." (p. 3 of Exhibit 660)

Regarding the marine transport program, Commerce and Industry Minister TOYOT. said that "m rine transportation was in a critical state owing to the marked decrease of charter ship...increase in the number of ships commandeered for military purposes and decrease in newly built ships, and we are now exerting all our efforts in transporting chiefly rice, coal and know. (p. 4 of Exhibit 660)

See Exhibit 654-1 (R 7157) a telegram dated 1 October 1941 and signed by HEALEA, Member of the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs (Paris) concerning Indo-China rubber. The telegram mentioned the release of 5,000 tons of rubber reducated by Japan in September, 1941. France was endcavoring to get German support of the Franch effort to obtain Japanese approval for the delivery of 5,000 tons of rubber to the U.S.A. as the proceeds from such sale was urgently needed for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else. The French request was turned down as the U.S. A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold. (R 7158) The telegram further stated that neither the Japanese nor the Germany Government would countenance further export of raw rubber from Indo-China to the U.S. ..., and that the Gornan Commissioner IEREE requested that an additional release of 5,000 tons to Japan be secured for Ceteber (7,159)

Exhibit 652 (R 7163), a document found in the German Foreign Office dated at Bongkok 1 September 1941, refers to the increasing activity of Japan, particularly regarding rice and rubber, in Indo-Chine. According to the talegram Japan solzed all valuable raw materials. The Exhibit states that "in Sai on there are twenty Japanese newspaper correspondents. There are 24 Japanese firms as compared with 14 before the war. Compatition between the new and the old Japanese firms has already set in. Japanese agents swarm over the country in all directions. There is marked economic espionage, e.g., careful inspection of rubber plantations. In Cambedia, the Japanese new buy rice fields and Kapek plantations. Attempts to buy small rubber plantations in the vicinity of Sangon from annamite and Chinese ewners have failed thus for. It is, however, foreseable that in ease of a continued worsening of the market, the Japanese will obtain large rubber plantations, even from French oners, since the conomic agreement with Indo-Chine stipulates them unlimited right of settlement as well as the right to acquire real estate. According to infermation here a rubber syndicate has been formed or is forming in Japan, chiefly supported by MITSUI, for buying rubber plantations in Indo-Chine." (7163-7164)

A vite was taken and it was ununinously carried. The above mosting wis in the presence of the Emperior. The document was signed by President MARA (deceased), Secretary HCRIE, Hideg, MOROFASHI, John TAMATSUJI, Masani.

PRIVY COUNCIL (1941)

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Exhibit Nc.	Date	Record page		Carr's Summary
637	3 July	7,011; 7,014	1	220
		Fresent		
	Presido	eror, HIROHITC nt HARA, Yoshi csident SUZUKI	imichi	
	St	ate Minister		
HIRANUMA KANAMITSU AKITA TOJC MATSUCKA HASHIDA			KAWADA MURATÀ OIKAWA OGAWA YANAGAWA TOYOTA INO	
	Co	uncillors		
KA"AI ISHII ARIMA KUNOTA ISHIZUKA SHIMIZU MINAMI	SUG	KI SUI AVARA SUURA IC	FUTAGAMI MANO OSHIMA OBATA TÄKEKOSHI MITSUCHI IZAVA	
	Cc	mmitteemen		
LURASE MCRIYAMA MIZUNC MATSUMOTO	MAT	ITO Suluma Aguchi R A	YUKAMA ISHIGURO KAWAMURA	
	Re	porters		
ISHII			ISHIZUKA	
Secretaries: -				

HCRIE, Hideo MORCHASHI, Jo TAKATSUJI, Masami

- 133 -

<u>Pecision</u>

On July 3, 1941, the Privy Council voted to ratify the France-Japanese Protocol on Guaranty and Political Understanding and of the Thai-Japanese protocol on Guaranty and Political Understandings. (7011, 7022)

Remarks

In June 194C, Japan requested Germany to give her a free hand in Indo-China. (Exhibit 52C-6825, and Exhibit 523-6825)

On 19 June 1943 Japan demanded that the Indo-China frontiers be closed to prevent transportation of supplies to CHIANG KAI-Shek and that she be permitted to 11203 Imperial officers along the frontiers to ensure that it remained closeld. (6726; 6850) The acceptance of these demands was requested before the evening of 20 June 1940. This was the first ultimatum that Japan delivered to Indo-China. General CATROUX, Governor-General of Indo-China was compelled to comply. (6797; 5850) The Japan Mission was under General NISHIHAMA who arrived in Hanoi on June 29, 1940. (6853)

On 1 August 194C, MATSUCKA issued an ultimatum to the French Ambassador in Tokyo in regard to passage of troops through the Province of Tongking, the use of airfields in Tongking and the stationing of troops and provision for the transportation of arms and ammunition. (6386) The ultimatum said that if no immediate answer was received, Japan would use force. (6887)

On September 20, 1940, Under Secretary of State Welles gave the Japanese Ambassador un oral statement' stating that the Japanese military representative in French Indo China, General NISHIHARA, was instructed on August 29th, to present an ultimatum to the French Governor-General making what was tantamount to a demand for complete occupation of French Indo-China with a threat that if these demands were not accepted before 10 p.m., September 22, the Japanese military forces would at once invade Indo-China. (6958) The French Governor-General refused the demand. For six months prior to this time (September 20, 1940) various (6958)official utterances of Japanese statesmen repeatedly reiterated that the official position of the Japanese Government was a desire to maintain the status quo in the Far East (6959 - Welles to the Japanese Ambassador). The Japanese Ambassador said that the latest demands were in compliance with the agreement of August 30th. Welles replied that this was not the case as the demands were refused on the specific grounds that they were outside the agreement of August 30th. (6961)

--134 -

<u>Pecision</u>

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Remarks

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--134 -

On SC Au ust 1949, MATSUCKA and the French Ambessedor HENRY entered into an exceedent the terms of which were to be confidential, (6967) whereby Japan would obtain military facilities in Tongking. The terms of the agreement were to be settled at a later date by joint agreement of the French and Japanese military authorities. (6965) The agreement was concluded on 4 September 1940. (6928) The Military Agreement was to become effective only after the approval of the governments concerned. To word dolog, an ultimatus was presented on September 19 by Gineral FISHIMALA. (3872) TALSTONA demonstrations MATSUCKA at various times requested the German Government to support Japanese domands. İ

In a momorandum from GREW (20 Sept 1940) he said MATSUCHA confirmed that the ultimatum had been sont (6965) and explained that the French Gevernor-General on September 5 refused to sign an agreement implementing the one signed August 30th for reasons not evident to Japan. MATSUCHA further explained that Japanese forces would be withdrawn from Inde-China after peace had been restored in China. (6966)

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en 3 September 1940 Japanese forces crossed the border. (6929) On 22 September 1940, the Japanese Army started the attack on the Tengking border constituting the first act of military aggression by Japaneagainst French Indo-China. (6933) On the same day, French Indo-China yielded to force and agreed to the Japanese terms. (6933) On 26 September the Japanese forces bended the harder of Hairborg. (6865)

On 12 Jule 1940 Signed a treatwof non-aggression with France (513; 6147) but refused to ratify it as soon as the Armistice in France was known and then started a campaign of claims against Indo-China. (France asked Armistice terms on 17 June 1940).

Japan signed a treaty of friendship with Siam on December 6, 1940 and transferred to Siam 38 fighter planes and 25 bombers. She then intervened to impose her mediation and the conclusion of an Armistice. (6992-6598)

Exhibt 564, a telegram from the German Ambassador in Texyo dated 6 February 1941, shows that Japan intended to obligate France (FIC) and Thailand by a secret agreement during the negotiations concerning the sottlement of the boundary discute of France and Thailand to make no political or military agreement with a third cover. (6446) Germany agreed to this. (6990) In a latter from NATSUCKA to Ambassador Henri (11 March 1941) NATSUCKA proposed mediation of the dispute between France and Thailand and enclosed a mediation proposal which he expected the French Gevernment to accept uncenditionally. (6994) The latter stated that Japan believed that the French Gevernment would not conclude any treaty or agreement between French Inde-China and a third power that would presupless the nature of political, conemic or military comparation to propose Japan directly or indirectly. (6995) HEMAI replied on 11 March 1941, (letters were exchanged) that the French Gevernment yielded to the insistence of Japan (6997) and on 9 May 1941 an agreement was signed in Tokyo, where, in

- 135 -

payment for its good offices, Japan imposed a protocol of political guaranty and understanding. (Exhibit 47-6943)

Under the solution, Indo-China ceded 69,000 Samare kilometers and 334,000 inhatitants while the provicus claims of Siam did not exceed a territory of 23,000 square kilometers and 64,000 inhatitants. Japan imposed the establishment under Jacanese supervision of demilitarized zones. (French Opening Statement)

Cn 14 July 1941, Japan decided to acquire military positions in and to advance into south Indo-China. The Japanese Foreign Minister gave detailed instructions that Japanese troops would advance on 20 July 1941 and said if the French accept by then it will be a peaceful advancement; if not, an arned advance. (7042)

Under duross of Germany and pressure from Japan the Vichy Government complied with these domands. Thus the plan for the complete occupation of Indo-China by the Japanese was realized. On July 28, 40,000 Japanese tropos landed in the south of Indo-China. (7068; 7072) On 9 December 1941, Japan imposed a new military agreement which completed her control over the occupied territories by her military, naval and air forces. (The agreement - a local military one between the French authorities and the Japanese Army for the joint defense of French Indo-China appears on p. 7121-7132 of the Record).

The Privy Council met on 3 July 19-1 for the curpose of ratifying the Frotocol of Political Guaranty and Understanding which Japan imposed upon F.I.C. for using her good offices in mediating the dispute between French Indo-China and Siam. (7014)

Under the first Protocol the Japanese Government guaranteed that the peace treaty settling the dispute was definite and unalterable, that the French Government agreed to promote intimate economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China. France agreed that she would not conclude with third powers any agreement concerning French Indo-China of a political, economic or political nature opposed to the interests of Japan. (7015)

The contents of the second protocal are practically the same as the first except that Thailand was not bound to refrain from concluding agreements with Third Parties. This protocol referred to the Treaty of Neutrality concluded on 12 June 1940, by France and Thailand. (7015)

ISHII said MATSUCKA's achievements were a victory for Japan, since they placed "Pritain in the shade" in Indo-China. (7018) He also said that the right to mediate move Japan the position of leadership in East Asia and he pointed out that the most valuable advantage from the treaty to Japan was its indefinite period of duration. (7019)

- 136 -

SHINIZU wanted to know the attitude of Thailand towards Nanking. MATSUCKA replied that he could not expect Thailand to recognize Nanking, it being farther from Thailand than Chungking, but he believed that when Japanese political and economic power steadily penetrated into Thailand, Japan will grasp the opportunity then to take the proper measures. MATSUCKA also said that, even though Japan's mediation proved successful, "British influence in Thailand remains unshakeable." (7020)

SHIMIZU wanted to know of Japan's attitude as to who was the "breaker of the treaty" between Germany and Russia. MATSUCKA said Germany, facing the crisis of war with Britain, concluded the treaty as a temporary expediency lest Russia be won over to Britain's side. (7021) He said Germany's "real intention was to detest and suppress, when opportunity presented itself. Not only the poviet Union's aggressive principle, but also the ideology embracci by that country". (7021)

FUKAI noted that third powers might take it as a symbol of Japan's accressive policy, if Japan looked upon herself as the stabilizing force of East Asia, pointing out that the agreement of August 31, (30) 1940 was not submitted to the Privy Council because, as the Prime Minister explained, he had to soize a moment when Trance was fearful of Japan's actions, therefore he was unable to take the formalities for submission of the documents to the Privy Council. (7022)

The Council unanimously agreed to ratify the protocol.

- 137 -

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The Council unanimously agreed to ratify the protocol.

		PRIVY COUNCIL (1941)	
Exhibit N	c. <u>Date</u>	Record rage	Corris Summary
649 650	28 July 28 July	7,069 7,075	231
		President HANA Vice-Fresident SUZUKI	
Councillo	rs		
KAWAI ISHII ARIMA KUBOTA ISHIZUKA SFIMIZU MINAMI	•	NARA ARAKI SUGAVADA MATSUURA UGHIO HAYASHI FUKAI	FUTAKANI OSFIMA CBATA TAKHGOSHI MITSUCHI IZAWA
<u>Cabinet M</u>	embers		
KONCE TANABE TOJC HASHIDA		MUPATA OIKAWA OGURA TOYODA	INC SAKONJI KCIZUMI IWAMURA
Explainer	<u>s</u>		
MURASE IRIYE MIYAUCHI SUZUKI MIYANOTO UYEFARA SAITO		MATSUMOTO MIZUNO SAKANOTO TURAZAKI "ICHIMURA OTA TOYODA	TOKO FAGA MUTO OKA FARACUCFI KOJIMA GOKA
<u>Secretari</u>	es		
FORIE MOROFASHI TAKATSUJI			

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Decision

The Privy Council unanimously agreed to the resolution that there be concluded between France and Japan a Protocol regarding the common defense of French Indo-China and military cooperation.

Remarks

The Investigation Committee met to discuss the Frotocal between France and Japan for a common defense of French Indo-China and the exchange of official documents regarding military cooreration.

ISFII asked if France had been intimidated. (707C) TOYODA replied that an intimation had been given to the French Government that an undesirable situation would likely develop if France failed to accept the Jaranese proposal. He also said Germany and Italy were asked to cooperate with Jaran in realizing the conclusion of the protocol. He further stated that Japan was forced to take effective and forcible steps against the De Gaulle party in southern French Indo-China. (7071)

Questioned as to the relation between Japan's foreign policy and the Government's declaration re conclusion of the recent declaration made by the Government had given the impression to Third Powers that Japan had penetrated into F.I.C. by force and to prevent the U.S.A. from taking unjust measures, the Government wishes to make it clear quickly that it was upon mutual agreement, and therefore made an announcement that an understanding had been made between the two governments. (7071)

Questioned as to the relationship between Japan's penetration into northern FIC during 1940 and the present measure, TOJO answered that the 194C penetration concorned the Chiang regime, its aim being different from that of the measures under discussion, and although Japan would be responsible for common defense with FIC by the prosent agreement, the area of Japan's military activities should not be restricted. (7072)

NARA wanted to know if the size of the Japanese Army would be restricted under the arrangement regarding the currency to be placed at the disposal of Japanese troops as provided for in the Article of Exchange. TOJO replied that the amount of money estimated with an ample margin to cover the necessary expense (all accounts to be settled by plastres except for the pay to soldiers) for about 40,000 troops which are planned to be sent over and therefore there was no fear that the size of the forces would be restricted on account of expense. (7072)

- 139 -

SUGAWARA inquired as to why the NISHIHAPA-MARTIN agreement had not been submitted to the Privy Council, to which TOYODA and TOJO explained that this agreement was a military agreement involving the Supreme Command, although based upon the MATSUCMA-HENRY agreement and therefore it was not submitted to the Privy Council. (7073)

To this explanation FUT.KAMI added that he understood the agreement to be a thoroughly international agreement concluded by the Commander-in-Chief of the Arries of both countries, but the matter was so urgent that there was no time to rubmit it to the Council as had been explained by the Fremier at the time. (7073)

Second Nosting

Exhibit 650: - The Prive Council met to deliberate on the ratification of the Protocol.

Reporter SUZUKI referred to the MATSUOKA-HENRY Agreement of August 30, 1940 and the economic agreement concluded on the substance of the same. He pointed out that Japan could never feel easy if French Inde-China cooperated with the policy of Anglo-Amminian encirclement against her. So, he said, Japan must prevent this and keep French Inde-China secure from invasion by Third Nations and at the same time bring about acoperation between Japan and French Inde-China which are very important to the self-existence and self-defense of Japan as well as to her southward drive policy. (p.4 of Exhibit 650)

SUZUKI also said that the existing political understanding between the two nations was not sufficient; therefore, Japan had to make France closely cooperate with her in the military field. (7076) Consequently, he concluded, Japan ordered the Japanese Envoy to France to negotiate with the French Government as a result of which the protocol and the plan for the exchange of official documents with obtained. (p. 4 of Exhibit 650)

The preamble of the protocol states that, in case the security of French Indo-China was threatened, leth countries "shall recognize the reason to think that Japan's pencial peace and the security of the Far East also are not free from danger." The proamble also refers to the profises made by Frence not to conclude any agreement of a political, economic or military nature with a Third Nation epposing directly or indirectly Japan. The necessary stops for military cooperation was to have been decided by special agreement. (page 5 of Exhibit 650)

- 140 -

Official documents were to be exchanged concerning the measures to be taken for military concertion based upon the protocol. The following clauses were decided upon: (7077-7078)

- I. Towards the Japanese Government the French Government shall edmit:
 - A. The dispatch of a necessary force of Japanese Army troops, war vessels and air forces to the southern Indo-China.
 - B. The use of Sienrenp and seven other places as air bases and Saigon and Comrany Bay as naval bases. The Japanese Army shall construct the facilities at these places for military purposes.
 - C. The right of quartering and training the Japanese Army. Various restrictions on Japan stipulated in the NISFIHARA-MARTIN Agreement were to be abolished.
 - D. The French Government shall offer to the Japanese Army 23,000,000 Indo-China pinstres for the current year which the Japanese Covernment agreed to repay with free yen, U.S. dellars or gold.
- II. The French Government shall approve the fundamental principles of the Japanese Army's advance.
- III. The details concerning the activities of the Japanese Army shall be discussed and decided on the spot. (7077-7078)

Reporter SUZUKI pointed cut that the "Wondency of dependency upon Anglo-American still remains in FIC" and that in the interior of FIC and expressly in the southern region, some do not cooperate with Japan but are trying to collaborate with Anglo-America. Therefore, he said, political understanding must be supplemented by a military cooperation.

Exhibit (51 (7080) is a copy of the Protocol for the Common Defense of FIC signed July 29, 1941 and copies of two letters dated at Vichy July 29, 1941. (Japanese troops landed at Saigon July 29, 1941). The two letters confirm the agreement. (7079) The Protocol appears on page 7104 of the Record.

- 141 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1941)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Summary118221 November10,391268

<u>Fresent</u>

President HARA Vice President SUZUKI Chairman of Committee of Inquiry ISHII

Councillors

ARINA ISHIZUKA MINAMI NARA FUTAGALI ODATA TAKEKOSHI IZAWA

Vinisters present

TOJO, Prime Minister, Minister of Home /ffairs & Mar Minister IWANURA, Minister of Justice TOGO, Minister of Foreign Affairs & Minister for Colonization

Fxplainers

MORIYAMA, Chief of the Bureau of Legislation SATA, Councillor of " 11 - 11 MIYAÚCHI 11 11 11 11 н 11 MATSUNOTO, Chief of the Bureau of Treaty, Foreign Office SAKAMOTO, Chief of Bureau of Furopean & Asiatic Affairs, Fgn. Office NISHIFURA, Head of 2nd Section of Bureau of Treaty, Fgn Office NEFICHI, Head of 3rd Section of Bureau of East Asiatic Affeirs, Foreign Office MARITA, Head of 1st Section of Bureau of Luropean & Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Office YOSANO, Head of 2nd Section of European & Asiatic Affrs., Fgn Office IDE, Administrative Official of Foreign Office INAMATSU, Director of the Police Bureau, Ministry of Home Affeirs MAGANO, Head of Peace Preservation Section of Police Bureau, Ministry of Home /ffairs IKEDA, Chief of Bureau of Criminal Eatters, Ministry of Justice Executive Secretary - HORIYE

Secretary NOPOHASHI Secretary TAKATSUJI

- 142 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
1182	21 November	10,391	268

Fresent

President HARA Vice President SUZUKI Chairman of Committee of Inquiry ISHII

Councillors

ARINA ISHIZUKA MINAMI NARA FUTAGANI OBATA TAKEKOSHI IZAWA

l'inisters present

TOJO, Prime Minister, Minister of Hore /ffairs & Jar Minister IWANURA, Minister of Justice TOGO, Minister of Foreign Affairs & Minister for Colonization

Fxplainers

MORIYAMA, Chief of the Bureau of Legislation Ħ SATA, Councillor of " 11 11 MIYAÚCHI 11 11 11 11 11 MATSUNOTO, Chief of the Bureau of Treaty, Foreign Office SAKAMOTO, Chief of Bureau of Furopean & Asiatic Affairs, Fgn. Office NISHIFURA, Head of 2nd Section of Bureau of Treaty, Fgn Office MEMICHI, Head of 3rd Section of Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Office MARITA, Head of 1st Section of Bureau of European & Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Office YOSANO, Head of 2nd Section of European & Asiatic Affrs., Fgn Office IDE, Administrative Official of Foreign Office IL'ANATSU, Director of the Police Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs MAGAMO, Head of Peace Preservation Section of Police Bureau, Ministry of Home /ffairs IKEDA, Chief of Bureau of Criminal Hatters, Ministry of Justice Executive Secretary - HORIYE Secretary NOFOHASHI Secretary TAKATSUJI

- 142 -

Decision

Unanimously decided to prolong the Anti-Comintern Pack, with a request that the Government rake every effort to rake it successful and to positively make the most of its provisions. (10,398)

Rerarks

The meeting was called to discuss the prolongation of the original Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 which was about to expire. A secret attached protocol was to be abrogated.

ISHIZUKA asked about the relations between Japan and Germany regarding the South Seas. TOCO replied that Germany had already recognized Japan's construction of a new order in East Asia and that in dealing with such a problem consultation was to be effected by degrees. (10,395)

FATSUMOTO, Director of the Bureau of Treaties replied that OTT had exchanged letters to make the islands Japanese territory for a nominal compensation by Japan to Germany. (10,395)

MINAMI (not the Accused) said the Pact had lost its vitality so far as Germany was concerned because the Treaty between Germany and Russia regarding termitorial inviolability w as an infringement of the spirit of the preamble of the Pact.

TOGO replied that although there is a close connection between the Third International and the Soviet Government, still there is a slight difference between ther, so it is not impossible to think of them separately, from which viewpoint, Japan concluded the Neutrality Treity with Soviet. (10,396) (N.B. -The Anti-Comintern Pact was against the Third International).

MINAMI also asked about the change of circumstances which rade the Secret Protocol between Japan and Gerrany unnecessary and thinking about the possibility of a reconciliation between Gerrany and the Soviet, doubted if it would be better to continue the Secret Pact. (10,396)

TOGO responded that the changed circumstances are (a) the German-Russian War and the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Russia, (b) Formation of alliance between Japan and Germany. (10,396)

- 143 -

IZ/WA asked about the concrete results of the Anti-Compute Pact during the five years since it was concluded. TOJC stated that he would utilize more and more the Inti-Comintern Pact to control cormunism. (10,397)

After discussion, the resolution to prolong the Pact was agreed to unanimously. (10,398)

THINY COUNCIL (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Fecorl Dave	Carr's Sumary
12/11	8 December	10,690	277

1241

Fresent

Tresilent EP. Vice resident SUZUKI

F.MI

NITSUI

USHI0

FUILAI

STULIER

1129SJUEA

H.YANI

8 December

Councillors

FULWIT

I.J.ECODEI

LIPSUORI

CSHIMA

OBAT.

IZalla

IKED.

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IGEII FIN KUT OTA TSHIZUEL S.IT 1ZU TIMAT

Malak

Stata Ministers

TOJO HAGHIDA INO KCIZUMI	I ALMINA SHIMADA TOGO TERAJINA	kaya Mishi Ha tt a
e l'aunt	1 Julian Jana	

Explainers

HOSHINO
MOPTY MA
SUZUKI
T.NI
YII MOTO

5.2020510 MATSUMOTO NUTO. OF.A

Decision

The inquiry committee concerning the declaration of ver against america and England met and unanimously decided to approve the Emperor's reference bill regerting the lecleration of war (10,695); the Flenary session of the council unanimously approved the draft of the Imperial ratification pertaining to the leclaration of wer. (10,699 - 10,700)

Pemarks

The document was offered because it related to events transpiring at the meeting of the Investigation Committee on 8 December 1941 which prove that at least from December 1, 1941 on, the negotiations with the U.S. were continued only "for the sake of Japanese wer strategy." (10,690)

- 145 -

THINY COUNCIL (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Fecorl nave	Carr's Surmary
1241	8 December	10,690	217

<u>Prosent</u>

Tresilent ELP.. Vice Tresident SUZUKI

R.KI

Councillors

IGNII ARIMA KUUOTA IGHIZUMA SATEIZU MINAMI

Matas

HOSHINO MOPIYAMA SUZUKI TANI YANAMOTO MATSUI SUGALIFA MATSUJFA USHIO HLYAWI FUFAI FUDAVLIT NANC OSHIMA OBATA L.NEGOSHI L.TCSUORI IZA./A IKEDA

State Ministers

T030	I MITA	Karlas
HACHIDA	SHIMADA	FISHI
0.11	TOGO	HAPPA
KC IZUMI	TERAJILA	

Explainers

51201010
MATSUMOTO
'UTO
OK.A

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The document was offered because it related to events transpiring at the meeting of the Investigation Committee on 8 December 1941 which prove that at least from December 1, 1941 on, the negotiations with the U.S. were continued only "for the sake of Japanese wer strategy." (10,690)

- 145 -

In ensure to a question by KUFOTA as to the time of the declaration of war, IOJC replied it shall be done as soon as the Imperial senction is obtained. He also said that since 1 December, the negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy, and that Japan would not declare war against Holland in view of future strategic convenience. TOJO and TALA OIO, Chief of the Europe and Asia Fureau, in reply to HINANI's (not the accused) question as to what attitude Germany would take in relation to the Tripartite Pect, said that when Japan declares wer, Germany and Italy will do likewise and they will not make a separate peace, pointing out that they were then proparing the dreft of an egreement to this effect. (10,692) See Exhibit J1 for this Treaty.

