Department of State, Washington, April 14, 1923.

Excellency:

I have the honor to communicate to your Excellency my understanding of the views developed by the discussions which I have recently had with your Embassy in reference to the status of the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes of November 2, 1917.

The discussions between the two Governments have disclosed an identity of views and, in the light of the understandings arrived at by the Washington Conference on the limitation of Armament, the American and Japanese Governments are agreed to consider the Lansing-Ishii correspondence of November 2, 1917, as cancelled and of no further force of effect.

I shall be glad to have your confirmation of the accord that is reached.

Accept, Excellency, etc., etc., etc.

(Signed) CHARLES E. HUGHS.

Page -2-
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHINODA Takeso, Chief of the Archives, Section Japanese Foreign Office hereby certify that the document in _English_ attached hereto consisting of _2_ pages and entitled "AGREEMENT EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES CANCELLING THE ISHII: LANSING AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1917." is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of August, 1946

(Signed) T. SHINODA
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) NAGAHARA ODO
ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

August 1, 1940.

The world stands at a great historic turning point, and it is about to witness the creation of new forms of government, economy, and culture, based upon the growth and development of sundry groups of states. Japan, too, is confronted by a great trial such as she has never experienced in history. In order to carry out fully at this juncture our national policy in accordance with the lofty spirit in which the country was founded, it is an important task of urgent necessity to us that we should grasp the inevitable trends in the developments of world history, effect speedily fundamental renovations along all lines of government, and strive for the perfection of a state structure for national defense. Accordingly, the general lines of the country’s fundamental national policies have been formulated as follows:

Summary of Fundamental National Policies.

1. Basic Policy.

The basic aim of Japan’s national policy lies in the firm establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty spirit of Meikyo Tohru, in which the country was founded, and in the construction, as the first step, of a new order in Greater East Asia, having for its foundation the solidarity of Japan, Nanchooukao and China.

Japan will, therefore, devote the total strength of the nation to the fulfilment of the above policy by setting up
2. National Defense and Foreign Policy.

The Government will strive for the repletion of armaments adequate for the execution of the national policies, by taking into consideration the new developments both at home and abroad, and constructing a state structure for national defense, capable of bringing into full play the total strength of the nation.

Japan’s foreign policy, which aims ultimately at the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, will be directed, first of all, toward a complete settlement of the China Aff’air, and the advancement of the national fortune by taking a farsighted view of the drastic changes in the international situation and formulating both constructive and flexible measures.


What is urgently required in internal administration is the laying of the foundation for a state structure for national defense through a complete renovation of the domestic administration in general, for which purpose the Government expects the realization of the following points:

A. Renovation of education thoroughly in harmony with the fundamental principles of the national polity, and also the establishment of ethical principles of the nation stressing, above all, service to the state and eradicating all selfish and materialistic thoughts.

B. Establishment of a powerful new political structure
and a unified control of government affairs.

a. Establishment of a new national structure, of which the keynote lies in the service to the state through the co-operation between government and people, every man according to his sphere of profession or business.

b. Renovation of the Diet as an organ for assisting the Throne, so as to adapt it to the new national structure.

c. Fundamental renovation in the operation of administrative organs, and the reformation of the bureaucracy, aimed at the unity and efficiency of those organs.

C. Laying the foundation of national defense economy, of which the keynote is to lie in the autonomous development of the economy of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with Japan as the center.

a. Establishment of a sphere of co-operative economies, with the Japan-Manchoukuo-China group as one of the units.

b. Inauguration of a planned economy through the co-operation between government and people, and especially the perfection of a unitary control system covering the production, distribution and consumption of important commodities.

c. Establishment of a financial scheme and reinforcement of banking control, directed toward the development of the nation's total economic power.

d. Renovation of the foreign trade policy so as to adapt it to the new world situation.
e. Establishment of the measures for self-sufficiency in the people's daily necessities especially in the principal foodstuffs.

f. An epoch-making expansion of the vital industries especially heavy, chemical and machine industries.

g. An epoch-making promotion of science, and rationalization of production.

h. Perfection and extension of the communication and transportation facilities so as to adapt them to the new developments at home and abroad.

i. Establishment of land development plans aiming at the enhancement of the total national strength.

j. Inauguration of permanent measures concerning the promotion of the stamina and physical strength of the nation, and especially the fundamental measures concerning the security and development of agriculture and agricultural communities.

k. Rectification of the inequality in individual sacrifices incident of national policies; full operation of various welfare measures, and renovation of the living mode of the nation, and the maintenance of such standard of living as will enable the nation to lead a plain, solid and vigorous life and to surmount the national crisis by persevering truly through years of hardship.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

T. HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section Japanese foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in English, consisting of ___ pages, marked "SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENT No. 8" and entitled "Announcement by the Japanese Government, August, 1940," is an exact and true copy of the Japanese original.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of Sept., 1946

(Signed) T. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

witness: (Signed) Nagaharu ODO
近現代国際関係史
（八月一日）

世界政治史の重要な一翼をなす国際関係文化の創成を見ること。新国際関係の形成が次の大戦に至る
とされる政治的、経済的、文化的な緊張の出現を違憲とする。
するための方策に農業及び農家の安定発展に関する根本方策を樹立する。
Japan's ideal since the foundation of the empire has been that all nations should be enabled to find their proper places in the world. Our foreign policy has also been based upon this ideal, for which we have not hesitated at times even to fight, staking our nation's existence.

What all mankind longs for is the firm establishment of world peace. But it goes without saying that peace can never endure unless it is a peace in which all nations enjoy their proper places. Unfortunately, however, the establishment of world peace in this sense is difficult of speedy realization at the present stage of human progress. In order to realize such a great ideal, therefore, it seems to be a most natural step that peoples who are closely related geographically, culturally, and economically should first form a sphere of their own for co-existence and co-prosperity and establish peace and order within that sphere, and at the same time secure a relationship of common existence and prosperity with other spheres. The cause of strife mankind has hitherto experienced lies generally in the failure to give due consideration to the necessity of some such natural and constructive world order and to remedy the irrationalities and injustices of old. The war in Europe brings home the truth of this with special emphasis. Therefore, in order to establish international peace on a permanent foundation every
Effort must be exerted for the rectification of the blunders that have been committed in this regard.

It is in this spirit that Japan is now engaged in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia. It is extremely regrettable, therefore, that there should be those who not only fail to understand Japan's good intentions based upon this fundamental principle, but on the contrary, obstruct the establishment of peace in East Asia by supporting the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. We have urged them to reconsider such an attitude in the past, and now we intend further to urge their serious reflection. We are determined to leave no stone unturned in order to eradicate all activities for assisting Chiang Kai-shek.

Some times there are those who would disapprove a change of the status quo by force of arms regardless of the reasons therefor. It is for the purpose of bringing about a just and permanent peace that Japan has been fighting in China for the past three years. Her employment of armed force is an act looking beyond the immediate present. The sword she has drawn is nothing other than a "life-giving sword" that destroys evil and makes justice manifest.

The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically, historically, racially and economically very closely related to each other. They are destined to co-operate and minister to one another's needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote the peace and progress in their regions. The uniting of all these regions under a
single sphere on the basis of common existence and the insuring of the stability of that sphere thereby is, I think, a natural conclusion.

The idea to establish first a righteous peace in each of the various regions and then establish collectively a just peace for the whole has long existed also in Europe and America. This system presupposes the existence of a stabilizing force in each region, with which as a center the peoples within that region are to secure their co-existence and co-prosperity as well as the stability of their sphere. It also presupposes that these groups will respect each other's individual characteristics, political, cultural and economic, and they will co-operate and fulfill each other's needs for their common good.

When the present European war broke out, the Japanese Government at once declared their policy of non-involvement and made it clear that this country did not intend to intervene in Europe and at the same time did not want to see the war spread into Asia. Quite naturally Japan expects that the Western Powers will do nothing that will exert any undesirable influence upon the stability of East Asia.

Japan, while she is carrying on vigorously her task of constructing a new order in East Asia, is paying serious attention to developments in the European war and to its repercussions in the various quarters of East Asia, including the South Seas region. I desire to declare that the destiny
of these regions is a matter for grave concern to Japan in view of her position and responsibility as the stabilizing force in the area.
我か国際情勢と帝国の立場と題する有田外務大臣放送

（六月二十九日）

凡そ世界平和の確立は人類の須要する所であり来して各々の所を得意する在
平和なるものは、万邦各々の所を徳の非される、本来性なき
とは言を待たないのあるのであります。しかし此の格物に於ける世界
平和の確立は人類進歩の現段階に於ては遙遠作ら一層にして達成
し難いものかあるのであります。故に、この大理想を現実する為
には地域的、人種的、文化的、経済的に密接なる関係にある諸民
族か共存共榮の分野を作り先つその観点内に於ける平和と秩序を
確立すると共に他の分野と共に他に共存共栄の關係を達成する
ことを故も自然な順序であらうと考えるのであります。

而して人類滅絕の原因が誠に異なる自然的建設的制御を顧みよう
デフ・ドゥー # 54

そもそも又来の不合理不公正に修正を加へようともしないこと
に存するとは、世界か過去に於て又現在に於て経験して居る實
の常をありまして今次戦争の勃発に繋がるものとこのたび陳する
次第であります。従って国際平和を還元の基礎の上に確立する
する為には凡ゆる努力を以て新くの如き通誼を正せねばならない
のをあります。

帝國が東亜新秩序の建設に向け trumpet 致して居り支那の更に
の一たびに於て於て居らない者を撤去し共存共栄を旨とするもので居り
した限りに於て於て居る限り不義が立脚せる東亜再建の大義に於
し決定を有しないものならさすて戦争を支持し東亜に於ける平
和の建設を妨害しつつあるものに存し居るのを念めて退縮など
とてありますまして遂てその反省を促し実ったのでありますか此の際
更に其の遵守を促すと共に避離行為の放送を為し凡ゆる手段を用
す決定を有するものであります世と従々武力に於ての状態の打開を
理由の如何を問わず否認せんとするものかありますか、帯図か巡
過去三年に互い兵を支那に動かして居りますのは公正にして永継佳
ある平和を招来するものを、異なつる表現なる大義の武力建
立たれて居ます、量に彼部員正の清い断を鍛え居るものに外ならな
いのですますます。

東亜の諸国は諸邦地方とは相違日にも、歴史的にも、民族的
に於てまた経済的にも進めてる賢なる諸係にありまして互に相
泊し相接し相補相成して共存共榮の実を舎げ、以て平和と繁栄と
を一括して共存の諸係に立つ、一分割と割し、その安定を図ると
とが當然の在るべきのはるかするのです。

故くの如く部分的に公正なる平和を岌々せんとする者は欧米諸国に於ても存
在するのです。

而して此の思想は次々の分頃に於ける安定勢力を想像するもの
であります。
民族的共存共栄を実現するとして、社会的な他の分野

平和的・文化的・及び経済的特性を尊重し配慮することを基本として

今次に述べたが、戦時中に日本政府は不介入の方針を

好ましいと、日本の核兵器不使用を果たすための

今次に述べたが、戦時中に日本政府は不介入の方針を

核兵器不使用を果たすための

今次に述べたが、戦時中に日本政府は不介入の方針を

核兵器不使用を果たすための

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核兵器不使用を果たすための

今次に述べたが、戦時中に日本政府は不介入の方針を

核兵器不使用を果たすための

今次に述べたが、戦時中に日本政府は不介入の方針を

核兵器不使用を果たすための
STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

November 3, 1938.

By the august virtue of His Majesty, our naval and military forces have captured Canton and the three cities of Wuhan; and all the vital areas of China have thus fallen into our hands. The Kuomintang Government exists no longer except as a mere local regime. However, so long as it persists in its anti-Japanese and pro-communist policy our country will not lay down its arms—never until that regime is crushed.

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign.

This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchoukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defence against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This indeed is the way to contribute toward the stabilization of East Asia and the progress of the world.

What Japan desires of China is that country will share in the task of bringing about this new order in East Asia. She confidently expects that the people of China will fully comprehend her true intentions and that they will respond to the call of Japan for their co-operation. Even the participation of the Kuomintang Government would not be rejected, if, repudiating the policy which has guided it in the past and re-
molding its personnel, so as to translate its rebirth into fact, it were to come forward to join in the establishment of the new order.

Japan is confident that other Powers will on their part correctly appreciate her aims and policy and adapt their attitude to the new conditions prevailing in East Asia. For the cordiality hitherto manifested by the nations which are in sympathy with us, Japan wishes to express her profound gratitude.

The establishment of a new order in East Asia is in complete conformity with the very spirit in which the Empire was founded; to achieve such a task is the exalted responsibility with which our present generation is entrusted. It is, therefore, imperative to carry out all necessary internal reforms, and with a full development of the aggregate national strength, material as well as moral, fulfill at all costs this duty incumbent upon our nation.

Such the Government declare to be the immutable policy and determination of Japan.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages, remarked "SHIPATORI DOCUMENT No. 10" and entitled "STATEMENT OF THE JAPAN'S GOVERNMENT ON NOVEMBER 3, 1938."

is an exact and true copy of the Japanese original.

Signed at Tokyo on this 18th day of September, 1946.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu ODO
Draft of the U.S.-Japanese Understanding dated April 16, 1941 (Incoming Telegram No. 234 dated April 17)

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, both Governments establish a just peace in the Pacific and by the rapid consummation of an enfente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which would be deliberated at a later conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

2. The attitudes of both Governments towards the European war.

3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.

4. Naval, aerial and merchantile marine relations in the Pacific.

5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.

6. Economic activity of both nations in the South-Western Pacific area.

7. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding subject, of course, to modification by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and character of nations.

The Governments of United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific Powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional and present concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The Attitudes of both Governments toward the European War. The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis alliances was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among Nations not directly affected by the European War.

The Government of Japan, with no intention of evading its existing treaty obligation, desires to declare that its military obligation under the Axis Alliance comes into force only when one of the Parties of the Alliance is aggressively attacked by a Power not at present involved in the European War.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

III. China Affair. The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang-Kai-Shek...
regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

A. Independence of China.
B. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China.
C. No acquisition of Chinese territory.
D. No imposition of indemnities.
E. Resumption of "open door", the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan.
G. No large-scale of concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory.
H. Recognition of Vanchukuo.

With the acceptance by the Chiang-K'ai-shek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.

The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of friendly and economic cooperation.

IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.

A. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace
each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereto shall be left for determination at the proposed joint conference.

R. At the conclusion of the projected conference, each ration might despatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of peace in the Pacific.

C. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of the China affair, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to release for contract by Americans certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, as soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the conference.

V. Commerce between both Nations and their financial cooperation. When official approvation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extends to Japan a gold credit in an amount sufficient to foster trade and industrial development directed to the betterment of the Far East.
economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

VI. Economic activity of both Nations in the South-Western Pacific Area. On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the South-Western Pacific Area shall be carried on by peaceful means, without resorting to armed aggression and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs. The policies of both Nations affecting political stabilizations in the Pacific.

A. The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing states within the Far East and in the South-Eastern Pacific Area to any European Power.

B. The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.

B. Japanese immigration to the United States and to the South-Western Pacific Area shall receive amicable consideration on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

Conference.

A. It is suggested that a conference between delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.
B. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.

C. This Conference could be held as soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.

D. The Agenda of the Conference would not include the consideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the pre-arranged Agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise Agenda could be determined by mutual agreement between both Governments.

Addendum.

The present understanding shall be kept as a Confidential Memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan. The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHINICHI TAKASO, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English, consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Draft of the U.S.-Japanese Understanding dated April 16, 1941 (Incoming Telegram No. 334, dated April 17) is an exact and true copy of an official document of Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of August, 1946

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Signature]
誤差ノ事情ヨリ故ノ左記ノ丁寧ニ到達シテ右ノ第ハ米政ノ政府ノ
修正

日米両国ノ拘束スル間際ニ於テノ相互ヲ誓約スル為ノ
交渉ノ

両国政府ノ

事物ヲ

両国政府ノ

事物ヲ

両国政府ノ

事物ヲ

両国政府は相互という際に固有の役割を果たす国家間経済的及び社会的秩序

来思想を踏まえ、許容セールルノ原則下で解決を有する

日本政府は労働同盟目的のため、平和的手段、平和的な手段を利用して

米国政府は将来的に、核の在ルモアルコントラノを明示

支配方略サレルアラルへキレイコントラルに際する

支持するマチアティキア式の状況に於てと

核の姿勢ルモアルコントラルを明示する

核の核のルモアルコントラルを明示する
四、太平洋ニ於テ海軍兵力及び航空兵力ヲ交字段ヲ海運ヲ仮係

五、他方ヲ対スルカハ日本ヲ維持セントヲ欲スルヲ以テ

試ラルモノトス右ノハ總ノノノノノノノノノノノノノノノノノニ

二、日本会社ハ當リテハ前ノハ限りノヲ派送セシミ時

日本ノノシ
モニタ

両国間経済提携促進ノ為米騒ハ日本ニ對シ東亜ニ於ケル経済

成績ノ改善ヲ目的トスル商工業ノ発展及日米経済連携ヲ実現ス

ルニ足ル金ノクレチットヲ供給スルモニタルノ

六、

両国間経済提携促進ノ為米騒ハ日本ニ對シ東亜ニ於ケル経済

成績ノ改善ヲ目的トスル商工業ノ発展及日米経済連携ヲ実現ス

ルニ足ル金ノクレチットヲ供給スルモニタルノ
日米両国政府ハ比島ノ独立ヲ異議ニツテハ両国間ノ安全保障ヲ強化スルノヲ望ムニスリキテ、

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1. 日米両国政府ハ比島ノ独立ヲ異議ニツテハ両国間ノ安全保障ヲ強化スルノヲ望ムニスリキテ、
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIKDA Takeso, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese
foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese
consisting of 10 pages and entitled "Draft of the U.S.-Japanese
understanding dated April 16, 1941 (Incoming telegram No. 234,
dated April 17) is an exact and true copy of an official
document of Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
6th day of August, 1946

(signed) T. Shimoda
signature of official

Witness: (signed) Ma. shara Cdo.
The Imperial Japanese Government, in its desire to secure permanent peace in East Asia, has always strive to promote friendship and cooperation between Japan and China. However, an atmosphere of hostility towards Japan has been created throughout China by anti-Japanese agitations used as an instrument by the Hankow Government to arouse public opinion and to enhance its own political power. The Chinese, over-confident of their national strength, contemptuous of our power, and also in league with the Communists, have assumed toward Japan an increasingly arrogant and insulting attitude. Herein lies the cause of all untoward events which have arisen repeatedly during recent years.

The present Incident is but the inevitable outcome of this situation: Dynamite had been ignited; the inevitable explosion merely happened to occur on the banks of the Yunting. The terrible Tchangchow massacre is also traceable to the same cause. In South and Central China, Japanese lives and property have been so jeopardised that our people have been compelled to evacuate, abandoning everything they had acquired after years of incessant toil.

As has been frequently declared since the outbreak of the present Incident, the Japanese Government, exercising utmost patience and restraint, has steadfastly pursued a policy of non-aggravation of the situation, and has endeavoured to reach a settlement locally and in a peaceful manner. In the Peiping and Tientsin area, our Garrison, in the face of countless Chinese provocations and lawless actions, has done no more than was ob-
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Absolutely necessary to secure lines of communications and to protect Japanese nationals there.

On the other hand, our Government advised the Nanking Government to put an immediate stop to all provocative acts and to refrain from obstructing the negotiations being conducted on the spot. The Nanking Government not only refused to follow our counsel, but proceeded toward the completion of war-like preparations against us. In flagrant violation of solemn military agreements, the Chinese moved vast armies northward, menacing our Garrison, and concentrated troops in and around Shanghai. Their provocative attitude became more clearly defined at Hankow. Finally at Shanghai, the Chinese opened fire upon our Naval Headquarters and bombed our warships from the air.

In this manner have the Chinese insulted our Government, committed acts of unpardonable atrocity against our country, and gravely endangered the lives and property of our nationals throughout China. They have finally exhausted the patience of the Japanese Government. It has thus become imperative to take drastic measures in order to chastise the lawless Chinese troops and to impress upon the Nanking Government the necessity for reconsideration of its attitude toward Japan.

That matters should have come to this pass is deeply deplored by the Japanese Government which earnestly desires the maintenance of peace in the Orient and sincerely hopes for the attainment of common prosperity and public welfare in Japan and China. The aim of the Japanese Government is none other than the realization of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Their only desire is to eradicate the anti-foreign and anti-Japanese movement rampant in China, and
completely to eliminate the fundamental causes of unfortunate incidents such as the present one, with a view to bringing about truly harmonious collaboration among Japan, Manchukuo and China.

Needless to say, the Japanese Government harbours no territorial designs. Its sole intention is to bring to reason the Nanking Government and the Kueintreg Party, both of which have persistently incited anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese masses. The Japanese bear no ill-will toward the innocent Chinese masses. In conclusion we hereby state that the Japanese Government will spare no efforts in safeguarding foreign rights and interests in China.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DATED AUGUST 15TH, 1937." is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 4 October 1946.

(signed) Nagaharu, ODO
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) T. SATO
府及国民等ノ犯ヲ使サントスルモノヲ被

サルヘキハ言ヲ発サル所ナリ。
I have always said that the mission of Japan is to proclaim and demonstrate KODO (The Imperial Way) throughout the world. Viewed from the standpoint of international relations, this amounts, I think, to enabling all nations and races to find each its proper place in the world. Accordingly the immediate aim of our foreign policy at present is to establish, in accordance with the lofty spirit of KODO, a great East Asian chain of common prosperity with the Japan-Mandshu-China group as one of the links. We shall thus be able to demonstrate KODO in the most effective manner, and pave the way toward the establishment of an equitable world peace. We should be resolved to surmount all obstacles, both material and spiritual, lying in our path. Furthermore, in concert with those friendly Powers which are prepared to co-operate with us, we should strive with courage and determination for the fulfilment of the ideal and the heaven-ordained mission of our country.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in English, consisting of 1 pages, remarked "SHIRATORI DOCUMENT No 7" and entitled "Statement of Mr. Yosuke MATSUOFA, Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 1, 1940" is an exact and true copy of the Japanese original.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of Sept., 1946

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu OEO
AGREEMENT BETWEEN MANCHOUKUO AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOR THE CESSATION TO MANCHOUKUO OF THE RIGHTS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING THE NORTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY (CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY)

Signed at Tokyo, March 23, 1935.
Effective from March 23, 1935.
Published March 25, 1935.

Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being desirous to settle the question of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and thus to contribute to the safeguards of peace in the Far East, have resolved to conclude an Agreement for the Cession to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), and have to that end named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The Government of Manchoukuo:

W.S.Y. TINGE, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan;
CHUICHI OASHI, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs;
WU-TSE-SHENC, Adviser to the Directorate-General of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway);

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
CONSTANTIN CONSTANTINOVITCH YOURENEFF, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Plenipotentiary Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Japan;

+ 1 -
Benjamin Ignatievitch KOZLOVSKY, Chief of Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs;
Semen Matveevitch KUZNETSOFF, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway);

Who, having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

ARTICLE 1.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall cede to the Government of Manchoukuo all the rights they possess concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), in consideration of which the Government of Manchoukuo shall pay to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the sum of one hundred and forty million (140,000,000) yen in Japanese currency.

ARTICLE 2.

All the rights of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) shall pass to the Government of Manchoukuo upon the coming into force of the present Agreement, and at the same time the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) shall be placed under the complete occupation and the sole management of the Government of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE 3.

1. Upon the coming into force of the present Agreement, the
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Senior members of the administration of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be released from their duties. The said senior members of the administration of the Railway shall hand over all the archives, records, papers and documents of whatever description in their charge to their respective successors in the new administration of the Railway.

It is understood that the term the "senior members of the administration of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway)" employed in the present Article indicates:

(A) All the members of the Board of Directors and of the Audit Committee.

(B) The general manager and assistant manager of the Administration.

(C) The assistant chief controller.

(D) All the managers and sub-managers of the Departments of the Board of Directors, the Audit Committee, the Control and the Administration. All agents for commission, engineers for commission. All the senior agents, advisers and chiefs of the sections and sub-sections.

2. With the aim of ensuring the normal functioning of the Railway, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to place at the disposal of the new administration the following persons from among the senior members of the administration of the Railway who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as advisers for one month from the
date of the coming into force of the present Agreement:

(A) The general manager of the Administration.
(B) The manager of General Affairs Office of the Administration.
(C) The manager of the Motive Power Department of the Administration.
(D) The chief of the Financial Department of the Administration.
(E) The manager of the Commercial Department of the Administration.

3. At any time after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the Government of Manchoukuo may dismiss any or all of the following persons:

(A) All the chiefs of railway sections, stations and depots.
(B) The chief of all the following auxiliary enterprises of the Railway:
   a. Forest concessions and lumbering.
   b. Coalmines.
   c. Power stations.
   d. Printing plant.
   e. Auxiliary enterprises of the Commercial Department.
   f. Nursery and green-houses in Harbin.
   g. Main workshops of the Ways Department.
   h. Wool-Washing works and hydro-loading works.
   i. Water works in Harbin.
   j. Soft-drinks factory.
   k. Saw-mill.
1. Gradations of beans.
2. Waste-cleaning works.
4. Health resorts and sanatoria.
5. Hospitals and clinics.

4. The persons referred to in Section 1 of the present Article shall have the right to remain in Manchoukuo and to retain their railway lodgings for one month after the coming into force of the present Agreement.

The persons referred to in Section 2 of the present Article shall have the right to remain in Manchoukuo and to retain their railway lodgings for two months after the coming into force of the present Agreement.

Those persons who have been dismissed by virtue of Section 3 of the present Article shall have the right to receive their regular salary for one month from the date of their dismissal. They shall have the right to remain in Manchoukuo and to retain their railway lodgings for two months from the date of their dismissal.

ARTICLE 4.

The Government of Manchoukuo shall succeed to the assets and liabilities of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in accordance with the list of assets and liabilities of the Railway as on December 31st, 1933, presented by the Delegation of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on March 22nd, 1934, to the Delegation of the Goverm-
ment of Manchoukuo through the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan, as supplemented by the lists which were made on March
17th and March 21st, 1935, in order to show the changes sustained
by the assets and liabilities included in the first list from
the date of the first list up to the date of the last list and
also to show the new assets and liabilities which have arisen
on and after January 1st, 1934.

It is agreed that the provisions of Section 4, Article 9
of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the
Questions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Republic of China signed at Peking on May 31st, 1924, and those
of Section 3, Article 1 of the Agreement between the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government
of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of
China signed at Mukden on September 20th, 1924, shall remain in
force.

ARTICLE 5.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
shall have the right to maintain the following property for the
use of their Consulate General in Harbin in the form of a per­
manent and rent-free lease;

a. The land and buildings now occupied by the said Consu­
late General;

Area: 14,873.68 square metres.

Buildings:
- Office, No. 1049; 2,174.90 square metres.
- Residence, No. 1047; 685.37 square metres.
- Residence, No. 1048; 1,447.61 square metres.
- Garage and its annex, No. 1051; 245.88 square metres.
- Guard-room, No. 1052; 38.90 square metres.

b. The land and building now occupied by the Officials of the said Consulate General:
- Area: 2,530 square metres.
- Building: No. 934; 258.51 square metres.

The following property shall be leased rent-free and sine die to the Consul General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin on the day of the coming into force of the present Agreement, and shall immediately thereafter be placed and remain under the occupation and management of the community of the citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin to be used solely for the purposes prescribed hereunder;

a. The IVTH School of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), situated at No. 35, Shang-Wu-Kai, Tao-Li, Harbin, with all the buildings and property to be found there, to be used for the elementary and secondary education of the said community.

b. The land known under No. 949, at the corner of Kao-
Area: 14,873.68 square metres.

Buildings:

Office, No. 1049; 2,174.90 square metres.
Residence, No. 1047; 685.37 square metres.
Residence, No. 1048; 1,447.61 square metres.
Garage and its annex, No. 1051; 245.88 square metres.
Guard-room, No. 1052; 38.90 square metres.

b. The land and building now occupied by the Officials of the said Consulate General:

Area: 2,530 square metres.
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a. The IVTH School of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), situated at No. 35, Shang-Wu-Kai, Tao-Li, Harbin, with all the buildings and property to be found there, to be used for the elementary and secondary education of the said community.

b. The land known under No. 949, at the corner of Kao-
Shi-Kai and Ching-Cha-Kai, Tao-Li, Harbin, with all the buildings on it, which are to be used in the future as a hospital.

Within one month from the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, a library shall be selected, for the use of the above mentioned IVth School (TN: to be made up of books) from the library belonging to the Northern Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in Harbin, by mutual agreement between the local authorities of Manchoukuo and the Consul General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin. The books so selected shall be transferred to the said School.

ARTICLE 6.

The properties occupied by the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) which are claimed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as belonging to them and not to the Railway, and the properties existing in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which are claimed by the Government of Manchoukuo as belonging to the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), are regarded as having been mutually renounced by respective Governments in favour of the other Government, and neither Government shall in future raise against the other Government any demand concerning the said properties.

The above provisions shall not apply to the properties (buildings and their sites and other railway properties) of the Transbaikal Railway now existing at Manchuli, and the properties of the Ussuri Railway now existing at Suifenho, which are actually occupied respectively by the said two Railways and shall remain their property under their management.
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Shi-Kai and Ching-Cha-Kai, Tao-Li, Harbin, with all the buildings on it, which are to be used in the future as a hospital.

Within one month from the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, a library shall be selected, for the use of the above mentioned IVth School (TN: to be made up of books) from the library belonging to the Northern Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in Harbin, by mutual agreement between the local authorities of Manchoukuo and the Consul General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin. The books so selected shall be transferred to the said School.

ARTICLE 6.

The properties occupied by the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) which are claimed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as belonging to them and not to the Railway, and the properties existing in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which are claimed by the Government of Manchoukuo as belonging to the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), are regarded as having been mutually renounced by respective Governments in favour of the other Government, and neither Government shall in future raise against the other Government any demand concerning the said properties.

The above provisions shall not apply to the properties (buildings and their sites and other railway properties) of the Transbaikal Railway now existing at Manchuli, and the properties of the Ussuri Railway now existing at Suifenho, which are actually occupied respectively by the said two Railways and shall remain their property under their management.
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Within one month from the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, a library shall be selected, for the use of the above mentioned IVth School (TN: to be made up of books) from the library belonging to the Northern Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in Harbin, by mutual agreement between the local authorities of Manchoukuo and the Consul General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin. The books so selected shall be transferred to the said School.

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The properties occupied by the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) which are claimed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as belonging to them and not to the Railway, and the properties existing in the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which are claimed by the Government of Manchoukuo as belonging to the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), are regarded as having been mutually renounced by respective Governments in favour of the other Government, and neither Government shall in future raise against the other Government any demand concerning the said properties.

The above provisions shall not apply to the properties (buildings and their sites and other railway properties) of the Transbaikal Railway now existing at Manchuli, and the properties of the Ussuri Railway now existing at Suifenho, which are actually occupied respectively by the said two Railways and shall remain their property under their management.

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ARTICLE 7.

Out of the sum of one hundred and forty million (140,000,000) yen in Japanese currency referred to in Article 1 of the present Agreement, the sum of forty six million seven hundred thousand (46,700,000) yen shall be paid in cash in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the present Agreement and the settlement for the remaining sum of ninety-three million three hundred thousand (93,300,000) yen shall be effected in the form of payments made by the Government of Manchoukuo for goods delivered to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 8.

Out of the sum of forty-six million seven hundred thousand (46,700,000) yen to be paid in cash in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the present Agreement, the sum of twenty-three million three hundred thousand (23,300,000) yen shall be paid simultaneously with the signing of the present Agreement.

The remaining sum of twenty-three million four hundred thousand (23,400,000) yen as well as the simple interest at the rate of three per cent per annum is to be paid by the Government of Manchoukuo to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic in the form of the Treasury Bonds of the Government of Manchoukuo. The said Treasury Bonds are to be issued of the following amounts and mature on the dates indicated hereunder: six million three hundred and seventy-six thousand five hundred (6,376,500) yen maturing on December 23rd, 1935; six million two hundred and forty-four thousand eight hundred and seventy-five
(6,244,875) yen maturing on September 23rd, 1936; six million one hundred and thirteen thousand two hundred and fifty (6,113,250) yen maturing on June 23rd, 1937; five million nine hundred and eighty-one thousand six hundred and twenty-five (5,981,625) yen maturing on March 23rd, 1938. The Treasury Bonds of the Government of Manchoukuo mentioned above are to be issued in favour of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and are to be delivered by the Representative of the Government of Manchoukuo to the Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics simultaneously with the signing of the present Agreement, and shall be paid at the Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd.

In case the exchange rate of the yen in terms of the Swiss franc calculated on the basis of the respective exchange rates of the yen and the Swiss franc in London on the day before the date of payment of any of the second and subsequent instalments provided for in the present Article should be lower or higher by eight per cent or more in comparison with the exchange rate of the yen in terms of the Swiss franc as calculated on the basis of the respective exchange rates of the yen and the Swiss franc in London on the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, the amount of the said instalment shall be increased or reduced, as the case may be, so that the value in Swiss francs of the instalment shall be the same as it is on the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement.
In case the present gold parity of the Swiss franc (one Swiss franc being equivalent to nine thirty-firsts of one gram of fine gold) should be altered or in case the convertibility of the Swiss franc into gold should be suspended, the following method shall be adopted in place of the method provided for in the preceding paragraph.

In case the weight of fine gold whose value, when calculated on the basis of the price of gold and the exchange rate of the yen in London on the day before the date of payment of any of the second and subsequent instalment, should be less or more by eight per cent, or more in comparison with the weight of fine gold whose value, when calculated on the basis of the price of gold and the exchange rate of the yen in London on the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, is equal to the said instalment the amount of the instalment shall be increased or reduced, as the case may be, so that the value in fine gold of the instalment shall be the same as it is on the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 9.

The settlement for the sum of ninety-three million three hundred thousand (93,300,000) yen, to be effected in the form of payments made by the Government of Manchoukuo for the goods delivered to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as provided for in Article 7 of the present Agreement, shall be executed in the following manner.

1. The Trade Representation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Japan will make contracts for the purchase of goods.
produced or manufactured in Manchoukuo or Japan, with the subjects or juridical persons of either of these two countries, up to the sum of ninety-three million three hundred thousand (93,300,000) yen indicated in Article 7 within the period of six months from the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement. The delivery of the goods thus purchased shall be effected to the Trade Representation in Japan by the above-mentioned subjects or juridical persons within the period of three years from the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement in accordance with the terms of the contracts concerned, it being understood that the goods so delivered in the course of each of the six equal periods of six months constituting the said three years shall not exceed in value the sum of thirty-one million one hundred thousand (31,100,000) yen and that the total amount of the goods delivered in the course of each of the three equal periods of one year constituting the said three years shall not exceed in value the sum of thirty-one million one hundred thousand (31,100,000) yen.

2. The terms of payment for the goods shall be arranged in such a way that for each such period of six months in the course of the said three years the Government of Manchoukuo shall make payment not exceeding the sum of fifteen million five hundred and fifty thousand (15,550,000) yen for the delivery of the goods mentioned in the foregoing Section and in case any balance of that sum shall for any reason remain unpaid at the end of any such period of six months, such balance shall be
paid off during the next six months and so on, so that the whole sum of ninety-three million three hundred thousand (93,300,000) yen shall be paid off by the end of the said three years.

3. It is agreed that should the above-mentioned contracts not be concluded within the period of six months after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the Trade Representation shall have the right to make such contracts after the expiration of the said period of six months, and further that, should any of the parties other than the Trade Representation to the contracts concluded in accordance with the foregoing provisions of the present Article fail to carry out such contracts or to fulfil such contracts, when same are abrogated for these reasons, the Trade Representation shall in each case have the right to conclude fresh contracts with other subjects or juridical persons of Manchoukuo or Japan, in which case the latter contracts may provide for the payment for and the delivery of the goods to be effected after the three years' term above mentioned.

4. The contracts mentioned in the present Article shall be concluded either c.i.f. or f.o.b. at the choice of the Trade Representation and shall provide for payments in cash for goods by the Government of Manchoukuo.

5. When the Trade Representation have concluded a contract for the purchase of goods with the subjects or juridical persons of Manchoukuo or Japan, the Trade Representation shall give the Financial Attache to the Legation of Manchoukuo in Japan a resume of the contract, mentioning the names of the parties to the contract, the description, place of origin and quantity of the goods, the total amount of the sums to be paid, the date and place
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of delivery of the goods and of the payment therefor, as well as any other terms of the payment and delivery, including any provisions for payment in advance. The said resume shall be attested by both parties to the contract. Besides this, so far as circumstances permit, certificates of origin issued by any chamber of commerce and industry in Manchoukuo or Japan in respect of the goods, or by any other organization authorized to issue such certificates by the Government of either of these two countries, shall be presented to the Financial Attache by the seller of the goods.

