

B. ソビエト連邦ニ對スル侵襲

一 緒言

裁判長閣下並ニ裁判官各位

Summa Cum H

H-1 主要日本犯罪人ニ對スル宣告が閣下ニヨリ行ハル時期が近ツキツ
ツアリマス。ニ様ニ長イ期間ヲ費シタリ此事件、審理、軍事裁
判が組織サレタ高遠ノ目的ニフサクニイテ文献ニ依リテ完結セラト
スルハナリマセニ。

ニ目的、中華民國、ソ連邦、亞米利加合衆國、大ブリテニ國並
ニ其他諸國、自由愛好國民ニ對スル日本、侵襲、有罪ナルコトヲ
宣告シ、主要日本戰爭犯罪人ヲ絞獄ニ處罰シ、ソノ以テ日
本ヲ平和的民主國家ニ改造スルコトヲ助ケ、又全世界ヲ新ク侵襲
ヲ蒙ラズニ保シ保護スルコト、世界制覇ノ思想、他國領土ノ占領
諸國民征服、狂人的思想ニ眩惑シタ「ムラ」一味、日本人ガ夢
想ノ且ク之ガ爲メニ其犯罪行為ヲ發展セシメタ様ト事ヲ實現
シヤウト欲シ居ル者ヲ警告スルコトデアリマス。

R.I

閣下、宣告、侵襲即チ勝手ト手段及方法ニ依リテ他國ノ土地
ヲ占領シ且チ他國民ヲ奴隸化セトスルニ認テ、企圖、國際的重大
犯罪デアツニ個々、侵襲犯罪人全體ヲ問ハシテ、六ナリトイフ
コトヲ全世界ニ示サテスルコトデアリマセニ。

閣下、宣告、夫レガ平和ト民主主義、確立並ニ侵襲、不
道及ビ反動ニ對シテ進歩的ト人道、強力ト戰爭手段デアリ

テ居タノデアリマス。

ソノ連邦ハ侵略國ノ主攻惠ヲ身ヲ以テ引受ケ且ツ「アツシヨ」的野蠻カラ人道ヲ救フ爲メ其ノ直滅戰ニ決定的役割ヲ演シマシタ。

其故ソノ連邦ハ最モ日本ニ近イ隣接國トシテモ侵略ノ日本ノ根源地ノ急速ナ撲滅ニ利害關係ヲ持ツテ居ルモノデアリマス。

P. 2

17-3 日本ノ侵略ヲ根絶スルコトハ、裁判所ノ權限ヲ先ヅ何ヨリモ先ニ被告席ニ在ル人々即チ帝國主義日本ノ支配層ノ指導者ヲ峻烈ニ処分スルコトヲ意味スルモノデアリマス。

H-11 被告等ハ今モ尚武器ヲ捨テマセンデシタ。彼等其犯行が過去

61101000 6.9.10

Summation H

バル程、歴史上名譽アル地位ヲ獲得シナケバナリマセン。

H-2

多年東方ニ於ケル世界侵略ノ根源地デアツクニ帝國主義國日本ト西方ニ於ケル世界侵略ノ根源地「ヒットラー」ノ獨逸ニ對シテ相互ニ對立ニ次世界大戰ヲ謀議シ而シテ人類ノ其ノ文明ヲ滅亡ノ際ニ追入マシタ。

「ソ連邦、北アメリカ合衆國、大ブリテン國及ビ其他列國ノ大連合ノ優良ナ子供等ハ侵略國トシテ戰争ニ自分ノ血ヲ流シマシタ。莫大ニ犧牲ヲ拂ツテ平和ヲ愛好國民ノ勝利ハ「ファッショ」樞軸國家ノ上ニ達セラレタノデアリマス。

ソ連邦ハ莫大ニ天然資源ヲ有シ且ツ平和及ビ民主主義ノ積極的騎士^{（勿論及日本）}侵略國家特ニ日本カラ^{（日本）}最^{（最）}重要テ攻意対象トナツ

Summation H

於此嚴密之秘密ヲシテ是ノ侵略政策ヲ日本ノ平秘ト爲
 メ戰ヲ等々公ニ強逼スルニ爲シテ各人々々其ヲ利用シ
 テ自己ノ犯罪ヲ承認セザルニシテ又計上ノ得テ不祥
 ト苦難ヲ幾百万ノ人々ニ齎シタ彼等ノ犯罪的侵略政策ヲ
 積極的ニ辯護シテ居ルデアリマス。
 法廷ニ立ツテ陰謀者達、証人トシテ裁判所ニ出庭シ極力元、
 彼等ノ主人ヲカバント努メテ居ル所、日本ニ於ケル暴行ノ反動
 的ノ介子デアリ元、將軍達ヤ同謀者達ヤ、外交官達ヲ集
 メテ居ルノテ更ニ危険デアリマス。
 之ノ宣告ニ際シ法廷ニ依ツテ考慮サレヨイデアリマス。

(次頁ニ續ク)

H-5 事實、證據皆顯大此罪狀。國家之自衛權、自衛之權、

對之被告等係爭行、以、紀、律、之、權、限、以、對、之、權、限、
畫、出、之、多、
私、之、運、邦、代、表、之、資、格、可、以、延、續、故、合、法、之、權、限、
支持、致、之、私、自、體、之、位、務、大、延、續、故、合、法、之、權、限、
對、正、侵、略、之、部、分、一、部、分、一、部、分、
提、
對、正、侵、略、之、部、分、一、部、分、一、部、分、

提、
對、正、侵、略、之、部、分、一、部、分、一、部、分、

1. 日本、侵略、致、階

H-6 「運、邦、對、正、侵、略、之、部、分、一、部、分、一、部、分、

居、之、又、

五、六、年（昭和三年）及三、四、五、年（昭和五年）間、

中、多、事、柄、此、時、代、以、前、日、本、帝、國、主、義、侵、略、行、為、

之、因、此、之、出、也、更、良、了、解、方、出、來、之、樣、也、

比、觀、美、日、之、主、義、日、本、戰、犯、罪、名、之、提、許、也、

行、為、之、本、質、（明治七年）林、慎、之、提、許、也、

日本、指、信、之、攻、擊、之、始、日、露、戰、爭、及、一、九、一、八、年（大、正、

七、年）乃、至、三、二、年（大、正、十、年）、西、比、利、亞、給、以、日、本、干、涉、

之、因、此、之、出、也、更、良、了、解、方、出、來、之、樣、也、

日本、帝、國、主、義、之、首、領、也、日、本、之、干、涉、其、後、自、然、

一、侵、略、之、前、此、正、自、自、認、之、也、

Summation - A

一九三九年五月十四日大東亞新秩序會議終止、會議
系于結束、

此中事之重要者、我々大陸進出、諸君が急早う期すに
なす物語は、是れは、我々が如何に當時、国内情勢ハ口を逆
行スル事、強固不決、大方針、下ニ朝議ヲ決定シ、所期、目的
ニ爲速スル外、是れヲ決断シ、是れニ上カク、嫌ニカアツタヤ子
持カス也、(法廷書記才六六七一九)ト語り之也

即チ、我々觀察例ハ夫レが歴史の指針デアリトシ、且又固知
歴史の字樣トシテ、報言等ニ提訴サシテ、ナリマスガ是等、侵
略事實關ニシテ、然レニ非設例、ハコト等、一般ニ知リ
居ル歴史的事實、其ノ旨ニトシテ、ナリマス。故ニ吾々、順序トシ
テ、此等ニ對シテ、先ニ、詳シク述ビ、之レ、ナリマス。又
亦設例、假令、此ニ在テ、多ク一更ノ文書即チ、一九五六年、外
文往復文書及ビ當時、國際條約(法廷書記才三八六八号、才
二九六二二二号)ヲ提出スル也。

然レ、此等、事實、其ノ旨ニトシテ、是等、深ク、檢討、且、客觀的ニ評價スル、ハ、日
本、六十九世紀、末期、及ビ、二十世紀、初期、ニ於テ、所謂、自己、朝ヲ、確立、支
那、侵入、其、朝鮮、ノ、台座、トシ、其、旨、ニ、シテ、他、列強、ト、同シ、日本
侵略、非常、中、文字、ヲ、視、テ、居、ル、トシ、互ニ、此、旨、ニ、對シ、
歴史、真實、侵法、不レ、此、時代、日本、侵略、政策、(東方、於テ、此、海洋、ノ
總行、ノ、旨、トシ、吾國、ノ、支、人、一、閉鎖、ニ、持、テ、ラ、其、鎖、ニ、具、シ、
東、ニ、王、子、取、ル、目的、ヲ、持、テ、此、旨、ニ、對シ、吾國、ノ、利益、ヲ、侵、害、ス、ル、トシ、向、テ、シ
テ、居、ル、ナリマス。

月令

1916

定案、廿二及廿十四條ヲ「毛知」ハ充令テ下リ又
協定ヲ提議シテ下リ又
對日本領的ニ「連極東」日本、植民地化セトスル
テ「日本、帝國主義者等、大連合議ニ於テ極東共和國
日本、冒險ガ既ニ明カニ失敗ニ終リ一九二二年(大正十一年)ニ於
行場所ハ「タ」テ下リ又

各鐵道取ハ「タ」人ニ對スル日本側ニ領者、銀行及「暴
同知」コト下リ又。日本、將校及兵士ガ現ハ「タ」各部獲
H-10 極東之領ニ於テ日本干渉者ニ依テ行ハ「タ」罪惡、

掠奪ニシテ

H-9 一九一八年(大正七年)日本帝國主義者等、更ニ吾國ヲ
政變シ「連極東」ヲ領ス且「四年間」言リ吾國民ヲ

Summation - H/

然レ之「早」日本、對露侵略、初段階ニ「過ギ」セテシタ
日本ハ「早」權太島南部ヲ奪取シタ

一九〇四年(明治三十七年)乃至五年(明治三十八年)戰爭、結果
日附テ「即」テ攻撃後二日ヲ經過シテ居リ又

日本天皇、討露宣戰布告書、一九〇四年(明治三十七年)二月十日
テ下リタ。此、攻撃、匪賊の性格、論争、余地ナリ即

H-8 此、日本侵略政策規ニ、一九〇四年(明治三十七年)二月八日
旅順ニ於テ「三」艦隊ニ對テ日本、海軍軍備信攻撃

0 159 0001 0 184

(法廷書証本三〇号)

「本協定本末ノ第十四條ニ

「極東共和國政府ハ「ウラシムノトク」地
區全治岸及ハ朝鮮國境 於シテハ重要要
要點ニ據リテ邊境ニ警備隊ヲ駐屯セシメ
テ岸ヲ再設ルルヲ朝鮮政府ニ委任スルコト
同ノ旨書面ニ於テ同意スルニ決シテ
極東共和國政府ハ全領土ニ於テ警備隊
及國境ニ對シテ警備隊ヲ駐屯セシメ
ルコトヲ同意スルニ決シテ
極東共和國政府ハ邊境ニ警備隊ヲ駐屯
セシメテ邊境ヲ警備スルコトヲ同意ス
ルニ決シテ

「茲ニ

極東共和國政府ハ「ウラシムノトク」地
區全治岸及ハ朝鮮國境 於シテハ重要要
要點ニ據リテ邊境ニ警備隊ヲ駐屯セシメ
テ岸ヲ再設ルルヲ朝鮮政府ニ委任スルコト
同ノ旨書面ニ於テ同意スルニ決シテ

1171

極東共和國政府ハ「ウラシムノトク」地
區全治岸及ハ朝鮮國境 於シテハ重要要
要點ニ據リテ邊境ニ警備隊ヲ駐屯セシメ
テ岸ヲ再設ルルヲ朝鮮政府ニ委任スルコト
同ノ旨書面ニ於テ同意スルニ決シテ

1172

極東共和國政府ハ「ウラシムノトク」地
區全治岸及ハ朝鮮國境 於シテハ重要要
要點ニ據リテ邊境ニ警備隊ヲ駐屯セシメ
テ岸ヲ再設ルルヲ朝鮮政府ニ委任スルコト
同ノ旨書面ニ於テ同意スルニ決シテ

South Korea

0 1 5 9 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 5

此段... 日本... 建設... 此... 及... 所... 服... 國... 經... 濟... 之... 力... 以... 備... 戰... 事... 決... 定... 指... 導... 特... 殊... 之... 前... 進... 戰... 事... 決... 定... 指... 導... 特... 殊... 之... 前... 進... 戰... 事... 決... 定... 指... 導... 特... 殊... 之... 前... 進... 戰...

Summary A

18

日本行政學之發展

行政學之發展與行政學之研究
行政學之發展與行政學之研究
行政學之發展與行政學之研究

(一) 行政學之發展與行政學之研究

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行政學之發展與行政學之研究

行政學之發展與行政學之研究

0 159 0001 0 189

117

此種情形，在醫學上，即所謂「神經衰弱」之徵候也。其發生之原因，多由於生活之過度，或由於精神之過度勞作，或由於身體之過度衰弱。其症狀，則為頭暈、眼花、耳鳴、心跳、失眠、健忘、食慾不振、消化不良、腰酸背痛、四肢無力、精神萎靡、神經衰弱等。此種情形，若不早為醫治，則必致成癆瘵，甚至危及生命。故凡有此種情形者，宜早為醫治，以資挽救。

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Inflammation H

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0 159 0000 1 0 190

Summary 104

此書之內容，係根據作者多年之研究，而整理成此。其內容之豐富，實非他書所能及。其內容之詳盡，實非他書所能及。其內容之詳盡，實非他書所能及。

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何處有，其意則在說明，人之行為，應如何處之。其意則在說明，人之行為，應如何處之。其意則在說明，人之行為，應如何處之。

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103

Summary

H1

出来、急合、急合の要請... 急合...
 在任...
 ...
 住居、留置...
 人移民、送出...
 制務位...
 自上の峻厳...
 ...
 ... (法長書証第六九〇号) ...

H20
 州及西... 前團 (法長書証第六八号) ...
 州及西... 前團 (法長書証第六八号) ...
 ...
 ...
 ...

此等... 証明...
 ...
 ... (法長書証第六三三号) ...

P. 16

Summary 14

二三葉亦新聞二摺載カシ、該送書証來六七八(等)
 ナラ毛編然ナラハ大。
 シハ當時勇氣一發斷行ヲ來セ、その明ヲ呼ビカサ、
 上ノ郷音イタナリク又。
 元四年十二月癸行雜誌改題ニ公至サカワ田申近
 衛、論說、新種對シ、侵略戰宣傳、一例ナリク又、
 即ケ年内ニ不可能祖祝カシ、テソクモスニ進撃、
 ト百ニカリ、同ニ既定ノ予定ニ化シテ奉ケテラズル……
 日本ノ、ト如何ニ動ラベキテラカ。日本、立場決定的
 意思、日本、盟國邦、トシ、勝利ヲ祝福シ、コト願ヲ毛
 手、以、日本、存來、大業遂行ニトシ、勝利ヨリ世界
 情勢ヲ殆用ス、ト、勿論、主心、(該送書証來六七四号)

H-23 戒ル一定、時期迄、狭ク範圍、陰謀団体或ハ之ヲ

近シ于居タ人々ノ考ベテラツク、大東亞建設計画ニ元四
 年乃至四年、頃ニ日本、排外ノ愛國主義宣傳基
 本の課題トナリテラリク又、日本、帝國主義、此頃南
 方ニ對シテ、侵略ヲ始メテラテラ、對シテ、聯邦侵略戰ヲ準備
 シ自己政策、高メニ思想、的、甚極ヲ來テ于居リテラ吾
 此種、只若キ、宣傳刊行物ニ言及シテラ。
 被答橋本欣五郎、大東亞帝國圖、ト題シ、元四年
 (昭和十七年一月五日附ク)、大日本、紙ニ発表ス、ト曰ク
 『茲ニ於テ、大東亞皇化圖次、諸邦ヲ包含ス、トモ、ト考メ
 度、即チ日、滿支、極東、ノ領、佛印、比、心、馬來、蘭

0 159 000 1 0 111

Summation A

印、英領東印度、印度、マラカ、濠洲、三十三、三
に、今、不平等、印度洋諸島(法
廷書証第六七五-A号)。

他、一例、田中直吉教授(九四三年(昭和十七年)二月
三日附、大阪府)、紙、卷表、名、亞細亞、大統、合、の
論說中、「東亞建設」云、段階、介、述、之、曰、り
濠洲、印度、之、了、了、解放、を、達成、之、る、が、才、三、段
階、云、ん、...、今次、聖戰、を、以、皇、軍、赫、々、の、戰、果、を、り
見、或、才、一、才、二、段階、に、殆、時、同、之、り、才、三、段階
に、達成、之、る、が、考、ら、ん、(法廷書証第六七六-A号)。

当時一九四三年(昭和十七年)二月南方産業調査会
「依、了、の、泰、之、書、籍、が、發、行、可、し、之、分、其、中、に、共
産、黨、建、設、問題、を、初、步、幾、何、学、的、の、方、法、を、り
了、解、求、之、る、に、云、ん、

此、書、籍、表、紙、に、世界、地圖、が、載、之、り、之、分、其、地
圖、に、正、四、形、の、日本、帝國、を、管理、下、之、る、に、東、亞、
地圖、(東、亞、聯盟、の、地、域、を、示、之、る、に、云、ん、之、分、其、地、域、に、公、力、を、
湖、邊、に、一、聯、銀、工、之、を、示、之、り、之、分、其、地、域、に、公、力、を、列

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島、を、示、す、(才、三、段、階、の、宣、傳、刊、行、物、に、最近、十、年、間、に、於、て、戰、争、開、始、に、主、導、
的、役、割、を、全、く、日本、に、屬、之、る、に、云、ん、之、分、其、地、域、に、公、力、を、
云、ん、

例、に、示、す、之、分、其、地、域、に、公、力、を、示、す、(才、三、段、階、の、宣、傳、刊、行、物、に、最近、十、年、間、に、於、て、戰、争、開、始、に、主、導、
的、役、割、を、全、く、日本、に、屬、之、る、に、云、ん、之、分、其、地、域、に、公、力、を、
云、ん、

0159 0001 0195

P18

H-24
 六、舉世公認，例中，華，欲明，以，此，種，論，以，其，我，會，護，欄，其，一，五，條，一，個，人，之，後，之，行，之，九，七，一，次，事，實，不，能，不，人，自，身，之，於，此，際，際，際，度，之，以，文，配，題，也，其，國，士，或，道，亦，刊，登，其，稿，見，三，版，版，瑞，事，院，其，之，下，可，能，其，之，大，概，觀，其，一，檢，察，官，三，位，之，十，份，証，據，也，其，一，其，之，舉，世，公，認，一，一，十，條，之，一，一，條，也。

此，種，論，以，其，我，會，護，欄，其，一，五，條，一，個，人，之，後，之，行，之，九，七，一，次，事，實，不，能，不，人，自，身，之，於，此，際，際，際，度，之，以，文，配，題，也，其，國，士，或，道，亦，刊，登，其，稿，見，三，版，版，瑞，事，院，其，之，下，可，能，其，之，大，概，觀，其，一，檢，察，官，三，位，之，十，份，証，據，也，其，一，其，之，舉，世，公，認，一，一，十，條，之，一，一，條，也。

此，種，論，以，其，我，會，護，欄，其，一，五，條，一，個，人，之，後，之，行，之，九，七，一，次，事，實，不，能，不，人，自，身，之，於，此，際，際，際，度，之，以，文，配，題，也，其，國，士，或，道，亦，刊，登，其，稿，見，三，版，版，瑞，事，院，其，之，下，可，能，其，之，大，概，觀，其，一，檢，察，官，三，位，之，十，份，証，據，也，其，一，其，之，舉，世，公，認，一，一，十，條，之，一，一，條，也。

此，種，論，以，其，我，會，護，欄，其，一，五，條，一，個，人，之，後，之，行，之，九，七，一，次，事，實，不，能，不，人，自，身，之，於，此，際，際，際，度，之，以，文，配，題，也，其，國，士，或，道，亦，刊，登，其，稿，見，三，版，版，瑞，事，院，其，之，下，可，能，其，之，大，概，觀，其，一，檢，察，官，三，位，之，十，份，証，據，也，其，一，其，之，舉，世，公，認，一，一，十，條，之，一，一，條，也。

Summary Item 14

0 159 000 1 0 177

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Suminism 14
H-26

斯德哥爾摩的經濟、其性質、其目的、其

傳上其日本帝國主義者政治、其目的、其性質、其

國、而戰的而力發展、其目的、其性質、其

三一九二三年中德之、其目的、其性質、其

論、其目的、其性質、其

歐洲、其目的、其性質、其

其目的、其性質、其

新此、其目的、其性質、其

五載、其目的、其性質、其

進、其目的、其性質、其

被、其目的、其性質、其

即、其目的、其性質、其

訂、其目的、其性質、其

其目的、其性質、其

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其目的、其性質、其

其目的、其性質、其

其目的、其性質、其

其目的、其性質、其

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Summation 14
H-27

上述ノ理由ニ依リ対ソノ侵略戦ヲ準備シテ計画ノ草
文ヲ法廷ニ提出スルコトヲ去来モセンハ此等ノ計画
ノ實在ト其内容ヲ完全ニ立証スル文書及ヒ其他ノ
証拠ヲ法廷ニ提出致シテ

(1) 一九二八年(昭和三年)乃至三三年(昭和六年)間ニ
於テ対ソノ戦計画
対ソノ攻撃戦準備基地化ノタメノ滿洲占據

一九二八年(昭和三年)乃至三三年(昭和六年)間日本參謀
本部並ニソノ連邦國境ニ接近シテ大陸ニ駐屯シ
從テ対ソノ日本帝國主義ノ前衛ヲタテ南東軍
司令部ハ対ソノ攻撃戦計画ヲ持テ居リシタ。此ノ
計画ハ日ソト云フ秘密名ヲ有シ滿洲及朝鮮地ニ
テ準備基地トスルヲ連邦海州ノ占領ニ因スル南東
軍及朝鮮(軍)ノ攻撃ヲ定メテムアリシタ。

一九二八年(昭和三年)カウ一九三三年(昭和七年)迄
南東軍參謀長アタリヲ証人ニ宅中將ハ日滿洲占領
ノタメ作戦ノ計画ハ日本陸軍參謀本部ニアルヲ以テ
ニ対スル日本軍作戦ノ一般計畫ノ重要ナル部分アタリ
ソノ聯邦ヲ攻撃スル計画カアルコトヲ私カ始メニ一九二八年
(昭和三年)七月參謀長ノ職務ニ赴任シタトキニ知リシタ
(法廷書面才六九九号)ト証言シシタ。

一九三三年(昭和六年)五月日本參謀本部ニ提出サレタ滿
鮮地ニ調査ニ因スル鈴木大佐ノ秘密報告中ニハソノ...

H-29

東洋に於ける「略作戦計画」作成（昭和五年）
 以上は日本大使及大使館附武官に授けられた情報
 報に於ては「大正五年義持」等とあり、勿論「昭和五年」
 報に於ては「昭和五年」等とあり、勿論「昭和五年」
 報に於ては「昭和五年」等とあり、勿論「昭和五年」
 報に於ては「昭和五年」等とあり、勿論「昭和五年」

H-28

連合軍に於ける「略作戦計画」作成（昭和五年）
 以上は日本大使及大使館附武官に授けられた情報
 報に於ては「大正五年義持」等とあり、勿論「昭和五年」
 報に於ては「昭和五年」等とあり、勿論「昭和五年」
 報に於ては「昭和五年」等とあり、勿論「昭和五年」
 報に於ては「昭和五年」等とあり、勿論「昭和五年」

Summation A

0 159 000 1 020 1

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H-31

Summation 1st

1. 關於此項之研究，其目的在於探討我國在國際法上之地位，以及我國在國際法上所應負之責任。此項研究之重要性，在於我國在國際法上之地位，以及我國在國際法上所應負之責任。

2. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

3. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

4. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

5. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

6. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

7. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

8. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

9. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

10. 我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。我國在國際法上之地位，係指我國在國際法上所應負之責任而言。

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Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or series of entries, possibly related to a technical or scientific study.

『...』 (Quoted handwritten text block)

(...)

Second main body of handwritten text, continuing the list or series of entries.

Final line of handwritten text at the bottom of the page.

0 159 0001 0203

1. 關於本會之組織及職權範圍，業經本會第一屆會員大會通過，並呈請內政部備案在案。

2. 本會之宗旨，在於研究、推廣及普及體育，以增進國民體魄，促進社會福利。

3. 本會之組織，由會員大會為最高權力機關，其下設有理事會、監事會及秘書處。

4. 本會之經費，由會員會費、贊助費及政府補助等項充之。

5. 本會之辦事處，設於本市中正路一二三號。

6. 本會之活動，應以推廣體育為首要任務，並應注意青少年之體育發展。

7. 本會應定期舉行會員大會，以報告業務並選舉理事監事。

8. 本會應加強與各級政府及社會團體之聯繫與合作。

9. 本會應注意會員之服務與福利，以增進會員之參與感。

10. 本會應定期出版會刊，以報導體育發展之動態。

中華民國三十三年九月一日
 內政部備案
 登記證：警字第一二三四號

Summary 14

關於我國之經濟發展與社會進步，自一九五〇年以來，已有顯著之成就。在經濟方面，國民政府（即現政府）積極推行各項建設，使國家之生產力與生活水準均有顯著之提高。在社會方面，政府亦致力於教育、醫療與社會福利之改善，使國民之素質與生活品質均有顯著之進步。此種發展與進步，實為我國歷史以來之重要轉捩點。

4-35

一、關於我國之經濟發展與社會進步，自一九五〇年以來，已有顯著之成就。在經濟方面，國民政府（即現政府）積極推行各項建設，使國家之生產力與生活水準均有顯著之提高。在社會方面，政府亦致力於教育、醫療與社會福利之改善，使國民之素質與生活品質均有顯著之進步。此種發展與進步，實為我國歷史以來之重要轉捩點。

二、政府應繼續推行各項建設，使國家之生產力與生活水準均有顯著之提高。在社會方面，政府亦應致力於教育、醫療與社會福利之改善，使國民之素質與生活品質均有顯著之進步。此種發展與進步，實為我國歷史以來之重要轉捩點。

三、政府應繼續推行各項建設，使國家之生產力與生活水準均有顯著之提高。在社會方面，政府亦應致力於教育、醫療與社會福利之改善，使國民之素質與生活品質均有顯著之進步。此種發展與進步，實為我國歷史以來之重要轉捩點。

四、政府應繼續推行各項建設，使國家之生產力與生活水準均有顯著之提高。在社會方面，政府亦應致力於教育、醫療與社會福利之改善，使國民之素質與生活品質均有顯著之進步。此種發展與進步，實為我國歷史以來之重要轉捩點。

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Summation A

H-37

日本陸軍省、自一九三五年(昭和十年)至一九四一年
 (昭和十六年)間、海運、向、通、運、力、を、以、て、
 半島上陸作戦用、用地、誌、情報、を、蒐集、研究、之、を、
 了、了、之、を、以、て、同、半、島、ノ、占、領、ノ、参、謀、本、部、ニ、依、
 之、計、画、サ、ル、信、息、ノ、ヲ、ア、リ、マ、ス、
 此、等、ノ、情、報、一、九、四、一、年、(、昭、和、十、六、年、)三、月、発、行、
 島、用、地、誌、集、ニ、記、載、サ、ル、ヲ、居、リ、マ、ス、
 (、法、廷、書、館、証、書、第、七、二、号、A、)

H-38 自今訂下海軍戰計畫遂行ヲ保証スル爲、日本指

導者帝國主義者一味、年々海軍軍力及其整備増強

致スルヲ

因東軍、人員、僅力自一九三二年(昭和七年)至三七年(昭

和十二年)之間五倍以上増加之ヲ多。此期中滿洲、於其日

本空軍、三倍以上、砲兵、四倍、又戰車、十倍以上、ナリシヲ

其後、年々於其武力増強、以上、其速度ヲ以テ續クニシテ

之、一九四二年(昭和十七年)迄、海軍、六百十方、兵員、有之ヲ多。

戰車、數、二倍増加シ、飛行機及砲、三倍以上、ナリシヲ。

(法廷書証、七〇号)

因東軍増強、特徴、日本空軍、増大ヨリ、遂ニ二連々速度

ヲ下クナリシヲ、即チ一九三二年(昭和七年)ニ於テ、因東

軍、日本陸海空軍、僅力、僅力二〇%、バ、也、一上、下、ナリ、カ、九

三七年迄、所、三〇%、バ、也、一上、下、ナリ、カ、又、家、東

ニ、殆、六、全、日、陸、軍、ノ、三、五、倍、也、一上、下、ナリ、カ、又、家、東

軍、六、國、(英、法、美、蘇、日、中)ニ、對、シ、テ、五、倍、以上、ノ、攻、撃、力、ヲ、於、テ、心、シ、

取、ル、事、也、(法廷書証、七〇号) 日本陸軍、其、力、ヲ、増、強、サ、シ、一、九、三、一

年、一、三、三、年(昭和七年)間、二、五、ヨリ、一、九、四、二、年(昭和十七

年)ニ、六、十、二、万、ノ、後、ニ、三、十、六、万、ノ、迄、ニ、ナリ、シ、ナリ、カ、又、

(法廷書証、七〇号)

内蒙、ニ、於、テ、編、成、シ、テ、"ウラ、バ、ト、"、及、後、員、加、爾、方、面、作、戰、

德意志... 德意志... 德意志... (德意志... 德意志... 德意志...)

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德意志... 德意志... 德意志... (德意志... 德意志... 德意志...)

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德意志... 德意志... 德意志... (德意志... 德意志... 德意志...)

Schwarzstein 17

南軍軍中、三月、
 此後、
 軍事、
 十三日、
 軍兵、
 此方、
 實施、
 中、
 斯、
 十六日、

二滿洲及朝鮮之終止軍事準備狀態

日本軍團、
 備、
 握、
 一九三二年、
 告、
 自附、
 証、
 平治、
 滿洲、
 其、
 陸軍、

60201000650

戰、準備及展開、爲必要、滿洲、於之、軍事準備基
地建設上無制限、權限、全般、之、關東軍司令官、與、今
ト、ト、判、リ、ス、

H

Summary

H43 檢察側、一九三三年(昭和七年)滿洲、於、日本、ヨリ、實
行セ、其結果、滿洲、一大、討、之、攻撃、準備、基地、也、之、方
策、之、關、ス、ル、之、聯、側、及、日本、側、完全、證據、ヲ、提出、
セ、タ、

日本軍閥、降伏、際、之、計画、ヤ、文書、ヲ、湮滅、ス、如、之、
ハ、此、準備、基地、ヲ、湮滅、ス、ル、ヲ、出来、マ、セ、タ、

之、所、國境、ニ、向、之、戰略、鐵道、及、石炭、道路、要、塞、地、帯、飛行
場、兵、營、軍、用、倉、庫、日本、侵略、者、之、所、侵略、軍事
準備、動、力、ス、ベ、キ、之、證據、ト、シ、テ、残、リ、タ、

一九四五年(昭和二十年)滿洲、が、之、聯、軍、部隊、ニ、依、リ、
解放、サ、タ、時、凡、之、之、等、之、數、軍事、施設、ハ、決定、サ、タ、

P.33

軍事準備基地ノ設定ハ特ニ戰略鐵道及自動道路網ノ建設ト云フ莫ニ特徴ガアリマス。故ニ河邊虎四郎ガ一九三二年(昭和七年)七月參謀本部ニ對シ「北滿ニ於ケル交通網ノ建設ニ方リテハ對蘇戰略關係ヲ顧慮スルヲ要ス」(法廷書証第七。一頁)ト意見ノ具申ヲナシタリハ偶然デハアリマセン。

ソレ連軍參謀本部ノ文書ヨリ滿洲ニ於ケル鐵道ノ延長ハ一九四一年(昭和十六年)迄ニ一万余百三十五軒ニ達シ自動車幹線道路ハ同時期迄ニ一万余軒以上日本人ノ手デ建設サレテ居ルコトガ判リマス(法廷書証第七。二頁)

法廷ニ提出サレタリ地圖上テ滿洲鐵道線路ヲ見シ又丈ケテモ此年中間ニ滿洲ニ建設サレタリ鐵道及自動車幹線道路ノ大部分カ戰略的意義ヲ有シソ連國境ニ向ワテ居タリト云フコトヲ確認サセマス。鐵道及自動車道ノ特ニ細カナ網ハソレ連北滿州ト境ヲ接スル滿洲ノ地方ニ建設サレタリ。之等路線ノ方向ハ日本軍ノソレ連領進ハ、又ソノ日本參謀本部作戦計畫ニテ下定サレタリト改テ居リマス。

南被昔ハ反對諷問ニ際シ彼ガ關東軍司令官タリシ當時滿洲ニ於ケル鐵道ノ積極的ニ建設ハ繼續サレ之等、鐵道ハソレ連國境ニ向テ敷設サレノコトヲ認メマシタリ。(連記録第一九九カニ頁)

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Summa Cum

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Summation H

4-46

力之特... (漢文) ...
 滿洲及朝鮮... (漢文) ...
 備滿洲及朝鮮... (漢文) ...
 于合... (漢文) ...
 此... (漢文) ...
 日... (漢文) ...
 其... (漢文) ...
 一九三五年(昭和十年)二月... (漢文) ...
 一九三七年(昭和十二年)六月... (漢文) ...
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 一九四一年(昭和十六年)八月... (漢文) ...
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1. 關於「...」之... (1954.12.14)
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 18. ... (1954.12.14)
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 20. ... (1954.12.14)

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 3. ...

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P.38

Shannon, F. M.

H

姓子ハゴトシヨ申ニ答ルニハ
 及三三七一四三遠近録第ニ〇〇頁(四一〇)
 秘ハ之等ニ註釋カキ依リテ上巻中ニ又補一
 支証及此ノ下カト一般引證ニ其ノカ
 (見ルニイハレマ)

後有二領事館... 橋梁軍子倉庫等... 王亞也任務... 九四二年(昭和三十七年)熱能會... 難民(子務局本部)二級... 週年記念... 對之戰... 博于層力... 又

(2) 廣東電報司令官公司(蔡)與

日本參謀本部及陸軍省... 大橋上于日本政府... 司令官(同國... 關於... 二於于... 証人... 東軍司令部... 分... 証... 高州國軍... 一年... 證...

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因東軍... 簽

自... 簽

因東軍... 簽

証人... 簽

因東軍... 簽

一九二五年... 簽

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Horizontal line of text with a double underline, possibly a signature or title.

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Commentaries 竹

同條三

「日本國及亞細亞諸國(以下略)在二十一年、於」

二條(東洋)與租借權不盡効行、於不之地域以外、滿

洲(以下略)且同條三條(兵)以下

二前記地域、除、外現日本國及亞細亞諸國(以下略)

二於、與領之、其、監理、在滿洲(以下略)全部、與、

二全然滿洲國(以下略)行政、(以下略)並、(以下略)

二九二年(昭和六年)滿洲(以下略)上、(以下略)目、

二其他、自國際、諸義務、(以下略)及、(以下略)

條約(以下略)破、(以下略)

「(以下略)及條約(以下略)七條、

二日本國及亞細亞諸國(以下略)滿洲(以下略)於、(以下略)鐵道、(以下略)全、

二工業、目的、(以下略)經濟、(以下略)及、(以下略)軍、(以下略)目、(以下略)以、(以下略)

經濟(以下略)也、(以下略)約、(以下略)

上述(以下略)之、

條約、此條(以下略)文、(以下略)亦、(以下略)日本、(以下略)之、(以下略)履、(以下略)行、(以下略)カ、(以下略)ハ、(以下略)カ、(以下略)ラ、(以下略)シ、(以下略)ト、(以下略)ス、

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1952
 1952年11月25日，美、英、法、蘇、中五國在日內瓦舉行會議，討論朝鮮停戰問題。會議於12月23日達成協議，簽署了《朝鮮停戰協定》。該協定規定：雙方在軍事上停止敵對行動，在軍事分界線（即三八線）兩側各退還俘虜，並交換戰俘。此外，還規定在停戰後兩年內，雙方應在平等基礎上舉行談判，以解決朝鮮的統一問題。

1952年11月25日

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Summation H

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P44

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P46

115

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Summary H

獲業問題 亦即所謂「華資問題」也。此項
 參謀本部之書、關於「外國資本」及「外國
 內外債權」等點、均詳述其目前之狀況、及
 示不於「公債」之來源、及「公債」之用途、亦
 于自由主義、及「公債」之發行、及「公債」之
 下、各部之狀況、及「公債」之發行、及「公債」之
 及「公債」之用途、及「公債」之發行、及「公債」之
 此、而「公債」之發行、及「公債」之用途、及「公債」之
 下、且「公債」之發行、及「公債」之用途、及「公債」之
 據、無、又「公債」之發行、及「公債」之用途、及「公債」之
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 二、在「公債」之發行、及「公債」之用途、及「公債」之
 鄉、將「公債」之發行、及「公債」之用途、及「公債」之
 告、(一九三二年一月一日) (一九三二年一月一日) (一九三二
 年一月一日) (一九三二年一月一日) (一九三二年一月一日)
 野、及「公債」之用途、及「公債」之發行、及「公債」之
 三、及「公債」之用途、及「公債」之發行、及「公債」之
 (一九三二年一月一日) (一九三二年一月一日) (一九三二年一月一日)

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4/27

McDonnell Douglas
Boeing

本車行自設之維修廠，現正積極籌備中，以期能為廣大客戶提供
 更完善之服務。目前，該廠已初步完成基礎設施之建設，並聘請
 了多位經驗豐富之技術人員，負責各項維修工作。此外，本車行
 還與多家知名汽車品牌建立了長期合作關係，確保了配件之供應
 及維修技術之先進性。未來，我們將繼續加大投入，提升服務質
 量，為廣大客戶提供最優質之維修體驗。

關於本車行之各項業務，歡迎廣大客戶隨時垂詢。我們將竭誠
 為您服務，確保您的愛車始終處於最佳狀態。如有任何建議或
 投訴，請隨時與我們聯繫，我們將認真處理。

地址：[地址信息] 電話：[電話號碼]

Summation H

方関東東軍及七軍駐屯日本軍増強ニ関スル自己、
資料ヲ提出シ此ノ戦争準備ト云フ重大ト軍力ヲ表
威銘ヲ弱ク示シ之ヲ。此等ノ資料ハ矛盾ニ且ツ少
クナリ居ニ。辯護側証人笠原、自一九三三年(昭和八)
至一九三六年(昭和十一年)間ニ関東東軍ノ兵力ハ増加セズ
トシ師團、混成旅團ニ騎兵旅團ニ一三二千ト云フト主張シ
又(法廷書記三六七号)辯護側証人笠原、此証言
ハ一九三七年(昭和十二年)ニ於テ関東東軍ノ兵力ハ三万不
ト云フト辯護側自ら提出シテ資料(法廷書記三六七号)
ト比較シテ同証言ナシ。諸賢ハ笠原証人ノ証言ノ虚
偽ト辯護側主張ノ矛盾ヲ認メテアリマシ。

H-58

辯護側証人高平、笠原華雄及田中新一ノ関東東軍
ノ兵力ノ其強弱ハ在ツテ師團数ヲ表現シ之ガ日本
軍ノ最良増強法ト所謂A型及B型師團ヲ云フ
日本ノ普通師團及他列國ノ普通師團ヨリ其数及
装備ニ於テ一倍以上モ優秀ト云フト云フニ就テハ沈黙
シ居ニ。然レモ関東東軍ノ師團数ヲ他列國ノ有
リト云フ師團数ト比較スル辯護側ノ根據ニ欠陥ガ
下リ何等熱判ノ能クナリマシ。

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H-59

関東東軍ノ強クシテ師團ノ其兵数ガ三万四千六百人
乃至三万九千四百人アリマシ。(法廷書記文七七号)
之ガ既ニ予所存ニ在リテ予ノ論合ニ基礎トシ其師團

Summation H

原英雄及其他數人、發言、証言、而保登二、三、
下、又、然、此、辯護、則、告訴、支、擊、之、序、之、三、文
對日攻、軍、備、之、了、達、之、行、以、之、序、之、三、文、証、言、
海、之、心、道、軍、兵、力、之、關、之、三、等、情、報、之、關、其、曾、且、朝、聯
駐、在、日、本、軍、兵、力、之、關、之、過、小、評、估、其、之、情、報、算、術、的、比
較、之、五、二、三、計、之、以、誠、之、罪、之、他、之、載、之、七、下、之、三、文、
又、兵、力、之、關、之、而、不、正、確、之、數、字、之、算、術、的、比、較、並、國、家
之、內、外、政、策、之、具、體、的、分、析、之、代、之、抽、象、的、察、覺、識、之、其
根、本、之、罪、惡、之、辯、護、則、能、否、度、下、之、三、文。

H-61

吾人自本側復曉、其、曾、下、之、在、以、年、和、愛、好、國、家
ガ、行、八、下、之、得、十、力、以、所、衛、的、社、會、對、之、之、辯、護、之、批
判、之、原、則、之、不、是、下、之、三、文、之、罪、惡、審、判、之、公、之、章
件、之、陰、影、之、與、之、法、之、之、虛、偽、之、途、之、之、三、文、之、三、文、
就、中、被、言、之、被、受、會、之、立、場、之、在、之、之、之、可、能、之、應、之、且、以
吾、國、之、八、下、和、愛、好、國、民、對、之、之、何、之、事、概、之、七、三、而、之
全、之、根、據、之、且、之、誹、謗、之、之、罪、科、之、科、之、之、如、之、下、之
語、之、之、之、之、之、之、吾、之、之、考、之、之、也。

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然、吾、之、行、之、兵、力、之、狀、態、之、關、之、之、其、虛、偽、之、比、較、之、
生、之、之、本、質、的、之、其、原、則、之、論、之、之、辯、護、則、之、之、之、受、理
之、認、之、之、之、也。

1. 關於「國」之定義，其範圍之廣狹，應視其用途而定。如指「國家」而言，則指具有主權之政治實體；如指「國籍」而言，則指具有某國法律上之身分。

2. 關於「國」之分類，可分為「主權國」與「非主權國」兩種。主權國具有獨立之主權，而非主權國則受他國之主權所轄。

3. 關於「國」之消滅，指一國因戰爭、合併或自然原因而終止其法律上之存在。

4. 關於「國」之承認，指他國對一國之主權地位表示承認。承認之方式有明示與默示兩種。

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5. 關於「國」之繼承，指一國將其權利義務移轉於他國。繼承之種類有全部繼承與部分繼承。

6. 關於「國」之保護，指他國對一國之主權地位提供保護。保護之種類有外交保護與領事保護。

7. 關於「國」之承認，指他國對一國之主權地位表示承認。承認之種類有明示承認與默示承認。

8. 關於「國」之消滅，指一國因戰爭、合併或自然原因而終止其法律上之存在。

9. 關於「國」之繼承，指一國將其權利義務移轉於他國。繼承之種類有全部繼承與部分繼承。

10. 關於「國」之保護，指他國對一國之主權地位提供保護。保護之種類有外交保護與領事保護。

Summation: H

H-02

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immation 14

詞

試... 兵... 如... 據... 滿洲... 亞細亞... 及... 海... 加... 縱... 今... 田... 據... 居... 縱... 然... 之... 值... 依... 唯... 十... 已...

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Summation 174

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の 1/2

日本帝國... 被爆の... 1/2

日本帝國... 被爆の... 1/2

三、高統... 二、形... 一、...

次五五五... (1)...

昭和二年... 次五五五... (1)...

000000000000000000000000

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Summation H

H-67
 五反田 行...
 三三不...
 (中...)
 可...
 倉... (連...)
 三...
 一...
 大...

(...)

H-70

「報者」中六廿五本館「送給」以上「之」感「敬」的「才」
軍者正及也「經濟」上「挖」置「之」行「心」也「又」「連」二「感」接「手」

に「ト」ヲ「微」見「シ」テ「居」リ「マ」シ「ク」

鐵道ヲ「破」壞「ス」ル「上」ニ「該」二「有」線「及」也「世」線「之」急「也」通「信」ヲ「復」造「ス」
軍「事」企「業」ヲ「作」爲「ス」破「壞」ス「ル」ト「輸」送「持」二「西」伯「利「亞」
傳「之」下「軍」紀「ヲ」額「廢」セ「ル」ト「軍」一「面」負「テ」失「敗」ス「ル」ニ
上「ノ」連「歐」羅「巴」領「域」ト「亞」細「亞」領「域」ト「信」氏「間」ト「及」自「國」

H-69

神國「報」告「者」曰「ハ」連「一」民「族」間「之」不「和」ヲ「鼓」動「ス」ル「也」

助「言」ヲ「リ」ル「也」(「法」廷「審」議「官」大「丸」會「之」三「三」)

時「ノ」連「諸」君「ヲ」務「キ」テ「亦」破「壞」ス「ル」作「事」ヲ「講」議「ス」ル「所」也「
報」告「書」出「テ」居「リ」マ「ス」
禮「(「禮」後「中」略「ト」リ「又」卷「譯」者「部」「(「三」ノ「譯」者「部」「
令」部「三」宛「テ」テ「回」本「側」ノ「報」之「有」力「ト」圖「謀」人「ノ」不「止」神「自」

H-68

一九二八年(昭和三年)中「自」來「卷」譯「者」部「及」自「國」譯「者」部

「禮」中「命」令「ヲ」遵「行」ス「ル」三「務」中「最」大「ノ」一「點」ニ「對」シ「テ」
「行」ハ「ス」
「實」行「ス」ル「上」ニ「送」リ「テ」テ「外」ニ「留」留「ス」ル「所」也
得「テ」テ「居」リ「マ「ス」
「實」行「ス」ル「上」ニ「送」リ「テ」テ「外」ニ「留」留「ス」ル「所」也

(「送」記「錄」第「九」四「四」)

「私」澤「山」ニ「十」書「信」ヲ「送」リ「テ」テ「外」ニ「留」留「ス」ル「所」也

南「カ」附「言」シ「テ」居「リ」マ「ス」

Summation H-

Summary

日本諸國及之使族不之に想像をたせたり之を。一報告
 及之滿洲及之朝鮮ハ、之連領或攻撃津浦基地、之
 之たり之也。二報告ハ謀略工作之展開、外次、
 之之述たり之也。

一 露列五以與ニ於之行動、謀略ノ主要事項

二 露列五以東ニ於之謀略ノ各機關ニ於之展開及
 其ノ行動

三 北滿ニ於之交通線、用之謀略

四 北滿ニ於之物資、蒐集ニ因之謀略

三報告ノ附屬書ノ中ニ「口口口」對露謀略工作ノ關聯
 之平時極原ニ於之採之、又最重要實施方針ノ之ヲ揭出シ
 たり之也。此等ノ施策、申テ「連邦」敵對的ノ活動ヲ世
 及、又露列五及之高加索ニ於テ「連政」ヲ顛覆スルヲ
 念共ニ、且之國外ノ自系露列五避難民、團體ヲ組織スル
 於之也。

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日本帝國主義ヲ實現スルニ連領ニ於テ之基礎工作、
 手段ヲ選ビテ之ヲ行ハリ之也。右報告六次、據ニ言ヘ
 之也。「吾等正可機關能任不可能ナル外交官トシテ入露
 タル之且亦不可能ナル委實特授ヲ入ル」。問題ニ極
 廣汎ト方面ニ且之ヲ居ラセ且之ヲ「報先書六次」ト之
 アリ之也。「對露謀略」包含之業務ハ多岐トシ其行動
 「全世界」且之ナリ云々……云々」

H-73

日本ノ帝國主義者達ハ獨歩ニ帝國戰及ビ無政府主義

一報告書ニ於テ「日本ノ帝國主義者達ハ獨歩ニ帝國戰及ビ無政府主義ヲ主張スルニシテ、其ノ目的ハ、日本ノ利益ヲ保護スルニ在リ、而シテ、他國ノ利益ヲ侵害スルニ在ラズ」云々

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）
「報告書」中「日本ノ帝國主義者達ハ獨歩ニ帝國戰及ビ無政府主義ヲ主張スルニシテ、其ノ目的ハ、日本ノ利益ヲ保護スルニ在リ、而シテ、他國ノ利益ヲ侵害スルニ在ラズ」云々

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

Summary H

H-72

神田佐成之施察、實際ニ於テ行ハレ、モ、ハ、ニ、

證明ニシテ、一九一九年（昭和四年）（中略）

惟サシテ、歐亞教之國駐在ノ日本側陸軍省會議ニ於テ、

ナニカ、記シテ、リ、二、會議ハ日本會議本部第二部長

ナリ、被報告部、右、ナリ、二、會議ニ於テ、

討論セリ、同題ノ中、六、次、一、ニ、入、リ、居、リ、シ、

「討論ニ際シテ、歐洲諸國ノ行、討論、手段、一、國、を、

列國、於、テ、白、德、露、人、情、況、上、格、格、格、格、格、格、

觀察、

露國以外ニ駐在セシ各武官ノ行、行、行、行、行、行、

見、（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

二會議ニ於テ、然、感、興、ヲ、收、メ、居、リ、シ、

二會議ニ於テ、加、シ、テ、當時、在、五、百、在、陸、軍、武、官、ニ、

被報告書ハ、二會議、一、部、ヲ、指、シ、テ、從、テ、

一九一九年（昭和四年）十一月十五日、

的利用ト云、報告書、

（法廷書証第一三四号ノ付）

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Summary 14

ト名ヅケテ居ルニ、事態ヲ利用シ、同時ニ日本ト同盟シ、他、侵略國家カ、軍事占領ノ方法ヲ高加索ヲ獲得ス、モト思フヲ居タリテアリマス。

「エスウ」ノ日本陸軍武官館立原元一九三二年(昭和六年)三月中國ノ「連ニ対スル謀略工作」ノ問題ニ関シテ特ニ一章ヲ割リテ居ル所、報告書ヲ參謀本部ニ送附シテ居リマス。

同武官ハ、「我謀報機關」ノ「國情報蒐集」ノ目的ヲ以テ之配置セラルルノ「謀略的見地」ヲ於基礎決定スルヲ要ス、ト提言シテ居リマス。(法廷書証第二六七(ロ))

H-74

「外五名ハ被害等カ」連ニ対スル謀略工作ニ参加シテ居ルヲ示ス左記ノ書類ヲ法廷ニ提出シテアリマス。

『謀略計画ニ関スル指示』一九三二年(昭和七年)十月五日日本ニ於テ參謀次長ノ署名シタルモノ。

『謀略計画指示』一九三二年(昭和七年)十月八日參謀總長戴仁親王ノ署名シタルモノ。

『謀略計画要領』日本參謀本部、作成ニ係リ、之ヲ日本參謀總長ノ前記指示ト共ニ各陸軍武官ニ配布セラルルモノ。(法廷書証第二四九号)

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Summary H

H-75 『謀略計畫要領』、中于第一、『対ソ戦争』又第二、『対支戦争』

又第三、『対米戦争』ト題カニシテ居リス。

『計畫』第三ハ日本、キチ『ソ連』対スル西歐諸國、ゾコトヲ

逆ビタノ、実行方法カ記サレテアリ。

『計畫』第五及 sixth ハ支那若クハ米國ト南戦、均合ニ『ソ連』

ガ支那側若クハ米國側ニ立ツテ战争スルコトヲ切ハラシヤクニ措置

ヲ講ビテハナラヌ又上述ニテアリ。

カ破壊スルコトヲ考慮ニシテ措置、中ニ次、モ、カ下リス。

『亡命反ソ』露人團體ラキハ、『ソ連』邦内、同上ニ連結シ各地ニ

暴動ヲ起サシメ非戰熱ヲ煽ルル共ニ滯農政權、崩壞ヲ図ルニ謀

(~~策書並條中九等~~)

H-76 一九三三年(昭和三二年)カラ始メソテ滿洲、ハルビヤ、及び其他、都市

ニ於テ日本陸軍特務機關、保護、下ニソ連ニ抗スル活動ヲ

スルタメ、白系『反ソ』人避難民、團體ガ生レハソ連ナリ、一九三三年(昭

和三三年)十二月ニ、『白系露人事務局』ガ設置セラル。右團體

日本官憲指導ノ下ニ總テ、白系露人避難民ヲ統合シタマフ。

ソ連ノ(法廷書証才七三号)

関東軍統帥部ハコト等、團體、使ヒソ連ニ『反ソ』行為破壊工作

及び『テロ』行為、タメニ『ソ連』敵意ヲ持、ソ連ニ各種ノ避難民

分子ヲ募集シタマヘリ。

H-77 『ソ連』司法機關ハ、『ソ連』領域ニ向ツテ組織的ニ派遣セラル

居タリ、日本側テ先、犯罪的ニ謀略工作ニ関スル事件ヲ多クシ

摘要

日軍之例，其「不仁」之「不仁」及「不仁」之「不仁」，其
件之「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
件之「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
件之「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
件之「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」

Summary

「美國情報機關」密傳十行，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
行動之「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」

「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
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「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」

日軍之例，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」

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「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」
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「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」，其「不仁」之「不仁」

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H-81 漢口之領事館、~~在漢口英租界內、與英領事館、~~
 漢口之領事館、在漢口英租界內、與英領事館、
 漢口之領事館、在漢口英租界內、與英領事館、
 漢口之領事館、在漢口英租界內、與英領事館、

H-80 日本軍船（八幡鐵道鐵道）於本月廿三日、由漢口開往
 日本軍船（八幡鐵道鐵道）於本月廿三日、由漢口開往
 日本軍船（八幡鐵道鐵道）於本月廿三日、由漢口開往
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 日本軍船（八幡鐵道鐵道）於本月廿三日、由漢口開往

H-79 漢口之領事館、在漢口英租界內、與英領事館、
 漢口之領事館、在漢口英租界內、與英領事館、

H-78 漢口之領事館、在漢口英租界內、與英領事館、
 漢口之領事館、在漢口英租界內、與英領事館、

Summation H

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此藥之功用，能治一切虛弱之症，如氣血兩虧，精神不振，食慾不振，消化不良，失眠，健忘，頭暈目眩，腰酸背痛，手足冰冷，婦女經期不調，產後失血過多，以及一切虛損之症，服之立見奇效。此藥乃選用名貴藥材，遵古法炮製而成，功效神速，誠為補虛之聖藥也。

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此藥之功用，能治一切虛弱之症，如氣血兩虧，精神不振，食慾不振，消化不良，失眠，健忘，頭暈目眩，腰酸背痛，手足冰冷，婦女經期不調，產後失血過多，以及一切虛損之症，服之立見奇效。此藥乃選用名貴藥材，遵古法炮製而成，功效神速，誠為補虛之聖藥也。

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「凡爾賽日本條約」制定後、起る事、然るに、又極東に平和維持の爲に、東支鐵道を「俄に半賣出」る事、都て不滿意の爲、然るに、鐵道、實際、價格二億五千金、不「」換算の億圓、乃至アリヌカ、鐵道、亦價、四五百萬、賣、之、訣、アリヌ。(法廷書証、卷四三三)

Summary of

ソ連國境に對する組織的+侵犯

H-84

所謂滿洲國にモ、トソ、ソ、ソ、連邦ト、同、境界、日本が滿洲を取つ、瞬間、色々々、事、日本、人、排、撃、の、衝突、事件、が、絶、え、起、場、所、一、九、三、三、年、(昭、和、七、年)、中、の、國、境、線、を、以、て、日本、側、侵、略、の、波、が、喰、ひ、止、ま、り、し、た、り、た、る、滿、洲、國、に、對、し、政、略、の、準備、事、業、の、進、展、が、益、々、進、展、す、に、從、つ、て、國、境、事、件、の、數、も、增加、す、の、數、は、日本、軍、部、が、ソ、連、に、侵、入、し、時、候、が、大、半、を、占、め、つ、た、り、た、る、事、實、を、示、す、に、一、九、三、三、年、(昭、和、七、年)、か、ら、一、九、四、五、年、(昭、和、十、年)、迄、の、國、境、侵、犯、の、數、は、ソ、連、邦、内、務、省、國、境、警、備、軍、管、理、局、の、調、査、書、に、昭、明、か、ら、り、た、る、。(法、廷、書、証、卷、七、五、三、三)

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この文書、中、に、引用、せ、ら、れ、た、る、一、九、三、三、年、(昭、和、七、年)、の、警、備、部、の、國、境、警、備、事、業、の、進、展、の、數、字、は、一、九、三、三、年、(昭、和、七、年)、の、數、字、即、ち、一、千、七、百、五、十、四、名、の、日本、側、手、力、を、以、て、比、較、す、る、に、十、分、アリ、ヌ、右、系、一、九、三、三、年、(昭、和、七、年)、の、日本、側、軍、人、の、ソ、連、國、境、侵、犯、百、七、十、回、日本、飛行、機、の、越、境、飛、行、及、び、日本、航、船、の、ソ、連、領、水、侵、犯、百、七、十、回、アリ、ヌ、。

1303

1403

1405

行... (選) 會議... 行... (選) 會議... 行... (選) 會議...

行... (選) 會議... 行... (選) 會議... 行... (選) 會議...

(三) 最近... (選) 會議...

國境... 傷兵... 每日... 三八元... 國境... 傷兵... 每日... 三八元...

Summary A

Summation H

自一九三一年九月十八日發生九一八事變以來，滿洲國之行政上之地位，人材
 之準備，均極重要。其時，滿洲國之行政上之地位，人材之準備，均極重要。其時，
 陸軍省特務部長，接奉滿洲國軍司令部之直電，指示其注意及處理之方
 法。此項內容，係由滿洲國特務機關，極秘密之書，「特殊
 移民地自示部」及「滿洲國特務機關」中，軍事及謀
 略工作，繼續之「國家務算」計畫，及「皇用」等
 事項，係由「(注)書証」中，及「
 之書証」中，及「及」等，及「野部隊」即「自示露
 人體」等，均係重要之事項。

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一九三一年九月十八日發生九一八事變以來，滿洲國之行政上之地位，人材
 之準備，均極重要。其時，滿洲國之行政上之地位，人材之準備，均極重要。其時，
 陸軍省特務部長，接奉滿洲國軍司令部之直電，指示其注意及處理之方
 法。此項內容，係由滿洲國特務機關，極秘密之書，「特殊
 移民地自示部」及「滿洲國特務機關」中，軍事及謀
 略工作，繼續之「國家務算」計畫，及「皇用」等
 事項，係由「(注)書証」中，及「
 之書証」中，及「及」等，及「野部隊」即「自示露
 人體」等，均係重要之事項。

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H. 88

一九三一年九月十八日發生九一八事變以來，滿洲國之行政上之地位，人材
 之準備，均極重要。其時，滿洲國之行政上之地位，人材之準備，均極重要。其時，
 陸軍省特務部長，接奉滿洲國軍司令部之直電，指示其注意及處理之方
 法。此項內容，係由滿洲國特務機關，極秘密之書，「特殊
 移民地自示部」及「滿洲國特務機關」中，軍事及謀
 略工作，繼續之「國家務算」計畫，及「皇用」等
 事項，係由「(注)書証」中，及「
 之書証」中，及「及」等，及「野部隊」即「自示露
 人體」等，均係重要之事項。

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Summation of

- 一、^{目的}：破壞工作係以破壞之手段，以達到自由之目的。此一破壞工作，係以破壞之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 二、^{對象}：破壞工作之對象，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 三、^{對象}：破壞工作之對象，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 四、^{手段}：破壞工作之手段，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 五、^{手段}：破壞工作之手段，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 六、^{手段}：破壞工作之手段，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 七、^{手段}：破壞工作之手段，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 八、^{手段}：破壞工作之手段，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 九、^{手段}：破壞工作之手段，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。
- 十、^{手段}：破壞工作之手段，係以一切之破壞性之手段，以達到自由之目的。

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Summary H

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 ソ聯政府、日本陸軍官憲心、聯ニ対スル行動ノ敵対的
 ニトスル多岐、遺憾スルヲ事實ニシテ、度々抗議ヲ致シ、
 ソソ、日本側、北京條約ニ対スル組織的、復讐ヲ指摘シ、
 然レ日本、平國主義者達、対ソ謀略工作、ヤラサカク下
 下リマス。辯護側、檢察側以上ニ示シ、ヤラサカク論争余地ナ
 証據ニ対シ、何ヲ立証セリトカ出来ニシタカ、辯護側、謀略工
 作問題ニツイテ、文書資料ヲ全然提出シテ下シ、

H-70
 辯護側、原証人、反對証人、檢察側、提出シ、原
 原が著者示シ、又、彼ノ死が著者或文書、性質及使命
 曲ニシテ下シ、

定原(辯護側)顧問(神田、報告、私的性質ヲ
 帯ビテ調査書アリ、ソレ復讐之原個人ノ送リ、ソレ
 カ、林ニ見セヨト、努力マシ、定原、尚又書、最初、三編
 カ受取ツタガ後、三編、受取リ、ソレ、新言ニ居リ、

後檢察側が神田ニ種本ノ發見、ソレ、訊問ニ、定原、
 原証人、原言、應得トシテ完全ニ暴露、タリ、即

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參謀本部員神田、一九二五年(大正十五年)中、參謀本部、
 推薦ニ依リ、冷爾賓陸軍特務機關、派遣セリ、
 又、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、
 ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、
 ソレ、又一九二七年(昭和二年)末、神田、心、ソレ、報告書
 全又六竹編(報告書証書六九七号)ニ據テ、定原、
 定原死ニ、附、ソレ、ソレ、定原個人トシ、ソレ、

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Shanghai Library

第... 卷... 第... 頁...
 此... 書... 係... 於... 年... 月... 日...
 由... 館... 收藏... 現... 存... 於...
 第... 號... 書架... 內... 第... 層...
 第... 頁... 內... 有... 關於... 之...
 資料... 詳見... 第... 頁... 第... 段...
 此... 書... 之... 內容... 與... 書...
 第... 卷... 第... 頁... 內容... 相... 符...
 故... 判定... 此... 書... 為... 真... 本...

Summary H

米(1)2公重... 又及伊太利... 松井の発言... 問題が討議... 了。(運記録米二八三九頁)

11-92 辯護例... 鐵道、賣却交渉... 日本側、何等か... 了。(運記録米二九三四七頁)

辯護例... (昭和十年)三月二十三日... 議定書... 結語... 言明... 議... 辯護例... 文書中... 及破壊工作... 了。(運記録米二八三九頁)

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Sumner 1-1

消息... 續... 日本... 總... 消息...

日本... 續... 消息... 續... 消息...

續... 消息... 續... 消息... 續... 消息...

續... 消息... 續... 消息... 續... 消息...

續... 消息... 續... 消息... 續... 消息...

續... 消息... 續... 消息... 續... 消息...

續... 消息... 續... 消息... 續... 消息...

Summation 14

會議記錄を否定したところ、大島、同人、見所
 した「言」に「言」の、部下が「言」を「言」の目的、と「言」
 を利用したと「言」の「言」を「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 據、その「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 であり、(憲法書証第三五、八号速記録第三三九頁)
 大島、其「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 を「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 又「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 避難「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 同「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 認「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 録第三三九頁)

二八省一九三九年(昭和十四年)二月三十一日附會議録、
 頁庚九十七「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 答「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 關係「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 彼「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 其「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 其「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」
 其「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」の「言」

一九三三年度(支)關東軍(後)部會議(支)文書(支)

書(支)部(支)文書(支)關東軍司令官、方針(支)令(支)や(支)部(支)を(支)主(支)張(支)り(支)。ニ(支)主(支)張(支)次(支)地(支)圖(支)に(支)關(支)連(支)する(支)價(支)値(支)に(支)上(支)り(支)云。

度(支)銀(支)壞(支)工(支)作(支)報(支)告(支)書(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)指(支)示

中(支)三(支)次(支)に(支)分(支)り(支)云。本(支)指(支)示(支)に(支)關(支)東(支)軍(支)總

司(支)部(支)の(支)主(支)張(支)を(支)受(支)け(支)特(支)殊(支)部(支)隊(支)教(支)育(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)指(支)示(支)基

干(支)部(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)訓(支)練(支)実(支)績(支)を(支)鑑(支)り(支)云(支)支(支)書(支)記(支)才(支)七(支)三(支)号)

斯(支)部(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)關(支)東(支)軍(支)司(支)部(支)の(支)針(支)を(支)合(支)致(支)し

歴(支)し(支)て(支)來(支)る(支)參(支)謀(支)長(支)の(支)更(支)更(支)不(支)何(支)等(支)根(支)拠(支)ヲ

持(支)つ(支)て(支)來(支)る(支)關(支)東(支)軍(支)司(支)部(支)の(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)の(支)針(支)ヲ

針(支)通(支)行(支)す(支)り(支)云。ソ(支)レ(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)の(支)向(支)題(支)ニ

以(支)て(支)孫(支)元(支)帥(支)八(支)日(支)本(支)側(支)代(支)表(支)士(支)岡(支)本(支)に(支)逸(支)軍(支)退(支)取(支)高

孫(支)元(支)帥(支)八(支)日(支)本(支)側(支)代(支)表(支)士(支)岡(支)本(支)に(支)逸(支)軍(支)退(支)取(支)高

此(支)の(支)事(支)實(支)を(支)詳(支)し(支)任(支)命(支)記(支)九(支)四(支)二(支)年(支)七(支)月(支)六(支)日(支)附(支)覽(支)書(支)ヲ

ニ(支)關(支)し(支)本(支)部(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)を(支)復(支)舊(支)制(支)ニ(支)復(支)す(支)云

(支)一(支)部(支)隊(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)の(支)針(支)を(支)合(支)致(支)し

此(支)の(支)事(支)實(支)を(支)詳(支)し(支)任(支)命(支)記(支)九(支)四(支)二(支)年(支)七(支)月(支)六(支)日(支)附(支)覽(支)書(支)ヲ

ヲ(支)關(支)し(支)本(支)部(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)を(支)復(支)舊(支)制(支)ニ(支)復(支)す(支)云

此(支)の(支)事(支)實(支)を(支)詳(支)し(支)任(支)命(支)記(支)九(支)四(支)二(支)年(支)七(支)月(支)六(支)日(支)附(支)覽(支)書(支)ヲ

ヲ(支)關(支)し(支)本(支)部(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)を(支)復(支)舊(支)制(支)ニ(支)復(支)す(支)云

此(支)の(支)事(支)實(支)を(支)詳(支)し(支)任(支)命(支)記(支)九(支)四(支)二(支)年(支)七(支)月(支)六(支)日(支)附(支)覽(支)書(支)ヲ

ヲ(支)關(支)し(支)本(支)部(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)を(支)復(支)舊(支)制(支)ニ(支)復(支)す(支)云

此(支)の(支)事(支)實(支)を(支)詳(支)し(支)任(支)命(支)記(支)九(支)四(支)二(支)年(支)七(支)月(支)六(支)日(支)附(支)覽(支)書(支)ヲ

ヲ(支)關(支)し(支)本(支)部(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)を(支)復(支)舊(支)制(支)ニ(支)復(支)す(支)云

此(支)の(支)事(支)實(支)を(支)詳(支)し(支)任(支)命(支)記(支)九(支)四(支)二(支)年(支)七(支)月(支)六(支)日(支)附(支)覽(支)書(支)ヲ

ヲ(支)關(支)し(支)本(支)部(支)に(支)關(支)し(支)參(支)謀(支)本(支)部(支)を(支)復(支)舊(支)制(支)ニ(支)復(支)す(支)云

此(支)の(支)事(支)實(支)を(支)詳(支)し(支)任(支)命(支)記(支)九(支)四(支)二(支)年(支)七(支)月(支)六(支)日(支)附(支)覽(支)書(支)ヲ

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Summation H.

159

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Summation A

H-96

(一九三八年)(昭和十三年)

一九三八年(昭和十三年)中日本帝國主義者達「滿洲謀
 德(包圍)目的」之「連滿洲朝鮮國境」接合部
 予以「ハル」湖地区之「連」河之谷江上攻撃之件に
 之を「攻撃」直接「目標」としてハル湖、両岸に於て
 不立地ハ「高地(張鼓峰)ヲ選んで之に對して」
 辯護則認(陸軍少將田中隆吉ハ「不立地ハ」高地
 「ト」言及「次」通「確認」之「即ち重要ヲ」戰略地
 域「ト」之「不立地」重要國境鐵道ヲ「真正」見「居」
 「又」...「私」才「多」觀測所「カ」ハ「決」然「ト」曰「ハ」ル
 「不立地」ハ「實」見「ニ」之「也」(運「送」記「録」才「三」七「四」頁)
 目録「豫」豫「末」ニ「國境」地区(彈「藥」地「方」)ヲ「對」し
 「攻撃」多「ク」準備「基」地「ト」シ「準備」ヲ「完」成「ス」
 既「九」三「三」年「中」朝鮮「監」督「參」謀「長」
 「對」蘇「聯」作「戰」場合「顧」慮「彈」藥「基」地「亦」將
 「蘇」聯「國境」ヲ「國」於「ル」作「戰」資料「調」査「(活」動「記
 才「三」三「五」頁)」、結果「ハ」陸「軍」少「將」田「中」隆「吉」
 「一」九「三」六「年」(昭「和」十「一」年)十「月」中「ハ」不「立」地「ハ」高地
 「カ」ラ「近」シ「國境」地区「ハ」ハ「ル」湖「附近」ニ「日」本「武」裝「隊」ノ「攻」撃
 「ガ」行「ハ」ル「ト」カ「ラ」リ「マ」ス「ガ」コ「レ」ハ「學」生「ニ」對「シ」テ「整」理「遊」キ「タ」ル
 「下」リ「タ」ル(活「動」記「録」才「三」五「頁」)

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H-97

日本帝國主義者達(一九三八年)(昭和十三年)中「ハル」
 湖地区に於て「側」對「之」侵略的行動を開始(自覺)

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H-98

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Summation II

八二附進... 漢之種養...

其ノ上ニ... 其ノ大ニ... 其ノ二ニ... 其ノ三ニ... 其ノ四ニ... 其ノ五ニ... 其ノ六ニ... 其ノ七ニ... 其ノ八ニ... 其ノ九ニ... 其ノ十ニ... 其ノ十一ニ... 其ノ十二ニ... 其ノ十三ニ... 其ノ十四ニ... 其ノ十五ニ... 其ノ十六ニ... 其ノ十七ニ... 其ノ十八ニ... 其ノ十九ニ... 其ノ二十ニ...

Summation A

手続の始末は了りたる。

手続限の自衛隊務大臣宇垣、援助を惜みず日本外務省
カ理察議一書三附原ノ地圖ヲ持ツテ居カツタコトヲ記
現ニテヤト考ヘテ居タデ下リニテガ以テ辯護側ノ豫期
及ニテ中ノヤト述ベテ

ソノハニ科ノ事ニシテシヨウ、...事件が發生スル
当然見テ下ルコト思ヒタス。(理記録才三九、三頁)

ソノ外一九三六年(昭和十一年)七月十五日西日本代理大使が
ノ達外務大臣委員部ヲ来訪シ、ハサノ湖、西方カラス、
軍撤去ノ要求ニ付、理外務大臣委員、日記ヲ明
カシテ空同代理大使(西)對シテ、全ク公文書ニアルコト
以ルルハ以テ撤去ト附原地圖ヲ五ニシタコトヲ、地圖
ノ空同場所、全クハキリ確定カシテ居ラヌ(法廷
里記録才七四三)が提示セラル。

日本外務省ノ公報ニシテ、側代表が七月十五日西村ニ
テ地圖送還ヲ要請セ(六四四号)ヲ提示セラルヲ認
テ居ラヌ。

斯等ノハハハ湖、西岸ト山嶺ト、同地域ヲ明瞭ニ
要索シ、自本側ノ委員達ハ、地域ガソ、側ニ居リ
居ルコト、要求知ラ居タコトナリタス。

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H-99

ハサノ湖附近ノ國境地ニハ、側カラ、僅ニ平常ノ國
境ヲ準備哨所ヲ以テ護衛セラレテ居ラヌコト、
地域ニ警備ノ正視部隊ハカクシテアリヌコト、ハ

一連の証を以て確認するに注意す。

前同境警備部長「于白土」中位次也之記言

手記より「一九三八年八月五日滿國境干渉隊

が「北」附近に来り、一隊も退るが「北」に

サリ、其の間「北」に上、國境警備隊が何隊も

北に「中」附近に居り、(透記録中七七三頁)

同様、証言者「北」に居り、(透記録

中二二八頁)

一九三八年(昭和十三年)七月初旬、日本軍部「北」

に「北」附近に砲兵を以て強化する旨、步兵

と歩兵を隊給、始りたり。

三二二頁「北」中位、次也之記言に

「七月六日、日本軍部、日本軍部「北」に

砲兵を以て「北」に「北」に「北」に

重軽機関銃等持り、三三三頁、而して

「北」に砲兵陣地構築するに注意す(透記録

中七七五頁)

「北」に「北」に「北」に「北」に

一九三八年(昭和十三年)一月十九日、前

同軍部「北」に砲兵陣地を以て其他

砲兵部設けたり、其の「北」に「北」に

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Annexation H

標、蘇十日本軍、邊境に於て「タムニヤ」高地、攻撃す。ソレ
 ントリ、二層ヲ「側國境警備兵十名」哨所ヲ全滅ス。ソ
 然、チヤカチ國境警備兵、援助部隊ヲ問ヘ合フ。索ラズ。

日本部隊ニ滿洲側領域、撃退ス。ソレ。(法廷書証、第七五
 五号、第七五六号)。
 七月三十日、夜、日本軍隊ハ「カホシ」トヤ、高地(張鼓峰)ヲ
 攻撃、目標トシテ、攻撃ヲ再開シ。二場合、合進撃、ニラ、ハ
 日本軍ノ、兵士、斃テ、アリ。ソレ。ソレ、事情、持、テ、保護、測、証、人
 田中隆吉、依、テ、証、人、ト、シ、居、ル。又、同、証、人、ハ、次、ノ、ヤ、ラ、ニ、証、言
 シ。又、張鼓峰、ニ、對、シ、兵、士、一、箇、連、隊、ヲ、攻撃、ハ、日本軍、ガ、マ、ク

タケアリ、又、(速記録、第二七四五頁)

証人「チヨシキ」ハ、次、ノ、ヤ、ラ、ニ、証、言、シ。ソレ、

日本軍ハ、七月三十日、一、箇、更、攻撃、ヲ、開始、シ。ソレ、其、時、兵
 カ、二、箇、大隊、ヲ、用、ル。ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、唯、國、境、警、備、隊、ヲ、カ、ク、参、
 加、シ、テ、過、ル。又、「ヒエ」ト、砲、兵、隊、ヲ、加、ヘ、セ、ル。其、日、國、日本
 側、カ、砲、兵、隊、七月、三十日、戰、闘、ヲ、参、加、シ。ソレ、ソレ、ソレ、
 戰、闘、カ、戰、闘、ニ、参、加、シ、ハ、日本軍、ハ、「ヒエ」ト、領、土、ヲ、占、領、シ、テ、マ、ク
 後、三、過、キ、セ、テ、予、シ、(速記録、第七七八頁)

其他、戰、闘、ヲ、参、加、者、即、チ、日本側、カ、(カホシ)ト、高、地、ヲ、迂、
 迴、シ、テ、ヲ、取、柄、ニ、取、見、シ、テ、証、人、(チヨシキ)ト、(法廷書証、
 第七五五号)及、ヒ、戰、闘、始、メ、テ、終、止、戰、闘、ノ、地、又、二、層、リ、ソ、レ
 ヲ「カホシ」ト、云、佐(法廷書証、第七五六号)ニ、同、様、ノ、

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証言より推して

斯稱ニ致之ニ日本軍隊撤去ノ事ヲ明シシテ
事実疑ハズトナリタリ

Summation A

4-101
分ノ湖、戦闘經過ハ、聯内務省国境警備軍局長、調査書ニ示シタリ、末尾ニ次言書キ、即チ
赤軍各部隊、戦闘参加依リ、九三年(昭和三年)
八月十日日本軍(撃碎)シ、聯軍全ク解
放シ、同地区ニ於テ国境ハ、八二年(明治廿九年)ノ
議定書ニ準據シ、国境警備隊ニ依リ、警備シ、
現在之警備セリ、在(法廷書証)ニ
九三年(昭和三年)八月十日、聯外務人民委員、
筆札ニモ、日本大使、同締結書協定ニ基
キ、側々日本側兩軍隊、全ク撤去シ、行動
止メ、双方共ニ、自撤去ス、留ルモノ、
(法廷書証)ニ示シ、(法廷書証)ニ示シ

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聯内務省国境警備軍局長、前記調査書ニ示シ、
側軍隊、戦闘行動終了、瞬間ニ於テ、位置
八二年(明治廿九年)、議定書ニ示シ、
正確ニ合致ス、
証言ニ示シ、
九三年(昭和三年)八月十日、
九三步兵師団、壊滅後、日本側、
自軍ニ、
撤兵ニ、
回復ス、
戦闘行動、初、
状況ニ於テ

六九

水鏡

卷

公本鏡... 辨護例... 即中亦護... 公報... 水鏡...
 日本... 辨護... 即中亦... 公報... 水鏡...
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San mation

元 永三ノ上(国境)警備隊長陸軍少將(以下)、証言
年次、下三二頁、

『私(以下)高地、東部斜面及三ノ上、高池
(以下)湖、西ノ)ノ常ノ側国境警備隊ヨリ警備ヲ
シ居リタル日本側国境警備兵、九三六年七月迄、カ
トヨシヤ、高地、西ノ斜面ニ居リタリ(速記録才
三五四頁)

九三六年(昭和十一年)以來、カトヨシ湖附近、国境地区ニ勤務
シ居リタル(以下)ノ証人、カトヨシ湖、中ノ、及三ノ上、三ノ
上、兩高地(国境)警備哨所ニシテ年次、下三二頁ノ証言ヲ
居リタル。

『私(以下)国境)警備隊ニ到着セタル(以下)ノ哨所ガ
国境)警備隊ヨリ警備ヲシ居リタルヲ知リ居
リタル。私(以下)ノ(以下)ノ国境)警備隊ニ勤務シ居
ル、(以下)ノ高地ニ行キ、(以下)ノ国境)警備ヲシタリ
タル。(速記録才三三三六頁)。

証人、カトヨシ湖、三ノ上、問題、(以下)ノ同様、年次、下三二頁ノ証言
ヲ居リタル。

『私(以下)九三七年(昭和十二年)、初メ行キ、カトヨシ湖、カトヨシ湖ニ
設置セタル(以下)ノ(以下)ノ私(以下)ノ哨所、(以下)ノ国境)警備隊員
ノ職ヲシタリタル(以下)ノ、相当前ガ設置セタル(以下)ノ(以下)ノ哨
所ニシテ(速記録才三一九三頁)

前(以下)ノ国境)警備哨長、カトヨシ湖、中ニ、証言、(以下)ノ同様、(以下)ノ(以下)ノ
(速記録才七七八頁)

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Summary 17

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日清戦争の賠償金に對する明の自々軍費と反對に、國境
 境警備兵が「オオゾルヤ」高地に「槍ヶ原」を、七月十日に
 附圖、ヤウナゴ一標論争を了得し、証據の價値を落すや
 ヤウナゴ力に地圖、ナリ支那文議定書、並に一八六〇年
 十一月十四日附支那「ウツ」河、北京條約及び一八六〇年
 (明治十九年)六月十六日附議定書、前二ツの「彈春」公衆
 國境ニ因ル支那國籍、議定書を「提出」シタ
 「アス」辯護人、言葉に依リ、マニヨシ等文書、「國境線
 かつ「イ」ナリ「オ」モ「チ」ヨス。
 (逸記録オ三六九頁) 此ニ「オ」ニ「チ」等、文書
 何ヲ示シテ居リスカ。
 一八六〇年一、北京條約
 國境線ヲ正確ナラシムルヲ特別、地圖ヲ作成スルヲ
 要カルト云フテ居リ、ソレ圖上ニ「必ス兩國、全權大
 臣署捺印」シ出、トナリヌ。(法廷書証オ二六六頁)
 『彈春』公衆、國境ニ因ル支那國籍、議定書ハ、
 サレ湖附近ニ於ケル境界ハ正確ニ示ルベキデアリト、並ニ新
 界標ハ、番字及文字ヲ以テ表示セラレテ「ウ」ナリト
 三場「チ」居、ヌ、ソレ「各分圖」ニ「之」ヲ註明シ、
 圖式「一」層詳細ナルニ「オ」ス、(法廷書証オ三六七頁)
 ナリトス。斯標「ウ」西文書ハ、吾々「ウ」ハ一八六〇年(明
 治十九年)六月二十六日、彈春議定書ヲ確信セタルニ又
 境界線ヲ定メル基本文書トシ、右議定書上ノ附圖

Summation

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所持の意見は、本領土に属する吾々近代文明の最後
 の権利アリ。又、この問題の解決は、決定スル最終的文
 書アル所ノ一ハ八六年（明治十九年）瑯春議定書ヨリ
 一歩ニ退カナイアルガケテ證據トシテアルニス。辯護側
 ハ瑯春條約ノ支那文ヲ提出シテ、界標向ノ境界線ノ
 通り方ハ非常ニ不明瞭ニ示サテアル（速記録オニ九三頁）
 トユウコトヲ證據トシヤウトシレリ。然レテカラコト場合ニ於テ
 本議定書ニ付ヤラレ且ツソレニ前着シテ不可分地圖ニ
 全然正確ニ又詳察ニ何等不明ナル余地ヲ残サナイガ境
 界ノ通路ガ示サテアルトシテ事定ムル弁護側テ意識的
 ニ世視シテ居ルニアルニス（法廷書証オニ九三頁）。弁護
 側ハ戦争行動ノ率先シテヤフテハソレ側ニ在ツカクヤウニ又
 日本側ハ不意ヲ打タレシムルアリソレテ日本側ノ努力ハ平
 和的且ツ急速ニ紛争ヲ調整スルニアツトモ決シテ居リス。
 三年護側ノ説ハ格別新レイコトデハアリマヤシ。コレハ一九三
 八年（昭和十三年）六月三十日（法廷書証オニ九三頁）次テ九
 三八年（昭和十三年）八月四日（ソ連外務人民
 委員ト意光同ノ話題デアル）ガアツテ吾々ハソ連外務人
 民委員ノ次ノ言葉ニコレ以上附加スル必要ヲ見ナイカリス。
 『大使ヨリ本政府ニ於テ事件ヲ平和手段ヲ解決ヤントスル
 事アルトト声明セシム併シ遺憾ナシトシ現地日本
 軍當局ノ行動ハ此意圖ニ副ハナイモカアル。射撃及
 砲撃ヲ使用シテソングイェト領ノ越境或ハ國境小
 哨ノ夜間攻撃等ヲ問題ノ平和的解決ト考ヘルコト

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P. 86

H-104

Summary H

「出來方之此耶？把行爲之起點上移之此
 唯反詰的ニ來未比之此言法ノヲ、是行爲
 結果發生之テ、其言ハ如何トモ言テ
 起リナク、之ハ、無言行動ニ至シテ、言
 ハシ。我ハ唯早ニ本國ニ歸リ行爲ニ應
 答ナシトシ（法廷書證第ニ三五号）
 日本帝國ニ然者進カ、八廿ニ滿洲進
 戰争ノ始ヲ結果ニ歸ス、故ニ據言ヲ蒙
 戰争ノ不道トシテ、此ノ故ニ自據
 代表者ニ至シテ、失ハシク、其言ハ、
 之ニ其教カラ、其價價答、其其區者進
 ニ然ニ言法ニ、其言、テ、

辨證間、戰事行動、感嘆、之、側、罪、跡、ヨ、テ、用、始、シ
 之、稱、証、據、世、ヲ、ヤ、ク、ト、シ、本、文、法、廷、是、能、自、本、側、保、護
 人、六、三、證、據、一、ヲ、証、人、ト、シ、符、ヲ、出、シ、テ、前、三、不、リ、次
 至、同、公、衆、八、天、日、本、外、務、省、高、長、ノ、リ、給、手、ニ、同、張、シ
 一九二一年（昭和三年）七月下旬、八廿ニ滿洲進戰斗現
 場ヲ上同、命令ヲ發行シ、所、ノ、三、稱、情、報、ヲ、基、礎、ニ
 ト、シ、テ、言、フ、テ、三、稱、証、言、ハ、本、邦、人、ノ、發、明、ト、ス、カ、
 知識、ト、シ、自、然、顯、象、及、久、ク、參、謀、特、務、ノ、言、葉、ヲ
 取、リ、テ、方、下、三、上、偽、造、物、ヲ、示、シ、テ、証、人、ヲ、反、對
 詰、問、シ、テ、深、ク、判、明、シ、テ、今、復、ニ、彼、ノ、法、廷
 提、出、シ、テ、其、語、有、此、彼、ノ、疑、難、實、ハ、與、際、証、人

Summary A

手許に今日迄『偶然保存ヤリ』等と信ズルコトニシテ
 心至筆ト調テ見ズルトシテ等ノ電報ハ或ル下級巡
 査ノ手尾函及朝鮮軍、或ル「参謀将校」齊藤
 少佐、情報ニ基テテテテテト又コト等ノ「タリ」
 三浦ハ総テ「ソ」右何等知ル所ナク又斯カル人物ハ統
 ジテ「ソ」存在シテ居ラコトヲ証據セテ得テ「ソ」
 解リ「ソ」コトヲ神話的ナ少佐、事情ニ通シテ居ル程度
 ハ三浦和「ハ」齊藤カヲ貫テ「カ」ニ「ソ」提出シテ居ル
 「ハ」カハ湖附近戦闘行動畧圖ガ最モ良ク「ソ」証明
 シテ居リス。コト日本少佐ハ畧圖ノ「ハ」一九三八年（昭和十三年）
 六月十日、「ソ」日露軍隊間「衝突」発生共「ソ」出テ
 書き入レ「ソ」居リスガ「ソ」法「ソ」ハ「ソ」月十九日「ソ」附近ハ
 何等衝突ハ発生シ「ソ」カ「ソ」ニ「ソ」テ「ソ」居リス。又
 例ハ「ソ」証人「ソ」ハ「ソ」コト「ソ」テ「ソ」次「ソ」ニ「ソ」証言
 居リス。

『七月十九日「ソ」ハ「ソ」何「ソ」筆「衝突」ハ「ソ」セ「ソ」テ「ソ」ハ「ソ」
 北「ソ」高「ソ」同「衝突」ハ「ソ」セ「ソ」テ「ソ」。(速記録三一九頁)

陸軍少将「ソ」ニ「ソ」ハ「ソ」コト「ソ」テ「ソ」次「証言」
 『日本側ハ一九三八年六月ノ初「ソ」カ「ソ」オ「ソ」ル「ソ」ヤ「高地」
 附近ニ歩兵及砲兵ヲ集結シ始メ「ソ」テ「ソ」日本軍隊
 ハ「ソ」カ「ソ」村附近及「ソ」カ「ソ」村附近ニ到着
 シ「ソ」テ「ソ」然「ソ」テ「ソ」一九三八年七月十九日「ソ」カ「ソ」
 オ「ソ」ル「ソ」ヤ「ソ」カ「ソ」ニ「ソ」ヤ「高地」附近ニ「ソ」カ「ソ」武
 カ衝突ハ「ソ」マ「ソ」テ「ソ」テ「ソ」テ「ソ」特「一九三八年七月十日

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H-165

畿ノミヤノ地域ヲ見ルカタニハ、ソズガシニヨル警ヲ深今着カ
 「ハサノ湖」ナラ遠キトヲ考慮ニ入レナトモニモ、遠ハ山ノ通
 シテ遠視スル能カヲ持ツテ居テレバナラナラナリナリマ入何
 政セラハソ連ニ居シテ居ルノハ、サオジョルナヤ、高共ノ東部斜
 面ノアリアアテコレハ西部斜面ノ以テ、泉ニ遠クシテ居テ
 三浦タラハ見ヘナラナリアルカラテアリマス。

六月三日、三浦カソノ觀察ヲ行フ時ハ、サオジョルナヤ
 高地ニハ僅ニ少數ノ兵カラ成ル國境警備所所アリ
 ソノカケテアリマス、國境警備所ノ兵ガ赤キ旗ヲ持テ居ル
 事ヲ認察シテ居タトシ、ウコトハ全然信シテ居ル事ナラズ。

5920 1000 6510

ニ何等ノ側日本側兩部隊ノ武力衝突ハ
ニテシテ
(法廷書証ナシハ五三三)

日本公式文書スラモ七月二十九日迄ハ
ソノ衝突ノ衝突カアツクコトヲ示シテ書キテ
法廷ヲ三師自身ノ被ハ戦斗ノ現場ニ居テ
變ノ場所ヲ教新離テ居テ「ソズク」ノ
警察支署カラ事能ヲ視察スルコトニテ居
居リス。証人「ソズク」ノ警察支署カラ
頂上附近ニマルガヘテ居ルヲ見
話ノ様ナ性質ヲ「ソズク」テ居リス。彼
「ソズク」ト云フ言ハル

「檢察側」ニテ「ソズク」ト云フ

「ソズク」ニ日本軍ヲ滿洲國ニ見
「ソズク」ニ日本軍ヲ滿洲國ニ見

「ソズク」ニ日本軍ヲ滿洲國ニ見

Summation 17

廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二) 廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二) 廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

(源) 廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

廣敷一平(同)國史館文庫「吉野公卿」六家傳(卷二)

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○國語の研究は、國語学の基礎をなす。その目的は、國語の歴史、構造、使用を明らかにし、國語の発展を促すことである。

○方言の研究は、國語の地域的変異を明らかにし、方言の歴史、構造、使用を明らかにすることである。

○文法の研究は、文法の構造を明らかにし、文法の歴史、構造、使用を明らかにすることである。

○語彙の研究は、語彙の構造を明らかにし、語彙の歴史、構造、使用を明らかにすることである。

○音韻の研究は、音韻の構造を明らかにし、音韻の歴史、構造、使用を明らかにすることである。

○言語の研究は、言語の構造を明らかにし、言語の歴史、構造、使用を明らかにすることである。

○言語学の研究は、言語学の構造を明らかにし、言語学の歴史、構造、使用を明らかにすることである。

(以上は、言語学の研究の目的である)

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○言語学の研究は、言語学の構造を明らかにし、言語学の歴史、構造、使用を明らかにすることである。

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ノ戦争ヲ誘引スルニ合國ヲ論セシムルニ由リ(長瀬
証卷三三三(令))

Summation 111

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弁護側ハ又外交交渉後ハ廿二湖ノ戦争行動ヲ停止
スルノ事実ト其後平和關係ヲ樹立セシムルコトヲ主張シ、
責任アル人々ノ行動ニ対スル刑事上ノ責任ヲ免除スルコトヲ
アルカニ主張シ居リマス。(速記録卷二ノ七九頁三三四頁)
コト主張ハ成立スルコトナリマス。何トシテハ其意ヲ解除シ、
ニハ何等カ其旨ニ出スル外交上ノ文書ニ於テ、敵軍ニ對シテ
特別ノ指示ヲ加ルニシテ、必要トスルカラズナリマス。國史ニ「新報」
ヲ指シ「廿二湖ノ戦争」ナリマス。其ノ外「廿二湖ノ戦争」
ハ「個人的」ノ「孤立的」ノ事実ナラズ、日本帝國主義者
達ノ反ソノ「侵略行動」ノ「組織」ノ「環」ニ由リ、
民主主義國ニ反對スル帝國主義國家ノ「侵略」ノ「環」
ニ由リ居ルナリマス。

112
最後ニ若シ弁護側ハ一九四一年(昭和十五年)四月日本ノ連
上締結スル中立條約ノ過去ノ關係ノ清算ナリマス。上
ノ責任ノ「消滅」ニ由リ、上ノ「中立」ノ「條約」ノ「前
述」ノ「外」ニ「通」シ、上ノ「中立」ノ「條約」ノ「日本側」ハ
「信」ノ「目的」ニ「締結」シ、上ノ「條約」ノ「法律」
上ノ「信義」上ノ「之」ヲ「引用」シ、上ノ「何等」ノ「根拠」ヲ「之」ニ「示」
ス。日本帝國主義者達、ハ「廿二湖」ノ「戦争」ノ「紛争」ノ「最
初」ノ「學」ニ「由」リ、上ノ「張力」ヲ「反」シ、上ノ「計」ノ「成」ル「之」ニ「由」
リ、上ノ「發展」ヲ「得」ル「之」ヲ「知」ル「ナリ」マス。

1091

六、八、河附近於日本側，無宣言戰爭（一九三
 年）（昭和十四年）（一九三七年事件）

H-109

一九三九年（昭和十四年）日本，帝國主義者達於「聯邦
 領域」突入之「西伯利亞鐵道幹線」切斷，極東之鐵道領
 域「歐羅巴」之「聯邦」切離之目的，其目的河（六、八、
 七）附近之蒙古人民共和國地域，別場所訂定之，政
 策之緣起也。

日本軍閥，其「戰爭」計劃之完成也，其常備軍，其地
 意，蒙古基地，訂定於「博」之居下矣。

一九三六年（昭和十三年）三月二十八日，當時「關東軍參謀長
 平」之報告，極端，有田「會談」中決，中日之戰爭也。

「若」外蒙古，其「我」國（兩個）合併也，其「極東」蘇俄之全
 性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全

性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全
 性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全

性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全
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性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全
 性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全

性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全
 性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全

性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全
 性，其「根」源也，其「復」也，其「又」極東，其「復」也，其「極東」蘇俄之全

Compendium

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味ア、茲ニ卒直ニ明瞭ニ之ヲ述ビテ、必要カ下ルニ、(法廷書證カ七六
号、A)

一九三六年(昭和十一年)三月十二日、聯、蒙古人民共和
國ト、同ニ「相互援助ニ関スル議定書」ヲ締結セリシコトナリ。
(法廷書證カ七一四号)

斯ヲ致シテ、日本、帝國主義者(派)、蒙古人民共和
國ノ領域ニ對シテ侵略戰爭ヲ開キテ、軍事行動ハ
同時ニ、聯ニ對シテ軍事行動トナリ、テ、アルトシテ、ソノ
承知言居又ナリシ。

ハ、ハ、河ニ於ケルハ、側軍隊、司令官、報告、中ニ、ハ
ハ、河地区、戰略的位置及ハ、ハ、河附近ニ、日本軍
統帥部ハ、軍事行動ヲ展開スルニ、當リテ、持ツテ居ル、數
箇、戰術的任務ヲ掲ゲラレタリシ。

H110 日本帝國主義者達、軍事行動開始ニ對シテ、外面的
ニ、正当ニ根據ヲシテ、ハ、ハ、河東岸ニ於ケル
蒙古人民共和國領土、一部令テ、ハ、河國境ト、向
ニ、主張シテ居ル所ニ對シテ、要求ヲ申出デ、アル、ハ、ハ、
ハ、ハ、河、東岸ニ於ケル、ハ、ハ、河、ハ、ハ、
治ヲ、ハ、ハ、河、東岸ニ於ケル、ハ、ハ、河、ハ、ハ、

ハ、ハ、河、東岸ニ於ケル、ハ、ハ、河、ハ、ハ、
ハ、ハ、河、東岸ニ於ケル、ハ、ハ、河、ハ、ハ、
ハ、ハ、河、東岸ニ於ケル、ハ、ハ、河、ハ、ハ、
ハ、ハ、河、東岸ニ於ケル、ハ、ハ、河、ハ、ハ、

Summary of the above

P. 3

Summarization H

「...」云々、内蒙古人民共和國成立の日(1947)

國境部隊、時期ハ二線ニ沿テ駐屯スルニシテ、三軍併列

瓮以前、ニハヒニ「河東部地区」ニ置キ人民兵ヲ組織

滿河間、國境、日滿例ヲ毛合ニシテ組織せずニシテ、

チリ」(法廷書証ホ六六号)

「ハハ河東は二穴ハニシテ日滿軍部隊ト自認シ

闘ニ入ラ、新軍部隊、指揮官「...」指揮官少佐ハ

言ヒテ在、ヤシニ述ベテ居リマシ

『ホ七國境敬備哨所ハ「ハ化」ニシテ河東方、蒙古人民

共和國、國境一部ヲ敬備衛ニテ居リマシ。哨所、敬備衛

ニシテ領域ハ「ハ化」ニシテ河東岸ニ在リ、モ「ハ化」

ニ在ホシ、一方ニ於テ河東方、ハニシテ三村深クシ

居リマシ。哨所、警備ニテ居ル國境、部分「ハ化」ニ在

ホシ、地矣、北方、敬備哨所、終ニテ居リマシ。哨所、奉節

ノ西岸「ハ化」ニ在リ、又ハ化湖附近ニ在リ、カクハ東岸

哨所カ、毎ヨリ自巡察及監視ヲ出シテ居リマシ」(法廷書証

ホ三、ホ七号)

同符、証言ハ「ハ化」可附近ニ於テ蒙古側國境敬備哨所

長陸軍少佐「ハ化」ニ在リ、カクハ「ハ化」ニ在リマシ。

(法廷書証ホ三、ホ六三号)

二、國境線ハ公成、支那及内蒙古地区ニ滿河間、蒙古

人民共和國間、國境、道路問題ニ特ニ從事スルヲ日本側

機關ニ在リテ、(主トシテ一九三五至一九三五)出版

地圖ト完全ニ一致スルモノナリ。

1 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 6 5 1 0

1111 蒙古人民共和國成立、外蒙古(中國)一帯を以て
下リ、其の國境の正確なる決定、多クは、其の那側地
圖が特別の意義を有する事なり。

法廷に於て、其の地圖が教團提出者、其の地圖に
等、地圖の外蒙、滿洲、同、境線が日(西)側を據る
ルル心河(治)下居(下)同河(東)方(東)側を據る
通(上)下居(下)下(下)居(下)ナリ。

其一九一九年(一九二一年)中、北京ニ在ル國界委員會、其
係地圖ニモ、境線ハ心河(東)方

ニ示シテ居ル。(法廷書証第六二二號)

日本出版者、其の中國地圖ニ於テ、心河(東)方ニ
心河(東)方ニ示シテ居ル、其の特徵的ナリ、其の
滿洲新華民國大地圖(一九三三年(昭和七年)版
ニ於テ出版、(檢察廳文書第六二二二號)ニ提出シ
タル)地圖ニ、國境ハ心河(東)方ニ示シテ居
ル。其の全圖ニ於テ「中華民國大地圖及滿洲國地圖
(一九三三年(昭和七年)版)東亞同文會編會編者(法書
証第六二二二號)ニ、國境ハ示シテ居ル。

1112 其境線ハ一九三三年(昭和七年)迄、滿洲(日本側)
地圖ニ於テ、滿洲國境、其の二特ニ、其の(東)軍
地圖ニ何等疑義ハナク、其の(一九二一年
(大正六年)版)東亞同文會編會編者(法書
証第六二二二號)地圖ニ、國境ハ心河(東)方ニ示シテ居

Summary H

(法廷書証才ニ七一〇号)。辯護側は境界ハ河ニ沿フシヲ通
ワテ居ルト云フ地圖ニ就テ、傳説ニ從フ必要カアルト云フ辯護
側ノ言ヒ分ハ一ニ地圖某、モノノ上テ境界カ河東方ヲ
通ワテ居ルト及ヒオニ河ニ平行シテ通ワテ居ルガケノ意
味テ境界線ハ實際河ノ傍ヲ通ワテ居ルヲ下リマスカラ成
リカナイテアリマス。

一九二六年(大正十五年)中、関東廳ニ依ツテ新地圖
カ出版サレシマシムガコレモ境界ハハルハ河ノ東方ニ示サレテ
アリマス。(法廷書証才ニ七〇九号)

一九三四年中(昭和九年)関東局ノ出版シタ地圖ニモ(國
境ハ矢張りハルハ河ノ東方ニ示サレテアリマス)(法廷書証
才ニ七〇四号ノA)

(関東廳ニ出版セラタ地圖上此地方ニ於ケル境界線ノ變
化ハ一九三五年(昭和十年)ニ始メテ起ワラナイテアリマス。當
時日本帝國國主義者連ハ侵略ヲ計(國ニ對テ)國境ヲ河ノ東
カラハルハ河某、モノノ上ニ移シ斯クテ此ノ時以前ニ出版シタ
自分ノ及テノ地圖ニテ百スルコトナクテアリマス。(法廷書
証才ニ七〇四号ノB)

(國境線カ偽造セラシム後テモ関東軍司令部ハ國境カ

正シク即チハルハ河ノ東方ニ示サレテアリタリ部内用秘密地

圖ノ出版ヲ續ケテ居リタリ。コノ點ナ地圖ノ一ツハ一九三七年十

月(昭和十二年)十二月出版セシモノシテ東條(関東軍參謀長カ

梅津陸軍次官ニ送附セラシテ居リマス。(法廷書証才ニ一九号ノ

B)才ニ一九号ノC)

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Summary 14

- 一 「國境線」の「河東方」引、(「最新權威」(外國) 地圖出版物) 於「廣多行」(「星洲」) 於「一九三二年」
- 二 「提提」(「主」) 於「安」(「通」) (「新書」(「人」) 等)
- 三 「自」(「之」) 國「卓」上「最近」地理「地圖」(「書」) 中、(「中國」) 地圖、一九三七年倫敦出版
- 四 「自」(「之」) 國「卓」上「地圖」(「書」) 中、(「東部」) 西「德」利「聖」(「地」) 圖、一九三五年「德」(「牙」) 於「(「ス」) ス「(「ス」) ス」出版
- 五 「自」(「之」) 國「卓」上「一般」(「地圖」) (「書」) 中、(「中國」) 地圖、一九三〇年(「昭和」) 五年倫敦出版
- 六 「自」(「之」) 國「卓」上「商會」(「世界」) 地圖(「書」) 中、(「中國」) 及「日本」地圖、一九三三—三三年(「昭和」) 七年—八年、(「教育」) 出版
- 七 「自」(「之」) 國「卓」上「(「及」) 卓」上「地圖」(「書」) 中、(「中國」) 及「日本」地圖、一九三五年(「昭和」) 十年倫敦出版
- 八 「自」(「之」) 國「卓」上「(「及」) 卓」上「世界」(「地圖」) (「書」) 中、(「聖」) 地「圖」地圖、一九三七年(「昭和」) 十二年、(「伯林」) 出版
- 九 「自」(「之」) 國「卓」上「世界」(「地圖」) (「書」) 中、(「東」) 亞「地」圖、一九三七年(「昭和」) 十二年、(「不」) 及「市」出版
- 十 「自」(「之」) 國「卓」上「(「家」) 百「(「洲」) 南」(「國」) 境「線」(「之」) 河「(「及」) 河」(「東」) 方「即」(「主」) 蒙「(「側」) 主張」(「通」) 示「(「示」) 示」

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總編者之自序
 讀者之注意
 第一章 總論 (一) 關於本報之宗旨
 第二章 歷史
 第三章 現狀
 第四章 將來
 第五章 附錄
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 讀者之注意
 第一章 總論 (一) 關於本報之宗旨
 第二章 歷史
 第三章 現狀
 第四章 將來
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 第三章 現狀
 第四章 將來
 第五章 附錄

Summary A

「有利」證明「上」其「六」機「學」之「六」種「引」之「雜」文
 不「概」錄「去」其「物」舍「其」體「之」字「之」文「不」錄「去」其「六」
 式「之」字「國」滿「洲」其「六」等「主」又「國」字「六」字「得」六「字」其「主」
 主「前」二「字」其「主」合「本」地「國」字「六」機「學」引「者」六「在」指「其」主
 又「地」圖「上」者「值」三「字」其「主」又「滿」洲「同」機「學」同「體」二「字」
 從「事」三「字」其「主」存「機」自「身」機「因」作「成」之「地」圖「三」字「其」主
 會「三」字「其」主「六」字「其」主（注：更「書」記「者」六「字」其「主」為「三」字「其」主
 三「字」其「主」六「字」其「主」）
 年「讀」倒「滿」錄「去」其「六」等「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」
 錄「去」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」
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 六「字」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」其「主」
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Summation 14

より多様、兵器約三十件多数、... 号二十号と兩國晨
不常備隊、大集團及之より上騎兵聯隊より方面、國
境地区同時に集りし。三村より此三家吉倉長に國側
急命令と之より河西部に送るに於て、國境附近に
僅に守りし者ありしなり...

日本側攻撃の準備の方面に向て豫め偵察を敷置し、
戰場、軍事、地形測量を行ひ、準備より日本側、既に
三年(昭十四)四月中葉より方面向て関東軍司令部
部、地形測量隊を派遣し、地形測量隊、作業を確
保し、六才二三才兵隊團、任務より、四一五五番証書
を發行し、

戰場、軍事、測量準備を早急に行ひ、事實に日本側
出兵より十四聯隊三村に命令より、原支に依り、確認
し、居り、(証書証書六六号附屬書也)

14

元来國境監視所長陸軍少佐「三上」は、日清側
の軍事行動開始より、証書より、三上は、
即ち、我哨所、白河部隊、或は日本軍正規部隊より
敵目より、攻撃を以て、...

P. 101

一九三九年昭和十四年五月十日朝八時頃重機、輕機、小
銃、手榴彈、武装より白河駐立隊約三〇名が
貨物自動車より上り、六六号証書、不承、地也、

Surrendered by

國境ノ越ニテ我組ニ攻撃シタリシハ、鐵道ノ沿ハテ、
 伊予ニ於テ、蒙主領土ノ邊界ニ至ルニ、一、打掛橋
 我總士向ニ、新霞人、取リテ、門前ノ我國駐隊
 備隊穩燭隊ニ、一、行止セ、取リテ、(昭和十四年)
 五月十日、曉迄、國境ノ邊界ニ至リ、(昭和十四年)
 方三、六、三三、
 戰中行動開始時、只ク、敵軍ノ大體、見知ル、
 與、本隊、取リテ、大々々、戰隊、ニ、對シ、
 新霞兵、取リテ、
 書証第 三 (七五三)

戰中行動、發展、示、
 書ノ于、
 書証第 三 (七六三)

書長、進展、
 加者、
 詳細、
 昭和十四年(昭和十四年)五月、
 技術、
 昭和十四年(昭和十四年)二月、

後方、
 (三三三) 三、
 鐵道、
 新霞、

鐵道、
 鐵道、

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n-100

努力ヲ行ハシ居ルニ因リテ、
又。

Summary 11

橋本群及ニ元者ニ軍司令部ヲ設ケ、
際、
兩洲騎兵三個聯隊、重砲兵三個聯隊、
因、
第二十六及第二十五、各步兵聯隊、
認令居リ、
三九直。

橋本群、又二百台、飛行機、
三谷加等二十五、
後方ニ此家ヲ倒、
記録才三、五八頁。

運軍ヲ行ルニ九三九三(昭和十四年)五月九日、
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Summary H

- 一、陸軍中將鐵淵立兵、乃「蒙軍」新戰斗行部多
 特編成之、才六軍司令官、而戰斗積極的參
 加焉者。三人、爾等、乃蒙側兵士、及官將校數名、
 如次之蒙兵赤二連、乃居此。
 二、服部高四郎、元日本陸軍大佐、三人、蒙軍
 生之、場所、名稱、正之、書、自、乃、蒙、兵、士、然、之、間
 東軍司令官、所、催、之、ト、カ、子、念、義、ヲ、亦、護、側、ト
 了、有利、之事、情、ヲ、小、細、カ、キ、ト、思、之、カ、ラ、四、人、不、受、
 三、大田三郎、三流、日本、外、交、使、ヲ、亦、護、側、ノ、希望、ニ、基、キ、
 日本側、外交上、行動、ニ、關、シ、之、問題、ニ、ヨ、リ、一、証、人、ト、ナ、シ
 々、々、ニ、又、軍、事、問題、ノ、真、實、ノ、家、ト、ナ、シ、又、之、以、テ、德、ヲ
 了、何、等、真、相、ヲ、知、ラ、セ、カ、シ、戰、斗、行、部、ノ、機、算、ト、モ、
 証、言、ヲ、入、レ、居、シ、也。
- 四、橋本群、元日本各謀本部、作戰部長、亦護側
 証人、主張、曰、滿、洲、隊、カ、蒙、古、國、境、營、備、兵、ニ

以下自負

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攻撃を加え、不久、及対三ヶ所、蒙古側國境警備兵、
ヲ行ハタシ、アカ、ヤリ、帰還シ、居リ、ス。少数、蒙古側國
境監視哨、ハ、限二個師團、ヲ、成ク、居、タ、日滿海陸
國境守備軍、ヲ、攻撃シ、ト、エウ、ヤリ、テ、コ、不、合、理、ト、言、ハ、シ、
テ、反、駁、シ、必、要、カ、ナ、ク、テ、ア、リ、マ、ス。

Summary H-123

辯護側ハ、ハサノ湖附近、無、宣、言、戦、争、ニ、ツ、キ、ヤ、リ、ト
シ、同、様、ハ、ハ、河、附、近、事、変、ノ、意、義、ヲ、低、ク、シ、テ、コ、
國境事件ニ、対、シ、テ、ハ、シ、力、ヲ、居、マ、ス。然、シ、テ、ハ、辯、護、側
ノ、試、ム、ノ、場、合、ニ、於、テ、モ、不、成、功、ヲ、ア、リ、マ、ス。コ、レ、ハ、戰、闘、行、動
ノ、規、模、ノ、長、引、ト、シ、テ、日、本、政、府、ノ、こ、レ、ニ、対、ス、ル、準、備、工、作、及
ビ、積、極、的、役、割、ハ、証、明、シ、居、マ、ス。

戦車、重砲、六、戰、闘、的、空、爆、撃、的、空、軍、ヲ、用、シ、戰、闘
行、動、ハ、三、ケ、月、以、上、ニ、亘、リ、シ、續、行、セ、ラ、レ、タ、リ、マ、ス。こ、レ、ハ、戰、闘
ハ、日、滿、側、力、ノ、限、ハ、限、ニ、算、定、シ、テ、モ、四、個、ノ、歩、兵、及、ビ、騎、兵、師
團、重、砲、兵、教、團、聯、隊、及、若、シ、テ、數、ノ、空、軍、ヲ、參、加、シ、テ、
軍、事、行、動、ハ、強、ク、準、備、セ、ラ、レ、タ、リ、マ、ス。鉄、道、ハ、敷、設、セ、シ、
軍、事、測、量、ニ、準、備、ハ、行、ハ、シ、戰、闘、ノ、初、日、三、個、半、乃、至、三、個
ノ、歩、兵、師、團、ヲ、下、シ、カ、ル、數、ノ、軍、隊、ヲ、集、結、セ、ラ、レ、タ、リ、マ、ス。

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辯護側証人稱、本、群、ハ、日、本、側、損、害、ノ、數、ヲ、一、万、人、ト、定、ム、
居、リ、マ、ス。(速、記、録、第、三、六、五、五、頁)

檢察側証人等、証、言、シ、テ、裁、判、所、宗、際、ハ、日、本、側
ノ、損、害、五、倍、以、上、ナ、リ、ト、シ、テ、知、ラ、レ、タ、リ、マ、ス。(速、記、録
第、三、六、三、七、〇、頁) 然、レ、傾、向、的、ト、日、本、人、証、人、示、シ、テ、居、ル、損

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Summation H

吾々の暴行ハハシ湖附近ノ侵略行為ノ國之恥章ニ於テ述
ク所ナリ又ハハシ河事ニ於テソノ已効力ヲ保持シ居議
論即チテ侵略行為ノソノ日本帝國主義者達ノ責任
ガ消滅スルヲ考ヘ得トスルソノ議論ヲココニ繰返
サナイザリマス。

セ「ソ連ニ對スル侵略」タメ日本ガ「ヒトナシ」独逸及「
ニス上伊太利トナラシム同盟。

(4) 防共協定「ソ連ニ對スル侵略主義者」アリク。

H-125

日本ノ「ソ連ニ對スル侵略的政策」日本ガ「ヒトナシ」独逸及
ヒ「アリス」伊太利ト陰謀ニ入ツタ後ニソノ積極性及力
ガ最高ノ程度ニ上ツタナリマス。陰謀ハ一九三六年十一
月二十五日日本ノ独逸ト向ノ防共協定ニヨリテ形式ヲ備ヘ
シ一九三七年(昭和十二年)ニソノ伊太利ガ参加シタ。

檢察側ハ既ニ防共協定ハ侵略者タル國家群ノ民主主
義諸國ニ對スル陰謀ナリソノ侵略ヲ強敵スルメ及ビ思
想上侵略ヲ正者化セシメタル偽装アリトソノソノ証據
ヲ述ベテアリマス。防共協定依リテ宣明セラル共産主義
義ト國爭ナリニシテ其ノ侵略ノ目的ヲ以テ彼等ノ力及技
術ヲ動員セシメタル手段ニ外ナラズアリマス。

同協定ハ表面上共産主義ニ對スル自己防衛アリタラ
降ハ其ノ後、匪賊國家ニ依リテ武力的發展ノ手段ノ爲準備
工作アリタリ。前米國國務長官「ヒトナシ」言フニ

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Summary H

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上チアリマス(法廷書証第一。六号)

防共協定、特ニ先ク以テ「連邦ニ向テ」アリマス。

連ニツイテハ、防共協定ニ附屬ニテ特ニ秘密協定加設セリ
トアリマス。コノ協定ノ第一條ハ、「連ニ反對ニ行ハキ國
争ノ共同手殺ガ規定セリテ居リマス。尤モコノ次ノ條件ガ
ミテ居リマス。『締約國ノ一方ガ「ソヴエト」社会主義共和國
聯邦ヨリ挑発ニ因リガレ攻撃ヲ受ケ又ハ挑発ニ因ラカレ
攻撃ノ脅威ヲ受ケル場合』」(法廷書証第四。〇号)

熟ニカサ「ソ連」平和愛好政策ハ一般ニ明カサリ、ソレニ何
等疑惑ヲ起ス言ハカナイ事トシマス。コノ條件ハ全ク何故モ意
義ナク又意味スラモ持タナイモノ形アリマス。有田外務大臣ハ
一九三六年(昭和十一年)防共協定締結ノ日樞密院會議ノ席
上「次ノヤウニ言明シテ居リマス。

『ソ國ハ自独雙方ヲ敵トセカレバソトヨク考ヘテ』

(法廷書証第四。五号)

一年後即チ一九三七年(昭和十二年)「連ハ日本ヲ侵略スルニ
時防共協定ニ参加シ又伊太利ト相對峙シ居ルニ、日本ハ
支那階級ヲ防共協定、目的ヲ見ニシトハ、ソノ様ナモノアリマス。

H-127
當時ニ於テハ日本政府、「連ニ對スル政策ヲ了解スルニ於テ
指徴附セルモノハ一九三五年十一月四日附、白鳥登有田家書
信アリマス(法廷書証第七。四号)也。白鳥ノ提議スル所
ニ從ヘバ日本ハ「連ヨリ次ノトヨク要求セカレバソトヨクアリマス。

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Summary H

浦塩其他一切武備ヲ撤廃シ... 樺太北半ノ安撫讓渡等ノ問題ニ于テハ... 樺太沿海州實收ヲ考慮セザルニカラス。是等ノ要求ハ... 嚴守スル法心ヲ以テ唱フガ心算ナリ... ソノ目標ハ蘇露上ノ關係ニ大清算ヲ爲スナリ... 露西亞ノ脅威ヲ永久ニ除クニカ爲スニ依リテ無方ニ負本主義共利國ナリメソノ天然富源ヲ著シク制限スルヲ要スル... 今日ナラバ未ダソノ見込充分ナリ。

一九三六年(昭和十一年)八月七日日本ノ四期會議ニ於テ、ソノ結論ヲ出シタル。ソノ「連」ヲ控制スル爲メ政局ヲ維持シテ制メルニ力ムルコト(法廷書証第七四号)

日本ノ當時ニ於テソノ「連」政策ヲ明カスル目的、多受ニ次ニ掲ガル又書ニ注意ヲ拂ハルニシテ願ヒタリ。即チ極東ニ於テ領土ノ安全ニ最大ノ打撃ヲ加ヘル外意ヲ日本ノ滿洲ニ保全スルニシテ國土ノ根據地有田會議(法廷書証第七六号、見)

在滿日本官憲ガ自來密路ノ参加セシテ行方對テ破壊工作ニツイテ「連」側ヨリ日本政府ニ與ル(一九三六年五月四日附抗議文(法廷書証第七三五号))

一九三六年(昭和十一年)十月二十六日「公」湖附近「連」國境ニ於テ日本軍ノ挑発行動ニツイテ、調査書(法廷書証第七五号)。

臣齋藤經由、日独間秘密航空連絡ノ設定ニツイテ、電報(法廷書証第七七号)。

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大島、証言、即チ

昭和十二年(一九三七年)ニ秘密協定、無クツカ、以テ陸軍ト日本陸軍上ノニヤ、陸軍ニ関スル情報、交換ヲ協定スル。此ニ関シテ此道ボニカニ示ハルカ利用ニキリ自暴シテ人ノ利ヲ強ヒテ決定スルニシタ。 (法廷書証第 四六七号)

H-128 防共協定ノ後、年々ニ於テ毛膏ニ「連ニ対スル日本、根本政策ヲ了ラシ、チアリヌ。

平沼總理大臣、(一九三九年(昭和十四年)五月四日、「上ト」)宛聲明中、防共協定ガ「謀セララレバ使命、遂行ニ当リ有效果ヲ了ラシ、ト言明シテ居リヌ。(法廷書証第 四七五号)。「リーントロフ」(一九四一年(昭和十六年)二月二三日大島ト会谈中、平次中ウニ言ヒテシタ。

「日本ノ友情、防共協定ガ結ビテカラ後ニトイフ、甚シク可能ナラシム、他方日本ノ支那、於テハ英國權益地ヲ奪フ、喰ヒ込ムトガ出来ヌ」(法廷書証第 四六九号)

H-127 防共協定、結果「連邦ニ対スル敵對的包圍状態ガ出来

上リマシタ。

大記事實、即チ米國政府ノ出版スル書籍「第三卷第六戰ニ到ラシメタル有テ、中ニ編述セシメテ了ルニ次、有テ第六三國協定締結迄(一九四〇年(昭和十五年)九月)迄ノ時期ニ於テ周知、トテ了ルニシタウコトヲ法廷、(一九四六年(昭和二十一年)八月二十日及廿二日)二月二十六日附決定、認メテ居リヌ。

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Summation H

『一九三八年(昭和十三年)三月二十日』「ヒラ」滿洲國承認
 日本、勝利ニ對シテ祝意ヲ表ス。

『一九三八年(昭和十三年)三月十日』独逸軍隊侵入大連ニ至ル
 ソレヲ『三月十三日』壤太利ト独逸合併、併壞太利ノ法律ニ
 依リ「ソノナ」ニ於テ発表セラル。『一九三九年(昭和十四年)三月
 十五日』独逸軍隊ヲ「ソノナ」ニ領土ヲ占領スルソレヲ『三月十
 六日』独逸ハ「ソノナ」及ビ「モロカニア」ニ對シテ保護制衛ニ必
 要ナル命令ヲ發表ス。『一九三九年(昭和十四年)九月十日』
 独逸軍隊波蘭ヲ攻撃セリ。『一九四〇年(昭和十五年)
 三月二十日』汪精衛政府南京ニ於テ樹立セラル。

(括弧内ヲ以テ之、事實上中國ノ大部分ニ於テ日本ノ支配ヲ
 確立シタルコトヲ意味スルモノガアルトスルコトヲ附記致ス)

以上ノ事實ニ附テ加ヘテ吾人右ノ圖、時期ニ於テ日本一九
 三八年(昭和十三年)中「ハカ」湖ニ於テ又一九三九年中「ハカ」
 河ニ於テ「ソノナ」連ニ對シテ無道ニ侵略戦争ヲ行ハシテ証明
 セ下リ居マシ。斯レニ致シテ防共協定ニ依リ組織的
 ニ考察セラルモノ日本ト独逸ト「ソノナ」連ニ對シテ陰謀、第一期
 結果トシテ侵略者連ノ勢力ハ「ソノナ」連國境ニ密接シテ直接
 以テ「ソノナ」連ノ脅威ハ「ソノナ」連ノ上ニカガリ居マシ。

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H-130

本書ニ於テ辯護側カテ提出セラルモノ文書、大部分
 日本ト独逸ト「ソノナ」連ノ行動ハ兩國ノ利益ヲ侵害スル
 タルコトト圖ノ權利ヲ持ツ居ル次第ヲ示シタルコトヲ
 証拠立タルコトニ用ヒラルモノ「ソノナ」連ノ即々有田外務大臣ノ

Summary H

演説(法廷書証第三七〇号)、日本外務省、言明(法
 廷書証第二三七号)、林首相演説(法廷書証第二三
 五、八号)板垣陸軍少将長、有田三对之説明(法
 廷書証第二六三号)、「リポート」直権信書(法
 廷書証第二七六号)云々。何故か、被告等は「コソ
 ント、闘争ヲ行ツタトスル、廉テ訴訟セラシテ居ルハ
 一カヲ云フ」云々。彼等が訴訟カシテ居ル古ハ、共産主義選
 動ハ闘フト見セカケテ侵略政策ヲ行ヒ、他國ノ土地ヲ奪取
 シ且他國民ヲ征服シテ上ト努力シタコトニ云フアリ。又
 被告等ハ、自分ニ對シテナクハ訴訟ニ對シテ、續ニ於テ
 辯護スルモノ何物ヲモ持ツテ居ナク、檢察側、訴訟
 費ヲ加テ、事項ヲ造リ上ケルコトヲ、三ツテ、結果的
 紛争ニトシテ居ル云々アリ。又。
 吾々ハ、此ノ違リカハ、國際軍事裁判所ニ於テハ、成功
 之得ナキカドウト云フコトヲ信シテ居ルモノアリ。又。

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Summary H

H-1
 被署名の提出は、その申請、本質につき、一面に於て協定
 締結、時代日本が、同盟者、積極的、敵對態度、
 持つ居る、ト此協定が、同盟、何れ、ニ、信に、トテ
 不定、ト、イ、カ、ラ、ン、生、ル、他、面、に、於、て、決、し、て、正
 定、ト、ス、レ、バ、サ、カ、テ、ナ、イ、ト、イ、ウ、能、定、ト、ス、
 第一、種類、之、文書、關係、アル、ハ、ト、イ、テ、ト、ク、ア、ト、宣
 告、口、世、書、ヲ、ア、ラ、ス、ト、シ、ニ、
 口、ト、ス、ニ、對、ス、ル、政、治、的、意、義、ト、ス、ル、ニ、ハ、ア、ラ、ス、ト、シ、
 し、カ、多、少、共、同、協、定、ノ、指、導、ヲ、ト、シ、テ、居、ル、也、(法廷書
 証、第、二、七、六、二、号、)
 ト、イ、ウ、ヤ、ハ、ト、小、心、テ、ア、ル、ガ、然、シ、モ、自、自、認、ク、テ、居、ル
 事、ガ、アリ、ス、
 此、協、定、ハ、同、盟、者、ニ、對、シ、テ、向、テ、ア、ラ、ス、ト、イ、フ、ハ、十、
 り、ハ、ト、ア、ル、証、據、立、テ、ス、ル、ハ、ト、イ、フ、ハ、ト、イ、フ、ハ、ト、イ、
 有、公、報、が、開、示、ス、ル、ハ、ト、ア、リ、ス、
 帝國、政、府、ニ、於、テ、何、レ、モ、特、殊、協、定、ノ、一、ト、シ、テ、論
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 二、三、七、一、号、)
 斯、様、ニ、シ、テ、日、本、ハ、他、ニ、如、何、ト、ル、協、定、ヲ、特、ク、シ、
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 シ、ト、ス、ル、ハ、ト、イ、フ、ハ、ト、イ、フ、ハ、ト、イ、フ、ハ、ト、イ、フ、

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主其レノニ偽ガリ又總ビニ一ト戸明ハルシハ自奉欺爾

正式虛偽ヲアリ

H 証

檢察側トシテハ并護側カ證據立テ、居ビ據ニ(並ニ) 証案三六、九五子秘密協定ハ、(昭和十五年)十一月二十五日防共協定延長一時ハ、(更新セシ) 防共

月三十五日防共協定延長一時ハ、(更新セシ) 防共
「ソレトシテ」ニ、本條約ノ價値ヲ認メテ居テ、
「ハ」ニ、第一、此ハ既ニ自合ニ終リ、
「ハ」ニ、第二、防共協定ハ、一効力ヲ繼續シテ居ニ
其、他秘密協定ヲ被ヒ直ニ三國同盟トシテ一併

結ビテアリ

斯、如クニシテ私ハ結論致シ、本章程ニ於テ

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Summation H

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三國同盟一家主義論議
伊三對三國同盟國家群之關係

Summary H

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三國同盟一家主義論議
 伊三對三國同盟國家群之關係
 一、三國同盟之成立
 二、三國同盟之發展
 三、三國同盟之關係
 四、三國同盟之未來
 五、三國同盟之評價
 六、三國同盟之結論
 七、三國同盟之附錄
 八、三國同盟之參考文獻
 九、三國同盟之圖表
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 九十七、三國同盟之圖表
 九十八、三國同盟之索引
 九十九、三國同盟之附錄
 一百、三國同盟之參考文獻

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Summation H

二、華人文書、その下に種種的「当事者」の「大島が

一九三八年（昭和十三年）六月ツツタカ平、許ニ日本家謀本
部ヨリ彼乙ニ於テ日本ト、軍事同盟締結、可能性ヲ探シ、
委任務ヲ予ニ課スル書類ガ到着スル。ソノ同盟、権能依リ

若シ「ソ」ト「聯邦」ト開戦スル義務ヲ負ヒ反對ニ「ソ」ト
聯邦ガ「林」乙「攻勢」ニ乘ルニ場合ニ日本「ソ」ト「聯邦」ト
開戦スル義務ヲ負フ「ソ」ト「攻勢」ニ乘ルニ場合ニ日本「ソ」ト「聯邦」ト
和「ソ」ト「日本」ト「攻勢」ト「ソ」ト「攻勢」ト「ソ」ト「攻勢」ト

シテ「ソ」ト「日本」ト「攻勢」ト「ソ」ト「攻勢」ト「ソ」ト「攻勢」ト
又「法廷書証」第「七」号、十「三」号「三」号ニ注意ヲカキサレ
ニ「ソ」ト「御願」ヲ致スル又「西書証」ヨリス「ソ」ト「日本」ト「攻

襲」シタ「ソ」ト「攻勢」ト「ソ」ト「攻勢」ト「ソ」ト「攻勢」ト
コ「ソ」ト「普証」中「大島」續「三」次、ヨリ「三」述「ベ」テ「ソ」ト
「ソ」ト「普証」中「大島」續「三」次、ヨリ「三」述「ベ」テ「ソ」ト

「ソ」ト「普証」中「大島」續「三」次、ヨリ「三」述「ベ」テ「ソ」ト
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一九四二年(昭和十六年)三月三日「ロンドン」ハ、大島、會議
 二月、九四五年(昭和十六年)三月三日、會議、彼
 一言、從ハ「結局、偉大、終、之、政權、
 終、意、味、ル、ヲ、口、シ、(志、意、書、記、カ、七、六、九、号)上、述、ハ、
 単、也、見、通、シ、傳、ハ、コ、文、書、其、后、部、會、明、コ、ト、シ、大、
 島、完、全、贊、同、ヲ、得、タ、リ、ス、
 「ソ、レ、上、連、邦、ヲ、對、シ、ト、シ、テ、攻、擊、ヲ、維、續、シ、タ、ル、日、本、政、
 展、開、ヲ、自、本、外、務、大、臣、松、岡、一、九、四、三、年(昭和十六年)三、四、日、
 「ル、リ、ト、シ、テ、」「ロンドン」ニ、對、シ、テ、會、見、的、的、
 會議、上、シ、タ、リ、ス、又、一、九、四、三、年(昭和十六年)三、月、十、日、
 「ロンドン」ニ、會、談、ヲ、シ、テ、次、日、三、日、明、ニ、大、
 島、部、獨、之、獨、立、時、ヲ、長、田、三、博、ハ、「一、九、四、三、年、三、月、十、日、日、
 獨、之、對、シ、テ、對、上、解、決、シ、テ、以、テ、敵、心、を、上、リ、テ、大、心、を、
 「ロ、ン、ド、ン」ニ、對、シ、テ、會、談、シ、タ、リ、ス、日、本、外、務、大、臣、松、岡、一、九、
 日、之、國、家、表、明、的、政、策、ヲ、以、テ、終、了、シ、タ、リ、ス、統、一、國、連、邦、ヲ、建、立、シ、タ、ル、日、後、
 三、國、國、上、之、種、國、最、大、存、在、シ、タ、リ、ト、シ、テ、(志、意、書、記、カ、七、六、九、号)三、日、
 同、一、九、四、三、年(昭和十六年)三、月、十、日、「ロンドン」ニ、大、島、部、
 上、「ロンドン」ニ、參、加、シ、松、岡、一、會、談、ヲ、シ、テ、大、島、部、
 一、(志、意、書、記、カ、七、六、九、号)ニ、
 一、九、四、二、年(昭和十六年)松、岡、一、會、談、ニ、
 今、度、日、之、對、シ、テ、獨、立、國、境、不、斷、ノ、建、立、中、ニ、シ、テ、
 連、邦、ノ、戰、争、見、通、シ、ヲ、傳、エ、タ、リ、ス、(志、意、書、記、カ、七、六、九、号)
 三、國、協、定、參、加、カ、シ、テ、多、ク、シ、タ、リ、ス、又、綜、合、計、劃、
 作、制、家、ト、シ、テ、上、述、邦、ヲ、侵、略、ノ、目、標、ト、シ、テ、選、ブ、コ、ト、シ、

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Summation H1

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Summation H

ヲ決シ局外者ハナカッタ、テ了ス
 一九四三年(昭和十六年)四月四日松岡「シムラ」会談
 才待松岡野田問題ニシテ「シムラ」ト、会談ヲ傳ヘ
 在シテ明カニシテ云。(雑誌書記才七九号)
 文書松岡が對シ、戰ハ日本、参加スルハ政府ニ約
 多トイハテテ物語シ云云。
 一九四三年(昭和十六年)三月十九日、会談ニテ「松岡「シムラ」
 對シ攻撃準備開始スル「シムラ」ト云、言明ニ答ニ次
 ニト云フ云云。
 「日本常ニ忠實ナル同盟國トシテ共同努力ニ對シ厚ニ
 宜ニ加減、アリカラス全部ヲ獻ゲルヲタク」(雑誌書記
 才七九号)或ハ云々余リモ一般の性格ヲ以テ約束セ
 知レテ云。

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「シムラ」具體的ニ性格、約束ヲ會談ニ文書ニ傳ヘテ、
 在シテ明カニシテ云一九四三年(昭和十六年)五月四日附、
 「シムラ」ト云、電文中一九四三年(昭和十六年)三月二
 十八日、会談ニテ「松岡」云、言明ニ引用シテ云
 「吾ニシテ、聯邦ト衝突スル場合日本如何ナル總
 理大臣又、外務大臣元日本ヲ中立ニ保ツ事ト云、
 之ニ此場合日本ハ自然必然性ヲ以テ、獨ニ側ニシテ、
 之ヲ攻撃スルニ違ハズ、如何ナル中立條約
 モ、事ニシテ何等モ變更スル事ハ出来ナイヲ云」
 (雑誌書記才七九号)

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ト主張カランヲ在東京トシテ大使トシテ

(注) 事自記ニテ四冊子

ト見是等記非シテ、国内的使用ナリ
 トモハ、ハナハ、両者、或ハ通、或ハ言、或ハ作、或ハ言、
 辯護側ハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、

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ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、

トハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、
 榎木側ニシテ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、
 邦中ニシテ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、
 後、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、ハナハ、

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Summation 14

辯護側、更ニ松岡ト總統ナラニ「ソノトク」トシテ、
 談「記録」ヲ送附スルトシテ、出末ナレド、何故「ソノ」原則的
 記録セズ、且ツ合談ニ際シテ、ハ「タ」繼談ヲ答賜スルハ
 爲メ、手掛リ言葉ヲ「記録」カク「ソノ」九四三年(昭和
 十六年)四月二十日附、「ソノ」外務省、(宣長、電報)
 提出スルニシテ、(法廷書記カ「三四」号)
 此文書ニ依リテ、且ツ合談記録、信ズルハ必西セカト
 走ルハ不正確ニテ、等々、結論、出ナリ「ソノ」ス。斯
 ナ合談、記録ヲ「ソノ」トシテ、欲ニ「ソノ」トシテ、ハ一般ニ其
 標「ソノ」カ外交上、仕事ニ、無カ「ソノ」トシテ、且ツ又其標、
 嚴秘ト問題、廣ク此文書ヲ暴露スル「ソノ」カ「ソノ」解
 此危險ト云フコトニ實際基キテ居ル「ソノ」カ「ソノ」合
 談記録、立証的價値關係ナルトシテ、ハ「ソノ」ハ「ソノ」
 其信據性ヲカスル「ソノ」ナリ「ソノ」
 「ソノ」トシテ、自身此、記録ヲ信賴基キ「ソノ」ハ「ソノ」
 居セ「ソノ」ナリ。例ハ前記述ス「九四三年(昭和十六年)五月五日
 附東京家庭電報(法廷書記カ「七九」号)ニ於テ、「ソノ」
 上「ソノ」ニ「ソノ」トシテ、對ニ日本、關係ニ就テ、
 松岡ト、談話、内ヲ傳ヘテ居「ソノ」ニ、即チ合談記録、
 確テ「ソノ」トシテ、而シテ、比、松岡、具體的、記録ヲ反駁
 シ「ソノ」ナリ「ソノ」カ「ソノ」トシテ、(法廷書記カ「
 一〇六」号)
 更ニ法廷「ソノ」ノ、日附、異ツテ松岡「ソノ」ト
 「ソノ」合談記録ヲ提出ス「ソノ」(法廷書記カ「三五」号)

5555 1000 6510

0159 0001 0306

其說上在曰三國之國運通合之
用記部上之說上之說上之說上之說
辨說則全在論理上之辨農創始之
說記部上之說上之說上之說上之說
及上之說上之說上之說上之說上之說
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三國志卷之九十四

其說上在曰三國之國運通合之
用記部上之說上之說上之說上之說
辨說則全在論理上之辨農創始之
說記部上之說上之說上之說上之說
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辨說則全在論理上之辨農創始之
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三國志

手白紙の攻撃(北三道) 欲しては予の(諸君書記
宋七九号) 上言の事、其の以て其の事、其の事也

近衛手記 中六次、ヨウガリ、ミトロ、言禁が引開
サシ、又、彼、自命、松岡、外相、対して、程、人、独り
戦、不可、避、た、三、手、所、詭、謀、を、置、て、其、對、手、の、聯、手
中、五、條、約、締、結、カ、ミ、ト、ハ、ハ、眞、意、を、解、明、ス、云、云

遊書記者(三五五号)

一部、分、り、前、引、開、大、松、前、(五、五、五) 對、し、攻、撃、事、備
シ、知、ラ、テ、予、不、可、下、手、を、明、シ、マ、ス。

日本、の、自、主、建、國、同、條、約、締、結、ハ、公、に、口、之、能
度、シ、テ、文、書、の、何、カ、引、去、リ、上、北、辯、護、側、努、力、ハ

聖、益、モ、十、字、の、陰、謀、合、股、的、目、的、を、遂、行、シ、テ、
又、自、同、時、自、命、自、身、刑、害、を、適、應、シ、テ、個、人、的、問、題

を、解、決、シ、行、フ、之、に、陰、謀、加、擔、者、ハ、予、ハ、自、日本
政府、の、外、交、政、策、個、々、問、題、に、對、し、自、命、自、身、計

算、を、得、テ、得、文、明、論、辯、シ、テ、予、ハ、之、ニ、カ、シ、眞、意、を、見
究、メ、大、々、事、業、の、進、衛、シ、テ、ハ、大、々、言、ハ、不、可、

ナ、シ、之、辯、護、側、(コ、ト、ナ、シ、) 九、四、一、年、(福、澤、六、次、郎、四、十、
日、) 出、處、勘、定、ハ、結、定、同、意、シ、テ、予、ハ、之、(遊、書、記者、三、五、
号) 上、言、シ、テ、予、ハ、明、文、書、を、提、出、シ、予、ハ、之、を、予、知、シ、テ、予、ハ、

一九四一年(昭和十六年)九月二十日 松岡電報(三)

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Summation 11
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Summary of

「ソノトコロニ日本、内外事情ヲ考慮スルコト」
連邦ト武力衝突ヲ避ケルヨリスメタトイウ近衛手記、
他ノ城ニ部命ヲ行ニ裁判長團六次ヨリ言ハシム
トス。

近衛公ノアル文書内容アルト申述ベラシメタトコロ、
ソノ内容ヲ立記スルニトテ受ケラセシ(連記簿ヲ三四
三頁)以上理由ヲツテ檢察側ハソノ内容ヲ判定セザレ
ド立書ニソノ論争スルハ必要ニ考エラセシ近衛
手記ヨリテ覽、内容ガ正確ニ傳ヘラシメタルコトガ
証明ガレタルハ、檢察側又松岡ノ決ニ仲裁者トシテ立
場ガテハソノ日本側ニツテ「ソノコト」連邦ニ対スル攻撃手
ヲ実行スル都合、好時期ヲ選ビトシテアルトイフ事ヲ
記録立テルナリセラ。

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Summation H

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九四年(昭和十六年)六月二十二日「オーストリア」

聯邦二対大政變を開始シタ。ハ「オーストリア」が、

完全無缺、軍事完了と認マシタ。オーストリア連邦二対

公然の侵略行為ナリ。オーストリア、ソヴェト、聯邦

二國同盟を遂ゲ、聯邦連合、二國同盟を日本空條

約違反を遂ゲ一人復同二列ニ松岡、最初直接回啓

ヲ送リタ。其、後

三國同盟を日本、對外政策、基礎アリ、若シ今次、戦争

ト中立條約亦此、基礎及び三國同盟ト不能ニシタ。

中立條約ハ期ヲ失フ、ソヴェト、オーストリア力説ニシ

テ、松岡、コソ、言葉、九四年(昭和十六年)七月十五日

附、オーストリア、二電報言フ、再確認カ。法廷

九四年(昭和十六年)六月二十二日附、電文、オース

ト、オーストリア、個人的ニ彼(松岡)依然日本、結局、

衝突ニ中立ヲ止リ得ナシ、見解、此、報告言フ、

心。九四年(昭和十六年)七月三日、オーストリア、日本政

府二対、中立條約ヲ遵守スルモ、其、聲明シタ、報

告多シカ。オーストリア、書、于居ル如ク、松岡ハ、

二対日本、聲明、用語ヲ富チ、備、不完全ニ鑑ミ、

二人、數、又、少シ、モ、不明瞭ニシテ、基礎ヲ置ナシ。

「オーストリア」現在我々ニ傳達セリ、政府、決定ヲ暗示スル如

ク、二聯ニ對シ、準備迅速ニ為カレ、二感付、于居ナシ。

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(法廷書証才七九六号) ト云フ一テアリシク

Sum mation 17

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然レ松岡ト與連レテ問題ニシテ一テ論ヲ登シタル必能カ
 凡ト若シ英文書ト云フニ實ハ松岡ガ「ソウ」対シテ攻撃
 準備ヲ取知シテ 松岡ガ「戦争」ト云フ日本「ソウ」上「聯
 邦」対シテ戦争ニ参加セト云フ「ソウ」約末ニ松岡ハ北信「的」目
 的「ソウ」上「聯邦」上「中立」條約ヲ結ビ 松岡ガ「ソウ」ガ
 対シテ戦争ヲ始メ「ソウ」日本「対シテ」開戦「ソウ」ニ「ソウ」ニ對シ
 「ソウ」ニ「後期」ヲ「主張」シタルト物語「ソウ」イ「ス」
 カニ「松岡」ニ「死」シタルト「對シテ」責任「増減」シ「ソウ」タ「ナリ
 」ト云フ「一部」ヲ「被」シタルト「証人」ガ「告訴」狀ニ「訴」
 「多ク」責任「現在」ニ「松岡」ニ「負」ツ「テ」
 「比」モ「長」シ「外務」大臣「交渉」ヲ「行」ハ「
 」國「政府」代「表」ニ「對シテ」内閣「軍」ノ「真実」ヲ「詳」細
 ニ「公」表「明」ス

2.133

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一、昭和三十二年四月中立條約締結直後関東軍
 參謀長ハ其國衆秘密會議ニ於テ演説シ本條約ヲ
 『三國同盟強化自覚』トシテ外交上「措置」ニ「特」徴
 附「及」テ「今」後「條約」ノ「効」ヲ「收」ム「ニ」
 對シ「テ」在「戰」時「條約」ノ「絶」對「不」
 言「リ」ニ「決」意「示」シ「
 三、以上明白且「破廉恥」ノ「言」ト「現」ハ「公」
 示「セ」
 言「リ」

「F」は、対ソ攻撃開始直後、即チソグニト国家最大危機ニ至ル日ノ關係、根本方針一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月二日帝前會議ニ引テ決定セラル。ソ独

戰ニ對シテ、三國軸輻精神ヲ基調トシテ、此輩ノ之ノ介入ニ對テハ、密ニ對ソ力の準備ヲ整ヘ、自主的ニ對處スルニ當リ、固深心用意ヲ以テ外交交渉ヲ行フ、獨シ

戰爭、推物帝國、尙有利ニ進展セバ、力ヲ行使シ、北方問題ヲ解決シ、北邊安定ヲ確保ス。（茲延書証

第七九号）

「私」は、證明セテ努力ヲ盡シ、政府ハ日本南方ニ對シテ戰況ヲ考慮シ、陰謀、金般の計畫遂

行、爲日本が責任ヲ以テ役割ニ原則的ニ賛成ス。

辯護側ハ、一九四二年（昭和十六年）七月二日、決定ニ定

行ニ物サズ、後一九四二年（昭和十六年）九月六日、

會議、決定ヨリ變更サレタト主張セテ試ミテス。

「F」ハ、辯護人ハ、最後、決定ヲ次ノニ性格ツク

ニシテ、對ソ態度ヨリテ、ソ聯ガ滿洲國及日本ヲ脅

威シテ、限日ヨリ中立條約ニ從ツテ日本、方カラ積

極的ニ行動ニ起サシム（速記録第三四六七頁）

辯護人ニ依リテ引用サレタ字句、決議、實際、字句

ト致シ、居リテ也。吾々、此處ニ誤差カ及ハ不正ナルト

云フニ就テ、判定方ヲ該延ニ提起致シテ、實際、内

容決言カテモ、全シテ也。

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Summation H

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Summation H

駐日「ドイツ大使」之「一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月三日附電文中「八次ノ事ヲ述ベラレタリ」。

『独逸ノ協力セ有クシテ「社会主義共和國聯邦」ニ因テ「元不測」ノ件ニ對シ日本ヲ準備スルニシテ...日本ハ「第一東部」ニ於テ「子情」ヲ發展スルニ「監視」ヲ居リ「其他」ヲ建設カシ「共產黨」組織ヲ破壊シ「確信」ヲモテ「軍備」ヲ增大、就中此「自的」ヲ達成シ「全」日本「政府」中ニ保持サシ「年」

一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月四日「オットー・ハルツ」ハ「電報中」テ「次」ノ事ヲ報告シ「ハ」日本「軍隊」ハ「美」ノ「而」モ「甚」ク「秘密」ヲ準備ス「ハ」在「ル」...（四）沿「海州」ヲ占領スル「目的」ヲ以テ「不」然「然」ノ「躁急」ヲ「ハ」シ「テ」「戰端」ヲ「開」ク（該「証書」才六三六）

一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月十二日「ハルツ」ハ「電報」ヲ「オットー」ハ「將校」ヲ任命「豫備」兵力ヲ「運轉」スル「者」ヲ「滿洲」ニ「シ」テ「徵用」シ「テ」「語」能「者」ヲ「召集」シ「テ」「國」軍「増強」セ「ル」日本ニ「ヨリ」テ「作」ラ「レ」タ「リ」

對「シ」テ「戰」争「準備」ヲ「一」連「貫」シ「テ」具體的「ニ」処置「ス」ル「テ」報「告」シ「タ」リ「タ」リ（該「証書」才七九九）

一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月二十五日附「電報」ニ「ヨリ」テ「豫備」兵力ヲ「召集」シ「テ」大規模「ニ」ラ「リ」八「日」中「旬」迄「ニ」約「九十」萬名ヲ「召集」セ「ル」事「ヲ」軍「馬」自「動」車「ニ」使「用」セ「ル」事「ヲ」滿洲ニ於テ「輸送」セ「ル」事「ヲ」軍「隊」ヲ「配」

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Summary 14

備之心を、華北軍に、軍隊を、備給を、為、軍需品、
 集結を行、滿洲を、三、朝鮮、方、新、軍、編、
 成を行、化、軍、報、告、之、續、也、...、然、之、在、う、
 其、が、軍、之、う、う、ア、ス、ト、之、地、方、及、北、方、三、対、を、攻、撃、す、
 制、限、之、を、又、固、は、二、六、イ、九、海、方、向、を、取、り、而、し、
 滿、洲、鉄、道、三、北、方、を、及、び、外、北、方、を、通、り、う、カ、ル、が、
 地、方、を、方、向、を、取、り、事、に、相、像、二、難、ク、な、
 用、始、時、期、を、出、(進、撃、に、余、意、見、三、ヨ、リ、未、ダ、八、月、
 中、旬、迄、カ、ル、一、小、の、事、に、因、本、將、軍、亦、屢、及、談、話、
 中、三、日、本、の、報、之、因、因、が、不、レ、ガ、河、三、割、違、う、時、始、ま、
 行、動、を、開、始、而、し、述、之、る、六、年、掛、り、テ、之、得、也、(張、廷、
 書、証、才、八、三、路、) 述、之、不、レ、云、

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 之、上、上、聯、邦、三、対、を、攻、撃、す、時、期、を、最、三、都、合、好、
 狀、規、定、也、之、を、日、本、指、導、自、心、之、上、上、聯、邦、三、対、
 を、侵、略、計、画、を、実、施、ス、ル、為、に、適、当、な、機、会、を、失、つ、
 恐、レ、ル、也、云、云、

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一九四二年(昭和十七年)七月三十一日東京ヨリ「ワシ、
 ト」ニ、送、ラ、ル、電、報、ニ、六、次、事、が、記、サ、レ、テ、下、リ、ス、而、...、
 勿、論、独、露、戦、争、に、五、年、三、北、方、問、題、解、決、絶、好、
 機、会、を、失、フ、事、件、を、利、用、ス、ル、準、備、を、進、め、
 居、ル、上、之、が、実、を、思、...、甚、之、独、露、戦、争、が、余、リ、
 是、邊、に、進、行、ス、ル、に、我、帝、国、の、決、然、的、三、何、等、有、
 知、見、一、致、行、動、を、取、ル、余、裕、を、有、ス、テ、イ、テ、ウ、ウ、(張、廷、

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日本ト云ハ「ソ聯亦忠実ニ守ル主義ヲ維持スル限リ」
 聯平和關係ヲ繼續ス考ヘルトイフ言明ガ九四
 年八月廿一日ソ聯大使ニ對シテ與ヘラシム時(該延書証
 書ハ三号一此)亦トシテ獨逸大使ハ配シテソ聯ト
 言ハ日本ガ怒リ「戰ニ參加スル」云フ印象ヲ受ケ居
 又ト云ヒ之ニ對シテ「ソ聯トシテ」云フ言明ハソ聯ニ
 對テ將來ノ政策ヲ遂行スルニ才一歩トシテ最良措
 置ト知ル考エ此ノ政策モ獨逸政府ト協調ヲ採ラシム
 事ヲ及ビ三國協定ノ精神ト目的ニ完全ニ致シ居リ
 一(該延書証書ハ。四号)トシテ保證的言明ヲ得テ居リ又

Summary 14

書証書ハ。(八号)
 元四年(昭和十六年)八月一日附電報ニ更ニ日本、
 動員狀況ニ関スル資料ガ次、ヨリ報ラシムルニ及ビ、三
 丁極東ニ於テ戰力ヲ消滅セシムル意圖トシテ為サシ動
 員(該延書証書ハ。五号)
 二、電報、白附九四年(昭和十六年)八月一日ニ注意
 撥起サ下サレ、之ハ内閣更迭後二週間自、松岡ガスラニ
 外務大臣ニシテカケリ、コトナシ。二、事實ハ、ソガエト、聯
 邦ニ對テ戰爭準備ガ松岡一國人ニ、關連シタモ、
 之ハ内閣更迭後二週間更迭ガ行フヨリトモ
 主權ヲ、牛ニ握ツテ、ソ聯ト日本ヲ配階級、方針ヲ
 シタニス。ソ、方針、極メテ明カナリシ。中ニ立條約
 掩護下ニ適當ノ機會ヲ得テ、ソガエト、聯邦ニ對
 テ攻撃準備ヲ積極的ニ行フトイフベシ。

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Summary of

二場合を他、各二場合ニ於テ、同二稱「日本側」
 二聯「對テ」敵對行動ヲ採ルリ計畫多ク、三國
 協定即チ保護例ヲ証據トシ、之ヲ「通リ」聯「
 友好」關係ヲ定テ目的ヲ結ビ、之ヲ「協定」基礎ニ
 置キ、之ヲ「力説」ス、以テ其ノ「心」ヲ「
 下」リ、且、及「上」ニ、夫「日本政府」が「對テ」戰爭「積極」的
 準備ヲ「三」度「多」ク「小」問題ニ「以テ」シ、偶然「女性」質「
 言」有リ、得「テ」モ「全」心「ヲ」明「カ」ス、想「逸」天使「電」報「ヲ」
 指「提」出「シ」テ、其「身」更ニ「又」提出「ス」ル「方」アリ、之「レ」公「事務」的
 正「義」的「ヲ」又「事務」的「ヲ」具體「的」ニ「承」知「シ」テ、居「ツ」テ、之「ヲ」基
 礎「的」ニ「組織」的「公」式「情」報「ヲ」「下」リ、之「レ」又、然「レ」五「六」
 日「又」止「マ」テ、日本「政府」の「決心」ニ「對」シ、攻撃「準備」ヲ「行
 ツ」テ、其「心」ニ「極」ク「重」ク「証」據「ヲ」日本「側」出「所」カ「ル」出「シ
 見」之「心」也。

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 一九四二年（昭和十七年）七月二日天皇親臨「下」行「ハ」シ、
 會議決定「北」有「問題」解決、身「武」力「行使」(張廷書
 註「之」九「号」)遂「行」ス、即「チ」領「土」領「土」、又「關」特
 種「(特別演習)」名「稱」下「ニ」暗「号」投「テ」居「ル」方「計」
 戰爭「準備」、特別「秘密」計畫「亦」作「成」ラ「ル」方「アリ」之「方」ヲ「計
 画」(侵略「國」暴「露」シ、他「資料」ト「共」ニ「日本」官「憲」中「ニ
 リ」テ「燒」却「ラ」ル「之」ヲ「然」シ「テ」計畫「及」ビ「之」ニ「依」テ「行」テ「實」施「セ

Summary of

之措置、主要に内容に於て信憑性他、文書及び
 權威的証人、証言に依りて証立するに依りて、
 証人、日本海軍謀本部將校副島龍藏、一九四一年
 昭和三十六年(夏)日本に於て偽添補員が行はるり
 (昭和三十六年)夏約三十万者を送らるり証言に
 國東軍強化、昭和三十六年(夏)即ち獨逸が、聯
 同証人一九四一年(昭和三十六年)夏に、他、
 増強を行はるり國東軍、強化、他、
 指置るる名指に就中、國東軍、各師団を増加
 定員、切替、タリトヲ示之(該証書証字(三四号))
 証人、松浦九州男、國東軍司令部員、内蒙吉に於
 其、地方へ出り日本軍、作戦並に沿海地方
 及、地方地方、何の方面に於て、國東軍、作戦が
 計畫、居り、確認する(該証書証字(三三号))

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Summary H

閣特演計画ニ基テ滿洲国政府ヲ遂行シテ措置ニシテ
 証人武部ニ示シ滿洲国政府 總務長官カ言フ
 乃與テ居リテス。ソレハ新ニ滿洲ニ到着シテ軍隊ノ食料
 食料及ヒ其他ノ物資ヲ提供スル下ニ、軍事的對象物及ヒ
 其他ノ施設、建設ニ要スル燃料カ多量ニ必要ナルコトヲ示シ
 之ヲ。証人ハコトヲ等シ、指電ニシテ、指令ヲ總ニ梅津
 閣東軍司令官カラ受取リテ、一九四二年(昭十六)夏東京
 丁東條陸軍大臣ヲ訪問シテ所ガ東條ハ武部ニ對シ閣特
 演計画ヲ閣連シテ閣東軍ニ對シテ所學ノ物ヲ供與ス
 ル措置ヲ滿洲国政府ニ於テ完全ニ實現スル必要ガアルト
 言明シテアリマス(法廷書証ニ三三七頁)。
 証人武部ハ閣特演計画實行ハ独逸ノ對シ攻撃
 直後開始セリシコト閣東軍ノ厨カラ著ク増大スルコト
 ニシテコト認メテ上テヤウニ証言シテ居リマス。
 同私ハコト閣特演計画ニイテ實ハ非常ニ驚イタリテアリ
 マス。ト申シマスハコトガ「朕」ニ對スル攻撃ガ始ルデハ有力。
 日ハ閣東軍ノイコトガ近イデハオカトイウコトヲ守ニ實ハ
 直感シタリマス。又閣東軍ノ參謀ニ面ニオキニテ
 毛日ハ閣東軍ガ直グニ起ルトイフコトヲ氣命ヲ示シテ居リ
 下リマス(法廷書証ニ三三六三頁)。
 梅津ハ一九四二年(昭十六)九月六日附ノ命令ヲ閣特演計
 画ニ從ヒ閣東軍ノウキニスル露露諸通訳ヲ補充養育ヲ行フ
 バキ旨命ヲ示シテ居リマス(法廷書証ニ三三三頁)

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Summation 14

閣特演計画ニ依リテ行ハニテ其ノ他ノ措置ニツイテノ問題ニ関シハ私ハ時間的制約ノ下ニ法廷ヲ管理セラレタ文書即チ法廷書証元八三三号、元六八二号、元八三五号ヲ引用スルニ

留メテ置キマス。尚閣特演計画及ヒコトニ從テ實際ノ措置ニツイテハ既ニ述マテ置キマス。此ノ點ニ於テハ、

六、元九七九号及ハ〇号、元八三〇号。閣特演計画ニ從テ閣東軍ノ兵力ハ二倍以上ナリ一九四一年(前十七)月頃八百人ニ達スルニシテ、

昭十三ニ比較スルニ略算ノ數ハ三倍ナリ又飛行機ノ數ハ三倍ニテナリシコトヲ(法廷書証元七〇六号)証人村上中将

ハ極東ノ連軍ニ對シテ居々日本軍兵力ノ約百人ニ述ベシコトヲ(連記斜字三二〇六四号)

ス、如クシテモ百ノ日本軍ハ遠東ノ完全ニ準備ヲ整

今一九四二年(昭和十六年)カラ連國境附近ニ駐屯シテ

然レテ連軍ガ總軍ニ示シテ抵抗ハ侵略者等ノ中心

ヲ混亂シ五四年(昭和十六年)ノ夏彼等、企圖ヲ破

推シテテリシ人。日本政府ハ陰謀、運命ヲ懸念念

ニ對シテ苦状ヲ申込ニシテ大島、証言ヲ即覽ナク

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的成功ヲ收ム得ル自信ガナク、大本然ハ最近ソビエト
聯邦ニ対スル行動ヲ延期スル決定ニ到達シテ相テアル。

(法廷書記文ハニテ)

ト報告シテ居ラス。私ハ曰一時延期ト云フ最後ノ言葉ヲ

強調シミス。ケイテ此ノ約束ニテ三週間及夫以上モ経過シマ

シガ状態ニ変化ハアリマセンデレ。一九四二年(昭和十六年)

十月四日附伯林宛電報テ、オツトハ曰日本ノ未ダ依然トシ

テ對シニ強イト云ハレテアル極早急ニ對スル交易ハ未ダ着迄

ハ不可能デアル。ソ連ガ独ニ對シテ示シテ強カシハ海カ

九月ニ日本ガ攻襲ヲシテモレバリアノ通路ハ本年中ニハ開

通セラレ得ヌデアロウ(法廷書記七八八号)ト報告シテ居

ラス。一九四一年十一月十七日附伯林宛電報テハ日本ノ

Summation 11

『大伴一九四二年(昭和十六年)七月廿八月初に私ハ独守ノ
攻取「テハホ」ガ遷「ナツク」コトヲ知リ始メタ「モス」クワ及ビ

「ミン」グ「ノ」ドハ彼等ノ「計」画ニ豫見セシク時期ニ奪取カセカ
ツク。此事ニ關シ私ハ説明ヲホムルタメ「リ」ッ「ベ」ント「ロ」ップ「シ」許
ヘ赴イタ。彼レハ説明ヲ與ヘ「タ」ム「ケ」イ「テ」ルヲ招イタ。其「ケ」イ「テ」ル
ガ私ニ語ツテ「ド」イ「ッ」軍、攻取「テ」ハ「ホ」一「遷」ク「ナ」ツク「ハ」聯絡ガ
大ニ伸張シ後オ部隊及諸機関ガ遷「ト」コトニ依ツテ「志」
起サシタモ「テ」ニ「関」連シ攻撃「ノ」「テ」ハ「ホ」ハ約三週間遷シラ
セルト「キ」ツク。(法廷書記「エ」七七六子)

一九四二年(昭和十六年)九月四日附伯林宛電報「「オ」ツ「ト」ハ
「露」西「軍」ガ独「乙」軍ノ如ク軍隊ニ対シ「テ」キ「ル」抵抗ニ鑑ミ
日本參謀本部ハ冬期到来前ニ露路西「乙」軍ニ対シ「テ」恐「ニ」ク決定

對「國土行動者」延期之「六」有人被認
 居「不」(按延書証示五五号)

對「改整時期」選定「戰略計畫」上「重電」事業
 下「」遺囑「日本」總「財中」於「最」
 有利「狀態」上「ハ」於「資源」基地「占領」

後「對」改整「開始」(「」)
 斯「心」態度「對」電「財」(「」)
 非常「重要」(「」)
 九月三十日附「東」發「伯林」宛「電報」(「」)

「」居「又」
 日現在「我」方「南」亦「移動」(「」)
 迫「手」讓「和」及「事」意味「也」(「」)
 壓「不」利「上」於「今」人「事」直接「行動」起「事」等「口」
 應「之」旨「信」(「」)
 大「」(「」)

日本「身」(「」)
 (按延書証示八〇三号)
 十六年)十二月六日附「東」發「伯林」宛「電報」(「」)

又「即」中
 我「才」(「」)
 的「備」(「」)

準備「決」(「」)

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南東軍各課長一九四二年四月
長官會議「南東軍司令部」
作戰準備及進軍「南東軍司令部」
狀態研究(南)特別問題「南東軍司令部」
文三七〇号

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一九四二年(昭和十七年)一月二十九日(倫敦)
「南東軍司令部」情報「南東軍司令部」
軍、進軍加進「南東軍司令部」
攻略後日本「南東軍司令部」
「南東軍司令部」海軍及北洋軍「南東軍司令部」
「南東軍司令部」(法廷書記「南東軍司令部」)

一九四二年(昭和十七年)一月二十九日(倫敦)
「南東軍司令部」四月二十五日(東京)
「南東軍司令部」(法廷書記「南東軍司令部」)
「南東軍司令部」(法廷書記「南東軍司令部」)

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對「掠奪戰」一九四二年(昭和十七年)四月二十五日(東京)
閣、日本參謀本部及南東軍司令部「南東軍司令部」
員會「南東軍司令部」領土行政計劃「南東軍司令部」
具體的「南東軍司令部」

証人武部五藏及松浦九智男(一九四二年四月二十五日)
一九四三年(昭和十七年)南東軍司令部「南東軍司令部」

軍司令官梅津，許三第五課が設けし同課、ハ聯領、占領地
 度ヲ作成シテ居ルニ並ビ此、任リハ滿洲國總務廳、專門家
 部千與ニテ居ルコトヲ証言シタル(連記録才三八四頁三九三
 三頁)

半護側証人池田ハ又討論、際一九四一年(昭和十六年)、
 六月方ラ九月迄參謀本部於テ「聯領、占領制度、作成
 從事」ニテ居ル將校班、班員ヲ下クシ並ビ「後日彼ハ陸軍
 少將トシテ關東軍司令部、課長ヲシ、同課、同様ニ占領地
 定、ハ「聯領、制度」ヲ作成シタルヲ明白ニシタ。(連記録
 才三六九四六頁)

「占領地行政制度」立案ニ付テ部 杉浦兩檢察側
 証人がシテ証言並ニ半護側自身、証人池田、與ヘテ証言
 對シテ半護側ハ元參謀本部及關東軍司令部、特
 校ヲリ現在右裁判ヲ半護人トシテ居ル大越トシ、証
 言ヲ以テ對抗セシメテ居ルニシタ。然レモ、証人毛彼、職務、
 「ハ」占領地行政制度問題ヲ研究スルコトヲ下クテ
 下クテ先ヅ以テ論メテ下リタ。(英文速記録才三七三頁)
 夫レカラ同證人ハ占領地諸地方ニ對シテ軍政計畫、關東
 軍司令部ニ依リテ作成セラルシ參謀本部ト送リテ下リテ
 ルカコ、計畫ニハ行政治安、維持、産業、組織、金融、通信
 及運輸送、各部カ入ツテ居ルコト並ニ彼ト池田カ占領

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Summation - H

地行政、研究、一九四二年(昭和十七年)中南洋方面ニ出張ヲ
 命ぜられたる事ニ付、(英文原記録才三七四頁)
 大越ハ彼ハ本裁判ヲ弁護人デアルト云フコトニ気がツイタ、
 テ事更ニ極テソシキ関東軍司令部ハ滿洲ガ行政ニ依リテ
 占領セシルカモ知ラナイカラ、滿洲ノ各地ニ對スル行政制度
 ヲ作成シタカ、ハ多クハ、ソノ事ニ對シテ、同意スルヤウニ
 ナリマシタ、ソ、先、証言ニ於テ、証人即チ今、弁護人大越ハ自
 命、旧長官デ、ソ、現在、弁護人トシテ、本裁判ニ出テ来ル
 池田ヲ攻撃シ、ソ、池田ガ、証人トシテ、ソ、証言ノ中ニ、幾
 多ク、不正確ナル事ガ、ソ、言フヤウニ、ナリマシタ、(英文原記録才三
 七五四頁)
 コノ様ニ、二人、今、弁護人ハ、本法庭ニ、於テ、喧嘩シ、ソ、於テ、彼等
 ハ、旧長官デ、今日、報告トシ、ソ、居ル、人々ヲ、不幸カラ、救ヒ、出ス
 ト、才、五、ヨリ、多ク、書、リ、ソ、ナリ、マシタ、

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Summation H

梅津自署名之閣議公報、一般の任務、兵力之命並ニ戰線及
心算、各個任務、國策、計畫、戰術、記言ヲ予之ニシテ、選記
録本(一四三頁)夫ニ依リテ、太平洋戰爭中ニ何ニテ日本
一九四二年(昭和十七年)ニ弱体化ニシテ、シテ又ニ聯邦
ノ意ヲ攻撃シ、其ノ武力ヲ反テ増大シテ之。 (選記書記
本(三三三頁))

私(一九四二年、一九四三年(昭和十七年、十八年)度滿洲軍
準備基地カラ、對シテ攻撃計畫、内容、同ク詳細述ベテ
記言ヲ付シ、松浦、此多誠ニ其場辰、記言、法廷、注
意ヲ以テ、復テ度ノ旨ニテ、(選記書記本(七三三頁、八三三頁、
八三三頁、八三三頁))

H162

斯ク、如ク攻撃準備ニ於テ、其軍事行動、其國ニ就テ言ハ
半能ニ發令ニシテ居テ、予リテ、然レ日本政府ノ期待シ
テ居テ、然能ニ、(昭和十七年)上同程、カニ不利、狀能
ニ續テ居テ、予リテ。

P149

独逸、陰謀、一戰計畫、其全圖、太平洋海上ニ於テ戰爭ヲ
行フテ居ルニ、其ニ、狀能ニ考慮シテ、夫レ故ニ独逸、六不
日本ニ對シテ、戰、急進ナル用、如ク、總論、他方、最、小、危險
ヲ以テ、戰爭ヲスルニ、其計畫、其、件、カ、出、テ、稱、下、注、出、テ、
シ。謀、議、間、ニ、於、テ、其、後、割、別、新、稱、ト、モ、テ、予、リ、テ、シ。

Summation - H

一九四二年(昭和十七年)三月二十六日附東京宛「ワシントン」電報に係る大島上協議之際、伯林、於大島、
 『勿論、我々日本固力即々三、欲方、固力、意味、不
 トコロア、ル故ニ日本が其固力ヲ跳越スル行キ方ヲ不
 コトハ先頭日本ニ對シ期待ニヨリト、思ハナ、(法廷書
 託才三八九送ト言)タトカ明カテ下リス。
 私「日本カ、吾々、力テ下ルカ、ト、ワシントン」
 言葉、即三國協定ニ基、独逸、其他、同盟諸國、總
 カテ下ルカ、其ヲ符ニ強調致シマ。
 一九四二年(昭和十七年)五月十五日東京宛電報中「ワシ
 トク」ハ日本が「西、北」分早ク「ワシントン」攻撃
 不決、定ニ立至シ心ニ越シタリトナリ。然ニ年、是、總
 び日本が、斯カニ作戦企圖ニ成功スニ足ル必要兵力ヲ
 缺キ居ルハ、當然日本ハ「ワシントン」中立關係ヲ
 維持スルカ、ス。斯カニ場合ニ於テ、日本、戰爭、共
 同遂行ニ有效ニ寄、興、ル、爲、ニ、別、方面例ハ、印度カ
 ナ、又、印度ニ於テ、攻勢ニ出ナシ、ナラ、(法廷書証、ヲ、ハ
 手)ト、希望ヲ述ベマシ。

私、三國協定参加國ノ世界の規模、戰爭ヲ協同ニ

Discussion 41

行の口は「無一、一」の字に似て、
 人の口の上並に二枚の文を字に似て、
 金引籠、各通、信路、上取、取、
 二枚字及、上取、取、

更ニ引字、取、
 見之字、取、取、

「口」上、口、字、空、如、改、
 同盟ニ対シ、蘭、後、
 生、是、成、功、
 証、(六七号)

九皇母 (昭和十七年) 夏、東條、
 詩詞ニ証人、大、
 前、
 實、
 日本、
 子、
 虎、
 之、
 優、

0 159 000 1 0329

P. 152

一六四三身(昭和三身)二三 一品を以て(昭和三身)を以て
 於て現在、(昭和三身)の事、昭和三身(昭和三身)を以て(昭和三身)

昭和三身の事

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昭和三身

H

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昭和三身(昭和三身)三(昭和三身)昭和三身(昭和三身)三(昭和三身)
 の事、昭和三身の事、昭和三身(昭和三身)三(昭和三身)

Summary

1. 1945年(昭和二十年)六月二十三日(即八月八日)日本投降後，
 中國政府根據《開羅宣言》及《波茨坦公告》，對日本提出八項條件，
 要求日本無條件投降。日本在八月十五日發表投降聲明，
 承認中國領土主權，並同意對華經濟合作。此後，
 中國政府開始接收日本在華領土及財產。

2. 1945年(昭和二十年)八月十五日(即八月八日)日本投降後，
 中國政府根據《開羅宣言》及《波茨坦公告》，對日本提出八項條件，
 要求日本無條件投降。日本在八月十五日發表投降聲明，
 承認中國領土主權，並同意對華經濟合作。此後，
 中國政府開始接收日本在華領土及財產。

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 中國政府根據《開羅宣言》及《波茨坦公告》，對日本提出八項條件，
 要求日本無條件投降。日本在八月十五日發表投降聲明，
 承認中國領土主權，並同意對華經濟合作。此後，
 中國政府開始接收日本在華領土及財產。

4. 1945年(昭和二十年)八月十五日(即八月八日)日本投降後，
 中國政府根據《開羅宣言》及《波茨坦公告》，對日本提出八項條件，
 要求日本無條件投降。日本在八月十五日發表投降聲明，
 承認中國領土主權，並同意對華經濟合作。此後，
 中國政府開始接收日本在華領土及財產。

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命ニ立証シテモ、ト考ヘズ。

Summation H

P. 154

H-166 弁護側ハ日本ハ対シテ攻撃ヲ準備シテカクシテ主張シズ。所ニ依リテ此主張ハ立証ナシテ居ハラセシカ。立証ニハ何ヨリモ先ニ日本ハ攻撃ヲ行ハシカクシテ居ルニ若シ攻撃ヲシカクシテ準備シテカクシト云フコトハ論理ハ簡單ナリ。然レ不正當ナリ。

吾々ハ弁護側、如何ナル文書ト事ヲ争フ、トスル。ソレニトビテハ彼カ日本ヲ「ロシヤ」ト、戦争ニ引込ニ試ミシカ。日本ハ「聯邦」ト、紛争ヲ回避セシメラセテ、結論ニ運シテト証言シテカクシテ(証書証ナシ四六三号)

「ソレニ依リテ」立証ニ於テ「ソレニトビテ」ノ、同シ様ナ証言他ノ文書中ニモ同様ニ有リヌ。(証書証ナシ二六九二号A)

事實リ「ソレニトビテ」ハ、斯様ナ証言ヲ争フニシテ、然レ夫レハ彼自軍ガ主要ナ独逸戦争犯罪人トシテ国際軍事裁判、立証ニ立ツ時ニ争フ、テアリヌ。平和ニ對ス陰謀ノ自命、同志ヲカ「ソレニトビテ」コトハ全ク自然テアリヌ。一方「ソレニトビテ」カ被告トシテ「ソレニトビテ」ハ、外務大臣「ソレニトビテ」等、文書ハ軍事法廷、審理事項トナルト全然考ヘ下居ナカク、時書キテ吾々カ立証提出シテ多數、文書ニ依リテ「ソレニトビテ」

p. 153

Summation 4/

力対して戦参加国として日本政府、同様に得て居ると云ふ
 こと及びその国々當りたる態度と云ふこと、争つべくもたず、確
 定したるに於て、問題の解は日本、対して政略、為す、時
 期選定は、又、又、又、而して若し此の謀議が實現せし
 たらば、此は其の「目的」は、遠く及ぶ帝國主義日本國
 保つるに因る事、云ふべきなり。

(次頁(後))

0159 0001 0335

P. 158

Summary-41

上証事項

此段所論人，其對「...」之討論，似係根據...

行日本德意志銀行，辦理之業務，其內容如下：

據一九三一年在德意志銀行之報告（即一九三一年...

德意志銀行自一九二九年，曾與德意志銀行及...

會經一九二九年，曾與德意志銀行及...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

德意志銀行之報告，係指一九二九年，曾與...

トスニトハ者ヲ識上不合理ナリ又ニ亦爾ニテキマス。

検査(側)文書其ノ対日政策ノ危険ト云フニハ被テ若ク兼護又セン
カ有ルナリ日英米法等ノリニトテ實際ニ於テハ日本政府ハ其ノ當時
ノ一連ノ行動カウノ政策ヲ期待シテモ居テカウヲ語リテ居ラス
而シテ一九四一年一月一日附山東提督ノ命令中ニ次ノ言キ
ヲ合ハシテ居ラス。

159
日ソソエウシニ主義主義若和國聯邦ノ事發展ニ備ヘテ
整言備テ嚴シクワリ。然レテウエ右ノ帝國カソノエウシ聯邦
邦ヲ攻撃セカスルニ聯邦ノ敵ヲ勤ク取ルカンキト信スル(法
廷証カハル)

0159 0001 0336

Summation H

附テ此ノ最後ノ兩人一般ニ敵ヲ以テ此ノ居ル所ニ護ト
 之ヲ將又無護側証人トシテ此ノ裁判ニ出廷スル日本判不両面
 神テアリ而シテ其地ノモノモ固シク種類ノ人リス。之等証人ハ
 被告ニ直接加担者アリマス。如何様ニシテモ被告ヲ無罪ニモ
 ニトスル彼等ノ証言及試ミハ夫レ其事ヲヨリテ自分自身ヲ
 無罪ニモントスルモノアリマス。

H-170

オニ次世田介大戦最初ノ三年間ニソレ連邦ハ「ヨーロッパ」ニ於テ
 オニ戦線カタルヨリメニ北信的ニソレ連ヲ攻奪シ且ツ独逸
 並ビ其ノ衛兵軍團ノ金軍事カ「ソレ」連ニ集中シタルヒト
 「ソレ」大軍トシテ戦ハシ金荷重ヲ負ツクアリマス。

「ソレ」連邦カ然レ「ファッショ」大軍ト歴史ニ見ル英雄的戦
 闘ヲ行フ所ナリ其時代ニ日本攻奪ノ企圖ヲ「ソレ」連邦ニ加シ

Summary 1-1

H-112

前設例六九四号十二年(昭和十三年)年度ニ作戦カシヨシ論
 本口統防備計畫ハ多大ノ注意ヲ得テ中ニ五五六九四号
 (昭和十九年)著ルニ「各謀本部始メテ」戦邊論ニ於テ
 防備計畫ノ行成ヲ考テ又ハ全職者ニ在リテ一七五五五九七ニ
 示サリタ。然レ之ハ「内閣少數院ニ統流」ヲヨシ電ノ頂上
 機關ニ又日本ハ同盟國陣ト破レテ對テリスレ

并據例六九四号(昭和十九年)及五五五号(昭和十九年)ノ行成
 在對北亞合衆國(大英及日其他列國)ノ戰ニ終止仲介ノ
 上格ニ據ルニ「同盟之鐵力」文書ヲ撰カシタメ之等ノ文
 書ハ本島ノ憲法特任務日軍大憲ニ從ヒ電報員(大憲カ)

五五三號ニ電報トシテ又「陸軍省紙」ニ於テ(一九一九年)「電報」ニ於テ
 前例(一九一九年)及「三〇号」及「二五号」ニ於テ(一九一九年)
 皇軍政府ノ世體ヲ得然レ遊キ其武力ヲ得兼テ爲救ハニ「此
 中會ニ繼グ」ノ誠ニ「上」ニ以テ「合衆國」ニ對シテ「
 夫」ノ誠ニ「上」ニ以テ「皇軍政府」仲介ノ同盟ニ「
 言」ル。自己ノ同盟義務ニ於テ「北亞」ニ對シテ「宣
 會衆國」及「六」ノ「上」ニ「要請」ニ「
 戰」テ「自」テ「人」ノ「命」ノ「犧」牲「ヲ」
 以テ「世」ノ「終」ニ「終」スル「事」カシ「
 一」

006510 1000 6750

Summation H

H-173

日本政府は次々として以て元寇暴徒中立條約を侵犯して、六月日本が德逸國を援助し、與て北目的の元寇軍を極東に於て牽制するとして、一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月、駐日德逸大使ハ伯林宛電報の中に次の如く報告して居ります。

『皇朝、増大就中此の目的を達成せしむるに、依りて、戦時進行の元寇軍を極東に於て牽制せしむる目的の有る元寇軍備の増大、固く日本政府の心中に保存せしむるべき事也（法廷書証第六三六号）』

「リズ」は一九四三年（昭和十六年）五月十五日東京宛電報の中に「是れ日本が対して、戦争のうちに十分力を持たせしむる日本に半立の維持に居るが長くない事である。この先は、次々として、元寇軍備の増大に當りては、元寇軍備の増大を懸念し、東部（北）に於ては、兵力の維持に當りては、是れ亦我々の負擔を輕くする事である（法廷書証第八〇六号）」と爲し、一九四三年（昭和十六年）三月三日「北」に對して「今既にして、北」に對して「北」の攻撃の結果を果して通報するに、同時「北」に對して「北」の歴史の上等日本側、赤藜襲撃、非露、露、経緯、経緯、未タカ也（法廷書証第八〇六号）」と報告して居ります。

P. 161

(ハ) 北の經濟政策上及び軍事上、状態は「北」の實情を此の條に供給するに

Summation H

H-175

中立條約、乳暴ヲ侵奪、次々ナリトシテ行ハシメ、
 即チ日本政府ハ独逸カノ連ヲ攻襲シ、復シテ日露
 側、軍事ニハ外交機關ヲ利用シ、連、經濟政治
 及ビ軍事欲返シ、軍事上之機密資料ヲ迅速ニ供
 給シ、テリシ。一九三二年(昭和三十六年)七月十日附電報中
 ナリトシテハ「オホシ」ナリトシテ、ナリトシテ、ナリトシテ、
 「モスコウ」日本大使、電報報告ヲ回送シ、ルコトナリ
 シ日本外務大臣ニ御禮ヲ言フヲ賞シ、ル……更ニ同
 電報ニハ連ヲ居入、一我々カ、方成テ、今后引續
 「ロンドン」カラ、報告ヲ受得ルニ、結構ナリトシ、(法廷書
 証カ六七号)一九四三年(昭和三十七年)十月カ、九四三
 年(昭和十八年)八月迄、参謀本部、(ロンドン、課長)ト
 ナリ、報告シ、又日本陸軍少将、松村詮人、参謀本
 部指導者、命令ニ依リ、(ロンドン)大佐、(譯)字十六課
 (供係關係)ニ、(譯)軍、兵力極薄ニ於テ、其、既置、野
 邦、戰事、能力ニ、(譯)情、報、ヲ、傳、シ、之、等、情、報、ハ、
 日本、(譯)官、其、(譯)答、復、情、報、源、ヲ、参、謀、本、部、ニ、
 告、シ、テ、(譯)資、料、ニ、基、キ、テ、(譯)シ、テ、(譯)シ、テ、(譯)シ、テ、
 關係)ニ、(譯)概、テ、(譯)目、回、位、情、報、ヲ、傳、シ、(譯)シ、
 証カ八三六号)ト、(譯)言、フ、居、リ、シ、

H-174

側、軍隊、(譯)統、途、里、ヲ、懷、藏、シ、テ、(譯)シ、テ、
 連、(譯)軍、事、狀、況、ニ、関、シ、テ、情、報、ヲ、(譯)送、ル、上、ニ、
 持、テ、(譯)居、リ、シ、日本大使館事務員野原壽吉ヲ、柳

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（一）

野原所著『陸軍』は、各書中ハ、三才問題の如ク、公家エトロシクノ軍事

能力』並ニ其ノ言ハ、及ビ其ノ他ニソシクテ、イテノアツマシム。

元来、不睦ヲ、其ノ邊、陸軍武官輔佐官「ベテスドルフ」ハ

一九四一—一九四五（昭和十六年—二十年）ノ間ニ日本参

謀本部カ、ソノ「内スル機密」事情報ヲ組織

的ニ受取ル。其ノ「確認」ニテ「リス」ス。コノ情報ハ早

達伯林ニ傳達「マリス」ス。コノ情報ノ内容ハド

ナリ、ソノ「リス」ス。コノ「リス」ハ「ベテスドルフ」ノ「言葉

ヲ回復」ス。

『』「ベテスドルフ」ノ「東軍関係」ノ「総」テノ「軍事情報」即チ

「軍隊」ノ「運送」ノ「数」、「軍事輸送」ノ「ト」並「豫備軍」ニ

0159 0001 0340

Summation H

留シミヤノコノ人ノ証言ノ最ニ本島約ナ部合ニ次ノ場テカリヌ。

『私ノ前戸發見サレタ書類ノ大部分ハ亦區部隊ノ兵員

及ノ販運工・家傭子ト捕給ノ連部軍需部工業及ビ

其生産品即チ飛行機、戦車、スソ連部ノ人的豫

備等ニ關スル機密資料ヲ内容トスル實書ノ寫

本アル所新クノ如キ性質ノソ連部ニ關スル軍事事情

報ヲ在ベルリソ日本大使館ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）

カラ一九四五（昭和二十年）迄在モスタフ日本大使建

川及佐藤ニテ暗号電報ノ入手シテ其暗号電報

ハ後ガ同將參事官トシテ整理カレ、佐藤

語ニ關シテハ後在ベルリソ日本大使館ハノノ

情報ヲ他ニ外務省ニ手交シテ居タカヤ（法廷

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Summation H

以下、詳細 歐洲戰線之陣移動、詳細並在
 之軍事工業、関之資料、受取リ之也 (法廷書証
 才五六八頁) 「この二紙を以て」ハ又日本海軍本部より受取リ
 情報ハ之性質ニ於テ勿論陸軍部亦合法約ニ手致シ、
 今手ニ得ル資料ニ對シテ起越シテ居ルニ違ハズ、尚
 又「これに於て」ハ此等情報ハ結果豐ニシテ重要ト意
 義ヲ有シ、之ヲ「選」対スルニ作戦上具體的ニ利用シ
 于ラタトスルコトヲ未ダ居リテス (透視録才五六
 三四八頁)

(三) 極東ニ於テ之ニ側船航行ニ知入ル妨害、側船
 二対スル不該ニ密留中海賊船の遊撃戰等。

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H-1077

日本政府ハ獨逸接障ノ目的ヲ以テ極平在ルニ側船航
行ニ對テ有テ妨害ヲ加ヘトシテ又中立條約ヲ亂暴侵
害シテ居リテス。

Summary 1-1

獨逸ハ連政墨提極平ノ側船航問題、國內諸港ト
交通シテ又海外航路ノ多クモ、就中米國ノ買付ク多ク各種
商品輸送ノ多クモ、連上ト人莫ク全音義持テテ多ク居リテス。
中立條約存立ニ居テ之拘テ、日本政府ハ一九四三年(昭和十六年)
八月二十五日、連政府對テ、側船航買付ク多ク移資テ米
國ノ浦塩斯德(輸送)スルニ日本側ニテ、困難ニテ非
常ニ微妙ノ狀況ニ在リテ、定テ此上之公式、申出テテ、
居リテス(法廷書証才八一三号)

日本政府ハ津野海峡等ノ太平洋ニ於テ、取短テ且最便
利ノ航路ヲ利用スルニテ、停止シテ之ヲ、此三字石海峡經
由若クハ南方海峡經由ニ轉テ、作申出テテ、此ニ著
ク、航路ヲ長クスルニ、隨テ、船隻運送ノ回數ヲ減少スルニ、
居リテ、非南方航路ノ安全ヲ、示シテ、朝鮮海峡
經由航路ニ、際テ、側船航「ア」ト「イ」ト「ウ」ト「エ」ト
ガ潜水艦ノ多ク、通過シテ居リテ、ニクテ、朝鮮海峡經由ヲ止
ムニ、此三字石海峡經由航路ノ、航行ヲ著ク長クス
ルニ、三四日、間水ヲ閉サシテ居リテ、ニ、海峡經由ハ、單
ニ畫圖分テ、許シテ居リテ、此三字石海峡經由太平洋ノ、航路

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Summation H

千島海峽を經由して通過し、右の如く分り、千島

海峽、多数、特、最短、南、部、海、峽、海、峽、船、航、行

具、合、要、の、千、島、海、峽、統、一、の、管、轄、の、航、空、航、路、(昭

和、三、年、三、月、二、日、附、の、海、陸、軍、管、轄、の、航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

航、路、は、千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号)

又、連、の、千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

千、島、海、峽、(海、軍、誌、二、九、号) 航、路、中、に、詳、細

述、す、(海、軍、誌、大、三、三、号)

Summary H

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日本支配階級との關係ニ於テ種々後述側ニ畫キリト努
力スルノミナラズ「ヒトウ」政府ニ於テ、條ツタ手段ニツキテ
御報告甲上ノ義務がアリトモトモテ考ヘテ居ルベシ。

大島(一九四三年(昭和十七年)六月二十四「リベントウ」トノ
合談ヲ日本側ガ行クノ)側船舶監檢ノ結果ニツキテ情
報アリベシトモテ、手ノ交ヘラセ、ソノ日本側ガ西部「アリ
ベシヤ」列島ヲ監視スルトモ將チ「ソノ」等ノ商船ノ輸
送困難ナラズニシテ少クモ之ノ監視ヲ止メテ居リマス。

(法廷書證第七六號)

一九四三年三月六日「リベントウ」が大島トシテ合談記録
中、次々々々場附ガ下リマス。

「ソノ」手ノ交ヘラセ、口シテ、輸入品トシテ我々ノ報告ニ就キ
大島(日本)ノ諸(海路(使用)ヲ許シ居ルベシ
「ソノ」海路ニ於テ一切ノ船舶(武器(彈藥)ヲ檢査セリト
ベシト言フ。 (法廷書證第六三號、A)

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日本官憲(ソノ)側船舶ノ不法ニ抑留シ海賊或龍襲
ノ組織ニシテ己ノ元々侵略ノ直接行動ナリマス。

一九四三年(昭和十七年)八月以後、期間ニ於テ一九四四年(昭
和十九年)元金七百七十八萬、ソノ側商船ガ日至、武力ヲ抑
留セシメ、中三隻(武器ヲ行使セシメ居リマス。

(法廷書證第六三號)

此ノ事例トシテ、側官憲ノ調査係ル「ソノ」側船舶不法
抑留ノ具體的十場合數個ヲ示シマス。

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Summation H

四月甲日本潜水艦「ベロバウ」
 (九四三年(昭和七年)五月)南洋海峽經由浦塩斯德三向(倉知品、貨物
 積平航行して艦多汽船「セ」に突入、キレツツガ方擱留せりし
 日下既ニ六隻、艦船擱留せりしを(九四三年五月)東亞海峽ニ護送せり
 年來之ヲ(法英諸國證案(一五号))
 九四三年(昭和七年)一月申宗谷海峡ニ於テ汽船「ウカ」
 号が擱留せりし大退逃ニ護送せりしニ干葉如テ三十五晝夜間不
 該擱留下りニシテ(法英諸國證案(一五号))
 有之に在テ待ガ加(ウカ)ヲ(法英諸國證案(一五号))
 九四三年(昭和七年)四月申宗谷海峡ニ於テ汽船「ウカ」
 号が擱留せりし(法英諸國證案(一五号))
 抑留下ニ在リテ(法英諸國證案(一五号))
 九四(原(昭和七年)十一月)申香港ニ於テ擱留セリシ「ウカ」
 汽船「ウカ」ヲ(ウカ)ニ又セリ又セリ「セ」セ「ウカ」ニ又セリ
 一ホリ「ウカ」ニ對シ日本側力ニ懸念ヲ加(三号)ニ「ウカ」ニ又セリ
 六月「ウカ」ノ側ニ標識(英國復ガ示ガテ「ウカ」ニ又セリ)ニ
 「ウカ」モ不測ニ墜落シ「ウカ」ノ船長ヲ「ウカ」ニ又セリ
 「ウカ」工止メ其ハ沈没シ汽船「セ」ノ「ウカ」ノ船長ニ「ウカ」ニ又セリ
 「ウカ」及ビ「ウカ」ノ船長ヲ「ウカ」ノ船長ニ「ウカ」ニ又セリ
 「ウカ」汽船「セ」ノ「ウカ」ノ船長ヲ「ウカ」ノ船長ニ「ウカ」ニ又セリ
 「ウカ」日本側ガ「ウカ」ノ船長ヲ「ウカ」ノ船長ニ「ウカ」ニ又セリ
 (一八号)亦(一五号))

0 159 000 1 0345

Summation 14

射撃並ニ略奪ニ際シテ被ハツテ損害關係ヲ汽船スガリ
ストロイ、号、其ノ後同称ニ沈没シタリ(法廷書記オハ
一九号)

日本側飛行機ガ一九四年(昭和十六年)十月十七日及十八日
ソノ側汽船ニヘリコック、号ヲ攻撃シテ之ヲ撃沈シタコト大確
実ニ明ニサレテリ又、汽船ニ(武器ヲ持テ木板輸送船)
対スル爆撃等、昼間、良ク見ヘル状態ニ、下テ又汽船ニ
明白ナル標識ガ、唯テ日本側空軍カヲ見テ何等カ過失
ヲル可能性、アリ得テ、状態、下ニ於テ行ハシムル汽船沈
没後船員等、日本側官憲、罪ヨリテ本国ヘ歸ルコト
本年此迄、二年洋上漂流船ノコト、ノ撃沈、状況
、副船長、ズ、リ、直近日本側官憲、言ハシテ、又裁
判ヲ訴ヘ、同、人、ガ、之、ヲ、確、認、シ、居、ル、又、(法廷書記オハ三
五〇一七号)汽船、マ、イ、コ、ツ、号、一、九、四、年(昭和十六年)
十、月、中、日、本、飛、行、機、ヨ、リ、撃、沈、シ、タ、コ、ト、ノ、船、長、シ、フ
ケ、ニ、三、ノ、作、成、シ、タ、文、書、ヲ、判、リ、タ、ス、(法廷書記オハ三三三号)
一、九、四、年(昭和十九年)一、月、中、ソ、ノ、側、油、槽、船、マ、リ、ホ、リ、号、
米、國、カ、ラ、十、島、列、島、ヲ、シ、テ、連、日、ト、途、中、大、泊、地、ヲ、在、座、シ、
タ、リ、日、本、官、憲、救、助、作、業、ヲ、行、フ、コ、ト、ヲ、許、可、シ、テ、出、タ、
シ、タ、油、槽、船、ヲ、救、助、ス、ル、コ、ト、十、分、本、末、ヲ、テ、下、リ、タ、
然、レ、他、ノ、側、船、船、カ、コ、ニ、近、附、ラ、ト、對、シ、テ、許、可、ハ、長、官、
即、チ、救、助、作、業、ガ、見、込、タ、ク、ソ、ノ、許、可、ヲ、出、タ、カ、ツ、タ、ノ、ア、リ、タ、
ソ、ノ、船、ヲ、沈、没、シ、タ、(法廷書記オハ三四号)

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Summarization H

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日本側、中立條約復讐を以て、國に對し、辯護を
行ふ、一面に於て事實を以て認め、日本側、中立條約
日本、中立條約の「選擇」を以て、中立條約に於て、
「中立」に同意するに、日本側、對し、中立條約は、
「在りて」中立、辯護例、中立條約の復讐を
「犯罪」として、中立條約を以て、中立條約に於て、
「三三」に於て、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約
「中立」に於て、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約
「中立」に於て、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約
係り、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約の復讐
各報に決定するに、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約
辯護例、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約の復讐
日本、政府は、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約の復讐
「中立」に於て、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約の復讐
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「中立」に於て、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約の復讐

日本側、中立條約復讐を以て、國に對し、辯護を
行ふ、一面に於て事實を以て認め、日本側、中立條約
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「在りて」中立、辯護例、中立條約の復讐を
「犯罪」として、中立條約を以て、中立條約に於て、
「三三」に於て、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約
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「中立」に於て、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約
「中立」に於て、中立條約の復讐を以て、中立條約

0 159 000 1 0347

Summation H

然ニナガウ既ニ吾々ガ立証ニテ通リ、日本政府ハ遂行スル
 方ハナク背信的目的ヲ以テ、中立條約ヲ締結シ、屢々
 且又乱暴ニシテ復言シテ、ソノタメニソ連政府ハ中立
 條約第三條ニ規定、廢棄豫告期限ガ到来スルト同
 時ニ本條約廢棄通告ヲナス、巴ハナキニ至リテテアリ
 ス。ソ連ガ中立條約廢棄通告後ニ於テ日本帝國
 至差我者達対テ三國戰シテ、トハ侵略ト、國爭事業
 ニソ連ガ貢獻ニテ譯テアリヌ。

(次頁へ續く)

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Summation H

年譜則「外邊」軍機處口供謂「關於張漢卿之變態」
 法然「外邊」之詳細情形，同類「外邊」之變態，雖在
 反對評閱之際，張曾與張漢卿、張信、張等，並在
 之「外邊」國、海軍權之「外邊」各種，情報均入手之「外」
 の「外」之趣旨，此言ヲ得カトシテ，然シテ其「外」
 軍武官ヲ經テ，其「外」情報カ「外」ヲ「外」
 三「外」即非「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 入「外」ヲ得「外」ヲ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 五「外」其「外」ヲ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 カ「外」邊政府ニ「外」邊軍機處ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 (「外」邊軍機處ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 何「外」邊國カ「外」邊軍機處ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 同「外」邊情報ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 四(「外」邊軍機處ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 東京「外」ノ「外」邊軍機處ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 値「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 カ「外」邊，此言ヲ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 或「外」邊行動ニ「外」邊軍機處ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 承認セザル得「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 言ヲ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」
 言明「外」ノ「外」(「外」邊軍機處ノ「外」ノ「外」ノ「外」)

0 159 000 1 0344

H-183 検察側、提出シマシク地図(鑑定書証才三九〇号)ニ日本政府
 ガソ側船舶用トシテ提議シテ東谷海峡及ニ最北、千島海
 峽經由、航路ガ示サレアリヌ。藤田証人ハコレソ側艦船
 ガ使用シテ航路ニシテト確認シ居ルニ(速記録才三三
 四五頁)然シ弁護側、申出ニ從テ証人ハ、地圖、ニ南部
 千島海峡經由、隙ヲ引キソシテニ等海峡ニ太平洋へ、
 一層近イ通路、ノ人ニ使用シ易イモノトシテカニ言フ
 ラス。証人ニ向ヒ彼ハコレ等南部海峡ガ航行可能トナ
 ルトコトヲ保障シ得ルカ何ヲ時証人ハ答ヘテ彼ハ航
 海ニシテ専門家トナリト言ヒシ(速記録才三三四頁)
 ニ答弁カ見マシテ証人ハ千島列島ノ間、水面ヲ經テ鉛筆
 ヲ走ラスニ當リ全然海洋航行汽船ノ通航、可能性ヲ考
 ケ居テカクアトガ明ラカデアリス。証人藤田ハ六四四年
 (昭和七年)五月中汽船「アガレストロイ」号ガ波没セテ
 事象ヲ確認シマシク、然レテ、波没ニツキテ日本側潜水
 艦ハ、附近ニ航行シカクアトカ、理由テ日本側潜水艦
 ノ行ク所アハ、多ク他國ノ潜水艦、其中米國又ハ英
 吉利、潜水艦ノ行クモノトテアトト言明シ居ルニ
 (速記録才三三五。九一。三三五。頁)

Summary H

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日本海賊ヲ杜撰セテトシテ「更汽船」ガ「連邦
 同盟国」ノ手ニ依ッテ撃沈サレト放言シテ証人ノ申立テ道
 實判斷スルデアリヌセウ。

証人藤田ハ汽船「アガレストロイ」号及「ア
 イ」号ノ真次ヲモ確認シマシク、然レテ日本側飛行機

Summation 14

H-184

ガコノ事ニ参加シタコトヲ根據ナク至定ニテ居リ
 ス。(速記録第3352号)。
 〇側船舶押留、件ニ半證人六名ハ船醫留
 類ニ何等カ不備ナ莫カバツテ行ハコトナ
 アルニ至ヒ同時ニコソ警不備、其カ如何ナルコトナ
 コツカヲ具體的ニ説明シテ不、根據、ナキ語ヲ
 興ヘテ居リ。最後ニ証人藤田ハ汽船「ヨシホ」
 ガ沈没シタ事ヲ至定ニセ、然レ「〇側船舶
 救助」ニ対シテ、船上船醫留問答
 可ク興ヘルコト、不可能ナルコトヲ言フ、至定ニテ
 居リス。

斯様ニシテ日本政府ヨリ打ツ、中立條約違反ニテ
 又迅速「打」ニ攻撃後「於テ」反「復」行爲ニテ
 下、弁護側「檢察側」提出シテ「命懸」何「ノ」反
 駁スルコトが出来ナカク「上」口ハ「漸」是致「ス」。

0 159 000 1 035 0

0 159 000 1 055 0 651 0

p. 178

Summation H-187

シテハニテキルニ此ノ權限ハ若シ陰謀ト云フニ當テ
際場裡ニ現去ル、犯罪ガ情状ニ因テ或ハ時ニ國家ニ
圍、政策ニ武器ト此ト云ハ實ニ般ノ類、不幸ニ
此ノ危險、下ルニテ下リ又。

侵略、立案及ニ實現、集團的殺害行為及ニ種本注
爲、立案及ニ實現、常ニ中心トシテ陰謀使黨、援
助、下ルニテ下リ又、種ト云ハ實ニ種ト云フニテ下リ
各國民、記憶ニ新ニテ下リ又、種ト云ハ實ニ種ト云フ
モ下リ又、種ト云ハ實ニ種ト云フニテ下リ又、種ト云ハ
度、偶然、主、下ルニテ下リ又、種ト云ハ實ニ種ト云フ
スル犯罪ヤクテ國際的犯罪、特性ヲ云フ事ト云フニ
三、事實ニ由テ國際的犯罪、各國、刑罰ニテ其意味
、犯罪ト云ハ、國際的行動(及傷、殺、事)カ成ル也、
主、行動、組織、カ、一定ニ種權限、活動、(侵略
、謀、備、浮屠、撲滅等)成ルニテ下リ又、種ト云ハ
、本性、於テ又、規模ニ於テ相与敬、人同、一致、カ
行動ヲ必要トスルニテ下リ又、種ト云ハ實ニ種ト云フ
、連絡、カ、單純、性、質、帶、テ、居、テ、又、暴、徒、者、數、計、
犯罪行為、シテ、容易、カ、才、互ニ、知、テ、合、テ、又、其、如
最モ幼稚、形、態、ニ、於、テ、參加、擧、言、スル、暴、徒、上、公、
國際的犯罪、遂行、ニ、於、テ、稀、ニ、北、環、球、ニ、下、ル、事、ト、又

P.178-A

Sum. mation 14
1788

軍網が組織し且つ実行する国際的犯罪、遂行に
参加するト云フにハ参加者等が、犯罪目的及び
犯罪計画ニヨリ結合せし且つ假令其参加者個
々、具体的犯罪行為ニ就テハ知ラズトガアルトモ、
其犯罪計画實現ノため、行動一般方針ハ互ニ知ラ
シムラシテ居ルト云フコトアリマス。

人類全般ノ利益ニ及スル犯罪行為ヲ實現スルニ
必要ナリ

以下次頁

0 159 0001 0357

0159 0001 0358

Summation 18

閣、複雑アツテ、国際犯罪、遂行ニ参加、形、畢竟於組
 織ニ及ヒ實現シテ犯罪的陰謀ニ参加、形即チ不ゲネ
 リス、ナルトニウツトニルゲアリヌ。独逸ニ於ケルニヤ字岡
 自令、政治的權力ヲ使用シ、日常、活動ニ當リ自令
 ガ独逸国内ニ設ケル機関網、即チゲス系、エス、エス
 アリスト、機関及其他ニ立脚ニ居タ、テリス、
 目本ニ於ケル、林、岡、自令、政治的權力ヲ使ツテ又大政
 翼賛會、ヤ字機関、會官廳、機關カ成ツテ居、
 大キキ組織、十三井、三菱、住友、安田其他、ヤ字總稱、
 一括財團トイフテ居タ、道本家性ト立脚ニ居タ、
 テリス、岡、後ニ暴露セリ、民主主義諸国相手、侵
 略戦争ヲ計画シタ中心、テリ又鼓吹者アツタ、テリス。

H-189

子、岡、犯罪的侵略ナル共通、目的ヲ以テ結合シ居リ、
 子、岡、指導者及ビ個々、参加者侵略戦争ナル共通、犯罪
 的計画ヲ以テ統合サレテアツタ、アツテ、陰謀参加者、
 平和反対、陰謀ナル争實、モ、対シテ、尚又彼等陰
 謀者、計画實現カラ生ズル有ル結果ニ対シテ、
 完全ニ責任ヲ負フモト自做サル義アリヌ。

P.179

マヤ字陰謀、法律性、何等カ、店舖、事務所又、個
 人住宅ニ対シテ共同ニ侵入スルコトヲ詔ニ合ツテ盜賊又、強
 盜、刑事犯罪團、法律性ト、勿論、其、趣、異ニシテ居リ、
 國家対スル交配陰謀者、一派、ヨリテ獲得セリ、ソ、ソ、
 機構全体ガ、一派、犯罪目的ヲ行フテ動員セル時、

Summation A

妻ありコヤヲ總黨、黨員ヲ結合スル業ヲコト極人ヲ複雜ナ
 了リヌコ場合ニ締密ニ微細ニ相互關係、網ヲ下リヌ
 子國內部ニ於テ各個ニ集團、間ニ起リ見解、差異、各部
 命的ニ政府、交進スルコトヲ先交映ニ居ルニ下リ、各ハハ
 侵略、同方向ノ開始時機、區定ノ實行速度及ニ子
 法等ノ問題ニツキ、戰略的若ク個人的亦法ニ相違カ下ク
 主ナリヌ。然レニコトハ如何ナル程度ニ於テモ彼等が共同、犯
 罪行為ニ参加ニ活ル上ニ之筆尖ヲ除去ニ得ルニテハナリ
 之ニ隨テ彼等彼等中、各人が侵略行為、實現ニ付シ
 國際的犯罪、遂行ニ付スルニ手負担スル責任ヲ免ル
 ルコトハ去来ナク下リヌ。

(以下相負)

6560 1000 6510

H-190

本法廷が主要日本戦争犯罪人ヲ裁判スルタニ基礎トシテ
是法律完全陰謀、特徴ヲ考慮シテ居リマス。規定

Summary 14

本軍ヲ裁判所、條例ニ明ニテラシテ居リマス。即チ
平和戦争法規及ヒ人道ニ対スル犯罪遂行ヲ目的
トシテ共通、計画又共同謀議、立案又ハ実行ニ参
加スル指導者、組織者、教唆者及ヒ共犯者、斯ル
計画、遂行上為サレタル一切、行為ニ付其、何人ニ
依リテ為サレタルトモ同ハ責任ヲ有ス(才五條末尾)
、規定全ク明確ニ告訴狀結論ニ現ルニ居リマス。
即チ各被告ハ彼が関与タリシ諸内閣及ヒ彼が支配
的地位ヲ有セシ一般官廳機關、陸軍機關又ハ海
軍機關凡テ、行為又ハ懈怠行為ニ対スル人多
シトガ罪ニ同ハルモトモ(附屬)ニテ、告訴、中テ
國際的犯罪人、陰謀ニ関スル觀念、中央政權
、諸機關及ヒ補助的機關、複雑ニ網ヲ使用シテ
行動スル犯罪的結合ニ関スルモデルト根拠ヲ有シ
且ツ明確ニ表現セテ居リマス。

H-191

コソコソ制度、下テハ中心人物、陰謀参加者ト彼
等、犯罪的計画ヲ実行スル広範圍ニ亘ル実行
者ト、同、距離が地理上、線ニ依リテモ又職務上、
線カラシテモ非常ニ大キキコトガ下リ得ルコトアリマ
ス。同ニ程度ニコソコソ陰謀、参加者違ハ彼等
、勤員ヲ実行者、全部ヲ知ラナイニ又知り得ナイ

p.181

Summary H

1. 予りたる。然ニテガラコト等事實ハ陰謀者、責任ヲ免除シナイシ又軽減モシナイデアリマス。反對ニコト等事實ハ陰謀者、犯罪ヲ特ニ重クスルデアリマス。彼等、計画ヲ実行スルルニ彼等ガシテ教唆及ビ彼等陰謀、才陰謀日本人、多數文衆ガ犯罪的價額ニ誘引セラレタリマス。コトハ陰謀参加者、責任ヲ重カラシムルニテアリマス。コト等罪惡ニ對シテ全被咎日本主要戦争犯罪人、全部ハ完全ニ刑ヲ受テ、責任ヲ負ルベキモデアリマス。

H-112
總シテ日本、国策、就中、對シテ侵略政策、軍閥首領、即チ東條、荒木、梅津、板垣其他、指導シテ組織スル且ツ実行セラレタリマス。全被咎、九六年(昭和三年)ヨリ九五五年(昭和二十年)ニ至ル期間日本、支配階級ヨリテ、總理若クハ大臣、外交官又ハ軍部首領、思想家又ハ高官、地位ニテリシコト主要ナル役割ヲ演ジタモデアリマス。被告等ガ有テシ機會ニ於テ自分、行動、性質ヲ十分了解シ且ツ、結果如何ナルベキカヲ知り、組織的ニシテ意識的ニ行動シテモデアルコトハ疑、余地ナクソエリマス。彼等ハ目的ヲ自分、前ニ置キシテ頑強ニシテ達成シテ努力シテ討伐的ニ行動シタリマス。吾々ガ「聯對キ」日本側侵略ヲ立証シタリマス。何モ陰謀者、終テ、措置ガ前以テ立案セシ慎重ニ作成セシ且ツ逐次實現セシ

1990 1000 6510

0159 0001 0352

Summary of

レタコトヲ立証シ居リマス。然ラコトハ被告時ガ自分、犯
罪行爲ヲ行ヒ、対シ侵略ヲ最重要ナル目的、トシテ居
リ犯罪的陰謀ニ加入シ居ラコトヲ証明シ居コトニ
争、余地ナイテリス。

三 結論
判子各位。

H-143

陰謀機關加盟者、責任國ノ主要規定、文明國、
法制全般ニ共通ニ規定ニ從ヒテ、対シ、侵略ニ對ス
ル責任、陰謀者一派、加盟者全員、負フべきナリス。
私、現在、願、被告ガ一派、統テ、加盟者ト
ルカ否カ、問題ニ差當リ之ヲ措キ、唯ツ、論議ノ余地、
アリコト、対シ、侵略ノ責任、被告席ニ在ル者全部、
負フべきモ、アルト云フコトアリマス。私、ソ、ウ、エ、ト、
社会主義共和國連邦ヲ代表シテ、本法庭ニ於テ發
言シ被告ニ對シテ提出セラルタル統テ、訴追ハ、ソ、ウ、エ、ト、
聯邦ニ對スル侵略行為、關係ニ於テモ、將又、告訴
狀、他、各部ニ、ソ、ウ、エ、ト、モ、完全ニ立証セラルモ、ト思、考、
スモ、アルリク、檢、察、側、ニ、侵略戦争、準備及ビ
開始ニ於テ、甲、報、ニ、及、ス、陰、謀、ニ、於、テ、戦争法規及ビ
慣例、侵犯ニ於テ、人類ニ對スル極度、悪行ニ於テ、全
被告ニ罪、レ、コトヲ立証シタモ、ト考ヘマス。

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0 159 000 1 0363

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Summation 14

共同謀議於此被告等各人沒別嫌疑只了り又。

然に被告等、各人が個別に犯罪を企及し、密謀、密通等、

于陰謀集團、行々の犯罪全體、何れも企及し、密通等、

有款を行つた、了り又。

日本、行つた、密通等、密通等、密通等、密通等、

的責任、分けて被告等、各人が責任、密通等、密通等、

二檢察官等、了り又、了り又、了り又、了り又、

唯今、是れ、公認、密通等、密通等、密通等、密通等、

淨、密通等、密通等、密通等、密通等、密通等、密通等、

了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、

了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、了り、

一 東條 英機

H194

Summary H

東條ハ公平ニ見テ日本軍閥、首領デアリシ日本、
対シ「侵略政策、最モ顯著ナル実行者」デアリト認
ミテケレバ「アラヌ」デアリス。
東條ハ閣東軍憲兵司令官トシテ、対シ「謀略及
破壊工作」積極的ニ從事シタ。
東條ハ閣東軍參謀長デアツテ、時ニ「連
古人民共和國」対テ、侵略戦争ヲ準備スルヲ及ビ、
「於テ戦争準備基地」ヲ造ルベク有ラニ努力ヲ致シ
タ。彼ハ「連攻撃」、戰略的計畫ヲ作成シ、
対スル東京、承認ヲ頑強ニ主張シ、取り所ケタ。
東條ハ陸軍次官トシテ、ハルハ河地、蒙古人民共
和國及ビ「連邦」ニ対スル攻撃ニ対シ、極大ト共ニ責任
ヲ負ハスベトシタ。
東條ハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）五月カ、日本、大臣、
總理大臣、職ニアツテ日本ヲ第二世界戦争ニ引キ
入レタ。トシテ「独逸」及ビ「アラヌ」上伊太利ト、三國協
定ニ軍事政治同盟、締結シテ、於テ彼、積極的役
割ハ國知、トデアツテ行ニ立証、必要ハアリタ。

H-195

ヲ時期ニ於テ東條ハ可シ侵略政策ヲ頑強ニ実行
致シタリ。

一九四二年(昭和十六年)七月二日、日本天皇議長、下ニ中立
條約、掩護、下ニ對シ「戰爭」ヲ内密準備スルコトニシテ
、狡猾ニ決定、採擇ニ參加スルハ彼ヲリシタリ。

東條ハ右、決定、實現ニ對シ完全ニ責任ヲ負ハネバ
、^{之ニ}實現ハ、^{對シ}評論尙カシテ、^{對シ}計劃尙^固固特擧ヲ
作成^ニ且ツ之ヲ実行^シテ、^{結果}滿洲ハ運極

東ニ突進スルヲ最後、^{命令}行シバカリニシテ、^{若ク}日本
側軍隊ヲ以テ充滿サテ居タリテ、^又。

東條ハ一九四一—一九四三年(昭和十六年—十八年)之間
尺ハ此湖ニ至ルコト連領スルヲ日本、^ヲ獲得スル意
圖ヲ寸時ニ抛棄スルニシタリ、^{シテ}、^彼ハ、^ノ犯罪的計
畧ヲ準備シ且ツ實現スルヲニ、^彼、^義ニ得ル有之ルコ
トヲヒクテ、^又。

二、梅津美治郎

梅津將軍、日本軍閥、最モ及勤^ノ士部、有敬
代表者ナリ、緊密ニ日独伊侵略同盟、支持者ナ
リ、長期ニ對シ「侵略戰」計畧及「準備」ヲ直接措

5977 1000 6510

H-796

梅津、東條及杉山、土英三閣、東軍、之「連邦領
 進攻計畫」此中「獨特演說」計畫、作成者「P. 22」
 日本參謀總長上、其活動、最近期間、梅津、
 對「歐計畫」續行「以上」之「總」三訂、甚
 手援助、與「之」。

三、荒木貞夫

荒木、其、政治活動、全期間、日本軍團、極端、
 膨脹、論者、界、思想、指導者、了、之、一九六五年（大正
 七年）一九三五年（大正十二年）間、日本干涉時代、後、
 連、極、東、占領、積極的、參加、其、後、日本、政府、內、指
 導的、地位、占、對、之、侵略、戰、準備、之、之、

一九三三年（昭和八年）荒木、八、對、華、會、議、之、佈、
 戰、爭、依、以、于、海、洲、後、具、加、爾、及、西、伯、利、亞、之、占、領、之、進
 樣、之、呼、之、對、之、之、

一九三八年（昭和十三年）荒木、八、對、五、人、民、共、和、國、
 占領、ヲ、訂、取、之、之、

一九四二年（昭和十六年）「連邦攻撃、問題」日本
 帝國主義者、之、上、之、單、之、時、問題、ヲ、ニ、カ、テ、カ、テ、時、
 荒木、ハ、「連邦攻撃」ヲ、速、急、ニ、之、比、樣、ニ、要、求、シ、日本、ガ、
 一九八年（大正七年）一九三三年（大正十二年）、一、年、涉、時、

代、實現、之、得、テ、カ、テ、之、ヲ、遂、行、シ、秘、ト、シ、之、之、
 荒木、八、全、生、涯、ヲ、日本、軍、團、之、義、者、一、味、ノ、犯、罪、的、計

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Summit H

憲、遂行ニ擇^ルニシテ。彼軍人トテリ外交^ニテテ、湖
謀^テテリ、陸軍^{大臣}トシテ、農兵司令官^トシテ、
陸軍^{大臣}トシテ、及文部^{大臣}トシテ、^トシテ、

如何^ニテ彼^ノ對^シテ、務^クテ長^ク彼^ノ何^レニテ先^ニテ、^トシテ、
積極的^ニテ及^テ遂^ニテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
第三^ニテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、

四、極垣征四部

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極垣將軍、名^ニ日本、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
ニ關係^ガアリ^ニス

極垣^ハ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
指導者^ノ一人^トシテ、如何^ニテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
政敵^ヲ殺^ス、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
タル支持者^ヲテ^リニ^ス。

極垣^ハ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
邊[、]極東^諸州^ヲ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
目的^ヲ以^テ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
擊^テ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、

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極垣^ハ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
河^ニテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
且^ツ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
以^テ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、^トシテ、
ト^シテ^ス。

五. 平沼騷一郎

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Summation H

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彼が及動の十國本社，指導者たりたり或ハ秘密院副議長，後ニ秘密院議長，總理大臣，與ニ秘密院議長，總理大臣，或ハ內務大臣たりたり其時ニ彼が占むる社會的及職務的十地位，如何ニ稱ニ得ルニ當リ日本，帝國之議者界上密接十關係あり其侵略的陰謀ヲ彼ハ合應ニ支持ニ且以鼓吹ニ此，報告，總ヲ，任事ハ其時侵略政策，果行ハ其「復略國，畢事」ヲ以テ，創設ニ據テ「ニ」居ルニ一九三五年（昭和六年）既ニ平沼ハ其「外交關係，斷絶運動」ヲ行ヒニ。

秘密院議長「ア」當時平沼ハ及動の十國共協定締結ヲ承認ニシ。一九三八年（昭和十三年）及一九三九年（昭和十四年）ニ於テ此「對」並ニ對蒙古人民共和國無宣戰戰爭，積極的十役割ハ彼，充テリニ。彼，其「對」秘密院準備，決議，行ヒタリ一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月二日會議ニ參加ニシ。

平沼ハ犯罪的「ア」上「教理」新秩序ヲ悉ク受テ此，「新秩序」ヲ整理ニ補付テニシ。

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Summation H

六. 南次郎

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日本帝國主義者、其指導者、人々也。對以侵略戰、計画及以進行、不斷ニ彼、名ト関連ガナリマス。既三九二(昭和三年)日本參謀次長トシテ南將軍、對以攻撃計画、作成及以對以謀略組織指導ニシテ。朝鮮駐屯日本軍司令官後陸軍大臣關東軍司令官トシテ南滿洲、占據及以對以攻撃、爲大、軍事準備基成、設定積極的ニ參加シ居リ又樞密院議員基三日本政治念、主長トシテ南、所謂「大東亞學堂」創設南陰謀會并、計画、實現即チ以「滿洲國」設立、日本領土化トシテ北ニシテ主要ト役割ヲ擔ヒ、朝鮮、其區職及以收界、在シテ初、終リ以「連邦」會盟、他平和愛好人民對以侵略、組織有シトシマス。

三. 重光葵

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元、其トシテ日本外務大臣、アツテ重光、日本帝國主義者、侵略的對外政策、先導者トナリシ。一九三(昭和十三年)重光駐シ、大使トシテ日本帝國主義者トシテ連邦ニ對以開始、ハケシ湖地ニ於テ以無量戰戰、度、其トシマス。以上トシテ連邦ニ對以攻撃後重光、東條內閣、外務大臣トシテ三国協定、強シ支持者トシテ自命ヲ示シ、數回、公開講演、於彼、中二次世界大戰ニ

於此日獨、共同、目的、傳導、三、夫故、康條、事、二、
討、了、侵略、準備、責任、ヲ、負、ハ、ナ、レ、バ、ナ、リ、也、之、

八、廣田弘毅

外交官、職、業、に、法、略、陰、謀、目的、の、實現、を、手、取、シ、テ、自、
本、支、配、階、級、の、私、益、を、力、に、推、進、す、ル、人、ナ、リ、也、
其、犯罪、的、的、行、爲、ヲ、廣、田、弘、毅、が、モ、テ、行、ハ、レ、タ、リ、且、日本、
大、隈、重、光、後、日、本、總、理、大、臣、又、ハ、外、務、大、臣、ト、シ、テ、時、時、

不、レ、タ、リ、也、
既、三、九、三、三、年、(昭和六年)原田將監、ト、合、談、ヲ、行、フ、
「強、硬、政、策」ヲ、採、ル、何、時、ニ、モ、計、ヲ、以、テ、自、己、の、管、轄、ヲ、以、
テ、廣、田、弘、毅、ノ、言、ヲ、採、リ、テ、之、ヲ、行、フ、

廣、田、弘、毅、支、鐵、道、ヲ、於、テ、日、本、帝、國、主、義、者、ト、シ、謀、
略、行、爲、(支、鐵、道)ヲ、鐵、道、部、ト、シ、テ、之、ヲ、行、フ、
連、ヲ、シ、鐵、道、ニ、三、倍、之、額、ヲ、費、却、シ、テ、自、己、の、以、テ、自、本、之、
行、爲、ヲ、以、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、廣、田、弘、毅、

廣、田、弘、毅、の、天、協、定、ヲ、締、結、シ、民、主、主、義、的、國、家、ト、シ、テ、建、立、す、
不、レ、能、ク、國、家、ヲ、以、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

進、行、ス、ル、滿、洲、鐵、道、三、期、對、外、行、爲、ヲ、以、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

紀、一、六、五、湖、北、ニ、於、テ、北、平、鐵、道、對、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、
廣、田、弘、毅、日、本、之、觀、者、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、
ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、自、己、の、私、益、ヲ、謀、ル、事、件、ニ、關、シ、テ、

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Summit H

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Summation K

九、大島浩

H-202

大島元伯林駐在日本大使館防共協定及三國同盟締結多矣、努力于其重要之陰謀參與者一人而已。一九三八年(昭和十二年)「ヒトラー」獨乙三國同盟締結之交渉ヲ行ヒ大島ハ同盟ヲ其先決ノ聯邦ニ向ケル構ニ努力シタリ。一九四一年(昭和十六年)「ヒトラー」獨乙、對ソ攻撃、匪賊的計畫ヲ全部知ツテ居タ大島、各方面ヨリ此、計畫ヲ支持シ且ソ日本政府ニ對シ日本、對ソ攻撃ヲ早ムル構ニ積極的ニ努力シタリ。大島、數年ニ亘リ對ソ謀報謀略行為ヲ伯林カウ組織シ獨乙、戰中ハ、聯邦軍ノ及ビ經濟、秘密情報、獨乙參謀本部、提供者ガナリタリ。

一。橋本欣五郎

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謀議、一般計畫ニ於テ橋本完本ト其侵略、主要ノ思想指導者一人トシ、役割ヲ頂テ謀略破壞行為、最モ醜惡トシテ投テ毛亂交際中ニ聯邦、俄在シテ先決ノ敵ヲナリタリ。且ソ、大使館附武官トシテ軍事占領ノ段ニ參テカサス、占領計畫ヲ作成シ伯林ニ於ケル大使館附武官會議ヲ、對ソ間謀謀略、為メニトシキシ、派及ビ自衛軍人ヲ利用スルコトヲ提案シ、ハ俄テナリタリ。一九四二年(昭和十七年)一月橋本、連極東ヲ所謂大東亞共榮圈トシテ稱シ、叫合シタリ。他國

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Summation 4

領土、占領及人民殺戮之目的、此種相繼增進的
、主要宣傳者、役割、彼、元来、日、也。

一、東郷茂徳

^{H-204} 東郷、外交場裡、於、重犯罪、時、才、經、對、以、関
係、就、手、當、中、憎惡的、活動、多、ク、也。元、四、一、年、(昭、和、十、三、年)
十、月、九、日、(昭、和、十、七、年) 九、日、也、日本、外、務、之、長、
シ、テ、東、郷、外、務、長、等、ヲ、對、シ、テ、侵、略、戰、争、準備、ヲ、責、
任、ヲ、負、ケ、テ、バ、リ、ク、也。本、問、題、ニ、就、テ、東、郷、積、極、的、
的、役割、期間、中、彼、が、國、策、研、究、會、の、會、員、ト、シ、テ、
及、シ、其、他、諸、國、ニ、對、シ、テ、侵、略、計、画、ヲ、作、成、シ、同、會、ニ、適、分、
資、金、提、供、ヲ、行、フ、事、ヲ、實、ニ、依、リ、色、彩、派、強、調、シ、
又、對、シ、テ、侵、略、幹、部、的、犯、罪、之、罪、に、被、シ、釋、シ、犯、罪、的、行、
為、ハ、概、シ、テ、之、ヲ、辯、解、シ、テ、在、リ、タ、リ、又、
^{H-205} 日本、帝國主義者、一、味、ノ、首、領、連、之、後、諸、國、ヲ、削、奪、シ、行、
動、シ、テ、名、稱、ヲ、宣、布、シ、資、本、主義、的、進、步、者、也、ニ、被、リ、テ、侵、
略、行、動、ヲ、余、儀、ナ、リ、タ、リ、日本、軍、閥、ハ、巴、比、倫、ノ、德、之、及、シ、
伊、太、利、自、己、ノ、國、際、法、ニ、共、ニ、違、フ、事、ヲ、行、フ、
陰、謀、ヲ、作、成、シ、人、民、奴、隸、化、並、ニ、殺、戮、ヲ、進、行、シ、
テ、自、分、等、ノ、狂、信、的、計、画、ヲ、實、現、ス、ル、為、メ、テ、二、次、世、界、
戰、争、ヲ、開、始、シ、世、界、ヲ、不、幸、ト、シ、苦、難、ノ、極、無、シ、
ニ、自、分、等、ノ、人、民、ニ、天、キ、テ、貧、苦、ヲ、與、ヘ、ク、ハ、彼、等、
乙、ト、シ、テ、之、ノ、強、奪、者、違、フ、吾、國、ノ、鄰、邦、
手、掠、奪、ス、時、占、領、シ、テ、其、領、土、ノ、利、益、ヲ、
ハ、被、害、者、が、參加、シ、居、ル、一、般、議、議、會、現、
結、果、ヲ、示、ス、之、

11000 6510

Summary

民國二十九年六月二十七日

查本會自成立以來，承蒙各界人士之愛護，業務日見發達。茲為適應時局之需要，特將本會組織及業務範圍，重新加以整理。茲將整理後之組織及業務範圍，分述如下：

一、組織：本會現設理事會、監事會、秘書處、各專科辦事處、及各分會。理事會為本會最高權力機關，由全體會員選舉之。監事會為監察機關，由全體會員選舉之。秘書處為本會之行政機關，由理事會任命之。各專科辦事處，分別辦理本會各項業務。各分會，分別辦理本會各項業務。

二、業務：本會業務範圍，除原有之各項業務外，增加下列各項業務：

(一) 辦理各項社會福利事業，如救濟貧民、收容孤兒、養老院等。

(二) 辦理各項社會教育事業，如職業訓練、成人教育、社會教育等。

(三) 辦理各項社會救濟事業，如救濟失業、救濟傷殘、救濟病弱等。

(四) 辦理各項社會服務事業，如法律服務、醫療服務、社會服務等。

(五) 辦理各項社會公益事業，如社會公益、社會公益、社會公益等。

以上各項業務，均由本會各專科辦事處及各分會，分別辦理。

附錄

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SECTION I.

Page I-1

1-1. It is respectfully submitted that, under all the evidence, the conspiracy charged in Count 1 of the Indictment has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the defense contend that there was no common plan or conspiracy. In support of this contention they point out that during the period charged in the Indictment there were seventeen different cabinets in charge of governmental affairs in Japan, and that there were many other persons who held cabinet positions and other high positions in the government in addition to the accused. From these facts they would have this Tribunal deduce that there was no common plan and no continuity in the effectuation of the conspiracy. It is respectfully submitted that this contention is based upon a misconception of both the nature of the conspiracy charged and the nature of the various changes in the cabinet.

1-2. With respect to the conspiracy itself, although the prosecution contends and has proved that there was a common plan as charged in the Indictment from the very beginning until the conclusion of the conspiracy, it has not contended and has in no way attempted to prove that all the conspirators, particularly these accused, joined the conspiracy at its very inception and remained with it until its ultimate failure. It is not necessary under the law of conspiracy to show that all joined in the beginning. It is sufficient to show that there was a common plan among two or more conspirators at the inception of the

(I-2)
conspiracy, and that the other conspirators joined in the course of the effectuation of the conspiracy. Although the prosecution maintains that it was proved that the common plan, as finally worked out, existed from the very beginning, it is not necessary to establish this fact in order to prove the conspiracy. It would have been sufficient to have shown that the common plan originally entered into was limited in scope and that it thereafter, during the course of the conspiracy, expanded into the common plan ultimately carried out.

I-3. The evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was corroborated in large part and supplemented by the evidence introduced by the defense, shows both the common plan and the continuity of its effectuation. The conspiracy, as shown by the evidence just reviewed, had its inception among certain officers in the army, particularly those on the staff of the Kwantung Army. However, it was a fact, which was clearly recognized, that the conspiracy, by reason of its nature and character, could not be effectuated without the cooperation and participation of the government. It was, therefore, necessary to obtain that participation and cooperation. To obtain this, the original conspirators had either to have at particular times a government which would cooperate with respect to the particular step in the conspiracy which they were then carrying out or to have a government which was firmly committed to the object of the conspiracy as a matter of national policy. The evidence has shown that the

(I-3)
conspirators used both methods. From the time of the Manchurian Incident until the HIRCTA Cabinet, the conspirators used the former method. Each change of cabinet during that period brought into power a government which was willing to go along with the step in the conspiracy that the conspirators were then working out. Beginning with the HIRCTA Cabinet, the second method was used. The HIRCTA Cabinet, as the price to be paid for being allowed by the conspirators to form a government, joined the conspiracy and made its object the national policy of Japan. This policy was never repudiated by any succeeding cabinet. On the contrary, each and every succeeding cabinet carried the program a step forward. While certain cabinets carried it forward more rapidly than others, the speed of effectuation was in each instance in accordance with the plans of the conspirators, or of most of them. While certain cabinets may have seemed to be less bellicose than others, this difference in attitude was solely due at the moment to a question of expediency with respect to a particular move in effectuating the conspiracy. It was due to a doubt whether or not certain contemplated action was either timely in light of all the circumstances, or would be beneficial for or detrimental to the several ends of the conspiracy. Not once was the opposition of any cabinet after the HIRCTA Cabinet directed toward eliminating the evils of the conspiracy itself.

I-4. Of course there were many conspirators in addition to these accused. However, many of the principal conspirators,

Page I-4

(1-4)
whom the evidence shows might well have been charged along with these accused, are now dead or, if living, are incapable of standing trial. Of those of the conspirators who are living and are capable of standing trial, these accused have been shown by the evidence to be the principal conspirators. It is no excuse or defense for these accused that other conspirators have not been indicted. In this connection it is well to note the efforts made in the course of the defense to shift the blame for particular actions, wherever possible, to persons now dead.

1-5. Moreover, the defense contention might have some validity if we could overlook the fact that the many changes in the cabinets were due in large measure to the actions of the conspirators in favor of the conspiracy. However, the evidence has shown that of the fifteen cabinets from the TANAKA Cabinet to the TOKI Cabinet, in each and every instance either the organization of the cabinet, or its downfall, and sometimes both its organization and downfall, were brought about by the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. The TANAKA Cabinet resigned because of the question of the discipline of the military men who were engaged in the conspiracy. HAMAGUCHI was assassinated in an abortive attempt to eliminate from the government the followers of the "Peaceful Policy" toward Manchuria. When the WAKATSUKI Cabinet refused to go along with the conspiratorial plan for further military action in Manchuria, it was replaced by the INUKAI Cabinet which would go that far. INUKAI was,

Page 1-5

(I-5)
however, unwilling to recognize the independence of Manchuria. He was assassinated and his cabinet was replaced by the SAITO Cabinet which was willing to establish a so-called independent Manchukuo. The OKADA Cabinet was eliminated by the revolution of February 26, 1936, and replaced by the HIRATA Cabinet which affirmatively joined the entire conspiracy. The HIRATA Cabinet fell because of the efforts of the military conspirators to eliminate the opposition of the political parties. The HAYASHI Cabinet was formed only after the conspirators made it impossible for UGAKI to set up a government. The first KONOE Cabinet resigned for the purpose of better effectuating the conspiracy. His successor HIRANUMA resigned and was succeeded by ABE because of the failure of the negotiations for a military alliance with Germany, an important element in the conspiracy. The YONAI Cabinet was compelled to resign because its policy was unsatisfactory to the group of the conspirators who wanted a strong alliance with Germany. YONAI was succeeded by KONOE, who admittedly was liked by the military conspirators and was in favor of the German alliance. The second KONOE Cabinet resigned solely for the purpose of eliminating MATSUOKA, who desired to move forward in a direction not desired by the majority of the conspirators. The third KONOE Cabinet fell, and the TOJO Cabinet was organized over the issue whether or not there should be an immediate war of aggression in furtherance of the conspiracy. A review of the cabinets of Japan during the period of the conspiracy, rather than revealing the

1 159 0002 038 1

(I-5)
lack of a common plan and a conspiracy, emphasizes immeasurably both the existence of the common plan and the continuity of its effectuation and establishes both facts beyond any question or doubt.

C. THE OTHER CONSPIRACIES

I-6. The evidence considered in connection with Count 1 likewise establishes beyond any doubt the other conspiracies charged in the Indictment. To consider the evidence particularly applicable to the other conspiracy counts, as well as the substantive counts, would be wholly repetitious of the evidence already considered. It will be sufficient to point out those portions of the evidence which establish the particular conspiracy counts now being considered.

Page I-6
§ I-9
Reading omitted

Count 2 is established by all the evidence considered in Part I of the Conspiracy, par. D-1 to D-97, inclusive.

Count 3 is established by all the evidence considered in Parts I, II, III, and IV of the Conspiracy, particularly Parts I and II, paragraphs D-1 to D-97, and E-1 to E-106, inclusive.

Count 4 is established by all the evidence contained in Parts I, II, III, and IV of the Conspiracy, particularly Parts III and IV, paragraphs F-1 to F-158, G-1 to G-174, and H-1 to H-184, inclusive.

Count 5 is established by all the evidence contained in Parts I, II, III, and IV of the Conspiracy, particularly

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(I-6)

Part II, paragraphs E-51 to E-57, inclusive; Part III, Section B, paragraphs F-99 to F-158, inclusive.

Count 37 is established by the evidence contained in paragraphs G-26 to G-161, inclusive, in Part IV of the Conspiracy.

Count 38 is established by the evidence contained in paragraphs G-26 to G-161, inclusive, in Part IV of the Conspiracy.

D. THE SUBSTANTIVE COUNTS

I-7. It would likewise be repetitious to consider the evidence with respect to each of the substantive counts. It has already been considered in connection with Count 1. It will, therefore, be sufficient to point out those portions of the evidence which establish the offenses charged in the several substantive counts.

Count 6, charging the planning of aggressive war against China, is established by the evidence considered in Parts I, II, and Section A of Part III of the Conspiracy.

Count 7, charging the planning of aggressive war against the United States, is established by all the evidence considered in Part III and in Section A of Part IV of the Conspiracy.

Counts 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, charging the planning of aggressive war against the British Commonwealth of Nations, are established by the same evidence which establishes Count 7.

(I-7)

Count 13, charging the planning of aggressive war against the Philippines, is established by the same evidence that establishes Count 7.

Count 14, charging the planning of aggressive war against the Netherlands, is established by the same evidence that establishes Count 7.

Count 15, charging the planning of aggressive war against France, is established by the same evidence that establishes Count 7.

Count 16, charging the planning of aggressive war against Thailand, is established by the same evidence which establishes Count 7.

Count 17, charging the planning of aggressive war against the U.S.S.R., is established by Section B of Part IV of the Conspiracy.

I-8. The initiation counts, in so far as the aggressive character of the wars initiated is concerned, are established by the same evidence which establishes the aggressive character of the wars in each of the other counts, including the main conspiracy.

Count 18, charging the initiation of aggressive war against China on or about September 18, 1931, is established by paragraphs D-28 to D-37, inclusive, of Part I of the Conspiracy.

(I-8)

Count 19, charging the initiation of aggressive war against China on or about July 7, 1937, is established by paragraphs E-31 to E-41, inclusive, of Part II of the Conspiracy.

Counts 20 and 21, charging the initiation of aggressive war against the United States and the Philippines, are established by paragraphs G-132 to G-141, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 22, charging the initiation of aggressive war against the British Commonwealth of Nations, is established by paragraphs G-132 to G-141, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 23, charging initiation of aggressive war against France, is established by paragraphs G-36, G-46, G-173 of the Conspiracy. If it is the defense's contention that Japan was never at war with France, it is submitted that such contention is wholly untenable. The contention is based upon the theory that Japan obtained the right to occupy French Indo-China by treaty from the Vichy Government. However, this completely ignores the circumstances under which Japan obtained those rights. Even before Vichy consented to Japan's occupation of Indo-China, on September 6, 1940, and September 23, 1940, Japanese troops had crossed the border and invaded Indo-China.^a It is the prosecution's contention that the invasion of the territory of a nation by the armed forces of another nation for purposes of aggression, even though the

I-8.

a. Ex. 620, T. 6929-33.

(1-8)

aggrieved nation later consents, constitutes the initiation and waging of aggressive war until the consent is given. While the consent may legalize the subsequent occupation, it cannot cure the previous illegality. Even if there had been no invasion of French territory prior to the signing of the agreements, the subsequent occupation, pursuant to the agreement with Vichy, constituted the initiation and waging of aggressive war. Where a nation, which has been subjugated and held captive by another, is forced to comply with the aggressive demands of a third nation under threat of military action, if such demands are not complied with, the consent obtained is invalid as having been obtained under duress, and the subsequent occupation constitutes the initiation and waging of aggressive war. If this contention were not recognized, one of the fundamental purposes of international law and of all law--to protect the weak against the deprivations of the strong--could be easily obviated. An aggressor need only obtain by duress compliance with his demands and the weak defeated nation would have no recourse or remedy. The weak nation, even though completely subjugated, would have to choose to fight a powerful enemy in order to obtain the protection of the law. This, it is submitted, would be the negation of all law. A law, whose function is to prevent breaches of the peace, cannot have as an absolute prerequisite to its invocation another breach of the peace. If the

(I-8)

Tribunal should hold that Japan was not at war with France from September 1940 for either of the two reasons just considered, it is submitted that on March 9, 1945, Japan initiated aggressive war against France and thereafter waged such war against that nation. On March 9, 1945, upon the failure of the Governor-General of Indo-China to accept Japan's new demands, Japan began military action.^{b.}

Count 24, charging the initiation of aggressive war against Thailand, is established by paragraph G-14C of the Conspiracy. With respect to this count, it is also contended by the defense that since Japan immediately entered into an agreement with Thailand, the charge has not been established. However, since Japanese troops were landed in Thailand in pursuance of Japan's aggressive purposes prior to the execution of the agreement, and Thailand's consent was obtained only after the invasion,^{c.} the contentions set forth with respect to Count 23 are equally applicable to this count.

Count 25, charging initiation of aggressive war against the Soviet Union, is established by paragraphs H-96 to H-108, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 26, charging the initiation of aggressive war against the Mongolian People's Republic, is established by paragraphs H-109 to H-124, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 27, charging the waging of aggressive war against China since September 18, 1931, is established by

1-8.

b. Ex. 663, T. 7177-81, Ex. 664, T. 7183-91.

c. T. 5352-7, 5692.

(I-8)

paragraphs D-17 to D-52, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 28, charging the waging of aggressive war against China since July 7, 1937, is established by paragraphs E-31 to E-66, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 29, charging the waging of aggressive war against the United States, is established by paragraphs G-141 to G-147, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 30, charging the waging of aggressive war against the Philippines, is established by paragraphs G-141 to G-147, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 31, charging the waging of aggressive war against Britain, is established by paragraphs G-140 to G-147, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 32, charging the waging of aggressive war against the Netherlands, is established by paragraphs G-141 to G-146, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 33, charging the waging of aggressive war against France, is established by paragraphs G-36, G-46, G-172-3 of the Conspiracy. The remarks made with respect to Count 23 are also applicable to this count.

Count 34, charging the waging of aggressive war against Thailand, is established by paragraph G-140 of the Conspiracy. The remarks made with respect to Count 24 are also applicable to this count.

(I-8)

Count 35, charging the waging of aggressive war against the Soviet Union in 1938, is established by paragraphs H-96 to H-100, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 36, charging the waging of aggressive war against the Moroccan People's Republic and the Soviet Union in 1939, is established by paragraphs H-109 to H-124, inclusive, of the Conspiracy.

Count 39, charging murder at Pearl Harbor, is established by paragraph G-141 of the Conspiracy.

Count 40, charging murder at Kota Bahru, is established by paragraph G-140 of the Conspiracy.

Count 41, charging murder at Hong Kong, is established by paragraph G-145 of the Conspiracy.

Count 42, charging murder by reason of the attack on HMS Leteral, is established by paragraph G-144 of the Conspiracy.

Count 43, charging murder in the Philippines, is established by paragraph G-144 of the Conspiracy.

1) 經濟問題

2) 糧食問題

3) 教育問題

4) 衛生問題

5) 勞務問題

6) 稅收問題

7) 社會福利問題

8) 治安問題

9) 交通問題

10) 國防問題

11) 外交問題

12) 內政問題

13) 民族問題

14) 宗教問題

15) 藝術問題

16) 體育問題

17) 科學問題

18) 哲學問題

19) 歷史問題

20) 地理問題

21) 氣象問題

22) 生物問題

23) 醫學問題

24) 法律問題

25) 政治問題

26) 軍事問題

27) 外交問題

28) 內政問題

29) 民族問題

30) 宗教問題

Summary I

Handwritten notes in vertical columns, likely a summary or report, covering various topics such as economic, educational, and social issues.

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I
Summary

原告の意思は達成せしむるが爲め、場合於ては遂行速度
の共同謀議者等、計画或は其の計画、大部分一致せし
モノナリ又或は内閣の他、モノ比し比較的は戰的ナリ
ヤウに見えども此の能なる相異の偏は其の時、共同謀議
遂行の特定段階於ける速度、問題依りてナリ
又其の此れ熟考せしむる行動が凡る状況に徴し時
宜しきと否か又共同謀議、數個、目的は實るか或
は阻害するモノナリと、疑惑依りてナリ又内閣内
閣以外の内閣、又討つて共同謀議自体を意除
去し向うは多し無クナリ又

I-4 勿論此等、被告以外は多し、共同謀議者が居り
し事、之を以て證據、示す所依りて此等、被告と共に
起訴し、之を宜しかく至り共同謀議者、多し、今、死之
と又、其を處すも 裁判ヲ受けるコトが出来ぬ者、共同謀議
者、内、生きたる居る裁判ヲ受けるコト、出来ぬ者、中
此等 被告の至り共同謀議者テアルト證據ニ依りて示
サレたり、他、共同謀議者が起訴サレ居ると云ふコト、
此等、被告は取つて言譯モナズ又辯護モナリ、之ニ
関聯、テ辯護中ニ特定、行為ニ對スル罪ヲ出来ル丈
今、死之、之を轉嫁スル爲め、爲サレし努力ヲ注意スル
が宜し、イナリ又

P. 0

尚又變護側、主張は若ん然各内閣、度々、更迭が甚
謀議を共同謀議、爲す、行爲ニ多し、起閣ノ事實ヲ
看過スルニ一か出来止すと、只然、効力ヲ持シ、知セザリ。

Summary Item

然之が、證據、示ス所ニ依ルニ、田中内閣ヨリ本條内閣
ニ至ルニ、閣、各場合ニ於テ、閣又ハ唯、又時ニ組
閣、閣、而シテ、共同謀議者ニ依リ、共同謀議促進
ノ爲ニ、爲サレタリ。田中内閣ハ、共同謀議ニ携ル軍人、
軍機問題ノ爲メニ、辭職セタリ。濱口ハ、政府ノ對滿、早
和政策ヲ奉者ヲ除カストシ、不成功ニ終リ、企ニ於テ、暗
殺セシメ、若槻内閣ハ、滿洲ニ更ニ軍事行動ヲ敢テ、不
スル共ニ、共同謀議者、計畫を通リ、カトシ、極ニ時ニ、ノ是
ハヤ、所ノ大義内閣ニ代之タリ。然シテ、養内閣
ハ、満州ノ無之ヲ認大ニ、欲セテ居リ、セタリ。彼、時
殺シ、ノ閣、所謂獨立滿洲國ノ建設ニ、欲セテ居
ル者、此ハ、閣ニ代之タリ。田中内閣ハ、一九三二年二月三日
六日、奉天ニ依リ、除カレ、金共同謀議ニ、断然参加セ、
廣西内閣ニ代之タリ。廣西内閣ハ、軍人ノ共同謀議者、
ノ政界、對テ、除カストシ、努力、ノ爲メ、倒シタリ。林内
閣ハ、止同謀議者ガ、宇垣ノ組閣ヲ、不可能トシ、タリ。後、然
ナリ、組織セシメ、タリ。第一次近衛内閣ハ、共同謀議者、ノ意
ヲ、遂行スルニ、爲ニ、辭職セタリ。後、継者、ニ、沼ハ、共同
謀議ノ、重要ナル一要素多シ、對獨軍軍同盟ニ、對シ、以、交談
失敗、爲ニ、辭職シ、阿部ガ、續キタリ。米内閣、ハ、ノ、政
外獨、悉ク、強大、同盟ヲ、望ム、共同謀議者、ノ、因テ、ニ、不、滿

片

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Summary I

足平アウツテ辭職ヲ餘儀ナラサシマシム。米内後ニ軍人、
共同謀議者カ好ムト認メラシ又獨逸ト同盟ニ贊成、
近衛ヲ立シマシ。第二次近衛内閣、多數、共同謀議者
カ希望セラル方向ニ進ムトシテ松岡ヲ除クテ、目的ヲ
辭職シマシ。共同謀議促進、乃チ侵略戰爭ヲ即
時行フベキ否ノ問題、乃チ第三次近衛内閣カ倒レ東
條内閣カ組織セシマシ。共同謀議期間中、日本ノ歴
代内閣ヲ回顧スルニ、共同計畫並ニ共同謀議、無力ヲ
示ス所カ共同計畫、存在トシテ履行ノ繼續ノ
両方ヲ無キニ強調シ且チ兩事實ヲ疑問又ニ疑ノ餘地
ナキニ確證シマシ。

1-6 許因第一ニ閣前ニ取上ケラシテ證據ハ同ニク疑テ
ノ起リ共ニ於テ告許セシテ他ノ共同謀議ヲ構成シ
ス。特ニ他ノ共同謀議ノ許因ニ又獨立ノ許因ニモ偏
用出来ル證據ヲ取上ケルトハ既ニ取上ケラシテ證據ヲ
スベキ證據ニトシテ示アリマシ。

今取上ケラシテノ特種共同謀議許因ヲ構成スル
ヤキ證據ノ一部ヲ指摘スルニ十分示アリマシ。

其ノ中、共同謀議ノ一部、即ち至中ニ
 於テ考慮セシムル全證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。
 訴因ノ二ハ、共同謀議ノ一部、即ち至中ニ
 訴因ノ三ハ、共同謀議ノ一部、即ち至中ニ
 於テ考慮セシムル全證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。
 特ニ第一及第二部、即ち至中ニ
 訴因ノ四ハ、共同謀議ノ一部、即ち至中ニ
 於テ考慮セシムル全證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。
 三、第四部、即ち至中ニ
 於テ考慮セシムル全證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。
 訴因ノ六ハ、共同謀議ノ一部、即ち至中ニ
 於テ考慮セシムル全證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。
 特ニ第二部、即ち至中ニ
 訴因ノ六ハ、共同謀議ノ一部、即ち至中ニ
 於テ考慮セシムル全證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。
 會比、全證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。
 訴因ノ三六ハ、共同謀議ノ一部、即ち至中ニ
 會比、證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。
 訴因ノ三八ハ、共同謀議ノ一部、即ち至中ニ
 會比、證據ニ依リテ立証セシム。

Summation I

I-8

二 具体的訴因

具体的訴因、各ニ就キ證據ヲ考慮スルニ於テ、同種重複的ニ行ハレ、之ハ既ニ訴因第三國連テ、考慮スルニ交リ、故、數多、具体的訴因中ニ訴追スルニ非テ、証ニテ部令、證據ヲ指摘スルニ十分ナリ。

中國ニ對シテ侵略戰爭ヲ企圖セ、責任同訴因第六、共同謀議ヲ一部、中ニ部及心ヲ三部、(A)ノ項ニ於テ考慮セ、證據ヨリ立証セ。

金象國ニ對シテ侵略戰爭ヲ企圖セ、責任同、訴因第六、共同謀議ヲ三部及心ヲ一部、(A)ノ項ニ於テ考慮セ、證據ヨリ立証セ。

金象聯邦ニ對シテ侵略戰爭ヲ企圖セ、責任同、訴因第六、(A)ノ項ニ於テ證據ヨリ立証セ。

比律連國ニ對シテ侵略戰爭ヲ企圖セ、責任同、訴因第六、(A)ノ項ニ於テ證據ヨリ立証セ。

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Summation I

1. 1947年12月，在倫敦召開之「大國會議」中，
 蘇聯代表團曾提出一項建議，謂「歐洲各國
 應在平等基礎上，組成一個歐洲聯邦，以
 維護歐洲之和平與穩定」。此項建議，
 曾引起英美兩國之極大興趣。然蘇聯
 代表團之此項建議，其目的在於使
 歐洲各國，在平等基礎上，組成一個
 歐洲聯邦，以維護歐洲之和平與穩定。
 此項建議，曾引起英美兩國之極大
 興趣。然蘇聯代表團之此項建議，其
 目的在於使歐洲各國，在平等基礎
 上，組成一個歐洲聯邦，以維護歐洲
 之和平與穩定。

0159 0002 0397

Simulation I

工： 肩頭，許國，起，戰爭，侵略的性質，責任，共同謀議，會，他，許國，存，於，戰爭，侵略性，立，証，不，同，証據，依，立，証，之，下。

許國第十人 一九三九年九月十日又，其項，中國，對，不，侵略戰爭，開始，責任，同，之，下，共同謀議，第一，部，第，三，節，乃至，第，三，七，節，(會) 依，立，証，之，下，之。

許國第十九 一九三九年七月七日又，其項，中國，對，不，侵略戰爭，開始，責任，同，之，下，共同謀議，第一，部，第，三，節，乃至，第，四，節，(會) 依，立，証，之，下，之。

許國廿一及廿三 美國及比律賓，對，不，侵略戰爭開始，責任，同，之，下，共同謀議，第一，部，第，三，節，乃至，第，四，節(會) 依，立，証，之，下，之。

許國廿二 全英聯邦，對，不，侵略戰爭，開始，責任，同，之，下，共同謀議，第一，部，第，三，節，乃至，第，四，節(會) 依，立，証，之，下，之。

許國廿三 佛國，對，不，侵略戰爭，開始，責任，同，之，下，共同謀議，第一，部，第，三，節，乃至，第，四，節(會) 依，立，証，之，下，之。

若，其，並，開，主張，日，本，及，之，佛國，戰爭，之，中，力，言，其，有，之，在，主張，全，德，主張，之，難，之，上，方，之，右，主張，日

本，之，的，言，之，政府，之，佛國，及，那，之，領，之，權利，獲得，之，說，其，在，之，之，然，之，是，日，本，之，是，之，權利，獲得，之，之，之，之，完全，無，視，之，之，一九四一年九月六日及一九四

年，之，日，之，政府，之，日，本，之，印度，及，那，之，領，之，承諾，以

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若し、只今取上テラタニ、理由、何カ、タメ、法廷、日、
一九四〇年九月ヨリ佛蘭西ト交戦状態ニカキタト主張ス
ルニ、一九四五年三月九日日本、討佛侵略戦争ヲ開始
シ、右、同盟国ニ対シ、此ノ戦争ヲ実行セルコトヲ申立テ
ス。一九四五年三月九日佛領印度支那總督ガ日本、
新憲法ヲ受理セザリシコトニ基キテ日本、軍事行動
ヲ開始シタゲアリス。(4)

泰国ニ対スル侵略戦争ヲ開始セル責任ヲ同ノ許因
オキ、四ノ共同謀議、⁴ニヨリ立証サレタラス。

本許因ニ関シ、又日本、泰国ト直ニ協定ヲ結ビタル故
ニ、許因返ノ実証サキ居、イト辯護側ニ依リ主張セ
ラキ居、ス併シ作ラ日本軍、日本、侵略目的ニ從
ヒ右協定成立前ニ泰国ニ上陸シタアリ、又泰国、承
諾ノ後ニ始メ得ラタアル以上、許因オニ、
ニ関シ述ラタ右主張、本許因ニ同称適用シ得ル
アリマス。

ソ、ソ、ソト聯邦ニ対スル侵略戦争ヲ開始セル責任
ヲ同ノ許因オキ、五ノ共同謀議、⁵ニヨリ立証
サレタラス。

1. 法廷記 六三 法廷記録 七七一
2. 法廷記 六四 法廷記録 七三九

蒙古人民共和國ニ對スル侵略戦争ヲ開始セ
ル責任ヲ同ノ許因チ十六共同謀議ニ乃至ス
ヨリ立証セリトナス。

一九三九年九月十日以降、中国ニ對スル侵略戦争ヲ開
始。責任ヲ同ノ許因チ十七共同謀議
D-19 乃至
ニヨリ立証セラレタリ。

一九三七年七月七日以降、中国ニ對スル侵略戦争ヲ開
始。責任ヲ同ノ許因チ十八共同謀議、
E-31 乃至
ニヨリ立証セラレタリ。

合衆國ニ對スル侵略戦争ヲ開始、責任ヲ同ノ許因
チ十九共同謀議、
G-11 乃至
ニヨリ立証セリ

比律賓ニ對スル侵略戦争ヲ開始、責任ヲ同ノ許因
チ二十共同謀議
H-14 乃至
ニ依リ立証セリ

英國ニ對スル侵略戦争ヲ開始、責任ヲ同ノ許因チ
二十共同謀議
I-14 乃至
ニヨリ立証
ラレタリ。

和蘭ニ對スル侵略戦争ヲ開始、責任ヲ同ノ許因チ三十

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Summary I

0040 2000 6510

Summary I

二、共同謀議 依りて立証セラル

佛蘭西に対する侵略戦争に開始 罪責を問ふ許因
三、共同謀議 依りて立証セラル、又、
立証セラル、テアリマス。許因三三三圖三十三の意見、
本許因も亦適用セラル。

泰國に対する侵略戦争に開始 罪責を問ふ許因三十四、
共同謀議 依りて立証セラル、又、

許因三十四の爲サシタル言説、又、本許因も適用セラル。

一九三一年蘇聯に対する侵略戦争に開始 罪責を問ふ許因三十五、
共同謀議 依りて立証セラル、又、

一九三一年蘇聯人民共産党に對する侵略戦争に開始 罪責を問ふ許因三十六、
共同謀議 依りて立証セラル、又、

真珠湾に於ける攻撃、罪責を問ふ許因三十九、
共同謀議 依りて立証セラル、又、

「三」に於ける攻撃、罪責を問ふ許因第四十、
共同謀議

13

Summation I

議 ⁹⁷⁷⁰ニ依リテ立認セラレテナルニテアリヌ。

香港ニ於テ此殺戮ノ罪責ヲ同ノ許因ヲ空ニ、共同謀
議 ⁹⁷⁷⁰ニ依リテ立認セラレテナルニテアリヌ。

英國皇艦「ペトル」號ノ攻撃ニ依リテ、殺戮ノ罪責
ヲ同ノ許因ヲ四ニ共同謀議 ⁹⁷⁷⁰ニ依リテ立認セラレテナルニテアリヌ。

比律賓諸島ニ於テ此殺戮ノ罪責ヲ同ノ許因ヲ四
十三、英國謀議 ⁹⁷⁷⁰ニ依リテ立認セラレテナルニテアリヌ。

0159 0003 0403



PRISONER OF WAR SUMMATION

(J-1)

J-1. This phase of the summation deals with the facts relating to the crimes against humanity and conventional war crimes charged in Counts 53, 54 and 55 of the Indictment. The law in regard to such crimes, which will be hereafter referred to as war crimes, will be discussed in the next succeeding phase of the summation.

J-2. In the prisoner of war summation argument will be addressed to the Tribunal with a view to establishing that the war crimes of which evidence has been given were in fact committed, and that they were committed in some cases as a part of the policy of the Japanese Government, and that in the remaining cases the Government was indifferent as to whether they were committed or not. The expression "Japanese Government" is here used in a very wide sense as embracing not merely members of the Cabinet but also senior officers of the Army and Navy, ambassadors and senior career public servants. Throughout the remainder of this phase of the POW summation the expression will be so used.

J-3. In this phase of the summation it is not proposed to link the individual accused with the commission of, or other responsibility for, war crimes; that will be done by counsel in making their addresses in regard to the accused assigned to them.

(J-4)

J-4. As far as possible it is desired to avoid subjecting the Tribunal to a repetition of the nauseating details of the massacres, murders, tortures and other almost inconceivable atrocities committed by the Japanese on the high seas and in every area that they occupied. With this end in view, and with the object of assisting the Tribunal in its weighty task, summaries of various phases of the evidence, which the Prosecution considers important, have been prepared and are annexed to this address as Appendix "A" and Appendix "B". It is not proposed to read these Appendices.

I shall now proceed to describe them briefly.

J-5. APPENDIX "A" is divided into two parts. The first part sets out details of atrocities committed by the Japanese on Chinese soldiers and civilians in China and Manchuria between 1937 and 1945, and, in addition, contains references to evidence showing the means by which the Japanese Government did, or ought to have, become acquainted with such atrocities.

J-6. APPENDIX "B" is divided into seven parts.

a. The first Part consists of a Summary of the evidence relating to treatment of prisoners of war, civilian internees and inhabitants in occupied countries other than the Philippines between December 1941 and September 1945.

In terms there appears to be some overlapping with APPENDIX "A" but that is not so in fact. Defense evidence contradicting or palliating the commission of war crimes shown by the

(J-6)
evidence for the Prosecution has been inserted in the appropriate place. On the other hand this Part ignores defense evidence relating to camps or other places in respect of which no evidence has been given by the Prosecution. This has been done on the basis of His Honor, the learned President's remark to the defense, "Meet the charges made against you and do not try to prove that in other cases where no charges were made no faults could be found."^{a.} It will be noticed that this Part has been divided into Divisions each covering six months or thereabouts. That has been done so that the Tribunal may readily correlate the periods of public office or service command of individual accused with the periods during which war crimes were committed at particular places.

b. The second Part consists of a Summary of the Prosecution evidence relating to treatment of prisoners of war, civilian internees and inhabitants in the Philippines between December 1941 and September 1945.

c. The third Part consists of a Summary of evidence relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the course of transportation by sea. It covers the period from 7 December 1941 to the end of the war.

d. The fourth Part contains a Summary of evidence of atrocities at sea, other than those relating to transportation of prisoners of war, and protests relating thereto. Here

(J-6)
again the period covered is the duration of the Pacific War.

e. The fifth Part contains a Summary of the documentary evidence as to Japanese assurances re the application of Geneva Red Cross Convention 1929 and Geneva POW Convention 1929.

f. The sixth Part consists of a Summary of documentary evidence as to information received by the Japanese Government about the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees. It is divided into three Divisions as follows: - (1) Protests, (2) Transcripts of broadcasts, and (3) Japanese official documents authorizing or establishing the commission of War Crimes.

g. The seventh Part sets out the ratio of prisoners of war who died or were killed to the number captured.

J-7. With regard to events and incidents described in APPENDIX "A", and APPENDIX "B", Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4, the defense has in very few instances denied or made attempts to disprove the Prosecution's evidence. Even where this has been done it is not proposed to argue the matter in every case. Owing to the welter of uncontradicted Prosecution evidence as to the commission of war crimes, it is only where they become very important, for some such reason as the close connection of one of the accused with them, that the merits of conflicting evidence

(J-7)
will be argued in this phase of the summation. The only other attack that has been made by the defense on the evidence of the Prosecution as to the commission of such war crimes takes the form of a confession and avoidance. An illustration of this is where the defense admits that prisoners in a certain area suffered from starvation, or the lack of medical supplies, but claims that this was unavoidable owing to insufficiency of, or inability to use, transport for the purpose of providing the necessary food or medicine. Here again it is not proposed to argue the merits of conflicting evidence, except in cases otherwise important. In many cases the reply of the defense to Prosecution evidence of atrocities is that such things never happened. For instance where a Chinese affidavit states that in September 1941, in Chen Tung Shih, Japanese of the 6th Division plundered the countryside and massacred 200 inhabitants;^{a.} the Defense reply to this is that troops were instructed not to burn, kill or loot and "in obedience to these orders of their superiors they did not commit any deed which would be a disgrace to their superiors".^{b.} Here no assistance can be given to the Tribunal and it must make up its mind unaided by anything the Prosecution can say.

Cases of conflict between evidence of Defense and the evidence of the Prosecution as to the actual commission of war crimes.

a. Burma.

J-7

- a. Ex. 341, T. 4611
- b. T. 27496

(J-8)

J-8. In regard to the period between September 1944 and the end of the war, a great deal of evidence was given by the Defense, but it relates mainly to the responsibility of the accused KIMURA and the state of knowledge of several of his high ranking officers. This type of evidence will not be traversed here, as we are now only concerned with the fact whether war crimes were committed or not. On this basis the only conflict is as to treatment of prisoners of war at Rangoon Gaol. For the Prosecution evidence was given that in March 1945, men dying of beri beri and dysentery were left to die in a bare concrete cell without bedding. Requests for strengthening food and medical attention made to the medical officer and orderlies on their behalf were refused on the ground that they would die in any event.

^{a.}
They did die.

J-9. For the Defense two witnesses stated that the prisoners of war camp at Rangoon Gaol was equipped with dispensary, sick room, showers, etc., and that the equipment was in good condition. Both admitted, however, that they had never seen the camp until they themselves occupied it after the surrender. ^{a.} A statement of the Camp Commandant TAZUMI was also exhibited. In it he said camp was bare and poorly equipped with furniture and fixtures, medicine and equipment were lacking. Fresh vegetables and ^{b.} meat were available for the feeding of the prisoners.

J-8

a. Ex. 1583-A, T. 13102

J-9

a. T. 27540, T. 27545, T. 27585, T. 27592

b. Ex. 3087, T. 27567-9

(J-10)

J-10. It is submitted that the evidence of IKEJIRA and ICHIDA as to the condition of the camp must be rejected in favor of the eye-witness HUDSON and TAZUMI. It also appears from TAZUMI's statement that strengthening food and medical attention, as opposed to medicine, was available. There is nothing to contradict the Prosecution's evidence that they were refused and therefore the Prosecution's version should be accepted.

b. Shanghai.

J-11. As to Shanghai the only part of the Prosecution's evidence which is challenged is that relating to the period ending in October 1942. The Prosecution spoke of the lack of food, bedding, heat and medical supplies, and of the bad sanitation and general ill-treatment at the Woosung POW Camp and Bridgehouse Gendarmerie.^{a.}

J-12. The Defense evidence comes from SAWADA and KUDO. The former was Commander of the 13th Army which occupied and controlled Shanghai. He held that appointment until October 1942. He gave evidence that the prisoners of war received compassionate, fair and just treatment and that the Red Cross representative who visited the Woosung Camp in August 1942, had told him that he was delighted with the conditions obtaining there.^{a.}

J-13. KUDO gave similar evidence as to the views expressed by the Red Cross representative. It is^{a.}

J-11

a. Ex. 1893, T. 14165; Ex. 1900, 1901, T. 14178-9;
Ex. 1911, T. 14191; Ex. 1914, T. 14194; T. 327C, 8C

J-12

a. T. 27447

J-13

a. T. 27149-51

(J-13)

submitted that the evidence of prisoners who were confined in these places and could speak with first hand knowledge of conditions should be accepted in preference to that of a Red Cross man who makes one visit to the camp or of a general who doesn't even claim to have seen the Gendarmerie or the camp. (To explain the views alleged to have been expressed by the Red Cross representative, Japanese official documents were introduced into evidence by way of rebuttal. They show that the Red Cross visit to the camp was deferred from April to August 1942, at the urgent request of the Chief of Staff of the 13th Army because the prison camp accommodation was unsatisfactory and the mental attitude of the prisoners was not reasonable. In other words the camp was dressed for inspection, and it looks as if the prisoners were intimidated. This evidence gives the lie to SAWADA who must have known of the official correspondence.)

(c. Korea.

J-14. In respect of Korea no evidence was given in the Prosecution's case but the Defense put in evidence Red Cross reports of visits to camps in Korea on 18 December 1942 and in November-December, 1944. These described the camps in favorable terms but that of December 1944 went on to say that three of the prisoners expressed their gratitude to the camp officials and expressed their regret

J-13

b. Ex. 3843, 3843A, 3843B, T. 38153-6

J-14

a. Ex. 3308, T. 30174; Ex. 3310, T. 30190

b. Ex. 3310, T. 30190

(J-14)
 at having failed to do so on the occasion of the previous Red Cross visit. The attention of the Tribunal is invited to the fact that this conversation was not read into the record but forms part of the Defense evidence. It appears on pages 6 and 7 of the Exhibit. The previous Red Cross inspection had been made in November 1943 by a different representative.^{c.} To rebut the effect of this report the Prosecution introduced an affidavit from one of the prisoners at the camp. He states that during the November 1943 visit to the camp three of the prisoners had made complaints to the Red Cross representative and on the next day^{d.} were sentenced to solitary confinement.

J-15. The three prisoners referred to in this document are identical with those referred to as expressing their regret in 1944 for having failed to thank the camp staff during the previous Red Cross visit. This shows that fear of punishment prevented persons from making complaints.)

d. Tokyo.

J-16. A large body of Prosecution evidence was given as to the conditions in the Tokyo Group of Prison Camps, -^{a.} Yokohama, Kawasaki and Nasotsu. The prisoners at these camps suffered from starvation, lack of medical supplies and attention, beatings and other cruel punishments.

J-14

- c. Ex. 3140, T. 27949
- d. Ex. 3844, T. 38165

J-16

- a. Ex. 1942, T. 14246; Ex. 1948, T. 14253;
 Ex. 1926, T. 14223; Ex. 1952, T. 14258; T. 14271-6;

(J-17)

J-17. To rebut this, SUZUKI who commanded all camps in the Group was called by the Defense and gave evidence of the good treatment of prisoners and particularly stressed the fact that good food was provided for the sick. In cross-examination he admitted that he had knowledge of frequent beatings of prisoners, that pursuant to an order of Eastern District Headquarters the rations of the sick had been reduced by one-third and that he himself had authorized his staff to use Red Cross supplies intended for the prisoners. ^{a.} It is submitted that in this case the Tribunal should have no hesitation in accepting the Prosecution's evidence in its entirety.

Confession and Avoidance.

a. Singapore.

J-18. The Prosecution's evidence shows that between the 21st and 23rd of February 1942, 5000 Chinese, most of whom were civilians but many of whom were members of the Straits Settlement Volunteers, were taken from their families, coralled in areas cordoned off by tanks and executed without trial. ^{a.} Diary entries of the Japanese commander of the Singapore Defense Forces show that on 19 February he issued orders for the rounding up of undesirable Chinese as from the 21st; that the roundup was completed by 22 February and that 5000 of them had been executed by 11:00 a.m. on 23 February. These entries are broadly confirmed by Diary of Imperial Headquarters which under date of 21 February

J-17

a. T. 27201-25

J-18

a. T. 5362, 5372, 5627-81; Ex. 476, T. 5624

(J-18)
says "There are fairly many volunteers and Malaysians who joined the enemy's force as a volunteer army and the fifth column. The army is now in search for them." An entry of 3 March states "Soon after the occupation we arrested and executed about 5000 delinquent persons as the first clearing."^{b.}

J-19. The Defense admits that the massacre took place and that it was carried out on the orders of General YAMA-^{a.}SHITA. It, however, seeks to justify it on the grounds that Chinese had hampered the Japanese forces as they came down the Malayan peninsula and as they attacked Singapore, and that since the surrender on the 15th of February, Chinese had looted surrendered arms, assassinated officers and men, destroyed communications and transport lines,^{b.} killed and pillaged law abiding citizens.

J-20. It is submitted that this is no justification and that the massacre was a war crime. Not one of the victims was tried and it is obvious, from the number involved and the short time that elapsed between their arrest and their murder, that no investigation of any description could have been held in all cases. Further, under Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Convention the members of the Straits Settlement Volunteers were entitled to bear arms against the Japanese and upon their capture to be treated as prisoners of war.

J-18
b. Ex. 476, T. 5624

J-19
a. T. 27401, 27408-9
b. T. 27400-1; Ex. 476, T. 27411

(J-20)

b. Singapore and other areas under control of 7th Area Army

J-21. In common with POW in every other area occupied by the Japanese, prisoners and civilian internees in Singapore, Java, Sumatra and Borneo suffered throughout their incarceration from lack of food and medical supplies. All of these areas were at that time under the control of 7th Area Army commanded successively in 1945 by the accused DOIHARA and ITAGAKI.

J-22. The Defense does not contest the truth of this evidence but says that allied air and submarine attacks had rendered Japan unable to transport food and medical supplies, and therefore Japan's failure to adequately provide for prisoners and internees should not be regarded as a war crime. The Prosecution does not concede this. Prisoners and internees had been receiving inadequate rations and supplies in these areas long before allied attacks had affected Japanese ability to transport supplies. But were supplies as short as the Defense would have us believe? At Singapore the Defense's own witness on this point admitted that there was six months' supply of rice on hand at the surrender. In addition there were the British food and medical supplies which had been captured at the fall of Singapore. They were still in stock. Further evidence of this has been given in the Prosecution's case. True it is that the Defense claims that it was necessary to hold these supplies on hand for future operations.

J-21

- a. T. 5420, 5491; Ex. 1512-7, T. 12914-30
- b. T. 13537; Ex. 1712, T. 13629; Ex. 1720, 1721, 1722, T. 13644-6
- c. Ex. 1769, T. 13784, Ex. 1778, T. 13820, T. 13471, 13474, T. 13573-9, T. 13576
- d. Ex. 1655, 1656, T. 13312-3, Ex. 1668, T. 13420, Ex. 1673, 1674, 1675, T. 13446-9, T. 13355-62, 13369-72

J-22

- a. T. 30199-202; Ex. 3312, T. 30220-3
- b. T. 30202, 30212
- c. Ex. 1513, T. 12914, Ex. 1516, T. 12930
- d. Ex. 3312, T. 30220

(J-22)

As to this the Prosecution submits that international law is paramount, that one who makes it bow to operational necessity commits a war crime.

J-23. In Borneo most of the camps to which reference was made earlier had been wiped out by the massacre or starvation of their prisoner occupants, but at the sole remaining one, Kuching, 50 cases of medical supplies were handed over by the Japanese on the day of the arrival of the allied relief team.

J-24. Similarly with regard to Java, at Bandoeng^{a.} and Tjimaki^{b.} large supplies of medical and Red Cross goods were made available while at Tjideng ample supplies of food were brought into the camp from the surrounding district where there had been no shortage during the preceding six months.^{c.} In Sumatra too, adequate food and medical supplies were provided after the surrender.^{d.}

J-25. Finally in November 1942, the British had offered to send a ship from Australia with supplies for prisoners of war, but this offer was rejected.^{a.} Surely this would suggest to the Japanese a means of saving the lives of their war prisoners.

J-26. On the whole of the evidence it is submitted that the Tribunal should reject the Defense's contention that the circumstances were beyond her control and should find that the failure to properly provide for prisoner and

J-23

a. Ex. 1675, T. 13449-52

J-24

a. Ex. 1712, T. 13629
 b. Ex. 1721, T. 13646
 c. T. 13537 et seq
 d. T. 13474; T. 13573-9

J-25

a. T. 27153

(J-26)
internees in these areas was a war crime.

J-27.

c. Burma-Thailand Railway. From August 1942 onward, prisoners of war were dispatched from Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies to Burma and Siam to construct a railway line from Kanchanburi in Thailand to Thanbuzayat in Burma for the purpose of supplying Japanese troops in Burma who were preparing to invade India. The total distance was about 400 kilometres and the greater part of that was over virgin mountainous jungle, and it was built from each end at the same time. In all, about 46,000 prisoners of war were employed and of these, 16,000 died in a period of eighteen months from starvation, disease and ill-treatment.^{a.} Japanese sources place the maximum number of prisoners employed at 49,776 and the deaths at 7,746.^{b.} In addition, from 120,000 to 150,000 Indonesians, Burmese, Chinese and Malayans were employed and their death roll from the same causes was estimated at 60,000 to 100,000.^{c.} The Prosecution's evidence that the line was being constructed for operational reasons is corroborated by Japanese documents that came into existence in 1944. Thus in a report dated 6 October 1944 from Chief of Staff, Southern Army to the Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau, the following statement appears:

J-27

- a. T. 5415, 5434-41
- b. Ex. 473, T. 5492
- c. T. 5415, 5434-41

(J-27)

"... For strategic reasons the completion of this railway was most urgent. Since the proposed site of this railway line was a virgin jungle, shelter, food, provisions and medical supplies were far from adequate and much different from normal conditions for prisoners of war..."

In a communication received on 4 October 1944 at the same Bureau from the Chief of Prisoner of War Camps in Siam states (inter alia) "At that time (i.e. during construction of railway), provisions and rations were scarce. Quarters and establishments were poor and medical facilities were inadequate. Moreover, for strategic reasons, it was necessary to complete the railway by August 1943 and the work was pushed forward at a terrific rate, with the result that many prisoners of war became ill and many died."^{d.}

J-28. There is ample prosecution evidence to show that the deaths of prisoners were due to ill-treatment, excessive labor, starvation, disease and medical neglect.^{a.}

J-29. A comparison of the death rate among prisoners as opposed to that among their guards shows that "F" Force, which was 7,000 strong and was guarded by 250 Koreans and 30 to 40 Japs lost 3100 men in a period of 7 months from April 1943 onward, while only one of the guards died. "A" Force had 900 deaths whereas only four of its guards died and one of these was a suicide.

J-30. "F" Force and "H" Force arrived in Thailand from Singapore in April and May 1943 respectively, the

J-27

d. Ex. 473, T. 5492

J-28

a. T. 11411-41, 11478, T. 13000-11, T. 13020-35,
Ex. 1561-70, T. 13054-78
Ex. 1574-5, T. 13083-7, Ex. 1580, T. 13098

(J-30)
latter force was 3,000 strong and had a death roll of 900 in
^{a.}
seven months.

J-31. The decision to construct the railway was made by Imperial General Headquarters in response to a request from Southern Army Headquarters.
^{a.} Subsequently, in February 1943, Imperial General Headquarters decided for operational reasons to speed up the construction by four months but later extended the new period two months.
^{b.} The result was that the line was completed in October 1943, two months earlier than was originally planned.
^{c.} The defense does not deny the facts generally, but attributes the death rate to the early onset of the rainy season preventing the transportation of supplies;
^{d.} it says that the Southern Army Commander realizing that the success of the construction depended upon sanitation, sent medical teams to the area to study and improve the sanitary conditions, to investigate malaria with a view to controlling it, and to purify water supplies. The Southern Army Headquarters had been advised by its medical officers of the grave danger of the prisoners contracting diseases, and from the end of 1942 onward of the growing death rate among them.
^{e.}

J-32. Even if this were so, if the Japanese had exercised every care and the deaths were solely attributable to the unexpected onset of the rainy season, they would in the circumstances have committed a war crime. Southern Army Headquarters had no right to send prisoners of war to work in an

J-30

a. T. 5434, 5439-41

J-31

a. T. 14633
b. Ex. 475, T. 5513
c. T. 5437
d. Ex. 475, T. 27412-24, T. 27746
e. T. 27746

(J-32)
area which it knew to be gravely dangerous to health, and further, it had no right to employ prisoners on the construction of a railway line to be used for military purposes. There can be no doubt that it was the intention of the Japanese, at that time, to use the line solely for military purposes, to supply and reinforce their troops in Burma. This is obvious from the Japanese documents quoted^{a.} and from the dictates of common sense.

J-33. But it was clearly not the rainy season that caused the deaths although it may have increased them; as early as March and April, even on the Japanese figures, the monthly death roll already exceeded 200.^{a.} If the rainy season had then already commenced, why send "F" and "H" forces there at the end of April and in May as was done.^{b.}

J-34. Further, the deaths were almost entirely limited to the prisoners of war. You will recall that there were five deaths among the Japanese guards in comparison with 4,000 among the prisoners in "F" and "A" forces in seven months.^{a.}

J-35. It follows that the deaths among the prisoners were due to the fact that they were subjected to conditions to which the Japanese were not subjected. They died from ill-treatment, excessive labor, and unnecessary medical neglect and starvation.

J-32

- a. Ex. 473, T. 5492
- Ex. 475, T. 5513

J-33

- a. Ex. 473, T. 5492
- b. T. 5439-40

J-34

- a. T. 5439-40

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(J-36)

J-36. It is submitted that the defense has in no sense justified the conduct of the Japanese authorities with regard to the Burma-Thailand Railway.

J-37.

d. Bataan Death March. A rather half-hearted attempt was made to justify the Bataan Death March on the grounds that it was unavoidable as neither transport nor ^{a.} food was available.

J-38. Even if that were true it would not justify the treatment meted out to the marching prisoners; throughout a nine day march, over 120 kilometers under a blazing sun, about 65,000 American and Filipino prisoners were kicked and beaten by their guards, the only drink they had was water from caribou wallows, the only food, that which was thrown to them by Filipinos. Those who through illness or fatigue fell out of the march were shot or ^{a.} bayoneted.

J-39. But even the claim as to lack of transport is met by irrefutable evidence in the form of an affidavit made by Major-General King, the Commanding General of the American Forces at Bataan. He says, "In destroying arms and equipment in preparation for surrender, I had reserved enough motor transportation and gasoline to transport all my troops out of Bataan. I pleaded, after my surrender, that this be done, offering to furnish personnel as might

J-37

a. T. 27764-5

J-38

a. T. 12579-91, T. 12741-3, T. 12610-8

(J-39)
be required by the Japanese for this purpose... The Japanese told me that they would handle the movement of the prisoners as they desired, that I would have nothing to do with it, and that my wishes in that connection could not be considered.^{a.} It is submitted that the hearsay defense evidence should be rejected in favor of the affidavit of General King. In any event, it affords no justification for the barbarous conduct of the Japanese throughout the March.

J-40. I now proceed to the main part of the summation, to establish that the war crimes, which we submit have been proved, were in some cases committed as a matter of definite government policy and that in other cases the Government was indifferent as to whether they were committed or not.

J-40A. For this purpose the subject matter will be dealt with under the following heads:

- (i) Reasons for non-ratification of Geneva Prisoners of War Convention 1929;
- (ii) Assurances given by the Japanese Government as to application of conventions;
- (iii) Knowledge of Japanese Government of the commission of war crimes by its nationals;
- (iv) Amendments of Japanese law since 7 December 1941 so as to authorize breaches of the Hague Convention 1907 and/or the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention 1929;

J-39

a. Ex. 1448, T. 12595

(J-40A)

- (v) Similarity of pattern of war crimes committed throughout Japan and areas occupied by the Japanese.

J-41. Reasons for non-ratification of Geneva Prisoner of War Convention 1929. The defense has provided us with the starting point of our argument. Japan had signed the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention 1929 and in 1934 the question arose as to whether the Emperor should ratify it. The Army and Navy petitioned against ratification, the Navy supplying reasons^{a.} for its petition.

J-42. As the document embodying these reasons was introduced by the defense it must be assumed that the defense has adopted them as the Government's reasons for non-ratification of the Convention. They may be paraphrased as follows: (a) The obligations are unilateral since no Japanese would become a prisoner of war, (b) Art. 86 enabling protecting powers to interview prisoners of war without observers would be dangerous to military security, (c) The ratification of the Convention would double the range of enemy aircraft as, having completed their mission the crew could land on Japanese territory secure in the knowledge that they would be well-treated. (d) Prisoners of war could not be so severely punished as Japanese soldiers, and this would involve a revision of Japanese Military and Naval Disciplinary Codes to put them on an equal footing, a revision which was undesirable in the interests of discipline.^{a.}

J-41

a. Ex. 3043, 3044 T. 27177-81

J-42

a. Ex. 3043, T. 27177

(J-43)

J-43. The objection that the obligations would be unilateral applies equally to the Hague Convention which Japan had already ratified and therefore it may be disregarded in our search for the Government's intentions. The obligation contained in Article 86 is a qualified one - thus it provides for representatives of Protecting Powers interviewing prisoners and says "they may interview them, as a general rule, without witnesses" - and that must mean that the belligerent holding the prisoners can make exceptions to that general rule. In those circumstances there can be no real risk of the prisoner disclosing anything inimical to security. Therefore, this reason also may be disregarded.

J-44. It will be submitted hereafter, in the legal phase of this Prisoner of War Summation, that as a matter of law there is no practical difference between the Hague and the Geneva Conventions, that of 1929 merely making explicit what is implicit in the declaration contained in the Preamble to the Hague Convention, 1907. Japan, of course, could not have adopted that view in 1934 because, had she done so, there would have been no point in her refusal to ratify the 1929 Convention.

J-45. The only penal provision of the Hague Convention relevant to our present purpose is Article 8. This corresponds almost in terms with Articles 45 and 50 of the Geneva POW Convention 1929 and so in that respect

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(J-45)
the two Conventions may be said to cancel out each other. The only other material provisions restrictive of punishment in the Geneva Convention are those contained in Article 46 - "Any corporal punishment, any imprisonment in quarters without daylight and, in general, any form of cruelty is forbidden. Collective punishment for individual acts is also forbidden."

J-46. It was therefore these restrictions that the Japanese Government wished to avoid; it wished to preserve the right to ill-treat prisoners under the guise of punishment and so to deter airmen from raiding the country. The ill-treatment of prisoners was to be a matter of government policy.

J-47. Assurances given by the Japanese Government that they would apply the Geneva POW Conventions 1929 "mutatis mutandis" and the variation in meaning given to that expression.

Shortly after the outbreak of the war with Japan, the Governments of United States and Great Britain informed the Japanese Government through their Protecting Powers that they proposed to observe the provisions of the Geneva POW Convention 1929, and sought assurances that Japan would likewise observe such provisions. ^{a.} At about that time Great Britain also stated that she would observe national and ^{b.} racial customs of prisoners as regards food and clothing. Shortly after this a similar declaration was made by the ^{c.} United States of America.

- J-47
a. Ex. 1468, p. 12787
Ex. 1494, p. 12879
b. Ex. 1495, p. 12880
c. Ex. 1492, p. 12789

(J-48)

J-48. The Japanese Foreign Ministry sought the advice of the War Ministry. After several conferences had been held at the War Ministry, the Vice-Minister of War replied that "it would be safe to notify the world that we have no objection to acting in accordance with the Convention (i.e. Geneva POW Convention 1929) in the treatment of prisoners of war, and that as regards food and clothing, we have no objection to giving due consideration to the national or racial habits and customs of prisoners."^{a.}

J-49. On 29 January 1942, TOGO as Foreign Minister notified the respective Protecting Powers that Japan although not bound by Geneva POW Convention 1929 would "apply mutatis mutandis the provisions of the said Convention" to prisoners in its hands.^{a.}

J-50. Japan also notified the Protecting Powers that she would "consider, on conditions of reciprocity, the national and racial customs of prisoners as to food and clothing."^{a.}

J-51. On 13 February 1942, Japanese Foreign Ministry notified Protecting Power that she would apply provisions of Geneva POW Convention 1929 to "enemy civilian internees, insofar as they are applicable and provided that they are not made to work without their consent."^{a.}

J-52. The original assurances of Japan's intention to observe the Convention "mutatis mutandis" were despatched

J-48

a. Ex. 1958, T. 14299

J-49a. Ex. 1490, T. 12878
Ex. 1496, T. 12882
Ex. 1956, T. 14295J-50a. Ex. 1493, T. 12879
Ex. 1496, T. 12882
Ex. 1956, T. 14295J-51

a. Ex. 1491, T. 12878

0 159 0003 0427

(J-52)
under the hand of TOGO. In the course of his evidence he said
"...I assumed (and still assume) that we were binding ourselves
only to apply the Convention so far as circumstances permitted.
"Mutatis mutandis", then, I supposed to imply that in the
absence of serious hindrances the Convention would be applied;
I assumed also, although this was only assumption on my part,
that when the requirements of the Convention came into con-
flict with the provisions of domestic law, the former would
prevail."^{a.}

J-53. MATSUMOTO Shun-ichi, who was employed in the
Bureau of Treaties from 1940 to October 1942, says "It was
the intention of Japan with respect to the treatment of
prisoners of war that the stipulations of the Geneva Con-
vention be applied so far as the circumstances permitted;
in other words, unless there were hindrances or obstacles
which made its application impracticable."^{a.}

J-54. TOGO did not consider that Japan was getting
nothing in return for her promise to apply the Geneva
POW Convention 1929 and to extend its provisions to in-
terned civilians. To a War Minister, fondly believing
that no Japanese soldier would ever surrender, it may have
appeared that Japan was taking on her shoulders heavy obli-
gations without a chance of deriving any corresponding ad-
vantage, but it was not so to a Foreign Minister. There

J-52
a. T. 35769-0

J-53
Ex. 3030, T. 27136

(J-54)
 were some hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians in allied territories, and it was part of TOGO's duty to ensure their comfort and safety.^{a.} The same policy is seen in December 1943 when the Chief of the Information Bureau at the War Ministry sent out Censorship Instructions to all units. Any reports giving an impression of cruel treatment, such as prisoners being punished or being made to labor without clothing were to be censored. The reason given was that "care should be taken to avoid issuing twisted reports of our fair attitude which might give the enemy food for evil propaganda and bring harm to our interned brothers."^{b.} Japan was getting a real and valuable return for her undertaking. Whether she, on her part, abided by the Convention or not, she was anxious to have the world believe that she was applying its provisions to the allied nationals in her power.

J-55. On 15 December 1942 an inquiry was made by the Swiss Minister as to the conditions under which American prisoners of war were used as laborers.^{a.}

J-56. The Foreign Office reply dated 28 January 1943 stated that they were employed in the spirit of decision to apply POW Convention 1929 "mutatis mutandis" in labor which was not dangerous.^{a.} No reference is made in the Hague Convention to dangerous work, but that expression does appear under the heading of "Prohibited Labor"

J-54
 a. Ex. 3030, T. 27133
 b. Ex. 1977, T. 14539

J-55
 a. Ex. 2025 (1) T. 14833

J-56
 a. Ex. 2025 (2) T. 14833

0 159 0003 0429

(J-56)
in Article 32 of the Geneva POW Convention 1929. At this stage Japan is anxious to make it appear that she is abiding by the 1929 Convention and she admits that the employment of prisoners in labor that was dangerous would be a breach of that Convention applied "mutatis mutandis".

J-57. In March 1944 the Swiss Minister advises the Japanese Foreign Minister that he has obtained evidence that prisoners of war have been obliged to perform humiliating work in public and that this is contrary to Article 2 of the 1929 Convention. ^{a.} The reply is that Japan is not bound by the POW Convention 1929 but that it is the policy of the Government based on humanitarian reasons ^{b.} to protect prisoners of war from insult. Evidently the Swiss Minister has previously sought and obtained from the Japanese a definition of applying the 1929 Convention "mutatis mutandis" because after acknowledging receipt of the last mentioned letter he goes on to say, "The Legation remarks that the communication, according to which the Imperial Government would not be bound by the Geneva Convention, does not appear to coincide with the previous declarations under which Japan promised to apply to Prisoners of War in its power the provisions of that Convention mutatis mutandis, that is to say in a measure that will not conflict with the text of the Japanese law. In order to overcome any misunderstanding

J-57

- a. Ex. 2025 (5), T. 14834
- b. Ex. 2025 (6), T. 14834

(J-57)
 on the application of the Geneva Convention, the Federal Government, in a letter from the Swiss Minister to H. E. Mamoru SHIGEMITSU of 26 February, expressed a desire to obtain as soon as possible full particulars as to the articles of the Prisoner of War Code which the Japanese Government considers inapplicable by reason of internal legislation.^{c.} It is apparent that Japan through SHIGEMITSU has made a departure from the meaning originally given to the application of the Convention "mutatis mutandis"; it no longer means that "in the absence of serious hindrances the Convention would be applied;"^{d.} it now means that it will be applied only insofar as it does not conflict with Japanese domestic law. TOGO's view that "where the requirements of the Convention came into conflict with the provisions of domestic law, the former would prevail" has been jettisoned.^{e.}

J-58. By this time the Japanese have decided to modify their application of the Convention still further. On 28 April 1944, the Japanese Foreign Ministry replies to protests lodged a considerable time before in relation to treatment of American prisoners of war. In the course of reply it says, "By the above mentioned intention of the Japanese Government to apply 'mutatis mutandis' the provisions of 1929 Convention relating to prisoners of war to American prisoners of war it is meant that the

J-57

- c. Ex. 2025 (7), T. 14834
- d. T. 35769-70
- e. T. 35769-70

0159 0003 0431

(J-58)
provisions of the Convention will be applied with the modi-
fications necessary in order to conform with the provisions of
existing laws and regulations of the country and with the re-
quirements of the actual situation as it develops.^{a.} Thus we
see that a still further limitation has been given to the meaning
of applying the Convention mutatis mutandis. It has now come to
mean that the Japanese will apply it when and to the extent that
they see fit.

J-59. The policy of the Japanese Government herein is
clearly illustrated - it is to ensure good treatment for its own
prisoners and internees by falsely undertaking to apply the
Convention; it is to refrain from applying the Convention when
it suits the Government. The advantages derived by failing to
apply the Convention will be discussed hereafter.

Knowledge of the Japanese Government that War Crimes Had Been
and Were Being Committed.

J-60. The fact that a Government knows that its nationals
have committed and are committing war crimes, coupled with the
fact that it makes no real attempt to prevent their continuance,
is very cogent evidence of the fact that such crimes were and are
being committed as part of the Government's policy or that the
Government is quite indifferent as to whether they are committed
or not.

The purpose of this part of the summation is to
show that -

J-58
a. Ex. 2024(4), T. 14827

(J-60)

(a) The Japanese Government acquired knowledge of the rape of Nanking, and thereafter it had reason to be on its guard against the repetition of war crimes by the Japanese Forces throughout the fighting in China and the Pacific War;

(b) It acquired knowledge of the commission of other war crimes prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War;

(c) It acquired knowledge of the commission of war crimes in almost every theater of the Pacific War.

The Rape of Nanking.

J-61. When Nanking fell on 13 December 1937 all resistance by Chinese Forces within the city ceased. ^{a.} The Japanese soldiers advancing into the city indiscriminately shot civilians on the street. ^{b.} Once the Japanese soldiers had obtained complete command of the city, an orgy of rape, murder, torture and pillage broke out and continued for six weeks. During the first few days over 20,000 persons were executed out of hand by the Japanese. ^{c.} The estimates of the number killed in and around Nanking within six weeks vary from 260,000 to 300,000, all of whom were brutally murdered without trial. ^{d.} The accuracy of these estimates is indicated by the fact that the records of the Red Swastika Society and the Tsung-Shan-Tong shows that these two organizations between them buried over 155,000 bodies. ^{e.} During this same period of six weeks not less than ^{f.} 20,000 women and girls were raped by Japanese soldiery.

J-61

- a. T. 2533, 2559, 2628, 3894
- b. T. 2562
- c. Ex. 328, T. 4569
- d. Ex. 324, T. 4537; Ex. 327, T. 4542
- e. Ex. 324, T. 4537-9
- f. Ex. 329, T. 4569

(J-62)

J-62. The Defense does not deny the fact of atrocities having taken place at Nanking but it suggests that a number of ^{a.} the atrocities were committed by retreating Chinese soldiers. It also refers to the punishment of those who had committed war ^{b.} crimes by Court Martial. The number of these must have been very few as TSUKAMOTO, Koji, the Prosecutor and Judge for the Central China Expeditionary Forces said that he handled only 10 ^{c.} cases.

J-63. There is ample evidence that the accused MATSUI, who at that time commanded the Central China Expeditionary ^{a.} Force, knew of the atrocities committed at Nanking. Many reports of atrocities were made to Japanese diplomatic officials in China and these were forwarded by them to the Foreign ^{b.} Office. The Foreign Office forwarded the reports to the War Ministry and the fact of the atrocities having been committed was discussed with War Ministry representatives at Liaison ^{c.} conferences. A whole series of reports, one of them containing a report of over 70 cases of rape, were sent to the Foreign ^{d.} Minister, the accused HIROTA. MINAMI, who was Governor-General of Korea at the time, had read reports about the rape ^{e.} of Nanking in the press. There can be no doubt that the rape of Nanking and the atrocities that occurred there were very well known in official Japanese circles. Foreign newspaper accounts of the atrocities in Nanking and Shanghai were also referred to in the Budget Committee of the House of Peers

J-62
 a. Ex. 328, T. 21474
 b. Ex. 3498, T. 33822; Ex. 257, T. 3464-5
 c. T. 21579

J-63
 a. Ex. 257, T. 3452; Ex. 255, T. 3552-3, T. 33089, 33849
 b. T. 21453, 29970, 3505-6; Ex. 323, T. 4509-36, T. 2661;
 Ex. 328, T. 4558
 c. T. 29970-2
 d. T. 29977-85
 e. T. 20015

(J-63) f.
on the 16th of February 1938. The accused KIDO was present.

Knowledge of Atrocities Subsequent to the Rape of Nanking but
Prior to the Pacific War.

J-64. In October 1938, Japanese Forces entered Hankow.
On the morning following the entry captured Chinese were kicked
or thrown into the Yangtze River and shot; in the streets of
Hankow were seen the bodies of six or seven Chinese with their
hands wired behind them; they had all been killed by shooting. a.
The Defense claims that no atrocities were committed at Hankow. b.
Of the Defense evidence, that of YOSHIBASHI c. may be disregarded
entirely, as the Japanese entered the city on 27 October and he
did not arrive there until the 29th, one day after the incidents
deposed to by the eye-witness Dorrance; d. as to KIKKAWA, he merely
says that the triumphal entry into Hankow was carried out in per-
fect peace and order, and as a consequence he believed that the
troops who entered the city in this manner could not have com-
mitted violence or any other questionable deeds. e. This, of
course, proves nothing, especially as to what happened on the
following day. YOSHIKAWA's evidence, it is submitted, is
equally valueless; it amounts to this: Orders had been given
to the troops to preserve strict discipline and the city was
entered in a peaceful manner, therefore "it is inconceivable
that the Japanese Army could have committed assaults, looting,
rapes and other brutal acts." f. Nothing has been produced to
justify the Tribunal in rejecting Dorrance's account. g.

J-63

f. Ex. 3342, T. 31515, Ex. 3737, T. 37285, T. 31486

J-64

- a. T. 3392-6
- b. T. 21585, 21588-9, 21595-6
- c. T. 21595-6
- d. T. 3392-6
- e. T. 21584
- f. T. 21588-9
- g. T. 3392-6

(J-65)

J-65. There is no evidence of the atrocities at Hankow having been brought to the notice of the Japanese Government, but there is evidence that shortly after this the Japanese Government was aware of atrocities having been committed in many places by their armies in China. On 15 February 1939 the Vice Minister of War sent to the Japanese Armies in Japan, Korea, Formosa and China, a memorandum instructing that men returning from the Chinese Incident Army should be properly controlled so that they should not reveal the state of affairs existing there. An enclosure sets out the type of revelation they should not make and give instances of such revelations having been made. To quote a few: "One company commander unofficially gave instructions for raping as follows: 'In order that we won't have problems, either pay them money or kill them in some obscure place after you have finished.'" "If the army men who participated in the war were investigated individually they will probably be all guilty of murder, robbery or rape." "The prisoners of the Chinese Army were sometimes lined up in one line and killed to test the efficiency of the machine gun."^a It is important to notice that the direction is to prevent the men from talking about these things; there is no direction to prevent such things from happening.

J-66. Further evidence of atrocities having been brought to the notice of the Japanese Government is contained in a

J-65

a. Ex. 3304, T. 30127

(J-66)
report dated 14 October 1941 from the Chief of Staff of the South China Expeditionary Forces to Vice Minister of War KIMURA. It reports the murder of a French missionary and 24 natives by a Japanese naval force engaged on a punitive expedition against Povea City on Hainan Island.^a The document had been referred to various sections in the War Ministry, and then sent to the Foreign Ministry. Possibly the Army may not have been so willing to circulate it, had it not related to the Navy. Be that as it may, it provided an additional reason why the Japanese Government should have been on its guard against the commission of war crimes during the Pacific War.

Knowledge of War Crimes during the Pacific War.

J-67. The three main documentary sources from which the Prosecution alleges that the Japanese Government obtained knowledge of the commission of war crimes by its nationals during the Pacific War are as follows:

- (i) Protests lodged by Protecting Powers on behalf of belligerents;
- (ii) Transcripts of recordings of broadcasts made from America and Great Britain during the Pacific War;
- (iii) Official Japanese documents which constituted evidence of, or a direction to commit, war crimes.

J-66

a. Ex. 3366, T. 31785

(J-67)

Protests made by Protecting Powers to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the attitude of the Japanese Government to the facts disclosed in the protests as indicating that war crimes were committed as a part of a definite government policy, or that the Japanese Government was indifferent to their commission.

J-68. The details of the more important protests have been summarized in Part IV and Part VI of Appendix "B". Those in Part IV have been correlated with a summary of the evidence of the crimes which gave rise to the protests.

J-69. Owing to the destruction of Japanese documents at the time of the Japanese surrender, ^{a.} it is impossible to trace each protest from the Foreign Office to the various Japanese Ministries and Army or Navy organizations to which it was sent. Evidence that has been given, however, enables us to get a general picture of the manner in which protests were handled after being received by the Foreign Ministry.

J-70. Most of the protests had reference to prisoners of war held by the Army. Copies of these with translations attached were sent to all Sections in the War Ministry concerned with the subject matter ^{a.} and at times, depending on the nature of the protest, copies were also sent to other ^{b.} Ministries such as Navy, Home Affairs, Justice, etc. At the War Ministry any protests received were discussed at the bi-weekly conference between the Minister, Vice Minister and the Bureau Chiefs. ^{c.} After this they were forwarded by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau to the Army Commander

J-69

a. Ex. 2000, T. 14699

J-70

a. T. 12833

b. T. 15516-28; Ex. 2173, 2174, T. 15513-4

c. T. 14288; Ex. 1980D, T. 14564

0 159 0003 0438

(J-70)
of the area in which the grounds of the protest had arisen and
also to the Chief of Prisoner of War Camps in that area.
d.

J-71. Upon information being received from the last mentioned sources a reply would be prepared in the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau and forwarded to the Foreign Office.
a.

J-72. From various documents in evidence it would appear to have been the practice to give protests and other documents originating with the Protecting Powers a fairly extensive circulation in the War Ministry; in addition the Foreign Ministry would frequently send duplicates of the protests to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau as well as to the War Ministry.
a.

J-73. Considered purely as a matter of machinery no fault can be suggested with regard to this system. But it is not enough for the Japanese Government to pay lip service to its obligations under International Law. The Tribunal will recall that the Japanese Government was already well informed of the barbarous manner in which the Japanese forces customarily behaved. The proof of that has already been adverted to in this summation. The Prosecution contends that the very nature of the protests, coupled with the supporting evidence that accompanied them, and the replies made by field commanders to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau, insofar as such replies are in evidence, made it perfectly clear to the War Ministry and the Foreign Office that war

J-70
d. Ex. 473, T. 5492; Ex. 1980C, T. 14561

J-71
a. T. 14287-8

J-72
a. T. 27158-9; Ex. 473, T. 5492; Ex. 3529, T. 34426;
Ex. 3367A, T. 31790

0 159 0003 0439

(J-73)
crimes had been and were being committed and yet no effective steps were taken to stop them. It is therefore submitted that they were allowed to continue as a matter of government policy or as matters to which the Japanese Government was indifferent.

To establish these propositions it is now proposed to discuss certain series of protests.

a. Rangoon.

J-74. On 8 July 1942 the Swiss Minister forwarded to TOGO, the then Foreign Minister, a protest regarding the treatment of British troops in Rangoon. It was accompanied by the most cogent and unassailable evidence of the truth of the facts contained in the protest. On 23 June 1942 the "Japan Times and Advertiser" published a photograph showing British prisoners of war cleaning the streets of Rangoon before the amused eyes of Burmese onlookers. It was a cutting of this photograph which was sent with the protest.

A reminder that no reply had been received was sent by the Swiss Minister on 2 August 1942. There never was an answer; there couldn't be an answer.

J-75. As an isolated instance this would not be of great importance. Its importance lies in the attitude of the Japanese Government to subsequent complaints, particularly as to conditions in that area. The Japanese Government knew that prisoners of war there were being treated

J-74

- a. Ex. 2022(1), T. 14754
- b. Ex. 2022(2), T. 14755

0 159 0003 0440

(J-75)
otherwise than in accordance with the POW Convention 1929.
In spite of this a complaint made on 15 September 1942 as
to ill treatment and starvation of prisoners of war at
Rangoon Gaol Camp^{a.} meets with a bland denial of the
facts alleged.
b.

J-76. A further protest lodged on 12 February 1943
as to conditions at the same gaol - that there British and
Indian officers had been beaten into unconsciousness, and
that already between 20 and 30 prisoners of war had died
on account of general ill treatment and the lack of food,
water and medical supplies - elicits no response.^{a.} Still
later, on 18 November 1944, Swiss Minister protests at
ill treatment of 700 British, American and Indian POW
at Rangoon Central Gaol.^{b.} There is no reply.

J-77. Evidence has been placed before the Tribunal
showing that conditions, similar to those complained of,
existed right up to Japan's final defeat.^{a.}

J-78. At the time of these protests the Japanese
Army was in undisturbed and unchallenged occupation of
the country, so it is futile to suggest that the War Min-
istry could not have ascertained the true conditions.

J-79. The policy behind having British prisoners of
war clean the streets of Rangoon is quite clear; it is an
attempt to lower British prestige in Burma, and so improve
Burmese cooperation with the invading Japanese troops. The

J-75
a. Ex. 2022(3), Ex. 2022(4), T. 14754-7
b. Ex. 2022(5), T. 14758

J-76
a. Ex. 2022(6), T. 14760
b. Ex. 2022(14), T. 14773

J-77
a. Ex. 1555, T. 12991; Ex. 1583, T. 13101;
Ex. 3087, T. 27567-9

(J-79)
policy behind the other war crimes alleged in these protests is not so clear, unless it is to break the spirits of the men by starvation and ill treatment so that they would cause no trouble to their captors. Otherwise one is forced to accept the view that the Japanese Government was quite indifferent to the fate of its prisoners.

b. Thailand.

J-80. On 5 July 1943 the first protest as to the treatment of British Commonwealth prisoners of war is lodged with the accused, SHIGEMITSU. Complaint is made that prisoners are suffering from starvation, lack of medical supplies, boots and clothing, but that in spite of this, they have been compelled to carry out heavy railway constructional work and that the callous treatment inflicted upon them has caused many to become seriously ill.^{a.}

J-81. With unaccustomed promptitude SHIGEMITSU replies on 24 July that prisoners are equitably treated and that all sick have received proper medical attention.^{a.}

J-82. On 30 August the persistent Swiss Minister forwards a further protest to SHIGEMITSU - prisoners working for long hours without a spell at backbreaking work, with insufficient food and practically no clothing, are dying like flies; already 3,000 have died from cholera, beri beri and other diseases. Permission is sought for the Swiss Consul at Bangkok to visit the camps.^{a.}

J-80
a. Ex. 2023(1), T. 14791

J-81
a. Ex. 2023(2), T. 14792; Ex. 2017, T. 14747

J-82
a. Ex. 2023(3), T. 14792

0 159 0003 0442

(J-83)

J-83. This protest brings from SHIGEMITSU the laconic reply on 1 October 1943 that the Imperial Government accords to prisoners of war the same treatment as that accorded to Japanese soldiers stationed in Thailand.^{a.}

J-84. Prisoners of war were sent to Thailand for the purpose of helping to construct the Burma-Thailand Railway. The conditions under which prisoners worked and died on this railway have already been described on pages J-11 to J-14.

J-85. Our present purpose is to examine the state of knowledge of the Japanese authorities at the time of these protests. It has already been shown that YASUDA had advised Southern Army Headquarters in 1942, before the work was started, that there was a grave danger of the prisoners contracting diseases, and from the end of 1942 of the growing death rate.^{a.} On Japanese figures, which Wilde declares are understated by 50%,^{b.} the reported death rate jumped from 54 in November 1942 to 800 in August 1943, the total deaths being 2909.^{c.} This was in Thailand alone.

J-86. WAKAMATSU, who was attached to the Transportation and Communication Section of the General Staff at Tokyo, inspected Burma and Thailand toward the end of July or the beginning of August 1943. This inspection was made as a result of reports that had been received in Tokyo that the work on the railway was not progressing,

J-83

a. Ex. 2023(5), T. 14793

J-85

a. T. 27746
b. T. 5434-41
c. Ex. 473, T. 5492

(J-86)
 that the physical condition of prisoners of war working on the railway was poor, and that the death rate was high. WAKAMATSU goes on to say that during his inspection he observed the laborers at work on the railroad and saw many cases of beri beri and dysentery ~~wrought~~ ^{wrought} the fact that he found that the quality and quantity of the food was not of the required standard. He orally reported the results of his inspection to the Chief of the General Staff, SUGIYAMA, at Tokyo. ^{a.} This was done before he relinquished his appointment with the Transportation and Communication Section ^{b.} in October 1943.

J-87. Further information at the disposal of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau was the telegraphed monthly report from the POW Commandant in Thailand dated 3 September 1943. It showed that of a total of 40,314 prisoners in Thailand, 15,064 were sick, ^{a.} that is sick by Japanese standards because you must remember that those suffering from beri beri and dysentery were still laboring on the railway line. It is therefore obvious that when SHIGEMITSU sent his replies of 24 July ^{b.} and of 1 October 1943, ^{c.} it was known to the military authorities in Tokyo, whose duty it was to supply him with information, that the replies were not in accordance with the existing facts.

J-86

- a. T. 14634-5
- b. T. 14633-6

J-87

- a. Ex. 1988, T. 14609
- b. Ex. 2023(2), T. 14792; Ex. 2017, T. 14747
- c. Ex. 2023(5), T. 14793

(J-88)

J-88. On 28 February 1944 the Swiss Minister writes to the Japanese Foreign Office stating that the condition of prisoners of war in Burma and Thailand leaves much to be desired and that there are in particular many cases of beri beri and that medical supplies to treat this disease are non-existent. ^{a.} No answer was received so reminders were sent on 25 April ^{b.} and on 10 June 1944. ^{c.} No reply was ever received.

J-89. On 23 June 1944 the International Red Cross Chairman proposed to the Foreign Minister that, owing to the sickness of the prisoners in Burma-Thailand, they should be repatriated in accordance with Articles 69 and 72 of the Geneva POW Convention 1929 and that in the meantime the Red Cross would collect medical supplies for them provided that the Japanese Government would arrange for transportation and distribution. ^{a.}

J-90. On 11 July 1944 copies of this communication were sent by SUZUKI of the Foreign Office to the War Minister, the Navy Minister and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. There is a rather quaint covering note from SUZUKI in which he says, "... Concerning the return of seriously wounded and ill prisoners of war proposed by the International Red Cross Committee, there will be much difficulty in its execution and therefore an answer will be made that it would be difficult to make such arrangements at present ..."

J-88

- a. Ex. 2022(7), T. 14762
- b. Ex. 2022(8), T. 14763
- c. Ex. 2022(9), T. 14764

J-89

- a. Ex. 473, T. 5492

(J-90)
He seeks the views of the addressees on his proposal to send
a.
such a reply.

J-91. As a result the Prisoner of War Information Bureau sought from Southern Army Headquarters and its own organizations in Burma and Thailand, evidence to confute protests made as to condition of prisoners but received from Southern Army and the Siam Prisoner of War Camp confirmation of the poor condition of the prisoners and the terrific mortality.
a.

J-92. In spite of this nothing was done to give effect to the Red Cross proposal of the repatriation of the seriously ill. The construction of the Burma-Thailand railway was a matter of government policy; the use of prisoner of war labor, in an area dangerous to health, for constructing a strategic railway line to be used for operational purposes was undoubtedly a war crime; the retention and continued use of prisoner of war labor in the area for that purpose after all of the facts were known to the Japanese Government shows that that Government was willing to, and did, permit the commission of war crimes in pursuance of its policy.

c. Wake Island.

J-93. From sometime prior to 20 April 1942 until 27 July 1945, the Swiss Minister bombarded the Japanese Foreign Office with requests for information as to the fate of American nationals captured on Wake Island. In all he wrote 14 letters, receiving three in reply, but none of these contained

J-90
a. Ex. 473, T. 5492

J-91
a. Ex. 473, T. 5492

(J-93)

any worthwhile information. From other sources the fate of
 all except 173 of the captured Americans was ascertained. ^{a.}

J-94. Evidence has been given showing that 36 of these
 prisoners were executed on 7 October 1943 on the orders of
 Admiral SAKIBARA, who commanded the island, and that the sole
 survivor was executed a week later by the Admiral personally. ^{a.}
^{b.} Prisoners had been held at Wake Island for laboring purposes,
 and the fact that they were there was known to the Japanese
 Government, ^{c.} yet it refused to supply information to that
 effect to the Protecting Power. They were eventually killed
 because the Japanese feared that the Americans would land on
 the island. ^{d.}

J-95. It will be shown hereafter that the killing, or
 threatening to kill prisoners, in the event of an allied
 landing, was a practice adopted by the Japanese in all areas
 of occupation. The only possible grounds that one can sug-
 gest for the failure of Japan to notify the Protecting Power,
 when requested, of the whereabouts of these prisoners, are
 that the Government realized that the prisoners might be
 killed in pursuance of such a policy.

d. Japan.

J-96. On 16 June 1943 the Swiss Minister conveyed to
 the Japanese Foreign Minister a request that additional
 food in the form of soya products, which were believed to
 be plentiful in Japan, should be distributed to prisoners

J-93

a. Ex. 2034, T. 14932; Ex. 2039-53, T. 14932-15016

J-94

a. T. 14926-31; Ex. 2035A, B, C, T. 14973
 b. T. 14911-37; Ex. 2035, T. 14966
 c. T. 27379
 d. T. 14926; Ex. 2036A, B, C, T. 14973

(J-96) a.
of war to augment the nutritive value of their food.

J-97. On 23 June 1943 Japanese Foreign Minister replied that the Japanese did not see the necessity of increasing the supply of any particular foodstuff. a.

J-98. At this time the War Ministry knew positively that prisoners no further away than the Tokyo Group of POW Camps were dying of malnutrition. In February 1943 the Army Medical College had started an investigation of the health of the prisoners in these camps; its report disclosed that they were in an undernourished condition due to a lack of a proper and sufficient supply of nutriment. a.
That this investigation was completed by May 1943 is established by a technical report published in the Monthly Report of the POW Information Bureau. b.

J-99. It is difficult here to suggest any definite government policy, and the attitude adopted would appear to arise from indifference to the fate of prisoners of war.

e. Dutch Hospital Ship "Op ten Noort".

J-100. On 1 March 1942 the Dutch Hospital Ship "Op ten Noort" while looking for survivors from two sunken Dutch cruisers near the island of "Bawear" was taken over by the Japanese and eventually sent to Japan where the complement of the ship was interned. The vessel was used by the Japanese for their own purposes and subsequently lost. a.

J-96
a. Ex. 2026(1), T. 14836

J-97
a. Ex. 2026(2), T. 14836

J-98
a. T. 27809-9; Ex. 3111, T. 27810
b. Ex. 3110, T. 27809

J-100
a. Ex. 2065, T. 15065

(J-101)

J-101. On 28 May 1942, Sweden as Protecting Power for Holland sent a protest to the accused TOGO.^{a.} On 9 June 1942 the Japanese Foreign Office replied and said that the capture was justified because the ship was being used for military purposes.^{b.}

J-102. On 28 September 1942 a further protest was made by Sweden to the Japanese Foreign Office rejecting the Japanese contention that the ship was being used for military purposes when captured.^{a.} In addition, protests were made by the Master of the ship to the Japanese Navy Minister on 22 February 1943^{b.} and to the Japanese Prime Minister on 23 February 1944.^{c.}

J-103. One would have expected that, before ratifying the seizure of this ship, the Japanese Government would have insisted upon the most cogent evidence of the ship's having been used for military purposes being presented by the naval authorities. One would have further expected such evidence to have been placed before the Tribunal by the Defense in justification of the course adopted by the Japanese Government. No such evidence was given, and it is submitted that its absence gives rise to an almost irresistible inference that no such evidence ever existed.

J-104. If this inference is drawn the seizure of this hospital ship is seen as an exercise of Japanese Government policy for the purpose of improving its own naval equipment.

J-101

- a. Ex. 2071, T. 15081
- b. Ex. 2072, T. 15081

J-102

- a. Ex. 2073, T. 15081
- b. Ex. 2067, T. 15070
- c. Ex. 2068, T. 15073

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(J-104)

(f) Philippines and China.

J-105. On 23 December 1942 the Swiss Minister sent to the Japanese Foreign Minister on behalf of the Government of the United States of America a protest against the manner in which civilians and prisoners of war were being treated in the Philippines and China.^{a.} Generally this note alleged torture, starvation, ill

treatment and murder and specified the places in which, and the persons upon whom, such war crimes were committed.

J-106. As nothing beyond a formal reply stating that investigations would be made had been received by 5 February 1944, the Swiss Minister again requested a reply and in addition sent a further detailed list of complaints received from the Government of the United States of America.^{a.}

J-107. On 24 and 28 April 1944 the Japanese Foreign Minister sent letters to the Swiss Minister in some cases denying, and in others admitting and attempting to justify, the facts upon which protests of 23 December 1942 and 5 February 1944 were based.^{a.}

J-108. It is not proposed to detail here all the complaints made in those protests, but for the purpose of illustration reference will be made to a few of them.

(1) Bridgehouse, Shanghai - Protests alleged that 53 Americans had been imprisoned for varying periods up to over six months in gendarmerie prison, Bridgehouse, where they were crowded into vermin-infested cells with common criminals, some of whom

J-105
a. Ex. 2024(1), T. 14795; Ex. 1477, T. 12797

J-106
a. Ex. 2024(2), T. 14796; Ex. 1479, T. 12803

J-107
a. Ex. 2024(3), T. 14796; Ex. 2024(4), T. 14827

(J-108)
 suffered from loathsome contagious diseases. Sanitary facilities were primitive and inadequate; food was far below standard necessary to maintain health; no heat was supplied from December to June and medical care was non-existent. Mr. Powell through lack of medical attention developed gangrene and lost the front half of both feet.^{a.}

The Japanese reply was that all Americans referred to were violators of military regulations and consequently criminals. They were not considered as being on the same footing as civilians interned under civil procedure, but they received medical attention and a food ration like that given to other criminals. In addition, they could have sent in from outside any food they purchased.^{b.}

Evidence verifying the conditions referred to in the American protest was given by the late Mr. J. B. Powell. He, in common with other Shanghai newsmen, was confined in Bridge-house on 20 December 1941, until 1 March. During that time he was interrogated but was never charged with any offense.^{c.} This was corroborated by other Prosecution evidence.^{d.}

(11) Battan Death March - The protest refers to the Battan Death March; the details of this, as shown by the Prosecution's evidence, are contained on J-14 and J-15 of this summation. The Japanese reply admits the march, and attributes it to lack of transport, but denies the mistreatment of prisoners of war.^{e.}

J-108

- a. Ex. 2024(1), T. 14795
- b. Ex. 2024(3), T. 14796
- c. T. 3271-85
- d. Ex. 1894; Ex. 1895, T. 14165-8
- e. Ex. 2024(3), T. 14796

0 159 0003 0451

(J-108)

(iii) Camp O'Donnell - The protest alleges that 2200 Americans and 20,000 Filipinos were reported to have died in the first few months of their detention, and that these deaths could have been avoided had the Japanese provided the minimum medical care for the prisoners.^{f.}

J-109. The Japanese, in reply, do not comment on the figures; they say that inadequacy of medical supplies was due to the fact that the Americans had destroyed their own supplies before capture; they also maintain that proper medical attention is being provided for the prisoners.^{a.}

J-110. The American protest is verified by Prosecution evidence showing that 1500 Americans and 26,000 Filipinos died at Camp O'Donnell between April 1942 and December 1942, and that deaths could have been prevented by proper food, shelter, clothing, water, sanitation and medication.^{a.}

J-111. In spite of these matters having been brought to the notice of the Japanese Government similar conditions to those described continued to exist in the Philippines and Shanghai up to the date of the Japanese defeat.^{a.}

(g) Murder of crews of sunken merchant ships.

J-112. Evidence has been given that between 14 December 1943 and 29 October 1944, eight British, American and Dutch merchant vessels were sunk by Japanese submarines in the Indian Ocean and one American in the Pacific Ocean. The submarines then took, or attempted to take, the Master of the ship aboard and then murdered

J-108

f. Ex. 2024(2), T. 14796

J-109

a. Ex. 2024(4), T. 14827

J-110

a. Ex. 1450, T. 12597-9

J-111

a. Ex. 1458, T. 12732; Ex. 1456, T. 12725; Ex. 1893, T. 14165; Ex. 1898, T. 14173; Ex. 1900, T. 14178; Ex. 1909, T. 14190

(J-112) a.
or attempted to murder the crews.

(i) On 5 June 1944 the Swiss Minister on behalf of the British Government sent a protest to SHIGEMITSU against the treatment of Master and crew of each of the British ships sunk. b.
On 16 September 1944 a reminder was sent that no answer had been received. c.
On 28 November 1944 the Japanese Foreign Office denied the atrocities alleged to have occurred in connection with the sinking of these ships. d.
On 19 May 1945 the Swiss Minister reiterated the protest of the British Government as regards the treatment of the crew of these ships. He also drew attention to an operation order dated 20 March 1943 issued by the Admiral commanding the First Japanese Submarine Force. He writes, "Fifth paragraph of this order authorizes submarine commanders not to stop with sinking of allied ships and cargoes, but at the same time to carry out complete destruction of allied crews except for such members as it may be desirable to apprehend with a view to securing intelligence." e.

(ii) On 19 June 1944 the Swiss Minister on behalf of the Government of the United States of America protested to SHIGEMITSU that when the "Richard Hovey" was sunk on 29 March 1944 the Japanese submarine had rammed and fired on the ship's boats, had fired on the survivors of the crew, and had taken on to the submarine four members of the crew of whom nothing had since been heard. f.
On 28 November 1944, SHIGEMITSU denied the happening of the atrocities alleged in regard to the sinking of the "Richard Hovey." g.

J-112

- a. Ex. 2076, T. 15088; Ex. 2087-0, T. 15141-50;
Ex. 2094-9, T. 15157-69
- b. Ex. 2092, T. 15153
- c. Ex. 2101, T. 15175
- d. Ex. 2102, T. 15177
- e. Ex. 2103, T. 15178
- f. Ex. 2076, T. 15088
- g. Ex. 2078, T. 15092

(J-112)

(iii) On 29 December 1944 an American protest against atrocities committed by the submarine which sank the "Jean Nicolet" was handed by an attache of the Swiss Legation to Minister Tadakazu SUZUKI. It states: "The vessel sank at approximately 0220 hours July 3rd. Seventy-five survivors of the Jean Nicolet were murdered when after leaving the sinking vessel between 95 and 100 persons from the torpedoed vessel were subjected by the commander and the crew of the Japanese submarine to treatment which was in contravention of the laws and customs of war and all humanitarian standards The United States Government protests that -

(1) The lifeboats and life rafts were machine gunned evidently to render them unusable by any of the survivors of the 'Jean Nicolet'; survivors of the 'Jean Nicolet' who were swimming were also machine gunned.

(2) The survivors upon boarding the submarine were robbed of all life belts, papers and other valuables.

(3) The survivors of the 'Jean Nicolet' after boarding the submarine were bound either with rope or wire and compelled to sit or kneel with heads down in rows athwartship from bow to stern facing the forward deck.

(4) Approximately half the survivors of the 'Jean Nicolet' were led separately to the after deck of the submarine and compelled to run between parallel rows of Japanese sailors armed with a variety of instruments, including gun butts and bayonets. While running this gauntlet the men were subjected to

0 159 0003 0454

(J-112) severe beating, and still bound were forced off the submarine into the water while the vessel was underway, with the evident likelihood that they would be caught in the turning propeller.

(5) The submarine suddenly and with no warning to the survivors of the 'Jean Nicolet' submerged, leaving a large number of them still on the deck of the vessel without means of self-preservation. D. M. Nilsson and Clem Carlin, master and chief mate respectively of the 'Jean Nicolet' were made prisoners and taken within the submarine, such treatment being similar to that accorded the master and three other survivors of the United States vessel 'Richard Hovey' The United States Government demands to be urgently informed regarding the present welfare and whereabouts of Captain Nilsson and Chief Mate Carlin . . . The Government of the United States demands a full and thorough investigation from the Japanese Government, and that the persons responsible for the incredibly cruel and terrible conduct against the defenseless survivors of the torpedoed vessel promptly be fully punished and that it be informed of the action taken . . . " h.

J-113. The Japanese reply dated 15 May 1945 denied the allegations contained in the protest. a.

J-114. The history of the Japanese decision to destroy the crews of torpedoed ships can be gathered from documents that have been put in evidence. On 3 January 1942 a conversation took place between Hitler and OSHIMA. In the course of it Hitler "pointed out that no matter how many ships the U.S.A. built,

J-112
h. Ex. 2080, T. 15095

J-113
a. Ex. 2066, T. 15105

(J-114)
 one of their chief problems was the personnel shortage. For this reason the merchant vessels were also being sunk without warning, with the idea that as large a part as possible of the crew should perish in consequence. If word should once get about that most seamen were lost in torpedoings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in recruiting new people . . . We were fighting for our existence and therefore could not permit any humanitarian points of view to govern. For this reason he had to give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which was not for the most part possible on the open sea, the submarines were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats. Ambassador OSHIMA sincerely concurs in these statements of the Fuehrer and says that the Japanese too are forced to follow these methods...."^{a.}

J-115. On 20 March 1943 the Operation Order of the First Submarine Force is issued instructing submarine commanders to destroy the crews of sunken ships, after taking such members into custody as may be useful for the purpose of intelligence.^{a.} From 14 December onward this Order is obeyed.

J-116. It is submitted that it is very obvious here that the destruction of ships' crews was a matter of Government policy. Had it been otherwise the protests lodged on 5 June 1944 as to the sinkings of British ships and on 19 June 1944 as to the sinking of the United States ship "Richard hovey" would have resulted in orders being issued which would have saved the crew of the "Jean

J-114
 a. Ex. 3813, T. 37910

J-115
 a. Ex. 2105, T. 15164

0 159 0003 0456

(J-116) a.
"nicolet" on 3 July and the crew of the American Merchantman
b.
"John A. Johnson" on 29 October 1944.

Transcripts of recordings of broadcasts from Great Britain and America as conveying knowledge of the commission of war crimes to the Japanese Government.

J-117. On 24 January 1944 at 1700 hours BBC London broadcast official United States Army and Navy reports of Japanese atrocities committed to American and Filipino prisoners. This broadcast included a statement that in one camp 2300 American prisoners had died between April and May 1942, while in another 4000 had died by October 1942.^{a.} On 29 January 1944 there were three American broadcasts through KWID.

(i) At 7 a.m. through San Francisco KWID quoted Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, as saying "... thousands of American and Filipino soldiers captured in the Philippines were wantonly murdered by the Japanese; 5200 American soldiers died mostly of starvation at two prison camps in October 1942. Anthony Eden had told the British House of Commons that thousands of British, Chinese, Burmese and Indian prisoners of war and internees had died in Japanese prison camps and that British protests had drawn unsatisfactory results."

(ii) At 8 a.m. the foregoing was repeated together with an additional statement by Cordell Hull that repeated protests had been lodged with Tokyo, but to no apparent avail.

(iii) At 6 p.m. White House Secretary Stephen Early said that the Japanese Government would not permit the United States

J-116

- a. Ex. 2087, 2088, T. 15140-5
- b. Ex. 2089, 2090, T. 15148-50

J-117

- a. Ex. 1488, T. 12821

(J-117)
Government to send food, material aid, or supplies to American
and Filipino soldiers who were in Japanese hands. b.

J-118. On 23 October 1944 an Army News Service broadcast stated "General MacArthur addressed a warning to Field Marshall Count TERAUCHI that he will hold enemy leaders immediately responsible for failure to accord prisoners of war and internees proper treatment; unimpeachable evidence has been received of degradation and brutality to which prisoners have been subjected." a.

J-119. The certificate verifying the exhibit containing the foregoing stated that transcripts of recordings of broadcasts were regularly distributed to all sections of the Foreign Office and also to the Board of Information, Navy Ministry and War Ministry. a.

J-120. The significance of this evidence lies in the fact that it shows that a wider circle of officials of the Japanese Government was infected with a knowledge of the war crimes specified than that which would have obtained information from the diplomatic protests.

J-121. The attention of the Tribunal is invited to the fact that the statement of White House Secretary Stephen Early is corroborated by the evidence of Defense witness KUDO, Tadao of the Japanese Foreign Office who said that the American Red Cross proposed to send ships with goods for the relief of their prisoners in various places in East Asia, but that the Japanese Navy rejected the proposal. a.

J-117
b. Ex. 1488, T. 12821

J-118
a. Ex. 1488, T. 12821

J-119
a. Ex. 1488, T. 12821

J-121
a. T. 27153

(J-122)

Official Japanese documents authorizing or evidencing the commission of war crimes.

J-122. Article 6 of the Hague Convention 1907 provides (inter alia) that tasks upon which prisoners of war are employed shall have no connection with the operations of the war. Article 31 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention 1929 states that labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct relation with war operations. A series of official Japanese documents which have been put in evidence show that the Japanese Government deliberately, and as a matter of policy, compelled its prisoners of war to engage in such labor.

(i) In a communication dated 6 May 1942 to the Chief of Staff of the Taiwan Army, the accused KIMURA states, "So that they can be used for the enlargement of our production and as military labor, white prisoners of war will be confined successively in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria . . ."

(ii) In the "Monthly Reports of the Secret Service Police" for August 1942 is set out a plan to use prisoners of war as a result of the labor shortage. I quote from this plan, "Owing to the good results obtained by 150 American prisoners of war at Zentsuji POW Camp who had been sent to Osaka in order to engage in laboring works as a neutralizing measure for labor shortage suffered in the military works and harbor equipment, the enterprising circles who were suffering from the labor shortage at several districts around Tokyo . . ."

J-122

a. Ex. 2010, T. 14716

7 159 0003 0459

(J-122)
applied to the military authorities to allow them to use
prisoners of war . . ."
b.

(iii) On 23 August 1942 the accused KIMURA, as Vice Minister of War writes to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, "For the realization of the urgent organization of the aircraft production we want to improve the present capacity of the Manchurian Machine Tool Co. according to the plan of utilization enclosed herewith, and to allot a large part of its improved capacity to the production of machine tools which are necessary for the urgent organization of the production of air ordnances, ammunition and aircraft in our country, especially to the production of special machine tools for mass production, which are necessary for the expansion of the factory in the Nissan Motor Car Co. Manufacturing Section, a main factory of ammunition for aviation automatic gun . . ." The plan which is referred to envisages the employment of 1500 prisoners of war.
c.

(iv) Foreign Affairs Monthly Report September 1942 published by the Foreign Section of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry states, "The labor shortage problem in Japan has become quite acute becoming more and more serious recently . . . As a result the Cabinet Planning Board entrusted by the Army Administrative Department for War Prisoners held a conference on August 15 regarding the transfer of war prisoners to Japan proper and their employment. At this conference the following

J-122
b. Ex. 1972A, T. 14509
c. Ex. 197CA, T. 14479

(J-122)
 principles were discussed and decided to be carried out . . . I.
 Of the industries in the National Mobilization Plan, war prison-
 ers shall be employed for mining, stevedoring and engineering
 and construction work for national defense . . ."^{d.}

(v) On 2 October 1942 the Chief of Staff of the
 Eastern District Army wrote to the accused TOJO as follows:--
 ". . . we request your sanction of the employment of the war
 prisoners interned in the Tokyo POW Camp for the undermentioned
 works . . ." There follows a description of the kinds of
 labor and this includes "Industrial labor for the expansion
 of productive power" and among the places of labor is men-
 tioned "Munition factories for expanding production."^{e.} Under
 the same date is a draft of the War Minister's instruction
 approving of the above mentioned application.^{f.}

(vi) A report of the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture
 to Ministers of Welfare and Home Affairs dated 6 October 1942
 states in reference to prisoner of war labor at Kawasaki and
 Yokohama Camps, ". . . It is generally admitted by all the
 business proprietors alike that the use of P.W. labor has
 made the systematic operation of transportation possible for
 the first time, and has not only produced a great influence
 in the business circles but will also contribute greatly to
 the expansion of production, including munitions of war . . ."^{g.}

(vii) A report dated 4 September 1942 from the accused
 ITAKAKI, as Korean Army Commander, to the accused TOJO sets out

J-122

- d. Ex. 1371A, T. 14565
- e. Ex. 1367, T. 14484
- f. Ex. 1367, T. 14484
- g. Ex. 1369, T. 14491

(J-122)
 regulations in use in the Korean POW Camps. They include the following: "Article 2. Not one POW must be left to time in idleness. Allow appropriate labor according to their skill, age and physical strength, thereby using them in industrial development and military labor." Article IV, par. 2, includes in the type of labor for which prisoners shall be used engineering labor on airfields.^{h.}

J-122A. Article 6 of the Hague Convention 1907 and Article 27 of the Geneva POW Convention 1929 forbids the compulsory employment of officer prisoners.

(i) On 3 June 1942 the Director of POW Custody Division sent a circular to army units on the subject of "Labor imposed on POW officers and noncommissioned officers." It states, "Although the imposition of labor upon POW officers and noncommissioned officers is prohibited under Article I of the POW Labor Regulations, it is the policy of the Central Authorities, in view of the present condition of this country which does not allow anyone to lie idle and eat freely, and also with a view to maintaining the health of prisoners of war to have them volunteer to work in accordance with their respective status, intelligence, strength, etc. Therefore it is desired that proper direction be given accordingly . . ." ^{a.} A similar notification was sent to the Chief of Staff of the Taiwan Army on 5 June 1942. ^{b.}

(ii) On 4 September 1942 the accused ITAGAKI, who was then Commander of the Korean Army sent to the accused TOJO a report on the regulations in force in the Korean POW Camps.

J-122.

h. Ex. 1976, T. 14,529

J-122A.

a. Ex. 1961, T. 14,425

b. Ex. 2003, T. 14, 708

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(J-122A)

Article 3 of these regulations reads as follows: "All prisoners of war including officers shall work. But guide those above warrant officers according to status, ability and physical strength to work voluntarily . . ." ^{c.} The language used "guide . . . officers . . . to work voluntarily" would suggest an absence of compulsion but it is submitted that this is merely a Japanese euphemism for "make it so uncomfortable for them if they don't work that they will volunteer for work." This is borne out by evidence which has been placed before the Tribunal; a reference to this evidence will be given later in the summation.

J-123. Article 2 of the Geneva POW Convention 1929 provides that prisoners of war must at all times be protected particularly against insults and public curiosity.

(i) The Governor of Kanagawa in his report to the Ministers of Welfare and Home Affairs of 6 October 1942 which was sent on to the Commander of the Eastern Area Army and the War Ministry states, ". . . Though the public has not been informed of POW labor, those who have guessed about it from seeing them on their way to and from the place of labor and their camps, seem to realize with gratitude the glory of the Imperial Throne, seeing before their eyes English and American POW at their labor. A considerable influence seems to have been exercised over the people of this prefecture, many of whom had been considerable pro-Anglo-American." ^{a.}

J-122A.

c. Ex. 1976, T. 14,259

J-123.

a. Ex. 1969, T. 14,491

(J-123)

(ii) On 4 March 1942 the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army sends to the accused KIMURA, who was then Vice Minister of War a signal in which he says, "As it would be very effective in stamping out the respect and admiration of the Korean people for Britain and America, and also in establishing in them a strong faith in victory, and as the Government-General and the Army are both strongly desirous of it, we wish you would intern 1000 British and 1000 American POW in Korea" The signal goes on to say that certain buildings will be used for interning the prisoners.^{b.}

On 5 March KIMURA sends a reply stating that 1000 prisoners of war are being sent and suggesting that the buildings in which it is proposed to house prisoners of war are too good for that purpose.^{c.}

On 23 March 1942 the accused ITOGAKI, as Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army sends to the accused TOJO a plan for the internment of prisoners of war. In this plan he sets out the purpose as follows: "It is our purpose by interning American and British prisoners of war in Korea, to make the Koreans realize positively the true might of our Empire as well as to contribute to psychological propaganda work for stamping out any ideas of worship of Europe and America which the greater part of Korea still retains at bottom."^{d.}

On 13 October 1942 the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army sends to the accused KIMURA a report of the parade of 998

J-123.

- b. Ex. 1973, T. 14,512
- c. Ex. 1973, T. 14,512
- d. Ex. 1973, T. 14,512

(J-123)
POW along bystander-thronged roads of Fusan, Seoul and Jinsen in Korea. He says, "As a whole it seems that the idea was very successful in driving all admiration for the British and Americans out of their (i.e. the Koreans') minds and in driving into them an understanding of the situation"^{e.}

J-124. Article II of the Hague Convention 1907 states that a prisoner of war cannot be compelled to accept his liberty on parole. It necessarily follows from this that he cannot be compelled to sign an agreement or take an oath not to escape when he does not even get his liberty in exchange.

(i) I shall now refer to certain regulations and laws made by the Japanese during the Pacific War under which they authorized the compulsory administration to prisoners of oaths that they would not escape, and providing heavy penalties for breaches of such oaths.

Article 5 of the Detailed Regulations for Treatment of Prisoners of War reads as follows, "As soon as prisoners of war have been imprisoned, they shall be administered an oath forbidding them from making an escape. Prisoners of war who refuse to take the oath mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be deemed to have intentions of escaping and shall be placed under strict surveillance."^{a.} The attention of the Tribunal will, at a later stage of this summation, be invited to the evidence showing the means adopted by the Japanese to compel prisoners to take the oath or to sign the nonescape agreement.

J-123.
e. Ex. 1975, T. 14,520

J-124.
a. Ex. 1965, T. 14,439

(J-124)

Article 10 of the Discipline Law for Prisoners of War reads, "Those persons who have taken an oath not to escape and who violate this oath shall be subject to either hard labor or imprisonment for a minimum of one year. Those persons who violate any other oaths shall be subject to a maximum of ten years."^{b,}

(ii) on 1 September 1942 the Commander of the Taiwan Army reported to the accused TOJO the arrival of prisoners of war at Taiwan. In the course of his report he writes, "At first Lieut-General Fercival and others refused to make an oath, but finally all but three signed their names. After that they became obedient."^{c,}

(iii) On 13 October 1942 the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army reports that immediately after the arrival of prisoners in Korea the Japanese succeeded in making them all take the oath."^{d,}

J-125. Article 4 of the Hague Convention 1907 and Article 2 of the Geneva POW Convention 1929 require that prisoners of war will at all times be humanely treated.

(i) Censorship Instructions dated 20 December 1943 from the Chief of the Information Bureau of the War Ministry shows that officials at the War Ministry were aware of the cruel treatment meted out to prisoners of war. The instruction prohibits ". . . any reports which give an impression of cruel

J-124.

- b. Ex. 1965, T. 14,439
- c. Ex. 1968, T. 14,488
- d. Ex. 1975, T. 14,520

(J-125)

treatment, such as prisoners being punished or being made to labor without clothing" The reason for this is that such reports "might give the enemy food for evil propaganda and bring harm to our interned brothers!"^{a.}

(ii) The Defense put in evidence a report of the treatment of prisoners of war in Japan. Part of this report details the punishments inflicted on Japanese who mistreated prisoners of war. These are shown at pages 14 to 33, and 54 to 70, of the exhibit, and although they form part of the evidence before the Tribunal they were not read into the transcript. They show that there were 156 cases of Japanese being punished for mistreatment of prisoners of war between February 1943 and August 1945. It is noticeable that the punishment given is trivial and bears no relation to the hurt inflicted on the prisoners of war. Thus the common punishment for beating prisoners is "admonition" or "reproof": for detaining prisoners in the guardhouse in the depth of winter without clothes or bedding Captain MURAKAMI was admonished; for beating and bayonetting a prisoner another Japanese received "5 days heavy good behaviour", whilst another who frequently lynched prisoners was admonished. The point of all of this, here, is that the Japanese authorities knew of the mistreatment of prisoners. The contemptuous punishments imposed show that the Government took no real steps to protect the prisoners of war from the brutality of the guards.^{b.}

J-126. Under Article 8 of the Hague Convention and Article 50 of the Geneva POW Convention 1929 escaped prisoners are liable

J-125.

- a. Ex. 1977, T. 14,539
- b. Ex. 3128, T. 27,894

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(J-126)
to disciplinary punishment only. In the 1929 Convention it is defined in Article 54, "arrest is the most severe disciplinary punishment that may be imposed on a prisoner of war. The duration of a single punishment may not exceed 30 days."

Although it is not defined in the Hague Convention it is submitted that it has a perfectly well known meaning at military law and that it is in terms of military law that the expression was used in the Hague Convention 1907. It means the amount of punishment that can be inflicted by a commanding or other officer in distinction to what may be awarded by a Court Martial. No evidence has been adduced to prove this but it is submitted that it is within the powers of the Tribunal to ascertain the state of the law for itself.

The Prosecution's submissions on this point are as follows:

(i) That the French text is the only official text of the Hague Convention 1907, and that in the event of any conflict that text will prevail, and that, as a consequence, if the meaning of a term is in doubt the French meaning of that term will be adopted;

(ii) That under French law "disciplinary punishment" has the meaning set out above, that is the amount of punishment that can be inflicted by an officer in distinction to that which can be inflicted by a Court Martial. The quantum of such punishment is 60 days arrest;

(iii) That under Japanese law disciplinary punishment consists of arrest for a period not exceeding 30 days;

(J-126)

(iv) That a distinction is drawn by the Japanese between disciplinary and other punishments is shown by the reference to disciplinary punishment in article 7 of Regulations for Treatment of Prisoners of War which provides that "a prisoner of war, not on parole who is captured before he succeeds in escaping shall be subject to disciplinary punishment."^a This distinction is also indicated by monthly returns sent to the War Ministry setting out separately Court Martial Punishments and Disciplinary Punishments.^b

(v) That the reason for the inclusion of the definition of disciplinary punishment in the Geneva POW Convention 1929 was the difference in quantum of punishment in the different countries.

In paragraph J-124 of this part of the summation the Prosecution submitted that the compulsory signing of non-escape agreements or the compulsory taking of oaths not to escape were illegal under the Hague Convention 1907.

According to Japanese official figures, between 2 June 1942 and 3 March 1945, 64 prisoners were convicted by Court Martial for violation of nonescape oath and received sentence ranging from one year's imprisonment to death.^c

Of course the only offense with which they could have been charged in the light of the restrictions imposed by International Law was that of escaping and the penalty would have been limited to thirty days' arrest.

J-126.

- a. Ex. 1965, T. 14,439
- b. Ex. 1999, T. 14,698
- c. Ex. 1998, T. 14,682

(J-126)

The imposition of these illegal penalties was known to the Japanese Government because monthly returns were required of all Court Martial punishments and of all disciplinary punishments imposed.^{d.} These returns were sent to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau. OYAMA, who held a position akin to that of a Judge Advocate General, said that reports of all Courts Martial were made to him at the War Ministry.^{e.}

J-127. Article 29 of the Hague Convention states, "A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party."

Between 1 December 1943 and 25 November 1944 five prisoners of war were convicted of espionage and sentenced to death and one was convicted of attempted espionage and sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment.^{a.} This is shown on official Japanese returns.

It is submitted that a prisoner of war cannot possibly be a spy, unless, perhaps, if he is set at liberty on parole. The basis of this is that by virtue of his status as prisoner of war his hostile character is known to the detaining power. The Prosecution has given evidence of the activities, torture and trial of the late Captain Matthews, whose name appears on this list.^{b.}

The Prosecution contends that these convictions were on the face of them illegal and that the Japanese Government through its representatives at the War Ministry knew of them.

J-126.

- d. Ex. 1999, T. 14, 698
- e. T. 21, 669

J-127.

- a. Ex. 1998, T. 14, 682
- b. Ex. 1666-7, T. 13,404-19

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J-128. Finally official orders issued to destroy documents, and authorizing the escape of guilty persons show that the Japanese Government was well aware of the fact that war crimes had been committed on a gigantic scale.

A certificate dated 5 August 1946 shows that the Adjutant General under the order of the War Minister on 14 August 1945 issued a notification to all Army troops to the effect that "the confidential documents held by every troop should be destroyed by fire immediately"^{a.} and instructions issued by the Chief of the Military Police on 14 August 1945 ordering^{b.} the destruction of documents corroborates such certificate.

A still more illuminating document is a circular that was sent by the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau to the Korean Army, Taiwan Army, Kwantung Army, North China Area Army, to Hongkong, Borneo, Thailand, Malaya and Java on 20 August 1945. It states, "Personnel who mistreated prisoners of war and internees or who are held in extremely bad sentiment by them are permitted to take care of it by immediately transferring or fleeing without trace. Moreover documents which would be unfavourable for us in the hands of the enemy are to be treated in the same way as secret documents and destroyed when finished with."^{c.}

From these documents it is clear that the Japanese Government was fully cognizant of the manner in which prisoners of war were treated and authorized and condoned such treatment as a matter of policy.

J-128.

- a. Ex. 2000, T. 14,699
- b. Ex. 2001, T. 14,700
- c. Ex. 2011, T. 14,718

amendments of Japanese Law since 7 December 1941 which in themselves authorized breaches of the Hague Convention 1907 and the Geneva Convention 1929.

J-129. Reference has already been made in paragraph J-124 hereof to the fact that the cumulative effect of Article 5 of "Detailed Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners of War"^{a.} and Article 10 of the Discipline Law for Prisoners of War^{b.} whereby prisoners of war were compelled to take an oath not to escape and if they did so were subject to a minimum penalty of one year's imprisonment. In the same paragraph the compulsory administration of an oath not to escape has been shown to violate Article II of the Hague Convention 1907, whilst the imposition of any punishment greater than a disciplinary punishment for escaping has been shown in paragraph J-126, to violate Article 8 of that Convention and Article 50 of the Geneva POW Convention 1929.

Articles 5 and 10 referred to above were introduced into Japanese law in March and April, 1943, respectively.^{c.} True it is that Article 10 of the Discipline Law for Prisoners of War had a somewhat similar counterpart in Article 5 of Law No. 38 of 1905 which provides that if a prisoner of war, after giving his parole not to try to escape, breaks the parole he shall be punished with imprisonment with heavy labor.^{d.} But at that time the parole referred to was a voluntarily given parole in return for which a prisoner received his liberty.

Similarity of pattern of crimes committed throughout Japan and areas occupied by Japanese.

J-130. The fact that the crimes committed by the Japanese were found to be the same in nature, and in the manner of their

J-129.

- a. Ex. 1965 (7 & 8), T. 14,439
- b. Ex. 1965 (29-30), T. 14,439
- c. Ex. 1965(7,8,29,30), T. 14,439
- d. Ex. 3133, T. 27,909

(J-130)
commission, throughout Japan and many of the areas occupied by the Japanese would give rise to an almost irresistible inference that they had not been committed at the whim of the individual perpetrators but as part of a common plan. It argues very strongly that they were committed as a result of special training towards that end, or at the least as a result of instructions emanating from some central authority.

(i) The making of oaths or agreements not to escape.

J-131. The attention of the Tribunal is here invited particularly to the coercive methods adopted by the Japanese to compel prisoners to make the oath or agreement and to the fact that the prisoners were not given their liberty after having given the undertaking not to escape.

J-132. At Changi Prisoner of War Camp in Singapore on 31 August 1942, all prisoners were ordered to sign a declaration that they would not escape. They refused to do so. On the evening of 2 September, 16,000 prisoners were herded into Selarang Barrack Square and kept there without food or latrine facilities for four days at which time the prisoners agreed, under compulsion,^{a.} to sign the declaration.

J-133. At River Valley Road and Havelock Road Camps Colonel Heath, who was in command of the prisoners, refused to have them sign the declaration because it was illegal. He was told by the Japanese that any prisoner who failed to sign would be confined^{a.} in a narrow space and punished until he signed it. Having learnt of what happened at Changi he ordered the prisoners to sign it.

J-132.
a. T. 5408-13; Ex. 1517, T. 12,930

J-133.
a. T. 5408-13

J-134. At North Point and Shamshuipo Camp in Hongkong in May, 1942, all prisoners were compelled to swear an affidavit that they would not escape. Some of the prisoners refused to sign and were thereupon imprisoned in Stanley Gaol. Here they were compelled to kneel all day and if they moved were beaten with a rubber hose. Towards the end of May they were not allowed any food and as a result became so weak that they made the required affidavit.^{a.}

J-135. Earlier, in January, 1942, patients at the Bowen Road Hospital were taken out and placed in the hot sun under threat to leave them there until all staff and patients had signed the declaration.^{a.}

J-136. Early in September, 1942, at Sandakan Camp in Borneo, the prisoners were ordered to sign a declaration that they would not escape. The Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Walsh said that he would not sign the declaration. He was immediately tied up and beaten and a firing party was detailed to execute him. To save his life the prisoners signed the Declaration.^{a.}

J-137. At Tandjong Priok in Java an officer was badly beaten with a chain for refusing to sign the declaration.^{a.} Similar treatment was meted out to officers and men at Cycle Camp in Batavia and they were told that the prisoners would be deprived of all food until they signed.^{b.}

J-138. In September of 1942 at Palembang, Batavia, because they refused to sign the declaration not to escape, 650

J-134.
a. T. 13,128; 13,144-5; 13,153

J-135.
a. Ex. 1603, T. 13,184

J-136.
a. T. 13,347, 13,387, 13,393; Ex. 1667, T. 13,410

J-137.
a. Ex. 1673, T. 13,446
b. 1. 11,533, 11,567, 11,585

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(J-138)
prisoners were locked up in a small school, the sick were thrown out of the hospital and the senior officers put in solitary confinement. On account of the death of one of the sick the prisoners signed on the eighth day.
a.

J-139. At Zentsuji Camp 41 prisoners were kept in confinement from 14 June 1942 until 23 September 1942 for refusing to take the oath and were finally threatened with execution if they persisted in their refusal.
a.

Brigadier Blackburn refused to sign the nonescape form at Karenko Camp in Formosa; he was stripped, beaten and kicked and left in a cell overnight without clothes. He finally signed it, informing them that he did so under protest and duress.
b.

J-140. It was obviously to the advantage of the Japanese Government to enforce the signing of such agreements, as the very severe penalties with which they punished escapes by prisoners who had signed the form of agreement would strongly deter them from escaping, and so enable the Japanese to reduce the number of guards employed.

(ii) Massacres.

J-141. The massacres disclosed by the evidence divide themselves into three classes: The first of these are massacres committed during the course of, or immediately after the completion of, some military operation. The dual policy behind them would appear to be to relieve the Army of the embarrassment of guarding prisoners of war and to terrorize their opponents.

J-138.
a. T. 13,562

J-139.
a. T. 14,964
b. T. 11,542-5

(J-141)

The greatest of such massacres was the rape of Nanking. This has already been referred to in paragraphs J-60 to J-63, and as the facts of this event will be given in some details by counsel dealing with the summation in regard to the accused MATSUI it is not proposed to make any further reference to it here.

at Hongkong between the 17th and 25th December 1941, the Japanese massacred about 150 Canadians, mostly medical personnel, who had surrendered and been taken into Japanese custody.^{a.} But this was not the worst part of the story, they then proceeded into St. Stephen's Hospital where they bayoneted to death or beheaded 70 patients and 25 members of the staff.^{b.}

Some 2000 miles away another Japanese force was making its way down the Malayan Peninsula and was about to distinguish itself in a similar manner. On 27 December 1941 they captured 75 Indian troops near Ipoh, tied them up and bayoneted them to death.^{c.} Almost a month later they captured and massacred 150 Australian and Indian troops at Farit Sulong.^{d.}

and then came the 14th and 15th February 1942. Near Katong Hospital the personnel of an ambulance were captured and killed,^{e.} and later on the same day troops of the Imperial Guard Division went through the ground floor of the Alexandria Hospital, Singapore, bayonetting patients as they lay in their beds, and even on the operating table. Members of the staff

J-141.

- a. Ex. 1594-1601, T. 13,167-75; Ex. 1608, T. 13,184
- b. T. 13,114-7; Ex. 1500-3, T. 13,163-6
- c. Ex. 1522, T. 12,946
- d. Ex. 1525, T. 12,949
- e. Ex. 1503, T. 12,899

(J-141)
were treated in the same manner. A further massacre on the following day brought up the grand total of those murdered at that hospital to three hundred and twenty three.
f.

Reference has already been made in paragraphs J-18 to J-20 of the summation to the massacre of 5000 Chinese on the 22nd and 23rd February at Singapore. Between March and April 1942 many thousands Chinese were arrested and executed in Johore Province.
g.