TOJC said Japan should keep a close watch over Pussia. (10,693)

FUTAGARI said that according to the draft for an Imperial edict which accompaniel the project for reference, it seems as though action of war is started from our side and so, he asked, did it not give imerica an excuse for declaring war. To this Fremier TOJO answered that "action of war may have been started from our side, the cause of the war is really nothing but the fact that america gave various economic pressures to Jepen." (10,694)

KAYA said there would be a Special Energency for Expense account drawn up for the expenses of the wor. (10,693) The Calinet Secretaries reported that at 8 m.m. on 7 December they were informed at Fremier's residence that the action would begin in the early morning next lay, and that during the day the declaration of wor against America and England would be presented for Imperial senction. (10,699)

ITIVY COUNCIL (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Surnery
1266 1267	10 Dec	11,304 11,305	288

iresent

President L.P. Vice Iresident SUZUKI

Councillors

ISEII JPIN. YUPOTL ISHITUEA SHI. 120 IIIII I X.PA .R.KI

10.10

MARSUI SJC. R.L L.FSUP. USEI0 LAYLSPI JUE 17 FULAGUAT OSHT Z

OF.AT. T.ITECOSHI I II POUCHI T7... '4 IKE). N MERO 11.MO

NUTO.

OY.L

MZH.I

State Ministers

TCJC KOIZELI

SFILMDA TOGO

Explainers

HORTY,M. MITSUMOTO S.FILOTO

NISHINUP. THOUGHT

Reporting Member - SUZUKI

Clerk or Secreteries

IDE

HOPIE MOROHASHI T.KATSUJI

Decision

The Privy Council unanimously decided to ratify the treaty against a separate peace between Germany, Itely and Japan. The treaty is Exhibit No. 51. (11,308)

- 147 -

<u>Pemerks</u>

Exhibit 1226 refers to the meeting of the Investigation Committee. SUGLALEA asked if it would not be more appropriate for Japan to sign the agreement after Germany and Italy had actually entered the war. To this question TOJO and TOGO replied that it had been arranged that Hitler would announce their participation in the war in the Reichsstalt as soon as he had signed this agreement, and that Japan could trust the words of the German Government. (11304) TOGO in reply to a question by HAYASHI concerning the circumstances of the negotiations with Italy, still that negotiations had been cerried on mainly at Berlin but there was complete understanding with Italy. (11,304) The Investigation Committee decided to accept the draft as it stood and the meeting adjourned. (11,305)

Exhibit 1267 is the peeting of the rivy Council concerning the treaty against the separate peace. ...ocording to the cutline of the draft of the agreement, the Three lowers, Japan, Germany and Italy promised not to suspend hostiluties or to make meace with either the United States of Americe or the United Kingdom until complete victory was achieved. The draft also states that the Three Towers " sould collaborate with the utmost intimacy after the verificance in victory in order to establish a righteous new order in significance of the Three-Lowers-Lect." (11307)

TKAR TKAR - 148 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1942)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
687	9,12,14,15, 19,20,21 October	12.071 to 12,095	301

Present

President HARA Vice President SUZUKI

<u>Councillors</u>

ISHII MINAMI, Hiroshi USHIO FUTAGAMI CBATA TAKEGOSHI MIKAMI MITSUCHI IZAWA MIMAMI, Jiro IKUDA

<u>Vinisters of State</u>

Premier and Jar Minister TOJO Agriculture & Forestry Minister INO Hore Minister Yuzawa Foreign Minister TANI Navy Minister SHIMADA

.

Exponents

HAYASHI				USATI
Chief Sec	y of Cabi	net HO	DSHIND	MATSUMOTO
Chief of	Legislatic	n Bur	. PORIYAMA	UEBA
Councillo	pr of "	11	IRIYE	IMAYOSHI
	it it			NAKANO
11	11 11	11	MIYAUCHI	KAWANOTO
11	11 11	t †	ARAKI	KADOWAKI
President	of Planni	ng Boa	nrd SUZUKI	
Chief of	lst Sec.,	Plannt	ing Bd. AKINAGA	
Vice-Chie	f of Manch	uriən	Affrirs TAKEUCHI	

Chief Secretary HORIYE

Secretary MOROHASHI " TAKATSUJI

ARAKI attended meeting of 12 October OKA " " 20,21 October IIJIMA attended the meeting of 20 October YAMAZAKI " " " 21 October HONDO " " " 21 October MIKAMI " " 15 October AKINAGA " " " 9, 12 October

- 149 -

PRIVY COUNCIL (1942)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
687	9,12,14,15, 19,20,21 October	12.071 to 12,095	301

Present

President HARA Vice President SUZUKI

Councillors

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<u>Ninisters of State</u>

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Exponents

HAYASHI				USATI
Chief Sec'y	r of Ca	binet HO	SHIND	MATSUMOTO
Chief of Le	egislət	ion Bur.	NORIYAMA	UEBA
Councillor	of "	11	IRIYE	IMAYOSHI
			SATO	NAKANO
11	11 11	11	MIYAUCHI	KAWAMOTO
11	11 11	\$1	ARAKI	KADOWAKI
President o	f Plan	ning Boa	rd SUZUKI	
Chief of ls	t Sec.	, Planni	ng Bd. AKINAGA	
Vice-Chief	of Man	churian	Affrirs TAKEUCH	I

Chief Secretary HORIYE

Secretary MOROHASHI " TAKATSUJI

ARAKI at	tended i	meeti		2 October	
OKA	11	11		0,21 October	
IIJIMA a	attended	the	reeting	of 20 October	
YA' AZAKI	[11	11	tt	" 21 October	
HONDO	11	11	11	" 21 October	
MIKAMI	11	11	11	" 15 October	
AKINAGA	11	11	11	" 9, 12 Octobe	r

- 149 -

USAMI attending recting of 15, 19 October SHIMADA " " 20 October KADOWAKI " " 19, 20 October

<u>Absentees</u>

SATO absent	from	recting	of 9 October
MIYAUCHI "	11	11	" 9, 21 October .
HAYASHI "	11	11	" 9, 12, 20 October
USHIO "	11	11	" 14, 19, 21 October
TOJO "	11	11	" 15, 19, 20 October
HOSHINO "	11	11	" 15, 19, 20, 21 October
IRIYE "	Ħ	11	" 15, 19, 20 October
IKEDA "	11	11	" 12 Octóber
USUI "	11	11	" 12, 15, 19, 20 October
MATSUMOTO"	11	**	" 9, 12, 14, 21 October
UEBA "	11	11	" 9, 12, 14, 2. October
INAYOSHI "	11	11	" 9, 12, 14, 2] October
NAKANO "	11	11	" 9, 12, 14, 19. October
каламото "	11	11	" 9, 12, 14 October
SUZUKI (Accu	ised)	Lbsent i	From meeting of 9, 19, 20, 21 October
TANI	·	tt	" " 2, 9 October

Decision

No decision.

Remarks

At these meetings the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry was deliberated.

9 October 1942

TOJO said that the new Ministry was to be established "In order to achieve victory, which is an absolute necessity for Japan, the combined fighting power of East Asia must be strengthened. However, the various organs of Japan in the Co-Prosperity Sphere at present are confusedly set up and find difficulty in maintaining unified and active measures. Therefore it is desired to establish a ministry and to appoint a responsibl minister, thereby establishing an appropriate national policy in achieving the aforementioned aims, and to be sure of a swift and decisive execution of this policy. Horeover, Japan had already openly declared to the world the construction of Greater East Asia, so there is no need of restraint in using the term 'Greater East Asia Ministry' at this time. It is preferable to use this term voluntarily." (12072)

MINAMI (not the Accused) asked if it would not alienate the people within the sphere if Japan treated the independent countries "as mandates of Japan or as occupied territories." (12073)

TOJO replied that "this draft, from the viewpoint of achieving victory, is intended to establish an or anization for the construction of Greater East Asia. In its operation close attention should be paid in regard to the alienation of the relative countries." (12073)

12 October 1942

USHIO queried into the relations of the proposed Ministry with the administration of the Southern occupied zone, stating that "it would be better to have administration in occupied zones in the interim replaced immediately by a permanent Greater East Asia Administration and thereby create a <u>fait accompli</u>. (12075)

In reply TOJO said "that the Southern Occupied Areas are now under military administration and, therefore, the authority of the Greater East Asia Ministry is excluded; but eventually full preparations will be made providing for the time when the Southern Occupied Area detaches itself from military administration onto civil administration. Furthermore, the military itself is desirous of having the military administration in the Southern Occupied Areas speedily replaced by civil administration; and even now designs are being made to have the Inspector General and the Inspectors of the Military Administration gradually replaced by Civil Service Officials."

- 151 -

TOJO also said that the scope of the Greater East Asia there "will include the KWLITUNG PROVINCE, SOUTH SEA ISLAND GROUP, MANCHURIA, CHINA, SIAN, FRENCH INDO*CHIMA, and the newly occupied areas brought about by the Greater East Asia War." (12,075-12,076)

<u>14 October 1942</u>

IZAWA pointed out the fact that in Formosa only a few native Formosans were being accepted as government and municipal officials. How, he asked, can one expect to assimilate the different people of the Greater East is Sphere, in order to bring about the sound establishment of Greater East Asia, when even in guasi-homeland Formose, such discrimination exists.

TOJO replied "that the establishment of Greater East Asia is based on the spirit of Hakko Ju (T.N. Gethering the eight corners of the world under one roof) and that it would not be difficult to assimilate even the different peoples if deflt with this spirit." TOJO continued "that subjects of territories should not purposely be excluded from being appointed as government and municipal officials and that it should gradually be reformed in accordance with the aforementioned spirit." (12,082)

15 October 1942

MINAMI (Hiroshi) inquired if it was necessary to have the Greater East Asia Minister supervise the extranorral diploracy with countries within the Greater East Asia region.

Chief of Legislative Bureau MORIYAMA replied "that countries in the Greater East Asia Sphere are mutually in a family relationship. Therefore, the diplomacy between these countries and the diplomacy between other independent countries differ in character markedly. Moreover, since there is an intimate and inseparable relationship between foreign policies and /extranormal diplomacy/ in the Greater Fast Asia area, it was decided to leave the Greater Fast Asia Minister take charge." (12,084)

19 October 1942

At this meeting, the discussion centered around the distinction between customary and extranormal diplomacy, the former, as it affected the Greater East Asia Sphere, being under the commander of the Foreign Minister; the latter being under the commander of the Greater East Asia Minister. (12,086) Foreign Minister TANI stated, in this connection, that "the relations of our Empire with the countries in the Greater East Asia sphere are somewhat the relations between relatives and it is the ideal of our Empire to have this further strengthened and developed into the relations of a single large family, and that during this period it could be eventually led to a point where diploracy would not be needed any more. But at the present stage, due to need for respect of dignity and the exchange of documents, it is necessary that customary diploracy be continued. Within this extent will the overseas organs come under the superintendence of the Foreign Minister." (12,086)

On the same question, the Chief of the Legislative Bureau, MORIMAMA, as well as Foreign Minister TAMI, said that "the Greater East Asia Ministry, after all, assumes charge of affairs on the establishment of the Greater East Asia, and since its contents cover the various fields in politics, economy and culture, extending over the whole area of Greater East Asia, it is necessary to have all the various items of diplomatic policy toward independent nations in the Co-Prosperity Sphere be charged to the care of Greater East Asia Ministry. Moreover, it would be appropriate to have international countesies and conclusion of international treaties, etc., which are custorary diplomacy, be charged to the care of the Foreign Ministry." (12,087)

20 October 1942

Nothing material.

21 October 1942

"Chairman SUZUKI proceeded to give an account of his interview with Prime Finister TOJO concerning the negotiations for the arendment of the original proposal agreed upon at the previous Corrittee meeting. He said that the Prime Finister was firmly determined to adhere to the original proposal, and could under no circumstances agree to the amendment, and that the Corrittee, therefore, had no choice but to express its views frankly when reporting the results of the investigation. All corritteeren expressed thanks to the chairman and decided to drop the problem."

Exhibit 90 is Innerial Ordinance 707, dated 1 November 1942 providing for the organization of the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic (ffairs (12,095). Exhibit 1346 is the joint declaration of the Asserbly of Greater East (static Nations, adopted on 6 November 1943. (12,098) Representatives of "the six independent nations of Japan, China, Thailand, Manchukuo, the Philippines and Burma" attended the conclave, as well as "Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, as observer" (12,100). TOJO, SHIMADA, SHIGEMITSU, HOSHINO, SATO, and OKA (all accused) were present at the reeting. (12,101 Foreign Minister TANI stated, in this connection, that "the relations of our Empire with the countries in the Greater East Asia sphere are somewhat the relations between relatives and it is the ideal of our Empire to have this further strengthened and developed into the relations of a single large family, and that during this period it could be eventually led to a point where diploracy would not be needed any more. But at the present stage, due to need for respect of dignity and the exchange of documents, it is necessary that customary diploracy be continued. Within this extent will the overseas organs come under the superintendence of the Foreign Minister." (12,086)

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20 October 1942

Nothing material.

21 October 1942

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PFINE COUNCIL (1:43)

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Pecord pare	Cerr's Summary
1275	18 August	11,364	304

Present

President HAFA Vice President SUZUKI

Councillors

APINA KUFOTA SHIMIZU MINANI, Firoshi MAPA SU(AMAFA

MATSUURA USHIO HAYASHI MUFAI MUFAI OFAEL INTEGOSEI NITEUCHI INTEN NITELNI, Jiro NOTOJI EIF..0

State Cinisters

TOJO AOKI SHIGEMITSU

Expositors

MCF IYAMA SATO MIYAUCHI ELUT UPA ANDO SONE MATSUDAIRA SUYANA SATO SAKANIDARA OFA T. J. TUCHI MIZUNO H. CIALRA VALADA MIX. KE

Secretaries

HOPIE MORCHLSHI TLAEUCHI

Decision

No decision stated in the record.

<u>Pemarks</u>

Exhibit 1275 is the record of the meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council relative to the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning Thai territory in Malaya and Shan areas.

- 154 -

MINLII became a Hember of the Frivy Council on 29 May 1942.

The treaty provided that Thailand should annex the Shan states from Burma.

"TCJO said that "because only a few years had passed since Thailend's cession of the territories, which she was about to re-acquire, her desires had been very strong" and for this reason "Japan was trying to recognize Thailand's reacquisition of these territories...." (11,365)

In answer to a question regarding the effect of the treaty on international law, WOFIY.MA, Director of the Bureau of Legislation replied "thetit was the popular opinion according to International Law that occupying nations had no territorial rights in occupied areas, and, therefore such treaties for territorial cession in the occupied area should not be concluded. However, on the other hand as an occupying nation was conducting the administration for occupied areas, in other words, military administration, and there was no special regulation stipulating that we should continue this condition forever, it should be perfectly all right to agree that there would be no objections to our abolishing the military administration in the occupied area and letting a third power annex such territories! (11364) He explained that the "treaty between Japan and Thailand would be concluded in this spirit." (11366)

In answer to a similar question by HAY.SHI, TOJO said that "International Law should be observed so long as the enemy observed it; but that International Law should be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according to cur own opinions, and that he considered the present measure as being perfectly justified by International Law." (11367) MINICI became a Hember of the Frivy Council on 29 May 1942.

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TCJO suid that "because only a few years had passed since Theiland's cession of the territories, which she was about to re-acquire, her desires had been very strong" and for this reason "Japan was trying to recognize Theiland's reacquisition of these territories...." (11,365)

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FUNCTIONS OF THE C.PINET

... It hough the Cabinet is the chief executive organ of the government, there is no specific reference to the Cabinet in the Constitution. If included at all, it is only by implication. The only writele which may be said to have application to that body is writele LY which provides:

"The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. All laws, Imperial Ordinances and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the State, require the counter-signature of a Minister of State." (650-651)

Yet notwithstending these facts, the Cabinet exists as a collective tody composed of departmental ministers under the presidency of a minister president for the purpose of initiating, directing and cerrying out the general policies of the government and to serve as a channel through which the Imperial prerogative over general affairs is placed in operation....(651) A rticle I of the Imperial Fescript on the Functions of the Cabinet provides: "The Cabinet is composed of the various Einisters of State." (651)

according to article LV of the Constitution, the Cabinet Ministers, or Ministers of State, are responsible for the advice which they give to the Emperor. The Constitution, however, as Frince JTO in his Commentaries explains, is silent about the person or persons to whom they are responsible and for what they are responsible, and the nature of the responsibility. (652)

...s to the person to whom there is responsibility, there is unanimity among the constitutional jurists that in legal principle, the ministers of state are primarily directly responsible to the Emperor and that no other organ of the State may question their legal responsibility or remove them from office. (652)

This primary responsibility to the Emperor is inescepable as to matters of state, even though the Emperor has sought out the advice of other constitutional and extraconstitutional bodies. (654)

Unite there has been some lispute as to whether cabinet responsibility is an individual responsibility or a collective one, the majority of experts have tended to regard the responsibility as that of the individual minister of state. In practice, the Cabinet has actually assumed collective responsibility under the leadership of the Fremier. (654)

The Cabinet as the chief alministrative organ with respect to general affairs of state has wide legislative powers, a portion of which is exercised in conjunction with other governmental bodies. Functions of the Cabinet (Donb'd)

Under the provisions of article LV of the Constitution, the Cabinet exercises the legiclative powers of the Emperor under article V, VII, VIII, IX and X of that instrument. (654)

The Cabinet exercises the legislative power conferred upon the Diet together with the Diet in one of the following manners: (656)

1. Through initiation of legislation. Since the elimination of political parties, initiation by the Cabinet has been the sole method used for the introduction of legislation.

2. Through the exercise of the power to approve or disapprove lecislation introduced by a member of the Diet.

In eddition the Catinet exercises control over the legislative power of the Diet by the provisions of the Constitution wherein the Dist is denied the power to convene of its own accord and wherein the Diet may be prorogued, or in the case of the House of Representetives, dissolved by the Cabinet.

3. The Cebinat, however, exercises power either by itself or in conjunction with governmental organs other than the Diet.

when the Diet is not in passion, the Cabinet exercises the legislative power through the issuance of Imperial Ordinances as provided in article VIII of the Constitution. This power is an extensive one and is shared in part with the Frivy Council. As the Diet Session ordinarily does not exceed three conths in length, as provided in the Constitution, Article XLII, the Cabinet exercises the legislative power without Diet concurrence for the greater part of the year. Although the Diet has the power of disepproval of Imperial Orlinances, the power has been rarely exercised, and even if exercised can be obviated by the reissuances of the disapproved ordinance immediately after the adjournment of the Diet. (657)

In addition the Cabinat has legislative powers over and above those of the Diet in the treaty-making power, which is in no way shared with the Diet, and through the general ordinance power. (657)

One other phase of power which is shared by Cabinet and the Diet is the financial power. (657)

While generally the Diet has legislative power with respect to finances, that of the Cabinet is much broader. (6(1-662)

First, the Diet, except in the case of en increase, cannot touch the funds allotted to the Imperial household.

Second, the Cabinet can prevent the Diet from reducing or rejecting any of the following items:

- 157 -

Functions of the Cabinet (Dont'd)

(i) Expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor.

(ii) Expenditures which have orisen by the effect of law such es treaty obligations.

(iii) Expenditures that appertain to the legel obligations of the Covernment.

Third, the Cabinet has wide financial powers not subject to prohibitory control of the Diet in the following instances:

(i) The use of a Continuing Expenditure Fund which may be set up by a friendly Diet for use in adverse times.

(ii) .. reserve fund which the Diet must mendatorily provide.

(iii) Thr right to make expenditures in excess of the Budget subject to the subsequent approbation of the Diet, which is of little value after an expenditure has been made.

(iv) The right to issue an Imperial ordinance for all financial measures in the event the Diet is not in session and cannot be convoked subject only to subsequent approval by the Diet which is of little value in the case of a <u>fait accompli</u>.

(v) The right to elways use the Budget and appropriations of the previous year regardless of the decision of the Diet. (661-662)

Like the legislative branch of the government, the executive department of the Japanese government is not a single agency. Easically, all executive power is vested in the Emperor. It is exercised, in fact, by the Cabinet and its agencies, the composite of the military and naval agencies known as the "Supreme Command" and the Privy Council. Conflicts of jurisdiction exist within and between these bodies. (663)

While the Cabinet exercises the chief governmental functions of formulating general policy, determining the modes of the exercise of the authority vested in the Throne formulating the legislative program and by leading the Diet, its effectiveness as the chief governing organ of Japan is severely limited by its dual nature. This "duality" of the Cabinet is due to two factors: (1) the peculiar position held by the ministers of war and navy within the cabinet; and (2) the nature of the personnel holding the offices of the ministries of war and navy. (664)

The ministers of wer and navy possess the important right of <u>iaku joso</u> or the right of direct access to the Throne. In this respect it should be noted that all Cabinet Ministers have the right of access to the Throne. However, the right of the war and nevy

- 158 -

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Functions of the Cabinet (Cont'd)

ministers to approach the Throne is greater than that of other ministers and is coequal with that of the Prime Minister. Thile the other ministers of state are responsible in every way to the cabinet for the carrying out of their luties and for advice given to the Throne, the Cabinet locs not have such complete control over the war and navy ministers sinct they have the right of escers to the Tarone on matters on matters which are kept secret from the other members of the Cabinet except the Premier. (664) This superior right is recognized in Article VII of the Imperial Ordinance on the Functions of the Cabinet which provides: (665)

"Such matters as concern military secrets and military orders and are reported to the Emperor, unless referred to the Cabinet by the Emperor, shall be reported to the Prime Minister by the Minister of War and the Minister of the Nevy." (445)

The importance of the right is further intensified by the fact that the Fremier is limited by law in the choice of qualified personnel in the filling of these positions. By Imperial Orlinence 193 of May 9, 1900, the wor minister must be a general or lieutenent general and the navy minister must be an admiral or vice-admiral in active service. On June 19, 1913, Admiral Yemamoto succeeded in videning the qualification to include those on the reserve lists, but since the administration of Fremier HIROTA in 1936 the qualifications have been limited to those in active service. Fecause of the requirement of active service, the army and navy have control of the appointment of the respective persons to the wer and navy ministries. This power is exercised for the army by a triumwirate consisting of the outgoing Secretary of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Director General of Military Education; and for the navy by a similar group holding the correlative offices in that branch of the service. (665)

The results of this duality of organization have been as follows: (666)

First, by feiling to appoint a war minister or a navy minister, either the army or nevy could prevent the formation of a cabinet or control the making of the personnal thereof.

Seconi, by compelling the war or nevy ministers, subject to the orders of the high command because of their active service status, to resign, either the army or the nevy could bring about the resignation of the Jahinet.

Third, through the use of the right of direct access to the Throne, the war and navy ministers have been able to obtain the establishment of policy which is contrary to the opinions of the Premier and the other members of his cabinet or which is kept entirely secret from them.

- 159 -

Finations of the Oscinet (Cont'd)

The Emperor has the supreme command of the army and the Nevy but he does not exercise it through the Cabinet 'ut through the minister of war, the minister of the navy, 'the chiefs of the general staff and the chief aide-de-camp to the Emperor, all of whom have direct access to the Experior and who are directly responsible to him. The Emperor is thus assisted in the exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command by organs which are separate from, and independent of, those which alvise the Throne over general affeirs of state. (669)

CLEINET MEETING (1931)

Exhibit No. Date Record page Carr's Summary

19-20 Soptambor 1554; 1555 --21-23 Soptambor 1562

Present

(..t the time of the lukdon outbreak the following held the positions indicated. (1556))

SUGIYARA, Vice War Minister K.N.Ya, Hanzo, Chief, army Gen. Staff MINCHIYA, Harushige, Vice Chief Army General Staff AOTSO, Kuniaki, Gen., Chief, Military Affairs Bureau

Cabinet Lambors

2nd WAALTSUKI Cabinet

162

- ministers -

(Frime)	WAKATSUKI, Reijiro
(Foreign)	SHIDEHARA, Aijuro
(Home)	"DACEI, Konzo
(Finance)	INCUE, Junnosuke
(Wer)	LIR. Jiro
(Nevy)	ABO, Kiyotana
(Justice)	"T.NBE, Chifuyu
(Education)) T.N.A., Ryuzo
	S.AUKAUCHI, Yukio
	tion) KOIZUMI, Latajiro
(Railway)	H.R., Shujiro

<u>Decision</u>

No reference to a decision.