The Financial Attache, upon receipt of the resume of the contract, provided its contents do not conflict with the provisions of the present Article, shall notify, not later than within seven days thereafter, the Trade Representation and the seller of the goods concerned to the effect that the Government of Manchoukuo undertake to effect payment for the goods in conformity with the said resume of the contract.

For the purpose of obtaining a settlement of his accounts the seller of the goods shall hand to the Trade Representation the document entitling the Trade Representation to dispose of the said goods (bill of lading, invoice etc.)

The Financial Attache, upon receipt of the notification given by the Trade Representation to the effect that the delivery of the goods referred to in the resume of the contract has been accomplished, shall issue a cheque to order drawn with the Industrial Bank of Japan, Ltd. as payer, the seller of the goods as payee and the price of the goods as its face amount, and shall deliver it to the seller on the date of payment, and,
in case the presentation of the certificates of origin of the goods above referred to shall have been prevented at the time of presentation of the resume of the contract, against such certificates. The seller of the goods shall give a receipt for the said cheque. Payment in advance to the seller of the goods may be effected in a similar manner by the Financial Attache in conformity with the resume of the contract against the advice of the Trade Representation to the effect that such payment shall be made.

6. It is understood that in the present Article the term "goods manufactured in Manchoukuo or Japan" indicates goods manufactured within either of the said two countries from raw materials imported from any other countries as well as from raw materials produced in either and that the term "juridical persons of Manchoukuo or Japan" indicates the juridical persons which are or may be incorporated in accordance with the law of Manchoukuo or Japan respectively.

ARTICLE 10.

1. Three months' notice shall be given to each of the employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), other than those included in the provisions of Article 3 of the present Agreement, who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and whom the Government of Manchoukuo may desire to dismiss from reasons of convenience on the part of the Government of Manchoukuo after the coming into force of the present Agreement.
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2. Employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who may be dismissed shall have the right to remain in Manchoukuo for two months after their dismissal in order to dispose of their personal affairs.

3. Employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall continue in the full enjoyment of their rights in movable and immovable property in accordance with the laws of Manchoukuo.

4. Employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall enjoy the full right to dispose of their property in accordance with the laws of Manchoukuo and to carry their property out of Manchoukuo either in its original form or in its money equivalent in any foreign currency.

5. Employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who have retired through dismissal or of their own accord and who leave for the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within two months after their retirement, shall be granted the privilege of free transport over the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) for themselves, their families, and their personal and household effects either to the station of Manchuli or to the station of Suifenho, at their own option.
ARTICLE 11.

1. The various descriptions of retiring allowances and payments (discharge allowances and other sums due to employees in respect of service on the Railway, employees' savings in the Relief Savings Association and the payments additional thereto on the part of the Railway including interest, pensions and block grants in accordance with the regulations of the Relief Savings Association, as well as pensions and compensations for personal injuries according to the "Regulations of 1912 relating to the indemnification of persons who have met with accidents") to employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who may be dismissed or may retire of their own accord after the coming into force of the present Agreement, so far as such allowances and payments are in respect of the period before the coming into force of the present Agreement, shall be individually reckoned and paid out in accordance with the regulations of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in force up to the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, as modified by the provisions of the present Article.

Note. Discharge allowances for the period up to November 11th, 1930, are to be paid according to the rates existing up to November 11th, 1930.

2. Employees who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who are dismissed or retire of their own accord after the coming into force of the present Agreement
shall be considered as employees who have been dismissed as the result of the abolition of offices, so far as concerns the calculation of various descriptions of retiring allowances and payments.

3. Discharge allowances and other payments relative to service concerning the railway, and compensations for injuries sustained in such service, as well as savings and the prescribed interest thereon, shall be paid within a fortnight from the day of dismissal or retirement, provided that in respect of persons who shall be dismissed, half the amount of such savings shall be paid within two months from the date of the notice of such dismissal.

The block grants to persons who have been in the service of the Railway for less than ten years as well as payments additional to savings together with the prescribed interest thereon shall be paid in four equal instalments within two years from the date of dismissal or retirement. The first instalment shall be paid within a fortnight, and the second instalment at the end of a year after the date of dismissal or retirement, and the third and the fourth instalments shall be paid at the end respectively of six and twelve months after the payment of the second instalment. As regards the last three of these instalments, the Government of Manchoukuo shall issue bonds for the amounts due drawn up in the name of the respective persons and maturing on the dates prescribed above. These bonds shall be delivered to
the respective recipients simultaneously with the payment of the first instalment above referred to and shall not be transferred thereafter to any other person.

Persons who have been in the service of the Railway for ten years or more shall be deemed entitled to pensions without undergoing the examination of their working efficiency, and the said pensions, instead of being paid annually, shall be paid in a block grant, that is to say, a sum eight and a half times the sum payable annually in respect of a pension shall be paid to the recipient in four equal instalments in the course of two years, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

Note. 1. The examination of the working efficiency of employees who have been in the service of the Railway for less than ten years will be effected according to the regulations of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in force up to the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement.

Note 2. Pensions for personal injuries, instead of being paid annually, shall be paid in block grants, that is to say, a sum eight and a half times the sum payable annually shall be paid to the recipients in the same manner as for persons who have been in the service of the Railway for ten years or more.

4. Employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) who are in debt to the Railway shall have
the sum of their indebtedness deducted from the various descriptions of retiring allowances and other payments due to them.

5. The various descriptions of retiring allowances and payments shall be paid in the currency of Manchoukuo at the exchange rate against the rouble of the North Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) existing at the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement and applied by the said Railway for settlements with their employees. The recipients of these retiring allowances and payments shall be allowed to remit the money they have received to other countries after having converted it into foreign currency.

6. The various descriptions of retiring allowances and payments and the bonds of the Government of Manchoukuo shall be paid or delivered to the legal recipients direct, but persons who have returned to the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can empower the Consul General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Harbin or any other person to receive them. Persons who have given such authority shall at the same time inform the North Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) to that effect.

7. Those persons who have retired before the coming into force of the present Agreement and are now being paid pensions shall continue to receive the pensions as previously in accordance with the regulations of the North Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in force up to the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, irrespective of whether the said regulations shall remain in force, be modified or abrogated thereafter.
Def. Doc. 770

In this case Section 5 of the present Article shall be applied as regards the exchange rate against the rouble of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), and, in case the legal recipients should be returning or should have returned to the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as regards remittances to other countries.

8. The sums which are to be paid out by the Administration or the Relief Savings Association of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) to employees who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of which neither the legal recipients nor their proxies or successors have demanded payment up to the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, shall be disposed of in accordance with the regulations of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) in force up to the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement.

9. Employees who have been dismissed or have retired after the coming into force of the present Agreement shall, during a period of one month from the date of their dismissal or retirement, retain their full rights with regard to their railway lodgings under the same conditions as before.
ARTICLE 13.

The Governments of Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with a view to promote and facilitate the intercourse and traffic between the two countries, shall conclude, within three months from the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement, a separate agreement which will provide for the settlement of questions concerning the conveyance of passengers, luggage and goods in transit, direct service for passengers, luggage and goods between railway stations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and those of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), and also, technical conditions permitting, direct services without reloading of goods between the Ussuri Railway and the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) via the station of Suifenho.

Within the period of the said three months, the two Governments shall conclude another separate agreement which will provide for telegraphic connection between the telegraphic lines hitherto operated by the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
ARTICLE 14.

The present agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in the English language in the City of Tokyo, this twenty-third day of the third month of the second year of Kangte, corresponding to the 23rd day of March, 1935.

(L.S.) W.S.Y. TINGE.
(L.S.) CHUICHI OHASHI.
(L.S.) WU TSE-SHENG.
(L.S.) J. C. YOURUNFF.
(L.S.) B. I. KOZLOVSKY.
(L.S.) KUZNETSOFF,
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English hereto attached, consisting of 23 pages and entitled "Agreement between Manchoukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Cession to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of September, 1946

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagaharu Odo
北海道（東支庁）ニ於ケルソウヴァイエートー
社會主義共和国聯邦ニ於ケルソウヴァイエートー

昭和二十年（一九五五年）三月三日東京ニ於テ署名

北朝鮮（東支庁）ソウヴァイエートー社会主義共和国聯邦

如くノ全権委員ヲ任命セリ

日本国政府

外交郷次長大橋忠一

外務郷次長材官使丁士源

北海道（東支庁）顧問公署參事鳥嶋謙

昭

協定
第三条

第一項

北海道（東京都道）＝ニルソウエイテト＝社会主義共和国間隣邦

第二項

政府ノ一切＝権利ハ本協定実施ノ同時＝附属ノ政府ニ移ハスバ且ト

第三項

ノ管轄ノ＝ヲケルベキモノス

第四条

管理局長及監理局長

各科ハ左ノ如シ

呈書ハ左ノ如シ

記録＝ハ左ノ如シ

管轄＝ハ左ノ如シ

満足＝ハ左ノ如シ
ワチルメリチトへホニハロイ

(2) 付随所

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<tr>
<th>右開業ノ左記各附属事業ノ主任</th>
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<td>ダック漂合併管理</td>
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5
 피해

所在地  
事務所 第三十九号  
会第十四七号  
宮合第号八十八號  
自動車道及び附属屋第千五十一號  
二四五・八一平方メートル

建築物

所在地  
農家倉庫街  
事務所 第十号  
會第千四十七號  
宫合第号四十八號  
自動車道及び附屬屋第千五十二號  
三八・九〇平方メートル

面積

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デフ・ドゥ・370

日支協同日トスル六百十一萬三千二百五十六（六十一三二五○）

大正十三年三月二十二日支那駐箚政府ノ代表者ヨリソウイエトト社会主決

て襄日部分名ノ同日ニ於キ政府ノ代表者ヨリソウイエトト社会主決

ニ於テ支那ハルベシ

本線ニ於セールル毎ニ於キ其ノ後ノ各階賦金ヲ第期ニ於ノ前日ノ

セールル毎ニ於キソウイエトトニ示サルルノヲ為ス相場ニ基キ算出

八分以上低キカ又ハ高キトノ前記階賦金ノ額ハ示サルルノヲ為ス相場ニ基キ

デサルルソウイエトトニ示サルルノヲ為ス相場ニ比テシテ

ラガ如ク場合ニ於ジテ増加又ハ減少セラルベシ

シムルガ如ク場合ニ於ジテ増加又ハ減少セラルベシ
瑞国【フランツ】在現ノ目的ヒーラ・ハ純金ハグラムノ
三十一分ノ九ニ相当スノガ diplかセラル為ハ瑞国【フランツ】金兌換
ガ停止セラルトキハ前項ニ規定セラル方法＝代リノ方法ガ掠
用セラルベシ

本條ニ規定セラルル第二条ニ於タレノタルノ銀金ノ支払期日ノ前日ノ
ロンドンニ於ケル金ノ価格及び國ノ報官相場ノ計算シテ當該割賦
金ノ額ニ依シテ価値ヲ有スル純金ノ重量ニ比シテシテハ該等ノ
シテ価値ヲ有スル純金ノ量ヲ比シテシテハ該等ノ計算シテ右割賦金ニ
キハ右割賦金ノ額ハ純金ニテ示サルルヲ科スルノノ協定実施ノ
日ニ於ケルモノト同ノナラシムルガ如々場合ニ於テ増加又ハ減少

本協定第七條ニ規定セラルル退【ソヴエイエトト】社会主義共和國聯邦
政府ニ引渡サル物資ニ對スル為ス国政府ノ支援ヲ以テ行ハルベキ

第十九條
九千三百三十万（九三、三〇〇、〇〇）円ノノ決定ハ左ノ方法

在日団ノソビエト社會主義共和國団聯邦通商代表部ハ本協

定実施ノヨリ六月ノ期間内ニ至り第七ニ週ガルル九千三百三十

万（九三、三〇〇、〇〇）円ノ額ニ達スル迄鈔造物品ハ日本國

民又ハ法人＝依り日本國＝在ル通商代表部＝引渡スル物品ハ

右ヲ前提ニハ該契約ノ條件＝従ヒ常に協定実施ノヨリ三年ノ期間ニ

於クレカノ臣民又ハ法人＝ト締結セラレタル物品ハ

何レカノ臣民又ハ法人＝ト締結セラレタル物品ハ

当該契約ノ條件＝従ヒ常に協定実施ノヨリ三年ノ期間ニハ日本國

在ル通商代表部＝ヲ前提ニハ該契約ノ右ヲ前提ニハ

賣成スル六月＝各六月＝均分期間＝於テスル引渡スキル物品ハ

超フェラルモノ

且右三年＝課スル三割＝各一年＝均分期間＝於テスル引渡スキル

物品＝総量ハ価格＝於テ三千百十万（三一、一〇〇、〇〇）円

超フェラルスキル

三

疎＝對スル支払條件ハ右三年＝於ケル＝ヨリ六月＝均分期間＝於

疎

三

疎＝對スル支払條件ハ右三年＝於ケル＝ヨリ六月＝均分期間＝於
当主の其の勘定・決済・貯得・帳務等の事務を代理人として担当

교수도물

財務役は両社代表部員の契約を務め、受注シタル商品等を支払

支払人トレシ主受注人トシ且商品別名式小切手発行し支払期日及び前記商品等原産地証明書指定者が契約

売主交付スペシ品、売主小切手無断受領書で交付スペシ

売主

ホテル営業部

会社

ハルペン
令状等登録取扱新規定

(良友)
電子機械学会誌 第31巻 第8号(1982年8月)
三月二十三日

大本営

東京市

昭和二年三月二十三日

大本営

東京市

昭和五年三月二十三日

大本営

東京市

昭和二十五年三月二十三日

大本営

東京市

昭和三十一年三月二十三日

大本営

東京市

昭和四十五年三月二十三日

大本営

東京市
REPLY OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.

September 21st, 1937.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur:

With reference to the incident of the wounding of His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to China, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, concerning which I made an ad interim reply in my Note under the date of September 6th, 1937, I now have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the inquiry in Shanghai and its vicinity having been completed the Japanese Government desire to make the following reply:

2. As the result of most careful investigations it has been established that on August 28th at 2.35 p.m., two Japanese planes machine-gunned and bombed two motor-cars which were believed, in all probability, to be military busses or trucks carrying officers or soldiers of the Chinese army at a point three kilometres southeast of Nanking, where the Chinese forces were concentrated since August 18th, not only had Japanese aeroplanes made repeated attacks upon them but a number of aerial combats between the Japanese and Chinese planes had taken place.

3. Owing to the difficulty, in present circumstances, of conducting an investigation on the spot, there has been some slight discrepancy in the various reports received as to the position of the Ambassador's motor-car at the time when he was wounded, but it was ascertained that no Japanese aeroplane had made a machine-gun attack, or dropped a bomb in the locality where the Ambassador was first reported to have been wounded.

However, careful study made simultaneously by the Japanese and British authorities leads to the conclusion that the
position of the motor-car in question might have been to the southward of Kating, instead of 6 miles south of Taitsang as stated in an earlier British report.

4. In the light of all those circumstances, the Japanese Government consider that the incident may have been caused by Japanese planes which mistook the Ambassador's motor-car as a military bus or truck. An injury to the Secretary of the Embassy may thus have been due to the action, however involuntary, of Japanese aircraft. The Japanese Government desire to convey to His Britannic Majesty's Government a formal expression of their deep regret.

5. As regards the question of the punishment of the aviator concerned, it is needless to say that the Japanese Government would take suitable steps whenever it was established that Japanese aviators killed or wounded, intentionally or through negligence, nationals belonging to a third country.

6. As stated in their interim note of September 6th, instructions have been sent again to the Japanese forces in China to exercise the greatest care in safeguarding non-combatants, it being the desire and policy of the Japanese Government to limit, as far as this can possibly be done, the dangers to non-combatants resulting from the existence of hostilities in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
DEP. DOC. #72.

His Excellency

The Right Honourable Sir Robert L. Craigie, K.C.H.G.,
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to Japan.

Etc., Etc., Etc.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "REPLY OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR" (21 September 1937) is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 4 October 1946.

(signed) Nagaharu, ODO
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) T. SATO
進支英國大使館

近時英連使用次要交通員名支那駐支那大使（サーリ・ヒュー・ナッポ）

以營救上賈護館名支那駐支那大使

進支英國大使

難事件

改題元支役本大臣八同下ニ謀支那情政府八支

進支之駅ナル調査ノ結果＝依レハ八月二十六日午後二時三十分

騒乱ヲ騒乱ヲ騒乱ヲ騒乱ヲ騒乱ヲ

八月二十六日以来日本飛行機ハハ之ニ對シ屡次攻撃ヲ行ヒタルノミナラ

ラス日支軍飛行機ノ同ニ次次二亘リ空中戦行ハレタルヲ次第ニ有

現在ノ状況＝於テハ現地調査ヲ行フコト困難ナルヲ以テナシ

之検
プルーフ出せん！大使館長当初ニ於ケル同便自動車ヲ
自宅ヲ毁シラタルモノヲ報せラルニ故ノハ
同大使カ當時発見シタルヲ報告セラレタニ故

璐ノ結果ニ於ケル各種ノ報告ニ疑分ノ相達ハアリタルモノ日本

飛行機ハ

同大使カ當時発見シタルヲ報告セラレタニ故

璐ノ結果ニ於ケル各種ノ報告ニ疑分ノ相達ハアリタルモノ日本

飛行機ハ

同大使カ當時発見シタルヲ報告セラレタニ故

璐ノ結果ニ於ケル各種ノ報告ニ疑分ノ相達ハアリタルモノ日本

飛行機ハ

同大使カ當時発見シタルヲ報告セラレタニ故
昭和十二年九月二十一日
外務大臣
両田 弘

大不列顕特命全権大使
「ゼライト」、「オノラブル」、「サーキット・クレジー」開下

若ハ戦意ニ因リ第三国人家殺傷シタルコト判明セル場合ハハ適用

=ル處置ヲ執ルヘキコト勿論ノ次ニ有之候

出来得ル限り単純セントスルハ帝國政府ノ希望シ且方スル危険

注意ヲ催フヘキ旨帝國政府ヨリ重ねテ訓令ヲ次第ノ次第ノ次第八九月六日府

不敬退同答シ恐キタル通リニ有之候

同答ヲ本大臣ハ兹ニ重ねテ開下ニ向テ敬意ヲ表シ譲

敬具

3
Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(22nd October 1898 (31st year of Meiji.)
Imperial Ordinance No. 258)

Art. 1 The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall administer governmental affairs concerning foreign nations, the protection of Japanese commercial matters in foreign nations, and affairs regarding Japanese subjects residing in foreign nations, and shall command and supervise diplomats and consuls.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall command and supervise the Kwantung Governor-General in respect to matters of foreign policy.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall manage affairs concerning cultural enterprises toward China.

Art. 2 The Ministry's Secretariats shall conduct affairs regarding foreign diplomats and consuls residing in the Japanese Empire, the conforming of decorations on foreigners, the keeping of treaty documents, and the translation of documents, besides what is stipulated in the general provisions.

Art. 3 The full number of Secretaries in full service of the Ministry shall be 18.

Art. 4 The Ministry shall have the following 4 Bureaus:
- Asian Affairs Bureau.
- European and American Affairs Bureau.
- Commercial Affairs Bureau.
- Treaties and Conventions Bureau.
Art. 5 The Asiatic Affairs Bureau shall conduct affairs of foreign policy concerning China, Hongkong, MACAO, and Siam.

Art. 6 The European and American Affairs Bureau shall conduct affairs of foreign policies, excluding those conducted by the Asiatic Affairs Bureau.

Art. 7 The Commercial Affairs Bureau shall conduct affairs concerning commerce, navigation, and emigration.

Art. 8 The Treaties and Conventions Bureau shall conduct affairs concerning treaties and matters of laws and regulations governing international relations.

Art. 9 In order to conduct affairs on information, there will be an Information Board in the Ministry.

A chief shall be appointed over the same board.

The chief shall be an official of "CHOKUNIN" rank.

(TN. A rank of Imperial Appointment)

The chief shall manage affairs of the same board, in compliance with orders of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Art. 10 In order to conduct affairs concerning cultural enterprises toward China a Cultural Enterprises Board will be set up within the Ministry.

A Chief shall be appointed over this board.

The Chief shall be an official of the "CHOKUNIN" rank.

The Chief shall manage affairs of the same Board, in compliance with orders of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Art. 11 46 Administrative Officials and 8 Commissioners, all
in full service of the Foreign Ministry shall be appointed in the Foreign Ministry.

The same officials shall be of the "SÖNIN rank." (TN. a rank appointed by Imperial approval) The same officials shall manage affairs under instructions of their senior officials.

Art. 12 7 Translator Officials in full service shall be appointed in the Ministry. The same officials shall be of the "SÖNIN rank." The same officials shall manage the translation of documents under instructions of their senior officials.

Art. 13 3 Telegraph Officials in full service shall be appointed in the Ministry. The same officials shall be of the "SÖNIN rank." The same officials shall manage matters concerning telegraphic codes, under instructions of their senior officials.

Art. 14 A Technical Official shall be of the "SÖNIN rank." The same official shall manage technical affairs under instructions of his senior officials.

Art. 15 The full number of clerks in full service of the Ministry shall be 152.

Art. 16 3 Probationary Translator Officials shall be appointed in the Ministry. The same officials shall be of "hannin" rank. (TN. minor rank) The same officials shall be engaged in the translation of documents and interpretation under instructions of their senior officials.

Art. 17 9 Assistant Technical Officials in full service shall be appointed in the Ministry. The same officials shall
be of the "hannin" rank. The same officials shall be engaged in tolographic operation, construction, and other technical affairs.

**Supplementary Provisions**

This ordinance shall come into force on and after the day of promulgation.

The Foreign Ministry certifies here that the foregoing ordinance was effective from 1929 (4th year of Showa.) till 1933 (8th year of Showa.)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kazuo, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages, remarked "SHIRATORI DOCUMENT No. 2" and entitled Imperial Ordinance on the Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an exact and true copy of the Japanese original.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of Sept., 1946

Signature of Official: (signed) HAYASHI

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu ODO

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation of the document described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 4th day of Nov., 1946
JOINT DECLARATION

According to 6 Nov. 43 announcement by the Greater East Asia Conference Office.

The representatives of the countries who participated in the Greater East Asia Conference held at Tokyo on 5 & 6 Nov. 43 are as follows:

Japan. Tōjō Hideki Premier.

China. Wan Chao Ming. Director of the Administrative Department, National Government.

Thailand. Wanwaitaiyakon (T.N.?) In the name of the Premier Marshal P. Pibul Soncorum (T.N.?)


Philippines. Jose, P. Laurel.


At this conference, upon unreserved discussion concerning the guiding principles in prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia and establishing a Greater East Asia all the representatives unanimously adopted the following joint declaration.

- 1 -
JOINT DECLARATION

It is the basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place, and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance.

The United States of America and the British Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation, and sought to satisfy their inordinate ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies the cause of the present war.

The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination, and ensuring their self-existence and self-defence, and in constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles.

1. The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.

2. The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another's
sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.

3. The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.

4. The countries of Greater Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.

5. The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese and English, consisting of 2 pages, remarked "SHIRATORI DOCUMENT No. 6." and entitled "Joint Declaration" is an exact and true copy of the Japanese original.

Signed at Tokyo on this
10th day of September, 1946

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagaharu Odo
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図示の解説

図示の詳細

図示の説明

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同も前に於ては大東亜戦争完遂と大東亜経済の方針との関し各国代表は同意を申し合せてございます。
大東亜共同宣言

大東亜共同宣言

大東亜各國は相互に自主に対立を尊重し互助救衛の質を張れる大東

アジアの共和を確立す

大東亜各國は相互に自主に対立を尊重し互助救衛の質を張れる大東

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因数に存す

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うし遂には大東亜の安定を保障より資さんとせり大東亜戦争の原

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大東亜各國は相互に共の防御を尊重し各民族の自由経済を尊重し
大東亜の文化を尊重し

大東亜各國は相互の下に密に接近し共の経済発展を図り大東亜
の文化を増進する

大東亜各國は高邦との交流を深うし人種的差別を徹底し昔の文
化を交流し進んで資源を開放して世界の進歩に貢献す
1. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.

The conclusions of the Conference may be summarized as follows:

(a) Resolutions and Statements regarding the Promotion of Trade within the Commonwealth.

(i) EMPIRE CONTENT.

With regard to the determination of the percentage of Empire Content necessary to secure preferential tariff treatment, the Conference draws the attention of the several Governments of the Commonwealth to the importance of this subject, and recommends that each of the Governments of the Commonwealth should investigate, as rapidly as possible, the standard of Empire Content which should be required by them for the import under preferential rates of the different classes of goods, bearing in mind the following principles:

(a) That though it must rest with each Government to decide what standard it will require, a greater degree of uniformity throughout the Commonwealth is desirable;

(b) The standard required should not be such as to defeat or frustrate the intention of the preferential rate of duty conceded to any class of goods.

(ii) EXPORT BOUNTIES AND ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES.

With regard to the question of export bounties and antidumping duties within the Commonwealth, the Conference adopted the following resolution:

This Conference, recognizing that export bounties...
and exchange depreciation adversely affect the value of tariff preferences within the Commonwealth, expresses the hope that with a rise in the level of commodity prices and with stabilised exchanges such bounties and the special duties which have been adopted as a means of adjusting the situation so created, may be withdrawn.

(iii) MAIN ARGUMENTS.

With regard to the conclusion of certain agreements for the extension of mutual trade by means of reciprocal preferential tariffs, the Conference adopted the following resolution:

The nations of the British Commonwealth having entered into certain agreements with one another for the extension of mutual trade by means of reciprocal preferential tariffs, this Conference takes note of these agreements and records its conviction;

That by the lowering or removal of barriers among themselves provided for in these agreements, the flow of trade between the various countries of the Empire will be facilitated, and that by the consequent increase of purchasing power of their peoples, the trade of the world will also be stimulated and increased;

Further, that this Conference regards the conclusion of these agreements as a step forward, which should in the future lead to further progress in the same direction, and which will utilize protective duties to ensure that the resources and industries of the Empire are developed on sound economic lines.

The agreements referred to are annexed hereto and the Conference commends them to the several parts of the Empire.
(b) Resolutions regarding Customs Administration.

The Conference recommends that the aims to be kept in view should be:

(1) The avoidance of uncertainty as to the amount of duty which would be payable on the arrival of goods in the importing country;

(2) The reduction of friction and delay to a minimum;

(3) The provision of facilities for the expeditious and effective settlement of disputes relating to all matters affecting the application of the Customs Tariff;

and that any measures which Customs Administrations might take to safeguard themselves against evasion should be consistent with these principles.

(c) Statement regarding Commercial Relations with Foreign Countries.

The Conference considered two broad groups of questions affecting the commercial relations of the several members of the Commonwealth with foreign countries.

In the first place, the Conference discussed the general question of the relationship between inter-Commonwealth preferences and the most-favoured-nation clause in commercial treaties with foreign Powers. Each Government will determine its particular policy in dealing with this matter, but the representatives of the various Governments on the Committee stated that it was their policy that no treaty obligations into which they might enter in the future should be allowed to interfere with any mutual preferences which Governments of the Commonwealth
might decide to accord to each other, and that they would free themselves from existing treaties, if any, which might so interfere. They would, in fact, take all the steps necessary to implement and safeguard whatever preferences might be so granted.

In the second place, attention was drawn to recent tendencies in foreign countries to conclude regional agreements between themselves for the mutual accord of preferences which were designed as being exclusive, and not to be extended to countries which were not parties to, or did not adhere to the agreements. On this point, there was a general agreement that foreign countries which had existing treaty obligations to grant most-favoured-nation treatment to the products of particular parts of the Commonwealth could not be allowed to override such obligations by regional agreements of the character in question. Particular reference was made in this connection to the question of the cereal in regard to which preferential treatment was in contemplation for the cereal exports of the States concerned—exports which constitute a substantial proportion of the world's exports of the cereals in question. The conference was however, informed that in the discussion which took place at Lausanne on the matter, the rights of third countries had, at the instance of the United Kingdom, been expressly reserved.

The Conference recognized that the fact that rights are accorded by most-favoured-nation treatment does not preclude a foreign country from seeking the consent of the various Governments of the British Commonwealth to the waiver of their rights in particular cases, and that these Governments must be by consideration of their individual interests in deciding whether or not to meet the wishes of the foreign country concerned,
so long, however, as the general principle that rights of this
kind cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn is fully and carefully pre-
served.

The Conference would, however, recommend that where two or
more Commonwealth Governments share a common interest in any pro-
posal for the waiver of particular treaty rights, they should
consult together with a view to arriving, in so far as possible,
at a common policy.

(d) Resolutions and statements regarding monetary and
financial questions.

I.

(a) A rise throughout the world in the general levels of
wholesale prices is in the highest degree desirable. The evil
of falling prices must be attacked by Government and individual
action in all its causes, whether political, economic, financial or
monetary.

(b) For dealing with the problem in its widest aspects the
Governments represented at this Conference record their conviction
that international action is urgently necessary, and announce
their desire to co-operate with other nations in any practicable
measures for raising wholesale prices.

(c) The Conference has considered what action can be taken
by the nations of the Commonwealth to help reverse falling prices.

As regards monetary factors, the Conference recognizes that
the central position of the United Kingdom, not only among the
countries of the Commonwealth but in world trade and finance,
makes the United Kingdom a main factor in anything that can be
done. The Conference, therefore, welcomes the following state-
ment made on behalf of the United Kingdom by the Chancellor of the Exchequer:

"His Majesty's Government desire to see wholesale sterling prices rise. The best condition for this would be a rise in gold prices, and the absence of a rise in gold prices inevitably imposes limitations on what can be done for sterling. A rise in prices cannot be effected by monetary action alone, since various other factors which have combined to bring about the present depression must also be modified or removed before a remedy is assured.

His Majesty's Government, nevertheless, recognize that an ample supply of short-term money at low rates may have a valuable influence, and they are confident that the efforts which have successfully brought about the present favourable monetary conditions can and will, unless unforeseen difficulties arise, be continued."

(d) The Conference recommends the other countries of the Commonwealth represented here to act in conformity with the line of policy as set out in the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, so far as lies within their power.

In the monetary sphere the primary line of action towards a rise in prices should be the creation and maintenance, within the limits of sound finance, of such conditions as will assist in the revival of enterprise and trade. Among these conditions are low rates of interest and an abundance of short-term money. While regard must be had to the different conditions applying to various types of loans, the rate of interest for all purposes
should be kept as low as financial conditions permit. At the
same time it is necessary that these favourable monetary conditions
be achieved, not by the inflationary creation or additional means
of payment to finance public expenditure, but by orderly
monetary policy, secured, if the necessity should arise, by
such steps as will restrain the spread of violent
speculative movements in commodities or securities.

It must be kept in mind, however, that the success of any
such policy will be impaired and might be nullified by the
failure to modify or remove important non-monetary obstacles.
Of the non-monetary factors which are depressing the level of
prices many are of international character and require an
international remedy. The actions of the Commonwealth should,
nevertheless, take all steps that lie in their power to increase
public confidence, especially in the field of business enterprise,
and to facilitate trade.

(c) The Conference recognizes the great importance to
traders of stability of exchange rates over as wide an area
as possible. The complete solution of this problem must wait
the restoration of conditions for the satisfactory working of
an international standard as referred to below. In the meantime,
and pending such a solution, this Conference has considered the
possibility of achieving valuable results in the directions
first by creating an area of stability among countries
requiring their currencies in relation to sterling; and secondly,
by avoiding wide-day-to-day fluctuations between sterling
and gold.
As regards the latter, the Conference has noted with satisfaction that the United Kingdom has already established machinery aimed at preventing wide fluctuations in the gold value of sterling caused by speculative movements. As to the former, the Conference recognizes the value of the countries within the Commonwealth whose currencies are linked to sterling, maintaining stability between their exchange rates and looks to a rise in the general level of wholesale prices as the most desirable means for facilitating this result.

II.

The Conference recognizes that the ultimate aim of monetary policy should be the restoration of a satisfactory international monetary standard. Such a standard should so function as not merely to maintain stable exchange rates between all countries, but also to ensure the smooth and efficient working of the machinery of international trade and finance.

This postulates international agreement among the great trading nations of the world, and while certain of the States here represented hold very definite views on the question of the most desirable standard, the Conference refrains from making any recommendations on the subject in view of the fact that the question is shortly to be discussed at an international conference. There are, however, several conditions precedent to the re-establishment of any international monetary standard. The most important among them are: a rise in the general level of commodity prices in the various countries to a height more in keeping with the level of costs, including the burden of debt and other fixed and semi-fixed charges; and an adjustment of the factors political...
economic, financial and monetary, which have caused the break-
down of the gold standard in many countries, and which, if not
adjusted, would inevitably lead to another breakdown of whatever
international standard may be adopted.

It is also in the view of the Conference of the utmost im-
portance to the future working of any international standard that
international co-operation should be secured and maintained with
a view to avoiding, so far as may be found practicable, wide
fluctuations in the purchasing power of the standard or value.

(a) Resolutions and Statements regarding Methods of Economic
Co-operation.

(i) General Resolutions.

This Conference, having discussed the question of Economic
Consultation and Co-operation within the Commonwealth, and
having considered the annexed report prepared for it on the
constitution and functions of existing agencies operating in those
fields:

Recommends that a committee should be appointed forthwith,
consisting of not more than two representatives of
each of the participating governments, to consider the means
of facilitating economic consultation and co-operation between
the several Governments of the Commonwealth, including a
survey of the functions, organization and financial bases of
the agencies specified in the annexed report, and an examination
of what alterations or modifications, if any, in the existing
methods of such co-operation within the Commonwealth are
desirable.
The Conference further recommends that it shall be an instruction to the Committee to elect their own Chairman from among their members, and to report to the several Governments represented thereon not later than the 31st May next, with a view to the consideration of their report by the several Governments not later than September 1935.

The Conference was given to understand by the representatives of the United Kingdom that, in order that the necessary time might be available for the preparation and consideration of the report of the Committee concerning the existing and future machinery for economic cooperation within the Commonwealth, the Government of the United Kingdom would continue to furnish any funds which may be required to finance essential work of the Empire Marketing Board down to the end of September 1935. The Conference records its deep appreciation of the action of the United Kingdom in this respect.

With regard to the above recommendations reservations were made by Mr. Havenga, for the Union of South Africa, and by Mr. Lemass, for the Irish Free State, respectively, in the following terms: --

(Mr. Havenga): "While not wishing to object to the acceptance of the report of the Committee on Methods of Economic Co-operation, I desire, in order to remove any ground for misapprehension, to record the following reservations on behalf of the Union of South Africa:

1. While not generally adverse to the institution of ad hoc bodies for economic investigation and preparation, the Union Government will not associate itself with any scheme for the erection of any organization in the nature of a permanent secretariat or preparatory committee to
Commonwealth Conferences, whether economic or otherwise.

"2. That portion of the report which introduces the draft resolutions relating to the appointment of a Committee to consider the means of facilitating economic consultation and co-operation, must not be read in the sense that the Union Government is committed in principle to give financial support to Commonwealth Economic Organizations."

(Mr. Luanse): "I do not object to the adoption of this report and the accompanying resolutions, but I wish it to be made perfectly clear in the published records of the Conference that the Government of the Irish Free State are not prepared to contemplate the setting up of an Imperial Economic Secretariat, or of any similar organ or centralization."

(ii) Resolution concerning Industrial Standardization.

1. The Conference recommends that, with a view to assisting the co-ordination of the work of national standardization, the following principles, as far as practicable, be observed:

(a) That the specifications should be in accordance with the needs of industry and fulfill a generally recognized want;

(b) That the community interest of producer and consumer should be maintained throughout;

(c) That the specifications should be arrived at by general consent;

(d) That periodical review and revision should be undertaken to prevent crystallization and keep the specifications abreast of progress;
(c) That full information regarding the initiation of any specification and progress in its preparation should, without delay, be circulated by the originating body to the corresponding bodies in other parts of the Commonwealth.

II. Having regard to the disadvantages which are apt to occur when a statutory provision embodies a standard specification verbatim, whether in whole or in part, instead of confining itself to a reference to a national standard specification, the Conference recommends that each Government of the Commonwealth in co-operation with its central standardizing body, should bring under review the position with regard to such statutory provisions, in order that it may be possible to keep these standards in line with industrial and scientific progress without the necessity of fresh legislation.

III. With a view to facilitating the general adoption of standard specifications throughout the Commonwealth, the Conference recommends that the Governments concerned take into favourable consideration the provision of free entry to standard specifications and other documents circulated between the central standardizing bodies.

IV. In order to provide the various parts of the Commonwealth with an accurate means of exchange of colour information and to secure a basic standard in trade practice, the Conference recommends that each central standardizing body should at an early date consider the issue of a standard schedule of colours.