J-142. Shifting the scene to Borneo, on 12 January 1942 in the neighborhood of Tarakan, 245 Dutch prisoners were captured by a different Japanese force and machine gunned and bayoneted to death,
a. whilst at Balikpapan on the 24th February 1942 the white population consisting of 80 to 100 Europeans was brutally murdered.
b.

At Laha on Ambon Island over 300 Australian and Dutch prisoners were murdered in four batches by a naval force on the orders of Admiral Hatakuni. This happened between the 1st and 20th February 1942.
c.

In New Britain, at Tol Tol and Waitavallo, about 160 Australians, many of them wearing brassards indicating that they were medical personnel, were captured in February 1942 and massacred the next day.
d.

In the same month at Banka Island in Sumatra, sixty men, some of whom were stretcher cases, and 22 Army Nursing Sisters managed to get ashore after their ship had been sunk by bombing.

J-141.
f. Ex. 1506, Ex. 1507, T. 12,904-7
g. T. 5644; Ex. 476, T. 5624

J-142.
a. Ex. 1685-6, T. 13,492-5
b. Ex. 1341, T. 12,049
c. Ex. 1819, 1819B, T. 13,930-40
d. Ex. 1852-4, T. 14,105-10

(J-142)

They gave themselves up to the Japanese, who bayoneted the stretcher cases and machine gunned the remainder.^{e.}

At Bandoeng and Lembang in Java, 150 Dutch prisoners of war were murdered early in March 1942,^{f.} whilst later in the same month 25 people, including women and children were taken out of the hospital at Soebang and shot or bayoneted by the Japanese.^{g.}

J-143. Other massacres took place at Tiga Rungu in Sumatra,^{a.} at Longnawen in Borneo^{b.} and at Milne Bay in New Guinea. With regard to the murders in New Guinea a captured Japanese explained that orders had been given to mutilate prisoners in order to dissuade Japanese troops from surrendering for fear of reprisals.^{c.}

J-144. To complete the list and to show that the Japanese persisted in their purpose to the very end, I refer to French Indo-China where in March 1945 over 600 persons - men, women, and children, soldiers and civilians, were massacred by the 37th Division.^{a.}

In none of the above-mentioned cases were any of the victims tried for any offense.

J-145. The second class of massacres were those committed to terrorize the civilian population of occupied countries; it was the Japanese practice to adopt such measures when the Kempei Tai could not discover the perpetrators of some alleged crime or when the civil population showed any signs of unrest.

At Palembang in July 1943 a large number of prisoners of war and civilians were tortured by the Kempei Tai in an

J-142.

- e. T. 13,454, T. 13,599;
Ex. 1767, T. 13,781
- f. Ex. 1704-5, T. 13,606-12
- g. Ex. 1707, T. 13,621

J-143.

- a. T. 13,757
- b. Ex. 1688-89, T. 13,498-9
- c. Ex. 1833-6, T. 14,067-74

J-144.

- a. T. 15,434-6;
Ex. 2118-24, T. 15,309-24;
Ex. 2132, T. 15,335;
Ex. 2145-7, T. 15,375-9;
Ex. 2150-5, T. 15,388-415

(J-145)
effort to discover the parties to a plot to stir up the Ambonese.

Failing to get adequate evidence they executed without trial 80

a.
Ambonese.

Between July 1943 and March 1944 approximately 293 persons were executed without trial in Java on suspicion of having been engaged in anti-Japanese activities. This was done on the orders of the General Officer commanding the Japanese Forces on the island.

b.
A revolt took place at Jesselton, Borneo, on the 10th October 1943. Suspecting that Suluks from a number of small islands north of Borneo had taken part in this revolt the Kempei Tai arrested, tortured and murdered almost the whole of the male population of these islands. In addition 170 Chinese were executed in connection with this uprising.

c.
By far the worst of these massacres was that which took place at Pontianak in January 1944, when 1340 Dutch, Chinese and Indonesians were executed for having allegedly conspired against the Japanese. Only 63 of these people were given a trial.

d.
e.
Other massacres took place at Sinkawang in Borneo, Timor and Burma.

f.
g.
J-146. The final class of massacres to be considered are those which were perpetrated in anticipation of a Japanese withdrawal or of an allied landing. In conjunction with these it is proposed to discuss threats and preparations to carry out such measures which, on account of the Japanese surrender, were not put into effect.

J-145.

- a. T. 13,601
- b. Ex. 1760, T. 13,701
- c. Ex. 1659-64, T. 13,322-42
- d. Ex. 1696-7, T. 13,514-20
- e. Ex. 1698, T. 13,520
- f. Ex. 1793-4, T. 13,838-41
- g. Ex. 1538-9, T. 12,966-8

(J-146)

The policy actuating such massacres is probably that of preventing prisoners from rendering any assistance to the invading force. As early as October 1942 at Tarawa in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, 22 New Zealand prisoners were murdered after an American air raid.^{a.}

In January 1943, 527 British prisoners of war had been transported to Ballale Island in the Solomons to construct an aerodrome. Most of them died in the next few months. In April the Japanese feared that the Allies would land on the island and in pursuance of previously made plans bayoneted to death the 90 surviving prisoners.^{b.}

A few months later the Naval Commander at Wake Island, Admiral SAKIBARA, caused the 97 surviving prisoners of war to be executed because he expected an American landing.^{c.}

At New Guinea 162 Indian prisoners, who were too sick to move, were massacred in May 1944 to prevent them from being recovered by advancing Allied forces.^{d.}

In various parts of Borneo 250 to 300 prisoners were executed between June and August 1945 because they were too sick to be withdrawn inland before the anticipated Allied landing.^{e.}

At Puerto Princesa, Palawan, on 14 December 1944, 141 American prisoners of war were murdered. They had been confined in air raid shelters on the pretence that an air raid was about to take place; petrol was poured into the shelters and set alight, and those who endeavoured to escape were shot.^{f.}

J-146.

- a. Ex. 1880, T. 14,141
- b. Ex. 1878-9, T. 14,137-8
- c. T. 14,926-31; Ex. 2035A, B.C., T. 14,973
- d. Ex. 1837, T. 14,080; Ex. 1839, T. 14,029
- e. T. 13,385; Ex. 1655-8, T. 13,312-6; Ex. 1668-70, T. 13,420-30; Ex. 1672, T. 13,439
- f. T. 15222; Ex. 1455, T. 12669

(J-146)

Finally at Ocean Island, just before the Japanese surrender they attempted to slaughter the surviving native population. There was one survivor out of one hundred.^{g.}

J-147. The view that the killing of prisoners in such circumstances was an over-all Japanese policy is strongly supported by evidence as to threats and warnings made to prisoners in various places. In June 1943 the Commandant of Naval Police at Taraken said that in the event of an allied landing the prisoners would be beheaded.^{a.} At Nicobar Island in July 1945 the Naval Commander told the internees that if the enemy landed all of the internees would be killed.^{b.}

J-148. In Borneo a similar threat was made^{a.} whilst at Nakompton Camp in Thailand, prisoners were told by one of the Japanese clerks in the adjutant's office that he had seen a secret order for the killing of prisoners in the event of an allied landing. This was borne out by the fact that machine gun posts had been set up covering the huts in which the prisoners were housed.^{b.}

J-149. The truth of the story about the secret order is strongly corroborated by the plan for final disposition of prisoners found in the Journal of Taiwan Prisoners of War Camp Headquarters under the date of August 1944.^{a.}

(iii) Punishments of Prisoners of War for escaping, in excess of those provided by the Hague Convention 1907, and the Geneva Convention 1929.

J-146.
g. Ex. 1884-5, T. 14,151

J-149.
a. Ex. 2015, T. 14724

J-147.
a. Ex. 1686, T. 13,495
b. Ex. 1622, T. 13,200

J-148.
a. Ex. 1668, T. 13,420
b. T. 11,442

J-150. Reference has already been made, in paragraph J-126 of this summation, to the fact that 30 days' arrest is the maximum punishment that the Conventions provide for prisoners of war who escape and are recaptured. The evidence placed before this Tribunal establishes that the normal punishment imposed by the Japanese was death, that it was the exception rather than the rule for Prisoners to be given a trial for this offence and that these practices were adopted throughout the greater part of the area of Japanese occupation.

J-151. It is now proposed to briefly summarize that evidence. At Guadalcanal in September 1942, two recaptured escapees were handed over to the medical officer who dissected them whilst still alive.^{a.}

Further north, at Ballale Island a British escapee was executed without trial in January 1943, on the basis that he was guilty of desertion from the Japanese Army.^{b.} This quaint notion was also held at Shanghai where in March 1942, an American escaped prisoner was tried on the same basis and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.^{c.}

In Ambon in 1942 eleven prisoners who were recaptured outside the camp were beaten for periods up to 11 days and then executed,^{d.} and in 1945 two more recaptured prisoners were executed.^{e.}

In Celebes 6 Dutch prisoners of war who had been recaptured after escaping were beheaded at Macassar in September 1942,^{f.} and at Teragan three Indians were executed for the same reason in 1945.^{g.}

J-151.

- a. Ex. 1850, T. 14101
- b. Ex. 1878-9, T. 14137-8
- c. Ex. 1900, T. 14178
- d. T. 13796; Ex. 1822-3, T. 14053-4
- e. T. 13979-84
- f. Ex. 1805, T. 13867
- g. Ex. 1806, T. 13875

(J-151)

Between April and May 1942 at various places in Java there were seven separate cases of recaptured prisoners being executed for escaping, the total number so punished being 24.^{h.}

In Sumatra three escapees were executed at Palembang,^{i.} and 8 at the island of Siberaeft.^{j.}

at Pontianak, Bandjermasin, Tarakan and Ranau, all in Borneo a total of 10 prisoners were executed between June 1942 and March 1945 for escaping.^{k.}

Seven recaptured prisoners were executed in Singapore,^{l.} while four others were sentenced to 9 years imprisonment,^{m.} seventeen were executed in Burma,^{n.} three in Kudken,^{o.} and eight in Hong Kong.^{p.}

In addition to the foregoing executions, all of which took place without any trial, two British officers were tortured, tried and shot at Hong Kong in December 1943 for endeavoring to effect a wholesale escape.^{q.}

(iv) Execution of Allied Airmen

J-152. On the 18th April 1942, American planes commanded by Colonel Doolittle raided Japan. The crews of two of the planes were captured in China. Subsequently to their capture "Regulations for Punishment of Enemy Air Crew" were made in China by the accused HATA on the 13th August 1942. The crews of these planes were tried by Court Martial under these Regulations and were

J-151.

h. Ex. 1711-8, T. 13624-37
 i. T. 13562
 j. T. 13603
 k. Ex. 1668, T. 13420;
 Ex. 1686, T. 13498;
 Ex. 1692, T. 13508;
 Ex. 1694, T. 13511

l. Ex. 1504, T. 12902;
 Ex. 1507, T. 12907
 m. T. 5490
 n. Ex. 1560, T. 13050;
 Ex. 1580-1, T. 13098-9
 o. Ex. 1899, T. 14174
 p. Ex. 1602-4, T. 13176-9
 q. Ex. 1606, T. 13181

(J-152) sentenced to death. Later the sentences in respect to five of them were commuted to life imprisonment.^{a.} The remaining three were executed. These Regulations had provided a death penalty for bombing, strafing or otherwise attacking civilians or non-military objectives.^{b.}

J-153. For a long time after this the Japanese dispensed with the formality of a trial as they did with the pretence that the executions had any connection with the attacking of non-military objectives. Executions were carried out without trial in Bougainville,^{a.} New Britain,^{b.} New Guinea,^{c.} Ambon,^{d.} Celebes,^{e.} Batavia,^{f.} Borneo,^{g.} and Burma.^{h.} In all, 56 Allied airmen were executed in these places. For the most part these territories consist of sparsely populated jungle country, where civilian objectives were few. Moreover the populations of these countries were friendly to the Allies so that there would be no point in killing or terrorizing civilians. In New Guinea the officer who issued the orders for the execution admitted that he had done so because the planes had bombed his battery.^{i.}

J-154. In December 1944, three American airmen who had parachuted from a plane engaged in aerial combat near Hankow were marched through the streets, severely beaten, soaked with gasoline and set on fire,^{a.} and in the Philippines in March 1945, two American airmen were beheaded at Cebu.^{b.}

In Singapore during the regime of Dillman two

- J-152.
 a. Ex. 3129-31, T. 27902-8; Ex. 1991, T. 14662
 b. Ex. 1991-3, T. 14662-70

- J-153.
 a. Ex. 1875, T. 14131; Ex. 1877, T. 14133
 b. Ex. 1866, T. 14123; Ex. 1873, T. 14129
 c. Ex. 1836B, T. 14075; Ex. 1846, T. 14096
 d. Ex. 1831, T. 14065
 e. Ex. 1798-1803, T. 13846-65; Ex. 1810, T. 13920
 f. T. 13601
 g. Ex. 1690, T. 13500
 h. Ex. 1547, T. 12976
 i. Ex. 1846, T. 14096
- J-154.
 a. Ex. 1891, T. 14162
 b. Ex. 1461, T. 12778

(J-154)
 members of the crew of a B-29 which had been shot down were lodged in the Outram Road Gaol which was under DOIHARA's control, as Commander of the 7th Area Army. They were a mass of burns and black from head to foot, but received no medical treatment.
 c.

Between May and July 1945, the accused ITAKAKI, having replaced DOIHARA as the Commander of the 7th Area Army, 26 Allied airmen were taken from the Outram Road Gaol and executed.
 d.

But the real holocausts took place in Japan itself. Between June and August 1945, 112 airmen were executed and of these 99 were not tried.
 e.

J-155. The policy which very obviously actuated the Japanese was to prevent airmen from carrying out their duties for fear of execution if captured. It re-echoes the reasons advanced by the Navy in 1934 for the nonratification of the Geneva POW Convention 1929; to which references have already been made in paragraphs J-41 and J-42. They failed signally in their objective as is shown by the fact that they had 3 Doolittle Flyers to execute in 1942, against 112 in Japan alone during the last three months of the war. But that is a commentary on the Japanese physiological inability to appreciate the courage of the airmen, rather than a proof that the policy did not exist.

(v) Treatment of Prisoners of War and Inhabitants of Occupied Countries by the Kempeitai.

J-154.

- c. Ex. 1514, T. 12927
- d. Ex. 1514, T. 12927
- e. Ex. 1921-4, T. 11,204-18

J-156. On reading the evidence relating to the Kempei Tai one is first struck by their fiendish cruelty and then by the uniformity of their methods wherever practised. This uniformity cannot have arisen by chance; it must have been the result of a common training. But if such a common training had been given it must have been a matter of Government policy, every member of the accused who had served in the Army or Navy must have known the nature of the tortures in which they indulged, must have known the worthlessness of confessions extorted by such tortures.

The particular types of tortures which suggest a common training are the water torture, the electric torture, suspending a victim for long periods, burning various parts of the body and placing a pole behind the victims knees and jumping on the victim's thighs. All of these tortures were administered by the kempei Tai at Singapore, ^{a.} Shanghai, ^{b.} French Indo-China, ^{c.} Borneo, ^{d.} Java, ^{e.} and Sumatra, ^{f.} while in Burma ^{g.} and Timor ^{h.} many of them were applied. In Japan there is evidence of the water torture having been applied to the Doolittle Flyers. ^{i.}

(vi) Transportation of Prisoners of War by Sea.

J-157. The evidence relating to this matter is summarized in Part 3 of Appendix B. Reference is made to it here merely to draw attention to the features common to almost every ship and

J-156.

- a. Ex. 1519-21, T. 12935-45; Ex. 1513, T. 12914
- b. Ex. 1893-4, T. 14165-6; Ex. 1901, T. 14179
- c. Ex. 2113-4, T. 15295-8
- d. Ex. 1660, T. 13332; Ex. 1666, T. 13404;
Ex. 1695, T. 13512; Ex. 1698, T. 13520
- e. Ex. 1747, T. 13676
- f. Ex. 1777, T. 13820, Ex. 1774, T. 13811
- g. Ex. 1533, T. 12961; Ex. 1610-6, T. 13186-92
- h. Ex. 1795, T. 13844
- i. Ex. 3834, T. 38030

(J-157)
all in violation of the Conventions. These features are over-crowding, underfeeding, inadequate sanitation and ventilation, lack of medical supplies and water, and ill-treatment of the prisoners.

(vii) General Matters.

J-158. In every installation throughout Japan and the occupied countries where prisoners of war were held, the prisoners were starved, subjected to corporal punishment, and their sick were neglected. Evidence relating to these crimes will be found on every page of Parts 1 and 2 of Appendix B. In ^{a.} Ambon, ^{b.} Borneo, ^{c.} Burma, ^{d.} Celebes, ^{e.} Hong Kong, ^{f.} Java, ^{g.} Singapore, ^{h.} Formosa, ^{i.} and Japan, allied prisoners of war were compelled to labor at work having a direct connection with operations of war. For the most part this consisted of the construction of aerodromes and building defences against Allied anticipated attacks by the Allied forces.

J-159. This completes the discussion on similarity of pattern of war crimes as indicating that they were committed as a matter of Government policy or of Government indifference, but before leaving it I would like to point out that it is inconceivable that so many hundreds of Japanese officers throughout these areas should commit, or permit to be committed by troops under their command, the crimes which have been discussed, unless they were certain that their actions would be approved by the Japanese Government.

J-158.

- a. T. 13962; Ex. 1825-7, T. 14056-9
- b. Ex. 1655-6, T. 13312-3; Ex. 1666-8, T. 13404-20;
Ex. 1673-4, T. 13446-8; Ex. 1686, T. 13495
- c. T. 13016; Ex. 1582, T. 13100
- d. Ex. 1804, T. 13866
- e. Ex. 1603-7, T. 13177-81; Ex. 1901, T. 14179;
Ex. 1911, T. 14191; Ex. 1914, T. 14194
- f. Ex. 1710, T. 13624
- g. Ex. 1508, T. 12909; Ex. 1510, T. 12911;
Ex. 1517, T. 12930
- h. Ex. 1630-1, T. 13210
- i. Ex. 1920, T. 14203; Ex. 1936, T. 14236;
Ex. 1942-3, T. 14246-7; Ex. 1946-8, T. 14251-3

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J-160. Repeated attempts were made by the International Red Cross and the Protecting Powers to obtain permission for their representatives to visit POW camps, but these attempts were almost invariably unsuccessful.^{a.}

The failure to grant permission to visit POW camps was undoubtedly due to a desire to conceal from the world the atrocious treatment meted out by the Japanese to their prisoners.

In Singapore, for instance, the resident International Red Cross Delegate, Mr. Schweizer, was not permitted to visit any of the camps at any time during the Japanese occupation.^{b.} It is futile to suggest that a visit to a prisoner of war camp would have put him in possession of information dangerous to military security; the only additional information he could have gotten would have been as to the manner in which prisoners were treated.

J-160a. It is submitted that the foregoing arguments and references to evidence demonstrate beyond possibility of contradiction that the war crimes proved to have been committed, were committed as a matter of Government policy, or that the Japanese Government knew of them and deliberately refrained from taking any steps to prevent their being repeated.

It is significant that not one of the accused has by himself or by witnesses given any evidence of any real attempt to prevent the commission of war crimes. It is true that evidence has been given of addresses made to officers and troops requesting them to behave in accordance with Bushido traditions, but the prosecution

J-160.

- a. Ex. 2016, T. 14728
- Ex. 2018-9, T. 14748-9;
- Ex. 3140, T. 27949
- b. Ex. 1518, T. 12934

(J-160A) submits that this in itself is not sufficient to discharge the onus, placed on a military commander, of ensuring that prisoners, under his control are treated in accordance with international law.

J-160B. This brings us to the consideration of certain matters of law in respect of Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

All the crimes charged in Counts 53, 54, and 55 of the Indictment are in fact offences against the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 or the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929.

It is the submission of the prosecution that Japan was bound by both the above-mentioned conventions. Although Japan did not ratify the Geneva POW Convention of 1929, at the outbreak of war, she gave a reciprocal agreement to apply it "mutatis mutandis" and is to that extent bound by it. The meaning of the Latin expression has already been discussed at some length in paragraphs J-52 to J-59. The prosecution submits that the undertaking given was one to apply the provisions of the 1929 Convention as far as was practicable. The difference in national or racial customs referred to in the diplomatic correspondence probably gives the best illustration of impracticability. Thus at certain times it may on this account become impossible to provide suitable boots or clothing to prisoners. The prosecution also submits that the Japanese, having deliberately taken advantage of their reciprocal undertaking, cannot now be heard to renounce it or vary its meaning. It is further submitted that the undertaking did not authorize the refusal to comply with any of the

0 159 0003 0489

(J-16Cb)
provisions of the convention on the ground that they were inconsistent with existing or subsequently made provisions of Japanese law.

In any event the Geneva POW Convention 1929 merely makes explicit what was already implicit in the Hague Convention of 1907. The preamble to the latter convention contains the following declaration, "According to the views of the High Contracting Parties, these provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit, are intended to serve as a general rule of conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations with the inhabitants. It has not, however, been found possible at present to concert Regulations covering all the circumstances which arise in practice. On the other hand, the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders. Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."

0 159 0003 0490

(J-160B)

What better evidence of the "principles of the law of nations" can there be than the 1929 Convention bearing as it does the signature of representatives of the thirty-five leading nations of the world, including Japan itself.

J-161. The next question to be considered is the responsibility of members of the cabinet and high ranking officers, both in the field and in the ministries, for these offences.

An attempt has been made to suggest that the Army and Navy were alone responsible for the breaches of the Laws of War, proved in such abundance. There has been a persistent attempt by cabinet members and high officers at each stage in the chain of command to shift the responsibility on to someone lower down. This is entirely contrary to the spirit and express provisions of the Convention. The preamble to the Hague Convention No. 4 says:

"On the other hand, the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders."

Article 3 reads:

"A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces."

(J-161)

No doubt this passage relates to the payment of compensation, but it shows the general responsibility, and that it was the duty of the Government to supervise and prevent occurrences which might lead to such claims.

Article 4 of the Regulations attached to that Convention is the most important from this point of view:

"Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them. They must be humanely treated"

Article 7 provides:

"The Government into whose hands prisoners of war have fallen is charged with their maintenance.

"In the absence of a special agreement between the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated as regards board, lodging and clothing on the same footing as the troops of the Government who captured them."

In this case there was a special agreement that national and racial differences should be respected.

Articles 10-12 inclusive show that the Governments are the parties concerned in questions of parole.

Article 2 of the Geneva convention provides:

"Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile power, but not of the individual or corps who have captured them.

"They must at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity."

(J-161)

"Measures of reprisal against them are prohibited."

Article 4 provides:

"The power detaining prisoners of war is bound to provide for their maintenance."

Article 77 provides:

"Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each of the belligerent Powers, as well as the neutral Powers, which have received belligerents, shall institute an official information bureau for prisoners of war who are within their territory.

"Within the shortest possible period, each of the belligerent Powers shall inform its information bureau of every capture of prisoners effected by its armies, giving it all the information regarding identity which it has, allowing it quickly to advise the families concerned, and informing it of the official addresses to which families may write to prisoners.

"The information bureau shall immediately forward all this information to the interested Powers through the intervention, on the one hand, of the Protecting Powers and, on the other, of the central agency provided for in Article 79."

It is, in our submission, therefore clear that it is the Government as a whole which is primarily responsible for the prevention of breaches of these Laws of War. This casts in the first place a duty upon every member of the cabinet and their advisers, and every high officer in the chain of command directly concerned

(J-161)
with these matters to satisfy himself that the Laws are being obeyed. Ordinarily no doubt this duty could be discharged by satisfying himself that proper machinery had been established for the purpose. But when information reaches him which raises a doubt as to whether they are being flagrantly disregarded, or shows plainly that they are, then a much higher duty devolves upon him.

The manner in which this information reached such men has been shown in some detail in paragraphs J-60 to J-128.

As regards a Cabinet Minister it is clearly his duty, upon learning of the commission of these crimes, to bring the facts to the notice of his colleagues in the cabinet, and to resign unless effective steps are taken to prevent their commission.

Singularly little evidence has been given by the Defense, who alone are in a position to know the facts, as to the steps, if any, taken by any of them for this purpose. There is no evidence that any of them ever raised the question of war crimes in the cabinet. Their failure to do so makes their guilt the greater. If they did raise the question and acquiesced in no effective steps being taken they must still bear the responsibility.

It is submitted that there was a clear duty upon every official who knew about the commission of any of these war crimes to use such power as he possessed to put the matter right at once, at least to the extent of bringing the outrages to an immediate stop.

0 159 0003 0494

(J-161)

With regard to such of the accused who were officers in charge of armies, or holding responsible staff appointments in armies in areas in which war crimes were committed, it is submitted that they have a further responsibility for failing to take proper steps to prevent their commission or continuance in such areas.

The duty devolving upon Bureau Chiefs in the War and Navy Ministry is to take whatever steps they can to prevent such crimes being committed.

It is finally submitted that by presenting to the Tribunal the mass of evidence which it has done, showing a uniform pattern of atrocities and breaches of the laws of war, the Prosecution has raised an unanswered presumption that this was part of a system of illegal employment, ill-treatment and murder of prisoners of war and civilians for which all the accused in office during the relevant periods are responsible.

0 159 0003 0495

February 5, 1948

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RE: SECTION J OF GENERAL SUGGESTION

The attached pages J-2, J-46 and J-71
are to be substituted for pages 2, 46
and 71 in Suggestion J.

International Prosecution Section

J-4. As far as possible it is desired to avoid subjecting the Tribunal to a repetition of the nauseating details of the massacres, murders, tortures and other almost inconceivable atrocities committed by the Japanese on the high seas and in every area that they occupied. With this end in view, and with the object of assisting the Tribunal in its weighty task, summaries of various phases of the evidence, which the Prosecution considers important, have been prepared and are annexed to this address as Appendix "A" and Appendix "B". It is not proposed to read these Appendices.

I shall now proceed to describe them briefly.

J-5. APPENDIX "A" sets out details of atrocities committed by the Japanese on Chinese soldiers and civilians in China and Manchuria between 1937 and 1945, and, in addition, contains references to evidence showing the means by which the Japanese Government did, or ought to have, become acquainted with such atrocities.

J-6. APPENDIX "B" is divided into seven parts.

a. The first Part consists of a Summary of the evidence relating to treatment of prisoners of war, civilian internees and inhabitants in occupied countries other than the Philippines between December 1941 and September 1945.

In terms there appears to be some overlapping with APPENDIX "A" but that is not so in fact. Defense evidence contradicting or palliating the commission of war crimes shown by the

(J-108)
 suffered from loathsome contagious diseases. Sanitary facilities were primitive and inadequate; food was far below standard necessary to maintain health; no heat was supplied from December to June and medical care was non-existent. Mr. Powell through lack of medical attention developed gangrene and lost the front half of both feet.^{a.}

The Japanese reply was that all Americans referred to were violators of military regulations and consequently criminals. They were not considered as being on the same footing as civilians interned under civil procedure, but they received medical attention and a food ration like that given to other criminals. In addition, they could have sent in from outside any food they purchased.^{b.}

Evidence verifying the conditions referred to in the American protest was given by the late Mr. J. B. Powell. He, in common with other Shanghai newsmen, was confined in Bridge-house on 20 December 1941, until 1 March. During that time he was interrogated but was never charged with any offense.^{c.} This was corroborated by other Prosecution evidence.^{d.}

(ii) Bataan Death March - The protest refers to the Bataan Death March; the details of this, as shown by the Prosecution's evidence, are contained on J-37 to J-39 of this summation. The Japanese reply admits the march, and attributes it to lack of transport, but denies the mistreatment of prisoners of war.^{e.}

J-108.

- a. Ex. 2024(1), T. 14795
- b. Ex. 2024(3), T. 14796
- c. T. 3271-85
- d. Ex. 1894; Ex. 1895, T. 14165-8
- e. Ex. 2024(3), T. 14796

(J-141)

The greatest of such massacres was the rape of Nan-king. This has already been referred to in paragraphs J-61 to J-63, and as the facts of this event will be given in some details by counsel dealing with the summation in regard to the accused MATSUI it is not proposed to make any further reference to it here.

At Hongkong between the 17th and 25th December 1941, the Japanese massacred about 150 Canadians, mostly medical personnel, who had surrendered and been taken into Japanese custody.^{a.} But this was not the worst part of the story, they then proceeded into St. Stephen's Hospital where they bayoneted to death or beheaded 70 patients and 25 members of the staff.^{b.}

Some 2000 miles away another Japanese force was making its way down the Malayan Peninsula and was about to distinguish itself in a similar manner. On 27 December 1941 they captured 75 Indian troops near Ipoh, tied them up and bayoneted them to death.^{c.} Almost a month later they captured and massacred 150 Australian and Indian troops at Parit Sulong.^{d.}

and then came the 14th and 15th February 1942.^{e.} Near Katong Hospital the personnel of an ambulance were captured and killed,^{e.} and later on the same day troops of the Imperial Guard Division went through the ground floor of the Alexandria Hospital, Singapore, bayonetting patients as they lay in their beds, and even on the operating table. Members of the staff

J-141.

- a. Ex. 1594-1601, T. 13,167-75; Ex. 1608, T. 13,184
- b. T. 13,114-7; Ex. 1590-3, T. 13,163-6
- c. Ex. 1522, T. 12,946
- d. Ex. 1525, T. 12,949
- e. Ex. 1503, T. 12,899

倫理學三論 三論終結

J-1 最終論告中、此部合に起訴状、諸國憲法三五四及五五
三諸違背多人道之罪及通例、戦争犯罪、關係
多事案を取扱字居り云。三論後戦争犯罪十号中、此方之
犯罪之関之法律之字、最終論告、此部合に於て論議
セラス。

Summation J

J-2 俘虜関之最終論告、於て、證據不舉出之旨、又
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犯罪或場合日本政府、政策、一部、之、行、ハ、テ、各
其、他、無念、於て、政府、犯罪、行、ハ、テ、行、ハ、テ、問
ハ、テ、無關心、之、事、ハ、テ、之、證據、之、具、以、テ、法、廷、之、對
之、論議、ハ、進、マ、ル、云、日本政府、ハ、此、言、事、不、報、高
ニ、廣、ク、意味、用、ル、之、事、内、閣、閣、員、之、下、之、陸、海、軍
高級將校、又、便、見、高、級、官、之、事、之、事、之、事、云、云、今、後
此、俘虜、関、之、最終、論、告、部、合、に、於、て、此、言、事、右
ノ、意味、之、用、ヒ、ラ、ス。

J-3 此、最終論告、此部合に於て諸違背之三個、被苦人

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T-6

附錄卷四 > 卷十 (10-11) 卷十

T-5

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場所ノ被シ戰争他國社カ行ヒテ期間トカ容易ニ因断サレ
トカ出テルルカ事ニモナシテモテテリマス。

又該編一編ハ一九四三年十二月一九四五年九月間以島ニ於ケル停
止被留者ノ地位民ノ取扱ニ関スル檢察例証據ノ概要ヲ含
ムトテ居リマス。

D. 0

此等三編ハ停處方及抑留者ノ海路輸送中ノ取扱ニ関スル

註 / 記録番号ハ天文ノ百又番子ニアル /

正(四) 記録 = 二十四

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Summation J

（第一編）一九四五年十二月三十一日一九四五年九月迄ノ間ニ以テ島

以外ノ口領國ニ於ケル海陸軍ノ抑留者又住民ノ取扱ニ關スル証據

ノ概要ヲ公シテ居リマス。因テ茲ニ於テ附屬書「A」ト重複シマス

エントリカワリマスガ、言フヤ大ハソウデハアリマセン。檢察側ノ証據ヨリ

リテ示サレマシキノ戦中ノ犯罪遂行ヲ否定スル辯解ニテ居ル辯護

側ノ証據ガ不適当ナ場所ニ挿入シテアリマス。一方該編ハ檢察

側ニヨリテ証據ガ幾クカコレ居ラナイ學慮收容所其ノ他場所

所ニ關スル辯護側ノ証據ヲ無視シテ居リマス。コレハ辯護側

ニ對スル非難也長閣下ノ御意見即「檢事ニヨリテ被告ガ訴追

サレテイル事蹟ニ對シテ直接ノワカリナサイ。ソレヲ合然訴追スル

項ニテハ事蹟ニ對シテ何等過失ガ見出サレナイコトヲ左証ニシヨウ

P. 4

附屬書 A 及附屬書 B 各本編 二編 三編 及四編 二說
 明之ニシテ大小事情ニ関シ辯護側ヲ檢察側、証據系至
 定感ハコトニ取テ試ミテ之ハ極少數例ニテ過キマセ、假令
 十分ナカニテ場合ニモ各場合ニ於テ問題ヲ論議スル積ムルハ

比率ヲ認明シテ居リマシ。

附屬書七編、死亡歌ハ敘述セテ之ハ、一應、修憲廢教ニ對シテ

又ハシテ證據之ニシテ日本例公文書。

抗議出被送、憲法及回戰ニ於テ罪遂行ニ據テ與

次ノ三節ニ分シテ居リマシ。

リクニ據テ二國ニシテ證據音類、概要ヲ含ムニ居リマシ。以テ

其論ヲ論ハ修憲及柳留者、取預ニ國ニ日本政府、反戰

概要ヲ含ムニ居リマシ。

ハ修憲條約、通商ニ關シ日本例、得階ニ就テ、證據音類

已第ニ編、一九二九年也木ハ赤十字條約、一九二九年也木

ニシリマシ。

居リマシ。本編ニ於テ亦含ムル期間ハ太平洋戰爭、期間中

ニ據テ行為、證據音類ニ關シ、國ハ修憲條約ニ據テ亦含ム

此等四編、修憲條約ニ關シ、證據音類以外、證據音類

終結シテ、期間ニ分シテ居リマシ。

證據、概要ヲ含ムニ居リマシ。以テ一九二九年十一月七日ニ於テ

Summary T

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Summary

了(三) 戦争犯罪遂行(四) 反駁(五) 檢察側証據
 多数、又之戦争犯罪被害者、又之密接+関係トシテ
 理由下ニシテ戦争犯罪が非常ニ重要性ヲ持ビテキル時ニ
 相及スル証據、價値ガ此ノ最終論告、部令ニ於テ論議
 サレタ。カレ戦争犯罪遂行(四)ノ檢察側証據ニ對シ辯
 護側ニヨリテサレタル唯一ノ攻撃ノ容認ハ免責ノ抗辯ヲ
 スルトシテ形或ヲトシタリ。例ヲ舉グニテ辯護側或ハ地方
 治療ガ創設又ハ醫療用品不足ニ苦シカニシテ認メスガ必要、
 食料又ハ醫療品供給ノ爲、輸送機關不充分ヲ以テ用
 フルガ必要ナルカク多ク、止ムを得テカラスト主張シ居
 ルアリ。此処ニモ亦他ノ重要ナル場合、外相及スル証據
 ノ價値ヲ論議スル積リハアリ。多ク場合殊ニ行爲ノ
 檢察側証據ニ對シ辯護側回答ハ、ヨリテ下注ニ起ラ
 タルトシテ、下ナリ。例ニ於テ中國人、供述書ガ九四年
 九月ニ鎮東軍ニ於テ第六師團、日清、京カ地方ヲ掠奪シ百
 多現住民ヲ殺戮シタル事ニ居ル件ニ對シ辯護側、回答
 ハ軍隊ニ就テ殺シテ掠奪シタルニテ、林ニ指令ヲ受テ
 居ル事ヲ「是等上官ノ命令ニ從ヒテ、面目ニカレヨリ
 行爲ヲ行ハシメ」ト云フ、アリ。此點ニ對シ法廷
 對シ何等援助ヲ與ヘトガ出来ズ、若シ法廷、檢察側が述
 べル事柄ニヨリテ援助スルニシテ、判断ヲ下サズ

P. 5

子一 日記 三四一 記録 四六一
 日記 三四五

戦争犯罪、現実に遂行關及此辯護例證據

檢査官例證據間、矛盾、實例

a. 「此也」

Summation J-8

護例三〇の「控出」カ、之ヲカシ、主トシ、被告又本村、責任及數

名、高級將校ノ認識ノ程度ニ關係ガアリ、又、其々ニ目下戰爭

犯罪ガ行ヒタリカ、ハ、トシ、之ノ内ニテ、詩ヲ子居ビ、テ、リ、ニ、カ

ニ、此種ノ證據ニ付テ、此處ハ、論ジ、セ、シ、己ニ、其、基、ヲ、唯、シ、テ、論

争ハ、コノ、シ、カ、シ、刑、務、所、ニ、於、テ、此、從、席、上、取、扱、ニ、關、シ、テ、行、ハ、リ、シ、

一、死、五、回、三、回、脚、氣、ト、赤、痢、ヲ、死、カ、ヨ、リ、テ、其、々、カ、復、其、何、モ

ナ、コ、ノ、シ、カ、シ、上、ノ、監、房、ニ、死、又、カ、シ、テ、放、置、サ、ル、カ、モ、被、害、者、側、ノ、証

據、據、據、等、ヲ、上、テ、居、リ、シ、又、彼、等、ノ、為、ノ、軍、医、ヤ、皆、香、島、ニ、元、氣

ハ、シ、テ、會、談、等、ヲ、檢、査、シ、授、ケ、テ、モ、ト、シ、カ、リ、シ、テ、彼、等、ハ、死、ス、ル、カ

カ、リ、シ、テ、種、由、ノ、一、ニ、無、絶、ト、シ、テ、其、方、彼、等、ハ、本、村、ト、シ、テ、(a)

第、九、條、ノ、刑、務、所、ニ、於、テ、此、從、席、上、取、扱、ニ、關、シ、テ、行、ハ、リ、シ、

一、死、五、回、三、回、脚、氣、ト、赤、痢、ヲ、死、カ、ヨ、リ、テ、其、々、カ、復、其、何、モ

ナ、コ、ノ、シ、カ、シ、上、ノ、監、房、ニ、死、又、カ、シ、テ、放、置、サ、ル、カ、モ、被、害、者、側、ノ、証

據、據、據、等、ヲ、上、テ、居、リ、シ、又、彼、等、ノ、為、ノ、軍、医、ヤ、皆、香、島、ニ、元、氣

ハ、シ、テ、會、談、等、ヲ、檢、査、シ、授、ケ、テ、モ、ト、シ、カ、リ、シ、テ、彼、等、ハ、死、ス、ル、カ

カ、リ、シ、テ、種、由、ノ、一、ニ、無、絶、ト、シ、テ、其、方、彼、等、ハ、本、村、ト、シ、テ、(a)

第、九、條、ノ、刑、務、所、ニ、於、テ、此、從、席、上、取、扱、ニ、關、シ、テ、行、ハ、リ、シ、

一、死、五、回、三、回、脚、氣、ト、赤、痢、ヲ、死、カ、ヨ、リ、テ、其、々、カ、復、其、何、モ

ナ、コ、ノ、シ、カ、シ、上、ノ、監、房、ニ、死、又、カ、シ、テ、放、置、サ、ル、カ、モ、被、害、者、側、ノ、証

據、據、據、等、ヲ、上、テ、居、リ、シ、又、彼、等、ノ、為、ノ、軍、医、ヤ、皆、香、島、ニ、元、氣

ハ、シ、テ、會、談、等、ヲ、檢、査、シ、授、ケ、テ、モ、ト、シ、カ、リ、シ、テ、彼、等、ハ、死、ス、ル、カ

カ、リ、シ、テ、種、由、ノ、一、ニ、無、絶、ト、シ、テ、其、方、彼、等、ハ、本、村、ト、シ、テ、(a)

第、九、條、ノ、刑、務、所、ニ、於、テ、此、從、席、上、取、扱、ニ、關、シ、テ、行、ハ、リ、シ、

一、死、五、回、三、回、脚、氣、ト、赤、痢、ヲ、死、カ、ヨ、リ、テ、其、々、カ、復、其、何、モ

ナ、コ、ノ、シ、カ、シ、上、ノ、監、房、ニ、死、又、カ、シ、テ、放、置、サ、ル、カ、モ、被、害、者、側、ノ、証

據、據、據、等、ヲ、上、テ、居、リ、シ、又、彼、等、ノ、為、ノ、軍、医、ヤ、皆、香、島、ニ、元、氣

ハ、シ、テ、會、談、等、ヲ、檢、査、シ、授、ケ、テ、モ、ト、シ、カ、リ、シ、テ、彼、等、ハ、死、ス、ル、カ

J-9

護例三〇

檢査官例證據間、矛盾、實例

J-6 (a) 書証 一五三-A 記録 一三〇二

1050 1000 6510

Summary

7-10 收容所長又々、陳述を提出せしむ。以て中子獄、其
收容所之家具等、非當ニ貧弱ナルヲ示シ、且テ設備
無キ事ヲ多ク述べしむ。新鮮ナ野菜ト肉類ト傳馬ノ糞
又々ニ食料トシて食す。(4)

7-10 收容所、状態ニ関スル事情及イテ、證據ニ自認シ、又
ハ、HUDSON及又々々々々々部下トシテ、其ノ主張強ク
ス。又々々々陳述カラ考ヘ、標品ニ得ルモノ、其ノ元氣
ヲツケ、食物中治療ニ得ルモノニ思ハス。以テ拒絶セ、不
ウ検査側、證據ヲ覆シ、何レモ、從ツテ検査側ノ所説、
容認セ、然ルニナリ。(5)

上海

7-11 上海ニ関シ、検査側、證據ヲ攻撃セ、且テ居テ、又々々々部下
ノ一九二一年十月ニ終ル期間ニ關係スル命令等、其ノ検査
側、吳淞傳馬所收容所及、アリ、又々々々憲兵司令部ニ於
テ食物、寢具、暖房、医療ニ等、無知、不慮、爲シ、施
設及一般の虐待ニイテ述ベ、ナリ。(6)

7-12 辯護側證據、澤田ト工藤ヲ出テ居リ、二人、前者上海
占領主支配下トシ、後十三軍、指揮官トナリ。(7)

7-13 記録三五四、三五五、三五三
三五九

(8) 電証 三〇七、記録三五三、九

7-14 電証 二〇三、記録四三五
" 一〇三 " 四三〇
" 一〇二 " 四二九
" 一〇一 " 四二八
" 一〇〇 " 四二七
" 九九 " 四二六
" 九八 " 四二五
" 九七 " 四二四
" 九六 " 四二三
" 九五 " 四二二
" 九四 " 四二一
" 九三 " 四二〇
" 九二 " 四一九
" 九一 " 四一八
" 九〇 " 四一七
" 八九 " 四一六
" 八八 " 四一五
" 八七 " 四一四
" 八六 " 四一三
" 八五 " 四一二
" 八四 " 四一一
" 八三 " 四一〇
" 八二 " 四〇九
" 八一 " 四〇八
" 八〇 " 四〇七
" 七九 " 四〇六
" 七八 " 四〇五
" 七七 " 四〇四
" 七六 " 四〇三
" 七五 " 四〇二
" 七四 " 四〇一
" 七三 " 四〇〇
" 七二 " 三九九
" 七一 " 三九八
" 七〇 " 三九七
" 六九 " 三九六
" 六八 " 三九五
" 六七 " 三九四
" 六六 " 三九三
" 六五 " 三九二
" 六四 " 三九一
" 六三 " 三九〇
" 六二 " 三八九
" 六一 " 三八八
" 六〇 " 三八七
" 五九 " 三八六
" 五八 " 三八五
" 五七 " 三八四
" 五六 " 三八三
" 五五 " 三八二
" 五四 " 三八一
" 五三 " 三八〇
" 五二 " 三七九
" 五一 " 三七八
" 五〇 " 三七七
" 四九 " 三七六
" 四八 " 三七五
" 四七 " 三七四
" 四六 " 三七三
" 四五 " 三七二
" 四四 " 三七一
" 四三 " 三七〇
" 四二 " 三六九
" 四一 " 三六八
" 四〇 " 三六七
" 三九 " 三六六
" 三八 " 三六五
" 三七 " 三六四
" 三六 " 三六三
" 三五 " 三六二
" 三四 " 三六一
" 三三 " 三六〇
" 三二 " 三五九
" 三一 " 三五八
" 三〇 " 三五七
" 二九 " 三五六
" 二八 " 三五五
" 二七 " 三五四
" 二六 " 三五三
" 二五 " 三五二
" 二四 " 三五一
" 二三 " 三五〇
" 二二 " 三四九
" 二一 " 三四八
" 二〇 " 三四七
" 一九 " 三四六
" 一八 " 三四五
" 一七 " 三四四
" 一六 " 三四三
" 一五 " 三四二
" 一四 " 三四一
" 一三 " 三四〇
" 一二 " 三三九
" 一一 " 三三八
" 一〇 " 三三七
" 九 " 三三六
" 八 " 三三五
" 七 " 三三四
" 六 " 三三三
" 五 " 三三二
" 四 " 三三一
" 三 " 三三〇
" 二 " 三二九
" 一 " 三二八

William Brewster

5/13

彼は前年十一月の議案に於て、
公平と正當な取扱を受けし人、大いに人々を驚異せし
所より、其代表は、其代表は、其代表は、其代表は、其代表は、

王藤八志十字代表は、
據り響かす多し、
直接知識を以て、
審判の回訪は、
若し、
組織の組織先的、
亦十七字代表は、
又、日本側、
の、
た、
一、
ニ、

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ニ、

線、
は、
は、
は、

572 記帳 七四四

573 〃 七四四

574 〃 七四四

朝鮮

Immation

朝鮮=関之、檢察側立証段階=於何等証據、提
 出せし居り、之を辯護側之証據ト言一九四三年十二月
 十八日及九四年十一月三十一日迄ニ於ケル赤十字、朝鮮
 收容所訪問報告ヲ提出し居、之也。此ノ收容所
 好意下ニ言書キ描寫し居り、之が一九四四年十月(角)報
 答傳書、中、三名が收容所職員ニ對シ彼等、感謝ヲ
 表現し、前、赤十字、訪問、際感謝ヲシカク、ト
 7遺憾ニ此ノ表現之ヲテ、述ベ之。法廷、
 注意ハ此會話ノ記録カシカク、辯護側証據一部ヲ
 之ニテ事實ニ喚起サレヌ。ソノ書証ノ第六頁及七頁ニ
 之ニ居リ、前、赤十字、視察、一九四三年十月別、代
 表者ニヨリ、行クシテ、可ク、此、報告ノ趣旨、及
 之ニテ、檢察側、收容所ニ居リ、之ヲ傳書、人多ク宣誓
 供述言フ、提出致ラシ。彼、一九四三年十月、收容所
 訪問中、傳書、中、三名が赤十字代表者ニ書情ヲ申シ
 テ、翌日、獨居監禁ヲ命ゼ、ト述ベ、居リ、ヌ。(四)

- (一) 四 書証 三三八 記録 三七四
- (二) " 三三〇 " 三九〇
- (三) " 三一〇 " 三九〇
- (四) " 三一四〇 " 三九四九
- (五) 檢察側文書 三一七六

J-15 此文書引用ガレキル三名信房六一九四四年前赤十字認同
 際收寄新職負感謝ヲシカラスニ於道遺撤、意ヲ表シテ去
 同公入庫ノコトナリ。此一事、新副、對以魂碑、信房、ニテ、
 苦情ヲ言ヒ、カフコト云フニ、トシテ、ナリ、云々

東京 丸

J-16 東京ニ於テ收寄新職、橫決、川崎、真津津、信房、收寄所、於
 此、收寄國ノ多數、換察側証據ヲ提出カセ、云々、收寄所、
 於先信房、重ク飢餓、苦シ、且、信房、及、改訂、其、他、
 刑罰、云々、云々

J-17 三手、次、取、ニ、云、云、言、也、已、於、此、收、寄、所、指、揮、之、于、信、房、之、命、
 本、亦、非、誤、側、之、誤、間、カ、信、房、ノ、良、好、下、行、賜、之、以、証、言、云、云、
 特、信、房、六、好、ノ、食、物、ノ、取、之、又、重、實、強、調、之、云、云、及、新、副、
 三、於、下、彼、信、房、ノ、辱、之、改、打、カ、レ、知、之、キ、ト、亦、部、電、達、官、
 也、指、令、彼、之、病人、一、日、分、食、糧、ノ、三、分、一、減、カ、セ、ト、及、信、房、
 宛、テ、赤、十字、ノ、救、恤、品、ノ、使、用、ヲ、彼、等、無、效、部、下、ニ、許、可、ヲ、
 三、信、房、之、信、認、之、執、此、一、場、合、當、區、選、換、察、側、証、據、ヲ、金、部、
 審、議、之、ト、云、云、何、等、躑、躑、ヲ、又、(五) 亦、有、赤、十字、致、之、云、云、
 J-18 書、九、四、三、號、錄、四、四、六、 (四) 記、錄、二、一、一、二、五

- 〃 九四、 四三二
- 〃 九六、 四三三
- 〃 九五、 四五六
- 記、錄、 四、七、一、六

8050 F000 6510

Summation J

答認ト見責

ル ニンカホル

J-18 検査側、証拠一九四三年二月二十日、二十三日、同三十一日
國人は大部分、民間人、海峽植民地義勇隊、人達を多
クシ、之が彼等、家族を離れ、戦車や團、地域進出に
レ、裁判、死刑せしむ事なす。この第一師團隊、日
本指揮官、日記、三月十九日、彼二十一日、皆た、又中國人
、検査命令より、検査二月二十二日、然し三月二十二
日、三十一日、所、近、死刑せしむ事、日記、三十一日、記
、日本軍、日記、三月三日、大部分確認、三月十日、附、記、事、義
勇兵、及、牙、列、三、敵、軍隊、今、三、人、可、成、得、山、平
原、自、ら、彼、等、搜、索、申、上、し、上、書、三、月、三、日、附、記
事、八、日、領、後、者、一、捕、捕、上、の、約、三、千、名、之、犯、罪、者、遂、捕、死
刑、又、上、述、ス、三、名、居、り、云、云。

J-19 弁護側、職、職、の、り、公、に、山、下、將、軍、命、令、を、遂、行、す、
る、事、上、の、三、名、を、答、認、す、居、り、云、云。然、し、弁護、側、日、本、軍、の
「二、月、廿、日、島、上、を、去、る、事、上、の、三、名、彼、等、の、三、年、し、之、攻、撃、の
時、中、國、兵、の、攻、撃、を、受、け、た、上、の、理、由、上、三、月、十、日、降、伏

P. 11

J-18 (a) 記録 五三六三、五三七三、五三七八

(b) 書記 甲六、 記録 五六三〇
「 甲六、 " 五六二四

J-19 (a) 記録 三二〇一、三二〇六、一九

以上中國兵威嚴解除之事實，故軍事時，故
 通信輸送線之破壞，及法律遵守之國民，故軍事時，故
 以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

J20 以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

主張之鐵道者，八人，裁判，以上之理由，以上之理由。

上彼等之證據，上間，於其經過之時間，以上之理由，以上之理由。

者，人，故，以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

三六，以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

鐵道地，故，以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

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以上之理由，以上之理由，以上之理由。

(後)

〃 一三五七三一九 記録一三五七六

書記 一六五五、一六五六 記録一三三三一一三

〃 一六六八 〃 一三四二〇

〃 一六七三、一六七四、一六七三 記録一三四六一九

記録 一三三五五、一六二、一三三六九、一七二

Summation J

J-19
(c)

記録 二四〇〇一、書証 四七六、記録 二七四一一

J-21
(a)

記録 五四三〇、五四九一

書証 一五二一七、記録 一三九一四一三〇

(b)

記録 一三五三七、書証 一七二二、記録 一三六二九

書証 一七二〇、一七二二、一七二二、記録 一三六四一六

(c)

記録 一七六九、記録 一三七八四

記録 一七七八、一三八二〇

記録 一三三七、一三四七四

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付書上抑當者三前上志比合文論之ニク多ト八戰事也樂樂諸

做入未ナリ上言比三歴比三事ニ^也觀察側之ヲ認ナリナリトス。

聯合軍ノ攻勢ヲ自奉テ、供給物運搬ニ影響ヲ及ボス以前分

スニ言テ、地獄三番比付書上抑留者八个之命ヲ割皆ト又給ス度

テノ局ヲ示シテ之ヲ然シテ之ヲ兼讓側ニ裁クヲ信セテ上ニ此証

供給物運搬ノ不足ニテ層々ナリナリトス。之ヲ未^レ止ニ於テ其

讓讓側自身ノ証人ハ三長三號ヲ降伏、降三六ヶ月間支心カテ

茶カ午許ナリト空言認^ルテ層々トス。之ヲ未^レ止ニ

語、呼^ビ捕獲^ステ英國人、食糧運搬物品ヲ奪^リテ去^ルトス。其

食糧及運搬品未^レ在何^レノ層々トシ國之証據ハ

更^ニ觀察側之証據階^ニ於テ提出カ^レテ層々トス。前述^ス、供給物

ハ將來^ニ作戰^ステテ手許^ニ保持^ステ世々^ニ也西^ニカ^レテテ上^ニ無^ク證

側^ニ在^ルニ、八頁空^ニテ語^ヲナ^リナリトス。之ヲ未^レ止ニ、觀察側^ノ國

際^ニ滴^リテ重^ク、英國諸國^ノ之^ヲ作^ル、此^レ西^ニテ、上^ニ在^ル、八戰

事^ノ犯^ス罪^ヲ、犯^ステ上^ニ主^張セ^テ下^ルトス。

J-23 是^レ引^用ノ事^ニ於^テ是^レ於^テ此^レ大^體、後^ニ廢^止收^入者^ト、後^ニ廢^止階

、總^テ廢^止、飢^饉、每^ニ掃^クマ^ルトシ、然^レニ^モ只^ニ、孩^ノヲ^テ收^入者^ト、之

之^レ（Becking）ヲ^テ、聯合^軍側^ノ、救^助隊^ヲ、到着^ステ、百^五十^五、送

階^ノ、日本^軍ノ^テ、流^シテ^モ、之^レ。

J-22 (a) 記錄 三〇一九一〇一

(b) 音証 三三一三 記錄 三〇二〇一三

(c) 音証 三〇二〇一 記錄 三〇二二

(d) 音証 一五三三 記錄 三九二四

(e) 音証 三三一一 三〇二二

(f) 音証 三三二二 三〇二〇

(g) 音証 一六九五 三四四九一五二

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Summit J.

1955 (1955) 年 11 月 13 日 (1955) 年 11 月 13 日
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21

Summation J.

J-27 (戦士、理由、有、鉄道、九三年、自、完成、不
ハ、之、也、之、是、有、大、作、業、恐、入、事、業、不、押、進、行、り、結
果、多、教、信、辱、之、病、多、因、推、り、為、教、死、亡、之、細

J-28 (信、辱、死、亡、之、症、候、過、分、飢、餓、疾、病、並、に、医、療、不、等、因、等
之、に、對、し、て、之、に、對、し、て、之、を、檢、査、し、証、據、を、得、り、し、る

J-29 (信、辱、自、ら、死、亡、す、彼、等、之、看、守、三、年、衛、兵、同、一、於、此
率、對、比、較、七、年、強、人、員、有、之、二、百、五、十、名、朝、鮮、人、各
三、〇、一、四、名、日、本、人、衛、兵、三、三、看、守、三、〇、下、隊、九、四、三、年、四
月、以、後、七、月、間、三、二、千、百、名、が、死、亡、す、之、衛、兵、中、十、六、名、
名、之、死、亡、之、三、十、六、名、也、八、号、隊、九、百、名、死、亡、者、有、之、
が、衛、兵、中、十、六、名、死、亡、者、之、中、一、名、自、殺、行、つ、た、也

J-30 (下、隊、及、上、隊、各、九、四、三、年、四、月、及、同、年、五、月、二、之、六、日、
自、自、隊、團、に、到、着、之、三、名、協、同、三、名、成、り、七、月、間、九、百、名
、死、亡、者、有、之、三、名、也

J-31 (南、方、軍、司、令、部、取、下、三、之、鉄、道、之、建、設、之、決、定、大、年、
信、辱、隊、之、事、力、に、對、し、て、之、を、檢、査、し、証、據、を、得、り、し、る、其、後、九、四、三、年、二、月、大、年、信、辱、

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- J-31 (a) 記録 五三三四、五四三九、一四
- J-32 (a) 記録 二四二一、四一、二四八、
三〇〇〇、一一
三〇二〇、一三九
書証 二五六一、四一、二七〇、 記録 三三、五七、六
一五七、四一、五 三〇八、三、七
一五八、 三〇九、八

Summary J

作戰上經由三戰役之由上自離早之格三法乘上然之後二十
 丁於期同之三月延長之之總村昔路果線路。最初計圖
 自之自自自之元四三十四。宣統之元之元之元之元之元之元
 二戰事全于在在在在在在在在在在在在在在在在在在在在在在
 期別皇之讓乘二之元上幅之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元
 致。除功之衛生之甚之十權。衛生之戰能之研究之政言之
 三之元之折在之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元
 為三在也也(衛生之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元
 係有合部。係之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元
 四三之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元
 甚重之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元之元

J-31 (13) 雜誌自七五 記錄五之三

(14) 雜誌 自百三

(15) 雜誌 自七五 記錄二七四二一四

記錄二七四六

(16) 〃 二七四六

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J-35 倭僑ノ間ニ於ケル死亡ハ日本人ガ服従セシメラレタカクテ條件ニ倭僑ガ服従セシメラレタトイフ事實人ニ基クモテアルトイウコトニナルコトアリマス。倭僑達ハ虐待、過勞並ニ不満足ヲ醫治スル思慢及飢餓ヲ死セシムルコトアリマシム。

J-36 倭僑辯護側ハビルマタイ國鐵道ニ關スル日本官憲心ノ所爲ハ如何ナシ意味ヲモ之ヲ正当化シテイナイト主張致シマス。

J-37 バタビヤノ死ノ行進。バタビヤノ死ノ行進ヲ輸送モ食糧モ得ラレタカクトイウ理由ヲ不可避ナリトシテ正当化セムトスル不

J-33 (a) 書証 四七三 記録 五四九ニ

(b) 記録 五四三九一四。

J-34 (a) " 五四三九一四。

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0159 0003 0518

Summary Done 丁

33 雨期ハ死亡率ヲ増加セシメタカモ知レテイカ死亡ノ原因トハナラ

ナカラントハ明白デアリマス。凡シ、三、四月ニ於テ日本側數字

ニ依ツテサヘハ一月ノ死亡率ハ既ニ二百名ヲ超エテ居リマシタ

若シ雨季カ其ノ当時 始マツテイタトシタナラバ、F 隊トハF 隊

ヲ四月末ト九月ニ送ツコトヨウニ、其所ニ何故送ツコトデアリマス

J-34 更ニ死亡ハ殆ド全部カ俘虏ニ限ラレテ居リマシタ。七箇月間ニ

F 隊トハF 隊ノ俘虏ノ中四千名ノ死亡ニ比較シテ日本衛兵ノ

中死セハ五名デアツコトヲ買下ハ想ヒ出ステセウ

J-19 然レテカウ、輸送不足ニ関スル主張ヲサヘテ「ガカン」ニ於ケル米
 軍ヲ指令官タル「キチク」(キチク)陸軍中將が作成セル官警
 供述書ノ形式ヲ有スル辯駁ノ餘地ヲ不証據ニヨリテ不視サ
 レマス。同中將ハ左ノ如ク述マテ居リマス。降伏準備ノ爲
 武器トモ裝備ヲ破壊スル際ニ私ノ全軍隊ヲハタシカク輸送
 スルニアル分ヲ輸送用自動車トモソリシヲ留保シテ置イタゲ
 テリマシタ。私ノ降伏後コノ目的ノ爲メ、日本人が要スルガ
 ノ人員ヲ提供スルカラ斷クシテ貫ヒ度イト申入レテ頼ハタシ
 テシ

J-37 (a) 記録 ニ七七六四一五

J-38 (a) 記録 一三五七九一九一 記録 一三七四一三
 一 二六 一〇 一八

Summation J

徹底ヲ企テカナセマシク。

J-30⁰ 假令ソレカ本當デアツトシテモソレハ行進中俘虜ニ課シテ
 取扱ヲ正當ニシテイデアリマス。約六テキ者ノ米人及比島
 人俘虜ガ焼クカ如キ炎天ニ曝サレテカラ百ニテロメーター以上
 ヲ晝夜九日間休ミシノ行進中、彼等俘虜ハ日本衛兵達
 ニ蹴ラレタリ殴打サレタリシタデアリマス。彼等俘虜達、唯
 一飲料水ハ水牛田ノ水溜ノ水デアリマシク。又唯一人食物ハ比
 島人カラ投ケテヘラレタモノデアリマシク。病氣ヤ疲カニ為メ
 行進行列カラ落伍シタ者ハ射撃サレタリ銃剣ヲ刺サレタリシ
 マシク。

名……日本軍、彼等之部隊又、目的、侵略之特長、以、然、
 以、就、于、何、關係、不、其、果、因、各、款、證據、之、感、
 出來、上、下、之、昔、年、外、中、之、軍、將、之、宣、告、與、軍、事、之、御、狀、
 納、三、辯、護、側、之、依、圖、證據、之、部、下、之、上、之、士、兵、之、完全、
 平、日、人、如何、之、場合、三、於、上、之、八、前、述、之、行、動、之、通、言、日、本、
 人、採、之、變、行、之、行、止、當、性、之、否、之、平、日、人、也、

J-39 私人最終論者、其、論、會、進、之、戰、之、證據、之、
 在、應、之、戰爭、犯罪、之、論、會、三、政府、之、飲、之、方、行、其、
 項、上、之、犯、行、也、又、他、場合、一、政府、之、漸、之、然、也、其、戰、犯、
 其、上、之、不、自、二、就、之、其、間、心、之、上、之、不、自、之、罪、之、也、
 普、通、之、不、自、也、

J-38 右、目的、之、爲、本、問題、之、在、各、項、之、自、之、不、自、之、
 不、自、也、

山 一九二九年、之、不、自、之、得、海、條、約、非、批准、之、理由、
 (ii) 條、約、之、適用、之、自、日本、政府、之、依、上、之、之、保證、
 (iii) 日本、國民、之、行、之、戰爭、犯罪、行、爲、之、自、日本、政府、之、保證、
 知、上、之、事、也、

J-39 (2) 書、指、一、回、只、記、錄、三、五、六、五

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不知其詳也、既此等理由ヲ包含スル文書ヲ提出シテイル、
 テアリマス。辯護側ハ此等、又キチ政府、右條約非批
 註ノ理由、テ採用シテモト認定カレルテアリマス。此等ハ
 左ノ如ク、意譯スニトカ出来ル、テアリマス。即チ、日本人
 ハ誰モ信憑力成ラナイカラ責任ハ一方的テアルコト、曰監視人
 無シニ才三個人信憑力合見セシムルカ八十項、軍事保
 証ニテ、附テアルコト、以條約批准ハ航空作戦ニ從事スル敵
 機偵察員カ信憑力トシテ、長キ取扱ヲ受ルニシテ、知ラテ其ノ

州の事記二四三、三〇五、二七一七八一頁

Summation J

條約草案ヲ許可スル爲メ一九四一年十二月七日以降ニ於テ
日本法律ヲ修正

(1) 日本國內及日本ニ領地区内ニ於テ行ハレタ戰爭犯罪特
式ノ類似

J-41 一九二九年「セネガ」條約條約非批准理由。兵護例

我々論者ノ出發点ヲ「セネガ」レマシ、日本ハ一九二九年

セネガニ條約ニ調印シ、一九三四年ニ天皇カ右

條約ヲ批准スベキカドカノ問題カ起リマシ、陸軍ト海軍

ト、此批准ニ反対ノ款願ヲ出シ、又海軍ハ其款願

ノ理由ヲ添附シ、ニールニテリマシ

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Summation J

任滿進行日帝領土收二書院
 航空機作戰範圍ヲ二倍スル
 如中哥羅夫刑室刑科ハ二
 ヲ從軍ノ國地位ニ置ル爲メ陸
 軍部主ク其ノ條定ハ憲法ニ
 義條ハ一方の二下ノ二
 八ノ條約ニ同格ニ適用スル
 意圖ヲ裁キ究明ス場合ニ
 本八ノ條約ニ記シ本年ニ海軍
 即チハ二海軍ニ爲テ保衛國
 次ノ條約ニ於テ又二條約ニ
 會議スルニ出テハ二六
 國ハ二一般原則ノ外ニ作
 バリタリノ二海軍協定ニ
 ヲ發言スルノ二張美之危險
 從テ二理由モ亦顯現ノ得
 我ニ管屬ニ關スル最終論者
 我ニ管屬ニ關スル最終論者

J42 (a) 普通法三〇三 二七二頁

任滿進行後日本領土由三看隨之下か出泰比力三下敵
 航空機作戦範圍ヲ倍下ルニシテ、三空軍ヲ三自空軍
 如中可酷九刑罰ヲ科スルニ出泰比力從リ日本軍人
 ヲ懲罰ス同地位ニ置リ爲日本陸海軍、懲罰令修正
 空軍之ヲ禁シ修正空軍紀、見地力、故也此也。

J43 義務一方の、三下之ウナ、異議ハ日本カ既ニ批准シテ
 八カ條約ニモ同好ニ適用セラルリ。ソレ故政府
 一意向ヲ表シカ察明又ニ場合ニ照視得ルモノナリ。

才八カ條記テ、才中ニ義務ノ限定セラルリ。一
 即チ、三空軍ノ義務ニ論及シ保護國代表者、就テ規定
 次、三空軍ノ層ナリ。又「彼等ハ一般ニ三空軍ノ義務大
 會議ニ出席スル也。ハ六即チ三空軍ヲ收容スル空戰
 國ハ、三空軍ノ原則、例外ヲ作ルコトカ出来ルコトカ、意味ヲ付
 ハリ。一、三空軍ノ命令ニ從テ義務カ安全ニ對シテ有害ナク
 才空言セテ、才環境ノ危險ハ全然有リ得ナシ、才下ナリ。
 從テ、三空軍モ亦出現、得ルモノナリ。

J44 二空軍ニ關スル最終論者、其の段階ニ於テニヨリ
 我ハ、三空軍ノ主義ノ度ナク思ヒタ。即チ三空軍問題也
 J42 (a) 書記三四三、二七二頁

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Summary J.

J-46 ソレ故、日本政府は避けて欲さず、この事、制限する。日本政府は懲罰の口実を得るを得る権利を保持す。イ息ニカクニ飛行士が同國を侵入スルに阻害スル故ニ行ハリス。信譽を得ず、政府は此等ノ事ヲ行ハリス。

J-47 日本政府は一九二九年、巴黎で「信譽條約」を締結シ、日本政府、保障及集積ニ至ルニ意味、意味。

日本ノ戦争、勃發後、問ニテ、米國及友國政府ハ日本政府ニ對シテ保護國ノ違フ一九二九年、巴黎條約ヲ遵守スルニテ提議スル通告ニ、且日本政府モ同條約ニ遵守スルヲ承認スルヲ保障スルヲ求メ、下後、英、領、又、食糧及衣服ノ國產、國民的及人權的習慣ヲ守ルニテ、聲明書ニ、後、同條約ヲ遵守スルヲ求メ、各ガ子ガ各異國ニテ、爲ル。

P. 6

J-48 日本外務省ハ陸軍省意見ヲ求メ、陸軍省ニ對シテ會議開キ、後、陸軍省意見ハ、我々ハ、信譽條約ニ從フ行動ニ事ニ要識、無キ、我々ハ、食糧及衣服等

- J-49 (a) 書是 一四六八 一三六七頁
- " 一四九四 一三八九頁
- (b) " 一四九五 一三八〇頁
- (c) " 一四九三 一三八九頁

十八條世界通告之三三在東京、十四條之答、
 十八條、一九四二年一月二十九日、青柳、外務大臣、于各利益保
 護國對日本、一九二九年、德意兩國、也亦、條約、
 拘束、受此化、五、六、七、八、九、十、日本、之管理、之公平、比、得、國、對、心
 之、七、條約、規定、標準、用、不、之、通告、之、七、條約、
 日本、之、利益、保護、諸、國、對、之、互、惠、主義、之、條件、に、て、
 食物、及、衣服、之、得、之、臺灣、國民、の、又、民族、の、慣習、を、考慮、
 又、七、條、中、通告、之、二、が、然、

一九五九	書誌	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八
一九五九	一九五八	一九五八

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 0159 0003 6510

Summation J.

J-57 一九三三年三月三日 日本外務省の利益保護機關ニ對シ一九三三年ノ停廢ニ関スル「モノ」條約ノ規定ヲ適用可能ナルコトヲ示シ、又此ノ條約國民同柳留者ノ自己承諾ナシニ作奉ル限制カトスルコト同規定ヲ柳留者ニ適用スルト通告シタリ。(a)

J-58 右條約ノ適用スルコトハ日本意思ノ最初ノ保障ニ依リ、年元カニ發見シタルモノ。彼ハノ、証言中ニ次ノ如ク述ベタル「一、我々ノ事情ヲ許シ範圍外ニ至ル條約ノ適用スル事ニ反對スルモノトシタルモノハ、今カモ之ニ思ハス居リ云」(b) 洋用ノ「意」ナリト降カシ、右條約ノ適用カトシ、其ノ意ヲ示スルモノ、其ノ當否相像ナリ。故ニ又之ノ意、強制ニ違フコトヲ示シ、右條約ノ適用ニ關シ、其ノ意ヲ必齟ニ此語ノ前ニ記シ置カスルモノトシタリ。(a)

J-59 一九三三年三月十日迄條約尚ニ新條トシ、其ノ停廢後一ノ「モノ」條約ノ規定ノ事情ヲ許シ、限リ即チ之ニ適用カトシ、其ノ意ヲ示シ、其ノ當否相像ナリ。故ニ又之ノ意、強制ニ違フコトヲ示シ、右條約ノ適用ニ關シ、其ノ意ヲ必齟ニ此語ノ前ニ記シ置カスルモノトシタリ。(a)

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- J-51 同書記 一五九一 一三七八頁
- J-52 (a) 同書記 一五九二 一三七八頁
- J-53 (a) 同書記 一五九三 一三七八頁

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Summation J

一、要領ハ日本が一九二九年、行務局ニ関スル「セネガール條約」通過
 而シ、且ノ規定ヲ保留者ニシテ拡張スルコトヲノ約書ニ未
 換何レ得ハズハナラト爲クニシタリ。日本亦ハ今海
 伏スルコトヲ甘ク爲クヲ誓ハシ居ルニ因リ、大抵、日本
 應ズル列強ヲ得ル機會ニ對シ、且ノ與權ヲ得ルコトヲ
 以テ、其ノ條約ニ見ユルコトヲ以テ、其ノ外務省ハ、且ノ
 事ニ對シ、其ノ條約ニハ、素直ニ「職務」部ヲ以テ、其
 同様ニ、針ハ陸軍省報道部長ガ、且ノ部派ニ依リテ、
 令ヲ發シテ、其ノ現ハシメ、又、行務局ガ、報部ヲ以テ、其
 衣服ニ着テ、且ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其
 與スル報道ハ、且ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其
 由ハ「我ガ公正ナル態度」展ク、且ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其
 好會ヲ與シ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其
 イク「御」ヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其
 ナル報酬ヲ得テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其
 ヲ遵守スルコトヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其
 「ノ」規定ヲ適用シ、且ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其ノ「御」ヲ以テ、其
 下居リニシタリ。

J-54 (A) 書証 三〇三。 二七三三頁
 (B) " 九七七 一四五三九

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Summary I

J-55 一九三三年十月五日 米國特種... 如何... 恢復... 聯合...

J-56 一九三三年一月... 米國... 恢復... 聯合... 條約... 恢復... 聯合...

J-57 一九三三年三月... 米國... 恢復... 聯合... 條約... 恢復... 聯合...

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- J-55 (a) 書誌 二〇三五 (一) 一四八三三頁
- J-56 (a) " 二〇三五 (二) 一四八三三
- J-57 (a) " 二〇三五 (三) 記錄 一四八三四

ノ理由ニ基キテ方針アリアルトイハナリマス。(4) スイス公使
ハ之ニ先立テ一九一九年ノ條約ヲ適用スルトノ確約ヲ
日本側ニ要求シ且之ヲ得テ事ハ明瞭アリマス。ソ
ハ唯今述ベタル旨簡ク受領ヲ承認セル位彼ハ次ノ如ク
談テテ述ベテキルデアリマス。即チ「本公使館ハ帝國政
府ハ「ゼネバ」條約ノ拘束ヲ受テスト」通告ハ日本ガソノ
權カノ序序ニ對シ必要ナル変更ヲ加ヘテ換言スレバ國
内法ニ抵觸セザル範圍内ニ於テ右條約ノ規定ヲ適
用スル事ヲ約シテ前同ノ聲明ト一致スル如ク見テ事
ヲ述ベシヨ。ゼネバ條約適用トシテ各種ノ誤解ヲ避ケル
爲メ我ガ聯邦政府ハ二月十六日附スイス公使ヨリ「皇光蔡
閣下ニ定メテ言フ向テ以テ日本政府ガ國內法上適用シ難
シト思フ序序條約ノ條項ニ関スル細目全部ヲ出マシ
ルガ事ク入テ手シ度ク希望ヲ表明シテ」(5) 皇光ヲ通シテ
日本ガ該條約ノ適用ニ付キテ不與エラレテ意味カラ
離レテ「トハ」明瞭アリマス。ソレハ最早「重大ナル支障
ガ生ケル本條約ガ適用サレシ」(6) 事ヲ意味ヤス今
ヤソレハ日本國内法ニ抵觸ヤ又限リ適用サレル事ヲ意
味シテ居リマス。「右條約ノ事亦ガ國內法ト抵觸スル
際ハ前番ガ優先スルトノ事尙ハ見解ハ地味サレシ」(7)

J57 言証ニ〇五(六) 記録一四八三四

(c) 〇二〇二五(七) 〇一四八三四

(d) 記録 三三五六九一七。

(e) 〇 三三五六九一七。

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Sumitani T.

J-58 此時期、日本側、右條約、適用了受、一層變
 更之此事、決定之云々、大正四年五月、日本外
 務省、米國兵船、衝突、因之、提議、抗
 議、對之、余程以前、同意、受、云々、此、回答、
 於、同省、米國兵船、衝突、廿、大正四年、信屬、
 因、之、條約、適用、云々、日本政府、正記、
 意思、右條約、現是、本邦現行法規、發生、
 之、良狀、要求、一致、之、在、受、之、變更、
 加之、適用、之、此事、之、意味、云々、(a)
 從、之、受、之、條約、之、適用、之、此事、之、意味、
 受、一層、制、之、加、之、之、事、判、之、之、今、
 之、日本、側、之、右條約、之、日本、側、之、適當、之、思、
 之、是、適用、之、思、程、受、之、適用、之、此事、之、意味、
 一致、云々。

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J-57 此、是、關、之、各、在、政府、方針、之、明、言、欲、明、之、之、
 右、條約、之、適用、之、此事、之、意、思、
 如、之、郵、船、之、衝突、之、保證、之、此事、之、日本、同、政府、
 都、會、受、之、時、之、條約、之、適用、之、差、控、之、此事、
 了、之、之、條約、之、不、適用、之、條、子、得、之、利益、之、論、

J-58 (a) 書記 二〇三四 記錄 一四三二

J-60

戦争犯罪が既に犯され且犯サレテ
事ヲ日本政府ヲ熟知スルモノト

一 国政府下ニテ国民ガ戦争犯罪ヲ犯シ且犯シテ事
ヲ政府ガ知ツニキル事実及斯ル犯罪ノ繼續ノ防止
ベキ實際ノ手段ヲ講ジテ之ヲ實現スルニ新シ犯罪ガ
ノ政府ノ政策ノ一部トシテ犯サレ且犯サレテ且蓋シ
ハ又犯罪ヲ犯サシキルモノニ就テ政府ガ合意無間ニ
下ル事実、全ク有力ノ證據アリテ

最終論旨、一部今日則チ左ノ事項ヲ示スルモノトス
ル

(1) 日本政府ノ南京強姦事件ヲ承知シ居タリテ、
ソノ責任ニ於テ日本政府、日本軍隊ヲ中國ニ於ケル戦

闘及太平洋戦争ヲ通シテ戦争犯罪ヲ犯シテ未ダ
ザルヤウニ警告セズキ理由ヲ持ツキマデテ

(2) 日本政府ノ太平洋戦争勃発以前他ノ戦争犯罪
罪ヲ犯サシムト承知シ居タリテ、

(3) 日本政府ノ太平洋戦争ヲ始メ何レノ方面ニ於テ
戦争犯罪ヲ犯サシムト承知シ居タリテ、

南京強姦事件

2750 0000 6510

J-62

辯護側ハ南京ニ於テ殘虐行為ガ行ハレシ事ヲ宣ハラセシメ
 ハニテ居リマセシガ、若テハ殘虐行為ハ速即中ノ中國軍ニ
 依ツテ行ハレタト暗ホシテ居リマス。(4)
 辯護側ハ戰爭犯罪
 ヲ犯シテ者ハ章法會議ヲ經テ即
 四罰サルト述ベテ居リマス。(4)

J61 (a) 記録 三三三、三五九、二六八、三九四
 (b) 〃 三五六

J62 (a) 書証 三三八 記録 二一四七四

(c) 書証 三三八、記録 四五六九

(b) 〃 三四九、三三八ニ
 二五七、三四六四

(cc) 〃 三三四、四五三七

〃 〃 三三七、四五四二

(2) 〃 三三四、四五三七、九

(1) 〃 三三九、四五六九

0 158 0003 0533

Summation J.

J. 6.

一九三七年十二月十三日、南京が陥落シタ時、同市内ニ在ル中国軍隊ノ凡テノ抵抗ハ停止シタ。(a) 同市ニ入城

シタ日本兵ハ街路ニ居タ民間人達ヲ無差別ニ射

撃シタシヨ。(b) 一度日本軍ハ同市ニ完全ニ支配スルヤ強

兵ノ殺戮ノ拷問及掠奪ハ、耽溺ガ始マシソレガ六週間續

キマシ。最初ノ二三日間ニ二萬以上ノ人々ガ日本軍ニ依リ即

座ニ死刑ニ処セラレマシ。(c) 六週間ニ南京市内トソノ周

リテ殺害カレタ概數ハ二十六万乃至三十一万ヲ全部ガ裁判

ナシ残虐ニ殺害サレタデアリ。(d) ヲ概數ノ正確性ハ紅

卍字會ト崇善堂ノ記録ガフニツノ團體ヲ十五萬五千人以

上ノ死体ヲ埋葬サシヨトヲ示シテ耳ル事、實ニ依ツテ示サレテ居リ

マシ。(e) 六週間ノ同期間ニ於テ二萬名ヲ下ラレル婦人ト少女ハ

日本軍ニ強クセサレタデアリ。(f)

Summation J

1-64

席ニ居テテリシ。(a)

南京虐殺事件以日本太平洋戦争以前残虐
行爲が孰れ知サレテナリト

一九三八年十月ニ日本軍隊、漢口ニ入城シテ、入城翌朝
捕虜ニナツタ中国兵、楊子江ニ蹴込メテ、投込メ、射撃
サレタ。漢口、街路ニ針金後手ニ縛ラレタ六三名、中
国人ノ死体が見ラレタ。彼等ノ總テ射撃ニ依テ殺害
サレタ。(a) 辯護側、漢口ニ殘虐行爲が行ハレタ事ヲ主張シ
テ居ラス。(b) 辯護側、證據、中テ「三六」ニ記シテ、(c) 日本軍
ガ十月二十日ニ金匱ニ入城シ、彼ノ自撃ヲ著シタ事ニ依テ
証言サレタ事件、一日後、二十九日迄、其処到着シ
テカッタ。今ヲ無視サル得ルテ下リセタ「三六」ニ関シ
ハ、彼漢口ノ勝利、入城、完全ニ平和及秩序、
下テ行ハシメテ之ヨリ彼等ノテ、今市中ニ入城シテ
軍隊ノ暴行又、如何ナル他、疑ハシキ行爲ヲモ見
得ナカッタ。信ヲト學ニテ居ラス。(d) 之勿論、特翌日
起ツタ事柄、関シ何物ヲモ証明シテ下リタ。我々、主張
ニ依ルヨリ、證據、同標ニ無價値ナリス。其ハ
新標ナリシ不嚴格ヲ「日記」ガ保持ナル標ニ命令ガ部隊

P. 36

- J-63 (b) 書記 三三四ニ 記録 三五二五
- " " 三七三 " 三七八五 記録 三二四六六
- J-64 (a) 記録 三三九二一六
- " " 三五五、三五八、九五、三五九五、一六
- " " 二五九五、一六
- " " 三三九二一六
- " " 二五八四

0159 0003 0536

水一論理 一

一、論理之基礎
 二、論理之發展
 三、論理之應用
 四、論理之批判
 五、論理之未來
 六、論理之地位
 七、論理之方法
 八、論理之價值
 九、論理之限制
 十、論理之意義

Vertical text on the right margin, likely a page number or reference.

Summation J

J-66

爲「殺害」(a) 指令「命令」等事態「就」註「ト」
行「爲」等事「ト」注「意」等「ト」(b) 等事「ト」注「意」
事態「悉」等「防」止「ル」命「令」等「ト」也。

日本政府通告「夕」殘虐行爲、其「以」之、記「據」、南
支派遣「軍」參謀「長」木村陸軍次官「死」一「九」四「三」年「十」月
十「四」附「報」告「書」首、中「令」之「居」之、其「三」海「南」島、不
宜「之」(c) 市「村」之「討」伐「隊」從「軍」之「自」本「海」軍「部」
隊「之」隊「之」名「佛」蘭「西」人「宣」教「師」及「二」四「名」之「民」、殺「害」之
報「告」之「居」之、(d) 文「書」、陸「軍」省、色「之」、課「之」差「同」等「之」
而「之」等「之」外「務」省「送」之「之」也。

恐「之」等「之」(其「之」海「軍」之「國」等「之」居「之」等「之」其「之」
流「之」等「之」一「余」、新「進」之「之」等「之」知「之」等「之」
其「之」等「之」用「其」之「自」本「政」府「之」不「平」打「擊」等「之」野「蠻」犯
罪「之」等「之」對「之」警「戒」之「之」等「之」等「之」追「加」理「由」之
與「之」等「之」也。

P 30

J-66 (a) 警務三三〇四 記録三〇一七

J-66 (c) 三三六六 三七八五

Summation J

ヨリ橋發せし事、實ニ對ニ日本政府一與一該抗

爭犯罪ノ行爲無頓首、著手シクシク示スモノトシテ、該抗

罪カ定メ政府ノ政案一部ヲ有サシクコトナシ、且日本政府

保護國ヨリサシク日本外務省ニ對シテ抗議及ビ獄中

ニ入キ日本側公及事

(III) 戰爭犯罪證據乃至戰爭犯罪ヲ指メ

記錄

(II) 太平洋戰爭中美國大國及英國大國爲首

(I) 交戰國爲保護國ヨリ提テ起シテ該

此箇主要トシテ又其次ノ如クテ

見ヨリ戰爭犯罪カ犯罪サレタリトシテ知リテ

檢察側於テ日本政府カ太平洋戰爭中

J-61

太平洋戰爭中ニ於ケル戰爭犯罪ノ

0159 0003 0538

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一層重要なる抗議詳細附屬日本書院蔵
約廿冊に居り又本論に在りてハ抗議の概要
犯罪證據、証據、概要、相関聯に居り又
コミンテルンに在りてハ抗議の概要に在り

J-68

J-69 日本降伏時於此に日本側又書院蔵
跡外務省より送付兄日本側諸君に在りてハ
諸君各抗議

J-69 (a) 日本書院蔵 0003 0159

右述バ夕筋ヨリ情報ヲ入リテ之ヲ一軍務局軍務課ニ於テ
回答ガ作成セラレ外務省ニ送還セルコトナリ

証據中ノ種々、又昔カラシメト、保護國カラ未タ抗議ナク化ノ

文書ハ陸軍省内デ相当底ク回覧スル慣行ガ多ク、又之ヲ思ハシメ
加テ外務省ハ屢々抗議、複々テ陸軍省へ送リ、夫レハ併存ガ

情報局へモ送ルガアリマシタ

下10 (a) 記録 一三八三三

(b) 一五五二六一二八

書誌 三三三三、二二七四、記録 一三三三三

(c) 記録 二四二八八、書誌 一九八〇D、記録 一四五六〇

(d) 書誌 四七三三、記録 三四九二

一五八〇C、一四五六一

下11 (a) 記録 一四三八七八

下12 (a) 記録 一三六一九

書誌 三三三三、記録 三四九二

一三三三三、二二七四、記録 一三三三三

二二七四、二二七四、記録 一三三三三

二二七四、二二七四、記録 一三三三三

二二七四、二二七四、記録 一三三三三

Summation I

ト出ツテ行ハシトハテ可能ナリトス。然シテモ其ノ事ハ
ニ依ツテ、抗議カ外務省ニ入キテシテ後、取扱ハレヨク
觀ヲ知ルコトガ出来マス。

テ抗議、大部分ハ陸軍ヲ收容セラレタ。停務ニ関シテモ之等ノ
寫メ辭訟ヲ附シテ、陸軍省ノ主題ニ關係ル統テ、課ニ送付ス。
町六、抗議、性質ニヨリテハ、他、各々即チ海軍省、内務省、司
法省等ノ如キニ送付サレシタ。陸軍省ニ於テハ、交領シテ抗
議ハ何モ、大臣、次官及ビ局長同ノ通函ニ會議ヲ附議スル事
此ノ後ハ抗議ハ停務情報局長ヨリテ、抗議ノ原因起リ地ニ
軍司令官及ビ該地ニ停務收容所ニ送付サレシタ。

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絶緯ニ機構ノ問題トシテ考ヘズ、此ノ組織ニ關シ何事モ
 阻ミ此ニ附クニ分岐ナシキニテ、ニカニ日本政府ノ
 國際法上ノ義務ニ對シテ外來的言辯ヲ爲スルハ何等
 モ無キ。然レ、日本軍隊が通常振舞ヒテ野蠻ナ
 方ニ日本政府が通常言ヲ承知スルニテ、又三州發展
 小ナリテ、ソノ證據ニ行テ既ニ當最終辯官中ニ於
 言及テ手居リテ、檢察側ハ戰爭犯罪ガシテ、
 且犯罪ガシテ、抗義、性質真ノ自他及共ノ等
 添附ガシテ重行テ證據、並ニ證據中ニ限リ、現
 地指揮官ヨリ、將傷事情報局宛、回答ラ、陸軍
 省及台外務省ニテテ完全ニ明示テテ主張スル
 事ナシ。然レモソノ停止ニ爲、有効モ何等ノ措置ヲ取
 リカカズテテ、ソノ故、犯罪、政府、政策、三事項
 トテテ或ハ日本政府、無關ハテ三事項トテテ繼續
 事ヲ許容セラカシテテ主張スルモノナリ。

(a) ランゲーン

一九四二年七月八日、又ハ又國公使、當時外務大臣 兒島

Summation J

郷ニ對シテラダグーニ於テ英國軍隊、取扱ニ関スル
 抗議ヲ送達シタルハ抗議中ニ舎シテ事案、眞實
 性ヲ証スル最モ有力ト且議論餘地ヲ證據ニ添附
 シテリタルハ一九四二年六月二十三日ニ「サンフランシスコ」
 工下、工下等々「ラダグー」之市街ヲ清掃シテ「高」
 好奇、自前「ラダグー」之市街ヲ清掃シテ「高」
 眞實掲載シタル抗議一緒ニ送達シタルハ此高長、初級
 事ナリタルハ何等回答ヲ受理シテ「ラダグー」ニ送達
 一九四二年八月二日ニ「ラダグー」之市街ヲ清掃シタルハ
 答ハ全然「ラダグー」ニ送達シタルハ「ラダグー」ニ送達

此例ハ「ラダグー」ニ於テ非常ニ重要ナル事ナリタルハ、
 重要性ハ、後、異議、特ニ該地ニ於テ状況ニ関スル異
 議ニ對シテ日本政府、態度中「ラダグー」ニ送達シタルハ、日本政府ハ
 地、停務ハ一九二九年、停務條約ニ從テ「ラダグー」ニ送達
 「ラダグー」ニ送達シタルハ「ラダグー」ニ送達シタルハ、
 容所ニ於テ停務、在停務全創ニ因テ一九四二年九月
 十五日「ラダグー」ニ送達シタルハ「ラダグー」ニ送達シタルハ
 「ラダグー」ニ送達シタルハ「ラダグー」ニ送達シタルハ

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- J-115 (a) 書証 = 〇 = (一) 記録 四二五
- (b) " = 〇 = (二) " 四七五
- J-115 (a) " = 〇 = (三) " 四七五
- (b) " = 〇 = (四) " 四七五
- (c) " = 〇 = (五) " 四七五

Summation J

J-116 其後元四年二月十二日現起シテ同監獄ニ於テ英國ノ
 抗議一英人及印度人將校ヲ其地ニ改打スル氣ヲ取リ且
 既ニ千名リテ千名、俘虜カ一般ノ虐待及テ食物、水、
 ビニ医療品、缺乏、為死シタリ、何等ノ回答ヲ得ニシ
 テ然ル尚後三一九四年十一月十八日、及至國公使ハ
 方ニ中央監獄ニ於テ七百名、英、米、印度人俘虜、
 虐待ニ抗議シタリ、何等ノ回答ガリテモナシ。

J-111 異議、述ラリテ同ニ狀況ガ正ニ日本、最後、敗北、時ニ存
 在シタリ示入証據、該廷ニ提出シテ、
 此等抗議、有カタ時日本軍、ノ、國、平穩ニ且排戦、
 ニキリ、命令、三井、カカ、陸軍省、実情ヲ確カシ、
 出ス、
 あり、
 提言、
 無益、
 あり、

J-118 英人俘虜ヲ言フシ、
 市街ヲ掃テ、
 北日、
 最後、
 政策、
 全ク明白ナリ、
 此ニ於テ、
 英人、
 威信ヲ失墜セシ、
 カリ、
 此ノ人、
 日本、
 侵、
 軍、
 協力ヲ増進セシ、
 試、
 此等、
 抗議、
 中、
 主張、
 其、
 他、
 戦、
 争、
 犯罪、
 北、
 日、
 後、
 三、
 此、
 政策、
 捕、
 獲、
 者、
 迷、
 途、
 中、
 北、
 日、
 三、
 創、

J-119 英人俘虜ヲ言フシ、
 市街ヲ掃テ、
 北日、
 最後、
 政策、
 全ク明白ナリ、
 此ニ於テ、
 英人、
 威信ヲ失墜セシ、
 カリ、
 此ノ人、
 日本、
 侵、
 軍、
 協力ヲ増進セシ、
 試、
 此等、
 抗議、
 中、
 主張、
 其、
 他、
 戦、
 争、
 犯罪、
 北、
 日、
 後、
 三、
 此、
 政策、
 捕、
 獲、
 者、
 迷、
 途、
 中、
 北、
 日、
 三、
 創、

- J-116 (a) 書記ニ二三(内) 記録一四七六。
- (b) " 二〇三三(回) " 一四七三
- J-117 (a) " 一五五五 " 一九九一
- " 一五八三 " 三三〇一
- " 三〇六七 " 二七五七、九

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Summation J.

敵ト虐待トシ俘虜ノ死傷ヲ推イテ下ルニシテ六、左程昭
白テ下リモ、テ下ル日本政府ハ、捕虜ノ運命ニ對シ全然
無関心ナリト云フ見解ヲ採リテ得テ下リシニス。

(五) 泰國

J-80 一九四三年七月五日英國俘虜、待遇ニ関スル最初ノ抗
議ヲ被告人重光ニ對シ提起セシメ、俘虜達ガ飢餓及
ビ医療品、靴、衣類、欠乏ニテ下ルニシテ然レ此ニモ拘
ニテ彼等ガ過重ノ鐵道建設作業ヲ遂行スルニ強制セ
ル事ヲタテ、並ニ假令ニ課セシメテ酷ク取扱ガ多ク、看
望ノ病氣カニテ未タニ、英議ガ申入ラレシ也。

J-81 異例ノ迅速ニテ七月十四日ニ重光ハ、俘虜ノ公正ノ取扱ハ
ル旨見テ病人ノ適當ノ医療ヲ當テ受テ未タ日回答セ
シ也。

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J-82 八月三十日、根元強ハ瑞西國公使ニ重光ニ更ニ抗議ヲ送達セ
テ、即チ「不規則ノ食糧ヲ殆ド何等ノ衣類モリ長時間
交代ニ背負、折ルニシテ作業ヲ以テ年々捕虜達ノ死、

- J-80 (a) 書記 二〇三二 記録 一四七九
- J-81 (a) " 二〇三三 " 一四七九
- " 二〇二七 " 一四七四

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Summation J.

ヨリ死ニ下リ之ヲ既ニ三千餘ガヨリ、捕殺等、他、捕殺等
死ニシテカ。ビニナリ、駐在瑞西國領事ヲ各牧養所ニ捕殺
スル許可ガ要請セシメタ。

J-83 此、抗議ヲシテ一九三三年十月一日ニ靈光ガ出スルニハ、帝

國政府ハ泰國內ニ駐屯セシ日本兵ニテ上同等、捕殺
捕虜三兵ニヨリ簡潔ニ回答セシメタ。

J-84 捕虜泰緬鐵道建設ニ助力セシ目録ヲ泰國ニ送ルニシテ、

捕虜運分此鐵道ニ作業スルニ死ニシテ捕虜ノ一トシテ
丁一件、負ニ送ルニシテナシタ。

J-85 我々、現在、目的ハ此等抗議、當時ニ於テ日本側當局、

知悉、程度ヲ究明セシトナリタ。安田ガ、作樂ヲ開始
シテ前、一九四二年ニ南洋軍司令部ニ對テ、捕虜ガ病氣

罹ル非常ニ危險ガリ且一九四二年末ヨリ死ニシテ高ナリ
旨建言シタニ既ニ示カシテ居リタ。五割方過少ニ見續ク

ルニシテ、ソノハ「ガ言明」日本側數字ニ、報告ガシ
死ニシテ、一九四二年十月一日、五十四カラ一九四三年八月、八百ニ

達スル、死ニシテ合計、二千九百九十九ニシテ、此ハ泰國ニ

J-82 (a) 書誌 二二三(三) 記録 四七九ニ

J-83 (a) 「 二二三(四) 」 四三九三

J-85 (a) 記録 二七四六

(b) 「 五四三四一四一

Summary J

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下りの三(ウ)

J-86

東京、参謀本部、運輸交通部ニ配属シ、東京
 一九四三年七月、奉命、船大坂、此の及、本國、視察
 之。此、視察、東京、於、受、夕、鐵道、作業、並、時、行、
 下、鐵道、作業、多、ク、作、爲、体、操、負、務、多、ク、死
 亡、率、高、ト、云、フ、ト、報、告、結、果、為、セ、ク、ナ、リ、タ、。若、不、
 續、イ、タ、假、視、察、中、假、鐵道、作業、中、労働、阻、害、觀、察
 之、多、ク、脚、氣、炎、者、赤、痢、恙、者、假、等、内、ニ、見、テ、食、糧
 之、量、ト、量、命、七、ラ、ク、標、準、ニ、ナ、リ、シ、イ、ニ、分、リ、タ、ト、言、フ、
 所、リ、タ、。假、假、視、察、結、果、東京、参謀、總、長、利、山、口、頭
 下、報、告、之、也、。此、下、假、一九四三年、十月、運輸、交通、部、
 所、屬、ヲ、離、レ、以、前、三、局、ヲ、タ、リ、タ、又、

- J-85 J-85 (c) 書記 四七三 記録 二四九二
- J-86 (a) 記録 一四六三四一五
- (b) " 一四六三三一六

Summaries J

- J-57 後藤の請願局が一任せらるる、情報ハ一九三九年九月三日附泰西の、後藤が泰西長官に電報ニシテ報告下りりニシテ、此ハ泰西の、補員計約三百四十名、内一五五十名が病氣(脚氣)赤痢ニ罹り、多く人達ヲ鐵道ノ常設ニシテイタコトヲ想起シ、トシテリニシテ、日本流、標準ヲ、病氣(脚氣)ト示シ、居リス、故ニ重光ハ一九三九年七月二十日、及二十月一(脚)附、紙、回答ヲ送リ、時ニ彼ニ情報ヲ供スル義務カ下ル東京ノ軍需當局ニ、其等回答カ現在スルノ案上一致シ、イコトヲ知シ、イタコトハ明白トナシ
- J-58 一九三九年二月二十八日瑞西園公使、日本外務省宛ニ書簡ヲ送リ、「此レハ泰国内、後藤、状況ニ遺憾、莫多キ旨、脚氣患者カ特ニ多キ旨、此、病氣(脚氣)ヲ治療スルニ医療品カ皆無トシテ、述ベテ、イタコトヲ、回答ニ付ニシテ、イコトヲ注意書カ、一九三九年四月二十五日、六月十日、夫レ送リ、シテ、由リテ回答ヲ受テ、イタコトハ、一カモアリ、シ、
- J-59 一九三九年六月二十三日赤十字国際委員会委員長ハ外務大臣ニ對シテ病氣、為泰西ニ於テハ後藤ハ後藤ニ因リ、一九三九年三月ニ條約ヲ六十九條並ニ第七十三條ニ從ヒ、中國ニ送還セリ、トシ、其、間、赤十字社ハ日本政府カ輸送ニ支給、手配ヲ
- J-588 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)
- J-589 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)

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為ス、條件ヲ修繕用區燈亮ニ業人ニヨリ提議スルニ如

Summary J

J-90 一九四四年十月十一日此ノ信書、總ノ外務省、鈴木ヨリ陸軍大臣海軍大臣及ビ信務情報部ニ送リ之ヲ三夫鈴木ノ一風重ハ夕符等書ガ出テ居リ之ヲ以テ中ニ復シ「……赤十字國際委員會中本ノ聖傷病信務、送還ニ関スルニ之ガ実施ニ関シ幾多困難アルコト美言ヨリ之ガ考慮ハ困難ナリト認ムルコト以テ之ヲ對シテ其ノ自己回答スル……」ト言フ事アリ又(1) 彼ノカ、此回答ヲ送ル安ニ「イテ宛先、意見ヲ承テナ

J-91 〃ノ結果、信務情報局ハ信務ノ狀況ニ関シ之ガシテ抗議ヲ論駁スル證據ヲ南方軍司令部及ビ自局、同止ニ及ビ泰國内出先カラ求メ之ヲ南方軍及ビ自局信務收容所カラ受テ之ハ信務ノ會弱ノ狀態及ビ之ガ死之數ヲ確認スルニ如

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J-92 此ノ三拘ニ又重病者、本國送還ニ関スル赤十字社、提案ヲ実行ニ移シ措置ハ信務控テシテ力カク行ハリ又赤紅鐵道ノ建設、政府ノ政策、一ノ項ナリト云

- J-89 (a) 書誌 四七三 記録 五四九二
- J-90 (a) " 四七三 " 五四九二
- J-91 (a) " 四七三 " 五四九二

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Summary J

健康ニ急ククニ地域ニ於テ作職ニ就キ政府中ニ以テ
 戰略的鐵道ヲ建設スルヲ以テ、經濟發達ヲ、英國ノ戰
 力ヲ下シ、戰爭ヲ、難キナクシ、及ビ、英領全島ニ對シテ
 府ニ知ルニ及ビ、公正ナル力ニ以テ、英領全島ニ對シテ
 保持進出ニ繼續的價用ニ使フ、此種價用ニ對シテ、英領全島
 犯罪ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、

了

(c) 二十一年 島

一九四二年四月二十日、英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、
 至ニ此種過激な侵襲「二十一年」島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、
 會ニ關スル報告、請求、日本、英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、
 英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、
 英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、
 總テ、英國ノ、英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、

J-94 一九四二年四月二十日、英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、
 「二十一年」海軍、英領全島ニ對シテ、英領全島ニ對シテ、
 J-93 同書、二〇三頁、記錄一四九三

二〇三九三、一四九三、一四九三

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5-24 (a) 中道 110 次 (I) 記録 156 次
5-24 (a) 中道 110 次 (II) 記録 156 次

Summary of

5-24 (a) 中道 110 次 (I) 記録 156 次
5-24 (a) 中道 110 次 (II) 記録 156 次
5-24 (a) 中道 110 次 (I) 記録 156 次
5-24 (a) 中道 110 次 (II) 記録 156 次

0159 0003 0551

Summation J.

J-98 東京地区俘虜收容所に離したる女俘虜の栄養不良
 爲メ次に三死之千人のトテ陸軍省、此、豫確ニ知テ
 人々ヲアリス。一九四三年二月陸軍軍醫西園寺が
 收容中、俘虜、健康状態ヲ調査ヲ始メ、テ適量
 且、充命+栄養下ル食料、供給欲シ、爲メ俘虜ハ
 栄養不良状態ヲアリスト其、報告書ニ依リテ示セ
 タリテ、(a) 下調査ハ一九四三年五月迄ニ完成
 シテ、ハ俘虜情報局発行自報ニ発表セテ専門
 的報告ニ依テ確証カキ居リス。(b)

J-99 日本政府、一定ノ政策ヲ茲ニ提示スルコトニ困難
 アルガ政府採リテ態度ハ俘虜、恩命ニ対スル無関
 心カラ至リト思ハリス。

(c) 和蘭病院船「オプ・テ・ノール」号 (OPTENNOORT)

F.52

J-100 一九四三年三月百和蘭病院船「オプ・テ・ノール」号
 (OPTENNOORT) ハ「バール」号 (Bamear) 嶋沖ニ沈

没ニシテ和蘭巡洋艦ニ隻カ、生存者ヲ探シテ
 日本軍ニ捕獲セシニ日本へ送リ、其処テ其ノ

J-98 問 (a) 記録ニ七六・九一九書誌三二二 記録ニ六一
 (b) 書誌三二一。 記録ニ七六・九

乗組員、折留せしむ。同病院船へ日本人ヨリ
 彼等自身、目的、爲し使用せし其、後沈没せし。

J-101
 瑞典國、和蘭國、爲、利益保
 護國として被給人東郷、抗議を送りし。又、
 一九四三年六月九日日本、外務省が其、汽船が軍事
 目的、使用せしと、之に、故其ヲ捕獲せし、ハ妥當
 にて、ト云ツテ答へし。

J-102
 該船、捕獲せし時、軍事目的、使用せしと、トス
 日本側、主張ヲ拒絶し、之に抗議ガ、一九四三年九月
 十八日瑞典國ヨリ日本、十二月二十二日日本、海軍大臣ニ宛
 船長、一九四三年三月三日自日本、總理大臣ニ宛テ抗議

議ヲ致し。一九四四年二月二十三日自日本、總理大臣ニ宛テ抗議
 日本政府ハ本船、會々捕ヲ承認スル、別ニ本船カ
 軍用ニ供セリ、ナリ、又、之ニハ、何人モ、當然、定期ニ

J-103
 此ヨリニ海軍當局ニ要求スル、本船
 船長、一九四三年三月三日自日本、總理大臣ニ宛テ抗議
 船長、一九四三年三月三日自日本、總理大臣ニ宛テ抗議

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Summation J.

トアリマス。尚、何人モ日本政府ヲ採ツテ、針
ヲ正當化スル爲ニ、様々證據ガ保護側ヨリ、法廷
ニ提出セルコトヲ期待ス。所ガ、其様々證據、提
出セルセテ、之ノ故證據、録除ハ、様々證據ガ
全然存在シテ、ツクタイツヲ抗シ難イ推論ガ出テ
来ルト我々主張シマス。

J-104

若シ此ノ推論ガ尊キルハ、本船、拿捕、
日本政府、自ラ、海軍艦隊ヲ改善スル爲、政策、
実行テ、ア、下見ニ、ル、テ、リ、ス。

北島及中国

J-105

一九四一年十月二十三日「ア、公使、」
中国政府、利益、爲、日本外務大臣ニ、対、北島及
中国ニ、於、テ、民間人及僑民ガ、取、扱、ヲ、示、シ、テ、
対、シ、抗議ヲ、送、リ、マス。本通告、一般、的、ニ、携、帶、
ガ、行、ル、多、場所、及、人名ヲ、明、記、シ、テ、
會、衆

P.54

- J-105 (2) 書誌 二〇三四 (一) 記録 一四七五
- " 一四七七 " 一三七九

Summation J.

J-106 一九四年 五月 自身是「調査」之人 或「身」或「時」

回答、他何等、回答「已」之「十」等、五「五」等、
府、與「同」答「要」或「公」等「如」三「三」等、無「無」

「得」多「詳」能「十」抗「識」之「要」之「入」

J-107 一九四年 四月 二「日」自「然」以「自」然「界」之「時」

公使「書」言「謂」之「送」、五「四」年「二」月「二」日「自」然「界」之「時」

二月三日、抗「識」之「要」、五「四」年「二」月「二」日「自」然「界」之「時」

「地」之「與」於「之」之「誤」不「而」之「五」年「五」月「五」日「自」然「界」之「時」

J-108

「シ」リ「抗」識「中」之「念」之「總」干、查「得」可「以」之「時」

及「歌」之「入」

以上「部」於「之」「抗」識「中」之「一」抗「識」、公「使」

「于」其「リ」之「入」、即「其」之「名」、其「國」人「於」六「日」之「三」日

「于」總「干」期「間」、間、其「分」之「入」、其「後」務

所「二」拘「捕」之「入」其「中」、其「然」之「彼」等「之」名、其「後」務

ニカ「リ」之「入」何「人」之「中」、其「後」務「人」不「二」抗「識」

J-109 (a) " 101B (B) " 101B (B) " 101B (B) " 101B (B)

J-106 (a) 書「註」二「〇」五「五」(B) 記「録」二「〇」五「六」

抗「識」之「要」之「入」、其「後」務「人」不「二」抗「識」

0159 0003 0555

Intermittent

年長。... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 總... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 全... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 多... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 日... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 下... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 因... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 與... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 及... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 中... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...

外國... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 於... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 語... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 下... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 某... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 於... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...
 二... 數... 年... 數... 年... 數...

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3100
 3200
 3300
 3400
 3500

(1) 一九四四年六月五日「又、又國公使ハ英政府、利益ヲ代表シ、沈ムル各英國船、船長及乗組員、待遇ニ對シテ重光ニ抗議ヲ送リ、(名) 一九四四年九月十六日、何嘗テ回答ヲ受ケタコトナシ、注、憲書ガ送ルコトヲ(一九四四年九月十八日、日本外務省ハ此等、船舶ノ沈没ト關聯シテ起ツクト申立テ、残産行爲ヲ否定致シ、(名) 一九四五年五月十九日「又、又國公使、此等船舶、乗組員、待遇ニ關シ、英國政府、抗議ヲ繰返シ申入レタ。公使、又日本第一潛水戰隊指揮、提督ガ出ル、一九四三年三月二十日附作戰命令ニ注意ヲ惹キ、(名) リス、彼ハ此命令第五項ヲ、潛水艦長ガ連合軍艦船及貨物、沈没スルコトヲ止ルコトナク、ソレト同時ニ情報入手、自的ニ逮捕シ、カ望ムコトト思ハル人員以外、連合軍乗組員、完全ノ滅亡ヲ遂行スルコトヲ許可シ、居ル上、書留ム事ナリ。(名) (ii) 一九四四年六月十九日、瑞西公使ハ、アメリカ合衆國政府、利益、爲ニ一九四四年三月二十九日「リヤード・ホバート、(RICHARD HOVERT) カ撃沈セシ、時日本、潛水艦ガ艦載艇ニ衝突シ、當テ射撃ヲ加ヘ、乗組員中、生存者ヲ射撃スル事、各々、乗組員ヲ潛水ニ引キ上リ、其後、彼等ニツイテ、何嘗テ消息ガ下リ、重光ニ抗議シ、(名) 一九四四年十一月二十八日、重光ハ「リヤード・ホバート」ニ、擧げ沈没ニ關シ、申立テ、(名) 残産行爲ノ起ツコトヲ否定シ、(名) 書留ム事ナリ。

イ	〇九	〇九	〇九	〇九	〇九	〇九	〇九	〇九	〇九
イ	〇六	〇六	〇六	〇六	〇六	〇六	〇六	〇六	〇六
イ	〇八	〇八	〇八	〇八	〇八	〇八	〇八	〇八	〇八
イ	〇七	〇七	〇七	〇七	〇七	〇七	〇七	〇七	〇七
イ	〇五	〇五	〇五	〇五	〇五	〇五	〇五	〇五	〇五
イ	〇三	〇三	〇三	〇三	〇三	〇三	〇三	〇三	〇三
イ	〇二	〇二	〇二	〇二	〇二	〇二	〇二	〇二	〇二
イ	〇一	〇一	〇一	〇一	〇一	〇一	〇一	〇一	〇一
イ	〇〇	〇〇	〇〇	〇〇	〇〇	〇〇	〇〇	〇〇	〇〇

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Summary J

(iii) 一九四五年十二月二十九日「シー・ニコット」(JEAN NICOLET)ヲ
 撃沈シテ潜水艦ニヨリ行ハシテ残存行爲ニ対シテ米國・抗議ガ
 瑞西公使館員ニ依リテ鈴木多カズ公使ニ手交セシツタ。
 シ「其ノ船ハ七月三日〇二〇時頃沈没シ。沈ミ行ク船ヲ離シ
 シ後雷撃セリ船、九十五名乃至百名、名ハ潜水艦長小ノ兼
 組員ニヨリ戦争ノ法規慣習及ステ人道的模範ニ達シ及
 ス待遇ヲ受ケ「シー・ニコット」ヨリ、七十五名ノ生存者ハ報告
 セル。……米國政府ハ左ノ如ク抗議シテ居リマス。即チ
 (1) 救命艇及救命筏ハ明ニ「シー・ニコット」ノ生存者ニヨリ
 モ使用セリ「シー・ニコット」ニ機銃ヲ射撃セシメ「シー・ニコット」
 ノ生存者ヲ泳イテイタ者モ又機銃射撃ヲ受ケル。
 (2) 生存者ハ潜水艦ニ上ルヤ救命浮標書類其ノ他ノ生命重要
 ヲ奪ハル。
 (3) 「シー・ニコット」生存者ハ潜水艦ニ乗艦後網或ハ針金を絡メ
 前甲板ニ面シ艦首カク艦尾ヲ横ニ列ラセテ頭ヲサテラ座ラセ
 或ハ眠ラセラル。
 (4) 「シー・ニコット」生存者ノ約半数ハ別ハ潜水艦後甲板ニ連
 シ行カ銃、手銃ヲ銃剣ヲ合シ種ルノ道具ヲ持ツヨ日本人
 水兵ガニ列ニ並ンダ列ノ間ヲ走ラセラル。コノ列ヲ走ラシキ間ニ
 人ハヒト改行ヲ受ケ艦ガ走ラシキ間ニ縛ラセテ海中ニ擲シ

P.60

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J-13	証書	二〇八〇	"	二〇八〇	J-13
J-12	証書	五〇九	"	五〇九	J-12

J-11 一九四二年三月三十一日。日本側と大島一問(証書)の交換について

J-12 緯ハ證ハ交換上提テ出シシテ諸君ト大島類カク推定スルコトトカキ

J-14 日本カ被雷撃船ノ乗組員トテノ決断ヲナシ

ニフクニクニク。

J-13 一九四五年五月十日付 日本側回答ニ對シテ議中ニ合テテ申

P 61

J-115 一九四三年三月二十日潜水艦長ニ対シ謀報ノ目的ノタメニ
 有用ト人員ヲ抑留シテ後戰手沈船舶ノ乗組員ヲ殺スコトヲ
 命ジテ第一潜水艦隊作戰命令ガ発セラレコシタ。十二月十四日
 以降コノ命令ハ守ラレコシタ。

J-116 船舶ノ乗組員ヲ殺スコトハ政府ノ政策ノ一事項デアリタト

J-114 1a) 書証 三八三 記録 三七九一。

J-115 1a) " 二一〇五 " 一五一八四

Summation J

マコト。ソノ會談中ニ於テ「ヒットラー」ハ如何程多數ノ米國艦

船が建造セリヨウトモ、彼等ノモクル難問ハ乗組員ノ不足デアル

トイフコトヲ指摘シタ。此ノ理由テソノ結果出來ルケテ多數ノ乗組

員ヲ死セサルトイフ目的ヲ以テ商船モ又無敬言生テ船ヲ沈ケレンツ

アリタ。若シモ大部分ノ船員が雷撃ヲ死シガト云フ許が流布サレ

タナラバ、米國側ハスガニ新ラシク人ヲ募集スルコトが困難ニナル

アラウ……我々ノ独一人ノ生存ノ爲ニ戦フテ其ノデア

ルデアルが故ニ人道的見地が支配スルコトヲ許スルコトハ出來ナ

カツタ。此ノ理由テ彼ハ外國船員ヲ捕虜ニスルコトが出來ナカツタ

場合ニハ、ソレテコハ公海上ニ於テハ低ノ場合不可能デアツタガ

潜水艦ハ雷撃後浮上シテ救命艇ヲ猛射スルコトヲ命イナケル

ナラナカツタ。大島大使ハ「總統ノ話ニハカウ同意シテ日本側モ亦

コソイフ方法ニ從フコトヲ余儀ナラサレイルト云ツテイル……」

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この上が此處ニ於テ非常ニ明白ナルニシテ、幾ニハ主張致シ
 ラス。若シモソフチカシクナラバ、一九四四年六月五日英國艦(艦名)
 沈没ノ、又一九四四年六月十九日、英國艦「リチャード」トモ之
 艦ヲ沈没ノ間、提督サシヲ抗議ヲ命メテ發せられたルニ、
 七月三日「リチャード」トモ之ヲ棄置スル及一九四四年十月二十九日、
 英國商船「ジョン・A・ジョンソン」(JOHN. A. JOHNSON)トモ之ヲ
 生命ヲ救フテ、アリアセ。

英國及米國ヨリ日本政府ニ對シ、戰爭犯罪遂行、
 情報ヲ傳ヘ放送、錄音記録。

一九四四年一月二十四日、七時、ロンドン、BBC、米人、
 比律賓人捕虜ヲ加ヘ、日本側、殘虐行爲ニテ、米艦
 海軍公報ニ放送シマス。此放送ハ、米收容所ニ於テ、
 一九四三年四月十五日、間、二千三百名ノ米人俘虜ガ死ニシ
 又他ノ收容所ニ於テ、一九四二年十月、三千四百名ガ死
 之ヲトク、叙述ヲ含ミ、トモ之ヲ、一九四四年一月三、九
 KW-Dヲ通ジテ三度、Pカカ、放送ガアリマス。

- J-116 a 書証ニ八七、三〇六 記録 一五四〇一五
- b " " 二〇六九、三〇六 一五四八一五。
- J-117 a " " 一四六
- b " " 一三三

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Summary. J

(i) 午前七時「サンフランシスコ」ヨリK.W.D.の國務長官「云々、
 心、言上ニテ「……比島ヲ逮捕セテ幾千トイフ米兵及
 比律賓兵、日本軍ニヨリ無謀ニ虐殺セラル。一九四三年
 十月中ニテ、收容所ニ於テ五千二百名米兵が大部分飢
 餓、自ニ死ニシタ。『アシナ・イーデン』、英國下院ニ對
 シテ幾千トイフ英國人、中國人、ヒロ人、印度人、俘虜及
 抑留者ガ日本側、收容所ニ死ニシ。英國、抗議、満足ナ
 結果ヲ招イテ、タイト告ケリ「アリアス」トイフ言葉ヲ引用
 シタ。

(ii) 午前八時、前述ノ放送、日本政府對シ繰返シ抗議ヲ
 提出シタルトモ、何等明白ノ效果ヲ得ナイ「云々、心、
 追加聲名ト夫ニ繰返サレタリ。

(iii) 午後六時、白聖館、秘書官「ステファン・アール」
 (STEPHEN EARLY)ハ、日本政府、日本、千ニシル米兵及比律
 賓兵ニ對シ米國政府ガ食糧、物質的援助或ハ日帝必需
 品ヲ送ルコトヲ許サナイテアラルト語リシタ(6)

P.64

J-116
 一九四四年十月二十三日ニ陸軍報道部放送、「アリアス」
 大將ハ元帥寺内伯宛ニ彼ハ敵軍指揮官等、俘虜及抑
 留者ニ適當ナ待遇ヲ與ヘ得ナイコトニ就テ直接ニ責任及上信
 スル警告ヲ發シタ。及駁出來テ證據ガ俘虜、及千名譽

J-117
 由書証 四八 記録 三三

P.65

J-121 J-119 J-118

100 100 100

書証

一四八

記錄

二八三

"

一四八

"

三三三

100

二七五三

J-121

俄之白聖館 (White House) 秘書官「アラン・フーリエ」

(Stephen Early) 聲明 米國海軍子可來聖二於各地

彼等、住處、救濟、為救恤品、積少、船舶、運送、トシ

提議、然之日本海軍、之ヲ拒絕、ト云ク、辯護側

證人、日本外務省、工藤忠雄、證言、依、確證、ト云フ

實、法廷、注意、ヲ求メ、ト云フ

Summary

J-120

此證據、重要性ハ、トカ、特ニ、戰爭犯罪、知識、傳播、ト云フ

トク日本政府、層々外交的抗議、ヲ得、テ、層々、ト云フ

カク、事實、確實、ト存ス

J-119

前記、包含、之、書証、ヲ、立證、之、證據、ヲ、放送、ノ、録音、記録、カ

外務省、各課、及、情報局、海軍省、陸軍省、規則的、聖帶

ト云フ、ト述下、ト云フ、ト云フ

毀損及殘忍、閉、ニ、受、領、ト、居、ル、ト、述下、ト云フ

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J-122a

J-122a

一九〇七年「ヘグ」條約第六條ニ就中俘虜ヲ使用スルニ作業
 關係ヲキモ、タルコトヲ規定シテアリ。一九一九年、俘
 虜ニ關スル「セネカ」條約第三條ニ據リ、從事スルニ當
 テハ作戰ニ直接關係ナキモノトシテアリ。證據
 トシテ提出セラル連、日本側公文書ニ、日本政府、故意ニ且、
 一政策、一事項トシテ俘虜ヲ斯カルニ當ルニ從事セシメ、強
 クシテ示シテ居リ。又、

一九四二年五月六日附臺灣軍參謀長宛通信ニ被
 入本村：「自俘虜之ヲ我生産擴充並ニ軍事上ノ任務利
 用スル如、逐次朝鮮、台灣、滿洲……ニ收容ス」ト述ベテ居
 リ。又、

一九四二年八月、「特別高等警官月報」ニ、労働力不
 足ノ結果俘虜ヲ使用スルニ計畫カ述ベテ居リ。又、

計畫カ私、引用ス。『曩ニ軍關係作業及港湾施設
 労働力不足、緩和策トシテ、在善通寺俘虜收容所收
 容中、米國俘虜一五〇名ヲ大段ニ分遣勞務ニ服セシメ
 ル所、其ノ成績良好トモアリニ依リ、隊ヲヨリ労働力
 不足ニ惱ミテ、了之東京……附近、各地方ニ於テル事業

証書 二〇一 記録 一四七六

戰爭犯罪遂行ヲ公認且證明スル日本側公文書

05900030555

家方面ニ在リテ、軍當局ニ対シ……停務、使用方懇請
スル所アリタリ。(8)

(iii) 一九四二年八月二十日破告日本村、陸軍次官ニシテ

関東軍參謀長宛ニ書簡ヲ書キテ居リタリ。航空機
急整備實現、又別紙利用方針ニ基キ滿洲工作機械
株式会社、現在能力ヲ増強シ甚ク大部ヲ舉ギテ國內
於此航空武器彈藥並航空機ノ緊急整備ニ必要ナル
工作機械、生産特ニ航空用自動車……主力生産工場
タル自産自動車株式会社加工部工場擴充ニ必要ナル多
數生産用専門工作機械、生産ニ充テ致度ニシテ計画
ハ停務一千五百名ノ使用ヲ求ルモノアリタリ。(c)

(iv) 内務省警備局外事課発行九月號外事月報ニ
「最近ニ於ケル勞務需而給、状況ハ相当逼迫ナル趨勢ヲ
示シ殊ニ最近ニ於ケル勞働力不足ニ逐次深刻化シタル
……斯クテ企画院ニ於テ陸軍停務管理理部ノ委嘱
ニ基キ去ル八月十五日停務ノ内地移入並勞務使役ニ關
スル會議ヲ主催シ甚ク會議ニ於テ……概シテ重要綱
ニ付審議ヲ經テ之ヲ實施スルコトナリタリ。

(v) 停務ノ之ヲ國民動員計画生産要素中鑛業、荷役
業及國防立本建築業……ニ使役スルコト……」(a)

山	由	山	山
197-A	197-A	197-A	197-A
145.5	145.9	145.9	145.9
145.5	145.9	145.9	145.9
145.5	145.9	145.9	145.9

9950 9950 9950 9950

0159 0000 0557

Summation J.

(Ⅱ) 一九四二年十月二日東部軍參謀長、被告人東條
 二九記 命令書等送リマシタ。「……東京停務收容所
 二收容中ノ停務ヲ九記ニ依リ就勞セシメ度ニ付認可セラレ
 度……」⁽⁴⁾ 続行勞役、種類ガ述ベラレ此ニ「生産力擴充
 爲、工業勞働」カ合マシ、又勞働場⁽⁵⁾ニ「生産力擴充
 爲、軍需工場」カ舉ゲテ居リマシ、同日附テ上記申
 請ヲ認可シテ先陸軍大臣指令、原稿付リマシ。⁽⁶⁾

(Ⅲ) 川崎及横浜停務收容所ニ收容中ノ停務勞務
 二園、一九四二年十月六日附厚生大臣並内務大臣宛神奈
 川縣知事ノ報告書ニ「從來運送費業務ニ付、停務
 勞務ノ使用ニ依リ始メテ計画的ニ之ガ進捗ヲ圖ルコト可能
 ナリタルニ、各事業主、等ニ陳述スル所ニテ、事業界
 ニ多大ノ好影響ヲ興、延、軍需品、他生産力擴充
 ……及ボス影響甚大ナルモト思料セラルト述ベテ居
 リマシ。⁽⁸⁾

(Ⅳ) 一九四二年九月四日附被告人板垣、朝鮮軍司令
 官トシテ被告人東條宛報告書ニ、朝鮮停務收容
 所ニ於テ實施中ノ規則ヲ述ベテ居リマシ。ソノ規則ニ九
 記、如キ條項ガ合ヒテ居リマシ。「第二条停務人ト雖
 モ無爲徒愈セシメテ其技能、年齢、体力等ニ應ジ
 適者トシ勞務ヲ課シ、我ガ生産擴充並ニ軍需上ノ勞

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J-122a	(4)	書記	一九六七	記録	一四四四
	(4)	"	一九六七	"	一四四四
	(4)	"	一九六七	"	一四四九

務ニ使用スモノトシ、第四條、第二節、三停虜ヲニ課スル
キ勞役、種類ノ中ニ飛行場ノ土木作業カ含ムルニ居リ、⁽²⁾

J-122 一九一七年海牙條約、第六條及七一九九年セネガール
停虜條約、第三七條、將校停虜ヲ強制的使用ヲ
禁止スルニ居リ、⁽³⁾

(1) 一九四二年六月三日停虜管理部長ハ陸軍部
隊定停虜多ク將校及准士官ノ勞務ニ關スル件トシテ
ノ首題ヲ廻状ヲ送り、甚シク、如ク記述サシ居
リ、⁽⁴⁾「停虜多ク將校及准士官ノ勞務ニ關シテ、停虜
勞役規則第一條ニ指示セシムル處トモ、之ニ雖モ世爲
徒食ヲ許サカレ、我國現下ノ實狀ハ停虜健康保持
等ニ鑑ミ、之等ニ對シテモ其自身ノ識能待力等ニ應
ジ自発的ニ勞務ニ就カシメ度キ中央ノ方針トシテ付可
シ指導ヲ相成度キ……」⁽⁵⁾ 同様に通牒ガ一九四二年六月
五日附台灣軍參謀長宛送達サシ、⁽⁶⁾

(2) 一九四二年九月四日、當時朝鮮軍司令部宛、⁽⁷⁾下
告人板垣ハ被告ノ東條宛朝鮮停虜收容所ニ於テハ
實施施論規定ノ圖ヲ報告ヲ送附シ、此等ノ諸規
定、第三條下記、通テリ、⁽⁸⁾「停虜將校以下、全

J-222 出 書託 一九七六 記載 四三九
出 書託 一九七六 記載 四三九

00550 0000 6510

Summation J.

P. 70

員之勞務ニ就カシムトス、但シ准士官以上ノ者ニ在リテ
 其ノ身命、職務及体力等ニ應ジ自発的ニ勞役ニ服
 セル如ク指道寺スルモノトス……」(c)

「……士官……自発的……勞役ニ服セル如ク指
 道寺スルモノトス」ニ使用サシク言語ハ強制テハナイコトヲ
 暗示シテ居ルコトナリ。然レ之ハ單ニ「彼等ガ働カセシ
 ハ彼等ニ取り非當ニ居心地ヲ悪クスル」ヲ彼等ガ自
 発的ニ働ク様ニナルト云フ日本語、婉曲法ナルト主
 張致シマス。

之ハ法廷ニ提出サシク證據ニ依リ確認サシテ居リマス。
 此證據ニ對スル言及ハ後ニ最終論告ヲ爲サシル
 トナリマス。

J-102 (c) 書証 一九七六 記録 一四三五九

Summation J.

一九四三年三月廿三日發言人板垣、用其語言、會實上、(一)宣傳
 收者計畫、被他人、(二)本計畫、(三)其、
 目的、(四)如、(五)即、(六)目的、(七)其、(八)宣傳、(九)其、
 收者之朝鮮、(十)其、(十一)實力、(十二)現實、(十三)認識、(十四)其、
 依然、(十五)其、(十六)其、(十七)其、(十八)其、(十九)其、(二十)其、
 其、(二十一)其、(二十二)其、(二十三)其、(二十四)其、(二十五)其、
 一九四三年十月十三日、朝鮮、(二十六)其、(二十七)其、(二十八)其、
 行、(二十九)其、(三十)其、(三十一)其、(三十二)其、(三十三)其、
 進、(三十四)其、(三十五)其、(三十六)其、(三十七)其、(三十八)其、
 其、(三十九)其、(四十)其、(四十一)其、(四十二)其、(四十三)其、
 效果、(四十四)其、(四十五)其、(四十六)其、(四十七)其、(四十八)其、

J-124

一九〇七年、(一)其、(二)其、(三)其、(四)其、(五)其、(六)其、
 其、(七)其、(八)其、(九)其、(十)其、(十一)其、(十二)其、
 其、(十三)其、(十四)其、(十五)其、(十六)其、(十七)其、(十八)其、
 其、(十九)其、(二十)其、(二十一)其、(二十二)其、(二十三)其、
 其、(二十四)其、(二十五)其、(二十六)其、(二十七)其、(二十八)其、
 其、(二十九)其、(三十)其、(三十一)其、(三十二)其、(三十三)其、
 其、(三十四)其、(三十五)其、(三十六)其、(三十七)其、(三十八)其、
 其、(三十九)其、(四十)其、(四十一)其、(四十二)其、(四十三)其、
 其、(四十四)其、(四十五)其、(四十六)其、(四十七)其、(四十八)其、
 其、(四十九)其、(五十)其、(五十一)其、(五十二)其、(五十三)其、
 其、(五十四)其、(五十五)其、(五十六)其、(五十七)其、(五十八)其、
 其、(五十九)其、(六十)其、(六十一)其、(六十二)其、(六十三)其、
 其、(六十四)其、(六十五)其、(六十六)其、(六十七)其、(六十八)其、
 其、(六十九)其、(七十)其、(七十一)其、(七十二)其、(七十三)其、
 其、(七十四)其、(七十五)其、(七十六)其、(七十七)其、(七十八)其、
 其、(七十九)其、(八十)其、(八十一)其、(八十二)其、(八十三)其、
 其、(八十四)其、(八十五)其、(八十六)其、(八十七)其、(八十八)其、
 其、(八十九)其、(九十)其、(九十一)其、(九十二)其、(九十三)其、
 其、(九十四)其、(九十五)其、(九十六)其、(九十七)其、(九十八)其、
 其、(九十九)其、(一百)其、(一百〇一)其、(一百〇二)其、(一百〇三)其、
 其、(一百〇四)其、(一百〇五)其、(一百〇六)其、(一百〇七)其、(一百〇八)其、
 其、(一百〇九)其、(一百一十)其、(一百一十一)其、(一百一十二)其、
 其、(一百一十三)其、(一百一十四)其、(一百一十五)其、(一百一十六)其、
 其、(一百一十七)其、(一百一十八)其、(一百一十九)其、(一百二十)其、
 其、(一百二十一)其、(一百二十二)其、(一百二十三)其、(一百二十四)其、
 其、(一百二十五)其、(一百二十六)其、(一百二十七)其、(一百二十八)其、
 其、(一百二十九)其、(一百三十)其、(一百三十一)其、(一百三十二)其、
 其、(一百三十三)其、(一百三十四)其、(一百三十五)其、(一百三十六)其、
 其、(一百三十七)其、(一百三十八)其、(一百三十九)其、(一百四十)其、
 其、(一百四十一)其、(一百四十二)其、(一百四十三)其、(一百四十四)其、
 其、(一百四十五)其、(一百四十六)其、(一百四十七)其、(一百四十八)其、
 其、(一百四十九)其、(一百五十)其、(一百五十一)其、(一百五十二)其、
 其、(一百五十三)其、(一百五十四)其、(一百五十五)其、(一百五十六)其、
 其、(一百五十七)其、(一百五十八)其、(一百五十九)其、(一百六十)其、
 其、(一百六十一)其、(一百六十二)其、(一百六十三)其、(一百六十四)其、
 其、(一百六十五)其、(一百六十六)其、(一百六十七)其、(一百六十八)其、
 其、(一百六十九)其、(一百七十)其、(一百七十一)其、(一百七十二)其、
 其、(一百七十三)其、(一百七十四)其、(一百七十五)其、(一百七十六)其、
 其、(一百七十七)其、(一百七十八)其、(一百七十九)其、(一百八十)其、
 其、(一百八十一)其、(一百八十二)其、(一百八十三)其、(一百八十四)其、
 其、(一百八十五)其、(一百八十六)其、(一百八十七)其、(一百八十八)其、
 其、(一百八十九)其、(一百九十)其、(一百九十一)其、(一百九十二)其、
 其、(一百九十三)其、(一百九十四)其、(一百九十五)其、(一百九十六)其、
 其、(一百九十七)其、(一百九十八)其、(一百九十九)其、(二百)其、

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(1) 其、(2) 其、(3) 其、(4) 其、(5) 其、(6) 其、(7) 其、
 其、(8) 其、(9) 其、(10) 其、(11) 其、(12) 其、(13) 其、(14) 其、
 其、(15) 其、(16) 其、(17) 其、(18) 其、(19) 其、(20) 其、(21) 其、
 其、(22) 其、(23) 其、(24) 其、(25) 其、(26) 其、(27) 其、(28) 其、
 其、(29) 其、(30) 其、(31) 其、(32) 其、(33) 其、(34) 其、(35) 其、
 其、(36) 其、(37) 其、(38) 其、(39) 其、(40) 其、(41) 其、(42) 其、
 其、(43) 其、(44) 其、(45) 其、(46) 其、(47) 其、(48) 其、(49) 其、
 其、(50) 其、(51) 其、(52) 其、(53) 其、(54) 其、(55) 其、(56) 其、
 其、(57) 其、(58) 其、(59) 其、(60) 其、(61) 其、(62) 其、(63) 其、
 其、(64) 其、(65) 其、(66) 其、(67) 其、(68) 其、(69) 其、(70) 其、
 其、(71) 其、(72) 其、(73) 其、(74) 其、(75) 其、(76) 其、(77) 其、
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 其、(85) 其、(86) 其、(87) 其、(88) 其、(89) 其、(90) 其、(91) 其、
 其、(92) 其、(93) 其、(94) 其、(95) 其、(96) 其、(97) 其、(98) 其、
 其、(99) 其、(100) 其、(101) 其、(102) 其、(103) 其、(104) 其、
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 其、(141) 其、(142) 其、(143) 其、(144) 其、(145) 其、(146) 其、
 其、(147) 其、(148) 其、(149) 其、(150) 其、(151) 其、(152) 其、
 其、(153) 其、(154) 其、(155) 其、(156) 其、(157) 其、(158) 其、
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 其、(165) 其、(166) 其、(167) 其、(168) 其、(169) 其、(170) 其、
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 其、(189) 其、(190) 其、(191) 其、(192) 其、(193) 其、(194) 其、
 其、(195) 其、(196) 其、(197) 其、(198) 其、(199) 其、(200) 其、

- J-123 (a) 書証 一九七三 記錄 一四五一
- (b) " 一九七五 " 一四五二〇

Summation J.

(d)	(c)	(b)	(a)
1979	1976	1975	1974
1955	1956	1959	1960

この問題は、 $n=100$ 、 $n=1000$ 、 $n=10000$ の場合について、 $\sum_{k=1}^n \frac{1}{k}$ の値を計算し、 $\ln n$ と比較して、誤差の範囲を調べたい。

1. $n=100$ の場合
 $\sum_{k=1}^{100} \frac{1}{k} \approx 5.1874$ 、 $\ln 100 \approx 4.6052$ 、誤差 ≈ 0.5822

2. $n=1000$ の場合
 $\sum_{k=1}^{1000} \frac{1}{k} \approx 7.4854$ 、 $\ln 1000 \approx 6.9078$ 、誤差 ≈ 0.5776

3. $n=10000$ の場合
 $\sum_{k=1}^{10000} \frac{1}{k} \approx 9.7876$ 、 $\ln 10000 \approx 9.2103$ 、誤差 ≈ 0.5773

この結果から、 $\sum_{k=1}^n \frac{1}{k} - \ln n$ が一定の値に近づくことがわかる。この値を γ (オイラーの定数) と表す。

0159 0003 0573

Summation J

J-125

一九三一年八月二十一日條約及一九三五...
處理第三條... (通) 以下取... 中... 規

(1) 陸軍省報道部長發一九四三年十二月廿七日...
陸軍省職員... 陸軍省... 陸軍省...
陸軍省... 陸軍省... 陸軍省... 陸軍省...
陸軍省... 陸軍省... 陸軍省... 陸軍省...
陸軍省... 陸軍省... 陸軍省... 陸軍省...

(2) 新聞機關... 日本... 新聞... 新聞...
新聞... 新聞... 新聞... 新聞...
新聞... 新聞... 新聞... 新聞...
新聞... 新聞... 新聞... 新聞...
新聞... 新聞... 新聞... 新聞...
新聞... 新聞... 新聞... 新聞...
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新聞... 新聞... 新聞... 新聞...
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新聞... 新聞... 新聞... 新聞...
新聞... 新聞... 新聞... 新聞...

J-125

(四) 書記 一五七 記錄 一五七三

0159 0003 0574

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Summary of ...

5-105

第 三 一 號 第 二 次 修 正

一、關於...
 二、關於...
 三、關於...
 四、關於...
 五、關於...
 六、關於...
 七、關於...
 八、關於...
 九、關於...
 十、關於...

一、關於...
 二、關於...
 三、關於...
 四、關於...
 五、關於...
 六、關於...
 七、關於...
 八、關於...
 九、關於...
 十、關於...

1. $\int \frac{1}{x^2} dx = \int x^{-2} dx = \frac{x^{-2+1}}{-2+1} = \frac{x^{-1}}{-1} = -\frac{1}{x} + C$
 2. $\int \frac{1}{x^3} dx = \int x^{-3} dx = \frac{x^{-3+1}}{-3+1} = \frac{x^{-2}}{-2} = -\frac{1}{2x^2} + C$
 3. $\int \frac{1}{x^4} dx = \int x^{-4} dx = \frac{x^{-4+1}}{-4+1} = \frac{x^{-3}}{-3} = -\frac{1}{3x^3} + C$
 4. $\int \frac{1}{x^5} dx = \int x^{-5} dx = \frac{x^{-5+1}}{-5+1} = \frac{x^{-4}}{-4} = -\frac{1}{4x^4} + C$
 5. $\int \frac{1}{x^6} dx = \int x^{-6} dx = \frac{x^{-6+1}}{-6+1} = \frac{x^{-5}}{-5} = -\frac{1}{5x^5} + C$
 6. $\int \frac{1}{x^7} dx = \int x^{-7} dx = \frac{x^{-7+1}}{-7+1} = \frac{x^{-6}}{-6} = -\frac{1}{6x^6} + C$
 7. $\int \frac{1}{x^8} dx = \int x^{-8} dx = \frac{x^{-8+1}}{-8+1} = \frac{x^{-7}}{-7} = -\frac{1}{7x^7} + C$
 8. $\int \frac{1}{x^9} dx = \int x^{-9} dx = \frac{x^{-9+1}}{-9+1} = \frac{x^{-8}}{-8} = -\frac{1}{8x^8} + C$
 9. $\int \frac{1}{x^{10}} dx = \int x^{-10} dx = \frac{x^{-10+1}}{-10+1} = \frac{x^{-9}}{-9} = -\frac{1}{9x^9} + C$
 10. $\int \frac{1}{x^{11}} dx = \int x^{-11} dx = \frac{x^{-11+1}}{-11+1} = \frac{x^{-10}}{-10} = -\frac{1}{10x^{10}} + C$

11. $\int \frac{1}{x^{12}} dx = \int x^{-12} dx = \frac{x^{-12+1}}{-12+1} = \frac{x^{-11}}{-11} = -\frac{1}{11x^{11}} + C$
 12. $\int \frac{1}{x^{13}} dx = \int x^{-13} dx = \frac{x^{-13+1}}{-13+1} = \frac{x^{-12}}{-12} = -\frac{1}{12x^{12}} + C$
 13. $\int \frac{1}{x^{14}} dx = \int x^{-14} dx = \frac{x^{-14+1}}{-14+1} = \frac{x^{-13}}{-13} = -\frac{1}{13x^{13}} + C$
 14. $\int \frac{1}{x^{15}} dx = \int x^{-15} dx = \frac{x^{-15+1}}{-15+1} = \frac{x^{-14}}{-14} = -\frac{1}{14x^{14}} + C$
 15. $\int \frac{1}{x^{16}} dx = \int x^{-16} dx = \frac{x^{-16+1}}{-16+1} = \frac{x^{-15}}{-15} = -\frac{1}{15x^{15}} + C$

Summation

5150 E000 6510

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

१२६

१२६

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

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 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय
 श्री कृष्णाय नमः

0 159 0003 0576

1957年11月

第 100 号
第 100 号

1. 1957年11月1日
2. 1957年11月1日
3. 1957年11月1日
4. 1957年11月1日

1. 1957年11月1日
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6. 1957年11月1日
7. 1957年11月1日
8. 1957年11月1日
9. 1957年11月1日
10. 1957年11月1日

Summary

Summary

1. 耶穌基督的降生 (Incarnation of Jesus Christ)
 2. 耶穌基督的受洗 (Baptism of Jesus Christ)
 3. 耶穌基督的傳道 (Ministry of Jesus Christ)
 4. 耶穌基督的受難 (Passion of Jesus Christ)
 5. 耶穌基督的復活 (Resurrection of Jesus Christ)
 6. 耶穌基督的升天 (Ascension of Jesus Christ)
 7. 耶穌基督的再來 (Second Coming of Jesus Christ)

耶穌基督的降生 (Incarnation of Jesus Christ)
 耶穌基督的受洗 (Baptism of Jesus Christ)
 耶穌基督的傳道 (Ministry of Jesus Christ)
 耶穌基督的受難 (Passion of Jesus Christ)
 耶穌基督的復活 (Resurrection of Jesus Christ)
 耶穌基督的升天 (Ascension of Jesus Christ)
 耶穌基督的再來 (Second Coming of Jesus Christ)

1. 耶穌基督的降生	1066
2. 耶穌基督的受洗	1067
3. 耶穌基督的傳道	1068
4. 耶穌基督的受難	1069
5. 耶穌基督的復活	1070
6. 耶穌基督的升天	1071
7. 耶穌基督的再來	1072

0159 0003 0578

7-128

7-128
手書 1011
1812

Summary I

1. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 2. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 3. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 4. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 5. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 6. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 7. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 8. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 9. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 10. 關於... (faint handwritten text)

0850-3000 510

Fig 1

Summation J

二日...
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 三十...

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 〇三九二五
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 〇三九二七
 〇三九二八
 〇三九二九
 〇三九三〇

〇三九三一
 〇三九三二
 〇三九三三
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 〇三九四七
 〇三九四八
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 〇三九五九
 〇三九六〇

0 159 0003 0582

1950	1950	1950	1950
1950	1950	1950	1950
1950	1950	1950	1950
1950	1950	1950	1950

Handwritten notes in the top section, including the name "T.M. DODD" and other illegible text.

Handwritten notes in the middle section, containing several lines of text.

Handwritten notes in the bottom section, including the name "S. S. S. S." and other illegible text.

1950

S. S. S. S.

Amundson

Handwritten notes in a cursive script, possibly a list or a set of instructions, located in the upper right quadrant of the page.

(A) (B) (C)

1000

Handwritten text at the bottom of the page, possibly a signature or a date, located below a horizontal line.

284

Stammleborn

1944年 1月 1日
1月 1日

1. 關於... 之... 問題...
 2. 關於... 之... 問題...
 3. 關於... 之... 問題...
 4. 關於... 之... 問題...
 5. 關於... 之... 問題...

1. 關於... 之... 問題...
 2. 關於... 之... 問題...
 3. 關於... 之... 問題...
 4. 關於... 之... 問題...
 5. 關於... 之... 問題...

Summary J.

用 爲 敵

日本軍之行動，其目的在征服全中國，
 一俟其軍事進攻進行中，其目的即在
 使全中國之鐵礦歸其所有。彼等其後之鐵礦
 業，係在太平洋之南，西國之陸軍已獲鐵礦
 之全權，敵之軍隊已進入太平洋之北，以
 及鐵礦之集中，其目的在於海軍之加強。
 日本之鐵礦，乃在北亞細亞，其目的在於
 使人皆謂之謂其最後論者，其目的在於使人
 知其目的，其目的在於使人知其目的，其目的
 在於使人知其目的，其目的在於使人知其目的。
 日本軍之行動，其目的在於征服全中國，
 一俟其軍事進攻進行中，其目的即在使全中國
 之鐵礦歸其所有。彼等其後之鐵礦業，係在
 太平洋之南，西國之陸軍已獲鐵礦之全權，
 敵之軍隊已進入太平洋之北，以及鐵礦之
 集中，其目的在於海軍之加強。日本之鐵
 礦，乃在北亞細亞，其目的在於使人皆謂之
 謂其最後論者，其目的在於使人知其目的，
 其目的在於使人知其目的，其目的在於使人
 知其目的，其目的在於使人知其目的。

141	一號	一九四一	一九四一
	二號	一九四一	一九四一
	三號	一九四一	一九四一
	四號	一九四一	一九四一

0 159 0003 0586

189

Summary J

1. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 2. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 3. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 4. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 5. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 6. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 7. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 8. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 9. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)
 10. 關於「...」之... (KRII 21.8)

100	100	100	100
100	100	100	100
100	100	100	100
100	100	100	100

100
 100
 100
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Summation J

1. 亞羅士打 (ARAK) 於一九四三年一月十一日 (即一九四三年一月十一日) 發生一宗劫案，劫去銀錢及金飾等物，價值約一千五百元。案發後，警方曾派員調查，但至今仍未破案。

2. 亞羅士打 (ARAK) 於一九四三年一月十一日 (即一九四三年一月十一日) 發生一宗劫案，劫去銀錢及金飾等物，價值約一千五百元。案發後，警方曾派員調查，但至今仍未破案。

3. 亞羅士打 (ARAK) 於一九四三年一月十一日 (即一九四三年一月十一日) 發生一宗劫案，劫去銀錢及金飾等物，價值約一千五百元。案發後，警方曾派員調查，但至今仍未破案。

4. 亞羅士打 (ARAK) 於一九四三年一月十一日 (即一九四三年一月十一日) 發生一宗劫案，劫去銀錢及金飾等物，價值約一千五百元。案發後，警方曾派員調查，但至今仍未破案。

5. 亞羅士打 (ARAK) 於一九四三年一月十一日 (即一九四三年一月十一日) 發生一宗劫案，劫去銀錢及金飾等物，價值約一千五百元。案發後，警方曾派員調查，但至今仍未破案。

P. 88

6. 亞羅士打 (ARAK) 於一九四三年一月十一日 (即一九四三年一月十一日) 發生一宗劫案，劫去銀錢及金飾等物，價值約一千五百元。案發後，警方曾派員調查，但至今仍未破案。

7. 亞羅士打 (ARAK) 於一九四三年一月十一日 (即一九四三年一月十一日) 發生一宗劫案，劫去銀錢及金飾等物，價值約一千五百元。案發後，警方曾派員調查，但至今仍未破案。

8. 亞羅士打 (ARAK) 於一九四三年一月十一日 (即一九四三年一月十一日) 發生一宗劫案，劫去銀錢及金飾等物，價值約一千五百元。案發後，警方曾派員調查，但至今仍未破案。

1943	(1)	劫案	亞羅士打	記錄	一三九三
	(2)	劫案	亞羅士打	記錄	一三九四
	(3)	劫案	亞羅士打	記錄	一三九五
	(4)	劫案	亞羅士打	記錄	一三九六
	(5)	劫案	亞羅士打	記錄	一三九七
	(6)	劫案	亞羅士打	記錄	一三九八
	(7)	劫案	亞羅士打	記錄	一三九九
	(8)	劫案	亞羅士打	記錄	一四〇〇

0 159 0003 0588

Discussion

1. 關於... (Topic 1)
 2. 關於... (Topic 2)
 3. 關於... (Topic 3)
 4. 關於... (Topic 4)
 5. 關於... (Topic 5)
 6. 關於... (Topic 6)

7. 關於... (Topic 7)
 8. 關於... (Topic 8)
 9. 關於... (Topic 9)
 10. 關於... (Topic 10)
 11. 關於... (Topic 11)

7190	(甲)	書籍	175	記錄三六六一
7190	(乙)	書籍	177	記錄一三五二
7190	(丙)	書籍	168	一八九九
7190	(丁)	書籍	163	一六六九
7190	(戊)	書籍	147	一七四
7190	(己)	書籍	141	一三五五

7190 (庚) 書籍 175 記錄三六六一
 7190 (辛) 書籍 177 記錄一三五二
 7190 (壬) 書籍 168 一八九九
 7190 (癸) 書籍 163 一六六九
 7190 (甲) 書籍 147 一七四
 7190 (乙) 書籍 141 一三五五

丁-165

第種、種族公認領地、民間人ヲ恐怖セシムル為行ハシムル事
ハ、其等英領事官立テラシム、何等カノ犯罪、犯人ヲ殺スル
事ナリトシテ、民間人が何カノ理由、徵候ヲ示シテ該合點
ナル手段ヲ取ルル事本國ナ、慣例ナリトスル事

丁
The...
丁

一九〇二、三、四年三月、信慶及七民間人、其ノ事
ハ、其等英領事官立テラシム、何等カノ犯罪、犯人ヲ殺スル
事ナリトシテ、民間人が何カノ理由、徵候ヲ示シテ該合點
ナル手段ヲ取ルル事本國ナ、慣例ナリトスル事

一九〇三年三月、信慶及七民間人、其ノ事
ハ、其等英領事官立テラシム、何等カノ犯罪、犯人ヲ殺スル
事ナリトシテ、民間人が何カノ理由、徵候ヲ示シテ該合點
ナル手段ヲ取ルル事本國ナ、慣例ナリトスル事

一九〇四年三月、信慶及七民間人、其ノ事
ハ、其等英領事官立テラシム、何等カノ犯罪、犯人ヲ殺スル
事ナリトシテ、民間人が何カノ理由、徵候ヲ示シテ該合點
ナル手段ヲ取ルル事本國ナ、慣例ナリトスル事

P90

一九〇五年三月、信慶及七民間人、其ノ事
ハ、其等英領事官立テラシム、何等カノ犯罪、犯人ヲ殺スル
事ナリトシテ、民間人が何カノ理由、徵候ヲ示シテ該合點
ナル手段ヲ取ルル事本國ナ、慣例ナリトスル事

一九〇六年三月、信慶及七民間人、其ノ事
ハ、其等英領事官立テラシム、何等カノ犯罪、犯人ヲ殺スル
事ナリトシテ、民間人が何カノ理由、徵候ヲ示シテ該合點
ナル手段ヲ取ルル事本國ナ、慣例ナリトスル事

一九〇七年三月、信慶及七民間人、其ノ事
ハ、其等英領事官立テラシム、何等カノ犯罪、犯人ヲ殺スル
事ナリトシテ、民間人が何カノ理由、徵候ヲ示シテ該合點
ナル手段ヲ取ルル事本國ナ、慣例ナリトスル事

一九〇八年三月、信慶及七民間人、其ノ事
ハ、其等英領事官立テラシム、何等カノ犯罪、犯人ヲ殺スル
事ナリトシテ、民間人が何カノ理由、徵候ヲ示シテ該合點
ナル手段ヲ取ルル事本國ナ、慣例ナリトスル事

0159 0003 0591

Summarization

然三十一日三十二日三十三日三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
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 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 「三十四日」三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日 (Puerto Princessa) 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
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 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日

P. 12

三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 「三十四日」三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日
 三十四日三十五日三十六日三十七日三十八日三十九日

J-446	(A)	登記	八百七十九	記錄	八百七十九
		"	八百七十九	"	八百七十九
	(e)	記錄	八百七十九	記錄	八百七十九
		"	八百七十九	"	八百七十九
		"	八百七十九	"	八百七十九
		"	八百七十九	"	八百七十九
	(f)	記錄	八百七十九	記錄	八百七十九
		"	八百七十九	"	八百七十九

0159 0003 0592

J209

以著述 0.5 記錄 17.0

J210

自証 16.6 記錄 13.0

一五三三 卷 1.1

此等、增習、日本、鐵、城、大、新、介、之、自、下、海、軍、之、自、

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200

(四) 一九三四年海軍條約及一九三五年海軍公約之關係

海軍公約之關係、一九三四年海軍公約、一九三五年海軍公約、

海軍公約之關係、一九三四年海軍公約、一九三五年海軍公約、

海軍公約之關係、一九三四年海軍公約、一九三五年海軍公約、

海軍公約之關係、一九三四年海軍公約、一九三五年海軍公約、

海軍公約之關係、一九三四年海軍公約、一九三五年海軍公約、

海軍公約之關係、一九三四年海軍公約、一九三五年海軍公約、

海軍公約之關係、一九三四年海軍公約、一九三五年海軍公約、

Summary

下(1) カテ其証據ヲ簡單ニ要約ニヤラト思ヒス。一九四二年九月二
 日(2) 於此ニ於テ二名ノ再捕(3) 行ハシテ逃走者ノ軍士ニ引渡サシ彼
 等ニテ僥倖等ヲ解剖シタリ(4)
 又ニ亦方「バラ」島ニ一名、英國人逃走者ガ日本軍カラ脱意
 罪ガテ根據ニヨリ一九四二年一月ニ裁判セ行テ死刑ニサシマ
 ル(5) 此、一風変ラテ考ヘ方ガ亦上海ニ於テ行ハシタリ。其処テ
 一九四二年三月ニ一名、米国人逃走者ガ同様ノ根據ヲ裁判テ
 受テ十二年、禁錮ニ処セラレタリ(6)
 一九四二年「アボ」ニ於テ收容所外ニ再捕(7) 行ハシテ信屬十一
 名ノ最高十日ニ此ノ期間殴打サシ次テ死刑ニ処セラレ(8) 東一九四
 二年三月再捕(9) 行ハシテモウ二人、信屬ガ死刑ニ処セラレ(10)
 「セ」ニ於テ、逃走後再捕(11) 行ハシテ和蘭兵信屬六名ノ五
 名(12) 「カ」ニ於テ斬首セラレ(13) 亦「カ」(Cage)ニ於テ六
 名(14) 同様理由ニテ印度兵三名ガ死刑ニ処セラレ(15)
 一九四二年四月十五日、間ニ此ノ心、各地ニ於テ、再捕(16) 行ハ
 シテ信屬逃走、故テ死刑ニ処セラレ(17) 別個ノ事情アリ
 三ノ名(18) 此ノ國ニ罰シテモシテ總數八十四名ナリ(19)
 又「カ」ニ於テ、逃走兵三名カ「カ」ニ於テ同ノ心ガ

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下(1)	四三九八五、記録一四二一	(1)	四三九八五、記録一四二一
(2)	「カ」	(2)	「カ」
(3)	「カ」	(3)	「カ」
(4)	記録一三九六	(4)	「カ」
(5)	「カ」	(5)	「カ」
(6)	「カ」	(6)	「カ」
(7)	「カ」	(7)	「カ」
(8)	「カ」	(8)	「カ」
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(12)	「カ」	(12)	「カ」
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(14)	「カ」	(14)	「カ」
(15)	「カ」	(15)	「カ」
(16)	「カ」	(16)	「カ」
(17)	「カ」	(17)	「カ」
(18)	「カ」	(18)	「カ」
(19)	「カ」	(19)	「カ」

P. 95

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丁卯年... 紀錄... 三六四... 三六五... 三六六... 三六七... 三六八... 三六九... 三七〇... 三七一... 三七二... 三七三... 三七四... 三七五... 三七六... 三七七

丁卯年... 紀錄

丁卯年... 紀錄... 三六四... 三六五... 三六六... 三六七... 三六八... 三六九... 三七〇... 三七一... 三七二... 三七三... 三七四... 三七五... 三七六... 三七七

0 159 0000 0595

カシラノ下リ又 後ニ至リ彼等、中五名ニ実スル宣言ハ無期懲
 役ニ改メテシテ之ヲ釋リ、三名ハ死刑ニ処セシメテ之ニ 二等ノ規程
 ハ民間ニ或ハ非學事目標ヲ懸置スル統等ニ又ハ其ニ 攻等 子
 上下ニ於テ死刑ヲ規定シテ其ノ下ニ下リ之ヲ

Summary
 7-143

此ノ後ニ長期ニ亘リ 日本學ハ死刑執行ハ非學事目標ニ攻撃
 所等カニ目標カニ下リ、口実ヲ設ケテ 彼等ノ行爲ハ正式ノ裁判
 台略ニシテ下リ之ニ 死刑ハアリトシテ「三ナリテ」ニキ「(1)
 下ニカ」セシメ之ニ 刑名「不ルキ」及「此」ニ於テ執行セシメ
 聯合學事執行ニ總計テ予テ名カ此等ノ場所ニ於テ死刑ニ処セシメテ
 公等ノ地域ハ 多クハ人目稀薄ニ密林地帯ニテ、其次ニ非學
 事目標カニ少クモ十九ノ下リ之ニ 之ニ於テ民間ノ公認カ
 罪状カニ「又」ノ行等ノ理由ニテ程此ノ地域ノ任民ノ聯合會
 ニ友好ニ下リ之ヲ下リ之ニ 同「下」ニ於テ死刑命令カ
 罪状ニ於テ機カ撤、絶障地ヲ懸置、之ハ其故ニテ下リ之ニ
 之ヲ認メ、下リ之ニ

R. 96

- (1) 同 要証 三三三 記録 三三三
- " 一三三 記録 一四六六
- " 一三三 記録 一四六六

- (2) 同 記 三三三 記録 一四三三
- " 一三三 記録 一四三三
- " 一三三 記録 一四三三
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- " 一三三 記録 一四三三
- " 一三三 記録 一四三三

- (3) 同 記 三三三 記録 一四三三
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- " 一三三 記録 一四三三
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- " 一三三 記録 一四三三

Summa Tamen

Handwritten text in a cursive script, likely a summary or list of items.

Handwritten title or section header in a cursive script.

1782

Main body of handwritten text in a cursive script, appearing to be a list or detailed notes.

1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099	2100
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(VII) 1941-1945

1941年(日本)之侵略 1942年(日本)之侵略 1943年(日本)之侵略 1944年(日本)之侵略 1945年(日本)之侵略

(VIII) 1946-1950

1946年(日本)之侵略 1947年(日本)之侵略 1948年(日本)之侵略 1949年(日本)之侵略 1950年(日本)之侵略

Summary

1-160

日本及占領諸地域ヲ通シテ、俘虜ガ收容ニシテ之ニ施
 設ニ於テハ、俘虜ノ飢餓ニ類シ、体刑ヲ受、且波打、疾病
 ノ害ヲ蒙ルニ付、シタテアリマス。此等ノ罪ニ因リテ、強姦、虐待
 等ノ事、第一及第二條、各頁ニ見ラレタリ。又、日本兵ノ
 於テ、斯ル金庫、俘虜ノ作戦ニ直接関係アル作業、労働
 ノ強制、サトクニ之ノス。之ノ多クハ飛行場、建設ニ際シ、
 サトク運合軍ニ依リ攻撃ヲ準備シ、防衛ノ陣地、構築コリ
 成ルニ付リマス。

1-157

此ノ戦争犯罪ガ政府ノ政策、事項ニ、或政府、無
 意ノ事トシテ犯サレタリ、又、戦争犯罪ノ種類
 以テ別ルニ論議ヲ定結スルニ付、之ガ其ノ論議ニ
 比シテ、此等諸地域、全体、非常ニ多数、日本兵、將校ガ
 論議、サトクノ犯罪ヲ犯シ、其ノ指揮下、軍隊ニ付、
 行方ノ許スルコト、彼等ノ行動ガ日本政府ヨ
 リ承認シ、且、サトクト彼等ガ確信ニ付、サトクトスル
 現像ニ及バ、サトクノ自認、指摘、サトク、付リマス。

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1-160 3頁

D 101

記號	日期	金額	摘要
①	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
②	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
③	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
④	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
⑤	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
⑥	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
⑦	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
⑧	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
⑨	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
⑩	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
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⑫	一九五六	一六〇〇	...
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Handwritten text in a cursive script, likely a letter or a journal entry. The text is dense and covers most of the page. It appears to be in a historical or literary context, possibly related to the '18th century' mentioned in the margin.

18th century

Handwritten text in a cursive script, continuing from the previous block. It contains several lines of text, some of which are more legible than others due to the handwriting style.

18th century	18th century
18th century	18th century
18th century	18th century

2-103

一、**イロハニホトテ**
 二、**ハルカニ**
 三、**ニシテ**
 四、**トモニ**
 五、**キコフ**
 六、**サバシ**
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Surrender to I-1408

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 七十九、**カタシ**
 八十、**トシ**
 八十一、**サバシ**
 八十二、**カタシ**
 八十三、**トシ**
 八十四、**サバシ**
 八十五、**カタシ**
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 八十七、**サバシ**
 八十八、**カタシ**
 八十九、**トシ**
 九十、**サバシ**
 九十一、**カタシ**
 九十二、**トシ**
 九十三、**サバシ**
 九十四、**カタシ**
 九十五、**トシ**
 九十六、**サバシ**
 九十七、**カタシ**
 九十八、**トシ**
 九十九、**サバシ**
 一百、**カタシ**

Summation J

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一、查認... 二、... 三、... 四、... 五、...
 六、... 七、... 八、... 九、... 十、...
 十一、... 十二、... 十三、... 十四、... 十五、...
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 九十六、... 九十七、... 九十八、... 九十九、... 一百、...
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 一百九十六、... 一百九十七、... 一百九十八、... 一百九十九、... 二百、...

0159 0003 0604

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Summary 丁

J-111

本國の歴史は、大正に於ては、明治に於ての歴史の延長として、戦後の歴史を構成する。

その歴史は、戦前の歴史と、戦中の歴史と、戦後の歴史とに分けられる。

戦前の歴史は、明治の歴史であり、大正の歴史であり、昭和の歴史である。

戦中の歴史は、昭和の歴史であり、昭和の歴史である。

戦後の歴史は、昭和の歴史であり、昭和の歴史である。

以上を総合すると、本國の歴史は、明治の歴史と、大正の歴史と、昭和の歴史とに分けられる。

我が國の歴史は、大正に於ては、明治に於ての歴史の延長として、戦後の歴史を構成する。

その歴史は、戦前の歴史と、戦中の歴史と、戦後の歴史とに分けられる。

戦前の歴史は、明治の歴史であり、大正の歴史であり、昭和の歴史である。

戦中の歴史は、昭和の歴史であり、昭和の歴史である。

戦後の歴史は、昭和の歴史であり、昭和の歴史である。

以上を総合すると、本國の歴史は、明治の歴史と、大正の歴史と、昭和の歴史とに分けられる。

Summation J

公、宛名、右情款の通り也。情報局ハ一方保護國

俾令ニシテ他、自衛に在リテ、復た其に空六ノ對シテ、

前記一切ノ情款ヲ因縁國ニ傳ヘ、保護國ハ其ノ

主張ニ依シテ、自衛ニ在リテ、復た其に空六ノ對シテ、

第一、此等ノ事柄ニ直接關係アル情事ヲ其ノ各國

下立ニ其ノ新聞記者、或ハ特派員ニ對シテ、

ルコトヲ、極大ニ注意ヲ喚ビルベシトス。

此ノ目的ノ為メ、自衛ニ在リテ、復た其に空六ノ對シテ、

第一、此等ノ事柄ニ直接關係アル情事ヲ其ノ各國

下立ニ其ノ新聞記者、或ハ特派員ニ對シテ、

ルコトヲ、極大ニ注意ヲ喚ビルベシトス。

此ノ目的ノ為メ、自衛ニ在リテ、復た其に空六ノ對シテ、

0159 0003 0607

Handwritten text in a cursive script, likely a letter or document, with several lines of text.

Second block of handwritten text, continuing the document.

Third block of handwritten text, concluding the document.

Vertical handwritten text on the left margin, possibly a name or address.

Small handwritten mark or signature at the bottom left.

Summation K

此五張送二進六六、日本三三三、實行也、
 上車如二對二、傑、通例、戰、要、類、
 ヲ生進せ之、大、假、略、政、策、二、對、三、
 梅又二上十、六、識、人、ト、言、之、警、言、ヲ、
 千、ハ、防、衛、ト、シ、テ、ナ、リ、ト、シ、ル、ハ、本、裁、權、
 不、論、進、不、不、論、進、不、

此六、最近二假、下、々、出、嗟、印、家、
 工失、セ、テ、了、シ、ニ、テ、シ、ル、ハ、先、大、政、策、二、
 時、時、相、互、二、排、擠、入、ル、ニ、テ、シ、テ、シ、ル、ハ、
 或、此、の、範、疇、ニ、属、ス、ニ、居、テ、カ、後、ハ、他、一、範、疇、ニ、
 告、口、カ、多、ク、イ、テ、シ、ル、ハ、自、自、立、出、テ、上、
 比、事、實、ヲ、調、ベ、テ、見、ル、ニ、テ、シ、ル、ハ、別、々、
 在、在、出、現、ス、ル、如、ク、ハ、問、題、ト、シ、テ、シ、ル、ハ、
 此、二、カ、リ、ル、ニ、テ、シ、ル、ハ、即、チ、合、議、會、ハ、
 此、策、ヲ、樹、立、ス、ル、に、法、律、ニ、據、ル、ハ、
 上、テ、シ、ル、政、策、ニ、對、シ、テ、高、官、任、カ、
 二、金、部、被、裁、ハ、總、體、的、的、的、的、
 二、政、策、ニ、對、シ、テ、各、自、有、ル、特、殊、性、
 二、以、テ、現、在、の、審、判、中、二、對、シ、テ、
 二、又、

Summary

... 政府 ... 政策 ... 社會 ... 經濟 ... 政治 ... 法律 ... 教育 ... 文化 ... 藝術 ... 科學 ... 宗教 ... 哲學 ... 歷史 ... 地理 ... 體育 ... 音樂 ... 戲劇 ... 電影 ... 廣播 ... 電視 ... 出版 ... 印刷 ... 交通 ... 運輸 ... 郵政 ... 電信 ... 金融 ... 銀行 ... 保險 ... 證券 ... 房地產 ... 農業 ... 牧業 ... 漁業 ... 工業 ... 礦業 ... 能源 ... 交通 ... 運輸 ... 郵政 ... 電信 ... 金融 ... 銀行 ... 保險 ... 證券 ... 房地產 ... 農業 ... 牧業 ... 漁業 ... 工業 ... 礦業 ... 能源 ...

R.3

Summation K

K-4

教多^レ承知^シ之^ヲ之^ヲ狀^ノ計^ヲシ^テ人^ノ報^ヲニ^シ目^ヲ在^ル金^ノ幣^ヲ一
 或^ハ學^ノ場^ニ傳^ハ入^ル場^ニ會^ハス^ルバ^シ之^ヲ權^ヲ下^ニ置^ク事^ナシ
 統^ヲ治^スル^ハ心^ヲ力^ヲ十^ニ分^ノ一^ヲ行^フル^ニ限^リス^ル所^ニ一^ヲ言^ハス^ル心^ヲ以^テ世^ヲ
 任^ス者^ハ人^ノ心^ヲ行^フル^ニ限^リス^ル也

外交官^ト誰^レ人^トト^シ外交^官大^臣ノ訓令^ヲ遵^行ス^ルト
 故^ニ或^ハ新^ニ造^リテ^ハ權^ヲ倒^スハ^シテ^ハ同^ノ心^ヲ以^テ之^ヲ權^ヲ倒^ス
 倒^ルハ^シテ^ハ外交^官ノ^一特^ニ權^ヲ五^張ヲ^以テ^ハ承^知ス^ル事^ナシ
 之^ヲ以^テ又^ハ斯^ノ以^テ特^ニ權^ヲト^シテ^ハ人^ノ心^ヲ在^ル所^ニ限^リス^ル也
 斯^ノ以^テ特^ニ權^ヲト^シテ^ハ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ五
 權^者之^一特^ニ權^ヲカ^レル^ニ五^張ニ^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ
 然^レ之^ニ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ國^際法^ニ違^フル^ニ限^リス^ル所^ニ限^リス^ル也
 任^ス者^ハ亦^ハ既^ニ二^冊ニ^シテ^ハ人^ノ心^ヲ在^ル所^ニ限^リス^ル也
 又^ハ大^臣ノ^一張^ヲ五^張ヲ^以テ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ五
 同^ノ心^ヲ以^テ又^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ
 大^臣ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ
 上^ニ基^キテ^ハ國^際ノ^一間^ノ書^信ヲ^以テ^ハ通^信ノ^一權^ヲ違^フル^ニ限^リス^ル也
 證^ニ據^テ國^際法^ニ上^ニ三^ノ心^ヲ識^スル^ニ限^リス^ル也
 任^ス者^ハ亦^ハ重^ニ西^方ノ^一心^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ
 野^村ノ^一心^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ
 NOMURAノ^一心^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ
 野^村ノ^一心^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ以^テ代^リト^シテ^ハ其^ノ他^ノ五^張ノ^一張^ヲ

Summation k

追廿五年十一月、在東京、由各國政府、
 檢察團、第一、國大、使、(何)一、場、會、(三)三、
 自己、政府、命令、命令、進行、(一)三、(二)六、(三)六、
 組織、團、(三)三、(一)一、職、務、範圍、(三)三、(三)三、(三)三、
 上、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、(七)三、
 為、自己、政府、政策、受、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、
 之、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 任、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 自己、職、務、範圍、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、
 正、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 其、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 以、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 兩名、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 有、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 是、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 一、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 及、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 其、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、
 其、(一)三、(二)三、(三)三、(四)三、(五)三、(六)三、

P. 6

部之員及内大臣の合して之なり。通例、戰爭犯罪非及
 三箇位者有、長上之ヲ、内閣、各大臣、把案顧問官、統帥
 亦一部類ニ屬ス。報告中ニ總理大臣ヲ合シ、閣議、議院員並
 被言ハ成リニテ中ニ下ナシ。并和對スル犯罪ニ對スル限ハ、
 日本、政府機構内、或ハ主要部門、政策制定ニ長上ノ
 終ニ義務或ハ責任ヲ負シテ中ヲ報告シ、政策決定、命令或ハ
 第一ノ部類ニ屬ス。被言即チ日本、法律、憲法、依皇取

K-6

Summation K

置キテ中ノ事實ニ上責任ヲ負ハルルキ報告ナリ。又
 ヲ行動及聲聞ニ依リ自分自身ヲ政策制定者トシテ水準ニ
 定ム所ニ依リ義務或ハ責任ヲ負フコトヲ中ニ下ナシ。其ノ
 策定對スル義務或ハ責任ヲ負フ中ヲ被言(3)曰ク、法律ノ
 日本、法律、定ム所ニ依リ、從的ニ甲同の法有テ、法律ニ
 中ヲ被言(2)最然、義務或ハ責任ヲ負フ中ニ下ナシ。又
 法律、定ム所ニ依リ、政策制定對スル最然、義務或ハ責任ヲ負
 ヲ特殊ノ法ニ關シテ、二部類ニ類別スルニ下ナシ。又、中ニ下
 為ニ對スル責任、特權及範圍ヲ決定スル者被言(1)其ノ中
 同ノ基礎ニ對シテ中ニ下ナシ。又、中ニ下ナシ。又、特殊ノ
 中ニ下ナシ。或ハ特殊ノ法ニ對スル者被言(1)其ノ中ニ下ナシ。又、
 總テ、被言(1)日本、侵蝕政策、策定者トシテ、法律、依リ、中ニ

K-5

責任の所在

人道に對しては罪に關する限りは於て人権に照して人々
 及び獸類に對しては現地に對し指揮官命令に依り
 たり。三、種類に原人及び被宣告者に於ては特等ノ夫ノ
 其ノ權限内ニ於て政策は定三對て其ノ最終ノ義務或ハ夫
 任ヲ及ぶ事ヲ許さる。實際ハ彼等台身ヲ及ぶ權ヲ行使
 せしむるに拘り採り用せしむる後継政策ニ對して責任を
 たり。日本政府機關内、主要部門、責任を
 個人に課す或ハ政策決定部、責任を共同に課
 せしむる事ハ最終ノ權力及義務ヲ用て人々及ビ社會
 ヲ其ノ權ヲ行使せん人々其ノ權ヲ行使する責任を
 せしむる事ヲ許さる。

然レども他人ノ權ヲ行使せん事ヲ許さる人々
 矢張り同様ニ責任ヲ用てたり。政策決定部
 ノ責任ヲ課す部、部長、副部長、或ハ各人自ラノ權ヲ
 行使し明瞭ニ或ハ暗ニ何レノ事ヲ行はせんと欲す
 等也。人々が專ら決定三對して自ラノ責任ヲ課す
 也。同意ニ責任ヲ負ふ事ヲ許さる。

基本法及ビ之ニ從テ制定せし法律ニ依り權利及ビ義務
 ヲ免れんと欲する事ヲ許さる。

責任

七-11

Summation K

其、部門、立案之政策ニ関シ最終ノ権力及最終ノ
 義務又ハ責任ヲ有シ居ル政府機構、主ナル部門、長
 ル者ハソノ有スル権限ヲ部下ニ委任スルナリ。彼、其、部
 下ノナシテ決議ニ対シテ責任ヲ負フベキナリ。彼、自
 介ガ其、決議ヲ否認若ハ取消ス非ガレ其、責任ヲ回
 避スルコト出来ズ。法律、ハ彼、最終責任ヲ負ハセズ
 シテ彼ガソノ決議ヲ破棄シテハ彼、決議ニ同意シ
 若シテ認可シテ見做サレテハナリ。斯クシテ非
 ザレ、彼、單ニ自己ノ権限及義務ヲ諸種、部下ニ委任ス
 ルニ依リテ全責任ヲ完全ニ回避スルコト出来ルコトナリ
 又。同様ニ一軍又ハ戰鬥地域、指揮官ハ自己ノ部下、
 行爲ニ対シテ最終ノ責任ヲ負フベキナリ。行政上
 ノ効力ヲ上ケルコト、彼、其、権限ヲ部下、指揮官ニ委
 任スルコト出来。併シ、彼、最終責任ハ存続シテナリ。又
 若シ部下、指揮官ガ此等ノ権限ヲ濫用シ若シ、實施セ
 ザルトキ彼ガ必要ナル訂正手段ヲ採ラレテ責任ハ最終
 責任ヲ有スル者ニ存スルベキナリ。

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Summation K.

1c-8

辯護側ハ日本、法律カコ、部類、官吏ニ課スル最終
 義務若ハ責任ハ單ニ政治的主責任ナリト論争セシカモ
 知レセ。一國ノ政治的行爲ヲ國際法ノ紀綱ナラシム
 論議ノ目的、又、コレヲ下ルニ仮定スルニ併テ斯様
 ナ者、日本ノ法律ニ當然、其ノ決議ニ對シテハ刑章ニ責任
 ガルトイフ理由、下ルニ容認スルヲハリ、之ニ國内ニ終
 テ其ノ行爲ニ對シ最終、政治上ノ權限義務ヲ責任ヨ有
 スルハ罪モナク、犯罪ノ遂行上タリ、ベカラズ此職務ニ就
 テル人ナラシテ下リ。本人ノ肯定能決斷者ハ默諾
 ナレハ犯罪ハ犯シ得ナカシテ下リ。又、ソレ故ニ國内
 的ニ最終、政治的義務若ハ責任ヲ有スル、國際的ニソレ
 相當ニ刑事上ノ責任ヲ有シテ下リ。

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Summation K

其例ニ在リテ、テリ。彼等ノ種々ノ表出ニ根據義
 務乃至責任ヲ解カ去ルニテ、正式ニ裁断ヲ請フナリ
 決定ニテ場合ガ位ニ止ラズ、ニガシク裁断ノ責、
 性格ニ固着ナシテテリ。最終責任者ノハ、然レ
 一旦、多角的ニ任務ヲ担ヒテ居リ、彼等ノハ、必
 然テテリ。ソレヲテ、部下ノ指シテテリ、テ
 リ。彼等ノ部下ニ默示ヲ行フ、或ハ、彼等ノ者
 持テ部員ヲ訓練ス者ナリ。看ルカ、彼等ノハ、密
 々テリ。之等、部下ノ實際ニ與テテリ、テ、極
 々特殊ニ、觀テテ、之等、人々ノ方、對テ、敬愛
 者テリ。連累者テテテ。中間者、特ニ、著
 々、國際的犯罪ヲ構成スル行為ニ對テ、責任、蓋
 々、免レ、唯、道ハ、特定、場合ニ於テ、彼等、情
 行等、何等關係、ナク、又、標本ナリ、針ガ
 決定、彼等、及、對テ、其、彼ガ、根、蓋、ニ、反、對
 ンモ、テ、事ヲ、示ス、テ、テ、リ。

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國際法上犯罪之構成要件，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

法理上之犯罪，其構成要件，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

故法理上之犯罪，其構成要件，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

又，一、犯罪之構成要件，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

二、責任之歸屬，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

三、行為之發生，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

四、行為之發生，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

五、行為之發生，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

六、行為之發生，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

七、行為之發生，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

八、行為之發生，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

九、行為之發生，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

十、行為之發生，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。此上最顯著者，在於行為之發生，而非在於行為之結果。

Summation

P.13

R/14

K-11 被召全部一就自女ハ、彼等、群ハ大部命日本、徳意敵
 策立案ニ對シテ、事與、彼等、能、彼等、亦、而、之、理由
 カニ、此、彼等、責、任、三、因、此、完、了、也、ト、ハ、証、據、不、存、
 コ、エ、テ、ア、リ、ハ、カ、日、本、政、治、機、構、由、於、干、預、使、用、者、ハ、中、
 ノ、事、カ、ニ、ス、ル、最、終、又、ハ、中、間、ノ、決、断、者、被、召、者、ハ、事、法、
 故、ニ、被、召、者、大、部、者、ハ、彼、等、が、在、職、中、行、ヒ、タ、ル、行、為、
 ハ、一、ニ、對、シ、テ、文、交、ニ、責、任、ヲ、負、フ、ハ、ム、ベ、キ、モ、一、點、ヲ、不、ナ、リ、ス、法、
 規、上、最、終、ハ、義、務、或、ハ、責、任、ヲ、被、召、者、が、課、ス、ル、コ、ト、カ、ラ、
 決、定、ス、ル、ニ、ハ、日、本、政、治、機、構、ヲ、檢、討、ス、ル、必、要、ナ、ル、コ、ト、ナ、リ、

Summation K

變、化、ス、ル、為、メ、此、ノ、一、部、ヲ、一、部、ニ、シ、テ、其、他、ノ、部、ヲ、
 下、リ、ス、コ、ト、等、ハ、人、達、ハ、往、々、權、限、ヲ、シ、テ、其、他、ノ、部、ヲ、
 得、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、針、ニ、シ、テ、機、唱、者、ヲ、シ、テ、一、部、ヲ、一、部、ニ、シ、テ、
 其、他、ノ、部、ヲ、人、達、ハ、主、張、ス、ル、コ、ト、ハ、一、部、ニ、シ、テ、其、他、ノ、部、
 彼、等、ハ、其、他、ノ、部、ヲ、不、法、的、的、に、機、唱、者、ヲ、行、ヒ、タ、ル、事、ヲ、
 特、殊、ノ、針、ニ、シ、テ、機、唱、者、ヲ、行、ヒ、タ、ル、事、ヲ、一、部、ニ、シ、テ、
 権、力、ヲ、振、リ、上、ル、コ、ト、ニ、依、リ、テ、國、策、ハ、立、本、ニ、シ、テ、其、他、ノ、部、
 ノ、採、擇、一、ニ、對、シ、テ、其、他、ノ、部、ヲ、一、部、ニ、シ、テ、其、他、ノ、部、
 且、ノ、実、行、ニ、移、シ、得、タ、ル、行、為、ヲ、托、担、ス、ル、コ、ト、ハ、被、召、者、ノ、少、
 ト、ニ、機、唱、者、及、ビ、機、唱、者、ノ、一、部、ヲ、一、部、ニ、シ、テ、其、他、ノ、部、

Summary K

リマス。日本、政治機構が他、諸國殊ニ其國、
 一 如キアルト假定スルニ、以テ得ルモノナラバ、今ナリ
 了斯様ニ假定スルニ違ハ、危險ナリトスルニ、
 長が相當ナル長所、通常、基本的政治機構、
 極テ皇天ノ福違イテ、教下ルモノナラバ、
 居ルモノアリマス。被告ノアル者ニ、
 確立スルモノ、即チ其相違イテ、
 吟味シテ、

K-12

此訴訟手続、合意ノ期間中ニ実行サ、
 言レバ政府、全権能ハ日本國天皇ニ歸スル
 アリマス。此ノ中ニ被告達自身モ、
 行動スルモノ、
 中ニ、
 天皇ニ進言者、
 天子ノコトヲ証スルモノアリマス。
 性ヲ附與セシメ、
 ト考ヘ得ルモノ、
 ニテ、
 皇天ノ福違イテ、

P. 15

公書証 六、 一、一、一六號
 各部録 三三三九、一三三
 書証 三六五、 部録 三六三七、六一三

0 159 0003 0625

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Demonstration

1. 是民及... 2. 天, 任命... 3. 與... 4. 議會... 5. 議會... 6. 議會... 7. 議會... 8. 議會... 9. 議會... 10. 議會... 11. 議會... 12. 議會... 13. 議會... 14. 議會... 15. 議會... 16. 議會... 17. 議會... 18. 議會... 19. 議會... 20. 議會...

Summation K

討、所感ヲ拘ミ居テチアタトシテ事ヲ以テ彼、責
 任ヲ回避スルコトヲモテ、決議ハ其、閣僚、閣員トシ
 成立スルコトヲモテ、事得テカラス事アリテ閣僚、復略
 手段ニ賛成投票スルカ又、黙從ヲ表明スルベリ、何時
 テモ許職スル事ハ必キ、今アリテモ若シ彼、個人的
 ニ確信ガ下ツトモ拘ミ彼等、其、閣僚、閣員トシテ在
 職スルガ、寧ろ重要ナルト思フタリ、又、其、評職ニテ
 カツラ、彼、法律上、復略政策ニ全能力ヲ傾ケテ居
 ツ主謀者ト同キ、責任ハカク、又、道徳上、其、罪
 悪ヲ充分認識シ、確信シテ、此、政策、木、故意ニ選
 テ、是、認シ、テ、アルカ、彼、等、以上、責任、カ、アル、テ、アリ、ス。

K-14

一省、長トシテ、閣僚、主責任ニ関シ、各省官制ニ関シ、勅
 令ハ、各大臣、ハ、主官事項ニ對シ、責任ヲアルベシト
 シ、コトヲ明確ニ規定スルベシトアリ、又、(a) 各省、官制、ハ、
 主官事項、閣、省令ヲ發シ、(b) 指示及ビ訓令ヲ發シ、
 且、警察及ビ地方官憲ヲ監督シ、彼等、命令ヲ停
 止スル權限ヲ有シ、(c) 又、其、下、僚ヲ統率、監督スル權
 限ヲ有シ、(d) 總理大臣ハ、特長ノ補職
 ナキ場合ト雖モ、彼、法規ニ各國務大臣、上、位ニテ、各行

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- a 書証 七三 才二條
- b " 七三 才四條
- c " 七三 才五條 其六條
- d " 七三 才七條

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Summation K

政部門運営、連絡調整ニ当リテ、
 總理、行政上、措置及命令ヲ停止ニ因テ、
 コトヲ得、敬憲察及ニ地方官吏ヲ指揮監督ニ或、
 等、命令ヲ停止及ニ撤同スル權限ヲ有ス、
 等、(4) 斯、抑、日本、法律、下、
 行爲ニ對シテ充極、主責任、總理大臣及ニ各省、長
 及ニ大臣ニ屬シテ、
 及ニ大臣ニ屬シテ、

K-14

書証七。

ナニ條

ナニ條

7290 0000 6510

0159 0003 0628

Secretary

一、國防部之職責
 二、國防部之組織
 三、國防部之編制
 四、國防部之經費
 五、國防部之訓練
 六、國防部之裝備
 七、國防部之研究
 八、國防部之宣傳
 九、國防部之外交
 十、國防部之其他

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- 1-15 國防部
- 1-16 國防部
- 1-17 國防部
- 1-18 國防部

Diagnosis

此部一要求此與源之制
 此權限維持之自注
 此戰事之抑制
 此東條一知日
 此限權之擁
 此政行力之獨立
 此自復割之權
 此指下之在
 此外交之於
 此十分檢討之證

中外通商章程

第一章 通商口岸

凡通商口岸，均准各國領事官駐紮。

P. 22

通商口岸，均准各國領事官駐紮。凡領事官駐紮之處，均准各國領事官辦理一切商務。凡領事官辦理一切商務，均准各國領事官辦理一切商務。凡領事官辦理一切商務，均准各國領事官辦理一切商務。

Summation K

K-16 統帥部、其、職權内ニ於テ、内閣、答喩ニ得ルコトガ、力
 ツテ、統帥部、(國策決定、参加ニ外、有効)内閣ヲ統帥シ
 リテ、リ、之、統帥部、自身、領域内、ニ、稱、就、テ、内
 閣ヲ獨立ニ、申、之、ガ、此、逆、(眞、テ、ハ、リ、マ、シ、即、チ、内閣、
 其、領域、於、テ、モ、統帥部、ヨリ、獨立、ニ、申、カ、タ、リ、テ、
 ス、之、陸海軍大臣、地位、僞、モ、テ、此、等、大臣、(政府、
 員、ト、シ、ト、同、時、統帥部、部、員、ト、シ、タ、リ、マ、シ、ス、此、系
 後、述、セ、タ、リ、今、テ、叙、ス、ル、ニ、モ、タ、日本憲法理論、基
 本、教、義、(ツ、違、背、モ、ト、者、ラ、シ、ス、ガ、尚、且、ツ、ガ、本、當、ニ、
 ヲ、實際、状態、ヲ、示、シ、テ、下、リ、ス、起、訴、狀、信、公、全、期
 同、直、リ、陸海軍大臣、(モ、現、役、陸軍、大、將、中、將、及
 海軍、大、將、及、中、將、ト、リ、マ、シ、タ、一、九、三、六、年、カ、ラ、現、役、新
 橋、丁、將、校、(モ、此、等、地位、ニ、就、キ、得、ル、コ、ト、ニ、法律、上、定、ム、
 三、タ、現、役、軍、人、ト、シ、タ、此、等、大臣、陸海軍、内、ニ、リ、
 部、ト、リ、シ、テ、上官、命、從、行、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、更、ニ、東、條、
 認、メ、テ、之、彼、陸海軍、大臣、ト、リ、政府、員、ト、リ、同、時、又、
 本、當、ニ、關係、者、ト、リ、軍、政、(閣、内、ニ、テ、作、戰、ヲ、頂、
 軍、人、ノ、見、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、東、條、統帥部、(責任、ト、言、フ、
 不、リ、也、)尚、理論、的、(軍、政、ト、作、戰、ト、区、別、ス、ル、ト、出、来、
 不、リ、カ、)實際上、区、別、ヲ、言、フ、コ、ト、ハ、無、取、テ、ト、テ、リ、マ、シ、

P. 22

K-16 a 書記 九三
 記 録 三六八二九一〇

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

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Germanische

上列二部未...
 完全...
 六此...
 翰車...
 田...
 友...
 統帥部...
 府...
 直...
 三...
 自...
 惟...
 陸...
 句...
 字...
 內...
 可...
 新...

新書 卷二 記録 三 九

Summation A

就任を拒否した方が主として主張する。この点も此、
 地位の受諾する候補者が乏しく、陸軍がこれら出衆
 内閣力或は指名された首相に不満な場合、この
 多と眞に注目すべきことである。部下、將校、上
 官が不満を思ふ内閣に勤めることは望むべくも
 ない。統帥部は望むが故に内閣を倒す好
 るが故に新内閣の出現を妨げることができ
 斯の統帥部、国策決定に參與すること、内閣を自由
 に決定する政策に對する最終責任を負ふ
 誤りである。

p. 25

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P 26

Summit K

國際聯盟之組織，其目的在於維持國際之和平與安全，並促進各國間之合作與友誼。此種組織之成立，實為人類歷史上之偉大事業。

國際聯盟之組織，係由各國代表在瑞士之瓦爾登會議中，經多數通過而成立。其宗旨在於維持國際之和平與安全，並促進各國間之合作與友誼。

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國際聯盟之組織

Summation K

組織 (國) 議會及軍、廷、國院、國附、... 總、... 國、... 批、... 三、... 四、... 五、... 六、... 七、... 八、... 九、... 十、... 十一、... 十二、... 十三、... 十四、... 十五、... 十六、... 十七、... 十八、... 十九、... 二十、... 二十一、... 二十二、... 二十三、... 二十四、... 二十五、... 二十六、... 二十七、... 二十八、... 二十九、... 三十、... 三十一、... 三十二、... 三十三、... 三十四、... 三十五、... 三十六、... 三十七、... 三十八、... 三十九、... 四十、... 四十一、... 四十二、... 四十三、... 四十四、... 四十五、... 四十六、... 四十七、... 四十八、... 四十九、... 五十、... 五十一、... 五十二、... 五十三、... 五十四、... 五十五、... 五十六、... 五十七、... 五十八、... 五十九、... 六十、... 六十一、... 六十二、... 六十三、... 六十四、... 六十五、... 六十六、... 六十七、... 六十八、... 六十九、... 七十、... 七十一、... 七十二、... 七十三、... 七十四、... 七十五、... 七十六、... 七十七、... 七十八、... 七十九、... 八十、... 八十一、... 八十二、... 八十三、... 八十四、... 八十五、... 八十六、... 八十七、... 八十八、... 八十九、... 九十、... 九十一、... 九十二、... 九十三、... 九十四、... 九十五、... 九十六、... 九十七、... 九十八、... 九十九、... 一百、...

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Summative K

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FEBRUARY 2 1948

IFS. RE: WASHIMOTO (CC)

ATTACHED PAGES 9, 10, 11, and 20 are to be substituted for
pages 9, 10, 11, and 20, in summation on WASHIMOTO (CC).

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FEBRUARY 2 1948

IPS. RE: HASHIMOTO (CC)

ATTACHED PAGES 9, 10, 11, and 20 are to be substituted for
pages 9, 10, 11, and 20, in summation on HASHIMOTO (CC).

IV. HASHIMOTO's connection with the March, October and Manchurian Incidents.

a. The March Incident.

CC-21. In connection with the March Incident, which was a plan to seize control of the government, OKAWA testified in the Tokyo Court of Appeals that it was at the request of HASHIMOTO and Col. SHIGETO that he held his interview with UGAKI to learn his views. The result of OKAWA's conference with UGAKI was reported by HASHIMOTO and SHIGETO to Deputy Chief of Staff NINOMIYA and TATEKAWA.^{a.} HASHIMOTO, in his testimony named TATEKAWA, KOISO, NINOMIYA, SUGIYAMA, OKAWA and himself as conspirators.^{b.}

CC-22. To offset the plot, HASHIMOTO obtained delivery of 300 bombs to SHIMIZU from the army^{a.} with which to start a mass demonstration which would lead to martial law and overthrow of the Cabinet.^{b.}

b. The Manchurian Incident.

CC-23. In addition to what appears in Part III of this summation, activities in preparation for a solution of the Manchurian Incident, there is evidence that HASHIMOTO admitted to TANAKA, Ryukichi, in 1934

CC-21.
a. Ex. 2177, T. 15,880-3
b. T. 28,820

CC-23.
a. Ex. 157, T. 1402-3
b. Ex. 157, T. 1402-3

(CC-23)
 that he, HASHIMOTO, had assisted the Kwantung Army,
 in accordance with a plan to have such an incident.
 TANAKA testified that HASHIMOTO named himself and
 five others as conspirators and defined the purpose
 to be the occupation of Manchuria, destruction of the
 influence of the war lords, and bringing about
 economic development and army occupation.^{a.} Capt. CHO,
 another of the conspirators, in discussing the matter
 with TANAKA also named HASHIMOTO as a co-conspirator.^{b.}

c. The October Incident.

CC-24. As for the October Incident, which was
 also a plan to seize control of the government, HASHIMOTO
 admitted that he thought up the plan to bring about a
 Cabinet headed by ARAMI as a result of a conversation
 with Capt. CHO.^{a.} That HASHIMOTO was involved in this
 plot is also confirmed by testimony of OKAWA in the
 Tokyo Court of Appeals where he said that the aim of
 the October Incident was to crush the TAKATSUKI Cabinet,
 which was dilly-dallying, and to set up a new and
 powerful party capable of solving important problems.
 OKAWA said he received his orders from HASHIMOTO, and
 that others involved were SHIGETO, ITAGAKI and NOMURA.^{b.}

CC-23.

- a. T. 1968, 1978
 b. T. 2014

CC-24.

- a. Ex. 3195, T. 28,975
 b. Ex. 2177-A, T. 15,565-7

(CC-24)
 TATEKAWA also told TAMAYA that HASHIMOTO, CHO and OKATA planned the October Incident to overthrow the government in power and to set up a new government which would support the Manchurian Incident.^{c.} This plan was to cleanse the ideological and political atmosphere of Japan and renovate Japanese politics by assassinating the leaders.^{d.} After the plot was discovered, HASHIMOTO and others were arrested,^{e.} and HASHIMOTO was subjected to heavy disciplinary confinement for 25 days and relegated to the HIMEJI Regiment.^{f.}

CC-25. Shelling of the Ladybird.

CC-26. On 11 December 1937, in the course of the blockade of China, a Japanese artillery unit under command of HASHIMOTO shelled the British vessel Ladybird and took it into custody.^{a.} The lame excuse given before the Tribunal that it was barely dawn and

CC-24.

- c. T. 2013
- d. T. 1973
- e. Ex. 3195, T. 29,795
- f. T. 19,667

CC-26.

- a. Ex. 258, T. 3166-7

(CC-11) carried out or attempted. These policies were likewise the policies of the other conspirators, who to a greater or lesser degree participated in the plan to impose its will by force on those who refused to consent.

CC-12. The absurdity of the claim by HASHIMOTO that Japan needed more and more living space for its millions is shown by the fact that Japan, from 1929 to 1941, already had possession of Korea and Formosa, and also had control of Manchuria. It was not territory the Japanese militarists were after. It was enslavement of the Asiatic world for Japan's announced destiny to bring the whole world under one roof, the roof of Japan (Hakko Ichiu explained by HASHIMOTO;^{a.} by MATSUOKA;^{b.} by TOJO;^{c.} referred to in connection with the Tri-Partite Pact;^{d.} referred to in connection with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere;^{e.} and defined.^{f.})

CC-43. As for HASHIMOTO's guilt under Counts 46-47, inclusive, and 54-55, inclusive, relating to murder and mistreatment of POW and civilians, outside of the shelling of the Ladybird, it can only be said that by his inflammatory language in the incitement of violence he helped produce the mental state of those who fought the

CC-42.

- a. T. 3535-C
- b. T. 3191
- c. T. 10303
- d. T. 6409
- e. T. 12215
- f. T. 9645

HASHIMOTO, Kingoro1. Charges against HASHIMOTO.

CC-1. In Counts 1 through 5 HASHIMOTO is charged with others in conspiring to wage wars of aggression in violation of international law, treaties and agreements with the object of obtaining for Japan the military, naval, political and economic domination:

- (a) Of East Asia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Count 1)
- (b) Of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, parts of China (Count 2)
- (c) The Republic of China (Count 3)
- (d) East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian Ocean and of all countries bordering thereon (Count 4)
- (e) Of the world in conjunction with Germany and Italy, but having domination in its own sphere (Count 5)

CC-2. In Counts 6 through 17 it is charged that HASHIMOTO with others, between 1 January 1928 and 2 September 1945, planned and prepared a war or wars of aggression in violation of international law, treaties, and agreements:

- (a) Against the Republic of China (Count 6)
 - (b) Against the United States of America (Count 7)
 - (c) Against the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations (Count 8)
 - (d) Against the Commonwealth of Australia (Count 9)
 - (e) Against New Zealand (Count 10)
 - (f) Against Canada (Count 11)
-

(CC-2)

- (g) Against India (Count 13)
- (h) Against the Commonwealth of the Philippines (Count 13)
- (i) Against the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Count 14)
- (j) Against the Republic of France (Count 15)
- (k) Against the Kingdom of Thailand (Count 16)
- (l) Against the USSR (Count 17)

CC-3. In Count 18, HASHIMOTO and others are charged with initiating a war of aggression against China, in violation of treaties, agreements, etc., on or about 18 September 1931.

CC-4. In Count 19, HASHIMOTO and others are charged with initiating a war of aggression against China in violation of treaties, agreements, etc., on or about 7 July 1937.

CC-5. In Counts 27 to 32, inclusive, and Count 34 HASHIMOTO and others are charged with waging a war or wars of aggression in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances against:

- (a) The Republic of China between 18 September 1937 and 2 September 1945 (Count 27)
 - (b) The Republic of China, between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 (Count 28)
 - (c) The United States of America, between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 (Count 29)
 - (d) The Commonwealth of the Philippines, between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 (Count 30)
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(CC-5)

Page CC-3.

- (e) The British Commonwealth of Nations, between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 (Count 31)
- (f) The Kingdom of the Netherlands, between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 (Count 32)
- (g) The Kingdom of Thailand, between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 (Count 34)

CC-6. HASHIMOTO is charged with others as a conspirator in formulating or executing a plan to permit murder on a wholesale scale of POW on land and sea between 18 September 1931 and 2 September 1945 (Count 44)

CC-7. HASHIMOTO is charged with others with ordering or permitting an unlawful attack and the unlawful killing of thousands of civilians and disarmed soldiers of The Republic of China:

- (a) On 12 December 1937 at Nanking (Count 45)
- (b) On 21 October 1938 at Canton (Count 46)
- (c) On or about 27 October 1938 at Hankow (Count 47)

CC-8. HASHIMOTO is charged with permitting violations of laws and customs of war as to POW and civilian internees in China from 18 September 1931 to 2 September 1945 (Count 53)

CC-9. HASHIMOTO is charged with ordering violations of laws of war as to POW and civilian internees in China from 18 September 1931 to 2 September 1945 (Count 54)

CC-10. HASHIMOTO is charged with deliberately and recklessly disregarding his legal duty to secure observance of the laws and

(CC-10)

customs of war as to POW and civilians in the power of Japan between 1st September 1931 and 2 September 1945 in China (Count 55)

II HASHIMOTO's military service.

CC-11. HASHIMOTO graduated from the Military Academy in 1911 and was appointed 2nd lieutenant of artillery. He served in the army continuously and reached the grade of Colonel in 1934. He was placed on the reserve list in August 1936 and recalled to duty in 1937. He then was placed on the reserve list in March 1939, after which he performed no active duty.

CC-12. HASHIMOTO graduated from the Military Staff College in 1917, served on the General Staff in the War Office in 1921, and with the Kwantung Army Headquarters in 1922, and again from 1923 to 1925. From 1925 to 1927 he served with the General Staff Office and War Office. From September 1927 through 1929 he served as Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in the Turkish Empire. From January 1930 to December 1931 he served on the General Staff War Office. From 1937 to 1939 he served as Commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Division.

CC-13. He received several decorations - among them one in 1934 in recognition of his services during the disturbances from 1931 to 1934; another in April 1940, when he received the 4th Class Order of the Golden Kite in recognition of his services in the China
a.
Disturbances.

CC-13.

a. Exh. 105, T. 699

III HASHIMOTO's political activities prior to the Manchurian Incident.

a. Views on the USSR, Manchurian and Mongolian Problems.

CC-14. In April 1929, while HASHIMOTO was Japanese Military Attache in Turkey, he attended a conference held in Berlin of Japanese Military Attaches in European countries which discussed items concerning the USSR. At this conference conditions in the Soviet were appraised, both present and future; the policy Japan should adopt was discussed if any future change took place in the USSR; a study of sabotage measures to be taken by various European countries was considered, in case of war with the USSR; a survey was presented of the activities White Russians could engage in; and views were exchanged on the effect on Soviet-European relations if Japan should end friendly relations with the USSR. HASHIMOTO suggested that Trotsky and 60 of his associates who had arrived in Turkey might be used for espionage, and that reports should be bought from good spies whenever a "good spy" is found.^{a.}

CC-15. In a secret report of 15 November 1929, HASHIMOTO recommended that the Caucasus should be seized for operations against Russia. He suggested to the Assistant Chief of the Army General Staff that this could be brought about by making all races in the Caucasus confront each other and thus bring about confusion in the area by instigating either the idea of Greater Armenia, or an independent Georgia, or the Mussulman movement, or the Partisan movement of the mountaineers. He said that the idea of Greater Armenia would

CC-14.

a. Ex. 732-A, T. 7652

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(CC-15)

Page CC-6.

be most promising as a fuse to give rise to such a situation regardless of its success, as this would result in great confusion breaking out because of opposition on the part of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

CC-15. In 1930, HASHIMOTO returned to Japan after a three-year stay in Europe. On his homeward voyage he pondered on how to reform Japan, because he felt that Japan was the only country "within the whirlpool of world movement that stood within the bounds of liberalism", and he considered that if she went on under present conditions she would drop from the ranks in the community of nations and fall. Therefore, on his return to the General Staff Office he "devised several schemes to put" his ideas into execution, and while he would not dare to say they were the only cause of such results, the Manchurian Incident, secession from the League of Nations, and renunciation of the disarmament treaty took place successively, and within the country the May 15th Incident, Shimo Tai Incident, and the February 26th Incident took place in succession.

CC-17. KIDO records in his Diary on 7 August 1931 that HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI backed a group of recent graduates from the Army Staff College in the study of Manchurian and Mongolian problems. These problems centered about the creation of a new regime, following the killing of Marshal Chang Tso' lin, by getting rid of the war lords in Manchuria and separating Manchuria from the ranking government. In fact an investigation by MI-2, then Chief of the Tokyo I.F. unit,

CC-15.

a. Ex. 734-A, T. 7647

CC-15.

a. Ex. 177, T. 1918-21

CC-17.

a. Ex. 179-A to 179-P, T. 1928

b. Ex. 1945

c. Ex. 1953

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(CC-17)

Page CC-7.

disclosed that the purpose of the killing of Chang Tso-lin was to create such new state under Japanese control. ^{d.} TANAKA, Ryukichi, testified that after Chan Hsueh-liang succeeded Chang Tso-lin the relations in Manchuria became extremely aggravated because Chang Hsueh-liang entered the Kuomintang and brought the Kuomintang flag into Manchuria. ^{e.} The Japanese army took a strong attitude in view of the great sacrifice Japan had made in that area since the Russo-Japanese war ^{f.} and took the stand that armed force should be resorted to in driving out the Chinese forces and setting up a new regime under Japanese control. ^{g.} Strong advocates of this procedure were HASEGAWA and Captain CHO, Isamu. ^{h.}

b. HASEGAWA, an organizer of the Sakura-Kai.

CC-18. The Sakura-Kai, was formally organized in the spring of 1931, the first meeting being called by HASEGAWA. ^{a.} All branches of the military establishments were active in this organization, including the War Office, the General Staff, and officers from the Inspector General of Military Education. They ranked from lieutenant-colonels to majors. The navy also had several officers active in its affairs. ^{b.} The purpose of the Sakura-Kai was two-fold; one, to carry out an internal revolution, or renovation, and, second, to settle the Manchurian problem. ^{c.} These purposes dovetailed into the plans of the army which desired a settlement of the Manchurian problem, bringing Manchuria under Japanese control, and, if harmony and cooperation could be realized, ^{d.} to use this as a basis for eventually freeing Asia from white domination and bring about the "ideal of Asia for the Asiatics." ^{e.} Coupled with military action

CC-17.

d. Ex. 180, T. 1951
 e. T. 1956
 f. T. 1958
 g. T. 1959
 h. T. 1960

CC-18.

a. T. 1961, Ex. 183, T. 2188
 b. T. 1962
 c. T. 1953
 d. T. 1986
 e. T. 1987

(CC-18)

Page CC-8.

in Manchuria, the Sakura-Kai, the group led by HASHIMOTO, sought to oppose the Japanese politicians and financiers who were extremely weak in their attitude toward various problems, and bring about their downfall and realize the "renovation of Japan".^{f.}

Such renovation was to be carried out by a "grand coup d'etat", by overthrowing the government and then setting up a new and renovated government to cleanse politics and political administration^{g.} as well as rally public opinion and efforts of the people toward settlement of the Manchurian problem.^{b.} That such plans were attempted is demonstrated by the March and October Incidents, which will be mentioned later.

CC-19. HASHIMOTO, the Sakura-Kai leader, in August 1931 told FUJITA, a newspaper owner, that positive action should be taken in Manchuria,^{a.} and on 19 September 1931 FUJITA saw HASHIMOTO and recalled saying to him, "I see you accomplished what you said should be done in Manchuria", or "At last you have done it, haven't you"^{b.} to which HASHIMOTO replied, "Yes, things came to the pass where they should come."^{c.}

CC-20. Thus the purposes and objects of the Sakura-Kai were put to practical use in effecting one of its primary objects, namely, the solution of the Manchurian problem, and in this HASHIMOTO had a leading part. The interference in political matters or political activity by officers, although prohibited,^{a.} was flagrantly and openly espoused by HASHIMOTO and other army officers in the Sakura-Kai and in movements for renovation of the government and by their stimulation and direction of a military-political movement in Manchuria, which ultimately led to international condemnation of Japan by the League of Nations.^{b.}

CC-18.

- f. T. 1982
- g. T. 1982
- h. T. 1983

CC-19.

- a. T. 1464
- b. T. 1465, 147A-5
- c. T. 1466

CC-20.

- a. Ev. 157, T. 1402-03
- b. Ex. 157, T. 1402-03

Page CC-9.

IV HASHIMOTO's connection with the March, October, Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents.

a. The March Incident.

CC-21. In connection with the March Incident, which was a plan to seize control of the government, OKAWA testified in the Tokyo Court of Appeals that it was at the request of HASHIMOTO and Col. SHIGETO that he held his interview with UGAKI to learn his views. The result of OKAWA's conference with UGAKI was reported by HASHIMOTO and SHIGETO to Deputy Chief of Staff MINOMIYA and

TATEKAWA.^{a.} HASHIMOTO, in his testimony named TATEKAWA, KOISO,^{b.} MINOMIYA, SUGIYAMA, OKAWA and himself as conspirators.

CC-22. To effect the plot, HASHIMOTO obtained delivery of 300^{a.} bombs to SHIMIZU from the army with which to start a mass demonstration which would lead to martial law and overthrow of the Cabinet.^{b.}

b. The Manchurian Incident.

C-23. In addition to what appears in Part III of this summation, activities in preparation for a solution of the Manchurian Incident, there is evidence that HASHIMOTO admitted to TAKAKA, Ryukichi, in 1934 that he, HASHIMOTO, had assisted the Kwantung Army, in accordance with a plan to have such an incident. TAMURA testified that HASHIMOTO named himself and five others as conspirators and defined the purpose to be the occupation of Manchuria, destruction of the influence of the war lords, and bringing about economic development and army occupation.^{c.} Capt. CHO, another of the conspirators, in discussing^{d.} the matter with TAKAKA also named HASHIMOTO as a co-conspirator.

CC-21.

- a. Ex. 2177, T. 15,500-83
b. T. 22,620

CC-22.

- a. Ex. 157, T. 1402-03
b. Ex. 157, T. 1402-03
c. T. 1968; 1978
d. T. 2614

c. The October Incident.

Page CC-10.

CC-24. As for the October Incident, which was also a plan to seize control of the government, HASHIMOTO admitted that he thought up the plan to bring about a Cabinet headed by ARAKI as a result of a conversation with Capt. CHO.^{a.} That HASHIMOTO was involved in this plot is also confirmed by testimony of OKAWA in the Tokyo Court of Appeals where he said that the aim of the October Incident was to crush the WAZATSUMI Cabinet, which was dilly-dallying, and to set up a new and powerful party capable of solving important problems. OKAWA said he received his orders from HASHIMOTO, and that others involved were SIGEMOTO, ITAGAKI and DOIHARA.^{b.} TATEKAWA also told TAKEAKA that HASHIMOTO, CHO and OKAWA planned the October Incident to overthrow the government in power and to set up a new government which would support the Manchurian Incident.^{c.} The plan was to cleanse the ideological and political atmosphere of Japan and renovate Japanese politics by assassinating the leaders.^{d.} After the plot was discovered, HASHIMOTO and others were arrested,^{e.} and HASHIMOTO was subjected to heavy disciplinary confinement for 25 days and relegated to the HIMAWI Regiment.^{f.}

d. The Shanghai Incident.

CC-25. Prior to military action at Lukouchiao, HASHIMOTO, Chief of Staff of the Japanese forces in China, demanded of General Ching the right to buy 6,000 mu of land between Fengtai and Lukouchiao. Since a purchase of the land would have been wholly contrary to the law of China and contrary to the desires of the individuals who owned the land,^{a.} the demand was refused. The only alternative remaining

CC-24.

- a. Ex. 3195, T. 26,975
- b. Ex. 2177-A, T. 15,585-7
- c. T. 2013
- d. T. 1973
- e. Ex. 3195, T. 28,755
- f. T. 19,367

CC-25.

- a. Ex. 198, T. 2321-2

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(CC-25)

Page CC-11.

was to obtain it by military force. From the fall of 1936, the Japanese carried on maneuvers often and on a larger scale than those of other powers. ^{b.} HASHIMOTO admitted that Japanese maneuvers were carried out intensively from April or May to September and October. ^{c.} From June to the outbreak of the incident, night maneuvers were carried out nightly. ^{d.} These maneuvers were deliberately provocative because they were conducted in a place the Japanese had no right to be and were in violation of international law. ^{e.} Furthermore, the Japanese were required to give notice to the Chinese of their intention to hold such maneuvers, but no notice was given. This was admitted by HASHIMOTO. ^{f.} As for the opening of hostilities on 7 July 1937, HASHIMOTO admitted that the Japanese had attacked the Chinese at Lungwangmiao. ^{g.} Thus it is clear that the Japanese opened hostilities. HASHIMOTO, as Chief of Staff of the Japanese forces, was in a position where he exercised, with his Commanding General, policy-making powers, and his participation in this initial act starting the long China war is his responsibility.

e. Shelling of the Ladybird.

CC-23. On 11 December 1937, in the course of the blockade of China, a Japanese artillery unit under command of HASHIMOTO shelled the British vessel Ladybird and took it into custody, ^{a.} and on 12 December 1937, in the course of the same blockade, the U.S.S. Panay ^{b.} was machine-gunned and bombed without warning and the vessel sunk. The lame excuse given before the Tribunal that it was barely dawn and

CC-25.

- a. Ex. 248, T. 3320
- c. T. 20,649-51
- d. Ex. 2479, T. 20,529
- e. Ex. 198, T. 2326
- f. T. 2396-9, Ex. 2479, T. 20,529, Ex. 2487, T. 20622-4
- g. Ex. 2487, T. 20,622

CC-26.

- a. Ex. 251, T. 3466-7
- b. Ex. 233, T. 3517, Ex. 964, T. 9418

(CC-25.)

that a heavy fog lay over the river^{c.} is inconsistent with Japan's acknowledgment of a wrongful act, as is shown by her payment of indemnity, and a disavowal of the incident by profuse apologies.^{d.}

V. HASHIMOTO's agitation for territorial expansion and creation of a Greater East Asia.

CC-27. In October 1936, after retirement, HASHIMOTO organized and was head of Dai Nippon Seinento,^{a.} one of its aims being the renovation and making young men the framework of the "New Japan".^{b.} The official organ of the Society was the Taiyo Dai Nippon, which was published three times per month.^{c.} In the January 1937 issue of the Taiyo Dai Nippon, HASHIMOTO advocated the dissolution of political parties and said that democratic government ignores the "T.E.O".^{d.}

CC-28. The following excerpt from an article written by HASHIMOTO and published in Taiyo Dai Nippon shows his activities from 1936 through 1941 in propagandizing for expansion and war:

"How shall Japan be able to battle against the Soviet Union without making an invincible air force the mainstay of Japanese armament?"^{a.}

He wrote the following:

"It is a humiliation to have to talk with England."
 "Define England as the enemy."
 "Our way is one: Expulsion of England!"
 "Arm the Axis!"^{b.}
 "The enemy that blocks our way to the south is England."

Again he wrote: "If it had not been for the support of England, the Chiang Government would be already destroyed. It is clear that if we attack England, the incident will be brought to an end immediately."^{c.}
 * * * "We have no choice. Fight England!"

CC-26.

- c. Ex. 2521, T. 21,346-7
- d. Ex. 2522; Ex. 2523, T. 21,350, 21,353

CC-27.

- a. Ex. 2188, T. 15,677
- b. Ex. 2185, T. 15,648
- c. Ex. 3193, T. 28,784, 15,683
- d. Ex. 2185, T. 15,649

CC-28.

- a. Ex. 2185, T. 15,651
- b. Ex. 2185, T. 15,659-60
- c. Ex. 2185, T. 15,660

(CC-28.)

Page CC-13.

"Now our real opponents are England and the Soviet Union. When there is only one way ahead of us, why are we hesitating? What we need now is a war time Cabinet with the highest authority." d.

CC-29. HASHIMOTO was one of those who moulded the plan for Japanese aggression by expounding the theory that Japan must have territorial expansion north, south, east and west, where Japanese could freely develop their powers.^{a.} He demanded lands, new lands, to develop "the riches now lying idle". He particularly mentioned the South Seas Islands^{b.} and argued that the Netherlands had its hands full with Java, and had left Borneo, New Guinea and the Celebes almost untouched.^{c.} He gave the Netherlands a back-handed slap by saying that the actual power protecting the South Seas Islands was the British Empire and, although Japan could not extol its past rule of Korea and Formosa, people under Japanese rule were fortunate compared to those "under the tyrannical rule of the white men".^{e.}

CC-30. In 1939 he engaged in prolific writings, all directed at stimulating aggressive warfare. He wrote that England was the enemy blocking Japan's "way to the south"^{a.} and he urged an attack on England,^{b.} saying that Hongkong should be occupied as well as the English concession in Shanghai.^{c.} He urged the strengthening of the Tri-Partite Alliance^{d.} and said Japan should attack the foreign concessions in Tientsin "instantly".^{e.} He said England must be expelled^{f.} and that it would be very "easy to beat England";^{g.} that the time was opportune to start the attack.^{h.} In January 1941, before a large audience at Kyoto, he continued exhorting the Japanese to over-

CC-28.

d. Ex. 2115, T. 15,661

CC-29.

a. Ex. 1290-A, T. 11,392
 b. T. 11,691
 c. T. 11,692
 d. T. 11,693
 e. T. 11,694

CC-30.

a. T. 15,660
 b. T. 15,660
 c. T. 15,659
 d. T. 15,660
 e. T. 15,660
 f. T. 15,659
 g. T. 15,659
 h. T. 15,660

(CC-30)

throw England and America, saying that Japan should advance southward and construct a Greater East Asia under the Imperial Sphere as soon as possible.^{i.} On 30 January 1941 he published a work entitled "The Second Creation", in which he proposed absolute war preparations so as to enable Japan to crush, at any time, countries which may interfere with Japan,^{j.} also he urged the expulsion of all British influence from China first and gradually to exclude British influence from the East Asiatic united zone.^{k.}

CC-31. As for Greater East Asia, HASHIMOTO took the view that this should include Japan, Manchukuo, China, the Soviet Far East, French Indo-China, Burma, Malay, the Dutch East Indies, India, Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, all in the sphere of Japan's influence.^{a.}

CC-32. The plan HASHIMOTO suggested for Japan's influence to be made manifest was as follows: "Territories incorporated into Japan should be administered by Governors-General, while Japanese advisers should be appointed for independent states. Military and diplomatic affairs should be placed absolutely under Japanese guidance. Other matters also should be controlled by Japan."^{a.}

CC-33. In 1938 he dissolved the Dai Nippon Seinento and instantly established the Dai Nippon Seikiseikai, whose policies were:

- (1) Restoration of the nation.

CC-30.

- i. T. 15,666
j. Ex. 2127-A, T. 15,670
k. T. 15,672

CC-31.

- a. x. 675-A, T. 7349; 23,377

CC-32.

- a. Ex. 675-A, T. 12,023

(CC-33.)

- (2) Stronger armament for the defense and liberation of the Asiatic nations.
- (3) Asiatic autarchy.
- (4) Attack Britain and her dominions.
- (5) Imperialization of East Asia.
- (6) Establishment of a state union in Asia.^{a.}

CC-34. He was a leader and permanent director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and was responsible for the publication of Taiyo Dai Nippon.^{a.}

CC-35. HASHIMOTO perjured himself when questioned by one of the prosecutors prior to trial.^{a.}

CC-36. It is apparent that in the critical years between 1936 and 1941 HASHIMOTO was urging the use of force to destroy the status quo; recommended resort to force to create for Japan more territory (similar to Hitler's seizure of so-called "Lebensraum"), and stimulated lawless and aggressive prosecution by force of Japan's desire for world leadership. His pronouncements were inflammatory and willfully calculated to arouse the fighting spirit of those who read or listened. The demands made by HASHIMOTO were in total disregard of Japan's obligations as a member of the community of nations, and in disregard of her duties under international treaties, agreements and assurances to which she was a party. It can be said that HASHIMOTO

CC-33.
a. T. 15,680-1

CC-34.
a. Ex. 2188, T. 15,674

CC-35.
a. T. 15,682-6

(CC-36.)
 directed public opinion to violate such treaties, agreements and assurances, and that his previous conduct fitted into the character he assumed as one of the conspirators to wage unlawful wars of aggression, for the purpose of military, naval, political and economic domination by Japan.

DEFENSE TESTIMONY

CC-37. The defense testimony may be briefly summarized as follows:

"The witness OBITA attempted to show that the shelling of the "Ladybird" in December, 1937, was a mistake due to foggy weather conditions. This testimony is negated by the testimony given by HASHIMOTO himself, in which he stated that his orders were to sink all vessels proceeding toward Nanking without regard to nationality.^{a.}

The witness OGAWA's testimony as to the pure purposes of the Dai Nippon Seinento and the Dai Nippon Sekiseikai,^{b.} is negated by the avowed purpose of these societies, as appears hereinbefore.^{c.}

The testimony of HASHIMOTO amounts to a general denial by the accused of having any part in the Manchurian incident or of planning or fomenting aggressive war. His testimony is negated, as appears from his writings and speeches extending

CC-37.

- a. T. 15,672-0
- b. T. 2^d,723
- c. T. 15,620-1

(CC-37.)
 through the period from 1929 to 1941. Furthermore,
 as hereinabove mentioned, the accused is a self-
 confessed perjurer, so that little credence may be
 given to his affidavit in his own behalf.

CC-38. The testimony of the defense witness,
 OBATA, further shows that HASHIMOTO was guilty of
 murder, as appears from the following:

"14. Since one death had resulted from the
 shelling, the Captain of the British ship
 asked us to attend the funeral service. We
 sent one representative to this funeral
 service. This was held at the public
 hall."^{a.}

CC-39. The testimony of HASHIMOTO in connection
 with the shelling of the British ship "Ladybird"
 on or about the 10th of December 1937, to the effect
 that the shooting was by mistake due to the dense
 fog,^{a.} is contradicted by an excerpt from the
 interrogation of HASHIMOTO of 17 January 1946,^{b.}
 wherein he stated that his orders were to sink all
 vessels proceeding toward Nanking without regard
 to nationality, and that after the fog lifted, at
 about 1000 hours, he started shelling four ships,
 one of which was the Ladybird. The same excerpt
 contradicts the testimony of OBATA, Minoru,^{c.}
 wherein he stated that the shelling of the Ladybird

CC-38.
 a. T. 28,772

CC-39.
 a. T. 28,796
 b. Ex. 3846. T. 38,181
 c. T. 28,769-70

(CC-39.)
 took place "before dawn and not yet light," and
 furthermore the excerpt from the interrogation of
 HASHIMOTO,^{d.} contradicts the statement made by
 OBATA as to the contents of the order from Lt.
 General YANAGAWA.^{e.}

- CC-40. HASHIMOTO's guilt of the offenses
 charged is established as indicated below:
- Count 1 - Paragraphs CC-14, CC-15, CC-16, CC-17,
 CC-18, CC-19, CC-21, CC-22, CC-23, CC-24,
 CC-25, CC-27, CC-28, CC-29, CC-30, CC-31,
 CC-32, CC-33.
- Count 2 - Paragraphs CC-16, CC-17, CC-18, CC-21,
 CC-22, CC-23, CC-24, CC-25, CC-31, CC-32,
 CC-33.
- Count 3 - Paragraphs CC-16, CC-17, CC-18, CC-21,
 CC-22, CC-23, CC-24, CC-25, CC-31, CC-32,
 CC-33.
- Count 4 - Paragraphs CC-14, CC-15, CC-16, CC-17,
 CC-18, CC-19, CC-21, CC-22, CC-23, CC-24,
 CC-25, CC-26, CC-28, CC-29, CC-30, CC-31,
 CC-32, CC-33.
- Count 5 - Paragraphs CC-28, CC-29, CC-30, CC-31.
- Count 6 - Paragraphs CC-16, CC-17, CC-18, CC-19,
 CC-20, CC-23, CC-25, CC-28, CC-29, CC-31,
 CC-32, CC-33.
- Count 7 - Paragraphs CC-29, CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.

CC-39.

d. IPS Doc. 3356
 e. T. 28,769

- (CC-40.)
Count 8 - Paragraphs CC-26, CC-28, CC-29, CC-30,
CC-31, CC-32, CC-33.
- Count 9 - Paragraphs CC-29, CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 10 - Paragraphs CC-29, CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 11 - Paragraph CC-33.
- Count 12 - Paragraphs CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 13 - Paragraphs CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 14 - Paragraphs CC-29, CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 15 - Paragraphs CC-29, CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 16 - Paragraphs CC-29, CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 17 - Paragraphs CC-14, CC-15, CC-18, CC-19,
CC-23, CC-28, CC-29, CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 18 - Paragraphs CC-16, CC-17, CC-18, CC-19,
CC-20, CC-23, CC-28, CC-29, CC-32, CC-33.
- Count 19 - Paragraphs CC-25, CC-26, CC-28, CC-29,
CC-30, CC-31, CC-32, CC-33.
- Count 27 - Paragraphs CC-16, CC-17, CC-18, CC-19,
CC-20, CC-23, CC-25, CC-26, CC-28, CC-29,
CC-30, CC-31, CC-32, CC-33.
- Count 28 - Paragraphs CC-25, CC-26, CC-28, CC-29,
CC-30, CC-31, CC-32, CC-33.
- Count 29 - Paragraphs CC-30, CC-31.
- Count 30 - Paragraphs CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 31 - Paragraphs CC-28, CC-29, CC-30, CC-31,
CC-33.
- Count 32 - Paragraphs CC-29, CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.
- Count 34 - Paragraphs CC-29, CC-30, CC-31, CC-33.
-

(CC-40.)

Count 45 - Paragraph CC-26.

Count 5A - Paragraphs CC-16, CC-17, CC-18, CC-19, CC-20, CC-21, CC-22, CC-23, CC-24, CC-28, CC-29, CC-30, CC-33.

Count 5B - Paragraphs CC-16, CC-17, CC-18, CC-19, CC-20, CC-21, CC-22, CC-23, CC-24, CC-28, CC-29, CC-30, CC-33.

VI. YASUHITO'S guilt under the charges.

CC-41. As for YASUHITO's guilt under Counts 1-5, inclusive, 6-17, inclusive, 18, 19 and 27-32, inclusive, which generally embrace the waging of wars of aggression, Parts III, IV and V herein show how he was an instigator of plans and schemes for the renovation of Japan for the purpose of using a revitalized military power for purposes of aggression and expansion. It was no coincidence that the policies he so strenuously advocated, namely, war with Britain and America, a movement south having in view a Greater East Asia under Japan's domination, an alliance with Germany, and extinction of Chinese sovereignty by destruction of the Chiang government were in fact

Page CC-20.

(CC-41.)
 carried out or attempted. These policies were likewise the policies of the other conspirators, who to a greater or lesser degree participated in the plan to impose its will by force on those who refused to consent.

CC-42. The absurdity of the claim by HASHIMOTO that Japan needed more and more living space for its millions is shown by the fact that Japan, from 1929 to 1941, already had possession of Korea and Formosa, and also had control of Manchuria. It was not territory the Japanese militarists were after. It was enslavement of the Asiatic world for Japan's announced destiny to bring the whole world under one roof, the roof of Japan (Hakko Ichiu explained by HASHIMOTO;^{a.} by MATSUOKA;^{b.} by TOJO;^{c.} referred to in connection with the Tri-Partite Pact;^{d.} referred to in connection with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere;^{e.} and defined.^{f.})

CC-43. As for HASHIMOTO's guilt under Counts 45-47, inclusive and 54-55, inclusive, relating to murder and mistreatment of POW and civilians, outside of the shelling of the Ladybird and Panay, it can only be said that by his inflammatory language in the incitement of violence he helped produce the mental state of those who fought the

CC-42.

- a. T. 3535-6
- b. T. 3491
- c. T. 10306
- d. T. 6409
- e. T. 12215
- f. T. 9645

0 159 0004 0554

Page CC-21.

(CC-43.)
"holy war", to resort to any extreme to bring about the much desired victory. Cruelty can well be said to be a by-product of the campaign of hatred against Britain and the United States, fomented by HASHIMOTO, and having as its objective contempt for those who stood in the way. Viewed from that angle, HASHIMOTO is responsible on the theory prevailing in torts, that he who is the proximate cause is responsible for all damages normally arising therefrom. The murders, the mistreatment of POW and civilians were incident to HASHIMOTO's challenge to Japan to fight a war for supremacy. The crimes that resulted were a concomitant of the drastic actions he recommended.

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IFS. RE: HASHIMOTO (CG)

ATTACHED PAGES 9, 10, 11, and 20 are to be substituted for
pages 9, 10, 11, and 20, in summation on HASHIMOTO (CG).

IV. HASHIMOTO's connection with the March, October and Manchurian Incidents.

a. The March Incident.

CC-21. In connection with the March Incident, which was a plan to seize control of the government, OKAWA testified in the Tokyo Court of Appeals that it was at the request of HASHIMOTO and Col. SHIGETO that he held his interview with UGAKI to learn his views. The result of OKAWA's conference with UGAKI was reported by HASHIMOTO and SHIGETO to Deputy Chief of Staff NINOMIYA and TATEKAWA.^{a.} HASHIMOTO, in his testimony named TATEKAWA, KOISO, NINOMIYA, SUGIYAMA, OKAWA and himself as conspirators.^{b.}

CC-22. To effect the plot, HASHIMOTO obtained delivery of 300 bombs to SHINIZU from the army^{a.} with which to start a mass demonstration which would lead to martial law and overthrow of the Cabinet.^{b.}

b. The Manchurian Incident.

CC-23. In addition to what appears in Part III of this summation, activities in preparation for a solution of the Manchurian Incident, there is evidence that HASHIMOTO admitted to TANAKA, Ryukichi, in 1934

CC-21.

- a. Ex. 2177, T. 15,580-3
b. T. 28,820

CC-22.

- a. Ex. 157, T. 1'02-3
b. Ex. 157, T. 1'02-3

(CC-23)
 that he, HASHIMOTO, had assisted the Kwantung Army,
 in accordance with a plan to have such an incident.
 TANAKA testified that HASHIMOTO named himself and
 five others as conspirators and defined the purpose
 to be the occupation of Manchuria, destruction of the
 influence of the war lords, and bringing about
 economic development and army occupation. ^{a.} Capt. CHO,
 another of the conspirators, in discussing the matter
 with TANAKA also named HASHIMOTO as a co-conspirator. ^{b.}

c. The October Incident.

CC-24. As for the October Incident, which was
 also a plan to seize control of the government, HASHIMOTO
 admitted that he thought up the plan to bring about a
 Cabinet headed by ARAKI as a result of a conversation
 with Capt. CHO. ^{a.} That HASHIMOTO was involved in this
 plot is also confirmed by testimony of OKAWA in the
 Tokyo Court of Appeals where he said that the aim of
 the October Incident was to crush the YAKATSUKI Cabinet,
 which was dilly-dallying, and to set up a new and
 powerful party capable of solving important problems.
 OKAWA said he received his orders from HASHIMOTO, and ^{b.}
 that others involved were SHIGETO, ITAGAKI and FOYUARA.

CC-23.

- a. T. 1968, 1978
 b. T. 2014

CC-24.

- a. Ex. 3195, T. 28,975
 b. Ex. 2177-A, T. 15,585-7

(CC-24)

TATEKAWA also told TAMAKA that HASHIMOTO, CHO and OKATA planned the October Incident to overthrow the government in power and to set up a new government which would support the Manchurian Incident.^{c.} This plan was to cleanse the ideological and political atmosphere of Japan and renovate Japanese politics by assassinating the leaders.^{d.} After the plot was discovered, HASHIMOTO and others were arrested,^{e.} and HASHIMOTO was subjected to heavy disciplinary confinement for 25 days and relegated to the HIMEJI Regiment.^{f.}

CC-25. Shelling of the Ladybird.

CC-26. On 11 December 1937, in the course of the blockade of China, a Japanese artillery unit under command of HASHIMOTO shelled the British vessel Ladybird and took it into custody.^{a.} The lame excuse given before the Tribunal that it was barely dawn and

CC-24.

- c. T. 2013
- d. T. 1973
- e. Ex. 3195, T. 28,795
- f. T. 19,657

CC-26.

- a. Ex. 258, T. 3466-7

(CC-41)
 carried out or attempted. These policies were likewise the policies of the other conspirators, who to a greater or lesser degree participated in the plan to impose its will by force on those who refused to consent.

CC-42. The absurdity of the claim by HASHIMOTO that Japan needed more and more living space for its millions is shown by the fact that Japan, from 1929 to 1941, already had possession of Korea and Formosa, and also had control of Manchuria. It was not territory the Japanese militarists were after. It was enslavement of the Asiatic world for Japan's announced destiny to bring the whole world under one roof, the roof of Japan (Hakko Ichiu explained by HASHIMOTO;^{a.} by M.TSUOKA;^{b.} by TOJO;^{c.} referred to in connection with the Tri-Partite Pact;^{d.} referred to in connection with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere;^{e.} and defined.^{f.})

CC-43. As for HASHIMOTO's guilt under Counts 45-47, inclusive, and 54-55, inclusive, relating to murder and mistreatment of POW and civilians, outside of the shelling of the Ladybird, it can only be said that by his inflammatory language in the incitement of violence he helped produce the mental state of those who fought the

CC-42.

- a. T. 3535-C
- b. T. 3191
- c. T. 10306
- d. T. 6409
- e. T. 12215
- f. T. 9645

HATA, SHUNROKU - SUMMATION

DD-1. HATA, Shunroku, is charged on Counts 1 - 17, inc.; 19, 25 - 32, inc.; 34 - 36, inc.; and 44 - 55, inc., in the Indictment.

DD-2. We shall briefly sketch his career and then point out the evidence which shows his part in the overall conspiracy of planning and waging wars of aggression, and in the component parts of the conspiracy. It is our position that HATA was at all times a militarist—one of the cliques which set and kept Japan on the road to war.

I. SKETCH OF CAREER.

DD-3. HATA was born 26 July 1879. After graduating from the Military Academy in 1900, he rose through successive ranks in the Army to become Major-General in 1926. In the meantime, he had made two official trips to Europe, once residing in Germany for the investigation of military affairs, and two official trips to China. He served as Chief of the First Department of the Headquarters General Staff, and on the staff of the Naval General Staff. On 1 August 1931 he was appointed Lt. General and inspector of artillery, continuing in this position until August 1933, when he became Commander of the 14th Division. From December 1935 until August 1936, he served as Chief of the Army Air Force Headquarters, and from August 1936 until August 1937, as Commander of the Formosan Army. On 2 August 1937, he became

Page DD-2

(DD-3)
 Military Councilor, and on 26 August 1937, he was appointed Inspector General of Military Education, serving concurrently in this position and as Military Councilor until 14 February 1938. During his tenure of these two positions, he was appointed a full General, and in December 1937, named Cabinet Councilor. From 14 February 1938 until 15 December 1938, he was Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Force. Immediately thereafter, he became Military Councilor, serving until 25 May 1939, when he was appointed Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor. He was Minister of War in the ABE Cabinet and in the succeeding YONAI Cabinet, his tenure in this position extending from 30 August 1939 to 22 July 1940. He was immediately thereafter appointed Military Councilor in the 2nd KONOYE Cabinet and continued in this position until he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China, in which capacity he served from 1 March 1941 until 22 November 1944. In June 1944 he was awarded the special title of Field Marshal, and appointed a member of the Board of Field Marshals and Admirals. On 22 November 1944, he again became Inspector General of Military Education, and on 7 April 1945, Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army Corps. ^{a.}

II. ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO AUGUST 1937 - PLANS FOR
AGGRESSIVE WAR.

DD-4. Before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, HATA, as Chief of the First Department of the Headquarters General Staff, ^{a.} gave instructions to Colonel SUZUKI, Shigeyasu, in March

DD-3.

a. Ex. 106, T. 701-7

DD-4.

a. Ex. 106, T. 701

(DD-4)
 1931, for an inspection tour in Manchuria and Korea areas. He directed that special consideration be given the strategic advantages in operational plans already prepared between the use of the western line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Szeching-kai-Taonan Railway for the transportation of the main Japanese forces. HATA further directed that consideration be given and report made concerning the airports in Manchuria. The report of Colonel SUZUKI submitted in May 1931 in response to the instructions he had received from HATA, showed clearly that plans were being prepared for aggressive action against the U. S. S. R. SUZUKI recommended that in the present plan of operation the 19th Division should be concentrated for use at Fushun and that the principal aim regarding the Army forces in the Maritime Province was to land on the coast east of Vladivostok, thus facilitating the operation by the Manchurian Army in occupying the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the advance of the Japanese forces in the area north of Nicholsk-Ussuzisk.^b

DD-5. In recognition of his meritorious services rendered in the Manchurian Incident of 1931-1934, HATA was decorated on 29 April 1934 with the First Order of Merit with the Grand Cordons of the Rising Sun.^a

III. HATA'S AGES ABROAD IN CHINA

DD-6. HATA's first period of waging war in China falls into two divisions: (a) his acts and responsibility as Military Councillor and Inspector General of Military Education from August 1937 to February 1938, and (b) his acts and responsibility while

DD-4

b. Ex. 691-., T. 7,438; Ex. 699, T. 7501

DD-5

a. Ex. 106, T. 703

(DD-6)
 Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces from February 1938 to December 1938.

A. Military Councilor and Inspector General of Military Education

DD-7. Within less than one month of the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge in China on 7 July 1937, MATSUDA was, on 2 August 1937, recalled from the Command of the Formosan Army and appointed Military Councilor.^a It was then his duty and responsibility to advise the Cabinet on military matters. The Japanese Army continued to overrun North China, and on 13 August 1937, hostilities broke out at Shanghai.^b

DD-8. At this crucial stage, MATSUDA was, on 26 August 1937, appointed to the politically powerful post of Inspector General of Military Education and continued to serve concurrently as Military Councilor.^a Japan rapidly extended the area of conflict and increased its forces in China. By the end of September, the League of Nations found that under the protection of thirty-eight Japanese warships, an estimated 100,000 Japanese reinforcements had landed and Japanese military forces had moved into the Yangtze Valley, Nanking and the interior of China had been bombed, and the Chinese coast blockaded by the Japanese Fleet.^b The Chinese estimated that by the end of September, 1937, there were over 350,000 Japanese troops in China, and Defense witness TANAKA, Shinichi stated that by the end of October, Japan had fifteen divisions in China.^c Before the end of 1937, Nanking, the capital of China, had fallen. The orgy of crime and

DD-7

- a. Ex. 106, T. 702
- b. Ex. 58, T. 3305

DD-8

- a. Ex. 106, T. 702
- b. Ex. 58, T. 3,305-6
- c. Ex. 2482, T. 20,685

(10-2)

violence known as the "Rape of Nanking," was at its height, and the capitals of each of six provinces of China, viz: Chahar, Ho-pei, Suiyuan, Shansi, Chekiang and Shantung, had been captured and were occupied by the Japanese armed forces.^{d.}

B. Commander-in-Chief of Central China Expeditionary Force

DD-9. Moving from the position of Military Councilor, where he advised concerning military operations, and that of Inspector General of Military Education, where he not only prepared Japanese troops for military operations, but as a member of the "Big Three", controlled the appointment of War Minister, and had it in his power to make and to destroy Cabinets, HATA, on 14 February 1938, took over the actual conduct of the war in China as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces.^{a.} The broader purpose of Japan's acts in China were beginning to be revealed. No longer could Japan conceal her true intentions in China under the guise of "localizing the incident."

DD-10. Flushed with victory in December 1937, and seeking to consolidate the results of its undeclared war against China, the Japanese Government, in which HATA then held a strategic position, offered so-called peace terms to China. These, if accepted, would have made of China a satellite of Japan.^{a.} These terms were submitted through Germany and the reply demanded in no event later than 10 January 1938.^{b.} On 11 January 1938 Japan reiterated the terms, adding that in the event China failed to accept, Japan would destroy the Cen-

DD-8

d. Ex. 254, T. 3, 430

DD-9

a. Ex. 106, T. 701

DD-10

a. Ex. 270, T. 3, 619-20
Ex. 3260, T. 29, 702-3
b. Ex. 270, T. 3, 620

(DD-10)
 trol Government of China and aid in the formation of a new regime.^c On 13 January 1938, China asked about the new conditions;^d on 14 January 1938 Japan decided^e and on 16 January 1938, Premier KONO announced to the world that Japan would no longer deal with the National Government of China, but would seek the establishment and development of a new government in China.^f Those who wanted an all out war against China had prevailed. The conspiracy was moving with increased tempo. On 14 February 1938, HATA assumed command in China.^g

DD-11. When HATA assumed command of the Central China Expeditionary Forces on 14 February 1938, he knew that he was engaging in a war against China. In his interrogation he stated:

"Although it actually was a war, all they ever considered it was a Chinese incident." Actually, it was a war."^h

The Defense claim that HATA's duties were "negative duties," merely to maintain peace and order in the triangle between Shanghai, Hanking and Hangchow,^b was not borne out by their witness, KAMEBE, Masakazu. On cross-examination he admitted that the extensive military operations conducted by HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, which included the battle of Tai ichuang, the capture of Haichow, the campaign resulting in the capture of Huchang, and the fall of Hankow, were neither "negative" nor "inactive" duties. He then added that these were new duties assigned to HATA.^c

DD-12. HATA did not long remain in the triangle zone con-

DD-10

- c. Ex. 3264, T. 29,844
- d. Ex. 486 C T. 5987-8
- e. Ex. 2260, T. 16,223 T. 22,055-6
- f. Ex. 3340, T. 30,838-9

DD-10

- f. Ex. 268, T. 3,563-5
- g. Ex. 106, T. 701

DD-11

- a. Ex. 256, T. 3,451
- b. Ex. 2479-A, T. 21,698
- c. T. 21,713

(DD-10)
 tral Government of China and aid in the formation of a new regime.^c On 13 January 1938, China asked about the new conditions;^d on 14 January 1938 Japan decided^e and on 16 January 1938, Premier KONOYAMA announced to the world that Japan would no longer deal with the National Government of China, but would seek the establishment and development of a new government in China.^f Those who wanted an all out war against China had prevailed. The conspiracy was moving with increased tempo. On 14 February 1938, HATA assumed command in China.^g

DD-11. When HATA assumed command of the Central China Expeditionary Forces on 14 February 1938, he knew that he was engaging in a war against China. In his interrogation he stated:

"Although it actually was a war, all they ever considered it was a Chinese incident. Actually, it was a war."^h

The Defense claim that HATA's duties were "negative duties," merely to maintain peace and order in the triangle between Shanghai, Hanking and Nanqchow,^b was not borne out by their witness, KAMABE, Masakazu. On cross-examination he admitted that the extensive military operations conducted by HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, which included the battle of Tai rchuan^g, the capture of Hsuechow, the campaign resulting in the capture of Nucheng, and the fall of Hankow, were neither "negative" nor "inactive" duties. He then added that these were new duties assigned to HATA.^c

DD-12. HATA did not long remain in the triangle zone con-

DD-10

- c. Ex. 3264, T. 29,844
- d. Ex. 486 C T. 6987-8
- e. Ex. 2260, T. 16,223 T. 22,055-6
- f. Ex. 3240, T. 30,838-9

DD-10

- f. Ex. 268, T. 3,563-5
- g. Ex. 106, T. 701

DD-11

- a. Ex. 256, T. 3,451
- b. Ex. 2479-A, T. 21,698
- c. T. 21,713

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(D7-12)
 necting Hanking, Hanchow and Shanghai. On 19 May 1938 his
 forces captured Hsuechow; on 6 June Kaifeng, the capital of Ho-
 nan Province, fell into his hands. On 27 June, Matang was
 captured; on 25 July, Kiuking was captured; on 12 October, Sin-
 yang fell to the troops under HATA's command; and his crowning
 accomplishment as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Ex-
 peditionary Forces was the fall of Hankow on 25 October 1938.
 Even with that he did not cease the penetration of China; and on
 11 November 1938, his forces captured Yoyang.^a Further light
 is shed on the size and extent of these operations by the state-
 ment of HATA in his interrogation, that the troops which were re-
 inforced to him from the North China Army prior to the Hankow
 campaign were "about 300,000 or 400,000" and that the campaign
 which resulted in the capture of Hankow consumed five months.^b

DD-13. The fall of Hankow was the high-water mark of that
 period of Japan's undeclared war in China. HATA had all but ac-
 complished the purpose of the conspirators. A few days later,
 on 3 November 1938, the Japanese Government issued a statement
 reciting that the Army had captured Kwantung, Hankow and Su-
 cheng; had overcome the important districts of China; had re-
 duced the National Government of China to a local regime.^a It
 boasted that operations would continue until the National Govern-
 ment of China was "completely annihilated." It affirmed that
 what Japan sought was the establishment of a new order in East
 Asia. "This is really the ultimate objective of the present

DD-12
 a. Ex. 254, T. 3,430-2.
 b. Ex. 256, T. 3,448-8

DD-13
 a. Ex. 269, T. 3,564

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(DD-13) expedition," and to accomplish this it was essential to link Japan, Manchukuo and China. Japan demanded that China take her own share in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia.

DD-14 Having completed the task (as the conspirators believed) of substantially destroying the National Government of China, HATA, on 15 December 1938, was relieved of his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, and on the same day was brought again into the inner circles of Government as Military Councilor.^a Before leaving the subject of HATA's acts in China during this period, it might be fitting to mention two points: (1) atrocities at Hankow, and (2) HATA's responsibility for the handling of opium and narcotics in the occupied portions of China.

1. Atrocities at Hankow

DD-15. Mr. A. A. Dorrance, Manager of the Standard Oil Company at Hankow, testified that in October 1938, he saw Japanese soldiers kicking captured Chinese soldiers into the Yangtze River and shooting those who came to the surface. He further testified that he saw on the streets of Hankow, "Chinese men dressed in Chinese gowns with their hands wired behind them, and they had been shot..."^a

DD-16. Obviously impressed by this testimony, the Defense produced a number of witnesses. Many of these testified as to the military operations preceding the fall of Hankow. Some testified that the city of Hankow remained quiet following its capture and that only a small force entered the city. Most of them also testi-

DD-14
a. Ex. 106, T. 702

DD-15
a. T. 3,392-6

(DD-16)

fied either that they did not see any acts of violence or did not believe that there were any atrocities committed by the Japanese troops at Hankow, that the evacuation of the city was so tranquil that there was no possibility for plunder, rape and murder. Some testified that they saw no corpses in the city.^a Certain of the witnesses testified that HATA's Headquarters issued orders to maintain strict military discipline. AMANO testified that HATA always advocated the three principles, "Don't burn, don't violate, don't loot." and that his policy had always been, "Defeat Chiang, but love his people."^b Several testified that the troops under their command committed no acts of violence^c and that by the first of November the city had returned to normalcy. One witness testified that many Chinese corpses were dumped into the Yangtze River because of the cholera epidemic raging throughout the city.^d The question resolves itself into the determination between positive evidence by Dorrance who testified as to what he saw, and negative evidence of other witnesses who state that in the parts of the city visited by them they did not witness atrocities, or who give it as their opinion that atrocities could not have been committed by the troops under their commands.

DD-17. In considering this question it is well to bear in mind that the troops under HATA's command throughout the entire period of his campaign in China in 1938, were destroying, looting and desecrating the properties of neutral nations, as well as entering their homes and killing their citizens. Ambassa-

DD-16

- a. Ex. 2559, T. 21,642
- Ex. 2553, T. 21,601
- Ex. 2555, T. 21,612
- b. Ex. 2564, T. 21,749
- c. Ex. 2551, T. 21,592
- Ex. 2567, T. 21,771
- d. Ex. 2556, T. 21,619

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(DD-17)
 ador Grew, on behalf of the American Government, made repeated protests to the Japanese Foreign Office.^{a.} Instances of these protests included: 26 March 1938 - the continuing occupation by Japanese forces of American Missionary property in Shanghai and the occupation and looting of other American Missionary Property at Changshu; Changchow; Chingkiang; Liwe, Nanking; Nanschiang; Quinsan; Shanghai, Suchew; Sungkiang; Yangchow; and Wusih; and other points in four different provinces in China.^{b.} 28 June 1938 - the attack on American Missionary property at Pingtu in Shantung Province and the wounding of the occupants.^{c.} 31 October - the wounding and killing of American nationals in China and the destruction of American property.^{d.} 21 November 1938 - the continued outrages by Japanese troops against American citizens and property in China, including desecration of the American flag.^{e.} These continuing reports of the acts of troops under HATA's command against the persons and properties of a neutral country make it reasonable to believe the testimony of an eye witness that atrocities were committed by these same troops against the persons and properties of Chinese citizens, and at the same time make it difficult to believe, as one Defense witness testified, that HATA's policy was "Defeat Chiang, but love his people."^{f.}

2. HATA's Responsibility for Opium and Narcotics

DD-18. SATOMI testified that he was engaged in 1938 by the Special Service Department under the China Expeditionary Force in Shanghai to handle the sale of opium and that for

DD-17

- a. Ex. 971, T. 9,523
- Ex. 975, T. 9,538
- Ex. 979, T. 9,540
- Ex. 981, T. 9,554
- Ex. 981, T. 9,956
- Ex. 983, T. 9,534
- Ex. 983, T. 9,567
- Ex. 936, T. 9,562
- b. Ex. 971, T. 9523
- c. Ex. 981, T. 9554
- d. Ex. 983, T. 9557

DD-17

- e. Ex. 986, T. 9562
- f. Ex. 2564, T. 21,749

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(DD-18)

from six to eight months he sold opium for the Special Service Department, and thereafter he continued in the same position under the direction of the China Affairs Board.^{b.} He further testified that the profits to the Special Service Organ and the China Affairs Board out of the first one thousand chests of opium which he handled for them amounted to about \$20,000,000.00.^{b.}

The Defense attempted to rebut this evidence by the witness KAWABE, Masakazu. His testimony is conflicting and contradicting. He testified that after the China Affairs Board was founded, political and economic affairs previously handled by the Commander-in-Chief were transferred to it, and that until it was established the Special Service Organization actually handled these in every place upon the request of the Chinese authorities. After admitting that the Special Service organizations were under the command of HATA, he stated that the China Expeditionary Force had nothing to do with opium, and then makes the remarkable statement, "It is clear that the Commander-in-Chief had nothing to do with the opium question, but I am not quite certain how far the Special Service Bureau, or the Special Service organizations knew about it."^{c.} It is difficult to understand the conclusion reached by the witness that HATA had nothing to do with opium and narcotics although the Special Service Organizations under his command were in charge of handling them.

DD-19. Gill testified that with the Japanese Occupation

DD-18

- a. T. 4,882-3
- b. T. 4,885
- c. X. 2479-A, T. 21,733-5

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(LD-19)
of Shanghai, opium control and supervision deteriorated; that in October 1938, discussions were held between the Puppet officials and the Japanese military authorities for the establishment of an opium monopoly; and that in the fall of 1938, opium was openly sold in Shanghai, with Japanese nationals taking a prominent part in the business.^a Dr. Bates testified that the use of opium and heroin increased in Nanking in the summer and autumn of 1938; that narcotics were advertised and sold under permission of the Puppet Government; the system providing for 175 licensed dens and 30 distribution stores; and that there were at least 50,000 persons using heroin in Nanking under the Japanese occupation.^b This was in the territory in which HATA's witnesses say that it was HATA's sole duty to maintain peace and enforce law and order.^c

II. MILITARY COUNCILOR AND AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE EMPEROR.

DD-20. As heretofore mentioned,^a HATA had led the Japanese armed forces into the very heart of China. He and his fellow-conspirators considered that the National Government of China had been reduced to a local regime.^b Having accomplished this purpose, larger and even more important measures in the carrying out of the overall conspiracy were in the offing. It is reasonable to infer that those closest to the new order in East Asia would seek the advice of the one who had so successfully carried their banner through China. On 15 December 1938, HATA was appointed as Military Councilor in the First KOKYU.

DD-19

- a. T. 4,409-22
- b. T. 2,648-54
- c. x. 2479-A, T. 21,698

DD-20

- a. DD-12-13 supra
- b. L-x. 268, T. 3,564

(DD-20) c. and exactly one week later, on 22 December 1938, Premier FUKUYE issued a statement reaffirming the purpose of the Japanese Government to completely destroy by force the National Government of China and at the same time to establish a new order in East Asia. In this statement he said: "Nothing is more necessary for China than to discard her old prejudices and to abandon her foolish resistance against Japan and her attitude in hanging on to Manchukuo." d.

DD-21. Military aggression in China continued. On 26 March 1939 the Japanese forces in China captured Nanchang, the capital of Jiangsi Province. a.

DD-22. On 25 May 1938 HATA was appointed Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor and continued in this position until he was appointed Minister of War in the ABE Cabinet on 30 August 1939. a. The fact that he had served as Aide-de-Camp and would be acceptable to the Emperor, gave to the conspirators an opportunity to hold at least one of their inner group in the ABE Cabinet when their plans had been temporarily frustrated by the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia, which brought about the fall of the HIRANUMA Cabinet.

V. WAR MINISTER - August 1939 - July 1940

DD-23. On 30 August 1939 HATA became War Minister in the ABE Cabinet and when that cabinet was succeeded by the YONAI Cabinet on 16 January 1940 HATA continued as War Minister in

DD-20.

c. Ex. 106, T. 702
d. Ex. 268, T. 3,566

DD-22.

a. Ex. 106, T. 703

DD-21.

a. Ex. 254, T. 3,431

(DD-23)
the YONAI Cabinet until his resignation on 16 July 1940 brought about the downfall of that cabinet.

A. HATA Nurtures the Conspiracy.

DD-24. When the conspirators in a movement spearheaded by War Minister ITAGAKI and Ambassador OSHIMA with the blessing of Premier HIRANUMA had practically completed the plans for a military alliance with Germany, the sudden execution of the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia fell as a stunning blow. It caused a temporary halt in the movement for closer collaboration with the Axis and required preparation for a new method of attack. The HIRANUMA Cabinet fell. On the surface it appeared that the militaristic group was losing ground. The moderate and anti-war forces in Japan seemed to be coming into their own. The long-range designs of the conspirators might be thwarted. This was for them a critical period. At this crucial hour it was HATA who carried their flag. HATA was the sole representative of the militaristic group in the ABE Cabinet. One other—KOISO—joined him in the YONAI Cabinet. HATA's conduct during the period that he was War Minister is more reprehensible in that he pretended to be in accord with the policies of the Government in which he was serving while he was at first secretly and later in a less veiled manner working for its overthrow. And when he had gained sufficient strength he boldly wrooked the YONAI Cabinet and brought back into power the militaristic group whose plans

(DD-24)

were now perfected and who with the added strength of TOJC rapidly set Japan on the road to more and greater wars.

1. HATA Appoints MUTO.

DD-25. On 30 September 1939, exactly one month after he became War Minister, HATA appointed MUTO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. ^{a.} In appointing his co-conspirator to this highly important position HATA not only indicated his approval of MUTO, whom we submit was a prime promoter of Japanese expansion by force, but brought into the inner circles of the Government one who at all times aided HATA in carrying forward the plans for Japanese domination—the establishment of the new order in East Asia. So closely did HATA and MUTO cooperate that when HATA as War Minister was questioned before committees of the Diet, MUTO would answer for him. ^{b.} TANAKA quoted HATA as having stated that MUTO influenced his resignation as War Minister. ^{c.} There may be question as to the extent to which HATA's appointee and subordinate in the War Ministry, MUTO, could have encouraged HATA in his decision to destroy the YOKAI Cabinet, but this does show the close and intimate relationship between these two co-conspirators.

DD-26. The Defense sought by the testimony of INAMU, Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, to show that he had suggested to HATA the appointment of MUTO after consultation with the departments of the War Ministry in accordance with

DD-25.

- a. Ex. 118, T. 742
- b. Ex. 2243-A, T. 16,150
- c. T. 15,901

(DD-26)
 regular Army procedure. ^{a.} Any favorable inferences from the testimony of this witness were destroyed by his statements on cross-examination to the effect that HATA had authority to recommend for appointment as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau whomover he desired and that neither HATA nor the Three Chiefs Council were necessarily required to follow the suggestion made by this witness in his capacity as Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau.

B. As War Minister HATA Continues to Wage War in China.

DD-27. Throughout his term as Minister of War, the Japanese Army continued its large scale aggressive warfare in China. This carried the complete support and approval of War Minister HATA. The Defense sought to prove through SAWADA that HATA was desirous of peace with China and always insisted it was most urgent to bring an end to the China Incident and to that end sought to reduce the strength of the Japanese troops in China, ^{a.} and TANAKA testified that HATA negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek for a peaceful settlement of the China Incident and wanted to bring about peace by the reduction and then withdrawal of all the troops in China. ^{b.} We respectfully submit that HATA's acts were directly opposite to those testified to by these witnesses and that HATA sought to thoroughly crush the Chiang Kai-shek regime and to support by military force the Wang Ching wei Government in China. On 23 December 1939 Japanese armed forces landed at Lungchow on the

DD-26.

a. Ex. 3208, T. 29997

DD-27.

a. Ex. 3205, T. 29,009
 b. Ex. 3233, T. 29,411

(DD-27)

southern tip of the China coast near French Indo-China. On 24 December they captured Nanning, the capital of Kwangsi Province.^c On 4 March 1940 the Japanese troops occupied Haichow on the border of Shantung Province.^d On 24 April 1940 the Japanese Army recaptured Kaifeng, the capital of Honan Province, and on 12 June 1940 the Japanese Armed forces captured Nichang, their nearest approach to Chungking.^e

DD-28. HATA's plan for peace in China envisioned an utter destruction of the National Government under Chiang Kai-shek and the setting up of a new regime which would cooperate with Japan in the same manner as Manchukuo. He reiterated these views in hearings before the Budget Committee of the Diet. On 22 March 1940 in reply to a question by Committee Member HIRAKAWA, who had cited HATA's previous explanation of the object of the China Incident and suggested to HATA that "the Chiang Regime will be utterly ruined", War Minister HATA said:

"Mr. HIRAKAWA's idea is quite reasonable, and it is unnecessary for me to repeat that the object of the present incident is to establish a new order in East Asia by thoroughly crushing the Chiang Kai Shek Government's pro-communistic and anti-Japanese policies. Therefore, we firmly believe that the establishment of the Wang regime is only a stage in the Incident and when the new government is established our Army will give every possible assistance, especially military help, to the Wang Regime and their policy will be firm and unchangeable as ever until the Chiang regime surrenders."^a (Underscoring added)

On the same date before the same committee HATA had previously stated: "Japan is now fighting what one may call a Holy War."^b

DD-27.

- c. Ex. 256, T. 3451
- d. Ex. 276-A, T. 3700
- e. Ex. 256, T. 3451

DE-28.

- a. Ex. 3832, T. 38,015
- b. Ex. 3832, T. 38,018

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DD-29. On 29 April 1940 HATA was decorated with the First Class Order of the Golden Kite in recognition of his meritorious services rendered in the China Affair. ^{a.}

C. HATA Sponsored and Approved the Wang Ching Wei Government in China.

DD-30. On 1 November 1939 the China Affairs Board, of which HATA was Vice President, ^{a.} outlined the cardinal points to be followed in the establishment of the new regime in China. ^{b.} It provided that first of all that "main component people of the new Central Government" should be made to understand what was desired and demanded by Japan and that the Central Political Conference should be so directed that there would be no conflict between what was desired and demanded by Japan "and what will be resolved by the Chinese side." The Japanese side would determine both the formation and the time of the establishment of the new Central Government and the political creed and policies of the new Central Government should include such principles for the readjustment of the new relationship between Japan and China as the desires of Japan might dictate - nothing contradictory to Japan's desires. It further determined "concerning the adjustment of the new relationship between Japan and China after formation of the Central Government and before the establishment of the new Central Government, the leading figures of the Government shall make a firm pledge to the Japanese side." ^{c.} In short, the new Government in

DD-29.

- a. Ex. 106, T. 703

DD-30.

- a. Ex. 106, T. 701
b. Ex. 3745, T. 37,398
c. Ex. 3745, T. 37,400

(DD-30)

China which HATA was sponsoring would be puppet in character, subservient toward the views of Japan and would aid HATA and his co-conspirators in destroying the National Government of China under Chiang Kai-shek and fit China into the scheme for the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

DD-31. To this new Government HATA pledged the full support of Japanese military might. He was quoted by a member of the Budget Committee of the Diet as having stated that "when the Wang Regime is established, the Army must render as much military help as possible to the newly born Central Government." ^{a.} And at the same session before the Budget Committee, 22 March 1940, HATA said: "Our Army will give every possible assistance, especially military help, to the Wang Regime." ^{b.}

DD-32. The tentative plan for the establishment of the new Government in China was prepared by the China Affairs Board while HATA was Vice-President and finally approved by both the Japanese and those with whom they were dealing in China on 30 December 1939. ^{a.} And on 30 March 1940 the new Government under Wang Ching Wei was formally established at Nanking. ^{b.}

D. HATA Spurned the Nine-Power Pact.

DD-33. In his interrogation ^{a.} HATA stated that he had studied international law in the War College and that he knew of the Nine-Power Treaty, and when asked whether or not he considered the waging of war in China a violation of this treaty, he replied evasively that "There seemed to be no

DD-31.

- a. Ex. 3833, T. 38,019
- b. Ex. 3832, T. 38,021

DD-32.

- a. Ex. 2721-A, T. 23,998 - 24,000
- b. Ex. 276-A, T. 3701

DD-33.

- a. Ex. 256, T. 3451

(DD-34)
other way out but to resort to armed force when other means failed." Not only does his entire attitude towards the China Incident and all of his actions in connection therewith show an utter disregard for this treaty but he publicly expressed his views as War Minister that the existence of this treaty should not be permitted to impede the carrying out of Japanese military operations in China.

DD-34. The Defense sought to establish by the witness ARITA that HATA respected the Nine-Power Pact. ARITA, the Foreign Minister in the Yonai Cabinet, testified ^{a.} that it was a common agreement between the Prime Minister and the Foreign, War and Navy Ministers to loyally and faithfully observe the provisions of the Nine-Power Pact in relation to China ^{b.} and he specifically denied that HATA ever stated that the Nine-Power Pact should not be permitted to interfere with the military operations of Japan in China. ^{c.} Evidence was introduced in rebuttal which directly disproved the testimony of ARITA and showed that HATA not only made the very statement attributed to him but made it before a committee meeting of the Diet at which ARITA was present and made answers to questions asked by members of the committee. ^{d.} When ARITA was asked by Committee Member KUBOI at a meeting of the Budget Committee on 7 February 1940 the position of the government with regard to the Nine-Power Treaty, YUSUJI suggested to him, "It is needless to say that this Nine-Power Treaty is a serious obstacle both in the

DD-34.

- a. T. 28991
- b. T. 28991
- c. T. 28991
- d. Ex. 3832, T. 38018

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(DD-34)
settlement of the Incident and in future wars." ARITA evaded the question and made an ambiguous reply stating that on the one hand it could be said that the renunciation of the treaty would be favorable in the establishment of a new order in the Far East, but on the other hand, the renunciation might cause repercussions and that he thought it was a problem which required careful deliberation. When on that day the same question was addressed to War Minister HATA he replied that "We should follow the Government's policy." ^e.

DD-35. That such an equivocal position with regard to the Nine-Power Pact did not properly represent HATA's views was fully disclosed some six weeks later when on 22 March 1940 before a meeting of the Budget Committee, HATA was asked directly a question concerning the Nine-Power Pact. I quote the question and HATA's reply. ^a.

INADA Committee Member.

"The fourth is a question concerning the Nine-Power Treaty. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has not yet expressed his decisive opinion on the abrogation of the treaty. It was his answer that deep consideration was necessary in regard to the time and the way of abrogating the treaty, for in some circumstances, it may end in good results, and in others, bad. However, this is also a very important diplomatic problem, and it is far from my intention to trouble the Minister of Foreign Affairs for his further answer unnecessarily. But I think this Nine-Power Treaty is the origin of many obstacles in the management of the China Incident. We may be victorious in every battle we fight, but as long as such a big diplomatic strong point bars our way, it is indeed a matter of undying regret for our people and a

DD-34.

e. Ex. 3833, T. 38025; 28974-9

DD-35.

a. Ex. 3832, T. 38015-18

(DD-35)

source of deepest chagrin. It is hoped that our Government will take into consideration the root and branch of the matter and its importance, and act so as not to make any mistakes. Otherwise though an army of a million strong may be sent to the front and a million tons of warships be launched, it would, in fact, be very difficult to attain the object of this war. Such being my opinion, I should like to hear the opinions of the two ministers in charge of military affairs, on the Nine-Powers Treaty from the tactical point of view, so as to make sure whether these two ministers who are the representatives of the Army and Navy, think the attitude of the Minister of Foreign Affairs towards the treaty inevitable, owing to circumstances."

HATA the State Minister.

"I should say that it is a matter of course for the Army to follow the Policy of the Government in dealing with the Nine-Powers Treaty, but as I am now questioned on it, I would like to give my personal opinion on the subject. The insulting and anti-Japanese policy of the Chiang Kai Shek Regime induced this present incident. In order to correct this misguidance and to bring about everlasting peace in East Asia, Japan is now fighting what one may call a 'Holy War.' Therefore, I believe that the present incident is of course beyond the scope of the Nine-Powers Treaty. Quite apart from its appreciability, the treaty still exists at present, but I do not think that the carrying out of our military operations ought to be restricted by the existence of this treaty. I also think that the Foreign Minister knows quite well that the general circumstances of East Asia at present are radically different from that of the time the treaty was concluded." (Underscoring added)

DD-36. These words of HATA were reassuring to Germany and on the following day, 23 March 1940, Ott telegraphed to the Foreign Office reporting a stiffening of Japanese attitude toward England and America and continued "Noteworthy is the report of strong words by the spokesman of the Army in the Diet

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(DD-36)
and statements by the War and Navy Ministers that Japan's progress in China could not be stopped by the obsolete Nine-Power Treaty." a.

E. HATA Favors Advance into French Indo-China.

DD-37. While HATA was War Minister Japan continued to increase the pressure on French Indo-China; its railroads were bombed and, even though the excessive demands of Japan on French Indo-China were reluctantly acceded to, plans were made for military advance into that country. On 5 February 1940 the French Ambassador protested for the second time the bombing of the Yunan Railway, as a result of which 40 people were killed (including five Frenchmen) and 84 were wounded. On the same day the Japanese Government insisted to the French Government that the use of the Yunan Railway for shipment of supplies which reached Chiang Kai-shek must be stopped and that until this was done the bombing of the railway would not cease. a. On 4 April 1940 Japan again bombed the Yunan Railway in French Indo-China. b.

DD-38. 17 June 1940 France surrendered. a.

DD-39. On the day following the surrender of France a Four-Ministers' Conference was held which HATA attended in which two plans were submitted regarding the French Indo-China situation: (1) that a request be submitted regarding the pro-Chiang actions and if refused by the French that force be employed, and (2) that force be immediately employed without negotiation. The military ministers wanted the first plan and it was adopted. a. On the next day, 19 June 1940, strong

DD-36.

a. Ex. 514, T. 6148-50

DD-37.

a. Ex. 618-A, T. 6857
b. Ex. 276-A, T. 3701;
Ex. 618-A, (p.3) 6822

DD-39.

a. Ex. 619, T. 6824

DD-38.

a. T. 6148

(DD-39)
representations were made to France by Japan to prohibit materials for the Chungking Regime from passing into Indo-China and it was demanded that Japanese inspectors be permitted to make investigations of the actual conditions on the spot. ^b This was HATA's attitude toward a prostrate France.

DD-40. On the same day, 19 June 1940 Ott reported to the German Foreign Office that Japan had authorized its Ambassador in Berlin to congratulate Germany on its recent successes and to point out the interest of Japan in the fate of Indo-China and the suggestion that a German declaration be issued that Japan would receive a free hand in Indo-China. Ott also reported that confidential information from Army circles informed him that Japan was contemplating the occupation of the strategically important Yunan Railway. ^a The demands of the Japanese military authorities were acceded to. On 20 June 1940 the French Ambassador notified the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister that due to the repeated representations of the Japanese Government, France had decided to prohibit the transportation of a wide range of materials and goods through French Indo-China into China. The official report adds that the route is one of the important routes over which war materials were supplied to Chungking and it had been entirely severed. ^b On 22 June 1940 Japan proposed to France (1) that military experts and Foreign Office officials be sent from Japan into French Indo-China to make an inspection concerning the suspension of the transportation of supplies, (2) that an advance party of Japanese Army

DD-39.

b. Ex. 615-A, T. 6796

DD-40.

a. Ex. 520, T. 6162-4
b. 615-A, T. 6797

(DD-4C)

and Navy officers should be sent to French Indo-China, and

(3) that, pending the determination by Japan of the materials which it would request the French Indo-China authorities to prohibit from being transported to China, they should continue a complete blockade of the frontier between French Indo-China and China. A helpless France accepted these demands. ^{c.}

DD-41. On 24 June 1940 Ott reported to the German Foreign Office that KOISO had inquired what would be Germany's attitude toward Japan's military moves in French Indo-China and part of the Netherlands East Indies and that MUTO had declared that Japan was very much interested in Indo-China. ^{a.} On 29 June 1940 a Japanese observation party headed by Major General NISHIHARA and consisting of 40 officials and Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers arrived at Hanoi. ^{b.} The Japanese militarists were moving south. HATA and MUTO were working in close harmony.

DD-42. As further evidence that plans for the southern advance were even then in the making the Japanese Government on 12 January 1940 notified the Netherlands Government of the abrogation of the treaties of the Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation made between them on 12 August 1935. ^{a.} On 20 May 1940 the Japanese Government made strong demands on the Netherlands for materials to be exported from the Netherlands East Indies; ^{b.} thus the government of which HATA was a member was moving towards the N.E.I. Its demands

DD-40.

c. Ex. 618-A, T. 6851-2

DD-42.

a. Ex. 1307-A, T. 11768;
T. 11770

DD-41.

a. Ex. 523, T. 6174
b. Ex. 618-A, T. 6853

b. Ex. 1309-A, T. 11777;
11786

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(DD-43)
would increase and when the Netherlands failed to comply the answer was war.

F. HATA Favored the New Political Structure-IRIA.

DD-43. Despite the testimony of YONAI that HATA avoided politics, ^{a.} we respectfully submit that it clearly appears from the evidence that HATA was in favor of the dissolution of political parties in Japan to the end that the Army could maintain a closer control over the government. When HATA was questioned before a sub-committee of the Diet on 19 March 1940 as to the Army's attitude toward political parties and the participation of the Army in politics, his appointee and close associate, the accused MUTO, replied on behalf of War Minister HATA that the Army favored the dissolution of political parties certainly insofar as they sought to further their interests, and referring to totalitarianism of European conception MUTO said that "Nationalism" is considered a better name for the guiding principle of the Japanese nation; that Japan's totalitarianism was completely nationalistic in faith and principle. ^{b.} YONAI stated in his interrogations which were introduced in rebuttal ^{c.} that HATA and the military circles considered his Cabinet a weak one for two reasons, the first of which was that the Cabinet on the whole did not support the creation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. YONAI stated that he was opposed to the creation of the IRIA because this association had the aim of establishing a fascist regime in the country on the same lines as in Germany and because such

DD-43.

- a. Ex. 3198, T. 28919
- b. Ex. 2243-A, T. 16150
- c. Ex. 3831-A, T. 38,000

(DD-43)
an organ as the IRIA "meant the establishment of a dictatorship in the country where the Parliament instead of being the organ of deliberation of questions would become an organ where the members simply vote for and applaud any new measure demanded by a dictatorship." He further testified that the leading military circles insisted on the creation of the IRAA, and when asked the most influential persons in military circles at that time he replied, "War Minister HATA, Chief of Military Affairs Section in the War Ministry, MUTO, and Chief of the General Staff, SUGIYAMA," and that these three had expressed dissatisfactions with the policy of his Cabinet. It further appears that on 9 July 1940 HATA was seeking to persuade Premier YONAI to cooperate with the new domestic organization, which was none other than the IRAA. d.

G. HATA Sponsored the New Order in East Asia.

DD-44. HATA as War Minister repeatedly stated that one of the objects of the China Incident was the establishment of a new order in East Asia. He also indicated that the overall plans included more than China and Manchukuo for he repeatedly stated in hearings before committees of the Diet that "The establishment of the new regime is only a stage of the Incident," and added, "It is a great mistake to take the establishment of the new regime as the accomplishment of the Incident, and I am sure such misunderstandings will never arise." Obviously he had in mind other actions to be taken by Japan similar to that then being carried on in China. He

DD-43.

d. Ex. 3199-A, T. 28941
(p. 4 of the exhibit not read into the record)

(DD-44)
said before a committee of the Diet on 22 March 1940: a. "I think it is necessary to impress deeply on the minds of our nation that the establishment of the new regime is only a stage in the Incident and that we must undergo many more difficulties in the future in order to accomplish the object of the Incident." In reply to a question as to Japan's future policy, before the same committee of the Diet, on the same date, HATA revealed what was in his mind when he said, after referring to the various blocs, "But as for us, in order to settle the Incident, there will be no change in our policy, which is to concentrate all our ability to exclude any third power which would persistently interfere with the establishment of the new order in East Asia." b.

H. HATA Favored Collaboration with Germany.

DD-45. As mentioned before, the plans which the conspirators had all but perfected during the HIRANUMA Cabinet for a military alliance between Japan and Germany were shattered when the non-aggression pact was signed between Germany and Russia, and the HIRANUMA Cabinet fell. HATA, the representative of the militarist group in the Cabinet, shared in this regard the views of his predecessor, ITAGAKI, and continued to work, quietly at first, then more openly, for closer collaboration between Japan and Germany. Events then taking place in Europe caused the conspirators to be all the stronger in their desire to cement the axis relationship. On 1 September 1939,

DD-44.

- a. Ex. 3832, T. 38,021-2
- b. Ex. 3832, T. 38,022-3

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(DD-45)

Germany invaded Poland. ^{a.} Four days later HATA and his predecessor as War Minister, the accused ITAGAKI, made speeches at the reception tendered by ITAGAKI to the German military and Naval Attaches. Ott reported, ^{b.} "ITAGAKI pointed out his most sincere efforts on behalf of a close German-Japanese connection, which had failed as a consequence of European developments. Emphasized that his successor shared his views completely. HATA referred to the Japanese Government's non-intervention declaration, but emphasized that he himself as a soldier had full understanding of the German action." On 23 March 1940 Ott reported a stiffening of Japan's attitude toward England and America and that the friendly relations existing toward the Axis powers were being emphasized in Japan. ^{c.}

DD-46. The Defense sought to prove by ARITA, ^{a.} and by YONAI, ^{b.} that HATA was opposed to the Tri-Partite Pact. On cross-examination YONAI was asked concerning statements made in his interrogation on 15 May 1946 and denied them. In rebuttal his interrogation was introduced in evidence, ^{c.} from which it appears that YONAI had, on 15 May 1946, replied to a question as follows: "Q. What point of view concerning the conclusion of a military alliance between Japan and Germany did HATA, Shunroku support? A. HATA, Shunroku thought that the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Germany at that time would be advantageous to Japan." In his interrogation YONAI further stated that the military circles were, during the time

DD-45.

- a. T. 6,148
- b. Ex. 2198, T. 15,744
- c. Ex. 514, T. 6,148

DD-46.

- a. Ex. 3000, T. 28,945-6
- b. Ex. 2198, T. 23,937
- c. Ex. 3001, T. 23,000-1

(DD-46)
of his Cabinet, demanding the conclusion of an alliance with Germany, and that there were misunderstandings between himself and War Minister HATA, "and they all boiled down to the point that the Cabinet being weak could not carry out the active war policy on which military circles insisted." ^{d.} YONAI said there were two reasons why HATA and the military circles considered his Cabinet a weak one: (1) Because he did not support the IRAA, and (2) because he did not support the building up of an alliance between Germany and Japan, and that the most influential persons in military circles at that time were HATA, MUTO and SUGIYAMA, each of whom expressed dissatisfactions with the policy of his Cabinet. ^{e.}

DD.47. France surrendered 17 June 1940, ^{a.} and there was a surge of sentiment to align Japan with victorious Germany. KOKOYE in his memoirs wrote: ^{b.} "In the spring of 1940, however, when the overwhelming military strength of Germany had swept across Western Europe and threatened, as it appeared, the existence of Great Britain, the question of a Tri-Partite military alliance again became a nationwide topic of great popularity. **** When I was honored with an Imperial Command to form a cabinet for the second time, anti-Anglo-Saxon sentiments and enthusiasm for a Tri-Partite Alliance were at their height, especially among the military circles and some groups of the people among the nation." Even the YONAI Cabinet could not entirely withstand this pressure following the fall of France, and the

DD-46.
d. Ex. 3831-A, T. 38,000-1
e. Ex. 3831-A, T. 38,001-4

DD.47.
a. T. 6,148
b. Ex. 2735A, T. 24,291

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(DD-47)

Cabinet indicated its willingness to belatedly undertake further collaboration with Germany. It proved, however, as we shall hereafter point out, to be too late to save the Cabinet, for the militarists, aided by HATA, wanted action and wanted it fast, and above all, did not wish the YONAI-ARITA Cabinet to gain credit for the successful conclusion of a policy which they had previously opposed.

DD-48. On 8 July 1940, the Japanese special envoy in Berlin, SATO, in a conference with Von Ribbentrop, ^{a.} congratulated Germany on its victory over France and stated that just as in Europe the new order would be brought about by Germany, Japan, on her part, had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. This conference had been held by instructions of the Japanese Foreign Office for the purpose of strengthening the coalition between the two countries, ^{b.} and the results of this conference were reported to the Japanese Foreign Office. Thereupon a plan for coalition between Japan and Germany was prepared by the Japanese Foreign Office and presented to a joint conference of the representatives of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries on 12 July 1940. This plan provided that Germany would recognize Japan's sphere of influence and political leadership in French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies and South Seas and that Germany would give proper support for the disposal of the China Incident, that Japan would take

DD-48.

a. Ex. 524, T. 6,179

b. Ex. 527, T. 6,131; Ex. 535, T. 6166

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(DD-48)
steps to check Britain in East Asia and facilitate her surrender and that Japan and Germany would contrive the fall of British influence by the partition of her colonies. ^{c.} The final draft of the agreement was approved at a meeting of the representatives of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries held on 16 July 1940, the very day that the YONAI Cabinet resigned. When asked on cross-examination about the conference between Saito and Von Ribbentrop held by direction of the Japanese Foreign Office while he was Foreign Minister, ARITA was extremely vague and evasive in his answers. ^{d.} YONAI denied all knowledge of the negotiations with Germany carried on by direction of his Foreign Minister and of the meetings held between the representatives of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries in his own Cabinet. ^{e.}

DD-49. In spite of these late efforts on the part of the YONAI Cabinet to collaborate with Germany and whether they were done with or without the knowledge and consent of YONAI and ARITA, a matter which we respectfully submit, seriously affects the credit of both, the change of attitude had come too late. The military clique, spearheaded by HATA and ably assisted by MUTO, wanted to accomplish two purposes, and they wanted to accomplish them immediately. The first was the renovation of the internal structure, that is the creation of the IRAA, and the second and most important was the formation of an alliance with Germany. The die had been cast—the YONAI Cabinet must fall—Japan must get back on the highroad to war. It was HATA, and HATA, alone, who could accomplish these ends. He did.

DD-48.
c. Ex. 527, T. 6,191
d. T. 23,936-68
e. T. 23,932-5

I. HATA Kicks the YONAI Cabinet.

DD-50. The YONAI-ARITA diplomacy was the diplomacy of the status quo and the policy of the YONAI Cabinet prior to the fall of France had been the policy of the status quo. HATA and the Army circles were demanding action. German victories and the German-Italian Axis control of Europe were causing HATA and the military clique to boldly increase their demands for a change in Japanese foreign policy toward collaboration with the Axis and to support the new political movement fashioned along totalitarian lines.^{a.} While the YONAI Cabinet indicated that it might be inclined toward rapprochement with the Axis,^{b.} it did not indicate that it would support the new political order -- the IRJA.^{c.} In addition, HATA and his group, doubtful of the extent to which the YONAI Cabinet would go in joining the Axis, in no event wanted this Cabinet to strengthen its position by obtaining credit for a new foreign policy of collaboration with the Axis which it had previously opposed.^{d.} The breach between HATA and the ARITA-YONAI Cabinet, of which he was a member, was widened with the controversy which arose over the advance notice of a speech to be made by ARITA and the actual broadcast made by ARITA on 29 June 1940.^{e.} Following this in quick succession, HATA urged YONAI to support KONOYE and the new political structure.^{f.} Obtaining no satisfaction, HATA first suggested and then in a formal note presented to Premier YONAI on 14 July 1940^{g.} demanded that the Cabinet resign.

DD-50.

- a. Ex. 3199A, T. 28,941 (pp. 1-3)
- b. Ex. 524, T. 6179; Ex. 127, T. 6191; Ex. 528, T. 6212
- c. Ex. 3808A, T. 37,362
- d. Ex. 531, T. 6239
- e. Ex. 3199A, T. 28,941 (p. 3); Ex. 530, T. 6238; Ex. 531, T. 6239; Ex. 529, T. 6233
- f. Ex. 3199A, T. 28,941
- g. Ex. 3199A, T. 28,941

(DD-50)
 When YONAI did not yield to this demand, HATA on 16 July 1940 resigned. When asked by YONAI to name a successor as War Minister, HATA refused telling him that there was no one who would accept for "the entire Army is absolutely opposed to your views."^{h.} HATA had accomplished his purpose; he had wrecked the YONAI Cabinet. Later the same day (June 16, 1940) the YONAI Cabinet resigned. We shall now discuss these several steps in somewhat more detail.

1. ARITA Broadcast.

DD-51. The newspapers carried a story which purported to be based on advance information from the Foreign Ministry of a speech which Foreign Minister ARITA proposed to make the latter part of June calling for a more active foreign policy and collaboration with the Axis. ARITA in a broadcast on 29 June 1940^{a.} mentioned that Japan did not expect the western powers to assert "any undesirable influence upon the stability of East Asia" but made no reference to collaboration with the Axis. The press then reported that it was the influence of the military, of which HATA was the head, that prevented ARITA from making the speech as planned. This caused a furor between the Foreign and War Ministries.^{b.}

DD-52. Ott reported to Berlin on 1 July 1940 with regard to ARITA's radio speech on 29 June 1940,^{a.} that protests of the Army forced the original text to be "substantially mutilated." He also reported, and this is particularly pertinent to HATA, "The growing influence of the Army also

DD-50.
 h. Ex. 3199L, T. 23,941 (p. 5); Ex. 532, T. 6240-3
 Ex. 383L, T. 38,000

DD-51.
 a. Ex. 529, T. 6233
 b. Ex. 530, T. 6238; Ex. 531, T. 6239; Ex. 3199L, T. 23,941

DD-52.
 a. Ex. 530, T. 6238

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(DD-52)
results from the stronger military attitude towards Honkong
and Indo-China." Ott reported again on 3 July 1940:

" * * * the Foreign Minister intended to stress
in his radio speech that the present government has never
deviated from the Axis policy, and has always had full
sympathy for the German demand for a New Order in Europe,
so much the more since Japan herself is striving for a
New Order in Asia. The government is determined to con-
solidate Axis friendship. The army protested against
this attitude on the grounds that in reality the above
policy of sympathy for the Axis is not compatible with
the policies hitherto pursued by the cabinet and because
the army wanted to avoid the YONAI-ARITA cabinet using a
sudden stress of friendship with the Axis as a chess
move to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition,
which is close to us and to save its own existence.

"The action of the Press Chief of the Foreign
Ministry, who disclosed the original text of ARITA's
speech to 'ASAHI' and announced the army's protest
publicly in a press conference, caused great indignation
in army circles."^{b.}

2. The Leading Article on Fall of the YONAI Cabinet.

DD-53. Meetings were held between ARITA and HATA and
announcement made to the public that the breach had been healed.
The essence of the problem had not been settled. The authori-
tative article on liquidation of YONAI-ARITA diplomatic policy
carrying a full account of the events which led up to and
caused the fall of the YONAI Cabinet, published 17 June 1940
in the Tokyo ASAHI Shimbun,^{a.} was not read in full into the
Record, only the letter delivered by Foreign Minister HATA to
Premier YONAI on 12 July 1940 having been read into the
Record by the witness YONAI on cross-examination.^{b.} After
tracing the increasing opposition to the YONAI-ARITA dip-
lomacy on the part of HATA and the Army circles because of
their failure to collaborate with the Axis and the

DD-52.
b. Ex. 531, T. 6239

DD-53.
a. Ex. 3199., T. 28,941
b. T. 28,939-40

(DD-53)
 dissatisfaction with their internal policy because of their failure to support the IRMA, it states "The direct cause for the collapse of the YOKAI Cabinet under such circumstances was War Minister HATA's strong attack" ^{c.} after outlining the circumstances surrounding ARITA's broadcast of June 29 and the reports that the text had been changed as the result of army pressure, the article continues:

"However, the essence of the problem had not been settled. Due to their contention that even if the foreign policy is changed, it would be impossible for the YOKAI-ARITA Axis to carry out the changed diplomacy and that the change would only represent a 'Shift' in form, the military circle strongly continued to demand the immediate establishment of the new political organization with the resignation of the YOKAI Cabinet, and the promotion of the changed policy by the new organization. Thus the movement for the appearance of Prince KONOME who is the leader of the new political organization, grew stronger.

"In view of the situation within the department, War Minister HATA, after having an interview with both Generals TERAMUCHI and SUGIYAMA, old military senior heads, on the 7th and 8th, decided generally on measures to be taken as the War Minister. And on the 9th he met the Premier in the Cabinet meeting and indirectly expressed his intentions by saying, "How about thinking about cooperating with the new domestic organization?" To this statement by the War Minister, Premier YOKAI replied, "with the domestic situation as it is, perhaps I may have to think about it." and thus expressed agreement for the time being.

War Minister Presents a Strong Vote
 "Subsequently, on the 11th, KATO, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, called on ISHII HATA, Cabinet Secretary General, explained to the latter in detail the intention of the Army, amplifying the intention of the War Minister. Later, War Minister HATA, on the evening of the 14th presented to Premier YOKAI an important advice in writing. The note was very clear, and the content is as follows:

"The present conditions are such that we are facing the greatest transition phase of world situation, and the strengthening of the domestic organization and the reformation of the foreign policy have become the most

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(DD-53)

pressing of all our work. However, the government is doing nothing, and it seems that it is idly losing an opportunity which will never come again. In this way it is even blocking the complete settlement of the Incident. Therefore, at this time, in order to give the people's minds a change, and promote the establishment of the new organization, from a broad point of view, how about deciding to have the Cabinet resign?

"The foregoing had an effect of a dagger pointing at the heart of the present Cabinet. On the following day, the 15th, War Minister HATA had consultations also with Prince KAN-IN, the Chief of the Army General Staff. As a result, War Minister made a final decision. Premier YONAI, however, had an altogether different view from the Army as regards the situation, and with the intention of taking charge of the political situation with the present organization to the last, made the following demand on the 16th at 9:50 a.m. at the Cabinet meeting when he met the War Minister:

"My views are absolutely opposite from those of the War Minister. There is no need for a new organization. As long as you cannot agree with my views, I want you to tender your resignation, and want you to recommend the succeeding War Minister."

"Thereupon War Minister HATA tendered the resignation which had already been prepared, and returned to the Official Residence of the War Minister for the time being. He then opened the conference of the Three Army Chiefs (T.N. RIKUGUN SAN CHOKUN) and the Conference of Supreme War Councillors in succession. After deliberations, the War Minister again returned to the Premier's Official Residence at 3:30 p.m., and met the Premier and made a clear out reply as follows:

"I conferred with the three army chiefs, recommended the succeeding war minister and negotiated for their acceptance. But under the present circumstances, they had no mind to accept it. The entire army is absolutely opposed to your views."

"Thus the lifeline of the present cabinet was severed, and the YONAI Cabinet resigned a half year after its formation." (Underscoring added)^d.

3. KIDO's Account of the Fall of the YONAI Cabinet.

DD-54. The accused KIDO wrote in his diary that on

9 July Vice Minister ANAMI stated to him as follows:

" * * * the character of the YONAI Cabinet is not at all suitable for making negotiations with Germany and Italy and it might even cause a fatal delay. The

DD-53.

d. Ex. 3199a, T. 28,941

(DD-54)

conclusion is that a cabinet change is inevitable in order to face this grave situation. The army unanimously will support Prince KOROYU's candidacy. Upon meeting Prince KOROYU after his return to Tokyo, the War Minister will take the opportunity to submit an important proposal to Premier YONAI."

and that on 16 July Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHII TA had telephoned him:

"War Minister HATA met Premier YONAI after 9:00 a.m. this morning and submitted his resignation. When told by the Premier to produce a successor, he replied that an answer may be expected by evening and left."

The Three Chiefs Conference of which HATA was a member refused to recommend a successor. Later on the same day, 16 July, having talked with Premier YONAI, KIDO wrote that the Premier assembled all the members in the Cabinet meeting room and expressed his decision to resign en bloc. "At this, War Minister HATA scowled, but straightway stood up and made a speech."

DD-55. At a meeting of the President of the Privy Council and former premiers held on 17 July 1940 to select a new premier, KIDO when asked by President HARA of the Privy Council the reason for the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet replied:

"I don't know the details but the gist of what I learned of the situation from Premier YONAI yesterday at MIYAMA is as follows: The Army thinks that the present cabinet is not adequate to carry out a policy which will suit the present ever-changing world situation and which will not be regretted later. It seems to show also a tendency to favour a political rapprochement with Germany and Italy. It also feels that even in domestic affairs the government, being separated from the people, will be unable to obtain satisfactory results in a number of policies, and that unless the political structure is strengthened, the government will be unable to cope with the present emergency. In a word since the War Minister's opinion is different from that of the present cabinet, he

DD-54.

- a. Ex. 532, T. 6243
- b. Ex. 532, T. 6244-5
- c. Ex. 532, T. 6246-7

(DD-55)

cannot fulfill his duty as the leader of the Army. Hence, he has come to the point of resigning." a.

DD-56. When testifying before this Tribunal the Accused KIDO in discussing TOJO's efforts to bring about the fall of the Second KONOYE Cabinet said, a. "The attitude taken by War Minister TOJO in the present political change is different from that taken by War Minister HATA under the YONAI Cabinet." When asked by the Tribunal regarding this part of his testimony and "What was the difference to which you refer?" KIDO replied: b.

"In the case of the YONAI Cabinet War Minister HATA presented his resignation to the cabinet and stated that the army could not offer a new man for the post—and there was no successor to succeed his post. Therefore, the YONAI Cabinet fell. The case in the Third KONOYE Cabinet was that a dispute or difference of views arose centering around the decision reached at the Imperial Conference, and TOJO had not yet tendered his resignation. That is the difference, that is the only difference that I meant to mention."

4. Defense Claim of Coercion Falls.

DD-57. The Defense sought to show by YONAI, a. ARITA, b. and SAWADA c. that HATA was forced to resign and by TATEKAWA d. that he resigned because of the influence of MUTO. We respectfully submit that in the light of the foregoing evidence such a contention is entirely untenable.

DD-58. YONAI's evidence is fully rebutted by his interrogations a. and his credibility as a witness before the Tribunal seriously impaired, if not destroyed, by his apparent lack of information about what had occurred in his own cabinet b.

DD-55.

- a. Ex. 532, T. 6250

DD-56.

- a. Ex. 3340, T. 31,015-16
- b. T. 31,813-4

DD-58.

DD-57.

- a. Ex. 3198, T. 28,916
- b. Ex. 3300, T. 28,945
- c. Ex. 3305, T. 29,008
- d. T. 15,901

- a. Ex. 3831-A, T. 38,000
- b. T. 28,321-44

(DD-58) and particularly by his frantic efforts to avoid confirmation of the article above recited which appeared in the Tokyo ASAHI Shinbun on 17 July 1940 ^{c.} giving an account of the fall of his cabinet and quoting in full the letter from HATA to YONAI of 14 July 1940 urging the resignation of the Cabinet. ^{d.}

DD-59. ARITA's testimony was not only shaken by his failure to remember on cross-examination instructions which he had given to and information which he had received from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin and the action taken within his own department ^{a.} but it was directly contradicted in the most material points by excerpts from HATA's speeches before the Diet Committee, introduced in rebuttal. ^{b.}

DD-60. SAWADA's testimony as to HATA's attitude toward the war in China was in direct conflict not only with the entire evidence of HATA's acts but with HATA's statement as War Minister before the Diet Committee as to the China Incident. ^{a.} And SAWADA's statement as to what he heard from another implying that HATA was opposed to a change in the Cabinet ^{b.} is entirely rebutted by HATA's letter to YONAI of 14 July 1940. ^{c.}

DD-61. TANAKA also testified that those under HATA in the War Ministry were in favor of the Tri-Partite Pact and because HATA was opposed it resulted that HATA's orders in the War Ministry were not being obeyed. ^{a.} This is quite contradictory to the testimony of NODA, another Defense Witness, who took the stand just prior to the reading of the TANAKA affidavit.

DD-58.

- c. Ex. 3199-A, T. 28,941
- d. Ex. 3391-A, T. 28,939;
28,931-41

DD-61.

- a. Ex. 3233,
T. 29,408-9

DD-59.

- a. T. 28,947-93
- b. Ex. 3832, T. 38,015

DD-60.

- a. Ex. 3233, T. 38,025
- b. T. 29,011
- c. Ex. 3391-A, T. 28,941;
T. 28,939

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(DD-61)

ODA was the Chief of the Personnel Affairs Bureau at the time HATA was War Minister. He testified that he was never aware of any movement or attempt within the War Ministry to discredit General HATA or oppose his policies. b.

DD-62. The argument that HATA was "forced" to resign is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. It falls of its own weight. If he were "forced" to resign, he would have likewise been forced to refuse to recommend a successor to YONAI, forced to recommend TOJO as the War Minister in the next cabinet, forced to go secretly to the Emperor to urge the appointment of TOJO, and finally "forced" to accept the position of Military Councillor in the Cabinet headed by the group which had forced his resignation.

J. HATA Brought in TOJO.

DD-63. Having succeeded in bringing about the downfall of the YONAI Cabinet by first resigning and then refusing to recommend his successor as War Minister, HATA immediately took steps to accomplish the purpose which he had in mind--the control of the new cabinet must be in the hands of the military clique. The new War Minister was the key man. HATA urged the selection of TOJO. Prior to becoming War Minister HATA had been Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor. a. This gave him an entree to the throne which he promptly used. While KONOYE was in the process of forming his cabinet and when he had not yet accepted TOJO for the post of War Minister, HATA went secretly to the Emperor two days after he had resigned and recommended

DD-61.

b. T. 29,337

DD-63.

a. Ex. 106, T. 701

(DD-63)
 TOJO as the new War Minister. b. The accused KIDO recorded in his diary on 19 July 1940 that when he was received in audience that afternoon,

"The Emperor stated that the War Minister had just secretly recommended TOJO for War Minister ** but that he thought the procedure was wrong for Prince KONOE was still in the midst of forming a cabinet and had not yet accepted TOJO for the post. and, as he thought the action was rather over hasty he had asked the War Minister whether he did not think the action as being out of order." "

KIDO further added that, being impressed with the reasonableness of the Emperor's opinions, he (KIDO) told the Chief Aide-de-Camp that "I hoped for liaison by the War Minister in order that the present instance might not set a precedent."

DD-64. The same Three Chiefs' Council of which HATA was a member that had refused on request of YONAI to name a successor to War Minister HATA after the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet quite promptly designated TOJO as War Minister in the new cabinet. Four days after HATA's visit to the Emperor, namely on 22 July 1940, the Second KONOYE Cabinet, with TOJO in the pivotal post of War Minister and including the accused HIRANUMA, HOSHINO, SUZUKI, as well as the late MATSUOKA, came into power.

X. HATA Accepts Appointment Under New Cabinet.

DD 65. HATA stayed with the military clique. On the very day that the Second KONOYE Cabinet with TOJO as War Minister was formed, HATA accepted appointment in that Cabinet as Military Councillor. We respectfully submit that the entire question as to whether he was forced to resign or whether he

DD-63.

- b. Ex. 539, T. 6266
- c. Ex. 539, T. 6266

(DD-65)
had long and efficiently worked to force the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet and bring into being a strong militaristic Cabinet is set at rest by the fact that HATA immediately accepted appointment under this Cabinet. HATA and the leaders of the new cabinet were co-conspirators.

L. HATA's Action Bore Fruit.

DD-66. Within six days after HATA resigned and the YONAI Cabinet fell and before the completion of the formation of the new Cabinet, four of those who were to become members of the new Cabinet, Premier KONOYE, War Minister TOJO, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Navy Minister YOSHIDA, met and drew up a foreign policy program for the new Cabinet containing a rapprochement with the Axis Powers. The Councillor of the Japanese Embassy informed Weermann of this on 22 July 1940 and described it as "an unusual procedure." a.

DD-67. Ten days after HATA forced the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet, the new Cabinet on 26 July 1940 approved the "Outline of the Basic National Policy." a. It described the fundamental aim of the Japanese national policy as follows: "First of all, it is directed towards the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia built upon a firm solidarity of Japan, Manchukuo and China with this Empire as the center." And it reiterated the statement "The fundamental aim of Japan's foreign policy lies in the construction of a new order in East Asia." It approved the setting up of a new political structure and the reform of the Diet system so as to conform to the new

DD-66.

a. Ex. 537, T. 6262

DD-67.

a. Ex. 541, T. 6271; T. 36,181-2

0 159 0005 07 14

(DD-67)
national political structure which would prove to be none other than the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

DD-68. Eleven days after HATA brought about the downfall of the YONAI Cabinet a liaison conference on 27 July 1940 determined, among other things:

"(1) To foster a strong political tie with Germany and Italy and to take active steps in the adjustment of diplomacy with the Soviet Union while maintaining a firm front towards the United States.

"(2) To strengthen policies toward French Indo-China, Hong Kong and settlements; to check assistance to the Chiang Regime and root out the feeling of enmity towards Japan.

"(3) To strengthen the diplomatic policy towards the Dutch East Indies in order to obtain important materials.

"(4) To reform the war-time organization at home." ^{a.}

DD-69. These new plans and policies were announced to the world on 1 August 1940. ^{a.} On 27 September 1940 the Tri-Partite Pact was signed and secret letters exchanged. ^{b.} At almost the same time the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was formally inaugurated. ^{c.} HATA had carried Japan one great step further toward the domination by force of East Asia. HATA and his co-conspirators were rapidly forcing Japan along the road to more and greater wars.

VI, HATA'S GAIN OF ACCESS TO R IN CHINA.

DD-70. On 1 March 1941 HATA became Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China, continuing in that

DD-68.
a. Ex. 1310, T. 11,794; T. 36,182

DD-69.
a. Ex. 1297, T. 11,714
b. Ex. 43, T. 513
c. T. 1642

(DD-70)
 position until 23 November 1944.^a HATA now had the opportunity to carry into effect the policies which he had announced as War Minister—to utterly destroy the National Government of China.^b

A. HATA's Forces Overrun South China.

DD-71. As the Japanese forces under his command in 1938 had overrun and occupied the major portion of Central China^a he now waged war throughout the great expanse of South China. City after city and province after province of the Republic of China fell into the hands of the Japanese military forces under the command of HATA. On 2 April 1941 Japanese forces landed at Foochow, capital of the Fukien Province; ^b on 16 June 1941 Ambassador Grew reported heavy bombing of Chungking and damage to United States property. ^c It is interesting to recall that during the time that HATA was conducting these extensive campaigns throughout China the forces of Hitler were overrunning Europe for on 22 June 1941 Germany invaded USSR. ^d On 12 October 1941 the Japanese forces recaptured Kichang, ^e on 5-10 May 1942 the Japanese captured Lungling, Tungchung, and on 3 December 1943 the armies under HATA's command captured Changteh. On 20 April 1944 the Japanese captured Shenchow; on 25 May 1944 Loyang; on 18 June 1944 the armies of General HATA captured Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province. ^f (Count 48 in the indictment.) On 8 August 1944 HATA's armies captured Hengyang. (Count 49 of the indictment.) On 10 November 1944

DD-70.

- a. Ex. 106, T. 703
- b. Ex. 3832, T. 38,015

DD-71.

- a. Ex. 254, T. 3430
- b. Ex. 254, T. 3431
- c. Ex. 1088, T. 9996
- d. T. 7958
- e. Ex. 254, T. 3431
- f. Ex. 254, T. 3432

(DD-71)
Japanese captured Kwailin (Count 50 of the indictment) and the following day the Japanese forces under command of HATA captured Liuchow. 5. (Count 50 of the indictment.) On 22 November 1944, HATA's forces captured Nanning.

B. Atrocities Committed on Civilians by Troops under HATA's Command.

DD-72. The record is replete with evidence of atrocities committed by soldiers under HATA's command in China during the years 1941-44. These include massacre and murder, torture, rape, robbery, looting and wanton destruction of property, and occurred in all parts of China occupied by troops under HATA's command. 8. These are set out in detail in Appendix A to Summation J, pages 21 to 26. Typical examples of the nature and extent of these atrocities which occurred in all provinces of China occupied by the troops under HATA's command are:

DD-73. 1. Hunan Province - in which are situated Changsha (Count 48 of the indictment) and Hengyan (Count 49 of the indictment.) A lance corporal of the Japanese Army testified that during the second Changsha campaign, Japanese army troops forced more than 200 Chinese prisoners of war at Changsha to plunder large quantities of rice, wheat and other commodities, and then massacred them. 9. In June 1944, when the Japanese forces occupied Changsha, they indulged in murder, rape and incendiarism throughout the area. 10.

DD-74. 2. Hebei Province - TI SHU-TANG testified that in July 1941 the Japanese troops forced 60 men, women and

DD-71.
g. Ex. 254, T. 3432

DD-72.
a. Ex. 331-340, T. 4,609
Ex. 341, T. 4,611
Ex. 344, T. 4,619
Ex. 345, T. 4,629
Ex. 346, T. 4,639
Ex. 351, T. 4,649
Ex. 350, T. 4,648
Ex. 353, T. 4,652
Ex. 354-359, T. 4,654
Ex. 360, T. 4,655
Ex. 209, T. 2,620

DD-73.
a. Ex. 341,
T. 4,611
b. Ex. 342,
T. 4,612

(DD-74)

children into a house, set it on fire and shot those who tried to escape; that in 1942, Japanese troops forced over 40 Chinese women to undress and parade in public view, shooting those who tried to escape to avoid embarrassment by jumping into a pool; and that in February 1944 he was taken along with other civilians and upon refusing to join the puppet force, was forced to go as a captive with the Japanese and labor for the Japanese Army, first in China and later in Japan until the end of the war; and that out of a group of 981 civilians thus forced to labor, 418 died. ^{a.} Colonel Fiang detailed numerous instances of torture and murder of Chinese civilians by Japanese forces, including the massacre of 200 civilians; the killing of over 1,000 civilians by starvation and freezing; that the nature of the torture inflicted on the Chinese by Japanese soldiers included having Chinese prisoners bitten to death by dogs, forcing water into the nostrils of prisoners, torture by electric current, burning, and requiring men and women, strangers to each other, to indulge in compulsory sexual intercourse. ^{b.}

DD-75. 3. Kwantung Province - in which is situated the city of Canton (Count 46 of the Indictment). In December 1941, more than 2,000 civilians were massacred by Japanese troops after they entered the city of Joi-Wang near Canton. ^{a.} In July 1944 ^{b.} over 700 Chinese civilians were massacred and numerous acts of violence and destruction of property committed in villages in the vicinity of Canton.

DD-74.

- a. Ex. 344, T. 4,619
- b. Ex. 345, T. 4,629

DD-75.

- a. Ex. 351, T. 4,649
- b. Ex. 350, T. 4,648

DD-76. 4. Kwangsi Province - in which are situated the cities of Kweilin and Liuchow (Count 50 of the indictment). In Kweilin women were forced into prostitution with Japanese soldiers, and hundreds of Chinese soldiers who had been taken prisoners had been killed and their bodies exposed to view on the Imperial Wall or thrown into the Lee River. ^{a.} Also detailed were 21 cases of murder, and numerous instances of looting, rape and abduction committed by the Japanese troops in and around Kweilin and Liuchow in Kwangsi Province. ^{b.}

DD-77. 5. Yunan Province. G. J. Hsu, a Chinese merchant, testified before the Tribunal that in May 1942, the Japanese troops massacred Chinese civilians at the Salween River on the Burma Highway by machine gun fire. He gave instances of rape by Japanese soldiers and testified that the road leading to the river was lined with civilians who had been shot. ^{a.}

DD-78. Massacre and murder, torture, rape, robbery, looting and wanton destruction of property--this was the pattern of warfare waged by the Japanese troops under HATA's command throughout China from March 1941 to November 1944. In seeking to rebut this the Defense introduced some witnesses who testified that either HATA's Headquarters or the Unit Commanders under his command issued orders prohibiting atrocities upon Chinese civilians. ^{a.} An excerpt from a radio broadcast alleged to have been made by HATA to the troops in China was introduced, ^{b.} and a news article purporting to give information concerning an order issued by HATA regarding

- DD-76.
 a. Ex. 353, T. 4,652-4
 b. Ex. 354-359, T. 4,654-5

- DD-77.
 a. Ex. 209, T. 2,620-2

- DD-78.
 a. Ex. 2571, T. 21,793
 Ex. 2572, T. 21,796
 Ex. 2573, T. 21,808
 Ex. 2556, T. 21,632
 Ex. 2560, T. 21,631
 b. Ex. 2562, T. 21,735

(DD-78)

the treatment of Chinese civilians by the Japanese Expeditionary Forces. ^{c.} Certain of these witnesses testified that Chinese civilians were killed by bombs, either Chinese or American, just before Japanese troops occupied Chinese areas. Three witnesses testified that there was some Court Martial punishment of Japanese troops for atrocities inflicted on Chinese civilians. The testimony of the Defense witnesses is conflicting, some testifying that there were no atrocities, and others testifying that punishment was meted out for the atrocities committed by the Japanese troops. It is respectfully submitted that the negative nature of evidence submitted by the Defense in no wise overcomes the positive testimony of eye witnesses presented by the Prosecution as to the atrocities committed against civilians in China by the troops under HATA's Command.

C. Mistreatment of Prisoners of War and Internees by Troops Under HATA's Command

DD-79. The evidence introduced by the Prosecution concerning the treatment of prisoners of war in those portions of China under HATA's command was twice stated in summary form in the record.

^{a.} Specific instances of mistreatment, torture and privation inflicted by the Japanese troops under HATA's command on prisoners of war and civilian internees are set

out in the appendix B to Summation J. ^{b.} These include numerous

DD-78.

c. Ex. 2565, T. 21,759

DD-79.

b. See Appendix B to Summation J - pp. 4-7, 25-26, 28-30, 45-47, 48, 49, 64-67, 80-83, 93, 94, 96, 111 and 112.

DD-79.

a. T. 27,455
T. 29,416*

* (As to Hong Kong and vicinity:
Ex. 1590 - 1628, T. 13,162-13,185.
Testimony of Burnett, T. 13,112-13,174

As to Shanghai and other parts of China: Ex. 1888-1896, T. 14,158-14,172
Ex. 1900-1902, T. 14,178-14,184
Ex. 1904, T. 14,186
Ex. 1907-1909, T. 14,188-14,190
Ex. 1911, T. 14,191
Ex. 1914-1915, T. 14,194-5
Testimony of Powell, T. 3,270-3,280)

(DD-79) instances which occurred at Shanghai Prison Camp, at
 c.
 d. e.
 Woosun Prison Camp, at Yangwan Camp, at Haihong Prison
 f. g. h.
 Camp, at Footang Internment Camp, and at Yochow.

DD-80. Against this volume of evidence, the Defense introduced very little testimony and none to specifically deny the positive testimony of atrocities against prisoners of war and internees which was presented by the Prosecution. One Defense witness testified that prisoners of war were allowed freedom so long as they refrained from hostile acts and that the responsibility for them was with the renegade Government at Nanking, a. and another testified that some of the prisoners who were taken in the Hengyang operations were injured by bombs dropped from Chinese planes. b. It is respectfully submitted that the evidence fully and clearly establishes that the prisoners of war and internees were starved, beaten, tortured and horribly mistreated in each of the camps above cited, and that this mistreatment at the hands of Japanese soldiers under HATA's command continued throughout the entire time that HATA was in command of the expeditionary forces in China from March, 1941, to November, 1944, and that the responsibility of HATA for these acts of the soldiers under his command is clear and inescapable.

D. HATA Asks Death Penalty for Doolittle Flyers

DD-81. On 18 April 1942 American flyers dropped bombs aimed at military objectives in Japan and landed in China.

DD-79.

c. Ex. 1890--., T. 14,161
 Ex. 1895--., T. 14,169
 Ex. 1896--., T. 14,171
 Testimony of Powell, T.
 3,270-80
 Ex. 1893--A, T. 14,165
 Ex. 1894--A, T. 14, 166
 Ex. 1901--A, T. 14,179
 d. Ex. 1901--., T. 14,179
 Ex. 1897--., T. 14,171
 Ex. 1909--., T. 14,190
 Ex. 1911--A, T. 14,191
 Ex. 1914--A, T. 14,194
 Ex. 1900--., T. 14,178

DD-79.

e. Ex. 1907--A, T. 14,189
 Ex. 1915--., T. 14,195
 f. Ex. 1888--A, T. 14,158
 Ex. 1894--., T. 14,166
 Ex. 1893--A, T. 14,165
 Ex. 1889--., T. 14,160
 g. Ex. 1904--A, T. 14,165
 Ex. 1908--A, T. 14,189
 Ex. 1893--A, T. 14,165
 h. Ex. 1902--., T. 14,184

DD-80.

a. Ex. 2572, T. 21,802-3
 b. Ex. 2558, T. 21,633

(DD-81)

These are known as the Doolittle Flyers. They were imprisoned and kept under HATA's jurisdiction until they were brought to Tokyo on 25 April 1942. They were kept in Tokyo until 17 June and then returned to Shanghai and placed in Bridge House jail and were thereafter continuously under HATA's jurisdiction. Their so-called trial was held on 20 August and they were all sentenced to death. The death sentence was subsequently commuted as to five of them and the other three executed.^{a.}

DD-82. These flyers were tried under regulations for punishment of enemy air crews issued by HATA, Supreme Commander of the Japanese Forces in China, 13 August 1942, by military commission set up by the 13th Army under orders from Commander-in-Chief HATA.^{a.} When asked the contents of the order from General HATA directing the trial of these captured flyers, SAWADA, the Commander of the 13th Army, replied "It was a simple order ordering the 13th Army to conduct the trial of the Doolittle Flyers."^{b.} The regulations for punishment of enemy air crews issued by HATA on 13 August, 1942, provided that death should be the military punishment, but imprisonment for more than ten years "may be substituted for it according to extenuating circumstances." It further provided "Under special circumstances the execution of military punishment shall be remitted."^{c.} It provided that these regulations should be enforced from the date of issue and made them in the nature of an ex post facto law by providing "these regulations shall be applicable also to acts committed previous to their enforcement."^{d.}

DD-81.

- a. Ex. 3834-A, T. 38,030
- Ex. 3130, T. 27,904
- Ex. 3131, T. 27,905

DD-82.

- a. Ex. 1991, T. 14,662
- T. 29,897
- b. T. 27,452
- c. T. 27,453
- d. Ex. 1991, T. 14,662

DD-83. At the time these flyers were captured there was no law or regulation providing for their punishment other than as prisoners of war,^{a.} and TANAKA, called as a witness for the Defendant HATA, testified that quite a controversy arose in the War Ministry and General Staff as to whether they should be treated as prisoners of war or tried under some new law that would be promulgated; that he and the Vice-Chief of Staff desired them treated as prisoners of war and that he understood a letter had been sent by HATA's Chief of Staff to the Vice-Minister of War stating that HATA desired to treat them as prisoners of war. However, the General Staff decided that they must be tried under an ex post facto military law, and that an officer was sent from the General Staff in Tokyo to General HATA with instructions that he proceed with the trial under the new military law, and that the reason for the trial in China was that the military authorities in Tokyo were ashamed and wanted to avoid their own responsibility.^{b.}

DD-84. Defense witness MIYANO testified^{a.} that HATA wanted to treat the flyers as prisoners of war and accord to them "generous consideration" and that a letter setting out HATA's views was sent by his Chief of Staff to the Vice Chief of Staff in Tokyo, and that as a result of this a messenger was sent from Tokyo expressing the desires of the Chief of the General Staff that the trial be carried out in a strict manner, and that the only orders ever received from Tokyo, in addition to the verbal orders brought by this emissary were (1) a communication from the Vice Minister of War dated 28 July, 1942, (Pros.

DD-83.
 a. Ex. 3206, T. 29,041
 b. Ex. 3206, T. 29,041

DD-84.
 a. Ex. 3197, T. 28,867

(DD-84)
Ex. 1192), and (2) notice of matters pertaining to treatment of crew members of raiding enemy planes dated 23 July 1942, from the Deputy Chief of Staff (Proc. Ex. 1193), each of which exhibits were presented to the witness on the stand. The first of these is notice sent by the Vice Minister of War to each Chief of Staff advising them that a decision had been reached in regard to the treatment of enemy air crews to the following effect: "Those who do not violate the war-time international law will have to be treated as POW's and those who showed actions of violating the said law shall be treated as war-time capital criminals." The second exhibit referred to above and confirmed by the witness as the only other instruction received from Tokyo is merely a draft of articles of war and proclamation to be issued in the future.

1. KATA Was First to Suggest Severe Punishment for Flyers

DD-85. Instead of desiring to treat these flyers generously and being reluctant to try them under an ex-post facto regulation, we respectfully submit that the evidence clearly shows that KATA was the first to suggest that these flyers should not be treated as prisoners of war, and that their acts should be treated as grave offenses of war and severely punished. KATA's only deterrent to immediate action was the feeling that international law might be involved. Within three days after the Doolittle Flyers were captured by KATA's forces

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Page DD-54

(DD-85)

in China, namely 25 April 1942, the Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces sent a telegram to the Vice Minister of War to the following effect:

"As we cannot allow American Air Force, after inhumanly blind-bombing at the time of air raids of the mainland, to escape to the Chinese Continent seeking the base or hoping to strive for their safety by becoming prisoners-of-war, we want positively to destroy such enemies and as such actions contain espionage elements. also we wish to make a statement to the effect that we intend to punish such actions with severity to be grave offenses of war. But it may have some relation to international laws and provisions, we wish to have the prompt opinions from the Center as regards to this matter."^a (Underscoring added)

That this telegram correctly expressed the views of HATA is borne out by the testimony of TANAKA,^b who in referring to the letter alleged to have been written by HATA's Chief of Staff to the Vice Chief of the General Staff, said that according to the practice of the Japanese Army such a letter was never written by the Commander himself, but was always written by the Chief of Staff "and when the Chief of Staff expresses anything in the official letter that is the expression of the intention of the Commander-in-Chief himself, not the opinion of the Chief of Staff."

DD-86. It is reasonable to conclude, we respectfully submit, that it was the result of this telegram from HATA's Chief of Staff that the discussions arose in the War Ministry and General Staff concerning which TANAKA^a testified as to whether these flyers should be treated as prisoners of war or tried under some new law to be promulgated. The circumstances

DD-85.

- a. Ex. 3370, T. 31,821-2
- b. Ex. 3206, T. 29,043

DD-86.

- a. Ex. 3306, T. 29,041

(DD-86)
 under which these flyers were kept, the treatment accorded to them while under General HATA's command, the circumstances surrounding the trial, and the fact that HATA made no recommendation for leniency after the so-called trial, all strongly support the position that HATA was fully responsible for the punishment and execution of these flyers.

2. The So-Called Confessions were Forged from the Flyers.

DD-87. The Defense offered in evidence the report from the military police to the Chief of Staff dated 26 May 1942 with regard to these flyers included with which, although not read in evidence at the time, are what purport to be the confessions of these eight prisoners of war. ^{a.} That these alleged confessions were obtained by duress and coercion is fully shown by excerpts from the testimony of Lt. Weilsen and Captain Barr taken from the record of the trial of U. S. of America v. SAWADA et als before a military commission at Shanghai in 1946. ^{b.} The testimony of these two flyers not only shows that the alleged confessions were wrung from them after the most intense torture but proves that during the entire time the flyers were under General HATA's command in China from the time of their capture until they were taken to Tokyo, they were treated in the most cruel and inhumane manner. They were bound, slapped, beaten, kicked, had water forced into their lungs, stretched on a rack, and hung by their handcuffs suspended from a peg on the wall and repeatedly threatened with

DD-87.

- a. Ex. 3129, T. 27,902
- b. Ex. 3834-1, T. 38,030

(DD-87)
 death if they did not give the information demanded of them by the Japanese soldiers. The treatment accorded to them at Bridge House after they returned to HATA's jurisdiction on 17 June 1942 was little better than that which they had received at the hands of the soldiers under his command following their capture. They were crowded into a cell, forced to live under the most unsanitary circumstances, furnished barely sufficient food and water to keep them alive and not allowed to bathe and shave during the seventy days they were confined at Bridge House. Concerning the treatment accorded to these flyers while they were under General HATA's command in China, MIYANO testified on cross-examination, "We had the means to know but I do not think we were able to be informed of all the circumstances and the facts."

3. There Was No Real Trial.

DD-88. The testimony of Lt. Neilson given in the SAWADA trial at Shanghai and introduced in this case ^{a.} shows that the so-called trial of these flyers was a sham and a pretense devoid of all elements of a judicial proceeding. Lt. Hallmark was brought into the room on a stretcher and in such an ill and weakened condition that he could not know what was going on. The eight flyers were asked only as to their education and air corps training. Someone in the room read a manuscript in Japanese. The prisoners asked to have it interpreted, and that was denied. No other statements were made. There were

DD-87.

c. T. 28,890

DD-88.

a. Ex. 3834, T. 38,050-3

(DD-88) no witnesses. The flyers were not advised then or at any other time of the charges against them. Nothing was interpreted into English. They were not asked to plead and Lt. Neilson testified, "We didn't even know it was a court martial." The entire proceedings lasted "from 20 minutes to half an hour."

4. HATA Received a Report of the So-Called Trial

a. DD-89. MIYANO testified that General HATA received a report of this trial which showed the circumstances surrounding the trial and conviction of these flyers, that the report showed the judgment and the reason for the judgment, together with the evidence on which it was based, and that General HATA made no investigations of the circumstances after the conclusion of the trial.

5. HATA Made No Recommendation for Clemency.

a. DD-90. The military ordinance issued by HATA 13 August 1942 for the punishment of enemy flyers under which these men were tried provided "Under special circumstances the execution of military punishment shall be remitted." MIYANO testified b. that General HATA ordered General SAWADA, the Commanding General of the 13th Army, to try the flyers under the provisions of the order issued by General HATA on 13 August 1942. He further testified c. that at no time after the trial did HATA make any recommendation or suggestion that any leniency be granted to the eight flyers sentenced to death. The failure of HATA to make any recommendation for clemency after

DD-89.
a. T. 28,911-2

DD-90.
a. Ex. 1191, T. 14,652
b. T. 28,897
c. Ex. 3197, T. 28,869
T. 28,876-7

(DD-90)
 the trial, though provision for it was expressly made in the order which he had issued and under which the flyers were tried is diametrically opposed to the statement of MIYANO who testified that HATA said "that if Tokyo insisted that the flyers be tried under the new military law, he HATA would give them the lightest possible or the most generous possible decision at the trial. He stated that if there were any slightest extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration, he would take them into consideration and pass as light a sentence as possible."

6. HATA Requested the Death Sentence.

DD-91. MIYANO was asked on cross-examination, "Did General HATA request the prosecutor of the 13th Army to ask for the death sentence for these flyers?" and replied, "I do not know."^{a.} He admitted that he testified at the SAWADA trial in Shanghai in February 1946. General HATA was not a defendant at that trial. An excerpt from his testimony in the SAWADA trial was then put to him, and after much evasion and hesitation and explanation even to the extent of once stating, "I cannot reply,"^{b.} he finally admitted the questions and denied the answers.^{c.} In rebuttal the Prosecution introduced the excerpt from his testimony in the SAWADA trial at Shanghai, the exact language of which had been put to him on cross-examination.^{d.} This testimony in the SAWADA trial is as follows:^{e.}

"Q: Did Nanking issue any orders to the 13th Army in

DD-90.

d. T. 28,871

DD-91.

- a. T. 28,904
- b. T. 28,907
- c. T. 30,914
- d. T. 28,904-5
- e. Ex. 3834-B, T. 38,058-60

(DD-91)

regards to the treatment of the fliers?

A: I do not remember.

Q: Was the trial of the Doolittle fliers ordered by General HATA to be tried at Shanghai?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you mean by your previous answer that HATA requested the 13th Army prosecutor to ask for the death penalty?

A: He requested so.

Q: (to Interpreter) Will you interpret that answer again?

INTERPRETER: He said he requested so -- requested that the sentence be executed; he requested so.

Q: Does he mean the general requested so?

A: Yes, HATA.

Q: Did General HATA request the prosecutor of the 13th Army to ask for the death sentence?

A: He requested the death sentence. (pr. 289-289)"
(Underscoring added)

VII. HATA WAGES WAR TO THE END

DD-92. On 22 November 1944, HATA was relieved of his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China and again appointed to the powerful position of Inspector General of Military Education, in which he served throughout MOISO's Cabinet.

DD-93. On 7 April 1945, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army Corps continuing in that command until the end of the war. As he had done in China in the Doolittle Fliers case, HATA again in July 1945 gave his approval to the

DD-92.
a. Ex. 106, T. 701

(DD-93)

request for the death penalty of captured flyers. OGIYA testi-

^{a.} filed that General HATA, as Commander-in-Chief of the Second General Army approved the requests for the death penalty for two captured flyers, Lt. Nelson and St. Augustus, that this approval was given in advance and not after the sentence had been passed. This approval by Field Marshal HATA was real at

^{b.} the trial on 18 July 1945, and the two flyers were forthwith convicted and executed the same day. HATA's action in the Doolittle case in China in 1942 was repeated in the case of these two flyers in Japan in July 1945.

VIII. TOJO RECOMMENDS HATA.

DD-94. It was HATA who wrecked the YONAI Cabinet making the way for the entry of TOJO into the government. It was HATA who went secretly to the Emperor and recommended TOJO as War Minister in the Second YOKOYE Cabinet. It was HATA, as a member of the Big Three Council, who selected TOJO as the War Minister in July of 1940. TOJO did not forget the man who was most responsible for his rise to power. Following the resignation of the KOISO Cabinet on 5 April 1944 a conference of Senior Statesmen was held that day to select a new Prime Minister. TOJO alone of all the conferees strongly urged the appointment of HATA as Premier. KIDO testified ^{a.} that when he, KIDO, suggested it would be better to choose a non-army man, "General TOJO would not yield. On the contrary, he went to the length of saying that if such a thing was done, the Army

DD-93.

- a. Ex. 1925-A, T. 14,221
14,227-8, 14,613-23
- b. T. 14,227-8

DD-94.

- a. Ex. 3340, T. 31,121

(DD-94)
 might look the other way (meaning a coup d'etat by the Army)"
 and that "All the conferees, except General TOJO" had a tacit
 understanding that they desired "a man free from any commit-
 ment in the past." So strong was TOJO's advocacy of the appoint-
 ment of HATA at this time insisting that "the government and
 the command must be fused into one,"^{b.} and "from this stand-
 point I believe Marshal HATA is suitable," that he threatened
 to again use the Army influence to wreck the Cabinet if HATA
 were not chosen, warning the Senior Statesmen "if the Army
 takes an aloof standing, the Cabinet will collapse."^{c.} TOJO
 and HATA stuck together to the end.

DD-95. There is attached hereto an appendix listing
 the counts in the Indictment in which HATA is charged and refer-
 ring by paragraph number to the pertinent portions of this sum-
 mation which support the charges in each of these counts. We
 respectfully submit that the facts proven in this case show that
 HATA is guilty of the over-all conspiracy of planning and waging
 wars of aggression, that he is guilty of actually waging
 wars of aggression, and that he is guilty of waging them in a
 manner which violated all the rules of war and in utter disre-
 gard of human rights. We submit that the evidence fully and
 fairly establishes his guilt under each and every count in the
 indictment in which he is now charged. May even-handed justice
 measure punishment with the crime.

DD-94.

- b. Ex. 3340, T. 31,139-40
- c. Ex. 3340, T. 31,141

HATA, SHUNROKUDD-96. - Appendix to Summation

Counts 1 to 5 of the Indictment -- the conspiracy counts -- are sustained by the entire evidence set out in this summation.

Counts 6 to 17 -- planning and preparing aggressive wars -- are sustained by paragraphs DD-4 to 8, DD-20, DD-23 to 69, inclusive. The evidence shows that HATA, having joined the conspiracy in its early stages (DD-4) and fully participating in it at the time of the China Incident (Divisions III, IV, and V of this Summation), is guilty of all subsequent planning and preparing to wage aggressive wars. DD-4 is especially applicable to Count 17.

Count 19 -- DD-3 and DD-4.

Counts 25 and 26 -- DD-3, DD-4, DD-23.

Counts 27 and 28 -- waging war of aggression against the Republic of China -- DD-6 to 19, DD-27 to 42, and DD-70 to 91.

Counts 29 to 32 and 34 to 36 -- HATA having planned and prepared for the wars described in these counts is guilty as an accomplice, instigator, and accessory (DD-23 to 69). Especially pertinent are paragraphs DD-24, DD-25, DD-33 to 36, DD-42, DD-44, DD-45, and DD-63. Paragraph DD-42 is especially applicable to Count 32. DD-23 is especially applicable to Count 36.

0 159 0005 0733

Page DD-63

(DD-96)

Count 45 - DD-7 and DD-8.

Count 46 - DD-8, DD-10 to 13, and DD-75.

Count 47 - DD-9 to 17.

Counts 48 and 49 - DD-70 to 73, and DD-79.

Count 50 - DD-70 to 72, DD-76, and DD-79.

Count 51 - DD-3 and DD-4.

Count 52 - DD-3, DD-4, and DD-23.

Counts 54 and 55 - DD-15 to 17, DD-72 to 91, and DD-93.

CO-2

熱河（訴因第二）

(c) 中華民國（訴因第三）

(d) 東亞及太平洋、印度洋及之ニ隣接スル總テノ
國（訴因第四）

(e) 獨伊ト適合ノ許ニ全世界ニ對シ、但シ三國ハ
各自自國ノ權ニ於テ支配權ヲ有スベキコト（訴因
第五）

訴因第六乃至第十七ニ於テ爾本ハ他ノ者ト共ニ
一九二八年（昭和三年）一月一日ヨリ一九四五年
（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間ニ於テ國際法、條約、
協定ニ違反シテ戰爭乃至ハ侵略戰爭ヲ計畫、準備

0159 0005 0734

CC-1

橋本欣五郎

一橋本ノ罪狀

訴因第一乃至第五ニ於テ橋本ハ、日本ノ爲ニ左記ノ諸地域ニ於テ陸軍、海軍、政治及經濟上ノ支配權ヲ得ル目的ヲ以テ、國際法、條約、協定ニ違反シテ侵略戰爭ヲ開始センガ爲共同謀議ヲナシタル廉ニヨリ、他ノ者ト共ニ起訴サレテオルノデアリマス。

(a) 東亞、太平洋及印度洋（訴因第一）

(b) 中華民國ノ一部デアアル遼寧、吉林、黑龍江及

- (1) 和蘭王國ニ對シ (訴因第一四)
- (2) 佛蘭西共和國ニ對シ (訴因第一五)
- (3) 泰王國ニ對シ (訴因第一六)
- (4) ソヴィエット社會主義共和國聯邦ニ對シ (訴因第一七)

訴因第一八ニ於テ橋本及他ノ者ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日又ハソノ頃、條約、協定等ニ違反シテ中華民國ニ對シ侵略戰爭ヲ開始シタ康ニヨリ起訴サレテキルノデアリマス。

訴因第一九ニ於テ橋本及他ノ者ハ一九三七年（

シタル廉ニヨリ、起訴サレテキルノデアリマス。

(a) 中華民国ニ對シ (訴因第六)

(b) アメリカ合衆國ニ對シ (訴因第七)

(c) 聯合王國、北部愛爾蘭、及英領聯邦全部ニ對シ

(訴因第八)

(d) 濠洲聯邦ニ對シ (訴因第九)

(e) ニュージーランドニ對シ (訴因第一〇)

(f) 加奈陀ニ對シ (訴因第一一)

(g) 印度ニ對シ (訴因第一二)

(h) 比律賓共和國ニ對シ (訴因第一三)

0159 0005 0735

- (b) 一九三七年（昭和十二年）七月七日ヨリ一九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間中華民國ニ對シ（訴因第二八）
- (c) 一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日ヨリ一九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間アメリカ合衆國ニ對シ（訴因第二九）
- (d) 一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日ヨリ一九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間比律賓共和國ニ對シ（訴因第三〇）
- (e) 一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日ヨリ一九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間英國屬

CC-5

昭和十二年（七月七日）又ハソノ頃條約、協定等ニ違反シテ中華民國ニ對シ侵略戦争ヲ開始シタラス。ヨリ起訴サレテキルノデアリマス。

訴因第二七乃至第三二及訴因第三四ニ於テ橋本及他ノ者ハ、國際法、條約、協定及保證ニ違反シテ左記ノ國家ニ對シ戦争乃至ハ侵略戦争ヲ開始シタラスヨリ起訴サレテキルノデアリマス。

(a) 一九三七年（昭和十二年）九月十八日ヨリ一九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間中華民國ニ對シ（訴因第二七）

0159 0005 0736

スル計画ヲ樹テ且之ヲ實施セシメタル共同謀議者トシテ起訴サレテキルノデアリマス。(訴因第四四)

CC-7

訴因第七欄本ハ他ノ者ト共ニ、中華民國ノ住民及非武裝兵數千名ヲ不法ニ攻撃シ、且不法ニ殺害スルコトヲ命ジ或ハ之ヲ許可シタルニヨリ起訴サレテキルノデアリマス。

(三) 一九三七年(昭和十二年)十二月十二日東京

ニ於テ(訴因第四五)

(四) 一九三八年(昭和十三年)十月二十一日廣東

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC

CC-6

邦ニ對シ（訴因第三一）

(f) 一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日ヨリ一

九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間和蘭王

國ニ對シ（訴因第三二）

(c) 一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日ヨリ一

九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間泰王國

ニ對シ（訴因第三四）

橋本ハ他ノ者ト共ニ、一九三一年（昭和六年）

九月十八日ヨリ一九四五年（同二十年）九月二日

迄ノ間ニ於テ、陸上及海上ニ於テ停船通過ヲ許可

0159 0005 0737

ニ於ケル存心並ニ抑留氏ニ關シ、戰時法違反ヲ命
ジタル康ニヨリ起訴サレテキルノデアリマス。(一
証因第五四)

CC-10

橋本ハ一九三一年(昭和六年)九月十八日ヨリ
一九四五年(向二十年)九月二日迄ノ間中華民
内ニ於テ日本ノ権力下ニアリシ存心及一般民ニ關
シ、戰時法及戰時慣習ヲ遵守セシムベキ彼ノ法律
上ノ義務ヲ故意ニ又不注意ニ兩却シタル康ヲ以テ
起訴サレテキルノデアリマス。(証因第五五)

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC

0159 0005 0738

ニ於テ（訴因第四六）

(c) 一九三八年（昭和十三年）十月二十七日或ハ
ソノ頃漢江ニ於テ（訴因第四七）

CC-8

橋本ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日ヨリ
一九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間中華民國
ニ於ケル停居及抑留民ニ關シ、戦時法及ビ戦時ノ
慣習ニ對スル違反ヲ許可シテ廉ニヨリ起訴サレテ
キルノデアリマス。（訴因第五三）

CC-9

橋本ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日ヨリ
一九四五年（同二十年）九月二日迄ノ間中華民國

橋本ハ一九一七年（大正六年）ニ陸軍大學ヲ卒業一九二一年（大正十年）陸軍省參謀本部ニ勤務シ一九二二年（大正十一年）東京軍司令部部員ヲ兼務シ、ソノ後再ビ一九二三年（大正十二年）カラ一九二五年（同十五年）迄之ニ勤務シマシタ。一九二五年（大正十四年）ヨリ一九二七年（昭和二年）迄彼ハ參謀本部ト陸軍省ニ兼務シマシタ。一九二七年（昭和二年）九月ヨリ一九二九年（昭和四年）末迄彼ハトルコ帝國ニ於ケル日本大使館付陸軍武官トシテ勤務シマシタ。一九三〇年（昭和五年）一月ヨリ一九三

0159 0005 0739

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC
CC-11

ニ橋本ノ軍隊服務

橋本ハ一九一一年（明治四十四年）ニ陸軍士官學校ヲ卒業シ砲兵少尉ニ任ゼラレマシタ。彼ハ其後引續キ陸軍ニ勤務シ一九三四年（昭和九年）ニ大佐ノ階級ニ進シマシタ。一九三六年（昭和十一年）八月豫備役ニ編入サレ、一九三七年（昭和十二年）ニ再召集サレマシタ。次イテ彼ハ一九三九年（昭和十四年）三月豫備役ニ編入サレ、ソレ以後現役服務ヲシマセンデシタ。

功ニヨツテ金鷄勳章功因以ヲ授ケラレタノデア
リマス。(c)

註 記録卷號ハ英文ノ頁番號デア
ル

CC-15

(c) 法廷證 一〇五 法廷記録 八九九

CC-13

一年（同六年）十二月迄彼ハ陸軍参謀本部ニ勤
勞シマシタ。一九三七年（昭和十二年）ヨリ一
九三九年（同十四年）迄彼ハ第十三野戦重砲師
團司令官トシテ勤勞シマシタ。

彼ハ勳章數個ヲ授與サレマシタガトソノ中ニ
ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）ヨリ一九三四年（同
九年）ニ亘ル参謀ノ功ニヨリ一九三四年（昭和
九年）ニ授兵サレタモノガアリマス。他ノ一ツ
ハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）四月ニ支那参謀ノ

0159 0005 0740

シ得ベキ活動ニ因スル報告書ガ提出サレマシタ。
 又万一日本ガソ連トノ友好關係ヲ停止スルガ如
 キ場合、既「ソ」關係ニ及ボス影響ニ兩シ意見
 ガ交換サレマシタ。橋本ハ「トルコ」ニ來任セ
 ル「トロツキー」及ソノ同志六十名ガ詳報ニ利
 用シ得ルコト、及「ヨキ聞諜」ヲ發見シタ際ニ
 ハ必ズ彼等カラ諜報ヲ買フベキデアルトイフコ
 トヲ提案シマシタ。(a)

a 法廷証七三二一A

法廷記録七六五八

ソカ 三三八八九

三 滿洲事變前ニ於ケル橋本ノ政治活動

a、ソ連、滿洲、蒙古問題ニ關スル見解

一九二九年（昭和四年）四月、橋本ガ「トル
コ」駐在日本陸軍武官デアツタ時、「ベルリン」
テ開カレタ滿洲駐在日本陸軍武官ノソ連問題討
論會ニ出席シマシタ。此ノ會議ニ於テハ、ソ連
ノ狀勢ガ現在及ビ將來ニ亘ツテ考察サレマシタ。
若シソ連ニ將來變化ガ起ツタ場合ニ日本ガトル
ベキ政策ガ論セラレマシタ。ソ連トノ競争ノ場
合ニ、歐滿諸國ガ用イルト思ハレルサボタージ
競争ノ研究ガナサレマシタ。白系ロシア人ノ爲

CC-16

イジャン」及び「トルコ」側ノ反動ノタメ大澤氏
ガ起ルテアロウカラト云ヒマシタ。(a)

一九三〇年（昭和五年）橋本ハ在日三年ニシテ
日本ニ歸リマシタ。歸朝ノ途上、彼ハ日本改革ノ
方針ニツキ熟考シマシタ。ソレハ彼ガ、日本ハ世
界ノ變動ノ渦中ニアツテ自由主義ノ範圍内ニ留ツ
テキル唯一ノ道デアルト感ジタカラデアリマシタ。
若シ日本ガ現在ノ状態テ進ンテ行クナラバ、國際

CC-15

a 法務記第七六一A

法務記第七六四七

CC-15

一九二九年（昭和四年）十一月十五日ノ秘密報

告ニ於テ、橋本ハロシヤニ對スル作戦上「コーカ

サス」ヲ取ルベキコトヲ計メマシタ。彼ハ、コノ

事ハ「コーカサス」ノ全種族ヲ互ニ對立サセ、大

「アルメニヤ」主義或ハ獨立「ジョージヤ」主義、

或ハ回教運動、或ハ山地民ノゲリラ活動ヲ促シ、

此地域ニ混亂ヲ惹起スルコトニ依リ成就ス得ベシ

ト巨首參謀次長ニ提議シマシタ。彼ハ大「アルメ

ニヤ」主義ハ、ソノ成否ハ別トシテ、斯カル狀勢

ヲ惹起スルニハ非常ニ有益ナ導火線デアルコト、

何故ナラコノ結果ハ「ジョージヤ」、「アゼルバ

0159 0005 0742

CC→17 CC→16

a	法廷監	一九一七	A	ヨリ	一九一八	至ル
b	法廷監	一九一七		法廷記	一九一八	
c	法廷監	一九一七		録	一九一八	
d	法廷監	一九一七			一九一八	

a 法廷監一九一七 法廷記一九一八

々ノ尙題ノ中心ハ、張作霖殺害ニ次イテ滿洲ノ
 軍國ヲ除キ、滿洲ヲ南京政府ヨリ分離シテ、(c)
 新政體ヲ樹立スルコトニアツタノデアリマス。(b)
 當時ノ東京駐兵隊々々歸ノ討空ニヨリ張作霖殺
 害ノ目的ハ、日本ノ管理下ニ新國家ヲ作り上げ
 ルコトデアツタコトガ矢張シマシタ。(a) 日中
 陸軍ハ、張作霖ガ張作霖ノ後ヲ繼イテカラハ、

CC-17

庭會ヨリ汎濫シ崩潰スルデアロウト考ヘマシタ。
 ソレ故ニ參謀本部ニ歸ルヤ自己ノ考ヘヲ「行
 ニ多ス方法ヲ莫ツカ計議シマシム。」ソレ等ノ
 ミニ依ツテ左ノ如キ結果ガ生ジタトハ、彼ハ言
 ハナイデアリマセウガ、滿洲事變、日露連臣危
 退、軍備修繕ニ案ガ次々ニ起リ、日内テハ三。
 一五事件、神兵隊事件、二。二六事件ガ相次イ
 テ起リマシタ。(a)

本戸ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）八月七日ノ日
 記ニ、彼本ト重直ハ最近ノ日軍大學卒業生ノ一
 日ノ滿洲、蒙古問題研究ヲ後援シテキルト言テ居マシタ。(a)

0159 0005 0743

CC-18 CC-17
 b a h g f e

法廷記録一八三

●	”	”	”	”	”	法廷記録一
—	—	—	—	—	—	九五八
九	一	九	九	九	九	九
六	八	六	六	五	五	八
二	八	〇	〇	九	八	

校等ヲ含ム陸軍部内ノ各部門ノ者ガ此ノ旨ヲ遵
 隨シマシタシソレヲハ中佐ヨリ少佐級ノモノヲ
 アリマシタシ。海軍モ海軍ノ事務ニ關シ他人ノ指
 校ヲ活動サセテ應マシタシ。(b) 海軍ノ目的ハ二
 ツアリマシタシ。一ツハ陸内革命或ハ革新ヲ行フ

CC-18

臣民黨ニ加リ、臣民黨ノ旗ヲ滿洲ニ持來ツタノ
 テ、滿洲ノ情勢ハ非常ニ惡化シタト懸念シマシ
 タル。(e) 日本軍ハ日露戦争以來日本ガ滿洲ヲ勝
 ツタ犠牲ノ大ナルニ鑑ミテ、強硬ナ態度ヲ持シ、
 中臣軍ヲ追出シテ日本ノ勢力下ニ新政體ヲ作り
 上ゲルニハ、(g) 武力ニ訴ヘルベキデアルトノ
 立場ヲ取リマシタ。此ノ方法ノ強力ナ唱道者ハ
 橋本ト長身大尉デアリマシタ。(h)

b、社会ノ組織者トシテノ橋本

社会ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）ノ春正式ニ組
 成サレ、第一回ノ會合ハ橋本ニ依リ召集サレマ
 シタ。(a) 内務省、参謀本部、教育總監部ノ將

0159 0005 0744

P-12

CO-19

CO-18

e d e
 " " 法廷記録一九六三
 一九八七 一九八六

 f
 h g 法廷記録一九八三
 " " 一九八二
 一九八三

上新ナ草新政府ヲ樹立シテ、政治ト行政ヲ肅正シ、(g) 滿洲問題ノ解決ニ對シテ與「ト人民ノ努力ヲ喚起セントスルモノデアリマシタ。」(h) カカル計程ガ企テラレタコトハ後述ノ三月及十月事件ニヨリ證明サレルノデアリマス。

年）八月ニ新國庭々主藤田ニ、滿洲ニ於テ發給
 秘會ノ指針者タル橋本ハ一九三一年（昭和六

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC

コト、第二ハ滿洲問題ノ解決デアリマシタ^(c)
 之等ノ目的ハ滿洲ヲ日本ノ勢力下ニ置キ、若シ
 島岡ガ意見出來レバ、^(d) 之ヲ考慮トシテ後
 ニハ「アジア」ヲ白人ノ支配ヨリ解放シ、「ア
 ジア」人ノ知ノ「アジア」ノ理想ヲ^(e) 實現シ
 テ、滿洲問題ヲ解決セントスル其ノ計畫ト一致
 シマシタ。滿洲ニ於ケル其等行動ト相並ンデ、
 橋本ノ指針ノ下ニ機會ハ、種々ノ問題ニ對シテ
 極端ニ弱腰テアツタ日本ノ政治家及資本家ニ反
 對シ、彼等ヲ打倒シテ「日本ノ革新」^(f) ヲ實
 現セントシマシタ。此ノ革新ハ「大クーデター」
 ニ依リ行ハレントシマシタ。即チ政府ヲ倒シタ

政治問題並ニ政治運動ヘノ介入ハ禁止サレテイ
 マシタガ、(a) 橋本及松本ノ國會議員將校ハ公然ト
 之ヲ支持シテ恥スルトコロナク政府改革運動ヲ
 ナシ、清洲ノ軍ノ政治運動ヲ勸導指導シ、遂ニ
 〔際連盟ニ依リ日本ガ國際的ニ非難サレルニ至
 ツタノデアリマス。〕(b)

00-19

a
 法廷記録一四六
 b
 一四六五 一七七一五

00-20

a
 法廷記録一五七
 法廷記録一五〇二一〇
 b
 一五七 一五〇二一〇

c
 一四六六

CC-20

行動が執ラルベキダト云ヒマシタ。(a) 一九三

一年（昭和六年）九月十九日ニ尾田ハ橋本ニ會

ヒ、彼ニ次ノ業ニ云ツルコトヲ記憶シテ居マス。

「蒲淵デシナケレバナラヌト貴方ガ云ハレタコ

トヲ成就サレマシタネ。」或ハ、「下ウトウヤツ

テ了ヒマシタネ。」ト。(b) 之ニ對シ橋本ハ「是

ルベキコトガ起ツタノダ。」ト答ヘマシタ。(c)

カクシテ機會ノ目的ハ、ソノ主要目的ノ一ツ

タル蒲淵問題ノ解決ヲ來スコトニ於テ實現サレ、

之ニ就テ橋本ハ主役ヲ演ジマシタ。現役將校ノ

本ハ大衆示以運動ヲ行ヒ、カクテ戒嚴令施行及ビ
 内閣以極ニ早ク計畫テアリマシタ。 (b)

00-53

b、演說事録

本會終日告第三部ニ記載ノ件即チ、演說事録係
 決ニ歸ヘル工作、ノ外ニ、精本ガ自身ハ右ノ如キ

00-21

a 法廷記録一七七

法廷記録一五五八〇一八三

b

法廷記録三八八二〇

P-14

00-22

&
00-21

a 法廷記録一五七

法廷記録一五〇二一〇三

b 法廷記録一五七

法廷記録一五〇二一〇三

0159 0005 0747

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC

CC-21

IV 三月事件、十月事件及滿洲事變ト

橋本トノ關係

a 三月事件

政權獲得ノ計畫ナリシ三月事件ニ關シ、大川ハ東京控訴院ニ於テ、彼ガ宇垣ノ意見ヲ知ル爲ニ宇垣ト意見シタノハ、橋本ト意見中佐ノ依頼ニヨルモノデアルト証言シマシタ。大川ノ宇垣トノ會談ハ橋本ト意見ニヨリ參謀次長二宮及ビ信川ニ報告サレマシタ。(a) 橋本ハ彼ノ証言ニ於テ信川、小畑、二宮、杉山、大川及彼自身ヲ共同證言者トシテ擧ゲテ居マス。(b)

CC-22

陰謀ヲ実行スル爲ニ橋本ノ取計ヒニヨリ信川ハ清水ニ三百個ノ短銃ヲ交付シ、(a) ソレヲ以テ

CC- 是モ又政權獲得ノ計畫デアル十月事件ニ關シ橋

本ハ、長大尉ト會談ノ結果荒木ヲ首班トスル内閣

ヲ樹テヤウトノ計畫ヲ考へ出シタトイフ事ヲ是認

シマシタ。(a) 橋本ガ右ノ共同謀議ニ加擔シタトイ

フコトハ亦東京控訴院ニ於ケル大川ノ證言ニヨツ

テ確認サレマシタ。大川ハ十月事件ノ目的ハ、優

柔不斷ナ若槻内閣ヲ倒シ重大問題ヲ解決シ得ル新

P-15

CC-22

&ri

CC-23

CC-24

a

法廷證 三一九五 法廷記錄 二八九七五

d

法廷記錄 二〇一四

c

法廷記錄 一九六八、一九七八

事變ヲ生セシムル計畫ニ從ツテ、滿東軍ヲ援助シ
タト一九三四年ニ田中隆吉ニ對シテ是認シタトノ
證據ガアリマス。橋本ハ彼自身及ビ他ノ五人ノ者
ヲ共同謀議者トシテ指名シ、ソノ目的ハ滿洲占領、
軍ノ首領達ノ勢力抹殺、經濟發展及ビ軍學占領ヲ
成就スルニアルト定義ヲ下シタ事ヲ田中ハ證言シ
マシタ。(c) 共同謀議者ノ一人デアアル長大尉モ亦コ
ノ事ヲ田中ト論ジタ際、橋本ハ共同謀議ノ意味ト
シテ指石シマシタ。(d)

0159 0005 0748

スルコトニヨリ、日本ノ政治ヲ刷新セントシタモ
ノデアリマス。(d) 陰謀被覺後、橋本及ビ他ノ者達
ハ逮捕サレ、(e) 橋本ハ二十五日間ノ重謹慎ヲ命ゼラ
レ、炬路騎隊ニ左遷サレタノデアリマス。(f)

CC-24
c b

法廷證 二一七七一A 法廷記録 一五五八五―八七

法廷記録 二〇一三

d 法廷記録 一九七三

e 法廷證 三一九三 法廷記録 二八七九五

f 法廷記録 一九六六七

0159.0005 0749

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC

シイ、勢力アル政黨ヲ打倒セルコトデアツタト述
 ベマシタ。大川ハ橋本ヨリ命令ヲ受ケ、他ノ關係
 者ハ重慶、板垣及ビ土肥原ヲツタト述ベマシタ。(b)
 健川モ亦田中ニ、當時政黨ヲ倒シテ居タ政府ヲ倒
 シ、滿洲縣變ヲ支辨スルトニコロノ新シイ政府ヲ樹
 立センガ爲ニ、橋本、長及ビ大川ガ十月事件ヲ計
 畫シタノデアルト、語リマシタ。(c) 該計畫ハ日本
 ノ思想的、政治的空氣ヲ廓清シ、首腦者ヲ暗殺

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。(d)

CC-26

a	法廷記録	三二五八	法廷記録	三二四六	一七
e	〃	三二五一	〃	三二四六	一七
d	〃	三二五三	〃	三二四〇	一七
〃	〃	三二五三	〃	三二四〇	一七

CC-26

CC-25

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P-18

CC-27

d	c	b	a
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八	九	八	八
五	三	五	八

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0159 0005 0751

平橋本領土の發展及び大東亞建設ヲ助ス

Summatin-CC
CC-27

HASHIMOTO

橋本ハ退後後、一九三六年十月ニ、大日本青年
黨ヲ組織シソノ會長トナリマシタ。(a)ソノ目的ノ
一ツハ改章デアリ、青年ヲ「新與日本」ノ中堅ト
ナスニアリマシタ。(b)同會ノ公ノ機關雜誌ハ「ケ
月ニ三回發行サレル太陽大日本デアリマシタ。(c)太
陽大日本ノ一九三七年一月號ニ、橋本ハ改黨ノ時
散ラ主張シ、民主々義政府ハ「大業」ヲ無視スル
モノデアルト述ベマシタ。(d)

彼ハ又「英國ノ援助ガナクレバ憲政權ハ既に崩壞
 シテキタ筈デアアル。英國ヲ攻撃スレバ、今次事變
 ハ立チドコロニ解決スルコトハ困難ダ。。。。コ
 レ以外ニ解決ノ道ハナイ。英國ヲ打倒セヨ！」(c)
 又「今ヤ我々ノ眞ノ敵ハ英國トソ聯デアアル。我々
 ノ行クベキ道ハ唯一ツダ。何故ニ我々ハ躊躇スル
 カ？我々ニ今必長アノハ我高橋力ヲ有スル現時内
 閣デアアル。」(d) ト云イタノデアリマス

28 a、	法廷記	一五六一
cc-b、	法廷記	一五六五九一六〇
c、	法廷記	一五六六〇
d、	法廷記	一五六六一

太陽大日本ニ拘載サレタ橋本ノ論説ノ左ノ抜萃

ハ、彼ガ一九三六年ヨリ一九四一年ニ至ル間領土

擴張及ビ戦争宣傳ニ活躍シタ事ヲ示シテ居マス。

「無敵空軍ヲ日本準備ノ中核トナスニ非ンバ日

本ハ如何ニシテソ戦ト成ヒ得ルヤ？」(a)

又彼ハ左ノ如ク誓キマシタ。

「美国ト談判セオバナラヌ事ハ屈辱デアル。」

「美国ヲ敵國ト呼ブベシ」

「我等ノ道ハ唯一ツ、美国ノ驅逐ニアリ！」

「艦船ヲ武装化セヨ！」

「我等ノ南方進出ヲ妨グル故ハ美国ニアル。」(b)

0159 0005 0752

ル者達ハ「白人ノ暴政下ニアル」者ニ比シテ幸
福デアルト云ツテ、(e) 蘭印ニ逆手打チ與ヘマ
シタ。

CC-30
一九三九年ニ彼ハ、イヅレモ侵略戦争ヲ目的
トシタ多クノ著述ヲシマシタ。彼ハ英國ハ、日
本ノ「南方進出」ヲ封鎖スル敵デアル(註)ト云キ

CC-29
a 法廷記録一ニ九〇一A 法廷記録一ニ六九二 d 法廷記録一ニ六九三
b 法廷記録一ニ六九一 e 法廷記録一ニ六九四

c 法廷記録一ニ六九二

CC-30
a 法廷記録一ニ六九〇

橋本ハ日本擴張計畫ヲ形造ツタ一人デアリ、日本ハ東西南北ニ領土的擴張ヲナシテ其處ニ於イテ自由ニ自國ノ力ヲ發揮スベキデアルトノ説ヲ述ベタ者デアリマス。(a) 彼ハ「空シク埋レテ居ル富一ヲ開發センガ爲ニ、新シイ土地ヲ要スト説ベマシタ。持ニ彼ハ南方諸島ヲ擧ゲ。(b) 蘭印ハ「ジャバ」デ手一杯デアツテ、「ボルネオ」ニ「ニューギニー」及ビ「セレベス」ニハ殆ンド手ヲツケテ居ナイト論ジマシタ。(c) 又事

實上南方諸島ヲ保護シテ居ル國ハ英國デアル。

(d) ソシテ日本ハ朝鮮及ビ台灣ノ過去ノ統治ヲ

自慢スルコトハ出來ナイガ、日本ノ支配下ニア

CC-30

ベキデアルト云ツテ日本人ニ對シ英米打倒ヲ引續
 キ勸告シタノデアリマス。(i) 一九四一年一月三
 十日ニ彼ハ「第二ノ開闢」ト題スル本ヲ發行シ
 マシタ、ソノ中デ彼ハ日本ヲ妨害セントスル日
 ヲ何時ナリトモ日本ガ離碎シ得ル爲ニ斷呼タル
 戰爭準備ヲナス事ヲ提唱シ、(j) 又、先ヅ中國ヨ
 リスベテノ英國勢力ヲ驅逐シ而ル後統一セル東
 亞地帯ヨリ漸次英國ノ勢力ヲ驅逐スルヤウ説キ
 マシタ。(k)

h 法廷記録一五六〇

b 法廷記録一五六〇

i 法廷記録一五六六

c 法廷記録一五六九

j 法廷記録一五六七〇 法廷記録二一八七一A

d 法廷記録一五六〇

k 法廷記録一五六七二

e 法廷記録一五六〇

f 法廷記録一五六九

g 法廷記録一五六九

0159 0005 0754

又、上海ノ英租界及ヒ香港ヲ占領スベキデア
ル

ト云ツテ (c) 英國ニ對スル攻擧ヲ促シマシム。

(b) 彼ハ三國同盟強化ヲ促シ、(d) 日本ハ天津

ノ外國租界ヲ「即時」攻擧セヨト述ベマシム。

(e) 彼ハ、英國ヲ追放セヨ (f) 「英國打倒ハ容

易デアアル」(g) 今ヤ攻擧ヲ開始スベキ好機デ

アル (h) ト云ヒマシタ。一九四一年一月ニ、京

都ニ於テ多數ノ聽衆ノ前デ、彼ハ、可成速ヤ

カニ南方ニ進出シ、帝國國內ニ大東亞ヲ建設ス

指環下ニ置ク。他ノ事柄モ亦日本ガ之ヲ支配ス
ル。(a)

CC-33

一九三八年ニ橋本ハ大日本青年黨ヲ解散シ、
直チニ大日本赤誠會ヲ結成シマシタ、ソノ要綱
ハ左ノ通りデアリマシタ。

CC-31

a 法廷証六七ノ一A 法廷記録七三和九、二三三七

CC-32

a 法廷証六七ノ一A 法廷記録二二〇二三

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC

CC-32

CC-31

橋本ハ大東亞ハ日本、滿洲國、中國、極東ゾ
聯、佛領印度、支那、「ビルマ」「マレイ」、
自領印度、印度、「アフガニスタン」、「ホー
ストレリア」、「ニュージールランド」、「ハワ
イ」「フィリッピン」及び大平洋、印度洋諸島
等日本ノ勢力範圍内ニアルモノハ總テ含ムベキ
デアルトノ見解ヲ有シマシタ。(a)

日本ノ勢力ヲ示ス爲ニ橋本ガ提示シタ計畫ハ
左ノ通りデアリマス。「日本ニ併合スル領土ハ
總督ガ之ヲ治メ、同時ニ獨立諸國ニハ日本ノ領

同ヲ任命スル。軍事及ビ外交問題ハ總テ日本ノ

0159 0005 0755

CC-35, CC-34, CC-33

CC-36

一九三六年ヨリ一九四一年ニ至ル危機ノ數年
 間橋本ガ現狀破壞ノ爲ニ武力行使ノ兵ヲ力説シ
 日本ノ爲ニヨリ多クノ領土ヲ創ル爲ニ「ヒツ
 トラー」ノ所謂「生活圏」獲得ト同ジシ武力ニ
 訴ヘヨト勸メ又日本ノ世界制覇ノ願望ヲ武力ニ
 ヨリ不法且ツ侵略的ニ遂行スル事ヲ鼓吹シタ

a

法廷記録一五六八〇一

a 法廷記録一五八

法廷記録一五六七四

a

法廷記録一五六八二一六

CC-35

際 橋本ハ裁判前ニ一人ノ檢察官ヨリ尋問サレタ
偽証ヲナシタノデアリマス
(a)

CC-34

リ、彼ハ大政翼賛會ノ指導者並ビニ常任理事デア
又太陽大日本發行ノ責任者デアリマシタ。
(a)

- (I) 國家ノ再建
- (2) 亞細亞民族ノ防衛ト解放ノ爲ノ軍備強化
- (3) 亞細亞ノ自給自足
- (4) 英國及其ノ領土ノ攻撃
- (5) 東亞ノ皇道化
- (6) アチアニ於ケル國家連合ノ建設 (a)

0159 0005 0756

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P-24

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC

ト云フ事ハ明白デアリマス。彼ノ發表スルトコロノモノハ煽動的デアリ、讀者又ハ讀者ノ注意ヲ喚起スル様故意ニ意圖サレタモノデアリマス。橋本ノナシタ要求ハ、共同生活ヲ行ム國家団体ノ一員トシテノ日本ノ義務ヲ全く無視シ、而モ日本ガソレニ對シテ當事者デアルトコロノ國際條約、協定、保證ニ對スル義務ヲ無視シテ居マシタ。即チ橋本ハ、輿論ヲ指導シテ、右條約、協定、保證ニ違反セシメヌデアリマス、又彼ノ以前ノ行爲ハ自ラ共同謀議者ノ一人トシテ日本ヲ陸海軍政治、經濟等ニ於ケル領導タラシメントシテ不法ナ侵略戰爭ヲ行ツタ點ノ彼ノ役柄ニ似合ツタモノト云ヒ得ルデアリマス。

橋本ノ証言ハ同被告ガ滿洲事變ニモ侵略戦争ノ
 計盤及ビ煽動ニモ何等關係シナカツタト云フ全體
 的否定ニ等シイモノデアリマスガ一九二九年（昭
 和四年）カラ一九四一年（昭和十六年）ニ至ル間
 ノ彼ノ著述及ビ演説ヲ見ル時彼ノ証言ハ否定サレ
 ルノデアリマス。

更ニ上述ノ如ク同被告ハ自ら偽證者タル事ヲ告白
 シテキルノデスカラ彼ガ自己辯護ヲシテ居ル宣誓
 口供書ハ殆ンド信用ガ出来マセン。

a、法廷記録 一六六七八一九

b、" " 二六七八三

c、" " 一六六八〇一

0159 0005 0758

辯 護 側 證 言

CC-37

辯護側ノ證言ハ大体次ノ通り要約出來マセウ。

證人小幡ハ一九三七年（昭和十二年）十二月
「レデイ、バード」號ノ砲撃ハ濠霧ニ依ル錯誤
デアツタコトヲ示サウト試ミマシタガ橋本ハ自分
ハ南京ヘ向ケ航行スル凡テノ船舶ハ國籍ノ如何ニ
不拘環沈セヨトノ命令ヲ受ケタト證言シタノデ先
ノ證言ハ否定サレルノデアリマス。(a)

大日本青年黨及ビ大日本赤誠會 (b) ノ真ノ目的

ニ關スル證人小川ノ證言ハ前ニ見ユル如ク (c) 此

等結社目ヲ世ニ示シタ目的ニヨリ否定サレマス。

P-26

CC-39

a、
b、

法廷證

三八四六

法廷記録

二八七九六

法廷記録

三八一八一

CC-38

a、

法廷記録

二八七七二

ハ國籍ノ如何ニ不拘 墮沈セヨトノ命令ヲ受ケテ居
リ午前十時頃 船ガ晴レタ後四隻ノ艦船ヲ砲撃シ
「レデイ、バード」號ハ其中ノ一隻デアツタト證
言シタ事ト矛盾シテ居マス。
コノ拔擢ハ小艦云ガ「レデイ、バード」號ノ砲撃

0159 0005 0759

HASHIMOTO Summation-CC

CC-38

辯護側證人小幡ノ證言ニヨレバ下記ノ如ク
橋本ハ殺人罪ヲ犯シテ居タ事ヲモ示シ居リマス

「14 砲撃ノ爲メニ一人ノ死者ヲ出シタノデ英艦々
長ハ我方ニ葬儀ニ列スルヤウ依頼シタ。我方カ
ラハ代表者一名コノ葬式ニ参列セシメタ。葬式
ハ公會堂デ行ハレタ (a)」

CC-39

一九三七年（昭和十二年）十二月十二又ハ其頃

英國艦船「レデイバート」號ノ砲撃ニ關シ砲撃ハ

漫遊 (a) ノ爲錯誤デアツタトノ橋本ノ證言ハ一九

四六年（昭和二十一年）一月十七日ノ橋本訊問ノ

抜萃 (b) 中ニ自分ハ南京ヘ回ケ航行スル凡テノ船員

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CC-41

再興ナル事力ヲ用ヒテ復略擴張ヲ企テントシタカ
 シテ日本ノ改革ヲ勵ムニテ其ノ計畫ヲ立テカクテ
 ニシテハ上述ノ第三、第四、第五部ハ彼ガ如何ニ
 含ムモノデアリマスガ此等諸國ニ於ケル橋本ノ罪狀
 及ビ第二十七、第三十二、三十八、三十九
 諸國第一、第五、第六、第十七、第十八、十九

VI 橋本ノ罪狀

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0159 0005 0767

リ一九四一年迄ニ既ニ朝鮮、臺灣ノ領土ヲ所有シ
又滿洲ヲモ支配シテ居タト云フ事實ニ依ツテ示サ
レマス

日本ノ軍國主義者ガ求メタモノハ領土テハナク亞細
亞世界ノ奴隸化デアリカクテ全世界ヲ一ツノ屋根

CC-42

橋本ノ主張ハ日本ハソノ幾千萬ノ人民ノ爲ニヨ
 リ廣イ居住面積ヲ必要トスルトイフノデアリマシ
 タガソノ説ノ荒唐無稽ナル事ハ日本ガ一九二二年ヨ

CC-44

彼ガカクモ熱心ニ主張シタ政策即チ對英米戰、
 大東亞ヲ日本ノ支配ノ下ニ置カントシタ南進策、
 獨逸トノ同盟、蔣政権打倒ニ依ル中國主權ノ滅亡
 等ガ實際ニ遂行サレ取ハ誤ミラレタト云フ事ハ僞
 然ノ一致テハアリマセン。此等ノ政策ハ又他ノ共
 同謀議者達ノ政策デモアリ彼等ハ程度ノ差コソア
 レ同計畫ニ關與シ、同意セヌモノヲシテ強制的ニ
 同計畫ノ命ズル所ニ從ハシメタノデアリマス

0159 0005 0768

渴望スル利益ヲ知ラス爲ニハ如何ナル迷惑手段ニ
 訴ヘテモヨイト云ウ如キ心理状態ニナツタト言フ
 外ハナイノデアリマス
 瑕疵行爲ハ橋本ガ英米ヲ憎悪セヨト宣傳シタ等ノ
 副産物デアリ、ソノ目的ハ妨害ヲナス者ニ對スル

- a 法廷記録三五三五六
- b 法廷記録三四九一
- c 法廷記録一〇三〇六
- d 法廷記録六四〇九
- o 法廷記録一一二二一五
- f 法廷記録九六四五

即チ日ソトイフ屋根ニテ蔽フベシトノ日ソガ宣傳
シタ宿命(一)橋本(二)松岡(三)原條(四)ガ説明シタ
八紘一宇、三國同盟ニ關シテ言及サレテ居ル(五)
大東亞共榮圈ニ關シテ言及サレ(六)且定義サレテ
居ル(七)ヲ實現セントシタノデアリマス、

「レデイーボード」號及ビ「バネー」號ノ砲撃
ノ外ニ俘虜及ビ非戦國員ノ殺害虐待ニ關スル訴因
第四五ノ第四七及ビ第五四ノ第五五ニ於ケル橋本
ノ罪狀ニ關シテ述ブレバ彼ハ激越ナ言葉ヲ用ヒテ
暴力行爲ヲ煽動シタ故ニ所謂暴行ヲ爲ツタ者達ハ

0159 0005 0769

P-37

輕蔑デアツタト言フ事ガ出來マス

コノ角辰カラ見ル時近因タル者ハ正常的結果タル
總ベテノ損害ニ對シテ責任ヲ有ストノ私犯ニ關シ
テ一般ニ行ハレル理論ニ基キ橋本ハ責任トナルノ
デアリマス。仔虜及ビ非敵國員ノ殺害、虐待ハ橋
本ガ日本ハ朝敵ヲ待ル爲ニ取フベシト力説シタ事
ニ伴ツタモノデアリマス。結果トシテ生ジタ犯罪
ハ彼ガ過激ナ行動ヲセヨト諷ベタ事ノ隨伴物ナノ
デアリマス

0159 0006 0771

IPS

10 February 1948

RE: HATA (DI) Summation

Attached pages DD-6, DD-7, DD-25 DD-35 and DL-36
are to be substituted for pages ID-6, DD-7, DD-25, DD-35
and DL-36.