Remerks

Fremier WAKATSUKI in his direct examination (his affidevit) stated inter alia as follows:

The first his Cabinat knew of the Mukden Incident was on September 19, 1931, the day after the outbreak; MIN.MI (accused) on September 20, 1931, at a Cabinet meeting, reported that "for strategic and tactical reasons it had been n cessary for the Japanese Imperial Forces to pursue the Chinese troops a certain distance into Chinese territory as a protection measure which would, in no sense be expanded;" on 22d and 23d September 1931, MIN.MI reported further

- 161 -

Oxpansion, saying that in the night of 22 September 193. General H.Y.SHI, Commander-in-Chief of Korean army, monoacross the Yalu River, hereby invading Asnopuria; LPA said it was true that General HAYACHE moved without the Imperial Sanction or without authority from the Gaugest act the War minister or the Chief of Staff; but that he, General HAYASHI, had received an urgent request from the Kwargtung army for aid; though MINALI agreed to put into effect the Cabinet policy (cease operations in Manchuria) day after day expansion continued; MINALI showed maps daily containing a line of boundary beyond which the Army would not go, but daily this boundary line was ignored and further expansion was reported but always with assurances that each expansion was the final one; MINALI "failed to control the Army in Manchuria and had not carried out the unanimous policy of the Cabinet in this matter, therefore, I rusigned as Frime Minister and my Cabinet with me" (1557) Affidavit signed "R. WAKLTSUKI."

See Ex. 57, Lytton Report, Page 71 "All the forces in Manchuria, and some in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of September 18th over the whole area of the South Manchurian Railway from Changehun to Port Arthur."

CABINEY MEETING (1931)

 Exhibit No.
 Date
 Record page
 Corris Sum and

 923
 24 September 9350; 1339
 6, 7

<u> Fresent</u>

Cabinet Nembers - 24 September 1931

2nd WAKATSUKI Cabinet (See Exhibit 162 herein - Cabinet keetings 1931)


<u>Decision</u>

Adopted a resolution that Japan had no territorial ambitions. (Cross examination of SHIDEELKA (1339))

<u>Remarks</u>

Stimson sent a tolegram that a note should be delivered to the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 24, 1931, stating that the American Government hoped that Japan and China would refrain from further hostilities.

The Japanese Government replied that "it may be superflucus to repeat that the Japanese Government herbors no territorial designs in Manchuria." (9350)



<u>Sxhibit Nc.</u>	<u>Date</u>	Record Page	Cerr's S.
189	24 September	2241	7

Present

Cabinet Lembers - 24 September 1931

2nd WARATSURI Cabinet (See Exhibit 162 herein - Cabinet Meeting 1931)

<u>D_cisicn</u>

No refurance to any docision.

Remarks

(Excerpts from Exhibit 58, being a telegram showing certain assurances given by Japan to the United States and being a statement issued after the Extraordinary Cabinet Nesting of 24 September 1931.)

The Statement said inter alia:

There were some detachments in Mukden and Korea and a small number of men in a few other places, but "nowhere does a state of military occupation as such exist." (2243)

A mixed brigade of 4,000 men were sent from Korea to join the Manchurian garrison but the total number of men didn't exceed the number set by treaty; the Japanese Government harbors no territorial disigns in Manchuria. (2244)

But see Exhibit 181 (2180) a talegram from General HaYASHI at Mukden on 19 Septembet to SHIDEHARA stating that although China had declared that she would act on the non-resistance principle absolutely, Staff Officer SAKAGAKI (T.N. probably a mistake for ITAGAKI) said "it was the Army's intention to see it through thoroughly" because the Chinese army had attacked the Japanese Army and because the matter "concerned the prestige of the State and the Army..." (2180)

See also Exhibit 181--another telegram from General HAYASHI to SHIDEARA stating that the Army was planning to start positive operations simultaneously throughout the various places along the Manchurian Railway Zone. (2183)

See also Lytton Report, Exhibit 57, for the Japanese Army's successive military movement into the interior of Manchuria at Chanchun, Koran, Nonni Bridgo, Tsitsihova Chanchow and Harban.

When Raul became War Minister on 15 December 300 reinforcements were sent to manchuria until the country was completely overrun by Japanese Perces and in the spring of 1933 Jahol was invaded and made a part of Lanchukue. (See Summary of Proof--"Japanese military Aggression in Monchuria" page 25)

CABINET NEETING (1931)

Exhibit No.	Dete	Record page	Cerr's Summary
188-в	Between 13-17 Decembor	2218	
188-C	Between 13-17 December	2219-2221	13

Present

INUKAI, Prime Minister ARAKI, Wor Minister OSUMI, Navy Minister (deceased) TAKAHASHI, Finance Minister (deceased) MORI, Secretary of the Cabinet (deceased) and all other me bers of HUKAI's Cabinet (2221; 2223)

Cabinct

INUKAI Cabinet

(Prime)	INUKAI, Takeshi
(Hore) (Finance)	NAKABASHI, Tokugoro
(Wer)	TAKAHASHI, Korekiyo ARAMI, Sadao
(Nevy)	OSUMI, Nineo
(Justice)	SUZUKÍ, Kisaburo
(Education)	HATOYAŃA, Ichiro
(Agriculture)	YAMAMOTO, Teijiro
(Cormerce)	MAYEDA, Yonezo
(Communication)MITSUCHI, Chuzo
(Reilway)	TOKONAMI, Takejiro
(Overseas)	HATA, Toyosuke

Decision

Approved ARAKI's military budget to pacify and occupy the four provinces of Fanchuria then under Chang Hsueh-Liang viz. Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungking and Jehol. The matter of the budget was referred to the Privy Council (with the Emperor pre-sent) which also approved it on 17 December 1931. (2219)

Remarks

The recting of the Privy Council on 17 December 1931 Was an extraordinary one. (2222) In answer to a question as to why it was so ARAKI replied, "It was really an energency session, as expenditures were required which would ordinarily have to be passed by the Diet and the Diet was not in session at the tire." (2232)

ARLEI in his interrogation stated that, "After I pagero Wer Minister, I discussed the policy of the occupation of General Chang's four provinces to clear up the Manchurian situation. After I had made the plan up ryself with the barro Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister, all agreed with me. The Prime Minister approached the Privy Council for approval." (2218)

He further stated that, "Until this time (17 December 1931) there had been no fixed policy, and it was realized that the absence of policy would result in the spreading of hostilitics. It had been decided that the three provinces comprising Chang Hsuch-liang's territory required pacification, but a statement by Chang Hsuch-liang to the effect that his jurisdiction extended over four territories expanded the scene of activities to Jehol. Chang Hsuch-liang was originally at Ching Chow (Chinchow). He later withdrew to Jehol from where he conducted his government." (2221)

1

In the riddle of July 1932 under the pretext that a Japanese officer named ISHIMOTO was missing, the Japanese started to invade Jehol. They were repulsed. After occupying certain key points the strategical situation of Jehol become very critical. On 22 February 1933 the Japanese Army sent to the Chinese an ultimatum stating that Jehol was not Chinese territory and decanding that Chinese forces in the Jehol Province be withdrawn within 24 hours. On 25 February 1933 war broke out and Jehol fell into Japanese hands on 2 March 1933. (KOISO--accused--was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army from August 1932 to March 1934; ARAKI--accused--was Finister of War during this time.) (2269-70). The conquest of Jehol was concluded by the Tang-ku Truce of 31 May 1933 (Exhibit 193 -2273-2274) CABINET MEETINGS (1932)

Exhibit No.

Late Record pase

12 March

222

16

Carr's Surmary

Present

2817; 2784

Cabinet Members - 1 March 1932

INUKAI Cabinet (Sce Exhibit 188-B, herein, Cab. Meeting 1931)

<u>Iecision</u>

The basic rlan for Management of Foreign Relations accompanying the foundation of the New Manchuria-Mongol State.

Romarks

On 15 September 1952 Japan recognized Manchukas.

Exhibit 222 is Part LL of "Cutling for Management of Foreign Relations with the Foundation of the New Manchuria-Mongol State" decided by the Cabinet around 1 March 1932. By the provisions of this outline Japan hoped to lead the new Manchuria-Mongol State to gradually develope, first internally and then in matters of foreign relation.

Under this outline Japan was to render "all sorts of aids," and to "let her declare the plans of keeping with the Open-Door and Equal Oppertunity principles so as she can avoid the intervention of powers;" Manchikue was to gain control of Custors by tactful means in order not to create unfavorable influence upon Japan's foreign relations, especially since the Fairen customs were located in an area controlled by Japan. Japan was to establish factual contact with the new state by unofficial means, e.g. by private law contracts and by local agreement between Japanese officials in Manchikue and the new state or its officials; Manchikue was to be allowed to "appeint small number of Japan se as the officials or councillors at first which may be enlarged gradually later." (2617-2619) The seizure of military power was to be justified upon the "right of subjugating bandits and the policy of protecting Empire subjects which were recognized by the League Council." (2819)

Two plans were devised regarding the disposition of the kan hurian Maritime Customs. The existing maritime customs in China were organized upon the basis of agreements on several occasions since 1854 between China and foreign countries and China had the obligation rot to change the customs until 1943. The other powers, especially Fritain, attached great

- 168 -

importance to the Chinese Customs system. The Customs' income wis used as security for Chinese debts to foreign countries. Japan could not instruct the Amantung Government to approve the science of Deiren customs by the new State before Japan's recognition of it because of the Established Fact of Dairen Customs in 1907. (2819-2020 - Excerpt also)

According to the First Plan the Customs orgnization in Manchuria could be preserved but, aside from the security for foreign loans, the income from maritime customs, including those from Lairon, should be seized by the new State. According to the Second Plan all customs **ebuld** be seized except that of Pairen but the income allotted for security for foreign debts should be sent to the Customs General or dectwited in a bank in view of respecting foreign security rights. The Second Plan was to be used only if the first failed. (2820)

ALAKI in his interrogation refers to a Calinet meeting of February or warch 1932 to form the Administration Committee to set up the new State (2784). The Commander-in-Chief (HCNJ)) of the Awantung Army requested that Henry Fu-Yi be made head of the new government. ARAKI said various Japanese Government officials head bear sent to help in the organization of manchuria. (2784) CABINET MEETING (1932)

Exhibit No. 223 Iate Record care 11 April " 2825 Fresent Carr's Summary

Cabinet Members - 11 April 1982

INUKAI Cabinet (See Exhibit 188-b herein, Cab. Meeting 1951)

<u>Fecision</u>

Cn April 11, 1332, the Cabinet docided "The Empire's Practical Assistance and Guidance Towards the New State of Manchuria and Mongolia."

Romarks

To bring about a single self-sufficient economic unit of Japan and Manchukuo by effecting control over the industries of the two countries, authoritative leaders were required, according to this Exhibit. To offect this two measures were to be taken: (1) The new State was to employ authoritative advisers from Japan who were to be the highest advisers in connection with financial, economic and general political problems; (2) The new State was to appoint Japanese Nationals to the leading posts in the Privy Council, the Central Bank and other organs of the new State. (2826) CAPINET MEETING (1952)

Exhibit No.

224

<u>Late</u>

3 May

!

Record page 2827 Carr's Summary

17

Present

Cabinet Members - 3 May 1932

INUKAI Cabinet (See Exhibit 182-B, herein, Cab. Mectings 1931)

<u>Decision</u>

Adopted "The General Frinciple of the Policy Concerning Construction of the Kirin-Tunghua Railway Extension Line." (2837)

Renarks

This decision concerned the construction of the extension and the method of payment therefor. (2828) This shows Japan was in May 1932 determining the policy of management and construction of railways in Manchukuo.

CABINET MEETING (1932)

ANT WANTER STAT

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carris Surris
225	12 August	2830	

Present

Cabinat Members - 12 August 1932

SAITO Cabinet

(Frime)	SAITO, Makoto
	UCHIDA, Yasuya
(Hone)	YAMANOTO, Tatsuo
(Finance)	TAKAHASHÍ, Korekiyo
(War)	ARAKI, Sadao
(Navy)	OSUMI, Mineo
(Justice)	KOYANA, Natsukichi
(Education)	HATOYAMA, Ichiro
(fericulture)	GOTO, Furio
	•

<u>Decision</u>

The document refers to a decision of the Japanese Government of 18 November 1930 to open negotiations with China concerning the acquisition of aviation rights in Marchuria and Mongolia. Negotistions were unsuccessful. On Noverber 11, 1931 the Cabinet decided to make the Japan Air Transportation Corpany terporarily open the regular Chang Chung-Dairen-Mukden air route and the Socul-Pinghsiang-Mukden route on the pretext of military communication and for the purpose of establishing the foundation for acquiring aviation rights in Manchuria and Mongolia and at the same time insuring communi-cations between Kwantung Army Units. (2831) But after Japan got control of Manchukuo it decided to turn the military fir service into a standing business organ and give it permanency. It was also decided that the management of rviation in Manchuria and Mongolia should be operated so as to contribute to the execution of the Imporial aviation policy, viz. th accomplishment of European-Asiatic air line, the development of industries and the preparation of <u>requiring</u> aviation rights in China proper. (2832) The Cabinet decided that a Joint Corpany of Japanese and Fanchurians should be organized --a corporation organized in Manchukuo with total control in Japan's hands. Subsidics were to be supplied by the Manchurir : Government and the South Manchurian Railway Company. (2832-3)

- 172 -

Remarks

The policy of the aviation corporation was to meet the demands of national defense and to contribute to the advance of Japan's aviation enterprise and the economical development of Manchukuo. (2833)

CABINET MEETING (1932)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record Page	Cerr's Surmary
229	12 Aurust	2900	19

Present

All of SAITO's Cabinet (acc. to ARAKI) (2900)

Cabinet Verbers - 12 Lugust 1932

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cabinet Peetings 1932)

Decision

Decided to formally recognize Manchukuo on 15 September 1932.

Remarks

According to ARAKI the Foreign Minister proposed the resolution to recognize Manchukuo.

Long before the military occupation of Kanchuria was completed, puppet governments were set up in the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. The machinery for performing this function was planned long in advance. The Self-Government Guiding Board was set up in Yukden as early as the latter part of September 1931, according to the testimony of KASAGI, Ryomei (2791). Although the board had a Chinese Chairman, it was controlled by the Japanese and financed by the Kwantung Arry. KASAGI Testified that all of its policies and activities had to be approved by ITAGAKI (accused) and the information as to which Chinese would be friendly to Japan's plans and would serve as willing collaborators was furnished by DOIHARA (accused). (2971) He also testified that of the 120 members of this guidance board only about 15 were Chinese or Fanchurians (2793).

The Lytton Report (Pages 88-99) shows in detail how the board fostered and developed the so-called "Independence Fovements" of the various cities and provinces and finally the establishment of the independent State of Manchukuo.

On Morch 9, 1932, Henry Pu-Yi was installed as Regent but he became a more puppet, every department of his government being under the control of Japaness advisers, secretaries or assistants (Lytton Report p. 106). See Exhibit 234 for a decision of the Cabinet, dated 22 December 1933 that the Government of Manchukuo should be changed from a remency to a constitutional monarchy.

. . . .

To give a color of legality to Japan's actions, in view of her part treaties, the independent State was set up. HASHIMOTO claimed credit for this suggestion (1969). At the insistence of ITAGAKI and ARAKI and others, the State was set up before the Lytton Report had been filed. By treaties and secret agreements with the new government Japan required full control of Manchukuo. See the testirony of OKADF, TANAKA and MCRISHIMA and McKensie's Summary, p. 32.

CABINET NUTTING (1932)

Exhibit No.	Drte	Record page	Cerr's Summary
231	9 December	2919	21

Present

(Cabinet Merbers - 9 December 1932

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1932)

Decision

Decided the policy of controlling the communication syster of Fanchuria and that a treaty to this effect should be concluded with Manchuria.

Remarks

In order to carry out the policy of the government regarding communications for the purposes of national defense and the economic development of Fanchuria the Cabinet decided that a treaty relating to the establishment of a joint enterprise to establish and operate under Japanese and Manchurian control the communications systems of Fanchuria should be concluded between Arbassedor NUTO (not the accused) and delegates of the Manchurian Government. (2920)

To the treaty there was an "annexed paper of the secret official exchange document" the matters concerning which were to be "prescribed in the secret corrend relating to the corpany of both the governments." (2922) The ennexed document was to provide that in case the Japanese and the Fanchurians differed, the opinion of the Japanese was to prevail; that the highest rilitary authorities of both countries (in Manchuria) could give instructions to the company of a military nature and could dispatch to the company of a military nature and inspect the communication organs, the execution of business etc.; that the highest military authorities in both countries (in Fanchuria) were to be given the might to employ all personnel of the company, "to practice supervision and inspection when necessary from the view point of mational defense on the maintenance of public order ..." (2923) But "the highest military argans of Fanchuria must obtain previously, approval of highest military organs of Japan stationed in Fanchuria when intending to indicate an inspection or to make demands of the said company. (2923-4)

The treaty was concluded on 26 March 1933.

CABINET NEETINGS (1933)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	Date	Record prge	Cerr's Summery
381	11 April	4708	23

Present

Cabinet Members - 11 Lpril 1933

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cobinet Meetings 1932)

Decision

Cobinet decision of 11 April 1933 decided that the raw opium in the custody of the Government-General of Korea could be transferred to the Government of Manchukuo as a temporary mensure (4709). The Cabinet decision of 23 December 1938 decided that the acreage necess ry for increased poppy-growing should be increased. (4709)

Remarks

According to the decision of the Cabinet on April 11th, Showa 8 (1933), the raw optium in the custody of the Government-General of Korea wap allowed to be transferred to the Government of Manchukuo as a terporary mersure; thereafter raw optium produced in Korea may be transferred to the Government of Manchukuo for the sake of cooperation with its monopoly system, besides being supplied as materials for the optium monopolies of the Government-General of Formosa and the Kwantun Bureau. Accordingly, it was submitted to the Optium Committee f deliberation on December 12, Showa 13 (1938), that the quantith of raw optium to be supplied or transferred to the Government-General of Formosa, the Kwantung Leased territory and the Government of Manchukuo, and the acreage for poppy-growing necessary to produce the required quantities of optium should be decided upon after consultation by the authorities concerned It was passed by the Corrittee on the same day, and it was decided upon by the Cabinet on December 23rd of the same year. (4709)

It was estimated that there would be an increase of 4900 ecres during the fiscal y r of 1939 and the total acreage was expected to emount to about 17,150 acres. (4709)

- 177 -

CABINET MEETINGS (1933)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Surrary2338 August292623

Cabin_t Nerbers - 8 Jugust 1933

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cabinet Mestings 1932)

Present

<u>Decision</u>

Decided the funder ental policy of Japan of guiding Manchuria based upon the Japanese-Manchurian Protocol. Manchuria was to become an independent nation possessing indivisible relations with Japan.

Rornrks

Exhibit 241 gives the terms of 15 September 1932 treaty (recognition).

In a letter to the Vice Minister of Wor dated 3 Noverber 1932 KOISO (accused)--Exhibit 230 (2903-2911), Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Arry, enclosed "In Outline for Guiding Manchukuo" prepared by the staff section of the Kwantung Arry, based upon a draft for such a plan prepared by the Second Section of the General Staff Headquarters. This policy provided that Manchukuo should be supported and developed as an independent state but should adapt herself to the Japanese national policy for the purpose of realizing full prosperity and harrony between the two countries. It further provided that the government of Manchukuo in the future should norinall be a constitutional Empire but substantially was to be autocratic, and the particip tion of the people in the legislature was to be only by those people selected by the Government. (2904)

The gist of the plan was that the administration of Manchukuo should be backed for the time being by the inner leadership of the Corrender of the Japanese Kwantung (rmy and carried out by officials of Japanese lineare, although officials of Fanchukuoan lineage would outwordly appear to be in charge. (2904) When an organ of civilian administration was established, the corrender of the Kwantung Arry should be chief of that organ. (2905) Arraments shall be aired at the maintenance of peace and order.(2907) Euconomically, there was to be established a "bloc" between Japan and Fanchukuo.(2907) Diplomatically, her attitude was to be anti-Chinese in principle, although outwardly it was to be one of non-interference. For the time being, Manchukuo was to advocate the Open Door Policy toward the United States and the Soviet Governments. (2908)

Regarding the adjustment of relations between Japan and Manchukuo ware set out in detail, the plan provided for the joint defense of both countries; that each industry was to be given a suitable locality either in Japan or Manchukuo, with the aim of abolishing mutual customs barriers and for purposes of joint defense (2905); that for some thre political parties should not be permitted to exist, and Japan should lead the general situation skillfully according to the principle of "Let the people follow blindly." (2909) Japanese were to occupy key positions (2909) and recial struggle was to be avoided if possible (2910); but, if unavoidable, military power should be used (2910); "under the direction of the Army, preventive measures shall be taken against political and ideological movements for national destruction which may arise from the inside or outside of the country." (2909)

Exhibit 233 (Cabinet decision of above date) is actually a combination of Exhibit 241 (Treaty of Recognition) (above) and Exhibit 230 (Outline for Guiding Manchukuo--prepared by the Kwantung Army)(above)but it has greater official sanctions since it was decided by the Cabinet with some elaborations on items rentioned in the other documents.

CLEINET -	FEETINGS
(193	3)

Exhibit No.	<u>Data</u>	<u>Keer</u>	<u>) Parc</u>	<u>Carr's</u>	<u>Sunan ny</u>
234	22 Deed	mber	2933	24	

Frescht

Cabinat Members - 22 December 1983

SAITO Cabinet (See Exhibit 225, horsin, Cabinet Eceting 1932)

<u>Decision</u>

Decided that the Govarnment of Manchukue should be changed from that of a Regency to that of a constitutional monarchy.

Ronarks

The docision says in part (2934-2935) that

"when proparations are completed, kanchukuo will be directed to enforce the konarchy."

"I. It must be made clear that the enforcement of hemarchy is not a restoration of the Shin regime, which was an auteeracy of followers of the memoreh, but the foundation of national constitution of a new hanchukup, and all causes of hindrances to the development of the Hanchurian state affairs and the execution of the national policy must be nullified, especially to contribute to the strongthening and expansion of the Japanese and manchurian national defense power necessary to overcome the international crisis which we may encounter before long. Learningly, the enforcement of the Henarchy must act upon the following three essential points." (2934)

Print one: Then enforcing the Henarchy necessary referentions shall be made so that there will be no hindrance or check-up on the development of state offairs of Henchukue and upon the execution of our national policies." (2935) Point three, states that: "It shall be kept in mind that though the Henarchy will be carried into affect, there will be no change in the policy or spirit of directing Manchukue and that there shall be no hindrance whatever to the execution of national pulicies." (2935)

The instrument then provided for an exchange of letters between the two governments and outlined the do-tails for sotting up the new honarchy.

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Exhibit 235 is a cortificate from the Japanese Foreign Office showing that the notes referred to were actually exchanged between the Japanese Lubassedur and the Frine Minister of Lonchukuo, on Earch 1, 1934, the very day the menarchy was inaugurated.

(1024) (1024)

Exhibit MO.	<u>Dato</u>	Pacord nape	Carr's Summary
226	20 March	20 3 0	25

Present

Cabinet Mombers - 20 March 1034

sarmo Cabinot (See Exhibit 225, herein, Cab Meetines 1932)

Decision

Janan decided to dominate and control Manchuria by unifying and developing her principal industries.

Remarirs

Exhibit 236 sets forth how the industries of Manchukuo should be controlled. It shows that Manchukuo was so much a nurnet covernment of Janan that the Jananese Cabinet determined how the principal industries of Manchukuo should be organized and developed to most the "demands of the Jananese Wmnire's national defense."

- 182 -

nimes i

CABINET L'EETING (1937)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record pape	Carris Sumary
260	ll July	2455	48

Present

Cabinet Members - 11 July 1937

1st KONOYE Cabinet

NOYE, Fuminaro
ROTA, Koki
BA, Ýeiichi
YA, Okinori
GIÝAMA, Gen
NAI, Mitsumasa 👘
IONÓ, Suehiko
IMA, Yoriyasu
SHIŃO, Shinji
GAI, Áyutaro
KAJÍTA, Chikuhei
ANI, Sónyu

Decision

According to Ching Teh-chun's cross-examination, the Japanese Cabinet under KONOYE on 11 July 1937, passed a resolution to send "a bigger number of Arry to North China."