V. As an immediate step towards the promotion of intra-Commonwealth trade through the adoption of commercial standard specifications, the Conference recommends that, in respect to
steel, timber, industrial chemical products and replaceable parts of agricultural implements and machinery, immediate steps be taken by the central standardizing societies in those parts of the Commonwealth affected to secure a greater degree of uniformity in standard specifications and their execution.

VI. With a view to the employment of common standard specifications for aircraft materials and component parts, and particularly the method of testing, therein specified, the Conference recommends that the national standardizing societies in those parts of the Commonwealth particularly concerned, should co-operate directly with this object in view.

VII. The Conference, taking note of the observation contained in the last paragraph of the Report of the Conference on Standardization accepted by the Imperial Conference of 1950, which reads as follows:

"Apart from day to day consideration of matters of detail, we are impressed with the desirability of rendering means of consultation on questions of policy that are allowed by the past, or by occasional conferences such as the present, is impressed with the desirability of obviating the difficulties and delays that inevitably occur under existing conditions in conducting consultations between the central standardizing societies in the various parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the misunderstandings which occasionally arise due to the distances between the correspondents due to the subject matter of the communications.

The Conference recommends that for the purpose of maintaining closer liaison in these matters the central standardizing societies..."
in the different parts of the Commonwealth should be authorised to call together, periodically or otherwise, representatives in their respective countries or the corresponding bodies, or persons otherwise designated for the purpose.

The Conference further suggests that such an arrangement might include a provision whereby the Three Commissioners maintained in different parts of the Empire of the several Commonwealth Governments should, as occasion requires, be available to act as Liaison Officers for this purpose. The Conference considers that it should be made clear that such consultations are purely supplementary to, and not intended in any way to supplant, the nature of direct communication already established between the central standardising bodies.

(iii) Gradual Standardisation of Agricultural Products.

The report of the Sub-Committee on this subject, which is set forth as Appendix B to the Report of the Committee on Methods of Economic Co-operation, was approved by the Conference.

(iv) Resolutions concerning Industrial Co-operation.

This Conference, having examined the report of the Imperial Economic Committee on Imperial Industrial Co-operation, finds itself in general agreement with the tenor of the Report.

The report makes it clear that industrial production has developed and will continue to develop in the less industrialised parts of the Commonwealth. These developments involve changes in the economic structure both of the more industrialised and of the less industrialised countries; and the Conference notes with approval the view of the Committee that: "the object of cooperation is not, and must not be, to arrest change, but wisely to
direct and facilitate its course."

It should, in the opinion of the Conference, be the object of any policy of industrial co-operation within the Commonwealth to secure the best division of industrial activities among the several parts of the Commonwealth and the ordered economic development of each part, with a view to ensuring the maximum efficiency and economy of production and distribution.

It is further the view of the Conference that the precise nature and extent of the co-operation to be achieved in any particular industry must largely depend upon effective consultation between those engaged, or proposing to engage, in that industry in any two or more parts of the Commonwealth.

The Conference therefore recommends to the various industries in which conditions are suitably for the purpose, the desirability of making arrangements for such consultation at the earliest possible date, but it records its belief that such consultation, to be fully effective, should be conducted between responsible persons or boards adequately representative of the industry in each part of the Commonwealth concerned.

The Conference further recommends that the Governments concerned facilitate and assist such consultations by all available means.

The Conference further recommends that, without prejudice to their liberty to determine their own general economic policies, the Governments of the Commonwealth should give sympathetic consideration to any proposals which may be directed towards giving effect to the principle of industrial co-operation and which may be put before them by responsible parties representing similar
industrial interests in the parts of the Commonwealth affected.

In this connection the Conference would urge attention to the importance of taking into consideration the interests of other parts of the Commonwealth which might be affected by such proposals.

(v) Resolution concerning film and radio.

The Conference takes note of the suggestions contained in the Report upon film and radio submitted to it by the Committee on Methods of Economic Co-operation, and commends that for the consideration of the Governments represented at the Conference.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. YASAI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "IMPERIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE, OTTAWA, 1952." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 29 October 1946.

Signature of Official

Witness: Nishigou GIO
(甲)知事の都合 (ア)エンパイヤル・コンテントス

(乙)次節の要件 (イ)エンパイヤル・コンテントス

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16
中央機械化標準ガ規格及商業上之試供品

図ノ示スルノ前記ノ規格及商業上之試供品

告ス

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會議ノ告書ノ提出ノ際ノ関連ノ事項ノ関係内ノ相談ヲテス．

本會議ハ三落ノ打ノ知識ノ延長ヲ固シテノ整備ヲ祈ス．

末

1930年ノ定

国際協力ノ共通ノ吉林省機械工具等ノ製造及び貿易ノ促進ノ為スルノ目的ヲ以テ本會議ハ一ノ特長ノ機械工具等ノ製造及び貿易ノ促進ノ為スルモノヘ

日

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テキストが読み取れませんでした。
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese entitled "IMPERIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE, AT OTTAWA, 1832." is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 28 October 1846.

(signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu Odo
EXCERPT FROM NEW YORK TIMES RE:
VICKY'S ATTITUDE CONCERNING INDO-CHINA.
JULY 24, 1941.

VICKY JUSTIFIES
INDO-CHINA MOVE
Says Cooperation With Japan Is Necessary for Defense of French
Colonies

DENIES TOKYO PRESSURE
Trend of Paris Newspapers is Toward War Against the Democracies for
Axis

By G. H. ARCHAMBAULT

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
VICHY, France, July 24 — Negotiations between France and Japan
regarding French Indo-China were reported here officially tonight to
be continuing. Their possible outcome is cooperation between French
and Japanese forces for the defense of the colony, should it be at­
tacked by British or Chinese or both.

Unaided French resistance, it is said, would be virtually out
the question, because of the small number of French troops and the
impossibility of sending reinforcements or munitions.

At a press conference the official spokesman explained that the
initiative for the negotiations had come from Tokyo and that the
French Government conceded the "force" of Japanese reasoning—
namely, that France had recognized "by treaty the predominance of
Japan "for the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia," and that
British and Chinese concentrations of troops represented a menace.

Denies Japanese Pressure

The spokesman insisted on two other points—that there had
been no pressure from Japan and no request for help from France.

Japanese Ambassador Sotome Kato again conferred with Adm.
Francois Darlan, Vice President and Foreign Minister. Messages also
passed between Vichy and Paris, where General Jean Decoux, Gov­
ernor General of Indo China, is discussing details with Major Gen.
Raishiro Sumita, head of the Japanese military mission.

Beyond this, assurance was given here that there had been no
developments. Nothing on Indo-China has been printed in the news­
papers of the unoccupied zone beyond the fact that Admiral Decoux
has received the Japanese general.
On the other hand, the Paris press continued to discuss Indo-China at length and hailed cooperation with Japan in that colony as an earnest that "collaboration with Germany, after passing through the economic and political phases, may now reach the military stage." Marcel Deat, editor of Oeuvre, even uses the words, "indispensable brotherhood in arms with the victor of yesterday, who has now become responsible for our common destinies." He declares that this "brotherhood" was the hope entertained by reinforcement troops in France vainly awaiting transportation to Syria.

Other editors in Paris write in the same vein, deploring that the French Government failed "by its indecision" to seek means—all possible means—of preventing Churchill's agents from holding Syrian soil, even temporarily.

In Aujourd'hui Georges Suarez says that hitherto Japan has treated French interests in Indo-China considerately, and then asks whether this attitude may not change "if Nipponese troops land in Indo-China tomorrow." He adds that the strategic value of Indo-Chinese bases is indisputable. Possession of the naval base at Cam Ranh, for instance, is held decisive for the occupant. He proceeds: "But would Japan go no further? The only possible answer is that France, having lost the faculty of decision because of her defeat, has only one means of recovering it—namely, political collaboration with Germany. French solidarity with Germany in the continental field means German solidarity with France in all the world field."

Several Paris editors, moreover, see in the formation of a legion of French volunteers to combat bolshevism a token of eventual official participation in the social liberation of the European Continent. It is reported from Paris that M. Deat and four other members of the National Popular Concentration, formed in Paris in opposition to the National Concentration in Vichy, now defunct, have joined the legion, which it is insisted, will fight in French uniforms and under the French flag. Recent report from Rome had it that the uniform would be German.

Vichy Would Avoid Precedent

VICHY, July 21 (UP)—Negotiations between France and Japan for virtually Japanese military control of South Indo-China were continued here today and it was reported that France was striving for a formula that would not create a precedent under which Britain or the United States might demand similar rights in French colonies in Africa.

France has recognized Japan's dominant position in Eastern Asia, an official spokesman said, "but this does not mean that France similarly will recognize the position of any other power concerning French Africa."
バリの新聞の伝達は無条調にくらし、民主国に対する説明をめざしての

「日本との協同は地域の植民地防衛上必要なり」と述べている。

日本の一つの特権法を除く地域の植民地防衛上必要とされる。
一方、バリオの発達は欧米も印西支那に影響を及ぼすが、中国では、相次ぐ段階にまで発展させしめたべを保険であるといつて認識してある。バリオは、この一時近とぞシリアとの接点を経て、バリオの他に、シリアの壊滅をもたらすような方法を求めることがしたかつたと聞じてある。
養育を決定的に有利にするであろうと云ってあらう。何れを思ったのかもしれぬが、これは決定的、誇大な政策を採った日本は、それだけに断定するであろう。何れに養育が求められるか、何かが決定したものである。

1940年7月14日（土）

ヴィシー派を除く、ヴィシー派を除く。
内閣は日本政権に実質上の支配することに関わらず十数日間の協議を経て今日も

資料で要請されて居る。日本政府のこの考へに従っても英仏は現在もも部局を

置き換へたがって居る。国際連盟に於いては居るのみならずこの期間に於ては

国際連盟の地位を廃して居る。しかしその利益は国際連盟の存立を快くしたい

内閣が国際連盟の存立を快くしたい

の国家同様の地位を認めることを既歴した。
The Principles of Greater Asia

Lecture delivered by Sun Yat-sen at the Kobe Girls' School on November 28, 1924, in behalf of the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and five other organizations.

Ladies and Gentlemen: I am very deeply impressed by such a warm welcome as I have received from you today. Today you have requested me to give a lecture on what is known as Asiaticism. Now before I go on to speak on this subject it is necessary for us to clearly understand what sort of place our Asia is.

Our Asia is the cradle of the oldest culture; that is, as early as several thousand years ago the Asiatics had already possessed an exceedingly advanced culture while the culture of the oldest countries of Europe, such as Greece or Rome, had been transplanted there from our Asia. And our Asia has had from the days of the remote past various cultures, philosophical, religious, moral and industrial. All these cultures have proved very remarkable in the world and the newest culture of the modern world has come down from this old culture of ours. In spite of all this, the peoples and nations of our Asia have gradually been on the decline during the past several hundred years. On the contrary, European peoples have made steady progress in the meantime to grow to be powerful nations. As they grew increasingly powerful their power has gradually come to be felt in the Orient to such an extent that they might severely oppress or even destroy the peoples and nations of our Asia. Because of this continued oppression, there had been not one country in our Asia until thirty years ago which enjoyed perfect independence. If this state of oppression had continued longer, the international situation would have grown much more entangled and difficult.

We know, however, that out of the worst situation comes a peaceful reign when it comes to a head; that is, it is a long lane that has no turning. Asia experienced a turning point when its decline had reached its culmination. This turning point was nothing but the starting point of the re-building of Asia. True indeed, that Asia saw its decline once but experienced the first
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sign of its revival thirty years ago. What then is the starting point of the revival? Thirty years ago Japan succeeded in abolishing all her unequal treaties with foreign powers. This very day that Japan abolished her unequal treaties was the day signaling the revival of all Asiatic peoples. Japan became the first independent country of Asia when she abolished her unequal treaties but the other countries—China, India, Persia, Afghanistan, Arabia and Turkey were not yet independent countries—had suffered partition of their territory and were no better off than mere European colonies. Thirty years ago Japan too was regarded as one of the European colonies, but because of her sightfulness and knowledge of ups and downs of peoples and nations the Japanese nation was so greatly roused and so struggled with the Europeans that Japan was able to succeed in establishing an independent country of her own, abolishing all unequal treaties. With Japan becoming an independent country of the Far East, all peoples and nations have come to cherish great hopes for their own independence. Now that Japan has become independent, abollshing all unequal treaties, they have come to think that they might as well follow Japan's example. Thus they, summing up their courage, started various movements for independence and there arose the conception that they should be the masters of Asia in trying to get themselves out of the European fetters, hating to remain European colonies. This has been a very optimistic thought in the last thirty years.

Well, let us look back on the thought that actually prevailed thirty years ago. All peoples of all Asia thought almost with resignation that they would have to remain slaves to Europe forever, being unable to extricate themselves from the oppression, because on the one hand Europe has a highly advanced culture, has made remarkable progress in science, wonderful developments in industry, in the manufacture of elaborate arms, and enjoyed a great military strength and power; and because on the other Asia has nothing in which to surpass Europe, she's not power enough to resist Europe. This thought was exceedingly pessimistic. And yet Japan had successfully abolished her unequal treaties and become an independent country thirty years ago. This fact had not
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Ever since Japan's victory over Russia the peoples of all Asia have started many independence movements here and there, expecting to crush out Europe. For instance, Egypt, Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Arabia have started movements for independence in succession and the Indians too have followed their neighbors' example. That is, the Asiatic peoples have come to cherish great hopes for independence as a result of Japan's victory over Russia. It was only twenty years ago that these hopes came to the front, but Egypt, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Arabia have succeeded in rapid succession in establishing their independence. It is still more noteworthy that the Indian independence movement too has gradually come to make steady progress. This fact of their restoration of independence shows that the racial thought in Asia has taken long strides in recent years. When this thought progress has reached its culmination, all the Asiatic peoples will easily unite themselves and stand up as one. It will be then and then only that the independence movements of all the Asiatic peoples can succeed.

In recent years the peoples in Western Asia have been on very friendly terms with each other, with exceedingly sincere feelings toward each other, so will they be able to unite themselves into one. The two great peoples in Western Asia are China and Japan. China and Japan are the motive power for those movements, and yet these two have taken an indifferent attitude toward each other, failing to get united as they ought to. There will sooner or later be a time when all peoples in Eastern Asia also will wish to get united together. The time is ripening for the peoples of the East,
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West, and the South to cooperate with one another so that the independence of the Asiatic peoples may be realized and the position that Asia occupied in the past may be regained.

The people of Europe and America know this tendency very well. To give an example, a certain American scholar published a book in which he discusses the rise of the colored races. The content of the book clarifies that Japan’s victory over Russia means the colored races’ defeat of the white. In the future when this phenomenon assumes serious dimensions there will be a possible danger that the white races will have a very hard time because all the colored races will get united against the white. The white people need now to be prepared for this before it is too late. Later, he wrote another book to contend that any and every race emancipation movement is against culture. According to this author, we must say that race emancipation movements in Asia as well as in Europe are all against culture. Such a view is shared by members of all the privileged classes in Europe, where the minority oppresses the majority within and without their national boundaries, and now they are trying to make slaves of the 900,000,000 people for themselves through oppression. They are already reaching out a sinister hand into Asia. This is a brutality indeed. We could not hate them too much. Judging from the contention of this American scholar that the awakening of the Asiatic peoples is against the world’s culture, the Europeans consider themselves as the only rightful heirs to culture and pretend to be the masters of culture, believing that culture will never originate anywhere outside Europe and that independence trends are against culture, and therefore European culture is in accord with justice and humanity while Asiatic culture is not. As for the status of culture in the last one hundred years, European material civilization has greatly advanced as never elsewhere while our Oriental civilization has not shown a great advance at all. So if compared only superficially, Europe is ahead of Asia, but if closely analyzed, what has been their so-called culture in the last one hundred years? Their civilization means scientific culture and utilitarian culture. This culture when applied to human society is material civilization. By material civilization is meant airplanes and bombs, rifles and cannon—a kind of military
The people of Europe and America know this tendency very well. To give an example, a certain American scholar published a book in which he discusses the rise of the colored races. The content of the book clarifies that Japan's victory over Russia means the colored races' defeat of the white. In the future when this phenomenon assumes serious dimensions there will be a possible danger that the white races will have a very hard time because all the colored races will get united against the white. The white people need now to be prepared for this before it is too late. Later, he wrote another book to contend that every race emancipation movement is against culture. According to this author, we must say that race emancipation movements in Asia as well as in Europe are all against culture. Such a view is shared by members of all the privileged classes in Europe, where the minority oppresses the majority within and without their national boundaries, and now they are trying to make slaves of the 900,000,000 people for themselves through oppression. They are already reaching out a sinister hand into Asia. This is a brutality indeed. We could not hate them too much. Judging from the contention of this American scholar that the awakening of the Asiatic peoples is against the world's culture, the Europeans consider themselves as the only rightful heirs to culture and pretend to be the masters of culture, believing that culture will never originate anywhere outside Europe and that independence trends are against culture, and therefore European culture is in accord with justice and humanity while Asiatic culture is not. As for the status of culture in the last one hundred years, European material civilization has greatly advanced as never elsewhere while our Oriental civilization has not shown a great advance at all. So if compared only superficially, Europe is ahead of Asia, but if closely analyzed, what has been their so-called culture in the last one hundred years? Their civilization means scientific culture and utilitarian culture. This culture when applied to human society is material civilization. By material civilization is meant airplanes and bombs, rifles and cannon—a kind of military
Culture. In recent years we Asiatics can hardly make progress because the Europeans are oppressing us solely with this military culture of theirs. European culture is that which oppresses people with military power, and this way of oppressing people with military power is expressed as "Hêlô" in old Chinese, or rule of might, so European culture is the culture representing Hêlô. In the Orient, however, we have long acquired this Hêlô culture, and we have another kind of culture that is called Hêlô culture. The essence of this culture is humanity and justice. This culture of humanity and justice will only influence people but never oppress them; it will make people virtuous but never inspire fear in them. Such virtue-inspiring culture is called Oô in old Chinese, or rule of right. So Asiatic culture is the culture of Oô. With the development of material civilization and with the prevalence of rule of might in Europe the various countries of the world have seen a daily decline of morality. Even in Asia there have been a considerable number of countries which saw a serious decline in their morality. But in recent years some of the scholars in Europe and America interested in Oriental culture at all, have gradually come to appreciate that Oriental morality is far higher than Western morality, while Oriental material civilization is behind that of the Occident.

As to which is more advantageous after all for the promotion of justice and humanity, Oô culture or Hêlô; or which will prove more advantageous for peoples and nations, you must have clearly seen. Here, by way of illustration, I will briefly dwell on this point. During the period of over one thousand years between 2000 years ago and 500 years ago, China was the most powerful country of the world, occupying just the same position of present-day Britain or America. Britain and America are at present powers but China in those former days was the only power. Well then, what kind of attitude did China assume toward the weaker minor peoples and countries in those days? And how did those weaker minor peoples and countries conduct themselves toward China? Those weaker minor peoples and countries, desiring to regard China as their suzerain and offer a tribute to her, all wished to be her feudal vassals, regarding it an honor to offer tribute to her and considering it a
In recent years we Asiatics can hardly make progress because the Europeans are oppressing us solely with this military culture of theirs. European culture is that which oppresses people with military power, and this way of oppressing people with military power is expressed as "Hedo" in old Chinese, or rule of might, so European culture is the culture representing Hedo. In the Orient, however, we have long despised this Hedo culture, and we have another kind of culture that is Hodo culture. The essence of this culture is humanity and justice. This culture of humanity and justice will only influence people but never oppress them; it will make people virtuous but never inspire fear in them. Such virtue-inspiring culture is called "Odo" in old Chinese, or rule of right. So Asiatic culture is the culture of "Odo." With the development of material civilization and with the prevalence of rule of might in Europe the various countries of the world have seen a daily decline of morality. Even in Asia there have been a considerable number of countries which saw a serious decline in their morality. But in recent years some of the scholars in Europe and America interested in Oriental culture at all, have gradually come to appreciate that Oriental morality is far higher than Western morality, while Oriental material civilization is behind that of the Occident.

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shame not to be able to do so. The tributary countries of China then comprised not only those of Asia but also those in western Europe, which used to come a long distance to offer tribute to her. How did China at that time conduct herself in regard to the tributes of those many countries and distant peoples? Did she compel the tribute to be paid by dint of military and naval power—Hedo. No, never—China simply resorted to Odō, or rule of right, in exerting influence over them. They in turn appreciated China’s virtue and desired to offer a tribute to her contentedly. Once they had come under the benevolent influence of her Odō they not only offered their tribute in their own generation but wished to continue to do so all through posterity. There are some instances even in recent years exemplifying this truth. For example, there are two small countries in northern India, one being Bhutan and the other Nepal. These two are small countries, but these peoples, being very strong and very fearless, fight most gallantly. Of the two, the people of Nepal are especially brave—so brave that Britain in governing India has decided to raise soldiers from among them, which Britain is using as tools in keeping India under her rule. Again Britain actually has power enough to destroy India, to make it her colony but can not easily behave so toward Nepal. Besides, she annually sends a great amount of money as a subsidy, and has only a number of officials stationed for political inspection there. Britain, being the most powerful country in the world today, still takes such a generous attitude toward Nepal. So Nepal may be said to be a strong country in Asia. What is the position now taken by Nepal toward Britain at present? She never offers a tribute to her, but rather takes a subsidy from Britain. China’s international position is at present so low that she stands even below a British colony, and yet Nepal regards China as her suzerain even today, in spite of the great distance with the wide territory of Tibet in between; that is, as late as the first year of the Republic of China she came over by way of Tibet to pay tribute to China, but because of the traffic difficulty along the frontier she has ceased to bring tribute ever since. Thus Nepal takes an attitude toward Britain different from that taken toward China. Gentlemen! Don’t you think this is strange? The mere contrast between these two
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different attitudes taken by Nepal toward China and Britain will illustrate the contrast between Eastern civilization represented by China and Western culture represented by Britain. Indeed China has declined in the last several hundred years but her culture is still in existence. So Nepal is still admiring China as her suzerain. On the contrary, Britain has now grown exceedingly strong and great, with an excellent material civilization and yet Nepal is paying no attention to this. You will know from this fact that Nepal has favorably been influenced by China, that Chinese culture is a true one and Britain’s material civilization is no culture but is regarded as rule of might.

Now what I have thus far said in regard to the Greater Asia principle may briefly be summed up as the problem of culture. That is, we are to compare and contrast Eastern culture and Western. Eastern culture is Odo, or rule of right, and Western culture is Hadô, or rule of might. Odo upholds humanity and justice as morality while Hadô aims at coercion based on utilitarianism. Humanity and justice as morality will influence people by justice and truth while coercion based on utilitarianism will oppress people with rifles and cannon. From the fact that Nepal is still wishing for Chinese influence and willing to pay respect to China as her suzerain, it is evident that countries favorably influenced will never forget their suzerain even after a period of several hundred years when their suzerain has declined. On the contrary, oppressed countries will always try to sever themselves from the oppressing country however strong and prosperous the latter may be at present. This truth is shown in the relations in which Egypt and India stand toward Britain. It is true that Britain has conquered Egypt and destroyed India and she is exceedingly strong and prosperous at present, but Egypt and India are always trying to sever themselves from Britain. It is because of this that there are many independence movements started in those countries. But because of strong military oppression the independence movements are not likely to succeed so soon. But once Britain should decline, Egypt and India will restore their independent position in less than five years, immediately expelling British influence out of their territory. By
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so saying, you will know the merits and demerits of Western and Western culture. When we stand in such a world as this, what should be the basis on which our Greater Asia principle should be realized? Our own native culture should be the basis. By our own native culture is meant humanity and justice as morality. Humanity and justice as morality and this alone is the right kind of basis for our Greater Asia principle. Why are we trying to learn the sciences of Europe in spite of our possession of such a background? That is only because we wish to develop industry and improve weapons. In learning from Europe we do not mean to follow its examples of destroying other countries or oppressing other peoples. We simply learn for our own self-defense.

Of all Asiatic countries Japan is the only country in recent years that has learned military culture from Europe and succeeded in making it her own. Japan today need not necessarily depend on Europeans in regard to the construction and maneuvering of warships, and she is also independent in regard to the organization and operation of armies. Thus Japan is indeed one true independent country in the Far East. Here in Asia there is at present one true independent country though during the Great War she was on the side of the Entente Powers and experienced calamities with the defeat. This country is no other than Turkey. At present there are only two independent countries in Asia, one being Japan in the east and the other Turkey in the west. Japan and Turkey are two great walls in the east and west in Asia. Besides, Persia, Afghanistan and Arabia have now come to possess military power by learning from Europe and the Europeans do not dare to despise these peoples. As for Nepal, the English powerful as they are do not look down upon her. They now possess strong military power. China will prove a great force once she is well united since she has a great number of military forces at present. In order to expound the Greater Asia principle with success and restore their old position for the Asiatic peoples, it is necessary for us to unite all peoples in all parts of Asia on the basis of humanity and justice as morality so that they will eventually grow into a great force.

This, however, we must seriously remember. As for the Europeans, it would be quite impossible for us to influence them
by merely expounding humanity and justice or to demand the return of rights and concessions successfully, by resorting to amicable means. It is as if one should try to feed a tiger in order to get its fur. So if we are to get all our rights completely returned, we must appeal to military force. Well, as for military force, Japan has had a perfectly strong military force from very early days, and Turkey, too, has come to possess a strong military force in recent years. The peoples of Persia, Afghanistan and Arabia have always been strong fighters. The 400,000,000 Chinese are naturally peace-loving people but when confronted with a life-and-death struggle will show great military force. If all Asiatic peoples are united in fighting the Europeans with their natural military force, surely we shall win and never be defeated. Moreover let us compare the populations of Europe and Asia. China has 400,000,000; India 350,000,000; Burma and Annam have scores of millions together; Japan alone has scores of millions; and the rest of minor peoples will number as many as Japan. So all the people of all Asia number more than one-half of the population of the whole world while those of Europe are barely 400,000,000. And our entire population is 900,000,000. It is contradictory to justice and humanity and therefore sure to fail in the end that the 400,000,000 should oppress the 900,000,000. In recent years, however, we come across some influenced by us among those 400,000,000. Just look at the present trend of culture in the world. In Britain and America, for instance, there have begun to appear those who advocate humanity and justice as morality though they are small in number as yet. In the rest of the barbarian countries, too, there is a similar phenomenon. This fact tells that Western culture of coercion based on utilitarianism is beginning to yield to Western culture based on humanity and justice as morality, and it is also a proof that Hadô is going to yield to Ôdô; thus we can say that world culture is from day to day advancing toward the light.

At present in Europe there is one country which is universally despised, regarded as a poisonous snake or a ferocious animal, not as a human race, and never approached, by all the European whites. In Asia, too, there are a good number of people with a similar view
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...that country, what country can it be? That is Russia. Russia is not going to be a branch family of the Family group of European whites. Why is Russia in such a status? That's simply because the upholders OCO, or rule of right, not might, or rule of might, expresses humanity and justice, not utilitarian coercion, supports the path of justice to her own ability, and does not approve of the oppression of the majority by the minority. The new culture of Russia has much in common with our traditional Eastern culture and the Russians are going to free her land and set up a French really independent of the European group of families. The Europeans are bringing a false charge against Russia as a threat of the world because they know that the new principle of Russia is not agreeable to their contention, hence the success of Russian principle means the failure of their own. In short, they knowingly try to take no notice of the fact that Russia is a country pursuing the path of humanity and justice.

Finally, we come to the very problem we are trying to solve; that is, how can the oppressed Asiatic peoples successfully resist the strong and prosperous peoples of Europe—or more exactly, how to remove inequality imposed upon the oppressed peoples. Oppressed peoples are found not only in Asia but also in Europe. Countries of rule of might oppress not only people in another continent and country but also in their own continent and territory. When I said our Greater Asia principle should be based on OCO, I meant to insist that all these unequal discriminations should be removed. In American scholar contends that all movements for people's emancipation go against culture, so we can say that the culture be advocate aims at abolishing inequality and therefore it contradicts new culture and seeks equality and emancipation for the people. Japan on the one hand has already met the new culture of Europe and America; her own, and on the other she is in possession of the essence of the OCO culture of Asia. Whether Japan will turn out in the future a tool of Western idea or the defender of Eastern idea—this should be seriously considered by the Japanese people.

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Sam Yut-sen's Principle, p. 110-1117
(First Volume)
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[Redacted]
ドイツ、義大利、英国、フランス、オーストリア、アメリカ、ソビエト、日本の各社、及びその他の国々に於て、大日本帝国の平和を確保し、従来の破壊的政策を改め、国際連合の基盤を築き、民主平和の世界を創設するための努力を進めることが必要である。
過ぎマセンガ、埃及、土耳其、波斯、シリア、アフガニスタン及びアラビア

民族性を最近発展シテ来タト示スモノデリマス。此ノ民族

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正義を前提に両岸が平等に協力を取り、アジアとヨーロッパを含む国際社会で共同の努力を進めたい。
アラブシャー民族の観光と世界ノ文化映し出し。シンテリアル・アリス・リカ

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伝統的な日本列島の文化や歴史を理解し、日本の現代社会を理解するための重要な資料です。

14
未提供文字内容。
ロシノミハラハダハナイロアリマス。只吾ハハナニ及

近宋照稠頭ノ国家デハ欧州ノ武力文化ヲクデダヲ
ナシテ唐ルノハ日本タデアリマス。欧州ハ軍隊ノ建設ヲナシ
ルマデ。今ハ必ムシテハ欧州人ヲ頭ルナリマス。陸軍ノ訓練ヲ

モぬ自主的ニ之ヲ行フコトガ出来ルノアリマス。ソレ故ニ日本

ハ大戰當時ヘ廃ノ完全ヲ殆多ノ国家ヲ建設セラルハ國家

ヲ設クイト目ニ遙と乍ら。現在ハハ一ノ完全ヲ殆多ノ國家ヲ

ヲ建設セラルヲ願セラルヲ。此ノハ朝土耳古アリマス。ヘ

二個ノ大ナル陸軍ヲアリマス。日本ト土耳古トハア

ラビヤー等ヲ欧洲ヲハルデ立派ナ武力ヲ備

ペテリヨ欧州人ヲ殖之ヲ等民族ヲ覆席シナイロアリマス。一
ネパール＝ヒマラヤ周辺部

英米人を彷徨させるシーケンス

彼等を今

ネパール＝ヒマラヤ周辺部

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何レモ戦争ニ流れ民族デハリマスガ。生死ノ隅ニ立テハ天赋あドテ大ナ
ル武力ヲ発揮スルノデハリマス。若し全亞細亜民族ヲ纏合シテ
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ハテイノデハリマス。レパ中ハ四億、印度ハ三億五千万、灣甸、安南等ハ合計数千
万。日本ハ一億数千万であり、他国各弱小民族ヲ数千万アリ、比喩レマス
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日本民

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夫レハ日本国民ノ面對ニ考ヘベキコトデアルリス。
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H.Y. SHI, Keoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese, marked "SHIR'TORI DOCUMENT NO. 17" and entitled "THE PRINCIPLE OF GREATER ASIA" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 23 October 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Negacharu Odo

Translation Certificate.

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan
Date 19th Sept. 1946
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
No. 1656
PEIPING, August 2, 1932.
(Received August 29.)

SIR: With reference to my telegram No. 383 of August 1, 9 (8) p.m., I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Commission of Study of the League of Nations now investigating the causes of trouble between Japan and China by the Japanese invader, which encloses an epitomized record of the statements which Count Uchida made at the interviews with that Commission in Dairen and Tokyo. I was permitted to make copies of this document for my confidential information, and I have the honor to request that the Department treat the document as confidential.

As stated in my telegram, my information is that while this document does not accurately set forth all that Count Uchida said to the Commission while it was in Tokyo, it is nevertheless believed to be a clear and accurate statement of the policy which Count Uchida as Minister of Foreign Affairs will follow in dealing with the Manchurian situation.

Respectfully yours,
NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON

(Enclosure)

Epitomized Record of Statements Made by Count Uchida at Interviews with the League of Nations Commission in Dairen and Tokyo

1. Some time ago at Dairen I had occasion to state frankly to Your Excellencies my personal views based upon my experience in connection with Manchuria, acquired in varied capacities during the past quarter of a century. To-day as Minister for Foreign Affairs I can discover no ground whatsoever for modifying those views on any essential point.

2. All the international disputes which have occurred in recent years in the Far East may be chiefly attributed in the first place to the fact that China disunited and destitute of control does not, taken as a whole, constitute a duly organized state, and in the second place to the revolutionary foreign policy of the Nationalist Government, strongly influenced as it is by communist doctrine imported from abroad. And it is not Japan alone, but all the Powers which
possess important interests in China, that must suffer from such state of affairs now existing in China.

3. Unfortunately extreme difficulties are encountered in any attempt to repair the injuries thus sustained by the various Powers, through any appeal to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty, the Anti-Yar Pact, or any other existing treaty intended for the maintenance of international peace. In fact, it has been the practice among the principal Powers to rely upon their own resources whenever their rights and interests in China were actually, or were in danger of being, seriously impaired. The recent history of China is full of examples of such cases, in which reparation for, or the prevention of, damage to their interests was effected by foreign Powers upon their own account.

4. Japan, as a country more intimately connected with China both historically and geographically, than any other, and possessing by far the greatest interests in China, has had to suffer more than other countries from the anomalous situation in China as I described above. As far as Japan was concerned, she naturally hoped to see China experience a re-birth and come to realize her true role in maintaining the peace of the Far East. For more than twenty years, especially as a sequel to the Conference of Washington, we have exercised the greatest patience and self-control, but conditions in China have failed to show any trace of improvement; on the contrary, they grew notably worse. It was at a moment when the feeling of our people was running high in face of the ever increasing Chinese provocations, that in Manchuria, Japan's first bulwark, where, staking the fortunes of our country, we fought two great wars with China and with Russia in order to repel their aggressions and, where our country's vital interests on the Continent of 'sin are centered, the sudden incident of September 17th occurred. We had no other course than to take decisive measures of self-defense.

5. As a consequence of Japan's action, the power of General Chang Hsueh-liong in Manchuria was extinguished. Influential old men of Manchuria, who had long chafed under the misrule of the Chings and were opposed to their policy of dragging Manchuria into the turmoil of Chinese civil war south of the Great Wall, seized the opportunity to set up an independent state.

Manchuria is a country quite apart from China Proper, geographically and in psychologico caracteristics. The population, though mostly of Chinese origin, are composed largely of these Chinese who, driven out of their homes in China Proper by famine and flood, by tyranny and oppression, fled to Manchuria seeking to start a new life in that land where they could enjoy comparative security and a chance to use to Japan's vigilance and enterprise. Moreover, historically viewed, Manchuria has never constituted a purely integral part of China. Especially during recent decades has it been demonstrated on innumerable occasions that the authority of no government in China Proper extended to Manchuria.
The founding of Manchukuo was only an outcome of the subterran­
ean revolutionary movement of many years' standing, which has
opened to come to the surface as a sequel to Japan's actions of self-
defence, and which proved successful owing to the peculiar charac­
teristics which separate Manchuria from China Proper. The inde­
pendence of Manchuria should therefore, be regarded as essentially
a phenomenon the political disintegration in China.

6. There may be more than one plan for the solution of the Man­
churian problem. The Japanese Government believe that the prob­
lem should be solved with the aim in view of ensuring the security
and stability of Manchuria as well as the permanent peace of the
Far East, and that at all events the mistake should not be made of ren­
dering the situation uncertain and so perpetuating occasions for future
disputes. It would be intolerable if, as a result of any temporizing
measures of extension or compromise, there should be resuscitated
in Manchuria conditions analogous to those that prevailed there prior
to the incident of 18th September last. In that sense I cannot agree
to any plan which would contemplate the inauguration of the rule
of an anti-Japanese and disorganized China over Manchuria. More­
over, the authorities of Manchukuo, who have repeatedly declared
their intention completely to separate themselves from the corrupt
and foul politics of China Proper and to set up an honest and able
government, would not consent to a plan which would utterly defeat
their ideal and aspirations.

I believe that any plan which might be formulated, in which no
account is taken of the existence of Manchukuo as an international
state, will fail to bring order and stability to Manchuria and tran­
quility to the Far East.