(DD-10)
 tral Government of China and aid in the formation of a new
 regime. ^{c.} On 13 January 1938, China asked about the new con-
 ditions: ^{i.} on 14 January 1938 Japan decided ^{e.} and on 16 January
 1938 Premier KONOYE announced to the world that Japan would
 no longer deal with the National Government of China, but
 would seek the establishment and development of a new govern-
 ment in China. ^{f.} Those who wanted an all out war against
 China had prevailed. The conspiracy was moving with increased
 tempo. ^{g.} On 14 February 1938, HATA assumed command in China.

DD-11. When HATA assumed command of the Central China
 Expeditionary Forces on 14 February 1938, he knew that he was
 engaging in a war against China. In his interrogation he
 stated:

"Although it actually was a war, all they ever considered
 it was a Chinese Incident! Actually, it was a war."^{g.}

The Defense claim that HATA's duties were "negative duties",
 merely to maintain peace and order in the triangle between
 Shanghai, Hanking and Hangchow, ^{b.} was not borne out by their
 witness, KAWABE, Masakazu. On cross-examination he admitted
 that the extensive military operations conducted by HATA as
 Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces,
 which included the battle of Taierhchuang, the capture of Hsu-
 chow, the campaign resulting in the capture of Wuchang, and
 the fall of Hankow, were neither "negative" nor "inactive"
 duties. He then added that those were new duties assigned
 to HATA. ^{c.}

DD-12. HATA did not long remain in the triangle zone

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| <u>DD-10.</u> | <u>DD-12.</u> |
| c. Ex. 3264, T. 29,844 | f. Ex. 268, T. 3,563-5 |
| d. Ex. 486-C, T. 5907-8 | g. Ex. 106, T. 701 |
| e. Ex. 2260, T. 16,223, T. 22,053-6 | |
| Ex. 3340, T. 30,838-9 | |

- DD-11.
- a. Ex. 256, T. 3,451
 - b. Ex. 2479-A, T. 21,698
 - c. T. 21,713

(DD-12)
 connecting Hankow, Han-chow and Shanghai. On 19 May 1938 his forces captured Hsuechow; on 6 June Keifeng, the capital of Honan Province, fell into his hands. On 27 June, Matang was captured; on 25 July, Kiuking was captured; on 12 October, Singyang fell to the troops under HATA's Command; and his crowning accomplishment as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was the fall of Hankow on 25 October 1938. Even with that he did not cease the penetration of China, and on 11 November 1938, his forces captured Loyang.^{a.} Further light is shed on the size and extent of these operations by the statement of HATA in his interrogation, that the troops which were reinforced to him from the North China Army prior to the Hankow campaign were "about 300,000 or 400,000" and that the campaign^{b.} which resulted in the capture of Hankow consumed five months.

DD-13. The fall of Hankow was the high-water mark of that period of Japan's undisclosed war in China. HATA had all but accomplished the purpose of the conspirators. Ten days later, on 3 November 1938, the Japanese Government issued a statement reciting that the Army had captured Kwantung, Hankow and Hsuechang; had overcome the important districts of China; had reduced the National Government of China to a local regime.^{a.} It boasted that operations would continue until the National Government of China was "completely annihilated." It affirmed that what Japan sought was the establishment of a new order in East Asia. "This is really the ultimate objective of the present

DD-12.

- a. Ex. 254, T. 3,430-2.
- b. Ex. 256, T. 3,443-8

DD-13.

- a. Ex. 266, T. 3,564.

(DD-40)

and Navy officers should be sent to French Indo-China, and

(3) that, pending the determination by Japan of the materials which it would request the French Indo-China authorities to prohibit from being transported to China, they should continue a complete blockade of the frontier between French Indo-China and China. A helpless France accepted these demands.

DD-41. On 24 June 1940 Ott reported to the German Foreign Office that FOISC had inquired what would be Germany's attitude toward Japan's military moves in French Indo-China and part of the Netherlands East Indies and that MUTO had declared that Japan was very much interested in Indo-China. On 29 June 1940 a Japanese observation party headed by Major General NISHIHARA and consisting of 40 officials of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries arrived at Hanci. The Japanese militarists were moving south. HATA and MUTO were working in close harmony.

DD-42. As further evidence that plans for the southern advance were even then in the making the Japanese Government on 12 January 1940 notified the Netherlands Government of the abrogation of the treaties of the Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation made between them on 12 August 1935. On 20 May 1940 the Japanese Government made strong demands on the Netherlands for materials to be exported from the Netherlands East Indies; thus the government of which HATA was a member was moving towards the N.E.I. Its demands

DD-40.

c. Ex. 618-h, T. 6851-2

DD-41.

a. Ex. 523, T. 6174
b. Ex. 618-h, T. 6853

DD-42.

a. Ex. 1307-A, T. 11768;
T. 11770

b. Ex. 1309-A, T. 11777;
11788

(DD-52)

results from the stronger military attitude towards Hong Kong and Indo-China." Ott reported again on 3 July 1940:

"* * *the Foreign Minister intended to stress in his radio speech that the present government has never deviated from the Axis policy, and has always had full sympathy for the German demand for a New Order in Europe, so much the more since Japan herself is striving for a New Order in Asia. The government is determined to consolidate Axis friendship. The army protested against this attitude on the grounds that in reality the above policy of sympathy for the Axis is not compatible with the policies hitherto pursued by the cabinet and because the army wanted to avoid the YONAI-ARITA cabinet using a sudden stress of friendship with the Axis as a chess move to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition, which is close to us and to save its own existence.

"The action of the Press Chief of the Foreign Ministry, who disclosed the original text of ARITA's speech to 'ASAHI' and announced the army's protest publicly in a press conference, caused great indignation in army circles."^b.

2. The Leading Article on Fall of the YONAI Cabinet

DD-53. Meetings were held between ARITA and HATA and announcement made to the public that the breach had been healed. The essence of the problem had not been settled. The authoritative article on liquidation of YONAI-ARITA diplomatic policy carrying a full account of the events which led up to and caused the fall of the YONAI Cabinet, published 17 July 1940^a in the Tokyo ASAHI Shinbun, was not read in full into the Record, only the letter delivered by War Minister HATA to Premier YONAI on 14 July 1940 having been read into the Record by the witness YONAI on cross-examination.^b After tracing the increasing opposition to the YONAI-ARITA diplomacy on the part of HATA and the army circles because of their failure to collaborate with the Axis and the

DD-52.

b. Ex. 531, T. 6239

DD-53.

a. Ex. 3199-A, T. 28,941

b. T. 28,939-40

(DD-53)

dissatisfaction with their internal policy because of their failure to support the IRAA, it states "The direct cause for the collapse of the YONAI Cabinet under such circumstances was War Minister HATA's strong attack."^{c.} After outlining the circumstances surrounding ARITA's broadcast of June 29 and the reports that the text had been changed as the result of Army pressure, the article continues:

"However, the essence of the problem had not been settled. Due to their contention that even if the foreign policy is changed, it would be impossible for the YONAI-ARITA Axis to carry out the changed diplomacy and that the change would only represent a 'Shift' in form, the military circle strongly continued to demand the immediate establishment of the new political organization with the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet, and the promotion of the changed policy by the new organization. Thus the movement for the appearance of Prince KONOYE who is the leader of the new political organization, grew stronger.

"In view of the situation within the department, War Minister HATA, after having an interview with both Generals TERAUCHI and SUGIYAMA, old military senior heads, on the 7th and 8th, decided generally on measures to be taken as the War Minister. And on the 9th he met the Premier in the Cabinet meeting and indirectly expressed his intentions by saying, "How about thinking about cooperating with the new domestic organization?" To this statement by the War Minister, Premier YONAI replied, "with the domestic situation as it is, perhaps I may have to think about it," and thus expressed agreement for the time being.

War Minister Presents a Strong Vote

"Subsequently, on the 11th, MUTO, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, called on ISHIHATA, Cabinet Secretary General, explained to the latter in detail the intention of the Army, amplifying the intention of the War Minister. Later, War Minister HATA, on the evening of the 14th, presented to Premier YONAI, an important advice in writing. The note was very clear, and the content is as follows:

"The present conditions are such that we are facing the greatest transition phase of world situation, and the strengthening of the domestic organization, and the reformation of the foreign policy have become the most

DD-53.

c. Ex. 3199-A, T. 28,941-63

0159 0006 0777

FATA Summary - DD

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P. 1

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$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^2} = \frac{\pi^2}{6}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^2} = \frac{\pi^2}{6}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^4} = \frac{\pi^4}{90}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^6} = \frac{\pi^6}{945}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^8} = \frac{\pi^8}{7560}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{10}} = \frac{\pi^{10}}{93555}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{12}} = \frac{\pi^{12}}{6355140}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{14}} = \frac{\pi^{14}}{135288480}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{16}} = \frac{\pi^{16}}{17640525600}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{18}} = \frac{\pi^{18}}{275253155200}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{20}} = \frac{\pi^{20}}{4154781462400}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{22}} = \frac{\pi^{22}}{64561078656000}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{24}} = \frac{\pi^{24}}{975243136000000}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{26}} = \frac{\pi^{26}}{147208929472000000}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{28}} = \frac{\pi^{28}}{2212160000000000000}$
 $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^{30}} = \frac{\pi^{30}}{32934966000000000000}$

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Handwritten text, possibly a section header or a specific instruction.

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Vertical handwritten text on the left margin, possibly a date or page number.

P. 3

DD-4	a
DD-4	a
	a
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P.4

HATA Summation - 2D

DD-7 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-5 a 總覽圖 10/10/10

DD-7 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-5 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-4 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-3 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-2 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-1 a 總覽圖 10/10/10

DD-7 a 總覽圖 10/10/10

DD-6 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-5 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-4 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-3 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-2 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-1 a 總覽圖 10/10/10

DD-6 a 總覽圖 10/10/10

DD-5 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-4 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-3 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-2 a 總覽圖 10/10/10
DD-1 a 總覽圖 10/10/10

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中國... 1949年...

Vertical text on the left margin, possibly a page or chapter number.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a letter or report.

19.5

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P 6

HATA Suminonon 1920

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p.1

0 199 0006 0784

P. 8

00-11 戶政事務所 民國六十一年 農曆正月廿一日
日 廿一日

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H. H. S. ...

HATA Summezon - DD

1. 德(中國)國聯一於十月廿二日(十月十二日)
 十一日(德)國(中國)及聯(國)一(德)國(中國)
 擊(親)德(國)一(德)國(中國)一(德)國(中國)
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2. 德(中國)國聯一於十月廿二日(十月十二日)
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德(中國)	國聯	一於十月廿二日
德(中國)	國聯	一於十月廿二日
德(中國)	國聯	一於十月廿二日

HITA Sumeration

一、本會之宗旨，在於研究我國之歷史，及整理我國之文獻，以發揚我國之文化，而增進世界之知識。

二、本會之組織，由會員組成之，會員分爲正會員、贊助會員、及通訊會員三種。

三、本會之經費，由會員之會費、及社會之捐助、及政府之補助等項充之。

四、本會之辦事處，設於本市中區某某路某某號。

五、本會之活動，包括出版刊物、舉辦講座、及進行田野調查等項。

六、本會之宗旨，在於研究我國之歷史，及整理我國之文獻，以發揚我國之文化，而增進世界之知識。

七、本會之組織，由會員組成之，會員分爲正會員、贊助會員、及通訊會員三種。

八、本會之經費，由會員之會費、及社會之捐助、及政府之補助等項充之。

九、本會之辦事處，設於本市中區某某路某某號。

十、本會之活動，包括出版刊物、舉辦講座、及進行田野調查等項。

9.11

1001	1002	1003	1004	1005	1006	1007	1008	1009	1010
1011	1012	1013	1014	1015	1016	1017	1018	1019	1020
1021	1022	1023	1024	1025	1026	1027	1028	1029	1030
1031	1032	1033	1034	1035	1036	1037	1038	1039	1040
1041	1042	1043	1044	1045	1046	1047	1048	1049	1050

(二) 河内並ニ上解集ニ對スル題ノ責任

一、星見... 一五三八年 河内ノ販売ヲ取扱フ
 二、... 文... 下ノ特... 部ニヤトシテ...
 三、... 閣... 部... 長... 以後...
 四、... 院... 地位ニ... 進...
 五、... 取扱... 日... 一... 期...

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HATA Summation - PD

清道金問題は、實に露の改革への妨げである。露は、
字印。

一九三八年十月二十二日、中国に於ては、アメリカ人殺
傷及び日本人財産の破壊。

一九三八年十一月二十一日、在中国アメリカ市民並
ニ露艦に對する自衛隊の暴行、ついでアメリカ國
旗の擄奪等々を含む。

此種十中、立國ノ人民並ニ
露艦ニ對スル烟ノ廢下ノ兵士ノ行爲ニ就テ、斷斷ナキ

新報ハ、中國市民ノ人身並ニ露艦ニ對シテ、マコシラ、同兵
士ガ暴行ヲ憐レ、以テ一報復者ノ証ミ、信カレルト

テモ、同報ニ「烟ノ政界ハ」云々、打倒
然レ人民ハ可ク愛スルヲ、マコシラ、
人ノ証ミ、信カレルト云々、
述ベ、丹波復讐ノ証

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HAZEL

P. 15

HATA S.

200

DD-20	a. 1941
DD-21	a. 1941

DD-22

DD-22
 1. 1941年11月11日
 2. 1941年11月11日
 3. 1941年11月11日
 4. 1941年11月11日

DD-22
 1. 1941年11月11日
 2. 1941年11月11日
 3. 1941年11月11日
 4. 1941年11月11日

DD-22
 1. 1941年11月11日
 2. 1941年11月11日
 3. 1941年11月11日
 4. 1941年11月11日
 5. 1941年11月11日
 6. 1941年11月11日
 7. 1941年11月11日
 8. 1941年11月11日
 9. 1941年11月11日
 10. 1941年11月11日

HATA Summation - DD

此下可徵信... 計數(請參見...)
... 阿部... 德... 阿... 阿... 阿...
... 阿... 阿... 阿... 阿... 阿...

五 (總... 國... 會... 會... 會...)

五... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...

A 國... 會... 會...

... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
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... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...
... 會... 會... 會... 會... 會...

011

11月+ 難字同 421 | 0794

一、難字同 421 | 0794
二、難字同 421 | 0794
三、難字同 421 | 0794
四、難字同 421 | 0794
五、難字同 421 | 0794

新編

一、新編 421 | 0794
二、新編 421 | 0794
三、新編 421 | 0794
四、新編 421 | 0794
五、新編 421 | 0794
六、新編 421 | 0794
七、新編 421 | 0794
八、新編 421 | 0794
九、新編 421 | 0794
十、新編 421 | 0794

Handwritten vertical text on the right margin, possibly a page number or reference code.

0159 0006 0795

Handwritten vertical text on the left margin, possibly a date or page number.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or a series of notes.

Small handwritten text or mark at the bottom left.

Handwritten text at the bottom of the page, possibly a signature or a reference.

P. 20

Handwritten header text, possibly a title or reference number.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or detailed notes.

Vertical handwritten text on the right side, possibly a date or classification.

Small handwritten text at the bottom right corner.

HATH Summation - 23

23-28

1. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(陸軍) 在... 宣佈...
 2. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(海軍) 在... 宣佈...
 3. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(空軍) 在... 宣佈...
 4. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(陸軍) 在... 宣佈...
 5. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(海軍) 在... 宣佈...
 6. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(空軍) 在... 宣佈...

7. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(陸軍) 在... 宣佈...
 8. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(海軍) 在... 宣佈...
 9. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(空軍) 在... 宣佈...
 10. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(陸軍) 在... 宣佈...
 11. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(海軍) 在... 宣佈...
 12. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(空軍) 在... 宣佈...
 13. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(陸軍) 在... 宣佈...
 14. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(海軍) 在... 宣佈...
 15. 1941年11月11日 日本軍(空軍) 在... 宣佈...

P. 1

1.
2.
3.

HATA Summation - 2D

此二又說明... (The following text is highly stylized and partially illegible, appearing to be a list or summary of points.)

DD-31

此二又說明... (Continuation of the summary text, containing several lines of dense, handwritten characters.)

DD-32

中國政府... (Text starting with '中國政府', likely discussing government policy or international relations.)

p. 23

- DD-33
- c. 漢語... 歐羅巴...
 - a. " 歐羅巴... "...
 - b. " 歐羅巴... "...

0 159 0006 0800

Page 4

中國(國) 各國... 10-33
 中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...
 中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...
 中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...
 中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...
 中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...
 中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...
 中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...
 中華民國二十九年...

10-33

中國(國) 各國...

中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...
 中華民國二十九年...
 中國(國) 各國...

DATA Sum. Mar. 1945

1. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 2. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 3. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
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 26. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 27. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
 28. 關於... (faint handwritten text)

226

WATA SUMIYAMA - 226

WATA SUMIYAMA - 226

1. 關於此項之說明書，請參閱本局之說明書。
 2. 關於此項之說明書，請參閱本局之說明書。
 3. 關於此項之說明書，請參閱本局之說明書。
 4. 關於此項之說明書，請參閱本局之說明書。
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 9. 關於此項之說明書，請參閱本局之說明書。
 10. 關於此項之說明書，請參閱本局之說明書。

WATA SUMIYAMA

WATA SUMIYAMA

WATA SUMIYAMA

0159 0006 0803

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matic

カヲ権 + タノ行 P=024
国務相畑

Main body of handwritten notes, including the words '国務相畑' and 'カヲ権 + タノ行 P=024'. The text is dense and difficult to read due to the handwriting and image quality.

Handwritten text at the bottom of the page, possibly a signature or a date.

0159 0006 0804

p. 28

... 第一階段 ... 第二階段 ...
 ... 第三階段 ... 第四階段 ...
 ... 第五階段 ... 第六階段 ...
 ... 第七階段 ... 第八階段 ...
 ... 第九階段 ... 第十階段 ...
 ... 第十一階段 ... 第十二階段 ...

總說明書

... 說明 ... 說明 ...
 ... 說明 ... 說明 ...
 ... 說明 ... 說明 ...
 ... 說明 ... 說明 ...
 ... 說明 ... 說明 ...

DD

DD

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HARA Summa Lin - 20
00-21 00-31

5080 9000 651 0

0 159 0000 0806

1. 中國之歷史
 2. 中國之地理
 3. 中國之政治
 4. 中國之經濟
 5. 中國之文化
 6. 中國之藝術
 7. 中國之科學
 8. 中國之宗教
 9. 中國之法律
 10. 中國之教育
 11. 中國之社會
 12. 中國之國際關係
 13. 中國之對外關係
 14. 中國之對外關係
 15. 中國之對外關係

六十一
 六十二
 六十三
 六十四
 六十五
 六十六
 六十七
 六十八
 六十九
 七十

0 159 0006 0807

HATA Susunan

1. HATA Susunan (Hata Susunan)
 2. HATA Susunan (Hata Susunan)
 3. HATA Susunan (Hata Susunan)
 4. HATA Susunan (Hata Susunan)
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 30. HATA Susunan (Hata Susunan)

0 159 0006 0809

DATA Acquisition

The first part of the report describes the general principles of the data acquisition system. It covers the hardware components, including the computer, the data acquisition board, and the sensors. The software part discusses the data acquisition program, the data storage, and the data processing. The second part of the report describes the results of the data acquisition. It includes the raw data, the processed data, and the analysis of the data. The third part of the report discusses the conclusions and the future work.

The data acquisition system is a complex system that requires a lot of attention to detail. The hardware components must be carefully selected and configured. The software must be carefully developed and tested. The data must be carefully collected and processed. The analysis must be carefully performed and interpreted. The conclusions must be carefully drawn and supported by the data.

11 08 0006 9157

100

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Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or detailed notes.

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HATA Summary-DD

DD-X5

关于通平沼内閣當時共謀者達「日德關係問題」三
 治下完成皇年ノ計畫ハ俄ノ間ニ不價各保物ヲ調停
 之ヲ斃碎言ハシテ平沼内閣ノ倒壊ヲ圖リ於此皇
 國主義者群ノ代弁者ニ此ノ責ヲ負ハシメ又信者
 被阻ト見解ヲ共ニ守居ル事ハ後審ニ後ニ「公然ト
 日往間」ヨリ密接ト協力ヲ爲シ俄ニ統一ニ於テ政
 起リシノ事ヲ詔言ハシ共謀者達ノ犯罪關係ヲ固
 確トシ且鐵道ノ益ヲ強化セシメ天正三年（昭和五年）
 九月一日皇ノ不立ニ「侵メ」ル事ハ信者及信者
 相トシテ「彼」失信者ヲ阻礙言ハシテ皇國主義者
 達ニ被阻ニ使テ信者ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ且皇
 國主義者ノ報告ニ依リ「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ
 結果失敗ニ將「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ且皇
 國主義者ノ努力ヲ以テ「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ
 安全ニ所見ノ同ク「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ且皇
 國主義者ノ努力ヲ以テ「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ
 行動ニ對シ「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ且皇國主義者
 五年（昭和五年）三月十三日「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ
 結果「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ且皇國主義者ノ努力
 ヲ以テ「彼」ノ欲望ヲ實現セシメ且皇國主義者ノ努力

p. 35

DD-X5

- 1. 遊記録六八
- 2. 遊記録第三九六号 遊記録三五七四
- 3. 遊記録 五二四 六八

HATA Summation - DD

DD-46

辨護側、有田 (a) 及米内 (b) 二氏之署名同同盟軍に對して、事、立証之稱、誠、人員が如何なるものか、
 一九四六年(昭和二十年)五月十五日、彼、吾同、終、事、際、虛、関、之、債、問、中、之、夫、等、之、百、四、十、八、區、外、債、權、額、
 彼、等、同、証、據、之、裏、之、上、に、米、内 (b) 及、米、内 (a) 二氏、
 與、六、年、五、百、五、十、五、百、債、問、對、之、次、稱、之、稱、見、之、同、
 日、独、同、軍、事、同、盟、締、結、之、期、間、に、獨、六、之、如何、之、見、解、
 又、持、之、力、卷、煙、後、六、之、當時、日、独、同、盟、締、結、の、締、結、
 事、に、對、し、日本、に、對、し、有利、之、上、を、考、へ、獨、六、對、之、事、
 同、於、之、米、内 (b) 及、米、内 (a) 二氏、之、債、問、時、代、之、債、問、
 同、盟、締、結、の、要、求、之、上、に、又、彼、自、身、に、對、し、獨、六、同、
 盟、之、誤、解、が、行、つ、た、誤、解、の、故、に、獨、六、同、盟、締、結、の、日、
 人、界、が、主張、之、屋、に、獨、六、之、債、問、之、實、行、は、事、
 發生、米、内 (b) 及、米、内 (a) 二氏、之、上、に、對、し、獨、六、同、
 盟、軍、人、界、が、彼、之、内、閣、に、對、し、獨、六、同、盟、之、事、に、
 理由、が、示、し、即、ち、(1) 獨、六、大、政、集、議、會、に、對、し、對、
 して、事、(2) 日、独、同、盟、締、結、の、支、持、之、上、に、
 了、す、べ、し、又、當、時、軍、人、界、に、於、て、最、有、力、者、の、煙、草、
 及、杉、山、之、予、見、彼、等、八、各、之、然、内、閣、一、致、を、示、さ、し、獨、六、表、
 明、し、た、事、也。

DD-46 a. 証、據、之、三。号、連、記、録、二、九、四、五、一、六

b. " " " "

c. " " " "

d. " " " "

" " " "

" " " "

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" " " "

" " " "

21 80 9000 651 0

HATA Summation - DD

DE-100
昭和十五年七月八日在ベルリン日英特使佐藤、...

新鉄路の修造ニ依テモ、ノナレルヲアツカセ、日本ハ一方テハ
硬東及ビ南洋ニ於ケル新鉄路ノ建設ノ為ニ三年間、努力ヲ續ケ
テ来リ、...

此ノ会議ハ該二國間、提携強化ノ為、日本外務省ノ訓令ニ基キ
シテ、...

18	a	法廷記者會ニ出席	速記録	六一七九
19	b	"	"	六一八一
20	c	"	"	六一八六
21	d	速記録	二八九五六一之八	六一九一

01590006510

HATH Summation - DD

米内閣、新念ニ基キ、行ハクニ進ミ、又亦、各派、
同閣、遷移、外、各省、代表者、同、用リ、各職、付、各、各、
知、又、ト、言、ス、也、

^{DD-49} 米内閣、独逸ト協力シ、特ト云フ、進ミ、也、努力ニ、托、シ、テ、
又、其、努力ガ、米内、及、石、有、田、ノ、諒、解、ト、同意、ト、下、ニ、下、シ、分、ト、
シ、カ、ニ、拘、ハ、ラ、ズ、！、我、々、ガ、此、ニ、提、出、ス、事、業、ノ、人、ノ、信用、ニ、甚、大、
ノ、影響、ス、ル、ニ、テ、テ、テ、！、！、！、態度、ノ、変化、ノ、既、ニ、過、去、ノ、烟、
ヲ、其、ノ、先、鋒、ト、シ、武、藤、ニ、依、リ、敏、腕、ニ、投、助、シ、テ、軍、部、ノ、一、目、
的、ニ、達、成、セ、テ、！、而、テ、進、ミ、ニ、達、成、セ、テ、！、欲、シ、テ、！、！、！、国内、機、構、
ノ、重、新、部、ト、大、政、策、ヲ、養、念、ノ、創、設、ヲ、シ、テ、！、！、！、！、！、米内閣、
ノ、独逸、ト、同盟、ノ、締、結、ヲ、シ、テ、！、！、！、！、！、米内閣、
ノ、倒、壊、ノ、外、テ、！、！、！、日本、ノ、戦争、ノ、大、道、ノ、引、進、ニ、テ、！、！、！、！、！、
是、等、ノ、目、的、ヲ、達、成、シ、テ、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、
是、等、ノ、目、的、ヲ、達、成、シ、テ、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、

I 烟 米内閣ヲ破滅ス

^{DD-50} 米内ノ石有田外交現状維持、外交ニテ、佛蘭西降伏、
亦、米内閣、政策、現状維持、政策ニテ、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、！、

10.39

^{DD-48} 2. 空想錄 三九三十五

行動を動かすには、先づ、絶て勝利、往時記憶、自一、二、三、
 既、即ち、日本外交政策、対肥前協力、不隠察、秘密、
 増大せし、金主主義的、組織、組織、組織、
 動、即ち、近衛、半、人物、之、以、大、政、議、事、を、
 海、海、
 新、政、治、決、定、即、ち、大、政、議、事、を、
 加、正、二、「烟」、其、作、用、米、米、内、内、
 一、一、
 為、勢、が、得、事、依、其、把、持、
 烟、上、加、共、一、同、買、下、之、
 十、比、キ、演、説、予、告、及、比、一、九、四、一、年、(即、十、五、年)六、月、二、日、自、演、
 二、依、
 引、續、キ、
 是、即、ち、之、の、
 嚴、初、ハ、示、唆、云、更、ハ、一、四、日、(即、十、五、年)七、月、一、日、(即、十、六、年)八、月、内、
 備、宛、提出、ナリ、正、式、文、書、(即、十、五、年)八、月、内、
 上、カ、手、烟、一、九、四、一、年、(即、十、五、年)十、月、十、日、自、演、説、之、米、内、
 陸、海、之、後、任、令、指、名、之、種、種、之、
 意、見、金、々、又、對、
 絶、之、。烟、ハ、自、的、の、完、遂、之、。從、米、米、内、内、内、内、
 絶、之、。烟、ハ、自、的、の、完、遂、之、。從、米、米、内、内、内、内、

DD50

ア	漢語	三五九	三五九
イ	漢語	三五九	三五九
ウ	漢語	三五九	三五九
エ	漢語	三五九	三五九
オ	漢語	三五九	三五九
カ	漢語	三五九	三五九
キ	漢語	三五九	三五九
ク	漢語	三五九	三五九
ケ	漢語	三五九	三五九
コ	漢語	三五九	三五九
ク	漢語	三五九	三五九
ケ	漢語	三五九	三五九
コ	漢語	三五九	三五九
カ	漢語	三五九	三五九
キ	漢語	三五九	三五九
ク	漢語	三五九	三五九
ケ	漢語	三五九	三五九
コ	漢語	三五九	三五九
カ	漢語	三五九	三五九
キ	漢語	三五九	三五九
ク	漢語	三五九	三五九
ケ	漢語	三五九	三五九
コ	漢語	三五九	三五九

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HATH Summation - PD

1. 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日)

1. 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日)

1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日)

1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日) 1951年(1月10日)至(1月16日)

1951	1951	1951
1951	1951	1951
1951	1951	1951
1951	1951	1951

0 159 0006 08 18

10. 42

HATA Summation - DE

報言の支

進化，結果于此，不ムハ爾の一九四〇年(昭和十五年)の四月に...

外務大臣(政府)の指導は、一語、其の中心に在り。其の目的は、...
新政府の成立を期すに在り。其の目的は、...
日本自派の組織を以て、新政府の組織を以て、...
其の目的は、...
其の目的は、...

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L & M 証言 第三号 連記録 六三九

60-578

2 2311
 6 2311
 a 2311 建記錄六二四三
 六二四四一五
 六二四六一七

新福福... 繼... 議... 她...
 議... 繼... 議... 她...
 繼... 議... 繼... 她...
 議... 繼... 議... 她...

知... 知... 知... 知...
 知... 知... 知... 知...
 知... 知... 知... 知...
 知... 知... 知... 知...

知... 知... 知... 知...
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0 159 0006 0822

陸軍の北支那行極々々々世界情勢ニ対応シテ遺憾ナキ
 外交政策ヲ行ハシ現内閣ヲ不信任シテ伊トシ
 政治的接近等、意向ヲ示シテ存テ又内政ニシテ
 政府、國民ト融和シ諸施策満足ニ成果ヲ挙げ
 得ズ政治体制、強化ヲ為スニ非カレバ此、非常時局
 対応ニ能ハスト云フテ、經局陸相、現内閣トシ、信任
 異ニシ陸軍總督、任ラシメ又能ハステ、辞表ヲ提出スニ
 至ルベシ

DD-14

証言ニ於テ、陸軍大臣被告ハ三次近衛内閣改組ヲ招来
 シトモ東條ノ努力ヲ語リ、次ニ述ビ云ク、今自政変ニ際シ東
 條ノ上リ能ハル米内閣時、烟陸相取テ能及ト異ル
 本大臣証言、此部分ニ関シ、ニ違フ事ナシト云フ、
 廿二日ハ、又上内閣時、次ニ通リニ答ヘタリ
 「米内閣時、烟陸軍大臣、辞職ハ陸軍大臣ノ許シテ内閣ニ
 出政ニシテ、此後位ニ委セラルト云フ、米内閣倒レタリ
 下リタル才三次近衛内閣、場合ハ即前會會議、決定、実行
 問題ト意見ハ指直シテ、本大臣ノ上ニシテ、東條、辞表ヲ
 提出スルベシト云フ事ナシト云フ、陸軍大臣ニテ申シテ、訂トス。

DD-55

- 〃 証言ニシテ 証言 六二五〇
- 〃 〃 三三四〇 〃 三〇一五〇一六
- 〃 〃 〃 三二六三〇一四

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HATAI Summary - DC

三島會社經營方針與煙草業之關係

10-8

中國之煙草業，自甲午戰事以後，漸趨於不振。其原因有三：一、外貨之傾銷，二、金價之騰貴，三、政府之禁煙。...

DC-81

國家之煙草業，自甲午戰事以後，漸趨於不振。其原因有三：一、外貨之傾銷，二、金價之騰貴，三、政府之禁煙。...

DC-82

國家之煙草業，自甲午戰事以後，漸趨於不振。其原因有三：一、外貨之傾銷，二、金價之騰貴，三、政府之禁煙。...

NO	品名	數量	單位	金額
60-61
60-60
...

HATA Summary Form - D
DD-63

後任者推馬、拒絕不之答、強指其有之、公次郎、因
在野、一、推馬、推馬、之、推馬、推馬、之、推馬、推馬、
命、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
上、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
一、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
之、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、

一、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、

推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、
推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、

推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、推馬、

0159 0006 0826

HATA Summation - DD

條陸相受諾之事實ヲ三十日ハ多ク其ノ詳ニ標ニ思フ
余其ノ事ハ力ヲ以テ之ヲ云フニ聞キ、(思フ)ト御話下(思)
本頁ニ更ニ附記ニ彼(本頁)ニ(天旨、御意見御石)ト云フニ
去退下後武官長上面談、際、今後先例トセシム様陸相
ト連絡方ヲ希望シ、更ニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ

DD-64

米内内閣總辭職後、米内首相ニ對シ、(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ
ノ拒絕ニ對シ、長官會議ニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ
閣、陸相ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ
謁言、自後、即チ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ
閣、極要ニ陸相ノ地位ニ東條ヲ攝シ、平沼、三津、鈴木
ニ被シ、並ビニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ

ト 烟。八。新。内。閣。下。三。命。ヲ。受。諾。ス。

DD-65

烟、軍閣ト共ニ居残リ、東條ノ陸相トスル事、第二、米内閣内閣
組閣ニ完了シ、其ノ日、烟、軍閣參議官トシ、其ノ内閣トスル
任命ヲ受諾ス。我々、彼、辭職ニ強要スル事、多ク、(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ
彼、自、米内内閣ニ辭職ニ強要スル事、強硬ニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ
事、(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ(思)ト云フニ

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DD-66

。 法廷記本五九号選記第六六六

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HATA Summation - D.D
DD-66

畑が米内内閣、没落ヲモタラシタ十日後、即チ一九四〇年七月二十七日、連絡會議（政府、統帥府）ハ他、諸事項ト共ニ左ノ件ヲ決議ス。

『一、獨得ト、緊密ナル政治提携ヲ育成スルト共ニ、米國ニ對シテ壓迫ヲ加ヘ得ルニ態勢ヲ構成シ、蘇聯ト外支刷新ニ活路ヲ見出シテ講スルコト。』

『二、佛、比、香港、其、他、租借地ニ對スル政策ヲ強化シ、後進行爲ヲ阻止シ、日本ニ對スル敵意ヲ掃滅スルコト。』

006000600000 6510

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DP-90

HATA

Organization - D.D

DP-49

(四) 重要之物品或獲得、金、幣、銀、印、票、外、交、不、針

予強也⁽¹⁾

國內之臨時組織、及、其、外、交、不、針、等、事、(1)

(三) 新計劃、各、不、針、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1)

世界、深、裁、(1)

(二) 和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1)

正式、議、事、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1)

和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1)

大、通、之、事、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1)

一九四二年、和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1)

DP-70

DP-100

和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1) 和、主、主、人、(1)

A 烟、軍隊開支及侵略

Summation - D D

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一九三一年之烟和十三年之被、指揮下日本軍三、
 主官部侵略占領之、同稱令支南、及支全地
 域三直、戰爭、遂行。中華軍、民、官、省
 力之省、烟、指揮下、軍隊、年、落、又、一九四二年
 和十六年之四月、日本軍、福建省、首府福州
 三陸、一九四二年和十六年之六月十六日、大度、
 重慶、大爆、聯合、國、財產、大、被、(一)
 中國金、通、之、大、戰、(二)
 日、軍、隊、三、四、六、(三)
 三、(四)
 一、九、四、二、年、十、月、十、日、日、軍、大、軍、
 再、出、攻、略、(五)
 一九四二年和十七年之五月、日、軍、
 日本軍、龍、騰、衝、占、領、一九四三年和十八年、
 十、五、日、烟、指揮下、軍隊、德、攻、略、一九四三年
 和十九年之四月二十日、鄭州、一九四三年和十九年、
 五、月、十、五、日、洛、陽、攻、略、一九四四年六月、日、軍、
 首、府、長、沙、攻、略、(六)
 一九四四年八月、日、軍、隊、衡、陽、攻、略、(七)

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R 55

1	才二五	三三三
2	才二五	三三三
3	才一〇八	九九六
4	才三五	三四三
5	才三五	三四三

HAIA Summation - PD

DD-72

詐狀訴因(四+九) 一九四三年十月一日至三月三十一日
 杯才改略(起訴狀訴因(三+十)) 一九四三年四月一日至三月三十一日
 柳才改略(起訴狀訴因(六+十)) 一九四三年四月一日至三月三十一日
 言烟、皇隊(南軍)之攻略、

B. 烟指揮十一軍隊(四+六)之攻略
 戰時皇軍之攻略

一九四三年 昭和十六年(一) 我國皇軍/皇軍之攻略、
 至同年(中國)於元烟、指揮十一軍隊(四+六)之攻略
 戰時皇軍之攻略(皇軍)之攻略、(四+六)皇軍
 戰時皇軍之攻略、皇軍之攻略、皇軍之攻略
 以上破壞命令、烟指揮十一軍隊(四+六)皇軍、
 中國各地(於三月行)之皇軍(皇軍)之攻略、(四+六)
 十一月(二十六頁)之附錄(一)詳述之(四+六)皇軍
 烟指揮十一軍隊(四+六)皇軍之攻略(四+六)皇軍
 行之(四+六)皇軍之攻略、(四+六)皇軍、(四+六)皇軍

DD-73

二湖(國)之(長)戰(戰)狀(訴)因(一)及(皇)軍(之)攻(略)

DD-74

三九一〇	三九一〇	三九一〇	三九一〇
三五四一	三五四一	三五四一	三五四一
三四六五	三四六五	三四六五	三四六五
三四四三	三四四三	三四四三	三四四三
三四一四	三四一四	三四一四	三四一四
三四一〇	三四一〇	三四一〇	三四一〇
三四一〇	三四一〇	三四一〇	三四一〇
三四一〇	三四一〇	三四一〇	三四一〇
三四一〇	三四一〇	三四一〇	三四一〇

HATA Summation - DD

誠狀語因亦四九(一)下北所, 第三攻長沙攻略戰, 抑
日本軍隊, 中國俘虜二百餘名ヲシテ米, 麥, 油,
物等ヲ掠奪シタル後復奪, 殺シテ小田石軍
士等兵, 記言(三)日本軍隊, 長沙, 占領シテ九
四四年(昭和十九年)六月, 復奪, 該地域ヲ通シテ殺
人掠奪取タル事(三)ニシテ

DD-78

二河沈着, 習習農業, 次, 抑, 記言ヲシテ。即チ一九四二年
館在十一年ノ日日本軍隊, 白人, 男子, 子供, 軒
ノ家ヲ押シテ, 之ヲシテ, 又, 其, 逃, シタル者ヲ射撃
シタル。一九四三年(昭和十八年)日本軍隊, 四〇名以上
中國婦人, 及, 着物ヲ脱カシテ, 公家, 面割ヲ行進
セシメ, 國歌ヲ唄シ, 水増シテ, 飛込テ, 逃, シタル者ヲ
射撃シタル。又一九四四年(昭和十九年)復, 他, 非戰鬥員ト共
ニ引致シ, 他國被擄ノ参加ヲ拒ムル後, 屠シテ, 日本軍
ト共ニ, 日本國トシテ, 最初, 中國, 三, 一, 一, 名, 日
本, 三, 戰, 争, 中, 勞働ヲ強要セシタル者トシテ, 及,
二, 名, 實, 際, 上, 九, 一, 名, 非戰鬥員, 團中, 四, 八
名, 在, 三, 一, 一, 名, 美, 兵, 隊, 日本軍隊, 依, 中國
非戰鬥員, 然, 前, 報, 人, 例ヲ詳細ニ説明シテ, 三, 一, 一,

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- 1. 第三攻長沙攻略戰 四六一
- 2. " " " " 四六二
- 3. " " " " 四六一九

HIATA Summa Ichi - DD
DD-78

DD-77

一 廣南省中國國、徐即後、延、記、言、一、六、四、三、年
(昭和三年)五月日本軍、台北、公路、二十、北、河、於、
機、關、鏡、火、三、空、軍、非、戰、斗、員、殺、斃、之、名、目、述、之、
徐、日、本、共、三、強、機、突、例、之、與、三、河、到、北、河、路、
三、射、擊、之、非、戰、斗、員、死、傷、之、列、之、序、目、記、言、三、七、(a)

殺、斃、被、人、榜、間、強、姦、強、盜、其、標、奪、及、財、產、不、法、
破、壞、一、五、九、三、年(昭和六年)三月、一、九、四、年(昭和
十九年)十月、之、指、揮、下、日、本、軍、三、三、中、國、全、土、
巨、之、強、行、之、殺、斃、之、事、目、之、詳、盡、則、及、取、
之、數、不、能、全、述、之、此、等、記、之、類、司、令、部、又、
既、下、部、隊、之、殺、斃、之、事、目、之、詳、盡、則、及、取、
之、數、不、能、全、述、之、此、等、記、之、類、在、軍、中、隊、
對、之、前、述、之、事、目、不、能、全、述、之、此、等、記、之、類、
之、提、二、三、日、本、軍、三、三、中、國、非、戰、斗、員、取、
之、斃、命、之、命、令、之、詳、盡、則、及、取、之、數、不、能、
全、述、之、此、等、記、之、類、中、武、者、之、中、國、非、戰、斗、員、
之、斃、命、之、事、目、之、詳、盡、則、及、取、之、數、不、能、
全、述、之、此、等、記、之、類、中、武、者、之、中、國、非、戰、
斗、員、之、斃、命、之、事、目、之、詳、盡、則、及、取、之、數、不、能、
全、述、之、此、等、記、之、類、中、武、者、之、中、國、非、戰、

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DD-78 DD-77	三三三三三
"	三三三三三
"	三三三三三
"	三三三三三

DD-78	(a) 三三三三三	三三三三三
"	" 三三三三三	三三三三三
(a)	" 三三三三三	三三三三三
(c)	" 三三三三三	三三三三三

HATA Summation - DD

三、知照ナル事ガ下ニ、証言ニテ、辯護側証人、証
 言、矛盾ニ居ル、或モ、殘虐行爲ガ、懣カソク、認言
 ニ、他、首、日本軍人、ニ、ヨリ、残虐行爲ガ、證、如
 四、國ガ行、ハ、認言、ニ、居ル、カ、ソ、辯護側、ヨリ、
 提、出、シ、テ、証、據、ハ、消、極、的、ナリ、テ、相、補、釋、ト、認、言、
 一、中、國、華、敵、ニ、對、シ、テ、殘、虐、行、爲、間、之、檢、察、側
 三、リ、提、出、セ、ル、事、同、數、サ、シ、テ、積、極、的、証、據、ヲ、決、シ、テ、
 三、得、ル、セ、ズ、ハ、不、成、カ、モ、張、氏、

(次頁へ續く)

0159 0006 0935

○ 烟指揮下、軍隊に俘虜被拘禁者、虐待

HATA Summation - DD

DD-77
烟指揮下、中国地域に於ては俘虜取扱に因り檢察側、提出の證據、其の記録中要約多形に二處述之に於て屬。烟指揮下、日本軍に於ては俘虜及國民家被拘禁者に於ては虐待拷問及暴行、特殊事例、最終論等、附屬文書に、上述之に於て、三、中、八、上海收容所、吳淞收容所、江灣收容所、海防收容所、浦東收容所、及三、中、八、於て起る多數、実例あり。

DD-80
此多數の證據、對其辯護側提出、證據、極く少く之を、檢察側提出の俘虜及被拘禁者に對し、其虐待行為、積極的證據を得ず、是の證據、亦、辯護側証人の俘虜敵對行為を控へ、限り自由を許さる居り、又、俘虜對其責任、南京、維新政府に於て、証言する居り、其他、証人、衡陽作戰當時、俘虜、中国飛行機投下、爆彈より負傷すと証言する居り。俘虜及被拘禁者も前述、各所於て、飢、寒、打、殺、拷問、受ける虐待を受ける。三、烟指揮下、日本兵に此虐待、烟が中国派遣軍指揮官の全期間、九四年(昭和二年)三月から九四年(昭和

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DD-80 DD-77
二頁
「 証証 第五七
「 三頁
「 記録 二八〇二三
「 二一六三三

11

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○ 海陸軍 〓	海陸軍 〓
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10-17

HATA Summarization - DD

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HATA Summation - DD

Year	Month	Day	Time	Location	Remarks
1901	10	11	A		10-11
"	"	12	A		10-12
"	"	13	A		10-13
"	"	14	A		10-14
"	"	15	A		10-15
"	"	16	A		10-16
"	"	17	A		10-17
"	"	18	A		10-18
"	"	19	A		10-19
"	"	20	A		10-20
"	"	21	A		10-21
"	"	22	A		10-22
"	"	23	A		10-23
"	"	24	A		10-24
"	"	25	A		10-25
"	"	26	A		10-26
"	"	27	A		10-27
"	"	28	A		10-28
"	"	29	A		10-29
"	"	30	A		10-30
"	"	31	A		10-31

0259 0006 0841

HATA Summation - DD

三軍三討ドーリツの塔乘員、裁判ヲ行フ事ヲ命メ、前
軍ヲ命令テ之ト答メ、五四年(昭和三十七年)八月十日
烟が登ル事ヲ敵飛行兵巡司令部(死前)ニ、規則ニ依リ
テ之ヲ規定シ居ルハ、情狀、即ニ皇天ノ賜命ニ十年以上、
廢刑ノ以テ之ニ代ヘテ之ヲ得、此ニ依リ居ル。更ニ特別幸
情、下ニ於テ之ニ刑罰ヲ執行スルニ依リテ之ヲ、規定ニ依リ
此等規定ニ依リ、日カニ実施セラルル事ヲ居ル。此等規定
ニ依リ、自以前ニ死セシ行高ニモ適用セラルル事ヲ、條項ニ
事後法、性質ヲ得テ之ニ依リ居ル。

此等塔乘員ヲ捕メ、自當時ハ、停職トシテ之ヲ以テ、彼等、延
擱ノ規定ニ依リ、何時停職トシテ之ヲ以テ、烟被信、為ニ
略シ、証人トシテ之ヲ証言シ、此等塔乘員、停職トシテ之ヲ
以テ、又ハ、刑ヲ受テ之ヲ登ル事ヲ、以テ、刑罰トシテ之ヲ
陸軍省及ハ、參謀本部内ニ、大ニ議論ヲ有シ、証人ト
シテ、參謀次長、彼等ヲ停職トシテ之ヲ、以テ、之ヲ以テ、証人
トシテ、之ヲ以テ、參謀長、參謀次長宛、手紙ヲ有シ、烟、彼等
ヲ停職トシテ之ヲ、以テ、之ヲ以テ、申送リ、之ヲ以テ、之ヲ以テ、
ガ、參謀本部、彼等ヲ事後軍法、下ニ裁判セラルル事ヲ、
之ヲ以テ、決定セラルル事ヲ、一將校ヲ東京、參謀本部カ、烟、大將

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0259	〃	三三六	〃	二九〇四一
0282	〃	〃	〃	一四六六三
0282	〃	〃	〃	二七四五三

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HATA Suminatsu - DJP

許二派違之新軍兵、從之裁判、違之、
三、裁判、中國、於、作、之、理、由、其、之、理、由、
取、才、自、身、、貴、任、自、國、庭、言、不、是、其、之、理、由、

辯護側証人高野、証言、
上、手、過、之、飯、等、二、言、自、大、九、考、處、自、上、之、手、之、機、自、之、地、

見解、子、報、概、之、年、紙、其、如、秀、謀、長、自、身、亦、秀、謀、長、

送、之、口、上、之、一、結果、使、者、亦、亦、亦、亦、送、之、裁判、之、證據、三、行、

口頭、命令、外、東、京、之、安、子、命、令、之、一、九、四、一、年、(昭、和、十、一、年、)

七月、廿、日、附、陸、軍、次、官、之、通、達、(陸、軍、制、隊、第、二、九、一、)

島、口、(四、)參、謀、五、代、理、之、答、之、一、九、四、一、年、(昭、和、十、一、年、)

七月、廿、日、附、本、國、飛、機、隊、機、長、(通、達、)之、件、(通、達、)

可、以、証、証、(一、)之、証、人、公、証、之、提、示、之、一、下、之、証、証、

陸、軍、次、官、之、各、參、謀、長、通、達、之、通、達、(機、隊、第、二、九、一、)

與、過、三、國、之、決、定、之、通、達、(通、達、)之、件、(通、達、)

國際、法、規、違、及、其、者、(通、達、)之、件、(通、達、)

違、及、行、為、之、不、正、之、者、(戰、時、重、罪、犯、人、之、手、續、)之、件、(通、達、)

二、茲、延、証、(即、午、前、言、及、)証、人、自、身、亦、亦、亦、亦、從、唯、

三、延、証、(即、午、前、言、及、)証、人、自、身、亦、亦、亦、亦、從、唯、

三、延、証、(即、午、前、言、及、)証、人、自、身、亦、亦、亦、亦、從、唯、

三、延、証、(即、午、前、言、及、)証、人、自、身、亦、亦、亦、亦、從、唯、

三、延、証、(即、午、前、言、及、)証、人、自、身、亦、亦、亦、亦、從、唯、

2480 9000 6510

一、指令上確認し、予盾法廷証公軍上軍律文官將未登
スキ声明、年定未過ガ方。

FIATA Summation - DD

DD-85
烟ハ禁テ先ニ塔乗員ヲ重刑ニ処スルコトヲ提實スル烟ハ此等
塔乗員ヲ寛大ニ取扱フコトヲ欲スルナリ、又彼等ヲ事後法
ノ規定下ニ裁判スルコトニ違フ事ナリ、タリニ烟ハ禁テ先ニ提實
シ此等塔乗員ニ對シテ何等トシテ待遇スルコトヲ及
ビ彼等ノ行為ハ重大ノ戰時犯罪トシテ取扱ハルニ處
セラルベキコトヲ主張スル事ハ證據カ明瞭ニ示シ居ルト我々ハ主
張スルモ、予盾法廷証公軍上軍律文官將未登ハ、主
張スルニ關シテ、懸念ノニテ、予盾法廷証公軍上軍律文官將未登
塔乗員(違)ガ中国ニ於テ烟ハ軍隊ニヨリテ捕ヘラレ、予盾法廷証公軍上軍律文官將未登
後、即チ一九四二年(昭和十七年)四月廿五日、中国派(違)
軍參謀長ハ陸軍次官ニ次(意味電報ヲ送)ル。

(次頁ニ續ク)

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0159 0006 0845

HATA Summation - I.D

DD-87

ニ搭乗員達ノ被害者ナク事情、烟、統轄下ニシテ際
彼等ニ與ヘテ行遇、裁判ヲセズ事情及ビ、所謂
裁令、カスニ後、煙ガ遺棄トスルカシテ事
實トシテ、烟ガニ搭乗員達、処刑及ビ處刑
ニ對シテ十分ニ責任ガアクトイフ論旨ヲ強ク支持スル
ベシ。

(一)所謂告白、搭乗員達ヲ処刑ニシテ、アキ。

辯護側ハ一九四二年五月二十六日附屬兵隊発券局長宛
ニ搭乗員達ニ関スル報告ヲ記録トシテ提言スル中ニ、
當部記録トシテ讀ム事ナシカニ、各各、告白、無事トシテ、(4)
コノ告白ト申シテ、一九四二年、シ、事、實、法、制、強、圧、三、三、
獲得セシメ、一九四二年、上海ニテ、軍事
委員会、前ニ開カシテ、米國、海軍、他ニ對スル裁判
記録、一九四二年、ハ、大尉、記、言、採、取
ニ對シテ十分ニ責任ガアキ。(5) 二人、搭乗員、記、言、ハ、
告白ト申シテ、一九四二年、ハ、最、大、之、拷、問、後、彼、等、ハ、
シ、事、實、ト、シ、テ、不、及、シ、テ、搭、乗、員、達、ガ
捕、令、ト、シ、テ、其、後、ニ、行、カ、シ、テ、烟、統、轄、下、ニ、
全、期、間、通、シ、テ、最、大、殘、酷、非、人、道、的、ノ、打、撃、ヲ、受、

4. 遠征隊三三六
4. " 三三三
5. 遠征隊三二九三
" 二八〇三〇

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0159 0006 0847

HATA Summary-DD

不レルモノ、甲尉ハ、室ニ擔架ニ、テテ覺心込ニ飛來長
 弱ニ切テ居タリ、何カ行ハツアルカ、天界ハ此ニテカ、
 下カク。八名ノ搭乗員達ハ、敬言ト空母ニ入リ、
 訓練ニツイテ訊カシマシキ、室内、誰カが日本文
 書ヲ讀ム。搭乗員達ハ、通訳言ハル部
 ニ頼ムガ拒絶セラル、他ニ何モ述ベテシカク。
 記人天一人居テカク、ハ、時ニ際シテ又代、折マ
 搭乗員達ハ自今等、告訴事由ニツイテ何モ聞カ
 シカク。一言ヌテ英語ニ通訳セシカク。搭乗員
 達ハ辯護申シ立テ、又此稱ニト云ハテ、
 「我々、
 シガ軍法會議テアルニヌテ、
 尉ハ記言シキ、又テ、手續ハ「命令」
 終ツシカク。

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HMTA Summation - DTD

2009

1. 關於... 2. 關於... 3. 關於... 4. 關於... 5. 關於... 6. 關於... 7. 關於... 8. 關於... 9. 關於... 10. 關於... 11. 關於... 12. 關於... 13. 關於... 14. 關於... 15. 關於... 16. 關於... 17. 關於... 18. 關於... 19. 關於... 20. 關於... 21. 關於... 22. 關於... 23. 關於... 24. 關於... 25. 關於... 26. 關於... 27. 關於... 28. 關於... 29. 關於... 30. 關於... 31. 關於... 32. 關於... 33. 關於... 34. 關於... 35. 關於... 36. 關於... 37. 關於... 38. 關於... 39. 關於... 40. 關於... 41. 關於... 42. 關於... 43. 關於... 44. 關於... 45. 關於... 46. 關於... 47. 關於... 48. 關於... 49. 關於... 50. 關於... 51. 關於... 52. 關於... 53. 關於... 54. 關於... 55. 關於... 56. 關於... 57. 關於... 58. 關於... 59. 關於... 60. 關於... 61. 關於... 62. 關於... 63. 關於... 64. 關於... 65. 關於... 66. 關於... 67. 關於... 68. 關於... 69. 關於... 70. 關於... 71. 關於... 72. 關於... 73. 關於... 74. 關於... 75. 關於... 76. 關於... 77. 關於... 78. 關於... 79. 關於... 80. 關於... 81. 關於... 82. 關於... 83. 關於... 84. 關於... 85. 關於... 86. 關於... 87. 關於... 88. 關於... 89. 關於... 90. 關於... 91. 關於... 92. 關於... 93. 關於... 94. 關於... 95. 關於... 96. 關於... 97. 關於... 98. 關於... 99. 關於... 100. 關於...

DD91

(四) 烟ハ刑ヲ請ホス。

於此ハ由田裁刑ニシテ人トシテコトヲ自白シテ大烟ハ刑ニシテ海
 知ルルコトハ「トコト」ニシテ彼ノ彼ノ九回六年半ニ海
 「シテ」ニシテ彼ノ彼ノ死刑ヲ科スルニシテ「トコト」ニシテ
 又對記問ニ答ハシテ大烟ハ刑ニシテ三回ノ數ヲ裁キ
 正對ニシテ(四) 烟ハ刑ヲ請ホス。
 輕ハ刑ヲ復言ハシテ「トコト」ニシテ彼ノ彼ノ九回六年半ニ海
 考慮ニシテ「トコト」ニシテ彼ノ彼ノ九回六年半ニ海
 「トコト」ニシテ彼ノ彼ノ九回六年半ニ海
 又「トコト」ニシテ彼ノ彼ノ九回六年半ニ海
 輕ハ刑ヲ復言ハシテ「トコト」ニシテ彼ノ彼ノ九回六年半ニ海

二 西一九〇一

二 西一九〇二

二 西一九〇三

二 西一九〇四

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DD 91

二 西一九〇五

西一九〇五

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DD-91

Q.

法廷証言第三(三四)B号 運送録三八〇五、六

際に、「証言ハ、次、通リ示ス。」(B)

問

搭乗員ヲ、取扱ニ関シテ、南洋支カラ、空軍十三隊ニ、何

等カ、命令ヲ發セラルコトナリカ。

答

記憶ニ依リ。

問

トナリ、上ニ、搭乗員、裁判ヲ、上海ニ、於テ、執行セラル

烟ヲ、得、命令ナリカ。

答

其ノ、又。

問

ア、夕、前、答、ノ、意味ハ、「烟ヲ、得、空軍十三隊、検査官

裁判ヲ、裁判、スル、ト、テ、請、求、セ、ラ、ル、コト、ナリ、カ。

答

彼、ハ、甘、リ、請、求、セ、ラ、ル、コト、ナリ。

問

(通訳官) ヲ、答、ヲ、モ、ウ、一、度、録、音、送、リ、下、サ、ル。

通訳官 - 彼、ハ、彼、カ、リ、請、求、セ、ラ、ル、コト、ナリ、ト、言、フ、コト、ナリ、

刑ヲ、執行、スル、様、ニ、請、求、セ、ラ、ル、コト、ナリ、 彼、カ、リ、請、求、セ、ラ、ル、コト、ナリ、

問

大將、カ、甘、リ、請、求、セ、ラ、ル、コト、ナリ、カ。

答

カ、リ、又、 烟、ヲ、

問

大將、カ、空、軍、下、三、隊、ヲ、檢、察、官、ニ、送、リ、テ、刑、ヲ、求、メ、ラ、ル、コト、ナリ、

答

彼、ハ、死、罪、ヲ、請、求、セ、ラ、ル、コト、ナリ、

(三六) (一六九頁)

(一〇) (一六五頁)

0580 9000 6510

HATA Summation - DD

此等 烟 最後之戰爭，遂行也。

DD-92 一九四四年/昭和十九年/十月二十二日 烟之中国派遣軍
最高指揮官，地位之重要にして其の教育總監として，有
力な地位に任ぜられた。彼は此の地位に小磯内閣存続中
の居る (a)

DD-13 一九四五年/昭和二十年/四月七日 彼は本軍團總司令官に
任ぜられ，戦争が終了しては引續き其の指揮を執つて居る。
彼が中国に於て「Shoolittle」塔集員事件
を行つたことと同じく，再び一九四五年/昭和二十年/六月停戦
飛行士三名及び死刑，死刑に同意した。不承の「証言」(a)
烟大將，本軍團總司令官として，停戦飛行士即ち
「Neilson」中尉及び「Augustus」(譯)
曹三名及び死刑，死刑に同意する。及此の同意，予
與に之を承つて，言渡が終つて三月二十六日の二
十時迄に居る。是れ，烟大將の同意，一九四五年/昭和二十
年/七月十日，公判に附設した。二人，飛行士，直ぐ二
刑部，宣告する。即日死刑す。烟大將，一九四二年/昭和
十七年/中国に於て「Shoolittle」塔集員事
件を行つたことと同じく，一九四五年/昭和二十年/七月十日日本に於て此の二

P. 95

- DD-100 (a) 証言 第一〇六 妻記録 七〇一
- " 証言 第一〇七 " 四二二
- " " " 四二七
- " " " 四六三
- " " " 四二七

人、能行士、事件ニ於テ終止セシム、ト云フ。

案、東條が烟ヲ推薦シタリト

DD94

烟ヲハ茶内閣ヲ維持シ東條ガ政治ニ入道ヲ極
メタモノナリ。烟ノハ種カニ天皇ニ拜謁シ東條ヲオモ
次近衛内閣ノ任相トシテ推薦シタモノニ外ナシ。烟ノ
ハ三長官會議ノ員トシテ一九四〇年ノ昭和十五年ノ七月

東條ヲ任相ニ論議ニタテ、ニアル。東條ハ味ニ自命ガ

権力ヲ握ルニ執リ責任ヲ負フ人物ヲ志却シタカシ。

元四年ノ昭和十九年ノ四月五日ノ小磯内閣總辭職ニ引

續キ新ニ任相ヲ論議スルニ至リ臣會議ガ即日開カシ。

金會議員中、東條ノ人ノミガ烟ヲ首相ニ任命スル事ヲ

強ク要請シ、本戸ハ証言ニ言ハシ、彼本戸ガ亦咬ニテ陸

軍外ノ者ヲ選ブガノ屬良ク事ヲ述ベタ時「東條大

將ハ中々承知セシメテ反對ニ若シ、如クスハ陸軍ハ

ソノホヲ向テ陸軍ニ依ルテ「ビタ」ノ意味スル「テ」ヲ事

及ビ「東條ヲ除ク金會議員ハ」彼等ガ「過去ニ行懸リ、無

クノ希望スルニシテ暗黙ノ了解ヲ待テ「兵ヲトク」添

降ル。東條ハ政治ニ統御カ「作」トシテ「トク」又

DD94

「遠退」ヲ三四〇

建記録三一三一

「 才三四〇 〃 三一三九一四〇

P.76

HATA Summation - DD.

2580 9000 5510

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779

HATA Sumatran - 250

敬啟者 茲因從禮節上之相繼 (20-3-1953)
中一連 之 2 號 幸 不 曾 因 事 停 止 此 為 共 記 著
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敬啟者 茲因從禮節上之相繼 (20-3-1953)

HA TA Summary

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1977

Main body of handwritten notes, appearing to be a list or detailed summary of items.

1977

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, possibly a conclusion or date.

HATA Summation - DD

十九) 特二處(下)部: DD-11+8, DD-11+5, DD-11+11
DD-11+6, DD-11+1, DD-11+4, DD-11+5, 及 DD-11+11
十九) DD-11+11 部: 特二部圖三十三 = 適用(得)十九
十九) DD-11+11 部: 特二部圖三十三 = 適用(得)十九
十九)。

部圖五

DD-17 及 DD-18

部圖六

DD-18, DD-18+11, 及 DD-18+11

部圖七

DD-19 及 DD-19

部圖八

及 DD-19 DD-19+11, 及 DD-19+11

部圖九

DD-19+11, DD-19+11, 及 DD-19+11

部圖十

DD-11 及 DD-11

部圖十一

DD-11, DD-11, 及 DD-11+11


部圖十二

DD-11+11, DD-11+11, DD-11+11

部圖十三

DD-11+11

0 159 0006 0856



平沼陳階 / 長沙論告

平沼 / 長沙 衡陽 桂林 柳州 / Changsha, Hengyang,
Kailin, Linchuan / 警備都市 於今日中華國一般
反對猿解除國人多數 / 不法越制 罰之 訴國才思
才四十九及才五十七除 / 憲訴狀中 / 全訴因才訴進才
才八十才八十。

官 歷

一八九〇年五月一九四五年六月 / 關平 江 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
三引讀 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
一千九百二十二年六月 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
四千二百二十二人 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
六副議長 / 一九三六年三月十三日 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
一九三九年一月五日 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
總理大臣辭職 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
十二月六日 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
四月 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
內務大臣 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南 / 嶺南
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MIRAKUMA Sumitomo - E-1
TF-a

HIRAMUNA Summation - EE

EE-4

A 書証 107 記錄 70日

EE-1

EE-2

EE-3

隨于一九三八年乃至一九三九年四月三日之極端晚 三時
 範圍內、自身之各種決定及爾後、四月三日、五月六日、
 及、一九三九年八月二十九日、一九四〇年、十二月六日、
 期間、除中、內閣、各決定並一九三九年八月三日、
 乃一九四五年、二月、三月、四月、五月、六月、七月、
 平沼、責任之確立、九月、十月、十一月、十二月、
 平沼、一八六九年九月、東京、空、一八八九年、
 法科大學、卒業、一八九〇年、三月、間、東京、
 才裁判所、及東京、控訴院、判事、大審院、檢事、及大審院
 長、之、歷、任。一九三四年、一月、九月、貴族院、議員、二、任、也、
 六年、十月、二十八日、勳、功、二、條、り、勳、章、授、け、ら、れ、り、
 平沼、日本赤十字會、KOHOSEI、新、中、國、家、空、軍、
 育成、團、者、護、持、院、問、意、德、普、及、及、國、家、精、神、
 高揚、日、自、の、人、、一、九、三、三、年、創、立、、日、國、際、
 之、功。一、會員、之、急、速、二、增加、二、總、數、五、萬、三、千、
 創立、三、會、、三、軍、部、及、司、法、省、、上、密、接、十、關、係、、力、を、
 二、會、二、種、、定期、刊、行、物、、即、日本、新、聞、、(The Foundation
OF STATE SOCIETY PAPER)、(月、二、回、刊、行、一、發、行、部、數、三、萬、)

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HIRAHARA, JUN-ICHI

(2007-12)

Handwritten notes in Japanese, including the characters "西遊記" (Saiyūki) and "一六〇〇" (1600).

159 0005 0001

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-10 樞密院ハソノ権限ヲ規定セル一九〇九年公布ノ勅令ニ依リ(憲法上ノ問題ニ條約及協定ニ関シ且ソ議會團會中緊急勅令ノ發布及政府ニ依リ議會ヲ提出セルハ普通法律案ノ施行前天皇ヲ諮詢、上其違言ヲ求メルハノ普通置的府制ナリトシ、ナリトシ。併シテ同院ハ議會或、國民ニ政治的責任ヲ負フコトナク、且モ國務全體ニ與リ大ニ勢力ヲ振ヒ内務外交兩部門ニ於テ行政府ニ對スル監視及監督權ヲ持ツ第二院トシテ在リトナリマシ。議員が提出スル議會ヲ通過スル法案ニ對シテ、同院ハ之ヲソノ承認ニ或、否認之得メナリマシ。

議會提出前、内閣ニヨリ其ノ議ニ附セシ法案ニ對シテ、同院ハ之ヲ承認之得メナリナリ、且モ修正スルコトナク、ナリマシ。關係ノ職權ニ依リ樞密院議序ヲ持ツ居リマシ。

EE-11 弁護側証人藤田ノ反對訊問ハ若シ施行ニ就テ樞密院承認ヲ要スルモノニ對シ同院カソ承認ヲ保留スル場合、而シテソノ案が憲法ニ違反ナル時、其ノ案ハ変更セラルルカ或ハ内閣辭職ノ爲メ又賜合モアリ。トイフコトヲ明ラカニナリマシ。

- P.S.
- EE-10 a 書証 八三 記録五〇五
- b 六四〇一 " 六六二二三
- EE-11 a 藤田記録一六五〇

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

P.6

EE-12
 平沼が樞密院に在職中、その重要事項は皆同謀議院の
 行為に述べられた。故に平沼が樞密院大臣に資格を
 于樞密院、高野がその時行ハク諸種ノ行為ハ有略致
 之ハ是等ノ行為ニ就テハ後段總理及國務大臣トシテ平沼
 ノ責任ヲ論ジ此際明ラカニ多クト存セリ。

EE-13
 (一九三六年三月十二日乃至一九三九年一月四日) 樞密院議
 長トシテ、更に樞密院(一九三九年一月二十九日) 平沼
 平沼が樞密院會議ニ出席スルに資格ヲ具ヘシコトヲ(三)。

EE-14
 彼、近衛首相ノ要請ト「樞密院」外支條約ニ關シテ關係カ
 下ルコト理由、平沼下ノ許可ヲ得、三月十九日、一月十日
 御前會議ニ出席シタリ。此會議、日本が媾和締結
 スルニ付テ、條件ヲ定メ中國ニ對シテ日本、國策ヲ決定シ
 三ノ(四) 決議、強ト總テノ條項ハ、一九四〇年十一月、日本
 汪精衛、新中國政府ト同ニ締結セシメ、最後、條約ニ具
 出サセリ。(五)

EE-15
 問題が命ヲ進行シ、内ニ日本政府ハ一九三八年一月十日(國

- EE-13
 A 書証ハ。 記録六八
 A " 三六四 " 一九八〇
 B " 三六四 " 一九八三
 C " 四〇 " 四九九 五三〇
 " 三六四 " 二九八三
 " 三六四 " 二九八三

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HIRANUMA Commission - E.E

民政府之交涉之中止之新政府之協力之新中國之建設之
法意之表明之新政府之協力之新中國之建設之
不中國領土權之不主權之中國之亦不在他國之權限之
此政等三對之河等之受國之權限之亦不在他國之權限之
不以此行為之暗之德意之初之直接通合之行為也

336 日本滿洲二語之經濟的政策的軍事の侵略之指針
于一九三一年九月十八日滿洲事變之際平沼(HIRANUMA)
總務長官對議事會之報告也。

337 日本滿洲二於此行動十九國條約及八國條約之關係
二倍中之外之 STIMSON 一九三二年二月三日之報告
二於此等二條約之規定及此義務之調和及此二條約之
事之進展及此等條約之履行之事實之報告也
此等事之關係之報告也

338 一九三二年十月九日滿洲事變之經過及不承認
事會議之秘密顧問官之報告(附)之報告
CHINGOW (一九三二年十月二十四日外務省之報告)
自是後之行動之報告之報告之報告之報告
三日錄(附錄之報告)之報告之報告之報告

R.7

336	文	三六	記録	三五六三
337	文	二〇	〃	三六〇九
338	文	六三	〃	九三〇〇

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PS

EE-20	EE-19	EE-18
又ケルニ STIMSON / ニヨリ米國ハ九ヶ國條約及ハロウヱフ	ルニケルニ	ルニケルニ
リニケルニ KELLOG-BRIAND / 條約ノ規定ニ違反スル事態總論	ルニケルニ	ルニケルニ
協定ハ如何ナルモノ之ヲ承認スルコトヲ拒絶スルニシテ	ルニケルニ	ルニケルニ
キ注意ヲ喚起サシタ後ノ一九三二年一月七日ニ日本外務大臣	ルニケルニ	ルニケルニ
ハ米國家國ニ日本ノ出立ヲ限リニ於テ滿洲及中國ニ於テ	ルニケルニ	ルニケルニ
戶開放主義ハ常ニ維持スルコトヲ保證スルニシテ	ルニケルニ	ルニケルニ
リニケルニ一九三二年三月一日中國前皇帝溥儀 / 王冠	ルニケルニ	ルニケルニ
ハ滿洲國總攝政トシテ地位ヲ引キ受ケルニ勸誘サシ	ルニケルニ	ルニケルニ

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

強、信用ヲ失フ處多ク大形ニ「指摘」ス。④日本ニ自衛
 台案下ニ漸ク行動シテ居ル結果トシテ一般ノ信用ヲ失フ
 居ルニシテ滿洲國ヲ獨立國トシテ日本ニシテ甚妙好
 都合ナリトシテハ、アルニ外、列強ガ其ヲ承認スルニシテ私信
 心ハ、彼ノ續クニ述ベテマシ。

④上彼ノ續クニ述ベテマシ。

④「三毛」トシテ一九三二年十月十七日以前、樞密院特別會
 議ニ於テ滿洲、四省ハ日本軍ガ占據スベキナリトシテ
 決定スルコトヲ、リニケルニ此ノ目的ノ爲ニ要求サシテ豫備リ
 承認スルコトヲ。④

EE-20

EE-19

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-21
 一九三三年九月十三日 樞密院、日本滿洲國間議定書ヲ滿
 場ニ於テ承認シ之。此ノ會議ニ於テ平沼、副議長及議
 定書報告官、議事委員會議長ヲ致シ之。平沼、報告
 シ之ハ滿洲國、其國民、衆意ニヨリテ獨立ノ國トナリ、其故
 日本ガ承認シ之ハ、單ニ滿洲國ヲ助ムル許リヲナク、係争問題
 ノ曖昧ニシテ、國際聯盟ニ引出サシテ日本ハ固ルコトナクナリ、
 ソレヲ滿洲國、承認ハ容易ニ想像ヲキル程ニ、暫時在野
 ニシテ、衝突ヲ思ヘシセ、國際的危機ヲ招来ス
 事ナリトナリ、斯ナル狀勢下ニ在リマス。我國ハ此ノ機會
 ニ滿洲國ヲ正式ニ承認シ之ト友好關係ヲ開始スルハ、
 有利ナルト考ヘマス。トアリマス。(四)

EE-22
 議定書ノ條項ニヨリ、滿洲國ハ中華民國ニヨリテ締結セ
 國際協約ヲ滿洲國ニ適用セシメ、之ヲ尊重シテ、
 ナシテ、日滿兩國ハ相互ニ相手國ノ領土保全權ヲ尊重
 スルコトニ同意シ、日本國及其國民ガ色々ノ日支協定ニ尊重
 居ルニ處テ、總ニノ權利ハ公私トモ滿洲國ニシテ、確認尊重
 セラルコトナリ。又、兩國ハ如何ニ改竊シモ、共同ニ防衛スルニ
 同意シ之。然、密協約ニヨリ、日本國ハ滿洲國ノ國防及其國
 境內ノ平和維持、現存ノ鐵道、港灣、水陸及航空路ノ支配

P. 9

臣が例へば廣東／CANTON／が獨立ヲ希望シタラ一俤ドウ云フコ
 トニハカトイフ点大ニ言及シ、更ニ彼(内田)ハ左條約締約國ハ此
 ノ獨立ヲ妨グルニ義務ヲ負ヘト云フ意見ヲ語リテ、アルトフコトヲ推測
 シタノチアリマス。岡田／OKADA／ハ米國ハ滿洲國ガ自己ノ自由
 意志ニヨリテ獨立シタ場合ハ條約違反トハナラナイガ日本ガ此獨
 立ヲ援助シ、擁護スルコトハ條約違反アリテ中国主權ノ無視
 トナルトイフ解ヲ語リテ、アルノチハナイカト考ヘテイタナキアリマス。

岡田／OKADA／ハ外務大臣ノ此上ニ關スル説明ハ不充分ナリアルト
 思ヒ、ツタテアリマス。(2)

EE-25
 身 考証 二四一 記録 二九八三

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-25

ノ應答及ヒ彼等ニ依テ爲サレタル言ハ認的辯明ニヨリテ立証
ニ得ルノチアリマス。一平沼が案ノ審査ニ當リ且其レヲ支持スル
様ニ報告シタキ委員會ノ委員長チアツタテ第一ハ留意スベキ
点チアリマス。

岡田 / OKADA / 顧問官ハ三ツト異ヲ擧ゲタルノチアリマス。

第一ハ右ニ付滿洲國ハ『其ノ人民ノ自由意志ニヨリテ獨立シタリ
チアツテ日本ハ九ヶ國條約ヲ中國々民ノ獨立ヲ妨ケルコトニ同
意シテカクシト云フ内田 / UCHIDA / 外務大臣ノ議會ニ於ケル声
明ニヨリ及シテ滿洲國承認ハ九ヶ國條約違反ニ非ザルカ否
カトイフ案チアリマス。岡田 / OKADA / ハ内田 / UCHIDA / 外務大

7159 0006 0867

000000000000000000

HIRAMUMI Summition - 三三

EE-28

固田 (KEIDA) / 中外 (中外) 該條條約內容：(九) 國條約
 一 西立 (西立) 不與 (不與) 國 (國) (U.K.) /
 九 國條約締結時 (國) 門 (門) 放 (放) 原 (原) 則
 等 (等) 國 (國) 均 (均) 遵 (遵) 守 (守) 該 (該) 條 (條) 約 (約)
 又 (又) 固田 (固田) 固田 (固田) 國 (國) 均 (均) 遵 (遵) 守 (守) 該 (該) 條 (條) 約 (約)
 日本 (日本) 亦 (亦) 遵 (遵) 守 (守) 該 (該) 條 (條) 約 (約)

EE-29

固田 (KEIDA) / 中外 (中外) 該條條約內容：(九) 國條約
 一 西立 (西立) 不與 (不與) 國 (國) (U.K.) /
 九 國條約締結時 (國) 門 (門) 放 (放) 原 (原) 則
 等 (等) 國 (國) 均 (均) 遵 (遵) 守 (守) 該 (該) 條 (條) 約 (約)
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EE-26

EE-26

固田 (KEIDA) / 中外 (中外) 該條條約內容：(九) 國條約
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HIRAHUMI Summation - EE-29
EE-30

第三質問(秘密協定の漏洩した場合如何ニ人
ベキヤニ関心)ニ對スル答辯トシテ内田/UCHIDA/ハ日本ト
シテ漏洩防止ニ特別ノ注意ヲ拂フ必要カアル、但シ
万一秘密協定が洩シタトシテモ其ノ内容ニ何等弊
ベキモノナシト信スルト述ベタガアリマス。(A)

岡田/OKADA/ハ外務大臣、説明が該條約締結國ヲ滿
足スル得ルヤヲ疑フタガアリマス。(A)

以下次頁

13

- EE-29 a 書註二四一 記録二九八六
- EE-30 a 書註二四一 記録二九八六

HIRANUMA Summation - EF

EE-22

EF-21

1. ... 2. ... 3. ... 4. ... 5. ... 6. ... 7. ... 8. ... 9. ... 10. ...
 11. ... 12. ... 13. ... 14. ... 15. ... 16. ... 17. ... 18. ... 19. ... 20. ...
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 41. ... 42. ... 43. ... 44. ... 45. ... 46. ... 47. ... 48. ... 49. ... 50. ...
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 61. ... 62. ... 63. ... 64. ... 65. ... 66. ... 67. ... 68. ... 69. ... 70. ...
 71. ... 72. ... 73. ... 74. ... 75. ... 76. ... 77. ... 78. ... 79. ... 80. ...
 81. ... 82. ... 83. ... 84. ... 85. ... 86. ... 87. ... 88. ... 89. ... 90. ...
 91. ... 92. ... 93. ... 94. ... 95. ... 96. ... 97. ... 98. ... 99. ... 100. ...

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

言ノ事ヲ決セタリテ、テアリタリ。(A)

EE-34

斯ノ一九三一年中對外關係及外交三國之次三ノ事
件ガ把家院權限内ニ於テ起リタリ、下ニ又、即々
一九三一年三月一日、令リイ溥儀 / HENRY PU YI / 滿洲
國皇帝即位也。一九三一年四月十日、天羽 / AMAU / 英
明發布(9) 一九三一年十二月二十九日、ワシントン / WASHINGTON /
海軍條約廢棄也。(10)

EE-35

一九三一年四月十五日、日本外務省、發表聲明、所謂「天
羽 / AMAU / 聲明」ヲ發表セタリタリ也。(11) 此聲明ハ中國ニ於
テ日本、特殊地位ニ依リ且、無細無ニ於テ、特殊、責任ヲ
果タシ、爲メ日本ハ推目、目的ニ他國ヲ利用セトシ、中國、企
圖ニ反對スルヲテ、主張ニ具、滿洲及上海事變後、
外國ト共同動作、技術的或、財政的援助、名目ヨリ也
トシ、政治的善後義ヲ有ルモ、思想ニテアリタリ也。日本ハ
又、航空機庫等、願向各政治的用途ニ充テル借款、供
与ニ反對スルヲアリタリ也。(12)

P. 15

EE-34	A	書証三三	記録一五八五
EE-34	A	溥儀PU YI	二九六八
		女書証九二五	九三八九
	C	五六	九三〇
EE-34	A	九三五	九三六九
	A	九三五	九三六九、九二

P. 16

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-37

EE-36

此、所謂「漢口」之「三三三」之「三三三」調查委員會於「証
 言」日本方面之手本及「青洲」發表之時、日本
 之國內、強有力之政策樹立者達、終始「貫通執一」之
 略、根本目的「暴露露」之、之「三三三」之「三三三」之「三三三」
 中國之「三三三」日本、指回「從」之「三三三」之「三三三」
 三限り總、中國、交渉ヲ許シ、トシ、下クニ、ヲ述ベ、
 之「三三三」

一九三四年四月二十五日、広田外務大臣、
 會議ニ於テ、三本、ハ九ヶ國條約中、他國、權利ヲ毀壞シ、
 子中國ニ於テ特權ヲ求メ、意圖ハ有シ、本條約ヲ完
 全ニ遵守シ、且、支持スルニ、日本、方針「三三三」トテ、大天
 羽、
 然「三三三」
 此、公式「三三三」
 此、公式「三三三」
 此、公式「三三三」

EE-36 書記 二〇六
 EE-37 a 九三六
 " 九三七
 " 九三九
 " 九三九

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P. 18

U. M. I. International - 37

HIRAKAWA Sumner - 43

海軍擴張計畫。自海軍大臣東鄉平八郎於明治三十三年(西曆一八九〇年)提出擴張海軍計畫以來。其計畫之內容。即所謂「甲午海軍擴張計畫」也。

此計畫之內容。係以三十年為期。自明治三十三年(西曆一八九〇年)起。至明治六十二年(西曆一九二九年)止。其計畫之內容。即所謂「甲午海軍擴張計畫」也。其計畫之內容。係以三十年為期。自明治三十三年(西曆一八九〇年)起。至明治六十二年(西曆一九二九年)止。其計畫之內容。係以三十年為期。自明治三十三年(西曆一八九〇年)起。至明治六十二年(西曆一九二九年)止。

其計畫之內容。係以三十年為期。自明治三十三年(西曆一八九〇年)起。至明治六十二年(西曆一九二九年)止。其計畫之內容。係以三十年為期。自明治三十三年(西曆一八九〇年)起。至明治六十二年(西曆一九二九年)止。其計畫之內容。係以三十年為期。自明治三十三年(西曆一八九〇年)起。至明治六十二年(西曆一九二九年)止。

明治三十三年	西曆一八九〇年	海軍擴張計畫
明治三十四年	西曆一八九一年	海軍擴張計畫
明治三十五年	西曆一八九二年	海軍擴張計畫

0 159 0006 0878

P. 22

EE-574
A 會議三九五 紀錄二六九一—九七

HIRAMUMI Summation - EE-574

EE-574

因本政府深願、本特種組織之目的在於提供資訊
三編本中之後、凡在本中之資料、均應予以保護
且本特種組織之目的在於提供、保護與提供
極、目的在於提供「新成員」之資訊及協助其
實現其之權利之國內組織、其目的在於提供、保護
其之目的在於提供資訊及協助其目的在於提供

(次編之續)

HIRANUMA Summary - 1933

EE-60

EE-59

及日張魯與 谷本 在 三月 日 總理 會議中
 外務、諸大臣、閣員、副總裁等、三月 日 閣議 中
 管理問題、新舊 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 阿比倫 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 既 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 才、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 現 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中

但 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 突 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 前 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 一九 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 該 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
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 辭 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中

直接訊問、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 三月 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 日 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 日 三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中、三月 日 閣議 中
 (以下次頁)

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P. 26

1911年11月11日 Steam Navigation - 25

第一、關於... 第二、關於... 第三、關於... 第四、關於... 第五、關於... 第六、關於... 第七、關於... 第八、關於... 第九、關於... 第十、關於...

第三、關於... 第四、關於... 第五、關於... 第六、關於... 第七、關於... 第八、關於... 第九、關於... 第十、關於...

第五、關於... 第六、關於... 第七、關於... 第八、關於... 第九、關於... 第十、關於...

第一、關於... 第二、關於... 第三、關於... 第四、關於... 第五、關於... 第六、關於... 第七、關於... 第八、關於... 第九、關於... 第十、關於...

119 0006 0001

HIRAHARA Sumitomo - EE

ト交渉及ニ於テ行政方針ヲ定メテ下リテ之ニ依リ凡ソ國
條約ノ原則ヲ肯定スルコトヲ言テ其意ヲ辯テ又中・國内ニ於
テ亦三國ノ現存權益ハ尊重スルコトハ條約ノ本意ノ結果
ナリトシ中國ニ於テ亦三國ノ將來ノ經濟上ノ活動ノ統
一標準上ニ法律的方針ヲ示シ從テ利益ハ公平
等々假令ニ理解セバ此ノ三國ニ於テ是ノ三國ノ三國

EE-65

一九三八年十月三日有田外相ノ演説ニ「OPEN」ニ曰ク去年
中國ノ狀態ノ變化ノ多ク機會均等ノ原則ハ固ク無
條件適用ヲ認メ在下ニ去來ノ一語ノ長短ハ要ス日本
ノ戶口政策及ニ機會均等ノ原則ハ亦三國ノ權益平衡
安んじ知ラズト言明シ又且又同ノ案係リ層層密着シ且
以テ其ノ存立ヲ保證スニ為テ是ノ方策ヲ講ジ之ヲ維持ス等々
原則適用ノ除カニ其ノ事ヲ為シテ之ヲ知ラズト云フ事
及ニ之ヲ知ラズ

EE-66

一九三七年十月三日有田外相ノ演説ニ「限・閉關」
前內閣ノ向テ政策ヲ踏襲シ又自滿及三國ノ政治及文化
經濟ニ至ル迄進歩シテ至ラズノ際隆盛進歩ノ基礎ヲ築
クニ為ラズ如何ニシテ之ヲ維持スルコトヲ為シテ之ヲ決定ス

「演説」五九九 記録 九五七三—七六

「 ” ” 五九九 “ ” 九五八一

其確言欲之也。彼、又曰奮身脫乎新秩序之羈絆

之、於其、上、也、中國、固、於、其、能、之、一、事、請、解、之、自、本、國、

協、力、不、可、而、希、望、之、自、身、也、抗、自、身、繼、統、之、者、對、其、不、斷

乎、其、之、之、實、誠、之、外、道、無、不、其、一、經、論、政、之、也、

確 三、之、平、和、(會、言、語、三、民、不、彼、自、身、之、言、語、也、)

宜、裁、的、外、交、政、府、之、言、語、也、又、國、氏、

運、命、之、說、上、年、之、六、次、戰、事、之、備、一、幕、間、運、命、說、也、

平、定、之、年、也、其、重、其、目、的、之、言、語、也、(言、語、也、)

其、之、言、語、也、(言、語、也、)其、言、語、也、其、言、語、也、信、

戰、事、之、說、也、其、言、語、也、其、言、語、也、其、言、語、也、

如何、之、鐵、道、之、權、之、上、也、其、言、語、也、其、言、語、也、

並、衛、之、彼、(六、次、內、閣、首、相、在、任、中、日、本、之、宣、戰、布、告、之、)

三、九、三、七、年、七、月、七、日、長、城、以、南、(中、國、之、侵、略、之、總、動、員、

滿、之、運、命、說、也、)依、于、日、本、(全、體、主、義、的、國、家、之、基、礎、之、預、

其、又、曰、也、(其、經、目、的、之、先、重、新、秩序、之、建、設、之、也、)其、言、語、也、

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HRRANUMM Summation - E E

1928

EE-15

A 書記 三五九一A

A 書記 三五九一A

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1928

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-60

平沼内閣、為之最初、仕事、一、内閣企圖現、起、
成、主、力、振、起、者、三、九、三、九、年、十、二、月、承、認、三、九、三、九、年、十、二、月、
及、其、序、文、大、件、於、三、九、三、九、年、十、二、月、陸、軍、省、作、
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EE-67

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MIRAMUMI Summation - 22

FE-75 國家總動員法從日滿規中及滿洲國法中一併廢止

今一九三五年七月二十六日附 錄 廢止之法律及命令

會及命令之陸軍軍令第二三三號關於滿洲國總動員法

特定其種類，所有至及至三三三號及至三三三號及至

此計劃從日在在計劃，設立之條，得得得得得得得得

日在在部命令二二陸軍軍令第一二二號關於滿洲國

憲法之施行，一號，一號，一號，一號，一號，一號，一號

協方之公法權利ヲ附与スルニ付テ

EE-71 至一九三五年十月一日在東京帝國議會開會

日加中ノ政府ノ政務ヲ施行スルニ指シテ總動員法ヲ施行ス

大量販賣賣ヲ許可スルニ付テ總動員法ノ施行スルニ付テ

陸軍軍令第一二二號

FE-72 至一九三五年十月一日在東京帝國議會開會

至一九三五年十月一日在東京帝國議會開會

至一九三五年十月一日在東京帝國議會開會

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至一九三五年十月一日在東京帝國議會開會

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
陸軍部

HIRAWAMA Summation - EE

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1933

日本銀行の
銀行券の
発行額



R 34

HIPANUMA Summation - EE

EE-77 海南島 (HAINAN ISLAND) 一九三九年二月十日 中華民國政府
 三月三日 奪取古銀井 三月十日 奪取
 佛領 (SPRATLEY) 諸島 三月十日 中華民國政府
 奪取古銀井 三月十日 奪取

EE-78 一九三九年五月十四日 日本軍 三月十日 奪取 天寧島 (TENCULAN)
 人民共和國 奪取 三月十日 奪取

EE-79 青年訓練所 (數) 生徒 學生訓練 教育委員會
 三月十日 奪取 教育委員會 三月十日 奪取 一九三九年 教育委員會
 三月十日 奪取 青年訓練所 教育委員會 奪取 教育委員會
 資料 命令 獨立 三月十日 奪取

EE-80 平沼 (首相就任前) 於三月三日 (WANG) 擔任 中華民國
 積極的 三月十日 奪取 一九三九年 十月十日 奪取 中華民國
 (KONGYE) 內閣 辭職 中華民國 臨時政府 三月十日 奪取
 日本 全國 三月十日 奪取 辭職 三月十日 奪取

ET 79 一九三九年六月十日 平沼 (首相就任後) (WANG) (中國)

EE-79	的認知受	記錄 六一四三
EE-80	女 書 証 五二	" 六一四五
EE-81	" 七六六	" 六一四六
EE-82	" 三三七	" 六一四七
EE-83	" 三三五	" 六一四八

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HIRANUMA S. 1887-1944

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一ナリガヤハ一色ノ或ハ一ノ味ナクハ必シテ味ノ同シトモ味ノ

此ノトモアツクナシデアモ、日本ハ結構ニ長シクハ信用ノ高キ

我國ハ及ビ伊大ノ刊一級心野ノ經濟論ヲ一讀スルニ於テ

我國國情ノ實情ヲ察シテ遂ニ一トシテ亞細ヤノ不振ノ原因

ヲ有ルハトシテ、私ハ斷言スルニ、一國ノ不振

ソレニテ拘ラス日本ノ該國ニ於テ終ニ一國ニシテ強ク

シヨハ必シク對シテ一國ノ的々強クニテアラスニテハ、人

然リテ今ハソノ現在ノ情勢ニ於テハ一國ノ不振ニ於テハ

將ニ不振トシテモ實際上一國ノ不振ノ原因ニシテハ、

HR. W. W. S. ...

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然三月後將何所運之動...

文步年半始，若人如何...

- ... 記錄 六二〇
... 六三〇
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EE-93

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EE-94

Thinking With Summation

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EE-95

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HIPANUMA Summer Town - 22

一九三九年日本於平沼總領事入駐東京時，曾與美政府
 簽訂最後的波恩和平條約，其條件為：日本在東亞之地位
 及太平洋領土之範圍與一九一一年倫敦海峽公約無異。此
 項條件與一九一一年倫敦海峽公約之內容，實有極大之
 不同。一九一一年倫敦海峽公約之內容，係以維持東亞
 之現狀為目的，而一九三九年波恩和平條約之內容，則
 係以擴張日本之權利為目的。此種不同，即為波恩和平
 條約與一九一一年倫敦海峽公約之區別所在。

一九二九年日本於平沼總領事入駐東京時，曾與美政府
 簽訂最後的波恩和平條約。此項條約之內容，係以維持
 東亞之現狀為目的。而一九三九年波恩和平條約之內容，
 則係以擴張日本之權利為目的。此種不同，即為波恩和
 平條約與一九一一年倫敦海峽公約之區別所在。

一九三九年日本於平沼總領事入駐東京時，曾與美政府
 簽訂最後的波恩和平條約。此項條約之內容，係以維持
 東亞之現狀為目的。而一九三九年波恩和平條約之內容，
 則係以擴張日本之權利為目的。此種不同，即為波恩和
 平條約與一九一一年倫敦海峽公約之區別所在。

一九三九年日本於平沼總領事入駐東京時，曾與美政府
 簽訂最後的波恩和平條約。此項條約之內容，係以維持
 東亞之現狀為目的。而一九三九年波恩和平條約之內容，
 則係以擴張日本之權利為目的。此種不同，即為波恩和
 平條約與一九一一年倫敦海峽公約之區別所在。

註冊	九九五	九九六	九九七
九九八	九九九	一〇〇〇	一〇〇一
一〇〇二	一〇〇三	一〇〇四	一〇〇五

HIPRAK/MS Supp.ation - (1)

1. 關於本會之組織及業務範圍
 2. 關於本會之經費來源及分配
 3. 關於本會之會員資格及權利義務
 4. 關於本會之辦事程序及會議規則
 5. 關於本會之附屬機構及合作關係
 6. 關於本會之對外關係及宣傳活動
 7. 關於本會之檔案管理及資料保存
 8. 關於本會之紀律及懲戒辦法
 9. 關於本會之其他重要事項

國際法

1. 國際法之概念及分類
 2. 國際法之發展及現狀
 3. 國際法之效力及適用
 4. 國際法之爭議解決
 5. 國際法之實踐與挑戰

1. 國際公法
 2. 國際私法
 3. 國際刑法
 4. 國際行政法
 5. 國際社會法

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HIRANUMA Sumner - EE

EE-101 一九四二年日米交渉、行ハ、トモニ同平詔、同表
トモニテアリヌ

EE-102 自一九四二年一月十三日、互同對六月二十日、同平詔、
中ニ向催サシ、日本、南方進出、準備トシテ、對英、
度支那及對泰國方針決定ニシテ、總務會議、大都會
ニテ居リマシタ

トモニテ居リマシタ、且ツ秘密協定ニヨリ、アラシク及、
國上軍事的、乃至政治的協定ヲ結バ、トモニ、
部ニ航空基地ト臺灣施設ヲ設備シ、又軍隊ヲ駐屯セ、
函ガ決定セリマシタ

EE-103 一九四〇年十月二十日會議決定、蘭領東印度經
措置、大都會ヲ含ム日本側要求明細書ガ一九四〇年
蘭領、印支當局ニ提出セリマシタ

EE-104 平詔、内相在任中、一九四一年一月二十日、閣議
、人口政策ガ決定サレ、トモニ據シ、バ、一九四五年度
目標ガタテ、トモニテアリヌ、日本、青年ヲ需
働カニ対スル慢者、資源トスベク、内閣的

EE-101 〃 書証 三三七 記録 九三四三
EE-102 〃 〃 一三〇三 〃 二七〇四
〃 〃 五八六 〃 六五六〇
〃 〃 六四七-A 〃 七〇六一
〃 〃 一〇九五 〃 一〇〇二八
〃 〃 一三〇六 〃 一七五三

EE-103 〃 〃 三〇九一-A

EE-102 〃 〃 書証 五三四 語

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國務大事

H/PRAM/JM/Supernation - EE

1. 1990年12月1日
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HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-101 一九四二年日米交渉、行ハシテ居ル間平沼、同交渉ニ参加シテ居タリテアリマス^(a)

EE-102 一九四二年一月十三日、五国年次年二十日、間平沼、此期間中ニ向テ日本、南方進出、準備トシテ、對佛領印度支那及對泰國方針ヲ決定スル邊際會議、大部會ニ参加シテ居リマス^(a) 必要アリテ武力ヲ用ルルモ、佛領印度支那南部ニ航空基地ト港湾施設ヲ設備シ、又軍隊ヲ駐屯セシムルトシテ居リ^(a) 且ツ秘密協定ニヨリ、アラスカ及フィリピン兩國ニ對シテ軍事及政治的協定ヲ結ビ、美精日英ハ其計畫画が決定セリ^(a)

EE-103 一九四二年十月二十三日閣議決定、英領印度支那經濟開發計畫、大部會ヲ含ム日本側要求明細書が一九四二年十月十日、英領印度支那當局ニ提示セリ^(a)

EE-104 平沼、内務大臣任中、一九四二年一月二十日、閣議ニ於テ日本、人口政策が決定サレ、トシテ據ルニ、一九四五年迄人口一億、目標ガタテ^(a)シ^(a)、アリマス。日本、青島ヲ軍隊並ニ常駐力ニ對スル優待、資源トスベク、肉体的精神的訓練

P. 44

EE-101	レ 書証 三三七	記録 二九三四	レ 書証 五五四	記録 六四四六
EE-102	レ 〃 一三〇三	〃 一二七四	レ 〃 三〇九一	〃 二八三三
レ	〃 五六六	〃 六五六〇		
レ	〃 六四七	〃 七〇六一		
レ	〃 一〇九五	〃 一〇〇二六		
レ	〃 三〇六	〃 二七五三		

HIRANUMI Summation - EE

練習簿 記述口上上本正書の(1)

EE-107 一九四五年四月 日本政府は國庫券發行を、(1) 國庫券發行
に關する法律を公布し、(2) 國庫券發行の準備を完了した。

EE-108 一九四五年四月 日本政府は、(1) 國庫券發行の準備を完了し、
(2) 國庫券發行の準備を完了した。

EE-109 一九四五年四月 日本政府は、(1) 國庫券發行の準備を完了し、
(2) 國庫券發行の準備を完了した。

EE-110 一九四五年四月 日本政府は、(1) 國庫券發行の準備を完了し、
(2) 國庫券發行の準備を完了した。

1945	4	10	100
1945	5	10	100
1945	6	10	100
1945	7	10	100
1945	8	10	100
1945	9	10	100

EE-106	1945	10	100
	1945	10	100
	1945	10	100

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HIRANUMA Summation - EE

ル最も完全且自由な機会ヲ日本ニ供与スルトシテ一九四一年七月廿
 四日「ルーズベルト」ROOSEVELT / 大統領、申入ニモ拘ラズ。又野
 村 / NOMURA / が日本ト合衆国間、外交関係が或、断絶スル
 カモシト又思ヒ「アメリカ」対日輿論ハ急激ニ変化シ、
 アリテ同国民ハ日本、南方進出ヲ以テ「シンガポール」SINGAPORE
 及蘭領東印度ニ向テ、一歩ニ過ギナト考ヘテ平ル指摘
 テ、請訓ニテ事案ニモ拘ハズ。而モ尚日本、一九四一年七月
 廿九日佛領印度支那、共同防衛、協定及議定書ヲ締
 結⁽⁴⁾シテ多數、自奉案ガ南部佛領印度支那ニ進駐セシメ
 コシタ、テアリマス。其、時平沼ハ内閣、一員タルヲ下旨ス。

EE-111 一九四二年十月十八日、條内閣が成立シタガ平沼ハ、閣僚
 ニハ任命サシマセテシタ。併シ彼ハ重臣トシテ政事ニ引續
 キ関係イタシマシタ。

重 臣

P. 47 EE-112 一九四〇年七月十六日ヨリ一九四五年マデ平沼ハ通常新首相
 推薦、タテ御催サシタ重臣會議ニ列席シタ。此等ノ會議
 ニ於テ次、推薦ガササシタ、テアリマス。

- EE-110 A 書証 一四五一A 記録 一〇七六二
- B " 一三三 " 一〇一八〇
- C " 一四三A " 一〇七六二

EE-114

- a " 三六五 " 二六三六
- c " 一三三 " 一三九〇
- d " 一一七 " 一一三九

EE-112

記事記一五田 記録一〇九二
 又書記一五田 記録一〇九二
 子五場ニ在リ、聖明ヲ説明シ又皇令傳ハ日本天降ニ就キ三詳
 述スニ之、重臣ヨリ質疑ガアリ、其條ニヨリ改訂例アリ
 一〇四ニ答録シ説明ガアリ、其條ニヨリ改訂例アリ

EE-113

天皇要求ニヨリ、重臣會議ガ一九四二年十一月二十日召集
 セリ。正武天皇ノ現自ノニヤキ、合衆國、英國、米國、被蘭、荷、
 戰列ヲ開始、決意ニツキ、完全ニ、
 新舊禮儀ガ、
 銘々曾テ日本、
 知ルル、
 召集ナリ

推定

一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、
 一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、
 一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、
 一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、
 一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、
 一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、
 一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、
 一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、

推定

一九四二年七月十七日 - 近衛、

HIRANUMA Summation-EE

アキリカ、側近安ヲ受諾スルニ、見解ヲ述ベルニ、
至ニテハ、
有トシテ、
是ハ、
ハ、
又、

Page

55-111
11-1111
11-1111

0000 0000 0550

P. 50

EE-115
 特ニ平沼一且余精神力ニ於テ合衆國ノ長
 耐(得)トナリテ同憂歎、物力ニ於テ、能力ニ疑
 慮(シ)ミ、唯愛國的感情ヲ喚起スルニ力ヲ求メ
 カリタルヲ主張シ、主リテ、
 EE-116
 平沼(郵)ニ於テ九四四年七月十七日、會議ヲ日
 有(路)邁進シ、強打ヲ舉、國一敵内閣ヲ作シ、
 以(種)業條内閣ヲ更迭スルニ決意シ、
 九四五年四月五日、會位平沼、
 論六條ヲ及列ナリ、其故ニ、
 述之シ、
 EE-117
 一九四五年四月九日平沼ハ再ニ極議院議長ニ力ヲ
 辯護部門

EE-118
 平沼、辯護、其弱カキ、
 終身防正化共同、努力ヲ強論シ、
 大佐(三)當面在東京、
 大使(三)當面在東京、
 臣在位當時、
 EE-119
 九、三三一、
 九、三三一、
 EE-120
 九、三三一、
 九、三三一、

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-115
 特ニ平沼一且余精神力ニ於テ合衆國ノ長
 耐(得)トナリテ同憂歎、物力ニ於テ、能力ニ疑
 慮(シ)ミ、唯愛國的感情ヲ喚起スルニ力ヲ求メ
 カリタルヲ主張シ、主リテ、
 EE-116
 平沼(郵)ニ於テ九四四年七月十七日、會議ヲ日
 有(路)邁進シ、強打ヲ舉、國一敵内閣ヲ作シ、
 以(種)業條内閣ヲ更迭スルニ決意シ、
 九四五年四月五日、會位平沼、
 論六條ヲ及列ナリ、其故ニ、
 述之シ、
 EE-117
 一九四五年四月九日平沼ハ再ニ極議院議長ニ力ヲ
 辯護部門

HIRAHARA Summation EE

EE-115 特ニ平沼、軍ニ日本ノ精神力ニ於テ、合衆國ト、長期戦ニ
耐(得ル)トナリ、同義ヲ、物力ニ於テ、能力ニ疑ハレ
ト述ベ、三、唯、愛國的感情ヲ喚起スルヲ、十分、方策上、力
カヲ、十分、主張、シ、ナリ、ス。

EE-116 平沼郞(私郞)ニ於テ、一九四四年七月十七日、會議、日本
ガ(略)進、ミ、強、力、ヲ、舉、國、一、致、内、閣、ヲ、作、リ、出、来
ル、條、東、條、内、閣、ヲ、更、迭、ス、キ、テ、決、定、シ、タ、リ、又
一九四五年四月五日、會、合、平、沼、ハ、戰、争、打、切、リ、能、平
論、ハ、強、力、ヲ、反、對、シ、其、故、ハ、飽、ク、迄、戰、フ、以、外、ニ、途、ナ、シ、ト
述、ベ、タ、リ、タ、リ、

EE-117 一九四五年四月九日、平沼ハ、再、ビ、私、家、院、議、長、ニ、ナ、リ、タ、リ、

辯護部門

EE-118 平沼、辯護、ハ、其、弱、力、ヲ、示、シ、テ、人、歐洲ニ於テ、戰
争、ヲ、防、止、ス、ル、共、同、ノ、努、力、ヲ、強、調、シ、テ、心、(HULL)宛、
テ、之、ヲ、論、當、時、在、東、京、下、行、力、入、使、館、臨、時、代、理
大、使、官、ト、ナ、リ、タ、リ、(DOOMAN)ヨリ、報、任、官、總、理、大
臣、在、任、當、時、年、報、政、策、理、想、及、ビ、希、望、ヲ、略、述、シ、タ、リ、

N. J. O

EE-118	〇	三三三	〇	三三三	〇
EE-118	〇	三三三	〇	三三三	〇
EE-118	〇	三三三	〇	三三三	〇
EE-118	〇	三三三	〇	三三三	〇

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

洲情勢ニ関スル日本外交方針ニ報告トシテ除キ、如何ニ重要性凡文書モ證據中ニ整理セラルベシトナリマス。

EE-119

心-HULLノ平詔、ナツセシニ對シテ回答ニ具シ、世界平和ニ関スル平詔、希望ハ極東ニ於テ武装斗争、存在トシ續行シニ伴フ政治的不安ニ據リテ一層急ク將來ニ及ビ、又歐洲圏内、出来ズル極東ニ影響スル如ク、極東、異常ニテ状態、延長ハ歐洲ニ於テ不安、誘因ニ寄與ス、ト云フコトヲ稱切ニ述ベテ平心ニナリマス。心-HULLノ更ニ、何レ、地理的圏内ニ於テモ平和的解決、一般世界情勢、改善ヲ行フ上ニ於テモ安定要素及ビ重要手段トナルト云フコトヲ述ベテ平心ニナリマス。

EE-120

平詔ガ一九三九年五月十日ニ心-HULLニ與ヘテ平和提議中ニ誠意ヲ示シテナクエララケルニ對シテ返答ハ平詔ノ行動ニ依テ平心ニナリマス。平詔ガ平和ニ関スルナツセシヲ心-HULLニ發送スル六日前ニヒトウ(HITLER)ニ自分ノ聲明書ヲ送リ、東亞ニ新秩序ヲ建設セトスル自分ノ努力ニ對シヒトウ(HITLER)一層緊密ニ接近ヲ遂ゲシコトヲ訴ヘテ居リ、平詔ガ平和ニ関スルナツセ

P. 51

EE-119	ル	書証	三三三	記録	二九三五
	ル	"	三三三	"	二九三五
	ル	"	三三三	"	二九三六
EE-120	ル	"	五〇三	"	六一〇四

P. 52

EE-22

看察良衛 / SAITO, Koshio / 口依甚 / 井沼カ九郎等
 五年中、閣議に大因し、閣内、皇戰等を起し、皇言、方長言
 事、結果生た敗害、一荒廢、二敵入、繼而、機言、之傳不
 名書証 七六、R 三三六七、四六
 R 三三六 〃 三九三三
 R 三三六 〃 三九三三

HH-21

HIRANUMA Declaration -- EE

〇〇上 / PRAGOTT / 口依甚 / 井沼カ九郎等
 秘張件何者、通之英國文、檢一、事、其、閣議
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上 / ANITA / 〇〇上、其、其
 / TIENTSIN / 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上

三十、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 民衆、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上
 〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上、〇〇上

〇〇上

HIRANUMA Summation - EE-13

言「日本ハドソト理由ガナシトモ(4) 戦争ヨクマナクナリトノ意見
ヲ語リテ預説ヲ語リテモナリト又。平沼ヨク意見ハ九三
年皇座會議デ彼ガ説ヲ奮力ト意見ト相及ルベシト云フ
平沼ハ其ノ時最後ノ戦争以外途ニ無ク、一述ハナシテ云フ
平沼ハ然レニ戦争及対英見ヲ述ベタト云フ 吾等ISHIOTA
証言ヲ讀ム時ニハ平沼ガ一九三九年ニ日本ヲシテ英國及
蘭西ニ対スル戦争ニ突入セシムルニハ構ガ出来ナク又衆氣
ヲ以テトス者度ヲ拂フベキナリト云

EE-13

平沼ニ対スル暗殺未遂、時平沼ヲ治療シテ医師塩田玄
重 ISHIOTA, Hiroshige. 一、口供書ハ平沼ガ一九四一年八月十四
日ヨリ一九四四年十月二十九日ニ至ル間公認ニ出席スル
ヨリテ、檢察側ガ承認シテ撤回セリ、又ハ平沼ハ上記
十月二十九日ニ前ニ述ベタル皇座會議ニ出席シ
タリト云

EE-124

前ニ總理大臣デナリテ辯護証人岡田啓行 (OKADA, Keisuke)
証言ハ岡田/OKADA/及ヒ平沼、出席シテ三回行ハル皇座
會議ニ及テナリト云フ、中、最も重要ナル皇座會議
ハ交渉ガ行テリ、国家間ニ戦争ガ避ケラレ、政府ガ感シテ

P. 53

EE-123	口書証 三三三	記録 二九四三
	〃 三三三	〃 二九四三
	〃 三三四〇	〃 三一二四

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

P. 54

ナク々當時、外交及内政殆皆勢ニ因リ望ミ意見ヲ
 示シテ陛下が召喚ナリ九四年十月廿九日、會議ナリ
 言リテ因田 / OKADA / 言ニ據テ、政府ハ望ミ、望ミ
 知シテ、若シ實際理由ガ未ダ政府、予許ニテ也故ニ政府
 表ナリ引合ニ出テ、政府、立場良シ諒解ナリカクナク因
 家、秘密ヲ填テ此ガ政府ハ從義心ニテ未ダ不從ニ邊答
 ナリテアリク

EE-125

因田、証言ハ東條ニ依リ断乎トシテ及駭カクナリク
 予、東條ハ、私ガ國家秘密、理由ヲ說明セテ予拒絶シ
 ナリテ九四年九月二十日、本院延テ予ナク因田 / OKADA /
 DA / 証言ハ事實ニ絶対基ナリトシテ、絶對踏止
 予、予ガ從義ナシカクシク、予ハ從義ナリク

EE-126

因田 / OKADA / 言ニ據テ、望ミ、望ミ、
 毛ガナリ、其、予柄ニ就テ、良シ注意シ、再考慮ニ戰等
 招来ナシ如キトニ因テ、極々慎重ニ進ムテ、政府ニ屬
 格、ニテ、予、予、彼等、皆諜言的且消極的意見
 予、証言ナリテ、予、予

EE-124	凡書証 三三九	記録 二九六
EE-125	♂ " 三三九	" 二九六
EE-125	♀ " 三三五	" 三三六
EE-125	♀ " 三三九	" 二九六
EE-125	♀ " 三三九	" 二九六

EE-124 9000 551 0

HIRAMUNA Summary - EE

EE-1241 ソレ故、東條、証言、依、六重臣、然、先、戦、略、三、層、制、を、

論、矣、際、未、政、府、政、策、全、敏、二、八、十、分、二、情、報、ヲ、受、テ、

又、本、國、英、國、又、三、方、二、對、英、戰、争、開、始、二、國、元、政、府、

意、向、ヲ、通、告、三、方、ヲ、以、テ、（意、向、） 尚、二、重、臣、二、集、テ、ハ、リ、

最、高、輔、導、長、官、ト、シ、テ、天皇、皇、座、下、二、其、選、大、半、無、任、務、ニ、シ、テ、

争、突、入、二、正式、決定、ヲ、受、附、上、場、所、ヲ、行、訪、問、力、ヲ、使、用、定、大、

心、ト、シ、テ、（意、向、） 止、セ、タ、（意、向、） 二、敏、等、ノ、出、立、職、任、置、道、少、シ、

（意、向、） 二、開、キ、テ、（意、向、） 一、方、ト、シ、テ、

EE-1242 他、方、國、因、其、主、張、之、ヲ、辯、（意、向、） 二、若、三、政、府、國、家、敏、察、ヲ、

凡、ト、云、フ、理、由、無、（意、向、） 重、臣、が、敏、察、セ、テ、了、良、及、敏、等、ヲ、敏、等、

二、危、害、ヲ、及、ビ、テ、（意、向、） 六、以、テ、六、之、弊、ノ、人、道、八、天、自、皇、座、下、

二、對、英、敏、等、ノ、議、議、ヲ、同、構、（意、向、） 二、念、ノ、タ、ク、ア、テ、了、リ、又、七、二、三、

ハ、敏、等、ノ、議、議、ヲ、思、受、三、履、行、セ、テ、六、然、レ、テ、（意、向、） 肝、懸、ル、

二、事、項、ヲ、完、了、（意、向、） 二、正、體、三、通、告、シ、テ、毛、之、ヲ、決、定、セ、テ、了、リ、

了、（意、向、）

EE-131 敏、等、業、通、信、有、限、公、司、ト、後、了、リ、ト、（意、向、） 一、定、上、重、臣、が、敏、等、

等、及、對、（意、向、） 二、意、見、ヲ、述、（意、向、） 二、力、ヲ、及、（意、向、） 二、重、臣、八、東、條、ヲ、敏、等、

EE-1243	記 録	三六三五
記 録	三六三六	
名	三六五五	
名	三三三九	
名	三三三九	
名	三六三六	
名	三六三六	
名	三六三六	

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-132

争不可避ヲ決心シテ之ヲ知リテ分ク其ノ莫ク不憚ニ
 事件ヲ委ス彼等自身消極的又諫止の意見ヲ
 甘シニ受テテリス

九四年、多ク敗北、後東條内閣ニ入リ、東條内
 閣ヲ辭職セシムニ定メシタ。理由ハ九四年七月十七
 日重臣六平沼邸ニ相会シ、確乎トシテ押切ル国民内
 閣ノ立立ルニ決心致シ之ニ對シテ翌日東條ハ辭職シ、重臣
 ハ新首相ヲ推薦スル旨集合致シ之タ。平沼ハ軍需
 品増産ヲ行フタメ軍人ノ方カヨリ、イカト云ヒ之タ。
 小磯大將ガ推薦サレシヲ對シテ重臣米内ヲ小磯トシテ
 任命スルヨリテ手配致シ之タ

R.57

EE722EE731	a	書証	三三九	記録	二九三六
	a	"	三三九	"	二九三六五
	b	"	三三九	"	二九三六四
	c	"	三三九	"	二九三六五
	d	"	三三九	"	二九三六六

EE-135

HIRANUMA
EE-134

Summation - EE

EE-133

一九四五年四月五日小磯辭職ニ直臣、鈴木、鈴木、
 小磯、後継者トシテ承認シタリ。(a) 皇皇會議
 於テ平沼ハ、戦局終結ニ賛成スルヲ如何ニ
 和諭者ヲ推薦スルヲ、公未ク、ノ、推シ、ニ、
 臣、選擇ハ、重臣ト見テ、持、ト、リ、一、私、
 三、又、戦局終結(絶対ニ反對)トシ、(c) 上言ニ最良ト
 戰ハ、被、同、選、ハ、レ、バ、ト、ナ、イ、ト、ク、能、度、ヲ、取、リ、タ、リ、(d)

岡田、反對、訊、問、際、平沼、戰局ヲ最良トシ、戦ハ、
 争、来、ル、ヲ、見、出、ス、ガ、必、要、ト、シ、上、言、ヲ、
 シ、テ、彼、ハ、最、良、ト、シ、戦、ハ、被、出、サ、レ、ト、上、言、ヲ、
 知、リ、ト、上、言、ヲ、認、致、シ、タ、リ、(a) 岡田、又、反對、訊、問、際、
 沼、ハ、九、四、五、年、ニ、平、和、交、渉、形、式、ヲ、戰、局、終、結、
 大、事、ヲ、望、ミ、タ、リ、ト、カ、ク、ト、承、認、致、シ、タ、リ、(b) 沼、
 選

一九四五年八月十日平沼ガ枢密院議長トシテ出席シタ
 御前會議ハ、天皇ノ主權及皇座ニ再確認ヲ唯、
 トシ、テ、ボ、ク、ス、宣、言、ヲ、受、諾、ス、ル、事、ヲ、決、定、
 致、シ、タ、リ、(a) 條件

EE-133	ル書証	二三二	記録	一一三九
EE-137	A	三三〇	"	三二七
EE-134	B	一一八	"	一九三〇
	C	三三〇	"	三二二
	D	三三〇	"	三二二

0 159 0006 09 10

HIRANUMA Summation - EE

EE-136

一九四五年八月十二日、聯合軍司令部ヲ受取リテ、ソニテ
 即座平沼ハ国体^(a)ヲ救フコトヲ切望シタ見地カス彼
 日本ノ究極ノ政体ハ国民ノ自由意思心ヨリテ樹立セ
 スルベシトイフ回答案、亦即ニ反対意見ヲ述ベタ^(b)
 コニ対シ主務大臣東郷、其項ニ何等ノ反対スベキモノヲ認
 メカクツテアリマス。鈴木總理大臣ハ平沼ノ立場ニ賛成
 シタヨリ見エマス、ソニテ平和交渉ガ締結^(c)サレバ、^(d)爆撃
 ト飢餓ヨリ幾百ノ無辜^(e)ノ民ガ犠牲トナル^(f)、如キ結
 果ヲ招来スルベシガ、ソノ平和交渉ガ果ニテ行ハルヤ否ヤ
 怪ニシツテ参リマス。ソノ間統帥部、能度^(g)強硬ニ
 タリ、又平沼及陸軍ノ反対、タテニ戦争指導最高會
 議、會合ヲ召集スルガ困難ニナリマス^(h)。遂ニ天皇陛下
 ハ内閣閣僚ト上記會議、議員ト、合同御前會議ヲ
 召集スルコト會議ニシテ戦争ヲ終結サレルコト決定シ
 タ⁽ⁱ⁾ナリマス。

EE-137

一九四五年八月十五日、平沼ハ木下ニ面會、鈴木 (SUZUKI)
 後継者トシテ東久邇宮ヲ總理大臣ニ推薦ス時、彼
 最右ノ公武活動ヲ果ニタテアリマス。
 皇室ヲ召集スル必要ガナト考ヘタ、テアリマス。^(a)

P. 59

EE-136	〃書証 三三四。	記録 三二四	EE-136	〃書証 三三四。	記録 三二六
	〃〃 三三四。	〃〃 三二四		〃〃 三三四。	〃〃 三二八九
	〃〃 三三四。	〃〃 一〇九		〃〃 三三四。	〃〃 三二九一
	〃〃 三三四。	〃〃 三二六五		〃〃 三三四。	〃〃 三二二〇。
	〃〃 三三四。	〃〃 三二六六	EE-137	〃〃 三三四。	〃〃 三二二〇。

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P. 60

H/IRAWAHA Summarization - E/E

E/I-107
E/I-108

彼、過重なることを提して、彼、
維持不能なる最悪の事態に達するに至るに至る
物、公職、長官の終止を主張するなり。

彼、鉄砲、爆薬、毒物の所持、
者、十が因に、彼、緊避之の旨を以て、
辯明するなり。彼、秘密顧問の
選、長官及び、兵衛、援助、
之、彼、秘密顧問、
及、内閣、議、
意、見、求、
全部、
議、
令、
内、
皇、
有、
又、
本、

Handwritten vertical text on the left margin, possibly a page number or reference.

Handwritten text at the top of the page, including a mathematical expression $\Delta x = \dots$.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a detailed derivation or explanation.

Handwritten text at the bottom of the page, possibly a conclusion or summary.

0 159 0006 0921

KAYA SUMMATION-II

資 産 具 宣

第 一 部

起訴状ハ資産被告ノ罪状トシテ次ノ點ヲ挙ゲテ居ル、

第一類 平和ニ對スル罪

訴因第一乃至第十七

訴因第十九乃至第卅四、但シ廿三、廿五、廿六及ビ卅三ヲ除ク、

第二類 殺 人

訴因第廿七乃至第四十七

第三類 通商ノ以テ争犯罪及ビ人道ニ對スル罪

訴因第五十三乃至第五十五

II-1

被告資産ニ關スル證據ヲ要約批判スルニ當リ、被告ノ活動ハ四期ニ分タレル。

A 第一期

第一次近衛内閣ニ就相トシテ入閣スル以前シテ被告ガ官職ニ就キタル日一九一七年（大正六年）三月十七日ヲ以テ始リ一九三七年（昭和十二年）六月四日ヲ以テ終ル期間

II-2
 一、二ノ例外ラ際クバ法廷ノ被告甲賀屋被告ホ
 フ日本政府ノ官吏トシテ最モ活潑ニ長期ニ亘リ活
 動シタモノハナリ。賀屋ハ帝國大學ニ於テ法律
 ラ専攻シ傍ラ政治學ヲ修メ卒業ト共ニ官吏トシテ
 ノ活動ヲ始メタ。賀屋ハ一九一七年（大正六年）
 大藏省ニ就職シタ。引續キ大藏省ニ在職シ徐々ニ

A 第一期

東京内閣蔵箱トシテノ在職期間、即チ一九四
 一年（昭和十六年）十月十八日ヨリ一九四四
 年（昭和十九年）二月九日迄及び其後日本ノ
 降伏ニ至ル迄ノ期間

D 第四期

任スル迄ノ期間
 （昭和十六年）十月十八日東京内閣蔵箱ニ就
 近衛内閣蔵箱ノ椅子ヲ去ツテヨリ一九四一年
 一九三八年（昭和十三年）五月廿六日第一次

○ 第三期

ラ以テ終ル期間
 即チ一九三七年（昭和十二年）六月四日ヲ以
 テ始リ一九三八年（昭和十三年）五月廿六日
 蔵箱トシテ第一次近衛内閣ニ在職シタル期間

B 第二期

KAYA SUMATION-I

II-3

a、註、記録番號ハ英字ノ頁番號デア
法廷證第一一一號、遠記録セニ
頁

0159 0006 0223

KAYA SUMMATION—II

正規ノ昇進ニ依テ其ノ地位ノ最高ノ地位ニ達シタ、
一九三七年（昭和十二年）六月四日第一次近衛内
閣ノ職相トナリ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十
八日東條内閣ニ於テ再ビ其地位ニ就イタ。

II-3

証據ノ示ス處ニ依レバ賀屋ノ政府勤務ハ主トシ
テ財政ノ分野ニ限ラレテハ后タガ賀屋ハ任命ヲ受
ケテ他ノ責任ヲモ取り、ソレニ依テ賀屋ハ政府ノ
各方面ニ於ケル活動ヲ日々知ル事ヲ待タノデアアル、
一九一七年（大正六年）ヨリ一九三七年（昭和十
二年）六月四日迄ニ賀屋被旨ハ九十ヲ下ラザル官
職ニ任命サレ種々ナル活動ヲシクノデアアル。註(a)

II-5
 蔵相就任迄ノ數年間ニ賀尾ハ海軍豫算カ増大
 シテ行クノヲ見タノデアアル。海軍省豫算ハ一九
 三一年（昭和六年）カラ一九三七年（昭和十二
 年）迄増加ノ一途ヲ辿リ、二億四千七百萬圓カ
 ラ出發シテ徐々ナガラ着々ト増加ヲ續ケテ一九三
 六年（昭和拾壹年）迄ニハ五億一千五百萬圓ニ
 達シ、海軍省豫算モ亦同様ニ増加シ、一九三六年度取
 府豫算中凡ソ其四八%ハ陸海軍省ノ要求ニ
 應ズル爲ニ使用サレツツアツタノデアアル。註 (a)

e、速記録

八五四〇一頁。

0159 0006 0924

KAYA SUMMATION-II

II-4

一九一七年（大正六年）ヨリ一九二〇年（大正九年）迄ノ對外方面ニ於テハ賀屋ハ大藏省勅務トシテ合衆國及ビ「ヨーロッパ」ニ駐在シタ。

一九二七年（昭和二年）賀屋ハ藏相秘書官事務取扱トシテ「ジュネーブ」會議ニ出席シ一九二九年（昭和四年）ニハ倫敦海軍會議（日本）全權隨員デアッタ。

一九三四年（昭和九年）賀屋ハ片委員會委員デアッタ。一九三六年（昭和拾一年）賀屋ハ對露事務局參與デアリ、北海道拓殖計畫調査會、海外拓殖委員會ニ委員トシテ參加シタ。

II-6

a、法廷遊 第三三三號 遊記録 三〇五至一五頁

II-6 一九三七年（昭和十二年）二月二日ヨリ一九三七年（昭和十二年）六月四日迄ノ寂相辯論ニ由テ

太郎ハ前任者馬場ガ承認シタ軍費豫算ノ増加ヲ阻止シヨウト決心シ、其レ故ニ軍部ト闘フニ當ツテ其ノ援助ヲ求メルタメニ賀屋ヲ次官ニ任命シタ。軍部ハ其勢カノ故ニ軍費豫算ヲ確立シタ。賀屋ハ良ク補佐ノ任ヲ盡シツイニ軍部ヲシテ其ノ軍費ヲ四千六百萬圓削減サセルコトニ成功シタ。金額ハ誠ニ些少デアツタ。註 (a)

II-7

新ノ如ク海軍軍費増加及ビ總費ヲ削減セントシテ失敗シタ背景ヲ持ツテ賀屋ハ第一次近衛内閣ニ蔵相トシテ入閣シタ。賀屋ガ此行動ニ出タ動機ハ府案ハ軍部ノ要求ト支配ヲ抑制シ得ルト云フ信念デアツタノダロウカ、彼ノ前任者ラハ失敗シタ。ソレトモ賀屋ノ行動ヲ促シタモノハ他ノ理由デアツタノダロウカ。即チ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十八日東條ガ賀屋ニ對シ蔵相トシテ閣内ニ於ケル援助ト指導トラ求メタ時ニ再ビ表面ニ現レタト我々が考ヘルテノ理由デアツタノダロウカ。

015900050925

己ノ政治経済理論ヲ北支民衆ニ持シツケツ、アツ
 タ。(e)

B 第二 期

II-9

一九三七年（昭和十二年）六月四日賀屋ハ第一
 次近衛内閣ニ入閣シタ。賀屋ガ専断策進受ニシ
 シテ反試シタト稱スル軍閥カ内閣ニ於ケル賀屋ノ

II-8

e	d	c	b	a
遊記録	遊記録	遊記録	遊記録	遊記録
二三一頁	三三六頁	八二六頁	八二六頁	五九〇一四頁

P-6

II—8

第一次近衛内閣成立直前ノ時機ハ重大ナ時期デアツタ。是大ナ政策ガ計畫作成サレ、實行ハ財務局長トシテ大藏次官トシテ、ソレ等政策ノ作成ト其意義トヲ知ツテ居タニ相違ナイ。(c) 防共協

定ガ承認サレ效果ヲ發生シテ居タ一九三七年(昭和十二年)六月重要国策五ヶ年計畫ガ起算サレ、

(b) 續イテ軍需品生産五ヶ年計畫長綱ガ起算サ

レタ (c) 滿洲ニ於イテハ種々ナル「事告」ガ起

リツ、アリ、ソレニ依リテ日本軍部ハ更ニ深く北支へ進入シテ行ツタ。

人的資源ト資金トヲ(日本)本国カラ求メル要求ハ不斷ニ増大シツ、アツタ (d) ソシテ軍部ハ自

0159 0006 0926

九三七年ノ石油貯蔵量ハ感シイ増加率ヲ示シタ、
 (b) 平年輸出向ケノ生産品デアツタ石炭ハ國內消費
 量ノ待望ヲ附ケラレ而モ石炭増加計畫 (c) 方立
 案サレ、滿洲口ニハ重工業ガ確立サレタ (d) 日
 本ノ經濟ガ動キ始メタ。ソノ計算キ動キ始メタ。
 一九三七年七月、直軍ハ上海港橋ヘマルコ、ポーロ
 ー橋 (e) ヲ攻撃シタ。ソシテ一九三七年七月
 十日ニ内閣ハ大軍ヲ北支ヘ増派スル決議ヲナシ

II-10

a	通記録	八五〇三頁
b	通記録	八五九二頁
c	通記録	八五九六頁
d	通記録第二三九號ノ通記録	二六六〇頁
e	通記録	三七六一頁

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KAYA SUMMATION-II

II-10

同僚デアツタ即チ西相杉山、参謀總長職任、陸軍
 次長今井、陸軍次官梅津、軍務局長後宮、海軍に
 参謀長東條、及ビ前内閣ト同ジ海軍省軍人
 カ齋藤ト同ジ閣内ニ居タ。賀屋ハ軍部カ支配權ヲ
 握ツテ居タ事、軍部カソノ計畫ヲ遂行スル爲ニ經
 費増加ヲ求メル要求ヲ削減スルコトノ不可能ヲ事
 ヲ知ツテイタ。此事ヲ充分ニ知サ乍ラ賀屋ハ東相
 就任ヲ受諾シタノデアアル。

一九三六年二月、日本ハ自家統制經濟(6)ニ

意キヲ込メタ財政計畫ヲ連續的ニ立テ給メタ。一

II-10

j	i	h	g	f
道記録	道記録	道記録	道記録	法廷記
二四三〇頁	三四六六頁	三三七八頁	三三七七頁	第二六〇號
				道記録
				三四八七頁

0159 0006 0928

KAYA SUMMATION—II

タ (f) 賀屋後告ハ此ノ國語ニ變成シタ、ソシテ此ノ
國語ハ當時漸増一送ヲ進リツ、アツタ東京ヲ益々上
昇セシメルコト、ナツタ。コレコソ日華戦争ノ始マ
リテアツテ、日本軍ハ南進ヲ續ケ、一九三七年八月
(g) ニハ上海ヲ攻陸同年十二月 (h) ニハ南京ヲ攻陸
シタ。

一九三七年十二月十二日米國軍艦バネー號カ沈没サ
レタ。(i) 南來日本軍ノ甲國侵陸ハ一九二三年迄
續シタ。(j)

ハ最早リフレーションノ目的トスルモノテハナク、
全ク事實上ノ競争ノ状態ニ入ツタノデアアル。
臨時事發特別會計ガ設定サレ、
膨脹シタ。ト云ツテ石ル。(a) 財政支出ハ急激ニ

P-9
II-12 II-11

2 通記 八五〇—一二二頁
2 法 第三八〇—九二二頁
2 通記 二五二—二八頁

0159 0006 0929

KAYA SUMMATION-II

II-11

歳費計算ハ一九三六年ノ二十五億圓カラ一九三七年ニハ五十五億圓以上ニ増大シタ。此ノ内ノ約七八%ハ巨海軍ガ侵略行動ヲ實行スル爲ニ使用サレタノデアアル。賀屋被告ガ藏相當時即チ一九三八年ノ歳費計算ハ八十億圓ヲ超過シ其ノ七〇%ハ巨海軍ニ依テ使用サレタコトトナツテイタル。(2)

II-12

石橋証人ニ依レバ一九三七年ノ昭和十二年ノ七月以後ハ、「財政状態ハ益ク變ツテシマヒ、ソレ

ルノハ、彼カ証言台テ屢々繰返シタ幾多ノ故意ノ
虚言ノ一ツニ廻ギナイノデアツテ日本ノ經濟ヲ
時体制下ニ置カントスル取手決議ガ行ハレタ當時
ノ彼ノ議會演説、公開演説、ラデオ放送、論説等
ハ彼ガ自ラ進ンデ活潑ナ戦争共謀者デアツタコト
ノ有罪ヲ立證スルモノデアル。

II-13

a、法廷証第三三三七號、追記録三〇六〇ニ頁

KAYA SUMMATION-II

II-13

賀屋被告ハ當時ノ自己ノ活動ニ關シテ「私ハ山積セル困難ナ事務ニ忙殺サレテ將來ノ競争ノ準備ヲナスト云フ餘裕ガナカツタ」ト述ベテイルケレドモ、併シ彼ハ自己ノ行動並ニ内閣閣議ノ正當ナルヲ證センガ爲ニ民衆ノ前ニ現レテ演説ヲシタリ、記事ヲ書イタリスルダケノ時間ノ餘裕ハ私ニモツテイタ。彼ハ軍部ノ積暴ヤ獨裁ヲ非難シタコトハ一度モナカツタ。

II-14

將來ノ競争ノ準備ト宣誓供述ヲナスト云フ餘裕ガナカツタ。ト宣誓供述書ノ中テ彼が陳述シテイ

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一九三七年十月二十六日賓屋ハ日華事變ハ實際
 ハ日華兩國間ノ戦争デアルコト、日本ハ單ニ軍事
 的ニ適當ナ準備ヲナサネバナラヌノミナラズ思想
 外交財政、經濟等ニベテノ分身ニ於テモ準備シナ
 クレバナラヌト述ベアイル。「我が國ハ現在尠ク
 トモ戦費二百億圓ヲ支出シ得ル——第一ノ急務ハ
 海軍ノ軍事費要求額ヲ支辯スルコトデアルト
 彼ハ指摘シテイル。此ノ陳述ハ賓屋ニ依リ「武力
 戦ト經濟戦」^(a)ト題シテナサレタ演説中ニ述ベラ
 レテオリ、其ノ演説ハ元彼ノ秘書ヲ勤メテイタ者
 ノ編集ニ係リ「戦時經濟生活」^(b)ト題シテ一九三
 八年ニ發行サレタ賓屋ノ演説書說集ノ一部ヲナス
 モノデアリマス。此ノ演説ハ單ニ彼ガ戦争ヲ夢想
 シアイトコトヲ示スノミナラズ、亦彼ガ戦争遂行
 ニ必要ナ經濟政策ニ對シテ國民ノ注意ヲ喚起スル
 ニ全刀ヲ傾倒シタコトヲ示スモノデアル。
 彼ガ此ノ總刀戰準備ニ參與スル自己ノ役割ヲ安ク
 見積モラナカツタ一例ヲ示スナラバ「特ニ經濟戦
 コソ戦争ヲ勝利ニ導ク最重要原因デアル。」ト囑
 破シテイル叙述ヲミルベキデアル。^(c)

a、法廷証第 3338 號 A、逐記録 30、667-170 頁
 b、法廷証第 3338 號、逐記録 30、668 頁
 c、法廷証第 3338 號 G、逐記録 30、666 頁

待スベキカラ説キ、國民精神總動員法ヲ後援スルニ就テ國民ノ精神的方面ノ重要性ヲ高調シタモノデアアル。執筆ノ日附ハ一九三七年十二月十三日トナツアイル。茲ニ提出スル此ノ論說ハ賀屋ガ以テ共謀者ノ一員トシテ軍部ト協力シ日本國民ニ同僚ノ思慮ヲ擴メル爲ニ自己ノ時局ト勢力ヲ傾注シテ日本國民ラシテ將ニ來ルベキモノニ備エシメントシタ事實ヲ描寫スルモノデアアル。

- II-16 a、法廷証第三三三八號B、速記録三〇、六七三—四頁
 b、法廷証第三三三三八號C、速記録三〇、六七六頁
- II-17 a、法廷証第三三三八號C、速記録三〇、六七七頁

II-16

「長期戦への備へ」^(a) 一九三八年四月十二日ノ
 執筆テ同巻カラノ拔萃デアル。コレハ中國テ戦ツ
 テイル兵隊ノ忠誠ト勇敢ヲ叙述シ新シイ近代の物
 質、裝備ノ必要ヲ力説シテ世論ニ訴エタモノデア
 ル。ソノ中テ賀屋ハ一九三八年ノ歳算豫算ハ八十
 億圓ニ達スルデアロウト云イ、「今後壹ケ年内ニ
 五十億圓ノ公債ヲ發行セバナラヌガ、コレガ、
 ウマク消化サレルカ否カハ戦時財政經濟政策ガ成
 功スルカ否カノ分レ目デアアル。」ト述ベテイル。^(b)

II-17

同巻カラノ、モウ一ツノ拔萃「戦後ノ女性」^(a)
 ハ婦人が如何ニシテ助力スベキカ、婦人ニ何ヲ期

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KAYA SUMMATION-II

II-18 日獨伊協定ハ一九三七年十一月十二日ニ締結
 サレタ。(a) 對華政策ヲ決定スル爲ニ開カレタ
 一九三八年一月十一日ノ御前會議ニ賀屋ハ出席シ
 テイタ。彼ハ臨時資金調整法ヲ適用スル權能ヲ
 與ヘラレ「特別軍事協定」(b)カラ出資ヲ認可
 スル權能ヲ與ヘラレタ。
 一九三八年三月ニハ電力法(c)ガ公布サレタ。同
 年四月三十日ニハ北支那開發會社ガ創立サレ、
 後彼ハ同社ノ總裁トナツタ。(d)
 滿洲重工業會社創立ノ計畫ハ既ニ立案サレ、施
 セラレテイタ。(e)

II-19 此ノ期間、銀行業方面ニ於テ賀屋被告ハ各銀
 行ノ投資方針調整ヲ指揮シ、コレニ依テ銀行ノ
 自治的行動ニ表後ノ止メヲ刺シタ。(a)
 ソシテ一九三八年二月ニハ中國ニ於テ自己ノ取
 掌下ニ儲備銀行(復讐)ヲ創立シ管理シタ。(b)

II-18	a、	速記録	六〇三頁		
	b、	法廷證	第八四〇號	速記録	八五五三頁
	c、	速記録	八五四三頁		
	d、	速記録	八二七四頁		
	e、	速記録	八四七四頁		
		速記録	五一三八頁	法廷證	第三三九頁
		速記録	二九六〇一頁		
II-19	a、	法廷證	第八四〇號	速記録	八五五八頁
	b、	法廷證	第八四〇號	速記録	八四四四一五頁

II-22

a、	法廷証	第三三三九號	速記録	三〇六八九頁
b、	法廷証	第三三三九號	速記録	三〇六九〇—九一頁
c、	法廷証	第三三三九號	速記録	三〇六九九頁
d、	法廷証	第三三三九號	速記録	三〇六九七〇〇頁

ガ「亞細亞人ノ爲ノ亞細亞」ヲ實現スル爲ニ自
己ノ采スベキ役目ノ莫大ナルヲ認メバコトヲ證
スルベキモノガアル。彼宣ヘテ曰ク「我々經濟
人ハ何ヨリモ先ヅ經濟地獄ノ祇一ヲ貸セナケレ
バナラナイ」彼ハ「亞細亞人ノ亞細亞」ノ統一
ハ其以後ノ分析ニ於テハ經濟的ノモノデナクテ
ハナラナイ」ト説明シテイル。(d)

KAYA Summation-II

II-22

被告賀屋ハ一九三八年十一月二日ノ日清支統
濟圓卓會議ノ議長デアリ、(a) 又此當會議ニ於テ

五人ヲ賞讃シ支那ニ於ル戰争ヲ名ツケテ「強敵」
ト呼ンダ、日本ヲシテ東亞ノ真ノ安定勢力タラ
シムル爲ニ軍備ト強力ナ經濟力ノ擴張ヲ強調シ
タ。國民ハ長期經濟建設ノ完成ニ向ツテ國家的
全カラ傾注スベシト賀屋ハ勸奨シタ。(b) 一九三

八年十一月廿九日賀屋ニ於テ彼ハ彼ノ演說ニ於
テ大東亞ノ一致ノ必要シ示シタ。(c) 可ニ亦賀屋

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II-23

a、	遠記録	三〇七〇三頁
b、	遠記録	三八七二頁

軍事遂行ヲ助ケル爲ニ是等ノ謀業ニ當リツツア
 ツク事ヲ知ツテ居ツタ。(a) 此ノ事ハ頁ニゲツテ
 ノ証言ニ依テ立證セラレル。曰ク北支開發會社
 ノ目的ハ日華間ノ戰鬥ニ際シテハ軍用資材ヲ供
 シ、日本ノ軍備ヲ擴張シ又半和産業ノ用ニ應ス
 ルニアルト實産ガ説明シタリト。(b) 此會社ノ組
 織、企業、目的等ハ頁ニ一紙以テ終局告第百八四、
 八五頁ニ於テ更ニ詳説ス。實産ノ此會社ニ於ケ

KAYA Summation-II

II-23

賀屋ハ一九三九年八月ヨリ一九四一年十月ニ
至ルマテ北支開發會社々長テアツタ。當法廷ニ
於ケル賀屋ノ證言ニ從ハバ北支開發會社ノ役員
ハ中國側招聘ニセトズクモノテ又日本軍ヲ接待スル
中國及び南方ヘノ進攻ハ是亦日本軍ヲ接待スル
タメニ中國側ニ行ツタ遠足デアル。賀屋ノ賣却
トシテハ第一ニ滿洲ニ軍隊ヲ遣メル事ニ對シテ
財政的援助ヲ與ヘル事デアツタ。大藏省ノ役人
トシテ及び北支開發會社々長トシテ、彼ハ日本
軍隊ガ強カシ以テ中國ノ産業ヲ接收シ、日本ノ

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平和ナ方向ニ向ケル爲努力スル事が適當ナリト
考へ即夜入閣ニ應ジタ。(b)

II-25

コ、ニ國家ヲ平和ノ方向ニ向ケルベク念願シ
タル賀庭ハ實ニ多年日本國ノ財政ニ關與シ、軍
部ノ増大スル要求ニ對シ斷エズ固ヒ續ケテ其分
力ノ盡シカリシヲ流淚シタル人ト同一人デアリ、

II-24

a、	法廷證第三三三七號	速記録	三〇六四八頁
	法廷證第三六五五號	速記録	三六三一五頁
b、	法廷證第三三三七號	速記録	三〇六四八頁

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KAYA SUMMATION-II

ル關係ハ其ニ彼ヲ共謀者トシテ認定スルノデア
ル。

D 一九四一年十月十八日ヨリ一九四四年

二月九日ニ至ル東條内閣ニ於ケル大藏

大臣トシテ及ビ爾后終戦時ニ至ル迄ノ

賀屋ノ存在

II-24

一九四一年十月十七日以後ハ賀屋ニ撥相トシ

テ入内スル事ヲ請フタ。東條ガ日米交渉ヲ續行

シ争點ヲ友好的ニ解決スル意圖ヲ有スル旨ヲ賀

屋ニ確言シタ。(a) 後賀屋ハ此際入内シテ國家ヲ

本ハ頁ニ長略ノ逆並ヲ綴ケテ居タ。彼自身マ
直部ノ長求ニ合致スル以策ヲ三振シテ居タノデ
アル。

KAYA SUMMATION—II

亦滿洲事變ハ遂ニ中國トノ本格的戦争トナルヲ
体面シタル同一人デアリ、又蘇相トシテ平和産
業ヲ轉ジテ、武器製造ノ計畫ヲナシタル其ノ人
デアル。賀正ガ眞面目ニ國家ヲ平和ナ方向ニ向
ケ得ル信念ヲ持ツコトガ出来タカドウカト云フ
モツトモナ疑ガ存スル。彼ハ日本ニ於ケル軍國
主義ノ傾向ノ制御スベカラザルヲ知ツテ居タ。
三國同盟ハ既ニ前年訂印ヲ經テ居タ。而シテ日

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II-26

- a、速記録二六九七三頁。
- b、速記録八四六〇頁。
- c、速記録二六九七四頁。
- d、速記録八四五三頁。
- e、速記録八四五七頁。

ル及四千五百萬ギルダノ製造ヲ要求シタノテ
 アル。(d) 此軍票發行ノ手續ハ大臣及ビ陸海
 軍大臣ニ委セラレタノデアル。(e) 而シテ一九四
 一年十一月一日賀屋ハ日本銀行ニ對シテ外貨軍
 票ニ關スル訓令ヲ出シテ在ル。

東條ノ保證ニ對スル質屋ノ信賴ハヤガテ薄カラザルヲ得ナカツタ。即チ新以相ニ依テ企圖セラルベキ最初ノ仕事ハ外國通貨與ノ爲ト草案ヲ作ル事ガ其ノ一ツデアツタノデアル。(a) 一九

四一年ノ初期ヨリ軍用通貨ハ製造セラレテアツテ、其名稱ハ「キルダー」「ドル」及「ペソ」デアツタ。(b) 外貨表示軍用手紙發行ノ件ト稱スル新シキ草案ガ質屋ニ提出サレ、質屋ハ或ル變更ヲ提議シコレハ彼ニ至ツテ承認サレタ。(c) 是ハ、一九四一年十月廿日迄ニ、三千七百萬「ペソ」一九四一年十一月廿日迄ニ四千五百萬ド

項ハ日本交渉ヲ中心トスルセノガ主デアツタ
爲同數相ガ主トナツテ論議スル場合ハナカツ
タ。(d) 團議、聯絡會議、乃至御前會議等ニ
於テ彼ハ出席シテ、其ノ「無發言」ニ依テ注
目ヲ惹イタ。彼ガ自己ト其地位トヲ以テ軍部
ヲ推進スルコトニ責賦シタト何人モ云ハザル
ヲ得ナイ。

II-27

a、速記録三〇六五〇頁。

b、速記録三〇六一〇頁。

c、速記録三〇六五四頁。

d、速記録三〇六一一頁。

法廷證三三三一號

KAYA SUMMATION—II

II—27

賃屋ハ証言シテ「入附後私ハ出來得ル限り
 戦争ヲ回避スル事ニ努力シタルト云ツテ居ル
 (a)

彼ハ何ヲ爲シタルデアルカ、石油事情ガ重大
 デアツタガ故ニ彼ハ「合成油製造、及樟太ヨ
 リ購入ノ方策等ヲ暗示シタル」(b) 案置ハ是ニ依

リテ若シ米國トノ關係斷絶ノ場合ニ其レラシ
 タル石油不足ガ解決サレン事ヲ望ンダ。十一
 月五日ノ聯合會議ニ於テ彼ハ「即決ニ反對シ
 遂ニ他日ノ再議ノ機ヲ與ヘラル、ニ至ツタ」(c)

以上ガ彼ガ「戦ヲ遂クル」爲ニナシタトシテ
 記録ニ示ストコロデアル。彼ハ多クノ場合連
 絡會議ニ出席シタガ連絡會議ニ於ケル協議事

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- a、速記録三五八三頁。
- b、速記録三六〇七二頁。
- c、速記録三六三二四頁。
- d、速記録三五六九六頁。

法廷證第三六五號。
 法廷證第三六五號。
 速記録三六〇六四頁。

KAYA Summation-II

一九四一年十月二十三日ヨリ十一月二日ニ至ル聯絡會議ニ於テ日米兩國間ノ交渉ヲ處理スル爲ノ三ツノ案ガ記草サレタ。賀屋ハ藏相トシテ此凡テノ會合ニ列席シタ。(a) 一九四一年十一月五日ノ聯合會議ハ遂ニ此ノ内ノ第三案即、交渉失敗ノ以テ於テ作以準備ヲ續行スルノ案ニ決シタ。(b) 交渉ガ成功シタケレバ合衆國ト戦争ガ起ルノデアル。東條ノ言ニ依レバ東郷及賀屋ハ翌朝マテ其承認ヲ留保シタ而シテ賀屋ハ翌朝ニ至リ、該案承認ノ旨ヲ東條ニ傳ヘタイト云フノデアル。(c) 賀屋ハ東條ニ對シテ前日モ該案ニ反對シタノデハナカツタノデアルト語ツタ。多分ニコレハ天度良イ時期ニ戦争ヲ開始スレバ勝利ヲ得ル機會ガアルト(統帥部ガ主張シタ事實ニ依ツタノデアロウ。(d)

剛トノ交渉ガ失敗ニ終ツタノテ日本ハ合衆國
英國、オランダト開戦スルト云フ事ヲ東條ハ
證明シタ。賀屋ハ日本ノ經濟力及ビ財政力ヲ
報告シタ。(b) 會議ハ開戦ト決シ東條ニ依レバ
御前會議ノ決議ハ開戦ト考ヘラレタ。(c)

II-29

a 法廷證 第三六五五號

速記録 三六三六四一七頁。

II-30

a、

速記録 三〇七〇五頁。

b、 法廷證 三六五五號

速記録 三六三七一一四頁

c、 法廷證 三六五五號

速記録 三六三七九頁。

II—29

一九四一年／昭和十六年／十一月二十九日
 重臣及び内閣閣員ハ合衆國、英國、南領東印度
 ニ對スル戦争ニ關スル意見言上ノ爲御前ニ伺
 候シタ。賀屋モ此ノ會議ニ出席シタ。(a)

II—30

賀屋ハ一九四一年／昭和十六年／十二月一
 日ノ御前會議ニ出席シタ。彼ハ所以テ戦争ニ
 反對シナイ首相ニ話々ガ會議ノ際ニモ彼ハ反
 對シナカッタ。彼ハ豫メ合衆國ニ對シテ開戦
 スルト云フ事ヲ知ツテイタ。彼ハコレヲ連絡
 會議又ハ首相官邸ニ於テ東條、島田、星野ノ
 イズレカヨリ聞イタ。(a) 此ノ會議ノ次第書ハ

十一月五日ニ決定シタ日本ノ國策ニ基ク合衆

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I-I-38

ヲ承知シタトシテセ彼ハ決シテキツバリト共
同謀議カラ離脱シタノデハナイ。彼ハ軍部及ビ軍部ノ
行動ニ對シ深ク根ザシタ反對ヲ持ツテイタト
云ハレナガラ然モ僻職セズ、ムシロ證據ニ依
レバ第一ニ軍部ヲ援ケタノデアルカラ、彼ノ
責任タルヤ尙サラ大キイノデアル。特ニ彼ガ
其等ノ政策ガ完全ニ愚イセノト知リ愚イモノ
ト確信シツ、承認シタト云フノデアルカラ尙
サラデアアル。

一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ十二月二日內閣
ニ企發院總裁ヲ議長トシ企發院外務、大藏、

KAYA SUMMATION-II

II-31

賀屋ノ辯護ノ主ナル點ハ彼ガ内閣ニ於ケル地位或ハ其他政府ニ於ケル地位ニツク事ヲ承諾シタ動機ガ平和ヲ獲得スル努力ニ於テ軍部ト闘フコトニアツタト云フ事及ビ共謀者達ニ依テナサレタ行動ヤ手段ニ常ニ反對シテ居ツタト云フ事ニアラシイ。而シテナガラ賀屋ハ共同謀議ニ參加シタ。ソレデ今ニナツテ共謀者達ノ其後ノ所爲ニ對シ彼ハ責任ガナイト主張スル事ハ出來ナイ。

若シ彼ガ或所爲ニ對シ反對デマリ蓋々ソレラ

0159 0006 0943

大臣ノ進言ニモトヅキ勅令ニ依リ大東亞省ガ設立サレタ。賀屋ハ當時大藏大臣デアツタ。賀屋ハ一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノ二月十九日迄東條内閣ノ閣員デアリ、戦争遂行ノタメニサレタ總テノ行動ニ對シソノ責任ヲ分擔セネバナラヌ。彼ハ決シテ如何ナル時ニ於テモ共同謀議カラ離脱シタノテハナカツタ。

起訴狀ニアル罪狀第二及び第三類ニ關シテ賀屋ハ上述ノ主要ト存任ニ期間ヲ通ジテ他ノ閣員スベテノ持ツ責任ガアル。コレ許リテナ

KAYA SUMMATION-II

國軍及び海軍省ノ職員ヨリナル第六委員會ガ
設ケラレタ。該委員會ノ事業及ビソノ存立ハ
秘密ニセラレル等ニナツテイタ。一九四一年
ノ昭和十六年ノ十二月十二日此ノ委員會ハ南
方地域ニ對スル經濟對策案ト題スル報告ヲ提
出シタ。此ノ政策ノ目的ハ戦争ノ遂行ノ爲ノ
重要資源ニ對スル需要ヲ滿タシ日本經濟ヲ強
化スル等デアツタ。

一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ十一月一日内閣諸

P-25

KAYA SUMMATION-II

ク「泰緬鐵道」ノ建設ト云フ如キ大事業が大
蔵大臣ト相談ナク且ツソノ同意ナシニ行ハレ
タチアロウト云フ事ハ考ヘラレナイ。若シ彼
ガ中國ニオケル又大平洋戦争ノ登舞台ヲ通ジ
テ行ハレタ暴行ヲ知ラナカツヌナラバ、コレ
ハアリ得ナイコトナノダガ、彼ガ如何シテモ
呼ビオコサネバナラナイ明日ナ知識ノ本ヲ利
用スルノヲ、タゞ故意ニ回避シマカラニ外ナ
ラヌ。

七、十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、

詩四三。11節一二、八、十、十二、十五、十六、十

七、十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、

二十八、

詩四四。11節一二、八、十、十二、十五、十六、十

七、十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、

二十八、

詩四五。11節一八、十、十二、十五、十六、十七、十

八、二十二、二十三、二十六、

詩四六。11節一二、八、十、十二、十五、十六、十七、

十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、

詩四七。11節一二、八、十五、十六、十七、十八、二

十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、二十八、

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KAYA SUMMATION-II

第 二 部

II-34

中ノ 証 據 ハ 證 據 ニ 依 テ 被 告 質 疑 ニ 對 ス ル 起 訴 狀
中ノ 証 據 ガ 下 分 立 証 サ レ ル コ ト ヲ 申 立 テ マ ス。

各 訴 因 ヲ 證 明 ス ル 資 料 ナ ル 節 以 下 ノ 節 Ⅱ 説 明 致 シ
マ ス。

訴 因 一。II 節 一、二、八、十、十二、十五、十六、十

七、十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、

二十八、

訴 因 二。II 節 一、二、八、十、十二、十五、十六、十

KAYA SUMMATION-I I

十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、
二十八、

詠函十三。I節一二、八、十、十三、十六、十七、
十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、
二十八、

詠函十四。I節一二、八、十、十五、十六、十七、
十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、
二十八、

詠函十五。I節一二、八、十五、十六、十七、十八、
二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、二十八、

誅囚八。II節一二、八、十、十五、十六、十七、

十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、

二十八、

誅囚九。II節一二、八、十、十五、十六、十七、

十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、

二十八、

誅囚十。II節一二、八、十、十五、十六、十七、

十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、

誅囚十一。II節一二、八、十、十五、十六、十七、

十八、二十二、二十三、二十六、二十七、

二十八、

誅囚十二。II節一二、八、十、十五、十六、十七、

SUMMATION OF CASE AGAINST HIRANUMA

EE-1. HIRANUMA is charged in all counts in the indictment except counts 48, 49 and 50, which relate to the unlawful killing and murdering of a large number of civilians and disarmed soldiers of the Republic of China in the cities of Changsha, Hongyang, Kwellin and Luichow.

GOVERNMENTAL SERVICE

EE-2. From 1890 to 1945, HIRANUMA had been continuously in government service in various capacities. From 1911, when he was appointed vice Minister of Justice, through appointment on 6 September 1923 as Minister of Justice; on 2 February 1924 as Councillor of the Privy Council; on 12 April 1926 as Vice President and on 13 March 1936 as President of the Privy Council; on 5 January (to 29 August 1939) as Premier; on his resignation as Premier, to 1945 as a Senior Statesman; and on 6 December 1940 as a Cabinet Member (to 17 October 1941; 6 December 1940, Minister without Portfolio; 21 December 1940, Home Minister; 18 July 1941, Minister without Portfolio) his governmental service was on the highest level. On 9 April 1945, he was re-appointed President of the Privy Council.^a

EE-3. Consequently, all decisions within the competence of the Privy Council between 1928 and 4 January 1939 and (of the Cabinet from the latter date to 18 October 1941 (with the exception of the period of time from 29 August 1939 to 6 December 1940), as well as those of the Senior Statesmen from 29 August 1939 to 1945 determine the responsibility of HIRANUMA, under the indictment.

EE-2

a. Ex 107 T 704

Page 2E-2

EE-4. HIRANUMA was born in Tokyo in September 1867 and was graduated in 1889 from the Imperial University College of Law. From 1890 to 1924, he served as Judge of the Tokyo District Court and the Tokyo Court of Appeals, Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, and head of the Supreme Court. On 9 January 1924, he was appointed a member of the House of Peers and on 28 October 1926, he was created a baron for distinguished services.^a

EE-5. HIRANUMA was President of the KOKUHON-SHA, a society founded in 1920 for the purpose of fostering the spirit of nationalism, bolstering the foundation of the state, working for the dissemination of learning and morality and exalting the national spirit. Its membership increased with great rapidity to a total of 50,000. At the time of its organization the society was in close touch with military circles and with the Ministry of Justice. It published two magazines, the Foundation of State Society Paper (Semi-monthly - circulation 30,000) and the Foundation of State Society Magazine (monthly - circulation 25,000). KOISO and ARAKI were members of this society.^a

EE-6. The association was, however, an instrument used by HIRANUMA for political purposes: for example, on 16 July 1931, HARADA records that "even in the matter of disarmament, it is clear that the extreme rightist KOKUHON-SHA is maneuvering in concert with the army."^a

EE-4.

a. Ex 102 T 704

EE-5

a. Ex 16. T 1636 (pp 2,3,4 of Ex)

EE-6

a. Ex 375-B T 375C

PRIVY COUNCIL

EE-7. HIRAHARA was Vice-President of the Privy Council from 1925 to 1933, when he became its President, serving in that capacity until 1939 at which time he became Prime Minister.

EE-8. In view of the vast powers of the Privy Council, to write a summary of the Prosecution's case against HIRAHARA, would be to write the whole story of Japan's attempt to secure the military, naval, political and economic domination of Greater East Asia.

EE-9. All of the acts of the Japanese Government within the competence of the Privy Council having as their ends the violation of International Law, treaties, agreements, assurances; planning, preparing, initiating or the waging of aggressive warfare are chargeable to HIRAHARA and are overt acts of the conspirators as alleged in the indictment.

EE-10. The Privy Council was a continuing body whose advice, under the ordinance defining its powers promulgated in 1890,^a was to be solicited by the Emperor on constitutional questions, treaties and agreements, and prior to the issuance of Emergency Imperial Ordinances, when the Diet was not in session, and to the enactment of ordinary legislation to be submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet. The Council became, however, a Third Chamber with broad supervisory powers over the executive in both foreign and domestic

EE-10

a. Ex 83 T 505

(EE-10)
matters, owing no political responsibility to the Diet or the people, yet exerting important influences over the entire affairs of the State. On bills which had been introduced by a Diet member and had passed the Diet, it could either approve or disapprove in toto; regarding projects of law which had been submitted to it by the Cabinet before introduction in the Diet, it could not only veto but could also freely exercise its amending power. The members of the Cabinet were ex-officio members of the Privy Council.^b

EE-11. The cross-examination of defense witness FUJITA reveals that if the Privy Council withheld its approval from an enactment upon which that approval was required, and if the bill was an important one, "the bill would either be changed or it (might) cause the resignation of the cabinet."^a

EE-12. The more important criminal acts of the conspiracy committed while HIRANUMA was on the Privy Council will be set forth, except those acts committed while he was a member of the Privy Council by virtue of his being Prime Minister; such acts will be found below when HIRANUMA's responsibilities as Prime and as State Minister will be discussed.

EE-13. As President of the Privy Council (13 March 1936 to 4 January 1939) and as Premier from the latter date to 29 August 1939, HIRANUMA was privileged to attend Im-

EE-10

b. T 640-1; 662-3

EE-11

a. Fujita T 17E26

(23-13)
perial Conferences.^a

EE-14. He attended the Imperial Conference of 11 January 1938, at the request of Premier HONOME and with the sanction of the Emperor "because of the Privy Council's connection with diplomacy, treaties, etc."^a This conference decided Japan's national policy toward China,^b laying down the conditions on which Japan was prepared to conclude peace. Almost all of the terms of the decision are to be found in the final treaty between Japan and the new Chinese Government under Wang Ching Wei concluded in November 1940.^c

EE-15. Before matters progressed very far the Japanese Government on 16 January 1938 issued a statement breaking off negotiations with the National Government and announcing its decision to cooperate with a new government and to construct a New China.^a This act was a direct treaty violation, although the statement said that the action involved no change in policy respecting China's territorial rights or sovereignty, or the rights and interests of other powers in China.^b

EE-16. At the time of the Manchurian Incident on 18 September 1931, which resulted in the economic, political and military aggression of Manchuria by Japan, HIRANUMA was Vice President of the Privy Council.

EE-17. Regarding the action of Japan in Manchuria in relation to the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris,

EE-13
a. Ex 80 T 682

EE-15
a. Ex 268 T 3563
b. Ex 270 T 3600

EE-14
a. Ex 3264 T 29840
b. Ex 3264 T 29837
c. Ex 40 T 499; 5320
Ex 3264 T 29837

7 159 0007 0953

(EE-17)

Stimson on 24 February 1932, stated that "a situation has developed which cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of those two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen."^a

EE-18. On 9 December 1931, the Manchurian Incident was considered by the Privy Council. At the meeting, Councillor EGI pointed out that if the Japanese Army should attack Chinchow (which it occupied on or about 3 January 1932 in spite of assurances given by the Foreign Office to the United States on 24 November 1931 that they would not do so), "great will be our loss of credit with the League of Nations and the Great Powers."^a Japan is, he continued, "losing general confidence as a result of continually taking action under the pretext of self-defense,"^b and "though it might be very convenient for Japan to have Manchukuo an independent state, I do not believe the great powers would accept it."^c

EE-19. Nevertheless, at an Extraordinary Meeting of the Council on or about 17 December 1931 it decided that the four provinces of Manchuria should be occupied by Japanese troops and for this purpose the budget requested was approved.^a

EE-20. As early as 7 January 1932, after having been reminded by Stimson that the United States would refuse to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered into in violation of the covenants of the Nine Power Treaty and the

EE-17

a. Ex 932 T 9370

EE-19

a. Ex 169-C T 2219

EE-18

a. Ex 2205-A T 15761
b. Ex 2205-A T 15761
c. Ex 2205-A T 15761

(EE-20)

Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Japanese Foreign Minister assured the United States that so far as Japan could secure it, the policy of the Open Door would always be maintained in Manchuria and China.^a But, two days later, on 1 March 1932, Henry PU YI, a former Emperor of China, was induced to accept the position as the Puppet Regent of Manchukuo.^b

EE-21. On 15 September 1932, the Privy Council unanimously approved the Protocol between Japan and Manchukuo. At this meeting, HIRANUMA served as Vice Chairman and as Chairman of the Committee of Judges to report on the bill. According to HIRANUMA's report, Manchukuo became an independent state by virtue of the action of its citizens; therefore, recognition by Japan would not only help Manchukuo but would also confuse the issue and save Japan from embarrassment before the League of Nations; and, while the recognition of Manchukuo would "as may be easily imagined, cause for a time no small shock to the world, (it) will not bring about any international crisis. Under the circumstances, our country considered it advisable at this juncture to give Manchukuo our formal recognition and open friendly relations with her."^a

EE-22. By the terms of the Protocol, Manchukuo was to respect the international agreements concluded by the Republic of China which were applicable to Manchukuo; Japan and Manchukuo agreed to mutually respect each other's territorial integrity; all the rights which Japan and her sub-

EE-20

a. Ex 932 T 9370
b. Fu Yi T 3977

EE-21

a. Ex 241 T 2972

7 159 0007 0955

(EE-22)
 jects had possessed under various Sino-Japanese arrangements, both public and private, were to be confirmed and respected by Manchukuo; and both states agreed to jointly defend themselves against any attack. By means of secret agreements Japan was entrusted with the national defense of Manchukuo and the maintenance of peace within its borders; with the control of the existing railroads, harbors, waterways and air-routes, and with the construction of new routes as required by the Japanese Army for the purpose of national defense; Japanese citizens were to be appointed State Councillors and officials of the central as well as the local governments whose selection was to be made upon the recommendation of the Commander of the Kwantung Army and whose dismissals were subject to his approval.^a

EE-23. Although, by these various agreements, the control of Manchukuo was apparently under the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Army, the Commander-in-Chief of that army was, of course, subject to orders from the Japanese Government, which government continued to exercise control either by Cabinet action or orders from the Minister of War, showing clearly that the Government of Manchukuo was absolutely under the direct control of the Japanese Government.^a

EE-24. This protocol was ratified by the Privy Council only after exhaustive discussion regarding the protocol and Japan's obligations under the treaty system. That the

EE-22
 a. Ex 241 T 2972

EE-23
 a. Ex 230 T 2903

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(EE-24)

councillors knew that the protocol violated the Nine Power Pact; that Japan's contention would be rejected by the world's public opinion as well as by the International Court of Justice; that Manchukuo became independent not of her own free will but through the aggressive actions of Japan can be proved by the points and objections raised and the replies and evasive answers given by the various councillors. HIRANUMA, it must be remembered, was the chairman of the committee which investigated and favorably reported the bill.

EE-25. Councillor OKADA raised three points. First, whether or not the recognition of Manchukuo was in violation of the Nine Power Pact, referring in this connection, to the statement in the Diet of Foreign Minister UCHIDA that Manchukuo "had become independent by the free will of her people and that Japan had not agreed by the Nine Power Pact to prevent the independence of the Chinese people. OKADA pointed out that the Foreign Minister referred to what might happen if, for example, Canton wished to become independent, he (UCHIDA), being of the opinion that the countries signatory to the Pact were not under an obligation to prevent this independence. OKADA felt, however, that America might be of the opinion that it would not be in violation of the Pact, if Manchukuo became independent of her own free will, but that it would be

(EE-25)

such a violation and disregard of Chinese sovereignty for Japan to assist and maintain this independence. OKADA thought that the Foreign Minister's explanation on this point was inadequate.^a

EE-26. The second point raised by OKADA referred to the conflict between the secret agreements in the bill under discussion and the Nine Power Pact, and the third point related to the arrangement whereby agreements were to be strictly confidential--pointing out if the secret agreements were to be divulged China would demand convocation of a conference of the countries signatory to the Nine Power Pact.^a

EE-27. In reply the Foreign Minister, UCHIDA, stated that, regarding the Nine Power Pact, the action of the Japanese army in coping with the Incident of 18 September 1931 was nothing but the exercise of Japan's right of self-defense; that the Nine Power Pact provided that China's territorial integrity should be respected, but it made no provisions at all for a case where a part of China became "independent as a result of China's own disintegration."^a

EE-28. As to OKADA's second point (whether there is doubt that the contents of the secret treaty were incompatible with the Nine Power Pact) UCHIDA said that there was no conflict between the two as the signatories for the Pact "are concerned with the Open Door principle, principle of equal

EE-25

a. Ex 241 T 2983

EE-26

a. Ex 241 T 2984

EE-27

a. Ex 241 T 2985

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(EE-28)
opportunity, etc." He saw no objection to Japan's being entrusted by Manchukuo with such matters as that country could do for herself.^a

EE-29. In answer to the third question (as to what would be done in the event that the secret agreements became divulged), UCHIDA said that Japan should take special care to prevent leakage, and if by any chance the secret agreement should become known he believed that there was nothing in them to be ashamed of.^a

EE-30. OKADA doubted if the explanations given by the Foreign Minister would satisfy the signatories to the Pact.^a

EE-31. Councillor ISHII said that he felt uneasy about Japan's contention that she could not agree "to the disposition of the Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria by the League of Nations under Article 15 of the League's Covenant."^b

EE-32. In this connection, ISHII argued that "should the dispute over Manchuria, which is not Japanese territory be disposed of according to Article 15, Japan's contention would be rejected by the world's public opinion as well as by the International Court of Justice," but on the other hand, "when Manchukuo is recognized by Japan and becomes an independent state.....the point most disadvantageous to Japan will thereby be removed."^a Regarding Japan's action in Manchukuo and the Anti-War and the Nine Power Pacts, ISHII reasoned that, since Japan has formally recognized Manchukuo

EE-28
a. Ex 241 T 2986

EE-31
a. Ex 241 T 2991

EE-29
a. Ex 241 T 2986

EE-32
a. Ex 241 T 2991

EE-30
a. Ex 241 T 2986

(EE-32)

and will enter into an alliance with her, Japan will be able in the future to assert that the independence of Manchuria was due to the disintegration of China and that the territorial integrity of the Republic of China was broken down by none other than Manchukuo. This will nullify the argument that Japan violated the Nine Power Pact. Therefore, "in consequence of the independence of Manchukuo, it has become unnecessary for the League of Nations to deliberate on the Manchukuo question under Article 15 of the League's Covenant."^b

EE-33. Japan's action in resigning from the League of Nations on 27 March 1933 had been approved by the Privy Council.^a

EE-34. Three events occurred during 1934 involving foreign relations and diplomacy and, therefore, within the purview of the Privy Council: the installation of Henry PU YI as Emperor of Manchukuo on 1 March 1934;^a the issuance of the ANAU Statement on 17 April 1934;^b and the denunciation of the Washington Naval Treaty on 29 December 1934.^c

EE-35. On 17 April 1934, an unofficial statement of the Japanese Foreign Office called the "ANAU Statement" was issued.^a This statement maintained that, due to Japan's special position in China and in order to fulfill her social responsibilities in Asia, Japan opposed any attempt by China to avail herself of any other country to resist Japan and felt that any joint operations with a foreign power, even in the name of technical or financial assistance after the

EE-32

b. Ex 241 T 2992

EE-33

a. Ex 2222 T 15845

EE-34a. Pu Yi T 3988
b. Ex 935 T 9389
c. Ex 58 T 9200EE-35

a. Ex 935 T 9389

(EE-35)

Manchuria and Shanghai Incidents, have political significance.

Japan would also oppose the supplying of China with planes, military advisors, or loans for political uses.^b

EE-36. Regarding this statement, Hull, in his testimony before the Pearl Harbor Investigation Committee, said that "Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy making elements in Japan" when it gave out the "Hands off China" statement; that the clear purpose of Japan was "to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed."^a

EE-37. Foreign Minister HIROTA, on 25 April 1934, purported to retract the AIAU statement in a conversation with Mr. Grew, stating that Japan had no intention of seeking special privileges in China in derogation of the rights of others in the Nine Power Treaty and that it was Japan's policy to completely observe and support that treaty.^a However, despite HIROTA's purported retraction of the AIAU statement, the "formula" based upon Japan's superior and special rights and interests in the peace situation in Eastern Asia was thereafter relied upon in dealing with Far East matters.^b

EE-38. On 29 December 1934, Japan denounced the Wash-

EE-36

b. Ex 935 T 9389-92

EE-36

a. Ex 1105 T 10114

EE-37

a. Ex 936 T 9393

b. Ex 937 T 9397

(EE-38)
 ingtor Naval Treaty,^a an act which according to Hull "was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest."^b Following abrogation of this treaty, "Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion in China."^c

EE-39. That the United States officially recognized the inconsistent position of Japan in giving lip service to the treaty system while, at the same time, flagrantly violating it can be gathered from Grew's statement of 15 April 1935 to HIROTA regarding the creation of an oil monopoly in Manchuria^a and the part played therein by Japanese Nationals and interests. Grew stated that the oil monopoly was a violation of Article III of the Nine-Power Treaty^b and even though Japan alleged that the monopoly was established by the sovereign state of Manchukuo, "the peculiar relations and undoubted influence of Japan with those authorities have been fully demonstrated in other recent issues."^c

EE-40. On 3 July 1935, the Privy Council approved a bill to conclude an agreement between Japan and Manchukuo regarding the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee to be permanently established in Hsinking, Manchukuo,^a which would deliberate and answer all questions on all important matters concerning the economic tie of the two countries and the supervision of the business of the Japanese-Manchurian Joint Special Corporation.^b

EE-39

- a. Ex 58 T 9177
- b. Ex 1106 T 10111
- c. Ex 1106 T 10115

EE-40

- a. Liebert; Ex 850 T 8421
- b. Liebert; Ex 850 T 8423

EE-30

- a. Ex 939 T 9407
- b. Ex 939 T 9408
- c. Ex 941 T 9415

EE-41. On 31 October 1935, the Foreign Ministry announced that a treaty between Japan and the Netherlands had been concluded providing for judicial settlement, arbitration and conciliation of all disputes between them. HIRANUMA represented Japan on the permanent commission set up under this treaty. The treaty was formally abrogated by Japan on 12 January 1940.^a

EE-42. The revision of the Imperial Ordinance on the "Organization of the War Ministry and One Other Subject" was approved by the Privy Council on 6 May 1936. HIRANUMA was Chairman of the Investigation Committee which recommended to the Council the revision, according to which the Ministers and Vice-Ministers of War or of the Navy had to be selected from generals or admirals on active service.^a

EE-43. On 10 June 1936 a treaty between Japan and Manchukuo was concluded under which Japanese residents in Manchukuo could enjoy the same privileges as those enjoyed by Manchukuoans, especially regarding the enjoyment of all rights relating to land.^a A supplemental agreement favored Japanese subjects on matters of taxation, fines and penalties and judicial procedure.^b

EE-44 The first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis" was taken by Japan in 1936, the year Japan's withdrawal from the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922 became effective.^a On 25 November 1936 Japan and Germany concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact (in 1937 Italy adhered) which pact was,

EE-41
a. Ex 1307-A T 11770

EE-43
a. Ex 237 T 2944
b. Ex 238 " 2949-59

EE-42
a. Ex 2367 T 18183-88

EE-44
a. Ex 1106 T 10111

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(EE-44) according to Hull, "ostensibly for self-protection against Communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations..."^b The treaty was ratified by the Privy Council on 30 November 1936.^c A Secret Pact was attached, directed specifically against the Soviet Union which provided that "in case one of the signatory powers is attacked or threatened with attack by the Soviet Union without provocation, the other signatory party shall refrain from taking any measure likely to result in any diminution of the burden of the Soviet Union's position, and the two signatories shall immediately discuss measures to be taken for the protection of their mutual interests."^d HIRANUMA as President of the Council, announced that the draft was unanimously approved.^e

EE-45 In January 1937, HIRANUMA attended a Privy Council meeting which approved the appointment of Naval Officers as administrators of the South Seas Islands in furtherance of plans for fortifying the Mandated Islands.^a

EE-46. On 30 March 1937, Japan refused to accept the fourteen-inch naval gun limitation agreed to by the British Commonwealth of Nations, France and the United States in 1936 at London thereby taking the first step towards a new naval race.^a

EE-47. Delivering no declaration of war, Japan on 7 July 1937, invaded China, south of the Great Wall.^a

EE-44

- b. Ex 1106 T 10111
- c. Ex 434 T 5938
- d. Ex 484 T 5960
- e. Ex 484 T 5972

EE-46

- a. Ex 58 T 9226

EE-47

- a. Ex 199 T 2326

EE-45

- a. Ex 909-A T 9158-5

EE-48. The League of Nations in the first report adopted on 6 October 1937, found that the military operations by Japan against China could not be justified on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of "the right of self-defense and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty.....and.....the Pact of Paris."^a

EE-49. In refusing to attend the Nine-Power Treaty meeting to be held at Brussels, Japan stated, 27 October 1937, that her declination was based upon the declaration of the League of Nations that the military operations of Japan in China violated the Nine-Power Treaty.^a

EE-50. The new formula adopted by Japan and set forth in this communication was that Japan's action was a measure of self-defense which she had been compelled to take in the face of China's violent and anti-Japanese policy and practice and was therefore outside the purview of the Nine-Power Treaty.^a

EE-51. On 14 December 1937, the Provisional Chinese Government was established in Peking.^a

EE-52. During July and August 1938, without a declaration of war, Japan attacked the territory of the Soviet Union at Lake Khasan and Mount Zuoernaya.^a

EE-53. The Privy Council on 2 March 1938 decided to terminate the cooperative relations with the various organs of the League of Nations.^a

EE-48
a. Ex 962 T 9475

EE-51
a. Ex 463-A T 5297

EE-49
a. Ex 954-B T 9447

EE-52
a. Teresh'in T 7757-76

EE-50
a. Ex 954-B T 9447

EE-53
a. Ex 271 T 3641

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EE-54. On 3 November 1938, the Japanese Government issued an official statement concerning the future of East Asia, after the main territory of China had been conquered and the National Government had been reduced to a local regime. According to the statement, the ultimate aim of Japan was to establish a "New Order, in East Asia" to accomplish which, firm steps were to be taken to renovate the various internal systems and to develop the total power of the nation.^a

EE-55. On 22 November 1938 the Privy Council agreed to the conclusion of a Cultural Pact with Germany,^a according to which the essence of the culture of Japan and Germany consisted "of the characteristic spirit of Japan on the one part and the racial and national life of Germany on the other." While the agreement purported to be confined to cultural matters at least one councillor feared the "agreement may bring about some kind of influence politically."

EE-56. On 26 December 1938, HIRANUMA insisted that KONOYE's first cabinet not resign, as it might interfere with the Wang Ching Wei plot to establish a puppet government in China, which plot, at the time was proceeding steadily.^a

- 5 - PREMIER

EE-57. On 5 January 1939 HIRANUMA became Prime Minister and the accused who were members of his cabinet are KIDO, HIRAGAKI, ARAKI and KOISO.

EE-58. As premier, HIRANUMA was President of the

EE-54
a. Ex 1095 T 11695-97

EE-63
a. Ex 589 T 6573

EE-64
a. Ex 2065 T 16231

0 159 0007 0955

(EE-58)

China Affairs Board which was established on 16 December 1938 with branch offices in Shanghai, Peiping, Amoy and ~~Kalgan~~. The Ministers of War, Navy, Finance and Foreign Affairs were vice presidents of the board.^a The control of opium in China was in the hands of this board.^b It studied the needs of opium in different parts of China and arranged for its distribution from Mongolia to North, Central and South China, distribution being made through Chinese organizations.^c During HIRANUMA's premiership, opium production increased generally in areas controlled by Japan.^d

EE-59. ITAGAKI remained as War Minister upon the request of HIRANUMA, but only after he had served upon HIRANUMA the following conditions decided upon by the Conference of the Army Senior Chiefs: (1) the aims of the China War should be in accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference and with fixed policies, and the Declaration of December 22, 1938, regarding China should be adopted in its entirety; (2) the plan for national defense should be established with the expansion of armaments as its aim; (3) The relations among Japan, Germany and Italy should be strengthened; (4) the system of total mobilization should be reinforced and the function of the Planning Board should be expanded; (5) production should be increased; (6) the national morale should be stimulated; (7) and trade should be increased.^a

EE-58

- a. Ex 389 T 4761
- b. Satomi T 4893
- c. Ex 389 T 4763
- d. Ex 372 T 4637-69;
- Ex 382 T 4711;
- Ex 387 T 4750;
- Ex 403 T 4813;
- Ex 417 T 4856;
- Ex 421 T 4871;

EE-59

- a. Ex 3503 T 30121
- Ex 413 T 4838-44;
- Ex 427 T 4895;
- Ex 428 T 4912;
- Ex 432 T 4924;
- Ex 433 T 4929;
- Ex 842 T 8389.

EE-60. On direct examination,^a ITAGAKI recalled having a conversation with HIRANUMA who said the principle task of his cabinet would be the speedy settlement of the China Incident, a policy inherited from the previous cabinet and therefore, ITAGAKI, as War Minister in the previous cabinet should remain in the same post in the new cabinet. ITAGAKI also recalled HIRANUMA's telling him that he would like to dispose of the strengthening of the "Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact" after the formation of his cabinet. ITAGAKI admitted that he entrusted the Vice Minister of War, YAMAWAKI, a defense witness, to serve as his messenger to notify HIRANUMA of his acceptance, but he denied that he knew of a paper being delivered containing the seven conditions. YAMAWAKI testified, and thereby squarely contradicted ITAGAKI, that he left with a Mr. Shiono^b at the headquarters for the formation of the HIRANUMA Cabinet^c "the conditions for General ITAGAKI's acceptance of the request to remain in office."^d

EE-61. In view of this, it is readily seen that HIRANUMA and ITAGAKI, together with the Army Senior Chiefs, made a "deal," the terms of which appeared as the seven conditions mentioned above. The fulfillment of these conditions was the prime object of the HIRANUMA Cabinet.

EE-62. HIRANUMA continued ARITA as Foreign Minister in his cabinet. ARITA was appointed by KONOYE as Foreign Minister in his first cabinet in November 1938. Upon his

EE-60

- a. Itagaki T 30334-36
- b. Yamawaki T 30119
- c. Itagaki T 30336
- d. Yamawaki T 30119

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(EE-62) :
appointment as Foreign Minister, a new policy in dealing with other countries was decided upon, whereby it was decided to avoid all phraseology that would affirm the principles of the Nine Power Pact, and to make them understand that the existing rights and interests of third powers in China would be respected but not as a corollary of the Pact, and that the standard laws governing the future economic activities by third powers in China were to be established in conformity with the new conditions.^a

EE-63. On 21 November 1938, ARITA told GREW that it was impossible for Japan to recognize the unconditional application of equal opportunity and the open door when the state of affairs had changed in China. He went on to assert that "Japan's Open Door Policy" and "Principles of Equal Opportunity" might clash with the rights and interests of third powers and implied that measures necessary to foster a closer relationship between Japan and China and to insure their existence, might necessitate at times eliminating the application of these principles to some extent.^a

EE-64. On 21 January 1939, HIRAYAMA addressed the Diet and assured it that his cabinet was committed to the same policy as the previous one and that he was determined, at all costs, to carry it out in order to lay the foundation of prosperity and progress in East Asia through the cooperation

EE-62
a. Ex 389 T 9573-76

EE-63
a. Ex 969 T 9581

7 159 0007 0969

(EE-64)
of Japan, Manchukuo and China in political, cultural and economic spheres. There must be a new order to replace the old, he said, and he hoped that the Chinese would understand this correctly, and cooperate with the Japanese. There was no alternative he concluded but to exterminate those who persisted in opposition against Japan.^a

EE-35. Surely these are not the words of a man of peace, of a government pursuing, to use his own term, a "moral diplomacy"^a or of a person who believed that the men charged with the destinies of nations should have as an important objective "a stabilized peace to replace interludes of preparation for the next war;" but rather they are the words of one determined to continue the aggressive war then being waged in China and to carry out "at all costs" the aggressive policies of his predecessor KONOYE, during whose first premiership, Japan, without a declaration of war invaded China south of the Great Wall on 7 July 1937; passed the General Mobilization Law, thereby providing the basis for a totalitarian state in Japan; and formulated the policy that the ultimate aim of Japan was to establish a new order in East Asia -- a policy that led Japan on its southward march from China to Pearl Harbor. Such was the policy and ambition of HIRAYAMA. He so stated it himself.

EE-36. One of the first acts of the HIRAYAMA Cabinet

EE-64
a. Ex 2229-A 1 15988-89

EE-68
a. Ex 3285 1 26225

(EE-66)

was to approve on 17 January 1939 a Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power prepared by the Cabinet Planning Board,^a the preamble of which in substance outlined the object and policy in the same terms as those found in a plan drafted by the War Ministry on 10 June 1937^b to provide the materials required by another plan previously drafted by the War Ministry on 29 May 1937, the object of which was the development of important industries by 1941, so that, in case of need, Japan could be self-sufficient in important materials.^c

EE-67. The plan of the HIRANUMA Cabinet of 1939 included within its scope a third plan drafted by the War Ministry on 23 June 1937 which had as its object the perfection of war preparedness and the realization of the plans mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, particularly in connection with the unification of army policies regarding the expansion, cultivation and control of munition industries.^a

EE-68. This Cabinet plan aimed at the revelation and strengthening of Japan's national power for the establishment of a comprehensive productive power expansion plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China, in order to bring about the realization of the necessary goal in regard to important national defense and basic industries by 1941 so as to be prepared for the epochal development of Japan's future destiny, the attainment of which was expected at all costs.^a It also aimed at the establishment of self-sufficiency in regard to important

EE-66

a. Ex 842 T 8270
b. Ex 842 T 8269
c. Ex 842 T 8264

EE-68

a. Ex 842 T 8271

EE-67

a. Ex 841 T 8270-63

7 159 0007 0971

(EE-68)

resources within the sphere of Japan's influence, thereby avoiding as far as possible being dependent upon the resources of third powers in time of an emergency.^b

EE-69-70. The plan of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, embodying as it did the substance of the three plans drafted by the War Ministry at a time when Japan was preparing for her war of aggression in China, and approved by the Cabinet in 1939 when Japan was waging a war of aggression in China leads to no other conclusion than that the plan had for its purpose the economic mobilization of the nation for aggressive warfare.

EE-70. In May 1938, the National General Mobilization Law was enacted^a which provided for the total mobilization of the personal and material resources of the nation.^b This law was specifically referred to in the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power approved by the HIRANUMA Cabinet in 1939, in accordance to which the government was to take measures, if necessary, to enforce the National Mobilization Law.^c

EE-70. Pursuant to the plan adopted by the Cabinet, national policies companies were organized from time to time for the purpose of entering into business directly to develop a specific industry or for the purpose of exploiting and developing foreign territories.^a The Korea Magnesite Development Company was formed on 19 June 1939, with a capitalization of ¥15,000,000 for the purpose of developing magnesite mining

EE-69

d. Ex 842 T 8272

EE-70

a. Ex 840 T 8475

EE-71

e. Ex 84 T 684

b. Ex 862-A; T 8789-8801
863-A

c. Ex 842 P 4

W

7 159 0007 0972

(EE-72) and the control and sale thereof.^b The Japan Electric Power Company was formed 1 April 1939 for the purpose of affecting a unity in the production and distribution of electric power within Japan proper. It was given monopolistic powers under the control of the government.^c The Japan Rice Company was formed on 25 July 1939 for the purpose of effecting a monopoly in the purchase and sale of rice. It had a capitalization of ¥30,000,000 and was one of the means used to control the price of foodstuffs since rice constituted the major item of the Japanese diet.^d On 10 August 1939, the Imperial Mines Development Company was formed for the purpose of developing the mining industry of Japan and the sale of its products. Its original capitalization was ¥70,000,000 but this was increased later to ¥90,000,000. One of the prime functions of this company was to assist private enterprise in developing the natural resources of the country in accordance with the national policy.^e

EE-73. In March 1939, the government was authorized to make compulsory purchases of all gold which had the effect of throwing all gold and gold articles in Japan into the hands of the government where it could be used for essential foreign exchange.^a

EE-74. On 5 April 1939, the Shipbuilding Industry Law was promulgated to provide for subsidies and loss indemnification and a system of controls was instituted

EE-72

- b. Ex 840 T 8532
- c. Ex 1840 T 8532
- d. Ex 840 T 8532
- e. Ex 840 T 8533

EE-73

- a. Ex 840 T 8517

0 159 0007 0973

(EE-74) ^a
and rigidly enforced.

EE-75. One of the first important ordinances affecting industry promulgated pursuant to the National General Mobilization Law was the ordinance concerning the Plan by the Promoter of a Business for General Mobilization dated 26 July 1939, which provided that the Ministries of War and Navy could call in the owners or promoters of selected businesses, named pursuant to the ordinance under the National General Mobilization Law, and order such persons to make plans for production following a set national production schedule. Under this ordinance the War and Navy Ministries were given power to force business to cooperate fully in the execution of army and navy plans to the fullest extent of their facilities and skills.^a

EE-76. On 16 August 1939, by decree of the Commerce and Industries Ministry there was promulgated the Coal Sales Control Regulations which permitted large sales of coal only to named distributors carrying out government policy and by the control of sales specialized production was brought about.^a

EE-77. During EIRANUZ's premiership, military and naval preparations were increased. Of a total budget of ¥8,952,463,000 ¥6,417,646,999 were allocated to the armed forces, approximately ¥400,000,000 in excess of the amount allocated in 1938.^a

EE-74.
a. Ex 840 T 8320

EE-76
a. Ex 840 T 8298

EE-75.
a. Ex 840 T 8402

EE-77
a. Ex 840 T 8542

EE-78. The standing army of Japan increased from 1,130,000 to 1,240,000^a and by a military conscription policy functioning through a Military Service Law provided a large number of reserves. This law was amended on 8 March 1939 promulgating amending regulations for military service, conscription of ex-servicemen, postponement for conscription for students and abrogation of the short-term conscription service system. A few weeks later, on 25 March 1939, Law no. 25 for safeguarding secrets of military material resources was promulgated aiming at the prevention of leakage of information on manpower and material resources.^a

EE-79. The Island of Hainan was taken by a surprise attack and occupied on 10 February 1939,^a and the Spratley Islands, a French possession off the eastern coast of French Indo-China, were also occupied by Japanese troops on 3 March 1939.^b

EE-80. On 14 May 1939, Japanese violated the Mongolian People's Republic with a force of 300.^a

EE-81. The Youth Training School, which provided, among other things, for the military training of students and which had been in effect in Japan for many years, became compulsory in 1939 at which time the school was renamed the "Youth School" and the training course became independent of gymnastics.^a

EE-82. Even before becoming Premier, H. RAJUMA was active in the Wang plot, having insisted in December 1938

EE-76
 a. Ex 880 T 9074-76
 b. Ex 840 T 8664

EE-80
 a. Ex 765 T 7746

EE-79
 a. Judicially noticed - T 6143
 b. Ex 513 T 6145

EE-81
 a. Ex 2377 T 18448-57

(EE-82)
that KONOYE's first cabinet not resign, as the ~~resignation~~ fight interfere with Japan's attempt to establish a puppet government in China.^a

EE-83. After he became premier on 10 June 1939, WANG had an interview with HIRANUMA regarding the establishment of the new government in China. HIRANUMA assured WANG that his cabinet inherited the ideas of the KONOYE statement and was adhering to them firmly, and he expressed his approval of WANG and the peace policy, stating that Japan was ready to lend absolute assistance and support in response to his decisive will.^a

EE-84. Four days before the meeting between HIRANUMA and WANG, a Five Ministers' Conference on 6 June 1939 decided the terms for the establishment of a New Central Government in China^a the provisions of which show the puppet character of the government about to be established. WANG had an interview not only with HIRANUMA but also with ITAGAKI, the War Minister, and KONOYE who at the time was a member of HIRANUMA's cabinet.^b Not only did HIRANUMA play an active part in the creation of the puppet government in Central China, but he also as President of the China Affairs Board by virtue of his being premier played a similar part in the establishment of a puppet government in North China as can be seen from a decision of the board which on 23 June 1939 decided to appropriate huge sums of money from the surplus of the Chinese Maritime Customs Revenues for the purpose of inducing WU PEI-

EE-82.

a. Ex 2265 T 15231

EE-84a. Ex 3742 T 37386
b. Ex 2721 T 3399C-96EE-88

a. Ex 2721 T 23991

0 159 0007 0976

(EE-84)
Fu to head another puppet government in North China.^c

EE-85. Relations with Germany had been developing since the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. This development continued during the HIRANUMA premiership the Pact being strengthened quantitatively by the adherence of Hungary and Manchukuo on 25 February 1939,^a and Spain on 27 March 1939.^b In March 1939, the HIRANUMA Cabinet orally agreed to give Germany preferential treatment in China^c and on 23 March 1939 Japan concluded with Italy a cultural agreement^d similar to that concluded with Germany on 22 November 1938, agreements which ostensibly cultural in character, were in fact instruments for use in developing the political relations among the three countries.^e All of the meetings of the Privy Council ratifying these agreements were attended by HIRANUMA, either as President thereof or as Premier.

EE-86. The most important political problem facing HIRANUMA was the question of the military alliance with Germany which had been advanced during the latter part of KONOYE's first term as Premier. But divergent views as to the scope of the alliance existed, with ITAKI and the Finance Minister favoring an outright military alliance and the Foreign and the Navy Ministers opposing an alliance of such scope.^a

EE-87. After more than seventy meetings of the Five Ministers' Conference, HIRANUMA secured a compromise which

EE-84
a. Ex 3743 T 37393-95

EE-86
a. Ex 504 T 6108

EE-85
a. Ex 491 T 6037
b. Ex 493 T 6045
c. Ex 496 T 6633-24
d. Ex 38 T 499, 515
e. Ex 590 T 6583

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(22-37)

accepted the principle of an unlimited alliance with certain reservations,^a and which took the form of the "HIRANUMA Declaration" of 4 May 1939 - a communication addressed by HIRANUMA to Hitler. The declaration states in part:

"I cherish great admiration for the lofty wisdom and the iron will with which His Excellency, Chancellor of the German Government, HITLER, is working at the noble task of the reconstruction of his country and at the establishment of an international peace founded upon the principles of justice.

"I, for my part, as Japanese Prime Minister, am likewise occupied with the strengthening of peace and with the maintenance of a New Order in East Asia founded on the principles of justice and morality.

"In this splendid hour it is a confirmed joy to me how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement between our two countries proves itself in the execution of the tasks placed before them. And today if I have in view the conclusion of an agreement, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and to make closer the cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy, this does not occur just out of a consideration of the mere expediency of it, but in the hope that in that way we may contribute to the consolidation of a world peace founded upon justice and morality in

~~22-37~~

a. Ex 504 T 6110

(EE-87)

consciousness of our common tasks now. As far as the strengthening of our relations is concerned, I can affirm that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even if one of those two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political and economic aid, to the extent possible to her power, military assistance.

"In spite of this Japan is ready, in accordance with the provisions of such an agreement to take up the military support of Germany and Italy; however, Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical manner any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances."

EE-88. Shortly after sending the declaration, the Cabinet endeavored to come to a final decision regarding an all out alliance as Japan had been advised that a German-Italian Pact was to be signed in May 1939.^a On 5 June 1939 the final decision was reached, according to which participation in a German war against England and France was

EE-88
n. Ex 486-K T 6115

(EE-88) conceded, with the reservation that Japan wished to secure the right to choose a favorable time for entering the war.^b

EE-89. But Japan having waited too long, Germany, on 23 August 1939, concluded with Russia a non-aggression pact.^a Five days later HIRANUMA and his Cabinet resigned.^b

EE-90. During the negotiations where do we find HIRANUMA with those demanding an all-out alliance or with those insisting upon one more limited in scope? That he favored an alliance of some kind there is no doubt, as he committed himself to the policy of his predecessor KONOYE, during whose first term, as was noted above, the question of an alliance first arose. Three days after becoming Premier he openly favored an alliance^a and in April 1939, he was of the opinion that the Army's plan was essentially right and, desiring to settle the deadlock, which had arisen at the Five Ministers' Conference, according to this plan, he endeavored to secure the cooperation of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in order to obtain the understanding of the Emperor regarding the Army's demands.^b To this end HIRANUMA sought the help of KIDO, then Home Minister, just as did ITAGAKI a few months later - only instead of working through KI O, ITAGAKI used KONOYE in his effort to change the Emperor's mind in favor of the Army's plan.^c

EE-91. In his declaration to HITLER of 4 May 1939, he affirmed that Japan was resolved to render to Germany and Italy not only political and economic assistance but, to the extent possible to her, military assistance, appealing at the same

EE-88
b. Ex 614 T 6793

EE-90
a. Ex 499-A T 6092
Ex 500 T 6094
b. Ex 3799-A T 37789
c. Ex 3805-A T 37840

EE-89
a. Judicially noticed T 6120
b. Ex 2272 T 162-0

(EE-91)
 time for closer rapprochement with HITLER who, he declared,
 was working at the noble task of the reconstruction of
 Germany and at the establishment of an international peace
 founded upon the principles of justice, just as he, HIRANUMA,
 was occupied with the strengthening of peace and with the
 maintenance of a New Order in East Asia founded on the
 principles of justice and morality.^a

EE-92. If justice be the rendering to others their just
 due and if morality is the quality of that which conforms to
 right ideals or principles of human conduct, the actions of
 both Germany and Japan, which need not be listed herein, leads
 to the conclusion that the principles of justice and morality
 common to HITLER and HIRANUMA, as set forth by HIRANUMA in
 his declaration to HITLER were not only distorted in conception
 but also diabolical in application.

EE-93. Regarding his declaration, HIRANUMA did not con-
 sider that a reply was necessary because the matter had already
 been solved when OSHIMA had answered "yes" to RIEZLER's
 question as to whether Japan could be considered a participant
 in the event of war between England-France and Germany and
 Italy, even if no military aid, at the time, would be forth-
 coming.^a

EE-94. HIRANUMA refused to make OSHIMA retract the answer when
 requested to do so by ARICA^a who thought OSHIMA's answer in-
 excusable and felt that the matter would cause considerable
 difficulty at the Five Ministers' Conference, because HIRANUMA

EE-91

a. Ex 503 T 6104

EE-93

a. Ex 3802-A T 37824-25

EE-94

a. Ex 3803 T 37825-27

(EE-94)
 desired to support the opinion of the War Minister and OSHIMA rather than to remain neutral. Because of the attitude of HIRANUMA and the War Minister, ARITA threatened to resign.^b and the Navy Minister became enraged.^c OTT confirmed this matter in a telegram to RIBBENTROP on 5 June 1939 stating that HIRANUMA and the Foreign Minister have agreed to the understanding that Japan would participate in the war against England and France with certain reservations by which Japan wished to secure the right to choose a favorable time for entering the war.^d

EE-95. In view of the foregoing, there can be no doubt that HIRANUMA supported his War Minister ITAGAKI and the Army's plan throughout until the final decision was made by the Five Ministers' Conference of 5 June 1939.

EE-96. During 1939 when Premier HIRANUMA, in Japan, was building the New Order in East Asia upon the basis of justice and morality, the Japanese Air Force in China was bombing American property, which had been clearly marked and the location thereof previously reported, with accompanying maps, to the Japanese authorities.^a

EE-97. The fact that indiscriminate bombing of civilian population was taking place and that unwarranted restrictions and discriminations had been placed upon British and American persons and business enterprises in China was called to the attention of the Japanese Government by England the the United States.^a As these bombings and discriminations continued after

<u>EE-94</u>	<u>EE-96</u>
b. Ex 3801-C T 37823	a. Ex 985 T 9559
c. Ex 3803-B T 37829	<u>EE-97</u>
d. Ex 614 T 6795	a. Ex 992 T 9598

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(EE-97)
repeated protests, the United States notified Japan on 26 July 1939 of its intentions to withdraw from the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which had been signed in Washington on 21 February 1911.^b

EE-98. As was previously mentioned, HIRANUMA and his Cabinet resigned on 28 August 1939 because of his failure to conclude the alliance with Germany, but it will be recalled that HIRANUMA agreed to the seven conditions of ITAGAKI and the Army Senior Chiefs. All but one were fulfilled. HIRANUMA failed to conclude the alliance with Germany but he did succeed in complying with the others. He adopted KONOYE's declaration of 23 December 1938 regarding China and the China war; the military forces and armaments were strengthened, production was expanded and a plan for the total mobilization of the nation adopted.

STATE MINISTER

EE-99. On 6 December 1940 and 21 December 1940, HIRANUMA was Minister without Portfolio and Home Minister, respectively, in the Second KONOYE Cabinet, and on 18 July 1941, he was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the Third KONOYE Cabinet.

EE-100. HIRANUMA supported the appointment of KONOYE to succeed YONAI at the Senior Statesmen's Meeting of 17 July 1940,^a and by joining KONOYE's Cabinet he adopted its policies.

EE-101. During the 1941 negotiations, HIRANUMA participated in the American-Japanese negotiations.^a

EE-97
b. Ex 994 T 9602

EE-100
a. Ex 532 T 6249

EE-101
a. Ex 3227 T 29243

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EE-102. From 13 January to 21 July 1941 HIRANUMA attended most of the Liaison Conferences held between these dates which decided the policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand preparatory to Japan's Southward march.^a Air bases and harbor facilities were to be established and troops were to be stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China by "force of arms," if necessary,^b and plans were determined to obligate France and Thailand by secret agreement whereby they would conduct no military or political agreement with third powers.^c

EE-103. On 16 January 1941, a list of Japanese demands containing most of the measures for the economic development of the Netherlands East Indies decided upon by the Cabinet on 25 October 1940 was presented to the Netherlands Indies authorities.^a

EE-104. When HIRANUMA was Home Minister, Japan's population policy was decided at a cabinet meeting of 22 January 1941 according to which the goal of 100 million for 1945 was set. The physical and spiritual training of the youths of Japan were to be intensified so as to make them a good source of military and labor forces.^a

EE-105. A cabinet meeting of 7 March 1941 decided that the detailed regulations regarding the application of revised National Mobilization Law were to go into effect March 20.^a

EE-106. Early in 1941, the manufacture of military currency for use in areas to be occupied by Japan was decreed.^a

EE-102

a. Ex 1303 T 11744
 b. Ex . . . T 6530
 Ex 647-A T 7061
 Ex 1095 T 10038
 Ex 1306 T 11753
 c. Ex 534 T 8446

EE-103

a. Ex 1306-A T 11832

EE-104

a. Ex 1067 T 9879
 Ex 835 T 8810

EE-105

a. Ex 1055 T 9842

EE-106

a. Ex 822 T 8452

EE-107. In a telegram dated 18 May 1941, OTT referred to a statement by MATSUOKA that "during a secret cabinet session, he (MATSUOKA) had called upon all members of the government clearly to acknowledge Japan's obligation under the Tripartite Pact on their part too, in all of their conversations. All members of the cabinet had agreed unanimously."^a

EE-108. On 22 June 1941 Germany attacked Russia. At that time, MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister advocated an advance "to both the northern and the southern regions."^a On the other hand, Premier KONOYE and the majority of cabinet members, maintained the view that nothing should be done that would injure Japan's military position in China; therefore, Japan's grip on Indo-China should be tightened.^b HIRANUMA agreed with KONOYE's views.^c The Liaison Conference of 25 June 1941, which HIRANUMA attended as Home Minister, sustained the Premier, and the action of the Conference was ratified by the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941.^d

EE-109. HIRANUMA, as Home Minister, attended the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941, which adopted resolutions concerning the Japanese-American negotiations. It was decided that Japan would adhere to the principle of establishing a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; that she would continue the disposition of the China Incident and would step up the southward advance; that the northern problems (Russia) would be dealt with according to the changes in the situation; and that Japan would remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing. Preparations for war against Great Britain

EE-107

a. Ex 1073 T 9911

EE-108

a. Ex 1093 T 10031
 b. Ex 1097 T 10035
 c. Ex 1098 T 10021
 d. Ex 1306 T 11753

(EE-109)

and the United States were to be made and her schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand were to be executed. While Japan would not for a while intervene in the German-Soviet war she would take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against Russia. In case America enters the war Japan would act according to the Tripartite Pact.^a

EE-110. In the face of President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24, 1941, that French Indo-China become a neutralized country giving Japan the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring a source of food, supplies and other materials which Japan claimed she was seeking^a and despite the fact that NOMURA, feeling that diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States might be severed, wired for instructions pointing out that American public opinion toward Japan was changing rapidly and that the people considered the southern advance of Japan as only the first step to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, Japan, nevertheless, concluded an agreement and protocol^b for the joint defense of French Indo-China on 29 July 1941; then large Japanese forces were moved into southern French Indo-China.^c HIRANUMA, at this time, was a member of the cabinet.

EE-111. On 18 October 1941, TOJO's Cabinet was formed but HIRANUMA was not appointed a member thereof. He continued, however, his interest in the affairs of government as a Senior Statesman.

EE-109

a. Ex 588 T 6566
T 10145
Ex 799 T 7904
Ex 1855 T 10140
Ex 1110-A T 10152

EE-110

a. Ex 1245-A T 10762
b. Ex 1192 T 10180
c. Ex 1245-A T 10762

159 0007 0986

SENIOR STATESMAN

EE-112. From 17 July 1940 to 1945 HIRANUMA attended meetings of the Senior Statesmen held generally for the purpose of recommending a new Premier. At these meetings the following recommendations were made:

- 17 July 1940 - KONOYE was recommended to succeed YOMAI.
- 17 July 1941 - KONOYE was recommended to succeed himself.
- 17 October 1941 - TOJO was recommended to succeed KONOYE^a
- 18 July 1941 - TERAJCHI, KOISO or HATA was recommended to succeed TOJO^b
- 5 April 1945 - SUZUKI was recommended to succeed KOISO^c

EE-113. At the request of the Emperor, a meeting of the Senior Statesmen was convened on 29 November 1941 for a complete and broad discussion of the decision about to be formally made to go to war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. It was not the usual conference called for the selection of a new Premier but was a conference convened so that the Emperor might have the unreserved view and opinions of the Senior Statesmen, each of whom had been a Premier of Japan.

EE-114. TOJO explained the reason why Japan was placed in a position where resort to arms against the United States could not be avoided and TOGO expounded on the American-Japanese negotiations. Questions were asked by the Senior Statesmen which the Government, according to TOJO,

EE-112
a. Ex 1154 T 10292
b. Ex 1177 T 11379
c. Ex 1282 T 11390

Page EE-40

(EE-114) answered and explained one by one.^a No one present expressed the view that the American proposal be accepted.^b None of the Senior Statesmen expressed the opinion that war should not be resorted to or openly expressed disagreement with the war policy, but contented themselves with giving what OKADA, one of the Senior Statesmen, termed negative and dissuading opinions.^c

EE-115. HIRANUMA, in particular, merely remarked that he agreed that Japan was equal to a prolonged war with the United States in spiritual strength but doubted its ability in material power, urging, however, that adequate measures and efforts be taken to awaken patriotic sentiment.^a

EE-116. At the conference of 17 July 1944 at HIRANUMA's home (unofficial) it was decided that TOJO's cabinet was to be replaced so that Japan could "build a powerful national cabinet which will surge forward unwaveringly;"^a and at the meeting of 5 April 1945 HIRANUMA said "I am strongly opposed to any advocacy for peace and cessation of hostilities" and therefore "there is no way out but to fight to the end."^b

EE-117. On 9 April 1945 HIRANUMA again became head of the Privy Council.

DEFENSE PHASE

EE-118. HIRANUMA's defense is very weak. Other than a message to HULL urging a joint effort to prevent war in Europe;^a a report from DOGAW, then Charge d'Affaires ad

EE-114

a. Ex 3655 T 36366
b. Ex 3647 T 35711
c. Ex 3229 T 29260-61

EE-118

a. Ex 3222 T 29210

EE-115

a. Ex 3340 T 31040

EE-116

a. Ex 1277 T 11374
b. Ex 3340 T 31124; 31134

Page EE-40

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EE-114

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 c. Ex 3229 T 29260-61

EE-118

a. Ex 3222 T 29210

EE-115

a. Ex 3340 T 31040

EE-116

a. Ex 1277 T 11374
 b. Ex 3340 T 31124; 31134

(EE-118)

interim in the American Embassy in Tokyo on "Japan's Foreign Policy in Relation to the Situation in Europe," which outlines the policies, ideals and hopes of HIRANUMA when he was Prime Minister, no other documents of any consequence were admitted in evidence.

EE-119. In the reply to HIRANUMA's message, HULL pointedly stated that HIRANUMA's desire for true world peace "is made the more remote by the existence and the continuance of armed conflict and consequent political disturbances in the Far East,"^a and, just as the events in the European sphere have repercussions in the Far East, "the prolongation of abnormal conditions in the Far East contributes to causes of unrest in Europe."^b HULL further stated "that each peaceful settlement, in whatever geographical sphere, constitutes a stabilizing element and an important step toward improvement in the general world situation."^c

EE-120. Was HIRANUMA sincere in his peace appeal to HULL of 10 May 1939? The answer is to be found in HIRANUMA's actions. Six days before sending the message of peace to HULL he had sent his "declaration" to HITLER appealing for closer rapprochement with HITLER in his, HIRANUMA's, endeavor to establish a "New Order in East Asia"^a and four days after sending his peace message, Japan, without a declaration of war, invaded the Mongolian People's Republic.^b In his message to HULL, HIRANUMA said it was the ardent wish to Japan that nations should have their own proper place in the world. These words were

EE-119.

- a. Ex 3223 T 29215
- b. Ex 3223 T 29215
- c. Ex 3223 T 29216

EE-120.

- a. Ex 503 T 6104
- b. Ex 766-R T 7846

(EE-120)
written when HIRANUMA was plotting to establish a puppet government in that part of China conquered by the military forces of Japan. Not one word was said by HIRANUMA in his peace message to FULL of Japan's actions in China.

EE-121. The affidavit of PIGGOTT^a merely states that through a confidential agent of HIRANUMA, PIGGOTT conducted the negotiations between the British Ambassador and HIRANUMA as the result of which ARITA told CRAIGIE that Japan was ready to hold a conference in Tokyo for the settlement of the Tientsin Incident.^b

EE-122. The affidavit of SAITO, Yoshie relates a speech of HIRANUMA at a cabinet meeting during May 1941, "the theme of his speech (being) that Japan must not fight for any reason whatsoever^a because a war between the big powers, once started would become protracted and no one could foretell the damage and devastation that would result therefrom."^b These ideas attributed to HIRANUMA are the converse of those he urged in 1945 at a Senior Statesmen's Meeting when he said that "There is no way out but to fight to the end."^c SAITO's testimony that HIRANUMA delivered an "impassioned plea against war" must be read in the light of his readiness and willingness to commit Japan to a war against England and France in 1939.

EE-123. The affidavit of SHIOTA, Hiroshige, the doctor who treated HIRANUMA, when an attempt was made to assassinate him, was withdrawn when the prosecution conceded that HIRANUMA was

EE-121

- a. Ex 3226 T 29233
- b. Ex 3226 T 29234

EE-122

- a. Ex 3227 T 29243
- b. Ex 3227 T 29243
- c. Ex 3340 T 31124

(EE-123)
incapacitated from attending to official duties from 14 August 1941 to 29 November 1941 on which day he attended the important Senior Statesmen's Meeting referred to above.

EE-124. The testimony of defense witness of OKADA, Keisuke, former Prime Minister, refers to three meetings of the Senior Statesmen attended by himself and HIRANUMA, the most important being the one of 29 November 1941, called at the request of the Emperor for the purpose of securing the opinions of the Statesmen on the current diplomatic and political situation, an impasse in the negotiations having been reached and the government feeling that war between the nations was inevitable.^a According to OKADA, to the questions asked by the Elder Statesmen, the Government replied "that the position of the Government would be well understood if the factual grounds were shown and if they could disclose and cite figures which they had, but which they stated they could not disclose since they were State Secrets."^b

EE-125. The testimony of OKADA is flatly contradicted by TOJO who said "The testimony of OKADA, before this Tribunal on 26 September 1947, that I refused to explain on the grounds of a 'State Secret' is definitely not founded on fact. The only matters that were not exposed concerned alone those pertaining to pure strategy."^a

EE-126. According to OKADA none of the Statesmen supported war but they did "urge the Government to reconsider the

EE-124

- a. Ex 3229 T 29260
- b. Ex 3229 T 29260

EE-125

- a. Ex 3655 T 36366

(EE-126)
 matter very carefully and to proceed with extreme caution
 in any matter which might bring about hostilities." ^a They
 all, he testified, expressed negative and dissuading opinions. ^b

EE-127. OKADA is again contradicted by TOJO who summarized the opinions of the Senior Statesmen as consisting of four points:

"(1) Even if the negotiations were broken off, we should refrain from war and make plans for the next move in the future.

"(2) There is no alternative left to us but to rely on the Government, since it has finally decided to resort to war after deliberate investigations.

"(3) If the war were to become protracted there would be much anxiety as to Japan's capacity to maintain the supply of materials and the trend of public opinion as well. (But no one gave his definite opinion as to the measures Japan should take on this point.)

"(4) If this war is for self-existence, we are compelled to wage war even if we foresee eventual defeat. But if it means that we resort to war for a so-called East Asiatic policy, it is highly dangerous." ^a

EE-128. TOJO said that he explained the government's intentions on each point. As to the first, if it were to be adopted, Japan's national defense would be jeopardized and her existence

EE-126

a. Ex 3229 T 29250
 b. Ex 3229 T 29250

EE-127

a. Ex 3655 T 36367

(EE-128)
 as a nation threatened. The second point needed no explanation and the third was explained in terms of the uncertainty of war, need for resources, especially oil, and the time to negotiate for peace.^a

EE-129. Consequently, according to TOJO, the Senior Statesmen were fully informed regarding all plans of the government, except those pertaining to pure strategy, and were informed of the Government's intention relative to opening hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.^a And yet this body of Elder Statesmen, in dereliction of their duty to the Emperor as his highest advisers, used their exalted position not one bit to stop the hands that within the hour were to select the time and place for the formal decision to go to war.^b

EE-130. On the other hand if, as claimed by OKADA, the Government did not disclose to the Senior Statesmen the facts and figures they request because they were state secrets,^a then those men were likewise derelict in their duty towards the Emperor, because in order to faithfully perform their duty it would have been necessary to be completely and accurately informed on all vital matters.^b

EE-131. Whether they were informed or not the fact remains that the Senior Statesmen did not advise against war. They contented themselves with negative and dissuading opinions leaving the matter in the hands of TOJO whom they knew had de-

EE-128

a. Ex 3655 T 36337-70

EE-129

a. Ex 3655 T 36364
 b. Ex 3655 T 36370

EE-130

a. Ex 3229 T 29261
 b. Ex 3229 T 29271

(EE-131) a
cided that war was inevitable.

EE-132. In 1944, after many reverses the TOJO Cabinet lost its popular appeal^a and the Senior Statesmen decided that it should be retired. For this reason, at a meeting at HIRANUMA's home on 17 July 1944, the Senior Statesmen resolved to build a National Cabinet "which will surge forward unswervingly."^b The following day TOJO resigned and the Statesmen convened to recommend a new Premier. HIRANUMA favored a military man because he could handle the matter of increased munitions. General KOISO was recommended^c but the Statesmen arranged that YOKAI should be appointed jointly with KOISO.^d

EE-133. On 5 April 1945, KOISO resigned and the Senior Statesmen approved SUZUKI, Kantaro, to succeed him.^a At the meeting of the Statesmen, HIRANUMA took the position that they must select a man who would fight it out to the end^b stating that "we cannot recommend any peace advocate who favors cessation of hostilities. From this import, the choosing of a Premier has important bearings.....I am strongly opposed (to) peace and (to the) cessation of hostilities."^c

EE-134. OKADA admitted on cross examination "that HIRANUMA always said that it was necessary to find a man who would be able to carry the war through to the end..." so he may have said "that it was necessary to fight to the end."^a OKADA also admitted on cross-examination that HIRANUMA did not want to accelerate the end of the conflict by way of negotia-

EE-131
a. Ex 3229 T 29261

EE-133
a. Ex 1282 T 11390
b. Ex 3340 T 31124
c. Ex 334C T 31134

EE-132
a. Ex 3229 T 29,265
b. Ex 3229 T 29264
c. Ex 3229 T 29265
d. Ex 3229 T 29266

EE-134
a. Ex 1282 T 29301

(EE-134)
tion for peace in 1945.^b

EE-135. On 10 August 1945 an Imperial Conference, which HIRANUMA attended as President of the Privy Council, decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the sole condition of reaffirmation of the Emperor's sovereignty and the Imperial House.^a

EE-136. On 12 August 1945, the reply from the Allies was received and immediately on the ground that he was anxious to save the "national polity"^a opposition was voiced by HIRANUMA to a reference in paragraph 4 of the reply stating that the ultimate form of the government of Japan should be established by the free will of the people,^b even though the responsible Minister, TCGO, saw nothing objectionable in the paragraph. Prime Minister SUZUKI apparently approved of HIRANUMA's position and doubt arose as to the possibility that the peace negotiations might not be concluded as the result of which "millions of innocents,^c due to bombing and starvation" would be sacrificed.^d In the meantime, the attitude of the Supreme Command stiffened^e and because of the opposition of HIRANUMA and the Army, there was difficulty in convening a meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of War.^f Finally, the Emperor convoked a joint Imperial Conference of cabinet members and component members of the Council at which it was determined to end the war.^g

EE-134

b. Ex 1282 T 29302

EE-135

a. Ex 3340 T 31777

EE-136

a. Ex 3340 T 31184
b. Ex 3340 T 31184; Ex 4 T 109
c. Ex 3340 T 31185
d. Ex 3340 T 31186
e. Ex 3340 T 31187
f. Ex 3340 T 31189
g. Ex 3340 T 31191

Page EE-48

EE-137. On 15 August 1945, HIRANUMA performed his last official act when he met with KIDO and selected Prince HIGASHIKUNI as the Premier to succeed SUZUKI. It was not thought necessary to convene the Senior Statesmen.^a

EE-138. Thus ignominiously ended the official career of a brilliant man, fighting to the end to preserve what he had done so much to destroy.

EE-139. He was not a militarist in the sense that he fought with guns and bombs; he was the sophist fighting with ideas and the skill of his intellect. He assisted in the formulation and execution of Japan's program of expansion, as a member of the Privy Council whose advice was followed on questions of constitutional law, diplomacy, the issuance of Imperial Ordinances and on the enactment of ordinary legislation to be submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet, which it could freely amend or veto entirely; as head of the Cabinet which exercised legislative power through the issuance of Imperial Ordinances when the Diet was not in session, and which initiated most of the legislation enacted by the Diet; as a State Minister charged with the duty of advising the Emperor for which, under the constitution, he was responsible; and as an Elder Statesman whose responsibility it was to recommend the appointment of a New Premier. At no time was his a minor role. At all times his governmental responsibility was on the highest level.

EE-137

a. Ex 3349 T 31200

Page EE-49

EE-140. As HIRAIUMA was either a member of the Privy Council, Premier, State Minister or Senior Statesman during the period of time set forth in the indictment, he is liable on Count No. 1.

EE-141. Pages 1 to 18, discussing HIRAIUMA's actions as a member of the Privy Council involve Counts 1, 3 and 4 for his acts in connection with the Manchurian and the China Incidents; Counts 6 and 17 for having planned and prepared a war of aggression against China and Russia respectively; Counts 18 and 25 for initiating the 7 July 1937 invasion of China and of the territory of the Soviet Union at Lake Khasan and Mt. Zaozernaya during July and August 1938; Counts 27, 28 and 30 for having waged a war of aggression against China and Russia respectively.

EE-142. Pages 18 to 35, enumerating the acts of HIRAIUMA during his Premiership, involved Count 1, the General Conspiracy Count; Count 3 for waging a war of aggression against China; Count 5 for his endeavors to form a military alliance with Germany and Italy; Counts 19 and 26 for initiating and waging a war of aggression against China; Counts 28 and 36 for initiating and waging an undeclared war of aggression on the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River; Count 31 for the unlawful killing and maiming of certain members of the armed forces of Mongolia and Russia in the attack on their territories in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River in the summer of 1939.

0 159 0007 0998

Page EE-50

EE-143. Pages 35 to 48, setting forth the acts of the Government of Japan from 6 December 1940 to 18 October 1941, involve Counts 1,3,4,5—Conspiracy Counts; Counts 7 to 17 inclusive for planning and preparing a war of aggression against the various countries enumerated in these counts; Counts 37 and 38 for conspiring to unlawfully kill and murder by initiating unlawful hostilities against the various countries enumerated therein.

0 159 0007 0999

IPS

February 19, 1948

Re: SUMATION - HIRAJIMA - (EE)

Pages EE-17 and EE-27 and EE-27A should be
inserted instead of pages EE-17 and EE-27.

Please not corrections on error sheet
attached.

IPS

0 159 0007 1000

IPS

February 19, 1948

Re: SUMMATION - HIRANUMA -(EE)

Make the following corrections:

Paragraph EE-72, page EE-25 - In the second line from top of page change affecting to effecting.

Paragraph EE-76, page EE-26 - Change first word of second line to "industry".

Paragraph EE-97, page EE-34 - Change the word "the" after the word "England" in the second line from the bottom to read "and".

Paragraph EE-112, page EE-39 - Delete 9th and 10th line completely, i.e. entry for 17 October 1941.

EE-48. The League of Nations in the first report adopted on 6 October 1937, found that the military operations by Japan against China could not be justified on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of "the right of self-defense and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty . . . and . . . the Pact of Paris."^{a.}

EE-49. In refusing to attend the Nine-Power Treaty meeting to be held at Brussels, Japan stated, 27 October 1937, that her declination was based upon the declaration of the League of Nations that the military operations of Japan in China violated the Nine-Power Treaty.^{a.}

EE-50. The new formula adopted by Japan and set forth in this communication was that Japan's action was a measure of self-defense which she had been compelled to take in the face of China's violent and anti-Japanese policy and practice and was therefore outside the purview of the Nine-Power Treaty.^{a.}

EE-51. On 14 December 1937, the Provisional Chinese Government was established in Peking.^{a.}

EE-52. During 1936 July and August 1938, without a declaration of war, Japan attacked the territory of the Soviet Union at Lake Khasan and Mount Zaozernaya.^{a.} The details of this attack are set forth in paragraphs E-96-E-108 of the general summation.

EE-53. The Privy Council on 2 March 1938 decided to terminate the cooperative relations with the various organs of the League of Nations.

EE-48.
a. Ex. 962, T. 9475

EE-49.
a. Ex. 954-B, T. 9447

EE-50.
a. Ex. 954-C, T. 9447

EE-51.
a. Ex. 463-A, T. 5077

EE-52.
a. Tereshkin T. 7767-76;
Ex. 753, T. 7755;
Ex. 755, T. 7808-11
Ex. 756, T. 7811-2
Ex. 3854, T. 38288
Ex. 2175, T. 15541

EE-53.
a. Ex. 271, T. 3641

EE-78. The standing army of Japan increased from 1,130,000 to 1,240,000^a and by a military conscription policy functioning through a Military Service Law provided a large number of reserves. This law was amended on 8 March 1939 promulgating amending regulations for military service, conscription of ex-servicemen, postponement for conscription for students and abrogation of the short-term conscription service system. A few weeks later, on 25 March 1939, Law No. 25 for safeguarding secrets of military material resources was promulgated aiming at the prevention of leakage of information on manpower and material resources.^b

EE-79. The Island of Hainan was taken by a surprise attack and occupied on 10 February 1939,^a and the Spratley Islands, a French possession off the eastern coast of French Indo-China, were also occupied by Japanese troops on 31 March 1939.^b

EE-78.

- a. Ex 880 T 9074-6
- b. Ex 840 T 8664

EE-79.

- a. Judicially noticed - T 6143
- b. Ex 512 T 6145

EE-80. On 11 May 1939 the Japanese forces trespassed the border of the Mongolian People's Republic. It was the commencement of fighting in the Halhin-Gol River area which continued from May through September, 1939, and which has been described in Paragraphs H-109 - H-123 of the general Summation. As his testimony shows, HIRANUMA was advised of this fighting by War Minister ITAGAKI.^a

EE-81. The Youth Training School, which provided, among other things, for the military training of students and which had been in effect in Japan for many years, became compulsory in 1939 at which time the school was renamed the "Youth School" and the training course became independent of gymnastics.^a

EE-82. Even before becoming Premier, HIRANUMA was active in the Wang plot, having insisted in December, 1938,

EE-80.

a. Ex 766 T 7246; Ex 768-A T 7855;
Ex 3857 T 39360; Ex 3662 T 39531

EE-81.

a. Ex 2377 T 16448-57

0 159 0007 1004

IPS

ERRATA SHEET

FEBRUARY 10, 1948

RE: HIRANUMA SUMMATION (EE)

The following corrections are to be made in

IPS SUMMATION on HIRANUMA (EE):

Page EE-4 Paragraph EE-11. Footnote a should read T.17564

Page EE-9 Paragraph EE-25. At end of second sentence,
insert quotation marks after words "Chinese
people".

Page EE-11 Paragraph EE-32. 3rd line from bottom. Words
"will thereby be removed", should read: "will be
thereby almost removed".

Page EE-27 Paragraph EE-79. Last part. Words "on 3 March 1939"
should read "on 31 March 1939".

Page EE-34 Paragraph EE-94. Third line from top. After
the words "resign", change period to comma.

International Prosecution Section.

HIRATA, Koki

Page 21-1

I. GENERAL - BIOGRAPHICAL

Ex-1. The defendant HIRATA was from 15 October 1930 to 19 November 1932, Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Foreign Minister from 1. September 1933 to 2 April 1935. He was appointed Premier on 6 March 1935 which position he held until the fall of the HIRATA Cabinet on 2 February 1937. On 20 January 1937, the Seiyu Kai Party mass meeting, issued a declaration criticizing the policy which this Cabinet had followed. The bungling of the Anti-Comintern Pact, they declared, had resulted in suspicion among other powers and the institution of semi-wartime organization and the pure bureaucratic economy had done more harm than good. They charged that the measures of HIRATA's Cabinet were not generally based on the welfare of the nation, but influenced by the dogmatic prejudices of the bureaucrats and the military.^{a.} Two weeks later HIRATA's Cabinet fell.

Ex-2. Witness TSUCHIDA placed the responsibility for the fall of HIRATA's Cabinet on the Army, particularly delegates in the House of Representatives who opposed the reform of the parliamentary system. The conflict grew so tense that the War Minister finally resigned and HIRATA could no longer maintain his Cabinet.^{a.}

-1.
a. Ex. 3208-1, E. 15,792

Ex-2.
a. Ex. 3256, E. 25,652

(FF-2.)

On 4 June 1937, he was appointed Foreign Minister and so acted until his resignation on 29 May 1938. After his resignation from this Cabinet position, he was Cabinet Councillor from 13 March 1940 to August 1940 and from July 1940 he attended the vital ex-Premier conferences held at the fall of each Cabinet to choose a new Premier.

FF-3. The keynote to HIROTA's character and policy is to be found in a decision of the Prime (HIROTA), Foreign, Finance, War, and Navy Ministers of 7 August 1936 where it was stated that "the fundamental national policy to be established by the Empire is to secure the position of the Empire on the East Asiatic Continent by dint of diplomatic policy and national defence, mutually dependent on each other, as well as to advance and develop the Empire toward the South Seas."^a This makes it plain that "national defence" was in his view merely a euphemism for the use of military power for aggressive purposes. This attitude he will be found to have adopted until June 1940 when he thereafter consistently recommended a military man as Premier. He was a man who frequently made pacific speeches and explanations to foreign powers, but his real intention throughout was to expand Japan's influence as far as possible by diplomacy backed by threats of force. Finally, when that had reached its limit, he was willing to hand over the situation to those who would use actual force.

II. ACTIVITIES WHILE AMBASSADOR TO USSR AND
ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA FOREIGN AND PEOPLE
MINISTER

FF-3.

a. Ex. 216, T. 2720

II-4. As early as 1931, during HIROTA's tenure of office as Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, he put forward his views towards the Soviet Union in a conversation with one Major-General FARADA, in which he stated that apart from whether Japan would wage a war against the Soviet, it was necessary for her to have strong policies in this regard and be ready for war at any time. The principal purpose of such policies was not defense against communism, but rather the conquest of East Siberia.^{e.} Witness MASAHARA stated, however, that HIROTA must have had some other motive in mind in saying this, since these were not his formal ideas.^{o.}

II-5. In December 1931, Litvinov made an offer on behalf of the Soviet Union regarding the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.^{a.} Although HIROTA on 15 October 1932 in a statement to the press regarding the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact had stated that such a pact could be concluded if it were calculated to bring some benefit to Japan,^{b.} one year elapsed before Japan replied in a negative vein to the Soviet's proposal. In this reply on 13 December 1932, Japan stated that formal opening of negotiations on this subject was untimely.^{c.}

II-4.
 a. Ex. 693, T. 7450
 b. Ex. 2671, T. 23,213

II-5.
 a. Ex. 744, T. 771
 b. Ex. 3232, T. 28,381
 c. Ex. 745, T. 7719

Page EE-4.

EE-6. Again on 4 January 1933, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the Japanese Government replying to the Japanese rejection of their offer for a non-aggression pact, ^{a.} and in reply on 13 February 1933 this proposal was ^{b.} again rejected by Japan.

EE-7. On 25 June 1933, prior to HIROTA's appointment as Foreign Minister, negotiations were opened between Japan and the Soviet Union for the purchase by Japan of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which the Soviet appeared willing to sell. ^{a.} At first difficulties were encountered because of disagreement on selling price, but finally HIROTA who was then Foreign Minister in August 1934, reached a compromise with the Soviet Union and an agreement was signed on 23 March 1935. ^{b.} HIROTA acclaimed the settlement of the railway transfer in a speech on 22 January 1935, ^{c.} and congratulatory notes were exchanged; Litvinov in a statement to foreign correspondents expressed delight at the successful conclusion of the negotiations. ^{d.} However, these negotiations were accompanied by considerable pressure on the part of Japan. For instance, on 23 October 1933, the Russian Consulate at Harbin complained strongly to the Japanese Foreign Office representative that the Chinese Eastern Railway

EE-6.

a. Ex. 746, T. 7720
b. Ex. 747, T. 7721

EE-7.

a. Ex. 3235-A, T. 29,436
b. Ex. 3234, T. 29,429
c. Ex. 3247, T. 29,491
d. Ex. 3252, T. 29,616

Page 17-5.

(17-7.)

had been subjected to attacks, destruction of tracks and property, murder of railroad agents, and despite previous complaints no corrective measures had been taken.^{e.} Again on 15 December 1934, the Vice-President of the Chinese Eastern Railway quoted to President Li Shao Gen a number of unlawful requisitions of living quarters and buildings belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway.^{f.}

17-8. Notes exchanged by HIROTA and Manchukuo show that Japan guaranteed the performance of the contract of the Manchukuo Government in the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway.^{a.}

17-9. While HIROTA in a speech on 23 January 1935 accused the Soviet Union of issuing anti-Japanese reports although Japan herself was not setting up new military establishments along the Manchukuo-Soviet border,^{a.} a letter dated 12 November 1935 from SHIRATORI to ARITA shows that Japan, nevertheless, had aggressive aspirations towards the Soviet and that these existed in the minds of the Foreign Ministry as well as in the Army.^{b.}

17-10. HIROTA's participation in decisions and measures which aimed at opposing the Soviet can be seen from the decision of the Four Ministers on 4 April 1936

17-7.

e. Ex. 745, T. 7739
f. Ex. 749, T. 7742

17-9.

a. Ex. 3237, T. 29,456
b. Ex. 774-A, T. 7883

17-8.

a. Ex. 443-A, T. 5082

(FT-10)
to make North China a special anti-communistic and
pro-Japanese zone, while eventually all China was to
be pro-Japanese and anti-Soviet.
a.

FT-11. In a report, dated 24 July 1936, drawn
up by the Foreign Office, "The Problem of a Japanese -
German Political Convention" was reviewed. While the
main purpose of a pact with Germany was cited as a
means of defense against communism and a means to com-
bat the menace of the Soviet Union, the actual pact
is continually referred to as a "Japanese-German
Coalition".
a. Also, while witness AMITA stoutly main-
tained that HIROTA did not agree with the policy of
an alliance with Germany and did not entertain similar
ideas to the Army on this subject.
b.

FT-12. On 7 and 11 August 1937, the decision and
proposed policy of the government was discussed and the
eradication of the Russian menace was decided.
a.

FT-13. HIROTA held the position of Foreign Minister
when the negotiations for the anti-Comintern Pact were
started,
a. and was Premier when, on 25 November 1936,
the Anti-Comintern Pact and secret Attached Pact be-
tween Japan and Germany were signed.
b.

FT-14. While the Foreign Office on 25 December
1936 issued a statement acclaiming the conclusion of

FT-10. a. Ex. 704, T. 7523
FT-11. a. Ex. 3267, T. 29,805
b. T. 30,014-16
FT-12. a. Ex. 215, T. 2720;
Ex. 979, T. 9549
FT-13. a. Ex. 1106, T. 10,115
b. Ex. 35, Ex. 48, T. 5936

Page FF-7.

(II-14.)

the Anti-Comintern Pact and stated categorically

"That the present agreement was not directed against
the Soviet Union nor any other specific country." ^{a.}

HIROTA in his capacity as Premier attended the
Investigation Committee Meeting of the Privy Council
on 20 November 1936, where it was explained that
"the present Japanese-German Pact comprises two
pacts; Pact against the Communist Internationale
and the Secret Attached Pact against the Soviet Union."
At this same meeting, HIROTA gave an explanation in
which he stated that the Communist activities of the
Soviet Union constituted a menace to Japan's East Asia
policy hence Japan had insisted on the cooperation of
China in this regard. ^{b.}

FF-15. Subsequently, on 26 November 1936, HIROTA
attended the Privy Council Meeting where the conclusion
of the Anti-Comintern Pact was unanimously approved. ^{a.}

IF-16. When on 12 November 1937, HIROTA as
Foreign Minister attended the meeting held to discuss
the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, he reiterated
that this pact was solely a pact against Communism. ^{a.}
Yet, the Bureau of Information of the Foreign Office,
which was under his direct control, issued a statement
of the conclusion of this extension, in which they
expressed concern that the true purport of the pact -
that it was not directed against any particular country -
had not been understood by all. ^{b.}

II-14.

a. Ex. 2371, T. 18,39:
b. Ex. 484, T. 5957

FF-16.

a. Ex. 492, T. 6033
b. Ex. 483, T. 5956

FF-15.

a. Ex. 485, T. 5957

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FF-17. At a liaison conference held on 15 January 1936, KONOE revealed that the Army General Staff was advocating cessation of hostilities in China in order to prepare for an attack on the Soviet Union, and that at a Cabinet Conference later on the same day the Deputy Chief of Staff went so far as to advocate direct dealing with Chiang Kai-shek. ^{a.} While KAWABE recalled that there had been considerable argument at the meetings, he could not specify the reasons. ^{b.} Again, it is obvious from HARADA's diary of 14 February 1936 that HIROTA must have been well aware that the army was advocating a halt in military advances in order to prepare for an attack against Russia. ^{c.} Although HORIUCHI, who was then Vice-Foreign Minister, was credited by HARADA as having made this statement, he could not recall it when questioned. ^{d.}

III. JAPAN'S ABROGATION OF THE WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY, EXPIRATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT, AND THE VIOLATION OF THE HULL-COOPER TREATY.

FF-18. On 29 December 1934 while HIROTA was Foreign Minister, Japan gave notice of her intention to withdraw from the Washington Naval Treaty, effective ^{a.} December 1936. Regarding this abrogation, HARADA, in his diary on 7 September 1934, stated that Premier OKADA and Foreign Minister HIROTA said, "Who long and

FF-17.

a. Ex. 2780-A, T. 37718
 c. T 22053-7
 c. Ex. 3790-A, T. 37736
 d. T 2387C-1

FF-18.

a. Ex. 942, T. 9416;
 Ex. 1105, T. 10,115

(FF-18)
short of it is that in the draft, we have utterly
opposed a ratio. Therefore, we must abrogate it no
matter how much the other powers agree to our pro-
posals. We are taking an unconditional stand.^{b.}
Then defense witness KONDO was confronted with this
statement, he at first admitted it to be true;^c but
later in re-direct examination he flatly denied that
HIROTA or OKADA had said such a thing.^{d.} On the same
day Ambassador Crew sent a telegram to Secretary of
State Hull stating that the Privy Council had unani-
mously approved the decision to abrogate the Washington
Naval Treaty, and he gained the impression that HIROTA
desired to delay the formal notice until after the
adjournment of the London conversations so that Japan
would not be charged with disrupting them.^{e.} Neverthe-
less, HIROTA maintained in a speech on 22 January 1935
to the 67th Diet Session that such a withdrawal should
not be taken as an indication that Japan intended to
launch out on any armament expansion; on the contrary,
Japan was looking forward to the conclusion of another
pact to succeed the Washington Treaty.^{f.}

FF-19. Such a pact, however, stood little chance
of realization, especially, since at the London Naval
Conference in January 1936, Japan insisted on a
common upper limit in place of the 5-5-3 ratio, which,

FF-18.
b. Ex. 3777-B, T. 37668
c. T. 26,538
d. T. 26,703
e. Ex. 53, T. 9199
f. Ex. 3247, T. 29,591

Page FF-10.

(FF-19)

of course, meant that unless Britain and America neglected their responsibilities in other parts of the world, Japan would dominate the Pacific.^{a.}

Refusal by other nations to accept this proposal resulted in Japan's withdrawal from the Conference.^{b.}

A description of these negotiations and his reasons for their failure is given by defense witness E. OMOTO.^{c.}

FF-20. Japan continued to expand her naval armament by supplementary building programs. The one entitled "Third Supplementary Program" aimed at the construction of a total tonnage of 233,000 tons plus 34 auxiliary vessels by the end of 1941. This program, according to witness KONO, was prompted by the increased naval production of the United States, although he admitted that it was not clear that this armament was directed against Japan because the United States was also preparing against the additional menace of the Western Axis powers.^{a.}

FF-21. When the United States suggested to HIROTA that the calibre for guns on capital ships should be limited, he replied on 7 June 1937, refusing to cooperate in this regard, reiterating Japan's policy of not embarking on the construction of a naval force which would constitute a menace, and adhering to principles put forth by Japan at the London Naval Conference the year before.^{b.}

FF-19.

- a. Ex. 2236, T. 15,977
b. Ex. 2425, T. 9421
c. Ex. 3011, T. 26,763 et seq.

FF-20.

- a. Ex. 3706, T. 23,632-69
b. T. 26,696

FF-21.

- a. Ex. 58, T. 9231

Page FF-11.

FF-22. In letters exchanged between HIROTA and Grew in 1938, Japan again turned down proposals put forward by Great Britain and America for a reciprocal exchange of information on naval construction, yet by espionage activities she attempted to ascertain America's naval strength.^{a.} Such an attempt for reciprocal exchange was made by Grew on 5 February 1938. He requested information regarding building of capital ships, since, although Japan had not subscribed to the London Naval Treaty, America as a signatory had the right of escalation in the event a power not a party thereto was building not in conformity with the limits set by the Treaty. He also requested that Japan satisfy the United States that she would not construct any vessel not conforming to these limits prior to 3 January 1943 without informing the United States of her intent; otherwise the United States would be forced to use her right of escalation.^{b.}

FF-23. On 12 February 1938, HIROTA acknowledged Grew's memorandum and in reply reiterated Japan's point that it was impossible to obtain equitable disarmament by a measure of qualitative limitation without quantitative limitation. Japan, therefore, felt unable to give information regarding construction of vessels and felt unable to comply with the request of the United States on this matter.^{a.}

FF-24. At precisely the same time that HIROTA was

FF-22.
 a. Ex. 1249, T. 11184
 b. Ex. 58, T. 9392

FF-23.
 a. Ex. 56, T. 9236

(FF-24)
 politely refusing any measures in naval limitation or information, the Japanese Government was engaged in the construction of the battleships *Yamato* and *Musashi*, both exceeding the treaty limit of 35,000 tons and 16 inch guns.^{a.} Yet, HIROTA on 4 March 1938 stated in a speech to the 73rd Diet Session that it would be well if in the future there was an opportunity for the powers to discuss naval disarmament.^{b.}

FF-25. On 26 April 1934, HIROTA cabled various Japanese embassies, including those in the United States and Great Britain, regarding a conversation he had had with British Ambassador Lindley on the subject of Japan's attitude towards the Nine Power Treaty. HIROTA maintained that Japan had never violated the Nine Power Treaty nor had she any intention of doing so.^{a.} Yet, the First Report adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on 6 October 1937, during HIROTA's tenure of office as Foreign Minister, condemned Japan's actions as being in breach of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and the Pact of Paris of 1928.^{b.}

FF-26. On 20 October 1937 the Foreign Ministry announced that the Belgian ambassador had presented Foreign Minister HIROTA with an invitation to attend a meeting of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty at Brussels on 30 October.^{a.}

FF-27. On 21 October 1937, Grew stated in his

FF-24.

- a. Ex. 913, T. 9420
- b. Ex. 3289, T. 30002

FF-25.

- a. Ex. 3244, T. 29582
- b. Ex. 962, T. 9474

FF-26.

- a. Ex. 9544, T. 9444

(FF-27)
 diary that while representations were being made to Japan to join in the Brussels Conference, HIROTA had revealed that the leaders of political parties were practically unanimous in their opinion not to partake in it. There was a strong possibility that the Foreign Office would turn down the invitation since it did not specify that the Conference did not arise out of the League of Nations resolution and the United States announcement of 6 October.^{a.} Japan declined the invitation of 27 October stating that in her opinion the action in China lay outside the Nine Power Treaty.^{b.}

FF-28. This refusal was explained by witness HCRINOCHI, who stated again that the refusal of Japan to participate in the Brussels Conference was not against the provisions of the Nine Power Pact, inasmuch as the participation was expected to be detrimental to the internal affairs of Japan.^{a.}

FF-29. On 16 November 1937, HIROTA expressed concern to Grew over the reports that the final resolution of the Brussels Conference contemplated united action against Japan, fearing that if the Japanese press got hold of such reports, it would have an unfortunate effect on public opinion. HIROTA added that Japan had considered the United States a likely mediator in the Sino-Japanese hostilities.^{a.}

FF-27.
 a. Ex. 3283, T. 29955
 b. Ex. 954B, T. 9446

FF-28.
 a. Ex. 3260, T. 29678

FF-29.
 a. Ex. 3284, T. 29957

IV. HIROTA'S POLICY TOWARDS MANCHUKUO

FF-30. HIROTA was a member of the Cabinet which on 22 December 1933, made the decision that Manchukuo should be directed to form a monarchy. The drafting of the declaration should make distinct the indivisible relationship between Japan and Manchuria.^{a.} While in a speech on 23 January 1934, he acclaimed the establishment of Manchukuo as an independent country.^{b.}

FF-31. On 1 March 1934, Pu-Yi became Emperor of Manchukuo and an Imperial Rescript was issued to this effect, and an announcement made in the Manchukuo Government Bulletin.^{a.}

FF-32. On 20 March 1934, the same Cabinet made a decision regarding Japanese-Manchurian Economic Administration. In this decision the policy was stated to include the secure establishment of Japan's world-wide economic expansion, while the transportation and other enterprises in Manchukuo were to be restricted by the demands of the Japanese Empire; national defense was to be carried out by speedy development under the power and appropriate administration of the Empire.^{a.}

FF-33. On 9 August 1934, the Japanese Government issued a statement that it would be necessary to relinquish Japan's extraterritorial rights if Manchukuo was to be allowed to attain full development. This was to be gradually executed to avoid any sudden change in the

FF-30.

- a. Ex. 234, T. 3936
- b. Ex. 3237, T. 29152

FF-31.

- a. Ex. 437A, T. 5015
- Ex. 2426, T. 19696

FF-32.

- a. Ex. 236, T. 2939

(FF-33) a.
lives of Japanese Nationals.

FF-34. On 26 December 1934, when HIROTA was Foreign Minister, an Imperial Ordinance was issued setting up the organization of the Manchurian Affairs Board, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Premier and dealt with such things as the affairs of the Kwantung Board, the co-ordination of Manchuria administrative affairs in every Ministry, and the superintendence of the South Manchurian Railway. Just how much independence Manchukuo was to have can be seen from the fact that four administrative officials were appointed by the Cabinet from among officers in the Army and Navy, and a two-in-one unification was effected by combining the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the Ambassador to Manchukuo. KUROSHIMA in cross-examination agreed that the Foreign Minister had direct supervision over the Ambassador to Manchukuo and that he did not recall one instance when MINAMI, the Ambassador to Manchukuo in 1935, acted contrary to the instructions of the Foreign Minister, at that time the Defendant HIROTA.

FF-35. On 21 January 1935, HIROTA in a speech reviewed the progress made in regard to extraterritoriality and explained the gradual abolition of these extraterritorial rights.

FF-36. Despite Japan's publication of her desire for Manchurian independence, her real policy towards Manchukuo can be seen from a Privy Council Meeting on

FF-33.
a. Ex. 2432, T. 19717

FF-34.
c. Ex. 451, T. 5112
b. Ex. 451, T. 5112; Ex. 452, T. 5114, T. 29501

FF-35.
a. Ex. 2434, T. 19728

(FF-36)
 3 July 1935, attended by Defendant HIROTA. At this meeting which was held to discuss the conclusion of a Joint Economic Agreement between Japan and Manchukuo, HIROTA stated regarding the formation of the committee that, since it was to be composed of four members from each country and one of the Manchurian quota was to be a Japanese, in case of any difference of opinion between the two countries no decision would be disadvantageous to Japan.^{a.} On 15 July 1935, while HIROTA was Foreign Minister the above-mentioned Japan-Manchukuo Economic Agreement was signed.^{b.}

FF-37. On 10 June 1936, a treaty between Japan and Manchukuo was signed concerning the residence and taxation etc. of Japanese subjects in Manchukuo. This treaty purported finally to give the Government of Manchukuo the administrative rights over the South Manchurian Railway Zone in exchange for a completely equal treatment of Japanese and Manchurians, giving the Japanese the right to travel, pursue commercial, agricultural or industrial vocations, and enjoy all rights relating to the land.^{a.}

FF-38. On 3 August 1937, when HIROTA was Foreign Minister the Agreement between Japan and Manchukuo was concluded whereby the Manchurian Development Company was organized to strengthen still further the bonds existing between the two countries.^{c.}

FF-36.
 a. Ex. 850, T. 8417
 b. Ex. 445, T. 5055; Ex. 951, T. 8433

FF-37.
 a. Ex. 237, T. 2944

FF-38.
 a. Ex. 438, T. 5018

FF-39. On 22 October 1937, at the time HIROTA was Foreign Minister a Cabinet decision was made outlining the establishment of heavy industry in Manchukuo. ^{a.}

FF-40. HIROTA was Premier when the Treaty between Japan and Manchukuo was signed abolishing the rights of extraterritoriality in Manchukuo. ^{b.} This included a manifest in regard to foreigners which encroached upon the rights of nationals of the United States as accorded them by the Treaty concluded between the United States and China. ^{b.}

V. HIROTA'S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA PRIOR TO CHINA INCIDENT

FF-41. During HIROTA's tenure of office as Foreign Minister from 14 September 1933 to 2 April 1936, and as Premier from 9 March 1936 to 2 February 1937, he was a member of the over-all conspiracy which planned and prepared by diplomatic means and direct provocation the high state of tension and unrest in China which culminated in the China Incident. During these years, while avoiding the actual use of armed force, the Japanese Government made plans and took measures with threats of such use towards the ultimate inclusion of China in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere.

FF-42. While in his speeches and declarations, as on 22 January 1935 and 1 March 1935, HIROTA acclaimed hope for the stabilization of peace in China and his belief in

FF-39.
a. Ex. 239, T. 2960

FF-40.
a. Ex. 2476, A.B.C.P., T. 20473
b. Ex. 944, T. 7410

(FF-42) ^{a.} he was a member of the equality of Japan and China, he was a member of the Cabinet which was at the time aware of the intrigues of the North China and Kwantung armies to establish autonomous regimes in China and to sever the Eastern provinces from the Nanking regime, thereby weakening it. The circumstances surrounding, and the conclusion of, the HO-UJIEZU agreement on 10 June 1935, provide one demonstration of the use of a small incident as a pretext for dominating territory and causing trouble. Using the murder of two Chinese in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin as an excuse, the Japanese requested the withdrawal of Chinese military police, the Kuomintang Party offices in Hopei and other organizations, and the transfer of General YU; to which demands the Chinese gave in. ^{b.} Not satisfied with this, the Japanese made stronger demands, ^{c.} which ISHIKAWA stated were only suggestions or representations. ^{d.} FUJASHIMA admitted that they were in the nature of an ultimatum. ^{e.} Under such demands the Chinese gave in and on 10 June 1935, the HO-UJIEZU agreement was concluded. ^{f.}

FF-43. America's attitude towards the North China autonomous regimes was made clear by Hull, Secretary of State, on 25 September 1935, when he issued a statement on the political struggle which was then taking place ^{a.} there.

FF-44. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office did nothing

FF-42.

- a. Ex. 3247, T. 29593; Ex. 3250, T. 29612
- b. Ex. 194, T. 2275-6
- c. Ex. 194, T. 2276
- d. Ex. 2491, T. 20787
- e. T. 29531
- f. Ex. 2491, T. 20787-8

FF-43.

- a. Ex. 938, T. 9403

Page HT-18.

(HT-4)
 to all these activities, although on 2 October 1935, WAKATSUKI, Secretary General to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping, cabled to Foreign Minister HIROTA informing him that rumor was prevalent that the Army was intending to organize an independent state out of the five provinces of North China independent of theanking Regime. Thus a bloc of Japan, Manchuria and North China would be established.

HT-45. Although witness KUBASAKI stated that until the actual establishment of the East Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Regime and the Hopei Chahar political council, the Foreign Office in Tokyo had no knowledge of them, he nevertheless identified a telegram dispatched from Acting Ambassador FURII to HIROTA on 15 October 1935, giving information that there were reports on the progress of the independent movement fostered by the Japanese military authorities, and the reports were that North China had come under the control of Japan. He also identified a file of newspaper cuttings regarding the North China autonomous movement as having circulated within the Foreign Office, which cuttings had been sent from Ambassador ARIYOSHI in China to Foreign Minister HIROTA on 27 November 1937.

HT-44.
 e. Ex. 197, T. 2283

HT-45.
 a. T. 29,536
 b. Ex. 3242, T. 29,537
 c. Ex. 3242-A, T. 29,542

FF-46. It must have been obvious to the Foreign Office that such movements were well under way and yet no measures were taken. Consequently, on 24 November 1935, a "Preparatory Committee for Autonomy in the War Zone" was organized subsequent to Japanese attempts to change the political structure of North China and set up an autonomy.^{a.}

FF-47. On 25 November 1935, the Japanese finally established the Japanese dominated and controlled Eastern Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council in the demilitarized zone established by the Tangku Truce. This council proclaimed independence of the National Government.^{a.} Subsequently, on 18 December 1935, General Sung Choh Yuan was appointed Chairman of the Hopei Chahar Political Council established for the administration of North China.^{b.}

FF-48. On 13 January 1936, Foreign Minister HIROTA sent "Gist of Plans for Dealing with North China" to the Japanese Ambassador in China. The plans were drawn up in the Foreign Ministry and dealt with the self-government of North China, cooperation with Japan, etc.^{a.}

FF-49. Simultaneously with the setting up of these autonomous regimes, HIROTA was preparing a plan, the essential policy of which was the securing of stabilization in East Asia by cooperation among...

FF-46.
a. Ex. 210, T. 2752

FF-48.
a. Ex. 215, T. 2719

FF-47.
a. Ex. 210, T. 2752
b. Ex. 211, T. 2754

(FF-49)
 Japan, Manchukuo and China. This became known as "HIROTA's Three Principles", and he first set them out in a plan dispatched to the diplomatic consular officials in China. These principles were: (1) control of anti-Japanese activities, (2) tacit consent to the independence of Manchukuo and cultural and economic cooperation with her, and (3) removal of communistic tendencies and influence.^{a.} After considerable discussions with the Army and Navy, the plan was adopted on 4 October 1935 by the Premier and War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers.^{b.} Secrecy was to be maintained by the diplomatic authorities.^{c.} On 14 November 1935, SUMA, Consul General at Hanking, secretly informed HIROTA that Japanese troops were being concentrated in the vicinity of Shenhai Kwan and that "grave events might be caused if wrong measures are taken."^{d.} In conversation with HARADA a few days later on the 30th November, HIROTA stated with respect to this concentration of troops that the movement of these troops south would depend on an Imperial Command. This fact, however, should be kept secret from the Chinese, who considered them an immediate threat; and if they found out they were merely a bluff, the Chinese would start to cause trouble. In addition, if the military faction discovered that China had learned this secret,^{e.} they would take strong measures.

FF-49.

- a. Ex. 3254, T. 29625; Ex. 3255, T. 29630
- b. Ex. 3255, T. 29630
- c. Ex. 3255, T. 29630
- d. Ex. 3256, T. 29633
- e. Ex. 3779A, T. 37674

FF-50. SUMA reported on 21 November 1935 that these principles had been presented to Chiang Kai-shek by Ambassador ARIYOSHI who had accepted them and had no 'counter proposals'.^{a.}

FF-51. Defense witness KUMASHIMA in his testimony regarding these early peace moves stated that although until May 1935 Sino-Japanese relations had improved, the attempted assassination of Tang Yu-Jen in December brought about a considerable change in these improved relations.^{a.} Again, on cross-examination he stated that the difficulties in the negotiations were due to the Chinese and stated that HIROTA was willing to continue negotiations.^{b.}

FF-52. HIROTA on 21 January 1936 publicized these three principles in a speech to the Diet.^{a.} This was immediately followed by what is known as "the 26 February Incident", when a large group of Army officers and men terrorized Tokyo^{b.} in an attempt to gain control of the government. Although the revolt was subsequently put down, it assisted in the fall of the OKADA Cabinet and the formation of a new Cabinet on 9 March 1936, headed by the Defendant HIROTA.^{c.}

FF-50.
a. Ex. 3257, T. 29635

FF-51.
a. Ex. 3241, T. 29492
b. T. 29555-6

FF-52.
a. Ex. 3241, T. 29492
b. Ex. 176, T. 1831-3
c. Ex. 108, T. 706

FF-53. During HIROTA's tenure of office as Premier in December 1936, the so-called Suiyuan Incident broke out. ^{a.} Defense witness KAWASHIMA claimed the incident was caused by the activities of officers of the Kwantung Army in Inner Mongolia and was the reason for the change in Sino-Japanese relations. ^{b.} He also stated that it would be natural for HIROTA to attempt a diplomatic solution since it was in keeping with his policy. He also denied that the Japanese had any knowledge of the incident until it actually occurred. ^{c.}

FF-54. On 11 August 1936, the Foreign Ministry and other ministries concerned drew up a program entitled "Important Decisions re International and National Policies, the Second Administrative Policy towards North China". The main purpose of

FF-53.

- a. T. 29556
- b. Ex. 3241, T. 29493-4
- c. T. 29556-60

(TT-56.)

Marco Polo Bridge Area and (3) control of anti-^{a.} Japanese organizations. Yet, on the same day the KOJIE Cabinet passed a resolution to send more troops to the Marco Polo Bridge Area and thereupon gave approval to the Army's proposal to mobilize necessary forces in the homeland and dispatch contingents from the Kwantung and Korean Armies to reinforce the North China Stationary Force.^{c.} In view of this, HORIUCHI's attempt to explain away this decision as a precautionary mobilization measure, stating that HIROTA consented to this decision with reservations and that the exclusive purpose of it was the protection of Japanese nationals, seems most unlikely.^{d.} In addition, in the report of the Personnel Affairs Section on "The China Affair", it is stated that at a Cabinet Meeting on the 11th July an important decision was made to take necessary steps in connection with the dispatch of troops to North China and also to take hasty measures for strengthening the staffs of diplomatic offices in North China.^{e.} While HORIUCHI purported to have knowledge of HIROTA's part in the negotiations to settle the China Incident and testified to everything he said and did, he could not recall an obviously important telegram to the

TT-56.

- a. Ex. 3260, T. 29,685
- b. T. 2455
- c. Ex. 3260, T. 29,688
- d. Ex. 3260, T. 29,689
- e. Ex. 230, T. 3487

0 159 0008 1029

(FF-56)
 effect that China had accepted Japan's demands on
 f.
 12 July 1937. This telegram, according to
 HARADA, was received on the afternoon of the
 12th and stated that China had accepted all
 demands. The demands, according to HARADA, differ-
 ed from those quoted by HORINOUCHI and were:
 (1) withdrawal of troops, (2) guarantee of the
 future, and (3) punishment of responsible officers.
 While HARADA quoted the military reporter as
 describing this as "a very sincere answer", the
 Army considered it a Chinese ruse to stop Japan's
 military preparations. g.
 Since the Chinese
 version of the affair put the blame upon the
 Japanese, h. it is obvious that these terms
 could have been agreed upon only under threat of
 force, whichever version is correct. HORINOUCHI
 admitted that the Foreign Ministry made no inde-
 pendent attempt to find out which version was
 correct but simply accepted that of the Japanese
 Army without question. i.
 In spite of HORINOUCHI's
 excuse that the purpose of Japan was solely to pro-
 tect Japanese interests, the Japanese Army again
 on the 14th attacked the city of Waming on an
 intensified scale with artillery support. j.

FF-56.
 f. T. 29,755
 g. Ex. 3780A, T. 37680
 h. T. 2026-34
 i. T. 29,751-52
 j. T. 2331

Page FF-28.

FF-57. On 20 July 1937, another Cabinet meeting was held and the decision was made to mobilize three home divisions for dispatch to China; the mobilization order for which was issued on 27 July. ^{a.} On 26 July, a Japanese ultimatum was handed to the Chinese requesting the withdrawal of troops from the Peiping area in 24 hours. ^{b.} HIROTA, in a speech on 27 July 1937, and also in a statement to the press on 2 September 1937, blamed China for the incident, accusing her of reinforcing her armies there and also rejecting Japanese-Chinese local settlement, ^{c.} but he made no mention of the swift mobilization moves by Japan.

FF-58. In July, according to HORIKOUCHI, a draft of settlement terms for China was agreed upon by the Premier and the Foreign, Navy and War Ministers, and approved by Foreign Minister HIROTA on 5 August 1937. These terms, he said, called for (1) the establishment of unfortified zones along the River Pai-Ho and the withdrawal of Japanese and Chinese troops from the areas specified as such, (2) no annexation of territories, and (3) no indemnities. ^{a.} However, no such document was produced. It appears that while HORI OUCHI himself could not produce this document, the same

FF-57.

- a. Ex. 3260, T. 29, 690-1
- b. T. 2326-34
- c. Ex. 2487, T. 20,875
- Ex. 2503, T. 20,873

FF-58.

- a. Ex. 3260, T. 29, 692

0 159 0008 1037

(BT-58)
terms as those to which he referred are included in "Plan for Disposing of Incident", which was approved by the Premier and the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministers on 7 August 1937. While this included the three terms which HORIUCHI himself mentioned, it also covers a far wider field, which considerably alters the interpretation of those terms. For instance, although settlement was cited as the main purpose, it was also stated that "we should be determined to exercise military power on a large scale and for a long period of time. Therefore, by taking necessary steps in this direction, we should make quick preparations so as to be able to meet any development in the situation." It is clearly shown that military action was to be prepared for and exploitation of materials necessary for military purposes was to be carried out. The demilitarized zones, which were to be set up, apparently were to be demilitarized to the extent that Chinese forces were to withdraw from what had been Chinese territory and that area was to be policed by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps, whose strength was to be decided by the Japanese--giving the Japanese in effect all they desired. Also included was the promise which Japan continually attempted to

(FF-58)
 extract from China - "that China would give a tacit
 b.
 promise to leave Manchukuo alone". KAWABE, who
 was a section chief of the General Staff and who
 took charge of the affairs relative to tactics
 in the Central Military Supreme Command from
 c.
 March 1937 to February 1938, testified to the
 situation during this time but professed ignor-
 d.
 ance of this meeting of 7 August.

FF-59. Even Germany at this time condemned
 the Japanese in regard to their actions in China
 as revealed in a telegram from the German Foreign
 Ministry to the German Embassy in Tokyo, dated 28
 July 1937, complaining that Japanese aggression in
 China was contrary to the Anti-Comintern Pact and
 a.
 was forcing China into the arms of Russia.

FF-60. In early August emissary FUJITSU was
 dispatched by HIROTA to help settle the affair.
 His mission was to be kept secret and instructions
 a.
 were sent by HIROTA to this effect. A draft
 proposal of demands which were to form the basis
 of FUJITSU's negotiations were cabled on 7
 August to Ambassador KAWAGOE. These terms differed
 from the previous local terms and requested: (1)
 majority of Hopei Province and six provinces of
 Chapei to be declared a demilitarized zone, (2)

FF-58.
 b. Ex. 3735, T. 37,219
 c. Ex. 2532, T. 31,974
 d. T. 22,629

FF-59.
 a. Ex. 486, T. 5975

FF-60.
 a. Ex. 3275, T. 29917

Page 51-31

(FF-60)
 abrogation of Hanku Truce, (3) liquidation of the
 Hopei Chakar and West Hopei Administration and direct
 administration of the area by Hanking Government.
 (4) economic cooperation between Japan and China
 to be arranged. ^{E.} More instructions as to the form
 of these negotiations were sent by MIKOTA on 7
 August, after consultation with the Navy, War and
 Foreign Ministers. These instructions impressed
 the importance of the Chinese initiating the truce.
 Nevertheless, MIKOTA stated that the outbreak of
 the "CYAMA Incident" on 9 August in Shanghai, where
 the negotiations were taking place, brought about
 a rupture and subsequent failure in the nego-
 tiations. ^{d.}

FF-61. On 9 August 1937, the Shanghai Incident
 or "CYAMA Incident" broke out, which HOKINOUCHI
 attributed to the killing of a Japanese Naval
 officer by Chinese soldiers. ^{a.} through independent
 enquiry would have shown the absurdity of the Jap-
 anese version of this affair as appears from the
 cross-examination of TAKEDA. ^{b.} In addition, the
 Premier and the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministers
 on 7 August 1937, decided that the "Principal areas
 for using military force on land shall be Hopei-
 Chakar and Shanghai." ^{c.}

FF-60.

- b. Ex. 3275, T. 29921
- c. Ex. 3276, T. 29926
- d. Ex. 3274, T. 29925

FF-61.

- a. Ex. 328, T. 3305; Ex. 3260, T. 29693
- b. T. 21267-320
- c. Ex. 3235, T. 32219

Page IT-33.

(IF-61)

Defense witness HORIKUCHI, when questioned, denied knowledge regarding a Cabinet meeting on 12 August 1937, which decided to withhold the mobilization order, despite the fact that he had testified concerning the incident and stated that reports and studies were forwarded to the Foreign Office and that HIROTA himself had done all in his power to bring about a local settlement. However, HARADA on 13 August 1937 refers to this Cabinet meeting, quoting HIROTA as having said, "If we should announce the issuing of the mobilization order, then the situation will be troublesome, so, at yesterday's Cabinet meeting, it was decided that the mobilization order will be issued but not announced." HIROTA, in a speech on 2 September 1937, blamed China for the incident, attributing it not only to the murder of two Japanese sailors but also to the fact that China had violated the agreement for the cessation of hostilities (1932). Again, on 5 September 1937, HIROTA attempted to justify Japan's attack on Shanghai on 9 August by placing blame on the Chinese; however, within less than forty-eight hours after the initial incident, Japan had concentrated about thirty warships in Shanghai and increased her armed forces there by several thousand, and HIROTA himself gave his approval to the increase of Japanese marines in Shanghai and the dispatch of these warships there.

FE-61.

- d. T. 29,764-6
- e. Ex. 3791A, T. 37687
- f. Ex. 2503, T. 20,873
- g. Ex. 2503, T. 20,866;
Ex. 58, T. 3303
- h. Ex. 5, T. 3305
- i. T. 29,764

Page 10-55

MF-52. ARITA was then dispatched on a tour of Manchuria, Peiping and other places, and was also to conduct unofficial conversations in Shanghai with the Chinese, but these conversations did not materialize due to the fact that the situation did not take a favorable turn for his visit to Shanghai.

MF-53. At the same time that these moves for settlement were supposed to have been made, the central authorities in Tokyo were going on with mobilization measures. For example, on 24 September 1937, the Cabinet decided on the mobilization of four divisions and the holding of four other divisions in readiness. ORIUCHI agreed that something to this effect had been decided.

MF-61. Grew's offer of mediation to IROTA on 22 July 1937 was rejected by the latter who stated that local settlement was still hoped for. Again on 6 August 1937, the British Government proposed to the United States that an Anglo-American offer of good offices be extended to both the Chinese and Japanese and requested the opinion of Dodds and Grew on Japan's probable reaction to such an offer. Hence, on 10 August 1937, Grew offered his help to Foreign Minister IROTA in the present

MF-52.
a. Ex. 3260, T. 29,564

MF-54.
a. Ex. 3260, T. 29,582
b. Ex. 3279, T. 29,951

MF-61.
a. Ex. 3782a, T. 37,89
b. T. 29,766

(17-64)

situation, stating that he had been authorized to say this was a definite offer of good offices.

He suggested arranging a meeting of Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries to conduct negotiations. ^{c.}

According to HARADA, HIROTA's personal idea for Japanese demands, which he expressed to the British Ambassador around 26 September, were: (1) setting up of a demilitarized zone by drawing a line slightly south of Tientsin and Peiping, and stationing Chinese and Japanese troops there, (2) recognition of Manchukuo, (3) cessation of anti-Japanese movements, (4) defense against communism, and (5) equal diplomatic opportunity in North China. ^{d.}

While HORIMOUCHI agreed in general that this was the gist of the demands, he refused to admit that Japan was using her military gains to obtain the recognition of Manchukuo, although he admitted that HIROTA had for years been attempting to persuade the Chinese Government to agree to this. ^{e.}

Nevertheless, Japan took no steps to pursue the subject of Anglo-American good offices, although HORIMOUCHI stated that a decision was made by the Premier, the Foreign and War Ministers to request the good offices of a third power ^{f.} in the event that negotiations on the basis of the terms in the August plan failed.

17-64.

- c. Ex. 950, T. 9435
- d. Ex. 3763, T. 37692
- e. T. 29,767-70
- f. Ex. 3260, T. 29,695

1937

FF-65. On 1 October, 1937, "An Outline Regarding the Settlement of the China Incident" was drawn up and signed by the Premier and the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers (HIROTA). It stated that the object of the diplomatic measures was to induce China into a position Japan desired and to make her give up anti-Japanese and pro-communistic tendencies. Japan was to prepare militarily for any change in the situation by enforcing nation-wide mobilization. Plans were formulated concerning the administration for North, South, and Central China areas, and the conditions for settlement of the Incident were decided upon. Simultaneously or subsequently to the truce, negotiations regarding the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations were to be conducted to include: the recognition of Manchukuo by China, abolition of Hopei-Chahar Council and Eastern Hopei Regime, conclusion of anti-comintern pact between Japan and China, and suppression of anti-Japanism.^{a.}

FF-66. Again on 27 October, HIROTA met Craigie who offered to do anything in his power to help settle the China Incident, to which HIROTA replied that it was his desire to have the assistance of Great Britain. On the basis of this 'feeler', HIROTA discussed with Craigie the possible peace

FF-65.
a. Ex. 3262, T. 29,771

(FF-66)

a.
 terms; HORINOJUCHI admitted that at this time there was a strong anti-British movement in Japan and that HIROTA on 1 November 1937, stated that in view of the fact that Britain was the most suitable mediator in the dispute, such movements would be troublesome and embarrassing to Japan. b.
 He could not, however, recall the end of the conversation in which HIROTA expressed the fact that Japan might eventually have to fight England, although at that moment the time was not ripe c.
 for an Anglo-Japanese war. Although HIROTA was supposed to be so anxious for Britain or America to mediate in the dispute, nevertheless, their offers of good offices were turned down. According to HORINOJUCHI, this was because of Army opposition, and it was contrary to HIROTA's wish d.
 that Germany was finally selected as the mediator.

FF-67. As can be seen, Japan did not actually wish for British mediation. SAITO's speech on 25 and 29 August 1938, in which he reviewed the policy regarding the China Incident, condemned Britain as a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek and called for the elimination of British economic support to China. e.
 also, at the very time at which HIROTA was consulting with Craigie on the subject of this mediation, Japan

FF-66.

- a. T. 29741
- b. T. 29793
- c. Ex. 37644, T. 37695
- d. Ex. 3260, T. 29700

FF-67.

- a. Ex. 2235, T. 16069

(FF-67) a.
 had already on or about 26 October 1937 requested
 Germany to use her good offices in the dispute. b.
 As late as 5 November 1937, HARADA recorded that
 HIROTA had very recently in a conversation with
 Craigie on this subject assured the latter that
 it would not do at all for Germany or Italy to
 act as intermediaries. c.
 HORINOUGHI attempted
 to explain that Japan was advocating a joint
 German-British intervention, d.
 yet no mention was
 made of such a coalition by HARADA. It appears
 very clear that HIROTA wished to give the British
 Ambassador the impression that Britain was the
 best mediator, but he actually had no intention of
 using her good offices and had already agreed to
 German mediation when he hypocritically consulted
 Craigie. On 5 November 1937, certain peace terms
 were proposed to the Chinese National Government by
 Japan through the good offices of Germany. e.

FF-6d. In a decision of the War and Foreign
 Ministries on 22 October 1937, it was stated that
 when the military purpose was practically attained
 the Nanking Government under force of this pressure
 would sue for peace. Again, it was stated that it
 would be a good move for England and the United States
 to draw China into negotiations, while it would be

FF-67.
 b. T. 29,796
 c. Ex. 3785a, T. 37697
 d. T. 29,798
 e. Ex. 486-5, T. 5983

(FF-68)
 excellent for Italy and Germany to act as the mediators on China's request. Care was to be taken not to publicize any moves towards mediation, in case it gave the impression of weakness. Defense witness MORIMOUCHI professed ignorance concerning this meeting and denied that peace moves were to be made when Japan had attained her end in China. He contended that the military operations there were confined to the safeguarding of Japanese interests, irrespective of the fact that such 'safeguarding' appeared to necessitate the occupation of large parts of China. On 16 November 1937, after German participation had already commenced, HIROTA in a talk with Grew stated the United States could assist by persuading Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate for peace, and HIROTA said that peace would be "reasonable" and "not a foot of Chinese territory would be kept by Japan".

FF-69. Subsequently on 28 and 29 November and 2 December, Germany again communicated Japan's intentions to the Chinese government stating that in spite of recent military successes gained by Japan, the terms proposed by the Japanese Government in early November were still the same. From the fact that

FF-68.
 a. Ex. 3268, T. 37,245
 b. T. 29,786-93
 c. Ex. 3264, T. 29,957

FF-69.
 a. Ex. 486-E, T. 6983

(1F-59)

on 7 December 1937, HIROTA had told KIDO that he had told the Chinese that if the war situation changed the terms would also change, it may be inferred that not only did HIROTA issue false statements to the Chinese, but when it so assisted him, he did so to his own colleagues. b.

HORIUCHI stated that a Liaison Conference was held on the 20th to discuss new terms, and the four main points were decided on. KIDO stated both in his diary and in cross-examination that he attended the Cabinet meeting on 31 December 1937 where the actual terms were decided and stated that Foreign Minister HIROTA was given full authority with respect to the handling of the terms. Those terms were: (1) Chinese were to cooperate in Anti-Comintern policy, (2) unfortified zones were to be set up, (3) there were to be necessary reparations from Chinese Government, (4) there was to be close economic relations between Japan and China. These, HORIUCHI stated, were naturally more severe than the August terms. f.

According to HARADA, the terms first proposed to the Cabinet were of a concrete character at the request of the General Staff who wanted to stop the war as soon as possible, but the Cabinet, at the insistence of KIDO, changed them to the above-mentioned four abstract terms. HIROTA advocated the inclusion of Shantung in the area of a new Chinese Government. g.

1F-69.

- b. Ex. 3786a., T. 37698
- c. Ex. 3250, T. 29,702
- d. Ex. 2259, T. 16,222
- e. T. 31,427-47
- f. Ex. 3260; T. 29,702
- g. Ex. 3786a., T. 37709

Page FF-40.

FF-70. On 20 and 27 December, the Japanese through the good offices of Germany dispatched certain "Basic Conditions", i.e., the terms above set out, with an explanation that the new conditions were proposed by Japan because of the change in circumstances.^{a.}

FF-71. On 24 December 1937, the Cabinet Council decided on "Outline of Measures for the China Incident." While they had only just commenced negotiations with the National Government for settlement of the affair, it is stated in the decision, "we shall not necessarily expect the conclusion of the negotiations with the Nanking Government, but while striving separately to save the situation, we will, as the military operations progress, in order to cope with the drawn out resistance by the Nanking Government, take measures according to the following policy in North China and Central China areas."^{a.}

FF-72. On 5 January 1938, Ambassador Dirksen informed the German Foreign Office that Japan was impatient for a swift reply from the Chinese regarding the proposals because new military operations were being planned.^{a.}

FF-70.

a. Ex. 486-B, T, 5984

FF-72.

a. Ex. 486-D, T, 5994

FF-71.

a. Ex. 3263, T, 29,875

FF-73. On 10 January 1938, Ambassador Dirksen cabled the German Foreign Minister once more, stating that HIROTA was insisting on a reply from the Chinese with the utmost speed, and the military were demanding an immediate and clear answer.
a.

FI-74. In a memorandum of Von Neurath dated 10 January 1938, he recorded that TOGO explained that although Japan wished peace with China, she would carry on the fight to the bitter end and terms would become harder the longer the fight continued.
a.

FF-75. On 10 January 1938, a Cabinet conference was held to discuss the settlement of the China Incident preparatory to the Imperial Conference. At this conference, it was revealed that the General Staff considered the peace terms too aggressive and felt they might thus impair further diplomatic relations, and so advocated a meeting in the Emperor's presence to prepare a counter-policy against the domestic tendency which was likely to become too aggressive. The Foreign Office and Navy applauded this view and agreed it might be a good thing to hold the proposed meeting in the presence of the Emperor in order to keep the said spirit alive.
a.

FI-73. a. Ex. 486-F, T. 5993 FF-75. a. Ex. 3265, T. 29,855

FF-74. a. Ex. 486-D, T. 5991

FR-76. But on 11 January 1938, HIROTA attended an Imperial Conference for the purpose of deciding the national policy towards China. At this conference, the main policy of Japan was stated to be the establishment of a Japan - Manchukuo - China bloc. Negotiations with the Chinese National Government were not to be barred if China sincerely asked for reconciliation, although the terms which were set out as being applicable in such a case were so severe that any hope of agreement would be virtually impossible. Not only did Japan, in these proposed conditions, call for recognition of Manchukuo and renunciation of anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo tendencies, but also required the establishment of an organization in North China to realize the co-prosperity of Japan, Manchuria and China, and the establishment of an anti-communistic self-government in Inner Mongolia, and also the conclusion of an agreement regarding exploitation of natural resources and due reparations from China.

FR-77. Even the Germans were doubtful of Japan's true intent in the negotiations as can be seen in a telegram from Ambassador Trautmann, dated 11 January 1938. In this, he stated that "The Japanese seem to be altering for the second time their statements which were

FR-78.
 a. Ex. 3264, T. 29,837

(FF-76)
sent through us.Transmission of such altered statements is considered here as a 'dirty trick' which the Japanese are playing on us."^{a.}

On 13 January 1938, Trautmann cabled the German Foreign Minister that the Chinese Government had replied to Japan, stating that the altered terms were too broad in scope and requesting they be apprised of the nature and content of the newly submitted proposals.^{b.}

FF-78. HORINOUCHI said that since the Japanese Government had submitted a detailed explanation together with the four fundamental principles, they were angered with this Chinese reply, considering it an artifice to delay the settlement on purpose.^{a.}

HORINOUCHI stated these details covering reparations, etc., were submitted through the German Ambassador.^{b.}

Nevertheless, when on 14 January 1938, Dirksen cabled the German Foreign Minister informing him that HIROTA had said he was very angry at the "meaningless Chinese declaration", the German Ambassador reported he replied to HIROTA that the Chinese Government had knowledge of only the four fundamental conditions and any further communications from the Foreign Minister to the Chinese Government had been forwarded in a very indefinite form in compliance with HIROTA's wishes.^{c.} Defense witness

FF-77.
a. Ex. 486-D, T. 5983
b. Ex. 486-B, T. 5984

FF-78.
a. Ex. 3260, T. 29,703
b. T. 29,810
c. Ex. 486-J, T. 5986

Page FF-44.

(FF-78)

KAWABE too admitted that the General Staff had previously advocated clearer terms and were anxious for a settlement with China, although the actual terms which were agreed on at the Cabinet meeting of the 21st December were expressed abstractly and extremely vaguely. ^{d.} Yet, witness HORIKOUCHI not only failed to recall whether these negotiations were presented at a Cabinet meeting, but also that the General Staff advocated a swift solution to the conflict, ^{e.} even though his testimony had in effect been largely devoted to these peace proposals. Again, this obvious lying is demonstrated by an entry by HARADA on 15 January, where he makes reference to the Foreign Minister's (HIROTA) remarks that the Chinese were well aware of the concrete proposals and were bluffing and, therefore, there was nothing to do but ^{f.} launch the alternative plan of long-term warfare.

FF-79. KAWABE stated that he was not aware that the Chinese Government had on 15 January requested more detailed peace terms and had assured the Japanese Government that they were not doing so for purposes of evasion. ^{a.} Trautmann stated in a cable on 15 January 1938, that KULG had requested that a report be forwarded to Foreign Minister HIROTA informing him of China's sincere wish for peace and earnest wish to be informed of the nature and ^{b.} contents of the basic conditions.

FF-78.

d. T. 22,046-50
e. T. 29,803
f. Ex. 3789-A, T. 37718

FF-79.

a. T. 22,066
b. Ex. 3736, T. 37,264

Page FF-45.

FF-50. Without making any attempt to

comply with China's request for a more detailed explanation, the Japanese Cabinet Council met on 15 January to discuss this reply, and a decision was subsequently made "not to deal with the National Government" on the basis that the Chinese reply lacked sincerity.^{a.} That this announcement had, in fact, been considered more than a month previously can be seen from HARADA's diary of 11 December 1937, in which KONOE remarked that "when Nanking falls, Chiang Kai-shek's government is going to collapse and KONOE is going to issue a statement withdrawing recognition from Chiang's government."^{b.} Although HIROTA telephoned HARADA on 17 January, stating that "As the Chinese Government failed to accept the proposal (determined by the Japanese Government), the Council, held in the presence of His Majesty, arrived at a decision to launch into the alternative plan", he had at a meeting the previous day personally advocated that very decision^{c.} which is not to be found in the statement of the decision of the Imperial Conference. This statement of the decision was issued on 16 January 1938 and declared the "Imperial Government will not care for the National Government hereafter, and expects the establishment and development of a new government of China that will be a worthy coalition with our Empire."^{d.} While HORIUCHI asserted that

FF-80.

- a. Ex. 326C, T. 29,704
- b. Ex. 3787-A, T. 37702
- c. Ex. 3789-A, T. 37718
- d. Ex. 268, T. 3563

(FF-80.)
this statement was so worded as to leave room for
further negotiation with the Nationalist Government,^{e.}
this cannot be gathered from its text, and KIDO
referred to it as a fixed policy and an epoch-making
announcement.^{f.}

FF-81. On 15 January 1938, the Japanese Foreign
Minister handed to the German Ambassador Japan's
statement regarding the breaking-off of negotiations^{a.}
between Japan and China for transmission to Hankow.
In a cable to the Reichsminister on 17 January 1938,
Dirksen condemned the action of Japan in breaking
off the negotiations and cited her as being re-
sponsible to the world for such action.^{b.} HIROTA
himself, when reviewing the negotiations in an
address to the 73rd Diet Session on 16 February 1938,
said that Japan had never tried to compromise with
Chiang Kai-shek and would only enter into direct
negotiation if Chiang Kai-shek accepted the Japanese
terms, and that Japan had pursued a policy of chas-
tising China in order to change her attitude.^{c.}

FF-82. In an address on 22 January 1938,
HIROTA attempted publicly to explain away the failure
of the negotiations, placing the responsibility on
the Chinese and claiming Japan had no intention of

FF-80.
e. Ex. 3260, T. 29,705
f. Ex. 2260, T. 16,223

FF-81.
a. Ex. 486-B, T. 5997
b. Ex. 486-G, T. 5999
c. Ex. 3737A, T. 37,285

(FF-82.)

separating North China from the rest of the country; a.

whereas, only a month previously on 24 December 1937, HIROTA had been a party to the policy decided for the North China Central areas in the event of failure of negotiations. In this it was stated that it was vital to create a new North China Regime capable of winning public confidence not only in North China, but also in Central and South China. Areas to be included in the new North China Regime were mainly Hopei, Shantung, Shanhsi, and part of Chahar Province. Regarding the economical development, its object was to strengthen the synthetic relations of Japanese and Manchurian economy and to increase the production of necessary materials for the national defense in

b. a broader sense in Japan and Manchuria. Immediately following the fall of Nanking in December 1937, moves were made to establish a new regime in China.

The Shanghai-Tatao Municipal Government was organized in Shanghai on 5 December, and the Nanking Public Order Maintenance Association and the Hangchow Public Order Maintenance Association were established on 1 January 1938. The Restoration Government itself was to be formally established on 28 March 1938 and, as a result, a number of

FF-82.

- a. Ex. 9726, T. 9521
- b. Ex. 3263, T. 29,815

Page TF-48.

(a)-82)
 local governments were then going to be created under its control. Thus, the provincial governments in Kiangsu Province, Chekiang Province, and Anhui Province, and the Governor's Municipal Public Administration office at Nanking came into being on 23 May, 20 June, 23 July and 24 April 1938, respectively; the Governor's Municipal Public Administration office of Shanghai was established on 28 April 1938; all were established only a few months after this obviously meaningless declaration of HIROTA.^{c.}

FF-83. On 27 January 1938, the program for the direction of the Central China Administration was decided on, the fundamental point of which was to establish a highly pro-Japanese regime, dependent on Japan.^{a.}

FF-84. Japan, having discarded any thought of peaceful settlement with Chiang Kai-shek, now set out on reparations for a long drawn out conflict, as evidenced by TOGO's interview with Von Neurath on 28 January 1938, in which TOGO on behalf of the Japanese Government made overtures concerning increased trade with Germany and Japan's desire for long-term credits with that country.^{a.} Also, in a memorandum to HIROTA on 21 January 1938, KOMEI stated

FF-82.
 c. Ex. 463, T. 5296

FF-83.
 a. Ex. 463, T. 5311-15

FF-84.
 a. Ex. 486-1, T. 6076

(7F-3-.)
 that general mobilization would be completed according to the necessity of national defense and plans made for general preparedness. Furthermore, not only were all measures to be taken in response to the prolonged resistance of China, but also in addition, rapid overseas expansion was to be planned and the complete military preparedness of the nation assured.

7F-84. The attempts by Japan to bring about a swift disintegration of the Nationalist Regime were not only devoted to military moves, but also included the use of more subtle methods, such as propaganda. On 8 February 1939, HIRCEA cabled diplomatic officials in Hong Kong and Shanghai informing them that the Foreign Office had been making various propaganda leaflets and pamphlets in order to bring about the disintegration within the enemy's army and to alienate the people's minds. He then set out the methods to be adopted in their particular areas.

VII. RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN AND PREPARATIONS FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

7F-85. Immediately after HIRCEA's

7F-86.

b. Ex. 3270, T. 37,245

7F-86.

a. Ex. 3271-A, T. 37,255

Page FF-50.

(FF-86.)

appointment as Foreign Minister, he told Ambassador Grew on 18 September 1933, that the cornerstone of his policy would be the furtherance of better relations between Japan and the United States. ^{a.} Again on 23 January 1934,

HIROITA made a speech at the 65th Diet Session in which he expressed hope for friendship between the United States and Japan despite previous difficulties ^{b.} which had arisen out of the Manchurian Incident.

FF-87. These statements are contradicted by the actual policy as followed. For instance, while on 31 February 1934, HIROITA had again assured Hull that Japan sought no special ^{a.} privileges in China, the Japanese Foreign Office on 17 April 1934, issued the statement which made clear Japan's purpose to compel China to follow her dictates to the exclusion of third power interests. ^{b.} Witness KUMASHIMA denied that this statement was the true policy of Japan. He said that AICU issued the statement without HIROITA's knowledge and that it was the result of a patchwork of telegraphic instructions which the Japanese had sent to China regarding the ^{c.} attitude of a League of Nations' delegate Monnet. Yet, in cross-examination the unlikelihood of

FF-88.

- a. Ex. 2236, T. 29,448
- b. Ex. 2237, T. 29,458

FF-89.

- a. Ex. 174, T. 1806,
Ex. 3230, T. 29,466
- b. T. 10,720, Ex. 255, T. 9389
- c. Ex. 3241, T. 29,483

(FF-87)

this explanation is shown, since he continued to assert the Japanese statements to Monnet were true but he denied the validity of the actual statement. ^{d.} Also HARADA on 17 April 1934, discussed the AMU statement in his diary, recording his personal feelings for AMU as favorable, but stating that AMU was "somewhat careless in some ways", ^{e.} although HIROTA and SHIGEMITSU said that it was not serious. From this it seems clear that AMU's only fault was that he made public Japan's real policy in contrast with HIROTA's public statements. Denials and regrets concerning this statement were immediately issued by the Foreign Office. ^{f.} HIROTA again assured the United States that Japan did not seek to create difficulties in trade with other countries ^{g.} nor was her ultimate motive an overlordship of the Orient, and that Japan had no intention of denouncing or abrogating any treaties in this regard. ^{h.}

FF-88. Nevertheless, Japan's disregard for the "open door" policy continued and on 31 August 1934, Grew drew HIROTA's attention to the oil monopoly in Manchuria, contending these monopoly plans were being formulated under Japanese guidance and hence the United States was approaching Japan on the subject. ^{a.} HIROTA, in a reply on 30 November 1934, stated that the control of the oil industry in Manchuria was not within the

FF-87.

- d. T. 29,528
- e. Ex. 3776-A, T. 37,660
- f. Ex. 3245, T. 29,584; Ex. 3246, T. 29,587
- g. Ex. 936, T. 9393
- h. Ex. 937, T. 9395

FF-88.

- a. Ex. 965, T. 9481

(FF-88) b. knowledge of Japan. This statement was untrue, as may be seen from the Cabinet decision to which HIROTA was a party of the previous 20th March^{c.}, which provides a policy for directing the economic development of Manchukuo, and in particular the petroleum industry, and the operation of thirteen other industries under special companies "directly or indirectly under the special protection and supervision of the Empire". Thus, Japan took no steps to remedy this monopoly, and so on 16 April 1935, Ambassador GREG in an oral statement called attention to the part played by Japan in this regard and warned her that this action would have an unfavorable effect on public opinion in the United States.^{d.}

FF-89. In a speech to the Diet on 22 January 1935, HIROTA expressed the good understanding which existed between Japan, the United States and Great Britain. He stated that the spirit of their policy was the fostering of good will and fraternal sentiments without mutual menace.^{a.}

FF-90. On 12 June 1936, HULL again complained to HIROTA in a memorandum that the United States had the impression that Japan was seeking economic domination, first in East Asia and then in other places.

FF-91. On 26 August 1937, British Ambassador to

FF-88.

- b. Ex. 939, T. 9406
- c. Ex. 236, T. 2939
- d. Ex. 941, T. 9414

FF-89.

- a. Ex. 3247, T. 29,593

FF-90.

- a. Ex. 948, T. 9427

Page FF-53

(FF-91)

China Sir Hugh Knatchbull Hugessen was wounded when Japanese planes machine-gunned and bombed the car in which he was riding. ^{a.} In reply to a protest concerning this incident, HIROTA replied to the British Ambassador in Japan that an investigation was being made into the affair. ^{b.} On 21 September 1937, HIROTA gave a full explanation of the affair, admitting the identity of the planes as Japanese and apologizing for the incident ^{c.} to which the British Ambassador replied on 23 September, stating that the incident was now considered closed. ^{d.}

FF-92. Whereas HORINOUCHI stated that HIROTA's policy was directed at safeguarding the interests of third powers in China ^{a.} and HIROTA himself on 2 September 1937, in a statement to the press declared that the rights and interests of third powers would be safeguarded by Japan; ^{b.} lives, property and interests of United States nationals were continually attacked by Japanese military. Protests such as the American Government's protest on 1 September 1937 re bombing of non-military objectives ^{c.}, Grew's message to HIROTA on 17 September 1937, concerning Japanese attacks upon United States nationals citing the bombing of the United States Missionary Hospital at Tientsin ^{d.}, Grew's message to HIROTA on 4 February 1938 concerning the utter disregard by Japanese military of United

FF-91.

- a. Ex. 265, T. 3538
- b. Ex. 2519, T. 21,337
- c. Ex. 265, T. 3539
- d. Ex. 2520, T. 21,341

FF-92.

- a. Ex. 360, T. 29,705
- b. Ex. 2503, T. 20,873
- c. Ex. 988, T. 9568
- d. Ex. 955, T. 9456

(FF-92) ^{o.}
 States property in China^{o.}, and Grew's protest on
 26 March 1938 concerning Japanese occupation of
 American properties in Shanghai and the looting and
 destruction which had taken place^{f.} brought forth no
 remedial measures. On 3 October 1938, Grew spoke
 to KONOYE, referring to the many conferences he had
 had with HIROTA concerning the protection of United
 States interests in China and the definite assurances
 which he had been given - only to be followed by more
 violations of United States interests and rights.^{g.}

FF-93. On 12 December 1937, the USS Pancy was
 operating in the Yangtze River protecting United
 States and other foreign nationals and maintaining
 direct communication between the United States Embassy
 at Nanking and the American Ambassador at Hankow.
 She was attacked by three Japanese planes without
 warning and subsequently sunk. Survivors were later
 rescued and picked up by HES Ladybird and USS Oahu.^{a.}
 HASENOTO, Kingoro, admitted that under orders from
 General YAMAGATA, he shelled the Ladybird and took
 her into custody when she was enroute to help the
 Pancy.^{b.} The State Department issued a statement
 on the sinking of the USS Pancy and the three
 merchantmen.^{c.}

FF-92.

- c. Ex. 969, T. 9496
- f. Ex. 971, T. 9503
- g. Ex. 973, T. 9534

FF-93.

- a. Ex. 263, T. 3517
- b. Ex. 258, T. 3466
 Ex. 2188, T. 15,674
- c. Ex. 2527, T. 21,367

Page FF-55

FF-94. HIROTA, who held the position of Foreign Minister at this time, received a protest from the Secretary of State through Grew concerning this sinking.^{a.} Consequently, the Japanese Government in a note signed by HIROTA, dated 14 December, to the American Government, apologized for the incident, explaining that owing to poor visibility the aircraft were unable to identify the boats as American, and consequently, the Fensy and three merchantmen were mistaken for Chinese vessels carrying fleeing Chinese troops; he again expressed regret in notes dated 24 and 26 December reiterating that the bombing was done by mistake.^{b.} HIROTA dispatched a note to the British Ambassador apologizing for the incident and stating that it was done by mistake and that Japan was prepared to make necessary in-kennification.^{c.} Grew recorded HIROTA's regret about the sinking of the Fensy in his diary on 13 December.^{d.} Nevertheless, the excuse that these occurrences were accidental is shown to be untrue by the evidence mentioned above and must have been known to be untrue by HIROTA.

FF-95. On 31 January 1938, Grew protested to

FF-94.

- a. Ex. 2343, T. 17694
- b. Ex. 2521, T. 21346-7
- c. Ex. 2522, T. 21350; Ex. 2523, T. 21353
- d. Ex. 2527, T. 21367
- e. Ex. 3285, I. 29693

(FF-95)

HIROTA concerning the recent revisions of customs rates on certain articles in North China trade by the Japanese - sponsored Peiping Provisional Government. He stated that the United States considered the Chinese Government the only one entitled to do this and pointed out the illegal assumption of authority by the Peiping Provisional Government. He stated that since Japan was responsible for the creation of this regime, the United States addressed her representations to Japan when acts of this regime affected the interests of foreign governments. He emphasized that the United States could not accept Japan's implied disclaimer of responsibility with regard to individual policy in North China.

FF-96. Seemingly, in order to dispel any doubt which the United States had regarding Japan's future military moves, HIROTA on 18 May 1938, approached Grew disclaiming any Japanese design on the Philippines and stating that he would be pleased to dispel any rumors by entering into conversations with the United States. Nevertheless, he had been a participant as Premier in the decision of 30 June 1936, where the basis of Japan's national policy had been decided, which was to include "getting rid of the menace of the U.S.S.R., while preparing against Great Britain and the United States". The substance of this was

FF-95.

a. Ex. 968, T. 9493

FF-96.

a. Ex. 997, T. 9607
 b. Ex. 977, T. 9542;
 Ex. 978, T. 9548

(FF-96)
 repeated and emphasized in a conference of 7
 August 1936, which laid down the general object
 "to secure the position of the Empire on the East
 Asia continent by dint of diplomatic policy and
 national defense, mutually dependent on each
 other, as well as to advance and develop the
 Empire toward the South Seas".^{c.} Concrete prep-
 arations to this end were contained in the Five-
 Year Plan of June 1937, copy of which was sent to
 HIKOTA in July 1937, the covering letter stating
 that it was to be dealt with by the Cabinet Plan-
 ning Bureau of which he was Chairman.^{d.} While
 the biography of HIKOTA states that he was Presi-
 dent of the Planning Board from 10 June 1937 to
 25 October 1937,^{e.} witness INO stated that in ef-
 fect he was President of the Bureau of Planning
 which preceded the Planning Board and was respon-
 sible for the political negotiations with those
 cabinet members who had an objection to the draft
 plan concerning the constitution and competency of
 the Insurance and Sanitation Ministry. His state-
 ments as to the limited scope of this Bureau are difficult

FF-96.
 c. Ex. 216, T. 2720
 d. Ex. 2227, T. 15980
 e. Ex. 108

(FF-96)
to reconcile with the covering letter abovementioned
and are, we submit, untrue. The same Cabinet was
also responsible for the policy and laws mobilizing
the total national strength dealt with in the General
phase.

VIII. AIR ATTACKS ON NANKING, ITS CAPTURE
AND SUBSEQUENT ATROCITIES THERE

FF-97. In an aide memoire from the American
Embassy to HIROTA on 1 September 1937, attention was
called to the fact that despite the United States
request of 23 August not to bomb Nanking and thus
endanger the lives of foreign nationals there, the
Japanese had on the night of 26 August bombed the
city and endangered United States lives and property.
It was requested that instructions be issued to the
military forces to discontinue these attacks.
a.

FF-98. On 20 September, Grew stated that as a
result of repeated protests concerning indiscriminate
bombings in the Nanking area, it seemed that the
Japanese Government was taking measures. Word had
been received that no bombing would take place after
the 25th.
a.

FF-99. Also on 20 September 1937, Grew in a
conversation with HIROTA pointed out the serious
effect the bombing of Nanking would have in the United

FF-97.
a. Ex. 988, T. 9568

FF-98.
a. Ex. 3281, T. 29,948

Page FF-59

(FF-99)
 States and other countries. HIROTA replied that he had ordered that in the bombing of the 21st area be taken to avoid injury to foreign establishments, although the civil government in Tokyo had very little influence over the forces where their general objectives were concerned.
 a.

FF-100. Again, on 22 September 1937, Grew complained to HIROTA about the request for withdrawal of American nationals from Nanking in view of the reported Japanese assurances that non-military and non-combatants would not be bombed. To this HIROTA replied on 30 September 1937, that since Nanking was a center of military operations, it was unavoidable that military establishments in and around Nanking would be bombed.
 b. Nevertheless, even after military operations had ceased, United States nationals were unable to return to the city; hence on 4 April 1938, Grew wrote to HIROTA drawing his attention to the fact that although Nanking had been occupied for three months, United States nationals were still prevented from returning to the city by the Japanese military.
 c.

FF-101. On 16 December 1937, the British Ambassador addressed a protest to HIROTA complaining of the attacks made on British warships and shipping

FF-92.

a. Ex. 3282, T. 29,942

FF-100.

a. Ex. 956, T. 9548
 b. Ex. 2531, T. 21,390
 c. Ex. 970, T. 9501

(FF-101)
 at Wuhu and near Nanking by Japanese air and land
 forces on 12 December. He stated that previous
 assurances had brought forth no results and punish-
 ment was the only efficacious method to prevent
 such outrages. HIROTA apologized to Craigie for
 the bombings in the vicinity of Nanking and gave
 assurances that a recurrence would be prevented.

FF-102. On 13 December 1937, Japanese forces
 entered Nanking after all resistance had ceased on
 the 12th. Subsequent to the fall of Nanking the
 Japanese Army indulged in rape, arson, looting and
 indiscriminate killings.

FF-103. Complaints and protests were forwarded
 by the International Committee for the Safety Zone
 to the Japanese Embassy concerning the atrocities
 and violations there. MIKADA and ONIMOTO,
 representatives of the Japanese Embassy in China
 and Consulate in Shanghai, were informed of the
 situation and were requested to bring the matter
 of pillaging of United States property to the
 attention of the military authorities. MIKADA
 stated that he made an oral report of the conditions
 in Nanking to Foreign Minister HIROTA in January 1938.

FF-104. Witness ISHII testified that reports

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|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| <u>FF-101.</u> | <u>FF-103.</u> |
| a. Ex. 954-C, T. 9451 | a. Ex. 323, T. 4508 |
| b. Ex. 2527, T. 21,367 | b. Ex. 328, T. 4552 |
| | c. Ex. 2537, T. 21,453 |
| <u>FF-102.</u> | |
| a. T. 2593; Ex. 310, T. 4483; | |
| Ex. 311, T. 4485; Ex. 312, T. 4488; | |
| Ex. 313, T. 4491; Ex. 315, T. 4495; | |
| Ex. 316, T. 4495; Ex. 317, T. 4496; | |
| Ex. 318, T. 4500; Ex. 320, T. 4507; | |
| Ex. 321, T. 4505; Ex. 322, T. 4506; | |
| Ex. 329, T. 4592 | |

(FF-104)
of the atrocities were forwarded by FUKUI to the Foreign Office and HIROTA was very concerned and alarmed about the reports. The Army was demanded to take strict measures to stop them immediately, and finally action was taken so that by the end of January 1938, the atrocities were exterminated. HIROTA himself requested SUGIYAMA to take strict
a. measures to halt these atrocities. Nevertheless, the witness admitted that as late as 2 February 1938, the atrocities were still going on and that reports
b. were still coming in up to that date. All reports concerning these atrocities were forwarded to HIROTA in addition to condemning press reports from the foreign press, but even when reports continued to come in, he did not press the question with the War
c. Minister, nor refer it to the Cabinet.

IX. HIROTA'S PARTICIPATION
IN THE ATROCITIES

FF-105. As a member of the Cabinet from September 1933 to February 1937 and again from 4 June 1937 to 29 May 1938, HIROTA was, in our submission, responsible during and after his tenure of Cabinet office for what we submit was the clear Japanese policy of encouraging the growth and use of narcotics in all parts of Japanese-occupied

FF-104.
a. Ex. 2267, T. 29,970-2
b. T. 29,973
c. T. 29,993

(FF-105)
China. The main evidence on this subject can be found in the testimony of three witnesses, Gill,^{a.} Bates and Lunsell.

FF-106. The evidence shows such encouragement of the growth and use of narcotics in all parts of occupied China and for so long a period as to show that this was the policy of the Japanese Government. For example, a publication of the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, entitled "Business Report of 1938"^{a.}, refers to a Japanese Cabinet Decision in April 1933, for the transfer in future of raw opium produced in Korea to the Government of Manchukuo as a temporary measure; and it refers to another Japanese Cabinet Decision on 23 December 1938, concerning the acreage for poppy growing necessary to produce the required quantities of opium to be supplied or transferred to the Governor General of Formosa, Kwantung Leased Territory and the Government of Manchukuo.

FF-107. Confirmation of the spreading of this narcotization policy can be seen from reports of the United States Treasury Attachés in various districts in China, including such reports on the situation during HIROTA's tenure of office.^{a.}

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- FF-105. a. T. 4407-23 et seq
T. 2648 et seq
T. 2683 et seq
 - FF-106. a. Ex. 381, T. 4708

- FF-107. a. Ex. 373, T. 4699; Ex. 374, T. 4694; Ex. 379, T. 4701;
Ex. 380, T. 4706; Ex. 381, T. 4703; Ex. 383, T. 4711;
Ex. 384, T. 4736; Ex. 388, T. 4751; Ex. 390, T. 4779;
Ex. 392, T. 4785; Ex. 393, T. 4786; Ex. 395, T. 4791;
Ex. 397, T. 4796; Ex. 403, T. 4814; Ex. 404, T. 4815;
Ex. 405, T. 4820; Ex. 406, T. 4825; Ex. 408, T. 4828;
Ex. 410, T. 4831; Ex. 411, T. 4834; Ex. 413, T. 4837;
Ex. 414, T. 4845; Ex. 415, T. 4856; Ex. 382, T. 4861;
Ex. 372, T. 4865; Ex. 418, T. 4867; Ex. 419, T. 4868;
Ex. 420, T. 4870; Ex. 421, T. 4871; Ex. 422, T. 4874;
Ex. 423, T. 4876; Ex. 424, T. 4879; Ex. 426, T. 4894;
Ex. 427, T. 4896; Ex. 432, T. 4922; Ex. 433, T. 4928;
Ex. 434, T. 4941

FF-105. Defense witness MALBA attempted to explain away the charges of the over-all opium campaign in Manchukuo and the Northern Provinces by insisting that the creation of the Manchurian Opium Monopoly Administration controlled the sale and illicit growth of opium. Nevertheless, he admitted that the registration of addicts was facilitated and organized growth encouraged, and while Japanese nationals were not allowed to purchase and smoke opium, the same strict measures were not applied to Chinese.

X. HIROTA'S ACTIONS AFTER HE LEFT OFFICE

FF-109. HIROTA as an Elder Statesman was instrumental in the choice of new Premiers on the fall of each Cabinet. In this capacity he attended a meeting on 21 July 1940 where the selection of the new Premier was made on the fall of the YOKAI Cabinet. HIROTA advocated a military man, but since there

FF-106.
a. T. 20508-58

(FI-109)
was no suitable candidate, he considered that
KONOYE would be a good choice as the military
a.
themselves were in favour of him.

FF-110. He also attended the Elder Statesmen's
meeting called on the fall of the Second KONOYE
Cabinet on 17 July 1941, where he laid stress upon
the reinforcement of General Headquarters and again
advocated the formation of a military cabinet, but
consented to the opinion of the rest upon KIDO's
c.
explanation of General Headquarters in the Palace.
Again on 17 October 1941, he was present when KIDO
suggested TOJO as Premier and War Minister even
though he was on military service and approved of
b.
this appointment.

FF-111. On 29 November 1941, a meeting of
Senior Statesmen was held and TOJO explained that
war was inevitable. A full report was given by the
Premier regarding the development of the negotiations
with America up to date. KONOYE reported that his
Cabinet had tried to adjust American-Japanese
relations but on the basis of that morning's
explanation by the Government, he was forced to
conclude that further negotiations would be
hopeless. HIROTA thought that it would be a mistake
to rush into war immediately after being confronted

FF-109.
a. Ex. 532, T. 6252

FF-110.
a. Ex. 1117, T. 10,166
b. Ex. 1154, T. 10,291;
Ex. 2250, T. 16,183

(FF-111)
 with the present crisis and suggested a postponement and possible diplomatic solution after its outbreak. The Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers, President of the Planning Board, and the Premier met with the Senior Statesmen in the evening and explained the situation, and between these two meetings, TOJO and the former Premiers, including HIROTA, met with the Emperor who heard each man's opinions.^{a.}

FF-112. On 17 July 1944, at a Senior Statesmen's Council convened to discuss the reorganization of the TOJO Cabinet, HIROTA said that he would not join the reorganized TOJO Cabinet if he were asked.^{a.} The following day he attended another Senior Statesmen's meeting (TOJO having resigned) where KOISO was selected as the Premier of the new Cabinet and at which he stated the prosecution of the war was first and foremost.^{b.} The Senior Statesmen again met on 5 April 1945 on the fall of the KOISO Cabinet and selected SUZUKI, Kantaro, as the head of the new Cabinet.^{c.}

FF-113. To summarize the effect of the above in relation to the several counts of the Indictment, we submit that the whole story establishes HIROTA's membership in each of the conspiracies charged in Counts 1-5 and, therefore, is evidence of his

FF-111.

- a. Ex. 1158-A, T. 10,513;
 Ex. 1196, T. 10,452;
 Ex. 3940, T. 31,037

FF-112.

- a. Ex. 1277, T. 11,377
- b. Ex. 1278, T. 11,377
- c. Ex. 1282, T. 11,390

Page FF-66

(FF-113)
responsibility for the specific matters alleged in
the remaining counts which arose out of these
conspiracies.

But we draw attention to the following
particular paragraphs which show direct connection
with certain counts.

Counts 2 and 27: Paragraphs 30-40 show that
HIROTA adapted and participated in the Manchurian
aggression from September 1933 onwards.

Counts 3, 6, 19, 27, 28, 45, 54 and 55: Para-
graphs 41-85 and 102-108 cover these counts,
especially with regard to Counts 54 and 55. Para-
graphs 102-4.

Count 5 is covered in Paragraphs 11-16, 67-70,
and 109.

Counts 4 and 6-17 deal with HIROTA's participation
in general preparations for war against countries
named and unnamed. We draw special attention to
paragraph 96 which shows that the countries particularly
contemplated were the United States (Counts 7 and 13),
the British Commonwealth (Counts 8-12), and countries
owning territories in the South Seas in addition to
the above, i.e., the Netherlands (Count 14), France
(Count 15), Thailand (Count 16), also the Soviet
Union (Count 17); with regard especially to the
British Commonwealth, paragraph 66; the United
States and Britain, paragraphs 8-29 and 89-96; the
Soviet Union, paragraphs 4-17.

0 199 0008 1069

As to counts for initiating (Counts 20-25) and waging (Counts 29-35) wars against the above-named countries, we submit that although HIROTA was not in office during the periods in question those events were merely the culmination of the conspiracies which we claim to have proved against him and that he is, therefore, responsible for the acts of his fellow-conspirators who actually did initiate and wage those wars. We also rely upon paragraphs 110-113 as showing such degree of personal participation in those acts as his position as an ex-Premier enabled him to exercise. We further submit that the meetings therein described gave him ample opportunity of dissociating himself from the conspiracy if he had so minded, but that he did not take those or make any other opportunities of doing so. The same remarks apply to Counts 37-42, 46, 47 and 52.

With regard to the allegations based upon the absence of a declaration of war, we would point out that, although there is no evidence that HIROTA knew of the intention to initiate an attack upon any particular country in that manner, the fact that the war or wars against China had been so initiated shows that such a procedure was within the scope of the conspiracy to which we submit he was a party.

0 159 0008 1070

16 FEBRUARY, 1948.

IPS RE: HIROTA (FF)

Attached pages No. FF-6, FF-7 and FF-63,
are to be substituted for the present pages 6, 7 and
63, in summation on HIROTA (FF).

(FF-10)

to make North China a special anti-communistic and pro-Japanese zone, while eventually all China was to be pro-Japanese and anti-Soviet.^{a.}

FF-11. In a report, dated 24 July 1936, drawn up by the Foreign Office, "The Problem of a Japanese-German Political Convention" was reviewed. While the main purpose of a pact with Germany was cited as a means of defense against communism and a means to combat the menace of the Soviet Union, the actual pact is continually referred to as a "Japanese-German Coalition".^{a.}

FF-12. On 7 and 11 August 1937, the decision and proposed policy of the government was discussed and the eradication of the Russian menace was decided.^{a.}

FF-13. HIROTA held the position of Foreign Minister when the negotiations for the anti-Comintern Pact were started,^{a.} and was Premier when, on 25 November, 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact and secret Attached Pact between Japan and Germany were signed.^{b.}

FF-14. While the Foreign Office on 25 December, 1936, issued a statement acclaiming the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and stated categorically "That the present agreement was not directed against the Soviet Union nor any other specific country."^{a.} HIROTA in his capacity as Premier attended the Investigation Committee Meeting of the Privy Council on 20 November,

FF-10.

a. Ex. 704, T. 7523

FF-12.

a. Ex. 216, T. 2720; Ex. 979, T. 9549

FF-11.

a. Ex. 3267, T. 29,885

FF-13.a. Ex. 1106, T. 10,115
b. Ex. 36, Ex. 48, T. 5936FF-14. a. Ex. 2371, T. 18,398

0 159 0008 1072

(FF-14)
 1936, where it was explained that "the present Japanese-German Pact comprises two pacts; Pact against the Communist Internationale and the Secret Attached Pact against the Soviet Union". At this same meeting HIROTA gave an explanation in which he stated that the Communist activities of the Soviet Union constituted a menace to Japan's East Asia policy hence Japan had insisted on the cooperation of China in this regard.
 b.

FF-15. Subsequently, on 25 November 1936, HIROTA attended the Privy Council Meeting where the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact was unanimously approved.
 a.

FF-16. When on 12 November 1937, HIROTA as Foreign Minister attended the meeting held to discuss the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, he reiterated that this pact was solely a pact against Communism.
 a.
 Further the Bureau of Information of the Foreign Office, which was under his direct control, issued a statement of the conclusion of this extension, in which they expressed concern that the true purport of the pact - that it was not directed against any particular country - had not been understood by all.
 b.
 But no mention was made of the Secret Pact which shows the complete falsity of these statements.

FF-14.
 b. Ex. 484, T. 5957

FF-16.
 a. Ex. 492, T. 6033
 b. Ex. 483, T. 5956

FF-15.
 a. Ex. 485, T. 5967.

FF-108. Defence witness NAMEA attempted to explain away the charges of the over-all opium campaign in Manchukuo and the Northern Provinces by insisting that the creation of the Manchurian Opium Monopoly Administration controlled the sale and illicit growth of opium. Nevertheless, he admitted that the registration of addicts was facilitated and organized growth encouraged, and while Japanese Nationals were not allowed to purchase and smoke opium, the same strict measures were not applied to Chinese.^{a.}

X. HIROTA's ACTIONS AFTER HE LEFT OFFICE

FF-109. ARITA testified that HIROTA was in 1939 and 1940, opposed to a military alliance with Germany.^{a.}
Put according to HARADA on 12 August 1939, KIDO and KONOMI^{b.} agreed that HIROTA was a suitable candidate for the next Premier on the fall of the HIRANUMA cabinet, which was already expected before the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, on the ground that KONOMI had interviewed him and found his opinions very similar to those of the Army on this question, i.e. for a full military alliance as opposed to the compromise plan adopted by the HIRANUMA cabinet.^{c.} Shortly before 24 August they still considered him the number one candidate. Put on that day he withdrew his candidature on a report by HARADA of Army opposition, in spite of or in ignorance of those views.^{d.}

FF-108.
a. T. 20308-58

FF-109.
a. T. 30,014-6.
b. T. 38,703
c. Ex. 3807, T. 37,846
d. Ex. 3878, T. 38,677

0 159 0008 1074

FEBRUARY 10 1948

IPS RE: MIRCIA (FF)

Attached pages No. FF-63, FF-64, FF-65 and FF-65a
are to be substituted for present pages 63, 64 and 65, in
summation on MIRCIA (FF)

Page 5-6

FF-108. Defense witness MATTA attempted to explain away the charges of the over-all opium campaign in Manchukuo and the Northern Provinces by insisting that the creation of the Manchurian Opium Monopoly Administration controlled the sale and illicit growth of opium. Nevertheless, he admitted that the registration of addicts was facilitated and organized growth encouraged, and while Japanese nationals were not allowed to purchase and smoke opium, the same strict measures were not applied to Chinese. ^{a.}

X. HEROTA'S ACTION AFTER HIS DEPT. OFFICE

FF-109. ARITA testified that HEROTA was in 1939 and 1940 opposed to a military alliance with Germany. Put according to HARADA on 12 August 1939 ^{a.} YONONE and YONONE agreed that HEROTA was a suitable candidate for the next Premier on the fall of the HIRANUMA cabinet, which was already expected before the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact; on the ground that YONONE had interviewed him and found his opinions very similar to those of the Army on this question. i.e. for a full military alliance as opposed to the compromise plan adopted by the HIRANUMA cabinet. ^{b.} Shortly before 24 August they still considered him the number one candidate. But on that day he withdrew his candidature on a report by HARADA of Army opposition, in spite of or in ignorance of those views. ^{c.}

FF-108.

a. T. 20308-58

FF-109.

a. T. 38703
b. Ex. 3807, T. 37346
c. Ex. 3878, T. 28677

REF ID: A66664

FF-110. HIROTA as an Elder Statesman was instrumental in the choice of new Premiers on the fall of each Cabinet. In this capacity he attended a meeting on 21 July 1940 where the selection of the new Premier was made on the fall of the YONAI Cabinet. HIROTA advocated a military man, but since there was no suitable candidate, he considered that KONO'E would be a good choice as the military themselves were in favour of him.^{a.}

FF-111. He also attended the Elder Statesmen's meeting called on the fall of the Second KONO'E Cabinet on 17 July 1941, where he laid stress upon the reinforcement of General Headquarters and again advocated the formation of a military cabinet, but consented to the opinion of the rest upon MIYANO's explanation of General Headquarters in the Palace.^{a.} Again on 17 October 1941, he was present when MIYANO suggested TOJO as Premier and War Minister even though he was on military service and approved of this appointment.^{b.} It appears from the longer contemporary "resume" reproduced in para. 216 of MIYANO's affidavit that after hearing a full statement by KONO'E of the matters leading up to his resignation, HIROTA expressed the following opinions: "As we are in the midst of the China Incident I think even politics must be conducted with the intentions of the Imperial General Headquarters at centre."^{c.}...."I think one of the plans worth studying is to make the Supreme Command recommend the candidate

FF-110.
a. Ex. 532, T. 6252

FF-111.
a. Ex. 1117, T. 10,166
b. Ex. 1154, T. 10,291;
Ex. 2250, T. 16,183
c. Ex. 344C, T. 2:991-31618

(FF-113)
 another Senior Statesmen's meeting (TOJO having resigned)
 where KOISO was selected as the Premier of the new Cabinet
 and at which he stated the prosecution of the war was first
 b.
 and foremost. The Senior Statesmen again met on 5 April
 1945 on the fall of the KOISO Cabinet and selected SUZUKI,
 c.
 Yantaro, as the head of the new Cabinet.

FF-114. References to laws and ordinances enacted
 during HIROTA's tenures of office as Foreign Minister,
 Premier and President of the Planning Board, which contri-
 buted to Japan's preparation for war and general mobilis-
 ation are to be found in paras. F-9, F-19, F-11, F-20, F-22, F-26,
 F-28, F-32 and F-65 of the summary of Internal and External
 Preparation for Aggressive War in Asia and in the Pacific.

FF-115. To summarise the effect of the above
 in relation to the several counts of the Indictment,
 we submit that the whole story establishes HIROTA's
 membership in each of the conspiracies charged in
 Counts 1-5 and, therefore, is evidence of his

FF-113.

b. Ex. 1278, T. 11,377
 c. Ex. 1282, T. 11,390

(FF-111)
for the next Prime Minister".