<u>Remarks</u>

No other reference to this meeting in the record.

- 183 -

CABINET MEETINGS (1937)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record rage	Carr's Sumary
239	22 October	2960	55

Present

Cabinet Henbers - 22 October 1937

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Heeting 1997)

Decision

Decided to form a powerful national political company to establish and develop heavy industry in Manchukuo.

Remarks

One half of the capital needed was to be invested by the Manchurian government and the other half "will be investigated by the Privates." This company was to invest and take leadership in the iron, steel, light metal industries as well as in heavy industries concerned with the construction of motor cars and airplanes (2963). It could also invest in and manage "annexedly" the enterprises relating to gold, mining, zinc, lead, copper and other mining industries. If Companies then in existence were to be traisferred to and managed by the new company.

CABINET MEETING (1937)

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Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Supp. Summ.
2255	27 October	16,218	9

Present

Cabinet Members in 27 October 1937

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Heeting 1937)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

KIDO stated in his diary that on 27 October 1937, he attended the extraordinary session of the Cabinet where a decision was made on the statement and answer to the invitation to the Conference in connection with the Nine-Power pact. (16,218)

CABINET MEETING (1937)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Supp. Summ.225819 November16,2219-10

Present

Cabinet Members - 19 November 1937

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Heeting 1937)

Decision

The Cabinet decided the liaison between Imperial General Headquarters and the Government.

Remarks

KIDO stated in his Diary of 19 November 1937, that at a Cabinet session on that day they decided the liaison b tween the Imperial General HQ and the Government. KIDO was of the opinion that Imperial General HQ regulations covered incidents as well as war. When he asked the War Minister if the degree and extent of an incident had been studied, the War Minister replied that he considered that Imperial General HQ would only be established if the incident had extended to the point of a declaration of war or the Army mobilization had been ordered. (16,221)

		ET MEEPING 1937)	
Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Supp. Summ.
2259	21 December	16,222	10

Present

Cabinet Members - 21 December 1937

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1st KONOYE Cabinet (see Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Feeting 1937)

Decision

See remarks.

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2

Remarks

KIDO stated in his diary that on 21 December 1937, he attended a Cabinet Meeting where negotiations with China, draft answer to the German Ambassador, and counter measures for the China Affair were discussed. KIDO urged the necessity of creating cultural measures in North China. (16,222)

CAE		MEETING
	(193	38)

Exhibit No.	Late	Record page	Carr's Sucr. Surn.
226 • ·	14 January	16,223	10

Present

Cabinet Merbers - 14 Conuary 1958

First KONCYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Calinet Meetings 1937

<u> Focision</u>

See Remarks.

Romarks

KINO recorded in his diary a Cabinet meeting on 14 January 1936, where the epsch making announcement concerning the China Afrair was discussed. Chiang hai-Shek's answer was considered as lacking sincerity, and the Cabinet decided to announce a fixed policy that they would have nothing to do with the National Government, but would negotiate with the new Chinese Government and join in the promotion of a newly rising China. and the peace of Asia. (16,223)

Exhibit 463-A is "Tocument purporting to establish provisional Gourment at Peiping and Restoration Government at Nanking" (5296). It refers to a Cabinet meeting held "soon after the establishment of the Provisional Government" (5301) which decided the "Fundamental Principles to Manage the Incident (5301). According to these principles, the "Japanese Government will comparate with the Manking Government to save the situation if the Manking Government reconsiders. However, if the Manking Government does not reconsider and continues the st-called long-term resist meet. Japan will not expect to negotiate with the Manking Government in the future, and furthermore to meet the necessity to manage the vast areas occupied by the Japanese forces, beneforth, Japan will take separate measures." (5301)

Exhibit 972-A is the "Announcement of the Japonese Government Relation to the China Incident," 16 January 1958. It said that "the vapanese Government will cease from henceforward to deal with that Government, and they look forward to the establishment and growth of a new Jhinese regime, harmonious coordination with which can really be counted upon. With

- 188 -

such a regime they will full cooperate for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations and for the building up of a rejuverated China." (9567)

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See Exhibit 463-A, herein, under Imperial Conference, 1938, for a reference to the decision of the Imperial Conference regarding the disposition of the China Incident. (5503)

- 189 -

CABINET MEETINGS (1938)

Bate Record porto

16 January

Carris Summer

63

486

Exhibit No.

6002

Present

Cabinet Mombers - 16 January 1938

1st KONONE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

<u>Decision</u>

The Exhibit refers to but does not set forth any decision.

Lemarks

Exhibit 486 shows that shortly after a cabinet meeting of 16 January 1938, it was considered necessary that Germany's policy regarding the Japanese aggression in China be re-priented. (Introductory remarks 60 1). A Japanese victory should be anticipated as well as China's turning move towards Russian communism. The policy of armament shipments to Whith, which was antagonizing Japan should be revised, and the German military advisers should be withdrawn from China, since they no longer have the confidence of the Chinese and are merely causing Japanese distrust War shipments to China should be suspended and Manchukup should be recognized; Gealings, etc., should be transferred to North China Regime and Peiping Government. (6C02-6015) CABINET MEETINGS (1938)

Record page

Exhibit No.

486

16 January 6002

Date

Carris Summer

63

Present

Cabinet Members - 16 January 1938

1st KCNOIE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

<u>Decision</u>

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C.BINTT LEETING (1938)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Surmary
856	18 January	8492	
857		8497	~ ~

Present

Cabinet Members-18 January 1938

(See Exhibit 260, herein, Cabinet Heetings, 1937)

Decision

The Cabinet decided the plan for regulating the supply and derand of essential materials during 1938.

Remarks

Exhibit 657 is a communication from K.Z.MI, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to ITAG.MI, the War Minister, outlining the type of revision deemed necessary by the Cabinet to achieve the national plan. The plan for regulating the supply and demand of essential materials during 1938 had been decided at the cabinet meeting of 18 January 1938 according to which lecision "imports shall be 3,000,000,000 yen and the total sum of imported materials shall be 3,000,000,000 yen by decreasing both military and lomestic demands (including Menchuria and Kyantung Province)." (8498)

However, it was found that exports would probably not exceed 1,-700,000,000 yen regardless of the efforts made to increase them. (excluding Manchuria, Kwantung Frowince, North and Centrel China).(2499)

Consequently, other than the following imports were not to be allowed:

"1. Those to be allotted for military demands and raw materials, materials, machine tools, fuel, etc. which are necessary for production and supply of war munitions.

"2. Rew materials and materials for exports.

"3. The minimum amount of medicine, fertilizer, etc., which ere absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the nation's livelihood.

"h. The minimum amount of erticles which are necessary for barter trade." (8499-8500)

- 191 -

The exhibit then sets forth details of the rovised plan.

Exhibit 856 is likewise a communication from KAZAUT to ITAWAI, War Minister, dated 23 June 1938 referring to the Carinet decision "re possible enforcement of the urgent measure vital to the general mobilization." (8492)

The exhibit states that the cabinet has just opened a meeting on General mobilization, which deliberated on enforcement of the general mobilization by acquiring the reports from all ministries. Judging from the result of that meeting, the plan of the mobilization of commodities for 1938 (13th year of Shora) decided before, has become difficult to realize because of the extremely unfavorable foreign trade balance owing to the decrease in export and other reasons. (8493)

Both the above exhibits were read in evidence by Mr. Liebert to show how serious the problem of acquisition of foreign exchange had become to the acquisition of essential meterials, so serious in fact, Liebert stated, that when the export trade fell off the cabinet called for a severe curtailment of plans as well as severe restrictions on civilian economy. (8491) The exhibit then sets forth details of the revised plan.

1

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		CAFINET MEETING (1938)	
Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Supr. Sugar.
2262	9 August	16,226	11-12

Present

Cabine's Members - 9 August 1938

1st KCNOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

<u>Tecision</u>

See Remarks.

Legar 18

KIDO stated in his diary of 9 August 1938 that he attended a Cabinet meeting where he heard about the progress of the Changhufeng Incident from War Minister ITAGAKI and the Foreign Minister. After, he heard of a proposal to reinforce the German-Japanese relations which had been made by Von Ribbentrop to CSHIMA. It contained a clause providing that in the case of one nation being attacked, the other would render military aid. Italy was to join and negotiations with her were under way. Ribbentroe analysed the European situation as: war with Russia would be inevitable, beace moves towards Czechs, Anglo-French relations strong, possibly backed financially but not militarily by the United States, Humania neutral and Hungary could be made an ally. (16,226) Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Supr. Sugr.22629 August16,22611-12

CABINET MEETING (1938)

Present

Cabinet Members - 9 August 1938

1st KCHOYE Cabinot (See Exhibit 260, herein, Cab. Meeting 1937)

<u>**Tecision**</u>

See Remarks.

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Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
381)	12 December	4709)	85)
382)		4711)	104)

Present

Cabinet Members - 12 December 1938

1st KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 260 herein Cab. meetings 1937)

Decision

Ex. 382: Decided to increase poppy cultivation by 12,250 acres.

Remarks

Ex. 381: - This exhibit is discussed under the same exhibit number for 1933, Cabinet meetings.

on 12 December the plan was approved whereby the stock of hydrochloric cocaine manufactured by Formosan Pharmaceutical Company in excess of requirements could be shipped to Japan proper and other countries, used in Formosa and supplied to Manchukuo. The China Board of Managers of Opium Committee approved this plan. (4709)

Ex. 382: - In order to meet the increasing demand for opium in excess of its production in Chosen, Manchukuo, Kwantung Leased Territory, and Formosa, and in accordance with the Cabinet's decision of December 12, 193°, the Opium Management Board on November 9, 1939 passed a resolution approving an additional 5,000 chobu (12,250 acres) increase of poppies cultivation in Chosen for 1940. This increase plus the previous year's 7,060 chobu raised the total acreage under cultivation to 12,060 chobu (29,547 acres)"

- 194 -

CABINET MEETING (1939)

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Record page	Carr's Supp. Sumr.
2230	28 May	15,990	18

Present

Cabinet Members - 23 May 1939

HIRANUMA CABINET

(Prerier)	HIRANUMA, Kiichiro
(Agriculture)	SAKURAUCHI, Yukio
(Commerce)	HATTA, Yoshiaki
(Communications)	TANABÉ, Harumichi
(Education)	ARAKI, Sadao
(Finance)	ISHIWATARI, Sotaro
(Foreign Affrs.)	ARITA, Hachiro
(Home)	KIDO, Kooichi
(Justice)	SHINO, Suehiko
(Navy)	YONAI, Mitsumasa
(Overseas)	KOISO, Kuniaki
(Railways)	MA EDA, Yonezo
(War)	TTAGAKI, Seishiro
(Welfare)	HIROSE, Hisatada

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

Telegram from the German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated 28 May 1939, requesting information regarding the new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference. In a confidential and unofficial conversation OSHIMA reported that, according to a telegram he had received from ARITA, the Japanese Government wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in the event of European conflict. OSHIMA, having refused to pass on this information to the German Government he had been requested to hold the matter over pending result of discussion among the various factors. The German Ambassador was asked to make it clear that this attitude was causing distrust among the Germans and Italians. (15990) CABINET MEETING (1939)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Supp. Surr.227228 August16,24020

Prosent

Cabinet Hembers - 28 August 1939

HIRANUMA Cabinet (See Exhibit 2230 herein Cab, meetings 1939)

Decision

See Remarks.

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Remarks

KIDO recorded in his diary that on 28 August 1939 a Cabinet Meeting was held regarding the bloc resignation of the Cabinet. After HIRANUMA's explanations, all agreed and tendered their resignations but the Emperor requested that all Cabinet Ministers retain their posts until further notice. KIDO was informed that TADA might become the new War Minister and that this would only intensify friction between different army groups. KONOYE told KIDO that ABE had been ordered by the Emperor to form a Cabinet, who instructed him to appoint either UNEZU or HATA as War Minister, follow a policy of cooperation with the U.S. and Britain and use discretion in choice of Home and Justice Ministers. KIDO thought the last two instructions of the Emperor could be disposed of by ABE at his discretion. Regarding the appointment of the War Minister, in order to avoid a clash with military circles, KIDO thought it best that the Emperor either summon the War Minister or convey to the Army his choice and let the three Chiefs of the Army recommend the War Minister. (16,240)

CABINET MEETINGS (1939)

Exhibit No.	Dite	Record page	Carr's Summary
840	24 October	8605	104

Present

Cabinet Members - 24 October 1939

ABE Cabinet

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(Premier)	AEE, Nobuyuki
(Foreign)	NOMÚRA, Kiehisaburo
(Interior)	OHARA, Naoshi
(Finance)	ACKI, Knzuo
(War)	HATA, Shunroku
(Navy)	YOSHÍDA, Zengo
(Justice)	MIYAGI, Chegoro
(Education)	KAWARADA, Kakichi
(Agriculture)	SAKAI, Tadamu asa
(Commerce)	GODO, Takuo
(Communication)	NAGAÍ, Ryutaro
(Overseas)	KANAMÍTSÚ, Tsuneo

Decision

The meeting is mentioned in the cross-examination of Liebert.

Remarks

On 24 October the Japanese Cabinet decided to change the basis for determining the external value of the yen from the pound sterling to the United States dollar.

- 197 -

CABINET MEETING (1940)

Exhibit No.	<u>Datc</u>	Record Page	Cerr's Suprary
1007	3 March	°634	110
		Present	

Cabinet Ferbers - 3 March 1940

YOMAI Cabinet

(Prerier)	YCHAI, Mitsurase
(Foreign)	ARJTA, Hechiro
(Interior)	KODLIA, Hideo
(Finance)	SAKURAUCHI, Yukio
("'~r)	HATA, Shunroku
(Nrvy)	YOS"IDA, Zengo
(Justice)	KHIURA, Shotatsu
	MATSUURA, C injiro
	SHIMADA, Toshio
(Cormerce)	FUJIWARA, Ginjiro
(Corrunication)	KATSU, Vesanori
(Bailway)	FATSUNO, Tsuruhei
(Overses)	KOISO, Kuniaki
(Welfare)	YOSHIDA, Shigeru

Decision

A "Top Secret" document setting forth the "Econoric Policy which should be taken in connection with Diplomacy toward USA" dated 3 Farch 1940. (Apparently, though not so stated, a Cabinet decision).

Ronaks

Regarding the sconoric policy to be taken in connection with diploracy towards the United States, of 3 March, 1940, it was stated that the United States had since the incident tried to raintain the 9-Fower Treaty and ignore the establishment of a new order in East Aska. In view of the possitility of the United States imposing a moral or legal embargo on exports to Japan, and Japan's dependence on the United States for resources necessary for carrying out the Divine War, Japan must eliminate her reliance on the United States by perfecting her manufacture of iron and importing from a third power (Straits, India, Australia and China). Petrol, too, must be obtained from a third power other than the United States, and aviation gas, electrolytic copper, molybdenum and vanadium must also either be produced by Japan or imported from another power. Thus, if Japan rids herself of dependence on the United States, she will no longer be threatened. (9635-9643)

- 198 -

CABINET MISTINGS (1940)

Exhibit No.	Drte	Record page	Carr's Surrary	
541	26 July	6271	133	

Fresent

C-binet Verbers - 26 July 1940

2nd KONOYE Cobinet

(Premier)	FORMET. PROMPTO
(Foreign)	TETSICK, Sosuke
(Interior)	YASUI, EIJI
(Finance)	KAWATA, ISSO
(Wor)	TOJO, Hidaki
(Navy)	YOSHIDA, Zengo
(Justice)	KAZAPT, AMIRO
(Education)	HARHTDA, KHRINIKO
(foriculture)	TSHTGPRO, Lagarusu
(Correrce)	KOBAYASHI, Jenizo
	NURATA, She 20
(Without P.F.)	HOSHIPÓ, Nacki

Decision

On July 26, 1940 the new cobinet (2nd Konoye) defined Japan's basic national policy. The decision was published on 1 August 1940 as an official declaration of the Japanese Government.

Remarks

The decision changed the basic notional policy to provide a national defense structure by (1, plans for Greater East Asia, (2) increase of creaments and (3) unification of dorestic policy.

According to the bisic policy, Japan was to secure "an unshakable national structure such as conforms to the new world situation" and to realize this policy Japan must "mobilize the total strength of the nation." (6272)

Armanents were to be increased "on the basis of a state structure for actional defense through manifestation of the nation's total strength". (6273)

The fundamental air of her foreign policy was to be in the construction of a new order of Greater E-st (sia. (6273)

As to the renovation of the internal structure Japan Was (1) to establish national Locality which attached first importance to the idea of service to the state; (2) set up a new national political structure by reorganizing the nation upon the basis of "service to the state", every ran according to his occupation, and by reforming the Diet System so as to conform to the new national political structure; (3) establish a national defense economy on the basis of autonomous construction of the economies of Japan, Manchaukou and China, with the Empire as the center.(6274)

Japan was also to execute a planned economy and to perfect a unified control system over production, distribution and consumption of vital goods (6275) and to effect an "epochal expansion of important industries, especially heavy, chemical and machine industries." (6275) It was also decided that welfare measures would be carried out and living conditions improved "so as to ensure a living standard truly befitting a stout-hearted and strong bodied people capable to survive ten years of trials and hardships and surmount the national crisis." (6276) CARINET INETING (1940)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Summery8613 October8590158

Present

Cobinet J'embers - 3 October 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541 herein, Cabinet Mottings 1940)

Decision

Decided the "Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchoukou and China."

Remarks

The program concerned the use of the war production and war production potentials to dominate East Asia.

According to the basic policy, the aim of the economic construction of Japan, Manchoukou and China was to establish a self-sufficient economy by about 1950 and to accelerate the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. (8562)

Japan was to "guide and nurture the economic construction of Manchoukou and China." (8563)

Manchoukou was to develop her heavy and chemical industries and at the same time supply Japan with a portion of the raw materials for her heavy industries. (8564)

A labor plan "based on the foundation of racial cooperation will be established and 'Gesart politisch' control and redistribution will be undertaken". (8564)

The "financial ideology will be so changed as to enable the acquisition of the necessary quantity and quality of materials as a state primarily (sic) without placing the financial foundation solely on the certainty of collection." (8565)

In regard to foreign exchange, the aim of control was to be directed not solely upon the econory of overseas pryment but also on the accuisition of national defense materials from foreign countries. Japan was to be the center of finance and settlement for the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. (8566) As to correrce, the post conception of correctial trade was to be changed to that of a trade policy based upon the principle of production economy with the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a unit. (8566)

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CABINET PRETINGS (1940)

Exhibit No.	<u>Drte</u>	Record page		<u>Carr's Summary</u>
1317	25 October	11,838	•	161

Present

Cobinet Merbers - 25 October 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Decided the "Measures for Economic Development of N.E.I."

Rerarks

On 25 October the Japanese Cabinet discussed the Japanese attitude toward the Netherlands Indies and decided upon a program by which Japan would take over virtual control of the whole economic and political life of the Netherlands Indies. (11838-11843) The first measure to be taken would be the liquidation of Netherlands Indies econoric relations with the European and American Continents; (11838) the seeking of pre-ferential treatment for Japan; (11838) the placing under Jap-anese control of the production and export of essential war materials; (11839) the placing of the exchange control of the Netherlands Indies under Japanese guidance; (11840) the liquida. tion of foreign financial holdings in the Netherlands Indies and the placing of the forrulation and execution of all economic policies under the control of a joint Japanese-Netherlands Economic Commission. (11841) In general this Cabinet's decision was an elaboration of the rough draft of initial demands which had been drawn up in August, going into much greater detail as to the various measures to be taken. Had these derands been fulfilled, they would have resulted in the establishment of full Japonese control of the Netherlands Indies and the expansion of Japan to those regions without an octual war being fought. That the Japanese Government at this tire took it for granted that the Netherlands Indies would fall to Japan shortly was clear. The derands on the Netherlands Indies were an attempt to achieve this end without full scale aggression. (NEI Summary p. 10-11).

- 203 -

CABINET DEETINGS (1940)

Exhibit No.	<u>Drte</u>	Record page		Carr's Summary
1317	25 October	11,838	•	161

Present

Cobinet Members - 25 October 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Decided the "Nersures for Economic Development of N.E.I."

Remarks

On 25 October the Japanese Cabinet discussed the Japanese attitude toward the Netherlands Indies and decided upon a program by which Japan would take over virtual control of the whole economic and political life of the Netherlands Indies. (11838-11843) The first measure to be taken would be the liquidation of Netherlands Indies econoric relations with the European and American Continents; (11838) the seeking of preferential treatment for Japan; (11838) the placing under Jap-anese control of the production and export of essential war materials; (11839) the placing of the exchange control of the Netherlands Indies under Japanese guidance; (11840) the liquidat tion of foreign financial holdings in the Netherlands Indies and the placing of the forrulation and execution of all economic policies under the control of a joint Japanese-Netherlands Econoric Commission. (11841) In general this Cabinet's decision was an elaboration of the rough draft of initial demands which had been drawn up in August, going into much greater detail as to the various measures to be taken. Had these derands been fulfilled, they would have resulted in the establishment of full Japonese control of the Netherlands Indies and the expansion of Japan to those regions without an octual war being fought. That the Japanese Government at this tire took it for granted that the Metherlands Indies would fall to Japan shortly was clear. The derands on the Netherlands Indies were an attempt to achieve this end without full scale aggression. (NEI Summary p. 10-11).

- 203 -

CABINET MEETING (1940)

Exhibit No.	Dete	Record page	Carr's Summary
462	5 Noverber	5,284	
		<u>Present</u>	

Cabinet Members - 5 November 1940

2nd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Becided on the "Summary of the Programme for Economic Construction Embracing Japan, Manchukou and China".

Remarks

Exhibit 462 states that the fundamental national policy of establishing GEA and simed at the construction of a new world order entered upon a new phase with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact (5,284). To cope with the <u>new</u> situation, the <u>new</u> policy was adopted based upon the economic development of Manchoukou, China and Japan "in accordance with the <u>new</u> outlook on the economic order." (5285)

It was stated that the world economic system of free trade was disintegrating, so the old system, based upon the old order was to be discorded. (5285) The new economic order was to be established within about 10 years (5286). Japan was to develop the highest type of precision and mechanical industry and at the same time to develop her basic industries; Manchukuo was to develop the mining industry and electrical undertakings and China was to develop her mining and solt industries and to undertake large-scale production of raw materials as well as her heavy and chemical industries. (5290)

Skilled workers and technicians were to be supplied by Japan to China and Manchoukou. (5292). Japan was also to furnish financial assistance. (5293) The principal correctial trade of the pact was to be revised so that the principle of productive trade would energy which would enable each country, region and economic sphere to supply the others with goods recuired by ther in exchange for the goods necessary for its own planned production. (5294)

- 204 -

CABINET MEETING (1941)

Exhibit No.	Drte	Record page
1067 865	22 January	9,879, 9880 8,810

Carr's Summary

<u>1.72</u>

Presint

HOSHINO, Naoki HASHIDA, K., Education Minister (Deceased) TOJO, Hideki, Wor Minister KANAMITSU, Tsunco, Welfare Minister

Cabinet Merbers

2nd Konoye Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cobinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

Draft of bill re population policy was unanirously approved by the merbers of the Cobinet.

Remarks

The new population policy was to increase the population of Japan quickly and incessantly, to enhance the quality of the Japanese, and to correct the distribution of the Japanese race so as to secure the leadership of Japan over East Asia. (9,880)

"In this connection, Dr. Nobumi ITO, president of the Board of Information, told Domei that since the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere is the greatest mission ever delegated to the Japanese, they must hold the responsibility as the leaders of East Asia. (9,882)

In view of present conditions of rapid increase in the population of the cities, the physical and spiritual training of youths in the cities especially shall be intensified, so as to make them a good source of military and labour forces. (8810)

- 205 -

CABINET DECISION (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
1055	7 March	9,842	185

Present Cabinet Members on 7 March 1941 (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet Meetings 1940)

Decision

It was decided that the detailed regulations relative to the application of the revised National Mobilization Law, which were approved in the 76th session of the Diet, would be put in force on March 20.

Remarks

"The most important action of the 73rd session of the Diet in March 1938 was the passage of the National General Mobilization Bill. Fearing that the enactment of this law would rean complete loss of individual liberty even in peace-time, merbers of the Lower House opposed it. Passage was assured, however, when Premier KONOYE promised that it was applicable only in time of extreme emergency and that the Government would appoint a majority of Diet merbers to the National Mobility zation Council. This Council, composed of thirty Diet members and twenty Government officials, scholars and experts, was responsible for the formation of Imperial Ordinances which would make the law more effective or more applicable to changing conditions and circumstances. From the time the bill was passed the question of its application, as a whole or in part, created a definite split within the Konoye Cabinet and was perhaps partially responsible for its final downfall on January 3, 1939."(1)

To quote from the Tokyo Gazette, the law provided for "control and operation of human and material resources in such a way as to enable the State to give full scope to the efficient use of its strength for ...national defense in time of war, including ...incidents or affairs (external affairs)...which may not be called a war as a matter of policy, but one which is virtually the same as war." (2)

The objects of the National Mobilization Bill were further elaborated in a perphlet issued by the War Department: (1) Borton, Japan since 1931, p. 60 (2) id. p. 61.