7. The recognition of a new state or government is not a matter
for the exercise of the choice or fancy of other states. It is a step
imposed upon them by the necessities of international intercourse.
It is rightly felt intolerable that a country should be compelled for
any length of time to regard the government which actually controls
its nearest neighbor as devoid of all substantial authority and title,
and as incompetent to represent it abroad. As Manchukuo is the
outcome of a local movement of self-determination on the part of the
inhabitants, who have undoubtedly been much oppressed in the past,
as above observed, there can be no question, in recognizing its exist­
ence, of any inconsistency with the Nine Power Treaty of Washing­
ton whose provisions Japan is most anxious to observe. The object of
the Treaty was not to exempt that region from the usual and normal
operation of the law of nations which legitimizes de facto govern­
ments, nor to perpetuate and integrity of discord. It would be di­
rectly contrary to its terms to hold that China must forever submit to
anarchy and that no part of the ancient Chinese territory can ever
be allowed to erect itself as an island of peace and security, but must
be forced down into the morass of discord and disorganization by
eight civilized Powers. In short, the Nine Power Treaty does not
forbid Chinese in any part of China to establish of their own free
will an independent state, and it does not, therefore, constitute a
violation of the Treaty to accord recognition to a new state so founded. There is no doubt that Kunchikov, if given fair and untrammeled opportunity by Japan and other powers, will quickly develop into a strong and stable nation, and so given a much needed lead to the establishment of a strong and stable government in China.
八月一日午後九時（八時）→発送内田官邸→八三一号電報

同盟国顧問委員会事務局長→日本

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八月二十九日受領

ルコト鲁・デモレラ・秘密料倉→コノノ

小官ノ電報中ニアル如ク。コノ言葉ハ、同盟国顧問委員会ガ東京訪問ノ際内田伯
日本政府は長期にわたる対テロリズムの抑圧を続けている。その結果、テロリズムの活動は急速に減少している。しかし、未解決の問題はまだ残っている。

日本では、テロリズム対策を含む社会的安保策が強化されている。この対策は、テロリズムの再発を防ぐための重要な一歩である。
The Japanese Delegation has laid before the Council of the League of Nations, the Observations their Government have thought proper to make regarding the Report of the Commission of Inquiry. We consider that the Report, taken as a whole, and especially in its descriptive accounts, furnishes a valuable picture of events. There are passages and even whole sections with which the Japanese Government are entirely in accord. We highly appreciate the earnest and arduous labour of the Commission, and we wish, first of all, to extend to the distinguished Members, collectively and individually our sincere appreciation and thanks.

We owe it to candour, however, to state that the Report has not been as full or as proper in many of its deductions and conclusions as a longer study of the problem would have produced. We have, therefore, taken pains to draft certain Observations for the consideration of the Council, and we hope that these will be carefully examined and fully weighed.

The condition of China is described at length in the Report, but a somewhat optimistio and hopeful attitude is taken which, we regret to say, we are unable to share.

The Commission took us Japanese to task for having shared in the "altogether different attitude which was taken at the time of the Washington Conference", then, "there existed no fewer than three governments professing to be independent, not to mention the autonomous status of a number of provinces or parts of provinces". At the time of the Washington Conference, in 1922, although conditions in China were not ideal, it was possible for us to join with other Powers in hoping for a restoration of unity and peace, and we gladly did so. We know that conditions were worse than they had been ten years before, when the Republic was proclaimed, but we hoped for improvement. Now, another decade has passed, and conditions are not better but worse.

There is now a kaleidoscope of rival military leaders, usually called War Lords. Outer Mongolia has become sovietized; Tibet is at war with China; Turkestan is almost entirely cut off from contact with the nominally sovereign state; the National Government is in control by military force of only the seven provinces in the north of the Yangtze River; Shantung is suffering from another conflict of military leaders; Szechuan is in disorder; the faction at Canton is independent and hostile; and, as the Commission reports, there is "history from another source, namely Communism".

At the time of the Washington Conference, there was not threat of Communism in China. That was taken into the country by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1925. With assistance in the way of arms, money, military experts and trained propagandists from Russia, the renowned revolutionary leader was able to organize the Nationalist movement; and when he died, General Chiang Kai-shek assumed the leadership. The General disagreed with his Russian associates and drove them out of the country; and today he is fighting the Communist movement carried on by Chinese leaders, particularly in the provinces of Kuei, Fukien and Kiangsi, - that is to say, the heart of China. But the National Government, of which General Chiang is the Chief, and the Kuomintang Party, which supports it, have not given up the principles which caused the various foreign Governments, a few years ago, to increase their garrisons at Shanghai.

Foreign troops - European and American as well as Japanese - have been stationed in China for more than thirty years, and foreign naval vessels have been patrolling the Yangtze River for a similar length of time. These foreign forces are kept there not only for the protection of their respective nationals who may venture beyond the beaten tracks of trade and travel but to protect even the foreign legations at the old capital, Peking (now Peiping), and the new capital, Nanking.

Is it not an extraordinary state of affairs when the lives of Ministers Plenipotentiary, accredited to a recognized government, have to be followed by troops or men-of-war for the safety of their lives? Does such a condition exist anywhere else in the world? Is the presence of foreign military and
naval forces in China, only a matter of form? I am sorry to say it is not.
In 1927, it will be remembered, the foreign consulates in Nanking were
attacked by officers and soldiers of a faction of the Nationalist Army, and
British and American naval vessels went into action to save the lives of their
consuls, and their wives and children. Nor have the attacks upon foreign
merchant vessels by bandits and soldiers ceased. Particularly in the past
seven years - that is to say, since the Nationalist Government decided to
bring the so-called "unequal treaties" to an end, foreign naval vessels
European and American, as well as Japanese, have had numerous encounters with
troops and bandit armies.

Although in normal times, our Government keeps no greater number of
troops and men-of-war in China proper than the British or American Government,
we have a far greater number of people to protect. The number of Japanese
residing and doing business in China treaty ports is several times larger than
the number of all other foreigners taken together. I mean by this statement
to show that we have sought not only to use as little force as possible but
to display as little.

The relations of China with foreign Powers have not been improved since
radical ideas were adopted by the Kuomintang party. As the League Commission
have reported, "in two particulars has this been carried so far as to con­
tribute to the creation of an atmosphere in which the present conflict arose,
namely, the use made of the economic boycott, and the introduction of anti­
foreign propaganda in the schools."

"The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen", says the Commission, "are now taught in
the schools as if they had the same authority as that of the Classics in
former centuries. The sayings of the master receive the same veneration as
the sayings of Confucius received in the days before the Revolution. Unfor­
Fortunately, however, more attention has been given to the negative than to
the constructive side of nationalism in the education of the young. A perusal
of the text books used in the schools leaves the impression on the mind of a
reader that their authors have sought to kindle patriotism with the flame of
hatred, and to build up manliness upon a sense of injury. The result of this
virulent anti-foreign propaganda, begun in the schools and carried through
every phase of public life, has been to induce students to engage in political
activities which have culminated in attacks on the persons, homes, or offices
of Ministers and other authorities and in attempts to overthrow the Government."

The National Government is permeated by acute anti-foreign feeling, and
works assiduously to instill a hatred of foreigners into the minds of the
younger generation. Fifty millions of young Chinese are growing up under the
influence of violent ideas, thus constituting a terrific problem for the im­
mediate future.

Although the armies of China number in all over two million men, few of
them are organized or trained for the defense of the country. In coping with
alleged injustice on the part of foreign Powers a method other than armed
resistance has often been adopted. This is the boycott - a form of hostility
contrary to commercial treaties or treaties of amity. Its results are often
more protracted, worse and more difficult to deal with than what is recognized
as war. It is warfare of an insidious character.

Our people in China have been tortured for many years by this practice
which includes the cutting off of even daily provisions. Many of our industries at home as well as in China have been
seriously injured, some actually destroyed. If it were a spontaneous and
natural thing, due to the dislike of us by those who buy our goods, we would
have some to complain about; but it is an institution inspired and organized
by the Kuomintang and even Government officials. It is utilized as an in­
strument of national policy to secure abandonment of a foreign Power of its
treaty rights. Powers of the world have extablished by treaty the resort to war
with armed force. I would ask the world why the boycott, when it assumes an official or semi-official character, should not be condemned by the League of
Nations and outlawed by it?

It is not only the Japanese who have suffered from this form of hostility.
Great Britain and even the United States have been boycotted. But we, who
depend more upon Chinese trade than any other nation, have, in recent years,
borne the brunt of it. The commission pointed out that "so far as Japan is
Defense Document No. 131, cont'd

China's nearest neighbour and largest customer who has suffered more than any other Power from lawless conditions. No have suffered from boycott in spite of long and various efforts to be on terms of unity with China. But the longer our tolerant attitude was observed, the more averse became the hostility. Our tolerant attitude was apparently mistaken by China as weakness and seemed to encourage the political factions to go further in the organization of their efforts to injure us.

As, in the course of my remarks, I must seem unavoidably to cast reflections on the conduct of the Chinese, it may be well for me to disclaim the idea, - sometimes latent in the report, - that Japan entertains feelings of bitterness or hostility towards the Chinese people. The Japanese Government believe that the Chinese people have been much misled, much terrorised and much misrepresented, and that their real desire is to enjoy in peace and quiet the results of their industry. Japan, maintaining her old friendly attitude, looks forward to ages of prosperous and neighbourly cooperation between the two nations.

So much for the condition of China. In Manchuria to which I now turn, anti-foreign agitation was concentrated on us.

Until the death of Chang Tso-lin, the dictator in Manchuria, in 1928, this sort of agitation was not permitted there. The "old Marshal" wisely prevented it. But when his son, the "young Marshal", Chang Hsueh-liang, fell heir to his father's estate and authority, he came to terms with General Chang Hsueh-liang and agents from China permitted anti-Manchurian and conduct propaganda directly against Japan. All the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria were to be "recovered". Japanese investments in railways, mines and other enterprises, - which had been of incalculable benefit to the Chinese people, - were to be taken away. They were slowly to be tortured out of the country. Pamphlets and papers were printed and circulated, posters pasted on the walls of the cities, and speeches were made in private and public with this object in view. Propagandists, trained and experienced in anti-foreign campaigning, directed the work. The army of Chang Hsueh-liang, numbering over three hundred thousand men, were indoctrinated with the principle.

The Commission dealt with this campaign, saying that in its official Party publication and mass-affiliated organs, the Kuomintang never ceased to insist on the primary importance of the recovery of lost sovereign rights, and abolition of "uncivil" treaties and the wickedness of imperialism. Such propaganda, the Commission continued, was bound to make a profound impression in Manchuria, where the reality of foreign interests, courts, police, guards or soldiers on Chinese soil was apparent. "Associations such as the Liaoning People's Foreign Policy Association made their appearance. They stimulated and carried on an anti-Japanese agitation. Pressure was brought to bear on Chinese landlords to raise the rents of Japanese and Korean tenants, or to refuses renewal of rent contracts. Korean settlers were subjected to systematic persecution. Various orders and instructions of an anti-Japanese nature were issued." In April, 1931, at a Conference of the People's Foreign Policy Association, held at Harbin, "the possibility of liquidating the Japanese position in Manchuria was discussed, the recovery of the South Manchuria Railway being included in the resolutions adopted".

Japan had no intention of surrendering her rights and properties in Manchuria and had repeatedly made that fact clear. She had officially warned Chang Hsueh-liang himself and generals and civil officials under him. She had made it known also throughout the world that she regarded Manchuria as of vital importance to herself both strategically and economically, and would countenance no change in the special position she held in that territory.

She had been careful, however, to state repeatedly that she had no intention other than to preserve her own rights, acquired by treaty, and her properties. She was content to recognize the fiction of Chinese sovereignty. She was also careful to observe the international policy of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity for the trade of all nations. She displayed patience at least as great as any Western Power, similarly placed, would have done. In fact, I believe she displayed far more. But the breaking point came. Even Japan's elasticity cannot be stretched indefinitely. The Incident of September 13, last year, was the straw that broke the over-stretched band.
With regard to that incident, the Commission's Report says that the damage done to the railway was not of itself sufficient to justify military action. It is true that the occurrence of the explosion, if taken only by itself, was quite insignificant. But here the Report fails to take fully into account the serious background of the situation. Had the incident occurred at another period of time, the Commission's observation might have been correct and justified. A far more serious incident, the wrecking of an express train, unmistakably an act of Chinese soldiers, resulting in the loss of many lives, did actually take place not far from this particular spot, several years ago, but it resulted in no expression of condemnation on the part of the Commission at the time. On the occasion of September 18, 1921, however, the state of tension was much higher and the consequences that followed were grave. It must also be remembered that the explosion in this instance was followed by firing from Chinese troops.

The prompt action of our scattered military forces along the South Manchuria Railway taken even before the orders from their Headquarters reached them, may be regarded as surprising by those who do not realize the height of mutual suspicion and tension that existed and the grave risks that both the Japanese troops and the resident Japanese population were taking. Like any other organized force, that of Japan must necessarily have been prepared for any emergency. When stationed on or in the neighborhood of foreign territory, particularly when repeated occurrences show that prompt measures may become imperative, an army must be prepared with a well thought-out emergency plan. This the Japanese army had. To have failed to prepare an emergency plan would have been a distinct dereliction of duty, for our troops, only ten thousand four hundred in number, were surrounded by an army twenty times their size, equipped with airplanes and possessing a well stored arsenal, regarded as the best in China. To prevent itself from being overwhelmed, the Japanese army had to have a plan and, when once the alarm arose, its action was almost automatic. It was in fact put into operation with "swiftness and precision", as the Report has it, and properly so.

In dealing with the events of September 19 and 19, the Commission says that "the military operations of the Japanese troops during that night can not be regarded as measures of legitimate self defense". With this we can not agree.

The paragraph concerning the right of self defense contained in the note of Mr. Kellogg, Secretary of State, dated June 23, 1921, reads as follows:

"(1) Self defense. There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self defense. The right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless to treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self defense.

The Resolution adopted by the Senate of the United States at the time of ratification of that Treaty states:"

"It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self protection may, and frequently does, extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it."

Also to be cited are the letters of Sir Austen Chamberlain dated May 19 and July 13, 1920.

The first observes:

"4. After studying the wording of Article I of the United States draft, His Majesty's Government do not think that its terms exclude action which a state may be forced to take in self defense. Mr. Kellogg had made it clear in the speech which I have referred above that he regards the right of self defense as inalienable, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary..."
"10. The language of Article I, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world whose welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government has been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self defense. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States has comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believes, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government."

Sir Austen Chamberlain's second letter says:

"I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of the 29th April that the proposed treaty does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self defense, as also with his opinion that each state alone is competent to decide when circumstances necessitate recourse to war for that purpose."

The French Government in its reply of July 14, 1929, made similar observations, as did also the German Government.

The Japanese Government, informed of all these communications, also did not fail to emphasize in their note of May 28, 1928, to the American Ambassador, that "the proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self defense."

In face of these express reserves, and in view of the organized hostility prevailing against our interests, our people and our forces at the time, the Japanese Government, which is the acknowledged judge in the matter, regards the action of its army as entirely one of self defense, the right to which the Pact of Paris was so explicitly understood not to question or to deny to any nation.

"Why did we not refer the matter of Manchuria to the League of Nations?" is a question that has often been asked. The answer, in brief, is first that Japanese national sentiment would not permit outside interference in the Manchurian question. Secondly, had we referred the matter to the League, the position of the Japanese, including Koreans, in Manchuria would have been seriously undermined, in view of the delay invariably incidental to League procedure. Thirdly, there is a difference between Japanese and Western mentality. The Westerner would begin to argue before the situation became acute, while the Japanese persists, perhaps too long, in the hope of a solution. Fourthly, when the breaking point came unexpectedly, events took their own natural course.

In regard to Manchuria, the Observations which we have presented to the Council differ materially from the Report of the Commission. We disagree with the contention that Manchuria was an integral part of China. It was distinctly and almost exclusively a Crown Domain or a private estate appanage of the Manchu Dynasty up to the beginning of the present century. And never has any of the recognized governments of China controlled it. Only on occasions, its dictator saw fit to ally himself with one or another of those governments. We have gone into this matter at some length in our Observations.

Chang Tsao-lin and Chang Hau-hsia-lin, who together ruled Manchuria for the entire term of the Republican regime, were independent or allied with one or another faction in China entirely according to their will and interests, and no power in China Proper was ever in a position to dislodge them.

We agree entirely with the Commission in their statement that the return of Manchuria to the status quo ante would be an unsatisfactory solution. But we entirely disagree with the statement that "the maintenance and recognition of the present regime would be equally unsatisfactory." The establishment of the state of Manchukuo appears to us to be the only solution possible. It was according to this view and conviction that the Japanese Government extended formal recognition to the new State, and concluded a treaty of alliance for
the mutual protection of the two countries. More consideration on our part of an alternative solution might possibly lay the whole Far Eastern situation open to serious disorders. It would immediately unsettle the feeling of confidence existing in the Manchukuo Government and among the people. It would encourage further activities from China to create disorders. We can enter into no such consideration.

The question of the genuineness of the independence movement in Manchuria was raised by the Commission. The Report states that "a group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired, who were in close touch with the new political movement in Japan, conceived, organized and carried through "the independence of Manchukuo."

The statement is not correct. The new State does not owe its organization to Japanese initiative. It is due to the people's evident wish to be rid of the Change. It had been a terrible rule, ruthless in its oppression of the people, as the Report partially shows. It was, therefore, only natural for the people to seize the opportunity for relief. It is a matter of history that this desire had led years ago to the cry of Foshing Anuia - which means " Preserve the frontiers and give us peace," or to use a more Western term "Manchuria for the Manchurians." The existence of this movement is no supposititious figment. Its leaders were perfectly well known and were highly reputable men. Two of the more prominent were officials of the Chang Government, both of whom had to resign to give way to the War Lord's grandiose schemes of conquest. It was Mr. Yu Chung-han, one of Chang's former counsellors, who after September 18, became the organizer of what was called the Self Government Guiding Board. And there was also a movement to restore the Manchu Dynasty in Manchuria, its cradle and its Crown Domain, this movement being as old as the Republic of China. The Report declares that prior to the Incident of September 18, the idea of independence did not exist. The Commission seems to have disregarded much information supplied them on this subject. It is certainly difficult, I concede, for Westerners to detect and know some of the undercurrents connected with these movements in the Orient.

A little thought will show the error in the Commission's deduction. The Committee for the Preservation of Order in the Fengtien region was established as early as September 24, 1931, and was issuing declarations which contemplated independence on September 26. On that same date General Hai Hua declared the independence of the Province of Kirin. On the 27th, a committee was formed for the preservation of order at Harbin. On October 1, General Chang Hsia-peng proclaimed the independence of Tientsin. On October 17, General Yu Chi-shan, Commander of the Liaoning Army of Defence declared his independence, demanding the foundation of a Manchu-Mongol State with the former Manchu Emperor as its ruler. Can it be supposed that within three weeks of the Incident of September 18, the allegedly undesirable and unwanted Japanese officials, a comparative handful of men, could have scoured the country, changed its conviction and rallied it to turn against the old regime? That is too much flattery for us. It is giving us credit, for ability in the art of persuasion that we do not possess. But are not these various local movements a very telling indication of welcome? If they are not that, they are at least an indication of satisfaction and relief at the disappearance of the rule of Chang Hauhe-liang.

Both Baron Shidehara, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Minami, Minister of War, issued telegraphic instructions on September 26, forbidding participation by Japanese military and civil officials and other Japanese in the various attempts already being made to establish a new political order in Manchuria.

Who was the most natural and logical chief executive for the new Government to seek? Can it be denied that this person was the rightful heir to the ancestral rulers of Manchuria? Or can it be questioned that Mr. Hai has long been a home, as well as an actual movement, for the restoration of Manchu authority in North China? There has been, indeed, several attempts at a restoration of the ex-Emperor to the throne of China, and at one time, for a brief period, he was actually returned to authority in Peking.

In our Observations fuller details are set forth. We regret that the Commission seems to have been persuaded to accept the statements and arguments of Chang Hauhe-liang's group of adherents in preference to those of the Manchoukuo officials and supporters.
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In our Observations fuller details are set forth. We regret that the Commission seems to have been persuaded to accept the statements and arguments of Chang Hsueh-liang's group of adherents in preference to those of the Manchoukuo officials and supporters.
While in several places, the Report expresses hope for China Proper, it expressed the contrary regarding Lanchoukuo. Our opinion reverses these hopes. Already the Government of Lanchoukuo, though hardly eleven months old, is functioning as a civil administration. It is the first civil administration the country has known since before the fall of the Manchu Dynasty twenty years ago.

While it is true that without the presence of the Japanese troops in Manchuria the new Government would have had difficulty in establishing itself, the question might be asked how the Nationalist Government could have been set up at Nanking without the aid of arms, men and money obtained from abroad?

In our Observations we have also given some details with regard to the progress of Lanchoukuo. Beside the slow progress in China this progress is comparatively amazing. I need cite in evidence but one telling fact, namely, the value of the paper dollar of the Central Bank. The Commission's Report expresses doubt of the success of that Bank. But the fact is that its paper dollar stands already at a premium over the value of the silver dollar - a fact unprecedented in Manchurian history under the long rule of the Ch'ang.

While even, on one occasion, the summary decapitation of several prominent Chinese business men at Marshal Ch'ang Tso-lin's command, was not a sufficient example to keep the price of his currency at par, the paper money of the present Government, as I have said, is already at a premium. I submit that this is extraordinary evidence of stability and of the confidence the people place in the new Government. The Report also expresses pessimism as regards the budgetary question. But this problem also leaves no room, as facts bear out, to any reasonable apprehension. It can be seen plainly in the report of the Financial Department of Lanchoukuo. It may here be added that Manchuria has been enjoying a surplus of from one to two million yen in exports over imports for more than a decade.

It is true that the suppression of outlawry and banditry has not yet been fully accomplished. Scattered remnants of the troops of the old dictator's forces are still in arms in opposition to the new Government and the Japanese forces. Banditry has been a means of livelihood and a professional business in Manchuria for scores of years, and the territory is too wide for us to expect to suppress it, in cooperation with the Lanchoukuo forces, in a few months or only a year.

The present outlawry is being, to some extent, supported from China Proper for the express purpose, - there can be little doubt, - of making a demonstration of discontent before the Western World, - while at the same time special efforts are likewise made to cover or to excuse the warfare that prevails in China.

It is unjust to make Japan responsible for what has happened in Manchuria. We did not seek the change. Had China as a whole, or even Manchuria alone, been properly governed, had the rights and interests and the lives of the Japanese people been free from deliberately destructive efforts, there would have been no change. We acted spontaneously in self defense; and when we acted, the independence movement developed spontaneously.

It is not inappropriate to recall the case of Navarino, when a conflict was so little desired or expected that one of the governments involved described it as an "untoward event". The Egyptian armament had come to assist the Turks to suppress the revolt in Greece; they were faced by a fleet of English, French and Russian vessels, which were bent on preventing them from doing so. In that state of tension, a chance shot furnished the spark that produced the conflict. The result destroyed the Egyptian fleet and Turkish hopes, and set the seal on the independence of Greece. Yet it began in mere self defense - the return of fire. This illustrates how impossible it is to limit the consequences of self defensive measures.

We might also recall the fact that the United States sent expeditions into Mexico in the years 1916 and 1917, because the Mexican Government of the time was unable to protect the lives of its people. In the case of Lanchuria the authorities themselves were actually encouraging the anti-Japanese activities. We are not to be held responsible for the results. China and the independent government of Chang Hsuch-liang are themselves responsible. It was their doing, not ours, and it was done against our repeated and persistent warnings. We have violated neither the Covenant of the League, nor the Five Power Treaty nor the Pact of Paris.
I would ask the Council to look at the record of Japan since she opened her doors, eighty years ago, to foreign intercourse. For three hundred years, a longer record than any other nation in the world, - we had had no foreign war. Subsequently we had occasion to participate in several. Have we sought in these wars anything but our own security from the menace of others? On the other hand, for how many years has the condition of China been a menace to the peace of the world and how long will it continue to be?

I ask of the Council a little patience. If the Western world will bestow upon us only a fraction of the tolerance it has so generously bestowed upon China it will be gratefully received.

The policy, the hope, the determination of my country is the maintenance of peace. We want war with no nation. We want no more territory. We are no aggressors. We desire deeply and earnestly the welfare of our great neighbour.

For decades the unhappy condition of China has been a dangerous influence while the policies of Japan have been the stabilizing and protective influence in the Far East. It would be difficult for the Japanese nation to understand the attitude of Western Powers if they should accuse us to the contrary.

In conclusion permit me, H. I. President, again to express the heartfelt thanks of the Japanese Government and the Japanese Delegation to Lord Lytton and the other distinguished Members of the Commission of Enquiry, whose arduous travel and able work we sincerely and truly appreciate.
日本代表委員は、日本政府が国際委員会の報告に同様にして答えるのを義務と

思考した意見を、国際委員会の機会に提示する。その報告は、全体と

して見ると、既に発表された記事がありますが、その見解は、全体と

なり得るものである。発表した意見を、国際委員会の機会に提示する。その報告は、全体と

会員の提案にし、既に発表された記事がありますが、その見解は、全体と

の意義や論点が充分で、速切で誤かった。それ故自覚の困難を促す為

に手数を踏まえられた意見書を作成したが、しかしこれらは、全体と
中国の状態は報問中にも詳しく報道されていて、我々が同意出来ない様
々然然的に好戦的態度が其に顕われてゐると云ふのを認識する。
委員会は、数箇の省や省中の一箇所の自由民の内在の事、独立も弱謠
する三つの政府が存在した、を見つけたミントン会議の会議前当時
には、僕令中図の態度は理屈ではなかったを示し、一九二二年のミントン会議の
同封を列强と共に紛囲する事が我々に来た。我々々は喜んでそうした。
十年前、共和国が宣示された時よりも戦局は恐らく是、是かよく成
る事を見た。今更に十年間過ぎたが態度はよく成つて居らぬ、一
層恐くなつてゐる。
通例所見と呼ぶれる軍事上の指導幕が下由與田の如く被拝してゐる。
外敵はソビエト化してゐる。ハペツは中国と戦争してゐる。トルキ
スはかの名義上の独立国とは殆ど全く被拝してゐる。

支那江口附近の倭々陥省の軍勢が支騒してゐる。山西省はも一つの部
軍専の存在を苦しんでゐる。四川省は混れてゐる。軍専派は一致せず敵戦

2
し合ってある。そして委員会が結成する役に、他の方面からの即ち共産
主義の影響がある。

ワレン・オッジが常設会に中華に共産主義の影響はありなかった。それに
にわたり、孫中山博士が中国に入れるたびであった。武装、資金、軍事等
及び関係されたロシアの宣伝家といえ、方面の助けを待って、あらゆる
名な革命家は国民政府運動を一組織する事が出来た。そして彼が死んだ
時革命家は国民政府運動を一組織する事が出来た。そして彼が死んだ
外に商賢や旅行で歩く範囲を超えて、遠く踏み出すかも知れない。自國民
日本の支持のためならぬ、故都北京に華 隈は、何等の語하거나ならぬ。
国民政府には、強い詰問感情がしみ込んできており、ますます政府の心のになり合い思想の影響を受けつつ成長しているが、斯様にして直ぐの好きなりし、思想を薙えてあるのだ。観中には、国府の授権を授けてあるもののは少ない。列強国である。中囯が武力建軍と呼ばれる方法が戦略的に用いられて来たら、本行戦が思わぬもので、又一つと處理に困難を来すものをである。
我が国は、住民は、多年に亘り、日々の食糧を供給される事のあるこの
慣行に於ける多くの我が政府は、大きな損失を蒙り、中には嘉賓を破
壊されたものもあった。若し之が我が商品を促進せしめられた。中国を
にして之は、常民又は政府の宣章より更に暴挙と非難させようとの国家政策の手
外感に中國に対する約束上の飲利を必ず破棄さざるをえようとの政策政策の手
在に、破損されてある。世界列強は、該約に於って武力行動の挑戦を
不可なりとして来てある。予は何故にイコットが、公的又は半官的仕合
を喚びた時、間接同意によって流様に不法なりとされぬかなかったかと、
委員会に尋ねて見たい。この政策政策行為を受けたものは日本人計りでも
支那貿易に依する者は、近年この問題を受けて来ている。委員会は日
本が、中国の住民人であり最大顧客である限り、他の国よりも一層
政府に苦しんでもある一事を指摘した。我々は、中国と何故しようか、
で、返答の際は、ご指摘の通りで、恐れ入ります。}

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民を治めるための機関を設けることを拒绝した。中国人は後にこれを承認し、それを実行した。

朝鮮人は組織的に反対を受ける。日本は朝鮮に示す行動が誤っていると考えた。

日本は、朝鮮を保護するための戦略を立てた。その戦略は、朝鮮の独立を保つために必要な条件を満たすものである。

ただし、日本は、条約を締結するために必要な条件を満たすことができず、朝鮮に保有する権利を放棄する可能性が高まった。
一つの方策を得たわけにならなかった。而して一度軍艦が出た場合には、
その行動に殆ど自立的であった。報告に沿って考える通り。早実それは
九月十八十九日の事件を抜いて、委員会はその夜の日本軍の軍艦行動
及正倉の手段と認めるを得ずと云っている。我々は之に同意する
事は出来ない。

一九二八年六月廿三日に出した国防長官ケロッ氏の覚書にある。正
警備艦隊に関する案内に下の如くである。

一自己防備。米艦の不敬警備覚書に於ては、如何に進取り方でも数
警備と警備したり警備は更に厳べては、その副利は、各艦係
が自然に得てあるものであって、法で制限されるのみでない。個
各艦係は、何特もその商歴の警備人は警備されるのでなくのに、自
己であって、警備の要項に拘わらなければならぬか否か決める場合
ある。その警備の要項された當時、米国軍機が無論した決断は次の通りに

18
べてある。

目指すのは行うに、之を行うする国家の領土支配論の展開を越えて、その
の威力を及ぼすから知れない、反満、反仏してある、次第に、分り切
った事である。

又オースチャン＝ナムケン卿が一九二八年前月十一之日及び七月十一
八日に出された手紙を引用しよう。

第一に言っている。

「4切案意旨案の第一議の第十二方を研究した後、英国政府に、そ
の字句が、一国が自己防衛を及ぼさを得る新仏を除きしてゐるとは
思はない。ケロッ氏は、予が上に参照した通訳中に、目指未
必からざるものと認める」という事は明かにして居った、而して英国
政府に関しても、本文中に何等附加する必要なし云々と一号
考えし居い。
ルネサンス年七月十四日の回答に於て釈迦政府は自衛政府の観念を表せり。更に確認の見解を発表せり。之等の観念を受けて日本政府も亦一米国の提案は確立観念に自衛政府の観念を相違するものと了解すしと百二十八年五月二十六日間の米国大使への答書に答論すること失念しなかった。

自衛と結済を求む自衛の行方なりと解して居る。
一覇洲事件を何が故に吾々は際際聯盟に移競させるか、との質問を
従々呪問せられるる問題である。其の回答は単に言へば先づ第
一に日本の国民性は際際問題に於て外邦の干涉を許さなかったから
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支部政府と結合法することを遠慮として居たのである。

これに若干の概念及利害を考えをして支部の一目派及他派の言論を問及せしめに

ここに

のである。
官吏の領の日本人の規制するようを禁止せり。

政府に属し触かも自然的にあって見合い的な行政観念に第二する人物を支へべきなり。その人物は平和統治の正道なる彼等を望むこと一と

関係者への復古に付属となる期待があつたともが環境させるものらしくもあつたぞあらが。所として現実の

関係者は更に閣外を放置した非者をそれが常らされる。当分は問題に留め置きの一意

関係者を関係者として発表せらるも周知せねに至らざる。
吾々は現在の状態を前後するべきことを不満足なる解決には到らない。

在在の状態の維持及承認は又不満足なるものである。然れども吾々は「現

在の状態の維持及承認は又不満足なるものである。然れども吾々は「現
登案依ったものは、はかれて来る暴力が、国民心を、ただただ、懸念させるものである。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念であり、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。報復が一部示され、それは、国民心の、統一である、国民の、緊急の、懸念である。
たる時情報は之を急急したるがである。対洋に於ける之等の局動に関する

九月二十六日同立経費の報を発表した。

将は當立の独立を告示した。十月十七日遼輯諸官司令官于五山大附

少し逐へた文を以も著軍令の機安に於て詰めることを背反する。

吉田真之の局立を報しした。
今日ノ通路ハ成田主任部長ガ表明ノノ＝ニ接続ガテルノノ
信実ノ為ノ次ノ餘地ガ→哿ノ及び西欧観光ニ照セール不備ノ為ノ通訊
同時＝交支部ニ於テ既存ノ機関ハ再シ
テナルガナルヲ延長ノ趣ヲ起スラガニ＝ハ日本＝負担セラレハルノ＝正

全體トテハ否決ヲ＝テテ今度ノ變革＝ポテテテハナルハノヲ何等ノ變革＝起
テテハナルガハ行ルヲ延

何ノテハハノノニ於テハ自戰のヲ進展レタ

ノスヲヲ断ソノノ中ノ一際＝如キハハノノリハ

ラウダナルノノヲ

カノハソノノ

デルヲ

取及軍ハハノノ援助ヲ＝テハノ＝デノ＝止

ノスヲノヲ

英仏軍＝の大部ヲハノ＝至
吾々ハ無意説願約を破却シテソナケレバ九ケ月後約を無視シマザマタバ
吾々は以上領土欲求シナイ。吾々侵略者デナイ。吾々従大
MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR,

As the result of the guarantee given this day by the Japanese Government to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the fulfillment by the Government of Manchukuo of all the obligations of payment which the latter are under in favour of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement for the Cession to Manchukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern railway), signed this day by the Plenipotentiaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Manchukuo, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency as follows:

In case any difficulties should arise in connection with the execution of payments on the part of the Government of Manchukuo, the Japanese Government will make every effort necessary under the given circumstances in order that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may receive all the payments due to them from the Government of Manchukuo ondly and within the respective limits of time prescribed by the said Agreement, so that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may suffer absolutely no loss in connection...
with the said difficulties.
I avail myself of this opportunity to reheat to Your Excellency, monsieur l'ambassadeur, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ASH NEW.

To Excellency

Monsieur Constant K. Broussard,
Ambassadeur Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Japan.

Tokyo, March 10th, 1920.

Monsieur le Ministre,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of to-day's date, in which you are good enough to inform me as follows:

"In the result of the guarantee given this day by the Japanese Government to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Tientsin rail by the Government of Manchuria of all the obligations of payment unless the latter are under in favour of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the provisions of the agreement for the concession to Manchuria of the rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the North Manchurian Railway (Chineto Eastern railway), signed this day by the plenipotentiaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Manchoukuo, I have the honour to inform..."
Your Excellency as follows:

In case any difficulties should arise in connection with the execution of payments on the part of the Government of Manchoukuo, the Japanese Government will make every effort necessary under the given circumstances in order that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may receive all the payments due to them from the Government of Manchoukuo timely and within the respective limits of time prescribed by the said agreement, so that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may suffer absolutely no loss in connection with the said difficulties.

In reply, I beg to state that I take note of your communication as above mentioned.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, monsieur le ministre, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed) O. O. IJIMA

Monsieur le Ministre,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan.
Certified

Statement of source and authenticity

I, Mr. Yabu, Atoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in question hereof attached, consisting of ___ pages, and entitled "Exchange of Notes between Governments of Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (2)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of Sept., 1948

[Signature]
Signature of Official

Witness: [Signature]
府が西洋国政府ノニニ動ヲテ質ハル一切ノ支払ヲ全額且つ賠償ヲ
定ヲ依リ定ヲテナリガルノニ於テハ、テニテソギニトシテ社會
主催ノ同盟国政府ハ右ヲ因メテ同盟国社會主催ノ同盟国政府
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ルニ為シテ

昭和十年（一千九百三十年）三月二十三日東京ニ於テ

廣田弘毅

日本國陸軍顧問社長、社會主催同盟国聯邦 CCT 金骶
大使
ソヴィエト連邦大使

外務大臣 鰐長

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Statement of source and authenticity

1, n. n., Assistant Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in Japanese hereto attached, consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Exchange of Notes between Governments of Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Issue of the Guarantee of Payment" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of Sept., 1940

Signature of Official

Witness: M. Nakazawa
Sept. 28, 4th year of Showa (TN: 1929)

Published by the East Asia Economic Research Bureau.

East Asia Pamphlet No. II.

Excerpts from

"A COLLECTION OF ANTI-JAPANESE TEACHING MATERIAL OF THE CHINESE"
2. Japanese Influence in the Orient (pp. 2-3)

South of Kyushu are the Liu-chiu, Formosa and the Pescadores islands. They were all our possessions some scores of years ago. The Korean Peninsula situated in a North westerly direction from Kyushu was taken away from us by Japan by force. Having taken possession of Korea, Japan has been exerting herself to the utmost in the administration and exploitation of Korea.

She has linked Korea with Southern Manchuria by building a railway and has been exercising great influence over the Kwantung Areas by leasing the Chinchou peninsula. Her ambition to invade the three eastern provinces is too obvious to mention. (upper class Geography Text book, Book No. IV. Chap.I.)

5. The National Humiliation Song. (Pages 6-7)

Tai-chu-Kuo (TN: Korea) Liu-chiu-and Tai-wan, The area is not small at all, but alas! All have been devoured away by her.

Now taking advantage of the disturbed conditions in our Country and the unsettled State of the Great War in Europe, she again imposed upon us a ruinous treaty in sheer violence of justice and humanity. The beautiful mountains and rivers of our dear fatherland are going to be taken away from us by force.