After KIDO had stated his proposals: "Is it KIDO's plan to make the Prime Minister (TOJO) concurrently assume the portfolio (apparently of War Minister)?" KIDO: "Yes". MIROTA: "Then it will be all right"

FF-112. On 29 November 1941, a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held and TOJO explained that war was inevitable. A full report was given by the Premier regarding the development of the negotiations with America up to date. HON YE reported that his Cabinet had tried to adjust American-Japanese relations but on the basis of that morning's explanation by the Government, he was forced to conclude that further negotiations would be hopeless. MIROTA thought that it would be a mistake to rush into war immediately after being confronted with the present crisis and suggested a postponement and possible diplomatic solution after its outbreak. The Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers, President of the Planning Board, and the Premier met with the Senior Statesmen in the evening and explained the situation, and between these two meetings, TOJO and the former Premiers, including MIROTA, met with the Emperor who heard each man's opinions.^{a.}

FF-113. On 17 July 1944, at a Senior Statesmen's Council convened to discuss the reorganization of the TOJO Cabinet, MIROTA said that he would not join the reorganized TOJO Cabinet if he were asked.^{a.} The following day he attended

FF-112.

a. Ex. 11584, T. 10,513;
Ex. 1196, T. 10,452;
Ex. 3340, T. 31,097

FF-113.

a. Ex. 1277, T. 11,372

コロニ奴レバ不手原ナ防共協定ハ他ノ列強ノ英意ヲ招来シ又半戦時優遇及ビ純官債的経済ノ確立ハ利ヨリ千倍スル事カ多カツタノデアリマス。

唐国内閣ノ沈散ハ多クハ國民ノ腐敗ヲ基礎トシタキノデハナク、官僚及ビ支部ノ獨斷的偏見ニ影響サレテキルモノデアルコトヲ非難シタノデアリマス。(6) 二通問復ニ比日内閣ハ瓦壞シタノデアリマス。

註 記簿巻紙ハ英文ノ頁番號デアル。

FF-1

法定記簿第一ニセムニ

0159 0008 1079

HIROTA Summation-FF
FF-1

長 田 弘 毅

一 思 山 一 記 的

被告廣田ハ一九三〇年十月十二日ヨリ一九三二年

十一月十九日ニ至ル間「ソビエツト社會主義共和

國聯邦」駐劄大使ヲ、一九三三年九月十四日ヨリ

一九三六年四月二日ニ至ル迄外務大臣ヲシテ居リ

マシタ。一九三六年三月六日首相ニ任命セラレ、

一九三七年二月二日廣田内閣ノ瓦解ニ至ル迄其ノ

地位ニアツタノデアリマス。一九三七年一月二十

日ノ政友會總會ハ宣言ヲ發シ同内閣ヲ方採ツテ居タ

政策ヲ批判シタノデアリマス。彼等ノ宣言シタト

相模定ノ爲メ開カレル重要ナル委員會ニ列席シ
タノデアリマス。

FF-5

我が國ノ性格並ビニ政策ノ進路ハ「帝國ノ進路
ベキ根本的國策ハ外交政策並ニ國防ニ在リ又相互
扶助シツ、東亞細亞大陸ニオケル帝國ノ地位ヲ確
立シ、同時ニ東南海ニ帝國ヲ進出セシムルコトニ

FF-2

2 法廷記録ニニハ 法廷記録ニ六六ニ

0159 0008 1080
0801 8000 6510

FR-2

証人「ツギタ」ハ辰田内閣瓦解ノ責任ハ誰ニ
 持ニ議會制度ノ改革ニ反對セシ衆議院ニ於ケル代
 議士ニアリトシマシタ。其ノ争ヒハ極メテ激烈ト
 ナリ迷ニ三軍大臣ハ辭職スルノ止ムナキニ至リ茲
 ニ於テ辰田ハ最早其ノ内閣ヲ保持スルコトハ不可
 能トナツタノデアリマス。(2) 一九三七年六月四日
 辰田ハ外務大臣ニ任命セラレ一九三八年五月廿九
 日辭職ニ至ル迄外相ノ職ニアツタノデアリマス。
 此ノ内閣ニ於ケル地位ヲ辨シテ後後ハ一九四〇年
 三月十三日ヨリ一九四〇年八月迄内閣顧問デアリ
 一九四〇年七月以降、辰田ハ各内閣瓦解後ニ新首

FF-3

② 法三三二一六 法三三二一七〇

ニヨリ出来得ル限リ擴張スルコトデアツタノデア
リマス。最後ニ、ソレガソノ限辰ニ達シタ時、彼
ハソノ政局ヲ實際武力ヲ用ヒ得ル者ニ欣ンテ引渡
シタノデアリマス。

HIROTA Summation-FF

アルトト進ベラレタル首相（原田）外務、大藏、
陸、海軍諸大臣ノ一九三六年八月七日ノ決議ニ見
ラレルノデアリマス。^{（c）}右ハ見解ニ依リテハ「國
防」トハ單ニ、侵略的目的ノ爲ニ武力ヲ行使スル
事ノ範圍ナ云ヒ廻シニ進ギナイコトヲ曉ラカニス
ルノデアリマス。彼ハ一九四〇年六月迄ハ右ノ意
度ヲ取りテツタ事ヲ曉ラカニサレルノデアリマス
ソレ以後ハ彼ハ絶エズ軍人ヲ首相ニ推舉シタノデ
アリマス。彼ハ、屢々平和演説ヲ諸外國ノ説曉ヲ
ナシテキタ人物デアハアルガ併シ彼ノ眞ノ意圖ハ微
頭微尾、日本ノ勢力ヲ武力増成ヲ背景ニシタ外交

0159 0008 1081

HIROTA Summation-FF

ハ、右ノ争ハ廣田ノ正式ノ意見デハナカッタノデア
ルカラ之ヲ言ツタノハ何カ他ノ動機ヲ有ツテキタニ
相違ナイト述べタノデアリマス。(b)

FF-5 一九三一年十二月「リトヴィノフ」ハ日華間ニ不
侵略條約ヲ締結スルコトニ關シテ断斷ノ爲メニ申入

FF-4
a 法廷證 六ルニ 法廷記録 七四五〇
b 法廷證ニ六七ニ 法廷記録ニ三二一八

2025 09 19 09:51:00

二、麻蘇大使時代ノ宿願ト爾後ノ外相、首相時

代ノ態度

FR-4

一九三一年既ニ廣田ハ其ノ蘇聯邦駐節大使在任中

一陸軍少將原田トノ會談ニ於テ蘇聯ニ對スル彼ノ見

解ヲ述ベタノデアリマス。其ノ見解ノ中デ「日本ガ

蘇聯ニ對シテ敢テ開始スルカドウカハ別トシテ右ニ

關シ日本ハ強硬以策ヲ執ル必要ガアリ又何時ニテモ

戰爭ニ應ズル準備ヲシテ直ク必要ガアルト述ベテ

キルノデアリマス。斯ノヤウナ政界ノ主要目的ハ共

産主義ニ對スル防禦デハナクシテ寧ロ「東亞シベリ

ヤ」ノ征服ニアツタノデアリマス (a) 然シ等原證人

019 0000 1000

HIROTA Summation-FF

ヲナシ來ツタノデアリマス。(a) 一九三二年十月十日
 五日廣田ハ日蘇中立條約ノ締結ニ關スル新聞ニ對シ
 テノ聲明中ニ若シ斯カル條約ガ日本ニ何等カノ恩惠
 フモタラスモトク豫測ガツケバ石ノ如キ條約ノ締結
 モ可能デアラウト述べタルモ、(b) 日本ガ蘇聯ノ提
 案ニ對シ拒絶的ナル句讀ノ回答ヲナスマデニハ一箇
 年經過シタノデアリマス。一九三三年十二月十三日
 ノ此ノ回答ニ於テ、日本ハ本問題ニ關シテノ公式交
 渉ノ開始ハ未ダ時宜ヲ得ザルモノト述べタノデアリ
 マス。(c)

FF-6 一九三三年一月四日「ソヴイエト」政府ハ不侵略
 條約ニ關スル彼等ノ申出ヲ日本側ガ拒否セルニ答
 テ再ヒ日本政府ニ覺書ヲ手交シタノデアリマス。(a)
 而シテ之ニ凡ヘテ、一九三三年二月十三日ニ本提
 ハ再ヒ日本政府ニ依テ拒否サレタノデアリマス。(b)

P-5

FF-5	a	法廷證	七四四	法廷記録	七七一
	b	法廷證	三二二	法廷記録	二八三八一
	c	法廷證	七四五	法廷記録	七七一九
FF-6	a	法廷證	七四六	法廷記録	七七二〇
	b	法廷證	七四七	法廷記録	七七二七

1933年六月二十六日ハ、廣田ノ外務大臣任命

ニ先立ち、「ソグイェト」方買却ノ希望ヲ見セテ居
タ東支鐵道ヲ日本カ買收スルニ願フ日本ト「ソグイ
ェト」聯邦間ニ交渉ヲ開始サレタノデアリマス。(a)

最初ハ買立價額ノ不一致ノ爲ニ支障カ起キタガ、結
局一九三四年八月當時外務大臣ニ就任シテ居タ廣田
ガ「ソグイェト」聯邦ト安協シテ一九三五年三月二

十三日ニ契約ヲ締印サレタノデアリマス。(b) 廣田
ハ一九三五年一月二十二日ニ演説ヲ行ヒ鐵道讓渡ノ
取極メラ喜ビ告ゲタノデアリマス。(c) 且ツ祝賀ノ

覺奮カ手交サレタノデアリマス。「リトグイノ」
ハ外國通信員ニ對スル聲明ニ於テ交渉ノ成立ヲ欲フ
旨表明シタノデアリマス。然シ乍ラ、之等交渉

ニハ日本側ヨリ相當ナル懸念ガ加ヘラレタノデアリ
マス。例ヘバ一九三四年十月二十三日ニ、哈爾濱ノ

「ロツア」領事館ハ日本外務省代表者ニ對シ東支鐵
道ハ攻撃、路線及ビ財産ノ破壞、鐵道代理人ノ殺害

ヲ被リ而モ過激ノ抗議ニモ拘ラズ何等ノ矯正の處置

附7 a 法廷證言三五五1A
b 法廷證言三四四
c 法廷證言三四七
d 法廷證言三五三

法廷記録三四三六
法廷記録三四三九
法廷記録三八九一
法廷記録三八六一六

4801 8000 6510

P-7

FF-8

a

法廷證

四四三

I A

法廷記錄

五〇四二

FF-7

f

法廷證

七四九

法廷記錄

七七四二

e

法廷證

七四八

法廷記錄

七七三九

モ深ラレテ居ナイト強硬ニ抗議シテ來タノデアリマ
ス。(g) 更ニ又一九三四年十二月十五日ニハ東支鐵道副
理事長ハ理事長李紹庚 / Li Shao Gen / ニ對シ東支
鐵道所屬ノ宿舍及ビ建築物ガ度々不法徵發セラレタ
ノヲ例トシテ擧ゲタノデアリマス。(f)

FF-8

廣田ト滿洲國ガ交渉シタル覺悟ハ日本ガ東支鐵道
買收ノ契約ヲ滿洲國政府ガ履行スルコトヲ保障シタ
コトヲ立證シテキルノデアリマス。(a)

0159 0008 1085

FF-10

對蘇反抗ヲ目的トスル諸般ノ決議立ニ手段ニ廣
田ガ參齋シダコトハ華北ヲ特別防共親日地帯トシ、
一
万ヤガアハ全中國ヲ親日、反蘇ニセントノ一九
三
六
年
四
月
四
日
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。(a)

FF-9 a、法廷証三二三七 法廷記録二六四五六
b、法廷証七七七一A 法廷記録七八八三

FF-10 a、法廷証七〇四 法廷記録七五二三

9801 8000 6510
0159 0008 1086

FF-9

一九三五年一月二十三日ノ演説ニ於テ廣田ハ日
 本自身ハ蘇聯國境ニ軍事施設ヲ新設シテキナイニ
 モ拘ラズ蘇聯邦ハ反日報道ヲ發表シテキルト非難
 シタノデアルガ、^(a)然モ一方白鳥ヨリ有田ニ宛テ
 タ一九三五年十一月十二日附ノ電翰ハ日本ガソレ
 ニモ拘ラズ、對蘇聯侵略野望ヲ抱イテキダコト並
 ニ之ハ國軍部内ハ勿論外務省ニ於テモ抱懷サレテ
 キダコトヲ明ラカニシアタルノデアリマス。^(b)

HIROTA Summation-WF

WF-11

一九三六年七月二四日附ノ外務省訓製ノ報告書ニ於テ「日獨政治協約ノ問題」ガ批評サレテアリマシタ。獨逸トノ條約ノ主要目的ハ共產主義ニ對スル防衛並ニソ聯ノ脅威ニ對抗スル手段デアルト引證サレタガ、實際ノ條約ハ屢々「日獨提携」トシテ言及サレテ居リ、^(a)シカモ又一方、證人有國ハ歐國ガ獨逸トノ同盟政策ニハ同意シナカツタシ又コノ問題ニ關シ巨擘ト意見ヲ同シクシナカツタコトヲ強硬ニ主張シタノデアリマス。^(b)

WF-12

一九三七年八月七日及ビ十一日石ノ政府ノ決定及ビ發言セラレタル策ガ討論セラレ「ロシヤ」ノ脅威ノ絶滅ガ決定セラレタノデアリマス。^(a)

WF-11

b、法廷証 三二六七

法廷記録 三六八八三

法廷記録 三〇〇一四一六

WF-12

a、法廷証 二一六
法廷証 九七九

法廷記録 二七二〇

法廷記録 九五四九

年十一月二十日ニ樞密院調査委員會ノ會議ニ出席
シタガ、其ノ席上、「本日獨協定ハ二ツノ協定、
即チ共產主義萬國協會ニ對スル協定及ビ「ソ」聯
ニ對スル秘密附屬協定ノ二ツヨリ成ルモノデア
ル」ト云フコトヲ説明サレタノデアリマス。同會議ニ
於テ廣田ハ説明ヲ行ヒ、「ソ」聯ノ共產主義運動
ハ日本ノ東亞細亞政策ニ對スル脅威ヲ構成スルモ
ノデアリ、故ニ日本ハ之ニ對シ支那ノ協力を強調
シテ來タモノデアルト述べタノデアリマス。(b)

FF-13

a、法廷証一〇六 法廷記録一〇二五
b、法廷証二六 法廷証四八 法廷記録五九三六

FF-14

a、法廷証二七一 法廷記録一八三九八
b、法廷証四八〇 法廷記録五九五七

8801 0000 6510

FF-13

防共協定ノ交渉ガ開始セラレタ時、廣田ハ外務大臣ノ地位ニアリ、^(a)一九三六年十一月二十五日、日獨防共協定竝同秘密附屬協定ガ訓印セラレタ時ハ首相テアツタノデアリマス。^(b)

FF-14

外務省ハ一九三六年十二月二十五日ニ防共協定締結ヲ得計スルニ明ラセシ「本協定ハ「ソ」聯成ヒハ其他ノイヅレカノ特定國ヲ對象トシタモノテハナイ」。^(a)ト云フコトヲ明確ニ述べタノデアリマスガ其ノ一方廣田ハ首相ノ資格ニ於テ一九三六

ノデハナイカトノ懸念ヲ表シテ居ルノデアリマ
ス。(b)

FF-I 7 一九三八年一月十五日開催ノ連絡會議ニ於テ
F 一 近衛ハ陸軍參謀本部ガ、ソ聯攻撃ノ準備ノタメ
F 二、中國ニ於ケル敵對行為ノ休止ヲ唱道シテキ
ルトコト又參謀次長ガ同日ソノ後行ハレタ關議
ニ於テ、將介石トノ直接交渉ヲ唱道シサヘシタ

FF-I 5 a 法廷證四八五 法廷記録五九六七

CC-I 6 a 法廷證四九二 法廷記録六〇三三
b 法廷證四八三 法廷記録五九五六

FF—15 ツイテ一九三六年十一月二十五日ニ、廣田ハ
樞密院會ニ出席シメガ同席上テ防共協定締結
ハ滿場一致テ允許サレタ^o(a)デアリマス。

FF—16 一九三七年十一月十二日ニ廣田ガ外相トシテ
防共協定擴張問題討論會ニ出席シメ折彼ハ、此
ノ協定ハ偏ヘニ共匪主義ニ對スル協定デアルト
云フコトヲ繰返シ述べタ^o(a)デアリマス。而モ
彼ノ直屬テアル處ノ外務省情報局ハ此ノ擴張ノ
締結ニ關シ聲明ヲ發シ、協定ノ眞ノ目的即チ之
ハ決シテ或ル特定ノ國ヲ對象トシテ居ルモノデ
ナイト云フコトガ全テノ着ニ了解サレナカツタ

III

日本ノ華府海軍協定海軍備制限並
ニ其ノ九ヶ國條約侵犯

FF-I 8 一九三四年十二月二十九日原田外務大臣當
時、日本八一九三六年十二月ヨリ華府海軍協定

FF-I 7 a 法廷證三七八九一A 法廷記 三七七一八
b 法廷記錄二〇五三一七

c 法廷證三七九〇一A 法廷記錄三七七三六

d 法廷記錄二九八七〇一

0159 0000 1090 0601 8000 6510

コトヲ洩ラシテキマス。(a) 河津ハ、合合ニ於テ
 相當ノ議論ガマツタコトヲ想起シテキルノデア
 リマスガ、ソノ理由ヲ明示スルコトガ出來ナカ
 ツタノデアリマス。(b) 更ニ、陸軍ガ露西亞攻
 撃準備ノタメ軍隊ノ進軍中止ヲ唱道シテキタコ
 トヲ廣田ハヨク知ツテキタニ相違ナイコトハ、
 一九三八年二月十四日ノ原田日記ヨリシテ明ラ
 カデアリマス。(c) 原田ハ當時外務大臣デアツ
 タ堀之内ガコノ陳述ヲナシタト認めテキルノデ
 スガ、堀之内ハ尋問ノ際之ヲ思ヒダスコトガ出
 來ナカツタノデス。(d)

ハ岡本長官「ハル」ニ打電シ、樞密院ハ開場一
致華府海軍協定廢棄ノ決議ヲ可決シタソレデ彼
ハ廣田ガ倫敦會議開合ハ迄、日本ガ之ヲ失敗サ
セタト非難サレ又豫メノ公式通告ヲ延期スルコトヲ欲シ

FF-18

- a 法廷證 九四二 法廷記録 九四一六
- 法廷證 一〇六 法廷記録 一〇一一五
- b 法廷證 三七七七一B 法廷記録 三七六六八
- c 法廷記 二六六八八
- d 法廷記 二六七〇三

HIROTA Summation--FF

ヲ脱退スルアル旨通告シタノデハ^(a) コノ廢案
ニ關シ、原田ハ一九三四年九月七日ノ日記デ岡
田首相及ビ廣田外相ガ次ノ如ク言ツマト述ベテ
ヲリマス。即チ「要スルニ、草案ニ於テ、我々
ハ比率ニ全然反對シタ。ソレ故我々ハ他ノ諸國
ガ如何程我が提案ニ同意シヨウトモ之ヲ廢案セ
ネバナラヌ。我々ハ無條件ノ立場ヲ採ラントシ
テキル。」^(b) ト辯護側證人近衛ガ此ノ記述ニ出
喰ハシマ時、彼ハ最初之ヲ眞實ト容認シタノデ
スガ。^(c) 後ニ再直接尋問ノ際、彼ハ原田ナリ岡
田ガ斯ルコトヲ言ツマト云フコトヲ明白ニ否定
シタノデアリマス。^(d) 同ジ日ニ「グルー」大使

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-18

f e
法廷證 法廷證
三 二
四 七
八

法廷記錄 法廷記錄
三 九
九 一
一 九

0199 0000 1092
2601 8000 6510

テキルト云フ印象ヲ受ケタト述ベテキルマス。⁽⁹⁾
 然ルニ拘ラズ、廣田ハ一九三五年一月二十二日
 第六十七議會ニ對スル演說ニ於テ、斯カル脱退
 ハ日本ガ如何ナル軍備擴張ニモ果出サントスル
 意圖デアルト云フ證左トシテトラレルベキモノ
 デハナク、反對ニ日本ハ華府協定ニ次グ今一ツノ
 ノ締結ヲ熱望シテキルモノデアルト主張シテキ
 ルノデス。^(f)

PP-19

然シナガラ新ニカク條約ハ、特ニ一九三六年一
 月ノロンドン海軍會議ニ於テ、日本ガ三一五―三
 ノ比率ノ代リニ共通ノ高位限界ヲ主張シテキルコ
 トニ儘ミ、實現ノ見込ハ殆ンドナカツタノデアリ
 マス。尙右主張ハ、勿論、英及米國ガ世界ノ他
 地方ニ於ケル其ノ責任ヲ怠ルニ非レバ、日本ハ太
 平洋ヲ支配スルト云フ事ヲ意味シタモノデアリマ
 ス。(a) 他ノ諸國家ニヨル、コノ提案ノ受諾拒絶ノ
 結果、日本ハ該會議ヲ脱退シテキマス。(b) 之等交
 渉ノ様子及ビ其ノ失敗ニ對スル彼ノ理由トスルト
 コロハ、辯護士人坂本ニヨツテ述べラレテキマ
 ス。(c)

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-22 FF-21 FF-20

ガ、シカモ傾察行動ニヨリ米海軍力ヲ値カメント
 シタノデアリマス。(a) 相互交談ノ新カ、ル試ミハ
 一九三八年二月五日「ゲル」ニヨリナサレタモ
 ノデス。彼ハ、日本ハ倫敦海軍條約ニ署名セルモ
 ノニハ非ルモ、米山ハ條約トシテ、締約トニ非
 ル間ガ本條約ノ定ムル限界ニ達カズシテ設置シア

b、法定記録 二六六六六

a、法定記録 五八
 法定記録 九二三一

a、法定記録 一二一九
 法定記録 一一一八四

4601 8000 6510
 0159 0008

ナル脅威ニ對シテモ準備シテキタは、右準備ガ日本ニ對シ向ケフンタコトハ明ラカブナイコトヲ認メテキマス^(b)

PP-2I

合衆國ガ主力艦ノ砲徑ハ制限サレオバナラヌト廣田ニ提言シタ際、彼ハ一九三七年六月七日答へテ、此ノ點ノ協力ヲ拒ミ、脅威トナル如キ海軍力増進ハ之ヲナサズトスル日本ノ政策ヲ繰返シ、爾年ノロンドン海軍軍縮會議ニ於テ日本提出ノ原則ヲ固守シタノブアリマス⁽²⁾

PP-22

一九三八年ニ廣田一グループ間ニ交換サレタ文書ニ於テ、日本ハ英國及ビ米國提議ノ海軍増進ニ關スル報告ノ相互交換案ヲ拒絶シタノデアリマス

スコト不可能ナリト認ズ又コレニ認スル合衆口ノ
要求ニ應ズルコト不可能ト認ジケノデアリマス。(2)

FP-22

b、法廷証

五八

法廷証録

九一九二

FP-23

a、法廷証

五六

法廷証録

九二三六

0 159 0008 1095

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-23

ル場合ハ、仲船權ヲ有スルガ故ニ、主權ノ行使ニ
關スル報告ヲ要求シタノデアリマス。彼ハ又日本
ガ其ノ志圖ヲ米國ニ通告スルコトナク一九四三年
一月三日以前ニ、此ノ限界ニ差カザル如何ナル艦
船モ之ヲ建造セザルコトヲ米國ニ確信セシムルコ
トヲ然ラザレバ合衆國ハ仲船權ヲ使用セザルヲ得
ヌ旨要求シタノデアリマス。(b)

一九三八年二月十二日、廣田ハ「グルー」ノ覺
書ノ受領ヲ認め、ソノ返答ニ、當時制限ヲ伴ハザ
ル質的制限法ニヨリ公平ナル軍備ヲ得ルコト不可
能ナリトスル日本ノ見解ヲ繰返シ述べタノデアリ
マス。ソレ故、日本ハ艦船建造ニ關スル通告ヲナ

スル態度トイフ問題ニ關スル英國大使「リンドレイ」ト
 ノ會談ニ就テ打電シタノデアリマス。廣田ハ、日
 本ハ未ダ嘗テ九ヶ條條約ニ違反シタコトモナケレ
 バ、又斯カル意圖ヲ持ツタコトモナイト主張シタ
 ノデアリマス。(2) 然ルニ廣田ガ外務大臣在任中デ
 アル一九三七年十月六日ノ日除聯盟總會ノ採決シ
 タ第一回報告ハ、日本ノ行爲ヲ一九二二年ノ九ヶ
 條條約及ビ一九二八年ノ「バリ」條約ニ違背スル

FF-24	a、	法廷證	九一三	法廷記録	九四二〇
	b、	法廷證	三二八九	法廷記録	三〇〇〇ニ
FF-25	a、	法廷證	三二四四	法廷記録	二九五八ニ

9601 8000 6510

FF-24

廣田ガ海軍制限乃至ハ情報ニ關スル措置全テヲ
 鄭重ニ拒否シテ居ツタノト丁度時ヲ同ジウシテ日
 本政府ハ何レモ條約制限ノ三万五千屯、十六吋ヲ
 超エル戦艦大和竝ニ武藏ノ建造ニ着手シテキタノ
 デアリマス。(a) 然モ、廣田ハ、一九三八年三月四
 日、第七十三議會演說ノ中デ新列強間ニ海軍々
 備縮少ヲ議スル機會ガアレバ好都合デアルト述ベ
 タノデアリマス。(b)

FF-25

一九三四年四月二十六日、廣田ハ在米英ノ日本
 大使館ヲ始メトシ、各國日本大使館ニ、日本ノ九ヶ國條約ニ對

FF-27 FF-26 FF-25

b、	a、	a、	b、
法廷證	法廷證	法廷證	法廷證
	三	九	九
九	二	五	六
五	八	四	二
四	三	A	
B		法廷記錄	法廷記錄
		二	九
		九	四
		四	七
		四	四
		六	

FF-28

ニ表示セザリシコトニ鑑ミ、外務省ガ其ノ招請ヲ拒否スルト言フ可能性ハ充分アツタノデシタ。(a)

日本ハ日本ノ意見デハ、中國ニ於ケル行動ヘ九箇國條約外ニアル旨ヲ述ベテ十月廿七日附、招請ヲ拒絶シタノデシタ。(b)

該拒絶ハ證人堀ノ内ガ説明シテキル、彼ハ再度コウ述ベテキル、即チ「ブラッセル」會議參加ハ日本國內情勢ニ有害ナリシヲ以テ、該會議ヘノ參

HIROTA Summation-FF

モノト断ジテ居ルノデアリマス。(b)

FF-26

一九三七年十月二十日外務省ハ、白耳義大使ヲ
廣田ニ十月三十日「ブラツセル」ニ於テ開催サレ
ル九ヶ國係約調印國會議ヘノ出席招待狀ヲオクツ
タコトヲ發表シタノデアリマス。(a)

FF-27

一九三七年十月二十一日、「グループ」ハ其ノ日
記ニ、ブラツセル會議参加ノ進言ガ日本ニ對シナ
サレテルノニ、廣田ハ政黨主腦部ハ該會議不參與
ニ事實上意見ノ一致ヲ見テキル旨ヲ洩ラシタト記
述シテキマス。該會議ガ國際聯盟ノ決議及ビ十月
六日附ノ合衆國ノ聲明ニ根源スルモノニ非ズト特

0159 0008 1097

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-29 FF-28

a、
法廷證
三二八四

法廷記錄
二九九至七

a、
法廷證
三二六〇

法廷記錄
二九六九八

0159 0000 1098
8000 6510

FF-29

加拒絶ハ九箇箇條約ニ反セルモノデハナイ、ト。

(3)

一九三七年十一月十六日、廣田ハ、「ブラツセル」會議ノ最終決定ハ日本ニ對スル共同行動ヲ企圖シタモノデアルトノ報道ニ關シ、若シ日本ノ新聞ガ斯カル報道ヲ探知スルナラバ輿論ニ對シ不幸ナ結果ヲ招來センコトヲ恐ルトテ其ノ懸念ヲ「グルー」ニ述ベテキマス。廣田ハ、日本ハ日華事變ニ於ケル好箇ノ仲介者ハ合衆國デアルト考エテキルコトヲ附ケ加ヘテキマス。(a)

0159 0000 1099

HIROTA Summation-FF

IV. 廣田ノ對滿政策

致クヨウ指導スベシトノ決議ヲシタ内閣ノ職員デア

リマシタ。宣言書ノ草案ハ日滿不可分ノ關係ヲ反映
ナラシムベシ。(a) 一方一九三四年一月二十三日ノ演
説ニ於テ獨立國トシテノ滿洲國ノ創立ニ誤解ヲ避
マシタ。(b)

一九三四年三月一日溥儀ハ滿洲國皇帝トナリ、
此ノ旨ノ勅語ガ發布セラレ、又滿洲官報ニ於テ宣
言ガ發表サレマシタ。(a)

一九三四年三月二十日同内閣ハ日滿經濟行政ニ
スル決議ヲシマシタ。此ノ決議ニ於テ同政策ハ日
本ノ世界的經濟發展ノ確立ヲ含ムト述べテキマス。
一方滿洲國內ノ輸送並ニ他ノ企業ハ日本帝國ノ要求
ニ依リ完成セラルベキコト、國際ハ日本帝國ノ力ト

P-21

FF-31 FF-30

a、	法廷證	四三七 A	法廷記録	三〇一三
b、	法廷證	三三三七	法廷記録	二九一五三
c、	法廷證	三三三	法廷記録	二九三六
	法廷證	三四二六	法廷記録	一九六六六

HIROTA Summation-FF

マシタ。ドノ程度ニ滿洲國が獨立ヲ得ルコトニナツ
 テキタカハ四名ノ行政官吏ガ内閣ニヨツテ陸海軍將
 校中ヨリ任命サレタ事實カラ知ラレルノデアリマス
 (2)
 ソシテ、關東軍指令官ト滿洲國駐劄大使トヲ結合シ
 テニツヲ一ツニスル統一ガ行ハレマシタ。樂島ハ反
 對訊問ニ於テ外務大臣ガ滿洲國駐劄大使ニ對シ直接

FF-34 FF-33 FF-32

a、 法廷證 二二六 法廷記録 二九三九

a、 法廷證 二四三二 法廷記録 一九七一七

a、 法廷證 四五一 法廷記録 三一一二

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適切ナル行政ノ許ニ於ケル迅速ナル發展ニ依ツテ

施ヒラレベキコト^(a)

FF-33 一九三四年八月九日日本政府ハ若シ滿洲國ガ充
分ナル發展ヲ遂ゲルコトヲ許サレルナラバ日本ノ治

外法權ヲ撤廢スル必要ガアルトノ懸念ヲ發表シマシ
タ。是ノ事ハ在魯日本人ノ生活ノ急激ナ變化ヲ避ケ
ルタメニ漸ヲ追ツテ遂行サルベキコト^(a)

FF-34 庚田ガ外務大臣タリシ一九三四年十二月二十六

日ニ對滿事務局ノ官制制定ノ勅令ガ發セラレ、同局
ハ首相ノ管轄下ニ入り、關東州局ノ事務、各省ノ滿

洲行政事務ノ調整及ビ滿鐵管理ノ如キ事務ヲ取扱ヒ

P-23

FF-34

b

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

HIROTA Summation-FF

監督ヲ有セシコト並ニ一九三三年ノ滿洲國駐劄大使
南ガ、當時ノ外務大臣被告廣田ノ訓令ニ反シテ行動
シタ事例ハーツモ記憶セザルコトヲ認メマシムル
(b)

0159 0008 101

HIROTA Summation-FF
 FF-36 FF-35

相違ノ場合、日本ニ不利ナル決定ハ無カルベシト
 違ベテ居リマス。(a)一九三五年七月十五日、原
 田ガ外相ノ際、上記ノ日滿經濟協約ハ署名サレマ
 シタ。(b)

a、	法延証	二四三	法延証	二四三	法延証	二四三
a、	法延証	八五〇	法延証	八五〇	法延証	八五〇
b、	法延証	四四五	法延証	四四五	法延証	四四五
	法延証	八五一	法延証	八五一	法延証	八五一
			法延証	一一九七二	法延証	一一九七二
			法延証	八二一七	法延証	八二一七
			法延証	五〇五五	法延証	五〇五五
			法延証	八二三三	法延証	八二三三

2011 8000 6510

一九三五年一月二十一日、廣田ハ演說ニテ治外
 法權ニ關スル經過ヲ概ミ且ツ、コレラノ治外法權
 ノ漸次振廢ヲ說明シマシタ。(a)

日本ハ滿洲國ノ獨立ニ對スル希望ヲ公表セシニ
 モ拘ラズ、日本ノ滿洲國ニ對スル眞ノ政策ハ被告
 廣田列席ノ一九三五年七月三日ノ樞密院會議ニ依
 ツテ知ルコトガ出來マス。日滿共同經濟協約締結
 會議ノ爲メ開催サレタ此ノ會議ニ於テ、廣田ハ參
 員會ノ形成ニ關シ、同委員會ハ各自カラ四名宛出
 シテ編成サレ且ツ滿洲國ノ適當ノ中ノ一人ハ日本
 人タルコトニ定メラレアルニ依リ、兩國間ニ意見

一九三七年十月二十二日、廣田ガ外務大臣ノ際
 滿洲國ノ重工業建設ノ輪郭ヲ定メル内閣ノ決議ガ
 行ハレマシタ。(a)

滿洲國ニ於ケル治外法權ヲ振廢スル日滿條約ガ
 調印セラレタ時、廣田ハ首相デアリマシタ。(a)
 コレハ米國ト甲國トノ間ニ締結セラレテキル條約
 ニ依リ與ヘラレテキル米國人ノ誹權利ヲ侵害スル
 外國人ニ關スル布告ヲ包含シテオリマシタ。(b)

a、法廷証 二三七 法廷記録 二九四四

a、法廷証 四三八 法廷記録 五〇一八

a、法廷証 三三九 法廷記録 二九六〇

a、法廷証 二四七六 A、B、C、D 法廷記録 二〇四七三

b、法廷証 九一四 法廷記録 九四一八

FF-38

FF-37

一九三六年六月十日、滿洲國在ルノ日本人ノ居住並ニ租稅等ニ關シ日滿間ノ條約ガ署名サレマシタ。此ノ條約ハ結局、日本人ニ旅行シ商業農業及ビ工業ノ職業ニ從事シ又土地ニ關スル凡ユル權利ヲ享受スル權利ヲ與ヘル日本人ト滿洲國人トノ完全ナ平等待遇ノ代リニ滿洲國政府ニ南滿洲鐵道地帯ノ行政權ヲ與ヘルト云フ意味デアリマシタ。(a)

一九三七年八月三日、廣田ガ外相ノ際、日滿協約ガ締結サレ、之ニ依リ滿洲國發會社ガ兩口間ノ關係ヲ更ニ強化スル爲ニ組織サレマシタ。(a)

0159 0008 1 03

PP-42

一九三五年一月二十二日及び一九三五年三月一日
 の演説及宣言ニ於テ、反動ハ中國ニ於ケル平和ノ
 定ニ對スル希望及ビ日華平等ノ信念ヲ叫ブ一方、
 (a) 彼ハ中國ニ自治政權ヲ樹立シ南京以權カラ東部諸州
 ヲ切斷シ以ツテ南京政權ヲ易体化セントスル華北ト
 歸東軍ト、該談ヲ當時知ツテ平々内閣ノ關係テアリマ
 シタ。局中ノ狀況及ビ一九三五年六月十日ノ何一極
 津協定ヲ迄ル狀況及ビソノ締結ハ領土ヲ支配シ紛争
 ヲ惹起スル口實ニ小事件ヲ利用スルコトノ一證左ヲ
 與ヘマス。天津ノ日本租界ニ於ケルニ中國人ノ該人

PP-42

a. 演説 三二二七
 " 三二二〇
 演説 三九三三
 " 三九六一

0159 0008 1104 8000 6510

MP-41

日華紛争前ノ廣田ノ對華政策

廣田ガ一九三三年九月十四日ヨリ一九三六年四月二日迄外相トシテ、一九三六年三月九日ヨリ一九三七年二月二日迄首相トシテ在任中、彼ハ遂ニ中日紛争トナツタ中日ニ於ケル高度ノ緊張及ビ不安状態ヲ計畫シ且ツ外交手段ト直接協働トニヨツテ之ヲ準備シタ全般的共同謀議ノ一員テアリマシタ。右數年間日本政府ハ、實際ノ武力行使ヲ避ケル一方、結局ハ國ヲ大東亞共榮圈ニ包括スルコトヲ目指シテ計畫ヲ立テ又武力行使ノ脅迫ヲ持ツ處置ヲ講ジマシタ。

FF-43

a	f	e	d	c	b
・	・	・	・	・	・
”	法廷証	”	”	”	法廷証
	二四九一		二四九一	一九四	一九四
九三八	”	”	”	”	法廷証
”	”	”	”	”	二二七五―六
九四〇三	二〇七八七―八	二九五三一	二〇七八七	二二七六	

FF-44

然シナガラ、外務省ハ、北平日本大使館ノ若杉
 参事官ガ一九三五年十月二日廣田外相宛打電シテ
 冀ハ北又五省ヲ以テ南京政府ヨリ獨立ナル努力固

FF-43

華北自治政権ニ對スル本國ノ態度ハ、當時同地
 ニ起ツテ居ル政治的紛争ニ關シテ聲明ヲ發シタ、
 一九三五年九月二十五日、國務長官「ハル」ニヨ
 ツテ明ラカニサレマシタ。(a)

0159 0008 105

HIROTA Summation— F F

ヲ口實トシテ、日本ハ中國憲兵、河北ノ國民黨基
 務所、及び他ノ機關ノ立退キ、及十將軍ノ引渡ヲ
 要求シ、之等ノ要求ニ對シ中國側ハ屈服シマシタ。
 (b) コレニ満足セズシテ日本ハ更ニ強硬ヲ要求ヲ
 シマシタ。(c) 之ヲ石川ハ提案又ハ建言ニ過ギナ
 イト述べマシタ。(d) 桑島ハソレ等ハ最後通牒ノ性
 質ノモノデアルコトヲ認メマシタ。(e) 右要求ノ
 許ニ中國ハ屈服シ、一九三五年六月十日何一梅津
 協定ハ締結サレマシタ。(f)

家ヲ組織セント意圖シツツアリトノ風評専ラナリト
 報告シタニエ拘ラズ、是等ノ行動ヲ阻止スルタメニ
 可尋モ爲シマセンデシタ。

斯クテ日、滿、華北ノ一ブロック (a) ガ結成サレル
 タロウ。

証人 藥島ハ東河北反共自治政權及河北一察哈爾
 政治會議ガ實際ニ創立サレル迄ハ外務省ハ其事ヲ
 何モ知ラナカツタト (a) 述ベテキルケレドモ、彼

ハ一九三五年十一月五日代理大使島井發廣田宛、
 日本軍當局ニ依ツテ育成サレタ獨立運動ノ進展ニ

FF-48 FF-47 FF-46

a、 法廷證	b、 法廷證	a、 法廷證	a、 法廷證
二一五	二一一	二一〇	二一〇
法廷記録	法廷記録	法廷記録	法廷記録
二七一九	二七〇四	二七〇二	二七〇二

FF-48 一九三六年一月十三日廣田外務大臣ハ陸軍日
 本大使ニ「北支指導計畫長綱」ヲ送リマシタ。
 該計畫ハ外務省ニ於テ作製サレ奉北ノ自治、日
 本トノ協力等ヲ取扱ツタモノデアリマス。(a)

華北行政ノ爲メ獨立サレタ河北察哈爾政務委員會
 會々長ニ任命サレマシタ。(b)

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-46

斯クノ如キ行動ガ相當進捗シテ居ルコトハ外務省ニハ明瞭デアツタニ相違ナイガ而モ何ノ處置モ取ラレマセンデシタ。

從ツテ、日本ノ華北ノ政治機構ヲ變更シ自治ヲ樹立セントノ企圖ニ續キ、一九三五年十一月廿四日「戦争地帯自治準備委員會」ガ組織サレマシタ。(2)

FF-47

一九三五年十一月廿五日、日本ハ遂ニ日本ノ支配シ管理スル冀東及共自治會ヲ、塘沽停戰協定ニヨリ設置サレタ軍政撤去地帯ニ樹立シマシタ。同會ハ國民政府ヨリノ獨立ヲ宣言シマシタ。

(2)

次デ、一九三五年十二月十八日、宋哲元大將ハ

0159 0008 1107

FR-49

a、法廷証 三三五四
 b、法廷証 三三五四
 c、法廷証 三三五四
 d、法廷証 三三五四

法廷証 三三五四
 法廷証 三三五四
 法廷証 三三五四
 法廷証 三三五四
 法廷証 三三五四
 法廷証 三三五四

FR-49
 同時ニ歐等ノ自治區域ノ獨立ト同時ニ廣田ハ
 一ツノ計畫ヲ準備シテ履マシム。同計畫ノ主要
 内容ハヨク、前開、中列ノ島カニ支ツテ五
 ノ安定ヲ確保スルコトヲ了リマシタ。

是ハ廣田ノ三原則トシテ知ラレ、初之
 ラ臨時領事館員ニ變シテ計畫中ニ進ベマシタ。

(一) 新日行動ノ取
 (二) 滿洲ノ獨立ノ以テ並ニ同列ノ文化開發ニ
 經濟的協力、及ビ

(三) 共産主義的傾向並ニ其ノ除去ヲ了リマシタ (a)

十月四日首相、陸相、海相、外相及ビ軍令ニ依
 ツテ採用サレマシタ。(b)

外交當局ハ秘密ヲ守ルコトニナツテ厚シマシタ (c)

一九三五年十一月十四日、東京ノ長官總領事ハ
 廣田ニ日本軍入出梅ノ附近ニ架線中ナルコト並
 ニ「若シ是ヲ取レバ取天等ヲ生ズルコトナ
 ルベキコト」ヲ切ニ警告シマシタ。(d)

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FF-50

一九三五年十一月二十一日須知ハ是等ノ原則
ハ有言大使ニ依ツテ島介石ニ提出サレ島介石ハ
同原則ヲ受諾シ何等ノ反論無シトシテ提出サナカ
タト報告シタノデアリマス。(a)

FF-49

e、 法廷証

三七七九 A

法廷記録

三七、六七四

FF-50

a、 法廷証

三二五七

法廷記録

二、九、六三五

0159 0008 1079

HIROTA Summation-3F

取日後、十一月三十日原田ト會談ノ際、原田ハ
此ノ軍隊ノ集結ニ關シテ此等ノ軍隊ノ南方移動
ハ陛下ノ命令ニ依ルダロウト其ベマシタ。
然シ此ノ事實ハ向軍隊ヲ直接ノ感傷ト考ヘル中
國人ニハ秘密ニシテ言ハナケレバナリマセンデ
シタ。ソシテ若シ向軍隊ガ反亂ニ過ギヌコトヲ
知レバ中國人ハ面位ヲ起シ始メルダロウ。
尙又若シ軍閥ガ中國ガ此ノ秘密ヲ知ツタト知レ
バ強私手段ヲ採ルダロウ。(9)

FR-51

無謀無恥人柴島ハ是等早期ノ和平運動ニ關スル
 其ノ發言ニ於テ一九三五年五月ニ主ルマテハ日華
 關係ハ好轉シテ居タガ十二月ニ於ケル層有主ノ態
 續未遂ハ好轉シタニ係ニ若シイ變化ヲモタラシタ
 ト述ベタノデアリマス。(a) 且ツ又彼ハ民間新聞ニ
 於テ交渉ノ障礙ハ支那側ニ趣因スルモノデアリ且
 國ハ交渉ヲ繼續シタガツテ居タコトヲ述ベタノテ
 アリマス。(b)

FR-52

原田ハ一九三六年一月二十一日議會ニ談スル演
 説ニ於テ是等三原則ヲ公表シタノデアリマス。(a)
 其ノ直後引續イテ山本將兵ノ大衆團ガ政府ノ機體
 ヲ企山シテ東京ヲ恐怖セシメタ財論ニ二大事件
 シテ知ラレテキル事件ガ突發シタノデアリマス。(b)
 暴動ハ其後發盛セラレタカソレハ國內内訌ノ崩壊
 及一九三六年三月九日ノ復讐原田ヲ首班トスル新
 内訌ノ成立ニ資シタノデアリマス。(c)

FR-51

送達書三二四一 送達記録三九四九三
 送達記録三九三三三 一六

FR-52

送達書三三三三 送達記録三九四九三
 送達書一〇七六 送達記録二八三一 一三
 送達書一〇八 送達記録 七〇六

ハ「對外、對内國家政策、華北第二行政政策ニ關スル重大決定」ト題スル計畫ヲ作製シタノデアリマス
 コノ計畫ノ主兵目的ハ蘇聯ノ侵略ニソナヘ又華北ヲ日滿支協力並ビニ相互扶助ノ基盤トセンガ爲、反共親日滿地帯ヲ作ルコトデアリマシタ。河北及ビ察哈爾兩省ノ政府機構ヲ肅正シ日本ノ勢力ヲ強化スルコトニヨル冀察政務會ノ指導計畫並ビニ國內行政刷新デアリマス。

P-53

FF-53

a	法廷記録	二九三三六
b	法廷記録	二九〇九三
c	法廷記録	二九三三六

HIROTA Summation—FF

FR—53

廣田ノ首相在職期間中ノ一九三六年十二月ニ所請
 緩進事件カ勃發シタノデアリマス。(c) 總領事人衆
 島ハ、コノ事件ハ內蒙古ノ滿東軍將校ノ活動ニ依リ
 惹起セラレ、日華關係ノ變化ノ理由デアルト主張シ
 タノデアリマス。(b) 彼ハ亦廣田ガ外交的解決ヲ試シ
 タ事ハ彼ノ取次ト一致シテ居ル故、當然デアラウト
 述ベタノデアリマス。彼ハ又日本人ガソノ事件ガ實
 際ニ起ルマデニソレニツイテ何ラカノ知識ヲ有シテ
 キタト云フコトヲ否定シタノデアリマス。(c)

FR—54

一九三六年八月十一日、外務省及他ノ關係諸官廳

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-56	FF-55	FF-54
b	b	a
法 廷 記 録	法 廷 記 録	法 廷 記 録
三 二 六 〇	三二二一 二五〇九 六四八八 〇	二 一 七
法 廷 記 録	法 廷 記 録	法 廷 記 録
二 二 二 三 六 八 三	二 三 三 二 九 〇 三 一 八 〇 七 八 〇	二 七 〇 〇

九二ノ該事件ニ對スル陳請(二)、中山鎮陸ノ正濱橋地
 區ヨリノ撤退及ビ(三)、反日口体ノ取締(四)テアリマ
 シタ。然ルニ同日近衛内閣ハ正濱橋地區ニ軍隊ヲ増
 派スル決定ヲ通過セシメ(五)據ツテ内地ニ於テ所要
 軍隊ヲ動員シ又華北陸境ニ於テ強化スル爲メ東京及ビ

2111 8000 6510

華北ニ産スル鐵、石炭、鹽ハ「我々」ノ國防ニ使用
サレルベキダト暗示シテ、同地方ノ經濟開發ニ特ニ
注意方向ケラレタノデアリマス。(a)

四、日華事變ノ勃發並同事變解決ノ企圖

FE-55

一九三七年七月七日上海橋事變ガ勃發シタノデア
リマス。(a) モツトモ華内ハ外務省ハソレニ關シテ全
然何モ知ラナカツタト述ベテキルノデアリマス。(b)

FE-56

華内ハ日華事變勃發直後橋本謙方同日應ノ局地保
決ヲ交渉シ、ソレハ結局一九三七年七月十一日調印
セラレタト記言シタノデアリマス。條件ハ(一)第二十

ツテ后ルト稱シ又原田が言ツタコト、行ツタコト
 空テヲ言シタノデハアルガ後ハ中国ガ一九三七
 年七月十二日ニ日本側ノ要求ヲ受諾シタトイフ趣
 旨ノ以テカニ重要ナル電報ヲ惹起スルコトガ出来
 ナカツタノデアリマス。(註) コノ電報ハ原田ニ使レ
 バ、十二日午後受領セラレ中国ガ要求ヲ全面的ニ
 受諾セル旨ヲ報ジタモノデアリマシタ。原田ニ使

FR-56

f	e	d	c
	法廷録	法廷録	法廷録
	二六〇	二六〇	二六〇
	法廷録	法廷録	法廷録
	二六七	二六八	二六八

朝鮮軍ヨリ分遣隊ヲ派遣セントスル軍ノ提案ニ同意ヲ與ヘタノデアリマス。(c) 右ニ就キ考ヘルニ眞田ハ同決定ニ條件附テ賛成セルコト及ビソノ目的ハ専ラ日本人ノ保証ナリシコトヲ述ベコノ決定ヲ豫備的動員措置ナリト説明シ去ラントスル堀内ノ意圖ハ甚ダ信ジ難キ事デアリマス。(d) 加フルニ人事課ノ「中國事態」ニ關スル報告ノ中ニハ、七月十一日ノ函件ニ於テ華北ヘノ軍隊派遣ニ關スル必兵ヲ措置ヲ深リ又華北ニアル外交事務局ノ職員ヲ強化スルタメノ緊急措置ヲ深ル爲重要決定カナサレタト書イテアルノデアリマス。(e) 堀内ハ支那事態ヲ解決セントスル交渉ニ於ケル堀内ノ役割ヲ知

0159 0008 1113

FW-56

j i h 6
法廷記録
三三八〇 A

法廷記録	法廷記録	法廷記録	法廷記録
二二三一	二六七一	二二二六	三三六八〇
	一三二	一三四	

ビ十四日ニ宛平市ヲ砲兵隊ノ支隊ノ下ニ一層大規模ニ攻撃シタノデアリマス。(j)

0159 0008 1114 8000 6510

レバソノ要求ハ、獨内ノ引用セルモノトハ相異シ
 (一)、撤兵、(二)、將來ノ保証及ビ(三)、責任將校ノ處
 罰デアリマシタ。原田ハ軍報道員ガコレヲ「極メ
 テ誠實ナ答ヘ」デアルト評シタノヲ引用シテ后ル
 方軍ハソレヲ日本ノ軍備ヲ停止セシメントスル中
 國ノ軍備ナリト考ヘタノデアリマス。(g) 該事件ニ
 關スル中國側ノ説既ハソノ責任ヲ日本側ニアリ(4)
 トシタノデアルカラ何レノ意見ヲ正シイニキセヨ
 是等條件ガ武力脅迫ガアツタレバコソ受諾セラレ
 タノデアルコトハ既カデアリマス。獨内ハ外務
 省ハ何レノ意見ガ正シイカラ知ル爲ニ獨立ニ努力
 シタ事ハナク唯單ニ何ノ美談モナク日本軍ノ説
 既ヲ認容シタコトヲ認メタノデアリマス。(1) 日本
 ノ目的ハ唯獨内ニ日本ノ利益ヲ擁護スルコトニア
 ツタトイフ獨内ノ美談ニキカ、ハラズ日本軍ハ專

FI-57

c	b	a
法廷記録		法廷記録
二二〇三七		三二六〇
法廷記録	法廷記録	法廷記録
二〇八七三	二三二六一三〇	二六六九〇一

ナル動員行動ニ付テハ一言モ違ベナカツタノデア
リマス。

WF-57

一九三七年七月二十日、夏ニ閣議ガ開カレ國內
 ノ三箇師團ヲ甲團ニ派遣スル爲メ動員ガ行ハレル
 コトガ決定セラレタノデアリマス。同動員令ハ七
 月廿七日ニ發令セラレタノデアリマス。(a) 七月廿
 六日ニ廿四時間以内ニ北平地區ヨリ其ノ軍隊ヲ撤
 收スルコトヲ要求シタ日本側ノ最後通牒カ甲團側
 ニ手交サレタノデアリマス。(b) 甲團ハ一九三七年
 七月廿七日ノ演說、夏ニ一九三七年九月二日ノ新
 聞ヘノ聲明デ甲團ニ本事態ノ責任ガアルトシ、該
 地ニ於ケル甲團ノ兵力増強、竝ビニ日華間ノ現地
 解決放棄ヲ懸念シタ(c)ノデアアルガ彼ハ日本ノ迅速

RF-58
 堀内ノ言ニ依レバ七月ニ中國ニ對スル事件處理
 條件ノ草案ニ就イテノ首相、外相田海軍相ノ意見
 一致ヲ見一九三七年八月五日外相廣田ノ承認スル
 庭トナツタノテアリマス。是等ノ條件ハ(一)白河ニ
 沿ツテ非武装地帯ヲ設置スルコト及非武装地帯ト
 指定セラレタル地域ヨリ日華兩軍ヲ撤退スルコト(二)
 領土ヲ併合セザルコト、(三)賠償ヲ取ラザルコトヲ
 要求スルモノテアツタト堀内ハ言ツタノテアリマ
 ス。(a)然シ乍ラ其ノ欲ナる類ハ提出サレマセンテ
 シタ。堀内自身此ノ行類ノ提出ガ出来ナカツタガ
 彼ガ言及シタモノト同一條件ガ「對變處理案」ニ
 含まレテキル様ニ思ハレルノテアリマス。ソツテ該
 案ハ一九三七年八月七日首相及外相田海軍相
 承認サレタモノテアリマス。是ハ堀内自身ノ言及
 シタ三條件ヲ含ソテキルガ然カモ其ハ益カニ眞汎
 ノ範圍ニ亙ツテ居リ是等三條件ノ解釋ヲ著シク變
 質スルモノテアリマス。例ハバ、對變處理案ガ主要
 ナル目的テアルトハ言フモノ以下ノ事モ又述ベラ
 レテ居ルノテアリマス。「吾々ハ大規模ニ且ツ長
 期ニ亙ツテ兵ヲ行侵スル決意ヲ爲サネバナラナ
 イ。夫レ故ニ此ノ方面ニ必要ナル手段ヲ取ルコト

a、法廷證三三六〇 法廷記録三三六九三

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約ヲ與ヘルトト言フ事モ含マレテキタノデアリマ
 ス。參謀本部ノ一課長デアリ又 (c) 一九三七年三
 月ヨリ一九三八年二月マテ陸軍中央統帥部ニ在ッ
 テ概略關係事項ニ携ツテキタ河邊ハ此ノ間ノ事狀
 ニ就イテ證言シタガ八月七日ノ此ノ會議ノ事ハ知
 ラナカツト言明シタノデアリマス。(d)

FF-58

- b、 法廷証三七三五 法廷記録三七二一九
- c、 法廷証ニ五八二 法廷記録ニ一九七四
- d、 法廷記録ニ三〇三九

ニ依リ事態ノ如何ナル進展ニモ應ジ得ルヨウニ吾
 々ハ速カニ準備ヲナスベキデアルト。軍事行動
 ガ準備セラレ軍事目的ニ必要ナル資材ノ開發ガ遂
 行セラレルコトトナツテ后々事ハ明瞭ニ示サレテ
 キルノデアリマス。設置サル可キ管ノ非武裝地帯
 ノ非武裝化トハ支那領域デアツタ地域ヨリ支那軍ヲ
 撤退セシメ又其地域ハ中國保安隊ニ依ツテ取り締
 ラレルト云フ範圍ヲ出ザルモノデアリマシタ。而
 シテ該保安隊ノ勢力ハ日本側ニ依ツテ決定サレル
 モノテ、石ハ結局日本カ希望シタ事ヲ總ベテ其ノ
 希望通りニ與ヘタモノデアリマシタ。且ツ又其ノ
 中ニハ日本カ中國カラ待ヤウト常ニ企圖シテキタ
 約束即チ一中^b國ハ滿洲國ニ干渉シナイト云フ黙

HIROTA Summation-FF

ヨリ訓令ガアツダノデアリマス。(c) 船津ノ交渉ノ
 差違トナルベキ要求ノ草案カ八月七日川越大使ニ
 宛テ、訓電サレタノデアリマス。是等ノ條件ハ以
 前ノ現地テノ條件ト異ツテ后リ、(一)河北省ノ大部
 分ト開北ノ六省ヲ非武装地帯ト宣言スル事、(二)括
 括休戦條約廢棄、(三)冀察、竝ビニ京河北行政部ヲ
 解散シ該地區ヲ南京政府ノ直接管理下ニ置ク事、
 (四)日華テ經濟協力ヲハカル事 (b) ヲ要求シタモノ

FF-59 a、法廷證 四八六 法廷記録 五九七五

FF-60 a、法廷證三二七五 法廷記録二九九一七
 b、法廷證三二七五 法廷記録二九九二一

8111 8000 6510
 0159 0008 1118

FF-59 中國ニ於ケル日本ノ侵略ハ防共協定ニ違背スルモノテアリ且ツ中國ヲ露西亞ノ掌中ニ追ヒ込ムモノデアルトノ苦情ヲ言ツテ來タ一九三七年七月二十八日附ノ獨逸外務省ヨリ東京ノ獨逸大使館ニ宛テタル電報ニテ明ラカニサレタル如ク、當時、獨逸テサヘモ日本ノ中國ニ於ケル行動ニ關シテハ日本ヲ非難シタノデアリマス。(2)

FF-60 八月初旬、密使ノ船洋方此ノ事件解決ニ助力セシマシタ。彼ノ使命ハ秘密ニセラルベク此ノ旨廣田

海軍將校ヲ殺害シタ事ニ起因スルモノデアルト堀
 内ハ云ツテキルガ、^(a)武田ノ反對尋問ガ暴露シタ
 ヤウニ該事件ニ關スル日本側ノ所見ガ如何ニ不台
 理デアルカト云フ事ハ個別尋問ニ依ツテ示サレル
 ノデアリマス。^(b)加之、一九三七年八月七日、首
 相、外務、海軍大臣ハ「陸上ニテ軍隊ヲ用ヒル主
 ナル地域ハ河北察哈爾及上海ナルコト」ヲ決定シ
 タノデアリマス。^(c)

FF-61	FF-60
a、	c、
法廷証三三八	法廷証三二七六
b、	d、
法廷証三一六〇	法廷証三二七四
c、	
法廷証三七三五	
法廷記録三三〇五	法廷記録二九九二六
法廷記録二九六九三	法廷記録二九九二五
法廷記録二一五七一三二〇	
法廷記録三七二一九	

HIROTA Summation-FF

デアリマタ。更ニ是等交渉ノ形式ニ關スル訓電
ガ國海外務諸大臣ト協議ノ上八月七日ニ廣田ヨリ
送ラレタノデアリマス。是等訓令ハ支那側ガ休戦
ヲ甲出ル事ノ重要恠ヲ強調シテ后タノデアリマス。
(c) 然シ、岡本ハ交渉ガ行ハレテ后タ上海ニ於ケ
ル八月九日ノ「大山事件」勃發ハ交渉ヲ不調ニオ
トシ入レ遂ニ失敗ニ終ハラシメタノデアルト述ベ
タノデアリマス。(d)

FF-61

一九三七年八月九日、上海事件即チ「大山事件」
ガ起ツタノデアリマス。同事件ハ中國兵ガ日本

0159 0008 1119

PH-61

B 1、d、

法廷証 三七八一 A
法廷証 三〇三
法廷証 三〇三

法廷証 三九七六四一六
法廷証 三九七六八七
法廷証 三〇八七三
法廷証 三〇八六六
法廷証 三〇八〇三
法廷証 三〇八〇三

辯護側証人堀内ハ尋問セラレタ時ニ彼ガ事件ニ關シ證言シ、且ツ報告及調査ガ外務省ニ提出サレヌ。廣田自身出來待ル限リ現地解決ヲモクラスベク務カシムト述べタニモ拘ハラヌ勅員令ヲ差シ控エル事ヲ決定セル一九三七年八月十二日ノ閣議ニツイテハ何モ知ラナイト主張シタノデアリマス。(d)而シ原田ハ一九三七年八月十三日ニ石ノ閣議ニ言及シ廣田ガ「モシ我々が勅員令ガ發令サレル事ヲ發表スルナラバ事態ガ面倒ニナルカラ昨日ノ閣議ヲ勅員令ハ發令スルガ發表ハシナイト云フ事ヲ決定シタ」ト云ツタ事ヲ引用シテ盾ルンデアリマス。廣田ハ一九三七年九月二日ノ演說ニ於テ中國ニ、二名ノ日本人永兵殺害實ニ中國ノ休戰協定(一九三二)違反ノ事實ヲ歸シテ中國ニ事變ノ責任ガアルト述べタノデアリマス。(e)實ニ又一九三七年九月五日、廣田ハ、八月九日ノ日本ノ上海攻撃ヲ中國側ニ其ノ責任ヲ負ハセルコトニ依リテ正當化セント企圖シタノデアリマス。(g)然シ最初ノ事件ノ勃發後四十八時間足ラスノ中ニ日本ハ上海ニ約三十

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PF-61

i h
、 、

法廷証

丑八

法廷証
二九七六四

法廷証
三三〇五

隻ノ戦艦ヲ集結シ同地ノ軍隊ヲ数千増加シタノテ
アリマス。(h)ソシテ、廣田自身、上海ノ日本海軍
艦隊ノ増強並ビニ同地ニ戦艦ヲ派遣スル事ヲ承
認シタノデアリマス。(i)

0159 0008 1121

HIROTA Summation-FF

歸ヨリ待期ノ状態ニ置クコトヲ決定シタノデア
リマス。(c) 境内ハ何カ右ノ類キ事項ガ決定セラ
レタト謂フコトヲ認メタノデアリマス。(b)

FF-64

一九三七年七月廿二日ノ「グルー」ノ廣田ニ
對スル調停申出ヲ廣田ハ未ダ拒ホ現地解決ヲ期
待シテキルト答ヘテ拒絶シタノデアリマス。(c)
一九三七年八月六日、英内政府ハ再度合衆國ニ

FF-62

a、法廷証 三二六〇 法廷記録 二六六九四

FF-63

a、法廷証 三七八二A 法廷記録 三二六八九
b、法廷証 二九七六六

FF-64

a、法廷証 三二六〇 法廷記録 二六六九二

0159 0000 1122 8000 6510

FF-62

ソコデ、滿洲、北平其ノ他ノ地ニ有田ガ派遣
 セラレタノデアリマス。彼ハ又上海デハ中國例ト非
 公式合談ヲスルコトニナツテキダノデアリマス
 ガ、此ノ合談ハ彼ノ上海訪問ニモ拘ハラズ情勢
 好轉セザリシ事實ノ故ニ具體化シナカツタノデ
 アリマス。(2)

FF-63

此等ノ動停運動ガ進行中デアツタ等ノ時ニ、
 東京ニアル當局主腦部デハ動員政策ガ採ラレテ
 居タノデアリマス。例ヲ以テグレバ、一九三七年
 九月廿四日、内閣ハ四箇師団ノ動員ト他ノ四箇

英國大使ニ表示シタ日本ノ要求ニ就イテノ廣田
 個人ノ考ヘト云フノハ、一天津及ビ北平ノ稍南
 方ニ一線ヲ劃シテ非武裝地帯ヲ設置シ、該地ニ
 中國及ビ日本ノ軍隊ヲ駐屯セシムルコト、(一)滿
 洲國ヲ承認スル事、(二)滿日通關ノ中止、(三)共產
 主義ニ對スル防衛、(四)華北ニ於ケル外交的權益
 均等。デアリマシタ。(註) 如内ハコレガ要求ノ大

FR-64	b、	法廷証	三二七九	法廷記録	二九九三四
	c、	法廷証	九三〇	法廷記録	九四三三
	d、	法廷証	三七八三	法廷記録	三七六九二

H_IROTA Summation-FF

對シ、日本及中國ノ兩國ニ英米ノ調停ノ申出ヲ
爲スコトヲ提議シ且ツ、斯クノ如キ申出ニ對シ
多分日本が見セルデアラウ反應ニ付テ「ドツド」
及ビ「グルー」ノ意見ヲ求メテ來タノデアリマ
ス。(b) 依ツテ一九三七年八月十日、「グルー」
ハ外務大臣廣田ニ對シ現情勢ニ於テ彼ニ援助セ
ン事ヲ申出デ、右ハ誤解ナル調停ノ申出デア
ルト提議スル制限ヲ有スルモノデアルト述ベタ
デアリマス。彼ハ交渉ヲ行フ爲日華兩國ノ全權
委員ノ會議開催ヲ斡旋シヤウト提議シタノデア
リマス。(c) 原田ニ依ルト九月二十六日廣田ガ

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HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-64

f o

法務省

第二課

法務部

第二課

法務部

第二課

0159 00008 1124 4211 8000 6510

要テアルト云フ事ニハ大體完成シタノデアルガ、
 廣田ガ滿洲國ヲ承認サセヤウト永年ニ頁ツテ中
 國以府ヲ説キツケテキタコトハ認めツツモ、滿
 洲國ヲ承認サセル爲日本方軍事の勝利ヲ利用シ
 タト云フ事ハ承認シナカツダノデアリマス。(1)
 然シ場内ハ交渉取ハ八月計畫ノ基礎條件が失敗
 シタ場合ニハ第三國ノ仲介ヲ要請スルトノ決議
 ヲ首相、外相及ビ海相ガ爲シタト被ヘタノデ
 ハアルガ日本ハ英米ノ調停ノ同意ヲ追求スル何
 等ノ手段ヲモ購ジナカツダノデアリマス。(2)

部河北政權ノ廢止、日華間ノ防共協定ノ締結並ビニ
排日主義ノ抑壓ノ線ニ沿ヒテ行ハル、等ニナツタノ
デアリマス。(a)

FF-65

a、法廷証 三二六二 法廷記録 二九七七一

FF-65

一九三七年十月一日「支那暴漢處理要綱」が作
 製サレ首相、陸相、海相、外相（廣田）ニヨリ署名
 サレタノデアリマス。外交政策ノ目的ハ中國ヲ日本
 ノ希望スル地位ニオキ中國ヲシテ反日親共ノ傾向ヲ
 拋棄セシムルニアルト記サレテアリマス。日本ハ全
 國的ナ動員ニヨリ軍事的ニ暴漢ノ如何ナル變化ニモ
 應ズベク準備スル事ニナツタノデアリマス。北支、
 中支、南支ノ各領域ノ行政ニ關スル計畫ガ作成サレ
 暴漢處理ノ條件ハ決定サレタノデアリマス。休戦ト
 同時或ハソノ後ニ日華關係ノ調整ニ關スル交渉ガ行
 ハルベク該交渉ハ中國ノ海濱國承認委員會及東

HIROTA Summation--FF

FF-66

ハネバナラヌカモシレヌガ其ノ當時ハマダ日英戦争
 ニハ時期尙早テアルト云フ事ヲ述ベク會話ノ終リヲ
 思ヒ出スコトガ出来ナカツタノデアリマス。(c)
 廣田ハ英國或ヒハ米國ガ此ノ紛争ノ仲裁ヲスル事ヲ
 非常ニ熱心ニ望ンテ居ルト思ハレテ居タガソレニモ
 拘ハラズ、英米仲裁ノ申出ハ一顧サレテシマツタノ
 デアリマス。猶内ノ言ニ依レバ、之ハ軍ノ反對ニ依

a、

法廷記

二九七四一

b、

〃

二九七九三

c、

法廷證

三七八四A

〃

三七六九五

0159 0000 6510

十月二十七日ニ廣田ハ再ビ「クレイギー」ト會見シタノデアリマス。『クレイギー』ハ支那海軍部長ヲ援助スベク彼ノ出來ル限リヲ盡サンコトヲ申出デ之ニ對シ賣田ハ英國ノ援助ヲ得ルコトハ彼ノ望ム所デアルト答ヘタノデアリマス。此ノ「サグリ」ニ基イテ廣田ハ可能性アル和平條件ヲ「クレイギー」ト建議シタノデアリマス。(a) 堀内ハ當時日本ニハ強力ナ反英運動ガアツタコト及ビ廣田ガ一九三七年十一月一日ニ、英國ハ此ノ等ノ最モ適當ナ仲裁者デアルト云フ見地カラ斯カル運動ハ日本ニ取ツテ厄介ナ因ツタコトデアルト述ベタト云フコトヲ認メタノデアリマス。(b) 然シ彼ハ、廣田ガ日本ハ結局ハ英國ト戰

FF-67

a、	法廷證	二二三五	法廷記録	一六〇六九
b、				二九、七九六
c	公廷證	三七八三	A	三七、六九七
d、				二九、七九八

FF-66

a、公廷證 二二六〇 法廷記録 二九、七〇〇

極ク最近本問題ニ關スル「クレイギー」トノ會談ニ
 於テ後者ニ獨逸或ヒハ伊太利ガ仲介者ノ勞ヲ取ルコ
 トハ全然何ノ役ニモ立たヌト確言シタト記録シテキ
 ルノデアリマス。(c) 須向ハ日本ガ獨逸共同仲介ヲ囑
 進シテキタコトヲ説明セント試ミタシ(d) ノデアアル

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-67

ルモノデ改修ニ獨逸ガ仲誠者トシテ選バレタノハ廣
田ノ希望ニ反スルモノデアリマシタ。(d)

見ラレル如ク、日本ハ實際ニハ英國ノ仲介ヲ望ン
デハ唇ナカツタノデアリマス。支那事變ニ關スル政
策ヲ批判セル一九三八年八月二十五日二十九日ノ
佐藤ノ演説ハ英國ヲ蔭介石ノ支持者デアルト非難シ
中國ニ對スル英國ノ經濟援助除去ヲ要求シタノデア
リマシタ。(a) 又コノ仲介問題ニツキ廣田ガ「グレイ
ギール」ト會談シテキル丁巳其ノ頃日本ハ既に一九三
七年十月二十六日或ヒハ其ノ前後ニ獨逸ニ對シ紛争
ノ仲介ヲシテ呉レルコトヲ要請シテキタノデアリマ
ス。(b) 一九三七年十一月五日ニ至リ原田ハ廣田ガ

0159 0008 1127

FF-68 FF-67

南京政府ハ余儀ナク和ヲ乞フデアラウト述ベテアリ
マシタ。更ニ又、英米ガ中国ヲ交渉ニ引込ム事ハ英
米ニトツテモ都合ノ好イ手段デアリ尙一方、英伊ガ
中国側要求ニ依リテ仲介ノ勞ヲ取ルコトハ更ニ好都合
ノコトダト述ベテキルノデアリマス。意味ノ印象
ヲ與ヘヌタメ諒解ニ爾スルカケ引キガ一段ニヒロマ
ラヌ様注意ガ拂ハレル筈デアツタノデアリマス。(a)

e、 法廷證 四八六一B 法廷記録 五九八三

a、 法廷證 三二六八 法廷記録 三七二四三

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0159 0008

ガ原田ハ其ノヤウナ提議ニ就イテハ何モ言ツテ居ナ
 イノデアリマス。廣田ガ英日大使ニ英日ガ海上ノ仲
 介者デアルトノ印象ヲ與ヘンコトヲ望ンデ居タ事ハ
 明白デアリマスガシカシ彼ハ實際ニハ英日ノ仲介ヲ
 用ヒル意圖ハナク且ツ彼ガ「クレイギー」ト表面ヲ
 伴ツテ會談シテキタ時既に「ドイツ」ノ仲介ニ同意
 シテキタデアリマス。一九三七年十一月三日ニ、
 獨逸ノ仲介ニ依リテ或ル和平條件ガ日本カラ中國國
 民政府ニ提議セラレタデアリマス。(6)

FF-68

一九三七年十月二十二日ノ陸軍及外務省ノ決定
 ニハ軍事目的ガ事實上得ラレタ時、コノ抑圧ノ下ニ

「日本ハ中國ノ領土ヲ一尺タリトモ保持シナイ」ト
述ベタノデアリマス。(c)

FF-68

c、 b、

法廷証

三二八四

法廷証

二九、九二七

法廷証

二九、七八六一九三

HIROTA Summation-FF

辯護側証人辯内ハコノ會合ニ關シテ何モ知ラナカツ
タト申立テ、日本ガ中國ニ於テ其ノ目的ヲ達シタ後
ニ和平工作ガ爲サレル筈デアツタトイフコトヲ否定
シタノデアリマス。彼ハ該地ニ於ケル軍事工作ハ偏
ヘニ日本ノ權益保護ニ限ラレテキタト斯、ル保護ガ
中國ノ大部分ヲ占領スル等ヲ必要トシタ様ナ事實ニ
モ拘ラズ、強ク主張シタノデアリマス。(b) 一九三
七年十一月十六日、獨逸ガ既ニ干與シ始メテカラ、
廣田ハ「グルー」トノ會談ニ於テ、合衆國ハ蔭介石
ヲ和平交渉ヲ行フヤウニ説伏スルコトニヨツテ援助
出來ルト述べ、且ツ講和ハ「道理ニ違フモノデアリ

0159 0008 1129

FF-70

a 法廷証 四八六一B

法廷証 五九八E

FF-69

f 法廷証 三二六〇
g 法廷証 三七八一A

法廷証 二九七〇ニ
法廷証 三七七〇九

FF-70 十二月廿日及廿七日、日本ハ獨逸ノ仲介ヲ以テ「
 基本條件」ナルモノ節チ、上述ノ條件ヲ、狀況ノ變
 化ニヨリ新條件ガ日本ニヨリ提出サレタトノ説明行
 キニテ發シタノデシタ。(a)

(二) 非武装地帯ヲ設置スルコト
 ナル賠償アルベキコト
 (四) 日華間ニ緊密ナ經濟關係
 ガ結バルベキコトデアリマシタ。之等ハ自然八月ノ
 條件ヨリモ取詰ナモノデアアル。(f)ト埒内ハ述べタノ
 デアリマス。原田ニ依レバ出來ルダケ早く戦争ヲ停
 止スルコトヲ欲シテキタ參謀本部ノ願ニ依リ内閣ニ
 提議サレタ最初ノ條件ハ具體的性質ノモノデアツタ
 ガ木戸ノ主張ニヨリ内閣ハソレヲ上流ノ四個條ノ
 國家的條件ニ變ヘタノデアリマシタ。原田ハ新中國
 政府領土ニ山東ヲ包含スルコトヲ主張シタノデアリ
 マシタ。(g)

HIROTA Summation--FF

FF-72

一九三八年一月五日、「デイルクセン」大使ハ、
獨逸外務省ニ、日本ハ、新舉執行幼計畫中ノ故ヲ以
テ、提案ニ關スル中國側ヨリ速方ナル回答ヲ切望シ
テキルト報告シテキマス。(a)

FF-71

a 法廷証三二六三
法廷記録二六八七五

FF-72

a 法廷証 一八六一D
法廷記録 五九九四

2611 8000 6510
0 159 0000 1132

FF-71

一九三七年十二月二十四日、閣議ハ「中口事變方
 策安」ヲ決定シマシタ。依等ガ、時局拾收ノ爲、
 國民政府ト交渉ヲ開始シタバカリデアルノニ、同決
 定中ニハ「我々ハ必ラズシモ、南京政府トノ交渉安
 定ヲ期行スルモノデハナイガ、加價ニ時局拾收ニ劣
 ムル一方、我々ハ軍事行動ノ進歩ニツレ、南京政府
 ノ近期反抗ニ對抗スルタメ、華北及ヒ燕中地域ニ於
 テ、左記政策ニヨル措置ヲトル」ト述ベラレテキマ
 ス。

(a)

FR-74 FR-73

軍事變ノ解決ヲ謀スル爲、閣議ガ開催セラレマシタ
 コノ閣議ニ於テ、參謀本部ハソノ和平條件ヲ侵略的
 ニ迫ギルモノト考ヘ、又新クテハ將來ノ外交關係ヲ
 害スル懸レアリト慮ジ、ソコデ餘リニモ侵略的トナ
 ル傾キアル自内傾向ノ調整ヲ策定スルタメ陛下御臨
 席ノ會議ヲ主張シタト云フコトガ明カニサレタノデ
 アリマス。外務省及ビ海軍ハコノ意見ヲ賞揚シ、如

a、法廷記 一八六一 F 法廷記録 五九九三

a、法廷記 四八六—D 法廷記録 五九九一

HIROTA Summation—FPF

FPF-75 一九三八年一月十日、御前會議ノ準備トシテ、中
マス。(a)

FPF-74 一九三八年一月十日附ノ電報ノ中ニ「フオン」ノ
イラートハ、東郷ガ、日本ハ中日トノ和平ヲ希望
スルモノナルモ、日本ハ最後迄戦等ヲ續行スル、而
シテ坂斗ガ長引ケバ長引ク懸念條件ハ益々困難トナ
ルデアラウト説明シタコトヲ記録シテ居ルノデアリ
マス。(a)

FPF-75 一九三八年一月十日「デイルクセン」大使ハ、野
廣ヲ遠外務大臣ニ打電シ、廣田ハ此モ遠カナル中日
間ノ回答ヲ主張シ、軍部ハ迅速且明快ナル回答ヲ要
求シテキタ旨ヲ述ベタノデアリマス。(a)

HIROTA Summation-FF

日本ハ之等提携関係中、滿洲國ノ承認及ビ排日、排
滿傾向ノ自制ヲ要求セシノミナラズ、華北ニ日滿
共榮實現ノ爲ノ組織ノ設置及ビ内蒙古ニ反共自治政
府ノ設立並ニ天然資源ノ開發及ビ中國ヨリ攻立ツベ
キ賠償ニ關スル協定ノ締結ヲ要求致シタノデアリマ
ス。(a)

FF-75

a、法廷証

二二六四

法廷記録

二六八三

FF-76

a、法廷証

二二六四

法廷記録

二六八三

REF ID: A6510

上ノ精神ヲ生カス爲、陛下御臨席下ニ右提案ノ會議ヲ開催スルコトハ良イ事デアラウト云フコトニ一致シタノデアリマス。(a)

然ルニ一九三八年一月十一日、廣田ハ對中國國策決定ノ目的ヲ以テ、御前會議ニ出席シテキマス。右會議ニ於テ、日本ノ主長政策ハ日滿華「プロツク」ノ確立ニ在リト述べラレテキマス。中國國民政府ト交渉ハ、例ヘカ、ル場合ニ適用シ得ルモノトシテ提案セラレタル條件ガ苛酷ニ過キ協定妥結ノ希望ハ畢竟不可能ナリトモ、若シ中國ニシテ、誠實ニ和陸ヲ求ムルニ於テハ、阻マレナカツタ事ナノデシタ。

FP-77

b e
、 、
" 法廷記

一 一
八 八
六 六
一 一
B D

" 法廷記

五 五
九 九
八 八
二 九

0159 0008 1135

HIROTA Summation-PP

PP-77

一九三八年一月十一日付「トウラウトマン」大坂
 發電ニ見ラルル通り、菊道人デスラ交渉ニ於ケル日
 本ノ真意ヲ疑ツテホタノデシタ。本電中、彼ハ一日
 本側ハ我々ヲ迫シテ送ツタ彼等ノ聲目ヲ又モ變更シ
 テ居ル様ニ思ハレル。。。。。如新變更サレ
 タ聲目ノ傳達ハ、當地デハ、日本側ガ我々ニシカケ
 テキル「卓劣ナル奸策」ト看做サレル。ト云ツテ
 居マス。(c) 一九三八年一月十三日、「トウラウトマ
 ン」ハ菊遠外務大臣ニ中「政府ハ日本ニ對シ、變更
 サレタル條件ハ範圍ガ廣汎ニ過ギルト述ベタル上、
 新提案ノ性質内容ノ通知方ヲ要求スル旨回答セリト
 打電シタノデアリマス。(b)

リ極メテ渾然タル形ヲ示レタト感合シタト報告
シテキルノデアリマス。(c) 知事 河邊モ又
十二月二十一日ノ閣議ニテ一致セル實際ノ條件ハ
抽象的且秘メテ曖昧ナ表現ニナツテキルガ、参謀
本部ハ以前ヨリ、モツト明瞭ナ條件ヲ唱道シ、中

a、法廷証 三二六〇 法廷記録 二六七〇三

b、法廷証 二六八一〇 法廷記録 二六八一〇

c、法廷証 五九八六 法廷記録 五九八六

9611 8000 6510

堀之内ハ、ロ本政府ハ匹碁本原ルト共ニ詳細ナル説明ヲ提出シテキタノデアルカラ之ヲ故意ニ解決ヲ延延セシムル策略デアルト考ヘテ憤慨シタト述ベテキマス。(a)堀之内ハ、コレラノ賠償金等ヲ含ム詳細ハ勿延大佐ヲ通ジテ提出サレタト述ベテ居リマス。(b)一九三八年一月十四日、「デイルクセン」ハ勿延外務大臣ニ對シ、長田ガ「無意味ナ中國ノ宣言」ニ大イニ憤慨シテキルト語ツタ旨打電セルニモ拘ラズ、勿延大佐ハ彼ガ長田ニ、中國政府ハ只、四碁本條件ノミヲ知り、ソレ以外ノ外務省ヨリ中國政府ヘノ通告ハ長田ノ希望ニヨ

P-59
F-119
FF-79
a

F-119
FF-78
f e d

FF-79

河遊ハ、中國政府ガ一月十五日ニ加詳細ナル和
平條件ヲ妥請シ、中國ハ同意セシカ爲メ斯クスル
モノデハナイト云フコトヲ日本政府ニ保證シタコ
トニ付テハ尙モ承知シテギナイ旨ヲ以テシテキマ
ス。(a)「トラウトマン」ハ一九三八年一月十五

法廷記録 二二〇四六・一五〇

法廷記録 二六八〇三

法廷記録 三七八九一
法廷記録 三七七一八

法廷記録 二二〇六〇

國トノ和解ヲ無望シテキタト証言シテキマス。(d)
 シカモ証人堀之内ハ、彼ノ証言ガ結果的ニ此ノ和
 平提案ニ專ラナリシニモカ、ハラズ、コレラノ交
 渉ガ閣議ニ提出サレタルヤヲ思出シ得ヌノミナラ
 ズ、參謀本部方專變ノ速カナル解決ヲ唱道セルコ
 トモ思出シ得ナカツタノデアリマス。(e) 更ニ、
 コノ明ラカナル偽リハ、一月十五日ノ原田ノ記録
 ニヨリ明ラカニサレテキマス。同記録ニ於テ彼ハ
 中國側ハ、具体的提案ヲ承知シテ居リ虚勢ヲ張ツ
 テヲル、ソレ故、長期戦ノ選擇案ニ着手スルノカ
 ハナイト云フ外相(原田)ノ言ヲ擧ゲテキマス。(f)

0159 0008 1137

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-80 FF-79

記ヨリシテ之ヲ親ヒ得マス。同日記中ニ近衛ハ「南
京ガ陥落スレバ加介石政府ハ崩壊ニ似シ、近衛ハ
皇政府ノ承認ヲ取消ス皇明ヲ復スル秘リデアアル」
ト述ベテ平マス。(b) 廣田ハ一月十七日原田ニ電
話シ「中山政府カ(日本政府ニヨリ決定サレタ)

b、	a、	b、	
法廷證	法廷証	法廷証	法廷証
三七八七	三二六〇	三七三六	三二〇六
法廷記録	法廷記録	法廷記録	法廷記録
三七七〇二	二六七〇四	三七二六四	二六〇六〇

0159 0000 1138 8000 6510

上F-80

日ニ、其ノ管取テ、孔ノ KUNG 管取ノガ和平ヲ希
望スル中國ノ誠實ナル希望ト基礎條件ノ性質並ニ
内容ヲ知り度キ切ナル希望トヲ廣田外相ニ送ル
公文ノ發送方ヲ要請セリト述ベテ居リマス。(b)

尙詳細ナル説明ニ對スル中國ノ懇請ニ應ゼント
スル所ナク、日本ノ閣議ハ一月十五日、此ノ回答
ヲ討論スル爲會合シ、次イテ中國ノ回答ハ誠意ヲ
缺キタルモノナリトノ概擧ニヨリ「國民政府ヲ相
手トセズ」トイフ決定ガナサレタノデアリマス。(a)
此ノ説明ガ實際一ヶ月以上モ前ヨリ考ヘラレテキ
タトイフコトハ一九三七年十二月十一日ノ原田日

ソレヲ確乎タル (f) 収録トシテ又創始的ナ聲明ナリト
 云ツテキマス。

一九三八年一月十六日、日本国外務大臣ハ、獨逸大使ニ、日華間交渉決裂ニ關スル日本側聲明ヲ

c、	法廷証	二七八九一A	法廷記録	三七七一八
d、	法廷証	二六八	法廷記録	三五六三
e、	法廷証	二二六〇	法廷記録	二九七〇五
f、	法廷証	二二六〇	法廷記録	一六二二三

HIROTA Summation—FF

提案ヲ受諾シテカッタノデ陛下御臨席ノ下ニ既カ
レタ會議ハ選舉案着手ノ決定ニ達シタト述べテハ
キマスガ彼ハ前日ノ政會議ニ於テ、彼ハ御前會議
決定ノ聲明中ニハナイ、アノ決定 (c) ヲ自ラ唱へ
タノデアリマス。コノ決定ノ聲明ハ一九三八年一
月十六日ニ發セラレ、^(a)「帝國政府ハ爾今國民政府
ニ意ヲ用キズ又吾カ帝國トノ提携ニ他スル新中國
政府ノ樹立及ビ發展ヲ期スル。」^(b)ノ原文不詳ノ
ト宣言シタノデアリマス。堀之内ハ右聲明ハ國民
黨政府ト今後更ニ交渉スル餘地ヲ強ス様ニ述べラ
レテキルト主張シタノデアリマスカ、^(e) 此ヲ其
ノ原文ヨリ整理スルコトハ出來マセン、又木戸ハ

0159 0008 1139

a、	法廷証	四八六一B	法廷記録	三九九七
b、	法廷証	四八六一G	法廷記録	五九九九
c、	法廷証	三七三七一A	法廷記録	三七二八五

0411 8000 6510

漢口へノ傳書ヲ爲、手交シタノデアリマス。(a)

一九三八年一月十七日ノ日通大至宛ノ電報中デ

「テイルクセン」ハ交渉決裂ニ際スル日本ノ行動

ヲ非トシ、日本ハ斯カル行動ニ對シ世界ニ責任ヲ

負フベキモノデアルトシタノデアリマス。(b) 原

田自身、一九三八年二月十六日、第七十三議會演

說中ニ石交渉ヲ同極シ、日云ハ石ト妥協セン

トシタコトハナク、石介石ガ日云ノ條件ヲ受理ス

ル場合ニノミ直接交渉ニ入ルモノデアリ、又日云

ハ中國ノ態度ヲ變ヘサセル(c) 爲中ニ肩懸ノ政變ヲ取

ツタト述ベテ居リマス。(c)

ハ主トシテ河北、山東、山西及び察哈爾省ノ一部テアリマシタ。經濟政策ニ關シテハ、其ノ目的トスル所ハ日滿經濟ノ綜合關係ノ強化及ビ以テ義ノ日滿國防ニ必要ナル物資ノ生産増加ニアリマシタ。(b) 一九三七年十二月南京陷落後、中國ニ新以獨立ノ運動カ行ハレマシタ。十二月五

附-82

- a、法廷証 九七二 G 法廷証 九五二一
- b、法廷証 三二六三 法廷証 二九八一三

FF-82

廣田ハ、一九三八年一月二十二日ノ演説ニ於
 テ、交渉失敗ヲ、中國側ニ其ノ責任ヲ負ハセ且
 ツ日本ハ華北ヲ中國ノ他ノ部分ヨリ分離セシメ
 ントスル意向ナキコトヲ主張シテ、之ヲ公然言
 ヒ紛ラサントシタノデアリマス。^(c)ソレニモ拘
 ハラズ、區カーケ月以前、一九三七^(b)年十二月廿
 四日ニハ、廣田ハ、交渉不調ノ場合華北中央地
 域ニトル爲メ決定セル政策ノ一管見者デアツタノ
 デアリマス。此ノ中ニハ、華北ニ於ケルハ勿論
 華中並南ニ於テモ、一統ノ信賴ヲ勝ち得ル新華
 北政權ヲ獨立スルコトガ所望ナル旨ヲ述べテキル
 ノデアリマス。新華北政權ニ包含サルべき地以

0159 0008 141

HIROTA Summation-FF

ノ明ラカニ意義ナキ原田ノ宣言後僅カ爾三ヶ月
ニシテ設立サレタメノデアリマス。(c)

FF-83

一九三八年一月二十七日、軍中行政指導部
決定サレ、其ノ要旨ハ、日本ニ依存スル高慶ノ
親日改組ノ自立デアリマシタ。(c)

FF-82

c、法廷証 四六三 法廷記録 三二九六

FF-83

a、法廷証 四六三 法廷記録 三三一—一—三

2411 8000 6510
0159 0008 1142

日ニハ、上海ニ「シヤンハイロタオ」市政府
ガ組織サレ、南京治安維持會及ビ杭州治安維持
會ガ一九三八年一月一日ニ設立セラレマシタ。
復興政府自體モ正式ニ一九三八年三月廿八日ニ
樹立セラレルコトニナツテ居リ、ソノ結果トシ
テ、最多ノ地方政權モ其ノ支配下ニ創設サレン
トシテキタノデアリマス。斯クテ江蘇省、浙江
省、及ビ安徽省ニ於ケル地方政權並ニ南京ニ於
ケル市公署ガ、ソレゾレ、一九三八年五月二十
三日、六月二十日、七月廿三日及ビ四月廿四日
ニ實現サレタノデアリマス。上海ノ商公署ハ一
九三八年四月廿八日ニ設立セラレ、何レモ皆コ

期抵抗ニ應ジテ凡ユル指區方毎セラレルノミナ
ラズ又其上ニ急送ナル海外運出ガ計ニサレ、國
民ノ完全軍備ガ維持ニサレルコトニナツテキル
ト違ヘテキマス。(b)

RR-85

國氏黨以信ノ迅速ナル分限ヲ招來セントスル
日本ノ企圖ハ、軍部行動ニ急急セルノミナラズ、

RR-84

a、法廷誌 四八六一 I 法廷誌 六〇七六
b、法廷誌 三二七〇 法廷誌 三六二四八

FF-84

日本ハ、村介石トノ平和的ニ解決スルト言フ
考ヲ抛棄シマシタノテ、今ヤ長期戦ノ準備ニ果
出シタノデアリマス。ソレハ一九三八年一月二
十八日ノ東郷ノ「フオン・ノイラス」トノ合
見ニ依ツテ證明サレテ居ル通りデアリマス。右
合見ニ於テ、東郷ハ、日本以府ニ代リ、獨逸ト
ノ貿易増進及ヒ日本ガ獨逸ニ對シ長期「クレデ
ット」ヲ希望シテキルコト等ニ固シ摺合シタノ
デアリマス。^(a) 又、一九三八年一月二十一日廣
田ニ與ヘタ宛書ノ中ニ、近衛ハ總動員ハ國防ノ
必要ニ順應シテ完成サレ、又一般準備ニ對スル
計畫ガナサレルト述ベテキマス。尙、中國ノ長

0759 0008. 143

HIROTA Summation--FF

FF

0159 0008 1144

宣傳ノ如キ一層陰險ナル方法ノ使用ヲモ包含シ
 タノデアリマス。一九三八年二月八日、廣田ハ
 香港、上海、北平ノ外交官ニ打電シ、外務省ハ敵
 軍部内ニ分裂ヲ惹起セシメ民心ヲ離反セシメン
 ガ爲、諸報ノ宣傳ピラ及ビパンフレットヲ作製
 シツツアルコトヲ報ジルノデアリマス。次デ彼
 ハ特定地域ニ應ジテ採ラルベキ方策ヲ指示シタ
 ノデアリマス。(2)

HH-87		HH-86	
b	a	b	a
"	"	"	"
三三三	一七一	一一二	三三六
三三三	三三九	二二七	三三六
"	"	"	"
九一八	二六六	二六八	二六八
九二〇	二六六	二六八	二六八

益ヲ求ムルモノニ非スト。言フテキマスノニ、(a)
 一九三四年四月十七日日本外務省ハ、甲口ヲシテ
 第三ノ利益誘導ニ、日本ノ強固スル所ニ從ハシ
 メントスル日本ノ目的ヲ以テカニセル利益ヲ得シ
 タノテアリマス。(b) 商人乗船ハ、右海關ガ日本
 ノ領ノ政策テアツタコトヲ否定シマシタ。彼ハ、

0159 0008 1445

HIROTA Summation-FIT

七、適合案に及不利は、此際並に後記取等並に

FF-86

以田ノ外務大臣任命直後、彼ハ一九三三年九月
 十八日ダフルト大臣ニ、彼ノ以田ノ任命ハ日米間ノ
 親善關係促進ヲアルト語ツルヲテアリマス。(a)
 一九三四年一月二十三日等ビ、以田ハ、第六十五
 議會ニ於テ演説ヲナシ、ソノ中テ彼ハ、諸列強等
 ニ起ルセル過去ノ諸支障ニモ拘ラズ、合家(日本)
 間ノ親交ニ望スル希望ヲ表明シテ平マス。(b)

FF-87

之等ノ聲明ハ爾後ノ實際以東京ニヨリ反取サレル
 モノテス。尚ヘバ、一九三三年二月二十一日廣田
 ハ再ビ「ハル」ニ、日本ハ甲ニ於テ何等特殊利益

HIROTA Summation-FF

原田及び重光ハ大シクモテナイト云ツテキルガ、
天初ハ「或細テ私分不注意ダ」ト述ベテキマス。
(e) コノ事ヨリシテ、天初ガ志カツタ唯一ノ疑ハ
原田ノ公ノ証明トハ著シク美ル日本ノ真ノ改竄ヲ

FF-87

- c、 法廷証 三二四一 法廷記録 二六四八六
- d、 " " 二九五二八
- e、 法廷証 三七七六一 A 法廷記録 三七六六〇

0159 0000 1146 6510

天羽が原田ノ了解ナクシテ石井明ヲ推シタノテア
 リ、又ソレハ日露協定ノ委員「モネツト」ノ態度
 ニ似シ日本側ガ申口ニ違ツタ也(報訓令ノ補遺組工
 ノ結果テアルト云ツテキマス。(c) 然ルニ、反對
 尋問ニ於テ此ノ説明ノ眞實性之シキコトガ示サレ
 テキマス。何故ナレバ、彼ハ「モネツト」ニ對ス
 ル日本ノ聲明ノ眞實アリシコトヲ信イテ主張シタ
 ノテスガ、彼ハ實際聲明ノ效力ヲ否定シタノテマ
 リマス。(d) 又原田ハ、一九三四年四月十七日、
 其ノ日記中テ、天羽聲明ヲ記シ、天羽ニ對スル自
 分一顧トシテノ好意ヲ記シテハキマスガ、彼ハ、

PM-67

h、	g、	f、
法廷證	法廷證	法廷證
九三七	九三六	三二四五
〃	法廷証錄	法廷証錄
九三九五	九三九三	二六五八二

0159 0008 1147

HIROTA Summation-PPF

公ニシテトテアツタコトガハツキリスル後ニ思
 ハレマス。此ノ聲明ニ關スル各定^(f)ヤ遺憾ノ意ハ正
 ニ外務省ニヨリ發セラレマス。田^(f)田ハ、野
 坂合衆國ニ對シ、日本ハ他國トノ通商ニ於テ支障
 ヲ生ゼシメントスルモノテモナク、^(g)日本ノ純
 粋ノ目的ハ東洋ノ宗主權ヲモナイコト、又日本ハ
 コノ締ニ關シ如何ナル條約ヲモ締結スルハ廢止スル
 意圖ヲ有スルモノニ非ルコトヲ斷言シタルテアリ
 マス。^(h)

HIROTA Summation-FF

石油工業並ニ「直接」同族ニ帝口ノ特別保護、時
 管下ニアル「特殊」社ノ下ニアル其ノ他ノ「三工
 業」指導方針ヲ定ムルモノテアリマス。斯クノ如
 ク、日本ハコノ獨占區ニ爲何等ノ指導ヲモ索マ
 ナカツタノテアリマス。ソコテ、一九三五年四月
 十六日、グルー「大坂」口頭ニ以テ、右「日」日本
 ノ「領」タル「役」制ニ就キ「注意」以テシ、右行動ハ合

FF-88

a、	三三三	九六五	法廷記録	九四八一
b、	〃	九三九	〃	九四〇六
c、	〃	二三六	〃	二九三九

0159 0000 1148 8411 8000 6510

ソレニモツハラズ、日本ノ「内戸開放」政策無視
ハ能クシタノテ、一九三四年八月三十一日「グルー」

ハ、滿洲ニ於ケル石油ノ獨占ニ就キ廣田ノ注意ヲ

喚起シ、是等ノ獨占計畫ハ日本ノ指導下ニ既定サ

レテ居リ、從ツテ合衆國ハコノ同意ニ關シ日本ニ

交渉スルモノテアルコトヲ主張シタノデアリマス

(a) 廣田ハ、一九三四年十一月三十日ノ回答中、

滿洲ニ於ケル石油工業ノ管理ハ日本ノ所知スル處

ニアラザル旨ヲ述べタノデアリマス。(b) コノ聲

明ハ、廣田ガ關係シタ先ノ三月二十日ノ閣議決定

ヨリシテ分曉スル通り、眞實テナカツタノデアリ

マス。(c) 同決定ハ滿洲國ノ經濟發展、分ケテモ

HIROTA Summation-PP

PP-89

其ノ真説テ、日本、合衆ニ及ビ英日同ニ存スル
充分ナル了解ヲ得テアリマス。彼ハ、彼
等ノ政策相違ナルモノハ、善悪ノ育成及ビ、相互
ノ利益無キ兄弟ノ想ヲ有テアルト述ベテキマス。(a)

衆國ノ共ニ一息ヲ及ボスベシト日本ニ告グシ
タリテアリマス。(d)

0159 0008 1149

HIROTA Summation-FF

本ノモノナルコトヲ認メテ、其ノ事行ニ認シテ是レ
 ノ意ヲ表シマシタ。(c) 是ニ認シテ、九月二十三日英
 日大使ハ右事行ハ今ヤ終レルモノト考メサレル旨述
 ベタノデアリマシタ。(d)

FF-9I				FF-90
a、	b、	c、	d、	a、
法廷証	"	"	"	法廷証
二六三	二二一	二六三	二五二〇	九一八
法廷証	"	"	"	法廷証
二五三八	二二二七	二五三九	二六三一	二四二七

0511 8000 6510

一九三六年六月十二日、「ハル」ハ吾度其ノ覺悟ニ於テ、合衆國ハ日本ガ最初ハ東洋ニ於テ、次ニ他ノ地域ニ於テ、經濟的支配ヲ求メツツアリト云フ印象ヲ有シテキルト廣田ニ抗議シマシタ。(a)

一九三七年八月二十六日、陸軍大臣「ヒニ」ナツテバル・ヒューゲツセン「兄ハ其ノ案ニセル自動車ヲ日本軍統帥部ガ機銃掃射シ燃焼シタル隊員傷致シマシタ。(c) 此ノ事件ニ對スル抗議ニ答ヘテ、廣田ハ陸日英日大使ニ、右事件ニ對スル請益ガ進メラレツツアル旨ヲ答ヘマシタ。(b) 一九三七年九月二十一日、廣田ハ事件ノ益處ヲ既得シ、其ノ統帥部ガ日

FF-92

g f e d c b a

〃〃〃〃〃〃

九九九九九九九
一〇七六五八五二
三三九三六〇六
三〇

〃〃〃〃〃〃

九九九九九九九
五五五五五五
二〇九九六八七
三三六六八七〇
三三

ニヨル占領並ニ行ハレタル採集及歌集等ニ關スル一
 九三八年三月二十六日ノ「グルー」ノ統制 (イ) ナド何
 レモ何等致治策シモタラサナカツタノデアリマス。
 一九三八年十月三日、「グルー」ハ、近衛ニ中國ニ
 於ケル米上權益ノ保護ニ就イテノ浪田トノ幾度カノ
 會談並ニ彼ガ與ヘラレタ切實ナル保ト一之ハ米上權
 益ノ一層多シノ被害ヲ伴フニ迫ギナカツタガ一之等
 ニ就イテ語ツタノデシタ。(g)

法廷

法廷記録

FF-92

益補之内ハ、廣田ノ政案ハ中口ニ於ケル第三口ノ利
 益補償ニ向ケラレテキタト候ベシ。(a) 又廣田自身ハ一
 九三七年九月二日新聞ニ訂スルニ既中ニ、第三口ノ
 權益ハ日本ニ依ツテ補償サレルト述ベタニモ訂ラズ(b)
 米口人ノ生命財産及利益ハ能ニズ日本軍ニ依ツテ取
 擧サレタゾデアリマシタ。就中、尙ヘバ一九三七年
 九月一日ノ非軍事目的ニ訂スル懸望ニ關スル米口
 政府ノ抗議(c) 惠州ニ於ケル米口傳道病院爆撃ヲ引
 用セル米口々籍者ニ訂スル日本ノ政案ニ關スル一九
 三七年九月十七日「グルー」ノ廣田宛通報、(d) 中口
 ニ於ケル米口財産ガ日本軍ニ依ツテ完全ニ無視サレ
 タル事ニ關スル一九三八年二月四日「グルー」ノ廣
 田ニ宛テタ通報、(e) 上海ニ於ケル米口財産ノ日本軍

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-94

a、
法廷
二
三
一
三

法廷記録
一七、六九四

FF-95

b a、
c、
" " " 法廷
二二二二二
三三三三三
二八八三
七八

" " " 法廷記録
二二二二二
三三三三三
二六六六
七四

廣田君名ノ米國政府ニ對スル遺言ニ於テ同事行ニ願
謝シ、視界不良ノタメ飛行機ハ同船ツ米國船ト認メ
得ズ、從ツテ「バオー」號及三隻ノ衝突ハ遺亡マ那

0159 0000 1152 2511 8000 6510

RF-93

一九三七年十二月十二日アメリカ軍艦「パネー」號／

USS Panay / ハ合衆國及び他ノ外國々民ヲ保護シ又

在南京アメリカ大使館及び在漢口アメリカ大使館ノ

直接連絡ヲ保持シツツ、和子江ニ於テ行動シテキマ

シタ。向來ハ報告ナク日本航空機三機ノ攻撃ヲ受ケ

真ノ後沈没シタノデアリマス。生存者ハ後刻救助サ

レ英國軍艦「レディバード」號 / HMS Ladybird / 及

ビアメリカ軍艦「オアフ」號 / USS Oahu / ニ報告サレ

マシタ。(a) 橋本欣三郎ハ、柳川大尉ノ命令ニヨリ、

「レディバード」號ヲ砲撃シ、該船ガ「パネー」號

救助ニ同フ途中之ヲ拿捕シタル旨ヲ認メテキマス。(b)

「パネー」號ハアメリカ軍艦「パネー」號及ビ三隻ノ砲船沈没

ニ關スル詳細ヲ發表シマシタ。(c)

RF-94 其ノ當時外務大臣ノ辰ニ就イテ尾崎廣田ハ此ノ沈

没ニ關スル詳細ノ抗議ヲ「ダグラス」氏ヲ經テ受取

リマシタ。(a) 其ノ結果、日本政府ハ十二月十四日附

e	d	c	b
"	"	"	"
三	三	三	三
二	二	二	二
八	三	二	二
五	七	三	一
"	"	"	"
三	三	三	三
九	一	一	一
六	二	三	三
六	六	五	五
三	七	三	〇

法廷記

法廷記

法廷記

HIROTA Summation-FF

軍ヲ撤退中ノ中日協ト談話セラレタト説明シマシタ^(b)
 彼ハ十二月二十四日及ビ二十六日附ノ通牒ニ於テ右
 懸案ハ誤ツテ爲サレタコトヲ反復シ、重オテ遺憾ノ
 意ヲ表シマシタ^(c) 廣田ハ美國大使ニ通牒ヲ發シ、
 向事作ニ陳謝シ、右ハ誤ツテ行ハレタル事及ビ日本
 ハ必長ナル賠償ヲ爲ス用意アル旨ヲ述ベマシタ^(a)
 「グルー」ハ十二月十三日附日記ニ「バニイ」號ノ
 沈没ニ就イテノ廣田ノ陳謝ヲ記入シマシタ^(e) ソレ
 ニモ拘ラズ、此等ノ事件が偶然ノ出来事デアルトノ
 言辭ハ前述ノ証據ニ依ツテ眞實ナラザルコトが示サ
 レ又廣田ハ眞實ナラザルコトヲ知ツテキタニ違ヒナ
 イノデアリマス。

案ヲ受諾シテ罷入ルコトヲ力能シテ力能シ。

ケルニ對テ、各ノ政ニ關スル日本ノ權々⁽²⁾提ノ責任放

トモノ子テ及ボス此ノ際、彼ハ米國ハ提北ニ於

ニ影ヲ及ボス此ノ政權ノ行爲ニ抗⁽²⁾出スル

依リ、米日、本ノ政權ノ行爲ニ外⁽²⁾有スルニ

彼ハ、政府ノ法限⁽²⁾ヲモテ、下⁽²⁾北平

臨マ、斯クスル議シテ、彼ハ中國政府ノ

限⁽²⁾ノ、依ニ於テ、或ル日「⁽²⁾」民田ニ

保證ノ、北平臨時政府ニ於テ、或ル日「⁽²⁾」民田ニ

對シ、九三八年一月三十日「⁽²⁾」民田ニ

對シ、九三八年一月三十日「⁽²⁾」民田ニ

對シ、九三八年一月三十日「⁽²⁾」民田ニ

FF-96

b	法廷證	九七七	法廷記録	九五四二
	法廷證	九七八	法廷記録	九五四八
c	法廷證	二一六	法廷記録	二七二四
d	法廷證	二二七	法廷記録	二九八〇
e	法廷證	一〇八		

其ノ説明等ニハ彼ガ議長タル内閣企業局ガ之ヲ
 取扱フベキコトガ、述ベテアリマシタ。(a) 廣函
 ノ履歴等ニハ彼ハ一九三七年六月十日ヨリ一九
 三七年十月二十五日迄企業院總裁テアツメトシ
 イテアリマス。(e) ガ、証人「イノ」(音讀)ハ

HIROTA Summation-IFP

十日ノ決議ニハ首相トシテ参加シテ居タノデア
リマス、同決議デ「英米ニ對シテ備ヘル一方
脅ノ脅トヲ除クコト」ヲ含ムコトニナツテ居ル
日本ノ國策ノ基礎ガ決定サレマシヌ。(b) 此ノ主
旨ハ一九三六年八月七日ノ會議ニ於イテ反復強
調同會議ハ「東亞大陸ニ於ケル帝國ノ地位ヲ、
相互ニ相依存スル外交政策ト國防ニ依ツテ、確保シ
同時ニ帝國ヲ南洋ニ向ツテ前進發展セシムル」
(c) 一投目的ヲ定メマシヌ。此ノ爲メノ具體的
準備ハ一九三七年六月ノ五ヶ年計畫中ニ盛り込
マレ、其ノ寫ハ一九三七年七月廣田ニ送附サレ

0159 0008 155

FF-97

一九三七年九月一日米田大使館發廣田宛電
ニ於テ八月二十三日附南京ヲ爆撃シ、之ニ依ツ
テ同地ノ外國人生命ヲ危険ナフシメザル限トノ
米田ノ要求ニモ拘ラズ、日本軍ハ八月二十六日
夜同市ヲ爆撃シ米田人ノ生命及ヒ財產ヲ危険ナ

9511 8000 6510

彼ハ實際ニハ企畫院ノ前身テアル企畫局ノ總裁
 テアリ保險衛生省ノ構成ト權限ニ關スル草案ニ
 反對スル關係トノ政治的交渉ノ責任者デアツタ
 ト述ベマシム。此ノ局ノ制限サレタ範圍ニ關ス
 ル彼ノ陳述ハ前記說明等ト一致シ難ク、依ツテ
 我々ハ眞實テナイト主張シマス。此ノ内閣ハ一
 般段階ニ於イテ敢テ私フ國力總動員政策並ニ同法
 ニモ亦責任ガアリマシム。

第八南京空襲同占領及ビ同動ニ於ケルソ

ノ後ノ暴行

FF-98

a
法廷證三二八一
法廷記錄二九九四八

FF-97

a
法廷證九八八
法廷記錄九五六八

FF-98

ラシメタル事實ニ注意ヲ喚起シマシム。斯カル
攻撃中止ノ訓令ヲ陸軍部隊ニ發スル祿要求シマ
シヌ。(a)

九月二十日、「グルー」ハ南京地區無差別爆
撃ニ付スル再三ノ抗議ノ結果トシテ、日本政府
ハ處置ヲ講ジツツアルモノ、如シト証明シマシム。二
十五日以後ハ爆撃ハ行ハレナカラウト言ハレテ
居リマシヌ。(a)

HIROTA Summation-FF

日本ノ再三ノ保證ニ鑑ミ、不圖氏ノ南京立退ニ對スル要求ニ關シテ抗議シマシタ。(a)此ニ對シ一九三七年九月三十日、廣田ハ、南京ハ作戰ノ中心ナルヲ以テ、南京内及ビ其ノ周邊ノ軍事施設ノ爆撃ヲ受クベキコトハ避ケ難シト回答シマシタ。(b)ソレニモ拘ハラズ、作戰終了後ニ於テサヘモ米國民ハ城内ニ復歸スルコトガ不可能デアツタ、茲ニ於テ、一九三

FF-99

a 法廷證三二八二

法廷記録二六九四九

FF-100

a 法廷證 九五六

法廷記録 九五四八

b 法廷證二五三一

法廷記録二、三九〇

8511 8000 6510
0159 0008

FF-99

又一九三〇年九月二十日「グルー」ハ廣田トノ
 談ニ於テ兩京爆撃ガ不圖及ビ他ノ諸國ニ及ボスベキ
 重大ナル影響ヲ指摘シマシタ。廣田ハ、東京政府又
 官ハ軍隊ニ封シテハ、軍隊ノ一般目的ニ歸スル場合
 ニハ、殆ンド統制力無ケレドモ二十一日ノ爆撃ニハ
 外國施設ハノ損害ヲ避クル様注意スベキ旨ヲ命ジ置
 キタリト回答シマシタ。(a)

FF-100

一九三七年九月廿二日、「グルー」ハ再ビ廣田ニ
 對シ、軍ニ關係シキ者及ビ非戦闘員ハ爆撃セズトノ

廣田ハ「クレイギー」ニ對シ南京附近ノ警備ニ陳謝
シ且再發ヲ防止スベシトノ保證ヲ與ヘマシタ。(b)

ルFF-102
一九三七年十二月十三日、日本軍ハ十二日ニ凡ユ
抵抗カ止ンデ終ツタ後ニ、南京ニ入城シマシタ。

FF-100
c 法廷証 九七〇
法廷証 九五〇一

FF-101
a 法廷証 九五〇一C
法廷証 九五〇一
b 法廷証 二五二七
法廷証 二一三六七

0159 0008 1159

HIROTA Summation-FF

八年四月四日「グルー」ハ廣田ニ書ヲ寄セ、南京ハ
我ニ三ヶ月間占領セラレ居ルニモ向ラズ、米國民ハ
今尙城內ヘノ復歸ヲ日本軍部ニヨツテ阻止セラル居
ル事實ニ彼ノ注意ヲ喚起シマシタ。(c)

FF-101

一九三七年十二月十六日、英國大使ハ廣田ニ對シ
十二月十二日日本陸軍部ニ依ツテ蕪湖ニテ又南京
附近ニテ英國軍艦及ビ船油ニ加ヘラレタル攻撃ニ關
シテ抗議ヲ提出シマシタ。彼ハ先ノ保證ハ何等ノ
效果モ齎サザリシ旨及ビ懲罰ノミカスカル暴行ヲ切
止スル唯一有效ナル方法ナル旨ヲ述べマシタ。(a)

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-103

a

法廷證
三二三

法廷記錄
四五〇八

法廷證
三二九

法廷記錄
四五九二

法廷證
三二二

法廷記錄
四五〇六

法廷證
三二一

法廷記錄
四五〇五

法廷證
三二〇

法廷記錄
四五〇七

法廷證
三一八

法廷記錄
四五〇〇

法廷證
三一七

法廷記錄
四四九八

法廷證
三一大

法廷記錄
四四九五

法廷證
三一五

法廷記錄
四四九五

法廷證
三一三

法廷記錄
四四九一

0159 0000 6510

南京陥落ニ次イテ、日本軍ハ強姦、放火、掠奪、及
ビ無差別の殺戮ヲ恣ニシマシタ。(a)

FF-103 安全地帯國際委員會ニ依ツテ日本大使館ニ對シ同
地ニ於ケル殺害及ビ違反ニ對シテ抗議ガ提出サレマ
シタ。(a) 駐華日本大使館並ニ上海領事館代表「ヒ

FF-102

a

法廷証 三一〇

法廷記録 二五三三

法廷証 三一〇

法廷記録 四四八三

法廷証 三一〇

法廷記録 四四八五

法廷記録 四四八八

行為ハ根絶セラレマシタ。廣田ハ百カラ是等刑罰履行
 爲ヲ停止スルタメ最重ナル處置ヲ採ル様杉山ニ要請
 シマシタ。(a)ソレニモ拘ラズ、右證人ハ一九三八
 年二月二日迄モマダ該履行爲ガ行ハレテキタコト、

FF-103

b 法廷証 三二八

法廷証 四五五二

c 法廷証 二五三七

法廷証 二一四五三

FF-104

a 法廷証 三二八七

法廷証 二九七〇一

カダ」(音讀)及ビ岡本ハ情況ヲ通知セラレ且不圖
 財産掠奪ノ件ニ關シ軍備局ノ注意ヲ喚起セラレ度シ
 ト要求セラレマシタ。(b)「ヒカダ」ハ一九三八年
 一月廣田外務大臣ニ對シ南京ノ狀況ヲ口頭ヲ以テ報
 告シタト述ベマシタ。(c)

FF-104

證人石井ハ強行爲ノ報告ハ藤井ニヨリ外務省へ
 送達セラレ、廣田ハ石報告ニ關シ非常ニ憂慮シ且ツ
 廣イタコトヲ証言シマシタ。國軍ハ之ヲ即刻停止ス
 ルタメ嚴重ナル處置ヲ講ズル豫長派セラレ、遂ニ處
 置ガ講ゼラレタ結果、一九三八年一月末迄ニハ強行

0159 0008 151

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-104

c b

法廷記 三九、九七八
法廷記 三九、九九三

0159 0008 1162
2911 8000 6510

竝ニ同日迄ハ報告ガ入リツツアツタコトヲ認メマシ
 タル。(b) 是等諸般行爲ニ關スル報告ハ全ベテ、外
 新聞ノ非難報道ト共ニ、皮田ニ送達セラレタガ報告
 ガ續々入リツツアツタ時デサヘモ、彼ハ同聞是ヲ
 相ニ追ラス、又内閣ニ計リマセンデシタ。(c)

FF-106 a, FF-105 a,

法廷証

三八一

法廷証

四七〇八

法廷証
法廷証
法廷証

四四七
三六八
二六八
以下續ク
以下續ク
以下續ク

一九三三年四月ノ日本内閣ノ決議ヲ述ベテ居リ、
 外務省條約局ノ出版物ハ朝鮮生産ノ生阿片ヲ臨時
 措置トシテ將來加印政府ニ譲渡スルコトニ因ス
 例ヘバ「一九三八年度華務報告」^(a)ト題スル日本
 是ガ日本政府ノ政策ヲアツタコトヲ示シテ居マス。
 於イテ麻薬ノ培養及ビ使用ヲ種々奨励シタノデ
 右證據ハ、舊々長期間ニ亘ル中國ノ全占領地域
 三

FF-106

ロ「リス」ノ證言ニ見出スコトガ出来マス。^(a)
 ナ證據ハ三人ノ證人「ギル」^(a)「ベイツ」及ビ「
 ノ主張デハ、責任ガアリマス。本件ニ關スル主
 張ノ栽培ト使用トヲ奨励スル政策ニ對シテ、我々
 ルモノ即チ中國ニ於ケル全日本占領地域ニ於テ麻
 後モ日本ノ明白ナ政策ヲアツタト、我々が主張ス
 ヲテ閣員トシテ、廣田ハ閣員トシテ在職中モ又其
 一九三七年六月四ヨリ一九三八年五月二十九日
 一九三三年九月ヨリ一九三七年二月マデ及ビ又

FF-105

九、廣田ノ阿片專賣圖與

FR-107
a

法廷証 法廷証 法廷証 法廷証 法廷証 法廷証 法廷証 法廷証 法廷証 法廷証
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又臺灣總督、關東租借地及ヒ滿洲國政府ニ供給シ
又ハ讓渡スベキ阿片ノ所要量ヲ生産スルニ必要ナ
ル「ヒナグシ」ノ培養面積ニ關スル一九三八年十
二月二十三日附日本内閣ノ別ノ決議ヲ述ベテキマ
ス。FR-107
此ノ麻薬政策蔓延ノ確證ハ、中國各地ノ米鹽財
務官ノ報告廣田ノ在職中ノ情勢ニ關スル右報告 (a)
ヲ含ム、主依ツテ知ルコトガ出來マス。

451 0000 6510

FF-109 FF-108

a, a,

a, 法廷証 五三二 法廷記録 六二五二

法廷記録 二〇三〇八一至八

FF-109

一〇、岡田ノ退職後ノ行動

彼ハ米内内閣ノ瓦解ニ際シ新首相ノ選定ガ爲サレタ
新首相ノ選擇ニ與ツテカガアリマシタ。此ノ資格デ
岡田ハ、政界ノ長老トシテ、各内閣ノ瓦解ニ際シ
一九四〇年七月廿一日ノ會議ニ列席シマシタ。岡田
ハ軍人が良イト言ツタガ、彼ハ適當ノ候補者ガ無イ
ノデ、近衛ハ軍部デモ評判ガ好イカラ、道任ダラウ
ト考ヘマシタ。(a)

FF-108

辯護側證人難波ハ、滿洲阿片 專賣制ノ設置ハ阿
片ノ販賣ト其ノ不正栽培トヲ抑制シタト主張シテ、
滿州及ヒ北滿諸省ニ於ケル全面的阿片問題ニ對スル
訴追ヲ辯明シ去ラウトシマシタ。ソレニモ拘ハラズ
彼ハ阿片 販賣者ノ登録ハ簡易化サレ、又組織化サレ
タ栽培ガ獎勵サレ、又日本人ハ阿片ヲ購買シ販賣ス
ルコトヲ許サレナカツタ、同様に、同様に、同様に、
中国人ニハ適用サレ無カツタコトヲ認めマシタ(a)

0551 0000 0551 0

報告が首相ニヨツテ行ハレマシタ。近衛ハ彼ノ
 内閣ハ日米關係ヲ調整セント努力シ來ツタガ、
 以府ノ今朝ノ説明ニ基キ、彼ハ爾後ノ交渉ハ三
 ミナキモノデアラウト辯論セザルヲ得ナイト報
 告シマシタ。廣田ハ現下ノ危機ニ直面シタル後
 直ニ競争ニ突入スルハ誤リデアラウト考へ、ソ

FR-110

a、	法廷証	一一一七	法廷記録	一〇一六六
b、	法廷証	一一三三	法廷記録	一〇二九一
	法廷証	一一三〇	法廷記録	一〇一八三

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-110

彼ハ又一九四一年七月十七日第二次近衛内閣
瓦ノ際、召集サレタ重臣會議ニ出席シ、ソコ
テ彼ハ參謀本部ノ強化ヲ主張シ、再ビ軍部内閣
ノ組閣ヲ唱導シタガ、木戸ノ宮中ニ於ケル參謀
本部ノ説明ニ依リ他ノ者ノ意見ニ同意シマシタ。
又一九四一年十月十七日木戸ガ東條ヲ彼ガ軍
務ニアツタニモ拘ラズ首相並ビニ陸相ニ推薦シ
タ時ニ列席シテヲリ、コノ任命ニ賛成シマシタ。

FF-111

一九四一年十一月九日、重臣會議ガ開催サレ、
東條ハ彼等ハ不可避ナルト説明シマシタ。彼
近ニ到ル迄ノ對米交渉ノ進展ニ關シテ充分ナル

0159 0008 167

HIROTA Summation-FF

FF-113

ニ列席シ、同會議テ小磯ハ新内閣ノ首相ニ選バ
レタ、ソシテ同會議テ彼ハ戦争遂行ガ第一番テ
アルト述べマシタ。(b) 重臣ハ一九四五年四月五
日、小磯内閣瓦解ノ際、特ビ官合シ、鈴木貫太
郎ヲ新内閣ノ首班ニ選ビマシタ。(c)

上述ノ事柄ノ起訴狀ノ取訴因ニ對スル關係ヲ
概括シテ、我々ハ辯論全体ガ訴因第一乃至第五ニ

FF-112	FF-111
a、 法廷證	a、 法廷證
b、 法廷證	法廷證
c、 法廷證	法廷證
一 二 二 八 三	一 一 一 九 六 三 三 四 〇
法廷記録	法廷記録
一 一 一 三 三 九 〇	一 一 一 〇 四 三 三 三 七

8911 8000 6510

ノ延期ト、功發後ノ或ハアリ得ベキ外交^(a)解決ノ
 提議シマシタ。陸、海軍、外務各大臣、企畫院
 總裁及ビ首相ハ夕刻重臣ト會シ、情勢ヲ説明シ
 タガ、此等二ツノ會議ノ間ニ、東條及ビ廣田ヲ
 舍ム元首補選ハ天皇ニ拜謁シ、陛下ハ各人ノ意
 見ヲ聽取遊バサレタノデアリマス。(a)

FF-112

一九四四年七月十七日、東條内閣ノ改造ヲ議
 スル爲召集セラレタ重臣會議テ、廣田ハ東條以
 造内閣ニハ請ハレテモ参加シナイト辨ベマシタ。(a)

翌日、彼ハ又他ノ重臣會議（東條ハ辭職シタ）

一節乃至第八十五節及び第一〇二節乃至第一〇八節ハコレヲノ訴因ヲ取扱ヒ、特ニ訴因第五十四及ビ第五十五ニ就イテハ第一〇二節乃至第一〇四節ガ取扱ヒマス。

訴因第五八第十一節乃至第十六節、第六十七節乃至第七十節及第一〇九節ニ取扱ハレテ居リマス。

於テ責任ヲ問ハレタル共同謀議ノ各々ニ、廣田
ガソノ一員タリシコトヲ立證シ、又ソレ故ニ、
コレラノ共同謀議ヨリ起リシソノ他ノ訴因中ニ
申立テラレシ特定事項ニ對スル彼ノ責任ノ證據
デアルト主張シマス。

シカシ、我々ハ此ル訴因ニ對シ直接口頭ヲ示
ス次ノ特定ノ節ニ注意ヲ喚起シマス。

訴因第二及ビ第二七、第三十乃至四十節ハ廣
田ガ一九三三年九月以降、滿洲侵略ヲ採用シ、
且ツ參加シタコトヲ示スモノデアリマス。

訴因第三、第六、第十九、第二十七、第二十
八、第四十五、第五十四及ビ第五十五、第四十

至第九十六節、蘇聯ニ出シテハ第四節乃至第十
七節。

上記諸國家ニ對シテ戦争ヲ開始シ（原因第二
十乃至原因第二十五）且ツ戦争ヲ行ヒタルコト
ニ對スル原因ニ出シテハ、我々ハ虜國ハ該期間
中ニハ在戦シナカツタケレドモ是等ノ出來事ハ
彼ニ對シテ既ニ立証シタト、我々ノ主張スル共

0159 0000 6510

訴因第四及ビ第六乃至第十七ハ、名ヲ擧ゲラレタ
 ル及ビ名ヲ擧ゲラレザル諸國ニ對スル競争ノ一
 般準備ニ廣田ガ參與シタコトヲ取扱ヒマス。我
 ヲハ特ニ第九十六節ニ注意ヲ喚起シマス。開頭
 ノ示ス所ニ依レバ、特ニ考慮セラレタ國々ハ米
 國（訴因第七及ビ第十三）、英領邦（訴因第八
 乃至第十二）及上記ノ外南洋ニ領土ヲ有スル諸
 國、即チ「オランダ」（訴因第十四）、佛蘭西
 （訴因第十五）、泰國（訴因第十六）、及ビ露
 聯（訴因第十七）デアリマシタ。尚、特ニ英領
 邦ニ關シテハ、第六十六節、米國及英國ニ關シ
 テハ、第八節乃至第二十九節及ビ第八十九節乃

ス。同シ言葉ガ訴因第三十七乃至第四十二及び
第四十六、第四十七及び第五十二ニモ當誤リマ
ス。

宣戦布告ノ無カツタコトニ悉ク申立ニ願シテハ、
廣田ガアノ様ニ特定ノ國家ニ對シテ攻撃ヲ開始
スル意圖ニ就イテ知ツテ居ルト云フ證據ハ無イ
ケレドモ、中國ニ對スル以争又ハ種々ノ競争ガ
アノヤウニシテ開始セラレタト言フ事實ハ斯様
ナ方法ハ廣田ガ當事者ノ一人テアルト我々が主
張スル共同保護ノ範圍内デアツタコトヲ示スコ
トシ我々ハ指摘シマセウ。

同議ノ結果ニ過ギザルコト及ビ其故ニ彼ハ是
等ノ戰爭ヲ實際ニ開始シ且ツ行ツタ彼ノ仲間ノ
共同謀議者ノ行爲ニ對シテ責任アルコトヲ主張
シマス。第一〇乃至第一一三節ハ前總理大臣
トシテノ彼ノ地位ガ同行爲ニ彼ノ個人的參加ヲ
可能ナラシメタ其程度ヲ示スモノデアルト我々
ハ信ズルモノデアリマス。我々ハ更ニ其中ニ通
ベラレテキル會議ハ、彼ガ希望スレバ、共同謀
議ヨリ脱退スルニ充分ナル機會ヲ彼ニ與ヘタモ
ノデアルガ、彼ハ其等ノ機會ヲ捕ヘナカツタシ
又ソウスル他ノ機會ヲ作ラナカツタト主張シマ

故ナレバ、近衛ハ彼ト會見シ、彼ノ意見ガ本問題ニ關スル陸軍
 ノ意見、即チ平沼内閣ニヨリ採用セラレタル妥協
 案トハ反對ニ完全ナル軍事同盟ニ贊スルモノト同
 様ナルコトヲ知ツテキダカラテアリマス。(b) 八月
 二十四日ヨリ少シ前ニ、彼等ハ猶彼ヲ候補ノ第一
 人者ト考ヘテキダノテアリマス。然シ、其ノ日ニ、
 彼ハ此ノ見解ニモ拘ラズ或ハ此ノ見解ヲ知ラズシ
 テ軍部ノ反對ニ關スル原田ノ報告(二)ニ基キ候補者タ
 ルコトヲ願ヒ下ゲタノテアリマス。(c)

FF-109	a、	法廷記録三八七〇三
	b、	法廷記録三七八四六
	c、	法廷記録三八六七七

HIROTA SUMMATION
FF ERRATA

「廣田弘毅」正誤表

第八八頁九行目「一〇、廣田ノ退職後ノ行動」ノ

次ニ左記

FF-109

ヲ挿入シ舊

FF-109

ヲ

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ニ訂正ス

FF-109

有田ハ、廣田ガ一九三九年及ビ一九四〇年ニ於テ初退トノ事、同盛ニ反對ナリシコトヲ証言シマ

シタ。然シ作ラ、原田ニ依リマスト、一九三九年

八月十二日(日)木戸及ビ近衛ハ、平沼内閣瓦解ノ

際ハ次期首相候補トシテ廣田ガ適任ナルコトニ一

致シタノテシタ。平沼内閣ノ瓦解ハ、僅獨不可侵

條約前、既に豫期セラレテアリマス。何

0159 0008 1172

ノ「概観」ニヨリマスト、辭職ニ至リシ事項ニ關
 スル近衛ノ語ヲ十分ニ闡キタル上、廣田ハ次ノ如
 キ意見ヲ述ベタノテアリマス。一吾々ハ中國事變
 ノ眞實中ニアルノテアルカラ、私ハ政治モ大本營
 ノ意向ヲ中心ニ行ハレナケレバナラヌト思フ」
 一「私ノ考ヘテハ、研究ノ價值アル策ノ
 一ツハ、統帥部ヲシテ次期總理大臣ノ候補ヲ推薦
 セシメルコトデアル」

第八九頁註

FF-110

ヲ

FF-111

ニ訂正ノ上末尾ニ左記ヲ追加ス。

c、法廷証三四四〇

法廷証ニ〇九九一—三二〇一ハ

HIROTA SUMMATION
FF ERRATA

第八八頁註ヲ左記ノ通り訂正ス

FF-108 a 法廷記録ニ〇二〇八一五八

FF-109 c b a 法廷記録三三八七〇三
法廷記録三三八七四六

FF-110 a 法廷記録六二五二
法廷記録六二五二

第八九頁
FF-110 ラ
FF-111 トシ、
FF-111 ラ
FF-112 ニ訂正ノ上、同頁八

行目新
FF-111 末尾ニ左記ヲ追加ス。

木戸ノ口供卷第二一六節(c)ニ記載セル長文ノ當時

0159 0008 1173

ビ太平洋ニ於ケル侵略戦争内外準備概要ノFノ九、
Fノ一九、Fノ一一、Fノ二〇、Fノ二二、Fノ
二六、Fノ二八、Fノ三二及ビFノ六五ノ各節ニ
ゴザイマス。

第九〇頁註中ノ

F-111

ヲ

F-112

ニ

、

F-112

ヲ

F-113

ニ

訂

正

ス

HIROTA SUMMATION
FF ERRATA

木戸ガ其ノ提案ヲ述ベタル後、
「總理大臣（東條）
ニ國務相（明カニ陸軍大臣）ヲ兼務サセヨウト云
フノハ木戸案テスカ」。木戸「サウデス」。廣田
「ソレデハ、イイデセウ」。

ヲ挿入ス
第 九 〇 頁
FF-112
ヲ
FF-113
ニ、
FF-113
ヲ
FF-115
ニ訂正シテ、左記新
FF-114

FF-114
員ニ貢獻セル法律並ニ法令ニ關シテハ、亞細亞及
シテ存在中ニ制定サレ、日本ノ戦争準備及ビ總動
員ニ貢獻セル法律並ニ法令ニ關シテハ、亞細亞及
廣田ガ外務大臣、總理大臣及ビ企劃院（總裁ト

本同ニ先立カニ種ヲレ多ノヲ了リマヌ。
 任前ニ先立カニ種ヲレ多ノヲ了リマヌ。
 正前ニ先立カニ種ヲレ多ノヲ了リマヌ。
 正前ニ先立カニ種ヲレ多ノヲ了リマヌ。

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 正前ニ先立カニ種ヲレ多ノヲ了リマヌ。

正前ニ先立カニ種ヲレ多ノヲ了リマヌ。
 正前ニ先立カニ種ヲレ多ノヲ了リマヌ。

訂正ノ上、同行「シカモ又「」以下本節ノ最後
「」シタノデアリマス。(b)「」迄ヲ削除ス。

◎第九頁註
ノb項ヲ削除ス。

◎第十一頁
ノ末尾ニ左記ヲ追加ス。

「然シ乍ラ此ノ陳述ノ益ク甚偽ナルコトヲ示ス此
ノ秘密協定ニ就テハ何等言及サレナカツタノデア
リマス」。

0159 0008 176

MIROTA SUMMATION

ERRATA—FF

廣田ハ外相トナルヤ、右交渉ヲ繼續シ、交渉ハ一
 九三五年三月二十三日意見ノ一致ヲ見終ツタノ
 アリマシタ。此ノ沿革ハ、本長終論告ノ II—78 乃至 II—85 デ
 節ニ詳細ニ述ベテアリマス。然シ乍ラ、此ノ交渉
 ハ日本側ノ相當ナ壓力ヲ伴ツタモノデシタ。レ

◎ 第六頁 FF—7 ノ註甲 b c d ノ各項ヲ削除ス。

◎ 第九頁 FF—11 六行目「シテ言及サレテ居リ、
 (a)」ニ

「シテ言及サレテ居ルモノデアリマス。(a)」ニ

0 159 0000 1 177

DOIHARA Summation - BB

土肥原夢三

I 侵略・煽動者として土肥原

BB-1 此、全共同謀議に於て土肥原、最も役割、最も重要、
トナリシ之也。以テ彼、最初、共同謀議者、ト云フテ、共同
謀議ニ、發議者、然リ且、終ニ之ヲ成ラセリ之也。滿洲侵略ニ
始メ、彼、中國に於テ、全冒險に於テ、彼、常ニ煽動者トシテ、行動
ス。彼、大膽、企、明ニ非合法的、手段、トシテ、實ニ既成事實
トシテ、何處ニ認、認、以、及、是、認、トシ、其、事、證據、トシ、居、ス。

BB-2 將來、陰謀ト侵略ト、結合、シ、テ、全、事、件、ヲ、創、シ、出、ス。土肥
原、策謀、中國、に、於、テ、非常ニ、重要ニ、シ、テ、其、何、處、に、於、テ、彼
、存在、ス。當、ニ、紛、擾、前、兆、及、時、ニ、示、シ、テ、之、後、人、微、候、ト、見
做、ス。中國、民、衆、ニ、對、シ、テ、肥、原、ニ、對、シ、テ、斯、ク、不、安、ニ、彼、自身、特
務、機關、ニ、陳、述、シ、テ、對、シ、テ、一、二、三、四、年、ノ、報、告、次、ニ、言、事、ニ、現
シ、居、ス。其、間、其、土肥原、報、告、兩、次、時、ノ、名、ヲ、言、フ、ト、ハ、是、レ
何、レ、ニ、對、シ、テ、居、ル、否、ノ、類、色、ヲ、答、フ、也。^(a)

II 滿洲、華北、對、土肥原、活動

BB-3 滿洲、華北、對、土肥原、既、二十、八年、に、中國、ニ、居、リ、シ、及、彼、

註、記録番号、英文、與、番号、云、凡、

BB-2 九、五、五、三、一、七、一、A 記録、二、六、一、八、九、三、六、五、七

BB-3 九、五、五、三、一、七、一、A 記録、一、五、七、三、三

H.I.

0 154 0009 1 179

DOIHARA Summation - 33

著者之類 亦向 日本 外交事務 行 調查 同 事 務 行 務
 國 務 省 之 特 許 同 地 是 以 中 國 領 事 官 亦 曾 使 命 成
 訊 問 情 形 等 語 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 及 訓 練 通 信 官 及 武 裝
 狀 況 之 調 查 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務
 海 漢 口 北 京 及 濟 南 之 運 輸 亦 長 途 旅 行 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務
 對 事 務 之 調 查 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務

58-1 中國調查局自本測 專理 應 應 之 全 乃 奉 天 於
 日本領事官曾向上述多記者關於中日事件和平的解決 近于
 7 倍之多 且 亦 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務
 疑 疑 錄 之 公 正 經 理 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務
 誠 意 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務
 原 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務
 彼 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務

58-1 一九三三年自都府板垣及他國亦曾發傳達中日事件
 日領事官滿洲之發言行動開始之計畫之內容之報道
 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務
 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務
 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務 亦 非 中 國 領 事 官 之 任 務

P. 3

- 357 久書三三〇一A 記錄一五七二一四
- 在書三三〇一A 記錄一五七三二五
- 在書三三〇一A 記錄一五七三二五
- 358-15B-6 訂知 三三四
- 訂知 三三四
- 訂知 三三四
- 訂知 三三四
- 訂知 三三四

0159 0009 1882

1. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 2. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 3. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 4. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 5. 諸君の注意を引くには、

00-10

1. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 2. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 3. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 4. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 5. 諸君の注意を引くには、

00-11

1. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 2. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 3. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 4. 諸君の注意を引くには、
 5. 諸君の注意を引くには、

00-12

DOHARA Summation - 03

DOIHARA Summita 813

88-13

農林部... 各省... 領事... 警察...
 警察... 各省... 領事... 警察...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...

警察... 各省... 領事... 警察...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...

警察... 各省... 領事... 警察...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...
 各省... 領事... 警察... 各省...

0159 0009 1184

○ 關於... 一三〇

關於... 一三〇

13

1301/1/224 S... - 138

關於... 一三〇

關於... 一三〇

關於... 一三〇

0 159 0009 1 186

1910

DOIHARA Sumnerien-5B

BIB-18

十月十日東京銀行...
 自三會(3)が...
 住(3)人(3)の...
 二置(3)の...
 此、計画(3)の...
 記、桑島(3)の...

88-11
 a. 書証
 二九四 記簿 三九八
 二九七 〃 〃 〃
 二九八 〃 〃 〃
 三〇二 〃 〃 〃
 三〇〇 〃 〃 〃

0159 0009 187

DOIHARA Summation -BB

P.11

BB-19

「土肥原素璋」目的ハ関東軍部ノ意ヲ体シ、滿洲獨立ノ前提トシテ至急宣統帝ヲ連レ去シ張學良ノ勢力ヲ切去ルニ爲ニシテ、何人ノ勸告及干渉ヲモテ排除シ、時ニ國策ト想交スルモ関東軍獨自ノ立場ヨリ自由ナル行動ヲ執ルハモテ得ルトノ決心ヲ以テ、政界有カ者ノ隠シタル支持ノ下ニ凡ソル策ヲ弄シ又手段ヲ論ゼズ遂ニ八月暴動ヲ起サシム、而モ計畫、手違ヒヨリ失敗ニ歸セリト見ルヤ全市ノ暴動ヲ機會ニ帝復滿ヲ敢行セシモノニテ、其ノ無謀ナル行動ハ到底我々ノ想像シ得ザル処ナリ、……暴動變ジテ日支間ノ衝突トナリ、土肥原ノ投ジタル石ハ我居留民ニ迷惑ヲ及ホセルミナラス、天津ノ治安ヲ攪乱シ帝國ノ威信ト國際的立場ヲ損シタルコト甚ダシク殊ニ彼ノ操縱セル反動分子ガ其ノ命令ニ依リ目ニ余ル行動ヲ執レルハ想像ニ難カラス内外ノ疑惑強キモ無理カニ又次第トナサセラル、同人ニ對シテハ兩度斯ノ如キ暴舉ヲ爲サザル様算ト惣談シタルモ引續キ倒張計畫ヲ進ム居ルガ如ク或ハ近々京津地ヲ於テ再び向等カノ事變發生スベシト懸念セラル。(2)

特別ノ注意カ喚起サレテキルハ、本計畫遂行ニ當リ、土肥原ハ天津ニ於テ領事當局ノ凡ソ忠告ト調停ヲ撓ネツケタバカリテナリ又彼ノ上官ノ指令ヲ無視シタトイフ事實デアリマス。

附註
a. 書誌 三〇〇 記録 四三九四一九七

十一月十二日本庄八村總領事ニ對シ傳信。天津ニ関
シ何等聞イテ居ラズバカリテナク、教目前板垣ヲシテソノニ
就テ急ガマヤラシト天津ニ通知サセシメテアルコトヲ告ゲマン
ク。(a) 板垣モ亦反對訊問ノ際、彼ハサウイウ風ニ電報ヲ打
ツテテ命セラレシコトヲ容認シシコト。(b) 然レ尙政指令ガ守
ラレテラツタカトイフコトハ示サレテ居リマセン。

BB-20

土肥原ハ彼ノ訊問ノ際、彼ハ板垣ニ溥儀ヲ強制的ニ連
レ度クヌヤウニトイハレテコトヲ述ベシタ。(a) 然レ溥儀ガ武装
セテ護衛ノ下ニ營口ヘ進ミテ行カレタコトハ荒川領事ノ報
告通リデアリマス。(b) 彼ハソノ計畫ヲ断ヤムコトヲ挑駁的ニ
遂行スルベシ本件ヲ事實上自分自ラ処理ヲシ、一方彼ノ上
官ハリシヲ後ニナツテ黙認シテヤウナリ訊デアリマス。ソレハ後ノ
段階ニ於テ相変ニス中國ヲ犠牲ニシテトコト、關東軍將
校ノ規律ト態度ニ大況ニ影響ヲ及ボシマシタ。

コトイフガ土肥原ノイッモノ物事ノ処理ヲ法テアリマシタ。トイフ
ハ彼ニ豫メ警告ヲ與ヘルコトハ充分心得テ居リマシタ。ソノ警告
サハ三梁島ガ捕虜ニテヤウニ斯クヤムナク尙見ズナク行動ヲ彼ガ

BB19 a. 音信ニ一九六 記録一五七四。
b. 記録三〇三八一

BB20 a. 音信ニ一九〇 記録一五七八。
b. 音信ニ一九四 四三九一八。
c. 音信ニ一九〇 一五七二九。

DOHAKA Summary 1-85

16-22
 土肥原六郎... (a) 反對証... 土肥原六郎... 領事館員... 接報... 確證... 理由...

土肥原六郎... 領事館員... 接報... 確證... 理由...

10

- 8920 文書記 三〇〇 記録 三六九 四三九
- 8921 〃 三三九 〃 三六九
- 8922 〃 記録 二八六 二六六
- 8923 〃 文書記 三六九 記録 二八六 二六六
- 8924 〃 〃 三六九 〃 二八六 二六六

確 實 根 據 。

1937年11月11日、...

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DOIHARA Summation - 5B

BB-24
 △天津事件ニ於テ三肥原自軍意圖ヲ勘
 三肥原自軍北ニ居ル為ニ豫備動靜ヲ密偵シテ直轄軍ニ
 上同ノ一團自軍ノ戰略的計畫ニ從テ三肥原自軍ニ作テ
 月白及六日ノ天津ニ於テ暴動ヲ策謀スルニシテ自軍
 ニテテテテテ。從テテテテテ自然別ニテテテテテテテ
 リ又。

BB-25
 日本軍自前哨ニ極テ接近シテ遂ニ津浦線ニ於テ
 中國軍隊ノ存在ヲ豫テテテテ日本軍當局ニ同テテテテ
 釀テテテテ天津ノ暴動ノ直ニ天津自軍自軍
 守備隊ヲ增強スルニ陸路ニ部隊ヲ發進スルニテテテ
 進中ニ日本軍ノ錦州附近中國軍ノ餘部ニテテテ
 テテテテテ計畫ヲ提議スルニ自軍自軍自軍自軍
 子テテテ此ノ目的ヲ達成スルニ三肥原自軍自軍自軍
 關東軍ノ計畫ニ良ク適合シテテテテテ。

P. 15

BB-26
 板垣ノ証言ニ依テ三肥原自軍自軍自軍自軍自軍
 於テテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテ
 確テテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテテ
 部隊ヲ發進サシテ居リ且此等部隊ヲ長城内ニ撤退ス

BB-28
 A 書証 五七 七二六頁

BB-26
 B 記錄 三〇三七九、八〇

BB-29

カモ知リテ不可能性も亦數ニ同地、具、情勢ノ確シトスル
 必要中心ト續有テ說明ニシテ、彼、更、部隊撤遣
 結果トテ、何カ混亂ノ可能性乃至ハ危險ニシテ、
 說明致スニシテ、

BB-29

肥原任務ニ関テ此說明入テ、京津地域ニ於テハ
 情勢ト錦州附近中國軍隊、存在ト關係ヲ明ラカ
 スルニ居テ、後若ハ國東軍が取除クニテ、期望ニテ、

屋号本、刺毛トシテ、京津地域ニ突撃、危險ガ有
 ルトニテ、増援ヲ要スルハ、與テ、指撥下ニテ、自
 津駐屯日本軍守備隊、員任テ、テ、ラ、リ、又

國東軍が同前、情勢ヲ確定シタニ、肥原、加東者ヲ發遣
 在場合、ハ、カ、リ、又、錦州が日本軍占領地域
 ト京津地域ト、同ニ、リ、又、テ、若、干、日、本、人、人、口、

ツテ後着地域ニ於テ、動乱が國東軍ニ、長城方面(前
 進)トシテ、依テ、錦州附近中國軍隊ト、云、テ、利、毛、ヲ
 取除ク、口、実、ヲ、テ、シ、又、在、肥、原、國、東、軍、ヲ、移、動、ニ、対、

テ、命、國、ト、テ、假、立、ツ、テ、情、勢、ヲ、作、リ、上、テ、リ、テ、シ、テ、

BB-28 天津駐在日本總領事ニ、天津事件、秘密調

BB-28
 日記録 三〇五七九
 C " 三〇三六二

2011 0000 6510

DOIHARA Summarization - BB

至三肥原小隊隊員係，張辟，音譯，少校，無罪
係，李際春及三千中，無獲獲其也。...

BB-24

十月八日起以李際勤，石三述之經理，人等市政
九日之各員會二十六說明，確證及此...

BB-30

中，李(音譯)係一九三二年二月，胡之華
在國日本軍，在歐於華北，被及在在知...

P. 17

BB-26	A	書記三〇〇	記錄三五五	BB-29	A	書記五	十六頁
	B	〇	三五五五六		B	〇	記錄三九六
	C	〇	三五五六	BB-30	A	記錄三六九	

DOIHARA Sumneron - BE

36-31

善... 征正國日放意大...

隊日液區之船世子鑿鑿于...

之附直之實三六十月二十...

射擊子十直三三三三三三...

動日起三三三三三三三三...

津儀(四)天津天津天津...

中... 國側教...

二... 統元...

三... 國側...

四... 協...

五... 軍...

六... 協...

七... 軍...

八... 協...

九... 軍...

十... 協...

Summary - 83

生三丸現しガリガリアリク、何レ政治的觀見カヲ見テ、重要性ヲ否定スルガ出来テ、此等ノ目的アリクニ、肥原ガ此工作、後師役ヲ勤メ、以テ実行スル人物アリク、謀リタク立証サライマス。

Doihara

58-33 肥原ガ彼ノ梁自報カ表々モ、合人ノ金ヲ、錢ヲ電報、寫リ、當時陸軍大臣南雲⁽⁴⁾ツタヒ証言アリキカ⁽⁴⁾、暴動勃発シ、於テ肥原、天津、在、純粹ニ、偶然ナリト、前回、陳述⁽⁴⁾ニ、全然信ヲ置キ得ズトシ、天津ニ於テ、中國側保安隊ヲ買収スルニ、肥原ガ金⁽⁴⁾ヲ武器ヲ使用シ、言フニ、肥原ニ對シ、罪状ヲ極壇⁽⁴⁾又否認シ、試ミ、然レ、極壇、同工作ニ於テ、共犯者ナリトシ、檢察側、彼ヲ否認、秘密調査ニ、根據ヲ置キ、誤リ、手証⁽⁴⁾ヨリ、反特⁽⁴⁾、梁自報、信憑性、如何ニ在テ、モ、日⁽⁴⁾、提議⁽⁴⁾。

河北⁽⁴⁾ニ於テ、肥原、活動

58-34

導儀トシテ、人物、傀儡⁽⁴⁾ガ新國家⁽⁴⁾、構成⁽⁴⁾、爲⁽⁴⁾、川⁽⁴⁾、殘部、次第⁽⁴⁾、領⁽⁴⁾、一九三三年一月二十六日、肥原、再⁽⁴⁾、哈爾濱⁽⁴⁾、於⁽⁴⁾、日⁽⁴⁾、軍⁽⁴⁾、特⁽⁴⁾、務⁽⁴⁾、機⁽⁴⁾、關⁽⁴⁾、職⁽⁴⁾、ヲ、引⁽⁴⁾、越⁽⁴⁾、ガ、爲⁽⁴⁾、造⁽⁴⁾、サ⁽⁴⁾、レ⁽⁴⁾、タ⁽⁴⁾。

P. 19

- 58-33 A 記錄 三三五九六、七
- B " 一九九〇九
- C " 三〇三二八
- 58-34 A 書記 五七 七九頁

DOIHARA Summation - 45
BB-31

彼等(西)送之(中)國(歸)者(一)人(此)等(成)功(之)
之(說明)之(者)(a) 惟(其)自(己)之(其)力(下)保(口)之(成)功(之)
元(河)之(土)肥(原)亦(無)接(土)肥(原)之(三)少(將)戰(略)
(諸)國(題)之(解)決(之)之(於)及(三)少(將)新(政)府(取)
之(今)之(取)心(之)人(物)之(手)中(收)之(口)之(於)亦(研)究(之)
之(三)之(者)

實際(全)滿洲(自)本(支)配(下)置(之)滿(洲)國(之)
傀儡(國)家(設)立(之)土(肥)原(一)九(三)三(年)四(月)十(日)
之(少)將(三)少(將)進(之)之(者)(a)

VII 土肥原三河片荒員統制

BB-38

一九三三年九月六日以來數月(阿)片(在)日(本)之(三)少(將)
之(間)之(者)(a) 土(肥)原(公)當(時)日(本)之(少)將(之)者(一)九
三(三)年(十)月(十)三(日)以(奉)天(總)領(事)外(務)大(臣)澤(田(幸)三
宛(之)信(之)事(之)報(道)依(之)市(政)府(實)金(部)進
目(的)以(之)阿(片)之(專)賣(之)之(當)札(之)發(行)之(令)之(以)自(報)
告(之)之(之)該(報)告(書)亦(阿)片(之)專(賣)之(當)札(之)發(行)
(之)事(之)計(劃)之(部)且(其)化(之)之(日)之(附)之(如)之(者)(a)

1021

A 記錄三三〇

BB-38 A 書記三式 書號六六一

A 書信一〇四

書號六九五

之 三 八 〇

三 〇 三七五〇 書號三三三〇〇

DOHARA Sumio

... 國家之發展 ... 社會之進步 ... 經濟之繁榮 ... 政治之清明 ... 文化之昌盛 ... 民族之團結 ... 國家之統一 ... 國家之獨立 ... 國家之自由 ... 國家之平等 ... 國家之正義 ... 國家之和平 ... 國家之繁榮 ... 國家之昌盛 ... 國家之強盛 ... 國家之偉大 ... 國家之光榮 ... 國家之尊嚴 ... 國家之榮耀 ... 國家之幸福 ... 國家之快樂 ... 國家之健康 ... 國家之美麗 ... 國家之和諧 ... 國家之統一 ... 國家之獨立 ... 國家之自由 ... 國家之平等 ... 國家之正義 ... 國家之和平 ... 國家之繁榮 ... 國家之昌盛 ... 國家之強盛 ... 國家之偉大 ... 國家之光榮 ... 國家之尊嚴 ... 國家之榮耀 ... 國家之幸福 ... 國家之快樂 ... 國家之健康 ... 國家之美麗 ... 國家之和諧 ...

VIII 内蒙古自治区之成立及其發展

1941

日本據滿洲之事實 ... 滿洲國之成立 ... 滿洲國之發展 ... 滿洲國之獨立 ... 滿洲國之自由 ... 滿洲國之平等 ... 滿洲國之正義 ... 滿洲國之和平 ... 滿洲國之繁榮 ... 滿洲國之昌盛 ... 滿洲國之強盛 ... 滿洲國之偉大 ... 滿洲國之光榮 ... 滿洲國之尊嚴 ... 滿洲國之榮耀 ... 滿洲國之幸福 ... 滿洲國之快樂 ... 滿洲國之健康 ... 滿洲國之美麗 ... 滿洲國之和諧 ...

1942

... 滿洲國之發展 ... 滿洲國之進步 ... 滿洲國之繁榮 ... 滿洲國之清明 ... 滿洲國之昌盛 ... 滿洲國之團結 ... 滿洲國之統一 ... 滿洲國之獨立 ... 滿洲國之自由 ... 滿洲國之平等 ... 滿洲國之正義 ... 滿洲國之和平 ... 滿洲國之繁榮 ... 滿洲國之昌盛 ... 滿洲國之強盛 ... 滿洲國之偉大 ... 滿洲國之光榮 ... 滿洲國之尊嚴 ... 滿洲國之榮耀 ... 滿洲國之幸福 ... 滿洲國之快樂 ... 滿洲國之健康 ... 滿洲國之美麗 ... 滿洲國之和諧 ...

223

滿洲國之發展

... 滿洲國之發展 ... 滿洲國之進步 ... 滿洲國之繁榮 ... 滿洲國之清明 ... 滿洲國之昌盛 ... 滿洲國之團結 ... 滿洲國之統一 ... 滿洲國之獨立 ... 滿洲國之自由 ... 滿洲國之平等 ... 滿洲國之正義 ... 滿洲國之和平 ... 滿洲國之繁榮 ... 滿洲國之昌盛 ... 滿洲國之強盛 ... 滿洲國之偉大 ... 滿洲國之光榮 ... 滿洲國之尊嚴 ... 滿洲國之榮耀 ... 滿洲國之幸福 ... 滿洲國之快樂 ... 滿洲國之健康 ... 滿洲國之美麗 ... 滿洲國之和諧 ...

Wihara Samadhi - 2

BR-40

... 其東... 音人... 泰... 哈爾省... 因... 五... 基... 人... 盟...

BR-40

... 區... 其... 依... 心... 後... 亦... 下...

BR

BR-40

... 么... 另... 另...

BR-40

... 另... 另...

BR-40

... 另... 另...

DOIHARA Summation - B5

B5-48

勸誘方所願之結果予實之得方以時士記實之
強硬手段被之致人心中。即其後論士論實之
之要義之中心。其意之中心。其意之中心。其意之中心。
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間。其法。其法。其法。其法。其法。其法。其法。其法。
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B5-49

之言。文後。向。其法。其法。其法。其法。其法。其法。其法。
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B5-50

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1929

B5-45

其法 三三六

B5-50

其法 三三六

B5-49

其法 三三六

B5-49

其法 三三六

其法 三三六

BB-57 a 記録 三〇三六

a 書証 一〇四

c. 〃 一九九四一五

記録 六九六

BB-57 a 記録 二一三四

b. 〃 二二〇三

a. 書証 二〇三六

BB-57 a 記録 二〇三六

b. 〃 二二〇三

c. 〃 三〇三

記録

1937年3月、龍原、日本内閣が、

長、三〇三日、一九三六年三月、

開始後、彼、十四師團、率、日本國、

陸軍、参加、一九三六年、

鐵道、並びに、龍原、日本、

下二、日本、皇軍、命、隊、對、之、名、

龍原、扶南、彼、龍原、對、之、殺、

1936年3月7日、龍原、内閣、對、日本、

華北、政權、が、警察、政權、ヲ、ノ、孩、

5000 5000 5000 5000

0159 0009 1207

DUIHARA Summe Ton 58

BB-58

彼人兵部... 姓名... 証人... 通... 彼... 中...
 國... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証...
 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証...
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BB-59

彼人成功... 政治的... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証... 証...
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58

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POHARA Summer 1951

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DOHAKA Summation - 113

83-70

138-57

下ノ二ノ解釋ニ至リテ是レノ二ノ
 証據ハ斯レニ解釋ノ後ニ檢證ニ至リテ是レノ
 又五ノ二ノ手記ニ「天ノ極星ハ皆ハ遠部ノ極星ニ
 速ニ書キ極星ノ極星ヲ以テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ
 極星ニ出不得ト云フ又其ノ極星ヲ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 極星ニ於テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 收養所ノ次ヲ以テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 國ノ極星ニ於テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 岸ノ後極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 下ノ二ノ極星ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 目ノ極星ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 全証集果ガナリテ其ノ一ノ極星

總論

終リニ臨ミテ是レノ極星ニ於テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 新造ハ左ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 事ノ事ニ依リテ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
 新因案ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星
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新因案ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星ニ以テ其ノ一ノ極星

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DOIHARA Sumation 33

新國歌第一卷...
 新國歌第二卷...
 新國歌第三卷...
 新國歌第四卷...
 新國歌第五卷...
 新國歌第六卷...
 新國歌第七卷...
 新國歌第八卷...
 新國歌第九卷...
 新國歌第十卷...
 新國歌第十一卷...
 新國歌第十二卷...
 新國歌第十三卷...
 新國歌第十四卷...
 新國歌第十五卷...

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0 159 0009 12 14

DŌHIHARA Summation BB
Errata sheets

訂正表 (BB) 土肥原最終報告

- 三十三頁 十四行 「聯邦共和國」ト下ルヲ「聯邦及蒙古軍隊」ト改ム。
- 三十七頁 六行 項目十三ト下ルヲ「項目第三第三第六第十第十十一及第十三」ト改ム。
- 三十七頁 十九行間 「訴因第三六項目第十」ヲ挿入スル。
- 三十七頁 十三行間 「訴因第三六項目第十」ヲ挿入スル。
- 三十七頁 十三行間 「訴因第五十一項目第十」ヲ挿入スル。
- 三十三頁 十一行間 以下、BB-579a 及 BB-579b 註ニ其脚註ヲ挿入スル。

BB-579a
辯護側証人守垣ハ上述ニ相會議ニ決定シ内容トハ書証
第三四五七号ノ證據價値ヲ弱メト試メ同會議ニ決定シ會
ヲ斯ルカニ文書ニ彼署名無キトシ土肥原正十原本下付
及メカニ(心) 茲ニ指摘スルキコトハ檢察側ノ此文書が原本
ナラズト主張スルニ居ラヌコトヲ認メテアリマシ。

P1.

添附せる證明書が証明に如る右文書が外務省公署に書綴
 一部に於てありて之を以て之なり。五相會議は決定
 を含む文書に何處も提出せしむるが辯護側は其議中を
 するを以て之なり。其等、正確性を就て何人何國も之を
 せしむる。

半信の証言に於て中國問題特別委員公致置國
 不以決定の答を否認せしむ。④ 明らに彼は五相會議
 之法機關を以て之を從之ノ權限内、斯を行政機關が設
 置を得んは其からしむる論法に甚しき否認根據を置
 けり。⑤ 土肥原、特別委員會に中國に派遣の
 決定を以て若干の決定を元に入内自六日、閣會議程
 出せる採用に於ては其の事實に於て時、一人、証人の前
 取らるる、その時を及駁すに代り、その記憶は其を裁
 断に供すに之を以て之なり。⑥ 又、新政權設置の爲中
 國要人に連絡して同種任務を與へる中國に派遣せしむる
 側証人の影信が、彼に五相會議、會議後、その任務を
 與へしむる証言に之を以て之を以て之なり。⑦ 檢察側
 更に土肥原(本人及び當時陸軍大臣)の松垣(の
 西名)土肥原、出張のその性質、任務を以て之を以て之を認

51 21 6000 651 0

Project Summary - BB
Cuba Island

2000-2001 (1/15/00 - 12/31/00) Jan 2001. The first year of the project was spent on the preparation of the project plan and the collection of baseline data. The second year was spent on the implementation of the project and the collection of data. The third year was spent on the analysis of the data and the preparation of the final report.

Year	Month	Activity	Personnel
2000	Jan	Project planning	1 person
2000	Feb	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Mar	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Apr	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	May	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Jun	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Jul	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Aug	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Sep	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Oct	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Nov	Baseline data collection	2 people
2000	Dec	Baseline data collection	2 people
2001	Jan	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Feb	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Mar	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Apr	Project implementation	2 people
2001	May	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Jun	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Jul	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Aug	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Sep	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Oct	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Nov	Project implementation	2 people
2001	Dec	Project implementation	2 people

0 159 0009 12 18

HOSHINO, Naoki

HOSHINO has been charged under Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, Seventeen, Nineteen, Twenty, Twenty-One, Twenty-Two, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Four, Twenty-Five, Twenty-Seven, Twenty-Eight, Twenty-Nine, Thirty, Thirty-One, Thirty-Two, Thirty-Three, Thirty-Four, Thirty-Five, Thirty-Seven, Thirty-Eight, Thirty-Nine, Forty, Forty-One, Forty-Two, Forty-Three, Forty-Four, Fifty-Two, Fifty-Three, Fifty-Four and Fifty-Five.

A. Period from July 1932 to July 1940, Manchuria Period.

GG-1. HOSHINO was director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Manchukuo Ministry of Finance^{a.} from July 1932 until July 1936, when he was appointed Finance Vice Minister.^{b.} In December of 1936 he was appointed Chief of the General Affairs Board.^{c.} He continued to hold both these appointments until he returned to Japan in July 1940, when he was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the second KONOE Cabinet and President of the Planning Board.^{d.}

GG-2. As Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Finance Ministry he had constant liaison with the Kwantung Army.^{a.} This liaison was established to deal with the many matters that arose as a result of the Japanese-Manchurian Treaty.^{b.} These matters included the flotation of Manchukuo public bonds in Japan, the support of the Kwantung Army being deemed necessary to ensure

GG-1.

- a. T. 5119-20
- b. Ex. 109, T. 5134-5
- c. T. 5135
- d. T. 5136

GG-2.

- a. T. 5120
- b. T. 5121

(36-2) c.
the success of the flotation.

67-3. Originally, the Kwantung Army administration was separate from that of the Railroad Zone although the Commander of the Kwantung Army was also the Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory. The Consulates were also separate. In 1933, however, after HOSHINO arrived in Manchuria, a change was made. The Kwantung Army Commander became the Japanese Ambassador to Peking and the Ambassador controlled the Consulates, the Manchurian Railway and the Kwantung Leased Territory. In 1934 another reorganization took place. There was established in Tokyo the Manchurian Affairs Bureau (of which the War Minister was President) which was under Cabinet supervision. The Prime Minister supervised the activities of the Ambassador while, in addition, the Foreign Minister supervised the purely diplomatic part of the Ambassador's functions. The effect of the reorganization was that the Commander of the Kwantung Army had control of the whole of the Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria, including diplomatic matters, the Kwantung Bureau, the Leased Territory and the South Manchurian Railway Company.

68-1. This unification of control and the bestowal in the Kwantung Army Commander of such comprehensive functions and powers undoubtedly made it easier for Japan to carry out the exploitation of Manchuria for her own purposes while the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had on paper some measure of control over the Commander's actions, the fact that the War Minister was President of the Manchurian Affairs Board enabled

69-2.
c. T. 5124

67-3.
c. T. 5122
d. T. 5122
c. T. 5140: T. 5521
T. 5114

(66-4)

the Army to dominate the whole situation. The defendant MINAMI was the first to hold the dual position of Commander of the Kwantung Army and Ambassador.

As to the Army's domination, HOSHINO stated, "Of course there is a very close connection between the Kwantung Army and the Manchurian Government and usually it represented pretty much the opinion of the Army."^{a.} HOSHINO admitted that when he was Chief of the General Affairs Board he kept a very close connection with the Kwantung Army. He met the Commander often, perhaps once or twice a month, and he met the other officials more often.

66-5. It is submitted that HOSHINO's activities from July 1932 until 1936 serve to show his participation in and responsibility for the conspiracies, and apart from any other consideration, in the light of all the evidence his association during this period with the Kwantung Army is highly significant, and it is suggested that this association by itself is sufficient to implicate him.

I. HOSHINO as Chief of the General Affairs Board (Dec. 1936- July 1940).

66-6. There can be no doubt that the Chief of the General Affairs Board exercised a powerful, if not a completely dominant, influence in the Manchukuoan administration. Tu-Yi stated that this official had more power than even the Prime Minister^{c.} and that, although he acted under the orders of the Kwantung Army, he held a position which had most of the powers in running the affairs of the state.^{b.} The Defense witness MATSUKI who hel

66-4.

S. T. 5106
S. T. 5159

66-5.

S. T. 5007
S. T. 5009

(32-6)

several important positions in the Manchukuo administration, including those of Chief of the Secretariat of the General Affairs Board, and later Deputy Chief of the Board,^{c.} described the functions of the Board which he claimed was under the immediate control of the Prime Minister.^{d.} He also claimed that the Chief of the Board was not subject to the direction of the Kwantung Army. No doubt, technically the Chief of the Board was subordinate to the Prime Minister but, in the submission of the Prosecution, the evidence as a whole makes it perfectly clear that in fact the Manchukuo Government, including the Prime Minister, was completely dominated by Japan, and in the administration of the Government, the Japanese officials and, particularly the Chief of the General Affairs Board, held the power.

GG-7. HOSHINO himself stated that the Board was one of the most important divisions of the Government,^{e.} and it is of special significance that, as admitted by the Defense witness MATSUKI,^{h.} the Chief of the Board was from the outset a Japanese subject. The real position with respect to the power and influence of the Chief of the General Affairs Board can be best appreciated by a consideration of the evidence relating to the Japanese domination of Manchuria, including the following:

A. Evidence showing first steps in domination.

- GG-8. 1. Ex. 280, T. 4257 - Letter dated March 10th, 1932 from Pu-Yi to the Commander of the Kwantung Army. The proposals in this letter were plainly dictated by the Japanese authorities.^{i.}

GG-6.

- c. T. 29157-8
d. T. 20112

GG-7.

- a. T. 5135
b. T. 20,162

GG-8.

- a. Ex. 280, T. 4257, 4260

0159 0010 1223

(30-2)

2. The action taken by Japan almost immediately after the Manchurian Incident to secure control of the Manchurian telegraph and telephone communications. See Ex. 57 (Lytton Report) at p. 97 and Exs. 231 and 232.^{b.} The drastic and comprehensive nature of the control obtained by Japan is very significant as is also the stipulation on p. 3 of Ex. 231 that the control provisions (including the provision that in case of dispute between the supervising authorities the decision should be made by the Japanese authorities) should be contained not in the Treaty but in "secret official exchange documents."
3. The Japanese Cabinet decision of August 24th, 1937,^{c.} laying down the policy with regard to Manchuria. This provided that "positive guidance is concerted in matters relative to Manchuria's fundamental institutions, national defence, public order, foreign policy and basic matters important in carrying out Japanese-Manchurian economies and its important internal affairs concerning the establishment of the foundation of the empire." It also provided (after reserving "positive guidance" over practically every activity necessary to hold the control of Manchuria) that "other matters are entrusted to the liberal activities of the authorities of Manchuria." Of special significance are the provisions that "directives toward Manchuria" shall be

11-2.

b. T. 2919-2925
c. Ex. 232, T. 2926

(20-8)

executed substantially by Japanese officials under the jurisdiction of the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the Ambassador of Japan and that in the meanwhile no political parties or organizations would be allowed.

4. Further decisions of the Japanese Cabinet with regard to Manchurian affairs ^{d.} throw additional light on nature and extent of the Japanese influence.
5. The South Manchurian Railway Company took over the management of all Chinese railroads after the Manchurian Incident ^{e.} and the influence of the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Government in respect to the Company has been shown.
6. Ex. 4431 shows that the Manchukuo Government bought from Russia the China Eastern Railway and Japan in March 1935 guaranteed performance by that Government of its obligations under the terms of purchase and thereby strengthened her grip over Manchuria.

20-9.

B. Domination through Joint Economic Committee.

1. Ex. 850 ^{b.} contains a report of the discussions at a Privy Council meeting in connection with the proposed agreement with Manchukuo for the setting up of a Joint Economic Committee and also the agreement itself. The contents of this document are of outstand-

20-6.

- a. Ex. 238, T. 5039
- b. Ex. 441A, T. 5036
- c. Ex. 439, T. 5021
- d. Ex. 443A, T. 5042

20-9.

- a. Ex. 950, T. 5418

(13-9)

ing importance, not only because the effect of the agreement was to bind completely the economies of the two countries, but also because the agreement and the Privy Council discussions show that care had been taken to ensure that Japan should always be able to control the Committee. As the Committee comprised four representatives from each country, the constitution on its face was fair and reasonable but as the Defendant HIROTA stated "the set up of the Committee may apparently seem equal on the part of both countries but in reality it is not." This inequality in favor of Japan was effected by providing that one of the four Manchukuo representatives should be the Chief of the General Affairs Board who, stated HIROTA, "is and will be a Japanese forever, I am confident".

2. As Chief of the General Affairs Board from December 1936, HOSHIKO was a member of the Committee presumably representing Manchukuo, but as HIROTA explained to the Privy Council it was HOSHIKO's "primary duty to see that there will not be any opposition between Japan and Manchukuo." HIROTA proceeds "In case the Manchukuo members of the Committee should purposely scheme to act against Japan's interests..... the Chief of the General State Affairs (i.e. the General Affairs Board) will take proper measures after giving due consideration to the interests of both countries. It will be his duty to lead

62-1.

1. Ex. 850, Page 4
2. Ex. 850, Page 6
3. Ex. 850, Page 4

(66-9)

Manchukuo in such a way that such fear (i.e. of Japan being at any disadvantage) would be unnecessary.^{6.} It will be observed, therefore, that in actual fact the control of the Committee and its very important activities was in the hands of Japan, and HOSHINO must, of course, have been fully aware of the powers he had under the agreement, the reasons therefor and the sham character of the apparently equal representation.

3. HOSHINO was questioned about this Committee and he explained that any difference of opinion between Japan and Manchukuo with regard to the use of Manchurian resources was settled by the Committee. He went on to say that each country had four representatives, but he did not explain that the apparently equal voting power was in reality unequal and that Japan had effective control. He also explained that the "final agreement" among the Committee members was generally unanimous, but it would appear that unanimity was obtained after "many discussions", and it may be inferred that the Manchukuo members fully realized that there was no object in their continuing to oppose the Japanese indefinitely.

66-10. Treaty and policy showing Japanese domination.

1. On June 10th, 1931 a treaty was made between Japan and Manchukuo whereby the Japanese in Manchuria were given equal rights with those held by the Manchurians.^{8.}

66-9.
a. Ex. 850, page 4
b. T. 5177
c. T. 5178

66-10.
a. Ex. 237, T. 2044

0159 0010 1227

(03-10)

2. The real object of Japanese policy with regard to Manchuria (as well as other countries) is shown by Ex. 979.^{a.} This document contains the decisions on National Policy made on August 11, 1936 by the Prime Minister and the War, Navy, Finance and Foreign Ministers. An examination of this policy leaves no doubt of the aggressive and expansionist nature of the Japanese plans and of the realization that to achieve their ends they were prepared to wage war.

03-11. Manchukuo Five-Year Industrial Plan

1. HOSHINO admitted that he had a great deal to do with the preparation of the financial parts of the Plan^{b.} and that in connection with the development of the Plan he worked with the Defendant ITASAKI. He also stated that the Commander of the Kwantung Army made the final decisions as to what should be included in the Plan.^{b.} The contents of the Plan and of the Revisions of the Plan are contained in Exs. 445 and 446.^{c.} Significantly, Ex. 446 is headed "Headquarters of the Kwantung Army." Stated briefly the Plans and the Revisions show very clearly that Japan's real object was to exploit the resources of Manchuria for the benefit of Japan. They also show how completely Japan dominated and controlled Manchuria and they emphasize the importance of Manchuria and its resources to what is called Japan's "National Defense."

03-10.

a. Ex. 979, T. 9543;
 Ex. 217, T. 2728;
 T. 22,077.

03-11.

a. T. 5106
 b. T. 5128
 c. Ex. 446, T. 5069;
 Ex. 445, T. 5052.

0 159 00 10 1228

(30-11)

It cannot be doubted, it is suggested, that the Plan was conceived, formulated and put into effect by Japan (and the Kwantung Army) as a necessary part of her aggressive and expansionist intentions.

2. HOSHIKO stated that the Japanese policy was to develop Manchuria first as a source for raw materials for Japanese industries and secondly as a place to which the expanding Japanese population could emigrate. ^{d.} and ^{e.} that the Japanese Army policy was the same. It is submitted that this explanation while undoubtedly true so far as it goes is plainly incomplete. All the evidence (and particularly the evidence with regard to the Five-Year Plan) shows that the Japanese policy was much more than an economic one and that it aimed at the domination of the whole of East Asia.

3. It should be noted that the Defense witness KATAYAMA ^{f.} stated that the Five-Year Plan was extended at Japan's request after the outbreak of the China Incident, but as the Plan was directed towards assisting the prosecution of the Incident rather than the development of Manchuria, the benefit did not accrue to that country. It is also submitted that the Five-Year Plan is directly related to the decisions as to National Policy made on August 13, 1936 and to the Japanese plans for industrial expansion for war purposes contained in Ex. 841 and 842.

30-11.

- d. T. 5160
- e. T. 5165
- f. T. 12,541
- g. Ex. 879, T. 8543
- Ex. 841, T. 8361
- Ex. 842, T. 8264

GG-12. Extent of Domination - Evidence of:

1. Evidence as to the progress of economic construction in Manchukuo and as to the progress in planning for the comprehensive expansion of productive power throughout Japan, Manchukuo and North China is contained in Exs. 449^{a.} and 450^{b.}. The latter document contains a striking reference to the development of Manchukuo as "an integral part and an essential factor in the establishment of the co-prosperity sphere of Greater East Asia." The value of this evidence is that it shows the extent of Japan's domination of Manchukuo and also the object to further Japan's expansion plans.

GG-17. Domination of Manchukuo administration by Japanese officials.

1. It was the intention of the Japanese from the outset that in the administration of the new state of Manchukuo Japanese officials should have the effective control. It was proposed that on the recommendation of the Kwantung Army Japanese nationals should be appointed as councillors and also as officers of the central and local government, and the dismissal of these persons should require the approval of the Army.^{a.} According to the Defense witness UDA,^{b.} provision for the employment of Japanese nationals was included in an appendix to the Japan-Manchukuo Treaty.^{c.}
2. Pu-Yi gave evidence that when the Defendant IWAGAMI

GG-12.

- a. Ex. 449, T. 5103
- b. Ex. 450, T. 5105

GG-13.

- a. Ex. 280, T. 4257
- b. T. 20,115
- c. Ex. 440, T. 5032; a. 4259.

(GG-13)

asked him to become head of the new state he stipulated that Japanese officials should be employed ^{d.} and that this policy was at once adopted is shown by the Lytton Report, ^{e.} which at pp. 99, 100 and 106 deals with this subject. The Report states that Japanese nationals were attached to all the important departments and that there were nearly 200 Japanese officials in the Central Government alone, without taking into account those in local governments or the War Office and Military Force or in government enterprises. As the Report is dated September 1932, it is plain that no time had been lost in carrying out the policy.

3. The defense witnesses UEDA, MATSUKI and MUTO, Tomio, referred in their evidence to this subject, ^{f.} the former claiming that the Manchukuo Government was solely responsible for the appointment of Japanese officials. It is significant that none of these witnesses challenges in any way the statements in the Lytton Report and no serious attempt is made by them or by any other witness to challenge the Prosecution's contention that these officials dominated the administration. MATSUKI stated that a Japanese national was made a Vice-Minister in June 1932 and later all Vice-Ministers were Japanese. ^{g.}
4. PuYi gave evidence that the Japanese "ran the show" ^{h.} and that the real administration was carried out at weekly meetings presided over by the (Japanese) Chief

GG-13.

- d. T. 3962, T. 3975
 e. Ex. 57, T. 513
 f. T. 20,115; T. 20,170;
 T. 20,398
 g. T. 20,163

GG-13.

- h. T. 3992

0 159 00 10 123 1

(22-13)

of the General Affairs Board and attended by the various (Wangse) Vice-Ministers and the Chief of the Foreign Section of the Kwantung Army. It is submitted that the evidence establishes that in order to bring about or assist in bringing about the domination of Manchuria by Japan, the practical control of the administration was secured by having placed in important positions a large number of Japanese officials. This policy was carried out continuously after the Manchurian Incident and continued until the end of the war.

5. It is also submitted that YOSHINO is responsible in a large measure for the carrying out of this policy. From July 1932 until July 1940, he held important appointments in the administration, particularly from December 1935 onwards, when he was Chief of the General Affairs Bureau. The witness NAMBA stated that YOSHINO requested that a suitable Japanese official be sent to Manchuria for the Opium Monopoly Bureau and he, NAMBA, was chosen. In his evidence he stated that before taking up his appointment he discussed the whole matter with YOSHINO in Tokyo. It seems fair to assume that YOSHINO took a leading part in obtaining other Japanese officials.

22-14. Evidence of Pu-Yi as to Japanese Domination.

1. This evidence shows that Pu-Yi was a mere puppet and that the so-called independent government of Manchuria was completely dominated by Japan and particularly by

22-15.

1. T. 3923
2. T. 2463, T. 20,356;
3. 22,337.

(GG-14)

by the Kwantung Army. This evidence is important in proving the guilt of HOSHINO. Not only does his evidence establish the fact of Japanese domination but it also establishes that HOSHINO played a leading part in bringing about this domination. It shows the power and influence exerted by the Chief of the General Affairs Board,^{a.} and that he acted under the orders of the Kwantung Army.^{b.} The Chinese were not able to oppose what the Japanese did.^{c.} It shows that all Manchurian industries and economic affairs were under Japanese control; the Chinese were not allowed to take part; and that HOSHINO was directly concerned with this.^{d.} The Bureau of Monopolies was under Japanese control^{e.} and had extensive powers which were used to the prejudice of the Manchurians.^{f.} The Manchurians were exploited for the benefit of the Japanese with respect to compulsory savings,^{g.} the ownership of land, and labor service.^{h.}

For all these matters HOSHINO was directly responsible and it is submitted that this evidence shows very clearly the important part played by him in furthering the conspiracy.^{i.}

GG-15. Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation as a Factor in the Domination of Manchuria.

1. HOSHINO stated that in 1937 a plan was formulated with the object of combining and developing Manchukuo heavy

GG-14.

- a. T. 3993
- b. T. 4020
- c. T. 3994-6
- d. T. 4021-2
- e. T. 4024-5
- f. T. 4028-31
- g. T. 4032
- h. T. 4033-6
- i. T. 4036-7

(9-15)

industrials. These were formerly under the South Manchurian Railway Company and MATSUOKA was at first doubtful about the expediency of the Plan although eventually he agreed. The Kwantung Army agreed also. The General Affairs Board (of which HOSHINO was Chief) assisted in the preparation of the special laws required in connection with the formation of the Corporation. In the submission of the Prosecution, in view of the important, indeed, the all important leading part taken by HOSHINO in bringing about the Japanese domination of Manchukuo, his participation in the conspiracies is beyond doubt. He held for a long period positions in the administration which gave him very important powers and enabled him to exercise a very strong influence in the affairs of the State and indeed to control them. He was throughout in close liaison with the real power in Manchuria, the Commander in Chief of Staff and other officers of the Kwantung Army. The evidence of Japanese domination referred to above is only a part of the evidence on this subject which has been presented, and the effect of all that evidence is to prove a deliberate policy on the part of Japan to exploit Manchuria for its own purposes, a policy which HOSHINO did all in his power to carry out.

3. TOJO testified that HOSHINO was among the five most important Japanese figures in Manchuria.

9-15.

- a. T. 5128-9
- b. T. 5130
- c. T. 30,576

II. HOSHINO's connection with the Opium Traffic. a.
GG-16. The affidavit of the defense witness TAMBA shows

that HOSHINO in September or October 1932, when he was in charge of the General Affairs Bureau of the Finance Ministry, took a leading part in arranging for TAMBA to go to Manchuria for employment in the Opium Monopoly Bureau. It is significant that, as is shown by paragraph 3 of Ex. 2463, the revenue aspect was evidently considered by HOSHINO as more important than the suppression of the traffic.

GG-17. HOSHINO negotiated a large loan from Japan, the security for which included the profits of the opium monopoly office. a. HOSHINO stated that he discussed the matter with MIYAO, Nobuyoshi, the then Commander of the Manchurian Army, with the object, according to him, of obtaining "the support" of the Army. b. As is shown by Ex. 227, the Chief of Staff of that Army had taken the initiative in June 1932 in a telegram to the War Minister to have the revenue from the Opium Monopoly increased, and the raising of the loan was the result.

GG-18. The profits from opium were approximately as follows: 1933 ¥300,000; 1934 ¥1,200,000; and 1935 ¥10,000,000. Thereafter the profits increased in the same ratio, being ¥30,000,000 in one year and in the next ¥30,000,000.

GG-19. It is suggested that the Court should accept TAMBA's original figures as correct. His evasiveness on cross-examination and the inconsistencies between his testimony on cross-examination and his affidavit show the evidence is submitted in an attempt to deceive the Tribunal, whereas there is no reason for doubting

GG-16.
a. Ex. 2463, T. 20355;
20365.

GG-17.
a. Ex. 375, T. 4665
b. T. 5121
c. T. 4670-2

GG-18.
a. Ex. 2463, p. 4; T. 20,330-1;
T. 20,349-50; T. 20,355.

7 159 00 10 1235

(33-19)
the accuracy and truthfulness of his original affidavit.^{P.} In view of his position in the Manchukuo Finance Ministry and later as Chief of the General Affairs Board, HOSHINO was very much concerned with the Manchukuo Budget and revenues.

III. HOSHINO's speech to the Economic Conference, December 13-20, 1938.

The report of HOSHINO's speech to the Economic Conference was introduced into evidence during the cross-examination of the Defense witness CBATA.^{A.} This witness declared that the China Incident was a disappointment to HOSHINO and he wanted it terminated as soon as possible. HOSHINO's speech shows beyond the possibility of any doubt that he regarded the Incident as "holy" and that it had his full approval. He expressed his approval of the Manchurian Incident which he described as the awakening of East Asia, and he stated that the recent China Incident was a development and expansion of the Manchurian Incident. He approved of the establishment of the new governments in North and Central China and on the Mongolian Border and advocated the construction of a new East Asia.

33-21. The whole speech and particularly the portion which appears at pp. 32155-7 of the Transcript is a strong indictment of HOSHINO and serves to implicate him in a positive and direct way in the conspiracies. It is not surprising that in April 1940 he was decorated for Meritorious Service in the China Affair.^{P.}

5. HOSHINO's appointment to the Second KONO Cabinet, and as President of the Planning Board.

33-19.
P. X. 2453, T. 20356.

33-20.
P. X. 32154, T. 20,159

33-21.
P. X. 109, T. 710.

20-20. HOSHINO's official connection with the Manchukuo Government ceased on July 21, 1940, when he was appointed to the Second KONO Cabinet. It may be reasonably assumed that he had some knowledge of the troubles that threatened the YONAI Cabinet and eventually destroyed it. It seems unlikely that the invitation to join the new Cabinet was not preceded by any negotiation or discussions.

20-23. HOSHINO had never previously held a Cabinet appointment, nor any appointment in Japan of a political or quasi-political nature. TOJO, MATSUOKA and OHASHI (Vice-Foreign Minister) who were appointed at the same time were also without previous Cabinet experience. It is surely significant that these four men all of whom had been prominent in Manchuria and were associated more or less closely with the Kwantung Army entered the Japanese Cabinet at the same time and it is submitted that their appointments constituted a victory for the Kwantung Army. It will be recalled that on August 2nd, 1940, OHTA in a telegram to the German Foreign Minister referred to OHASHI's appointment as signifying the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian Group in the new Government.

20-24. It seems reasonable to contend that the Army and particularly the Kwantung Army were responsible for HOSHINO's appointment to the Cabinet and the Presidency of the Planning Board. How else can his appointment be explained? He had been away from Japan for eight years. He had never previously held office of this kind. The Army had brought about the fall of

20-23.

a. No. 538, T-6265

(13-24)
the YOKAI Cabinet. The Manchurian Group evidently had considerable influence as is shown by the appointments of TOJO, MATSUOKA, OKASHI AND HOSHINO. It is most unlikely that HOSHINO would have been selected unless it was known that he favored the militaristic expansion policy. He had shown by his speech in December 1938 that he was an ardent supporter of this policy; and his work in Manchuria undoubtedly demonstrated his loyalty to it.

63-25. HOSHINO has not explained how he came to be appointed nor has any evidence on the matter been given by any other witness. In all the circumstances it would appear to be a fair and reasonable inference that his selection was due to its being known that he was a supporter of the aggressive expansion policy (in other words a member of the conspiracies), and that his appointment was a step in the conspiracies and further, that HOSHINO in accepting appointment did so with the intention of assisting the execution of the policy.

C. Period from July 22nd 1940 to April 4th 1941.

66-26. During the period from July 22, 1940 to April 4, 1941, HOSHINO was President of the Planning Board and a member of the Cabinet without portfolio.

I. Evidence re Planning Board Activities.

67-27. HOSHINO in his interrogations gave the following information about the Planning Board. He stated that the Planning Board was formed "to collaborate the various departments and to make future plans for the coming year".⁸ The Board was concerned with the general arrangements of the various departments and the

67-27.

a. T. 5137

(26-27)

formation of production plans and material distribution plans and such other matters as transportation.^{b.} The material distribution plans were over-all plans and did not go into detail. Demands and estimates of material were submitted by the various departments and the Board made its plans according to the amount of materials available. The demands of the Army and Navy constantly increased but as the details of their plans were kept secret the Board did not know the purpose for which the materials were required.^{c.}

Oil supplies were a serious problem but the Army and Navy appeared to think that they had sufficient supplies to last them until "they would get their hands on the oil in the south".^{d.}

HOSHINO himself considered that in the early stages of the war Japan would be able to occupy a great deal of the Far East and with the materials such as oil which would then be acquired they would be able to carry on the war for a long time. Although the plans were made for "Japan proper" they necessarily affected Manchukuo as to raw materials, imports and exports, and finance.^{e.}

The plans for Japan and Manchukuo were coordinated with the assistance, if necessary, of the Joint Japan-Manchukuo Economic Committee.^{f.}

26-28. The Board comprised about 100 persons and made economic plans for Japan.^{g.} There was a plan made in November 1940, for business, manufacturing and industry which provided for the organizing into a solid group of industries of the same kind and for government control through the group.^{h.}

II. Important Cabinet Decisions.

26-27.

- b. T. 5148
- c. T. 5149-50
- d. T. 5169-70
- e. T. 5137-9
- f. T. 5167-9, T. 5177-9

26-28.

- a. T. 5171
- b. T. 5133; T. 15,963-5

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GG-29. Several important decisions made by the Cabinet and the Planning Board during the period HOSHINO was a member of both. Some of these decisions were:

1. There was the Cabinet Decision of July 26, 1940, "Outline of Japan's Pacific National Policy". ^{a.}
2. There was the Liaison Conference Decision of July 27, 1940. ^{b.}
3. Efforts were made to strengthen relations with Germany and Italy culminating in the Tri-partite Pact of September 27, 1940.
4. On August 1, 1940, MATSUOKA instituted negotiations with France which resulted in Japan obtaining important rights in French Indo-China. ^{c.}
5. During August 1940, drafts were prepared of demands to be made on Netherlands East Indies and a mission was sent. ^{d.}
6. In the autumn of 1940 the Planning Board made economic plans for organizing industries which involved a high degree of Government control in Japan and also for Manchuria, China and East Asia. ^{e.}
7. Early in November 1940, following the announcement of National Policy on August 1, there was published the "Outline of Plan for Block Economy of Japan, Manchukuo, China". ^{f.} This plan will be referred to later.
8. On September 30 the Total War Research Institute was established.
9. Early in 1941 the decision was made to resume negotiations with the United States; NOMURA was appointed Ambassador in January. ^{g.}

GG-29.

- a. Ex. 540, T. 6279
- b. Ex. 1310, T. 11,794
- c. Ex. 620, p. 4B, T. 6886
- d. Ex. 1311, T. 11,798
- e. T. 5131-3; T. 5137-8
- f. Ex. 541, : T. 6371
- Ex. 2224, T. 15,951-61

GG-29.

- g. Ex. 1008, T. 9643
- Ex. 1009, T. 9648
- Ex. 1043, T. 9798
- Ex. 1045, T. 9804
- Ex. 1056, T. 9843
- Ex. 1057, T. 9847

(66-29)

The above matters are important in considering the question of HOSHINO's participation in the conspiracy.

III. Plan for Block Economy of Japan-Manchukuo-China.

66-30. On November 8th, 1940, the Yomiuri newspaper published a statement issued by the Cabinet Intelligence Bureau giving particulars of the Plan for Block Economy of Japan-Manchukuo-China which had been made public on November 5th.

The newspaper stated that the Plan followed the Cabinet decision announced on August 1, 1940, as to the fundamental national policy and explained that the Government since that decision had been studying, principally with the Planning Board, how to embody "the establishment of a Cooperative Economic Sphere" unifying Japan, Manchukuo and China and embracing the Greater East Asia. This plan was the result. This shows the newspaper's idea of the influence of the Planning Board and particularly the influence of HOSHINO in formulating the Plan, since a photograph of HOSHINO was published with the particulars of the Plan.

66-31. The Cabinet Intelligence Bureau's announcement commences as follows: "Our fundamental policy to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia which aims to form a New Order in the World has now entered a new stage by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy." It is thought to be unnecessary to refer here to the details of the plan, and it is probably sufficient to say that in general, it aims at the establishment of a new order in East Asia and the enlargement of the scale of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of East Asia

66-30.

- a. Ex. 2224, T. 15951-61
- b. Ex. 540, T. 6271

(CC-31)

by an economic bloc comprising Japan, Manchukuo and China. To accomplish this, the plan provided that "in order to promote national defense economy, finance must function so as to meet national purposes."

IV. Plan for new economic structure.

GG-32. Reference is hereby made to the evidence of the Defense witness ORATA with respect to the plan for a new economic structure prepared by the Planning Board and submitted to the Cabinet in the autumn of 1940. ^{B.} According to ORATA, this plan was proposed by "young officials" of the Planning Board and when presented to the Cabinet by HOSHINO met with considerable opposition, particularly from the Minister of Industries and Commerce **KOBAYASHI**. HOSHINO agreed to alterations (but these, it is submitted, are of only trifling importance) and eventually the plan was adopted by Cabinet.

GG-33. The evidence of ORATA considered with the evidence in **KOYOTI'S MEMOIRS** ^{B.} appears to make it clear that the dispute in connection with this plan was one of the factors which brought about a reorganization of the Cabinet in April 1941. The real aim of the Army was to convert the Ministry of Industries & Commerce into a Ministry of Munitions. **KOBAYASHI** was apparently opposed to this and was supported by business men. In the end both **KOBAYASHI** and **HOSHINO** resigned and there can be little doubt that while the Army won a victory, it was necessary in order to avoid breaking up the Cabinet for the Army to agree to **HOSHINO's** resignation also. The new economic plan was intended

GG-32.

a. Ex. 865, P. 41, T. 29,149

GG-33.

Ex. 3216A, T. 29,168

(GG-33)
to effect revolutionary changes in the economic structure in order "to promote the completion of armaments." The plan provided for a high degree of Government control.

V. Other Plans Revealing HOSHINO's Place in the Conspiracy

GG-34. The whole of the new plan for a changed economic structure is important in the consideration of the policy decisions made and the economic and other measures taken by the Second KONOE Cabinet and of HOSHINO's part in these matters. There is set out in the plan a population policy which was adopted by the Cabinet on January 22, 1941. This plan was adopted in order that the mission of the Empire to establish the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere could be carried out, and also "to secure Japan's leadership in East Asia". An increase of population to 100 million by 1960 was the aim and it is expressly stated that one of the objects was "to ensure the supply of military and labor forces required by a high-degree national defense state." The Tribunal's attention has already been directed to the obvious inconsistency between the adoption of this plan and the claims made by the Defense as to the difficulties caused Japan by reason of her over-population. b.

GG-35. It is submitted that as President of the Planning Board and as a member of the Cabinet HOSHINO must be held to have a responsibility for this plan and for all that is involved in it, particularly in view of the close relationship between population and the comprehensive production expansion plans for which the Planning Board was responsible or with which it was

GG-34.

- a. Ex. 865, p. 45
b. T. 24,799-24,809

(GG-35) ^{a.}
 concerned. This is confirmed by a Japanese newspaper article
 about the plan. According to this article, HOSHINO made
 detailed explanations of the population policy embodied in the
 plan.

VI. Demands Made on Netherlands East Indies.

GG-36. Reference should also be made to the demands made
 on the Netherlands East Indies with respect to economic matters
 in August 1940. ^{a.} Not only is HOSHINO concerned as a member of
 the Cabinet, but also as President of the Planning Board, it is
 certain that he must have had an important share in the prepara-
 tion of the demands.

VII. Tri-Partite Pact.

GG-37. In addition to his responsibility for the Pact as
 a member of the Cabinet, HOSHINO was directly concerned in his
 capacity as President of the Planning Board as is shown by the
 report of the proceedings of the Investigation Committee of the
 Privy Council concerning the Pact on September 26, 1940. He
 attended the proceedings and gave particulars of Japan's strength
 in materials, and while he stated that Japan's reserves were not
 yet completed, he added, ^{a.} "However, we are already quite prepared".

GG-38. It should be mentioned that HOSHINO was also present
 at the meeting of the Privy Council held on September 26, 1940
 at the conclusion of the meeting of the Investigation Committee. ^{a.}
 The Privy Council approved the draft Pact. The Imperial Rescript
 of September 27, 1940, proclaiming the Pact, bears HOSHINO's
 name. ^{b.}

GG-35.
 a. Ex. 1077, T. 9879

GG-36.
 a. Ex. 1311, T. 11,798.

GG-37.
 a. Ex. 552, T. 6354-5;
 T. 6365; T. 6369 and
 T. 6378.

GG-38.
 a. Ex. 552, T. 6379
 b. Ex. 554, T. 6395

VIII. Mobilization Law.

GG-39. In view of the paramount importance of the provisions of the National General Mobilization Law to the economic and other plans with which the Planning Board was concerned, it is significant that on March 8th, 1941, it was announced that the Cabinet had decided that the regulations made under that Law would be put in force on March 20th.^{a.}

IX. HOSHINO's Connection with The Total War Research Institute.

GG-40. The Total War Research Institute was established by an Ordinance of September 30th, 1940. The Ordinance provided that the Institute "shall be under the administration of the Prime Minister and shall control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war". The head of the Institute was to be of Chokunin rank and councillors were to be appointed by the Cabinet from among the higher civil servants of the various Government offices concerned and from among eminent and experienced scholars who were to be recommended to the Throne by the Prime Minister.^{a.} HOSHINO was appointed Acting Director on October 1st, 1940. He was at that time President of the Planning Board and Minister without portfolio.^{b.} In January 1941, a permanent Director was appointed, namely Lieutenant General FIMURA, who prior to his appointment was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and who subsequently commanded the 5th Army in Manchuria and was later Director of the

GG-39.

a. Ex. 1055, T. 9842

GG-40.

a. Ex. 868A, T. 8817-8
b. T. 8818-22.

(GG-40)
 Military War College. ^{c.} HOSHINO was appointed a Councillor on May 2nd, 1941. ^{d.} Other councillors appointed were the accused SUZUKI on December 21st, 1940 ^{e.} and KIMURA on May 5th, 1941. ^{f.}

GG-41. Members of the Institute included high-ranking Army and Navy Officers, Secretaries of Ministries and members of staffs of large corporations such as the South Manchurian Railway Corp. ^{a.} Student or research members were departmental officers holding important positions in the various ministries, practically every branch of the State's activities being represented. In addition, there were representatives from the Military Staff College, Banks, Industrial Corporations, the Schools, the Manchukuo, Chosen, and Taiwan Governments, and the North China area Army. ^{b.}

GG-42. The Director and other permanent officers were assisted by lecturers of high standing chosen from various ministries, Universities, Industry and Commerce and other institutions. ^{a.} The lectures covered a wide range of subjects including the fundamental principles of total national war, the mobilization of materials, food problems, the steel industry, land and sea communications, transport, finance, Foreign Policy, affairs in China, the United States, Great Britain, the Near East, Russia and Europe, military and naval tactics, mobilization of munitions and various matters relating to the South Seas. (ibid.)

GG-43. The Institute issued publications which dealt with a wide variety of subjects. Of the ninety-eight publications, the existence of which is known to the Prosecution, all except three bear the classification "Top Secret", "Secret" or "Confi-

GG-40.

- c. T. 8824-5; T. 27072
- d. Ex. 109, T. 710
- e. Ex. 126, T. 787
- f. Ex. 113, T. 727

GG-41.

- a. Ex. 869, T. 8825
- b. Ex. 869, T. 8825

GG-42.

- a. Ex. 869, T. 8826

(GG-43) a.
 denial". Excerpts from a few of the publications were read to the Tribunal which showed a striking anticipation of what actually happened in connection with such important matters as the U.S.-Japanese negotiations and the course they took, events in French Indo-China and Siam, the proposed extent of the Greater East Asia Sphere and the plans for its establishment, and the outbreak of the Pacific war without a previous declaration of war.

b. The witness IIMURA stated that the exercises conducted by the Institute had as their background the international and domestic situation Japan was then facing or expected to face and the students examined and discussed the national problems which would necessarily arise in case Japan moved into the Southwest Pacific.

c.

GG-44. It is to be noted that by Item II of Article 10 of the Imperial Ordinance for the Organization of the War Ministry (as revised), provision was made that matters concerning students of the Institute were to be dealt with by the Military Administration Section.

c. Although the evidence as to the duration of the Institute's activities is not quite clear, it is evident from the dates of the publications that the Institute was still functioning in 1945.

b.

GG-45. The Prosecution submits that the evidence with regard to the formation of the Institute and its activities and publications and also the persons connected with it shows that it was an important organization which was founded and carried on as an essential part of the plans of the conspirators for

GG-43.

- a. Es. 1354, T. 13,343;
 T. 27,024.
 b. Ex. 686A, T. 7416; T. 7420;
 T. 8989-8925;
 Ex. 688A, T. 7425-7429
 Ex. 689A, T. 7431-4
 Ex. 690A, T. 7435-7
 Ex. 870A, T. 8930-8936
 Es. 871, T. 8941-8972
 c. T. 37027-3

GG-44.

- a. Ex. 74, T. 684
 b. Ex. 869, p. 3-5

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(GG-45)

waging aggressive wars of conquest and expansion. In support of this submission the following comments are made. It was established at a very important time in the course of events leading to the outbreak of the Pacific War. The YONAI Cabinet had fallen in July 1940 and thereafter and, particularly after the Cabinet policy decisions made on July 26th, and the Liaison Conference of July 27th, the aggressive action was taken towards French Indo-China and the Neatherlands East Indies in August. On completion of the Tri-partite Pact in September, the plans of the conspirators were pushed ahead with great energy. An active period of planning followed in which HOSHINO as President of the Planning Board took a leading part. It cannot be doubted, it is suggested, that the establishment of the Institute was a necessarily logical and inevitable part of the plans for expansion. The publications of the Institute show very clearly that every aspect of war was studied. The Institute was not an ordinary Military or Naval Staff College. Its purpose and functions were much wider. They comprised a study of "national total" war. In other words, it was contemplated that wars would be waged for the purposes of which all the subjects of the state and all its resources would be used. It was considered necessary that there should be studied every subject that bore on the waging of war. These subjects were not limited to the science of fighting, to the training of soldiers and their equipment. It was contemplated that the whole people would be at war in their

0 159 00 10 1248

Page GG-30

(GG-45)
different spheres and it was intended that the studies and exercises of the Institute would ensure that the maximum value was obtained from every individual.

GG-46. It is necessary in this connection to consider all the evidence that has been presented in this case and particularly that evidence which relates to the aggression in Manchuria and the extension of that aggression to China and the plans made for so many years for the establishment of a Greater East Asia sphere. Is it credible that in September 1940, Japan would have wasted time and energy in a mere academic debating school—especially, when the carrying on of the school involved so many important Government officials and other persons all of whom were essential to the execution of the expansion plans which have been found in evidence? If the Institute were not regarded as important, it would not have been established by an Ordinance, nor placed under the administration of the Prime Minister nor given the constitution and functions which it possessed. Is it not manifest that being concerned as it was with planning, it was no accident that HOSHINO became its first Director until a permanent director was obtained? Nor was it merely fortuitous that the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army should be made the permanent Director. Can it be seriously suggested that at that juncture the officer holding that important appointment was brought to Tokyo to spend his time on unimportant work which had no practical objective?

GG-47. In this connection it is interesting to observe that the strengthening of the Manchurian Group's influence in the Second KONOE Government referred to previously was carried a step further by the appointment of IIMURA to the Institute. The comprehensive nature of the membership, the high status of the Councilors, members and lecturers, the scope of the studies, exercises and publications, the fact that it continued to function during the War when it was important that no man should be idle or not suitably employed, all these factors show conclusively the importance of Institute.

GG-48. It is possible, of course, that it had difficulties in getting started and that the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Councilors were too busy to give it much assistance. It is also possible that it did not fully achieve what was expected of it, although its publications would appear to show that it was not only very active but also successful. However, in the submission of the Prosecution, it has been established that the formation and carrying on of the Institute affords strong evidence of the aggressive plans of the conspirators and of the matters charged in the Indictment.

GG-49. The Defense witnesses IIMURA ^{a.} and OSHIMA ^{b.} and also the Prosecution witness HORIBA ^{c.} attempted to minimize the importance of the Institute, its activities and publications, and the functions of HOSHINO and other

GG-49

- a. T. 27066; 27077
- b. T. 29161-7
- c. T. 8820-8887

(GG-49) defendants in relation thereto. It is not considered necessary to examine this evidence in detail. It is submitted that it completely fails to answer the contentions made by the Prosecution with regard to the Institute.

GG-50. So far as HOSHINO is concerned, it is submitted that the formation and activities of the Institute directly implicate him by reason of his association with it, first as Acting Director and later as Councillor. He is also implicated as a member of the Cabinet which caused it to be established and, more particularly, as President of the Planning Board. The defense witnesses IINURA ^{a.} and OSHIMA ^{b.} have stated that HOSHINO was inactive in the affairs of the Institute. Even if this evidence be accepted, it does not in any way free HOSHINO from the responsibility which must necessarily attach to him by reason of his association with the Institute.

D. HOSHINO'S RESIGNATION IN APRIL 1941.

GG-51. In April 1941, HOSHINO resigned his position as President of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio in the second KONOE Cabinet. Defense Witness OBATA ^{a.} gave no explanation of the reason for HOSHINO'S resignation although he refers to disputes between HOSHINO and KOBAYASHI over the economic plans. According to him, ^{b.} and economic plan ^{c.} was prepared by some of the young officials of the Planning Board. When HOSHINO sub-

GG-50

- a. Ex. 3070, T. 27067; T. 27072; T. 27076
- b. T. 29101-4

GG-51

- a. Ex. 3214, T. 29,139
- b. Ex. 3214, T. 29,143
- c. Ex. 865, T. 8807

(GG-51)
mitted this plan in the autumn of 1940 to the Economic Minister of the Cabinet, there was considerable opposition, especially from KOBAYASHI. The witness stated that HOSHINO agreed to its being changed so as to make it more in favor of a laissez-faire economy and eventually after certain changes had been made, ^{d.} the Cabinet approved of the plan. It should be pointed out incidentally that the changes mentioned by OBATA appear to be quite immaterial.

GG-52. KONOE Memoirs, ^{a.} with regard to the change of Cabinet Ministers connected with economic affairs in April 1941, is a very important piece of evidence. The whole document deserves careful study. It is submitted that it clearly shows that the resignations of KOBAYASHI and HOSHINO were brought about by the disputes that arose over the economic plans and from a consideration of all the circumstances: the true position would appear to be as follows:

GG-53. The dispute between HOSHINO and KOBAYASHI was a very serious one. It is probable also that, despite HOSHINO's denial, trouble was in fact caused by KOBAYASHI prematurely disclosing the plans to business men and obtaining their support to his opposition to HOSHINO's plans. It is not credible that the Army opposed the plans. Indeed, it cannot be doubted that the Army was to a large extent actually responsible for them. Nor does it appear to be credible that the Army or TOJO forced HOSHINO to

GG-51

d. T. 29,150

GG-52

a. Ex. 3216A, T. 29,169

(GG-53)
 resign because HOSHINO was not prepared to go along with the Army. KONOE makes it plain that he did not wish the dispute to break up his Cabinet and that the dispute had to be concealed from the public. KONOE persuaded OGURA to join the Cabinet without portfolio and he decided with the approval of TOJO and others to replace KOBAYASHI by the appointment of Vice Admiral TOYODA. It was obvious that KOBAYASHI would not resign if he would "lose face" by doing so and he would not have given way to another businessman. To replace him by TOYODA would save his face and at the same time satisfy the Army and the Navy. It is apparent from the whole document, in the course of which HOSHINO's name is hardly mentioned, that HOSHINO was quite willing to resign and it was KOBAYASHI who was making the difficulty. The only reasonable inference is that it was considered by the Army wiser not to break up the Cabinet but that HOSHINO should resign. HOSHINO must have been a party to this. He was replaced by a militarist SUZUKI and, therefore, in substance the Army achieved what they were striving for. But the most important point to be observed from this excerpt from KONOE's Memoir is that, according to KONOE, the appointment of TOYODA would result in clarifying "the character of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as a munitions ministry".^{a.} KONOE goes on to say that this, together with the fact that SUZUKI headed the Planning Board would mark an advance towards the perfecting

GG-53

a. Ex. 32161, T. 29,174

(GG-53)
of the national defense structure. It is plain that the whole object of the readjustment of the Cabinet and the change in the Planning Board appointment was to make the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in fact, but not in name, a munitions ministry.

GG-54. The Defense declared in the opening statement to HOSHINO's defense that KONOE's MEMOIRS would show that TOJO informed HOSHINO he must resign. KONOE's MEMOIRS do not go as far as this, ^a but it cannot be doubted that HOSHINO's resignation came about because of his desire to further the Army's plans for expansion. It is submitted that HOSHINO resigned in order to assist the TOJO and the other militarists and to further the expansion plans of the conspirators.

E. Period between April 4th 1941 and October 18th 1941.

GG-55. The circumstances in connection with HOSHINO's resignation of the appointments held by him in the Second KONOE Administration have already been referred to and it has been suggested that the true explanation of his resignation is that it was made in order to further the conspiracies. The apparent inactivity of HOSHINO after his resignation and until he became Chief Cabinet Secretary on October 18th, 1941, possesses, it is suggested, an important significance.

GG-56. According to the Defense, from the time of his resignation until he was appointed Chief Cabinet Secretary HOSHINO led a life of idleness. The witness MURAKAMI ^a

GG-54

a. Ex. 3216A, T. 29,169

GG-56

a. Ex. 3218, T. 29,188

(GG-56)
testified that after his resignation HOSHINO spent his time in reading, exercise and in traveling about the country. According to him, HOSHINO took no part whatever in public affairs and his only visitors were long-standing friends. It should be observed that this witness while claiming that he took charge of HOSHINO's business and affairs after his resignation and for that purpose lived at his private house, although he was employed in the Ministry of Finance at the time, claims at the same time that HOSHINO had no business. Indeed, in his own words--"his life was that of unemployment to the letter". Further, although he professes to be able to say that HOSHINO took no part in affairs and even goes so far as to say that HOSHINO never even talked with TOJO on the telephone, he goes to some trouble to explain that most of the time HOSHINO was traveling and was not accompanied by the witness. In this connection, reference should be made to the Interrogation of HOSHINO by the Prosecution introduced by the Defense. ^{b.} There HOSHINO stated that after his resignation he was doing no special job and was visiting various parts of the country. The trips to the country, he stated, were mostly private and he claimed that he made the trips to see the condition of the country.

GG-57. The Defense witness INADA ^{a.} stated in his affidavit that HOSHINO had told him that all he had been doing after he resigned in April was to travel around Japan. It is remarkable that HOSHINO should have taken a six-months

GG-56

b. Ex. 3212A, T. 29,203

GG-57

a. Ex. 3220, T. 29,199

(GG-57)

holiday at that critical juncture. When it is remembered that he had been for all his working life a Government official until he was brought to Japan in July 1940, to enter the KONOE Cabinet and that he was only 49 years of age, it is extraordinary that he should have been so inactive. If the Prosecution's submission is accepted, that his resignation was made in order to further the conspiracy of which he was a strong supporter, it would appear to be reasonable to suggest that his statement that he was inactive during that long period is not credible. It appears much more likely that he was quietly engaged in organizing and furthering the conspiracy and that he was standing by in the meanwhile until the time should be appropriate for him to take a more active part. This time came when, in October 1941, the KONOE Cabinet fell and TOJO became Prime Minister. It would appear to be more than a coincidence that HOSHINO, who had worked with TOJO in Manchuria, who had been so prominent in Manchuria, who had entered the Cabinet at the same time as TOJO and other members of the Manchurian Group and who had resigned under the circumstances which have been referred to, was so conveniently available to become the Chief Cabinet Secretary at that time. While there is no direct evidence which shows that HOSHINO during this period was engaged in furthering the plans for aggression and expansion, it seems probable that in all the circumstances he was doing so.

F. Period during which HOSHINO was Chief Cabinet Secretary

GG-58. On October 18th, 1941, HOSHINO became Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Cabinet then formed by TOJO, and he held this appointment until July 23rd, 1944,^{a.} when the TOJO Cabinet fell. In the Prosecution's Interrogation of HOSHINO,^{b.} HOSHINO claimed that he had intended going to Korea in October on a visit but cancelled the visit on being appointed Chief Cabinet Secretary. HOSHINO also stated that he and TOJO were not exactly old friends but stated that TOJO was in Manchuria for about two years at the time he was and also that he worked with him when TOJO was Minister of War and HOSHINO was on the Planning Board. When asked whether he was not the closest man in the Cabinet to TOJO he replied, "As the Chief Secretary I was the closest to TOJO, however, I cannot say that I was the closest adviser." TOJO testified that because he needed an assistant, it was necessary for him first to choose the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, and so he chose HOSHINO, who had been one of his colleagues in the Second KONOE Cabinet and whom he considered the ideal man for the post because of his previous experience and personal ability.^{c.}

GG-59. The Defense offered evidence to show the duties of Chief Cabinet Secretary.^{a.} Apparently, it is the Defense's contention that the duties outlined in this exhibit are such as to make the holder of the office a

GG-58

- a. Px. 109, T. 710; Ex. 102, T. 685
- b. Ex. 3212, T. 29,204; T. 29,191-2
- c. Ex. 3655, T. 36314

GG-59

- a. Ex. 3219, T. 29,193

(GG-59)
 mere official and the holder could play no effective part in the conspiracy. The evidence of the Defense Witness INADA, who was a member of the Cabinet Secretariat, is apparently also directed to this point as well as to show that no significance should be attached to HOSHINO's appointment to this position. According to INADA, he was asked by TOJO to assist him in the selection of the Chief Cabinet Secretary. TOJO gave him the names of two persons whom he was considering for the appointment, that of HOSHINO and one other, and he asked INADA whether the Secretariat could work smoothly under HOSHINO. ^{b.} It does not appear that TOJO asked him the same question about the other candidate. On cross-examination, INADA explained that the appointment of Chief Cabinet Secretary was really in the hands of the Prime Minister ^{c.} and that whenever there was a change of Prime Ministers, there was a change of Chief Cabinet Secretary.

GG-60. It is submitted that on the evidence as a whole the appointment of HOSHINO (if not in the case of other Chief Cabinet Secretaries) at that time enabled him to exercise and in fact he did exercise a definite influence over the course of events. Reference has already been made to the fact that, according to the Defense evidence, HOSHINO had

GG-59

- b. T. 29,194; T. 29,198
- c. T. 29,202

(GG-60)
been idle for six months. This is in itself extraordinary and it is suggested difficult to believe. The evidence shows that during that period he was a member of the House of Peers, having been appointed on his resignation in April, and on May 2nd, he was appointed a Councillor of the Total War Research Institute. Further, on July 12th he was appointed a member of the National Mobilization Investigation Committee.^a Surely these appointments carried with them some duties and obligations. It appears to be more than merely fortuitous that he should be ready to take this appointment immediately after the Army Group had brought about the downfall of the KONOE Cabinet. It seems clear that the appointment of Chief Cabinet Secretary was the personal appointment of the Prime Minister, and that from TOJO's previous knowledge of HOSHINO's activities in Manchuria and as a fellow member of the KONOE Cabinet he selected a man whom he knew was in favor of and would support fully the War Policy.

GG-61. It is suggested that the appointments held by him and his activities after he became Chief Cabinet Secretary show that he was taking an active part in affairs both before and after the outbreak of war. On November 1st, he was made a Councillor of the Planning Board. Although he ceased on November 5th to be a

GG-60

a. Ex. 109, T. 71C

(GG-61)
member of the National Mobilization Investigation Committee
(possibly because his continuing in this office was un-
comfortable with functions as a Planning Board Councillor)
he was on November 6th appointed a member of the Science
Investigation Committee. On November 15th, he was appointed
a member of the Government Committee at the 77th Session
of the Diet. On November 24th, he ceased to be a
Councillor of the Total War Research Institute and on
December 2nd, he became a member of the Committee for
the Encouragement of People's Savings. He received
further appointments as a member of the Government
Committee at the successive Diet sessions and it is
significant that on February 21, 1942 he became Secretary
of the Investigation Committee for the Establishment of
Greater East Asia, and later in November he became a
member of the Liaison Committee of the Greater East
Asia Ministry. ^{a.} It is submitted that the fact that
these appointments were made as well as their nature was
attributable to his being an active participator in
the conspiracies.

GG-62. It should be mentioned that after HOSHINO
became Chief Cabinet Secretary he attended the very
important Imperial Conferences on November 5 and
December 1, 1941. HOSHINO was also present at a
number of Liaison Conferences between October 23 and
December 8, 1941, and he had an active part in the

GG-61

a. Ex. 109, T. 710

(GG-62)
conferences, according to TOGO. ^{a.} At these conferences, HOSHINO stated the stationing of Japanese troops in China was necessary, and that the Japanese conditions for settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict relative to the talks with the United States should not be relaxed. TOGO testified that HOSHINO took a strong stand that Japanese proposals for negotiations should not be relaxed in these Conferences prior to Pearl Harbor. ^{b.} HOSHINO also indicated the negotiations should be terminated because they would not reach a successful culmination. ^{c.} According to TOGO and TOJC, HOSHINO also explained various plans and proposals to the Liaison Conferences and acted as an "Explainer" at the Privy Council Meetings held December 8, 1941 (with regard to the Declaration of War). ^{d.} HOSHINO was an "Exponent" at meetings of the Privy Council on October 9, 12, and 14, 1942, in connection with the organization of Greater East Asia Ministry. Further, on November 6, 1943, he attended the assembly of East Asiatic Nations. ^{e.}

GG-62

- a. T. 36072; T. 36064
- b. T. 36084; T. 36086; T. 36077; T. 36090
- c. T. 36091
- d. T. 35,757; T. 36084; T. 36,192
- e. Ex. 1346, T. 12098

63-G. HOSHINO's guilt of the offenses charged is established as indicated below.

Count 1:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 62.

Count 2:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35.

Count 3:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 60, 61, 62.

Count 4:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 62.

Count 5:- Paragraphs GG-29, 30, 31, 37, 38.

Count 6:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45.

Count 7:- Paragraphs GG-4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 62.

Count 8:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 62.

Count 9:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 62.

- (63-9)
- Count 10:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45,
60, 61, 62.
- Count 11:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60,
61, 62.
- Count 12:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25,
28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61,
62.
- Count 13:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60,
61, 62.
- Count 14:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45,
60, 61, 62.
- Count 15:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45,
60, 61, 62.
- Count 16:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45,
60, 61, 62.
- Count 17:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45,
60, 61, 62.

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(63-G)

Count 19:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 35, 60, 61, 62.

Count 20:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 21:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 60, 61, 62.

Count 22:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 23:- Paragraphs GG-27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39,
40, 42, 43, 45.

Count 24:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 25:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25.

Count 27:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 29, 30, 31, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45.

Count 28:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45.

Count 29:- Paragraphs GG-29, 30, 31, 60, 61, 62.

Count 30:- Paragraphs GG-29, 30, 31, 60, 61, 62.

Count 31:- Paragraphs GG-29, 30, 31, 60, 61, 62.

Count 32:- Paragraphs GG-29, 30, 31, 60, 61, 62.

Count 33:- Paragraphs GG-27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39,
40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 62.

Count 34:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 35:- Paragraphs GG-4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25.

Count 37:- Paragraphs GG-27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36,
39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 62.

Count 38:- Paragraphs GG-29, 30, 31, 36, 39, 40,
42, 43, 45, 60, 61, 62.

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(63-G)

Count 39:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 40:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 41:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 42:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 43:- Paragraphs GG-60, 61, 62.

Count 52:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
25.

Count 54:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31.

Count 55:- Paragraphs GG-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31.

0 159 00 10 1265

IRS

FEBRUARY 10, 1948

RE: SUZUKIJI - HUSHEHO (33)

The attached pages 20-1, 2, 15, 16, 18, .
22, 16, 23 and 31 are to be substituted
for similarly numbered pages in Sumation
of HUSHEHO already distributed.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Page 36-1

HOSHINO, Aoki

HOSHINO has been charged under Counts One through Seven; Nineteen through Twenty-Five; Twenty-seven through Thirty-Five; Thirty-Seven through Forty-four; Fifty-Two through Fifty-Five.

A. Period from July 1932 to July 1940, Manchuria Period.

36-1. HOSHINO was director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Manchukuo Ministry of Finance from July 1932 until July 1936, when he was appointed Finance Vice Minister. In December of 1936 he was appointed Chief of the General Affairs Board. He continued to hold both these appointments until he returned to Japan in July 1940, when he was appointed Minister without portfolio in the second KATO Cabinet and President of the Planning Board.

36-2. As Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Finance Ministry he had constant liaison with the Kwantung Army. This liaison was established to deal with the many matters that arose as a result of the Japanese-Manchurian Treaty. These matters included the flotation of Manchukuo public bonds in Japan, the support of the Kwantung Army being deemed necessary to ensure the success of the flotation.

36-1.

- a. T. 5119-20
- b. Ex. 109, T. 5134-5
- c. T. 5135
- d. T. 5136

36-2.

- a. T. 5120
- b. T. 5121
- c. T. 5124

GG-3. Originally, the Kwantung Army administration was separate from that of the Railroad Zone although the Commander of the Kwantung Army was also the Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory. The Consulates were also separate.^{a.} In 1932, however, after OSHINO arrived in Manchuria a change was made. The Kwantung Army Commander became the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo and the Ambassador controlled the Consulates, the Manchurian Railway and the Kwantung Leased Territory.^{b.} In 1934 another reorganization took place. There was established in Tokyo the Manchurian Affairs Bureau (of which the War Minister was President) which was under Cabinet supervision. The Prime Minister supervised the activities of the Ambassador while, in addition, the Foreign Minister supervised the purely diplomatic part of the Ambassador's functions. The effect of the reorganization was that the Commander of the Kwantung Army had control of the whole of the Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria, including diplomatic matters, the Kwantung Bureau, the Leased Territory and the South Manchurian Railway Company.^{c.}

GG-4. This unification of control and the vesting in the Kwantung Army Commander of such comprehensive functions and powers undoubtedly made it easier for Japan to carry out the exploitation of Manchuria for her own purposes. While the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had on paper some measure of control over the Commander's actions, the fact that the War Minister was President of the Manchurian Affairs Board enabled

GG-3.

- a. T. 5139
- b. T. 5139
- c. T. 5140, X. 4524, T. 5114

(GG-15)

industries. These were formerly under the South Manchurian Railway Company and MATSUOZA was at first doubtful about the expediency of the Plan although eventually he agreed. The Kwantung Army agreed also. The General Affairs Board (of which HOSHINO was Chief) assisted in the preparation of the special laws required in connection with the formation of the Corporation. In the submission of the Prosecution, in view of the important, indeed, the all important leading part taken by HOSHINO in bringing about the Japanese domination of Manchukuo, his participation in the conspiracies is beyond doubt. He held for a long period positions in the administration which gave him very important powers and enabled him to exercise a very strong influence in the affairs of the State and indeed to control them. He was throughout in close liaison with the real power in Manchuria, the Commander and Chief of Staff and other officers of the Kwantung Army. The evidence of Japanese domination referred to above is only a part of the evidence on this subject which has been presented, and the effect of all that evidence is to prove a deliberate policy on the part of Japan to exploit Manchuria for its own purposes, a policy which HOSHINO did all in his power to carry out.

3. TOJO testified that HOSHINO was among the five most important Japanese figures in Manchuria.

 GG-15.

- a. T. 5128-9
- b. T. 5130
- c. T. 36,576

II. FOSHINO's connection with the Opium Traffic.

GG-16. The affidavit of the defense witness NAMBA shows that FOSHINO in September or October 1932, when he was in charge of the General Affairs Bureau of the Finance Ministry, took a leading part in arranging for NAMBA to go to Manchuria for employment in the Opium Monopoly Bureau. It is significant that, as is shown by paragraph 3 of Ex. 2463, the revenue aspect was evidently considered by FOSHINO as more important than the suppression of the traffic.

GG-17. FOSHINO negotiated a large loan from Japan, the security for which included the profits of the opium monopoly office.

a. FOSHINO stated that he discussed the matter with HUTO, Nobuyoshi, the then Commander of the Kwantung Army, with the object, according to him, of obtaining "the support" of the Army.

b. As is shown by Ex. 227, the Chief of Staff of that Army had taken the initiative in June 1932 in a telegram to the War Minister to have the revenue from the Opium Monopoly increased, and the raising of the loan was the result.

c.

GG-18. The profits from opium were approximately as follows: 1933 ¥300,000; 1934 ¥1,200,000; and 1935 ¥10,000,000. Thereafter the profits increased in the same ratio, being ¥20,000,000 in one year and in the next ¥30,000,000.

a.

GG-19. It is suggested that the Court should accept NAMBA's original figures as correct. His evasiveness on cross-examination and the inconsistencies between his testimony on cross-examination and his affidavit show the evidence is submitted in an attempt to deceive the Tribunal, whereas there is no reason for doubting

GG-16.

a. Ex. 2463, T. 20356; 20366.

GG-17.

a. Ex. 375, T. 4685
b. T. 5124
c. T. 4681-2

GG-18.

a. Ex. 2463, p. 4; T. 20,330-1; T. 20,349-50; T. 20,356.

Page GG-18.

GG-22. HOSHINO's official connection with the Manchukuo Government ceased on July 21, 1940, when he was appointed to the Second KOHO Cabinet. It may be reasonably assumed that he had some knowledge of the troubles that threatened the YONAI Cabinet and eventually destroyed it. It seems unlikely that the invitation to join the new Cabinet was not preceded by any negotiation or discussions.

GG-23. HOSHINO had never previously held a Cabinet appointment, nor any appointment in Japan of a political or quasi-political nature. TOJO, MATSUOKA and OHASHI (Vice-Foreign Minister) who were appointed at the same time were also without previous Cabinet experience. It is surely significant that these four men all of whom had been prominent in Manchuria and were associated more or less closely with the Kwantung Army entered the Japanese Cabinet at the same time and it is submitted that their appointments constituted a victory for the Kwantung Army. It will be recalled that on August 2nd, 1940, OTT in a telegram to the German Foreign Minister referred to OHASHI's appointment as signifying the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian Group in the new Government.

GG-24. It seems reasonable to contend that the Army and particularly the Kwantung Army were responsible for HOSHINO's appointment to the Cabinet and the Presidency of the Planning Board. How else can his appointment be explained? He had been away from Japan for eight years. He had never previously held office of this kind. The Army had brought about the fall of

GG-23.

a. Ex. 538, T. 6265

(GG-29)

The above matters are important in considering the question of HOSHIKO's participation in the conspiracy.

III. Plan for Block Economy of Japan-Manchukuo-China.

GG-30. On November 8th, 1940, the Yomiuri newspaper published a statement issued by the Cabinet Intelligence Bureau giving particulars of the Plan for Block Economy of Japan-Manchukuo-China which had been made public on November 5th.

The newspaper stated that the Plan followed the Cabinet decision announced on August 1, 1940, as to the fundamental national policy and explained that the Government since that decision had been studying, principally with the Planning Board, how to embody "the establishment of a Cooperative Economic Sphere" unifying Japan, Manchukuo and China and embracing the Greater East Asia. This plan was the result. This shows the newspaper's idea of the influence of the Planning Board and particularly the influence of HOSHIKO in formulating the Plan, since a photograph of HOSHIKO was published with the particulars of the Plan.

GG-31. The Cabinet Intelligence Bureau's announcement commences as follows: "Our fundamental policy to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia which aims to form a New Order in the World has now entered a new stage by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy." It is thought to be unnecessary to refer here to the details of the plan, and it is probably sufficient to say that in general, it aims at the establishment of a new order in East Asia and the enlargement of the scale of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of East Asia

GG-30.

- a. X. 2224, F. 15851-61
b. X. 540, F. 6271

VIII. Mobilization Law.

GG-39. In view of the paramount importance of the provisions of the National General Mobilization Law to the economic and other plans with which the Planning Board was concerned, it is significant that on March 8th, 1941, it was announced that the Cabinet had decided that the regulations made under that Law would be put in force on March 20th.^{a.}

IX. ROSHINO's Connection with The Total War Research Institute.

GG-40. The Total War Research Institute was established by an Ordinance of September 30th, 1940. The Ordinance provided that the Institute "shall be under the administration of the Prime Minister and shall control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war". The head of the Institute was to be of Cho'kunin rank and councillors were to be appointed by the Cabinet from among the higher civil servants of the various Government offices concerned and from among eminent and experienced scholars who were to be recommended to the Throne by the Prime Minister.^{a.} CS IKC was appointed Acting Director on October 1st, 1940. He was at that time President of the Planning Board and Minister without portfolio.^{b.} In January 1941, a permanent Director was appointed, namely Lieutenant General IKURA, who prior to his appointment was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and who subsequently commanded the 5th Army in Manchuria and was later Director of the

GG-39.

a. X. 1055, C. 9842

GG-40.

a. X. 868A, T. 8817-8
b. T. 8618-92.

(GG-43) a. "dential". Excerpts from a few of the publications were read to the Tribunal which showed a striking anticipation of what actually happened in connection with such important matters as the U.S.-Japanese negotiations and the course they took, events in French Indo-China and Siam, the proposed extent of the Greater East Asia Sphere and the plans for its establishment, and the outbreak of the Pacific war without a previous declaration

b. of war. The witness IIMURA stated that the exercises conducted by the institute had as their background the international and domestic situation Japan was then facing or expected to face and the students examined and discussed the national problems which would necessarily arise in case Japan moved into the Southwest Pacific.

GG-44. It is to be noted that by Item II of Article 1C of the Imperial Ordinance for the Organization of the War Ministry (as revised), provision was made that matters concerning students of the Institute were to be dealt with by the Military Administration

a. Section. Although the evidence as to the duration of the Institute's activities is not quite clear, it is evident from the dates of the publications that the Institute was still functioning in 1945.

GG-45. The prosecution submits that the evidence with regard to the formation of the Institute and its activities and publications and also the persons connected with it shows that it was an important organization which was founded and carried on as an essential part of the plans of the conspirators for

GG-43.

- a. Ex. 1354, T. 12,343;
T. 27,024
- b. Ex. 686A, T. 7416; T. 7420;
T. 8889-8925;
Ex. 688A, T. 7425-7429
Ex. 689A, T. 7431-4
Ex. 690A, T. 7435-7

GG-44.

- a. Ex. 74, T. 684
b. Ex. 869, p. 3-5

GG-43 (continued)

- b. Ex. 870A, T. 8930-8936
Ex. 871, T. 8941-8972
c. Ex. T. 27027-3

(99-49)
defendants in relation thereto. It is not considered necessary to examine this evidence in detail. It is submitted that it completely fails to answer the contentions made by the Prosecution with regard to the Institute.

99-50. So far as HOSHIKO is concerned, it is submitted that the formation and activities of the Institute directly implicate him by reason of his association with it, first as Acting Director and later as Councillor. He is also implicated as a member of the Cabinet which caused it to be established and, more particularly, as resident of the Planning Board. The defense witnesses ^{a.} UEMURA and ^{b.} OSIMURA have stated that HOSHIKO was inactive in the affairs of the Institute. Even if this evidence be accepted, it does not in any way free HOSHIKO from the responsibility which must necessarily attach to him by reason of his association with the Institute.

B. HOSHIKO'S RESIGNATION IN APRIL 1941.

99-51. In April 1941, HOSHIKO resigned his position as President of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio in the second KATO Cabinet. Defense witness ^{a.} UEMURA gave no explanation of the reason for HOSHIKO'S resignation although he refers to disputes between HOSHIKO and UCHIDA over the economic plans. According to him, ^{b.} an economic plan was prepared by some of the young officials of the Planning Board. When HOSHIKO sub-

99-50.

- a. Ex. 3030, T. 27087; T. 27073; T. 27076
- b. T. 29161-4

99-51.

- a. Ex. 3314, T. 29133
- b. Ex. 3314, T. 29149
- c. Ex. 835, T. 8837

A、一九三七年七月ヨリ一九四〇年七月ニ至ル滿洲期間

GG-1

星野ハ一七三二年七月カラ一九三六年七月迄滿洲
國財政部總務司長ヲシテ居リ、(a) 同一九三六年七月
ニ財政部次長ニ任命サレマシタ。(b) 一九三六年十二
月彼ハ總務局長ニ任ゼラレマシタ。(c) 彼ハ其ノ後引
續キ右ノ兩職ニ在任シ、一九四〇年七月ニ日本へ歸
朝スルト共ニ第二次近衛内閣ノ無任所大臣及企畫院

註、記録番號ハ英文ノ頁番號テアル

GG-1

a、 法廷記録 五一一九一ニ〇

b、 法廷證 一〇九 ” 五一三四一五

c、 ” 五一三五

P-1

星 野 直 樹

星野ハ訴因第一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、
十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、
十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十
五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、
三十三、三十四、三十五、三十七、三十八、三十九、
四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、五十二、五
十三、三十四及五十五ニヨツテ起訴サレテキルノデア
リマス。

0159 0010 1275

キタノデアリマスガ、陸軍大臣ガ對滿軍務局總裁デ
 アツタ、メニ陸軍ハ總テノ專斷ヲ左右スルコトガ可能
 デアツタノデス。南後告ガ第一回ノ關東軍司令官兼
 大使トナリマシタ。

陸軍ノ支配ニ就テ、星野ハ勿論關東軍ト滿洲國政府
 トハ非常ニ密接ナ關係ガアリ通常ソノ政府ハ軍ノ意
 見ヲ多ク代表シテキルト述べテ居リマス。(a)

c、

法廷證

四三二 A

法廷記録

三一四〇

a、

”

三一六六

GG-4

務局（局長陸軍大臣）が東京ニ設立サレマシタ。總理大臣ガ在滿大使ノ活動ヲ監督シ、一方外務大臣ガ大使ノ職能ノ純外交的ノ面ヲ監督致シマシタ。コノ改革ノ結果關東軍指令官ハ、外交問題、關東廳、租借地、南滿洲鐵道會社ヲ包含スル滿洲ニ於ケル日本管轄權内ノ總テヲ支配スルニ至リマシタ。(c)

コノ統一セル支配並ビニカ、ル廣範圍ノ職能及權カヲ關東軍司令官ニ附與スル事ニヨリ日本ハ自國ノ目的ニ從テ滿洲採取ヲナス事ガ確ニ一段ト容易ニナツタノデアリマス。内閣總理大臣、外務大臣ハ規定上ハ司令官ノ行動ヲ支配スル何等カノ方法ヲ有シテ

0159 0010 1278

HOSHINO Sumio 10-20-20

星野ハ彼ガ總務廳長デアツタ時、關東軍ト緊密ナ連
絡ヲ保ツテキタトイフコトヲ肯定致シマシタ。彼ハ
司令官ト屢々懇ラク毎月一回カニ同位會談シ、他ノ
官吏達ニハモツト數多ク會ツテキタノデアリマス (b)

GG-5

一九三二年七月カラ一九三六年迄ノ星野ノ活動ヲ
見レバ彼ガ共同謀議ニ關與シ且ツ之ニ對シ責任ヲ有
シテキタトイフコトガ分リ又他ノ事情ヲ顧慮スル迄
モナク、總テノ證據ヲ照合スレバ右ノ期間ニ於ケル
彼ノ關東軍トノ提携ハ極メテ明白デアリマス。又コ
ノ提携トイフコトノミニテモ充分星野ヲ共同謀議ニ
連累セシムルニ足ルモノデアルト考ヘラレマス。

一 總務廳長トシテノ星野 (一九三六年十一月—一九四〇年七月)

GG-6

總務廳長ハ滿洲國行政ニ對シ、絕對支配トハ言へ
テイマテモ、大ナル權力ヲ行使シタ事ハ疑問ノ余
地ハアリマセン。海軍ニ依レバ本長官ハ總理大臣以
上ノ權力ヲ有シテ居リ (a) 關東軍ノ命令下ニ行動シ
テ居タトハ云ヒナガラ、國事遂行機能ノ殆ソド凡テ

P-4

GG-6 GG-4

b、
a、

法廷記録 三一三九

三九七

星野目ラモ同議ハ、政府ノ急モ重要ナ一部門デア
 ツタト述ベテ居リ^(a)又辯護人松木モ認メテキル
 如ク^(b)同議長官ガ最初ヨリ日本山兵デアツタトイ
 フコトハ特ニ意味ガ深イノデアリマス。總務廳長官
 ノ態度ト勢力ガ如何ナルモノデアツタカニ就テノ實
 相ハ、日本ノ滿洲支配ニ關スル證據ヲ考究スレバ最
 モヨク理解シ得ルノデアリマス。ソノ證據ノ中ニハ
 次ノ如キモノガアリマス。

法廷記録

四〇二〇

GG-6

c b

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三〇一三七一八

d

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二〇一〇一三

GG-7

b a

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二〇一六一

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二一三三

ヲ掌邊スル地位ニ有ツタノデアリマス。(b) 總務長官
 房長官及ビ同局長代理(c) ヲ始メトシ滿洲國行政ニ
 於ケル幾多ノ重要ナ地位ニアツタ辯護側證人松木ハ
 同局長ノ機能ハ總理大臣ノ直接支配下ニアツタト主張
 シ又更ニ(d) 同局長ハ關東軍ノ指揮ヲ受ケテハキナカツ
 タト確言致シマシタ。形式上ハ同局長ハ明カニ總理
 大臣ニ隷屬シテキタノデアリマスガ檢察側ハ、證
 據全数カラミテ、滿洲國政府ハ事實上總理大臣共完
 全ニ日本ノ支配下ニアリ同政府ノ行政ニハ日本ノ官
 吏、特ニ總務局長ガ權力ヲ有シテキタコトハ、全ク
 明カデアルト考ヘルノデアリマス。

CG-8

g	f	e	d
法 定 記 録	法 定 記 録	法 定 記 録	法 定 記 録
三 三 三 A	三 三 三 A	三 三 一 A	二 三 六
法 定 記 録	法 定 記 録	法 定 記 録	法 定 記 録
三 〇 三 二	三 〇 三 一	三 〇 三 六	二 九 三 九

- (a) 日本ノ内閣ノ滿洲國是ニ關スル其ノ後ノ決定事項ヲ見レバ、日本ノ勢力ノ侵蝕トソノ範圍ガ一層既確ニナリマス。
- 5、滿洲事變後、南滿洲鐵道合資方中口ノ總テノ鐵道ノ管理ヲ行フヤウニナリ、(e) 右ハ本合資ニ關スル山東軍司令官ト日本政府ノ勢力ヲ示スモノデアリマス。(f)
- 6、法
定
記
録
三
A
(g) ニヨレバ滿洲國政府ハ

日滿經濟進行ニ當ツテノ重要ナル基本事項、更ニ
滿洲帝國ノ基礎建設ニ就テノ重要ナル國內問題等
ニ對シ積極的ナ指導ヲ爲ス」トイフコトヲ規定シ
テ居リマス。更ニ又ハ滿洲ノ支配ヲ維持スル爲ニ
必要ナ活動ハ事實上凡テ之ニ對シテ「積極的指導」
ヲ習得シタ上テ後、「他ノ事項ハ滿洲當局ノ自由
ナ活動ニ任ス」トイフコトモ規定シテ居リマス。
特ニ重要ナコトハ「滿洲ニ對スル指令」ハ實際ニ
於テハ既東軍司令官及日本大使官轄下ノ日本側官
吏之ヲ遂行ストイフモノト、差當ツテハ如何ナル
程度、政治機關ヲ許容セズトイフ三條項デアリマ
ス。

ケルコトニアツタトイフ事ノミナラズ日本が常ニ
 本委員會ヲ統制シ得ルコトヲ保証スルヤウナ考慮
 方術ハレテキル事が同協定及ビ憲法院會議ニ依リ
 示サレテ居ルカラデアリマス。本委員會ハ爾日ヨ
 リ各口給ノ代表ヲ出シテ組織サレテキマシタノデ
 ソノ補風ハ表面上ハ公正妥當デアルヤウニ見えマ
 シタ。シカシ後告廣田モ云ツテキル如ク「同委員
 會ノ組織ハ一見何レノ國ノ儀ニ於テモ平等デアル

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。 法廷証 八五〇 法廷証 八〇一八

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HOSHI NO Summation-GG¹

「ロシア」カラ東支銀道ヲ買収シ日本ハ一九三五
年三月ニ、買収條件ニ基ク滿洲國政府ノ義務遂行
ヲ保証シ、コレニヨツテ滿洲國把握ヲ一段ト強化シ
マシタ。

B、經濟共同委員會ニ依ル支配

GG-9
1、法廷社八三〇號 (a) ニハ經審院會議ニ於ケ
ル共同經濟委員會設立ニ關スル日滿協定案及ソノ
協定自体ニ關スル前議ノ報告ガ記載シテアリマス
本文書ノ内容ハ極メテ重要ナキノデアリマスガ、
ソレハ右協定ノ趣旨ガ兩國ノ經濟ヲ完全ニ結合ビツ

ヤウニ見エルカモ知レナイガ、事實ハソウデナイ」
ノデアリマシタ。(b) 日本領ニ有利ナコノ不平等ハ
滿洲國領西人ノ代表ノ中ノ一人ハ總務廳長デア
ルト、イフ規定ニ依ルモノデアリマス。即チコノ
長官ハ「日本人デアリ今後キズツト日本人ガナル
デアラウト相信スル」ト廣田ガ述べテ居リマス。(c)
2、廣田ハ續ケテ述べマシタ。一九三六年十二月
以來總務廳長タリシ關係上星野ハ同委員會委員ト
シテ滿洲國ヲ代表シテキルト看做サレタノデアリ
マスガ、廣田モ在野院デ説談シテキル如ク「日本
ト滿洲國トノ間ニ對立ナドガ一切起ラヌヤウニ取

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CG-9

g f

委員ノ間ニ於ケル「最後の決定」ハ通常委員一致
 テ爲サレタト説既シテ后リマスガ、コノ委員一致
 タルヤ「数多ノ議論」ノ後ニ到達シタモノト考ヘ
 ラレ且又滿洲口委員ハ、日本側ニ對シ際限ナク
 反對ヲ續ケテモ何モナラナイトイフコトヲ良ク知
 ツテキタトモ推測出来マセウ。

法廷記録 五七七

法廷記録 五七八

有シテキタ諸種ノ権能、之ヲ有スルニ至ツタ理由
 及ビ外見上平等ナ代表ノ参加トイフ偽曲的性質等
 ヲ充分承知シテキタニ違ヒアリマセン。

3、墨野ハ同委員會ニ就テ訊問ヲ受ケ、滿洲ノ資
 源利用ニ關シテ日本ト滿洲國トノ間ニ意見ノ相違
 ガ生ジタヤウナ場合ニハ同委員會ガソレニ決着ヲ
 ヲ附ケタト説明シマシタ。(1) 更ニ彼ハ兩國ガ各四
 人ノ代表ヲ出シテキタト (2) 違ベマシタガ外見上

平等ナ投票權ハ事實ニ於テハ平等テハナカツタト
 イフヤウナコトヤ、日本ガ實情ヲ鑑ツテキタ等ト
 イフコトハ説明シマセンデシタ。又彼ハ同委員會

GC-10

b	a
法 法 法	法 法 法
二九 一七 七九	二三 三七

法 法 法 記 記 記 録 録 録	法 法 法 記 記 記 録 録 録
二二 二六 二七 〇二 七八 七	二 六 四 四

タコトハ疑問ノ余地ハナク又彼等ノ目的ヲ達スル
 爲ニ彼等ハ戦ヲ賭ス覺悟ヲアツタトイフ事
 千疑問ノ余地ナク認識サレマス。

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HOSHINO Summation-GG

日本ノ支那ヲ示ス條約及改定

GG-10

1、一九三六年六月十日、日本ト滿洲國ノ間ニ條約ヲ締結サレ、コノ條約ノ結果滿洲ニ於ケル日本人ハ、滿洲人ト同等ノ諸權利ヲ有スルニ至リマシタ^(a)

2、滿洲(並ビニ他ノ國々)ニ在スル日本ノ政令ノ其ノ目的ハ法廷第九七九號ニ示サレテ居リマス^(b) 右文書ハ、一九三六年八月十一日總理大臣及大臣、海、大藏、外務大臣ノナシタ口案ニ關スル決定事項ヲ含ンテ居リマス。コノ口案ヲ承認スレバ、日本ノ計畫ガ條約的擴張的性質ヲ帯ビテ居

GG—II

a	法廷記録 一 二六
b	法廷記録 一 二八
c	法廷記録 四 四六
	法廷記録 四 四五
	法廷記録 五 〇 五九
	法廷記録 五 〇 六一

洲ノ資源ヲ日本ノタメニ搾取セシトスルモノデ
 アル事ヲ明瞭ニ示シテ居マス。ソレラハ又日本
 ガ完全ニ滿洲ヲ統治支配シ、滿洲及ビソノ資源
 ガ日本ノ所謂「國防」ニトリ重要デマル事ヲ強
 調シテオリマス。右計聲ハ、日本（及ビ東京軍）

滿洲國陸軍三箇年計畫

I、星野ハ、彼ガ右計畫ノ財政部門作成ニ大イニ關係ヲ有シ、(a) 計畫ノ發展ニ就イテ被告坂垣ト共ニ仕事ヲシタ旨ヲ容認シマシム。亦彼ハ、關東軍司令官ガ右計畫ニ何ヲ包含スベキカトイフ事ニ關シテノ最後ノ決定ヲナシタト述べマシタ。(b) 右計畫案及ビ條約案ノ内容ハ、陸軍第四四五號及ビ四四六號ニ記載サレテアリマス。(c) 法廷證第四四六號ガ關東軍司令部ト連シテアルノハ意味深長デアリマス。計畫案及ビ修正案ハ簡單ニ述べテアリマスガ、日本ノ軍ノ目的ハ滿

GGE—II

f e d

ノデアアル事ヲ示シテ居リマス。

3、辯護側控人ノ片倉ハ五箇年計畫ハ支那事變
 勃發後ニ日本ノ要求ニヨツテ補充サレヌト述ベ
 マシタガ (f) コノ計畫ハ滿洲國ノ發展トイフヨ

法廷記録第一六〇

法廷記録第一六五

法廷記録一九〇一

ニ依リ日本ノ侵略擴張目的ノ必要ナ殺割ヲ果ス
爲ニ日本ニヨツテ發案サレ、成文化サレタトイ
フ事ヲ疑フ事ハ出來ナイト思フノデアリマス。

2、星野ハ日本ノ政策ハ、滿洲ヲ第一ニ日本産
業ノ原料ノ源トシテ、第二ニハ擴張シツツアル

日本ノ人口ガ移住シ得ル場所トシテ發展セシム

ルコト、^(d)ソシテ日本軍ノ政策モコレト同様デ

アルト述ベマシタ。^(e)コノ説明ハ述ベザアルコ

トハ正ニ眞實デアリマスガ、明フカニ不十分

デアルト思ハレマス。總テノ證據ハ(待ニ五箇

年計費ニ依スル證據)日本ノ政策ハ經濟的以上

ノモノデアリ、東亞全体ノ刷新ヲ目的トシタモ

進歩ノ證據ハ法廷證第四四九號 (a) 及ビ第四五〇號 (b) ニ記載サレテアリマス。文部第四五〇號ハ「大東亞共榮圈建設ニ於ケル一構成部分及ビ必要缺クベカラザル本質的要素トシテ一」ヲ洲國發展ニ關スル顯著ナ參考文獻デアリマス。

GG-I I

g 法廷證 九七九 法廷記録 九五四九
 法廷證 八四一 法廷記録 八二六一
 法廷證 八四二 法廷記録 八二六四

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a 法廷證 四四九 法廷記録 五一〇三
 b 法廷證 四五〇 法廷記録 五一〇五

リハ專使ノ遂行ノ援助トイフ事ニ向ケラレタノ
 デ滿洲國ノ利益ノ増加トイフ結果ニハナリマセ
 ンデシタ。又五箇年計畫ハ一九三六年八月十一
 日ニ定メラレタ國策ニ關スル決定事項及び、法
 廷證第八四一號及び第八四二號記載ノ戰爭ヲ目
 的トスル日本ノ產業擴充計畫ニ直接關係アルモ
 ノト思ハレマス。(g)

制壓ノ程度ノ證據

滿洲國ニ於ケル經濟建設ノ進歩及び日本、滿

洲國、華北ヲ通ジテノ廣汎ナ生産力擴張計畫ノ

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- 命サレルコト、及び右ノ官ノ免官ハ國東京軍ノ承認ヲ得ベキ事ガ提議サレマシタ。(a) 辯護側證人ウエダ (b) ニ依レバ、日本人雇用規定ハ日、滿條約附屬書ニ含まレテ居タノデアリマス。(c)
2. 溥儀ニ依ルト被告板垣ガ、新國家ノ元首ニナルコトヲ溥儀ニ願ツタ時、板垣ハ日本官吏雇用 (a) ヲ條件トシマシタ、コノ政策ガ直チニ採
- a 法廷證ニハ〇 法廷記録 二〇一五七
- b 法廷證 四四〇 法廷記録 五〇三三
- c 法廷記録 二五九
- d 法廷記録 三九六二
- 法廷記録 三九七五

GG-I3

右法廷證ノ價值ハ日本ノ滿洲ニ對スル副盛ノ程
度、及び日本ノ擴張計畫ヲ促進スル目的ヲ示シテ
居ル點ニアルノデアリマス。

日本官吏ニヨル滿洲國行政ノ支配

I、滿洲新國家行政管理ニ於テ、日本官吏ガ有
カナル支配權ヲ持ツコトヲ日本ハ最初カラ意圖
シテ居タノデアリマス。關東軍ノ推薦ニヨリ日
本人ガ顧問並ビニ中央及び地方政廳ノ官吏ニ任

GG-13

f e 法廷證五七

法廷記録 五二三

法廷記録 二〇、一一九

法廷記録 二〇、一七〇

法廷記録 二〇、三九八

滿洲國政府ノミガ日本官吏任命ノ責任ヲ有シテ
居タト主張シマシタ。石ノ證人ノ中一人トシテ
荷シクモ「リットン」報告ヲ非難シタモノハ無
ク、又夫等ノ目更ガ行政ヲ支配シタトイフ檢事

用サレタ事ハ「リットン」報告一ヨツテ示サレ
テ居マス。(e) 「リットン」報告ノ第九九、一〇
〇頁及一〇六頁ハコノ間題ヲ扱ツテキルノデア
リマス。右報告ハ日本人ハ總ベテノ重要部門ニ
配屬サレ、地方廳、陸軍省、軍隊、或ハ政府ノ
專案ニ從事セル者ヲ除イテ、中央政府ノミニテ
モ殆ンド二〇〇人ノ日本人官吏ガ居ツタト述ベ
テ居マス。報告ハ一九三二年九月附デアリマス
カラ、コノ政策ガ直チニ實行サレタトイフ事ハ
明白デアリマス。

3、辯護側證人「ウエダ」松本及ビ武蔵「トミ
ヲ」ハ證人トシテコノ間題ニ言及シ、(f) 前者ハ

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g	法廷記録	二〇、一六三
h	法廷記録	三九九二
i	法廷記録	三九九三

クコトニヨツテ確保サレヌトイフ事ヲ立証スル
モノト思ハレマス。コノ政策ハ前記事變後絶エ
ズ實行サレ、終戦迄續イタノデアリマス。

例ノ主張ニ對シテ他ノ證人モ何等區別ニ非難ヲ
 獄ミナカッタノハ注目ニ價スルノデアリマス。
 松木ハ日本人ガ一九三二年六月ニ大臣次官トナ
 リ、後^(g)ニハ次官ハ全部日本人デアツタト述ベマ
 シタ^(g)

4、薄儀ハ日本人ハ「芝居ヲシ」^(h) 此ノ行政ハ

總務司長（日本人）ニヨツテ司會サレ、諸大臣

次官（日本人）及ビ諸軍第四團長⁽ⁱ⁾ノ出席

スル毎週ノ會議ヲ實行サレタトイフ證據ヲ提出

シマシタ。コノ證據ハ、日本ノ滿洲國支配ヲ實

現スル爲又ハ實現ヲ援助センガタメニ、直ノ行

政支配ニハ多數ノ日本人官更ヲ重要ナ地位ニ置

GG-I3

J 法廷證ニ四六三

法廷記録ニ〇三三六

法廷記録ニ〇三三七

要十役割ヲ演ジタト推定スルノハ公平デアルト
思ハレマス。

5、又、星野ハ此ノ政策ノ實行ニツイテ多大ノ責任ガアルト思ハレマス。彼ハ一九三二年七月ヨリ一九四〇年七月迄、彼ガ總務司長デアツタ一九三六年以降ハ特ニ、重要ノ行政上ノ任命ヲ行ヒマシタ。證人難波ハ、阿片專賣局ノ爲ニ、適當ノ日本人ガ加刺國ニ派遣サレルコトヲ星野ガ要求シ、彼、難波ガ選バレタト述ベマシタ。證人トシテ彼ハ、任命ヲ受諾スル前ニ彼ハ東京ニ於テ星野ト總ベテノ專断ヲ討論シタト述ベマシタ。(j) 星野ハ他ノ日本人官吏ヲ得ルノニ主

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中國人ハ日本人ノ爲ス事ニ反對スル事ハ出來マセ
 ンデシタ。(c) 石證人ハ又滿洲ノ秘ベテノ産業及
 ビ經濟ガ日本ノ支配下ニアリ、中國人ハ之ニ加ハ
 ル事ヲ許サレナカツタトイフ事又益野ハ直接コレ

a、法廷記録 三九九三

b、" 三〇二〇

c、" 三九九四一六

日本制憲ニ關スル海峽ノ證言

1、本證言ハ溥儀ガ一箇ノ使節ニ過ギナカッタ事
 及ビ滿洲國ノ所謂獨立政府ハ日本ニ依リ、特ニ
 東軍ニヨツテ完全ニ支配サレテ居タトイフ事ヲ示
 シテ居マス。本證言ハ星野ノ犯罪ヲ決定スル上ニ
 於テ重要デアリマス。溥儀ノ證言ハ日本ノ制憲ノ
 事實ヲ立證スルノミナラズ、マタ星野ガ右ノ制憲
 ヲ實現スルニ於テ主役ヲツトメタトイフ事實ヲモ
 立證シテ居ルノデアリマス。右ハ秘書司長ノ行使
 セル權力及ビ勢力ヲ示シ、(a) 且ツ又彼ハ門東軍
 ノ命令ノ下ニ行動シタトイフ事ヲ示シテ居マス。(b)

シメル目的ヲ以テ訂書ガ成文化サレマシタ。右重工業ハ以前ハ南滿洲鐵道會社ノ傘下ニアリ、後初松陶ハコノ訂書ガ適當ナリヤ否ヤラ疑ツタノデアリマスガ、速ニ同意シマシタ。臨東阜モ亦同意シマシタ。(2) 総務部(星野ガ司長デアリマシタ)

d、法廷記録 L〇二一一二
 e、法廷記録 L〇二一一五
 f、法廷記録 L〇二八一三一
 g、法廷記録 L〇三三二
 h、法廷記録 L〇三三一六
 i、法廷記録 L〇三六一七

a、法廷記録五一二八一九

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HO SHI NO Summation-GG

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ニ關係シテ居タ事ヲ示シテ居マス。(d) 專賣局ハ
 日本人ノ支配下ニアリ、(e) 廣範ナル諸種ノ權力
 ヲ有シ、ソレ等ハ滿洲人ニ損害ヲ與ヘタノデアリ
 マス。(f) 強制的蓄貯、(g) 土地所有(h) 及ビ勞力奉仕(i)
 ニ關シ、滿洲人ハ日本人ノ利益ノ爲ニ搾取サレマ
 シタ。總ベテ之等ノ事柄ニ對シテ星野ハ直接ニ責
 任ガアリ、本證言ハ共同謀議促進ニ於テ彼ノ演ジ
 タ重大ナ役ヲ非常ニ明瞭ニ示シテ居ルノデアリマ
 ス。

滿洲制鐵ノ要素トシテノ滿洲産業開發會社

1、一九三七年ニ滿洲國諸重工業ヲ結合、發展セ

日本自身ノ目的ノ爲ニ滿洲ヲ搾取センガ爲ノ日本
 ノ訂誓的政策ヲ立証シテ居ルノテアリマシテ、星
 野ハ全力ヲ擧ゲテコノ政策ヲ實行シタノデアリマ
 ス。

3、東條ハ星野ハ滿洲ニ於ケル五人ノ最も重要ナ
 ル日本人ノ中ノ一人デアツタト諛言シマシタ。(c)ナ

b、 " 五一三〇

c " 三六、五七六

野ハ彼ノ言フトコロノ陸軍ノ支持レラ得ル目的デ
 關東軍司令官武藤信義ノブヨシト同問題ヲ討議シタト述
 ベマシタ。(b) 法廷證第二二七號ニ示サレテイル
 通り(c) 關東軍參謀長ハ一九三二年六月進ンデ
 陸軍省宛電報ヲ打チ阿片專賣ニヨル收入ヲ増加
 セシメ、ソノ結果借款ノ増額トイフコトニナツ
 タノデアリマス。

GG-16

a、法廷證

二四六三

法廷記録

二〇、三五六

〃

二〇、三六六

GG-17

a、法廷證

三七五

法廷記録

四六八五

b、

五一二四

c、

四六八一—二

GG-16

二、星野ト阿片賣買トノ關係 (a)

辯護人難波ノ口供書ニヨレバ、星野ハ財政部總務司長タリシ、一九三二年九月又ハ十月ニ、阿片專賣總務ノ爲ニ難波ヲ滿洲ニ行カセルコトニツイテ大キナ役割ヲ演ジタトアリマス。法廷證第二四六三號第三節ニアル如ク、星野ガ明カニ賣買禁止ヨリモ收入面ヲ重視シタトイフコトハ明白ナ事デアリマス。

GG-17

星野ハ巨額ノ對日借款ヲ交渉シ、ソノ擔保ニハ阿片專賣者ノ收益ガ含マレテイマシタ。(a) 星

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コト及ビ眞實ナルコトハ之ヲ疑フ何等ノ理由モナ
イノデアリマス。(a) 滿洲國財政部ニ於ケル地位及
ビ其後ノ總務廳長トシテノ地位カラ見テ星野ハ滿
洲國ノ豫算及收入ニ非常ナ關心ヲ持ツテイタノデ
アリマス。

正、一九三八年十二月三日ノ經濟會議ニ於ケル

星野ノ演說。

GG-201 右經濟會議ニ於ケル星野ノ演說ニ、スル

GG-18 a. 法廷證 二四六三、第四頁 法廷記録 二〇、三三〇一

法廷記録 二〇三四九一、二〇

二〇三五六

GG 19 a 法廷證 二四六三 法廷記録 二〇、三五六

GG-18

阿片收入ハ大体次ノ通りデス。一九三三年三十万圓、一九三四年百二十万圓、一九三五年千万圓、其後收入ハ、年額二千万圓ノ次ノ年ハ三千万圓トナル割合デ増加シマシタ。(a)

GG-19

當法廷ガ難波ノ取初ニ學ゲタ數字ヲ正確デアルトシテ受理サレンコトヲ提議致シマス。反對訊問ニ於ケル彼ノ回避的態度、及ビ反對訊問ニ於ケル彼ノ證言ト彼ノ宣誓供述トノ不一致ハ右證言ガ法廷ヲ欺ク爲ニナサレタコトヲ示スモノデアリマスガ、之ニ反シ彼ノ取初ノ宣誓供述書ノ正確ナル

GG-21

右演説ノ全部、特ニ法廷記録第二九一五五―七
 頁記載ノ部分ハ、星野ニ對スル有力ナル訴追事項
 デアリ積極的又直接ニ彼ヲ共同謀議ニ誘坐サセルニ
 役立ツモノデアリマス。一九四〇年四月彼方日支
 事變ニ於ケル勳功ニヨリ勳章ヲ授與サレタコトハ
 意外デアアリマセン。(a)

GG-20

GG-a、法廷証 三二一五―A 法廷記録 二九一五九

GG-21

a、法廷証 一〇九 法廷記録 七一〇

論議等ハ辯護側證人小畑ノ反對訊問ノ際證據トシ
 テ提出サレマシタ。(a) 本證人ハ星野ガ日支事變ヲ
 遺憾トシ出來ル丈迄カニ終結ヲ望ンダト言明シマ
 シタ。星野ノ演說ハ、彼ガ同事變ヲ「聖戰」ト見
 ナシ、全面的ニ之ニ賛成デアツタユトヲ示スモノ
 デアルコトハ何等ノ疑ヲ容レマセン。彼ハ滿洲事
 變ヲ東亞ノ覺醒ト稱シテ同事變ニ賛成ノ意ヲ表シ
 又當時ノ日支事變ハ滿洲事變ノ發展、擴張デア
 ルト述ベマシタ。彼ハ華北、華中及ヒ蒙古國境ニ於
 ケル各新政府ノ樹立ヲ是認シ、新東亞ノ建設ヲ主
 張シマシタ。

GG-23

レタコトモアリマセン。同時ニ任命サレタ東條、
 松岡及ビ大橋（外務次官）モ以前ニハ内閣ニ於ケ
 ル經驗ヲ有シマセンデシタ。海軍ニ於ケル有力者
 デアリ爾東軍ト 多少共密接ナ關係ヲ有シテイタ
 是等四人ガ同時ニ日本ノ内閣ニ入ツタトイフコト
 ハ確カニ意義重大デアリ、又右任命ハ東軍ノ勝
 利デアツタト考ヘラレマス。一九四〇年八月二日
 「オット」ガ獨外相宛電報デ大橋ノ任命ニツイテ
 新内閣ニ於ケル海軍派勢力ノ一層ノ強化ヲ意味ス、
 ルモノデアルト言ツタコトハ想起サルベキコトデ
 アリマス。(a)

a、法廷説

五三八

法廷記録

六二六五

GG-22

B、星野ノ第二次近衛内閣々僚及ビ企劃院總裁
任命

星野ノ清洲國政府トノ公的關係ハ彼ガ一九四〇
年七月二十一日第二次近衛内閣々僚ニ任命サレタ
トキ終了シマシタ。米内々閣ヲ脅カシ結局之ヲ倒
スニ至ツタ紛議ニ就テ彼ガ何カ知ツテイタト推測
シテモ不當デハアリマスマイ。新内閣々僚ニ推サ
レル 前ニ何等ノ交渉乃至討議カ行ハレナカツタ
トイフコトハ恐ラク存リ得ヌト思ハレルノデア
リマス。

GG-23

星野ハ以前ニハ、曾テ閣僚タリシコトナク、又
日本ニ於テ政治的乃至準政治的性質ノ職ニ任命サ

0159 00 10 1300

ラ示シタノテアリマス。ソシテ彼ノ海淵ニ於ケル
 業績ハ疑モナク彼ガ右政策ニ忠實デアツタコトヲ
 示シマシダ。

GG-25

星野ハ彼ガ如何ニシテ任命サレルニ三ツダカニ
 就テ説明シテ居マセン、又ソノコトニツキ何等ノ
 證據モ他ノ証人ヨリ提出サレテ居ナイノデアリマ
 ス。凡ユル狀況カラ見テ以下ハ公正妥當ナ推論ト
 思ハレマス。即チ彼ノ選任ハ彼ガ侵略主義的擴張
 政策ノ支持者（執言スレバ共同謀議ノ一員）タル
 コトガ知ラレナイダコトニ依ルコト、彼ノ任命ハ

GG-24

星野ノ内閣々僚及ビ企劃院總裁任命ハ軍、殊ニ閣
京軍ニ責任アリト主張スルコトハ正當デアルト忌
ハレマス。ソレ以外ニ彼ノ任命ヲ説明スル事が出
來マセウカ？ 彼ハ日本カラ八年間離レテ居マシタ。
彼ハソレ迄ニ此ノ種ノ職ヲ尋ジタコトハアリマセ
ン。 軍ハ本内々閣ヲ伺臨サセマシタ。 京線、松
岡、大橋、星野ノ任命ニ見ラレル如ク滿洲派ハ弱
カニ非常ナ勢力ヲ有シテ居マシタ。 星野ガ軍國主
義的擴張政策ニ賛成シテイル事ガ知ラレテ居ナカ
ツダトシダナラバ、到底彼ハ選任セラカッタノ
デアラウト忌ハレマス。 彼ハ一九三八年十二月ノ
演説ニ於テ彼ガ右政策ノ熱心ナ支持者デアルコト

企劃院ハ各省ノ一般の準備事項、生産計畫及ビ物
 資配分計畫、輸送ノ如キ其ノ他ノ事項ニ關係ガア
 ツタ。(b) 物資配分計畫ハ總体的計畫テアツテ細部
 ニ立テ入ラナカツタ。物資ノ需要及ビ見積ガ各省
 カラ提出サレ、企劃院ハ利用シ得ル物資ノ量ニ從
 ツテ計畫ヲ立テタ。國海軍ノ需要ガ絶エズ増加シ
 マシタガ、彼等ノ計畫ノ詳細ハ秘密ニサレテキタ
 ノデ企劃院ハ物資ノ必要目的ヲ知ラナカツタ。(c)

GG-27

- a、 法廷記録三一三七
- b、 " " 三一四八
- c、 " " 三一四八—五〇

共同謀議ニ於ケル一步前進テアツタコト、及び
ニ、星野ノ任命受諾ハ彼ガ石政策遂行援助ノ意思
ヲ以テ受諾シタルコト、ノ以上テアリマス。

C、一九四〇年七月二十二日ヨリ一九四一年四月
四日ニ至ル期間

GG-26

一九四〇年七月二十二日ヨリ一九四一年四月四
日ニ至ル期間、星野ハ企劃院總裁兼無任所大臣テ
アリマシタ。

I、企劃院ノ活動ニ關スル證據

GG-27

訊問中星野ハ企劃院ニ關シテ次ノ様ニ説明シマ
シタ。彼ハ、企劃院ハ「各省ト協力シ、次年度へ
ノ計畫ヲ立テル爲」ニ設ケラレダト述ベマシタ。(a)

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石油ノ供給ハ重大問題デアツタガ、陸海軍ハ彼等
 ガ「南方ノ石油ニ手ヲツケル」一持續スルダケノ
 十分ナ貯蔵ガアルト考ヘテイル様子デアツタ。(d)
 星野自身ノ考テハ、戦争ノ初期ニ於テ日本ハ極東
 ノ大部分ヲ占領スルコトガ出来、ソノ際獲得セル
 石油ノ如キ物資ヲ長期戦ヲ行フコトガ出来ルトイ
 フデアツタ。請許登ハ「日本内地」ノ爲ニ作成
 サレタカソレラハ原料、輸出入、財政ニ關シテ必
 然的ニ滿洲國ニ影響ヲ與ヘタ。(e) 日本及ビ滿洲國
 ノ爲ノ請許登ハ必要アレバ日滿共同經濟委員會ノ
 援助ヲ以テ調整サレタ。(f) / 以上デアリマス /

GG-28

企劃院ハ約百名カラ成リ日本ノ經濟請許登ヲ作
 成シマシタ。(a) 一九四〇年十一月ニ商工業ニ對ス
 ル一ツノ請許登ガ作成サレマシタガソノ請許登ハ同種類ノ業
 一ツノ強力ナ團體ニ吸收サセルコト、又石炭體ヲ通
 シテノ政府ノ統制ヲ規定シタデアリマス。(b)

真 重長閣議決定事項

GG-27 d、法廷記録五一六七一七〇
 e、〃 五一三七一九
 f、〃 五一六七一八

法廷記録五一七七一八

GG-28 a、法廷記録五一三一
 b、法廷記録五一三一

法廷記録五一三九六三一五

締結トナリマシタ。

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）八月一日ニ松岡ハ御

園西トノ交渉ヲ開始シ其ノ結果日本ハ特印ニ重裏

ナル特利ヲ得ルニ至リマシタ。(c)

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）八月中ニ商務東京印度

ニ對シテ爲スベキ要求ノ原案ガ作成サレ且使節ガ

派遣サレマシタ。(d)

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）秋ニ企劃院ハ工業ヲ

組織化スル經濟計畫ヲ行テ、之ハ日本ニ於ケル、

且ツ滿洲、中國以東亞ニ對スル高度ナル政府統制

9 a	2 b	9 c	9 d
法廷証	法廷証	法廷証	法廷証
五四〇	二二〇	六二〇	二二〇
法廷証	法廷証	法廷証	法廷証
六二七九	一一七九四	六八八六	一一七九八

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GG-29

星野ガ内閣及企動院ニ在任中、是等兩官ノ決定セル諸重要決定事項以下是等決定事項中ノ事項
一 一九四〇年ハ昭和十五年ノ七月二十六日「日本
ノ太平洋防衛策要綱」ト云フ閣議決定事項ガアリマ
シタ。(a)

一 一九四〇年(昭和十五年)七月二十七日ニ通給
會議ノ決定事項ガアリマシタ。(b)

三 獨伊トノ關係強化ニ對スル勢力カ擴ハレ遂ニ一

九四〇年(昭和十五年)九月二十七日ノ三閣會議

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ラ含ムモノデリアマシタ。(e)
一九四〇年(昭和十五年)十一月初、八月一日
ノ國策發表ニ據リテ、同日、^(f)第ノフツク^(g)經濟
策要編「方發表サレマシタ」此ノ^(h)計畫ニハ後
ニ言及シマス
ハ九月三十日ニ總力⁽ⁱ⁾經濟研究所ガ設立サレマシタ。
ハ一九四一年ハ昭和十六年(初年度)ニ合衆國ガ交渉
繼續ノ決定ガナサレマシタ。^(j)真村ガ一月ニ大候ニ
任命サレマシタ。^(k)
上記ノ事項ハ星野ノ^(l)共同計畫ニ^(m)關スル間ヲ
考慮スル際ニ直⁽ⁿ⁾裏テアリマス。
眞日、清、羅、等^(o)フツク經濟計畫
一九四〇年十一月八日ニ東京新聞ハ内閣情報局
發表ノ^(p)結果ヲ掲載シ、十一月五日ニ發表サレタ日
報^(q)ノフツク經濟計畫ニ^(r)關キ明細ヲ^(s)記シマシ
タ。(a)同新聞ハ本計畫ハ一九四〇年ハ昭和十五
年(八月一日)ニ發表サレタ根^(t)本國策^(u)(b)ニ^(v)關スル内
閣決定ニ^(w)悉ク^(x)モノヲ^(y)ア^(z)ルト^(aa)述ベ且^(ab)政府ハ該決定以

〇四七六五三九八八四
四三三三三三三三三三三三
三三三三三三三三三三三三
二二二二二二二二二二二二
一一一
一六二
一六二
一八

0 157 00 10 1935

GG-31

来、主トシテ企業院ト共ニ、日滿華ヲ綜合シ大東
亞ヲ包含スル「共同經濟圏ノ樹立」ノ具体化方策
ヲ研究シテ來タ。

此ノ案ハソノ結果デアルト説明シマシタ。
此レハ企業院ノ勢力ニ對スル該新案ノ考へ、特ニ
該計畫立案ニ際シテ、星野ノ勢力ヲ示スモノデア
リマシタ。ト云フノハ星野ノ氣負ガ其ノ計畫ノ詳
細ト共ニ掲載サレテアツタカラデスリマス。

内閣情報局發表ノ冒頭ハ次ノ通りデアリマス。
「世界ニ新秩序ヲ作ランガ爲大東亞共榮圈ヲ樹立
セントスル我が根本政策ハ今ヤ日獨伊匪ノ三國同
盟締結ニヨツテ新段階ニ入ツタ。ト。此處テ其
ノ計畫ニ付詳細ニ言ハスル必要ハナイト考ヘラレ
マス。ソシテ、大體本計畫ハ東亞ニ於ケル新秩序
ノ樹立ト日滿華ヲ包含スル經濟ブロックニヨル東
亞共榮上ノ規模遠大トヲ目途スルモノデアルト言
ヘバ先ヅ其ノ意ヲ盡シテ居リマス。此ノ目的ヲ達
成センガ爲ニ本計畫中ニ「國防經濟ヲ促進センガ
爲ニ財政ハ政策ニ適合スル稼運營サレネバナラヌ」
ト規定シテアリマス。

上、新經濟結構計畫

GG-32

企業院ニヨツテ立案サレ一九四〇年（昭和十五
年）秋ニ内閣ニ提出サレタ新經濟結構案ニ關スル

GG-33 GG-32

a 法廷証 三二一六 A

法廷証 二九一六四

a 法廷証 八五五第四一頁 法廷証 二九一四九

陸軍ノ真ノ目的ハ商工省ヲ軍需省ニ變申スルコトデアリマシタ。小林ハ明白ニ之ニ反對シ且實業家達ハ彼ヲ支持シマシタ。結局小林及星野ハ辭職シマシタ。陸軍ガ勝利ヲ得マシタガ内閣ノ崩壞ヲ避ケンガ爲ニ陸軍ガ星野ノ辭職ニモ同意スル必要ガアツタコトハ殆下疑フ餘地ガアリマセン。

痛言 僞証人小畑ノ証言ニ付キ茲ニ一言致シマス。

(a) 小畑ノ証言ニヨリマス、本計畫ハ企畫院ノ「若手ノ官更」ニヨツテ提案サレ、星野ガ内閣ニ提案シタ時ニハ相當ノ反對、特ニ商工大臣小林ノ反對ニ逢ヒマシタ。ソレテ星野ハ變更ニ同意シハ然シ是等ノ變更ハ重要ナラサル事項ニ過ギナイト息ハレマス。結局ニ本案ヲ内閣ガ採用シタト云フコトデアリマス。

GG-33

小畑ノ証言ト近衛手記ノ証言トヲ合ヤテ考ヘ
 マスト本案ニ關スル論争ハ一九四一年ハ昭和十
 六年〜四月ノ内閣ノ再組織ヲ齎ラス原因ノ一ツ
 トナツタコトガ明瞭ニナル様デアリマス。(a)

GG-34

a. 法廷説 八六三 第四五頁

本ノ指針ヲ「退休」センガ爲ニ採用サレタノデア
 リマシタ。一九六〇年ハ昭和三十五年ニ迄ニ一億
 ニ達スル人口ノ増加ガソノ自標テアリマシテ本業
 ノ目的ノ一ツハ「高度且切斷家ノ必要トスル仕事
 力及労働力ノ供給ヲ確保スルニアリ」ト明白ニ記
 サレテアリマス。但法廷ハ既ニ本計畫ノ採用ト、
 人口過剩ノ爲ニ日本ニトツテ生ジタ困難ト問題ニ

0159 0010 1308

HOSHINO Summation-GG

此ノ新經濟案ハ「軍備ノ先廢ラ促進」センガ爲ニ
經濟政策ヲ根本的ニ變更スルコトヲ意圖シタノデ
アリマス。本案ニハ高度ノ政府統制ガ規定サレテ
居リマシタ。

V、共同謀議ニ於ケル地位ヲ
表ハス他ノ計畫案

GG-34
自ノ爲セル政策決定及ソノ採用セル經濟及他ノ方針
ト、是等ニ於ケル星野ノ役割トヲ考察スル上ニ重

要テアリマス。此ノ計畫中ニハ人口政策ガアリマ
スガ之ハ一九四一年ハ昭和十六年一月二十二日
ニ内閣ガ採用シマシタ。(a) 本案ハ東西共榮
樹立セントスル帝國ノ使命ヲ達成シ且「東亞ニ日

GG-36	GG-35	GG-34
a	a	b
・法廷証	・法廷証	・
一一三一	一〇六七	
法廷証	法廷証	法廷証
一一七九八	九八七九	二四、七九八―二四、八〇九

VI、 東印度ニ對スル要求

GG-36 一 一九四〇年（昭和十五年）八月ニ際シ問題ニ關シ 東印度ニ對シテナセル要求事項ニ付テモ又 一言セネバナリマセン。(a) 星野ハ一關係トシテ 關係セルノミナラズ企業院總裁トシテ彼ガソノ要求ノ準備ニ於テ重要ナル役割ヲ演ジタニ相違ナイコトハ確實デアリマス。

GG-35

目セラレテ居リマス。(b) 關スル辯護側ノ主張トノ間ノ明白ナ矛盾ニ已ニ注

星野ハ企畫院總裁トシテ又一關係トシテ特ニ企

畫院ガ責任ヲ有シ或ハ之ガ關係セル人口計畫ト廣

汎ナ生産擴充計畫トノ間ノ密接ナ關係ニ鑑ミ、本

計畫並ニ之ニ含まレタル總テノ事項ニ對シ責任ア

ルモノト考ヘネバナリマセン。此ノ事ハ本計畫ニ

關スル日本ノ新聞ノ記事 (a) ニヨツテ確保セラレ

マス。此ノ記事ニヨリマスト星野ハ本計畫ニ表ハ

レタ人口政策ニ關シテ詳細ナ説明ヲシタノデアリ

マス。

0159 0010 1309

GG-38

b
"

五五四

"

六三九五

a
法廷証

五五二

法廷証

六三七九

GG-37

a
法廷証

五五二

法廷証

六三五四一五

" " "

六三六五
六三六九
六三七八

GG-38

星野ハ調査委員會終了ノ後ノ一九四〇年ハ昭和十五年ノ九月二十六日ノ秘密院會計ニモ出席シタコトヲ擧ゲネバナリマセン。(a) 秘密院ハ同盟案ヲ承認シマシタ。一九四〇年九月二十七日附ノ同盟宣言ノ附録ニハ星野ノ名方取ツテ居ルノデアリマス。(b)

GG-37

VII、三 國 同 盟

星野ハ一に依トシテ右ノ同盟ニ責任ガアル上ニ
 安ハ企て竟意欲ノ貫徹ニ於テ直接ニ關係シテ吾リ
 マスガ、ソノ事ハ一九一〇年ハ昭和十五年ノ九月
 二十六日ノ該同盟ニ歸スル秘密院ノ調査委員會ノ
 調査ニ記載サレテ居リマス。彼ハ其ノ會報ニ出
 席シ日本資料ノ國力ニ關シ詳細ト説明ヲシテ居リ
 マスガ同時ニ日本ノ財政或ハ未だ充實シテ居ナイト述
 ベマシタガ、一然シ乍ラ我々ハ既ニ十分準備ガ出
 來テ居ルト附言シマシタ。(a)

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GG-40

總力戰研究所ハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月三十日ノ勅令ヲ設立セラレマシタ。本所ハ「内閣總理大臣ノ官轄ノ下ニアツテ、國家總力戰ニ由進スル基礎的研究及ビ計劃ヲ管理シ、且又國家總力戰ニ關スル官吏及ビソノ他ノ者ノ教育及ビ訓練ヲ管理スルコト」ヲ、コノ勅令ハ規定シテキマス。本所ノ所長ハ勅

GG-39

2、法廷證 一〇五五 官廷記録 九八四二

GG-39

VIII 勤 員 法

企 業 院 ガ 関 係 シ テ キ タ 経 済 及 ビ ソ ノ 他 ノ 計
 畫 ニ 對 シ 國 家 總 勤 員 法 ノ 制 定 ガ 最 モ 重 要 デ ア
 ツ ヲ ト イ フ 點 ニ、一 九 四 一 年 (昭 和 十 六 年)
 三 月 八 日 ソ ノ 法 律 ノ 下 ニ 制 定 セ ラ レ タ 規 則 ガ、
 三 月 二 十 日 ニ 施 行 セ ラ ル ル ダ ラ ウ ト 内 閣 ガ 決
 定 シ タ ト 云 フ コ ト ラ 宣 表 シ タ コ ト ハ、重 要 ナ
 ル コ ト デ ア リ マ ス。

IX 星野ト總力戦研究所トノ關係

0159 0010 1311

GG-40

總力戰研究所ハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）
 九月三十日ノ勅令ヲ設立セラレマシタ。本所
 ハ「内閣總理大臣ノ官轄ノ下ニアツテ、國家
 總力戰ニ關連スル業ニ關シテ研究及ビ指導ヲ盡理
 シ、且又國家總力戰ニ關シテアル官吏及ビソノ
 他ノ者ノ教育及ビ訓練ヲ管理スルコト」ヲ、
 コノ勅令ハ規定シテキマス。本所ノ所長ハ勅

GG-39

2、法廷證 一〇五三 法廷記録 九八四二

GG-39

VIII

動員法

企業院が關係シテキタ経済及ビソノ他ノ計
 画ニ對シ國家總動員法ノ制定ガ必要トモ
 認テアツタトイフ點ニ、一九四一年（昭和十六年）
 三月八日ソノ法律ノ下ニ制定セラレタ規則ガ、
 三月二十日ニ施行セラルルダラウト内閣ガ決
 定シダト云フコトヲ發表シダコトハ、重要ナ
 ルコトデアリマス。^(c)

IX

皇野ト總力戰研究所トノ關係

0159 0010 1312

GG-41

星野八一 一九四一年（昭和十六年）五月二日
 兵ニ任命セラレマシタ。外ニ參與トシテハ、
 一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十二月二十一日
 被告鈴木、一九四一年（昭和十六年）五月五
 日ニ同復村ガ任命セラレマシタ。(f)

同研究所々員中ニハ、海軍ノ高級將校、
 各省書記官及ビ南滿洲鐵道株式會社ノヤウナ

GG-40	a	法廷證	ハクハ A	法廷記録	八八一七一八
	b	法廷證	ハハ二四一三	法廷記録	八八一八一九二
	c	法廷證	ハハ二四一三	法廷記録	二七〇七三
	d	法廷證	一〇九	法廷記録	七一〇
	e	法廷證	一一六	法廷記録	七八七
	f	法廷證	一一三	法廷記録	七二七

任官級トシ、參與ハ關係各官署ノ高等官並ニ
年歳差違アル者ノ中ヨリ、總理大臣ノ奏ヒラ
儀テ、内閣ガコレヲ任命スルトシテアリマス。(c)

星野ハ一九四〇年(昭和十五年)十月一日
所長代理ニ任命セラレマシタ。彼ハ當時全
院總業兼任所大臣テシタ。(b) 一九四一年(

昭和十六年)一月當世ノ所長ガ任命セラレマ
シタ、即チ飯村ニ軍中尉デアリマス。彼ハコ
レニ任命セラレル前ニハ陸軍少將長デアリ
マシタガ、次イデ在滿洲第五軍司令官トナリ、
夏ニソノ後陸軍大学校長トナリマシタ。(c)

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GG-41

大倉社ノ職員ヲ含ンデホマシム。(2) 學生及ビ
 研究員ハ各省ノ重要ナル地位ニアル高官連中
 テ、實際上國家活動ノ凡ユル部門ヲ代表シテ
 キマシム。ナホソノ上、陸軍大學校、銀行、
 産業會社、學校、滿洲國政府、朝鮮及ビ台灣
 總督府並ニ華北派遣軍ノ代表者ヲ含ンデキマ
 シム。(b)

a、	法廷證	八六九	法廷記録	八八二五
b、	法廷證	八六九	法廷記録	八八二五

0159 0010 1314

マシタガ、ソレハ、日米交渉及ビソノ経過、勿價印
度マ那並ニ暹羅ニオケル事件、大東亞圖ノ強寇範圍
並ニソノ設立ノ計畫、及ビ前以テ宣戰布告ナキ太平
洋戦争ノ勃發トイフヤウナ重要事件ニ關連シテ、實
際的ニ起ツタ事件ヲ美事録想シテキタコトヲ示シテ

GG-42

a、法廷証 八六九

法廷証 八八二六

GG-43

a、法廷証 一三三〇

法廷証 一三三〇二
ニキ〇二二

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及^{GG-42} 所長及ビソノ他ノ常任職員ハ、各省、大學、産業商會
 及ビソノ他ノ団体カラ選拔セラレタ優秀ナル諸師ノ

援助ヲ得マシタ^(a) 語義ハ國家總力戦ノ基盤原理、

物質動員、食糧問題、工業、陸海交通、運輸、財政、

外交政策、中国、合衆國、英、近東、露日及ビ以

洲ノ事情、陸海軍技術、軍需品ノ動員、ソノ他南洋

事情ナド、廣汎ニ亘ル題目ヲ合ンデキマシタ。
 (同書)

GG-43 同研究所ハ各種ノ題目ヲ取扱ツタ出版物ヲ發行シ
 マシタ。原案例ニモソノ存在ノ知ラレテキル九十八

種ノ出版物中、三種ヲ除イテハ、凡テ「秘」^(a)、「秘」

或ハ「機密」ト區分セラレテキマス。^(a) コレ等出版

物ノ二三カラノ被奉ハ、當法廷ニ於テモ閉鎖セラレ

GG-44

b、	a、	
”	法廷記録	
八六九	七〇	
	法廷記録	
三〇 — 三	六八四	

GG-43

c、	b、
法廷記録	法廷記録
” ” ” ”	” ” ” ”
ニ八八六六六六七六	ニ八八六六六六七六
ニ七七七九九八八〇	ニ七七七九九八八〇
ニ〇〇〇九九八二六	ニ〇〇〇九九八二六
ニ七一三	ニ七一三
” ” ” ” ”	” ” ” ” ”
八八七七七八七	八八七七七八七
九〇九一〇一〇二一	九〇九一〇一〇二一
〇〇〇〇〇〇〇〇	〇〇〇〇〇〇〇〇
人一人一一人	人一人一一人
九九九〇九九	九九九〇九九
七七七〇七七	七七七〇七七
二六二六二六	二六二六二六

出版物の日付カラスルト、本館究所ハ一九四五年（昭和二十年）ニモナホソノ機能ヲ有シテキタコトハ明白デアリマス。(b)

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HOSHINO Summation-GG

キマス。(b) 証人飯村ノ述べル所ニヨリマスト、本研
究所が行ツタ演習ハソノ當時日本ガ正位シテキタカ
或ハ直位セントシテキタ日本ノ内外ノ情勢ヲ、ソノ
背景トシテキマシタ、ソシテ學生達ハ日本ガ南西太
平洋ニ移動シタル場合、必然的ニ起ル國家間問題ヲ
検討、討論シマシタ。(c)

GG-44 陸軍省官制(改訂ニヨル)ヲ規定シタ勅令第十條
第二項ニヨレバ、本研究所ノ學生ニ關スル事務ハ軍

政課ノ所管デアルト規定シテアツタコトハ、注目ス
ベキコトデアリマス。(a) 本研究所ノ活動期間ニ關ス
ル證據ハ十分ニ明瞭デハナイデアリマスガ、ソノ

國ノ政策決定後並ニ七月二十七日ノ連絡會議ノ後、
佛領印度支那及ビ佛領東印度ニ對シ八月中侵略行爲
カ行ハレマシタ。九月三國同盟條約ノ完了スルヤ、
共同謀議者ノ計畫ハ極メテ精力的ニ推シ進メラレマ
シタ。次イデ活潑ナル企畫ノ時期ガヤツテ移リマシ
タガコノ時期ニ於テ、星野ハ企畫既成トシテ主安
ナル復讐ヲ演ジマシタ。本研究所ノ設立ハ膨脹計畫
ノ極メテ必然的ナ且止ヲ待サル部分デアツタコトハ
疑フ余地ガナイヤウニ思ハレマス。本研究所ノ出版
物ハ戰爭ノアラユル方面ガ研究セラレタト云フコト

本研究所ノ構成及ビソノ活動並ニソノ出版物及ビコレニ關連シタ人物ニ關スル證據ハ、本研究所ガ征服及ビ膨脹ノタメノ侵略戰爭ヲ起サントスル共同謀議者達ノ計畫ノ肝要ナル部分トシテ設立セラレ、且ツ運営セラレタ重要ナル事項ヲアツタト云フコトヲ示シテヲルト、檢察官ハ申述ベマス。

コノ申立ヲ支持スルタメ以下ノ如キ説明ヲ行ヒマス。本研究所ハ、太平洋戰爭ノ勃發ヲ招來シタ諸事件ノ過程中ノ、極メテ重要ナル時機ニ設立セラレマシタ。一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月米内内閣ハ崩壊シマシタ、ソシテソノ後、茲ニ七月二十六日ニ於ケル内

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ノ研究及ビ演習ハ、各個人カラ最大ノ價値ヲ獲得スルコトヲ確實ナラシメルヤウニ、企圖セラレテキマシタ。

GG-46

本件ニ關シテ提出サレタ凡テノ証據、殊ニ滿洲ニ於ケル侵略、ソシテソノ侵略ノ中國ニ對スル擴張、並ニ大東亞國ノ確立ノタメ多年行ハレタ計畫ニ關シテスル証據ナドヲ考察スルコトハ、前記ノコトニ關シテ必要デアリマス。一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九

ヲ、明日ニ示シテキマス。本研究所ハ普通ノ陸軍大
學校或ハ海軍大學校デアリマセンデシタ。ソノ日
的及ビ機能ハ極メテ廣汎ニ亘ツタモノデシタ。ソレ
ハ「國家能力」戰ノ研究ヲ包括シテキマシタ。換言
スレバ、國家ノ全臣民ト全資源ヲ、用フル如キ戰爭
ヲ惹起スルコトヲ考ヘテキタノデアリマス。ソコニ
於テハ戰爭惹起ニ關連アル凡ユル問題ガ研究サレネ
バナラナイト、考ヘラレテキマシタ。コレラノ是日
ハ戰國科學、軍隊ノ訓練及ビソノ設備ニハ限ラレテ
キマセンデシタ。全國民ハ各自ノ相異ナル分野ニ於
テ戰爭ニ從事スルコトガ考ヘラレ、ソシテ本研究所

勿論、當所究所ノ實是ニハ固キカマツタニウシ、
 首相、内閣及閣内連ハ多忙ノ爲、充分ノ援助ヲ與
 ヘ給マカツタテアラウ。又所究所ノ出版物ハ此ノ
 所究所ガ以ル宿願ヲアツタバカリカ、成功ヲ收メ
 タト言ツテ平ル様ダガ、此ノ所究所ハ期待サレタ
 所ヨ充分果シナカツタトモ考ヘラレマス。然シナ
 ガラ、檢察官ノ監督ニ於テ、此ノ所究所ノ設置並
 ビニ起發ハ共同謀議者ニ依テ計畫及準備状中ニ
 起シサレタル點中ニ此方ナル點ヲ以テ六ヘルモノト爲
 ニ擬定サレマシタ。

GG-47

此ノ關係ニ於テ第二次起程内ニ於イテ前述ノ
各活動内ノ勢力ヲ増大ハ該村ノ此ノ研究所ヘノ任
命ニ依ツテ更ニ一歩ヲ進メシムルコトヲ考ヘルコ
トハ其味アルコトデアリマス。此ノ會員ノ綜合性、
廣闊、曾良知識ノ高キ地位、研究、活動、出版ノ
能ハ及ビ何人モ達シテキタリ不適當ナ任命ニ就イ
タリシテナラナイ取組中、此ノ研究所ノ活動方針
イテキタ事等、凡テ此等ノ事柄ハ此ノ研究所ノ重
要性ヲ決定的ニ示スモノデアリマス。

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ラレマス。星野ハ又研究所ヲ設立サセタ内閣ノ關係トシテ、又特ニ企劃院ニ就クシテソレニ關係ガアリマス。海軍省邊人飯村、(a)及大島、(b)ハ星野ガ所屬ノ仕事ニハ積極的テアツタト述ベテキマス。此ノ發言ガ受理ナル可キトシテモ、星野ハ所屬トシテ、亦ノ爲當然自ラスフベキ責任ヲ免レルコトハドウシテモ出來マセヌ。

GG-49 a、法廷記録 二七〇六六・二七〇七七
 b、" 二九一八一
 c、" 八八二〇一八八八七

GG-50 a、法廷記録 三〇三〇 法廷記録二七〇六七・二七〇七二
 b、法廷記録 二六一八一

二七〇七六

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GG-49

海防自衛隊人取付、(a) 大島、(b) 及び松本自衛隊人編
場、(c) ハ管初研究所ノ重要書、ソノ海防出版、及び
皇軍並ニソノ他之ニ關係アルは皆進ノ後制ヲ預小
化セント務メマシタ。此ノ語言ニ許領ニ探討スル
コトハ必要ト考ヘラレマセヌ。ソレハ研究所ニ
シテ察見ガ行ツタ懸念ニ全然答ヘテ居ナイモノト
考ヘラレルヲテアリマス。

GG-50

星野ニ關スル限り彼ハ初メハ所長代理トシテ、
後ハ顧問トシテ研究所ニ關係シテキタ理由ニ依
リソノ開設並ニ活動ニハ直接ノ關係アルモノト考ヘ

ニレマス。星野ハ又新研究所ヲ設立サセタ内閣ノ關係トシテ、又特ニ企劃院ニ委託シテソレニ關係ガアリマス。海軍大臣飯村、(a) 及大島、(b) ハ星野ガ新研究所ノ仕事ニハ積極的テアツタト述ベテ平マス。此ノ証言ガ受理サル可キトシテモ、星野ハ新研究所ノ關係ヲ當然自ラ負フベキ責任ヲ負レルコトハドワシテモ出来マセヌ。

GG-49 a、法廷証言 二七〇六六・二七〇七七
 b、" 二九一八一七
 c、" 八八二〇一八八八七

GG-50 a、法廷証言 三〇三〇 法廷証言 二七〇六七・二七〇七二
 b、法廷証言 二六一八一七 二七〇七六

GG-49

場、(c) 社団法人以村、(a) 大島、(b) 及び社団法人
 星野並ニソノ他之ニ關係アル者並ニ役員ヲ兼小
 化セント努メマシタ。此ノ旨言ニ詳細ニ検討スル
 コトハ必長ト考ヘラレマセヌ。ソレハ研究所ニ
 シテ社務部ガ行ツタ懸ニ全然答ヘテ居ナイモノト
 考ヘラレルヲテアリマス。

GG-50

星野ニ關スル限リ彼ハ初メハ所長代理トシテ、
 後ニハ顧問トシテ研究所ニ關係シテキタ理由ニ依
 リソノ開設並ニ活動ニハ直接ノ關係アルモノト考ヘ

モツト目田經濟ニ關フ様ニ變更スルコトニ同意シ
 結局若干變更ヲ行ツタ、(a) 上テ内閣ハ計畫ヲ承
 取シタノテアリマス。小島ノ進ベタソノ變更ト云
 フノハ全ク彼々タルモノニシイコトヲ附加ヘテ指
 摘シテ置カネバナリマセヌ。

GG-51	a、	法廷証	三二一〇	法廷証録	二六一三九
	b、	法廷証	三二一〇	"	二六一三九
	c、	法廷証	八六五	"	八八〇七
	d、	法廷証録	二六一五〇		

GG-51

D、一九四一年四月星野ノ解任

一九四一年四月星野ハ企劃院總裁及第二次近衛
内閣ノ解任所大臣トシテノ地位ヲ解任シマシタ。
辯護人小畑、(a)ハ經濟計畫ニ關スル星野ト小
林ノ間ノ諍争ニハ言及シタガ、星野ハ解任ノ理由
ニ付テハ何等ノ説明モシマセンテシタ。彼ノ言フ
所ニ依レバ、(b)經濟計畫 (c)ハ企劃院ノ若手官
更ノアル者ニ依ツテ準備サレタト云フコトテス。
星野ガ一九四〇年ノ秋内閣ノ閣工大臣ニ此ノ計畫
ヲ提出シタトキ特ニ小畑ト下カラ相當ノ反對ガア
リマシタ。證人ノ證言ニ依レバ、星野ハ此計畫ヲ

0159 0010 1323

ノ計畫ニ反對スル目分ヲ支持シテ眞ハウトシタコ
トカラ起ツタトモ考ヘラレルノテアリマス。此軍
ガ此ノ計畫ニ反對シタトハ信ゼラレマセヌ。此計
畫ニ付テハ此軍ニ實際ノ責任ガ大ニアルコトハ
誠ニ疑ヒノナイ所テアリマス。星野ガ此軍ト協同
スル氣持ガナイカラ、此軍又ハ東條ガ星野ヲ信任
サセタノダト云フコトモ信ジラレナイヤウデス。

CG-52

2、法廷記 三二一六 A 法廷記 二九一六九

HOSHINO Summation-GG

GG-53

所小亦カ此ノ計登ヲ事前ニ言棄家ニ送妻シテ星野
リマシタ。星野ハ否定シテキマスガ、紛争ハ實ノ
星野ト小亦ノ間ノ事ハ非信ニ真大ナモノデア

トヲ既ニカニ示シテ居リ諸般ノ事情ヲ考慮スルハ
真相ハ次ノ如クニ思ハレルノデアリマス。

GG-52

近衛ノ回談録 (a)

一八一一年四月經濟問題ニ關連

セル經濟關係ノ更迭ニ關シ非信ニ重要ナ證據資料

デアリマシテソノ全容ガ復真ナル研究ニ値スルノ

テス。此ノ事ハ小亦ト星野ノ信任ハ經濟計畫ニ

關シテ起ツル事ニ依ツテ起リシタモノデアルコ

トヲ既ニカニ示シテ居リ諸般ノ事情ヲ考慮スルハ

真相ハ次ノ如クニ思ハレルノデアリマス。

0159 0010 1324

アツタコトハ、星野ノ名コソ由テ后ヲ又ガ全權
 ヨリ免テ院ヲカテアリマス。國尊ハ星野ガ信任シ
 テモ尙ホサヌ方ガ實能ダト考ヘタト云フコトハ安
 心ナル証ニテアリマス。ソウ考ヘタ一人ニ對ヒア
 リマセン。彼ノ代リニハ軍口三銃石ノ鈴木ガ任ゼ
 ラレタノナアルカラ實能ニ於テ此軍ハソノ目的テ
 達シタ證テアリマス。然シ近衛ノ同僚録中カニノ

近衛ハ目分ハ此ノ亂争ノ爲内閣ヲ崩壊サセ度クナ
 カツタコト、此ノ亂争ハ世間ニ秘シテ世カネハナ
 ラナカツタコトヲ明ラカニシテマス。近衛ハ小倉
 ヲ説イテ無任所大臣トシテ入閣セシメ東條ソノ他
 ノ同志ヲ擯テ、遠田海軍中將ヲ起用シテ小村ニ代
 ヘルコトニ決シマシタ。小村ハ「面目ヲ失フ」ガ
 如キコトアラバ辭職シナイダロウシ又他ノ實業家
 ニ進ヲ説ラナイコトハ既ラカテアリマシタ。彼ニ
 代ヘルニ遠田ヲ以ツテスレバ、彼ノ顔モ立ツシ、
 同時ニ山縣重ヲモ罷足サス事ヲテス。星野ハ擯任ヲ
 魚望シテ居タガ、擯任ニ意欲ヲ培ヘタノハ小村テ

GG-53

a

法廷記

三

二

一

六

A

法廷記

三

六

一

七

四

此ノ改革ニ見ル、最モ重要ナル點ハ「近衛ニ依ルバ
 其目ノ任命ハ「同工省ノ監督トシテノ性格」(a)バ
 「隣國ナラシメル結果トナニウ」云フコトデアリ
 マス。近衛ハ、是ニ就ケテ云フニハ此等ナルヤル
 本ガ企圖既ニ試ミナツタコト、共ニ「国防準備ノ完
 成ニ一前進ヲ示ス」ダヲウト。同國ノ改造ト企圖既
 人等ノ獎勵ノ全目的ハ「同工省ヲ名目トシテハナク
 實ニ於テ其監督トスルコトニ在ツ」タルコトハ明ニカ
 アリマス。

0159 0010 1326

CG-54

2、法定証 三二一六 A 法定記録 二九一六九

GG-55

星野が第二次近衛内閣ニ於テ彼ガ占メタル職ヲ解任シタコトニ付テノ準備ハ既に述べタ通りデ、共同謀議推進ノ爲ニ解任シタト云フノガ、ソノ解任ノ眞實ノ説明デアルコトモ既に申上ゲタ所デアリマス。

星野が解任シテ以來一九四一年十月十八日内閣

GG-54

辯護側ハ星野辯護ノ旨頭陳述ニ於テ、近衛ノ
同意録ハ東條ガ星野ニ辭任ヲ迫ツタコトヲ示シ
テイルト申シマシタ。近衛ノ同意録ハ此點マデ
ニハ觸レテ居マセン^(a)。ガ星野ノ辭任ハ陸軍ノ膨
脹計畫ヲ推進シタイト云フ彼ノ希望カラ實現シ
タコトハ疑ヒ得ナイ所デアリマス。星野ハ東條
ソノ他ノ軍國主義者ヲ援ケテ共同謀議者達ノ膨
脹計畫ヲ推進スル爲ニ辭任シタモノト論断スル
次第デアリマス。

同、一九四一年四月四日ヨリ一九四一年十月

十八日ニ至ル期間

0159 0010 1327

野ノ仕事ヤ同通ノ取扱ニ當ツタト云ヒ、ソノ爲ニ當時勤務先ハ大藏省デアツタガ星野ノ私邸ニ起居シタト云ツテ居ル一方、星野ニハ仕事ハナカツタト主張シテ居リマス。彼自身ノ言葉デハ實際「彼ノ星野ノ生活ハ文字通り失業ノ生活デアツタ」ト云フノデス。更ニ彼ハ星野ハ時勢ニハ関係セス、東條トハ電話テ話シタコトサハ

GG-56

3、法廷証 三二一八 法廷記録 二九一八八

GG-56

書記官長ニナル迄ノ表面上ノ沈滞ニハ重要ナル
意義ガアルコトヲ申上ゲマス。

辯護側ノ言フ所ニ依レバ、彼ノ解任ノ時カラ
内閣書記官長ニ任セラレル迄、星野ハ閑散ナ生
活ヲ送ツタト云フコトデアリマス。證人村上^(a)

ハ星野ハ解任以來、讀書、運動、國內旅行ニ
ソノ時間ヲ費シタト證言シマシタ。彼ノ言フ所
ニ依レバ、星野ハ公事ニハ全然關係セズ、ソノ
訪問客モ唯舊來ノ友人ダケデアツタトノコトデ
アリマス。此ノ證人ハ星野ノ解任以來、彼ガ星

GG-

自分ニ、四月ニ辭任以來シテ來タコトハ日本ヲ
 旅行シテ廻ハルコトダケダト言ツタト述ベマシ
 ヲ。星野が此ノ重大時機ニ六ヶ月ノ休暇ヲ取ラ
 ネバナラナカツタト云フコトハ注意スベキコト
 デアリマス。彼ガ一九四〇年七月近衛内閣ニ入
 ルタメ日本ニ呼バレル迄、ソノ活動全期ヲ通ジ
 テ官吏ラシテキダコト、又彼ハ未ダ四九オデア

GG-57 GG-56

a、
 法廷証 三三三〇
 法廷証録 二九一九九

b、
 法廷証 三三一三
 法廷証録 二九二〇三

ナイト云フコトが出来ルト曉言シナガラ、一方
 星野ハ大抵ノ時旅行シテ居タガ証人ハ同行シナ
 カツタト意々説明シテキマス。此ニ口證シテ、
 辯護側ノ提出シタ檢察側ニ依ル星野訊問書ヲ參
 照セバナリマセヌ。(b) 其中テ星野ハ辭任以後
 ハ特定ナ什事モナク國內各地ヲ歴訪シテキタト
 述ベテ居リマス。地方ヘノ旅行ハ大抵個人的ナ
 モノデアツタト述ベ、地方ノ事情視察ガ旅行ノ
 目的ダツタト主張シマシタ。

條ガ首相ニナツタ時到來シマシタ。滿洲テ東條ト共ニ勸キ滿洲デハ非常ニ幅ヲ利カシ東條其他ノ滿洲國ノ人々ト同時ニ入ロシ前送シタヤウナ事情ノ下ニ辭任シタ星野ガ其時ノ内閣書記官長トナルニハ按モ適任デアツタコトハ偶然以上ノコトニ思ハレルノデアリマス。星野ガ此期間中後時ト膨脹ノ計畫推進ニ具カツタト云フ事實ヲ

ノダコトヲ想起スレバ彼ガソナニ沈滞シテ居
タト云フノハ妙ナコトデアリマス。彼ノ辭任ハ
彼ガソノ強力ナル支持者デアツタ共同謀議推進
ノタメデアツタト云フ檢察側ノ申立ガ容レラレ
ルナラバ彼ガソノ長期間ヲ無爲ニシテ居ツタト
云フ彼ノ陳述ハ信ゼラレナイト申シテ然ル可シ
ト思ハレマス。彼ガ密カニ共同謀議ノ組織、推
進ニ當ツテキダコトヤ、ヨリ活動的ナ役割ヲ演
ズル好機ガ到來スルマデ暫時待機シテキダコト
ハ愈々間違ヒノナイ所ト思ハレルノデアリマス。
其ノ好機ハ一九四一年十月近衛内閣ガ倒レテ東

シテ居リマス。星野ハ又彼ト東條トハ正體ニハ
 舊友テハナク、東條ハ星野ガ下々頃約二年間
 洲ニ居タトイフ事、及ビ東條カ前任大臣テ星野
 ガ企望院ニ居タ時、東條ト仕事ヲ共ニシタト述
 ベテキマス。内閣ニ於テ東條ニ彼モ親密ナ人同
 テハナカツタカトノ訊問ニ對シテ星野ハ「書記
 官長トシテハ私ハ東條ニ彼モ親密デアツタ、然

GC-58

2、法廷証 一〇九 法廷記録 七一〇

法廷証 一〇二 法廷記録 六八五

b、法廷証 三二二 法廷記録 二九二〇四

二八一九一一二

HOSHINO Summation-GG

GG-58

示ス直接ノ證據ハナイノデアリマスガ凡テノ事
情カラ見テ恐ラク彼ハソレヲヤツテキダト思ハ
レルノデアリマス。

又、星野ガ内閣書記官長タリシ期間

一九四一年十月十八日、星野ハソノ時東條ノ
組閣シタ内閣ノ書記官長ニ、東條内閣ガ倒レタ
一九四四年七月二十二日迄ソノ任ニ在リマシタ。

檢察官ノ星野訊問書ニ於キマシテ^(b) 星野ハ

十月ニハ朝野ヲ訪問ニ行ク儀リテアツタガ内閣

書記官長ニ任命サレタ爲訪問ヲ又リ止メタト申

0159 0010 1331

等積極的役割ヲ演ズルコトハ出来ナカッタト
スルノハ明ラカニ辯護側ノ抗辯デアリマス。

内閣官房ノ一員デアツタ辯護側証人森田ノ証言
モ亦、星野ノコノ地位ヘノ任命ニハ何等ノ意義
モ附サルベキデハナイ事ヲ示スト共ニ、明ラカ
ニコノ點ヲ指シ示シテ居ルノデアリマス。森田
ノ言フ所ニ依リマスト、彼ハ星野ニ内閣書記官

GG-58

c、法廷証 三六五三 法廷記録 三六三一四

GG-59

e、法廷証 三二一九 法廷記録 二六一九三

GG-59

シ私が彼モ親密ナ助言者デアツトハ云ヘナイ
ト答ヘテイマス。東條ハ証言シテ彼ハ輔佐役ヲ
必要トシゴカラ先ヅ内閣書記官長ヲ選ブ必要ガ
アリ、ソコテ彼ハ第二次近衛内閣ニ於ケル彼ノ
同様ノ一人デアリ、又ソノ從來ノ經驗ト才能カ
ラ見テ官長ノ地位ニハ理想的ナ人物ト考ヘタ星
野ヲ選ンダト申シテキマス。(c)

辯護側ハ内閣書記官長ノ職務ヲ示ス證ニテ
出致シマシタ。(a) コノ法廷ニ長給サレテイル
職務トハソノ地位ノ保持者ヲ單ナル官吏トスル
ガ如キモノデ、ソノ保持者ハ共同謀議ニ於テ何

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c、	b、
法廷記錄	法廷記錄
二六二〇二	二六一九四
	二六一九八

長ノ人選ニ當リ東條ヲ援助スル様依頼サレタト
 云フコトデアリマス。東條ハ彼ガソノ任命ヲ考
 慮シテ居タ二人ノ人物ノ名前即チ星野ト彼ノ一
 人ノ名前ヲ彼ニ告ゲ、福田ニ官房ハ星野ノ下テ
 圓滑ニ仕事カ出來ルカドウカト尋ネマシタ。(b)
 東條ガ他ノ候補者ニ就キマシテモ彼ニ同ジ質問
 ヲシタトハ思ハレマセン。反對質問ニ際シマシ
 テ福田ハ、内閣書記官長ノ任命ハ全ク首相ノ手
 ニ握ラレテキテ(c) 首相ノ更迭ガアル度毎ニ内閣
 書記官長ノ更迭ガアツタト説明シテキマス。

彼ハ「家動員審査委員會」ノ委員ニ任命サレクノデア
リマス。(2) 確カニ此等ノ任命ハ或ル職務ト關係ヲ伴
ツタデアリマス。軍閥ガ近衛内閣ノ倒壞ヲモタラシ
タニ後ニ彼ガコノ職務ニ就キマシタ事ハ單ナル偶然
以上ノモノニ思ヘルノデアリマス。内閣書記官長ノ
任命ハ首相ノ個人的任命デアリマシタ事、及び東條
が星野ノ補加ニ於ケル活動ヲ豫テカラ承知シテ居リ
又近衛内閣ノ關係トシテモ熟知シテ居タカラ星野ハ

全体トシテノ證據ニ依ツテ之ヲ見レバ當時ニ於ケル星野ノ任命ハ（他ノ内閣書記官長ノ場合ニハ、然ラズトシマシテモ）彼ヲシテ物事ノ進行ニ決定的勢力ヲ揮フコトヲ得セシメ又事實彼ハ之ヲ實行シクモノト断定ヲサマス。辯護側ノ證據ニ依リマスト星野ガ六ヶ月間遊ンデキタト云ウ事實ニハ既に言及サレテオリマス。コレハソノ事自体妙ナ事デアリマシテ信ジ難イト考ヘラレマス。證據ハ、コノ期間中彼ガ四月ニ辭任シタ際ニ任命セラレテ貴族院議員デアリ、又五月二日ニハ總力戰研究所ノ顧問ニ任ゼラレタトイウ事ヲ示シテ居リマス。頁ニ七月十二日ニハ

戦争政策ニ賛成デアリ又ソレヲ充分支持スル人物タルコトヲ承知シテ彼ヲ選ンダコトハ明白ト思ハレマス。

彼が占メタ地位ト内閣書記官長ニナツテ後ノ彼ノ活動トハ戦争勃發ノ前後共彼が積極的役割ヲ政界ニ演ジテ居タ幕ヲ示スモノデアルト考ヘラレマス。十一月一日彼ハ企畫院ノ顧問ニナリマシタ。十一月五日ニハ國家勲章審査委員會ノ委員ヲ選メマシタケレ共(一)志ラクコノ職務ヲ任ケテ企畫院ノ顧問トシテノ職務ヲ兼ヘルコトガ不安デアツタカラデアリマセウ)十一月六日ニハ科學調査委員會ノ委員ヲ命ゼラレタノデアリマス。十一月十三日、彼ハ第七十七議會ノ政府委員ニ任命サレマシタ。十一月二十四日彼ハ總力戰研究所ノ顧問ヲ選メマシテ、十二月二日ニハ國民時書奨励委員會ノ委員ニナリマシタ。莫ニ彼ハ其ノ後ノ議會デモ政府委員ニ任ゼラレマシタガ一九四二年二月廿一日ニ大東亞建設調査委員會ノ幹事ニナリ十一月ニハ大東亞省連絡委員會ノ委員ニナツタ意義アルコトデアリマス。(a) 此等ノ任命ガソノ職務ノ

GG-62

國トノ會議ニ關聯スル日支紛争解決ニ對スル日本側
 ノ條件ハ寛大ニサレルベキデハナイト述ベテマス。
 星野ハ眞珠灣攻撃ニ先立ツ此等ノ會議ニ於テ日本側
 ノ交渉提案ハ緩和サル可キデハナイトイウ強硬ナ意
 度ヲ深ツタト東郷ハ警告シテ居リマス。(b)

a、	法廷記録	三六〇七二	三六〇六四
b、	〃	三六〇八四	三六〇八六
		三六〇九〇	三六〇七七

GG-62

佐賀ト皖ミ合ハセテ行ハレタトイフ事實ハ、彼が共
同謀議ノ積極的參加者デアツタ事ニ歸因スルモノデ
アルト断定サレルノデアリマス。

星野ハ内閣書記官長ニナツタ後一九四一年ノ十一
月五日及ビ十二月一日ノ非常ニ重大ナ御前會議ニ列
席シタトイフ事ヲ述ベテ匿カナケレバナリマセヌ。

星野ハ又一九四一年十月二十三日ト十二月八日ノ閣
ニ數多ノ連絡會議ニモ出席シテ居リ、東京ノ言フ所
ニ依リマスト彼ハ會議ニ於テ積極的ナ役割ヲ持ツテ
居ツタト云フコトデス。^(a) 此等ノ會議ニ於キマシテ

星野ハ日本軍隊ノ中國進屯が必要デアルコト又合衆

GG-62

買シマ一 九四三(年)十一月六日 彼ノ真面目な態度ニ因
 致シタ。タ。 (e)



e
 、
 添 附 圖 1 冊 1 本
 添 附 記 録 1 冊 1 本
 d
 、
 添 附 記 録 1 冊 1 本
 添 附 記 録 1 冊 1 本
 c
 、
 添 附 記 録 1 冊 1 本

六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十五
二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一
三十四、三十五諸節。

訴因第三、

G G ノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、九
十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十
六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十五
二十七、二十八、三十、三十一、六十、
六十一、六十二諸節

訴因第四、

G G ノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、九
十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十
六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、
二十五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十

GG-63

先發サレタル犯罪ニ付星野ノ有罪タルコトハ下記
ニ示ス通り實証サレテ居リマス。

訴因第一、GGノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、九、

十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十
六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十五
二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一
三十四、三十五、三十七、三十八、三十
九、四十、四十二、四十三、四十五、六
十、六十一、六十二諸節

訴因第二、GGノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、九、

十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十

0159 0010 1338

訴因第七、G Gノ四、五、八、九、十、十一、十二

十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、

十九、二十、二十一、二十五、二十七、

二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十九

四十、四十二、四十三、四十五、六十、

六十一、六十二諸節

訴因第八、G Gノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、九

十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十

六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十五

二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一

三十九、四十、四十二、四十三、四十五

六十、六十一、六十二ノ諸節

三十一、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十二、四十三、四十五、六十、六十一、六十二諸節

訴因第五、GGノ二十九、三十、三十一、三十七、三十八諸節

訴因第六、GGノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十四、三十三、三十九、四十二、四十三、四十五諸節

0159 0010 1339

群圖第十一、G G / 一、二、三、四、五、六、八、

九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五

十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一

二十二、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十

三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五

六十、六十一、六十二諸節

群圖第十二、G G / 一、二、三、四、五、六、八、十、

十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、

十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十三、二

十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十九、

四十、四十二、四十三、四十五、六十、

六十一、六十二諸節

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HOSHINO Summation-GG

群四第九、G Jノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、九

十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十

六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、

二十五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十

三十一、三十九、四十、四十二、四十三

四十五、六十、六十一、六十二諸節

群四第十、G Gノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、九

十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十

六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十五

二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一

三十九、四十、四十二、四十三、四十五

六十、六十一、六十二諸節

辭圖第十五、G G / 一、二、三、四、五、六、八、

九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五

十六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十

五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三

十一、三十九、四十、四十二、四十三、

四十三、六十、六十一、六十二諸節

辭圖第十六

、G G / 一、二、三、四、五、六、八、

九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五

十六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十

五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三

十一、三十九、四十、四十二、四十三、

四十五、六十、六十一、六十二諸節

訴因第十三、GGノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、

九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五

十六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十

五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三

十一、四十、四十二、四十三、四十五、

六十、六十一、六十二諸節

訴因第十四、GGノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八、

九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五

十六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十

五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三

十一、三十九、四十、四十二、四十三、

四十五、六十、六十一、六十二諸節

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訴因第二十九、G Gノ二十九、三十、三十一、六丁

六十一、六十二節

訴因第三十、G Gノ二十九、三十、三十一、六丁、

六十一、六十二節

訴因第三十一、G Gノ二十九、三十、三十一、六丁

六十一、六十二節

訴因第三十二、G Gノ二十九、三十、三十一、六丁

六十一、六十二節

訴因第三十三、G Gノ二十七、二十八、二十九、三

十、三十一、三十九、四十、四十二、四

十三、四十五、六十、六十一、六十二節

節

0159 0010 1343

HO SHI NO Summation--GG

係圖第二十七、GGノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八

九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五

十六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十二

五、二十九、三十、三十一、三十三、三

十九、四十、四十二、四十三、四十五

節

係圖第二十八、GGノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八

九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五

十六、十七、十九、二十、二十一、二十二

五、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三

十一、三十九、四十、四十二、四十三、

四十五

標圖一十三

十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、
 十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、

標圖一十四

十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、
 十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、

標圖一十五

十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、
 十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、

標圖一十六

十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、
 十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、

標圖一十七

十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、
 十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、

標圖一十八

十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、
 十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、

標圖一十九

十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、
 十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、

標圖二十

十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、
 十、六、十、九、三、二、六、二、八、二、十、九、三、四、十、三、八、三、

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HOSHINO Summation-GG

群因第五下五、GGノ一、二、三、四、五、六、八

九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五

十六、十七、二十七、二十八、二十九、

三十、三十一節節

0159 0010 1345

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HOSHINO SUMMATION
RRRAJA-GG

星野一訂正表

／第五頁 a16 の項ノ末尾ニ挿入。／

星野ハ關東軍當局ト共ニ對露戰爭準備ニ活躍シ
タ旨、武部ハ證言致シマシタ。(e)

／第五頁第十三行目ノ

「ト述ベテ居リ」(a)トアルヲ、「ト認メテ居リ」(a)

ニ訂正。

第六頁

第二十五行削除。

第六行目 2, 3, 4, 5, 1 ニ訂正。

第九行目 (b) ヲ (a) ニ訂正。

終リヨリ三行目 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

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第七頁 第八行目

「滿洲ニ對スル指令」ノ上下括弧ヲ削除。

第五頁

a16 の項脚註、

法廷記録ノ前ニ、法廷記録三四三九ヲ追加。

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FEBRUARY 13 1948

IPS RE: ITAGAKI (MI)

ATTACHED PAGES MI-16 and MI-16-A, AND
PAGES MI-23 AND MI-23-A ARE SUBSTITUTED FOR
PAGES 16 AND 23 OF THE SUBMISSION ON ITAGAKI (MI).

(HH-30) ^{a.}
specifically ITAGAKI of the Kwantung Army.

HH-31. The successive aggressions against Inner Mongolia and North China finally precipitated the outbreak of an all-out war against China on a large scale in July, 1937. ITAGAKI was then the Commander-in-Chief of the Fifth Division in Japan, but he was also attached to the Army General Staff shortly before the war. ^{a.} He was sent out to the battle front in North China. Defense witness KOKUBU testified that ITAGAKI was an authority on China and having spent many years in China he had great affection towards the Chinese people. ^{b.} His affection, however, could be ironically demonstrated by his talk with the witness Goette, then a correspondent, that the Japanese forces in North China might turn south toward the Yellow River in Central China. ^{c.}

VI. WAR MINISTER - 1938 to 1939

HH-32. As the war against China went on, ITAGAKI was appointed War Minister in the KONOYE Cabinet after its reorganization in May, 1938. His witness FURUKO testified that ITAGAKI was chosen because ITAGAKI favored a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. ^{a.} But FURUKO had to admit that after ITAGAKI became War Minister, the war was intensified. ^{b.} ITAGAKI admitted that as soon as he assumed office he believed the attack upon Hankow to be unavoidable. ^{c.}

HH-33. USAKI, who testified for ITAGAKI, denied the authenticity of the document which contains the decisions

HE-30.
a. T. 1639-40

HH-31.
a. Ex. 110, T. 716
b. T. 30063
c. T. 3784

HH-32.
a. T. 30088-9
b. T. 30090
c. Ex. 3316, T. 30300

(HH-33)

of the Five Ministers Conference by stating that any such documents held at the Foreign Office are not true originals unless they bear his signature. ^{a.} It is to be pointed out here that the Prosecution does not contend the document in question is an original copy. It is sufficient to show that the document is part of the official archives and files of the Foreign Office as per attached certificate. Time and again documents containing decisions of the Five Ministers Conference have been introduced without resting ^{b.} Defense objections. No question has been raised as to their accuracy or authenticity.

HE-33a. UELKI further denied that such decisions had been reached because he, as Foreign Minister at that time, was opposed to such views as expressed in the decisions. ^{a.} However his denials were weak. He merely stated that such decisions were improbable and that he could not remember ^{b.} them. But it is to be recalled that he made a report to the Emperor on the China situation, the contents of which were exactly the same as some of the decisions of the Five Ministers Conference. ^{c.} Then asked whether some of the decisions had been later submitted to and adopted by the cabinet meeting of 10 August 1938, the 31 year old witness chose to tell the court that he has no recollection of such, ^{d.} instead of rebutting them altogether as he did before.

HE-33b. ITAGAKI admitted that he as the War Minister occupied a very important position in the Five Ministers Conference in

HE-33.

- a. T. 33311
- b. T. 2727; T. 6731; T. 9549

HH-33c.

- a. T. 38911-3
- b. T. 38911-2
- c. Ex. 139
- d. T. 38329

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(HH-44)

was to keep Manchuria and to exploit it economically.

The same was being applied to the occupied parts of China Proper. A program for such in the name of economic development of China was officially decided

in January, 1939.^{a.} A special kind of exploitation^{b.} was similarly going on--namely, the opium traffic.

Evidence sufficiently shows that whatever was done in Manchuria in this traffic was not exactly repeated in the other occupied parts of China.

HH-45. As War Minister, ITAGAKI carried great weight in the Five Ministers Conference (which, similar to a war cabinet, was to discuss the major problems.^{a.}

As the exponent of the Army's views, ITAGAKI was able to impose the demands upon the succeeding HIRANUMA Cabinet in January, 1939, in which he remained as War Minister. The demands were that the "Holy War" against China should be continued, that Japan should expand her armament and mobilize her resources and that the relations with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy should be strengthened.^{b.}

HH-44.

- a. Ex. 461-A, T. 5267-77
- b. Ex. 418, T. 4967-8

HH-45.

- a. T. 30413
- b. Ex. 3303, f. 30120-2

HH-46. Consistent with this policy while ITAGAKI was the War Minister, Japan severed all relations with the League of Nations but still kept to herself the Mandated Islands in the Pacific.^{a.} During the same period, Japanese army launched undeclared and aggressive attacks in the Changkufeng area (1938) and the Nomanhan area (1939) against Soviet and Mongolian troops. In both cases ITAGAKI was one of the chief initiators. Although ITAGAKI himself claimed that he was in favor of keeping tranquil relations with the U.S.S.R.,^{b.} YAMAMOTO testified that ITAGAKI confided to him as Vice Minister of War that the U.S.S.R. was the primary objective.^{c.} In fact the idea of attacking the Nomanhan area was conceived by ITAGAKI as early as 1936, when in a conversation with Ambassador ARITA he stated to the latter "if Outer Mongolia be combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territory in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition."^{d.} He was able to put his plan into action when he became War Minister.

HH-46.

- a. Ex. 271, T. 3641-8
- b. T. 30304
- c. T. 30104-6
- d. Ex. 761-A, T. 7831

ITAGAKI, Seishiro

CHARGED under counts: 1-5
6-17
18-19
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51-55

- I. Prior to the Mukden Incident
- II. The Mukden Incident
- III. The Creation of a Puppet State
- IV. Control of "Manchukuo"
- V. Inner Mongolia, North China and All China
- VI. War Minister, 1938-1939
- VII. Waging War in China and in the Pacific
- VIII. Conclusion

I. PRIOR TO THE MUKDEN INCIDENT

HH-1. In May 1929, ITAGAKI was appointed staff officer
a.
of the Kwantung Army and soon afterwards, he identified himself
b.
as the recognized leader of the young officers there. ITAGAKI,
in his testimony on the background of the Mukden Incident,
c.
repeatedly referred to this fact. The aspiration of the
young officers was to occupy Manchuria, to separate it from
d.
China, to keep it for Japan, and to exploit it economically.

HH-2. To embark on such an undertaking, it was necessary
to organize themselves in both plotting and agitation.

ITAGAKI became intimately acquainted with the group around
Dr. OKUMA, Shunsei, consisting of DOJIHARA, KOISO, TADA and
others whose avowed objective was to absorb Manchuria in order

HH-1.

- a. Ex. 110, T. 715
- b. Ex. 225, T. 3016
- c. T. 1960; T. 1966; T. 1971; T. 1975; T. 1982
- d. T. 1976
Ex. 245, T. 3016; T. 23017

(HH-2) ^{a.} To carry out their objective, to make Japan self-sufficient. ITAGAKI, together with H. SHIMOTO, DOHHEIRA, KOISO and others, was subsequently involved in the drafting of a plan to overthrow the civilian government. ^{b.} Particular attention is invited to this point as it constitutes the very beginning of the conspiracy.

HH-3. In the earlier part of 1930, OKAMA went to Mukden to see Chang Hsueh-liang, the Chinese General in Manchuria. OKAMA proposed that Chang should separate himself and the area under his control from the rest of China. ^{a.} This overture was turned down by Chang. The conspirators reached the conclusion to achieve the objective by using force.

HH-4. MORISHIMA testified that the Kwantung military clique held the strong opinion that in order to preserve Japanese interests in Manchuria it would be necessary to occupy it by the use of armed force and to establish a government there subservient to Japan. ^{a.} ITAGAKI personally voiced such opinion to TANAKA. ^{b.} Though ITAGAKI himself denied that such a conversation ever took place between TANAKA and himself, ^{c.} yet his close associate, ISHIMURA, had to admit under cross-examination that ITAGAKI did entertain the idea that an armed conflict would be inevitable. ^{d.}

HH-5. An armed conflict was in fact not inevitable, as both the Chinese authorities and the Japanese consuls were trying hard to reach a settlement. ^{a.} But the efforts toward peace were frustrated by the army clique. ^{b.} In doing so, the

HH-2.
 a. Ex. 2177-4, T. 15565-6
 b. Ex. 2177-4, T. 15587

HH-5.
 a. Ex. 57, pp. 61-65
 b. T. 3016-7

HH-3.
 a. T. 1980

HH-4.
 a. T. 3016-7
 b. T. 1959-60; T. 1974-6
 c. T. 30325-7
 d. T. 22193

(HH-5)

conspirators made the situation appear that an armed conflict was inevitable and such a conclusion was reported to Tokyo.^{c.}

Most assuredly, it was a make-believe situation calculated for the purpose of agitation. The achieved result was admitted by ISHII RA that all Japan was discussing the failure of negotiations.

On the eve of the Mukden Incident, DOHIERA, a close associate of ITAGAKI, was summoned to Tokyo. There he advocated through the press the solution of all pending issues in Manchuria by force if necessary and as soon as possible.^{d.}

HH-6. While the open agitation was going on, the secret operational plan was made ready. ISHII RA, who prepared the operational plan, testified that ITAGAKI knew it.^{a.} He also testified that ITAGAKI was in charge of supervising the special service organ at Mukden.^{b.} ITAGAKI knew that two guns were installed at Mukden in secrecy.^{c.} ITAGAKI in his own testimony attempted to explain that the secrecy of the guns was maintained in order not to excite the Chinese.^{d.} But there has been no denial that these guns were effectively used in a surprise attack against the Chinese. ITAGAKI further explained that the whole operational plan was a defensive one, but he contradicts himself by saying that the main forces would be afforded an opportunity to deliver a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese Army.^{e.}

HH-7. That the incident was a pre-arranged one is even more apparent, since OKUMA in Tokyo had already learned of it a month beforehand. He told SHIMIZU when he was drunk that ITAGAKI and others would bring about an incident in Manchuria in the near

HH-5.

- c. T. 22199
- d. Ex. 57, p. 66

HH-6.

- a. T. 22158
- b. T. 22268
- c. T. 22158; T. 1987-91
- d. T. 30258
- e. T. 30258

Page HH-4

(HH-7) a.
 future. Early in September reports came to Tokyo that ITAKI and other staff officers of the Kwantung Army were scheming to start some actions. ^{1.} ITAKI was reported as to have employed Japanese adventurers for creating troubles. Although he denied this, he admitted in substance that there was a report to that effect. ^{c.} Evidence later introduced shows that upon receiving such report the Japanese Foreign Minister instructed the Consul-General to control the activities of adventurers and informed the Army of the same. ^{d.} Apparently Tokyo was very much worried. A special envoy in the person of TATEKAWA was sent to Mukden to stop the action. ^{e.}

II. THE HIDDEN INCIDENT

HH-5. TATEKAWA, leaving for Mukden, telegraphed ahead that he would like to meet either ITAKI or ISHIBARA. ^{a.} In response, ITAKI was sent to Mukden with an assignment to meet TATEKAWA and to contact the Special Service Organ and the Consulate-General. ^{b.} ITAKI admitted that it was customary for a special emissary like TATEKAWA to deliver message without delay. However, he spent two hours with TATEKAWA without any obvious desire to learn about the contents of the message which TATEKAWA was to deliver, nor was TATEKAWA in earnest to have any discussion about it with him. ^{c.} In fact, ITAKI just put him

HH-7.

- a. T. 1404
- b. T. 19821; T. 19827
- c. T. 3082-7
- d. Ex. 5759, T. 57315
- e. T. 17871

HH-8.

- a. T. 19110
- b. T. 22117-8
- c. T. 20350-1

(HH-8) ^{d.} off until the next day. Of course, there was never a next day for the supposedly intended purpose, as the Incident broke out the very same evening.

HH-9. As soon as he disposed of TATEGAWA, ITAGAKI went to the Special Service Organ and, as he put it, chatted there for at least one hour and a half. ^{a.} It must be pointed out that this Organ was the only link between the outposts and the headquarters of the Kwantung Army at Port Arthur, for that Organ alone possessed the code to dispatch telegrams to the Commander-in-Chief. ^{b.}

HH-10. The alleged Incident broke out and Colonel HIRATA went to the Special Service Organ. Thereupon ITAGAKI assumed the duty of directing the operation. HIRATA in his testimony attempted to show that ITAGAKI had no authority to give him orders. However, he admitted that he did ask for ITAGAKI's approval for attacking the Chinese, and he did receive such an assurance from ITAGAKI. ^{a.} ISHIIHARA also admitted that ITAGAKI did give the field commander either guidance or instruction. ^{b.} ITAGAKI himself admitted he gave them certain assurance. ^{c.}

HH-11. ISHIIHARA testified that ITAGAKI had no time to investigate ^{a.}, and ITAGAKI stated that communications were bad and he was unable to ascertain the true nature of the situation. ^{b.} Thus, it is apparent that he arbitrarily approved the field commander's plan to attack the Chinese army without even troubling himself to find out what was really going on. He was informed that the Chinese made it known that there would be no resistance

HH-8.
d. T. 22122

HH-11.
a. T. 2209
b. T. 30356

HH-9.
a. T. 30352
b. T. 30353

HH-10.
a. T. 19307-13
b. T. 22122; T. 22153; T. 22213
c. T. 30265

(HE-11) ^{c.}
 in the interest of peace. ISHIMURA so testified ^{d.}, KATEKURA,
 who later investigated it, so confirmed ^{e.}, and ITAGAKI himself
 so admitted. ^{f.} Yet when Consul-General HAYASHI pleaded with
 ITAGAKI to stop the military action in view of non-resistance
 from the Chinese, ITAGAKI refused. Even while he had not
 ascertained the actual situation, he bluntly alleged without
 foundation that the regular Chinese army challenged the
 Japanese. ^{g.} Even while he had not the time to investigate, he
 told HAYASHI that it was necessary to deal with the Chinese
 Army thoroughly. ^{h.}

HE-12. Once the approval was given and the operational
 plan carried out in earnest, the Japanese army began the
 occupation of Manchuria. Therefore, it is inevitable to draw
 the conclusion that it was ITAGAKI who as one of the central
 figures in the Kwantung Army had planned and carried out the
 occupation of Manchuria. ^{a.}

III. THE CREATION OF A PUPPET STATE

HE-13. Soon after Mukden was occupied, DOHIREI was
 appointed mayor. ITAGAKI was the man who set up this
 municipal administration with a military man as its chief ^{a.},
 although he denied that it was he who recommended DOHIREI. ^{b.}
 However, defense witness YAMAGUCHI testified that ITAGAKI
 approved the appointment. ^{c.} While he also denied that it was
 a military administration ^{d.}, his co-defendant WAKI admitted
 in substance that it was at least a temporary military admin-

HE-11.
 c. T. 19105
 d. T. 18936
 e. T. 30275
 f. Ex. 2193, T. 15724
 g. T. 30276
 h. Ex. 2193, T. 15735-6

HE-13.
 a. Ex. 2194, T. 15736
 b. T. 30356
 c. T. 18313-9
 d. T. 30358

HE-14.
 a. T. 1969-71; T. 1975

(HH-13) c.
 istration. ITAGAKI alleged that DOHIERA was assisted by the Chinese and there were only a few Japanese advisors. f.
 Under cross-examination he said he did not remember what were the positions the Japanese hold in the municipal administration g.
 but Exhibit 3479-B h. gives a complete list of the principal
 functionaries and all of them were Japanese. This administration in Mukden, in less than one month after its establishment, planned, in accordance with the Army's secret plans, the monopolization of opium and the issuing of lottery tickets for the purpose of raising funds. i.

HL-14. After creating the Mukden municipality, the next step was to set up a Self-Government Guiding Board. KASAGI who served in it testified that policies and activities were controlled by ITAGAKI. a.
 ISHIMURA at first stated that ITAGAKI had hardly any connection with the Board. b.
 When confronted with a previous statement made by him, ISHIMURA admitted that he did make the statement before that ITAGAKI was its political advisor. Anything that the Self-Government Guiding Board did had to be sanctioned by the army, and ITAGAKI was able to know about it. c.
 KATAYAMA testified that pursuant to the order of the Vice-Minister of War, the Kwantung Army officers were not supposed to participate in any political movement. He admitted, however, that certain assurances of ITAGAKI had served as a suggestion in carrying out the independence movement. d.
 KATAYAMA testified that DOHIERA and ITAGAKI manipulated the Chinese puppet. e.
 In spite of his denials f., abundant evidence shows that the activities of the

HL-13.

- c. T. 19879
- f. T. 33267
- g. T. 33259
- h. T. 33303
- i. Ex. 3740, T. 37339

(HL-14)

- d. T. 18943; T. 19061
- e. T. 2792-4
- f. T. 30366-8

HL-14.

- a. T. 2793-4
- b. T. 22249
- c. T. 22251-2

(HH-14) puppets were entirely under the control of these two conspirators. ^{E.}

HE-15. After setting up the S 1st Government Guiding Board in South Manchuria, North Manchuria remained to be brought under control. Through the defense witness ^{a.} TIKEDA denies it, the evidence shows that the Japanese supplied Chang Hsi-peng with 3,000 rifles and 200,000 Chinese Yuan in silver to enlarge his army in order to march into North Manchuria. On the other hand, General Ma Chan-shan in possession of his troops there was conceded by the accused ^{c.} ITAGAKI to be a man of real worth. In lieu of taking military operations against him, an intrigue was arranged. ^{d.} DOHIFURU was sent to North Manchuria in January 1934. He induced General Ma to become a puppet by offering him money and munitions ^{e.}, and ITAGAKI himself went to see Ma and made him join the Japanese. ^{f.} Furthermore, the Japanese supplied arms to the Mongols in North Manchuria to support their so-called independence. ^{g.} To create a puppet state governing all Manchuria, Japanese adventurers, who called themselves a National Guard Unit, became very active at various places. It was discovered to be a scheme based on high policy decided and executed by ^{h.} ITAGAKI.

HE-16. ITAGAKI alleged that prior to the Mukden Incident ^{a.} the anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria was active and intense. After the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese army, ITAGAKI claimed that the common desire was the creation of an independent

HE-14.

c. Ex. 2479-E-1, T. 2300-30

HE-15.

- a. T. 1936-73
- b. Ex. 7407, T. 37324
- c. T. 30277
- d. Ex. 37, Lytton Report, p. 79.
- e. T. 3231-4
- f. T. 18950
- g. Ex. 2406, T. 37322
- h. Ex. 305, T. 4403-5

HE-16.

a. T. 30255

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(HH-16)
 state. Suddenly leaders in many Provinces and districts came forward favoring separation from China.^{b.} It was he himself who controlled these puppets as shown in Exhibit 5195.^{c.} Again it was he himself who reported to Commander-in-Chief HONJO what independence was the unanimous demand of the Manchurian people.^{d.}

HH-17. But the puppet state was in need of a titular head, and the ex-emperor Pu-Yi seemed to be a good choice. In November 1931, DOHHEIRA was sent to North China, and as soon as he arrived in Tientsin, disturbances broke out there. Thereupon the staff officers of the Kwantung Army proposed the immediate dispatch of troops to reinforce the garrison force at Tientsin in North China.^{a.} ITAKAKI admitted that he only arranged for the expenses for DOHHEIRA's trip,^{b.} but he certainly did more than that. DOHHEIRA was given an additional assignment to contact Pu-Yi.^{c.}

HH-18. DOHHEIRA, in his interrogation, testified that details of his meetings with Pu-Yi were arranged by ITAKAKI.^{a.} Consul General HAYASHI also reported ITAKAKI's activities in connection with Pu-Yi's coming to Manchuria.^{b.} At the request of Consul-General HAYASHI, Commander-in-Chief HONJO had instructed ITAKAKI to notify DOHHEIRA not to hurry about the undertaking and ITAKAKI admitted that he had sent such a telegram.^{c.} But contrary to HONJO's order, Pu-Yi was taken to Manchuria and put under the protective custody of the Kwantung Army. After the arrival of

HH-16.

- b. Ex. 3316, T. 30275-8
- c. T. 15730
- a. T. 30273

HH-16.

- a. Ex. 2190-4, T. 15726-7
- b. Ex. 2196, T. 15739-41
- c. T. 30381

HH-17.

- a. Ex. 57, pp. 76-77
- b. T. 30275
- c. T. 30300

(HH-18)
Pu-Yi, ITAGAKI sent a female spy by the name of KUMASUKE,
disguised in male attire, to take the ex-empress to Manchuria. d.

HH-19. Since the final step was to obtain the consent of
the Tokyo Government; ITAGAKI was sent to Tokyo by HONJO. a.
He was given an audience with the Emperor, during which he hinted
that there would be a new ruler in Manchuria and the Japanese
Army would take care of its national defence. HIDO, who recorded
this in his diary, said he was quite astonished at the idea. b.
ITAGAKI also explained the situation to the Army authorities in
Tokyo. c.
By so doing, he had secured the approval of the central
authorities to go ahead, as he claimed that as a result of his
explanation the Army authorities "understood" the new conditions
in Manchuria. d. This was also confirmed by MATSUURA. e.

HH-20. Upon his return, HONJO ordered him to see Pu-Yi. a.
Pu-Yi at first refused to become the head of the new state
because ITAGAKI demanded that Japanese should be employed as
Manchurian officials. b.
ITAGAKI himself also stated in his
direct examination that he failed to obtain Pu-Yi's acceptance.
It was an advisor of Pu-Yi who prompted him to report to HONJO
that Pu-Yi had agreed to accept. c.
According to Pu-Yi, ITAGAKI
told his advisors threateningly that in case of Pu-Yi's refusal
the Kwantung Army would take drastic actions. d.
Then ITAGAKI
went back to Mukden and completed the preparations for the
establishment of "Manchukuo". After this, he visited Pu-Yi
once again, and Pu-Yi allegedly consented to become the Regent
of "Manchukuo". ITAGAKI explained that such was the request

HH-18.
d. Ex. 303, T. 4401

(HH-20)
b. T. 3962
c. T. 30282
d. T. 3964-7

HH-19.
a. T. 18998
b. Ex. 2191, T. 15731-2
c. Ex. 3316, T. 30280
d. T. 30279-80
e. T. 19003

HH-20.
a. Ex. 3316, T. 30284

(HH-20)
made by the Chinese puppets themselves, but even if this should be granted to be true, it was not the Chinese puppets who persuaded Pu-Yi. ITOHAKI in his testimony admitted in substance that he alone communicated with Pu-Yi and reported the result, not to the Chinese puppets but to the Commander-in-Chief KANTO.

IV. CONTROL OF MANCHURIA

HH-21. Having initiated the conspiracy, having carried out the military aggression and having created a puppet state with a titular head, ITOHAKI remained in the Kwantung Army to exert his control over Manchuria. Pu-Yi testified that ITOHAKI was a powerful man. Pu-Yi stated that as he was in the hands of the Japanese, he had no freedom of speech and whatever statement he made was made by ITOHAKI. At the time of the interview with the Lytton Commission, it was ITOHAKI who, directly or indirectly, told him what to say at the interview, and this was true of all interviews.

HH-22. Pu-Yi also testified that ITOHAKI was a staunch supporter of the Concordia Society, which was established for the control of Manchuria. Defense witnesses YAMAGUCHI and OKADA both denied that ITOHAKI had any connection with this

HH-20.
e. T. 30783-4

HH-21.
a. T. 3977
b. T. 4025

HH-22.
a. Ex. 712-A, T. 266

(HH-22)b. society, but the Decennial Year Book of the Concordia Society^{c.} definitely shows that he was one of its committee members.

HH-23. The Kwantung Army was given the authority and a detailed outline for the guiding of Manchukuo^{a.}, and there is ample evidence to show that Manchukuo was completely dominated by the Japanese.

HH-24. During all this time until 1937 ITAGAKI had never left the Kwantung Army, serving successively as its Vice-Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff.^{c.} He virtually admitted that he was in charge of personnel matters concerning Japanese officials in the Manchukuo Government.^{b.} In addition, he was connected with the narcotic traffic too. TANAKA testified that the Army Special Service Organ, under DOHHEIRA, was in charge of opium traffic. Later on, ITAGAKI, together with MIYAZAKI and TAJIMA, made an effort to set up the Opium Monopoly Bureau.^{c.} MIYAZAKI admitted that one of the reasons it was taken away from the Special Service Organ was that it was running the opium traffic for its own profits.^{d.} After the establishment of the Opium Monopoly Bureau the League of Nations Committee reported that in Manchukuo more opium was grown and sold. This constituted an increased source of revenue for the puppet state.^{e.}

V. INNER MONGOLIA, NORTH CHINA AND ALL CHINA

HH-25. On December 10, 1934, ITAGAKI was promoted Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.^{a.} Elevated to a more powerful position, he used Manchuria as a base for the further-

HH-22.
b. T. 4134; T. 4136
c. T. 1885; T. 30077

HH-25.
a. Ex. 110, T. 716

HH-23.
a. Ex. 230, T. 2903-11

HH-24.
a. Ex. 110, T. 716
b. T. 15856-8
c. Ex. 383, T. 4711-3
d. T. 30289-90
e. T. 19975-6

(HH-25)

ance of aggression against the rest of China as the conspiracy gradually developed. The objectives were Inner Mongolia and North China at the same time, and the whole of China later on.

HH-26. As soon as he assumed the post, the Kwantung Army on January 24, 1935, charged the Chinese troops in Chahar Province with intrusion into Manchuria.^{a.} In May 1935, the Kwantung Army sent TAMEKI, Ryukichi, to see Prince Teh, a Mongolian leader, and to urge him to establish autonomy there.^{b.} Naturally, Prince Teh could not easily accept the inducement while the Chinese troops were still around. In June, when four Japanese army officers were alleged to have been detained and insulted by the Chinese at Chang-pei, the Kwantung Army presented severe demands. KIMURA testified that the aim was to extend the scope of the demilitarized zone to the Province of Chahar. Since DOHLEBA was in charge of intelligence in that area, he was sent to negotiate.^{c.} As a result of the negotiations, the Chinese on June 27, 1935, agreed to withdraw their army from that area and prohibit anti-Japanese activities in the whole Province of Chahar.^{d.} Once the Chinese authority was removed, the way was open for the Kwantung Army to flirt with its Mongolian puppet. Two months later, in August 1935, Prince Teh promised to cooperate closely with Japan, and the Kwantung Army extended financial aid to him. On February 11, 1936, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Council was removed to West Sunito, a place where the Japanese could exert more effective control, and Japanese civilians were sent there as advisers.^{e.}

HH-26.

- a. Ex. 2489, T. 20754
- b. T. 2040-2
- c. T. 20755
- d. T. 2213
- e. T. 2042

(HH-26)

Soon afterwards, an independent Mongolian Government was established in secrecy, and it signed an agreement with Manchukuo.^{f.}

HH-27. ITAGAKI was promoted the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on March 23, 1936.^{a.} Five days later he had a talk with Ambassador ARITA concerning the importance of Mongolia to Japan and Manchuria. In consistency with the aggression against both China and USSR, he said "If Outer Mongolia is combined with Japan and Manchuria, the Soviet territory in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition".^{b.}

HH-28. The aggression against Inner Mongolia was a flank movement while the main front was, of course, North China. In May 1935, the Japanese Garrison Army in North China was pressing hard on the Chinese authorities. ITAGAKI, the then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, lent his support. He held the opinion that instead of the diplomats, the army people should take the lead in conducting negotiations with China. In fact, he was already using the South Manchuria Railway people and the Japanese Army in North China to exert pressure on China.^{a.} As a result of such pressure, the so-called Ho-UMETU agreement came into being in June 1935, which clearly weakened the authority of the Chinese Government in North China. To follow up, ITAGAKI sent DOHIREI to North China in September 1935 to set up an autonomous regime there as a buffer state.^{b.} In order to have a pretext, ITAGAKI and DOHIREI studied the matter and decided to use anti-communism as the slogan.^{c.} This is confirmed not

HH-26.

f. T. 2042; Ex. 212, T. 2705-7

HH-27.

a. Ex. 110, T. 716
b. Ex. 761-A, T. 7829-31

HH-28.

a. Ex. 2192, T. 15734
b. T. 2028
c. T. 3121-2

(HH-28)
only by TAJAKA, who drafted the order to DOHIMARA, but actually by the fact that two months later in the demilitarized zone was established the so-called Eastern Hepei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council, independent of the Chinese Government. ^{d.}

HH-29. Eastern Hepei was only a part of North China and the conspirators were not so easily satisfied. On November 19, DOHIMARA demanded that the Chinese Hepei-Chahar Political Council itself should become autonomous. ^{e.} He threatened that the Kwantung Army would invade North China if the demand was refused ^{b.} and the land and air forces of the Kwantung Army were actually demobilized. Under cross-examination, ITAGAKI at first tried to deny ^{c.} this, just as MIYAMI did under similar circumstances. ^{d.} But when confronted with the mobilization orders issued by the Army Commander, ITAGAKI had to admit that they were the ones issued at that time. Troops were ordered to be prepared outside of the Great Wall for an advance into North China; the air force was ordered to get ready for action over Peiping and Tientsin areas. ^{c.} Moreover, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to whom ITAGAKI was the Deputy, issued on December 9, 1935, a propaganda plan. ^{f.} It was to convince the world, ironically, of the lawfulness of the aggression against North China. It was desired to launch the propaganda to prepare the ground for and to facilitate the military campaign. ^{e.}

HH-30. Again such a bold attempt caused great concern in the Tokyo government. MATO testified that the OKADA Cabinet experienced difficulties with the army, and he mentioned

HH-28.

d. Ex. 210, T. 2702-4

HH-29.

- a. T. 3315-6
- b. T. 33043; T. 29345
- c. T. 30389
- d. T. 19396
- e. Exs. 3317-A, 3318-A,
T. 30392-4
- f. Ex. 195, T. 3277
- g. T. 3279

(HH-30) a.
specifically ITAGAKI of the Kwantung Army.

HH-31. The successive aggressions against Inner Mongolia and North China finally precipitated the outbreak of an all-out war against China on a large scale in July 1937. ITAGAKI was then the Commander-in-Chief of the Fifth Division in Japan, but he was also attached to the Army General Staff shortly before the war. a. He was sent out to the battle front in North China. Defense witness KOKUBU testified that ITAGAKI was an authority on China and having spent many years in China he had great affection towards the Chinese people. b. His affection, however, could be ironically demonstrated by his talk with the witness Goette, then a correspondent, that the Japanese forces in North China might turn south toward the Yellow River in Central China. c.

VI. WAR MINISTER - 1928 to 1939

HH-32. As the war against China went on, ITAGAKI was appointed War Minister in the KONOYE Cabinet after its reorganization in May 1938. His witness FURUKO testified that ITAGAKI was chosen because ITAGAKI favored a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. a. But FURUKO had to admit that after ITAGAKI became War Minister, the war was intensified. b. ITAGAKI admitted that as soon as he assumed office he believed the attack upon Hankow to be unavoidable. c.

HH-33. He admitted that he as the War Minister occupied a very important position in the Five Ministers Conference in

HH-30.
a. T. 1639-40

HH-31.
a. Ex. 110, T. 716
b. T. 30083
c. T. 3784

HH-32.
a. T. 30086-9
b. T. 30090
c. Ex. 3316, T. 30300

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(HH-33)
 discussing the war situation. He also admitted that the policies adopted by this Conference were in conformity with his views. Between June and October 1938, the Conference made successive decisions of the utmost importance. On July 8, 1938, it was decided that if the Chinese should surrender, the Japanese terms would be the retirement of Chiang Kai-shek and the merger of the Chinese National Government into the pro-Japanese-Manchukuo new central government. It was further decided that if the Chinese should refuse to surrender, more strategic points would be occupied, various regimes would be strengthened until a new central Chinese Government could be set up, and every effort, including propaganda and financial tactics, should be made to bring about the destruction of the present National Government of China. On July 15, 1938, the Conference laid down the policy for the establishment of a new central Government in China. While the National Government of CHINA would be reduced to a local regime, the new central Government would be supervised by Japan in military affairs, foreign relations, economics, religion and education, with the help of Japanese advisers and officials in that Government. In yet another decision by this same Conference, Japan would cause Britain to give up her policy of aiding China, while declining British offer of mediation in the Sino-Japan war.

 HH-33.

- a. T. 30.11
- b. T. 3.17, T. 373:0

(HH-33)

ITAGAKI himself refused to admit these decisions under cross-examination. However, not only the records of the Conference speak for themselves, but the subsequent events clearly show that the decisions made were invariably carried out in earnest.

HH-31. At the same time, ITAGAKI openly declared that Japan should be prepared for a long war with China which might last ten years. He also stated that Japan should be resolved against the interference of third powers in China. His opinion again found its expression in an official declaration of the Japanese Government on November 3, 1936, in which it was stated that Japan would fight on until the Chinese Government should be completely destroyed. It warned other Powers to change their attitude in order to fit in with the new situation.

HH-35. Indeed ITAGAKI meant what he said. Both Hankow in Central China and Canton in South China were occupied by the Japanese in October 1936. By the joint decision of War Minister ITAGAKI and the Navy and Foreign Ministers, administrations were set up there immediately after the occupation for the purpose of giving political guidance to the local puppet regimes to be created and giving economic guidance to secure materials and other benefits for Japan. The administrations should keep in close cooperation with the Special Commission on China Affairs headed by DAIHARA. On November 25, 1936, the decision was made to occupy the Hainan Islands, at the extreme southern tip of China. It was captured on February 10, 1937. Up to

HH-34.

- a. Ex. 2197, T. 15741-3
- b. Ex. 1291, T. 11695-7

HH-35.

- a. Ex. 3741A, T. 37372;
Ex. 3741B, T. 37376
- b. Ex. 612, T. 6731
- c. Ex. 613-A, T. 6732

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(HH-35)

December 12, 1936, the total number of Japanese troops
 ITOGAKI sent to China amounted to 1,600,000.^{a.} Numerous
 atrocities were committed by the Japanese soldiers in
 China. They were so outrageous that the Vice Minister of
 War under ITOGAKI had to issue a special order to the
 returned soldiers prohibiting them from revealing the
 truth as frankly cited in this order.^{b.}

HH-36. In spite of intensified war, China could not
 accept the peace terms which Japan demanded. ITOGAKI decided
 to join hands with important Chinese. He possessed an order
 for "peace".^{a.} For that purpose, DONIWARA, TSUDA and BANJAI
 were sent to China on a special mission.^{b.} It was named
 "Special Commission on China Affairs" under the direct control
 of the Five Ministers Conference to work out important
 strategies against China and to establish the new central
 Government in China. War Minister ITOGAKI and the Navy
 Minister were in charge of the liaison between this Special
 Commission on China Affairs and the Imperial Headquarters.^{c.}
 The purpose was to find out those Chinese who desired
 "peace" and to secure their cooperation with Japan if
 they were conceded to be the best man for the job.^{d.}
 DONIWARA was the responsible member in this Commission who
 administered the entire task and established an agency
 in China known as the DONIWARA Agency.

HH-35.

- a. Ex. 3341, T. 31394-3;
T. 1394
- b. Ex. 3301, T. 30126-30

HH-36.

- a. Ex. 3316, T. 30307
- b. Ex. 3316, T. 30307;
T. 30429
- c. Ex. 3157, T. 37361-2
- d. T. 30430-2
- e. T. 30433-4

0 159 0011 1372

HH-27. YAMAOKI, the Vice Minister of War under ITOGAKI, testified that DOHIMARA worked on retired Chinese leaders and ex-generals and frequently sent communications to the War Ministry. Exhibit 3908 was one of those communications in which DOHIMARA ^{a.} reported his manipulations of the Chinese puppet. It was by no means a new type of diplomacy or strategy. What the ITOGAKI-DOHIMARA team had performed in Manchuria in the name of "independence" was now again put into operation by the same team in China in the name of "peace".

HH-30. ITOGAKI had another right-hand man in the person of KIGESA who was working for the creation of a puppet Central Government in China by inducing as its head an important member of the Chinese Government, namely, Wang Ching-wei. KIGESA made contacts with the agents of Wang and reported the plan to ^{a.} ITOGAKI. ITOGAKI in turn submitted the plan to ^{b.} the Five Ministers Conference. Having secured the consent of the Five Ministers, ITOGAKI ordered KIGESA to deliver the Japanese terms to the agents of Wang in Shanghai. ^{c.} Wang accepted the offer. Accordingly, KIGESA informed the Five Ministers Conference through ITOGAKI. ^{d.}

HH-37.

- a. Ex. 3902, T. 39109-16

HH-38.

- a. T. 24032
- b. T. 24031
- c. Ex. 3721-4, T. 23979;
T. 24032-3
- d. T. 24037-3

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HH-39. From WAGNER's lengthy testimony, it was evident^{a.} that Wang's flight from Chungking was a pre-arranged plan. On December 13, 1938, Wang escaped to Hanoi in French Indo-China.^{b.} Immediately, KONOYE made an official statement on December 22, 1938, outlining the basic policy of Japan with regard to a New China.^{c.} In response, Wang made a speech at Hanoi on December 23, 1938, advocating the acceptance of KONOYE's statement by China.^{d.}

HH-40. Wang's temporary residence at Hanoi in French Indo-China might be compared to Fu-Yi's protective custody at Yinkow inside Manchuria. Naturally the next step would be to install Wang as a titular head of the so-called New China, just as Fu-Yi was made the puppet ruler of Manchuria. Preparatory to the establishment of a new puppet regime, the so-called National Salvation Anti-Comintern League was organized in Central China, while Wu Pei-fu in North China, on whom DCHIHARA had been working, was also urged to come forward. Ample funds^{a.} were provided for both. Such funds did not come from Japan at all but came from the surplus of the Chinese Maritime Customs Revenue which Japan had seized^{b.} and appropriated.

HH-41. In April 1939, ITAKKI sent WAGNER to Hanoi with

HH-39.

- a. T. 24037-40
- b. Ex. 2721-4, T. 23989
- c. Ex. 268, T. 3566-8
- d. Ex. 2590, T. 22310

HH-40.

- a. Ex. 3608, T. 35281-3
- b. Ex. 3744, T. 37396;
Ex. 3743, T. 37393

(HH-41)
 the specific assignment of getting Wang to Shanghai under Japanese protection. ^{a.} ITAGAKI attempted to shift the responsibility upon the Five Ministers Conference instead of shouldering it himself alone. KAGESA testified that he went not only under ITAGAKI's orders but also with a personal letter from ITAGAKI addressed to Wang. ^{c.} Wang was requested to go to Shanghai in order to carry out the so-called peace movement. ^{d.} ITAGAKI felt that a good opportunity was approaching.

HH-42. Wang was brought to Tokyo where he conferred with ITAGAKI and others. ^{a.} The testimony of KAGESA and the interpreter SHIMIZU was enough to show that Wang was free to act only within the limits set by the Japanese demands. ^{b.} While Wang was in Tokyo, the Five Ministers Conference again decided on June 6, 1939 upon a Policy for the Establishment of a New Central Government. This puppet system in China should be formed with a policy of "separate rule", as previously decided by the Imperial Conference on November 30, 1938. It should be guided as well as aided by Japan. ^{c.}

HH-43. After Wang's visit to Tokyo, the China Affairs Board, of which ITAGAKI was one of the Vice-Presidents, drew up a tentative plan which was accepted by Wang on December 30, 1939. ^{a.} To establish the puppet regime for all China, KAGESA continued to play a leading role behind the puppets. ^{b.} The puppet regime under Wang was established in Nanking on March 30, 1940. ^{c.}

HH-44. As it should be recalled, the original conspiracy

HH-41.

- a. T. 24042-4
- b. T. 30440
- c. Ex. 2721-2, T. 23970;
T. 23976; T. 24054
- d. Ex. 3316, T. 30314

(HH-42)

- c. Ex. 3742; T. 37986

HH-43.

- c. Ex. 2721-2, T. 24000
- b. T. 3858
- c. Ex. 276-2, T. 3701

HH-42.

- a. T. 24099
Ex. 2585, T. 22254-70
- b. Ibid.

(HH-44)
 was to keep Manchuria and to exploit it economically. The same
 was being applied to the occupied parts of China Proper. A
 program for such in the name of economic development of China
 was officially decided in January 1939.^{a.} A special kind of
 exploitation was similarly going on--namely, the opium traffic.^{b.}
 Evidence sufficiently shows that whatever was done in Manchuria
 in this traffic was now exactly repeated in the other occupied
 parts of China.

HH-45. As War Minister, ITAGAKI carried great weight in
 the Five Ministers Conference which, similar to a war cabinet,
 was to discuss the major problems.^{a.} As the exponent of the
 Army's views, ITAGAKI was able to impose the demands upon the
 succeeding HIRANUMA Cabinet in January 1939 in which he remained
 as War Minister. The demands were that the "Holy War" against
 China should be continued, that Japan should expand her armament
 and mobilize her resources and that the relations with Nazi
 Germany and Fascist Italy should be strengthened.^{b.}

HH-46. Consistent with this policy while ITAGAKI was the
 War Minister, Japan severed all relations with the League of
 Nations but still kept to herself the Mandated Islands in the
 Pacific.^{a.} During the same period there occurred two incidents
 on the Manchurian border involving the U.S.S.R. Although ITAGAKI
 claimed that he was in favor of keeping tranquil relations with
 the U.S.S.R.,^{b.} YAMAMOTO testified that ITAGAKI confided to him
 as Vice Minister of War that the U.S.S.R. was the primary
 objective.^{c.}

HH-44.

- a. Ex. 461-4, T. 5267-77
- b. Ex. 418, T. 4867-8

HH-45.

- a. T. 30413
- b. Ex. 3303, T. 30120-2

HH-46.

- a. Ex. 271, T. 3641-8
- b. T. 30304
- c. T. 30104-6

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HI-47. At the time of the Chankufeng Incident, ITAGAKI asked for the permission to use force. Although the then Foreign Minister UGAKI denied that armed forces were to be used against the U.S.S.R., he had to admit that he agreed with ITAGAKI that preparations should be made.^{a.} Subsequently when ITAGAKI reported to the Emperor that the Foreign Minister had agreed to employ armed forces against the U.S.S.R., he was severely reprimanded by the Emperor.^{b.}

HI-48. In 1933 when the NOMEJUN Incident occurred, ITAGAKI again voiced the opinion that hostilities should be allowed to continue against the desire of Prime Minister HIRAYAMA.^{a.} Simultaneously, the Japanese Mongolian Army was strengthened and expanded. It was to defend Mongolia under the control of the Japanese.^{b.}

HI-49. The U.S.S.R. was by no means the only objective in ITAGAKI's mind. He confided to YAMAMOTO^{a.} that Britain and France might be the next objectives. In fact, he openly declared his belief at the Diet that in order to establish the so-called New Order, conflict with third powers was inevitable.^{b.} On July 7, 1939, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the war against all China, ITAGAKI gave a press interview in which he said that Japan's mission of constructing a New Order in East Asia would necessitate the stamping out of interference by other powers.^{c.}

HI-47.

- a. T. 23684-9
- b. Ex. 3799-A, T. 37754-7

HI-48.

- a. Ex. 768-A, T. 7652-6
- b. Ex. 274, T. 3672-9

HI-49.

- a. T. 90101
- b. Ex. 2203, T. 15716-8
- c. Ex. 2201, T. 15748-51

HH-50. In order to carry on the war with China, to prepare further aggression against the U.S.S.R. and to regard the other Powers in the Far East as next in line, it naturally followed that the conspirators should seek an alliance with their fellow gangsters in Germany and Italy. The Five Ministers Conference in 1938 laid down the decision to negotiate with Germany for an extensive agreement as advocated by the Army.^{a.} When Hitler succeeded in seizing a part of Czechoslovakia, ITAGAKI on October 2, 1938, sent him congratulations.^{b.} In the next month, Japan and Germany concluded a Cultural Pact.^{c.} It was a political action that ultimately led to a pact with Germany and to war.^{d.} On May 8, 1939, in a press interview, ITAGAKI declared that it was a welcome fact that Germany and Italy had bound themselves together by military alliance to maintain peace and to build up a New Order in Europe. He also hinted that in accordance with the deep-rooted spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact, Japan might join the military alliance of the Axis Powers.^{e.} Later on, according to TIEDO, the Army was insisting on a military alliance with Germany to be concluded as soon as possible. In case of non-compliance with the Army's views, War Minister ITAGAKI would resign and thereby bring about the fall of the entire Cabinet.^{f.}

HH-51. From the very outset, ITAGAKI was in favor of a military alliance with Germany against all the Western European Powers. He did not submit to the Emperor's wish to have the pact directed strictly against the U.S.S.R. alone.^{g.} Throughout

HH-50.

- a. Ex. 780, T. 7909-10
- b. Ex. 2199, T. 15745
- c. Ex. 589, T. 6573-7
- d. T. 6577
- e. Ex. 2214, T. 15815-6
- f. Ex. 2271, T. 16237

HH-51.

- a. Ex. 3795 B, T. 37767-8

(HI-51) the entire negotiations conducted by OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, ITAGAKI consistently lent his support in every turn. He covered up the arbitrary actions of Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI against the charge of the Emperor. He fought hard in the Cabinet against opposition to the realization of an extensive alliance with Germany. Although the military alliance was not materialized in 1939 because of the conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact in August, ITAGAKI pointed out to the German Ambassador OTT "his most sincere efforts on behalf of the close German-Japanese connection, which had failed as a consequence of European developments".

VII. WAGING WAR IN CHINA AND IN THE PACIFIC

HI-52. In September 1939, when the various Japanese units in China were placed under the unified command of the newly established Headquarters in Nanking, ITAGAKI was appointed its Chief of Staff. There he lent his support to the puppet government under Wang and to Wang's movement for the so-called peace. Again the relationship between the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China and the Wang regime could be exactly compared to the relationship between the Kwantung Army and "Manchukuo". The intrigue to secure more Chinese puppets and to divide the Chinese among themselves was continued by ITAGAKI.

HI-53. In July 1941, ITAGAKI was transferred to the Command of the Korean Army where he remained until April 1945. In that position he seemed to be less active, but judging from his opinions, ideas and schemings in the past, he was certainly

HI-1.

- b. Ex. 3793-B, T. 37781-a
- c. Ex. 3800, T. 37803-9; Ex. 3801-A, T. 37811-2; Ex. 3801-C, T. 37822-4; Ex. 3803-B, T. 37828-9; Ex. 3804-B, T. 37836-7; Ex. 3807-A, T. 37846-7
- d. Ex. 3173, T. 15744

HI-50.

- a. Ex. 3916, T. 30318-9
- b. T. 30150-1

HI-52.

- a. Ex. 110, T. 717

(HH-53)
 not free from the responsibility for the outbreak of the Pacific War, which in every respect was an outcome of the overall conspiracy in which ITAGAKI had played a most active part. His duties in Korea might have been less colorful, but certainly it was equally sinister, if not more so. He requested that 1,000 American and British POW's be sent to Korea in order to achieve a psychological effect upon the Koreans by humiliating the Allies in the eyes of the Koreans. Numerous atrocities were committed in the POW Camps under his command. These were admitted to be true by his own witness HERRA, in spite of his contention that careful attention was directed to the POW's in accordance with law. Such contention is directly contradictory to the contents of a report which ITAGAKI sent to TOJO, the then Premier, in September 1942, outlining the labor provisions of the POW's in Korea.

HH-54. In April 1945, ITAGAKI was transferred to become the Commander of the Seventh Army in the South Seas. MATSUMA testified that ITAGAKI as a loc 1 commander had limited control over the POW's there. He further explained that the ill-treatment of the POW's was due to the shortage of supplies as communications were harassed by the war. MATSUDA claimed that ITAGAKI insisted on sending rations to the POW's in spite of the strong public opinion against it. Such testimony was directly contradicted by the overwhelming evidence with regard to POW's in South Sea areas.

HH-55.

- b. Ex. 1273-4, T. 14512-4
- c. T. 3016-7
- d. Ex. 1276, T. 14531-8

HH-56.

- a. Ex. 110, T. 717
- b. T. 30127
- c. T. 30102
- d. T. 30219
- e. Ex. 161: 1617-22; 1640-28; 1668-74; 1686; 1691; 1723; 1724-7; 1751-9; 1763; 1778; T. 413-9; T. 13672; T. 13673; T. 13756

VIII. CONCLUSION

MIYAKI. As one of the original conspirators and as one of the most active leaders both in the Army and in the Government of Japan, MIYAKI consistently initiated aggression and committed crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.

It is respectfully submitted that evidence introduced by the Prosecution substantiates every Count of the Indictment under which he is charged.