- 206 -

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By the National General Mobilization Law, Japan aims to control and operate her entire personal and material resources to the fullest possible extent in order to enable her to demonstrate her national power most effectively for her national defense in time of energency to supply her army and navy with the vast amount of war materials they require in time of war, to secure smooth economic operation for the stability of national life, and at the same time to demonalize the enery on the battlefield as well as on the aconomic and propaganda fronts. (1)

More specifically, this new low was made necessary by the limited character of the Funitions Industry Mobilization Law already in force. Since the re-enactment of the latter, it had been necessary to mass numerous emergency measures to supplement it, such as the Temporary Capital Adjustment Law, temporary measures on exports and imports, and a temporary shipping control law. This new mobilization law was allinclusive and thus eliminated the need for further specific legislation. It was divided into two general parts, war-time and peace-time reasures. Under the former, such vital aspects of national life as labor, materials, institutions, enterprises, capital, prices and the press might be controlled. The provisions regarding labor and other services required of all subjects a defense duty to the State which gave the right to employ or discharge workers, and regulate their wages, labor conditions and working hours. Labor disputes were prohibited or prevented by corpulsory arbitration while landowner-tenant problems had to be settled under provisions of the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law. As explained by the War Department parphlet:

With the outbreak of a war, a large number of young ren who are working in rines and factories will be called to the colors, and those establishments must be replenished with a greater number of operatives than before... All organizations engaged in peace industries may have to curtail their activities or even suspend them altogether...with the result that a large number of operatives will be put out of work. The object of personnel mobilization is to adjust the demand and supply of labor to cope with the situation. ..It calls for close cooperation between labor and capital as well as the cooperation of women.

To ensure adequate supplies, Article Eight provided for the control of the production, consumption, use, movement, transfer, export and import of important goods. For this (1) id. p. 61 (2) id. p. 61-62

- 207 -

purpose the Government had to make up any shortage in war materials by their purchase abroad and by stimulating the increase of their production at hore, and "have ther in store to provide for any possible contingency. The government could limit or prohibit the consumption of certain war materials for ordinary purposes or to encourage the people to use substitutes for them." For the smooth operation of business enterprises using these materials, provision was made for direct control of vital industries, including the install-ation of new equipment. Industrialists operating in the same field had to cooperate in the importation, purchase and sale of goods to climinate waste. In the field of capital investment, necessary regulations were provided to balance the supply and derand of capital with that of labor and raterials. These include the restriction or prohibition of the formation of new companies, the control of capital increase or debenture issues, and finally the supervision of investments of banks, both national and private, to ensure the supply of capital. To raise sufficient funds for the execution of wer, it was necessary to establish a war-time tax system and a policy of floating public bonds to prevent financial inflation. Thus all roney circulation organizations could be controlled. "It will also make efforts, in order to buy necessary raw materials, to increase export trade, to arrange financial credits, to manage foreign bonds held by Japanese, to in-crease the output of gold." The government was empowered to restrict or prohibit the publication of articles on military and diploratic affairs as well as important financial, econoric and other matters, and had the power necessary to pro-secute those who violate these provisions.

Beginning with Article Twenty-One, the provisions concern general peacetime ressures. A national registration of people in the professions and with technical ability was provided for, and this was to be supplemented by government training of necessary technicians. Factory owners were expected not only to formulate plans for increased production in war-time and to conduct training and exercises in operation on this scale, but had to hold reserve supplies of petroleum, iron and other essential materials. Profits were assured through the Government guarantee of certain rates of business profit for industries affected by the National Mobilization Law, and the National Mobilization Indernity Commission had charge of compensations for losses incurred under the working of the Law. (2)

(1) id 62-63 (2) ið 63

- 208 -

Another important feature, emphasized by the War Department pamphlet, is the nacessity for flexible plans in its execution. This aspect also reveals the extreme breadth of the scope of the law.

The Government ... must be equipped with farreaching plans to raise efficiency promptly in production of necessary materials, their transportation and other activities to facilitate the general mobilization. The plans and preparation will differ in their scope according to the megnitude of war... The Government, therefore, rust be equipped with plans and preparations applicable to varyang conditions.

Such regulations, which may require revisions in the future, should be fixed by Imperial ordinances for the sake of convenience instead of being made provisions of the National General Mobilization Law...But the basic principles on which such regulations may be established should be embodied in the law ...In the application of the law, the government is to consult with the National General Mobilization Research Commission, thus preventing it from abusing its power of causing the issuance of Imperial ordinances.

Thus with far-reaching provisions assured in the Law itself and provision rade for its implementation by Imperial ordinance, the National General Poblization Law rade possible, with the least amount of effort, the formation of a completely totalitarian state in Japan.

In spite of the carlier promises by Government officials that the Law would not be applied furing the immediate emer-gency, it became necessary by May 5, 1938, to invoke it in part, by decree, the articles defining the general purpose of the Law and the industries coming under its control were promulgated. The Government likewise expressed its right to expropriate private enterprises under Article 12 of the Bew. National reg-istration was ordered to ascertain the extant of the mation's resources in professional, vocational. and technical ability. The general requirements that factory owners formulate plans for war-tire production and obtain reserve supplies were enforced, as was the guarantee of profits to industries affected. A supervisory corrission was established consisting of Diet merbers and representatives from the Cabinet Planning Board. It should be pointed out, however, that most of the articles made effective at this tire were those considered as peacetire reasures. As hostilities continued, Japan found it more and more essential to consider the application of all phases of the Law, a consideration which has in no small

id p. 63-64

- 209 -


degree upset the smooth running of the Japanese Government, so much so, in fact, that Prince Konoye, was forced to reorganize his cabinet and strengthen it against both internal and external criticisms. (1)

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The articles of the law were enforced increasingly by Imperial Ordinances. By June 1939 these included: the compulsory registration of all males between the ages of 16 and 50; the adoption of Article 11 authorizing the Department of Finance to control profits in industry and to appropriate property for war purposes if desired; the training of skilled workers; and compulsory mediation in all labor disputes, the regulation of employment of workers to prevent too high wages in important industries and the requisition of citizens for work in vital ones. Thus the real air of the law, the control and operation of Japan's entire personal and material resources slowly become a reality.(2)

(1) id. p. 64

(2)_{id. P. 121-122}



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Record pare

Carr's Summary

Exhibit No. Date

1038

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Present

Attendance not stated.

2 May

Cabinet Members - 2 May 1941

2nd KONOYE Cabinet, (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cabinet meeting 1940)

<u>Decision</u>

The Cabinet decided that the National Defense Security law would be enforced on May 10, 1941.

<u>Remarks</u>

Exhibit 1038 is an extract from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. Datailed regulations governing the enforcement of the above mentioned law were to be published on 10 May 19k1.

CABINET : THETING (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
1097	c/a 28 June	10,035	217

Present

2nd Konoye Cabinet SUGIYA'A, Hajima, Chief of Staff (See Exhibit 541 herein, Cab. Leeting 1940)

Decision

According to OTT: It was decided that Japan should tighten her grip on Indo-China for which purpose three divisions were (allegedly) prepared.

<u>Remarks</u>

Premier KOMOYE and the majority of the Cabinet Ministers agreed that nothing must be done to injure Japan's military position in China. Only preparatory measures for various possible actions on the part of Japan were prepared. An Army memorandum confirmed that preparatory measures were being taken. (Record p. 10,035). The preparations for attacking Russia would take at least six weeks unless a decisive material and moral weakening of Russia in the Far Fast took place beforehand. RIBBENTROP urged that Japan attack Russia (10,033) in order to protect her rear for a move South. Germany attacked Russia 22 June 1941.

According to OTT, OSHIMA urgently "advised the Japanese Government to attack Russia soon." (10,036).

According to KIDO, (10,037) TOJO said that the attitude of the Kwantung Army towards the German-Russo "er should be calm and prudent.

- 212 -

Cabinet Meeting (1941)

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Record page	Carr's Summary

1118 2 July 10,171

Present

Cabinet Members

2nd Konoye Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cab. Heeting 1940)

<u>Decision</u>

(No information)

Remarks

Konoye's Second Cabinet resigned 16 July 1941 and on 18 July 1941, his third Cabinet was formed. Konoye's 3rd Cabinet, with Admiral Toyoda replacing Hatsuoka as Foreign Minister continued the policy of the 2nd Konoye's Cabinet which rested upon the basis of the spirit and aims of the Tripartite Pact (10,171). No change took place in Japan's attitude towards Germany and Italy. Germany was so informed by Matsuoka on the basis of the Cabinet decision of 2 July. (No record of Cabinet meeting).

Upon the resignation of Matsuoka, Admiral Toyoda became Foreign Minister and a translation of his declaration on becoming Foreign Minister was sent by OTT to Berlin. According to the declaration, Toyoda intended to continue Matsuoka's foreign policy and to strengthen the close unity of Japan, Germany and Italy. (10171)

At the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941, the Empire's policy was established following the outbreak of the German-Russian War. The Conference decided the policy of stationing troops in French Indo-China which, according to Tojo (10,152) was the principal problem at that time. According to the resolution adopted at this conference Japan was to, first of all, "accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand"; stabilize her structure for the Southern advance and, while the "spirit of the Tripartite will form the keynote of our attitude towards the German-Russian War", she would not intervene in the war for a while but would secretly prepare arms against Russia. (10,147)

See Exhibit 644: Ott wired Berlin that the Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda denied that the Indo-China action was influenced by the Cabinet change; Ohashi said that Vichy had been pressed for a reply to Japan's measures and if the French answer was not in the affirmative, the Japanese Government would resort to force. (7,052-3)

- 213 -

Cabinet Meeting (1941)

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary

1118 2 July 10,171

Present

Cabinet Members

2nd Konoye Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cab. Heeting 1940)

Decision

(No information)

<u>Remarks</u>

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Record page

С	а	r	r	۲	s	Summary
	-	-	*		~	

1116 16 July 10,164

Date

Exhibit No.

Present

Cabinet Members

2nd KONCYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 541, herein, Cab. Heeting 1940)

Decision

Marquis MATSUDAIRA called KIDO on 16 July 1941 saying that the resignation "en bloc" of the second KONOYE Cabinet had been decided at a special cabinet meeting. KONOYE tendered the general resignation at 9 p.m.

Remarks

MATSUOKA's views as Foreign Minister towards the proposal formula for a Japan-American understanding brought about the Cabinet resignation. MATSUOKA wanted to instruct NOLURA that the Japanese Government would reject HULL's oral statement as being of a disgraceful nature for Japan; later MATSUOKA would wire a compromise formula to NOLURA. But KONOYE was of the opinion that the formula should be wired with the rejection so that the U.S. would not conclude that Japan intended to discontinue negotiations. (10,162) According to KIDO, MATSUOKA sent instructions to NOMURA by himself and not through the medium of the competent director. KONOYE disagreed with KIDO's suggestion that MATSUOKA resign to avoid a Cabinet change because MATSUOKA and his party would make propaganda to the effect that pressure from the USA on the Japanese Government was the cause of MATSUOKA's resignation. (10,164)

KIDO received an imperial order to invite the President of the Privy Council and the ex-Premiers to gather at the palace to ask their opinions as to who would be the suitable person for the post of Premier in the succeeding Cabinet.

See Exhibits 642, 644 and 118 for evidence of the continuation by the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet of the policy of the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet.

- 214 -

CABINET MEETING (1941)

<u></u>	Late	locord page	Carris Summary
1132	22 August	10,204	237

Present

SUZUKI, Teiichi - Governor of Planning Board

Cabinet Members

3rd Konoye Cabinet

(Prenier) (Foreign) (Home) (Finance) (Var) (Justice) (Justice) (Education) (Agriculture) (Commerce) (Commerce) (Communication) (Velfare) (State)

KONOYE, Fumimero TOYODA, Teijiro TANABE, Harumichi OGURA, Mesatsune TOTC, Hideki OIFAMA, Koshiro IVANURA, Michiyo HASHIDA, Kunihiko INO, Hiroya SAKCNJI, Seizo on) IURATA, Shozo KOIZUNI, Chikahiko SUZUKI, Teiichi

Decision

Decided the national cormodity mobilization plan. "The key points of the scheme are: (1) Prompt expansion of armaments; (2) Establishment of a system of autarchy for important resources in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, especially the maintenance of steel and coal production; (3) Maintenance of the lowest limit for the metion's living necessities; and (4) Strict harnowy between the commodity mobilization scheme and the marine transportation plan."

Remarks

The plan had been studied by the Planning Board and the related offices in order to establish a strong war time system in the midst of the complicated international situation.

SUZUKI introduced and explained the Flan.

The government issued a communique in the form of a verbal statement by <u>SUZUKI</u> to the effect that the Government attaches importance to the four points aimed at the complete execution of the China emergency and the prompt completion of the war time system to meet the new international situation. SUZUKI also said that "as regards the supply of commodities for the 1941-2 fiscal year various counter measures have been taken in anticipation of a situation in which imports from third powers might become difficult. Accordingly, there is no fear that a hitch will occur in the execution of this commodity mobilization scheme.

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"The enforcement of the commodity mobilization scheme depends upon a strong war sense and the cooperation of officials and the people."

N.B. - SUZUKI's verbal statement was not read but is in evidence.

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CAPINET MEETING

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Fecord pare	Carr's Summary
1133	5 Sept 1941	10,214	242

Present

Cabinet Members

3rd Konoye Cabinet (See Exhibit 1132, herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

Decision

Decided the Traffic Mobilization Plan in order to place land and sea transportation on a wartime basis.

Pemarks

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of 7 September, showed that concrete plans were being drefted by the Communications and Railway Ministry, based on the traffic mobilization plan for 1941-1942. The Railway Ministry will embark upon construction of freight cars and the Communications office will establish the shipbuilding control association to systematize the shipbuilding industry.

	CAPINET LEETING	
	(1941)	
Date	Becord pace	

Exhibit No.	Date	<u>Record pare</u>	Cerr's Summery
1140	12 September	10,228-9	243

<u>Present</u>

SUZUKI, Teiichi

Cabinet Members

3rd KONOYE Cabinet (See Exhibit 1132, herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

Decision

Adopted the 1941 Morkers' Mobilizatio + Plan

<u>Remarks</u>

This plan was a preparatory step for the establishment of the people's total lator service system and was jointly formulated by the Planning Board and the Welfare Office for the purpose of insuring the supply of sufficient labor for the increased production of munitions. (10,229)

MEETING AT KONOYE'S HOME (OGIGAISO)

Exhibit No.	Date	<u>Re</u>	cord page	Carr's Summary
1147	12 October	1941	10,246	249

Present

Premier KONOYE President of the Planning Board SUZUKI Foreign Minister TOYODA Navy Minister OIKAWA War Minister TOJO

<u>Decision</u>

On the advice of the War Minister TOJO, they decided that the demands regarding the stationing of troops in China should not be altered; that the successful results of the Chinese Incident should be rade secure; and that they should further their parley based on these agreements.

<u>Remarks</u>

Exhibit 1147, an extract from KIDO's Diary of 12 October 1941. He said that a meeting was held in KONOYE's home at 2 p.m. to discuss the adjustment of diplomatic relations betweer the United States and Japan. The information was given to KIDO by TOMITA, First Secretary of the Cabinet. (10246)

According to KONOYE's own account of the meeting, negotiations between Japan and the United States reached a deadlock because Japanese troops occupied French Indo-China. On August 28th, KONOYE proposed a conference to Roosevelt who stated that he favored such a conference if a general agreement could be reached as a premise. (10251)

On September 6th, 1941, an Imperial Conference, was called to determine the basis of a counter-measure and it/decided that Japan should complete her preparations for a war with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands by the end of October, 1941. In the meantime, she would try to secure her demands through diplomatic measures. (10,218). According to TOJO, it was decided that both peace preparations and war preparations would be pushed. (10,221) At the beginning of October the Supreme Command "became boisterous" stating that they would not wait beyond October 15th for the insuccess of diplomatic negotiations. (10,252) The day before the meeting of October 12th, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau OKA told KONOYE that with the exception of the Naval General Staff, the Navy did not want a war with America but that since the Navy herself, approved the decision of the Imperial Headquarters, the Navy Minister would propose to leave the decision with the Prime Minister, i.e., continuation of negotiations. (10253)

KONOYE, opening the reeting, said we must now decide for war or peace but that it should be determined if there is any hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiations. (10253)

TOJO said there was absolutely no hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiations; Navy Minister OIKAWA said that they should comply with the decision of the Prime Minister. TOJO replied that the decision could not be left solely in the hands of the Premier and asked the Foreign Minister if he had confidence in the success of the negotiations Foreign Minister TOYODA said that an agreement could be reached regarding (1) the Tripartii' Alliance and (2) the economic problem in China but that (3) the question of keeping troops in China is the difficult one, America being emohatic in demanding the complete withdrawal of such troops. TOYODA further said Japan could agree to withdraw in principle and station troops by agreement between Japan and China. TOJO objected saying he couldn't yield on the question of the withdrawal of troops. The meeting ended without any decision. (10,251-10,257)

TOJO's interrogation contained the following questions and answers regarding the meeting of October 12th, (10272-10274)

"Q What was the purpose of the meeting and what occurred there?

"A As I recall them, I think the reasons for the conference were as follows: In the first place, the middle ten days of October, which had been set as the time by which we would strive for a favorable diplomatic turn, were upon us. The Japanese proposal for a reeting between Prince KONOYE and the President of the United States had been turned down by America. The international situation was becoming more tense all the time. In these circumstances, it was necessary for the Government of Japan to decide more definitely just what its policy was to be, and I believe that was the basic purpose of the conference at Prince KONOYE's home.

- 220 -

- "Q Did you not quarrel with KONOYE at that reeting?
- "A No, it was not a quarrel. Our opinions differed.
- "Q Differed on what?
- "A My opinion was as follows: Japan was making concession after concession in the effort to effect a diplomatic break before the middle ten days of October, but on the other hand, America refused to budge from her position and make no concessions The reeting between Premier KONOYE and the Pressdent, by which it had been hoped that a political settlement could be reached had been turned down. As War Minister, my opinion was that there remained practically no hope of a diplomatic break and I suggested that the time had come when we had better rake up our rinds for war. The longer we delayed in making this decision, the more dis-advantageous the subuation would be for Japan if war were decided upon later. I felt thus because we were now in the middle ten days of October."

For KONOYE's letter of resignation addressed to the Emperor see Exhibit 1152 - h. 10,284. In substance it said that "Army Minister TOJC judged negotiations with the United States on friendly tarms could not possibly materialize before the desired time (middle or latter part of October); that it was impossible to consent to the withdrawal of troops from China and that the time had come to open war against the United States. Prime Minister KONOYE, however, thought that all negotiations with the United States were not hopeless and that the stationing of troops in China could be achieved in substance while appearing to yield to the United States. "

In this connection TOJO's interrogation (Ex. 1153-A - R 10,289) is as follows:

- "Q Did you feel, at the time the KONOYE Cabinet fell on cr about 17 October 1941, that war should be declared against the United States and the other three nations?
- "A At that time I felt, as War Minister, that the opportune time for fighting was in Langer of being lost and the Imperial Conference had set the middle ten days of October as the limit for waiting for a favorable diplomatic break."

- 221 -

Page 5 of the interrogation extract:

- "Q Was it not because of the fact that you, as War Minister, favored war with the United States that the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941?
- "A Theoretically yes. KONOYE thought that a diplomatic solution was still possible if Japan would withdraw troops from China, but the Army felt that there would be no guarantee that the unlawful acts of the Chinese, which had caused the Incident, would not be resumed if the troops were withdrawn before their purpose had been achieved, and the Army could not bear to so withdraw the troops."

See Exhibit 2250 (Pros. Doc. No. 2 A) for a fuller and more considered account than appears in KIDO's Diary, Exhibits 1147, 1150, 1151, 1154, and 1156, of the fall of the Third KONOYE Cabinet and KIDO's reasons for recommending TOJO as the new Premier. (16198)

CAPINET MEETING (19/1)

Exhibit No.	Date	Pacord page	Cerr's Summary	
1167	4 November	10,330	240	
Present				

Cebinat Mombers

1030 Cabinet

Premier) Foreign) Finance) Navy) Justice) Education) Agriculture) Commerce) Communication)	TOJO, Fideki TOJO, Fideki TOJO, Shigenori KAYA, Okinori SHIMADA, Shigetaro IMAMIFA, Michiyo HASHIDA, Kunihiko INO, Hiroya HISHI, Hobusuka TEPASHINA, Ken
Commerce)	EISHI, Hobusuke
Communication)	TEPASHIWA, Ken
Welfare)	HOIZIMI, Chikahiko
State)	SUZUKI, Teiichi

Decision

CUTCLE INNER OF

The Cabinet agreed on the Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on British and American problems.

<u>Remarks</u>

"The following types of news and speeches were excluded:

*(A) Such news and speeches as will enable the enemy to porceive our war preparations and strategic activities.

"(E) Such sensational speeches and activities as will cause the public to lose the pride of a great people and take direct actions against residents of third powers."

- 223 -

CAPINET MEETING (19/1)

Exhibit No.	Date	Pecord pare	Cerr's Surnery	
1167	4 November	10,330	260	
Fresent				

Cabinat Mombers

TOJO Cabinet

Premier) Foreign) Finance) Navy) Justice) Education) Agriculture) Commarce) Communication) Welfare)	TOJO, Eideki TOJO, Eideki TOJO, Shigenori KAYA, Okinori SHIMADA, Shigetaro IALMIFA, Michiyo HASHIDA, Kunihiko IMO, Hiroya EISEI, Nobusuka TEPASHIM, Ken EOIZEIL, Chikabiko
Welfare) State)	KOIZUMI, Chikahiko SUZUKI, Teiichi

Decision

The Cabinet agreed on the Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on British and American problems.

Remarks

"The following types of news and speeches were excluded:

"(A) Such news and speeches as will enable the enery to perceive our war preparations and strategic activities.

"(E) Such sensational speeches and activities as will cause the public to lose the pride of a great people and take direct actions against residents of third powers."

- 223 -

CABINET MEETING (1941)

Carr's Summery

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367

1331 28 November

Date

Exhibit No.

11,943

Ecord page

Present

Cabinet Verbers

TCJO Cabinet (See Exhibit 1167 herein, Cab. Heeting 1941)

<u>Locision</u>

Decided to establish in the Cabinet the Sixth Committee organized with the personnel of the Planning Board, the Forcign Binistry, the Finance Ministry, the War Ministry and the Bavy Ministry for the purpose of discussing and drafting matters pertaining to the economic plans and control contering around the acquisition and development of the resources in the Southern Areas (French Indo-Ching, Thailand and other southern areas).

Porerks

SUZUXI, President of the Planning Board was Chairman of this Committee which was to draw up plans for the economic exploitation of the southern ereas. The Vice President of the Planning Board was the Chief Secretary of the Committee. Committee men and temporary committee men were appointed by the Prime Minister from among high civil officials. The general affairs of the Committee were to be handled by the Planning Board. The establishment of the committee and other matters pertaining to it were to be kept secret. The committee was established to carry out the economic plans and control a centering around acquisition and development of the resources in the southern areas through a controlled activation of the composite national power under a united political and strategical policy. (11,946-11,947)

The first report of the Sixth Committee was deted 16 December 1941 and gave full details concerning the economic measures to be taken in the Netherlands Indies and the other southern areas after the occupation. The economic measures taken by Japan in the Netherlands Indies after their occupation by Japan closely followed the program worked out in this report. (11,947). The report is found in Exhibit 1332. (11,948)

According to the report the principal aim of the policy is to fill the domend for important natural resources and to establish a system of suparchy for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and to find means of strengthening the Imperial economic strength. See also Exhibit 1333-A, Record 11,959, an excerpt from the document entitled "Summarized Plan for Management of the South Sea Arces" deted 14 December 1941.

According to this excerpt, the basic policies of the plan concern the ecquisition and utilization of military bases, the stationing of troops, the acquisition of petrol, tin and rubber, the severing of the political shackles of Europe and America in the South Sectors, etc. (11,961) -224 -

CAPINET MEETING (1941)

Exhibit No.	<u>De to</u>	Record page	Cerr's Surmary
1192	28 November	10,438	272

Present

Cabinet Members

TCJO Cabinet (See Exhibit 1167, herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

Decision

Approved a journelistic plan proposed by newspaper leaders for ' establishing a new system in press circles aimed at placing news apers on a war time basis.