What a humiliating and grievous day this is, the 7th day of May of the 4th year.

The dreadful moment to enslave us all is staring us in the face. We wonder how soon on earth can this humiliation be cast off by us. (From a collection of songs for educating primary school pupils into the Party)
(6) Huang Ta (pp 7-8)

Huang Ta (China) is an inhabitant of the village of the "Orient". He has inherited his ancestral home and estates of many generation and he came from a good family well known in the village. He is a man of weak and frail frame and is inefficient. He has often shown inability in the management of his domestic affairs and has blundered in negotiations with other families. On numerous occasions he is proud of his generosity but the people look down upon him as a fool. He is not on the verge of bankruptcy as yet, but his finances have become difficult and more difficult with the years as his expenditures have increased while his income has decreased.

Pai Erh (Western) is a tenant of his house but good in business and is making a lot of money. One day, Pai Erh, conspiring with his attorney, made a complaint and placed a claim against the Huangs on the pretence that a servant of the Huangs did something bad and eventually made the very house which he had previously rented unconditionally his own. Pai Erh has many brothers. They, having learned it easy to cheat Huang, have contrived successfully to deprive him of some more houses on one pretext or another. And at the same time, conspiring with Huang's book-keepers, they secretly confiscated the farms and furnitures which had been held in mortgage.

Huang Chiu, whose ancestors originally came from the same family with the Huangs, has always been as poor as a church mouse; taking advantage of Huang however, he has robbed him of a lot of his farms and houses.
Huang Ta passes the day loafing all day long. His children are all still young and do not know anything but when they grow up there is at least hope of reviving the good name of the family again, (The National Fumiliation Reader, Book No. II, chap. 10)

The Shin Jü (GIWADAN) (TN: refers to the Boxers Treaty) (pp. 37-28)

The Shin Jü Treaty was concluded by China under duress of the Eight Allied Powers on the 11th year before the year of the foundation of the Republic of China, or that is to say, on the 7th month of September of the year of "Shin-Jü" (T.N. corresponding to the 27th year of "Kuang Hsi" of the calendar of the Chinese empire or to the year 1901 A.D.) The most important (TN: clauses) of which are as follows:

(1) An indemnity of 450 million taels divided into annual installments and to be paid over a period of thirty-nine years.

(2) To destroy the fortifications at TAKIT and to allow foreign troops to garrison the area between TAKIT and PEKING.

(3) Not to permit the Chinese people to live in the Foreign Legation Quarters in PEKING.

Although the Eight Allied Powers came on the pretext that the Boxers has killed Foreign residents, they, in fact, combined had been oppressing China in common for many preceding years. Having succeeded in their first attempt, they had become accustomed to attacking us concertedly. We must strive to annul the (Shin Jü Treaty) and abolish all unequal treaties altogether at the earliest-possible moment.
We had to pay an indemnity and apologize for our killing of only a few foreigners. What are the foreigners going to do about their nationals, who have committed murder, arson, and plunder while in our land? (Teaching material for educating primary school pupils into the party-book III.)

17 Our Incomplete Territory. (pages, 75-77).

(1) How Incomplete Is Our Territory?
(2) Why Is It Incomplete?
(3) Why We Should Recover the Territory We Have Already Lost?

Our country's territory is incomplete. There are foreign concessions. For example, Britain has a lease on Wei hai wei, Japan, Port Arthur and the Bay of Dairen, and France Kwantchow Bay respectively. There is the foreign settlement. There are foreign settlements in such places as Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, Yen Tal and Yuf-Chow. There are ceded territories. For example, like Hongkong and Formosa which Britain and Japan robbed us of respectively. There are the invaded territories. For instance, Japan annexed our Korea, Britain and France invaded our south western frontier areas and Russia has encroached upon our north eastern and north western borders.

These areas were all plundered away from us by the imperialistic Powers through various threatening and deceptive means.

Unless we recover these by suitable means, the territorial integrity of our country cannot be restored nor can the distress of our countrymen be removed.
(1) The May 30 Incident (pp. 77-78). On May 15th of the 14th year of the Republic of China, KU, Cheng Hon, a workman employed by a Japanese Cotton spinning mill in Shanghai was shot to death by a Japanese. Some students gathered in the Settlement to collect condolence money but were arrested by British patrolmen. Both the students and the workmen became very indignant. On the 30th, they formed a large formation, marched into the Settlement, and made speeches. At 3.00 p.m. British patrolmen nabbed the student who was making the speech. The crowd of students who were on Nanking Road and Chikiang Road were all seized and went to the front of the police station with the student (TW; who was taken prisoner).

By this time the British patrol chief had summoned many patrolmen and were having them guard the police station. When things reached the point whether the crowd would break its ranks or not the Patrol chief ordered them to fire. The patrolmen fired twice in succession gaining results of several scores of dead and wounded. Since the opening of the port of Shanghai this was the first tragedy of such proportions. (Teaching material for educating primary school pupils into the Party Book IV)

(1) China’s Losses of Territories (pp. 116 to pp. 117)

The territories we have lost recently are Wei Hai Wei, Fort Arthur, Dairen, Koeloa, and Keangchow Pay. Previous to these were Korea, Formosa, the Philippine Islands, Burma, Annam and the like. (Chapter 4, Book I of the Three Principles of Democracy Text book of new China for use in higher classes)
I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described below is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 12 December 1946

"A collection of anti-Japanese teaching material of the Chinese."
昭和四年九月二十八日

東亜経済調査局発行

東亜小冊第二

一部邦俳句集摘抄

抜録
二、日本東洋の勢力（二頁）

九州の南面に琉球、澎湖列島及び日本列島の日本在住者の勢力

朝鮮半島も別に日本東洋の勢力

本州半島

第一節

日本東洋の勢力

日本の東洋の勢力

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辛丑條約

（三七頁）

辛丑條約是民國紀元前十一年的十一月十八日，由中國與八國聯軍將軍在北京參酌，下約定之條約，其內容如下：

一、割佔北京及各處不平等條約的一大段，包括原約內所載之地，均予確立為永久中華民國之土地。

二、北京外國使館區，自今後不許中國兵士出入。

三、八國聯軍將軍之軍隊，自今後不許留在中國境內。前此之軍隊，亦即刻撤退。凡中國應負之賠款，自今後即由外國領事官，於中國各處機會，逐次繳還。

四、中國政府應將原約內所載之不平等條約，悉行取消，現行之條約，亦應以正義之條約，互相修改。凡中國外國人民之關係，均應按照國際公約，互相尊重。
辛丑（清和）條約

三・大沽砲台ヲ破壊シ大沽ヲ至ル外国兵ヲ撤退スルヲ約

八国総合衛・華犯と後ノ華犯彼等八国在外公使館区域ノ内ニ出ヲ許スナラナイ

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中七，我國領土不完全
（七五頁）

我國的領土，已不完全。有租借地例如英國鹹海衛留，日租借地如巴牙，法租借地等等。有租界例如上海，天律，威戶，租界等等。有領土例如東北和西北邊境等。這些領土都不能恢復國民的痛苦也不能解決收復領土的問題。
一、

五段

陈七文

（七月八日）

十人从上海开埠以来所留的大惨案不会有结束

（小学校教科书第四册）
一、中國領土的喪失（一一六頁）

壹現時所失去的領土是威海衛、旅順、大連、九龍、風州、台前一路等處屬、長江、澎湖、緬甸、安南。（新中國三民主義實施綱領用第一冊第六課）
In October, 1938, Canton and Hankow fell into the hands of the Nipponese Army and the Chiang Kai-shek Government became a mere local regime. On November 22, 1938, the Government of Nippon declared:

What Nippon seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and coordination between Nippon, Manchoukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defense against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia.

In its note of November 18, 1938, to the American Government the Government of Nippon announced:

Nippon at present is devoting her energy to the establishment of a new order based on genuine international justice throughout East Asia, the attainment of which end is not only an indispensable condition of the very existence of Nippon, but also constitutes the very foundation of the enduring peace and stability of East Asia. It is the firm conviction of the Nipponese Government that in the face of the new situation, fast developing in East Asia, any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and maxims of the past would neither contribute toward the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issues. However, as long as these points are understood, Nippon has not the slightest inclination to oppose the participation of the United States and other Powers in the great work of reconstructing East Asia along all lines of industry and trade.

Nippon's announcement of the policy of establishing a new order in East Asia evoked a crop of criticisms from diverse American quarters, and American proclivity of aiding Chiang Kai-shek reached a new height. The United States Export-Import Bank on December 15, 1938, placed a credit of $25,000,000 at Chungking's disposal; in addition, the United States Treasury extended the Chinese American monetary agreement of July 9, 1937 thereby enabling Chungking to dispose of its silver and obtain dollar exchange against its gold reserves accumulated in New York. The Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, meeting at Washington in January 1939, went on record for the first time in favor of an embargo on war materials to Nippon. In May 1939 the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church adopted a resolution condemning America's continued "partnership in aggression" and urging immediate legislation by Congress to prevent the sale of munitions and war material to Nippon. Several bills placing limitations on Nippon's trade with the United States were offered by members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. A resolution was sponsored by Senator Pittman empowering the President to impose an embargo on war supplies to Nippon. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee re-acted Secretary Hull to indicate whether the proposed action would "violate any treaty." Although Hull on July 21, 1939, gave a noncommittal answer, the same answer actually preceded...
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the State Department's decision on the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty with Nippon by only five days.

On July 24, 1939, as a result of an agreement between the then Foreign Minister Ariita and British Ambassador Robert Craigie, the text of a basic accord under which negotiations could be conducted for a formal settlement of the 1931-35 treaty was announced in Tokyo and London. The significant Arita-Craigie formula ran as follows:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully recognize the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress, and note that, as long as this state of affairs continues to exist, the Nipponese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in regions under their control and that they have to suppress or remove any such causes or acts as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy.

His Majesty's Government have no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by the Nipponese forces, and they will take this opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by taking it plain to the British authorities and British nationals in China that they should refrain from such acts and measures.

On July 26, 1939 only two days after the announcement of the Arita-Craigie formula, Secretary Hull served a notice of abrogation of the Nipponese-American Commercial Treaty. The Washington Government took this unannounced step mainly to give effect to its policy of "quarantining" Nippon economically.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR On September 1, 1939 the European war broke out. Curiously enough, the first and immediate step the United States Government took was to transfer the major portion of the Navy to the Pacific coast centering on Pearl Harbor—where which was obviously planned to antagonize Nippon. Early in 1939 a sum of 22,000,000 from the F.I.A. funds was allotted to naval construction. In March 1936 the Navy Department, in view of the增加军备法 Act, secured authorization from Congress to extend with a naval building program designed to reach the figure sanctioned by the Naval Treaty before the end of 1942. President Roosevelt accelerated his construction schedules with the greatest possible naval expenditures (for 1936-1937 and 1937-1938) in American history. This Roosevelt's program did not contemplate an exact parity with Britain, it provided for a substantially greater margin of superiority over Nippon, especially in capital ships. Moreover, the London Agreement of 1936 not only assuaged the pre-occupation of the United States with the British and French competition, but also enabled it to replace its naval strength more freely against Nippon. On April 1, 1936 the United States, Britain, and France adopted an increased naval gun caliber of sixteen-inches. On June 30, 1938 these three Powers signed an agreement raising their capital ship tonnage limit to 45,000 tons. The United States in this way played an active
part in bringing about a revision in the capital ship construction, because it was bent upon bottling up Nippon in the Pacific.

On January 26, 1910 the Nippon-United States Commercial Treaty expired and the United States became quite at liberty to impose an embargo at any time on Nippon. On January 11, 1910 Henry L. Stimson in a long letter in the New York Times recommended legislation to prohibit the export to Nippon of arms, munitions and raw material needed for the manufacture of accessories, to some of which a moral embargo had already been applied since June of 1908. Two embargo proposals prepared by Senators Piatt and Schuylkill were placed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. On March 12, 1940 Wang Ching-wei declared his intention to establish a new Central Government of China. Prior to this, on March 7, 1940, the United States Government gave a loan of $20,000,000 to Chiang Kai-shek. Thereafter, on March 30, 1940, Secretary Hull issued his statement of nonrecognition of the newly organized Nanking Government under the presidency of Wang Ching-wei.

On September 22, 1940 agreement was concluded between the Governments of Nippon and France, by which the former was to respect the rights and interests of the latter in East Asia and, in particular, the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereign rights of France over all parts of Indo-China. On the part of France it was required to grant Nippon special facilities in Indo-China in order to enable the Nipponese Army and Navy to pursue their operations. Retaliating this accord, which in no way affected the rights and interests of America, President Roosevelt on September 26, 1940, declared an embargo on the export of iron and steel scrap as from October 16, except to countries of the Western Hemisphere and to Britain. Of the exports of steel scrap in the first seven months of 1940, Nippon took about one third, that is, over half a million tons. Simultaneous with the enforcement of the embargo, the Federal Loan Administration Office announced that a further credit of $15,000,000 was to be granted to Chungking from the American Export-Import Bank to assist it in meeting exchange needs, and that the loan would be liquidated by the sale of tungsten, the United States Government having undertaken to buy as much as thirty million dollars' worth of tungsten for defense needs. The new loan to China and the fresh embargo order were, in the opinion of the leaders of the Capitol Hill, measures "short of war, but more effective than mere words."
日本の求めるものは単なる一地方政権を覆し果たす。一九三八年十一月二十三日日本政府は、東アジアにおける文化及びその他の分野における日本政府はその推進に尽力すべきである。新文化を創造し、且つ東アジアを

東アジアを、新文化を創造し、且つ東アジアを

の推進に尽力すべきである。新文化を創造し、且つ東アジアを
東亜の平和の確立に向けて何等寄与させるのにならず目指す目標の達成をも解決するものではない。併しながら、景観の障が理解される以上、

日本は合衆国及び他の諸国が常在、及通商の全般に亘って東亜再建の大事業に参加する要には戦かの反対意見を有するものではない。

東亜に於ける新秩序建立の政策に関する日本の説明はアメリカの諸方面から多くの批評を呼び起こした。合衆国及び入役行は一九三八年十二月十五日二千五百萬円の

クレイピットを知度の為報が成立した。更に加えるに合衆国財務省は一九三七年七月九日の米交貨品協約を延長し、それに依りて常在をしてその

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の為報を前分し、ニューヨークに移設せるの金額2億円に対し五百万円

入金させるにした。戦争の原因及び効用に属する会議は一九三九年一

月ワシントンで開催されたがその会議に於て始めて日本に対し戦争資材の

出納禁止を断行する事を記録に留めるに至った。

又一九二九年五月には長老派教会大会はアメリカの引渡しのiben

時に対し協力を臨時し、議会が直ちに日本に対し軍需品及び戦争資材の

件をも解決するものではない。併しながら、景観の障が理解される以上、
販売を停止させしむる立法手段を採るべしとの決議を採択した。日本の合衆国務長官に提案中の行動が、該国に退肯する鄰国に何等の影響を及ぼすを懸念せるるに過ぎず、議会の決議を採択した。日本に対する競争の要因を排除するに足るような措置を講ずるにあたり、合衆国政府は、当該国に関与するための措置を講じるべきである。
貿易を停止せしめる立法手段を採るべしとの決議を採択した。日本の合衆国との議定書に制限を設ける目的を以てせる多数の法案が上院議員に依つて提出され、政府の決定に立つと以て合衆国議員が否決を告示した。ハルはこれに反し一九三九年七月二十四日當り除のない回答を與へたが、この同意の為されたのは日本との議定書の破棄に関する国務省の決定を以てたと云う。
をもつこと、それに彼らを妨害し敵を圧倒するが如く一切の原因又は能動
の政府は日本軍軍の上記諸目的達成に有効なる如何なる行動又は方策をも行
事であるが如く。政府は有田式方策の有効なる如何なる行動又は方策をも行
るアメリカの政策を具体化する為に策定したのであった。

一九三九年七月二十六日、即ち有田一クレーキ方策の発表から僅々二日の
後於てハル務務長官は日米通商紛約破棄の通牒を発した。ワシントン政
府はこの一見不必要にかき合い行動を主として日本を諦諦的に警戒せんとす
るアメリカの政策を具体化する為に策定したのであった。
メリア海軍省はヴィンソンメント法に依って一九四二年の終末迄に海軍造りに依つて許容された一定の数値に達する様企議されたる海軍造計を以てその造計計画を達成させた。メリア史及最大の平時海軍造計へ一九三六年ニ及一九三七年ニ一八年ニ大なる事のひらきを用意して向。一九三六年のロンドン造計は英仏との競争に対する関心を淡したのみならず合衆国を合せ日本に対し従来よ
り一層自由にその海軍力の実力をなさめめた。一九三六年四月一日来仏は十六時迄に最大増強限度を採用した。一九三八年六月三十日にはこの三口は主力艦の航数制限を四万五千頓に引上げる造計に照印した。答回国は願くして主力艦建造に際する修正を達成すべく懇意の役割を演じた。何となれば當時合衆国は太平洋に於て日本に対し
一九四〇年一月二十六日来仏造計造計は消期となり、合衆国は日本に対し
Translated by
Defence Language Branch

Certificate of Source and Authenticity of Documents

I, Yamakawa, Takesuke, Vice-Director of Publication Bureau, The Asahi Shimbun, hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written by S. Eki, Akiyoshi, in Japanese consisting of 348 pages and entitled "Rikkokushi, Nihonshoki Vol. II" was published by the Asahi Shimbun in conformity with the manuscripts of the above author, and also that the above author is deceased at this time.

Signed at Tokyo
On this 24th day of December, 1946.

YAMAKAWA, Takesuke (Seal)

I, Miyata, Minoru, witness, certify that the above was signed and sealed in my presence.

At the same place on the same day.

Witness: MIYATA, Minoru. (Seal)
Excerpt from "Shono Shokki":

"Let Consisting of Seventeen Articles"

On the third day of the fourth month of the twentieth year (ND: 804, ...), in the reign of the Emperor Jingo, the Prince Regent (Mitsukuni Narihira) created the 'Kage' or the 'Law consisting of Seventeen Articles.' This 'Kage' runs as follows:

To the officials of our Government:

1. Let harmony be the fundamental principle of all your conduct and a virtue to which to all men, and those who have cultivated true harmony are very difficult to find. Thus said are not obedient to their superiors, and others are at variance with their neighbors. Hence ye our officials, should always keep yourselves in harmony and concord with each other, especially when you hold discussions. Then justice and reason will have their way, and there will be nothing that cannot be accomplished.

2. Respect the Three Treasures with all your heart. The Three Treasures are a Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. These are the last elements to which all living creatures on earth are due, and these are the most fundamental principles which underlie all the teachings of the world. Hence, there should be no one, in any generation, who does not respect these. These are inordinately valued now but a small part of the whole people. All the rest can be set on the right path, if they are taught, by means of teaching. But this can be done only when the teaching is based on the above three treasures.
3. Be obedient and respectful to Imperial commands. The Emperor is like Heaven, the officials are like Earth. As long as the Heaven covers and the Earth bears, the four seasons return in due sequence, enabling all lives to prosper in their proper place. But if Earth were to take the place of the Heaven, the whole universe would be plunged into chaos. Thence it is necessary for you officials to be obedient and loyal to the Emperor in both word and deed. Be obedient, we repeat, and respectful to Imperial commands, otherwise ye shall fall into destruction.

4. Let 'li' (The respect for order) be the underlying principle of whatever ye do. 'Li' is the essence of the art of ruling the people. Any lack of 'li' among the officials will result in some disorder among the people. And any lack of 'li' among the people is the sure cause of all sorts of evils. If the relation between the Emperor and the officials be based upon 'li', the Government will be maintained in due order and discipline. And if 'li' be permitted among the people, peace and order will thrive throughout the land.

5. Abstain from any sort of greed. Judge cases brought before the court according to justice. Scarcely a day passes without a thousand cases being brought by the people before the court, so that the number of cases arising in the course of a few years may easily be imagined. It is our regret to note lately the practice among our registrators
Making corrupt use of their authority. The rich can always obtain the decision in their own behalf, just as a stone flung into a pool does not fail to make waves on the surface of water, just as the poor always lose their cases, just as water poured on a stone does not move it at all. Thus the poor do not know where to apply for their remedies. Berlin is said a great fault of our Government.

6. To reward good and to punish evil is a good principle inherited from ancient times. Never let a good deed pass without praise. Never let an evil deed pass without correction. Flatterers and deceivers are very ruinous both to the land and to the people. Those are apt to inform the superiors of faults of the inferiors, and to slander the superiors when they talk with inferiors. Those are men who have no loyalty towards the Emperor and no benevolence towards the people, and they often cause serious troubles.

7. Each one of your officials has an authority of his own, which is restricted by the nature of his office. Never abuse your authority. Then a wise man holds an office, voices of praise rise first among the people. When a wicked man holds it troubles are sent and disasters occur one after another, although those who have everything from birth are very few, whoever tries his best to develop his faculties can attain to sagacity. Success or failure in doing a thing solely depends upon the man who does it, whether it may or may not be of great importance. Likewise, in regard to the rule of an age, the happiness or misery of the people depends upon the man who rules them during that age, whether it may or
may not be in difficulty. Thus the right choice of the person for an office is a condition necessary to the permanent prosperity of the nation. For this reason, the wise kings of ancient times never created an office for a man's sake, but always sought a man for an office.

8. Ye, our officials, attend your office early in the morning, and leave it late in the evening. Public affairs occur incessantly, and even a whole day's working is not enough to finish them. If ye attend the office late in the morning, ye will not see affairs which have occurred before that time. If ye leave it early in the evening, ye will not see affairs which may occur after that time.

9. Faithfulness is the basis of righteousness. Let faithfulness be your guide in doing anything. Right or wrong, success or failure always depends upon faithfulness. Thus when all ye officials possess the virtue of faithfulness, there will be nothing that ye can not do. On the contrary, if ye lack this virtue, ye will fail in whatever ye do.

10. Be free from anger. Never resent others' faults. Everybody has his own mind. Every mind has its own opinions. One holds for truth what another holds for falsehood, and holds for falsehood what the latter holds for truth. And no one can be sure which is in the right, for both are neither sage nor fool, but are plain men, who may be sometimes right and sometimes wrong. Thus no one can say with certainty that some are wise and some are foolish, any
more than one can find an end of a ring. Reflect, then, upon your own faults, whenever you get angry with some one else. Ask the opinions of others, even when you feel sure about a matter.

11. Observe carefully the merits and faults of your subordinates. Let rewards and punishments be according to justice. We regret to hear of late that rewards and punishments are not always given in due proportion to merits and faults. Give rewards and punishments strictly in accordance to justice.

12. (Addressing the local governors in particular)
Never extort from the people. There is only one sovereign for the land and for the people. And this one sovereign is the Emperor himself. All your officials of our Government are but vessels subordinate to Him. Therefore, you have no right to extort from the people beyond legitimate taxation.

13. Try your best to acquaint yourselves with all the affairs of your office. You may sometimes be absent from your office due to an illness or on a mission. But after your return, try your best to get familiar with the new circumstances that have arisen in your absence, as if you had been present during that time. Never neglect public affairs under the plea of ignorance of their going to absence.

14. Never be envious of others. If one envies another in some way, the latter will also envy the former in another way, thus forming an endless succession of evils arising from mutual jealousy. When one finds another excels himself in intellect or talent, one gets envious of his
superiority and displeased with his presence. Thence we find a sage being fairly treated only at the interval of every five centuries, and we scarcely find a saint being fairly treated even at the interval of a millennium. This is a thing to be greatly regretted, for without sages and saints no good government is to be hoped for.

15. Leave all private interests behind and pursue the public good. This is the right way for our officials. When a man adheres to his own interests, he always harbors ill-feelings towards others, which unfit him to cooperate with his colleagues. Lack of harmony with his colleagues may lead him to do evils to the public for his own benefit. Indeed, ill-feelings are bent to produce breaches of the laws. Therefore, the first chapter of this "kempo" says that harmony is the basis of all conduct.

16. To set the people upon public services in timely season is a good policy inherited from ancient times. You may use the people for public works during winter, for in this season they have enough leisure. But never use the people from spring till autumn, for these are the season for farming and silk-raising. If the people were to cease farming, we would have nothing to eat. If they were to cease silk-raising, we would have nothing to wear.

17. In dealing with grave affairs, never make a decision by yourselves without asking the opinions of others. On slighter affairs you need not always consult others. When one conducts grave affairs, one cannot be sure whether there is no fault. Thence it is necessary to consult others.
in such cases or that one may do things according to reason and justice."
Def. Dec. No. 142

EXCERPT FROM PACE 95 OF NIKON SHOKI
VOL. III, MEIJI TENNO
(Def. Exhibit for Identification No. 2355)

On the seventh of March (662 B.C.) (on the day of MINOTO-U, TSUITACHI of LAIOTO-TONI), Emperor JIMMU issued the following Rescript:

Since we started on the eastern expedition, six years have elapsed. By the august grace of the Great God in Heaven, the rebellious people have been put to death. Though the outlying regions have not yet been subdued and remnants of the evil elements are still rampant, there is no stir and turmoil in the central districts. It is indeed befitting at this juncture that we should build a new Capital City and construct a palace therein. The present time is still young and uncivilized; the people are modest and simple, and they habitually dwell in nests and caves. However, when a sage wishes to set up an institution, regard is always rightly had to the times. Whatever redounds to the benefit of the people cannot stultify the sage's work. We will therefore have the woods cleared and a palace built thereon, and will, in all reverence, ascend the Imperial Throne in order thereby to assure tranquility to the people. It is in this way that we propose to prove ourselves worthy of the divine grace of the Great God in Heaven in bestowing this land upon us, and on the other hand, to strive to develop the heritage of the Imperial Grandson (TK: NINIGI-NO-I-LIOTO, Grandson of MIKURASU-O-TIKAMI and the first sovereign of Japan) who cultivated and nurtured the righteousness. Would it not, then, be good to endeavour to build a holy capital covering the entire land and to make one family out of the whole world? MASHULPA, a locality lying to the southeast of Mt. UEHIBI, seems to be the centre of the land. This shall be the site for Our Capital.

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DEF. Exhibit for Identification No. 2355
NABORUCHI (Six National Histories)
Compiled by SAI-ISSI, AEIYOSI;
Published by the ASAHISHINEN,
December 30, 1928.

NIKON SHOKI Volume I
Completed in 720 A.D.
Presented in May of the same year
by Prince TONEI to Emperor GEMBA.
Translation Certificate

I, SAKUNA, Shin, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of excerpts from page 95 of NIHON SHOKI, Vol. III, JINKU TENKO is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ SHIN SAKUNA

Tokyo, Japan

Date 22 May 1947
ERRATA - SHEET
for the Corrected Copy of Def. Doc. No. 142.

Strike out the 2nd line "Exh. 2355".
Add "VOLUME I" to the 3rd line, after "..... OF NIHON SHOKI".
Put the 4th line "VOL. III. JIMMU TENNO" in Parenthesis.
Strike out "Volume I" of the 4th line from the bottom of the page.
西藏 • 拉萨

【西藏】

西藏，简称“藏”，是中华人民共和国的少数民族自治区，省会拉萨。西藏位于中国西南部，横跨北纬26°50′至36°53′，东经91°46′至106°49′，面积1222798平方千米，是世界上海拔最高的地区之一。西藏是中国领土不可分割的一部分，是中华人民共和国的少数民族自治区，是中国五个少数民族自治区之一。

西藏是藏族的主要聚居地，人口约占90%，其他民族如汉族、门巴族、珞巴族等也居住在西藏。西藏是中国的少数民族自治区之一，拥有丰富的旅游资源，如布达拉宫、大昭寺、纳木错等。

【拉萨】

拉萨，是西藏自治区的首府，位于中华人民共和国的西南部，是藏族的主要聚居地之一。拉萨是中国的少数民族自治区，拥有丰富的旅游资源，如布达拉宫、大昭寺、纳木错等。拉萨是西藏自治区的首府，位于中华人民共和国的西南部，是藏族的主要聚居地之一。拉萨是中国的少数民族自治区，拥有丰富的旅游资源，如布达拉宫、大昭寺、纳木错等。
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Put the 4th line "VOL. III. JIMMU TENNO" in Parenthesis.
Strike out "Volume I" of the 4th line from the bottom of the page.
WHY DO WE ATTACK HANKOW?
By Shujitsu Ozaki

(Published in Sept. number [TN: year not given] of the TAIYOKU (Continental))

I

It is only of late that the Japanese public have actually adapted themselves to war-time conditions. Whether they like it or not, they have been obliged to prepare themselves against a protracted war. However optimistic one may have been so far, one cannot, under the present acute situation, but be serious, and give up one's optimistic views. To tell the truth, between those who are leading a peaceful life at home and those who are fighting in sweat and mud on the Chinese front, there has been a gap — a mental gap wider than the geographical one separating the two sets of the Japanese. However, this difference in the war-feeling of the two groups is being gradually eliminated, as the Japanese at home have also come to be further and further pinched in their daily life under the enforcement of the war-time control and mobilization of goods and materials.

All the Japanese have at last come to adjust themselves to the prospect of a protracted war.

But it seems at least to me that the public in general are too calm and quiet. Although the frenzied enthusiasm we saw in the early days of the war did not seem a happy phenomenon, this calmness at this juncture can neither be approved unconditionally. It even seems to be a kind of resignation on the part of the people in the face of the stern realities.

Needless to say, the situation that Japan is now trying to steer through is so difficult that it cannot be surmounted unless the whole of the people, in a national movement led by a high ideal, press forward vigorously with the force of an avalanche.

With this in view, the writer cannot help feeling uneasy at the existing state of affairs.

II

Even before the battle of Hsiichow was started, the siege of Hankow had been a subject for dispute. There were some who stressed the strategic importance of Hsiichow and so greatly counted upon the result of the battle of Hsiichow, while others stood against the further advance of the Japanese troops into the interior, for fear of the futile prolongment of the fighting area, as it would endanger the Japanese national finance as well as the maintenance of the occupied territories. Nevertheless, in order to assure victory, it had become absolutely necessary for the Japanese Army to occupy Hankow.

Along the Lung-Hai Railway, the Japanese force started their march on the Wuhan-Hankow area in close chase of the enemy retreating from Hsiichow. But after the occupation of Longfon and Kaifong, their vanguard was held up at Chungmochou, where part of the embankment of the Huanghai (Yellow River) was broken by the Chinese Army.
Through the broken embankment, the turbulent waters of the Hoangho are now reported to be running southwards, sweeping over the Lung-Hai Railway, through the Yingho, the Hwaiho and Hungtse Lake into the former course of the Hovngho and out into the sea.

By this flood, thousands of villages, large and small, were inundated with the loss of many lives and tons of millions of yen worth of crops and property. According to the reports of the Chief of the Reconstruction Office of Honan Province, the flood area is 2,300 sq. kilometers, the inundated villages more than 2,000, the washed-away houses more than half a million, and the devastated rice-fields two million and a half sq. (CN: about 62,500 acres). This may well be called an act in "The Tragedy of East Asia" caused by the China Incident. I wonder if the great River Hoangho is going to change its course for a seventh time since the dawn of history.

Thus, the advance of the Japanese troops along the Lung-Hai and the Peiping-Hankow railways was checked for the time being, and the main endeavors of the Japanese forces were directed towards restoring public peace in North China by sweeping away the remaining enemy forces in and around Shensi and other districts. But at the same time the Japanese Army's intention to attack Hankow was clearly revealed by their "up-the-Yangtze" strategy.

On June 11, the Japanese Navy demanded the withdrawal from the fighting area of all ships of third powers by announcing, "From this day on our Navy shall commence her attacking operations upon Hankow."

On the very next day Anking was taken by the cooperation of our Army and Navy while Tsienkiong was seized by the land force on June 17. Hankow was occupied on July 4 and July 26 saw Kukiang fall into the hands of the Japanese Army. Lying on the Yangtze River, Kukiang has an important position; it is only 50 li distant from Hankow. Further, on August 2, our Army occupied Hungmeiksien in Hupeh Province, a strategically important point to defend Wuchang and Hankow. It is 36 li from Hankow. Consequently, the Chinese at Hankow were greatly dismayed.

According to foreign dispatches, by the end of July the main diplomatic personnel of the Chiang Kai-shek's Government including Yang Chung-hui, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had left for Chungking. Most other non-military government offices also removed to Chungking while some fled to Hungyang-hsien or Hungning-hsien. Thus, Hankow had turned into a purely military center, only offices of communications, transportation, munitions supply, and war industries remaining there.

The Russian Embassy had already moved and the rest of the foreign embassies and legations at Hankow had completed removing to Chungking with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the end of July.

At any rate, the defense of Wuchang and Hankow was got ready by Chiang Kai-shek in a purely military formation. But about the final steps for defense, the Communists and Kuomintang did not agree. The former insisted upon fighting to the last while the latter insisted on retreating as usual after some amount of fighting. It is reported, however, that the insistence of the Kuomintang on finally abandoning Hankow prevailed upon the rest.
Chiang Kai-shek drew two defense lines for Hankow and Wuchang — an outer and an inner one. The outer line ran from Kushih in the west of Anhwei Province through Yingshan, Taihu and Kikiang, to Nanchang. At Kushih, Yingshan and in their environs the Huphe, Szechwan and Yunnan Armies were posted, while at Kukiang Nanchang and in their neighbourhood were posted the five divisions of the newly organized Kwantung Army besides more than 100,000 troops gathered from Kiangsi and Hunan. The inner defense line ran from Wushongkwan through Machong and Huangkang to Echeng, and was defended by the Hunan Army newly created by Chang Chih-Chung, Chief of Hunan. And most of the Central Army was reported to have been gathered under the command of Chen Chong around Wu-chang and Hankow, defending the Peiping-Hankow Railway at the section between Hangkow and Wushongkwan, and the Canton-Hankow Railway at the section between Wuchang and Changsha. But the outer line had already been broken through by the Japanese offensives.

III

Japan’s objective in attacking Wuchang and Hankow lies not so much in the taking—though important in itself—of those big political and military footholds of the Nationalist Government, as in the pursuit of the two vital results to be produced by the Chiang Kai-shak Government’s retreat into the interior and becoming a mere local power. One of them is the opening to be made for the estrangement of the Communists from the Kuomintang by cutting the so-called red route and isolating each sphere of influence from the other. The other is the possibility for disappointing the Powers by the degeneration of the National Government into a petty local regime and causing them to give up their support of it.

These two are the fundamental objectives of Japan in this campaign, though there are minor motives such as destroying the utility for the Chinese of the Canton-Hankow Railway, and securing the economic and military utility of the Yangtze Kiang for the Japanese.

Let us consider the first objective. The Communists, as I have said before, strongly insisted upon defending Wuchang and Hankow to the last. The Hsin Hua Jih Pao, a Hankow Communist paper, published under the joint signature of such leading Communists as Chon Sao-yu (Wong-min), Chou En-lai, and Chin Pang-hsion (Po-ku), an opinion regarding “the third stage of resistance”. The gist of it is as follows:

“The Spanish people hold Madrid, their capital, against their enemy for two years. Why can’t the brave labourers and soldiers of Wuchang and Hankow defend their cities? The crucial point is whether or not we take actual defensive steps, and not whether we are in a position to defend the cities or not.

“The most important factor to work throughout “the third stage of resistance” is the political and economic power of Wuchang and Hankow. The success or failure in the defense of the two cities greatly affects not only the third stage of resistance but the home and foreign affairs of China herself. Consequently, the third stage of resistance is closely knit with the course of this defense.”
"That are, then, the effective measures for the defense of Wuchang and Hankow as well as for the resistance of the third period?

On the military side, it is necessary to strengthen the defense of Wuchang and Hankow and also of the Yangtze River, and to reinforce our air force and air defense preparations. Further, students and citizens should be organized into a self-defense corps and given military equipment and training.

On the political side, a committee should be formed at once for a general mobilization for the defense of Wuchang and Hankow with the representatives of not only the Nationalist Military Committee and Garrison Headquarters but also of the Communists as well as of the industrial, agricultural, or commercial circles, cultural organizations and also women's organizations.

Besides the above-mentioned items, the following may be suggested as expressing general opinions regarding the military side of the third stage resistance. Namely, the reinforcement of the equipment and disposition of the front, unification of command, organization of different army corps, military training of the masses, development of guerilla tactics, improvement in the method of conscription, etc.

Moreover, as an active preparatory step for the third stage resistance, a political department should be at once established in everyone of the corps of different classes."

Apparently, these claims of the Communists were not accepted by the Kuomintang. The loss of Wuchang and Hankow will affect the Communists more severely than any other group. It will, at the same time, prove not a small blow to the Soviet Union who is helping China through the Chinese Communists. The fact that the Japanese are advancing on Hankow instead of Kwangtung, will delicately affect the relations between the Soviet Union and Britain, the two main supporters of China at present.