- Count 1 is substantiated by Paragraphs 1-34
- Count 2 is substantiated by Paragraphs 1-34
- Count 3 is substantiated by Paragraphs 25-45
- Count 4 is substantiated by Paragraphs 46-47
- Count 5 is substantiated by Paragraphs 50-51
- Count 6 is substantiated by Paragraphs 1-35
- Counts 7-16 are substantiated by Paragraphs 48 and 49-51
- Count 17 is substantiated by Paragraphs 16-51
- Count 18 is substantiated by Paragraphs 1-12
- Count 19 is substantiated by Paragraphs 25-31
- Count 23 is substantiated by Paragraphs 49-51
- Counts 25-26 are substantiated by Paragraphs 46-48
- Count 27 is substantiated by Paragraphs 8-12
- Count 28 is substantiated by Paragraphs 31-45
- Counts 29-34 are substantiated by Paragraphs 52-54
- Counts 35-36 are substantiated by Paragraphs 46-48
- Counts 45-47 are substantiated by Paragraphs 53-54
- Counts 51-52 are substantiated by Paragraphs 46-48
- Counts 54-55 are substantiated by Paragraphs 32-35 particularly Paragraph 35

IPS

ERRATA SHEET

FEBRUARY 19, 1948

RE: ITAGAKI SUMMATION (HH)

The following corrections are to be made in IPS
Summation on ITAGAKI (HH):

Page HH-5 Paragraph HH-10
Line 3 Change "operation" into "operations".
Line 8 Change "instruction" into "instructions".

Page HH-7 Paragraph HH-14
Line 6 Change "... he did made ..." into
"he did make".
Last word, second line from bottom of page
Change "his" into "ITAGAKI's".

Page HH-9 Paragraph HH-16
Line 5 Change "what" into "that".

Page HH-11 Paragraph HH-21
Line 7 Change "on specc" into "of speech".

Same Page Same paragraph
Change "was made by ITAGAKI" into
"was dictated by ITAGAKI".

Page HH-12 Paragraph HH-24
Line 10 Add "why" after "reasons".

Page HH-20 Paragraph HH-37
Next to the last line of the paragraph
Insert "other parts of" between "in" and
"China".


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H-H

無名氏詩集卷之十
雜詩五首

十一

0 159 0011 1383



A. H.

Handwritten text in the upper section of the page, appearing as a list or series of notes.

Main body of handwritten text, consisting of several paragraphs of cursive script.

此項工程，係由本局委託
 建築師事務所，於民國
 二十六年，在該地興建
 住宅，計有房屋六十餘
 間，佔地約五百餘畝，
 現已竣工，定於近日
 內，分發給領，以資
 安置。

0 159 00 11 1335

ITAGAKI

二四。五法廷記録一九三三(一)則中軍、高級參謀
名板垣六九月十日奉天、居川(假)板垣(六步兵六二
十九聯隊長並志三奉天守備隊長平田大佐及已獨
立兵備隊砲兵六二大隊長、島本中佐、必厚十
ル指令ヲ與(假)等奉天、北太管、兵備攻撃
決意同意之云々。上板垣自身在、如ク記云ニ
了居又。

偶々ノニ居合ニ參謀時校上ニ、首務ニ於テ、
私人依等、決意ヲ受諾シ、獨立兵備隊北太管ニ下
敵上戰ニ於テ十九聯隊長奉天、中、謀上斷、上
アコトヲ司令官ニ報告スルヲ絶シ、採ル云。(法廷
記録三、二六四)

公表セラレ、中國側、無抵抗政策ヲ考慮シ、對
斗ヲ中止セ、上ニテ、林領事、熱心ヲ具、執拗ニ要求
對テ、板垣協力ニ力ヲ付、上ニ對テ、主權ノ理
由ニテ、非難側、舉テ、上ニテ、口ハ、事態ヲ收拾スル
ハ、時ヲ得、且、日本軍ニ遲滞ト油斷ヲ養フニ上テ、
敵、常套的好計ヲ下ル、毛測ラレ、力ヲ付、上ニテ、
ニシタ。(W、八、三六頁、法廷記録四、三四一頁)言及
ニ於テ、中國側、完全準備ナシ、狀態(法廷記五、
七、六八―七〇頁)及、中國軍、其、地域ニ於テ、
管中完全ノ無抵抗ヲ示シ、居、上ニテ、調査團
ノ報告、非難側、コ、主張ヲ完全ニ否定スルモノ
アリマス。右調査團、調査ノ結果ハ、次、如クナリマス。

P 3

0159 0011 1389

Handwritten text in Chinese characters, appearing to be a list or a series of entries. The text is very faint and difficult to read, but it seems to contain several lines of information, possibly names and dates or descriptions. The characters are arranged in vertical columns.

90

1 TAGAKI

彼、後ニ独立宣言ノ意圖ナキコトヲ明ニシテ、
毅ト変遷サシ職式毅ハ整頓ヲ曰リ毅ハ三奉
長ニ任セラル。 (清廷) 迄之、八ノ(在) 一九三
十月七日林炳領率部軍兵等來臺、而禁之
次、如、述、ニ、居、リ、ス。

六月、毅軍司令部ヲ衰金凱、將、田、加、
結果、六月、朝、地、方、安、定、維持、委員、ハ、
一、合、合、ヲ、催、シ、政、務、院、律、令、ニ、張、宗、良、ハ、政、
教、並、ニ、國民、政府、ノ、閣、僚、ノ、軍、ノ、要、求、ニ、通、
斷、絶、ス、且、字、句、ヲ、挿、入、ス、決、シ、右、ノ、日、七、
ノ、下、十、一、日、居、リ、(清、廷) 迄、三、七、九、一、
三、六、三

毅、臨、上、之、所、ニ、依、テ、毅、壇、力、
赴、キ、次、如、ノ、報、告、
及、
居、
ノ、

滿洲、一般的傾向、獨立國家、遂至、一獨立國家、

界以外優秀之人々、意見ヲ統一シ、統一國ヲ造ル、

凡テ獨立國家、權立ヲ欲ス、故ニ三本國ニ對シテ、

正亦當ニ張力自政權、進行、自辨、一政府、

政府、滿洲、進出ニ及、對テ、九、確、權、

テ、ク、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、

三、陸軍大臣一符中國態度

辯護例、陸軍大臣、板垣、次、改、善、

調、之、居、

「支那ニ関シテ、我カ武力進出ニ停ム、

退、占領地帶ヲ安定シ、同時ニ韓、

ヲ拒絶スルニ、一層、努力ヲ要ス、

法廷記録四五、二、九、(法廷記録三三六、

板垣、行動、彼カ表明、

一九三八年六月二日ヨリ、一九三九年八月

陸軍大臣在任時代、全文ニ續ク、

タル重要ナル都市及、

ヲテオケ、(法廷記録二五四、法廷記録三四三、

所、國政權、平和的解決ヲ求メ、

重要ナル役割ヲ演ジ、五相會議、

介石、退陣、支那政府、

條件、可キ、上、並ニ日本ハ「敵國」

之目的、多ク、中國ニ於テ、

0 159 00 11 1392

0 159 0011 1393

0159 0011 1377

DOHARA

五股... 核... 即... 行... 日... 日... 證... 青... 自... 附... 日... 日... 會... 試... 一...

外... 法... 三... 即... 恰... 子... 評...

(遠) 彼等は「肥田」を「肥料」として、
 了す。 肥田は「肥料」に於て「肥料」
 陸軍大臣「肥料」を「肥料」として、
 了す。

兼護田「兼護田」人「兼護田」
 新聞紙「兼護田」
 議事「兼護田」
 行「兼護田」
 六「兼護田」
 同書「兼護田」
 了「兼護田」
 了「兼護田」
 了「兼護田」

兼護田「兼護田」人「兼護田」
 新聞紙「兼護田」
 議事「兼護田」
 行「兼護田」
 六「兼護田」
 同書「兼護田」
 了「兼護田」
 了「兼護田」
 了「兼護田」

「兼護田」人「兼護田」
 新聞紙「兼護田」
 議事「兼護田」
 行「兼護田」
 六「兼護田」
 同書「兼護田」
 了「兼護田」
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 了「兼護田」

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
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一、本報之宗旨
 二、本報之方針
 三、本報之組織
 四、本報之經費
 五、本報之發行
 六、本報之廣告
 七、本報之印刷
 八、本報之地址
 九、本報之電話
 十、本報之電報
 十一、本報之郵政
 十二、本報之法律
 十三、本報之章程
 十四、本報之規則
 十五、本報之辦法
 十六、本報之規定
 十七、本報之決定
 十八、本報之執行
 十九、本報之監督
 二十、本報之考核
 二十一、本報之獎勵
 二十二、本報之懲戒
 二十三、本報之修訂
 二十四、本報之廢止
 二十五、本報之其他

1. 關於... 2. 關於... 3. 關於... 4. 關於... 5. 關於... 6. 關於... 7. 關於... 8. 關於... 9. 關於... 10. 關於... 11. 關於... 12. 關於... 13. 關於... 14. 關於... 15. 關於... 16. 關於... 17. 關於... 18. 關於... 19. 關於... 20. 關於... 21. 關於... 22. 關於... 23. 關於... 24. 關於... 25. 關於... 26. 關於... 27. 關於... 28. 關於... 29. 關於... 30. 關於... 31. 關於... 32. 關於... 33. 關於... 34. 關於... 35. 關於... 36. 關於... 37. 關於... 38. 關於... 39. 關於... 40. 關於... 41. 關於... 42. 關於... 43. 關於... 44. 關於... 45. 關於... 46. 關於... 47. 關於... 48. 關於... 49. 關於... 50. 關於... 51. 關於... 52. 關於... 53. 關於... 54. 關於... 55. 關於... 56. 關於... 57. 關於... 58. 關於... 59. 關於... 60. 關於... 61. 關於... 62. 關於... 63. 關於... 64. 關於... 65. 關於... 66. 關於... 67. 關於... 68. 關於... 69. 關於... 70. 關於... 71. 關於... 72. 關於... 73. 關於... 74. 關於... 75. 關於... 76. 關於... 77. 關於... 78. 關於... 79. 關於... 80. 關於... 81. 關於... 82. 關於... 83. 關於... 84. 關於... 85. 關於... 86. 關於... 87. 關於... 88. 關於... 89. 關於... 90. 關於... 91. 關於... 92. 關於... 93. 關於... 94. 關於... 95. 關於... 96. 關於... 97. 關於... 98. 關於... 99. 關於... 100. 關於...

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Main body of handwritten text, consisting of several paragraphs. The text is dense and appears to be a detailed report or letter.

一、關於... (faint text)
 二、關於... (faint text)
 三、關於... (faint text)
 四、關於... (faint text)
 五、關於... (faint text)
 六、關於... (faint text)
 七、關於... (faint text)
 八、關於... (faint text)
 九、關於... (faint text)
 十、關於... (faint text)

總之... (faint text)
 以上... (faint text)
 特此... (faint text)

0159 0011 1413

021

021 0142A

敬啟者：敝處現有(批發)批發(2011-2012)年
 度各項業務，現正積極開展中，如有需要，請
 隨時與我們聯繫。電話：021-12345678
 地址：上海市某某路某某號某某公司
 某某部某某人某某啟

- I、奉天事件以前
- II、奉天事件
- III、德俄國家樹立
- IV、「滿洲國」ノ統御
- V、內蒙古、北支及全中國
- VI、陸軍大臣 一九三八—一九三九年
- VII、中國及太平洋ニ於ケル戰爭遂行
- VIII、結 語

ITAGAKI Summation-HJ

坂 道 征 四 郎

左ノ訴因ニ因リ訴追

一 一 五

六 一 一 七

一 一 八 十 九

二 三

二 五 一 二 六

二 七 一 三 二

三 三 一 三 四

三 五 一 三 六

四 四 一 四 七

五 一 一 五 五

0159 0011 1414

垣ハ、大川周明博士ヲ中心トスル一區、即チ土肥原、小磯、多田/ANDA/其ノ他日本ガ自給自足出來ルヨウニスルタメ、滿洲ヲ併呑スルコトヲ公然ノ目的トセルモノト親密ナ知已トナツタノデアリマス。(a) 此ノ目的ヲ達成スルタメ、其ノ後板垣ハ、橋本、土肥原、小磯及其ノ他ト共ニ、

HH-1

a 註、記録番號ハ英文ノ頁番號デアル

記書
録證
七一五〇

b 記書
録證
三二〇四一五

c 記書
録證
九九九九九
八七七六六
三五一六〇

HH-2

a 記書
録證
三一五七六五
一六

d 記書
録證
三二〇四九七
六一七

5141 1100 6510
0159 0011 1445

I、奉天事件以前

HH-1

一九二九年五月板垣ハ關東軍參謀ニ任ゼラレ (a)
 其ノ後間モナク自分ガ同軍青年將校達ノ認メラ
 レタ指導者タルコトノ實ヲ示シタノデアリマヌ (b)

田中ハ、奉天事件ノ内幕ニ關スル證言中デ度々
 此ノ事實ニ言及致シマシタ。(c) 青年將校達ノ熱
 望スルトコロハ、滿洲ヲ占領シ、コレヲ中國ヨ
 リ切離シ、日本ノタメニ保持シ、經濟的ニ利用
 スルコトデアリマシタ。(d)

HH-2

斯カル企ニ乘出スタメニハ、陰謀及ビ煽動ノ
 タメニ、結集スルコトガ必要デアリマシタ。板

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

文官政府ヲ傾覆サセル計策ノ作成ニ關係シマシ
タ。(b) 此ノ點ニ特ニ御注意ヲ願イ度イノハ、コ
レガ共同謀議ノソモソモノ旨メラ構成スルカラ
デアリマス。

HH-3

一九三〇年ノ初メ頃、大川ハ瀋洲ニ於ケル中
國ノ將軍張學良ニ會フタメ奉天ヘ行キマシタ。
大川ハ張ガ自身及ビ其ノ支配下ニアル地域ヲ、
中國ノ他地域ヨリ絶縁スベキコトヲ提議シマシ
タ。(a) 此ノ提議ハ張ニヨリ拒絶サレマシタ。此
ノ共謀人選ハ武力ヲ行使シテ目的ヲ達セントノ
結果ニ到達シタノデアリマス。

HH-4

森島 MORISHIMA ハ、滿蒙ノ軍閥ハ瀋洲ニ於
ケル日本ノ權益ヲ保持スルタメニハ、瀋洲ヲ兵
力ヲ用イテ占領シ、日本ニ後立ツ政府ヲ設立ス
ル必要ガアルトノ強硬意見ヲ持ツテイタ、ト提言
シマシタ。(a) 板垣ハ個人的ニ田中ニ向ツテ斯様
ナ意見ヲ言ツタノデアリマス。(b) 板垣自身ハ斯

HH-2

b、青龍三二七七一A

記録二五五八七

HH-3

a、記録二九八〇

HH-4

a、記録三〇一六一七

b、記録二九五九一六〇

〃一九八四一六

P-4

様ナ語ガ田中ト自分トノ間ニアツタコトヲ否定
 シマツタガ(c) 其ノ親シイ同僚石原 / ISHIHARA /
 ヘ反詰質問中、板垣ガ武力衝突ヘ進ケ得ナイト
 ノ考ヘヲ確カニ持ツテイタコトヲ逆ニ認メマシ
 タ。(d)

BH-4

0、記録三〇三三五一七
 d、〃三三一九八

同條、土肥原ハ東京へ召致サレマシタ。此處テ土肥原ハ新聞ヲ通シ滿洲ニ於ケル全未解決問題ヲ必要トアレバ武力ヲ以テ而モ可及的速ニ解決スルコトヲ主唱シタノデアリマス。^d

HH-6 公然タル煽動ヲ行ヒツツアル間ニ、秘密ノ作戰計畫ノ用意ガ出來タノデアリマス。 作戰計畫シ作ツタ石原ガ / ISHIHARA / 板垣ハコレヲ

- JH-5 a、特設 三七 六四一六三頁
- b、記録 三〇一六一七
- c、 二二一九九
- d、特設 三七、六六頁

0159 0011 1418

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-5

武力衝突ハ實現不可能デハナカツタノデアリマス。ソレハ中國當局ト日本領事トハ解決點ニ到達スベク、懸命ニ努力シテキタカラデアリマス。(a)

然ルニ平和達成ノ努力ハ、軍閥ノタメニ失敗ニ歸シマシタ。(b) 之ヲ失敗セシメルノニ、共謀者達ハ

情勢ガ武力衝突ハ不可能デアルヤウニ見セカケ、左様ナ結論ヲ東京ニ報告シタノデアリマス。(c)

確カニソレハ煽動ヲ目的トセル倅リノ情勢デアリマシタ。此ノカチ得々結果ハ、石原ノ認メテ居ルトコロデ、全日本ガ交渉失敗ヲ論ジテ居タト云フコトデアリマス。奉天事件ノ前日、板垣ノ親シイ

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-7

a、記録 一四〇四

e、" 三〇七五八

d、" 三〇七五八

c、" 二二一五八

b、記録 二二二〇八

a、記録 二二一五八

HH-6

イ 將來滿洲デ一事件ヲ引起スト言ツタノデアリマ
ス。(a) 九月ノ初メ、板垣及關東軍ノ其ノ他參謀將

HH-7

此ノ事件ガ豫メ準備サレタモノデアルコトハ、
東京ノ大川ガ一ヶ月前ニ既ニ此ノコトヲ知ツテ后
タコトカラシテ、益々明白デアリマス。大川ハ辭
ツテキル時、清水ノSHIMIZUノニ板垣其ノ他ガ近

6141 1100 6510

知ツテキタト證言シマシタ。(2) 石原 / HOSHIMURA /

ハ又板垣ガ奉天ノ特務機關ヲ監督シテキタト證言
シマシタ。(b) 板垣ハ又秘密ノ中ニ大砲ガ二ツ奉天

ニ据エラレタコトヲ知ツテキマシタ。(c) 板垣ハ自

分ノ證言中ニ、大砲ニ關スル秘密保持ハ中國側ヲ

刺戟シナイタメデアツタト、説明シヤウトシマシ

タ。(d) 然シ此ノ大砲ガ中國軍ヲ奇襲攻撃シタ時大

變有效デアツタコトハ全ク否定シテキナイノデア

リマス。板垣ハ更ニソノ全作戦計畫ハ防衛的ノモ

ノデアルト説明シタガ、主兵力ニハ中國陸軍ノ中

樞ニ大打撃ヲ加ヘル機會ガ與ヘラレルト述ベタコ

トニ依リ、自己撞着ニ陥ツテキルノデアリマス。(e)

II 奉天事件

HH-8 建川 / HASEKAWA / ハ奉天ニ向ケ出發スルニ當リ、
爾以テ、板垣カ石原 / ISHIHARA / ニ合ヒ度イト電
報ヲ打チマシタ^o。之ニ應ジ、板垣ハ建川 / HASEKAWA /
ニ會ヒ、特務機關ト總領事館トニ連絡ヲト

HH-7 b、記録 一九八二一、記録 一九八二七
c、〃 三〇三四三—七

d、尋証 三七三九、記録 三七三一五
e、記録 一九八二一

P-7
HH-8 a、記録 一九一一〇

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

校が何等カノ行動ヲ起サウト企ランデキルトノ報告ガ東京ヘ入りマシタ。(b) 板垣ハ紛擾ヲ惹起スルタメ、日本人ノゴロツキノ支那浪人ノヲ備ツタ、ト言ツテ報告ガアリマシタ。板垣ハコノコトヲ否認シマシタガ、ソノ様ナ内容ノ報告ガアツタコトハ事實上認めタノデアリマス。(c) 其ノ後ニ提出サレタ證據ニヨレバ、斯カル報告ヲ入手シタ日本外務大臣ハ此等支那浪人ノ活動ヲ抑制スル總領事ニ指令シ、又此ノ事ヲ陸軍ニ通知シタノデアリマス。(d) 東京デハ明カニ非常ニ心痛シマシタ。其ノ行動ヲ阻止スルタメ建川ナル特別使節ガ奉天ヘ送ラレマシタ。(e)

0159 0011 1420

ITAGAKI Summation-III

HH-8

d	c	b
"	"	記録
二	三	二
二	〇	二
一	三	一
二	五	一
二	〇	七
	一	八

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ル任務ヲ受ケテ奉天ニ派遣サレマシタ。(b) 板垣ハ
 建川／FABERKAWA／ノ様ナ、特別使節ハ、遅滞ナク
 用務ヲ傳ヘルノガ通例デアルコトヲ認メテキマス。
 然ルニ板垣ハ建川ト二時間モ共ニ過シナガラ、建
 川／FABERKAWA／ガ傳ヘル答ノ用務ノ内容ヲ眞劍ニ
 ナツテ知り度イトモ思ハズ、又建川／FABERKAWA／
 モ板垣ト之ニツキ何等協議スル熱意ハナカツタノ
 デアリマス。(c) 事實板垣ハ次ノ日マテ建川ニ任バ
 サセマシタ。(d) 勿論計畫サレテキタト思ハレル目
 的ニハ決シテ明白ト言フ日ハナカツタノデアリマ
 ス、其ノ理由ハ事件ハマサニ其ノ日ノ夕方起ツク
 カラデアリマス。

HH-10

此ノ所謂事件ガ勃發シ、平田／HIRATA／大佐ハ特務機關ヘ行キマシタ。ソコデ板垣ハ此ノ作戰ヲ指揮スル任務ヲ引受ケタノデアリマス。平田

／HIRATA／ハ其ノ證言デ、板垣ニハ自分ニ命令スル極限ガナカツタコトヲ證明シヨウトシタガ、板垣ニ中國軍ヲ攻撃スル承認ヲ求メ、板垣カラ確カニ左様ナ保證ヲ得タコトヲ認メテオリマス。(a) 石原／TSHIHARA／モ又確カニ板垣ガ塊地指揮官ニ指導或ハ訓命ヲ與ヘタコトヲ認メテオリマス。(b)

P-9

HH-10 HH-9

a、記録 三〇三三二

b、記録 三〇三五三

a、記録 一九三〇七一三

b、記録 二二一一三、記録二二一五三、記録二二一一三

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-9

板垣ハ碓氷川/FATHERKAWAノ始末ヲツケルトスグ、
特務機關ヘ行キ、板垣ノ口ヲカリレバ、其處デ少
クトモ一時間半雑談シタノデアリマス。(a) 此處デ
指摘セネバナラナイコトハ、此ノ機關ガ前哨地ト
旅順ニ於ケル關東軍司令部トノ間ノ唯一ノ連絡機
關デアツタコトデアリマス。ソレハ此ノ機關ノミ
ガ總司令官ニ電報ヲ打ツノニ暗號ヲモツテキタカ
ラデアリマス。(b)

0159 0011 1422

ITAGAKI Summation-HH
 HH-11 HH-10

後ニコレヲ調査シタ片倉/KATAKURAハ斯ク確認
 シ、(d) 板垣自身モ斯ク認メタノデアリマス。(e) 然
 ルニ林/HAYASHI/總領事カラ中國軍ハ抵抗シナイ
 ノダカラ軍争行動ヲ中止スルヤウニト板垣ニ訴ヘ
 タ時、板垣ハ拒絕シマシタ。(f) 實際ノ狀況ヲ確カ
 メテシモシナイ中ニ、板垣ハ何ノ根拠モナク、中
 國正規軍ガ日本軍ニ挑戦シタト無造作ニ斷言シタノデアリマ

- c、記録 三〇二六五
- a、記録 一五二〇九
- d、記録 一八九三六
- b、記録 三〇三五六
- e、記録 三〇二六五
- f、書證 二一九三、記録 一五七三四
- c、記録 一九一〇五

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板垣自身モ自分ガ此等ノ者ニ或ル保證ヲ與ヘタ
 コト認メテオルノデアリマス。(c)

HH-11

石原／ISHIHARA／ハ板垣ニハ調査スル時間ガナ

カツタ、ト證言シテオリ、(a) 板垣ハ通信狀況ガ悪

ク情勢ノ眞ノ性質ヲ確メルコトガ出來ナカツタ、

ト述ベテオリマス。(b) スクテ板垣ハ實際ニ何ンナ

コトガ起ツテキルカヲ確カメル勞ヲスラ取ラズニ

勝手ニ、中國軍ヲ攻撃セントスル現地指揮官ノ計

畫ヲ承認シタコトハ明白デアリマス。板垣ハ、中

國軍ガ平和ノタメニ抵抗シナイト發表シタコトヲ

聞イテキマシタ。石原／ISHIHARA／ハ斯ク證言シ、(c)

0159 0011 1424

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-12

ス。(g) 末ダ調ベル時間ガナカツタニモ拘ハラズ、
板垣ハ林／HAYASHI／ニ中(日)軍ヲ徹底的ニ始末セホ
バナラヌト言ツタノデアリマス。(h)

一度承認ガ下リ、作戰計畫ガ懸命ニ實施サレル
ヤ、日本軍ハ滿洲ノ占領ヲ開始シマシタ。従ツテ
關東軍ノ中心人物ノ一人トシテ滿洲ノ占領ヲ計畫
シ、實行シタノハ板垣デアツタト結論セザルヲ得
ナクナルノデアリマス。(a)

HH-11

g、記録 三〇ニ六六

ITAGAKI Summation HH

通ハ日本人が市政中ニ占メテ居タ地位が何ンナ
 モノデアツタカラ記帳シテキナイト言ヒマシタ (g)
 ガ書證二四七九一B (h) ハ三長職員ノ全名簿ヲ示
 シコレガ全部日本人デアルトイフ事ヲ示シテイマ
 ス。此ノ奉天ノ政府ハ、其ノ設立後一ヶ月ニ足ラ
 ズシテ、軍ノ秘書計帳ニ從ヒ、資金獲得ノタメ、
 画片ノ專賣ト、富銀ノ彩票ノ發行ヲ計畫シマシ
 タ (i)

o	d	o	b	a	o	g	f
一	三	一	三	二	記	記	記
九	〇	八	〇	一	帳	帳	帳
八	三	八	三	九	三	三	三
七	五	一	五	〇	七	〇	〇
九	八	三	六	二	三	三	三
		一		九	七	四	六
		九			三	〇	七
					六	三	九
					三	三	〇
					九	〇	三

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III 傀儡國家樹立

HH-13

奉天ヲ占領シテ間モナク土肥原ガ市長ニ任命サ
レマシタ。板垣コソハ軍人ヲ長官トスル此ノ市政
ヲ仕立テ上ゲタ人ナノデアリマス。(a) ガ土肥原ヲ

推薦シタノガ自分デアルコトハ否認シテ居リマス

(b)

然シ辨護側証人山口 / YAMAGUCHI / ハ板垣ガコ

ノ任命ヲ承認シタコトヲ証言シテキマス。(c) 板垣

ハ又コレガ軍政デアルコトヲ否定シマシタガ、(d)

共同被告南ハコレガ少クトモ一時固ニハ軍政デア

ツタコトヲ事實上認めテ居ルノデアリマス。(e) 板

垣ハ土肥原ガ中国人ニ又持セラレ、日本人顧問ハ

極ノ少数デアツタト主張シマシタ。(f) 反對諷刺中

ハ許サレナカツタト片倉ノKAWASAKIノハ証言致シ
 マシタ。然シ彼ハ坂垣ノアル保証ガ獨立運動遂行
 ノ示唆トナツタコトヲ承認シマシタ。(d) カサギノ
 KASAGIノハ土肥原ト坂垣ガ中國ノ信僞ヲ操ツタト
 証言シマシタ。(e) 彼ノ否定ニモ拘ラズ、(f) 信僞ノ
 行動ハ全クコノ二人ノ共同謀議者ノ統制下ニアツ
 タコトハ澤山ノ證據ノ示ス所デアリマス。(g)

HH-I4

a、	記録	二七九三—四
b	〃	二二二四—九
c、	〃	二二二五—一—二
d、	〃	一八九四—三、
e、	〃	二七九三—四
f、	〃	三〇三六—八
g、	〃	三四七四—E—一

記録 一六〇八一

記録 三三六〇〇—三〇

0159 0011 1426

奉天 / HUKUDEE / 自治市創設後次ノ段取ハ、自治

指導部ヲ設備スル事デアリマシタ。ソノ部ニ芳ノ

テキタ、カサギ / KASAGI / ハソノ方針ト仕事ハ板

垣ガ支配シテキタト隨言致シマシタ。(a) 石原 / 石原

HARA / ハ最初ニハ、板垣ハ殆ドソノ部ニ關係ガ

ナカツタト言ヒマシタ。(b) 彼ガ爾ニナシタ陳述ヲ

爾前ニツキツケラレタ時、石原ハ、板垣ガソノ政

治顧問デアツタト爾ニ陳述シタコトヲ承認シマシ

タ。自治指導部ノナス事ハ何事デモ軍ノ承認ヲ得

ナケレバナラズ、ソレデ板垣ハソノ部ニツキ知ル

事ガ出来タノデアリマス。(c) 陸軍次官ノ命令ニ據

リ關東軍將校ハ如何ナル政治運動ニモ干與スル事

P-I4 南滿洲 / SOUTH MANCHURIA / 二自治指導部
 HH-I5 設置後ハ、北滿洲 / NORTH MANCHURIA / 又

記下ニ置クコトガ未ダ達ツテ居マツタ。森田(1)人武田 / TAKEEDA / ハソレヲ否認シテ居リマス。證據ヲ見ルト、日本側ガ張海島 / CHANG HAI-PENG / 二彼ノ軍隊ヲ増強シテ北滿洲ニ進軍セシムルタメニ銃三千挺、銀二十萬元ヲ供給シテ居ルコトガ示サレテイマス。(2) 他方、其處ノ北滿 / 二自分ノ軍隊ヲ持ツテ居ル馬占山 / MA CHAN-SHAN / 府軍ハ被告板垣カラ立派ナ人物ト認メラレテ居リマシタ。(3) 彼ニ對シ軍事行動ニ出ツル代リニ或ル陰謀ガ企テラレマツタ。土肥原ガ一九三二年一月北滿洲へ派遣サレマシタ。(4) 彼ハ、全ト軍需品ヲ運ルカラ偽僞ニナルヨウニ馬 / 馬 / 馬軍ヲ唆カシ(5) 板垣自身ガ馬 / 馬 / 二會イニ行キ日本側ニ加擔サセマシタ。(6) 更ニ日本側ハ北滿洲ノ蒙古人ニ武器ヲ與ヘテ彼等ノ所謂獨立ヲ支持シマシタ。(7) 全滿洲ヲ統治スル傀儡國家ヲ作ルタメ、日ラ國民自衛軍ト稱スル日本ノ軍人「ゴロ」進ハ彼方此方テ非常ニ活動シ始メマシタ、コレハ板垣ニヨツテ決定

ITAGAKI Summation HH I 5

- HR-I5 a、記 一六三六三 一七三
- b、記 二四〇七、 記録三七三三四
- c、記 三〇二七七
- d、記 五七 リットン / LITTON / 報告書七九頁
- e、記 三三三 一四
- f、記 一六九六〇
- g、記 二四〇六、 記録 三七三三三

P-15

HH-15

h

RESEARCH

AND

DEVELOPMENT

LABORATORY

REPORT

ITAGAKI Summation HH-

HH-I5

ト サレ
イ サレ
フ 官
コ 施
ト サ
ガ レ
判 タ
リ 高
マ 等
シ 政
タ 策
。 ニ
(h) 基
ズ
イ
タ
陰
謀
デ
ア
ツ
タ

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ITAGAKI Summation-HH

E-I7 然シナガラ傀儡國家ニハ虛名ノ君主ガ必要デア
タノデ、前皇帝浦儀ノヒロキハガ適任ダト目
サレタノデアリマス。一九三一年十一月、土肥原

ハ北支ヘ派遣サレ、彼ガ天津ヘ到着メルヤ否ヤ同
地ニ紛擾ガ勃發シタノデアリマス。ソコテ關東軍
ノ參謀達ハ北支ノ天兵ニ於ケル守備隊ヲ增強スル
タメニ兵力ノ急派ヲ唱ヘタノデアリマス。
(a)

HH-I6 a、記録 三〇二七五—八
b、書證 三三一—六 記録 三〇二七五—八
c、記録 一五七—三九

HH-17 a、書證 五七、七六一—七七頁
d、記録 三〇二七八

6241 1100 6510

HH-16

板垣ハ奉天事件以前ニハ滿洲ノ抗日運動ハ活潑
且熾烈ナモノデアツタト斷言致シマシメ。(a)

日本軍ノ滿洲占領後ハ獨立國家ノ創造ガ一般ノ希望
デアツタト板垣ハ主張致シマシメ。各省各縣ノ
指導者選ガ中翳カラノ分離ヲ熟望シテ俄ニ馳セ參
ジマシタ。(b) 法廷證第二一九五號ニ示シテアル様
ニコレヲ傀儡ヲ豫ツテキタ者コソ外ナラヌ彼自身
ナノデアリマス。(c) 又本庄ノ田○三○ノ司令官ニ
獨立ハ滿洲人ノ一致シタ要求デアルト報告シタノ
モ失張リ彼自身ニ外ナラナイノデアリマス。(d)

本庄 / HONZO / 司令官ハ土肥原ニコノ企圖ニ
 關シテハ急ガ又襟ニ通知セヨト板垣ニ訓令シタ
 ノデアツテ、板垣モ彼ガ斯様ナ電報ヲ送ツタコ
 トハ認メマシタ。(c) 然シ本庄 / HONZO / ノ命
 令ニ反シ、薄儀ハ滿洲ニ送レテ來ラレ、關東軍
 保護ノ下ニ置カレタノデアリマス。薄儀 / HD
 IKH / ノ到着後板垣ハ、前皇后ヲ滿洲ニ送レテ
 來ルタメニ川島 / KAWASHIMA / トイフ女圖樣ヲ
 男表サセテ派遣シタノデアリマス。(d)

HH-17

b 記録三〇三七五
 c 記録三〇三八〇

HH-18

a 記録二一九〇、A 記録一五七三六一七
 b 卷二一九六、記録一五七三九一四
 c 記録三〇三八一
 d 卷三〇三三、記録EEEO1

HH—18

板垣ハ彼ハ土肥原ノ旅費ノ上面ヲシタトダケ
ヲ認メテ居ルノデアリマスガ。(b) 彼ハ確ニソ
レ以上ノコトヲ致シマシタ。土肥原ハ尙ソノ外
溥儀ト交渉スルトイフ役目ヲ與ヘラレタノデア
リマス。(c)

土肥原ハソノ訊問ノ際ニ彼ノ海峽ノPURIYH
ノトノ會見ノ詳細ハ板垣ガ御辯立ヲシタノダト
證言シテ居リマス。(a) 林ノHAYASHIノ總領

事モ亦、溥儀ノPURIYHノヲ滿洲ヘ迎ヘルコト
ニ關スル板垣ノ活動ヲ報ジタコトガアリマス。

(b) 林ノHAYASHIノ總領事ノ要請ニヨツテ、

0159 0011 1430

HH-19 最後ノ段階ハ東京政府ノ承認ヲ得ルコトデア
 リマシタノデ、板垣ノ H H A G A K H / ハ本庄ノ田
 O M U O / ニヨリ東京ニ派遣サレマシタ。(a) 彼
 ハ天皇ニ拜謁仰付ケラレマシタガ、ソノ際彼ハ
 滿洲ニ新シイ統治者ガ出来テ日本陸軍ガソノ關
 防ニ當ルコトラ仄カシマシタ。之ヲ自分ノ日記
 ニ記録シタ木戸ノ K H D O / ハ、コノ時ニハ全
 篤イタト言ツテ居リマス。(b) 板垣ノ H H A G A K
 H / ハ又東京ノ陸軍當局ニコノ事情ヲ説明致シ
 マシタ。(c) 斯クシテ、彼ハ説明シタ結果陸軍
 當局ガ滿洲ニ於ケル新事態ヲ「了解シタ」ト確
 言シタノデ中央當局カラ進ンデヤツテ宜シイト
 イウ承認ヲ得マシタ。(d) 之ハ片倉ノ K A H A K
 H / モ確認致シマシタ。(e)

HH-20 彼ノ歸還ヲ俟ツテ本庄ノ H O M U O / ハ彼ニ傳
 儀ニ會見スルヤウ命ジマシタ。(f)

ITAGAKI Summation HH

HH-19 a、記録 一八九九八

b、誓證 三一九一 記録二五七三一 一三

c、誓證 三三一大 記録三〇二八〇

d、記録 三〇二七九 一八〇

HH-20 e、記録 一九〇〇三

a、誓證 三三一大 記録三〇二八四

0 159 0011 1432

溥儀ハ最初新國家ノ頂首ニナルコトヲ拒絕シ
 マシタ、ソレハ板垣 / HEAGAKH / ガ日本人、ヲ
 滿洲國官更トシテ雇傭スルコトヲ要求シタカラデ
 アリマス。(b) 板垣 / HEAGAKH / 自身モ亦直接訊
 問際溥儀ノ承諾ヲ得ルコトガ出来ナカツタコトヲ
 陳述致シマシタ。溥儀ガ承諾スルコトニ同意シタ
 旨ヲ本庄 / HONJO / ニ通告スル様促シタノハ溥
 儀ノ顧問チアリマシタ。(c) 溥儀ノ言ニ依リマス
 ト板垣 / HEAGAKH / ハ溥儀ガ拒絕シタ場合、關
 東軍ハ激烈ナル行動ニ出ル旨ヲ恐喝的ニ顧問達ニ
 告ゲヌト言ハレテ居リマス。(d) ソコデ板垣 / H
 EAGAKH / ハ奉天ニ歸リ「滿洲國建設ノ準備ヲ完
 了致シマヌタ。コノ後、彼ハ再ヒ溥儀ヲ訪問シマ
 シタ所溥儀ハ「滿洲國」ノ執政トナルコトヲ承認
 シタト言ハレテキマス。板垣 / HEAGAKH / ハ斯
 ル事實ハ中國人ノ僥倖自ラガナシタ要求チアツタ
 ト説明致シマシタガ假令之ガ事實トシテ認めラレ

HH-20

- b、記録 三九六三
- c、記録 三〇二八二
- d、記録 三九六四一七

ITAGAKI Summation HH

HH-20

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タトシテモ薄儀ヲ説得シタノハ中國人ノ僞僞デ
 ハアリマセンデシタ。板垣／HELVAN／ハソ
 ノ證言ノ中デ彼ノミガ薄儀ト連絡シ、ソノ結果
 ヲ中國人僞僞テナク、本庄／HOELO／司令官
 ニ報告シタコトヲ具體的ニ認メテ居リマス。(e)

タノハ板垣デアリマシタシ、コレハ總テノ會見デ
モ同様デアリマシタ。(b)

HH-22

海侵 / PARTY / ハ又板垣ガ滿洲國支配ノタメニ

創立サレタ協和會 / THE CONCORDIA SOCIETY / 頑強

ナ支持者デアルコトヲ證言シテ居リマス。(a) 辯

護側證人山口ト小澤 / OZAWA / ノ兩者ハ板垣ガコ

ノ結社ニ關係ヲ有ツテキタコトヲ否定シマシタ (b)

ノ原文頁HH-11ニガ、協和會十年紀念年鑑ハ

彼ガソノ委員會ノ一員デアツタコトヲ明確ニ示シ

テ居リマス。(c)

HH-21

a、記録三九七七

b、記録四〇四五

HH-22

a 存證七三十一A 記録六〇六

b 記録四一三四 記録四一三六

c 記録一八八五 記録三〇〇七七

HH-21

IV. 滿洲國ノ統御

共同謀議ヲ開始シ武力侵略ヲ遂行シ、ソノ上有名無實ノ元首ヲ戴イタ傀儡國家ヲ作り上ゲタ板垣ハ全滿ニ権力ヲ振フ爲、關東軍ニ當リマシタ。溥儀ノEDUARD KAWANISHIノハ板垣ハ勢力ノアル男ダト證言シマシタ (a)溥儀ハ、日本僑ノTHE J. JAPANESEノノ手中ニ在ツタノデ言論ノ自由ハ持ツテ居ラズ、彼ガシタ聲明ハ全テ板垣ガ作ツタモノダト述べマシタ。リットン使節團ノTHE LYTTON COMMISSIONノ會見ノ際、會見デ言フベキコトヲ直接間接彼ニ云ヒワケ

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HH-23

關東軍ハ滿洲國 / MANCHUKUO / 指導ノ權限
細ノ要領ヲ授ケラレテ居タノデアリマシテ、(a)ト詳
滿洲國ガ完全ニ日本側ニヨツテ支配サレテイタコ
トヲ示ス證據ハ澤山アリマス。

HH-24

一九三七年マデノコノ全期ノ間ヲ進ジ板垣ハ逐
次副參謀長及參謀長ヲ(一)任關東軍カラハ全然離レ
ナカツタノデアリマス。(a) 彼ハ、滿洲國政府内ノ
日系官吏ニ歸スル人(二)事ヲ擔任シテ居タコト又事實
上認メテ居リマス。(b) ソノ上彼ハ麻藥取引ニモ
關係シテ居リマシタ。(c) 田中ノ(三)ハ土肥原
指揮ノ陸軍特務機關ガ阿片取引ヲ扱ツテ居タト證
言シマシタ。(d) ソノ後板垣ハ、南及(四)東條ト共ニ、阿
片專賣局ノ設立ニ努カシマシタ。(e) 南ハ、特務機
關カラ之ヲ取上ゲタ理由ノ一ツハ特務機關ガ自己
ノ利益ノタメ阿片ノ取引ヲヤツテ居タカラダトイ
フコトヲ認メテ居リマス。(d) 陸軍特務委員會ハ、滿
洲國テハ阿片專賣局ノ設置後阿片カ従前以上多量ニ栽培サレ販賣
サレテ居ルト報告シテ居リマス。コレガ偽知口家ノ財源増收トナツ
タノデアリマス。(e)

HH-24

- a 卷三三〇 記三九〇三、一一
- b 卷三一〇 記三七一六
- c 卷一五八五 記一八八
- d 卷三八三 記四〇一、一三
- e 卷三〇二八 記一九〇

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ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-25

Ⅴ、内 蒙 古 北 支 及 全 中 國

一九三四年十二月十日板垣ハ、關東軍副參謀長
 ニ昇進シマシタ。(a) 今迄ヨリノ原文頁II頁I一三ノ
 頁ニ有力ナ位置ニ居クヤ彼ハ、共同謀議ノ漸次進
 展スルニ伴ヒ滿洲ヲ中國ノ爾余ノ地域ニ封スル侵
 略機運ノ進地トシテ利用シタノデアリマス。内蒙
 古及北支ガ同時ニ其目標トナリ、次イテ之レガ中
 國全域ニ及ンダノデアリマシタ。


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HH-25

a、卷一〇

記 録 一 六

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HH-

板垣ノ HIRAGAKI ノハ一九三六年三月二十三日附

テ關東軍參謀長ニ陸進シマタ。(a) 五日後彼ハ日滿兩

國ニ對スル蒙古ノ重要佐ニ就イテ有田ノ ARIMA ノ大使

ト語リマシタ。對中國・ソ聯兩國食入ト一致スルコ

トデアアルガ、板垣ハ「外蒙ノ OUTER MONGOLIA ガ日本

ト滿洲ニ併合サルレバ極東ニ於ケル「ソヴェト」領

土ハ非情ニ危險ナ状態ニ陥ル」トイフコトヲ語リマ

シタ。(b)

HH-26

e 記録 二〇四二

f " 二〇四二 善證 二一一

" 二七〇三一七

P 25
HH-27

a 善證 一一〇 記録 七一六

b " 七六一一△ " 七八二九一三一

0159 0011 1438

徳王ハ日本ト緊密ニ協力スルコトヲ約シ、
 彼ニ財政的援助ヲ與ヘマシタ。一九三六年二月十一
 日內蒙古自治委員會ハ日本側ガ今マテヨリモ一層有
 效ニ支應ヲ行フコトガデキル場所、
 即チ西蘇尼特
 / WEST SUNITGO / ニ移轉サレマシタ。ソシテ日系一
 般人若干ガ顧問トシテ同地ヘ派遣サレマシタ。(e)
 ソノ後同モナク蒙古獨立政府ガ秘密裡ニ樹立サレ、
 ソレガ滿洲國トノ協定ニ關印シマシタ。(f)

迫ノ結果トシテ所謂何一梅津ノ「ONE-UMENU」協定ガ一
 九三五年六月ニ成立シコレガタメ明ニ北支ニ於ケル
 中國政府ノ權力ガ弱マリマシタル。次イデ南名「HENTU」
 ハ緩衝國トシテ自治政權ヲ設立スルタメ一九三三年
 九月土肥原ノ「DOHEIHARA」ヲ北支ニ派遣シマシタ。(b)
 口實ヲ作ルタメ板垣ト土肥原ハ此ノ問題ヲ研究シ防
 共主義ヲスローガントスルコトニ決定シマシタ。(c)
 コノコトハ土肥原ニ對スル命令ヲ起草シタ田中「TANAKA」
 ニヨツテノミナラズ又實際ニ、二ヶ月後中國政府カ

A、書證 二一九二 記録 一三七三〇

B、記録 二〇二八

C、" 三一三一—二

0159 0011439 6541 1100 6510

內蒙古ノINNER MONGOLIAノ侵略ハ、側面運動デア

ツテ主要戦線ハ勿論北支デアリマシタ。一九三三年
五月、北支ノ日本陸軍守備隊ハ中國當局ヲヒドク壓
迫シテオリマシタ。當時關東軍參謀次長デアツタ板
垣ノITAGAKIハコレヲ支持致シマシタ。彼ハ外交官ニ
代ツテ陸軍ノ人達ガ中國トノ交渉遂行ニ牛耳ヲ執ル
ベキデアルトイウ意見ヲ持ツテオリマシタ。事實彼
ハ既ニ中國ヲ壓迫スルタメニ南滿洲鐵道従業員及北
支日本陸軍ヲ使用シテオリマシタ。(a) コノヨウナ壓

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HH-28

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ラ獨立シテ非武後地帯ニ所請冀東防共自治會

サレタ事實ニヨツテ確認サレテオリマス。(a) ~~BASELIN HOPEI ANTI-COMMUNISM~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ 立

0159 0011 1440

HH-29

真東ハ僅カニ北支ノ一部ニ過キナイノテ、共
同談話者等ハコレダケテハ容易ニ満足シマセ
テシタ。

十一月十九日、土肥原 / DOHHEARA / ハ、田園
冀察 / HOPEH-CHAHAR / 既指會ハソノマ、自治體
トナルコトヲ要求シマシタ。(a) 彼ハ、此ノ要求
ガ拒否サレルナラバ、關東軍ハ北支ニ侵入スル
ト脅迫シ、(b) ソシテ、關東軍ノ地上及航空兵
力ハ實際ニ動員サレマシタ。反逆諷問ノ際、板
垣 / HIRAGAKI / ハ、管モ南 / NANKAN / ガ丁度同
様ナ状態ニアツタ時否定シタト同シ様ニ、(c) 同
最初ハコノ事ヲ否定シヨウトシマシタ。(c) 併

シ軍司令官ノ提布シタ動員令ヲツキ付ケレタ
時、板垣 / HIRAGAKI / ハ、其時彼セラレタモノテ
アルトイフコトヲ認めサルヲ許マセシテシタ。
部隊ハ萬里ノ長城外テ北支侵入ノ準備ヲセヨト
命令サレマシタ。又航空隊ハ北平 / PEKING / 及
天津 / TIENTSIN / 地域ノ戰鬥ニ到シテ準備セヨ
ト命令サレマシタ。(d) 其ニ、關東軍參謀次長
ヲアツタ板垣 / HIRAGAKI / ハ、一九三五●十二

HH-29

- a 記録 二三一五十六 ○ 管證三二七人至三一八人
- b 記録 二九五四三。記録二九五四五
- c 記録 三〇三八九 ○ 記録三〇三九二一四
- d 記録 一九九九六

遂ニ一九三七年七月、大規模ノ對支全面的戰爭ノ
 勃發ヲ早メマシタ。當時、板垣/ITAGAKIノハ日本
 内地ノ第五師團長デアリマシタガ、彼ハ又戰爭直
 前ニ參謀本部附ニナリマシタ。(a) 彼ハ北支敗線
 ニ派遣サレマシタ。締護補證人コクブ/KOKUBUノハ
 板垣/ITAGAKIノハ中國ニ就イテノ權威者デアリ
 長年中國ニ干タノテ中國民ガ大愛好キデアツタト
 證言イタシマシタ。(b)

HH-30 HH-29

f 書證 一九五、記錄 二二七七

g 記錄 二二七九

a 記錄 一六三九一四〇

HH-31

a 書證 一一〇、記錄 七一六

b 記錄 三〇〇八三

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ITAGAKI Summation -HH

月九日宣傳計畫ヲ發表シマシタ。(f) ソレハ皮肉
ニモ世界ニ、北支侵入ノ合法任ヲ首肯サセヨウト
シタモノデアリマス。ソレハ駁回ニ對スル理由ヲ
コシラエ、駁回ヲ容易ナラシメルタメノ宣傳ヲ開
始スル爲メニ計畫サレタモノデアリマス。(g)

HH-30 再度新様ナ出題ギタ企畫ハ、東京/TOKYO/政府
ヲ大イニ憂慮サセマシタ。彼等ノGOHO/ハ、岡田

OKADA/内閣ハ陸軍ニハ手ヲ焼イタト證言シマシ
タ。ソシテ彼ハ、特ニ關東軍ノ板垣/ITAGAKI/ニ
ハ手ヲ焼イタト述べマシタ。(a)

内閣及北支ニ對スル相次イテ行ハレタ侵入ハ、

化シ、中國ノ現國民政府打倒ノ宣傳及ビ財政策略等ノタメニ宣傳及ビ財政策略等ノアラユル努力ヲ盡スト決メタノデアリマス。ソノ會議ハ中國ニ新中央政府ヲ設立スル方針ヲ一九三八年七月十五日ニ定メタノデアリマス。尙國民政府ハ之ヲ地方政權ニ下ケルガ、新中央政府ハ日本人顧問及ビ役人ヲ同政府ニ雇入レ、ソノ援助ヲ得テ宣傳、外務關係、經濟、宗教、及ビ教育等ヲ日本ニ管理サセヨウトイフノデアリマス。更ニコノ會議ニヨツテ決

MH-33

a 記録 三〇四一四

彼ハ彼方極相トシテ、取況討議ノ五相會議ニ極
 メテ重要ナル地位ヲ占メテ平々コトヲ認メマシタ
 彼ハ又此ノ會議ニヨツテ採擇サレタ諸政策ハ彼ノ
 意見ト一致シテ平々コトヲ認メマシタ。(a) 一九三
 八年ノ六月カラ十月ニカケテ、本會議ハ續ケサマ
 ニ最モ重要ナ決議ヲ致シマシタ。一九三八年七月
 八日ニ、中國ガ降伏スルトスレバ、日本側ノ條件
 ハ蔣介石ノ引退暨ニ中國國民政府ヲ親日、滿洲國
 新中央政府ニ併合サセルコトデアルトイフコトヲ
 決定イタシタノデアリマス。更ニ、若シ支那側ガ
 降伏ヲ拒絶シタ場合ニハ、戰略的地點ヲ更ニ占領
 シ、新中央中國政府設置可能ノ祈マテ諸制度ヲ強

ITAGAKI Summation—HH

HH-33

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0159 0011445

定サレタモウ一ツノ事ハ、日本ハ日支取仲業ニ關
スル英國ノ申出ヲ辭退シ且ツ、英國ヲシテ據府政
策ヲ齒念セシムルコトデアリマシタ。(b)
板垣ハ反對訊問ノ際之等ノ決定ヲ否認スルコトヲ
拒ミマシタ。然シ會談ノ記録自身ガ證明シテキル
バカリテナク、隨伴事件ガコレ等ノ決定ハ實ニ眞
面目ニ遂行サレタ事ヲハツキリト示シテ居リマス。

HH—34

：	a	管	證	二一九七	記	錄	一五七四一—三
：	b	管	證	二一九一	記	錄	一一六九五—七

HH—35

板垣ハ實際本氣デコレヲ言ツタノデアリマス。
 中文ノ漢口/汉口/及ビ兩支ノ廣東/CANTON/ハ共ニ一九三八年十月、日本軍ニヨツテ占領サレタ
 ノデアリマス。板垣陸相、海相及外相ノ共同決定
 ニヨリ、占領直後、コレヨリ樹立セントスル地方
 傀儡政權ニ政治的指導ヲ與ヘ又日本ニ對スル物資
 及ビ其他ノ便益獲得ノ爲メニ經濟的指導ヲ與ヘル

0159 0011 1446

板垣ハ同時ニ日本ハ對中國長期戰ノ準備ヲ行フ
必要ガアル、戰爭ハ十年モ繼續スルヤモ知レズト
公然ト聲明シマシタ。

彼ハ又日本ハ中國ニ於ケル第三國ノ干涉ニ對スル
決意ヲスル必要ガアルト主張ンマシタ。(a) 彼ノ

意見ハ、一九三八年十一月三日、日六ハ海軍政府

ヲ完全ニ倒壞スル迄戰ハネバナラヌト言明セル日

本政府公式宣言ノ中ニ於テモ再ビ表ハレテ居タノ

デアリマス。此宣言ハ、他ノ列強ニ對シ、新情勢

ニ即應スル爲メ其態度ヲ變更セヨト警告ンタノデ

アリマス。(b)

ITAGAKI Summation—HH

HH-35

a、	管證	三七四一	A	記録	三七三七一
b、	管證	三七四一	B	記録	三七三七六
c、	管證	六一三	A	記録	六七三二
d、	管證	三三〇一		記録	三一三九二一三、三一三八六
e、	管證	三三〇四		記録	三〇一二六一三

次官ハ、歸還兵ニ對シテ特別命令ヲ發シ、ソノ命令
 管ニ率直ニ列擧セルガ如キ事實ヲ部外ニ漏ラス事
 ヲ禁止致シマシタ。(e)

0159 0011447
 1447 1100 6510

目的ヲ以テ其處ニ行政機關ガ設置サレタノデアリ
マス。

此等ノ行政機關ハ土肥原ヲ首班トスル支那問題待
別委員會ト密接ナル協力ヲ保タナケレバナリマセ
ンデシタ。(2) 一九三八年十一月廿五日、中國ノ

最南端、海南島 / HAINAN ISLANDS / 占領

ガ決定サレマシタ。(b) 同島ハ一九三九年二月十

日占領サレタノデアリマス。(c) 一九三八年十二月

十二日迄ニ、板垣ガ中國ニ派遣シタ日本軍ノ總數
ハ百六十萬ニ達シタノデアリマス。(d) 中國ニ於

テ無敵ノ殘虐行爲ガ日本兵ニヨツテ犯サレマシタ。

彼等ハ非常ニ暴虐デアツタ爲メ、板垣ノ下ノ陸軍

ス事ト彼等ガコノ仕事ニ最適ノ人間デアルコトガ
 認メラレタ場合ニハ日本ニ對スル彼等ノ協力ヲ確
 保シヨウトスルコトトニアツタノデアリマス。(d)
 土肥原ハ此ノ委員會ニ於テコノ仕事ノ全部ヲ管理
 シ、土肥原機關トシテ知ラレテキル機關ヲ中國ニ
 設置シタ責任者デアリマス。(e)

a、	書證	三三一六	記録	三〇三〇七
b、	書證	三三一六	記録	三〇三〇七
c、	書證	三四五七	記録	三〇三〇七
d、			記録	三〇三〇七
e、			記録	三〇三〇七

0159 0011 1448

ITAGAKI Summation-III

HH-36

戰爭ガ激化シタニモ不拘、中國ハ日本ノ要求シ
タ和平條件ヲ受諾スル事ハ出來ナカツタノデアリ
マス。板垣ハ「和平」ニ熱意ヲ有シテキタ中國要
人ト提携スルコトヲ決意シマシタ。(a) ソノ目的

ノ爲メニ土肥原、津田ノ如ク及ビ阪西

ノBAIKINAHノガ特別使命ヲ帯ビテ中國ニ派遣サ

レマシタ。(b) コレハ中國ニ對スル重要戰略ヲ作リ

上ゲ、且ツ中國ニ新中央政權ヲ樹立スル爲メ五相

會議ノ直接監督下ニ「對支特別委員會」ト命名サ

レマシタ。板垣陸軍大臣及ビ海軍大臣ガコノ對支

特別委員會ト大本營トノ間ノ連絡ニ當リマシタ。

(c) ソノ目的ハ「和平」ヲ希望スル中國人ヲ見出

HH-38

板垣ハ中國政府ノ重要人物汪精衛 / WANG

CHING-I WEI /ヲ説得ンテ首班ニ推シ、中國ニ倪

偶中央政府ヲ樹立スルコトニ奔走シテイタ今一人

ノ右腕ヲ擁シテ居リマシタ。之レガ即チ影佐一

KA GESSA /デアリマス。影佐ハ汪ノ總代理人ト

連絡シ、ソノ計劃ヲ板垣ニ報告シマシタ。(2)

HH-37

a、書證

三三〇二

記録 三〇一〇九上六

HH-38

a、記録

三三〇二

一

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板垣ノ下ニ陸軍次官デアツタ山脇/YAMAWAKIノハ、土肥原カ引退シタ中國指導者及ビ前將軍等ニ勸キカケ、度々陸軍省ニ通報ヲ送ツタト證言致シマシタ。法廷證三三〇二號ハ之等通報ノ中ノ一ツデアツテ、土肥原機^(a)ガ土肥原ノ傀儡中國人操縦ヲ報告シタモノデアリマス。之ハ決シテ新シイ型ノ外交デモ策略デモアリマセン。板垣一土肥原組ガ「獨立」ノ名ノ下ニ滿洲テ行ツタ事カ、今ヤ又モ「和平」ノ名ノ下ニ中國ニ於テ同ジ組ニヨツテ實施サレタノデアリマス。

P-37

HH-38

d	c	b
記錄	證書	記錄
二四〇三七一八	二七二一一A	二四〇三一

記錄 二四九七九，二四〇三二

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

他方、板垣ハ、ソノ計劃ヲ五相會議ニ提出致シマシ
タ^(b) 五大臣ノ同意ヲ得ルヤ板垣ハ上海ニ於ケル
正代理人ニ日本側ノ條件ヲ傳達スル様影佐ニ命令致
シマシタ^(c) 汪ハ、ソノ提案ヲ承諾致シマシタ。
之ヲ影佐ハ板垣ノ手ヲ通ジテ五相會議ニ報告致シマ
シタ^(d)

0159 0011 1450

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-39

d	e	b	a
音證	音證	音證	記録
二二九〇	二六八	二七二一	二四〇三七
		A	一四〇
記録	記録	記録	
二二三一〇	三五六一八	三三九八〇	

0159 0011 1451 1541 1100 6510

影佐ノ長時間ニ亘ル證言ニヨリ汪ノ重慶脱出ガ豫
 定ノ計畫デアツタ事ハ明白デアリマス。(a) 一九三八
 年十二月八日汪ハ佛領印度支那ノハノイノBANGLAノミ
 逃レマシタ。(b) 直チニ近衛ハ同年十二月二十二日新
 中國ニ關スル日本ノ根本方針ノ概要ヲ示ス公式聲明
 ノヲ出シマシタ。(c) コレニ應ヘテ汪ハ一九三八年十二
 月二十九日ハノイニ於テ一場ノ演說ヲ行ヒ中國ノ近
 衛聲明受諾ヲ提唱シタデアリマス。(d)

マシテ、日本ガ接收シ取上ゲテ干タ中国海關收入
剩余金カラ出タモノデアリマス。(b)

書證	三七一四三	記録	二七三九三
書證	三七一四四	記録	二七三九六
書證	三六〇八	記録	三五二八一三

0159 0011 1452

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-40

佛印、ハノイニ於ケル注ノ寓后ハ滿洲ノ聲目ノ
 YINKOWノニ於ケル導儀ノPURIHノ保護監察ニ強欲ス
 ルモノガアリマス、當然、次ノ手段ハ總領事ヲ下度
 滿洲ノ傀儡統治者トサレタ様ニ、注ヲ所謂、新中
 國ノ名目ダケノ元首ニスルコトデアリマシタ。新
 傀儡政權樹立ノ準備トシア、所謂救國防共聯盟ガ
 率中ニ組織サレマシタ、他方、土肥原ガ働キカケ
 テキタ華北ノ吳佩孚ノ部員HEIHEIノモ出慮ヲ促サレ
 マシタ。潤澤ナ資金ガ兩者ニ支給サレマシタ。(a)
 以上ノ資金ハ日本カラハ全々來ナカツタノデアリ

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-41

d	c	b	a
書證	書證	記録	記録
三三二一六	二七二一	三〇四四〇	二四〇四二
	A		一四

記録 三〇三二一
 記録 二二九七〇、二二九七六、二四〇五四

0159 0011 1453

板垣ハ、汪／WANG／ヲ日本ノ保護ノ下ニ上海ニ起
 レテ來ルトイウ特別使命ヲ與ヘテ影佐ヲ、(a) 五三
 九年四月、河内／HANOI／ニ派遣致シマシタ。(b) 板
 垣ハ自分自身テ、ソノ責任ヲ取ル代リニ、五相會
 議ニ責任ヲ轉嫁シヨウト致シマシタ。(b) 影佐ハ、
 板垣ノ命令ノミデナク板垣ガ汪ニ寄セテ親展ノ書
 面ヲモ持ツテ行ツタト證言致シマシタ。(c) 汪ハ所
 謂和平運動ヲ違フ爲ニ上海ニ行ク事ヲ要求サレマ
 シタ。(d) 板垣ハ好機到レリト感シタノデアリマス。(d)

P - 4 I

HH-42

o	b	a
證	證	證
三	同	二
七		四
四		〇
二		九
	上	九
記		記
錄		錄
三		二
七		二
三		五
八		四
六		一
		七
		〇

HH-42

汪ハ東京ニ連レテ來ラレ、板垣ヤ其ノ他ノ者ト
 會議ヲ致シマシタ。(a) 影佐及通譯清水ノ證言ハ、
 汪ガ日本ノ要求ニヨツテ定メラレタ範圍内ニ於テ
 ノミ自由ニ行動スルコトガ出來タ事ヲ示スニ十分
 デアリマス。(b) 汪ノ東京滞在、五相會議ハ一九
 三九年六月六日、新中央政府設立ノ方針ヲ決定致
 シマシタ。中國ノコノ傀儡制度ハ、一九三八年十
 一月三十日ノ御前會議ニヨツテ既ニ決定セル通り
 「別ニ定ムル規則」ノ方針ヲ形成スベキモノトナ
 リマシタ。コレハ日本ニ指導サレ且ツ援助サレル
 コトデアリマシタ。(c)

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ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-43

c	b	a
書證	記録	書證
二七六	三八五八	二七一
I		I
A		A
記録		記録
三七〇		二四〇〇〇
一		

0159 0011 1455

汪ノ東京訪問後、板垣ガソノ副總裁ノ一人デア
 ツタ與亞院ハ一九三九年十二月三十日、汪ニヨツ
 ア受諾サレタ試案ヲ作成致シマシタ。(a) 全中國ニ
 對シ傀儡政權ヲ設立ヘルタメニ、影佐ハ引續キ傀
 儡ノ影ヲ重妻ナ任務ヲシテ居リマシタ。(b) 汪ヲ首
 班トスル傀儡政權ハ一九四〇年三月三十日ニ南京
 ニ設立サレタノデアリマス。(c)

P-43

HH-44

b	a
書證	書證
四一八	四六一
	一A

記錄	記錄
四八六七	五二六七
一八	一七七

記憶シテ置クベキハ、始メノ共同謀議ハ滿洲ヲ
保有シソレラ經濟的ニ開發スル事デアリマシタ。
中國本土ノ占領地域ニモ同ジコトヲ適用致シマシ
タ。中國ノ經濟開發ノ名ヲ以テスル様ナコトニ對
スル筋書ハ、一九三九年一月ニ公式ニ決定サレマ
シタ。(a) 特種ノ開發—即チ阿片取引ノ如キ事ガ同
様ニ行ハレツツアリマシタ。(b) コノ取引ニ關シ滿
洲内ニ於テナサレタ事ハ何テモ今度ハ中國内ノ他
ノ占領地區ニ於テソツクリソノママ繰リ返ヘサレ
タトイフ事ハ證據ガ十分ニ示ス所デアリマス。

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-45

b	a
三	記
三	録
三	三
三	〇
〇	四
三	一
三	三

記
録
三
〇
一
二
〇
一
二

0159 0011 1457

板垣 / HIRAYAMA / ハ陸軍大臣トシテ五相會議ニ於
 ア重キヲナシテ居リマシタ、コノ會議ハ、戰時内
 閣ノヨウニ、重大問題ヲ討議スルモノデアリマシ
 タ。(a) 陸軍ノ意見ノ代辯者トシテ板垣 / HIRAYAMA /
 ハ、一九三九年一月陸相トシテ留任シタ後繼平沼
 / HIRAYAMA / 内閣ニ要求ヲ押付ケルコトガ出來マ
 シタ。ソノ要求ハ中國トノ「主權」ヲ繼續スルコ
 ト、日本ハ軍備ヲ擴張シ資源ヲ動員スルコト及び、
 ナチ獨逸 / NAZI GERMANY / ノアツシヨ伊太利 / FASCIST
 ITALY / トノ關係ヲ強化スルコトデアリマシタ。(b)

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-46

板垣が陸軍大臣在任中コノ政策ニ從ツテ、日本ハ
 國際聯盟トノ關係ヲ全ク斷チマシタガ依然トシテ太
 平洋ノ委任統治島嶼ヲ保持シテ居リマシタ。(a) 同
 ジ期間ニ滿洲國境ニ蘇聯ト關係アルニツノ事件ガ起
 リマシタ。板垣 / ITAGAKI / ハ蘇聯トノ平隱關係維
 持ニ贊成デアルコトヲ主張致シマシガ、(b) 山協
 / YAMAWAKI / ハ、板垣 / ITAGAKI / ガ陸軍次官トシ
 テノ彼ニ、蘇聯ハ主目標デアルコトヲ打明ケタコト
 ヲ證言致シマシタ。(c)

E-45

HH-46

- a 誓證二七一 / 記録三六四一七八
- b 記録三〇三〇四
- c 記録三〇一〇四 一六

E-46
HH-47

張鼓聲 / CHEANKUFEENG / 事件ノ時、板垣 / HEAGAKH / ハ
武力行使ノ許可ヲ妥請シマシタ。當時ノ外務大臣宇垣
/ UGAKH / ハ蘇聯ニ對シ武力ヲ行使スルコトニナツテイ
タコトヲ否定シマシタケレ共、準備ヲナスベキデアルト
イフコトニ付テハ板垣 / HEAGAKH / ト意見ガ一致シテイ
タコトヲ認めネバナリマセンデシタ。(a) 次イデ板垣
/ HEAGAKH / ハ外務大臣ガ蘇聯ニ對シ武力ヲ行使スルコ
トニ同意シタトイフコトヲ陛下ニ奏上シタ時、彼ハ陛下
ニ非度ク叱責サレマシタ。(b)

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-47
a
b

記録二三八八四一九

答證三七九三A、記録三七七五四一七

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

ス。 (b) 日本側純率ノ下ニ蒙古ヲ防衛スルニアツタノデアリマ

ノモノハノ / NOMONHAN / 事件物被ノ一九三九年ニ蒙
／ ITAGAKI / ハ平治 / HIRANUMA / 借相ノ希望ニ反シ、
戦闘ヲ繼續サセネバナラストイフ意見ヲ再ヒ述ベマシタリ

時ヲ同ジウシテ日蒙軍ハ強化擴大サレマシタリソレハ
ス。 (b) 日本側純率ノ下ニ蒙古ヲ防衛スルニアツタノデアリマ

HH-47

HH-48 a 書證七六八 - A 記録七八五三 - 六
b 書證二七四 記録二六八八 - 九

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

HH-49			HH-50
c	b	a	
書證ニニ〇一	書證ニニ〇〇	記録ニ〇一〇四	中國トノ既爭繼續ノ爲、對蘇侵略ヲ一段ト準備スル爲又極東ニ於ル他ノ列強ヲ同列ノ次ノモノト認ムル爲共同謀議者達ガ猶遲、伊太利ノ無顧渾仲間トノ同盟ヲ求メルコトニナツタトイウコトハ當然デアリマス。
記録一五七四八一五一	記録一五七四六一八		

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HH-49

板垣 / ITAGAKI / ノ考デハ蘇俄ハ決シテ唯一ノ巨國
 デハアリマセンドシタ。彼ハ英國並ニ佛露西ガ次ノ巨
 國ニナルカモ知レヌト山脇 / YAMAWAKI / ニ打聴ケタノ
 デアリマス。(a) 事實彼ハ議會ニ於テ所謂新秩序確立
 ノ爲ニハ第三國トノ衝突ハ避ケ難イトイフ信念ヲ明カ
 ニ發表シマシタ。(b) 一九三九年七月七日、全中國ト
 ノ戰爭勃發第二週年紀念日ニ當リ、板垣 / ITAGAKI /
 ハ記者團ト會見ノ席上、東亞ニ新秩序ヲ建設スルトイ
 フ日本ノ使命ハ他國ノ干涉ヲ排除スルコトヲ必要トス
 ルニ至ルトイフコトヲ述ベマシタ。(c)

f e d c b a

HH-50

警 署 記 録 三 二 七 一
 警 署 記 録 三 二 七 一
 警 署 記 録 三 二 七 一
 警 署 記 録 三 二 七 一
 警 署 記 録 三 二 七 一

記 録 一 六 二 三 七 一
 記 録 一 六 二 三 七 一
 記 録 一 六 二 三 七 一
 記 録 一 六 二 三 七 一
 記 録 一 六 二 三 七 一

閣ノ瓦解ヲ招クヨウデアリマシタ。(1)ソレガ爲全内
 閣ノ瓦解ヲ招クヨウデアリマシタ。(1)ソレガ爲全内

主張シテ居リマス。陸軍ノ意見ニ感ジナイ場合、板垣
 主張シテ居リマス。陸軍ノ意見ニ感ジナイ場合、板垣

ハ獨逸トノ軍學同盟ヲ出來ルダケ早く締結スルコトヲ
 ハ獨逸トノ軍學同盟ヲ出來ルダケ早く締結スルコトヲ

新秩序建設ノ爲軍學同盟ニヨツテ提議シタトイフコト
 新秩序建設ノ爲軍學同盟ニヨツテ提議シタトイフコト

三九年五月八日、記者團トノ會見ニ於テ、板垣／＼
 三九年五月八日、記者團トノ會見ニ於テ、板垣／＼

セシメタ政治的工作デアツタノデアリマス。(d)一九
 セシメタ政治的工作デアツタノデアリマス。(d)一九

定ヲナスタメ、獨逸ト交渉スルコトヲ決定致シマシタ
 定ヲナスタメ、獨逸ト交渉スルコトヲ決定致シマシタ

ITAGAKI Summetion-IH

一九三八年ノ五加會議ノ旨ノ主張ニヨリ、大體邊土
 一九三八年ノ五加會議ノ旨ノ主張ニヨリ、大體邊土

一ヒトラー／＼HEAGAKH／ガチエコスロウアキア
 一ヒトラー／＼HEAGAKH／ガチエコスロウアキア

一／＼CZECHOSLOVAKIA／ノ一部ノ攻陥ニ成功スルヤ、板垣
 一／＼CZECHOSLOVAKIA／ノ一部ノ攻陥ニ成功スルヤ、板垣

一／＼HEAGAKH／ハ一九三八年十月二日、祝賀ヲ送リマシ
 一／＼HEAGAKH／ハ一九三八年十月二日、祝賀ヲ送リマシ

一タ。(b)翌月、日本ト獨逸ハ文化協定ヲ締結致シマシ
 一タ。(b)翌月、日本ト獨逸ハ文化協定ヲ締結致シマシ

一タ。(c)ソレハ結局獨逸ト條約ヲ結バシメ戰(争)ニ導入
 一タ。(c)ソレハ結局獨逸ト條約ヲ結バシメ戰(争)ニ導入

一セシメタ政治的工作デアツタノデアリマス。(d)一九
 一セシメタ政治的工作デアツタノデアリマス。(d)一九

一三九年五月八日、記者團トノ會見ニ於テ、板垣／＼
 一三九年五月八日、記者團トノ會見ニ於テ、板垣／＼

一／＼HEAGAKH／ハ獨逸ト伊太利ガ歐羅巴ニ於ル平和ノ維持ト
 一／＼HEAGAKH／ハ獨逸ト伊太利ガ歐羅巴ニ於ル平和ノ維持ト

一新秩序建設ノ爲軍學同盟ニヨツテ提議シタトイフコト
 一新秩序建設ノ爲軍學同盟ニヨツテ提議シタトイフコト

一ハ喜バシイ事デアルト聲明致シマシタ。(e)彼ハ又防共協
 一ハ喜バシイ事デアルト聲明致シマシタ。(e)彼ハ又防共協

一定ノ深ク秩ノ強ツタ精神ニ従ヒ、日本ハ樞軸國トノ軍
 一定ノ深ク秩ノ強ツタ精神ニ従ヒ、日本ハ樞軸國トノ軍

一學同盟ニ參加スルヤモ知レヌトイウコトヲ仄メカシマ
 一學同盟ニ參加スルヤモ知レヌトイウコトヲ仄メカシマ

一シタ。(e)木戸／＼HEAGAKH／ニ依リマスト後ニナツテ陸軍
 一シタ。(e)木戸／＼HEAGAKH／ニ依リマスト後ニナツテ陸軍

HH-51

板垣ハ抑々最勦カラ全西歐列國ニ對抗スル...

此ノ協定ノ目標ヲ嚴重ニ懸懸ノミニ向ケサセヨウ...

トスル天皇ノ希望ニ從ガラクカツタノデアリマス...

大島及白鳥ニヨツテ行ハレタ交渉ノ凡テヲ細ジテ...

板垣ハ常ニ一貫シテ援助ヲ與ヘタノデアリマス...

彼ハ天皇ノ非難ニヨリ大島及白鳥兩大使ノ助手ナ...

行動ヲ蔽ヒ包シタノデアリマス。(b) 彼ハ南門ニ...

ツテ廣範圍ニ亘ル對獨同盟ノ實現ヲ對スル反對ト...

烈シク圖ビマス。(c) 一九三九年八月、獨蘇協定...

ガ締結サレタ爲ニ同盟ニ於テハ此ノ軍事同盟ハ、...

實現ヲ見ナカツタガ、板垣ハ、「歐洲ノ情勢ガ變...

化シタ結果失敗ニ歸シハシタガ、彼が日獨...

關係強化ノタメニ極メテ眞摯ナ努カラシタコト...

ヲオツト/OMH、獨乙大使ニ指摘シマス。(a)

HH-51 e, b, e, 書證

Table with 3 columns: Page numbers (e.g., 三七, 三八), Record numbers (e.g., 記録三七), and Record titles (e.g., 記録).

059 001147

E-51

NH-52

a 記帳簿三六一六 記帳簿〇三二八一六
b 記帳簿三〇一五〇一

日人向士ヲ 誑問サセヨウトスル術業ハ、板垣ニヨツ
テ續ケラレタノテアリマス。

0159 0011 1464

VI 中國及大平洋ニ於ケル戦争遂行

JH—52

一九三九年九月在華日本軍各部隊方南京/WANKINGノ

ニ新設サレタ司令部ノ一元的指揮下ニ入レラレタ時

板垣ハソノ參謀長ニ任命サレマシタ。此處ニ於テ彼

ハ汪/WANGノ傀儡政府及ビ所謂和平ヲ目的トスル汪

ノWANGノ運動ニ援助ヲ與ヘマシタ。(a) 日本ノ文部

軍ト汪/WANGノ政權トノ關係ハ、此處ニ於テモ歸東

軍ト「滿洲國」トノ關係ニ正確ニ見ヘル要ガ出來ル

ノデアリマス。更ニ多クノ他國中國人ヲ獲得シ、中

一九四一年七月、板垣ハ朝鮮軍司令官ニ轉ジ、
 爾後一九四五年四月ニ至ルマデ在任シマシタ。(a)
 此ノ地位ニ在任中ハ、稍ニ行動ハ不活潑デアツタ
 様ニ見エルガ、過去ニ於ケルソノ意見、思想並ニ
 策動ヨリ判断スレバ、確カニ太平洋戦争物變ニ對
 スル責任ヲ免レマセン、ソノ太平洋戦争コソハ、
 アラユル點デ板垣ガ一方ノ最モ主動的ナ役割ヲ演
 ジタ全面的共同謀議ノ結果デアツタノデアリマ
 板垣ノ朝鮮ニ於ケル任務ハ多彩ト云フコトカラハ
 左程デハナカツタカモ知レマセンガ陰謀ナ點デハ
 確カニ他ノ場合ト同ジ程度、若シクハソレ以上デ
 アツタノデアリマス。板垣ハ朝鮮人ノ目前デ適合
 國人ヲ凌辱スルコトニヨツテ、朝鮮人ユ或ル心理
 的効果ヲ與ヘヨウトスル目的ノ下ニ、一千名ノ米
 國及英國ノ俘虜ヲ朝鮮ニ送ル様要請シタノデアリ
 マス。板垣ノ指揮下ノ俘虜收容所デハ數多クノ殘
 虐行為ガ行ハレマシタ。(b) 俘虜ニ對シテハ法ニ從
 ツテ細心ノ注意ガ辨ハレタトノ板垣ノ主張ニモ拘
 ハラズ彼自身ノ証人井原 / HARA / ハ之等ノコト
 ガ事實デアルト認メタノデアリマス。(c)

ITAGAKI Summation-EH

- a 記録三〇一六六―一七
- b 卷註九七三―四 記録一四五一―一四
- c 卷註一一〇 記録七下七

0159 0011 1466

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

新様ナ抗辯ハ一九四二年九月、板垣ガ當時ノ首相京
俵ニ送ツタ勅諭ニ於ケル停戦ノ労働規定草案ノ報告
ノ内容ト正ニ査着スルモノデアリマス。(d)

HH-54

一九四五年四月、板垣ハ南方地區ノ第七方面軍司
令官ニ轉補サレマシタ。(a) 板垣 / HAZIYAMA / 板

垣ハ現地軍ノ指揮官トシテ、同地ノ停戦ニ對シテ限
ラレタ管理ノ権限シカ持ツテホナカツタト証言シ。(b)
更ニ停戦ノ不當待遇ハ戦争ノタメ交通ニ困難ヲ來シ

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

訴因第二ハ第一―第二四項ニヨツテ確證サレテ居
リマス。

訴因第三ハ第二五―第二五項ニヨツテ確證サレテ
居リマス。

訴因第四ハ第四六―第四九項ニヨツテ確證サレテ
居リマス。

訴因第五ハ第三〇―第三一項ニヨツテ確證サレテ
居リマス。

訴因第六ハ第一―第四五項ニヨツテ確證サレテ居
リマス。

訴因第七ハ第十六―第四六項及第四九―第三一項
ニヨツテ確證サレテ居リマス。

0199 0011 1467

HH-55

VII
結

論

最初カラノ共同謀議者ノ一人トシテ又日本ノ陸軍並ニ後居ニ於ケル最モ積極的ナ指導者ノ一人トシテ、極端ハ終始一貫侵略ヲ開始シ、平和ニ對スル罪及人道ニ對スル罪ヲ犯シタノデアリマス。

檢察官ノ提出シタ證據ハ據ツテ以テ極端ガ訴追サレテキル迄訴狀各訴因ヲ確認シテキルモノデアアルコトヲ申上げマス。

訴因第一ハ第一―第二回項ニヨツテ確認サレテ居リマス。

訴因第二八ハ第三一―第四五項ニヨツテ確證サレ
テ居リマス。

訴因第二九―第三四ハ第五三―第五四項ニヨツテ
確證サレテ居リマス。

訴因第三五―第三六ハ第六―第七八項ニヨツテ
確證サレテ居リマス。

訴因第三七―第四七ハ第五三―第五四項ニヨツテ
確證サレテ居リマス。

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

訴因第十七ハ第四六―第五一項ニヨツテ確證サレ
テ居リマス。

訴因第十八ハ第一―第十二項ニヨツテ確證サレテ
居リマス。

訴因第十九ハ第二五―第三一項ニヨツテ確證サレ
テ居リマス。

訴因第二三ハ第四九―第五一項ニヨツテ確證サレ
テ居リマス。

訴因第二五―第二六ハ第四六―第四八項ニヨツテ
確證サレテ居リマス。

訴因第二七八―第十二項ニヨツテ確證サレテ
居リマス。

ITAGAKI Summation-HH

0159 0011 1469

訴因第五一―第五二ハ第四六一―第四八項ニヨツ
テ確証サレテ居リマス。

訴因第五四―第五五ハ第三二―第三五、特ニ第
三五項ニヨツテ確証サレテ居リマス。

仮通以終明告

正誤表

ト 日本文第三十二頁^a HH-33 項ノ次ニ左記^e HH-33 ヲ行ハスルコ

^a HH-33 仮通ノ各メ註言シテ字通ハ五相合前ノ次誤ラ
^e 言ム文替ニ就テ外^a省保管ノコノ據文替ハ従ノ
君名シアルモノテ燕イ辰リ與正ナ原本^aハナイ
ト言ツテソノ信憑性ヲ否定シマシタ^(a) 檢察
付トシテハ簡題ノ文替カ原本デアルト主張シテ
イルノテナイトイフコトシコ、ニ強辯致シマス。
該文替ガ、添附監刷替ノ通り外^a省保管ノ言文
替ノ一部デアルト云フコトノ疑ウカニスレバ十
分デアリマス。五相合誤ノ次誤ラ言ム文替ハ従
來屢次提出サレタノデアリマスガ、之レニ對シ
辯護^(b)カラハ何等^a誤ラトカナカツタノデアリ
マス。ソノ正^a補サ乃至^a管感^a氣モ何等^a闕トハ
ナラナカツタノデアリマス。

^e HH-33 石ニ對スル註ラ左ノ如ク挿入ノコト

^a HH-33
^b a、記録 三六八一
b、記録 二七三二
三三三二 六五四九

0159 0011 1411

HH-33^a


ノ直後ニ左記

HH-33^b

ヲ加フ

^bHH-33 宇垣ハ新様ナ決議ヲ更ニ否定致シマシクモ、其
理由トストコロハ當時ノ外務大臣トシテ彼ハ
右決議中ニ示サレテキル様ナ見解ニハ反對チア
ツタカラトイフノデアリマス。(a) 併シ彼ノ否定
ハ薄弱ナモノデアリマシタ。彼ハ唯コノ様ナ決
議ハ有り得ザルコトデアリ又思ヒ出スコトモ出
來ナイト述べタノデアリマス。(b) 併シ彼ガ
ノ情勢ニツイテ陛下ニ五相會議決定ノ或ルモノト全
然同一内容ノコトヲ上奏シタ事實ヲ想起スル必
要ガアルノデアリマス。(c) 新様ナ決議ノアルモ
ノガ後ニ提出サレテ、一九三八年八月十六日、
閣議ヲ採擧サレタカドウカラ質ダサレタ時、此
八十一才ノ老證人ハ、彼ガ曾テシタ様ニ全然之
レヲ否定スルコトヲセズ、法廷ニ對シソノ様ナ
事ハ記憶ガナイト述べル行方ヲ選ンダノデアリ
マス。(d)

0 159. 0011 1473



0159 0011 1474

HH-33^b

ニ對スル脚註ヲ左ノ如ク導入ノコト

HH-33^b

a、記録 三六八一—一三

b、記録 三六八一—一三

c、音讀 一六九

d、記録 三六八一—一三

記号

日本文第四十五頁
HH-46

項全文ヲ左ノ通り訂正ノコト

HH-46

板垣が國相在任中コノ方針ニ沿フテ、日本ハ
國際進出ト一切ノ關係ヲ斷ツタノデアリマシタ
ガ、太平洋ニ於ケル委任統治諸島ハ依然掌握シ
テイタノデアリマシタ。(a) 向來南洋中、日本軍ハ
張鼓嶺 / CHANGKUEFENG / 地域 (一九三八年) 及
モンハン / NOMANHAN / 地域 (一九三九年) ニ於
テ「ソ」軍及蒙古軍ニ對シ宣戰布告ヲキ優略攻
撃ヲ敢行シタノデアリマシタ。二ツノ場合トモ
板垣ハ主謀者ノ一人デアリマシタ。板垣ハ彼自
身「ソ」軍ト平穩ヲ確保ヲ維持スルコトニ費
テアツタト主張シテキルノデアリマスガ、(b) 山
島 / YAMAWAKI / ハ陸軍次官トシテノ彼ニ板垣ガ
「ソ」軍ガ第一目標デアルト訂チ關ケタト發言

0159 0011 1475

0 159 0011 1476

シテ居リマス。(c) 事實、ノモンハン地域攻撃ノ
案ハ既ニ一九三六年板垣ニ依リ構想サレテキタ
ノデアリマシテ、當時有田大使トノ琉球合談ニ
際シ彼ハ有田ニ「外蒙ガ日本及滿洲國ニ併合サ
レレバ極東ニ於ケル「ソ」聯領土ハ極メテ危険
ナ状態ニ陥ルデアラウト云ツテ居ルノデアリ
マシテ、(d) 陸相トナルニ及ンテ彼ハ自己ノ案
ヲ實行ニ移シ得タノデアリマス。

HH-46

ニ對スル脚註ノ追加トシテ左記ヲ加フ。

HH-46

d、警証セキ一I A 記録セハ三一

0 159 0011 1477

0 159 00 12 1478

KAYA, Okinori

PART I

The indictment charges the Defendant KAYA with the following:

Group 1: Crimes against peace

Counts 1 to 17 inclusive

Counts 19 to 34 inclusive, excepting Counts 23, 25, 26 & 33

Group 2: Murder

Counts 37 to 47 inclusive

Group 3: Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against humanity

Counts 53 to 55 inclusive

II-1. In summarizing and commenting on the evidence concerning the defendant KAYA, his activities are divided in four time classifications:

A. First Period:

Those years prior to his serving as Finance Minister in the First KANO Cabinet which start March 17, 1917, the date of his entrance in government service, and end June 4, 1937.

B. Second Period:

His tenure as Finance Minister in the First KONO Cabinet, commencing June 4, 1937 and ending May 26, 1938.

(II-1)

C. Third Period:

The time elapsing between his departure from the Finance Ministry in the First KONOE Cabinet on May 26, 1938 and the starting of his service as Finance Minister in the TOJO Cabinet on October 18, 1941.

D. Fourth Period:

His tenure as Finance Minister in the TOJO Cabinet, from October 18, 1941 to February 9, 1944, and up to date of surrender.

A. FIRST PERIOD

II-2. With one or two exceptions, no one in the Prisoners' Dock has had a more active and sustained service with the Japanese Government than has the Defendant KAWA. These government activities started upon his graduation from the Imperial University, where he majored in law and minored in political science. In 1917 he became an employee of the Government in the Finance Ministry. He retained that employment with the Finance Ministry, gradually and normally reaching the top of his career. He became Finance Minister June 4, 1937, in the First FUKUDA Cabinet and again assumed that post in the TOJO Cabinet October 18, 1941.

Page 103

II-3. The evidence shows that although his services with the Government were limited chiefly to the financial field, other appointive responsibilities were assumed by him which gave him a day by day picture of what was going on within all of the various governmental circles. From 1917 to June 4, 1937, the Defendant KAYA held not less than 90 governmental appointive positions in various activities.^{a.}

II-4. In the foreign field in 1917 to 1920, he served the Finance Ministry in United States and Europe. In 1927 he was in attendance at the Geneva Conference as Acting Secretary to the Finance Minister, and in 1929 he was an Attendant to the Plenipotentiaries at the London Naval Conference. In 1934, he was a member of the Opium Committee. In 1936 he was a Consular of the Manchurian Affairs Committee and took part as a member of the Colonization Plan Investigating Committee for Hokkaido, and as a member of the Overseas Colonization Committee.

II-5. During the years preceding his appointment as Finance Minister, KAYA saw the Ministry of War Budget increased from 1931 to 1937, from 247,000,000 yen slowly but surely to 515,000,000 yen by 1936, and a like increase in the budget for the Ministry of the Navy - that out of the total governmental budget for the year 1936, approximately 48% of same

II-3.

a. Ex. 111, T. 722

(II-5)
was being used to satisfy the demands of the War and
a.
Navy Department.

II-6. YUKI, Toyotaro, Finance Minister from
February 2, 1937 to June 4, 1937, resolved to check
the increase in the military budget which had been
approved by his predecessor, R. I. A., and therefore
appointed KAYA as Vice Minister "to assist in combating
the military. The military, because of its power,
had its budget established. KAYA rendered every
assistance" and secured the agreement of the Army
not to spend 46,000,000 yen. This cut was a mere
a.
fraction.

II-7. With this background of failure to curtail
the Navy and Army budget increases and expenditures,
KAYA entered the First KONO Cabinet as Finance
Minister. Was this prompted by a belief on his part
that he would be successful in the future in curbing
the demands and control of the military? His pre-
decessors had failed. Or was it prompted by other
reasons, reasons that we feel asserted themselves
again on October 18, 1941 when TOJO sought his
assistance and guidance in his Cabinet as Finance
Minister?

II-8. The days immediately preceding the First
KONO Cabinet were momentous ones. Policies were
formed and made that reached far into the future,

II-5.
a. T. 8540-41

II-6.
a. Ex. 3322, T. 30,551-5

(II-8)
 and KAYA as Chief of the Finance Bureau and Vice-Minister of Finance must have known of their making and their import. The Anti-Comintern Pact had been approved and was in operation. In June 1937, there was drawn up the Five-Year Program of Important Industries followed by the outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials. In Manchuria, "Incidents" were occurring which brought the Japanese Military deeper into North China. Demands for manpower and finance from the homeland were constantly growing, and the Military was foisting their political and economic philosophies on the peoples of North China.

B. SECOND PERIOD

II-2. On June 4, 1937, KAYA entered the First KONOE Cabinet. With him in the Cabinet was the military clique he contends he opposed concerning military budget appropriations. There were SUGIYAMA, War Minister; KOTOHITO, Army Chief of Staff; IKAI, Army Vice-Chief of Staff; UEMU, Army Vice-Minister; USHIROGU, Chief of the Military Bureau, and TSJO, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army; and identical personnel from the Navy Ministry in the previous Cabinet. KAYA knew the militarists were in control and that it was impossible to curtail their demands

II-3.

- a. T. 5900-4
- b. T. 8269
- c. T. 8261
- d. T. 2362
- e. T. 2315

(II-9)
for increased appropriations to carry out their program. Knowing this full well, he accepted the post of Finance Minister.

II-10. In February 1936, Japan began a series of financial programs, emphasizing state control of economy.^{a.} Stockpiles of oil reserves in 1937 were of tremendous proportions.^{b.} Coal, normally a product for export, was labelled for home consumption, and plans were made for expansion of the coal output.^{c.} Heavy industry was established in Manchukuo.^{d.} Japan's economy was on the move -- her armies were on the move. In July 1937, her army struck at Lukochiao (Marco Polo Bridge)^{e.}, and on July 11, 1937, the Cabinet decided to send a larger army to North China^{f.}, which KAWA approved and which meant a revision upward in the then ever-increasing expenditures. This was the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese continued southward and invaded Shanghai in August 1937^{g.}, and Nanking in December 1937.^{h.} On December 12, 1937, the U.S.S. Panay was sunk.^{i.} Further aggressions in China by Japanese armies continued until 1945.^{j.}

II-11. The national budget increased from ¥2,500,000,000 in 1936 to over ¥5,500,000,000 in 1937, of which the Army and Navy used approximately 76% to carry on their aggressive activities. The

-
- II-12.
a. T. 8543
b. T. 8292
c. T. 8296
d. Ex. 239, T. 2960
e. T. 3761
f. Ex. 260, T. 3487
g. T. 3377
h. T. 3378
i. T. 3466
j. T. 3430

(II-11)
national budget for the year 1938, when KAYA was
Finance Minister, was in excess of ¥8,000,000,000,
approximately 70% of which was to be used by the
Army and Navy.^{a.}

II-12. Witness ISHIBASHI stated that after
July 1937, there was a "complete change in the
financial state of affairs. It was no longer aimed
at 'reflation', but entered completely into a state
of de facto war. The Emergency Military Special
Account was established, and financial expenditures
rapidly expanded."^{a.}

II-13. KAYA stated with respect to his activities
during this period, "I was occupied with the difficult
task before me and I did not dream about a preparation
for a future war."^{a.} He did, however, find time to
go before his people and make speeches and also
write articles in an effort to justify his actions
as well as the decisions of the Cabinet. He never
condemned the increasing activities and control of
the military.

II-14. The statement in his affidavit that
he did not dream about a preparation for a future
war is only one of many deliberate lies he told on
the stand. His speeches to the Diet, at public
gatherings and on the radio and in his written articles
at the time these war decisions were made to put

II-11.
a. T. 8541-42

II-12.
a. Ex. 2841, T. 25,428

II-13.
a. Ex. 3337, T. 30,642

(II-14)

Japan's economy on a war-time basis establish his guilt as an active and willing conspirator.

II-15. On October 26, 1937, KAYA stated that the China Incident was actually a war between Japan and China, and that Japan should make adequate preparation not only in the way of military force but also in the way of all spheres, including thought, diplomacy, finance and economy. He pointed out, "We shall be able to afford at least ¥20,000,000,000 in war expenditures at present -- the first thing to be done is to meet the military demands of the Army and the Navy". This statement was made by KAYA in a speech entitled "Armed War and the War of Economy"^{a.}, which is part of a collection of KAYA's speeches and articles compiled by his former private secretary and appears under the title, "War-time Economic Life", published in 1938.^{b.} This speech shows that he not only dreamed about war but also did his utmost to alert his people as to the economic measures that must be taken to prosecute the war. To show that he did not underestimate his own part in this total war preparation, KAYA stated that "economic war, in particular, is that most important factor which brings war to a successful end."^{c.}

II-16. "Preparation for a Protracted War"^{a.}

is an excerpt from the same book, dated April 12, 1938.

II-15.

- a. Ex. 3338A, T. 30,667-70
- b. Ex. 3338, T. 30,665
- c. Ex. 3338C, T. 30,676

II-16.

- a. Ex. 3338B, T. 30,673-4

0 159 00 12 1486

(II-17)

This is an appeal to the people, showing the loyalty and courage of the soldiers fighting in China and their need for new and modern materials and equipment. KAYA stated that the budget for 1938 will be ¥8,000,000,000 and that "one year from now we must issue more than ¥5,000,000,000 of government bonds. Success or failure of the war-time policies regarding finance and economy depend solely upon whether the bonds will be absorbed satisfactorily or not".^{b.}

II-17. Another excerpt from the same book, "Women Behind the Gun"^{a.}, tells how the women are to help and what is expected of them, and gives much attention to the spiritual side of the nation in sponsoring the National Spiritual Mobilization Law. This is dated December 13, 1937. These articles, we submit, portray KAYA as one of the conspirators, going along with the military, using his time and efforts to sell the same idea to the Japanese people, and preparing them for what is to follow.

II-18. The Protocol between Italy, Germany and Japan^{a.} was concluded on November 12, 1937. KAYA was in attendance at the Imperial Conference of January 11, 1938, which was held for the purpose of deciding the policy toward China. He was authorized to apply the Temporary Fund Adjustment Law and could authorize expenditures from the "Extraordinary War

II-16.
t. Ex. 33380, T. 30,676

II-17.
a. Ex. 33380, T. 30,677

II-18.
a. T. 6037

Page II-10

(II-19) b.
Expenditures Account". In March 1938, the Electric
 c.
Power Law was promulgated. On April 30, 1938, the
North China Development Company was formed, of which
 d.
he later became President. Plans for the Manchurian
Heavy Industry Company had already been drawn and
 e.
were in operation.

II-19. In the field of banking during this period, the accused KAYA directed the adjustment of investment policies in all banks, thereby destroying the last vestige of the autonomous action in banks^{a.} and in February 1938, he established and operated reserve banks under the direction of his office in China.^{b.}

C. THIRD PERIOD

II-20. On May 26, 1938, in the reorganization of the First KONOE Cabinet, KAYA was one of those who resigned his post. He did not, as he stated on direct examination, that he had no connection with the Cabinet or government from date of his resignation until October 18, 1941. When questioned further, he did not deny that he held several important posts during this period, most of which appointments were made by the Cabinet.^{a.}

II-21. During this period KAYA also conducted addresses and talks to quite an extent for the purpose

II-18.

- b. Ex. 840, T. 8553, T. 8542
- c. T. 8274
- d. T. 8474
- e. T. 5128; Ex. 239, T. 2960-6

II-19.

- a. Ex. 840, T. 8558
- b. Ex. 840, T. 8444-5

II-20.

- a. T. 30,662

(II-21) ^{a.}
of encouraging savings among the people". In the
two addresses introduced into evidence there is no
mention of savings, but a new thought was propagated
by the accused KAYA to his listeners -- "Asia for the
Asiatics". ^{b.}

II-22. The defendant KAYA was chairman of the
Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Round-Table Conference
of November 2, 1938. ^{a.} Again, at this conference
he made an appeal to the people by praising the
Japanese soldiers and calling the war in China a
"holly war". In order to make Japan the real
stabilizing force of East Asia, KAYA stressed the
necessity of expanding powers, armaments and strong
economic power. KAYA urged the people to devote the
entire national energies to achieve a long-range
economic construction. ^{b.} At Hiroshima on November 29,
1938, he delivered another address which pointed out
the necessity of a union of Greater East Asia. ^{c.}
Moreover, the evidence shows that KAYA realized the
significance of the part he was to play in bringing
about "Asia for the Asiatics". He declared, "We
economists must first of all proceed toward the
welding of an economic area". He explained the
basis for a "union of 'Asia for the Asiatics' must
in the last analysis be an economic one". ^{d.}

II-23. KAYA was president of the North China

II-21.

- a. T. 30,680
- b. Ex. 3339, T. 30,689;
Ex. 3339A, T. 30,698

II-22.

- a. Ex. 3339, T. 30,689
- b. Ex. 3339, T. 30,690-91
- c. Ex. 3339A, T. 30,699
- d. Ex. 3339A, T. 30,699-700

(II-23)

Development Company from August 1939 to October 1941.

According to KAYA's testimony before this Tribunal, the officers of the North China Development Company were in China upon the invitation of the Chinese, and the invasion and march of the Japanese armies in Manchuria and China and southward was an excursion put on by the Chinese for the entertainment of the Japanese armies. In the first place, it was KAYA's duty to deliver financial assistance to the marching armies in Manchuria and China. As an officer of the Finance Ministry and as President of the North China Development Company, he knew that Japanese armies had forcibly taken over Chinese industries and were operating these industries to support Japan's war efforts.

^{a.} This is further proved by the testimony of Coette, who said KAYA explained that the purpose of the North China Development Company was to supply Japan with war material to be used in the conduct of Sino-Japanese hostilities, to expand the armament of Japan, and to meet the needs of peacetime industry. ^{b.} The organization, plan and purposes of this company are more fully set forth in the General Summation, pages E-84 and E-85. KAYA's connection with this company further identifies him as a conspirator.

II-23.

a. T. 30,703

b. T. 3872

D. KAWA'S TENURE AS FINANCE MINISTER IN THE TOJO CABINET FROM OCTOBER 18, 1941 TO FEBRUARY 9, 1944, AND ON TO THE DATE OF SURRENDER

II-24. On October 17, 1941, TOJO requested KAWA to join his cabinet as Finance Minister. After TOJO assured KAWA that he intended to continue the Japanese-American negotiations and settle the dispute amicably^{a.} KAWA felt he should join the cabinet and do what he could to "steer the State to a peaceful landing". KAWA^{b.} joined the cabinet the same evening.

II-25. KAWA who was bent on steering the State to a peaceful landing is that same man who was connected intimately for many years with the financial affairs of the Japanese nation, that same man who contends he continuously fought the demands of the military for increased appropriations but consistently saw his efforts defeated, that same man who saw the aggression in Manchuria blossom into a full-fledged war with China, that same man who as Finance Minister formulated plans which turned peace-time industries into those for making implements of war. There is justifiable doubt as to whether KAWA could seriously entertain the belief that he could steer the State along a peaceful course. He knew the trend of militarism in Japan was uncontrollable. The Tripartite Pact had been signed the year before, and Japan was still

II-24.
a. Ex. 3337, T. 30,648;
Ex. 3655, T. 36,315
b. Ex. 3337, T. 30,648-50

(II-25)
on a march of aggression. He himself had advocated the policy of meeting the demands of the military first.

II-26. KAYA's reliance on TOJO's assurances soon faded, for one of the first tasks to be undertaken by the new Finance Minister was to continue working on draft measures for the manufacture of foreign currency.^{a.}

Early in 1941, military currency had been manufactured and the denominations were "guilder dollar and pesos."^{b.}

The new draft measure, entitled "the issue of military notes with foreign currency denomination" was submitted to KAYA, who suggested a revision which was later approved.^{c.}

This called for the manufacture of 37,000,000 pesos by October 20, 1941, \$45,000,000, and 45,000,000 guilders by November 20, 1941.^{d.} This procedure for the issuance of the military currency was left to the Finance Minister and the Army and Navy Ministers,^{e.} and on November 1, 1941, KAYA issued instructions to the Bank of Japan concerning foreign military currency.

II-27. KAYA testified "After joining the Cabinet, I did everything within my power to avoid war."^{a.} That did he do? The oil situation was critical so he "suggests a plan for the manufacture of synthetic oil and the plan to buy from Karufuto."^{b.} KAYA hoped that Japan could thus solve the oil shortage which he feared would result if relations with the United States were broken off. At the November 5 Liaison Conference he "urged against

II-26.

- a. T. 25,373
- b. T. 8460
- c. T. 26,794
- d. T. 8453
- e. T. 8457

II-27.

- a. T. 30,650
- b. Ex. 3331, T. 30,610

0 159 00 12 1492

(II-27)

an immediate decision and was finally given an opportunity to consider the matter for another day".^{c.}

That is what the record shows he did to "avoid war".

He "was present at most of the liaison conferences though he never played a leading role in the discussion as the topic of the conferences mostly centered around the U.S.-Japanese negotiations".^{d.} At all Cabinet, Liaison, and Imperial Meetings his attendance was conspicuous by his "saying nothing". No one can say but that he loaned himself and his office to the furtherance of the military.

II-28. In the Liaison Conferences from October 23 to November 2, 1941, three plans for handling the negotiations between the United States and Japan were drawn up. KAYA attended all the conferences as Finance Minister.^{a.} The Liaison Conference of November 5, 1941, finally decided upon the third plan to continue with operational preparations in anticipation of the failure of negotiations. Unless negotiations were successful, there would be war with the United States.^{b.} According to TOJO, TOGC and KAYA reserved their approval until the next morning, and KANA communicated his approval of the plan the next morning to TOJO.^{c.} KANA told TOJO that he had not been opposed to the proposal the day before. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the

II-27.

- c. T. 30,454
- d. T. 30,611

II-28.

- a. T. 35,835; T. 36,072
- b. Ex. 3655, T. 36,217
- c. Ex. 3655, T. 36,344;
T. 35,696; T. 36,064

(II-26)
Supreme Command insisted that there was a chance for
victory if war was started at an opport^{d.} time.

II-27. On November 20th, 1941, the senior
statesmen and cabinet officers appeared before the
Emperor to give opinions regarding war against the
United States, Great Britain and Netherlands East
Indies. KAWA attended this meeting also.^{a.}

II-28. KAWA attended the Imperial Conference
of December 1, 1941. He had told the Prime Minister
that he would not oppose war and at the conference he
did not oppose war. He knew in advance hostilities
were to be opened against the United States. He heard
this either at a "Liaison Conference" or at the Prime
Minister's official residence and heard it from
TOJO, SHANEDA or KOSHINO.^{e.} TOJO decided that the
agenda for this conference was "Whereas the negotiations
with the United States based on the outline of Japan's
national policy, decided on November 20th, having ended
in failure, Japan opens war against the United States,
Britain and the Netherlands". KAWA gave a report on
Japan's economic and financial strength.^{b.} The
conference decided to commence hostilities and accord-
ing to TOJO, the decision of the Imperial Conference
was considered the decision of the cabinet.^{c.}

II-29. The main point of KAWA's defense seems
to be that his motive for accepting cabinet posts

II-30.
d. W. 50, 192

II-31.
a. Ex. 565, T. 36, 564-7

II-32.
b. W. 5, 195
c. Ex. 565, T. 36, 562-4
d. Ex. 565, T. 36, 569

(II-31)
and other governmental positions was to combat the military in an effort to attain peace and that he had been opposed all along to certain actions and steps taken by the conspirators. However, KANA joined the conspiracy and cannot claim now that he has no responsibility for the subsequent acts of the conspirators. Even if he were opposed to certain acts and approved of them reluctantly, he never definitely disassociated himself from the conspiracy. Since he allegedly had this deep-rooted opposition against the military and its actions and did not resign but rather from the evidence aided the military first of all, he is even more responsible, particularly since he approved of policies with the full knowledge and conviction of their evil.

II-32. On December 7, 1941, the Sixth Committee in the cabinet was established under the chairmanship of the President of the Planning Board and made up of personnel from the Planning Board, and the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministries. The work of committee and the fact of its existence were to be kept secret. On December 12, 1941, this committee filed its report entitled "Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern Area". The aim of this policy was to fill the demand for important resources for the execution of the war and to

Page II-13

(II-32) strengthen Japan's economy. On November 1, 1942, the Greater East Asia Ministry was established by Imperial Order on advice of Cabinet Ministers. KAWA at that time, was Finance Minister. KAWA was a member of the TOJO Cabinet until February 19, 1944 and must share responsibility for all actions taken to prosecute the war. He never at any time disassociated himself from the conspiracy.

II-33. In regard to Groups 2 and 3 of the offenses, in the Indictment, KAWA not only had the responsibility that every other member of the Cabinet had during his two main periods of office which have been set forth above, but it is impossible to conceive that such a large operation as the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway would have been carried out without consultation with and consent of the Minister of Finance. If he was ignorant of the outrages in China and throughout the theaters of the Pacific War, which is incredible, it could only have been by deliberate abstention from using the obvious sources of knowledge which it was his duty to invoke.

PART II

II-34. The Prosecution submits that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the charges in the Indictment against the accused KAWA. The numbered paragraphs which

(II-54)

tend to prove specific counts are set forth below:

Count 1: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18,
22, 23, 26, 27, 28.

Count 2: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18,
22, 23, 26.

Count 3: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18,
22, 23, 26, 27, 28.

Count 4: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18,
22, 23, 26, 27, 28.

Count 5: Paragraphs II-2, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22,
23, 27.

Count 6: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18,
22, 23, 26.

Count 7: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23,
25, 27, 28.

Count 8: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22,
23, 26, 27, 28.

Count 9: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22,
23, 26, 27, 28.

Count 10: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22,
23, 26, 27.

Count 11: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22,
23, 26, 27, 28.

Count 12: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22,
23, 26, 27, 28.

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Page II-20

(II-31)

- Count 13: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 14: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 15: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 16: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 17: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 18: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 19: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 20: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 21: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 22: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 24: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 27: Paragraphs II-3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.
- Count 28: Paragraphs II-3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.
- Count 29: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 30: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 31: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 32: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 34: Paragraphs II-30, 31.
- Count 37: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 38: Paragraphs II-2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
- Count 39: Paragraphs II-30, 31.

(II-54)

Count 40: Paragraphs II-50, 32.

Count 41: Paragraphs II-70, 32.

Count 42: Paragraphs II-70, 32.

Count 43: Paragraphs II-30, 32.

Count 45: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23,
23.

Count 46: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23,
23.

Count 47: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23,
23.

Count 54: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23,
23, 26, 30, 32.

Count 55: Paragraphs II-2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23,
23, 26, 30, 32.

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FEBRUARY 2 1948

IPS RE: KAYA (II)

Attached pages No. II-3, II-10, II-17, are
to be substituted for present pages 3, 10 and 17 in
summation on KAYA (II).

II-3. The evidence shows that although his services with the Government were limited chiefly to the financial field, other appointive responsibilities were assumed by him which gave him a day by day picture of what was going on within all of the various governmental circles. From 1917 to June 4, 1937, the Defendant KAYA held not less than 90 governmental appointive positions in various activities.^{a.}

II-4. In the foreign field in 1917 to 1920, he served the Finance Ministry in United States and Europe. In 1927 he was in attendance at the Geneva Conference as Acting Secretary to the Finance Minister, and in 1929 he was an Attendant to the Plenipotentiaries at the London Naval Conference. In 1934, he was a member of the Opium Committee. In 1936, he was a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Committee and took part as a member of the Colonization Plan Investigating Committee for Hokkaido, and as a member of the Overseas Colonization Committee.

II-5. During the years preceding his appointment as Finance Minister, KAYA saw the Ministry of War budget increased from 1931 to 1937, from 247,000,000 yen slowly but surely to 515,000,000 yen by 1936, and a like increase in the budget for the Ministry of the Navy - that out of the total governmental budget for the year 1936, approximately 48% of same

II-3.

a. Ex. 111, T. 722

(II-19) Expenditures Account." ^{b.} In March 1938, the Electric Power Law was promulgated. ^{c.} On April 30, 1938, the North China Development Company was formed, of which he later became President. ^{d.} Plans for the Manchurian Heavy Industry Company had already been drawn and were ^{e.} in operation.

II-19. In the field of banking during this period, the accused KAYA directed the adjustment of investment policies in all banks, thereby destroying the last vestige of the autonomous action in banks, ^{a.} and in February 1938, he established and operated reserve banks under the direction of his office in China. ^{b.}

C. THIRD PERIOD

II-20. On May 26, 1938, in the reorganization of the First KONOE Cabinet, KAYA was one of those who resigned his post. He stated on direct examination, that he had no connection with the Cabinet or government from date of his resignation until October 18, 1941. When questioned further, he did not deny that he held several important posts during this period, most of which appointments were made by the Cabinet. ^{a.}

II-21. During this period KAYA "also conducted addresses and talks to quite an extent for the purpose

II-18.

- b. Ex. 840, T. 8553, T. 8542
- c. T. 8274
- d. T. 8474
- e. T. 5126; Ex. 239, T. 2960-6

II-19.

- a. Ex. 810, T. 8558
- b. Ex. 840, T. 8444-5

II-20.

- a. T. 30,662

(II-31) and other governmental positions was to combat the military in an effort to attain peace and that he had been opposed all along to certain actions and steps taken by the conspirators. However, KAYA joined the conspiracy and cannot claim now that he has no responsibility for the subsequent acts of the conspirators. Even if he were opposed to certain acts and approved of them reluctantly, he never definitely disassociated himself from the conspiracy. Since he allegedly had this deep-rooted opposition against the military and its actions and did not resign but rather from the evidence aided the military first of all, he is even more responsible, particularly since he approved of policies with the full knowledge and conviction of their evil.

II-32. On December 2, 1941, the Sixth Committee in the cabinet was established under the chairmanship of the President of the Planning Board and made up of personnel from the Planning Board, and the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministries. The work of the committee and the fact of its existence were to be kept secret. On December 12, 1941, this committee filed its report entitled "Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern Area." The aim of this policy was to fill the demand for important resources for the execution of the war and to

0 159 00 12 1503

IPS

February 18, 1948

Re: SUMMATION - XAYA - (II)

The attached page II-14 is to be
inserted instead of page II-14.

(II-35)
 on a march of aggression. He himself had advocated the policy of meeting the demands of the military first. KAYA carried out financial measures and assisted in the planning for an attack against the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, China and other nations.

II-26. KAYA's reliance on TOJO's assurances soon faded, for one of the first tasks to be undertaken by the new Finance Minister was to continue working on draft measures for the manufacture of foreign currency. ^{a.} Early in 1941, military currency had been manufactured and the denominations were "guilder dollar and pesos." ^{b.} The new draft measure, entitled "the issue of military notes with foreign currency denomination" was submitted to KAYA, who suggested a revision which was later approved. ^{c.} This called for the manufacture of 37,000,000 pesos by October 20, 1941, 45,000,000 and 45,000,000 guilders by November 30, 1941. ^{d.} This procedure for the issuance of the military currency was left to the Finance Minister and the Army and Navy Ministers, ^{e.} and on November 1, 1941, KAYA issued instructions to the Bank of Japan concerning foreign military currency.

II-27. KAYA testified "After joining the Cabinet, I did everything within my power to avoid war." ^{a.} What did he do? The oil situation was critical so he "suggests a plan for the manufacture of synthetic oil and the plan to buy from Karufuto." ^{b.} KAYA hoped that Japan could thus solve the oil shortage which he feared would result if relations with the United States were broken off. At the November 5 Liaison Conference he "urged against

II-25.

c. Ex. 838, T. 8171-2;
 Ex. 682-5, 712, 718,
 725, 729, 739

II-26.

a. T. 26,973
 b. T. 8460
 c. T. 26,794
 d. T. 8453
 e. T. 8457

II-27.

a. T. 30,650
 b. Ex. 3331, T. 30,610

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FEBRUARY 11 1948

IRS RE: WDO (JJ)

Corrections:

Para. JJ-39, p. JJ-27, line 16 for "not" read "now"

Para. JJ-50, p. JJ-33, add further footnote after JJ-50, c. -
"See generally paras. F-110-130 hereof pp. F-103-124".

Para. JJ-51, p. JJ-36, add further footnote after JJ-51, 1 -
"See T. 38,703".

Para. JJ-49, p. JJ-33, add footnote - "See paras. F-79-82,
pp. F-78-81".

Para. JJ-34, p. JJ-22, add further footnote - "See the following
paras. hereof: F-5, p. F-5, F-9, p. F-10, F-11, p. F-12, F-17, p. F-18,
F-20, p. F-20, F-22, p. F-22, F-32, p. F-32, F-31, p. F-37."

KIDO, Koichi

JJ-1. The case against KIDO begins substantially with his joining the first KONOYE Cabinet as Education Minister on 22 October 1937, and the first phase of it, in which his responsibility is clearest and most direct, continues through that cabinet and the succeeding HIRANUMA Cabinet until 28 August 1939, when the latter resigned. In the former he also held the office of Welfare Minister concurrently between 11 January and 26 May 1938, and solely from then until the first KONOYE Cabinet resigned on 4 January 1939. In the HIRANUMA Cabinet he held the office of Home Minister. His real position and influence, however, were by no means dependent upon the particular offices he held, but upon his membership and powerful voice in the cabinet, and upon his personal friendship and influence with his colleagues, especially KONOYE, who remained as a Minister without portfolio in the HIRANUMA Cabinet. He admits the collective responsibility of the cabinet for all their actions.

JJ-2. The second important phase of the case against him relates to his holding of the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal from 1 June 1940 until the surrender.

JJ-3. During the intervening period his principal activity seems to have been in connection with the formation of a new political party, in which he had already taken part during the latter part of the first KONOYE

JJ-1.
a. T. 31,385

(JJ-3)
Cabinet, and of which he was to have been Vice President under KONOYE if he had not accepted the post of Lord Keeper.

JJ-4. During the earlier period of the conspiracy KIDO held the position of Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper from 28 October 1930 to 13 June 1936. We do not suggest that during this period he was a member of the conspiracy, although in his diary of 10 September 1931, he expressed general agreement with the view of one TAMII of the Foreign Ministry that "self-defensive action" in China might be unavoidable according to developments in the future. ^{a.} In cross-examination he said ^{b.} that in the beginning he thought the Manchurian Incident was defensive (which is difficult to reconcile with his entry ^{c.} of 23 September 1931, which shows that he did not believe the Army story about the railway explosion) but later he thought it had ceased to be so. We submit that a careful study of his diary entries before and after the Mukden Incident shows that although he was hostile at this time to the military plotters, the real ground was fear of their gaining too much power in Japan, especially at the expense of the Emperor's personal attendants, of whom he was one, rather than any objection to aggression in principle. Indeed no entry from the diary has, we submit, been produced from either side which shows that he ever opposed any aggression because it was morally wrong or

JJ-4.
a. Ex. 179E, T. 1935
b. T. 31,476
c. Ex. 179J, T. 1939;
Affidavit, par. 15, T. 30,732-4

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(JJ-4) contrary to International Law or treaties. Sometimes he opposed the military for the reason above-mentioned; sometimes he advocated caution or delay because he was not convinced that immediate aggression would be successful; sometimes, especially in the China Incident in 1937-9, he actively supported aggression, as we claim to have proved. Never did he express any moral objection to it. Always he was prepared to let the military have their way and in later years at least to make it easy for them, rather than risk the possibility of revolution or civil war in Japan.

JJ-5. Between 13 June 1936 and 22 October 1937, he was President of the Board of Peerage.

JJ-6. The principal sources of information about him are his own diary, the HIRADA-SAIKONJI Memoirs, and his evidence before the Tribunal, apart from the general evidence of the decisions and events of the periods during which he held office.

JJ-7. It is therefore important to test the reliability of these sources. His own diary, we submit, there is no reason to doubt; it does not appear to have been written with any ulterior motive and may be taken to represent his real views and an accurate record of events as he saw them at the time. It is valuable as evidence about other people as well as himself. He raises two points about the translation in various passages

(JJ-7)
of his affidavit: (1) that we have quoted from the exhibits instead of the record and therefore do not show language corrections subsequently made; (On the contrary we have incorporated all such corrections in our copies of the exhibits (as we presume the Members of the Tribunal have done , and quote from them as corrected,) (2) that certain passages which have already been decided by the Language Arbitration Board and certain others which have never been submitted to them by the Defense are incorrect. This he swore although he admitted that his own knowledge of English is imperfect.^{a.} It was for them to submit to the Board the precise passages which they proposed to correct, but as they have never done so the existing translations stand as the evidence before the Tribunal.

JJ-8. In considering his evidence it is essential to form an opinion as to his veracity, and we submit that he has been demonstrated to be a deliberately untruthful witness, of which we will give specific examples. There are a number of controversial statements of fact in his affidavit (to some of which we will call attention) where it is obvious that if true they could have been corroborated by other witnesses, but are not. We call attention to what happened to the order of proof which he submitted of evidence to follow his own. Two affidavits, which did corroborate him on minor points of fact,

JJ-7.

a. T. 31,292

(JJ-8) ^{a.} were admitted without objection. One was entirely and another partially rejected so far as they dealt only with matters of opinion, procedure and character, but part of the second which purported to relate contemporary expressions of opinion by him was admitted. ^{b.} Another was objected to on similar grounds and adjourned for a reply. ^{c.} The following morning ^{d.} it was announced on his behalf that owing to the rulings above-mentioned the whole of the remainder of his order of proof was withdrawn. It follows that none of it can have corroborated him on any question of fact, or alternatively that it had been discovered that the affidavit could not be relied upon to support his case.

JJ-9. In reading his voluminous affidavit of 296 pages, in which he purports to give a detailed day to day account of all his important activities and all the important events during his period of office, two things are now obvious. The first is that over and over again he gives a detailed account of some event and some opinion which he says that he held or expressed at the time, and claims that this is corroborated by his diary, when in fact a careful examination shows either that they are in conflict or that he has added a gloss so important that it is impossible to believe that he would have omitted it from the diary if it were true. In cross-examination he stated that his memory depended on his diary, ^{a.} but the

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- JJ-8.
 a. T. 31,339, T. 31,641
 b. T. 31,622, T. 31,631
 c. T. 31,637
 d. T. 31,645

- JJ-9.
 a. T. 31,577-8

(JJ-9)
most important statements in his affidavit do not. We ask the Tribunal to rely on the diary entries only and to reject his oral evidence where he seeks to add to them or explain them away.

JJ-10. The second is that although he purports to give an extremely detailed account of his daily doings on all matters connected with the charge, he omits all reference to certain vitally important decisions which were already in evidence when he testified particularly the cabinet decisions with regard to China of 24 December 1937^{a.} and those of 9 and 10 January 1938, which settled the decisions formally taken at the Imperial Conference of 11 January 1938.^{b.} The witness HORINOUCHEI, who also purported to give a detailed account of these events from a Foreign Ministry point of view, did the same thing, but the omissions had been corrected during his cross-examination when these documents were exhibited on 2 October 1947, twelve days before KIDO began his evidence. In our submission, they clearly show the falsity of KIDO's story about his part in the China affair; and although no doubt his affidavit was then completed, some attempt could have been made, but was not, to deal with them by supplementary questions. In any case, we submit, it is impossible that either he or HORINOUCHEI can have forgotten such vital decisions, and that they must have omitted them because the prosecution had not proved them

JJ-10.

a. Ex. 3263, T. 29,815

b. Ex. 3264, T. 29,837; Ex. 3265, T. 29,855

7 159 00 13 15 12

(JJ-10)
as part of their case and in the hope that they had not been discovered.

JJ-11. With regard to the HARADA-SAIKOWJI records it is remarkable that, although these had been under study by the Defense ever since 29 August 1947, KIDO's long affidavit contains no reference to them whatever, but it does contain frequent references to his friendship and respect for both HARADA and SAIKOWJI, which indeed he reiterated in cross-examination.^{a.} But when confronted with a number of passages in those records, he not only queried their accuracy (though for the most part he confined himself to saying that he did not recollect them)^{b.} but attacked HARADA as lacking in scholarship and in system^{c.} and asserted that for a period of three or four months after UGAKI failed to form his cabinet (i.e. the end of January 1937) he was incapacitated by illness and KIDO had to perform his duties for him.^{d.} Also that during some unspecified period in his later life he was riven to drowsiness and inattention.^{e.} A study of the diary by Mrs. KONOYE shows that during the period in question (although he had one short spell which cannot have been longer than four days, if as long, when he was confined to his house)^{f.} he was constantly travelling between Tokyo and his own and SAIKOWJI's country houses and calling upon various people; the statement is clearly untrue. As to the last allegation, HARADA lived more than five years

JJ-11.

- a. e.g. T. 31,540
- b. T. 31,449-50, 31,523, 31,567, 31,571
- c. T. 31,540
- d. T. 31,541
- e. T. 31,542
- f. Ex. 3879, T. 38,682

(JJ-11)
 after the death of SAIONJI in November, 1940, when he ceased to keep the records, and there is nothing to show that the statement, even if true of any period, relates to the time when he was keeping the records. More important perhaps is the consideration that, even if he sometimes missed some part of what was being said to him, that is no indication that he has invented or distorted those things which he has recorded. No witness has attacked his honesty, nor has KIDO suggested that he had any motive for misrepresenting him. He admits that in October, 1940, the last entry exhibited,^g he still trusted HARADA, who was neither malicious nor out of his mind, though he asserts untruthfully, we submit, that he was then in very bad health.^h

The records themselves agree with KIDO as to the continuing friendship with HARADA and with KONOYE, though they also show that from 1938 onwards HARADA became increasingly shocked at the change of attitude of both KIDO and KONOYE which he records. We ask the Tribunal to accept without hesitation the evidence of Dr. TERUYAMAⁱ (modified only slightly as to years 1941 and 1942, which are irrelevant, by Dr. SASAKI^j and Mrs. KONOYE,^k and to find that KIDO was giving a false story in the attempt to discredit the memoirs, knowing full well how disastrous they were to him if accepted as correct as we submit they should be. It is noticeable that as far as the evidence goes no entry in the Memoirs is in conflict with any entry in KIDO's diary; the conflict is entirely with his oral evidence. If accepted, we

JJ-11.
 g. Ex. 3590, T. 31,571
 h. T. 31,573-4
 i. Ex. 3719, T. 37,118
 j. Ex. 330, T. 33,535-90
 k. Ex. 3750, T. 37,162; Ex. 3750a, T. 37,461

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(JJ-11)
submit, that the excerpts from the memoirs entirely dis-
credit KIDO as a witness. Another and perhaps the most
notable case in which we submit he has been proved to be
untruthful is with regard to his knowledge of the atrocious
k.
ties in China.

KIDO and the EMPEROR

JJ-12. What was KIDO's real attitude towards the
Emperor? He professes great loyalty, but if you accept
HARADA's record of his private remarks the truth is he
held him secretly in some contempt. On 20 April 1939,
HARADA records him as saying in connection with the pro-
posed alliance with Germany, on which the Army with the
support of HIRANUMA were pressing for a more extreme form
of military pact than ARITA or YONAI would agree to. "The
present Emperor is a scientist and very much of a liberal
as well as a pacifist. Therefore if the Emperor's ideas
are not changed there will exist quite a gap between His
Majesty and the Army and Rightist groups." This makes
it clear also that he considered it his mission to guide
the Emperor into a more sympathetic attitude towards the
views of the Army and the right wing. This, we submit,
is the key to his whole course of action after he became
Lord Keeper in June, 1940. These remarks evidently as-
tonished and angered HARADA, and it is idle for KIDO, who
professed great friendship for him, to suggest that he
could possibly have been mistaken about such a matter,

JJ-11.
k. par. JJ-34, below

JJ-12.
a. Ex. 37994, T. 37,789
b. T. 31,531

(JJ-12)

especially in view of HARADA's subsequent remarks.

JJ-13. From the very beginning it is clear, in our submission, clear that KIDO's main pre-occupation was to prevent the Emperor, and more particularly his personal attendants, of whom he was himself one, being brought into controversy or danger of being ousted or even assassinated. This is well illustrated by his diary of 22 September 1931.

a.
b.

Because the Army was indignantly declaring that the Emperor had been induced by his personal attendants to form an opinion against further extension of the Manchurian Incident, therefore KIDO and his friends decided that the Emperor should avoid saying anything further about it and Prince SAIONJI should keep away from Tokyo. This was just the moment when a firm line by these two might have been decisive, although it may also be true that it might have provoked trouble with the Army.

JJ-14. Again, at the Imperial Conference of 11 January 1938, although SAIONJI had been specially consulted as to whether it was in order for the Emperor to ask questions and had replied in the affirmative, the Cabinet prevented this by having everything cut and dried in advance and KONOYE told the Lord Keeper that the Emperor should not say anything, so that the General Staff complained of this. At the end of July, 1938, HARADA reports KIDO as saying, "It is disturbing to have the Emperor taking such pointed actions," in

a.
b.

JJ-13.

- a. See e. g. T. 31,310-7, 31,503
- b. Ex. 1731, T. 1938

JJ-14.

- a. Ex. 3284, T. 29,837
- b. Ex. 3739L, T. 37,718

Page JJ-11

(JJ-14)
reference to Emperor's rebuke to ITAGAKI about the
abominable actions of the Army.^{c.}

JJ-15. On 20 April 1939, occurred the instance set
out in Paragraph JJ-12 hereof. Two days later HARADA
records him as outlining a plan whereby instead of changing
the Emperor's views he was to be forced to acquiesce by a
threat of cabinet resignation.^{a.} It is true that on 5 May
he seems to have changed his views as to the best way of
dealing with the immediate problem, but that does not
alter the importance of his previous remarks as showing
his attitude towards the Emperor.

JJ-16. In par. 124 KIDO gives an explanation of
his diary entry^{b.} about the Emperor's orders to Gen. ABE
when he was forming his new cabinet (in which he admits to
deal with the main point). Although he admits that it was
within the Emperor's prerogative to instruct the adminis-
tration as to the outline of foreign policy,^{c.} at this
time he is telling KONOYE for transmission to ABE that,
as to the Emperor's instruction that "Diplomatic policy
should follow the line of cooperation with Britain and
the United States," this was a matter which ABE could dis-
pose of at his discretion, i.e., that ABE could pay just
as much or as little attention to it as he thought fit -
an important point, in view of the events of October-
December, 1941. The entry also shows that the Emperor
could get the War Minister he wanted, and that KIDO knew

JJ-14.
c. Ex. 3793a, T. 37,754

JJ-15.
a. Ex. 3795B, T. 37,804
b. Ex. 3800a, T. 37,808

JJ-16.
a. T. 30,832-3
b. Ex. 2272, T. 10,240
c. par. 158, T. 30,910-11

(JJ-16)
the way for him to do it. See his cross-examination on
d.
this point.

JJ-17. The next important point on this subject is
the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September, 1940,
soon after KIDO became Lord Keeper. ^{a.} HARADA raises the
question how KIDO and KONOYE persuaded the Emperor to
agree to it; when he had always been saying that he
would never give his consent. He reproached KIDO for
concealing the whole matter from SAICHOJI and himself and
was extremely dissatisfied with KIDO's excuse for this.
It is curious in view of this that KIDO in his affidavit
professes that all his thinking on this subject was based
on SAICHOJI's views. ^{b.} KIDO and KONOYE said to HARADA
that they had told the Emperor that it was the only way
to keep the U.S.A. out of war, and that as the Navy had
withdrawn their opposition it must go through. This
explanation is obviously incomplete. Out of what war?
If merely out of the European war, what interest had
Japan in this? But if Japan intended military action
against British, French, Dutch and Portuguese possessions
in the Far East, as we submit she clearly did, and with
KIDO's knowledge and approval, ^{c.} then it means that the
object was at least to prevent the U.S.A. from interfering
with those proceedings.

JJ-18. ^{c.} KIDO asserts that MATSUOKA conducted the
negotiations so secretly that he himself only heard of

JJ-16.
d. T. 31,340

JJ-17.
a. Ex. 3810, T. 37,380
b. par. 153, T. 30,907-3
c. Ex. 627, par. 2, T. 6972-3

JJ-18.
a. Par. 152, T. 30,907

(JJ-18)

then from KOMEI on 12 September, but he does not say that he then informed the Emperor, nor does it appear that he did so, when on the 14th TOJI secretly told him that the Army and Navy had agreed upon the pact,^{b.} and MATSUOZA suggested that the Senior Statesmen be consulted.^{c.}

The first record of his discussing it with the Emperor is on 16 September,^{d.} but the diary entry does not give any particulars, though he professes to supply them from memory and to transfer to this date a conversation recorded in his diary as taking place on the 21st,^{e.} the effect of which he misrepresents. It clearly says that the China Incident should be got out of the way in preparation for the war with England and the U.S.A., which he foresaw as the result of the Pact, not as he says "because it was an irritant to the U.S.A.". Nor does this or any other entry in his diary support his assertion that he opposed the Pact.^{f.}

JJ-19. Paragraph 155^{g.} is unintentionally illuminating on this point. He states that once the Government had approved a certain course it was too late for the Emperor to do anything effective to prevent it, though prior to that he might have done so. We submit that the true inference from the above facts is that MATSUOZA's suspicions were well founded, and that KIDO participated with KOMEI in a scheme to conceal the pact from the Emperor until it was too late, and then to

JJ-13.

- b. Ex. 627, par. 6 (not read)
- c. Ib. pars. 7&8 (not read)
- d. Par. 153, T. 30,907-9
- e. Ex. 2277, T. 18,250
- f. See also par. 156, T. 30,911

JJ-19.

- a. T. 30,10-1

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(JJ-19)
persuade him to accept it by an obviously unaided explanation. It appears that he attended the Privy Council meeting which finally approved the Fact. ^{b.} As to the Emperor's power to give directions as to foreign policy and as to peace and war, i. e., practical as well as nominal powers, he admitted such powers, though he tried to qualify them by saying that he meant only that the Emperor could express his opinions to the Cabinet. ^{c.}

KIDO and the Duties of the Lord Keeper.

^{a.}
JJ-20. In pars. 40-46 KIDO records a series of discussions in 1932 with Prince SAIONJI and asserts that these refute our contention that as Lord Keeper he developed a new function, that of advising the Emperor on the choice of every new premier. They do not; they merely show a desire on the part of SAIONJI, owing to his advancing years, to have the assistance of the Senior Statesman in exercising this function and a draft scheme prepared by KIDO in which the Lord Keeper was to play no part except, perhaps, that of a convener. There is no evidence that even this was put into practice before KIDO became Lord Keeper. Nor is there any support for KIDO's assertion in par. 115 ^{b.} that his predecessor had adopted a somewhat similar method.

JJ-21. The subject cropped up again in November, 1939. With regard to the diary entry of 10 November 1939, ^{a.}
KIDO in par. 127 ^{b.} makes an entirely unfounded

JJ-19.

- b. Ex. 643, 1st par. T. 7049 (not read)
- c. T. 31,576-7, 31,597

JJ-20.

- a. Pars. 40-46, T. 30,781-93
- b. Par. 115, T. 30,801-2

JJ-21.

- a. Ex. 2273, T. 16,842
- b. Par. 127, T. 30,883-90

(JJ-21)
 allegation as to the manner of its introduction and translation. It was in fact fully revised by the Language Administration Board before its introduction and bears a number of corrections by them. The procedure which KIDŌ advocates for choosing a new premier is a meeting of ex-premiers--whether the Lord Keeper should participate in it at all needed further consideration, but he should not recommend a premier to the Throne. He should confine himself to acting as the Emperor's adviser. Later when he became Lord Keeper he reversed this view and took it upon himself to make the recommendation after consulting the ex-premiers.

JJ-22. As soon as he got into office a new procedure was laid down by him and he obtained the Emperor's approval of it, although SAIONJI was still alive. This is set forth in his diary for 16 July 1940.^{a.} The Lord Keeper was to summon the President of the Privy Council and the former premiers, seek their opinions, himself participate in the discussion, and report the result and their answer after consultation with SAIONJI.

JJ-23. The entry for 17 July,^{a.} which is a full account of the meeting, shows that the procedure was carried out. KIDŌ took full part in the discussion, supporting the nomination of KŌNYŌ and stressing the fact that the Army supported him, although he now professes^{b.} to have been disturbed by this fact. The result was

JJ-22.

- a. Ex. 532, pp. 3-5, especially the last par. on p. 3, the first half of p. 4 and the 3rd par. on p. 5, T. 6245-8

JJ-23.

- a. Ex. 532, T. 6249-53
 b. Par. 143, T. 30,900-1

(JJ-23)

merely reported to SAI WJI, not even by KIDO himself, after the meeting.

JJ-24. After SAITOMI's death the same procedure was followed on 17 July 1941. ^{a.} At the vital meeting of 17 October 1941, he took it upon himself to recommend TOJO to the meeting and afterwards to the Emperor, although the support obtained for him at the meeting is dubious. ^{b.} On 18 July 1941, he reverted to the procedure of 17 July 1941. ^{c.} On 5 April 1945, he introduced on his own initiative another innovation by consulting before the meeting the two Chiefs of Staff and the outgoing War and Navy Ministers and reporting their views to the meeting. ^{d.}

JJ-25. KIDO repeatedly asserts, e.g. in pars. 17-^{a.} 19, that the duty of the Lord Keeper is to advise the Emperor on political matters, and especially foreign affairs, ^{b.} only upon request by the Emperor. The diary entries nowhere support this assertion, which KIDO constantly repeated with a view to minimizing his responsibility. On the contrary we submit that the entries from June, 1940, onwards refute it. ^{c.} ^{d.} cross-examined on behalf of KIDO, stated, we submit, with obvious truth that the duty of "advising the Emperor at all times" includes offering unsolicited advice when proper. TOJO also speaks of KIDO's duty to convey information from the Cabinet members to the

JJ-24.

- a. Ex. 1118, T. 10,168; Ex. 1117, T. 10,168 and affidavit par. 213 T. 30,091-91,918
- b. Ex. 1157, T. 10,291; Ex. 2250, T. 16,196
- c. Ex. 1273, T. 11,377
- d. Ex. 1291, T. 11,391; Ex. 1282, T. 11,398

JJ-25.

- a. T. 30,793-7
- b. See Ex. 1039, T. 9879
- c. e.g. Ex. 532, p. 3 1st par., T. 6245; Ex. 2277, T. 16,250
- d. T. 35,796-9

(JJ-25)
Emperor and vice versa and complains of KIDO's failure in
this respect on an important occasion in February, 1942,^{g.}
when the Emperor urged speedy peace moves.

KIDO and the China War.

JJ-26. When KIDO joined the first KONOYE Cabinet
on 22 October 1937, the China war was already well ad-
vanced, the idea of imposing a local settlement had been
abandoned, the Shanghai incident had taken place, and the
troops were progressing towards Hankin^{a.}. He admits that
he was in close touch with KONOYE and had been advising him
before he joined the cabinet, and must therefore have
known of the policies adopted on 7 August^{b.} and 1, 11
and 22 October,^{c.} as well as the "Plan for Heavy Indus-
tries in Manchuria",^{d.} although he is careful to allege
in his affidavit^{e.} that the latter was approved three
hours before he joined the cabinet. He was therefore
well aware of the kind of cabinet he was joining and the
actions and policies to which it was committed. On
27 October he was at the cabinet meeting which decided^{f.}
to reject the invitation to the Nine-Power Conference;
he alleges^{g.} that this had been decided before he joined,
but the diary does not say so; if it is true he must have
heard it from KONOYE before he joined, and anyway he
agreed. On 3 November 1937, he records a conversation with
SUGIYAMA, which in his affidavit^{h.} he says was about the
settlement of the China Affair, but this is not borne out

JJ-25.

a. T. 35,310-1

JJ-26.

- a. Affidavit, pars. 64-5, T. 30,325-6
- b. Ex. 3735, T. 37,219
- c. Ex. 3263, T. 29,315; Ex. 3266, T. 37,233;
Ex. 3735, T. 37,219
- d. Ex. 239, T. 2960
- e. Par. 37, T. 30327
- f. Ex. 2255, T. 16,218
- g. Par. 68, T. 30,827
- h. Par. 70, T. 30,828-30

(JJ-26) i.
by the diary, which includes among the subjects "the
declaration of war."

JJ-27. With regard to his conversations with KONOYE^{a.}
on 15 and 16 November 1937, no doubt it is true as he says
that the subject under discussion was one of KONOYE's
numerous proposals of resignation, but the diary shows
clearly that it is untrue (as he alleges) that KIDO's ob-
jection to this was based upon the effect it would have
on the prospects of peace--on the contrary, it was the
effect it would have on the fortunes of war "now when we
are on the offensive."^{b.}

JJ-28. Again the passage in the affidavit^{a.} deal-
ing with the diary entry of 19 November 1937, is a^{b.}
misrepresentation of the entry. There is no record of
KIDO warning SUGIYAMA against abusing the new regula-
tions (which incidentally he had discussed with him on
3 November), but merely a question as to the meaning of an
incident. Although no declaration of war was issued, the
Army or a large part of it had already been mobilized and
an Imperial General Headquarters was in fact established,
as is made clear by Exhibit 3272,^{c.} without any recorded
protest by KIDO.

JJ-29. KIDO's account of the cabinet's decision as^{a.}
to the new peace terms for China is not borne out by
the diary entry quoted in par. 61 of 18 December 1937.
It is completely at variance with what MIYADA records^{b.}

JJ-26.
i. Ex. 2256, T. 16,219

JJ-29.
a. Affidavit pars. 77-
31, T. 30,834-7

JJ-27.
a. Pars. 70 & 71, T. 33,828-31
b. Ex. 2257, T. 16,220

b. Ex. 3788a, T. 37,709,
T. 31,126-49

JJ-28.
a. Par. 72, T. 30,831-2
b. Ex. 2258, T. 16,221
c. Ex. 3272, T. 37,260

(JJ-29)
 as having been said by both HIROTA and KIDO on 21 December,
 which shows clearly KIDO's objection to the General Staff's
 desire for immediate peace and for the submission of pre-
 cise terms. The reasons given are totally different from
 those stated in his affidavit. KIDO's account of the
 cabinet meeting of 21 December,^{c.} again contains a gloss
 which is not borne out by the diary^{d.} and omits all refer-
 ence to the important words "counter-measures for the
 China Affair."

JJ-30. The next and most important cabinet meeting was
 that of 24 December,^{a.} of which, as already mentioned, KIDO
 makes no mention whatever until cross-examined.^{b.} It should
 be considered in detail, but the result may be summarized as
 a complete plan for the establishment of puppet regimes
 in North and Central China and Shanghai, the economic
 exploitation of the area for the benefit of Japanese
 "national defense" and economy, the pretense of Chinese
 management with the reality of complete Japanese control,
 the concealment of the policy until a "suitable occa-
 sion," and the postponement of interference with the
 concessions in order to avoid disputes with third countries.

JJ-31. Next come the cabinet meetings of 9 and 10
 January 1938, which decided the policy to be put before
 the Imperial Conference on 11 January,^{a.} to none of which
 is there any reference in the affidavit. Exhibit 3265
 shows that the General Staff considered the peace terms

JJ-29.
 c. Par. 82, T. 30,337
 d. Ex. 2259, T. 15,222

JJ-30.
 a. Ex. 3263, T. 29,815
 b. T. 31,170-3

JJ-31.
 a. Ex. 3264, T. 20,637; Ex. 3265, T. 20,655

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Page JJ-20

(JJ-31)
 already proposed too aggressive. Exhibit 3264 sets out the detailed terms which are in fact not less, but more aggressive than the earlier ones; they were in fact never disclosed to the Chinese. Exhibit 3265 also contains an appendix on p. 2 summarizing the subsequent events down to 16 January, and shows that on 14 and 15, January Liaison Conferences and Cabinet meetings were held to discuss the Chinese request for details of the terms which KIDO had insisted should be kept vague. He admits that it was natural for the Chinese to ask details, but concurred in the decision to refuse them. The General Staff pressed for these to be given but the cabinet objected and finally the General Staff gave way under protest, and the statement refusing to deal further with Chiang Kai-shek's Government was issued. KIDO stated that he took no part in this decision and infers that he knew nothing of the views of General TADA, Vice-Chief of the General Staff. But his diary refers to the "epoch-making announcement about the China affair. We continued our discussion through the afternoon . . . we thought . . . we decided."

JJ-32. HARADA's account of this matter is much fuller and contains detailed statements by HARADA, TADA and two by KIDO to HARADA, which make it clear that he knew all about TADA's views and played a vehement part in opposing them. It also shows that the motive of the

- JJ-31.
 b. Ex. 4863, T. 5934; Ex. 4860, T. 5937
 c. T. 31,463
 d. Pers. 84-5, T. 30,838-10
 e. Ex. 2260, T. 15,223

- JJ-32.
 a. Ex. 37392, T. 37,715

(JJ-32)
 General Staff in desiring an immediate end to the China
 affair was to prepare against Russia. KIDO's remark (at
 the end of par. 34) that Japan missed the first oppor-
 tunity to make peace with China is, we submit, hypocriti-
 cal, since he and Hirota were the two principally
 responsible. It is remarkable that in par. 35 KIDO
 professes ignorance as to the source of the prosecution's
 questions to the witness HALLBE on this point, since
 before KIDO gave evidence the HALLBE records had been under
 study by the Defense for three months. KIDO's statement
 at the end of par. 36^{b.} that the decision to set up and
 deal with a new government was a short-cut to peace
 ("rather than to overrun the vast territory of China with
 armed forces") contrasts sharply with the cabinet and
 Imperial Conference decisions^{c.} that if the Chinese
 Central Government did not accept Japan's terms, "the
 Empire shall be determined to annihilate them" and to
 that end "should promote the rapid cultivation and com-
 plete arrangement of total national strength, especially
 the national defense power." It appears from HALLBE's
 entry of 11 December 1937,^{d.} that the decision to refuse
 to deal with Chiang Kai-shek had been envisaged, if not
 finally taken, as early as that date.

JJ-33. On 21 January 1938, a most important cabinet
 decision on the general principles of national policy was
 taken^{a.} (following upon the last mentioned decision) "to

JJ-32.
 b. P. r. 86, T. 30,310-1
 c. Ex. 3264, p. 1, T. 25,845-6
 d. Ex. 37374, T. 37,702

JJ-33.
 a. Ex. 3270, T. 37,219

(JJ-33) strive for the strengthening of our national power internally and to plan for the development of our Empire externally. With a period of emergency extending over several years as our objective . . . Military aims in the China Incident shall be perfectly attained and the status of general mobilization completed . . . all measures shall be taken in response to the prolonged resistance of China . . . Within the next four years the promotion of the development of important industry shall be planned . . . supplies of materials necessary from the standpoint of national defense secured under a comprehensive plan including North China, etc., besides Japan and Manchukuo . . . The guidance of national thought shall be strengthened and made complete . . . education (KIDO's department) will be reformed in order to cultivate the character of the people of a great nation . . . necessary state control over (everything) for the purpose of national preparedness." Following out this policy KIDO admits ^{b.} that he approved of the National General Mobilization Law. ^{c.}

^{a.} JJ-34. In par. 87 KIDO roundly asserts that the first time he ever heard of the Nanking atrocities was after the surrender in August, 1945, and says that if he had heard of them at the time he would certainly have tried to do something about it, even though it was not a matter of cabinet responsibility. The latter contention

JJ-33.
 b. T. 31, 512
 c. Ex. 31, T. 684

JJ-34.
 a. Par. 87, T. 30, 611; see the following pages hereof:-
 75, p. 75; 79, p. 710; 711, p. 712; 717, p. 718;
 720, p. 720; 722, p. 722; 732, p. 732; 791, p. 777

(JJ-34)

is, in our submission, unfounded, but the assertion we claim has been proved to be false, and deliberately so, for no one could have known of such a thing and forgotten it. ^{a.} HIROTA admittedly know all about them throughout the period during which they were occurring both from the reports of the International Committee forwarded to him by the Japanese Legation in Hanking and from the foreign press. So did SUGIYAMA. It is inconceivable that both of them, especially the former, should have failed to inform their cabinet colleagues. But it is now, in our submission, also clear that KIDO had seen the reports on the subject in the foreign press and the above-mentioned diplomatic reports and that in any event his attention was drawn to the former by Baron OKUMA in the House of Peers on 16 February 1938. This was made pretty clear by the newspaper extract and his cross-examination thereon, which we submit is obviously full of proverberations; ^{b.} but the actual Diet report ^{c.} shows that OKUMA referred to articles in the foreign press about the conduct of the Japanese forces at Hanking and Shanghai, and KIDO himself admits hearing about these reports as to Shanghai and "quite a number of reports from other sources," which can only have been, at least must have included, the diplomatic reports received by HIROTA about Hankin. Not only, therefore, was he guilty of failure to take any steps in the matter as he admits

JJ-34.

- a. HIDAKA, T. 21,153
- b. Ex. 3342A, T. 31,487, 31,514-26
- c. Ex. 3737A, T. 37,285

(JJ-34)

he ought to have done, but his credit as a witness is destroyed.

JJ-35. KIDO's diary entry of 19 May 1938^{a.} is completely misrepresented in his affidavit.^{b.} The two points of real importance about it are (1) that not only was he a party to the original decision not to deal with Chiang Kai-shek but he was also a party to the later^{c.} reiterations of that decision in November^{d.} and December 1938; (2) that he here again commits himself to a protracted warfare of about three years, if the success then being achieved by the Japanese Army did not force Chiang Kai-shek to accept the Japanese terms.

JJ-36. In pars. 93-7^{a.} KIDO discusses the cabinet reorganization with entries from his own diary showing the major part he played in it. But again the diary does not support his assertion that the object was to introduce new members more favourable to concessions to China in order to settle the incident. In the middle of par. 91 he says that HIRAI had been criticized in the Diet about the statement refusing to deal with Chiang Kai-shek.^{b.} Yet when he was cross-examined^{c.} about an actual recorded criticism of HIRAI on this matter on 16 February 1938, (of the opposite kind from that which he suggests) he later refused to admit that he had heard it, though he himself answered the immediately preceding interpellation and at first he said he thought he was present^{d.} for that

JJ-35.

- a. Ex. 2261, T. 13,224
- b. Ex. 3340, T. 30,845
- c. Ex. 268, T. 3533
- d. ib. T. 3505

JJ-36.

- a. Ex. 3340, T. 30,843-53
- b. T. 31,485-507, Ex. 2340
- c. T. 31,486, Ex. 3310

Page JJ-25

(JJ-36)
 he became aware of MIKAMI's statement. The allegation
 in par. 96^{d.} that ITAKI was appointed to settle the
 China Affair because he was popular with the Chinese
 contrasts with his own impression of ITAKI recorded
 in his diary on 17 November 1931^{e.} and 11 January 1932,^{f.}
 as well as with the evidence as to the latter's career
 as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, especially in 1935.

JJ-37. His entry for 23 July 1938^{a.} shows that he
 was in touch with the proceedings of the five Ministers'
 Council,^{b.} though he stresses that he was not a member
 of it.

JJ-38. In par. 103^{a.} KIDD speaks of his duties as
 Minister of Welfare, but he makes no reference to their
 including the Opium Committee, as shown in his diary for
 12 December 1938.^{b.} This was one of the subjects on
 which Japan still purported to cooperate with the League
 until the decision, to which KIDD was a party, to with-
 draw from all bodies was taken on 2 November 1938.^{c.} He
 presents his excuses for this in par. 106.^{d.} Japan's
 actual proceedings with regard to opium are described in
 pars. 205-106 of this summation, and we submit that
 from the time when he became Welfare Minister he bears
 direct, as distinct from general responsibility for them.

JJ-39. Although, as he points out, there were
 various movements during 1938, especially by MIKAMI, for
 reversing the decision of 14 January and dealing direct

JJ-36.

a. Ex. 3340, T. 30,849
 b. Ex. 3340, T. 30,742
 f. Ex. 2191, T. 15,731

JJ-38.

a. Ex. 3340, T. 30,856
 b. Ex. 3341, T. 31,381
 c. Ex. 2264, T. 16,231
 d. Ex. 3310, T. 30,863

JJ-37.

a. Ex. 3310, T. 30,853
 b. Ex. 3157, T. 27,350

(JJ-39)

These public statements were publicly adopted by HIRANUMA as the basic policy of his new Government which KIDO also joined; he also spoke of the extermination of those who opposed it. KIDO's only reference to any of these statements is in par. 112^{3.} where he says that the HIRANUMA cabinet demonstrated a continuity of policy in trying to settle the China Affair by appointing KONOYE as Minister without portfolio. In our submission, they completely destroy the whole of his story on this subject. The only kind of settlement contemplated from 14 January 1938 onwards, if not before, was the complete submission or destruction of the National Government of China; only on that submission would they be graciously permitted to merge with the new puppet Governments, which were being established from the winter of 1937 onwards^{h.} and were now to be amalgamated.

JJ-40. The affidavit nowhere mentions the diary entry of 12 December 1938,^{a.} already twice referred to herein, which also shows that among the reasons for which KIDO tried to dissuade KONOYE from resigning was the embarrassment it would cause to ITAGAKI "who had despatched an army of 1,600,000 strong overseas." This was the man whom KIDO had described in par. 96^{b.} as so popular with the Chinese that he would settle the incident. Cross-examined, KIDO said that he had

JJ-39.

- f. Ex. 2229A, T. 15,988
- g. T. 30,670-1
- h. Ex. 463, T. 5206

JJ-40.

- a. Ex. 3341, T. 31,391
- b. T. 30,819,52

(JJ-20 c. d. exaggerated the figure. He also asserted that he had only discussed the matter with ITAGAKI because KONOYE asked him to do so as a friend, whereas the diary says "wishing to consult the War Minister myself, I asked the Premier to leave the matter to me" - a typical instance of the way in which he distorts his own diary in order to minimize his responsibility.

JJ-41. KIDO's account in par. 111^{a.} of the circumstances in which he accepted the Home Ministry in HIRANUMA's cabinet again depends upon an elaborate gloss, not substantiated by the diary.^{b.} On the contrary the entry of 17 February 1939, quoted in par. 111, shows that his decision was not to bring the Reform Bill which he mentioned, but not to submit it "alone", i.e. to deal with it as part of some more elaborate measure.

JJ-42. Later references to the "China Incident" are mostly involved with other matters, and will be dealt with where they occur.

KIDO's work as Education Minister

JJ-43. KIDO was Education Minister from October 22, 1937, to May 26, 1938, and as such becomes, in our submission, responsible for furthering the alleged conspiracy in two distinct ways. In the first place his membership in the cabinet makes him responsible for the acts of the cabinet whilst he was a member of it and in addition he is responsible for the policy pursued

JJ-10.
 c. T. 31,394, 31,473
 d. T. 31,305

JJ-11.
 a. T. 30,667-70
 b. Ex. 2267, T. 16,233

(JJ-43)
by the Education Ministry whilst he was its chief.

JJ-44. In our contention KIDO was always a man who used whatever power he had and not one who would at any time have been a figurehead. He was himself spoken of having been interested, when appointed, in fulfilling his duties as Minister of Education to the best of his ability and of having been anxious to receive information, suggestions and opinions so that he could make proper decisions.^{a.} When a little over a year later, he became Home Minister, he stated in his diary that he accepted this position on condition that he could dispose of pending Home Ministry problems at his own discretion.^{b.} In our submission, his responsibility for the policy of the Education Ministry whilst he was its chief is very real and clear.

JJ-45. He has testified that whilst Minister of Education, he allowed the Tokyo Imperial University self-autonomy and freedom of thought,^{a.} and denied the statement of the Prosecution witness, UUCHI, that he, KIDO, was responsible for Professor YAMAIKAWA being dismissed from the faculty of Tokyo Imperial University for expressing pacifist views.^{c.} KIDO makes a point of the fact that UUCHI admitted his evidence was hearsay,^{d.} but in view of UUCHI's testimony that the then President of the University referred the matter to him, UUCHI,^{e.} and discussed it with him in detail,^{f.} it is submitted

JJ-44.

- a. T. 30,828
- b. Ex. 2267, T. 16,233

JJ-45.

- a. T. 30,826
- b. T. 30,833
- c. T. 345, 952
- d. T. 30,832
- e. T. 952
- f. T. 353

(JJ-45)
 that CUCHI's evidence is reliable. CUCHI testified
 that he knew very well that the President of the University consulted KIDO about this matter, and that in
 1937 six professors and also other members of University
 staffs were dismissed because they were suspected of
 being sympathetic to peace ideals. After their dis-
 charge all were arrested and imprisoned by the police.^{h.}
 KIDO admits having two interviews in one afternoon with
 Vice-Minister YAMAMURA about the case of Professor
 YAMAMURA and recorded both interviews in his diary.^{i.}
 He must therefore have taken a good deal of interest in
 the matter. Considering his character and that he was
 then Minister of Education, it is submitted that it is
 inconceivable he should have taken this amount of in-
 terest in the case of a University professor accused of
 pacifist propaganda and yet remained a mere spectator,
 not in any way interfering, as claimed by him.^{j.} It is
 submitted that the true account of this matter was given
 by CUCHI.^{k.}

JJ-46. According to IKTSUNA, in 1937, whilst KIDO
 was Minister of Education, the school system was reor-
 ganized and more school time was devoted to military
 training and the teaching of military subjects.^{a.} KIDO
 says that the evidence to this effect is absolutely
 false.^{b.} However, as KIDO says that Prime Minister
 K. KOME set up an Educational Council to revamp the

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- JJ-45.
 g. T. 953
 h. T. 945
 i. T. 30, 833
 j. T. 30, 553
 k. T. 914

- JJ-46.
 a. T. 1103
 b. T. 30, 334

(JJ-16)
 educational system and that he, KIDO, sought to prevent militarists from becoming members of it (this is at the end of November, 1937).^{3.} It is pertinent to consider the cabinet decision on or about January 21, 1938, to strengthen the guidance of national thought and the accompanying cabinet statement that "it is expected that education will be reformed in order to cultivate the character of the people of a great nation".^{4.} This is from the sixth paragraph of a cabinet decision on the general principles of the national policy as stated by the Prime Minister KONOE to Foreign Minister HIRATA on January 21, 1938.^{5.} It is submitted that the Educational Council which had been set up less than two months previously was clearly the body which the cabinet had in mind when it stated in January, 1938, that it expected education to be reformed. As this cabinet decision stated this reform in education was to be "in order to cultivate the character of the people of a great nation", some idea of the type of reform intended may be gathered from the remainder of the document laying down the general principles of the national policy, which has already been summarized in par. JJ-33, hereof. The fact that the Educational Council was set up to play its part in promoting such a policy as this gives one an idea of how much credence to give KIDO's statement that he sought to prevent militarists from becoming members

JJ-16.

- c. T. 30,532
- T. Ex. 3270, T. 37,251
- c. Ex. 3270, T. 37,219

(JJ-16)
of it.¹ It is also, in our submission, confirmation
of IKESHIMA's evidence.³

JJ-17. KIDO's sympathy with, and participation
in, Japanese aggression in China is also shown by an
article called "the Japanese Spirit", published by the
Department of Education in the Tokyo Gazette for March-
April, 1933, when KIDO was Minister of Education.¹
KIDO denied all responsibility for this article,² but
the defense's witness IMAKATSU admitted that generally
speaking no statement would be issued by the Department
of Education without the knowledge of the Minister of
Education.³ The article justified Japanese policy in
China and condemned the Chinese Government for not
yielding to Japan.

JJ-18. Contradictory statements were made by
defense witnesses about military training in Japanese
schools. IMAKATSU first stated that neither ARAKI nor
KIDO, when Minister of Education, took any new measures
concerning military education^{a.} and then amended this by
saying that ARAKI had never done so "at his own initia-
tive."^b He repeated, however, that no such measures^{c.}
were taken by KIDO, whether at his own volition or not.
When asked about one of the important ordinances con-
cerning military training listed by him^{d.} (i.e.,
regulations with respect to the youth schools)^{e.} which
had, according to him, been agreed upon by the departments

JJ-16.
f. T. 30,632
g. T. 1103

JJ-18.
a. T. 18,543
b. T. 18,548
c. T. 18,555
d. T. 18,544
e. T. 18,518

JJ-17.
a. Ex. 298, 1. 3563
b. T. 30,812
c. T. 18,582

Page JC-33

(JJ-48) f.
concerned before ARAKI became Education Minister, he
denied any agreement whilst KIDO was Minister of
Education and stated that the regulation issued in
April, 1939, had been agreed on in 1935. h.

JJ-49. It is submitted that nothing has occurred
to shake the Prosecution's evidence that KIDO used his
position as Minister of Education to further militarism
and aggressive nationalism. a.

KIDO and the negotiations with GERMANY and
ITALY in 1938-9.

JJ-50. The first reference to this in the diary is
for 9 August 1938. In par. 101 he gives a long ac-
count of his discussion with KONOYE, none of which is
supported by the diary. It is, however, significant
that he was consulted privately about it when it was
not disclosed in the cabinet meeting. In par. 109 he
describes another discussion with KONOYE on this sub-
ject, again quoting a diary entry of 17 December 1938,
which again, however, does not support his statement as
to his own opinion or as to his ignorance, repeatedly
alleged and shown to be untrue, of the proceedings of
the Five Ministers' Conferences. If, as he suggests,
this question influenced the decision of the KONOYE
Cabinet to resign, it is remarkable that both he and
KONOYE joined the HIRANUMA Cabinet, which immediately
continued the negotiations in which KIDO took part, as
will be shown.

JJ-48.
f. T. 18,564
g. T. 18,568
h. T. 18,569

JJ-49.
a. see paras. 7, 79-84
pp 78-81

JJ-50.
a. ix. 2252, T. 13,225
b. T. 30,855-6
c. T. 30,364-6; see generally paras
7 110-130 hereof. pp. 7, 103-124

[Page 30-3.]

JJ-51. In dealing with this question in pars. 112-
 a. 119 KIDO again falsely suggests that he was entirely
 opposed to the alliance, and that because this was dealt
 with by the Five Ministers Conference of which he was not
 a member, and they failed to arrive at an agreement, he
 had nothing to do with it, except from the point of view
 of the possible effect of a dispute upon public order in
 Japan. While it is true that this was an aspect of it with
 which he was particularly concerned, it is clear that he
 was taking an active part in the matter generally. Also,
 the Government did arrive at a decision in favour of a
 proposed treaty contained in communication from HIRANUMA
 to Hitler formally handed over by Foreign Minister ARITA
 to Ambassador Ott on 4 May 1939, which would have com-
 mitted Japan in the event of war between Germany and the
 USSR to active participation and, if the war should be
 with Britain and/or France, to "political and economic and,
 to the extent possible to her power, military assistance"
 b. to Germany. It is true that neither the Germans and
 Italians, nor OSHIMA and SHIKATORI, nor ITAGAKI, nor the
 Army thought this went far enough, and the whole matter
 was brought to a temporary stop by the German-Russian Non-
 Aggression Pact. On 31 March 1939, KIDO conferred with
 c. HIRANUMA on the subject generally: On 14 April par. d.
 115 quotes and misrepresents a diary entry which shows
 that he again was informed of all the circumstances by

JJ-51.

- a. T. 30,370-7
- b. Ex. 503, T. 6103
- c. Ex. 2268, T. 16,234
- d. F. 30,872-5

(JJ-51)

HIRANUMA, and KIDO insisted that the Army and Navy must arrive at some compromise or other and that HIRANUMA must write personal letters to Hitler and Mussolini. On 19 April he wanted the Alliance concluded because failure would have a very bad effect not only on the domestic situation, but also on the China Incident.^{o.} On the next day HIRADA records a most important talk with KIDO on the subject, which shows that KIDO used intrigue to persuade the Emperor to agree with the Army's views at HIRANUMA's request.^{f.} Two days later HIRADA again reported a scheme to force the Emperor's hand by threatening cabinet resignation.^{g.} On 2 May 1939, he records his view that it would be subject to the same two disadvantages if the negotiations failed and this should be avoided; but in any case public opinion should be unified. He was not so much concerned as to what kind of alliance was made with Germany so long as they avoided quarrels in Japan.^{h.} The effect of his two last-mentioned diary entries is again misrepresented in his affidavit. On May 5, HIRADA records that he had changed his attitude since April 20th and was advocating the recall of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI,^{i.} but this was the day after HIRANUMA's letter to Hitler, which was not acceptable to them. But on 4 August he was again urging a compromise between the Army and Navy, without going into its terms, to avoid the fall of the cabinet.^{j.} Immediately afterwards, however, follows an

JJ-51.

- e. Ex. 2269, T. 16,235
- f. Ex. 3799A, T. 37,739
- g. Ex. 3799B, T. 37,804
- h. Ex. 2270, T. 16,235
- i. Ex. 3800A, T. 37,306
- j. Ex. 2271, T. 16,237

(JJ-51)
 important quotation from HARADA relative to this of 10 August 1939.
 k. It shows that the whole matter was discussed in the cabinet and that there was a "pre-arranged plan" on which they were all agreed, i.e. the one of 4 May, but that ITAGAKI and the Army were also determined on a full military alliance if this plan was not accepted by Germany. In our submission, all these extracts show that YIDO was so far from opposing the alliance that throughout he was seeking to promote its conclusion by various schemes of securing agreement between the contending parties within the cabinet, not only because he feared disturbances in Japan if it fell through, but also because he thought it would have a bad effect on the movement for establishing Wang's regime in China. It is particularly significant that he was urging compromise not only to ITAGAKI, who favoured full military alliance, but to YONAI, who opposed it.
 l. This in itself refutes his claim to have been an opponent and shows him as a supporter at least of the compromise plan, which committed Japan a long way towards war. But he told HARADA on 12 August, 1939, that MIROTA would be the best candidate as Premier to succeed HIRANUMA, because he had told KONOE that his views were much the same as the Army's, i.e. on the full military alliance. So it seems that KIDO also agreed with this view.
 m.

YIDO and the New Party.

JJ-52. During the nine months when YIDO was out of office the question of the new political party or merger of existing parties, which he had already discussed in detail with YONOE on 7 September 1938, again came into prominence. YONOE was to

be President and YIDO Vice-

JJ-51
 k. Ex. 3807A, T 37,846
 l. Ex. 2270, T. 16,235
 m. T. 38,703

JJ-52.
 a. Ex. 2263, T. 16,227
 b. Ex. 2274, T.16,246; Ex.2275, T. 16,247; Ex. 2276, T.16,248.

(JJ-52)
 President. It was not to be formed until KONOYE had accepted the Imperial mandate, which they already contemplated on 26 May, more than seven weeks before YONAI was forced out of office. Then the new party was to be formed, the dissolution of all the old ones requested, and all Ministers were to be made to join the new one. There was also to be a supreme national defense conference and a cabinet consisting only of the Premier and the War and Navy Ministers. It follows that even if the Premier was a civilian he would be the only civilian member of either body. It was suggested, however, that according to circumstances there might be two or three other cabinet members. KIDO deals with this in pars. 130-135.^{c.} Although he asserts that this was not to be "one state, one party" on the Nazi model, and that the object was to strengthen the Premier against the military, this seems completely at variance with the scheme as set out.^{d.}

KIDO's actions after he became Lord Keeper.

(1 June 1940 - 2 September 1945)

JJ-53. KIDO stresses that the diary entries in this period merely show him receiving information from cabinet Ministers and others and not expressing opinions or taking action himself.^{a.} This is in many cases true, but in our submission, (1) they show his knowledge of the nefarious

JJ-52.
 c. T. 30,891-5
 d. Ex. 2275, T. 16,247

JJ-53.
 a. e.g. pars. 130-9, T. 30,897-8

7 159 00 13 1543

Date JJ-33

(JJ-53)
 schemes of his fellow-conspirators and that (2) he had a duty to advise the Emperor to prevent them. We submit that the fact that he made no protest to the cabinet members, and gave no such advice to the Emperor is in itself evidence of his acquiescence in the plans. The two examples mentioned in the paragraphs cited show that even the comparatively mild YOKAI cabinet and its Foreign Minister AKITA were planning to use force (if necessary) against French Indo-China^{b.} and the Netherlands East Indies, and regarded the Nine Power Treaty as inoperative and not to be revived;^{c.} KIDO accepted all these views without objection. The same remarks apply to many later instances, not all of which we think it necessary to quote. We shall draw special attention to those where he does record his opinion or advice.

^{a.}
JJ-54. Paragraph 150^{a.} is a remarkable misrepresentation of his entry of 9 September 1940,^{b.} which contains no record of his indignation at the military action in French Indo-China as alleged. The same is true of par. 151^{c.} as to pars. 1 and 2 of the entry of 14 September 1940,^{d.} which clearly shows KIDO as endorsing as well as reporting the opinion that "if we let matters continue without doing anything, the mischief-making of England and the U.S. would become more and more serious" and supporting MATSUOKA's proposal of an ultimatum to French Indo-China. This tends to negative his unsupported

JJ-53.
 b. Ex. 619, T. 6223
 c. Ex. 1294, T. 11,708

JJ-54.
 a. T. 30,905-3
 b. Ex. 626, T. 6971
 c. T. 30,903-7
 d. Ex. 627, T. 6972

(JJ-54) e.
assertions about his oppositions to the Tri-Partite Pact.

JJ-55. On the question of the Tri-Partite Pact (which has already been discussed from another angle in pars. JJ-17-19 above, which should be read with what follows), the diary contains singularly little information to show YIDU's opinion, actions or advice to the Emperor, leaving the assertions in his affidavit that he opposed it entirely unsupported; but there are illuminating passages which point to their falsity. He says ^{a.} that he only learned of the negotiations from KONGYE on 12 September, but admits that he knew of Stahmer's arrival, which was in fact on 7 September 1910, ^{b.} and that secret talks were being conducted at MATSUOKA's house. He cannot have failed to guess their object, even if he was not informed of details. He also clearly knew that the Navy was opposed to the Pact because on 14 September he records ^{c.} that TOJO secretly informed him that this opposition had been withdrawn. There is no record of his having passed on to the Emperor any information on the subject before ^{d.} 16 September, nor does he so allege in his affidavit. Yet in par. 155 ^{e.} he himself says that prior to the Government arriving at a final decision the Emperor could effectively have intervened. Yet on 14 September he is clearly treating the matter as settled, because he is discussing details of the Imperial Conference to give it the usual ^{f.} formal sanction. It is noticeable that this is the same

JJ-54.
e. Pars. 152-5, T. 30,907-11

JJ-55.
 a. Par. 152, T. 30,907
 b. Ex. 3115, par. 2, T. 27,985
 c. Ex. 327, par. 1, T. 3972
 d. Par. 153, T. 30,907-8
 e. T. 30,910-11
 f. Ex. 327, pars. 7 & 8, T. 3972

Page JJ-40

(JJ-55)
 day on which he made the remarks about the "mischief-
 making of England and the U.S." in connection with another
 subject.

JJ-56. He introduces the subject in par. 153^{a.} by
 describing himself as a disciple of SAIONJI, which no
 doubt in earlier days he had been, and he asserts that he
 visited him once a month and heard and agreed with his
 pro-Englo-American views. There is no record of any such
 visits during these later years, and HARADA on 20 October,^{b.}
 states that he concealed the whole matter from both
 SAIONJI and himself, together with his excuse for doing so.
 HARADA records the Emperor's objection and the absence of
 any satisfactory explanation by LENOYE or KIDO as to how
 they had won him over. KIDO's diary entry of 21 September^{c.}
 contains his only record of any advice bearing even in-
 directly on the subject, and it was far from expressing
 opposition. It was to the effect that if the alliance was
 concluded Japan would eventually have to oppose both
 England and the United States and therefore should take
 immediate steps to clear the China Incident out of the way.
 Of course, this would have helped Japan enormously in the
 Pacific War if it had been done. This entry does not
 show how he intended this to be done, and his statement^{d.}
 in par. 156 that he advocated "decisive concessions" to
 the Emperor is again a gloss which should be rejected,
 especially in view of his entry of 29 November,^{e.} the

JJ-56.

- a. T. 30,907-8
- b. Ex. 3510, T. 37,830
- c. Ex. 2277, T. 16,248
- d. T. 30,911
- e. Ex. 2276, T. 16,251

(JJ-56) f.
effect of which is again misrepresented in par. 160.

The advice was not that any compromise peace with Chiang Kai-shek should be sought, but that "we should be fully prepared to complete our national strength while securing key points." His objection to compromising with "positive action proponents" was because "owing to the exhaustion of our power" it would "cause inability to bring about the submission of the enemy." He clearly was still advocating a fight to a finish with the National Government and further preparations to ensure the result. The Tri-Partite Pact was finally agreed on 25 September, was approved by the Privy Council on the 26th, and was signed in Berlin on the 27th. It seems probable that one of the objects of this haste was to prevent the Emperor from taking effective steps to stop it, but on KIDO's own showing it would not have been too late on the 21st if KIDO had advised him to do so.

JJ-57. Paragraph 157^{a.} is misleading as to the diary entry of 26 September 1940.^{b.} KIDO's regret at the action of a unit which forced a landing to bombard Haiphong was not an objection to the use of force as such. Without opposition from him it was decided to use force if the threat did not bring the Vichy Government to terms. He was criticizing the stupidity of those who used force contrary to orders when the threat had already produced the desired result.

JJ-56.
f. T. 30,913.
c. Ex. 3145, pars. 10-11, T. 27,965

JJ-57.
a. T. 30,911-2
b. Ex. 613, par. 4, T. 7049

7 159 0013 1547

JJ-59. Paragraph 162^{a.} contains a long dissertation on KIDO's pacific views with regard to the border dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand, but this is entirely unsupported by the diary entry quoted at the end, which records only the Emperor's personal opinion and timid action

JJ-59. Paragraph 163^{a.} and the diary of 1 February 1941^{b.} record a report by the Chiefs of Staff from which it appears that the Navy intended to use Camranh Bay and the air bases near Saigon in preparation for the southward policy and intended to deceive the world by a false representation as to the object. Neither in the diary nor the affidavit is there any trace of opposition by KIDO either to the action or the deception.

JJ-30. Paragraphs 166 and 167^{a.} are a long attempt to explain away the plain meaning of the diary for 19 April 1941,^{b.} which is not quoted. It says that KIDO and KONOYE agreed that in any negotiations with the United States they must be careful to keep good faith with Germany and Italy and not to interfere with the establishment of a new order in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere "which is our fixed national policy." This obviously confined the possibilities of the negotiation within such narrow limits that it is difficult to see how anyone on the Japanese side can have had any belief in their success from the beginning.

JJ-59.
a. T. 30,915-7

JJ-59.
a. T. 30,917-9
b. Ex. 1303, T. 11,743

JJ-60.
a. T. 30,922-4
b. Ex. 1085, T. 9875

JJ-61. Paragraph 108^{a.} purports to deal with the important diary entry of 28 April 1941^{b.} about the duty of the Lord Keeper in advising the Emperor about diplomatic questions and the situation when he, the premier and the Foreign Minister were simultaneously ill. The entry merely says that he asked Chief Secretary MITSUDAIRA to submit his opinion to the Throne but does not say what the opinion was. KIDO now asserts that he said that "the Lord Keeper had no authority concerning diplomatic matters but to convey Imperial questions to the premier and Foreign Minister, nor to answer about a diplomatic problem on his own responsibility." This we submit is manifestly contrary to fact and to his own practice as repeatedly recorded in the diary. Chief Secretary MITSUDAIRA could have been called to corroborate this astonishing statement, if willing to do so. Actually, his was one of the affidavits served and withdrawn,^{c.} but the Tribunal had expressly ruled^{d.} that evidence of precisely this type would be admitted if available. He was called for another accused and examined for KIDO on another matter, but not on this one.^{e.}

JJ-62. In par. 175,^{a.} KIDO gives a long account purporting to be based upon the diary for 23 June 1941,^{b.} of a conversation with KONOYE about the changed situation caused by Germany's war against Soviet Russia. He asserts that he said this had "changed one of the elements

JJ-61.
 a. T. 30,921-5
 b. Ex. 1006, T. 9876
 c. See par. JJ-3, above
 d. T. 31,631
 e. See par. JJ-81, below

JJ-62.
 a. T. 30,930-1
 b. Ex. 1094, T. 10,023

(JJ-62)
by which the Alliance was formed" and asked KONOYE to consider most carefully whether the Alliance should be continued any longer, and that KONOYE agreed. There is no trace of this opinion in this or any other diary entry; it is in complete conflict with the opinion he expressed to KONOYE and HIRANUMA on 21 June,^{c.} and with the advice which he says he gave the Emperor on 31 July 1941.^{a.} To ask the Tribunal to disbelieve this story altogether. This entry also shows that he agreed in principle with SUZUKI's opinion about the unification and reinforcement of Imperial General Headquarters.

JJ-63. The entries for 18^{a.} and 25 June^{b.} and 5 July 1941^{c.} show that he knew of the plans for the advances into Southern French Indo-China on or before those dates, without any record of disapproval or of advice to the Emperor to attempt to stop them. Par. 177^{d.} contains the astonishing statement about the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 that he never knew until he read KONOYE's memoirs that the plan there adopted "contemplated this advance and was to be carried on even if it meant recourse to war against the United States and Britain." This was the only Imperial Conference of which he does not admit knowing all the details as it was obviously his duty to do; e.g. he quotes textually from the one of 6 September 1941,^{e.} and if this text was available to him so must the others have been.

JJ-62.

- c. Ex. 781, T. 7910
- d. Ex. 1125, T. 10,184, par. 2 of his answer to the Emperor.

JJ-63.

- a. Ex. 1080, T. 9998
- b. Ex. 1095, T. 10,026
- c. Ex. 1112, T. 10,155
- d. T. 30,033
- e. Ex. 2250, T. 16,198

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(JJ-33)

Further it can hardly be reconciled with the diary for 2 July, imperfectly quoted in par. 177, which shows the conference was held in the morning to adopt the national policy, and in the afternoon the Emperor told him about it. Moreover, the practice was for the actual policy to be decided at previous Cabinet Conferences, and the above-mentioned entry for 25 June shows that he knew that the policy on this point had been decided and reported to the Emperor. Again we ask the Tribunal to reject this story.

JJ-34. In par. 165 ^{a.} MID. gives a paraphrase of his entry for 2 August 1941 ^{b.} which in itself makes it clear that he was not objecting to war with America in itself. He was only objecting to "a hasty decision to go to war now." He then says he recommended an immediate and exhaustive study of Japan's actual power and discussion of fundamental national policies. The affidavit omits the important part of the entry where he says that, if KIMUYE resigned after failure to secure a loan, "the Army and Navy would then assume charge of the administration of the country." This is exactly what happened in October on MID's own recommendation.

JJ-35. One of the most illuminating of the diary entries respecting MID's real attitude to the question of a Pacific war is that of 7 August 1941, ^{a.} in which he says he expressed the opinion he then held to KIMUYE, of which he gives a long and misleading paraphrase in par. 167 ^{b.}

JJ-34.

- a. T. 30,320-1
- b. Ex. 1129, T. 10,138

JJ-35.

- a. Ex. 1130, T. 10,133
- b. T. 30,323-7

Page JJ-6

(JJ-65)
and entirely omits the important parts of the diary,
which we ask the Tribunal to study from the text. The
first ten paragraphs are devoted to stating in detail the
necessary scope and practical difficulties of such a war
in the circumstances of the time. Then come the vital
words in par. 11: "He could not do what we wanted on
account of the lack of our national power." What did he
want to do? Obviously not, as he now asserts, to obtain
needed materials from the southern areas by peaceful
means. Lack of national power could not prevent that;
it was only prevented by the refusal of Japan to assent
to the terms on which they could have been obtained. He
goes on to say that they might be compelled to make the
same decision as in the case of the Three Powers' inter-
ference after the Sino-Japanese war. That Japan actually
did was to submit for the time being and wait for better
opportunities to enforce her will upon China, which came
in 1915, 1931 and 1937. In pars. 12 and 14 he speaks of
a ten years' plan with the ultimate objective of Japan's
advance to the Southern Regions consisting of "(a) estab-
lishment of heavy industries and machine-tool industries,
(b) establishment of a synthetic oil industry, (c) expansion
of ocean lines and shipping." What for? Obviously it was
to overcome the specific obstacles to the waging of a suc-
cessful war which he had listed in pars. 1-9. In par. 13
he says they should "meanwhile" rest re friendly relations

Page JJ-17

(JJ-65)
with the United States and try to secure needed materials.
We submit that this is the advice of a man who fully
shares the aims of the militarists but not their confi-
dence in immediate success; for success he is prepared to
wait ten years. His doubts are clearly based on those of
M.G.M.C. a week earlier.^{c.} Later when M.G.M.C. changed his
view (KID) fell in with the rest.

JJ-66. In par. 190^{a.} he relates an alleged conver-
sation with KON'YE on 5 September 1941, before he saw the
Emperor about the coming Imperial Conference, of which
conversation there is no trace whatever in the diary,^{b.}
though if true it would have been the most important part
of the entry. The same remarks apply to another conver-
sation between the two alleged in par. 192^{c.} to have
taken place after KON'YE and the Chiefs of Staff had seen
the Emperor on the same day.

JJ-67. In the same par. he asserts that before the
conference on the 6th he himself suggested to E.R.I.,
President of the Privy Council, that he should ask some
questions, which conversation is not mentioned in the
diary.^{a.} In any case he used E.R.I.'s intention as an ex-
cuse for persuading the Emperor not to ask his own
questions, but merely to conclude with a request that
whole-hearted efforts should be made in diplomatic nego-
tiations. Efforts were not likely to produce results

JJ-65.
c. Ex. 1125, T. 10,184

JJ-66.
a. T. 30,948-9
b. Ex. 1134, T. 10,214
c. T. 30,951-3

JJ-67.
a. Ex. 1135, T. 10,215

(JJ-67) unless instructions were to agree to the terms necessary for success.

JJ-68. Paragraph 196^{a.} describes an alleged rebuke KID^o gave to KONGYE on 26 September 1941 about his desire to resign, in which he says he advised KONGYE to propose a review of the decision of 6 September. The only reference in the diary to this is "I advised him to be prudent", which certainly does not suggest a conversation of the kind alleged.

JJ-69. On 29 September 1941, the diary^{a.} relates a talk with Z.R. who wanted the final Imperial Conference before deciding on war to be less formal than usual and to include the senior statesmen in the Council. In par. 197^{b.} KID^o says that this was followed in the meeting of 29 November, which is of course quite incorrect.

JJ-70. The diary entry of 9 October 1941^{a.} is another important exposure of KID^o's real mind at this time. It is substantially to the same effect as that of 7 August^{b.} and the same remarks apply.

JJ-71. The diary of 12 October 1941^{a.} gives Chief Secretary TONIN's account of the Five Ministers' Conference at KONGYE's house and records Navy Minister OIKUMI as making the only sensible and sincere remark about the negotiations: "If our choice is the restoration of friendly relations by diplomatic negotiations we must do it thoroughly," which KID^o^{b.} rightly interprets in par. 202

JJ-68. a. T. 30,956-7
JJ-69. a. Ex. 1142, T. 10,231
b. T. 30,957-8
JJ-70. a. Ex. 1146, T. 10,241
b. Ex. 1130, T. 10,198
JJ-71. a. Ex. 1147, T. 10,246
b. T. 30,962-8

(JJ-71)
of his affidavit as "even making considerable concessions." If KIDO had ever given similar advice he would have shown his sincerity. But TOJO insisted upon the terms: "(1) we should not change our policy of stationing troops in China or the other policies connected with it; (2) we should not entertain anything that might affect the result of the China Incident." KIDO therefore well knew that however much TOJO might promise to continue negotiations for a time, he did not intend to offer terms on which they could possibly succeed.

JJ-72. The situation was fundamentally simple. Japan had for years been engaged in a war of sheer aggression in China, for which no one was more clearly responsible than KIDO. She wanted to retain the fruits of that aggression. She also wanted to make an aggressive advance to the south, and by her actions in French Indo-China had taken obvious aggressive steps for that purpose. At the same time she wanted the United States, Britain and the Netherlands to go on supplying her with materials, especially oil necessary for that purpose.^{a.} They had at last refused to do so. Only three possible courses were open: (1) to give up aggression and make terms acceptable to the ABCD powers; (2) to make war upon the ABCD powers; or (3) to leave things as they were. TOJO had declared himself for No. 2. KIDO, while he would not declare himself, had intimated the willingness of the Navy to support

JJ-72.

a. Ex. 1125, T. 10,184; Ex. 1130, T. 10,198

(JJ-72)

whatever decision KONOYE made and their preference for No. 1. No one advocated No. 3 though it was clearly the only possible compromise, no doubt because if they could not get the embargoes lifted, Japan's power of waging war in the future would gradually wane. On 13 October 1941, KIDO and SUZUKI agreed that KONOYE must try to promote mutual understanding between the War and Navy Ministers. Obviously this could only be done by one or the other living way. The diary expresses no preference, but as usual at the end of par. 204^{c.} the affidavit adds a gloss "to bring about the peaceful solution." We submit that KIDO was only interested in securing agreement, no matter what it was. If he had a preference for a peaceful solution at all, it was only because the hesitation of the Navy caused him to take a poor view of the chances of success.

JJ-73. On 15 October^{a.} the question of a HIGASHIEMUNI Cabinet came up, and KIDO would only agree to it if a common policy had previously been worked out between the Army and Navy. Again the diary contains no indication what this common policy should be, but par. 205 of the affidavit^{b.} supplies the usual gloss and a further curious one--that owing to the Prince's inexperience, actual power would lie with the Deputy Prime Minister who would probably be TOJO. "Such being the case, the possibility of averting war would be very slim." In our submission, he

JJ-72.

- b. Ex. 1149, T. 10,274
- c. T. 30,969-70

JJ-73.

- a. Ex. 1150, T. 10,184
- b. T. 30,972-5

(JJ-73)
 well understood that the possibility of avoiding war was
 even slimmer when TJJ became Premier. As no agreement
 had been reached, KIDO vetoed the scheme. The reasons,
 without the glosses, are repeated in the entry for
 16 October ^{c.} in which he records having suggested to IOJO
 revision of the resolution of 6 September, which he de-
 scribes as "rather careless". The meaning of this phrase
 is in our submission clear: it was careless in two
 respects, (1) in fixing a date without regard to subsequent
 events, and more particularly (2) in deciding upon war at
 that date, while the Navy, though it had consented, was
 dubious and divided in opinion as to the prospects of suc-
 cess. On 9 October ^{d.} he had for the first time recorded
 an objection (to KONOYE) to this resolution as "too out-
 right, and not the conclusion of exhaustive discussion."

JJ-74. KIDO has given two accounts of his interview
 with TJJ on 16 October, besides the diary entry above-
 mentioned. Sometime in November, 1941, he related it as
 part of a history of events from 6 September to 17 October ^{a.}
 (hereinafter called "the November story"). In par. 209 of
 his affidavit he gives a longer and quite different ac-
 count. ^{b.} Curiously enough the latter depicts TJJ as much
 less compromising than the former. But the affidavit also
 offers a very different version of KIDO's own statements.
 We ask the Tribunal to give more credence to the contem-
 porary story in which KIDO purports to quote his own

JJ-73.
 b. T. 30,972-5
 c. Ex. 1151, T. 10,281
 d. Ex. 1146, T. 10,241

JJ-74.
 a. Ex. 2250, T. 16,198
 b. T. 30,983-4

(JJ-74)

exact words: "In view of the present attitude of the Navy, it is hardly possible to decide on the opening of hostilities with America . . . In short, without the decisive assurance of the Navy, the utmost precaution must be taken in plunging into an all-out war and gambling the fate of the country." There is no trace of any contemporary document containing any other objection than this on his part, or indeed that of any of the other leading actors.

JJ-75. KIDA had also given three different contemporary accounts of the Senior Statesmen's Meeting on 17 October, of his reasons for opposing UGAKI and recommending TOJO, and of two communications of the Emperor's and his own communications to TOJO and MIKUMA on the former's appointment: the diary,^{a.} the November story^{b.} and the long "resum."^{c.} (hereinafter so named) reproduced in par. 216 of the affidavit; which does not deal with the last point. In addition pars. 211-215 and 217-221 give^{d.} long accounts of the first and third points from memory as to the reasons against UGAKI, who was supported by MIKITSUKI and to some extent by KIDA and ISE at the meeting, and "considerably and strongly stressed, and demanded from various quarters",^{e.} in the "resume" the only reason he gave was that he had not had time to find out whether UGAKI would get sufficient Army support. However, in par. 216, p. 195 of his affidavit he admits^{f.} that as a result of enquiries by TSUDAIRA he thought

JJ-75.

- a. Ex. 1154, T. 10,291
- b. Ex. 2250, T. 16,198
- c. T. 30,991-31,018
- d. T. 30,996-91, 31,019-23
- e. Ex. 2250, last par. T. 16,198
- f. T. 31,013-4

(JJ-75)
 there might not be such military opposition to him as before, but he did not suggest an adjournment to probe this further. In the November story he says he was definitely opposed to him because he thought the new Premier must be a man who knew all about the 6 September resolution as a member of the former cabinet. KID in par. 220 now swears^{g.} that it was his considered opinion, shared by others, that UGAKI would not have been able to form a cabinet, or if he did, there would have been a revolution in Japan followed by war. This is contrary to both his contemporary stories. In the November story he gives the above, i.e. the need for a member of the former cabinet, as his only reason for recommending TOJO and in that category does not mention even having considered OIKAWA or anyone but TOJO. He there asserts that he got the approval of the majority of the members, but in the diary he only claims HIRATA, ABE, and HARA as having given positive approval. The "resume" agrees with the latter statement, but shows that HARA considered it unsatisfactory and only to be adopted for want of a better suggestion. OKATSUKI, HAYASHI and OKADA opposed in greater or less degree; no opinion is recorded by the others. OIKAWA was suggested, but OKADA and YONAI did not want the Navy to recommend a naval man. In the resume, KIDO reports fully the reasons he gave for recommending TOJO: that agreements must be reached between the Army and Navy and the

JJ-75.
 3. T. 31,021-2

(11-11)
September decision must be re-examined, and that TOJO recognized the need of this action and should be ordered by the Emperor to carry it out. As I have already had no reference to the kind of agreement to be reached or policy to be adopted.

JJ-73. In the last paragraph of the November story, KIDO says, "I finally determined to recommend War Minister TOJO to the Throne, being resolved to take the whole responsibility on myself, I submitted the r commandation to the Emperor."

JJ-77. In par. 212^{a.} KIDO says "another reason was TOJO's character. Since he was appointed Minister of War, TOJO much respected Imperial wishes." And in cross-examination^{b.} he says "what I felt in regard to TOJO was that if the Emperor told him to do something he would faithfully obey." If this is true, why did he not advise the Emperor in terms to order him not to make war, but to agree to such terms as would secure peace? In par. 213^{c.} he says that on the morning of 17 October, KONOYE (who was or claimed to be ill and did not attend the conference, but sent a long document which is incorporated in the "resume") told him that he recommended TOJO, "provided that he was given an Imperial command to scrap the decision of 8 September; use his efforts to effect cooperation between the Army and Navy; and strive for peace." It is most significant that the last four words find no place

JJ-77.

- a. T. 30,989-9
- b. T. 31,603
- c. T. 30,990

(JJ-77)

in any part of any contemporary document, and particularly in the actual messages communicated by KIDO as from the Emperor to TOJO and MIKUMA after TOJO's appointment, nor does KIDO in pars. 218-9 of his affidavit allege that they did. The text of those messages is on the last page of the November story. Apart from the vital omission above-mentioned, two questions arise: (1) Why did KIDO deliver them instead of the Emperor, if not in order that he might be sure of phrasing them in his own way, (2) What inference could MIKUMA be expected to draw, having been passed over and leaving office, other than that a successor should be chosen who would fall in with KIDO's wishes. That part of the message which deals with the 6 September resolution does not suggest any fresh concessions to the ABCD powers but merely a broader and deeper investigation of domestic and foreign affairs. The whole thing in our submission plainly means no more than this-- "before you decide on war be sure that both the Army and the Navy are agreed that we shall win."

JJ-78. a. The diary entries of 19 November and 26 November 1941, exhibit KIDO's caution and pre-occupation with the "unification of public opinion" after the Imperial Conference of 5 November. They do not, in our submission, show any advice to the Emperor to prevent war, but merely to make sure that all the risks had been considered and that it would receive

JJ-77.
d. T. 31,018-21

JJ-78.
a. Tx. 1181, T. 10,309
b. Tx. 1190, T. 10,129

(JJ-78)
united support.

JJ-79. The two telegrams of 26 November 1941^{a.} and 28 November 1941,^{b.} show that TGG consulted KID about the proposal of FOMURA and KURUSU to get President Roosevelt to send a peace-cable to the Emperor, as he afterwards did and that KID^{c.} opposed it. In par. 234 he professes to have no recollection of this matter, but TGG^{d.} confirms his own statements in the second telegram and adds that KID said that if the conditions suggested by the Ambassadors were adopted, the result might be civil war.

JJ-80. The day after the Senior Statesmen's Meeting of 29 November 1941,^{a.} in which KID does not record himself as saying anything, the Emperor said^{b.} that there was still doubt as to the Navy's position and KID advised him to summon SHIMADA and MIYAMA to make sure and to inform TAJI of his intention. Later, the same day the Emperor told him that they had answered his question "with considerable confidence", so he was to instruct TAJI "to proceed as planned". In par. 239^{c.} KID says that he does not know what they told him, but the diary as above quoted shows that he knew the substance very well. In the last sentence of that paragraph, he says that the Emperor's instructions were to proceed with the Imperial Conference, not the war, basing this upon a statement not supported by the diary--that earlier in the day TAJI had asked for

JJ-79.

- a. Ex. 2249, T. 16,196
- b. Ex. 1193, T. 10,442
- c. T. 31,036-7
- d. Ex. 3316, T. 35,707, 35,804-6

JJ-80.

- a. Ex. 1196, T. 10,452
- b. Ex. 1198, T. 10,468
- c. T. 31,045-7

(JJ-80)
 and the Emperor had refused an Imperial Conference for 1 December. In any case it amounts to the same thing, because everybody clearly knew what the cut-and-dried decision was to be. KID^d offered no further advice to avert war, obviously we submit for the reason that he himself from the beginning had only wanted the assurance of the Navy's confidence in victory, and because, as he himself says in par. 235, he also regarded Hail's note of 26 November as "beyond the pale" to use his own expression and as not coming within any of the categories of a possibly acceptable answer laid down by him on 19 November.^e The question whether there is any possible justification for the view has already been fully discussed.^u

JJ-81. The important diary entry of 8 December 1941, deals with two matters. The first is President Roosevelt's telegram and KID's visit to the Palace from 2:10 to 3:30 a.m. Here there is a sharp conflict between his account and TCG's as to whether the latter informed him of the contents of the telegram which in par. 242 of his affidavit he denies,^b and TCG asserts^c that he did so when he met him at the Palace, having described its general nature previously on the telephone.^d KID is also contradicted on this point by his Chief Secretary I. TSUBURU^e who says that he heard the contents, though not the details, from KID on the same morning. It is remarkable that KID failed to call this witness himself but obtained

JJ-80.
 d. T. 31,037
 e. Ex. 1161, T. 10,399

JJ-81.
 a. Ex. 1239, T. 10,643
 b. T. 31,048-9
 c. Ex. 3616, T. 35,729
 d. T. 35,797
 e. T. 35,599-600

(JJ-81)
special leave to examine him when called as a witness for TOGO, although the matter was outside the scope of his affidavit. However, he examined him on this point only, there being many on which he might have corroborated or contradicted KIDO, with the above result. In any case, KIDO cannot have failed to guess the subject matter of such a telegram at such a time, but he made no attempt to see the Emperor or to advise him to order the holding-up of hostilities while such an important matter was fully considered although he declares that he did not know that they had already begun or when they were to begin. MATSUDAIRA was informed by the Foreign Ministry soon after 10 a.m. on the 7th, and again soon after 8 pm., that the message was known to be on its way, and was to have passed the information on to KIDO as his duty was, but KIDO does not mention this. None of them say that they took any steps to trace it, and all allege that the first they knew of the contents was when or after Ambassador Grew brought the telegram to TOGO. Yet the practice was for the Foreign Ministry and the Chief of Staff daily to collect copies of any cables

JJ-81.

f. T. 26,108

(JJ-31)
of interest to them, and on this, messengers called frequently. The contents were certainly known in the Army Chief of Staff's office, even to junior members, before 6 p.m.

JJ-82. The second matter in the diary entry of 8 December shows that at the time he was driving to the office which he records that he reached at 7:15 after a ten minutes drive, he had knowledge that the air raid on Hawaii had already been carried out.^{a.} "Knowing of it, I was anxious about its result." This, we submit, shows clearly that he knew of it before the event, and when he describes it as a "surprise attack" he knew it had been made so. In par. 242, however,^{b.} he asserts that he first heard of it a little after 6 o'clock by a phone call from an aide-de-camp. Obviously, if this important statement were true, (1) he would have mentioned it in the diary, and (2) the aide-de-camp would have been called to corroborate him or his absence accounted for. We ask the Tribunal to reject it. In par. 243 he also asserts^{c.}

JJ-81.
3. T. 10,570

JJ-82.
a. T. 31,606
b. T. 31,318-50
c. T. 31,050

(JJ-82)
 that he heard it over the radio before leaving home.
 This is barely possible as a matter of time; we have
 proved that the announcement was not made until 7
 o'clock and then did not mention Hawaii or Pearl Harbor,
 so that even if it were true it would not account for
 the knowledge shown in the diary. d.

JJ-93. In par. 249 ^{a.} KID quotes a diary entry of
 12 February 1942, as to the Emperor's expression of hope
 for an early peace. This is the matter which TGC com-
 plains that KID concealed from him. ^{b.} In the previous
 paragraphs KID asserts that this was due to his influence
 but the only diary entry he quotes of 6 February ^{c.} in
 par. 248 of his affidavit does not support him; it shows
 him as saying; "the shortest way to peace is to fight it
 out."

JJ-94. The diary entry of 13 March 1942 ^{a.} shows
 that KID knew of Mr. Eden's speech about the atrocities
 in Hongkong, and in pars. 247 and 250, his references to
 public opinion in America ^{b.} show that he was receiving the
 foreign press reports. His statements in par. 251 ^{c.} as
 to T.J.'s denial of Eden's statements and KID's belief
 until the end of the war that prisoners were well treated
 should therefore, we submit, be rejected, especially in
 view of the falsity of his similar statement about Nanking.
 Similar remarks apply to the execution of American air-
 men ^{d.} and his explanation in pars. 254 and 258 of his

JJ-82.
 d. Ex. 1234, T. 10,636; Ex. 1235., T. 10,639

JJ-93.
 a. T. 31,055-7
 b. Ex. 3646, T. 35,740, 35,807
 c. T. 31,055

JJ-94.
 a. Ex. 1985, T. 14,606
 b. T. 31,053-4,
 T. 31,058-9
 c. T. 31,059-60
 d. Ex. 1986, T. 14,607;
 Ex. 1987, T. 14,608

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(JJ-84) o. f.
 affidavit. In par. 273 he admits that SHIGEMITSU reported to him about the Swiss protests and difficulties he was having with the Army over them. Yet, KIDO says that he assumed that the position was being improved. Nowhere does it ever appear that he reported to the Emperor as he should have done, or advised him to intervene and insist on stopping the outrages which were occurring within a few miles of his office as well as in every theater of war.

JJ-85. The remainder of the affidavit is devoted chiefly to an account of KIDO's alleged peace efforts after the war situation began to develop in a way obviously unfavourable to Japan. We will not comment in detail as this is, we submit, of minor importance, beyond observing that very few of his statements are supported by the diary. But the entry of 6 January 1914,^{a.} the effect of which is gravely misrepresented in par. 262,^{b.} calls for comment. It envisages possible peace terms only in the event of Germany's collapse. In the 3rd paragraph he calls for precautions against "fellows like Badoglio" appearing in Japan. The terms suggested are clearly not such as the Allies could have considered, even so he says they may be thought too conciliatory. Then comes his real idea: whereas on 7 August 1941^{c.} he had talked of ten years' preparation before Japan could accomplish her aggressive intent, he

JJ-84.

- e. T. 31,062, 31,067
- f. T. 31,103-7

JJ-85.

- a. Ex. 1273, T. 11,367
- b. T. 31,071-3
- c. Ex. 1130, T. 10,198

(JJ-85)
 now talks of "about a century", but the object is still the same, to be accomplished now by cooperation with the USSR and China against Anglo-Saxon America and Britain-- "prepare our organization" and "quietly save our real strength."

JJ-86. At the Senior Statesman's Conference on 18 July 1944, ^{a.} to choose a successor to TOJO, KIDO so far from advocating peace twice explained that what he meant by "finishin; the war" was to choose an Army man for "the strengthening of home defense, the increase of Army strength in the homeland and that of the military police."

JJ-87. At the similar conference on 5 April 1945, ^{a.} which selected the successor to KOISO, again he agreed with HIRANUMA that there was no way out but to fight to the end. He said that precautions must be taken against anti-militarism now when the homeland is about to become a battlefield.

JJ-88. In par. 296, 310 and 312, ^{a.} KIDO states that on 18 June 1945 he advised the Emperor to summon the Supreme Council for Direction of War and command them to terminate the war. If this is true, it shows that the Emperor had such power and could have issued a similar command to prevent the initiation of war. KIDO says that ^{b.} TOJO would have obeyed an Imperial command, and if the case now presented on behalf of more than one member of

JJ-86.
 a. Ex. 1279, T. 11,377

JJ-87.
 a. Ex. 1282, T. 11,368

JJ-88.
 a. T. 31,159-61, I. 31,183-9, T. 31,190-1
 b. T. 31,596

(JJ-38)

TOJO's Cabinet is true, that they had been opposed to the war and yet voted for it, such a command would have received support within the Government. But KIDO gave no such advice.

JJ-89. Relating those facts to the Counts in which KIDO is charged we submit:-

1. Taken as a whole they show him to be guilty of Counts 1-5; as to Count 2 we admit that he was not an original conspirator, but adopted and made use of the fruits of that particular conspiracy when he joined those charged in Counts 1 and 3.
 2. A similar remark applies to Count 6 although the war against China had begun, as far as the Manchurian Incident is concerned, long before we allege that KIDO joined the conspiracy, and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident had occurred shortly before, the process of planning and preparation for expansion of the war against China was continuous and he took a prominent part in it.
 3. With regard to Counts 7-17 inclusive we say that while the planning and preparation for war had begun long before he joined the conspiracy he took an active part in it when he was a party to the general expansion of warlike preparation in 1939 and continued so to the end.
 4. We abandon Count 19 as against KIDO because the actual initiation took place before he joined the conspiracy.
-

(JJ-89)

5. There is ample evidence of his guilt on Counts 20-40, both as a member of the conspiracy and by direct participation.

6. With regard to Counts 25 and 26 he was a member of the cabinet when these attacks took place, and we submit is responsible as such, and as a conspirator for the acts of his fellow conspirators.

7. As to Counts 27-36 inclusive we submit that there is clear evidence of his responsibility for the waging of all the wars concerned, all of which took place while he held office.

8. With regard to Count 37 and Counts 39-43 inclusive so far as they depend upon the absence of a declaration of war, we rely especially upon pars. JJ-81-2. On Counts 38 and 39-43 so far as they depend upon other breaches of International Law we submit there is ample evidence against him.

9. As to Counts 45-50 inclusive we rely especially upon par. JJ-34, so far as they allege massacres contrary to International Law; so far as they depend upon the same considerations as are dealt with in Count 38 and 39-43 the remarks in sub-par. 8 hereof apply, as they do also to Counts 51 and 52, coupled with those in sub-par. 6.

10. With regard to Counts 54 and 55, we rely especially upon pars. JJ-34 and 84.

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Page JJ-61

(JJ-89)

There we say that we rely especially upon certain paragraphs we mean that the whole case set out herein is generally relevant to the Counts mentioned, but those paragraphs have a particular bearing upon them:

0159 0013 1571

Page JJ-61

(JJ-89)

There we say that we rely especially upon certain paragraphs we mean that the whole case set out herein is generally relevant to the Counts mentioned, but those paragraphs have a particular bearing upon them.

0 159 00 13 1572

FEBRUARY 21 1948

LS RE: WDO (JJ)

Corrections:

Para. JJ-39, p. JJ-27, line 16 for "not" read "now"

Para. JJ-50, p. JJ-33, add further footnote after JJ-50, c. -
"See generally paras. F-110-130 hereof pp. F-103-124".

Para. JJ-51, p. JJ-36, add further footnote after JJ-51, 1 -
"see T. 38,703".

Para. JJ-49, p. JJ-33, add footnote - "see paras. F-79-82,
pp. F-78-81".

Para. JJ-34, p. JJ-22, add further footnote - "see the following
paras. hereof: F-5, p. F-5, F-9, p. F-10, F-11, p. F-12, F-17, p. F-18,
F-20, p. F-20, F-22, p. F-22, F-32, p. F-32, F-91, p. F-87."

0 159 0013 1573

FEBRUARY 17 1948

IPS RE: KIDO (JJ)

Attached page No. JJ-36 is to be substituted
for present page 36, in summation on KIDO (JJ)

(JJ-51)
important quotation from HARADA relative to this of 10 August
1939. It shows that the whole matter was discussed in the
cabinet and that there was a "pre-arranged plan" on which they
were all agreed, i.e. the one of 4 May, but that ITAGAKI and
the Army were also determined on a full military alliance if
this plan was not accepted by Germany. In our submission, all
these extracts show that YIDO was so far from opposing the
alliance that throughout he was seeking to promote its conclusion
by various schemes of securing agreement between the contending
parties within the cabinet, not only because he feared disturb-
ances in Japan if it fell through, but also because he thought
it would have a bad effect on the movement for establishing
Wang's regime in China. It is particularly significant that he
was urging compromise not only to ITAGAKI, who favoured full
military alliance, but to YONAI, who opposed it. This in
itself refutes his claim to have been an opponent and shows him
as a supporter at least of the compromise plan, which committed
Japan a long way towards war. But he told HARADA on 12 August,
1939, that HIROTA would be the best candidate as Premier to succeed
HIRANUMA, because he had told KONO that his views were much the
same as the Army's, i.e. on the full military alliance. So it
seems that YIDO also agreed with this view.

YIDO and the New Party.

JJ-52. During the nine months when YIDO was out of office
the question of the new political party or merger of existing
parties, which he had already discussed in detail with KONO on
7 September 1938, again came into prominence. KONO was to
be President and YIDO Vice-

JJ-51

k. Ex. 3807A, T 37,846
l. Ex. 2270, T. 16,235
m. T. 38,703

JJ-52.

a. Ex. 2263, T. 16,227
b. Ex. 2274, T.16,246; Ex.2275,
T. 16,247; Ex. 2276, T.16,248.

0 159 0013 1575

FEBRUARY 18 1948

IRS RE: YIDO (JJ)

Attached pages No. JJ-52, JJ-58 and
JJ-58A. are to be substituted for present pages 52,
58 and 58A, in connection on YIDO (JJ)

(JJ-74)

exact words: "In view of the present attitude of the Navy, it is hardly possible to decide on the opening of hostilities with America . . . In short, without the decisive assurance of the Navy, the utmost precaution must be taken in plunging into an all-out war and gambling the fate of the country." There is no trace of any contemporary document containing any other objection than this on his part, or indeed that of any of the other leading actors.

JJ-75. YIDO has also given three different contemporary accounts of the Senior Statesmen's Meeting on 17 October, of his reasons for opposing UGAFI and recommending TOJO, and two of communications of the Emperor's and his own communications to TOJO AND OHAMA on the former's appointment: the diary, ^{a.} the November story ^{b.} and the long "resume" (hereinafter so named) reproduced in par. 216 of the affidavit; ^{c.} which does not deal with the last point. In addition pars. 211-215 and 217-221 give ^{d.} long accounts of the first and third points from memory. As to the reasons against UGAFI, who was supported by YAKATSUJI and to some extent by OKADA and ABE at the meeting, and "considerably and strongly stressed, and ^{e.} demanded from various quarters", in the "resume" the only reason he gave was that he had not had time to find out whether UGAFI would get sufficient Army support. However, in par. 216, p. 185 of his affidavit he admits ^{f.} that as a result of enquiries by MATSUJIMA he thought

JJ-75.

- a. Ex. 1154, T. 10,291
- b. Ex. 2250, T. 16,198
- c. T. 30,991-31,018
- d. T. 30,986-91; 31,018-23
- e. Ex. 2250, last par. T. 16,198
- f. T. 31,013-4.

0 159 00 13 1577

Page JJ-58

(JJ-81)
special leave to examine him when called as a witness for TOGO, although the matter was outside the scope of his affidavit. However, he examined him on this point only, there being many on which he might have corroborated or contradicted FIDO, with the above result. In any case, FIDO cannot have failed to guess the subject matter of such a telegram at such a time, but he made no attempt to see the Emperor or to advise him to order the holding-up of hostilities while such an important matter was fully considered, although he declares that he did not know that they had already begun or when they were to begin. MATHEIRA was informed by the Foreign Ministry soon after 10 a.m. on the 7th, and again soon after 8 p.m., that the message was known to be on its way, and must have passed the information on to FIDO as his duty was, but FIDO does not mention this. None of them say that they took any steps to trace it, and all allege that the first they knew of the contents was when or after Ambassador Grew brought the telegram to TOGO. Yet the practice was for the Foreign Ministry and the Chief of Staff daily to collect copies of any cables.

JJ-81.

f. T. 26,168.

0 159 00 13 1578

Page JJ-58A

(JJ-81)
of interest to them, and on this day, messengers
called frequently. The contents were certainly known
in the Army Chief of Staff's office, even to junior
members, before 6 p.m.^{g.}

JJ-82. The second matter in the diary entry
of 8 December shows that at the time he was driving
to the office which he records that he reached at
7:15 after a ten minutes drive, he had knowledge
that the air raid on Hawaii had already been carried
out.^{a.} "Knowing of it, I was anxious about its
result". This, we submit, shows clearly that he
knew of it before the event, and when he describes
it as a "surprise attack" he knew it had been made so.
In par. 242, however,^{b.} he asserts that he first heard
of it a little after 6 o'clock by a phone call from
an aide-de-camp. Obviously, if this important statement
were true, (1) he would have mentioned it in the diary,
and (2) the aide-de-camp would have been called to
corroborate him or his absence accounted for. We ask
the Tribunal to reject it. In par. 243 he also asserts^{c.}

JJ-81.
g. T. 10,570

JJ-82.
a. T. 31,606
b. T. 31,048-50
c. T/ 31,050

0051 0013 1580

P. 2
MIDO
Shimizu
55

英國議定初期間，未及開，大至德皇自俄國...

○事十月廿八日，一九三六年，亦即德皇在柏林...

間，於其後，共同謀議者，一良也，一九三六年...

二於此，已防衛行為，行本者，德皇自俄國...

不若也，一意見，金固的，固京，亦未開，亦未...

於其後，俄知，固滿洲事，俄，防衛的，亦未...

一九三六年，日，日，日，日，日，日，日，日...

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自記，二，二，二，二，二，二，二，二，二，二...

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Werner 210

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1. 所謂「假說」者，指其非真，而為虛構之說也。其目的在說明事實之真相，而非在證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。科學之假說，須能經實驗之檢驗，而證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。科學之假說，須能經實驗之檢驗，而證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。

2. 所謂「假說」者，指其非真，而為虛構之說也。其目的在說明事實之真相，而非在證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。科學之假說，須能經實驗之檢驗，而證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。科學之假說，須能經實驗之檢驗，而證明其為真。

假說之性質

3. 所謂「假說」者，指其非真，而為虛構之說也。其目的在說明事實之真相，而非在證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。科學之假說，須能經實驗之檢驗，而證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。

4. 所謂「假說」者，指其非真，而為虛構之說也。其目的在說明事實之真相，而非在證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。科學之假說，須能經實驗之檢驗，而證明其為真。故其性質與科學之假說不同。

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此書之內容。係根據日本帝國憲法。及各項法律。而編纂而成。其目的在使讀者。能對於日本之政治制度。有正確之認識。此書之編纂。係由日本帝國憲法。及各項法律。之條文。而編纂而成。其內容之詳盡。實為日本政治制度。之權威性之參考。此書之編纂。係由日本帝國憲法。及各項法律。之條文。而編纂而成。其內容之詳盡。實為日本政治制度。之權威性之參考。

1919 Summary - 19

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Kido Shunshichi - 77
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天皇三十二年(西曆一千九百零九年)七月二十日、天皇御幸、一、
二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百。

一九三二年(西曆一千九百零九年)四月二十日、御幸、一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百。

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KIDD Summary JJ

① 1974年11月
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 ⑥ 1974年11月

① 1974年11月
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 ⑦ 1974年11月
 ⑧ 1974年11月
 ⑨ 1974年11月
 ⑩ 1974年11月

KIDO Summation 35

1. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...
 1937年(昭和十二年)六月以降、記事...
 3. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...
 4. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...
 5. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...
 6. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...
 7. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...
 8. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...
 9. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...
 10. 王様と交際する日記、記事の何処...

P 19

TJ-2*	(c)	法廷証 三七八	法廷証 二二七六
	(d)	" 三八一	" 二二八四
		" 三八二	" 二二八八
TJ-25	(a)	法廷証 三三三九	
	(b)	法廷証 三三三九	
	(c)	前出法廷証 三三三九	法廷証 三三三九
	(d)	法廷証 二二七六	法廷証 二二七六
(e)	(a)	法廷証 三三三九	
	(b)	三三三九	

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Kido Summarization 131

本邦の郡縣制

凡そ郡縣制は、秦の始皇帝が初めて行つたもので、その後、漢、隋、唐、宋、元、明、清と、歴代を通じて、常に採用されて来た。其の理由は、郡縣制が、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。

郡縣制は、郡と縣の二階制である。郡は、地方の大区域を管轄し、縣は、郡の下に設置され、地方の小区域を管轄する。郡の長は郡守と呼ばれ、縣の長は縣令と呼ばれた。郡守は、中央の命を受けて、地方を統治し、賦税を徴せしめ、兵を率へた。縣令は、郡守の命を受けて、地方を統治し、賦税を徴せしめ、兵を率へた。

郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。

郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。

本邦の郡縣制は、秦の始皇帝が初めて行つたもので、その後、漢、隋、唐、宋、元、明、清と、歴代を通じて、常に採用されて来た。

郡の長は郡守と呼ばれ、縣の長は縣令と呼ばれた。郡守は、中央の命を受けて、地方を統治し、賦税を徴せしめ、兵を率へた。縣令は、郡守の命を受けて、地方を統治し、賦税を徴せしめ、兵を率へた。

郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。郡縣制は、地方を統一し、中央集権を成すに最も適した制度であるからである。

Handwritten notes at the top of the page, possibly a title or introductory text.

Vertical handwritten notes on the left margin, possibly a date or page reference.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or series of entries.

Second main body of handwritten text, continuing the list or series of entries.

Table with handwritten entries, possibly a list of items or a small data table.

金銀記録ノ事

K100 Illumination - JJ

中國ノ金銀ノ事情ニ對シテノ條件ニ對シテ...

本邦ノ銀價ノ平定ノ頃ニ引續キ...

ノ通記各事ニ合致スルニハ...

主且ニ廣田及東洋ノ兩人ノ...

主ニ金價ノ急激ノ騰貴ニ...

並ニ明確ニ此種ノ提示ヲ...

ニ本邦ノ反動ノ事ヲ明ラシ...

理由トシテ...

トハ金價ノ暴落...

ノ説明ニ...

諸事ノ整理...

75-70

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0 159 00 13 1600

0 159 0013 1501

WFO Summation 3

由國人自己體悟中... 此種... 世界... 再... 案... 不...

25-31

次，國聯於一九三二年一月十日及十一日行之之... 國聯... 一月... 十日... 會議... 提出... 案... 供... 書... 行... 言... 及... 十... 十... 十... 證... 三... 六... 五... 號... 三... 號... 案... 謀... 本... 部... 八... 項... 既... 提... 案... 於... 十... 年... 七... 月... 十... 日... 條... 件... 等... 案... 之... 無... 優... 越... 之... 點... 十... 三... 年... 九... 月... 十... 日... 合... 議... 案... 之... 第... 三... 十... 三... 號... 二... 人... 詳... 細... 之... 條... 件... 亦... 載... 其... 中... 一... 之... 於... 二... 之... 案... 案... 於... 前... 諸... 條... 件... 之... 一... 等... 優... 越... 之... 十... 三... 年... 十... 月... 十... 日... 一... 等... 條... 件... 之... 詳... 載... 自... 國... 國... 二... 八... 號... 至... 十... 月... 十... 日... 十... 日... 人... 之... 案... 案... 之... 第... 三... 十... 六... 號... 三... 號... 二... 人... 之... 條... 件... 亦... 載... 其... 中... 一... 之... 十... 六... 日... 起... 之... 條... 件... 之... 要... 約... 之... 條... 件... 亦... 載... 其... 中... 一... 之... 十... 三... 年... 十... 月... 十... 日... 一... 等... 條... 件... 之... 詳... 載... 自... 國... 國... 二... 八... 號... 至... 十... 月... 十... 日... 十... 日... 人... 之... 案... 案... 之... 第... 三... 十... 六... 號... 三... 號... 二... 人... 之... 條... 件... 亦... 載... 其... 中... 一... 之... 十... 六... 日... 起... 之... 條... 件... 之... 要... 約... 之... 條... 件... 亦... 載... 其... 中... 一... 之... 十... 三... 年... 十... 月... 十... 日... 一... 等... 條... 件... 之... 詳... 載... 自... 國... 國... 二... 八... 號... 至... 十... 月... 十... 日... 十... 日... 人... 之... 案... 案... 之... 第... 三... 十... 六... 號... 三... 號... 二... 人... 之... 條... 件... 亦... 載... 其... 中... 一... 之... 十... 六... 日... 起... 之... 條... 件... 之... 要... 約... 之... 條... 件... 亦... 載... 其... 中... 一... 之...

10-21-31	(a) 國聯	(b) 國聯	(c) 國聯	(d) 國聯	(e) 國聯
10-21-31	案	案	案	案	案
10-21-31	案	案	案	案	案
10-21-31	案	案	案	案	案
10-21-31	案	案	案	案	案
10-21-31	案	案	案	案	案

て下_二又_一

……我_レ……_レ對_二世_一の_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

……對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……_レ對_二我_レの_レ我_レ……

KID's Illumination - JJ

F24

3532 3533 3534
 (a) " "
 3535 3536 3537
 (b) (c) (d)

0.159-230.0000 3538 (a) 3539 (b)

10.159-230.0000 3538 (a) 3539 (b)
 3540 (c) 3541 (d) 3542 (e) 3543 (f)
 3544 (g) 3545 (h) 3546 (i) 3547 (j)
 3548 (k) 3549 (l) 3550 (m) 3551 (n)
 3552 (o) 3553 (p) 3554 (q) 3555 (r)
 3556 (s) 3557 (t) 3558 (u) 3559 (v)
 3560 (w) 3561 (x) 3562 (y) 3563 (z)

KIDO summation - JJ

最初、被合衆國の備置したる軍隊に、俄に侵襲
 田三三三責任者及びその部下の、(以下略)の
 予り云々、本邦が証言を主として、辯護側(以下略)の
 下原目記を後述の如く、本邦の軍隊に、本邦の
 項に於て、三三三就、証人(以下略)の、檢察官(以下略)の、
 據が解(以下略)の、述(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 府(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 領域(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 考(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 本邦の(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 多(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 府(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 府(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 防(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 下(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 一(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、
 判(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、(以下略)の、

正(1)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)

165

ニ努メ外ニ帝國發展ヲ謀ルニシテ、國家ノ發展則チ其ノ強クシテ、

正ルニ閣議決定ヲ爲サシムルニシテ、即チ教學計画ニ對シテ、

日本ハソノ目標トシテ、支那事變ニ對シテ、早急自衛ニ注意シ、

達成ニ總動員態勢ヲ完成シ、土地戰、空軍擴張、海軍擴張、

ニテ凡ソル方策ヲ講ビ、今在ルニ對シテ、早急自衛ニ注意シ、

發展ヲ促進スルノ計畫ヲ樹ク、一國協約見地ニ對シテ、

物資ノ供給ヲ日本及滿洲國、本、華北事變ニ對シテ、

ナル計畫ニ基キテ、確保スル、一國民協約、指導ヲ強クシ、

完璧ニシムル、一、大國民トシ、性格強盛、以テ教育、

(本邦ノ愛持部門)ヲ改革スル、一、國家の進歩、目的ヲ

以テ(總ニ對シテ)必要ナル國家統制ヲ行フ、事ノ決定、

テ下リシムル、一、國家ニ從テ本邦ノ國家統制官員選出ヲ

承認シテ、一、認メテ居ルニシテ、

JJ-324

第八項 (a) 於テ本邦、南京ノ殘虐行爲ニ對シテ、

公認戰犯ヲ格ナシテ、一、飽テテ、

ソコトヲ既ニ聞及ニシテ、

往問題ニ對シテ、

ニ努メテテ、

見解ヲハ、

JJ-33

(a) 遠征記 三三〇。

遠征記 三三〇。

三三〇

JJ-34

(c) 第八項

八

八

六八四
三〇八四一

KIDO Sumation-JJ

云々彼、中立宣言の心は、証明の入り入りと云、此れは、彼も、彼
 二於て、本主、蔣介石、福洋、と云、と、声明、関、係、無、識、今
 非難、サ、ラ、ト、云、之、云、之、又、カ、キ、本、主、の、真、際、を、記、録、す、る、に、其、
 年二月十六日、本問題、即、ち、此、廣、田、政、策、(復、加、言、分、の、全、文、は、
 反对、の、類、の)ニ、就、て、反、対、派、同、サ、シ、ル、ト、後、三、三、三、三、三、三、
 府、ク、ト、が、ナ、リ、ト、云、出、之、マ、シ、ク、然、シ、本、主、の、真、際、前、の、訊、問、
 二、自、己、答、へ、テ、取、初、ハ、ン、時、議、會、に、出、席、シ、テ、云、ヘ、ル、ト、云、又、
 彼、の、廣、田、言、明、ヲ、知、ル、ニ、至、リ、ト、云、下、リ、ト、云、又、據、據、の、由、國、
 人、向、ニ、人、道、が、チ、ク、力、ク、又、即、ち、事、変、ヲ、解、決、ス、ル、を、任、命、サ、
 シ、ト、云、ト、云、九、十、六、項、(a)ニ、於、テ、ル、申、立、之、一、九、三、三、年、十、二、月、十、日、
 及、九、三、三、年、一、月、十、日、^(b)、彼、の、自、記、ニ、書、キ、テ、ル、本、主、の、真、際、を、後、述、
 二、行、ハ、シ、ル、事、上、明、確、ニ、シ、テ、又、同、様、根、拠、無、誤、無、欺、ニ、シ、テ、之、を、
 中、立、三、五、年、の、經、緯、三、項、に、關、シ、シ、テ、相、友、ト、シ、テ、云、フ、リ、ク、

25-34

一九三三年一月二十三日、日記(a)ニ、彼、が、五、相、會、議、ニ、議、事、
 二、関、子、二、テ、サ、ク、ニ、テ、カ、サ、テ、下、リ、シ、ス、カ、モ、彼、の、右、會、議、
 一、頁、ヲ、八、十、カ、ニ、テ、三、項、に、テ、云、フ、リ、ク、

25-36

第一、三、項、(a)ニ、於、テ、本、主、の、學、生、大、臣、ト、シ、テ、職、務、を、承、
 任、シ、之、が、一、九、三、三、年、十、二、月、十、日、(b)ノ、日、記、ニ、テ、記、シ、テ、
 一、頁、ニ、テ、云、フ、リ、ク、

P29

TJ-33X-15-37	法廷	三三四〇	三二四〇
(a) (u)	"	"	三二四八
"	"	二六一	三〇八四
"	"	三三四〇	三〇七三
"	"	三三四〇	三〇八五
"	"	三三四〇	三〇八六
"	"	"	三〇八七
"	"	"	三〇八八
"	"	"	三〇八九

770055-39

78040

二十日奉照シテ申シテ云々我々之は總論ニ於テ諸君
 全問題ニ關スル本邦ノ陳述ニ於テ自公ニ論議ニシテ
 考ヘテ。遲クモ去八月一日中國政府ニ對シテ
 解決方策、國民政府、完全降伏、交渉ヲ遂メ、以テ
 覆滅セテ下リ。斯レ降伏、場能ニシテ國民政府、新
 僑僑諸政府、合併ヲ寬許シ、以テ上ニテ居ル
 事、此等、新諸政權、三三七年、答ニ出テ、以テ
 合併スル許リトテ居リテ了ル也。

本論告中ニ於テ既ニ二回引用セシ凡三八頁ニ至リ
 日誌ニ於テ之ヲ判シ、通リ「當テ六二〇、〇〇〇、〇〇〇
 兩邊ノ困難ニ對シテ其ノ方ニ在リ、カチ不仕、近衛、辭職ニ
 此ニ至リテ上ニ於テ得、努力ノ理由、一、支那、中國人
 國ニ人望カシキヲ、事變ヲ解決スルニ加シテ、凡九十六項
 本邦ノ斂メ、生シ人物、二期ニ人物ヲ、テ、及テ、
 間ヲ斂メ、不テ、數字、公、誇大ニ、申シ、以テ、
 八、近衛ヨリ友人トシテ、立場ヲ、依テ、斂メ、大、
 此問題ニシテ、單ニ、論議スル、過キ、ナシ、生、
 三反シテ、日誌ニ「自身ノ、陰謀大ニ、合議セ、
 (a)(c) (b) (d) (e) 法廷記 四六三 法廷記 五二七六
 " " " 三三四一 " 二二九九一
 " " " 三三四一、三四六
 " " " 三三四五

0191 4100 6510

KIDO Summation - JJ

疑ハ自命ニ違ヒルルヤシ述衛ニ亦シト記シアリマス
己ハ不尤カソノ責任ヲ輕減セトテ自ラ、日記ヲ歪曲スル事
方、典型的ナ例デアリマス。

JJ-41

木ノ平沼内閣、内相タルコトヲ受諾シテ當時ノ状況ニ
テ、第三項^(a)ニ於ケル彼ノ説明モ亦日記^(a)ニ言テハ
確証ナシト念、入テ牽強附會ニ基クモアリマス。
所カ、第三項ニ引用サレテ年ル一九三九年三月十六日ノ記事ニ
ヨリ、木ノ決意ハ、彼ガ言及シテ年ル改定案ヲ撤回ス
ルト云フデハ、ソノ案ヲ「單據」テハ提出シ、即チ何カ
邊カニ研鑽ヲ重クテ案ノ一部令トシテハ、取扱公
トスルニ在テコトヲ判ルデアリマス。

P33

JJ-41

(a) (a)

法廷記 三三六

法廷記録 三〇、六二、一六〇

一六二三三

0159 0013 1512

134

KID0 Summons 511

77-44

法廷記録 三〇八六

我々主張又此所テハ本邦ノ自ラカニ發給ニ依リテ
 六物ヲ如何ナル場合ニ送物ニ付ルベシト人物云々
 下カクテテラフニテ、總ハ文部大臣ニ任セ、一時全カ
 畫言テ、任務ヲ全テ自ラカニテ、又ハ適切ナル
 判斷ヲ得ルベシテ、願ハシキ處ニ、其ノ上ニテ、多
 ク自ラカニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、
 除本邦ノ内務省、警察廳、農林省、海軍省、陸軍省、
 理

77-44

77-44

本邦ハ一九三二年十月三十一日、一九三二年十月三十一日、
 文部大臣、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、
 共同謀議推進三行ハ、明ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、
 任セリ。又、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、
 當時ノ内閣、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、
 其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、
 其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、

77-42

文部大臣、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、

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其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、
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 其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、其ノ上ニテ、
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K 100 Summary - JJ

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0159 0013 1518

1244

Handwritten notes on the right margin, possibly a date or reference number.

Handwritten text at the bottom of the page, likely a title or subject line.

20-31
Handwritten text block, possibly a date or section marker.

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Handwritten text block, continuing the notes or diary entries.

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Handwritten text block, continuing the notes or diary entries.

Handwritten text block, continuing the notes or diary entries.

20-31
2. 法廷証書。三
法廷証書。三
法廷証書。三
法廷証書。三

P 45

JJ-53

0. 号
" 法廷証
一 六
二 九
九 四

法廷記錄
" 六
一 八
二 七
八 三

0159 0013 1623

KIDO Summation

ナク。此ニキヤ、一、檢察側ハ彼が國境ニ這入リ、
 何等抗議ヲ申入ルズ且ソ天皇ニ對シ石違言ヲ言フ
 ルトイフ事實ヨリ、諸計畫容認ノ證據ヲ示シテ其テ
 ントスルモデアリマス。引用セシタ諸項ニ於テ、速ベシテ
 ニソノ事例ガ、比較的穩健ナ案内ニ圖及ビ、同内閣ノ
 有田外相デサヘモ、こゝヲ得アル場合、一併領印度ニ對シ、
 及ビ蘭領東印度ニ對シ、武カヲ行便スルコトヲ計畫シ、
 又九ヶ國條約ヲ無効且ツ再ビ効カヲ發スルコトナキ
 モト見做シタコトヲ示シテ居リマス。(C) 不戸ハ石見解
 ヲ異議ナク容認シタデアリマス。

0 199 00 13 1624

KIDD Communication - 27

270

國庫、稅務、保險、銀行、證券、信託、公債、私債、

引證、法律、會計、統計、經濟、社會、政治、

今日之中國，其經濟之發展，實由於外資之輸入，

而外資之輸入，則由於中國之經濟之不振，

故欲救中國之經濟，必先救中國之政治，

而欲救中國之政治，必先救中國之國民，

此即所謂救國必先救國民之義也。

0 159 00 13 1628

p. 50

KIDD Summation - JJ

手與は天ノ子、
 此部隊、行部、
 及替ニテ、
 若し「
 カヲ行復、
 エリニセリ、
 彼が批撃、
 本レニ、
 ナリニ、
 ナリニ、

(※)

1100 - 1100 - 1100

Handwritten text in a cursive script, likely a list or notes, starting with a circled number 1.

Second block of handwritten text, continuing the list or notes, starting with a circled number 2.

Third block of handwritten text, continuing the list or notes, starting with a circled number 3.

1100 - 1100 - 1100

進駐 計圖ヲ知シテ居タコトヲ示シ居ルニテ、
 予ツクト又ハ之ヲ阻止スルニクニ天皇ニ起テテ、
 何事ヲ記シテ予ツクニカキ上リテ、
 御前會議ニテ記シテ、
 予記ヲ見ルニ、
 企テ假令來集ト、
 此等ニテ予居ルニ、

本所詳細ニ知リテ、
 議文ヲシテ、
 又、
 予居ルニ、
 予ニテ、
 一日、
 又同日、
 又上、
 終會議ニ決定セリ、
 三、
 知、
 重

12. 54
 K1D0 Summation-JJ

7. 法廷 二吾邊邊錄 一六五八
 丸法廷記 三〇九三三

0 159 00 13 1632

Vertical text on the left margin, possibly a page number or date.

Handwritten text in the first section, consisting of approximately six lines of cursive script.

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Handwritten text in the third section, consisting of approximately six lines of cursive script.

Final lines of handwritten text at the bottom of the page.

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KIDO's Summation

	55-71	55-90	55-69
a	1	1	1
b	1	1	1
c	1	1	1
d	1	1	1
e	1	1	1
f	1	1	1
g	1	1	1
h	1	1	1
i	1	1	1
j	1	1	1
k	1	1	1
l	1	1	1
m	1	1	1
n	1	1	1
o	1	1	1
p	1	1	1
q	1	1	1
r	1	1	1
s	1	1	1
t	1	1	1
u	1	1	1
v	1	1	1
w	1	1	1
x	1	1	1
y	1	1	1
z	1	1	1
total	26	26	26

Vertical Chinese text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The characters are arranged in a column and are somewhat faint and difficult to read.

Vertical text on the left side of the page, possibly a date or page number.

190

Horizontal Chinese text at the bottom of the page, possibly a signature or a list of items.

KIDO Summation - JJ

十月十二日、日記三線返サレテアリ又^(b)、上條上木戸、東條ニ
 対テ九月二日、決定ヲ修正スルヤウ提言シテ、同決定ヲ多少進
 向「テ」ト評シテアリマス。此、言葉、意味、明確ニテ、檢察
 側申立テマス。此、二ノ案ニ於テ、迂回「テ」リテ、尤、以後
 二起ルニ來テ考慮スル事ナシ、或、此時期ニ定メテ、特
 二又(2)海軍側、其時期決定ニ同意シ、トシテ、勝負ニ関
 二テ、疑念ヲ持テ、意見ニ違フ「テ」リテ、拘「テ」テ、時期ニ開戦
 二カ決定セ「テ」トシ「テ」案「テ」アリマス。十月八日^(a)、本、始テ同決定
 二関「テ」(近衛「述」^(c))異議ヲ詔「テ」リ、余リニ唐突「テ」テ、十
 二日、論議「テ」結果ニ依テ、案「テ」評「テ」アリマス。

JJ-74

近、日記記事、外ニ、木戸、東條、十月十二日、余見聞
 二テ、記録「テ」書「テ」アリマス。一九四一年十月、或、時、本、心
 二テ、九月六日ヨリ十月十日迄、出来事、話、一部、今「テ」述「テ」テ、
 二リマス。(以下、十月記録ト稱ス^(d)) 彼、宣、誓、供、述、書、二、九、項
 二ヨリ、長ク且、全然、相、違、フ、記録「テ」アリマス。^(e) 奇妙、事、
 二、後、者、於「テ」、東、條、公、答、於「テ」、予、リ、也、一、層、非、妥、協、的、三、極
 二カ、ナ、リ、也。然、レ、ニ、同、宣、誓、供、述、書、ニ、本、人、自、身、近、之、事、
 二、就「テ」、全、ク、異「テ」、供、述「テ」、少、シ、テ、リ、也。

p. 63

JJ-74	檢	察側、法廷ニ對シ、本戸が自今、言葉ヲハ、三、回申「テ」テ、近
(a)	法廷記	二五二 法廷記録 一〇三二
(b)	法廷記	二四六 " 一〇三四
(c)	法廷記	二三〇 " 一六九八
(d)	法廷記	" 三〇九八三四

Summation-TJ

KIDO

此項が十カ月ト述べて中又、然レ得、空誓保護書(全頁)、
 三六項ニ於テ、松平、向合ニ、結果、本戸、宇恒ニ於テ、
 有、概ニ陸軍モ反村ニ於テ、考へテ事ヲ認メテ
 有、テアリガ、其際此、更ニ檢討ニモ、~~決定~~延期
 之、事、提案ニ十カ月トアリ又、十月記録ニ於テ、本戸が
 述べて中、事、新首相、前内閣、員トテ、九月六日、決
 定ヲ總テ知ツテ中、者、テ、又、考へテ、宇恒ニ
 断テ反村ニトイフ、テアリ又、然レニ本戸、三、項ニ於テ
 今度、自分、熟慮、結果、宇恒、内閣、組織、得
 十カ月トテ、假ニ組織、得、タトシ、モ、日本ニ革命、起
 リ、続テ、戦争、カ、覚、テ、考へ、他、者、モ、同意、見、テ、
 述、テ、アリ、又、此、彼、カ、特、誌、タ、ニ、テ、記録、ニ、テ、借、ラ、シ、テ、
 記録、ニ、於テ、彼、ト、述、テ、如、即、前、内、閣、員、ニ、事、必要、カ、
 東、條、ヲ、推薦、シ、唯、一、理由、ヲ、述、テ、中、又、コ、ノ、範、疇、ニ
 於、テ、及、川、或、東、條、外、何、人、ヲ、考慮、シ、ト、述、テ、アリ、又、本
 戸、十、月、記録、ニ、於テ、金、匠、會議、出席、者、過、半、數、ヲ、支持、シ、
 受、ク、ト、主張、シ、中、又、日記、ニ、於テ、阿部、原、が、積極、的
 賛、成、シ、ト、述、テ、中、又、概、ハ、後、者、ノ、記、述、ト、致、
 ス、原、ノ、賛、成、ヲ、不、満、思、ハ、リ、良、イ、考、ヘ、テ、
 賛、成、シ、モ、ヨ、ク、考、ヘ、テ、事、ヲ、述、テ、中、又、花、村、河、内、

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TJ (1) 法記録 三〇三—一四
 (2) " " 三〇三—一二

55-77

一九四一年十月二十二日 (a)

及び同年十月二十八日 (b)

二通、電報

示之所依ハ、東郷ハ口上ニ於テ大統領ガ言ハソ、後實現セリテアラスカ
 天會ニ討シ、平和勸告ノ親電ヲ發スルヲ取計ラテハ、イフ野村ト東郷ト提
 案ニ就キ、不產相談シ、イナリマスガ、不產ハ及村トシテアリマス。不產ハ二三四項 (c)
 ニ於テ、此等ハ何等記憶シテナシト述ベテアリマスガ、東郷ハオニ電報
 三三九 彼ノ言葉ヲ確認シテ居リ (d) 且、不產ガ、若シ西大使ノ提案ニシテ
 條件ヲ受テ諾スルハ、内亂ガ起ル結果トナルカモ知レヌト語ツテ、述ベ
 テ居リマス。

55-77	55-78	法廷記	法廷記録
(a)(c)(d)(a)	(b)(a)	一一八一	一〇三八九
"	"	一一九〇	一〇四三九
"	"	二三四九	一六一九六
"	"	二九三	一〇四四二
"	"	三六四六	三〇三六一七
"	"	"	三五七〇及三三三八、四一六

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KIDO Summation - JJ

JJ-10

勢ノ更ニ広ク深ク檢討ニ就キテ述べテ其ノ意ヲ示ス。此ノ態度
体ノ事ハ次ギノ事即チ「汝等戰ヲ決定スル前ニ陸海軍ニシテ
我ニ勝算アリト見解ニ致スル事ハトモナク時勢ニ意味シ
テ先ニ過ギヌト我々ハ申立テルモノデアリマス

一九四一年十一月十五日 (a)

十一月二十六日 (b)

日記ノ記事ハ本所カキ

一月五日御前會議以後國論ノ統一ヲ行ヒ且チ此ノ問題ニ慎重

ト態度ヲ專心シテテウチ事ヲ為スモノデアリマス。此ノノ記事ハ

何等天皇ニ対シテ戦争ヲ防止ヲ建言スル事ナク、且軍ニ以テ危

険ノ場合ヲ考慮シ、戦争ヲ一致シテ又持忍事ヲ確實ナク

シメルヤウニト進言ヲシテ過ギヌ事ヲ示シテ居リマス。

KIDG Summary JJ

177-80

一九四二年十一月五日(4) 龍世金議 昭示教人之言 議
 一 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 二 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 三 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 四 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 五 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 六 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 七 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 八 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 九 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十一 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十二 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十三 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十四 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十五 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十六 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十七 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十八 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 十九 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)
 二十 銀自身業言... (text continues with dense handwritten notes)

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- (a) 一二六
- (b) 一二六
- (c) 一二六
- (d) 一二六
- (e) 一二六
- (f) 一二六
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- (k) 一二六
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- (m) 一二六
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- (o) 一二六
- (p) 一二六
- (q) 一二六
- (r) 一二六
- (s) 一二六
- (t) 一二六
- (u) 一二六
- (v) 一二六
- (w) 一二六
- (x) 一二六
- (y) 一二六
- (z) 一二六

KIDO Summation - JJ

多、前年三月木本が新カニ際ニ斯ル電報、三三ヲ知ルル
 二人ヲ得テ之ヲ入ル。ソレヲ拘テ亦之、所業方ニ終ル
 カ又何時始ルカ知ラカシク人明言シ居ルカ斯ル電報十
 事柄ヨリ先ニ檢討スル迄野島南始テ得テヤリ指圖下度
 廿台願フタニ天皇ニ拜謁スル事先又ハ進言ニ事先ニ之ヲ
 知ル松平八月、午前十時直後午後一時直後、二回ニ至リ、
 如セシハ依違中ナリト、報告ヲ外務省方ニ送テ之ヲ他ニ
 務ニ此情報ヲ亦テ報告スルニ相違ナシトモ本午、此ノ事
 以テ一言ニ之ヲアリセシ。ソレニ也、ソレ、何チヨリ家ニ受ル電報
 三段ヲ讀ミテ、彼等ノ中誰一人トシテ言フハ居ルカ、
 始テ知ルルカ、
 後、アツク上留主様ニ事先、
 ヲ集ルル上及ビ、
 長、司令部長、慣例アリトシ。ソレ、
 陸軍參謀本部ナリト依違ニ至ル迄知ラシマケルカ、
 三ノ事

JJ-82

十音ハ日記、
 丁五分後所分爲
 於此ノ下ニ知ル
 三ノ事

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- JJ-81 (A) 長記録三六八
- JJ-82 (A) 長記録三六六

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p. 172

トコトヨリ、ヨロトヨリ
〃 ヌヨトヨリ
〃 〃

トヨトヨリ、ヨロトヨリ
〃 〃

カニカニヨリ
〃 〃

カニカニヨリ
〃 〃

ヨロトヨリ
〃 〃

ヨロトヨリ、ヨロトヨリ
〃 〃

ヨロトヨリ、ヨロトヨリ
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ヨロトヨリ、ヨロトヨリ
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ヨロトヨリ、ヨロトヨリ
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ヨロトヨリ、ヨロトヨリ
〃 〃

KIDO Summation - JJ

(K) (L) (C)

六月六日、日記文下(C) 彼、言ヲ受母ニ示シ、六十六ノ三八、彼ガ
「平和ノ捷徑ハ戦争カコトヲ示シ、之言ニ至リ、カ書キ下リ也。」

一九四三年三月十三日、日記カラ、木下ガ香港ニ於キ、珠崖行
海ニ就テ、イ、エ、ノ演説ヲ知リテ居タルガ判リ、之、又、才
二四七項及ニ三五項ニル米國ニ於テ、一般砲撃、意思^(b)ニ就テ
「記事ハ、彼ガ外国新聞ノ報道ヲ讀ム、居タルヲ物語ル、
テ、アリ、ス。」「イ、エ、ノ、言明ニ對スル東條、否定及ニ木下、戦争
終結迄停戦ハ、好ク取扱ハ、テ、ヲ、ト、確信ニ就テ、才、二五項^(b)
、彼ノ記述ノ、以、故、殊ニ南京ニ就テ、同様ノ記述、産後、
下ニ、上、思、合、七、五、六、之、ヲ、却、下、カ、ル、ヲ、モ、テ、下、上、申、下、テ、又、米國
飛行隊員ノ、処^(a)及ニ、彼ノ宣誓供述書、才、二五四及、才、三五八項^(b)
ニル、彼ノ説明ニ就テ、同、様、概、提、言、ヲ、致、ス。才、二三四項ニ、木下
ハ、重光ガ瑞西カラ、抗議及ニ、同、ノ、軍、部、ト、關係力、因、倒、下、
下、才、彼ノ報告ニ、テ、ノ、認、テ、居、ル、又、然、レ、モ、木下ノ、意、態、ハ、
深、善、サ、レ、テ、下、ノ、意、ト、恣、テ、居、ル、也。彼ハ、天皇ニ報告セ、テ、下、才、
十、カ、ノ、二、向、処、ニ、其、影、跡、ハ、ク、又、概、彼、所、カ、ラ、數、里、場、所
並、ニ、戰場、至、ル、ト、申、下、行、ハ、テ、才、才、珠、崖、行、隊、ヲ、中、止、ス、レ、ヤ、
才、才、才、主張、之、ル、コ、ト、天皇ニ、進、言、ス、ル、ト、云、ヒ、才、才、十、カ、ノ、タ、テ、ス。

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証文 九八三

追記録 三〇五

証文 九八六

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KIDO Summation - 70

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KIDO Sumner-tion 55

55-55

本邦、起訴せしむるに許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし
り申すべし。

1. 金條の是を以て、事案ハ彼が許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし

ヲ示すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

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結ぶるに、特別、共同協議、欲せず。故に、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

之、同様ノ見解ハ許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

端議ニ參加スルニ主張スルに、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

應リハ、中國ニ對シテ、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

少シ前ニ起リタルハ、又、中國ニ對シテ、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

準備ナキハ、引續キ行ハ、彼ノ中ニ、重慶ノ事、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

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彼等共同協議ニ參加スルに、以前ニ起リタルハ、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

三年戰爭準備ノ一般擴張ニ參加スルハ、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

最後ニ予之ヲ續クベシ。

4. 許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

以前ニ起リタルハ、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

5. 許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

1. 參加者トシテ、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

6. 許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。又、許因三條不成立の事、本邦に於て、起訴すべし。

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シテ虐殺ニ関シテ居ル限り、以下第三十四項ニ論據ヲ置ケモノアリ
 マス。又ソレ等ガ訴因第三十八及七、第三十九乃至四十三ニ論セラレ居ルト
 同様ノ考察莫ニ係ル限り、以下第三十四項ノ第八節ガ適用サレマ
 ス。又同節ハ同項第六節ト共ニ訴因第五十一及七、第五十二ニ就
 テモ適用サレマス。

10. 訴因第五十四及七、第五十五ニ関シテハ、吾々特ニ以下第三十四項及七、第
 八十四項ニ論據ヲ置クモノアリマス。

五、五々ガ或レ上定ノ項目ニ特ニ論據ヲ置クこと云々事ハ以上述べ全論昔
 ハ凡テ指摘シテ訴因ニ関係アルモノアリカトシ、等ノ項目ハソレ等ノ訴因
 ニ就テハ特別ノ関係カアルト云フ意味アリマス。

KIDO Summation - JJ

一頁テアリシラス。ソレニ 古々ハ閣僚ノ一頁、 且彼ノ仲間タル共同謀
議者達ノ行爲ニ對シテハ其ノ一頁トシテ彼ノ責任アルモノト認メラス。

久 訴因第三十七乃至第六ニ就テハ彼ノ在職中ニ起ラタコトニ因テ
アル凡テノ戰事ヲ遂行ニ對シ彼ニ責任ノアツク明カニ證據カアルト
思考シマス。

8. 訴因第三十七及び三十九乃至四十三ニ關シテハソレ等カ宣戰ノ
布告ノナカクモトニ係ルモノデアリ限リ吾々ハ特ニJJ. I. 八ノ二項ニ證據
ヲ置クモノデアリマス。 訴因第三十八及び四十三乃至四十三ニ就テハ
ソレ等ハ國際法ノ其他ノ侵犯ニ係ル限リ彼ニ對スル証憑ハ十分テ
アルト斷ジマス。

9. 訴因第四十五乃至第五十二ニ就テハ我々ハソレ等カ國際法ニ及

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訴因十六。II節一、二、八、二十六、二十七、二十八、
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訴因十九。II節一、八、十、十二、十五、十六、十七、
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訴因二十。II節一、三十、三十二、

訴因二十一。II節一、三十、三十二、

訴因二十二。II節一、三十、三十二、

訴因二十四。II節一、三十、三十二、

訴因二十七。II節一、八、十、十二、十五、十六、十七、

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February 24, 1948.

IPS ERRATA SHEET

RE: KIMURA (KK)

Please note the following corrections to be made in

Summation on KIMURA:

Page KK-2, Paragraph KK*4: Omit the word "a" in the ninth line.

Page KK-4: Paragraph KK-8. In the 7th line insert the words "setting out" immediately after the word "Ministry".

Page KK-5: Paragraph KK-9. In the 9th line substitute the words: "conspiracies that have" for the words "Conspiracy that has".

Page KK-11, Paragraph KK-22. In the second line omit "a".

Page KK-26: Paragraph KK-44. In the first line substitute words "September 1944" for the words "September 1945".

IPS

KIMURA, Heitaro

KK-1. KIMURA has been charged under Counts 1 to 17, 20 to 22, 24, 27 to 32, 34, 37 to 44, 53 to 55 of the Indictment.

I. GENERAL - BIOGRAPHICAL

KK-2. Having held various army appointments and having attained the rank of Colonel, the accused KIMURA was on the 15th March 1935 appointed as Chief of the Control Section, Mobilization Plans Bureau, War Ministry.^{a.} On the 1st August 1936 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General and assigned as Director of the Bureau of Ordnance at the War Ministry, a post which he held until the 9th March 1939, when he became a Lieutenant-General and was given command of the newly formed 32nd Division, which was stationed at Yenchou in China.^{b.} The only importance attributed to these earlier appointments is that they show the accused as having been in a position to have detailed knowledge of the preparations for, and the carrying on, of Japanese aggression in China. There is no detailed evidence as to anything which the accused had done up to this time, but it is significant that on 29th April 1940 he received the 3rd Class Order of the Golden Zite and the First Order of Merit in recognition of his services during the China Incident.^{c.}

KK-2.

- a. Ex. 113, T. 727; Ex. 2282, T. 16,257
- b. Ex. 113, T. 727
- c. Ex. 113, T. 727

KK-3. On the 22nd October 1940 he was appointed
^{a.}
 Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and whilst holding
 that post became a member of the Japan-Manchukuo Joint
 Economic Committee and of the Manchurian Land Development
 (Colonial) Committee on the 7th November 1940.

KK-4. He relinquished his various offices in
 Manchuria on the 10th April 1941 when he was appointed
 Vice-Minister for War, under the accused TOJO, in the
^{a.}
 second KONOYE Cabinet. On the 5th May 1941 he was ap-
 pointed Councillor of the Planning Board, and Councillor
^{b.}
 of the Total War Research Institute. As Vice-Minister
 of War it was part of his duty to attend meetings of
^{c.}
 Imperial General Headquarters. From the 15th November
 1941 until he relinquished his appointment as a Vice-
 Minister of War he was a Government Committee Member
 attending matters under the jurisdiction of the War
^{d.}
 Ministry for each session of the Diet.

KK-5. On the 11th March 1943 he was relieved of
 his appointment as Vice-Minister of War at his own request
 and received the appointment of War Councillor. On the
 30th August 1944 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of
 the Burma Area Army, an appointment which he still held at
^{a.}
 the Japanese surrender.

II. ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO HIS APPOINTMENT AS VICE-MINISTER
 FOR WAR ON 10th APRIL 1941.

KK-6. It is submitted that the accused joined the

KK-3.

a. Ex. 3347, T. 31,357

KK-4.

a. Ex. 113, T. 727
 b. Ex. 113, T. 727
 c. T. 14,293, T. 14,633-1
 d. Ex. 113, T. 727

KK-5.

a. Ex. 113, T. 727

Page KK-3

(KK-6)
conspiracy charged in Counts 1 to 5 of the Indictment at the latest while he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. In the summation of the individual phase of the accused HOSHINO it has been clearly shown that almost from the inception of the so-called independent state of Manchukuo, that state was really the Kwantung Army acting through the intermediary of the General Affairs Board, in furtherance of the interests of Japan. There is a continuance of that policy in the days when KIEURU, as Chief of Staff, was second only in importance in that Army to his fellow accused UMEZU. On the 5th November 1940 we already find him interfering in the internal civil affairs of Manchukuo when he sends a telegram to the Vice-Minister of War requesting that the Manchukuo Ambassador to Japan and the Manchukuo Minister of Communications be permitted to exchange positions.^{a.} The pretense that Manchukuo is functioning as an independent state has been abandoned.

KK-7. His appointment to the Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee has already been referred to. There is no need for us to discuss in detail that Committee here as it has already been fully covered in paragraph GG-9 of the HOSHINO phase of the summation to which the Tribunal is respectfully referred. It is sufficient here to say that its purpose was to secure economic domination of Manchukuo for the purpose of

KK-8.

a. Ex. 217, T. 3002

(KK-7)
increasing Japan's war potential. This appointment was a rather strange one for a Chief of Staff and entailed duties quite outside those normally performed by a Chief of Staff.

KK-8. It is therefore apparent that Japan is, through the Kwantung Army, exercising political and economic domination of Manchukuo. Let us now see what the evidence has to say as to the purpose of that domination. On the 16th December 1940 KIMURA sends a telegram to his counterparts on the General Staff and at the War Ministry the Kwantung Army's agreement, "in view of the spirit of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance", to a proposed "trade pact between Japan, China, and Manchukuo as a body and Germany."^{a.} This was done at a time when Japan had neither the right nor the power to exercise sovereignty over China, at a time when Japan could not attain that power without further invasions of China for the purpose of destroying the existing Government of China. From some time prior to 1931 Japanese plans to attack the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were being prepared,^{b.} and such plans were still being perfected in 1940-1941 during KIMURA's tenure of office as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. In fact the former Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Manchurian Government, TAKEBE, Rokuzo, gave evidence that KIMURA

KK-8.

- a. Ex. 243, T. 3002
- b. Ex. 699, T. 7601

(KK-8) had given him orders designed to further this preparation for an attack on Soviet Russia,^c Therefore it is clear that KIMURA knows that the economic domination of Manchukuo by the Japanese is aimed at aggressive attacks on China and Russia.

KK-9. If aggressive war is a crime at International Law, as the Prosecution submits it is, then KIMURA by assisting in political, economic and military preparations which he knows are directed towards aggressive war commits a crime. The evidence of his assistance at, and furtherance of, these preparations is evidence from which the Prosecution submits that the Tribunal could and should draw the inference that KIMURA at this time was a participant in the conspiracy that has been proved before this Tribunal to have existed to achieve the objects set out in Counts 1 to 5.

III. ACTIVITIES DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE AS VICE-MINISTER UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE PACIFIC WAR.

KK-10. From the time of KIMURA's assuming the duties of office as Vice-Minister he must have been very active in forwarding the material preparations for a war of aggression. The nature of these preparations has been sufficiently shown in paragraphs F-27 to F-53 of this summation.

KK-11. To show KIMURA's necessary connection with these preparations it is enough to examine the duties of his office. To him, we find, are entrusted matters

KK-9.

c. Ex. 670, I. 7330

(KK-11)
concerning the control and utilization of Manchurian resources; ~~matters concerning~~ general mobilization in Korea, Formosa, and the colonies; matters concerning peace-time facilities relative to the General Mobilization Program; and matters concerning the volume of wartime requirements in connection with the General Mobilization Program.
a.

KK-12. From very many sources he acquired knowledge which to a man of his training could only mean that Japan was preparing to embark on further wars of aggression. From the 5th May 1941 he was Councillor to the Planning Board and the Total War Research Institute. The nature, constitution and purpose of the Planning Board up to the time of KIMURA's appointment has been adequately discussed in paragraphs 2G-26 to 2G-39, and in relation to the period following his appointment will be discussed in paragraphs 7V-40 to 7V-55. Similar details in regard to the Total War Research Institute have been discussed in paragraphs F-41 to F-47 and 3G-40 to 3G-50. The facts and arguments stated therein with regard to these two bodies are adopted here without repetition. From them two almost irresistible inferences germane to our present purpose emerge. The first is that by virtue of KIMURA's duties of office in regard to mobilization of personnel and material resources he must have been frequently consulted

KK-11.

a. Ex. 3365, T. 31,769; Ex. 3343, T. 31,658

(KK-12)
 on behalf of these bodies, and secondly that a knowledge of the work of these bodies must result in any reasonable army officer (with KIMURA's background and training) drawing the inference that Japan was planning for a war, not of self-defense, but of aggression.

KK-13. On the 10th May 1941 he receives a communication from the French Indo-China Expeditionary Force suggesting that an incident in which a Japanese soldier was injured by a French Indo-China soldier be used for exerting pressure on the French authorities to compel them to agree to Japan's stationing as many troops as they wish in French Indo-China.^{a.} In this communication it is stated quite frankly that the additional troops are required for use against China. The repercussions from this incident are shown in a decision of an Imperial Headquarters Government Liaison Conference held on 25 June 1941. Japan has decided to demand the right of stationing such troops and of establishing and using such air bases as she wishes in French Indo-China, and in the event of the demand being refused to resort to war.^{b.} There is no evidence that KIMURA attended this Conference but there can be no doubt that he learnt of the decision. On the 30th June 1941 he was present at a Conference of the Army Members of the Supreme War Council at which TOJO explained in detail the international situation.^{c.}

KK-13.

- a. Ex. 634, T. 7000
- b. Ex. 1306, T. 11,753
- c. Ex. 2246, T. 12,173

KK-14. KIMURA was, in accordance with the normal and necessary practice, informed after the Imperial Conference of 6th September 1941 that the Chief of the General Staff had instructed the then Major-General **TANAKA Shizochi** to begin preparations for operations against Malaya, Java, Borneo, Bismarck, Dutch East Indies and Philippines in accordance with an operational study^{a.} which he had previously made.

KK-15. As has been shown in paragraph F-51 of this summation, orders were given on 7th November 1941 for the distribution of warlike stores to troops who, for some time beforehand, had been deployed for attacks on Malaya, Hongkong, Guam and the Philippines. KIMURA could not have been unaware of these preparations because the provision of personnel, materials and funds was in the hands of the War Ministry.^{a.}

KK-16. KIMURA also knew that currency for use in countries which Japan planned to conquer was being manufactured from early in 1941. His own seal appears on some of the correspondence on this subject between the Finance Ministry and the War Ministry.^{a.} What possible point was there in printing this currency unless it was proposed to invade Malaya, Borneo, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines.

KK-17. In November, 1941, he was officially advised of the movement of the Third Air Group and Southern Army

KK-14.
a. T. 16,145

KK-15.
a. T. 16,154

KK-15.
a. Ex. 352, T. 8447

Page XK-9

(XK-17) ^{a.}
 Headquarters to Saigon. Finally he countersigned the orders issued immediately after the Imperial Conference on the 1st December 1941 alerting all Commanding Generals of troops in the Southern Seas areas that war with the United States, England and Holland would commence on the 3th December 1941. ^{b.}

XK-18. Thus far it has been shown that, at least from the time of his appointment as Vice-Minister for War, KIMURA knew that Japan was preparing to embark on further aggressive wars and that he assisted in the preparations.

KK-18. The Defense has given some indication as to its answer on behalf of KIMURA to any allegation of guilt based on his activities as Vice-Minister for War. It is that KIMURA merely carried out the policy of TOJO and that as a professional soldier he could not relinquish his appointment. ^{a.} Whilst it may be that an officer cannot resign from the armed forces in wartime, it is quite clear that KIMURA could have requested to be relieved of his appointment as Vice-Minister because that is exactly what he did some two years later on the 11th March 1943. He was relieved of his post as Vice-Minister at his own request. ^{b.} Had KIMURA not been in favor of carrying out the TOJO war policy ^{c.} his appointment as Vice-Minister for War would not have been continued after the fall of the third KONOYE Cabinet. Instead he chose to remain and

XK-17.

- a. Ex. 873, T. 8973; Ex. 875, T. 8964
 b. T. 15,146-7

XK-18.

- a. T. 31,754
 b. Ex. 113, T. 727
 c. Ex. 1118, T. 10,250

(KK-18)
 render whatever assistance he could in carrying out TOJO's
 criminal policy.

KK-19. The only other matter to which I intend to
 refer during this period is a signal received by KIMURA
 in October, 1941, from the Japanese forces on Hainan
 Island. It reports the massacre of French missionaries
 and natives by Japanese naval forces during a "punitive"
 expedition. Its only importance here is that it con-
 stitutes a warning to KIMURA of the danger of Japanese
 troops committing atrocities and should have put him on
 his guard a few months later when dealing with protests
 from the allied governments.^{a.}

IV. ACTIVITIES AS VICE-MINISTER FOR WAR BETWEEN THE
 OUTBREAK OF THE PACIFIC WAR AND 11th MARCH 1943.

KK-20. In December, 1941, and January, 1942, the
 Governments of the United States of America and Great
 Britain through their respective Protecting Powers in-
 formed the Japanese Foreign Office that they proposed to
 observe the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War
 Convention 1929 and requested that Japan give assurances
 that she would likewise observe that Convention.^{a.}
 These communications were referred to the War Ministry
 and after several conferences had been held there,
 KIMURA, on the 23rd January 1942, advised the Foreign
 Office that it would be safe to notify the world that
 Japan has no objection to acting in accordance with the
 Convention in the treatment of prisoners of war.^{b.} The

KK-19.

a. Ex. 3366, T. 31784

KK-20.

a. Ex. 1466, T. 12,767; Ex. 1194, T. 12,879
 b. Ex. 1958, T. 14,290

(KK-20)

Japanese Government actually advised the Protecting Powers that although she was not bound by the Prisoner of War Convention 1929 she would apply mutatis mutandis the provisions of that Convention. KINUDA therefore knew of the Japanese obligations in respect of the treatment of prisoners of war.

KK-21. From the 8th July 1942 onwards the Protecting Powers on behalf of the Allied Governments lodged protests with the Japanese Foreign Office as to the treatment of prisoners of war and internees. The manner in which these protests were brought to the knowledge of the Vice-Minister for War has already been made clear in paragraphs J-29 to J-72. It is requested that those paragraphs be considered as part of this phase of the summation. In addition the attention of the Tribunal is invited to the evidence of Defence witness KUDO, Tadao, of the Foreign Office who states that unimportant protests were referred to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau but important ones were referred to the Vice-Minister of War.

KK-22. In view of the fact that KINUDA was later to become a Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Area Army it is rather a coincidence that all of the protests received on behalf of the British Commonwealth during his term of office as Vice-Minister were protests against the treatment meted out to prisoners of war in Burma. In addition

YI-20.

c. Ex. 1490, T. 12,374; Ex. 1493, T. 12,382

KK-21.

a. T. 27,159, T. 27,372

(KK-22)
 on behalf of the United States of America a protest was received as to the treatment of prisoners of war and internees in the Philippines and China. All of these protests have already been detailed in paragraphs J-74 to J-78 and J-105 to J-110. To only one of these protests is any reply made and that reply is a false denial of the facts alleged.^{a.} It was the duty of KLEWA, in common with other officials at the War Ministry to ensure that these protests were adequately investigated, and if they were founded on fact, to remedy the state of affairs which gave rise to them.

KK-23. The conduct of all affairs relative to the treatment of prisoners of war was placed under the Prisoner of War Administrative Division, which was a Division of the War Ministry.^{a.} Prisoners of war camps themselves were to be administered by the commander of an army or of a garrison under the general supervision of the Minister of War.^{b.} By Imperial Ordinance it was provided that the Vice-Minister shall assist the Minister, coordinate the affairs of the Ministry, and supervise the affairs of the Bureaus and Divisions.^{c.} The Vice-Minister then had a very real responsibility in regard to the treatment of prisoners of war. It cannot be said that he was misled by reports received from the theaters of war. Consider the protest against British prisoners being compelled to clean the streets of Benzon. He knew that

KK-22.

a. Ex. 2022(5), T. 14,759

KK-23.

a. Ex. 1985(page 2), T. 14,139

b. Ex. 1905(page 3), T. 14,139

c. Ex. 73, T. 691

(KK-23) this was true because it was accompanied by a photograph from the "Japan Times and Advertiser". If anything had been done to remedy this state of affairs one would have expected the Defense to have placed evidence of it before the Tribunal. As this was not done, and as the Defense are in the best position to know what really happened, it is submitted that the Tribunal should draw the inference that the Japanese War Ministry did nothing to remove the cause of complaint. Similar reasoning applies to the other protests. Had the War Ministry received misleading information from Japanese field commanders as to the manner in which prisoners were treated the Defense would certainly have placed evidence of such information before the Tribunal.

KK-24. It is submitted that KIMURA had a duty to cause the conditions complained of in allied protests to be remedied and that his failure to do so proves that he deliberately and recklessly disregarded his duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and to prevent breaches of the Conventions and the Laws and Customs of War at least in regard to prisoners in those areas covered by the protests.

KK-25. In March, 1942, he arranged to send British and American prisoners of war to Korea for the purpose of stamping out the respect and admiration of the Korean people for Britain and America. To avoid repetition

KK-23.

d. Ex. 2022(1), T. 14,754

Page 11-11

(YK-25)
reference is made to paragraphs 5-102 to 5-104 where the history of the transaction is revealed. KIMURA's attitude towards prisoners of war is shown particularly in his complaint that the accommodation which it was proposed to provide for the prisoners is too good.

KK-26. KIMURA was present at the conference held about the end of April, 1942, when the treatment of prisoners of war was discussed. In spite of the protest of the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau that it was contrary to the 1929 POW Convention TOJO decided that all prisoners including officers should be made to work.^{a.} That this policy was adopted is corroborated by addresses delivered by or on behalf of the accused TOJO from May to July, 1942.^{b.}

KK-27. KIMURA also knew of the use of prisoners of war in work having a direct connection with the operations of war. Not only did he know of it, but he himself authorized it.^{a.} For a fuller discussion the Tribunal is respectfully referred to paragraph 5-102 hereof.

KK-28. KIMURA was also aware that the oath not to escape, which was contrary to Article III of the Hague Convention 1907, was being compulsorily administered to prisoners of war.^{a.} He was so advised by the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army in October, 1942, and took no steps to prevent it.

KK-29. During KIMURA's tenure of office there was

KK-25. a. Ex. 1973, T. 14,515 KK-26. a. Ex. 1975, T. 11,520

KK-27.
a. T. 14,283-90
b. Ex. 1960-1, T. 17,423-31

KK-29.
a. Ex. 2010, T. 11,716; Ex. 19704, T. 11,479;
Ex. 1969, T. 17,491

(YK-29)

no Parliamentary Vice-Minister and KIMURA appears to have carried out the duties of that office in his capacity as a Government Committee Member attending matters under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry for the Dist.^{a.} On the 17th February 1943 KIMURA attended the Dist in that capacity to explain proposed amendments to the Prisoner of War Punishment Law 1905.^{b.} Although the latter law itself was contrary to the Hague Convention 1907 and the Geneva POW Convention 1929 it had been made prior to those Conventions. One would have expected any amendment to be in the direction of bringing it into conformity with the provisions of these Conventions.^{c.} This was not so, however, as the effect of the amendments were to make the penalties more severe. Reference had already been made in paragraphs J-121, J-126 and J-128 to this law in connection with the compulsory administration of oaths not to escape. Article 7 of the amended law^{d.} has its counterpart in article 3 of the 1905 law^{e.} providing penalties ranging from death to hard labor in the case of mass escapes. Both of these laws clearly violate both the Hague and the Geneva Conventions, although, as has been said before, the 1905 law was not in violation of International Law at the time of its creation. KIMURA in his address to the Dist makes no reference to the fact that both the 1905 law and the proposed amendment law were in contravention of the Conventions. It is submitted

 YK-29.

- a. I. 31,732-2
- b. Ex. 1936, I. 11,477
- c. Ex. 3133, I. 27,909
- d. Ex. 1938(p. 32), I. 11,439
- e. Ex. 3133, I. 27,909

(XX-29)

that, irrespective whether this mission was due to a policy of his own or to a policy laid down by the War Ministry, KIMURA's fraudulent failure to bring the true state of the law to the notice of the Diet constitutes evidence of an attempt on his part to cause Japan to contravene its legal duty of observing the provisions of the Conventions.

XX-30. Reference has been made in paragraphs J-27 to J-33 and paragraphs J-60 to J-62 to the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railway. KIMURA's responsibility lies firstly in that he took part in the decision to use prisoner of war labor for the construction of this railway, which for the reasons given in the aforementioned paragraphs, the Prosecution submits, was to be used for the purpose of carrying on military operations. In the absence of evidence to the contrary one must assume that the reports of the death rate among prisoners employed on the railway from October, 1942, onwards were conveyed by Southern Army headquarters to the War Ministry at Tokyo. Reports were certainly being sent to the POW Information Bureau monthly at a later date, as there is evidence of a monthly report submitted in September, 1943. There is no reason to believe that the submission of such reports was not in accordance with a regular practice which had been adopted at least since September, 1942. To do know

XX-30.

a. T. 11,931

b. Ex. 1986, T. 11,809

(KK-30)

From the evidence of the late Colonel Wildo that an office was kept by the Japanese at Changi for submitting such returns.^{c.} If such information was given then KIMURA as a member of Imperial General Headquarters must, along with the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, take the responsibility of ordering in February, 1943, the speeding up of the work by three months and thus greatly increasing the already growing death rate.^{d.}

KA-31. Reference has already been made to the trial of the Doolittle Fliers in paragraphs J-152 and DD-31 to DD-34. KIMURA took part in the conferences as to what was to be done with these fliers. The evidence is that he sided with SCOG in urging that they be dealt with leniently, but in spite of this the decision was carried over their heads that they should be tried under ex post facto legislation making them triable by a military court set up for the purpose and making them subject to the death penalty.^{a.} Whilst the fact that KIMURA opposed this course of action may be of importance as regard to penalty, it is submitted that it does not exonerate him from guilt. As Vice-Minister he was a member of a conference which was called on to decide whether some action illegal under International Law should be taken against these prisoners of war. It was decided against his opposition to pursue this

KK-30.

a. T. 5327
 b. Ex. 475(p. 8), T. 5513

KK-31.

a. T. 11,307, P. 29,041-5

(XX-31)
 illegal course of action. His clear duty is to relinquish his appointment as Vice-Minister for War, but instead of doing this, he immediately takes steps to give effect to this illegal decision.^{b.}

XX-32. To offset the whole of the evidence against KIMURA the Defense have called evidence drawing a picture of KIMURA as a figurehead, passively carrying out the policy of the War Minister, having no important duties of his own and having no control over any of the Bureau Chiefs in the War Ministry.^{a.} True it is that in the absence of the Minister for War the Vice-Minister did not take his place in the Cabinet. But it is very clear from the evidence of TANAKA, Ryukichi, who has invariably shown a friendly disposition towards KIMURA, that in the absence of the accused, TOJO, the accused KIMURA has carried out the duties of the War Minister other than those relating to Cabinet matters such as policy making, politics, economics and diplomacy.^{b.}

Part of the duties of the Vice-Minister of War are set out in the War Ministry General Affairs Regulations^{c.} and these include some very important duties which have already been described in paragraph 4 hereof. In addition these Regulations show that before any important matters are formulated by the Bureau Chiefs, they must receive the approval of the Minister and Vice-Minister for War, and similarly none of the Bureau can carry any

XX-31.

b. Ex. 1392-3, T. 11,630-70

XX-32.

a. Ex. 3351, T. 31,370; Ex. 3357, T. 31,715;

Ex. 3361, T. 31,761; Ex. 3362, T. 31,802

b. T. 12,308-8

c. Ex. 3312, T. 31,656; Ex. 3365, T. 31,769

(KK-32)
 decision into effect without the approval of the Minister
 and Vice-Minister. It seems inconceivable that a man
 of KIMURA's background and carrying the rank of Lieut.-
 General, a rank senior to all others in the War Ministry
 except the War Minister, should be given a position in
 which he could be nothing but a figurehead. On the other
 hand he may have invariably agreed with the Minister's
 policy and to that extent have seemed a figurehead,
 but in that case he must take the responsibility for
 the decisions insofar as they involve the commission of
 offenses against International Law. Finally let us con-
 sider a contemporaneous opinion of him given at a time
 when the expounder had no motive for lying. I refer to
 German Ambassador Ott who, in May, 1922, in a despatch to
 his own Government recommended him for the Grand Cross
 pointing out that as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army
 he had especially worked on behalf of Germany, that as
 Vice-Minister of War he was one of the principal advo-
 cates of German-Japanese military cooperation, and that
 his personal relationship to TOJO as well as his (TOJO's)
 primary preoccupation in his position of Prime Minister
 have enhanced his (KIMURA's) influence on the leadership
 of the War Ministry as well as his position in regard to
 the other Vice-Ministers to a marked degree.

KK-33. It is submitted that during this period of
 his career KIMURA has been shown to have been guilty of

KK-32.

1. Ex. 3343 (Arts. 30, 40), T. 31,258
- e. Ex. 1272, T. 11,319

(KK-33) ordering, authorizing and permitting breaches of the laws and customs of war and of deliberately and recklessly disregarding his legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and to prevent breaches of such laws and Customs of War.

V. ACTIVITIES BETWEEN THE 11th MARCH 1943 AND THE JAPANESE SURRENDER.

KK-34. On the 11th March 1943, the day that he was relieved of his post as Vice-Minister for War, KIMURA was appointed War Councillor.

KK-35. On the 30th August 1944 he was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Armed Forces in the Burma area and took over command of the Burma Area Army in the middle of September, 1944.

KK-36. In addition to the general responsibility in respect of war crimes which attaches to all of those taking part in the conspiracy referred to in Count 1 of the Indictment, a more specific responsibility is laid on the shoulders of KIMURA for the war crimes committed in Burma, his area of command, during this period.

KK-37. On the 27th January 1945 at Esipaw, about 40 miles northeast of Mandalay, 621 Indian prisoners of war were confined in a room 25 feet square. Each received as food one small rice ball per day. By the 9th March 1945, 500 had already died from sickness and starvation. On that date six were removed to Monghai

KK-34.
a. Ex. 113, T. 727

KK-35.
a. Ex. 113, T. 727
b. T. 31,729

(XV-37)

and subsequently an attempt was made to behead them, but one survived. Of the prisoners left behind at Esipaw^{a.} nothing is known as to their fate. The Japanese retained control of Mandalay until the 21st March 1945 so there was no reason why these prisoners should not have been evacuated almost immediately after their capture in January.^{b.} On the 7th February 1945 four Royal Airforce personnel were executed without trial in Moksokwin Reserve Forest,^{c.} at the end of April, 1945, four Burmese were executed without trial near Kanzada,^{d.} early in May seven Burmese and two allied airmen were beheaded without trial at Ongun Cemetery,^{e.} and at Tharravaddy seven Burmese were shot by the Kempai Tai.^{f.} Each of these places were within a radius of 60 miles from Rangoon where, at that time, KIMURA had his headquarters.

XV-38. At the New Law Courts Annex, the Kempai Tai gaol at Rangoon, the prisoners were so badly beaten after an attempted escape that seven of them died, another seven airmen imprisoned at this gaol died of ill-treatment.^{g.} Reference has already been made in paragraphs J-8 to J-10 to the conditions at the Rangoon Gaol Prison Camp. This prison was notorious for the fact that captured airmen were there held in solitary confinement for long periods, that they were starved and beaten and not provided with medical supplies or attention. The prison commander, Captain TAZUJI, and

XV-37.

- a. Ex. 1553, T. 12,983
- b. Ex. 3090, T. 27,598
- c. Ex. 1547, T. 12,976
- d. Ex. 1543, T. 12,973
- e. Ex. 1544, T. 12,974
- f. Ex. 1546, T. 12,976
- g. T. 27,604

XV-38.

- a. Ex. 1541, T. 12,970

(KK-38)

the Medical Officer, Lieutenant ONISHI, received sentences of seven years imprisonment and death respectively on their trial before a War Crimes Commission Court on a charge of being parties to ill-treatment causing the death of 17 prisoners of war at that camp.^{b.}

KK-39. KIKKA's headquarters were moved from Anson to Boulmein at the end of April, 1945.^{a.} The picture changes; from that time onwards we find that the atrocities are committed at or in the vicinity of Boulmein. On the 20th June 1945 a Burmese is tortured to death by the Kempei Tai at Kyakto for failure to give information about allied paratroops;^{b.} four days later at Ebain the whole populace of the village was arrested and machine-gunned because they were alleged to have assisted the allies. In all, 97 were murdered on this occasion.^{c.} On the 7th July 1945 at Kalason 630 Burmese, the entire population of the village, were massacred and thrown into wells.^{d.} Kalason was 10 miles from Boulmein where KIKKA had his headquarters. The massacre was carried out on the immediate orders of Battalion Commander Major ICHIKAWA, who stated that he had received orders to clean up Kalason and that it would be alright if he wiped out the whole village and killed all the villagers. The reason for the punitive action was that Kalason was alleged to have been assisting paratroops.^{e.} The Kempei Tai was also very active.

KK-38.

b. Ex. 1541, T. 12,970

KK-39.

- a. T. 5069
- b. Ex. 1537, T. 12,965
- c. Ex. 1538-9, T. 12,966-8
- d. Ex. 1539-41, T. 12,968-70
- e. Ex. 1540(p. 1 & 5), T. 12,969

(KK-39)
 At Shanzu village which is quite close to Moulmein, the
 Kempei Tai arrested and killed seven Burmese. At
 Kankarsik 20 suspects were tortured to death, and at
 Tankara nine Burmese were executed. All of these
 murders took place in July.

KK-40. In Moulmein itself on the 24th July 1945,
 27 Burmese who were suspected of political offenses
 were taken from the Moulmein Gaol and shot by the
 Kempei Tai. Four marines who had been held there
 since April, 1945, disappeared without any trace and
 must be presumed to be dead, whilst six Burmese died
 after their release by the Allies as a result of tor-
 tures inflicted by the Kempei Tai.

KK-41. Until December, 1944, the internment camp
 at Tavoy was under the command of the Independent 24th
 Mixed Brigade, a unit under KIMURA's command. In
 that camp the internees men and women were starved and
 beaten, in desperation they ate dogs, rats and snakes,
 to keep themselves alive as 90 per cent of them suf-
 fered from beri beri, pellagra and other forms of
 malnutrition.

KK-42. What answer is made to these allegations
 by KIMURA's witnesses? They do not deny that these war
 crimes were in fact committed. They do deny that these
 crimes came to their knowledge, and say that they there-
 fore made no report of them to Burma Area Army Headquarters.

KK-39.
 f. Ex. 1541, T. 12,970

KK-42.
 a. T. 27,542, T. 27,553,
 T. 31,725, T. 31,730

KK-40.
 a. Ex. 1539, T. 12,968
 b. Ex. 1541, T. 12,970
 c. Ex. 1541, T. 12,970

KK-41.
 a. T. 27,584-5, 31,737-8
 b. Ex. 1555-8, T. 12,991-4

Page XK-21

(XK-12)

As to the murder of the 27 Burmese taken from the Moulmein Gaol and the Kalazon Incident there is evidence that, when told of them after the war, KIMURA denied all knowledge of the occurrences. They say that KIMURA stressed and

advised that the Japanese strive to win the confidence of the Burmese people to enforce strict discipline and to raise morale. It was also said that KIMURA was so

earnest to win the friendship of Burma that he published a pamphlet setting out the attitude to take towards the Burmese. After the attack on Japanese forces by the

Burmese National Army at the end of March, 1945, KIMURA is said to have ordered that the Japanese should not take revengeful action and that they should carry out only the minimum punitive action necessary for operations. There

is some suggestion that owing to the hasty retreat from Rangoon to Moulmein in May, 1945, and air raids at the latter place the Headquarters could not function properly.

It is not clear whether this is advanced as a suggestion that atrocities may have been committed by uncontrolled stragglers, but it is hard to read anything else into it.

XK-13. As to Rangoon Gaol Prisoner of War Camp the Defense contended that conditions there were good. This argument has already been dealt with in paragraphs J-8 to J-10 and in order to avoid repetition the Tribunal is respectfully referred to those paragraphs for both the Defense's contention and its refutation. In addition

XK-12.

- b. T. 31,724, T. 31,735
- c. T. 27,558, T. 27,601-3, T. 27,610,
T. 31,722, T. 31,731, T. 31,711
- d. T. 27,576, T. 27,600, T. 27,603, T. 31,714
- e. T. 27,561, T. 27,580
- f. T. 27,578, T. 27,606

(KK-23)

the Defense contended that this camp was not under the control of the Burma Area Army but was under the command of the Chief of Prisoner of War Camps, Malaw, who in turn was directly under the command of Southern Army. The Defense also claims that the treatment of internees at the Tavoy Internment Camp was good.

KK-24. Before discussing in detail the defenses raised, I invite the Tribunal to consider the special knowledge that KINURA has already been shown to have as regards the fact that in the past war crimes were frequently committed by the Japanese and particularly his knowledge of war crimes having been alleged to have been committed in the Burma area. As we have already seen, in October, 1941, at the latest he received information that must have put him on his guard against the natural Japanese propensity to commit atrocities. Whilst he was Vice-Minister for War three protests had been sent to the War Ministry in respect of atrocities committed in Rangoon alone, and of these, two related to the Rangoon Ghol itself. In the same period there was one long American protest relating to treatment of prisoners of war in China and the Philippines. Moreover since assuming command of the Burma Area Army he must have been informed of a protest lodged on the 14th July 1944 as to treatment of the prisoners in the Moulmein area. It wasn't answered until the 15th May 1945, and as

KK-23.

- a. T. 27,538, T. 27,584
- b. T. 27,542, T. 27,589

KK-41.

- a. Ex. 3366, T. 31,785
- b. Ex. 2022(1), T. 14,754; Ex. 2022(3), T. 14,754-6;
Ex. 2022(6), T. 14,760
- c. Ex. 2024(1), T. 11,795

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(X-42)

KIMURA took over command on the 12th September 1945, it is reasonable to assume that it was investigated, if at all, during the period of his command.

KK-45. It is submitted, that, particularly in the light of this special knowledge, KIMURA as Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Area Army could not discharge his duty to protect prisoners of war and the inhabitants of occupied countries, by merely telling his officers to preserve discipline and by publishing pamphlets telling his troops how to treat the Burmese. We have not had the pleasure of reading this pamphlet, but the policy of the Japanese does not seem to have had any appeal to the members of the Burmese National Army. Can any sane man believe that KIMURA instructed the Japanese not to take revengeful action against the Burmese, when he knows that within 10 miles of KIMURA's headquarters the whole population of Kalagan, 630 men, women and children, were murdered? Obviously no battalion commander would have committed this massacre if he knew that it was in direct violation of his General's orders. The atrocities were nowhere committed by uncontrolled stragglers; they were committed by regular units or members of the Kempei Tai.

KK-46. The contention that the Mawson Gulch Prison Camp did not come under the control of the Burma Area Army is given the lie by Captain TAZUMI, the Commandant of the Camp, who is now serving seven years imprisonment

KK-44.

d. Ex. 2022(10), T. 14,784; Ex. 2022(20), T. 14,785-7

(KK-46)
 for his ill-treatment of prisoners of war. He says that from the time he took charge of the Rangoon Camp on the 15th March 1944 he was placed under the command of the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army, and that the latter put him under the command of the 73rd Line of Communications Sector.^{a.} The 73rd Line of Communications Section was a unit under the control of KIMURA.^{b.} DAZUMI in his statement says that he never received any orders from Southern Army headquarters but that he was being "ordered and directed by the Commander of the Burma Area Japanese Army in connection with the execution of business."^{c.} None of the witnesses called by the Defense ever visited the prison camp until after the cessation of hostilities and there is no evidence of the camp ever having been visited by anyone on KIMURA's behalf.^{d.} The Burma Area Army was responsible for supplying food and medicine to the prison camp. This was done through the Line of Communications Section.^{e.} Although reports of deaths of prisoners were made to the Burma Area Army Headquarters, no inquiries into these deaths were made either by or at the instance of that Headquarters^{f.} or any other body.

KK-47. The Prosecution submits that KIMURA has wholly failed to carry out his duty of protecting prisoners of war and the inhabitants of occupied Burma from being murdered or ill-treated by his troops, and

KK-48.

- a. Ex. 7087, T. 27,565
- b. T. 27,545
- c. T. 27,565-7
- d. T. 27,545, T. 27,592
- e. T. 27,518-9
- f. T. 27,554, T. 27,594

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(KK-17) that in view of the special knowledge that he has been shown to have had, and in view of the fact that many of the crimes alleged were committed either at or in the vicinity of Ranzoon and Foulmeir where he had his headquarters at the relevant time this failure constitutes a deliberate and reckless disregard of his legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and to prevent breaches of the Laws and Customs of War. In support of this submission the Prosecution relies on the facts and argument set out in Part J of this summation in addition to the matters referred to in paragraphs KK-31 to KK-46 hereof.

VI. CONCLUSION.

KK-48. The prosecution submits that KIMURA should be convicted on all Counts on which he has been charged, other than Counts 2, 41 and 53. Without limiting itself in any way the Prosecution, in support of its submission, refers particularly to certain paragraphs of this phase of the summation and contends that such paragraphs read in conjunction with the general phase of the summation establish his guilt on the Counts previously referred to in this paragraph.

KK-49. Paragraphs KK-3 to KK-9 so read show him to have become a party to the conspiracies charged in Counts 1, 3, 4 and 5. Paragraphs KK-10 to KK-19 and KK-32 set out evidence of material assistance provided by him in

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Page KK-29

(KK-49) seeking to achieve the objects of those conspiracies. His guilt on the first of these Counts, or on the remaining three of these Counts, would automatically establish his guilt on Counts 6 to 17, 20 to 22, 24, 27 to 32, 34, and 37 to 43, provided that the facts alleged in such Counts have been proved to have taken place. In the general phase of the summation the proof of such facts has been outlined.

KK-50. Paragraphs KK-20 to KK-47 establish his guilt on Counts 51 and 55 of the Indictment.

KK-8 以下三行、日本、自軍、軍、三、滿洲國、故、地、以

經濟的支配、實、行、三、年、以、上、之、間、三、行、三、今、度、之、支、配

目的、付、一、証、據、何、ヲ、示、ス、テ、本、邦、滿、洲、國、之、見、出、三、十、六

日、自、本、村、三、國、同、盟、締、結、精、神、三、繼、三、提、議、三、六、日

滿、洲、國、本、部、及、陸、軍、省、三、於、之、終、上、國、柱、人、物、三、打、電、

三、三、事、業、三、自、本、村、對、三、統、治、權、ヲ、行、使、三、以、權、利、

ヲ、以、力、ヲ、示、ス、三、又、日、本、三、現、在、中、國、政、府、之、威、又、自、的、

以、于、更、三、中、國、之、侵、略、三、不、止、三、其、力、ヲ、得、以、三、以、其、本、邦、

時、行、ハ、シ、テ、リ、又、三、九、三、年、前、三、威、持、以、來、自、本、邦、三、

社會主義共産國連邦改革、計畫、準備、ハ、三、行、ハ、シ、テ、

カ、ル、計、画、ハ、九、四、年、三、九、四、年、三、以、本、村、國、軍、軍、事、策、謀

長、三、三、在、職、期、間、中、三、五、年、完、成、サ、シ、テ、三、三、三、三、事、

實、三、滿、洲、國、總、務、長、官、武、部、六、藏、三、本、村、が、彼、三、難、攻

長、進、軍、備、後、進、三、目、的、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、

從、三、本、村、が、自、主、三、三、滿、洲、國、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、

略、攻、蛋、三、目、的、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、

KK-9 若、シ、侵、略、戰、事、ヲ、檢、察、シ、テ、三、張、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、

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KK-8 (a) 書証三四三記録 三〇二
(b) " 六九 " 七五
" 六〇 " 七三三〇

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6891 4100 6510

KIMURA Summation - KK

はの経済的及倫理的準備ヲ助テリニ依テ、犯罪ヲ犯シ
テ死シトス。然レ是等ノ準備ニ由リテ自衛進メテ自衛
ノ如ク進ミテ新国界ノ至ラニ進シテ自衛ノ達成
ニ爲ル証ニシテ自衛ノ証ヨリ共同謀議ニ至リ得ル。然レ
自衛ノ言ノ進歩ヲ以テ証ニシテ裁判所ノ引キテ自衛ノ言
又スルニ、檢察官側ニ主張スル所、証ニシテアリテ

且、次官ニ任セテ太平洋戦争ノ起ルニ、活動

KK-10 本朝ニ次官ニ任セテ時ニ、侵略戦争、物質的準備
ノ準備ニ非テ、積極給テ下テニ進ムトナリテ、是等ノ準備
ヲ、在望ニ至ル迄論旨、下ノ原乃至原ニ於テ十分至
テ証明アリテ

KK-11 是等ノ準備ニ未ダ進メテ自衛ノ準備、職務ヲ謂
シ、今ノ自衛ニ關シテ自衛ノ準備、自衛ノ準備
ノ準備ニ進ミテ自衛ニ至ラニ進シテ自衛ノ達成
ニ爲ル証ニシテ自衛ノ証ヨリ共同謀議ニ至リ得ル。然レ
自衛ノ言ノ進歩ヲ以テ証ニシテ裁判所ノ引キテ自衛ノ言
又スルニ、檢察官側ニ主張スル所、証ニシテアリテ

- 録三一七六九
”三一八〇 ” 三一七六六

一、極大之數、方(四)ノ權限ヲ得ニシカバ、下ノ十枚者
 二、五枚者ニ於テハ、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、且テ必要ノ信託
 三、五枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限
 四、五枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限
 五、五枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限
 六、五枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限
 七、五枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限
 八、五枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限
 九、五枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限
 十、五枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限、一ノ十枚者ノ權限

KIMURA Summarization

日本政府對於此項... (handwritten notes)
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p. 17

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KIMURA Sumitomo

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3. 日本に於ける... (Faint handwritten text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page)

4. 日本に於ける... (Faint handwritten text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page)

一月二十三日外務省ニ対シテ行動スル事ト曰テハ日英議定書ニ
約ニ從ツテ行動スル事ト曰テハ日英議定書ニ從フ事ト曰テハ
世界ニ通告シテ差支アリト報セヨシマシクハ日英議定書
本政府ハ右利益代表國ニ對シテ日本ハ一九一二年
停廢條約ノ拘束ヲ受ケル事ト曰テハ日本ハ右利益代表國
規定ニ準用スル事ト通告シマシクハ本府ノ定メテ
取扱ヒニ關スル日本義務ニ對シテ居テ下ニ云フ

一九一二年七月八日以前連合國政府ノ爲メ補任代
表諸國ハ信託局及抑留者ノ取扱ニ關シ日本外務省
ニ抗議ヲ提出シマシクハ此等ノ抗議ハ陸軍次官ニ知
ラサレタリ法ハ既ニ下リテ九項ハカラテ下ニ二項迄ノ各
項ヲ明ラカニサシテ居リマシクハ此等ノ各項ガ最終論旨
本段階ノ一部アルト仰者ニニル事ニ對シテ我々ハ願
フ致シマス。更ニ由テ西ニテガナル抗議ハ信託局停廢局
ニ關附カレラガ重要ナル抗議ハ陸軍次官ニ關附カ
レタリ速ベテモル辯護側認人デテ外務省ノ上議
シマシクハ認言ニ裁判所ガ留意ヲシテ居リマシクハ
御願ヒ致シマス

P. 10

- 14-2 書記 一四三九
- 14-2 書記 一三八七
- 14-2 書記 一三八八
- 14-2 書記 一三八七
- 14-2 書記 一三八八
- 14-2 書記 一三八七

0159 0014 1691

KIMURA Sumiyoshi - k.k

本村、聯合國、決議中、於、非難、之、身、狀、能、之、正、之、
此等、地域、得、當、國、之、條、約、及、戰、事、及、現、實、創、造、等、
之、確、保、之、違、反、之、豫、防、之、為、備、等、之、事、業、等、
義務、故意、及、無、謀、等、之、事、業、等、之、事、業、等、
讓、談、之、又、

一九四二年三月、彼、朝鮮、人、之、交、國、及、米、國、對、金、堂、等、
欽、仰、之、根、拠、之、目、的、之、米、交、停、廢、等、朝鮮、之、米、等、
之、取、極、之、言、。重、複、之、證、之、言、。該、之、件、之、交、等、所、謂、
之、米、之、項、目、之、項、目、之、參、照、願、之、本、村、得、長、等、對、此、能、
復、得、善、用、之、之、事、業、之、提、案、等、之、設、備、之、事、業、等、
假、言、情、中、之、特、之、事、業、等、之、事、業、等、

本、村、會、長、等、取、扱、論、議、之、言、一九四二年十月、
本、會、之、公、報、之、言、。得、長、等、對、米、交、等、一九四二年、
會、然、之、言、。本、會、之、提、議、之、言、。本、會、之、提、議、之、言、。本、會、
得、長、等、之、言、。本、會、之、提、議、之、言、。本、會、之、提、議、之、言、。本、會、
之、言、。一九四二年五月、六月、之、言、。本、會、之、提、議、之、言、。本、會、
之、言、。本、會、之、提、議、之、言、。本、會、之、提、議、之、言、。本、會、

P. 15

原典

- a. 書証 一九七三 記録 一四五一
- a. 記録 一四二九一九
- b. 書証 一六〇一四 記録 一四四三十三

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一九七五	一九七〇	一九七〇
〃	〃	一九七六
〃	一九七九	一九七六
一九五〇	一九七六	一九七六

本村七亦、學傷ヲ作戦行動直接関係ニ伴生ニ機關
 言語ニ知リ居タリシヲ、彼ハ知リ居タリシニ
 ナク、自ラノ許可ヲ下リ、故ニ故ニ辨明ヲ請
 議、本最終論出⁵²²環、即、然、少、暇、ヲ、取、リ、天
 六本村、又、傳、信、二、対、ニ、七、年、一、八、一、九、七、年、の、上
 條、二、反、面、に、不、逃、走、ト、宣、稱、シ、テ、強、引、的、に、宣、稱、シ、テ、自、ラ
 了、即、リ、事、ヲ、下、リ、ア、ル、能、ハ、一、九、四、二、年、十、月、二、戰、艦、隊、軍
 艦、隊、長、ハ、自、ラ、の、知、リ、居、タ、リ、シ、ト、ア、ル、ヲ、以、テ、知、リ、居、タ、リ、シ、ト、宣
 何時、措置ヲ講ジテ、有、リ、シ、ム、ヤ。

0159 0014 1701

KIMURA S. Summary of ...

不村、在職同政務次官、存不村不議會、陸軍
 省、⁽¹⁾ 遺棄物、府委員、上、⁽²⁾ 資格、下、職務、ヲ行、⁽³⁾ 之、
 不村、一九四三年二月十七日、一九〇五年、提
 案、井、⁽⁴⁾ 修廢懲戒法、改正案、ヲ説明、之、⁽⁵⁾ 爲、⁽⁶⁾ 資格、下、
 議會、⁽⁷⁾ 之、⁽⁸⁾ 懲戒法、⁽⁹⁾ 之、⁽¹⁰⁾ 一九〇七年、⁽¹¹⁾ 之、⁽¹²⁾ 之、
 條約、⁽¹³⁾ 一九二二年、⁽¹⁴⁾ 受、⁽¹⁵⁾ 之、⁽¹⁶⁾ 修廢條約、⁽¹⁷⁾ 之、⁽¹⁸⁾ 之、⁽¹⁹⁾ 之、
 此等條約以前、⁽²⁰⁾ 之、⁽²¹⁾ 之、⁽²²⁾ 之、⁽²³⁾ 之、⁽²⁴⁾ 之、⁽²⁵⁾ 之、
 此等條約、⁽²⁶⁾ 規定、⁽²⁷⁾ 之、⁽²⁸⁾ 之、⁽²⁹⁾ 之、⁽³⁰⁾ 之、⁽³¹⁾ 之、
 此、⁽³²⁾ 之、⁽³³⁾ 之、⁽³⁴⁾ 之、⁽³⁵⁾ 之、⁽³⁶⁾ 之、⁽³⁷⁾ 之、⁽³⁸⁾ 之、
 此、⁽³⁹⁾ 之、⁽⁴⁰⁾ 之、⁽⁴¹⁾ 之、⁽⁴²⁾ 之、⁽⁴³⁾ 之、⁽⁴⁴⁾ 之、⁽⁴⁵⁾ 之、
 此、⁽⁴⁶⁾ 之、⁽⁴⁷⁾ 之、⁽⁴⁸⁾ 之、⁽⁴⁹⁾ 之、⁽⁵⁰⁾ 之、⁽⁵¹⁾ 之、⁽⁵²⁾ 之、
 此、⁽⁵³⁾ 之、⁽⁵⁴⁾ 之、⁽⁵⁵⁾ 之、⁽⁵⁶⁾ 之、⁽⁵⁷⁾ 之、⁽⁵⁸⁾ 之、⁽⁵⁹⁾ 之、
 此、⁽⁶⁰⁾ 之、⁽⁶¹⁾ 之、⁽⁶²⁾ 之、⁽⁶³⁾ 之、⁽⁶⁴⁾ 之、⁽⁶⁵⁾ 之、⁽⁶⁶⁾ 之、
 此、⁽⁶⁷⁾ 之、⁽⁶⁸⁾ 之、⁽⁶⁹⁾ 之、⁽⁷⁰⁾ 之、⁽⁷¹⁾ 之、⁽⁷²⁾ 之、⁽⁷³⁾ 之、
 此、⁽⁷⁴⁾ 之、⁽⁷⁵⁾ 之、⁽⁷⁶⁾ 之、⁽⁷⁷⁾ 之、⁽⁷⁸⁾ 之、⁽⁷⁹⁾ 之、⁽⁸⁰⁾ 之、
 此、⁽⁸¹⁾ 之、⁽⁸²⁾ 之、⁽⁸³⁾ 之、⁽⁸⁴⁾ 之、⁽⁸⁵⁾ 之、⁽⁸⁶⁾ 之、⁽⁸⁷⁾ 之、
 此、⁽⁸⁸⁾ 之、⁽⁸⁹⁾ 之、⁽⁹⁰⁾ 之、⁽⁹¹⁾ 之、⁽⁹²⁾ 之、⁽⁹³⁾ 之、⁽⁹⁴⁾ 之、
 此、⁽⁹⁵⁾ 之、⁽⁹⁶⁾ 之、⁽⁹⁷⁾ 之、⁽⁹⁸⁾ 之、⁽⁹⁹⁾ 之、⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ 之、

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KK-30

附の日本法律、憲法會議、這自引了りたつて大
 紙に日本第三條の規定に當りて其法律の完
 務を違背せしむる證據を形成せしむるに
 張る。

鞍山鐵道建設訂之旨及於之節から一三節
 及之節の了りたる節に於て爲りたる不詳、責
 任、大分觀察、主眼は依りて上記各部三節より

理に依りて軍事作戦を遂行之目的、爲る使用地
 華中の一本鐵道、建設、停廢、停廢力、使用之
 たが、（後記あり） 依りて鐵道、建設、停廢、停廢力、使用之

一九四二年十月以降鐵道ヲ使用セシメ停廢、死之器
 國共報、南方軍司令部ニ依りて、東京、陸軍省

之のあり、推定は千九百一十七年之役期ニ當り廣
 同の如く自報告が權が三送二に於りて又、何故

一九四二年九月二日報告提之りたりて證據あり
 斯も此報告、提之りて一九四二年九月以降、採
 等、正規、預則ニ從つて中から、信之べき理由ハ、予

云、斯も此報告提之、對華精神が日本人ニ依
 三、予て之を自報告に於て之に故、分、大、記

KK-30

記

一、九六三

一、九六三

一、九六三

一、九六三

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KIMURA Suminotomokuni

據ニヲ知ルニテハ、(c) 斯ノ情報ガ及クニテハ、大平
管一員トシテ、木村ハ一九四三年二月ニ作業、三月ニ進
ヲ命ジ、又斯ノ三隊ニ昇ルニツト、其ノ際、大平
タシテ、責任ヲ陸軍大臣及參謀總長ト共ニ負フニ
シテ、テハ、(d)

KK-31

「ドクトル」搭乗員、裁判ニ関スル言及、既ニ「空軍及
DP」ノ部カ、DP「空軍」於テ、爲ルニ在リ。木村ハ、此等
ノ搭乗員ニ、如何ニ定規ニ與ルニテ、關スル會議ニ参加ス。
此據ニ依リ、然レ、東條ニ、彼等ノ「大平」ニ、彼等
ノ「主張」ニ、テ、テ、然レ、此ニ、拘ルニ、其目的、爲ニ
證ニ、テ、軍中、裁判所ニ、於テ、彼等ノ「公判」ノ、所、又、此
ノ「去来」且、彼等ノ「死刑」ニ、關スル、謝、及、此、ノ、于、裁判所
行クニ、テ、決定ガ、彼等ノ「死刑」ノ、所、以テ、採、取、セ、ル、事、ナ
リ。(a) 木村ガ、此行動方針ニ、反対、シ、テ、軍、刑、罰、三、團
ノ、重要、事、ト、シ、テ、彼、ノ、責、任、自、身、大、小、ノ、事、ヲ、主張
セ、テ、次、官、ト、シ、テ、彼、ノ、國際、法、上、不、法、ノ、或、レ、行、爲、ヲ、此、等
ノ、罪、屬、ト、シ、テ、採、取、セ、ル、事、ヲ、決、定、ス、ル、事、ノ、會議、ニ、與、ル、事、ナ
リ。彼、反對、ニ、拘、ル、事、以、テ、不、法、ノ、行、動、ヲ、會、議、所、以、テ、決定、ス、ル、事
ナ、リ。然、レ、自、身、任務、ノ、陸、軍、次、官、ト、シ、テ、彼、職、責、ヲ、負、フ、事

R.19

KK-30

a. c.

記録

五三七

証

四七二八號

記録 五三三

a.

記録

一四三六

一五〇三三

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P. 20

14-51

1. 善延 五九千三
記録 西水六十七

KIMORA Summation - K1E

1. 善延 五九千三
記録 西水六十七

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KIMURA Summation - KK

1. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} x^n = \frac{1}{1-x}$ (for $|x| < 1$)
 2. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} nx^{n-1} = \frac{1}{(1-x)^2}$
 3. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n^2 x^{n-1} = \frac{1+x}{(1-x)^3}$
 4. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n^3 x^{n-1} = \frac{1+4x+x^2}{(1-x)^4}$
 5. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n^4 x^{n-1} = \frac{1+10x+7x^2+x^3}{(1-x)^5}$
 6. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n^5 x^{n-1} = \frac{1+25x+25x^2+5x^3+x^4}{(1-x)^6}$
 7. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n^6 x^{n-1} = \frac{1+42x+63x^2+28x^3+3x^4}{(1-x)^7}$
 8. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n^7 x^{n-1} = \frac{1+63x+126x^2+84x^3+21x^4+x^5}{(1-x)^8}$
 9. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n^8 x^{n-1} = \frac{1+96x+280x^2+280x^3+120x^4+16x^5}{(1-x)^9}$
 10. $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n^9 x^{n-1} = \frac{1+144x+504x^2+756x^3+420x^4+63x^5+x^6}{(1-x)^{10}}$

14141414 Summation - KK

此期同中戰爭、法規、規程、章程、
不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、
不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、
不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、
不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、

降伏之活動

不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、
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不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、不為、

(1) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(2) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(3) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(4) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(5) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(6) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(7) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(8) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(9) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

(10) 1914年10月1日、第一次世界大戦が勃発した。この大戦は、1918年11月11日に終結した。この大戦は、人類史上最大の戦争であり、数千万人の犠牲者を出した。

1914年10月1日	第一次世界大戦が勃発した。
1918年11月11日	第一次世界大戦が終結した。
1914年10月1日	第一次世界大戦が勃発した。
1918年11月11日	第一次世界大戦が終結した。
1914年10月1日	第一次世界大戦が勃発した。
1918年11月11日	第一次世界大戦が終結した。
1914年10月1日	第一次世界大戦が勃発した。
1918年11月11日	第一次世界大戦が終結した。
1914年10月1日	第一次世界大戦が勃発した。
1918年11月11日	第一次世界大戦が終結した。

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KIMURA Sumner - KK

KK-36

「三つ」と、憲兵隊刑務所下北新裁判所別館二番、
 修務達八逃之ヲ念テ後踏ク改打廿此内七名死之云 又此
 刑務所刑獄廿三其外七名、飛行士六名修達三死之云
 云云 「三つ」と刑務所修務救済所ノ状況ハ一、六、
 知事、丁部庄ニ就ニ論及者ニ在リ云云 此ノ刑務所ノ監押
 士六名飛行士ノ長期間監所ニ監禁者十名、運二使事ノ機工
 廿七名、改打廿七、墜機者廿六名又活捕者六名、
 下有名下リ云云 修務救済所長、多ク之ヲ不罰ノ旨ヲ諭、
 「三つ」中尉、該救済所ニ在ル者十七名、修達三死ニ在リ云云
 處信ノ關係ニ多ク詳ク以テ、戦争犯罪罪ヲ專念裁判所於テ、
 管理セラレ云云 又之禁錮七年及死亡刑、宣言シ受テテ云云

KK-37

本村、司令部一九四五年四月廿「三つ」と「三つ」と
 部致シ云々 重傷者云々、以時以降我々「三つ」と及「三つ」
 此部ニ於テ殘存者及犯罪者見テ云々云々。一九四五年六月
 十日、「三つ」と聯合厚澤部隊ノ關係ヲ通報シ云々云々、
 局「三つ」と(五回)、憲兵隊ヨリ書キ來リ云々
 又之關係「三つ」と(Hubei)ニ在リ、以テ、命令民ヲ聯合
 局ヲ援助シテ中ニ立チ云々云々 遺孀者、機關銃ニ撃テ死ス云云

P.S.J

KK-38

a. 書証 一五四一 記録 一三九七
 b. " 一五四一 " 一三九七

KK-39

a. 記録 五〇六九
 b. 書証 一五三七 記録 一三九五

(Kamikaze) ニ於テ二十名ノ嫌疑者ガ被テ殺サレ、「モルタン」
 (Tan Kaya) ニ於テハ、九名ノ「モルタン」人ガ被テ刑ト處セラルマシク、
 此等ノ殺人ノ總テ七月ニ行ハレタリテアリマス。

KK-40

「モルタン」ニ於テサハ、一九四五年七月三日政治犯ノ嫌疑者ガ被テ
 ニシタニテ七名ノ「モルタン」人ガ「モルタン」監獄ウチニ送リテ置カレ

兵隊ニヨツテ射殺サレシマシク、一九四五年四月以來其処ニ拘

置サレテ居タリ、海兵ノ跡形モナク消シ去セテマシマシク、彼

等ハ死ニシタリト推定セテハナリラセシク、
 一頁、九名ノ「モルタン」人ハ

KK-39

c. 書証 一五三八一八 記録 一三九六六一八

d. " 一五三九一四一 " 一三九六二七〇

e. " 一五四〇(一及五五) " 一三九六九

f. " 一五四一 " 一三九七〇

KK-40

a. " 一五三九 " 一三九六八

b. " 一五四一 " 一三九七〇

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總計九十七名カ此際ニ殺害セラルシヨリ
一九四三年七月七日カ

ゴシ(Katsagon)ニ於テ、ソノ村ノ全住民タル六百名ノ「ニル」人

ヲ虐殺セラル。井戸ノ中ニ投ケ込メシキリ。少フシハ木村ノ司

令部ノマツタ「モル」ニカラテ、所ニテカリシラス。虐殺ハ大隊

長「イカ」少佐ノ直接ノ命令ニ依リテ行ハレタリ。ニル人ハ彼

「カラ」シテ掃蕩セヨトノ命令ニ従フテテカリシ。彼「全村ヲ

全滅」セセ。全村民ヲ殺シテモヨカリシ。述ベテ居リシ。懲罰的に行

ニ「理由」ハ「カラ」ゴシ「村落」ノ全住民ヲ殺シテ居ルニ由リ

サレタニ「テ」アリシ。實ニ「自衛隊」モ「非常」ニ「活動的」ナリシ

シ。 「モル」メン「極」ク「近」ク「シ」ヤスレ(Shanmu)「村」ノ「重要」兵

隊ハ七名ノ「ニル」人ヲ「逮捕」シ「証言」致シマシ。 「カ」チ「レ」イ

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... .. (MORPHO) (KALASTO)

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KIMURA Summation - KK

一 (a) 演 師 備 考 信 憑 衣 好 于 下 以 主 林 三 層
 下 了 師 師 設 例 又 「 木 人 」 (TAVOT) 操 固 術
 同 會 堂 又 同 不 算 拍 揮 一 真 歷 以 不 主 林 心
 三 行 人 三 三 行 信 憑 收 答 竹 同 會 堂 拍 揮 下 三 行
 三 三 行 設 例 以 收 答 竹 以 三 行 會 堂 及 野 下
 三 三 行 設 例 以 收 答 竹 以 三 行 會 堂 及 野 下

一 (a) 演 師 備 考 信 憑 衣 好 于 下 以 主 林 三 層
 二 七 五 八
 二 七 五 九

2001

2001

1947年
1948年
1949年
1950年
1951年
1952年

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 1953年... 1954年... 1955年... 1956年... 1957年... 1958年...
 1959年... 1960年... 1961年... 1962年... 1963年... 1964年...
 1965年... 1966年... 1967年... 1968年... 1969年... 1970年...
 1971年... 1972年... 1973年... 1974年... 1975年... 1976年...
 1977年... 1978年... 1979年... 1980年... 1981年... 1982年...
 1983年... 1984年... 1985年... 1986年... 1987年... 1988年...
 1989年... 1990年... 1991年... 1992年... 1993年... 1994年...
 1995年... 1996年... 1997年... 1998年... 1999年... 2000年...

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KIMURA Summation - KK

持此、彼が特別に知之所を鑑みし時、此の方面軍
 司令部より木村、只軍二部下、將校軍紀維持等
 と告ぐるは、亦諒下、軍隊に此の人、取扱の方
 法を教へるは、ソレヲ発行スルコトヨシ、停傷及亡領語
 國住民を保護スルは、任初ヲ采スルハ出来タカ
 主張致ス。我々、此、ソレヲ讀ム先、案ヲ有
 ンセテ、日本、政策が此の國民軍、人々ニ少
 部許へト母が下々と思ハテ、ナリ。木村、司令
 部、十里範圍内、カラガシ(不知)、全住民、即
 ち男女子供六百三十名が殺戮サシタリ。知リ時、正氣
 ヲ失フ者誰カ、木村、日本軍ニ此の人ニ對シ報復行
 爲ヲナスベカラスト命令シ、テ、ソレ信スルコトが出來セ
 カ。明カニ何、大隊長ヲ虐殺ガ自己將軍、命令ニ直接
 違反スルモ、テ、ソレ知リ、ナシ、此、虐殺ヲ行ハシ
 十カヲテ、ナリ。殘虐行為、如何ナル場所ニテ、取
 締ラセ、又、落伍者ヨリ行ハシ、テ、ソレ、正規、部隊
 者、ノ、憲兵、隊員、ヨリ、行ハシ、テ、ナリ。

P.31

刑務所收容所、此の方面軍支配下、實
 シ、ソレ、主張ガ停傷、虐待、廉、以テ、現在、七年、

禁錮服之ニキニ收容所長「又ミ」大尉ニヨリテ、遺徳に
 コトカ明カニサシテオリマス。彼ハ彼ガ九四五年三月十日
 ニ「^ニ」ニ收容所ヲ擔任シテ、日本「^ニ」方面軍司令官、
 令官、指揮下ニ置カレ、ソレヲ同司令官ハ彼ヲ第七十三
 兵站地区、指揮下ニ置キ、自ラ指揮下ニ置キ、第七
 十三兵站地区、不村、指揮下ニ置キ、
 「^ニ」ハ、彼、陳述、中テ、彼、日本、南方軍司令部
 カニ、何等、命令ヲ受領シテ、ハナク、電報ヲ遂行
 南シテ日本「^ニ」方面軍ヨリ命令セシ指圖ナシ、
 述テナリ、^ニ」^ニ復側ニヨリテ召喚セシ證人ハ何モ
 終戦後ニ至リテ同刑務所收容所ヲ訪問シ、
 且同收容所ガ木村ニテ誰カニ訪問ナラシムルコト、
 證據モナシ、^ニ」方面軍ハ、傷兵收容
 所ニ食物及医薬品ヲ補給スル責任ガ付クナリ。
 此ハ兵站地区ヲ通行ハシ、^ニ」^ニ傷兵、死亡報告書
 「^ニ」方面軍司令部ニ提出セシ、^ニ」^ニカ、此等
 死亡、調査、同司令部、或ハ何カ他、團作ヨリテ、
 「^ニ」亦、其、請求ニヨリテ、行ハシ、^ニ」^ニ。

- (a) 書証 三八七 記録 三七五六一五
- (b) 記録 三七五五
- (c) " " 三七五六一七
- (d) " " 三七五五 記録 三七五九
- (e) 記録 三七五四、八、九
- (f) " " 三七五五 記録 三七五九四

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木村大太郎

KIMURA Summation - KK

本村大起講談、新國學乃至學士大學士乃至學士三三學士
二十四學士乃至學士三三學士三田三十七乃至學士四四學士五三
乃至學士五五本講述亦于ありて之。

一般論 - 履歷

陸軍種々、職之勤、陸軍大佐、階級進歩、被授、木
村大起一九三五年三月十五日陸軍省整備局(統制課長)補
之。 (a) 一九三六年八月一日彼、陸軍少將、陸軍省
省兵器局長ニ補之。 (b) 一九三九年三月九日、陸軍中將
ニ進之。 (c) 中國、交州駐屯之新設、陸軍第二師團師團
長ニ親補之。 (d) 此等初期、重職、有
唯、重要性、以、等、被授、人、自、在、中國、於、此、這、略、準
備、及、遂、行、詳、細、ニ、知、悉、之、地位、ア、リ、テ、示、ス、コ、ト
ナ、リ、マ、ス。 彼、人、が、以、時、定、之、為、シ、如何、ト、事、關、ニ、評
判、ニ、証、據、ハ、合、致、ア、リ、マ、ス。 然、レ、初、一、九、四、〇、年、四、月、二、九、日、依
テ、華、事、ニ、功、績、有、リ、功、三、級、金、錨、勲、章、及、四、級、軍、功、章、
官、ヲ、拜、受、ス、之、コ、ト、公、意、表、被、ア、リ、マ、ス。 (c)

註 記録番号、英文、頁番号、凡

- R.1
- KK-2 (a) 書証 一三三 記録 七二
- " " 二二八 " 二二五
- (b) " " 一一三 " 七二七
- (c) " " 一一三 " 七二七

新二 十月三日依閣議東軍ノ總參謀長ニ補フシノ職ニ充テ
 一九四四年十月七日日滿經濟共同委員會ニ滿洲經濟年
 員會ノ委員ニ充テ

附々 第三次近衛内閣ニ於テ被任人車條ノ下ニ彼方陸軍次官ニ補
 之シ一九四一年四月十日ニ彼方滿洲ニ於テ彼方總務長官
 一ニ充テ (a) 一九四一年五月五日總務院參事及總務院
 院評參事ニ任テ (b) 陸軍次官トシテ大本營
 議會議ニ列座スルニ任テ (c) 總務院一節ニ充テ (一九四一年十
 一月五日) 以陸軍次官トシテ本官ヲ退任スルニ任テ (a) 議
 會ニ充テ會ニ陸軍省所屬陸軍事務政府委員ニ任テ (a)

附々 一九四三年三月十日彼方陸軍次官、本官ヲ顧ニ依リ受テ
 軍部ニ參謀官ニ補フシ (一九四四年八月三日) 彼方編
 方面軍司令官ニ補フシ (日本降伏時本官ノ職ニリテ (a))

附々 一九四四年四月十日 陸軍次官任命ニ充テノ活動
 被任人ニ起訴狀、訴因等第一ヨリ第二中ニ詳述サレテ
 同議會議ニ選テ上院東軍ノ參謀長時任ニ充テノ上院
 上ノ下ヲ主張セシメ。被任人國籍ノ個人ハ陸軍總長

- KK-5 (a) (1) 証書 二二三
- (2) 証書 二二三
- (3) 証書 二二三
- (4) 証書 二二三
- (5) 証書 二二三
- (6) 証書 二二三
- (7) 証書 二二三
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- (77) 証書 二二三
- (78) 証書 二二三
- (79) 証書 二二三
- (80) 証書 二二三
- (81) 証書 二二三
- (82) 証書 二二三
- (83) 証書 二二三
- (84) 証書 二二三
- (85) 証書 二二三
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- (95) 証書 二二三
- (96) 証書 二二三
- (97) 証書 二二三
- (98) 証書 二二三
- (99) 証書 二二三
- (100) 証書 二二三

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KOISO1. Charges against KOISO.

(LI-1). Counts 1-5 charge KOISO with conspiracies to wage wars of aggression and in violation of International Law.

Counts 6-17 charge KOISO with planning and preparing wars of aggression against the nations hereinafter named, between January 1, 1928 and September 2, 1945; namely, in count 6, the Republic of China; count 7, the United States of America; count 8, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and northern Ireland and all parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations; count 9, the Commonwealth of Australia; count 10, New Zealand; count 11, Canada; count 12, India; count 13, the Commonwealth of the Philippines; count 14, the Kingdom of the Netherlands; count 15, the Republic of France; count 16, the Kingdom of Thailand; and count 17, the USSR.

Count 18 charges KOISO with initiating a war of aggression against China.

Count 26 charges KOISO with initiating a war of aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic.

Count 27-32 charge KOISO with waging wars of aggression against China, the United States of America, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Count 34 charges KOISO with waging a war of

(LL-1)
aggression against Thailand.

Count 36 charges KOISO with waging a war of aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and the U.S.S.R.

Count 44 charges KOISO with murdering POW members of armed forces and civilians.

Counts 48-50 charge KOISO with specific acts of murder at various places in China.

Count 51 charges KOISO with specific acts of murder at specific places in Mongolia and the U.S.S.R.

Count 53 charges KOISO with conspiring to commit breaches of the law and customs of war in respect to the treatment of POW and civilian internees.

Count 54 charges KOISO with authorizing and fomenting the offenses mentioned in Count 53.

Count 55 charges KOISO with deliberately and recklessly disregarding legal duty to take adequate steps to prevent the breach of conventions and secure observance of the laws and customs of war.

2. KOISO's activities prior to the Manchurian Incident.

(a) His affiliations.

(LL-2) From 1929 to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, a movement led by OKA KA having as its objective the settlement of the Manchurian problem,^a by the establishment of a people's movement,^b

(LL-2)

a. T. 15,578

b. T. 15,573

(LL-2) gradually aroused the interest and assistance of the Army.^c KOISO, ITAGAKI, DOIHARA, Gen. TADA, and others prominent in Army circles, made it possible for OKAWA to openly deliver lectures at the Army General Staff.^d In addition, OKAWA lectured throughout Japan in 135 places with audiences of over 100,000.^e His aim was to arouse the Japanese so that they would "brave fire and water for their motherland."^f He urged the unification of public opinion on foreign policy and stated that the solution of the Manchurian problem was an absolute condition to the very existence of Japan.^g He advocated world supremacy for Japan; urged Japan to prepare for war with the United States, and attacked the principle of the status quo among nations.^h It was with this advocate of aggression that KOISO aligned himself, and, as will be later seen, became entangled in the March Incident.

(LL-3) KOISO had become a member of KOKUHONSHA Society in 1924 and remained a member until the society "disappeared."^a He attended a meeting of this organization in July 1931 at which HIRANUMA also was present.^b He could not remember whether ARAKI was or was not present. He knew that HIRANUMA was president of the KOKUHONSHA.^c

(LL-4). The KOKUHONSHA Society (Foundation of the State Society) had as its purpose the fostering

(LL-2)

- c. T. 15,575
- d. T. 15,565
- e. T. 15,597
- f. T. 15,597
- g. T. 15,598
- h. T. 15,602

(LL-3)

- a. T 32,273
- b. T 32,274
- c. T 32,274

(LL-4) of the spirit of nationalism, bolstering the foundations of the state and the exaltation of the national spirit.^a KOISO asserted that he affiliated with this society because the fundamental character of the state was not fully clarified and he decided that it would be a good thing to secure an understanding of the true character and spirit of Japan through the magazine published by the organization.^b KOISO denied being a member of the SAKURAKAI.^c

(LL-5). Thus it is seen that in the critical years before the Manchurian Incident, KOISO was more than a military man under orders of his superiors. He was a supporter of persons and movements having as their ultimate objectives, forceful measures for the expansion of Japan, by war, if necessary.

(b) His official position and connection.

(LL-6). KOISO was commissioned an infantry second lieutenant in June 1901; he was promoted at various intervals, becoming Major General in December 1926. In August 1930, he became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, which position he held until 29 February 1932, when he was named Vice War Minister.^a

(LL-7). The Military Affairs Bureau had five sections: the Military Affairs Section, the Military Service Section, the Conscription Section, the

(LL-4)

- a. Ex 164, T 1,636
- b. T. 32,276
- c. T. 32,281

(LL-6)

- a. Ex 3375, T 32,205

(LL-7)
Defensive Preparations Section, and the Horse Administration Section.^a

(LL-8). Matters concerning General Staff Headquarters were under his jurisdiction^a as well as matters regarding normal army organization, including as peacetime and wartime organizations.^b General TATEKAWA, Chief of the Second Section of the Army General Staff, whose name is linked to KOISO as a plotter of the March Incident,^c was strongly of the opinion that unless Manchuria were seized by Japan, it would be impossible for Japan to become one of the powers of the world as a highly developed national defense state.^c It was the same General TATEKAWA who was sent to Mukden by the General Staff, after KOISO broached the need for action by the Central Authorities to stop impulsive movements by the Kwantung Army, and who failed to carry out his instructions.

(c) His Connection with the March Incident.

(LL-9). The March Incident was a plot engineered by OKAWA, but participated in by TATEKAWA, MIYONUMA, and KOISO, Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO, CHIGEFUJI and others,^a to enable the masses to express their disapproval of the Diet, then in session, by means of a mass demonstration and a bombing in the vicinity of the Diet. It was expected that the ensuing turmoil would necessitate the declaration of martial law, the overthrow of the

(LL-7)
e. Ex. 3385, T 32,484

(LL-8)
a. Ex. 3385, T 32,484
b. Ex. 3385, T 32,484
c. KIDO Diary, Ex 179F, T 1,927-8
d. TATEKAWA, Ryukichi, T 2,002-3

(LL-9)
e. T 1,927-8

(LL-9)
Cabinet, and the plan was to install War Minister
MAGAKI as Premier, thus centering political power
around the Army group.^b

(LL-10). KOISO denied any connection with the
initial plot but claimed that OKAWA first broached
the matter to UGAKI, and later, returning for a
second conference, explained the plan to him. At this
meeting KOISO said that he concluded that the plan was
reckless.^a Nevertheless, instead of dissociating him-
self from participation therein, he ordered his sub-
ordinate MAGATA to examine the plan to find out whether
the plan had consistency^b because, as he now claims,
the matter had to be reported to the War Minister and
he said no plan could be submitted to the War Minister
in which there was any inconsistency.^c Just why a
plan of this kind which had no relation to War Depart-
ment affairs had to be presented to UGAKI, the War
Minister, was not explained.

(LL-11). Although the plan finally was cancelled,
due to UGAKI's refusal to permit the same to be exe-
cuted,^a the action planned, and the measures adopted,
indicate definitely that the participants were moti-
vated by a desire to solve the Manchurian problem,^b
and accomplish Japan's "overseas development,"^c and at
the same time set up a political power centering
around the army.^d

(LL-9)

b. Ex. 2177-A, T 15,586;
32,282-3

(LL-10)

a. T 32,288
b. T 32,291
c. T 32,291

(LL-11)

a. T 15,582
b. T 15,578
c. T 15,581
d. T 15,583

(LL-12). In working out the plan, KOISO gradually "came to be involved" and later "took charge of everything,"^a and it was agreed between OKAWA and KOISO, that OKAWA would represent the civilians and KOISO would represent the Army.^b

(LL-13). TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu, Chief of the Second Section of the Army General Staff, made available for OKAWA's use, 300 imitation bombs in connection with the proposed bombing.^c After it was decided by UGAKI that the plan should be abandoned, KOISO requested the return of the bombs from OKAWA, SHINIZU and finally he intervened with Marquis TOFUGAWA, because he felt the prestige of the army would suffer unless the bombs were recovered.^b He did not seize the bombs by using military authority because he claims that the bombs belonged to the infantry school which was under the jurisdiction of the Inspector General of Education, a separate branch of the Army from the War Ministry.^c It is interesting to note that Gen. IWATO, Nobuyoshi, now deceased, who was Inspector General of Military Education at that time, showed no interest whatsoever in the matter, and KOISO, who claimed on cross examination that the Military Affairs Bureau had no responsibility in connection with the bombs, was more concerned as to their return than anyone else, including Gen. IWATO, who he says

(LL-12)

- a. T 15,582
- b. Ex 2177-A, T 15,583

(LL-13)

- a. T 32,285-6
- b. T 32,298-97
- c. T 32,298

(LL-13)
they were charged to.

(LL-14). Apart from OKAWA's statements as to KOISO's participation in the March Incident, there is testimony of ISHIHARA that there were "rumors" at the time of the incident, that the principal figures in it were KOISO, UGAKI, NAGATA, and other officers in the War Ministry.^a HASHIMOTO, on taking the stand, testified that KOISO's connection with the incident was his attempt to secure the return of the bombs,^b although he previously stated in interrogations that KOISO was one of the planners of the March and October Incidents.^c KOISO himself insisted on the stand that he was not a participant, but on the contrary had warned the Vice Chief of the General Staff of the impropriety of officers participating in a plot of the nature of the March Incident.^d

(LL-15). In evaluating the evidence pro and con as to KOISO's relation to the March Incident, the conclusion must be reached that KOISO was a conspirator in the plot. His actions in relation to OKAWA, when OKAWA presented his plan to him are not consistent with his claim of non-participation. It is idle for him to say now that he referred OKAWA's plan to NAGATA, his subordinate, to determine the consistency of the plan because the matter could only be reported to the War Minister if it was consistent,^a because

(LL-14)

- a. T 22,202
- b. T 28,807
- c. T 15,676-7
- d. T 32,287

(LL-15)

- a. T 32,291

(LL-15)
 the plan was never found consistent by NAGATA, and because he took the matter up with UGAKI, the War Minister, one or two days after he had given the plan to NAGATA for examination.^b On the basis of this undisputed evidence, KOISO did present an inconsistent plan to UGAKI notwithstanding his testimony that only consistent plans could be presented to the War Minister. Either KOISO felt that the plan was consistent when he saw UGAKI, or he was determined to secure the consent of UGAKI despite the plan's inconsistency and absurdity. KOISO's present condemnation of the OKAWA plan does not fit into the pattern of the actions he took sixteen years ago. At that time he seemed so interested in the plan to overthrow the Cabinet that (a) he gave OKAWA a hearing and became familiar with the plan;^c (b) he directed OKAWA, pursuant to UGAKI's order, to put the plan in writing;^d (c) he asked OKAWA to read the plan to him after it had been reduced to writing;^e (d) he made pencil notations of the plan and took these notes to the War Minister;^f (e) he ordered NAGATA, his subordinate, to examine the plan to determine whether it was consistent;^g (f) he reported the plan to the War Minister^h in spite of the fact that the plan was not consistent; (g) one or two days later KOISO went to see UGAKI and asked for his reaction.ⁱ These actions show KOISO's

(LL-15)

- b. T 32,292
- c. T 32,290
- d. T 32,290
- e. T 32,290
- f. T 32,291
- g. T 32,291
- h. T 32,292
- i. T 32,292

(LL-15) determined insistence to secure 'GAKI's consent to the proposal, and his active participation in the plot.

(LL-16). These facts and admissions show not merely a disinterested passive attitude on the part of KOISO, on a matter which was not proper for consideration by a Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, but indicate a close cooperation between KOISO and the chief conspirator, O'NINA, aiming at the acceptance by the War Minister, of a scheme to create a coup d'etat, having as its object placing the military in the saddle, as the first step toward solving the Manchurian Incident.

(d) His Relation to the Mukden Incident.

(LL-17). KOISO became apprehensive of the critical situation in Manchuria in the summer of 1931 and spoke to MINAMI and the Vice Chief of the General Staff about it.^e He claims he did not mention TATEKAWA's name as a suitable person to be entrusted with the mission to stop an outbreak in Manchuria,^b and it was only after TATEKAWA had been dispatched that he says he was informed that TATEKAWA had been selected.^c The testimony of MINAMI that he met with TATEKAWA prior to his trip and talked the matter over with him^d and instructed him to investigate reports of HAYASHI that there were Kwantung Army movements around Mukden,^e clash significantly with KOISO's assertion that he did not know in advance that TATEKAWA was to make the trip.

(LL-17)

- a. T 32,307-8
- b. T 32,309
- c. T 32,310
- d. T 19,821
- e. T 19,827

(LL-17)
 TATEKAWA and KOISO were great friends.^f They were both interested in Manchurian problems.^g The General Staff selected TATEKAWA as a personal emissary in order that the ideas of the Chief of the General Staff and War Minister would be thoroughly understood in Mukden by the people on the spot.^h Although there was telegraph connection between Tokyo, Port Arthur and Mukden,ⁱ this personal emissary was sent. Major General TATEKAWA, the emissary, was the same person who was responsible for securing the bombs for OYAMA in the abortive March Incident.^j Although KOISO denied that TATEKAWA failed to carry out his mission by reason of a preconceived arrangement with him,^k nevertheless, it is more than a coincidence that TATEKAWA, of all persons available, should have been selected to carry out a mission, the object of which was irreconcilably in conflict with TATEKAWA's desires, namely, the acquisition of Manchuria by Japan, and for that reason, it is readily apparent why TATEKAWA failed to deliver the orders of the General Staff upon his arrival at Mukden. TATEKAWA's duplicity and wilful disobedience of his orders was admitted by him in a conversation with TANAKA, Ryukichi, in which he said that he acted in this manner because he was in sympathy with the contemplated action of the Kwantung Army and had no desire to stop it.^l

(LL-17)

- f. KAWABE, T 19,433-4
- g. MINAMI, T 19,922
- h. T 32,325
- i. T 32,324-5
- j. T 32,326
- k. T 32,326
- l. T 2,005-7

(LL-17)
TATEKAWA's claim that it was too late for him to do anything about the matter the morning following the Mukden Incident^m is further evidence that he came to Mukden with a scheme to let the Incident occur, and after its occurrence he washed his hands of the matter, as though he had merely come to Mukden on a pleasure trip. The record is absolutely bare of any facts showing that TATEKAWA carried out his mission, or that he took any steps to stop the rolling war machines of Japan in the incipency of the military movements then starting. Conspiracy is written on every phase of TATEKAWA's actions, and the relationship between TATEKAWA and KOISO, and the fact that TATEKAWA made the trip after KOISO's representations to the General Staff is of major importance in evaluating whether there was a concerted plan between the two of them.

(LL-18). In the Report of the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the League of Nationsⁿ it is stated that among other things which set the stage for the events that took place on 18 September 1931 and thereafter, were the "dissatisfaction of the Army," the "appearance of a new political force emanating from the Army," the abandonment of the SHIBEMURA "policy of conciliation," and the vigorous speeches by the Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counselling

(LL-17)
m. T 2,005-7

(LL-18)
e. Ex 57, T 66-7

(LL-18)
direct action by their army in Manchuria.

(LL-19). The conclusion reached by the Assembly of the League of Nations on 24 February 1933^a that the Manchurian movement was conceived, organized, and carried through by a group of Japanese civil and military officials points to the actions of KOISO, TAKEKAWA and others in the War Ministry prior to the Mukden Incident, the overt act which culminated years later in the Pacific War.

(c) KOISO's Knowledge of Plans for Conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia.

(LL-20). Although KOISO denied knowledge that studies were being made in the War Ministry prior to the Manchurian Incident concerning the conquest of Manchuria,^a Prosecution Exhibit 3375,^b dated 25 July 1931, shows that such study was being made. This appeared in a report from the Commander of Military Police sent to the War Ministry and was processed by SHIMANUKI, one of KOISO's assistants, contemplating action by Japan to secure complete possession of Manchuria and Mongolia, from the standpoints of maintenance of fighting ability and of self-sufficiency.^c In this communication the Commander of the Military Police asked for a minimum of 5,000 military police if complete military occupation was planned.^d KOISO, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, is chargeable with knowledge of the studies and plans which

(LL-19)

a. Ex 59, T 40-44

(LL-20)

a. T 32,300

b. T 32,303-05

c. T 32,303

d. T 32,304

(IL-20) were considered in his bureau, and his plea of ignorance thereof may be considered manufactured to fit the present situation.

(LL-21). It was also while KOISO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that a document from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army passed through his bureau, on 9 December 1931, explaining what was called the "temporary expedient system" in effect in Manchuria. This system was a plan to provide guidance to the various Chinese regimes, and proposed that if a new regime was established it should be guided inwardly. The plan was to effect such guidance by a small organ so that the secret would not leak out and endanger the establishment of rights and interests by Japan. Furthermore, it was proposed that if a new government were established, its guidance would be carried out by an advisory body.^a That this was actually done is demonstrated by the establishment of an "advisor" system,^b with Gen. TADA as the guiding genius, by means of which the Kwantung Army secured complete control not only of the Manchukuoan Army but also the Manchukuo Government.

(LL-22). KOISO knew or should have known that plans were thus made for the establishment of the puppet government of Manchukuo, by the interference, and active guidance of Japanese organs and agencies,

(IL-21)

- a. Ex 3377, T 32,339-41;
also T 33,629-30
- b. Ex 3378-A, T 32,357-72

(LL-22)
in violation of the Nine Power Treaty, and procedures were adopted to effectuate the continued dominance by Japan in the affairs of Manchukuo, by secret and aggressive means.

3. KOISO's Relation to Activities in Manchuria Subsequent to the Incident.

(LL-23). At the time of the Manchurian Incident, WAKATSUKI was Prime Minister. Under his leadership the Cabinet opposed expansion of the Army,^a and the budget for the Army was reduced.^b However, the Army group gained power between July and October 1931, and an association to study Manchurian and Mongolian problems which had Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO and SEUGEFUJI as its backers, was formed among a group recently graduated from the Army Staff College. The Army could not check these persons, and difficulty was even had in drafting a budget.^c

(LL-24). KOISO, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau,^a had the duty to put the General Staff plans into effect. In other words, in drawing up any plans for operations, organization, and the mobilization of the Army, the General Staff Office had to have expenses and supplies given to it by the War Ministry, since the War Minister controlled expenses and supplies. In making such plans, the General Staff Office requested the War Ministry for such expenses and supplies. Upon

(LL-23)

- a. T 1,556; 1,509
- b. T 1,554
- c. Ex 179-B, T 1,927-8

(LL-24)

- a. T 1,556

(LL-24)
 receiving such request the War Ministry, after studying the funds and supplies it had, carried out the General Staff's plans, and the Military Affairs Bureau was the section of the War Ministry for carrying out these plans.^b

(LL-25). The Cabinet as a whole realized that the Manchurian Incident had the elements of a very serious situation and MIYAMAI was informed it should be terminated.^a Notwithstanding this determination MIYAMAI permitted the situation to expand day after day, although he gave assurance that it would be discontinued. MIYAMAI testified that he could have stopped HONJO if he wanted to, but he concluded he could not do so because of tactical and strategic reasons.^b KOISO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau is chargeable with aiding and acquiescing in MIYAMAI's action. As a result of MIYAMAI's failure to control the Kwantung Army, WAKATSUKI resigned.^c

(LL-26). KOISO also appeared as an endorser of HIRANUMA for Premier, in May 1932, following the assassination of Premier INUKAI.^a The suggestion by KOISO that HIRANUMA be the next Premier at that time is significant, as HIRANUMA in 1920 was the first President of KOKUHONSHA, the "Foundation of the State Society," which was related to the "Black Dragon" Society, later called "Production Party," in which

(LL-24)

b. T 15,859

(LL-25)

a. T 1,554-5

b. T 1,554-5; 19,833

c. T 1,557

(LI-26)

a. Ex 2252, T 16,215

(LL-26) ^b
 KOISO was a director, and apparently both KOISO and HIRANUMA kept up their interest in KOKUHONSHA as is evidenced by their attendance at a meeting of the Society in July 1931.^c

4. KOISO as Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army.

(a) Political Activities resulting in Violations of the Nine-Power Treaty.

(LL-27). On 8 August 1932, KOISO became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.^c He held this position until 5 March 1934.^b While he asserts that he had no power to command troops while Chief of Staff, because he was only a staff officer responsible for administrative matters in the Kwantung Army Headquarters,^c he initiated several important policies, all violative of the Nine-Power Treaty, namely: (a) control of the Manchukuo Government as shown by letter dated 3 November 1932,^d being an outline for guiding Manchukuo; (b) domination of Manchukuoan foreign commerce as shown by letter dated 29 December 1932, outlining a general policy for Manchukuo customs duty, under which no power other than Japan was to share unconditionally in Manchukuo-Japanese tariffs,^e and (c) control of government officials as shown by telegram 24 January 1934, recommending divided responsibility in the Manchukuoan Government so that the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army could control either the Premier or

(LL-26)

- b. Ex 164, T 1,636
- c. T 32,274

(LL-27)

- a. T 32,225
- b. T 32,231
- c. T 32,230
- d. Ex 230, T 2,903
- e. Ex 3379-L, T 32,377-80

(LL-27)
 a department head.^f He also must have been cognizant of the Advisor system, established at the founding of the Empire, under which the Kwantung Army Advisors secured control of the local and central governments in Manchukuo,^g as this Advisor system was directed by Gen. TADA, who was amenable to the Commanding General, Kwantung Army.

(b) Military Activities Involving Aggressive Warfare against China.

(LL-28). Military operations of the Kwantung Army continued while KOISO was Vice War Minister, 29 February 1932 to 8 August 1932,^a and thereafter while he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, 8 August 1932 to 5 March 1934.^b After the occupation of the three provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang, two general offensives were launched in July and August 1932. During the remainder of the year quite a number of Chinese key points were occupied, and small scale attacks continued from time to time.^c KOISO claims that since Manchukuo, in its declaration of independence dated 1 March 1932, announced that the four Northeastern Provinces were within its territory, it was necessary for the Kwantung Army in cooperation with Manchukuo to restore law and order in Jehol Province.^d At the beginning of 1933, while KOISO was Chief of Staff, the battle of Shenhaikwan was started and the key points along the Great Wall,

(LL-27)

- f. Ex 3380-A, T 32,383-4
 g. Ex 3378-A, T 32,357-72

(LL-28)

- a. Ex 114, T 733
 b. Ex 114, T 733
 c. Ex 192-A, T 2,268-70
 d. T 32,225

(LL-28) such as Shanhaikwan and Kiurenkov fell into Japanese hands.^c Japan and Manchukuo claimed that Jehol was not Chinese territory. The Chinese were given a 24-hour ultimatum to withdraw Chinese forces from Jehol.^f On 2 March 1933, Jehol fell.^g From 1933 to 1935 there were conspiracies to oust Chinese from Hopei and Chehar.^h The claim that additional military operations, after Jehol, were necessary due to persistent attacks by bandits and Chinese groups against the Great Wall,ⁱ has little weight, in view of the documents already referred to^j which show that pacification of Manchukuo was not the real purpose of those military activities, but that seizure and control of the local and central government of Manchukuo and exploitation of the country for Japan's benefit was actually the aim, and that such aim was accomplished.

(LL-29). Pu Yi's testimony shows that such control by the Kwantung Army was exercised in Manchukuo over banking;^a over the courts;^b over cotton;^c over currency;^d over appointments;^e over labor;^f over land;^g over opium;^h over rice;ⁱ and over travel.^j

(c) KOISO's Connection with Opium Control in Manchuria.

(LL-30). Although KOISO denied he had any connection with opium control in Manchukuo the testimony of AIZUMI in the DOIHARA individual phase emphasized that the Special Service Organ had no such

(LL-28)

e. Ex 192-A, T 2,269
 f. Ex 192-A, T 2,268-70
 g. T 2,270
 h. T 2,701
 i. T 32,229
 j. Ex 3379-A, Ex 3380-A,
 and Ex 3378, Ex 230,
 T 2,903

(LL-29)

a. T 4,032-3
 b. T 4,045, 4,283
 c. T 4,028
 d. T 4,031, 4,210
 e. T 3,987
 f. T 4037-7
 g. T 4,033-6
 h. T 4,040-4, 4,322
 i. T 4,030
 j. T 4,036

(LL-30)^a control and MINAMI testified that one of the reasons he had for abolishing the Special Service Department when he became commanding general of the Kwantung Army was that the Special Service Department may have been running the opium traffic for its own benefit instead of for the Government of Manchukuo.^b KOISO was Executive of the Special Service Department^c concurrently with his other function as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.^d If the Special Service Department had control of opium, the responsibility for increased growth of poppies, the increased use of opium,^e and the use of the profits thereof,^f are matters for which KOISO would be chargeable. For instance, the extensive encouragement for users of opium and heroin in Manchuria is shown by the large number of retail shops selling same;^g and the same applied in Kirin,^h and as to heroin, extensive traffic was permitted in Chahar and Jehol.ⁱ

5. KOISO as Minister for Overseas Affairs.

(LL-31). KOISO served as Minister for Overseas Affairs in the HIRANUMA Cabinet from 7 April 1939 to August 1939; and in the YONAI Cabinet from 16 January 1940 to 22 July 1940.^a He denied making statements attributed to him in an interview on Domei News Agency,^b in which he is reported to have stated that a strengthening of the German Alliance would be acceptable if Germany and Italy understood Japan's

(LL-30)

- a. T 28,606
- b. T 19,976
- c. T 32,373-4
- d. Ex 114, T 733
- e. T 4,690, 4,905, 4688. 4,673-4
- f. T 4,683-6
- g. T 4,688
- h. T 4,690
- i. T 4,780-2

(LL-31)

- a. Ex 114, T 734; 32,231-2
- b. T 32,234

(IL-31) position.^c He remained a member of HIRANUMA's Cabinet while HIRANUMA took action to strengthen the anti-Comintern Pact,^d but claimed the Cabinet was not told of it.^e He admitted he heard from HARADA of HIRANUMA's message to Hitler extolling Hitler's "wisdom" and "iron will," and praising Hitler for the "noble task" in which he was engaged.^f He admitted he had a conversation with HARADA on two occasions in May 1939, in which HARADA claims KOISO urged strengthening the Tri-Partite Pact, but he says that HARADA's Diary as to the conversations is "entirely false,"^g and was but a reflection of HARADA's "subjective view" that KOISO favored the Pact.^h As for his conversation with the Navy Minister in 1939, he claims he did not urge the Pact, but only asked the Navy Minister whether the Navy's thoughts in regard to the Alliance were changing.ⁱ That KOISO favored the Tri-Partite Pact is shown from the HARADA Memoirs.^j

(IL-32). While he was Minister of Overseas Affairs in the YONAI Cabinet, KOISO had a meeting with Ott, in which he was said to have asked Ott to find out what Germany's attitude would be to military action by Japan in French Indo-China and the East Indies.^a KOISO claims that in sending his report of this conversation to Germany, Ott phrased it, so as to indicate that KOISO said what actually Ott had

(IL-31)

c. Ex 2214, T 15, 216
 d. T 32,401
 e. T 32,401
 f. T 32,402
 g. T 32,403
 h. T 32,406
 i. T 32,409
 j. Ex. 3801-B, T.37215

(IL-32)

a. T 32,411

(LL-32) ^b
 been telling FOJEC.

(LL-33). In this connection it is significant that KOISO took no affirmative action as a Cabinet member to check Japan's aggressive actions toward French Indo-China, such as the Four Ministers' Conference decision of 19 June 1940, to use force against French Indo-China, without negotiations;^a the plan to seize the Yunnan Railway;^b and the proposal of 22 June 1940 by Japan to France that Japanese officials be sent to French Indo-China to determine what materials would be permitted to be shipped via Indo-China to China.^c His acquiescence in these policies, which invaded the sovereignty of French Indo-China, lend additional credence to the telegram Ott sent (supra), in which KOISO himself, as was stated, actively planned military action in the South Pacific, provided Germany would give its consent thereto.

(LL-34). It would be the height of incredulity to give any credence to KOISO's claim that HARADA and Ott misrepresented him in their writings, as no substantial evidence or theory was announced by him to support this claim made by him at the hearing.

(LL-35). KOISO knew in the spring of 1940 that the Japanese Foreign Office was announcing that the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies would be preserved,^e but he says he had no knowledge of

(LL-32)

b. T 32,411

(LI-35)

a. T 32,411-12

(LI-33)

a. Ex 610, T 6,824

b. Ex 520, T 6,163

b. Ex 520, T 6,164-5

c. Ex 618-A, T 6,851-2

(LL-35)
 economic demands then being made on the East Indies by Japan which would have interfered with its sovereignty.^b However, in a speech before the Budget Committee of the Diet on 17 February 1940, he stated that Japan's destiny was to advance in all directions.^c He testified that the traditional culture of Japan embraced all ideologies^d and could merge with all of them and advance without opposition, and he stated that he did not think any opposition to Japan's advance would arise.^e

(LL-36). On 17 March 1940, KOISO spoke before the Joint Conference of the Committee of Accounts, 75th Session of the Diet, recommending a two-fold policy of having the South Pacific as well as the North the objectives of Japan.^a That Japan was sounding out Germany in the spring of 1940 as to her attitude toward a movement south is indicated by an announcement by Ott in May 1940, that Germany was not interested in the Netherlands Indies. This action by Germany was considered a "carte blanche" to Japan.^b Thereafter, on 20 May 1940, further demands were made by Japan on the Netherlands.^c The negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies which culminated in war were begun by a note dated 2 February 1940, while KOISO was Minister of Overseas Affairs, in which Japan demanded virtually unrestricted economic

(LL-35)

- b. T 32,412
- c. T 32,416
- d. T 32,417
- e. T 32,418

(LL-36)

- a. Ex 2215, T 15,824-25
- b. Ex 517-C, T 11,606-9
- c. Ex 1309-A, T 11,787-9

(LL-36)
 privileges in the East Indies,^c and while KOISO claims he knew "little" about such negotiations,^e Ott reported to his government on 24 June 1940 that KOISO asked him what Germany's attitude would be to military activity by Japan in Indo-China and parts of the Netherlands Indies, to which the Ambassador replied that Germany would probably raise no objection provided Japan would pledge herself to tie down America in the Pacific Area, perhaps by a promise to attack the Philippines and Hawaii in the event of America's entry into the war against Germany.^f Later, KOISO was considered as an envoy in August 1940 to consummate the drastic demands against the East Indies.^g He denied that he conditioned his acceptance as envoy on being sent on a battleship and being given authority to fire in case of emergency.^h

(LL-37). While Japan, during this period (February to June 1940) was asserting it entertained no territorial ambitions in the East Indies and any suspicion that it intended to proceed against the East Indies was unfounded,^a the Japanese Foreign Minister refused to agree with a U.S. proposal 27 June 1940, to maintain the status quo, on the ground that it would "be inadvisable at this time to have Japan's activities including those in the Netherlands, restricted,"^b and on 12 and 16 July 1940,

(LL-36)

- c. Ex 1309-A, T 11,780-2
- e. T 32,426
- f. Ex 523, T 6,174
- g. T 32,427
- h. T 32,427

(LL-37)

- a. Ex 1014, T 11,685-6
- b. Ex 1294, T 11,708-9

(LL-37)
the Army, Navy and Foreign Offices of Japan discussed Japan's attitude toward the southern regions and Japan's future domination of these areas.^c

(LL-38). It was also in this period, while KOISO was a member of the YOI'AI Cabinet that the Japanese Government on 3 March 1940 decided to revise its economic policy in connection with diplomacy toward the United States by freeing itself from reliance, on the United States, as soon as possible, for such materials as scrap iron, petroleum, electrolytic copper, molybdenum and vanadium, and machine tools; decided to expand production of military equipment; decided to secure more intimate relations with Manchukuo and China; and decided to make further efforts to bring the southern countries within Japan's economic sphere.^a

(LL-39). The necessity for Japan to secure raw materials for her war making plans from new sources accounts for the militant and aggressive action by Japan in her dealings with the East Indies and French Indo-China.

(LL-40). While these sparring measures preliminary to war were being taken, KOISO was Minister of Overseas Affairs. He had a responsibility as a Cabinet member either to resign, or to denounce the several actions taken to achieve Japan's objective

(LL-37)
c. Ex 527-8, T 11,699

(LL-38)
a. Ex 1007, T 9,635-42

(LL-40)
by pressure methods. His failure to disassociate himself from the aggressive moves, and his failure to object to continued military operations in China, which resulted in the capture of Haichow in Shantung Province on 4 March 1940; the recapture of Kaifeng on 24 April 1940, and the capture of Naichang on 12 June 1940^a make him a party to the actions by Japan against her neighbors, violative of their treaty rights and sovereignty.

(LL-41). All the talk about non-aggressive and self-defensive action taken in China and the South has a hollow sound when it is seen that so-called "pacification" and "defense" became the means used by Japan to achieve economic and political domination. The decisions of the Five Ministers Conference as to China illustrate the pattern established to control and exploit subjugated territories,^a and the seizure of the whole economy of the East Indies also illustrates Japan's real purposes, and lack of candor.^b

6. KOISO as Governor General of Korea.

(LL-42). It was while KOISO was Governor General of Korea (29 May 1942 to 22 July 1944), that British POW arrived in Korea on 13 August 1942, and were publicly paraded and degraded.^a Although he was not Governor General when this matter was arranged, the

(LL-40)

a. Ex 254 & 276-A, T 3,431; 3,700;
22,415-16

(LL-41)

a. Ex 3457 T. 37,50
b. T 12,150-56

(LL-42)

a. Ex 1975, T 14,522

(LL-42)
pre-existing plan to publicly degrade these "white" prisoners was carried out while he was Governor-General.