Femerks

An Imperial Ordinance concerning the creation of the new system was to be issued under Articles 16 and 18 of the National Motilization Lew. (10,438-9)

CALINET DECISION (1941)

<u>Exhibit No</u>. 1202-4 Date

o/a 1 December

<u>Pecord pr 3 Carr's Summer</u> 10,482 275

Present

tojo Shimada Magano Kaya SUZUKI HOSHINO MJTO OKA

Catinet Manhers

TOJO Cabinet (See Exhibit 1167, herein, Cab. Meeting 1941)

<u>Decision</u>

Approved gist of final note to USA (10,482, 10,503)

Remarks

TOJC confirmed that TOGO said that he, 1060 composed the text of the note on the basis of views furnished by the Liaison Confirence and that text, after being written, was presented to and approved by the Liaison Conference. The text of the note was also approved by the Cabinet. (10,482-3)

CONTENTS OF THE FINAL NOTE

According to TOJO, the gist of the final note to America was approved by the Cabinet and the Liaison Conference but the final text was the responsibility of the Foreign Hinister TOCO who composed the text of the note on the basis of the views furnished by the Liaison Conference. The text was approved by this Conference and the Cabinet (10,482; 10,506); hence, the responsibility for its composition rests with the participating members of the Liaison Conference and the Cabinet. (10,509)

TOJO stated that the members of the Lisison Conference who were responsible for the study and discussion of the matter were TOJO, SHIMDA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TSUIADA, ITO, KAYA, SUZURI and the three secretaries HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA. The members of the Cabinet under the Constitution are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, even on matters outside the competence of their respective offices. (10,510)

TOGO contends that neither he, the Foreign Of 'ice nor the Goverament can take the sole responsibility for the contents of the final note since it involves a question of war and had to be considered by the High Command. (10,506) "All members of the Limison Conference and even some members of the Cabinet who were familiar with the question" ere responsible for the contents of the note, said TOGO. (Ex. 1206-A, R. 10,506) -226 -

CABINET MEETING (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Surmary
1204-A	l or 2 Dec	10,493-4-5-6	

<u>Present</u>

Whole TOJO Cabinet (See 1167 herein, Cab. reetings 1941. TOGO resigned as Minister of Overseas Affairs 2 Dec 1941, replaced by INO, Hiroya)

Decision

The whole Cabinet attended the Imperial Conference of the 1st or 2nd of December, 1941 which decided to what war against the United States and Great Britair.

Remarks

Problem of how the final note was to be dispatched was handled by the Foreign Minister. The Cabinet and TOJO agreed that since Japan had been challenged and was acting in selfdefense, they would not be impeded from attacking the U.S. and Great Britain because of international law or treaties.

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TIME OF DELIVERY OF FINAL NOTE

The Liaison Conference delegated to the two Chiefs of Staff, SUGIYAMA and NAGANO, and Foreign Minister TOGO the task of setting a time prior to the attack for the delivery of the final note - a time which would comply with diplomatic and strategic requirements. (10,483-6)

The time and the date set for the attack was known by the Foreign Minister TOGO and the President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI. (10,483)

However, the responsibility of delivering the note prior to the attack is the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. (10,488)

According to 10J0 (10,487), he and the Cabinet realized that the shorter the notice given to the Urited States the more probability there was of a mishap. However, Ambassador NOMURA being a very responsible official, was relied upon to carry out this grave responsibility perfectly. (10,488)

According to TOJO, instructions had been sent to the Embassy in Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1 p.m., December 7th, Washington time (3 a.m., December 8th, Tokyo time) (10,512) In a telegram from Tokyo to Washington, December 7th, 1941, it was stated "Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible, to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States on 7 December, 1 pame your time). (10,537)

All members of the Liaison Conference knew of the sending of such instructions. (10,512)

In a telegram dated 1 December 1941, from Tokyo to Washington, it was decided to withhold submitting the note to the United States Ambassador to Tokyo so that the United States would not know of the real status of the negotiations. (10.517)

TOGO admitted and excused the non-delivery of any warning whatsoever to Great Britain until after 0700 hours on ? Decerber when he handed a copy of the note to Ambassador Craigie by saying that he thought Washington would bass it on to London.

DECLARATION OF WAR

As to why a declaration of war had not been made pricr to the attacks on United States and Great Britain, 10.70 stated that Japan's final note broke off diplomatic relations foreclosing further action under treaty procedure, giving to Japan freedom of action from the standpoint of international treaty and international law, (10496-7)

In this connection TOJO also said that Japan was acting in self-defense in response to a military and economic challenge by various countries, especially England and America, thereby threatening her existence and necessitating the right of self-defense. (10,502)

TOJO further stated that from the standpoint of strategy, the necessity for victory had to be considered as well as diplomatic procedures, since the possibility of victory was intimately related to the question of time. (10499) TOJO was extremely anxious for the success of the surprise attack and he thought that there should be at least thirty minutes' notice before the attack. (10500) He knew, in his capacity as War linister, that four surprise attacks were to be executed at the sec time against the possessions of the United States ar. Great Britain. (10499)

- 228 -

The whole matter of responsibility under treaties and international law had been considered and studied by the Cabinet, the matter, according to TOJO, being the grave responsibility of the Foreign Minister. The entire Cabinet agreed with TOJO's views as to the effect of the final note. (10,493-4)

TOJO contends that Japan was not bound by the Kellogg-Briand Pact nor by any other treaty provisions because it was acting in self-defense. (10,503-4)

Admiral NOMURA does not consider that the final note was a declaration of war. (10,502)

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"TINE CHART "for December 6, 7, 8, 1941"

It is divided under headings:

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TORYO THE PLACE LOCAL THAT EVENTS

Sth0045Shenghai2345 - 7thThe ShanghaiBund (Internationa Settlement) occupied by Japanese troops.

Sth 0140 Kote Behru 2400 - 7th The British beach defenses shelled from the see.

8th 0205 Kota Bahru 0025 - 8th Japanese lending at Kota Eshru in Northern Maleys.

8th 0305 Singora 0125 - 8th About this time at Singora and Patani in Southern Siam, Japanese landed ani advanced towards Malayan Lorder.

8th	0 320 - 25	Pearl Herbor	0750-55 7th	Attack at Pearl Harbor
8th sinf	0520 with casualtic	Shan(hai es.	0420 - 8th	H.M.S. Peterel
Eth	0610	Singapore	0430 - 8th	Air Raid on Singepore.

8th 0700 Tokyo 0700 - 8th Tokyo Bedio fives first ennouncement thet hostilities have begun.

8th 0730 Tokyo 0730 - 8th Mr. Grew cells on Foreign Minister TOGO at his request and TOGO hands him copy of document honded by Mr. WONDFA to Mr. HULL, describing it as Emperor's enswer to President's message.

8th 0800 Tokyo 0800 - 8th Sir Robert Creigie calls on Foreign Minister TOGO at his request and is handed a copy of the same document.

8th	0805	Giam	0805 - 8th	Guem attacked.
8th	0900 Pe t <i>r</i> ree	Hong Kong n	0800 - 8th Betwe	Hong Kong attacked en
114	0 and 1200 T	okyo	1140 and	1200 Imperial

1140 and 1200 Tokyo Pescript issued"

- 230 -

CABINET MEETING (1941)

<u>Exhibit No</u> . 1235-C	<u>Date</u> <u>Record page</u> 8 December 10,654 <u>Present</u>	Carr's Summary
TOJO SHIMADA	All Ministers of Str	te except TOGO

Cabinet Members

TOJO's Cabinet (See Exhibit 1167 herein, Cab. meetings 1941. TOGO resigned as Minister of Overseas Affairs 2 Dec 41, succeede by INO, Hiroya)

Decision

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Navy Hinister SHIMADA gave a report of the process of the battle with USA and Great Britain and based on this report, the Government of Japan decided on the policy to be adopted. (No further reference to the policy).

- 231 -

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Following the outbreak of the China War in 1937, the "Four Ministers" meeting of the Premier, War, Navy and Foreign Ministers was established. Later, the Finance Minister was added to this group making a "Five Ministers" Conference.

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At these meetings the views of the Supreme Command were transmitted through the "ar and Navy merbers. This method proving unsatisfactory to the Chiefs of Staff, the Liaison Conference plan was adopted to adjust the differences between the civil government and the High Command. (680)

-232-

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE (1936)

<u>Exhibit No</u> .	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
704	7 August	7,523; 7,878	39

Fresent

Prime Minister HIROTA, Kooki Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro War Minister TERAUCHI, Juichi Navy Minister NAGANO, Osami

Decision

Decided the "Foreign Policy of the Empire."

Renarks

The exhibit is a top secret decision concerning the state of relations between Japan and USSR; the necessity for making North China pro-Japanese and anti-Communistic; the obtaining of resources for national defense and the extension of traffic establishments. (7524)

The exhibit also states that "The developments in the European political situation have a great influence on the East Asia, and so Japan must exert every effort in bringing European powers to its advantage, especially in restraining the Soviet Union." (7878) k

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See Exhibit 216 herein, Five Ministers Conference of 7 August 1936 for discussion of the same subject matter.

FOUR MINISTERS CONFERENCE (1936)

Ladibit No.

217

Record page Carr's Summary 2,740

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Present

Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro War Minister TERAUCHI, Juichi Navy Minister NAGANO, Osami Finance Maister BABA, Eiichi

Date

11 August

(N.B. - Decision of the competent members, presumably the above.)

Decision

Decided the "Second Administrative Policy Towards North China," August 11, 1936. See Exhibit 979 herein for the decision of the sare date of Five Ministers Conference on this matter. (9549)

Remarks

Second Administration policy toward China of 11 August set out the influencing of North China in a pro-Japanese and anti-Com unistic direction, and the improving of national defense in preparation against USSR; North China was to be made a base for cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China for mutual aid, by guiding politics and making the Manking Govern-mont recognize the characteristic feature of North China. $(2740-27^{\circ}3)$

See Exhibit 210 herein for the Four Ministers' Conference decision of 20 February 1937 on "The Third Administrative Policy towards North China." (2745)

- 234 -

FOUR MINISTERS! COMPERENCE (1937)

Exhibit No.DateRecord valueCarr's Summary21820 February2,745; 2,746-743

Present

Foreign Minister MaYASHI, Senjuro Finance Minister YUKI, Toyotaro Army Minister SUGTIANA, Gen Nevy Minister YOMAI, Mitsumese

Decision

うな言語の一下では「

The ministries concerned decided "The Third Administrative Policy Toward North China." (2745)

Remarks

The Third Administrative Policy Towards North Chine decided 20 February 1937 once more set forth Jepan's intention regarding the administration of North Chine. The principal object of this policy was to make Manchukuo pro-Jepanese and pro-anti-Comintern, to procure defense materials and to prepare the defense against U.S.S.R. (2747)

To accomplish this objective Japan should assist in furthering the economic policy in North China, "eid in secret the government of North China and the the Nanking Government recognize the specialty of North China and the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China." (2747)

Japan must "Abstain from all the actions as give other powers misunderstanding of our intention" as the "measures which we took in North Chine made the Foreign Fowers think that we were aggressive in Chins." (2747)

Japan shall develop the economy of North China by welcoming the "investment of private capitalists and by the extension of our rights and interests in North China, we establish the close friendship between Japan and China. Py thus establishing the friendship not only 'in time of peace but in time of war we may procure the materials for munition industries.'" (2747)

See Exhibit 217 on Four Ministers' Conference, decision of 11 August 1936 on "The Second administrative Policy Towards North China." (2740)

- 235 -

FOUR MINISTEPS' CONFERENCE (1937)

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Record page	Carr's Summary
219	16 April	2,748	1424

Present

Foreign Minister S.TO, Noatake Finance Minister YJKI, Toyotaro War Minister SUGIYANA, Cen Nevy Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa

Decision

Decided the "Plans for Guiding North China," 16 April 1927.

<u>Femerks</u>

According to these plans, the foreign policy shall be to make North Chins a firm anti-Communist and pro-Lanchu Japanese region and to acquire communication facilities in preparation against the "Red Threat." (2748) When carrying out this policy the Nanking Pegime must be guided so that it will recognize the special position of North China. (2749)

Since the Japanese policy towards North China gave rise to "the erronecus impression to China and other Powers that our Empire has the intention of enlarging the truce zone, advancing the frontier of Menchukuo or else realizing the independence of North China," in our future policy, "It is vitelly important to attend solely to the execution of cultural and economic measures having as main objects secure and facile life and work for the North China populace, thus contributing to the achievement of our expected aims." (2749)

Regarding the economical levelopment of North China, Japan shall edvocate the free advance of civilian capital, as well as Chinese capital, "Thereby constructing as inseparable Sino-Japanese situation based on the economical profits of Chinese and Japanese in accord, and to contribute to the maintenance of North China's pro-Japanese attitude both in peace time and in war, especially the development of those military resources vital to national defense (iron, coal, salt, etc.) and the establishments of communication, electricity, etc. connected to this shall be speedily realized by special capital, if necessary." (2750)

- 236 -

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
619	18 June	6,824	122

Present

Prime Minister YCNAI, Mitsumasa Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro Wer Minister HATA, Shunroku Nevy Minister YOSHIDA, Zengo

<u>Decision</u>

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Decided that, regarding French Indo-China's pro-Chiang's acts, negotiations should be conducted end, after waiting for a reply, it should be determined if force should be resorted to or not. (6924)

Remarks

Exhibit 619 is an extract from KIDO's Diery of 19 June 1940 referring to a talk he had with Foreign Minister AFITA about two plans debated at the Four Ministers' Conference of the previous day.

The two plens are "(1) That a request be submitted regarding the pro-Chiang acts, and in case the request is refused by the French, that force be employed; (2) That force by employed at once from the beginning on the idea that negotiation is unnecessary." (6824)

The Military Ministers favored the first plan as "It was their idee to have the first part of the first plan put into effect at once and to decide after waiting for a reply whether to resort to force or not." (6824)

The Conference adopted the plan of the military ministers. (6824)

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE (1940)

<u>Fxhibit No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	Record page	Carr's Summary
541	4 September	6271; 6307; 7920	144

Present

Prime Minister KONOYE, Fumimaro Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, Yosuke Army Minister TOJO, Hideki Navy Minister YOSHIDA, Zengo

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Decision

The Four Ministers' Conference decided the "Outline of the Basic National Policy" on 4 September 1940, (6271)

Remarks

This Exhibit refers to a decision of a Liaison Conference of 19 September 1940. For a discussion of this, see Liaison Conference heading, Exhibit 541, 1940 herein.

FOUR MINISTERS' CONFERENCE (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
618-A	5 November	6,873	164
	21 November	6,873	164

Present

Prime Minister KONOYE, Furimaro Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, Yosuke Army Minister TCJO, Hideki Navy Minister OIKAWA, Koshiro

Decision

Decided to "assist Thailand in her recovery of lost territory and plan to make Thailand cooperate both politically and economically in the establishment of the New Order in East Asia." (Four Ministers' Conference of 5 November 1940 - 6873) and decided "that when Thailand accepts our demands we would immediately assist her in the recovery of Luang Prabang and Pakuse." (Four Ministers' Conference of 21 November 1940 - 6873)

Remarks

Ex. 618-A is a "Business Report of South Seas Section in 1940." (6844) It refers to the above two meetings and contains the background, from Japan's viewpoint, of the frontier dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China. (6868-6874)

FOUR MINISTERS CONFERENCE (1944)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Summary13482 Sept.12,110309

Present

Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU Finance Minister ISHIWATA, Sotaro War Minister SUGIYAMA Navy Minister YONAI

> (N.B. - This was a meeting of the competent officials of the ministries concerned, presumably from the ministries set forth above. The exhibit does not contain the attendance.)

<u>Decision</u>

See Remarks.

Remarks

on 2 September 1944 the competent officials of the ministries concerned proposed that the independence of the East Indies be announced in a special Diet session; (12,110) that "the former Netherlands Indies (excluding New Guinea) shall be the scheduled territory to be made independent (The Navy's approval reserved)" (12,111); that theform and time of Independence and the relations with the Empire shall be determined separately. (12,111); that, regarding Java, radical changes in the status of the military administration shall be avoided, but the participation of the people in politics shall be strengthened. (12,112)

See Exhibit 1344 entitled "Course of Events Leading up to Decision on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." (12,065; 12,068; 12,107; 12,113; 12,114)

Exhibit 1349 is entitled "Measures for the Netherlands East Indies Independence - Data for Foreign Minister's explanation, 17 July 1945. (12116)

- 240 -

FOUR MINISTERS CONFERENCE (1944)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
1348	2 Sept.	12,110	309

Present

Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU Finance Minister ISHIWATA, Sotaro War Minister SUGIYAMA Navy Minister YONAI

> (N.B. - This was a meeting of the competent officials of the ministries concerned, presumably from the ministries set forth above. The exhibit does not contain the attendance.)

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

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See Exhibit 1344 entitled "Course of Events Leading up to Decision on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." (12,065; 12,068; 12,107; 12,113; 12,114)

Exhibit 1349 is entitled "Measures for the Netherlands East Indies Independence - Data for Foreign Minister's explanation, 17 July 1945. (12116)

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- 240 -

In order to show what the Foreign Ministry and other Japanese authorities meant by the use of the term "independence" in connection with the occupied territories, see Exhibits 62⁸, 133⁴, 1333-A, 1336 and 1335.

See also Exhibit 687, herein, for a series of meetings of the Privy Council on the proposed establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry in the period of 9 - 24 October, 1942, (12071 - 12095)

See Exhibit 1346 for the joint declaration of the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations, adopted on 6 November 1943, as well as for an account of the proceedings of the Assembly on 5 and 6 November 1943. (12098-12102)

Exhibit 277 is the speech of Prerier KOISO before the 85th Diet session on 7 September 1944, (12,113), regarding East Indies Independence, (12113)

On July 17, 1945 it was decided that "the Empire shall recognize the independence of the East Indies at the earliest possible opportunity" (12,115) (Less than a month later Japan surrendered and the decision was never put into effect.

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE (1936)

Exhibit No.	<u>Da te</u>	Record pape	Cerr's Summary
977	30 June	9,542	38
978	11 11	9,548	39

Present

Prime Minister HIFOTA Foreign Minister ARITA Finance Minister EARA Nevy Minister NAGANO Army Minister TERAUCHI /Navy Minister MAGANO Army Minister TERAUCHI (Two Ministers'Conference of 30 June)/

(Both Conferences on same day and same subject matter).

Decision

Decided the . "Basis of National Folicy."

Romarka

Exhibit 977 is the outline of the National Folicy as fiecided by the Wer and Navy Ministers.

Thr fundemental policies are as follows; (1 a) a consistent policy of overseas expansion (9543); (B) Completion of Jepan's national defense ermament to "secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia in fact as well as in neme" (9543); (c) Develop Manchukuo to stabilize the Jepan-Manchukuo national defense, promote Jepan's economic development by getting rid of Russie "while preparing aginst Britain and the U.S." (9544), (d) promote "our racial and economic development in the Southern Seas, especially in the outer Southern Seas." (9544)

The aim of Japan's military preparations was to enable Japan to cope with any force which the USSR can mobilize in the Far East, "so that we may smash her Far Eastern force at one blow from the beginning." (9545) Regarding the Navy, Japan "must complete its ermaments sufficiently to maintain the command of the Western Pacific against the U.S. Navy." (9545)

Exhibit 978 is a discussion of the same matter later in the day at a Five Ministers' Conference of 30 June 1936.

- 242 -

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE (1936)

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Record page	Cerr's Summery
97 7	30 June	9,542	38
978	# #	9,548	39

Present

Prime Minister HIFOTA Foreign Minister ARITA Finance Minister EABA Nevy Minister NAGANO Army Minister TERAUCHI /Navy Minister MAGANO Lomy Minister TERAUCHI (Tro Ministers'Conference of 30 June)/

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(Eoth Conferences on same day and same subject matter).

<u>Decision</u>

Decided the: "Basis of National Folicy."

Romarka

Exhibit 977 is the outline of the National Folicy as decided by the War and Navy Ministers.

Thr fundamental policies are as follows; (1 a) a consistent policy of overseas expansion (9543); (B) Completion of Jepen's national defense ermament to "secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia in fact as well as in neme" (9543); (c) Develop Manchukuo to stabilize the Japan-Manchukuo national defense, promote Japan's economic development by getting rid of Russis "while preparing aginst Britein and the U.S." (9544), (d) promote "our racial and economic development in the Southern Seas, especially in the outer Southern Seas." (9544)

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Exhibit 978 is a discussion of the same matter later in the day at a Five Ministers' Conference of 30 June 1936.

- 242 -

FIVE MINISTERS CONTEPENCE (1936)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Cerr's Summery
216	7 mugust	2,727	36

<u>Fresent</u>

War Minister TERAUCHI, Juichi Nevy Minister NaGANO. Osami Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro Finance Minister MAEL, Eiichi Prime Minister EIKOTA, Kooki

Decision

Decided the "Basic Principles of National Policy" 7 August 1936.

Remarks

Basic principles of national policy decided by the Premier HIPOTA, ARITA, BABA, TERAUCHI and N.G.NO on ? August deal with the policy to be established to secure the position of the Tapire in East Asia continent and to advance towards the South Seas. Intensification of national defense of Japan and Manchukup in order to eradicate Soviet menace and prepare against Britain and America. (2727)

See Exhibit 704 for Four Ministers Conference of August 7, 1936 for a discussion of the same subject matter.

FIVE MINISTERS CONFEPENCE (1996)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	<u>Carr's Summary</u>
97 9	11 Auchist	0 5/10	30

Fresent

Prime Minister HIROTA, Kooki Foreign Minister APIRA, Hachiro War Minister TEFAUCHI, Juichi Navy Minister M.GaNO. Coami Finance Minister BABA, Siichi (decensel)

Decision

Decided the "Fundamental of our National Policy", 11 August 1936.

<u>Femarks</u>

The fundamental principle of administering the State lies in "making the Japanese Empire develop into the stabilization power, nominal and virtual, in the East Asis," (2549) and in "securing a steady footing of our Empire in the Eastern continent as well as developing in the South Seas under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defense." (9550) The general principles are: (1) Exclude the "military rule policy of the powers," (9550); (2) complete "our defensive armsment," (9550), strive "to eradicate the Eussian manage on the north, in order to realize a steadfast development of Manchuria," (6550) and at the same time we should "be propared for Britain or America", (9550) and (4) try to "fulfill our national strength correlative with the completion of Manchurie." (9551)

The outline of the new policy is as follows:

(1) Aim "to counteract all the military forces that Russia can furnish to employ in the Far Zest" and, so as to be able "to strike a hit at the very cutset of the wer upon the Russians, we should complete our military force in Kores and Manchuria," and at the same time we should (9551-2) secure the command of the sec on the Western Pacific counter to the American Navy, (9552);

(2) The military authorities must assist the diplomatic organ "from within in order to have it act fully and advantageously, evading all the time to act from without as far as possible," (9552)

(3) Public opinion should be led end unified, the administrative and economic organs should be improved; the people's livlihood should be stabilized; measures should be taken in order to make a drestic progress in air and sea transportation; a self-sufficient policy should be established for the important resources and material essential to national defense and industry; the diplomatic function should be quickened and Japan's national culture should be enhanced abroad. (9553)

- 244 -

FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE (1938)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Summary61225 November6,73184

Present

Prime Minister KONOYE, Fumimaro Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro Finance Hinister IKEDA, Seihin Army Minister ITAGAKI, Seishiro Navy Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa

Decision

Decided that Hainan Island would be captured by military action in case of necessity and discussed and agreed to the principle of adjusting the new Sino-Japanese relationship.

Remarks

The matter read in evidence contains no other remarks on the decision except as set forth above. (6731)

Exhibit 613-A, a copy of the Tokyo Gazette, Volume III, No. 10, reads as follows:

"February 10. Hainan Island, off the South China Coast is surprised by the Japanese landing forces under Vice-Admiral Nobutake KONDO, Commander of the Imperial Naval Forces in South China. Kiungchow and Haikow fall into the hands of the Japanese." (6733)

FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE (1939)Carr's Summary Exhibit No. Record page Date 95 6 May 6,103

Present

Premier HIRANUMA Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro Finance Minister ISHIWATARA, Sotaro War Minister ITAGAKI Navy Minister YONAI, Mitsumasa

504

Decision

HIRANUMA "obtained a ∞ mpromise, which the Army indicates is the highest possible offer under present conditions, in the conflict of the Five Ministers' Conference, (War and Finance Ministers against the Foreign and Navy Ministers)", regarding closer cooperation with Germany and Italy, i.e. for a Trinartite Pact.