Let us now consider the second objective. The Powers now stand at a turning point to decide their attitudes towards the China Incident. On one hand they seem to intensify their antipathy against Japan and more talks are abroad about their intended aid and loans to help China directly. But on the other hand there are some signs indicative of their approach towards Japan.

From this point of view we pay special attention to the discussions held at the British Parliament on July 26-27.

Sir Sinclair, a member of the House of Commons, said: "It is difficult for us to send any fleet or army to the Far East to support the Chinese Army. So we should advance loans to China instead."

"In order to curb Japan's foolhardiness," stated Lord Ernbank (TN: phonetic), "I propose to raise the customs tariff on the goods imported from Japan into the British Isles and Dominions and, if necessary, to revogate the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911."

"It is better to check Japan in some way rather than to aid China," insisted Lord Cecil.

"Japan has repeatedly evoked her respect for British rights and interests in China and the maintenance of the open-door policy there. But in many cases, she has acted to the contrary. We don't want to have Japan keep on the same string any more. What does the Government say about it?" demanded Milne.

- 4 -
Whereupon Mr. Butler, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied: "This problem, together with others is to be talked over in the coming conversation between Sir Robert Craigie, Ambassador to Japan, and Japanese Foreign Minister Okawa, and its outcome is hoped to make clear to us the sincerity of the statements of the Japanese Government. Our Government has never taken any step to weaken the resisting power of Chiang Kai-shek’s Government against Japan, and the fact that our government has not introduced a bill making it possible to advance loans to the Nationalist Government does not mean that it refuses to help them."

Premier Chamberlain, after explaining his reason for withholding permission against the advance of loans to China, said: "Other methods of aid are now under consideration. British rights and interests in China are so old and extensive that we cannot allow them to be lost. So we will resort to every means to defend them. When a prospect opens for sure success, our Government will not hesitate to take some measure to stop hostilities in the Far East."

The practical demands that Britain is making of Japan at present are: Free passage of the Yangtze for her ships, rehabilitation of the British staff in such leased railways as the Shanghai-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow and Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway, payment of the bond interests, reopening of the British factories in the Japanese occupied area, etc.

Just now the Ugaki-Craigie conversation is under way with close public attention at home and abroad.

As for German influence in China, we can say so much that General Falkenhauzen and other military advisers who were robots, as it were, the contradiction lying between the German national policy and the tenacious pursuit of German merchants after commercial interests in China in the sale of munitions and others have finally left their posts.

French and Russian military instructors are said to have taken their places.

IV

Carried out in such circumstances as the above, the attack on Hankow will be sure to mark an important period in the Sino-Japanese hostilities. But at the time when Hankow is about to fall, the Russo-Japanese border dispute has suddenly come up with aggravating force and has cast a new light upon the situation.

As we all know, it is a serious border fight waged around Changyenfong between Japan and Russia since July 12. After unsuccessful negotiations, a fierce battle was fought around Shaoshofong and Changyenfong on July 29-31. On August 1, some Russian aeroplanes flew over and bombed Korean and Manchurian border-lands where fierce fighting is still going on at present.

Since the Manchurian Incident, cases of Russo-Japanese border dispute have been innumerable, but none has been more serious than the present one. The case is so critical that there is no knowing when a war will break out between the two countries. It is possible that this dispute may develop in such a direction as to completely change the phases of the China Incident.
Concerning this border dispute, some suspect, from the close Russo-Chinese relations, the working of some cooperative arrangements between the two countries at this crucial moment. This suspicion seems well grounded when we consider the above-described importance of Hankow in Russia's Chinese policies as well as in the policies of the Chinese Communists especially at this juncture when the city is about to fall. A further thought may lead us to conclude that the political crisis in Europe, caused by the quick advance of the Germans in Czechoslovakia, having been alleviated by the recent Anglo-German understanding, it temporarily allowed Russia to act more freely in the Far East. Or some may attribute this turn of tide fundamentally to a British policy to restrain Japan.

Still others try to explain that this is an attempt of the Russian Government, externally to divert the attention of the people from Stalin's too rigorous purges, which might otherwise result in internal unrest and conflict, or that this is a Russian demonstration against the case of 3rd General Lushkow (TNI: phonetic) who recently escaped from Russia to the protection of the Japanese Government.

The writer, however, would like to take it as a mere border dispute, though a rather complicated one, limited to the affected region which both parties are fighting to occupy, each believing and claiming it as their own.

But from the general objective conditions of the present Russo-Japanese relations we cannot pass it over as a mere local border dispute. It entails questions of critical nature.

Every Japanese is deeply interested in, and anxious about, the developments of Russo-Japanese relations.

At the beginning of this article, the writer has said that the Japanese as a whole are very quiet just now, so quiet that the writer cannot help feeling uneasy about it. Probably the Japanese people are beginning to realize the seriousness of the situation they are confronted with. Their apparent calmness is not a mere sign of their resignation but something more deeply rooted.

Many of us will quite agree with a certain radical political leader who said to the writer:

"It seems that a kind of apathetic resignation is prevailing among the present-day Japanese youth. I feel depressed not to hear them discuss foreign or internal social questions vigorously."

So that as it may, it is most important for the Japanese public to know the seriousness of their present circumstances, for in doing so, they can never be vain-glorious. We firmly believe that they will in time rise from the present chaos with their own means of solution for this crisis. They will then surely display their genuine courage toward their home and foreign questions.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the preceding translation in the attached document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

December 14, 1947
日中では時間に制限を設けていません。しかし、実際に訪問の時間に制限されている場合もあります。今からでも時間に制限されていません。日中では時間に制限を設けていません。しかし、実際に訪問の時間に制限されている場合もあります。今からでも時間に制限されていません。
為たものであるような気をなす。

雲が少なく日本が今曝け切るようとしてある周辺は生けしもので

くらくは民権が一つの道道なる道理に破りかかれ一つの国民選

の形をはって番雪の朝き前進進歩を巡するので当かれれば完成し進いよ

うな近勢のもつののである。

これを思いつける現状を想みる一国の不安を払ぜずには居らねない

のである。
水を占領した。七月四日には海口を占領した。既に二十六日には
が、陸軍の(Field Army)を展開した。七月に上部隊は八月二日以
のため、九月に小野の戦闘で
の地域である。九月には海口下流五十
は本を追われた。海口を去る三十六家の地経である。かくして海口は
既に大軍団を下达に言っている。外港の破壊の一として、これらを
の外交官ロンバ以下外間都官に入七月末までに全部仮設に移築した
とある。その一部は港湾及び鳥島に移築した壇で今や海口は築き
様に一部は港湾及び鳥島に移築した壇で今や海口は築き
心となり、陸軍、海軍、空軍部隊
の六十万軍団または百人組の配給は海上に於て行われた。七月末までに
の中央に於ての陸軍の方針変わり。一日
と同の地図を死守するか、外の空軍部隊はともに陸海軍及び陸海軍
の三十万軍団または百人組の配給は海上に於て行われた。七月末までに
の中央に於ての陸軍の方針変わり。一日
と同の地図を死守するか、外の空軍部隊はともに陸海軍及び陸海軍
中国事務のるかることを、第二に、第三にとし、これに於いても、この三者、中でも特に第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のもの、即ち第三のものです。
部分内容不清晰，无法准确翻译。
この共産主義の主張は選択的に示されるとところはならなかった。

なお、第三期業の進展の見通しの準備として、各級部版の中に政治部の速時建立

の側から省略しつつある表現にたいする二つの現在の表現ある、ソ連に(ソ連)目を

背、イギリスとの立場に対し微妙なる形態を反映するものと見ることが出来るであろう。
第三の問題については、列挙に今や、自分のした決定すべき必要な
感情が一層つるるうように見え、また彼が努力を揺るぐための
措置が今や一層の努力の必要なものであるが、何に於ては、日本に於て
の
これの裏から見て出来た事目すべきものがある。
シングチーム下院幹部は、支那影響のため彼が意見を発表に
述べるのは困難だから、その代わり支那に態度を取るべきに
エリバンクは、日本に反対を促すためには、日本から英米両国
同に渡入される機会の利用を用上げ、必要とされる一九一一年の日米
議定書の虚偽を昭告すべきと主張
ウォールドロー、ミルンは、日本は支那に於ける英米の不利益
と主張

と主張
外交史の観点から

この事件の詳細についてはここに詳述するまでもないが、七月十二日におけるソビエトとの間の激しい交渉をめぐる渡来もない事態前年である。

外交交渉の不成功に次いで七月二十九日から三十一日にかけて、交渉は再度に場を移して再開され、その結果九月に至っては ...


Page 12
崩壊及びソビエトの対立政策に於て特に重要なること前記の如くとするとなる
ならば、局中のかかるの如く考えることは、原因が無いことではあるのであ
る。更に一層重要になった方においては如何に於てソビエト政策の危険は
英ソ労働者の最近における
に於て政策に基づくものであるとの証をなすものである。

ハインは、ソビエト政府の行政の行動と、ソビエト政府の行政の行政の
　を誤解化するために必要に注意を分判する試みであるとし、更に
　また、ソビエト政府の行政の行政の

研究者たとえこれを想定理地に於ける局地の事変繋合事件のや、如何
れを占めるために努力を以て争いつ、ある一肢に於ける事変事件
なりと信じたいのである。
そういったものの勿論日ソ間閣の間には指摘の京大内閣官制にはこれを
模倣するに要する一綱要件として止めるべき深刻な危機を抱いている
ところである。

蕭者はこの一文の最初に於いて日本人一人が非常に
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恐
我々もまたこれに近い感じを受ける。しかし大衆が自らの立つとこ
ちの防備が甚だ薄いところに根ざしてあると信じることとは意味なことで
あり、このような場合には決して空想から出たいもののである。
我々は大衆がやがて戦いところから自らの修復を提げて現場するこ
とを固信してある。その時こそ内部に敵しても外に敵しても震える身が
発揮されるにあたるにあたる。
TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND TURKEY

Signed at Paris on October 10, 1939.

TREATY.

The President of the French Republic, His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of Indus (in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and the President of the Turkish Republic:

Desiring to conclude a treaty of a reciprocal character in the interests of their national security, and to provide for mutual assistance in resistance to aggression,

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, namely:

The President of the French Republic:

M. René Cassigli, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Commander of the Legion of Honour;

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of Indus (in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

Sir Hugh Montgomerie Girtonbough-Pugesson, K.Ch.;
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary;

The President of the Turkish Republic:

Dr. Hafiz Seydan, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy for Istanbul.
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE 1.**

In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey, France and the United Kingdom will co-operate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power.

**ARTICLE 2.**

(1) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power.

(2) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, the Government of the United Kingdom and the French Government will collaborate effectively with the Turkish Government and will lend it all aid and assistance in their power.

**ARTICLE 3.**

So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Roumania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.
ARTICLE 4.

In the event of France and the United Kingdom being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression committed by that Power against either of those Nations without the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 being applicable, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together.

It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at least a benevolent neutrality towards France and the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE 5.

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3 above, in the event of either:

(1) aggression by a European Power against another European State which the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties had, with the approval of that State, undertaken to assist in maintaining its independence or neutrality against such aggression, or

(2) aggression by a European Power which, while directed against another European State, constituted, in the opinion of the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties, a menace to its own security,

the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as might be considered effective.
ARTICLE 6.

The present Treaty is not directed against any country, but is designed to assure France, the United Kingdom and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance in resistance to aggression should the necessity arise.

ARTICLE 7.

The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding on bilateral obligations between Turkey and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 8.

If the High Contracting Parties are engaged in hostilities in consequence of the operation of the present Treaty, they will not conclude an armistice or a peace except by common agreement.

ARTICLE 9.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited simultaneously at Ngor as soon as possible. It shall enter into force on the date of this deposit.

The present Treaty is concluded for a period of fifteen years. If none of the High Contracting Parties has notified the two others of its intention to terminate it six months before the expiration of the said period, the Treaty will be renewed by tacit consent for a further period of five years, and so on.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Ngor, in triplicate, the 19th October, 1939.

(L.S.) R. MISSILI.

(L.S.) H. M. MILTON-BULL-HUGHES.

(L.S.) W. R. SYR.

4
PROTOCOL NO. 1

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries state that their respective Governments agree that the Treaty of mutual assistance dated this day shall be put into force from the moment of its signature.

Done at Angora, in triplicate, the 19th October, 1939.

R. M. S. R. U. I.
H. M. K. T. H. U. A. E. R.
D. R. S. H. W. M.

PROTOCOL NO. 2.

At the moment of signature of the Treaty between the United Kingdom, France and Turkey, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to this effect, have agreed as follows:

The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the aforesaid Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the U.S. S. R.

The present Protocol of Signature shall be considered as an integral part of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded to-day between the United Kingdom, France and Turkey.

Done at Angora, in triplicate, the 19th October 1939.

R. M. S. R. U. I.
H. M. K. T. H. U. A. E. R.
D. R. S. H. W. M.
DEF. DOC. #150

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 13th day of December 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

witness: Nagaharu Odo
千九百三十九年十月十九日「アカニア」於テ署名

ノリ之ヲ採リタリ

（本条約ノ英文ハ英囯政府発行ノ白書）
リヘンと北部「アイルランド」連合王国二関し

特命全権大使「ナイト」コンスロンダー・オブ・セント・マイクル・エンド・サント・ジョージー・サーサー・ヒューマン・マンガマリー・ナッ

「トロール」共同国大統領

「イスタンブール」州選出下院議員、臨時外務大臣、内閣議長コード

右各連盟国ハ其ノ侵害症状ヲ変更シガ良好妥当ナルヲ認メタル

後ノ間規定ヲ協定セリ

第一條

トロール國ニ對スルニヨーロッパ＝ノ＝ノ侵略ノ結果トシテト

トロール國ニ於テノ戦闘行為ニ従スル場合＝於テハ連合王国＝政府

府及単独西國政府ハトロール＝因政府ト有效ニ協力シ且＝ニ其ノ為

得ル一切ノ助力及協力ヲ與べス

デ
第二節及第三節所適用セラルルコントナクシテ聯合王国及保関司令部ガ其

何レカノニ一方ニ对シヨーロッパノノ箇所ニ為シタル侵略ノ結果ト
シテハ一箇ノノ箇所行ニ從スル場合ニ於テハ論約ヲハ即時ヲ退

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尤モ右ノ如キ不調ノ事件ニ於テハトルコノ国ハ保関司令部及聯合王国

ニ对シヲクトモ好意的中立ヲ遵守スルコトヲ約ス

前記ヲ三箇ノ規定ヲ容シルコトヲナクシテ

第

第五節

締約国モノノラガヨーロッパニ依リタルサルルコントハ對シシノ独立ヲハ中立ヲ維持スルコトヲ

他ノラサルルコントハ對シシノ同意ヲ得テシタル場合ニ於テサルルコントヲ

トニ付従ヲ助シルコトヲ其ノ同意ヲ得テサルルコントヲ

ハヨーロッパニ依リ為サルタル業務ニ對シテヨーロッパニ

他ノラサルルコントハ對シシノラサルルコントヲ

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第六条

本条約ハ何レノ国ニ對シテ仕向ケラレタルモノニ非ズ本条約ハ必要ノ
生ズル場合ニ於テ依ヲニ對シテ最ハルルヲ為シス相互ノ助力及援助ヲ備前面國
聯合王國及他国トルコール国ハ對ソ確保セントコヲ目的タルモノナリ

第五条

締約国ハ合意ヲ依ルノ外合国ニ憲約ヲ締結スルヲ平和持続ナル

ヘン
第一談定書

下名ノ金庫委員ハ各自ノ政庁ガ本日附ノ相互委託条約ヲ其ノ署名ノ時
ヨリ実施スルコトニ意見一致セルコトヲ既認ス

千九百三十九年十月十九日「アンカラニ於テ本費三通ヲ作成ス

ドクトルハーバン・サイダム

エレマッサグリ
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kacru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here to attached in Japanese consisting of 8 pages and entitled "Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of December 1946.

E. Hayashi
Signature of Official

witness: Nagaharu Osdo
AGREEMENT OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND POLAND.


The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Polish Government:

Desiring to place on a permanent basis the collaboration be­
tween their respective countries resulting from the assurances of
mutual assistance of a defensive character which they have already
exchanged;

Have resolved to conclude an Agreement for that purpose and
have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland:

Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Polish Government:

His Excellency Count Edward Raczyński, Ambassador Ex­
traordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Polish
Republic in London;

Who, having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due
form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article I.

Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hosti­
ilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the
latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party
will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all
the support and assistance in its power.
Article 2.

(1) The provisions of Article 1 will also apply in the event of any action by a European Power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence or one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces.

(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of action by that Power which threatened the independence or neutrality of another European State in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Party, the provisions of Article 1 will apply, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other European State concerned.

Article 3.

Should a European Power attempt to undermine the independence of one of the Contracting Parties by processes of economic penetration or in any other way, the Contracting Parties will support each other in resistance to such attempts. Should the European Power concerned thereupon embark on hostilities against one of the Contracting Provisions of Article 1 will apply.

Article 4.

The methods of applying the undertakings of mutual assistance provided for by the present Agreement are established between the competent naval, military and air authorities of the Contracting Parties.

Article 5.

Without prejudice to the foregoing undertakings of the
Contracting Parties to give each other mutual support and assistance immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, they will exchange complete and speedy information concerning any development which might threaten their independence and, in particular, concerning any development which threatened to call the said undertakings into operation.

Article 6.

(1) The Contracting Parties will communicate to each other the terms of any undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or may in future give to other States.

(2) Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to give such an undertaking after the coming into force of the present Agreement, no other Contracting Party shall, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be informed thereof.

(3) Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties may enter into in future shall not limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating in these undertakings and the third State concerned.

Article 7.

Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

Article 8.

(1) The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years.

(2) Unless denounced six months before the expiry of this
Contracting Parties to give each other mutual support and assistance immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, they will exchange complete and speedy information concerning any development which might threaten their independence and, in particular, concerning any development which threatened to call the said undertakings into operation.

Article 6.

(1) The Contracting Parties will communicate to each other the terms of any undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or may in future give to other States.

(2) Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to give such an undertaking after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the other Contracting Party shall, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be informed thereof.

(3) Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties may enter into in future shall neither limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating in these undertakings and the third States concerned.

Article 7.

Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

Article 8.

(1) The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years.

(2) Unless denounced six months before the expiry of this
period it shall continue in force, each Contracting Party having thereafter the right to denounce it at any time by giving six months' notice to that effect.

(3) The present Agreement shall come into force on signature.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in English in duplicate, at London, the 25th August, 1939. A Polish text shall subsequently be agreed upon between the Contracting Parties and both texts will then be authentic.

(L.S.) HALIFAX.
(L.S.) EDWARD RZYMSKI.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of December 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

witness : Nagaharu Mdo
千九百三十九年八月二十五日「ロンドン」締結

「グレートブリテン」及び北部「アイルランド」政府及び

「ポーランド」政府

両国が短い交換シテル防衛の必要性相互援助の必要性の一籌可

協力を永くの基礎ノ上ヲ置ケンコープルヲ望シ

が為協定ヲ締結スルコトニ決シ左ノ如ク其ノ検察委員ヲ任命セリ

外務大臣、子爵「ハリファックス」

「ポーランド」政府

英国指揮「ポーランド」共同国際命全體大使、伯爵「エドワード・ラタンスキー」

各国検察委員ハ其ノ検察委員任状ヲ交換シ之ヲ良好妥当ナルヲ認メタル

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
一方の締約国が之を對スルヨーロッパノ国ニ依ル後ノ結果ト
シテ該国トノ戰闘行為ニ從事スルヲ至ルトキハ他方ノ締約国ハ自國ノ
為シ得ル一切ノ支持及援助ヲ戦闘行為ニ從事スル締約国ニ對シ直ニ與
フペシ．
百 năm tras nihn năm八月二十五日"ロンドン"に於ケ英吉利將軍以テ本督
二通ノ作成ス"ポーランド"顧ノ本文ハ次テ締約國間ニ協定セラレ
ク右ノ場合ニ於テ兩本文八共ニ正文タルペシ

ハリフアックス
（印）

エドワード・ラチンスキー
（印）
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

T. HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Agreement of Mutual Assistance Between the United Kingdom and Poland" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of December 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Yasaharu ødo
The Imperial Rescript

It has indeed been a great ethical principle bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors to promote the cause of justice and humanity all over the world and thus establish universal brotherhood among all nations. And we (Te: "Chihi," pronoun reserved for the Emperor) have always borne this matter conscientiously in mind. Now, however, the world situation has come to such a pass that there seems to be no limit to disturbances, and disasters to be suffered by mankind threaten to become immeasurable also. So, we entertain a deep concern for the removal of these evils and restoration of peace at the earliest possible date. Accordingly, we ordered our Government to negotiate for partnership and collaboration with Germany and Italy, who share the same intentions as Japan. We are greatly pleased to see a treaty hereby concluded between the three aforementioned countries.

We feel that to allot all countries its respective proper place and to have all people enjoy safety of life and property, is the greatest task over incumbent upon humanity, and we are yet very far from seeing this task accomplished. Thou, our subjects, should endeavor to gain a clearer conception of our national polity and, with careful planning and prudent deliberation, make strenuous efforts in unison, overcome the critical situation, and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne eternal as heaven and earth.

The Imperial Regnal and Seal 27 September, the 15th year of Showa (1940)
On this 27 day of September, the 10th year of Showa (1940)

Premier Prince
War minister

Foreign minister
(Concurrently) minister of Oversea Affairs

Education minister
Extraordinary acting minister of Commerce and Industry Finance Minister

Home minister
(Concurrently) welfare minister

Justice minister
Communication minister
(Concurrently) R. I. A. Y. minister

Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
Navy minister

Director of the Planning Board
Certificate

I, Z.A.O., Z.A.O., Chief of General Affairs Section, of the Cabinet Secretariat, certify that the Japanese document given on the attached sheet is identical with the original Imperial Regent published in the extra number of the Japanese Government's official gazette, issued on Sept. 27th, the 10th year of Showa (1940).

On this second day of December, the 1st year of Showa (1946), at Tokyo.

Chief of General Affairs Section, Cabinet Secretariat, Z.A.O., Z.A.O. (Signed and sealed)

I certify that the foregoing has signed and sealed before me.

On this of December, the 1st year of Showa (1946), at Tokyo.

Signed: Secretary of the Cabinet Meeting, Naito Kikumaro (Signed and sealed).

Translation Certificate.

I, Charles B. Senio, Chief of the Japanese Language Branch, hereby certify that the following translation attached to the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and ability, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/ / Charles B. Senio.

Tokyo, J. A. N.
D. 26, Dec. 1946.
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証

明

自分佐藤昭生ハ内閣官房総務庁長ナルトヨ別紙日本政文書第十五年九月二十七日発行ノ附外所載

昭和二十一年十二月一日於東京

内閣官房総務庁長 佐藤昭生

同日於所

立会人 内閣官房官 井川克一
.TRANSMITION

Pursuant to section 538 of Title III, Part II, of the Tariff Act of 1930 (46 St. 560, 701), the United States Tariff Commission has investigated the differences in costs of production or
and all other facts and conditions enumerated in said section with
respect to, cotton cloth, being wholly or in part on, growth or
product of the United States and of the respect to a like or similar
article wholly or in part on, growth or product of the principal
competing country;

Whereas in the course of said investigation a hearing was held,
of which reasonable public notice was given and at which parties
interested were given reasonable opportunity to be present, to
produce evidence, and to be heard;

Whereas the Commission has reported to the President the
results of said investigation and his findings with respect to
such differences in costs of production,

Whereas the Commission has found by said investigation
that the principal competing country is Japan, and that the duties
expressly fixed by statute do not equalize the differences in the
costs of production of the domestic article and the like or similar
foreign article, then produced in said principal country, and has
specified in its report the increase in the rates or duty expressly
fixed by statute, found by the Commission to be equal to said investigation to be necessary to equalize such differences; and
WHEREAS in the judgment of the President such rates of duty are shown by such investigation of the Tariff Commission to be necessary to equalize such differences in costs of production:

Now, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Sec. 306 (c), Title III, Part II of the said Act do hereby approve and proclaim increases in the rates of duty expressly fixed in Paragraph 306 (b) of Title I of the said Act on cotton cloth, bleached, containing yarns the average number of which exceeds number 30 but does not exceed number 50, from 16 per centum ad valorem and, in addition thereto, for each number, thirty-five one-hundredths of 1 per centum ad valorem, to 28 1/2 per centum ad valorem and, in addition thereto, for each number, one-half of 1 per centum ad valorem; and increases in the rates of duty expressly fixed in Paragraph 306 (c) of Title I of the said Act on cotton cloth, printed, dyed, or colored, containing yarns the average number of which exceeds number 30 but does not exceed number 50, from 16 per centum ad valorem and, in addition thereto, for each number, thirty-five one-hundredths of 1 per centum ad valorem, to 28 1/2 per centum ad valorem and, in addition thereto, for each number, one-half of 1 per centum ad valorem.

None of the foregoing increases in rates of duty shall be applied to any cotton cloth of a kind described in Paragraph 306 (d) of Title I of the said Act.

In ...thereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 31st day of May in the
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty-six, and of the
(seal) Independence of the United States of America the one
hundred and sixtieth.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

by the President:

Cordell Hull
Secretary of State.

(No. 2171)

(Pills, May 21, 1936; 4:44 p.m.)
STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, A.Yamada, Chief of the Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document in English entitled "PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES -- INCREASED RATE OF DUTY ON COTTON CLOTH -- OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -- A PROCLAMATION" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo 14 November 19...
合衆国大統領
木綿衣類に関する増加関税
アメリカ合衆国大統領により

1930年の国際法（4月4日、590、701）の第2条第3項の50部に該当合衆国財務委員会は
仕様的に或いは部分的に合衆国の成長物であり生産物である木綿の生産価格の差及びそれに関するすべての他の事実、条件並びに仕様的に或いは部分的に
主要競争国間の成長物、生産物たる同一或いは類似品につき以上のこと等を研究せり。

この調査の中興に於ては密観が聴取され合理的な民間の部が加へられその関係団体は出席し意見をつよく
耳をかたむけるへども通常なる状態から加へられたり
委員会は大統領に本調査の結果及び生産価格の差額
に関する決定を報告せり。
委員会は調査に依り次の事実を知れり。即も主要
競争国は日本であること及び法令による所定の関税
は国内貨品と競争に於て紡績された類似品との価格
合衆国大統領
木ネフ属に関する17条の加筆
アメリカ合衆国大統領により
宣言

1930年の関税法（480法，590701）の第2595条に於て合衆国大統領委員会は、
全般的に成びは部分的に合衆国の成長若し生産した
木ネフ属の生産価格の差及びそれに関するす
べての他の事項、條件並びに全般的成びは部分的に
主要関税条の成長物，生産物若し同一成びは類似品
につき以上のことを研究せり。

この調査の中通に於ては意見が取られ合理的な民
間の呼が加へられそのii条同様は出席し露一夜をつく
り耳をかたむげるべき適当なる数合が期へられたり
委員会は大統領に調査の結果及び生産価格のかか
る差額に関する判定を報告せり。

委員会は調査に依り次のような事項を知り，即ち主観
関税条は日本であること及び法令による所定の関税
は関内運品と関外に於て徴収された類似品との価格

1
の差を平衡ならしめることで、その報告に於て委員会はその問題の結果、法令による所定の関税率の増加がかかる差額に平衡ならしめる為に必要であると認めたことを確定に述べべく。

大抵傾向の関税率は関税委員会のその問題により税関領有の関税を平衡ならしめることの必要事が示されるということ思ふ。

以上により余、アメリカ合衆国大統領フランクリン
ルーズヴェルトが、これに該当の第2篇第3項33.6
(0) 部により余に示され同様に関税ののもとに税関領
有の関税を増加に定めを示し為の如く直指す。は示現
有利益平均額3.0以上5.0以下の所定税額1.3ヶそれ以
上は各税額に従税額
35
100

1/2づつ100%に減るまで
増加それ以上は各税額に1/2づつ増加す。

印刷紙は染色せる紙及び紙色せる綿布類に関して
は為の如く関税率を増加する。即ち平均額3.0以上
5.0以下の税額を含む場合は従税額1.6ヶそれ以上
は税額に従税額
35
100

1/2づつ221/2%まで増加それ以上は
各税額に1/2づつ増加す。
証 明 書

出所並びに使用に関する証明書

余、日本外務省記録敗戦志。次のこと証明する。

突椙で記された文書は「合衆国大統領一木舘文書に関する関係増加率―アメリカ合衆国大統領により一証明書」と正題を読む被告なる日本外務省公文書の発行なり。

1946年11月14日 東京にて

署名 宅 謹

証人 佐 賢
I, OHTA, Kôzô, having first duly sworn according to the customary formality in this country, deposing as follows:

1. 15 DEC 1939 — Born at Fukushima City.
2. 1920 — Graduated at the Imperial University (British Law Section)
3. From APR 45 to AUG 45 — Served as Minister of Education in the SUZUKI Cabinet.

When the SUZUKI Cabinet accepted the Potsdam Declaration, I understood that war criminals in the said Declaration meant conventional war criminals according to existing international law, including neither leaders of the people nor high officials in important positions of the State who had no relation with the said conventional war crimes.

SUZUKI Prison,
This 5th day of December 1946
OHTA, Kôzô, Affiant.
DE: DOC No. 160

The written oath

I swear according to my conscience to state the whole truth, conceal nothing and to add nothing.

O.W.T., 6.25
(Signed and Se 1.d.)
DWP DOC No. 160

Sworn to and subscribed before me at the above mentioned date and place.

SHIDO RA, Tokisaburo
Witness.
CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the duly assigned Investigating Officer for the Defense Section of the Major War Crimes Trial, and that I was present on 5th December 1946 at the interrogation of OHTA, Kozo in Sugamo Prison. I further certify that the foregoing affidavit was interrogated and translated to me by MATSUSHITA, Yasutoshi. Sworn to and subscribed before me this 5th December 1946.

David W. Persons, Cert. Inf.
Investigating Officer,

Translation Certificate.

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation of the affidavit of OHTA, Kozo is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 2 Dec. 1946
无
这是一张白纸，没有任何可读的文本。
CHINESE ATTACK KOREANS - Bond of 400
Destroy Dam Built Under Guard. Another
Changchun Incident.

In connection with dispatches from Changchun reporting a collision
between the local Japanese and Chinese authorities in consequence of the
persecution of Korean farmers by Chinese, the Asahi says that the question
of the persecution of Korean farmers at Manpaochan, about 30 kilometres
north of Changchun, dates from May 31st, when 300 Chinese policemen were
sent to clear the place of about 200 Korean farmers.

The situation became tense at one time, but the negotiations subsequently
opened by the Consulate-General at Mukden with the authorities of Kirin prov-
ince eased the situation appreciably. The Chinese authorities consented
to the continued residence of the Koreans, but insisted on the abandonment
of the work on which these Koreans have been engaged, namely building dams
on a river. The Japanese authorities rejected the demand on the ground
that the Koreans being used to the planting in paddy fields, it is im-
possible for them to take to planting in dry fields. Moreover, it was
pointed out, it is too late to change the programme. For the loss re-
sulting from the dam construction work the Japanese authorities offered
to make due Compensation. The Chinese side, however, was insistent, and
no agreement has hitherto been reached. In the meantime, the Japanese
side, deeming it of vital necessity for the Korean farmers to Complete
the dam construction work for irrigation purposes, the work was carried
on and finished on the 27th ultimo. The Chinese authorities connived
at it, evidently willing to take the matter up later.

On the 1st instant, however, over 400 Chinese farmers raided the
district in a body, wrecked the dam and committed outrages.
Def. Doc. 3 167

Article from The Japan Chronicle, July 3, 1931.

CHINESE ATTACK KOREANS - Bomb of 400
Destroy Dam Built Under Guard. Another
Changchun Incident.

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新作に備えるレタチルルメ。 настоящееにいたる以前スルコトハリメデイトイフノデアツタ。ルトノ理由ニ於て支那ノコノ要求ヲ拒否シタ。更ニモウツノ理由

日本側當局ハ右工場ヲリ生ゲベノ損害ハ正當ニ賠償スルト申す。しか

日本側当局ハ従来強硬デツテ、現在マデノコロ和解ノ成立ニ至ルテイ

レタが結論必須デアルトイフ見迫ヲリハノクニヲムニュガムニ鉄道工事ヲ戦行シ、先月ニテセニコ

レヲ完成シタ。支那側當局ハコノ認識ヲ形デアツタガ、支那問題ヲ当

ガムニヲ破壊シ、暴行ヲ第イ。
For Japan, the preservation of peace and order in North China is always a matter of serious concern. However, the Chinese policy of relentless opposition against Japan has frequently threatened the tranquility of that region, leading finally to the Laiyouchiao Incident of the recent date. From the outset the Japanese Government have, in the interest of the peace of East Asia, made it their policy to seek non-aggravation of the situation and a settlement on the spot and they have striven to dispose of the troubles in a peaceful manner. To the Hopei-Chahar Political Council Japan made only such demands as were most lenient and localized in character and scope—namely, discontinuation of the stationing of Chinese troops in the vicinity of Laiyouchiao and on the left bank of the Yungting River, the necessary guarantees for the future, punishment of those directly responsible and apology from their superiors. The Hopei-Chahar authorities agreed to these terms of settlement on the night of July 11, but no sincere attempt to carry them out has been made during all these days past. On the other hand, the Japanese Government addressed a memorandum to the Nanking Government on July 17, advising them to cease immediately from all provocations by word or deed, and not to interfere with the settlement on the spot. The Nanking Government, in their utter disregard of the realities of the situation, not only have rejected our proposals, but have pushed on even more vigorously their warlike preparations, increasing the
tension all the more. It was while the Japanese Government, patient
and forbearing, were still continuing their endeavors to effect a
peaceful solution, that on July 26, our soldiers, engaged in
repairing telegraph lines, were unlawfully fired upon by the Chinese,
and that in the evening of the same day the Chinese shut the gate
of escaping from our forces who, with the understanding of the
Topei-Chahor authorities, were entering the city in order to
protect our residents there.

These outrages clearly constitute armed obstruction of the
execution by our North China Garrison of their primary duties of
protecting our nationals and of insuring free communications between
Peiping and Tientsin. The Japanese Army is now compelled to resort
to such self-defensive measures as are necessary for executing its
own duties as well as for insuring the fulfilment of the terms of
settlement. Of course, Japan has no other objectives in view save
the accomplishment of the very causes of all antecedent intents such as
the present one. She entertains no enmity toward the innocent
people of China, nor does she harbor any territorial designs. It
goed without saying that she will make every effort to safeguard
the rights and interests of the Powers.

Though things have come to such a pass, even now, Japan, whose
mission is to secure peace in East Asia, hopes most fervently that
China will yet reconsider, and thereby make it possible to minimize
the scope of the present incident and to bring about an early and
amicable settlement.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "An Informal Statement made by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, expressing the views of the Japanese Government, July 27, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of December, 1946.

(signed) Nagaharu ODO
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) a. ISaIDA
東亜平和確保

日本

太平洋

東亜平和確保

日本

太平洋

日本

太平洋

日本

太平洋
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, 3DO, Nagahara, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "An Informal Statement made by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, expressing the views of the Japanese Government, July 27, 1947," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of December, 1946.

(signed) Nagahara 3DO

Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) H. ISHIDA
P. 114  STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE REGARDING THE INCIDENT
OF SHELLED THE LADYBIRD AND OTHER BRITISH VESSELS.
DECEMBER 30, 1937

At the request of the Foreign Minister, H. Koki Hirota,
the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, called upon the
Foreign Minister on the 28th December, and was handed the Note
of the Japanese Government with respect to the incidents of
attacks made on the Ladybird and other British vessels.

Essential contents of the Japanese Note are as follows:

Monsieur l'Ambassadouir,

Concerning the incidents that occurred on the 12th
instant in which Japanese forces attacked British men-of-war
and merchant vessels by mistake, I had the honour to address
a Note under date of the 14th instant tendering the profound
apology of the Japanese Government, and stating that they have
taken the necessary steps to prevent the recurrence of similar
incidents, and that they would deal properly with those respon­
sible—and also defray the necessary compensation. Your
Excellency sent a Note in reply under date of the 16th instant,
in which Your Excellency, after describing the circumstances
surrounding the incident, said (1) that the British Government
were glad to receive my Note of the 14th mentioned above, (2)
that they requested an assurance that the contents of my Note
would apply to the attacks upon the British merchant vessels,
(3) that they took particular note of the point that those responsible would be suitably dealt with, and (4) that they desired to be informed that measures had been actually taken of a character which would put a definite stop to incidents of such a kind. I hastened to assure your Excellency immediately in my Note of the 17th instant that what I had said in my Note of the 14th would, of course, apply to the British merchant vessels that had been attacked under such circumstances.