(LL-43). Also while he was Governor General, Japan's military forces increased to about 1,100,000 in Manchuria by January 1, 1942.^a Such a vast military force in Manchuria, with Korea as the supply base, was necessary because the North (USSR) as well as the South (The Indies, Java and other countries) were the objectives of KOISO and others in Japan.^b

7. KOISO as Prime Minister.

(LL-44). KOISO was Premier from 22 July 1944 to 7 April 1945.^a At the meeting of Senior Statesmen on 18 July 1944, at which the selection was made, KOISO was second choice to TERAMACHI.^b OKADA, an elder statesman, wanted to re-examine the question whether KOISO could organize a truly National Cabinet.^c General ABE was the only one who disagreed to a KOISO-YONAI Coalition Cabinet.^d KIDO testified that when KOISO was selected, KOISO knew only three of the Senior Statesmen.^e During KOISO's regime he made efforts to increase production of munitions and foodstuffs; bring adjustment between the state policy and the supreme command,^f and settle the China war.^g He tried to return to active service so that he could hold the additional post of War Minister, so

(LL-43)

a. Ex 706, T 7,532
b. Ex 2215, T 15,825-6;
15,930

(LL-44)

e. T 31,105
f. T 32,254
g. T 32,253

(LL-44)

a. T 11,383-4
b. KIDO, T 31,061
c. T 31,099
d. T 31,104

(LL-44)
 that he could determine whether the war should be terminated or be fought out on the mainland of Japan,^h but in this he was opposed by SUGIYAMA and could not carry out his plan.ⁱ He claimed he was thwarted in his efforts to settle the China war as a result of opposition by the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs,^j and at a later date the Emperor told him to return Wiao Pin, the go-between KOISO expected to use to negotiate with Chiang Kai-Shek, to China.^k KOISO did not explain, in this connection, how he expected to secure peace with China, in view of the unrescinded decision of the Five Ministers' Conference of 15 July 1938, which had proved a stumbling block to peace since that date, and which provided in detail for Japanese supervision of military affairs, foreign relations, economic matters, religion and education in China.^l

(LL-45). KOISO, on 21 April 1942, had been made a member of the committee for the establishment of Greater East Asia.^a The scope and purpose of Greater East Asia were discussed in the Diet in January 1942.^b The countries to form the Greater East Asia were Japan, Manchukuo and Nanking China, as the inner core. Thailand and Indo-China were to be included.^c The Malay Peninsula and Hongkong were to

(LL-44)

h. T 32,262
 i. T 32,256
 j. T 32,260
 k. T 32,261
 l. T 30,421-2

(LL-45)

a. Ex 114, T 735
 b. T 11,339
 c. T 11,345

(LL-45)
 bc transformed into a bulwark for the Greater East Asia.^d The Philippines and Burma would be given independence, as puppets, on the lines of Manchukuo;^e and the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and Chungking, China, were to be conquered by force of arms if they persisted in resisting Japan.^f The purpose of the establishment of Greater East Asia was to extend Japan's sphere of domination over East Asia and provide important sources of raw materials for her; prevent the flow of raw materials from the South Seas to enemy powers; secure self-sufficiency for the Army in areas of operation and cooperation with Japan by existing enterprises in occupied areas.^g

(LL-46). In accepting a place on the committee to effectuate the organization to realize the aggressive action proposed in the conquest or domination of sovereign territories, KOISO made his position with the militarists crystal clear.

(LL-47). KOISO later announced in his speech before the 85th Diet Session in 1944^a that the real objective of Japan in the war of the Pacific was the expulsion of Anglo-American influence, the emancipation of China from oppression by those countries which had continued for 100 years, and the reconstruction of a Greater East Asia based on morality and mutual cooperation.^b He thereby destroyed the

(LL-45)

(LL-47)

a. T 11,341

a. Ex 277, T 3,703

b. T 11,341-2

b. Ex 277, T 3,715

c. T 11,342

d. T 11,343; also see

NAMBUJOTO's views, T 7,348-9,

15,652; SHIRATORI's views,

T 3,778-9; 3,827-31; SUZUKI,

SHIGEMITSU's views, T 7,438-44;

TANAKA, TAKIKUCHI's views,

T 7,349-52

(LL-47)
fictitious assertion that had been made over a period of years that Japan was only engaging in a war of defense.

(LL-48). It was also while he was Prime Minister that freedom was promised to the East Indies^a but the underlying intent was to retain important places from a military standpoint by lease,^b and to retain control of the agricultural enterprises, sugar industries, public utilities, private railways, gas and power companies and newspaper plants.^c This intent was openly announced in the same month KOISO promised independence to the East Indies, by the Chief of Staff of the OSAN Army Corps, who said, "There shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government."^d

(LL-49). KOISO was also Premier when on 1 February 1945 the Japanese under the pretext that French Indo-China was "lacking in sincerity" in respect to joint defense, divested French Indo-China of all semblance of sovereignty following a six hour ultimatum to place all French Indo-China military forces under Japan's control jointly with French Indo-China,^a subject, however, to the orders of the Japanese Army on matters of organization, allotment and movement.^b He also knew of the

(LL-48)

- a. T 11,670; 12,214-5
- b. T 11,727
- c. T 12,150-56
- d. T 12,217

(LL-49)

- a. Ex 661, T 7,165; 32,429
- b. T 32,429

(LL-49)
auxiliary decision to place French Indo-China communications and transportation under Japanese control.^c This action was the realization of the plan agreed upon by the Army and Navy Imperial Headquarters on 16 April 1941 "to occupy bases in the Southern part of French Indo-China needed for a military advance into the Netherlands Indies."^d

(LL-50). KOISO's explanation that as Premier he desired to end the Pacific War, is qualified by his admitted statement that his plan was to destroy, even temporarily, the advancing power of the enemy so that Japan could thereby arrange a negotiated peace.^a This explanation by KOISO is confirmatory of his actions while Premier to continue military operations more intensively than ever so as to perpetuate Japan's military machine in the event of termination of the war by negotiation. To strengthen the military forces, KOISO strove to adjust and harmonize state policy with the policy of the Supreme Command and also increase production of munitions and foodstuff,^b and to secure the real war potential of the State by redoubling efforts for prosecution of the war.^c His failure to accomplish his objective of a more unified command and a more intense prosecution of the war, led to his resignation as Premier.^d He resigned on 5 April

(LL-49)

- c. T 32,429
- d. Ex 1306, T 11,753-4

(LL-50)

- a. T 32,252
- b. T 32,254
- c. T 31,116
- d. T 31,116

(LL-50)

1945.^e KIDO, in summing up his impression of KOISO, said that he did not mean to say that KOISO was particularly considered as a peace advocate.^f The Keeper of the Seal should have known whether KOISO was in reality endeavoring to bring about peace or not. In his view, KOISO was a militarist.

(LL-51). KOISO's explanation for continuing in many important offices although opposing the policies being put into action, was that the Japanese, by custom, bend all their efforts to prosecute a policy, once it has been decided upon.^g This is no answer to his participation in the schemes of the militarists over a number of years, and his knowing and willing acceptance of the benefits and offices incident to performance of duties not compulsorily imposed. And in final analysis, such subservience to a long standing tradition is no excuse for the violation of laws, treaties, customs of war and crimes against humanity.

8. KOISO's Connection with POW.

(LL-52). The witness YAMAZAKI^h testified that the Prisoners of War Information Bureau was established in accordance with international treaty and was under the supervision of the Prime Minister as an outside bureau of the Cabinet.

(LL-50)

c. T 31,119
f. T 31,243

(LL-51)

a. T 32,431

(LL-52)

a. T 14,882

(LL-53). The same witness testified that all matters pertaining to POW in the field (whether in or outside Japan) were directed and supervised by commanders of the armies or commanders of independent divisions.^a

(LL-54). SUZUKI, Tadekatsu, testified^b that documents relating to POW generally were sent to the Chief of the POW Information Bureau.

(LL-55). Admitting these facts, it can be said that the Premier had responsibility to determine whether the procedures and policies of the Field Commanders and officials in the POW administrative services were adequate and in conformity to international law and in accordance with the dictates of humanity.

(LL-56). Under the Constitution of Japan, then in force, it was the duty of the Premier to give advice to the Throne, coordinate the work of the ministries and issue orders for the suspension of any administrative operation or any order by a Minister of State.^a Especially on matters involving foreign nations, such as POW matters, the Premier was required to know what was going on, as he had a duty as the top Cabinet adviser to the Emperor to see that activities of his Cabinet officers and their subordinates were properly

(LL-53)
c. p. 14, 287

(LL-54)
c. p. 14, 2841

(LL-56)
c. p. 534

(LL-56)
performed. If the Premier knew what was going on and failed to take proper action he was guilty of wilful neglect of his duties and if he failed to apprise himself of what was going on he was equally guilty for neglecting his duties. Viewed in this light, it must be concluded that KOISO, as Prime Minister is chargeable with such crimes against POW, as occurred during the time he held the office of Premier.

9. KOISO's Actions in Relation to Counts in the Indictment.

(LL-57). (a) Counts 1-17. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 herein connect KOISO with the conspiracy counts and with the waging of aggressive warfare.

(b) Count 18. As Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, he was responsible for the military movement into Jehol, and the North China provinces.

(c) Count 26. There is a conflict of evidence in this court. The testimony of TANAKA is that KOISO ordered the concentration of troops.^a However, this is denied by KOISO.^b

(d) Counts 27-36. Violation of the Nine Power Treaty in Manchuria and China.

(e) Count 48. As KOISO was Governor General of KOPEA on 18 June 1944, he is chargeable only in this count for acts of his co-conspirators.

(LL-57)

a. T 22,751-6

b. T 32,232-3; 32,439-41; and by
KITANO, T 32,511-13

(LL-57)

(f) Counts 49-50. As KOISO was Premier on 8 August 1944, he is chargeable only as a participant in the group perpetrating the crimes alleged.

(g) Count 51. As KOISO was Minister of Overseas Affairs in the summer of 1939, he is guilty only as a participant in the group perpetrating the crimes alleged.

(h) Counts 54-55. As to treatment of POW, KOISO is chargeable as an accomplice in the execution of the plans to violate international law.

KOISO Memorandum - LL

小磯三對三對請理由

(一) 請因案一及案五：侵略戰爭進行，其目的在於
 中國之滅亡，非小磯三對三對之願也。

請因案六及案七：一九三九年四月九日
 二年一月二十二日及五月九日二日三三三三三三三三
 揚言諸國家三對三對侵略戰爭，計劃、準備、
 罪之小磯三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對
 中華民國、請因案六、東洋利他合衆國、請因
 案八、分三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三
 及全英聯盟、請因案九、遠東聯邦、請因案十、
 新西蘭、請因案十一、加拿大、請因案十二、印度、
 請因案十三、比律賓聯邦、請因案十四、和蘭王
 國、請因案十五、佛蘭西共和國、請因案十六、泰國、
 三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三三

請因案十六：中國三對三對侵略戰爭開始，非
 小磯三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對

請因案十七：蒙古人民共和國三對三對侵略
 戰爭開始，非小磯三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對

請因案十八及案三十二：中國、東洋利他合衆
 國、比律賓聯邦、全英聯盟及和蘭王國三對三對
 侵略戰爭進行，非小磯三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對三對

71

訴因第四十四、表米國三對之信強戰爭遂行罪ヲ小懲ニシテアリス。

謝因第三十六、歐亞人民共謀國々ノ和平也社會主義共親國聯邦三對之信強戰爭遂行罪ヲ小懲ニシテアリス。

訴因第四十四、將兵ノ信強及一報之殺戮罪ヲ小懲ニシテアリス。

訴因第四十八、至新五十二、中國各地ニ於テハ明確な殺行為罪ヲ小懲ニシテアリス。

訴因第五十一、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百。

訴因第五十二、八、信強及一報之殺戮罪ヲ小懲ニシテアリス。

法類(慣例)及行爲ノ罪ヲ小懲ニシテアリス。

訴因第五十四、訴因第五十三、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百。

例遵守ヲ確信スルニ適宜ノ措置ヲ講スルヲ志スル上、義務ヲ故意ヨリ無謀ニ無視スルニ罪ヲ小懲ニシテアリス。

KOISO Summation - 11

滿洲事變期、小磯、活動
(他) 彼、諸種團體加盟關係

44-2

一九三九年「滿洲事變」勃發に至る迄、期間不同に
 卒る國民運動ヲ起(他)之に依り滿洲問題ヲ
 解決スルコトヲ目的トシ運動(他)漸次隆華、同
 心ト援助ヲ喚起スルに至リ、小磯、板垣、肥
 原、多田、(他)將軍其他陸軍部内知名、士、力
 テ大川、公然參謀本部ヲ講演ラスルコトヲ企テ、
 之(他)ソ、大川、日本全國百三十五箇所ヲ、
 以テ聽衆講演ラシマシ。彼、目的、日本國民
 ヲ鼓舞ス、斯クテ「祖國、多水火ヲ許セザルニ」
 在リ、(他)彼、外交政策ニ就テ、國民、興
 論統一、必要ヲ説キ、滿洲問題、解決、日本存
 立、絶対條件ナリト主張シテアリマシ。(他)
 彼、日本、世界制覇ヲ提唱シ、米國合衆國、
 戰爭準備ヲ論シ、又、各國間ニ於ケル現状維持
 原則ヲ非難シマシ。(他)小磯、が共鳴シ、後述、通
 リ三月事件ニ接キ込マシ、
 三ツテアリマシ。

R3

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|---------|----|-------|---|----|-------|
| 44-2 | 記録 | 一五二七八 | 〃 | 記録 | 一五五九八 |
| d. e. a | 〃 | 一五五六三 | 〃 | 〃 | 一五六〇二 |
| d. c. | 〃 | 一五五七五 | | | |
| e | 〃 | 一五五六五 | | | |
| e | 〃 | 一五五九七 | | | |
| e | 〃 | 一五五九七 | | | |

記録簿(英、日、原簿)アリ

44-5

コヨウニ、滿洲事変前ノ危局ヲ數年間小磯ハ
 上司ノ命「服」シテ居ルガ、軍人デアリマセン
 テシタ。彼ハ「究極」ノ目的トシテ必要トナス「戰」ヲ
 コツテ「日本」膨脹ヲ計「ロウ」ト云フ「強カ」策ヲ有ス
 人物ヤ「連」動ノ「支」持者デアリマシタ。

43
 a. 記録 三二二七三
 b. " 三二二七四
 c. " 三二二七四

44
 a. 記録 一六四 記録 一六三六
 b. 記録 三二二七六
 c. " 三二二八一

0159 0015 1760 0911 5100 6150

小磯三郎の「日本主義」の著書に「THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION」
 の會員ニテリ同社が「海峽」の近會會員デアリマシタ
 彼一九三一年七月「結社」會給ニ出席シマシタガソ公
 合ニ平沼モ出席シテ居リマシタ彼ハ荒木ガ出席シ
 居ツタ何ウカ覺エテ居リマシタ彼ハ平沼ガ国本社ノ總
 裁デアツタコトハ承知シテ居リマシタ(c)

国本社ハ国家主義精神ノ涵養・国破ノ護
 持及國民精神ノ作興ハ其目的トシタモデアリマ
 シタ^(a) 小磯ハ彼ガソノ結社ニ加入シタハ國體ノ根
 本ガ明徴デナイコトソノ社テ発行シテ居ル雜誌テ眞
 ノ國體ノ其ノ精神ノ意味ヲ把握スルガ可アリト決
 意シタカラテアルト主張シマシタ^(b) 小磯ハ櫻會ノ會
 員デアリトテ否定シマシタ^(c)

KOISO Summation - LL

P. 5

LL-6 a. 書誌三三七五 記帳三二二〇
LL-7 a. 書誌三三六四 一三二四六〇

LL-7

軍務局以下、五課あり。即ち、軍務課、
兵務課、徴募課、財源課及馬政課、
照合課名正確トス。又、予リテ、
課長、課長、課長、課長、課長

LL-6

小磯、一九〇一年六月陸軍歩兵少尉、
後田宗進、一九二三年十二月陸軍少將、
一九三二年八月彼、陸軍省軍務局長、
一九三二年二月二十九日陸軍次官に任命、
居リマシタ。 (a)

(b) 彼、公職及關係

0159 0015 1762

- 44-9 参謀本部陸軍中隊、平時家室訪問、
 軍兵制二箇之至要、
 案二部長建川輝男、一級、
 INCIDENT、陰謀者トシテ小隊、
 が瀬江ヲ掌握シ、
 強、
 六中隊、
 参謀本部カラ本年天、
 及指ホリ遂行スルコトヲ出来ルコトヲ期、
 リニシテ、
- 44-9 (c) 彼、三月事件ノ、関係
 三月事件、
 天、
 意思表示ヲ可能ナラシムル、
 二宮/NISHIMURA、
 意、
 意、
 意、
 意、
- 44-8 a 書証 三六三、
 b、
 c 本局記 書証一七九、
- 44-9 a. 証 九三七八、
 d 田中隆吉 証 二〇一三一

L-11 a. 八三三三

" c. 九三三三

" e. 九三三三

L-10 a. 八三三三

L-9 a. 八三三三

此計此計此計此計此計此計此計此計此計此計

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K0150 Summation - 44

行動及「採擇」之權、方任六采、
 解波、日本、海外交渉、
 中心上及新政治行、
 々々、
 此計畫ヲ立案采、
 于リ、遂ニ、
 氏間ヲ代表シ、
 間ニ意見カ、

- U-11 記録 一五八六
- 〃 〃 一五八七
- 〃 〃 一五八八
- 〃 〃 一五八九
- 〃 〃 一五九〇
- U-12 記録 一五九一

KOISO Summation - C.C.

LL-13

参謀本部第二課長 達川美次 (TATENO ^{美次} Yoshitsugu) のソノ爆弾計画ニ関連シ、三百個ノ擬砲火ヲ大川が利用出来ルヤ否ニシテ (a) 宇垣が此ノ計画ヲ放棄スベシトシテ決定シテ後、小磯が「取戻す」とシテ、威信ニ関スルト思フヲテ、大川及ヒ清水 (SHIMIZU) ニ爆弾返還方ヲ要求シ、遂ニ徳川 (TOKUGAWA) 侯トテニ仲介ニ立ツテ、アリマス (b) 彼等ノ軍、権ヲ用テ爆弾ヲ押收スルコトハシラセテ、シテ其ノ理由ハ爆弾ハ陸軍省トハ別個、一系統ヲル教育總監部、管轄下、歩兵学校ノモトアリカラズ、ト彼ノ主張ニ居リス (c) 此処ニ興味アリキト、当時、教育總監、死シテ武藤信義 (MUTO, Nobuyoshi) 將軍、何事此問題ニ関心ヲ示サザラズ、又ハ爆弾ニ関連シテ、軍務局ハ何等責任ナシト、反対訊問、際ニ主体ノ小磯が、爆弾、武藤 (MUTO) 將軍等、管轄下アリト云ヒテ、者達、誰モ以上ニ爆弾返還ニ関シテ心配シ居ラズト、アリマス。

LL-14

小磯、三月事件参加ニ関スル大川、陳述トハ別ニ三月

P. 9

- LL-13 a. 記録 三三二八五十六
- b. " 三三二九六、九七
- c. " 三三二九八

LL-15

水磯ノ三月事件トノ関係ニツイテノ肯定否定兩探
 ノ証拠ノ價值判断ヲスルトモ、小磯カヲ密謀
 ニ於ケル一共同謀議者デアラフト云フ結論ニ到達ス
 ル旨デアリマス。大川カソノ計画ヲ小磯ニ提示ス
 際ニオケル、大川ニ関連シテノ同人ノ行動ハ参加
 セストリソノ主張トイ旨スルモノデアリマス。前ノ通リ
 モ、テケクテハ陸相ニ報告出来ナイト云フ理由ヲ小磯

- LL-14 a 記録 ニニニ〇ニ
- b. " ニ八ハ〇セ
- c. " 一五六七六一七
- d. " 三三ニハセ

9961 5100 6510

KOISO Summation - LL

事件、主要人物ハ小磯、宇垣 (USAKI)、永田 (MAYEDA)

及ビ陸軍省ノ他ノ將校達アルト云フ。導カ事件

当時ニ行ハレテ居ラシト、石原 (ISHIHARA) ノ証言

カアリマス。(a)

橋本ハ先ニ証問ノ際、小磯ハ三月

及十月兩事件ノ立案者ノ一人アルト述べタシモ

拘ラズ。(c)

証人ニ立ラフ時ニハ、小磯ノ同事件

トノ関係ハ、爆彈ノ返還ヲ得ル為ニ努力シテ幸

デアラト証言シマシク。(b)

小磯自身ハ証人

シテ、自分ハ参加者アルカクモ却ツテ三員事件ノ如

キ性質ノ陰謀ニ將校達ガ参加スルコトノ適當ナ

クイコトヲ参謀次長ニ蔽言告シテ四遺イタムト主

張シシ事。(d)

KOISO Summation - 44

P.11

本州、計画、責任如何、決定又ハ操部下番
 (NAGATA)ニ委付タルトシ、今ハ之ヲ責任シテハ、小
 磯ニシテ、無意味ナリトス。又ハ、本州(NAGA-
 TA)ニ遵ヒ、此ノ計画ニ責任負出サレ、今ハ小磯
 ニ此ノ計画ヲ調査、本州、永日(NAGATA)ニ委付タリ、後
 一日ニ日ノ半程(UGAKI)経過トシ、此ノ件ニシテ、言
 ハシムカニ、(a) 本州明白ニ、責任基礎
 トシ、小磯ノ筋ノ通リ、計画ナリトシ、陸相ニ提
 出来、本州ニ、責任ニ、拘ル、今ハ、此ノ
 計画ノ半程(UGAKI)ニ提出、今ハ、本州
 ハ、小磯ノ半程(UGAKI)ニ、今ハ、彼ノ計画
 ニ、責任付下ル、既ニ、本州、此ノ筋ノ通リ、本
 又不合理トシ、本州、半程(UGAKI)ニ、此ノ筋ヲ得
 本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、
 計画ニ対スル、小磯、今ハ、非難、彼ノ、本州前
 取ノ行動ニ、提議、本州、本州、彼ノ、本州、倒
 サル、本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、
 フル、本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、

(a) 本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、本州、
 (b) 本州(UGAKI)、本州、本州、

44/15	a.	記録	三三三九一
	b.		三三三九二
	c.		三三三九〇

4-15	イ	記録	三三九〇
	ロ	イ	三三九〇
	ハ	イ	三三九一
	ニ	イ	三三九二
	ヒ	イ	三三九三
	ヘ	イ	三三九四

大川＝指来の二計画と文書＝書き出しの
 計画＝書類ニシテハ後六川之計畫ニテ
 書類ニテハ(ハ)ニ計画ニテ手配解了體
 取書ヲ作リ、此等、注意書ヲ添付、振出ノ
 (ロ)此計画ニ貴部下ノ指示ヲ求ルニテ
 加下米田(NAGATA)ニ調査ヲ命ジ、
 (ハ)計画ニ一貫性ナシトテ、
 了テ感想ニ報告ス、
 (ロ)二十日、
 早退(GAKI)ニテ行来ノ意見等々、
 之ノ程上ニ興味ヲモクニテ、
 等ノ行動：ドウシモノニ據キ、
 (GAKI)ノ承諾ヲ得、
 意振ニ、
 上ノ啓出、
 (ロ)

KOISO Summation - 66

4-16 此等ノ事、實及び自認、軍務局長タル者が考慮スルコトニ
 于ハ妥當ヲ欠ク問題ニ對シ小磯、方ニ早ニ無關心ト受動
 的ノ態度ヲトシ止マズ更ニ滿洲事變解決ノ第一歩ト
 シテ軍部ニ權カヲ握ラセシ目的、下ニ「クーデター」ヲ發生シ
 ヲトスル密謀ヲ陸相ニ承認セシコトヲ極ヒトテ、ソノ主謀者
 大川トノ間ニ小磯が密接ナル關係ヲ有シテ居タリト示シ居
 ルベアリヌ。

4-17 (d) 小磯、奉天/MUKDENニ對スル關係
 小磯ハ一九三一年夏滿洲ニ於ケル逼迫シク情勢ヲ憂慮
 シ南/MINAMI/及び參謀次長ト此ノ事ニ就テ討議シ三三
 級ノ滿洲ニ於ケル紛爭勃發阻止、使命ヲ托スル適性者
 トシテ建川/TATEKAWA/、名ヲ擧ゲタコト、ソノ主張
 シテ建川/TATEKAWA/ガ選任セラルコトヲ知ラセシ、建
 川/TATEKAWA/ガ派遣セラルコトヲ知ラセシ、南カ
 建川/TATEKAWA/、旅行亦ニ建川/TATEKAWA/ニ命ジ事件
 就テ熟議シ奉天用四關東軍ガ行動ニタリ、林/HAYASHI/
 ノ報告ヲ調査スル様ニ指令シ知ト云フ南ノ証言ハ建川/TATEKAWA/
 ガ旅行スルコトニ於テ居テ事ハ亦以テ知ラセシ、一九三一年ノ小
 磯ノ斷言ト何カ意味アリテ不一致ヲ示シ居リヌ。

P. 13

4-17	e. d. c. & a.	記録	三三三〇八
	"	"	三三三〇九
	"	"	三三三一〇
	"	"	一九八二一
	"	"	一九八三七

0 15 9 00 15 17 1 1

KOISO Summation - 22

715

建川、主張、彼が事件が起キルが二三起キサレ計画ヲ奉ルニ
 奉リト、モウノ、証據ヲアリニス、ソノ事、事變發生後、軍ニ
 奉天ニ遊覽証行ニテモ未ニ其タカ、如ク此ノ問題カラ予引
 イタノデアリニス、此ノ記録、建川が自己、使命ヲ遂行シ
 下ス、ソノ時ニ端ニ幾ニ夕軍事行動ノ初動ニ於テ日本
 ノ戦争機械、回轉ヲ停止セヨトスル何等カノ手段ヲ取
 名ト示ス如キ如何ナル事案ヲモ完全ニ欠イテ居リニス、密
 謀ナル文字、建川ノ行動ノ予ニ面ニ記サキ居リ、ソノ建川
 ト小磯ノ關係ト及ビ建川が參謀本部ニ對スル小磯ノ提案
 ニ因テ此ノ旅行ヲ三夕事案トシ、此ノ兩者ノ間ニ協同ノ計画
 ガアリタドウカラ判断スル上ニ大ナル重要性ヲ有スモノト予
 リニス

11-17
 715 記録 二〇五七

0 159 00 15 1772

P15

K0190 Summation - 22

LE30 LE19 LE18

a. 記號 三一三〇
a. 五加
a. 記號 五七

LE20

小鐵/K0150/六橋... 鐵州... 鐵州...

LE19

元三五... 鐵州... 鐵州... 鐵州...

LE18

國際聯盟... 鐵州... 鐵州... 鐵州...

KOISO Summation - 66

知事ト云ク「居リ之ハ一九三二年七月二十五日附
 察側表廷証ヲ三三五號ハ斯ル研究ハ行ハズ居ル
 名ト云ク「三三三」又「三三八」憲兵司令部ヨリ陸軍省
 送附セ、戰鬥能力、維持ト自然自足、觀望カ三日本
 満洲及蒙古ト完全ニ所屬スルヲ、行動ヲ計畫シテ
 久小磯（KOISO）側進者、人言ハ之、之又于（SHIMAZU）
 之「三三」ヨリ処理セリ報告、中ニ云ク「居リ之ハ」此
 通信中ニ「憲兵司令部ハ、軍ヲ、的占領ヲ完全ニ計
 画スルハ、最少五〇〇名、憲兵ガ必要ナルト述ビテ
 居リ之ハ」小磯（KOISO）ハ「軍務局長トシテ、局内
 ヲ考察セリテ、研究ト計畫ニ就キテ、ハ当然知事「居リ
 之ハ」ニ從テ、知事「居リ之ハ」ハ彼申立其場ヲ糊
 塗スルヲ捏造シテモ、ト覺者ナリト云。

P. 17

Let			
d	c	記録	三三三〇三〇五
		"	三三三〇三
		"	三三三〇四

P18

KM150 Summary -LL

LL-22

LL-21
 三、觀察經濟學說
 經濟學說之內容
 政府機關之干涉及積極的指導
 機關之干涉及積極的指導
 經濟學說之內容
 政府機關之干涉及積極的指導
 機關之干涉及積極的指導

LL-21

LL-21
 三、觀察經濟學說
 經濟學說之內容
 政府機關之干涉及積極的指導
 機關之干涉及積極的指導
 經濟學說之內容
 政府機關之干涉及積極的指導
 機關之干涉及積極的指導

5771 5100 6510

KOISO Summation LL

LL-23
 3. 事变後滿洲に於ける活動ト小磯/KOISO/ト關係
 満洲事变時、左根/WAKAZUKI/が首相
 下ニシテ、彼、指導、下ニ内閣、陸軍、張長
 對シテ、陸軍予算ヲ削減セリシヲ(併シ、二三
 年々々十月、内閣ニ陸軍部が権力を得、ソシテ橋
 本/HASHIMOTO/及重光/SHIGEMITSU/陸軍中佐ヲ
 後援者トシテ陸軍大学校最近卒業生、内閣、滿
 洲問題研究会が組織セリシヲ陸軍、此等、者ヲ
 押シ、コトが出来ズ、予算ヲ立案スルニ困難イタリシ

LL-24
 小磯/KOISO/ハ軍務局長(1)トシテ參謀本部計
 画ヲ實施スル義務アリシヲ。據言ス、陸軍、作戰
 編成及動員等、計画ヲ立案スルニ參謀本部、陸軍
 大臣が費用及、需品ヲ握ツ、年々、費用及需品ヲ
 陸軍省カラ支給シテラフナリシヲ、斯レ計
 画ヲ立テルトキ參謀本部ハ、必要ニ費用及需品ヲ陸軍
 省ニ要求致シシヲ。斯レニ要求ヲ受理スル陸軍省

- LL-23
 a. 記録 一五五六 一五八九
- b. " 一五五四
- c. 書誌 一三九一B 記録 一三九七六
- LL-24
 a. 記録 一五五六

217

LL-26

小磯 / KOISO / 又三三平 / 大藏 / INUKAI / 首相晉後 / 平浪 / 日記 一五五九

日記 一五五九
日記 一五五九
日記 一五五九

LL-25

内閣 全体上より漸進的、慎重に、
能く起て安泰の念を置かざるを以て、
INAMI、該事件を終結せしむるに努むるに
シテ、此決定は約に反し、INAMI、
件を停止せしむる保証は、
否ニシテ置かざる。南 / INAMI、
上野、本社 / HONJO / 停止せしむるに
ハ戦術的、理由の斯くは、
ニテ、証言シタカ。小磯 / KOISO、
ニテ、南 / INAMI、行動を補助し、
ニテ、買入キテ、南 / INAMI、
ニテ、結果、
ニテ、

内閣、有らば資金を要し、
國を遂行シタカ、
内閣、
内閣、
内閣、

9771 5100 5900

KOISO Summation - L-L

平沼 / HIRANUMA /
 次期首相ニシテ / 小磯 / KOISO / 一時、亦、有
 意義ナリトアリマス。其、理由トシテ平沼 / HIRANUMA /
 一九三〇年 國本社 / KOKUHONSHA - Foundation of the State
 Society / 初代社長ニシテ (國本社、後年「皇座會」ト
 稱シ、皇座會ニ關係アリマスガ) 小磯 / KOISO /
 同社、理事ニシテ (b) / 小磯 / KOISO / 平
 沼 / HIRANUMA / 所長、一九三三年首、同社、集會ニ
 出席シ、ヨリニシテ 証明ナキ中心如ク、國本社ニ関
 心ヲ持テ居タルハ明瞭ナリマス。(c)

又 関東軍參謀長トシテ、小磯 / KOISO /

4-27

(a) 九ヶ國條約ニ違反セル 政治的 活動

一九三三年八月廿二日 小磯 / KOISO / 関東軍參謀長
 ニシテ、總一九三四年三月廿九日迄、此、地位ニ居リ、
 彼、彼等ニ 関東軍司令部ニ在リテ、行政事務ニ責
 任シ、參謀ニ過キ、又、理由ニ、參謀長在任中、軍隊
 ノ指揮ニ、權限ガナク、主張ナリマスガ、彼、其、執
 行ニ、九ヶ國條約ニ違反スル、重要政策ヲ發見シ、即

(a) 一九三三年十月三日 附(1) 文書ノ示スル、滿洲國政

4-26 a. 書証ニ三五 記録一六三二五

b. " 一六四 " 一六三六

c. 記録三三三三四

4-27 a. 記録三三三三五

b. " 三三三三一

c. " 三三三三〇

d. 書記ニ三〇 記録二九〇三

R-27

府、支配一ノ文書、同國指導ヲ擬要スルベク、
又。

(b) 一九三三年十月二十二日 附文書、亦如ク滿洲國外國
貿易、支配一ノ文書、日本國以外、列強ノ無
條件ニ滿日関稅率⁽⁴⁾ 自心與ニ差⁽⁵⁾ニトガ出サナ
クニナラシム滿洲國関稅ニ對シ一級政策概要
ヲ述ベタミ、⁽⁶⁾ナリ云。

(c) 一九三四年十月二十四日 附電報、亦如ク同國政府
官吏ノ統御一ノ六、滿洲軍司令部官首相志、
各省大臣、執シカク監督出來ルヨク、滿洲國政
府内ニ責任分割制ヲ推薦⁽⁷⁾シタミ、⁽⁸⁾云。然
滿洲帝國建國ノ基礎ヲ固脚制度ヲ知テ居テ、⁽⁹⁾皆
シク。同制度下ニ國家主權同連、同制度然際東軍司令
官ニ服從スル多國ノ日本國ノ將軍ニシテ指導
サシム、⁽¹⁰⁾滿洲國、地方及中央政府ヲ支配スル
ニトガ出來タリ、⁽¹¹⁾云。

LL-27

- 2. 書誌三三九-A 記錄三三三七八。
- 3. 三三〇-A 三三三三一四
- 8. 三三六-A 三三三七一七

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KOISO Summation - LL

LL-28

(a) 中國に対する行ハリ軍事行動 (侵略戦争ニ含ム)

小磯が一九三三年二月十九日から一九三三年八月八日(ア)陸軍次官ヲ勤ル其後一九三三年八月八日から一九三四年三月五日(イ)ニテ関東軍参謀長ヲ勤ルキツル。関東軍が継続シテ作戰ヲ行ハリテアリス。遼寧(LIAONING) 吉林(KIRIN) 及び黑龍江(HEILONGKIANG) 三省ガ占領サレテ後一九三三年七月と八月に総攻勢ガ三回開始サレタデアリス。二年ノ内ニ中国ノ多ク要所ガ占領セリ。小規模ノ攻勢ガ時々継続シテ行ハリテアリス。(c)

満洲国が一九三三年三月一日附、獨立宣言書、中テ東北四州ガ其領土内ニ在ルト声明シタケ。関東軍ニトリテハ満洲国ト協力シテ熱河省ニ於テ法規及秩序ヲ回復スル必要ケルヲシテト小磯ノ主張シキルデアリス。(d) 一九三三年ノ初メ小磯ガ参謀長デアリテ、山海関戦ガ開始セリ。山海関及九門口(JIUMENKOU)ガ長城沿線、要所ガ日本側ノ手中ニ陥落シ、デアリス。(e) 日本及ハ満洲国ハ熱河省中

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LL-28	a	書証	一二四	記録	七三三
	b	〃	二四	〃	七三三
	c	〃	一九=A	〃	三六八・七〇
	d	記録	三三三五		
	e	書証	一九=A	記録	三六九

KOISO Summation - LL

国、領土に於て主張する所は、中國、其、邊境、
熱河を撤退スルに、二十四時間限付、最、後、
隊ヲ渡ラザルヲ以テスル也。 一九三三年三月二日。
熱河の陥落ニ付テリ也。(1) 中國人、河北
省(HOPEI)及び察哈爾省(CHAHAR)に逐出
スル共同謀議が一九三三年から一九三五年二月に
行ハラレタリ也。(2) 兵隊及び中國人、群が
長城(3)を執拗ニ攻撃スルヲ以テ、熱河作戦後
尙ホ作戦が必要ナルト主張、既ニ参照ナシ
タ文書(4)ニ徴スル、悉ク問題ナシトナリ
アリシ、其ノ文書、滿洲國ヲ否定スル所が之
等、軍事行動、其、目的ニ非スル、滿洲國、
地方政權、及び中央政權ヲ侵奪シ、日本、利
益、ヲ以テ滿洲國、土地ヲ所獲スル所が其、事實
ナ、目的ヲ定メ、之、目的が果タサレタリ、不
ナリトナリ也。

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LL-77

溥儀 (PUYI)、證言、閑東軍ニ依リ、斯、女子、
理が滿洲國ニ於テ、金融 (a)、裁判所 (b)、棉花 (c)、
通関 (d)、任免 (e)、労働 (f)、土地 (g)、阿片 (h)。

- | | | | | |
|-------|----------------------|---------|-----------------|---------------|
| LL-28 | f. 書記 一九三 A | 記録 三六七。 | LL-29 | a. 記録 四〇三、三三三 |
| | g. 記録 三三〇。 | | b. 記録 四〇四、四三三 | |
| | h. 記録 二七一 | | c. 記録 四〇二、六 | |
| | i. 記録 三三三九 | | d. 記録 四〇三、四二〇 | |
| | | | e. 記録 三九六、七 | |
| | | | f. 記録 四〇七、一九 | |
| | 書記 三三九、三三〇、A. 記録 三三三 | | g. 記録 四〇三、一六 | |
| | 三三六、三三〇。 | | h. 記録 四〇一、四、四三三 | |

米穀 (1) 及び旅行 (2) = 町より実行 (3) サリコトキ
不... (4) ... (5) ...

(C)

満洲ニ於ケル阿片之販制ト小販トノ關係
小販ハ自今ハ滿洲ニ於ケル阿片ノ販制ト何等
ノ關係モナカズト云フニモテアリマシムニ肥原ノ
個人段階ノ中テ、相澤 (SINZAWA) 證言ハ特務
機關ハ何等カル統制ヨシキモ居ラセカクアトモ
強調シテ居リ也。前ハ自今ハ關東軍ノ許可
官トナリテ、特務司ヲ廢止スルノ理由
一ツハ特務部ハ滿洲國政府ノメナケナリ
特務部自身ノ利益也ト云フ阿片 取引ヲモテ
オツカモシレシメトシタメノアトモト 證明ヲモテアリス也
小販ハコト特務部 (1) 行政官ヲマルトモニ關
東軍ノ参謀長トモ兼キテモテアリス也。昔レ
コト特務部ハ阿片ノ統制ヲモテキテラハ觀察業
ニ栽培ノ増加ナリトモ、阿片 (1) ノ利用ノ増加
カクコト及ビコトノ利益 (1) 利益 (1) 使用
ニ対スル責任ハ小販クモツヘキデアリマス。例ハ
滿洲ニオイテ、阿片 (1) へイン、以用者ノ広
ク、使用ノ擴大 (1) ... (1) ... (1) ...

LL-10 記録 四三三
四三六

LL-30 記録 一八八
一九九
二〇〇

C. 三三三三三

LL-10 記録 七三三

LL-10 記録 四八八
四八九
四九〇
四九一
四九二
四九三
四九四
四九五
四九六
四九七
四九八
四九九
五〇〇

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LL-31

5.

販賣する事も不蒙起り、今も不蒙起り、
 来り、今も不蒙起り、
 日六日、
 警察給納箱(三三三三)故に、
 二於、計り、下り、下り、

板橋務大臣上り、小磯
 小磯、平記内閣、冷下、
 手合、月、又、半、(DVA) 以、
 一月十六日、先、
 多、下、又、
 上、合、際、本、
 声、自、
 小磯、
 日本、
 他、
 小磯、
 (C) 小磯、
 平、
 平、
 平、

LL36
 LL31
 LL30
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 LL2
 LL1

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b. a

" 22

三 三

四 四

一 一

0159 0015 1784

KOISO Summation - LL

タトキニ「アウト」(OFF)の命令は、
 ハ、命令を備へた電報機は、
 等行動ニ対スル獨り立個々
 ルタメ「アウト」(OFF)の命令は、
 「アウト」(OFF)の命令は、
 ルニ当リ、實際ハ「アウト」の命令は、
 クコトヲ小機ヲ去リ、
 ガ其ノ報告ヲ記述シ、
 シテイリスレテ下リマス。

KOISO Summation - LL

LL-33

コレニ閣聯シテ小磯公交渉ヲ行ハシテ佛印ニ對
 武力ヲ行使セシトス。一九四〇年六月十九日、四相會
 議決議^(a)雲南^(b)之鐵道ヲ奪取セシト
 スル計畫及如何ナル原料ヲ印度支那ニ經テ中國
 ニ輸送アルベキカラ決定スルヲ日本、實ニ佛印
 ニ派遣スルコトニ度^(c)ト、一九四〇年六月二十日附日
 本ヨリ佛蘭西へハ入ル等、如キ佛印ニ對スル日本
 侵略的行動ヲ阻止スルヲニ、閣僚トシテ何等
 肯定的行動ヲ執ラカツタコト、注目ニ值スルヲ
 アリス。(c) 小磯が佛印ノ主權ヲ侵害スル之等、政
 策ヲ甘ニ承知シテハオツト、一〇月^(d)が去リ
 (前記)電報ヲ發シ信用セシル、予ハ之ヲ此
 電文中ニ小磯自身既ニ述ベタ如ク、獨逸が其ニ
 同意スル條件、下ニ太平洋上於ケル戰爭行動ヲ
 積極的ニ計畫シタテアリス。

LL-34

P. 29

原田^(e)及^(f)オツト^(g)一〇月^(h)小磯⁽ⁱ⁾コトヲ
 直達^(j)テ書キアル、小磯ノ主張ニ信^(k)道^(l)自^(m)ハ
 最大⁽ⁿ⁾疑念^(o)アル^(p)故^(q)ニ小磯^(r)其^(s)意向^(t)際^(u)
 述^(v)ベタ^(w)以^(x)ノ主張^(y)ヲ^(z)據^(aa)キ^(ab)タ^(ac)ト^(ad)可^(ae)對^(af)實^(ag)上^(ah)ノ^(ai)認^(aj)

LL-33

- a 著記六九 記六三
- b 三〇 六六五
- c 六六 六五二

據天理論之述ベテカツラマシキニ

一九四五年、臺北、外務省が臺灣東部

WATHERLANDS TEST INDICES、現存臺灣

臺北、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

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マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ、マサカシ

4L-35

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KOISO
Discussion
4L

4L-36

一九四五年三月十七日、機、第七十五議、
會聯仁會、於、南太平洋並北太平洋、
又、三國、政策、日本、目的、推將、又、演說、行、之、
夕、(a) 日本、が、九四、年、春、南進、三、村、之、心、續、意、
ヲ、行、今、マ、サ、カ、シ、ト、コ、ト、カ、九、四、年、五、月、十、日、
又、三、國、政策、日本、目的、推將、又、演說、行、之、
夕、(a) 日本、が、九四、年、春、南進、三、村、之、心、續、意、
ヲ、行、今、マ、サ、カ、シ、ト、コ、ト、カ、九、四、年、五、月、十、日、

4L-35
a 記録 三三四二一二
b 書誌 三三四二六四一四五
c 三三四一六
d 三三四一七
e 三三四一六
f 三三四二二
g 三三四二二

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KOISO Summation - LL

P31

独逸ノ南領トシテ WETHERLANDS INDIES
 同ノラ 南領トシテ發表シテ示サシテ居リマス。トモ
 コノ行爲日本ニ對スル白紙委任狀トシテ解サシタ
 リテ其後一九四〇年五月十日ニ日本オランダ
 WETHERLANDSニ對シテ西ニ來テ行ツテ、ニ
 遂ニ戰争ニ入ルニシテ南領東ニシテ WETHERLA
 NDS EAST INDIESトシテ交渉ハ小磯ヲ格務大臣
 ツク一九四〇年五月一日附ノ電覽書ニシテ開始サレ
 本ハ中ニ事實ニ東ニシテ EAST INDIESニシテ
 此無制限ノ經濟的特權ヲ西ニ來シテ、ニ
 又小磯、斯ル交渉ニツキハ、殆ビト知ナカク
 主張ニシテ、ニシテ、ニシテ、ニシテ、ニシテ、
 年六月二十四日、政府ニ對シテ、小磯が彼ニシテ支那
 WINDO-CHINA)並ニ南領トシテ WETHERLANDS
 INDIES)ニ於テ日本が軍事行動ヲ取ル場合ト
 シ、如何ニ此態度ニ此ル上、對シテ、大
 使、若シテ、アメリカが對シテ、戰ニ參加シタキマ
 シ、PHILIPPINES)及、HAWAII)ヲ攻撃
 ントシテ、約東ヲ日本ガ、ニシテ、太平洋
 々ニシテ、トシテ、約東ヲ日本ガ、ニシテ、太平洋

LL-316
 多書紀五七一九記録二六六一九
 〇、三〇九八、二七七一
 〇、三〇九八、二七七一
 〇、三〇九八、二七七一

〇記録三四二六

21-37

21-38

唱に或る人と同論を為す。然るに、其の事實は、
又、(4) 其後、(4) 月、職、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
二村に激越す。此等、成、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
于座り、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
也。又、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
コナ、條件、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、

二期間(一九四〇年一月一日(大東元)日本) 日本、
冬、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
ノ、二村、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
據、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
現、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
緊、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
日本、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
同、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
又、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
六、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
地、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、
対、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、(4) 月、

一九四〇年三月三日日本政府所可成の連立(注記) 物資
LL-36 右書紙五三三 記録六一七四
g. 記録三二四二六
h. 三二四二七
LL-37 右書紙一〇一四 記録二六八一九
c. 三二八、二六九

005100 5100 6510

0159 0015 1789

KOISO Summation - 22

即チ盾鉄、石油、廢解銅、モリブデン (MOLYBDENUM) 等ナシク、CANADIAN 及工作機械ヲアメリカ合衆国ニ依存スルニ止メ、コトニヨリ合衆国ニ対シ外交政策ニ関連シテ、經濟政策ヲ変更スルコトヲ決定シ、又軍需製産ヲ拡大決定シ、滿洲国及中国ト更ニ一層緊密ニ關係ヲ確保スルコトヲ決定シ、南方諸國ヲ日本經濟圏、中ニ入ルニ及ビ更ニ努力ヲスルコトヲ決定シ、又小磯ガ米内 (SONAI) 內閣、夏ニアツタテ期間、コトデアツタテ、アツタテ。

22-39

日本ガ戰爭準備計画、多ク新ニイテ陸軍カラ原料ヲ確保スル必要ガ生ラレ、コトニヨリ日本ガ東ニシテ (EAST INDIES) 及佛領印度支那ヲ取扱フニ、軍事的侵略的行動ヲ以テ及ビ、コトヲ説明スルモ、アツタテ。

730

22-38 a 事件 100 記録 三三三十四

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K0150 Summary - 2-1-

21-40

此等補強手段於戰事以前即取已甚周，其目的在於
 至之。彼國係以不銹鋼之產或高，其產量自本
 目的達成，即取之數多，行動非，其產量自本
 何分子行任務方之。彼價賤的行動，其產量自本
 於其產量之國於軍中，繼續行動，其產量自本
 音田山東 / SHANTUNG / 濟州 / HAI / 巨劍
 元四年四月十四日 / KAI / 音田 / 音田 / 音田
 不自十四日 / MICHAEL / 音田 / 音田 / 音田
 加彼中三隣邦，即對日本行身線約，其產量自本
 違反行為，即在上述之，其產量自本

21-41
中國及越南之於軍事行動，不經濟的自衛的

此種上之經濟部，所謂「平船」，其產量自本
 防衛，其言甚末，日本之經濟的，其產量自本
 之達成也，其言甚末，其言甚末，其言甚末
 國之五種會議，決定，其產量自本
 在之制定，其言甚末，其言甚末，其言甚末
 全部之接收，其言甚末，其言甚末，其言甚末
 其言甚末，其言甚末，其言甚末，其言甚末

21-40

- a 書証 二五〇、二六一A 証據 三四三、三七〇、二四一五、一六
- a 書証 三四五、証據 三三五〇
- a 証據 一二九、一五六

21-41

- a 書証 三四五、証據 三三五〇
- a 証據 一二九、一五六

00671 5100 6510

KOISO Summary - 22

朝鮮總督上書小磯

LL-42 英國、傳書多一九四二年八月十日朝鮮總督着之公衆
面前ニ公衆の條面ヲ取カシテ之ヲハシ小磯カ朝鮮
總督ヲシテ一九四二年八月十九日一九四二年七月十日
曰ク(此ノ事ナリニシテ) 子ノ事件ハ實ニ極ニシテ
ハ彼ニ未ダ總督ニ無シトシテ言ハシテ、自人傳
書ヨ公衆、面前ニ取カシテ之ヲハシ、誠ニ訂正後
ガ總督ニシテ時ニ履行セシメテ之ヲナリ又。

LL-43 小磯總督上書當時、日本陸軍、對英一九四二年
一月日迄ニ滿洲ニ於テ約百十方ニ増進セシメ、北
方ニ聯シテ南方(東印度) EAST INDIES / 諸島ニシテ
二三ノ他國及小磯、各日本、他人、自的ニシテ
ハ朝鮮ヲ供給地、滿洲ニ莫大ニ其力ヲ用ヒ、
ハ必要ニシテ之ヲナリ又。

總理大臣上書小磯

LL-44 小磯、一九四四年七月十日、一九四五年三月迄、官稱下

- LL-43 a 官証 一九七五 証號 一四五三三
- LL-43 a 官証 七〇六 証號 二五三二
- b " 三三五 " 一九四五年六月 一五三三

P. 35

KO/50 Summary - 22

外務關係、經濟事情、宗教及教育、日本管理之詳細、取極多、一九三八年七月十五日、五相會議、決議が取消された、望みは、居たが、如何に、和平が、障害物として、なり、如何に、中国に、和平を得たいと、期待する、と、説明致した、と、云ふ。

44-45

一九四二年四月二十一日小磯、大東亞建設委員、大任、任命された、その、大東亞、範圍及び目的、一九三二年、月、議會、論議された、大東亞、形成、中国、日本、滿洲国、及び南京、中国、下り、核として、行、た、と、云ふ。泰國、印度支那、倉之、と、して、居る、と、云ふ。MALAY、半島、香港、HONGKONG、大東亞、初、陸、と、して、居る、と、云ふ。PHILIPPINES、Burma、滿洲国、同列、傀儡、と、して、居る、と、云ふ。而して、南、東、印度、才、不、たり、と、して、居る、中国、日本、親、敵、と、して、居る、と、云ふ。大東亞建設、目的、大東亞、日本、統治、國、擴張、と、して、居る、と、云ふ。原料、物資、重要、と、して、居る、と、云ふ。南洋、原料、物資、敵、國、流、出、と、して、居る、と、云ふ。

P. 37

44-45	d. e. f. a.	記録 三四二一
	"	証書 一四、記録 三五
	"	記録 二三、三四、四五
	"	記録 一三四一
44-45	e.	記録 二三四一
	f.	記録 二三四二

と防々として以て作戦区域を陸軍に自給する確保を占領地域に現存する業を日本に協力する確保を占領

と云ふことなり

LL-44

独立国を領する征服又統治せしむる侵略行為を實現を機園を遂行する委員会中、地位を受諾ししことより、小磯軍閥と關係を明瞭に言ふことなり

又

LL-41

其、後一九四四年、十八五議會會議案を以て為る會議案

小磯、太平洋戦争に於ては日本、真の目的、英米、勢力を排除、百年間繼續する之の咄、國の有り、一圧迫カラ中國を解放せしめ、及道義に相互に協力する事、大東亞を再建せしむる目的、大義を以て居り、又、その目的、日本が防衛戦に於ては、先づ日本に於て長年直に作りし上、不況を極め、所説を破壊する事、日本に於て

LL-46

東印度に自由を約束す如く、下は、八軍に於ては、觀兵

カウを以て要地若手、租借に依り、手中に據り、尚曲直を主張し、諸企業業、製糖、茶業、公共施設、建設、鐵道

LL-43

手 記 録 二三四三 及 右記 鐵道

橋本、見解、記 録 七三六九

島身、見解、記 録 七三六九

鈴木三三夫/SUZUKI Shigeyasu/ 三三三三

見解 田中皇太子、Naokichi/ 七三六九

見解 田中皇太子、Naokichi/ 七三六九

LL-48

LL-49

a. 記 録 二七九 三三四五
b. 記 録 二七九 三三四五
a. 書 誌 二七 記 録 三三三
b. 二七 記 録 三三三

7571 5100 6510

0159 0015 1795

KOISG Sino-military - 21

記者：... 會聚... 海軍... 艦隊... 亦... 艦... 軍... 參謀... 長... 亦... 艦... 軍... 參謀... 長... 亦... 艦... 軍... 參謀... 長...

1/200
1-100-100
1-100-100

LL-50

小磯が首相ニシテ太平洋戦争ヲ終結カスルヨウ希望ニシテ
 トイフ彼、弁明ハ彼ノ計畫ガ一時的ニカシ敵ノ進出カヲ控
 ケニ依テ日本ガ商議ニ依ル平和ノ取極ムヲ為シ得ルヨウニ
 ヲウトスルニアツタト、彼ノ肯定シタ陳述ニヨツテ制限ヲ受ケテ
 ノテアリマス (A) ニ、小磯ノ弁明ハ商議ニヨル戦争終結ノ場
 合ニ対シ日本ノ軍事機密ノ恒久化ヲ計ルガ為メ軍事行
 動ニ從來ヨリ更ニ強クニ制限行セントスル首相當時ノ彼ノ行
 動ヲ確證スルモノデアリマス 其ノ增強ノ為小磯ハ因襲ヲ謂

LL49

- a 書記 六六一 記録 七一六五 三三四九
- b 記録 三三四〇
- c 〃 三三四〇
- d 書記 一三〇六、 記録 一七五三、四

LL-50

- a 記録 三三三二

0159 0015 1796

Kolsa Summation - LL

LL-49

佛領印度支那が共同防衛ニ関シ「誠意ニ依リテキル」ト云
 口實ノ下ニ日本側が全佛領印度支那ヲ編成割当及行動等ノ
 項ニ関シテハ日本陸軍ノ命ニ服スコトヲ條件トシテ日本ト佛領
 ノ共同拒押下ニ置ラトシ六个月内期限付最後通牒ニ次シテ佛
 印カラ獨立國トシテノ態容ヲ悉ク糾奪シテミマシタ 一九四五
 二月一日ハ小磯が亦首相テアツタ時テアリマシタ 彼ハ亦佛領印度
 支那ノ通信及運輸ノ業ヲ日本ノ統制下ニ回導ラトスル附隨
 的決定ヲモクシテ居リマシタ 其ノ行動ハ「蘭領印度支那ノ進取
 ニ必要ナル佛領印度支那ノ基地ヲ示ラシ據ニシラト云フ一九四一
 月十六日大本營陸海軍部雙方間ニ協定カシタ字本ノ實現ヲ
 促タシテアリマス」

P. 42

K0150 Summary-LL

標記は「証言」にて「証言」

山崎 / K0150 / 証言の關係

11-52

山崎 / YIMAZAKI / 証人 / 証言 / 關係 / 依り設けし内閣、其處、三三總務長、
タコト、証言ニ依り、

11-53

同日証人、現地（日本、内外）因（証言）
月子軍司令部又は、総立御園景が據り、
言ニ依り、

11-54

鈴木九郎 / SUZUKI Takaharu / 證言 / 証言 / 關係
一般ニ傍屬情報局長、許ニ送附せし、
三三層ニ依り、

11-55

斯カレ事、実ヲ認メ、且、總務大臣、官後、
携サシ、現地軍司令部、並ニ官武部、
針カ適當ナレバ、又、國際法ニ依り、
カ、又、人道ノ故、ホニテ、

11-54 11-53 11-52

a. a. a.
〃 〃 〃
一四六七 一四六二 一三六二

8971 5100 6510

K0150 Summation - LL

LL-56

当時施行せしむる日本憲法ニヨリハ天皇ニ進言ニ各
 省、事務ヲ委任ス又國務大臣ノ行政運用若シテ措
 置、停止命令發スルハ總理大臣ノ職務ヲ有リス又
 總理大臣ノ陛下ノ内閣最高顧問トシテ關係及ビソノ部下ノ正
 シク行動ニテハ之ヲ監督スル任務ヲ有スルガ故ニ特ニ信譽
 問題、如キ外國ニ關スル問題ニ就キ、成行ヲ知ルハ要カ
 タアリマエ、又總理大臣ノ成行ヲ知ツテ若シテ適當ノ処置
 ヲ採ラカラスルハ彼ノ故意ノ職務ニ忠シク履行有罪ナ
 リ、又カ一事ノ成行ヲ總理大臣ヲ知ル様ニカクトスルハ職務
 怠慢、廢職等ニ由罪ナラズ、又、此ノ見地ニ從テ
 考ヘマス、小磯ノ起訴、總理大臣在任中ニ起リタ
 カ故ニ信譽ニ對シテ犯罪ニ對シ總理大臣トシテ責任
 ナルガ故ニ

9. 起訴狀中、訴因ニ關シ小磯/K0150ノ行動

P. 43

LL-57 (a)

訴因一ニ云、三ノ中、第一三項、小磯/K0150ト共同謀
 議、訴因各價額戰爭遂行ト關係ヲ示スモ、ナラズ

LL-56

a. 記録ニ

LL-57

a. b.

記 錄

二二五二一六

三三三三三三 三三四三三三 四一 四二

三五二一三三 北野 - KITANO - 三三三

- (四) 許因八 閩東軍參謀長十三元 彼、類、可、及、北、文、議、者、於、軍、事、行、動、之、其、任、務、中、及
- (三) 許因六 本許因中、証據、鐵、軌、之、下、及、因、空、之、証、據、証、言、之、中、及、小、鐵、軌、之、中、及、中、國、之、命、令、之、中、及、居、之、中、及、小、鐵、軌、之、中、及、三、三、香、定、三、三、居、之、中、及
- (二) 許因七 三、六、滿、洲、及、中、國、之、於、北、九、之、國、條、約、違、反
- (一) 許因四 小、鐵、軌、之、中、及、一、九、四、年、六、月、十、八、日、之、朝、鮮、總、督、之、下、三、三、三、三、本、許、因、中、及、共、同、謀、者、之、行、為、之、對、三、三、許、違、法、之、三、三、
- (一) 許因九 一、五、小、鐵、軌、之、中、及、一、九、四、年、八、月、八、日、之、總、理、大、臣、之、下、三、三、三、三、中、立、之、犯、罪、遂、行、團、體、參、加、者、之、三、三、三、三、有、罪、之、三、三、三、三、
- (二) 許因五 一、五、小、鐵、軌、之、中、及、一、九、四、年、八、月、八、日、之、朝、鮮、總、督、之、下、三、三、三、三、中、立、之、犯、罪、遂、行、團、體、參、加、者、之、三、三、三、三、有、罪、之、三、三、三、三、
- (三) 許因三 一、五、小、鐵、軌、之、中、及、一、九、四、年、八、月、八、日、之、總、理、大、臣、之、下、三、三、三、三、中、立、之、犯、罪、遂、行、團、體、參、加、者、之、三、三、三、三、有、罪、之、三、三、三、三、
- (四) 許因二 一、五、小、鐵、軌、之、中、及、一、九、四、年、八、月、八、日、之、朝、鮮、總、督、之、下、三、三、三、三、中、立、之、犯、罪、遂、行、團、體、參、加、者、之、三、三、三、三、有、罪、之、三、三、三、三、
- (五) 許因一 一、五、小、鐵、軌、之、中、及、一、九、四、年、八、月、八、日、之、朝、鮮、總、督、之、下、三、三、三、三、中、立、之、犯、罪、遂、行、團、體、參、加、者、之、三、三、三、三、有、罪、之、三、三、三、三、

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MATSUI, I JANE

Introduction

11-1. The purpose of this summary is to present to the Tribunal an analysis of the evidence introduced by the Prosecution and by the Defense with respect to the defendant MATSUI and an argument based thereon. The analysis of the evidence will be found in Part I and the statements at the beginning of each numbered paragraph are the salient facts which the Prosecution contends have been established by the evidence. The argument based upon the analysis of the evidence will be found in Part 2.

11-2. The defendant MATSUI is charged under counts Nos. 1-17, 19, 25-32, 34, 35, 36, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 of the Indictment.

PART ONE

ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY THE PROSECUTION AND BY THE DEFENSE

11-3. The defendant MATSUI was appointed commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force on 18 August 1937,^{a.} and was appointed commander of the Central China Expeditionary Force on 30 October 1937.^{b.} The Central China Expeditionary Force was composed of two armies - one commanded by Prince ASAKA and the other by Lt. General YANAGAWA.^{c.}

-2-
a. Ex 115, T 736
b. Ex 115, T 736
c. Ex. 255, T 3557

Page M-2.

1.

The "Ladybird" Incident.

MI-41 a. In his interrogation WASHIMOTO states:
 "I shelled the Ladybird and took it into custody. The Commanding Officer of the Ladybird told me he was going to the assistance of the Panay because he had gotten word that the Panay was in trouble. She was under order from Lt. General YANAGAWA. These orders read as follows: 'Nanking, being in a state of siege, and it appearing that enemy troops would attempt to flee upstream, Colonel WASHIMOTO is to sink all vessels proceeding towards Nanking without regard to nationality.' I think these orders were issued two days before the fall of Nanking."

"The Inevitability of Renovation" by
 b.
 WASHIMOTO:

"Two days before the fall of Nanking we unexpectedly received an order to attack all the Chinese soldiers retreating from Nanking towards the north on board transport ships. Several ships which seemed to be transports full of defeated soldiers came in sight several thousand metres downstream from the HU and we opened fire at them. I heard that a British warship happened to be in the group and was hit by some of our shells, and that it became a problem later on, but as for the Imperial Army we only

MI-41.

- a. Ex 258, T 3466-7
 b. Ex 264, T 3532-3

()
carried out the proper measures. At that time even British warships could not pass off Wuhu without being fired at."

On cross-examination, MATSUI stated that he took full responsibility without hesitation for the Ladybird Incident. In his evidence in chief, he stated that he ordered his Chief of Staff to investigate immediately and ordered the Commander of 10th Army to apologize to the British Naval Commander-in-Chief and he apologized to Admiral Little of the Royal Navy.^{c.}

M-5. The Panay Incident was on 12 December 1937. After the Panay had been abandoned two of the crew returned in one of the ship's boats to obtain stores and medical supplies. While they were returning to the beach a Japanese power boat filled with armed Japanese approached close to the Panay, opened fire with a machine gun, went alongside, boarded and left within five minutes. Report by U. S. on the Incident.^{a.} In his affidavit MATSUI states that he had nothing to do with the "Panay" Incident.^{b.} On cross-examination he stated that as he was directing joint Army-Navy operations he felt that although it was not his direct responsibility, it was in accordance with Bushido to express at least a word of regret to Admiral Yarnell of the U. S. Navy.^{c.}

M-5.
c. T 33,908

M-5.
a. Ex 263, T 3,525
b. T 33,834
c. T 33,909

II.

The defendant MATSUI issued a proclamation before the fall of the city which was distributed widely by airplane.

11-6. The prosecution witness, Dr. H. S. Bates,
a. states that MATSUI's proclamation made before the fall and distributed widely by airplane declared that the Japanese Army had only good will for peaceful citizens of China and would do no harm to those who did not resist the Imperial Army.

On 8 October 1937, MATSUI issued a statement in which he said that the devil defying sharp bayonets were just on the point of being unsheathed so as to develop their divine influence, and that the mission of the Army was to chastise the Nanking Government and the outrageous Chinese.
b.

Before he left Tokyo to take up his command he did have thoughts of pushing on to Nanking after the capture of Shanghai.
c. He asked for five divisions in the Shan hai Expeditionary Force before leaving Tokyo.
d.

On cross-examination MATSUI stated that before the capture of Nanking he issued an order to the effect that as Nanking is the capital of China the capture of it is an international event. Careful studies must be made in this regard so as to dazzle China even more greatly with Japan's military glory.
e.

The defense witness NAKAYAMA, an intelligence officer on the staff of the Central China Area Army, states
f.

-
- 11-6.
a. T 2,632
b. Ex 3411, T, 52,764
c. T 33,843
d. T 33,839
e. T 33,863
f. T 21,896

(11-6)
that MATSUI's order issued before the fall of Nanking provided that all troops must refrain from doing illegal acts and that a great number of military police as well as assistant military police should be made to enter the city at the same time as the troops in order to prevent all unlawful acts.

III.

The troops that entered Nanking from 13 to 16 December were all experienced troops officered by experienced men.

a.
11-7. Interrogation of MATSUI.

"The troops that entered Nanking and were there on 13, 14, 15, 16 December were all experienced troops officered by experienced men. I had never commanded these troops before. I had not heard of these troops behaving badly elsewhere in China or Manchuria. The army was a newly formed organization sent from Japan but it was composed of many experienced veterans. One division came down from the Peiping and Tientsin area. Prince ASAKA had joined the army only about 10 days before its entry into Nanking and in view of the short time he was connected with this army I do not think he can be held responsible. I would say that the Divisional Commanders were the responsible parties."

11-6.
b. T 21,894-7

11-7.
a. Ex 257, T 3,460-1

(12-7)

The witness HIDAKA, counselor in the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai giving evidence for the Defense states ^{b.} that MATSUI told him that he intended to stop the forces outside of the city wall and induce the Chinese commander to surrender and that he would dispatch only highly disciplined crack troops into the city. ^{c.}

IV.

There was no resistance in the City on the part of the Chinese.

12-8. Dr. M. S. Bates of Nanking University states that there was no resistance of any kind within the City. ^{a.}

The witness Hsu, Chuan-ying, employed in the Ministry of Railways at Nanking, states that there was no resistance by Chinese troops in Nanking on 13 December 1937 and on that day all Chinese soldiers left the City. ^{b.}

John G. Macsee, Episcopal Minister at Nanking states that after 13 December there was no resistance on the part of Chinese Forces in Nanking. ^{c.}

V.

The defendant MATSUI entered the City on 17 December.

M-9. (a) On 17 December a Military Review was held. ^{a.}
(b) On 18 December a Memorial Service was held; ^{a.}
in his interrogation MATSUI states that the bodies of dead civilians, women or children had all been removed by the time

M-7.
b. Ex 2537, T 21,445
c. T 21,447

M-9.
a. Ex 262, T 3,510

M-8.
a. T 2,628
b. T 2,558
c. T 3,894

(1-9)
he went into Manking, but he saw a few dead Chinese
soldiers near the West Gate.
b.

The witness OKADA, a lecturer in a Shan hai
school, states that MATSUI went to see the refugees
in the neighborhood and asked them about the dangers
that they had undergone during the fighting and com-
forted them. On cross-examination, MATSUI states
he was not in the refugee zone. He met a couple of
refugees and talked with them in a temple on top of
a mountain.
d.

VI.

On 18 December the Defendant MATSUI issued a press
release.

MM-10. Press release by Gen. MATSUI, 18 December
1937:
a.

"A religious ceremony for the war dead 18
December. The triumphal entry was on 17 December.
The army having become considerably exhausted it
is necessary for troops in general to take a
little rest because the army has been engaged in
unrelenting landing operations for four months. I
preferably must express my deep sympathy for the
enormous loss the troops and inhabitants suffered
from the war."

The instructions of MATSUI issued on 18 December
stated that all officers and men should enforce stricter
discipline and that everyone should be cautious with

MM-9.
b. Ex 257, T 3,461
c. T 32,749
d. T 33,861

MM-10.
a. Ex 262, T 3,510-1

(11-10) b.
regard to his conduct.

VII-

The defendant MATSUI left Nanking one week after his entry on 17th December.

11-11. In his interrogation MATSUI states: a.

"I entered Nanking on 17 December and after one week I returned to Shanghai. I met and discussed with U. S. and British Commanders, also the Italian and French Ambassadors with a view to settling things in a peaceful way. I did not talk to any foreign diplomats at Nanking."

VIII:

Atrocities at Nanking.

(a) Killing.

(1) Civilians.

11-12. Dr. Robert O. Wilson, a surgeon at the University Hospital in Nanking, from January 1936 to August 1940 describes the bayonet and bullet wounds of patients brought to the hospital and that within a very few days after 13 December the hospital filled up rapidly with many, many cases of injury to men, women and children of all ages. Large groups of men were taken to the river bank of the Yangtze River and shot, their bodies being pushed into the river. Another large group were taken outside the city wall, machine-gunned and the wounded then

11-10.
b. Ex 3,397, T 32,617-8

11-12.
a. T 2,530
b. T 2,533

11-11.
a. Ex 257, T 3,459

(MM-12) c.
bayoneted.

MM-13. The witness Shan, Teh Yi was arrested in the refugee zone and states ^{a.} that more than 1,000 male civilians were bound together and removed to the bank of the Yan tze River where they were ordered to sit down and were machine-gunned.

MM-14. The defense witness HIDAKA states that many Chinese soldiers entered the safety zone disguised as civilians. ^{a.}

MM-15. G. A. Fitch, Y.M.C.A. worker says ^{a.} that on 15th December he saw approximately 1,300 men all in civilian clothes taken from one of the camps, lined up, roped together and marched off to be shot.

MM-16. The witness Hsu, Chuan-ying, employee of Ministry of Railways states ^{a.} that on the third day witness drove around the city. On one street tried to count the number of corpses lying on both sides of the street and counted more than 500 and said it was no use counting. Not a single corpse was in uniform; they were all civilians, both young and old, including women and children. The Japanese took 1,500 civilians out of the safety zone. These people were machine-gunned and their bodies pushed into the pond.

MM-17. Dr. M. S. Bates of Hanking University states ^{a.} that hundreds of cases were reported to Japanese officials. He saw a whole series of shootings of

MM-12.
c. T 2,536

MM-15.
a. T 4,460

MM-13.
a. T 2,600

MM-16.
a. T 2,563-7

MM-14.
a. T 21,460

MM-17.
a. T 2,626-30

(M-17)
individual civilians without any provocation or apparent reason whatsoever. Within his own knowledge 12,000 civilians, men, women and children, were killed inside the walls. The bodies of civilians lay on the streets and alleys in the vicinity of his own house for many days after the Japanese entry.

M-18. Witness Captain Liang Tin-Fang was in Medical Corps at capture of Nanking. He estimates that about 5,000 men from refugee camp were taken to the river, lined up and machine-gunned. Shooting lasted from seven o'clock to 2 o'clock and was witnessed by 800 Japanese including officers, some of whom were in sedan automobiles.
a.

M-19. John G. Magee, Episcopal Minister at Nanking, says that^{a.} after 13th December the conduct of Japanese troops towards Chinese civilian men was unbelievably terrible. The killing began by individual soldiers or groups up to 30, each one seeming to have the power of life or death. Soon there was organized killing of great bodies of men. Soon there were bodies of men lying everywhere and he passed columns of men being taken out to be killed. These people were being killed by rifle fire and machine gun principally. Also they knew of groups of several hundreds being bayoneted to death. On December 14 or 15, he passed two long columns of Chinese all tied up with their hands in front

M-18.
a. T 3,370-1

M-19.
a. T 3,894

(12-19) of them, four by four. There may have been 1,000
 to 3,000 men in these two columns. ^{b.} About 1,000
 men were marched to the bank of the Yangtze River and
 there moved down with cross-fire machine guns. ^{c.} On
 18th December he went with Vice-Consul TANAKA of the
 Embassy to put up notices to protect property. He
 turned into an alley to take a short cut but soon
 ran into so many bodies that the car had to back
 out of the alley; they couldn't possibly get through
 without driving over so many bodies. ^{d.} He saw 300-500
 Chinese dead by the river side. The clothing was
 burned off these bodies and many of them were charred. ^{e.}
 On 21 December he saw many bodies lying by the side of
 the road. ^{f.}

12-20. Sun Yuen Chan, a rice merchant in Nanking,
^{a.} states that 10,000 people lined up on the bank of
 the river and were machine-gunned.

12-21. The defense witness USUGI, a lieutenant in
 the 3rd Division, stated that when he entered Nanking on
 the evening of 13th December there were many scattered
 dead bodies of both Japanese and Chinese ^{a.} and that
 the soldiers were ordered not to enter the refugee
 quarters. ^{b.}

12-22. The defense witness NAKAYAMA states that
 all armed resistance ceased on the morning of 13th
 December ^{a.} and that he never saw any dead civilians

12-19.
 b. T 3,898
 c. T 3,896
 d. T 3,901
 e. T 3,901
 f. T 3,902

12-20.
 c. T 4,484

12-21.
 a. T 32,599
 b. T 32,591

12-22.
 a. T 21,916

(11-22)

within or without the walls of the city.

(2) Policemen.

11-23. The witness Ma Chan Teh, a policeman in Nanking, states that ^{a.} he together with 300 other policemen and many civilians were marched to the main west gate of the city. As they went through the gate they were machine-gunned and about 16 groups, each containing over 100 persons, were killed. Gasoline was thrown on some of the bodies and set afire.

(3) Electric Light Company Employees.

11-24. The Diary of James McCallum discloses that ^{a.} on 8 January 1938, 43 employees of the Electric Light Company were lined up and machine-gunned.

(4) Prisoners of war.

11-25. Dr. W. S. Bates, Professor of History at Nanking University states that ^{a.} more than 30,000 soldiers who had surrendered and laid down their arms were cut down by machine-gun fire within the first 72 hours immediately outside the walls of the city. Laborers were hired by the International Committee to bury them.

(5) The burials.

11-26. The attention of the Tribunal is drawn to a chart showing the number of victims buried and the ^{a.} places where their bodies were found.

The totals are:

11-22.

b. T 21,922

11-25.

a. T 2630-1

11-23.

a. T 2,604-5

11-24.

a. Ex 324, T 4537

11-24.

a. Ex 309, T 4477

(12-26)

Tsung Shan-tang Teams	112,266
Red Swastika Society	<u>43,071</u>
	155,337

Also to a statement of Lu Su in which he states that ^{b.}
57,418 internees were frozen, starved or killed, and
to a report on War Crimes at Nanking prepared by
the Procurator of the District Court. The number of
victims killed totalled 278,586. ^{c.}

(b) Rape

12-27. Dr. M. S. Bates of Nanking University states ^{a.}
that one month after the occupation Mr. Raabe, Chairman
of the International Committee, reported to German auth-
orities he believed that not less than 20,000 cases of
rape had occurred. A witness on the basis of safety zone
reports alone estimates some 8,000 cases. Every day and
every night gangs of soldiers went through the city,
chiefly in the safety zone seeking women. A Chinese
woman was raped by 17 Japanese soldiers.

The documents of the Nanking Safety Zone dated ^{b.}
2 February 1938 report 75 cases of rape, 4 cases of
murder and 13 cases of robbery, all reported to have
occurred during the last week in January, 1938.

12-28. John G. Magee, an Episcopal Minister at ^{a.}
Nanking, says that on 3rd January Japanese tried to
force us to send the women back home from our safety zone.

12-26.

b. Ex 324, T 4538
c. Ex 327, T 4547

12-28.

a. T 3,909

12-27.

a. T 2634
b. Ex 323, T 4536

(17-28)
 He advised the older women to go home to make a showing
 of compliance. Rapines began a gain with the women who
 went back. The rapines continued day by day after
 the occupation. Men, women and even children were
 killed. If a woman resisted or refused she was
 either killed or stabbed. If the husband of the
 woman tried to help he was killed. ^{b.} On 20 December
 he saw a Japanese soldier in the act of rape. ^{c.} Two
 girls were raped on New Year's Day. ^{d.} On February 1st,
 1938, he saw two soldiers raping a 15-year old girl.
 He reported to a sentry who only laughed. ^{e.}

17-29. The Defense witness MAKAYAMA believes that
 there were several cases of rape and assault against women
 to a limited extent. ^{a.}

17-30. The defense witness MAKASAWA, a colonel
 and Chief-of-Staff of the 16th Division saw some
 traces of fire when he first entered and received reports
 from the M. F.'s of a few instances of plunder committed
 by Japanese troops. ^{a.} These were scattered offenses
 concerning discipline which were for instance attempts
 to enter the refugee areas; attempts to cohabit with
 Japanese women and things of that nature. There were
 some actual cases of rape but few in number. ^{b.}

17-31. The defense witness IINUMA, Major-General
 and Chief-of-Staff stated that after the entry into
Marking there were a few cases of plunder and outrage

17-28.
 b. T 3,904
 c. T 3,906
 d. T 3,907
 e. T 3,916

17-30.
 a. T 32,626
 b. T 32,641

17-27.
 a. T 21,944

(19-31) ^{a.} reported to IATSOI and the offenders were punished. There were "rough actions" such as beating or licking ^{b.} the inhabitants and burning furniture. There were small fires. ^{c.} He heard of cases of rape after his headquarters moved into Nanking after the 25th or ^{d.} 26th December.

(c) Looting.

12-32. The German Foreign Office in China ^{a.} Reports state that there is no store in the city which has not been broken into or looted.

The correspondence from the American Embassy, ^{b.} Nanking says that it is believed that there is scarcely a single piece of property in Nanking that has escaped entry and looting by the Japanese Military.

^{c.} Dr. H. S. Bates of Nanking University states that in some cases looting was well organized and systematic using fleets of army trucks under the direction of officers. Vaults in banks cut open with acetylene torches. He saw a supply column two-thirds of a mile long loaded with furniture. Practically all commercial ^{d.} property of any noticeable value was taken.

John G. Haese, an Episcopal Minister at Nanking, ^{d.} states that the Japanese took from the people anything that struck their fancy; wrist watches, fountain pens, money, clothing and food.

19-31.

- a. T 32,651
- b. T 32,673
- c. T 32,651
- d. T 32,656

12-32.

- a. Ex 327, T 4,594
- b. Ex 373, T 4,575
- c. T 2,831-6
- d. T 3,920

(d) Burnings.

11-33. The German Foreign Office in China
 a. Reports state that approximately one-third of the
 City was destroyed by fire through Japanese.

Dr. H. S. Bates of Nanking University states
 b. that beginning on 19th or 20th December burning
 was carried on regularly for six weeks. Sometimes
 gasoline was used but more commonly chemical strips.
 Private property was seized to supply incoming Japanese
 residents. The Russian Embassy was burned. The YMCA
 building, two important churches and two chief German
 commercial properties.

John G. Mace, an Episcopal Minister at Nanking,
 c. states that on 21 December practically all the
 foreigners in the city signed a petition and took
 their petition to the Japanese Embassy to beseech
 them in the name of humanity to stop the senseless
 burnings of the homes of the people.

IX.

There were atrocities in the district surrounding
 Nanking.

11-34. The correspondence of the American Embassy,
 a. Nanking, contains a communication from N. to the
 Consul General at Shanghai describing the murder of
 Chinese and looting and states that American and British
 flags were pulled down.

11-33.

- a. Ex 329, T 4,592
- b. T 2,636-7
- c. T 3,921

11-34.

- a. Ex 328, T 4555

(14-34)

John G. Kates, Episcopal Minister at Hanking,
 b. says that everywhere in the surrounding villages
 the same kind of things were happening that were
 happening in Hanking.

A Summary Report on War Crimes in Hanking
 prepared by the Procurator of the District Court
 discloses that ^{c.} 50,000 to 60,000 persons captured
 in vicinity of Ho-Fu-Chen including young and old
 men and women were machine-gunned and bayoneted.

MATSUI states in his affidavit that there were
 comparatively few fires in Hanking, the number of
 houses destroyed being approximately 50 or 60.
 d.

X.

Opium was sold openly after the fall of Hanking.

14-35. Witness Dr. R. C. Wilson of University
 Hospital, Hanking, gave evidence that ^{a.} prior to
 occupation he had never seen an opium den with a
 sign on the outside showing the sale of opium was going
 on. One year of the occupation, in spring of 1937, he
 counted 21 opium dens openly selling opium in the
 space of about one mile.

Dr. K. S. Bates of Hanking University testified
 that ^{b.} there was no open and notorious sale or use of
 opium for some 10 years before the Incident of 1937
 and that opium was used in back rooms chiefly by older
 men of the gentry and merchant type.

14-34.

b. T 3,920
 c. Ex 327, T 4,542
 d. T 33,823

14-35.

a. T 2,547
 b. T 2,650

0 159 00 15 18 18

(HM-35)

The witness Hsu Chun-min, of Ministry of Railway
stated that ^{c.} opium was publicly open for sale after
December 1937.

II.

The Army was out of control and there was a lack
of discipline.

HM-36. In his interrogation MATSUI admits ^{a.}
that there were some lawless elements in the Army. He
says in part:

"I draw a distinction between the obeying of
orders by a soldier in the process of operations
and what the soldier does off duty. The officers
commanding the troops in Hanking had the duty of
overseeing the behavior of their soldiers both
off duty and on duty. I base the statement that
the behavior of the soldiers was bad on account
of their behavior towards the Chinese population
and their acts generally. I consider that the
discipline of the troops who captured Hanking
was excellent but the conduct and behavior was
not."

HM-37. The German Foreign Office in China
reported that ^{a.} on 14th December the Japanese troops
which were insufficiently provided for due to the
fast advance were let loose on the city and acted
in a manner which was indescribable for regular troops.

HM-35.

c. T 2,582

HM-37.

c. Ex 329, T 4,599

HM-36.

.. Ex 257, T 3,458

Page MM-19.

(124-37)

Reports dated 14 January 1938 from the German Foreign Office in China to the Foreign Office in Berlin relative to situation in Nanking following the fall of that city state that ^{b.} the Japanese military authorities apparently lost authority and their troops, who for weeks plundered the city after its capture, violated 20,000 women and girls, slayed thousands of innocent civilians (among them 43 workers of the power plant) in a brutal manner, mass murder by machine-gun fire being among the humanitarian methods of execution.

The German Foreign Office in China Reports express the view that ^{c.} the fateful days of Nanking have clearly shown two facts:

- (1) The failure of the control of the defense of the fort of Nanking.
- (2) The lack of discipline, atrocities, and criminal acts, not of an individual but of an entire army, namely the Japanese.

124-38. The correspondence of the American Embassy, Nanking, ^{a.} discloses that American officials called on 14 American residents on 6 January who were asked what they particularly desired

Case

b. Ex 327, T 4,572
c. Ex 329, T 4,604

124-38.

a. Ex 328, T 4,561

(-39)
 authorities regarding conditions at Nanking. Their
 reply was: "To have the Japanese authorities get their
 soldiers under control and put an end to the horrors
 and atrocities now occurring."

The same exhibit discloses that the Japanese
 soldiers swarmed over the city ^{b.} in thousands and
 committed untold depredation and atrocities. It
 would seem, according to stories told us by foreign
 witnesses, that the soldiers were let loose like a
 barbarian horde to desecrate the city. Men, women and
 children in uncounted numbers throughout the city were
 killed.

M-39. Dr. W. S. Bates of Nanking University says
^{a.} that three days after entry small posters or proclama-
 tions were secured from high officers of the gendarmerie
 to be put up at the entrance to foreign property order-
 ing all soldiers to keep away. Not only did the soldiers
 daily disregard these proclamations but they also
 frequently tore them down.

M-40. The defense witness SAKAKIBARI, a staff
 officer, states that he directed in many places, by
 means of his autographed notice boards, safeguard of the
 inhabitants and prohibition of looting in many other
^{a.} places.

M-41. The Diary of James McCallum ^{a.} contains the
 following entries: "19th December. The whole Japanese
 Army seems to be free to go and come and do anything it

M-38.
 b. T 4,572

M-40.
 a. T 32,683

M-39.
 a. T 2,644

M-41.
 a. Ex 309, T 4,468-70

(13-41)
 "releases." "29th December. The people, helpless and unarmed have been at the mercy of the soldiers who have been permitted to roam about at will wherever they pleased. There is no discipline whatever and many are drunk. By day they go into the buildings in our safety zone centres, looking for desirable women, then at night they return to get them."

13-42. John G. Magee - Episcopal Minister at Nanking - says that ^{a.} the Japanese soldiers paid absolutely no attention to their own consular notices about foreign property or to American Embassy notices about foreign property. On 21 December TANAKA told ^{b.} Magee that the bad division then in Nanking would be changed for a better one and he thought by 24 December everything would be settled. After that there was no apparent betterment.

13-43. George A. Fitch, YMCA worker, says that ^{a.} 19 December was a day of complete anarchy. The military have no control over the soldiers. On 20 December vandalism and violence continued unchecked. The most important shopping street was in flames. He counted 14 fires from my window, and saw many Japanese army trucks loaded with loot which they were taking from the shops before setting fire to them.

13-44. In his affidavit MATSUI states that not a few of the crimes in Nanking were committed by Chinese troops and people when Nanking fell. ^{a.} But in answer to

13-42.
 a. T 3,920
 b. T 3,904

13-44.
 a. T 33,822

13-43.
 a. T 4,462

(MM-44)
 the Acting President he stated that NAKAYAMA and
 HIDAKA did not report any specific facts in regard to
 outrages committed by Chinese soldiers. They only
 conveyed to him general rumours in regard to those
 cases.
 b.

XII.

There was an inadequate number of military
 police available in Nanking.

MM-45. Dr. M. S. Bates of Nanking University
 testified^{a.} that the Embassy officers declared one
 great reason for the difficulty was the small number
 of military police or gendarmes available, which,
 at the moment of occupation, they declared to be 17
 in number.

John G. Magee - Episcopal Minister at Nanking -
 b. said "At first there seemed not to be any M. P.'s
 Then more were brought in and they said they were try-
 ing to make an effort, and they were throwing some of
 them as guards around certain areas in our Safety Zone.
 We were encouraged by this, and thought things were going
 to be better, but later on it became a kind of joke
 to us because those very gendarmes began to do some
 of the things the other soldiers were doing. A great
 many of the Chinese police were killed."

The defense witness HIDAKA states that at first
 there were only 14 Japanese gendarmerie in Nanking but

II-44.
 b. T 33,917

II-45.
 a. T 2,644
 b. T 3,928

(13-45)
on 17 December he heard that 40 other military police
c.
were to be obtained in several days.

XIII.

Complaints were made to Japanese Embassy officials at Nanking and forwarded to the Foreign Office in Tokyo.

13-46. The witness Hsu Chuan-ying, an employee in
a.
the Ministry of Railways, at Nanking said that com-
plaints were made to the Japanese Embassy and to the
Commander-in-Chief's office but not a single proclamation
was made prohibiting raping, looting and killing.

13-47. John G. Magee - Episcopal Minister at Nanking -
a.
stated "almost daily reports were made to the Embassy
and many of us went in person as I did myself many times
to the Japanese Embassy to tell of individual cases of
outrage."

13-48. Dr. H.S. Bates of Nanking University told the
a.
Tribunal that almost daily for the first three weeks
he went to the Embassy with a typed report or letter cover-
ing the preceding day and frequently had a conversation
regarding it with the officials, FUKUI, consul, TANAKA,
vice consul, and FUKUDA. These men were trying to do what
little they could but were terrified of the military, and
they could do nothing except forward these communications
through Shanghai to Tokyo.

13-49. The witness ITC, Minister at large in China,
a.
stated that he was in charge of negotiations with the

13-45.
c. T 21,449

13-48.
a. T 2,638

13-46.
a. T 2,594

13-49.
a. T 3,505-6

13-47.
a. T 3,922

(13-49)
 diplomatic corps and members of the press at Shan_hai
 and also was in charge of information. He says:

"I received reports from members of the
 diplomatic corps and from press men that the
 Japanese Army at Nanking had committed various
 atrocities at the time. I did not seek to
 verify these reports. I did report a general
 resume of what I had heard from diplomats and
 from press men. All my reports were sent to
 the Foreign Office."

MM-50. Dr. L. S. C. Smythe: Professor of
 Sociology, Nanking University, since October 1928,
 was in Nanking continuously from September 1935 to
 July 1938 and was Secretary of the Committee. The
 Committee filed ^{a.} nearly two protests every day for
 the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation.
 These were daily conferences at the Japanese Embassy.
 The Embassy at no time denied the accuracy of the
 reports. They continually promised they would do
 something about it, but it was February 1938 before
 any effective action was taken to correct the situation.

MM-51. The witness NAKAYAMA states that reports
 made by foreign residents were submitted to the Consul
 General and thinks that such matters were reported to
 the Special Service Department of the Shanghai Expedition-
 a.
 army Force. Unfortunately such reports were not made
to the Central China Area Army. It was the duty of the

MM-50.

a. T 4,456-8

MM-51.

a. T 21,927

Page 134-25

(M-51)
Staff Department of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force
to transmit those reports. ^{b.} The witness reported to
UTO complaints of violation of foreign interests in
Nanking. ^{c.}

M-52. A letter from the American Embassy in
Tokyo to the Embassy, Nanking, encloses a report ^{a.}
from the British Embassy at Nanking which states:

"The Rev. Boynton of the National Christian
Council who brought me these reports stated that
the Japanese Embassy officials who reached Nan-
king shortly after the entry of the Japanese
troops were horrified when they saw the orgy of
drunkenness, murder, rape and robbery which was
going on openly in and around the refugee zone.
Failing to make any impression on the military
commander, whose attitude of callous indifference
makes it probable that the Army was deliberately
turned loose on the city as a punitive measure
and despairing of getting cables through to
Tokyo owing to army control, Embassy officials
had even suggested to the missionaries that the
latter should try and get publicity for the facts
in Japan so that the Japanese Government would
be forced by public opinion to curb the Army."

^{b.}
It is disclosed by the evidence that up to 10
January 188 cases were reported.

M-51.

- b. T 21,929
- c. T 21,934

M-52.

- a. Ex 328, T 4,558
- b. T 4,574

11-52. The defense witness HIDAKA states that the reports on wrongs allegedly done by Japanese soldiers were submitted to the Consulate General by foreign residents. Most of these reports were based on hearsay and since the Consul General had not enough time to investigate each of them the reports were sent to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo and to the Army in Nanking. It seemed that the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo gave notice of these reports to the War Ministry. Whenever reports were submitted from the officials on the spot the authorities in Tokyo called the attention of the Army to them. It was due to this fact that the Army Control Headquarters sometimes gave directives about this to Army officials on the scene.^{a.}

11-54. The defense witness ISHII, Itaro, Director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, states that following the triumphal entry into Nanking on 13 December the Acting Consul General reported from Nanking by telegraph to the Foreign Office regarding the atrocities of Japanese troops in Nanking.^{a.} This report was transmitted without delay to the Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Office. At that time, the Foreign Minister being alarmed and worried about the matter urged the witness that some step be taken quickly to suppress such disgraceful deeds.^{b.} The witness told the Foreign Minister that a copy of the telegraphic report had already been

11-53.
a. T 21,453

11-54.
a. T 29,970
b. T 29,971

(28-54)
transmitted to the War Office and that he intended to warn the military authorities at the coming Liaison Conference of the War Office, the Ministry of the Navy and the Foreign Office, against such deeds. At the Liaison Conference one or two days later, he brought the problem of atrocities to the attention of the Chief of the First Section, Bureau of Military Affairs, and demanded that strict measures be taken to stop them immediately. The military delegate shared his feelings and acceded to his demand.
c.

The defense witness ISHII further stated that shortly after a detailed account typewritten in English drawn up by an International Security Committee consisting of representatives of third powers in Nanking regarding atrocities of Japanese troops was received from the Acting Consul General in Nanking.

On the occasion of the following Liaison Conference, the witness showed the report to the Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of Military Affairs and repeated his demand in compliance with the wish of the Foreign Minister. The military delegate answered that a strict warning had already been given to the Nanking Occupation Force.
d. On cross-examination, the witness stated that there were

Memorandum

c. T 29,972

d. T 29,972

(17-54)
a whole series of such reports one of them reporting
something over 70 cases of rape ^{e.} and that all reports
were made to the Foreign Minister. ^{f.}

Each time reference was made to the Rape of
Nanking, in the foreign press he received a report from
the Chief of the Information Bureau and these were
circulated to the Minister, Vice Minister and all Bureau
Directors. ^{g.} He thinks HIROTA took up this question
with the War Minister once or twice. ^{h.} The reports
were accepted at their face value though there were
many points of duplication. ^{i.}

XIV.

The military authorities were aware of the situation.

17-55. ^{a.} In his interrogation, MATSUI states
that almost as soon as he entered the City he heard that
Europe and America had got the idea that his troops had
committed many outrages. He heard it from a small
diplomatic official, the Consul at Nanking.

17-56. ^{a.} The documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
dated 16 December contain the following statement:

"We refrained from protesting yesterday
because we thought when the High Commander
arrived order in the city would be restored
but last night was even worse than the night
before, so we decided that these matters should be

- | | |
|---------------|--------------------|
| <u>17-54.</u> | <u>17-55.</u> |
| e. T 29,977 | a. Ex 257, T 3,452 |
| f. T 29,985 | |
| g. T 29,988 | <u>17-56.</u> |
| h. T 29,990 | a. Ex 323, T 4,508 |
| i. T 29,995 | |

(18-56)

called to the attention of the Imperial Japanese Army which we are sure does not approve of said actions by its soldiers."

These reports continue through December and January.

18-57. In his interrogation, the accused MUTO, Adjutant to the Chief of Staff of the Central China Army from November 1937, states ^{a.} that he returned from Nanking to Shan, hai 24 or 25 December. At the time of the surrender of Nanking, WATSUI was suffering from tuberculosis and had been in the rear area. They came to Nanking for the taking-over ceremonies. He remained 10 days. At that time the town was already cleaned up and it was safe to walk about alone. He had not heard of the Japanese soldiers acting up. TSUKADA, Chief of Staff, told him there were incidents of stealing, assault, killing and rape. Following that, orders were issued for all units except security troops to leave the town. The original order for the taking of Nanking, stated that only picked fine troops were to enter the town, and the remainder of the troops were to remain out. However, all of the units entered the town for which action WATSUI became mad and bawled out his subordinates." It was felt that if too many troops were allowed in Nanking there was due to be trouble inasmuch as the troops had suffered many hardships since Shan, hai. The men were under pressure for such a long time that it was felt inadvisable

18-57.

a. Ex 255, T 3,552-5E

Page MM-30

(MM-51)
to allow them in town. General MATSUI heard of the incidents afterward and became quite enraged at the conduct. He was there when General MATSUI heard of this and MATSUI became mad and bawled out his subordinates. The report did not show very many incidents as soon as it was published orders were issued to the M. Ps. to suppress such activities and arrest any participants. The order was issued by General MATSUI as soon as he heard of the incidents. As soon as they arrived in Nanking for the ceremonies, MATSUI received the information and the order was immediately issued. The M. Ps. normally had the duty. The order was to more severely enforce the regulations. The incidents started when Nanking was entered around the 12th to the 14th. MUTO remembered in a report that it was reported that Chinese people were looted, burglarized, and other times such as rape, etc. were committed by the Japanese Army. Between 10 and 20 incidents were reported. Prince ASAKA commanded one Army and Lt. General YAMAGATA the other. MUTO can't imagine that there were thousands of these incidents. He followed Gen. MATSUI during the formal entrance into the city of Nanking and at that time there were between 10 to 20 incidents reported to him. Also the City of Nanking was pretty well cleared away and 10 days later he returned to Shanghai. He cannot ever believe or imagine

Page 24-31

(1257)

that there were incidents running into thousands. His duties were to assist the Chief of Staff.

b.
When giving evidence on his own behalf,

MUTO stated that after the formal entry at Nanking on 17 December, General MATSUI heard for the first time from Chief-of-Staff TSUKAKA that most of the units had entered the city against the commanders' orders and that following the entry of the units plunder and rape cases occurred there. General MATSUI ordered both commanders to withdraw promptly out of the city all forces except the strength necessary to guard Nanking and strictly to maintain military discipline and morale. MUTO understood that both commanders executed this order but the withdrawal was delayed a little because the Chinese were burning buildings and there was little water to drink.

EX-58. In his affidavit MATSUI says that at the time of the capture of Nanking, he was sick in bed at Loochow 140 miles away and was unaware of any outrages and received no reports thereof. ^{a.} The only thing he heard was a rumour towards the end of December 1937 to the effect that there were some cases of illegal acts in Nanking, but he had no official report about such fact. ^{b.} He did everything in his power to prevent occurrences of such unfortunate incidents and to give severe punishment to the guilty. ^{c.}

On cross-examination, MATSUI stated that the two army commanders kept him in close touch with the progress

EX-57.

b. T 33,089

EX-58.

- a. Ex 3,498, T 33,822
- b. Ex 3,498, T 33,824
- c. Ex 3,498, T 33,825

(MI-58) d.
of operations and reported the Fall of Nanking.

In his affidavit MATSUI states that in the unsettled condition at the time of the capture of Nanking some excited young officers and men may have committed unpleasant outrages. e. These unpleasant outrages were rape, looting, forceful seizure of materials and murder. f.

MI-59. The defense witness MAKIYAMA, Yasuo, an intelligence officer on the staff of the Central China Area Army, states a. that after the ceremony on 17 December, MATSUI gathered all participating officers and ordered them to be more strict in maintaining military discipline and morale. MATSUI had received a report from the military police regarding some crimes connected with military discipline and morale which were committed by some troops under his command and unnecessary troops were ordered to go outside the wall. b. MATSUI received additional reports from commanders and divisional commanders under his command as well as from diplomatic organs. c.

MI-60. In his affidavit MATSUI states that after entering Nanking on 17 December he heard about outrages for the first time from the Commander of the Kempai Unit through his Chief of Staff TSUKADA and at once ordered every unit to investigate and punish the guilty men. a.
On cross-examination he stated that he heard stories of similar nature from the Consul in Nanking b. but did not mention it in his affidavit because it was not an official

MI-58.
d. T 33,850
e. Ex 3,498, T 33,821
f. T 33,849

MI-59.
a. T 21,902
b. T 21,903
c. T 21,925

MI-60.
a. Ex 3,498, T 33,822
b. T 33,850

(MM-60) report but merely in the course of conversation. This was on the 18 or 19 December and the Consul told MATSUI that some of the officers and men of the Japanese Army who had entered Nanking had committed outrages. He denies that he received reports of outrages from the commanders of the two armies immediately after the fall of Nanking as had been stated by the witness HAKAYAMA. His staff officers were receiving reports daily from the gendarmerie since the fall of Nanking. The staff officers went to the Kempei tai to get information and the facts were brought to his attention for reference purposes.

MM-61. The defense witness HAKAYAMA, an intelligence officer on the Staff of the Central China Area Army, states that on 26 or 27 December 1937 he conveyed a verbal order of the Chief of the Staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army saying that it was rumored that illegal acts were being committed in Nanking by Japanese troops and no such act should be done under any circumstances for the honour of the Japanese Army. Anyone who would misconduct himself would be severely punished.

MM-62. The defense witness HIDAKA, counsellor in the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai, states that he met MATSUI in Shanghai on 1 January 1938 when MATSUI was sincerely grieved to find for the first time that some of his subordinates had done wrong. HIDAKA was deeply impressed that MATSUI had not been aware of such facts until that time. MATSUI did not specify that wrong was done.

MM-60.

c. T 33,851
d. T 33,851
e. T 33,852
f. T 21,925
g. T 33,870
h. T 33,872
i. T 33,871

MM-61.

a. T 21,906

MM-62.

a. T 21,447
b. T 21,467

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MM-63. On cross-examination MATSUI states that he did receive reports made by Staff Officer NAKAYAMA and Counsellor HIDAKA about the middle of January 1938. They mentioned crimes committed by Japanese soldiers but they reported orally and MATSUI doesn't remember the contents too well. ^{a.} It was a very difficult thing to investigate and their investigation was not exact. ^{b.} MATSUI assumes that HIDAKA based his investigations on reports from foreigners in the refugee zone but MATSUI did not hear of such reports. ^{c.} On cross-examination MATSUI stated that he did not write any newspaper reports regarding illegal acts in Hankin. ^{d.}

IV.

The atrocities continued for weeks after the Fall of the City.

MM-64. The witness Dr. R. O. Wilson of University Hospital, Hankin, ^{a.} stated in evidence that cases continued to come in for a matter of some six or seven weeks following the fall of the city on 13 December 1937. The capacity of the hospital was normally 180 beds and this was kept full to overflowing during the entire period.

The witness Hsu Chuan-ying of the Ministry of Railways ^{b.} says that the atrocities were worst for the first three months and later on it gradually diminished more or less.

John G. Magee, Episcopal Minister at Hankin, ^{c.} stated that after about 6 weeks it began to taper off although

MM-63.

- a. T 33,859
- b. T 33,860
- c. T 33,865
- d. T 33,867

MM-64.

- a. T 2,538
- b. T 2,584
- c. T 3,922

Page 12-35

(12-64)

many things happened — individual things happened after that.

d.
Dr. J. S. Bates of Nanking University testified that after February 6th or 7th there was a noticeable improvement in the situation, and although many serious cases occurred between then and summer, they were no longer of a mass or wholesale character. The terror was intense for 2¹/₂ to 3 weeks. It was serious for a total of 6 or 7 weeks.

XVI.c.

No attempt was made to stop the atrocities.

12-65. Witness Hsu Chuan-yin, an employee in the Ministry of Railways, states that ^{a.} the Japanese authorities did not try to stop the atrocities. Not a single proclamation, not a single notice was put on the street to stop all these atrocities and the raping and looting.

12-66. John G. Raabe, Episcopal Minister at Nanking, testified that ^{a.} when he told the investigator from the Embassy of what he had seen and about driving the soldiers off from a woman he just began to laugh. These things would be reported to the Embassy and they would send a man around who had no real intention of investigating the case but whose chief desire was to find out who the informants were. ^{b.} If there was any real desire to stop this thing they could have stopped it. If they had shot 25 men the thing could have been stopped, ^{c.} but it was looked upon entirely too lightly. On one occasion when Mr. Raabe

12-64.

c. T 2,642-44

12-65.

a. T 2,594

12-66.

a. T 3,931

b. T 3,936

c. T 3,941

(12-66)
and a Japanese officer saw a soldier in the actual act of raping a woman, all the officer did was to slap the soldier.
d.

12-67. Dr. H. S. Bates of Nanking University on 27 December wrote ^{a.} "Shameful disorder continues and we see no serious efforts to stop it. The soldiers every day injure hundreds of persons most seriously. Does not the Japanese Army care for its reputation."

XVII.

The punishments awarded were few in number and inadequate.

12-68. In his interrogation defendant MATSUI ^{a.} stated:

"The only notes in my diary concern a court martial of an officer and perhaps three soldiers in connection with the rape of Chinese in Nanking. I think the officer was executed and the soldiers imprisoned. This was as a result of my advocating severe punishment for offenders. I received this information when I was in Shan hai and put it in my diary there. All my records were burned including this diary but I have made a few notes from memory since which I think will be useful if I come to trial."

12-69. Dr. H. S. Bates of Nanking University said ^{a.}
in evidence:

12-66.
d. T 3908

12-69.
a. T 2,642-3

12-67.
a. T 2,642

12-68.
a. Ex 257, T 3,464-5

0 159 00 15. 1837

Page 114-37

(121-69)

"We were assured by the civil officials in the Embassy that on several occasions strong orders were sent from Tokyo to restore order in Hankin. We saw no significant results of such orders until the coming of some kind of high military deputation about the 5th or 6th February. I learned that a high military officer called together a large body of lower officers and non-commissioned officers, telling them very severely that they must better their conduct for the sake of the name of the Army. Prior to that time we saw and heard of no instance of effective discipline or penalty inflicted upon soldiers who were seen by high officers in the very act of murder and rape. On three or four occasions Mr. Raabe and other members of the committee were in the presence of high officers when they saw the shooting or bayoneting of a civilian or an act of rape. In each case the soldier was required to give an extra salute to the officer and an oral reprimand was administered but the name of the soldier was not taken nor was there any other indication of discipline."

114-70. The defense witness OUCHI, a Second Lieutenant in the 9th Division, who entered Hankin on 15 December, states that there was not a single criminal ^{a.} charged with an illegal act. And the witness AKICAKA,

114-70.

a. T 32,600

(12-70)

a Colonel in the 9th Division, states he left Nanking on 24 December and no criminal was found among those under his command.

The defense witness OGAJI, Chief of Legal Affairs Section, 10th Army, states that during his stay in Nanking, 14-19 December, he did not hear any rumors of illegal conduct of Japanese soldiers nor were there any indictments for illegalities.

12-71. The defense witness TSUKAMOTO, Koji, was appointed Prosecutor for the Shanghai Expeditionary Force on 30 August 1937 and Prosecutor and Judge for the Central China Expeditionary Force on 9 February 1938. He states that after the entry into Nanking, unlawful acts were committed by Japanese troops and he examined these cases. Four or five officers were involved and the rest were mostly trifling cases committed by privates. The kinds of crimes were chiefly plunder, rape, etc., while the cases of theft and injury and the cases of death were very few. He remembers that there were a few murder cases but has no memory of having punished incendiaries or dealt with mass slaughter criminals. The crimes were committed at different places but a considerable number of cases, he believes, took place in the refugee quarter in Nanking. He actually handled ten cases himself but the number of people involved was greater than the number of cases.

12-70.

- b. T 32,608
- c. T 32,676

12-71.

- a. T 21,563
- b. T 21,579

XVIII.

Hallett Abend had an interview with the Defendant MATSUI in January, 1945.

124-72. In his interrogation, MATSUI says: ^{a.}

"I saw Abend about a month after Nankin. I requested him to see me as I had heard rumours and I wished to quell these by putting the facts before Mr. Abend. I explained to Mr. Abend my views regarding the respecting of foreign rights and interests in Nankin. Also my desire not to inflict damages to neutral properties and interests. I also stated that it was my desire to achieve peace and extend the hand of friendship to Chinese troops who had stopped fighting but that it was my duty to punish Chinese troops who continued opposition."

In cross-examination, MATSUI stated that he wished to quell rumours by putting the facts before Mr. Abend and asked Mr. Abend to see him about a month after the fall of Nankin. ^{b.} He talked to Abend on the basis of reports that had been communicated to him (MATSUI) from the Kempeitai. ^{c.}

XIX.

A number of high ranking military officers arrived in Nankin about the 5th or 6th February.

124-73. Correspondence of the American Embassy, Nankin, ^{a.} discloses that on 6th February Major General MAYA, the new Garrison Commander gave a welcoming tea at the Japanese Embassy for foreign diplomatic representatives at

124-72.

- a. Ex 275, T 3,463
- b. T 23,868
- c. T 23,873

124-73.

- a. Ex 328, T 4,588

(MM-73)
Nanking.

He criticized the attitude of foreigners who were sending abroad reports of Japanese atrocities and encouraging the Chinese in their anti-Japanese feeling.

MM-74. In his cross-examination, MATSUI stated that Major General HONMA was sent to his headquarters by the General Staff about the end of January, 1938, and HONMA said that the authorities in Tokyo were very worried about the reports of outrages committed by Japanese soldiers in China.
a. MATSUI stated that he was not aware of any communications from the General Staff addressed to him regarding the behavior of the troops.
b. At no time was he reprimanded by the Chief of the Army General Staff or the War Minister.
c. He presumes that HONMA learned of the reports of outrages from the reports sent by the Foreign Office to the Army.
d.

XX

Defendant returned to Japan in February, 1938, and was released from the service on 5 March 1938.

MM-75. In the interrogation of HATA, it is stated that General HATA succeeded General MATSUI in Central China on 17 February 1938.

XXI

Defendant MATSUI was not asked to make a report on the Nanking incident and while there must have been investigations and reports the Defendant MATSUI does not know for certain.

MM-76. In his interrogation, MATSUI says:
a.

-
- MM-74.
 - a. T. 33,856
 - b. T. 33,856
 - c. T. 33,873
 - d. T. 33,873

MM-75.
a. Ex. 256, T. 3445

MM-76.
a. Ex. 257, T. 3464

(134-76)

"I was placed on the reserves immediately upon arrival in Tokyo so I do not know for certain but there must have been investigations and reports. I was not asked to make a report. If there had been any such incidents I would naturally have made a report on my own responsibility."

MATSUI states on cross-examination that up to the time he left Shanghai in February, 1938, he had received no reports of the investigations he had ordered. Then he asked for them the reply was that as soon as they were completed a reply would be sent.

MEI-77. A document entitled "Army Records of the China Incident" 1939 was admitted in evidence during the cross-examination of the witness YAMAMOTO and contains a memorandum entitled "The Situation of the Military Forces and Army Men Returned from the Disturbance Area" which points out that some returning soldiers to Japan do not restrain their speeches. Examples are given where the statement has been made that "the thing I like best during the battle is plundering" and "in the battlefield we think nothing of rape" and "prisoners of the Chinese Army were some times lined up in one line and killed to test the efficiency of the machine gun."

XXII

The defendant MATSUI was responsible for the Rape of Nanking.

MEI-76.

- b. T. 33,855
- c. T. 33,856

MEI-77.

- a. Ex. 3301, T. 30,126
- b. T. 30,127
- c. T. 30,129
- d. T. 30,130

MM-78. In his affidavit MITSUI states that the Central China Area Army was over the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the 10th Army Headquarters and its mission was to unify the command of these units^{a.} and that his relation with the officers and men in the field in regard to command and supervision was entirely indirect.^{b.} He further states that one of the contributing factors to the unfortunate incidents at Wanking was that as Commander of the Central China Area Army he had no direct authority over the officers and men in the field.^{c.}

MM-79. On cross-examination, MITSUI stated that when he said command and supervision was entirely indirect, he meant that command was exercised through the Commanders of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the 10th Army.^{a.} Moreover the Headquarters of the Central China Area Army had no authority over such matters as rations, quarters, pay and medical services^{b.} but admitted that the 10th Army and the Shanghai Expeditionary Force were under his command.^{c.} MITSUI further stated on cross-examination he did not have authority directly to handle discipline and morals. As Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army he was given the power to command operations of the two subordinate armies under his command^{d.} and that ordinarily discipline and morals within an army were the responsibility of the Division Commander.^{e.} He had the obligation or duty rather than authority to see that

MM-78.

- a. Ex. 3498, T. 33,819
- b. T. 33,820
- c. T. 33,825

MM-79.

- a. T. 33,849
- b. T. 33,843
- c. T. 33,849
- d. T. 33,873-4
- e. T. 33,871

(11-79)
discipline and morals were maintained in the units under
f.
his command.

11-80. MATSUI stated that he did not say that the
power of discipline was not inherent in his command and
did not evade all responsibilities in connection with the
capture of Nanking as Area Army Commander commanding his
a.
subordinates but was trying to say that he was not
directly responsible for the discipline and morals of the
b.
troops under the respective armies under his command.

He had no authority to take disciplinary
measures or to hold court martial, such authority resided
c.
in the Commander of the Army or the Division Commander.

He had no legal right to issue an order for
a court martial and no authority except to express his
desires as overall Commander-in-Chief to the Commander of
the Army under his command and the divisional commanders
d.
thereunder.

He stated that it would be a very difficult
matter to determine his responsibility with regard to the
question of discipline and morals and he could not make
e.
any definite statement at that time.

11-81. The accused stated that he did not send a
report about the incidents in Nanking to the higher command.
He may have talked about this matter to the General Staff
a.
Office after his return to Tokyo.

If there was any responsibility about ser-
vants' reports with regard to the discipline and morals f.

11-79.
f. T. 33,874

11-80.
a. T. 33,874
b. T. 33,374
c. T. 33,875
d. T. 33,875
e. T. 33,873

11-81.
a. T. 33,878

(MM-81)
troops, the responsibility did not reside in the Commander-
in-Chief of the Area but in the Division Commander.^{b.}

He could not say definitely from the legal standpoint whether the Division Commander should send such reports through the Commander of the Army or by channelling it through the Commander-in-Chief of the Area Army.^{c.}

MM-82. In answer to the Acting President, MATSUI stated that he could not say that the maintenance of military discipline had no connection with military strategy and, therefore, insofar as the two were interconnected, he thought that he did have the power to interfere in matters relating to military discipline, but in the strict legal sense he did not conceive himself as having the power to give specific orders in detail with regard to the maintenance of military discipline and this remains his belief to the present day.^{1.}

MM-83. It appears, however, from his cross-examination that on 18 December 1937 he ordered as many officers as possible of the various armies and divisions to assemble because on 17 December through his Chief of Staff he has received the report of the tendermerie in regard to outrages committed by the Japanese soldiers and he gathered these officers together for the purpose of giving them instructions directly.^{a.}

These instructions are in evidence and state in part that all officers and men should realize the true

MM-81.
b. T. 33,379
c. T. 33,380

MM-82.
a. T. 33,863

MM-83.
a. T. 33,853

(EE-83)

significance of command, should enforce stricter military discipline and that everyone should be cautious with regard to conduct on his part and should exert his utmost efforts to maintain and surmount the splendid battle results, thereby enhancing the prestige of the Imperial Army.

XXIII

On 29 April the defendant MATSUI was decorated with the 1st Class Order of the Golden Kite for meritorious war services during the China Incident.*

XXIV

In 1929 the defendant MATSUI, Director of the Second Section of the General Staff, called a meeting in Berlin of all the Military Attaches of Japan in European countries.

EE-84. In his affidavit MATSUI states the meeting of Japanese military attaches in Berlin was not an official conference as there was no particular purpose. The meeting was of a social nature. On cross-examination, he admitted that the expenses of his trip to Berlin were defrayed by the General Staff and that attaches were there from Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland, Russia, Austria, Turkey and Italy. H. SHIMOTO, who was the military attache in Turkey, spoke of intelligence work vis-a-vis Russia and of utilizing White Russians who were in Turkey.

The accused H. SHIMOTO stated on cross-examination that at the meeting of Japanese military attaches in Berlin in 1929 the topic of sabotage and

EE-83.

- b. Ex. 3387, T. 32,617-8
- *. Ex. 115, T. 736

EE-84.

- a. Ex. 3498, T. 33,827
- b. T. 33,866
- c. T. 33,329

(NY-84) d.
espionage against Russia came up.

FFV

"Asia for the Asiatics."

NY-85. a.
Witness General Ching Teh-chun states that in the autumn of 1935 MATSUI came to Peiping. He was a general in retirement at that time and advocated the concept of Greater Asia. He hoped to establish a branch of the Greater Asia Association in Peiping. Through the introduction of Mr. Chen Cho-sun, Director of the Peiping and Liaoning Railway, MATSUI met General Sun and the witness and both of them expressed their disfavor. MATSUI, in his conversation with the witness, advocated that Asia should be the Asia of the Asiatics and that European and American influence should be expelled. The witness replied that he was afraid that what MATSUI meant by Asia of the Asiatics was actually the Asia of the Japanese. Unless there were real equality and reciprocity, nothing could be discussed.

b.
The witness declared that he did not participate in a meeting in Tientsin at which there was created a Founders Committee for the China Greater Asia Association.

c.
On cross-examination General Ching stated that MATSUI wanted to expel the British and American interests out of Asia. The subsequent facts that happened at Pearl Harbor and the attack on Manila and other places

NY-84.

d. T. 24,039

NY-85.

a. T. 2317

b. T. 2373

c. T. 2407

15-47.

(M-85)
will be factual enough to prove that.

M-86. KUNII states in his affidavit that he established the Greater Asia Association in 1933 and that it was not political but an organization to study social culture.^{a.} In 1935 and 1936 he travelled north and south in China and endeavored for the accomplishment of the Greater Asia movement.^{b.} The Dai Nippon Asia Development League, of which he was vice president or adviser from its establishment, was formed to combine the numerous organizations engaged in developing Asia.^{c.} It came under the newly organized I. R. A. A. After the outbreak of war, he went to Indo-China, the Southern Regions, and the Philippines exhorting the peoples of the countries of Great Asia to cooperate with the Great Asia League.^{d.}

M-87. The defense witness MAKATANI identified an editorial in the magazine "Dai Asia Shugi" of October 1940, the organ of Great East Asia in which he expressed his satisfaction that the Sino-Japanese conflict as a war to emancipate Asia had at last taken up the real issue with the advance of Imperial Troops into French Indo-China. This advance, so far as historical significance goes, meant a few steps advance towards the war to liberate Asia.^{3.}

M-86.

- a. Ex 3498, T 33,829
- b. T 33,830
- c. T 33,832
- d. T 33,895

M-87.

- ... Ex 3405, T 32,711

Page 12-48.

(11-87)

In an article appearing in the January 1941 issue of the magazine "Dai Asia Shu, i" ATSUI wrote that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy and the recognition by the Nanking Kuomintang Government had forced (the Japanese people) to go on the road to construct a New Order in Asia against a long dominance of Great Britain, America and France in Asia.^{b.}

In the July 1941 issue of the magazine "Dai Asia Shu, i" ATSUI wrote an article in which he stated that the immediate enemies were clearly Britain and the United States and the group of democratic nations. In the name of 100,000 dead heroes, he absolutely opposed any compromise with the United States.^{c.}

PART TWO

ARGUMENT

(The references to the footnotes are to sections in the Summary Part One)

11-88. It is submitted that the evidence adduced before the Tribunal has made it abundantly clear that atrocities occurred in Nanking. There can be no doubt that tens of thousands of Chinese men, women, children and disabled soldiers and police were killed by Japanese soldiers; that thousands of

11-87.

b. Ex 3499-A, T 33,900

c. Ex 3500-A, T 33,915

Page 111-49

(111-88)
Chinese women and girls were raped and that looting
and burning went on over a wide area of the city.^{a.}

111-89. The evidence adduced by the Defense, while
not denying that atrocities did occur, would make it
appear that they occurred only to a limited extent.^{a.}

111-90. It is submitted that the preponderance of
the evidence in favour of the contention of the Pros-
ecution must compel the Tribunal to the conclusion
that such Prosecution evidence is both convincing and
overwhelming and ought to be accepted.

111-91. It is further submitted by the Prosecution
that it has been established by the evidence that the
atrocities went on over a long period of time and that
little or nothing was done to check them in spite of
the many appeals made by the foreign residents to the
Japanese Embassy in Hanking.^{a.}

111-92. It may be open to argument that the officials
at the Japanese Embassy, being terrified of the military,
were helpless in the matter but the fact remains that the
atrocities went on unchecked for a period of six or seven
weeks after the fall of the city on 13 December 1937.
It cannot be argued that they could not have been brought
to an end by prompt and decisive action on the part of the
military authorities and the defendant MATSUI it is submitted^{a.}
must be held answerable for the failure to take such action.

111-88.
a. Sum. Sect. VIII (a), (b),
(c), (d)

111-91.
a. Sum. Sect. XV

111-89.
a. Sum. Sect. VIII (a), (b),
(c), (d)

111-92.
a. Sum. Sect. XVI

Page 12-50

12-23. It will doubtless be contended by the Defense that WATSUI was not aware of the actual conditions existing in Nanking after its capture. It is submitted that a contention of this nature is not by the evidence presented to the Tribunal which establishes ^{a.} that at least from the time of his entry into the city on 17 December he well knew that outrages were being committed. In all probability, he knew before his entry on that day from reports received by him from his subordinate commanders but the evidence in this regard is not conclusive.

12-24. It is, however, conclusive on the point that in fact he was informed of atrocities by the Kempetai when he entered the city on 17 December and also by a consular official in Nanking. Subsequent information came to him from reports received by his staff officers from the Kempetai and from reports made to him by officers ordered to make investigation into the matter of atrocities. It is significant that in January 1938 WATSUI sought an interview with a journalist Hallett Abend because he wished to quell rumours by putting the facts before Mr. Abend. ^{a.} It is also to be observed that early in February the authorities in Tokyo became so disturbed by the reports received of outrages in Nanking that it was considered necessary to send General ^{b.} HONMA in China.

12-23.

a. Summ. Sect. XIV

12-24.

a. Summ. Sect. XVIII

b. Summ. Sect. XIX

Page 114-51

114-95. And while it has been established by the Defense that after his entry into the City NATSUI, because of what he had been told by the Kempetai, called his officers to ether and instructed them to be more strict in maintaining discipline, the Prosecution submits that no real effort was made by NATSUI to ensure that his instructions were carried out. The evidence is clear that there was a deplorable lack of military police and that the few there were, were themselves guilty of illegal acts.^{a.} It is also clear that the few offenders who were apprehended were awarded inadequate^{b.} punishments, with the result that the Japanese soldiers in Nankin, completely out of control, were swarming through the city and for weeks indulged in an orgy of murder, rape, robbery and burning,^{c.} the responsibility for which must rest upon the Commander-in-Chief, NATSUI.

114-96. An attempt was made by the Defense to establish^{a.} the fact that Chinese soldiers, having thrown down their arms, had disguised themselves as civilians. Whether this is true or not the evidence discloses that there was no armed resistance after the fall of the city,^{b.} and their murder in cold blood is a crime for which no justification on any ground could possibly be found to exist.

114-95.

- a. Summ. Sect. XII
- b. Summ. Sect. XVII
- c. Summ. Sect. XI

114-96.

- a. Summ. Sect. VIII
- b. Summ. Sect. IV

121-97. It was suggested in the evidence adduced by the Defense that the number of dead bodies in Wankang might be explained by the fact that soldiers were killed in preceding battles and bodies were exhumed from places where they had been gathered and buried. While no proof of this was offered by the Defense, it should be pointed out that the evidence of the Prosecution establishes ^{a.} not only the number of bodies found but the many different places in the city where they were found and the surmision that they were exhumed is entirely unsupported by the evidence before this Tribunal.

121-98. The defendant MATSUI seeks to evade his responsibility by taking the position ^{a.} that his command and supervision over his armies was entirely indirect and that consequently he was not directly responsible for the discipline and morals of the officers and men under his command. He would, it seems, limit his responsibility to purely operational matters such as the shelling of the "Ladybird." ^{b.}

121-99. The Prosecution submits that it is impossible to divorce the power to enforce discipline from the power of command and he himself admits that where military discipline and military strategy are interconnected he did have power to interfere in matters of military discipline. ^{a.}

121-97.
 a. Summ. Sect. VIII,
 (a) (5)

121-99.
 a. Summ. Sect. XXII

121-98.
 a. Summ. Sect. XXII
 b. Summ. Sect. I

Page 74-53

MM-100. Furthermore, it is clear from the evidence^{a.} that it was the Commander-in-Chief, MATSUI, who on 18 December called his officers together in Nanking and told them that they should recognize the true significance of command and enforce stricter discipline. It was MATSUI who ordered investigations, such as they were, into atrocities and it is submitted that everything he did is consistent with the view that the power to enforce discipline resided in him as Commander-in-Chief and cannot be shifted as he suggests to his subordinates in the armies under his command.

MM-101. He should have followed his own advice and, realizing the true significance of his own command, have enforced stricter discipline on those officers and men of the Japanese Army who turned a peaceful and nonresisting city into a charnel house littered with the bodies of innocent Chinese men, women and children.

MM-102. His responsibility for such crimes against humanity can only be shared with those governmental heads and high army officers in Tokyo, who being fully aware of the atrocities by reason of the reports^{b.} of the foreign residents in Nanking, themselves did nothing to bring to an end those tragic events which continuing as they did day after day have made the fall of Nanking a black page in the history of Japan.

MM-100.

a. Summ. Sect. XXII

MM-102.

a. Summ. Sect. XIII

MF-103. With regard to the other activities of MATSUI during the period covered by the Indictment, it is clear, from the evidence,^{a.} that as early as 1929 he was present at a meeting in Berlin of the Japanese military attaches in Europe when such matters as sabotage and espionage against Russia came up for discussion.

MF-104. It has also been shown clearly that he has been, and still is, a life long advocate of the policy of "Asia for the Asiatics" and the expulsion of foreign interests from East Asia.^{a.}

MF-105. After establishing the Greater East Asia Association in 1933, he spent much of his time in the succeeding years, as the evidence shows, in travelling through the countries of East Asia and exhorting the peoples of those countries to adhere to that policy and to construct a new order in East Asia.^{a.} As vice president and adviser to the Dai Nippon Asia Development League from its establishment he continued to exert his influence to that end and in furtherance of that policy. The evidence adduced in this case has shown him to be a person, who, by his actions, his speeches and his writings,^{b.} has constantly displayed a hostile attitude towards China, Great Britain, America and France and who cannot now escape responsibility for the wars of aggression which, aimed as they were at the establishment of a New Order

MF-103.

a. Summ. Sect. XXIV

MF-105.

a. Summ. Sect. XXV

b. Ex. 3267, T 37246

MF-104.

a. Sum. Sect. XXV

(12-105)
in East Asia, ultimately brought disaster to Japan.

12-106. To sum up, it is submitted that the Defendant MATSUI is guilty as charged under the conspiracy Counts 1-5, inclusive, of the Indictment. As has been shown by the evidence as early as 1929 he participated in the overall conspiracy charged in Count 1 and the evidence against him concerning his military and non-military activities shows that he is also guilty under Counts 4 and 5. In addition, the evidence of his activities in China from the time he joined the conspiracy makes him guilty in respect of the conspiracies relating to China charged under Counts 2 and 3.

12-107. Counts 6-17 inclusive relate to the planning and preparation for aggressive war. It is submitted that being a defendant who joined the overall conspiracy as early as 1929, and did not withdraw, as his subsequent activities show, he is guilty of all subsequent planning and preparing pursuant to that conspiracy. Such being the case, he is guilty under all of the Counts 6-17 inclusive. In addition to preparing and planning the overall program for aggressive war, there is direct evidence establishing that MATSUI planned and prepared the war against China as charged in Count 6 of the Indictment.

12-108. Counts 18 to 26 inclusive relate to

Page 55-56.

(MM-108) initiating aggressive wars. He is not charged under Counts 18 and 20-24 inclusive. It is submitted that there is direct evidence that MATSUI is guilty of initiating a war of aggression against China in 1937 as charged under Count 19, and that he is guilty as charged under Counts 25 and 26 as an accomplice, instigator and accessory by reason of his guilt in planning and preparing the wars of aggression referred to in the said Counts 25 and 26.

MM-109. It is also submitted that the evidence of his activities since 1929, both as a military leader and as advocate for a New Order in East Asia, show MATSUI to be guilty of waging aggressive war under Counts 27 to 32 inclusive and Counts 34 to 36 inclusive. This defendant is not charged under Count 33. In addition, he is guilty under Counts 28, 35 and 36 because the evidence establishes that he was a person guilty of initiating the wars referred to in those Counts.

MM-110. The Defendant, MATSUI, is charged under Counts 45, 46, 47, 51 and 52 of the offences contained in Group II of the Indictment relating to murder. With regard to Count 45 (Murder) it is submitted that the evidence adduced before the Tribunal makes it abundantly clear that MATSUI is guilty under this

(24-110)
Count. He is also guilty under the remaining Counts in this group with which he is charged, i. e. 46, 47, 51 and 52 by reason of the fact that the evidence establishes that he was a person who planned and prepared to commit the offences charged under those Counts.

24-111. The remaining Counts in the indictment, 54 and 55, are contained in Group III and relate to Conventional War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. If, as has been submitted, the defendant MATSUI is responsible for the Rape of Nanking, he then is clearly guilty of the conspiracy charged under Count 54 and is fixed with responsibility for the violation of the laws of war as charged under Count 55.

24-112. In the result it is submitted that the defendant MATSUI is guilty as charged.

159 00 15 1858

FEBRUARY 6 1948

IPG RE: MATSUI (LM)

Attached pages No. MI-15, MI-19, MI-21 and
MI-31, are to be substituted for present pages 15, 19
21 and 31, in summation on MATSUI (MI)

(MM-31) a.
 reported to MATSUI and the offenders were punished.
 There were "rough actions" such as beating or kicking
 the inhabitants and burning furniture. b.
 There were
 small fires. c.
 He heard of cases of rape after his
 headquarters moved into Nanking, after the 25th or
 26th December. d.

(c) Looting.

M-32. The German Foreign Office in China
 a.
 Reports state that there was no store in the city
 which had not been broken into or looted.

The correspondence from the American Embassy,
 b.
 Nanking says that it was believed that there was scarcely
 a single piece of property in Nanking that had escaped
 entry and looting by the Japanese Military.

c.
 Dr. M. S. Bates of Nanking University states that
 in some cases looting was well organized and systematic
 using fleets of army trucks under the direction of
 officers. Vaults in banks cut open with acetylene
 torches. He saw a supply column two-thirds of a mile
 long loaded with furniture. Practically all commercial
 property of any noticeable value was taken.

d.
 John G. Moore, an Episcopal Minister at Nanking,
 states that the Japanese took from the people anything
 that struck their fancy; wrist watches, fountain pens,
 money, clothing and food.

M-31.

- a. T 32,651
- b. T 32,673
- c. T 32,651
- d. T 32,656

M-32.

- a. Ex 329, T 4,594
- b. Ex 328, T 4,575
- c. T 2,635-6
- d. T 3,920

(IM-37)

Reports dated 14 January 1938 from the German Foreign Office in China to the Foreign Office in Berlin relative to situation in Nanking following the fall of that city state that ^{b.} the Japanese military authorities apparently lost authority and their troops, who for weeks plundered the city after its capture, violated 20,000 women and girls, slayed thousands of innocent civilians (among them 43 workers of the power plant) in a brutal manner, mass murder by machine-gun fire being among the humanitarian methods of execution.

The German Foreign Office in China Reports ^{c.} express the view that the fateful days of Nanking have clearly shown two facts:

- (1) The failure of the control of the defense of the fort of Nanking.
- (2) The lack of discipline, atrocities, and criminal acts, not of an individual but of an entire army, namely the Japanese.

IM-38. The correspondence of the American Embassy, Nanking, discloses that ^{d.} American officials called on 14 American residents on 6 January who were asked what they particularly desired to be brought to the attention of the Japanese

IM-37

b. Ex 329, T 4,572
c. Ex. 329, T 4,604

IM-38

d. Ex. 328, T 4,561

Page 123-21

(MI-41)
 places." "29th December. The people, helpless and unarmed have been at the mercy of the soldiers who have been permitted to roam about at will wherever they pleased. There is no discipline whatever and many are drunk. By day they go into the buildings in our safety zone centres, looking for desirable women, then at night they return to get them."

MI-42. John G. Magee - Episcopal Minister at Nanking - says that ^{a.} the Japanese soldiers paid absolutely no attention to their own consular notices about foreign property or to American Embassy notices about foreign property. On 21 December TANAKA told ^{b.} Magee that the bad division then in Nanking would be changed for a better one and he thought by 24 December everything would be settled. After that there was no apparent betterment.

MI-43. George A. Fitch, YMCA worker. says that 19 December was a day of complete anarchy. The military have no control over the soldiers. On 20 December vandalism and violence continued unchecked. The most important shopping street was in flames. He counted 14 fires from his window, and saw many Japanese army trucks loaded with loot which they were taking from the shops before setting fire to them.

MI-44. In his affidavit KATSUI states that not a few of the crimes in Nanking were committed by Chinese troops and people when Nanking fell. ^{a.} But in answer to

MI-42.
 a. T 2,920
 b. T 2,904

MI-44.
 a. T 33,622

MI-43.
 a. T 4,462

(MM-57)
that there were incidents running into thousands. His duties were to assist the Chief of Staff.

b.
When giving evidence on his own behalf, MUTO stated that after the formal entry at Nanking on 17 December, General MATSUI heard for the first time from Chief-of-Staff TSUKADA that most of the units had entered the city against the commanders' orders and that following the entry of the units plunder and rape cases occurred there. General MATSUI ordered both commanders to withdraw promptly out of the city. All forces except the strength necessary to guard Nanking and strictly to maintain military discipline and morals. MUTO understood that both commanders executed this order but the withdrawal was delayed a little because the Chinese were burning buildings and there was little water to drink.

MM-58. In his affidavit MATSUI says that at the time of the capture of Nanking he was sick in bed at Loochow 140 miles away and was unaware of any outrages and received no reports thereof.^{1.} The only thing he heard was a rumour towards the end of December 1937 to the effect that there were some cases of illegal acts in Nanking, but he had no official report about such fact.^{b.} He did everything in his power to prevent occurrences of such unfortunate incidents and to give severe punishment to the guilty.^{c.}

On cross-examination, MATSUI stated that the two army commanders kept him in close touch with the progress

MM-57.
a. T 33,089

MM-58.
a. Ex 3,498, T 33,822
b. Ex 3,498, T 33,824
c. Ex. 3,498, T 33,825

February 24, 1948.

URGENT SILENT

HIS. RE: MATSUI (12)

Please note following corrections in MATSUI SUBMITION (12)

Page 11-7. Para. 11-10. Line 2. after "1937" insert "reads part as follows"

Page 11-11. Para. 11-20. Line 2. after "people" insert "were".

Page 11-15. Para. 11-32 Line 10. after "using" insert "of"

Para. 11-20. Para. 11-38. Line 8. after "seen" insert "the exhibit states".

Page 11-21. Para. 11-43. Line 3. Delete "have" and substitute "had".

Page 11-30. Para. 11-57. Line 17. Delete "times" and substitute "things".

Page 11-33. Para. 11-62. Line 7. Delete "that", substitute "what".

Page 11-34. Para. 11-63. Line 11. Delete "write" and substitute "read".

松井被告ハ起訴狀ノ次ノ訴因ノ下ニ訴遣サレテ
唐リマス。即チ第一乃至第十七、第十九、第二十
五乃至第三十二、第三十四、第三十五、第四十四、
第四十五、第四十六、第四十七、第五十一、第五
十二、第五十三、第五十四及第五十五。

159 00 15 1864

MATSUJI Summation-MM

MM-1

松井一石 様

緒言

本摘録ノ目的ハ松井被告ニ關シ檢察側及辯護側
提出ノ證據ノ分析及其ノ證據ニ基ク論議ヲ當法廷
ニ提出セントスルニアリマス。證據ノ分析ハ第一
部トナツテ居リ、番號ヲ附シタ各項ノ初ノ陳述バ
檢察側ニ於テハ、既ニ證據ニヨリ確證セラレタモ
ノト主張スル顯著ナ事實デアリマス。

此ノ證據分析ニ基ク論議ハ第二部トナツテ居リマ
ス。

MIATSUI Summation-MM

MM-3

第一部

檢察側及辯護側提出證據ノ分析

松井被告ハ一九三七年八月十八日上海派遣軍司令官
 ニ補セラレ、(a)一九三七年十月三十日中支派遣軍司
 官ニ補セラレマシタ。(b)中支派遣軍ハニツノ軍團カ
 ラ成ツテ居リマシタ。——ハ副看官 / Prince
 ASAKA / ラ司令官トシ他(柳川 / YANAGAWA / 中
 將ガ司令官デアリマシタ。(c)

P-2

MM-3

- 註、記録番号ハ英文ノ原番号デアル
- a、巻一五、記録七三六
 - b、巻一五、記録七三六
 - c、巻二五、記録三三三

0 159 00 15 1866

I

「レターバード」 / LADY BIRD / 事件

MM-4

橋本ハソノ談聞調査ニ於テ以下ノヨウニ述ベテ
居リマス。(a)

「自分ハ「レターバード」ヲ砲撃シテ之ヲ拿捕シ
マシタ。「レターバード」ノ司令官ガ私ニ、彼ハ
「バネー」 / BANEY / 艦ノ操ヲ同一クノテ救援ニ
赴クトコロテアルト語シマシタ。之ハ柳川中將ノ
命令ニ依ツタモノデアリマス。コレ等ノ命令ハ次
ノ如キモノデアリマス。「南京救援令下ニ在リ、
敵軍ハ湖流シテ脱出セントスル候様アリ、橋本大
佐ハ南京ニ向ツテ航行スル船舶ハ全部ソノ圍捕ノ
如何ヲ問フズ撃沈スベシ」是等ノ命令ハ南京陥落
二日前ニ出カレタモノト私ハ信ジマス。(b)

橋本君「革新ノ必然性」(c)
「南京陥落ノ二日前ニ突如トシテ命令ガ來テ、
進送船ヲ南京ヨリ北方ニ退却中ノ全支那兵ヲ攻撃
セヨ」トイフノダ。蕪湖ノ河口ノ下流似千米ノト
コロニ敗殘兵ヲ乗セテ進送船ヲシイモノ以隻ガ過
リカカツタカラ之ニ砲撃ヲ加ヘタ。

MM-4

a、巻証ニ三八
b、巻証ニ六四

記録ニ四六六一七
記録ニ三三二一三

0 159 00 15 1867

MATSUI Summation-MM

其ノ船ノ中ニ圖ラズモ英國軍艦ガアツテコレニ我
 砲弾ノ發カ命中シア問題ニナツタト云フ話デア
 ルガ、皇軍トシテハ當然ノ處置ヲ取ツタニ過ギナ
 イ。ソノ時、英艦テスラモ燕窩 / 鴨口 / 沖ヲ過ラ
 ウトスレバ砲撃サレタ。(1)

反討訊問ノ際松井ハ、「レテーパード」事件ニ對
 シテハ、躊躇サク全責任ヲ取ツタト述ベマシタ。
 彼ノ口供書ニシテハ証言ノ折、彼ハ、自分ノ參謀
 長ニ即刻調査ワラ命ジタコト、第十軍司令官ニ英
 國海軍司令長官ニ對シ陳謝ヲ命ジタコト、彼ハ英
 國海軍リットル / 提督ニ陳謝シタコト、
 シテ陳ベタノデアリマス。(2)

ML-4
 。、記録三三九〇ハ

0199 0015 1858

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-5

「パネー」事件ハ一九三七年十二月十二日ノコトデアリマシタ。「パネー」ガ既ニ抛棄サレテ後ニ、ソノ乗組員二名ガ「パネー」ノホートデ必需品ト品乗品ヲ取りニ戻リマシタ。コノ二人ガ岸ヘ引返シテ居タ時、武裝シタ日本兵ヲ一杯載セター般ノ日本ノ変動艇船ガ「パネー」ノ傍マデ近付キ一挺ノ機關銃ヲ發射シ、舷側ヘ横断ケニシテ乘リ込ミ、五分足ラズテ逃去シマシタ。コレガコノ事件ニ關テノ米國 / U.S. / ノ報告デアリマス。(a) 事
 松井ハソノ口供ニテ、自分ハ「パネー」事件ニハ無關係デアルト言ツテ居リマス。(b) 反對訊問ヲ受ケテ彼ハ、自分ハ陸海軍共同作戦ヲ指揮シテ居タノデ、直接自分ノ責任デハナカッタノダガ米國海軍 / THE U.S. NAVY / ヤーネル / YARNELL / 提督ニ少クトモ一言遺憾ノ意ヲ述べルノカ武士道 / BUSHIDO / ニ違ウモノト思ツタノダト認ベテ居リマス。(c)

MM-5

- a、自白 二六三 記録 三五二五
- b、記談 二三八三
- c、記談 二五九〇九

MMI-6

g、	f、	e、
記録	記録	記録
二一八九六―七	二一八九六	二一八六三

タメ毎隊ノ入城ト同時ニ多敵ノ急兵及補助健兵ヲ
 入レシメルベキテアルト定メテアツタト云フノデ
 アリマス。(g)

0 159 00 15 18770

MATSUI Summation-MM

反對訊問ヲ受ケテ松井ハ、南京占領前、南京ハ支那ノ首都デアルカラソノ占領ハ國際的事件ノ一ツダ、トイフ意味ノ命令ヲ出シタト申シマシタ。日本ノ軍事上ノ榮光テ更ニ一層支那ヲ眩感セシメル様コノ點ニ就キ周到ノ研究ガ必要ダト命ジタト云フノデアリマス。(e)

中支方面軍 / THE CENTRAL

CHINA AREA ARMY / 參謀部情報將校テアツタ精鋭備

證人中山ノNAKAYAMAノ陳ベテ居ル所ハ (f) 南京陷

落前ニ被セラレタ松井ノ命令ニハ、全軍隊ハ不法

行爲ヲ避ケネバナラヌ、スベテノ不法行爲ヲ防グ

0 1 5 9 0 0 1 5 1 8 7 1

MAFUSUI Summation-Mm

III

十二月十三日乃至十六日南京ニ入城ノ際ハ總テ
 江原ノアル指揮官ニ統率サレタニアル事既テアツ
 多。

松井ノ談(7)

「十二月十三日、十四日、十五日、十六日ニ南京ニ
 入城シ、同地ニアツタ際ハ總テ江原アル指揮官ニ
 統率サレタニアル事既テアリマシタ。自分ハ曾テ
 此等ノ際ヲ指揮シタコトハアリマセン。自分ハ此
 等ノ際カ甲冑及武器ノ他ノ方固テ属絶ノ儀レタコ
 トノアツタコトハ固キマセンデシタ。其際ハ新ラ
 シク編成サレテ日本カラ派駐サレタモノデアリマシ
 タカ江原アル多数ノ官兵ヲ以テ編成サレテ居リマシ
 タ。江蘇省ノ北平 / PEIPING / 及天津 / TIENTSIN /
 方面カラ来マシタ。朝香宮 / Prince ASAKA / ハ早ノ
 南京入り直カ十日前之レニ参加サレマシタ、朝香宮
 カ比呂トシテノアツタ時日ノ儀カ大體カラ寛テ自
 分ハ彼ニ責任アリト考ヘラレマセン、自分ノ考ヘ
 テハ曾ノ責任者ハ山口長 / 衛隊 / テアルト思ヒマス」
 在ニ海日本大使館参事官タリシ人日高 / HIDAKA /
 ハ無謀ノ爲メノ兵ヲ出スニ當リ(7) 松井ガ軍ヲ
 市ノ城壁外ニ止メ、中西儀

F-8

7 a 巻註ニモヤ 記録ニモヤ〇一
 b 巻註ニモヤ 記録ニモヤ

カッタコト及其日誌テノ中兵方同市ヲ撤退シタ
 コトヲ述ベテ居リマス。(b) 南京ノプロテストヤント
 監督教會宣教師ヂヨン、ジー・マギー / JOHN. G.
 NAGEE / 八十二月十三日以後南京ノ中兵方除儀
 ニ於テハ何等ノ抵抗モシテカッタコトヲ述ベテ居
 リマス。(c)

MM-7
c

記録 二五四七

MM-8
c b a

記録 二六二八

記録 二五五八

記録 二八六四

0 159 00 15 1872

指揮官ニ降伏ヲ勸告スル考デアツタト云フコト及
彼ハ軍紀ノ正ヲ維持部隊ノミヲ入城サセル心算
デアツタト日高ニ語ツタト述べテ居リマス。(c)

IV 南京市ニ於テハ中國領ニ抵抗ノ事案ナシ

MM-8

南京大學ノエム、エス、ベーツ / H.S. BATES /

博士ハ市内ニ於テハ何等ノ抵抗ヲ無カツタコトヲ
述ベテ居リマス。(a) 南京鐵道部勤務ノ西人許徳雲

/ HSU, CHUAN- / HING / ハ一九三七年十二月十

三日南京ニ居ツタ中國側軍隊ハ何等ノ抵抗モシナ

		MM-8		MM-7
c	b	a		c

記録	記録	記録
三八九四	二五五八	二六二八

記録 二一四四七

カッタコト及其日誌テノ中「兵方同市ヲ撤退シタ
 コトヲ述ベテ居リマス。(b) 南京ノプロテスタント
 監督教台何華師ヂヨン、ジー・マギー / JOHN. G.
 NAGEE / ハ十二月十三日以後南京ノ中口軍隊
 ニ於テハ何等ノ抵抗モシテカッタコトヲ述ベテ居
 リマス。(c)

指揮官ニ降伏ヲ勸告スル考デアツタト云フコト及
彼ハ軍紀ノ嚴正ヲ維持部隊ノミヲ入城サセル心算
デアツタト日高ニ語ツタト述ベテ居リマス。(c)

IV 南京市ニ於テハ中國僑ニ抵抗ノ要求ナシ

MM-8

南京大學ノエム、エス、ベーツ / H. S. DATES

博士ハ市内ニ於テハ何等ノ抵抗モ無カツタコトヲ
述ベテ居リマス。(a) 南京鐵道部勤務ノ西人許傳香

／ HSU. CHUAN - YING / ハ一九三七年十二月十

三日南京ニ居ツタ中國側軍隊ハ何等ノ抵抗モシナ

0159 0015 1873

近ノ避難氏ヲ訪ヒ、戦闘中彼等ノ被ツタ危険ニ付
尋ネ彼等ヲ慰メタト述ベテ居リマス。(c) 一方反對
訊問ニ於テ松井ハ避難地帯ニハ行カナカツタト述
ベテ居リ、彼ハ或ル山ノ山頂ノ寺院デ數名ノ避難
民ニ會ヒ、彼等ト話ヲシタトイフノデアリマス。(d)

VI 十二月十八日松井被告新聞發表ヲ行フ。

MM-10 一九三七年十二月十八日ノ松井大將ニ依ル新聞
發表 (a) ハ次ノ通りデアリマス。即チ「十二月十八
日、戦死者慰靈祭。十二月十七日赫々タル入城ヲ

MM-9 a、
替證 二六二
記録 三五〇

MM-9 b、
替證 二五七
記録 三二七

MM-9 c、
替證 二六二
記録 三二七

MM-10 a、
替證 二六二
記録 三五〇

MM-10 d、
替證 二六二
記録 三五〇

0 139 00 15 1874

MATSUI Summation-4M

V 松井被殺告十二月十七日南京入城。

MM-9

(a) 十二月十七日 國兵式舉行
(b) 十二月十八日 慰靈祭舉行

彼ノ訊問ニ於テ松井ハ彼ガ南京ニ赴イタ時迄ニ一
般人、及婦女子等ノ死者ノ遺骸ハ凡テ取り除ケラ
レテ居ツタガ西門ノ附近テ少數ノ中國兵ノ死骸ヲ
見タト述ベテ居リマス。(b)

證人、上海ノ某學校教師岡田/OKADA/ハ松井ガ附

VII 松井極告十二月十七日兩京入城後一途間ニ

意ハ格ニ草紀ヲ述ハシテ守ルキコト居リヤ。ス。(b)
 一馬殿ニ草紀ヲ述ハシテ守ルキコト居リヤ。ス。(b)
 注ニ其行動ニ
 十二月十日八日發セラレタリ。云々
 同情ヲ表スルモノナリ。云々
 ノ方戦争ニヨリ蒙リタル莫大ナル損失ニ對シ深甚
 若干ノ修養ヲ極ルニ必要ナルヲ以テ余ハ先ツ各部隊及住民
 居リシ修養ヲ極ルニ必要ナルヲ以テ余ハ先ツ各部隊及住民
 行ク軍ハ四月々月ニ亘ル間斷ナキキ上陸作戦ニ從軍シ

51.81 51.00 651.0

MM-12

a

記録ニ五三〇

b

記録ニ五三三

c

記録ニ五三六

者ヲ病院ガ忽チ充満スルニ至ツタコトヲ述ベテ
 居リマス。(b) 多致成年男子ノ集団ハ楊子江岸ニ
 連レテ行カレ射殺サレ其死骸ハ河中ニ投セラレタノデア
 リマシタ。今一ツ大キナ集団ガ城壁外ニ連レ行
 カレ、機關銃ノ射撃ヲウケ、其上負傷者ハ銃刺
 デ突キ刺サレマシタ。(c)

MM-12

南京ニ於ケル殘虐、行爲

(a) 殺人

(I) 一被 人

一九三六年一月ヨリ一九四〇年八月迄南京大
聖病院ノ外科醫テアツタ「ロバート・オーウイ
ルソン」/ROBERT.O.WILSON/博士(a)ウイ

ハ同病院ニ運バレタ患者ノ銃剣ヤ彈丸ニヨル負
傷ニ就テ述べ且ツ十二月十三日後、數日中ニ凡
ユル年齢ノ成年男女及兒童ノ夥シキ多數ノ負傷

0159 0015 1876

MM-14

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MM-13

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記
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MM-15

a
記
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四
六
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MM-15

Y. H. C. A 勤勞者「ジー・エイ・フイッチ」
/ P. A. H. H. O. H / ハ、十二月十五日、凡テ平
暇ヲ極フタ約千三百名ノ男子ガ以容所ノ一ツカ
ラ引キ出サレ、列ヲ組ミ、一藩ニ進チ縛ラレテ
射殺サレル爲メニ出テ行クノヲ目シタト述ベ
テ居リマス。(a)

シマシタ。(a)

0 159 00 15 18777

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-I3

尙徳義證人 / SHANDEI /
 區テ逮捕サレタノデアリマスガ彼ハ千名以上ノ
 男子一般人が一緒ニ纏リ上ゲラレテ楊子江ノ
 YANGZHI RIVER / ノ江岸ニ運レ出サレ、其處
 テ彼等ハ坐ル様ニ命ゼラレタ上、機關銃テ射撃
 サレタト證言シマシタ。(a)

MM-I4

辯護側證人日高 / HIGASHI / ハ、一般人ニ變
 裝ノ多量中國兵ガ安全地帯ニ入リ込ムダト證言

P-14

MM-I6

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記録ニ五六三一七

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MM-I 6

或道部勤務者許傳音 / H S U , O C H U A N U - Y I H G /

證人ハ、第三日、市街ヲ車テ走り廻ツタト述
ベテ居リマス。(2) 或ル町テハ街路ノ兩側ニ横ハ
ツテイル死骸ノ數ヲ算ヘテ見テ、五百以上ヲ數
ヘタガ、ソレ以上數ヘルノハ無數ダツタト云ツ
テ居リマス。軍服ノ死骸ハ一ツモナカッタノデ
シタ。彼等ハ悉ク一般人デモ無ク、別ナク、婦
女子モ含マレテ居リマシタ。日本軍ハ千五百名
ノ一般人ヲ安全地帯ヨリ引出シ、此等ノ人々ハ
機銃掃射サレ其ノ死体ハ池ノ中ニ投ゲ込マレタ

0159 0015 1878

MM-18

a

記

深

三三七〇一

MM-17

a

記

深

二六二六一三〇

証人、梁延芳 / LIANG-YING-FANG / 大尉ハ南京
 / NANKING / 陥取ノ時ハ南京ニ居リマシタ。約五
 千名ノ男子ガ誰民收容所カラ川ニ送レテ行カレ整列
 ノ上樹鏡揃切サレマシタ。別室ハ七時カラ二時迄
 ケラレマシタ、ソシテ、將校ヲ含ム八百名、日本兵
 ガ之レヲ觀テ居ツタノデアリマス。是等將校ノ取者
 ハ箱型乗用車ニ乗ツテ居リマシタ。(a)

南京大學ノ「エム。エス。ペイツ」／M. S. BATES /
 博士ハ、數百ニ上ル事件ガ日本官憲ニ報告サレタト
 述ベテ居リマス。(a) 彼ハ何等ノ沈黙モナク、敢ハ
 何等明日ナ理由モナクシテ没多仙々ノ一般人が驚恐
 サレタ惨事ノ起ルヲ初メカラ終リマテ口閉シタノデ
 アリマス。彼自身ノ知ル限リテハ一萬二千名ノ成年
 男女及兒童ガ城内テ殺害サレタノデアリマス。一般
 人ノ死骸ガ彼自身ノ住宅附近ノ街路ヤ小路ニ、日本
 軍入城後數日間モ放置サレテイタノデアリマス。

MM-19	a	記	録	三八九四
	b	記	録	三八九八

アリマス。彼等ハ王トシテ小銃及ビ樞銃ヲ射殺サ
 レテイタノデアリマス。彼等ハ亦、銃創ヲ刺シ殺
 サレテイタ數百名ノ集團ヲ殺ツモ知ツテ居リマス。
 十二月十四日カ十五日ニ彼ハ中國人ノ二ツノ長イ
 縱列ノ通ツテ行クノニ會ヒマシタ。彼等ハ四列ニ
 ナツテ皆手ヲ前デ縛ラレテ居タノデアリマス。此
 等ノ二縱列ニハ千名乃至三千名居ツタ様デアリマ
 シタ。(b) 約千名ハ楊子江／＼ YANGTZE RIVER／＼ノ

MM-19

南京ニ於ケル「プロテスタント」監督派教會ノ
 傳道師ジョン。ジー。マギー / JOHN. G. MAGEE / 證

人ハ、十二月十三日以後ノ日本兵ノ一般ノ中國成
 年男子ニ對スル行爲ハ殆ンド信ジ持ラレナイ恐怖
 ロシイモノデアツタト云ツテ居リマス。(a) 殺戮

ハ個々ノ兵士又ハ最大三十名ヲ一團トスル數團ニ
 ヲツテ始メラレ、各自ハ生殺ノ權ヲ持ツテ居ルカ

ノ氣ガアリマシタ。間モナク多數ノ男子成年者ニ
 對スル組織的殺戮ガ行ハレマシタ。忽チ到ル處暴

累タル死屍ヲ見ラレタノデアリマス。又彼ハ引出

サレテ殺サレニ行ク人々ノ行列ニ行キ會フタノテ

0159 0015 1880

MM-22 LM-21

a、	a、
記録	記録
ニ一六九一八	三三三三〇
ニ一六九二二	三六五六一

MM-23

a、記録ニ六〇四一五

MM-23

南京ノ警官。伍長徳ノWU CHANG FEHノ證人ハ、
 彼及ビ三百名ノ他ノ警官並ビニ多以一般ノ人ガ市ノ
 西大門ヘ行進サセラルト謀逆シテ居ルマシマス。(a)
 彼等ガ此門ヲ通り起キテ時、機銃掃射ヲ受ケテ、
 各自在以上ノ梁國約下六個ガ級サレタテアリマ
 ス。死者ノアルモノニハカソリンヲ注ガレ、燒カレ
 タテアリマス。

MM-32

MM-21

(2)

第三山口所島ノ中尉、大杉ノOSUGIノ海軍御家人
 ハ、十二月十三日夕刻、南京ニ入ツタ時、日本人
 及ビ甲口人双方ノ死体ガ請處ニ取リテオツタコ
 ト(a) 及兵士道ガ地民地區ニ入ラナイ様命ゼラレタ
 旨ヲ陳述シテ居リマス。(b)

海軍御甲山ノMATSUYAMAノ軍人ハ武力抵抗ハ十二月
 十三日朝迄ク止ミ(a) 市城壁ノ内外テハ一般ノ死石
 ヲ全然免カケナカツタト陳述シテ居リマス。(b)

0159 0015 1882

MM-25 MM-24

a、記録 二六三〇一

a、記録 三〇九 記録 四〇七七

MM-26

所ヲ示ス由ニ、裁判官各位ノ御注意ヲ願ヒタイノテ

(5) 煙 葬

以上カ、市城區ノ區外テ取初ノ七十二時間ノ間
ニ機銃テ射チ倒サレタト述ベテ后リマス。(a)
彼等ヲ埋葬スル爲、多数行働石ガ實際委員會ニ雇
ハレタノテアリマシタ。

MATSUI Summation-MM

0159 0015 1883

MM-25

S. BATES 博士ハ、陣以シテ武裝ヲ棄テタ兵三萬人
東京大ニ歴史ヲ教授「エム・エス・ベイツ」ノ

(4) 俘 虜

MM-24

「ジエームス・マツカラム」ノ「JAMES MOCALUM」ノ
日記ハ、(a) 一九三八年一月八日、電燈會社使用
人四十三名ガ整列サセラレタ上、機銃掃射サレタ
コトヲ明カニシテ居リマス。

(3) 電燈會社 役 人

MM-26

c、	b、	a、
三 二 七	三 二 四	三 二 四
記録	記録	記録
五 四 七	五 三 八	五 三 七

(T・N・日本語収容経過記録ニズレバニセ九五八六名テア
 二マス。)

0 159 00 15 1884

MATSUI Summation-MM

アリマス。(a) 其後ハ次ノ通リテアリマス。

陸奥守 / TSUNG SEAN-TANG / 陸奥守 一一二六六

江 記 守 守 四三〇七一

合 計 一五五三三七

更ニ左ノ探通ト報告ニ由リ意ヲ成ハシタイノテマ
リマス。即チ魯通 / JU SU / カ 五七、四一八名
ノ探通者ガ凍死、飢死、及び被害ノ厄ニ遭フタト
述ベテイル彼ノ探通守 (b) ト地方裁判所控訴ニヨツ
テ作成サレタ南京 / NANKING / ニ於ケル戦争犯罪ニ
關スル報告デアリマス。彼サレタ犠牲者ノ總數ハ
二七八、五八六名デアリマシタ。(c)

0 159 00 15 1985

MATSUJI Summation-MM

MM-27

南京大虐ノ「エム・エス・ベイツ」ノ M.S. BATES
 博士ハ占領後一ヶ月間ツテカラ國際赤十字會議長
 「ラーベ」ノ RABE 氏ハ私逃營居ニ對シテ
 彼ハ強姦ガ二〇、〇〇〇件以上起キタト思フト云
 フコトヲ報告シタト述ベテ居リマス。(a) 安全地
 帯ノ報告ノミヲ基準トシテ該人ハ約八、〇〇〇件
 アツタト云フテ居リマス。毎日毎晩舞臺カノ兵士
 ノ聲ハ主トシテ安全地帯ニ婦女ヲ求メテ市中ヲ歩
 キ廻ツテイマシタ。一中隊婦人ハ十々名ノ日本兵
 士ニ強姦サレマシタ。
 一九三八年二月二日附ノ南京安全地帯ニ即スル文
 書(b)ハ強姦七十五件、姦人四件ハ探獲十三件ヲ報
 告シテ居リマス。以上ハ皆一九三八年一月中ノ最
 終ノ週間ニ起キタト報告サレテオリマス。

MM-28

在南京プロテスタント監督教會派牧師デヨン、
 デイ・マギーノ CHOM G. MAREE ノハ一月
 三日ニ日本側ハ私共ニ無理ニ私共ノ安全地帯カラ

MM-27

a .

記 録 三六三四

P-21

b . 三三三

記 録 四五三六

MM-29

MM-28

a	e	d	c	b	a
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記	”	”	”	”	記
録					録
二					
一	三	三	三	三	三
九	九	九	九	九	九
四	一	〇	〇	〇	〇
四	六	七	六	四	九

MM-29

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7 159-0015 1886

MATSUI Summation-MM

姉女ヲ歸宅サセヨウト致シマシタ。(a) 私共ハ比
 較的年令ノ多イ姉女ニコノ事ヲ承知シテ歸宅スル
 ヨウ勸メマシタ。歸宅シタ姉女ニ對シテ又強姦ガ
 始リマシタ。強姦ハ毎日々々續ケテ行ハレマシタ
 身女ト子供達迄ガ被害サレマシタ。姉女ガ反抗ス
 ル刀父ハ拒否スルトキハ、彼女ハ被害サレル刀父
 ハ突キ刺サレマシタ。姉女ノ夫ガ助ケ様トシタト
 キニ、彼ハ被害サレマシタ。(b)
 十二月二十日彼ハ日本ノ一兵士ノ強姦罪行犯ヲ目
 撃イタシマシタ。(c) 二名ノ少女ハ元旦ニ強姦サ
 レマシタ。(d) 一九三八年二月一日彼ハ二名ノ兵
 士ガ十五才ノ少女ヲ強姦スルノヲ目撃イタシマシ
 タ。歩哨ニ報告シテモ一笑ニ附スルノミデシタ。(e)

P-23

MM - 3I

MM - 3

d c b a

b a

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” ” 記 録

・ ・ ・
” 記 録

三三三三三
二二二二二
六六六六六
三三三三三
六三三三三

三三三
二二二
六六六
三三三
一六

家財ノ焼却ノ如キ一純泰ナ所業ニガアリマシタ。

(b) 小規模ノ火災ガアリマシタ。

(c) 司令部ガ十月二十五、六日以後南京ニ移轉シテカラ強奪事件ノアツタコトヲ聞キマシタ。

(d)

0159 0015 1887

MATSUI Summation-IM

辯証側證人第十六師團參謀長中澤 / NAKASAWA /

MM - 30

ハ、彼が始メテ南京ニ入ツタトキニ火災ノ跡ヲ若干
目撃シ又日本軍隊ノ犯シタ取件ノ掠奪ニ關シテノ
報告ヲ憲兵カラ攝取シマシタ。(a) 此等ハ軍規ニ

關スル所々ニ散在シタ違反行爲デ、例ヘバ避難地
域侵入未遂、日本人婦女トノ同棲未遂及コレニ類
似スルモノデアリマシタ。強姦ニ關スル事件ハ事
實上若干アリマシタガ被ク少取デアリマシタ。(b)

MM - 31

辯証側證人參謀長陸軍少將飯沼 / HIRAZUMA /

ハ「南京入城後探尋暴行事件ガ若干アツテ松井

/ MATSUDAニ報告サレ、犯罪者ハ處罰サレタ

ト陳述イタシマシタ。(a) 任氏ノ鞭打、足打及

ノ長サニ續イタ補給隊ヲ自導シマシタ。實際ニ少
 シデモ彼等ノアル國品ハ思テ救済サレマシタ。
 在而京「プロテスタント」福音教會派牧師「デヨ
 ン・デイ・マキ」/ JOHN. D. HAGEE / ハ「日本人
 ハ、自分ノ氣ニ入ソタモノハ何テモ人民カラ拯
 シマシター」トテ此等計、高年等、金銭、衣類及食
 物等デアツタ」ト述ベテオリマス。(4)

MM-32

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|---|-----|----|------------|
| a | 三二六 | 記帳 | 三六九 |
| b | 三二八 | 記帳 | 四三三 |
| c | | 記帳 | 二六三
三六一 |
| d | | 記帳 | 三六二〇 |

0 159 00 15 1888

MM-32

(c) 探 察

在中國領事館外務省局ノ報告ハ「市中ニハ破壊サ

レズ若クハ探察サレヌ后備ハ一隊ヲナシ」ト述ベテ

オリマス。(a) 在南京アメリカ大使館付記者カラノ通信ハ

南京ニハ日本軍兵士ノ侵入及探察ヲ免カレタ

庭ハ殆ンド一ツモナイヤウニ思ハレルト述ベテオ

リマス。(b) 南京大子ノ「エム・エス・ベーツ」

兵士ノDR. M. S. BATES、ハ、現ル軍令ニハ局長指揮ノ

下ニ一隊ノ軍用「トラック」ヲ使ルシ、探察ガ巧

ミニ組織サレテ系統的ニ行ハレタト述ベテオリマ

ス。(c) 銀行ノ空庫並ハ「アセチリン」燭ヲ用ヒテ

開ケラレマシタ。彼ハ家財ヲ積貯シテ三分ノ二程

イ・ニム・シー・エイ」/K.K.O.A./ビルディング、重兵ナル教會ニ煉及ビ主兵ナル街道ノ商業用財産二個所ヲ焼打サレマシタ。在爾京「プロテスタント」監督會ニ牧師「ジョン・デイ・マギー」/JOHN.D.MAGFEE /ハ「十二月二十一日ニ市内ノ殆ンド凡テノ英ニハハ職員等ニ署名シテ、日本大使館ニ對シ入道ノ地ニ於テ、住民家屋ノ無差別焼打ヲ中止スルニツテ謝罪シタ」ト述ベテオリマス。(c)

III-33

c b a
 書 記 簿
 三二九

記 簿
 三六三
 三六二
 三六一

一七

0159 0015 1889

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-33

(a) 焼打

在中日領事館外務當局ノ報告ハ「同市ノ約三分ノ一ハ日本人ノ放火デ破壊サレタ」ト述ベテオリマス。(a) 南京大學ノ「エム・エス・ベイツ」/ E.S.

BALES / 博士ハ焼打ハ十二月十九日或ハ二十日ニ

始マリ六週間續ケテ行ハレタト述ベテオリマス。(b) 現時ハ「ガソリン」ガ使用サレマシタカ、運

常ハ化学的編切レガ用ヒラレマシタ。入ツテ來ル

日本人佐氏ニ供給スルタメニ(私有貯蔵ガ)押取

サレマシタ。ソ聯大使館ハ焼打サレマシタ。「ワ

0 159 00 15 1890

MM-34

d c b a 電信 三二六
電信 三二七

記電信 三
記電信 八
記電信 二
記電信 五
記電信 二
記電信 三

MM-34 IX 南京局送地區ニ於ケル 爲
 南京ノ「アメリカ」大使館ノ通報 (a) 甲ニハ甲
 國人ノ被害及ビ掠奪ニ就テ記載シタ 蕪湖 / WUHU /
 カラ上海總領事宛通報文ガ合マレテ居リ又「アメ
 リカ」及ビ英國ノ國旗ガ引下サレタコトガ述べラ
 レテキルノデアリマス。
 南京ニ於ケル「プロテスタント」監督會派送
 信「ジョン・デー・マギー」 / J. H. G. MAGEE /
 ハ南京ヲ起ツテキタコトト同様ノコトガ長途ノ特
 電ノ到ル所ヲ起ツテキタト云ツテキルノデアリマ
 ス。(b) 地方法院檢察官ノ作底シタ南京ニ於ケル
 戦争犯罪ノ概要報告ハ 佛山 / HO-FU SHAN / 附
 近ヲ漏ヘラレタ三、六百人ノ老若男女ガ總計テ
 銃撃サレ銃刺テ死サレタコトヲ既ラカニシテキル
 ノデアリマス。(c) 松井ハソノ口供書ノ中テ、南
 京テハ比喩的來兵ガ少ク、焼失シタ家屋數ハ約五、
 六十戸デアリト云ツテキルノデアリマス。(d)

0159 0015 1891

MATSUI Summation-IM

MM-35

Ⅹ 南京陥落後ノ公然タル阿片販賣

證人デアアル南京大學病院ノ「アール・ホー・ウイ
ルソン」ノ H. O. WILSON 博士ハ、占領前ハ阿片ヲ販
賣シテキル旨ノ看板ヲ外部ニ出シタ阿片箱ハ全然見
タコトガナカツタト証言シマシタ。(a) 占領下ニ在ッ
ツタ莫ル年即チ一九三七年ノ春ニ、同證人ハ、阿片
ヲ公然ト販賣シテキル阿片箱ヲ一屋裡ノ間ニ二十一
數ヘタノデアリマス。

南京大學ノ「エム・エス・ベイツ」ノ E. S. BATES /
博士ハ、一九三七年ノ暴徒前十年位ノ間ハ阿片ガ公
然ト世間ニ知レテ賣サレ莫イハ使用サレタコ
トハナカツタコト、及ビ阿片ハ主トシテ上流及ビ商
人階級ノ老年者ノ間ニ屋内ノ臭マツタ部屋ヲ使用サ
レテキタコトヲ証言シタノデアリマス。(b)

安徽省ノ許崇智ノ HSU CHUAN-YING / 證人ハ、一
九三七年ノ十二月以後、阿片ノ販賣ハ公然ト自由ナ
モノデアツタト述ベテキルノデアリマス。(c)

P-27

MM-35

- a、 記録 三三四七
- b、 " 三六三〇
- c、 " 三三八三

MM-37 MM-36

MM-37

在中國獨逸外務當局ハ迅速ニ運送ノタメ給兵不十分デアツタ日本軍隊ハ十二月十四日同市ニ開拔セラレ、正規ノ軍隊トシテ名状スベカラザル如キ行爲ニ出タ、ト報ジテキルノデアリマス。(a) 在中國獨逸外務當局ヨリ怡和ノ外務省ヘ宛テタ一九三八年一月十日附ノ、南京陥落後ノ南京ノ情勢ニ關スル報告ハ

a、書證 二二七 記録 二四二八

a、" 三二九 " 四三九九

MM-36

XI. 軍ノ統制缺如及ビ綱紀弛緩

松井ハ訊問調書中デ、軍ノ中ニ若干不埒ナ分子ガ居ツタト認メテ居リマス。(2) 松井ハ部分的ニ次ノ様

ニ云ツテ居マス。即チ「私ハ作戦行動同兵ガ命令ヲ

遵守スルコト、兵ノ勤務下番中ノ行動トノ間ニ區

別ヲナシテキル。在南京部隊ヲ指揮スル將校ハ勤務

上番下番兩万ノ場合ノ部下ノ兵ノ行動ヲ監督スル義

務ヲ有シテキタ。兵ノ行動ガ悪カツタト云フ私ノ陳

述ハ、支那民衆ニ對スル兵ノ行爲ト一ニ行動トニ甚

ツクモノデアル。私ハ南京占領軍ノ軍紀ハ優劣テア

ツタト思フガ行動ハ然ラズト思フ。」

0 159 00 15 1893

日本ノ軍當局者ハ疑カニ其ノ懲戒ヲ失ヒ、其ノ軍隊
 ハ南京ヲ陥レタ後數週間ニ亘リ南京市ヲ掠奪シタガ、
 二萬ノ婦女子ニ暴行ヲ加ヘ罪ナキ數千ノ常兵ハ發覺
 所ノ従業員四十三名ヲ含ムヲ殘忍ナ方法デ殺害シ
 機關銃火ニヨル大量殺害ノ如キハ人道的處刑法ノ中
 ニ入ル位テアツタ、ト述ベテキルノデアリマス^(b)
 在中國獨逸外務當局ノ報告ハ、ソノ所見ヲ述ベテ^(c)
 南京ノ殺滅的ナ日日ハ曉ラカニ次ノ二ツノ事實ヲ示
 シタ、トシテ居リマス、即チ
 (1) 南京堡壘防禦統制ノ失敗。
 (2) 各個人テナク、全團軍即チ日本軍ノ規律保加、暴
 行、及び犯罪行為。

MII-37

b、	書	三二九	記録	四二九二
c、	〃	三二九	〃	四六〇三

様デアリマス。益市ニ置ツテ男、女、子供が禁へ切
レヌ程致害サレクノデアリマス。

MM-39 南京大學ノ「エム・ニス・ベーツ」/M, S, BATHS/
博士ハ南京入城三日後、外山ノ所有地ノ入口ニ指示

スルヤウ秘テノ兵ノ立入禁止ヲ命ジタ小サイ贈 札
或ハ布告ヲ懸兵隊ノ高級尉長ヨリ入手シタト言ツテ
居リマス(a) 連日兵士連ハ走等ノ布告ヲ無視シタノミ
ナラズ又屢々糾ギ取ツタノデアリマス。

MM-38 a、書 証 二二八 記 録 五六一
b、 〃 〃 〃 〃 〃 〃

MM-39 a、記 録 二六六

7 159 00 15 1894

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-38

南京ノ「アメリカ」大使館ノ通報ノ既カニシテキル所ニヨルト、アメリカ官報ハ一月六日十四名ノ「アメリカ」居留民ヲ訪問シ、南京ノ事態ニ関シ特ニ日本官憲ニ注意ヲ喚起シタイコトハ何カト尋ネタ所、是等居留民ノ返答ハ「日本軍當局者ヲシテ其ノ兵ヲ統制下ニ仕カシメ、現ニ生起シツツアル關係スベキ行為及び強行爲ヲ終結セシメルコト。」ト云フノデアリマシタ。^(a) 尚法廷証ハ幾千トナイ日本兵ガ同市ニ充満シ、^(b) 言語ニ絶スル掠奪、強行ヲ行ツタコトヲ明カニシテキルノゾアリマス。外人目撃者ヨリ同イタ所デハ、兵士等ハ同市ヲ冒濫スルタメ一群ノ貴族ノ如ク身被シニサレタカノ光景ヲ呈シタ

安陸地帯ノ中興ノ運物ニ入り込ンデ望マシイ女ヲ捜シテ匿キ、夜ニナルトソノ女送シ遣レニ戻ツテ来ルノデアアル。」

MM-42

南京ニ於ケル「プロテスタント」監督派教會牧師「ジョン・ジー・マギー」ノ「JOHN G. MAGYER」ノハ、日本兵ハ外國財産ニ關スル日本領事ノ告知、又ハ外國財産ニ關スル米國大使館ノ告知ニ全然注意シ

MM-40

a. 記 録 三二六八三

MM-41

a. 記 録 三〇九 記 録 三二六八一七〇

MATSUI Summation-MI

MM-4I

MM-40
元參謀將校ノ辨護尙証人柳原ノ SAKAKIBARA ノハ
自筆ノ簡札ヲ處々方々ニ掲ゲテ真ノ他各地ニ於ケル
住民ノ保護、掠奪ノ禁止ヲ指令シタト云ツテ居ルノ
デアリマス。(a)

「ジエームス・マツカラム」ノ JAMES MCCALLUM ノ

ノ日記ニハ、次ノ如キ記事が載ツテ居リマス。(a) 「十

二月下九日、日本全年ハ外出ガ自由テアリ自分達ノ

好キナ事ハ何ゾモ出來ル様ニ見エル。「十二月二

十九日、ドウスル事モ出來ズ又武漢シテキナイ人々

ハ、自分ノ好キア所ヘハドコニゾモ勝手ニ歩キ廻ル

事ガ許サレテキル兵士等ノ掌中ニアル。瓜犯ハ亂レ

又少クノ者ハ鎗目シテキル。其ノ中ニ彼等ハ我々ノ

0159 0015 1895

MATSUI Summation-MM

御ハナカツタト言ツテ居リマス。(a) 田中ハ十二月二
十一日ニ當時南京ニ駐在シテイタ悪イ節口ハ、良イ
節口ニ代ヘラレ、十二月二十四日マデニハ何事モ解
決スルト思フト、マギー / MARRER / ニ断シマシタガ
ソノ後モ益然改善ハ見エマセンデシタ。(b)

0 159 00 15 1896

MH-44

b a

記録三三九一七
記録三三八二二

HM-43

a

記録四四六二

辯シタ所ニヨルト中山ノニハカスアニアノ及日高
 ノヒトダカノハ中國兵ノ犯シタ亂暴ニ關シテ何
 等特殊の事實ヲ報告シナカツタト、彼ハ噴述致
 シマシタ。彼等ハ、之等ノ事件ニ關シテ一般の
 風評ヲ只彼ニ傳ヘタダケテマツマノデアリマス。
 (b)

MM—43

Y M C A ノ職員「ジョージ・A・フィッチ」
 / GEORGE・A・FITCH / ハ、十二月十九日ハ
 完全ナ無政府状態ノ一日デアツタト言ツテ居リ
 マス。(a) 軍ハ兵士ノ上ニ何等統制ヲ行ツテキマ
 セン、十二月二十日ハ、蠻行、暴虐ガ抑制サレ
 ルコトナク續イテキタノデアリマス。目抜キノ
 商店街ハ燃エテ居リマシタ。彼ハ彼ノ窓カラ十
 四ヶ所ニ火ノ手ノ尋ガルノヲ見、又火ヲ付ケル
 前ニ店カラ取ツテ來タ掠奪物ヲ滿載シタ日本陸
 軍トラツクヲ澤山見マシタ。

MM—44

松井ハ彼ノ口供書ニ、南京陥落ノ際中國軍ヤ
 中國人モ、南京ニ於テ、可ナリノ犯罪ヲ犯シタ
 ト述ベテ居リマス。(a) 然シ、裁判長代理ニ答

3159 0015 1897

MM-45

a、記録 二六四頁
 b、記録 三九二頁

ヒ、ソノ中ノ幾人カラ我々ノ安全地帯ノアル地
 區ノ附近ニ衛兵トシテ配備シタノデアリマス。
 我々ハ之デ元氣ガツキ、モウ大丈夫ダト思ヒマ
 シタ。然シ後ニナツテ之等、當該兵達ガ他ノ兵
 ガシテキタ様ナアル等ヲシ始メタノデソノコトガ我
 我ヲ戲談ノ様ナモノニナリマシタ。中野巡査ハ
 非常ニ澤山殺サレマシタ。一ト云ヒマシタ。(b)

MM-45

XII. 南京ニ於テ使用シ得ル憲兵ノ數ハ
不十分デアツタ

南京大皇ノM・S・「ベーター」/M.S.BATES /

博士ハ、大使館附武官連ガ、コンナ悶着ヲ惹起

シター大理由ハ使用シ得ル憲兵ノ數ガ少ナカツ

タタメデアツテ占領當時總數十七人デアツタト

明言シテキタト證言致シマシタ。(a) 南京ニ於ケル

「プロテスタント」監督派教會牧師、「ジョン

ジー・マキーン」/JOHN G. HAAGERE /ハ、「最

初憲兵ハ一人モキナイ様ニ見エマシタ。ソノ後

段々連レテ來ラレ彼等ハ一生懸命ヤリマスト言

0159 0015 1898

MM-46

a、記録ニ五九四

MM-45

c、記録ニ一四四九

MM-47

南京ニ於ケル「プロテスタント」界派教會
牧師「ジョン・ジー・マキー」/ JOHN G. MARRER

總司令官ノ事務所ニ苦情ヲ持込マレマシタガ、
強姦、掠奪、殺戮禁止ノタメニ一國ノ臣民ヲ
發セラレナカツタト述ベマシタ。(a) 國ノ臣民ヲ

MM-46

音 / H S U C H U A N I Y I N G / ハ、日本大使館及
南京ニ於ケル鐵道省ノ使用人デアル華人許傳

XIII

南京ノ日本大使館館員ニ苦痛ヲ持込
マレ、東京ニ於ケル外務省ニ送達サレ
レマシタ。

辯護側證人、日高ノロヒロヒノハ最近南京ニハ
十四人ヨリ成ル日本憲兵隊ヨリ居リマセンデシ
タガ、數日中ニ更ニ四十人ノ憲兵ガ送レテ來ラ
レル筈トイウコトヲ十二月十七日ニ言イタト、
陳述致シマヌタ。(c)

0159 0015 1899

P-36

MM-47

a

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記

録

三

九

二

二

MATSUI Summation-MM

ハ、一殆ド毎日報告ガ大使館ニ送ラレ、私モ致
シマシタヨウニ我々ノ多クノ者ハ自身テ何度モ
日本大使館ニ行キ暴行事件ヲ一ツ一ツ話シマシ
タ。ト陳述致シマシタ。(a)

0 15 9 00 15 1900

MM-49

支那派遣特命全權公使デアツタ人伊藤ハ、上海駐劄外交部及新聞記者口トノ交渉並ニ情報ニ關スル任務ヲ帯ビテキタト披露致シマシタ。(a) 彼ハ「私ハ外交部ノ面々及記者等カラ、南京ニ於ケル日本軍ハ、當時及々ノ露骨行爲ヲ犯シテキルトイフ報告ヲ受ケマシタ。私ハ之等ノ報告ヲ信メ様トハシマセンデシタ。私ハ外交

MM-48

a、記録 三六三八

MM-49

a、記録 三五〇五一六

MM-48

南京大學ノM・S・ベーツ／M・S・BATES / 博
 士ハ、最初ノ三週間ハ殆ド毎日大使館ニ其ノ前
 日ノ出來事ヲ告イタ、「タイム」ニ打ツタ報告
 又ハ手紙ヲ持ツテ行キ、福井／FUJII / 領事、
 田中副領事／FUJIOKA / 等ノ館員トソレニ口
 シ屢々話ヲシタト法廷ニ話シマシタ。(2) 之等ノ
 人々ハ亘少ナガラモ彼等ノ出來ルダケノ事ヲシ
 ヲウトシマシタ。然シソレヲモ算ラ恐レテ居タ
 爲メ彼等ハ之等ノ通信ヲ上海ヲ通ジ東京ニ送達
 スルダケテ後ハ何も出來ナカツタノデアリマス。

0159 0015 1907

ンデシタ。彼等ハソレニ付キ何トカ致シマセウ
ト絶エズ納京ハ取シテ居リマシタガ、一九三八
年二月ニナツテカラ始メテコノ状況ヲ改善スル
タメノ有様迄切ナ行方ヲ取ラレマシタ。

MI-51

證人中山ノ *Shōzō Nakayama* / ハ、外國居留民ヨリノ
報告ハ總領事ニ提出サレマシタ、ト述べ、又ソ

MI-50

a、記録 頁三六八

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-50

日ヤ新聞記者連カラ同イタ事ノ極ク秘密ヲ實際
ニ報告シタノデアリマス。私ノ報告ハ全部外務
省ニ送達致シマシタ。一ト言ヒマス。

一九二八年十月以來爾次大學社會學教授デア
ル L. S. Co. スミス / L. S. Co. STAFFERS / 博士ハ、一

九三五年九月ヨリ一九三八年七月マデ引續キ南
京ニ居リ、委員會ノ書記デアリマシタ。其ノ委
員會ハ日本ノ占領ノ最初ノ六週間ハ毎日約二回
ノ抗議ヲ提出致シマシタ。(c) 之等ハ日米大使館
ニ於ケル毎日ノ會議ニカケラレマシタ。大使館
ハイツモ報告ノ正確サヲ拒ンダコトハアリマセ

0159 0015 1902

MATSUJI Summation-1111

ノ様ナ事件ハ、上海派遊軍ノ特務機関ニ報告サ
レタト恩ヒマス、ト述ベテホリマス。(a) 不幸ニ
シテ、ソノ様ナ報告ハ中文万両位ニハ報告サレ
マセンキシタ。之等ノ報告ノ間違スルノハ上海
派遊軍參謀部ノ誤りナリマシタ。(b) 該人ハ南
京ニ於ケル外國領事官視ノ音信ヲ截断シ、
ニ報告シマシタ。(c)

1111-52

在東京アメリカ大使館カラ在南京大使館へ宛
テハ書簡ノ中ニ在南京イギリス大使館カラノ報
告ガ同封サレテ居テ、此報告ハ次ノ如ク述ベテ
イルノナリマス。(a) 「之等ノ報告ヲ小官ニ着
シタル國民志願隊營長ノ「ポイントン」ノ BOYER
FOE / 師ノ田ノ所ニテハ、日本大使館員ニシテ
日本軍入城後同モナク南京ニ到着シタルモノハ
泥濘、殺戮、強姦、掠奪ノ一次修羅場ガ避難地
區ノ内外ニテ公々然ト展開サレ居ルヲミテ保護
シ居リタリ。彼等ハ本館報告ニ注意ヲ促サント

1111-52 1111-51

- a、電報 三二八
- b、電報 三二九
- c、電報 三三〇
- d、電報 三三一

記録 三三六

P-40

MM-52

b
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記
録
簿
帳
簿
簿
簿

MATSUI Summation-MII

セシモ果サズ、結局辯論官ノ無情無門心ナル意
度ニ徴シ兩黨ノ手段トシテ軍ヲ同市ニ對シテ故
志ニ放サレタルモノノ如シト觀察シ居リ、又東
京ニ打電連絡セントスルモ軍管理ナル爲之亦絶
望ナリ、依テ大使館職員ハ宣教師ニ彼等宣教師
ヨリ日本ニ於テ之等ノ野蠻ヲ公表スル如ク試ミ
日本政府方與國ニヨリ國軍ヲ抑制スル様ニ仕向
ケテハ如何トノ話アリタル程ナリ。

一月十日マテニ一八八管ガ報告サレテキルコト
ガ證據ニヨツテ明カニサレテ居リマス。(b)

P-41

MM-54

a、記録
二九七〇

MM-53

a、記録
二一五三

MM-54

喚起シタノデアリマシタ。其結果早ノ中央當局デ
ハ時々之ニ關スル指令ヲ出允早富局ヘ出シタノデ
アリマシタ。(a)

新設備設人、東亞局長、石射猪太郎 / TCHII, Itaro /

ハ十二月十三日、南京勝利ノ入城後總領事代理カ
南京カラ電報デ、外務省ニ宛テ南京ニ於ケル日本
軍隊ノ及行爲ニ關シ報告シテ來タト述ベテ居リ
マス。(a) コノ報告ハ陸軍省ノ早務局長ニ直チニ

辯護士日高 / HIDAKA / 證人ハ日本兵ニ依テ行

レタト稱スル幾多不法行爲ニ關スル報告ハ外國居

留民ガ總領事館ニ提出シタノデアルト述ベテキマ

ス。之等報告ノ大多數ハ、傳聞ニ基ヅイテ居リ、

總領事館ハ一々之等ヲ調査スル暇ガナカツタノデ

右ノ報告ハ東京外務省及南京ノ早ニ送附サレマシ

タ。東京外務省ハ之等報告ニ就テ早急ニ送達シ

タモノト見エマス。報告ガ出先官急ヨリ提出サレ

ルトイツモ東京當局デハ之レニ就テ陸軍側注意ヲ

0 159 00 15 1905

辯護側証人石射 / ISHII / ハ更ニ、南京ニ於ケル
第三國ノ代表ヲ組織サレテキル國際安全委員會ガ
作成セル日本軍隊ノ暴行爲ニ關スル印シセル詳
細ノ英文報告ヲ聞モナク南京ノ總領事代理カラ受
ケ取ツタト陳述致シマシタ。

- b、記録 二九七七一
- c、記録 二九七七二

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MATSUI Summation-MM

送達サレマシタ。當時外務大臣ハコノ事件ニ對シ
之レヲ憂慮シテ證人ニ、新カル不面目ナル行爲ニ
鎮壓スル様速カニ何等カノ措置ヲ取ル様ニト促シ
マシタ。(b) 證人ハ此電報報告ノ寫シハ既ニ陸軍
省へ廻附サレタコト及ビ彼ハ陸海軍兩省、及外務
省ノ次回起給會議ニ於テ軍當局者ニ新カル行爲ニ
對シ警告スル積リデアルト外務大臣ニ話シタノデ
アリマス。ヤ兩日後ノ連絡會議ニ於テ、彼ハ暴虐
行爲ノ問題ニ付軍務局第一課長ノ注意ヲ喚起シ、
之ヲ速カニ阻止スルタメ嚴重ナ指圖ヲ取ル様要求
シタノデシタ。陸軍側ノ代表ハ彼ト同感デアツタ
ノデ彼ノ要求ニ同意致マシタ。(c)

d、記録	三九七三
e、記録	三九七七
f、記録	三九八五
g、記録	三九八八
h、記録	三九九〇
i、記録	三九九五

MATSUI Summation-MM

次ノ連絡會談ノ際證人ハ軍務局第一課長三其ノ報告ヲ示シ、外務大臣ノ意ヲ体シ彼ノ要求ヲ樂リ返ヘシマシタ。單代表ハ嚴意ナル報告ヲ既ニ南京占領軍ニ渡シタト答ヘタノデアリマス。(d) 反對訊問テ證人ハ斯様ナ報告ハ全部アリ、ソノホノ一ツハ暴行七十件以上ヲ報告シテキルモノガ有ツテ(e) 全部ノ報告ハ外務大臣ニ出シタ(f) キルモノト隨述致シマシタ。

外國新聞ニ南京ノ暴行ガ出タ都度彼ハ情報部長カラ報告ヲ受ケ、之等ハ大臣、次官、及各局長ニ同覽サレマシタ。(g) 彼ハ廣田ガコノ間預マ一、二回陸軍大臣ト詰問シタモノト考ヘテキルノデアリマス。(h) 之等ノ報告ハ多クノ細ニ於テ重複シテキタガ、一應紙面ヲ受容セラレタノデアリマシタ。(i)

MM-56

a、書證 三三三 記録 四五〇八

MM-55

a、書證 二五七 記録 三四五二

ガ、昨夜ハ一昨夜ヨリモ一層悪化シタノテ、此等ノ件ニツキ日本帝國陸軍ノ注意ヲ喚起スルコトニ決定シタ。我々ハ日本陸軍ガ兵士ノ斯カル行動ヲ認めル等ハナイト信ジテ平ル。」
此等報告ハ十二月及一月中讀イテ平ルノテアリマス。

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-56

南京安全地帯 / NANKING SAFETY ZONE / 十一月

十六日附文書ニ次ノ様ナ記録ガアリマス。

(a)

「昨日沈黙ヲ差控ヘタノハ、取高司令官ガ到着ス
レバ、市内ノ秩序ガ回復スルト考ヘタカニテアル

MM-55

彼ノ訪問テ、松井ハ、彼ガ南京入城ノ殆下直後
歐羅巴已及不日テハ、彼ノ麾下部員ガ幾多ノ暴虐行
爲ヲ爲イタト考ヘテキルコトヲ聞イタト傾述シテ
キマス。(a) 彼ハソレノ下級外交官ニ在爾京領
事カラ此イタノテアリマス。

XIV

宣當局ハ其ノ事ヲ告知シテキタ。

0159 0015 1908

果、警務部長以外ノ部長ハ全部街ヨリ撤去スルヤ
 ウ命令が出マシタ。南京奪取ノ後初ノ命令テハ、
 遺リ撤キノ後警務部長ノミガ、市街ニ入リ、江ノ
 宜隊ハ市外ニ留マルヤウニナツテ平マシタ。然ル
 ニ全部隊ガ市街ニ入ツタ爲「公汗ノ HASTI ノ公汗
 怒シテ下ノ者連日怒馬リツケタノテアリマス。」
 余ハ多クノ宜隊ヲ南京ニ入レルト、宜隊ガ上海以
 來幾多ノ困難ニ遭ヒテキルタメ、兎角同じ方

MM-57

a、警務 二五五

記録 三五五二一五八

0159 0015 1909

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-57

一九三七年以來中文派遣員參謀長附副官デアツタ。

被告武蔵ノMUTOノハ、其ノ訊問中、自分ハ十二月二十四日カ二十五日ニ、南京ヨリ上海ヘ歸ツテト言ツテキマス。(a) 南京陥落ノ時、松井ノMATSUIノハ廊結核ヲ患ヒ、後方地取ニ居マシタ。ソレテ兩人ハ入城式ノタメ南京ヘ行ツタノデアリマス。彼ハ此處ニ十日居マシタ。此ノ時ハ既に街ハ清掃サレ、獨リ歩キモ安全デアリマシタ。松井ハ日本兵ノ非行ニ就キ何モ見キマセンテシタ。

參謀長坂田ノTSUKADAノガ彼ニ勅達、暴行、殺人、

モノテアリマス。前人が式ノメメ前京ニ到着ス
ルトスグ、此ノ情報ヲ入手シ、臣等ニ此ノ命令
ヲ出シマシム。憲兵ハ警備此ノ任務ヲ持ツテキ
タモノテアリマスカラ、此ノ命令ハ規則ニ頁ニ
照会ニ施行スルコトデアリマシム。此等ノ事件
ハ十二日カニ下地日以前京へ突入シタ時給マツ
タモノテアリマス。武漢ノREIGNノハーツノ報告ノ
由テハ又知人が探察、此等ニ遣ヒ、又此ノ外日

0159 0015 1910

MATSUI Summation-MM

起リ勝チダト云フ感ジカシテ平々カラテアリマ
ス。兵士ハ長イ間緊張ヲセラレテ平々クメ、コ
レヲ市街ニ入レルノハ貴防テハナイト思ハレタ
ノデアリマス。松井 / MATSUI / 大將ハ後ニ之等
ノ事件ニ関キ、其ノ行動ニ激怒シマシム。武蔵
ハ松井 / MATSUI / 大將ガ之ニ関キ松井 / MATSUI /
ガ激怒シテ、部下ニ怒鳴リツケタ時、其處ニ居
マシタシ。此ノ報告ニハサシテ多クノ事件ハ示シ
デアリマセンテシタガ、之ガ公表サレルト同時ニ
憲兵ニ新隊ナ行動ヲ派遣シ、總テ犯入ヲ逮捕ス
ル様命令カ出タカラテス。此ノ命令ハ松井 / MATSUI /
大將ガ之等ノ事件ヲ觀クト同時ニ出シタ

NATSUI Summation-jim

本軍方組織等ノ類キマツルトノ知事セガアツタ
 コトヲ悉出ツテマシマス。即チ下月迄二十ノ部片
 ノ知事セガアリ、同省/ASAKA/信ガ一ノ率ヒ
 神川/YANAGAWA/中村カモウ一ツノ率ヒテ平
 マシマス。武蔵/BUHO/ハ此等部片ガ長千モ一ツ
 タコトヲ想像スルコトガ出来ナイノ事アリマス、
 即チ武蔵ハ東京正武入部ノ高松井/MATSUI/大將
 ニ歸行シ、此ノ時下月迄二十ノ部片ガマツタ
 イワ報告ヲ受ケマシマス。然シ又東京/BANKING/
 市ハ町屋町屋ニ片割イテスリ、其ノ後十日シテ
 上海ニ歸リマシマス。從ツテ数千ニ昇ル部片ガマ
 ツタコトヲ信スルコトモ又、想像スルコトモ出
 来ナイトイフノ事アリマス。而シテ武蔵ノ任職ハ
 参謀長ニ當任スルコトヲマツルノ事アリマス。
 即チニ當スル部片^(b)ノ中テ、武蔵/BUHO/ハ松井
 /MATSUI/大將ガ十二月十七日東京正式入部ノ
 後、類メテ参謀長塚田/TSUKADA/ヨリ、軍司令
 官ノ命ニ反シ、空襲部カ市村ニ入ツテ終ヒ、比
 軍司令カ市村ニ入ツタハ、此等ノ種々事件カ發
 生シタモノト察出ツテマシマス。松井/MATSUI/

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MATSUI Summation-III

大尉ハ兩司令官ニ南京/NANKINGノ防衛ニ必要ナ
ダケノ兵力ニ限シ、他ハ全部退カニ市内ヨリ撤
退シ、軍規、軍規ヲ嚴守スベシト命令シマシム
武蔵/MUTSUノ兩司令官トモ此ノ命令ヲ實行シマシ
シタガ、撤退ハ、支那人ガ家ヲ焼イテナリ、飲
料水ガ少ナカツタメ、少シ遅レタモノト思ツ
タトイフノテアリマス。

III-58

f	e	d	c	b	a
三	三	三	三	三	三
四	四	四	四	四	四
六	六	六	六	六	六
八	八	八	八	八	八

記	記	記	記	記	記
三	三	三	三	三	三
三	三	三	三	三	三
八	八	八	八	八	八
四	二	五	二	四	二
六	一	〇	五	四	二

松井 / MATSUI / ハ口供書ノ中テ、南京 / NANKING /
 攻陥ノ際、昂奮セル將校及兵ニ不群ナル暴行ヲ働
 イタキノガ若干キタカキ知レナイト言ツテキマス。
 (e) 此等ノ不群ナル暴行ガ自チ強張、掠奪、暴力
 ニヨル戦費ノ擧成、殺人等デアツタノデアリマス。(f)

0159 0015 1913

III-58

松井/MATSUI/ハ其ノ口供書ノ中デ、南京/NANKING/

攻佔當時、自分ハ百四十區離レタ江州/HOOCHOW/

デ病床ニアリ、暴行ニシテハ何等も知セズ、又

其ノ報告モ受ケテカツタト言ツテキマス。(a) 唯自

分ノ口イタノハ一九三七年十二月末南京デ不法行

爲ガ少シアツタトイフ時ノミテ、斯カル事實ニ就

テ何等公報ニ表シナカッタ。(b) 自分ハ斯カル不詳

事情ノ發生ヲ防ギ、又右罪者ヲ懲罰ニ處スルニ全

力ヲ盡シタモノデアル。(c) ト述ベテ居リマス。

反對訊問ノ時、松井/MATSUI/ハ南京司令官ガ作戦

ノ進行ニ就テ自分ト緊密ニ連絡シ、南京/NANKING/

ノ陥落ヲ報告シテクレタト言ツテオリマス。(a)

MHI-59

報告何人、中文方面軍參謀附キ謀報將校、中山守人 / NAKAYAMA, YASUHO / 十二月十七日ノ武後松井 / MATSUI / 方出席シタ將校全部ヲ集メ、軍規ハ瓜分ヲ謀ニ進言スルヤウ命令シタト言ツテキマス。(c) 即チ松井 / MATSUI / ハ憲兵ヨリ、部下ノ軍隊ノ中ニ軍規、軍律ニシスル罪ヲ犯シタキノガアルコトニツキ報告ヲ受ケタノテ、不必長ナ軍隊ハ城外ニ去ルヤウ命令シマシタ。(b) 莫ニ松井 / MATSUI / ハ司令官及部下ノ部下ノ部下ニ外交官ヨリ追加報告ヲ入手シタノデアリマス。(c)

MHI-60

松井 / MATSUI / ハ其ノ口供書ノ中テ十二月十七日南京 / NANKING / 入城後、始メテ塚田 / FUKADA / 少隊長ヲ見シ、憲兵隊長ヨリ暴行ノコトヲヒキ、直チニ谷部 / TANI / 少佐ト有罪者ノ處罰ヲ命ジタト言ツテキマス。(c) 又反動隊員ノ時ニハ南京 / NANKING / ノ公署ヨリ両少佐ノ罰ヲ問イタカ(b) コレガ公式報告テハナク、軍ニ對シテ甲テ問イタニシキナイトイウノテコレヲ口供書ノ中ニ載テキナイト述ベ

MHI-59
 c e 記 二下ホ〇二
 b 記 二下ホ〇三
 c 記 二下ホ三三

MHI-60
 b a 記 二下ホ八
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MM-61

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MM-60

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／ NAKAYAMA / ハ一九三七年十二月二十六、七日頃
上海法廷年参謀長ニ口頭命令ヲ傳達シテ、「南京
テ日本軍ノ不法行爲ガアルトノ事ダカ、且本軍ノ
百目ノタメニ斷ジテ左様ナコトカアツテハナラヌ
差シ不心得者カアツタナラば重ニ処罰スル」(2)
ト
傳ヘタト以テシテ居リマス。

テキマス。(c) コレハ十二月十八日カ十九日ノコト
 デ、ソノ領事ハ松井ニ南京ニ入ツタ日本軍ノ將兵
 ノ中ニ暴行ヲ爲イタ者カキルト語シタノデアリマ
 ス。(d) 然ルニ本人ハ証人中山 / NAKAYAMA / ノ言ツ
 タ如ク、(e) 南京陥落ノ直後、(e) 兩軍ノ司令官カラ
 暴行ノ報告ヲ受ケタコトヲ否認シテキルノデアリ
 マス。南京陥落以來彼ノ參謀將校ハ毎日憲兵ヨリ
 報告ヲ受ケテキマシタ。(g) 參謀將校ハ情報入手ノ
 タメ憲兵隊へ出向キ、(h) ソシテ此等ノ報告ヲ參考
 ノタメ本人ニ示シ注意ヲ喚起シタノデアリマス。(i)

0159 0015 1915

一 中山ノヒダカノ記録及日高ノヒダカノ
MM 参事官ヨリ報告ヲ隨ニ受ケタト述ベテ居リマス。

ソノ報告ハ日本兵カ犯シタ犯罪ニ就キ述ベタノ
デアリマシタガ、爾人ハ口頭テ報告シタノテ、
松井ハ内容ヲ餘リヨク覺エテ居リマセン。(a)

コレヲ調査スルコトハ大ニ難シカツタシ、又
ソノ調査モ正確デハアリマセンデシタ。(b)

MM-62 a . 記録 ニ 一 四 七
 b . " ニ 一 四 六 七

MM-63 a . 記録 三 三 八 五 九
 b . " 三 三 八 六 〇

0159 0015 1916

MATSUI

Summation - MM

MM-62

上海ノ日本大使館參事館、辯護律師人、日高

／田中ハハハ／ハ一九三八年一月一日上海テ
 松井ニ會ツタガ、其ノ時松井ハ自分ノ部下ノ中
 ニ惡イコトヲシタ者ガアツタコトヲ初メテ知ツ
 テ非常ニ異イテ居タ。ト言ツテオリマス。日高
 ／田中ハハハ／ハ、松井ガ其ノ頃迄其ル等
 ヲ知ツテハ居ナカツタノダトノ深イ印象ヲ得マ
 シタ。(a) 然シ松井ハ其ノ惡イ事トハ何シナコ
 トデアアルカ、ハツキリ言ヒハシナカツタノデア
 リマス。(b)

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反對訊問ノ際松井ハ、一九三八年一月中旬頃

MM-64		MM-63	
b	a	d	c
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證人 鐵道部職員許傳普 / HSU CHUAN-YING /
 ハ、私邸ノ取モ非違カツタノハ初メノ三箇月テ
 ソノ後ハ取々少シヅツ減ツツテ行キマシタ、ト言
 ツテ居リマス。(b)
 南京ノプロテスタント福音教會牧師「ジョン・
 ジー・マギー」 / JOHN G. MAGEE / 様

0159 0015 1917

MATSUI Summation-MM

松井ハ、日高ノ前ニハ遠征地帯ノ外國人カラ出
タ報告ニ惹イタモノト思フガ、ソナテ報告ハ陣
カナカツタト言ヒマス。(c) 反對訊問ノ際松井
ハ、東京ニ於ケル不法行為ニ就テ新聞記事ヲ何
モ嘗カナカツタト願ベマシタ。(d)

東京陥落後被追問モ答復シタニ處

MM-64

証人、東京大學病院ノ「アール・オウ・ウイルソ
ン」ノ由・●・WILSONノ博士ハ一九三七午

十二月十三日同市陥落後約六、七之間モ醫院ガ

被イテ起ツタモノデアルト証言シマシタ。(a)

同病院ノ収容員ハ約百八十デアリ醫院中

ハ常ニ職員デ収容シ切レナイ程デアリマシタ。

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Mis-64

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MATSUI Summation-MM

々ノコト方起リマシタガ、約六週間後ハ段々ト
 少クナリ始メマシタ(單獨ノ事件ハ其ノ後起キマ
 シタト言ヒマシタ。)

南京大學 / NANKING UNIVERSITY / 「エム・エ

ス・ベーツ」 / M. S. BATES / 博士ハ、二月六日

或ハ七日後ハ事感ハ目ニ見エテ改尋セラレ、其ノ
 時ト夏トノ間ニ泰山ノ重大事件ハ起リマシタガ

最早集会的トカ大ガカリトカノ性質ノモノハアリ

マセンデシタ、ト訪言シマシタ。恐怖ノ甚シカツ

タノハ二週間半乃至三週間ノ間デシタ。恐ロシカツ

P-55

MM-66

c b a
記記記

録録録

三三三
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九三三
四六一

MM-65

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録

二五九四

笑イ出シタト詮言致シマシタ。(a) 是終ノ事柄ハ大
 使館へ報告セラレ、大使館ハ事件ヲ調査スル實意ガ
 ナク唯ダソレヲ告ゲタ者ガ誑ダツタカ認ベタガツテ
 居タ者ヲ派遣スルノデシタ。(b) 活シコノ事ヲ止メ
 サセル實意ガ少シデモアツタナラバ、彼等ハコレヲ
 止メサセルコトガデキタノデシタ。若シ彼等ガ二十
 五名ヲ銃殺シタナラバコノ事ハ止メラレタノデスガ(c)
 間近ヲ餘リニ輕視過ギテ后リマシタ。取ル時

0 15 9 00 15 19 19

MATSUI Summation-MM

XVI

法履行爲ヲ止メヨウトハシナカツタ

MM-65

説人 鐵道部 職員 評傳音 / HSUCHUAN-YING / ハ、日

本 當局者ハ法履行爲ヲ止メヨウトシマセシタ、

ト 言ツテ店リマス。(a) 是等凡テノ發虎行爲ヤ強姦

掠奪ヲ止メサセルタメ嗟一ツノ布告、嗟一ツノ注意

書ヲモ街頭ニ出シマセシタ。

MM-66

南京ノプロテスタント 監督 鐵會 牧師「ジョン。

ジMM-66
「マギイ」 / JOHN Q. MAGREE / ハ、彼ガ大使館カ

ラ 來タ 調査官ニ彼ノ見タコトヤ一人ノ女カラ兵士達

ヲ 追立テタコトヲ話シマシタトコロ、ソノ調査官ハ

MM-63

a

香

證

記

三

四

六

四

一

五

MM-67

a

記

三

二

六

四

二

MM-66

d

記

三

三

九

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八

MM-68
 松井ハ其訊問ノ際次ノ様ニ述ベマシタ。(a)
 日記ノ中ノ唯一ツノ記ニハ、南京ニ於ケル中國人
 強姦ニ關シ一人ノ將校ト三人ノ兵ノ軍法會議ニ關ス
 ルモノデアリマス。ソノ將校ハ死加ニ處セラレ兵ハ
 餘役ニナツタト私ハ思ヒマス。比ハ私ガ犯罪者ハ敢
 處罰ハ少數ノ人ニ行ハレ又不充分デアリマシタ。

XVII

私

0159 0015 1920

MATSUI Summation-MM

「ラーベ」／RAABE／氏ト日本ノ一將校ガ、一兵士
ガ或ル知人ヲ強姦シテ居ル現場ヲ見テ、件ノ將校ガ
取ツタ處直ト云フノハ唯ダソノ兵士ヲ平手デ打ツタ
ダケデシタ。(d)

MM-67 南京大學ノ「エム。エス。ベーツ」／M.S. BATES
博士ハ「見苦シイ放縱ガ候イテ居ル、其ヲ止メ様ト
スル眞面目ナ努力ヲ吾々ハ見ナイ。兵士等ハ毎日數
百人ノ人々ヲヒドク扱ケテ居ル。日本軍ハ自分ノ名
譽ヲ掃ハナイカ。」ト十二月二十七日ニ書イテ居リ
マス。(a)

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MATSUI Summation—MM

割ニ庭スベント王張シタ結末デアリマシタ。
私ハ此ノ報告ヲ上海ニ届ル時ニ受ケマシタ、ソシ
テ真ヲ私ノ日記ニ記入シマシタ。此ノ日記及真他
私ノ記以ハ全部焼却サレマシタ、然シ私ハ若シ私
ガ教範ニ出タ時ニ有用デアルダロウト考ヘタノデ
記憶ノ中カラ二三ノ手控ヘラシテ置キマシタ。

0159 0015 1927

シ有致ナ憲兵又ハ刑罰ガ課サレタ例ヲ一ツモ云々ハ
見聞シマセンデシタ。ラーブノFAABEノ氏及委員合
ノ他ノ人々ハ三、四回上級將校ノ面前デ市民ヲ拘獲シ或
ハ銃剣ヲ突キ殺シ或ハ強姦行爲ヲシテ居ル現場ニ居
合セマシタ。其等ノ場合ニ於テ兵ハ將校ニ更メテ殺
害サセラレ口頭デ証言ガ加ヘラレマシタノミデ兵ノ氏
名ヲ記録サレルコトモナク又其他ノ憲兵ノ指示モア
リマセンテシタ。

a、
記録 二六四二一三

MM-69

南京大學ノ「エム・エス・ベイツ」M. S. BATES /
 博士ハ次ノコトヲ證言シマシタ。(2)

「南京ノ秩序ヲ回復セヨトイウ強イ命令ガ屢々東京
 カラ通達サレタトイフコトヲ吾々ハ大使館ノ文官達
 カラ確言サレマシタ。二月三、六日頃或ル種ノ高級
 軍事派遣員ガ到着スル迄ハコノヨウナ命令ノ有様ナ
 結果ヲ吾々ハ見マセンデシタ。一人ノ高級將校ガ大
 勢ノ下級將校及下士官ヲ集メテ軍ノ名譽ノ爲メニ彼
 等ノ行動ヲ改善シナクテハナラヌト云フコトヲ屢重
 ニ言渡シタト云フコトヲ私ハ知リマシタ。其時以前
 ニハ我人、強姦ノ現行ヲ上級將校ニ見ラレタ兵ニ對

0 159 00 15 1922

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MM-71

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二一五六三

MM-70

a
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b
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c
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記録
三二六〇〇
”
三二六〇八
”
三二六七六

ビ一九三八年二月九日、中支派遣軍ニ對スル檢察官
及ビ判士ニ任命サレタノデアリマス。彼ハ、南京
ノMANKINGノ入城後不法行爲ガ日本軍ニヨツテ犯サレ
此等ノ訴訟事件ヲ審問シタト陳述シテ居リマス。(a)
E、三名ノ身被方違果シ其他ハ大部分兵ニヨツテ犯
サレタ似非ノ事件デアリマシタ。

0159 0015 1923

MATSUI Submation-MM

MM-70

第九師團ノ陸軍少尉テ十二月十三日南京ニ入ツタ
 辯護側證人 大内ノ ^(a)OGUCHIノハ不法行為ヲ起訴サレタ
 罪人ハ一人モ無カツタト述ベテ居リマス。(a) 又第九
 師團ノ陸軍大佐デアツタ證人 島坂ノ ^(b)YAKIZAKAノハ、
 十二月二十四日ニ南京ヲ去ツタガ其間彼ノ部下ニハ
 一人モ犯罪人がナカツタト述ベテ居リマス。(b)
 第十軍法務部長デアツタ辯護側證人 小川ノ ^(c)OGAWAノ
 ハ十二月十四日カラ十九日迄彼ノ南京滞在中日本兵
 ノ不法行為ノ噂ヲ聞カナカツタシ又不法行為ヲ起訴
 サレタモノモナカツタト述ベテ居リマス。(c)

MM-71

辯護側、證人、塚本浩次ノ ^(c)FUKAHITO KOJIノハ一

九三七年八月三十日、上海派遣軍ニ對スル檢察官及

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MM-72

MATSUI Supplication-III

犯罪ノ種類ハ、竊盜及ヒ傷害事件及ヒ殺人事件ハ甚
ダ稀デアツテ、主トシテ掠奪強姦ナドデアリマシタ
彼ハ、二三ノ殺人事件ガアツタ事ハ記憶スルガ放火
犯ヲ罰シタリ大畏懲罰ヲ取扱ツタリシタ記憶ガナ
イノデアリマス。犯罪ハ色々ノ場所テ行ハレタガ相
當賞ノ事件ハ、彼レノ思フニハ、南京^(b)ALPHA送難
地區ニ於テ起ツタモノデアリマス、彼自身ハ實際十
件取扱ツタガ送罪セル人々ノ數ハ事件ノ數ヨリ多
ツタデアリマス。(b)

XVIII

一九三八年一月 ハレット、アーベンド
/ HALLETT ABEND / ハ後告松井ト會見シマシタ。

松井ハ訊問ノ際次ノ如ク話ツテ居リマス。(a)
「私ハ南京ノT、H入獄ノ後約一ヶ月經ツテカラ」
「アーベンド」 / ABEND / ニ送ヒマシタ。

a、右証 二七三 " 三四六三

b、 記録 二一三七九

MM-111

ヨリ確證サレテ居ル事實ニアルノデアリマス。

起訴狀中ハ爾余ノ訴因、第五十四及ビ第五十五ハ第三類中ニ含まレ通例ノ戰爭犯罪、及ビ人道ニ對スル罪ニ關スルモノデアリマス。松井被
告ガ「南京掠奪」ニ對シテ責任アリトハ、我々
ガ主張シテ居ル所デアルガ、モシサウトスレバ松井バ
明カニ訴因第五十四ヲ以テ訴追サレテキル共同
謀議ニツイテ有罪デアリ、訴因第五十五ヲ以テ

MM-110

松井被告ハ、殺人關係ノ 訴狀第二類ノ中ニ
含マレテキル諸罪ニ關シ、訴因第四十五、第四
十六、第四十七、第五十一及第五十五ノ下ニ訴追
サレテ居リマス。訴因第四十五（南京）ニ關シ
テハ、法廷ニ提出サレタ證據ハ松井ガ本訴因ノ
下ニ有罪デアルコトヲ充分明カニシテ居ルト信
ジマス。尙又松井ハ、彼ガ訴追サレテキル第二
類ノ爾他ノ訴因、即チ第四十六第四十七、第五
十一及第五十二ニ於テモ有罪デアリマス。其ノ
理由ハ、松井ガ上記諸訴因ニ於テ訴追サレテ居
ル罪ヲ計算シ準備シタ者デアルコトガ、證據ニ

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氏ノ前デ事實ヲ述ベテ風評ヲ打消サント希望シソシ
 テ南京ノ HANKING / 陷落ノ一ヶ月後彼レニ面會ヲ求メ
 タノデアリマス。ト陳述シマシタ。(b) 彼ハ憲兵隊
 カラ松井ニ申進サレタ報告ヲ基礎トシテ「アーベン
 ド」ノ ABEND / 氏ニ語ツタノデアリマス。(c)

b、
 c、

記 録 三三六六八
 三三八七三

MATSUI Summation-MM

私ハ色々風評ヲ聽イテ居リ、又「アーベンド」

ABENDノ氏ノ前テ事實ヲ述べ風評ヲ打消シタイト思
ツタノテ當方カラ面會ヲ求メマシタ。私ハ南京ニ於
ケル外國權益ノ尊重ニ關スル自分ノ見解ヲ「アーベ
ンド」ABENDノ氏ニ説明シマシタ。

又中立國ノ財産利益ニ損害ヲ及ボサヌト云フ自分ノ
希望ヲ説明シマシタ。尙私ハ平和ヲ達成シ、戦闘ヲ
中止シタ中國兵ニ對シテハ友情ノ手ヲ差延べルコト
ガ自分ノ希望デアルガ抗戦ヲ繼續スル支那軍ヲ降懲
スルコトガ自分ノ義務デアルト述べマシタ

松井ハ反對訊問ノ際彼ハ「アーベンド」ABENDノ

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MM-74

a、記録 三二八五六
 b、" 三二八五六

MM-73

a、書証 三二八 記録 四三二八

74 反響訊問ノ際松井ノ MAJESTI / ハ、「本國ノ HOMMA /
 MM-74 軍少將ハ一九三八年一月末頃參謀本部カラ彼ノ司
 令部ニ派遣サレ、又本國ノ HOMMA / ガ東京ノ TOKYO /
 當局ハ在中日日本兵ノ暴行ニ關スル報告ニ就テハ非
 常ニ心配シテキタト語ツタ」ト陳述致シマシタ。(a)
 松井ノ MAJESTI / ハ「彼ハ軍隊ノ行狀ニ就イテ彼ニ宛
 テタ參謀本部ノ通信ヲ受取ツタ覺エハナイ」ト述べ
 マシタ。(b) 彼ハ如何ナル時ニモ參謀總長又ハ陸軍大

MATSUI Summation-MM
MM-73

XIX

二月五、六日頃高位ノ陸軍將校
多岐南京ニ到着

南京駐在米國大使館通信ハ、二月六日、新守備
隊司令官天谷ノAMATAノ少將ハ、南京ニ於ケル外國外
交代表達ノ爲ニ日本大使館ニ於テ歓迎茶話會ヲ催シ
タコトヲ報ジタノデアリマス。

天谷ハ日本軍ノ退却ノ報告ヲ送ツタリ反日感情ヲ
懐ク中國人ヲ激刺シツツアル外國人達ノ態度ヲ非難
シタノデアリマス。(a)

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MM-75 MM-74

a、	d、	c、
書	記	記
証	録	録
ニ	三	三
二	三	三
六	八	八
	七	七
	八	六
記		
録		
三		
二		
五		

公井ハ訊問ノ際次ノ如ク述ベテ居リマス。

XXI 公井被告ハ南京事件ニ關シテ報告書ヲ作成スル
 ヤウニ要求ツレマセンデシタ、又一万圓並及報
 告ガ有ツタ筈ダノニ公井被告ハハツキリト知ツ
 テ居リマセヌ。

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MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-75

巨カラ証實サレタコトハアリマセシタ。(c) 彼ハ
「本岡ノHOMMAノハ外務省カラ監算ニ送附シタ報告
カラ暴行ニ就イテノ報告ヲ知り得タト思フ」ト述ベ
テオリマス。(d)

XX 被告ハ一九三八年二月日本ニ歸還シ、一九三八
年三月五日現役ヨリ解除サレマシタ。

知ノHAFVAノニ關スル訊問ノ際「知大尉ハ一九三八
年二月十七日中マニ於テ松井大尉ノ後ヲ引繼イタ」
ト述ベテオリマス。(a)

MM-シテ認容サレタ一九三九年「日華事變ノ陸軍記録」

ト題スルー文書ハ「動亂地境カラ歸還シタ軍隊及軍

人ノ状態」ト題スル傷亡録ヲ合ンテオリマシテ、ソ

レハ日本ニ歸還シタ兵士ノ或ル者ハ話ヲ償マナイト

云フコトヲ指摘シテオリマス。(a)

「戦守中私ノ取モ好シクダモノハ抹殺テアル。(b)

「戦場デハ強姦ハ何トモ思ハナイ」(c)

MM-77	MM-76
c b a	c b a
” 記 書	” 記 書
録 記	録 記
三三三	三三三
〇〇〇	八八五
一一一	八五五
二二七	六
記	記
録	録
二〇一	二〇六
二六	

0159 0015 1929

MATSUI Summation-MM

「私ハ東京／TOKYO／ニ到着スルト直ニ豫備役ニナ
リマシタノデ、私ハ今催カニハ知リマセンガ、調査
ト報告ガナサレタ筈デアリマス。私ハ報告ラスル様
ニ要求サレマセンデシタ。若シ何方折様ナ事件ガア
ツタトシマシタナラバ、私ハ勿論責任ヲ以テ報告ヲ
作ツタデアリマセウ。」(a)

松井ハ反對訊問ノ際「一九三八年二月上海ヲ去ル
時マデ彼ハ彼ガ命ジタ調査ニ關シテ何等ノ報告モ受
信シナカツタ」ト述べテオリマス。(b) 彼ガ報告ヲ要
求シタ時ノ返事ハ報告ノ出来上リ次第御返事申上ゲ
ルトノコトデアリマシタ。(c)

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MM-77

d
記

家

NO 1110

MATSUI Summation-MM

「中日軍ノ停房違ハ時々一列ニ並列サセラレテ、
同銃ノ性能ヲ試メス爲殺サレタノデアリマス」
(a)

0159 0015 1930

MM-79

松井ハ反對訊問ノ際、指揮監督ガ全然間接的ニ行ハレタト云ツタ時ニ、ソレハ指揮ハ上海派遣軍及ビ第十章ノ司令官ヲ廻ジテ行ハレタトイフ意味デアルト云フタノデアリマス。(2) 松井ハ頁ニ中文方面軍本部ハ食糧、宿舎、冷與及ビ醫藥品(b)ノ如キコトニ對シテハ概體ヲ有シテキ

MM-79 MM-78

b	a	c	b	a
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				警証 三四九八
記録	記録	記録	記録	記録
三三八四八	三三八四九	三三八二二	三三八二〇	三三八一九

MM-78

XXII

被告松井ハ南京強姦ニ責任アリ

松井ハ自分ノ口述書ノ中デ中支方面軍ハ上海
派遣軍及ビ第十軍本部ヲ支配シテキタモノデ其
ノ使命ハコレ等部隊^(a)ノ指揮ヲ統一スルニ在
ツタコト及ビ自分ト戰場ニ於ケル將兵トノ關係ハ
指揮監督ノ點ニ就テハ全然同接的デアツタコト
ヲ述ベテキルノデアリマス。^(b) 松井ハ西ニ南京
ニ於ケル不幸ナル事件ヲ起シタ原因ノ一ツハ自
分ハ中支方面軍ノ司令官トシテ戰場ニ於ケル將
兵ニ對シ直接ノ職權ヲ有シテキナカツタコトニ
アルト述ベテキルノデアリマス。^(c)

0159 0015 1931

MM-79

f	e	d	o
、	、	、	、
記	記	記	記
録	録	録	録
三	三	三	三
三	三	三	三
八	八	八	八
七	七	七	四
四	一	三	九
		一	
		四	

MM-80

ルタメノ職信ヨリモ寧口其ノ責任或ハ議事ヲ有
 シテキタノデアリマス。(f)

松井ハ軍紀ニ關スル職信ハ自分ノ指揮ニ附
 隨セヌモノデアルトハ云ハナカツタト云ウテキ
 ルノデアリマシテ、自分ノ部下ヲ指揮シテキタ
 方面軍指揮官トシテ東京陸活ニ關係アル總テノ

MATSUI Summation—MM

ナカツタト云ウテ居リマスガ然シト十位及ビ上野
派遺軍ハ自分ノ指揮下ニアツタコトヲ認メテキ
ルノデアリマス。(c) 松井ハ更ニ反對訊問ノ際、
自分ハ軍紀風紀ヲ直接左右スル職權ヲ有シテキ
ナカツタト云ツタノデアリマス。即チ松井ハ自
分ハ中文方面軍最高指揮官トシテ自分ノ指揮下
ニ在ルコノ二ツノ部下軍隊ノ作戦ヲ指揮スル職
權ヲ與ヘラレテキテ、(d) 軍隊内ノ普通ノ軍紀風
紀ニ就テハ師團長ガ責任ヲ有シテキタノダト云
ウタノデアリマス。(c) 松井ハ自分ノ指揮下ニ在
ル部隊ニ軍紀風紀ガ維持サレテキルヲ見極メ

0159.0015 1932

HM-80

e	d	c	b	a
記	記	記	記	記
録	録	録	録	録
三	三	三	二	三
三	三	三	三	三
八	八	八	八	八
七	七	七	七	七
六	五	五	四	四

出長ニ自分ノ希望ヲ述ベル以外ニ権限ヲ有シナ
 カツタノテアリマス。(d)
 松井ハ軍紀風紀ニ關シテ自分ノ責任ヲ決定ス
 ルコトハ大變ムヅカシイコトデアツテ當時何等
 一定ノ聲明ヲナシ得ナカツタト述ベテキルノテ
 アリマス。(u)

0 159 00 15 1933

MATSUI Summation-MM

責任ヲ回避スルモノデハナイト云ツテキルノデ
アリマスガ^(a) 自分ノ指揮下ニ在ル兵隊内ノ部
隊ノ軍紀風紀ニ對シテハ自分ハ直接責任ヲ有サ
ナイト云ハントシテキタルデアリマス。^(b)

彼ハ無効手段ヲ講ズルに極力取ルハ軍法會議ヲ掌
握スルに極力取ル有シテキナカツタノデアリマス。
斯カルに極力取ルに對シテハ軍法會議ニ對シテ
デアリマス。^(c)

松井ハ軍法會議ニ對シテ命令ヲ發スル法律的
権限ヲ有シナカツタノデアリマス。ソシテ自分
ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍司令官及び其ノ部下ニ在ル

MM-81

c	b	a
、	、	、
記	記	記
録	録	録
三	三	三
三	三	三
八	八	八
八	七	七
〇	九	八

地カラ言ツテ彼ハ雑定的ニハ言フ事ハ出来マセ
 ンデシタ。(c)

0159 0015 1934

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-81

被告ハ南京ノ出来事ニツイテノ報告ヲ統帥部
ニ送ラナカツタト述べマシタ。彼ハ東京ニ居ッ
テカラコノ事件ニツキ参謀本部ニ話シタカモ知
レマセン。(a)

軍ノ軍紀風紀ニ付スル報告ヲ送ル事ニツキ何
カ責任ガアツタトシタナラバ、ソノ責任ハソノ
師团长ニアルノデ其ノ方面ノ最高指揮官ニハア
リマセンデシタ。(b)

コノ様ナ報告ハ師团长ガ軍司令官ヲ通ジテ送
附スベキモノカ、又ハ方面軍ノ最高指揮官ノ手ヲ
經テ送附スベキモノデアルカニ就テハ法律的見

MM-83

a、
記録三三八五八

MM-82

a、
記録三三八八三

隊ヨリ報告ヲ受ケタカラ論算及師團ヨリ出來ル
タケ澤山ノ將校ニ集合スル様ニ命令ヲ下シ、彼
ハ直接ニ之等將校ニ訓示ヲ與ヘル目的ニテ彼等ヲ
一同ニ集メタ事ハ明瞭デアリマス。(a) コノ訓

MM—82

裁判長代理ニ答ヘタトキニ、松井ハ、軍紀保持ハ戦略トハ關係ハナイト云フ事ハ出來ヌト述ベ從ツテコノ二者ガ相互ニ關係シテキル限リ軍記ニ係スル事件ニ、干渉スル權力ヲ彼ハ實際ニ持ツテキルト思ツタノデアリマスガ嚴然タル法的意識カラ言ヘバ、彼ハ軍紀保持ニ關スル詳細ニ渡ル特殊命令ヲ下スベキ權力ヲ自分ガ持ツテキルトハ、考ヘナカツタノデアリマス。ソレテ今日テ^(a)尙彼ハソノヨウニ確信シテキルノデアリマス。

MM—83
然シ彼ノ反對訊問ニヨリマスト、一九三七年十二月十八日ニ、彼ハ十二月十七日ニ彼ノ參謀長ヲ通ジテ日本兵ガ暴行ヲ犯シタ事ニ關シ憲兵

0159 0015 1935

XXIV

一九二九年ニ、參謀本部第二部長、反告松井

ハ歐洲各國ニ於ケル大使館附陸軍武員會員ノ會

合ヲ「ベルリン」ニ召集セリ。

MM-84

彼ノ口供書ノ中テ、松井ハ、「ベルリン」ニ於ケル日本ノ大使館附陸軍武員會合ハ特別ノ目的ハナカツタノデ公務上ノ會合デハアリマセ

MM-83

＊ b、書證三三九七 記帳三二六一七一八
書證一一五 記帳七三六

0 159 00 15 1936

示ハ證據トシテ提出サレテホリマス。其ノ一部
ニ、全將兵ハ統帥ノ旨ノ趣旨ヲワキマヘ、嚴肅
ナル軍紀ヲ勵行スベキデアリ、各自ハ各自ノ行
爲ニシテ慎重デアルベキコト、赫々タル戦果ヲ
維持シ、雄大スル傲、各自ノ最大ノ努力ヲ盡ス
ベキデアル、之ニヨツテ帝國(二軍)ノ威望ガ直揚
サレルノデアルト述べテキマス。(b)

XXIII 報告松井ハ四月二十九日ニ、日華事變ノ勳功
ニヨリ勳一等ニ叙シ金鷲勳章ヲ授ケラル。

Mim-84

d c b a
, , , ,

書證三三九八

記録三三八二七

記録三三八八六

記録三三八八九

記録二八八三九

對「ロシア」謀報活動が話題ニ上ツタト述ベテ
后リマス。(a)

MATSUI Summation—MI

ンデシタト述ベテキマス。會合ハ社交的性質ノ
モノデシタ。(a) 反對訊問ノ際彼ハ、彼ガ「ベル
リン」ニ行ツタ費用ハ、謀本部ガ支出シ、其處
ニキタ武官ハ、英國、獨逸、佛蘭西、ポーランド
ロシア、オーストリア、土耳其、及伊太利カラ
ノ武官デアツタトイウコトヲ承認致シマシタ。(b)
土耳其ノ大使館附陸軍武官デアツタ橋本ハ對出
ロシア「情報任務及土耳其ニキル自兵」「ロシア」
人利用ニツイテ話ヲ致シマシタ。(c) 被告橋本ハ
反對訊問ノ際、一九二九年ノ「ベルリン」ニ於
ケル日本大使館附陸軍武官ノ會合ニ於テ妨害行爲及

0 159 00 15 1937

a、
記談
二三一七

成ヲ表明シタノデアリマシタ。松井ハコノ證人ト
ノ會談テ、「アジャ」ハ「アジャ」人ノ「アジャ」
デアルベキコト、歐米ノ勢力ハ驅逐セラルベキテ
アルコトラ主張シマシタ。コノ証人ハ松井ノ言ウ
「アジャ」人ノタメノ「アジャ」ト云ウ意味ハ事
實ハ日ム人ノタメノ「アジャ」デアアルコトヲ悞レ
ルモノデアルト云エマシタ。

0159 0015 1938

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-85

「アジャ」人ノタメノ「アジャ」

証人秦徳純 / CHING TSEH-CHUN / 將軍ハ、一九三五

年ノ秋松井ガ北平 / PEI-PING / ニ來タト申シテ居リ

マス。(a) 彼 / 松井 / ハ當時退役將官デアリ大ア

ジャ」王表 / THE CONCEPT OF GREATER ASIA / ヲ唱

ヘテ居リマシタ。彼ハ北平ニ大「アジャ」協會 /

THE GREATER ASIA ASSOCIATION / ノ支部ヲ設置

シタイト言ツテ居リマシタ。北平鐵路局長陸寬生

CHAN CHE-SUNG DIRECTOR OF THE PEI-PING AND LIAO-

NING RAILWAY / 氏ノ紹介デ松井ハ宋 / SUNG / 將軍ト

コノ証人トニ面會シマシタ。コノ二人ハ共ニ不實

MM-86

a、
記録
二二九八

記録
三三八二九

MM-85

b、
記録
二三七六

c、
記録
二二八七

MM-86

松井ハ其時保通社ヲ一九三三年彼ガ大「アジヤ」協會ヲ設立シタコト及ビソノ協會ハ政治的ノモノテナク純智文化研究ノ團體テアルコトヲ陳ベテ居リマス。(a) 一九三五年及一九三六年彼ハ、支那南北ニ旅行シ大「アジヤ」運動達成ノタメ努力

0159 0015 1939

MATSUI Summation-MM

眞ノ平等ト互惠ヲ欠ク以上何等容讓スル事ハ出來
得ナカツタノテシタ。

コノ證人ハ天津 / TIENTSIN / テノ會合ニハ參加シ
ナカツタト言明致シマシタ。(b) ソノ會合テ支那

大臣總協會ノ創立委員會 / FOUNDERS COMMITTEE /
ガ生レマシタ。

反對訊問テ秦將軍ハ、松井ガ英米ノ權益ヲ「ア

ジャ」カラ驅逐スルコトヲ欲シテ居タト陳ベテ居

リマス。(c) 其後眞珠灣 / PEARL HARBOR / デ起ツ

タ諸事實反ヒ「マニラ」 / MANILA / 其他ニ對スル

攻撃ハソレヲ實證スルニ足ルモノデアリマス。

0 159 00 15 1940

MATSUI Summation-AM

シマシタ。(b) 彼が創立當時カラ副總裁乃至顧問
 デアツタ大日本興亞聯盟 / THE DAI NIPPON ASIA
 DEVELOPMENT LEAGUE / ガ「アシヤ」ノ開發
 ニ從事シテ居タ多數の団体ヲ統合スルタメ結成セラ
 レマシタ。(c) コノ団体ハ新タニ組織サレタ大
 政務會 / H. P. A. A / ノ傘下ニ入ツタノデシタ。
 戦争勃發後 / 譯者註、大平存戦争ナラン / 、彼ハ
 仰印及南方諸地ニ並ニ比島 / HINDOCHINA, THE SOU
 THERN REGIONS AND THE PHILIPPINES / ニ出掛ケ大「ア
 シヤ」聯盟ニ協力スルヨウ大「アシヤ」諸國民ヲ
 鼓吹シタノデアリマシタ。(d)

MM-87

辯論會 中谷 / ZAKAYAN / ハ大アジア協會ノ
 機関雜誌「大アジア主義」一九四〇年十月號中ノ
 一論説ヲ自己ノ筆ニナルモノト認メマシタ。其論
 説テ彼ハ「アジア解放戦トシテノ文部事業ガ皇軍

MM-86

- b、記録 三三、八三〇
- c、記録 三三、八三二
- d、記録 三三、八九五

國家許テアル、十萬ノ兵艦ノ名ニ於テ米國トハ如何ナル安切ニモ絶對ニ反對デアル、ト述べタノデアリマス。(c)

a、	b、	c、
書證	書證	書證
三二〇五	三二九一	三二〇〇
	A	A
記録	記録	記録
三二、七一	三三、九〇	三三、九一
	〇	五

ノ仰領インド支那進駐ヲ以テ茲ニ漸ク本誌ニ入ツ
 タ事ニ會心ノ欣ヲ表明シ此ノ進駐ハ歴史的意義ニ
 於テハ、アジア解放戦ヘノ數歩躍進ヲ意味シテキ
 ルノデアアル、ト述ベテキルノデアリマス。(a)

一九四一年一月號ノ「大アジア主義」ノ論說デ、
 松井ハ日本、獨逸、伊太利間ノ三國協定ノ締結及
 南京國民黨政府ニ依ル承認ハ(日本人ヲシテ)ア
 ジアニ於ケル英米印ノ長イ間ノ支配ヲ斥ケテ、ア
 ジアノ新秩序建設ノ道ヲ進ムニ至ラシメタト書イ
 テ居リマス。(b)

一九四一年七月號ノ「大アジア主義」ニ松井ハ一
 論說ヲ寄セテ、直接ノ敵ハ英國米國及其他ノ民主

0159 0015 1941

ケラレタコトニハ益ク疑問ノ余地ハナイノデアリ
マス。(a)

MM-89

辯護側提出ノ證據ハ強行爲ガ起ツタ事ヲ否定
シテハキナイガ、之等ハ小規模ニシカ起ラナカツタ
ト思ハシメルモノデアリマス。(a)

MM-90

檢察側ノ三張ニ有利ナ證據ノ優越性ニ依リ、斯
カル檢察側證據ガ何人モ肯肯スルモノデアリ且ツ
壓倒的デアリ、當然容認スベキモノデアルト、教
判所ニ於カレテハ結論セラレルニ違ヒナイト考へ
ル次第デアリマス。

MM-89 MM-89

a、摘録

VIII 節

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

a、摘録

IX 節

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

第二部

論 證

MM-88

(註ノ參照ハ摘録第一部中ノ該當ノ節ヲ指ス)

法廷ニ提出サレタ証據ニヨツテ、南京ニ於テ殘

虐行爲ガ行ハレタコトハ十二分ニ明瞭ニナツタト

思フモノデアリマス。數萬ノ中國人男子、婦人、

小兒、非武装ノ兵、警官等ガ日本兵ニ殺害サレタ

コト、數千ノ中國婦人、少女ガ凌辱サレタコト、

及南京市ニ於テ廣汎ナ地域ニ亘リ掠奪ヤ放火ガ續

0159 0015 1942

MI-92

a、
調録

XVI
節

MI-91

a、
調録

XV
節

ハナイノデアリマス。御座行知ラ算當局者ノ復返
 且ツL₁乎タル處置ヲ以テシア終熄セシメルコトガ
 不可能デアツタナドト主張スル余地ハナイノデア
 リ、松井被告ハ斯クノ如キ處置ヲ取ラナカツタコ
 トニ對シ責ヲ負ハシバナラヌトスルモノデアリマ
 ス。(a)

MM-91

奥ニ偵察働ヨリ甲上ゲタイノハ、此強行爲ガ
長期間ニ亘ツテ續行サレ、外國居留民ヨリ在南京
日本大使館ニ何度モ訴願ガ行ハレタニモ拘ラズ、
之ヲ阻止スル措置ハ殆ド或ハ全然トラレナカツタ
コトハ證據ニヨツテ既に補証サレタ所テアル、ト
云フコトデアリマス。(a)

MM-92

日本大使館ノ官吏ガ幹部ヲ捕レテ居リ、此問題
ニ就テハドワニモ出來ナカツタ、ト論ズル余地ハ
アルカモ知レナイガ、一九三七年十二月十三日同
市陥落後六、七週間ニ亘リ強行爲ガ阻止ヲ受ケ
ルコトナク續行サレタト云フ事實ニハ何等變リ

MATSUI Summation-1111

証-93

勿に辯護側デハ松井ガ占領後ノ南京 / NANKING /
ニ存在シタ實狀ヲ知ラナカツタノダト主張スルコト
デアリマセウ。ソコテ申上ゲタイノハ此種ノ主張
ニ對シテハ、少クトモ十二月十七日ノ松井ノ入城
以後、暴行ガ行ハレツツアルノヲ充分承知シタコ
トラ証シテ居ル法廷(英)証據ヲ以テ之ニ對イル
ト云フコトデアリマス。(a) 恐ラク松井ハ入城シタ
ソノ以同ニ於テモ、部下指揮官ノ報告ヨリシテ、
此ノコトヲ知ツテ居タノデアラウガ、此點ニ對ス
ル証據ハ確實テハナイデアリマス。

P-79

証-93

a、摘録 Ⅳ 節

報告ヲ受ケテ非常ニ憂慮シ、本間／HONMA／將軍ノ中
即派遣ヲ必要ト考ヘタコトニモ注目スベキデアリマ
ス。(b)

MM-95

ソシテ、松井／MATSU／ハ、彼ガ同市ニ入ツタ後、
憲兵隊カラ詰ヲ聞イタノデ、部下ノ尉校達ヲ召集シ
テ紀律維持ニモツト様裕デアルヨウ訓令シタトイフ
コトヲ知脱側ニヨツテ立証サレテ居リマスガ、檢察

MM-94

a、摘録 一八節
b、摘録 一九節

MM-94

然シ乍ラ、事實ニ於テ松井ガ十二月十七日南京ニ
入城シタ時憲兵隊ヨリ、又南京領事館員ヨリモ、此
ノ殘虐行爲ニ就イテ報告ヲ受ケタト云フ點ハ確實デ
アリマス。彼ノ幕僚ガ憲兵隊ヨリ受ケタ報告、及ビ
暴行事件ノ調査ヲ命ゼラレタ將校ガ彼ニ宛テテ作成
シタ報告等カラ、其ノ後ノ情報ガ彼ノ許ニ達シタノ
デアリマス。松井ハ新聞記者、「ハレット・アーベ
ント」/HALLETT ABEND/ノ前ニ事實ヲ示シテ流言ヲ
鎮メヨウト希望シタノデ、一九三八年一月、同氏ト
ノ會見ヲ求メタコトハ意味深イモノガアリマス。(a)
尙又、二月初旬東京ノ當局者ガ南京ニ於ケル暴行ノ

0159 0015 1945

MM-95

c	b	a
攝	攝	攝
錄	錄	錄
一	一	一
一	七	二
節	節	節

MATSUI Summation

側ハソノ訓令ガ確實ニ遂行サレルヨウニ松井ハ實際
際勢力シナカツタトイフコトヲ提出イタシマス。
憲兵ガ情無イ程不足シテキテ、而モ其ノ少數ノ憲
兵自身モ不法行爲ヲ犯シテキタトイフコトノ證據
ガ歴然ト呈ガツテ居リマス。(a) 又逮捕サレタ少
數ノ犯罪者スラモ不十分ナ處罰ヲ受ケタノデ、(b)
南京市内ノ日本兵ハ完全ニ統制ヲ亂シテ、市内ヲ
横行シ、數週間ニ亘ツテ、殺人・強姦・強奪及燒
打ノカギリヲ盡シタ(c) トイフ結果ニ對シテ松井
最高指揮官ハ責任ヲ負フベキデアルトイフコトモ
明瞭デアリマス。

0159 0015 1946

テ説明サレルト述べマシタ。コレニ就イテノ證據ガ辯護側カラハ提出サレマセンノニ、檢察側ノ證據ハ發見サレタ死体ノ數バカリテナク、其等ガ發見サレタ市内ノ多クノ色々ナ場所ヲ立証シテキルコト及其等ノ死体ガ掘り出サレタトイフ示唆ハ本裁判所ニ提出サレタ證據ニ依ツテハ支持サレナイト云フコトヲ指摘シテ置カナケレバナリマセン。(a)

a、摘録 八節

b、" 四節

a、" 八節 (a) (三)

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-97

MM-96

辯護側ハ中國兵ハ武器ヲ棄テ、市民ニ變裝シタト
イフ事實ヲ立證 (a) ショウト試ミマシタ。コノコト
ガ眞實デアツテモナクテモ、同市陥落 (b) 后ハ武力
抵抗ハナカッタノデ冷靜ノマ、テ殺戮シタコトガ犯
罪デアリ、ソノコトニ對シテハ、如何ナル根據カラ
モ正當タルコトヲ證スルコトガ出來ヌトイフコトヲ
該證據ガ明カニシテオリマス。

辯護側ノ引用シタ證據中ニ、南京市内ノ死体ノ數
ハ兵士ガ前述ノ段トテ殺サレテ、死体が集メラレ、
埋葬サレタ場所カラ掘り出サレタトイフ事實ニヨツ

0159 0015 1947

MM-100 MM-99 MM-98

a、
、
”

二二節

a、
、
”

二二節

b、
、
”

一節

a、摘録
二二節

MM-100

合ニ、彼ハ軍紀事項ニ容喙スル權利ガアツタト自認
シテキルコトヲ突出イタシマス。(a)

更ニ、十二月十八日、部下將校ヲ南京ニ召集シ、
統帥ノ真ノ意義ヲ認識シテ軍紀ヲ一層厳正ニ勵行ス
ベキコトヲ是等將校ニ話シタノハ松井最高指揮官デ
アツタコトハ證據(a)ニ據テ明瞭デアリマス。殘虐
行爲ヲ罰スルコト、ソノヨウナコトヲ命令シタノ
ハ松井デアツタデアリマシテ彼ノ爲シタ事ハ何レ

MM-99

責任ヲ限定シヨウトスル様ニ思考サレマス。(b)

ドー / LADYBLIND / 砲撃ノ様ナ作戦事項ニノミ彼ノ

MM-98

松井被告ハ麾下ノ陸軍ニ對スル命令監督ハ全ク箇
表的デアリ、從ツテ麾下將兵ノ軍紀風紀ニ對シテ直
接責任ガナイトイフ態度ヲ取ツテ彼ノ責任ヲ回避シ

ヨウト努メテオリマス。(a) 彼ハ全ク「レデイ、バー

檢察側ハ紀律強行權ヲ指揮權ヨリ分離スルコトハ
不可能デアルコト及彼ハ軍紀ト軍略ガ相關聯スル場

0159 0015 1948

ル虎ノ家ト化セシメタ日本軍ノ將兵ニ對シテモツト
嚴正ニ軍紀ヲ勵行スベキデアツタノデアリマス。

0159 0015 1949

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-101

モ軍紀ヲ勵行スル權力ハ最高指揮官トシテ彼ニアル
ノデアリマシテ、松井ガ申シマスヨウニ之ヲ麾下ノ
軍隊内ノ部下ニ轉嫁シ得ザルモノデアルトイフ見解
ト一致スルノデアリマス。

松井ハ自分自身ガナシタ息告ニ從ヒ、自分自身ガ
發シタ命令ノ眞ノ意義ヲ實現シテ、平和ニシテ無垢
抗ナ都市ヲ中斷ノ男女及ビ子供ノ死体ガ散亂シテキ

0159 0015 1950

MATSUI Summation-MI

MI-102 人員ニ對シテ犯シタ新ル犯罪ニ對スル彼ノ贊
 任ハ東京ニ於ケル政府首腦者及ビ軍高級將校ト
 共ニ責フベキモノデアリマシテ、是等ノ人々ハ
 南京ニ於ケル外國僑民ノ被害ニ係リ^(a)コノ
 残忍行爲ヲ良ク承知シテ居ナガラ自分自身是等
 ノ悲惨ナル出来事ヲ諒解セシムル何程ノコトモ
 爲サナカツタノデアリマシテ毎日々々彼等ノナ
 スガ儘ニコノ悲惨事ガ繼續シタタメニ南京ノ陥
 落ヲ日本ノ歴史ニ汚點トシテ記サシメムノデア
 リマス。

MI-103 起訴狀ニ關係アル期間中ニ、松井ガ爲シタ其
 他ノ行動ニ付シテ云ハバ、松井ハ早クモ一九二
 九年ニ歐洲ニ於ケル日本ノ天宮宮附陸軍武官
 ノ伯林ニ於ケル會合ニ出席シタコトガ記録ニ係
 リ^(a) 際デアリマシテ、コノ會合ニ於テハ露
 西軍ニ對スル妨害行動及ビ諜報活動ガ檢討サレ
 タノデアリマス。

MI-102 a、摘録 一三節

MI-103 a、摘録 二四節

0 15 9 00 15 1951

MATSUI Summation-AMI

MI-104

松井ハ其ノ長イ生涯ノ間「皇國要人」ノタメノ
トニ「トスル政策ヲ主張シテ來テ今キ尙、其ノ通
リデアアルコトガ明ラカニサレテキルノデアリマ
ス。(a)

MI-105

松井ハ一九三三年ニ大東亞協會ヲ設立シテヨ
リ、其ノ後ノ自分ノ生涯ノ大部分ヲ、其ノ證據
ガ示シテキル如ク、東亞ノ諸國ヲ旅行シ、是等
諸國ノ國民ニ國々ノ政策ヲ守リ東西ニ好秩序
ヲ建設スルコトヲ勸告シテ過シタノデアリマス。(a)
松井ハ大日本具東亞協會ノ副總理及ビ顧問トシ
テ、其ノ設立當時カラ其ノ目的ヲ達成シ且ツ其
ノ政策ヲ促進セシムルタメニ絶エズ努力シテ行
ツタノデアリマス。本段附ニ於テ引用サレタ證
據ハ松井ニ、松井ハ自分ノ行動、講演及ビ書函
ニ依リテ中國、(b) 英吉利、アメリカ及ビ佛蘭西
ニ終始以意アル態度ヲ示シ、コノ侵襲戰爭ニ對

MI-105 MI-104

a、摘録 二三頁

b a、摘録 二三頁
b、好意録 三三六九

記録 三三三四六

スル證據ハ松井ガ亦併因第四及ビ第五ノ下ニモ
有罪デアルコトヲ示シテ居リマス。ノミナラズ、
共同謀議ニ參加シテ以後ノ中曰ニ於ケル松井ノ
活動ニツイテノ證據ハ、併因第二及ビ第三ノ下
ニ訴追サレテモル中曰關係ノ共同謀議ノ點テモ
松井ヲ有罪ダラシメルモノデアリマス。

MM-106

スル責任ヲ免レ得ザル人物ニシテコノ侵略戦争
ハ所謂東亞ニ新秩序ヲ建設スルコトヲ目的トシ
タモノデ、其ノ結果、終ニ日本ニ不幸ヲ齎ラシ
タモノナルコトヲ示シタノデアリマス。

之ヲ要スルニ松井被告ハ起訴狀ノ原因一乃
至第五ノ共同謀議ノ虚テ訴追ノ如ク有罪デア
ルト申上ゲルノデアリマス。

既ニ證據ニ依ツテ既カニサレテキル様ニ、松井
ハ早クモ一九二九年ニ、謀議第一ニ訴追サレテ
キル全面的共同謀議ニ参加シタノデアツテ、又
ソノ軍事上並ニ非軍事上ノ活動ニ關スル彼ニ對

0159 0015 1952

シ前登シクニ止ラス、夏ニ、起訴状ノ審問第六ノ甲ニ訴追サレテキル類ク、甲口ニ對スル取争ヲ前登シ違備シルコトモ、之ヲ覆登スル已接證據ガアルテアリマス。

訴因如十八乃至第二十六ハ、侵略取争ノ類ニ屬スルモノテアリマス。合併ハ、訴因第十ハ及第二十七乃至第二十四ノ下ニハ訴追サレテ居リマセン。合併ハ、訴因第十九ニ於テ訴追ノ如ク、一九三七年ノ甲口侵略取争ノ類ニ對シ有罪ナアリ、又訴因第二十五及第二十六ノ下ニ訴追ノ如ク、右口訴因中ニ據テシラ

0159 0015 1953

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-107

訴因第六乃至第十七ハ、被告等ニ對スル
 訂登ト証明ニ關スルモノテアルガ、一九二九
 年ノ秋キニ於テ既ニ全區的共同謀議ニ參加シ
 且ツソノ後ノソノ活動ガ示ス様ニ、之ヨリ
 處スルコトヲシナカツタ被告トシテ、松井ハ
 ソノ共同謀議遂行ノ各メノ其ノ後ノ一切ノ計
 畫並ニ準備ニ對シ、罪ヲ負フベキモノデアリ
 リマス。事情斯クアル上ハ、松井ハ訴因第六
 乃至十七ノスベテノ項ニ直ツテ有罪デアリマ
 ス。松井ハ被告等ノ全體ニ直ル筋書を遂行

第三十六ノ下ニ有罪テアリマス。何故ナレバ、
彼ガ上記ノ証因ニ示サレテキル競争ヲ開始シタ
罪ヲ負フベキ者テアルコトハ証據ニヨツテ確證
サレテ居ルカラナリマス。

MATSUI Summation-MM

MM-109

侵略戦争ノ計畫及び準備ニ於ケル罪ノ故ニ、
共犯者、被疑者、従犯者トシテ有罪テアルコト
ノ直接ノ證據ガアルト申上ゲルモノデアリマス。

又、毎ノ首魁者トシテ、同時ニ東京新橋序ノ
暗道者トシテノ一九二九年以來ノ松井ノ活動ニ
シスル證據ニ依リ、訴因第二十七乃至第三十二
及ビ訴因第三十四乃至第三十六ニ於ケル侵略取
手遂行ニ就キ松井ガ有罪アルコトハ斷カテアル
ト主張スルモノデアリマス。

本被告ハ訴因第三十三ノ下ニハ訴追サレテ居リ
マセン。更ニ松井ハ訴因第二十八、第三十五及

0159 0015 1954

P-91

MATSUI Summation- III

MM-112

訴追サレテキル戦争法規違反ニ對スル責任ハ動カシ得又所トナルノデアリマス。

如ク以上ヲ要スルニ、我々ハ、松井波告ハ訴追ノ

以
上

0159 0015 1955

53

頁

33

頁

MM-63

MM-43

テアリマス。」ヲ能ハ「ト同法延ニ
 ハ延ベテアリマス。」ヲ加フ
 第五行「行ツテキマセン」ノ次「
 デシタ。」ヲ加フ
 第五行「カ」ヲ能ハ「マ」ヲ加フ

MATSUI SUMMATION-MM

ERRATA SHEETS

30 頁、
10 頁、
タ シ

MM-38 MM-10

項第十二行、「光景ヲ呈シタ」ノ次「様
一節」ヲ加フ
項第二行、「新聞發表」ノ次、「ノ
最終報告松井ノ部 (MM) 中左ノ如ク訂正セラレ

公井 (MM) 關係 正誤表
國 際 税 察 部
一九四八年二月二十四日

0159 0015 1956

7-159 00 15 1957

FEBRUARY 2 1948

IPS RE: MINAMI (MN)

Attached pages No. MN-5, MN-20, MN-20-A,
and MN-21, are to be substituted for present pages
5, 20 and 21, in summation on MINAMI (MN).

Page NF-5

(NF-5)
 vicusly mentioned. At this meeting, the parties present "exchanged their outspoken opinions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian problems."^{c.} Later in the same month, MINAMI stated: "The Army has long recognized the necessity of increasing our divisions in Korea and we hope the day will come when more divisions will be dispatched there."^{d.} At a meeting of Army and Division Commanders held 4 August 1931, MINAMI was quoted as having stated in his address, "Guard Manchuria, our life line."^{e.}

NN-6. MINAMI was far from passive in his relation to the Lukien Incident. He knew that the problem was acute, or else the aforesaid meeting would not have taken place, at which the entire top hierarchy of the General Staff, met with him and his top satellite KOISO, along with the officials of the South Manchuria Railway. Although he testified that this meeting was but a social luncheon, there is no doubt that the meeting was for the purpose of exchanging views on the strategy to be used to apply forceful action in Manchuria. That MINAMI was not an apostle of peace, as he seeks to portray himself, prior to the Lukien affair, appears from the report of the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the League of Nations^{a.} where it is said, that the "vigorous speeches by the Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counselling direct action by the Army in Manchuria" were one of the things which set the stage for the events that took place on 18 September and thereafter.

NN-5.

- c. T. 15753
- d. T. 15753
- e. Ex. 2207, T. 15,784-5

NN-6.

- a. Ex. 57, p. 66-7; Ex. 186, T. 2209-10;
Ex. 2207, T. 15,783

(NN-25)
groundless", based on mistaken suppositions, and
i.
unworthy of notice.

NN-26. On the conclusion of the UMEZU-Ho Agreement only a few days after the meeting mentioned above, MINAMI received a report of the same, but he said he did not know about "small details" such as whether the Chinese agreed to all the demands, and he said he thought an ultimatum with a time limit with a threat of invasion was "too silly."^{a.} MINAMI's testimony as to UMEZU's ultimatum is discredited by testimony of Defense witness KAWASHIMA who stated that beginning in May, 1935, there were skirmishes between Japanese and Chinese forces followed by protests lodged directly with the Chinese Government by the Kwantung and North China Stationery Forces, imposing conditions such as withdrawal of Chinese forces and extermination of Kuomintang branches and enforced the fulfillment of those conditions with an ultimatum.^{b.} This testimony also confirms the newspaper reports of the HO-UMEZU Agreement.^{c.} However, MINAMI heard that in consequence of the agreement the Chinese evacuated their troops from North China.^{d.} All anti-Japanese military forces were withdrawn on 10 June 1935.^{e.}

NN-25.

i. T. 19989

NN-26.

a. T. 19991
b. T. 29488-90
c. Ex. 2206-A, T. 15771-82
d. T. 19991
e. T. 20787

0 159 00 15 1960

Page NY-20-A

NY-21. MINAMI also denied that he had knowledge of an ultimatum DOIHARA had given the Chinese on 15 November 1935 that unless autonomy of the north was proclaimed, five Japanese divisions were going into Hopei and six into Shantung. He admitted that autonomous regimes for Eastern Hopei and Hopei-Chahar were established, but those, he said, were set up by the Chinese themselves. ^{a.} On 12 November 1935, MINAMI telegraphed the War Ministry that he had issued orders for the First Mixed Brigade to concentrate outside the Great Wall near Shanhaikwan by 15 November 1935 to cooperate with the China Garrison Army. ^{b.} MINAMI telegraphed the War Ministry the Kwantung Army orders of 16 November 1935 which directed the Air Forces to advance between Shanhaikwan, Suichung and Chinchow by 20 November and to prepare for marching towards the Peiping-Tientsin area. ^{c.} These telegrams confirm MINAMI's cooperation with DOIHARA in setting up "autonomous" regimes in Eastern Hopei and Hopei-Chahar, and give the lie to his statements appearing in the record. ^{d.} When confronted with a document dated 9 December 1935, entitled "Kwantung Army's Propaganda Plan which shall be carried out in parallel with its military activity" • 10

NY-22.

- a. T. 19996
- b. Ex. 3317-A, T. 30391-2
- c. Ex. 3317-A, T. 30394-5
- d. T. 19793, T. 19777-35, 19,995-7

Page NK-21

(NK-27) ^{e.} in North China", he admitted that things described in the document really happened. ^{f.} This document included such material as follows: "We start our propaḡanda to convince the whole world of our lawfulness as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung Army into North China takes place. It must be made clear that when we do dispatch our military force to China sometime in the future, we do it for the purpose of punishing the Chinese military clique, and not the Chinese people at large." ^{g.}

NK-28. In view of the foregoing activities of aggression planned or consummated, MINAMI still maintained that while he was in command of the Kwantung Army he was doing nothing hostile to the Chinese Government. ^{a.}

NK-29. Vis-a-vis the Soviet, there were plans of the Kwantung Army in 1934 and 1935 for a war against U.S.S.R.; ^{a.} and from 1934 to 1936, MINAMI as Commanding General of the Kwantung Army was engaged in the development of Manchuria as a military base for an attack by Japan against the U.S.S.R. ^{b.} It was in this same period that the Kwantung Army furthered the creation of an autonomous movement in North China and an Inner Mongolian autonomous regime, the purpose of which

NK-27.

- g. Ex. 197, T. 19997-9
- f. T. 20006
- g. T. 19998-9

NK-28.

- a. T. 20000

NK-29.

- a. Ex. 703, T. 7515
- b. Ex. 723, T. 7551; Ex. 670, T. 7330, 20037-8

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST MINAMI, JiroI. Charges Against MINAMI

NN-1. MINAMI is charged on all counts of the Indictment, except Counts 19, 20-26, 33, 34-43, 45-56. He is charged as a conspirator in the plan to secure military, naval, political and economic domination for Japan in the regions specified in Counts 1-6; and in Counts 6-11 he is charged with planning and preparing a war of aggression and a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances and in Counts 27-32 and in 34, he is charged with waging a war of aggression and a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances, in Count 44 he is charged with conspiring to procure and permit murder of FC on a wholesale scale and in Counts 53-55, he is charged with conspiracy to order, authorize or permit breaches of law or custom in respect to FC, in China, from and after 18 September 1931.

II. MINAMI's Background

NN-2. MINAMI graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1897 as a 2nd Lieutenant. He served in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5. From 5 March 1927 to the termination of the war in 1945, he held military as well as political positions of great impor-

(PK-2)
 tence. On 5 March 1927 he became Vice Chief of the Army General Staff. 1 August 1929, Commander of the Chosen Army; 7 March 1930, General. 22 December 1930, War Councillor; 14 April 1931, War Minister; from 13 December 1931 to 9 February 1934 he acted first as War Councillor and then Councillor; on 10 December 1934 he was appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army and concurrently was Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Kwantung Governor General, which position he held until 6 March 1935, except that of Kwantung Governor General, which office was abolished in 26 December 1934; on 6 March 1935 he was attached to the Army General Staff Headquarters; on 22 April 1936 he was placed on the reserve list; on 5 August 1936 he was appointed Governor General of Chosen; on 29 May 1942 he was appointed a Privy Councillor; and on 31 March 1945 was appointed a member of the House of Peers.

III-3. In viewing the important assignments and appointments of MIHAMI from 1927 to 1945 it becomes apparent that between those dates, he was in positions of great authority, where policy making was required, and where action had to be taken either to advance or halt acts of military aggression. Such offices as Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, War Councillor, War Minister, Commander of the Kwantung Army and Governor General of Chosen, were offices of crucial impor-

PK-2.

a. Ex. 117, T. 740-2

(NN-3)

tance during the periods MINAMI held such positions. That he took a leading part in, and enhanced the movements of Japanese aggression by his participation in the successive military movements, which culminated in the Pacific War, is amply shown by what will later appear.

III. MINAMI's Activities Prior to the Mukden Incident.

NN-4. MINAMI is first seen in the open, during his tenure as War Minister in the WAKATSUKI Cabinet from April to December 1931. He knew or should have known of the March Incident, and he knew or should have known that the War Office was represented in the Sakura-Kai and that the aims of the Sakura-Kai were to carry out an internal revolution and settle the Manchurian problem. MINAMI was fully apprised of the seriousness of the situation in Manchuria as early as the summer of 1931, because KOISO who had become apprehensive that trouble was brewing, spoke to MINAMI^{b.} and to the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff about it. The upshot of such conversations was the dispatch of General TATEKAWA, a section chief of the General Staff to Manchuria to head off irresponsible action.^{c.} There is a dispute as to who dispatched TATEKAWA to Mukden. TANAKA, Ryukichi, testified that MINAMI ordered TATEKAWA to go,^{d.} whereas KOISO testified that TATEKAWA was sent by the Army General Staff.^{e.} MINAMI testified that TATEKAWA was sent by orders of the General Staff, but that he met with TATEKAWA prior to the trip and talked over the matter with him,^{f.} and he told TATEKAWA that he should see Consul HAYASHI to

NN-4.

- a. T. 1963
- b. T. 32308
- c. T. 32309
- d. T. 2006
- e. T. 32310
- f. T. 19821

(NN-4)
 investigate reports made by him of army movements around
 Lukdon. ^{f.} Regardless who ordered T. TAKAMA to make this
 trip, T. TAKAMA failed to carry out his mission and per-
 mitted the incident to occur, as was admitted by T. TAKAMA
 himself, because he did not desire to stop it. ^{h.} Having
 in mind that MINAMI testified that T. TAKAMA was interested
 in Manchurian problems, ^{i.} and assuming MINAMI knew
 that T. TAKAMA was the person responsible for releasing
 the bombs to G. G. in the March Incident, ^{j.} it would
 seem that the slightest consideration of the matter on
 the part of MINAMI would have caused him to make sure that
 T. TAKAMA, one of the chief conspirators in the March In-
 cident, was not entrusted with such an important and
 delicate mission.

NN-5. MINAMI, prior to this crucial time, was
 fully apprised that a crisis was impending as appears
 from a meeting which took place in July 1931, when he
 summoned the Manchurian Military Attachés to his offi-
 cial residence to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems. ^{a.}
 At that meeting the Army side was represented by MINAMI,
 A. N. Y., Chief of the General Staff, S. G. Y., and I. Y.,
 Vice-Minister, T. C. Y., Vice-Chief of the General Staff,
 M. I. S., Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, G. I., Chief
 of the 3rd Section of the General Staff, and T. T. Y.,
 Chief of the 2nd Section of the General Staff, ^{b.} the
 latter being the conspirator in the March incident, pro-

NN-4.
 g. T. 19827
 h. T. 2005; 250-7
 i. T. 1822
 j. T. 32325

NN-5.
 a. T. 15773
 b. T. 15752

(FN-5)
 viously mentioned. At this meeting, the parties present "exchanged their outspoken opinions regarding the Manchurian-Mongolian problems"^{c.} Later in the same month, MIAMI stated: "The Army has long recognized the necessity of increasing our divisions in Korea and we hope the day will come when more divisions will be dispatched there."^{d.}

NI-6. MIAMI was far from passive in his relation to the Mukden Incident. He knew that the problem was acute, or else the aforesaid meeting would not have taken place, at which the entire top hierarchy of the General Staff, met with him and his top satellite, WISO, along with the officials of the South Manchuria Railway. Although he testified that this meeting was but a social luncheon, there is no doubt that the meeting was for the purpose of exchanging views on the strategy to be used to apply forceful action in Manchuria. That MIAMI was not an apostle of peace, as he seeks to portray himself, prior to the Mukden affair, appears from the report of the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the League of Nations^{e.} where it is said, that the "vigorous speeches by the Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counselling direct action by the Army in Manchuria" were one of the things which set the stage for the events that took place on 18 September and thereafter.

NI-5.

- c. T. 15753
- d. T. 15753

FN-6.

- a. Ex. 57, p. 66-7; Ex. 186, T. 2209-10;
 Ex. 2207, T. 15,783.

NN-7. HIMMI also knew of, or should have been familiar with, studies being made in the War Ministry prior to the Manchurian incident, concerning the course of Manchuria; ^{a.} and he knew or should have known that a group in the Army led by Lt. Colonel H. SHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI had become so powerful between July and October 1931, that the Army could not check such persons and difficulty was even had in drafting a budget; ^{b.} and that this group, including General F. TAMURA were strongly of the opinion that unless Manchuria were seized by Japan, it would be impossible for Japan to become one of the powers of the world as a highly developed national defense state. ^{c.}

NN-8. SHIDEHARA testified that prior to the Mukden incident, he notified HIMMI that he had received a cable from the Japanese Consul General in Mukden that within a week a big incident would break out. SHIDEHARA protested strongly to HIMMI in connection with the report ^{a.} and he also saw HIMMI personally to advise him that several civilian residents in Manchuria had come to him at the Foreign Office and told him that "something extraordinary was going on . . . some war-like preparation might be going on". ^{b.} SHIDEHARA said he told HIMMI that this was very serious, and HIMMI agreed with SHIDEHARA that he would do "his level best to maintain discipline among these officers" ^{c.} HIMMI's testimony is

NN-7.
 a. Ex. 3375, T. 32300
 b. Ex. 179, T. 1934
 c. T. 2003

NN-8.
 a. T. 2006
 b. Ex. 33589-90
 c. T. 33592

Page NN-7

(NN-8)
to the effect that SHIMIZU only casually mentioned the matter at a Cabinet meeting and KIMURA told SHIMIZU-H.R. he would have the matter investigated, other wise he couldn't believe it. It was at this point that the officers responsible for the situation should have been dealt with appropriately, if KIMURA really desired to stop an incident.^e

NN-9. The record, however, does not show that KIMURA, the "doubting Thomas" did a single thing to stave off the event, which was so notoriously bruted about that the Foreign Office, the General Staff and the War Minister in Tokyo knew approximately when it was to take place, and that was to happen.

NN-10. The sum and substance of the matter is that the SHIMIZU-H.R. policy of conciliation was thrown overboard and a new political force emanating from the army came into play, aided and abetted by KIMURA, as was found by the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations, and the Mukden incident, the overt act of the conspiracy, was permitted to occur.

IV. KIMURA's acts after Mukden

NN-11. Immediately upon receiving notice that military action had taken place in Mukden on 18 September 1931, KIMURA became very active. He called General SUGIYAMA, KAIHO and KUSHIBUCHI to his official residence

NN-8.
d. T. 19821
e. Ex. 3479, T. 33,639.

NN-10.
a. Ex. 57, T. 66-7

Page 11-8

(NN-11) a.
 "to consider steps to meet the situation". Liaison
 was made with the General Staff and a policy of non-
 expansion was agreed upon. This policy was approved by
 the Cabinet and the Emperor. b.
 HOJO, the Commanding
 General of the Kwantung Army, was notified of the deci-
 sion. c.
 MIKAMI claims that from that time on the mili-
 tary operations of the army on the spot came under the
 jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army General Staff as
 an exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command." d.
 Further decisions made were: (a) approving the movement
 of a Brigade of the Korean Army which movement had al-
 ready taken place at the discretion of the Commander
 thereof who had been "moved with incontestable sympathy
 over the fervent requests of the Kwantung Army"; (b)
 ratification of the action of the Kwantung Army as a
 "temporary measure", f. (c) and a decision that no
 military administration was to be established. g.

11-12. Despite MIKAMI's attempt to whitewash him-
 self and place all responsibility on the Supreme Command
 for further activities of the Kwantung Army, he admitted
 on cross-examination that he, MIKAMI, agreed to put the
 "Cabinet policy into effect with the Army at once." e.

This shows that MIKAMI, as War Minister, had more than
 a theoretical duty or interest. It shows he had a duty
 to perform, and how he failed to perform it is an elo-
 quent answer to his protestations of lack of authority

11-11.

- a. T. 19780
- b. T. 19781-2
- c. T. 19782
- d. T. 19782
- e. T. 19782
- f. T. 19783
- g. T. 19783

11-12.

- e. T. 19830-1

(NN-12)
 He admitted that he had conferences day after day with Premier WAKATSUKI as day after day the incident expanded. WAKATSUKI said that MIYAMA would show by a line, a boundary beyond which the Army would not go, and almost daily this boundary line was ignored and further expansion was reported "but always with assurances that this was the final move." ^{b.}

NN-12A. On 19 September 1931, the Premier WAKATSUKI complained to HARADA that he received no report regarding the Manchurian Incident from either the Foreign Minister or the War Minister, and when he made inquiry from the War Minister as to what they intended doing, if something should happen in Manchuria with the small Japanese forces there, the reply was, "We will send out troops from Korea. Probably troops have already been sent out from Korea." ^{a.}

On 22 September 1931, HARADA recorded that MIYAMA made a proposal to send the Korean Army to Manchuria, but that the Cabinet did not approve the proposal at this meeting because the matter might be taken up by the League of Nations and the Premier rebuked the War Minister for sending out troops as far as Kirin and Changchun. Later on MIYAMA again brought up the matter of dispatching the Korean Army in the Cabinet meeting of September 22nd. He told the Premier, "The Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army decided that the situation was urgent and

NN-12.

b. T. 19831

NN-12A.

a. Ex. 3757-B, T. 37,577-2

0 159 00 15 1971

Page 109a

(NN-12A)
already has dispatched one brigade". MIYAMI
was very anxious to have the dispatching of the
Korean Army approved in the Cabinet meeting. In
the Cabinet meeting of September 23rd it was de-
cided that the Government should defray the expenses
without raising any objection.^{b.}

Under date of 30 September 1931 the Premier
WAKATSUKI reported to MATSUDA that at the Cabinet
meeting MIYAMI repeatedly stressed, "I want to
dispatch troops to Chientao." When the Premier
said, "No", MIYAMI retorted, "In case the lives
and properties of Japanese residents are endangered,
will Your Excellency take the responsibility?"^{c.}

At the Cabinet meeting of 1 October 1931,
Foreign Minister SWIDENHARA stated that the keeping
of troops in Kirin and Tungki is far from good,
but MIYAMI stated, "If we withdraw troops now,
the situation will be very difficult for us and
we will not be able to maintain control of the
situation in Mukden and Kirin. Properly speaking,
I believe it better for Japan to withdraw from
the League of Nations."^{d.}

On 22 October 1931, WAKATSUKI complained,
"At today's Cabinet meeting War Minister MIYAMI
said an exceedingly outrageous thing in regard
to the League of Nations. He said, 'There is no

NN-12A.

- b. Ex. 3758A, T. 37589-91
- c. Ex. 3759A, T. 37586-7
- d. Ex. 3760A, T. 37589-90

0 159 00 15 1972

Page NN-CB

(NN-12A)
need for paying deference to the League of Nations;
there should be no objection to seceding from the
League. Should Japan be determined to wage war a-
gainst the whole world, this (T.N. secession from
the League) can be readily done***** I am really
troubled because he is such an irresponsible person."^{e.}

NN-12. MINAMI admitted that although HONJO
had blanket authority to do what he liked "within
the scope of his official authority"^a MINAMI could
have stopped him.^b He failed to stop him, he said,
because "a situation was created wherein there could
be nothing else but expansion or extension of the
hostilities",^c due to the large number of the enemy
and frequent surprise attacks made on the Japanese.^{d.}

NN-14. MINAMI was fully advised as to the
expansion of the incident, and the failure of HONJO
to obey the Cabinet decision, as MINAMI was sent
copies of various telegrams received by SHIDEHARA
from Consuls and Consul-Generals during the progress
of the incident from 21 September 1931 and 7 November
1931^{a.} and it would have been legally possible
for MINAMI to have either refused to supply the
necessary money out of the budget for carrying on
such reverents, or to recall the officers who failed
to carry out his instructions.^{b.}

NN-12A.

e. Ex. 3761A, T. 37591-2

NN-13

a. T. 19832
b. T. 19833
c. T. 19833
d. T. 19833

NN-14.

a. Ex. 3479, B.C.D.E.F.G.H.I & J, T. 33600-27
b. Ex 3479, T. 33639

MN-15. MINAMI's initial action on the outbreak of the incident, in wiring Honjo that a policy had been adopted to localize the affair to a minimum,^{a.} and that the action of the Kwantung Army was to be a "temporary measure" and not an occupation of Manchuria, and that no military administration was to be established,^{b.} was almost immediately reversed because, as he said, he was placed "in a very awkward position" due to a new situation developing before the government could act.^{c.} This, he claims, occurred when the Kwantung troops withdrew from Harbin; in the battle on the Nonni River; in the occupation of Tsitsihar; and in the so-called reconnaissance flight over Chinchow,^{d.} after he had agreed with Secretary Stimson in November 1931, that there would be no hostile operations toward Chinchow.^{e.} For the Chinchow bombing, MINAMI issued a severe warning to Commander HONJO,^{f.} although he admitted that he could have recalled him, but he "did not recognize the need".^{g.} In fact, MINAMI admitted that he approved the action which HONJO took.^{h.} MINAMI also approved the appointment of BOHARA as Mayor of Mukden, which he thought was an "unavoidable" step in the light of the situation,^{i.} and he also admitted he never took any disciplinary measures to compel the leaders of the Kwantung Army

MN-15

- a. T. 19331
- b. T. 19783
- c. T. 19787
- d. T. 19738
- e. T. 10073-5
- f. T. 19783
- g. T. 19918
- h. T. 19918
- i. T. 19879

0159 0015 1974

(MN-15)
 to carry out the orders they were getting from Tokyo.^{j.}
 On re-direct examination, MINAMI testified that both the General Staff and the War Ministry investigated the Kwantung Army to determine whether the Army was ignoring the policies and intentions of the Central authorities, and whether the "younger officers were treating its commanding general as a robot, or that ITAKAKI, ISHIHARA and other staff officers were taking arbitrary action" and the report was that all these rumors were without foundation.^{k.} It is interesting to note that the General Staff investigation, which resulted in a whitewash, was made by NINOMIYA, a participant in the March incident conspiracy,^{l.} and the investigation by the War Ministry, which resulted in a similar whitewash, was made "with an extremely careful attitude," and after consultations with the Chief of the Army General Staff.^{m.}

MN-16. MINAMI's real views on the Mukden incident are summed up by TANAKA, who in testifying said that MINAMI told him in 1935^{n.} that he had advocated a decisive settlement of the pending issues in Manchuria, from the standpoint of national defense,^{b.} and because of this he had come into "loggerheads with Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, who maintained a passive attitude resulting in friction which extended even into their personal emotions."^{c.}

MN-15

- j. T. 19915
- k. T. 20061-62
- l. T. 1927-8
- m. T. 20061

MN-16

- a. T. 2019
- b. T. 2020
- c. T. 2019

NN-17. From the foregoing it appears that MIKAMI, in conjunction with the General Staff approved aggressive actions by the Kwantung Army in direct conflict with policies of non-expansion prescribed by the Cabinet.

V. Views of MIKAMI on Manchurian Incident

NN-18. MIKAMI believed that the Manchurian Incident was an "unavoidable exercise" of the right of self-defense, ^{a.} and that even after it expanded it was not a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty. ^{b.} He "firmly believed" that HONJO was loyally abiding by the instructions he sent and "was not interfering with the internal political affairs of Manchuria", but was primarily engaged in the maintenance of law and order. ^{c.} He "took precautions" that no military administration was to be set up. ^{d.} And although he knew that under the Portsmouth Treaty Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria was recognized, ^{e.} he believed that Manchukuo was founded in accordance with the will and wishes of the people of Manchuria. ^{f.}

NN-19. These opinions of MIKAMI are in direct conflict with his testimony that the real use Japan intended to make of Manchukuo was as a base for operations against Russia in the event of war between Japan and Russia, ^{a.} and they also conflict

NN-18

- a. T. 19883
- b. T. 19883
- c. T. 19894
- d. T. 19894
- e. T. 20039
- f. T. 20040

NN-19

- a. T. 19807, Ex. 837,
T. 8160

0 159 00 15 1976

Page NN-13

(NN-19)
with his tacit approval of DOIHARA's activities in connection with the establishment of the Peace Preservation Committee in Mukden under leadership of DOIHARA; ^{b.} the Liaoning Autonomous Government organization under the sponsorship of DOIHARA; ^{c.} the abduction of Pu-Yi, through the efforts of DOIHARA; ^{d.} and the establishment of a "temporary expedient system" in Manchukuo which provided for guidance of the various Chinese regimes by a small section in the Kwantung Army with the plan to "inwardly" guide a new regime if such were established by an "advisory body" of the Kwantung Army. ^{e.} MINAMI knew or should have known that plans were thus made for the establishment of a puppet government in Manchukuo by the interference and the guidance of Japanese agencies in violation of the Nine-Power Pact, and that procedures were planned and adopted to effectuate the continued domination of Manchukuo by Japan through secret and evasive means. His testimony that Manchukuo was established in accordance with the will and wishes of the people of Manchukuo ^{f.} and that HONJO was not interfering with the internal political affairs of Manchuria ^{g.} is flatly disproved by the machinations of his agents in the field who were doing the opposite. That MINAMI knew fully what

NN-19

- b. T. 33605-06
- c. T. 33607-8
- d. T. 33618
- e. Ex. 3377, T. 32339-41; 33629-30
- f. T. 20040
- g. T. 19894

(NN-19) was going on appears from SHIDEIARA's testimony^{h.} in which he stated: "I have often told MINAMI of what was then happening there in Manchuria, but my impression was that he practically had no power to control these men." And if he had the power, SHIDEIARA did not think that MINAMI sent out orders to recall the officers who did not obey him.^{i.}

At a Cabinet meeting when the matter was broached SHIDEIARA said MINAMI "looked very much embarrassed."^{j.}

NN-20. The conclusion can be reached that MINAMI was entirely in sympathy with what occurred in Manchuria and that he wanted things to happen as they did, just as TATEKAWA permitted the original incident to occur because he did not want to stop it.^{a.}

VI. MINAMI's Activity after his Regime as War Minister

NN-21. MINAMI testified that after his resignation as War Minister he was "given the obscure post of Supreme War Councillor", in which job he had nothing to do except assemble about twice a year to hear lectures given by the military authorities. He also said he acted as tutor to young Prince KAN-IN by request and therefore paid little attention, if any, to political and military matters.^{a.} On cross-examination, MINAMI admitted

NN-19

h. T. 33631-32
i. T. 33633
j. T. 33633

NN-20

a. T. 2006; 2505-7

NN-21

a. T. 19790

(NN-21)
 that within three weeks after his resignation as War Minister he was sent on an inspection trip to Manchuria under orders of his successor, War Minister ARAKI. ^{b.} While on such trip, he knew that orders issued by him as War Minister to prevent the occupation of Chinchow had been disobeyed ^{c.} and that the Kwantung Army had occupied Chinchow on 3 January 1932. ^{d.} Yet he did not ask HONJO why he was disobeying the orders he had received, ^{e.} although on his return he says he reported to ARAKI that the occupation of Chinchow was contrary to the policies which he had set up during his tenure of office. ^{f.} Upon receiving this information all ARAKI did was to listen. ^{g.} On cross-examination, HINAMI recalled that in addition to listening to lectures as a Supreme War Councillor he, himself, delivered a lecture before the Emperor on 28 January 1932 on the latest situation in Manchuria. ^{h.} Among others present was KIDO. ^{i.} In this lecture HINAMI concluded that Japan should take over the defense of Manchuria-Mongolia and expedite completion of the Kirin-Kwainai Railway, thus making the Sea of Japan into a lake and facilitate Japan's advance into the North Manchuria area; ^{j.} take concrete measures economically by Japanese-Manchuria Joint

NN-21

- b. T. 19922
- c. T. 19922
- d. T. 19921
- e. T. 19922
- f. T. 19923
- g. T. 19923
- h. Ex. 2251, T. 19924-5
- i. T. 19924
- j. T. 19924

(NN-21)
 management as a hedge against economic blockade from abroad; and take measures to solve the population problem by giving emigrants in Manchuria the same protection as they receive in South America, provided a colonial trooping system is established there. k.

NN-22. In view of HINAMI's continued activity for the War Department as a direct representative of War Minister ARAKI, his report to the Emperor of his findings, and his being "tutor" to Prince KAF-IN, he was far from being the inactive person he sought to paint himself. His sudden emergence as Commander of the Kwantung Army in December 1934 illustrates in no uncertain manner his importance in the chain of events centering around Manchuria, in which he was so much concerned initially when the overt act at Mukden took place.

VII. HINAMI as Commanding General of the Kwantung Army

NN-23. From 10 December 1934 to 6 March 1936, HINAMI was Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army.^{a.} He was concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo and as such was in direct communication with the Foreign Office in Tokyo. ^{b.} He testified that his principal problem was the stabilization of Manchuria and maintenance of peace. He also said he gave advice

NN-21

k. T. 19925

NN-23

a. Ex. 117, T. 740-42, T. 19948

b. T. 19955-6

(NN-23)
 to the Manchukuoan Government on various matters such as agriculture, transportation, education,^{c.} and he admitted he exercised "absolute control over the military and diplomatic affairs of Manchukuo."^{d.} He no doubt knew that in the regime of his predecessor an advisor system had been established by General TADA which gave the Kwantung Army complete control of the Manchukuoan Army as well as the Manchukuo Government;^{e.} and not satisfied with this admitted system of control over the internal and external affairs of Manchukuo, MINAMI knew that such control was tightened by a preponderance of Japanese on the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo, although he tried to explain this away by saying that the deciding vote Japan had on the Board was of no value to Japan, since this Japanese, as a Manchurian official,^{f.} received "no treatment as a Japanese official" since he obeyed "the laws of Manchukuo as an official of the Manchukuo Government and represents Manchukuo".^{g.} This conclusion on MINAMI's part seemed to differ from the view of HIROTA, who concluded that such official was "simultaneously a leading instrument dispatched by Japan" and MINAMI believed that this was "a cause of anxiety" for his colleague HIROTA.^{h.} Naturally, this sad state of affairs, this conflict

NN-23

- c. T. 19962
- d. T. 19963
- e. Ex. 3378-A, T. 32357-72
- f. T. 19965
- g. T. 19966
- h. T. 19967

(NN-23)
of fiduciary relationship would be not only embarrassing but absolutely unworkable, if it had not been aimed at providing control by Japan, rather than the "free and equal partnership between Japan and Manchukuo" which MINAMI so naively claimed existed. ^{i.}

NN-24. While MINAMI was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, he also approved a plan for controlling organs directing public opinion in Manchuria. ^{a.} He decided that this was necessary because of the intense competition in the publishing world. ^{b.} The real reason was that there were many newspapers and journals owned by the Chinese, and this was an element in the decision to guide public opinion to secure the "healthy development of Manchukuo" ^{c.} by making them conform to Japan's views, or be eliminated.

NN-25. As for the UMEZU-HO, Yin-chin, DOHARA-Cheng To-Chun, and other agreements which were concluded in 1935, MINAMI claimed that they were consummated in an "exceedingly friendly atmosphere". ^{a.} He did not know, he claimed, that the UMEZU-Ho Agreement resulted from an ultimatum with a fixed date, with the alternative an invasion of China by the Kwantung Army. ^{b.} He claimed he never saw the agreement ^{c.} and he said that although

NN-23

1. T. 19965

NN-24

a. T. 19967
b. T. 19968
c. T. 19967

NN-25

a. T. 19981, 19794
b. T. 19981
c. T. 19983

Page NN-19

(NN-25)
 he had seen newspaper reports of the impending movement of Kwantung Army troops into China,^{d.} he believed such reports were groundless rumors and suppositions and he placed no confidence in them whatsoever.^{e.} He further claimed that there were rumors of demands by the North China Army, which was commanded by UMEZU at one time and by General TADA later, but MINAMI claims he knew nothing of what took place,^{f.} although he did admit that General UMEZU attended a conference at Mukden on 29 May 1935, at which MINAMI and General HAYASHI were also present.^{g.} At this meeting UMEZU, he says, reported only on conditions in the area of his command, namely North China, but not one word was said about the impending UMEZU-Ho Agreement which was consummated in the first week of June 1935. MINAMI claims that at the meeting of 29 May 1935 UMEZU merely gave his "greetings" and returned to Peking, after having reported on "routine business matters".^{h.} MINAMI also said that HAYASHI came to Manchuria on the occasion of this tri-partite conference only in order "to inspect conditions in Manchuria" and he did not mention the subject of troop movements or ultimatums.^{i.} MINAMI said that the rumors that troop movements might take place were "all

NN-25

- d. Ex. 2206-A, T. 15,771-2
 e. T. 19985
 f. T. 19986
 g. T. 19986
 h. T. 19987
 i. T. 19989

(NN-25)
groundless", based on mistaken suppositions, and
unworthy of notice. ^{1.}

NN-26. On the conclusion of the UMEZU-Ho
Agreement only a few days after the meeting
mentioned above, MINAMI received a report of the
same, but he said he did not know about "small
details" such as whether the Chinese agreed to
all the demands, and he said he thought an
ultimatum with a time limit with a threat of
invasion was "too silly". ^{a.} However, MINAMI
heard that in consequence of the agreement the
Chinese evacuated their troops from North China. ^{b.}
All anti-Japanese military forces were withdrawn
on 10 June 1935. ^{c.}

NN-27. MINAMI also denied that he had
knowledge of an ultimatum DOIHARA had given the
Chinese on 18 November 1935 that unless autonomy
of the north was proclaimed, five Japanese
divisions were going into Hopei and six into
Shantung. He admitted that autonomous regimes
for Eastern Hopei and Hopei-Chahar were established,
but these, he said, were set up by the Chinese
themselves. ^{a.} When confronted with a document
dated 9 December 1935, entitled "Kwantung Army's
Propaganda Plan which shall be carried out in
parallel with its military activity in North

NN-25

1. T. 19989

NN-27

a. T. 19996

NN-26

a. T. 19991

b. T. 19991

c. T. 20787

(NN-27)
 China", b. he admitted that things described in the document really happened. c. This document included such material as follows: "We start our propaganda to convince the whole world of our lawfulness as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung Army into North China takes place. It must be made clear that when we do dispatch our military force to China sometime in the future, we do it for the purpose of finishing the Chinese military clique, and not the Chinese people at large." d.

NN-28. In view of the foregoing activities of aggression planned or consummated, HINAMI still maintained that while he was in command of the Kwantung Army he was doing nothing hostile to the Chinese Government. a.

NN-29. Vis-a-vis the Soviet, there were plans of the Kwantung Army in 1934 and 1935 for a war against U.S.S.R; a. and from 1934 to 1936, HINAMI as Commanding General of the Kwantung Army was engaged in the development of Manchuria as a military base for an attack by Japan against the U.S.S.R. b. It was in this same period that the Kwantung Army furthered the creation of an autonomous movement in North China and an Inner Mongolian autonomous regime, the purpose of which

NN-27

- b. Ex. 197, T. 19997-99
- c. T. 20006
- d. T. 19998-9

NN-28

- a. T. 20,000

NN-29

- a. Ex. 703, T. 7515
- b. Ex. 723, T. 7581; Ex. 670, T. 7330, 20037-8

(NN-29)
 was to separate the five northern provinces from the Nanking regime^{c.} and to bring this area into close relationship with Manchuria under Japanese leadership.^{d.} This movement gained great headway from June 1934, after the conclusion of the UMEZU-Ho Agreement.^{e.}

KUWASHIMA, Kazue testified that in November, the Foreign Office received information that the Kwantung Army was concentrating its mechanized troops at Shanhaikwan with a view to intimidating North China. The Foreign Office warned the Army not to take such action.^{f.}

VIII. Activities subsequent to his career in Manchuria

NN-30. MINAMI became Governor General of Korea on 5 August 1936.^{a.} On 23 September 1938, while Governor General, he wrote Foreign Minister UGAKI of the "invincible" Japanese troops, the "Holy War" against China, the necessity for the "recognition of a pro-Japanese regime in North and Central China" and the enhancement of the prestige of Japan, and the imminency of the fall of Hankow.^{b.} MINAMI admitted that he had previously stated that he was against a war with China, but explained that what he meant was that it was always highly unfavorable and a disadvantage to fight a war with a neighboring country.^{c.} As for the China war, he said these hostilities occurred as a result of "unavoidable circumstances".^{d.} Finally, in order to really explain his change of attitude, he said that his views on peace with China were views held by him prior to the outbreak

NN-29

- c. T. 2026
- d. T. 2027
- e. T. 2027
- f. T. 29,488-90

NN-30.

- a. Ex. 117, T. 740-42
- b. Ex. 2437, T. 20012-13; T. 20,010
- c. T. 20014
- d. T. 20014

(NN-30)
of the incident. ^{c.}

NN-31. It was while he was Governor General of Korea, on 14 May 1941, ^{a.} that he received from Hitler the decoration of the Grand Cross of the Eagle, a decoration only 2 or 3 other Japanese had ever received, but he did not know the reason why he had been thus singled out by Hitler for such award. ^{b.}

NN-32. Also while Governor General of Korea, he gave his consent to the internment of 1,000 British and 1,000 American POW in Korea, "as it would be very effective in stamping out the respect and admiration of the Korean people for Britain and America." ^{a.} The arrangement regarding this matter was made while ITAGAKI was Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army, ^{b.} and the matter was fundamentally one to be arranged by the Army. However, the consent of the Governor General, or at least his favorable views, had to be obtained, otherwise the request for authority to intern such POW would not have stated that "the Governor General and the Army are both strongly desirous of it." ^{c.}

NN-33. In May 1942, MINAMI became a member of the Privy Council. ^{a.} He admitted attending a series of meetings in October 1942 concerning the Greater East Asia Ministry. ^{b.} At one of these

NN-30

c. T. 20015

NN-31a. I. 20016
b. T. 20016NN-33a. T. 20021
b. T. 20021NN-32a. Ex. 1273, T. 20018
b. I. 20017
c. T. 20018

(NN-33)
 meetings it was stated that the draft for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry was not based on rules of righteousness, but were based upon "rules of right." ^{c.} MINAMI remembered that such a statement was made and he agreed with it. ^{d.}

NN-34. As for the establishment of a Greater East Asia Ministry, MINAMI claimed that he opposed it, ^{a.} but his only ground of opposition was that there was already a Ministry for Foreign Affairs and this new ministry was but adding "one house on top of another". ^{b.} His opposition seemed to melt later, when he congratulated SHIGEMITSU on becoming Minister of Greater East Asiatic affairs as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs. ^{c.} Also, while a member of the Privy Council, on 18 August 1943 he concurred in the arrangement whereby parts of Malaya were handed over to Thailand; ^{d.} and he also admitted that he concurred in TOJO's views that "international law should be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according to our (Japan's) own opinions." ^{e.} He also became President of the Greater Japan Political Association, ^{f.} whose principal aim was to extend the Co-Prosperty Sphere all over Asia, including India, Burma, the Dutch East Indies and the

NN-33

- c. T. 20022
- d. T. 20023

NN-34

- a. T. 20023
- b. T. 20023-4
- c. T. 20026
- d. T. 20027
- e. T. 20029
- f. T. 20033

(NN-34)
 Philippines. ^{g.} He believed in Asia for the Asiatics, ^{h.}
 but he thought the idea of Japan ruling the world was
 an entirely mistaken notion. ^{i.} Apparently MINAMI
 was satisfied if such rule could be imposed within
 the limits of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia.
 While still a member of the Privy Council, MINAMI
 was appointed President of the Greater Japan Political
 Association in March, 1945. One of the principle aims
 of this association was to extend the Greater East
 Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere over all East Asia, includ-
 ing India, Burma, Dutch East Indies and Philippines. ^{j.}

IX. Connection of MINAMI with Charges in the Indictment

NN-35. Counts 1-5. The evidence of MINAMI's
 activities while War Minister, and his dealings with
 KOISO, TATEKAWA, NIHOYAMA and others who conspired
 to secure domination for Japan, his later approval
 of the China War, and his activities in the Greater
 East Asia movement connect him with these counts
 as a conspirator.

Counts 6-18. The evidence of MINAMI's approval
 of the expanding movements in Manchuria, Mongolia and
 North China connect him with these counts as plan-
 ning and preparing a war of aggression.

Counts 27-32 and 34. The evidence of MINAMI's
 activities while War Minister and as Commander-in-
 Chief of the Kwantung Army while the movements for
 the separation of parts of China were taking place
 connect him with these counts wherein he is charged
 with waging wars of aggression.

NN-34.

- g. T. 20034
- h. T. 20034
- i. T. 20048
- j. 1.20,352-4

159 00 15 1989

Page NN-24

Counts 54-55. As for these counts under which he is charged with conspiracy to order, etc., breaches of law or custom in respect to POW in China, he can be held as a co-conspirator, except in the instance of his action in having British and American POW brought to Korea for illegal purpose, in which case he is directly chargeable for the wrongdoing.

0 159 00 15 1990

February 16, 1948

IPS

Re: MINAMI (NN)

The attached pages NN-2 and NN-22 and A
should be substituted for pages NN-2 and
NN-22.

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Page NM-2

(NM-2)
tance. On 5 March 1927 he became Vice Chief of the Army General Staff; 1 August 1929, Commander of the Chosen Army; 7 March 1930, General; 22 December 1930, War Councillor; 14 April 1931, War Minister; from 13 December 1931 to 9 February 1934 he acted first as War Councillor and then Councillor; on 10 December 1934 he was appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army and concurrently was Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Kwantung Governor General, which position he held until 6 March 1936, except that of Kwantung Governor General, which office was abolished in 26 December 1934; on 6 March 1936 he was attached to the Army General Staff Headquarters; on 22 April 1936 he was placed on the reserve list; on 5 August 1935 he was appointed Governor General of Chosen; on 29 May 1942 he was appointed a Privy Councillor; and on 31 March 1945 he was appointed a member of the House of Peers.^{a.}

NM-3. In viewing the important assignments and appointments of MINAMI from 1927 to 1945 it becomes apparent that between those dates, he was in positions of great authority, where policy making was required, and where action had to be taken either to advance or halt acts of military aggression. Such offices as Vice Chief of the Army General Staff,^{a.} War Councillor, War Minister, Commander of the Kwantung Army and Governor General of Chosen, were offices of crucial impor-

NM-2.

a. Ex. 117, T. 740-2

NM-3.

a. T. 19607, 19944
Ex. 2436, T. 10943

(17N-29)

was to separate the five northern provinces from the
 Nanking regime^{c.} and to bring this area into close re-
 lationship with Manchuria under Japanese leadership.^{d.}

This movement gained great headway from June 1935, after
 the conclusion of the UMEZU-Ho Agreement.^{e.} KAWASHIMA,

Zazuo testified that in November, the Foreign Office re-
 ceived information that the Kwantung Army was concen-
 trating its mechanized troops at Shanhai-kwan with a
 view to intimidating North China. The Foreign Office
 warned the Army not to take such action.^{f.} During
 his stay in Manchuria MIKAMI fostered the activities
 of the Kye-wa Kai society in the matter of preparing
 the population of the country for a war with the U.S.S.R.
 and continued personally to guide the subversive activ-
 ities directed against the Soviet Union in using the
 Kharbin Special Service Organ subordinated to him for
 this purpose. In December 1934 in Kharbin was organized
 the "Bureau for the Russian emigrants affairs" which was
 widely used by the Kharbin Special Service Organ for
 the activities hostile to the Soviet Union.^{g.}

VIII. Activities subsequent to his career in
 Manchuria

17N-30. MIKAMI became Governor General of Korea
 on 5 August 1936.^{h.} On 23 September 1938, while
 Governor General, he wrote Foreign Minister UGAKI of

17N-29.

- c. T. 2026
- d. T. 2027
- e. T. 2027
- f. T. 29, 486-90
- g. Ex. 731, T. 3853

17N-30.

- a. Ex. 117, T. 740-2

(NH-30)

the "invincible" Japanese troops, the "Holy War" against China, the necessity for the "recognition of a pro-Japanese regime in North and Central China" and the enhancement of the prestige of Japan, and the imminency of the fall of Hankow. ^{b.} MINAMI admitted that he had previously stated that he was against a war with China, but explained that what he meant was that it was always highly unfavorable and a disadvantage to fight a war with a neighboring country. ^{c.} As for the China war, he said these hostilities occurred as a result of "unavoidable circumstances". ^{d.} Finally, in order to really explain his change of attitude, he said that his views on peace with China were views held by him prior to the outbreak

NH-30.

- b. Ex. 2437, T. 20012-3; T. 20,010
- c. T. 20014
- d. T. 20014

ス。又訴因第六乃至第十八ニ於テ、侵略戦争並ニ國際法、條約、協定及保證ニ違反セル戦争ヲ計畫シ、準備シタ處テ訴追サレテ居リマス。又訴因第二十七乃至第三十二及第三十四ニ於テ、侵略戦争並ニ國際法、條約、協定及保證ニ違反セル戦争ヲ行ツタ處テ訴追サレテ居リ、訴因第四十四ニ於テ停戦ノ大規模継続ヲ惹起シ、許可スルコトニ加シタ處テ訴追サレ、又訴因第五十三乃至第五十五ニ於テ、一九三一年九月十八

59 00 15 1994

MINAMI SUMMATION

1

1、南ニ對スル訴追

南次郎ニ對スル證據要約

南ハ、訴因第十九、第二十乃至第二十六、第三十三、第三十五乃至第四十三、第四十五乃至第五十二ヲ除キ、起訴狀ノ全訴因ニ對シ、訴追サレテ居リマス。南ハ、訴因第一乃至第五ニ示サレタ地域ニ於テ、日本ノタメニ、陸軍、海軍、政治及經濟ノ方面ニ於ケル支配權ヲ獲得スル計畫ノ共同謀議者ノ一人トシテ訴追サレテ居リマ

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-1

199 00 15 1995

日當日及以除、中國ニ於テ管處ニ關スル法規及
價例違反ヲ命令シ、認可シ、許可スルコトヲ共
同謀議シタ廉テ訴追サレテ居リマス。

三一年十二月十三日カラ一九三四年二月九日マデノ
間、初メハ軍事參議官ヲ、ソノ後議定官ヲ勤メマシ
タ。一九三四年十二月十日關東軍司令官ニ補セラレ、
特命全權大使及關東長官ヲ兼ネ、コノ關東長官ノ地
位ヲ除キ、一九三六年三月六日マテ右ノ職ニ在任シ
マシタ。關東長官ノ職ハ一九三四年十二月二十六
日ニ廢セラレタノデアリマス。一九三六年三月六日
參謀本部附トナリ、一九三六年四月二十二日豫備役
ニ編入セラレマシタ。一九三六年八月五日朝鮮總督

II、南ノ經歷

南ハ一八九五年ニ陸軍少尉トシテ日本陸軍士官學校ヲ卒業シマシタ。

彼ハ一八九四―五年ノ日清戦争ニ從軍シマシタ。一九二七年三月五日カラ一九四五年ノ戦争終結マデノ間、彼ハ軍專上並政治上ノ樞メテ樞要ナ地位ヲ占メ

テ居リマシタ。一九二七年三月五日參謀次長ニナリ、

一九二九年八月一日、朝鮮軍司令官、一九三〇年三月七日、陸軍大將、一九三〇年十二月二十二日、軍

專參議官、一九三一年四月十四日、陸軍大臣、一九

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NN-2

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一九四二年五月二十九日極密顧問官ニ任ゼラレマシ
タ。ソシテ一九四五年三月三十一日貴族院議員ニ任
ゼラレマシタ。 A

註、記録番号ハ英文ノ頁番シテアル

III-2

A 台證一一七、記録七四〇一四二

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MINAMI SUMMATION-IN

NE-3

一九二七年ヨリ一九四五年ニ至ル間ノ南ノ重要ナル任務及地位ヲ觀ルトキハ、彼方右ノ期間、救策樹立カ必要ナリ、且ツ武力侵略行動ヲ推進スルニセヨ阻止スルニセヨ、イツレカノ措置ヲ執ラサルヲ得ナイ、大キク禮限ノアル地位ニ在ツタコトガ明カデアリマス。

參謀次長、算學參謀官、陸軍大臣、關東軍司令官及朝鮮總督ノ如キ官職ハ、南方占メテ居ル期間ニ在ツテハ、彼メテ重要ナ地位デアリマシタ。次々ノ算學行動一コレハ太平洋戦争テ頂點ニ達シマシタ一ニ參照スルコトニヨリ、日本ノ侵略行動ニ一方ノ指導的地位ヲ占メ且ツ進軍行動ヲ推進サセタコトハ、彼ニ越ベル所ニヨリ十分ニ判ル所デアリマス。

III 奉天 / MUKDEN / 事件ニ先立ツ南ノ活動

NN-4 南ハ、一九三一年四月カラ十二月マデ、若槻
 / WAKATSUKI / 内閣ノ陸相在任中ニ初メテ舞台ニ
 姿ヲ現シマシタ。彼ハ三月事件ヲ知ツテ居タシ
 或ハ知ツテ居ルベキデアリマシタ。又櫻會 / 櫻會
 SAKURAI-KAI / ニ陸軍省ヲ代表スル者が居タコト、
 櫻會ノ目的ハ國內革命ノ遂行ト滿洲問題ノ解決
 トニアツタコトヲ知ツテ居タシ、或ハ知ツテ居
 ルベキデアリマシタ。A 南ハ既ニ夙ク一九三
 一年ノ夏頃、滿洲ノ情勢ノ急ナルコトヲ十分報
 ラサレテ居リマシタ。ト云フノハ紛擾ガ將ニ生
 起シツツアルコトヲ憂感シ始メテ居タ小島ガ、
 コノ事ニ就テ南ト參謀次長ニ相談シタカラデア
 リマス。B 此ノ協議ノ結果ガ無責任ナ行動ヲ
 制スルタメニ參謀本部ノ一部長建川 / HIRAKAWA /
 將算ノ滿洲派遣トナツタノデアリマス。C 誰
 ガ建川ヲ奉天 / MUKDEN / ニ派遣シタノカニ就テ
 ハ論議ガアリマス。田中巖吉 / TANAKA, Ryukichi /
 ハ、南ガ建川ニ行クヤツ命ジタノ事ト證言シタ

MINAMI SUMMATION-EDF

NN-4
 C B A
 " " " 記録 一九六三
 " " " 三三三〇八
 " " " 三三三〇九

NN-4

D	記録	ニ〇〇六	H	記録	ニ〇〇六・二五〇五七
E	〃	三二三一〇	I	〃	一九八二二
F	〃	一九八二一	J	〃	三二三二五
G	〃	一九八二七			

念頭ニ置キ、又建川ハ三月事件ノ際大川ニ爆彈ヲ讓渡シタ責任者デアルコトヲJ 南ガ知ツテ居タト想像スルトキハ、若シ南ニシテ多少ナリトモコノ問題ニ考慮ヲ拂ツテキタナラバ、三月事件ノ主ナル共同謀議者ノ一人デアアル建川ニハ斯カル重要且ツ微妙ナ使命ヲ托スベキデナイコトヲ確信スルニ至ツタコトト思ヘテ來ルノデアリマス。

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MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN - 4

ガ、D 一方小使ハ、参謀本部ガ派遣シタノダ

ト證言シマシタ。E 南ハ建川ハ参謀本部ノ命

令テ派遣サレタコト、及ビ自分ハ、出發前建川

ト會ヒ、問題ニ就イテ相談シ、F 且ツ林/HAI-

YASHI/領事ニ會ツテ同領事ガ奉天/MUKDEN /ノ

周邊テノ軍ノ行動ニ就イテシタ報告ヲ調査セヨ

ト命ジタ、G コトトヲ證言シマシタ。誰ガ建

川ヲ派遣シタニモセヨ、建川ハ、自身モ承認シ

タヨウニ、事件ノ發生ヲ阻止シタクナカツタノ

デ、自己ノ使命ヲ遂行セズ、事件ノ發生スルガ

マ、ニセシメタノデアリマス。H 建川ハ満洲

問題ニ興味ヲ有シテ居タ、I トノ南ノ證言ヲ

NN-5

南ハコノ決定同時期ニ迄立ツテ、一九三一年七月ニ行ハレタ管合ニ見テモ判ルヨウニ、重大危機ガ切迫シテ居ルコトヲ十分知ツテ居リマシタ、ソノ會合ノ際彼ハ滿蒙問題對シノタメソノ官邸ニ滿鐵 / THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY / 菅野君ヲ招致シタノデアリマシタ。A 兵ノ會合ノ陸軍側代表者ハ南、金谷 / KAHAYA / 參謀總長、杉山、伊東 / HIO / 次官、二宮 / HIEOMIYA / 參謀次長、小磯陸軍大臣局長、沖 / OKI / 參謀本部第三部長及建川參謀本部第二部長デアリマシタ。B コノ建川ハ先ニ述べタ三月事件ノ共同謀議者デアリマス。コノ會合ハ出席シタ陸軍側滿鐵側双方共「滿蒙諸問題ニツキ眞意ナキ意見ヲ交換シタ」ル、ソノ後同月、南ハ以下ノヤウニ述べマシタ。「朝鮮 / KOREA / ニ増師ノ必要ガアルコトハ陸軍ノ傳統的ニ認メテ來タ所デアル。我々ハ何地ヘ増師ノ日ノ近カラシコトヲ切望シテキル次第デアル」 D

NN-5	A	記	録	一	五	七	五	三
	B	"	"	一	五	七	五	三
	C	"	"	一	五	七	五	三
	D	"	"	一	五	七	五	三

0 159 00 15 2002

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NN-6

南ノ奉天 / PECK DEE / 事件ニ對スル關係ハ相當
 受動的以上ノモノデアツタノデアリマス。彼ハ此問題
 ガ暴迫シテキルコトヲ知ツテキタノデアリマス。
 サモナクハ右會合ハ行ハレナカツタ管デス。其
 ノ會合ノ際、參謀本部ノ全幹部ガ彼ト彼ノ燕下
 ノ筆頭小磯並ニ南滿洲鐵道ノ役員若干ト會見シ
 タノデアリマス。彼ハコノ會合ガ單ナル應交酌
 午餐會デアツタノダト証言シマシタガ、此ノ會
 合ガ滿洲ニ於ケル武力行使ノ基礎タルベキ方略
 ニ就テ意見交換ヲ行フヲ目的トシタモノデアツ
 タコトハ察アリマセン。南ハ奉天事件前彼自身
 ヲ平和ノ從徒カノヤウニ描カウトシタノダガ、
 彼ガソウデナカツタコトハ、國際連盟ニヨツテ
 任命サレタ調査委員會ノ報告カラモ窺ヘルノデ
 アリマス。A 即チ右報告ニハ「滿洲ニ於ケル
 軍ノ直接行動ヲ謀イタ東京テノ日本陸軍大臣ノ
 強硬ナ演説」ガ九月十八日及其以後ニ起ツタ事
 タノ事件ニ對スル舞台ヲ仕舞シタ事ノ一ツデア
 ルト述ベテイルノデアリマス。

P-9

NN-6

A 卷 讀 五 七、 記 録 六 六 一 七

MINAMI

SUMMATION - NN

NN-7

A 卷 證 三三七五

記録 三三〇〇

B 卷 證 一七九

記録 一九二六

C 記録 二〇〇三

高度國防國家トシテ世界列強ノ一ツニナルコ
トハ出來ナイト云フ強硬意見ヲ持ツテ居タコ
トヲ知ツテ居タノデアリマス。或ハ知ツテ居
タ筈デアリマス。C

2003 05 15 00 15 00

NN-7

南ハ亦滿洲事變ニ先ダテ陸軍省内テ滿洲征服

ニ關スル諸種ノ研究ガ進メラレテイタコトヲ

知ツテ居リマシタ。或ハ之レヲ熟知シテ居タ

等デアリマス。A 又彼ハ一九三一年七月乃

至十月ノ間ニ橋本／HASHIMOTO／中佐及

ビ重藤／SHIBEDATH／ノ率イル陸軍部内

ノ一派ガ抬頭シ、其ノ結果是等ノ人物ヲ軍部

ガ制禦シ得ナクナリ、豫算編成スラ支障ヲ見

ルニ至ツタコト、及ビ建川將軍ヲ含ム此

一團ハ日本ガ滿洲ヲ手ニ入レナケレバ日本ハ

- A 記 録 三 〇 〇 〇 系
- B 記 録 三 千 五 百 八 十 九 〇 系
- O 記 録 三 五 九 〇 系
- D 記 録 一 九 八 二 系

幣原 / SHEPHERD へ奉天事件ニ先ダチ、奉天
 駐在日本總領事ヨリ、一週間以内ニ一大事ガ勃
 發スルト敏ジク電報ヲ入手シタコトヲ、南ニ第
 へタト諷言シテオリマス。幣原ハ此報告 A ニ
 關シ南ニ強硬ニ抗議シ、彼ハ亦數名ノ在滯居留
 民ガ外務省ニ彼ヲ訪問シテ「何カ異狀ナコトガ
 始マツテキル」一一一候等準備ガ造メラレテキ
 ルラシイト彼ニ語ツタト云フコトヲ南ニ知ラ
 セルタメ自ラ南ニ面會シタノデアリマス。B
 コレハ頗ル重大デアルト南ニ語シタト幣原ハ
 述ベテオリマス。斯クテ南ハ、「全カヲ擧ゲテ
 之等將校ノ總指揮官ニ務メルト云フコトヲ幣
 原ニ納シタノデアリマス。〇 南ノ諷言ハ次ノ
 通りデアリマス。即チ幣原ハアル論議ノ席上、
 空クサリゲナク此ノ問題ニ普及シタノデアリマ
 シテ南ハ幣原ニ、此件ヲ諷言シヨク、ソウテナ
 イトソレヲ信スルコトガ出来ナイト語ツタ、云
 タ。D 若シ南ガ此事件ヲ阻止スルコトヲ確實
 念願シテイタラ、此時機ニ此事態ニ責任アル將
 校ヲ適當ニ處置スベキデアリマス。

MINAMI

SUMMATION-NN

NN-10

A 書證五七、 記録六六一七

セル新政治力が南ノ教唆ニヨリ活動シ給メ、
ソシテ共同謀議ノ公然ノ行爲デアル奉天事件
ガ惹起スルノガ許サレタ事デアリマス。

0159 0015 2005

P-12

NN-9

然シ乍ラ記録ハ「疑グリ屋」ノ南ガ、此ノ事
件ヲ回避スル爲メノ唯ダーツノ事モ行ツタコ
トヲ示シテ居リマセン。此ノ事件ハ相當評判
サレ、其ノ爲東京ノ外務省、參謀本部及陸
軍省ハ何時其レガ起ルカ又何ガ起ルカラヲ大
体知ツテ居ツタノデアリマシタ。

NN-10

此問題ノ大要ハ、幣原ノ HIDEHARA ノ調
和的政策ガ廢棄サレテ、國際連盟ノ調査委員
會ニヨツテ認めラレタム如ク軍部カラ發生

0159 0015 2006

MINAMI SUMMARY-NN

NN-11

IV、奉天事件後ノ南ノ行爲

一九三一年九月十八日、軍事行動ガ奉天ニ於テ起
ツタ報知ヲ入手スルヤ否ヤ南ハ非常ニ活動シ始メ
マシタ。彼ハ何事態ニ對處スル手段ヲ考慮スルタ
メ杉山ノSUZUKIノ將軍、小磯及柳淵ノKUSUHIBUCHI
ヲ官邸ニ呼ビ寄セマシタ、A 參謀本部ト連絡ヲ
取り不擴大方針ニ意見ガ一致シマシタ。此方針ハ
内閣及ヒ天皇ニヨリ裁可サレマシタ。B 關東軍
司令官本庄ノHONMAノハ此決議ニ就テ通告ヲ受ケタノ
デアリマス。C 南ハ、其ノ時以來現地ノ軍事
行動ハ統帥權ノ變動トシテ參謀總長ノ管轄下ニ入
ツタノデアルD ト主張シテ居リマス。更ニ、
次ノ決定ガ行ハレマシタ。即チ(a) 關東軍ノ熱心
ナ要求ニ對スル止ムニ止マレヌ向情ニ動カサレ
司令官ノ獨斷ニヨツテ行ハレタ朝鮮軍ノ一個
旅團ノ出動ニ關スル認可E (b) 暫定手段トシ
テF 關東軍ノ行動ノ是認及ビ (c) 軍政府ヲ設置
セザルコトノ決定G

P-13

NN-11

A 記録一九七八〇
B 記録一九七八一
C 記録一九七八二
D 記録一九七八三

11

E 記録一九七八三
F 記録一九七八三
G 記録一九七八三

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-12

南が表面ヲ糊塗シテ其後ノ關東軍ノ行動ニ對ス
 ル全責任ヲ統帥部ニ歸セシメント企テタニ手拘
 ラズ、南ハ、反對質問ニ際シ、彼ハ「内閣ノ政
 策ヲ直チニ陸軍ノ實行ニ移スコト」Aニ同意
 シタコトヲ認メマシタ。此レハ南が陸相トシテ
 理論的義務或ハ關心以上ノモノヲ有シテ居タ事
 ヲ示シテ居リマス。

此レハ彼が履行スベキ義務ヲ有シテ居タコトヲ
 示シテ居リマス、ソシテ彼が此ヲ履行シソコナ
 ツタコトハ彼ノ權能ヲ持ツテ居ネカツタトイウ
 異議申立ニ對スル雄辯ナル回答デアリマス。

彼ハ日ヲ送ツテ事件が擴大スルノデ徑日若槻

ノ WAKATSUKI / 首相ト協議ヲ行ツタコトヲ認メ
 マシタ。若槻ハ、南ハ何時モ、線ニヨツテ、軍
 隊ガ今後越エテハナラナイ境界ヲ示シテ居リ
 マシタガ殆ド毎日此ノ境界線ハ無視サレ、更ニ
 擴大ガ報告サレマシタ、然シ「此レハイツモ後
 後ノ行動デアルトイフ保障ガ付イテ居ツタ」ト
 語リマシタ。 B

A 記録一九八三〇一

B 記録一九三八一

MH-13

- A 記録一九八三
- B " "一九八三
- C " "一九八三
- D " "一九八三

MH-14

- A 書證三四七九、B、C、D
- B、F、G、H、I、及J
- 記録三三六〇〇一三七
- B 書證三四七九
- 記録三三六三九

報ノ寫ヲ送達サレテキタノデ、此事變ノ擴大及ビ
 本店ノHONTONノガ内閣ノ決定ニ服從セザルコトヲ能
 ク承知シテイタノデアリマシテ、A 南ガ財力
 行動ノ遂行上必要ナル資金ヲ豫算ヨリ支出スルコ
 トヲ拒絕スルカ又ハ彼ノ訓令ヲ履行シナカツタ
 校等ヲ召還スルコトハ法的ニハ南ニトリ可能デア
 ツタノデアリマス。B

MINAMI SUMMATION - NN

NN-13

南 / MIAMI / ハ亦本庄 / HOUSTON / ガ「彼ノ職務上ノ
極限内」A ニ於テ、意ノ儘ニ行フ絶對權ヲ有シ
テキタケレドモ、彼ノ行動ヲ阻止シヨウトスレバ、
ソウシ得タノダトイフコトヲ認メマシタ。B 南
ハ敵ノ優勢ナルト、瀕發スル日本軍ヘノ奇襲ノタ
メ「坂田ガ擴大乃至延長ノ一途ヲ迫ラザルヲ得ナ
イ情勢ガ生起シタ」C ノデ彼ヲ阻止シナカツタ
ノダト、コウ彼ハ逃ベテオリマス。D

NN-14

南 / MIAMI / ハ彼ガ一九三一年九月二十一日ヨリ
同年十一月七日ニ至ル此事變ノ經過中、菅原 / SETI -

DEHARA / ガ各領事及總領事ヨリ受信シタ程々ノ電

0 159 00 15 2008

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN - 15

ムソン / SHIMSON / 長官ト錦州 / CHINCHOW / ニ對スル
 攻撃作戦ハ行ハヌコトニ同意シタ後ノE 所謂錦
 州上空偵察飛行D 等ニ於テ起ツタノデアリマシ
 タ。錦州 / CHINCHOW / 爆撃ニ對シテ、南 / HEARTH /
 ハ本庄 / HORTON / 司令官ニ嚴重警告ヲ發シマシタ、
 F 但シ彼ハ本庄ヲ召還シ待タニ拘ハラズ「其ノ
 必要ヲ認めナカツタ」トインコトラ肯定シテイル
 ノデアリマス。G

A 記録 一九三三一
 B 記録 一九七八三
 C 記録 一九七八七
 D 記録 一九七八八

E 記録 一〇〇七三一五
 F 記録 一三七八八
 G 記録 一九九一八

6002 51 00 651 0

NN - 15

此ノ事件ヲA 最少限ニ局地化シヨウトスル方針

ガ採擇サレタコト、關東軍ノ行動ハ一一時的措置

ニタルベキテ滿洲ノ占領ニアラザルコト及軍政ハ

布カザルコトB 等ヲ本庄ノヘ打電スル等

此ノ事變ノ勃發ニ際シ南ガトツク初最ノ措置ハ彼

ガ述べタトコロニヨルト政府ガ何等カ措置ヲトリ

待ル前ニ起ツテ來ル新事態ノタメ、彼ガ非常ニ

工台ノ惡イ立場ニ置カレタノデ、殆ンド其直後

逆轉致シマシタ。コレハ彼ガ主張スルトコロテ

ハ、關東軍ガ哈爾濱ノHARBINヨリ撤退シタ際、或

ヒハ嫩江ノNONNI RIVERノ河畔ノ取圍、齊々哈爾濱ノ

TSITSIHARノ占領及彼ガ一九三一年十一月ステイ

H 記録 一九二一八
I 記録 一九二七九
J 記録 一九九一五

K 記録 二〇〇六一六二
L 記録 一九二七一八
M 記録 二〇〇六一

ガ獨斷專行的ナ行動ヲ採ツテイルカドウカトイ
フコトラ明確ニスルタメ關東軍ヲ調査シタガ報告
ハ是等ノ風聞ガ皆根據ノ無イモノデアルトシテキ
ルトイフ證言ライタシマシタ。K 事實ノ糊塗ニ終
ツタ參謀本部ノ調査ガ三月事件陰謀ノ參畫者二宮
ノNINOMIYAニヨツテ行ハレ、L 又同様ノ糊塗ニ
終ハツタ陸軍省ノ調査ガ極メテ慎重ナル態度ヲ
而カモ參謀總長ト協議ノ上テ行ハレタトイフコト
ヲ聞クノハ興味ルコトデアリマス。

一 事實南 / MINAMI / 本庄 / HONJO / ガ採ツタ行爲ヲ承認
 NN シタコトヲ認メテ居リマス且 南 / MINAMI / 亦奉

天 / MUKDEN / 市長トシテ土肥原 / DOIHARA / ノ就任
 ラ承認シコレヲ彼ハ時局ニ鑑ミ「已ムヲ得ザル措
 置」デアルト考ヘタノデアリマス、I 亦彼ハ關
 東軍首腦部ニ對シ彼等ガ東京ヨリ受ケタ命令ノ實行ヲ迫ル
 懲戒的手段ヲ全然トシナカツタコトヲ認メマシタ。

J 直接再訊問ノ際、南 / MINAMI / ハ參謀本部及ビ
 陸軍省ノ兩者ハ關東軍ガ中央當局ノ方針及意圖ヲ
 無視シテキルカドウカ、又「青年將校等ガ其ノ指
 揮官ヲろぼつと」ROBOT / 扱ヒシテキルカドウカ、
 或ハ板垣 / ITAGAKI / 石原 / ISHIHARA / 其他ノ參謀連

0.159 0015 2010

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NH-16

A、	B、	C、
記録	”	”
二〇一九	二〇二〇	二〇一九

トNH-17
上述シタトコロニヨリ南ノHIGHWAYノガ参謀本部
聯繫ノ下ニ、内閣ガ極メタ不續大方針ト正反對
ニ關東軍ノ侵略的行動ヲ承認シタコトガ窺ヘルノ
デアリマス。

1102 5100 6510
0159 0015 2011

南ガ國防ノ觀點カラ滿洲ニ於ケル諸懸案ノ徹底
的解決ヲ主張シタトイフコトB 及コレガタメ南
ガ「消極的態度ヲ採ツテキタ幣原ノHITIDELATAノ外
務大臣ト論争ノ果、双方ノ個人的感情マデ發展シ
タ摩擦ヲ惹起スルニ至ツタ」C トイフコトヲ一
九三五年中南ガ田中ニ語シタA トイフコトヲ田
中ガ證言中ニ述ベテキルノデアリマスガ、奉天
ノMUKDEN / 事變ニ關スル眞ノ見解ハコノ田中ニヨ
ソテ要約サレテキルトコロデアリマス。

HN-18

F	E	D	C	B	A
、	、	、	、	、	、
”	”	”	”	”	記 録
三〇〇四〇	二〇〇三九	一九八九四	一九九四	一九八八三	一九八八三

／PORTSMOUTH TREATY ニヨリ滿洲ニ對スル中國ノ主
 權ガ承認E サレテイルトイフコトヲ知ツテキタ
 ガ滿洲國ハ滿洲人ノ意志ト希望ニ應ヘテ設立サレ
 タモノデアルトイフコトヲ信ジテイタノデアリマ
 スC F

MINAMI SUMMATION-NW

NE-18

V 滿洲事變ニ關スル南ノ見解

南ノ見解ノハ滿洲事變ガ自衛權ノ「不可避的
ナ行使デアリア 又該事變擴大後ト雖モソレガ九
ヶ國條約ノ違反デハナイトイフコトBヲ信ジテ居
リマシク。

彼ハ自分ノ後シタ訓令ヲ本庄ノ「HONJO」ガ忠實ニ守
リ「滿洲ノ内政ニ干渉セズ」主トシテ法ト秩序ノ
維持ニ當ツテイタコトヲ「固ク信シテオリマシタ」C
彼ハ軍政ガ布カルルコトナキ様「警戒シタ」D
トイフノデアリマス。而シテ彼ハポーツマス條約

0159 0015 2012

MINAMI SUMMATION—N

ヲ南ガ承認シタコトモ矛盾スルノデアリマス。
 九ヶ國條約ニ違反シテ、日本側後國ノ干涉、指導
 下ニ滿洲國內ニ傀儡政府ヲ樹立スル目的ヲ以テ、
 斯ノ様ニシテ計畫ガ作成サレタコト、及び内容ナ
 爾振サレ難イ手段ニ依リ日本ニ滿洲國ヲ繼續シテ
 支配スルヲ得シメル措置ガ、立案サレ採擇サレタ
 コト、ヲ南ハ知ツテキタ、或ハ知ツテ居ルベキダ
 ツタノデアリマス。滿洲國ハ滿洲國民衆ノ意志ト
 希望ニ從ツテ樹立サレ、本庄ノ *REPORT* / ハ滿洲
 ノ内政上ノ問題ニハ干渉シテキナカツタ、G ト
 ノ南ノ證言ハ、ソノ方面デ反對ノ事ヲシテキタ南
 ノ部下ノ策謀ニ依リ、明ラカニ偽リデアルコトガ

0159 0015 2013 F102 5100 6510

州國ノ利用トイフノガ日露戦ノ場合、之ヲ露國
 ニ對スル作戦基地トシテ使用スルコトデアツタ、
 トノ南ノ證言 A ト直接ニ矛盾スルシ、又土肥原
 ノ指導下ニ奉天ニ治安維持會ノ設置 B 土肥原ノ
 後援下ニ遼寧 / JIAONING / 自治政府ノ組織 C
 土肥原ノ勢力ニ依ル博愛 / PLUYI / ノ誘引 D 及
 ビ關東軍ノ「顧問府」ニ依リ新政府が設立サレル
 場合之ヲ「内閣的」ニ指導スル計畫ノ下ニ、關東
 軍内ノ一小部局が種々ノ中國自治權ヲ指導スルコ
 トヲ定メタ、「過渡的復法制度」ヲ滿州國內ニ設
 立シタコト E 之等ノコトニ關スル土肥原ノ活動

NN-19

J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A
"	"	"	"	記録	管証	"	"	記録	管証
三三六三三	三三六三三	三三六三三	一九八九四	二〇〇四〇	三三七七七	三三六一八	三三六〇七	三三六〇五	八三七
			一三二		記録三三三九一四一、三三六二九一三〇		一八	記録一九八〇七 八一六〇	

ス、I 或ル 陶器ノ折、コノ 語ガ 持出サレタ 時弊
 原 / SHIDJIARA / ハ、南ハ「大變管惑シタヤウ
 ニ見受ケラレタ、」ト 述ベテキルノデアリマスナ

MINAMI SUMMATION—NN

NN—19

證明サレテキルノデアリマス。如何ナルコトガ行
ハレテキタカヲ南ガ良ク知ツテキタコトハ、弊原

／ SHIDBHARA ノ證言ニ依ツテ明ラカデアリマ

ス。H 弊原／ SHIDBHARA ノハ、其ノ證言中デ、

「私ハ、當時瀋洲デ起ツテキル事ニツイテ屢々南

ニ話ヲシタケレドモ、私ノ受ケタ印象ハ、南ハ事

實上此等ノ連中ヲ抑制スル能刀ヲ有シテキナイ、

ト云フコトデアツタ。」ト述ベテ居リマス。ソシ

テ弊原／ SHIDBHARA ノハ、若シ南ガ統領刀ヲ有

シテキタトシテモ、自分ニ服従シナイ將校ノ召還

命令ヲ發シハシナカツタモノト考ヘタノデアリマ

MINAMI SUMMATION--NN

NN-21 NN-20

ト述ヘテ平ルノデアリマス。A。南ハ、陸相倅
任後三週同経タヌ中ニ、南ノ倭艦有荒木陸相ノ命
ニ依リ南洲視察ニ派遣サレタコトヲ反對訊問ノ際
認メテ平ルノデアリマス。B。南ハコノ視察隊
行中、自分ガ陸相トシテ談シタ、錦州ノCHIHONGHOU
占領禁止ノ命令ガ實行サレナカツタコト、C。

A 記録 一〇〇六・二五〇五・一七

A 記録 一六七九〇

B 記録 一六九二二

C 記録 一六九二二

5102 5100 6510
0.159 0015 2015

NN-20

建川 / HATEKAWA / ガ最初ノ事件ノ阻止ヲ望マナカ
 ツタガ故ニ、其レノ起ルガマ、ニシテオイタト同
 様、南モ滿洲ニ起ツタコトニ全ク共鳴シテ平テ、
 事態ガ生起シタ通りニ起ルコトヲ欲シテ平々ノダ
 ト云フ結論ガ得ラレルノデアリマス。A。

VI

陸相時代後ノ南ノ活動。

NN-21

南ハ、陸相辭任後「軍事參謀官ノ閑職ニ就キ」
 コノ職ニ在ツテハ、軍當局ノ話ヲ聽クタメ年二回
 位參案スル以外、何モスル仕事ハナカツタ、ト證
 言シテ平ルノデアリマス。南ハ、又依頼ニヨリ閑
 院 / KANEHIZO / 若宮ノ御指導役ヲ勤メ、其ノタメ政
 治、軍事ニ殆ンド何等ノ關心ヲ有シテ平ナカツタ

NN-21

マス。且。陪都者ノ中ニハ本戸モ居リマシム。
 I。南ハコノ請償テ其ノ結請トシテ、日本ハ滿
 蒙ノ防備ヲ引受ケ、吉會鐵道ノ完成ヲ促進シ、斯
 クテ日本海ヲ湖氷化シ日本ノ北滿地域ヘノ進出ヲ
 容易ナラシムベキコト、J。經濟上テハ、海外
 ヨリノ經濟對鎖ニ對抗スル厚壁トシテ、日滿共同
 經營ニ依ル具體策ヲ樹立スベキコト、

D 記録 一九九二一

I 記録 一九九二四

E 記録 一九九二二

J 記録 一九九二四

F 記録 一九九二三

G 記録 一九九二三

H 記録 二二五一

・ 記録 一九九二四一五

0 159 00 15 20 15

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

№-21

一九三二年一月三日ニ駐東軍ガ錦州／＼CHINGHOW／＼
ヲ占領ツテキタコトヲ知ツタノデアリマス。D

而モ南ハ、歸國シタトキ、錦州／＼CHINGHOW／＼占

領ハ自分ガ在任中ニ樹立シタ方針ニ反スルモノナ
ルコトヲ荒木ニ報告シタ、ト云ツテ居リナガラ

本庄／＼HONJO／＼ニ對シテ何故ニ受ケタ命令ニ服從

シナイノカヲ尋ネナカツタノデアリマス。E

荒木ハコノ報告ヲ受ケタ時、唯ダ其レヲ徴イテ

平タノミテアリマシタ。G。南ハ軍事參謀官ト

シテ講演ヲ聽イタコトノ他、南自身ガ一九三二年

一月二十八日、滿洲ノ近情ニ就テ御前講演ヲシタ

コトヲ、反對派間ノ際ニ思ヒ出シテ平ルノデアリ

MINAMI SUMMATION-NF .

0159 0015 2017

P24

NN-21

屯田兵制 / COLOMIAL TROOPING SYSTEM / 方南洲ニ
確立サレルノヲ條件トシテ、南洲移民ニ南米ニ於
ケル移民ノ受ケルト同様ノ保護ヲ與ヘルコトニヨ
リ、人口問題解決策ヲ講ズベキコト、K。ヲ述
ベテ平ルノデアリマス。

NN-21

K
記
録

一
九
九
二
五

地ヲ獲サヌノデアリマス。
彼ハ夙クモ奉天ニ於ケル歴然タル行爲ノ發生
當時、此ノ一連ノ事件ニ深く關係シテキタノ
デアリマス。

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-22

南ガ荒木皇相ノ直接ノ代理者トシテ陸軍省ノ
タメ引續キ活動シテキタコト、自己ノ所見ヲ
陛下ニ奏上シタコト、及ビ閣院/KABE-HO /
ノ宮ノ「御指導役」デアツタコトニ鑑ミルナ
ラバ、南ハ自分自身ヲ見セカケヨウトシテキ
ル様ナソシテ非活動家デハ決シテナカツタノ
デアリマス。

一九三四年十二月兩ガ突然陸東軍司令官ニ就
任シタコトハ、滿洲ヲ中心トスル一連ノ事件
ニ於ケル彼ノ重要佐ヨク説明シテ疑問ノ余

0159 0015 2018

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-23

滿洲國軍並ニ滿洲國政府ノ完全統治ヲ關東軍
ニ與ヘタ願向制度ガ多田ノFADAノ大將ニヨツ
テ設定サレタト云フ事ヲ彼ハ疑ヒキナク知ツ
テキタノデアリマス。且 滿洲國ノ内外關係專
務ヲ統治出來ルコノ制度ニ満足セズ、爾ハコ
ノ極ナ統治ハ滿洲國總務廳ニ日本人ヲ多ク入
レル事ニ欲ツテ固メラレルト云フ事ヲ知ツテ
キタノデアリマス。尤モ彼ハコノ事ヲ滿洲國
ノ役人ニナツテキル

- | | | | | |
|---|---------|----------|---|----------|
| A | 書證一七 | 記錄七四〇一四三 | D | 記錄一九九六三 |
| B | 記錄一九九四八 | | E | 書證三三〇八一A |
| C | 記錄一九九六二 | | F | 記錄一九九六五 |

6102 5100 6510

關東軍司令官トシテノ南

一九三四年十二月十日ヨリ一九三六年三月六日マデ、南ハ關東軍司令官デアリマシタ。A

彼ハ兼滿洲國大使デアリ、ソノ資格デ東京ノ外務省ト直接ニ連絡ヲ取ツテ居リマシタ。B

彼ノ主ナル問題ハ滿洲ノ安定ト平和維持ニアツタト彼ハ諛言致シマシタ。彼ハ又農業、輸送、教育等種々ノ問題ニ關シ滿洲國政府ニ助言ヲ與ヘタト言ヒ。又「滿洲國ノ軍事、外交上ノ要柄ヲ絶体的ニ統治」シテ居タト申立テ、居リマス。D

彼ノ前任者ノ統治時代ニ

ノ理由」デアツタト信ジテ居リマス。且勿
 論、コノ悲シムベキ事態、コノ信任關係ノ矛
 盾ハ、南方實在セリト淡白ヘナイーヴニ主
 張スル「日滿兩國ノ自由ニシテ平等ノ提議」
 ヨリモムシロ日本ヲシテ統治セシムルコトヲ
 目的トシタモノデナカツタナラバ、紛糾サセ
 ルバカリデナク、絶對的ニ實行不可能ノモノ
 デアツタノデアリマス。I

G 記録一 九六六六

H 記録一 九六六七

I 記録一 九六六五

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MINAMI SAMITION-NN

NN-23

コノ日本人ハ「滿洲國政府ノ役人トシテ滿洲
國ノ法律ニ從ヒ、滿洲國ヲ代表シテイル」ガ
ノデアツテ「日本ノ役人トシテノ待遇」ハ何
等受ケテイナイノデアルカラ、總務廳ニ日本
ガ持ツテイル決定權ハ日本ニトリ何等價値ハ
ナイト言ツテ言ヒ送レヨウトシマシタ。コノ
南ノ結語ハ、廣田ノ意見トハ異ツテキル様ニ
見エマス。廣田ハ、ソノ様ナ役人ハ「同時ニ日
本ヨリ派遣サレタ指導機關」デアルト申立テ
テ居リ、南ハ彼ノ同様廣田ノタメ之ヲ「不安

MIHAMI SUMMATION - NN

NN-24

A	記録	一九九六七
B	"	一九九六八
C	"	一九九六七

其他ノ諸協定ニ關シテハ、兩ハ、此等ハ「非常ニ友交的雰囲気」裡ニ完了サレタト主張シマシタ。A 彼ハ梅津・何應欽協定ガ期限付及關東軍ニヨル中國侵略ノ留保條件付最後通牒ニヨツテ成立シタコトハ知ラナカツタト主張シマシタ。B 彼ハ此協定ヲ見タコトガナイト確言シマシタ。C 彼關東軍ノ軍隊ガ中國内ニ將ニ移動セントシテイル

NN-25

A	記録	一九九八一 一九九七九四
B	"	一九九八一
C	"	一九九八三

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南ガ爾東軍司令官デアツタ時、彼ハ又、滿洲ニ於ケル輿論指導機關ノ統制計畫ヲ承認シマシタ。

A 彼ハ、出版界ニ熾烈ナル競争ガアル爲メニ此レハ必要デアルト決定シマシタ。B 眞實ノ理由ハ、中國人所存ノ多數ノ新聞雜誌ガアツテ彼等ヲ日本ノ意見ニ一致セシメ左モナイモノハ追放シテ「滿洲ノ健全ナル發展」C ヲ達成スルヨウニ輿論ヲ指導スルコトガ此決定ノ一要素デアリマシタ。

一九三五年ニ締結サレタ梅津・何應欽／HO YIN-

CHIN／及ヒ土肥原・秦德純／CHENG TE-CHUN／並ニ

即チ北支ノ狀況ノミヲ報告シタガ、一九三五年六月ノ第一週ニ成立シタ梅津・何應欽／＼UMENZU-HO／協定ガ差迫ツテイタノニソレニ就テハ一言モ話サナカツタト爾ハ言ヒマス。一九三五年五月二十九日ノ會議ニ於テ、梅津ハ「挨拶ノ辭」ヲ述べ、「日常ノ事務事項」ヲ報告シタ後、北京／PEKING／ニ歸還シタト爾ハ確言シマシタ。G 更ニ爾ハ、林／HAYASHI／ガコ、三頭會談ノ際ニ「滿洲ノ狀況視察」ノ爲メニ滿洲ニ來タガ軍隊ノ移動或ハ最後通

NN-25

F	E	D
〃	〃	記錄
一九九八六	一九九八六	一九九八五

G 記錄 一九九八七

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MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-25

トイフ新聞報道ヲ見タケレドモ、斯ノ如キ報道ハ
根據ナキ風説及ビ憶測デアルト思ヒ何等ノ信用モ
置カナカツタト語ツタノデアリマス。D 彼ハ更
ニ、一度ハ梅津、其後ハ多田／＼ハ／＼／將軍ガ
司令官デアツタ北支軍ガ要求ヲ提出シタトイフ風
説ガアツタコトヲ主張シマシタガ、ドンナコトガ
起ツタカハ全然知ラナカツタト主張シマシタ。尤
モ南ハ、一九三五年五月二十九日梅津將軍ガ奉天
／＼MUKDENニ於ケル打合せ會議ニ出席シ、南及ビ林
／＼HAYASHI／將軍モ亦之ニ列席シタ事ハハ認メマ
シタ。此會議ニ於テ梅津ハ彼ノ指揮下ニアル地域

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

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P-30

NN-25

藤ノ問題ニハ言及シナカツタト語りマシタ。H 爾
 ハ、軍隊ノ移動ガ行ハレルカモ知レナイト云フ風
 説ハ誤レル憶測ヲ基礎トシタ「全ク事實無根」ノ
 モノデアツテ一顧ノ値モナキモノデアツタト語り
 マシタ。I

NN-25

H 記録 一九九八九

I 一 一九九八九

NN-26

C	B	A
、	、	、
記録	記録	記録
ニ	一	一
〇	九	九
七	九	一
八	一	
七		

NN-27

北方ニ自治ガ宣セラレナケレバ日本ノ五個師
 國ガ河北ノHOPEHノニ、六個師團ガ山東ノ
 SHANFUNGノニ向フトノ一九三五年十一月
 十八日ニ土肥原ガ中國側ニ與ヘタ最後通牒ヲ
 南ガ知ツテキタト云フ事モ彼ハ否定致シマシ
 タ。冀東ノWASSERFERNHOPEHノ及冀察ノ田
 OPEI OHAHARノニ自治政權ガ設ケラレタ事ハ

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-26

前記ノ會合ノ數日後、梅津。何ノD M E N D H
○ノ協定ノ締結ニ關シ、南ハ其ノ報告ヲ受ケマ
シタガ、彼ハ中國側ガ全部ノ要求ニ同意シタ
カドウカノ如キ「小事」ニツイテハ知ラナカ
ツタト言ヒ、又侵略スルト懸シナガラ期限付
最後通牒ヲ發シタノハ「余リニ慰」ナ事ダト
思ツタト言ヒマシタ。A 然シ南ハ、協定ノ
結果、中國側ガ北支カラソノ軍隊ヲ引上ゲタ
コトハ聞イタノデス。B 排日軍ノ全部ハ一
九三五年六月十日ニ撤退致シマシタ。C

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MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-27

A、記録 一九九六
B、卷證 一九五
C、記録、ニQ〇〇六
D、記録 一九九八―九

記録 一九九七―九九

的ナルコトヲ全世界ニ納得セシムル爲メ我々
ハ宣傳ヲ開始スル。―――將來何レノ時
カ、中國ニ我軍ヲ派遣スルヤウナ場合ニハ、
我々ハソレガ中國軍閥絶滅ノ爲ニ行フノデア
ツテ、中國人一般ニ對スルモノデハナイト云
ウ事ヲ明カニシナケレバナラナイ。―――D

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ハ彼ハ認メマシタカ、之等ハ中國側自身ヲ設
立シタノデアルト彼ハ言ヒマシタ。 A 「
北支ニ於ケル關東軍ノ軍事行動ト平行シテ實
施セラルヘキ關東軍宣傳計畫」ト題スル一九
三五年十二月九日附文書ヲ面前ニツキケラレ
タ時。 B 彼ハ文書ニ述ベラレタ事ハ實際ニ
起ツタ事ダト容認致シマシタ。 C コノ文書
ハ次ノ如キ意味ヲ包含シテ居リマシタ。即チ
「關東軍ガ北支内ニ前進スルヤ否ヤ、我合法

代デアリマシタ。コノ目的ハ北方ノ五省ヲ南京
 政權カラ分離セシメ。又コノ地方ヲ日本ノ指
 導權下ノ附加ト緊密ナル關係ニ置ンガ爲デアツ
 タノデアリマス。D コノ運動ハ梅津一何
 / UMEZU-HEC / 協定締結後一九三五年六月ヨリ非
 常ナル前進ヲナシタノデアリマス。E

▲記録ニQ0000

▲書證セ〇三、記録セ五二五

C 記録ニ〇二六

B 書證セ二三、記録セ五八一

D 記録ニ〇二七

書證セ〇、記録セ三三〇、二〇三七八

E 記録ニ〇二七

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-29

NN-28

計登セラレ又ハ成就セル前述ノ侵略行動ニツイ
テ、南ハ、彼ガ關東軍司令官在任中、中國政府
ニ何モ敵對ヲ爲サナカツタト今尙主張シテ居リ
マス。A

ソヴイエットニ對シテハ、關東軍ハ一九三四年
ト一九三五年ニ對ソ聯戰爭計登ヲ樹テテ居リマ
ス。A 又一九三四年カラ一九三六年マデ南ハ

關東軍司令官トシテ日本ガ、ソ聯攻撃ノ折、軍
ノ基地トシテ滿洲ノ開發ニ從事シタノデアリマ
ス。B 關東軍方更ニ北支ニ自治運動ヲ起サセ
又内蒙自治区権創立ニ邁進シタノモ、コノ時

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MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-30

明致シマシタ。C 中國戰ハ、一避ケル事ノ出
來ナカツタ事情一ノ結果トシテ戦争ガ起キタノ
ダト彼ハ言ヒマシタ。D 最後ニ彼ノ態度ノ變
化ヲ眞ニ説明スル爲ニ彼ハ中國トノ平和ニ歸ス
ル彼ノ意見ハ等變物變以前ノ彼ノ意見デアツタ
ト申シマシタ。E

A 書證一一七 記録七五C一四ニ

B 書録三四三七 記録二〇〇一一一三

C 記録二〇〇一四

D 記録二〇〇一四

E 記録二〇〇一五

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滿洲ニ於ケル彼ノ經歷後ニ於ケル行動

南ハ一九三六年八月五日ニ朝鮮總督ニナリマシ

タ。A 一九三八年九月二十三日・彼ガ總督デ

アツタ時、彼ハ「無敵」日本軍・中國ニ對スル

「望戰」、北支及中支ニ於ケル親日政權ノ承

認」及ビ日本ノ威信ノ増大及ビ漢口／*HANKOW*ノ

陥落焦眉ノ急ニ關シ宇垣外務大臣ニ書面ヲ寄セ

マシタ。B 南ハ彼ガ中國トノ戰爭ニ反對デア

ツタト、以前ニ述べタ事ヲ容認シマシタガ彼ノ

考ヘテキタノハ隣國ト戰フコトハ常ニ非常ニ不

都合デアリ不利益デアルト云フ視リダツタト説

及讚美ヲ斷歴スルニ、眞ニ效果のテアルト思ツタカラデアリマス。A コノ事件ニ關スル準備ハ板垣ガ朝鮮軍司令官デアツタ時ニナサレ、B ソノ事ハ根本的ニ陸軍ニヨツテ準備サレル事ニナツテ居マシタ。然シ總督ノ承諾、或ハ少クトモ彼ノ贊成意見ヲ得ネバナラナカツタノデアリマス。然ラザレバソノ豫ナ停止ヲ抑留スル權限ヲ得ル爲ニ提出サレタ要求ノ中ニ「總督及ビ陸軍、兩者ガコノ事ヲ極ク希望ス」トハ述ベル事ガ出來ナカツタノデアリマス。C

HH-31

A、記録
B、記録

ニ〇〇一六
ニ〇〇一六

HH-32

A、卷證
B、記録
C、記録

一九七三
ニ〇〇一七
ニ〇〇一八
記録ニ〇〇一八

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MINAMI SUMMATION-NN
NN-31

NN-32

彼ガヒットラーノP.H.H.E.R.ノカラ爲印大十字勳章ヲ
貸ツタノハ、一九四一年五月十四日デA 彼ガ朝鮮
總督ノ時デアリマシタ。コレハ日本人デハ他ニ三人
シカ受ケタ事ノナイ勳章デアリマス。然シコノ様ナ
授與ノ爲メニ何故彼ガヒットラーニ選拔サレタカ彼
ハソノ理由ヲ知ラナカツタデアリマス。B

又彼ガ朝鮮總督デアツタ時、朝鮮ニ、千人ノ英國
俘虜、千人ノ米國俘虜ヲ抑留スルコトニ關シ承諾ヲ
與ヘマシタ。ソレハ「英米人ニ對スル朝鮮人ノ尊敬

MINAMI SUMMATION-NN

NN-33

D	C	B	A
、	、	、	、
記	記	記	記
録	録	録	録
二	二	二	二
〇	〇	〇	〇
〇	〇	〇	〇
二	二	二	二
三	二	一	一

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6202 51 00 651 0

南ハ一九四二年三月ニ樞密顧問官ニナリマシタA
彼ハ一九四二年十月閉催ノ大東亞省ニ關スル遠東會
議ニ出席シテ居タ事ヲ認メテ居リマス。B コノア
ルーツノ會議ニ於テ、大東亞省設立案ハ正義ノ法則
ニ基ヅイテイルモノデナイ、一力ノ法則ニ基ヅイ
テキルモノデアツタト云フ事ガ言ハレルノデアリマ
ス。C 南ハソノ議ナ話ガ出タガ彼ガソレニ同意シ
タトイウ事ヲ記憶致シテ居リマス。D

九、南 / HENAKI / ト起訴狀中ノ起訴事項トノ關係
 訴因一五、南 / HENAKI / ガ陸軍大臣在任中ノ活動
 ノ證據、日本ノ支配權獲得ヲ共同謀議シタ小磯、
 KOHSC / 、建川 / TATEKATA / 、二宮 / HINOMIYA / 其他ト
 ノ關係、對支戰爭ヲ後ニ到ツテ認メタコト及ビ大
 東亞運動ニ關スル活動ハ共同謀議者トシテ本訴因
 ト關係アルコトヲ示シテ居リマス。

訴因六一八、南 / HENAKI / ガ滿洲、蒙古、北支ニ
 於ル發展運動ヲ承認シタトイン證據ハ、彼ガ侵略
 戰爭ノ計畫並ニ準備ヲナシタモノトシテ本訴因ト
 關係アルコトヲ示シテ居リマス。

訴因二七、三二及ビ三四、中國ノ若干部分ノ分派
 運動ガ行ハレアイタ頃南ガ陸軍大臣トシテ又關東
 軍司令官トシテ行ツタ活動ノ證據ハ彼ガ侵略戰爭
 遂行ノ責任ヲ問ハレイル本訴因ト關係アルコト
 ヲ示シテ居リマス。

訴因四四、殺人ヲ齎ラシ且許容スル共同謀議ニ就
 イテ彼ノ責任ヲ問フテイル本訴因ハ、彼ガ共同謀
 議者トシテ責任ガアルトイン根據ニヨツテ、彼
 ニ對シ正當ト認メ得ルノゾアリマス。

P. 39

NN35

訴因五三一五五、彼方在中國俘虜ニ關シ法律又ハ慣習ノ違反ヲ命ズル等ノ共同謀議ノ責ヲ問ハレテイル本訴因ニ關シ、彼ハ不法ヲ目的ノ爲ニ英、米俘虜ヲ朝鮮ニ移シタ事例、本件ニ於テ彼ハソノ不法行為ニ對シ直接的ニ責任ガアリマスガソレヲ除イテ彼ハ共同謀議者ト考ヘ得ルノデアリマス。

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NN-12A

モ、
臣ニ、
ボシテ
フニハ、
外務大臣カラ
モ、
臣ニ、
ボシテ
フニハ、
外務大臣カラ
モ、
臣ニ、
ボシテ
フニハ、
外務大臣カラ

一九三一年九月十九日、
外務大臣ハ原田ニ

NN-12
節ノ末尾ニ次ノ
ZENTEN
節ヲ挿入シヨ

NN-8
節ニ次ノ註ヲ加フ

NN-8
。 書註ニ四七九
記録ニ三六三九

NN-6
節ニ次ノ註ヲ加フ

NN-6
a
書註ニ一〇八七六
記録ニ一五二七〇八三
一〇

MINAMI SUMMATION

NN ERRTA

NN-5

NN-5節ノ例註ヲ追加セヨ
○ 書證ニニ〇セ

記一五七八四一五

々
○

アル
州ヲ守レ
(○)ソノ
誤抄デ
教々ノ
生命維
テ

NN-5

節ノ終リニ次ノ如ク挿入セヨ

一九三一年八月四日

爾 (NN) 正誤考

0.159 0015 2023

MINAMI SUMMATLON

NN. ERRTA

マシタ時、南ハ「日本人唐魯民ノ生命財産ガ危儀
ニサラサレル場合、閣下ハ責任ヲオトリニナリマ
スカト言ヒ返シタ。(e)ト報告シテ居リマス。
一九三一年十月一日ノ閣議ニ於テ常原外務大臣
ハ音赤 / KIRIN / 及南家 / FUNGLIA / ニ尋問ヲ
臨南サセルコトハ以シテ良イコトデアハナイト述ベ
マシタガ、南ハ「若シモ今軍隊ヲ引上ゲタラ、我
々ニトツテ寧ろハ俄ル凶暴ニナリ、奉天 / MUKDEN /
及音赤 / KIRIN / ノ状態統治ヲ維持スルノ方出来
ナクナルト懸ウ。本會リ云ヘバ日本ノタメ國際聯盟
ヲ脱退シタ方がヨイト私ハ信スルト言ヒマシタ。(d)
一九三一年十月二十二日若松總長シテ田ク「今日
ノ山田デ、南國軍大臣ハ國際聯盟ニ臨シ甚多不埒
ナコトヲ言ツタ。彼ハ「國際聯盟ニ敬意ヲ表スル
必要ハナイ。聯盟脱退ニ乘機ナドアル管ガナイ。
日本ハ全世界ヲ袖手ニ戦争ヲスル氣テラ、コノ事
(譯者註、聯盟脱退ハワクノナイコトデアアル。
ト言ツタ。彼ハソノ様ナ無責任ナ人ニテカラ自分
ハ本會ニ函ルト言ヒマシタ。(e)

NN-12A

- e. 音赤 三六三九 A 記 三六三八六一七
- b. " 三六三〇 A " 三六三八六一九〇
- e. " 三六六一 A " 三六三六一一三

MINAMI SUMMATION
NN ERRTA

起ツタラドウスル積リカト質ネタラ「朝鮮カラ
軍隊ヲ送リマスヨ。多分モウ朝鮮カラ軍隊ガ行
ツテシマツタデシヨウ。」ト云ウ返事デアツタ。
ト語リマシタ。(a)

一九三一年九月二十二日、原田ハ、南ガ朝鮮
軍ヲ滿洲ニ派遣スル提案ヲナシタガ、其ノ事件
ハ國際連盟ニ取り上げラレル可能性ガアルノデ
内閣ハコノ閣議ニ於テソノ提案ヲ承認セズ、又
首相ハ陸軍大臣ニ吉林/KHARIN/及長春/CHANG
CHUN/マデ軍隊ヲ送ルコトモ拒絶シタト記録シテ居リ
マス。後刻南ハ九月二十二日ノ閣議ニ、朝鮮軍
ヲ派遣スル件ヲ再度提案致シマシタ。彼ハ首相
ニ「朝鮮軍司令官ハ事態ハ急迫シテ居ルト定メ、
既ニ一旅團送ツテシマツテイル」ト語シマシタ。
南ハ閣議ニ朝鮮軍派遣ヲ承認サセルタメ一生感
命デアリマシタ。九月二十三日ノ閣議デ政府ハ
兵費(ナクソノ費用ヲ支出スルコトヲ決定致シマ
シタ。(c)

一九三一年九月三十日ノ日附テ若槻總理大臣
ハ原田ニ、閣議デ南ガ「自分ハ青島/CHIENTSAO/
ニ軍隊ヲ派遣シ度イト思フ」ト何遍モ何遍モ力
説シマシタガ、總理大臣ガ「イケナイ」ト云ヒ

F-2
NN-12A
a、管 37571 B 記録 37571 八
b、" 37571 A " 37571 八 一

MINAMI SUMMATION
NN ERRFA

- NN-26
c, 證ニニ〇六一A 記録 一五七七一一八三
- NN-26
d, 證ニニ〇六一A 記録 一五七七一一二
- NN-26
節ノ初ノ文ノ次ニ以下ヲ挿入セヨ
梅津ノ最後通牒ニ就テノ南ノ証言ハ、禁錮
證人桑島/KUWASHIMAノ次ノ發言ヲ信託
出来ナイモノトナリマシタ。即チ桑島ハ、一九
三五年五月初メ日又兩軍ノ間ニ小桒合ガアリ、
次イテ東軍及北支延屯軍/HHE KWANFUNG
AND NORTH CHINA SEAFHONARY BOARDSノ
カラ又部軍ノ部長、國民黨支部ノ廢止等トイフ
條件ヲ附シタ抗議ガ直接又部政府ニ提出セラレ、
最後通牒(d)テ是等條件ノ履行ガ強行セラレタ
ト申シマシタ。コノ証言ハ亦、新報報漢ノ梅津
一何應欽/HOUMENQUノ協定(9)ヲ裏付シマス。
- NN-26
節ノ附註ヲ次ノ如ク訂正セヨ
現在アル附註ヲ「b」ト「c」ヲ「d」ト「e」ニ
變頁スルコト。「b」ト「c」ノ新附註ヲ以下ノ通り追
加セヨ
- NN-25
次ノ附註ヲ加フ (NN-25 節ノ中斷トイフ語ノ後ニ (d)
ヲ入レル)
- NN-25
附註 d, e, f, g, ヲ「e, f, g, h」ニ參照

MINAMI SUMMATION

NN. ERRATA

NN-27

節ノ最後ノ文ノ後段ヲ「中國軍閥一絶滅云々」トアルヲ「支那軍閥ヲ根絶ノ目的ヲ以テ云々」ト訂正ス。

NN-29

節ノ末尾ニ次ヲ挿入セヨ

桑島カズエ / KAWASHIMA Kazuo / ハ、十一月ニ外務省ハ關東軍ガ北支ヲ脅カス目的ヲ山梨關 / SHANAI HANAI / ニ機密化部隊ヲ集中シテイタトノ報道ヲ受ケ、外務省ハ軍ニソノ様ナ行動ヲトツテハイケナイト警告ラシタト証言致シマシタ。(f)

NN-29

f、記録ニカロハハ一カ

NN-34

節ノ末尾ニ次ヲ挿入セヨ

前ハ樞密顧問官在任中、一九四五年三月大日本政治會總裁ニ任命サレマシタ。同會ノ主要目的ノ一ハ、大東亞共榮圈ヲ擴大シテ印度 / INDIA / ビルマ / BURMA / 蘭印 / DUTCH INDIES / 及ビフィリツピン / PHILIPPINES / ヲ含ム全東亞ニ及ボスコトニアツタノデアリマス。(j)

NN-34

j、記録ニヨ〇三三ト

	a、	卷證	八三九一A、	記錄	八一七五
	b、	〃	六七〇	〃	七三三〇
	〃	〃	三三七一	〃	二〇〇三七一八
	〃	〃	一九九三一一二	〃	三一八三五
	〃	〃	七〇六、七〇八、七一二一六	〃	〃

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HN-29

節ニ對スル註ヲ

左ノ通り訂正スルコト

百 最 終 論 考
追 加 正 誤 表

歐羅巴三國論古正集卷

歐羅巴三國論古正集卷
歐羅巴三國論古正集卷

歐羅巴三國論古正集卷
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新學制教育論

蔡元培

教育者，立國之本也。教育之興廢，關係於國家之盛衰。故教育者，國家之命脈也。教育者，民族之靈魂也。教育者，社會之公器也。教育者，個人之幸福也。教育者，世界之希望也。教育者，人類之光榮也。教育者，宇宙之奧秘也。教育者，生命之意義也。教育者，時間之價值也。教育者，空間之廣闊也。教育者，心靈之深邃也。教育者，智慧之源泉也。教育者，力量之基礎也。教育者，美德之土壤也。教育者，和平之種子也。教育者，繁榮之動力也。教育者，進步之階梯也。教育者，發展之引擎也。教育者，變革之利器也。教育者，創造之工具也。教育者，探索之舟楫也。教育者，發現之燈塔也。教育者，追求之火炬也。教育者，奮鬥之號召也。教育者，犧牲之精神也。教育者，奉獻之力量也。教育者，責任之擔當也。教育者，使命之傳承也。教育者，理想之追求也。教育者，信念之支撐也。教育者，勇氣之源泉也。教育者，毅力之基礎也。教育者，耐心之土壤也。教育者，謙虛之種子也。教育者，勤儉之動力也。教育者，奮鬥之階梯也。教育者，發展之引擎也。教育者，變革之利器也。教育者，創造之工具也。教育者，探索之舟楫也。教育者，發現之燈塔也。教育者，追求之火炬也。教育者，奮鬥之號召也。教育者，犧牲之精神也。教育者，奉獻之力量也。教育者，責任之擔當也。教育者，使命之傳承也。教育者，理想之追求也。教育者，信念之支撐也。教育者，勇氣之源泉也。教育者，毅力之基礎也。教育者，耐心之土壤也。教育者，謙虛之種子也。教育者，勤儉之動力也。

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14

1. 重要な任務を遂行し、有るべき義に背かず、
 2. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
 3. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
 4. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
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 9. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
 10. 任務の遂行に必要にして、

7. 此裁判の連合軍軍医の任務は、
 1. 傷病者の救済、
 2. 衛生の維持、
 3. 戦傷者の治療、
 4. 戦傷者の看護、
 5. 戦傷者の輸送、
 6. 戦傷者の埋葬、
 7. 戦傷者の遺体の発見、
 8. 戦傷者の遺体の埋葬、
 9. 戦傷者の遺体の発見、
 10. 戦傷者の遺体の埋葬、

8. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
 9. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
 10. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
 11. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
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 17. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
 18. 任務の遂行に必要にして、
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P 5

一九四五年五月十四日
 国民政府主席及行政院院长
 次至苏联参加(彼等同胞数亿代之)纪念于其中(高明)
 历史的一页(一九四五年五月十四日)
 也宣言(余身)于(一九四五年五月十四日)
 宁(于)之(即)个(世)个(别)之(行)动(也)日(本)人(自)
 于(灭)亡(之)前(二)三(三)之(文)化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 言(者)言(依)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 理(性)之(经)路(也)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 期(到)来(也)……
 吾(等)之(悲)痛(也)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 以(平)和(之)实(及)正(义)之(道)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 主(张)不(死(也)以(于)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 世(界)征(伐)之(期(也)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 合(除(去(也)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)

14. 此(如)下(之)记(录)之(被)告(内)容(也)合(合)合(合)
 三(日)本(之)政(府)之(既)三(日)本(之)政(府)之(既)三(日)本(之)政(府)之(既)
 告(退)之(願(也)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 彼(守)之(彼)之(權(勢)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 子(爆(彈)之(心(也)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 註 / 記(錄)者(三)之(其(也)自(己)全(国)之(利)益(也)文(化(之)统(一)也(其)中(之)国(家)
 及(書(記)之(記(錄)也(其)中(之)国(家)

漢書地理志云：漢興，高祖封功臣，皆以列侯，置國於諸侯，皆以列侯，置國於諸侯。

漢書地理志云：漢興，高祖封功臣，皆以列侯，置國於諸侯，皆以列侯，置國於諸侯。

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漢書地理志云：漢興，高祖封功臣，皆以列侯，置國於諸侯，皆以列侯，置國於諸侯。

漢書地理志云：漢興，高祖封功臣，皆以列侯，置國於諸侯，皆以列侯，置國於諸侯。

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此書... 內容... 關於... 之... 研究... 報告...