Remarks

On 6 May OTT cabled the State Secretary relating that Premier HIRANUNA had obtained a compromise in the conflict of the 5-Minister Conference (War, ITAGAKI and Finance Minister ISHIWATARA against Foreign and Navy Ministers). He then quoted the Army declarations on the obligatory military aid suggested in the proposed treaty and stated that it was hoped that the HIRANUMA Declaration would offer the opportunity for the final conclusion of the treaty, 6108

Concerning the main points of the declaration, the Army explained "1). Regarding obligatory aid, the army had further proposed to lay down more clearly the 'change in circumstances' which would later make effective aid possible, and to declare in short that the neutrality of Japan would not in any way enter into the question. The army attributed the present wording to the Foreign Minister. The War Vice Minister declared that the treaty bound Janan definitely to the Axis Powers. We must, however, understand that Japan was isolated in the Far East and was in a considerably worse position than the Axis bloc in Europe which could cooperate directly. In case of war, however, independent of the outbreak and extent of Japanese acts of war, just the plain fact of the treaty would exert effective pressure on the enemy," (6108-6109)

- 246 -

"2), Re the 'Explanation', the army emphasizes that the present proposal was more elastic, contained no specific formulation, and left open negotiations for which there were spreased to be favorable prospects, according to OSHIMA'S telegram receive yesterday. (6109)

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"3). Explanations concerning 'Sincerity of my Country' were indicated as a particularly important personal word of honor of the Prime Minister, after I had referred to the wording which could be easily misunderstood. (6109)

"The whole statement had been delivared to the Emperor by the Foreign Minister, which fact also follows from the indications made in the press. In case an agreement is not reached, the army expects a resignation of the cabinet, which would be quite undesirable at the present time for foreign and Jomestic reasons (6109-6110)

"Declarations from navy circles not yet obtainable. Main opposition of the navy comes evidently from Navy Vice Minister YAMAMOTO. (6110)

"From the Foreign Ministry a senior official, who stands especially close to Ambassador SHIRATORI, let me know personally that in the entire government a deep cleft between friends and enemies of the alliance had formed. The situation was very serious and complicated. By his personal initiative, the Prime Minister had achieved a declaration of compromise which accepts the principle of an unlimited alliance, limiting this, however, by two significant reservations. This attitude of Japan must, it is true. astonish the Aris Powers, who are accustomed to unequivocal decisions, but it arises necessarily from the lack of unified leadership. Should negotiations collapse, cabinet crisis is threatening with serious consequences. (6110)

"General impression is that most active preliminaries of the treaty idea stress extraordinary difficulties and (one word apparently lacking) urgently hopes that HIRANUMA's declaration would offer the opportunity for the final conclusion of the treaty." (6110)

"This is signed 'OTT'" (6108-6111)

Exhibit 503 is a telegram dated 4 May 1939 from OTT to the Reich Foreign Minister relating to what is known as the HIRANUMA Declaration, the text of which is as follows:

"'I cherish great admiration for the lofty wisdom and iron will with which His Excellency, Chancellor of the German Government, HITLER, is working at the noble task of the reconstruction of his country and at the establishment of an international peace founded upon principles of justice. "2). Re the 'Explanation', the army emphasizes that the present proposal was more elastic, contained no specific formulation, and left open negotiations for which there were surposed to be favorable prospects, according to OSHIMA'S telegram receive yesterday. (6109)

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Exhibit 503 is a telegram dated 4 May 1939 from OTT to the Reich Foreign Minister relating to what is known as the HIRANUMA Declaration, the text of which is as follows:

"'I cherish great admiration for the lofty wisdom and iron will with which His Excellency, Chancellor of the German Government, HITLER, is working at the noble task of the reconstruction of his country and at the establishment of an international peace founded upon principles of justice. "I, for my part, as Japanese Prime Minister, am likewise occupied with the strengthening of peace and with the maintenance of a New Order in East Asia founded on the principles of justice and morality.

"In this splendid hour it is a confirmed joy to me how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement between our two countries proves itself in the execution of the tasks placed before them. And today if I have in view the conclusion of an agreement, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and to make closer the cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy, this does not occur just out of a consideration of the mere expediency of it, but in the hope that in that way we may contribute to the consolidation of a world peace founded upon justice and morality in consciousness of our common tasks now. As far as the strengthening of our relations is concerned, I can affirm that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even if one of those two nowers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political and economic and, to the extent possible to her power, military assistance.

"In spite of this Japan is ready, in accordance with the provisions of such an agreement to take up the military support of Germany and Italy; however, Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical manner any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances.

"I should especially like to receive Germany's and Italy's express consent to the foregoing point."

"Furthermore, in consequence of the international situation which confronts it, Japan would be compelled to exercise the greatest caution in regard to the explication which it would give at the time of the publication of this agreement. I would be glad to receive the unequivocal assent of Germany and Italy on this point also.

"I may add that the planned agreement rests upon the foundation of mutual confidence, and that to doubt the sincerity of my country in the slightest would be tantamount to destroying the real basis of the agreement and would make its execution impossible.

"The thoughts which I have just portraved arise from reflections of a moral and spiritual nature and cannot be influenced by reasons of expediency. If I undertook to express them with all frankness, it was because I was guided exclusively by the sincere desire to bring our endeavors to a satisfactory conclusion!" (6104-6106) On August 23, 1939 the German-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty was signed. (By Tribunal Order No. 400 the Tribune, took judicial notice of this fact.) (6120)

On May 22, 1939, Germany and Italy signed a formal troaty of military alliance. (6120)

Exhibit 486-L relates to the Japanese protest over the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty (6122) and it is a telegram from OTT stating that the Japanese Foreign Minister handed him copies of the following instructions sent to OSHIMA:

"(1) To inform the German government that the Japanese government had interpreted the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact as finally terminating the present negotiations between Japan and Germany for a Tripartite Pact with Italy;

"(2) The Japanese Government declares that the German act of making a non-aggression pact with Russia constitutes a serious violation of the secret agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. Therefore she files a solemn protest with the German Government.

"The Foreign Minister added, that Japan had been forced to make the enclosed declaration, but that she was willing to continue friendship for Germany and was seeking a suitable way."

(Signed "OTT")" (6123)

But OSHIMA was dissuaded by WEIZAECKER from making the sharp protest regarding the "inconsistency of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact with the secret treaty between Germany and Japan" (6124) and "merely telegraphed to his government, saying he had followed its order But in fact he - OSHIMA - had postponed the fulfillment of the demarche till now, 18 September 1939." (6125)

Exhibit 507 shows that notwithstanding the temporary setback to the conclusion of a Germany-Italy-Japanese Alliance, Germany continued her efforts to develop closer German-Japanese relations.

On 30 August 1939 the HIRANUMA Cabinet resigned because of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia, and it was succeeded by the Cabinet of ABE.

- 249 -

FIVE MINISTEPS' CONFERENCE (1939)

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Exhibit No.	<u>Dø te</u>	<u>Pecord pare</u>	Carr's Supp. Sour.
2198	8 August	15, 744	21

Present

Navy Minister YCMAI, Mitsumase Wer Minister ITAGLKI, Seishiro Foreign Minister "FITA, Hachiro Finance Minister ISHIWATARI, Sotaro Prime Minister EIRAWMA, Kiichiro

<u>Decision</u>

See Remarks.

Pemarka

Cablegram sent by Ambassador OTT to the Army High Command and Air High Command on 6 September 1939 regarding Five Ministers' Conference on 8 August in which Army's urgent desire was stressed for early conclusion of China conflict; alleviate present tension by conforming to wishes of masses and prevent dengerous reaction in direction of an economically tempting settlement with England. These reasons being so compelling War Minister ITAGAKI was resolved, as a last resort to risk his resignation. A decision was to be reached by 15 August and IFAGAKI requests that Berlin end Rome Covernments be apprised of the situation and suggest they help by concessions. These provided that there would be no mental reservations behind the wording and thet a verbal form of Japanese supplementary statement be found. The new alliance was chiefly a domestic political weepon but the Army was the chief supporter of the Allience. The plans of the Foreign Minister who attaches great importance to successful negotiations with England would be cancelled out if Germany shows initiative in a spirit of concession. (15,744)

FIVE MITTISTARS CONFURNCE (1340

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534

Exhibit No.

e, 259

Record page

Present

Premier YONAI Foreign Minister ARITA, Hachiro Arny Minister HATA, Shunrohu Nevy Minister YOSHIDA, Zengo Finence Minister SAKUPAUCHI, Yuhio

Date

12 July

<u>Decision</u>

See remarks.

Remerks

Exhibit 534 is an excerpt from FIDC's Diary of 14 July 1940. KIDO said he was asked by the Emperor "whether an order (which had been secretly reported by the Prince, the Chief of the General Staff, for heavy artillory mobilization for the purposes of the South China campaign) had been fully cleared with the Government." (6259) In this regord he sold that he "Learned from the Aide-de-Camp that he had heard as follows from the War Minister: At the Four Ministers' Conference on the 12th (which the Finance Minister was specially invited to attend) the results of a careful study were that since in any case any preparations at all would require a month and a helf, they had agreed to push preparations." (6259)

Exhibit 534 was offered to show the military activity of the General Staff at the time of the fall of the YONAI Cabinet which "was forced by the Army." (6257)

Exhibit 533 is a tolegram from OTT to the German General Staff dated 17 July 1940 stating that he had "information from Japanese General Staff that siege batteries have been already mobilized for attack on Hongkong in the case that it might be necessary." (6257)

Exhibit 532 consists of excerpts from HINO's Divry showing the downfell of the YONAI-ARITA Cebinet, the means by which it was accomplished, and the reasons therefore. (6240-6256)

- 251 -

FUNCTIONS OF THE "MENDO" AND THE "ELDTP STATESTER"

The body of Elder Statesmen called the GEPO was an extra-constitutional and extra-lagal istitution. This body was more or less informall; constituted from among the councillors and leaders of the Maiji Restoration and had no status within the constitution, laws or orlinances. However, there gredually developed the custom that those statesmen the played leading roles in the Restoration of 1848 and in the early period of the Constitutional history of Japan vere to be consulted on matters of paramount importance in domestic and foreign matters including the maming of a new cabinet, war declarations, conclusions of peace and negotiations of treaties and international agreements of importance. For many years one or another from among the Genro occupied the important governmental positions of Prime Minister, President of Privy Council or Lord Keeper of the Privy Seel. Beginning informelly, the group began to be recognized as a covernmental institution and finally in December 1926, then Prince Saionji was appointed a Genro, the institution was formally recognized by an Imperial Rescript making the appointment. (677)

The group met and functioned on direct order from the Emperor that they should meet and advise on the solution of the quastion submitted. While they advised on grave matters of state such as the declaration of war, conclusion of peace and matters involving international relations, their most important function was in serving as the medium through which a new cobinet was nemed, thus filling up one of the major gaps in the Japanese Constitutional system occessioned by the fact that as a matter of legal principle the cabinet is responsible only to the Emperor. Upon the death of Prince Scionji in 1940, the Genro disappeared as an institution. (578)

The second of these groups is the group known as the Elder Statesmen or Jushin. (679)

With the passing of the function of advising the Emperor on the <u>metter of the selection of a new cabinet from the Genro to the Lord</u> <u>Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Lord Keeper instituted the practice of consulting individually with the ex-premiers and the President of the <u>Privy Council</u>. This group of Elder Statesmen, and extra-legal body came to be known as the Jushin. In July 1940, this body was officially formalized by being convoked and meeting as a group to advise the Lord Keeper on the selection of a new premier. While the conference of expremiers has the primary function of advising on the selection of a premier, on occasion it has been summoned to advise the Emperor on matters of state of grave importance. (679)</u>

- 232 -

FUNCTIONS OF THE "CENTO" AND THE "ELDTP STATESTEM"

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- 232 -

MEETING OF SINIOP STATESMEN (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Cerr's Summary
532	17 July	6,249	135

Present

HARA, President of Privy Council WAXATSUKI OKADA HIROTA HAYASHI KONOYE HIRANULA KANROJI, Vice Lord Grand Chamberlain

Decision

The Senior Statesmen decided to recommend that Prince KONOYE succeed YONAI as Prime Minister.

Remarks

Exhibit 532 is an extract from the diary of KIDO 17 July 1940 recording that a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held to choose a new Prime Minister to succeed YCNAI. KONOYE, who was favored by the military, was recommended.

The Exhibit gives the background of the downfall of the YONAL-ARITA Cabinet and the means by which it was accomplished and the reason therefor. KIDO stated that "I don't know the details but the gist of what I learned of the situation from Premier YONAI yesterday at HAYAMA is as follows: The Army thinks that the present cabinet is not adequate to carry out a policy which will suit the present ever-changing world situation and which will not be regretted later. It seems to show also a tendency to favor a political rapprochement with Germany and Italy. It also feels that even in domestic affairs the government, being sevarated from the people, will be unable to obtain satisfactory results in a number of policies, and that unless the political structure is strengthened, the government will be unable to cope with the present emergency. In a word since the War Minister's opinion is different from that of the present cabinet, he cannot fulfill his duty as the leader of the Army. Hence he has come to the point of resigning." (6250)

- 252 -

WAKATSUKI suggested Prince KONCYE; HARA, HIRAMUMA, HAYASHI end OKA agreed to this. (6251)

HIROTA seid that "It seems the China Incident cannot be easily settled if the cabinet is as weak as it has been, and there is no other way but to continue the present state of affairs. Judged from this view point, it would also be a good thing to have a suitable military man capable of working closely with the Army and Navy. However, there is no such man. Bosides, since the military themselves wish it there is no problem about asking Prince KOPCYE to take the field." (6252)

CONFERENCES OF SENIOR STATESMEN (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Cerr's Summery
1117	17 July	10,166	227

Present

HARA, President of Privy Council WAKATSUKI OKADA AFE YOMAI HAYASHI HIROTA KANROJI, Vice Lord Grend Chamberlain KIDO

Decision

The Senior Statesmen on 17 July 1940 approved KONOYE as Prime Minister for the third time. 1947

Remarks

Exhibit 1117 is an excerpt from KIDO's Diary regarding this meeting:

"WAFATSUKI questioned me as to the purpose of the resignation and the diplometic problems (i.e. the clesh of opinions between the Premier and Foreign Minister). ABE stressed the necessity of having Prince KONOYE as Premier; OKADA recommended Prince KONOYE, saying that no other person could exercise general control over both the Army and political circles; HAYASHI held the same opinion as ABE and OKADA; HARA did not differ from the above-mentioned; HIROTA laid stress upon the reinforcement of G.H.Q. and the formation of a military Cabinet, but he consented to the opinion of the rest upon my explenation of the establishment of G.H.Q. YONAI said that Frince KONOYE was the most suitable man to cope with the present difficulty. WAKATSUXI supported Prince KONOYE though his attitude was not positive. We recommended Prince KONCYE unanimously and closed our meeting at 2 p.m. The Emperor and Empress returned to Tokyo from their Hayama Villa. I visited the Emperor from 3:30 p.m. to 4:10 p.m. to report on the progress of our meeting, while the Lord Chamberlain telephoned to Prince KONCYE to request his presence at the Pelece. At 5:05 p.m. Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Palace to receive the Imperial command to form a cabinet. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, visited me at 5:50 p.m. to explain the draft understanding between the U.S.A. and this country." (10, 167 - 8)

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CONFERENCE OF SENIOR STATES NEW (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
1154 ~	17 Cctober	10,291	255 AL, PARTS
		Prosent	•.

KIYOURA WEKATHSUKI OFRIA HAYASHI HIROTA ABE YONAI HAFA, Fresident of Privy Council KIDO

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Decision

The Senior Statesmen approved TOJO as successor to Premier KCNOYE.

Remarks

On 17 October 1941, the Senior Statesmen met and approved TOJO as Premier. KIDO proposed TOJO's name. The excerpt says:

"At 11 a.m. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me to make arrangements for a senior statesmen's conference. It was held from 1:10 p.m. to 3:45 p.m. in the west ante-chamber of the Palace. Those present were Viscount KIYOURA (92 years old), Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, General HAYASHI, Mr. HIROTA, General AEE, Admiral YONAI, all ex-Premiers and President of the Privy Council HAPA. I explained the situation of the general resignation. Mr. WAYATSUKI recommended General UGAKI as the succeeding Premier, and General HAYASHI discussed the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet.

¹I asserted that the most important things were the revision of the decision of the last Council in the Imperial presence and the unity of opinion between the Army and Navy. I suggested a TOJO Cabinat as a solution of these problems, with TOJO as Premier and War Minister, even though he is on military service. J met no objection to my proposal, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, and Mr. HARA, giving me positive approval. The meeting broke up at 4 p.m. I reported to the Emperor the details of the progress of the ex-Premiers Conference and talked with him until 4:15 p.m. The War Minister proceeded to the Palace at the request of the Emperor to receive the Imperial Order for the formation of a new Cabinet.

- 255. -

This was followed by the visit of Navy Minister OIKAWA to whom the Emperor gave advice to the effect that the unity of opinions between the Army and the Navy were very desirable. I passed on to them in an ante-room the following message as ordered by the Emperor. In deciding the fundamental policy of our country we need not necessarily follow the decisions of the Council in the Imperial presence on the 6th of September, but should study carefully conditions both at home and abroad." (10.291-2)

Exhibit 1155 shows that TOJO remained in active military service after he became Premier; he also became a full general (10,293). The Emperor sanctioned this. (10293)

CON ERENCE OF SENIOR STATESMEN (1941)

Exhibit No.DateRecord pageCarr's Surrar:119629 November10,452272

Present

WAKATSUKI OKADA HTHANJIA KONCYE JOMAI MUROTA HAYASHI ABE KIDO

Decision

The Senior Statesmen's Conference of November 29, 1941 discussed the matter of war with the United States.

Remarks

Exhibit 1196 is an excerpt from KIDO's Diary of 29 November, 1941. The Emperor asked the Senior Statesmen's opinion concerning the present political situation. What was said was as follows:

"The Emperor remarked on the difficult times we were roing through.

"Baron WAKATSUKI said that we were equal to a prolonged war with the $U_*S_*A_*$ in spiritual power, but regarding material power, we must make a careful study.

"Admiral OKADA said that he had grave doubts as to our supply capacity in regard to war materials, and thought the Government's statement about this matter to date was quite incomplete.

"Baron HIRANULA agreed with Mr. WAKATSUKI's opinion as regards the spiritual strength of the Japanese nation, and urged further measures to awaken patriotic sentiment.

"Prince KONOYE stated that it was quite regrettable that our negotiations were going to be a failure in spite of our strenuous efforts since last April. But he was of the opinion that there would be no need to resort to a hasty war just becaus of the rupture of the negotiations as we might be able to reach a wise solution in some way or other, while continuing our struggle against difficulties.

"Admiral YONAI said that he could not base his opinion on definite data but it was his desire that we should be careful not to lose what little we possess by trying to avoid becoming poorer by inches.

"Mr. HDPOTA said that although our policy had been to prevent Anglo-American interference in the China Inc.dent, this had reached their present situation. We should be able to seid an opportunity to solve the pending problems between the two countries even after the commencement of hostilities, if we way sincere enough in our diplomatic efforts.

"General HAYASHI stated that as he had no data for his opinion, he could do nothing but believe the decisions of the Imperial Headquarters and the Government.

"General ABE said that according to the Government statement the negotiations had come to a deadlock in spite of strenucus efforts on our part. He was sure that the Government had study the world political situation from various angles with laboriou minuteness, for which we ware thankful. But it would be quite necessary to pay much more attention to the attitude of the Chinese people than to the war with the U.S.A., otherwise we would lose the fruits of victory in the Chinese Incident,

"Mr. WAKATSUKI said that the war should be fourth to the 1 even if there was no chance to win, if it was a defensive one for the cause of our national existence and self-defense, but we should avoid the war if we intended to realize our ideals such as 'the Asiatic Co-prospericy Sphere' or 'the stabilizing of power in Asia', because such a war would be very dangerous. (10,452, 10,453, 10,454)

But see Exhibit 1296 in its corrected form (16187). (No material change in meaning as set forth above),

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CONFFRENCE OF SENIOR STATESMEN (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summery
1158-A	1 December	10,513-10,515	

Present

HIROHITO, The Emperor WAKATSUKI CKADA HAYASHI, Senjuro YONAI ALE, Nobuyuki UJAAS HIRATA

(SHIMARA, TOGO and TOJO met with the Senior Statesmen during the morning before the meeting and explained the situation to them.) (10,515)

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<u>Fecision</u>

See Remarks.

Remarks

Exhibit 1158-A is an extract from TOJO's interrogation of 11 March 1943 which reads as follows:

"Q When and why was a meeting of ex-promiers held prior to the last Imporial Conference of 1 December 1941?

"A You mean the Senior Statesmen?

"Q Yes.

"A That was convened by the Emperor.

"Q When?

- "A It was either on the 1st or the 31st.
- "Q What was the purpose of calling that meeting?

"A The Emperor was very anxious about the question of war with America and he convened them in order to hear each man's opinion.

"Q Who premided at that meeting?

"A Let's see -- those were WAKATSUXI, OKADA, Senjuro HAYASHI, YOMAI, Nobuyuki ABE, KONOYE, HIRANUMA. "Q You still have not answered who presided.

"A I think perhaps WAKATSUKI presided. I don't really know.

"Q Did you make any statements at that meeting?

"A Of course, I was there, too, as the Premier at that time. Yes, I did. The Mayeror was there and heard each man's orinion in turn. I was there and from time to time spoke, giving the government's point of view.

"Q What did you state as the government's point of view?

"A I explained various things, but I don't remember the details now. I explained the inswitchleness of war.

"Q Did the Emperor make any statement at all at their meeting?

"A No, he only listered. This was not a conference. It was only that the Emperor wished to hear the opinion of each man.

"Q Did you express your of inion before any of the others expressed theirs?

"A It was this way: The turny, Navy and Foreign Ministers, President of the Cabinet Planning Board, and I, as Premier, met with the Sonior Statesmen in the morning and opplained the situation to thom. Then after a Court dinner with the Emperor, the former Premiers and I met with the Emperor who heard each men's opinion in turn. The other cabinet rembers were not present at that time, only I from the government. There was one other former Premier present - HIROTA." (10,513-5)

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MEETING OF SENIOR STATESMEN. (1944)

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Record pare	Carr's Summary
1277	17 July	11,372	307

<u>Fresent</u>

WAKATSUKI OKADA HIRANUMA HIROTA ABE KONOE YONAI

à.

Decision

Discussed the resignation of TOJO's Cabinet at HIRADUN'4's home. They decided "to build a powerful national cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly."

Remarks

This was an unofficial conference.

Exhibit 1277 is an extract from KIDO's Diary of 17 July 1944 stating that OKADA talked with him about the meeting as follows:

WARATSUKI said that the "Cabinet has completely lost the sympethy of the public." (11,372)

YOMAI said he refused to join TOJO's Cabinet. He had discussed the matter with OKA, Chief of the Neval Affairs Bureau. (11,372)

AFE said that the people "are completely out of sympathy with this Cabinat" and that he "must decided my attitude according to the attitude of the Imperial Rule assistance Political Society." (11,373)

HIRANIMA said it is not a question of whether the Cabinet is overthrown or not, or whether the next cabinet will be a weak one or not. The point is "that we are really concerned about our country, and we must make up our minds to do something." (11,373)

HIROTA said he would not join the Cabinet. (11,374)

Later TOJO called and explained to KIDO his cabinet's policy regarding changes therein (11,374). He said that the Supreme Cormand would be consolidated and the Navy Minister changed; that the Lieison Conference would be renovated and strengthened as so to consist of two Ministers of State of the Premier class (AFE and YON4J considered)

besides both Chiefs of Staff and the Ministers of War, Navy, Munitions, Finance and Foreign affairs. KISHI would request to retire as Minister of State so that FUJIMARA, in order to strengthen the air force, could serve full time as Member of Munitions; MAEDA or SHIMADA would be appointed Welfare Minister in order to have a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society in the Cabinet, and General APE and Admirel YCNAI would be asked to join the cabinet as Ministers of State in order to reinforce the Imperial Hundquarters; the Cabinet Advisory System would be revived, if the Senior Statesmen desire it and the Cabinet members would keep close contact with the Senior Statesmen; the advisory setup of the Imerial Fule Assistance Folitical Society would be divided into two departments, technical and political, with five advisers to be appointed from among the House of Peers and the House of Fepresentatives, respectively. (11,376)

- 262 -

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MEETING OF SEMIOR STATESMEN (1944)

Exhibit No.DateRecord praceCarr's Summary127818 July11,378308

Present

WAKATSUKI OKADA HIROTA KONOE HIRANUMA ABE YOMAI HARA, President of Privy Council KIDO, Lord Keeper of Privy Scal

Decision

Decided that TERAUCHI, ZOISC or HATA be recommended to the Emperor as successor to TOJO.