Upon the occurrence of the present incident the Japanese Government did their best to ascertain the facts of the case; but unfortunately, for various reasons, such as the wide separation of the units concerned which was consequent upon the progress of the military operations, and the inadequacy of the means of communication, the completion of the investigation has been delayed. We have now at length received a full report covering all aspects of the incidents, of which the principal points have already been explained by our military and naval authorities to members of Your Excellency's Embassy.

As Your Excellency must have gathered from this report, the present incidents were, in each case, due to the fact that our armed forces concerned had taken it for granted that under the circumstances which prevailed at the time all foreign warships and vessels had sought refuge from the theatres of battle and from their vicinity, and that there could be no other vessels left in those localities than those of an enemy character, and also to the fact that just then, owing to the
thick fog or haze, visibility was extremely poor; and there is no room for doubt as to the fact that our forces never attacked those vessels intentionally, knowing them to be of British nationality. This is clearly apparent in the light of the one fact alone that our naval air squadrons and military units ceased firing the instant they discovered the nationality of the ships, and our soldiers gave assistance in taking care of the dead and wounded of the "ladybird".

As regards the assertion advanced to the effect that our military commander concerned spoke of his having received an order to fire upon all vessels on the Yangtze, the Japanese Government have, with special concern, investigated the matter, and it has been established that the alleged order applied only to all vessels used for military purposes by the enemy, and it was never meant to apply to the vessels of third powers.

As regards the matters of an apology on behalf of the Japanese Government and compensation, it is only necessary to reaffirm that I have said in my previous Note. As for the treatment of those responsible, although it has been established that the incidents were entirely due to a mistake, the Japanese Government, in order to insure against all possibility of similar mistakes, have dealt properly with those responsible on the ground that they failed to take the fullest measures of precaution.

Finally, as regards the guarantee for the future, the Army and the Navy issued, immediately after the incidents,
strict orders to the forces to guard against a repetition of such mistake by exercising the greatest caution in every area where vessels of Great Britain and other third powers are found. Also, both the military, naval, and diplomatic authorities on the spot have, in view of the present untoward incidents, renewed the rigid instructions that had been repeatedly given to safeguard life and property in the case of third powers. The Japanese Government are studying, and expect to carry out, every possible means of realizing the above aims. For instance, they intend to ascertain, in still closer cooperation with the British authorities, the whereabouts of British nationals and interests, and to communicate intelligence thereof to the authorities on the spot, and also to subordinate units, and they have taken steps to improve the facilities of communication for the speedy and effective transmission of orders.

The Japanese Government have taken all these measures enumerated above in their sincere desire to render more effective and certain the guarantee for the rights and interests of Great Britain and other third powers, and I earnestly hope that this will be appreciated by the British Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODC, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Regarding the Incident of Shelling the Ladybird and British Vessels, December 30, 1937" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of ..., 1947.

(Signed) Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) K. Ishida
レバノンを除く他国の政権

（十二月三十一日）

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（2）
二十六日関東軍参謀長大島征治中将は、相模原駐屯地司令官に所信の Exclusive Recommendation to 将

（3）
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office regarding the Incident of Shelling the Ladybird and British Vessels, December, 30, 1937" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

7
on this 7th day of January 1947.

(Signed) Nagaharu, ODO
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Ishido.


"Excerpts from "East Asia" pamphlet No.1. Translated by
Two Speeches given at the Pacific Conference, Defense Language
Rev. 4, 1929, given by Yosuke Matsuk., French
Published by East Asia Economic Research Bureau.

J. MANCHURIA: PAST AND PRESENT

By MITSUKI, Yosuke

Manchuria is often called in Europe and America, the central zone of war,
or "the Balkans of Asia". Many writers point out this area as the stage of
"the next world war". But in recent years, great influx of Chinese
immigrants into Manchuria erected a topic for the whole world. In consequence
the economic development of Manchuria has drawn much attention. This certainly
is an important phase. I would like to discuss this phase. Amidst attacks
and abuses Japan has been calmly and boldly striving and concentrating all
energies on her objective for more than twenty years. Japan, as she has not
forgotten in the past, cannot forget to consider her security seriously.
I think you remember that once Russia trampled down Mongolia and Korea with
the tacit consent of China and almost succeeded in occupying Manchuria.
History reports itself, and Japan has still reason to be apprehensive for her
safety. Regardless of this situation, giving her best talent to the development
of Manchuria, Japan has been striving to achieve her objective. The world has
begun to recognise the actual fact that the thirty years' history of Manchuria
is a record of development probably never known in the world's history and
fortunately this record will hold out and another will be erected in several dozen
years to come. In order to make a full estimation of Manchuria's achievement,
I think it is necessary to make various comparative studies. In the first
place, comparison must be made by tracing back to the age of Manchuria
before HENGHUNG (NINGPO) was opened as a foreign trade port. Only seventy
years ago Manchuria was nothing but a deserted, uncultivated area, thinly popu-
lated with no contact with the modern civilised world, the only exception being that trade in furs and hides was carried out across the Siberian border. The government of the CHING Dynasty in Peking was not only loath to encourage the cultivation of Manchuria, but tried every means to impede it. For instance, the government enforced its policy of forbidding the Chinese to emigrate into areas north of the Great Wall. It was only in 1905 that the laws and orders relating to this were abolished. The Manchurian court in Peking deemed Manchuria a forbidden land isolated from other Chinese areas and the Chinese were not allowed to settle there.

The history of Manchuria's connections with other powers at large dates from the day when NEWCHWANG was opened as a port. But the development of the port since its opening was so slow that after forty years its annual foreign trade did not exceed 20 million Haikwan (Ti Custom) Tael. This slow development was due to the fact that at the time the sole dependable traffic facilities in Manchuria were rivers and streams NEWCHWANG (YINKOW) situated at the mouth of a river, enjoyed an advantageous position in trade. But as the railway came to occupy the foremost position as a means of transportation and the river froze during the most important months of the year, this circumstance had been an obstacle to the port of NEWCHWANG achieving a large scale commercial development.

The large scale development of Manchuria which has been realised within these thirty years, in fact, entirely depended on the opening of railway transportation. It was the construction of that huge Eastern China Railway by the Russians that took an initiative in this field. Although the Russians laid the railroad chiefly in strategic consideration, the distribution of the railway lines was suitable for
commercial development. One was a commercial line stretching from east to west, with Vladivostok as the central port, and the other was the line running from south to north having Dairen as its terminus. The reason why I specially lay stress on this, is very clearly shown in that Manchurian development in future may be achieved by following the original Russian plan which confirmed the above mentioned success by building the rail roads in four directions. While Russians should be crowned with the honour of having taken an initiative toward the development of Manchuria according to modern principles, it is also plain fact that the Russian undertakings in Manchuria did not give an noteworthy benefit to the world. Namely, the Russians used the Manchurian railway entirely for their own purpose, without opening this to others. So there was no other way for other nations to carry on trade in Manchuria except through PEICHWANG as before. Later the situation made a rapid change when Japan came to possess the most part of the southern line of the Eastern China Railways, opened this railway to every nation of the world, made Dairen a free port and quickened the opportunity for opening many commercial markets in all Manchuria. Thus Japan brought a motive power to make this area a really important factor in the world's commerce.

During this period or within a few years after the Russo-Japanese War, the resources of Manchuria were, properly speaking, a possibility rather than an actuality. I think the prosperity of Manchuria as we see it today is to be attributed to the achievements performed in the past quarter century. The main factors of this development consist in the South Manchuria Railway and several Japanese interests on account of which the Japanese government is responsible for maintaining peace and order in Manchuria. Among the twenty eight ports and
markets opened for Manchurian trade, twenty four were opened by Japanese proposals. Even so, we could have anticipated the present or present parity of Manchuria without the Japanese contribution in according two factors essential for Manchurian international development, name peace and safe steady communication facilities.

If we go back to the time before Japanese interests originated and compare the past Manchurian situation with that of China proper, the former is found to have been an unknown and uncultivated area, having very little trade with other nations.

Compared with the rest of the Chinese areas, Manchuria remained a barren land infested with mounted bandits and China Proper had no concern over it. In China Proper at that time there had already appeared signs of development in railways, harbours, telegraphic communications and other modern cultural facilities, while Manchuria still remained a deserted land. However, during the past thirty years Manchuria has not only attained the level of China Proper, but outstripped it in various fields. Also in China proper because of civil war and other insurrections, the actual industrial development, especially transport facilities were completely impeded and the existent industrial facilities in many fields were demolished.

On the contrary we saw the progress of constant construction and development. Thirty years ago there were a few isolated cottages in HARBIN, but it has now become a city with about 400,000 inhabitants. The then deserted coast of DAIKEN has already become the second largest port in China. During the past twenty years Manchurian population and its annual foreign trade increased from 20 million Hsukwan Taels to 726 million Hsukwan Taels. Manchuria remained a barren area with
ne other importance to China than that it provided the Manchurian court in Peking, the Manchurian Chi-Jen (TNi followers of the first Emperor of the CHING Dynasty) to govern the Chinese, but Manchuria has become one of the most thriving districts in China which is now responsible for one third of her foreign trade. Moreover, I do not think it a preposterous exaggeration to say that Japan is qualified to be loaded with not a little honour for this development of Manchuria. From the beginning of her various activities, Japan unfortunately incurred a certain suspicion. I will next quote what Sir Alexander Hesi wrote in December, 1900. This is really an interesting paragraph.

"South Manchuria was invaded and occupied by the Japanese as the result of the Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895; a very pessimistic view was taken in certain quarters as to the commercial future of Manchuria. This view proved to be false in the light of the later historical development. Japan has already become the chief market of Manchurian staples, and now that she is free and unobstructed in buying materials, she is making industrial expansion with great energy and considerable success. Manchurian trade since the Sino-Japanese war has actually trebled."

After the Russo-Japanese war, Japanese activities of primary importance have been the establishment of the South Manchuria Railway Company, Ltd, and the reconstruction of the railroads completely destroyed by the retreating Russian troops. Moreover, Japan made the port of Dairen a modern harbour as it is today, laid and reconstructed the Mukden-Antung Railway which runs between Mukden and Antung, afforded financial facilities to the Chinese railways; and as they actually engaged in railway construction works, in place of the Chinese people, in most cases, transport and industrial developments in large areas of
Manchuria have resulted. The experiments and investigations achieved by Japan hastened the progress of Manchurian agriculture and livestock breeding and made various Manchurian material products prominent in the world market.

It is, of course, based on consideration of her own interests that Japan engaged in activities in Manchuria, but at the same time it is a plain fact that foreigners and the Chinese who reside in Manchuria are enjoying substantial benefits because Japan takes an interest in that land. Yes, the real situation is that foreign residents in Manchuria rely on the Japanese railways, railways constructed and harbours equipments managed by Japan for transporting their imports and exports. And in case of emergency, it is the Japanese troops stationed there that the foreign residents will count on for the safety of their lives and property. Though their number is small, the history shows that not only the Japanese but also foreign residents and many Chinese were constantly under their protection. For instance, at the time of the KUO Sung-ling incident, the Japanese railway zone was swarmed with Chinese, and foreigners in Mukden frankly admitted that for their safety they had to rely on Japanese troops. Foreign residents in Manchuria share the benefit of hygiene services, city planning, hospitals and cultural institutions mainly installed by Japan. The prevention of the plague and other epidemics which raged in Manchuria, is entirely carried out by the corporation of both the Japanese and Chinese nations.

However, we should not overlook the prominent contributions made by foreign nations in developing Manchuria. Great Britain constructed the Peking-Mukden Railway whose main line runs in Man-
The first bonds of the South Manchuria Railway subscribed for the achievement of its great undertaking, were accepted by British capitalists. Especially the South Manchuria Railway's accessories in the earlier period were mostly purchased from U.S.A. So that is the reason why the present South Manchuria Railway is called a typically American railway. Russia and France made contributions, the former constructing the Eastern China Railway and the latter supplying the most part of construction expenses. As the world is gradually recognizing the result of progress achieved in Manchuria and the surprising possibility of its further development in future, there is no doubt that foreign capital is seeking objects of investment in Manchuria so as to promote its present progress.

That the foreign nations share the benefit of Manchurian development is best shown in trade statistics. I do not like to bother you by enumerating minute statistical figures now, but I simply state a few of them. While in 1898 the British vessels entering the Manchuria ports numbered 168, 161,000 tons in total, they in 1928 reached 456 vessels, 2,700,000 tons in total tonnage. As to U.S.A. ships, only four sailing vessels came to the Manchurian harbours in 1898, while in 1928, that is—within the past thirty years, they increased to 127 vessels and 500,000 tons. British trade for Manchuria through three open ports in South Manchuria was 20,000,000 Taikwan Tael in total in 1928, while U.S.A. trade within the same year reached 5,500,000 Taikwan Tael.

To these I will add the following announcement of the Chinese Rail Affairs Bureau. Last year's U.S.A. export trade to China proper is reckoned at 30 cents sold per person, while to Manchuria, the sale is at the rate of 80 cents per person.
What benefit are the Chinese enjoying from the Manchurian development? This is too evident a fact to be dwelt upon. Nevertheless, unfortunately we hear constant complaints from the Chinese that Manchuria is being 'looted' by foreigners. Also we often see paintings which depict those pitiable Chinese residents in Manchuria, who were suffering through the friction between Russia and Japan. There is no doubt that it was a great blessing to Manchuria that originality, capital, and enterprises needed for the Manchurian development were all supplied by foreigners. Famously, in fact, Russia, Japan, and Great Britain constructed all railways in Manchuria and supplied them with capital till recent years, while comparatively small is the amount of capital invested by the Chinese for a great railway network undertaking, a keynote for progress and prosperity of Manchurian rulers and inhabitants. Without these railways and especially these export routes for Manchuria's principal products through the harbour installations of Dairen and Vladivostok, no doubt the present Manchuria would have been just a stop further from the former Manchuria which had a sole sea port at Fushun. It is a plain truth that solely by dint of development in transport facilities and maintenance of peace and order, is the present Manchuria an area provided with the highest prosperity and order in the whole of China and consequently with the greatest possibility of future development.

Moreover, it is for us to remember that our Chinese friends speak grievously over the preponderance of foreign interests in Manchuria, while by their own acts they show themselves that they realize benefits bestowed on them by the existence of the fore-mentioned foreign interests. The best evidence of this is that of these numerous Chinese immigrants who come from north China, especially from Shantung
It is still more significant that the Chinese show a special fancy for living in Manchurian areas under Japanese jurisdiction. Thus the Chinese population in Manchuria doubled in the past twenty years. The Chinese population in the South Manchurian Railway zone increased from 9,000 persons in 1907 to 202,000 in 1917. In other words, the Chinese population in the whole Manchuria was doubled, while those in the railway zone under Japanese jurisdiction increased four times. Manchuria covers an area of 384,000 square miles and its Chinese population is reckoned approximately at 27,000,000 persons, while the Japanese leased territory extending only to 1,400 square miles, actually holds more than one million Chinese. The reason why the Chinese like this area is very clear. Under Japanese administration there are wide modern cultural facilities, low and fixed taxes, and a good police system. Though at the beginning of the establishment of the South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd., subscription for shares was equally offered to the Chinese, they did not want to utilise this opportunity. However, the Chinese in Manchuria profit much by the enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd. The company employs more Chinese than Japanese. In the fiscal year which ended in March, 1928, against 22,000,000 Yen dividend to the shareholders, the total amount of wages paid was 25,45,000 Yen, 76% of which went to the Chinese. Moreover, what we should remember is that even most of the Japanese incomes there are expended for purchase of Manchurian products, so after all they are gained by the Chinese people.

Next, Japan is the first market abroad for Manchurian staples, even does not only transport Manchurian farm products but also is a great customer for them. Should Japan block her railways and harbour
in Manchuria, and decide not to buy Manchurian products, Manchuria would face a panic instantly.

As I have said before, the chief Japanese contributions towards Manchuria are maintenance of peace, and supply of proper and safe traffic facilities. Nevertheless, Japan could have done nothing without the greatest Chinese asset, i.e., cheap and diligent Chinese labour. As peace is secured, millions of Chinese have lately flowed into Manchuria from northern Chinese provinces, especially from Shantung to be absorbed into large and uncultivated fertile soil. This influx of immigrants constitutes a main factor for future Manchurian development, together with the fact that almost a half of the arable soil in Manchuria still lies unploughed. When this factor, the abundant supply of cheap but efficient labour, together with the still uncultivated soil, is to be utilised, we have to rely on two factors which, so to speak, made Manchuria what it is today -- peace and transportation. About 3,460 miles of the railway which Manchuria has today, consist of about 700 miles occupied by the South Manchuria Railway, 1,100 miles of the Eastern China Railway, and the rest, 1,650 miles under the control of the Chinese railways for which the Japanese supplied capital and undertook construction for China, are under control of China. Several important routes, however, were constructed by the Chinese with their own capital. It is an important factor now that the Chinese kept their own railways, electric cars, and electric-light undertakings, and made the streets large enough to carry out modern city planning, when we compare the state with other Chinese districts which have been given over to chaos rather than to construction within the past several dozen years.

-10-
Conditions in Manchuria originate to a certain extent from the fact that the Chinese owe much to Japanese leadership in following her enterprise, but we would expect more or less similar situations to be realised in other Chinese provinces. If peace and order can be maintained, the same development can be expected in Chinese provinces other than Manchuria. Manchuria shows a splendid example to other Chinese provinces that a surprising achievement can be attained by the Chinese with their superb perseverance and vigorous energy if they are allowed to act freely without any obstruction. As a matter of course, the fact is clearly shown that the development and prosperity of any area make peace and order an absolutely necessary condition, and order follows the development of railway communication, if these Manchurian districts enjoying railroad facilities compared with others not having the fortune. Thus in the Japanese railway zone order is specially maintained and from the result the fact is found that even the Chinese praise the railway zone for the safety of their trade and livelihood. This is just the same as the fact that the Chinese themselves seek their safety at the foreign settlements outside Manchuria, and even in the Chinese railway zones, peace and order are better maintained than in other areas where railway facilities are unknown. In other words, the situation is that unprotected travel is dangerous, even the areas not far from railroads, being bandit ridden, to say nothing of the districts without railway facilities. As Manchurian development in the past owed itself to the existent railways, still more railways will have to be constructed to achieve further future development, because it is to be expected that the immigrants in the districts with railway facilities will reach a saturation point. We often hear of railway competition arising between the Chinese and
Japanese, and of course common sense shows that such a fear is not well founded. The reason why Japan takes interest in Manchurian development consists in this, that she seeks materials in Manchuria to make manufactured goods of them so as to sell them there in expectation of the gradually increasing Manchurian population. Japan has several times declared that she has no political ambition in Manchuria. This requires no evidence, but the best evidence is that Japan actually encouraged and urged Chinese immigration in Manchuria.

Each time a Chinese immigrant is added Manchurian becomes more Chinese, so if Japan should entertain any political ambition, she would have to oppose the influx of immigrants. All Chinese immigrants coming into Manchuria to live are producers of material goods and at the same time potential purchasers of industrial goods. In this sense it is a vital concern for Japan to encourage immigrants. In order to cultivate the areas to be settled by these immigrants, new railways must be constructed. So long as these new railways do not make their objectives simply to impede the existent railways and to compete amongst themselves but rather to open a new working field and as long as they are so constructed as to be properly and ably managed, it goes without saying that they should be constructed by any one. The increase of Manchurian production is so quick that it is almost unimaginable for a well laid out railway to suffer from scarcity of cargoes.

Moreover, Manchurian railways rather than suffering from mutual competition, must cooperate in helping each other. Furthermore, all railways from the point of view of giving full scope to their natural function of practical use, cannot be allowed to overlook the necessity of keeping in touch with proper sea ports, and the construction of new
railways in Manchuria should necessarily be decided upon from a consideration of the question of whether or not it is possible to install harbour installations at geographically suitable points. The greater part of Manchurian products at present need to be transported through the two big ports of DAIREN and Vladivostok. Small ports like ANTUNG and YINFEW, even if they be improved, cannot be expected to mean much in the solution of the problem of how to transport the tremendous volume of Manchurian products in case the present almost 27 million population of Manchuria should increase to 75 million in future (and Manchuria can easily sustain this population.) When the still uncultivated districts are cultivated according to the arrangement of transport functions, it is self-evident that, following them, the increase of railways and harbour equipments will be required. When we consider the huge increase of products in future, Manchuria is, as it were, a gigantic bottle filled with a large volume of fluid which can flow only from a single and restricted outlet.

In making new harbour installations it clearly follows that such coastal spots must be chosen so as to bring products by land transport from various parts of the hinterland by way of the shortest possible distance. And such harbour installations, of course, must be made as much as possible at spots which lie within a short distance from the railroad.

This is, for example, why Japan tries to set up a port on the Korean coast, which is to function as an export port for the large and fertile areas having already been and to be cultivated in the northern and western part of the railroad between CHANGCHUN and TUNHUA. The products of these farming areas, if good harbour installations existed, can make the distance far shorter than at present to reach
their respective terminal markets (Japan is one of the most important markets.) As the prices of commodities such as soybeans and wheat are decided by the world market and their buyers are governed by those prices, whether the expense in transportation is high or low is a great factor for producers. The more expense needed to forward products from the place of origin to the place of selling, the less becomes the profit for the farmers to be gained from the products. Moreover, in proportion as those materials produced in Manchuria are supplied cheap to the countries which demand them for the production of manufactured goods, increases the power of purchasing raw materials and expands the market to which Manchurian farmers sell their products.

To be sure, in Manchuria, Japan, China and all other countries in the world desire the same state of affairs, that is, its rapid prosperity and development. As to the means of achieving this, as I have often tried to explain, factors which performed a miracle in the past dozen years, namely, both peace and proper transportation shall be the chief factors in the future development. It goes without saying that one thing essential under the present circumstances is cooperation. In the several dozen years to come too, construction should be carried out on the basis which has given us success in the past thirty years, and Manchuria shall be made not only the most prosperous area in China, but also an example to be followed by the rest of China.
I, William L. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document:

s/s William L. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date: 22 January 1947
第一 焦洲の過去及び現在

焦洲は昔々米利治国に於て観覧の中心地なり。即ち一領域のパルカ

rendeと称せられ、又多くの記者は好むてこの地域を一次の世界並

て数邦人移民が大急的に流出し来つたことが端なくも給外世界各

国の新事実となり、遂て焦洲の現況に残存し、つとこれに大なる注

意を喚起せらるに至つたのであります。これはひまでもなく焦

洲が増進する局面であります。この局面に於て私のをして注意すること

を許されることならば、日本は着々と不急要政策の実行中にしてあつて何

かにむかし歴史に及ぼる二十有数年間その目的とする朗に沿い

し、その努力を頭倒し終つたのです。日本は過去に於て歴史

を忘れてはならぬ。歴史を復興なり、過去の経験を参考にし、今

の焦洲を略取するに成功したことは御記帳の邦と

思ひます。歴史は遠返り、而して日本は依然として此路に踏して憂

甚なり。
日本の過去及び現在の稲穂を充分に評価するには、私なりに恐れ
なる比較研究を必要とする。先づ第一に外語文書にとし
て歴史に従って比較せられなら

ある。それには、三十数年昔のことは
びやかな。只偶々にその国旧部略を
でる史料の有無を試みたかっ
たののみならず、却ってこれに阻止する

者を決める可き理由を有
ばる。日本は当時の経済的発展の為に

あるに至つたのであつたから

も拘らず、日本は当時の経済的発展の

を以てして、その目的の完成に分

されるに至つたのであつたから

できなるのみならず、将来

の事は十一ケ年間に亘って一層の開発が可能なる

との最低を認めし始めつづいてゐる。
に凡言の武力を廃したのであります。例へば国内の長崎以北の地に住人の移住を禁止するの政令を強行したのであります。これに対して北京に於ける通商関係は問題を以って居るが、武力以外の手段による統制の各點と罪悪をしめ、関して居人の家住を禁止の態と改したのであります。なお之点が世界各に一定に為されるか否かの大問題に、一八五〇年頃に於て見られ、Triangle贸易の如くに於て居るべき。此の問題の解かならない所のものは、當時MIB的に於て現れるべき、唯一の交通機関が河川である。河川に於て交通機関として第一次の地位を占め、かつ、一年二千千の最も要なる輸出片開河川の水運するといふやうなことをもあり、広々
この南は平地港として大規模の商業的発展を遂せしめるに一の助

過去三十五年間に於て建設されられた大規模なる商業の発展

講出前人は主として前期の防以を以てその築造を期したるにも拘

に、その後の講出前人の大なる大形の支幹要路役であったので

あります。一方講出前人は近代的の計画の下に実洲開発の第一着手を為したるの
名前を描ぶべきであると同時に、西洋を学ぶのが現在の所で全く必要である目的の為に使用して、特にこれが描くべきである。何れにこれを利用せずず、完全に他の助明民は絶然として、手許を罷じて、

何にこれを利用せずず、問に入れて何に絶然として、手許を罷じて、

世界に対し何等の利益を興へなかったことにも何等なる差異である

これは現実的といふよりも夢の可能なりといふ方が適切であった。
主たる要素は、南海洲の問題を含む日本国政府をした、その故に南海洲における

活動と治安維持に任じしる所の日本の港湾利益の存在であります。

二十八箇所の港。揚。の条件、及び特別の経済、の条件を

からする二つの要素、即ち平和と安全、及び南海洲の存在

を前提とした条件がなかったならば、殆ど今日の南海洲を

期待し得ない。
上一勝の荒野の地であった。然らに遠古三千年の間に於て漸次は殖
り支那全部の域に達しつつあるのみならず、最遠の方国に於てこれを殖
をる為めに於て上流部の漸次、特に遅れば速かに其の能力を発揮し盛
して居るのである、且つ

一箇の都市を形成する様に於て、今既に四十萬人の都市民を有する
了る都市は、三十年前於ては一在の極めて荒廃の都市に過ぎ
かつた大都市は遂に支那に於ける首要の都市に定して居ります。過去
二十年間於て於て漸次の都市民は二倍に増加し、その外國人及於て年間三
千萬の漸次支那に於て住居して居る外には一都市にとって何等の意義を
有せざる荒廃の地にして

ありましたが、近様々な方面に於て漸次は終に支那に於ける産業を
ある。
ホージェイ氏（Sir Alexander Ismay）の一の変化をした所のものと申します。

一方、一九三四九年の一の変化をした所のものも一申します。
出 商品を広めるに当たって、主として日本の道路及び日本の建設に
出 商品を広めるに当たって、主として日本の道路及び日本
の建設に

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の建設に
出 商品を広めるに当たって、主として日本の道路及び日本の建設に
出 商品を広まるに当たって、主として日本
それでも居る可憐なる藩民居住の支配人を客に接した藩民をよく見るの
であります。藩民開発の為に授けた勧告、資本投資に際し始め
と凡てが外因人の提供させるものである点との藩民の為めに大なる幸
福なることとは筆を離さない選択であります。即ち出雲、日本、英吉利近
年に至るまで要管上藩民に於ける凡ての観念を演尊すると共に、その
改善を供給したのでありまして、而かも之に反して、藩民の支配者
並に居住民の進歩振興の苦調する大農家指導の為めに支配の按
たる現金資本は比較的浩大に過ぎないのであります。これらの観
点なく、更に支那に大選、藩民指導の為に依る藩民等政治的
は出雲と相接する一步に止るべきは筆を離さぬこと至難にある
と相接する一步に止るべきは筆を離さぬこと至難にある
藩民指導の為めに依る藩民等政治的
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藩民指導の為めに依る藩民等政治的
の観念を改善の維持に於て依り、今日の藩民が支那
就口では不平を消し、貢献の行動に於ては、前総の如き外局

を除く存在は彼方の示する黙っては近切なる評価を抱せる。支

部員syscallの無名なる支部の役住民はその役行

に際し好むが如く居住することを更に意味深いことと努

る。斯くし

て謂めの支部員人口は過去二十年間に二倍に増加し

た。従って、謂め一

一九一七年には二十万二千人増加し

た。この支部員人口二倍の増加に於て、日本の行政下に於て

方艶の日本の無名者数は二百万千人以上の支部員で

て明白である。支部員が何故にこの地獄を好むかに付ては、理由を

め

であります。支部員が何故にこの地獄を好むかに付ては、理由を
南滿洲鉄道株式會社創立の当初、初期の取引においても株式の比率を低く設定し、会社の安定を図った。しかし、会社の成長を図るためには、より多くの資金を得ることが必要であった。このために、南滿洲鉄道株式会社は、多くの株主に利益を提供することを約束した。このように想着される場合、南満洲鉄道株式会社は、取引の成功を図った。
前進の通りを活用し、開発に当たる日本の主たる部位は、平和の維持と適切な安全を図るための事務としてあります。支那の変化は、支那の大きい生産力、即ち、労働者数に相当するリーダーの存在であります。平和の保証と共に出た大なる変革のための努力を加えるが必要です。
に置かれております。支那側の説得の成るものには日本が支那の何れ
に資本を供給して、その経済工事を引き受け、而して支那銀行等に
あるものがあるため、支那銀行等の経済は日本が支那の為め

都市計画を実現する等の設備を示したことは、実に最近数十年間
に亘って建設よりも得る不経済な破壊を目的にした政策以外の支那
の各地と比較対照するに當って、重大なる一要論を提出するのでで
あります。故にこの一要論は日本の為て支那の各地に於てても同様の
支那の各地に於ても同様の計画を進めることを得ねば、所謂経済計画
の為めに何が支那の何れに於ても同様の計画を進めることを得ねば、所谓

支那人がその坂目の忍耐力と旺延なる精力とに

を許さらないにしも、支那人がその坂目の忍耐力と旺延なる精力とに

17
ある層の開発のためにには、より多くの鉱政が増設されなければならぬ。何となれば、鉱政の存在自体の減少を意味するからである。しかし、支那人と日本間の鉱道競争の問題を考慮に入れれば、支那が日本をよりよくするためには、鉱政の増設が必要である。このためには、鉱政の増設が必要である。
ことを許されないのでありまして、沿岸に於る新港湾の建設も、必ずや近代的港湾を有する事が、若しくは私的な有利益なる地點に港湾設置を為すの可能かあり、否かに依って決定せらるべきものであります。現時に於ける沿岸の生産物の大部に大関する沿岸漁業の二大要口に依って輸送することを要するのであり、安東、營口の如き小港が将来七千五百万人に増加したる場合、更に容易に沿岸の生産物の輸送を如何にするのが問題の解決に対しして多くを期待し得ないのであります。今の未だ利用させられ居らざる居、地方が一層適当機能の遂図に伴ひ開拓せらるゝに及ぶでは、これに際して重要な沿岸及び港湾設備の増加を要すること、は明白であります。而出して正に来るべき将来の巨大なる生産物の増加に一層増益するならば、沿岸は更に發展せるものと、その集積を盛れる恐るべきのであります。
又所知る増極は次の如く設置するに當っては、出来得る限り短か
き最初の無達間を以て基地各方の黙示と密せしめるが如き前
戸は無駄に我等の眼より生産家に於て造出された所在であら
るべきものであります。此れ即ち例へば、日本が明治の開業に
於て無駄せらるべき広大な地の被せられるより近き時刻に
とれてより美のものであります。前後之の倉屋の生産物は長さ
市場に入倉等の必要に當ってはその倉屋に依って支配するに
るものであるが故に、該地元の高低が生産家の利益であります。生
産家がその生産物に依って利すると所が如何なるかを以って

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

--vs--

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deposant: UNO, Masuko

I, UNO, Masuko, having sworn as shown in the attached written oath, depose and state as follows;

After being graduated from the University of London, I became a Shokutaku (TN; an official not on the regular staff) of the Foreign Ministry, and later a secretary of the Japan Foreign Affairs Ass. (sociati) which publishes a magazine "Contemporary Japan".

As I was not connected with editing about that time, I do not know the circumstances under which Mr. SHIRATORI, Toshio's articles entitled "The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" and "Preparing for a New World Order" came to be printed in the said magazine in the December number of 1940 (the 15th year of SHOWA), and in the April number of 1941 (the 16th year of SHOWA), respectively.

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According to the Contribution Accounts-Book kept by the Japan Foreign Affairs Association, it is evident that the texts of the two articles appearing in "Contemporary Japan" under Mr. SHIRATORI's name entitled respectively "Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" (December Number, 1940) and "Observations upon the Current Situation at Home and Abroad" (April number, 1941) were originally in Japanese and were both translated into English and rewritten by the magazine which published them. Entries in the aforesaid Accounts-Book were made by the editor and the cashier of the said association every month.

According to page 10 of the Accounts-Book (for items during December, 1940), the Japanese text of the article entitled "Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" was written on eleven sheets of paper (payment for it made by the magazine was a check for thirty yen.)

It was translated into English by Mr. YOKOYAMA, Hidosaburo (at present, chief of the foreign news section of the Jiji Shimpo Newspaper), on seven sheets and a half, which translation was rewritten by an American named SPINKS on ten sheets.

According to page 14 (for April, 1941) of the same, the Japanese text of the article entitled "Observations upon the Current Situation at Home and Abroad" was written on seven...
sheets (payment therefore was nil) and translated into English by Mr. YOKOYAMA, Hidesaburo on eleven sheets, which translation was rewritten by Mr. SPINKS on fifteen sheets. Mr. SPINKS was an American journalist, who, I hear, has recently come again to Japan and is now serving at GHQ.

Neither the Japanese texts nor the English translations of these articles are in existence at present for they were thrown away after being preserved for about one year. I have heard that KUWABARA, Tsutomu (formerly an office-boy of the said Association and now living at GOKAN, KOMEMAKI-MURA, TONE-GUN, GUMMA-KEN) remembers that he only once took what apparently was a proof of an English copy, to Mr. SHIRATORI's residence and handed it over to Mrs. SHIRATORI as Mr. SHIRATORI was not at home and had the chit-book (not preserved now) stamped with a seal by her, but that he does not remember whether it was in the autumn (which would mean that the copy was for the December number, 1940), or in the spring (which would mean that the copy was for the April number, 1941). It is not known whether or not Mr. SHIRATORI examined the abovementioned copy and sent it back to the said Association, but the custom is that, if a copy is returned, the returned copy is printed in the magazine, but if not returned, the text is printed as it is, presuming that it has been approved. I remember...
Corrected copy of
Def. Doc. #178

nothing other than that which I have stated above.

In addition, according to the said Accounts-Book of the
Association, the number of copies printed of the said magazin
was 1,600 for the March issue of 1940; 2,000 for May; 2,000
for July; 2,000 for September and 2,000 for February 1941
and 1,500 for March 1942.

/S/ UNO, Masuko (seal)

No.10 NISHIKATA-MACHI, HONGO-KU, TOKYO,
This 3rd Day of December, 1946.

We hereby certify that the above affiant swore and
stated, and signed and sealed in our presence.

Witnesses: /S/ SAKUMA, Shin (seal)
Associate Legal Counsel at
the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East.
HIBOTA, Yoji (ditto.)

This 3rd day of December, 1946.

OATH

I swear, according to my conscience, to state the whole
truth, neither concealing what I know nor adding what I do
not know.

/S/ UNO, Masuko (seal)
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1934年
民國深秋

國米最盛

維持

倒壟中國

倒壟中國

《The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow》

《Preparing for a New World Order》
（2）
被告の役割に端を発し、今日の事件は、ある意味で、被告の栄光を授けるものである。被告は、当時の裁判所が示唆したように、かつての裁判所の役割を果たし、今日の事件を解決するため、被告の役割を果たしてしまった。

被告の役割は、既に述べたように、裁判所の役割を果たし、今日の事件を解決するため、被告の役割を果たしてしまった。
私たちはこの問題の解決のために、研究と努力を行べきです。
(3)
森 俊

広島市 関町

昭和41年11月11日

内人

森 俊

昭和41年11月11日

生前

写真

関町

二階

（4）

VICTOR GOLDSBACH

14 Henrietta Street Covent Garden
1954.
LEw. LOC. p177 Further Excerpt from Exhibit 279.

Excerpt from "TAWLIT IN THE FORBIDDEN CITY" by
Forinple Johnston.

(INSlAI COVER)

LJ7101

IN THE FORBIDDEN CITY

BY

A. M. J. G. JOHNSTON

K. C. M. G., C. B. E., M.A., M.B. L.

Professor of Chinese in the University of London;
last British Commissioner of Wei-hsi; Tutor to His Majesty the Emperor Hsuan-T'ung;

AUTHOR OF

From Peking to Mandalay - the Dragon in
Northern China, Buddhist China; Chinese
Appeal to Christian Concerning
Christian Missions, Letters to
Missionary, the
Chinese Press, etc.

WITH A FACE-LE

BY

THE AUTHOR

LONDON

VICTOR GALLIMAX AND

14, Henrietta Street Covent Garden
1934.