一、... 二、... 三、... 四、... 五、... 六、... 七、... 八、... 九、... 十、...

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(1956. 11. 15)

1. 關於... (faint handwritten text)
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 10. ... (faint handwritten text)

21 ソレ故ニ我々ノ若シ歴史ニ於テノ機會が要求スル
 22 ヲバ現在コソ、裁判所が秩序正々トシテ裁判ヲ行ハス此
 等ノ禍ヲ人類ニ齎ラシメ責任者ニシテ決定スル時ニ
 中ニ立寄ラズ右ノ方法、中一、處置ノ責任者、誰トシテ決定
 スルコトナラズ、中二、彼等ニホツテ、宣言が要求スル刑罰即
 實ニシテ犯罪ニ相当スル嚴罰ヲ課スルコトナラズ。此ノ刑罰
 が何ナルベキカヲ決定スル、檢察部ノ任務ナラズ。我々
 在犯罪が極悪ナルコトヲ指南スルコトガ、以テ責任者ニ在リ
 如何ナル事情、許ニ於テモソシ等ハ許スルコト、法律ニ在リテ許
 ル行為ニ對シテ總テ得ル唯一ノ可能ニ辯護ノ狂氣、辯護
 五ルコトナラズ、斯ル辯護、裁判ヲ受テ被告、誰ニ申シ
 居テモ、一名、被告、本裁判ニ於テ審理、際ニ於テ、復
 正氣ニ關スル疑、爲ニ裁判所自カク、動議ニ在テ被告
 所カク既ニ除カシ。公議ニ且テ故意ニ侵略政策ヲ採
 ルコトヲ認テ且テ故意ニ全社會ヲ破壊シ去ルノミナラズ無
 辜、犧牲者、數が何百方ヲ以テ數ヘテ得ルコトヲ承知
 テ居テ相違ナク程、破壊、虚勢ヲ起スモノト考テ此ノ軍
 隊ヲ行動セシメ、罪アリト判明シテ正氣、個人ニ對スル刑重ニ
 關シテ疑ガ下リ得セシム。

P15

23 斯ル計画ヲ承知、採テ用之且シ之が遂行ヲ援助シ
 正氣ノ人間が是、自國ノ最上ノ利益、爲ニ採ルべき道
 ヲ、タト信心ヲ不ク、テ、本ト辯護ニ主張シ得ル上
 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

23. 此新說手續二於上世，昔在國威前手，
 安泰子維持也。為世界，大盟各國，
 又上方法ヲ用テ居比，
 罪責何人カ買テ，
 此法系ニ於テ，
 是レノ類似，

4. 從中，
 此法系ニ於テ，
 罪責何人カ買テ，
 又上方法ヲ用テ居比，
 安泰子維持也。為世界，大盟各國，

此新說手續二於上世，昔在國威前手，
 安泰子維持也。為世界，大盟各國，
 又上方法ヲ用テ居比，
 罪責何人カ買テ，
 此法系ニ於テ，
 是レノ類似，

第一、... 第二、... 第三、... 第四、... 第五、... 第六、... 第七、... 第八、... 第九、... 第十、...

第一、... 第二、... 第三、... 第四、... 第五、... 第六、... 第七、... 第八、... 第九、... 第十、...

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二 國家及之條約 就中 國家 爲 二 國家 之 關係 之 一
戰 爭 國 際 之 目 的 之 一 也 其 中 之 一 也 其 中 之 一 也
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國 際 國 家 間 之 平 和 生 活 中 之 條 約 之 一 也 其 中 之 一 也
國 家 間 之 於 法 治 之 關 係 之 精 神 之 一 也 其 中 之 一 也
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相 互 之 信 用 之 一 也 其 中 之 一 也

26. 最 初 之 平 和 集 團 國 家 族 集 團 之 一 也 以 後 之 人 類
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P. 19

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P. 24

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一、關於本會之組織與職權，業經本會第一屆第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲將本會之組織與職權，分述如下：

一、本會之組織：本會設理事會，由會員大會選舉之。理事會設理事若干人，由理事會推選之。理事會設秘書長一人，由理事會推選之。

二、本會之職權：本會之職權，依本會章程之規定。本會之職權，包括：

(一) 辦理本會之業務。

(二) 管理本會之財產。

(三) 監督本會之職員。

(四) 其他依本會章程所賦予之職權。

本會之組織與職權，業經本會第一屆第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲將本會之組織與職權，分述如下：

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(二) 管理本會之財產。

(三) 監督本會之職員。

(四) 其他依本會章程所賦予之職權。

中華民國三十一年

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0159 0015 2079

MUTO SUFFIMATION-00

武 藤 章

00-1 武藤章ハ共同謀議ノ全容（原因第一乃至第五）ニヨリ、ソシテ個々ニハ謀議第七、八、九、一〇、一一、一二、一三、一四、一五、一六、一七、一九、二〇、二一、二二、二三、三四、三六、三七、二八、二九、三〇、三一、三二、三三、三四、三六、三七、三八、三九、四〇、四一、四二、四三、四四、四五、四七、五三、五四、及ビ第五五ニヨツテ起訴サレテ居リマス。

00-2 武藤ハ(a) 真珠湾攻撃時ノ副後ヲ通ジテノ東京ニ於ケル立案者ノ一人トシテ及ビ(b) 作戦地尉校トシテ共同謀議ノ首魁ニ真実ナ役ヲ演ジマシタ。

I 立案者トシテ

00-3 武藤ハ一九三九年九月三十日ヨリ一九四二年四月二十日迄陸軍省ノ軍務局長テアリマシタ。(a)

註 記以管紙ハ英文ノ真管カテアル

00-5 a、野査 一一八 記以 七四四、七四六

比島、進、」(6)「以美會、全伊ト張、於カ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 = 度支那、大以美會、全伊ト張、於カ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 主義的內閣ヲ以美會、全伊ト張、於カ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 米內閣ヲ以美會、全伊ト張、於カ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 再ニ開始シテ以美會、全伊ト張、於カ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 シテ草率的ニ以美會、全伊ト張、於カ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 ノ大體ヲ以美會、全伊ト張、於カ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 (1) 前定ノ期及中事ニ於テ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 史上決定的ナ期及中事ニ於テ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源
 シテ此ノ期及中事ニ於テ起ニ攻ニ進ハル日本及「英ヤ生及核力開シテ正ノ日本及「ガ鳥ノ富源

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二當り、我々ハ先ヅ、軍勢ノ分知ヲ及有シ、眞任ヲ察ノ立
 及ビ、實行ニ對スル武ト母トナリ、於テ死ノ行爲及テ、眞
 實性ヲ簡
 此等事件ノ母トナリ、於テ死ノ行爲及テ、眞實性ヲ簡

00-4

討スルツツト、其ノ他、ヨクナシ、於テ死ノ行爲及テ、眞
 實性ヲ簡
 討スルツツト、其ノ他、ヨクナシ、於テ死ノ行爲及テ、眞
 實性ヲ簡

00-5 武原ノ勢力ノ疑ハ彼ノ局ガ陸軍ノ豫算ノ上ニ
有シテイタ支配權デアリマシク。參謀本部ハ「陸

軍ノ作戦、動員及ビ編成ノ計畫」ヲ立テマシク
ガ、「此等計畫ヲ實行ニ移スガ爲ニ參謀本部ハ
資金及ビ此等計畫ヲ實行スル手段ヲ供與スルコ

00-4

a、	記	録	一	五	八	六	三
b、	記	録	一	四	八	四	六
c、	記	録	一	三	八	六	二

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MUTO SUMMATION—00

單ニ調査スルコトカラ始メマス。元武蔵ノ同僚ニシテ協力者、元兵務局長陸軍少將田中隆吉ハ武蔵ヲ「陸軍省ノ參謀長格」デ「才氣煥發ノ頭腦ト政治的力備ニヨツテ彼ハ目立ツタ人物デアッタ」^(a) 彼ハ陸軍省内ノ主要ナ人物ノ一人デアツタ^(a) ト評シマシタ。モウ一人ノ陸軍省高官、山崎シゲロ^(b) 陸軍大佐 (COL. SHIGORO YAMAZAKI) モ此ノ印象ニ田中ト同調シマシタ。^(b) 田中ハ續ケテ、米内内閣ト東條内閣ノ間「事實上陸軍ハ日本ノ推進力デアリ、陸軍ノ政策ノ殆ンド全部ガ武蔵ノ才氣アル頭カラ出テ來タ……」^(c) ト言イマシタ。

00-2

武蔵ハ (a) 真珠湾攻撃時ノ副後ヲ通ジニノ東京ニ於ケル立案者ノ一人トシテ及ビ (b) 作戦地將校トシテ共同謀議ノ胥腕ニ重役ナ役ヲ演ジマシタ。

I 立案者トシテ

00-3

武蔵ハ一九三九年九月三十日ヨリ一九四二年四月二十日迄陸軍省ノ軍務局長デアリマシタ。(a)

註 記録番号ハ英文ノ具番ニテアル

00-3

a、海軍 一一八 記録七四二、七四六

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武 藤 章

00 -1

武藤章ハ共同謀議ノ全容（訴因第一乃至第五）
 ニヨリ、ソシテ個々ニハ訴因第七、八、九、一
 ○、一一、一二、一三、一四、一五、一六、一
 七、一九、二〇、二一、二二、二三、二四、二
 六、二七、二八、二九、三〇、三一、三二、三
 三、三四、三六、三七、三八、三九、四〇、四
 一、四二、四三、四四、四五、四七、五三、五
 四、及び第五五ニヨツテ起訴サレテ居リマス。

日本ノ推進力デアリ、陸軍ノ政策ノ殆ンド全部
 ガ武蔵ノ才氣アル頭カラ出テ來タ……
 言イマシタ。

00-5

武蔵ノ勢力ノ雖ハ彼ノ局ガ陸軍ノ豫算ノ上ニ
 有シテイタ支配權デアリマシタ。參謀本部ハ「陸
 軍ノ作戦、動員及ビ編成ノ計畫」ヲ立テマシタ
 ガ、「此等計畫ヲ實行ニ移スガ爲ニ參謀本部ハ
 資金及ビ此等計畫ヲ實行スル手段ヲ供與スルコ

00-4

a、	b、	c、
記帳	記帳	記帳
一五八六三	一四八四六	一三八六二

0 159 00 15 2084

WUTO SUMMATION-00

單ニ調査スルコトカラ始メマス。元武蔵ノ同僚
ニシテ協力者、元兵務局長陸軍少將田中隆吉ハ
武蔵ヲ「陸軍省ノ參謀長格」デ「才氣煥發ノ頭
腦ト以治的力備ニヨツテ役ハ目立ツタ人物デア
ツター彼ハ陸軍省内ノ主要ナ人物ノ一人デアツ
タ」^(a)ト評シマシタ。モウ一人ノ陸軍省高官、
山崎シゲロー陸軍大佐 (Col. Shigero Yamazaki)
モ此ノ印象ニ田中ト同評シマシタ。^(b) 田中ハ續
ケテ、米内内閣ト東條内閣ノ間「事實上陸軍ハ

00 席シマシタ。彼ハ必要ナ操算ヲ監行ノ爲ニ獲得

シマシタ。(b) 武蔵ハ監算監管同、(c) 監算外務省

間、(d) 監算省抄本部同、(c) ノ起給役テシタ。彼

ハ度々監算次方ノ代辦者ニナツタコトモアリ

マス。(f)

00-5 a、記 一三六六一
b、記 一六一六六一

00-6 a、記 七四三
b、記 二九二
c、記 二二六
d、記 一〇三
e、記 一〇一
f、記 一〇一

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記 一八

7 159 00 15 2085

MUTO SUMMATION—00

トヲ擔當スル陸軍省ノ當該局タル軍務局ノ同意
 フ得ナケレバナリマセンデシタ^(a) 陸軍中將
 田中新一ハ當該列所ニ活シ陸軍省ガ參謀本部ノ
 求ムル人員資材其ノ他ヲ供スルヲ拒ンタ時ハド
 ウナルカト尋ネラレ、此ノ元參謀本部作戦部長
 ハソノ場合ニハ作戦計畫ハ立案サレ得ナイシ、
 又、參謀本部ハ陸軍省ニヨツテ供與サレル人員
 資材ノ範圍内デ作戦計畫ノ案ヲ起草スルコトガ
 一ノ慣行事項デアツタト答ヘマシタ。^(b)

—6
 以府委員トイフ資格テ^(c) 武庫ハ當ニ議會ニ出

三六一三七年ニ中佐ニナリ、
陸軍ノ參謀ニ
ナリマシダ。(b)

00-8

a、記 一〇〇六
b、記 一六一一八

0159 0015 2086

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-7

彼ノ勢力ノ源泉ニ關スル以上ノ概括的ナ背
後門派ヲ以テ、我々ハ此處ニ如何ニ武断ガ殆
ンドスベテノ重要ナ政府ノ活動ニソノ手ヲ延
べ、且此等ノ事件ヲ惹起シタトコロノ立案決
定ニ自ラ參與シ取ハ既定ノ案ヲ大規模ニ實行
シタカラ示シマス。

1 滿洲事變及ビ支那事變

00-8

一九三一年九月十八日ノ奉天事件ノ間、武
原ハ陸軍省本部ノ少佐デシタ。(a) 彼ハ一九

00-10

a、
七、七
三三〇八五記録
三七三三〇
三七三六〇

00-9

a、
七、七
三三〇八五

右政策ニ定メタ全計登ヲ完全ニ實行スル爲メ
 ニ一九三八年十月七日ニ五相會議トノ間ノ秘密
 連絡委員會ガ設置サレマシタ。ソノ連絡委員會
 設置ノ目的ハ決議案ノ第一項ニ指定サレテ居リマ
 スガソレハ「中國ニ於ケル局面ノ處置ニ關シ
 五相會議ニ依ツテ同意サレタ事項ノ遂行ヲ促進

00-11

0159 0015 2087

MUTO SUMMATION—00

00—10

00—9

一九三七年三月ニ武藤ハ作戦ト編制ヲ擔當ス
ル陸軍參謀本部第二課長デアリマシタ。(a)ソ
レ故ニ彼ハ一九三七年七月華北作戦ノ責任ヲ有
シテ居リマシタ。(b)

一九三九年九月ノ終リ彼ガ軍務局長ニ就任シ
タ時ハ第一次近衛内閣ハ中國ニ對シテ採ル可キ
基礎政策ヲ既ニ確立シテ居ツタデアリマス。
中國ノ軍事的政服、華北ニ日本ノ支配ノ確信政
府ノ樹立及其ノ國ノ經濟的開發ハ前記政策ノ主
要目的デアツタデアリマス。(a)

ハ焼却ヲ免レタコトヲ認識シナカツタノデアリ
マス。

00-13

ソノ與亞院總務長官心得ガ「延給委員會ノ發
員デアアル早初局長ニ一九四二年三月五日ニ首相
官邸ノ會合ニ出席シテ隣局ニ歸スル連終部長ノ
報告ヲ聞クヨウ請求シタ」コトヲ述ベテイル

00-11

a、
証書 三三二五七
記録 三七三五〇 三七三六四一五

00-12

a、
記録 三三一七
b、
記録 三三一八

0159 0015 2088

MUTO SUMMATION-00
00-12

スル爲メ及必要ノ場合ニハ五相會議デ論議サル
ベキ手段ヲ研究調査スル (a)五相會議デアリシ多ク

1a 秘密連絡委員會

反對訊問デハ武蔵ハ「五相會議」トノ間ノ秘密
連絡委員會ニ就テハ何モ知ラヌ (a)ト否認シ
テ居ル。七証第三四五七號ノ英文第四頁ノ第十
六項ヲ示サレタ際ニ彼ハ「軍務局長ニナツタ」
時ハ「所謂委員會ナルモノハ最早存在シテナカ
ツタノデ」ソレニ就テハ何モ知ラヌ (b)ト主
張シテ居リマス。明カニ彼ハ七証第三四五九號

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-14 00-13

- a、証書 三二五七 記録 三七三六四一五
- a、記録 三三三〇三 一三三二〇五
- b、記録 三三二〇五

00-14

證第三四五九號ノ其ノ部分ハ記録ノ中ニ記載サレテ居リマス。ソレデハ武蔵ハ與亞院ノ秘密連絡委員會ノ委員デナカツタトイウ彼ノ答ヲ言張ルノカ如何カト訊ネラレマツタ。(a) 彼ハ彼ノ誤解ガ「秘密連絡委員會」ナル辭句ノ使用カラ生ジタコトヲ云ウコトニヨリ切り拔ケヨウト試ミマツタガソレハ彼ガソウデナカツタト主張シタ其ノ秘密ナル形容詞ニヨリ誤解サセラレタコトヲ意味シテ居リマス。(b)

「コノ委員會ハ五相會議ニ入スル秘密委員會」デ「軍務局長・軍務局長・軍務局長ヲ含ム八名ノ委員ヲ以テ組織セラレテ居ルコトヲ特ニ規定シテアルソノ決議案 (a) ノ第二項ガナカツタナラバ一見シテ武蔵ノ辯解ハ眞實ラシク見エルノデアリマス。ヨメ秘密委員會ニハ四名ノ幹事ガアリソノ中ニハ軍務局長・軍務局長モ含マレテ居ツタノ

00-15 00-14 00-16

00-15

九四一年九月六日武藤ト報告人向ハ外務大臣官
七証第三四五六加、外務省ノ秘密文書ニハ一

- b、七証 三四五七 記録 五七三六四一五
- c、七証 二七六一 A 記録 五七四一
- b、七証 一六一 記録 五三三五
- 七証 二七三一 A 記録 三三〇〇三

デアリマス。ソレテスカラ、軍務局カラハコノ
 秘密委員會ニ二名ノ委員ヲ出シテ居リ、又別ニ
 一名ハソノ秘密委員會ノ幹事ニ出シテ居ツタノ
 デアリマス。(b) 秘密委員會ノ幹事ニ出シテ居ツタノ
 コノ秘密委員會ヲ通ジテ武藤ハ中國ト中國ヲ
 搾取スルニ當ツテ積極的指導的參加ヲシテイタ
 ノデアリマス。彼ハ一九四〇年三月三十日南京
 政府ノ正式樹立ニ於テ頂點ニ達シタ中國ニ於ケ
 ル日本ノ傀儡トシテ(王)王(溥)ヲ樹立セムトスル後
 ノ段階ノ日本ノ言聲(及)及中國ノ自然的、人的
 資源ノ日本ノ強認ナ搾取ヲ稍合法的形式ヲ以テ
 隠蔽シタ新政府ト日本間ノ一九四〇年十月十日
 ノ條約ノ締結(ニ)確ニ關係シタノデアリマス。

00-16 Ib 中國ニ對スル日本ノ平和條件

日本ノ軍隊ヲ永久的ニ駐屯セシメムトスル主張
 ノ日本ノ理由トシテ、共產主義ヲ抑制セムトス
 ル希望ヲ擧ゲタノデアリマス。海南島ニ日本軍
 ノ駐屯ヲナラシメル「ボルネオ」「スマトラ」
 或ハ比島カラ日本ニ對スル共產主義滲入ノ脅威
 ガナカツタトイウ明白ナ事實ヲ証人證ニ於テ武
 藤其レ自身ハ谷認シナケレバナラナカツタノデ
 アリマス。(b) 疑モナク一九四一年十二月八日

2. 記録 一〇七九二

b. 記録 三二一九六一七

邸ニ於テ支那事變解決ニ關スル基根的條件ヲ商
議シタコトヲ記載シテアリマス。

秘証第三四五六號ニアル殆下同ジ條件ハ中國
ニ對スル日本ノ平和條件ヲ含ム秘証第一二四號
Fニ後程編入サレ、一九四一年九月二十二日ニ
在東京「グル」大使ニ手交サレタコトニ御注意
アリタイモノデアリマス。(註)且ツ又日米交渉
ガ最後の危機ニ至ルマデ日本ハ秘証第三四五九
號及秘証第一二四五號Fニ記シテアル日本ノ要
求條件ヲ頑固ニ固執シテ居ツタノデアリマス。

日本ハ、海南島ヲ含メ中國ニ於ケル或ル地域ニ

00-18

b、
記録

一一八

記録

七一五

a、
記録

一一八

記録

七五二一三

00-17

c、
記録

六一三一A

記録

六七三二一三

00-19

此等三行ハ「ドイツ」及「イタリヤ」傘下ノ
歐洲新秩序ニ平行スル爲メ、東亞ニ日本治下ノ
新秩序ヲ確立スベキ主長政策ノ三部分ヲ代表ス
ルモノデアリマスカラ、此處テハマトメテ「ジ
テ居リマス。日本ニトツテ大東亞ノ新秩序トハ

MUTO SUMMATION—00

00—18

ニ馬來ヲ侵略シタ多敏ノ日本軍隊ハ聯合セル日本ノ陸海軍ニヨツテ占領サレタ海南島カラ派遣サレ(C)「シンガポール」エノ跳躍基地トサレテイマシタ。

一九三一年カラ一九三五年ニ至ル事變ニ於テ盡クシタ勲功ニ依リ武蔵ハ一九三四年四月二十九日勲三等旭日中授章ヲ授ケラレマシタ。(a)而シテ又知事變ニ於ケル功勞ニ對シ一九四〇年四月二十九日勲三等金鷲勲章ト勲二等旭日章光章ヲ授ケラレタノデアリマシタ。(b)

F-12

MUTO SUMMATION—00

單ニ、第三國ノ妨害ト條約履行ノ約束ヲ受ケズ
ニ、滿洲及中國ノ搾取ヲホシイマ、ニシ、又南
進シテ印度支那、インドネシヤ及南洋ノ其ノ他
ノ諸國ノ莫大ナ富ヲ獲ル自由ヲ意味シタニ過ギ
ナイノデアリマス。

0159 0015 2093

MUTO SUMMATION-00

^{2a}米 内内閣瓦解ニ先立ツ経緯

⁰⁰⁻²⁰

「恐ルベキ「ドイツ」ノ機械化師團ガ「フラン
ス」ノ心算ヲ電撃シタ後、武藤其ノ他東京ニ於
ケル日本人指導者迄ハ、「ナチス」ノ好機會ヲ
擧マウト決定シマシタ。一九四〇年五月二十二
日、ベルリンニ於ケル日本ノ外交官ノ報告ニヨ
リ「ドイツ」ハ、蘭領印度ニ對シテハ關心ヲ有
シナイト日本ニ通告シマシタ。其ノ通告ハ日本
ニトツテ「インドネシヤ」ニ進出ノ許可ト考エ
ラレマシタ。^(a)

一九四〇年六月十七日「フラン

ス」ガ降伏シタ後、四相會議ハ印度支那ニ對

事同盟締結ノ前提トシテ、總ベテノ政黨解体ノ必要ヲ見ル先見ヲ有シテイマシタ。即チ同月ノ二十日議會ニ於テ武藤ハ公式ニ現存政黨ノ解体ヲ主張シタノデアリマス。寺内伯ノ全体主義ニ關スル見解ヲ引用シ、武藤ハ歐州諸國ノ觀念デアル全体主義ニ對シ國家主義トイウ名稱ヲ一層可トシ、是ヲ以テ日本國家ノ指導原則トナスベキデアルト提言シマシタ。(A)

00-22, 00-21

a、	b、	a、	誓證	二七三五	一A	記録	二四二九
"	"	"	"	二七三五	一A	"	二四二九
"	"	"	"	二二四三	一A	"	一六一三
"	"	"	"	二二四三	一A	"	一七一九
"	"	"	"	"	"	"	一六一五〇

スル様ニ見エタ時、三國軍事同盟ノ問題ハ再ビ
 全歐的大人氣ノ話題トナリマシタ。然シ、今回
 ノ同盟ガ、英國及米國ニ對シ向ケラレタモノデ、
 前年ニ於ケル様ニ、「ソヴィエト」聯邦ニ對シ
 向ケラレタモノデナイ點ニ於テ、兩計畫ノ間ニ
 ハ性格上根本的差異ガアリマス。(a) 近衛公ハ尙
 次ノ様ニ述べマシタ。即チ、「反アングロサク
 ソン感情ト三國同盟ニ對スル熱心ハ、特ニ軍事
 關係者ノ間ニ於テ、頂點ニアリマシタ。……(b)」

00-22

武蔵ハ機會ヲ逸スル程ボンヤリシテイマセン
 デシタ。夙ニ一九四〇年三月彼ハ日本ニ於ケル

全体主義國家建設ノ前提並ニ較勝國獨逸トノ軍

00-24

武蔵ノ議會演説ハ即時效果ガ現レマシタ。即チ三日後ニ「オット」大使ハ日本ノ對英米態度ハ明ラカニ硬化シタト伯林ニ喜コバシイ報告ヲシマシタ。(a) 一九四〇年四月十四日有馬伯ハ木戸ニ對シ懇ベテノ政黨ヲ一黨ニ合体スル問題ヲ切り出シタ。(b) 五月二十六日ニハ近衛、木戸、有馬ノ三名ガ食卓ヲ共ニシテ此ノ問題ヲ論ジマシタ。(c) 木戸ハ「一九四〇年七月八日迄ニ近衛公ハ樞密院議長ヲ辭シ新政治機構ノ創設ニ盡瘁

00-23

00-24

a、記録
b、記録
c、

三三二六七一八
三五一四
三〇八九二
三〇八九四

記録 六一四八一五〇

00-23

如何ニ武藤ガ否定シテモ、新聞バカリデナク
議員達自身モ亦此ノ演説ヲ政黨解体ノ強キ提唱
ト解釋シタコトハ動カスコトノ出来ナイ事實デ
アリマス。此ノ議會ニ於ケル武藤ノ演説ノ二日
後ニ畑及石田ハ、稻田議員ヨリ「昨日及一昨日
決算委員會ニ於テ單務局長ガ提言シタ政黨解体
ノ主張ニ同意スルカドウカ」ト質問ヲ受ケマシ
タ。更ニ附加シテ云エバ、武藤ガ引用シタ全体
主義ノ意見ヲ持ツ寺内伯トハ即チ一九三九年「
ナチス」黨會議ニ日本ノ公式代表者トシテ伯林
ニ派遣サレタ寺内ノコトデアリマス。(a)

0 159 00 15 2096

書記官長石波ヲ訪問シ「陸軍大臣ノ意思ヲ敷衍
シ」軍部ノ意思ヲ細部ニ亘ツテ説明シタ。(d)
訊問ノ際武蔵ハ「近衛首相ノ目的ガ指向セラル
ベキ方向ニ關スル私ノ同意ト算成トニ就テ」石
渡ト語ツタト稟述シマシタ。(e)

00-24

d、記録

三〇九〇〇

00-25

a、音證

三一九九一A

記録

二八九四一

00-25

b、記録

三〇九〇〇

c、音證

三一九九一A

記録

二八九四一

d、音證

三一九九一A

記録

二八九四一

e、記録

三三二五八

00-25

シテイタコトヲ指摘シマシタ。(d)

近衛ハ、「再ビ來ラザル好機ヲ無駄ニ失ツテ
イル」米内首相ニ不満デアツタ、軍部ノ寵兒ト
ナツタコトハ秘メテ了解シ得ルコトデアリマ
る。(a)
一九四〇年七月八日頃阿南陸軍次官ハ「軍部ハ
近衛公ガ首相トシテ出馬スルコトニ熱望シテイ
ル」ト木戸ニ確言シマシタガ、木戸ハ之ニヨツテ
「多少ノ不安」ヲ感ジタノデアリマシタ。(b)

同月九日畑ハ新田内機轉ニ對スル米内首相ノ協
力ヲ求めマシタ。(c) 更ニ十一日ニハ武蔵ハ内閣

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00-26^a

00-26

00-26^a

b	a	c	b	a
〃	〃	〃	〃	〃
三 八 三 一 一 A	三 八 三 一 一 A	〃	〃	三 八 〇 八 一 A
	記録	〃	〃	記録
三 七 〇 九 〇 九 一 〇 二	三 七 〇 九 〇 九	二 八 九 二 六	二 八 九 二 六	三 七 八 六 二

米内首相ハ、如カ陸相ヲ辭職シタノハ陸軍ガ
 彼ノ内閣ヲ弱體ト考ヘテ、(a) 而シテ彼ノ内閣ガ
 其當時國內反對外政策ノ重要問題デアツタ、大
 政黨會ノ創立ト及日獨同盟トヲ支持シナカツ
 タ理由テ弱體ト考エラレタト述ベマシタ。(b)
 彼ハ、大政黨會ノ創立ハ「ドイツ」ニ於ケル
 ト同ジ線ニ沿ツテイル日本ニ於ケル「フアシス
 ト」政体 即チ「獨裁政治ノ確立ヲ意味シ」其

00-26

2 D 米内内閣瓦解ノ理由

陸軍ハ武蔵及阿南陸軍次官ヲ通ジテ、遂ニ一九四〇年七月中旬ノ或時「近衛ノ政治的秩序ヲ實現スル爲メ内閣ノ總辭職」ヲ要求スルニ到リマシタ、而シテ其レガ拒絶サレタ時武蔵ト阿南ハ「畑陸相ノ辭職ヲ強請スルノ外方法ガナイ」ト宣言シマシタ。(a) 反對訊問テ、米内ハ彼ガ阿南ガ其處ニ居ナカツタト考ヘタケレドモ、之ヲ確證シマシタ。(b) 畑ハ米内ニ武蔵ト阿南トニ依テ表明サレタ意見ハ彼等自身ノ個人的意見デアツタト語リマシタ。(c)

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00-27

b	a
・ 記録	・ 記録
三三二四七	三一八九一

最近重要ナラ
 タテ下セラレシラ
 (記録三七二四六一四七)

00-26^a

e	d	c
・ "	・ "	・ 記録
二三五	三八三	三八三
8 頁	一 A	一 A
1	"	記録
		三八〇〇二
		一〇三

阿南及武蔵ト、ソレカラ武蔵ヲ出席サセタ陸軍
 三長官ト、而シテ其後武蔵ガ幹事長デアッタ、
 眞事参議院ノ参議官等ト會議シマシタ。(a)
 因ニ、本文書ハ彼ガ三長官會議テ何方起ツタカ
 知ラナカツタトイウ武蔵ノ陳述ヲ裏切ツテ居リ
 マス。(b) 本文書ノ第二項ハ彼ガ三長官會議ニ

MUTO SUMMATION—00

ノ下ニ於テハ議會ハ審議ノ機關デアル代ニ一
 獨裁政治ニヨツテ要求サレタ一切ノ法案ヲ單ニ
 贊成投票シ審議スル機關トナルガ故ニ彼ハ大
 政黨議會ノ創設ニ反對デアツタト述べマシタ^(c)
 彼ハ其時陸軍部内テ最モ有力ナル人物ハ畑陸相
 武蔵軍務局長及杉山參謀總長デアツテ、而シテ
 彼等全部ハ彼ノ内閣ノ政策ニ不満足ヲ表明シタ
 ト述べマシタ。^(d) 因ニ武蔵ハ軍務局長時代ニ
 彼ハ政治ニ非常ニ活動的デ而シテ趣味ヲ持ツテ
 居タコトヲ容認シマシタ。^(e)

00-27

七月十六日ニ畑陸相ハ正ニ辭職シマシタ。然

シ彼ノ辭職ニ先立ツテ、畑ハ最初彼ノ役所デ、

MUTO SUMIATION-00

0028

出席シタコトヲ示シテ居リマス。

田中隆吉ハ東條ガ、武蔵ノ政治的勸告ニ重ク
 信頼ヲ置イタトイフ彼ノ觀察ヲ押シ進メル爲
 ニ、三國同盟ニ懸スル軍ノ意見ガ内閣ニ容レ
 ラレナカツタ爲メニ不内閣ヲ辭職シタ畑
 陸相ノ問起ヲ擧ゲマシタ。一九四〇年ニ、田
 中ハ畑將軍ニ「何故彼ガ實際彼ノ意見及性質
 ニ反シタ斯カル態度ヲ取ツタカ」ト竝ネマシ
 タ。而シテ畑ハ武蔵ノ影響ニヨリソウセザル
 ヲ得ナカツタト答エマシタ。(a)

00-30	00-29
b a、	c b a、
記 書	記 書
録 証	証 録
三六	三一
一八一	三三三
一	三三三
記 録	記 録
六二七	六二五
三	七一八

レハ、「日本基本国策要綱」ト題シ「大東京新秩序ノ建設」ヲ目的トシ、コレガ達成ノ爲メ「建設的且ツ弾力性アル方策ガ帝國ノ自運ヲ進展セシメル爲メニ採用サレマス」(a) コノ「弾力性アル諸方策」ハ對内並ニ對外諸政策ノ發展ノ爲メノ一般施策ニ亘ツテ居リマシタガ、コレヲハ後日大政翼賛會及三國同盟ニト進展シタノデアリマス。東條ハ七月廿六日ノ政策ノ重要性ヲ確認致シマシタ。(b)

0159 0015 2101

木戸ハ陸軍ガ獨逸トノ軍事同盟ヲ希望シ、米内ノ
 排除ヲ望ンデキタト述ベマシタ。(a) 而シテ米内ノ失
 脚ヲ實現スルタメニ用イラレタ手段ハ陸軍大臣ガ後
 任者ヲ承認スルコトヲ拒否スルコトデアリマシタ。(b)
 一九四〇年七月十七日「オットー」大使ハ欣然トシテ
 獨逸國參謀本部ニ對シ、陸軍ニ依ツテ強備セラレタ
 内閣ノ更迭ニ鑑ミ、更ニ積極的ナル反英政策エノ急
 速ナル更換ガ期待セラレル旨ノ情報ヲ送ツタムデアリマス。(c)

20 新秩序政策

近衛及陸軍ノ大東亞新秩序政策ハ内閣ニ依ツテ一
 九四〇年七月廿六日ニ公式ニ採用セラレマシタ。ソ

ニモ指尙セラレテ居タ。貴下ハソレガ基本圖策中ニ
合マレテ居ルノヲ見出スコトガ出テマス。(b)ト答
ニマシタ。

00-32

七月二十六日ノ基本圖策ハ其ノ翌日宮城ニ開會セ
ラレタ政府ト大本營トノ連絡會議ニ於テ討議サレマ
シタ。武蔵ノ出席シタ同會議ノ閉會後「昨日開議ニ
決定シ見タ基本圖策要綱ニ關シ政府ハ説明ヲナシ、

00-31

a、答証

三三三、八頁

記 録

三三三、一三

b、

”

三三三、三

0 159 0015 2 102

武蔵ハ書證第五四一號ノ一九四〇年七月廿六日ノ
 日本憲本圖案ノ草案ノ作成ニ關係ヲ有シテ居ツタノ
 デアリマス。武蔵ハ「東條ニ依ツテ内閣ニ提出セラ
 レ、承認ヲ受ケタトコロノ日本帝國ノ新秩序ヲ組織
 的ニ組織シ立テタ」カ否カニ就テ巢鴨ニ於テ訊問セラ
 レタ時彼ハ「近衛公ガ東條ニ次ノ陸軍大臣ニ就任ス
 ルヤウ招請シタ際ニ東條ガ總理大臣ニ提示センガタ
 メ持参シタ計畫ハ彼ノ周ノ軍務課ニ於テ作成セラレ
 タトコロノモノデアツタ」ト答ヘテ居リマス。(a) 證
 人臺ニ於テ武蔵ハ「軍務局軍務課ニ依ツテ作成セラ
 レタ草案ノ基本目的ハ内外ノ新秩序ノ樹立ヲ目標ト
 シタモノデアツタ」カトノ訊問ヲ受ケ「ソレハソレ

00-34

b a
、 、
" 記

以

三三
三三
二六
二六
一三

00-33

d c b a
、 、 、 、
" " 記

以

三三三三
三三三三
二二二二
六六六六
一一七

00-32

b a
、 、
" 記

以

" 記

00-34 武蔵ハ三国同盟ノ封印後、新設制ハ公式ニ大改
 資會トナツタト述ベテマダ。(2) 右ノ大改製資會創立
 前ニ日本ニ於ケル最大ノ改製ナル民改製ヲ含ム全改
 製ガ悉ク併徹シマシタ。(b)

0159 0015 2103

MUTO SUMMATION-00

兩件ニ付テ完全ナル一致ヲ見タ。一トイフコトガ公
式ニ發表サレマシタ。(a) 諸賣新聞ハ會議ノ開催ガ一
口流ニ於ケル猶進及ビ伊太利ノ壓倒的勝利ニ依ル世
界時局ノ急激ナル變化ニ對應スルタメノ新憲本草案
ヲ決定スルタメ必要一トナツタト報ジマシタ。(b)

2e 新憲案ニ於ケル武蔵ノ役割

00-33 一九四〇年七月二十六日ノ憲本草案(a)ノ第三項ニ
差ク計畫ヲ實現スルタメ、新憲案委員會ガ設置サレ

マシタ。(b) 武蔵ハ真ノ常在幹事會ノ一員デアリマシ

タ。(c) 常在幹事ノ役目ハ計畫案ヲ完成スルコトデア

リマシタ。(d)

萬國程モ國庫ニ依ツテ補助サレテ居リマシタ。レコト、及「真ノ組織ハ日本ニ於ケル各縣、區、街ニ反ビマシタ」ト後編ハ起ベマシタ。(b) 大政翼賛會ハ、又、反美感情ヲ煽動スル爲メニモ利用サレマシタ。(c)

00-35	a、	書	一六六	電	一六三九
	b、	誌	一六〇	一	
	c、	誌	一一八		
					00-26
					既出

0159 0015 2104

MUTO SUMMATION—00

00-35

米内首相ノ理念ガ如何ニ其ノ後ノ發展ニヨリ表
 示セラレタカ、又如何ニ大政翼賛會ガ日本ニ於ケル
 全權主義的マニフェストヲ確立スルタメノ機關トシテ實際ニ
 用ヒラレタカガ一九三六年岡田内閣當時ノ内務大臣
 後藤文夫ニヨリ説明セラレマシタ。(a) 大政翼賛會創
 立以後ハ「是レ以外ニ有力ナル政黨ハ存在シナカツ
 タ」コト、「其結果ハ、全口ヲ通ジテ、ソノ組織内
 ニ重要ナル位置ヲ占メル政府ノ役人ニ依ツテ完全ニ
 マニフェストコロノーツノ重要ナル公ノ組織ヲ樹立
 スルコトデアリマシタ」コト、此ノ組織ハ「年八百

a、記録 三三二六二

シテ武蔵ニ對シソノ原案ヲ送り返サセマシタ。證
 人ニ於テ武蔵ハソノ原案ガ總理ノモノデアルコ
 トヲ知ラナカツタシ、ソレガアマリ長通ギタノデ
 半分程削除シタト受ケ入レ難イ爲處ゲタ辯解ヲシ
 タノデアリマス。(a)

武蔵ハ自分ノ失望ヲ自分ダケノモノニシテホキ
 マセンデシタ。彼ハソレヲ海軍軍務局ノ高木大佐

新聞ニ發表セラレタ如キ近衛聲明ハ陸軍特ニ武

蔵ニトツテ大キナ失望トナリマシタ。西洋民主々

義國家ヲ過度ニ篤カサナイタメ近衛ハ彼ノ聲明ノ

原案ニ、新秩序トハ「ナチズム」ヲモ「フアツシ

ズム」ヲモ意味スルモノデハナイトイフコトヲ嘗

キマシタ。トコロガソレガ外交官ヨリモ、モツト

軍國主義デアル武蔵ニ送ラレタトコロ後者ハ早速

「ナチズム」ト「フアツシズム」ノ否認ヲ削除シ、

ソノ原案ヲ内閣ニ返シタノデアリマス。近衛ハ日

本ノ文官ハ、モシシヨウト懸ヘバ軍部ノ強制ニ抵抗

スルコトが出来ルコトヲ示スヤウニ見エル處云ト

00-57

b、 密書 三〇九一A
 c、 ” 三〇九一A

武蔵ノ大政集費會ノ禮券支持ニ當ツテノ積極的
 役割ハ一九四一年二月下旬大政集費會顧問ノ資格
 ニ於テ彼ガナシタ次ノ際臨カラ察スルコトガ出来
 マス。即チ皇海軍ハ過去ニ於テ大政集費會ノ發展
 ニ出来待ル限リ協力シテ來タヤウニ、將來ニ於テ
 モ同旨ト充分協力スルトイフノデアリマス。彼

00-58

ニ備ヘマシタ。一九四〇年八月下旬萬木大佐トノ
 永イ會談ヲ武蔵ハ陸軍ガ如何ニ統派政黨ノ解散反
 陸軍ノ要望ニ應ジテユクベキ親軍黨ノ編成ヲ招來
 セント懸命ノ努力ヲナシテ來ツタカ、又如何ニ地ノ
 計畫ガ近衛總理ノ聲聞ガ新聞ニ發表セラレタ時打
 響ヲ蒙ツタカ「(b)トイフコトヲ述ベマシタ。時ニ
 近衛ガ單ナル軍部ノ「ロポツト」トシテ用ヒラレ
 ルコトヲ拒ンダノテ武蔵ノ悲シミハ益々ヒドクナ
 リマシタ。近衛ハ新秩序建設ニツイテハ益々苦ソ
 テ軍部ト提携シテ行キ度イガタ、彼等ノ傀儡トナ
 ルコトニハ同意シテイトイフニアルヤウニ思ハレ
 マシタ。(c)

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F-26

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-40 00-39 00-38

a、	書證	三三〇	記録	六三三〇
a、	書證	三四一		
b、	書證	一一八	〃	七四六
a、			記録	三三三六三 一六

00-40

該條約ノ第一條ニ「日本國ハ歐洲新秩序建設ニ於ケル獨逸國ト伊太利國ノ指導ヲ認メ且尊重ス」ト規定サレテアリ、一方第二條ニハ獨逸國ハ伊太利國ハ大東亞新秩序建設ニ於ケル日本國ノ指導ヲ認メ且尊重ス」ト書イテアリマス。(a)

00-39

四〇年七月二十六日ノ「日本基本政策要綱」(a) 九第二項「國防ト外交」ニ從ヒ一九四〇年九月二十七日獨逸 日本 伊太利ニヨル三口條約ガ非常ニ準ヤカニ締結サレマシタ。

2e. 武 藤 ト 三 國 條 約

ハ當時陸海軍ノ代辯者タルコトヲ認メマシタ。(a)ソレカラ一九四二年二月二十一日彼ハ大東亞建設審議會ノ幹事ニ任命サレマシタ。(b)

00-41

a、	b、	c、	d、
書證	〃	〃	〃
三三二	一〇三〇	一〇三〇	〃
記録	〃	〃	〃
六三三〇	六三六一	六三七一	六三七六

00-42

十三日前ニモ一回在答院ハ同條約ニ關スル會議
ヲ開キマシタ。二ツノ質問ガ出サレマシタ。

- (1) 「三國條約締結ノ結果トシテ日本ニ對スル合衆
國ノ経済的壓迫ガ強烈ヲ極メル危險性ハナカラウ
カ、カ、ル場合ノ對策如何？」
(2) 「最悪ノ場合

武蔵ハ一九四〇年九月二十六日ノ樞密院訓令委員
 員會々議ニ出席、同委員會ハ條約ヲ萬場一致可決シ
 シマシタ。^(a) 此ノ會議ニ於テ外務大臣松岡ハ「該
 條約ハ吾ガ帝國將來ノ外交ノ基礎ヲナス」トイフ
 コトヲ説明シマシタ。^(b) 松岡、東條及近衛ハ深井願
 問官ノ質問ニ答ヘテ「獨逸ノ援助ハ優秀ナル武器ト物資
 ノ供給ニアル」^(c) ト言ヒマシタ。鈴木顧問官ハ合
 衆國ハ海軍擴張計畫ヲヤツテ居ルト述べ此ノ點ニ
 ツイテノ意見ヲ求メマシタ。及川海軍大臣ハ日本
 ハ短期決戦ヲ勝チ得ルト言ヒマシタ。スルト鈴木
 ハ「私ハ此ノ條約ガ締結サレルト否トニカ、ハラ
 ズ日米戰爭ハ免レナイト思フ」ト言ヒマシタ。^(d)

00-43

00-42

加シタコトニ少シモ疑ヒハナイノデアリマス。彼
 ハ又殆ンドスベテノ聯絡會議ニ出席シタコトヲ認
 メタノデアリマス。(b) 田中少將ハ證言ニ、阿部内
 閣以來武蔵ノ下ニアツタ軍務局ハ終始一貫三國同
 盟ヲ唱進シ、獨逸及伊太利ノ下ノ歐洲新秩序ニ匹
 敵スル日本ニヨル東亞新秩序ノ建設ヲ主張シタト
 述ベマシタ。(c)

a、書證

三三一

記録

六三四三

a、

三三一

〃

六三〇七

六三〇八

b、

三三一

〃

一六一三

一六一三

c、

〃

〃

一五八六

一七〇

00-43

(合衆國トノ開戦) 如何ナル準備ヲシナケレバナ
 ラヌカ、一答ハ 日本ハカ、ル場合ノ爲ニ用意ヲ
 ナシ條約締結ニヨツテソノ國際的地位ヲ強化スル
 トイフ予防策ヲ講ジ又合衆國カラ得テキタ天然資
 源ヲ南太平洋及其ノ他ノ場所カラ獲得スルタメ、
 外交的、經濟的、軍事の方策ヲ講ズルコト等デア
 リマシタ。(a)

一九四〇年九月十九日 獨、日、伊樞軸ノ強化
 ニ必要ナル方策ヲ探ルコトヲ決定シタ聯絡會議ガ
 開カレマシタ。(a) 武蔵ノ局ガ陸軍ト外務省ノ聯絡
 機關デアリ該條約ガ軍事同盟ヲ含ンデキタコトヲ
 考ヘルト彼ガソノ交渉ヲ承知シテ唐リ、ソレニ參

0159 0015 2109

テ居ラズ、條約ハ日本ニ破滅ヲ來スモノトシテ反
 對シタト斷言シマシタ (a) 彼ハ又續ケテ言ヒマシ
 タ。 「三國同盟締結ノ主張者ト話ヲスル時ハイッ
 デモ上述ノ私見ヲ彼等ニ話シマシタ。或ル時獨逸
 飛行將校「グローナー」大佐ニソレヲ話シタトコ
 ロ彼ハ微笑シテウナヅキマシタ。 . . .」彼ハ東京
 ノ軍部テハ三國條約反對者トシテ知ラレテ居タト
 彼ハ述ベマシタ。(b)

a、	卷證	二三三	(七頁九頁)	記録	三三三	三三三	三三三
b、	〃	二三三	(九一—一〇頁)	〃	三三三	三三三	三三三
a、	〃	〃	〃	〃	三三三	三三三	一八一—二〇
b、	〃	〃	〃	〃	三三三	三三三	三三三

00-45

然シ武蔵ハ証人台ニ於テ彼ガ成上リ者ト時ンダ
「ヒットラー」モ「ムツソリーニ」モ共ニ信用シ

ノガ彼ノ仕事トナツタト答ヘマシタ^(b)
テ強ク、遂ニ大多數ノ意見ヲ陸軍大臣ニ提出スル
アツタカモシレナイコト、カ、ル感情ハ軍部ニ於
ニ提出シタ書類ノ中ニソノ條約ニ贊成スル陳述ガ
勸告シタカドウカヲ尋ネラレタ時、武蔵ハ、東條
マシタ^(a)カ、ル條約ハ日本ノ爲ニナルト東條ニ
於テハ彼ハ政策ニ就イテ發言權ハナカツタト認メ
シテハソレニ好意ヲ持ツテキタガ、公的ノ資格ニ
武蔵ハ集場ニ於テ訊問サレタ時、彼ハ「個人ト

00-44

武蔵ハ集場ニ於テ訊問サレタ時、彼ハ「個人ト

10-40

2

f-1

武臣ノ獨逸勳章

之ヲ差役トシテ、以テハ日本ニ於ケル獨逸

大使館大使館附軍武官及情報部ガ彼等ノ口

ガ賦與シ得々最高ノ軍ノ名譽表彰ノ一ツヲ

・ ・ ・ 彼等ノ總統ニ信ヲ置カヌ而シテ三日

條約ノ締結ニ反對シタ人ヲ推薦スルコトニ

ヨリ大ナル外交的災難ヲ演ジナカツタカドウ

カト尋ネラレマシタ。(a) 其ニ答ヘテ、武臣ハ獨

逸外務省ハ何モ失望ヲシナカツタト主張シ

マシタ。何トナレバ條約ノ締結後、其レ

ニ關係シタ種々ノ附屬事務「ガ彼ノ局ニ依

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MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-47

我々ハ、彼ノ獨逸國勳章ノ沿革、即チ彼ハ陸軍省ヨリ勳章授與ニ推薦サレタトイフ沿革ニ關シ、
 脚註ヲ加ヘタコトニ對シ確カニ武官ノ才藝ヲ受ケテ居リマス。檢察側提出法廷監第一二七二號ハ東京駐獨逸大使ヨリ柏林外務省ニ宛テタ電報デアリ、
 (a) 其ノ昌頭項目ニハ「日本陸軍ハ或ル日本人ガ三國條約締結ノ際ニ獨逸國勳章ヲ受ケルヤウ推薦セヨトノ要求ヲ以テ繰返シ武官ニ當ヒ得ツテ來タト書イテアリマス。

00-48

更ニ同電報ハ、「然シ乍ラ、兎角スルウチニ、戰爭勃發以後ハ殊ニ多數ノ日本人ガ得ゲラレバナラズ且コレヲ人々ハ、本戦争榮耀賞行ニ於ケル日獨協力ニ重大ナル貢獻ヲシテ來タシ且同時ニ彼等ハ日本政府乃至ハ陸軍ニ重要ナル地位ヲ占メテ居ルカラ互ニ主義ヲ順應シナイデセ、彼等ガ勳章ヲ受ケルコトハ妥當ト思ハレルデアリ。此レハ東條側近ノ一國ノ人々ニ關係ノアルコトデアリ、彼等ハオソラク日本ノ政策ノ具体化ニ及ボス彼等ノ決定的ニ影響ヲ暫時保留スルデアラウ。 . . . 故

E-31

47

00

記 録 一 一 三 四 七

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00-48

00-50

00-49

a

チ

a, b, c
記録 一二三五
記録 一二三五六
記録 一二三五七

a 記録 一二三五上

私ハ夫ノ被勳ヲ總統ニ推薦シタイト志フ、^(a) 閣
 長タリシ一八九二年十一月十五日黒本ニ於テ出座
 ノ虚軍中尉武藤章。彼ハ今キ茲長キ野戦指揮ヲ
 得タシ且非凡テ生涯方彼ノタメニ意見サレテ居ル
 日本ノ政策ノ遂巡ヲ無視シテ、武藤ハ其モ重要ナ
 地位ニ於テ常ニ日匈同盟ノ締結ヲ期望シテ來タ。^(a)
 勳章一、大十字勳章、彼ノ冒昧ヲ特別ニ表彰シテ^(a)
 同ジ電報中テ勿^(b)越^(b)上^(b)軍武官ハ夫ノ如キ推薦ヲシ
 タノ旨アリマス。^(b)一九三五年武藤ノ虚軍省ノ
 政治方面ノ局長トシテ武藤ハ屢々私ノ報告書ノ中
 ニ尋ゲラレテ來タ。日本虚算ニ概ツテ意見サレタ
 政治勢力ニ鑑ミテ彼ノ態度ハ^(c)非^(c)常ニ重要ナセノデ
 アツタシ且夫ルノチア^(c)。一^(c)
 武藤ニ授與シタ大十字勳章ハ有名ナ^(c)武藤總長チ
 アル杉山大尉ニ授與シタセノト同ジ勳章チアツタ
 コトハ注目スベキコトアリマス。^(a) 武藤ハ彼ノ

00-50

0--51

a

記三三八五九

00-50

b

、管證ニニニ

記一八一三

知ハ又、彼ガ武藤ヲ等初局長ニ任命シタコ
 トニ責任ガアルトイフ事、彼ノ事件ニ全々
 不利ナ影響ヲ及ボシタコトヲ暗々社ニ傳ツ
 テ極ルケテアリマス。彼ノ旨以原通ニ於テ
 知ハ「田代省人專謀長起ヲ免ジテ、彼ガ武
 藤將也ヲ復ノ地位ニ任命シタコト及後續隨
 宜大臣トシテ東條ヲ推薦シタコトニ何等價

0159 0015 2114

MUTO SUMMATION-00

10--51

訊問ニ於テ、証人等ト比較シテ、証人等長
ハ日本ニ於ケル証人等ト比較シテ、高イ絶對
的ナ利益者ナラツト述ベテ居ルマヌ。(2)

被告局ニ於ケル証人等ノ証言元自タル
被告公人等ハ、武蔵方殺ケル事ヲ認シ、被告等
ノ証言ニ對シテ、於ケル非難的ナ言ハ合ヒテ十
分ニヒツテ居ルマヌ。何トナルバ
彼ノ自認証言ニ於テ、被告等ノ証言ハ「三日月
刺ニ於ケル被告等ノ証言ニ對シテ、証人等ヲ殺
ケラレタ七名中、証人等ノ一人ヲハアツタレ」
ト指稱スルノニ當リシテ居ルマヌ。(2)

0159 0015 2115

MUTO SUMMATION-00

係ガオカツタ「コトヲ要請スルト本法廷ニ
知ラセタノテアリマス。(b) 如ハ米内内閣ノ
瓦解ニ對スル責任ニ歸シテ自分ヲ糾弾シテ
ガラ、貴族ハ彼ノ證人海軍ヲ遣ジテ武備ニ
軍ノ費メヲ負ハセタノテアリ、前々長
澤田ハ全部ノ氏名ヲ擧ゲアカツタガ、彼ガ
船ノ前任ヲ継承シタ人々ハ次官同前及一
人ハ勿論武備テアル阿南ノ部下ノ人達(c)内ニ
アツタト懸賞シタ時、彼ハ武備ヲ自標トシ
テ盾タコトニ何樂業ヒヲ爲サテカツタノテ
アリマス。

3 南方進出

一九四〇年九月二七日ノ三日條約締結ノ
一日後ニ、日本ハ秘密ニ南方方面ニ對ス
ル形式上ノ外交政策ノ計畫ヲ以テ大東亞新
秩序建設(a) 國家基本政策ヲ具体化シタノテ
アリマス。(a) 其ノ後初ノ提議トシテ「日本

F-54

00-52 00-51

- a、卷六二六
- b、記録二八八五四
- c、記録三九〇一一

記録九七五十七

0 159 00 15 2 115

MUTO SUMMATION-00

ノ南方方山進入ノ自的組織ハ・・・差管リ
比島及「グアム」ヲ採イテ「ハワイ」ノ西
部迄ノ全地球ニ互ツテ植ル。印、印、
英領「ボルネオ」及南洋羣島ガ表々ガ先ツ
要關スベキ地置デアル。(b)トアリマヌ

00-54

a
 記録 六一七四

00-53

a 記録 六九七九
 b // 六九七七
 c // 六九七九

00-54

然シテ本ニ正式ノ訂立ヲ立テル以前ニ宣旨及以
 府ハ既ニ必要ナル準備工作ヲ余程前ニ立テ、シマツ
 テ居タルテアリマス。尚ハ八一九四〇年六月二十
 四日東京駐劄御通大使ハ、被告人民海及小磯ヲ通
 ジテ印反支船ノ主船長ニ謂スル御通ノ見解ニ
 付ヨウトスル日本側ノ努力ニ謂シテ御通外務省ニ
 報告シタルテアリマス。(a)

0159 0015 2117

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-53

泰西ニ歸シテ同計置テハ「我々ハ泰西ト其國
 是ニ歸結シ且泰西ヲ彼方基地トシテ使用スベキテ
 アル。然シ乍ラ泰西ノ準備ヲ速テセル爲ニハ、我
 ヲガ往來行動ヲ開始スル迄、日泰同ノ外交關係ハ
 不安定ナルト獲フカ適切テアル。」ト述ベテ
 アリマス。(a) 佛印ニ就シテハ、我々ハ獨立行動
 起ヨ企圖シ且「フランス」ニ其ノ三權ヲ獲取サセ
 ルベキテアル。(b) 海峽植民地ニ就シテハ、「日本
 ノ直接ノ支配下ニ置カサケレバ」ラヌ。(c) トア
 リマス。

00-56

ト起ベタノテアリマス。

衆イモナク武蔵ヲシテ南方地域ニ於ケル日本
 ノ進入ノ要路ノ發展ヲ最重ニ見張ラセル事ニ、
 武蔵ハ一九四〇年十二月二十六日拓務省南洋局
 ノ參與ニ指セラレマシタ。 (a) 此ノ任命ハ無力
 ナレバ四當局ヲ除取セシメ日本領事件ニ同意セ

00-55

b

11-131-6

記録一八三五一六

c

11-131-6

記録一八三五一六

00-56

a

11-131-6

記録一八三五一六

0159 0015 2119

MUTO SUMMATION—00

年十月二十五日、齋藤代表ノ「バタビヤ」送送
秘大臣松岡宛秘密電報ハ、「インドネシヤ」ニ
於ケル油田ヲ租借セントスル日本ノ管轄ノ兵力
ノ背後ノ真ノ目的ヲ暴露シマシム。即チ「露國
軍事作戦ノ見地ヨリ」(b) 軍事志却ヲ豫定スル
ト云ウコトデアリマシタ。地球ヲ半周シテ「ベ
ルリン」ニ於テ來極大役モ亦糸ヲ引イテイマシ
タ。一九四〇年十一月二十九日、來極ハ日露協
定及ビ日露協定ノ締結ガ「シヤム」ヲ含ム中口
ノ南ノ地域ヘノ日本ノ進出ノ先決條件デアリ、
「同地域」ノ利用ナクシアハ、「シンガポール」
ヲ陥落ニ到ラシメルコトハ殆ンド不可能ナラン
(c)

F-59

00-57

c b a

「一九〇六

「一九〇六

「一九〇六

「一九〇六

00-56

c b

「一九〇六

「一九〇六

00-58

ケル地帯に於て、及び勿印島嶼ニ於ケル必取ナキ
 取ノ取電ノ如キ、泰日及び勿印ニ於ケル凡ユル
 準備方策ヲ促進スルコトヲ決定シマシタ。(b)
 空軍ハ更ニ「勿印政府又ハ勿印官局ガ我方ノ取
 取ニ應ジナイ場合ハ、我々ハ武力ニヨリ目的ヲ
 達成スル」コトニ意見ガ一致シマシタ。(c)リ目付ヲ

他ノ日本ノ指針若シハ如何ナル代償ヲ拂ツテモ
 勿印ノ「ロシア」に取電ノ取後、武庫及び其ノ

0159 0015 2120

MUTO SUMMATION—00

00—57

シメタトコロノ日本毎原ノ東京日計ニ於ケル商
度支辦准入ノ約三ヶ月後ニナサレタモノデアリ
マス。(b) 一九四一年三月十七日、武蔵ハ地方
開發金庫設立委員ニ補セラレマシタ。(c)

武蔵ガタシカニ出船シテイタト思ハレル一ノ
重要ナ連絡官計ガ一九四一年六月二十五日ニ
カレ、此ノ官計ハ「地方ニ於ケル方策ノ促進ニ
スル件」(a)ト題スル官計ヲ可決シマシタ。此
ノ官計ハ航空基地ノ設定、勿印内特定地域ニ於

00-60

一九四一年七月二十八日若シクハ其ノ前後、東
 條ノ言ニ依レバ、四万ノ日本軍隊ヲ南都印度支那
 ニ上陸シマシタ。(b)
 同日武蔵ハ軍事協力ニ關ス
 ル日本ト獨逸支配下ノ「ヴィシー」佛蘭西間ノ議
 定書ヲ討論シタ。極密院會議ニ出席シマシタ。(b)
 木戸ハ一九四一年八月七日ノ日記ニ「ジンガポー
 ル」ト比島」ノ占領ハ「南印ニ於ケル上」ヲ成功

00-59

a 會議 六四〇 記錄 七〇三七
 b 會議 六四一 記錄 七〇四三

00-60

a 會議 六四九 記錄 七〇七三
 b 會議 六四九 記錄 七〇六九

0159 0015 2122

00-59

3b 南部印度支那侵入

「シンガポール」ニ向ツテノ次ノ進出ハ南部印度支那ヲ進シテテアリマシタ。一九四一年七月十日陸軍部加藤大使ハ電報テ軍事要地獲得ノ爲南部佛印ニ出兵スルト言ウ閣議決定及ビ此ノ閣議決定ヲ佛口政府ニ傳達シ、ソノ申入レノ實行ニハ武力ヲ用ヒルト言ウ申入レノ通報ヲ受ケマシタ。(a)

二日後、佛受セル東京發東京宛秘密電報ハ佛印占領ノ「管面ノ目的」ハ「右地域ニ於イテ、我が目的ヲ達成シ」且「同地ヨリ奇襲ヲ敢行スル」コトデアルト述ベマシタ。第一抵抗ガ試ミラレタル場合ニハ「我等ハ武力ヲ以ツテ之ヲ粉砕シ之ヲ占領シ且

戒嚴令ヲ施行スベシ」(b)

トナツテオリマス。

0159 0015 2123

MUTO SUMMATION—00

00—61

セシムル不可俟ノ先決要件デアッタト記シマシ
タ。(c) 何故ナラ「傍印ノ占領」ノ後「次ニ我々
ノ決定表ニノツテイルノハ傍印ニ對スル最後遺牒
ノ送附デアアル」(a)カラデアリマス。

武蔵ハ「帝國ハ「情勢ノ推移ニ伴フ帝國々策要
綱」中、南方ニ對スル施策ヲ遂行ス」ト言ウ

決定(b)ヲ採擧シタトコロノ一九四一年九月六日
ノ御前會議(c)ニ出席シマシタ。若シ十月上旬頃

(一九四一年)ニ到ルモ交渉ガ成功シナケレバ「
直チニ對米(英蘭)開戦ヲ決意ス」(c)ト言フ決

議ガ爲サレマシタ。

00-64	00-63		
a	c b	a	a
			記録
			一〇二一八
			記録
			一六一四五
			記録
			一六一四五
			記録
			一六一四五

東條及木村ノ兩將ニト共ニ武官ハ「杉山ノ之等ノ指示ヲ知ツテ居リマシタ。何トナレバ當時ノ軍令官トシテ本軍トノ關係ヲ得スル決定ト取扱ヒ方ノ性質自体カラ見テモ、彼等三名ハコノ指示ヲ知ラネバナラナカツタシ又知ツテ居ツタノデアリマス」

(a)

0159 0015 2124

HUTŌ SUMMATION-00

00-63

戦争準備

目送トシ戦争準備ヲ完璧スルコトガ武蔵ガ出席
シタ九月六日ノ御前會議ノ熱慮ノ上ノ結論デアツ
タノデアリマス。(2)

參謀總長杉山ハ參謀本部作戰部長田中新一ニ「ジ
ヤヴァ」 「ボルネオ」 「ピスマルク」 「蘭印」 及
比島ノ諸島ニ對シ「作戦準備ヲ開始スルヤウ」 訓
令シタノデアリマス。(b) 七月二日ノ連絡會議後

田中ハ前述ノ圖々ニ對スル出征ニ關スル作戰研究
ヲスル様ニ指示サレマシタ。(c)

ノ油田租借ノ要求ノ背後ニアル真ノ目的ハ搾取ノ見地カラ」(a) 軍事基地ニ使用スルニアツタノデアリマス。

00-66

一九四〇年九月二十六日武蔵ガ出席シタ秘密院
 憲法委員合ニ於テ東條ハ「最悪ノ事態ニ陥リタル際」ニ對處スル爲メノ日本ノ準備ニ關スル質問ニ答ヘテ對米競争ニハ陸軍ノ力限リ陸軍兵力ノ一部ノミヲ展開スルト述ベタノデアリマス。(a)

00-66 00-65

a	d	c	b
書證	書證	書證	書證
一〇三〇	一三一六	一三〇九	五三三
記録	記録	記録	記録
六三三三	一一八三六	一一七八七	六二五七
		一九三	

0159 0015 2125

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-65

九月六日ノ御前會議ノズツト以前カラ日本ノ
 準備ハ熱狂的ニ進歩シツ、アツタノデアリマス。
 以ニ一九四〇年七月十七日ニ「香港ニ對スル万
 ノ場合必要ナル攻撃ニ備ヘテ攻口砲兵中隊ハ既ニ
 動員サレタ旨ノ極秘内報ヲ日本海軍本部ヨリ」得タト「オット」大使
 ハ「遠征隊本前ニ報告シタノデアリマス。(b)一ヶ月前ニ日本ハ「將來
 起ルベキ如何ナル情勢ニ於テモ」前年日本ニ輸出
 シテ居ツタ正炭量ヲ送カニ越ヘル大量ノ原料ヲ日
 本向ニ輸出スルヤウ直接保障ヲ印ニ要求シタノ
 デアリマス。(c) 既ニ指摘シマシタ通り早クモ一
 九四〇年十月ニ於ケル日本ニ較ル「インドネシア」

00-67

00-66

f e d c b a
記記記記記記
記記記記記記

d c b

八八八三八
二四四四〇五
六六六四二二
二二一 五

一〇
二記記
記記記

八
四二八
〇六二
六五

記七一
記二
一八
六六七

記記記
記記記

六六六
三三三
七六五
六五二

「ほ」 親手票ハ南印ヲ使用スル爲メノモノデ「キ
ルグー」券ノ名稱ニナツテ居リマシタ。(d) 「K」
號ハ美領馬來、美領「ボルネオ」及泰印ヲ使用ス
ルモノデ(0) 弟ノ名稱テ出來テ居リマシタ。「ほ」
號ハ比島ヲ使用スルモノデ「ベソ」ノ名稱テ出來
テ居リマシタ。(f) 空用手票發行ノ目的ハ「南方

0159 0015 2126

MUTO SUMMIATION—00

海軍大臣及川ハ俄國ニ對スル日本艦隊ノ準備ハ完
成シテ居テ、「相當長期」續ケルダケノ軍需品、
特ニ原油ハ十分ニアル (b) ガ、大規模ノ艦隊ト艦
隊トノ設備ヲ整備トシテ言ヘバ半年カ一年ノ中ニ
日本ノ財源ハ潤滑スルタラウト預言シタノデアリ
マス。 (a) 然シ及川ハ遠慮即決ナラバ日本ハ勝ツ
ト佳念ニ説服シマシタ。 (d)

00—67

氏ニ一九四一年一月十六日ニ陸軍省ハ大藏省ニ
對シテ案方函 (e) ニ於テ使用スル手票原型ヲ準備
スルヤウ至急要求シマシタ。ソノ月ノ中ニ大藏大
臣ハ手票印刷ヲ命ジマシタ。 (b) 五月迄ニハ紙幣ノ
幾分カハ既に印刷ガ出来上ツテ居リマシタ。 (c)

F-46

00-67

j	i	h	g
書記	書記	書記	書記
八五二	八四四	八四二	八四五
一六頁	四	一三	七

0159 0015 2127

MUTO SUMMATION-00

方面ニ作戦スル場合ヲ考慮シ軍費支拂」ヲスルタ

メデアツタノデアリマス。(g)

其ノ後、一九四一年九月十三日三千七百二十萬

「ペソ」ヲ印刷スルヤウ要求サレマシタ。(h) 又

四千三百八十六萬弗ヲ印刷スル要求モアリマシタ。(i)

是レ等ハ皆、陸軍省軍務局自身ノミナラズ軍

務課モ知ツテ居リマシタ。(j)

00-67a

e	d	c	b	a
記	記	記	記	書
球	球	球	球	證

九	九	九	八	
〇	〇	〇	九	八
九	九	九	〇	六
三	一	〇	八	八
				一
				A

記球八八一七

00-67b

ノ 陸軍省ノ「參謀長」役トシテ武蔵ハ此等スベテ
 準備ヲ知ツテ居リ且關係ガアツタノデアリマス。

彈藥等ヲ選取シタノデアリマス。(c) 彈藥集積所
 ガ建テラレ、(d) 更ニ多クノ機関及彈藥機カ選
 バレテ來タノデアリマス。(e)

0159 0015 2128

00-67a

ルタメニ、總力戰研究所ヲ設立スル勅令ガ一九四〇年九月三十日ニ公布サレタノデアリマス。(a)

研究所ハ當時豫期サレテ后リ其後ニ起ツタ情勢ノ「机上演習」ヲ行ツテ后タノデアリマス。(b)

角スルウチニ日本ハ國際連盟ガ日本ニ委ネテ后タ

信用ニ背イテ委任統治諸島ニ要基ヲ設ケタノデア

リマス。一九四〇年ノ初メニ高城他及沿岸砲台、

及其他ノ壘ノ兵器ガ「アスリート」飛行場ニ備附

ケラレマシタ。又當時N&K列島ハ埴哨カラ「ア

スリート」海軍飛行基地へ飛行機ノ部分品、砲、

元參謀本部作戦部長ノ田中新一甲將ハ「準備ニ對
 スル事務ハ參謀本部ニ依ツテ行ハレマシタカ補給
 及兵力等ノ様ナ實際的ナ準備ハ陸軍省ガ取り計ラ
 ヒマシタ。武蔵甲將ハ陸軍省ノ軍務局長デアツタ
 ノテ作戦ノ準備ニ對スル説明ハ參謀本部ガ彼ニ對
 シテ行ハナケレバナリマメンデシタ。彼ハ補給及
 經費ニ對スルコトハ特ニ好ク知ツテ居リマシタ。』
 ト我々ニ自信ヲ以テ述べタノデアリマス。(a) 陸
 軍省時代カラノ武蔵ノ舊知デアル田中隆吉少將ハ
 參謀本部ニテ作成ヲ見タ詔計費ヲ實現スルタメニ
 ハ「參謀本部ガ先ヅ陸軍省ニ於ケル金銭、資金、
 及ビコレラノ計費ヲ實現スル方法ヲ取扱フ局即チ
 軍務局ノ承諾ヲ得ル事ガ必要デアツタ」ト證言シ
 マシタ。(b) 武蔵ガ陸海軍豫算中陸軍豫算ヲ取扱
 ツタ際、一九三九年ノ年額ハ豫算總額八十億八千
 三百六十六萬二千圓ノ中ノ六十四億一千七百六十
 四萬六千九百九十九圓ニ跳ネ上リマシタ。一九三
 六年ニハ同年ノ豫算總額二十三億一千七百七十二
 萬四千圓ノ中、陸海軍豫算ハ僅カ十億七千五百萬

05-67b
 a 記 録 一〇二四六
 b 記 録 一五八六一

0 159 00 15 2 129

00-68
 c b a
 記 書 書
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 三 四 四
 二 六 六
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 四 一 A 一 A
 記 記
 以 以
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 三 三
 二 二
 一 一
 六 三
 三 三
 二 二
 一 一
 五

00-67b
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 八 五
 四 〇
 一 二

成ニ盡力」ヲ要請シタトコロノ台湾軍參謀長宛ノ
 密電ヲ準備サセマシタ。(a) 台湾軍司令官ハ「湖
 洲及ビ恒春ノ飛行場ノ第一期工事ヲ完成セリ」ト
 報告ヲシマシタ。(b) 此書類ハ「台湾ニ於ケル空
 中作戦準備ノ件」ト云フ件名發送ノ中ニアリマシ
 タ。而シテ武蔵ヲ「加任局長」トシテ檢證シテ居
 リマス。(c) 書類ガ證據トシテ提出サレル以前ニ、

0159 0015 2130

00-68

割デアリマシタ。一九四〇年ニハソレハ百十億三
 千三百七十六萬九千圓ノ中六十七億六千六百六十
 四萬五千九百二圓ニ増加シマシタ。又一九四一年
 ニハ百九十二億五千三百二十五萬七千圓ノ中百五
 十四億四千六百七十一萬一千九百三十一圓ニ跳ネ
 上リマシタ。(c)

飛行場建設等ニ關スル比較的些細ノ舉柄デサヘ
 モ武蔵及ビ彼方統轄スル局ガ取扱ツテ居リマシタ。
 即チ一九四一年六月十四日同局ノ軍務課ハ陸軍次
 官木村ノ爲メニ「時局ニ鑑ミ引續キ爾後ノ作業完

00-69

a
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察

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記
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00-68

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録 録

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三 三
二 二
一 一
〇 〇

サレ得ナイ一カ知レタ後不與政府が大使ニ質問シ
タ時回答資料トシテ一九四一年、七月十一日ニ
軍務局方外務省ノ爲ニ原案ヲ作成シマシタ。(a)
因ミニ、日本軍ノ増援ハ獨逸軍カ「ソ」聯邦ニ侵
略シテ西歐國境ヲ越ヘタ約二週間後ニ行ハレマシ
タ。

0159 0015 2131

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-69

武蔵ハ彼ノ局ガ早クモ一九四一年六月ニ台湾ニ於ケル飛行場ノ建設ヲ涉取ラス(狂)的ナ仕事ニ從事シタルコトヲ否定シマシタ。(a) 彼ハ戦争ノ第一日ニ台湾カラ海軍機ガ比島ノ「クラーク」ファイールド」ヲ攻撃シタコトヲ承認シマシタ。(e)

種々ノ方面ニ於ケル日本軍隊ノ増強ハ武蔵及彼ノ局ニ依テ知ラレタノミナラズ、尙亦増強ノ背後ノ策除ノ意圖ヲ慮散スル言詳ヲ作ルノガ彼等ノ仕事デアリマシタ。例ヘバ、「澎湖既占ノ陸軍部隊ノ増強サレタ等(少)クトモ當分期カル擧ハ明カニ

P-51

00-70

a

學

記

1

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大

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記

以

九

八

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三

MUTO SUMMATION-OC

00-70

4b 外 交 交 渉

一九四一年ノ春、太平洋ニ於ケル懸念ヲ平和裡
ニ解決スル爲ニ日本交渉ガ「ワシントン」ヲ駁始
サレマシタ。 (a) 全交渉ヲ遂ジテ、米國ト英國ガ
滿洲ト中國トヲ日本ノ轄取ニ任セルナラバ、日本
ハ戰争ヨリ寧ロ平和ヲ欲シテ居タト云フコトガ即
白デアリマシタ。

0159 0015 2132

00-72

00-71

a. 記録

三三〇〇三

b. 〃 a. 記録

三三〇〇〇 三三〇〇〇 三三〇〇〇 三三〇〇〇

00-72

岩畔ハ彼ガ「ワシントン」ニ居タ間、彼ノ上官、武蔵カラ何等指示ヲ受ケズ、彼モ亦、武蔵ニ何等報告ヲ送ラナカツタト頑強ニ主張シマシタ。(a) 然モ一瞬ノ後、彼ハ法廷ガ辯護第三四四三號トシテ受理シタ檢察側文書第三一二七號、一九四一年六月二日附、「軍務局長ヨリ岩畔大

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-71

4b-I

武蔵ハ此交渉デ非常ニ活躍シテ、大ナル影響ヲ有シテ居リマシタ。正ニ「ワシントン」ニ於テ、彼ハ彼ノ部下、軍務課長、岩畔「ヒデヲ」大佐ヲ、野村大使ノ下テ勤務スル様ニサセマシタ。岩畔ハ左ノ如ク證言シマシタ。即チ軍服ヲ着テ現役軍人ノ資格デ、彼ハ「野村大使ヲ補佐スル軍務局附武官トシテ渡不シ」^(a)彼ハ「ハル」長官及國務省ノ他ノ官吏ニ依ツテ重責ヲ負サレ、彼ハ「了解原案」ノ創案者デアリ、彼ガ野村ニ「ハル」トノ會談ニ伴ハレ、此會談デ彼ハ彼自身ノ意見ヲ自由ニ述べル機會ヲ與ヘラレタト。^(b)

0159 0015 2133

00 - 72

a	c	b
.	.	・
1	1	証
		三四三
		記録
"	"	三三〇一〇一
三三〇〇四	三三〇一一	三三〇一〇一

ニ達マレルコトニナリ或ハ日本ガソノ義務ヲ
 自ラ解釋シテ行動スルコトヲ求メラレルヤウナ
 事情ニナレバ、日本ハ米國ニ對シテ武器ヲ執ル
 コトヲ甚ダ残念ニ思フテハアラウガ、ソノ義務
 ヲ果タスヲ餘儀ナシト感ズルデアラウト説明シ
 マシタ。(d)

佐へ」ノ極秘電報ヲ眞正デアルト檢證シマシタ。(b)
其電報デ、武蔵ハ、「ルーズベルト」大統領ノ
煇邊爾談ヲ批判シテ「日本ハ米國參戰ノ場合ト
雖モ、米國ヲ攻撃スル三國同盟ノ義務ヲ拒否ス
ルナラントノ殊更自己ニ有利ナル判斷強キガ如
シ」トノ意見ヲ述べマシタ。(c) 武蔵ノ反動ハ
二日後「ワシントン」デ「ワードマン、バーク
ホテル」ニ於ケル「ハル」長官トノ會談デ岩畔
ニ依ツテ選カニ語ラレマシタ。岩畔ハ「ハル」
ニ對シ、ソノ了解ノ目的ガ日本ヲシテ三國條約
カラ送サカルコトヲ得シムルニアリト假定スル
コトハ全ク間違ッテキテ、真一不敵ガ歐州戰爭

00-74

00-73

a . 証
 三二九八

b . 証
 三二九八

a . 証
 三三〇一一二

タ。外務省ノ或ル職員ガ若時ノ「ワシントン」ニ於ケル干渉ヲ得マズ、ソコテ東條ハ、今後ノ交渉ニ對スル如何ナル態度ヲモ進ケル爲、彼ニ建議ヲ命ジタノデアリマス。(b) シカシ反對派間ニ於テ、若時ハ彼自身ノ要請ニヨツテ召遣セラレタノダト言ヒマシム。彼ハ交渉ガヤ、困難

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-73

又電報中ニ於テモ（書誌第三四四三號）前記
 ハーローズベルト「大統領ノ「木蘭ノ暗殺ガ暴
 シク強化シ居リ」「英艦必要物資ガ英艦ニ届ク
 タメ必要ナルアラユル手段ヲ執ルベシ」トノ公
 言及ビ蔣介石ノ「流賊」ヲ補給シタコトニ言及
 致シマシタ。武蔵ハ岩崎ニ「上達ノ要領ハ當方
 ノ希望ト相反スル」ト述べ「我ノ意圖スル所ナ
 リ」ト彼ニ警告シマシタ。(a)

00-74

一九四一年八月、日本軍隊ノ印度支那進駐後、
 岩崎ハ日本ニ歸リマシタ。(a) 岩崎ハ歸郷スル
 ト同時ニ、武蔵カラ、彼ガ「ワシントン」ヨリ
 召還セラレタ理由ヲ告ゲラレタト主張セシマシ

0159 0015 2135

30-74

d	0
・	・
〃	〃
	三三〇〇五
	三三〇〇六

30-75

東京ニ於テ、交渉ノ陣中、武蔵ハ、華僑會館
 4a-9 東京ニ於ケル武蔵ノ後報
 和商會館、松宿院會館其ノ他西洋民主及美國家
 ニ對スル説力ヲ結メ付ケル目途ミノ決定ヲ待リ
 出ス計畫ニ参加シテ、言ニ言フ蜜蜂ノ蜂ニ多忙デ
 アリマシタ。証録一〇三號タケデモ、一九

ニナツテ來タノデ、私ハ日本ニ打撃シテ計程ヲ
 報告シタイト言ヒマシタ。サウシテ、ソノ實態
 ニ對スル回答テ私ハ召還セラレタノデス。(c)
 ト述べマシタ。岩崎ハ、日本軍隊ノ印度支那進
 出ニヨツテ、「ワシントン」ニ於ケル交渉ハ「
 大ナル困難ニ逢着シ」、米陸大統領ハ凍結令ヲ
 發シ、「ハル」長官ハ野村及ビ岩崎ニ對シ、印
 度支那進入ハ日本側ニ於テ太平洋問題ニ關シ實
 際ニ平穩的交渉ニ入ルコトニツイテ誠意ヲ傳イ
 テイルコトヲ聲明シタト言ハサルヲ行ナカッタ
 トイフコトヲ否認イタシマシタ。(d)

00-77	00-76	00-75		
a . 記録	a . 記録	d . "	c . "	b . "
三三五六	五八八	二六九〇九	二六一九七	二六一四五
記録	記録			記録
三三一九三	六五六六	二六一五〇		一〇〇五一
〇〇	〇〇			一六三
一五	一五八			
〇一六	出			
出				

00-77 一九四一年九月六日、御前會議方開催サレタ
 當日、武蔵下岡ハ外務大臣官邸テ中國ニ提出ス
 ベキ「和平宣言」ヲ討議シマシタ。(a) 一九四一

00-76 既ニ提議シタ如ク、武蔵ハ、南進計畫ヲ如何
 ナル程在ラ拂ツテモ遂行スル旨決定シタ一九四
 一年七月二日ノ重大ナ御前會議ニ出席シテオリ
 マシタ。(a)

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MITO SUMMATION-00

四一年一月十三日ヨリ一九四一年七月二十一日ニ
 至ル三十五回ノ連絡會ヲ計立シテオリマスガ、
 ソノ終テニ武蔵ハ出席シマシタ。(a) 前於務省
 アメリカ局長山本熊一ハ、一九四一年十月二十
 三日ヨリ十一月二日迄毎日連絡會ヲ開催サレ
 十一月六日カラ十一月二十九日マテノ間ニハ五
 六回ノ連絡會ヲ開催サレタト證言イタシマシ
 タ。(b) 武蔵ハソレ等會ニ規則正シク出席シ
 テキマシタ。(c) 山本ハ更ニ、正式ノ會ヲトハ
 別ニ、武蔵及ビ岡ト會行シタト述ベマシタ。(d)

00-78

a . 1

記録

10218

00-77

b . 警政

一二五1F

記録

10792

c . 〃

三四五六

証証

一二五1F

00-79

武蔵ハ一九四一年十一月五日ノ御前會議ニ參
 加シタノデアリマス。御前會議デハ「吾國國策
 遂行ノ要領」ニ關ヒスル對外措置 方是該サレ
 タノデアリマス。獨乙及伊太利ニ對スル方針ニ
 關シテハ「日本交渉決裂シ戰爭不可避ト認メラ
 レタル際ハ大体十一月二十五日以後ト想定ス」

MUTO SUMMATION-00

年九月二十二日ニ、コノ條件ハ東京駐劄「グル
 大使ニ渡サレタノデアリマス。(b) 他ノ日本ノ指
 導者ノ如ク武蔵ト岡ハ若シ中國ガ日本ノ傀儡滿洲
 國ヲ承認シ中國ノ天然資源ノ開發ヲ許シ「中國
 領土内ノ一定地域ニ必要ナ勦尙中」(c) 日本陸
 軍及海軍ヲ駐屯スルコトヲ許ス限リ、中國ト和
 平ヲ望ンダノデアリマス。

亦一九四一年九月六日ニ「日本ハ南洋政策ヲ
 遂行シ若シ一九四一年十月始メマデニ交渉ガ不
 成功ニ終ツタ場合ハ「アメリカ合衆國ハ英國

及紐西ラニ對シテ即時戦争ヲ行フ」コトヲ決定
 シタ御前會議ニ出席シタノデアリマス。(a)

印	不	ニ	種	ナ	ノ	對	シ	開	ク	外	交	ハ	我	ノ	企	國	起	ナ	國	ノ	對	シ	帝	ノ	國	ニ	春	通	ス	開	ハ	給	ス	タ	マ	(a)	
...

6510 5100 6510

00-79

a

11K2

11K2

温度 10mm 第一

b

”

11K2

” 10mm

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-80 樂島ニ於テ、武蔵ハ星野ト岡ト共ニ一九四一年十一月ノ連絡會議ニ於ケル對米戰爭ヲ行フベキ決定ヲ支持シタカ如何カト訊問サレマシタ。武蔵ハ「サウ云ヘルデセウガ、我々ハ何レトモ決定スル地位ニアリマセンデシタ。」彼ハ戰爭ヲ行フ決定ヲ避ケル爲ニ何か爲シタカト尋ネラレタニ對シ、彼ハ「私ハシマセンデシタ」ト答ヘマシタ。(a)

被告東郷ノ反對訊問ノ際ニ、首席檢察官ガ、「本裁判ノ核心」(b)デアルト述ベタ一九四一年十一月一日、二日ノ連絡會議ハ「午前二時頃終ツタ」(c)ソシテ若シA案又ハB案ガ拒絶サレタ場合ハ米國ニ對シ戦端ヲ開クコトヲ終ニ決定シタノデアリマス。(d)

00-81 東郷ハソノ任意供述書ニ於テ、(.) 武蔵ハ一九四一年十月二十三日ヨリ同年十二月八日迄ノ間ニ關カレタ連絡會議ニ出席シタト云フ事、(b)

E-59

- 00-81. 00-80
- a、 電話 三四〇人 一K131、一K130
 - b、 電話 三四〇人 一K034
 - c、 電話 三四〇人 一K036
 - d、 電話 三四〇人 一K038、一K039
- b a、 電話 三四〇人 一K038
- b、 電話 三四〇人 一K039

東郷ガソノ任意僕達等ノ中テ武臣、岡及ヒ星野
 ニ不利ナ效果ヲ有ラス斷ラ被殺シヨウト忠實ニ
 然シ無款ニ努力ヲ拂ツタ時ニ、口テ胡化ス
 云フ東郷ニトツテハ遺憾ナコトヲ露呈シタコト
 ガ三六、〇五八頁ヨリ三六〇八六頁迄ノ間ニ證
 明サレテ居リマス。

00-81
 e、記 三六〇七三
 d、記 三六〇八二
 c、記 三六〇八四

MUTO SUMMATION-00

「同會議ニ於テハ全員ガ活潑ナ役割ヲ果シタ」(c)

ト云フ事、武蔵ハ同及ビ星野ト共ニ「同會議

ニ提出サレタ各種ノ計畫ト提案ヲ説明シタ」(d)

ト云フ事、及び「此ノ三名ハ同會議ニ於ケル討

議ニ参加シタ」(c) ト云フ事ヲ述ベマシタ。討議

ニ参加スルト云フ事ハ、其ノ何レカニ味方シ、

議論ヲ交ヘ、信ジサセ、納得サセ、氣持ヲ動か

シ、相手ノ意見ヲ作り上ゲル事デアリマス。此

レハ一般説明者ノ機能ヲ遙カニ凌駕スルモノデ

アリマス。武蔵ハ活潑ナ討論者トシテ、政策制

立機關ノ中ニ重要ナ役割ヲ占メテ居リマシタ。

0159 0015 2142

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-82

御前會議ニ於テ、書類ヲ配布シタニ通ギナイ
 ト云フ武蔵ノ云ヒ分ハ、一九三九年及ビ一九四
 〇年少尉ノ階級ニ在リ、一九四一年ニハ日本算
 ノ第二番目ノ最高階級タル中尉ノ位ニ在ツタト
 云フ事ヲ認メタト云フ事ト對比シテ、全く滑稽
 ニ思ハレマス。(a) 武蔵ノ進ベル所ニ依レバ、海
 軍側ノ爲ニ書類ノ配布ヲセヤツテイタ岡ハ日本
 海軍ノ第二番目ノ最高階級タル海軍中尉デアリ
 マシタ。(b) 陸軍中尉及海軍中尉ガ、宗内人トシ
 テ働イタリ、營法廷ノ裁判官各位ニ書類ヲ配布
 シタリスル兵卒ト同ジ級ヲ行フト云フ事ハ、
 正常ナ考ヘラ持ツ者デアルナラバ、誰ガ考ヘ
 ルデセウカ。勅令第三一四號ハ、武蔵ニ對シ、
 「國防以策一般ニ關スル事項」及ビ「國際的規
 約ニ關スル事項」ヲ掌ル義務ヲ課シテ居リマス。(c)
 戦争或ハ平和ニ關スル重要ナ課題ガ討論サレソ
 シテ決定サレル會議ニ於テ極ヤ變ノ風ヲシタリ、
 書類ヲ配ル丈デハ、「國防以策一般」及ビ「國際
 的規約」ニ關スル事項ヲ掌ルコトハ到底有リ得
 ナイデアリマス。

00-82

- a、記録 三三一八〇
- b、記録 三三一八〇
- c、符號 七四、一頁四頁

E-61

00-84

公式詔書録ハ、(a) 天皇ニ御弼ノ責任ヲ負ウ
 者ハ其ノ詔ニ出席スベキモノナリトノ主旨ニ
 從ツテ、武庫方天皇ノ召集ニヨリ十一月十三日
 ノ御前會議ニ出席シタルコトヲ何等異議ノ餘地ナ
 ク説明スルモノデアリマス。十一月五日内閣ガ
 「從來ノ通例ノ人員ニ加エテ」武庫外六名ノ高

00-83

a 御察惟文書三〇九〇一D
 b 記 錄三三一八一
 c 三三一八四

00-84

a 御察惟文書三〇九〇一D

其レニ加フルニ、我々ハ、武蔵ノ御前會議ニ
 加ノ眞ノ性質ニ關シ説明ヲ具ヘル、一九四〇年
 十一月十三日ノ御前會議ノ秘密公式謄本ヲ有
 シテ居リマス。(a) 武蔵ハ、此ガ十一月十三日
 ノ御前會議ニ出席セルコトヲ否認シ、且其ノ謄
 本ガ證據トシテ提出サレルノヲ阻止セント大
 イニ努力シタノデアリマス。其ノ公式謄本ヲ
 示サレ、且其レガ侍從職官内省文書謄本記官
 「鈴木マサミ」ニ依リ複製ナリト説明セラレタ
 旨ヲ告ゲラレタ時、武蔵ハ何處迄モ其ノ會議ニ
 出席シタコトヲ否認シ給ケ、(b) 且全ク其ノ文
 書ヲ信認シ得ヌ旨主張シタノデアリマス。(c)

0159 0015 2143

P-63

0159 0015 2144

MUTO SUMMATION-00

級官吏が會議ニ出席スルヨウ召集サルベシト公
式ニ要求シタル旨を察任書第三〇九〇號―D
ニ記サレテヨリマス。侍從長、侍從次長及内大
臣が相談ヲ受ケマシタ。侍從次長ハ、参加者範
圍ノ擴大ニ異議ヲ持ツ旨ノ意見ヲ表達シタノテ
アリマス。所謂御前會議ハ原則トシテ天皇ニ對
シ御觸ノ責任ヲ負ウ者ヨリ成ルベキモノデア
ル以上、結局内閣ノ要求ハ許容サレタノデアリマ
ス。(b)

00-84

b

警察文書三〇九〇―D

0 159 00 15 2 145

AUTO SUMMATION-00

00-85

武藤ガ物事ノ成行ヤ日本ノ上層官僚ノ考エ方
 ヲ左右スル権カト威信トヲ有シテキタコトガ、
 彼自身ノ証人ニシテ、元武藤ノ軍務課ノ一員タ
 リシ「イシイ」アキホニヨリ、不知不識ノ間
 ニ暴辱サレタノデアリマス。「イシイ」ハ一九
 四一年十一月一日眞夜中ノ連絡會議ニ於テ、乙
 架ハ「學前ニ陸海軍統帥部ニ見セナイテ席上デ初
 メテ東郷外務大臣カラ「提出サレタル宮際遊シ
 タノデアリマス。(a) 白熱セル議論ガ杉山參謀總
 長ト東郷トノ間ニ殺キマシタガ、議論ハ非常ニ
 重大ナル危機トナツタ (b) 休息中武藤ハ廊下デ
 杉山ニ話シカケテ、杉山ガ無理ナ態度ヲ取ツテ
 キル旨話シタノデアリマス。(c) 會議ガ再ビ始ツ
 タ時、杉山ハ武藤ノ諫言ニ留意シテ意見ヲ快ク
 東郷ノ見解ニ従イ乙架ニ賛成シタノデアリマス。(d)
 此ノ一片ノ辯護側證據ノミニテモ平和カ戦争カ、
 善カ悪カニ對スル日本ノ劃期的ナ決定ヲ左右ス
 ル爲クベキ努力ヲ武藤ガ持ツテキタコトヲ、疑
 問ノ餘地ナク證明スルモノデアリ、而シテ不幸
 ニモ彼ハ、最善ノ努力ヲ戦争ト悪ノ方ニ向ケタ

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00-85	a、	記錄	三三六八三
	b、	記錄	三三六八三
	c、	記錄	三三六八三
	d、	記錄	三三六八三

0159 0015 2176

90-86
b, 警証

三四五四

記録

三三一〇三
三三一〇三
三三一〇三

特⁰⁰⁻⁸⁶ 武藤自叙ハ、日米外交交渉ノ途中ニ於テ、「
 宛ルニ一九四一年八月頃、日本ガ米販ニ對シテツ
 宛ルニニ談歩ヲシタ時、「私ガ其ノヤウナ談
 歩ヲシタノデアルト思フ」トイウ容認ヲナシタ
 ノデアリマス。(a) 武藤ハ、此等ノ談歩ヲシタ爲
 ニ東條ガ彼ヲ叱責スルヨウナコトハ決シテナカ
 ツタ旨陳述シタノデアリマス。(b)

ノデアリマス。此ノ特殊ナ機會ニ武藤ハ如何ニ
 スレバ米國ヲ最モ充分ニ恐嚇出來カノ問題ヲ解
 決スルニ當リ、杉山ヨリ一層ノ外交的巧妙サヲ
 示シタノデアリマス。武藤ハ共同ノ目的ヲ達成
 スル爲メ策略ヲ變エルノニ自在且檢微デアツタ
 ニ對シ、一方杉山ハ、特ニ野ガ在中國日本軍ノ
 名特、榮督ニ歸スル場合ニ自己ノ立場ニ於テ
 率直ニシテ且屢々、頑迷デアツタノデアリマス。
 武藤ガ彼ノヨリ洗練サレタ方法ニ杉山ヲ惹キツ
 ケルニハ大シタ時間ヲ製シナカツタノデアリマ
 ス。

尋ネラレテ武藤ハ「ソウデス」ト答エタノデア
リマス。(c)

00-88 4a-2-a
一九四一年十一月十三日ノ武藤案

00-88
一九四一年十一月十八日武藤ハ「ワシントン」
ニ於テ交渉ガ成功シタ場合ノ情分ニ應ズル爲ニ
外務省ノ山本ニ文書デ案ヲ提出シタノデアリマ
ス。(a) 武藤ノ案デハ日本ノ太平洋ニ於ケル平和

00-88	00-87		
a、	b、	a、	音證
〃	〃	〃	〃
三三	二二	二二	一一
四四	二二	二二	一一
四五	四一	四一	一一
〃	〃	〃	記録
三三	一六	一六	一〇
〇〇	一一	一一	〇九
三七	二七	二七	〇一
			一〇
			〇九
			五五

0159 0015 2147

MUTO SUMMATION-00

00-87

武蔵ハ米英兩國ニ對スル宣戰ヲ討議シタ一九

四一年十二月八日ノ樞密院調査委員會ノ會議ニ

參加シタノデアリマス。東條ハ其ノ會議ニ於テ

質問ニ答エテ、「戦争行動ハ我方方ヨリ開始サ

レタノカモ知レヌ………」^(a)旨言明シタノデア

リマス。武蔵ハ巢鴨ニ於テ、東條ガ一九四一年十

月總理大臣トナリタル時以來彼武蔵ガ軍務局長

ヲ退職シタル時迄、凡ユル東條ノ政策ニ就イテ

東條ニ同意シタルヤ否ヤヲ訊問サレタノデアリ

マス。武蔵ハ内閣ハ全員意見ガ一致シテイタト

答エマシタ。^(c) 明確ナ返事ヲ迫ラレ且彼ノ回答

ハ完全ニ東條ニ同意シタコトデアツタカドウカ

引武 令ノ 米ノ 介石 接方 助メ 止メ 結石 令ヲ 送
送

(一) 大元ノ上ノ 結令ノ 廢介ノ 石ト 凡ユル 接助メ 止メ 結石 令ヲ 送
(二) 大元ノ上ノ 結令ノ 廢介ノ 石ト 凡ユル 接助メ 止メ 結石 令ヲ 送
(三) 大元ノ上ノ 結令ノ 廢介ノ 石ト 凡ユル 接助メ 止メ 結石 令ヲ 送

(イ) 印度ニ於テ 印度ノ 米ノ 價ト 同シ 米ノ 價ト 同シ 米ノ 價ト 同シ
(ロ) 印度ニ於テ 印度ノ 米ノ 價ト 同シ 米ノ 價ト 同シ 米ノ 價ト 同シ

ノ代價トシテ 米ノ 價ト 同シ 米ノ 價ト 同シ 米ノ 價ト 同シ
ノ代價トシテ 米ノ 價ト 同シ 米ノ 價ト 同シ 米ノ 價ト 同シ

8412 5100 6510

7 159 00 15 2 144

MUTOC SUMMATION-00

00--90

前分務省アメリカ局長山本熊一ハ、其案ハ參謀本部カラ出タモノデアルト、武藤自身ハ、ソレハ「^(a)全ク無理ナコトデアリ取上ゲル價値スライナイ」ト感ジテ居ツタコト、及東郷ハ山本ガ其レヲ受取ルノヲ叱責シタコトヲ述ベテ武藤ニ披露シヨウトシタノデアリマス。^(b)若シ其ノ案ノ出所ガ眞實ニ參謀本部カラデアツタナラバ山本ハ其ノ旨ヲ其ノ督憲ニ表示シタデアリマセウ。實係ニ山本ハ、自身ノ記憶ノ爲メニ且、出所ニ關シテ公ノ記録ヲ正シクシテ置クトイウ明カニ二重ノ目的デア同案ノ表紙ニ「一九〇一年十一月十八日、皇務局長武藤ヨリ。山本^(c)」ト鉛筆デ註釋ヲ付イタノデアリマス。若シ其案ガ「全ク無理ナモノデアリ、取上ゲル價値スライナイモノデアリ、」且山本ガ其レヲ受取ルノヲ東郷ガ叱責シタトシタナラバ、外務省ハ日本政府ノ最高ノ秘密ナ印ノ「國家秘密」ト其レニ印ヲ捺サナカツタデアリマセウシ^(d)且其レヲ然

- P-68
- 00--90
- a、記録 三三〇四ノ
- b、" 三三一二ノ
- c、" 三三〇三ノ
- d、" 三三〇三ノ

MUTO SUMMATION-00

心ニ守リ且保持スルノニ盡力シナカツタデアリ
マセウ。此等ノ考察方法廷ヲシテ次ノ質問ヲ出
本ニナサシメタニ相違アリマセウ。一證人ガ、
出所ハ参謀本部ニ在ルト云ツテイル此ノ案ヲ武
藤ガ個人的ニ不賛成デアツタコトヲ示ス文書カ
「メモ」ガドコカニアリマスカ。(e) 山本ノ答ガ
率直サニ缺ケテ后リ胡カニ言ヒ廻レデアリマシ
タノテ裁判長代理ハ「其レハ質問ニ對スル答テ
ハアリマセン」ト注意シ、且更ニ同ジ所同ヲ同
イマシタ。山本ハ茲タト「イ、エ、ソノヨウナ
答イタモノハアリマセン」(f)ト答エタノデアリ
マス。法廷ヨリ更ニ訊問シタノニ答エテ山本ハ
彼ノ記憶以外ニハ其案ガ参謀本部カラ來タコト
ヲ示スモノガ種類ソノモノノ中ニハ何モナカツ
タコトヲ認めタノデアリマシ。(g)

0-69

00-90	e、記録	三三〇四八
	f、記録	三三〇四八
	g、記録	三三〇四八

タ。武蔵ノ外交方法ハ何卒オトナシク時市ヲオ渡シ
 下サイ。ソレデナケレバ大變ナコトニナリマス、ト
 大マカニ笑ツテ被害者ニ勸メテイル凶器ヲ持ツタ強
 盜ニ稱例エルコトが出来マス。石油ヲ渡セ、デナケ
 レバ。。。。。。。甲口ハ放ツテ置ケ、デナケレバ。
 。。。。。。ワルシユ信正ヤ「ドロート」Drougrik
 神父ヲ通ジテノ武蔵ノ外交的努方ハ、此ノ見地ニ於
 テ考案サレナケレバナリマセン。(b)

記 録
 一五八三三 一五六一九 三三二〇三
 三二二一 記 録 三二二七九 一六〇

武蔵ハ合衆國ニ對シ敬慕ナ態度ナリト云ル分子ニヨリ考ニテレタ爲メニ彼等ニヨリ脅迫サレテキタカモ知レマセン。(a) コレラノ分子トハ助カニ起國家主義者ノ分子デ、日本ノ優秀ナカヲ通信シ、即時「アメリカ」ニ對スル武蔵ニヨル彼後ノ試ヲ主張シタ極端主義者ノ團體デアリマシタ。コレラノ過激ナ恣意ナ人達ニ比シ、武蔵ハ冷淡ナ狡猾ナ策士デ、追ヒツメラレタ「アメリカ」ヲシテ日本ノ變ラザル要請ニ從エサセルタメニハ武力の壓迫ト共ニ外交的術策ヲ用フルコトヲ厭ハヌ人デアリマシタ。武蔵ト起急進派トハ手段コソ異ナレ非人道的目的ハ同ジデアリマシ

0159 0015 2151

0159 0015 2153

MUTO SUMMATION-00

勝大至が衆ヲ登キ、岡モ登キ彼モ登イタト示トシ
 タ。(b) 然シ武蔵ハ其ノ誤同申後テ彼ガ同進ツテ是ツ
 タト云イマシタ。宣長亦付登ト彼ガ言ツタノハ彼云
 其ノ他ニヨツテ存成サレタ語登ノコトデアリマシタ
 彼ハ我後追原ハ外務省ガ起草サレタト言ヒマシタ。
 衆参ノ衆ガ相談ノ爲彼ニ示サレ彼ハソレヲ是認シマ
 シタ。(c) 岡ト星野モ亦衆ノ存成ソ手付ヒマシタ。岡
 ハ海軍シ、星野ハ聯船會談ヲ、彼武蔵ハ陸軍省ヲ代
 表シマシタ。武蔵ハ山本ガ外務省ヲ代表シタト云イ
 マシタ。(d) 証人台ニ於テ武蔵ハ集島ニ於ケル訊問ノ
 記録ノ此ノ部分ノ正確性ヲ否認シマシタ。訊問ノ公
 平ト記録(巻証知二三〇)一A(証)ノ正確ニ面スル
 点上ノ証録ハ武蔵ガ知ツテ居ツタ廻リニ真正ノ事
 ノミヲ言ミツトスルニ當テ訊問者ガ苦勞シタコトガ
 記録サレテイルトイフ事言テアリマス。
 知ニバ訊問者ハ武蔵ニ次ノ質問ツシマシタ。
 「岡、後世人ノタメニ、此ノコトハ蓋然トシテ置キ
 マセウ。貴下ハ貴下自身ノ事柄ヲ存成シタ東
 郷氏モ同様自身ノ事柄ヲ存成シ、岡氏モ亦自

P-72					
00-92	証	三三二〇	一A	記	一六一三〇
d	"	三三三〇		"	一六一三三
"	"	三三二〇	一A	"	一六一三六

0 154 00 15 2 154

MUTO SUMMATION-00

「答

身ヲ作成シタ。貴下等谷々各福ノ享給無クハ
 後貴下等三人ガ會合シテ最後ノ草稿ヲ作成シタ。又「
 失禮シマシタ。宣旨亦告トハ天皇ノ演説ノ意
 察ニアナタガ用イラレテオルト思ツテイマシ
 タ。コレハ私及他ノ者ニヨツテ作成セラレマ
 シタ。宣旨ノ最後通牒ハ外務省ガ起草シマシ
 タ。(e)」

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00-92

e 〃 記 録 一六二三三

此ノ論議ヲ考慮スベキ後ノ點ハ武蔵ガ眞珠灣、
 新嘉坡、「フイリツピン」及「インドネシア」ノ
 攻撃ヲ要求スル秘密作戰計畫ヲ知ツテ居タカドウ
 カトイウコトデアリマス。東條ハ、首相及内閣ノ
 「依トシテ彼ハ作戰計畫ヲ知ラナカツタガ、然シ
 大本營及ビ軍事參議院ノ一員トシテ彼ハ其レ等ニ
 就テ知ツテ居タト主張シマシタ。(2) 東條ノ誇張サ
 レタ真実ヲ口爭セズニ置クコトヲ許レテサヘモ、

a、卷證 三三三三 記録 三〇六一七

b、 " " 三〇六一八一七

a、卷證 三三三六 " 一三六二六

MUTO SUMMATION

00-93

記録が正確デアルトイフ他ノ證據ハ、被告人質疑ガ
彼ノ辯護ニ於ケル證據トシテ右記録ノ部分ヲ使ツ
タトイウ事デアリマス。(a)
書證第三三三三號テ見ラレル通り、訊問中武藤ハ
彼ガ熟考ノ上錯誤ナリト考エタニシタ陳述ヲ
訂正スベク時々要求シマシタガ、ソレハ許可セラ
レマシタ。(b)

4a-4

秘
密
作
成
計
登

0159 0015 2155

00-95

a、〃 三一八九一A 〃 二八九四一
 b、〃 〃 〃 一八八〇
 c、〃 三八〇四一B 〃 三七八三六一七

00-94

b、書證 一一八 記帳 七四四
 c、〃 一一八 〃 七四四

ニ彼ニ與ヘラレタ秘密報告ニ接シタト証言シマシ
 タ。彼ハ尙、彼ガ請求スレバ海軍ノ如何ナル他ノ
 秘密報告ヲモ入手シタト申シマシタ。(b) 且亦、一
 九三九年「ナチ」ノMEET / 黨會議ニ出席スル爲寺
 内信ヲ白林ニ派遣スル陸軍ノ計畫ニ關シテハ、天
 皇自身ト雖彼ガ軍事參議院ノ會議ニ出席スル迄ハ
 其ノ事ヲ知リマセンデシタ。(c)

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MUTO SUMMATION

00-95

尙武藤ハ大本營陸軍大臣隨員 (b) ノ職ニアリ、又
軍事參議院ノ幹事長 (c) デアツタカラ其等秘密計
畫ニ就テ知ツテ居タデシヨウ。

軍事參議院ノ重要任ハ畑陸相ガ彼ノ辭表ヲ米内
首相ニ提出スル前ニ同院ト陸軍三長官トニ相談セ
ネバナラナカツタコトテ明白ニサレマシタ。(a) 前
海相岡田海軍大將ハ、彼ガ海軍大臣トシテ受ケタ
報告ハ彼ガ軍事參議院ノ一員トシテ受取ツタモノ
ト一般ニ同様デアリ、而シテ後者ノ資格テ彼ハ常

0 159 00 15 2 157

MUTO SUMMATION

00-96

陸軍省参謀部第一六、一九四一年十二月一日ノ御前會議ノ後、
 戦争勃發ノ場合邊備ガ出來テイルヨウニ西南方ニ於ケル軍司令官
 總ニ命令ヲ發クヨウニ杉山參謀總長ニヨツテ命令
 セラレタトイウ陳述ヲナシタ者デアリマス。(a)
 杉山ハ命令ヲ效力アラシメル爲ニハ彼ノ署名ガ必
 要デアツタカラ命令ヲ發シマシタ。然シ右命令ハ
 南太平洋ニ於ケル各司令官ニ打電サレ得ル以前ニ
 亦陸軍大臣、陸軍次官及軍務局長ノ各夫々ノ資格
 トシテノ東條、木村及武藤將軍等ノ承認ノ署名ヲ
 得ナケレバナリマセンデシタ。(b) 田中ノ云ウ處ニ
 ヨレバ、其等ガ出サレ得ル以前ニ其等重要命令ニ
 ハ陸軍大臣、陸軍次官及軍務局長ノ署名ヲ得ルコ
 トハ參謀本部ニ於テハ慣習ノ規則デアリマシタ。(c)

00-97

一九四一年十月八日 武藤ハ在東京ノ當務ノ米
 國大使館附武官ノ一員タル、「F. D. Merrill」
 ノ「F. D. Merrill」少佐ニ次ノ様ニ語りマシタ。「最早
 外交官ノ間ノ話合テハ我々兩國間ノ問題ヲ解決ス
 ル望ミハ實際上無クナツタ。此ノ問題ハ兩國ノ陸
 軍同志ヲ解決スベキモノデアル。軍ハ其方戦ワズ

P-76

00-96

a、
b、
c、

記録

一六一四六

一六一四六一七

一六一四七

00-98

a、
「
三七二八
”
三七二二一三四

”
三三二〇六

00-97

a、
「
三七四八
記録
三七二二一三四

00-98

合ニハ六通同後ニハ「マニラ」/Manilaノ實方ト
我方トガオソク交エルヨウニナルトイウコトデアル^(a)」

後ニ「ビルマ」ニ於ケル有名ナ「メリル」突
撃隊 (Merrill Marauders) ノ隊長「メリル」將
軍ニナツタ「メリル」少佐ハ後ガ日本シ去ル前ニ
彼ガ武庫ト會見スルニツタ遅延ヲ説服シマシタ^(a)
「メリル」ハ、參謀本部ニ來訪スルヨウ招待ヲ受
ケタ、ソツテ出立スルヤ直チニ國軍省ニ送レテ行

MUTO SUMMATION

シテ之ヲナスコト可能デアリ、コノ故ニ私ハ貴官
ガ立派ナ陸軍ヲ日本ガ存シテイルコトヲ上司ニ報
告スルヤウ盡方スベキダト思フ。貴官ガ我々ヲ如
何ニ裁判サレヨウト私ハ憚ハナイガ、貴官ハ只現
貴ノ事實ノミヲ云ウヨウニ注意サレ度イ。若シ貴
官カ事ノ有リノ儘ノ狀態ヲ貴方側ノ人達ニ御傳エ
スルコトが出来ナイナラバ私ハ遺憾メテ不愉快ナ御
餞別ヲ差上げナケレバナラナイコトヲ恐レルモノ
デアル。此ノ餞別トハ若シ了済ニ到達シ得ナイ場

0159 0015 2158

説談出來アノデアリマス。

00-99

田中新一將軍ハ眞珠灣攻撃ノ當日一九四一年十二月八日ニハ陸軍省職員全員ノ集會ガアツタト證言シマシタ。陸軍大臣東條ガ部内ノ者ニ訓示ヲ具ヘル前、武蔵ト田中ハ一緒ニ立ツテイマシダツシ

00-98

b、書證 三七四八 記録 三七四二ニ一ニロ

c、 ” 三三二〇八

0159 0015 2159

MUTO SUMMATION

カレ、武蔵將軍ニ直接シタトコロ、「メリル」少佐ハ日本軍從軍旅行カラ歸ツタバカリデアアルカラ少佐ニ國際情勢ノ重要點ヲ説明スルコトハ武蔵ノ希望スルトコロデアルト武蔵ガ云ツタ旨ヲ語リマシタ。(b)

卷註第三七四八頁ハ「メリル」少佐ガ彼ノ會見ニ關シ作成セル報告書ノ認證謄本デアリマス。武蔵ハ「メリル」少佐ニハ彼所テ會ツタコトハナイ、汎シヤ彼ト會談シタコトハナイトスゲナク否定シマシタ。(c) 彼ニソレガ事實ナカツタトスレバ何故「メリル」將軍ガ自己ノ想像テ重要ト會見ノ行紀ヲ作り上げたカラ武蔵ハ説明シマセンテシタ、亦

00-100

a、 卷 三三三
 " " 三四三六
 b、 " 一四八三六

00-99

a、 記 一八一七一
 b、 " 一三八六七、一三八七一

長トシテノ武蔵ニ歸得且スワシメ得ルノデアリマ
 ス。彼ハ任職ニ關スル政策ハ一九四一年十二月末
 カ一九四二年初頭ノ頃設けセラレタ學務局長カ
 ラ出タ事及ビ任職改定所ハ彼ノ高ノ指導下ニ進テ
 ラレタ事ヲ容シシマシタ。(a) 元任職局長及ビ任
 職局長ノ高官 (b) 出崎シゲル大佐ハ任職ニ關ス

0159 0015 2160

MUTO SUMMATION

00-100

テ武蔵ハ田中ニ「到頭陸軍大臣が英海ニナツタ」
ト云ヒマシタ。ソノ翌日陸軍省聯合食堂デモウ一
度集會ガアリマシタ。彼等ノ會話ノ途中、武蔵ハ
田中ニ來物大便ノ米田派起モ龍田丸ノ派起同様敵
對行為開始ニ至ル諸事ヲ「カモフラージュ」スル
企テ通ギナイト告ゲマシタ。(b)

5、戦争ノ初期段階ニ於ケル到頭行為

太平洋戦争ノ初期段階ニ於ケル「バター」元
ノ行進「シンガポール」ノ織法、香港ノ強姦其ノ
他ノ職業スベキ到頭行為（一九四一年十二月八日
一九四二年四月二十日）ノ責任ノ多クガ軍務局

中尉テアリマシタ。(f) 田崎ハ繰返シテ「軍務局長
ヲ罷ズシテハ何事モ為サレ得テカツタ」(g) ト言ヒ
マシタ。

s、	f、 三、 四	e、	d、	c、
”	一一八	”	”	記 録
一 一 八 四 七	七 四 三	一 四 八 四 三 一 六	一 二 八 二 四	一 四 八 二 四

MUTO SUMMATION

ル「スベテノ重要ナ事項」ハ「軍務局ヲ經テケレ
 バナラズ、軍務局ヲ經テケレバ殆ンド何事モ爲サ
 レ得ナカツタ」(c)ト陳述シマシタ。「軍務局長
 自身ガ命令ヲ與ヘタ」ノカ、ソレトモ「種類ガ單
 ニ軍務局長ヲ經由シタ」ノカトイウ反對訊問ヲ受ケ
 彼ハ「單ニ軍務局長ヲ經タトイウヨリハモツトツツ
 ト強イ意味デアル」(d)ト答ヘマシタ。少將武蔵ガ
 ドウシテ停務管理局長官中將植村ニ命令ヲ發スル
 コトガ出来タノカト尋ネラレ、田崎ハ「軍務局長
 ハ事務ニ關スル限り、陸軍大臣ノ參謀長ノヨウナ
 モノデアリ、ソレテ命令ヲ發シ得タノデアル」(e)
 ト答ヘマシタ。事實ハ、武蔵ハ一九二一年十月ニハ

照下サイ。

5a 「シंगाポール」「マニラ」が「ジャバ」

ニ於ケル宏福行爲

大本營陸軍に負トシテ (a) 武蔵ハ「大本營、大

東亞公署作戦日誌一 (b) ニ記載サレタ一九四二年二

00-102

00-101

00-102

- a、J 章(一) 敵移駐報告(附屬卷 B、第二編九〇―九六項 九七項)
- b、J 章(一) 敵移駐報告(附屬卷 B、第二編 九八―一〇一項)
- a、書證 一一八 記録 七四五
- b、" 四七六 " 三六二五

P-81

0 159 0015 2 162

MUTO SUMMATION

00-101

武蔵ガ停居及ビ停居收容所ニ歸スル諸政策ニ付
 キ管理及監督ヲシテキタ戦争勃發ヨリ一九四二年
 四月二十日ニ至ル間、全戦域ヲ遍ジテ侮辱、殘虐
 行爲及ビ殺害ガ連合國停居及ビ民間人ニ對シテ行
 ワレマシタ。ソレ等ハ非常ニ残酷ニワタリ非常
 ニ多クノ犠牲者ヲ出シテ居リマシタノテ東京ニ居
 タ武蔵其ノ他ノ日本ノ指導者達ハ、ソノヨウナ殘
 虐行爲ヲ命ジタカ又ハソレ等ヲ知ツテソノヨウナ
 行爲ヲ容認シタモノト合理的ニ見做サレ得ルノテ
 アリマス。「バター」死ノ行違 (a) 及「オード
 ネル」ノ O'DONNELL / 收容所ノ「テスホール」
 / Death hole (b) ノ詳細ニ付テハ一紙最終報告ヲ

本総論下キ。

閣下キ通シ「^(a)及ハ「^(e)真ニマニ
 閣下キ行「ユウシタ」及「^(a)タ
 リ「^(a)マ」小「^(a)マ」マ
 閣下キ行「^(f)セ」マ「^(b)セ」
 閣下キ行「^(f)セ」マ「^(b)セ」
 閣下キ行「^(h)マ」マ「^(h)マ」
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I 南京強襲事件

一九三七年十一月四日ヨリ一九三八年七月初旬
 マテ武漢ハ中支那方面軍總司令官兼上海派遣軍及
 第十軍司令官、松井大將ノ指揮ニ任テアリマシシ
 武漢ハ作戦ヲ遂ジ松井ノ指揮ニ任リマシタガ、其
 ノ作戦ハ東京ノ空軍ニ互リ、八月後ニ「マニラー」
 ノ強襲事件ニ於テ最高潮ニ達シタ日本軍ノ他ノ強
 襲行為ノ遂ヲ達リ上ガタ南京強襲事件ヲ繪具トシ

a、記録 三三〇八六 三三〇九一

0159 0015 2184

MUTO SUMMATION
00-103

- e、J 章（一般最終報告）附屬卷 B、
第一編 三―四頁
- f、J 章（一般最終報告）附屬卷 B、
第一編 一―三頁
- g、J 章（一般最終報告）附屬卷 B、
第一編 一七―一八頁
- h、J 章（一般最終報告）附屬卷 B、
第一編 一八一―九頁

II 出先將校トシテ

三六日、關於(二)於十月十九日、

中(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

茶(四)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

の、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

日、關於(三)於十月十九日、關於(三)於十月十九日、

591.2 5100 6510

MEMO 附錄

d	MEMO	附錄	、
c	MEMO	附錄	、
b	MEMO	附錄	、
a	MEMO	附錄	、

00-105

項二十一、A、B、C、D、E、F、G、H、I、J、K、L、M、N、O、P、Q、R、S、T、U、V、W、X、Y、Z、AA、AB、AC、AD、AE、AF、AG、AH、AI、AJ、AK、AL、AM、AN、AO、AP、AQ、AR、AS、AT、AU、AV、AW、AX、AY、AZ、BA、BB、BC、BD、BE、BF、BG、BH、BI、BJ、BK、BL、BM、BN、BO、BP、BQ、BR、BS、BT、BU、BV、BW、BX、BY、BZ、CA、CB、CC、CD、CE、CF、CG、CH、CI、CJ、CK、CL、CM、CN、CO、CP、CQ、CR、CS、CT、CU、CV、CW、CX、CY、CZ、DA、DB、DC、DD、DE、DF、DG、DH、DI、DJ、DK、DL、DM、DN、DO、DP、DQ、DR、DS、DT、DU、DV、DW、DX、DY、DZ、EA、EB、EC、ED、EE、EF、EG、EH、EI、EJ、EK、EL、EM、EN、EO、EP、EQ、ER、ES、ET、EU、EV、EW、EX、EY、EZ、FA、FB、FC、FD、FE、FF、FG、FH、FI、FJ、FK、FL、FM、FN、FO、FP、FQ、FR、FS、FT、FU、FV、FW、FX、FY、FZ、GA、GB、GC、GD、GE、GF、GG、GH、GI、GJ、GK、GL、GM、GN、GO、GP、GQ、GR、GS、GT、GU、GV、GW、GX、GY、GZ、HA、HB、HC、HD、HE、HF、HG、HH、HI、HJ、HK、HL、HM、HN、HO、HP、HQ、HR、HS、HT、HU、HV、HW、HX、HY、HZ、IA、IB、IC、ID、IE、IF、IG、IH、II、IJ、IK、IL、IM、IN、IO、IP、IQ、IR、IS、IT、IU、IV、IW、IX、IY、IZ、JA、JB、JC、JD、JE、JF、JG、JH、JI、JJ、JK、JL、JM、JN、JO、JP、JQ、JR、JS、JT、JU、JV、JW、JX、JY、JZ、KA、KB、KC、KD、KE、KF、KG、KH、KI、KJ、KK、KL、KM、KN、KO、KP、KQ、KR、KS、KT、KU、KV、KW、KX、KY、KZ、LA、LB、LC、LD、LE、LF、LG、LH、LI、LJ、LK、LL、LM、LN、LO、LP、LQ、LR、LS、LT、LU、LV、LW、LX、LY、LZ、MA、MB、MC、MD、ME、MF、MG、MH、MI、MJ、MK、ML、MM、MN、MO、MP、MQ、MR、MS、MT、MU、MV、MW、MX、MY、MZ、NA、NB、NC、ND、NE、NF、NG、NH、NI、NJ、NK、NL、NM、NO、NP、NQ、NR、NS、NT、NU、NV、NW、NX、NY、NZ、OA、OB、OC、OD、OE、OF、OG、OH、OI、OJ、OK、OL、OM、ON、OO、OP、OQ、OR、OS、OT、OU、OV、OW、OX、OY、OZ、PA、PB、PC、PD、PE、PF、PG、PH、PI、PJ、PK、PL、PM、PN、PO、PP、PQ、PR、PS、PT、PU、PV、PW、PX、PY、PZ、QA、QB、QC、QD、QE、QF、QG、QH、QI、QJ、QK、QL、QM、QN、QO、QP、QQ、QR、QS、QT、QU、QV、QW、QX、QY、QZ、RA、RB、RC、RD、RE、RF、RG、RH、RI、RJ、RK、RL、RM、RN、RO、RP、RQ、RR、RS、RT、RU、RV、RW、RX、RY、RZ、SA、SB、SC、SD、SE、SF、SG、SH、SI、SJ、SK、SL、SM、SN、SO、SP、SQ、SR、SS、ST、SU、SV、SW、SX、SY、SZ、TA、TB、TC、TD、TE、TF、TG、TH、TI、TJ、TK、TL、TM、TN、TO、TP、TQ、TR、TS、TT、TU、TV、TW、TX、TY、TZ、UA、UB、UC、UD、UE、UF、UG、UH、UI、UJ、UK、UL、UM、UN、UO、UP、UQ、UR、US、UT、UU、UV、UW、UX、UY、UZ、VA、VB、VC、VD、VE、VF、VG、VH、VI、VJ、VK、VL、VM、VN、VO、VP、VQ、VR、VS、VT、VU、VV、VW、VX、VY、VZ、WA、WB、WC、WD、WE、WF、WG、WH、WI、WJ、WK、WL、WM、WN、WO、WP、WQ、WR、WS、WT、WU、WV、WW、WX、WY、WZ、XA、XB、XC、XD、XE、XF、XG、XH、XI、XJ、XK、XL、XM、XN、XO、XP、XQ、XR、XS、XT、XU、XV、XW、XX、XY、XZ、YA、YB、YC、YD、YE、YF、YG、YH、YI、YJ、YK、YL、YM、YN、YO、YP、YQ、YR、YS、YT、YU、YV、YW、YX、YY、YZ、ZA、ZB、ZC、ZD、ZE、ZF、ZG、ZH、ZI、ZJ、ZK、ZL、ZM、ZN、ZO、ZP、ZQ、ZR、ZS、ZT、ZU、ZV、ZW、ZX、ZY、ZZ

00-104

00-107

a、
卷証三四五〇、
記録三三〇九一、
三三〇九二

00-106

a、
記録三三三三一、
卷証三四五〇、
記録三三〇八九

00-108

3、「スマトラ」ニ於ケル殘虐行爲
武蔵ハ近衛師團長トナル爲メニ、一九四二年四

00-107

2、北支殘虐行爲

一九三八年七月初旬ヨリ一九三九年九月末マテ
武蔵ハ北支方面軍參謀次長ヲアリマシタ。彼ハ北
平ニ移動シマシタ。北支殘虐行爲ノ詳細ニ付テ
ハ速記録ノ七十八頁ヲ參照下サイ。

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MUTO Summation-00
00-106

武蔵ハ、供述書及訊問ニ於テ、「掠奪及強姦ガ
 同所ニ於テ行ワレタ」コトヲ認メテイル。(a) 武蔵
 ハ然シ「松井將軍麾下ノ二指揮官ニ報告サレタ事
 件ハ僅カニ十件乃至二十件ニ過ギナカツタ」ト主
 張シテイル。(b) 何故武蔵及松井ガ此ノ有名ナ町ノ
 數千名ノ市民ニ對スル集團亂行、殺戮及拷問ヲ知
 ラナカツタカトイフコトハ公平ナ人ニハ了解ノ出
 來ナイコトデアル。武蔵ノ宣誓供述書ニハ、彼又
 ハ松井ガ、斯カル、犯罪ノ再發ヲ防止スル爲、有
 罪者ヲ罰スルノ處置ヲ深ツダトハ、ドコニモ述べ
 テイナイ。

00-109

月二十日尋訪局長トシテノ彼ノ駛ラ去リ、山下將
 軍ノ參謀長トナル爲メ比島ニ向ケ「マダソ」
 Khab - ラ出發シタトキ、一九四四年十月十二日
 マテ近衛師團長ノ職ニ止ツナイマシタ。(a)「マ
 ソ」ニ於ケル武蔵ノ滞在ヲ行クレシテ處行爲メ
 詳細ニ付テハ一般最終報告ヲ参照下サイ。(b)

4、「マニラ」ノ強姦事件及比島ニ於ケル未
 期ノ凶虐行爲

一九四四年十月二十日ノ夜、武蔵陸軍中將ハ山下
 將軍指揮下ニアル第十四方面軍參謀長トシテ就任ノ爲メ比島ノ「マ
 ソ」(Korinthos) 兵艦ニ到着シマシタ。(a) 彼ハ
 一九四五年九月、日本降伏マテ其ノ職ニ在ツタノ
 テアリマス。(b) 山下將軍ノ參謀長トシテ彼ノ在任
 中、彼等ノ軍隊ニヨル集團的強姦、破壊、擄囚、
 亂行ノ溢惡ヲ行爲ガ無カノ比島人民ノ上ニ加エラ
 レタノテアリマスガ、「バタソカス」(Batangas)

00-108

a、警録三四三四、記録三三二一三四
 b、丁章(一般最終報告)附屬卷B、

第一編一七一八、三六、五六一五七、七三二七四、
 ハヤトハ八、一〇二頁

00-109

a、記録三三一三四、警録一一八、記録七四七
 b、警録一一八、記録七四七

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M.UTO Summation-00

ノ 殲滅ト「マニラ」ノ 強姦事件ニ於テ其ノ 絶頂ニ
 達シタノデアリマス。ソノ「サヂズム」ノ 冷
 血性、ソノ 野蠻性、ソノ 残忍性ヲ 暴性ニ於テ、
 ソレハ 八年 前 爾 京 強姦事件ニ於テ作ラレタ 惡
 型ノ 著シキ 特徴ヲ 有シアオリ、其ノ 型ニ 從ツテ 行
 動シタノデアリマス。婦女子、子供、及 老人ヲ 含
 ム 武 器 ナキ 非 戦 闘 員 幾 万 人 カノ 生 命 ヲ 奪 イ、又 ハ
 コレ等ノ 人々ノ 運命ヲ 滅茶々ニシタ 虐待 行爲ノ
 兇分ニ 証 明 サレタ 記 述 ハ 最 終 論 告 中ニ 述 ベラレテ
 居 リ マ ス。(c) 是 台 國 民 間 糾 察 者 及 俘 虜ニ 對 スル 虐
 行、飢 餓、及 傷 害ノ 詳細ニ 付テハ 一 般 最 終 論 告ヲ
 參 照 下 シ。(d)

00-109

- c、丁 草 (一 般 最 終 論 告) 附 屬 書 B、
 第 二 編 二一、二三、二五、二六、二七、六一、六二、
 六三、六四、七〇、七一、七二、七三、七八、八八 項
- d、丁 草 (一 般 最 終 論 告) 附 屬 書 B、
 第 二 編 六二、六三、一一三、一二三、一二七、
 一三八、一三三、一三四、一三五、一三六、一三七、
 一四〇、一四三 項、 記 録 二七六三八、二七六三九、
 二七六四〇、二七六四一、二七六四二、二七六四三、二七六四四、二七六四五、二七六四六、二七六四七、二七六四八、二七六四九、二七六五〇

00-111

高松司令部カ其ノ私虐行爲ヲ認識シ、命令シ或
ハ宥恕シテ居ツタ筈デアルトイウ理由デソノ事
實認定ト有非決定ハ聯合軍最高指揮官ガ支持シ
タノデアリマシタ。

武蔵ハ東京及北支デ何ガ起ツタカラ知ツテ居
タノテ、彼ノ無効上有シテ居ル大ナル権力ヲ以
テ亞細亞ノ他ノ地ニ於テ是等公虐行爲ノ再發

武蔵ハ茲ニ初カル私磨行爲ハ全然知ラナカツ
タ、ソシテソレハ命令シタモノデモ宥恕シタモ
ノデモナイト裁判所ヲ信セシメヨウトシマス。
山下ハ初カル私磨行爲ニ對シテ彼ノ生命ガ賭サ
レタ裁判ニ附ラレタ時ニ同様ナ辯護ヲ爲シタノ
デアリマス。「マニラ」軍律委員會ハ一比嶋人
ヲ際キ米軍軍官ノ將軍ヲ以テ組織セラレ、山下
ヲ初首刑ニ處スコトヲ宣告シマシタコトハ普ク
知レ直ツテキル所デアリマス。ソノ殘虐行爲ハ
餘リニ以範圍ニ互リ且懸賞デアツタノデ日本ノ

罪ハ日露及日清戦争中ニハ知ラレナカッタト彼
 ハ述ベマシタ。(c) 日本軍ノ下士卒ノ發育及品
 行ヲ改善スル爲ニ彼ハ何ヲ爲シタ方ト尋ネラレ
 タ時、彼ハ笑イナガラ、彼ハ其レニ就テハ何事
 ヲモ爲シ得ナイ地位ニ居タト答エマシタ。(d)

c、日記 二五五 三頁

b、日記 一六一 三二

c、日記 一六一 三二

d、日記 一六一 三三 一六

MUTO SUMMATION-00

ヲ少ナクトモ防止出来タノデアリマス。一九三九年ニ山下ハ杉山將軍指揮下ノ北支方面軍ノ參謀長デアリ武藤ハ參謀次長デアツタノデアリマス。(a) 武藤ハ東京強姦事件後、暴行ヲ奨励スル電報ガ發行サレマシタガ、其レハ日本軍人ヲ恥入ラシメタコトヲ容認シマシタ。(b) 彼ハ亦其レハ日本ノ軍紀教育ノ焦點ヲ表シタモノデアルト述ベマシタ。此ノ現象ハ西比利亞出兵中初メテ生ジタモノテ、ソコデハ強姦略奪及虐殺ノ事件ガ最初ニ報告サレタコトデアリ、斯カル犯

0159 0015 2170

白ナル以向ノ根源ヲ端正スル極限ト擧會トヲ有シテ居リマシタ。

武蔵及彼ト同種ノ人達ハ其レニ付テハ何モシナカツクノデアリマス。————向敵ナレバ、ソレハ、多クノ人々ニ恐怖ヲ與エテ服從セシメ、又、多クノ人々ヲ脅迫シテ協力セシメル結合ノ良イ手段ニアツタカラデアリマス。

- | | | | | |
|----|----|-----|----|-----|
| a、 | 記録 | 一一八 | 記録 | 七五五 |
| b、 | 記録 | 一一八 | 記録 | 七五五 |
| c、 | 記録 | 一一六 | 記録 | 三三三 |

而カモ、軍務局長トシテ彼ハ事實上陸軍省ノ
 参謀長デ軍ト議會トノ連絡員デ而シテ参謀本部
 ト陸軍トノ間ノ橋渡デアリマシタ。一九三九年
 (a)十月十日、彼ハ教育局ノ参員ニ任命サレマシタ。
 一九三九年、十二月十一日、彼ハ内閣カラ
 日本語教科用圖書調査委員會委員 (b)ニ任命
 サレマシタ。彼ハ長イ間彼ガ陸軍教育ヲ監ト提
 携シ而シテ「陸軍ノ適切ナル教育ニ非常ニ興味
 ヲ持ツテ居タル」コトヲ容認シマシタ。(c)新様
 ニ、彼ハ、彼等武力ニ依ル擴張計畫ニ反對シタ
 一切ノ國民ニ虐待ヲ加エル日本軍隊ニ於ケル明

日本側ノ一舉手一投足ヲ正當化セント努メタ
 ノデマリマス。若シ機會ガ興ヘラレルナラバ
 武藤及東條一味ノ他ノ者違ハ、滿洲ノ中國人
 「匪賊」ヲ再ビ討伐スルタメニ、中斷ヲ取リ
 戻ス「聖戰」ニ新タニ着手スルタメニ、恐爾
 ニ繼ラレタ未來ノ犠牲者達ガ自ラヲ防禦シ、
 屠戮、泊ヲ最早貢グ事ヲ拒絶シテオル間ニ再
 ビ「包圍」ヲ非難スルタメニ、アノ得意ノ直
 珠灣反旅順ノ卑怯ナ攻擧ヲセウ一度不意ニ行
 ウタメニ、ソシテ、「大東亞共榮圈」ノ失ワ
 レタ榮耀榮華ヲ再ビ獲得スルタメニ——新シ

00-113

III

結

論

自責ノ言葉一ツナク、後悔ノ歎息一ツナク
悔恨ノ涙一滴スラナイノデアリマス。昔時ノ
威勢ト傲慢ハ未ダ其處ニアルノデアリマス。
我々ハモウ一度ヤルトイウ様子ハ誤リチノデ
アリマス。武蔵ハ被告席ノ彼ノ仲間ノ共同謀
議者達ノ様ニ、此等審理ヲ通ジ列強者ニ見セ
カケ様トシ米國及西洋民主々諸國家ニ對スル
攻撃ノミナラズ、劫掠ツレタ南洋、中國、比
島、「インドネシア」及「ビルマ」ニ於ケル

0159 0015 2172

00-115

武蔵ニ對スル各訴函ヲ清單ニ記述スレバ次
ノ通りデアリマス。

訴因番號

一乃至五

訴因事項

一以天商標爲

六、七、八、九、

一九二八年一月ヨリ一九四

十、十一、十二、

五年九月二日ニ至ル間 中

十三、十四、十五、

商(六)、米(七)、糖

十六、十七、

合王(九)、濃酒(九)

新酒(十)、カナダ(十一)

MUTO SUMMATION-00

三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四
 十二及四十三ヲ、頁ヨリ頁ニ至ル或争初
 期ニ於ケル總行爲ニ00-67スルセノ00-70ハ
 五十三、五十四、五十五ヲ、頁ヨリ頁ニ
 至ル南京ノ強姦事件及北支ノ通商行爲ニ00-72
 ルモノハ、訴因第四十四、四十三、四十六、
 四十七、五十三、五十四、及五十五ヲ、頁
 ノ「スマトラ」ニ於ケル通商行爲及ビ00-72
 リ「頁ニ至ル」マニラ一ノ強姦事件ト爲ニ
 於ケル後期ノ通商行爲ニ00-71スルセノハ、訴因
 第四十四、五十三、三十四、及三十五ヲ含ン
 デキマス。

0159 0015 2174

對スル侵略戰爭開始。

二十六

一九三九年夏蒙古人民共和國ニ

對スル侵略戰爭開始。

二十七

一九三一年九月十八日ヨリ一九

四五年九月二日迄、中國ニ對ス

ル侵略戰爭遂行

二十八

一九三七年七月七日ヨリ一九四

五年九月二日迄中國ニ對スル侵

略戰爭遂行。

0-159 00 15 2 175

MUTO SUMMATION-00

十九

印度(十二)、比島(十三)、
和蘭(十四)、德國(十五) 泰國
(十六)、ロシヤ(十七)、ニ
對スル侵略戰爭ノ計畫準備。

一九三七年七月七日中國ニ對ス
ル侵略戰爭開始。

二十、二十一、二十
二、二十四、

一九四一年十二月七日木蘭、(一)
二十、比島(二十一)、全英聯
邦(二十二)、暹羅(二十三)
泰國(二十四)、ニ對スル侵略
戰爭開始。

二十三

一九四〇年九月二十二日佛蘭二

0 159 00 15 2 176

二十九乃至三十二、
三十三、

一九四一年十二月七日ヨリ一
九四三年九月二日迄米國（二
十九）、比島（三十一）、金美第
邦（三十一）、和島（三十二）
泰島（三十三）ニ對スル侵略
戰爭遂行。

三十三

一九四〇年九月若クハ其後、
勿蘭ニ對スル侵略戰爭遂行。

三十六

一九三九年迄、蒙古人民共和
國以ロシヤニ對スル侵略戰爭
遂行。

三十七

一九四〇年六月一日ヨリ一九
四一年十二月八日迄、一八
九九年七月二十九日「ヘーグ」
條約及五條記條狀附屬書Bニ
違反シ、不始、比島金美第邦、
和島、泰島ニ對スル不法ナ
戰爭開始ニ致シ、殺人及虐殺
ノ共海賊行。

三十八

一九四〇年六月一日ヨリ一九
四一年十二月八日迄、一八
九九年七月二十九日、ヘーグ

三十九	四十一	四十二
-----	-----	-----

條約第六、七、十九、三十三、
 三十四、及三十六條起訴狀附
 屬書B)三卷反シテ、米國、比
 島、全美聯邦、和蘭、泰國三
 對スル不協ナル戦争開始ニ依
 ル縱人及證據、共商談議。

一九四一年十二月七日、露珠
 海三對スル不協攻撃。
 一九四一年十二月八日「コマ
 バ」ニ對スル不協攻撃、
 一九四一年十二月八日香港ニ
 對スル不協攻撃。

一九四一年十二月八日英領「
 ペトリル」ニ對スル不法攻
 撃。

015900152177

OKA, Takazumi

PF-1. The accused OKA is charged under Counts 1 to 17, 20 to 22, 24, 27 to 32, 34, 37 to 44, and 53 to 55 of the Indictment.

I. OKA's Naval Career and Official Positions

PF-2. OKA was born in 1890 and graduated from the Naval Academy in 1911. By 1919 he had become a submarine captain.^{a.} In October 1931 he was assigned for duty in the Naval General Staff and concurrently in the Navy Ministry;^{b.} thereafter he spent most of his naval career in administrative positions in Tokyo. For more than ten of the fourteen years from 1931 to 1945 he was attached to Naval Headquarters.^{c.}

PF-3. OKA played an important part in the conspiracy to plan and wage wars of aggression and participated in it from beginning to end in his capacity as (a) one of the Staff Officers attached to the Naval General Staff and Navy Ministry in Tokyo from October, 1931 to December, 1936 (b) as Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, from 15 January, 1938 to 14 October, 1939 (c) as Chief of Division Three, Naval General Staff from 15 October, 1939 to 15 October 1940 (d) as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau from 15 October 1940 until 18 July 1944, and (e) as Navy Vice Minister from 18 July, 1944 until 5 August, 1944.^{a.}

PF-2.

- a. Ex. 120, (p.3), T. 750
- b. Ex. 3473, T. 33,381
- c. T. 33,452

PF-3.

- a. Ex. 120, T. 751-761

PP-4. OKA's share in the conspiracy is shown by the fact that he rose steadily in rank and official position throughout the entire period. In 1931 he was a Commander in the N. Vy. ^{a.} He was promoted to Rear Admiral on 1 December, 1939. ^{b.} On 1 December 1942 he was promoted to Vice Admiral. ^{c.}

PP-5. As Chief of Section One of the Naval Affairs Bureau and subsequently Director of the Bureau, OKA was in a position to share in the formulation and execution of the policies culminating in the wars of aggression. Vice Admiral HOSHINA, Zaichiro, former Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau testified that when it was necessary to negotiate with outsiders in handling matters within the jurisdiction of the Navy Ministry, it was customary for the Ministry to do so through the Naval Affairs Bureau. ^{a.} This is confirmed by the interrogation of the accused HUTO where he stated that in order to accomplish effectively a given mission, the Navy Ministry and War Ministry established a liaison in order to coordinate their efforts and that this liaison was effected through the close association of OKA of the Naval Affairs Bureau and HUTO of the Army Military Affairs Bureau. ^{b.}

PI-6. The key to the power exercised by OKA and HUTO is their control over the budget of the Army ^{a.} and Navy. ^{b.} The General Staff could not formulate operational plans unless the War and Navy Ministry provided the men and material. ^{c.}

PP-4.

- a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,381
- b. Ex. 3473, T. 33,384
- c. Ex. 3473, T. 33,385

PP-6.

- a. T. 15,659-61
- b. Ex. 3006, T. 26,659
- c. T. 16,166-7

PP-5.

- a. Ex. 3468, T. 33,307
- b. Ex. 2240, T. 16,123

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PP-7. In addition to being Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, OKA as Government Commissioner was liaison between the Navy and the Diet; ^{a.} in his capacity as standing follower to the Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters he was liaison between the Navy and Imperial General Headquarters; ^{b.} he also acted as liaison between the Navy and the Foreign Office, ^{c.} between the Navy and the Imperial Conferences and between the Navy and the Liaison Conferences. ^{d.}

B. virtue of these various activities OKA was able to exercise influence in many spheres of governmental activity and participated in numerous policy-making decisions as will be shown later.

II. OKA's Participation in the Manchurian Incident.

PP-8. At the time of the outbreak of the Mukden Incident of 18 September, 1931, OKA was attached to the Naval General Staff. ^{a.} On 10 October, 1931 he was appointed to serve concurrently in the Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry. ^{b.} It is submitted that OKA by virtue of his official position as a staff officer shared in the decision to send naval reinforcements to Shanghai in January, 1932 and hence bears responsibility for the ensuing clash between the naval landing force and the Chinese troops at the Coopei sector. ^{c.} That OKA participated in the Manchurian Incident in his capacity as a staff officer is shown by the fact that on 29 April,

PP-7.

- a. T. 33,475
- b. Ex. 120, T. 753, 756-760
- c. T. 33,487
- d. Ex. 3473, T. 33,411

PP-8.

- a. Ex. 120, T. 751
- b. Ex. 3473, T. 33,381
- c. Ex. 59, T. 3289-91

Page PF-4.

(PF-8)
1934 he was decorated with the Middle Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for meritorious service in the 1931-1934 Incident.^{d.}

PF-9. The accused OKA has stated that the decoration did not indicate any participation by him in the conspiracy since at the time he was a member of Section 2 of Division 1 of the Naval General Staff which was concerned only with armaments and not military operations.^{a.} However, the Japanese Navy was already planning to use Manchuria as a spring board for further aggression. OKA testified that a naval mission was established in Manchuria soon after the Incident for the guidance of the Manchukuan Navy. He also admitted that the Japanese Navy obtained oil from the Fushun area.^{b.} OKA, as a member of Section 2 which was concerned with armaments, is chargeable with participation in the planning and execution of these activities.

III. Japan's Abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty, Breach of the 1928 Non-Interference Agreement with the League and Subsequent Aggression in Manchuria

PF-10. In October 1931 OKA was assigned for duty in the Investigation Section of the Navy Ministry. Except for the period from October 1932 to April 1934 when he was a member of the Disarmament Commission of the Japanese Navy delegation to the League of Nations, he remained on duty with the Investigation Section until December, 1936.^{a.} It was this Investigation

PF-8.
d. Ex. 120, T. 752

PF-10. Ex. 3473, T. 33,381-2

PF-9.
a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,381
b. T. 33,429

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(FP-10)

Section which handled matters relating to naval disarmament. OKA was one of the few able disarmament experts in the Japanese Navy and was officer in charge of the Naval Disarmament Section.^{b.}

FP-11. During this period from 1932 to 1936 the Japanese Navy conducted a successful campaign to escape from the restraints imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty. The Naval leaders insisted that Japan must demand parity or at least a great increase in relative tonnage at the Conference in 1935, and in September 1932 had built up a feeling of resentment or contempt for anything or anyone connected with the treaty.^{a.} In October, 1933 the accused SHIGEMITSU told Baron HARADA that the Navy was demanding equality in armaments, and if this demand was denied would seek to abrogate the Naval Disarmament Treaty even at the risk of a rupture.^{b.} The preliminary Naval Disarmament Conference was convened in June, 1934^{c.} but Japan's delegates did not arrive until October 1934. Defense witness INOUE testified that at the Preliminary Naval Disarmament Conference of 1934, the Navy advocated the common upper limit system of disarmament and the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty. The Foreign Office opposed the Navy plan because it was too sudden a leap in view of the international situation and because it would give rise to doubts as to the peaceful intentions of Japan but due to the persistent objection

PP-10.

b. T. 35,515

PP-11.

- a. Ex. 58, T. 2179;
Ex. 156, T. 1322-3
- b. Ex. 3774-A, T. 27,647
- c. Ex. 58 (p.5), T.502;
Ex. 3011, T. 26,782

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(PP-11)
of the Navy, the Foreign Office opinion was overruled and the Navy plan was adopted as the basic policy of Japan at the Disarmament Conference. The accused TOGO confirmed this and testified that as Director of the European-Asiatic Bureau he received from the Navy the draft instructions to the Japanese delegation at the Disarmament Conference based on the principle of the common upper limit; that he opposed the Navy proposal but was overruled.^{e.} Defense witness OKADA likewise confirmed the fact that at the time of the London Naval Conference of 1934-1935 the Foreign Office opposed the position of the Navy and carried on heated arguments with the Navy over the problem of the common upper limit and abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty.^{f.}

PP-12. Just prior to the London Conference of 1935 a document entitled "The Method and Main Points of Enlightening Public Opinion in the Preliminary Negotiations Re 1935 Naval Limitations Conference" and dated October, 1934 shows that the Navy Ministry was organizing and diffusing propaganda to insure the termination of the 1922 and 1930 Naval Treaties.^{a.} It is contended that OKADA as Chief of the Disarmament Section of the Navy Ministry and the Navy's leading expert on naval disarmament participated in the preparation of this document. As a result of the concerted pressure of

FP-11.

- d. Ex. 3625, T. 35,496
- e. Ex. 3646, T. 35,737
- f. Ex. 3734, T. 37,165

PP-12.

- a. Ex. 912, T. 9,217

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(FP-12)
 the Navy, on 29 December, 1934 Japan gave notice of her
 intention to withdraw from the Washington Naval Treaty,
 effective 31 December, 1936. ^{b.} On 21 August, 1935
 the accused SHIGETSU told Baron HARADA that the Navy
 opposed Britain's plan for qualitative limitation
 of armament on the ground that it was meaningless with-
 out quantitative limitation; the attitude of the Navy
 was that it was advantageous never in future to accept
 limitations from other countries and the Navy was very
 touchy in the matter. ^{c.} Subsequently, the instructions
 given to the Japanese delegation to the London Naval
 Conference on 12 January, 1936 embodied the Navy proposal
 for a common upper limit in place of the 5-5-3 ratio, ^{d.}
 which meant that unless Britain and America neglected
 their responsibilities in other parts of the world,
 Japan would dominate the Pacific. ^{e.} Although the
 instructions were issued in the name of the Foreign
 Minister ^{f.} defense witness IMBUE stated that such
 instructions were given jointly by the Navy Minister
 and the Foreign Minister. ^{g.}

FP-13. On 15 January 1936, the Japanese delegation
 led by Admiral HAGINO withdrew from the London Naval
 Conference. ^{h.} By this action the Japanese Navy had
 freed itself from any limitation on its expansion. It
 is submitted that OKA is Chief of the Investigation

FP-12.

- b. Ex. 942, T. 9,416
 c. Ex. 3773-A, T. 37,672
 d. Ex. 3011, T. 26,815
 e. Ex. 2226, T. 15,977
 f. Ex. 3011, (Annex 20), T. 26,782
 g. T. 25,59.

FP-13.

- h. Ex. 58, T. 9217,
 Ex. 945, T. 9,421

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(PP-13)

Section which handled disarmament problems was an essential member of the Navy group which overrode the protests of the Foreign Office and insisted upon the common upper limit and the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty as a result of which the London Naval Conference of 1936 was unable to reach any agreement and thus the way was opened for Japan to commence arming for further aggression.

PP-14. After the failure of the 1936 Naval Disarmament Conference, Japan launched an extensive program of naval rearmament the details of which have been fully set forth previously in this Summary. As part of this program Japan laid the keels for two battleships and three heavy cruisers which exceeded in tonnage and guns the maximum limits set by the London Naval Treaty of 1936.^{2.}

PP-15. Although Japan was not a party to the 1936 London Naval Treaty the construction of such capital ships in secret is evidence of Japan's aggressive intentions especially when coupled with the fact that on 12 February, 1938 Foreign Minister HIRATA in answer to a note from Secretary of State HULL requesting assurances that Japan was not constructing nor acquiring any capital ships or cruisers not in conformity with the London Naval Treaty of 1936, sent a reply which declined to give the desired information.^{3.} At exactly the same

PP-14.

- . Ex. 913, T. 9,240;
- Ex. 917, T. 9,253

PP-15.

- a. Ex. 58, T. 9,236

Page PP-9.

(FF-15)
 that HINOTA was refusing to join in naval limitation or exchange of information, the Japanese Government was engaged in the construction of the above mentioned battleships and cruisers all of which exceeded the treaty limit.^{b.} The Japanese Foreign Minister tried to persuade the Navy to agree to the notification of ship construction on the ground that the Navy would have to make necessary explanation before the Diet as well as the Finance Ministry but the Navy insisted that the maintenance of secrecy was not impossible in Japan and hence rejected such notification.^{c.} As a result the details of the budgets were kept secret from the Diet.^{d.}

FF-16. The purpose of this naval expansion was stated by the Navy at an Imperial General Headquarters Council in the Imperial Presence on 18 February, 1938, to be the necessity of preparing against Great Britain and America.^{c.}

FF-17. With the exception of one year when OKA was Commander of the warship "JINGEI" from 1 December, 1936, to 1 December, 1937,^{a.} he was attached to the Navy Ministry during the period prior to October, 1939, and hence, it is submitted, was one of the Navy group who continued to insist upon expansion of naval armament. As Chief of the First Section, Naval Affairs Bureau, which was in charge of all matters concerning naval armaments and construction of warships,^{b.} and subsequently as Chief of the

FF-15.

- b. Ex. 913, T. 9240;
Ex. 917, T. 9253
- c. Ex. 3625, T. 35,497;
Ex. 3641, T. 35,437-8
- d. Ex. 34-A, T. 7247

PP-17.

- a. Ex. 100, (page 5),
T. 750
- b. Ex. 75, (page 2),
T. 684

PP-16.

- a. Ex. 3272, T. 37,262

Page PP-10.

(PP-17)
entire Naval Affairs Bureau, OKA by virtue of his official position played an important part in the naval rearmament of Japan.

IV. Secret Fortification of the Mandated Islands In Violation of Treaty.

PP-16. After the termination of the Naval Disarmament Treaty and as part of the subsequent naval rearmament, Japan secretly fortified the Mandated Islands, to implement the general plan of aggression. The details of the secret fortification have been set forth previously in this Summation. In addition to such evidence the Prosecution refers to Exhibit 3840^a introduced as rebuttal evidence.

PP-19. The accused OKA shares the responsibility for much of the illegal fortification of the Mandated Islands by reason of his official positions during this period. As Chief of Section Gen., Naval Affairs Bureau, from 15 January 1938 to 15 October 1939, OKA's duties included taking charge of matters concerning naval armaments and naval administration in general, construction or organization of warships, matters concerning warships and weapons of war and other munitions in general and matters concerning guarding and defense.^a As Chief of the Third Division, Naval General Staff from 15 October 1939 to 15 October 1940, OKA had charge of gathering and investigating military intelligence^b and

PP-18.
a. Ex. 3840, T. 38,115

PP-19.
a. Ex. 75 (Volume 2,) T. 684
b. Ex. 3473, T. 33,384

Page FP-11.

(FP-19)
of collecting and piecing together information on the international situation, the war preparedness conditions and the war preparedness of the major powers.^{c.} Subsequently as Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau after 15 October 1940, OKA supervised the activities of the entire Bureau including Section Two which handled matters of national defense policy and international conventions.^{d.} The evidence of defense witness YOSHIDA, Hidemi shows that the Naval Affairs Bureau played the leading part in rearming the Mandates.^{e.} In all three of the above positions, OKA is responsible for the planning and execution of the fortification of the Mandated Islands.

V. Economic Exploitation of Greater East Asia.

FP-20. From the time OKA became Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, on 15 January 1938, he took an increasingly large share in the economic exploitation of the areas conquered by Japan. On 25 January 1938, he was appointed Secretary of the Bureau of Manchurian Affairs and held this position until 21 October 1939.^{a.} On 30 April 1938 OKA was appointed a supporter to the Organizing Committee of the North China Development Co. Ltd. and the Central China Development Co. Ltd.^{b.} which were formed to accelerate economic development in China with one half of the capitalization subscribed by the Japanese Government.^{c.} Subsequently from 18 May 1938 to

FP-12.

- c. Ex. 3006, T. 26,658
- d. Ex. 25, (p. - 2), T. 684
- e. Ex. 2590, T. 448

FP-20.

- a. Ex. L.C, T. 753-4
- b. Ex. L.C, T. 753
- c. Ex. 459, T. 5251

(PP-20)
23 October 1939, OKA served as secretary of the committee appraising properties invested by the China Development Companies.
d.

PP-21. The bare assertion by defense witnesses that the North and Central China Development Companies were really beneficial to China^{a.} is unavailing in view of the evidence. The accused OKA stated that the Development Companies were used by Japan to procure the war materiel needed for the Sino-Japanese hostilities and to expand the armament of Japan.^{b.} OKA shares the responsibility for the economic exploitation of China.

PP-22. From 21 February 1939 to 23 October 1939 OKA served as secretary of the Connecting or Liaison Committee of the China Affairs Board^{a.} which exercised control over industry, transportation and economic problems of China through the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company.^{b.} From 2 August 1939 until 19 October 1939 he was secretary of the Overseas Colonization Investigative Council.^{c.} On 29 April, 1940 he was decorated with the 4th Class Order of the Golden Kite and the Second Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure for meritorious services in the China Incidents.^{d.}

PP-23. After becoming Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau on 15 October 1940 OKA continued to participate in the exploitation of Asia. On 21 November 1940 he was

PP-20.
d. Ex. 120 (page 5), T. 750

PP-21.
a. Ex. 1575, T. 1,374-31;
Ex. 2079, T. 21,753
b. T. 1685-12

PP-22.
a. Ex. 120, T. 753-5
b. T. 15,267
c. Ex. 120, T. 753-4
d. Ex. 120, T. 755

(PF-23)
Again appointed a member of the Collecting or Liaison Committee of the China Affairs Bureau. On 26 December 1940 he was appointed a Councillor of the Bureau of Southern Colonization of the Overseas Affairs Ministry, and on 18 January 1941 Councillor of the Bureau of Manchurian Affairs. On 9 December 1941 he was appointed Chief of the Department of Southern Administrative Affairs. From 17 March 1942 until 2 April 1942 he was a member of the Organizing Committee of the Southern Development Bank.^{a.}

PF-24. The formation of the Greater East Asia Ministry was proposed by the Planning Board and Premier TOJO in January 1942.^{a.} On 21 February 1942 OKA was appointed secretary of the Greater East Asia Construction Council.^{b.} The accused TOGO testified that on 29 August 1942 he conferred with HOSHINO about a draft of the proposal for the Greater East Asia Ministry and explained his reasons for opposing the plan. Soon thereafter, OKA and SATO, the two Chiefs of the Army and Navy Military Affairs Bureau, visited TOGO and after saying that the plan was supported equally by the Army and Navy requested him to agree to the plan but TOGO again refused. On 1 September 1942 TOGO resigned as Foreign Minister in protest against the plan.^{c.}

PF-25. On 20 and 21 October 1942 OKA attended two meetings of the Investigative Committee of the Privy

PF-23.
a. Ex. 140, T. 756-9

PF-24.
a. T. 14, 159
b. Ex. 140, T. 759
c. Ex. 140, T. 756-9

Page Pr-14.

(PP-25)

Council concerning organization of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in his capacity as Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau. At the meeting on October 20th in answer to a question from a committee member, OKA stated that the Southern occupied areas in charge of the Navy were principally Burma, Celebes and New Guinea including Sunda Isles and Dutch Timor. On 1 November 1942 the Greater East Asia Ministry was established. The same day OKA was appointed a member of the Connecting or Liaison Committee of the Greater East Asia Ministry, a position he held until 29 December 1944. In addition, from 22 December 1942 until 21 November 1944 OKA was a member of the committee training essential personnel for Greater East Asia.

PP-26. In November, 1943, the Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations was held in Tokyo at which representatives of the so-called independent nations of China, Thailand, Manchuria, the Philippines and Burma met with representatives of Japan. OKA attended this assembly which concluded with the adoption of a Joint Declaration of Basic Principles.

PP-27. The purpose of the establishment of Greater East Asia was to extend Japan's sphere of domination over East Asia and provide important sources of raw materials for her. The ordinance establishing the Greater East Asia Ministry indicates that the entire East Asia Sphere was

PP-25.

- a. Ex. 687, T. 12,093-4
- b. Ex. 687 (page 16), T. 12,071
- c. Ex. 90, T. 684
- d. Ex. 120, T. 759; T. 12,095
- e. Ex. 120, (page 7-11), T. 750

PP-27.

- a. T. 11,343

PI-26.

- a. Ex. 1346, T. 12,098-100

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Page FP-15.

(FP-27) b.
to be treated as a colonial possession of Japan.

FP-28. It is submitted that OKA's participation throughout his career in the economic exploitation of the conquered areas of Asia as shown by the various official positions held by him, leads to the inescapable conclusion that he was not just a Naval officer carrying out his routine duties but a wholehearted supporter of Japan's military aggression in China and the South Seas.

VI. OKA's Political Activities.

FP-29. OKA's personal part in the conspiracy arises from the fact that from the time he became Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, he was increasingly involved in responsibility for affairs of state. OKA testified that there was no basis for the rumor that he had power and influence among a so-called group.^{e.} This is flatly contradicted by the evidence. Even before he was appointed Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau he had become a member of the young officers' clique which was meddling in politics and usurping the functions of the civil authorities. Upon cross-examination OKA admitted that in June, 1938, as Chief of Section One, he had weakly meetings with General KAGESA of the Military Affairs Bureau and KISHI, the Secretary to Premier KOHJE, for the purpose of exchanging information concerning the China Affair, and hearing explanations and reports with regard to China from

FP-27.
b. 1. (87) T. 12,037

FP-29.
c. T. 3,123

1 159 00 15 2 193

(PP-29) b. KAGESA who was a China expert. KAGESA at that period was engaged in an intrigue involving Kuo and Tung, former officials of China's Foreign Ministry, who were brought to Tokyo to meet KAGESA and proposed that Yan Chiang-wai should sue for peace on behalf of China. c. It is apparent that OKA was involved in this intrigue through his weekly meetings with KAGESA. The evidence shows that OKA was utilizing his position as Chief of Section One to participate in schemes by the young Officers' group relating to the China Affair as early as June, 1938. Thus, at an early date, he was involved both from a military and a political point of view in the general conspiracy.

PP-30. Again, on 30 August 1938, OKA, as Chief of Section One, and KAGESA, as Chief of Army Military Affairs Section, held a conference at which plans for the capture of Canton by the Army and Navy were considered, and it was tentatively decided that since the capture of Canton was only the application of overall policies it could be carried out without prior consideration by the Five Ministers' Conference. It was also decided at this conference that since the Canton operation was an action lying purely and simply within the Supreme Command Sphere, a decision to leave the formal decision of policy to the Five Ministers' Conference might give rise to the charge that the prerogative of the Supreme Command had

II-2).

- b. T. 33,463
- c. Ex. 3721A, T. 23,978

II-3.

- a. Ex. 3874, T. 37,433.

Page FF-17.

(PP-30) b.
 been violated. On cross-examination OKA stated that he did not remember this conference with KAGESA and did not think it took place because such matters as the capture of Canton were outside the scope of his duties. When the official record of the conference was shown to him he stated that he had no recollection whatsoever concerning it. c. The Prosecution submits that OKA's denial of recollection of a matter as important as this conference relating to the capture of Canton is not entitled to credence. It is apparent from the evidence, which is controverted solely by the unsupported denial of the accused himself that OKA was using his official position to encourage aggressive tactics by the Army and Navy in China and to prevent the political government of Japan from exercising its proper function.

FF-31. On 8 July 1938 the Five Ministers' Conference decided Japan's whole strength should be concentrated upon bringing about the destruction or surrender of the Central Government of China. a. In order to carry out the above policy the Five Ministers' Conference on 7 October 1938 established a secret Liaison Committee whose purpose was to accelerate the performance of matters agreed upon by the Five Ministers' Conference in relation to the disposal of the situation in China. b. The secret Liaison Committee was composed of eight members among whom were the Chief of the Naval Affairs

FF-30.

- b. Ex. 3474, T. 37,484
- c. F. 33,465-8

FF-31.

- a. Ex. 3457, T. 37,352
- b. Ex. 3457, T. 37,364

Page PI-18.

(IP-31)
 Bureau and the Chief of Section One of the Naval Affairs Bureau. Among the four secretaries of the secret committee was the Chief of Section One of the Naval Affairs Bureau. Hence the Naval Affairs Bureau had two members on the committee and one on the secretariat. OKA in his capacity as Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, was both a member and a secretary of the Liaison Committee. The importance of the secret Liaison Committee is shown by the fact that its main functions were to determine the outline of concrete execution by way of acceleration of the performance of matters decided by the Conference of Five Ministers and to transfer them to each government office concerned, to agree on the agenda to be introduced to the Conference of Five Ministers and to introduce matters which the Third Committee for China desire to present to the Five Ministers' Conference. The decision of the Five Ministers' Conference which established the secret Liaison Committee stated that the Committee was to be abolished when the China Affairs Board was established. However, it appears that a similar Connecting or Liaison Committee was subsequently established in connection with the China Affairs Board. OKA, in his capacity as Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, was appointed Secretary to this Connecting Committee of the China Affairs Board on 21

 IP-31.

- c. Ex. 3457, T. 37,305
- d. Ex. 3457 (Annex 16), T. 37,350

Page PP-19.

(PP-31) ^{a.} February 1939. Shortly after he became Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, he was again appointed a member of the Connecting Committee of the Bureau of China Affairs on 21 November 1940, ^{f.} and of its successor, the Greater East Asia Ministry on 1 November 1942. ^{E.}

PP-32. On 9 February 1940 OKA received a decoration from the Nazi Government. ^{a.} If this was not in connection with his efforts to bring about the Tri-Partite Pact which was then being negotiated, it was at least in recognition of the fact that he was favorably disposed toward Nazi Germany. Furthermore, OKA's statement that he had nothing to do with the Tri-Partite Pact ^{b.} is contradicted by the admitted fact that on 23 January 1941 he was appointed an Imperial Member of the German-Italian-Japanese Mixed Experts Committee provided for by Article IV of the Tri-Partite Pact ^{c.} which had the purpose of strengthening and executing the Tri-Partite Pact. ^{d.}

PP-33. After OKA became Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau his political activities were enhanced. The accused IMTO who was Chief of the Army Military Affairs Bureau testified that although the Imperial Rescript of 1882 admonished military men not to intervene in politics, the War Minister was forced to take part in politics because he attended the Cabinet Conference as a state minister and must carry out the decision of the Cabinet. The Military Affairs Bureau was the political machine.

PP-31.

- e. Ex. 120, T. 753
- f. Ex. 120, T. 756
- g. Ex. 120, T. 759

PP-32.

- a. T. 33,453
- b. T. 33,417
- c. Ex. 120, T. 757
- d. Ex. 559, T. 6417-20

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P. e P-20.

(P-33)

through which this was done. Its function was to carry out political affairs but not in politics itself.

The Naval Affairs Bureau fulfilled the same function with respect to the Navy Minister. Defense witness HOSHINA, Zenshiro, testified that when necessary to negotiate with outsiders in handling matters within its jurisdiction, it was customary for the Navy Minister to do so through the Naval Affairs Bureau and for that reason the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, as a matter of convenience in maintaining liaison, was frequently appointed councillor or member of the various committees. ^{b.} As a result OKA shortly after becoming Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau was appointed a member of the Board of Admirals, standing follower to the Navy Minister in the Imperial Headquarters, secretary of the National General Mobilization Council, councillor of the Cabinet Planning Board, member of the Connecting Committee of the China Affairs Bureau, councillor of the Bureau of Southern Colonization of the Overseas Affairs Ministry, and councillor of the Bureau of Manchurian Affairs. ^{c.} In January 1939, while chief of Section One he had been appointed a Government Commissioner on matters related to the Navy Ministry in the Diet and he was reappointed to this position ^{d.} annually until 1943. It is to be noted that Section

PP-23.
 a. Ex. 3154, T. 33,122
 b. Ex. 2757, T. 33,307
 c. Ex. 1200, T. 755-7
 d. T. 23,415

Page PP-21.

(PP-33)
 Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau had charge of all matters concerning the dissemination of knowledge relating to national defense and matters concerning the evidence of organizations connected with naval affairs.

IP-4. It is apparent that OKA's duties in liaison matters were wide and diversified. His bare statement that as Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau he received orders from the Navy Minister and carried out routine functions and was never in a position to assume any independent responsibility vis-a-vis outside contacts is contradicted by the evidence. Defense witness HUSHINA, Zenshiro testified that the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau drafts plans for matters within his functions and submits them to the Navy Minister for his approval. It is obvious that such duties permitted the exercise of considerable discretion and enabled OKA to become the active instigator and participant in the establishment of policies furthering the conspiracy as will be shown subsequently.

IP-35. On cross-examination OKA stated that there is no instance of the Navy engaging in positive activities with reference to the IRMA. In early February, 1941, the accused NITO as a councillor of IRMA stated that the Army and Navy would fully cooperate with the association in the future as in the

PP-23.

a. Ex. 75, (page 2) T. 684

PP-34.

a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,386
 b. Ex. 3468, T. 33,305

IP-35.

a. T. 33,477

Page II-22.

(FF-35)

past. He represented both the Army and Navy in speaking before the IRAA, ^{b.} and hence must be deemed to have represented the views of OKA who was also a councillor of the IRAA. ^{c.}

FF-36. On 4 April 1941 OKA as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau made an interim report to Premier KONOE concerning the proposal by KONOE to have Vice Navy Minister TOYODA accept a position in the new Cabinet as Minister of Commerce and Industry to counter balance the appointment of Lt. Gen. SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board. OKA reported that the matter was still difficult to realize and KONOE requested that he ask the Navy Minister to try once more to persuade TOYODA. ^{a.} This shows that OKA acted as liaison between the Navy Minister and the Premier on the matter of forming a new cabinet in which the proper balance between Army and Navy should be preserved.

FF-37. As late as July, 1944, OKA acted as spokesman for the Navy in trying to bolster up the TOJO Cabinet. An entry in KIDO's Diary for 17 July 1944 relates the discussions pertaining to a re-organization of the cabinet and shows that OKA had attempted to induce Admiral YONAI to accept a cabinet position in a last effort to save the Cabinet. ^{a.} Defense witness HAMURA, Naokuni, stated

FF-35.

- b. T. 33,266
- c. T. 33,477.

FF-36.

- a. Ex. 3216A, T. 29,176

FF-37.

- a. Ex. 1277, T. 11,372; Ex. 1278, T. 11,377

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Page FP-23.

(FP-37) that as Navy Minister in July, 1944, he ordered OKA to sound out YONAI as a prospective cabinet member and that OKA acted solely under his orders. Even if true, this does not alter the fact that as usual in such cases OKA was the official chosen to represent the Navy in political negotiations.

FP-38. It is submitted that OKA was not just a military puppet carrying out the orders of his superior officers. He was one of the young officers who continually pushed the Japanese Government forward on the path of aggression. He played a large part in helping the Japanese military to encroach on the power of the civil authorities. Even though OKA was subject to orders from the Navy Minister his position as liaison representative of the Navy in political matters enabled him to exert great influence over events. As will be shown later his influence was always exerted in furtherance of the aggressive aims of the conspiracy.

VII. OKA's Participation in the Conspiracy as a Member of Imperial and Liaison Conferences and Privy Council Meetings.

FP-39. From the time when OKA became Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau he participated in many policy making decisions by reason of his attendance at Imperial and Liaison Conferences and Privy Council Meetings. He testified that during the period he was Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau he attended the Imperial and Liaison

(FP-39)

Conferences and Investigative Committee meetings of the Privy Council with the exception of three or four times when he was ill.^a The evidence shows that he attended all four of the Imperial Conferences during the crucial year 1941, namely the conferences held on 2 July, 6 September, 5 November and 1 December 1941.^b From January to July, 1941, OKA attended twenty-four Liaison Conferences.^c In view of his statement that he was absent only three or four times in all^d he must have attended an equal number during the second half of 1941.

FP-40. OKA testified that he attended the Imperial and Liaison Conferences as secretary and the Investigation Committee meetings of the Privy Council as explainer and did not participate in the discussions or exercise the right to vote.^a This is contradicted by the evidence of the Japanese Central Liaison Office that OKA was present at Imperial Conferences together with MUTO and TOMITA as a Secretary of the Conference for the purpose of giving explanations concerning the bills^b which shows that he participated in the discussions. Further evidence that OKA actually participated in the discussions is found in the record of the Investigation Committee meeting of 20 October 1942 where he joined in a discussion with another committee member as to what occupied areas in the South were to be in charge of the Navy.^c

FP-39.

- a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,411
- b. Ex. 1107, T. 10,140
- c. Ex. 1103, T. 10,056-64
- d. Ex. 3473, T. 33,411

FP-40.

- a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,411
- b. Ex. 1107, T. 10,140
- c. Ex. 667, (page 16), T. 12,071

59 00 15 2202

P. o IP-25.

FP-41. An example of OKA's attempt to evade responsibility is the fact that he testified that he attended meetings of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council only as an explainer and did not participate in the decisions of the Committee.^{a.} It is to be noted however that in at least one case of which we have record the meeting of the Investigation Committee on 28 July 1941 was followed a few hours later on the same day by a meeting of the Privy Council itself which unanimously ratified the protocol concerning military cooperation of Japan and French Indo-China.^{b.} Unlike the prior Investigation Committee meeting where all explainers were asked to retire before the decision was reached, OKA did not retire from the Privy Council meeting and was present when all members signified their unanimous consent by standing up;^{c.} accordingly, OKA must share in the responsibility for such decision.

FP-42. OKA's statement that he attended meetings of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council "only in the company of the Navy Minister as explainer . . . in order to submit materials which he needed"^{a.} is a further example of his outright mendacity in attempting to evade responsibility. It is sufficient to point out that on at least two occasions of which we have record he attended a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council at which the Navy Minister was not present. The first such instance was

FP-41.

- a. T. 33,414
- b. Ex. 650, T. 7074
- c. Ex. 650, (p. 37) T. 7074

FP-42.

- a. T. 33,414

File PP-26.

(PP-42)

on 21 October 1942 when the Investigation Committee met to consider matters concerning the establishment of the Greater East Asiatic Ministry. ^{b.} The second was on 18 August 1943 when the Investigation Committee met and unanimously approved the draft of the treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning the annexation of Siam territory by Thailand. ^{c.} At both of these meetings SHIMADA was absent and OKA was the sole representative of the Navy who was present.

PP-43. Similarly, as to Liaison Conferences, OKA himself testified that he attended in order to make explanations and supply information. ^{a.} It is obvious that this enabled him to exert considerable influence on the decisions made at such conferences. This is confirmed by defense witness YAMAOTO, Kazuichi, former Chief of the American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office who testified that MUTO and OKA as secretaries of the Liaison Conferences, took charge of preparation, explanation and adjustment of the draft and collection of materials. The draft on military matters was done by the Army or Navy or the Supreme Command. ^{b.} Further confirmation was given by TOGO on cross-examination when he admitted that HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA in their capacity as secretaries explained the various plans and proposals submitted and participated in the debates in the conferences. ^{c.}

PP-44. The Liaison Conferences dated from the time

PP-42.

- b. Ex. 687, T. 12,094
- c. Ex. 1275, T. 11,364

PP-43.

- a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,412
- b. Ex. 3474, T. 33,417
- c. T. 35,984

Page PP-27.

(PP-44)

of the first KONOE Cabinet when it became necessary to establish some liaison between the military High Command and the Cabinet. They had no constitutional existence and their decisions in a formal sense had no weight but since the decisions were treated at the time as binding upon those present, in practice they had great weight. TOGO's testimony as to the Liaison Conferences is very significant: -

"Since the Army and Navy Vice Chiefs of Staff were almost always in attendance before the war and since of the three secretaries (Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, secretaries of Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus) two were military men, it can be seen how strong the military influence in the conference was. Indeed, the fact of the establishment of such a conference is proof of the fact that the military authorities were not only interfering in politics but were exercising such influence as to control and direct the national policy, and that some coordination was needed, but while the military members of the Liaison Conference exercised great influence in the affairs of state, the civilian members exercised very little or none on military affairs, and were not allowed even knowledge of military operations. Decisions of the Liaison Conference involving affairs of state had of

PP-44.

2. Ex. 3646, T. 35,677

Page PP-28.

(IP-44)

course to be presented to the Cabinet - and, in proper case, to an Imperial Conference - but in almost no instance did such a decision fail to pass through the Cabinet in the form in which the Conference had adopted it. Of course drafts of the decisions of the Liaison Conference were always prepared beforehand - the matters examined by the staffs of the ministers concerned and coordinated by the three secretaries before they were submitted to the Conference. ..." a.

PP-45. It can be seen from this that OKA and MUTO as the liaison officers between the Army and Navy had come to occupy a position of paramount importance. Their duties as stated by the accused MUTO were to avoid any misunderstanding of action and to coordinate the efforts of both the Army and Navy together with the Premier, Foreign Minister, and Finance Minister.

VIII. Japan's March to the South.

PP-46. During the period when OKA was attached to the Naval General Staff, and Naval Affairs Bureau, he was a member of the over-all conspiracy which planned and executed the expansion and aggression of Japan toward the south.

PP-47. On 26 July 1940 the second KONOE Cabinet defined Japan's basic national policy according to which Japan was to construct a new order of Greater East Asia built

PP-44.

b. Ex. 3646, T. 35,678-9

PP-45.

a. Ex. 2240A, T. 16,123

Page FF-29.

(FP-47)
upon the firm solidarity of Japan, Manchukuo and
China with Japan as the center.

FP-48. Pursuant to this policy Japan made demands on France for the passage of Japanese troops through the province of Tonkin, in northern French Indo-China, the use of airfields in Tonkin, and the stationing of troops and provision for the transportation of arms and ammunition. The ultimatum warned that if no immediate reply was received, Japan would resort to the use of force. The French Ambassador stated that acceptance of these demands would be the equivalent of a declaration of war by France against China.

FP-49. Navy participation in this matter is shown by defense witness ABE, Katsue, who testified that as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, from October, 1939, to October, 1940, he represented the Navy in conferences with the Army and Foreign Office as to securing the cooperation of French Indo-China. Further evidence that the plan for the South Seas involved ultimately the use of military operations is evident from the statement of 10 August 1940 by Prince FUSHIMI, Chief of the Naval General Staff, to the Emperor that the Navy wished at present to avoid the use of force against the Netherlands Indies and Singapore and that, since at least eight

FP-47.
a. Ex. 541, T. 6271

FP-48.
a. Ex. 620, T. 6886-7

FP-49.
a. Ex. 3015, T. 26,871

Page FF-30.

(PF-49)
 months were needed for preparation after a decision
 for war was made, the later war came the better. ^{b.}
 This made it apparent that Japan would resort to war
 to achieve her aims in the south when preparations
 were complete.

PF-50. On 22 September 1940 the Japanese Army
 started the attack on the Tongking border constituting
 the first act of military aggression by Japan against
 French Indo-China. On the following day French Indo-
 China yielded to force and agreed to the Japanese
 Army and Navy terms ^{a.} including the right to station
 32,000 troops in Indo-China ^{b.} and to anchor one war-
 ship in Haiphong Harbor. ^{c.}

PF-51. By virtue of his official position as
 Chief of Division Three, Naval General Staff, from 15
 October 1939 to 15 October 1940, OKA is chargeable with
 participating in the planning and execution of this
 military advance into Indo-China. The accused OKA
 admitted that the Naval General Staff handled operation
 plans ^{a.} but claimed that Division Three of Naval General
 Staff had charge of gathering and investigating military
 intelligence and was not connected with operations. ^{b.}
 However, it appears that OKA was also a member of Naval
 Staff in Imperial Headquarters ^{c.} and as such he is
 responsible for the move into Indo-China. Also as Chief
 of Division Three OKA is responsible for setting up the

PF-49.

b. Ex. 1298, T. 11,718

PF-50.

a. Ex. 620, T. 6933;
 Ex. 621, T. 6830
 b. Ex. 625, T. 6969-70
 c. Ex. 620, T. 6951-2

PF-51.

a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,415
 b. Ex. 3473, T. 33,384
 c. Ex. 1,0, (6), T. 750

Page Five-31.

(PP-51)
 Naval espionage organization which was later shown to be
 functioning in the South Seas in October, 1941.^{d.}

PP-52. On 25 October 1940 Delegate SAITO's secret telegram at Batavia to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA betrayed that the real purpose behind Japan's efforts to lease oil fields in Indonesia was to establish military bases "from the point of view of military operations against the Dutch."^{a.} That OKA participated in this southward advance of Japan is further shown by the fact that he was appointed secretary of the Overseas Colonization Investigation Council on 2 August 1939,^{b.} and together with MUTO became Councillor of the Bureau of Southern Colonization, Overseas Affairs Ministry on 26 December 1940.^{c.} Also, on 17 March 1942 he and MUTO were both appointed members of the Organizing Committee of the Southern Development Bank.^{d.}

PP-53. A Liaison Conference was held on 13 January 1941 which was attended by OKA as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau and MUTO as Chief of the Army Military Affairs Bureau.^{a.} The presence of OKA and MUTO at this and a great many other Liaison Conferences is indicative of their active collaboration. There is no evidence of what took place at this Conference other than an "exchange of views"^{b.} but it may be inferred that the conference decided to authorize the preparation of military currency to be used in certain unspecified areas since three days later on 16 January 1941 the War Ministry requested that such currency plates be prepared at once.^{c.}

PP-51.

d. Ex. 1325, T. 11,885

PP-52.

a. Ex. 1103, T. 10,056
 b. Ex. 1103, T. 10,056
 c. Ex. 852, T. 8451

PP-52.

a. Ex. 1316, T. 11,835-6
 b. Ex. 120, T. 753
 c. Ex. 120, T. 756;
 Ex. 118, T. 745
 d. Ex. 120, T. 759; Ex. 118, T. 746

1P-54. That Japan's interest in Indo-China and Thailand was entirely military was made apparent in the Liaison Conference of 30 January 1941, attended by both OKA and MUTO^{c.} which decided the policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand.^{b.} The main outline of this policy as shown by an entry in KIDO's Diary was to establish Japan's leading position in Indo-China and Thailand by utilizing the fact that these countries had accepted Japan's arbitration proposal to contribute to the preparations for the southward policy; as part of these preparations the Navy contemplated the use of Camranh Bay and the air bases near Saigon. As the real purpose could not be stated openly, it was decided to disguise them as "preservation of trade and communications" and "security against war between Indo-China and Thailand."^{c.} The evidence of KIDO's Diary in this point is confirmed by Defense Exhibit 3658 which purports to be the actual decision of the Liaison Conference and states that if unavoidable Japan will resort to arms against French Indo-China.^{d.}

1P-55. That OKA was in favor of this policy of using so-called arbitration to exert pressure in achieving the southward advance is further shown by the fact that on 6 February 1941 he was appointed a follower to the Imperial Commissioner arbitrating the dispute on the border between Siam and Indo-China. The conduct of Japan in this

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- 1P-54.
 - a. Ex. 1103, T. 10,058
 - b. Ex. 1503, T. 11,744;
Ex. 3658, T. 36231
 - c. Ex. 1303, T. 11,744-5
 - d. Ex. 3658, T. 36,231

- 1P-55.
- a. Ex. 120, T. 757

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File 1F-33.

(11-55)

arbitration proceedings was such as to lead British Ambassador Craig to inquire of MATSUOKA whether Japan did not expect exorbitant compensation for acting as mediator in the Sino-French Indo-China dispute.

FF-56. On 3 February 1941 OKA and TUTO attended a Liaison Conference which arrived at a decision to be used as instructions or reference by MATSUOKA in his negotiations with Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union during his European visit. The document provided that Japan would be the political leader in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and would be responsible for the maintenance of order in those areas. The people living in those areas, in principle, should maintain independence or be made independent; but the people in the districts now in the possession of Britain, France, Holland, Portugal and others, who are incapable of being independent, were to be permitted to have as much self-government as possible in accordance with their ability under the guidance of Japan. Economically, Japan would reserve preference over the defense resources of those districts but in other commercial enterprises the Empire would adopt the principle of open door and equal opportunity. The world was to be divided into four great blocs - the Greater East Asian Bloc, the European Bloc (including Africa), the American Bloc and the Soviet Bloc (including India and Iran).

FF-55.

b. Ex. 1046, T. 9813

FF-56.

- a. Ex. 1103, T. 10,058
- b. Ex. 3657, T. 36,213
- c. Ex. 3657, (page 2), T. 36,213

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PF-57. On 24 March 1941 a report to Ribbentrop from Ott concerning military preparations in Japan stated that the Navy was vigorously preparing for an attack on Singapore; preparations were expected to be concluded by the end of May.^a In April 1941, Imperial Headquarters decided upon an Army and Navy policy concerning measures to be taken in the South and stated that in certain circumstances it would be necessary to resort to arms in carrying out national policy in the South.^b OKA as a member of the Department of Naval Preparedness Examination, Imperial Headquarters and also as an assistant to the Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters^c shares the responsibility for this decision.

PF-58. In April, 1941, the Planning Board issued a confidential pamphlet entitled "Outline of Fundamental National Policies" which included a Cabinet decision of 22 January 1941 relating to the fundamental principles of Japan's population policy. The plan stated that it was the mission of the Empire to establish the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and to accomplish this mission it was necessary to increase the population quickly, enhance its quality and to correct distribution of Japanese emigrants to secure leadership over the races of East Asia.^a OKA as a Councillor of the Planning Board on this date shares

PF-57.

- a. Ex. 576, T. 6478
- b. Ex. 1305, T. 11,751
- c. Ex. 120 (page 6), T. 750

PF-58.

- a. Ex. 865, T. 8807-10;
Ex. 1067, T. 9879-82

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(18-58)
the responsibility for this document.

18-59. The invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany on 22 June 1941 accelerated the Japanese move to the South. Three days later, on 25 June 1941, OKA and MUTO attended a Liaison Conference which adopted as official policy that a military union should be established with Indo-China as soon as possible which would stress the establishment or use of air bases and harbor facilities in certain areas in Indo-China and the stationing of troops in the Southern part. Failing that, it was decided that Japan would attain her objective by force, for which preparations would be made in advance. ^{a.} OKA admitted attending a Liaison Conference which discussed such matters. ^{b.} On 2 July 1941 this accelerated program received official sanction in the Imperial Conference which decided that Japan should adhere to the principle of establishing a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and should step up the Southward advance. Japan should accomplish the execution of the schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand and for this purpose preparations should be made for a war with Britain and the United States. ^{c.} OKA attended this meeting of the Imperial Conference. ^{d.}

18-60. On 7 July 1941 at the request of the accused MUTO a draft of reply material was submitted to the Foreign Office for use by Ambassador NOMURA in replying to questions of the United States Government concerning the French Indo-

18-61.

- a. Ex. 1006, T. 11,753;
Ex. 1075, T. 10,027
- b. T. 33,429
- c. Ex. 588, T. 6566;
Ex. 799, T. 704
- d. Ex. 1107, T. 10,110

(FP-60)
 China problem. Included in this document were draft instructions from the Navy stating that it was quite dangerous if the matters especially as regards the North leaked through to the United States too early.^{a.}

FP-61. Pursuant to the decision of the Imperial Conference on 2 July, Japan presented its demands to the French Government on 14 July 1941.^{b.} and threatened that if France did not accept by July 20th, force would be used.^{b.} On 28 July 1941 both OKA and MUTO attended a meeting of the Inquiry Committee of the Privy Council which decided that Japan and France should conclude a Protocol for the common defense of French Indo-China and military cooperation.^{c.} At this meeting War Minister TOJO stated that the penetration into northern French Indo-China the previous year was concerned with the Chiang regime and hence its aim was different from that of the present penetration; although Japan would be made responsible for common defense with French Indo-China by the present agreement, the area of Japanese military activities would not be restricted.^{d.} A few hours later on the same day a Privy Council meeting was held at which OKA was also present which unanimously approved the protocol between Japan and French Indo-China. The protocol provided that the French Government should consent to the dispatch of a necessary force of Japanese Army troops, war vessels

FP-60.

a. Ex. 3458, T. 37,427

FP-61.

- a. Ex. 646, T. 7055
- b. Ex. 640, T. 7037
- c. Ex. 649, T. 7069
- d. Ex. 649, T. 7072

(FP-61)
and air forces to southern Indo-China, the use of
Siamreap and seven other places as air bases and Saigon
and Camranh Bay as naval bases, and the right of quarter-
ing, maneuvers and training of the Japanese Army.
e.

FP-62. On 29 July 1941 Japan and the Vichy Govern-
ment signed the Protocol for joint defense of Indo-
China.
a. Japan had thus gained a military and naval
base to use as a concentration area and jumping off
ports against the Netherlands Indies.
b. The use to
which the base would be put was soon evident.

FP-63. In August, 1941, the accused SUZUKI and
the Planning Board heard that the Navy was dismantling
oil well equipment in Japan to be taken south for use
in exploiting the oil fields of the areas to be
occupied.
a. OKA both as a Councillor of the Planning
Board and as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau must have
been aware of this.

FP-64. The Prosecution submits that during this
period OKA in his capacity as Chief of Section Three,
Naval General Staff, and subsequently as Chief of the
Naval Affairs Bureau was actively engaged in the plan-
ning and execution of Japan's aggressive policy in the
South.

IX. Negotiations with the United States.

FP-65. The negotiations between the U. S. and Japan
commenced in April, 1941. The proposal for a Japan-

FP-61.
e. Ex. 650, T. 7074-7

FP-62.
a. Ex. 651, T. 7079
b. Ex. 629A, T. 7032-3

FP-63.
a. T. 25,370-1

Page FP-38.

(FP-65)

American understanding submitted by Hull to NOMURA was received in Tokyo on 17 April 1941.^{a.} Immediately upon receipt of this proposal and on the same date a joint conference of high government and military leaders including OKA and MUTO was convened by Premier KONOE.^{b.} It was decided to accept such a proposal but only on certain conditions as follows: It was to be made clear that there was to be no infringement of the Tripartite Pact and that the object of the negotiations was to promote world peace and not to relieve the United States of her commitments in the Pacific and allow her to increase her support of Britain; also clearer impression must be given to the idea of building a new order.^{c.}

FP-66. OKA and MUTO attended Liaison Conferences on 3 May, 8 May and 12 May 1941^{1.} which presumably considered the United States proposal. On 12 May 1941 NOMURA presented to Hull the draft of the first Japanese proposal which made it plain that the obstacle to reaching an agreement was the divergence of views as to the extent of Japan's obligation under the Tripartite Pact, the solution of the China Affair and Japan's expansion to the South. As to the Tripartite Pact Japan maintained that it was purely defensive but proposed that its obligations of military assistance under it would be applied under Article 3 of the Pact. In respect

FP-65.

- a. Ex. 2866, T. 25,695
- b. Ex. 2866, T. 25,694,
T. 33,375
- c. Ex. 2866, T. 25,697

FP-66.

- a. Ex. 1103, T. 10,000-1

Page 11-29.

(FP-66)
 to the China Affair, Japan proposed that the United States should acknowledge the KOFIE three principles of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communism and economic cooperation together with the principles set forth in the treaty with Hankow and the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China. The explanation also proposed that if China did not accept United States advice to negotiate, the United States should discontinue her assistance to him. With respect to the southward expansion, the matter of refusing to acquiesce in a transfer of southwest Pacific territory was dropped.^{b.}

FP-67. OKA's participation in the preparation of this document is shown by the testimony of the accused KIDO who stated that the Foreign Office drafted the original formula for a Japanese-American understanding and that OKA was an assistant at the time the formula was drawn up although he did not take a leading part.^{a.} Irrespective of whether OKA was one of the "activist groups of young officers in the Army and Navy" mentioned by MATSUOKA as those who opposed the policy of serious discussion of the American proposal,^{b.} it is at least obvious that as one of the authors of the Japanese proposal he was opposed to making concessions which in any way interfered with Japan's aggressive program. MATSUOKA's own motive in negotiations, as he informed

FP-66.
 b. Ex. 1070, T. 9891,
 9894-9903

FP-67.
 a. T. 11,237-8
 b. Ex. 1008, T. 9886

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(FP-67)
Ott, was only to postpone or prevent United States entry into the war and to prevent increase of assistance to England.^{c.}

FP-68. The fundamental inconsistency in the negotiations with the United States was that throughout the whole period that a peaceful arrangement was being sought by NOMURA and Hull, the conspirators in Japan were actively continuing their program for expansion in China and in the south. This became apparent when the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 decided that regardless of any change in the international situation Japan would continue the southward advance even if it meant war with Britain and the United States.^{a.} The decision of this Imperial Conference which OKA attended^{b.} indicated that there was no hope of overcoming the obstacles to a Japan-United States agreement.^{a.}

FP-69. In spite of the fact that the continuance of aggressive tactics as sanctioned by the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 rendered an agreement with the United States almost impossible, the conspirators continued to negotiate with the United States. The original Japanese proposal of 12 May 1941 had been answered by a counter proposal from Hull on 21 June 1941.^{a.} An excerpt from the KENOE Memoirs shows that joint conferences were held on July 10th and 12th.

FP-67.
c. Ex. 1073, T. 2,10

FP-68.
.. Ex. 582, T. 6566-8
b. Ex. 1197, T. 10,140

FP-69.
a. Ex. 1091, T. 10,001-3

File FP-41

(FP-69)

At the joint conference on the 12th the Army and Navy made a joint statement which provided that Japan's attitude toward the European War should be determined according to treaty obligations, the three KONO principals should form the basis for dealing with the China question, America could recommend an armistice but should not intervene and Japan should reserve her right to use armed force in the Pacific in case of need. It is to be observed that again the Army and Navy had laid down as part of their terms the three conditions which prevented the successful termination of negotiations, namely the Tri-Partite Pact, the solution of the China question and Japan's armed aggression in the South.

FP-70. That this joint statement of the Army and Navy was in fact prepared by Director of Navy Affairs OKA and Director of Military Affairs MUTO is stated in an entry in KIDO's diary for 15 July 1941. Both KONO and MATSUOKA approved of the formula but the latter wished to instruct NOMURA to first reject the oral statement of Hull of 21 June 1941, whereas KONO wanted the revised formula to be wired to NOMURA at the same time as the rejection of the oral statement lest the United States assume that negotiations were discontinued. Nevertheless MATSUOKA wired instructions to NOMURA which precipitated a Cabinet crisis. The fact that both sides had agreed to the revised formula prepared by OKA and MUTO shows that OKA and MUTO exercised

FP-69.

b. Ex. 2866, T. 25,746-7

FP-70.

a. Ex. 1115, T. 10,161

b. Ex. 1115, T. 10,162-3

(FP-70)

relative influence over the whole course of the negotiations.

FP-71. The accused OKA on direct examination stated that it was not within the province of his department to prepare such a formula and that the Director of the Bureau could not be responsible for drafting the complete formula for the agreement. It is to be noted that OKA never expressly denied that he had MUTO to either prepared the original Japanese formula; he merely denied by inference that he could have prepared the formula alone, a fact which was never alleged by KIDO. OKA also asserted that KIDO on direct examination had denied the construction placed upon Exhibit 1115, the extract from his diary. ^{b.} An examination of the record shows that Exhibit 1115 referred to alterations in the original formula made by OKA shortly before 15 July 1941 whereas KIDO's testimony on direct examination was that at the time the original formula was prepared in April 1941 OKA was an assistant although he did not take a leading part. ^{c.} It is submitted that KIDO's statement does not in any way impair the validity of the facts set forth in his diary (Ex. 1115), relating to OKA's share in preparing the revised formula of 15 July 1941 but merely reveals the additional fact that OKA was an assistant in preparing the original formula of April, 1941.

FP-71.

- a. T. 33,389-90
- b. T. 33,389
- c. T. 31,237-8

Page PP-43.

PP-72. OKA has testified that in August 1941 he was ordered by OIKAWA to have a merchant ship ready to take KONOE to a personal conference with Roosevelt.^{a.} Defense witness OIKAWA confirmed this and stated that he had unofficially selected OKA as a naval attendant in KONOE's suite because of OKA's intense interest in the negotiations.^{b.} Defense witness TAKATA also confirmed this and added that OKA appeared very happy at the developments.^{c.}

PP-73. It is contended that this evidence is of no value since at best it merely shows that OKA hoped to achieve the aim of the conspiracy by diplomatic methods. The Prosecution submits that OKAWA's whole participation in the negotiations shows that he was one of the leaders among the conspirators whose insistence upon Japanese adherence to the 4 is and continued aggression in China and the South Seas rendered the negotiations fruitless almost from the start.

X. The Formulation by OKA and MUTO of Japan's Peace Terms with China.

PP-74. Further proof that OKA and MUTO as the liaison officers of the Army and Navy were jointly influential in matters of State policy is provided by Exhibit 3456, a top secret memorandum of the Foreign Office which shows that OKA and MUTO on 6 September 1941 held a conference at the official residence of the Foreign Minister and stated the basic terms for settling

PP-72.

- a. T. 33,391
- b. Ex. 3470, T. 33,341
- c. Ex. 3470, T. 33,367

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(FP-74)
the China Affair. The document provided that the Chuan-king Government should join the working Government and that Japanese troops should be stationed in Amoy and Hainan Islands, as well as in certain districts of the Mongolian-Sichuan Area and North China.

FP-75. This document represents the maximum concessions which the Army and Navy were able to agree upon through their liaison officers, MUTO and OKA, in the negotiations with the United States. Throughout all the later negotiations Japan clung tenaciously to these terms relating to China. At the Imperial Conference held the same day on 6 September 1941, Japan's minimum demands for to China to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States were stated as follows: The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the China Incident; the Burma Road will be closed and the United States and Britain will give China no aid, neither military nor economic support; particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the new arrangements between Japan and China, Japan shall adhere to its necessity. Similar terms and conditions were subsequently incorporated in Exhibit 1245-F which contained the proposed terms of peace with China handed to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on 22 September 1941. These terms provided that for purposes of cooperation against Communism

FP-74.
Ex. 3456, T. 33,192

FP-75.
Ex. 588, T. 6,546;
Ex. 779, T. 7904

Page PF-45

(PF-75)

Japan should have the right to station troops and
 Naval forces in certain areas in China for a necessary
 period to accomplish these purposes. ^{b.} The accused
 AUTO, himself, on cross-examination had to admit that
 there was no threat to Japan of Communism infiltrating
 from Borneo, Sumatra or the Philippines which would
 require the garrisoning of Hainan Island. ^{c.} The real
 purpose of the troops on Hainan was subsequently re-
 vealed when they were used to invade Malaya on 8
 December 1941.

PF-70. The decision of the Imperial Conference
 on 5 November 1941 again reiterated in Proposition A
 the demand that "Among the Japanese troops dispatched
 to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident,
 those in the designated areas in North China and
 Hainan Island will be stationed there
 for a certain necessary time after the establishment
 of peace between Japan and China. Simultaneously with
 the establishment of peace, we shall commence to with-
 draw the rest according to a separate agreement between
 Japan and China, and with the stabilization of public
 order this will be completed within two years." A
 note appended to the decision states that "If the
 United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary
 term, it will be replied that our aim will be approx-
 imately 25 years." ^{d.} It is to be noted that Proposition

PF-75.

- b. Ex. 1245-F, T. 10,792
- c. T. 53,196

PF-76.

- b. Ex. 779, T. 7904;
- Ex. 528, T. 6566

Page PP-46.

(PF-76)

B as actually submitted to Hall on 20 November, 1941,

Although it mentioned withdrawal of troops from French Indo-China upon the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area, it contained no promise whatever to withdraw troops from China itself.

PF-77. The Prosecution submits that the original statement by OKA and MUTO of the terms of peace for China contained in Exhibit 3456 represented one of the chief obstacles to the successful termination of negotiations with the United States. The stationing of troops in certain areas of China remained a fundamental principle of Japanese policy throughout the entire negotiations.

XI. The Fall of the KONOE Cabinet.

PF-78. Premier KONOE set forth the facts pertaining to the resignation of the Third KONOE Cabinet in several documents. A statement dictated by him says that on 11 October 1941, OKA told KONOE that with the exception of the Naval General Staff the brains of the Navy did not favor war with the United States, but that in view of the Imperial Conference decision of 6 September which the Navy had approved, the Navy could not say so and accordingly the Navy Minister will propose to leave the decision in the hands of the Emperor at the conference next day.

The following day, 12 October 1941, at a conference at the

PF-76.

b. Ex. 1245 H, T. 10,811-4

PF-77.

. T. 33,196

P.-78.

. Ex. 1148, T. 10,253

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(PP-78)
 Premier's private residence at Ojikubo between the
 Premier, War Minister, Navy Minister and President
 of the Planning Board, TOJO stated that there was
 absolutely no hope for a successful conclusion of
 the diplomatic negotiations since it was impossible
 to withdraw the troops from China.^{b.} Navy Minister
 OIKAWA stated that the time had come to determine on
 peace or war and he would like to leave the decision
 entirely up to the Premier. If they were to seek peace
 they should go all the way with it. If there was to be
 war it must be determined then and there.^{c.} In other
 words the Navy Minister was not completely opposed to
 war but was merely opposed to postponing the decision
 any later. The deadlock between the Premier and War
 Minister continued and as a result the Army took the
 position that the Navy must declare itself, since if the
 Navy says she cannot go to war a way could be found to
 dissuade the subordinate Army officers. UIC called on
 Chief Secretary TOIWA and requested that the Navy be
 asked to make a definite statement.^{d.} Thereupon, Chief
 Cabinet Secretary TOIWA spoke to OIKAWA concerning the
 matter on 14 October 1941, and OIKAWA stated that the Navy
 could not say in any formal manner that it did not wish
 war but could only say that it was up to the Premier.^{e.}

PP-79. It is to be noted that the accused OIKAWA gave
 a slightly different version of the conversation on

PP-78.

- b. Ex. 1148, T. 10,253-6
- c. Ex. 2013, T. 25,863
- d. Ex. 1148, T. 10,263
- e. Ex. 3446, T. 33,050

(FP-79)
 October 14th. He stated that TO ITA first expressed the view that it would be difficult for the Navy to state it would be unable to fight and then he (OKA) agreed with him.^{a.} This version of the conversation is contradicted by the statement dictated by KMOE^{b.} as well as by the KMOE memoirs.^{c.} Furthermore, defense witness TO ITA himself failed to confirm OKA's recollection of the conversation. TO ITA does not mention any such conversation on October 14th but states on the contrary that on October 12th it was OKA who volunteered the information that the Navy could not decide whether to fight.^{d.}

FP-80. The accused OKA on the stand stated that the description of the conversations on or about October 12, 1941, given by KMOE shows that OKA's participation in the negotiations was merely his official acts as liaison officer and that OKA was only delivering messages of higher officials.^{a.} Defense witness OIKAWA stated that when OKA told TO ITA that the Navy could not fight he was conveying the intention expressed by OIKAWA as Navy Minister.^{b.}

FP-81. It is significant that when the deadlock between KMOE, TJO and OIKAWA was reached on October 12th the attempt to settle the matter was made by negotiation between OKA, UTO and TO ITA. This indicates that OKA had considerable influence on the decisions made. When called upon by UTO to take a position one way or another, OKA

FP-79.
 a. T. 33,397; T. 33,495
 b. Ex. 1148, T. 10,250
 c. Ex. 3446, T. 33,050
 d. Ex. 3467, T. 33,301

FP-80.
 a. T. 33,394
 b. Ex. 3470, T. 23,343

Page IP-49.

(PP-81)
 refused and left the decision to KONO. ^{a.} MATC on cross-examination testified that at his conversation with TO IFA on 14 October 1941, it appeared that in view of the attitude of the Navy it would be impossible for the War Minister to hold back those within the War Ministry who advocated a strong policy. ^{b.} The accused TOJO on cross-examination confirmed this when he stated that OIKAWA's insistence upon continuance of negotiations was a case of evasion of responsibility. ^{c.} The accused TOGO on cross-examination stated that KONO said the Navy was familiar with its Naval strength but KONO was in no position to decide and thus the attitude of the Navy was cowardly. ^{d.} TOGO added that the Navy entrusted the decision to the Premier as to whether the negotiations should be continued but there was nothing said by the Navy about entrusting to the Premier the question of relaxing the terms set up by the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6th. ^{e.}

PP-82. On 16 October 1941, the KONO Cabinet resigned and on 18 October the TOJO Cabinet was formed with OKA retaining his position as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau. ^{a.} The Prosecution submits that OKA's participation in the political maneuvers preceding the fall of the KONO Cabinet indicates that he had an intimate knowledge of the plans of the conspirators leading to war. His willingness to serve in the TOJO Cabinet is ample proof that he was

PP-81.

- a. Ex. 3346, T. 33,051
- b. T. 33,163
- c. T. 36,524
- d. T. 35,867
- e. T. 35,869

PP-82.

- a. Ex. 102, T. 685

(FP-82)
willing to plunge Japan into war, as further shown
by his subsequent conduct.

XII. The Decision For War.

PP-83. As early as 6 September 1941 the problem
of attacking Pearl Harbor was debated at the Naval War
College. It is inconceivable that OKA did not have
knowledge of this since of the forty-one top ranking
Naval officers who attended, two officers (Captain
TAKATA and Commander SHIKI) were from the Naval Affairs
Bureau.^{a.}

PP-84. From the time of the formation of the TOYO
Cabinet the preparations for war went forward with greater
vigor. An increasing number of Liaison Conferences were
held to consider questions of fundamental policy.^{a.} OKA
and MUTO attended all of these conferences.^{b.} At the
conferences reports were received of the progress of
negotiations with the United States from the Military and
Naval Attaches in Washington.^{c.}

PP-85. The decisions reached at these Liaison Con-
ferences have been set forth at length in the General
Summary of the Prosecution case. Attention is directed
to the Liaison Conference of 1 and 2 November 1941 which
adopted Proposals A and B;^{a.} to the Liaison Conference of
11 November 1941 when the draft of the "Principal Reasons
Alleged for the Commencement of Hostilities against the
USA and Britain" was adopted;^{b.} to the Liaison Conference

FP-83.

- a. Ex. 809(5), T. 11,230 PP-85.
a. Ex. 2915, T. 25,941-8
b. Ex. 1175, T. 10,362-5

FP-84.

- a. Ex. 1163, T. 10,315
b. T. 26,146-8
c. T. 36,358

Page FF-51.

(P-85)
 of 13 November 1941 which decided that after the break-
 down of negotiations with the United States about 25
 November, Japan would notify Germany and Italy of
 Japan's intentions to start war against the United
 States and Britain; ^{c.} to the Liaison Conference of
 20 November 1941 which adopted measures relating to the
 details of setting up military administration in south-
 ern occupied areas ^{d.} and to the Liaison Conference of
 28 November 1941 which unanimously decided on war with
 the United States. ^{e.}

FF-86. On 31 October 1941 a communication from
 the Chief of the Financial Bureau addressed to OKA among
 others established the procedure for issuance of
 military currency notes in foreign denominations to
 defray war expenditures in the event of military oper-
 ations in southern regions. ^{a.} A similar communication
 dated 31 October 1941 addressed to OKA among others refers
 to the military currency as gulden, dollars and pesos and
 says the areas in which they are to be used are Dutch East
 Indies, British Malaya, Borneo, Thailand and the Philippines. ^{b.}
 In both cases the approval of the Navy Minister was re-
 quested and the seal of OKA indicates that the communica-
 tions came to his attention.

FF-87. An excerpt from the interrogation of Admiral
 YAMAGUCHI states that as Chief of Naval General Staff he
 approved of the YAMAGUCHI Plan to attack Pearl Harbor at the

FF-85.

- c. Ex. 878, T. 8994
- d. Ex. 877, T. 8987
- e. T. 36,077

FF-86.

- a. Ex. 852 (Comm. #9),
T. 8456
- b. Ex. 852 (Comm. #10),
T. 8456

(FP-87)

end of October or early November after the plans had been perfected by preliminary maneuvers at sea and on paper. In this interrogation NAGAKI states several times that the Naval Affairs Bureau participated in the discussion of the VAADTK Plan.^{a.} Defense counsel has objected that this is a mistranslation.^{b.} In any case the fact that OKA knew of the plan is confirmed by Exhibit 809 where NAGAKI and other officers of Naval General Staff stated that the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau knew a part of the plan in advance.^{c.}

FP-88. OKA attended the Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941 which fixed a deadline for completion of the negotiations by 25 November 1941 or in the event of their failure to go to war.^{a.} In addition he attended the Imperial Conference on 1 December 1941 which decided that negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of national policy having failed, Japan would declare war on the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.^{b.}

FP-89. At the conclusion of the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941 the Emperor warned the members repeatedly that the final note must be delivered before the attack.^{a.} Defense witness YAMAOTO, Kumachi, testified that at the Liaison Conference of 2 December 1941 the question of procedure for opening hostilities first came up for discussion and TOGO said that at least

FP-87.

- a. Ex. 1197A, T. 10,461
- b. T. 10,465
- c. Ex. 809(67), T. 11,230

FP-89.

- a. Ex. 1201A, T. 10,480

FP-88.

- a. Ex. 1169, T. 10,333-40
- b. Ex. 588, T. 10,519

Page PF-53.

(FP-89)

a notification of termination of negotiations must be given prior to hostilities. ^{b.} Witness further stated on cross-examination that at this conference Vice Chief of Naval General Staff ITO on behalf of the Naval High Command made a strong request that in view of the need of conducting a surprise attack and inflicting heavy damage at the outset the negotiations should not be terminated at the time of opening hostilities. ^{c.} The accused T.GG in his direct examination confirmed the fact that ITO wanted negotiations left un-terminated and added that M.CAK also stated at this Liaison Conference ^{d.} that the Navy wanted to carry out a surprise attack.

On 3 December 1941 the Liaison Conference decided that a notification closing negotiations would be given at Washington. ^{e.} The drafting of the final note to the United States was done by the Foreign Office but it was submitted to the Liaison Conference and Cabinet and approved by them. ^{f.} In an excerpt from his interrogation T.GG stated that the responsibility for the composition of the note rests with the participating members of the Liaison Conference among whom he specifically named OKA. ^{g.}

PF-90. The accused OKA on direct examination admitted that the draft of the final note prepared by the Foreign Office was submitted to him and his subordinates for study and revision. As a result OKA sensed that it was inadequate as a final note and recommended that wording be inserted

PF-91.

- b. Ex. 2915, T. 16,093
- c. T. 26,134
- d. Ex. 3646, T. 35,724
- e. T. 26,095
- f. Ex. 2915, T. 26,095-6;
Ex. 1202A, T. 10,482;
Ex. 1206A, T. 10,506
- g. Ex. 1207A, T. 10,509

Page 1P-54.

(FF-90)
 reserving freedom of action to Japan. When the draft
 of the note was distributed at the Liaison Conference
 he discovered that the suggested revision was not
 made and after the conference he was told by YAMAKOTO
 of the Foreign Office in effect that it was unnecessary.^{a.}
 This was confirmed by defense witness SHIBA, Katsuo,
 who was OKA's assistant at the time.^{b.} On cross-
 examination OKA admitted that when first interrogated
 by the Prosecution he denied knowledge of ever asking
 the Foreign Office to change the wording of the note
 but after entering Sugamo Prison and talking to TOGC
 and SHIBA his recollection was refreshed.^{c.} The Pros-
 ecution submits that this explanation is unworthy of
 consideration. Moreover, defense witness YAMAKOTO
 denied that he received any such suggested revision from
 OKA or had any discussion with OKA on the matter.^{d.}
 TOGC also denied knowledge of any suggested revision of
 the note by OKA.^{e.}

FF-91. OKA stated on direct examination that at the
 Liaison Conference TOJO said the time of delivery of
 the final note would be entrusted to consultation between
 the Foreign Office and the Supreme Command. Later OKA
 heard that it would be delivered in Washington one hour
 before the opening of hostilities but he does not remember
 the date, from whom or where he heard this information.
 He learned for the first time after the war that the time
 was altered to 30 minutes prior to the opening of hostil-
 ities.^{a.}

FF-90.

- a. T. 33,400-2
- b. Ex. 3469, T. 33,322
- c. T. 33,437-9
- d. Ex. 3632, T. 35,563
- e. T. 35,861-2

FF-91.

- a. T. 33,402

Page 55.

PI-92. A Foreign Office document states that soon after 4 a.m. on 7 December 1941 OKA telephoned the Foreign Minister and reported on the success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.^{a.} On cross-examination OKA stated he did not recall such a telephone call but such a thing was possible. He also admitted that he might have been informed about 4 o'clock on the morning of 8 December, 1941 about the success of the attack but had no recollection of it now.^{b.} On cross-examination TOGO admitted receiving a telephone call from OKA at this time in which OKA used the words "surprise attack on Hawaii."^{c.} This report by OKA coming approximately forty minutes after the opening of the attack on Pearl Harbor at 3:20 a.m. shows that OKA was in very close contact with matters of operations including the Pearl Harbor attack. The Prosecution submits that his statement that he did not learn that the time for delivery of the final note was altered to 30 minutes prior to the attack is incredible in the face of the evidence.

PI-93. At 7:30 a.m. on December 7, 1941, a meeting of the Inquiry Committee of the Privy Council was held at which the bill regarding declaration of war was unanimously adopted.^{a.} OKA admitted that he probably attended this meeting as an explainer.^{b.} At this meeting TOJO stated that since 1 December the negotiations with the US were continued only for the sake of strategy. Navy Minister SHIMADA reported on the outbreak of war against

PF-22.

- a. Ex. 3647, T. 35,927
- b. T. 33,500-1
- c. T. 35,933

PI-23.

- a. Ex. 1241, T. 10,690
- b. T. 33,502

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FP-56.

(PF-93) c.
America and England at Hawaii and Bay.

FI-92. At about 12:00 noon the Imperial Rescript declaring war on the United States and Britain which had been approved by the Privy Council was issued.

OKA was not a signatory of this document but in his interrogation UTO admitted that he collaborated with TUGO and OKA in preparing the draft of the Imperial Rescript. Each of them prepared a draft and then the three were put together. Subsequently on

direct examination UTO testified that his statement in the interrogation was a mistake; that he and OKA did not make a draft of the Imperial Rescript but only offered reference material for the Rescript to Chief Cabinet Secretary HOSHINO, and that the draft of the Rescript was prepared in the Cabinet. c.

FI-95. The Prosecution submits that OKA participated in the preparation of both the final note and the Imperial Rescript as well as attending the Investigative Committee meeting of the Privy Council which decided on war and hence he is chargeable with responsibility for the decision to wage an aggressive war contrary to the principles of international law.

XIII. Prisoners of War.

FP-96. OKA as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau had jurisdiction over Navy prisoners of war. In principle all prisoners captured by the Navy were to be handed over

FI-93.
c. Ex. 1241, T. 10,691,
10,699

FI-94.
a. Ex. 1240, T. 10,686-9
b. Ex. 2240, T. 16,121-5
c. Ex. 3454, T. 33,125

(PP-96)
 to the Army but until such time the prisoners were under
 naval supervision in temporary camps. ^{a.} The Navy Minister
 had authority to make rules and regulations for the admin-
 istration of prisoners of war. ^{b.} SULLIVAN admitted that as
 Navy Minister he issued such instructions and cited as
 an example Navy Ministerial Notification No. 33 relating
 to prisoners of war originally issued in 1904 and
 amended in 1941 which authorized naval stations or
 other naval authorities who receive prisoners of war
 to detain them in any temporary camp available having
 adequate facilities pending transfer to the Army. ^{c.}

PP-97. O'KA testified on direct examination that
 when it was impossible to turn over prisoners of war
 to the Army immediately, they were provisionally
 interned by the naval unit in the field or, if in Japan,
 by a naval station. ^{a.} Matters concerning prisoners
 of war were handled by the Navy Ministry as matters
 belonging to general naval administration. The Navy
 Ministry handled the establishment and revision of
 rules pertaining to prisoners of war, liaison within
 other offices concerning prisoners of war and requests
 from units at the front for supplies and medicine for
 prisoners of war. ^{b.}

PP-98. On cross-examination O'KA stated that the
 Naval Affairs Bureau handled matters relating to
 prisoners of war requiring liaison with the Army,

PP-96.

- a. Ex. 3054, T. 27,278-9
- b. Ex. 3065, T. 27,359
- c. Ex. 3565, T. 34,600;
 Ex. 3055, T. 27,275-8

PP-97.

- a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,419
- b. T. 33,424-5

Page 11-58.

(FP-98)

Foreign Office or Home Office and also with the naval units having prisoners in their custody. The highest authorities in connection with supervision over prisoners of war were the commanders of naval stations, commanders of a fleet and commanders of naval guard areas.^{a.}

FP-99. It appears from this evidence that CKA was attempting to minimize the importance of the Naval Affairs Bureau in relation to prisoners of war by shifting all responsibility to the commanding officer of the naval unit having custody of the prisoners. It is submitted that this is contrary to the evidence. CKA himself admitted on direct examination by his own counsel that the Navy Minister's position vis-a-vis these various commanders was that since the Navy Minister controlled all navy men and civilians attached to the navy,^{a.} he had supervisory powers. It is contended that such supervisory powers would normally be exercised through the Bureau of Naval Affairs which was charged with matters concerning prisoners of war. CKA also admitted on direct examination that one of the matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Naval Affairs Bureau was the report under the regulations covering the names and rank of any prisoners held which enabled the Naval Affairs Bureau to furnish information thereon to the Foreign Ministry.^{b.}

FP-98.

a. T. 33,505-6

FP-99.

a. T. 33,426;
T. 33,506

b. T. 33,419-20

P. = FF-59.

FF-100. Defense witness Y. MOTO, Yoshio, who was formerly Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, confirmed the fact that the N. V. Ministry issued instructions concerning the handling of prisoners of war to naval bases, naval stations and fleet head quarters, and stated that the originals were in the custody of the Naval Affairs Bureau but were destroyed by fire in May, 1945. As examples of such instructions he listed instructions for the transport of prisoners from the southern combat zone to Japan in January and February 1942; orders to Sasebo Naval Station to investigate the number of deaths among the prisoners of war at Sasebo temporary prison camp in the Spring of 1943 and instructions to make a survey and report on the condition of prisoners of war held outside of Japan in December 1944. ^{a.} Witness also confirmed the fact that a report as to the names, rank and other matters relating to the prisoners of war was made by Yokosuka ^{b.} Naval Station.

FF-101. Further evidence of OKI's responsibility for prisoners of war is the testimony of Defense witness TAKI, Toshitane, former Chief of Section One, Naval Affairs Bureau, who stated that since 8 December, 1941, Section One handled matters pertaining to prisoners of war, ^{a.} and that Section Two was a sort of clearing house for matters concerning international regulations regarding prisoners of war. ^{b.} He also testified that

FF-100.

- a. Ex. 3066, T. 27,375-6
- b. Ex. 3066, T. 27,384

FF-101.

- a. Ex. 3065, T. 27,359
- b. T. 33,371

Page FP-80.

(FP-11)
 a temporary naval prisoner of war camp was established
 at Ofun. We first heard of it before July 1942 and
 believed that it existed until after the end of the war.
 We said at the first Ofun Detention Camp was established
 by the Vietnamese Naval Section but admitted on cross-
 examination that the Navy Minister provided the funds
 for the establishment of the camp. Defense witness
 Y. A. T. stated that during the war prisoners captured
 by the Navy were stationed at Wake, Rabaul, Ambon, Macassar
 and Haiphong as well as at Sasebo temporary prisoner of
 war camp. The evidence also shows that instead of
 being turned over to the Army immediately the prisoners
 were often kept in Naval prison camps for years. It
 is to be noted that the 98 civilians executed on Wake
 Island had been held there by the Navy from December,
 1941 until 7 October 1943.

FP-102. The Prosecution submits that the evidence
 leads to the inescapable conclusion that OKA was
 responsible for the mistreatment of naval prisoners
 of war. OKA was a member of the Department of Naval
 Preparedness Examination, Imperial Headquarters, and
 also an assistant to the Navy Minister in Imperial
 Headquarters at the time Imperial Headquarters issued
 the orders pertaining to the Burma-Thailand Railroad
 which resulted in the deaths of approximately 10,000
 prisoners of war, and hence must share in the

FP-101.

- c. T. 27,370-1
- d. T. 27,373
- e. Ex. 2066, T. 27,375-7
- f. Ex. 1935A, T. 14,233;
Ex. 1934A, T. 14,235
- g. Ex. 2057, T. 15,049
T. 14,926

FP-102.

- a. Ex. 120, T. 755
- b. Ex. 475, T. 5513-4

Page FP-61.

(FP-102)
 responsibility. During the period that CKA was Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau there were many instances of mistreatment of prisoners of war at Ofuna Camp including the case of the Allied fliers, who were beaten, tortured and denied proper food and medical attention resulting in their death.^{c.} Allied prisoners of war being transported from Wake Island to China upon orders of the Navy Minister^{d.} were brutally mistreated^{e.} and five of them were beheaded without trial.^{f.} In addition the evidence shows that many hundreds of Allied nationals who were captured on Pacific Islands or at sea were killed or otherwise mistreated. Details concerning the massacre of 141 American prisoners of war on Palawan Island, of nine American fliers on Kwajalein and of 28 American civilians on Wake as well as of hundreds of American seamen and civilians taken from torpedoed Allied ships have been set forth previously in this Statement and will not be repeated here. It is sufficient to point out that Admiral AB3, the Commanding Officer of naval forces on Kwajalein, testified at his trial that he ordered the execution of American prisoners of war upon orders from the Highest Naval Central Headquarters in Tokyo.^{h.} Further evidence that the Japanese Navy adopted the deliberate policy of murdering prisoners of war is contained in the testimony of the witness HAKIHARA, Jiro, who described the atrocities

FP-102.

- c. Ex. 1934A, T. 14,235
Ex. 1933A, T. 14,233
- d. Ex. 3065, T. 27,366
- e. Ex. 1640A, T. 13,253;
Ex. 1639-A, T. 13,249
- f. Ex. 2037, T. 14,983;
Ex. 2038, T. 14,995
- g. Ex. 2055G, T. 15,030

(PF-102)
 committed on board the submarine I-8 against the survivors of torpedoed Allied merchant ships and stated that the Captain of the submarine told him that Naval Headquarters had issued an order that everyone on board enemy vessels was to be slain.^{h.} Furthermore, 1st Submarine Force Secret Operation Order No. 2 which was issued on 20 March, 1943 at Truk expressly authorized the destruction of the crews of enemy ships.^{i.} That it was the policy of the Naval High Command to destroy survivors of torpedoed ships is also shown by Exhibit 3813A, the record of a conversation between Ambassador OSHIMA and Hitler on 3 January, 1942, in which Hitler said he had given the order for German submarines to surface after torpedoing and to shoot up the lifeboats and OSHIMA replied that the Japanese also were forced to follow these methods.^{j.}

PF-103. OKA testified on direct examination that during his term as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau he had no knowledge of the operational movements of naval units and hence learned of the atrocities against prisoners of war for the first time during this trial. While Chief of the Bureau he never heard or saw any note of protest.^{a.} This statement becomes incredible in the light of the statement of defense witness YAMAMOTO, Yeshio, who served as Chief of Section One of the Bureau during OKA's tenure of office, that Admiral SAKAIBARA sent a telegraphic report to the Navy Ministry concerning the

FP-102.
 h. Ex. 3842, T. 38,141
 i. Ex. 2105, T. 15,185
 j. Ex. 3813A, T. 37,911

PF-103.
 a. Ex. 3473, T. 33,420-2

Page PP-63.

(PP-103) b.
 execution of the 98 United States civilians on take.
 MAJOR also stated that the Naval Affairs Bureau did
 receive some protests concerning atrocities against
 survivors of Allied ships. c.
 In addition the evidence
 shows that the Japanese Foreign Minister by letters
 dated 12 February 1944 and 11 July 1944 forwarded notes
 of protest concerning treatment of prisoners of war to
 the Navy Minister. d.
 In view of the fact that copies
 of protests were received both by OKA's superior officer,
 the Navy Minister and his subordinate, the Chief of
 Section One, his denial that he ever saw or heard of
 any such protests is not entitled to belief.

IP-104. It is submitted that OKA as Chief of the
 Naval Affairs Bureau and by virtue of his official
 connection with Imperial Headquarters is responsible
 not only for failing to take adequate measures for the
 protection of prisoners of war in the custody of the
 Japanese Navy but also for reckless disregard of legal
 duty leading to an inference of intentional authoriza-
 tion of atrocities committed against prisoners of war.

XIV. Conclusion.

IP-105. There is set forth in an appendix annexed
 hereto a brief description of the charges against OKA and
 the sections of this Summation which substantiate such
 charges. In conclusion, it is submitted that the evidence
 fully establishes the guilt of the accused OKA for his
 participation in the general conspiracy to wage wars.

IP-103.

- b. Ex. 3066, T. 27,379
- c. Ex. 3066, T. 27,382
- d. Ex. 2173, T. 15,513;
 Ex. 473, T. 5,492

(FP-105)
of aggression and wars in violation of international
law, for planning and preparing and for actually initiating
and waging such wars, for murder and conspiracy to
murder and for violating the laws and customs of war.

Appendix to Summation Against CKA

- Counts 1 - 5 have been substantiated by the facts
summarized in Sections I to XII
inclusive.
- Counts 6 - 17 by Sections I to XII inclusive
- Counts 20 - 22 by Sections IX, X, XI and XII
- Count 24 by Sections IX, X, XI and XII
- Count 27 by Sections II, V, VI, VII, VIII and
X
- Count 28 by Sections V, VI, VII, VIII and X
- Counts 29 - 32 by Section XII
- Count 34 by Section XII
- Counts 37-- 43 by Sections IX, X, XI and XII
- Counts 54 - 55 by Section XIII

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February 13, 1948

IPS

RE: SUMMATION - OKA (PP)

The attached page FP-33 is to be substituted
for page PP-33 in Summation on OKA already
distributed.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION
SECTION

(PP-55)
 arbitration proceeding was such as to lead British
 Ambassador Craigie to inquire of MATSUOKA whether Japan
 did not expect exorbitant compensation for acting as
 mediator in the Siam-French Indo-China dispute. ^{b.}

PP-56. On 3 February 1941 OKA and MUTO attended
 a Liaison Conference ^{a.} which arrived at a decision to
 be used as instructions or references by MATSUOKA in
 his negotiations with Germany, Italy and the Soviet
 Union during his European visit. ^{b.} The document
 provided that Japan would be the political leader in
 the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and would
 be responsible for the maintenance of order in those
 areas. The people living in those areas, in prin-
 ciple, should maintain independence or be made
 independent, but the people in the districts now
 in the possession of Britain, France, Holland,
 Portugal and others, who are incapable of being
 independent, were to be permitted to have as much
 self-government as possible in accordance with their
 ability under the guidance of Japan. Economically,
 Japan would reserve preference over the defense re-
 sources of those districts but in other commercial
 enterprises the Empire would adopt the principle of
 open door and equal opportunity. According to
 this document, the world was to be divided into
 four great blocs among which were the Greater East
 Asia bloc under Japan and the European Bloc
 (including Africa) under Germany. ^{c.}

PP-55.

b. Ex. 1046, T. 9813

PP-56.

a. Ex. 1103, T. 10,058
 b. Ex. 3657, T. 36,213
 c. Ex. 3657, (page 2), T. 36,213

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OKA Summation - PP

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丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自
... 丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自
... 丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自

PP-13

丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自
... 丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自
... 丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自

丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自
... 丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自
... 丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自

丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自
... 丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自
... 丙辰年... 徵 丙辰年一月十二日... 以上... 會議... 自

0 159 00 15 2257

Handwritten text, possibly a signature or name, located above a horizontal dashed line.

Handwritten mark or symbol on the right side of the page.

Handwritten text on the right side of the page, possibly a date or reference number.

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P/0

OKM Simulation - PP

2011年11月15日 (星期三)

甲 (6) 普通池 3114 記錄 3226
 乙 (6) 1.0 (實) 七五
 丙 (6) 中五 (實) 六
 丁 (6) 六 六
 戊 (6) 六 六

2011年11月15日
 普通池 (3114) 記錄 (3226)
 1.0 (實) 七五
 中五 (實) 六
 六 六
 六 六

PP-19
 國 (6) 2011年11月15日 (星期三)
 普通池 (3114) 記錄 (3226)
 1.0 (實) 七五
 中五 (實) 六
 六 六
 六 六

0 159 00 15 226 1

P1/2

PR-21

1. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 2. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 3. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 4. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 5. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 6. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 7. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 8. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 9. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 10. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)

PR-21

1. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 2. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 3. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 4. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 5. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 6. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 7. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 8. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 9. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 10. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)

OKA Seminar Title PP

1. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 2. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 3. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 4. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 5. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
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 7. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 8. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 9. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)
 10. 1980年10月1日 (即1980年10月1日)

P14

014 Summary List - PF

分在... 外籍... 職...

五... 國... 職... 職...

職... 職... 職...

- (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z)

UFA Summation - PP

PP-07
 大東亞建設、目的、東亞三洲、日本、及歐國之擴張、重要、北原
 科學家、日本、著名、北原、三洲、之、(20) 大東亞建設、之、命令、
 日本、東亞、三洲、之、領土、之、取、北原、三洲、之、(20)
 日本、東亞、三洲、

PP-08
 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20)
 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20)
 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20)
 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20)
 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20) 北原、三洲、之、(20)

三 國際運動

PP-09
 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20) 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20)
 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20) 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20)
 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20) 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20)
 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20) 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20)
 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20) 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20)
 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20) 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20)
 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20) 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20)

PP-10 國際運動、之、個人、之、(20)

0 159 00 15 2265

7/16

pp. 2

OP4 Summation - PP

同前記... (mirrored text)

同前記... (mirrored text)

Main handwritten text on the page, appearing as bleed-through from the reverse side. It contains several lines of dense, cursive Japanese characters.

0199 0015 2267

1218

Q44 Summation - PP

1. 關於... (faint text)
 2. 關於... (faint text)
 3. 關於... (faint text)
 4. 關於... (faint text)
 5. 關於... (faint text)
 6. 關於... (faint text)
 7. 關於... (faint text)
 8. 關於... (faint text)
 9. 關於... (faint text)
 10. 關於... (faint text)
 11. 關於... (faint text)
 12. 關於... (faint text)
 13. 關於... (faint text)
 14. 關於... (faint text)
 15. 關於... (faint text)
 16. 關於... (faint text)
 17. 關於... (faint text)
 18. 關於... (faint text)
 19. 關於... (faint text)
 20. 關於... (faint text)

OKA Summation - PP

事務局長、會議、此、與、田、政、博、務、長、等、
、轉、本、部、二、任、任、務、之、事、(四)、彼、部、海、軍、事務、局長、
、十、月、間、日、九、日、自、日、本、海、軍、部、派、出、再、次、派、出、
、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(五)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、下、次、來、函、會、同、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(六)、

pp-23
一九四二年九月九日、
此、公、事、時、文、物、中、日、三、國、條、約、之、表、現、也、(一)、彼、
、部、長、上、周、來、函、中、日、三、國、條、約、之、表、現、也、(二)、彼、
、部、長、上、周、來、函、中、日、三、國、條、約、之、表、現、也、(三)、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(四)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(五)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(六)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(七)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(八)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(九)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(十)、一九四二年十一月五日、

P.19

pp-20
國、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(一)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(二)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(三)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(四)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(五)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(六)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(七)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(八)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(九)、一九四二年十一月五日、
、日、本、海、軍、部、長、官、等、(十)、一九四二年十一月五日、

- | | | | | | |
|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|----|
| (一) | 110 | 日記 | (四) | 110 | 日記 |
| (二) | 110 | 日記 | (五) | 110 | 日記 |
| (三) | 110 | 日記 | (六) | 110 | 日記 |
| (七) | 110 | 日記 | (八) | 110 | 日記 |
| (九) | 110 | 日記 | (九) | 110 | 日記 |
| (十) | 110 | 日記 | (十) | 110 | 日記 |

P 20

OKA Summation - PP

1. 總理 蔣中正
 2. 副總理 翁文灝
 3. 財政部長 翁文灝
 4. 教育部長 蔣經國
 5. 國防部長 俞大維
 6. 外交部長 顧維鈞
 7. 內務部長 谷正倫
 8. 農林部長 何應欽
 9. 交通部長 朱家驊
 10. 僑務委員會 蔣經國

我于此次整理大政國務院之組織，又
 因整理大政國務院之組織，故特將
 整理大政國務院之組織，分列如左：
 一、總理 蔣中正
 二、副總理 翁文灝
 三、財政部長 翁文灝
 四、教育部長 蔣經國
 五、國防部長 俞大維
 六、外交部長 顧維鈞
 七、內務部長 谷正倫
 八、農林部長 何應欽
 九、交通部長 朱家驊
 十、僑務委員會 蔣經國

1722 0015 0159

P. 22

ORA Summation - PP

74-35

1. 8.

1. 8. 19

118822

Handwritten notes in Japanese, including the characters 'OR' and 'Summation'.

OKA Summation - pp

pp-36
 一九三三至一九四〇年（昭和八至一五年）日本衛生行政
 概況（厚生省衛生課、企画院統計部、農林省、内務省、文部省、
 農林省、海軍省、陸軍省、各官廳）
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料

一九三三至一九四〇年（昭和八至一五年）日本衛生行政
 概況（厚生省衛生課、企画院統計部、農林省、内務省、文部省、
 農林省、海軍省、陸軍省、各官廳）
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料

pp-37

一九三三至一九四〇年（昭和八至一五年）日本衛生行政
 概況（厚生省衛生課、企画院統計部、農林省、内務省、文部省、
 農林省、海軍省、陸軍省、各官廳）
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料
 衛生行政の概況、衛生行政の組織、衛生行政の業務、衛生行政の
 施設、衛生行政の成績、衛生行政の将来、衛生行政の参考資料

CPA Summary - PP

1. 2018年1月1日、A社はB社を買収し、B社の全株式を取得した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。

2. 2018年1月1日、A社はB社を買収し、B社の全株式を取得した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。

3. 2018年1月1日、A社はB社を買収し、B社の全株式を取得した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。

4. 2018年1月1日、A社はB社を買収し、B社の全株式を取得した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。

5. 2018年1月1日、A社はB社を買収し、B社の全株式を取得した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。A社はB社の買収に際して、B社の純資産額を1000万円と評価し、B社の純負債額を500万円と評価した。

2

p.24

第一 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第二 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
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第十一 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第十二 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第十三 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第十四 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第十五 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第十六 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第十七 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第十八 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第十九 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子
 第二十 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子 皇太子

OKA Summation - pp

Handwritten notes in the top section, including the word 'Summation' and various mathematical or technical terms.

OKA

Main body of handwritten notes, starting with 'OKA' and containing dense text and mathematical expressions.

pp. 5

Table with two columns and four rows of handwritten entries, possibly representing a list of items or data points.

OKA Summary - p. 2

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金... (倒置) ...
又。

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P. 1

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... (倒置) ...
... (倒置) ...

1943

公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年
公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年

1944

反動團體中 實業界 係其之基礎
認為 十分之九 實業界 係其之基礎
反動團體中 實業界 係其之基礎
認為 十分之九 實業界 係其之基礎

公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年
公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年
公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年
公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年
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公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年
公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年
公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年
公債總額三億圓 昭和十八年

pp-45

陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、陸軍部、海軍部、外務省、陸軍省、海軍省、内閣、各機関との連絡を、
+ 陸軍部、海軍部、外務省、陸軍省、海軍省、内閣、各機関との連絡を、
+ 陸軍部、海軍部、外務省、陸軍省、海軍省、内閣、各機関との連絡を、
+ 陸軍部、海軍部、外務省、陸軍省、海軍省、内閣、各機関との連絡を、
+ 陸軍部、海軍部、外務省、陸軍省、海軍省、内閣、各機関との連絡を、

陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、
陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、

陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、
陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、
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陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、
陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、

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陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、
陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、
陸海軍間、連絡網を以て、

pp-40

OKA summation - P10
PR47

1. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
2. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
3. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...

1. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
2. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
3. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
4. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
5. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
6. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
7. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
8. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
9. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
10. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...

1. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...
2. 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於... 關於...

1944	1945	1946	1947	1948
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1941年	1月	1日	100	100
1941年	1月	2日	100	100
1941年	1月	3日	100	100
1941年	1月	4日	100	100
1941年	1月	5日	100	100

1941

1941年1月1日 100
 1941年1月2日 100
 1941年1月3日 100
 1941年1月4日 100
 1941年1月5日 100

1941

1941年1月6日 100
 1941年1月7日 100
 1941年1月8日 100
 1941年1月9日 100
 1941年1月10日 100
 1941年1月11日 100
 1941年1月12日 100
 1941年1月13日 100
 1941年1月14日 100
 1941年1月15日 100

1941
1941
1941

1941年1月16日 100
 1941年1月17日 100
 1941年1月18日 100
 1941年1月19日 100
 1941年1月20日 100

OKA Summation - Pt. 1

1. 關於... (a) ... (b) ...
 2. ...
 3. ...
 4. ...

Pt. 2

一、...
 二、...
 三、...
 四、...
 五、...

Pt. 3

關於... (a) ... (b) ...

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...

1952	1953	1954
1955	1956	1957
1958	1959	1960
1961	1962	1963
1964	1965	1966
1967	1968	1969
1970	1971	1972

國史館發行「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)

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「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
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 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)
 「皇朝」巨冊「皇朝」又「前編」(國史館發行)

OKA Summary-Tion-PP

題上... 卷之... 第一...

卷之... 第一...

五十四... 卷之... 第一...

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0159 0015 2285

P. 36

Okim's Examination - P.P.

PP-577

人書紙 文六 語法書
6. 三五, 一五
c. 三〇, 二五

PP-579

一九四一年六月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長

PP-58

一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長

PP-581

一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長
一九四一年五月二十日, 總務, 總務課, 總務課長, 總務課長, 總務課長

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2044 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州

2045 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州

2046 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州

2047 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州

2048 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州 羅州

OKA Summation - P P

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的世界平和ヲ増進スル以上及米國、太平洋洋上於テハ、義務ヲ行フ事ヲ以テ對英援助ノ增加ヲ許サセヨトヲ明シカニカニトテ下リテ及而テ又新、秩序建設、理念ニ層明瞭ナル印象ヲ與ヘテトイフコトヲ行フ事也

pp 56

圖上世戰ハ一九四一年五月三日、五月廿五日、連日會議ニ出席スルカニ之ヲ以テ米國ノ提案ヲ檢討シタリ

下リ又 一九四二年五月十日、野村ハ門也三才四、日本ノ提案ヲ提出スルカニ之ヲ以テ、提議ニ對シテ、障害ハ三國

條約ニ、日本、義務ヲ範圍、中國問題、解決及日本、南方振興等三點ニ見解ヲ相違テ下リヨト明シカニテ

居リテ及 三國條約ニ關シテ、日本ハ之ハ全ク防衛的ナリテ中心ニ主謀スルカニ之ヲ以テ、軍事援助、義務

ヲ履行スルニ依リ通用サセテ、提議スルカニ、日華事

實ニ此ノ下、日本、米國ガ南京政府ノ條約及日滿

幸英同盟ニ對シテ、諸原則ト共ニ善隣又善共

存ニ盡ク對シテ共同防禦及經濟的協力ノ並衛三原則ヲ

承認スルカニ提議致シテ其カニ對シテ、米國ハ亦假令籍ヲ交換

シト米國側斷言ヲ受諾シテ、米國ハノ對英援助

助ヲ打切ル事ヲ許シテ、南方ノ領土擴張ニ關シ

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OKA Summation - P10

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A. 1131. 10691

著誌八六頁、經緯三五九七

055100510051005100510

OKA Summary - PP

pp-70 此、陸海軍共同聲明が事実上海軍と務局長閣下陸軍と
 務局長武林等が作成したもの北西年七月十五日、本日記
 記に於てあり、(a) 近衛松岡兩名共此、度来り承認致さ
 り、然るに後者武林、北西年六月二十日、口頭聲明ヲ突
 拒絶する野村訓令に於ては望みあり、近衛、米國が
 交渉、打切らるるに若し、此、口頭聲明ヲ拒否ス
 ルト同時に、修正案ヲ野村宛電送スルヲ欲スルアリ、
 且、同松岡、内閣、危機ヲ招来スル野村宛訓令
 電送スルヲ望み、又、閣下武林等が作成スル修正案ニ
 及び共同案等ハ、その専断、閣下武林が交渉、全經過
 及び、勢力ヲ及ぼさるる事、又、元々、行ハス。

pp-71 報告大同、直に、認め、然るに、その、作成、元、二、
 部、局、権限、外、此、語、及、び、局長、決定、交、接、不、可、起、事、
 責任、持、リ、ト、す、り、得、ず、ト、陳、述、ス、ル、因、武、林、が、一、
 方、日、本、側、最、初、之、不、可、作成、ス、ル、ヲ、明、示、的、に、閣、下、不、
 可、ト、一、度、否、定、ス、ル、ト、決、意、ス、ル、ヲ、示、ス、ル、人、假、令、軍、機、
 案、が、作成、ス、ル、ノ、事、ハ、何、レ、ト、推、定、シ、否、認、ス、ル、過、半、ノ、事、
 此、事、度、ハ、不、可、ノ、事、ト、シ、テ、行、フ、事、ハ、否、定、ス、ル、ノ、事、ト、
 認、識、授、認、向、テ、不、可、ト、假、令、日、記、機、密、書、証、第、二、五、号、下

10. 4. 3.

- pp-70 1. 書証 二五 記録 二六
- 2. 〃 二五 〃 二六
- pp-71 〃 記録 三三 九

0.159 00 15 2293

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0. 8. a.

証 証 証
三三三九一
三三三九二
三三三九三
三三三九四
三三三九五
三三三九六
三三三九七

PP-71

0. 8. b.

証 証
三三三九八
三三三九九

PP-72 國ハ、已不實也、個人の會議ニ近衛ヲ遣ハシ
 上高船ヲ豫備シ、一九四一年八月二日、命
 令ヲ受テ、上證言致シ、毎護衛証人及リ、此
 事ヲ確認シ、且國ニ交渉ニ強ク、爾ハ、持テ、居リ、
 近衛一行ノ豫算、隨行限リ、非公式ニ國ヲ選
 ヲト述ベク、ナリ、又、我護衛証人、タカク、亦、此、事
 ヲ確認シ、國ニ、善、態、ニ、進、行、非、常、ニ、嬉、シ、ク、ニ、見、
 ント、附言シ、ナリ、又、

O.K.A. Summation - PP

致シ、
 在彼等ノ、上、ノ、進、行、事、業、ハ、三、三、三、九、一、ノ、上、ヲ、主、張
 比、上、證、言、ニ、基、キ、一、九、四、一、年、四、月、原、案、ヲ、作、成、シ、當、リ、認、補
 深、作、成、シ、タリ、國、ノ、分、擔、ニ、關、シ、事、實、ニ、基、キ、性、ヲ、實、
 (書証一二五号)ニ記載シ、一、九、四、一、年、四、月、十、五、日、修正
 証言(見)ニ、上、ノ、旨、ヲ、示、シ、又、我、ハ、本、旨、陳、述、ガ、本、旨、自、記
 カ、ナ、リ、補、佐、シ、タ、リ、カ、ト、イ、フ、者、直、接、認、同、シ、タ、リ、
 四、月、二、日、原、案、ヲ、作、成、セ、リ、タ、リ、且、時、ニ、國、ニ、對、シ、テ、的、的、ニ、
 言、テ、作、成、カ、リ、タ、リ、原、案、ニ、對、シ、テ、一、九、四、一、年、七、月、二、日、
 上、書、証、言、一、二、五、号、一、九、四、一、年、七、月、二、日、ノ、少、數、改、訂、
 カ、ク、解、説、ヲ、添、付、シ、上、五、張、ニ、シ、タ、リ、(見) 証、言、一、二、五、号、

0159 0015 2294

OKA Summary --pp

PP-73

精々其の、因が外交手段ニ依リテ共同謀議、目的達
成ヲ希望シ居ルニテ、其ノ不ニ居ルカ、此、證據、
何等價値ナク、其ノ主張、亦、其ノ不ニ居ルカ、檢察
創、因、全面的、交渉参加、日本、起、軸、因、執、ヲ
主張シ、且、中国、及、南洋、ヲ、引、續、キ、侵、略、シ、タ、タ、タ、ニ、殆
下、其、始、カ、キ、交渉、ヲ、交、果、ナ、カ、ク、シ、タ、共同謀議、中
假、其、指、導、者、大、テ、シ、タ、ト、示、ス、ル、カ、キ、申、上、ル
モ、可、シ、ク、ス。

× 日本、中国、ノ、平等條件ニ関スル、因、武、謀、
立案

PP-74

因、武、謀、部、陸、軍、少、将、長、官、海、軍、少、将、長、官、ト、シ、テ、国家政策、不
事柄、共、同、ノ、精、カ、キ、ヲ、居、ル、ト、シ、テ、其、以、上、ノ、重、証、外、務、省、極
秘、文、書、ト、シ、テ、其、証、字、三、四、五、六、号、ト、シ、テ、居、ル、同、書、証、ハ、
五、四、五、九、月、六、日、因、武、謀、部、外、務、省、官、邸、於、テ、會議、ヲ
行、ヒ、日、華、事、ヲ、交、解、ス、ル、基、本、條、件、ヲ、述、ベ、ク、シ、テ、其、不、ニ、居、ル、
事、ヲ、其、其、又、其、重、慶、政府、(南京政府)、加、入、シ、テ、下、
及、日本、海、軍、部、隊、ノ、蒙、古、及、熱、河、疆、域、及、華、北、(定、北) 地、区、並

P. 45

廈門及海軍島二駐也之干以上規定之干以上人

PP-95

此 文書 陸軍 海軍 本國 交涉 於 邊境 將 撤

武 林 某 國 通 三 年 兵 見 之 故 三 條 之 最大 讓 與 義 三 人

也 充 分 之 入 假 使 交 涉 之 干 日 通 三 年 日 本 中 國 之 國 意

此 條 件 之 執 行 之 干 日 本 一 九 四 二 年 九 月 六 日

同 日 之 行 之 領 事 會 議 之 於 日 本 國 上 交 涉 之 於 天

滿 足 之 干 日 本 中 國 之 國 意 之 嚴 少 限 之 要 求 之 次 如 之

述 之 之 干 日 本 中 國 及 英 國 之 精 神 日 本 華 華

要 之 地 理 之 干 日 本 中 國 之 公 路 之 開 鎖 之 力

美 國 之 國 意 之 精 神 何 名 政 權 之 軍 事 上 之 及 經

濟 之 援 助 之 與 之 之 特 之 日 華 間 之 新 之 之 取 權 之

善 之 日 本 國 軍 隊 之 駐 也 之 日 本 某 次 要 之 國

報 之 之 干 日 本 國 意 之 精 神 何 名 政 權 之 軍 事 上 之 及 經

干 日 本 國 意 之 精 神 何 名 政 權 之 軍 事 上 之 及 經

提 出 條 件 之 精 神 何 名 政 權 之 軍 事 上 之 及 經

此 等 之 目 的 之 運 成 之 干 日 本 國 意 之 精 神 何 名 政 權 之 軍 事 上 之 及 經

電 隊 之 海 軍 隊 之 駐 也 之 日 本 國 意 之 精 神 何 名 政 權 之 軍 事 上 之 及 經

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OKA Summation - PP

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及 書 證 三 四 五 六 實 錄 三 九 三
五 八 八
六 三 六
七 九 〇 四
七 九 〇 四
一 三 四 年 三 月 一 日 七 九 三

5622 5100 6510

英法美俄德日各國之瓦解

近衛首相於去年十月間辭職二國元首定議... 英法美俄德日各國之瓦解... 一九三九年九月一日... 海軍大臣... 會議... 決定... 首相... 閣員...

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- 甲 一九三九年九月一日
- 乙 " " 一九三九年九月一日
- 丙 " " 一九三九年九月一日

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金に見出さるるより、能く度り難し、其様々、
 圖書記、長き、諸國の海軍、一階、一階、
 要語、(1) (2) 其、與、(1) (2) 國、海軍、
 國、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、
 (1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、
 (1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、

pp. 50

漢、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、(1) (2) 國、
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三三四六	記	三三四六
三三四五	記	三三四五
三三四四	記	三三四四
三三四三	記	三三四三
三三四二	記	三三四二
三三四一	記	三三四一

XII 戦線ノ概要

Summary - PP
PP-83

三月二十一日(即九月六日) 皇族海軍攻撃ノ問題ハ海軍大臣
ニ於テ討議サレタ。出席者ニ、甲(名) 高級海軍士官
十二名、乙(名) 海軍大臣及乙(名) 海軍中佐(海軍
事務局長)等ノ方ニ於テ此ノ事ヲ知ラセテ、
上ノ者ノ見解ヲ示シタリタ。②

OKA
PP-84

東條内閣ノ組織ノ時カラ 戦線準備ニ、弓刀ニ進
サレタ。基本ニ於テ問題ヲ検討スルニ益々多ク、連
絡會議カ同僚サレタ。③ 岡ノ武蔵ト長等ノ會議、全
部ニ出席シタ。④ 其ノ會議ニ於テ對米交渉ノ進行開
ク「二十一日」駐在陸海軍武官カラノ報告ヲ聴取シタ。⑤

PP-85

己ノ建議會議ニ於テ廿日決定、檢察側一般取極論告
ニ於テ詳細ノ交渉所ヲ示シタ。⑥ 「A案」ヨリ採擇
シ一九四二年十一月日及三日、連絡會議⑦ 「對米案開
戦後日管」ノ案ニ於テ採擇シ一九四二年十一月十日、
連絡會議⑧ 十月十日音信、對米交渉失敗後日本ノ
米案ニ於テ戦線ノ開始スルニ之ニ意圖ヲ示シ「通知」
シテ決定シ一九四二年十一月十三日、連絡會議⑨ 南方占

P. 3

PP-85	直意(一五三)	記	二一三〇
C. d. a. C. d. a.	二六三	"	一〇三五
"	二五五	"	二六四六
"	二七五	"	三六三八
"	二七五	"	三九四一
"	二七五	"	一〇三三
"	二七五	"	一〇三三

(一) 確率 (2)

例。20個の球を5個ずつに分ける。

① 20個の球を一括し、10個と10個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{2}$

② 20個の球を5個ずつに分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{25}$

③ 20個の球を2個と18個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{10}$

④ 20個の球を3個と17個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{10}$

⑤ 20個の球を4個と16個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{5}$

⑥ 20個の球を5個と15個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{4}$

⑦ 20個の球を6個と14個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{7}$

⑧ 20個の球を7個と13個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{10}$

⑨ 20個の球を8個と12個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{15}$

⑩ 20個の球を9個と11個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{20}$

⑪ 20個の球を10個と10個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{2}$

⑫ 20個の球を11個と9個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{20}$

⑬ 20個の球を12個と8個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{15}$

⑭ 20個の球を13個と7個に分ける。確率 $\frac{1}{10}$

0159 0015 2305

20/10/01 // 20/10/01 // 20/10/01

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20/10/01 // 20/10/01 // 20/10/01

20/10/01

20/10/01 // 20/10/01 // 20/10/01

0 159 00 15 2307

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OKA Summation-PP

PP91

PP92

PP92

1. 關於「歐戰」之研究，應注意其「國際性」與「全球性」之特徵。
 2. 歐戰之爆發，實為「歐洲列強」與「全球列強」之衝突。
 3. 歐戰之影響，不僅限於「歐洲」，更波及「全球」。
 4. 歐戰之結束，標誌著「歐洲列強」之衰落與「全球列強」之崛起。
 5. 歐戰之研究，應從「國際性」與「全球性」之角度出發。
 6. 歐戰之研究，應注意其「國際性」與「全球性」之特徵。
 7. 歐戰之研究，應注意其「國際性」與「全球性」之特徵。
 8. 歐戰之研究，應注意其「國際性」與「全球性」之特徵。
 9. 歐戰之研究，應注意其「國際性」與「全球性」之特徵。
 10. 歐戰之研究，應注意其「國際性」與「全球性」之特徵。

10/10/00-1

歐戰之研究

PP93

歐戰之研究

pp-pp

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 三三三三 - 三三三三
 三三三三 = 三三三三
 三三三三 = 三三三三

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Figure 1. A schematic diagram of the experimental setup for the measurement of the rate constant k_2 of the reaction between H_2O_2 and H_2O_2 in the presence of a catalyst. The reaction is carried out in a stirred reactor at constant temperature. The concentration of the reactants is monitored by a detector (D) which is connected to a computer (C) for data processing.

The reaction mixture is stirred continuously to ensure homogeneity. The detector (D) measures the absorbance of the reaction mixture at a fixed wavelength, which is proportional to the concentration of the reactants. The data is then processed by the computer (C) to determine the rate constant k_2 . The reaction is initiated by the addition of a catalyst (Cat). The rate constant k_2 is determined by plotting $\ln \frac{[A]_0}{[A]_t}$ against time t , where $[A]_0$ and $[A]_t$ are the initial and final concentrations of the reactants, respectively. The slope of the resulting straight line is k_2 .

OKA, Sumiyoshi - pp

The rate constant k_2 is determined by plotting $\ln \frac{[A]_0}{[A]_t}$ against time t , where $[A]_0$ and $[A]_t$ are the initial and final concentrations of the reactants, respectively. The slope of the resulting straight line is k_2 . The reaction is initiated by the addition of a catalyst (Cat). The rate constant k_2 is determined by plotting $\ln \frac{[A]_0}{[A]_t}$ against time t , where $[A]_0$ and $[A]_t$ are the initial and final concentrations of the reactants, respectively. The slope of the resulting straight line is k_2 .

督三國空軍東亞司令部 總務司令部 總務司令部
地指標六三六二五三三〇

OKA Summation - PP

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此證據之... 總務司令部... 收容... 海軍部
隊指揮官... 轉嫁... 海軍部... 海軍部...
一重... 證據... 國... 海軍大臣... 海軍部...
海軍大臣... 海軍部... 海軍部... 海軍部...
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新設問題... 海軍部... 海軍部... 海軍部...
海軍部... 海軍部... 海軍部... 海軍部...

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- 〇 三三五三六
- 〇 " 三三三六
- 〇 " 三三五六
- 〇 " 三三四九一〇

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PR-100

2 證三〇六六 記錄 三〇三七六
 1 〃 〃 〃 〃
 〃 〃 〃 〃

OKA Summation-199

三村之指本早於三月廿五日發刊確證。其原由八海軍
 艦隊司令部係於三月廿一日。一九四五年三月。被共方上
 述三月。以此指本一案例。一九四二年一月
 及二月三兩月有作戰地。日方。行。輸送。村之指本
 一九四三年春。世保復與宇府三村之保停處。徵收。志
 行。此。作。停。間。及之。故。調查命令。一九四四年十月
 外。地。於。此。停。處。此。間。之。調查。報告。又。三。念。會。列
 編。三。三。〇。 此。六。又。海。關。二。關。之。武。裝。階。級。其。他。一
 事。項。二。間。之。指。本。被。復。復。與。宇。府。三。村。之。作。成。此。等。事
 實。已。經。証。明。之。事。實。

検査側（記録が）の通帳への取掛手順（表）

PP-1-2

「表」の「取掛」の行を参照し、取掛の手順を確認する。

⑥ 大分県の「取掛」の行を参照し、取掛の手順を確認する。

⑤ 福岡県の「取掛」の行を参照し、取掛の手順を確認する。

④ 熊本県の「取掛」の行を参照し、取掛の手順を確認する。

③ 鹿児島県の「取掛」の行を参照し、取掛の手順を確認する。

② 佐賀県の「取掛」の行を参照し、取掛の手順を確認する。

① 福岡県の「取掛」の行を参照し、取掛の手順を確認する。

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① 取掛の手順を確認する。

② 取掛の手順を確認する。

③ 取掛の手順を確認する。

④ 取掛の手順を確認する。

⑤ 取掛の手順を確認する。

⑥ 取掛の手順を確認する。

⑦ 取掛の手順を確認する。

⑧ 取掛の手順を確認する。

⑨ 取掛の手順を確認する。

⑩ 取掛の手順を確認する。

PP-1-1

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c	〃	〃	〃	〃	〃	〃
b	〃	〃	〃	〃	〃	〃

OKA Summation - pp

裁判於東京、最高海軍、中央司令部、命令之
 米人俘虜、死別執行、命、（譯述）、捕獲
 者十餘名、下、（譯）、日本海軍が俘虜殺害、故意、
 方針、採用、其以上、記據、証人、中、原、次、郎、証言、
 甲、合、之、三、名、及、即、令、人、潛、水、艦、I-8、艦、于、奧、雷、
 政、艦、中、受、多、遭、合、國、商、船、生、存、者、三、討、行、以、之、
 殘、存、行、為、之、誠、明、也、而、（譯）、潛、水、艦、艦、長、海、軍、司、
 令、部、敵、艦、能、上、全、員、殺、害、之、上、命、令、之、後、又、上、述、
 語、之、三、上、陳、述、之、之、名、前、自、又、一、九、四、三、年、三、月、十、日、下、
 以、島、（譯）（譯）、下、殺、之、之、第一、潛、水、戰、隊、秘、密、作、戰、命、令、
 才、之、三、所、示、之、三、敵、艦、船、乘、組、員、殺、害、之、討、可、之、（譯）、
 奧、雷、政、艦、中、受、多、船、解、生、存、者、之、殺、害、又、三、海、軍、
 高、級、司、令、部、方、針、于、下、之、三、亦、書、記、才、三、八、三、号、三、
 三、三、三、三、三、三、之、三、（譯）、（譯）、一、九、四、三、年、一、月、三、日、大、島、大、使、
 上、之、三、上、之、會、談、記、錄、下、之、三、其、中、二、三、上、之、三、（譯）、（譯）、
 逃、潛、水、艦、三、討、之、奧、雷、政、艦、後、水、面、三、浮、已、上、之、（譯）、救、命、
 可、之、三、之、三、命、令、令、其、三、上、語、子、而、三、之、（譯）、大、島、之、日、本、側、
 天、亦、以、其、式、三、從、之、三、上、三、議、才、之、三、上、之、（譯）、三、上、之、
 三、上、之、三、上、（譯）、（譯）

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| 1 | 〃 | 三八二二 | 〃 | 三八一四 |
| 2 | 〃 | 二〇五 | 〃 | 一五八五 |
| 3 | 〃 | 八三三 | 〃 | 三七九二 |

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各國亦應……
行……
致……

XIV 結 論

國二行及諸國及之諸國立記及此最終論各
各部：均略十餘……
戰……
上國際……
斯……
此……
慣例……
之……

國二行之最終論書附原書

- 新國家…… 第一節…… 於下……
- 新國家…… 第二節……
- 新國家…… 第三節……
- 新國家…… 第四節……
- 新國家…… 第五節……

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新國二	新國二
新國三	新國三
新國四	新國四
新國五	新國五
新國六	新國六
新國七	新國七
新國八	新國八
新國九	新國九
新國十	新國十

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OSHIMA, Hiroshi

SUMMARY

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OSHIMA, HiroshiI. INTRODUCTION

QQ-1. The declarations and conduct of OSHIMA, Hiroshi are of special importance in proving the fact of conspiracy and the method by which it was sought to accomplish its aims and objects. Therefore, much of the evidence relating to this accused is set forth fully in the Summation of Conspiracy. Where references to this argument are made, the abbreviated term "Summation" will be used. The principle evidence involving OSHIMA will be assembled and described under appropriate headings.

II. CHARGES IN THE INDICTMENT

QQ-2. This accused is charged in the Indictment under Counts 1 to 5, 6 to 17, 20 to 22, 24, 27 to 32, 34, 37 to 43, 54 and 55, inclusive in each instance. The nature of the charge under the respective counts has been fully discussed elsewhere.^{R.}

III. ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT AS MILITARY ATTACHE TO GERMANY

QQ-3. On his return to Japan in 1925, after having served two years as Assistant Military Attache in Berlin and two years as Military Attache in Vienna,

QQ-2.

- a. General Summation, A-1-9.

QQ-3

OSHIKAWA was successively a Battalion and Regimental Commander, instructor of the Army Heavy Artillery School, and member of the Inspectorate-General of Military Training of the Army. He was Chief of the Third Section of the General Staff with the rank of colonel and a member of the Naval General Staff from August 1931 to the spring of 1934, during which period the so-called Mukden Incident, the October Incident, and the May 15th Incident occurred.^{a.}

QQ-4. While a general staff officer, OSHIKAWA became acquainted with others of the accused. TOJO, UMEZU and KATO served with him as army general staff officers and SHIMADA and OZA as navy general staff officers. The accused ARAKI and MIKAMI were War Ministers; KOISO was Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, and SUZUKI was a member of the Bureau of Military Affairs, all within the War Ministry. OSHIKAWA conferred with the War Ministry from time to time as his duties required.^{a.}

QQ-5. Although OSHIKAWA disclaimed connection with the Manchurian Incident and the problems of Manchuria,^{a.} he was decorated on April 29, 1934 with the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of meritorious services rendered in the Incident from 1931 to 1934.^{b.} His training, associations and identification with the General Staff in the formative period of the conspiracy

QQ-3.

- a. Ex. 121, T. 766.
Ex. 3508, T. 33,975-6.

QQ-5.

- a. Ex. 3508, T. 33,983.
b. Ex. 121, T. 766.

QQ-4.

- a. T. 34,069.
Ex. 3508, T. 34,051.

QQ-5
 charged well fitted him for the major role he subsequently played in carrying out the purposes of the conspiracy.

IV. THE PERIOD OF THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

A. Alliance With the Axis

QQ-6. How the ultimate object of the conspiracy was adopted as the basic principle of the national policy of Japan at the Five Ministers' Conference of the HIRATA Cabinet on August 7, 1936,^a how an alliance with the Axis became a step prerequisite to the execution of the conspiracy,^b and how Japan chose as her ally Germany, a nation then engaged in a program of military preparation for aggressive action in Europe,^c are fully presented in the summation.

QQ-7. OSHELA was sent to Germany as Military Attache in March 1934. The summation adequately presents the part played by OSHELA in negotiating for an alliance with Germany, the conclusion of the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact and Secret Agreement attached thereto,^a the quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the pact,^b and the manner in which Japan, armed by this new alliance, invaded China in July 1937 and engaged in a major war of aggression.^c

QQ-6.

- a. Summation, F-22-23.
- b. Summation, F-93-94.
- c. Summation, F-94-95.

QQ-7.

- a. Summation, F-96-101.
- b. Summation, F-109-111.
- c. Summation, F-101-102.

30-8. Negotiations for the alliance had their inception through military channels.^{a.} OSHIMA attempted to justify this action by explaining that a Military Attache is authorized under Japanese regulations to negotiate agreements and treaties on purely military matters without participation of the Ambassador,^{b.} although subsequently he claimed that the alliance was merely an ideological pact against the spread of Communism.^{c.} From these two statements by OSHIMA, it is all the more apparent that the pact was conceived in a military atmosphere, was designed as the basis for military cooperation, and was intended to conceal its real purposes through the disguise of an ideological pact. That the Army was the motivating power behind the alliance is further apparent from OSHIMA's statement in his interrogation that "the Army had enough power to very probably sell the pact to the Japanese Government" and that "no treaty could possibly have been made on this if the Army had not wished it,"^{d.} although in his affidavit he claimed to have been misunderstood.^{e.} The recall of German military advisers and the suspension of German deliveries of war materials were instances of the German support of the Japanese Army in China.^{f.} The Japanese General Staff near the end of December 1937 sought to utilize the ties with Germany under the Anti-Comintern Pact by

30-a.

- a. Ex. 477, T. 5,913-6.
- b. Ex. 3508, T. 33,986.
- c. Ex. 3508, T. 33,989.
- d. Ex. 478, T. 5,918.
- e. Ex. 3508, T. 33,984.
- f. Ex. 3811, T. 37,900.

QQ-8
 directing OSHIMA to request the German Army to make peace offers to Chiang Kai-shek through General Falkenhausen, German military adviser to the Chinese Government.^g The purpose of this, however, was not to recede from Japanese aggressive plans but to give a breathing spell in China while preparing to proceed against the alleged enemy in the north.^h The special interests of the Japanese Army in Japanese-German cooperation under the Anti-Comintern Pact had a fundamental bearing on OSHIMA's conduct.

B. OSHIMA By-Passed the Embassy in Trade Negotiations with Ribbentrop

QQ-9. It was the established policy that the Japanese War Ministry in its planning intended to make use of the reserves and materials of Manchuria and North China and that the integration of the economy of China into that of Japan was a function of the War Ministry and came under its supervision.^a The Japanese Army was obligated to Germany for the cooperation and assistance given under the Anti-Comintern Pact and under the plan of the conspirators their continued assistance was required in carrying out the objects of the conspiracy. Cooperation under the Anti-Comintern Pact extended to the fields of economics and finance.^b Consequently, the Japanese Army favored the extension to Germany of preferential trade treatment in North

QQ-8.

- g. Ex. 3508, T. 33,990.
- h. Summation, E-56.
Ex. 3789-A, T. 37,722.

QQ-9.

- a. Ex. 847, T. 8,436-7 and 8,443.
- b. Ex. 491, T. 5,039.

CG-9
China, and OSNKA was of the opinion that "military considerations worked inevitably in favor of this."^c

It is not surprising, therefore, that OSNKA, the spokesman for the Army, should advance the Army's views on this matter.

CG-10. Togo, known as TOGO, who was Japanese Ambassador to Germany from December 1937 to October 27, 1938, testified that as early as February 1938 an occasion had presented itself for him to tell Ribbentrop that all important political and economic matters involving the governments of Germany and Japan should be transacted exclusively by negotiations between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador, to which Ribbentrop agreed, but despite this promise he found in May that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was still discussing economic problems relating to China with others than the embassy personnel directly concerned.^a

Although TOGO did not mention the Military Attache OSNKA by name, the inference from his testimony was that Ribbentrop in violation of his assurance that he would deal only with the Ambassador in connection with important political and economic matters was considering economic matters in negotiations with Military Attache OSNKA for the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact."^b

CG-11. OSNKA adopted this view of the evidence by securing the Tribunal's permission to reopen his case to

CG-9.
c. Ex. 3811, T. 37,901.

CG-10.
a. Ex. 3843, T. 35,355-6.
b. Ex. 3843, T. 35,656.

QQ-11
 disprove that he had by-passed the Embassy in negotiating on commercial matters in North China and produced two witnesses on this subject, GODO and KOJIMA. GODO, whose mission did not concern German preferential trade negotiations, did not discuss commercial matters with Ribbentrop after 28 February 1938^a and did not discuss with OSFIMA trade matters relating to North China prior to his departure in April 1938.^b KOJIMA's testimony that he never heard of OSFIMA's participation in trade negotiations with Ribbentrop is entirely valueless in light of the fact that he had not known of the talks relating to the proposed Japanese-German alliance until July 1938^c when they were shown to have begun in January 1938,^d and in light of the further fact that as Naval Attache his duties did not require him to participate in any manner in commercial or trade matters.^e

QQ-12. When negotiations concerning Japanese-German trade cooperation were renewed on 21 December 1938 shortly after the change in the ambassadors, Wienl, Director of the Commercial Bureau of the German Foreign Office, presented Ambassador OSFIMA with Ribbentrop's last proposal which had been given Ambassador TOGO on October 6th. At this time OSFIMA confirmed TOGO's testimony relating to the by-passing of the embassy by stating "on the question of preferential treatment he had himself always worked for them but that opinion was divided in Japan."^e

QQ-11.

- a. T. 37,089.
T. 37,098.
- b. T. 37,094.
- c. T. 37,070.
- d. Ex. 497, T. 6,051.
- e. T. 37,069.

QQ-12.

- a. Ex. 3811, T. 37,901.

C. OSHIMA Endeavored to Influence Trade Policy in North China

QQ-13. The Japanese Government demonstrated great reluctance to grant German demands for preferential treatment in North China and in fact advised Germany that "the Japanese Government was not able to assure Germany a better position than all other powers in a treaty form."^a OSHIMA, who in the meantime had been appointed Ambassador, endeavored to change the attitude of his Government and by so doing ascended to the policy making level. On December 9th, he sent "an energetic telegraphic message to Tokyo to the effect that preferential treatment should be granted in writing and that the practical German difficulties in China should either be removed or the German officials in Tokyo and in China informed in detail by the Japanese officers on what grounds this was presently not yet possible."^b OSHIMA further promoted and encouraged the exercise of pressure on his Government to yield in this matter by sending letters through a Japanese General to leading figures of the Japanese Army advocating German preferential treatment.^c OSHIMA's efforts in this direction were continued as reflected by the report made by the German Ambassador in Tokyo on the 15th day of March 1939 in which he stated: "OSHIMA has actually telegraphed repeatedly in accordance with out interests."^d OSHIMA, in thus following the wishes of

QQ-13.

- a. Ex. 592, T. 6,586-9.
- b. Ex. 3811, T. 37,901-2.
- c. Ex. 3811, T. 37,902.
- d. Ex. 596, T. 6,623.

QQ-13

Germany and the previously described views of the Japanese Army, was working counter to the policy of his Government. For further confirmation of this statement reference is made to the telegram of Wehltat on 23 January 1942 wherein he called attention to OSHIMA's prior failure to put across his personal views regarding preferential treatment in North China.^o

D. OSHIMA Engaged in Espionage and Subversive Activities under the Protocol of the Anti-Comintern Pact

QQ-14. Japanese-German collaboration under the Anti-Comintern Pact included espionage and subversive activities against Russia. OSHIMA related that in 1937 the German and Japanese armies agreed to exchange intelligence about the Russian military, and in September or October 1938 it was decided to intensify the use of White Russians in this enterprise.^a Operations were conducted by USUI, acting under the supervision of OSHIMA, the Military Attache.^b

QQ-15. On the 31st day of January 1939, Himmler visited OSHIMA, after which he recorded the substance of their conversation.^a OSHIMA denied that Himmler visited him at that time^b and offered as witnesses TAMAHASHI, Secretary of Protocol to January 1939^c and SUGIURA, his successor,^d who testified that no request passed through them for a meeting between Himmler and

QQ-13.

e. Ex. 3818, T. 37,937.

QQ-14.

a. Ex. 487, T. 6,022.
b. Ex. 488, T. 6,024.

QQ-15.

a. Ex. 489, T. 6,026.
b. Ex. 3508, T. 33,991.
c. Ex. 3501, T. 33,923.
d. Ex. 3502, T. 33,924.

QQ-15
 OSWIMA. Whatever value this negative type of testimony would otherwise have had, it is entirely demolished by the statement in the interrogation of General KAMARA, Military Attache, made before the lodging of the indictment, that Himmler and OSWIMA were friendly and that he believed they met quite often, and under ordinary circumstances saw a great deal of one another.^e This is confirmed by the witness KOHARA, at page 5 of the unread portion of his affidavit, that Himmler and other notorious leaders of Germany frequently called upon OSWIMA at the Embassy and in turn OSWIMA called upon them.^f

QQ-16. Before OSWIMA was confronted with Himmler's record of the conference, he admitted the purchase through his office of real estate in Falkensee in the name of a middleman for the purpose of carrying on anti-Soviet propaganda and that propaganda was printed there for distribution in Russia. He also admitted knowledge of the expulsion of a Japanese officer by the Afghanistan Government.^a In addition to Himmler's record of the conference reciting the foregoing matters admitted by OSWIMA to be true, he recorded OSWIMA as having said that he was undertaking long range work of disintegration of Russia emanating in the Caucasus and the Ukraine, that he had succeeded in sending ten Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier with

QQ-15.
 e. T. 33,771.
 f. Ex. 811.

QQ-16.
 a. Ex. 488, T. 6,024-5.

QQ-16
 orders to kill Stalin, that a Japanese officer had worked in Afghanistan in connection with the Mohammodan movement but had been expelled because he was suspected of wanting to overthrow the Afghanistan Government, and that six Russians were employed in writing and printing pamphlets at Falkensee. The recital of a discussion of a treaty by means of which the triangle Germany-Italy-Japan would assume a firmer shape also lends weight to the validity of Himmler's report due to the fact that OSHIMA was engaged at that time in discussing such a treaty and such discussions as will presently be seen were being conducted outside of usual diplomatic channels.^b OSHIMA's denial of the contents of this written report is unimpressive.^c

V. THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A STRONGER MILITARY ALLIANCE

A. The Need of a Stronger Alliance With the Axis

QQ-17. Although the accused, acting through their leaders, mobilized the entire strength of the nation for its war against China, they were unable to conclude the so-called China Incident. Consequently, they were brought to a realization of the necessity for closer collaboration with Germany as demonstrated by the future course of negotiations between the two powers. These

QQ-18.

- b. Ex. 489, T. 6,026-7.
- c. Ex. 3508, T. 33,993.

Q3-17. negotiations and the role played by OSKINA are faithfully depicted in the summation.^a They are worthy of close study as they demonstrate clearly the personal guilt of the accused OSKINA. A detailed recounting of this testimony will not be made.

3. The Army Acting Through OSKINA Moved for German Aid

Q3-18. OSKINA, in following the directions of the General Staff, approached Ribbentrop in January 1938 on the question of assistance in bringing the so-called China Incident to a close. Ribbentrop thereupon suggested the advisability of bringing Germany and Japan closer together by means of a treaty. This information was conveyed to the General Staff and according to the interrogation of OSKINA a reply was received in June approving the furtherance of German-Japanese cooperation. Although OSKINA stated that he did not remember the details of this communication, he admitted that an agreement to act in accord in dealing with Soviet Russia was to be kept uppermost in mind.^a

Q3-19. OSKINA's alleged inability to remember the contents of this communication does not deprive the Tribunal of the true facts for on the 26th day of April 1939, Ribbentrop wired Ambassador Ott what had transpired.^a He stated that in the summer of 1938, General OSKINA gave him the information that "the time had come

Q3-17.

a. Summation, F-111-25.

Q3-18.

a. Ex. 497, T. 5,051-2.

Q3-19.

a. Ex. 502, T. 6,096.

QQ-19

in the opinion of the Japanese Army to conclude a general defensive alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan."

The Japanese Army's suggestion for the alliance pact included "granting of help and assistance in case one of the three powers should be attacked without provocation by another power."

QQ-20. This demonstrates that from the very inception of negotiations, at a time prior to OSHIMA's sending of KASAHARA to Japan with a draft of the proposed treaty, the Japanese Army had advocated and proposed through OSHIMA a general alliance and one applying to all countries, as distinguished from one limited to Russia. OSHIMA's testimony that the draft of the proposed alliance which he sent by KASAHARA to Tokyo was Ribbentrop's proposal^a is due either to an intentional or an actual failure of OSHIMA's recollection. It was this type of an alliance that the accused both within and without the Government needed in perfecting the objects of the conspiracy, and for which OSHIMA so consistently, strenuously and stubbornly worked.

3. OSHIMA By-Passed the Embassy in Negotiations for the Alliance

QQ-21. The accused TOGO testified that negotiations for the alliance were conducted by Military Attache OSHIMA in violation of Ribbentrop's assurance that he would deal only with the Japanese Ambassador in

QQ-20.

a. Ex. 3508, T. 33,928.

Q3-21.

connection with important political and economic matters,^a and the defense witness MARITA testified that Military Attache OSHIMA carried on negotiations for the alliance without consulting Ambassador TOGO.^b The unusual manner in which the discussions relating to the alliance were conducted was commented upon by Ribbentrop in his telegram to Ambassador Ott on the 26th day of April 1939, wherein he stated that the discussions between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo had "for special reasons and in accordance with agreements made with the other partner been conducted outside usual diplomatic channels."^c From only a casual consideration of the record, it will appear that the paramount reason for conducting these discussions outside of the usual diplomatic channels was the desire of the conspirators to keep the negotiations secret until the propitious moment should arrive.

D. OSHIMA and Ribbentrop Wanted an Alliance Aimed at All Nations

Q3-22. It has been pointed out that the General Staff advised Military Attache OSHIMA in June 1938 that the time had come to conclude a general defensive treaty, one which would provide help and assistance in case one of the three powers should be attacked without provocation by another power.^a In July, OSHIMA explained the proposals he and Ribbentrop had discussed to Naval

Q3-21.

- a. Ex. 3648, T. 35,658.
- b. T. 35,400.
- c. Ex. 502, T. 3,098.

Q3-22.

- a. Ex. 502, T. 3,098.

QQ-22

Attache KOJIMA and the Assistant Naval and Military Attaches.^b According to the testimony of KOJIMA on cross-examination, OSHIMA told them that Ribbentrop had expressed the view "that the situation had changed materially and that Germany was now concerned about Great Britain and France," and that the situation in China demanded close cooperation between Germany and Japan "in order to solve the China Incident." OSHIMA then advised his listeners that he was in favor of Ribbentrop's ideas, but he was afraid the Navy would not agree to them. KOJIMA, in wiring the Navy General Staff regarding the conference, was unable to recall the contents of the wire except for one matter with which he said he was very much concerned at that time. The matter to which he referred conclusively shows that OSHIMA and Ribbentrop advocated an alliance against all nations. He said that he pointed out in his telegram that the inclusion of the phrase "any nation" would in his opinion lead to war with the United States and Great Britain.^c

QQ-23. General KAYABE, another defense witness, testified on cross-examination that Hitler, Ribbentrop, OSHIMA and he saw eye to eye on the proposal which obligated Japan to engage in war on the side of Germany if Germany should become involved in war with England. KAYABE also testified that he learned from telegrams

QQ-23.

- b. T. 37,070-2.
- c. T. 37,070-5.

09-23
which came from the General Staff office in Tokyo that the view of the Japanese Government as distinguished from OSHIMA's and Ribbentrop's was that Japan would go to war in case of a German-Russian conflict but could not promise to enter into hostilities in case of a conflict between Germany and Great Britain.^a

09-24. Notwithstanding this pointed testimony by the Naval and Military Attaches serving with him, OSHIMA categorically denied that he advocated an alliance with Germany which would obligate Japan to participate in an European war between Germany and England whether Russia was in the war or not,^a and he extended his denial to the statement that "No question arose in connection with British involvement."^b

09-25. That OSHIMA favored an alliance with Germany aimed at nations other than Russia is confirmed by Foreign Minister ARITA's report to the Emperor on 8 April 1939 in which he stated that "Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI made a clarification, which reported their own opinion only, to Germany and Italy of the Empire's intention to fight in the event that these should wage war with England and France * * *."^a Throughout the entire course of the negotiations for the military alliance the fact stands out that OSHIMA continuously advocated a strong military alliance against all nations.

09-23.
a. T. 33,774-6.

09-24.
a. T. 34,091.
b. T. 34,092.

09-25.
a. Ex. 3798-A, T. 37,779.

H. OSHIMA Appointed A-ambassador in Order to Bring About the Alliance

Q3-25. As pointed out before the proposed alliance was discussed by Military Attache OSHIMA and Ribbentrop from January to September 1938 in violation of the assurance by Ribbentrop to Ambassador TOGO that such matters would be discussed through diplomatic channels only. After action was taken at the Five Ministers' Conference near the end of August, 1938, TOGO allegedly advised the Foreign Office of his objections to a Tri-Partite Pact, and shortly thereafter his transfer to the post of Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. was effected by the Foreign Minister.^a

Q3-27. The Army put forward OSHIMA's name for the ambassadorship and the General Staff Headquarters repeatedly urged him to accept the appointment. His appointment was also urged by General ITAGAKI, the War Minister. Although these facts were at first denied by OSHIMA, he admitted having so stated in his interrogation.^a The communication from the Foreign Minister to the Premier requesting that the Emperor's approval be obtained for the appointment of OSHIMA as Ambassador^b and the letter from the Foreign Minister to the War Ministry inquiring whether the appointment of the Military Attache to the position of Ambassador was objectionable to the War Ministry^c were matters of form to be complied with in the elevation of any military

Q3-26.

- a. Ex. 3645, T. 36,659-60.
T. 34,100.

Q3-27.

- a. T. 34,111-3.
b. Ex. 3523, T. 34,340.
c. Ex. 3523-B, T. 34,342.

66-27
 officer to the post of Ambassador and it is submitted, does not constitute even an inference adverse to the position that OGUMA's appointment was in fact sponsored by the General Staff and War Minister ITAKAKI.

66-28. The unusual, if not wholly unprecedented, occurrence of Army selection of an ambassador from its own ranks was designed to secure the continuance of negotiations by a protagonist of their views. That replacement of TOGO by OSHIMA was a well conceived plan by the conspirators in which OSHIMA participated to promote early conclusion of the alliance is shown by the statement of General KAWABE on cross-examination that before his departure for Berlin he learned from Chief of the Intelligence of the General Staff that "OSHIMA had been named ambassador in order to bring off about this alliance."^a It is thus apparent that the appointment of OSHIMA to the ambassadorial post was in itself part of the plan of the conspirators to effect the objects of the conspiracy. That he lent himself to and was a part of this enterprise is abundantly clear from his course of conduct.

F. OSHIMA Advocated an Alliance Which Included Provisions Not Acceptable to His Government

66-29. The negotiations already alluded to show it was contemplated that the general defensive pact should take the form of a triple alliance between Japan, Germany

66-23.

a. T. 33,774.

QQ-29
and Italy. OSHIMA testified that while Military Attache he received a report of the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference on the draft proposal which KASAHARA had delivered to Tokyo, and that he promptly transmitted it to Ribbentrop.^a The two telegrams comprising a single instruction were identified by OSHIMA in cross-examination and are analyzed elsewhere.^b

QQ-30. OSHIMA testified that in this report to Ribbentrop he committed Japan against the policy of limiting Japan's duty of military assistance to cases where Soviet Russia alone was involved.^a This the Prosecution contends was contrary to the conditions and reservations under which general approval was given by the Five Ministers' Conference. However, OSHIMA's action was in accordance with the policy theretofore advocated by Ribbentrop, OSHIMA and the Japanese Army as previously alluded to. OSHIMA's efforts to impress this policy on his Government will be treated in more detail under subsequent headings.

QQ-31. USAMI, formerly counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, testified that a telegram was received from the Foreign Ministry stating that a question had arisen as to whether countries other than Soviet Russia should be included in the object of the pact.^a This telegram was received around the end of November or early in December 1938.^b

QQ-29.

- a. Ex. 3508, T. 33,999.
- b. Summation, F-112-3 and F-115-6.

QQ-30.

- a. T. 34,003.

QQ-31.

- a. Ex. 5494, T. 33,733-4.
- b. T. 33,756

QQ-32. With knowledge of the conditions and reservations upon which approval of the draft had been stipulated in the telegrams of instructions and with full knowledge of the question that had been raised by the Japanese Government as to whether countries other than Soviet Russia should be included in the object of the pact as disclosed by the November or early December telegram, OSMINA, at the request of Ribbentrop, made a trip to Rome in the middle of December, and in a conference with Mussolini endeavored to influence Italy to unite in the alliance.^a

QQ-33. Early in January 1939 Mussolini communicated to Ribbentrop his decision to unite in the proposed alliance,^a and Count Ciano noted in his diary on January 7, 1939, that Ribbentrop had sent him the text of the pact.^b The text had been worked out by direct consultations on the part of Ribbentrop with OSMINA and Ciano, and its application was not restricted to Russia alone.^c

QQ-34. This action on the part of OSMINA in seeking Italian participation in an alliance known to include provisions not acceptable to his government was designed to influence Japanese diplomatic policy in conformity with the aims and objects of the conspiracy.

QQ-32.

a. Summation, F-114.

QQ-33.

a. Ex. 497, T. 6,051.
b. Ex. 499-A, T. 6,092.
c. Ex. 502, T. 6,099.

G. OSHIMA's Preparations for Reception of ITO Commission Revealed Plan to Influence Government Policy

93-35. In early January 1939, after the formation of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, OSHIMA was advised by the Foreign Minister that Minister ITO and others would be dispatched to Berlin in order to transmit instructions regarding the policy the Government had decided upon. OSHIMA's request for advance information as to the Government's decision was denied and he was instructed to await the arrival of the ITO Commission.^{a.} It is apparent, however, that the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome had advance information as to the character of the proposals being brought by the ITO Commission in light of the advice given Count Ciano by SHIRATORI on 6 February 1939 at which time SHIRATORI said that he was skeptical about the possibility of an early conclusion of the triple alliance and that he believed that the Japanese counter proposal would be a compromise proposal which he advised Italy not to accept.^{b.}

93-35. The first action taken by OSHIMA to meet this situation was to confer with the leading Japanese diplomats in Europe. General KAWABE, Military Attache to Germany, testified that OSHIMA, in an effort to establish his own views regarding the propriety of a Japanese-German alliance which would obligate Japan to

93-35.

- a. Ex. 3494, T. 33,735-3.
b. Ex. 501, T. 3,055-6.

QQ-36

participate in an European war if England became involved in a war with Germany, made a tour of important countries in Europe for the purpose of consulting the Japanese Ambassadors stationed in those countries. Among those consulted were SHIGEMITSU in London and KURUSU in Belgium.^{a.} This occurred in February 1939 prior to the arrival of the ITO Commission.^{b.}

QQ-37. It does not appear that these efforts were productive of the results that OSHIMA hoped for so an hurried attempt was made to perfect another scheme to influence the policy of his Government. OSHIMA planned the calling of a meeting in Berlin of all Ambassadors stationed in Europe on the occasion of the arrival of the ITO Commission. The need was so urgent that without first obtaining approval of his Foreign Office, OSHIMA telegraphed TOGO, and presumably other Ambassadors, that he was requesting Foreign Ministry approval for the calling of such a meeting. Because of the difficulties in travel, TOGO left Russia, where he was then Ambassador before obtaining directions from his home government, and on his arrival in Berlin learned that Foreign Ministry approval for the calling of the meeting had been denied.^{a.} Notwithstanding this lack of approval, we find in addition to TOGO, KURIYAMA, Minister to Sweden, AKAU, Minister to Switzerland, SAKO, Ambassador to Poland, and SHIMAZU were on the scene at varied intervals but on early dates after the arrival of the

QQ-36.

- a. T. 33,780-3.
- b. T. 34,120.

QQ-37.

- a. Ex. 3646, T. 35,661.

QQ-37

ITO Commission. b. OSHIMA endeavored to explain their presence by testifying that:

"It has been sort of a custom of officials of the Japanese Foreign Office to take various opportunities to visit other posts for the purpose of liaison and exchange of information from time to time,"^c.

and when asked on cross-examination if TOGO came at his own suggestion or OSEINA's, he replied that he came at his own initiative.^d The purpose in the plan to call the meeting of Ambassadors is easily discernible from the views OSHIMA admitted having probably expressed in a meeting between SHIRATORI, TOGO and himself, namely, that Germany and Italy were rising powers in Europe and to align with them would be allowing Japan to improve her position in East Asia.^e

OSEINA and SHIRATORI Rejected the Government's Policy Communicated to them by the ITO Commission and Refused to Officially Transmit it to German and Italian Representatives

QQ-38. The ITO Commission arrived in Berlin late in February 1939.^a OSHIMA admitted that the Commission advised him of the Government's views regarding the proposed pact and directed him to carry out negotiations in accordance therewith^b and to work within those views.^c

QQ-39. Count Ciano made an entry in his diary on March 8, 1939 that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had refused to

QQ-37.

- b. T. 34,121-3.
- c. T. 34,123.
- d. T. 34,124.
- e. T. 34,124.

QQ-38.

- a. Ex. 3494, T. 33,736.
- b. Ex. 497, T. 6,071.
- c. Ex. 497, T. 6,079.
Ex. 3508, T. 34,002.

QQ-39

communicate through official channels the Japanese reply on the Tri-Partite alliance in which the intention was expressed of regarding the pact as exclusively anti-Russian.^a Ribbentrop, in his wire to Ott on the 26th of April 1939, also stated that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had refused to officially present to Germany and Italy the Japanese proposal to limit the mutual obligations of assistance to the case of a war with Russia.^b OSHIMA attempted to dispose of these independent statements of Ciano and Ribbentrop by a wave of the hand, so to speak, in testifying, "This was clearly not the case."^c Reference is made to the summation for a discussion of these incidents and the untrustworthiness of OSHIMA as a witness.^d

QQ-40. OSHIMA cabled his views to Tokyo in opposition to the proposals.^a The telegram containing OSHIMA's views is not available, but the SAIOJI-HARADA Memoirs gives a clear insight as to what actually transpired and the extent to which OSHIMA went in his efforts to impose his convictions upon the Government and influence and direct Japanese policy. OSHIMA's conduct was such as to occasion a statement by the Deputy Chief of Army General Staff to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that he had "strictly warned Ambassador OSHIMA that the supreme authority of diplomacy is vested in the Emperor" and cautioned him that he should not forget his position by expressing as his own the opinions of Germany.^b OSHIMA

QQ-39.

- a. Ex. 501, T. 6,096.
- b. Ex. 502, T. 6,100.
- c. Ex. 3508, T. 34,005.
- d. Summation, F-117-9.

QQ-40.

- a. Ex. 3508, T. 34,003.
- b. Ex. 3795-A, T. 37,767.

QQ-40

denied that any such warning was in fact given him.^c

Foreign Minister ARIWA bitterly complained to the Army that the General Staff was conducting diplomatic negotiations without consulting the Foreign Minister and that Ambassador OSHIMA had telegraphed the General Staff concerning the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact without the knowledge of the Foreign Minister.^d This likewise was denied by OSHIMA.^e

QQ-41. In the interval of time between the arrival of the ITO Commission and the Government's reply to OSHIMA's objections, OSHIMA and SHIRATORI continued to express disapproval of the Government's policy resulting in the following declaration by the Foreign Minister:

"* * * No matter what they (Ambassadors to Rome and Berlin) might say the (Japanese) Government cannot cancel its decision. All we have to do is to change the Ambassadors if they are going to rush to conclusions and say that the decisions (of the Japanese Government) will not do. * * * In all cases we wired back instructions (to both Ambassadors) to do as recommended by the Japanese Government."^a

Again OSHIMA denied receiving the instructions from the Foreign Minister.^b

QQ-42. This action of OSHIMA in rejecting the Government's policy was conduct which exceeded the normal functions of an ambassador and is evidence conclusively showing the influence he sought to and did exercise over the Government's policy.

QQ-40.

- c. T. 34,125.
- d. Ex. 3796-A, 37,771.
- e. T. 34,125-6.

QQ-41.

- a. Ex. 3797-A, T. 37,773.
- b. T. 34,125.

I. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI Considered New Government Proposals to Be "Impossible," and Again Refused to Officially Communicate Them to German and Italian Governments

QQ-43. The Japanese Government partially succumbed to the influence of those who opposed the proposals delivered by the ITO Commission and around the end of March reconsidered its stand and forwarded to the Ambassadors new instructions.^a Ribbentrop, in his telegram of April 26, 1939 to Ambassador Ott, described the proposals and related what transpired in the conference in early April when the new Japanese proposals were unofficially made known to him and Count Ciano.^b It was on this occasion that the Ambassadors branded the new proposals as "impossible" and refused to officially deliver the proposals to the German and Italian Governments. Reference is made to the comments in the summation relating to this incident.^c OSHIMA denied that he refused again at this time to carry out his instructions, but he was silent on the question of his opposition to the proposals.^d

J. OSHIMA Endeavored to Influence Japanese Policy by Threatening to Resign as Ambassador

QQ-44. When OSHIMA and SHIRATORI refused to communicate through official channels the proposals brought by the ITO Commission, they, according to Ciano and

QQ-43.

- a. Ex. 3508, T. 34,005.
- b. Ex. 502, T. 6,100-2.
- c. Summation, F-120.
- d. Ex. 3508, T. 34,005-7.

Q-44

Ribbentrop, requested Tokyo to accept the pact of alliance without reservations under the threat of resigning their ambassadorial posts. This incident is fully discussed in the summation,^a and is confirmed by ARITA in his statement that the Five Ministers' Conference of April 25, 1939 considered an urgent request which had come from OSHIMA and SHIRATORI for their recall.^b In the face of the foregoing separate and independent statements by Count Ciano, the Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Foreign Minister ARITA regarding the Ambassadors' threat to resign, OSHIMA denied that it occurred.^c

Q-45. The threat of resignation by the

Ambassadors was a matter of real consequence. KIDO anticipated the possibility of its affecting peace and order within the nation.^a The telegram of Military Attache BALZAI at a later date stated that OSHIMA's resignation would cause a fiasco in Japan's foreign policy.^b Not only did the threat of resignation serve to strengthen Germany and Italy in their positions with regard to the pact, but it served the purpose of bringing additional concessions from the Japanese Government to meet the views of Hitler, Ribbentrop, OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and their co-conspirators, including especially War Minister ITAGAKI and the military group. Viewing the evidence as a whole, there is little doubt

Q-44.

- a. Summation, F-117-9.
- b. Ex. 3800-A, T. 37,809.
- c. Ex. 3508, T. 34,004-5.

Q-45.

- a. Ex. 3800-A, T. 37,808.
- b. Ex. 3614, T. 37,916.

QQ-45

that the fall of the HIRANUMA Cabinet would have been precipitated by a total collapse of negotiations for a military alliance as would have occurred had the Ambassadors resigned, just as it finally occurred when negotiations collapsed as a result of the conclusion of the German-Russian non-aggression pact.

QQ-46. As a counter measure to the threat of resignation, it was decided by the Five Ministers' Conference of 25 April 1939 that communication be made directly by the Premier with Hitler and Mussolini through the German and Italian Ambassadors at Tokyo instead of using the Japanese Ambassadors stationed in Berlin and Rome.^{a.} This counter proposal took the form of what is known as "The HIRANUMA Declaration of May 4, 1939," a full discussion of which appears in the summation.^{b.} This proposal yielded further to the influence of the two Ambassadors in that it provided that military assistance would be given against nations other than Russia "to the extent possible." The effectiveness of OSHIMA's efforts in drawing Japan further and further into the strong military alliance sought by the conspirators was inferentially admitted by OSHIMA when he testified that the HIRANUMA message to Hitler "was thus strongly in support of the line of negotiations which I was pursuing at that time."^{c.}

QQ-46.

- a. Ex. 3800-A, T. 37,808.
- b. Summation, F-120.
- c. Ex. 3508, T. 34,009.

K. OSHIMA Exceeded His Authority in Advising Ribbentrop That Japan Would Participate in War

QQ-47. The reservations and secret understanding specified in the proposals brought by the ITO Commission limited the obligation of war participation on the part of Japan to nations which had embraced Communism. These reservations were altered in the new proposals delivered to the Ambassadors during the latter part of March. According to the statement of OSHIMA, the reservation with regard to Communism was eliminated and there was substituted for it the duty on the part of Japan to give aid consisting of military advice. By military advice OSHIMA explained was meant trading of intelligence, temporary leasing of bases, export of fuel oil and other commodities, and in general "all aid outside actual participation."^a OSHIMA admitted he advised Ribbentrop that by the new proposal in late March, Japan accepted in principle the duty of war participation in case of Germany and Italy's being attacked by countries other than Soviet Russia,^b but he denied stating specifically that Japan would actually participate in war.^c Foreign Minister ARITA, as we have seen, reported to the Emperor on April 8, 1939 that Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI acted without regard to the wishes of the central authorities and overstepped their authority in replying to Germany and Italy that Japan intended to fight in the

QQ-47.

- a. Ex. 497, T. 6,065.
- b. Ex. 3595, T. 34,006.
- c. T. 34,135-6.

20-47
 event these two powers should wage war with England and France.^d This was followed by a conference between the Emperor and War Minister ITAGAKI, in which the Emperor charged that the Ambassadors had infringed upon his supreme authority and personally reprimanded ITAGAKI for adopting the attitude of supporting them under such circumstances and expressed dissatisfaction with "the War Minister's deviation from the subject at each meeting of the Cabinet,"^e though this conference with the Emperor was denied by ITAGAKI.^f

20-48. Ribbentrop, after the receipt of the HIRANUMA declaration, asked OSHIMA whether Japan could be considered as being in a state of war in the event Germany should go to war against a third nation even if no military aid from Japan were given, to which OSHIMA replied in the affirmative. Foreign Minister ARITA commented that it was indeed inexcusable for OSHIMA on his own authority to propose such a thing as "participation in war" and to make such an arbitrary reply. Premier HIRANUMA and War Minister ITAGAKI upheld OSHIMA's answer.^a The Foreign Minister proposed the annulment of Ambassador OSHIMA's reply to Ribbentrop at the Five Ministers' Conference of May 20th but OSHIMA's action was left unrescinded.^b OSHIMA was noncommittal and evasive when questioned about this matter.^c

20-47.

- d. Ex. 3798-A, T. 37,779.
- e. Ex. 3798-B, T. 37,784.
- f. T. 30,492-3.

20-48.

- a. Ex. 3801-C, T. 37,823-4.
Ex. 3802-A, T. 37,824.
- b. Ex. 3803-A, T. 37,825-7.
- c. T. 34,138.

L. OSHIMA Again Refused to Officially
Transmit His Government's Policy
to Germany

62-49. On May 28th, 1939 Ribbentrop wired Ambassador Ott that formal communication of the May 20th decision of the Japanese Government had not been made and Ott was instructed to make certain representations to the Japanese Government regarding this delay. In the same telegram Ribbentrop stated he had been confidentially and unofficially informed by OSHIMA that OSHIMA had received a telegram from Foreign Minister ARITA according to which the Japanese Government wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of European conflict and that he had sent a very energetic telegram to ARITA refusing to pass this point of view on to the German Government.^a OSHIMA denied the foregoing by stating that in this conference with Ribbentrop he told him that he cabled to ARITA his observations upon an instruction concerning the Gaus draft and that Ribbentrop had misunderstood this intentionally or unintentionally.^b The truth of Ribbentrop's report and the falsity of OSHIMA's denial is confirmed by Ambassador Ott's telegram of May 27, 1939, in which he advised Ribbentrop that a spokesman for the Army had said that the Foreign Minister wired the May 20th decision of the Five Ministers' Conference to Berlin and Rome "in a form which the Army rejects because it does not automatically fix the entrance into a state of war against

62-49.

- a. Ex. 2230, T. 15,991.
- b. Ex. 3808, T. 34,010.

00-49

England and Franco, but proposes to make it depend on the situation at the time," and that the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome had refused transmittal of this decision to the governments to which they were accredited.^c

00-50. In Ribbentrop's wire of May 28th OSHIMA is quoted as having stated that after sending the "very energetic telegram" to ARITA, the War Minister requested him by wire "to hold off until later against ARITA in order not to disturb the discussions among the various factors in Tokyo," and that the "Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a Cabinet overthrow."^a OSHIMA explained that although he did not receive a telegram from ITAGAMI, the Military Attache KAWABE did and that this telegram allegedly in answer to one from KAWABE criticizing the equivocal attitude of the Government advised KAWABE (1) that it would be better to keep quiet now as the atmosphere of the Five Ministers' Conference is inclined to favor the conclusion of a treaty, and (2) that he had no intention whatsoever to overthrow the present Cabinet.^b Clause (1) is in substance the same statement that Ribbentrop reported was made by OSHIMA. Clause (2) is in direct conflict with the statement Ribbentrop attributed to OSHIMA, namely, that the Army was firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly even at the risk of a Cabinet overthrow. That ITAGAMI did entertain these

00-49

c. Ex. 3746, T. 37,409.

00-50

a. Ex. 2230, T. 15,991.

b. Ex. 3508, T. 34,011.

Ex. 2651, T. 33,770.

QQ-50

views cannot successfully be contradicted in the light of Exhibit 2190, T. 54,141 and 54,145. This exhibit includes two telegrams from Ott, the first of which, bearing date August 11, 1939, reports that the Army had resumed at the Five Ministers' Conference a bitter battle for the alliance and that "the War Minister is resolved as a last resort to risk his resignation" and the second, of which, bearing date August 18, 1939, reported that since the War Minister was unable to break through the unanimous front of the other ministers he claimed his resignation unavoidable. This evidence as a whole, it is submitted, fully establishes the Ribbentrop telegram as a trustworthy and corroborated document.

QQ-51. Attention should be called to CSNIMA's denial that he at any time while Ambassador communicated either directly or indirectly with the War Ministry or the General Staff.^a General KAWABE testified that as Military Attache it was his duty to convey the views and opinions of the Army to the Ambassador and to transmit the views and opinions of the Ambassador to the Army,^b and this is precisely what he did with regard to the exchange of communications with the War Minister as described in the preceding paragraph. Another instance where this was shown to have occurred is the BA ZAI telegram of 3 May 1941 at the time CSNIMA

QQ-51.

- a. Lt. 5601, T. 54,011.
T. 54,136.
- b. T. 33,779.

QQ-51
 was making an effort to block MATSUOKA's trip to the United States.^c Although OSHIMA may not have communicated directly with the War Minister or the General Staff, it is quite apparent from this evidence that he used his Military Attache for that purpose when the occasion required it. The procedure also worked in reverse as shown by the Ott telegram of 11 August 1939 when General MACIJIRI, Chief of the Central Section of the War Ministry, advised that the War Minister would by-pass the Foreign Ministry and communicate certain facts to OSHIMA and SHIRATORI.^d

N. OSHIMA Withheld Delivery of Japan's Protest to Serve Political Purpose

QQ-52. OSHIMA deliberately disobeyed an order by the Japanese Government to deliver a sharp protest to the German Government on the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. This incident is treated in the summation.^a Notwithstanding his action of withholding delivery of the protest, OSHIMA wired his Government that he had followed its order.^b OSHIMA was of the opinion that official delivery of the protest would have grave effects if made during the critical phase of the German-Polish negotiations.^c This demonstrates OSHIMA's kindred and sympathetic attitude to the pressure that Germany was then applying

33-51.

- c. Ex. 3814, T. 37,916.
- d. Ex. 2198, T. 34,143.

QQ-52.

- a. Summation, F-123.
- b. Ex. 506, T. 6,125.
- c. T. 6,124-5.

66-52
to Poland. Having by his actions arbitrarily deprived the order from the Foreign Ministry of its severity, he delivered it in a surreptitious and unofficial manner on September 12, 1939, at which time he congratulated Germany on the success of its Polish campaign.^d This action in withholding delivery served to lessen the friction between the two powers resulting from the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and facilitated the close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy which Ribbentrop and OSHIMA agreed was "not in the least dead."^e

II. The Importance of the 1938 and 1939
Period of Negotiations for a Tri-
Partite Pact

66-53. The importance of the 1938-1939 negotiations in its effect upon Japanese, German and Italian policy, and consequently upon the execution of the plan of conspiracy, cannot be over estimated. This is adequately set forth in the summation and will not be repeated. Several observations, however, will be made to OSHIMA's alleged defense as to this matter. With regard to OSHIMA's contention that he considered the proposed treaty was of a purely defensive character,^a it is only necessary to point out that his efforts to have the alliance aimed at all nations could not be purely defensive in the absence of a showing of an existing imminent and efficient threat of aggression by

66-53.

a. Ex. 3508, T. 34,012.

00-53
such nations. No such threat existed in fact. OSHIMA's further contention that he considered the pact as more to be used as the means in diplomatic negotiations^b. when considered in the light of his subsequent publication entitled "The Idea of German Diplomacy" (00-56) is an admission as to at least one use the prosecution claims the Axis alliance was intended, namely, to gain strength enough to enforce their will upon other sovereign nations and failing in their coercive attempts to accomplish it by the use of force.

VI. CONCLUSION OF THE TRI-PARTITE PACT

A. OSHIMA Played an Important Function in Maintaining Close Japanese-German Relations

00-54. OSHIMA, who, according to the testimony of General KAWABE, held the same views as Ribbentrop regarding a military alliance and who saw eye to eye with both Hitler and Ribbentrop, returned to Japan in December 1939.^a Ribbentrop, who considered it of great importance to the policy of collaboration that OSHIMA remain in Germany as Ambassador,^b advised Ott that OSHIMA on his return to Japan would work for German-Japanese friendship.^c Ribbentrop and OSHIMA agreed that Japan's position ultimately would be secured by German victories and that the idea of close cooperation between Germany,

00-53.

- b. Ex. 3508, T. 34,012.

00-54.

- a. T. 33,775.
Ex. 3508, T. 34,016.
b. Ex. 507, T. 6,129-30.
Ex. 498, T. 6,130.
c. Ex. 508, T. 6,131.

22-54

Italy and Japan was to the real interest of all parties concerned.^d The work of OSHIMA in behalf of the maintenance and improvement of German-Japanese relations began even before his departure for Japan according to a report made by Stahmer on 28 August 1939.^e

22-55. The cooling off in the relations between Japan and Germany as the result of the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact was a matter of vital concern to the conspirators, both within and without Japan, as it endangered their deeply laid plans for an Axis alliance. At this critical period in the progress of the conspiracy and in keeping with the foregoing assurances and requests by Ribbentrop, OSHIMA performed a necessary and vitally important part in cementing the relationship of Japan and Germany and in bridging over the immediate crisis until Japan was prepared for the step which the conspirators had urged should be taken. No leading figure in Japan was as well qualified for this role as OSHIMA.

22-56. OSHIMA published a most revealing article in the January 1940 issue of BUNGEI SHUNRUI, entitled "The Idea of German Diplomacy,"^a which, it is submitted, was propaganda designed to sell the Japanese people on the glory and efficacy of Axis power, to soften the feeling that had arisen from the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, and to pave the way for the alliance which was soon to be concluded.

22-54.

- d. Ex. 507, T. 6,127-8.
- e. Ex. 2746, T. 24,505.

22-56.

- a. Ex. 3516-A, T. 34,153.

QQ-57. OSHIMA knew of the work of the Gestapo: he was familiar with the basic German doctrine that force is necessary to solve international problems as enunciated in Hitler's "Mein Kampf;" he knew of the murder without warning of Hitler's own followers in what was notoriously known as the "blood bath;" and he was aware of the establishment of the notorious concentration camps and the reign of terror which followed; and yet in this article he extolled Hitler's so-called Diplomacy of Honor, Equality and Freedom.^{a.} He wrote with admiration of the so-called "bloodless victories" made possible because of the existence of a powerful army, perfect command over the whole nation under it, and the nation's trust in the command.^{b.} By "bloodless victories" OSHIMA admitted that he was referring to such events as the Nazi Putsch in Vienna in July 1934 when Dollfuss was assassinated, the occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938 when von Schuschnigg was forced to resign upon threat of German invasion, and the occupation of the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia in October 1938.^{c.} The accomplishment of these so-called "bloodless victories," OSHIMA said, was due to Germany's determination to resort to arms at any moment if necessary to carry out her own positive policies.^{d.} For a Japanese this was very direct language

QQ-57.

- a. T. 34,161-3.
Ex. 3516-A, T. 34,153.
- b. Ex. 3516-A, T. 34,154.
- c. T. 34,154.
- d. Ex. 3516-A, T. 34,156.

QQ-57
 imparting the idea that Japan must profit by this example and be determined to fight at any moment for the advancement of her positive policies, that is, the principles which the conspirators had engrafted upon the national policies of Japan. To placate and soften the attitude of those who had become infuriated with Germany's action in concluding a non-aggression pact with Russia, OSHIMA expressed the opinion that Germany could not be rightly denounced because of the critical situation she faced regarding military operations on one or two fronts or the possibility of avoiding war.^e OSFIMA eulogized Hitler and Ribbentrop and emphasized the dependence that Hitler placed upon Japan and the confidence and respect in which he held the Japanese. He appealed to the pride and patriotism of the Japanese people by stating that the Japanese, like Hitler, were very brave and were a people who did not fear death. Then as a rebuke to the Government which had failed to conclude an alliance with Germany, he stated, "Our Government, at this juncture, must establish national policies and exert itself to carry them out."^f

QQ-58. On 31 December 1939, Ambassador Ott, in apprising his Government of the political situation existing at that time in Japan, reported that the coalition Cabinet was not capable of complete affiliation with any of the European power groups for the time being, that according to the views of Ambassadors

QQ-57.
 e. Ex. 3516-A, T. 34,157.
 f. Ex. 3515-A, T. 34,157-61.

QQ-58

OSHIMA and SHIRATORI two or three more transient cabinets would be needed in order to bring about a drastic change, and that the two Ambassadors were working hard for the overthrow of the present Cabinet.^a OSHIMA denied participating in any movement to bring about the downfall of the Government and denied discussing the subject with Ambassador Ott.^b

QQ-59. During the latter part of 1939 or early in January 1940, the German and Japanese Governments agreed on a visit by the Duke of Coburg to Japan on the occasion of the 2600th Anniversary of the national foundation when a pompous reception for the Duke as a guest of the State was planned by the Japanese Government, but after the Asama Maru Incident court circles friendly to the democratic powers were fearful that the anti-British feeling agitated by the Asama Maru Incident and the intensification of pro-German feeling of the people that would result from the visit of the Duke of Coburg made it inadvisable that the visit be made as planned. OSHIMA advised Ambassador Ott that he saw in the proposed postponement of the visit a possible advantage for German policy as the anti-British movement would be enabled to develop to the full extent if not burdened with the suspicion of being under German influence. Therefore, OSHIMA recommended that the visit be postponed to April or May. This visit it was contemplated

QQ-58.

- a. Ex. 3503-A, T. 33,941.
- b. T. 34,062.

92-59

should be the occasion for Stahmer, the special envoy of Ribbentrop, to accompany the party for alleged information purposes.^a OSHIMA admitted this conference with Ott but denied any knowledge of the existence of an anti-British movement in Japan.^b When the visit of the Duke of Coburg occurred, Stahmer interviewed OSHIMA, SHIRATORI and others and reported on 23 February 1940 that they remained in an unchanged friendly attitude and were ready to give every support, and that means were being taken to strengthen pro-German influence in the Foreign Ministry and the Army.^c When Ott was asked whether OSHIMA, after the visit of Stahmer to Japan, actively worked for a closer relation between Japan and Germany under the influence of Mr. Stahmer, Ott significantly replied, "No active work by OSHIMA in this respect as a result of Stahmer's influence."^d This rather apparent effort to avoid directly stating that OSHIMA worked for closer relations between the two powers is confirmation of the fact that he did engage in such work.

92-60. On 13 June 1940, Ambassador Ott wired his Government that the Embassy was still endeavoring to stir up Japanese ill feeling against America by influencing the press and leading political personalities in a way deemed proper, and gave as an example the suggestion to political leaders that due to the interests and activity of America in the Pacific area a conflict

92-59.

- a. Ex. 3503-A, T. 33,943-4.
- b. T. 34,064.
- c. Ex. 511, T. 6,140-2.
- d. Ex. 3502, T. 33,929.

QQ-60

between Japan and America was in the long run unavoidable.

In his report, Ambassador Ott added, "In confidential cooperation with the Embassy, Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI and circles closely connected with them are operating in the same direction."^a.

QQ-61. An ex-parte statement in question and answer form was obtained from Ott in an effort to impeach Ott's telegram of 12 June 1940.^a An analysis does not bear out the defense contention, rather it confirms the truth of the report. In a long explanation Ott gave his reason for reporting to Ribbentrop that he was working in his own way.^b Ott does not infer that his statement as to his work in cooperation with OSHIMA and SHIRATORI was untrue. It is most significant that the examiner who was present did not dare ask that specific question. From the fact that he did not do so, it is to be presumed that the answer would have been adverse to his contention. In fact, it is clear from the succeeding questions that it was well understood that Ott was casting no doubt upon the truthfulness of his report regarding the cooperation of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. Instead of asking about the correctness of the report of cooperation, this question was asked: "Did you mean in the fourth paragraph of this document that the Embassy, OSHIMA and SHIRATORI worked together in a common program, based upon a mutual

QQ-60.

- a. Ex. 516, T. 6,152.

QQ-61.

- a. Ex. 3502, T. 33,929-34.
Ex. 516, T. 6,152.
b. Ex. 3502, T. 33,932.

QQ-61
 understanding and common agreement, and if so what was the aim?" To this question, Ott replied: "No, I did not mean that because there was no such agreement."^c Ott, in denying that he meant the cooperation of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI was based upon "a mutual understanding and common agreement," was not denying the truth of any statement contained in his telegraphic report. He proceeded to state that SHIRATORI "warned by private talks, and sometimes by the press, against the courting of the United States."^d In further denying that the cooperation was a common plan, Ott reiterated that he had privately talked with OSHIMA and SHIRATORI separately.^e When asked again why he stated there was close cooperation, Ott referred to his previous statement and said that he used the expression to give weight to his message and to carry through his objections, an entirely different thing from saying that his report was factually untrue. That Ott did not intend to cast doubt upon the accuracy of his report concerning political cooperation by OSHIMA and SHIRATORI is clearly demonstrated by cross interrogatories taken in behalf of the prosecution through which three telegrams bearing dates 31 December 1939, 23 January 1940 and 26 January 1940 were introduced in evidence.^f These telegrams reflect political activity and cooperation on the part of OSHIMA. In the redirect interrogatories taken in behalf of the defense, which it

QQ-61.
 c. Ex. 3502, T. 33,932-3.
 d. Ex. 3502, T. 33,933.
 e. Ex. 3502, T. 33,933.
 f. Ex. 3503-A, T. 33,938-44.

QQ-61 will be recalled, the defense refused to use in evidence and which the prosecution tendered in evidence, Ott confirmed what these telegrams imported.⁶

QQ-62. On 8 July 1940, in a conference between Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassadors SATO and KURESU, Ribbentrop, in referring to German-Japanese cooperation, stated that he had for years furthered this cooperation with General OSHIMA and that it had already borne fruit for both parties. He referred to the fact that Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a restrengthened Germany, Japan, he said, could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as actually happened.^a Not long prior to this, on 29 April 1940, OSHIMA was decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun for meritorious service in the China Affair.^b

B. OSHIMA Performed an Important Function in Securing the Unity of the Government and Nation Behind the Tri-Partite Pact

QQ-63. By May 1940 Germany had demonstrated her military power by overrunning the low countries in Europe and internal preparations of a military and economic character in Japan had been increased so that

QQ-61.
g. Ex. 3503-B, T. 34,372-5.

QQ-62.
a. Ex. 524, T. 6,181.
b. Ex. 121, T. 767.

QQ-63.

the time was ripe for the conspirators to renew their efforts in bringing Japan into open opposition to the democracies through a Tri-Partite alliance, the conclusion of which was a necessary part of their criminal plans. The method by which the conspirators brought Japan formally and completely into the Axis partnership in crime is fully presented in the summation.^a When the YOMAI Cabinet was succeeded by the Second HOIGUN Cabinet, both OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, exponents of the military alliance, by press interviews, approved MATSUKA's appointment as Foreign Minister which presaged new developments in behalf of the alliance.^b

QQ-64. Prior to the conclusion of the pact, there were occasions when OSHIMA and SHIRATORI discussed the subject of the alliance. OSHIMA denied that any concrete measures for its adoption were considered in these discussions.^a When Stahmer, the special envoy of Ribbentrop, arrived in Japan during the early part of September, he first visited OSHIMA. OSHIMA testified that on this occasion he told Stahmer he was in no position to be concerned with the proposed alliance and advised him to see MATSUKA.^b During the course of the negotiations which followed, OSHIMA on one occasion was the sole guest of Stahmer at the German Embassy, at which time Stahmer asked his advice regarding a point in the negotiations on which he and MATSUKA disagreed.

QQ-63.

- a. Summation, P-127--7.
- b. Ex. 536, T. 6,262.

QQ-64.

- a. T. 34,169.
- b. T. 34,170.

33-34
 OSHIMA, in his testimony, alleged that he told Stahmer he was in no position to give him any assistance and merely suggested that he should see MATSUOKA about it.^c In the light of Stahmer's telegram of 23 February 1940 and all of the other evidence concerning OSHIMA, including his frequent denials of established facts, it is only reasonable to believe that his participation in the negotiations for the pact, the culmination of all his efforts and work, was greater than he was willing to admit. OSHIMA's services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, whether in the important preliminary steps or in the actual conclusion of the treaty, were acknowledged by Hitler in conferring upon him the award of the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold.^d

33-35. Opposition in Japan to the Tripartite Pact was such that an Imperial Rescript was used for the purpose of uniting the people behind it.^a Nothing could have been of greater importance to the conspirators than the unification of the Japanese Government and the people behind this pact. No one was in a better position to effectively speak on this subject than OSHIMA, the protagonist of a strong military alliance who saw eye to eye with Hitler and Ribbentrop and who had previously emphasized to the Japanese people by his timely article published in January 1940 the German power of diplomacy

33-35.
 c. T. 34,171-3.
 d. Ex. 602, T. 6,671.

33-35.
 a. T. 34,174-5.

0 159 00 15 2367

33-35
were backed by a strong army and perfect command over the whole nation under it. For the second time, OSHIMA resorted to the press, this time to solidify the Government and nation behind the objects of the conspiracy.

34-35. OSHIMA's first article, entitled "Activate the Alliance--Shun Diplomatic Passivity" appeared close on the heels of the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact in the 27 October 1940 edition of the YOMIURI newspaper.² A close study of this document, parts of which were not read in evidence, is of importance in obtaining a clear understanding of OSHIMA's true views and the common plan which existed among the conspirators as well as the function that OSHIMA played in selling these ideas and plans to the Japanese people. He stated that the alliance had as its object the founding of a New Order in East Asia and in Europe, and although the treaty provided for mutual military support, this was not an object in itself and was only an unavoidable measure to be taken should some third power obstruct the founding of the New Order. It stands to reason that the establishment of the contemplated New Order in East Asia and in Europe could not be effected without military aggression, as it involved the territories and rights of sovereign nations. This point was conceded by OSHIMA in his conversation with Erdmannsdorff on 18 October 1941, when he expressed his opinion that the Japanese Government must have been certain at the

33-35.
a. Ex. 1289-A, T. 11,734.

QQ-66

time the Tri-Partite Pact was concluded that the Greater East Asia Sphere could only be achieved through a push to the south, and with the sword at that.^b This, it is submitted, constitutes an amplification of OSHIMA's defense that he considered the alliance a defensive pact. He stated in this article that the settlement of the China Incident and the European war should be considered as a unity and that the Japanese people must make up their minds to the fact that the treaty called for Japanese cooperation in establishing the New Order of Germany and Italy in Europe. He called upon the nation with unswerving resolution to make careful preparations to combat any obstructions which other nations may offer. Unfortunately in recent years, he stated, there had been a tendency for conflicting opinions to arise within Japan and warned that if it continued in the future, Japan would not be able to accomplish its mission in the world. He admonished the people not to indulge in vain bickerings but to stand foursquare ready to burst through any barrier to the achievement of Japanese aims. He reminded the people that never before was such resolute determination and firm courage necessary. The treaty must be activated with all speed, and the first essential step to this is to complete preparations for action rapidly, he stated. He asserted that the Tri-Partite powers must march ahead in perfect concord to protect their common interests,

QQ-66.

b. Ex. 3523-A, T. 37,967.

QQ-56

and that a tremendous amount of preliminary work was required to be done with respect to Japan's relationship with Germany and Italy and within Japan itself. With an air of finality he then advised his readers that the country's policy had been clearly laid down so anxiety about the matter was uncalled for.

QQ-57. The foregoing broad appeal to the Japanese people was quickly followed by another article by OSHIMA published in the November 1940 issue of the magazine DAI ASIA SHUGI.^a This magazine was published by the Greater East Asia Association, of which the accused MATSUI was Chief, the accused HIROTA, SHIRAKORI and MATSUOKA were counsellors, and the accused SUZUKI, a director. This article entitled "The Tri-Partite Alliance and the United States of America" is of the same general character as the former article. In this article he pictured the war aims of Germany and Italy as being similar to Japan's object in dealing with the China Incident and assigned that fact as the reason for conclusion of the alliance between the three powers. He asserted that the fact this recent alliance was concluded with the grand object of establishing a New Order in the world constituted the great feature of the treaty, and he called upon the nation to recognize the significance of this. OSHIMA again called on the people for cooperation in the establishment of the New Order of Germany and Italy and pointed out that it was essential that

QQ-67.

a. Ex. 3517-A, T. 34,190.

20-67

Japan immediately plan with its allies Germany and Italy in establishing a concrete policy and commence with its realization in a positive manner. As a final appeal, he stated that at this turning point of the world, all the people should combine their efforts for the great imperial idea of establishing a New Order in Greater East Asia in accordance with the Imperial wishes which had been recently promulgated.

C. OSHIMA Appointed Ambassador to Germany for the Second Time

20-68. On 13 December 1940 Ott wired Ribbentrop that the Foreign Minister had repeatedly offered the German ambassadorial post to OSHIMA who declined in order to continue his politically active work for the Tri-Partite Pact.^a By politically active work Ott testified he did not mean that OSHIMA had a part in the preliminary negotiations or in the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact for he was not consulted.^b OSHIMA admitted that the Foreign Minister urged him to accept the post at a meeting in November 1940^c but denied that he worked politically for the pact or refused the appointment because of a desire to stay in Japan for that purpose.^d The Foreign Minister renewed pressure on OSHIMA to accept the appointment and important navy circles in an endeavor to have a completely reliable proponent of the alliance policy with Germany occupy the

20-68.

- a. Ex. 560, T. 3,422.
- b. Ex. 3503, T. 33,936.
- c. Ex. 3508, T. 34,025.
- d. Ex. 3508, T. 34,019.

63-58

most important ambassadorial post in Europe likewise urged OSHIMA to accept. Ambassador SHIRATORI, who was considered indispensable chiefly as a leading figure in the Japan pro-German rejuvenation movement, emphatically supported OSHIMA's appointment. OSHIMA, in considering the appointment, wanted to avoid the appearance of a weakening of his Tri-Partite Pact policy. The appointment was made on 20 December 1940.⁶ From this history it is apparent that OSHIMA was considering the matter of his appointment at the time he published his article in which he stated it to be essential that "we immediately plan with our allies, Germany and Italy, and establish a concrete policy and commence with its realization in a positive manner."⁷

63-62. At a farewell party given to the new Ambassador by MATSUOKA, MATSUOKA significantly stated in a speech that Japan's efforts for the establishment of the New Order in East Asia began with the Manchurian Incident and that the Holy War in which Japan had been engaged in Asia for three and one half years was for the purpose of establishing a New Order in East Asia. He prophesied that the results of the European war and Japan's efforts to establish the New Order in Asia would fundamentally alter the history of the world. After speaking of the unity between Japan and Germany effected by the Tri-Partite Pact and the inseparable relationship between the two powers, MATSUOKA in recognizing

63-62.

- c. Ex. 121, T. 757.
- f. Ex. 3517-A, T. 34,186.

33-59

OS. HIA's intimate knowledge of German affairs acquired through many years of study and his experience as Military Attache and Ambassador to Germany, pointed out that OS. HIA had built up such an absolute personal credit among the leaders of the German Government that he could talk with them without reserve, and evoke the tremendous national reliance which was reposed in Ambassador OS. HIA as the result of his new assignment.^{a.}

VII. COOPERATION UNDER THE TRI-PARTITE PACT

A. OS. HIA Aided in the Japanese Plan to Occupy French Indo-China

33-70. In a telegram to OS. HIA bearing date 17 February 1941, MATSUOKA directed that Germany be requested to use its good offices to have the Vichy Government accept Japan's plan of mediation between French Indo-China and Thailand. He pointed out that the success or failure of Japan's plan of mediation would gravely affect the political situation of East Asia and the position of all Axis powers, that failure of Japan's southern policy would eventually cause a serious set-back in the operations of Germany and Italy and that success of the plan would establish Japanese influence in Thailand and French Indo-China and furnish the grounds upon which to request "various conveniences" which Japan desired.^{a.} OS. HIA first

33-59.

a. Ex. 261, T. 6,423-6.

33-70.

a. Ex. 3521, T. 34,295-6.

QQ-70
 claimed that this telegram was received in Berlin two days prior to his arrival and that it must have been handled by the Charge d'Affaires, ^{b.} but when confronted with a memorandum by Weizsaecker bearing date February 17th relating to his arrival in Berlin, OSHIMA admitted that he in fact arrived on the 17th of February. ^{a.}
 That the German Government effectively responded to MATSUOKA's request to bring pressure to bear upon the Vichy Government is conclusively shown by the telegram of Boltze, Counsellor in the German Embassy in Tokyo, bearing date 12 March 1941 in which he advised that the Foreign Vice Minister OFASHI had requested that there be conveyed to the Reich Foreign Minister the sincere gratitude of the Japanese Government for the extraordinarily favorable and effective support of the Japanese mediation in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China. ^{c.} This is evidence of the successful completion of OSHIMA's first undertaking after his arrival as the new Ambassador to Germany. The importance of the French Indo-China-Thailand Border Dispute in Japanese plans for aggressive expansion is demonstrated in the summation. ^{c.}

R. OSHI A Discussed with Ribbentrop
Steps to Be Taken in Collaboration
Under the Tri-Partite Pact

QQ-71. As early as 19 December 1940, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA discussed with Ambassador Ott a visit to Europe in which he emphasized the need to make a

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- QQ-70.
 b. T. 34,389
 c. T. 34,324.
 d. Ex. 566, T. 6,447.
 e. Summation, G-49-42.

QQ-71
 a strong gesture in favor of the Tri-Partite Pact and to overcome the deadlock in the negotiations with Russia and China.^a However, MATSUOKA had in mind the discussion with German leaders of certain concrete matters which went far beyond this general statement. Desiring not to lose a chance which might only return after a thousand years, an expression common to MATSUOKA, OSEIWA, Hitler and Ribbentrop, MATSUOKA intended to discuss in Berlin the next steps in the promotion of the aims of the conspirators, steps which included the use of armed force against sovereign nations without any pretense of self-defense. On 10 February 1941, MATSUOKA informed Germany that he desired to discuss in Berlin such important questions as the attitude of the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact toward America, a preventive attack against Singapore, termination of the China conflict and the strengthening of Japanese hands in the negotiations with Russia as the result of a surprise agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. In connection with the question relating to the preventive attack against Singapore, MATSUOKA advised that Japan would undertake a decision on this question only in complete agreement with the Reich and that in the meantime the armed forces were taking the measures necessary to be ready for war.^b

QQ-72. OSEIWA endeavored to minimize the importance of the part he played in these discussions of the

QQ-71.
 a. Ex. 537, T. 6,449.
 b. Ex. 569, T. 6,454-6.

44-72
 aggressive plans by testifying that he was not instructed to arrange with the German side the agenda of conversation of MATSUOKA in Berlin^a and that no conference had been held by him with MATSUOKA on Japan's foreign policy.^b However, this feigned ignorance on the part of OSHIMA is disproved by the statement of MATSUOKA to Ambassador Ott that he had informed Ambassador OSHIMA of the questions he proposed to discuss in Berlin.^c Armed with knowledge of the questions that MATSUOKA desired to discuss, OSHIMA prepared the way by engaging in two conferences prior to MATSUOKA's arrival in Berlin. In a conference with Weizsaecker on 25 February 1941, he suggested the possibility of a modus vivendi with Russia which would be sufficient to "relieve Japan in the north." With regard to China, OSHIMA expressed the view that pressure would be put on Chiang Kai-shek through Japanese support of Wang Ching-wei. As to British possessions in East Asia, OSHIMA stated that it was necessary that Hong Kong be first taken and then Singapore should be seized in grand style by operations from both the sea and the land. OSHIMA told Weizsaecker that he had energetically advocated the point of view in Tokyo "that one should not let slip by opportunities that would determine the fate of Japan for centuries."^d

44-73. On the following day, 23 February 1940, OSHIMA conferred with Ribbentrop. Discussions of the advisability of a Japanese attack upon Singapore having

44-72.

- a. Ex. 3503, T. 34,024.
- b. Ex. 3503, T. 34,025.
- c. Ex. 569, p.2 (not read in evidence).
- d. Ex. 570, T. 6,457.

Q2-73

been previously initiated by MATSUKA in Japan and by OSHIMA in Berlin, Ribbentrop encouraged such an attack. OSHIMA explained that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May and for the sake of safety preparations must be made not only for war against England but also against America. The moment for the occupation of Singapore, he said, must be coordinated with operations in Europe. OSHIMA alluded to the occupation of Hong Kong as in his previous conference with Miezacher. He also declared himself willing to do everything to realize the policy that had been discussed and he remarked that he had asked the Foreign Minister to bring to Berlin "the most concrete possible proposals."^a Following these discussions of aggressive plans, Ribbentrop, on 27 February 1941, wired Ambassador Ott in Tokyo directing him to work with all the means at his command to the end that Japan take possession of Singapore by surprise as soon as possible.^b Within a few days thereafter, on 3 March 1941, Hitler issued Directive 24, in which it was stated that the aim of the cooperation based on the Three Power Pact must be to bring Japan as soon as possible into active operations in the Far East.^c OSHIMA explained that in talking to Ribbentrop about an attack on Singapore he expressed his personal opinion in order to ascertain German intentions for the future, and that he considered it was to some extent necessary not to give the impression that Japan was assuming an

Q2-73.

- a. Ex. 571, T. 6,459-57.
- b. Ex. 572, T. 3,468.
- c. Ex. 573, T. 3,470.

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CG-73 evasive attitude.^{d.} This explanation appears unreasonable when considered in the light of Ribbentrop's later statement to MATSUOKA in an official conference that he had already discussed with OSHIMA such a specific matter as the type of German assistance which should be given in the blow against Singapore.^{c.}

CG-74. OSHIMA testified that he had no recollection of telling Ribbentrop that the preparations for attack on Singapore would be completed by May^{a.} for the reason, as he stated, that he had never received any information on such a subject. In this connection it is important to consider the same information which arose from another and independent source both as bearing upon OSHIMA's credibility and upon the establishment of the fact. In Ambassador Ott's report to Ribbentrop on 26 March 1941 he stated that upon inquiry from the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral NOBUKI, he was told that the Navy was vigorously preparing for an attack upon Singapore and preparations were expected to be concluded by the end of May, and on inquiry from the Chief of the Army General Staff, General SUGIYAMA, he had been advised that the Army was also making preparations for an attack presumably at the end of May. Ott reported that the will to attack existed in the Army and the Navy, that preparations for attack were in progress and that military prospects were favorable. In keeping with OSHIMA's explanations to Weizsaecker on February

CG-73.

- a. Ex. 3508, T. 34,022-3.
- e. Ex. 580, T. 6,529.

CG-74.

- a. Ex. 3508, T. 34,022.

33-74

22, 1941, Ott emphasized that the need for the Japanese rear to be left free by Russia played a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and was being striven for by reconciliation with Russia.^b

33-74g. OSHIMA endeavored to discredit the testimony relating to Japanese preparations for the occupation of Singapore by producing the affidavit of Ribbentrop. What Ribbentrop said was that he could not imagine that OSHIMA made the statement that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May, and if OSHIMA did make it, it was for propoganda purposes.^a We are not concerned with Ribbentrop's guesses and speculations. What is of importance is that he did not deny that OSHIMA made the statement attributed to him. A most significant situation exists relative to the Ribbentrop affidavit. The copy served upon the Tribunal and read into evidence fails to include two vitally important paragraphs which were marked out and initialed by Ribbentrop. These two paragraphs contain matter considered vital by the defense, and Ribbentrop's refusal to endorse them can be construed in no other light than a denial of their validity. Thus it has developed that it is far more important to learn what Ribbentrop would not say than it is to ascertain what he did say. The paragraphs in question are as follows:

"During all our conversations, negotiations, and conferences OSHIMA took no official position but reserved his judgment until he submitted the matter to his government. His personal views were not inserted into his official act; this was his definite policy.

33-74.

b. Ex. 575, T. 6,478-9.

33-74a.

a. Ex. 2732, T. 24,741.

0159 0015 2379

22-74a

"At no time did OSHIMA ever suggest an attitude to commit his country to war. I tried hard since the beginning of 1941 to cause OSHIMA to commit himself and his country to the war, first against Great Britain and then against Soviet Russia. All of his official and personal efforts were directed toward keeping Japan out of the war with the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia."

22-75. The conferences conducted by MATSUOKA on his arrival in Berlin regarding the importance of an early attack by Japan on Singapore are treated in the summation.^a OSHIMA testified that in the conference he attended MATSUOKA did not make any commitment on this subject and that he was never informed as to the character of the other conferences that occurred.^b

This is rebutted by OSHIMA's own telegram of May 20, 1941 bitterly castigating MATSUOKA for what appeared to be a change of intention on his part regarding the advance to the south, in which he stated, "When Foreign Minister MATSUOKA visited Germany recently he said, as his personal opinion, that Japan was going to attack Singapore, but it seems that he has changed his opinion."^c

C. OSHIMA Discouraged Japanese-Russian Negotiations

22-76. As early as January 1940, OSHIMA was known to favor rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union,^a and, as we have seen, on February 23, 1941 in a conference with Weiszaecker he spoke of Japan's future policy as envisaging a modus vivendi with Russia which would be sufficient to relieve Japan in the north.^b The Japanese

22-75.

- a. Summation, F-150-1.
- b. Ex. 3508, T. 34,024-5.
- c. Ex. 1075, T. 9,921.

22-76.

- a. T. 34,217.
- b. Ex. 570, T. 6,457.

QQ-76
 views regarding rapprochement with Russia were also made clear in Ott's report to Ribbentrop on March 21, 1941 regarding his inquiry from Admiral KOZO and General SUGIYAMA as to the preparations of the Navy and the Army for an attack on Singapore, in which he recorded that "conditions for the accomplishment of this is a free rear toward Russia" and "the need for her rear to be left free by Russia plays a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and was being striven for by reconciliation with Russia."^c

QQ-77. In the meantime the situation between Germany and Russia had undergone a change. Hitler's "Barbarossa" plan had been decided upon,^a and it had become imperative from the viewpoint of Germany that a Japanese threat be maintained against Russia in the East. Consequently, Ribbentrop discouraged a non-aggression pact between Japan and Russia. He advised MATSUOKA not to touch on the question of the non-aggression pact in Moscow "as it was not apt to fit quite into the framework of the present situation."^b Several days later he warned MATSUOKA that it would probably be best in view of the whole situation not to carry the discussion with the Russians too far and that in his opinion the question should be dealt with only in a purely formal way and should not be gone into deeply.^c

QQ-76.
 c. Ex. 576, T. 6,478-9.

QQ-77.
 a. Ex. 573, T. 6,472.
 b. Ex. 579, T. 6,520.
 c. Ex. 580, T. 6,522-9.

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62-73. OSHIMA learned from either Hitler or Ribbentrop that there existed a probability of a German attack on Russia^a and independently of what he heard from German officials, he concluded there was great probability of war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. due to the concentration of large bodies of troops on the Russian border and the extensive military preparations which were then being made.^b In the light of this changed situation between Germany and Russia, OSHIMA was of the opinion that Japan should not be too hasty in entering into a non-aggression pact with Russia, and he advised MATSUOKA accordingly. Although MATSUOKA did not desist in his plans, he reported to OSHIMA the progress of negotiations on two occasions.^c It is not the change of OSHIMA's views to conform more nearly with the German viewpoint, as had so frequently occurred before, which lends the greatest significance to this incident. The most important consideration is that the giving of advice to MATSUOKA and the receiving of reports from him as to the progress of the negotiations in Moscow reflect the leading role OSHIMA played in the formulation of Japanese policy and disproves his contention that he merely served as a messenger between Japan and the country to which he was accredited.

62-73.

- a. T. 34,217-8.
- b. T. 34,310.
- c. T. 34,330-2.

Page 15-01

D. OSHIYA Endeavored to Block American-Japanese Negotiations

33-79. On May 5d, OSHIYA was shown the April 15th draft of a proposed agreement between the United States and Japan and Ott's telegram to Ribbentrop regarding the pending negotiations.^a The proposal of MATSUOKA to make a trip to the United States had been carried in the press in the latter part of April.^b OSHIYA immediately undertook to obstruct the course of the American-Japanese negotiations. His first act was to bring pressure from the General Staff upon MATSUOKA to abandon this proposed trip. On May 3d, his Military Attache BAZAI sent a telegram to the General Staff, in which he pointed out that the proposed trip by MATSUOKA would create a very unfavorable situation and would nullify the results of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's visit to Germany and Italy, and warned that if the situation be left alone the problem of Ambassador OSHIYA's resignation may arise, thereby causing a fiasco in the basic problems of Japan's foreign diplomacy. BAZAI requested grave deliberation on the matter.^c As was to be expected, this telegram was delivered by the General Staff to the Foreign Ministry where it was shown to have been received on May 5th. Following the dispatch of BAZAI's telegram, OSHIYA wired the Foreign Minister on May 4th and advised that although the German Government had given no expression of its attitude, he was nevertheless greatly concerned over the

33-79.

- a. Ex. 1975, T. 9,990.
- b. Ex. 3515, T. 34,233.
- c. Ex. 3514, T. 37,916.

66-79

proposed trip and cryptically reminded MATSUOKA that it was only common sense to consider the United States completely hostile against Germany and Italy. He requested that he be informed by return cable of the truth about his, MATSUOKA's, plans.^d OSHIMA testified that the matter of the proposed trip of MATSUOKA was nothing more than a rumor, but in his telegram of May 20th to MATSUOKA, OSHIMA reported that he had ascertained that it was not a rumor.^e He denied that he knew of the negotiations until the last of May.^f This denial was also untrue in the light of his telegram of May 20th.^g OSHIMA also denied any knowledge of or connection with the sending of the telegram by his Military Attache,^h but, it is submitted, MATSUOKA fully understood OSHIMA's scheme to bring military pressure to bear upon him when in his reply he requested OSHIMA to inform both of his attaches about the matter.ⁱ His reply also indicates that OSHIMA took his Naval Attache into the scheme.