Remarks

Exhibit 1278 is an excerpt from KIDO's Diary of 18 July 1944 and refers to an official meeting of the Senior Statesmen convened by KIDO, to select a successor to TOJO. HIROTA proposed the Imperial Frince, HIRANUMA objected and insisted on a military man, so did KIDO. WAKATSUKI several times suggested UGANI but got no support, except from KONOYE. HIROTA seid the prosecution of the war was first and foremost and no one dissented. They recommended TERAUCHI, KOISO or HATA. TOJO opposed TERAUCHI on military grounds and the Emperor decided to appoint KOISO. (11377-11380) But see Exhibit 1280 herein (1944) as to coalition cabinet composed of KOISO and YONAI

- 278 -

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NEETINGS OF SEMIOR STATESMEN (1944)

Exhibit No.	Date	Pecord vege	Carr's Summery
1280	20 July	11,383	308

Present

Ceneral ABE General KOISO MARATSUKI OKADA LIROTA

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FONOYE FIPANULA YONAI HARA KIDO

Decision

approved a coalition cabinet to be formed by KCISO and YOMAI.

Remarks

According to Exhibit 1279 on 19 July KONOYE suggested to KIX that the new Cabinet should be a coslition between KOISO and 1 - NAJ; Kido agreed to this proposal. (11381)

Exhibit 1230 refers to the Senior Statesmen meeting of 20 July 1944, KIDO explained the development regarding the coslition. KOISO and YONAI were ordered by the Emperor to form a cabinet. (11383)

L'and

On 22 July KOISO became Frime Minister; SHIGENITSU remained as Foreign Minister and became Great East Asia Minister; TOJO, SUZUKI and HOSHINO lost Cabinet office.

MEETINGS OF SEMIOR STATESNEN (1945)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record pace	Carr's Summary
1282	5 April	11,390	311

Present

KONOYE HIRANUMA SUZUKI HIROTA WAKATSUKI OKADA TOJO KIDO Lord of Grand Chamberlain

Decision

Decided to recommend SUZUKI, Kantaro, President of the Privy Jouncil as the successor to Promicr KOISO.

Remarks

Exhibit 1282 is an extract from KIDC's Diary of 5 April 1945. (N.B.-This Exhibit was read in the Record in its corrected form. Only pages 1 and 2 were read. Pages 3,5,7, 11 and 12 were corrected. The following matter is taken from the Exhibit as corrected. See Record 16,195).

KIDO reported the following conversation as having taken place at the meeting:

TOJO remarked that frequent changes in cabinet in war time are deplorable. "I think", he said, "the San Francisco Conference of April 25 is especially the most important period. The Cabinet to be formed should be the final one. Within the country at present, there exists, on one hand, the opinion that we should fight to the last to provide for the future developments of the country and on the other hand, the opinion to accept the unconditional surrender terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is necessary to decide on this first." (p. 5 of except)

HIRANUMA stated that "There is no way cut but to fight to the end."

HIROTA said that "We must win by any means. Although there are pessimistic views, in this current war, no country has so far been winning straight through from the start. All of them have been, one time or another, on the verge of being defeated and have rallied back again. The next Cabinet should be one that would fight through to win the war." He thought that the Conference should ascertain the intentions of the Army and Navy authorities. (p. 6 of Excerpt)

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HIRANUMA then pointed out that MOISO's Gebinet formation was a failure and that he, MOISO, should have consulted the Elder Statemann "a little more without being apprehended by theories." (p. 6 of Elcorro)

WAKATSUKI said that "If the opinions of Baron HIRANUMA should be adopted (select principal cabinet members beforehand) nobody will be willing to accept the premiership and it will not be possible to form a cabinet. It will thoroughly restrict the activities of the Premier." (p. 9 of Excerpt)

HIROTA said that "It is better to have either the Wer Minister or the Navy Minister be the Chief of the new Cabinet." (p.10 of Exc rpt)

HIRANUMA stated that "There are two phases of pinion at home in regard to the conclusion of the War. At this time, we must have a person who will fight it out. We cannot recommend any peace advocator who favors cossistion of hostilities. From this import, the choosing of a Premier has important bearings. Incidentally, I an unable to voice any opinion if it means that all we have to do is to appoint the premier and the rest to be left to him. I am strongly opposed to any advocacy for peace and cossation of hostilities." (p. 10 of Excerpt)

SUZUMI remarked that "Since the Premier must be physically strong . stand the strain, I suggest Prince KONCYE who is the youngest." (p. 12 b) Excerpt)

HIRANULA replied that "The candidate should be a military man" and therefore "It is my wish to have Admiral SUZUII accept the promiership." (p. 12 of Excerpt)

KIDO said that "As I had said previously, now that the Japaness il is on the verge of becoming a battlefield, strengthening of the government had become all the more necessary, and therefore, an imposing and dedate Cabinet which has the confidence of the people must be established. From this point, I think the opinion of his Excellency TCJO is plausible, but, personally, I hope to have his Excellency SUZUKI rise to the occasion." (p. 12 of Excerpt)

TOJO pointed out that "At the present when our land is about to be come a battlefield we must take special care, or else there is a form that the Army might take an aloof standing. If the Army takes an aloof standing, the Cabinet will collapse." (p. 13 of Excerpt)

KIDO responded to this by asking if there is any omen or premonition regarding the Army's taking an aloof standing, (p. 13 of excerpt)

TOJO replied that "Cant say there is none." (p. 13 of Excerpt)

KIDO then seid "As I have seid a little while ago, the antimilitaristic sentiments are quite strong end there are possibilities of having the people take an aloof standing." (p. 13 of Excerpt)

OKAMA wanted to know what was meant by "'taking an aloof standing' to a person who received the Imperial Command" and who is responsible for the national defense? "Are they not the Army and Navy?" (p. 13 of Excerpt)

TOJO again replied that "Because of that apprehension I said to take care." (p. 13 of Excerpt)

The meeting adjourned.

On 7 April SUZUKI became Prime Minister, TOGO again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor; SATO, Lt. General became Commander of the 37th Divisions in Indo-China and (later) Siam; DCHIHARA became Chief Inspector of Military Training and again Supreme War Courcillor; ITAGAKI, General, became Commander-in-chief 7th Army (Malaya); HATA became Commander-in-chief of 2nd Army.

On 9 April HIRANUMA again became President of the Privy Council.

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Miscellaneous Meatines

SUPPEME WAR PLANS COUNCIL a/k/a/ Supreme War Advisory Council Supreme War Direction Council Supreme War Leadership Council (1944)

Exhibit No.	Dete	Pecord page	Cerr's Summary
1349	5 September	12,117-8	

Present

(Attendence not stated in Exhibit).

Decision

"After deliberation at the Supreme War Supervisory Conference of September 5, last year (1944) former Prime Minister KOISO in his declaration of the government's policies at the 85th Extraordinary Session of the Diet on September 9th, made a statement that "The Empire is ready to recognize independence for the East Indies in or to secure everlasting welfare for her people,' thereby clarifying the Empire's intentions on this problem." (12,117)

Remarks

The Council "merely decided that the above statement was to be made at the Diet Session." (12,118) No time for the recognition of their independence was, however, stated. (12,118)

Miscellaneous Meetings

SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL e/k/e Supreme War Advisory Council Supreme Ver Direction Council Supreme War Leedership Council

(1945)

Exhibit No. Det	te <u>Record page</u>	Carr's Summary
1350 17	July12,115July12,121July12,236	313 313 313

Present

Attendence not stated in the Exhibit.

Decision

The Supreme Advisory Conference of 17 July 1945 decided that "The Empire shall recognize the Independence of the East Indies at the carliest possible moment." (12,115)

Remarks

Exhibit 1344 is entitled "Course of Events Leading Up to Decision in Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War." (12068) It refers to a decision of the Supreme Advisory Conference of 17 July 1945 that the independence of the East Indies should be recognized at the earliest possible moment and "for this purpose, preparation for independence shall be immediately promoted and intensified," (12,115) but "less than a month later the Empire had surrendered and this was never put into effect." (12,115) The Potsdam Declaration was signed on 26 July 1945.

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Exhibit 135C (12,121) and the testimony of DeWeerd (12,236) also refer to this decision regarding the measures for the East Indies independence stating that preparations for independence should be hastened. The area to be independent was the Netherlands East Indies and the independence as a new nation would be proclaimed as soon as preparations were completed. In areas where preparations were not complete, steps would be taken to transfor them by degrees to the jurisdiction of the new nation. (12,122)

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Miscellancous Meetings

	SUPREICE MA e./k/e.	NR PLANS COUNCIL Supreme War Advis Supreme War Dires Supreme War Leeds (1945)	ction Council
Exhibit No.	Dete	Record page	Cerr's Summery
1283	9 August	11,393	314

Present

(Attendance not stated)

Decision

Decided to accept with four reservations the Potsdam Declaration. See Remarks.

Remorks

On 9 August KIDO recorded in his diary that Premier SUZUKI informed him that the Supreme War Guidance Council had decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration with four reservations: (1) preservation of the Imperial Dynasty; (2) Independent evacuation of troops; (3) handling in our own country of persons responsible for the war; and (4) no guarantee occupation.

The Jepanese qualified acceptance of 10 August contained only the reservation with regard to the Emperor.

The Allies replied on 11 August.

Final Japanese acceptance was 14 August. Japan's defeat was kept secret until 21 August.

On 17 August Prince HIGASHIKUNI beceme Prime Minister; SHIGEMITSU egein beceme Foreign Minister, Greater E-st Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor.

The Instrument of Surronder was signed on 2 September.

On 9 October SHIDEHARA became Prime Minister.

The Moscow Conference Agreement was signed 26 December.

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Miscelleneous Meetings

SUPREME WAR PLANS COUNCIL

a/k/a Supreme War Advisory Courcil Supreme War Direction Council Supreme War Leadership Council

(1945)

Exhibit No.	Dete	Record pree	Carr's Summary
661	1 December	7,166; 7,173	310

Present

(Attendance not stated)

Decision

The Supreme War Leedership Council decided on the "Measures towards French Indo-China to meet the sudden change in the Situation, February 1, 1945." (7,166)

Remarks

According to the decision Japan "shall request the Governor-General of French Indo-China to agree" .. that the military and armed police forces of French Indo-China should be placed under the joint command of the Japanese Army" (7,167) and "immediate orders shall be given to all organs in French Indo-China to cooperate fully and loyally in accordance with the requests of the Japanese Empire." (7,167) The "aforesaid two items shall be accepted in toto within six hours." (7,167) The "Japanese forces on the spot shall elevate and support the independent positions Annam, etc., as they deem fit, and devise plans so as to make them cooperate with us actively." (7,168)

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Miscellancous Meetings

PRISONER-OF-WAR INFORMATION BUREAU (1942)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
198C-B	on or after	14,558	
1980-0	7 December	14,562	
1980-D		14,563-E	600 t-0 -00

Present

None stated in Exhibit, but see Exhibit TA AKA herein under heading "Military Service Bureau Conference, 1042." (14,289)

Decision

Immediately after the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, according to TOJC (Exhibit 1980-D, 14,558), the Frisoner of War Information Eureau was set up in the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry. (14,558)

Remarks

The War Minister (TOJC) ordered the formation of the Prisoner of War Bureau. (14,559)

Regarding the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, TCJO said in his interrogations as follows:

(From Ex. 1980-B)

"Q Were you, from 7 December 1941 on, familiar with the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war?

"A I know of these at the time.

"Q At that time did you, as Premier and War Minister, believe that the provisions of those conventions applied to Japan and should be followed by her in war?

"A Naturally.

"Q In addition to the provisions of those conventions, there are also other recognized rules and customs of war followed by civilized nations, are there not?

"A As a civilized nation, we would follow the principles of humanism.

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"Q I suppose by humanism, you mean that prisoners would be treated humanely, as by civilized nations?

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"Q So that, in general, from 7 December 1941 on, you, as Premier and War Minister, folt that Japan was bound by the Hague and Geneva Conventions with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war and also bound by the rules and customs of civilized nations with respect to treating prisoners of war humanely, did you not?

"A Yes." (1-,559-60)

(From Exhibit 1980-C)

"Q But you, as Minister of Mar during the period when these atrocities were committed, are the responsible party for their commission, are you not?

"A Tes.

"Q What explanation can you give for the fact that you did not learn of them when they were so videspread and of such a serious nature?

"A I was always under the impression that army commander; in the field who were responsible for the treatment of prisoners understood what was required of them in this connection.

"Q During this entire period from 7 December 1941 on, you were aware of the fact, were you not, that the United States and Great Britain, through friendly nations, had warned the Japanese Government that Japanese officials and the Japanese Government would be held responsible for violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and for violations of the rules of war with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war?

"A Yes, and if these atrocities are true, treatics have been violated.

"Q During this same period, were you not aware that the United States and Great Eritain, through friendly nations, had made numerous and repeated complaints, giving specific data and charging that there had been, in each instance, violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and of the rules of war in connection with the mistreatment of priseners of war? "A I do not remember details, but I think these came through the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. "Q Such complaints would first come to the Foreign Ministry and then be routed to the Minister of War's Office, would they not? 1

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"A Yes.

"Q How many of these complaints were made, that you recall, of your personal knowledge?

"A I cannot recall just now how many were received.

"Q What, if anything, did you do with respect to those which were received?

"A These were passed on to the various army commanders through the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

"Q Were reports then made back by those bureau heads or individuals to you, as Minister of War, relative to these complaints?

"A No, no replice or reports were sent back. These complaints were sent to the various people concerned calling the matter to their attention." (14,562-4)

(From 198C-D)

"Q Were these complaints, which were made during this period by the United States and Great Britain through friendly nations with respect to the mistrcatment of their prisoners by the Japanese Government, taken up at the weekly meetings of the Prisoner Burcau that you have referred to?

- 267 -

"A Yes. These matters were taken up at the bi-weekly meetings." (14,565)

Miscellaneous Mectings

MILITARY SERVICE BUREAU CONTERENCES (1942)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Sum ary
Tanaka	April	14,288-20	

Present

According to TAMAKA, those present were:

TOJO, War Minister KIMURA, Vice Minister TOMIMAGA, Chief of the Fersonnel Eureau SATO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau TANAMA (the witness) MAN, Chief of Ordnance Bureau YOSHIZUMI, Chief of Procurement and Mobilization Bureau MURIHASHI, Chief of the Security Bureau MIKI, Chief of the Surgeon General's Bureau OYAMA, Chief of the Legal Affairs Bureau NAKAJIMA MAKAJIMA MAKAMURA, Commander of Gendarmie HONDA, Chief of the Armored Forces Bureau MATSUMURA, Chief of the Army Press Section (Private secretaries of War Minister and Vice War Minister)

Decision

According to TANAKA, it was decided by TOJO at the meeting of bureau chiefs of the War Ministry (meetings were held twice a week - 14,298) that "All prisoners-of-war engage in forced labor." (14,290)

Remarks

TANAKA, in his direct examination on this matter said, inter alia:

"Q Was there a discussion at that time in connection with how prisoners of war should be treated?

"A At the request of EUMURA, Chief of the Prisoner of Ver Information Europe, TOJO, War Minister, gave his decision.

"Q What was his decision?

"A In the light of the prevailing situation in Japan at that time, which was to enhance the labor efficiency of the country, and in the light of the slogen then current, "No work, no food," the first point that was decided at this meeting was to make all prisoners of war engage in forced labor.

- 268 -

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With regard to this decision, YUEMUIA, Chief of the Military Affairs - Prisoners of War Information Bureau, said that making prisoners of war of the rank of warrant officers and above work would be in violation of the Geneva Convention. But in spite of the view thus expressed by INFENIA, War Minister TOJC gave the decision of utilizing these officers for labor purposes in the light of the fact that Japan had not ratified the Geneva Convention, although it was the government's position to respect the spirit of the convention.

It was decided that prisoner of war camps be established not only in the southern areas but also in Japan proper, in Formosa, Morca, China, and Manchuria, and to send prisoners of war to these areas as a means of onhancing the trust and confidence of the peoples of Asia in Japan." (14,238 - 14,290)

Miscellaneous Meetings

CONFERENCES IN WAR MINISTRY ON P.O.W.E (1942) (1943)

Exhibit No.	Date	Rec. rd page	Carr's Sumary
1958	1942-43	14,299-14,303	

Present

None stated in Exhibit, but see TAYAKA, herein, under heading "Military Service Bureau Conferences, April 1942-43.

Decision

At a conference in the War Ministry it was decided that as "The Geneva Convention relating to Frisoners-of-war was not ratified by his Majosty, we can hardly announce our observance of the same." (14,201)

Remarks

Exhibit 1958 is a communication to IPS from the Central Liaison Office of 18 April 1946 regarding decision not to apply the Geneva Convention. (14,299) The communication is as follows:

"There is no data to confirm whether or not there was held any conference in the Mar Ministry on May 6, 1942. However, as regards the matter of (14,299) non-application of the Genera Convention the following decisions of the Mar Ministry may be cit d:

"1. The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under date of January 13, and 16, (1942) transmitted to the Mar Ministry the inquiries of American, British and other governments. The Ministry, following several conferences, reached a decision (Annex I) and communicated the same to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 23. However, there are no records of the conference.

"2. On January 27, 1943, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs sent an inquiry regarding the application of the Frisoner of War Convention to non-combatant internees. As a result of a conference, the Ministry reached a decision (Annex II). The same was communicated by the Vice Minister of War to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under date of February 6, however, there is no record of the conference.

"3. The Foreign Office, under date of December 12, 1941, transmitted to the War Ministry the communication of the International Red Cross Committee Chairman, Max Hudar, concerning collection and transmission of information regarding prisoners of war. After a conference, the Ministry reached a decision (Annex III), which was communicated to the Foreign Office. "4. The above decisions being entirely in line with the fundamontal principles and policy, according to which the War Ministry had always directed the conduct of the affairs relating to prisoners of War, no orders seem to have been issued in consequence of the decisions. (Existing data have been examined, but it cannot be ascertained whether any order was issued or not.)

"Annex I.

"Reply from Vice Minister of War to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 23, 1942. (Translation)

"In answer to your inquiries in clear Eo. 52 and No. 53, dated January 13 and No. 85, dated January 16, the views of this Ministry are as follows:

"1I. Concerning No. 52:

"1. In view of the fact that the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war was not ratified by his Majesty, we can hardly announce our observance of the same. But it would be safe to notify the world that we have no objection to acting in accordance with the Convention in the treatment of prisoners of war.

"12. As regards providing prisoners of war with food and clothing, we have no objections to giving due consideration to the national or racial habits and customs of the prisoners.

"^{#1}II. Concerning No. 53 and No. 55, the above views will be applicable.¹

"Annex II.

"Application of the Frisoner of War Conv. ntion to Hen-Combatent Internees. (Army, Ordinary No. 753, February 5, 1942) (Translation)

"Referring to your communication, Yo. 149, dated January 27, 1942, on the above subject, the views of this ministry are as follows:

"The 1929 Gen va Convention relating to Frisoners of War has no binding power whatscever on Japan." But this ministry has no objection to applying the principles of the Convention to non-combatant internees within such limits as it is applicable, provided, however, that no person be subjected to labor against his will.

"Annex III.

"Communication of the International Red Cross Committee Chairman concerning collection and transmission of information regarding prisoners of war dated December 28, 1941 (Army Ordinary 9392) (Translation)

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"Referring to your communication No. 4585, dated December 12, 1941, on the above subject, the wiews of this ministry are as follows:

"The Ministry agrees to the proposal.

"However,

"a. It is not that we 'declare that we are prepared to apply in practice' the provisions of the Prisoner of War Convention of 1929, but that we 'utilize them for the convenience of transmission of information."

"b. Information is to be transmitted by telegram and other means." (14,299-14,503)

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DECISICUS OF IMPERIAL MEADQUARTERS (1041)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summery
1905	early April	11,751	194
		Present	

(Exhibit does not contain the attendance).

Decision

Decided the "Gist of Imperial Headquarters, Army end Navy Department Policy Concerning Measures to be taken in the South."

<u>Pemarks</u>

A decision by Imperial Headquarters of April states that Japan must establish close military, political and economic relations with French Indo-China and Theiland, and close economic relations with the Netherlands East Indies. Arms are only to be resorted to in the event the embargoes or anti-Japanese encirclement of United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China became so tense they cannot be tolerated. (11751-11753)

Miscellaneous Meetings

SUPPENE WAR COUNCIL (Army Members) (1941)

Exhibit No.	Date	Pecord page	Cerr's Supp. Summ.
2246	30 June	16,178	27

Present

T.I.H. Marshell Prince KAN-IN General Frince ASAKA General Prince HIGASHI-KUNI General Count TERAUCHI, Hiseichi General DOIHARA, Kenji General OKAMURA, Yasuji War Minister TOJO General SUGIYAMA, Gen, Chief of General Staff General YAMADA, Otozo, Inspector General of Army Education War Vice Minister KIMURA Vice Chief TSUKATA

Decision

See Remarks.

Remarks

On 30 June 1941 the Army called a conference of Army members of the Supreme War Council TOJO and related officials explained the fast changing International situation, after which Japan's future attitude was discussed. Defendants TOJO, DOMINARA and KINDPA were present at the meeting. (16,178)

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JOINT CONFERENCES (1940)

Exhibit No.	Date	Record page	Carr's Summary
527	12 July	6,191	129

Present

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Army Office - Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA Navy Office - Commander SHIBA Mayel General Staff - Captain ONO Foreign Office - Section Chief ANDO " " ISHIZAWA Secretary TOKUNAGA

Decision

See Remarks.

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Remarks

A joint conference of War, Nevy and Foreign Ministers discussed, at length, the matter of strengthening the harmony between Japan, Germany and Italy, on 11 July 1940.

Exhibit 527 is the minutes of this conference and shows the existence of a strong Japanese demand for conclusion of military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy as means of realizing the Japanese Empire's plan for expansion in East Asia and the South Sees. They agreed to make agreement in form of a diplomatic note to be strengthened to agreement, if Germany recognized Japan's position in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Gist of agreement was to be that Germany keep out of French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies, support Japan in China, and favorably consider Japanese economic relations; while Japan in return would support Germany's European policy, check Britain in the Far East and supply essential materials. (6191-6211)

See Exhibit 528, herein, Joint Conferences 1940 for the minutes of the adjourned Conference unifying the opinions of the three ministers on this matter. (6214)

- 877 -

ERRATA SHEET #1

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nugust 5, 1947.

RE:	IPS DOCUMENT NO.							
	(RULINGS OF	THE INTERNATIONA	L MILITARY	TRIBUNAL	FOR	THE	FAR	EAST)

The following changes are to be made in the above Document:

1. Page v (Index) Headnote 25 reads:

"ON EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE GIVEN IN REBUTTAL -DOCUMENTS NOT MENTIONED AS SUCH BY COUNSEL".

2. Page xi (Index) Headnote 35 and 36:

Insert "SECONDARY EVIDENCE" after the word "COMPETENCY".

3. Page xx (Index) Under "TR-NSLATIONS", Headnote 1:

Change"BOARD BY REFEREES" to "BOARD OF REFEREES"

4. Page III -27 (CROSS-EXAMINATION). End of third paragraph, reference should read:

"(pp 22058-9- May 14,1947)".

PAGE III -27 (CROSS-EXAMINATION) Last paragraph, second line, last three words should read:

"disallow without any"

5. Page VI -3 (DOCUMENTS), Sixth Paragraph:

Change "FURNIESS" to "FURNESS"

Second sentence, same paragraph, should read:

"We do not need them" instead of "We do need them"

6. Page VI - 19 (DOCUMENTS). After Fifth Paragraph, "(See also CROSS-EXAMINATION 22 and 23) should read:

> "(See CROSS-EXAMINATION 22 for case where document used by . way of surprise and CROSS-EXAMINATION 23 for necessity of tendering for identification)".

ERRATA SHEET #1

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nugust 5, 1947.

RE: IPS DOCUMENT NO.0006 (RULINGS OF THE IMTFE)

> 7. <u>PAGE VII-88 (EVIDENCE)</u> At end of <u>second</u>paragraph, under <u>Rule 103</u> instead of "(P.1243, June 24, 1936)", reference should read:

> > "(P.1243, June 24, 1946)"

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- 8. PAGE XI-5 (MOTIONS), second line, under Rule 12, change "34d of May" to: "3rd of May".
- 9. PAGE XIV-3 (REDIRECT EXAMINATION). After last line of page, under "(p.1386, June 26, 1946),"add:

"See also REDIRECT EXAMINATION 4"

<u>NOTE:</u> Missing or blurred pages may be replaced by contacting Room 340.

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JOINT COUFEPENCES (1940)

Exhibit No.	<u>Date</u>	Record page	Carr's Summary
528	16 July	6,214	
		Present	

Foreign Office - Section Chief ANDO " ISHIZAWA " JAJIFI Secretary TOKJNAGA Army Office - Lt. Col. TAKAYANA Army General Staff Office - Mejor TANENURA Navy Office - Commander SHIBA

Decision

The conference of subordinate members of the War. Mavy and Foreign Ministries agreed upon the intensification of the coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy on 16 July 1940. (6214)

Pemarks

See Exhibit 527, herein, Joint Conferences, 12 July 1940. (6191)

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