66-80. OSHIMA's opposition to the conduct of American-Japanese negotiations by MATSUOKA is plainly apparent and is fully understood from a reading of his three dispatches to MATSUOKA of May 20, 1941, notwithstanding his emphatic denial on cross-examination that he opposed the diplomatic policy of MATSUOKA with regard to the United States.^a In his first telegram, he expressed deep concern over what he considered to be the

66-79.

- d. Ex. 3518, T. 34,258.
- e. T. 34,235.
Ex. 1075, T. 9,918.
- f. T. 34,231-2.
- g. Ex. 1075, T. 9,918.
- h. T. 34,249.
- i. Ex. 3519, T. 34,244.

66-80.

- a. Ex. 1075, T. 9,918.
T. 34,242.

63-60
 development of this matter and its effect upon the future of Japan as well as the Tri-Partite Pact. In spite of advice from MATSUOKA that it was unnecessary to report to him the opinions of the staffs of Germany and Italy on the negotiations that were being conducted, OSHIMA advised MATSUOKA that he could not understand the reasons for this decision of MATSUOKA, and regardless thereof he could not keep silent and had expressed his opinion frankly in two separate telegrams.^{b.}

63-81. In the second telegram, he stated, he had answered Ribbentrop's criticisms of the negotiations by stating that Japan was observing the Tri-Partite Pact as the basis of its diplomacy, and accordingly there was no reason to conclude the proposed treaty between Japan and America contrary to the Tri-Partite Pact. He suggested that MATSUOKA must have been compelled by "a certain group" to consent to it. He critically stated that when Foreign Minister MATSUOKA visited Germany he said that Japan was going to attack Singapore, but that it seemed he had changed his opinion. He prophesied that if the proposed agreement should be concluded Japan, in his opinion, would lose the chance to establish her right of leadership in East Asia. OSHIMA then presented MATSUOKA with two plans which, without the authority of the Foreign Office, he had discussed with Ribbentrop. The first was to refuse the proposal of America, and the

63-80.
 b. Ex. 1075, T. 9,918-9.

81-81

second was that if the agreement were concluded that it be done so under the condition that America maintain a neutral attitude without extending convoy patrol assistance. He expressed Ribbentrop's fear that the agreement might make the Tri-Partite Pact automatically meaningless.^a

81-82. In the third telegram OSHIMA repeated the deep dissatisfaction of the German Government with the American-Japanese negotiations and the concern of the German Government about the future of the Tri-Partite Pact. OSHIMA reminded MATSUOKA that when he came to Germany all of the people in Germany heartily welcomed him and delighted in the strengthening of the Axis, but as the American negotiations followed so closely his trip to Germany, the feeling was very strong that Germany had been betrayed. He reminded MATSUOKA that the European War was developing very favorably for Germany and Italy and that very important developments were expected in the light of which it was unreasonable for Japan to lose the confidence and trust of Germany and Italy who would become the leaders in Europe. OSHIMA expressed his fear that "such a two-faced diplomacy should lead Japan to an absolute international isolation during the critical period which may arise after the war." He warned that if Japan solved the China Incident with the support of America, she would lose the existing opportunity to expand southward and

81-81.

a. Ex. 1075, T. 9,920-8.

65-82
the possibility of attacking Singapore. He emphasized the fact that by such a treaty the elimination of fear in the Pacific would permit the United States to reinforce her assistance to Britain which would greatly affect the war in Europe. Should Japan abandon her right to leadership in the southern regions for the sake of America, it was clear, he stated, that Japan could not stress her leadership to Germany and Italy, and this would mean abandonment by Japan of her great mission to establish a New Order in the Greater East Asia. He called MATSUOKA's attention to the fact that the Tri-Partite Pact had been concluded by Japan and that the road the Japanese people should follow had been made clear. He earnestly implored MATSUOKA that if the conclusion of the agreement was unavoidable, the Japanese Government should at least uphold the principle that Japan would facilitate the battle of Germany and Italy against Britain, that Japan should demand America's neutrality in the European war, and that it should be made clear that Japan had an obligation based upon the Tri-Partite Pact to participate in the war.^a

65-83. As late as July 12, 1941, OSHIMA conferred with Weiszacker on the development of Japanese-American relations. When asked whether the Americans considered their rear in the Pacific Ocean to be secure, OSHIMA replied that his own views on how America was to be handled were known to the Germans and that he had again

65-82.

a. Ex. 1075, T. 9, 927-32.

66-83

advised MATSUOKA recently simply to break off the conversations with Washington.^a Prince KO CYE, in his memoirs, also recorded the fact that OSHIMA declared his opposition to the American-Japanese negotiations in strong language. No further comment is needed upon the conduct of OSHIMA in his opposition to the American-Japanese negotiations than to quote the statement of Prince KO CYE when he uses the following language:

"It was evident that through the influence of the German representations and the repeated observations of Ambassador OSHIMA the originally vague attitude of the Foreign Minister had become more and more vague; and it was more and more obvious that, in contrast with the other Cabinet members, who were full of hopes, he was standing alone in his opposition."^b

E. Additional Power Was Concentrated
in the Hands of OSHIMA

66-84. On December 20, 1940, there was established a General Commission, a Military Technical Commission and an Economic Technical Commission in each of the three capitals, Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, under Article IV of the Tri-Partite Pact.^a OSHIMA testified that the commission in Berlin had nothing but a nominal existence and that no material discussions concerning future plans or combined operations took place.^b Admiral YOKOI, a member of the Military Commission in Berlin, admitted in the course of his interrogation that the reason why the joint Military Commission did not function effectively

66-83.

- a. Ex. 3815, T. 37,921.
b. Ex. 3824, T. 37,972.

66-84.

- a. Ex. 559, T. 6,417-20.
b. Ex. 3508, T. 34,043.

22-84
 was that an unofficial commission consisting of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and General OSHIMA was established. Ribbentrop and OSHIMA, he said, conferred in respect to military measures, and with these conferences proceeding on the level of the German Foreign Office, it was difficult for the subordinate Military Commission to carry out its functions.^c This usurpation by OSHIMA of the powers and duties of the Military Commission under the Tri-Partite Pact enabled him to more effectively cooperate with Germany in carrying out the objects and purposes of the conspiracy.

22-85. Additional power was assumed by OSHIMA when, as he advised Ribbentrop on January 2, 1942, the Japanese Government concentrated in his hands for the Japanese side "the handling of all questions which concerned the general principles of cooperations in the whole field of the common prosecution of the war and to speak at the proper time with the Reich Foreign Minister and, insofar as Italy was interested, with the Reich Foreign Minister and the Italian Ambassador. Nothing beyond purely military and economic questions of detail were to be directly handled by the military and economic members of the subcommissions of the Tri-Partite Pact."^d OSHIMA denied that he received such instructions and stated that although he had talked with Ribbentrop regarding matters of policy there was no instance in

22-84.
 c. T. 36,972.

22-85.
 a. Ex. 3812-A, T. 37,906.

22-85
 which a decision on any new policy had been reached.^{b.}
 However, the fact of the receipt of such instructions was confirmed in a conference with Hitler on January 3, 1942 when OSHIMA advised that he was empowered by his Government "to discuss the prosecution of the war with the Reich Foreign Minister. Even though individual questions could be discussed directly between the Army, the air force, and, above all, the Navy, in his opinion it was of the greatest importance that the main line of policy should be laid down exclusively by him and the Foreign Minister. The same was true for the economic and political questions."^{c.} OSHIMA continued in the established practice of discussing military and economic matters of utmost importance with German leaders and endeavored to guide the policy relating to such matters as will subsequently appear.

F. OSHIMA Advocated Utilization of Japanese-German Economic Power in the Joint Conduct of the War, and Acting Under the Tri-Partite Pact Negotiated a Treaty With Germany Designed to Reduce Third Powers to Economic Servitude

22-86. The common plan of the conspirators to establish a new world order, as exemplified in the Tri-Partite Pact, contemplated the isolation of all nations not surrendering vital sovereign rights to the Axis powers and their reduction to economic servitude. This is made clear from a study of the negotiations between

22-85.

b. T. 34,210-2.

c. Ex. 3813-A, T. 37,912.

QQ-86

OSHIMA and Ribbentrop regarding plans for world economic control under the Tri-Partite Pact. This could not be accomplished without a successful termination of the military aggressions in which the Tri-Partite powers were engaged, but while these wars of aggression were being waged, deep plans were laid which would not only aid in concluding these wars favorably to the aggressive powers, but would lay the foundation for the cooperation needed to protect their scheme of world domination and control into the far distant future.

QQ-87. In line with the provisions of the Tri-Partite Pact and in conformity to the plan of the conspirators, OSHIMA and Ribbentrop on March 23, 1942 discussed future economic cooperation between the Europe-Africa sphere under the leadership of the Axis and the Greater East Asia sphere under the leadership of Japan, in which the goal was designated as the establishment of a large scale economic agreement with preference for the Tri-Partite powers and with the exclusion as far as possible of third parties, America in particular.^a OSHIMA had previously pointed out to Ribbentrop that the development and utilization of "the raw materials-rich South Sea regions" went hand-in-hand with the progress of military operations, and that Japan was doing its utmost to facilitate the delivery of East Asiatic products to Germany. Germany, he stated, should do everything to deliver machines, munitions, materials

QQ-87.

a. Ex. 3819, T. 37,946.

66-67
and plants to Japan. This was part of the plan for reciprocal utilization of German and Japanese economic power. In this connection, OSHIMA proposed on his own initiative and without first obtaining the authority of his Government that Germany should grant Japan a total credit of one billion yen for three years with a bridging-over credit of fifty million yen for the most urgent German deliveries. ^{b.}

66-68. Discussion of the proposed economic agreement was continued on May 9, 1942. Ribbentrop pointed out that the starting point for all political and in particular for all economic discussions and plans was the Tri-Partite Pact, which would prove effective for all international settlements even after the war and for an enormous length of time to come. The two major political areas created by the Tri-Partite Pact, he said, must in advance fix their economic relations in such a way that they would in no way adversely affect the political relations. OSHIMA enthusiastically concurred in the idea of a treaty arrangement for economic relations and stated that it was all the more important because it would be difficult to bring America to its knees in the present war and that after the end of the war battle would have to be waged with the United States in the field of economy through an economic boycott by Japan and the Axis. Ribbentrop proposed the formulation

66-67.

- b. Ex. 3818-A, T. 37,906-7.
Ex. 3818-A, T. 37,937.
Ex. 3818-B, T. 37,939.

Page 22-71

22-88

of a basic accord which would be for publication and a secret protocol not intended for publication which would include important details as to which OSKIMA expressed his fundamental agreement. The various points on which Ribbentrop and OSKIMA fundamentally agreed formed the charter for projecting world domination and control into the far distant future and were covered by the following proposals:

(1) The economic cooperation between the two great spheres under the pact should be facilitated by a strict central control.

(2) The guiding powers from their natural economic preferences should exert influence on the regulation of economy of the independent states within the two spheres, thereby necessitating these independent states to carry out a far reaching control of their economies. This as was expected would finally result in the two economic areas being combined into one unit which would also affect the field of customs and currency.

(3) The Tri-Partite powers should be given mutual preference in all economic fields. This contemplated preferential treatment, action to prevent the products of one partner from being forced from the market by an outsider such as the United States, and the restriction of sale of important goods to third powers until after the needs of the partners had been met.

(4) The resumption and continuation of economic relations with enemy countries after the war should take place only after mutual agreement between the two partners. This was to apply particularly against the United States and Central and South American countries.

(5) In the event economically independent establishments within the two economic areas, such as the Mitsui interests in Japan, should oppose the contemplated economic control, measures should be taken to eliminate them."

22-88.

a. Ex. 3820-A, T. 37,950-3.

QQ-89. These negotiations bore fruit in the conclusion in January 1943 of a trade agreement between Japan and Germany and an identical agreement between Japan and Italy.^a This was the treaty which Ribbentrop and OSEIMA agreed in their May 9th conference should be formulated for publication. What they secretly agreed to in carrying out the purposes of the conspirators to bring the entire world under their domination and control was set forth in the secret protocol to the foregoing treaty.^b OSEIMA in his testimony disclaimed participation in the negotiations but admitted responsibility.^c At first he denied the existence of the secret protocol,^d but later admitted its existence.^e This secret protocol negotiated by OSEIMA constituted an embodiment of the nefarious plans and proposals of OSEIMA and Ribbentrop fully set forth in paragraphs QQ-87 and QQ-88. With these policies and agreements written into the law of Japan, Germany and Italy, success at arms was all that was needed to inflict upon both belligerents and non-belligerents throughout the world the yoke of political and economic servitude.

G. OSEIMA Advocated Japanese Expansion by Use of Force in the Areas South of China and in the South Seas, Favored the Exploitation of Those Areas and Negotiated for Air and Naval Bases for Use in Military Aggression

QQ-90. The expansion of Japanese aggression into the areas south of China and into the South Seas is fully

QQ-89.

- a. T. 34,230.
Ex. 50, T. 501 (Not read in evidence)
- b. Ex. 3520, T. 34,246 and 34,267-9.
- c. T. 34,320.
- d. T. 34,231.
- e. T. 34,246.

QQ-90
set forth in the summation.^a When asked if he approved of and favored Japanese exploitation of Indo-China, OSHIMA replied, "I never heard of that."^b He also testified that his opinion had never been asked regarding the establishment of air and naval bases in French Indo-China and that he "had never thought of that."^c He stated he did not think he had ever approved of Japanese penetration into Indo-China.^d However, the evidence shows that OSHIMA advocated expansion by use of force into French Indo-China and other southern areas, that he favored exploitation of those areas and that he negotiated for German assistance in obtaining naval and air bases for use in military aggression against Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore.

QQ-91. In September 1939, OSHIMA, timing his action with the initiation of war by Hitler against Poland, advised military aggression in the southern areas of Greater East Asia and against Hong Kong for which the Japanese Navy, he said, was prepared. He was of the opinion that Japan should try to tear the Netherlands from England so as to be able to exploit the raw materials of the East Indies.^a In his article, entitled "Activate the Alliance---Shun Diplomatic Passivity," published in October 1940, he referred to the fact that prior to the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan for a long time had been determined to carry out its mission

QQ-90.

- a. Summation, G-19-44.
- b. T. 34,284.
- c. T. 34,305.
- d. T. 34,307.

QQ-91.

- a. Ex. 509, T. 6,136-7.

QQ-91

to set up a New Order in Greater East Asia and establish a relationship with the "Southern Countries" conducive to so-called mutual harmony and prosperity.^b As we have seen, he was of the opinion that the Japanese Government had in mind at the time of the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact that the Greater East Asia sphere could not be achieved without a push to the south by the use of armed force.^c

QQ-92. OSHIMA's conference with Weiszaecker, February 22, 1941, in which he considered it necessary first to take Hong Kong and then to seize Singapore and his collaboration with Ribbentrop and Hitler in discussing plans for a Japanese attack on Singapore have been considered.^a He participated in a conference between MATSUOKA and Hitler in which MATSUOKA expressed the view that Japan would proceed by force, if necessary, in establishing the New Order.^b OSHIMA's part in bringing German pressure to bear on Vichy to accept Japanese demands in connection with the French Indo-China-Thailand border dispute, a necessary step in the Japanese strategic planning, has also been considered.^c At the time of the Japanese mediation of the Indo-China-Thailand border dispute, a decision was reached, according to a statement by OSHIMA, that an agreement was to be made with the Thailand Government for a Japanese invasion of Thailand, the purpose of which was to secure bases in that country for use as a springboard against Singapore.^d

QQ-91.

- b. Ex. 1299-A, T. 11,737.
- c. Par. QQ-66, supra.

QQ-92.

- a. Par. QQ-72, supra.
- Par. QQ-73, supra.
- b. Ex. 577, T. 6,495.
- c. Par. QQ-70, supra.
- d. Ex. 355, T. 7,115.

QQ-93. The plan of aggression in the southern areas included occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, but Japan failed in enforcing its demands upon this country.^{a.} This failure constituted an additional incentive for Japanese action in securing naval and air bases in south Indo-China from which speedy and effective military action could be launched. On June 10, 1941, OSHIMA advised Germany that the Japanese Army desired to obtain bases for the Navy in southern French Indo-China, which, he said, could be traced back to the fact that the Japanese armed forces wanted to create a favorable strategic position vis-a-vis Singapore.^{b.} This was followed on July 12, 1941 by OSHIMA's statement to Weizsaecker that the occupation of certain positions in southern Indo-China as bases for aircraft and warships was an urgent Japanese need. OSHIMA further stated on this occasion that although he did not consider a move toward south Indo-China imminent, he thought that Japan was waiting for a good opportunity.^{c.} On July 17, 1941, OSHIMA advised Ribbentrop that the Japanese Government had started negotiations with the French Government with a firm decision to secure for herself, among other things, naval and air bases in Indo-China. The realization of this plan, he said, was the first step for Japan's push to the south. He represented that this action would divert English-American forces and in this sense would give aid to Germany and Italy in the spirit

QQ-93.

- a. Summation, G-42, G-45-51.
- b. Ex. 635, T. 7,009.
Ex. 586, T. 6,560.
- c. Ex. 3815, T. 37,920.

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83-93
of the Tri-Partite Pact. OSEIMA then called upon Germany to stand at the side of the Japanese Government and assist Japan in its negotiations with France.^{d.}

83-94. After Japan secured naval and air bases in south French Indo-China through threat of military action,^{a.} Erdmannsdorf was directed by Ribbentrop to confer with Ambassador OSEIMA. In the course of the conference OSEIMA advised that action against the southern regions had been prepared and the only question was when "things should start." He expressed the view that it should be in conjunction with German operations against Great Britain.^{b.} On November 17, 1941, Erdmannsdorf again conferred with OSEIMA at the direction of Ribbentrop, this time to inquire as to whether the Japanese advance would be to the north or to the south. OSEIMA advised him that an advance by Japan toward the south was in his opinion unavoidable because of the pressing Japanese need for petroleum, and in explaining what was meant by advance to the south he stated that the seizure of the island of Borneo was above all necessary. During the course of the conference it was determined from examination of a map that Borneo was 1,000 kilometers distant from the part of Indo-China occupied by Japanese troops. OSEIMA mentioned the necessity of being prepared for simultaneous military action against the Philippines should the United States be inclined to interfere and pointed out

83-93.
d. Ex. 642, T. 7,043-7.

83-94.
a. Summation, C-43-4.
b. Ex. 3623-A, T. 37,967.

20-94
 that the United States could not defend the Philippines effectively in view of the fact that Manila was only 800 kilometers distant from Formosa. OSHIMA expressed the need for increasing the number of Japanese troops in south East China for an invasion of Thailand, the purpose of which would be to obtain a springboard against Singapore. OSHIMA commented upon the British fortification of Singapore and the absence of strong British naval forces there. He expressed the opinion that the Japanese advance against Singapore should be considered in conjunction with a German advance in the Middle East and stated that he considered an attack on Singapore would be most effective. OSHIMA also asserted that he assumed the three Japanese infantry divisions on the island of Hainan were being trained for landing operations and combat in tropical regions.^c

H. OSHIMA Favored Japanese Military Action Against Russia and Endeavored to Influence Japan to Participate in the German War Against Russia

20-95. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, OSHIMA continued actively to further the goals of the conspiracy against the U.S.S.R. and insisted upon an early Japanese action against the U.S.S.R. This was in line with MATSUOKA's statement that, despite the Japanese-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, no force could prevent Japan from attacking Russia at Germany's side if Hitler

20-94.

c. Ex. 655, T. 7,117 (Part only read in evidence)

QQ-95
 decided to solve the Russian question by violent means.^{a.}
 The German attack took place on 22 June 1941.^{b.} Within
 a week, on 28 June 1941, Ribbentrop was able to cable
 to Ambassador Ott in Tokyo that he had reached an agree-
 ment with OSHIMA that the latter would influence his
 Government to speedy military action against Soviet
 Russia.^{c.} That OSHIMA lost no time asserting his
 influence in that direction is shown by a telegram from
 Ott of the same date in which Ott advised Ribbentrop
 that, according to confidential reports coming from the
 Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador OSHIMA urgently
 advised the Japanese Government to attack Russia soon.^{d.}
 In the face of this evidence originating from two
 different sources, OSHIMA categorically denied the con-
 tents of both telegrams.^{e.}

QQ-96. OSHIMA stated that he never once expressed
 an opinion in favor of a Japanese attack on Russia
 prior to the summer of 1942^{a.} and contended that he only
 transmitted German requests for Japanese participation
 in the war against the U.S.S.R.^{b.} However, he admitted
 in cross-examination that only one official request to
 that effect was made and asserted that this happened in
 the summer of 1943.^{c.} That his role exceeded by far
 that of a messenger between the two governments and that
 he usurped the position of a policy making official far
 beyond the scope of his ambassadorial duties, is clear
 from two telegrams sent by Erdmannsdorf, head of the

QQ-95.

- a. Ex. 1768, T. 9,938.
- b. T. 6,561.
- c. Ex. 587, T. 6,562.
Ex. 1096, T. 10,031.
- d. Ex. 1097, T. 10,036.
- e. Ex. 3508, T. 34,026.

QQ-96.

- a. T. 34,272.
- b. Ex. 3508, T. 34,026.
- c. T. 34,271.

62-96
 Japanese Section of the German Foreign Office,^{d.} one
 addressed to Von Rintelen and dated 18 October 1941^{e.}
 and the other addressed to Ribbentrop and dated
 17 November 1941.^{f.} Both telegrams dealt with conversa-
 tions Erammsdorf had with OSHIMA on the dates indicated.
 OS IIA, in cross-examination, first denied that there
 was any occasion on which he talked with a section chief
 of the German Foreign Office but later narrowed his
 denial down to "official discussions" and when asked
 specifically about the purport of the discussion
 reported in the above mentioned telegram of 17 November
 1941, he stated evasively that he did not recall his
 utterances mentioned therein.^{g.} According to the tele-
 gram of 18 October 1941, OSHIMA replied to a remark by
 Erammsdorf regarding the appearance of new Russian
 divisions from Siberia on the German front that it would
 be good if the Japanese Army by means of a push into
 east Siberia contributed to the restoration of a land
 connection between Germany and Japan, that he had often
 submitted proposals to that effect to his Government
 and that he hoped that actions in accordance therewith
 would soon be taken. According to a portion of the tele-
 gram dated 17 November 1941, which was not read in evi-
 dence, OSHIMA stated that he was of the opinion that in
 view of the time of the near military operations against
 the Soviet Union could take place only on a limited scale
 but that an attack on Vladivostok or even an advance

62-96.

- c. T. 34,274.
- d. Ex. 3873-A, T. 37,857-8.
- f. Ex. 665, T. 7,117.
- g. T. 34,274-6.

93-86
toward Lake Baikal at this time of the year was secretly possible and would, under present circumstances, have to be postponed until spring.

93-87. OSHIMA's plan of an advance of the Japanese Army against Vladivostok and in the direction of Lake Baikal was promptly taken up again the following spring by Ribbentrop. OSHIMA stated in a conference with Ribbentrop on 28 March 1942 that although he had received no official communications on the Japanese intentions he agreed with Ribbentrop that an advance of the Japanese armies against Vladivostok and in the direction of Lake Baikal would be of special significance and that he would do everything on his own initiative to have his Government undertake the advance against Vladivostok and east Siberia this year as he was of the opinion that such a good opportunity would never return.^a

93-88. OSHIMA's contention that he was not in favor of a Japanese attack on Russia and that he merely performed his ambassadorial duty of reporting German requests to his Government, is also disproved by a memorandum from Weizaecker to Ribbentrop dated 21 April 1942. For, in this memorandum Weizaecker explicitly reported that OSHIMA, of his own accord, stated how matter of course it seemed to him that Japan should attack the Russians in East Asia and assured Weizaecker that he was working hard to put an end to the wholly unnatural situation in which Japan was still living in

93-87.
a. Ex. 3819, T. 37,944.

93-88.
a. Ex. 3921, T. 37,958-9.

0 159 00 15 2402

88-98
peace and close neighborliness today with the Russian enemy so furiously engaged by Germany.^{a.}

88-99. While all the evidence mentioned shows that Germany did not request Japanese participation in the war against the Soviet Union during the period dealt with up to now and while, as is stated above, OSKIMA contends that the only official request of this nature was made in the summer of 1941,^{a.} it appears from the memorandum of a conference between Ribbentrop and OSKIMA on 9 July 1942, that on this date Ribbentrop suggested the advisability of a Japanese attack on Russia. Although OSKIMA apparently did not consider this an "official request," his reaction was instantaneous and unequivocal. He stated that he was convinced of the imperativeness of a Japanese attack on Russia and promised to report immediately to Tokyo in accordance with the explanations of Ribbentrop who had just given an account of German successes. The memorandum notes that OSKIMA seemed very enthusiastic over the idea.^{b.}

88-100. When OSKIMA transmitted Ribbentrop's suggestion, he added his own point of view that "an early advance against Russia and intensive action to paralyze English shipping in the Indian Ocean was proper." On 30 July 1942, in conveying the Japanese reply--namely, that under the circumstances action by Japan against the Soviet Union would bring about too great a dispersion of Japan's strength--he added that personally he shared the

88-99.
a. T. 54,271.
b. Ex. 3813-A, T. 37,925.

CG-100

understanding that an uniquely favorable opportunity presented itself to Japan to deal a blow to the Russians and moreover the Japanese Army had also advocated the opinion that such action against Russia was necessary, that he himself had proposed again and again to utilize the opportune moment and this would be also borne in mind in Japan and that he certainly was for conducting a thrust against Russia, too, in spite of the necessity of operations in the southern theater. He also stated that he did not consider the answer which had just reached him as the last and that perhaps an action against Russia might yet be possible before October. It is significant that at the time of this conference it is OSHIMA who stated that in his opinion the advance to the north was the question on which Japan's fate hung and which he was always reiterating to his Government and Ribbentrop who only observed that he shared OSHIMA's views completely and hoped that Japan might soon feel strong enough to risk the advance into the north.

a.

CG-101. In March 1943 the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters deliberated concerning a German request to attack Russia. It is to be assumed that this is the request which OSHIMA considered to be "official." In a conference with Ribbentrop on 6 March 1943, OSHIMA transmitted the results of these deliberations, namely, that the Japanese Government had full understanding of

CG-100.

a. Ex. 3822-A, T. 37,961-5.

Pa. 14.3

CG-101

the desires of its German ally but felt that it was unable in view of her present war situation to enter into the war. OSHIMA elaborated on this by stating that what decided the issue for Japan was whether she had sufficient forces and whether her armament capacity was sufficient in order to attack and defeat the Russians in addition to the enemies Japan already had without endangering her operations on other fronts. He stated that he knew that for a long time Japan had the intention of turning against Russia but for the time being she evidently did not feel strong enough to do so. A portion of the memorandum of this conference which was not read into evidence shows that he also added that Japan was armed if Russia should attack but that insufficient forces were ready for an attack on them.^{a.}

CG-102. In a subsequent conversation with Ribbentrop on 18 April 1943, OSHIMA assured Ribbentrop that Japan would certainly attack Russia if success in that direction could in any way be expected and that he understood that for the last twenty years plans of the General Staff had been worked out for an attack on Russia and were still directed toward such an attack,^{a.} and as late as September 1944 in a conference in which Hitler held out the hope that he would again go on the offensive against the Red Army at some future date, OSHIMA assured him that Japan would fight on the side of Germany until final victory had been achieved and that it would use

CG-101.

a. Ex. 812-A, T. 8,014-8.

CG-102.

a. Ex. 839-A, T. 8,176-7.

33-102

its last troops to realize this as there was only one road for Japan which it would follow to the end.^{b.}

33-103. Just as OSIIA denied the contents of Ribbentrop's and Ott's telegrams of 29 June 1941 and of Erdmannsdorf's wire of 17 November 1941, so did he deny having any recollection of his conference with Ribbentrop on 23 March 1942,^{a.} having had a conference with Weiszaecker on 21 April 1942,^{b.} having made the statements ascribed to him in the memorandum about the conference with Ribbentrop on 9 July 1942,^{c.} and having any recollection of his remarks in the conferences with Ribbentrop on 30 July 1942,^{d.} and 6 March 1943.^{e.} We submit that this uninterrupted denial of evidence contained in official German documents originating from a variety of German officials and covering conferences he had during the period of almost two years can only serve to destroy utterly the credibility of OSIIA as a witness. These documents show conclusively that OSIIA continuously used his position in accord with his German co-conspirators to influence his Government in the direction of an aggressive war against the Soviet Union.

I. OSIIA Negotiated for German Participation in the Japanese War Against the United States and Conclusion of a "No Separate Peace Pact" and Cooperation in the Making of a Joint War

33-104. As we have seen, the fundamental principle of the Tri-Partite Pact was to establish the so-called

33-102.

b. W. 3831, T. 38,519-20.

33-103.

- a. T. 34,277.
- b. T. 34,277.
- c. T. 34,278-80.
- d. T. 34,281-2.
- e. T. 34,283.

23-104
 New Order in East Asia, Europe and Africa, and the cooperation of the Axis Powers was pledged to its accomplishment. The military alliance proposed in 1939 contained an obligation that in the event of war, peace would only be concluded jointly.^a At the Privy Council meeting which approved the Tri-Partite Pact, LAMSONA stated that if war should break out, the Tri-Partite powers would immediately come to an agreement on a "no separate peace pact."^b In reply to an inquiry from the Japanese Army submitted through Ambassador Ott on November 18, 1941, Ribbentrop advised that the idea of concluding peace or armistice only jointly in case Japan or Germany became involved in war against the United States, no matter for what reason, was looked upon as natural, and that Germany would be willing to make a corresponding statement in an agreement.^c When this message was delivered to the Japanese Army on or prior to November 23, 1941, General OKAMOTO said that he was very pleased to find the fact once more confirmed that Germany would not leave Japan in the lurch in case of a conflict with the United States, and he inquired whether Germany would consider herself to be at war with the United States in the event Japan commenced the war. He further advised that the Army was insisting on speeding up the decision for an advance in the south since the season favorable for such an operation was imminent.^d That the Axis powers at this time construed the pact as

23-104.

- a. Ex. 502, T. 3,099.
- b. Ex. 552, T. 3,355.
- c. Ex. 601, T. 3,338.
- d. Ex. 802, T. 3,340-1.

QQ-104
obligating military participation of all three nations in the event anyone should become involved in war with the United States, regardless of the reason for the war, is plain from the conduct and declarations of the co-conspirators. A leading official of the Foreign Ministry stated that it had always been the opinion of MATSUOKA that the provisions of Article III of the Tri-Partite Pact were to be considered as applicable in any conflict between one of the three powers and the United States, except in the case, for example, where one of the three powers would attack without reason the American continent.^e As we have just seen, Ribbentrop pledged support in a Japanese war against the United States, regardless of the reason bringing about such a war. When Mussolini was asked what Italy would do if Japan would declare war on the United States, he pledged military support to Japan and stated, Italy "is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tri-Partite Pact."^f

QQ-105. After overtures were made by the Japanese Army through Ott, formal diplomatic negotiations were conducted through OSUJIMA. There were two main objectives to be accomplished, a declaration recognizing German duty of participation in the Japanese war against the United States and the conclusion of an agreement that no separate peace would be made without joint approval. Although OSUJIMA did not deny his participation in the negotiations aimed at these two objectives, he attempted

QQ-104.

e. Ex. 606, T. 6,664.

f. Ex. 606, T. 6,659.

QQ-106
 to minimize the importance and effectiveness of his efforts. He denied any recollection of a conference with Ribbentrop on November 29th or the dispatching of a telegram advising Tokyo of the results of that conference, notwithstanding the intercepted message was introduced in evidence.^{a.} With regard to the two paramount questions, OSMIA in this telegram quoted Ribbentrop as saying: "Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point." As an indication of OSMIA's view of the importance of the statement, he requested that a copy of the telegram be shown to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo.^{b.} Notwithstanding the receipt of this word from Ribbentrop, OSMIA was directed to confer also with Hitler.^{c.} OSMIA claimed that despite his urgings the German reply was postponed day by day until December 7th.^{d.} That Germany was responding to OSMIA's urgings is apparent, however, from the fact that on December 5th Ribbentrop submitted for hurried action to Mussolini a plan for triple action on Japanese intervention in the war and a pledge not to make a separate peace.^{e.} On December 11, 1941, the obligations of the Tri-Partite Pact were recognized by the conclusion of a treaty in which the three powers agreed to wage war in

QQ-105.

- a. Ex. 3503, T. 34,030.
Ex. 603-A, T. 6,644-50.
- b. Ex. 603-A, T. 6,350.
- c. Ex. 604, T. 3,652.
- d. Ex. 3508, T. 34,035.
- e. Ex. 607, T. 6,652.

22-105

common against the United States, promised not to lay down arms until the common war was successfully concluded, and pledged that they would not conclude an armistice or peace with either the United States or the British Empire without a complete understanding between themselves.^{f.} On December 14, 1941, Hitler gave a reception in OSHIMA's honor, at which he presented him with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold in recognition of his services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation which had finally culminated in a close brotherhood of arms. OSHIMA expressed his delight that this brotherhood of arms had come into fruition.^{g.}

22-106. OSHIMA having succeeded in negotiations for the final step in the perfection of the conspirators' plans to align other aggressive nations with Japan in carrying out the objects of the conspiracy, it only remained necessary to implement those plans. OSHIMA began at once by delivering a comprehensive lecture at Hitler's reception on the war situation in the Pacific and in the Archipelago area. He demonstrated by the use of a map the successes of the Japanese air forces and fleet in the Philippines and in the Malay Peninsula. He spoke of Japan's turning toward India after the capture of Singapore and emphasized the necessity of synchronization of German and Japanese operations. Prior to this time, the Japanese Government had been of great

22-105.

- f. Ex. 51, T. 6,668-9.
- g. Ex. 609, T. 6,371-80.

QQ-106

assistance by turning over to Germany the new invention of aerial torpedoes. OSHIMA informed Hitler that landing warfare had been greatly developed and practiced in Japan during the past thirty years and that exercises in this type of warfare had been carried out with great energy on the island of Hainan. He suggested that this and other methods of warfare developed by Japan should be studied by Germany.^a

QQ-107. The next step in the implementation of the plans of the conspirators was the conclusion on January 18, 1942 of the military agreement in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact by which the world was divided into zones for operational cooperation between the Axis powers. Well defined zones were assigned the respective powers in which each should carry out the required operations. The general operations plan contemplated that Japan, working together with the Germans and the Italians, would carry out operations in the South Sea areas, in the Pacific, and in the Indian Ocean. The agreement also provided for collaboration in the planning and conducting of economic warfare and collaboration concerning psychological warfare.^a OSEIMA stated on cross-examination that he had nothing to do with this agreement and went so far as to state that he knew nothing of its contents. Yet, in starting negotiations for economic cooperation in a conference with Ribbentrop on January 2, 1942, he stated that these

QQ-106.

a. Ex. 609, T. 6,671-80.

QQ-107.

a. Ex. 49, T. 6,681-6.

QQ-107

negotiations should be "parallel to the conversations on military cooperation" then under way.^b The witness .OMURA admitted that OSHIYA made contacts for the opening of the negotiations,^c but this limitation of OSHIYA's participation is hardly plausible, if it is considered that, according to a statement made by him at the time, the main line of policy was to be laid down exclusively by him and Ribbentrop, while the Army, air force and Navy were to discuss "individual questions."^d There can be no doubt that the agreement belonged to the former category and, therefore, to OSHIYA's field of activities, although he did not sign the document.

QQ-108. It may be noted that actual cooperation in pursuance of the Tri-Partite policy started long before December 7, 1941, and was not directed only against countries with whom Japan was at war. Exchange of intelligence about the U.S.S.R. was carried on continually since 1937 except for a temporary cessation after the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact.^a This was done under OSHIYA's supervision^b not only while he was Military Attache but also after he became Ambassador as is shown by the testimony of the witness MOHARA^c and the documents introduced in evidence through his affidavit.^d While he was Ambassador, the German counterespionage organization cooperated in his subversive activities.^e

QQ-107.

- b. Ex. 3812-A, T. 37,906.
- c. T. 26,586.
- d. Ex. 3813-A, T. 37,912.

QQ-108.

- a. Ex. 487, T. 6,022.
- b. Ex. 488, T. 6,023-4.
- c. Ex. 811, T. 7,995-8.
- d. T. 8,011-2.
- e. Ex. 489, T. 6,026.

33-109. On February 23, 1941 Ribbentrop explained to OSHIYA that the closest cooperation in all spheres, particularly in regard to news service and the press, was necessary for the common prosecution of the war such as had already been arranged with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria. OSHIYA advised that he intended to set up a program with German representatives for the intensification of Japanese propaganda^a and established a newspaper division within the Japanese Embassy under the management and control of Minister SAKURAI.^b The cooperation in the use of the propaganda weapon was directed especially toward India and the Arabian countries^c indicating the world wide scope of the conspiracy between the aggressor nations of Asia and Europe. In Directive #24, which, as has been shown, followed closely OSHIYA's conference with Ribbentrop on February 23, 1941,^d Hitler emphasized the necessity of strengthening the Japanese war potential and directed the high commands of the branches of the armed forces to meet in a comprehensive and generous way the demands of the Japanese concerning communication of German warfare and combat experiences and to assist in matters of war economy and techniques.^e On March 29, 1941 Ribbentrop stated to MATSUOKA that he had discussed with Ambassador OSHIYA the question of German assistance in the blow against Singapore and offered MATSUOKA the advice of German experts on aerial warfare regarding the use of

33-109.

- a. Ex. 571, T. 6,465.
- b. T. 34 248-9.
- c. T. 54 250.
- d. 33-73, supra.
- e. Ex. 573, T. 6,470.

83-109

dive bombers against the British fleet in Singapore and information concerning Hitler's new method of attack on strongly fortified positions as well as Hitler's advice on the best method of attacking Singapore in particular. For the latter proposal, OS I.A. was requested to procure a map of Singapore.^f The exchange of military discoveries and experiences is exemplified by the presentation of a newly invented German armor piercing grenade to Japan,^g the transfer of two German submarines to the Japanese navy as samples, which has been treated elsewhere,^h the supplying of Japanese aerial torpedoes and blue prints for them to Germany,ⁱ and the offer to give the benefit of Japanese experience in landing operations to Germany both by bringing German officers to Japan^j and by placing Japanese officers at the disposal of the German Army.^k

83-110. In spite of the fact that no state of war existed and a neutrality pact had been concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, Japan's cooperation with Germany extended to activities against Russian shipping,^a and, even before Japan was in a state of war with the United States, to the prevention of American deliveries of military supplies to Russia.^b On June 27, 1941, the very day of the German attack on the Soviet Union, OS I.A. sent a telegram to KATSUNOYA stating that Ribbentrop called Japan's attention to an alleged withdrawal of Russian troops from the Far East. Whether a

83-109.

- f. Ex. 580, T. 8,529-30.
- g. T. 34,253.
- h. TT-13.
- i. Ex. 609, T. 8,673-7.
- j. Ex. 608, T. 8,679.
- k. T. 34,253.

83-110.

- a. Ex. 812-A, T. 8,014.
- Ex. 813, T. 8,026.
- Ex. 778, T. 7,903, 8,038-4.
- Ex. 815, T. 8,036.
- Ex. 816, T. 8,037.

83-110. (Continued)

- Ex. 817, T. 8,041.
- Ex. 818, T. 8,042.
- Ex. 819, T. 8,044.
- Ex. 820, T. 8,045.
- Ex. 821, T. 8,047.
- Ex. 822, T. 8,049.
- Ex. 823, T. 8,051.
- Ex. 824, T. 8,053.
- b. Ex. 795-A, T. 7,959.
- Ex. 795-A, T. 8,031.
- Ex. 814, T. 8,032-5.

CG-110
 specific request for some Japanese action to prevent such movements was included in the telegram or not, MATSUOKA explained spontaneously that he would immediately propose counter measures.^c

CG-111. To achieve military cooperation, it was necessary to keep the other parties informed on the progress of operations in numerous conferences which are referred to in the summation. It may suffice here to mention some examples: At the end of July or beginning of August 1941 Keitel was invited by Ribbentrop to explain the situation of the Russian front to OSHIMA,^a on December 14, 1941 OSHIMA gave Hitler a comprehensive lecture on the war situation in the Pacific and the Archipelago area^b and in 1943 Japanese officers, clothed as couriers and embassy secretaries, came to Berlin to deliver particulars concerning the military situation and Japanese forces and plans. OSHIMA, while admitting the arrival of these persons, denied that they actually brought and delivered plans for future operations.^c Negotiations for the delivery of two German submarines were initiated by the Japanese and formal request therefor was made by Ambassador OSHIMA.^d As is shown elsewhere, this was part of a common program for the intensification of tonnage warfare, that is, the sinking of merchant vessels by submarines.^e

CG-112. As contemplated by the military agreement of January 18, 1942, Japan, Germany and Italy vaged a

CG-110.
 c. Ex. 725-A, T. 7,959.

CG-111.
 a. Ex. 774, T. 7,973, T. 34,277.
 b. Ex. 609, T. 6,678.
 c. T. 34,253.
 d. Ex. 3911, T. 38,878.
 Ex. 3817, T. 37,932.
 e. TT-13-7.

QQ-112

joint or common war. With the exception of the joint operational plans executed by Germany and Japan in the Indian Ocean, the operational activities of each nation were in the main confined to the zones designated for each nation in the military agreement. By the timing of operations, the Tri-Partite powers secured the greatest possible advantage in that the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations were required to divide and scatter their forces on land and sea in widely separated areas of the world, and the Soviet Union in resisting the German aggression was required to divide its forces to meet the ever-present threat on its eastern border. Coordination of this global war effort on the part of the Axis powers required collaboration in the field of economics and propaganda as well as in the conduct of military and naval warfare. That GSHIA, who occupied the most important ambassadorial post in Europe, aided and abetted in this collaboration is abundantly clear from his proven declarations and conduct, which appear under the general heading "Cooperation Under the Tri-Partite Pact" of this summation.

VIII. CO CONSPIRACY

QQ-113. The law of conspiracy and the principles covering the individual responsibility of the accused have been fully argued.^a Reference is made to the

QQ-113.

- a. Summation, G-1-20.
- Summation, I-1-12.
- Summation, K-1-22.

0 159 00 15 24 16

CG-113

forgeing arguments rather than repeat them in applying the law to the facts relating to this accused. The case against OSIIA is presented upon two parallel theories. The first theory is that as a member of the conspiracy charged, OSIIA, both as Military Attache and as Ambassador, played an important part in effectuating the common plan of conspiracy by negotiating the various treaties which were an integral part of the conspiracy and by collaboration with the Axis powers pursuant to the common plan of the conspirators. Once having joined the conspiracy, his acts in furtherance of its aims and objects, it is submitted, cannot be defended on the theory of diplomatic immunity even if it be contended those acts were confined to the normal functions of a military attache or an ambassador. The second and parallel theory is that OSIIA's activities transcended the normal functions of a military attache and ambassador. By his declarations and conduct he endeavored to guide and influence the policy of his Government in line with the objectives of the common plan of his co-conspirators.

CG-114. In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the entire evidence summarized herein establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that OSIIA is guilty of the conspiracy counts (1 to 5, inclusive) charged in the Indictment. With respect to the remaining counts enumerated under heading "II," the same evidence, it is submitted, constitutes indubitable proof of OSIIA's guilt as an aider and abettor in the commission of the substantive offenses charged therein.

0 159 00 15 24 17

Shima

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Ⅱ、一九三八年及び一九三九年ノ三國

同盟交渉期間ノ重要件

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A、大島、密議ナル白狐の密謀持上ニ

重要役割ヲ演ズ

B、大島、三國同盟ノ背後ニ於テ官民

ノ團結確保ニ重要役割ヲ果ス

〇、大島再ビ單獨大健ニ任命

七三 三國同盟下ノ協力

A、大島、日本ノ佛領印度支那占領許

望ヲ助成

B、大島三國協定下ニ共同着手サルベ

キ指針ニ付「リッツベントロツプ」

ト協議ス

〇、大島、日露交渉ヲ自止

Ⅰ、大島、日本交渉ヲ自止ニ勢ヲス

Ⅱ、大島ノ手甲ニ勢ヲ長ニ集中サル

Ⅲ、大島ハ日獨經濟力ヲ機等ノ共同總

行ニ利用スルコトヲ提唱シ三國同

盟ノ許、第三國ヲ經濟的煩雜ノ地

位ニ掃蕩セシムルコトヲ企圖セル

協定ヲ獨越ト商議ス

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七十五頁

七十八頁

八十頁

八十九頁

九十三頁

一〇二頁

一〇五頁

4、大島、日本ノ甲國以南ノ地接及ビ
 南洋ニ於ケル武力ニ依ル領土擴張
 ラ増進ス、又該地域ノ開發ヲ可ト
 シ、武力侵略ノ除根用スル陸軍及
 ビ海軍並地ヲ交渉ス

一一二頁

5、大島、日本ノ對露戰爭行動ニ賛成
 シ且ツ露獨戰争ニ日本ヲ参加セシ
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6、大島、日本ノ對米戰爭立ニ草獨不
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 同戰爭遂行ニ働カス

一三二頁

六 結 論

一四六頁

三 起訴狀ニオケル訴狀

QQ-2

信被旨ハ起訴狀ノ訴因第一乃至第五、第六乃至第十七、第二〇乃至二十二、第二十四、第二十七乃至三十二、第三十四、第三十七乃至四十三、第五十四及五十五ニヨリ、起訴サレテ居ルノテアリマス。余訴因ニヨル訴因ノ輕重ハ他テ充分ニ調査サレテ居ルノテアリマス。(a)

註 起訴狀ハ其文ノ真否疑テアル

P-1

QQ-2

a、起訴狀最終旨 五一一一

0159 0015 2421

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ
QQ-1

一 旨 頁

大 島 浩

大島浩ノ監製及行氣ハ共同謀議ノ事實及ソノ
目的ヲ達成センカタメニ迫致セラレタ手段ヲ
明スルノニ特ニ重要ナモノデアリマス。従ツテ
當報告ニ關スル證據又書ノ多クハ共同謀議ノ
終ニ皆中ニ録ス所ナク採示サレテアリマス。同
證據ニ普及スル時ハ「最終報告」ナル密陸語ヲ
使ル所シマス。大島ヲ含ム主ナ證據又書ハ特別
項目ノ下ニ採成シ記載スルノデアリマス。

Q.Q-3

a、
 法廷証 一一一
 法廷証 七六六

法廷証 三五〇八
 法廷証 三三九七五―六

Q.Q-4

參謀本部及び軍令部ノ幕僚デアツタ爾ニ大島
 ハ他ノ秘台等ト知己ニナツタノデアリマス。
 及武蔵ハ東條、海軍、參謀本部幕僚トシテ、又
 陸軍、及ビ岡ハ軍令部幕僚トシテ彼ト共ニ出陣
 シタノデアリマス。秘台荒木ト爾ハ陸軍大臣デ
 アリマシタ。小磯ハ軍務局長デアリ、鈴木ハ軍
 務局長デアリ皆陸軍省ニ居タノデアリマス。大

0159 0015 2422

三 獨逸大使館附陸軍武官拜命以前ノ活動

大島ハ「ベルリン」駐在陸軍武官補佐官トシ
 テ二年「ワイーン」駐在陸軍官トシテ二年勤務
 ノ後一九二五年歸朝スルヤ、引續キ大隊長、陸
 軍其他兵學校教官、陸軍教育、總監部部員ヲ歴
 任シタノテアリマス。彼ハ陸軍大佐ノ階級デ參
 謀本部第三課長デアリ又一九三一年八月ヨリ一
 九三四年ノ春マテ海軍軍令部部員デアリマシタ。
 其ノ間ニ所謂奉天事件、十月事件、五、一五事
 件カ起ツタノデアリマス。(a)

OSHIIMA SUMMATION-QQ
QQ-5

島ハ彼ノ任務ニ忌シ、時々陸軍省ト協議シタノ
 デアリマス。(a)
 大島ハ海軍大臣及海軍ノ顧問ニハ何年何月
 ハナイト云ツタカ (a) 彼ハ一九三一年乃至一九
 三四年ノ事變ニ於ケル功績ニ依リ一九三四年即
 月二十日旭日ノ中級章ヲ授ケラレタノデアリ
 マス。(b) 旭日ノ中級章ヲ授ケラレタノ標成基
 ニ於ケル海軍本部置ニ軍令部ニテノ彼ノ功績、
 父兄及彼等ハ彼等其後彼等共同謀議ノ目的ノ
 遂行上演シタ真長ナル彼等ニ依リナ者トシタノ
 デアリマシタ。

以 防 共 産 黨 代
 イ、 加 納 少 将 ノ 簡 監

QQ-6

如何ニシテ共同謀議ノ最終目的カ一九三六年
 八月七日ノハ兵内閣至海軍大臣ニ於テ日本ノ出兵
 ノ理由公見トシテ採用サレタカ、(c) 如何ニシ

P-3
 QQ-6
 QQ-5
 QQ-4

a、	法廷証書 三三〇八	法廷証書 三三〇六九
b、	法廷証書 三三〇八	法廷証書 三三〇七一
a、	法廷証書 三三〇八	法廷証書 三三〇八三
b、	法廷証書 一一二一	法廷証書 七六六
a、	最終報告 五十二二一三	

QQ-7

QQ-6

- a. 最終報告 R1961-01
- b. 最終報告 R11091-11
- c. 最終報告 R11011-03
- b. 最終報告 R1951-04
- c. 最終報告 R1941-06

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ
QQ-7

テ 備 備 ト ノ 同 協 方 共 同 認 識 度 以 ニ 必 要 ナ
 段 階 ト ナ ツ タ カ (b) 又 日 本 ガ 如 何 ニ シ テ 特 殊 隊
 洲 ニ 於 テ 使 隊 行 動 ノ 為 メ 軍 備 ヲ 計 登 シ テ 后 タ 獨
 乙 ヲ 同 協 國 ト シ テ 扱 シ ン ダ カ (c) ト 云 フ コ ト ハ 最
 終 報 告 ニ 於 テ 充 分 ニ 提 示 サ レ テ 居 ル ノ デ ア リ マ ス。
 大 島 ハ 一 九 三 四 年 三 月 ニ 大 使 館 附 属 員 武 官 ト
 シ テ 獨 乙 ニ 派 遣 サ レ タ ノ デ ア リ マ ス。 該 報 告
 ハ 大 島 ガ 獨 乙 ト ノ 同 協 國 共 同 認 識 度 同 協 國 附 属 員 武 官
 定 額 結 (a) 同 協 國 認 識 ノ 量 的 強 化 ニ 質 的 強 化 (b) 等 ノ
 交 渉 ニ 依 ジ タ 後 如 何 ナ ル 万 法 デ 日 本 ガ 右 ノ
 新 同 協 國 ニ 依 ツ テ 強 化 サ レ テ 一 九 三 七 年 七 月 ニ 支
 那 ヲ 依 留 シ 與 ニ 大 ナ ル 使 隊 隊 員 ニ 介 入 シ タ カ ラ
 充 分 ニ 提 示 シ テ 居 ル ノ デ ア リ マ ス。 (c)

ト抗爭スル準備ヲ整ヘル間中國ニ於テ一息入レル
 時間ヲ與ヘルタメテアツタノテアリマシ。(h) 防共協
 定ニ依ル日獨協力ニ於ケル日本國軍ノ特權ハ大島
 ノ行爲ニ根本的關係ヲ持ツテ居ルノデアリマス。

QQ-8

- d、法廷證 四七八 法廷記録 五九一八
- f、法廷證 三八一 法廷記録 三七九〇
- g、法廷證 三三〇八 法廷記録 三三九六〇
- h、取終報告 四一三六

法廷證 三七八九一 A 法廷記録 三七七二二

0159 0015 2426

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

ラクハ結バレ待ナカツタテアラウ^(a) トイフ言
 中ノ陳述ニヨリ更ニ一層明ラカニセラレタノテア
 リマヘ。獨逸軍學顧問ノ名遣及ビ獨逸ノ軍需資材
 引キ渡シノ中止ハ獨逸ガ中國ニ在ル日本軍ヲ支養
 シテキタ純証テアリマヘ^(f) 日本參謀本部ハ一九
 三七年十二月下旬頃大島ニ中國政府附獨逸軍學顧
 問「^(g) フォルケンハウゼン」將軍ヲ遣ジテ蔣介石ニ
 和平甲込ヲ為スコトヲ獨逸國軍ニ要請スル檢指令
 シテ防共協定ニヨル獨逸トノ縁ヲ利用セントシタ
 ノテアリマヘ^(g) 然シコノ目的ハ日本ノ侵略計畫
 ラ乘ケルノテハナク北方ノ確實ト見做サレタル故

0159 0015 2427

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

大 島

「リッペントロツブ」トノ通商交渉ニ於テ
大島側ヲ難シトイテ策謀ス

QQ-9

日本陸軍省ハ其計畫ヲ立テルニ當リ滿洲並ニ
韓北ノ保護ハ其策ヲ使テト益シテ居ル事及
ビ中國ノ經濟ヲ日本ノ經濟ニ統合スルコトハ國
策ノ根本ナリ且ツ英米レカ國軍行ノ監督ニ屬^(a)
ハルト書テ其ハ其方針ヲアツクノテアリマス。
日本軍ハ防共協定ノ下ニ編進ヨリ兵ヘラレタ
ト其協定ニ依リ編進ノ恩義ヲ蒙ツア居タルナ
リマス。ソシア共同謀議等ノ計畫ニ依レバ共
同謀議ノ目的遂行ノタメニ彼等ノ援助カ引
續キ必長トサレタルナリマス。防共協定ニ
依ルニ編進ノ經濟財政ノ方面ニマテ及ボ
サレタルナリマス。^(b) 日本國軍ハ韓北ニ於
テ貿易上ノ特惠待遇ヲ獨ニモ及ボス事ニ
賛成シテ居タルナリマス。ソシア大島ハ「
國軍ノ考慮ハ必然的ニ右ニ賛成シテ動イ
ア居タル」トイフ意見ヲ抱イテ居タルナ
リマス。^(c)

P-7

QQ-9

- a、 法廷証 八二七 法廷記録六四三六十七及
六四四三
- b、 法廷証 四九一 法廷記録六〇三六
- c、 法廷証 三八一 法廷記録三七九〇一

0 15 9 00 15 24 26

OSHIKIMA Summation-99

ソレ故國軍ノ代辯者デアル大島カ此管ニ關シテ
算ノ見解ヲ延メテ行クノハ何等驚クニハ及バナイ
事ナノデアリマス。

99-10

一九三七年十二月ヨリ一九三八年十月二十七日
迄横濱日本大使デアツタ被告東郷ハ左ノ如ク証言
シタノデアリマス。一九三八年二月ニ早クモ「リ
ツベントロツプ」ニ對シ、日獨兩國政府ガ關係シ
テ后ル總テノ重要ナ政治問題トシテ汪精衛國民庭ハ
必ズ外務大臣ト日本大使トノ間ノ交渉ニヨリテ折
衝サルベキデアルト言ハネバナラヌ必要ガ在ジク
ノデアリ共レ「リツベントロツプ」ハ承諾シタ
ノデアリマス。然ルニ右ノ拘束アルニモ拘ハラズ
外務大臣「リツベントロツプ」ハ大使館ノ直接關
係官以外ノ者ト支那ニ關スル經濟問題ヲ益々モ証
言シテアテラ五月ニ証見シタノカアル^(a)ト証
言シタノデアリマス。
東郷ハ大使館附山軍武官大島ト岩前ハ揚ゲナカツ
タカ彼ノ証言カラノ決断ニ依レバ「リツベントロ

99-10

a、 証言ニ六四六 法廷記録ニ六六三二一六

0159 0015 0409

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

ツブーハ重要ナ政治的経済的諸問題ニ關シテハ必
ズ大使トダケ協議スルト約束シタ彼ノ言質ヲ破ツ
テ彼ハ「防共協定ヲ強化^(b)スル^(b)ニ大使領附武
官大島トノ交渉ニ於テ經濟問題ヲ考慮シテ居タノ
デアリマス。

QQ-11

大島ハ華北ノ商業問題ニ關スル交渉ニ於テ大使
館ヲ出シ抜イタトノ説ヲ辯駁センガ爲自分ノ反証
長階再開ノ許可ヲ法廷ヨリ待ルコトニ候ツテ証人
ノ石ノ見解ヲ探詰シタノデアリマス。彼ハ本管ニ
關シ伍堂名^(a)及小島名^(b)ノ兩名ノ証人ヲ出シム
ノデアリマス。伍堂^(a)ノ任務ハ獨逸ノ特惠貿
易ノ交渉ニ關係ナキ爲一九三八年二月二十八日以
降「リツベントロツブー」ト通商問題ニ關シ商議
セシコトナク^(a)且一九三八年四月本人ノ出發ニ
至ルマテ華北關係貿易問題ニ就イテ大島ト討究シ
タコトハナイノデアリマス。^(b)「リツベントロツ
ブー」トノ貿易交渉ニ大島ガ參註シタト云フ事ヲ一

QQ-10

b、法廷証三六四

法廷記録三五六三六

QQ-11 a、

法廷記録三七〇八六

b、

法廷記録三七〇九八

法廷記録三七〇九四

1 159 00 15 2433

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

度モ聞イタ事ガナイト云フ小島ノ証言ハ、彼ガ提議セラレテ后タ日獨同盟ニ關スル官談ヲ、其レガ一九三八年一月ニ始メラレテ后タト立証セラレタルニモ拘ハラズ (d) 一九三八年七月マデ (e) 始ラナカツタト云フ事實ニ鑑ミ、又莫ニ海軍武官トシテ彼ノ任務ハ如何ナル形ニ於テモ彼ガ通商或ヒハ貿易問題ニ關與スル必要ヲ生ジナカツタ (e) ト云フ事實ニ鑑ミ一齊無價值ナモノデアリマス。

QQ-12

大使更迭後同モ無イ一九三八年十二月三十一日ニ日獨貿易上ノ協力ニ關スル交渉ガ再び開始セラレタル際、獨逸外務省商務局長「ザイール」~~Wierl~~ /ハ大島大使ニ十月六日東郷大使ニ與ヘラレタル「リツベントロツプ」ノ最後案ヲ提出致シタノデアリマス。此ノ際大島ハ大使館ヲ差シ捕イテ策謀セル事ニ關スル東郷ノ証言ヲ「待遇待近問題ニ關シ彼ハ、常ニ彼等ノ為ニ伺イタガ然シ日本ガハ其レニ關スル意見ハ色々異ツテ居タ」 (a) ト述ベテ承認シタノデアリマス。

QQ-11

e d o、
法廷証 四九七

法廷記録 三六〇七〇
法廷記録 三六〇五一
法廷記録 三六〇六九

P-10

QQ-12

a、法廷証 三八一一

法廷記録 三六九〇一

シ、ソレニ依リ、彼ハ以テ作威スル人々ノ等
 級ニ迄登ツタノデアリマス。十二月九日彼ハ特
 意待~~ニ~~ガ文書ニ依ツテ承諾セラルベキデアリ、
 又中口ニ於ケル、~~勿~~通ノ實際上ノ不便ヲ排除カ
 レルカ、サモナクバ東京及中山既在ノ~~勿~~通言
 更ハ、ソレガ如何ナル理由ニ依リ現在ノ所尙ホ
 不可能デアルカラ詳細ニ通告セラルベキデアレ
 トノ趣旨ノ強硬ナル電文ヲ東京ニヨセテ來ルノ
 デアリマス。^(b) 大島ハ更ニ、日本ノ武ル將軍ヲ
 遣ジテ日本陸軍指導者ニ、~~勿~~通行費待~~ニ~~ヲ増等

QQ-15

a、	法廷證	三九二	法廷証録	六二八八一
b、	法廷證	三八一	法廷証録	マ九〇一

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OSHIMA Summation-QQ

QQ-13

ハ、大島ノ對華北貿易政策ヲ左右セントノ企圖

日本政府ハ華北ニ於ケル特恵待遇ヲ欲スル獨
 逸ニ對シ且ツ、實際ニ獨逸ニ對シ「日本政府ハ獨
 逸ニ對シ、他國ヨリモヨキ地位ヲ條約ノ影ニ於
 テ確證スルコトハ不可能デアリ」ト通告シタノ
 デアリマス。(a) 其ノ向大使ニ任命セラレテ居ル
 大島ハ、自國政府ノ態度ヲ變更セシメント企圖

確證スルタメニ、「華北ニ於ケル特賣待」ニ
 スル個人的意見ニ是非ニモ相得サセヤウトシテ
 意ヲ遂ゲナカツタ以爾ノ大島ノ失敗ニ注意シ
 起シタル、一九四二年一月二十三日附ノ「グ
 ルタート」ノ電文ヲ引説スルモノデアリマス^(e)

QQ-13

e、	d、	c、
法廷証	法廷証	法廷証
三八一八	三九六	三八一
法廷証	法廷証	法廷証
三六九三	三六三三	二六九二

7 159 00 15 2432

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

シタ手紙ヲ送ツテ、比ノ國ニシテ自國政府ヲ
從ハシムベク詰迫ヲ加ヘルコトヲ促遊馬島シタ
ノデアリマス。(c) 大島ノコノ方面ニ於ケル勢方
ハ、東京駐劄海軍大使ガ一九三九年三月十三日
附ノ報告ニ映シ出サレテ居ル様ニ、其ノ後モ
續サレタノデアリマス。即チ彼ハソノ報告ノ中
デ「大島ハ本當ニ我々ノ利益ニ據リ歸返シ、打
電シテ來テキル。」ト述ベテ居ルノデアリマス。(d)
大島ハカクノ如ク歸返ノ希望及前途ノ日本國
軍ノ見解ニ從フ事ニ依リ山口以府ノ政變ニ反シ
テ行動シテ來タノデアリマス。コノ陳述ヲ要ニ

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

ニ、大島、防共協定締結等ニヨリ
諜報並ニ取極活動ニ從事ス。

QQ-14 防共協定ニ依ル日獨ノ共同ハ「ロシヤ」ニ對
スル諜報及取極活動ヲ合ンテキルノデアリマス。
大島ハ一九三七年ニハ日獨兩軍ハ「ロシヤ」軍
ニ對テノ情報ヲ交換スルコトニ同意シ、一九三
八年九月又ハ十月ニハ右計畫ニ於テハ自系露人
ヲ更ニ使用スルコトガ決議サレタ。(a) ト述ベタ
ノデアリマス。
同種ハ大使館附武官大島ノ監督下ニ於テ、確
定「SECRET」ニ依リ秘密セラレタノデアリマス。(b)

QQ-15 一九三九年一月三十一日「ヒムラ」ハ大島
ヲ訪問シタノデアリマス。向訪問後、「ヒムラ
」ハ彼等ノ會談ノ内容ヲ記録ニ留メテ仁イ
ノデアリマス。(a) 大島ハ其時「ヒムラ」ガ彼
ヲ尋ねタ事ヲ否認シタ。(b) 一九三九年(c) 一月マテ

QQ-14	a、	法廷記録	一八七	法廷記録	六〇三
	b、	法廷記録	四八八	法廷記録	六〇四
QQ-15	a、	法廷記録	四八八	法廷記録	六〇三
	b、	法廷記録	三三〇八	法廷記録	三三〇九
	c、	法廷記録	三三〇三	法廷記録	三三〇四

ノ事ハ證人野原ニ依リ、其ノ宣誓口供等ノ未ダ
朗讀サレナイ部分ノ第三頁ニ於テ「ヒムラー」
及他ノ稱述ノ他ノ有様ヲ指等指述ガ度々大衆
ニ大島ヲ尋ネ大島モ又彼等ヲ訪レタト稱述サレ
テキルノデアリマス。(f)

QQ-16

大島ハ「ヒムラー」ノ右宮談ノ記述ヲ見セラ
レル前ニ、彼ハ反共宣傳ヲ遂行スル目的ノ爲ニ

QQ-15	f c i	法廷証	三三〇ニ	法廷証	三三九ニ四
	f	法廷証	八一	法廷証	三三七七一

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

儀典係ヲシテ居タ高橋ヲ、又其ノ後任者杉浦⁽³⁾ツ証人トシテ出シタノデアリマス。彼等ハ「ヒムラー」ト大島トノ會合ニ關シテハ何等ノ依頼モ取リツイダ事ハテカツタト證言シタノデアリマス。此ノ暫定の證言ハ他ノ場合ニハ如何ナル價値ヲ有シタニモセヨ大渡館附陸軍武官河邊將軍ガ「ヒムラー」ト大島ハ懸念デアツタコト、彼等ハ實ニ屢々會合シ普通ノ場合ニ於テハ互同志體分度々相見えタト^(e)信ズル旨起訴狀提出前ニ行ハレタル訊問ノ際ニテシタ陳述ニ依ツテソレハ根本カラ覆サレテキルノデアリマス。此

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名ノ露西亞人ニ爆彈ヲ持タセテ無事「コーカサ
ス」ノ國境ヲ越サセル事ニ成功シタトイフ事、
一人ノ日本人將校ガ同教徒ノ運動ニ關聯シテ「アフガ
ニスタン」デ活動シタガ役ハ、「アフガニスタン」政府ノ願望ヲ意
圖セルモノトノ嫌疑ニヨリ追放サレタト云フ事、及び六人
ノ露西亞人ガ「ファアルケンゼー」デパンフレツ
トヲ著イタリ印刷シタリシテ后ルト云フ事ヲ語

QQ-16

a、法廷證 四八八 法廷記 六〇二四一五

0159 0015 2435

OSHIMA summation-QQ

大使館ヲ通ジテ仲買人ノ名義デ「ファアルケンゼ
ー」ニ不動産ヲ買ヒ亦露西亞ニ配布スル爲ニ宣
傳ガ其處デ印刷サレタコトヲ認メタノデアリマ
ス。彼ハ亦「アフガニスタン」政府ニ管リ一人
ノ日本人將校ガ追放サレタノヲ知ツテ居タ事モ
認メタノデアリマス。(2) 大島ガ眞實デアルト認
メタ前送ノ事項ヲ詳述セル「ヒムラー」ノ右會
談ノ記録ノ外ニ「ヒムラー」ハ大島ガ、「コー
カサス」及び「ウクライナ」ヨリ發生シ露西亞
ヲ崩壞セシメル大事業ヲ行ツテ居ルトイフ事、
彼ハ「スターリン」ヲ殺セトノ命令ヲ受ケタ十

QQ-17

被告等ハ、彼等ノ指導者ヲ遣ジテ爲シ、對支
 戦争ニ國家ノ總力ヲ動員シガニモ拘ラズ彼等ハ
 所謂文部事務ヲ終結セシメルコトが出来ナカツ
 タノデアリマス。因ツテ、彼等ハ今後ノ兩國間
 ノ交渉ノ過程ガ示スヤウニ、勿乙トノ更ニ密接
 ナル共同作業ノ必要性ヲ切實ニ感ゼシメラレル
 ニ到ツタノデアリマス。之等交渉並ビニ大島ノ

QQ-16

b、法廷證 一八九 法廷記録 六〇二六―七
 c、法廷證 三三〇八 法廷記録 三三九三

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OSHIMA Snmmation-QQ

ツタト記録シテキルノデアリマス。日獨伊三國
關係ガヨリ強固ナ形ノモノトナル條約ニ就イテ
ノ論議ノ詳細ハ又大島ガ其ノ當時右ノ如キ條約
ヲ討議シテ居リ斯カル論議ハ極無ク示サレル通
リ普通ノ外交ノ儀禮ヲ施スニ行ハレテ居タ^(b)
ト云フ事實ニ鑑ミ「ヒムラー」ノ報告ノ確實性
ヲ高メルモノデアリマス。大島ノ右報告文書ノ
内容否認ハ甚ダ印象的デナイノデアリマス。^(c)

其更ニ聲言ナル軍事同盟交渉ノ期間

イ、日獨伊トノ更ニ鞏固ナル同盟ノ必要

P-17

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

QQ-17

a、最終報告 第一一三

演習の役割ハ最終報告中、忠實ニ記載サレテア
リマス。(a) 其等ハ被告大島ノ個人的罪状ヲ明カ
ニ示スモノデアアルカラ綿密ナル研究ヲスル價值
ノアルモノデアリマス。本證據ノ詳細ナル論述
ハ行ハナイノデアリマス。

0159 0015 2437

QQ-18

a、法廷証 四九七 法廷記録 六〇五一—二

QQ-19

聯ニ對處スルニ協力シテ事ヲ行フトノ協定ヲ先
ツ第一ニ心ニ留メテ置クベシ (a)トアツタト認め
タノデアリマス。

大島ハ本通牒ノ内容ヲ思ヒ出スコトガ出來ナ
イト申立テタノデアアルガ、ソレトテモ不法廷カ
ラ眞ノ事實ヲ剽奪スルコトハ出來ナイノデアリ
マス。何トナレバ、一九三九年四月二十六日ニ

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OSHLMA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ-18

B、大島ヲ遁シ行動スル陸軍、獨逸援助
ヲ提議ス。

參謀本部ノ命ニヨリ大島ハ、一九三八年一月
ニイハユル支那事變ヲ終結サセルタメノ援助問
題ニ關シテ「リツベントロツプ」ト交渉シタノ
デアリマス。ソコデ「リツベントロツプ」ハ條
約ニヨル日獨提携ノ得策ヲ提議シタノデアリマ
ス。右情報ガ參謀本部ヘ傳達サレ、大島ノ訊問
ニ據レバ六月ニ日獨協力ヲ更ニ進メル事ヲ是認
スル返答ガ受領サレタノデアリマス。大島ハコ
ノ通牒ノ詳細ヲ記憶セズト述ベタガ彼ハ「ソ」

QQ-20 QQ+19

QQ-20

コレハ交渉ノ開始直初カラ即チ大島ガ提案
 セラレタ條約ノ案ヲ持タセテ笠原ヲ日
 本ヘ送ル以前ニ既ニ日本陸軍ハ大島ヲ通ジテ
 總体的同盟ニシテ相手國ヲ「ロシヤ」ニ限定
 セル同盟トハ區別サレル蓋テノ國ニ適用サレ
 ル同盟ヲ唱道提案シテ盾ツタコトヲ證明スル
 モノデアリマス。大島ノ復ガ笠原ニ持タセテ
 東京ニ送付シタ提案セラレタ同盟案ハ「リッ
 ベントロツプ」ノ提案ニナルモノデアツタ (a)ツ

a、法廷証

三三〇二

法廷記録

六〇九八

a、

三三〇八

〃

三三九九八

0159 0015 2439

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

「リツベントロツブ」ハ「オツト」大佐ニ、
廻ツタ事ヲ打電シタカラデアリマス。(a) 彼
ハ、一九三八年ノ夏ニ、大島大將ガ彼ニ「日
本陸軍ノ見解デハ日獨伊間ニ、總体的防禦同
臣ヲ締結スル時期ガ到來シタ」トノ通知ヲ與ヘタ。
ト述ベタノデアリマス。日本陸軍ノ提案セル
同盟條約案ハ「三國ノ何レカ、他國ヨリ何ノ
理由モナク攻撃サレタル場合援助ヲ與エルコ
ト」ヲ含ンデキタノデアリマス。

99-21

折行スルトイフ保正(2)ニ違フヲ、大島田軍

ノ軍兵隊治ハシテ同船交シカ、⁽²⁾ニ開シテハ日本大心ノ

東海接符ハ同船交シカ、⁽²⁾ニ開シテハ日本大心ノ

東海接符

大島田軍ニ開シテ大島田軍ニ開シテ

トニ違フカマノヲカマシマ。

トノカマシマニ大島田軍ノ新シクモ一其シテ命ニ且

タハコノ權ノ同船交シカ、⁽²⁾ニ開シテハ日本大心ノ

内界ノ接符ガ共ニ同船交シカ、⁽²⁾ニ開シテハ日本大心ノ

却カノ接符ガ共ニ同船交シカ、⁽²⁾ニ開シテハ日本大心ノ

トノ接符ガ共ニ同船交シカ、⁽²⁾ニ開シテハ日本大心ノ

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六月、三國ノ中ノ何ノ理由モナク、一九三八年

參 謀 本 部 ハ 大 體 一 口 一 口 何 理 由 三 八

ハ 大 島 及 「 大 島 及 」 ツ ヲ 希 ヲ 云 コ ト 知

ラ ル ノ 共 同 謀 者 希 ヲ 云 コ ト 知

ト 云 フ 共 同 謀 者 希 ヲ 云 コ ト 知

合 ノ 好 イ 時 機 ガ 到 リ 運 行 ツ タ 最 大 密 ニ 保 持

常 ノ 外 交 經 験 考 慮 シ 運 入 タ 運 行 ツ タ 最 大 密 ニ 保 持

察 シ 在 意 シ 考 慮 シ 運 入 タ 運 行 ツ タ 最 大 密 ニ 保 持

ハ 運 行 ツ タ 最 大 密 ニ 保 持

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99-22 99-21

「言ヌカ實カ實カ實カニ突化シタノヲ獨ル道ノ合ヲ大ナ不
 ノ體ヲニヨリマシムラハ大島ノ黨ニシテツル」ツルメテ小
 説因シテマシメテ反對ニ於テスル小島ニ
 島海軍武官小島及ビ大佐實島海軍武官補佐官ニ
 ト「ツルツルハシマニツルツル」カヲ言ヒシマヲ言ヒシマニ
 定ヌルニシテ海軍防衛ノ同盟ニ（²）之ニ接防スル秋ノ來ニ
 攻ムルヲ受ケテタル防衛隊ニ合（²）之ニ接防スル秋ノ來ニ

QQ-22

c、法廷記録

三七〇七〇一五

ト「リッペントロツプ」が各國家ニ對スル同盟ヲ
 提唱シタコトヲ決定的ニ示シテキルノデアリマス。
 彼ハ彼ノ電報ノ中デ「如何ナル國家ヲモ」トイフ
 字句ヲ包含シタコトハ彼ノ意見ニヨレバ合衆國及
 ビ英「トノ^(c)取争へ^(c)争クモノダト指論シタト述ベタ
 ノデアリマス。

0159 0015 2442

OSHLMA SUMMATION- QQ

利願山下佛蘭西ニ關心ヲ持ツテキルト、又、中島
ノ專断ハ日ヲ專断ヲ解決スルタメニ日獨島ノ
密接ナ協力ヲ必要トシテキルトノ見解ヲ表明シタ
ト語ツタノデアリマス。ソレカラ大島ハ彼ノ強取
者ニ彼ハ一リツベントロツブレノ志ニ賛成デア
ルガ海軍ガソレニ同意シナイノデハナカラウカト懸
念シテ居ルト語ツタノデアリマス。小島ハ同會談
ニ關シ海軍々令部ヘノ電報ノ中デ、當時彼等ソレ
ニ非常ニ關心ヲ持ツテキタト彼ノ言ツテキル一要
件ヲ除イテハ電文ノ内容ニ就イテ想ヒ出スコトガ
出来ナイノデアリマス。彼が言及シタ要件ハ大島

Q.Q.-24 Q.Q.-23

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法廷記録
一九〇九一
一九〇九一

a、
法廷記録
一九〇七七一六

Q.Q.-24

コノ彼ト共ニ勤勞シヨリシニ海軍武官ノ氣イテ
言ニモ拘ニス、大勢ハ、總國軍ガ參戰スルカ否カ
ニ拘ラズ、獨、英同ノ歐州軍ニ日本ヲ參加セシム
ル勢速トノ同軍ヲ彼方増強シタルヲ絕對的ニ否之
シタルテアリマス。(a)且ツ、彼ハ「英西介入ニ關
シテハ何等同意ハ與セラズ」(b)ト強言以シテ
否認シタルテアリマス。

一九〇九一

QQ-23

他ノ證據例証人河邊村年ハ反對証詞ニ於テ
「ヒットラー」「リツベントロツプ」大島及彼ハ
若シ河邊ガ英口ト戦争ニ捲キ込マルルヤウナ場合
ニハ日本ヲ河邊ニ味方シテ戦争ニ介入セシメルト
云フ義氣ニ意見一致セル旨証言シタルデアリマス
河邊ハ亦、彼ハ東京ノ參謀本部カラノ電報ニ依ツ
テ、大島及「リツベントロツプ」ノ見解トハ異リ
日本政府ノ見解ハ、日本ハ獨「ソ」戦ノ場合ニハ
戦争ニ介入スルダラウガ獨英版ノ場合ニハ戦争ニ
介入スルコトハ約束出来ナイ(a)ト云フコトヲ知
ツルト云フコトヲ証言シタルデアリマス。

0159 0015 2443

E・田邊ヲ當ラス爲メニ大島ハ大使ニ

任命セラル。

QQ-26

爾ニ指命シテ進リ、提議アレタ同陸ハ「リツ
ベントロツプ」ノ東海大使ニ對スル新章ナ伴ハ
外交経路ヲ進ジテノミ協議スベシトノ保證ヲ破
ツテ大使信問武官大島ト「リツベントロツプ」
トニ依ツテ一九二八年一月カラ九月マテ協議サ
レマシタ。一九三八年八月ノ終リ迄クノ五相會

QQ-25

a、法廷証 二七九八一A 法廷記録 二七七七九

QQ-26

a、法廷証 二六二六 法廷記録 二六六五九一六〇

〃 二四一〇〇

QQ-25

大島方露西亞以外ノ口ニ對スル利益ノ同盟
 ニ賛成セルコトハ、一九三九年正月八日ノ有田
 外務大臣ノ一大島、白鳥兩大使ハ、獨逸ニ對シ
 唯彼等國ノ見解テアル、若シ獨逸二國ガ英佛
 ト戦争スル場合ニハ石炭等ニ參照スルト云フ帶
 口ノ意圖ヲ快瞭ニシタルト述ベタ、天皇ヘノ上
 奏ニヨリ確證セシレルテアルマシマス。(c) 軍事同
 盟交シ全期間中、大島方絶エツ、全世界ニ對シ
 テノ強烈ナ宣戰同盟ヲ唱導シテキタ事實ハ明ラ
 カナリマシマス。

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P-25

QQ-27

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OSHIIMA Summation-QQ

QQ-27

議ニ於テ猶更カ執ラシムル候、東郷ハ申立ニ依リ
 バ三國同盟ヲ遂スル彼ノ反戦ヲ外務省ニ通告シ
 其ノ後同モテク彼ノ懸念大ニ長ヘノ際任ガ分極大
 重ニ依ツテ行ハシマシタ。(a)

國軍ハ大島ヲ後任大使ニ推挙シ參謀本部ハ彼
 ニ其任命ヲ受諾スルヤウ再三懇迫シマシタ。
 彼ノ任命ハ更ニ相違大將カラモ進ニシマシタ、
 是等ノ事實ハ最初大島ニ依ツテ否認サシマシタ
 ガ彼ハ結局ニ於テ其ノ極ニ陳述シタコトヲ認
 メマシタ。(a) 外務省首相大島ノ大使任命 (b)
 ニ對スル以下ノ陳述可表前方針ノ手原及ビ外
 務省 (c) 首相大島ニ對シ國軍武官ノ大使任命ガ國軍
 官ヲ大使ノ職ニ昇進セシムル採ニ從フベシ形式
 上ノ事情アリ、大島ノ任命ガ事實參謀本部及
 ビ彼等首相ニ依ツテ發起サレタノナルト言フ
 立憲ノ反對ノ根拠ヲ形成シテイト主張シマス。

a、	參謀部	三六四六	參謀部	三六五九	一六〇
〃	〃	〃	〃	三四〇〇	〃
c b a、	〃	〃	參謀部	三六一一	一三
〃	〃	〃	〃	三四〇〇	〃
〃	〃	〃	〃	三四三	〃

Q.Q.-28

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目的は、貸行スル旨を一部分ナツルコトハ新ク
シテ戻カテマシマス。彼方比ノ企ニ盡力シヌコノ
企ノ一部分ナツルコトハ彼ノシテ來々行動カラ
充分明カテマシマス。

159 0015 2446

OSRIMA summation-Q.Q.

Q.Q-26

陸軍方部内カニ大使ヲ選出スルト云フ、全然先

見ノ三強者ニ使ツテ交渉ノ組織ヲ確立ニスル爲メ

ニ調整セラレバノテアリマス。大島ヲ東郷ニ交代

セシメタルハ共同謀議者達ノ長ク考ヘテ計登サア

ツテ之ニ大島方側ニ早期締結ヲ促進スル爲メニ

参謀シタルコトハ反響甚大ノ際ノ海軍將領ノ「ベル

リン」へ出資前ニ参謀本部情報部長カラ「大島ハ

此ノ同盟ヲ行ハス爲メニ大使ニ任命サレタ」(a)ト

言イタルノ陳述ニ依ツテ示サレテ居マス。大島ノ

大使任命ハソノ旨旨カ共同謀議者ノ共同謀議ノ旨

旨

QQ-30

大島ハ「リツベントロツブ」ニ對スル當報告ニ
 於テ、彼ハ日本ガ日本ノ軍事援助ノ義務ヲ蘇聯ノ
 ミガ含マレル場合ニ制限スル政策ニ反對スル言質
 ヲ與ヘタト證言シマシタ。(a) 是ハ五相會議ガ一
 般的承認ヲ與ヘタ條件及ビ保留條件ニ反スルモノ

QQ-29 a 法廷證 三五〇八 法廷記談 三三九九九
 b 最終報告 F-1-1-1-3 及ビ F-1-1-5-1-6

QQ-30 a

法廷記談 三四〇〇三

QQ-29

F、大島、政府ノ受諾シガタキ條項ヲ含ム同盟ヲ唱道ス。

既ニ述ベタ交渉ハ、一般的防禦條約ハ、日。獨。
伊間ノ三國同盟ノ形式ヲトルベキデアルト考ヘラ
レテ居タコトヲ示シマス。大島ハ、武官在任中、
笠原ガ東京ヘ送ツタ起草提案ニ對ス、五相會議ノ
決定ノ報告ヲ受ケ、且ツ、之ヲ直チニ「リッペン
トロツプ」ニ送達シタト證言シマシタ。(a) 只一
ツノ訓令ヲ包含スル二通ノ電報ハ反對尋問中、大
島ニヨリ相違ナイコトガ認メラレマシタ、ソシテ
外ノ所テ分析サレテ居リマス。(b)

QQ-31

「ベルリン」日本大使館元領向、宇佐美ハ、外務省ヨリ、蘇聯以外ノ國ガ條約ノ對象ニ含マルベキヤ否ヤノ問題ガ起ツテキルトノ電報ガ受領サレタト證言シマシタ。(a) 此ノ電報ハ、一九三八年十一月末頃又ハ十二月初ニ受領セラレマシタ。(b)

QQ-32

訓電中ニ奉ゲラレタ草案承認ノ條件並ニ保留條件ヲ知り、又蘇聯邦以外ノ國ガ、十一月或ハ十二

QQ-31

b

a

法廷証

三四二四

法廷証

三三七三三一四

法廷証

三三七五六

0159 0015 2448

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

デアツタト檢察僞ハ主張シマス。然シ乍ラ、大島
ノ行動ハ前ニ述ベタ通り、ソレ迄「リツベントロ
ツブ」、大島及ビ日本陸軍ニ依ツテ唱道サレタ政
策ニ一致スルモノデアリマシタ。コノ政策ヲ政府
ニ押シツケントシタ大島ノ努力ハ、更ニ詳細ニ後
ノ題目デ取扱ハレルデモウ。

伯ハ一九三九年一月七日ノ日記ニ「ロツベントロ
 ツプ」ガ被ニ同盟ノ原文ヲ送ツタト書イテキマス。
 (b)
 同原文ハ「リツベントロツプ」ガ大旨及ビ「チア
 ノ」ト直表協議ノ上作成サレタモノデ、ソノ適用
 ハ(露)亞ノミニ限定サレテキナカツタノデアリマ
 ス。(c)

QQ-32
 a 竣終報告 F-1-1

QQ-33
 a 法廷録 五九七 法廷記録 六〇六一
 b 法廷録 五九一 A 法廷記録 六〇九二
 c 法廷録 五〇二 法廷記録 六〇九九

0159 0015 2449

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

QQ-33

月始メノ電報ガ示ス様ニ該同盟ノ對象ニ含まレル
ベキヤ否ヤニ關スル日本政府ノ起シテ居ル問題ヲ
知悉シテ、大島ハ「リツベントロツブ」ノ要諦ニ
依リ、十二月中旬羅馬ニ赴キ、「ムツソリーニ」
トノ會談ニ於テ、伊太利ヲ同盟ニ加附セシメント
努力シタノデアリマス。(a)

一九三九年一月初旬「ムツソリーニ」ハ提議サ
レタ同盟ニ加附セントノ彼ノ決意ヲ「リツベント
ロツブ」ニ傳達シマシタ。(a)ソシテ「チアノ」

ニ關スル訓令傳達ノ爲メ伯林ニ派遣セラレル旨ノ
 通知ヲ受ケマシタ。政府ノ決定ヲ前以ツテ通知サ
 レ度シトノ大島ノ要請ハ拒マレ、伊使節ノ到着
 ヲ待テト訓令サレマシタ。(a) 然シナガラ、伯林
 及ビ羅馬駐劄ノ日本大使ハ、伊使節ノ齎ラス提
 議ノ性質ニ關シ豫メ通知ヲ受ケテキタコトハ、一
 九三九年二月六日白鳥ガ「チアノ」伯ニ與ヘタ謝

QQ-35

a 法廷録 三四九四

法廷記録 三三七三五―六

QQ-34

自國政府ノ受容シ得ザル條項ヲ含ムコトガ解ツ
テキル同盟ニ伊太利ノ加盟ヲ求ムル大島ノ此ノ行
動ハ共同謀議ノ目的ニ從ツテ日本ノ外交政策ヲ左
右センガ爲メニ計畫サレタノデアリマシタ。

QQ-35

G、大島ノ伊藤使節引見準備ハ政府ノ政策ヲ左右セントス
ル計畫ヲ暴露ス

一九三九年一月上旬、平沼内閣成立後、大島ハ
外務大臣カラ、伊藤公使其ノ他ガ政府決定ノ政策

0159 0015 2450

QQ-35

b

伝送證

五〇一

送付記録

大〇九五一大

告ニ鏡ミテ明カデアリマス。ソノ際白鳥ハ三國同盟ノ早期締結ノ可能恣ニ疑問ヲ懷ク望並ニ日本ノ反對義務ハ妥協提議ナルベシト信ゾズル旨ヲ述べ、伊太利ニ之ヲ受請セザルヤカニ報告シマシタ。(b)

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P-32

QC-36

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	三三二二〇

QQ-37

是等ノ勢力ハ大島ガ希望スル結果ヲ生マナカツ
 タラシク、ソコテ早急ナ企ガ本國政府ノ政策ヲ左
 右スルタメノ別ノ計畫ヲ遂行スル爲メニナサレマ
 シタ。大島ハ伊藤侯爵ノ到着ヲ後ニ「ヨーロツパ」
 陸軍ノ全大使會ヲ「ベルリン」ニ召集スルコト
 ヲ計畫シマシタ。ソノ必要ハ非常ニ差シ迫ツテキ

0159 0015 2452

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ - 36

此ノ情勢ニ對處スル爲メ大島ノ執ツタ最初ノ行
 動ハ歐洲ニ駐劄スル主ナ日本ノ外交官ト協賛スル
 コトデアリマシタ。駐劄大使官附武官川邊將軍ハ
 大島ハ、若シ英國方御逸トノ戰爭ニ裨キ込マレル
 場合ニ日本ヲ歐洲戰爭ニ參加セシムベキ日獨同盟
 ノ通否ニ懸シテ彼自身ノ見解ヲ確立シヤウトシテ
 歐洲重要諸國ニ駐劄スル日本大使ト協賛スル爲メ
 右諸國ヲ旅行シタト證言シマシタ。協賛ヲ受ケタ
 人々ノ中ニハ「ロンドン」ノ重光、「ベルギー」
 ノ來栖ガ居リマシタ。(a) コレハ一九三九年二月
 ノ事デ、伊藤佐伯ノ到君前デアリマシタ。(b)

知ルヲ了リマス。(b) 大馬ノ
 シ伊ノ使節ノ到ルニ後、モナク、現勢ニ肩ヲコト
 句「京師ニシテ外ニ果山」トス、カエテ「公使、但
 ス、東海ノ外ニ、^(a)コト知リマス。京ノ京ニモ拵ハ
 カ「到着ノ際、何レ^(a)石炭ニ對スル外、省ノ京ニ指
 シ「府ノ指令ヲ待ル以前ニ」トシテ「京師」トス、
 敗。旅行ノ困難、爲メニ當時大使ヲツク、京師ノ
 對スル外、省ノ承取ラ、京師ノ行軍シマス、
 京ニ先ツ外、省ノ京師ヲ先ニモ、京師ノ大馬ノ

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99-39 99-38 99-37

a . 添付書 五〇一

b a . " " 三三三
 " " 三三三
 " " 〇九二九
 " " 八七七四

e . 在籍簿

法廷記 三 四一三四

" " 三 三三三
 " " 三 四六六
 " " 三 〇〇七
 " " 三 〇七三
 " " 三 二九一六

OSHIYA SUMMATION - 99

「ロツバ」ニ於ケル物共國家テアリ、之ト同列ニナ
 レバ日本ハ東亞ニ於ケルソノ地位ヲ改革シ得ルヲ
 ラヤトノ意見ニ依ツテ容易ニ認メルコトが出来マ
 ス。(e)

II 大島公使自島ハ管見監督官ノ政府改定ヲ

示ケ之ニ公式ニ公使代表ニ傳達スルコトヲ云

99-38 管見監督官ハ一九三九年二月下旬「ベルリン」ニ
 到任シマシタ。(a) 大島ハ長俣監督が提議ノ商榷ニ
 自ラニ政府ノ見解ヲ彼ニ通告シ、之ニ依ツテ返答
 ヲ送メ(b) 同見解ノ範圍内ニ於テ行動スル事(c)
 指示シタコトヲ認メマシタ。

99-39 「チアノ信」ハ一九三九年三月八日、彼ノ日記
 ニ大島公使自島ハ石井上及他國ニ對スルモノニ詳
 シク「ロツバ」ノミニ對スルモノト考ヘル意
 圖ヲ表シスル三頁直感ニ對スル日本側回答ヲ公式
 回答ニ依リ傳達スルコトヲ拒ミタリト記入シマシタ。(e)

QQ - 40

e	d	c	b
.	.	.	.
	"		法廷記
	二七九六		二七九五
	一A		一A
"	"	"	法廷記
三、一、二、一、六	三、七、七、七、一	三、四、一、二、六	三、七、七、六、七

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OSHIMA SUMMATION - QQ

最高権力ハ天皇ニ在ルト殿皇ニ報告シ獲選ノ見
解ヲ自己ノ見解トシテ述ベル事ニヨツテ自己ノ地
位ヲ忘レザル様注意セリト聲明ヲ發セシメル迄
ノモノデアリマシタ。(b) 大島ハ此ノ様ニ報告ハ

實原征ニ具ヘテレタト云フ事ヲ否認シマシタ。(c)

外務大臣有田ハ参謀本部ガ外務大臣ニ根柢セズシ

テ外交交渉ヲナシテキルコト並ニ大島大佐ハ外務

大臣ニ知セズシテ以テ決定ノ強化ニ關シテ参謀本

部ニ打電シタコトヲ專ニ對シテ秘シク披露シマシ

タ。(d) 此ノ事モ同様ニ大島ニ依ツテ否認サレマシ

タ。(e)

OSIIMA Summation-99

99-41

伊藤使節長到君ト大島ノ反對ニ對スル政府ノ
同答トノ由ニ大島公白鳥ハ明キニ政府ノ政策
不承認ヲ表明シタノテ、ソノ結果、外務大臣ハ
我々ノ喜ばラシマシタ。

「・・・彼等（「ローマー」及び信林聖澤大
使）が何ト言ハリトモ（日本）政府ハ美ノ
決議ヲ撤回スルコトが出テ来ナイ。我々ノ爲
スベキコトハ若シ彼等が懸念ニ精進ヲ下シ
且ツ（日本政府ノ）決議が撤回ト言ハウ
トスルハラス大使ヲ更迭セシメル丈ケナラ
ル。・・・凡ユル機会ニ於テ政府ノ期
告通リニテス様訓令ヲ（請大使ニ對シテ）
提出セシマシタ。（a）
我々大島ハ外務省ヲ其ノ訓令ヲ受取ツタコトヲ
告知シマシタ。（b）

99-41

- a、法廷證 三七七七 I A 法廷記保 三七七七三
- b、 ” ” ” ” ” ” 三七一三九

0 159 00 15 2450

QQ-43

- a、法廷証 三三〇八 法廷証録 三三〇〇三
- b、" 三〇三 " 六一〇〇一三

QQ-45;

日本政府ハ、伊藤使節團提出ノ案ニ反對セル人
 ノ影響ニ半バシ、三月末頃其ノ主張ヲ述テ直
 シ、大使館ニ新指命ヲ與ヘタノテアリマシム。(a)直
 「リツベントロツプ」ハ、一九三九年四月二十六
 日附「オット」大使館電報中ニ、右提案ヲ説明シ
 此ノ日本ノ訂提案カ彼及ビ「テア」ノ「伯」ニ非公式
 ニ類ラサレタ匹月初旬ノ會議ニ於テ分閉セル事柄
 ニ付キ述ベテキマス。(b)

QQ-42

通常ノ職能ヲ超ヘタ行爲デアツテ彼ガ政府ノ政策
 ヲ左右スル爲メニ、求メタ勢方ト實際ニ之ヲ左右
 シタ勢方トヲ締結的ニ示ス證據デアリマス。

I 大島及ビ自島ハ政府ノ新提案ヲ
 「不可能」ナルモノト考ヘ及モ獨
 伊政府ニ對スル両案ノ公式報告
 ヲ拒否ス。

QQ-44

大島並ニ白鳥ガ伊藤使節ノ齎ラシタル提案ノ正
 式手續ニ依ル傳達ヲ拒絶セル際「チアノ」及ビ「
 リッペントコツプ」ノ亂フトコロニ依リマスト、
 彼等ハ大使ノ地位ヲ擯取スルゾト圖シテ同盟條約
 ノ無條件受諾ヲ東京ニ要請シタノテアリマス。
 此ノ事ハ最終通告ニ於テ十分ニ論ジ、(a) 又一九
 三九年四月廿五日ノ五相會議ハ大島及ビ白鳥ガ其

QQ-45

c、最終通告 E-1-10

d、法廷証 三E-0-8 法廷記録 三H-0-0-1-7

QQ-44

a、最終通告 E-1-1-7-1-9

大島達ガ此ノ新提案ニ「不可能」ノ拒印ヲ捺シ獨
 伊政府ニ對スル右提案ノ公式傳達ヲ拒絶シタノハ
 此ノ時ノ事テアリマス。本件ニ關シテハ急務報告
 中ノ論評ヲ參照セラレタイ。(c) 大島ハ今度モ亦彼
 ガ指令ノ實行ヲ拒絶セル事ヲ否認シテキマス。然
 シ乍ラ、彼ハ提案ニ對スル彼ノ反對ニ就テハ沈
 黙シテキダノシアリマス。(d)

J、大島ハ大使辭任ノ成難ニヨリ

日本ノ政策ヲ左右セント努ム。

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QQ-45 QQ-44

b、	a、	e、	b、
三六二六	三八〇〇A	三八〇〇A	法廷記録 三八〇〇A
三八二六	三八〇〇A	三八〇〇A	三八〇〇A
三八二六	三八〇〇A	三八〇〇A	三八〇〇A

ノ石造ヲ其請セル緊急要求ヲ息考セリト云フ有田
 ノ陳述ニヨツテ稽証サレテキルモノテアリマモ (b) 有田
 大使ノ辯職成績ニハスル前記「チアノ一伯、獨道
 外箱「リツベツトロツヅ「一巫ビ有田外箱ノ別個特
 定ノ以テモ拘ラズ、大島ハ若ノ事ノアツタコト
 ヲ密証シテ居リマモ、^(e)

大使ノ辯職成績ハ誠ニ重大事デアリマシタ。木
 戸ハ之ガ国民内ノ平和及ビ秩序ニ影響スルコトア
 ルベキヲ予知シテキマシタ。^(a) 其ノ後ノ「バツザ
 イ「武官被電報ニハ、大島ノ辯職ハ、日本外交政
 策ニ行届シラ来スベシト述ベテキマモ。^(b) 此ノ辯
 職成績ハ、確ニ協定ニ爾シ獨歩ノ地位強化ニ役立
 チタルノミナラズ又「ヒツトラ「一、「リツベツ
 トロツヅ「一、大島、白鳥並ニ特ニ振振相及ビ軍
 一派ヲ倒ストスル後等ノ共同議議者ノ如ニ附フ様

QQ-45

P-41

OSHIMA Summation-QQ.

日本政府ヨリ重ナル讓歩ヲ強要スルニ役立ツタノ
デアリマス。此ノ證據ヲ全體トシテ見マスルニ、
獨ソ不可侵條約締結ノ結果交渉不調トナリシ際、
結局發生セルト全く同様ニ、若シ大使辭職ノ事ア
ツタナラバ發生シタト思ハレル軍事同盟交渉ノ全
面的不調ト云フコトガ平海内閣瓦境ヲ早メタノデ
アラシト云フコトハ殆ンド疑フ余地ガナイノデア
リマス。

0 15 9 00 15 246 1

ニ於テ、更ニコノ二大使ノ影響ニ因シタセノ
 デアリマス。其例証讀者ニヨツテ求メラレタ
 強方ナル軍事同盟ヘ日六ヲ益々深ク引込マン
 トシタ大島ノ劣刀ノ效果アリシコトハ、大島
 ガ平沼ノ「ヒツトラ」ニ對スル遺言後ハ、
 カクテ當時私ガ追求シテキル交渉ノ線ヲ強ク
 支持スルモノデアツタ。ト遺言シルトキ推論
 的ニ彼ニヨツテ認メラレタノデアリマス。()

QQ-46

- a、法廷證 三六〇〇一ム 法廷記録 三三八〇八
- b、最終論告 F-1110
- c、法廷證 三三〇八 法廷記録 三三〇〇九

QQ-46

辭職威嚇ニ對スル對象トシテ「ペルリン」

及「ローマ」駐在ノ日本大使ヲ用キズシテ東

京駐在ノ獨伊大使ヲ遣ジ直接首相ヨリ「ヒツ

トラニー及ムツソリニー」ニ通告スルコトニ

一九三九年四月二十五日ノ五相會議ニヨリ決

定サレタノデアリマス。(a) 此對策ハ「一九三

九年五月四日ノ平沼聲明」トシテ知ラレテキ

ル形ヲトリ、ソノ全面的檢討ハ最終報告ニ現ハ

レテキマス。(b) 此ノ提案ハ、露西亞以外ノ諸

國家ニ對抗シ得ル出來得ル限リノ範圍ニ於テ

軍事的援助ノ具ヘラルベキコトヲ規定シタ點

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代ツタノデス。軍事的助言トハ、情報ノ取引
 基地ノ臨時貸與、燃料油ソノ他物品ノ輸出並
 ニ概シテ「實際参加以外ノ凡ユル援助」ヲ意
 味スルセノト大島ハ説明シマシヌ。(a) 大島ハ
 彼ガ三月下旬ノ新提案ニ依ツテ日本ハ獨逸並
 ニ伊太利ガ蘇聯邦以外ノ國ニヨリ攻撃サレル
 場合参戦ノ義務ヲ原則的ニ容認セルセノデア
 ルト「リツベントロツプ」ニ通ジタコトヲ認
 メマシタ。(b) 日本ハ實際ニ参戦スルデアラウ

QQ-47

a、法廷證 四九七
 b、法廷證 三五〇八

法廷記録 六〇六五
 法廷記録 三〇〇六

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OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ-47

K、大島越極トシテ日本海軍艦スベシト
「リツベントロツプ」ニ通知ス

伊藤使節團ノ齋ラシタ提案ニ指定サレタ保留條件並ニ秘密了解事項ハ、日本側ノ参戦責任ヲ、共產主義ヲ奉ズル國ニ限定シテキタノデシタ。此等保留條件ハ、三月下旬大使ニ手交サレタル新提案ニ於テハ、変更サレニキタノデアリマス。大島ノ叙述ニ依レバ、共產主義ニ關スル保留條件ハ、除却サレ之ハ日本側ガ軍事的助言ヨリ成ル援助ヲ真フルノ義務ト

QQ-47

- f、
- g、 法廷證三七九八 B 法廷記録三七九八
- d、 法廷證三七九八 1 A 法廷記録三七九八
- o、 法廷記録三七九八 1 法廷記録三七九八

QQ-48

後、大島ニ對シ若シ剣逸ガ知三軍ト戦ヲ交ヘ
 「リツペン」トロツプ一ガ、平沼宣言ノ受領
 タル場合假令日本ヨリノ軍事明援助ナクトモ

ト明確ニ言ツタコトハ否定シマシタ。(o) 既ニ
 我々が審理シタ如ク、有田外相ハ、一九三九
 年四月八日陛下ニ大島、白鳥兩大臣ガ中央當
 局ノ希望ヲ無視シテ行動シ、獨、伊ニ對シ日
 本ハ此等兩國ガ英、佛ト交戦スル場合誠ヲ意
 志テアル旨越權シテ回答シタト奏上シテキル
 ノテアリマス。(d) 之ニ次テ天皇ト板垣陸相ト
 ノ會談ガ行ハレソノ會談ニ於テ天皇ハ兩大臣
 ガ陛下ノ大權ヲ侵奪セリト雖シ新カ情勢下ニ
 彼等ヲ支持スル態度ヲ採リタコトニ對シ板
 垣ヲ個人的ニ叱責シ、[] 閣議毎ニ陸相ガ右問
 題ヲソラシテキルコトニ不痛ノ意ヲ表サレ
 タノデスガ(e) 天皇ト、コノ會談ヲ板垣ハ否
 認シタノテアリマス。(f)

島ノ「リツベントロップ」宛回答ノ取消ヲ提
 案シマシタガ、大島ノ行功ハ取消サレズ其儘
 ニサレテキマシタ。(b) 本件ニ關シ衙門サレタル
 際、大島ハ曖昧且迷口上デアリマシタ。(c)

QQ-48

- a、 法廷證三八一丁c 法廷記録三七八二三一四
- b、 法廷證三八〇丁A 法廷記録三七八二四
- c、 法廷證三八〇丁A 法廷記録三七八二五
- 法廷記録三七八二七

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SUMMATION-QQ

日本ハ戰鬪狀態ニ在リト看倣シ得ベキヤヲ尋
ネタノデアリマスガ、之ニ對シ大島ハ、然リ
ト回答シマシタ。有田外務大臣ハ、大島ガ獨
斷ヲ以ツテ 戦争参加 ノ如キ一件ヲ提案セ
ルコト又斯カル專斷的の回答ヲ爲セルコトハ誠
ニ恕シ難イト評シタノデアリマス。平沼首相
及ビ板垣陸相ハ大島ノ回答ヲ支持シマシタ。
外務大臣ハ、五月二十日ノ五相會議ノ席上大
(a)

ノ見解ヲ獨逸政府ニ傳達スルコトヲ拒絕スル節メ
 テ強硬ナル電報ヲ有田外相ニ送ツタコトヲ知ラサ
 レタ旨ヲ述ベテキマス。(a) 大島ハ「リツペン
 ト
 ロツブ」トノ此ノ會談ニ於テハ、彼ガ「ガウス」
 案ニ歸スル訓令ニ就イテノ彼ノ意見ヲ有田ニ代電
 シタコトヲ語ツタノデアルコト又「リツペン」ト
 ツブ」ハ之ヲ意識的カ無意識的ニカ理解シタノデ

0,0-49

a
 法廷證ニニ三〇
 法廷記録 一五九九一

大島。又モ本國政府ノ政策ヲ覆逆ニ公式ニ
傳達スルコトヲ拒絕ス。

一九三九年五月二十八日、「リツベントロツプ」
ハ「オット」大使ニ、五月二十日ノ日本政府決議
ノ公式通牒ガナサレテ后ナイコトヲ打電シマシタ。
尙ホ「オット」ハ此ノ通牒ニ關シ日本政府ニ或ル
抗議ヲナス様訓令ヲ受ケタノデシタ。同電報ニ於
テ「リツベントロツプ」ハ内密ニ又非公式ニ大島
ヨリ、大島ガ有田外相ヨリ電報ヲ受取リ其ノ電報
ニ返レバ日本政府ハ萬一歐洲戰アル場合戰争状態
ニ入ルコトヲ留保シタキ希望ナルコト及ビ彼ハ此

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傳達ヲ拒絶シタト云ツル旨報ジテキマス。(c)

Q.Q.-50

五月二十八日附「リツベントロツプ」ノ電信中ニ於テ、大島カ有田ニ「ソノ非常ニ力アル愛報」ヲ送ツタ後、煙相ガ彼ニ「東京ニ於ケル諸君ノ原動力ノ阻害ヲ妨害セザル様、暫ク有田ニハ既與セ

Q.Q.-49

b 法廷證 三五〇八 法廷記録 三四〇一〇

c 法廷證 三七四六 法廷記録 三七四〇六

OSBIMA Summation-Q.Q.

アルコトヲ述ベテ前述ヲ否認シテキマス。(b)
「リツベントロツフ」報告ノ眞實ナルコト及び大
島ノ否認ノ虚偽ナルコトハ、一九三九年五月二十
七日ノ「オツト」大使ノ電報ニ依ツテ確證サレテ
キマス。真電報ニ於テ彼ハ「リツベントロツフ」
ニ、陸軍代辦者ガ、外相ハ五月二十日ノ五相會談
ノ決議ヲ但林及羅馬ヘ打電シメコト、ソレハ「英
領ニ對シテ戰爭状態ニ入ルコトヲ機械的ニ決定セ
ズ、其ノ時ノ情勢ノ如何ニ依ルコトヲ提議シテキ
ル故陸軍ガ排斥スル形式デアル」コト、又但林及
羅馬駐在ノ日本大使ハ各々其陸海軍政府ノ右決議

0159 0015 2467

了リハ河ヲ幾度懸崖ノ絶ニ登リテハ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (一) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (二) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (三) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (四) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (五) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (六) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (七) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (八) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (九) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、
 (十) 河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、右ノ河ノ水ノ流ルル所ニ至リ、

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OSIMA Su... tion-000

ツタトイフコトハ、法廷証二一九八號本第三
 一第一號及比第三四一五號ニ當スルモ有教ニ
 及成モレ待ルモノデハアリマセン。コノ法廷証
 ハ「」トヨリノ二通ノ執軸ヲ包含スルモノデ
 アリ、一九三九年八月十一日附ノ其ノ内ノ第一ノ
 モノハ、學ハ五相會議ニ於テ同盟ノルメ禁門ヲ再
 開セハコト及「」國權ハ最後ノ手扱トシテソノ警備
 ヲ請スル決心ヲシテ居ルコトヲ執シ、一九三九
 年八月十八日附ノ第二ノモノハ、陸軍大臣ハ爾余
 ノ此大臣ノ共同一致ノ取扱ヲ欠ルコト不可成
 ナリシヲ以テ、ソノ時任ノ違ケ待ベカラザルモノ
 ナルコトヲ主張シ、コトヲ執シテモノデアリマス。
 空社トシテコノ證據ハ「」ツベントロツブ「」ノ電
 報ヲ據スルニ足リ且證據トナル文學トシテ十分實
 證シテ居ルモノト主張スルモノデアリマス。

00-51

大島方真ノ大使タリシ間ノ何時ニテモ直接或ハ
 商談ニ望算省乃至ハ參謀本部ト連絡セリト云フコ

ナラバ、田々シキ結果ヲ招來スルデアラウト云フ
 意見デアツタノデシタ。(c)之ハ獨歩ガ當時波瀾
 ニ加ヘツ、アツタ壓迫ニ對スル大島ノ同氣相憐ム
 同情的ナル態度ヲ示スモノデアリマス。
 彼ノ行動ニ依リ外務省命令ノ緩裕サガ適ニ奪レテ
 シマヒマシタノデ、彼ハソレヲ内々非公式ニ、

QQ-52 a 最終報告 F-1-23

b 法廷證 五〇六 法廷記録 六一二五

c 法廷記録 六一二四一五

M 大島ハ政治目的ノタメ日本ノ抗議文手交ヲ
差控フ。

大島ハ、猶ソ不可侵條約締結ニ際シ獨逸政府ニ
宛テタル該重ナル抗議手交ヲ命スル日本政府ノ命
ニ故意ニ從ハナカツタノデアリマス。

此ノ事件ハ最終詮告中テ取扱ハレテホマス。(a)

此ノ抗議文ノ手交差控ヘノ彼ノ行動ニモ拘ラズ、

大島ハ政府ノ命令ニ從ヒタル旨自國政府ニ打電シ
タノデアリマス。(b) 大島ハ、抗議文ノ公式手交

ハ、若シソレガ獨逸波交渉ノ危機段階中ニナサレハ

P-52

0159 0015 2472

OSHIMA Summation -QQ

一九三九年九月十八日ニ手交シ、其時彼ハ獨逸ノ
 渡邊(敬)役ノ成功ニ對シ祝詞ヲ述ベタノデアリマン
 タ。 (d) 手交差控ヘノ此ノ行動ハ、獨逸不可侵條
 約ノ締結ヨリ來ル兩國間ノ軋謀ヲ輕減スルニ役立
 テ又「リツベントロツプ」及ビ大真ガ「少シモ空
 文ニナツテキナイ」コトニ意見ノ一筋ヲ見タ日獨
 伊間ノ密接ナ協力ヲ助長シタノデアリマシタ。(e)

二 105 # 家言 106 # 家言

06-53

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QQ-55

b. 法廷証 三三〇八 法廷証 三三〇二

QQ-54

ム、大島新按ナル日獨關係保持上ニ互々役割ヲ演ズ

軍事同盟ニ歸シテ「リツベントロツプ」ト同一
見解ヲ有シ又「ヒツトラ」及ビ「リツベントロ
ツプ」ト意見ヲ同ウシテキタノテアルト河邊將軍ノ
証言セル大島ハ、一九三九年十二月ニ日本ニ歸朝

大島ハ「獨乙外交ノ理念」ト述スル後ノ後ノ出版
 物ニ就シテ考ヘル時ハ（QQ—56）、同盟ハ外交
 渉ニ於ケル手段トシテ一層利用サレルベキモノト
 考ヘタト更ニ主張シテキマスガ、^(b)之ハ樞軸同盟
 ガ企圖セルモノト後察知ガ主張スル少クトモ一利
 用目的即チ彼等ノ意志ヲ他ノ獨立國ニ強假スルニ
 足ルカラ得而シテソノ強壓的試ニ失敗ノ際ハ武力
 行使ヲ以テ之ヲ起成セントスルコトニ附スル容認
 デアリマス。

獨斷不可侵條約締結ノ結果トシテノ日獨關係ノ
冷却ハ、日本國內外ノ共同諒識者ニトツテハ重大問
題デアリマシタ。ソレハ陸海同盟ノタメノ深謀ヲ

- a、 法廷証 三三〇八 法廷記録 三三七七五
- b、 法廷証 五〇七 法廷記録 六一二九一三〇
- c、 法廷証 五〇八 法廷記録 六一三一
- d、 法廷証 五〇七 法廷記録 六二二七一八
- e、 法廷証 二七四六 法廷記録 二五五〇五

OSHIMA SUMMATION—QQ

シマシタ。(a) 大島が大使トシテ獨逸ニ滞在スル
コトハ合作政策ニトリ重要ナリト考ヘタ。(b)
「リツベントロツプ」ハ「オツト」ニ對シテ大島
ハ歸朝ノ腕ニハ獨日友好ノ爲メニ努力スルデアラ
ウト通告シマシタ。(c) 「リツベントロツプ」ト
大島トハ共ニ、日本ノ地位ハ結局獨逸ノ勝利ニヨ
リ保障サレ又獨逸、伊太利及び日本間ノ緊密ナル
協力ト云フ理念ハ關係各國ノ眞ノ福祉トナルモノ
ナリト云フ意見デアリマシタ。(d) 獨日關係維持ト其
ノ發辰ノ爲メノ大島ノ仕事ハ、「スタマー」ノ一
九三九年八月廿八日ノ報告ニヨルト彼ノ日本へノ
出發前ニ於テサヘ始ツテキタノデアリマス。(e)

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OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

危険ニ懸シタカラテアリマス。共同謀議進行途上ニ於テ又「リツベントロツプ」ノ前途ノ約束ト妥求トニ對シテ歩調ヲ合ハス途中ニ於テノ此ノ危険ニ當ツテ、大島ハ日獨關係ヲ強固ニスルタメニ又共同謀議者カ戰ラネバナラヌト主張セル手段ニ對シ日本ノ準備ナルマテ目前ノ危険ヲ切り抜ケルタメニ必要且ツ極メテ肝要ナル役員ヲ果シタノデアリマス。此ノ役員ヲ果スノニ大島程立派ナ資格ヲ供ヘテ居ル大人物ハ日本ニ在リマセンデシタ。

QQ-56

大島ハ、一九四〇年一月發行ノ文藝春秋ニ於テ「仙遊外交ノ理想」(a)ト題スル極メテ啓示的ナ論文ヲ公ニシマシタ。ソレハ極軸國ノ光榮ト利益(リヤク)ニ日本國民ヲ眩惑セシメ、獨斷不可侵條約締結ニヨリ生ジタル感情ヲ柔ゲル、又ヤガテ同盟ヲ締結サルベキ同盟ノ地均ラスルタメノ宣旨デアツタト考ヘラレルノデアリマス。

QQ-56

a、法廷証 三五一六一A 法廷記録 三四一五三

國民ノ信頼ノ爲メニ出來々所謂「無血勝利」ノコトヲ稱讃シテ言キマシヌ。(b) 「無血勝利」ニ依ツテ、大島ハ、「ドルフアス」ガ暗殺サレタ一九三四年七月ノ「ウキーン」デノ「ナチーノ暴動「ベルサイユ」條約侵略犯ノ一九三六年三月ノ「ライン」地方占領、「フオン・シユースヒニヒ」ガ獨逸ノ侵略ノ威嚇ニ

Q.Q-57

a、

法廷證三三一六一A

法廷記三三一三三

法廷記三三一六一三

b、法廷證三三一六一A

法廷記三三一三四

0159 0015 2477

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ-57

大島ハ「ゲスタポ」ノ仕事ヲ知ツテ居マシ
タ、「ヒットラー」ノ「吾ガ障壁」ニ審イテ
アル國際問題ヲ解決スルニハ力ガ必要ダトイ
フ獨逸ノ根本主義ヲ熟知シテ居マシタ、所謂
「血浴」ノ惡名ヲ知ラレル、「ヒットラー」一
屬ノ部下ニ對スル無智毒殺等セ知ツテ居リマ
シタ、惡名ヲ探ツタ中央情報局事務所ノ設立ノ
事ヤソノ後ノ恐怖政治ヲ知ツテマシタ。然モ
尙此ノ記事テ彼ハ所謂「ヒットラー」ノ名譽
平等及自由ノ外交ヲ口ヲ極メテ賞メマシタ。
彼ハ有力ナ軍隊ノ存在、ソノ許ニ於ケル全國
民ニ對スル完全ナル指揮及ビ影響等ニ對スル

(a)

直接的ナ言葉デアリマシタ。露西亞ト不侵略
 條約ヲ締結シタ獨逸ノ行動ニ激怒シタ人々ノ
 態度ヲ慰撫緩和スル爲ニ、大島ハ獨逸ガ一正
 面又ハ二正面作戰ニ就イテ直面シタ危機又ハ
 戰爭迴避ノ可能性ノ爲メダカラ獨逸ヲ誹難ス
 ルハ正シクナイトノ意見ヲ發表シマシタ。(e)ス
 大島ハ「ヒットラー」ト「リッベントロツク」ヲ稱讚シ

QQ-57

- | | | |
|----|----------|-----------|
| c、 | | 法廷記録三六一六四 |
| d、 | 法廷證三五一六A | 法廷記録三六一二六 |
| e、 | 法廷證三六一六A | 法廷記録三六一三七 |

0159 0015 2478

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

遂ヒ辭職ヲ餘議ナクサレター一九三八年三月ノ
「オーストリア」ノ併合及ビ一九三八年十月
ノ「チエツコスロバキア」ノ「スデーテン」
地區ノ占領ノ如キ事件ヲ指スコトヲ大島ハ認
メマシタ。(c) 此等ノ所謂「無血勝利」ノ達成
ハ自己ノ積極的ノ政策實行ノ爲メニ必要ナラ
バ何時ニテモ武力ニ訴ヘントノ獨逸ノ決意ニ
因ツタモノデアルト言ヒマシタ。(d) 日本人ニ
取ツテハ、是ハ日本ハ此ノ前ニ徴ツテ利益ヲ
得、日本ノ積極政策即チ、共同謀議者ガ日本
ノ國策ハ以込ンダ原則ヲ違メル爲メニハ何時
ニテモ戦フ決意ヲ喪ストノ觀念ヲ具ヘル甚ダ

P-89

QQ-57

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OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

「ヒツトラ」ノ日本ニ對スル依存ト彼ノ日本人
ニ對スル信用ト尊敬ヲ強調シマシタ。彼ハ日
本人ハ、「ヒツトラ」ノ倅ニ、非常ニ勇敢
デアリ、死ヲレナイ國民ダト言ツテ、日本
國民ノ自負心ト愛國心ニ訴ヘマシタ。ソレカ
ラ獨逸トノ同盟締結ニ失敗シタ政府ヲ非難ス
ル詞トシテ彼ハ「吾國ノ政府ハ此際國策ヲ確
立シ、之ガ遂行ニ努力スルヲ最ムト述ベマ
シタ。(f)

0159 0015 2479

QQ-58

a、法廷記 三三〇一 A 法廷記 三三〇一
 b、 ” 三三〇一

QQ-59

一九三九年ノ後半又ハ一九四〇年一月初、強道
 及び日本政府ハ連日二六〇〇年案ニ關シ「コバー
 グ」公ノ日本訪問ニ同意シソノ原因實トシテノ同
 公ニ對スル蒙テ秋總會ガ日本政府ニ依テ計畫
 シレマシタ。然シ該國丸事停後、民主主義論者ニ
 親善的タリシ官廷方面ハ該國丸事停ニ依ツテ頗ラ
 レタ反英感情及び「コバーグ」公ノ訪問ヨリ生ズ

OSHIRA SUMMATION - QQ

QQ-58

一九三九年十二月三十一日「オット」大使ハ嘗
時日本ニ存在セル政治的債務ヲ政府へ譲ジテ、聯
合内閣ハ歐洲勢力國ノ何レトモ當分ハ完全ナ提携
ハ出來ザルコト、大島及ビ白鳥大使ノ意見ヲハ果
斷ナ改革ヲ爲スタメニハモウ二、三ノ一時的内閣
ガ必要ヲアラウト云フコト及ビ「大佐」ハ現内閣員
表ノ爲メ統制勢力中ナルコトヲ報告シタ^(a) 大島
ハ政府ノ倒壊運動ニ加シタコトヲ否認シ又「オ
ット」大使ト同閣員ヲ協議シタコトヲ否認シマシ
タ^(b)

0159 0015 2480

証シマシタガ、日本ニ於ケル反英運動ノ存在ヲ知
 ラナカツタト述ベマシタ。(b)「コバード」各ノ訪
 問ガ行ハレタ際「スターマー」ハ大島、白鳥及び
 他ノ人々ト會見シ且一九四〇年二月二十三日、彼
 等ハ依然友好ノ態度ヲ保持シ凡ユル支持ヲ與フル
 用意アリ又外務省及ビ陸軍ニ於ケル親英勢力強化
 ノ手段ガ採ラレツ、アル旨報告シマシタ。(c)

QQ-59

- a、法廷證三三〇三一A 法廷証三三三九三一E
- b、" " 三三〇六E
- c、" " 六一五〇一E

0 159 00 15 248 1

OSHIMA SUMMATION - QQ

ベキ國民ノ親和感情ノ増強ノ爲メ同訪問ガ計畫通
リ爲サレルコトハ不待言ナリト思ツタ。大島ハ「
オットー」大使ニ若シ獨逸ノ勢力下ニ在ルト云フ様
様ヲ強ハサレナイナラバ反英運動ハ充分ニ發展サ
スコトガ出來ルダラウカラ訪問延期ノ申入レハ獨
逸ノ政策ノ爲ニ有利トナルコトナリ得ベシト察ジ
マシタ。ソレ故、大島ハ同訪問ヲ四月又ハ五月迄
延期スル様様メマシタ。此ノ訪問ハ「リツベント
コツブ」ノ特使「スターマー」ガ申立ノ情報目的
ノ爲メニ石一行ト同行スル好機タルベシト思考サ
レマシタ。(a) 大島ハ此ノ「オットー」トノ協議ヲ承

QQ-60 QQ-59

a、
 // 三一六
 // 六一三

d、
 法廷証三一〇ニ
 法廷証三一三ニ

ナリ一ト兩言シテヲリマス。(a)

告ニ「大島、白鳥兩大使及彼等ト番接ノ關係アル
 筋ハ留大使出ト秘密ニ協方シテ同シ方面ニ活躍中
 ナリ」ト打電シマシタ。一オット一大使ハ其ノ報
 告ニ於ケル米國ノ利益並ニ活動ノ爲メニ日米間ノ
 衝突ハ結局避ケラレヌトノ暗示ヲ政界指導者達ニ
 與ラ起サウト努力中デアリ、一例トシテ太平洋地

QQ-60

彼が實際石活動ニ從事シタ事實ヲ確証スルモノデ
 アリマス。

一九〇〇年六月十二日「オット」大使ハ本且政
 府へ大使館ハ今尙、適當ト思ハレル方法ニ使ツテ
 新聞及政界ノ重要人物ヲ動カシテ、日本ノ對米反

「オット」ハ「スターマー」ノ日本訪問後大島ガ
「スターマー」氏ノ影響ヲ受ケテ日獨同一層緊密
ナル關係ノ爲活潑ニ活動シタカドウカト聞ハレタ
際、「オット」ハ感激アリゲニ「スターマー」ノ
影響ノ結果トシテハ此ノ點ニ於テハ大島ノ活潑ナ
活動ハナカツタト答ヘマシタ(2) 大島ガ二重橋
ノ一層緊密ナル關係ノ爲メニ活動シタト直捷ニ述
ベルコトヲ述ケヤウトスル此ノ寧ニ既カナ好力ハ

0159 0015 2482

99-61 問答形式ノ一方的陳述ヲ一九四〇年六月十二日
 附ノ「オット」ノ電報ヲ詰問ノ際ニ「オット」カ
 ラ得マシム。(a) 分府均吟味ハ辯護側主張ヲ立証ト
 ス、等口同報告ノ眞實ヲ立証シマス。「オット」
 ハ長々シク説明シテ、彼ハ自主的ニ活動シテキム
 事ヲ「リツベントロツフ」ニ報告シテ理由ヲ述ベ
 マシタ。(b) 「オット」ハ大島及白鳥ノ勸カシテハ
 イコトニ關スル彼ノ原意ハ眞實ナイトハ難ク推
 シマセン。唐舎ハヒタ誤同者ガアノ特殊ノ質問ヲ
 致シテオット云フ事ハ極メテ恣意ノ深イコト
 デアリマス。彼ガソウシテオット云フ事實カラ
 判明スレバ答辯ハ彼ノ主張ニ反スルモノデアツム
 ラウト推定サレルベキデアリマス。事實、其レニ
 續ク質問ニ答ツテ「オット」ハ大島及白鳥ノ勸
 カニ關スル其ノ報告ノ眞實性ニハ疑問ヲ懐ンテ唐
 ナイトガヨク了解サレタコトが明カデアリマス。
 此カニ關スル報告ノ正シサニ疑イテ尋ナル代リニ、

99-61
 a、 法廷証言 三三〇二 法廷証言 二〇九三九 一三四
 b、 法廷証言 三三〇二 法廷証言 二〇九三九 一三四

此ノ質問ヲ尋ねマシタ。「アナタハ此ノ書類ノ第
 四節ニ於テ獨逸大使館大島・白鳥ハ相互了解ト共
 同協定ニ基ク共同計畫ニ一緒ニ働イタト言フノテ
 スカ、又ソウナラバ其目的ハ何デアリマシタカ。」
 此ノ問ニ對シテ「オットー」ハ「否、其ノ様ナ協定
 ハアリマセンデシタカラ、我ハソウ言ツルノチハ
 アリマセン。^(e)」ト答ヘマシタ。「オットー」ハ大島・
 白鳥ノ協力ハ相互了解ト共同協定トニ基イタセノ
 デアルト云フ意味ヲ云ツタノチハナイト否定シテ
 居リマスガ、彼ノ電報報告中ニ舍マレテキル陳述
 ノ眞實性ヲ否認シテハキマセンデシタ。彼ハ更ニ
 白鳥ハ「個人的談話ニ依リ又時ニハ新聞ニ依ツテ
 米國ノ堀ニ對シテ警告或シマシタ」ト述べマシタ。^(f)
 更ニ同協力カ共同計畫デアルコトヲ否定シナカ
 ラズ、「オットー」ハ内密ニ大島・白鳥ト別々ニ相
 談シタコトヲ反復シマシタ。^(g) 緊密ナ協力がアツ
 タト何故述べタカト再反問セラレタ時ニ、「オツ
 トー」ハ彼ノ以前ノ陳述ノコトニ言及シテ彼ノ通信

99-61

o、	法廷証	三五〇二	法廷証録	三三九三三	一三
d、	法廷証	三五〇二	法廷証録	三三九三三	
e、	法廷証	三五〇二	法廷証録	三三九三三	

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- f、法廷証 三三〇三 A 法廷証 三三九三 八一四
- g、法廷証 三三〇三 B 法廷証 三四三三 七一五

ニ重キヲ加ヘ我彼ノ反對ヲ貫徹スルタメニ其ノ
 言葉遣ヲ用ヒタノデアルト言ヒマシタ。之ハ彼
 ノ報告ハ事實上偽リデアツタト言フノトハ全ク
 異ツタ事柄デアリマス。「オット」ハ大島、宮
 島等ノ以給前協力ニ關スル彼ノ報告ノ正確サニ
 疑イテ疑ヲ抱ク意思ノ無カツタコトハ檢察側ノ
 タメニ行ハレタ反對副ニ依ツテ明カニ説明サ
 レテ居マス。檢察部ハ一九三九年十二月三十一
 日附、一九四〇年一月二十三日附、一九四〇年
 一月二十六日附ノ三道ノ電報ヲ證據トシテ提出
 シマシタ。(f) 是等ノ電報ハ大島ノ方ノ政治的宿
 病ト協力トヲ反映シテキマス。辯護行ノ爲メニ
 行ハレタ直接再訊問ニ於テ辯護側ハ之ヲ證據ト
 シテ使用スルコトヲ拒絶シ、檢察側ハ之ヲ證據
 トシテ提出シタコトヲ思出サレルコトデレウガ
 一「オット」ハ是等電報ノ述ベテキル事ヲ證據
 致シマシタ。(g)

0159 0015 2485

QQ-62 一九四〇年七月八日「リッペントロツフ」ト
 佐藤、來樞爾日本大使ノ會談ニ於テ「リッペン
 トロツフ」ハ日獨ノ協カニ言及シ、彼ハ大島將
 算ト數年ニ亙ツテ此ノ協カヲ促進シ來タリ、又
 ソレガ既ニ双方ニ對シテ效果ヲ生ジタト述ベマ
 シタ。彼ハ日本ガ疑モナク強カナ獨逸ノ存在ニ
 ヲツテ、中國トノ紛争ノ全範圍ヲ通ジテ今日ニ
 至ル迄相當ノ利益ヲ取メタ事實ニ言及シマシタ。
 再強化サレタ獨逸ノ存在ナクシテハ、日本ハ實
 際ニツタ桂梁ク東亞ニ於ケル英國反ヒ其他ノ利
 益範圍ニ入り込ムコトハ出來ナカツタデアラフ
 ト彼ハ述ベマシタ。(a) コレヨリ少シ前、一九四〇
 年四月二十九日、大島ハ日露事變ノ功績ニヨリ
 旭日大波章ヲ授カリマシタ。(b)

B、大島、三國同盟ノ官位ニ於テ官民ノ區別
 確保ニ重要後割ヲ采ス。

QQ-63 一九四〇年五月迄ニハ勿論ハ歐洲ノ低地諸國
 ヲ蹂躪シテソノ軍事力ヲ誼由シ又日本ノ軍事力

QQ-62 a、法廷証 三三四 法廷記録 六一八一
 b、法廷証 一三一 法廷記録 七六一七

0 159 00 15 2787

経済的性質ノ高準備ハ増強セラレテ居リ、ソノ
結果、共同諒議者邊ニトツテ、三國同盟ヲ通ジ
テ日本ヲ民主々義論ニ對シ公然ト反對セシメ
ントスル彼等ノ努力ヲ新ニスル時機ガ熟シテ居
マシタ。ソシテ右同盟締結ハ彼等ノ犯罪的計畫
ノ必要ナ一部デアリマシタ。共同諒議者ガ日本
ヲ正式且完全ニ臣屬制ト犯罪ノ仲間ヲサセタ方
法ハ或終警告ニ完全ニ違ベテアリマス。(a) 米内
内閣ノ後ヲ第二次近衛内閣ガ以テタ際、軍事向
盟者等タル大島、白鳥兩行ハ、新聞記者會見
ニ於テ、同盟ニ有利ナル新シイ發展ヲ暗示スル
松岡ノ外務大臣任命ニ感服シマシタ。(b)

80-63

- a、或終警告 頁一三七一四七
- b、法経證三三ニ卷証録六二六二

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Q Q - 6 4

c . b . a .

法廷記録	三四一六九
〃	三四一七〇
〃	三四一七一三

渉中ノ或ル點ニ關シ彼ノ助言ヲ求メマシタ。
 大島ハ、彼ノ証言ノ中デ、彼ハ「スターマー」
 ニ自分ハ彼ニ助言ヲ與ヘル立場テナイコトヲ告
 ゲ、ソノ點ニ關イテ松岡ニ意見を述べツタ。
 ケデアルト申立テマシタ。(c) 一九四〇年二月
 二十三日附「スターマー」ノ報載及び大島ニ關
 スル他ノ總ベテノ證據、彼ノ度々ノ既定事實ノ

0159 0015 2488

OSHIMA SUMMANTON -Q Q

Q Q - 64

右同盟締結ニ先立ち、大島ト白鳥ガ右同盟間
題ヲ協諒シタ時ガアリマシタ。此等ノ協諒テ右
同盟採用ノ具体的手段ハ何モ考慮サレナカツタ
ト大島ハ述べマシタ。(a) 「リツベントロツプ」
ノ特使「スターマー」ガ九月上旬、日本ニ到着
シタ時、彼ハ先ヅ大島ヲ訪ネマシタ。大島ハ此
際「スターマー」ニ彼ハ提案サレタ同盟ニ關係
スル立場デナイコトヲ告ゲ、松岡ニ會見スル様
勸告シタト證言シマシタ。(b) 其ノ後ノ交渉中
ニ、大島ハ一度獨逸大使館テ「スターマー」ノ
唯一人ノ客トナツタコトガアリ、ソノ時「スタ
ーマー」ハ彼ト松岡トノ意見ノ一致シナイ、交

QQ-65 QQ-64

a .

法廷記録 三四一七四一五

d . 法廷證

六〇九

法廷記録

六六七一

國民ノ一致團結起軍大ナモノハアリ得ナカツタデ
 アリマセウ。此ノ問題ヲ大島陸海軍的ニ討ジ得ル
 好地位ニ居タ者ハナカツタノデアリマス。
 ソノ理由ハ、大島ハ強力ナル軍勢同陸ノ主唱者テ
 アリ「ヒツトラー」及ビ「リツベントロツブ」ト
 完全ニ意見一致シ又一九四〇年一月發表ノ彼ノ時
 機ヲ得タ論說ニヨツテ強力ナル軍隊ト之ニ依ル全
 國民ニ對スル完全ナル指揮權トヲ背景トスル場合

0159 0015 2489

OSHIMA SUMMATION- Q Q

否定ヲ含ム、ニ鑑ミテ、彼ノ努力ト仕事ノ結晶タル、彼ノ右條約ノ交渉ヘノ参加ガ、彼ガ認メルコトヲ欲シナイ程ニ大キカツタト信ズルコトハ全く合理的デアリマス。日獨協力ノ達成ニ於ケル大島ノ功績ハ、重要ナ豫備的手段ニ於イテニセヨ、條約ノ締結ソノモノニ於テニセヨ、「ヒツトラ」ガ彼ニ金ノ獨逸爲大十字章ヲ授ケテ之ヲ認メタノデアリマス。(a)

Q Q - 65
日本ニ於ケル三國同盟ニ對スル反對ハ非常ナモノデ之ヲ支持スル爲メニ國民一致ヲ結サス目的テ詔勅ガ用ヒラレタ程デアリマシタ。(a) 共同議

者ニ取ツテ此ノ同盟ヲ支持スル爲メノ日本政府ト

P-7 :

P-

0159 0015 2490

OSHIMA SUMMATION-Q Q

ノ獨逸ノ外交力ヲ日本國民ニ以前力説シテ居リマ
シタカラ。二度、大島ハ新聞ニ訴ヘマシタ、今度
ハ共同謀議ノ諸目的支持ノ爲メニ政府ト國民トヲ
一致團結サス目的テ。

QQ-66

三、方新秩序建設の目的は、その方期に適合せしむべき不可避の措置に在りて、是を以て進べしむ。企圖せしむるは、東亞及歐州に於ける新秩序建設ハ、其の目的は、皆ハズシテ實現せしむる時ナカツトイフコトハ、當然ナシテアリマス。何トモシバ、ソレハ獨立國家ノ領土及び利益ヲ包含シタモノナラハ、アリマス。コノ點ハ大島方、一九四一年十月十八日ノ「エムズマンドムフレ」トノ會議ニ於テ認めマシタ、ソノ際、大島ハ、三、四兩國方締結せしむる際、日本政府

a、法廷證言 一三九一A 法廷証言 一、七三三

0159 0015 2491

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

QQ-66

「同じく我々が核化セヨ」外交ノ受動性ヲ非セト見
 スル大島ノ最初ノ語又ハ三國同盟ノ締結ノ直接因
 實新編ノ一九〇〇年十月二十七日號ニ出マシタリ
 ソノ一節ハ証據トシテ引讀セラレカツル本文書
 ノ編者ヲ指見ハ、大島ノ真ノ所見、其時該書編
 者存在シタ同共計並ニ大島ガ定見ノ理念及ビ語
 彙ヲ日本ニ其ニ賣リ附ケルノニ似ジク彼等ニ其カ
 ニ強クスル上ニ重々テアリマス。彼ハ右同盟ハ東
 亞及ビ歐洲ニ新秩序ヲ建設スルコトヲソノ目的ト
 シタモノナリ、石原村ハ相互ニ強固ヲ進定シテ居
 ルガ、ソレハソレ自体ガ目的マハナク何レカノ如

(a)

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

ハ天(東)軍國ハ南方進出ニ依リ、然モ劍ヲ以テノ
 ミ、(b) 達成セラレ時ルトイフコトヲ確信シテ盾
 ノニ相慕フイトノ意見ヲ張揚シタメテアリマス。
 コトハ、天島ガ國監ヲ防衛備前ナリト考ヘルト
 イフ彼ノ海軍ヲ益強セシムルモノデアルト主張
 シマス。彼ハコノ點ヲ甲國對越ニ歐列國以對
 ノ解決ハ一體ノモノト考ヘルベキコト竝ニ日本
 國民ハ右側面ハ歐列ニ於ケル獨逸ノ新秩序建設
 日本ノ協力ヲ要求シテ盾ルトイフ點當ニ對シ
 ソノ地位ヲ定メネバナラヌト述ベマシタ。彼ハ
 國民ニ他國ガ示スヤモ知レヌ煩苛ナル妨害トモ
 察フ爲メニ懸乎タル決意ヲ以テ細心ノ準備ヲナ
 ス様希望シマシタ。不幸ニモ最近ニ至リテ、ト
 彼ハ述ベマシタ。日本ニハ相尋レザル意見ガ起
 リサワナ傾向ガアリマシタソレテ、若シソノ傾
 向ガ將來モ繼續スルナラバ日本ハ世界ニ於ケル
 ソノ使命ヲ達成スルコトハ出来ナイテアラウト
 警告シマシタ。彼ハ國民ニ徒ラズル争戰ニ耽ル
 コトナク、日本ノ目的達成ニ資スル如何ナル障

ニカニ定メラレテキル、ソレ故石問題ニ關スル心
配ハ不必具デアルト讀者ニ報ジマシタ。

0159 0015 2493

OSHIMA Summation—QQ.

我ヨモ矢復スル覺悟テドツシリ帯ヘヨト我メマシ
タ。彼ハ國民ニ未ダ管テ新クモ口乎タル決意ト決
然タル勇氣ガ必髮テアツルコトハナイコトヲ注意
シタルナアリマス。右條約ハ全速力ヲ以テ積極化
セラレネバナラヌ、コノタメ缺ク可カラサル第一
ノ宿願ハ行動ニ備ヨ速ニ完成スルコトデアルト彼
ハ速ベマシタ。彼ハ三國同盟語ハソノ共通權益
ヲ防護スル爲メ完全ニ協力一致シテ前進セネハ
ラヌ又日本ノ獨伊トノ關係ニ關シテ又日本ノ口内
ニ於イテ膨大ナル豫備的工作ヲ爲ス必要ガアルト
宣言シマシタ。決定的態度テ彼ハ次イテ口實ハ協

彼ハコノ同盟カ最近世界新秩序建設ノ偉大ナル目的ヲ以テ締結サレタ事實ハ本條約ノ大ナル特長ヲナスト斷シ、國民ニコノ意義ヲ認識スル様要請シマシタ。大島ハ再ビ國民ニ獨伊ノ新秩序建設ヘノ協力ヲ要望シ又日本ガ直テニ同盟國獨伊ト共ニ具體的政策ノ樹立ヲ計畫シソノ實現ヲ積極的ニ開始スルコトガ緊要デアルト指摘シマシタ。最後ノ訴ヘトシテ彼ハコノ世界ノ轉換期ニ當リ全國民ハ最近御發布ノ御聖旨ニ從ヒ大東亞新秩序建設ノ偉大ナル帝國ノ理念ニ對シ彼等ノ努力ヲ結集スベシト述ベマシタ。

Q. Q-67

a 法廷證

三五一七一A

法廷記錄

三四一八〇

QQ—67

前述ノ日本國民ニ對スル廣範ナル訴ニ次イデ間
 モナク雜誌「大豆細亞主義」^(a)ノ一九四〇年十
 一月號發表ノ大島ノモウ一ツノ論文ガ出マシタ。

此ノ雜誌ハ大豆細亞協會ニ依リ出版サレタモノデ
 被告松井ハソノ會長デアリ被告廣田、白鳥、松岡
 ハソノ顧問デアリ、被告鈴木ハ理事デアリマシタ。

「三國同盟ト亞米利加合衆國」ト題スル此ノ論文
 ハ前ノ論文ト同一ノ一般的性質ノモノデアリマス。

此ノ論文ニ於テ彼ハ獨逸ト伊太利ノ戰爭目的ハ日
 華事變處理ノ日本ノ目的ニ等シイト述ベ、ソノ事
 實ヲ右三國間ニ同盟ヲ締結スル理由トシマシタ。

7159 0015 2494

0 159 00 15 2495

QQ-68

○ 大島 再々 陸軍 大使 ニ 任命

一九四〇年十二月十三日、「オット」ハ「リッ
 ベントロツプ」ニ外務大臣ハ大島ニ再々陸軍大使
 ノ職ヲ提供シタガ彼ハ三國同盟ノ爲メニ政治的活
 動ヲ繼續スル爲メニ辭退シタト打電シマシタ。(c)
 政治的行動ト云フノハ大島ガ三國同盟ノ準備交渉
 又ハ締結ニ參與シタト云フノテハナイト言フノ
 ハ彼ニハ相談シナカツタカラト「オット」ハ証言
 シマシタ。(b) 大島ハ外務大臣カ一九四〇年十一
 月(c)ノ會合ニ於イテ彼ニ就任受諾ヲ迫ツタコト
 ハ認メタガ彼ガ同盟ノ爲メニ政治的行動ヲシタコ
 ト又ハソノ目的ノ爲メニ日本滞在ヲ希望シタノテ
 兵ノ任命ヲ断ツタトイフ事ハ否認シマシタ。(a)
 外務大臣ハ再々大島ニ就任受諾ヲ迫リ又海軍ノ有
 力者達モ獨逸トノ同盟政策ノ完全ニ信認シタル發
 議者ヲ以テ中テ最モ重長ナ大使ノ職ニ就カセ微
 トシテ同シ様ニ大島ニ受諾ヲ迫ツタ。主ニ、日獨
 親善回復運動ノ立役者トシテナクテハナラス人ト
 考ヘラレテ后々自爲大使ハ、大島ノ任命ヲ以テ

QQ-68

c	法廷証書	三	五	〇	六	〇	法廷証書	三	五	三	三
d	法廷証書	三	五	〇	三	〇	法廷証書	三	五	〇	三
a	法廷証書	三	五	〇	八	〇	法廷証書	三	五	〇	三
	法廷証書	三	五	〇	八	〇	法廷証書	三	五	〇	三
	法廷証書	三	五	〇	八	〇	法廷証書	三	五	〇	三
	法廷証書	三	五	〇	八	〇	法廷証書	三	五	〇	三

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○ 法廷証

一一一

法廷証録

中六中

⊕ 法廷証

三三二七 I A

法廷証録

三三二八六

OSHIIMA SUMMATION-QQ

持シマシタ。大島ハ右任命ヲ考ヘルニ當リ、彼ノ
三國同盟ノ弱体化ノ現レルコトヲ選ケ度イト思ツ
タ。

一九四〇年十二月二十日任命サレマシタ。(e)

ニノ経路カラ見テ、大島ハ我々ハ同盟國獨逸、伊太利
ト直チニ計畫シ、具体的政策ヲ樹テ、積極的ニ其
ノ實現ニ取リ掛ル一事ヲ縣長テアルト追ベタ彼ノ
論文ヲ發表シタ時ニ彼ハ彼ノ任命ノコトヲ考ヘテ
后々コトハ明カデアリマス。(f)

a、法廷証 二六一 法廷記録 六四二三一六

メテ、大島が獨逸政府ノ指導者間ニ絶對的ノ個人
的信用ヲ築キ上ゲタカラ彼ハ彼等ト腹藏ナク語ル
事ガ出來ルト指謫シ、新任ノ結果トシテ大島大使
ニカケラレル大ナル國家的信頼ニツイテ語リマシ
タ^c(a)

松岡主借ノ新大使選別會席上テ、松岡ハ、演説
 テ、東亞新秩序建設ノ爲ノ日本ノ努力ハ、滿洲事
 變ト共ニ始マリ、日本ガ亞細亞ニ於テ、三年半モ
 續ケテキタ聖戰ハ東亞ニ新秩序ヲ建設スル爲テア
 ルト意味深ク陳述シマシタ。彼ハ歐洲戰ト日本ノ
 東亞ニ於ケル新秩序建設ノ努力トノ結果ハ根本的
 ニ世界歴史ヲ變化サセルテアラウト予言シマシタ。
 三國同盟ニ依ツテ生ジタ日獨ノ一体化及ビ兩國間
 ノ不可分關係ヲ語ツタ後、松岡ハ、大島ガ長年ノ研
 究及ビ大使館内武官及ビ陸海大使トシテノ經驗ヲ
 通ジテ得タ獨逸事情ニ對スル造詣ノ深イコトヲ認

QQ-70

QQ-70

a、法廷證

三三三一 法廷記録 三三三三三六

b、
〃
〃

三四三八
三四三三
三四三四

VII 三國同盟下ノ協力

A、大島、日本ノ領領印度支那占領計畫ヲ助成

一九四一年二月十七日附大島宛ノ電報ニ於テ、
 松岡ハ日本ノ領領、泰國調停計畫ヲ「グアイタイ」
 政府ニ呈請セシメタルタメ獨乙ガ辨起スル據要請ス
 ベシト指示シマシタ。彼ハ日本ノ調停計畫ノ成否
 ハ單ニ東亞ノ政局並ニ全權顧問ノ地位ニ甚大ナル
 影響ヲ及ボスベキコト、日本ノ南方政策ノ失敗ハ
 遂ニハ獨逸ノ作戦ニ重大損傷ヲ來スベキコト並ニ
 同計畫ノ成功ハ泰、印ニ於ケル日本ノ勢力ヲ増
 立シ、日本ガ所望スル「各黨ノ傾直」ヲ要求スル^(a)
 甚盛ヲ與フベキコトヲ指摘シタノデアリマス。^(a)
 大島ハ以初此ノ電報ハ彼ノ到着ノ二日前ニ倍添テ
 受領シテ、ソレハ代理大使ガ處理シタニ違ヒナイ
 ト主張シマシタガ^(b) 彼ノ怡然到着ニ照準テルニ
 月十七日附ノ「ヴァイゼケル」ノ電報ヲツキツケ
 ラレテ、大島ハ彼ガ實ハ二月十七日ニ到着セルモ
 ノナルコトヲ認メタノデス。^(c)

0159 0015 2498

QQ-70

證據デアリマス。日本ノ侵略擴張計畫ニ於ケル他
印、泰國境紛争ノ重要性ハ、最終報告ニ於テ之ヲ
論證シマス。(e)

- d、法廷證據 三六六 法廷記録 六四四七
- e、最終報告 三九一—三九二

獨乙政府ガ「ヴィンシー」政府ニ迫ル壓力ヲ加ヘル
 ベキ松岡ノ要請ニ對シ有效ニ應ヘタコトハ、一九
 四一年三月十二日附東京駐在獨乙大使館參事官「
 ボルツェー」ノ電報ニ依ツテ明確ニ立證サレルノデ
 アリマシテ、ソノ電報テ、彼ハ大橋外務次官ガ泰
 國、佛蘭西ノ紛争ニ於ケル日本ノ調停ヘノ特別好
 意アリ且有效ナル支援ニ對スル日本政府ノ眞摯ナ
 ル感謝ヲ獨乙國外務大臣ニ傳達スベキヲ要望シタ
 ト知ラセタノテス。(d) 之ハ大島ノ新任獨大使トシ
 テ到着後最初ノ企テガ成功裡ニ完遂サレタコトノ

0159 0015 2499

QQ-71

云ビ一リツベントロツプニ共進ノ營業ヲアルキ
 一過ノ好況ヲミセザラントシテ、松岡ハ借款ニ
 於テ共同謀議者ノ目的促進ノ爲メ其ノ借款、即チ
 目前ノ口實無クシテ獨立ニ對スル南方行使ヲ合
 ム事ニシ協議セント欲シマシタ。一九四一年二月
 十日、松岡ハ借款ニ對シ、米國ニ對スル三國協定
 營業等口ノ態度、新借款ニ對スル協防的攻進、中日
 事變ノ終止及び蔣介石トノ接近セテ和局ノ結果ニ

a、法廷證 二六七 法廷記(六四四)

0159 0015 2500

OSHIIMA SUMMATION - QQ

QQ-71

B、大島三〇條定下ニ共同着手サルベキ密約ニ

ニ付テ「リツベントロツプ」ト協議ス

早クモ、一九〇〇年十二月十九日、外務大臣
岡ハ「オツト」ト臥瀬訪問ヲ談ジ、其際彼ハ三〇
協定ニ有リタル懸イ「ヂエスナヤ」ヲナスコトノ
必要云ビ露山云ビ斥「ト」ノ交渉停止ヲ打斷スルコ
トノ必要シ方説シタノデアリマヌ。(a) シカシナガ
ラ松岡ハ、此ノ懸案の原もヨリ是方露大ナル欺ル
具ニ的暴露ヲ強シノに事者ト信認スルコトヲ考ヘ
テキタノデアリマシタ。松岡、大島「ヒットラー」

00-71

В СОВЕТСКОМ СОЮЗЕ

0 159 0015 2502

OSMILU, SUIKANTION-000

00-72

大島ハ伯林ニ於ケル松岡ノ會談ノ旨目ニ付獨逸側
 トノ...メラ訓令サレザリシコト (a) 及ビ、日本
 ノ外交政策ニ關スル彼ト松岡トノ協議ハ行ハレサ
 リシコト (b) ラ諒言シテ、後略計畫ノ此等意圖ニ
 於イテ彼ノ欲セシ我側ノ意見法ヲ是少程度ニセン
 ト努力シテキマス。シカシ乍ラ、コノ大島ノ關知
 セズト云フ伴リノ申立テハ、松岡ガ、伯林ニテノ
 會談ヲ延滞セル同旨ニ付キ大島大使ニ報告セリト
 「オツト」大使ニ述べタルコトニヨリ反証サレテ
 キマス。(c) 松岡ガ各報ニ於テ欲スル旨ヲ知レ
 ルヲ私ニ、大島ハ、松岡ノ伯林到任前ニ二ツノ回
 談會ヲ行ヒ乍ラ無クノデアリマシタ。一九四一
 年二月二十二日ノ「ライアイサアエツケル」トノ回
 談ニ於テ、彼ハ「北方ニ於テ日本ヲ安堵セシムル」
 ニ充分ナル策ヲ出シトノ旨定條約ノ可能性ヲ諒言シ
 タノデアリマス。中國ニ關シテハ、大島ハ日本ノ
 汪精衛支持ニヨリ蔣介石ニ力ヲ加ヘルトイフ意
 見ヲ表明シタノデアリマス。

00-72

- 0、 " " " " 法廷記録 二四〇三ロ
- 0、 " " " " " 二四〇三五
- 0、 " " " " 如二頁 (上掲トシテ朗讀サレズ)

QQ-72

マシタノテ「リツペントロツフ」ハ斯ルナ攻ムラ
 然ルシタノデアリマシタ。大島ハ、新嘉坡古島
 島ハ五方不遠ニ先丁スベキモ、久留ノ外ニ唯ニ到
 英軍等ノミアラズ封木島等ノ年加モ爲サネバナラ
 又ト以テシタノテシタ。新嘉坡白飯ノ時機ハ、隊

①、 松尾 五七〇 松尾 六〇五七

QQ—73

東亞ニ於ケル英日ノ領土ニ關シテハ、大島ハ先ツ
 香港ヲ取リ次ニ海峽兩面ヨリスル作戦ニヨリ堂々
 ト新嘉坡ヲ占領スベキデアルト述ベテキマス。大
 島ハ彼ガ東京ニ於テ「現世紀」^(u)同ノ日本ノ運命ヲ決
 スル機會ヲ逃シテハナラス」トイフ見解ヲ盛稱
 進セル旨ヲ「ヴァイザエケル」ニ告ゲテキマス。

五日、島チー元は○年二月二十三日大島ハ「リ
 ツベントロツブ」ト勸諭シマシタ。日本ノ新嘉坡
 政界首魁ノ談話カソレ以前ニ日本ニ於テハ松岡ニ
 依リ、他補ニ於テハ大島ニ依リ、如メラレテ居リ

0159 0015 2503

QQ-73

一年三月三日、「ヒットラー」ハ指令第一四號ヲ
出シマシク、ソノ旨ニハ三〇條ニ基ク官力ノ旨
視ハ日ムラシシテ出來ザル限リ速ニ秘要ニ於テ復極

- a. 伝記 三七二 伝記記録 六二九一六七
- b. 伝記 三七二 伝記記録 六二六八

OSHIMA SUMMATION—QQ

此ニ於ケル作戦ト講和サセネバナラナイト彼ハ云
 ツタノテアリマス。大島ハ、前ノ「ヴァイゼツケ
 ル」トノ論議ノ時ト同様香港占領ヲ仄カシクノデア
 リマス。彼ハ又、相談セル方策實現ノ無喜ンデ盡
 リマスルト言明シ、「故モ具体的且ツ可能ナル提案」
 (a)ヲ彼ニ對テラス。然レモ大臣ニ要求セル旨ヲ述ベ
 タノデアリマス。之等使節討議ノ結果ニ引續キ、
 「リンベントロツプ」ハ一九四一年二月二十七日
 東京ノ「オット」大使ニ打電シ、日本ガ出來得ル
 際リ速ニ宣戦ニ公ツテ新嘉坡ヲ占領スル。彼ノ為
 シ和ルルユル事取ラ無シテ勿ラスル。總司令部シタノ
 テアリマシタ。(b)ソノ後數日內ニ、即チ一九四

OSLIMA SUMMATION-QQ

的作候ヲ起セルコトヲナケレバナラナイト遊ベ
 テキマス。(e) 大島ハ、新嘉坡攻取ニテ「リツベ
 ントロツプ」トノ語テ、御起ノ加來ノ意旨ヲ尋メ
 ル爲、彼ノ偏人の君見ラ遊ベタノデアリ、又日
 ガ同遊的感度ヲ以ツテ辱ルト云フ印象ヲ受ヘナイ
 コトカ以テ反必長ト爲ヘタノデアルト知ラシテキ
 マス。(e) 此ノ趣旨ハ、「リツベントロツプ」カ
 儀ニ公武以テ心向ニ爲シ新嘉坡攻取ノ時與ヘラルベ
 キ御起ノ功効ル式ノ如キ特別ナル間ハ無ニ大島
 ト相談シタト遊ベタコトニ思シテ爲レバ、
 二倍ハアイニ思ハレルコトデアリマス。(e)

9,0-76

e、	法廷証	五七三	法廷記録	六二七〇
e、	法廷証	三二〇八	法廷記録	三二〇三二一三
e、	法廷証	三八〇	法廷記録	六三三九

Q.C.-743

ナセルモノナルコトヲ彼ガ否定シナカツタトイフ等テス。『リ
ツベントロツブ』ノ宣誓ロツブニ就テハ誠ニ信義深キ事
情ガ存スルノデアリマス。當裁判所ニ提出サレ
證據トシテ讀マレタ寫本ハ、『リツベントロツ
ブ』ガ抹殺シテ頭字署名ヲセル誠ニ重要ナル二
節ヲ含ンデキナイノデアリマス。此ノ二節ニハ
辯護國ガ肝要ナルモノト考ヘルコトガ書イテア
ルノデス、而シテ『リツベントロツブ』ガ此等

3、法定證

ニ七六ニ

法定記録

ニ四七〇一

OSHLMA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ-74a

大島ハ、「リツベントロツプ」ノ宣誓口供書ヲ出シテ、新嘉坡占領ニ對スル日本ノ準備ニ就イテノ証言ヲ信ズルニ足ラヌ物トセント努メタノデアリマスガ、「リツベントロツプ」ガ言ツタ事トイフノハ、新嘉坡占領準備ガ三月末迄ニハ完成スルダロウト大島ガ言ツタト想像スル事ハ出來ナイトイフコトデ、若シ大島ガ新カル事ヲ言ツタトスレバ、其レハ宣誓ノ目的デアツタノダト云フノデス。(a) 「リツベントロツプ」ノ推測ヤ憶測ハ吾々ノスル所デハアリマセン。

重要ナノハ、大島ガナセルモノトサレテキル策運ヲ大島ガ

0159 0015 2506

行爲ニサシハサムコトハ了リマセシメテソノ式ノ
ノ考ヲ差テサシテサキヲシタ。彼ノ私見ヲ公送ノ
形ニ立タリタリシテ、彼ノ私見ヲ公送ノ
シカクシテ、彼ノ私見ヲ公送ノ

「吾々ガガ會テ、彼ノ私見ヲ公送ノ

次ノ如キモ、彼ノ私見ヲ公送ノ
ツテ、彼ノ私見ヲ公送ノ
リシテ、彼ノ私見ヲ公送ノ
カコト云フ。此ノ私見ヲ公送ノ
此ノ私見ヲ公送ノ

1052 5100 6510

シタ
「

ビソ脚トノ威争ヨリ同返セシメル事タケケテ
 ノ彼ノ努力ハ凡テ日本ヲ合衆、美、日、及
 ラカト大突ニ骨ヲ折リテマシタ。公、私、兩、方、面
 第一ニ對テ、美、初、年、カ、ラ、大、島、並、ニ、彼、ノ、私、言、ヲ、ト
 九、四、一、年、ハ、一、度、モ、了、リ、マ、セ、シ、タ。私、ハ、一
 ツ、タ、事、ハ、一、度、モ、了、リ、マ、セ、シ、タ。私、ハ、一
 送、ニ、大、島、ガ、彼、ノ、國、ニ、戰、争、ヲ、サ、セ、ル、如、キ、態、度、ヲ、取、
 此、レ、ガ、彼、ノ、權、固、ク、方、折、リ、マ、シ、タ。今

0 159 00 15 2500

OSHIWA SUPPLEMENT--(C)

Q.Q.-75

伯林到着後、松岡ニヨリ行ハレタル日本ノ新
 嘉坡早頃攻撃ノ重要性ニ關スル協議ハ、最終論
 告ニ於テ取扱ハレマス。(a) 大長ハ、彼ノ出席セ
 シ協議會ニオイテ松岡カ、コノ問題ニ關シ何ラ
 ノ言質ヲモ與ヘタコトナク又、外ニ起ツタ協議
 會ニ關シ何ノ報告モウケタルコトナキヲ證言シ
 マシタ。(b) コレハ、一九四一年五月廿日ノ、松
 岡ノ兩進ニ關スル意圖ノ變化ト思ハレルモノヲ
 語ク難ズル大長自身ノ電又ニヨリ反駁サレマス。
 其ノ中テ彼ハ「松岡外相ガ最近御逸ヲ訪問ノ際
 彼ハ個人ノ意見トシテ、日本ハ、新嘉坡ヲ攻撃
 スルデアラウト述ベタガ、彼ハ意見ヲ變ヘタ様
 デアル」ト述ベテキマス。(c)

Q.Q.-75

- a) 最終報告 P 1-150-1-1
- b) 法廷證 三五〇八 法廷記録 三六〇二四一五
- c) " 一〇七五 " 六九二一

0159 0015 2509

c、大島、日蘇交渉ヲ阻止、

QQ-76
 一九四〇年一月既ニ、大島ハ日本蘇聯邦交ノ美
 近ニ達成スルモノト知ラレテキマシタ。而シテ、
 我々カ審理シマシタ如ク、一九四一年二月二十二
 日「ヴァイゼクル」トノ官談ニ於テ、彼ハ日本ノ
 將來ノ政策ヲ、北方ニ於テ日本ヲ安堵セシムルニ
 充分ナル暫定條約ニ直ニセルモノトシテ語ツタ
 ノデアリマス。(b) 對露接近ニ關スル日本ノ見解ハ、
 海軍並ニ陸軍ノ「シンカポール」攻取準備ニ關シ
 近藤提督及ヒ杉山大將ニ對スル彼ノ問答セニ關ス
 ル一九四一年三月二十四日「リツベントロツプ」
 宛ノ「オット」ノ報告ニモ明カニサレタノデスガ
 ソノ報告ニ於テ、彼ハ「之ガ完遂條件ハ露西亞ニ
 對シ後方ガ自由デアルコト」及ヒ「ソノ後方ガ露西亞
 カラ自由ニナラネバナラヌト云フコトガ日本ノ考
 慮ノ決定的後物ヲ果ヘモノデアリ對露和解ニ依リ
 之ガ獲得ニ努力中デアル」コトヲ記録シテキルノ
 デアリマス。(c)

- QQ-76 a、 法廷記録三四二一七
 b、 法廷記録五七〇 法廷記録六四五七
 c、 法廷記録五七六 法廷記録六四七八一七

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ-77

トカクセル内閣内閣ノ情勢ハ變化ヲ受ケマシタ
 「(a)ヒットラー」ノ「バルバロッサ」計畫ハ決定サ
 レ且獨逸ノ立場カラシア、日本ノ脅威ヲ東洋
 ニ於テソ聯ニ對シ維持スルコトハ、避クベカラザ
 ルモノトナリマシタ。從ツテ「リッベントロフ」
 ハ日露間ノ不可侵條約ヲ阻ンダノデアリマス。彼
 ハ「モスクワ」ノ不可侵條約ノ問題ハ「現在ノ情
 勢ノ体面ニスツカリ調和シサウモナイカラ、
 燭レナイ様ニト松岡ニ忠告シタノデアリマス。(b)又ニ
 日後、彼ハ松岡ニ、全局ヨリシア蘇聯トノ討議
 ニ深入セスガ恐ラク最善ノ策ヲアラウト警告シ又
 彼ノ意見ヲハコノ問題ハ、單ニ全ク形式的ニ處理
 スベキヲ操ク立入ルベキヲナイト警告シタノデア
 リマス。(c)

QQ-77

- a、法廷証 五七三 法廷記録 六四七二
- b、法廷證 五七九 法廷記録 六五二〇
- c、法廷証 五八〇 法廷記録 六五二五 一九

QQ-78

a
b
c

(c) 大島ニ、二ツノ場合ノ交渉ノ経過ヲ報告シマシク、
此ノ事件ニ最モ重要ナル証拠ヲ與フルモノハ、
先ニ幾度カ起ツタ如ク獨逸ノ見解ニ一層密着ニ一
致スル爲ノ大島ノ見解ノ變更ヲハアリマセン。最
モ考慮スベキ重要ナルコトハ、公同ヘ忠告ヲ與ヘ
ルコト及ビ「モスコ」ニ於ケル交渉ノ進行ニ關

法廷記録三頁二七一八

法廷記録三頁三一九

法廷記録三頁二〇一

1159 0015 2511

OSRIMA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ-78

大島ハ「ヒツトラ」カ或ハ「リツベントロツ
 プ」カラカ、^(a) 獨逸ノ封森取軍ノ蓋然性ガ存在スル
 コトヲ知り、^(a) 又彼ガ獨逸ノ後人ヨリ聞知セル事
 トハ無關係ニ、彼ハ大童ノ軍隊ノソ邊國境ヘノ集中
 及ビ當時ナサレツツアツタ廣汎ナル備ニ依リ獨逸
 及ビソリエート盧智主義共和國ノ職守ノ公算大
 ナリト結語シタノテアリマス。^(b) 獨逸ノ此ノ變
 化セル情勢ニ鑑ミ大島ハ、日本ハソ邊ト不可侵條
 約ヲ條リニ任意ニ結ブベテナイトイフ意見ヲア
 ツタノテス。從ツテ、彼ハ松岡ニ忠告シタノデア
 リマス。松岡ハ、彼ノ計畫ヲ斷念ハセザリシモ、

OSHIMA SUMMATION-99

シ彼ヨリ報告ヲ受ケタルコトハ大島ガ日本ノ政策
 作成ニアツテ演シタ指導的役割ヲ反影シ、又彼ガ
 岸ニ日本ト彼ガ派遣サレタ國トノ使ヒ役トシテ勤
 務シタニ廻キヌトイフ彼ノ主張ヲ反駁スルモノデ
 アルト云フコトデアリマス。

0 159 00 15 25 13

D、大島、日米交渉阻止ニ努カス

五月三日ニ大島ハ合衆國ト日本トノ間テ提
 議サレタ四月十六日ノ協定案ト該懸集中ノ協
 定ニ歸シテ「ハット」發「リツベントロツ
 プ」宛ノ電報(a)トヲ見セラレタノデアリマス
 松岡ノ訪米提案ハ四月ノ末ニ新聞ニ依リモタ
 ラサレタノデアリマス。(b)大島ハ直ニ一日
 交渉行程阻害ニ乘リ出シタノデアリマス。彼
 ノ最初ノ行動ト云フノハ此ノ提案サレタル旅
 行ヲ放棄サセルヤウ參謀本部ヨリ松岡ヲ押込
 スルコトデアリマシタ。五月三日、大島附陸
 軍武官阪西ノ田中少佐ハ參謀本部ヘ打電シ
 テ、提案ノ松岡ノ旅行ハ非常ニ不利ナ情勢ヲ
 招來シ外務大臣松岡ノ知逆ニ伊太利訪問ノ
 成果ヲ無ニスルモノナルコトヲ告諭シ、又若
 シカクノ如キ事起ラズラバ大島大使
 ノ辭職問題ガ持チ上ルヤモ知レズ引イテ本日
 本外交ノ根本問題ニ大失敗ヲ齎スモノダト警

QQ-79

- a、法廷證一〇七三 法廷記録六一〇
- b、法廷證三三一八 法廷記録六一三六

ス。大島ハ松岡ノ計畫ニ付キ其ノ眞實ナルト
 コロヲ折返シ電報ニテ通知サレタシト稟請シ
 タノデアリマス。(d) 大島ハ徳島ノ松岡旅行ノ
 件ハ聞ナル噂ニ過ギナカツタコトヲ辯言シタ
 ノデアリマスガ五月二十日、松岡ニ宛テタ
 彼ノ實報デハ大島ハソレガ母テ無イト云フコ
 トヲ確メタト報ジテ居ル、デアリマス。(e)

QQ-79

- c、法廷証三八一四 法廷記録三八九一六
- d、法廷証三五一八 法廷記録三八二三八
- e、法廷証一〇七五 法廷記録三八二二六

法廷記録三八九一八

0159 0015 2514

OSHIMA SUMMATION-CC

告シタノデアリマス。

阪西ノBANNAHノ右問題ニ付キ慎重ナル考
慮ヲ拂フコトヲ要請シタノデアリマス。(c) 無

論豫期通り此ノ電報ハ參謀本部カラ外務省ニ
移牒セラレ、ソコデハ五月五日ニ受理サレタ

モノトシテ處理サレタノデアリマス。阪西ノ電

報ニ次テ、大島ハ五月四日外務大臣ニ打電シ

テ、獨逸政府ハ其ノ態度ニレシ何等ノ表スル

トコロハナイガ、ソレニモ拘ハラズ彼ハ提案

ノ旅行ニ對シ非常ニ憂慮シテ店ル旨ヲ進言シ

又合衆國ガ獨逸及ビ伊太利ニ對シ全面的ニ敵

對シテキルコトヲ考エルノハ感メテ常識的デ

アルコトヲ松岡ニ秘カニ在意シタノデアリマ

タコトモ示シテ后ルノデアリマス。

QQ-79

1、	h、	g、	f、
法廷證三五一九		法廷證一〇七五	
法廷記録 三三二四四	法廷記録 三三二三九	法廷記録 三三二三八	法廷記録 三三二三一

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

彼ハ五月末ニ至ル迄其ノ交渉ヲ知ラナカッタ
 ト否認シタノデアリマス^(f)ガ此ノ否認モ又五
 月二十日ノ彼ノ電報ニ準ミ眞實テハナイノデ
 アリマス。^(g)大島ハ又彼ノ陸軍武官ガ電報ヲ
 發シタコト或ハ彼ガ打電ニ關聯セシコトハ一
 齋否認シタノデアリマスガ、^(h)シカシ松岡ガ
 其ノ返事テ大島ニ對シ、右問題ニ關シ彼ノ陸
 海軍武官ニ通知スルコトヲ要請シテ居ルトコ
 ロカラ松岡ハ大島ガ軍ノ懸刀ヲ彼ノ上ニ加ヘ
 ントシテ居タ計費ヲ充分知ツテキタト吾々ハ
 考ヘルノデアリマス。⁽ⁱ⁾松岡ノ返事ハ又、大
 島ガ大使館附海軍武官ヲ彼ノ計費ニ加ヘテ居

ノ松岡ノ訓告ニモ拘ラズ彼ハ執シ守ルコトが出来
ズ二ツノ別々ノ電報ヲ彼ノ意見ヲ卒正ニ表明シタ
デアリマス。(3)

QQ-31

第二電ニ於テ彼ハ日本ハ三山同盟ヲ其ノ外交ノ基
調トシテ遵守シテ居リ従ツテ三山同盟ニ反セル日本
國ニ懸案トナツテキル紛糾ヲ締結スル理由ガナイト
述ベテ「リッベントロツプ」ノ談交ジニ關スル非難

QQ-80

a.	法廷電	一〇七五	法廷記録	六九一八
b.	法廷電	一〇七五	法廷記録	三三三三
				六九一八

QQ-80

大島ハ米國ニ就スル公使ノ外交交渉ニ反對シタコトヲ反對派同ニ於テ強ク否定シテキルニモ拘ラズ^(a)ヨ米交渉ヲ公使が行フコトニ對スル彼ノ反對ハ一九〇一年五月二十日尙彼ヨリ公使ニ宛テタ三通ノ電報ヲ一讀スレバ極メテ明瞭トナリ、又充分ニ了解サレルノデアリマス。彼ハ最初ノ電報ニ於テ此ノ同通ノ進展ト彼ガ考ヘテキタ事柄、又日本ノ將來並ニ三國同盟ニ及ボス其ノ影響ニ就シ深ク憂慮スル旨述ベテキルノデアリマス。目下行ハレツツアル交渉ニ就スル尙尙參謀本部ノ意向ヲ公使ニ報告スル必要ガナイト公使ヨリ報告ガアツタニモ拘ラズ大島ハ公使ガ此ノ決定シナシタ理由ハ了解出来ナイト彼ニ通知シ右

結サレルモノトスレバ米にハ加知護衛隊助シ
 大セズニ中立態度ヲ保持スルト云フ條件ノ許ニナサ
 ルベシト云フノデアリマシタ。彼ハ其ノ條件ハ三回
 再上シ且勸諭ニ懇請ナキモノトシナイカト云フ「リ
 ツベントロツプ」ノ懇念ヲ述ベテキルノデアリマス^(a)

QQ-32

第三ノ電報ニテ大島ハ、日米交渉ニ對スル御意以
 府ノ審シキ不滿意ト三回同亞ノ將來ニ論スル御意以
 府ノ懇念ヲ繰返シタノデアリマス。大島ハ、法同ニ

QQ-31

法同電報 一〇〇ニ 法同電報 一〇〇一ハ

0 159 00 15 25 17

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

ニ答ヘタト述べテ居ルノデアリマス。彼ハキツト松
岡ハ「我ル國体」ニ強ヒラレテソレヲ承諾シタノデ
アラウト言ツタノデアリマス。外務省閣ハ御訪問
ノ際ニ日本ハ新憲法ヲ改定スル積リデアルト述べ
ガ彼ハ強見ヲ變更シタヤウニ思ハレルト此語的ニ述
ベタノデアリマス。若シ憲法ノ修訂ガ締結サレルヤ
ウナ場合ニハ、彼ノ考ヘルトコロデハ、日本ハ東京
ニ於テ勸告ヲ仰立スル機會ヲ失フダラウト彼ハ豫言
シタノデアリマス。大島ハソレカラ松岡ニ、外務省
ノ命令ヲ受ケズニ「リツベントロツブ」ト斷言セシ
二ツノ案ヲ提示シタノデアリマス。第一案ハ米山ノ
案ヲ拒絶スルコトデアリ、第二案ハ若シ條約ガ締

援助ヲ得テ亞細亞事變ヲ解決スルナラバ、日本ハ現在
有シテキル南方發展ノ機會、豈ゾニ「シンガポール」
攻撃ノ可能性ヲ失フデアラウト警告シタノデアリマ
ス。彼ハ新、ル條約ニ依ル太平洋ニ於ケル不安ノ除
去ハ合衆國ヲシテ其ノ對英援助ヲ強化スルコトヲ得
サシメ、ソレハ以テ英事ニ重大ナル影響ヲ與ヘルモ
ノデアルト強調シタノデアリマス。日本ニシテ若シ
アメリカノ爲ニソノ南方政策ニ於ケル指導權ヲ放棄
セン方日本ガソノ強硬的立場ヲ維持ニ對シ強調スル
コトノ不可能ナルハ切ラカナ事デアリ、而シテソレ
ハ日本ノ大東亞新秩序建設トイフ偉大ナル使命ノ意

彼が獨逸ニ來タ時、獨逸ノ全國民ハ心カラ彼ヲ歡迎
シ、在歐ノ強化ヲ喜ンダガ、彼ノ獨逸旅行後スグニ
米交渉ガ始マツタノデ、獨逸ガ裏切ラレタトイフ感
情ガ非常ニ強イト云フ事ニ注意ヲ喚起シタノデアリ
マス。彼ハ在歐ニ歐海軍ハ在日ニ取ツテ非常ニ有利
ニ展開シテヨリ、重大ナル進展モ豫想セラレ、右ニ
鑑ミ、日本ガ歐州ノ指導者トナル獨逸ノ信頼位ビニ
信用ヲ失フコトハ不合理ナルト云フコトヲ松岡ニ
氣ヅカシメタメノデアリマス。大高ハ「新、ル表裏二
面アル外交ハ以後來ルヤモ知レヌ危機ニ於テ、日本
ヲ完全ナ國際的孤立ニ導クデアラウトイフ彼ノ夢
愿ヲ表明シタノデアリマス。彼ハ若シ日本ガ米國ノ

P-99

QQ-32

1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010

ツタノデアリマス。

0159 0015 2519

棄ヲ忌除スルモノデアルト彼ハ違ベタノデアリマス
 彼ハ、三山同盟ハ既ニ日本ノ編入セラル處ニシテ日本
 國民ノ迫ルベキ道ハ既示セラレタトイフ事ニシテ
 松岡ノ注意ヲ喚起シタノデアリマス。彼ハ若シ條約
 締結ガ不可違アラバ日本ハ少クとも、日本ハ獨伊ノ
 對美戦ヲ援助シ、以テ既ニ對スル米國ノ局外中立ヲ
 棄メルベキデアリ、又日本ハ三山同盟ニ蓋ツキ右以
 事ニ參加スベキ義務ヲ有スル事ヲ既示スル(2)等ノ主
 義ヲ堅持セネバナラヌトイフコトヲ熱心ニ松岡ニ諷

QQ-83

a 法廷証 三八一五 在在記 三七九二一

ハ、下記ノ言葉ヲ用ヒタ近御公ノ記述ヲ引用スレ
バソレ以上ノ註釋ヲ加ヘル必要ハナイノデアリマ
ス。

〔法廷代表者ノ影響及ビ大島大使ノ度々ノ執祭
的意見ニ依ツテ、初メカラ曖昧デアツタ外務大
臣ノ態度ハ益々曖昧トナツタコトハ明カデアツ
タ。ソシテ希望ニ添チテ居タ他ノ職員ト對照ヲ

一九四一年七月十二日ニ至ツテ大島ハ日本關係
ノ進展ニ付テ「ヴァイセツカー」ト認識シタノデ
アリマス。木俣テハ太平洋ニ於ケル従軍ノ背後ガ
安全デアルト考ヘテ居ルカドウカト認カレテ、大
島ハ木俣ヲ如何ニ取扱フベキカニ付テノ後自多ノ
意見ハ獨逸側ニ分ツテ居ルト答ヘソシテ後ガ再ビ
最近松岡ニ對シ疏的ニ米國政府トノ會談ヲ打切ル
激勵告シタト答ヘタノデアリマス。(a) 近衛公モ
ソノ同級生ノ中ニ、大島ガ破シイ言葉ヲ使ツテ日
本交渉ニ反對ヲ唱ヘタ事實ヲ記シテ居ルノデアリ
マス。大島ガ日本交渉ニ反對セルソノ行動ニ付テ

0159 0015 2521

OSIIMA Summation-000

トシテ彼一人ノミハ長崎シテ居ルコトガ紛々明
目ニオツテ來タノデアツタ。(b)

五、大島ノ手中ニ勢力ヲ三集中サル

99-84

一九四〇年十二月二十日、三國同盟第四條ニ基
キ、東京、佐林、鹿島ノ三官邸ニ冬々海軍展覽會、
關子軍事情報委員會及ヒ經濟同業公會ガ設置サ
レタノデアリマス。(a) 大島ハ佐林ニアツタ委員
會ハ姓名自ラノ符號ニシテキツイモノデアツテ弊
ノ計略ニ共働作事ニトシテ何等具體的ノ協賛ハ
行ハレナカッタト報告シタノデアリマス。(b) 佐
林ノ軍事情報委員會ガ委員デアツタ横井海軍大將ハ、
其ノ意向中デ、何故ニ海軍委員會ガ效果物ニ具
ノシ能ラズ在リ得ナカッタカト云フ理由ハ、外務
大臣「リツベントロツブレト大島大將ヨリ所ル非
公式委員會ガ設置サレタカラデアルト云フコトヲ

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99-84 99-83

b	佐林	三八二五	佐林記録	三七九七二
a	佐林	五五九	佐林記録	六四一七一〇
b	佐林	三五〇八	佐林記録	三四〇四三

QQ-84

c

法廷記録 三三九七二

QQ-85

ト協力スルヲ待セシメタノデアリマス。

一九四二年一月二日、大島ガ「リツベントロツ
 プ」ニ報知シテ唐ル遼リ日本政府ガ日本ノ代表者
 タル彼ノ手中ニ「戦争ノ共同遂行ノ全分野ニワタ
 ル」一放協力原則ニ關スル凡ユル向應ノ處理位ニ迄
 時猶遼國外相ト、又伊太利ガ協興スル限リニ於テ
 ハ猶遼國外相並ニ伊國大使ト會談スル權能ヲ集中
 シタ事ニ依リ大島ハ更ニ新タナル權力ヲ附與サレ

0 159 00 15 2522

OSHIMA Summation--QQ

認メタノデアリマス。「リツベントロツブ」ト大
島トハ軍事的方法ニ關シテ協議シ獨逸外務省ノ格
式ニ於テ是等會談ガ進メラレテ后々以上、從國
ナ軍事委員會ニ取ツテハ其ノ職務ヲ遂行スル事ハ
困難ナコトデアツタ(c)ト板井ハ語ツテ居ルノデ
アリマス。大島ガ三國同盟ノ下ニ設立サレタ軍事
委員會ノ機能ト義務ヲ尋ツタ事ハ彼ヲシテ共同謀
議ノ目的ヲ實現スル爲ニヨリ一層效果的ニ獨逸外

獨逸外務大臣ト討論スル極限ヲ與ヘラレタコトヲ
 知ラセタ際ニ確認セラレタノデアリマス。儘々ノ
 問題ハ直接空軍、空軍特ニ海軍ニ於テ討論セラレ
 得ルトスルモ政策ノ主要方針ハ彼及ビ外務大臣ノ
 ミニヨリタテラルベキコトハ尙モ重クナコトデア
 ルトイフノガ彼ノ意見テアツタノデアリマス。

QQ-85

a 法廷証 三八一ニ一A
 b

法廷証 三七九〇六
 法廷証 三四二一〇一ニ

OSHIMA Summation-Q.Q

タノデアリマス。

純粋ニ軍事的且経済的ナル細目ニ歸スル問題以外
 ニハ何事モ三國同盟陸軍委員會ノ宣旨、經濟委員會
 ニヨリ直接處理サレザル事ニナツテ中タノデアリ
 マス。(a) 大島ハ斯々ル訓令ヲ受ケタコトヲ否
 認シ彼ハ「リツベントロツプ」ト政等問題ニ歸シ
 謝シラシタコトハアルガ新政策ニ歸スル決定ガ爲
 サレタトイフヤワナコトハ全然ナカツタト述べタ
 ノデアリマス。(b) 然シナガラ知々ル訓令受領ノ

事實ハ一九四二年一月三日「ヒツトラ」トノ會
 談ニ於テ大島ガ彼ハ本國政府ヨリ「戦争ノ遂行ヲ

QQ-85

c
法廷記 三八一三一A
法廷記 三七九一三

F、大島八日強襲兵力ヲ戦守ノ共同遂行ニ務
用スルコトヲ提唱シ三國聲明ノ許第三
ラ政治的奴隷ノ地位ニ降参セシムルコト
ヲ企圖セル協定ヲ獨断ト有義ス。

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

濟並ビニ歐(船)防艦ニ於テモ同ジ事ガ云ヘルノデア
リマス。『(○)大島ハ最モ重大ナル軍艦位ニ選
濟艦艦ヲ編進三編ト詳スル既定條例ニ從ヒ之ヲ
艦艦シ又次ニ示サルカガ如キ問題ニ關スル政令ヲ
指導セント努力シタノデアリマス。

7 159 00 15 2524

將來ニ到ルマテ世界ヲ制シテ統禦セントノ役等
ノ謀計ヲ立テルニ必要ヲ協力ノ益健ヲ置クヨロ
ナ深イ計畫カマサレテ居タノテアリマス。

Q.Q-87

三國同盟ノ條規ニ一減シ又共同謀議者等ノ計
畫ニ減ヒ、大島ト「リツベントロツプ」トハ一
九二二年三月廿三日和議締結下ノ試案一箇節
加脱ト日本指下ノ大東亞國トノ間ニ於ケル將

Q・Q-86

三國同盟中ニ表示サレタ如ク世界新秩序建設

ノ共同謀議者等ノ共同計畫ハ死活ニ關スル主權

ヲ擅斷シテニ議定セサルニテノ國家ヲ孤立セシ

メ經濟的救済ノ地位ニ墮落セシメルコトヲ企圖

シタリテアリマス。是ハ三國同盟下ニ於ケル世

界經濟統制計畫ニ關スル大島一ツベントロツ

プーノ交渉ノ新紀元ニ使ハレタルトモツタリテアリ

マス。右ハ三國同盟締結國ガ從事シテキル戰爭

ガ成功ヲ了了シテケレバ達成シ得ザルモノナリ

アリマス。然レ一方ニハ是等ノ復讐戰爭ガ行

ハレテキル間ニ復讐國ニ對シテ是等ノ戰爭ヲ有

利ニ終結スルヲ助ケルノミナラズ又遠力送イ

0159 0015 2525

高、及び工業設備は日本に送るべきことになり起へ
 る、ナマリマス。是ハ日獨經濟力ノ相互利用契
 ノ一節ナマツルノナマリマス。右ニ關連シ、大
 島ハ先キ日本國府ノ監督ヲ受ケスニ後自身ノ
 營業ニテ、獨逸ハ彼モ無異ナル獨逸銀ノ物賣引
 銀ニ對シ五十萬圓ノ仕切矣被貸出ヲ請ヘテノ三
 年間總計一億圓ノ貸出ヲ日本ニ許容スベキコト

QQ-17

a、法廷證 三八一九 法廷記録 二六九六

0159 0015 2526

OSHIMA Summation—QQ

來ノ経済的効力ニ付テ論議シ石川説ニ於テハ、
 三ノ向直補給出ニ對シテハ特恩的デアリ、又出
 來品ノ限リ第三ニ、税ヲホシテ新採スル大規模
 ナル經濟施設ヲ樹立スル事ヲ具ノ目的ニシテ論
 示サレテ居ルヲアヒマス。(a) 尤キニ大島ハ
 「リツベントロツプ」ニ向ツテ、「原料生産」
 ノ臨洋的取組」ノ開發ヲ相用ハ作以テ其後ト進行
 シテ進捗シテ居ルコト、或ビハ日本ハ東亞ノ商
 物ヲ獨逸ニ送ルコトヲ容易ニセント最善ヲ懸シ
 テ居ルコトヲ指論シテアヒマス。彼ハ獨逸
 ハ西來品ノ限リニ對シテ獨逸製、其原料、原料

テ其ノ方以治ニ依ニ惡イ形ヲ以テ示サナイヨウ
 ニ決定スベキデアルト彼ハ述ベタノデアリマス。
 大島ハ經濟關係ニ就イテノ條約取扱メノ考ニ熱
 意的ニ同意シテ現在ノ競争ニ於テ本國ヨリ屈服セ
 シメルコトヲ困難ナラニウツ、又戰後ハ日本及
 他國ノ經濟ホイコツトニ就ツテ經濟方法ニ於
 テ對米取給ヲ行ハサケルハナラナイカニ右ノ事
 ハ尙一層重要テアルト述ベタノデアリマス。

QQ-07 b	法廷證	三八一	二一 A	法廷証録	三七九	〇六一七
" "	" "	三八一	八一 A	" "	三七九	〇三七
" "	" "	三八一	八一 B	" "	三七九	〇三九

0159 0015 2527

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

ヲ提議シタルテアリマス。(b)

QQ-88

懇求ノ経済協定ニ就スル旨議ハ一九四二年五月九日夏ニ議ケレタルテアリマス。「リツベントロツプ」ハ凡ユル政治的特ニ凡ユル経済的諸問題ニ計畫ノ出發點トシテ於テスニモ又將來ニテ長期間、總テノ關係問題ノ解決ニ有益ナルコトガ立證サレタル三回同盟ヲアルコトヲ提議シタルテアリマス。三回同盟ニ依ツテ創設サレタル二大政治體ハ前以テ其ノ經濟關係ヲ決シ

0159 0015 2528

OSHIWA Summation-QQ

「リツベントロツプ」の公法がルベ半自治的以
徴メト重要項目を包含スル非公法ノ秘密的規程
ノ作前ノ現狀ヲ、是ヲ起イテ大島ノ根本的ニ國
意スル旨通ク、メテアヒマス。「リツベントロ
ツプ」ト大島方被承認スル意メテ諸職ノ起イテ
案ニマテ及テ世界制約近ビニ履解計畫ノ意奉
メテモメテ次ノ提案ヲ會ムモノテアヒマス。

(一) 三國間並ニ或ルニ大島内ノ經濟協力ノ修正

メテ大島制約ニモツテ切斷サルベキコト

(二) 諸制約ノ其ノ自然的ノ經濟的便宜ニ依ツテ

ニ島内ノ獨立國家ノ經濟政策ニ制約ニ對テ

及ボシ是ニ依ツテ是等獨立國家ニモツテ大

島ノ經濟政策ヲ遂行セシムルコト。右ニ依

リ遂ヒニハ三國間並ニ會合ツテ一ニ依リシ

メテ又關稅及通貨ノ方面ニモ影響ヲ及ボス

モノト期待セラル。

(三) 三國間並ニ或ルニ大島内ノ經濟ノ修正ニ於

テ互ニ特權ヲ與ヘシムルコト。右ノ修訂

案ニ依リ、局外者對シテ大島内ノ經濟政策ニ對シ

テ他國ノ干渉が形勢ヨリ強制的ニ行ハ

P-109

Q.Q.-88

a、
松尾屋
三八二C
I
A
松尾屋
三九七C
I
三

7159 0015 2529

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

出せしむるノヲ防止スル手段及營業口ノ必具
ヲ充スマテハ重要商口ノ第三口へノ販賣價
減等ヲ企圖セラルベシナラズ

(四)

戦後歐口ノ經濟關係ノ復舊並ニ繼續ハ二
等口商ノ相互同意ノ上ニテ始メテ行フコ
トヲ待ベシ。是ハ特ニ不圖中爾米諸口ニ適
用セララル、モノトス。

(五)

二經濟圏内ニ於テ經濟的ニ獨立シテキル商
事會社例へハ日本ニ於ケル三井企業ノ如キ
モノガ此一計畫ヲシテハ經濟機關ニ反對
スルコトナラバ其結果は去スル方策ヲ取ラ
ルベキコト也。(E)

シカカ其ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 大島ハ其ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 ニ違ハラシクシテ多ク其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 在ニ於テ其ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 カクハ其ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 共同ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 了ツテ其ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 公衆ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 ツルノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 此等ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ
 此等ノ言ニ對スル其ノ前ノ起ラ其ノ實ニ在ルヲ加メタルノ事(○)アリ

06510 5100 6510

屬シタカドウヲ訊カレテ大長ハ^(a)ソウ云フ事ハ^(b)イタ
 事カナカツタ。^(b)ト答ヘタノデアリマス。彼ハ
 又佛領印度支那ニ空軍並ビニ海軍基地ヲ建設スル
 コトニ^(c)シテ彼ノ意見ヲ訊カレタ事モテク又^(c)ソウ
 云フ事ヲ考ヘタ事モナカツタ。^(c)ト^(c)言シタ
 ノデアリマス。

90-90 a 最後報告一カ一ロニ
 b

法廷記録 三二二八四

法廷記録 三二二〇五

c

0159 0019 2531

OSEIMA SUMMATION—Q.Q.

此等ノ政策及ビ協定ヲ日、獨、伊ノ法律ニ依テ遂
ミタル上ハ、最早ヤ武力闘争ニ於ケル成功ノミガ
全世界ノ交戦國及ビ非交戦國ニ政治的並ニ經濟的
服従ノ物ヲ謀スルニ必妥ナスベテトナツタノデア
リマス。

G 大島ハ日本ノ中國以南ノ地域及ビ南洋ニ於ケル武力

ニ依ル領土擴張ヲ指導ス。之等地域ノ開發ヲ可トシ、

武力使用ノ際使用スル空軍及ビ海軍基地ヲ交渉ス。

Q.Q-90

日本ノ侵略ノ中國以南ノ地域及ビ南洋ニ對スル

發展ハ最終通告中ニ詳シク述ベテアルノデアリマ

ス。(a) 日本ノ印度支那開發ヲ承認シ、其レニ實

QQ-91

a 新報 五〇六

法廷記録 六一三六一七

QQ-90

a

法廷記録 三三三〇七

彼ハ日本ガ東印度ノ原料ヲ發ヲ利用スル等ガ出来
ルヤウニ日本ハ和蘭ヲ美口カラ引離スベク努力ス
ベキテアルトノ意見ヲ持ツテ居ツタノチアリマス。(a)

一九四〇年十月發表セラレタ「同盟」ヲ積極化
シ……外交ノ受動性ヲ遣ケヨ」ト題スル論文ノ中

0159 0015 2532

OSEIMA SUMMATION—QQ

QQ—91

彼ハ日本ノ印度支那進出ニ當テ贊成シタ事ハナカ
 ツタト思フト造ベタノデアリマス。(d) 併シ乍ラ
 大島カ佛領印度支那及ビ其ノ他ノ南方地域ニ對ス
 ル武力ニ依ル佛土擴張ヲ嚮導シ、是等地域ノ開發
 ニ贊成シ、又一帯「國、高領東印度」シンガポ
 ル」ニ對スル武力侵襲ニ使用スル海、陸軍並ニ地獲
 得ノ爲メ逸ニ援助方交渉シタコトハ證據カ示シテ
 居ルノデアリマス。

一九三九年九月大島ハ「ヒットラー」ノ對波蘭
 戰爭開始ニ時ヲ合セ彼ノ云フ所ニ依レバ日本海軍
 カ準備シテ居タト云フ大東亞ノ南滿地嶺及ビ香港
 ニ對スル軍事侵襲ヲ勸告シタノデアリマス。

0159 0015 2533

OSHIIMA SUMMATION—QQ

テ彼ハ三國同盟以前既ニ長期ニ互リ日本ハ大東亞
新秩序ヲ建設シ「南方諸國」トノ所謂相互協調並
ニ共榮ニ導ク島嶼ヲ樹立スル使命ノ遂行 (b) ヲ決
意シテ居タトイフコトニ言及シタノデアリマス。
我々ノ知ル如ク、彼ハ日本政府ハ三國同盟締結當
時、大東亞國ハ西方ニヨル南方進出ヲ行ハズシテ
ハ達成セラレ得ズト考ヘテ居タトノ意見ヲ抱イテ
居タノデアリマス。(c)

ノ希望ヲ有ツテ居ル旨ヲ通知シタノデアリマス。
 右ノコトハ日本ノ軍隊ガ新嘉坡ニ向ヒ合ツタ好
 戦地點ヲ設置スル事ヲ欲シテ居タ事ニ遊ル
 事ガ出來ルト彼ハ開ツタノデアリマス。(b) コレ
 ニ就イテ一九四一年七月十二日、大島ハ「ヴア
 イセツカー」ニ、南都印度又ハニ航空機並ニ暖
 爐ノ基地トシテ取ル地點ヲ百餘スルコトハ日本

d、法廷証 六五五 法廷記録 マー一八

QQ-92

QQ-93

a、波終請告 g 四三一三一 g 一四二
 b、法廷証 六三三 法廷記録 六〇九
 法廷証 三八六 法廷記録 六三六〇

3159 0015 2535

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

QQ-93

マシタ。(d)

南方地域ニ於ケル侵略計畫ハ爾領東印度ノ占
 據ヲ含ムモノデアリマシタガ日本ハ爾ニ對シ
 其ノ要求ヲ強印ニ行フコトガ出來ナカツタノデ
 アリマス (a) 右矢致ハ夏ニ、迅速且ツ效果的ナ
 軍事行動ヲ開始シ得ル兩部印度支那ニ於ケル海
 軍並ニ航空基地ヲ獲得セントノ日本ノ行動ニ新
 タナル動機ヲ加フルニ至ツタノデアリマス。一
 九四一年六月十日、大島ハ勿論ニ向ツテ、日本
 軍ハ兩部領印度支那ニ海軍基地ヲ獲得セント

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

ノ重大懸念ヲアルト述ベタノデアリマス。同機
 會ニ大島ハ更ニ彼自身トシテハ南郷印展支那方
 西ヘ向ツテノ行動ハ切迫セルモノトハ考ヘナイ
 ケレドモ、日本ハ好機ヲ待ツテ居ルノデアラウ
 ト考ヘル旨述ベタノデアリマス。(c) 一九四一年
 七月十七日、大島ハ「リツベントロツプ」ニ、
 日本以府ハ何ヨリモ先ツ印展支那ニ於ケル海軍
 並ニ航空基地ヲ獲得セントノ牢固ナル決意ヲ以
 テ佛蘭西政府ト交渉ヲ開始シタト通告シテ居ル
 ノデアリマス。石訃聖ノ實現ハ日本南進ノ第一
 歩デアルト彼ハ言ツタノデアリマス。彼ハ、此
 ノ行動ハ其、米軍ヲ牽制スルモノデアツテ、コ
 ノ意味テ三國同盟ノ精神ニ則リ製造及ヒ伊太利
 ヲ援助スルモノデアルコトヲ説キ示シタノデア
 リマス。ソレカラ大島ハ刻ニ日本政府ニ味方
 シ、日本ト佛蘭西トノ交渉ニ於テ日本ヲ援助ス
 ルコトヲ要求シタノデアリマス。(d)

QQ-93

c、	法廷證	三八一五	法廷記録	三〇九二〇
d、	法廷證	六四二	法廷記録	四〇四六一七

方テアルカニ就イテ調査セルクメナシク、
 大島ハ彼ニ後ノ意見テハ、日本ノ前方進出ハ日本
 ノ石油ニ對スル緊急ナル必要ニ達ケルキモノナル
 旨進言シ、且ツ其方進出ノ意味ヲ説明シテ、彼ハ
 「ボルネオ」島ノ占領ガ就中心ナル旨ヲ述ベテ
 キマス。會議期間中地ニラ檢討シテ「ボルネオ」
 ガ日本軍ニヨリ占領サレテキル印度支那ノ地ニヨ
 リ、一千キロノ距離テアルコトヲ確メラレマシム。

a、 最終報告 G-143-144
 b、 法廷證 三八三三—ム 法廷報告 三六九六七

OSHIMA SUMMATION-Q.Q.

Q.Q-94

日本が軍事行動ノ試斷ニ依リ南滿洲ニ海軍及び
航空ノ基地獲得後ニ^(a)「ニルドマンズドルフ」ハ

「リツベントロツプ」ヨリ大島大使ト相談スル様
命セラレマシタ。ソノ會議中、大島ハ、南方地域
ニ對スル行動ハ準備サレ、此ル同盟ハタゞ何時「
事ヲ始メル」ベキカナルト通告シタノヲシタ。ソ
レハ、ソレハ、英國ニ對スル協定作戦ト相俟タネ
バナラストノ意見ヲ表明シマシタ。^(b)

一九四一年十一月十七日、「ニルドマンズドルフ」
ハ再び「リツベントロツプ」ノ命ニヨリ大島ト會
談シマシタ、今回ハ日本ノ進駐ガ北方サアルカ

0159 0015 2537

『ノガボール』ニ於テハ『ニ京中』ニ於テハ『カノミヤ』ト稱ス

(『カノミヤ』ト稱スニ於テハ『ニ京中』ト稱ス)

是クノテマリマシカク(『カノミヤ』ト稱ス)

於テハ『カノミヤ』ト稱スニ於テハ『カノミヤ』ト稱ス

是ノ日本ノ兵三ツノカクシテハ『カノミヤ』ト稱ス

考ニシテハ『カノミヤ』ト稱スニ於テハ『カノミヤ』ト稱ス

ト稱ス」ガボールニ於テハ『カノミヤ』ト稱ス

ト稱ス」ガボールニ於テハ『カノミヤ』ト稱ス

ト稱ス」ガボールニ於テハ『カノミヤ』ト稱ス

II、大島、日本ノ鐵道早急行切ニ鐵道ヲ
 且ツ建設セシメ日本ヲ加セシメシ
 ト努カス。

荷越ノ澎湖那波環後、大島ハ澎湖那ニ對スル美
 同該環ノ目的促進ニ其ノ活動ヲ振ケ、日本ノ對露
 早急行切ヲ主張シタルヲアリマシタ。コレハ、日
 露不可侵條約アルトモ若シ「ヒツトラ」ニシテ
 暴乃手取ニヨリ露國國境ヲ侵蝕セシトスルニ於
 テハ如何ナルカモ日本ガ獨逸國ニ味方ヲシ置置置
 シ攻撃スルコトヲ防衛スルコトハ出来ナイト云フ
 大島ノ條約ト一致スルモノヲアリマシタ。(a) (b) (c)
 ノ攻撃ハ一九一一年六月廿二日付ハレマシタ。(d)
 其ノ一週同域内ノ、一九一一年六月廿八日、「リ
 ツベ」トロツツア一ハ、東京陸軍「キツト」大演ニ
 大島ガ彼ノ政府、且ツ鐵道早急行切ヲトラ
 シタルト云フ大島トノ關係ニ對シタル重ラ記載ス
 ルコトガ出来タノヲアリマシタ。(e)

a、松尾重 一〇六八 松尾記 一〇六八
 c、 〃 〃 〃 〃
 d、 〃 〃 〃 〃
 e、 〃 〃 〃 〃
 一〇六八 〃 〃 〃 〃
 三六七 〃 〃 〃 〃
 一〇六八 〃 〃 〃 〃
 一〇〇三三 〃 〃 〃 〃

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QQ-95

e	d
、	、
〃	〃
	〃
三三〇八	一〇二七
〃	〃
	〃
三三〇六	一〇〇六

大島カ時ヲ知サズ其ノ方面ニ對スル彼ノ方ノ地位
ヲアラハセルコトハ外務省ヨリ出タル秘密文ニヨ
レバ大島大使ハ日本以テ是ニ對シテ攻讐スル
ヤウ切ニ要請シテキルト「オット」ガ「リツベン
トロツプ」ニ請キシテキル是日當ノ電報ヲ讀ラカ
テアリマシム^(a)ニツノ異ツタ出所カラ來テキルコ
ノ證據ニ接シ、大島ハ二通ノ電報ノ内容ヲ既述ニ
吞ヒシテ居リマス^(o)

0159 0015 2540

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QQ-96

8、

ニ進出シテ獨日間ノ陸上連絡線同ニ貢獻スレ
バ好都合デアルコト、彼ハ屢本^々國政府ニ謝多
テ其意ヲ建策セルコト又其ノ建策ニ從フ行
動ガ速カニ執ラレルコトヲ希望スル事等ヲ述
ベタノデマリマス。一九四一年十一月十七日
附ノ電報ノ一部ヲ、證據トシテ朗讀サレナカ
ツタセノニ依レバ、大島ハ時期ノ點ヨリシテ

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

會談ヲ取扱ツテキマス。大島ハ反對尊問ニ於
 テ、彼ハ獨逸外務省ノ部長ト語ル如キ機會ハ
 無カツタト最初ハ否認シマシタガ、後ニ至ツ
 テ否認ノ範圍ヲ「公式ノ相談」ニ縮少シ、上
 述一九四一年十一月七日ノ電報中ニ報セラレ
 タ商談ノ趣意ニ就イテ詳細ニ尋ネラレタ時、
 彼ハ該電報中ニ尋ゲラレテキル自分^(g)ノ發言ヲ
 思ヒ出セヌト回避的ニ述ベテキマス。(一九四
 一年十月十八日ノ電報ニ依レバ大島ハ、「シ
 ベリヤー」ヨリノ露西亞ノ新師團ガ獨逸前線へ
 出現セルコトニ疑スル「エルドマンズドルフ」
 ノ言葉ニ答ヘテ若シ日本軍ガ某部「シベリヤー」

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QQ-97

、法廷証三八一九

法廷記 三一九四

ニ付テハ公式ノ通報ニ接シ居ラザルモ清國及ビ
「バイカル」湖方面ニ對スル日本軍ノ進出ニ
特別ノ意義アリトスル「リツベントロツプ」
ノ意見ニ同意スルシ、又斯カル好機會ハ再來
セザルセノト思フ故、今年政府ガ浦鹽及ビ東
部「シベリヤ」ニ對スル進出ヲ企テル事自ラ
進ンデ盡力シヨウト云ツタノデアリマス。^o(a)

0159 0015 2543

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ-97

對赤軍舉行功ハ制限サレタ小規模ニシカ實施
サレ待ズ、浦縣知德ノ攻撃或ハ「バイカル」
湖方面ヘノ進軍サヘセ當時ハ殆ト不可能テ、
當時ノ事情下ニ於テハ春マデ延期サレナクテ
ハナラナイダロウト述ベテキルノデアリマス。

浦縣及ビ「バイカル」湖方面ニ對シ日本軍
ヲ進出セシムル大島ノ計畫ハ、早速次ノ春再
ビ「リツベントロツブ」ニヨリ取上ゲラレマ
シタ。一九四二年三月二十三日「リツベント
ロツブ」トノ協議ニ於テ、大島ハ日本ノ意圖

66-98

a、法廷證三八二一

法廷記 三九三八一九

ク不自然ナル状態ヲ終止セル爲努力シテ居ル
ト「ヴァアイスゼツケル」ニ保證シタコトヲ判
然ト報告シテ居ルカラデアリマス。

--QQ-98

大島ハ日本ノ露西亞攻撃ニ賛成デナク、單
 ニ獨逸ノ要求ヲ本國政府ニ報告スル大使ノ任
 務ヲ行ヒタルニ過キナカツタノデアルト云フ
 大島ノ主張モ亦一九四二年四月二十一日附ノ
 「ヴァイスゼツケル」發「リツベントロツ
 プ」宛覺書ニ依ツテ反証サレルセノデアリマ
 ス。何故ナレバコノ覺書中ニ於テ「ヴァイス
 ゼツケル」ハ大島ガ自ラ進ンデ日本ガ東亞ニ
 於テ露西亞軍ヲ攻撃スルコトガ如何ニ當然ノ
 コトニ彼ニ思ヘタカラ語リ、又獨逸ガ烈シク
 戦ツテ居ル露西亞ト云フ點ト日本ガ今日尙平
 和ニ又親密ナ隣人ラシク暮シテ居ルト云フ全

0159 0015 2544

シタノテシタ。彼ハ彼カ日本ノ封露攻撃ノ絶對性
 ラ確信シテ居リ、獨乙ノ成功ニ關シ丁度述べタ計
 リノ「リツベントロツブ」ノ説明通り東京ニ區ニ
 報告スルコトヲ約束シタト述ベマシタ。獨乙ニハ
 大長ハソノ考ヘニ非^(b)常ニ熱心ノ様デアツタト記シ
 テキルノテアリマス

QQ-99

a、

b、 法廷証 三八一六―A

法廷証 三四二七一

法廷証 三七九二五

猶乙ハコレ迄ノ取扱ヒ期間中日本ノ對露戰參加
 ラ要求シナカツタコトヲ既述證據ノ凡テガ立證シ
 テ居リ、又一方前述ノ如ク大島ハ此ノ種ノ唯一ノ
 正式要求ハ一九四三年ノ夏ニ行ハレタト主張シテ
 キルノデアリマスガ、(a) 一九四二年七月九日
 ノ「リツベントロツプ」大島會談ノ學書ヨリシマ
 スト、コノ日「リツベントロツプ」ハ日本ノ對露
 攻撃ノ待知ナルヲ提案シタ様ニ思ハレルノデアリ
 マス。大島ハ此カニ之ヲ「正式要求」トハ考ヘナ
 カツタトハ云ヘ、彼ハ隣時ニ且ツ明確ニ之ニ對處

フ意見ヲ唱道セルコト、彼自身モ再三好機ノ利用
 ラ提テシコレハ日蓮國内ニ於テモ銘記セラレハル
 ベキコト、茲ニ彼ハ兩方戦場ニ於ケル竹藪ノ必委
 ナルニモ拘ハラズ、砲力ニ劣匹亞ニ對シ一擧ヲ加
 ヘルコトニ賀服デアル旨ヲ附ケ加ヘタノデアリマ
 ス、彼ハ又丁度彼ノ許ニ到着シタ時答ヲ最後ノモ

159 0015 2546

OSHIMA SUMMATION-2Q
QQ-100

「リツベントロツプ」ノ提案ヲ傳達セル際、大島ハ「送カナル對條違出並ニ印度洋ニ於ケル其船積無力化ノ強力ナル指遣ガ然ルベキデアルト」トイフ彼自身ノ意見ヲ附ケ加ヘタノテアリマス。一九四二年七月三十日、日本側回答、即チ斯クノ如キ情況下ニ於テハ日本ノ對條行動ハ日本ノ国力ヲ餘リニ分散サセルモノナリ、ト云フ回答ヲ傳ル。セル際彼ハ彼僑人トシテハ對條並ニ一擊ヲ加ヘルニ好ノ機會方日本ノ商ニ現ハレタト考ヘ居ルコト、更ニ日本は軍又石ノ如キ對條行動ハ必要ナリトイ

0199 0015 2547

OSHIMA SUMMATION-QQ

ノトハ考ヘ居ラサルコト及ビ多分變遷行動ハ猶十
月前ニ可能ナルベキコトヲ述ベタノデアリマス。
コノ會議ニ於テ、自己ノ意見デハ北方進出ハ日
ノ運命ノ懸ル問題デアリ、自分ハ常ニ本國政府真
ニ「リツベントロツプ」ニ練リ送シテキル問題ヲ
アルト述ベタノガ大島デアルト云フコトハ意味深
キコトデアリマス。「リツベントロツプ」ハ單ニ
大島ト全ク意見ヲ同シクスル言ヲ述ベ、日ムカ北
方進出ヲ取行スルニ足ル種強イモノト且ク感ジテ
實ヒ反キ言フ述ベタノデシタ^(a)...

QQ-101

一九四三年三月日、本政府ト大本營ハ樺太
ノ御遊ノ接請ヲ既イテ審議シマシタ。此ハ大島ガ
「公武」ト見做シタ接請デアルト推定シ得ル、一
九四三年三月六日ノ「リツベントロツプ」トノ會
談ニ於テ、大島ハ此等ノ審議ノ結果、即チ、日本
政府ハソノ同盟國御遊ノ接請ヲ充分諒解シテ居ル
ガ然シ日本ノ現在ノ戦況ニ鑑ミ戦艦ニ入ルコト

QQ-100

e, 公武遊 一八二二一A 公武遊記 一七九六一一五

區區カ以學シテモ軍備ハ整ツテキルガソレニ對ス
 ル攻勢ニ對シテハ不充分ナ軍隊シカ屬サレテキ
 ナイト附言シタコトヲ示シテキマス。(a)

a. 法廷証 八一ニ一A 法廷証 八〇ニ一〇一八

OSHIMA SUMMATION—QQ

トハ不可能ナリト慰ズルト云フコトヲ信スシマシ
 タ。大島ハ此ニ就イテ詳述シ、右問題ヲ日本ノ急
 メニ決定スルモノハ日本ガ現ニ有スル敵ノ如ニ
 他ノ戦線ニ於ケル作戦ヲ危険ニ陥ラシムルコトナ
 ク爲ル要ヲ攻撃シ敗ル爲メニ充分ナル實際ヲ有ス
 ルヤ否ヤ及ビ日本ノ軍備能力カソレニ充分ナリヤ
 否カデアルト述ベマシタ。俄ハ長年日本ハ蘇聯ヲ
 敵トスル意圖ヲ有シテキタコトラ知ツテキルガ、
 差シ當ツテ、日本ハ明カニソワスル力ガナイト慰
 ジテキルト述ベマシタ。證據トシテ朗言サレナカ
 ツタコノ會談ノ宛書ノ一部ハ俄カ及日本ハ假令俄

0159 0015 2548

0 159 00 15 2549

OSHIMA SUMMATION-G1

190--102

一九四三年四月十八日ニ「リツベントロツプ」
 トノ其ノ後ノ會議ニ於テ、大島ハ「リツベント
 ロツプ」ニ日本ハ若シ其ノ方面ノ成功ガ兎ニ為ル
 期シテラルルナラバ必ズ「ロシア」ヲ攻撃スベキ
 旨、及ビ彼ハ最近二十年間參謀本部ノ計畫ハ「ロ
 シア」攻撃ノ爲ニ作成シ來ツタコト、並ニ尙依然
 トシテ斯カル攻撃ノ方向ニ向ケラレテ居ル (a)ト
 了解シテ居ル旨ヲ保證シマシタ。又近ク一九四四
 年九月ニ「ヒットラー」ガ將來何日カ赤軍ニ對シ
 再ビ攻勢ニ出ヤウトノ希望ヲ甲出タ會議ニ於テ大
 島ハ彼ニ日本ハ最後ノ勝利ガ達成セラレル迄ハ「
 ドイツ」ノ側ニ立ツテ戦フベキ旨及ビ日本ガ最後
 進行クベキ道ハ只一ツシカナイノテ是ヲ實現スル
 爲メニハ最後ノ軍隊迄モ使用スベキ旨ヲ保證シマ
 シタ (b)

190--103

一九四一年六月二十八日附「リツベントロツプ」
 及ビ「オット」ノ電報並ニ一九四一年十一月十七
 日附「エルドマンズドルフ」ノ電報ノ内容ヲ大島

F-129

190--102

a、法廷證 三八三九一A
 b、" 三八六一

法廷記録 三六二七六七
 " 三六五一九一三〇

0159 0015 2550

OSHIWA SUMMATION-Q6

ガ否定シタノト全く同様ニ、彼ハ一九四二年三月二十三日ノ「リツベントロツプ」トノ會談ラ記憶 (a) セズト否定シ、一九四二年四月二十一日「ライゼカール」ト會談シタコト (b) 一九四二年七月九日ノ「リツベントロツプ」トノ會談ニ「(c) スル」覺悟ノ彼ガシタト云ハレル筈ニ行ツタコト (d) ヲ否認シ、又一九四二年七月三十日 (e) 及ヒ一九四三年三月六日 (e) ノ「リツベントロツプ」トノ會談ニ於ケル彼ノ言葉ヲ記憶セズト否認シタノデアリマス。我々ハ各私ノ獨逸自更ノ發シ、ソシテ殆ンド二ケ年ニ真リ彼カ行ツタ會談ヲ網羅スル獨逸ノ公式文書ニ含まレル證據ノ斯ノ如ク連續的ニ否認スルコトハ證人トシテノ大島ノ信用性ヲ完全ニ破壞スルニ役立チ在ルノミデアルト王辰シマス。此等文書ハ大島カ本國政府ヲ對蘇侵略ノ方向ニ向ハシメル爲メソノ獨逸ノ共同謀議者ト協力シテ絶エズ彼ノ地位ヲ利用シタコトヲ決定的ニ示スモノデアリマス。

F-130

Q6-103	a、	法廷記録	三四二七七
	b、	〃	三四二七七
	c、	〃	三四二七八—八〇
	d、	〃	三四二八一—八二
	e、	〃	三四二八三

99-104
 a 存 延 慶 大 10
 b 存 延 慶 大 11
 c 存 延 慶 大 12
 d 存 延 慶 大 13
 e 存 延 慶 大 14

スルニテ、
 一、
 二、
 三、
 四、
 五、
 六、
 七、
 八、
 九、
 十、

OSHIHA SUMMATION-QQ

月二十三日又ハ其レ以前ニ日本陸軍ニ停ヘラレタ
 時、前本將軍ハ合衆國ト交戦ノ際、獨逸ハ日本ヲ
 見捨てザルベシトノ事ガ再ビ確言セラレタノヲ見
 ナ大變喜バシイト言ヒマシタ、ソシア彼ハ日本ガ
 戦争ヲ始メル場合、獨逸ハ米國ト交戦中ナリト考
 ヘルダラワカドウカト尋ネマシタ。彼ハ莫ニ^(d)上
 ハ南方進出作戰ノ好時期ガ切迫シテ居ルノヲ^(d)右
 進出ニ對スル決定ノ促進ヲ主張シテ居ルト言ヒマ
 シタ。當時樞軸諸國ガ石炭國ハ何レカノ一國ガ米
 國ト戦争スル場合ニハソノ戦争原因ノ如何ニ拘ラ
 ス三國全部ノ軍事的參加ヲ規定スルモノト解釋シ
 タ事ハ仲間ノ共同謀議者迄ノ行動ヲ導閉カラ判断
 シテ防隙デアリマス。外務省ノ一主張者ハ三國同
 盟ノ第三條ノ規定ハ三國中ノ一國ト米國トノ如何
 ナル戦争、但シ例ヘバ、三國中ノ一國ガ理由ナク
 米大陸ヲ攻撃スル場合ヲ限クニ適用シ得ルモノト
 考フベキデアルト云フノガ松岡ノ持論デアツタト
 述ベマシタ。^(e)我々が只今見マシク様ニ、一リッ
 ベントロツブルハ日本ノ對米戦争ニ、斯ル戦争ヲ

P-132

QQ-104

d、法廷証六〇三
 e、法廷証六〇八

法廷証六六〇一
 法廷証六六六

98-104

九
八
七
六
五
四
三
二
一

0159 0015 2554

OSHIMA Summation--QQ

紙ニ印シ種 樹タル決電ヲ持ツテ申ルト引用シテ
 アリマス。右以述ノ重長迄ニ對スル大皇ノ所見ヲ
 示スモノトシテ、彼ハ、右電報ノ爲シテ東京ノ陸
 海軍海軍ニ示ス様請求シマシタ。 (b) 「リツベン
 トロツプ」カラコノ言葉ヲ受ケタニモ拘ラズ、大
 島ハ、(c)「ヒットラート」モ協賛スル事命ゼラレマ
 シタ。 (c) 大島ハ彼ノ管使ニモ拘ラズ、獨逸ノ向
 後ハ十二月七日迄延期サレマシタ。 (d) シカシ十
 カラ、獨逸ガ大島ノ管使ニ懸ジツ、アツタコトハ、
 十二月五日ニ「リツベントロツプ」ガムツソリニ
 ニ封シ、至寇庭區スル様、日本ノ戦争参加ノ際ノ
 三國行動ニ對スル計畫並ニ軍務詳細ヲナサザル事
 約ヲ提出シタ事實ニヨリ明カデアリマス。 (e) 一
 九四一年十二月十一日、三國同盟ノ義務ハ三國ガ
 合衆國ニ對スル共同ノ戦争ヲ遂行スルコトニ同意
 シ、右共同戦争ガ成功裡ニ終ル迄ハ秘密ヲ禁テザ
 ルコトヲ誓約シ、又三國間ニ完全ナ了解ナクシテ

E-135

QQ-105

b	法廷証	六〇三	A	法廷記録	六六五〇
c	法廷証	六〇四		法廷記録	六六五二
d	法廷証	三五〇	八	法廷記録	三四〇三五
e	法廷証	六〇七		法廷記録	六六六二

モ、差押へた電報が陸軍トシテ發出サレテ居ルニ
 モ拘ラス、記憶ガナイト否認シマシタ。(a)此ノ
 二ツノ主旨ハ「シテ、大島ハ此ノ電報デ「リッ
 ベントロツフ」ノ言トシテ「若シモ日本ガ謝水儀
 事ニ従事スレバ、撤退ハ勿論直チニ野等ニ参加ス
 ルデアラウ。カクノ如キ情勢ナレバ發給ガ米國ト
 陸軍部ニ行ウ可能ニハ絶對ニナイ。總統ハコノ

99-105

a	法廷証	三五〇八	法廷証	三四〇三〇
法廷証	六六〇三	A	法廷証	六六〇三

QQ-105

日本三軍ガ「オット」ヲ通ジテ申込ヨシタ等ニ
大島ヲ通シテ、正式ノ外交交渉ガ行ハレマシタ。
二ツノ達成スベキ主要目的ガアリマシタ、即チ日
本ノ對不戦争ニ拘逸ノ參加義務ヲ認メル定言ト共
同承認ヲクシテハ個別羣獨語和ヲナサザルベシト
ノ協定ノ締結トデアリマシタ。大島ハ、コノ二ツ
ノ目的ヲ目標トスル交渉ニ參加シタコトヲ否認シ
ナカツタケレドモ、彼ノ努力ノ重要性及ビ効果性
ヲ最少程度ニシヤウト試ミマシタ。彼ハ十一月二
十九日ノ「リツベントロツフ」トノ會談モ、ソノ
會談ノ結果ヲ東京ニ報告スル電報ヲ發送シタコト

0159 0015 2555

大島ハコノ軍事約國結ガ實現シタ喜ヲ表明シマシ
タ。(g)

QQ-106

大島ハ共同謀議者ノ設計書ノ完成ニ於ケル最後
ノ處置、即チ、共同謀議ノ該目的ノ實行ニ當リ他
ノ侵略諸國ヲ日本ト同列ナラシムルコトニ對スル
交渉ニ成功シタノデ、後ハ此等ノ計畫ヲ遂行スル
コトダケガ必要デアリマシタ。大島ハ直ニ「ヒツ
トラー」ノ歓迎會ニ於テ太平洋及び多島海運路ニ
於ケル戰況ニ關シ演説ヲ演スルコトニヨツテ

QQ-105

g	f
法廷證	法廷證
六〇九	五一
法廷証	法廷証
六六七一	六八八一
八〇	

0159 0015 2558

OSHIMA Summation-QQ

ハ不圖又ハ英帝國ノ何レトモ休戰條約又ハ尋知ヲ
締結セザルコトヲ誓約シタ條約ノ締結ニヨリ、承
認サレマシタ。(f) 一九一五年十二月十四日、「
ヒツトラール」ハ大島ノ爲メニ歡迎會ヲ催シ、ソノ
席上ニテ、彼ハ、大島ニ、遂ニハ、緊密ナル軍事
的團結ニ達シタ日獨協力ノ達成ニ對スル彼ノ功ヲ
賞シテ、金、ドイツ勳章大十字勳章ヲ贈リマシタ。

QQ-106

a
法
廷
証

六〇九

法
廷
証
録

六
六
七
一
一
八
〇

行ハレタコトヲ報ジマシタ。彼ハ日本ガ發達サセ
タ此ノ戰國方法及ビ他ノ方法ヲ徇逸ハ要究スベキ
デアルト旋議シマシタ。(a)方法ヲ徇逸ハ要究スベキ

0 159 00 15 2557

OSHIMA Summation—QQ

給メマシタ。彼ハ地圖ヲ用ヒテ比島及ビ「マレー」
半島ニ於ケル日本空軍及海軍ノ成功ヲ示シマシタ。
彼ハ「シンガポール」占領後日本ハ印度へ進ズベ
キコトヲ詔リ又獨逸ト日本ノ作戦ノ同時發生ノ必
要ヲ強調シマシタ。是ヨリ先、日本政府ハ空中魚
雷ノ新發明ヲ獨逸ニ譲渡スコトニヨリ大イニ賛成
シテキルノデアリマス。大島ハ「ヒットラー」ニ
上陸戦方過去三十年間日本ニ於テ非常ニ發達サレ
實施サレヌコノ權ノ鞏ノ反省ガ海軍ニ於テ盛ニ

QQ-107

a、	法廷	三八一	法廷	三六八一
b、	法廷	三八一	法廷	三六八一

ノ決定ハ無シテ又ソノ内容ハ少シモ知
 ラズト云ヘ起ベマシタ。然モ、一九三二年一
 月二日ノ「リツベントヒップ」ノ會議ニ於テ
 經濟的シ方ノ交渉ヲ開始スルニ當リ、彼ハ是等
 交渉ハ目下進行中ノ「軍事シ方」ニ關スル會議ニ
 並行「スベキモノ」ナラト起ベマシタ。(b)

0159 0015 2558

OSIIMA Summation-QQ

QQ-107

共同謀議者ノ計畫遂行ノ次ノ段階ハ一九四二
 年一月十八日ノ三國同盟ノ締結ノ準備協定ノ締
 結ナリマシタ。之ニ依リ世界ハ極東方面ノ作
 戦能力ノ増進帯ニ分裂セリマシタ。各該方面
 是ノ作戦ヲ遂行スベキ規模ニ境界ヲ定メリシタ
 然レテ夫々ノ國ニ經營テラレマシタ。一は作戦
 計畫ハ日本カ獨逸軍艦ニ伊太利軍ト協同シテ、
 南洋諸島域ハ太平洋及び印度洋ニ於イテ作戦ヲ
 遂行スルコトヲ謀期シマシタ。石協定ハ又經濟
 戰ノ計畫實施ノ協同及び心理戰ニ關スル協定ニ
 規定シマシタ。(a) 大島ハ反英專断ノ隊後ハコ

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Q.Q-108

Q.Q-107

Q.Q-108

三、前記ノ取極送行上ノ管領ノ地方ハ以ニ一
 九〇一年十二月七日ヨリスツト以同ニ給メニレ
 且ツ日本方取等申ノ請出ニ對シテノミ向ケニレ
 テ居バノテハオカツタコハ注意スベキ事ナマ
 二マス。餘切事ニ關スル情報ノ交換ハ獨斷不使
 斷續的印後ノ一時的停止ニ依キ一九三七年カ
 ラ起エズ取ケニレマシタ。 (a) 走ハ大島ガ大使

c、

法廷記録 二六五八六

d、法廷證

三八一三一A

法廷記録

二七九一一二

a、法廷證

四八七

法廷記録

六〇二二

OSHIWA Summation-QQ

野村證人ハ大島ガ交渉開始ノ折衝ヲシテコトヲ
 認メマシタ。(c) 併シ當時大島ノテシテ預述ニ
 依ルバ、彼等ノ大船ハ尋ラ彼及ビ「ロツベント
 ロツプ」ニ依リ定メラシムルコトニオツテ居リ、
 他方「空海軍」ハ「彼等ノ同意」ヲ協議スルコト
 ニオツテ居ツタトイフコトヲ考慮スルバ、大島
 ノ參與ノ此ノ制界ハ眞實ヲシクナイテアリマ
 ス。(d) 大島カ國文學ニ著信シテカツタトハイ
 へ、協定カ爾ノ結果ニ屬シ、從ツテ大島ノ指圖
 分岐ニ屬スルモノキアツルコトニハ何ノ疑モア
 リテナイノテアリマス。

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QQ-108

e、	d、	c、	b、
法廷證		"	法廷證
八八九		八一	八八
"	"	"	法廷證
六〇二六	八〇一一二	七九五八	六〇二三
			一四

証人直武官ハリシ同ノミナニス彼ガ大使トナ
ツタ後ニ於テモ、野原^(c) 證人ノ證言及び彼ノ宣
誓口供書ヲ述ジテ證據^(d) トシテ提出セラルタ文
書ニ依ツテ示サレル通り大島ノ監督下ニ爲サレ
タノテアリマス^(b) 彼ガ大使テアツタ間、獨逸所
業機關ハ彼ノ破壞的活動ニ協力シマシタ^(e)

0159 0015 2567

テ后リマシタ。既ニ示サレタ様ニ、一九四一年二月廿三日ノ「リツベントロツプ」トノ大詔ノ會談直後ノ指令書第廿四號(d)ニ於テ「ヒットラー」ハ日本ノ戦争可能性ヲ強化スル必兵ヲ方説シ軍隊ノ各支隊ノ高級司令官ヘ獨逸戦争ノ通信及ビ戰術經驗ニ關スル日本ノ要求ニ包括的全般的不應ズルヤウ戦争經濟並ニ技術事項ヲ援助スル様指令シマシタ(e)

QQ-109

a	法廷証書	五七一	法廷証書	六四六五
b			法廷証書	二四二四八一六
c			法廷証書	二五二五〇
d	附記	QQ-103		
e	法廷証書	五七三	法廷証書	六四七〇

0159 0015 2561

OSHIMA SUMMATION—QQ

QQ—109

一九四一年二月廿三日「リッペン・ロツプ」ハ
アラユル方面、時ニ報導並ニ新聞ニ出スル最モ緊
衝ナル勸力ガ伊太利「ルマニア」「ハンガリー」
「スロバキア」及ビ「ブルガリア」ト既ニ打合セ
濟ミノ戦争ノ共同遂行上必要デアルト大島ニ説明
シマシタ。大島ハ日本ノ宣傳ヲ強化スル爲メ(a)
獨逸代表ト計畫ヲ達テル意向ナリト通知シ、佐久
間公使汪營並ニ監督ノ下ニ(b) 日本大使館内ニ新
聞班ヲ設けシマシタ。宣傳武器利用ノ爲方ハ時ニ
印度及ビ「アラビヤ」諸國ニ向テラレ(c) 亞細亞及
ビ歐洲ノ侵略國間ノ共同謀議ノ世界的範圍ヲ示シ

等の發見及ビ海嶽ノ交流ハ獨逸ノ新發見ニ係ル被
 甲發見ノ日本ヘノ提供 (g) 他ノ所デ既ニ取扱ツタ
 二隻ノ獨逸潜水艦ヲ鑑査トシテ日本ヘ讓渡 (h) 日
 本ノ他中魚雷ト其ノ青銅質ノ獨逸ヘノ提供 (i) 及
 ビ獨逸將校ヲ日本ニ招致シ (j) 又日本將校ヲ獨逸
 兵ニ提供 (k) スルコトニ依ツテ日本兵ノ上陸作戦
 ノ進展ノ利益ヲ獨逸ニ與ヘン等ニヨリ軍事上ノ發
 見及ビ海嶽ノ交流トノ由山ニ依ツテ明瞭サレテキ
 マス。

QQ-109	f	法廷記録	六五二六〇
	g	法廷記録	三二五三
	h	法廷記録	六六七六
	i	法廷記録	六六七六
	j	法廷記録	六六七六
	k	法廷記録	三二五三

0159 0015 2582

OSHIMA SULLIMATION-GG

一九四一年三月廿九日「リツベントロツプ」ハ松
岡ニ大島大使ト新嘉坡攻撃ニ於ケル獨逸ノ援助問
題ヲ協議シタト述べ、新嘉坡ノ英國艦隊ニ對スル
急下降爆撃機使用ニ關スル空甲戦ノ獨逸專家ノ
進言及ビ堅牢ナル要塞ニ降地攻撃ノ「ヒットラー」
ノ新方法並ニ特ニ新嘉坡攻撃ノ最良ナル方法ニ關
スル「ヒットラー」ノ忠言ヲ松岡ニ申出テマシタ。
コノ申出甲ノ後者ニ對シテ、大島ハ新嘉坡ノ地圖
一枚ヲ手ニ入レルヤウ要請セラレマシタ。(f) 軍

02-111

a
 d
 c
 b

法廷證
 法廷記録

三三三
 八九二
 七一
 三〇

法廷記録
 " " " " "

三三三
 三三三
 三三三
 三三三
 三三三
 三三三
 三三三

大 使ニ 依ッテ 交渉 爲サシテ 爲サシテ 之ニ 對シテ (a) 別ニ 示サシテ 解
 ニヨッテ 交渉 二 隻ノ 知ラシテ 逃レ 去ル 事 爲シ 引ク 正 式 請求 ハ 大 島
 々。 (c) 一 隻ノ 知ラシテ 逃レ 去ル 事 爲シ 引ク 正 式 請求 ハ 大 島
 ノ 許シ 交渉 二 隻ノ 知ラシテ 逃レ 去ル 事 爲シ 引ク 正 式 請求 ハ 大 島
 者ノ 交渉 二 隻ノ 知ラシテ 逃レ 去ル 事 爲シ 引ク 正 式 請求 ハ 大 島
 鮮 國 將 校 カ 斃 死 爲 伯 日 本 軍 部 隊 及 ビ 計 劃 ニ 係 リ 此 等
 日 本 將 校 カ 斃 死 爲 伯 日 本 軍 部 隊 及 ビ 計 劃 ニ 係 リ 此 等

0159 0015 2555

OSHIMA SUMMATION-10

ル走り、是ハ噴飯坂、即チ、泗水艦ニ依ル商船
撃沈ノ以化ニ對スル共同計畫ノ一部デアリマシ
多。(e)

112

一九四二年一月十日ノ軍事協定ニ依ツテ企
圖サレタ起リ、日本、獨逸及ビ伊太利ハ共同ノ
家ハ共同ノ戦争ヲ行ツタノデアリマス獨逸及日
本ニヨツテ實行サレタ印長洋ニ於ケル共同作戦
計畫ヲ除イテハ、各國ノ作戦活動ハ主トシテ軍
事協定中ニテ各國ニ指定サレタ地域ニ限ラレテ
行リマシタ。作戦ノ時機ヲ待タ為メ、三國同盟
ハ、米國及ビ全英聯邦ガソノ部隊ヲ世界ノ廣ク
驅レタ地域ニ海陸ニ分割、法在セシムルヲ要シ
又獨逸ノ侵略ニ抵抗中ノ蘇聯ハ其ノ東部疆境ニ
於ケル不韙ノ脅ムニ對處スル為メ部隊ヲ分割ス
ルヲ要シタ點ニ於イテ有リ得ルベキ最大ノ有利
ナ立場ヲ確保シマシタ。福軸堅固ノコノ世界的
戦争努力ノ協力ハ陸軍及ビ海軍ノ戦争行動ト同
様經濟及ビ宣傳ノ面ニ於ケル協同ヲ要シマシタ。

P-145

QC-1111

e、TT-1-1-17

Q.Q.-113

a、最終報告

” ”

K	I	C
—	—	—
—	—	—
—	—	—

二ツノ平行セル點ニモトツキ提出サレマス。第一ノ論ハ詠追セラル、共同謀議ノ一員トシテ、陸軍武官トシテ又大使トシテ大島ハ、共同謀議ノ共通ノ計畫ヲ遂行スルニ當リ共同謀議ノ重要ナル一部分タル種々ノ條約ヲ交渉スルコトニ依リ、又共同謀議者ノ共通計畫ニ從ツテ植植國ト協同スルコトニ依ツテ、重ナ役割ヲ演ジタト言フコトデアリマス。一度共同

OSHI MA SUMMATION-QQ

QQ-113

VIII

一 緒 論、

歐州ニ於ケル最モ重要ナル大使ノ地位ニアツタ大島ガ此ノ協同ヲ補助シタコトハ彼ノ立憲サレタ諸國及ビ行動ニ依リ充分明瞭テアリマシテ、右聲明及ビ行動ハコノ最終論告ノ「三國協定下ノ協力ナル一般見出ノ許ニアリマス。

共同謀議ノ法律及ビ被告ノ個人責任ニ互ル論原則ハ充分ニ論證セラレマシタ。^(a) 右法律ヲ本被告

ニ關係スル事實ニ適用スル際ニ、前述ノ論證ヲ繰返サナイテ之ヲ引用シマス。大島ニ對スル訴訟ハ

0159 0015 2566

訴因（第一乃至第五（ヲ當ム））ニ對シ有罪ナルコトヲ立證スルモノナルコトヲ認シテ主張スルモノデアリマス。第二項ノ下ニ枚舉セラル、各リノ訴因ニ關シテハ、同證據ハ大島カソコニ訴追セラルル實質的犯罪ノ遂行ノ幫助者トシテ有罪ナルコトノ疑ヒ得ザル證明ヲナスモノナルコトヲ主張シマス。

0159 0015 2567

謀議ニ参加シタ以上、ソノ目的促進ノ爲メノ彼ノ行動へ、假ヘソレラノ行動カ陸軍武官又ハ大使ノ職務ニ限レタト主張サレテモ、外交官免除説ニヨリ辯護シ得ズト主張シマス。第二ノ平行スル論ハ、大島ノ活動ハ陸軍武官及ビ大使ノ正規ノ職務ヲ超エタト言フコトデアリマス。彼ノ宣言及ビ行爲ニヨリ、彼ハ仲間ノ共同謀議ノ共通ノ計畫ニ従ヒテ、彼ノ政府ノ政策ヲ指導シ、左右セント分メマシタ。

QQ-114

之ヲ要スルニ、コ、ニ概括セラレタル全証拠ハ坊ラカニ、大島ガ起訴狀ニ訴追セラル、共同謀議

0 159 00 15 2568

SATO, Kenryo

RR-1: The accused SATO is charged in Counts I to 17, 20 to 22, 24, 27 to 32, 34, 37 to 44, 48 to 50, and 53 to 55 of the Indictment.

I. - GENERAL - BIOGRAPHICAL.

RR-2: Prior to the 1st August 1936 SATO had held various military appointments none of which had any particular significance in relation to our present purpose. On that date he was for the third time in the space of eight years ordered to be attached to the Army Ordnance Main Depot. In addition he was appointed a Staff Member of the Military Affairs Bureau. On the 1st March 1937 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and on the 24th June he was appointed as an Investigator of the Planning Office. In August he was commissioned as a special member of the North China Incident General Mobilization Business Affairs Committee; the name of which was altered about a month later to the China Affair General Mobilization Business Affairs Committee. Towards the end of October 1937 the post of Investigator of the Planning Board was abolished but SATO was a month later appointed as Secretary of the Board. On the 15th July 1938 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel, appointed a member of the Cabinet Information Board Committee and ordered to serve concurrently in the Military Affairs Bureau. At about the same

(RR-2)
time he was relieved of his appointments on the Planning Board and the China Affair General Mobilization Business Affairs Committee. On the 13th December 1938 he was released from his position as a member of the Cabinet Information Board Committee. ^{a.}

RR-3: Later in the same month he was appointed Professor of the Army Air Corps School at Hamatsu and in May 1939 he went to China as a Staff Officer of the South China Expeditionary Force. In the summer of 1940 he went to French Indo-China as Assistant Chief of Staff of that Force. This was the first of three or four visits of up to ten days duration that he made to French Indo-China whilst holding that appointment. In March 1941 he returned to Japan and took up the appointment of Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. ^{a.}

RR-4: On the 14th March 1941 he was appointed Government Commissioner dealing with affairs under the jurisdiction of the War Department in the 76th Diet, and was so appointed for every succeeding Diet until he left the War Department at the end of December 1944. On the 15th October 1941 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General. ^{a.}

RR-5: In April 1942 SATC was appointed Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in succession to the accused

RR-2:
a. Ex. 122, T. 775

RR-3:
a. Ex. 2238A, T. 16083

RR-4:
a. Ex. 122, T. 775

Page RR-3

(RR-5)
MUTO, and held this appointment until the 14th December 1944 when he was made Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force. ^{a.} On the 1st March 1945 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and on the 7th April was appointed as Commander of the 37th Division ^{b.} which was then in Indo-China, but subsequently moved to Thailand. SATO was serving in this capacity until the Japanese surrender. ^{c.}

II -- ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO HIS APPOINTMENT AS
CHIEF OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION
OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU IN
MARCH 1941

RR-6: Whilst SATO held his appointments with the Cabinet Planning Board between 24th June 1937 and 15th July 1938, the Board was engaged in a project of outstanding importance, namely the planning of preparations for a large scale war. The development and character of these plans are explained in detail in paragraphs F-2 to F-8 of the General Summation to which the Tribunal is respectfully referred. Whether the "Outline of Japanese Army's Five Year Plan" ^{a.} was, as the Prosecution contends, a summary of "Outline of the Five Year Plan for Production of War Materials" ^{b.} or, as Defense witness OKADA claims, ^{c.} a summary of a part of "Particulars in Framing a Program for Extension of Important Industries" ^{d.} is immaterial for the present purpose as both clearly aim at a huge

RR-5:

- a. Ex. 2238A, T. 16083
- b. Ex. 122, T. 775
- c. Ex. 2238A, T. 16083

RR-6:

- a. Ex. 2227, T. 15380
- b. Ex. 841, T. 8261
- c. T. 18326; T. 18328
- d. Ex. 842, T. 8264

(RR-6)
 increase in the war potentials with 1941 as its goal. The "Outline of Japanese Army's Five Year Plan" ^{e.} is accompanied by a covering note, dated 13th July 1937 and addressed to the accused HIRATA, who was at that time holding the position of President of the Planning Board, ^{f.} stating that every Ministry would make a draft and that as soon as the programs had been drafted they should be submitted to the Planning Board for execution. Moreover, "Particulars in Framing a Program for Extension of Important Industries", which OKADA says was shown to all the Ministries ^{g.} contains the "Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power" which was made by the Planning Board and approved by the Cabinet in January 1939. ^{h.} It is thus apparent that the Planning Board had been working on this plan from shortly after 13th July 1937 and throughout the period during which SATO was one of its members. It is furthermore apparent that in his position, SATO must have participated in the creation of these plans, especially in view of the fact that he was detailed to his position with the Planning Board by the Army which had originated these plans and to which they, by their nature, were of great concern. This is borne out by the fact that he later was chosen to facilitate the passage of the National General Mobilization Law - one of the devices envisioned in these plans - as "explainer" before the Diet ^{i.} and by a speech which he made later, on 11th March 1942, in which he pointed with some pride to

RR-6:

- g. Ex. 2227, T. 15980
- f. T. 29659
- g. T. 18329
- h. Ex. 842, T. 8264
- i. Ex. 2238-A, T. 16083;
Summation F 22-3

(RR-6)
the advantages this plan and its execution had for the
Greater East Asia War which was then already under way. ^{j.}

RR-7: Further evidence, showing that his contribution to the conspiracy during the early stages of his participation consisted in the planning of preparations for war, is provided by his being a member of the China Affair General Mobilization Committee from August 1937 to July 1938. ^{a.} It was very probably on account of this wide knowledge of the preparations for war that had been made, and were to be made, that he was chosen to act as "explainer" to the Diet of the General Mobilization Law and so facilitate its passage. ^{b.} This was in February 1938. The General Summation, paragraphs F 22-9, explains how by the adoption of this law Japan became a totalitarian state, committed to a policy of expansion. The Tribunal's attention is respectfully invited to these paragraphs. It has already been stated that for SATO his contribution to the passage of this law was a continuation of his work, aiming in the same direction, in the Cabinet Planning Board. ^{c.} He found this law "a necessity" and objections to it "unnecessary". As he himself says in his interrogations: "The Government was unable to explain this (i.e., the implications of the General Mobilization Law) satisfactorily to the Diet, and of those present before the Diet, I was the only person capable of explaining the implications of the law," and "Of the explanations given up to that time I feel sincerely that mine was the most powerful one given." ^{d.}

RR-6:

J. Ex. 8-9, T. 8413-5; Summation F-31

RR-7:

a. Ex. 123, T. 775

b. Ex. 84, T. 684; Ex. 2238A, T. 16083

c. RR-6, supra

d. Ex. 2238A, T. 16083

RR-8. On the 25th and again on the 28th August 1938, SATO delivered a speech at the Home Ministry to Conferences of Chiefs of Police Departments. ^{b.} SATO was Army spokesman at the time, and the Defence claims that he delivered the speeches as part of his official duties. ^{c.} Their importance here lies in the deep knowledge they show SATO to have had of Japan's plans for aggression against Russia and continued aggression against China. This is not merely a knowledge of the plans of the Army but also of the reactions of the other Ministries towards them. They forecast the fall of Hankow, the creation of a national defence zone embracing Japan-Manchukuo and China, the placing of Northern China under Japan to the same degree as Manchuria had already been placed, the use of Central China as a base for the development of Japanese economic interests and finally the preparation for a war against Russia. He also shows his awareness of the fact that 1942 is the focal date for a large scale war, as has already been submitted in paragraph RR-6. Thus he says, "It goes without saying that, by taking a war against Soviet Russia into consideration, it is necessary to secure Inner Mongolia, but it would be disadvantageous for us to purposely start a quarrel with Soviet Russia from our side at present in view of the fact that our forces against China and Soviet Russia would have to be split

RR-8.

- a. Ex. 270, T. 3605;
Ex. 2235, T. 16069;
Ex. 3863 and 3864, T. 28576-7
- b. Ex. 2238, T. 16083
- c. Ex. 3531, T. 34439

Page RR-7

(RR-8)

in two, so that we would have to choose the right opportunity in the event of our becoming forced to fight. Moreover, this must not be until after the war preparations and productive power have been amplified - after 1942 - for the said purpose".

In the course of the speech he criticises very freely the Cabinet and particularly the Foreign Office for offering China peace conditions which he deemed too mild, aligning himself clearly and openly with the moulders of Army policy against the Government, and indicating that he was at this time a party to the conspiracies charged in Counts 1 to 5 of the Indictment.

RR-9. Reference has been made already in paragraphs G-27, G-31, G-35 to G-39, G-43 and G-44 to the Japanese coercion of the French Vichy Government into allowing them to enter French Indo-China under threat of a Japanese attack. SATO as Assistant Chief of Staff of the South China Expeditionary Force went to French Indo-China in the summer of 1940, that is at about the time of the Japanese entry into that country.^{a.} We have no particular evidence of his activities there. No doubt the invasion of French Indo-China was carried out in furtherance of the Japanese conspiracies to obtain military, naval, political and economic domination of the countries and parts referred to in Count 1 of the

RR-9.

- a. Ex. 2236A, T. 16083;
- Ex. 620, T. 6933;
- Ex. 621, T. 6830.

(PR-9)
 Indictment. The prosecution submits that from the time when SATO enters into the conspiracy to carry on an aggressive war he loses the shield of being a soldier carrying out his orders and becomes at International Law a criminal committing a crime at all times when he is assisting or doing anything in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is therefore contended that SATO by carrying out his ordinary military duties in French Indo-China is committing a crime. The Japanese Army was there in violation of International Law and SATO was a party to the conspiracy that had brought it there in violation of International Law.

RR-10. Earlier, that is in 1939 or 1940, SATO^{a.} had served at the battle of Nanning in China, and on the same reasoning is guilty of a crime in so doing.

III. ACTIVITIES OF SATO WHILST HOLDING THE APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU.

RP-11. The Military Affairs Bureau is divided into two Sections:- (1) The Military Administration Section; (2) The Military Affairs Section. Among the matters entrusted to the latter Section are those concerning general affairs of national defence policy, those concerning international regulations, and those concerning army affairs of all foreign countries including Manchuria and China.^{a.}

RR-10.
 a. Ex. 3534, T. 34464

RR-11.
 a. Ex. 74, T. 684.

Page RR-0

(RP-11)

The use of the words "defence policy" as a euphemism for "policy of aggression" during the period of the conspiracy at least after August 1936 has been dealt with at length in the General Summation. ^{b.} It is thus clear that SATO's Section was within the War Ministry primarily concerned with the preparation of this policy of aggression.

RR-12. The decision of the Army and Navy Departments at Imperial Headquarters in April 1941 to resort to war "in case the Empire's self-existence should be threatened by the embargoes of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands" ^{a.} is clearly a matter concerning "national defence policy in general" considering the above-mentioned use of these words. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are compelled to assume that SATO's Section was concerned with the preparation of this decision. Even before this, instructions had been given for the manufacture of Japanese invasion currency for use in the Dutch East Indies, Borneo, Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines. In view of his Section's duties with regard to military affairs of foreign countries, SATO must have known of this at the time. The fact that in October 1941 correspondence on this matter was directed to his Section among others confirms the contention that his Section was ^{b.} concerned in the preparation of these decisions.

RR-11.

b. F-1,2.

RR-12.

a. Ex. 1305, T. 11751

b. Ex. 852, T. 8447

Page RR-10

RR-13. When a crucial point in the development of the conspiratorial aims against the United States and Great Britain had arrived at the time of the fall of the Third HONOYE Cabinet in October, 1941, it was SATO who lent himself to furthering these aims by promoting a TOJO Cabinet. The importance of SATO's position, his own personal influence and the degree to which TOJO relied upon him was shown by the fact that at that time he was sent by TOJO to explain to Senior Statesmen ABE and HAYASHI the difficulties which would be caused by the appointment of Prince HIGASHIKUNI as Prime Minister. ^{a.} The natural result of this was to clear the way for TOJO's succession to the Prime Ministership. The Defence has endeavoured to use ABE's account of this incident to discredit General TANAKA, Ryukichi. ABE said that on this occasion SATO had not suggested that TOJO be made Prime Minister, but had suggested that the Army desired ^{b.} the appointment of Prince HIGASHIKUNI. This evidence was tendered to show that TANAKA was wrong when he said that SATO had told him that he, SATO had seen the two veteran Generals, ABE and HAYASHI, and in

RR-13.

- a. Ex. 3532, T. 34,443
- b. Ex. 3526, T. 34402

(FR-13)

the course of conversation had told them that unless TOJO was made Prime Minister the Army would be difficult to control. In the first place this cannot possibly affect TANAKA's credit. ABE deposes to a conversation between himself and SATO, whereas TANAKA deposes to the account of that conversation given him by SATO. Two significant factors emerge, the first that SATO's own account, given in his interrogations and put in evidence by the Defence, corresponds in import more closely to that of TANAKA than that of ABE, and secondly the only man, other than TANAKA, who could give a correct account of the conversation between TANAKA and SATO, is SATO himself. SATO has not chosen to vary the account given in his interrogations.

FR-14. SATO retained his position in the War Ministry after the replacement of the Third KONOYE Cabinet by the TOJO Cabinet and was on the 15th October, 1941. promoted to the rank of Major-General. In a certificate covering a document entitled "Principal reasons alleged for the commencement of Hostilities

FR-15.
 c. T. 15873
 d. Ex. 3532, T. 34443

Page RR-11

(RR-14)
 against the U.S.A. and Britain" dated the 11th November, 1941, TANAKA, Ryukichi stated that to the best of his knowledge and belief the document "was prepared by or under the direction of SATO, Kenryo, then Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau". It sets out the reasons for Japan's determination to fight the United States and Great Britain, and has endorsed upon it the words "Draft proposed for decision by the Liaison Conference". It shows that SATO knew of Japan's decision to precipitate a war and that he, or one of the members of his Section, had been busy preparing the Japanese apologia.^{a.} For the Defence WARA says that this document was never presented to the Liaison Conference but was made for the use of officials in the War and Navy Ministries and General Staffs, and that it was prepared collectively by members of those organizations.
 b. This witness in cross-examination admitted that the War Ministry was represented on the pre-Liaison Conference by a member of the Military Affairs Section, that the document referred to was adopted by this pre-Liaison Conference of the War and Navy Ministries and the General Staff, and that he himself cannot say whether it was or was not adopted precisely in the form in which it came from the Military Affairs Section.
 c. It is submitted that this evidence does not

RR-14.

- a. Ex. 1175, T. 10362
- b. T. 34452-3
- c. T. 34455-61.

page ER-12.

(RR-14)
affect TANAKA's certificate except in so far as it asserts that the document was adopted at the Liaison Conference. Its importance here lies in the fact that it shows that SATO was aware that Japan was proposing to precipitate a war with the United States, Great Britain and Holland and was working in that direction.

RR-15. SATO admits that he was privy to the negotiations with America which were terminated by the outbreak of war. He states that when negotiations were under way with the United States supplies from the United States came from the Foreign Office to the War Ministry and thence to his bureau, that is when they affected the Army.^{a.} As Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau he must have known the extent and aims of the Japanese war preparations. As TANAKA, Ryukichi says, the General Staff draws up the plans for operations but before they can be put into operation they must have the consent of the War Minister, and that monies and supplies for carrying out the operations are provided by the Military Affairs Bureau. It is the duty of the Military Affairs Bureau to prepare the estimates of Army expenditure for the purpose of getting the Budget through the Diet, and accordingly high ranking officers in that Bureau must be familiar with the general nature of the Army's plans.^{b.}

RR-16. On the 10th March 1942, SATO delivered a

RR-15.

- a. Ex. 2238A, T. 16083
- b. T. 15859-62.

(RR-16)

speech at the Army Day Celebrations at Niihaya Wall.

In it he approbates Japan's launching her attacks on the Allies without any prior declaration of war, and points out that on account of the time of the monsoon season the 8th December was the last opportune moment for opening the war. He goes on to say that Japan had been preparing for a war to break out in 1941 or 1942 and had made her preparations with that object in view, that throughout the Chinese Incident sixty per cent of the Budget was used for the purpose of preparing for this war whilst the remaining forty per cent was used for the fighting in China.^{a.} Previously he had in the Diet on the 10th February 1942 announced that the war would be carried on until both the United States and Great Britain had been brought down to their knees.^{b.}

RR-17. During this period he must have also learnt of Japan's undertaking to apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention 1929 mutatis mutandis. You will recall that evidence was given that on the 23rd January 1942 the accused YEMMA notified the Foreign Office that it would be safe to notify the world that Japan had no objection to acting in accordance with that Convention in the treatment of prisoners of war.^{a.} As matters concerning international relations were specifically delegated to the Military Affairs Section there can be no doubt that SATO took part in the

RR-16.

- a. Ex. 849, T. 8411)
- b. Ex. 2236A, T. 16076

RR-17.

- a. Ex. 1958, T. 14289

Page RA-14

(RA-17)
 conferences which were held at the War Ministry before KIMURA notified the Foreign Office of the War Ministry's views on the application of the Convention.

RA-18. Throughout the whole of this period it is obvious that SAITO knew of Japan's plans for waging an aggressive war and that he did his best to forward them. General Ambassador OTT in recommending him for a German decoration says that he was definitely pro-German and that "the importance wielded by him during the last three months before Japan's entry into the war has obviously increased."^{a.} SAITO admits that while he was Chief of the Military Affairs Section he was in agreement with the policy of the Minister for War, so that it cannot be said he was merely a professional soldier carrying out a disagreeable duty.^{b.}

IV. ACTIVITIES FROM HIS APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU UNTIL THE JAPANESE SURRENDER.

RA-19. In April, 1942, SAITO was appointed to succeed the accused MURAKAMI as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. In describing the Military Affairs Bureau, TAKEKAWA Ryukichi said that it had charge of the Army's Budget, the organization, equipment and installation of the military forces, the making of domestic and external plans and the conduct of propaganda.^{a.} More specifically with regard to prisoners of war its duties included the location and construction of prison camps, and the drafting of replies to protests for ordered from the Foreign Office.^{b.} The Chief of the

RA-17.
 b. Ex. 74, T. 684

RA-19.
 a. T. 14286
 b. T. 14286-7

RA-18.
 a. Ex. 1272, T. 11349
 b. Ex. 24381, T. 16083

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(RR-19)

Military Affairs Bureau also attended the bi-weekly conferences presided over by the Minister of War.^{c.}

SATO was present at the Conference in April 1942 at which TOJO decided that all prisoners of war including officers^{d.} must work.

RR-20. An attempt was made by the Defence to show that the Military Affairs Bureau did not receive any protests or copies of protests relating to prisoners of war, and in the process to discredit TANAKA, Ryukichi. Defence witness NIICHIYA gave evidence that he was in the Military Affairs Bureau until July 1944, that he did not recall having received any protests from the Foreign Office and that replies to the Foreign Office in relation to protests were not drafted by the Military Affairs Bureau.^{a.} He also added that if all protests relative to prisoners of war had passed through the Military Affairs Section, as General TANAKA testified, he, NIICHIYA, would have known of it.^{b.} The Prosecution submits that his evidence is valueless and was designed to mislead. In cross-examination he admitted that between April and December 1942, he was acting as private secretary to TOJO, in his capacity as War Minister and that he could not say whether protests went to the Military Affairs Bureau during this period.^{c.} He at first denied having seen any documents relating to prisoners of war whilst a member of the Military Affairs Section of the Bureau,^{d.}

RR-19.

c. T. 14288
d. T. 14290

RR-20.

a. T. 34413
b. T. 34414
c. T. 34416-7
d. T. 34418

(RS-20) ^{e.}
but later admits to having seen and signed such documents.

RR-21. The protests which have been proved to have been received by the Japanese Government during this period are set out in Part 6 of Appendix "B" to Section "J" of the summation and a general reference is here made to such protests. As regards the circulation of such protests the Tribunal's attention is respectfully invited to paragraphs J-70 to J-73 of this summation.

RR-22. As a result of the destruction of Japanese documents at the time of the Surrender ^{a.} the only documents available to the Prosecution as showing the manner in which general prisoner of war matters were handled at the War Ministry are those bearing dates in 1942. A perusal of these shows that it was the practice for these documents to be referred to the Military Affairs Bureau among other Bureaux. Thus in March 1942 the request that British and American prisoners be sent to Korea in order to stamp out the admiration of Koreans for American and British people came through the Military Affairs Section. ^{b.} The telegram referring to the compulsory administration of oaths to Lt. General Percival and others in Formosa was referred to the Military Affairs Section, or as it is there called the War Affairs Section, before being sent on to the Prisoner of War Control Department. ^{c.} In October 1942 a request that authority be given to the East District Army to employ prisoners

RP-20.

e. T. 34424

RR-22.

- a. Ex. 2000, T. 14699
- b. Ex. 1973, T. 14512;
Ex. 1974, T. 14518
- c. Ex. 1968, T. 14488

(RR-22)
of his work which included work on military projects was approved on the authority of the Vice-Minister, but the Military Affairs Section was the section which had dealt with the matter. Again the report of the parade of prisoners of war in Korea for propaganda purposes was sent to the Military Affairs Section before being sent on to the Prisoner of War Control Department. Finally in September 1942 regulations made by the accused ITAKAMI regarding prisoners of war to engage in work having a direct connection with the war, were referred to the Military Affairs Section among others. This shows the position in 1942; and NISHIYAMA who was appointed as Chief of the Military Affairs Section in December of that year and retained the position until July 1944 states that he does not think that there was any change in the policy so as to stop such documents being sent to his Section.

RR-23. SAITO, who as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was acting as liaison between the General Staff and the War Ministry, conveyed to a conference of Bureau Chiefs at the War Ministry the General Staff's view that the Doolittle flyers should be exempted.

RR-24. From the foregoing, it is obvious that, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, SAITO received information of allied protests as to mistreatment of prisoners of war, was familiar with the various Japanese

RR-22.

- d. Ex. 1967, T. 11481;
- e. Ex. 1975, T. 11520
- f. Ex. 1976, T. 11529
- g. T. 31134-5

RR-23.

- a. T. 29047

(RR-24)

official documents which themselves established breaches of the Conventions and knew of the illegal decision to execute the Doolittle flyers. The power to prevent the commission of these atrocities and to prevent the other breaches of the Conventions rested in the war Minister,^{a.} under Japanese law. But at International Law it was the duty of the Japanese Government to protect prisoners and to ensure that the Conventions were observed. SATO having learnt of the true state of affairs should have done everything in his power to remedy it. But he did nothing in that direction; on the contrary we find that upon being interrogated after the surrender he states that as Chief of the Military Affairs Section and as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau he was in agreement with the policy^{b.} of the Minister for War.

RR-25. On the 19th February 1949, SATO addresses the Budget Committee of the Diet. He is just as resolute as ever in carrying on the aggressive wars that Japan had started.^{a.} On the 18th August 1947, SATO attended the Privy Council Meeting with TOJO, OKA, MIYAMA I and SHIGEMITSU to explain the proposed treaty by which Siam was to be rewarded by giving her part of Malaya. It was at this Meeting that TOJO stated that International Law should be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according "to our own opinions".^{b.} He also attended, as army representative, the Assembly of the puppet

RR-24.

- a. Ex. 1965, pp.2 and 3, T. 14439
- b. Ex. 2238, T. 16083

RR-25.

- a. Ex. 2237, T. 16080
- b. Ex. 1275, T. 11364

(RR-25)
governments of the Greater East Asiatic Nations on the 6th November 1943, when a resolution envisaging the usurpation of the lawful governments of those countries was carried.^{a.}

RR-26. SATO relinquished his office as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in December 1944 and became Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force, a position which he retained until April 1945, when he assumed command of the 37th Division in Indo-China.^{a.} This Division had been responsible for the murder of hundreds of French Indo-Chinese troops and civilians during the month of March 1945, but there is no evidence of any atrocities committed by them after that month.^{b.} The Division was moved to Siam in June 1945, but there is no evidence as to any atrocities committed by it there.^{c.}

V. - GENERAL - CONCLUSION.

RR-27. The Prosecution submits that SATO should be convicted on all Counts on which he has been charged, other than Counts 44 and 53. In support of this submission the Prosecution relies on all relevant evidence, whether outlined in this Summation or not, and refers particularly to certain paragraphs of this phase of the Summation and contends that such paragraphs read in conjunction with the general phase of the Summation establish his guilt on all Counts other than Counts 44 and 53.

RR-28. Paragraphs RR-6, to RR-16, RR-18 and RR-25

RR-25.

c. Ex. 1346, T. 12098

RR-26.

a. Ex. 2233, T. 16083
b. ET. 15434-6
c. Ex. 3535, T. 34466.

(RR-28) show him to have become a party to the conspiracies charged in Counts 1 to 5 of the Indictment as from June 1937 at the latest, and to have sought to further the objects of the conspiracies from that time onwards. His guilt on these Counts would automatically establish his guilt on Counts 6 to 17, 20 to 22, 24, 27 to 32, 34, 37 to 43 and 48 to 50, provided that the facts alleged in such Counts have been proved to have taken place. In the general phase of the Summation has been outlined the evidence upon which the Prosecution relies to establish such facts.

RR-29. Paragraphs RR-17 and RR-19 to RR-24, considered in conjunction with Section "J" of the Summation establish his guilt on Counts 54 and 55 of the Indictment.

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Ref. No. No. 3115
(Sec. H-18)

DECLARATION FOR THE DEFENSE
SECTION "H-18"

SATG, Henry

J. M. FREEMAN
H. KUCANO
Defense Counsel

Def. Doc. 3115
(Sec.N-18)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The brevity of this Summation not only matches that of the prosecution in regard to the accused SATO, but it is entirely in keeping with the complete lack of evidence offered against him.

The prosecution has divided its argument with the fulchrum resting upon the appointment of Sato to the post of Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in April, 1942. We shall follow their procedure to the end of a logical presentation designed for clarity.

II.

ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO SATO BECOMING
A SECTION CHIEF IN THE MILITARY
AFFAIRS BUREAU.

1. The prosecution elects to disregard any activities of this accused prior to 1 August, 1936. Therefore, nothing will be included in this Summation prior to that date. On this date the accused Sato was attached to the Army Ordnance Depot and became a staff member of the Military Affairs Bureau. In March, 1937, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, and in June made an investigator of the Planning Board, which position was abolished in October of the same year. In November, 1937, he was appointed a secretary to the Planning Board and relieved of this post in July, 1938 (RR-2, T. 41, 596). The Tribunal should bear in mind that during this period his primary duties were those of a staff member of the Military Affairs Bureau.

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Now, what significance does the prosecution place upon these appointments, particularly that with the Planning Board? After some reference to acts and orders of the President of the Planning Board, they state - "It is thus apparent that the Planning Board had been working on this plan. . . the period during which Sato was one of its members." Also - "Sato must have participated in the creation of the plan." Without any assistance from the evidence, Sato becomes a member of the Planning Board, a participant in plans that "aim at a huge increase in war potentials with 1941 as its goal," and enters the alleged conspiracy (RR-6, T. 41,600).

All this, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence shows that he was never a member of the Planning Board; that he was with the Board as an investigator three months, and as a secretary six months over a period of less than a year (Ex. 122, T. 768). Notwithstanding the fact that the witness Okada testified that while he was a member of the War Preparations Section of the Mobilization Bureau of the War Ministry, he himself drew up Exhibit 841, which was concerned with military plans, and Exhibit 842, which was a plan for the establishment of a peacetime economy (T. 18,272-73). It is well to note that neither of these plans were ever used because of the outbreak of the China Incident, although approved by the War Ministry (T. 18,272-286). The prosecution attaches no importance to the fact that the Planning Board consisted

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of members from all walks of life, only a few of whom are among the accused, and that the Planning Board had some 60 to 70 full-time investigators and secretaries, none of whom are in the prisoner dock (Ex.71). It is also unimportant to the prosecution that the accused Sato's position therein was that of a part-time secretary and that these so-called "plans" were drawn up in the War Mobilization Bureau where he had no duty or function (Ibid). No evidence of any nature is offered that this accused ever participated in any activity of the Planning Board, or the preparation of the plans referred to.

The prosecution continues to attach importance to the accused Sato's relation with the Planning Board for they contend - "It was very probable on account of this. . . that he (Sato) was chosen to act as 'explainer' to the Diet of the General Mobilization Law and so facilitate its passage." (RR-7, T. 41,601). It is not in furtherance of the prosecution's purpose that the Mobilization Law is entirely different from the five-year industrial plan (Ex.84, T. 684 and Ex. 2802, T.25,210), nor that one of the requirements of his position in the Military Affairs Bureau was to explain such bills and their implication to the Diet (Ex.74, T. 684), and it would not further their objective to admit that the functions of an explainer were merely to answer questions propounded by Diet members (T. 32,959).

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2. Early in the trial the prosecution sought to attach great importance to two alleged speeches of Sato's purportedly delivered before a conference of Chiefs of the Police at the Home Ministry in August, 1938 (Ex. 270, T.3605). Shortly after the introduction of these speeches in evidence, the authentication of which was still in doubt, the prosecution characterized this exhibit as "a record of policy-making conference of the highest Japanese Government officials occurring in January, 1938" (T. 9502). Later they came back with a new and revised translation of this document, but still without proper authentication (Ex. 2235, T.16,069). Finally a certificate was obtained from the drafter of the document. What does Kuragai, the writer, say about the document? He states that during the session of this conference he attended a lecture given by Colonel Sato, Chief of the Press Section of the War Ministry, who had been invited by the Police Bureau of the Home Office for the occasion. He recalls that after the speeches were made, he jotted down some notes but that Sato had spoken rapidly and his notes were not accurate because he does not use shorthand. For this reason, he explains, in the preface he wrote: "The words and contents are those of the writer." (Ex. 3864, T. 38,578-79). After this the prosecution abandoned its contention that this document represents "a policy-making conference of the highest Japanese officials." Sniffing ground, they now say its

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importance "lies in the deep knowledge they show Sato to have had of Japan's plans for aggression against Russia." (RR-8, T.41,602).

Encircling some 60 to 70 secretaries to the Planning Board (Ex.71), making the unadopted five-year industrial plan and the mobilization law one and the same, they endeavor to bring Sato into the alleged conspiracy. Do they seriously contend that "a great policy-making document of the highest officials of the Japanese Government," born of the notes of an unofficial observer at a Policeman's Conference, binds Sato to a conspiracy charge of accomplishing aggressive war? Weighing the issues in light of the importance they deserve, will they not recognize that the writer himself questions the accuracy of his document? It is apparently unimportant to the prosecution that at the time these speeches were made Sato's peculiar duties as head of the Press Section of the War Ministry brought him to the conference, and that since no official record was kept of the speeches, it is highly probable that several speakers, other than Sato, may have been the source of subject matter included in this document. Could it be that the importance of the document for the prosecution lies in the extreme scarcity of evidential material to be utilized in preparing the accused Sato's summation? This question is not asked lightly. It is obvious on its face that this document could have no probative value. It is

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suggested that its importance lies in the fact that with the exception of one other speech, all the evidence offered against this accused was by TANAKA, Ruykichi.

Be that as it may, the remarkable fact is that this is the sum total of evidence which the prosecution contends is sufficient to indicate "that he (Sato) was at this time a party to the conspiracy charged in Counts 1 to 5 of the Indictment." (RR-8, T.41,603).

3. In May, 1939, Colonel Sato went to China as a Staff Officer of the China Expeditionary Forces. In July and August, 1940, he visited French Indo-China (Ex.2238-A, T. 16,083). The prosecution admits there is no evidence of any activities of Sato while on these visits. However, they make this observation - "no doubt the invasion of French Indo-China was carried out in furtherance of the Japanese conspiracies. . . referred to in Count 1 of the Indictment." (RR-9, T. 41,604).

After first admitting there is no evidence as to the accused's activities while on these visits to Indo-China, they ask the Tribunal to presume that he was there preparing the invasion of French Indo-China in furtherance of Japanese conspiracy referred to in Count 1 of the Indictment. They then make this observation - that from the time Sato "entered into the conspiracy, he loses his shield of being a soldier" - but how and when did he enter the alleged conspiracy? According to the

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prosecution, it was when he became a part-time secretary to the Planning Board, for a period of less than a year, at which time the Planning Board had a rostrum of 60 to 70 full-time secretaries and investigators (Ex.71).

It is significant to note that the accused Sato is not named in Counts 23 and 33 of the Indictment, which allege that a number of the accused, on or about 22 September, 1940, initiated and waged a war of aggression and a war in violation of international treaties, etc., against the Republic of France. These counts in the Indictment could only refer to the so-called "invasion" of French Indo-China. It is apparent that even the prosecution itself placed no importance on Sato's being a Staff Officer to the China Expeditionary Forces when this Indictment was drawn. It is unnecessary to refer to the duties of a Staff Officer. He is little more than an aide to the Chief of Staff (Ex.78, T. 684).

III.

ACTIVITIES WHILE A SECTION CHIEF OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU

1. In March, 1941, Sato became Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. There are two sections in this Bureau; namely, Military Administration Section and Military Affairs Section. Among other duties of the Military Administration Section were: (Ex.74).

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- (a) Matters concerning the fundamental principles of national defense,
- (b) Matters concerning the general control of estimates.
- (c) Matters concerning fundamental munition administration.

The duties of the Military Affairs Section were:

- (a) Matters concerning general affairs of national defense policy.
- (b) Matters concerning international regulations.
- (c) Matters concerning affairs with the Imperial Diet.
- (d) Matters concerning popularization of national defense spirit and counter-plan for nation's thoughts. (Ex.74).

The prosecution contends that by virtue of his functions in the Military Affairs Section listed under (a) - "it is thus clear that Sato's section was within the War Ministry primarily concerned with the preparation of this policy of aggression." (RR-11, T.41,605). It further contends that the decision of Imperial Headquarters of April, 1941, to resort to war under certain conditions, is clearly a matter concerning national defense policy in general, and therefore, "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are compelled to assume that Sato's section was concerned with the preparation of this decision." (RR-12, T.41,606). This assumption is made, notwithstanding the fact that as a Section Chief he was not permitted to even attend Bureau meetings within the War Ministry (Ex.2238-A, T.14,331 and 16,083), much less attend a meeting of the Imperial General Staff who made such a decision. It also does not consider the fact that

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function (a) of the Military Administration Section is almost identical with function (a) of the Military Affairs Section. Upon what line of reasoning, therefore, are we compelled to assume that Sato's section was concerned with this decision? According to the prosecution, the answer lies in the absence of evidence to show that he was not concerned with the decision; reasoning which is void of logic and absurd on its face.

Actually, however, there is evidence explaining function (a) of the Military Affairs Section. Colonel Nishiura, who was Chief of the Military Administration Section at this same time, testified as follows:

"One of the matters placed under the charge of the Military Affairs Section was matters concerning the national defense policy in general. This might be understood to mean that the Bureau had authority to make a final decision on matters of national defense policy, but the exact contrary is the case. Matters of national defense and tactics were the exclusive concern of the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs." (Ex.3439, T.32,955).

According to this witness, both the Military Administration Section and the Military Affairs Section were merely to coordinate activities when such plans involved consultation with the War Minister. The duties were purely administrative and had nothing to do with the formulation of policy of national defense plans. This evidence has not been contradicted by the prosecution.

2. The prosecution contends that in October 1941, at the time of the fall of the 3rd Kogyo Cabinet, "when a crucial point had been reached in

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Japan's conspiratorial aims", Sato busied himself in promoting a Tojo Cabinet (RR-13, T.41,606). What are the facts? What is the evidence offered to the Tribunal in support of this contention? The prosecution offered the testimony of TANAKA, Ryukichi, who stated that Sato told him he went to see Senior Statesmen Abe and Hayashi on behalf of Tojo becoming Prime Minister to succeed Prince Kenoye (T.15,873). Sato's interrogation recites:

"I was sent by Tojo to see Abe and Hayashi following the resignation of Prince Kenoye in October, 1941, to explain to them that Tojo thought some person like Prince Higashi-Kuni would be the logical successor."

Sato denied having mentioned Tojo to Abe or Hayashi. He denied having influenced General Tojo's appointment as Premier. He expressed surprise when informed the next day of Tojo's appointment as Premier (Ex.3532, T.34,445). What does Tojo say about this? He testified that Tanaka's testimony on this point "has no factual foundation whatsoever." He relates that he felt no one but Prince Higashi-Kuni could have handled the situation with success following the resignation of the Kenoye Cabinet and that he had expressed this opinion to Prince Kenoye and to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido. Therefore, he sent Sato to transmit this opinion to Abe and Hayashi (Ex.3655, par.80, T.36,909), and it should be noted he was not alone in this thought for Navy Minister Oikawa likewise favored Prince Higashi-Kuni (T.34,570).

What does General Abe have to say about this

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visit of Sato's? He states that Sato came to visit him on the day the 3rd Konoye Cabinet resigned, bringing him a message from General Tojo recommending Prince Higashi-Kuni as Prime Minister. General Abe stated that at no time did Sato mention Tojo's name as Prime Minister. He further testified that at the meeting of the Senior Statesmen, after much discussion Kido suggested Tojo's name as Prime Minister and there was no objection (Ex.3522, T. 34,404-411). In the face of this positive contradiction of Tanaka's testimony, the prosecution states - "this cannot possibly affect Tanaka's credit" (RR-13, T.41,607). Abe and Tojo are confirmed in this regard by Kido (T.31,809). In any event, the story of Tanaka becomes highly irrelevant for Abe was not challenged by the prosecution on cross-examination.

3. The prosecution offered in evidence a document entitled "Principle Reasons Alleged for the Commencement of Hostilities against the United States and Britain," dated 11 November, 1941, certified by TANAKA, Ryukichi, which stated that to the best of his knowledge and belief, the document was "prepared by or under the direction of SATO, Kenryo, the Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau" (RR-14; Ex.1175, T.13,362). The purpose of this document was to show by inference that Sato knew that Japan was preparing to precipitate a war and he or one of the members of his Section prepared this document for the accused Muto to read at a Bureau meeting. Muta

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denied having read this document at a Bureau meeting, or having ever discussed such a matter with Sato (T. 33,161-62). The witness Hara testified that this document - "was drafted collectively by officials of the Army General Staff, Navy General Staff, Army Minister, Navy Minister and Foreign Office. It was not written by the Chief of the Military Affairs Section Sato, as testified by the prosecutor's witness TANAKA, Ryukichi. "(T.34,453). He also testified that it was not an official document prepared in the War Ministry, nor was it considered by any Liaison Conference. He was familiar with the document because he was assistant to Colonel Tanemura, who participated in the drafting of this document on the part of the General Staff office (Ex.3533, T.34,452-460). Attention is called to the fact that he did not testify, either on direct or cross-examination, that any part of this document came from the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau, as is inferred in the summation of the prosecution (RR-14, T.41,610).

4. The prosecution contends that Sato, by virtue of his position as head of the Military Affairs Section, knew the extent of the Japanese war plans (PR-15, T.41,611). Their only support of this contention is the testimony of TANAKA, Ryukichi, who said that the General Staff draws up the plans for operation, but they cannot be put into effect unless they have the consent of the War Minister because moneys and supplies for carrying out operations are provided by the Military Affairs

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Bureau (T.15,859-62). In refutation of this, Colonel Nishiura, head of the Administrative Section, told the Tribunal that the matter of estimates for the General Staff "is negotiated with the Finance Ministry through the Intendance Bureau; for materials, with the Planning Bureau or the Munitions Ministry through the Equipment Bureau." (T.32,952). He further testified that the Military Administration Section, and not the Military Affairs Section, had certain duties in connection with budget matters. The Military Affairs Bureau's only duty in regard to the budget was performed by the Administrative Section whose only function in turn was - "To do its best to adjust the organization and application of budget business of other bureaus and sections to the requirements of national defense, as set by the General Staff." (T.32,956).

5. The prosecution has laid great stress on a speech made by the accused Sato on 10 March, 1942, at Hibiya Hall on Army Day celebration. It is unnecessary to refer to the fact that Japan was at this time already at war and that one of Sato's duties in the Military Affairs Section was that of ordinary wartime propaganda (Div.II, par.3 of this Summation). This speech naturally was calculated to bolster the morale of both soldiers and Japanese nationals. The speech is not dissimilar to thousands made in every country at war. Sato was still in charge of the Press Section of the War Ministry. It was nothing more nor less than a typical wartime

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speech and does not merit further discussion (KR-75 T.41,611).

Up to this time the highest position the accused Sato has held was that of a Section Chief in the War Ministry. Attention is directed to the fact that in the War Ministry there were some twenty odd Section Chiefs, not one of whom are in the dock except Sato (Ex.3031, T.27,077). Therefore, we submit that undue importance has been attached to Sato's position herein, in so far as it has any bearing on the issues of this case.

IV.

ACTIVITIES AFTER APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU UNTIL JAPAN'S SURRENDER.

1. We come now to the real reason why Sato finds himself an accused in this case. Some four months after the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, he became head of the Military Affairs Bureau. The prosecution contends that in the position as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Sato was concerned, among other things, with (a) making of domestic and external plans for the conduct of propoganda, and (b) with the drafting of replies to protests forwarded from the Foreign Office in regard to the treatment of POW's (KR-16, T.41,613). The former we admit, but the latter is emphatically denied.

Again the prosecution relies on TANAKA, Ryukichi, the ever-present witness, for their evidence

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in this regard (T.14,286). As usual, Tanaka's testimony is not corroborated by any other witness. To contradict this evidence, the defense offered the witness Ninomiya, who was head of the Military Affairs Section while Sato was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau during the war with the exception of a short time in 1942. It is in this section that Tanaka stated replies to protests were prepared. This section, according to Tanaka, received all protests from the Foreign Office. Ninomiya, however, testified that replies to protests were not prepared by the Military Affairs Section, but by the POW Information Bureau, entirely separated from the Military Affairs Bureau. Protests from the Foreign Office were forwarded to the POW Information Bureau and matters relating to POW's were handled by this bureau (T.34,414). The prosecution contends that this witness admitted on cross-examination having seen and signed such documents, and, therefore, his evidence is "valueless and was designed to mislead" (RR-20, T.41,614-15). Let's be perfectly fair. The document presented to Ninomiya was Item 28 of Exhibit 3067, which Ninomiya, after examining, stated, and I quote:

"Yes, my name appears there, so does the name of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau Sato, but in those cases seals by proxy appear."

Also -

"It appears a Staff Member of the Bureau by the name of Yamazaki impressed the seal by proxy, both as to Sato's name and mine." (T.34,419)

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This document was then offered in evidence and became Ex.3528. But is this document a protest or a reply to a protest, as the prosecution infers in its summation? It is not. The document refers to the application of Article 86 of the Geneva Treaty and has nothing to do with protests as to treatment of POW's. This document had been circulated through the entire War Ministry, as is indicated in the introductory caption. The prosecution then asked the witness to identify certain documents, including Exhibits 1968 and 1973-76, and 3120, in not one of which the Military Affairs Section was concerned, and none of them having anything to do with protests and replies (T.34,424-433).

2. The prosecution makes a number of references in its summations to various documents wherein they allege distribution to the Military Affairs Bureau, among others, in an effort to point a suspicious finger at the Military Affairs Bureau in relation to POW matters. However, in each instance the captions of these documents showed that they were copies and circulated throughout the War Ministry; as, for illustration, in the document referred to on the cross-examination of the witness Ninomiya (T.34,422).

The witness Kudo, who was Chief of the 3rd Section of the Bureau of Treaties of the Foreign Office, when asked where the Foreign Office sent complaints, replied:

"They were sent to the department of Government concerned; namely, the POW Information Bureau."
(T.27,158)

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He also testified that "replies from authorities concerned" meant "with regard to POW's they were received from the POW Information Bureau, and with regard to civilian internees, from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry for Overseas." (T.27,157).

Mr. Suzuki of the Foreign Office also testified that protests went from the Foreign Office to the POW Information Bureau (T.12,840). Colonel Nishiura who was head of the Military Administration Section during this time, testified that no protests were received from the Foreign Office in his Section, nor did his Section prepare any replies to protests (T.32,960). When asked this question:

"Q. Do you know where policies and regulations were made relative to the treatment of POW's - what Bureau or Section?

he answered:

"A. By the POW Administration Bureau. That is where they were drafted." (T.32,962).

Tanaka himself admitted on cross-examination that replies to protests were prepared by the POW Information Bureau; that all reports of POW camp commanders were made to the POW Information Bureau (T.14,352 and 14,369). That protests relative to the treatment of POW's and replies thereto were forwarded to and received from the POW Information Bureau in the War Ministry is further corroborated by the accused Togo who was Foreign Minister during this period (Ex. 3646, T.35,768-69).

Therefore, whose testimony is "valueless and designed to mislead"? It is our submission that Tanaka discredited himself as a witness long ago. The Tribunal's attention need not again be directed to the

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fact that Tanaka has appeared as a witness before this Tribunal some nine or ten times, testifying both for the prosecution and the defense. He admitted that as head of the Military Service Bureau, the Kempei-tai was under his control; that it was necessary that the seal of his bureau be affixed to the document setting up the procedure for the trial of the Doolittle fliers (T.29,647). It is a matter of evidence that Tanaka has been provided his livelihood while testifying before this Tribunal (T.2168-2169). He testified that there was friction between his Bureau and the Military Affairs Bureau (T.14,342). It is submitted that his failure to attain the post of Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau has bred resentment within him against the accused Sato.

Tanaka's background and conduct during this trial argues strongly against acceptance of his testimony. Were it not for the fact that the prosecution predicates its case against the accused Sato largely on this witness' utterances, we would be inclined to pass him off without comment. The very fact of his repeated appearances indicates strongly his willingness to divide his testimony between prosecution and defense as his interests dictate.

In July, 1946, Tanaka testified that he was dismissed as Chief of the Military Service Bureau in September, 1942 (T.1947). He later testified, with an elaborate explanation, as to why he resigned as Chief of the Military Service Bureau in September, 1942 (T.2,053). He admitted on cross-examination

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(Sec.N-18)

that he was continuously with the prosecution while it was presenting its case, with the exception of two weeks to return to his home in the Fujiya Mountain area. He stated on cross-examination on July 1, 1946, that he had been under daily investigation by the International Prosecution Section (T.2681).

After changing his affiliation from the prosecution to the defense, on the only occasion he was cross-examined by the prosecution, Tanaka made a misstatement of fact (T.29,053), testifying that Colonel Otsuki was in the Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau and wanted the Doolittle fliers severely punished. The truth came out when Colonel Otsuki testified here in this trial himself that at that time he was in Saigon and the prosecution did not attempt cross-examination (T.34,438). We contend that Tanaka has demonstrated that he was firstly, interested in avoiding indictment himself; secondly, in reaping what personal benefits he could; and thirdly, obtaining revenge upon certain of the accused whom he dislikes.

Relying upon the statement of law given by the President of the Tribunal: -

"English law appears to be this, as I understand it; Witness A can be asked whether witness B is a credible person, and witness A can base his opinion on the general reputation or the general character of that person," (T.14,391) -

when the defense first offered Tanaka as a witness, counsel for Sato made this statement -

"If the Tribunal please, since the accused Sato intends to attack the credibility of this witness at a later date, we do not join in his being called as a witness." (T.22,713).

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Later, at the time the accused Sato's individual case was being presented, we offered evidence as to the bad reputation this witness had for truth and honesty. We were overruled by the court, through the announcement of the Acting President (T.34,386-392). It is, therefore, our contention that this Tribunal should disregard the testimony of this witness, at least as to the accused Sato.

3. In its conclusion the prosecution states that the power to prevent atrocities and other breaches of conventions relating thereto rested in the War Minister (RR-24, T.41,617). They do not charge Sato with the commission of illegal acts but rather with the omission to act in the furtherance of the prevention of such alleged violations. The statement of the prosecution that Sato was in agreement with the policy of the War Minister is misleading, for it infers that he approved of the alleged mistreatment of the POW's. Such has never been proven and until the law announced by this Tribunal(T.33) is changed, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution to sustain such charges with proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Such evidence as has been introduced against Sato as to his words spoken after the commencement of war has no bearing upon the issues arising from the indictment, unless the heretofore admirable trait of patriotism or loyalty to ones country during a period of war is to become a tainted and condemnable thing.

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4. The accused Sato relinquished his office as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in December 1944, and became Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces until April, 1945, when he assumed command of the 37th Division in Siam. The prosecution itself states that while this Division had been responsible for atrocities before Sato took command, after his command in April, 1945 "there is no evidence of any atrocities committed by them after that month." (AR-66).

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CONCLUSION.

L. It is not with facetiousness that we say the accused Sato's case presents aspects which are the simplest and yet the most difficult of understanding. It is difficult to understand why he was indicted in the first place, and the lack of evidence presented against him to sustain the charges in the Indictment makes the consideration of the issues involving him the simplest.

2. As to the planning, preparation and initiation of aggressive war, the evidence both of the prosecution and defense solidly discloses that there is no basis for a consideration of guilt. As to the waging of aggressive war, which some might accept as a natural consequence of his being a soldier during wartime, we sincerely urge the Tribunal to weigh carefully whether this accused is actually chargeable with an offense such as contemplated by the

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(Sec.N-1c)

magnitude of these proceedings. As has been heretofore stated, the factory worker who turned the screw in the manufacture of a weapon of war, or the farmer who supplied his grain to feed a soldier are, in the same sense, participating in the waging of war. The difference is only one of degree and the degree to which the accused here participated is not such as would warrant a conviction.

The President of this Tribunal said:

"The distribution of powers and responsibility among the Government departments and sub-departments is very likely the same in Japan as elsewhere. We are concerned about the activities of the individuals and more particularly, the accused." (T. 15,885).

Wherein Sato's participation in Governmental affairs or the carrying on of his ordinary functions of military office were criminal, is difficult of understanding. At no time has the prosecution offered even a scintilla of evidence that the accused Sato conducted himself other than as a reasonable and patriotic man in compliance with the duties imposed upon him. Nor was he at any time in a position such as could command the charge of policy-making.

3. The prosecution quite appropriately divided their argument into two divisions, one bearing upon Sato's activities before assuming the post of Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and the other after that date. The assumption of such office, as the evidence has clearly shown, was after the commencement of hostilities. It is not mere speculation or

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surmise that leads us to the belief that Sato would never have found himself one of the accused in this courtroom had he not assumed this post. After acceptance of this assignment, the evidence leads us to the sound conclusion that he perpetrated no wrong cognizable by the Charter of this Tribunal.

4. We respectfully urge the Tribunal to consider the imprisonment of this man during the long pendency of this trial in light of the utter failure of the prosecution to initially justify even his indictment, much less to prove his guilt. In so doing, we ask for a verdict of "Not Guilty" on each and every count in the Indictment in which he is charged.

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1917-1918

SATC Summary

1. 本會之宗旨在於推廣華文教育，以保存民族文化，並促進國際交流。本會自成立以來，承蒙各界人士之支持，業務蒸蒸日上。

2. 本會之主要工作包括：

- (1) 舉辦各類華文班，包括幼兒班、小學班、中學班及成人班，以普及華文教育。
- (2) 出版華文雜誌，介紹華文文學、歷史及文化，以豐富華文讀者之知識。
- (3) 舉辦各類文化活動，如春節聯歡會、中秋聯歡會、國慶慶祝大會等，以增進會員間之友誼，並向僑胞展示華文文化之魅力。
- (4) 加強與海外華文組織之聯繫，共同推廣華文教育。

3. 本會之經費來源包括：

- (1) 會員會費：本會設有不同級別之會員，其會費如下：
 - 會費：新加坡幣 100 元
 - 會費：新加坡幣 50 元
 - 會費：新加坡幣 20 元
- (2) 義賣收入：本會定期舉辦義賣活動，所得款項全數撥充會務。
- (3) 社會捐助：本會承蒙各界人士之慷慨捐助，使會務得以順利開展。

4. 本會之未來展望：

- (1) 繼續擴大華文班之招生，提高華文教育之普及率。
- (2) 加強與海外華文組織之合作，共同推廣華文教育。
- (3) 舉辦更多元化之文化活動，豐富僑胞之文化生活。
- (4) 加強與僑胞之溝通，提高本會之服務質量。

- 822-7 依：華文班數 = 參加人數 = 會費 = 新加坡幣 100 元
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SATO Summarization - R.R.

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姓名 延誤 入 五二 延誤 入 四四七

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SATO Sumation - P.R

一、¹ $\int_0^{\infty} \frac{e^{-x} x^n}{x^2 + 1} dx = \frac{\pi}{2} \frac{1 - (-1)^n}{1 + n}$ (n 爲正奇數)
 二、² $\int_0^{\infty} \frac{e^{-x} x^n}{x^2 + 1} dx = \frac{\pi}{2} \frac{1 + (-1)^n}{1 + n}$ (n 爲正偶數)
 三、³ $\int_0^{\infty} \frac{e^{-x} x^n}{x^2 + 1} dx = \frac{\pi}{2} \frac{1 - (-1)^n}{1 + n}$ (n 爲正奇數)
 四、⁴ $\int_0^{\infty} \frac{e^{-x} x^n}{x^2 + 1} dx = \frac{\pi}{2} \frac{1 + (-1)^n}{1 + n}$ (n 爲正偶數)
 五、⁵ $\int_0^{\infty} \frac{e^{-x} x^n}{x^2 + 1} dx = \frac{\pi}{2} \frac{1 - (-1)^n}{1 + n}$ (n 爲正奇數)
 六、⁶ $\int_0^{\infty} \frac{e^{-x} x^n}{x^2 + 1} dx = \frac{\pi}{2} \frac{1 + (-1)^n}{1 + n}$ (n 爲正偶數)

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SATO Sumitomo-RR

第一、本會全體會議決議、根據本會章程、由本會全體會議、選出理事、及監事、其任期為一年、自民國二十一年一月一日起、至二十二年十二月三十一日止、其任期屆滿、即行改選、其選舉辦法、由本會全體會議、另行議定、

22/15

第二、本會全體會議決議、根據本會章程、由本會全體會議、選出理事、及監事、其任期為一年、自民國二十一年一月一日起、至二十二年十二月三十一日止、其任期屆滿、即行改選、其選舉辦法、由本會全體會議、另行議定、

民國二十二年一月一日 總理 櫻井 大八三

一九三三年一月一日

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SATO Summation - PR

PR-20

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 窓の受取ラカシヨトテ不カクカシクシタ。ソニテ田中
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 (音讀) 彼、一九四五年二月迄軍事事務局ニ居リタルコト
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 十月迄至彼、陸軍大臣トシテ、東條條、被書ヲ紛々居
 リシコト、並ニ以テ期間ニ抗議ガ軍務局ニ行キヤ否ヤ
 又言セ得サレトテ談クシタ。彼、是取初同軍務
 課員トシテ、實際ハ從務員ニシテ文書ヲ見タルコトヲ五
 識シタガ、彼、同文書ヲ見且ツ之ニ署名名ニクナリテ認
 事、歴シク不認

22-24
記 録

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SATO Summary

此等、殘虐行為ヲ阻止シ、他、倭國邊境ニ於テ其
限日本憲法下ノ陸軍大臣ニテ之ヲ行ハシムルニ因テ
之於テ捕虜ヲ保護シ條約(通稱)守テ保シ自(日本)敵
府ノ義務下ニテ之ヲ行ハシムルニ因テ、佐林(幸)ト相會ヒ知
事トシテ之ヲ行ハシムルニ因テ、彼、極限(ト)ニ至リ、
アトモ之ヲ行ハシムルニ因テ、此レニ對シテ、何國於テ何
モ事カザリ之ヲ行ハシムルニ因テ、及、對ニ我々ノ降、伏、彼、親(ト)シテ、
彼ガ、軍務課長トシテ及、日、軍務局長トシテ、陸軍大臣、
政、府ニ賛成(ト)シテ之ヲ行ハシムルニ因テ、

一九四三年二月十九日ニ佐藤議會會場、參事會長ト演說シテ言
事。彼、自、本、國、始、メ、侵略戰爭ノ進行ニ對シ、相、憂、シ、極、中
先、決、意、ヲ、有、リ、之、ヲ、行、ハシ、メ、一九四三年八月十八日ニ、佐藤、六、國、連、絡
對、シ、テ、一、部、ヲ、經、テ、報、復、シ、條、約、守、テ、說、明、シ、自、國、東、條、
約、南、軍、光、ト、共、ニ、起、衆、院、會、議、ニ、出、席、シ、テ、言、事、保、護、國、際、法、
戰、爭、遂、行、自、他、カ、我々、自、身、良、見、ニ、條、約、守、テ、報、復、シ、
一九四三年八月十八日、會、議、ニ、於、テ、之、ヲ、行、ハシ、メ、佐、藤、亦、陸、軍、副、長、
表、シ、テ、一九四三年十一月六日、東、亞、諸、國、傀、儡、政、府、會、議、
ニ、出、席、シ、テ、言、事、其、時、此、等、諸、國、正、當、に、我、府、ノ、實、務、奪、
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SHIP SCHEDULE

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倫敦號：由倫敦開往上海，每星期一、四、六開行。
 中法號：由上海開往倫敦，每星期二、五、日開行。
 怡和號：由上海開往倫敦，每星期三、六、日開行。
 太古號：由倫敦開往上海，每星期四、日、一開行。
 招商局：由上海開往倫敦，每星期五、二、三開行。
 怡和號：由倫敦開往上海，每星期六、三、四開行。
 太古號：由上海開往倫敦，每星期日、六、日開行。
 招商局：由倫敦開往上海，每星期一、日、一開行。

倫敦號：由倫敦開往上海，每星期一、四、六開行。
 中法號：由上海開往倫敦，每星期二、五、日開行。
 怡和號：由上海開往倫敦，每星期三、六、日開行。
 太古號：由倫敦開往上海，每星期四、日、一開行。
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 怡和號：由倫敦開往上海，每星期六、三、四開行。
 太古號：由上海開往倫敦，每星期日、六、日開行。
 招商局：由倫敦開往上海，每星期一、日、一開行。

SATI Summary - PR

1. 1950年10月1日，中華人民共和國正式成立。這是在中國共產黨領導下，全國人民經過長期艱苦奮鬥的結果。新中國的成立，標誌著中國歷史翻開了新的一頁。

2. 新中國成立後，中國人民在政治、經濟、文化等各個領域都取得了長足的進步。中國共產黨領導人民建立了社會主義制度，實現了國家的統一和民族的團結。

3. 在國際事務中，中國人民積極參與，為維護世界和平與發展作出了重要貢獻。中國人民將繼續在黨的領導下，為實現中華民族的偉大復興而努力奮鬥。

4. 中國人民將繼續在黨的領導下，為實現中華民族的偉大復興而努力奮鬥。中國人民將繼續在黨的領導下，為實現中華民族的偉大復興而努力奮鬥。

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SHIGEMITSU Summatation - SS Gene Te. Br. etc

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(II) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)

P32 P30 P29 P28 P26 P25

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重見表
①

SYSTEMTSU Summation - SS

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SHIGE ITSU, Mamoru

SS-1. SHIGE ITSU, Mamoru, is charged under the following counts of the Indictment: 1-18, 23, 25, 27-35, 44, 48-50, 52-55.

SS-2. In 1911, SHIGEMITSU graduated from the German Law Department of the College of Jurisprudence of Tokyo University. From that time on until Japan's surrender he held various diplomatic posts of responsibility. During the period covered by the Indictment the defendant occupied the following posts: in 1929-30 he was Japanese consul-general in Shanghai, and concurrently councillor of the Japanese Embassy in the Republic of China. Later, until 1932, he was charge d'Affairs and Ambassador to China. During his tenure of office as ambassador, SHIGE ITSU was wounded as a result of an attempt against his life and the lives of other high-ranking Japanese officials made by Chinese patriots in Shanghai. This accounts for the break in his diplomatic career up to 1934, when SHIGE ITSU was appointed chief of the Cultural Activities Department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1935, SHIGE ITSU was a member of the Board of Manchurian Affairs of the Cabinet. In August, 1936, he received the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and was appointed Ambassador to the USSR. He remained in this office until September, 1938, when he was appointed Ambassador to Great Britain. In February, 1941, SHIGE ITSU was relieved of his duties as Ambassador to Great Britain and was appointed Ambassador to the Wang Ching-wei puppet government in China. From

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Page 33-1

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(SS-2)
April 6, 1943, until April, 1945, SHIGEMITSU was Japanese Foreign Minister, and besides that from July 22, 1944, until April, 1945, was concurrently Minister of Greater East Asia.
a.

SS-3. Thus, in the course of the whole period covered by the indictment, SHIGEMITSU occupied responsible diplomatic posts, the holding of which called for his knowledge of the conspiracy aims and for the active effectuation of the goals set up by the conspirators. His tenure of office as Councillor of the Embassy, Consul-General in Shanghai and Ambassador to China in 1929-1932 was connected with the beginning and development of Japanese aggression against the Republic of China and with the so-called "first Shanghai incident".
a. Already at that time he was a participant in the over-all conspiracy. In connection with the events of this period SHIGEMITSU was awarded the Order of Merit with the Order of Double Rays of the Rising Sun.
b. His tenure of office as a member of the Manchurian Affairs Board in 1935 was connected with the further development of Japanese expansion in Manchuria and with the transformation of this country into a military base for an attack against the Soviet Union. As Ambassador to the USSR he is responsible for the initiation of the undeclared war of aggression against the Soviet Union in the Lake Khasan area in the summer of 1938. At that time, as it will further be shown, SHIGEMITSU was an active agent of the most reactionary militarist circles of Japan, who to the utmost

SS-2.
Ex. 123, T. 775-81

SS-3.
a. Ex. 59, T. 3287-97
b. Ex. 123, T. 775

Page SS-3.

(SS-3)
 extent was striving to aggravate the conflict and to bring about an aggressive war against the USSR. ^{c.} While Ambassador to Great Britain he showed that he was an active supporter of the Japanese policy of expansion in the South Seas area ^{d.} by frequently urging and recommending to the Japanese Government to avail themselves of the situation created as a result of the war in Europe for the establishment of Japan's rule over Asia. In 1943-1945 while he was Minister of Foreign Affairs he always showed himself as a determined advocate of close alliance with Hitlerite Germany, of fascist methods of warfare and of the establishment of the fascist "new order" in the whole world, and his practical activities were directed towards achieving those ends. Thus an analysis of the defendant's career shows that during the whole period of time covered by the indictment, particularly from 1932, he was always appointed to such diplomatic posts as were associated with the necessity of fulfilling important tasks that were part of the common plan of conspiracy.

SS-4. When SHIGEMITSU was Japanese Ambassador to China in 1932 there occurred the so-called "first Shanghai incident" which was an important link in the development of the plan of aggression vis-a-vis China. The incident started on January 20, 1932, with the presentation of "five demands" to the Mayor of Shanghai by the Japanese Consul-General in that city, who was directly subordinate to SHIGEMITSU. Among those demands were the demands with regard to the withdrawal of Chinese troops, the dissolution of all anti-Japanese

SS-3.

c. Ex. 753, T. 7755;
 Ex. 754, T. 7757;
 Ex. 758, T. 7818;
 Ex. 2633, T. 22,803;
 Ex. 759, T. 7825

SS-3 (cont'd)

d. Ex. 1017, T. 9683;
 Ex. 1018, T. 9683-8;
 Ex. 1019, T. 9691-3;
 Ex. 1023, T. 9712-6

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Page SS-4.

(SS-4)
 organizations, etc. The Japanese diplomatic action, being an unlawful interference with the internal affairs of the sovereign Chinese state, served as a pretext for the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese naval forces in Shanghai to initiate an armed clash with the Chinese troops, which was provoked by him in the Chapei area, from where, as it is shown in the report of the Commission of the League of Nations, the Chinese troops "would not have time to withdraw even had they wished to do so."^{a.} It must be noted that the Japanese attacked the Chinese in spite of the fact that the Mayor of Shanghai agreed to comply with those unlawful Japanese demands. After that, considerable reinforcements of Japanese troops were dispatched to Shanghai by the Japanese imperialists, in particular between the 7th and the 15th February - a mixed brigade and a division under the command of General UEDA,^{b.} and on March 1, two more Japanese divisions. This, undoubtedly, was aimed at the expansion of the conflict for the purpose of realizing the aggressive conspiracy against China. The attempt made by the Defense to rehabilitate SHIGEMITSU in connection with those events by referring to the fact that on May 5 he signed an agreement pursuant to which a considerable part of the Japanese troops were withdrawn from Shanghai cannot be acknowledged as well-grounded, because SHIGEMITSU was forced to do it due to a number of circumstances beyond his control, as for instance, the pressure of foreign countries and the decisions of the League of Nations (the decision of the League of Nations

SS-4.

- a. Ex. 59, T. 3290
- b. Ex. 3161, T. 28,135-38

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Page 33-1

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 Ex. 754, T. 7759;
 Ex. 758, T. 7818;
 Ex. 2633, T. 22,803;
 Ex. 759, T. 7825

SS-3 (cont'd)

d. Ex. 1017, T. 9683;
 Ex. 1018, T. 9683-8;
 Ex. 1017, T. 9671-3;
 Ex. 1023, T. 9712-6

Page SS-4.

(SS-4)
 organizations, etc. The Japanese diplomatic action, being an unlawful interference with the internal affairs of the sovereign Chinese state, served as a pretext for the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese naval forces in Shanghai to initiate an armed clash with the Chinese troops, which was provoked by him in the Chapel area, from where, as it is shown in the report of the Commission of the League of Nations, the Chinese troops "would not have time to withdraw even had they wished to do so."^{a.} It must be noted that the Japanese attacked the Chinese in spite of the fact that the Mayor of Shanghai agreed to comply with those unlawful Japanese demands. After that, considerable reinforcements of Japanese troops were dispatched to Shanghai by the Japanese imperialists, in particular between the 7th and the 15th February - a mixed brigade and a division under the command of General UEDA,^{b.} and on March 1, two more Japanese divisions. This, undoubtedly, was aimed at the expansion of the conflict for the purpose of realizing the aggressive conspiracy against China. The attempt made by the Defense to rehabilitate SHIGEMITSU in connection with those events by referring to the fact that on May 5 he signed an agreement pursuant to which a considerable part of the Japanese troops were withdrawn from Shanghai cannot be acknowledged as well-grounded, because SHIGEMITSU was forced to do it due to a number of circumstances beyond his control, as for instance, the pressure of foreign countries and the decisions of the League of Nations (the decision of the League of Nations

SS-4.

- a. Ex. 59, T. 3290
- b. Ex. 3161, T. 28,135-38

(SS-4)

Assembly of March 4, 1932; the U. S. Government's order to the American military authorities in Shanghai of March 5 on entering into collaboration for the settlement of the conflict; a repeated interference of the "Commission of Nineteen" of the League of Nations, etc.)^{c.} In its declaration on the recognition of Japan as aggressor in Manchuria the League of Nations pointed out that according to the estimate made by the Chinese side the "Japanese intervention in Shanghai cost them (The Chinese) 24,000 soldiers and civilians killed, wounded or missing, and they estimate their material losses at about 1500 million Mexican dollars."^{d.}

SS-5. When SHIGEMITSU was a member of the Board of Manchurian Affairs, he made himself known as an advocate of a further development of Japanese expansion in China. At that time there was no difference between the position of SHIGEMITSU and that of ITAGAKI and the other conspirators who were of the opinion that the negotiations with China should be conducted by military authorities who, for the purpose of exercising pressure, used the Tientsin garrison and the Manchurian railway.^{a.} While SHIGEMITSU was a member of the Bureau of Manchurian Affairs, Japanese militarists were busy working on a large scale at the transformation of Manchuria into a military base for an attack against the USSR.^{b.} The official position occupied by the defendant makes him responsible for those actions.

SS-4.

- c. Ex. 59, T. 3293-4
- d. Ex. 59, T. 3293

SS-5.

- a. Ex. 2192, T. 15,733-4
- b. Ex. 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718

SS-6. SHIGEMITSU's activities in connection with the undeclared aggressive war against the Soviet Union in the Lake Khasan area in July and August, 1938, when the defendant held the office of Ambassador to Moscow, must be particularly singled out. In the early part of July, 1938, the Japanese militarists started concentrating troops in the Hill Zaozernaya (Chankufeng) area, at the junction of the borders of the Soviet Union, Manchuria and Korea in the vicinity of Vladivostok. An official report of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows that at the same time SHIGEMITSU, who was then on a mission in Europe, received a telegraph order to return to Moscow immediately. He arrived in Moscow on the ^{a.} 18th.

SS-7. By the time of SHIGEMITSU's return to Moscow Japanese representatives had been shown, at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the Manchun Protocol of 1886 and the map attached thereto, which indisputably established the fact that the boundary ran along the watershed of the mountain range west of Lake Khasan. Thus it was established that the Japanese claims on the western bank of the lake and in particular on the ^{a.} whole of the Hill Zaozernaya were insolent.

SS-8. In spite of that, on July 30, 1938, SHIGEMITSU called on the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and made a demand in the form of an ultimatum that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the western bank of Lake

SS-6.

a. Ex. 2647-A, T. 22,927

SS-7.

a. Ex. 2647-A, T. 22,926;
Ex. 754, T. 7750

(SS 8)
 Khazan, threatening to resort to force. Without any basis of fact he rejected all proof produced by the Soviet side and in particular, speaking about the map attached to the Hunchun Protocol, stated:

" . . . to my mind, at this critical moment speaking of some map is unreasonable. This will only complicate matters." ^{a.}

Further SHIGEMITSU stated:

" . . . Japan has the rights and obligations to Manchukuo to use force and make the Soviet troops evacuate. . . ."

SS-9. Further, in compliance with the over-all plan of conspiracy, SHIGEMITSU encouraged the initiation of hostilities. On July 29, 1938, Japanese troops started military operations in the Hill Bezimyanaya area and on the night of July 30-31, the main forces of the Japanese 19th Rifle Division were brought into action, and the fighting assumed large proportions. On August 4, 1938, SHIGEMITSU called on the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and kept insisting on the insolent demands of the Japanese-Manchurian side. ^{a.} On August 6, 1938, the Zaozornaya Hill was cleared of Japanese troops by regular troops of the Soviet Army.

SS-10. However, even after that, SHIGEMITSU continued insisting on the demands he had previously made and protracted the negotiations. SHIGEMITSU's conference with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR of August 7, 1938, is described in the Diary of the latter in the following way:

SS-8.

- a. Ex. 754, T. 7703
- b. Ex. 754, T. 7763

SS-9.

- a. Ex. 2636, T. 22,826-36

(SS-10)

"I pointed out to SHIGEMITSU that when we speak of the frontier, we mean the existing frontier established by the Khunchun and other agreements, and it is the only frontier we can speak of.

"SHIGEMITSU's reply is, that according to their interpretation of the Khunchung agreement, the Japanese party considers that the frontier before July 11 should be the one between Manchukuo and the U.S.S.R. "It means that the Chankhufeng hill is a Manchurian territory. Therefore, it is desirable that the Soviet party should not attack the Japanese troops even if Chankhufeng were now in the hands of the Japanese. I say to SHIGEMITSU I am afraid there is no use of conversing any longer and we had better discontinue the talk. We have shown the frontier on the map. The Bezimyanaya and Chankhufeng hills are on the Soviet territory. We shall defend them at any cost and we shall not yield an inch."^a

SS-11. Only on August 10, 1938, did SHIGEMITSU change his position, when, after the Japanese troops had been completely routed, he agreed to the cessation of hostilities on the condition that each side would remain in the positions occupied by the troops of both sides at that moment, i. e., as of August 11, 1938.^a Then on August 21 and 31, due to the complete failure of the adventure, SHIGEMITSU consented to recognize the Kunchun Protocol and the map attached thereto as basic documents for the delimitation of the border line, thus admitting that he was wrong and that his demands were unlawful.^b

It becomes quite clear from an analysis of the course of the diplomatic negotiations that SHIGEMITSU deliberately initiated large-scale military operations, acting as an agent of the most aggressive Japanese circles and an active participant in the criminal conspiracy.

SS-10.

a. Ex. 2658, T. 22,859

SS-11.a. Ex. 2716, T. 23,908
b. Ex. 2643, T. 22,903;
Ex. 759, T. 7825

SS-12. After the failure of the Japanese aggression in the Lake Khasan area SHIGEMITSU could not remain Japanese Ambassador in Moscow any longer and he was transferred to London as Ambassador to Great Britain / 1938-1941/.

Evidence shows that in holding this office SHIGEMITSU continued to remain an active adherent of Japan's policy of aggression on the Asiatic continent, which followed the policy of the Hitlerite clique in Europe. After the occupation of Belgium and the Netherlands by Hitlerite Germany, SHIGEMITSU on May 14, 1940, sent a telegram to Foreign Minister ARITA in which he urged to:

" . . . apply our national policies for China and South Seas in accordance with the policy to make our situation in the East Asia firm and stable . . ."a.

SS-13. On May 26, 1940, in connection with the military successes of the Hitlerites, SHIGEMITSU sent a telegram to the Foreign Minister stating that it was necessary

"to cope with whatever change in the international situation may occur."

He also advised:

"As for Japan, as the result of present war, she should shoulder willy-nilly the responsibility for the stability of East Asia, which occupies one third of the world, so I think it may be advantageous to strengthen our position there . . . in order to take an active part in the future international arena."a.

SS-14. The more Hitlerite aggression in Europe made progress the more persistent became SHIGEMITSU's recommendations to the Japanese government concerning the intensification of the policy of expansion in Asia. Thus, in a telegram addressed to Foreign Minister ARITA of June 19, 1940, he said:

SS-12.

a. Ex. 1017, T. 9685

SS-13.

a. Ex. 1018, T. 9688

0 159 00 15 2654

(S)

4) is needless to say that it is quite advantageous to make use of European War to strengthen the position of Japan in the East Asia . . . It is quite important to watch the attitude of the United States to say nothing of paying attention to the condition of France, in the case of taking positive policy for French Indo-China and others . . . If the surrender of France will be realized, her plantations in South Pacific Ocean will be probably interfered with by Australia and in that case Japan may grasp the opportunity to take positive activity . . . Japan will not tolerate to leave East Asia districts as the plantation and object of trade to be exploited by capitalism of Europe . . . As it is evident that the influence of Europe to Orient will be remarkably reduced after the war, Japan had better, I presume, take advantage of this opportunity to establish our position in East Asia firmly."

SS-15. SHIGEMITSU fully adhered to the principle of "building Greater East Asia" which was equal to the Hitlerite slogan of "new order" in Europe. On August 5, 1940, SHIGEMITSU sent the following telegram to MATSUOKA:

"Please accept my hearty congratulations for the establishment and enforcement of the Greater East Asia Policy." a.

SS-16. In the same telegram SHIGEMITSU formulated the principles of the policy of expansion on the Asiatic continent, which he believed to be the most effective. He advanced two such principles: (1) to effectuate the aggression at the expense of such countries as were weakened to the utmost by war and (2) to defeat such countries one by one, trying to avoid a simultaneous war against several opponents. SHIGEMITSU wrote:

SS-14.

a. Ex. 1019, T. 9691-3

SS-15.

a. Ex. 1023, T. 9711

(SS-16)

" . . . in order to establish our position in Greater East Asia, it would be necessary to consider measures for gaining the maximum benefits at the minimum loss by carrying them out at the direct expense of small nations (for instance France and Portugal) (although indirectly it may turn out to be at the expense of Britain and America) and by avoiding conflict with other countries so as not to make many enemies at once but to dispose of them one by one."

Thus in May, 1940, SHIGEMITSU regarded the practical implementation of the mission to create Greater East Asia under the leadership of imperialistic Japan as being similar to the initial Hitlerite conquests in Europe, which were prepared by fascist diplomacy, which strove to isolate nations, which were to become the objects of aggression, with the view of disposing of them one by one. Thus unity of aims and methods of actions of imperialist Japan, Hitlerite Germany and fascist Italy was later on always stressed and advocated by the defendant SHIGEMITSU.

SS-17. On February 19, 1941, SHIGEMITSU was appointed Japanese Ambassador to the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei.^{a.} The very fact of SHIGEMITSU's appointment to this post characterizes to what extent the leaders of Japan's ruling clique trusted him; for the functions of the Japanese Ambassador to the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei went far beyond the scope of an ordinary diplomatic representation. In connection with this it should be recalled that the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army who actually was a dictator of the country. The Wang Ching-wei puppet government differed very little

SS-16.

a. Ex. 1025, T. 9711

SS-17.

a. Ex. 123, T. 777

Page SS-12

(SS-17)
 from the puppet government of Manchukuo, and if it did
 it was only in that the full subordination of the local
 administration to the Japanese emissaries was still more
 expressed in this case.

SS-18. On April 20, 1943, SHIGEMITSU was appointed
 Minister of Foreign Affairs and remained in this office
 until April, 1945. (From July 22, 1944, he was concurrently
 Minister for Greater East Asia Affairs) As mentioned
 before, SHIGEMITSU, while Minister of Foreign Affairs in
 the KOISO and TOJO War cabinets, manifested clearly that
 he supported the idea of war to the end on the side of
 the Axis powers, favored Hitler's claims and took all measures
 within his power for the transplantation of the "New Order"
 principles into the so-called "Asiatic Sphere of Co-prosperity".
 Besides that, evidence has proved SHIGEMITSU's co-participation
 in the commission of conventional war crimes, in particular
 in the encouraging of the brutal treatment of prisoners of war
 in the Japanese POW camps and in deliberately misinforming the
 protecting powers.

SS-19. SHIGEMITSU has shown that he was an ardent
 supporter of the Tripartite Pact and regarded war in Europe
 and Asia as actions of the Axis powers commonly agreed upon and
 directed towards the achievement of one and the same goal.
 SHIGEMITSU frequently advocated this thesis in his public
 statements. To quote some of them:

SS-16.
 Ex. 123, T. 777

(SS-19)

"The Pact of Alliance shines forth as brightly as
 ever to illumine our road to victory . . .

It is well for us to renew . . . our firm
 determination to prosecute the common war . . .
 The spirit of Japan who is fighting in East Asia
 is the spirit of Germany and her allies fighting
 in Europe . . ."

The address was made on September 27, 1943. a.

"As soon as Japan, accepting the challenge of America
 and Britain, rose in arms, on December 8 two years
 ago, our allies Germany and Italy lost no time in
 responding to our action by forming a common war
 front with us."

This statement bears the date of December 1, 1943. b.

" . . . on December 11, 1941, the three nations,
 concluding a new treaty, firmly pledged themselves
 to fight out the common war until final victory . . ."
 (Article dated December 12, 1944)^c.

SS-20. SHIGEMITSU's public statements while he held
 the post of Foreign Minister were equally manifest in
 demonstrating his undisguised fascist stand. SHIGEMITSU's
 statements glorifying Hitler and Mussolini which took
 place when Germany and Italy had already suffered severe
 defeats went far beyond customary diplomatic courtesy and
 were made in an effort to justify fascism and the criminal
 "New Order" in Europe. Thus, SHIGEMITSU stated:

"The figures of the German people under the leadership
 of their Fuhrer are undoubtedly the figures of heroes.
 We are firmly convinced that Europe will, after all,
 be saved by Hitler and Mussolini." (32 December 1944)^d.

When Hitler's regime was already doomed, SHIGEMITSU continued
 deceiving his own people as to the course and outcome of the
 European war and pledged loyalty to Hitler.

SS-19.

- a. Ex. 773-A, T. 8062
- b. Ex. 773A
- c. Ex. 828-A

SS-20.

- d. Ex. 828-A

(SS-20)

" . . . Undoubtedly the decisive war is progressing in our favor.

" . . . As long as Japan, Germany and Italy are solidly united we need entertain no doubt as to the successful outcome of the war . . .

" . . . we pledge afresh to further tighten our co-operation and forge ahead for final victory."
(12 December 1944) ^b.

"The combination between our Empire and other allied countries is becoming firmer and firmer and we are convinced of carrying out the current war successfully to the last together with our allied countries at any cost." (January 21, 1945) ^c.

The last statement was made less than four months prior to the final defeat of Germany. We have confined our outline to only some of the statements made by SHIGEMITSU. However, should it be the pleasure of the Tribunal, the Prosecution is prepared to present a great deal of similar statements made by this accused.

SS-21. SHIGEMITSU's responsibility as Foreign Minister for the treatment of prisoners of war follows, inter alia, from the Imperial Ordinance relating to the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the regulations relating to the "Establishment of an office concerning Japanese residing in enemy countries and enemy nationals residing in Japan".

SS-22. Article 8 of the Imperial Ordinance sets forth that the "Bureau of Treaties and Conventions" under the Foreign Minister "shall take charge of affairs relating to treaties and conventions and to matters concerning external laws and regulations".
^a.

SS-20.

- b. Ex. 828A
- c. Ex. 829A

SS-22.

- a. Ex. 76, T. 684

SS-23. The regulations relating to the "establishment of an office concerning Japanese residing in enemy countries and enemy nationals residing in Japan" provide in Section I: "Work to Be Handled by the New Office" as follows:

"3. Matters relating to enemy nationals who are internees, prisoners of war, or interned in concentration camps under Japanese jurisdiction. Looks after business related to the treatment (clothes, food, living quarters, inquiries and answers as to safety, communication of the "list" (T. N. of their names), appointment of, and calls on, the nation representing their interests and the delegation of the International Committee of Red Cross, communications, relief, labor, punishment, repatriation, etc.) of the above-mentioned enemy nationals.

"Among the above-mentioned business shall be included, replying to proposals from enemy countries and other sources".^{a.}

SS-24. As Foreign Minister, SHIGEMITSU could not help being aware of protestations made by the allied powers against inhuman treatment of POWs in Japanese prison camps. Thus, on April 5, 1943, the Japanese Foreign Ministry received a note of the U.S. Government transmitted through the Swiss Minister and containing a warning to the effect that the United States would punish those Japanese military persons and officials who were responsible for mistreatment of U.S. POWs and atrocities committed against them.^{a.} Throughout the years 1942-1945 the Swiss Government repeatedly

SS-23.

a. Ex. 3845, T. 38,174

SS-24.

a. Ex. 1478, T. 12,803

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(SS-24) called the attention of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to facts of inhuman treatment of allied POWs in prison camps located both in Japan proper and in the occupied territories and requested that representatives of a protecting power be allowed to visit prison camps. ^{b.} Similar representations were filed by the Swiss Mission throughout the years 1943-1945 with respect to mistreatment of POWs in prison camps located in the territory of Thailand. ^{c.} During the years 1943-1945 the Swiss Minister, likewise, exchanged notes with the Japanese Foreign Ministry with regard to the treatment of American civilian internees. ^{d.} On June 16, 1943, the Swiss Mission called the attention of the Foreign Ministry to the fact that "the British Government is greatly concerned about the food supply of POWs" and requested that steps be taken to improve food supply. ^{e.} On February 5, 1944, the Swiss Mission forwarded to the Japanese Foreign Ministry a note of the U. S. Government containing an enumeration of facts, which had come to the knowledge of the U. S. Government with respect to inhuman treatment of American and Philippine POWs in 1942-1943 in various camps located in the Philippines. ^{f.} SHIGEMITSU could not help being aware of the fact that toward the end of January, 1944, Mr. Cordell Hull (on behalf of the U. S. A.) and Mr. A. Eden (on behalf of Great Britain) made broadcasting addresses wherein information, then in the possession of the U. S. and British governments with respect to mistreatment of POWs by the Japanese administration, was

SS-24.

- b. Ex. 2016A, T. 14,728-47
- c. Ex. 2023, T. 14,792-95
- d. Ex. 2024, T. 14,796
- e. Ex. 2026, T. 14,836
- f. Ex. 1479, T. 12,803-10

(SS-24) briefly set forth. In this connection in October, 1944, SCAP issued a warning to the Japanese military leaders.

SS-25. SHIGEMITSU's replies to all these reports on inhuman treatment of allied POWs and requests for visits of prison camps by representatives of neutral countries were made in a perfunctory manner and contained false information in regard to the condition of POWs and refusals to grant permission for visiting camps.

Among these false statements there is, for instance, SHIGEMITSU's letter of April 22, 1944 in which he answering Swiss protest regarding mistreatment of prisoners of war assured the protecting power that "... it is the policy of the Japanese Government to protect POW against insults".

Examples of the fate of protests by the protecting powers on behalf of the United States and Great Britain are briefly referred to below:

SS-26. The United States protests of 23 December 1942 against the mistreatment of prisoners of war in the Philippines were replied to by SHIGEMITSU on 24 April 1944 denying the contentions of the protests. This reply is shown to be a tissue of false statements so far as the Philippine atrocities are concerned by the following Prosecution evidence:

- | | | |
|---------------|--------------|------------------------|
| T. 12,577-80 | T. 12,680-8 | T. 12,605-9 |
| T. 12,741-3 | T. 12,701-2 | Ex. 1477, T. 12,507 |
| T. 12,610-18 | T. 12,734-7 | Ex. 1455, T. 15,218-22 |
| T. 12,598-601 | T. 12,748-51 | T. 12,669-72 |

SS-24.
 a. Ex. 1488, T. 12,822-7

SS-25.
 a. Ex. 2025-A (6) - (7),
 T. 14,834-5

SS-26.
 a. Ex. 2024-A-3,
 T. 14,796; 15,808-13
 Ex. 1477, T. 12,507;
 Ex. 1479, T. 12,803

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| | | |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| (SS-26) | | |
| T. 12,602-3 | T. 12,772-3 | T. 12,689-702 |
| T. 12,745-6 | T. 12,582-3 | T. 12,778 |
| T. 12,640-9 | T. 12,783-4 | T. 12,393-401 |
| T. 12,673-9 | | |

SS-27. On 7 July 1943 the Japanese Foreign Ministry presented a verbal note to the Swedish Consul-General in Hongkong to visit prison camps in Thailand.^{a.} On the same day a request for permission for the Swedish Mission to visit a camp of civilian internees, in Sionar, was rejected by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^{b.}

SS-28. Protests lodged with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Swiss Legation on behalf of Great Britain concerning the ill-treatment of prisoners of war in Thailand and requests for permission to visit the camps during 1943-1944 resulted in constant denials by SHIGEMITSU of mistreatment of prisoners of war and refusal by him of permission to visit POW camps.^{a.} For instance, on July 24, 1943, SHIGEMITSU sent a memorandum to the Swiss Minister wherein he stated that the treatment of POW in Thailand was proper and that sick prisoners received medical attention but at that moment he said no permission to visit those camps could be granted.^{b.} We will not repeat evidence of inhuman treatment of POWs in camps located in the territory of Thailand. Evidence presented to the Court shows that the Japanese Government had in its possession reports concerning intolerable conditions imposed on POWs in those camps, notorious for an extremely brutal regime

SS-27.
 a. Ex. 2018, T. 14,748
 b. Ex. 2019, T. 14,750

SS-28.
 a. Ex. 2023-A-(1)-(8),
 T. 14,792-5
 b. Ex. 2017, T. 14,746

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(SS-28) c.
established there by the Japanese administration.

SS-29. Between 25 April 1944 and 19 March 1945 many protests were filed by the Swiss Legation in behalf of Great Britain alleging mistreatment of POW, lack of medical supplies, atrocities, cruelty to POW in shipping them to the Burma-Thailand area, mistreatment of POW at the camps of Mangan and Burma, all of which resulted in denials by SHIGEMITSU of evidence of any such facts. a.

The falsity of these denials by the accused is shown beyond any doubt by the testimony of Lt. General AKALUTSU b. and by the special report of the Japanese Government after the surrender regarding the conditions in camps. c. From this testimony and from this report as well as from the testimony of Colonel Coates d. and Colonel Wild e. who were prisoners of war in those camps during the war and who characterized at length the regime of physical extermination of prisoners of war which was established there, may be seen that the Japanese Government had sufficient information on that subject.

SS-30. In reply to the representation of the Swiss Mission concerning a regime of starvation imposed on British POWs, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by SHIGEMITSU in the verbal note of 23 June 1943 referred the Swiss Minister to the reply to a similar request made by the International Red Cross on 10 June 1943. In this reply it was pointed out that "the

SS-28.

- c. Ex. 1989, T. 14,633;
Ex. 473, T. 5513

SS-29.

- a. Ex. 2022-(8)-(18),
T. 14,763-84
b. Ex. 1989, T. 14,633-6
c. Ex. 475, T. 5,513
d. T. 11,409-16; T. 11,425-48
e. T. 5,434-5-5,685

(SS-30)
 authorities concerned who have been and are paying the best possible attention to the quantity and nutritive value of the food given to prisoners of war do not see the necessity of increasing the supply of any particular foodstuff." a.

SS-31. From August, 1943, throughout a long period of time the Swiss Mission was communicating with the Japanese Foreign Ministry in an attempt to obtain information as to the fate of the U. S. citizens captured by the Japanese on Wake Island, many of whom had been executed by the Japanese. a. The Japanese Foreign Ministry replied to numerous inquiries made by the Swiss Mission at the request of the U. S. Government in a non-committal manner, deceiving and taking no steps in order to investigate and punish those who were responsible for atrocities. In his letter dated 15 May 1945 addressed to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Swiss Minister pointed out:

"Strongly desirous of being able to put the families of these concerned at rest, the (Government of the United States of America) remarks moreover that the Imperial Government has had 3 years now to compile the report requested and that consequently nothing ought to prevent its immediate transmission." b.

SS-32. Under similar circumstances SHIGEMITSU repeatedly denied facts of attacks on survivors from allied merchant vessels by Japanese submarines. a.

Three protests lodged with SHIGEMITSU in connection with the slaughter of survivors of torpedoed British merchant ships in the Indian Ocean by Japanese submarines b. finally resulted in an answer from SHIGEMITSU dated 28 November 1944

SS-30.

- a. Ex. 2026-A, T. 14,837-8

SS-31.

- a. Ex. 2036-2051, T. 14,972-15,016
 b. Ex. 2052, T. 15,016

SS-32.

- a. Ex. 2101, T. 15,176
 b. Ex. 2092, 2093, T. 15,153-8

(SS-32) categorically denying that Japanese submarines were concerned in such piratic attacks. ^{c.} However, evidence adduced by the Prosecution shows the falsity of SHIGEMITSU's ^{d.} reply.

SS-33. Trying to refute the charges against SHIGEMITSU as to this section, the Defense offered the testimony of SUZUMI, Tadakatsu, former Chief of the "Office concerning Japanese Residing in Enemy Countries and Enemy Nationals Residing in Japan" who at the time (from 1943 to 1945) was directly under SHIGEMITSU.

What does this testimony say? This witness is different from SHIGEMITSU only in the scope of his criminal activities. If we brush aside the witness' quite unfounded allegation as to the "good intentions" of SHIGEMITSU with regard to prisoners of war which were never realized, he testified only that:

- a) SHIGEMITSU knew of the protests by the protecting ^{a.} powers
- b) In spite of that, he never took up the matters ^{b.} of P.O.W. before the Cabinet
- c) SHIGEMITSU did not permit visits by the representa- ^{c.} tives of the protecting powers to the P.O.W. camps,

Thus in substance this testimony only confirms SHIGEMITSU's guilt. It also showed that in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs SHIGEMITSU was not the only one who criminally neglected the rules of international law, but had many co-participants among the personnel.

SS-32.

- c. Ex. 2102, T. 15,177
- d. Ex. 2094-2099, T. 15,157-75

SS-33.

- a. T. 38,908, T. 38,906, T. 38,903
- b. T. 38,909-11
- c. T. 38,911

(38-33)

To hide now behind the cowardly excuse put forward by SUZUKI that the War Minister allegedly would not permit SHIGEMITSU to make investigations as to the conditions in the POW camps and would not allow him to permit visits by the representatives of the protecting powers to the POW camps, is no defense for the accused who is fully responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against prisoners of war, as he held the high post of Foreign Minister.

SS-34. The accused also receives no help from the clumsy sophisms of the witnesses MATSUMOTO^a and SUZUKI^b about changing the name of the "Office Concerning Japanese Residing in Enemy Countries and Enemy Nationals Residing in Japan".^c

In spite of the change in the name of the Bureau the fact remains that the regulations themselves and duties^d imposed upon the office remained the same.

Besides, the change of the name of the Bureau under Minister of Foreign Affairs could in no way change the duties of the Minister himself and neither could it diminish his responsibility for the violation of generally recognized rules of international law pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war.

SS-35. To justify the accused the Defense presented a number of documents which were supposed to confirm that in the course of negotiations concerning the events in the vicinity of Lake Khasan SHIGEMITSU could be honestly under

SS-34.

- a. Ex. 3895, T. 38,780-3
- b. Ex. 3896, T. 38,787-9
- c. Ex. 74, T. 684
- d. Ex. 3845, T. 38,174;
T. 38,280-1

(SS-35)
 misapprehension as to the location of the border line,
 the reason being the alleged discrepancy between the
 Russian and Chinese texts of the Hunchun Protocol of 1886.
 In particular, the Defense tried to prove that whereas the
 Russian text of the protocol says—"From Letter T the border
 is running to the North-west, following the line of the
 mountains, west side of Lake Hassan and reaches the north
 end of the sandy ridge,"^{a.} the Chinese text allegedly
 says—"Proceeding northwestwards from the border-mark Tu,
 crossing a hill and reaching the north of a sand hill via
 the west side of Lake Hasang."^{b.} However, different ex-
 pressions explained by the difference in the languages can
 in no way substantiate the contention of the Defense, be-
 cause the Defense could not deny that on the map attached to
 the protocol the border line is shown precisely in accord-
 ance with the Soviet contention.^{c.} Furthermore, it is
 specifically set down both in the Russian and Chinese texts
 that the border line runs along the watershed of the
 mountain range. In particular the protocol says:

" . . . the red line on the map marks the border all
 along the watershed, and the water that flows west-
 wards and pours into the River Tuman belongs to China,
 and the water that flows eastwards and pours into the
 sea belongs to Russia." d.

Thus, SHIGEMITSU was undoubtedly aware of the illegal nature
 of the Japanese action. As has been noted above, he ignored
 evidence offered by the Soviet side and attempted to
 aggravate the conflict as much as possible. What the

SS-35.

- a. Ex. 753
- b. Ex. 3545C, T. 34, 507
- c. Ex. 2175, Ex. 753
- d. Ex. 3545C

(SS-35)
theory of the Defense amounts to is that SHIGEMITSU was acting in pursuance of instructions of the Japanese Government and that he, himself, proposed that hostilities be stopped. In support of this contention the Defense has been able to produce only records of SHIGEMITSU's conversations with the USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs borrowed from the Prosecution,^{e.} trying to construe them in their own manner. Thus, for example, the Defense wants to regard SHIGEMITSU's proposal to discontinue hostilities as a proof of his allegedly pacific policy. Such proposal was made by SHIGEMITSU on 4 August and thereafter. However, first of all, it had not happened before the Soviet Army put up a resolute resistance which sobered up the Japanese imperialists and, secondly, SHIGEMITSU demanded that Japan's unlawful claims be satisfied as a prerequisite for the cessation of hostilities. What was the value of such a "peaceful" proposal? As to the allusion made by the Defense to the fact that SHIGEMITSU acted on his government's instructions, the Prosecution never contended that he acted entirely on his own. On the contrary, we have always contended that, being a party to the conspiracy, SHIGEMITSU certainly acted in conformity with the principles of the Japanese ruling clique.

SS-35.
e. Ex. 2633, Ex. 2635, Ex. 2638;
Ex. 2716, Ex. 2643

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(SS-20)

But if the Defense means something else, then there must be, in this case, certain official instructions. But what kind of instructions? Where are they? The Defense failed to produce any such documents. They solely rely on the testimony of former Foreign Minister UGAKI. On a brief cross-examination by the Prosecution in reply to questions based on Prosecution documents the witness UGAKI said "No" to 8 questions, "I don't know" to 5 questions, "I have not heard" to 11 questions and "I have no recollection" to 14 questions. He "remembered", "heard" or "knew" only this: that, contrary to documents, the border line was allegedly vague, that Soviet troops arbitrarily occupied the area of the conflict, that SHIGEITSU acted in pursuance of his instructions and that the instructions were aimed at a peaceful solution of the conflict. And where are these instructions? The witness failed to produce any of them. In contradiction to his own contentions to the effect that SHIGEITSU acted in pursuance of instructions this witness stated that SHIGEITSU had not been instructed to refuse taking into account the map for the purpose of settling the conflict and had no authority to threaten with the use of force. We do not deem it necessary to subject to detailed criticism the unwarranted allegations of this witness as regards the essence of the Lake Khasan developments. The witness, himself, being formerly Foreign Minister, is too much interested

 SS-25.

- f. Ex. 2715, T. 23,866-71, T. 23,884-904
- g. T. 23,884-900
- h. T. 23,895-7

(SS-35)
 in passing off the undeclared aggressive war in the vicinity of Lake Khasan as an incident of which the Japanese side was not guilty. An outline of all the evidence as to the aggressive nature of the actions of the Japanese imperialists in the Lake Khasan area is contained above in the respective section. We deem it proper to remind that Article 6 of the Charter contained the following provision with respect to the responsibility of an accused:

"Neither the official position at any time of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged"

Hence, it is abundantly clear from documents and facts that SHIGEMITSU took an active part in the undeclared aggressive war of Japan against the U.S.S.R. in the Lake Khasan area and is liable therefore for grave responsibility.

SS-36. Among other evidence the Defense has produced telegrams and some other correspondence with respect to SHIGEMITSU's contemplated trip to Manchuria with Mr. T. V. Soong, and the establishment of a "joint commission" on account of the Mukden incident in April-May, 1932. However, the commission was never established and the trip never materialized and, consequently, this correspondence can be of no importance. ^{a.} Other documents offered by the Defense consist of statements and affidavits of various diplomats and to a certain extent mirror the attitude of these individuals

SS-36.

- a. Ex. 3536, Ex. 3537,
 Ex. 3538, Ex. 3539;
 T. 34,468-81

(SS-36)
 toward the accused. This group of documents includes the
 statement by Lord Hankey,^{b.} the statement by Lord Sempill,^{c.}
 questions propounded to Sir Robert Craigie and his answers
 thereto,^{d.} the affidavit of Joseph P. Kennedy,^{e.} the
 affidavit of Joseph B. Davis, the statement of H. A. Gwynne.^{g.}

In all these documents there is one peculiar feature which
 attracts one's attention: wherever they refer to "good
 intentions" of the accused they imply only such intentions
 which were never materialized. This refers both to
 SHIGEMITSU's contemplated trip to Central Europe in 1941 in
 order to meet MATSUKA with a view to the settlement of Anglo-
 Japanese relations and to his proposal as to the dispatch of
 a special British mission to Japan. The Tribunal, we
 presume, will not be misled by these declarations of
 SHIGEMITSU's concerning his striving for peace, friend-
 ship for peoples, etc. witnessed by the aforementioned
 persons. SHIGEMITSU's actual views as well as the
 aggressive aims he pursued as an active participant in
 the conspiracy are sufficiently disclosed in the official
 telegrams which he sent to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.^{h.}
 It also follows from his practical activities aimed at
 the promotion of the aims of the conspiracy. It is like-
 wise characteristic that it was SHIGEMITSU who was appointed
 Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister of Greater
 East Asia Affairs in 1943, one of the most crucial periods of
 the war. In the light of this fact it is quite obvious
 that Japan's ruling imperialist clique was, least of all,

SS-36.

- b. Ex. 3547, T. 34,511
- c. Ex. 3549, T. 34,523
- d. Ex. 3555, T. 34,544
- e. Ex. 3551, T. 34,530
- f. Ex. 3546, T. 34,507
- g. Ex. 3552, T. 3453
- h. Ex. 1017, Ex. 1018, Ex. 1019, Ex. 1023

0 159 00 15 2672

(SS-26)
 inclined to take seriously the "peaceful" assurances
 SHIGEMITSU gave several years ago to diplomats of the
 allied powers, creating a smoke screen for the effectuation
 of the aggressive plans of Japan. As a member of the Wartime
 cabinets of TOJO and HATENO (April, 1943--April, 1945)
 SHIGEMITSU should be held fully responsible for the pros-
 ecution of a criminal war of aggression against the allied
 powers and for the preparation of an attack against the
 Soviet Union during the same period. Throughout his
 entire diplomatic career SHIGEMITSU acted as an active
 member of the criminal imperialistic clique closely
 connection with the representatives of aggressive militaristic
 circles, and we support the charges against SHIGEMITSU, as
 formulated in the Indictment, in their entirety.

SS-27. It is submitted that the evidence fully
 establishes the guilt of the defendant SHIGEMITSU as
 charged in Counts 1-5 of the Indictment and his respon-
 sibility for all actions resulting from the general
 participation in the conspiracy. As to the specific
 counts, the evidence which establishes SHIGEMITSU's guilt
 may be found as indicated:

| <u>Counts:</u> | <u>Paragraphs</u> |
|----------------|---|
| 1-5 | All |
| 6-18 | 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-11, 12, 13, 14,
16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 36 |
| 23 | 14, 16 |
| 25, 35, 52 | 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 35 |
| 27-34 | 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 |
| 52-55 | 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34 |

0159 0015 2673

加 乘

1. 加 乘 法 則 之 運 算 法 則 與 數 學 中 之 運 算 法 則 無 異 且 其 運 算 法 則 亦 與 數 學 中 之 運 算 法 則 無 異 且 其 運 算 法 則 亦 與 數 學 中 之 運 算 法 則 無 異

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0159 0015 2677

SHIGEMITSU S. Information - SS

日本國政府、東京、外務省、國際聯盟、設
 置、國際調查委員會、職權、則、通、及、那
 國、職、權、則、通、及、那、國、職、權、則、通、及、那
 國、職、權、則、通、及、那、國、職、權、則、通、及、那

SS-4 (2) 日本國政府、東京、外務省、國際聯盟、設
 置、國際調查委員會、職權、則、通、及、那
 國、職、權、則、通、及、那、國、職、權、則、通、及、那

P 1

0159 0015 2679

017717 EPM SU Summary - 52

干涉結果軍事及一般人死亡傷者及行不明二四〇〇〇名。其物資
的損失約十五億元。以上推算之居上。以上言不居小。 (d)

1. 據此推測，日本在侵華戰爭中，其軍事及一般人之死亡傷者及行不明者，約有二四〇〇〇名。其物資之損失約十五億元。以上推算之居上。以上言不居小。

2. 據此推測，日本在侵華戰爭中，其軍事及一般人之死亡傷者及行不明者，約有二四〇〇〇名。其物資之損失約十五億元。以上推算之居上。以上言不居小。

3. 據此推測，日本在侵華戰爭中，其軍事及一般人之死亡傷者及行不明者，約有二四〇〇〇名。其物資之損失約十五億元。以上推算之居上。以上言不居小。

4. 據此推測，日本在侵華戰爭中，其軍事及一般人之死亡傷者及行不明者，約有二四〇〇〇名。其物資之損失約十五億元。以上推算之居上。以上言不居小。

0 159 00 15 2680

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SHIGEMITSU Summarization SS

私董光一校多國境二國論云、爲合公衆之理解、
 復及其、此、各協定之條、定、以、其、得、國、境、之、
 二、官、記、上、指、圖、云、

重光公野春協、本、自、分、詳、款、條、件、不、用、圖、之、形、
 境、之、界、十、官、定、野、云、其、中、條、件、及、其、十、五、年、之、期、
 上、述、云、之、公、野、張、款、案、亦、論、條、件、十、五、年、之、期、
 三、張、款、案、現、在、日、本、十、年、二、十、一、年、七、月、八、日、開、
 日、本、軍、事、之、款、十、五、年、條、件、之、條、件、也、云、云、

光一私董光念云、之、以、上、論、議、之、旨、也、其、論、之、旨、也、
 云、云、方、如、日、本、十、五、年、十、五、年、之、條、件、也、其、中、條、件、之、國、境、
 不、同、之、地、名、高、地、(不、同、十、五、年)、及、其、條、件、之、不、
 同、之、條、件、也、其、中、條、件、之、條、件、也、其、中、條、件、之、
 如何、十、五、年、之、條、件、也、其、中、條、件、之、條、件、也、

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0 159 00 15 2684

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SHIRAZ MIT 84 Summer station - S.S.

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SS-82

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SS-82

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SS-82

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0159 0015 2686

廣東省立第一中學

廣東省立第一中學
校址：廣州
校長：李應林
校務處：廣州
教務處：廣州
總務處：廣州
訓導處：廣州
體育部：廣州
音樂部：廣州
美術部：廣州
衛生部：廣州
圖書館：廣州
校醫室：廣州
學生會：廣州
青年團：廣州
學生自治會：廣州
學生會：廣州
青年團：廣州
學生自治會：廣州

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SHIGEMITSU S. Commission - S.S.

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2010

0199 0015 2589

SHIGEMITSU Summation - 88

P. 9

普通、外交代表機關、就國手奉、起、
 及び、
 三、國聯、
 委任滿洲國日本大使、事實上滿洲國、
 及び、
 任稱、
 行政、
 此所、

35-40

SHIGEMITSU Summation - SP

32-34

1. 1954年10月1日以前に於ける
 2. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 3. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 4. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 5. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 6. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 7. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 8. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 9. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 10. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける

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1. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
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 9. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける
 10. 1954年10月1日以後に於ける

230

新... 舊... 大... 小...

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SHIHOI MPT 011 Summation- 51

0159 0015 2693

1. 關於本會之組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

2. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

3. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

4. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

5. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

6. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

7. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

8. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

9. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

10. 本會為推廣業務起見，擬在各地設立分會，其組織及職權範圍，業經本會臨時總會決議，除函請貴會備查外，合行函請貴會協助辦理。

S412E WTSU Summation - 88

五國專使於一九一九年(即和十七年)及一九二二年(即和十八年)間，不
知一九一九年(即和十七年)及一九二二年(即和十八年)間，不
知一九一九年(即和十七年)及一九二二年(即和十八年)間，不
知一九一九年(即和十七年)及一九二二年(即和十八年)間，不

一九一九年(即和十七年)五月五日「凡爾賽條約」及一九一九年
會集國之名，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
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國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及

在十月間(一九一九年)十月間(一九一九年)十月間(一九一九年)
十月間(一九一九年)十月間(一九一九年)十月間(一九一九年)

3323

一九一九年(即和十七年)五月五日「凡爾賽條約」及一九一九年
會集國之名，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
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一九一九年(即和十七年)五月五日「凡爾賽條約」及一九一九年
會集國之名，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及

一九一九年(即和十七年)五月五日「凡爾賽條約」及一九一九年
會集國之名，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及

PaB

一九一九年(即和十七年)五月五日「凡爾賽條約」及一九一九年
會集國之名，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及
國名明之，以下又有一十六國之名，以「五國專使」及

0 159 00 15 2697

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0 159 00 15 2698

1. 1954年11月15日
 2. 1954年11月15日
 3. 1954年11月15日
 4. 1954年11月15日
 5. 1954年11月15日

159

Sim, the first summation - 55

The first summation is the sum of the first 10 natural numbers. This is a well-known formula that can be derived using the method of differences. The sum of the first n natural numbers is given by the formula $\frac{n(n+1)}{2}$. For $n=10$, the sum is $\frac{10(10+1)}{2} = \frac{10 \cdot 11}{2} = 55$. This result is consistent with the handwritten note on the right side of the page.

0159 0015 2599

SHIHEMITSU S. Kawanishi

SS-29

一九四四年（昭和十九年）四月五日（即五月三日）
 三月十九日止，問「（一）」
 修偽軍人，對之處理，
 際及「（二）」
 之「（三）」多數，抗議，
 會於「（四）」
 告，此等言，令明「（五）」
 記言。終戰後作成，
 本政府，特別報告書，
 許「（六）」問題，
 戰時「（七）」收容，
 大佐（（八））
 的總制度，詳調，
 干歷「（九）」。

SS-29

美軍俘虜，
 「（一）」及「（二）」
 戴「（三）」日本外務省，一九四三年（昭和十八）三月

SS-29

- 「（一）」
- 「（二）」
- 「（三）」
- 「（四）」
- 「（五）」

100)

0 159 0015 2700

200 g

SS-31 SS-30

a

Handwritten notes in German, possibly 'Handwritten notes'.

Handwritten notes in German, possibly 'Handwritten notes'.

a

Handwritten notes in German, possibly 'Handwritten notes'.

Handwritten notes in German, possibly 'Handwritten notes'.

Handwritten notes in German, possibly 'Handwritten notes'.

Main body of handwritten notes in German, containing several paragraphs of text.

Supplement No. 100

Additional handwritten notes in German at the bottom of the page.

SHIHEMITSU Summation - 89

一、本人、家康、國二、不市、坊、以、二、五、廿、外、經、心、
二、已、既、心、及、本、國、政、府、及、再、社、以、報、告、作、則、火、
合、自、二、十、五、年、以、後、一、切、之、心、亦、不、以、傳、達、之、煩、也、
于、十、年、以、來、一、切、之、心、也、
十、年、以、來、一、切、之、心、也、

SS 22

三、同、日、據、之、起、場、官、重、次、等、況、十、七、年、合、國、
會、同、時、一、切、之、心、及、本、國、政、府、及、再、社、以、報、告、作、則、火、
合、自、二、十、五、年、以、後、一、切、之、心、亦、不、以、傳、達、之、煩、也、
于、十、年、以、來、一、切、之、心、也、
十、年、以、來、一、切、之、心、也、

此、事、由、於、本、國、政、府、及、再、社、以、報、告、作、則、火、
合、自、二、十、五、年、以、後、一、切、之、心、亦、不、以、傳、達、之、煩、也、
于、十、年、以、來、一、切、之、心、也、

| | | |
|----|-----|--------|
| 一、 | ... | 頁一五六頁 |
| 二、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |
| 三、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |
| 四、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |
| 五、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |
| 六、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |
| 七、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |
| 八、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |
| 九、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |
| 十、 | ... | 頁一五三六頁 |

P 30

STIYHMSU Summation - S's

(a) (b)

1960年
1961年

1960年 1961年 1962年 1963年 1964年

1. 關於「新加坡」之歷史，大抵可分為「荷蘭」、「英國」及「新加坡」三個時期。在「荷蘭」時期，新加坡是荷蘭東印度公司之重要據點，其歷史可追溯到1619年。在「英國」時期，新加坡於1819年成為英國之殖民地，其歷史則可追溯到1819年。在「新加坡」時期，新加坡於1963年成為新加坡共和國之首都，其歷史則可追溯到1963年。

(b) 關於「新加坡」之歷史，大抵可分為「荷蘭」、「英國」及「新加坡」三個時期。在「荷蘭」時期，新加坡是荷蘭東印度公司之重要據點，其歷史可追溯到1619年。在「英國」時期，新加坡於1819年成為英國之殖民地，其歷史則可追溯到1819年。在「新加坡」時期，新加坡於1963年成為新加坡共和國之首都，其歷史則可追溯到1963年。

Handwritten text on the left margin, possibly a page number or reference.

Handwritten text at the top of the page, appearing to be a title or introductory paragraph.

Main body of handwritten text, consisting of several lines of cursive script.

Second main body of handwritten text, continuing the narrative or list.

| | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
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| Handwritten | Handwritten | Handwritten | Handwritten |

Handwritten text at the bottom left corner.

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SHINGE MITSU Summation - 90

一、

一、
二、
三、
四、

五、
六、

七、
八、
九、
十、

十一、
十二、
十三、
十四、

十五、

- ① 法律書 三六三三号
- ② 六三五
- ③ 六三八
- ④ 六六
- ⑤ 六四三

0 159 00 15 2706

[Faint, illegible text covering the majority of the page, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side.]

14

1954

0 159 00 15 2708

[Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is scattered across the page and is difficult to decipher.]

[Vertical text on the right margin, possibly a page number or reference code, written in a cursive or handwritten style.]

Handwritten notes in Chinese, likely a transcription or summary of a document. The text is dense and covers most of the page.

Vertical handwritten text on the left side of the page, possibly a date or reference number.

Small handwritten text at the bottom left corner.

0159 0016 2711

| | | |
|-------------------------|---|-----------------|
| UNITED NATIONS ARCHIVES | <u>CAMERA OPERATOR'S REPORT AND CERTIFICATE</u> | REEL NO.
I59 |
|-------------------------|---|-----------------|

| PRODUCTION DATA | INDEXING DATA | | CODE NO. |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|---|----------|
| STARTED
27/6/89 | PERIOD | United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC)
Member Governments, other National Authorities and
Military Tribunals
Box 426, 427 and 428 | |
| FINISHED
29/6/89 | | Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents
of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (Tokyo Trials).
International Prosecution Section Documents PAG-3/2.3.4 | |
| TOTAL NUMBER
OF IMAGES
3003 | | Aggression against the Soviet Union, other Conspiracies,
Conventional War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity | |
| APPROVED: | | Individual Defendants | |
| | | Hashimoto - Koiso
Matsui - Shigemitsu | |
| | | End of Reel I59 | |
| | | RETAKE 17 July, 1989:
K. Sugiarto - Boxes 426, 427
M. John-Lewis - Box 428 | |

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the micrographs appearing in this reel of film are true copies of the original records described above.

Date: 29/6/89

Signature of
Camera Operator: AK Evans

REDUCTION

26x

0 199.00 16 27 13

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








IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)




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PAG - 3

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