- 1 -
Had the Manchus retired to Manchuria, and had the collapse of their power in China proved final and complete, it is by no means improbable that we should have witnessed a revived Manchurian monarchy, similar to that which existed in the first half of the seventeenth century, completely independent of China. A large number of able Chinese loyalists would have taken office under such a monarchy, and they would have been followed many Chinese of all classes who were dissatisfied with conditions under the republic. Had such a monarchy been established it is not improbable that before long it would have been joined by Jehol and the rest of Inner Mongolia. (8)

This possibility of retiring to Manchuria was not overlooked by the Manchu court when the revolution in China began to look dangerous. On the contrary it was seriously discussed, and many imperialists both in China and in Manchuria urged that this would be the wisest course to pursue. What finally decided the terms secured for them by Yuan Shih-k'ai in the Articles of Favourable Treatment ...

Two of the princes were amazed and indignant at what they regarded as the shameful pusillanimity of the regent and their brother-nobles .... When they perceived that they were outvoted, that the promises and veiled threats of Yuan Shih-k'ai were breaking down all opposition, that the regent and empress-dowager were succumbing to the pressure of a stronger will than theirs, and that the imperial cause was
indeed lost, these two princes took their departure from
the capital and went into exile, vowing that if they
ever returned it would only be when the Dragon flag
flew once more over the gates of Peking, or in their
coinage. One of these men was Pu-wei, Prince Kung;
the other was Shun Ch'i, Prince Su. The former has
lived for many years in the Japanese leased-territory of
Port Arthur, thinking and dreaming of little else but the
possibility of the revival of the glories of his house.
Prince Su returned to Peking in April, 1922 - in his coif

Note (6) "In 1911, China became a republic and at the same time,
Mongolia declared its independence and stated that whenever China
restored the monarchy under a Manchurian emperor Mongolia would
voluntarily rejoin China" (J. A. Lodge in the China Illustrated
Review, Tientsin)

A conflict between Japan and the Chinese republic - or
those who posed as representatives of the republic in
Manchuria - could, thought these monarchists, give them the
opportunity they desired. To those who might reproach them
with treachery to China in allying themselves with a foreign
power, they would be able to reply that China had already
declared the Manchus to be aliens (tsu) and had driven
them from the throne on that ground. An alien race or an
alien family owed no allegiance to China......
Knowing this to be so, I have found it difficult to explain the statement in the Lytton Report that the Manchurian independence movement "had never been heard of in Manchuria before September, 1931," (11) except on the assumption that the evidence of the existence of such a movement in the interests of the old monarchy had not been laid before Lord Lytton and his colleagues.

Note (11) Lytton Report, p. 97.
The devastation and violation of the imperial tombs
(the Tung-lo, to the east of Peking) took place between
the 11th and the 18th July, 1923.

Everything else could be forgiven—insults, ridicule,
threats of death, demolition of property, the tearing
up of agreements—but not this appalling act of
savagery and sacrilege. From that time on there was
no chance in the emperor's attitude to China—or rather
towards those who were responsible for his government.
By nature he is generous and forgiving and I have never
heard him utter a word of angry complaint against the
first violent of his envoys. But this was something
he could never overlook. Up to that time he had taken
part in the independence movement that he knew was
withering in Manchuria, and the possibility
of his being invited to return to the Manchurian home
of his ancestors was a subject to which he had hardly given
a serious thought. He had never ceased to hope that China
would recover her sanity and that all would be well.
But now that hope was dead. When I next visited
him the change was very marked. So marked was it that
it seemed to me as though he had been in communion with the
spirits of his outraged ancestors and that they had urged
him to turn away from China that had disgraced herself and
then and to fix his seat on the land in which they had laid
the strong foundations of their empire three hundred
years ago.
On October 1st, 1951, on behalf of the British Government I conducted the re-establishment of 1951. Since 1949 that Territory, with a population of nearly 200,000 and an area about one-fifth the size of the Isle of Wight, had been governed by a British Commissioner directly responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It was now handed back to China, and the people of the Territory passed under the jurisdiction of the Chinese republic for the first time, for when it was "leased" to Great Britain, China was still a monarchy.

Immediately after the re-establishment I returned to England, not moving then, if ever, I should return to the country in which I had spent over thirty years. Rather unexpected. I returned almost exactly one year later, partly on business connected with the "Boxer" indemnity as a member of the British group participating in the biennial Pacific Conference, which that year was held in China.

The famous manchurian incident of September 18th, 1931, took place a few days before my ship reached Japan on my outward journey. I went on to China, and almost immediately after my arrival at Shanghai I travelled by train to Tientsin, which I reached on October 7th. The emperor expected me, and I was met at the station by one of his officers. There was a very prevalent rumour in Tientsin that he had already left for Manchuria. that, of course, I knew to be incorrect. I spent the next two days in his company, and was given information which enabled me to foresee what was to happen in the near future. The information which he
himself gave it was corroborated by Chen, neko-hsu.

That night we were both the emperor's guests at dinner, the only others present being Chen, Chui, Chen Paa-Sian and Chui Leong. As may be readily understood, there was only one topic of conversation.
（40頁、10行）

若し誰かが諸問題に迫るべきか、彼等の努力が無駄であるか、決定的に完成したなら、元来の目的を達成するためには、この成果を無視することも不可能なことである。

非難の声を聞かずに、彼等の努力はその道を歩んできた。彼等の努力は、彼等の努力が無視されることを無視することも不可能なことである。

彼等の努力は、彼等の努力が無視されることを無視することも不可能なことである。
說明の仕役がない。

注文十一、リットン報告書

玉皇の解幕（北京東方の竦立）に対する舉行で、延閑が1928年4月
の5日から11日の間に亘って行われた。

この時以来皇帝の支局に対する取扱いを責任させるものに対する選
手の選ばるべき候補下は評するところが出なかった。

彼の言葉が全く顕った。皇帝からいへば皇帝は威容であってその政
政が全く顕った。この時水の水たけは同僚政の流連し海溝所であった。この時までは皇帝は

論争に於ける領略運営が極度の劣を示すのを知りつつ該に於る

をせず、暗知の遮蔽時に視かれて遅ると云ふことも多少も雲箇目の考

とせ。
へてのなかった。彼は常に文部が正規に戻り戻るがようなら望みを棄て
なかった。しかし彼の望みが絶えず前進し、断興をと次に訪れた時彼
の上に現れた変化は驚くべきものがあった。その変化は急に激しいも
のであったので彼は皇帝が凌駕された君主の怒りを味方にし
いたと疑い、且その君主の激怒が（そのかかして）己を汚し詫罪を
したという経緯するのを皇帝を促してある場に急にさだめた。

1683年10月10日英国内閣を代理して帝政家語の講義を務めた。

哲学者であるロドフ作家の作家の講義を務めるときの講義
は1683年以内に完成された。講義は講義の講義の講義
在読者の講義の講義の講義の講義の講義の講義の講義
下に入ることになっていた。故にこの講義が講義の講義の講義の講義
はまた王立したからである。
DEF: D'U. #177

ある事は会ったが思いもかけず、成平後は又舞へ戻って来た。間経事
件に詰めとする謝罪の事務やらその年は又舞で行はるることになつてゐる。

1895年3月10日彼の有名な幕天事件は私の往路の途の時が日本に
着く二三日前に起ったのである。私は父が旅を兼ねて上海に寄くと否
て居て帰で私は彼の左翼の一員としてやらで行った。

天井で彼の義員の一人に会ふ機会を
洲へ設けたとき舞峯が尋ねで行ったが、私は知覚をしかしきかふやで
いだ場所をは囲まれていて何と誰も見ることに努めていた。次に二日を旅は急し共に連し舞音巡を向き
よめた所で舞峯は舞峯によって予報された。その夜舞峯て旅は舞峯の正里の
客さわれた。舞の客さ舞峯へは舞峯が舞峯の正里の
かで舞峯された通りその舞の客さの題日に差一でありました。

Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common programme of purposes and principles embodied in the joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence, and religious freedom and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands, as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, declare:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the tripartite pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

- 1 -
The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

Done at Washington, January 1, 1942.

(Signed) The United States of America: Franklin D. Roosevelt;

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Winston Churchill;


The Commonwealth of Australia: R.G. Casey; The Kingdom of Belgium: Cte. R. Straton; Canada: Leighton McCarthy;

The republic of Costa Rica: Luis Fernandez; The Republic of Cuba: Aurelio F. Concha; The Czechoslovak Republic: V.C. Hrbek; The Dominican Republic: J. W. Troncoso;

The Republic of El Salvador: C.A. Alfaro; The Kingdom of Greece: Simon P. Diamantopoulos; The Republic of Guatemala;


The Kingdom of Norway: K. Munthe de Morgenstierne; The Republic of Panama: Jean Guardia; The Republic of Poland: Jan Ciechanowski; The Union of South Africa: Ralph W. Close;

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia; Constantin A. Potitch.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kiharu, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "JOINT DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, COSTA RICA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, GREECE, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, INDIA, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NORWAY, PANAMA, POLAND, SOUTH AFRICA AND YUGOSLAVIA." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 6th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. HAYASHI

Signature of Official.

Witness: (Signed) MURAMATSU Y.
文本内容缺失，无法进行自然语言的平文转换。
中国国家主席胡锦涛在北京人民大会堂出席世界华文传媒论坛开幕式并发表重要演讲。他强调，华文传媒是连接中华各民族、各国华人华侨的重要纽带，是传播中华文化的使者，是弘扬中华文明的窗口。他指出，华文传媒在服务国家发展大局和实现中华民族伟大复兴中国梦中肩负着重要使命。他希望华文传媒继续以高度的文化自觉和文化自信，讲好中国故事，传播好中国声音，构建好中外文明交流互鉴的桥梁。
千九百四十二年一月一日「ワシントン」於テ作戦

「ソヴィエト」社會主義共和國連邦
「南極」南極大陸
「オーストラリア」澳洲
「カナダ」
「コスタリカ」共和国
「キューバ」共和国
「エクアドル」共和国
「エルサルバドル」共和国
「エル・サルバドル」共和国
「ヨーロッパ」
「イタリア」
「フランス」
「オランダ」
「スペイン」
「ポルトガル」
「ギリシャ」
「ギリシャ」王国

3
「アテネ」
「ハイチ」
「ハンガリー」
「インディア」
「オランダ」
「ニュージーランド」
「ポーランド」
「アフリカ」

昭和十八年二月八日

加入
「ブラジル」
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Koro, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of _A_ pages and entitled "JOINT DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, COSTA RICA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, GREECE, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, INDIA, LUXEMBURG, THE NETHERLANDS, NEZ. ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NORWAY, PANAMA, POLAND, SOUTH AFRICA AND YUGOSLAVIA..." is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 8th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Noguchi ODO.
TREATY OF UNION IN THE WAR AGAINST HITLER

Germans and her Associates in Europe and
of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance
Thereafter between the U.S.S.R. and
The United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland.

Signed at London, May 26, 1942.
Ratifications exchanged at Moscow, July 4, 1942.
In force from July 4, 1942.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and British Dominions
beyond the seas, Emperor of India, and the President of Supreme Council
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany,
signed at Moscow on July 12, 1941, and to replace them by a formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and
the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated
with her in acts of aggression in Europe;

Desiring moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate
closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the
peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the
bases of the principles enunciated in the declaration made on August 14th,
1941, by the declaration made on August 14th, 1941, by the President of
the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to
which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered;

Desiring, finally, to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an
attack upon either High Contracting Party by Germany or any of the States
associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe,

have decided to conclude a treaty for that purpose and have appointed
as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions
beyond the seas, emperor of India,

for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

the Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.P., His Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

the President of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republies;

Vasily Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs,

who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form,
have agreed as follows;—

PART ONE

Article 1.

In virtue of the Alliance established between the United Kingdom and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the high Contracting Parties
mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and
support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which
are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article 2.

The high Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any negotiati­
ones with the Hitlerite Government or any other Government in Germany that
does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate
or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with
Germany or any other States associated with her in acts of aggression in
Europe.
PART TWO

Article 3.

(1) The High Contracting Parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the pre-war period.

(2) Pending the adoption of such proposals, they will after the termination of hostilities take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article 4.

Should one of the High Contracting Parties during the pre-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany of any of the States mentioned in Article 3 (2) in consequence of an attack by that State against that Party, the other High Contracting Party will at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in his power.

This Article shall remain in force until the High Contracting Parties, by mutual agreement, shall recognize that it is superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article 3 (1). In default of the adoption of such proposal, it shall remain in force for a period of twenty years, and thereafter until terminated by either High Contracting Party, as provided in Article 8.

Article 5.

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the reestablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests
of the United Nations in these objects, and they will act in accord with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

Article 6.

The High Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

Article 7.

Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directly against the other High Contracting Party.

Article 8.

The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time, and the instrument of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of the instrument of ratification, and shall thereafter replace the agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, signed at Moscow on July 12th, 1941.

Part One of the present treaty shall remain in force until the reestablishment of peace between the High Contracting Parties and Germany and the Powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part Two of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years. Thereafter, unless twelve months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either High Contracting Party shall have given notice in writing of his intention to terminate it.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, I.P.Y.SHI, Enoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereunto attached in English consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Treaty of Union in the War against Hitlerite Germany and her Associates in Europe and of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance thereafter between the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, May 26, 1942," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. N.Y.SHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagaharu ODO

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(Translation in Japanese)

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Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. N.Y.SHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagaharu ODO
平和と維持及ドイツ国又ハヨーロッパ於ケル侵害行徳ニ識シ
且平和条約ノ締結ヲ際し九月十四日ハアメリカ合衆
国大統領及「グレートブリテン」國総督大臣＝依ル＝サレソ
ドイツ国＝於ケル＝防民＝後＝於＝セント

海外国土皇帝印成文帝監下

グレートブリテン＝及北部アイルランド＝総合王國
图1：根据不同的实验数据，我们进行了四种不同的测试。在每种测试中，我们使用了特殊的实验条件。这四组测试分别在42°C、50°C、60°C和70°C下进行。在每组测试中，我们记录了实验结果。结果显示，温度对实验结果有显著的影响。在42°C时，实验结果优于其他温度。
第七条

締約国ハ戦後相互ヲ有ルテル経済的援助ヲ需フルコトヲ約ス

第六条

第ハ条約ハ戦後相互ヲ有ルテル経済的援助ヲ需フルコトヲ約ス
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K.Y. SHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Treaty of Union in the War against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and of Collaboration and Mutual assistance thereafter between the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, May 26, 1942," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 8th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. H.Y. SHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Masaharu ODO
AGREEMENT FOR JOINT ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY.

Signed at Moscow, July 12, 1941.
In force from July 12, 1941.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have concluded the present agreement and declare as follows: (1) The two Governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany; (2) They further undertake that during the war, they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

The present agreement has been concluded in the Russian and English languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, 12th July, 1941.

V. Molotov
Deputy President of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

R. Stafford Cripps
His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the U.S.S.R.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Agreement for Joint Action by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the War against Germany, July 21, 1941" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagaru Odo
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT FOR
JOINT ACTION.

Upon the conclusion of the agreement for joint action by His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the
U.S.S.R. in the war against Germany, the Contracting Parties have agreed
that the aforesaid agreement enters into force immediately upon signature
and is not subject to ratification.

The present Protocol has been drawn up in duplicate in the English
and Russian Languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, 12th July, 1941.

H. S. Cripps
V. Molotov
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Koyu, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Protocol to the Agreement for Joint Action, 12th July 1941" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagatomo, Oto
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kiichi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "Protocol to the Agreement for Joint Action" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Hayamizu, Odo
INTRODUCTION

The Japanese Government have studied with all the care demanded by the importance of the document the Report presented by the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the League of Nations.

It has been the constant object of the Japanese Government to do everything in their power to afford information to the Commission and to facilitate their investigations. They sincerely appreciate the endeavors made by the members of the Commission to make themselves acquainted with the details of a very delicate and complex situation which presents many unfamiliar and novel features.

In view of the exacting nature of the task and of the very short time which could be devoted to it, it is not, however, surprising that the Report should in various passages be marked by omissions, inconsistencies and misapprehensions. To obtain a thorough knowledge of the situation, a year would not have been too long. A six weeks' visit to Manchuria and some weeks spent in the atmosphere of Peiping and Hankow could only impart a superficial impression, dependent as the Commission necessarily were on the information furnished them, and the views entertained, by authorities more familiar than they with the Chinese language and conditions. Had they had more time and visited other parts of the country, especially South China, the optimism which they express regarding the Chinese situation would, it is felt, have been considerably modified.

It is by no means the intention of the Japanese Government to indicate all the points in which they feel that the Report lies open to exception. Nor do they intend to enter into any meticulous criticism of details in the Report, which, taken as a whole, and especially in its descriptive portions, furnishes a valuable compendium of events. For the moment, and of course without prejudice to the presentation of their further opinion, they will limit themselves to the formulation of certain observations on matters of capital importance, with the sole object of establishing the true facts.

In offering these observations, the Japanese Government have, needless to say, not the remotest intention of casting any reflection on the conscientious way in which the Commission have drawn up their Report. But they are impressed by the feeling that items of information drawn from unimpeachable sources—e.g., those presented by the representatives of the Japanese Government—have been passed over or disregarded, whilst undue credit has been accorded to dubious information coming from obscure or even unknown quarters.

The Japanese Government cannot ignore the fact—apparent on the face of the Report—that in addition to the documents duly exchanged between the Parties, the Commission have based their findings on newspaper articles, on letters received from official correspondents, and on the private conversations of members of the Commission and their expert advisors with individuals in—
vested with no special qualifications. It is a fact worthy of remark that this kind of evidence emanating from indefinite and uncertain sources is invariably used to corroborate Chinese contentions against those of Japan. The Japanese Government had no means of ascertaining in each case the source of such information and refuting it, and must necessarily reserve the right of making further enquiries to elucidate the degree of credit which is to be attached to such material.

The reception of this kind of dubious or worthless evidence is particularly noticeable in the sections dealing with the Incident of 28 September and with the establishment of the Independent State of Manchukuo. In the former case it leads to a complete misconstruction of the motives which actuated the Japanese armed forces and in the latter case to the presentation of suggestions for the future government of Manchuria which are consistent neither with the tenor of the remainder of the Report nor with the realities of the situation.

In its future deliberations directed to securing the peace of the Far East, the League of Nations cannot, in fact, avoid taking into account the whole of the existing circumstances in this part of the world — in China as well as in Manchuria, including the events which have transpired subsequently to the preparation of the Report. It is with a view to afford what assistance they can to this endeavour that the present observations have been drawn up, so that Members of the League may have a clear comprehension of the real situation in all its bearings.

When, in the course of these observations, reflections are unavoidably cast on the conduct of the Chinese, it may be well to disclaim the idea, sometimes latent in the Report, that Japan entertains feelings of bitterness or hostility towards the Chinese people. The Japanese Government believe that the Chinese people have been much misled, much terrorized and much misrepresented and that their main desire is to enjoy in peace and quiet the results of their industry. Japan, maintaining her old friendly attitude, looks forward to ages of prosperous and neighbourly cooperation between the two nations.

CHAPTER I

CHINA

A. General Survey

The Report very properly endeavours, before dealing with the situation in Manchuria, to give in Chapter I a general view of China and to furnish some account of the internal conditions there prevailing.

Unfortunately, it reveals that the investigations conducted by the Commission have been not only incomplete, but somewhat superficial. It contains, indeed, many just conclusions flowing for the most part from observed facts. But all these observations and conclusions are enveloped in a mist of optimism, the glamour of which is certain to be misleading to anyone who does not know the true facts.
The Commission appear to be surprised at such statements as that "China is not an organized State" (p. 17) and that "China is in a condition of complete chaos and incredible anarchy." (p. 17) They call attention to "an altogether different attitude that was taken at the time of the Washington Conference by all the participating Powers," when in fact there were two completely separate Governments, one at Peking and another at Canton, when banditry was rife, frequently interfering with the communications in the interior, and when preparations were being made for a civil war which a few months afterwards overthrew the Central Government and set up a third independent government in Manchuria; when, in short, "there existed no fewer than three Governments professing to be independent, not to mention the virtually autonomous status of a number of provinces or parts of provinces." (p. 17)

At that time, conditions were certainly not ideal. But there were then only three main rivals in the field. Now there is a whole kaleidoscope. Outer Mongolia and Tibet have been almost entirely lost, while the National Government at Nanking not only secure no obedience from various local leaders, especially, the Southern faction at Canton, but are actually threatened by the tremendous communist aggregation which has its centre in the Province of Hupei, Fukien and Kiangsi. That most of the factions aim at the ideal of a United China, of which each thinks to be the master, is possible enough, but that does not make China united, as the Report seems inclined to assert.

At the time of the Washington Conference, it was possible to hope for an early restoration of unity and peace to China, but events have belied that hope. The disunion and anarchy of China have gone from bad to worse. The struggles of rival militarists have been woven into the very fabric and structure of Chinese politics, communism has deeply entrenched itself in the heart of the country. The habit of civil strife has become ingrained and endemic; and it is only unreasoning optimism, or a failure to acquaint oneself with the conditions on the spot, which can or may prompt an observer to detect progress since 1922.

The Japanese Government recognize the justice and force of many of the conclusions of the Report in so far as it deals in Chapter I with the present conditions prevailing in China.

"Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with the resulting weakness of the Central Government, have been the characteristics of China since the revolution of 1911. Those conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact, and until remedied will continue a menace to world peace and a contributory cause of world economic depression." (p. 13)

At p. 11, dealing with the problems of assimilation and transformation which confronted both Japan and China, the Report emphasizes the special conditions of China "owing to the vastness of her territory, the lack of national unity of her people, and traditional financial system, under which the whole of the revenue collected did not reach the Central Treasury." It remarks that "the reluctance of China to receive foreigners, and her attitude toward those who were in the country was bound to have serious consequences," and that "it concentrated the attention of her rulers on resistance to and restriction of foreign influence," and it adds that "as a result, the constructive reform necessary to enable the country to cope with the new conditions was almost completely neglected."
At p. 16, the Report calls the fact that from 1911 to 1928, "China was ravaged by warring factions; and the ever-present bandits grew into veritable armies by the enlistment of ruined farmers, desperate inhabitants of famine-stricken districts, or unpaid soldiers. Even the constitutionalists, who were fighting in the South, were repeatedly exposed to the danger of militarist feuds arising in their midst."

At pp. 16-17, it notes that upon the establishment of a government at Nanking in 1927, "the party was not ready to put into operation its schemes of political and economic reconstruction, but was prevented from doing so by internal dissensions, the political revolt of various Generals with personal armies, and the menace of Czarism. In fact, the Central Government had repeatedly to fight for its very existence."

Finally, on p. 17, it remarks that "for a time unity was maintained on the surface. But not even the semblance of unity could be preserved when powerful war lords concluded alliances amongst themselves and marched their armies against Nanking. Though they never succeeded in their object, they remained, even after defeat, potential forces to be reckoned with. Moreover, they never took the position that war against the Central Government was an act of rebellion. It was in their eyes simply a struggle for supremacy between their faction and another one which happened to reside in the national capital and to be recognized as the Central Government by foreign Powers," and reaches the conclusion that "from this summary description it appears that disruptive forces in China are still powerful." (p. 17)

How can these entirely justified statements be reconciled with the optimistic views to which expression is given in the same Chapter? It is stated, for instance, on p. 17, that "although, at present, the Central Government's authority is still weak in a number of provinces, the central authority is not, at least openly, repudiated."

It is hardly necessary to recall facts of recent date, subsequent to the composition of the Report, which prove that the struggles between rival war lords are still far from having come to an end. In the North, despite the injunction of the National Government, General Liu Shih-nien and General Han Fu-chu have been carrying on hostilities since the middle of September. In the South, for instance, the struggle for the presidency of the Provincial Government of Fukien has also brought about fights between opposing military and civil factions. In the West, Thibetan troops have occupied the Provinces of Haikang and Kokonor. In the Province of Szechuan military operations have taken place between General Lii Hsiang-chi and in spite of an urgent telegram from General Chiang Kai-shek reminding them that such behavior is calculated to produce an impression of want of unity, these hostilities have gone on unabated.

The Report indeed explicitly states that negotiations in China do not only mean, as in most countries, that the U.S.S.R. either a political corporate held by certain members of existing parties or the organization of a special party be accepted for recognition by the other political parties. "It has become an actual fact if the National Government. It possesses its own army, army and government, and its own international sphere of action. For this state of affairs there is no parallel in any other country." (p. 23).
Upon this rapid review of the "disruptive forces," the continually con­trolling nature of which the Report duly recognizes, it is the conviction of the Japanese Government that, contrary to the view expressed on p. 17 of the Report, that "considerable progress has in fact been made" since the date of the Wash­ington Conference, an impartial examination will show that the condition of China is in fact much worse.

B. ANTI-FOREIGN ACTIVITIES IN CHINA

The many intense manifestations of anti-foreign sentiment that have taken place in China have played no less a part than those conditions of anarchy and disturbance which have just been described, in creating the atmosphere that gave rise to the recent unfortunate conflict.

The Report itself takes occasion to pronounce that:

"Having started upon the road of international cooperation for the purpose of solving her difficulties, as was done at Washington, China might have made more substantial progress in the ten years that have since elapsed had she continued to follow that road. She has only been hampered by the virulence of the anti-foreign propaganda which has been pursued. In two particulars has this been carried so far as to contribute to the creation of the atmosphere in which the present conflict rose, namely, the use made of the economic boycott and the introduction of anti-foreign propaganda into the schools." (P. 18)

Anti-foreign propaganda (in the schools especially) and boycott are circumstances of aggravation which are unfortunately dissevered from each other in the Report. They must be attentively co-ordinated, if we desire to understand the real state of things which prevailed in China, when special causes of tension in Manchuria resulted in the Incident of 18 September, 1931.

The "National" Government are permeated by acute anti-foreign feeling, and work earnestly to instil a virulent hatred of foreigners into the minds of the younger generation. Fifty millions of young Chinese are growing up under the influence of violent ideas, thus constituting a terrific problem for the immediate future. The Nanking Government are doing their best to foster this alarming process. Let us cite from the Report:

"The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen are now taught in the schools as if they had the same authority as that of the Classics in former centuries. The sayings of the Master receive the same veneration as the sayings of Confucius received in the days before the Revolution. Unfortunately, however, more attention has been given to the negative than to the constructive side of nationalism in the education of the young. A perusal of the textbooks used in the schools leaves the impression on the mind of a reader that their authors have sought to kindle patriotism with the flame of hatred, and to build up maleness upon a sense of injury. As a result of this virulent anti-foreign propaganda, begun in the schools and carried through every phase of public life, the students have been induced to engage in political activities which sometimes have culminated in attacks on the persons, homes or offices of Ministers and other authorities, with an attempt to overthrow the Government." (P. 19)
The Report recognizes that the Chinese boycotts have been the definite expression of a hostile attitude on the part of China towards Japan, that they injure the economic interests of Japan, and that they are consequently detrimental to friendly relations between Japan and China both from a psychological and from a material point of view. These observations confirm what the Japanese Government have always consistently maintained.

Some remarks may, however, be made on the special character of Chinese boycotts and on the question of responsibility for them.

In recent years, the boycott has developed in China the special characteristic of being employed not only as a means of protest against legitimate measures of foreign Powers to protect the lives and property of their respective subjects in China, but also as an instrument of national policy to secure the abandonment by another nation of its treaty rights.

As to the question of governmental responsibility, the Report states that "there is no doubt" as to the responsibility of the Kuomintang for the boycotts. This is patently correct, and it must be added that the Kuomintang, or the Nationalist Party, is not a simple political party in the Occidental sense of the term, but a regular state organ of China in accordance with the Chinese organic law. It is evident that its acts entail national responsibility upon the National Government.

No isolated descriptions, however minute and detailed, of anti-foreign methods of education and of the operation of boycott movements can be sufficient of themselves to give a full understanding of the actual conditions prevailing in China. It is necessary that the whole should be co-ordinated, so as to revel, underlying these two phases of anti-foreign activity, the anti-foreign policy of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government. This feature the Report fails to bring out. It is noteworthy that the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government began to play an important role in China within a few years of the Washington Conference. They have persistently pursued their so-called "revolutionary policy" ever since they came into power. It is this avowed policy of theirs, as well as the lawless conditions subsisting in China, that has alarmed foreign Powers and has increased their reluctance to surrender the rights which constitute at the moment their only protection.

On this point, the Report itself states that "the influence of the Kuomintang has introduced into the nationalism of China an additional and abnormal tinge of bitterness against all foreign influences. ... It demands the return of leased territories, of administrative and other not purely commercial rights exercised by a foreign agency in railway areas, of administrative rights in concessions and settlements, and of extraterritorial rights which imply that foreigners are not amenable to Chinese law, courts and taxation" (p. 19), and that "China demands immediately the surrender of certain exceptional powers and privileges because they are felt to be derogatory to her national dignity and sovereignty." (p. 23)

Further study would have revealed to the commission that these were not empty "cranks", but that the Chinese authorities were determined to push them through to fruition by their own unilateral declarations and their own brute force.
The Kuomintang Party has time and again announced as its basic foreign policy the abolition of foreign rights, with the avowed intention of denouncing "unequal" treaties unilaterally, if need be, regardless of the attitude of the other signatory Powers. In 1925, General Chiang Kai-shek declared that should the Nationalist revolution succeed, China would abolish all "unequal" treaties immediately and unilaterally. In January, 1927, the British Concessions in Hankow and Nanking were forcibly seized by the Kuomintang. Its actions may have become somewhat more moderate after the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking in April, the same year, but its policy did not change. They repeatedly proclaimed their intention of abrogating "unequal" treaties and of doing away with the rights and interests acquired by foreigners in China. They repeatedly pledged themselves to the public to carry out this policy. Acting upon the pledge, the Government on December 23, 1929, promulgated a law providing for the abolition of extraterritoriality as from January 1, 1930, and again in January 1931, declared that unless a satisfactory settlement of the extraterritoriality issue could be arrived at by the end of February, the same year, the Government would proceed with their proclaimed policy of abolishing extraterritoriality by other than diplomatic means. At the same time, there were issued "Regulations regarding the Administration of Justice in the case of Foreigners," and thus they openly expressed their intention of unilaterally doing away with the treaties, announcing the fact to the interested Powers.

It will be apparent that foreigners and their rights in China were faced with serious dangers prior to the Incident of 13 September. And, as the Report observes, "so far as Japan is China's nearest neighbour and largest customer, she has suffered more than any other Power from the lawless conditions...." (p. 23)

C. Abnormal Status of Foreigners in China.

The internal disintegration which in fact lies at the very heart of the capital question of China, together with the state of constant insecurity to which the lives and property of foreigners are consequently exposed; the inculcation of hatred in the schools and the anti-foreign propaganda among the adolescents; the sacred methods of boycott to be applied to foreigners of another nationality or another race; the unilateral denunciation of treaties, along with the rest of the measures derived from the theories of "revolutionary diplomacy," all contribute to inves the problems which are presented by China, destitute as she is of a strong and united government, with an entirely special character, and prevent the application of usual methods of solution. Such anti-foreign characteristics as have been described (and which are unparalleled anywhere else), have obliged foreign Powers to maintain a system for the protection of their rights and interests at their own hand. Those Powers not only possess rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, but maintain (of course besides their leased territories) concessions in Tientsin, Hankow, Shanghai and other cities, which they themselves police and administer. While thus making due provision to minimize the evil effects of Chinese lawlessness, these Powers hold themselves in a condition to protect their rights by force of arms. Besides the forces protecting the Japanese railway in Manchuria, there were before the Incident of 13 September, 4,700 American, British, French and Italian troops, together with some 360 Japanese, in the Peiping and Tientsin districts, all stationed there since 1901 in virtue of treaty stipulations. Most of these Powers also have forces stationed in Shanghai, not under treaty.
in the simple necessities of self-defence—a state of affairs which has come about altogether subsequently to the Washington Conference of 1922, and thus shows the deterioration of conditions since that date. Many men-of-war are also stationed, not only at sea-ports like Shanghai and Tsingtao, but also in inland waters, such as the Yangtze River and the Peiho.

Nor is this an empty form. There have been many occasions on which these troops and vessels have been employed in active self-defence.

Besides such conspicuous cases as those presented by the firing by foreign forces at Shumen in 1925, the bombardment of Yunchung in 1926 and that of Hankow in 1927, there have been numerous cases in which foreign men-of-war navigating the Yangtze River have been compelled to return the unprovoked fire of Chinese troops from the banks. These unprovoked attacks have indeed been on the increase in recent years, particularly since the Nanking came into power.

It is thus clear that the position of foreign Powers in China is an altogether exceptional one, without parallel in other parts of the world. International usages and the manner of exercising the right of self-defence are there marked by characteristics unlike any to be found in other civilized countries. The Report itself states on p. 23 that "the realisation of China’s national aspirations in the field of foreign relations depends on her ability to discharge the functions of a modern Government in the sphere of domestic affairs, and until the discrepancy between these has been removed the danger of international friction and of incidents, boycotts, and armed interventions will continue."

The application of what may be called "Peace Machinery" such as resort to International Courts or Arbitrators encounters insuperable obstacles in the case of China. It has been found impossible in the past to make use of these organs even in disputes which did not involve vital interests. The abnormal conditions of China and the fact that the Powers refuse, in view of their existence, to modify the abnormal and extraordinary institutions above-mentioned are sufficient proof of the impossibility of applying Chinese disputes the normal "Peace Machinery", as constituted at present.

CHAPTER II
Manchuria
A. General Survey

The Commission seem throughout to be influenced by the assumption that Manchuria is naturally and necessarily part of China. In fact, on p. 29, they say it has always been considered "an integral part of China." As a matter of fact, the union of Manchuria with China has only been temporary and accidental. This is apparent from the Report, which passes lightly over the situation which supervened on the dethronement of the Manchu Dynasty. In fact, although the Manchurian authorities may have "followed the lead of Yuan Shih-k'ai," and many have gone so far and so recently as to excuse themselves very much about their constitutional position, it is safe to accept the considered opinion of Escarra, an adviser to the Nanking government, (Le Chine et le Droit International, p. 240), that the disappearance of the Manchu Dynasty from China and the consequent disappearance
The substratum of the dynastic bond which united Manchuria is...union with China...accompagnait guère d'autres modes de rattachement...La Mandchourie...sieurs d'autres familles...au contraire, qui a conquis l'Empire chinois...On ne peut pas, d'autre part, considérer la Chine comme ayant été vassale de la Mandchourie...Il s'agit bien d'un exemple d'union personnelle...Le fait que les Mandchous étaient sur le trône de Chine, sans plus...Cette famille disparaissant, il fallait trouver une autre formule juridique pour expliciter le rattachement de la Mandchourie à la Chine...Il ne semblait pas que cette formule ait été recherchée d'une manière consciente...Thus the connection between Manchuria and China was loose and vague, and on various occasions Chang Tso-lin repudiated it in set terms.

Even assuming that in this ambiguous state of things Manchuria must be pronounced to have been for the moment duly incorporated with China—a large assumption—the fall of the United Republic after the death of Yuan Shih-kai in 1916 signalled the break-up all unity of government in China. None of the governments arising in that vast area had any title to supremacy over the rest, and the eventual establishment of a government at Nanking and its recognition as a legitimate government by the Powers could not invest it with authority over regions, such as Manchuria, which had never been subject to its sway.

In point of fact, Chang Tso-lin never took orders from any of the various parties who from time to time seized authority in Peiping, though he may have consulted their inclinations when it suited him to do so. "His attitude from time to time," says the Report (p. 28), "depended on the nature of his personal relations with the military leaders who controlled the changing central authorities. He seems to have looked upon his relations with the Government in the sense of a personal alliance." The Report gives many instances of his independence and proceeds to develop the theory, that in asserting independence of, and true alliance with, the Chinese Government, he did not mean to be independent of China. (p. 28-29) This assertion can only mean, at most, that Chang desired and would have welcomed a United China comprising his own Mandchuria. That may or may not have been the case, but it obviously in no respect affects the status of Manchuria, which depends solely on facts and not upon surmises. In point of fact, in his declaration of May, 1922, Chang expressly says that the North Eastern Provinces "are not recognized as territories of the Republic of China.*

Chang Tso-lin's son and successor, General Chang Hau-chiang, has adopted essentially the same attitude; not repudiating the ideal of a United China which should include Manchuria, and accepting the Nanking Government as a symbol of that ideal unity, but entirely repudiating any subjection to it in practice. As the Report says (p. 30), "The relationship with the Central Government depended on all affairs military, civil, financial and foreign, on voluntary cooperation. Orders or instructions requiring unquestioning obedience would not have been tolerated. Appointments or dismissals against the wishes of the Mandchurian authorities were unthinkable."

* "To the Foreign Ministers in Peiping, the Foreign Consuls in Tientsin and the Foreign Residents both Civil and Military in Tientsin."
The Report thus clearly demonstrates the entire independence of Manchuria under the Chang Dynasty to anyone who is not an imbecile or an ignoramus.

Then, therefore, on p. 29, the Report declares Manchuria to have "remained an integral part of China" and elsewhere declares that such is still its position. This contradicts all that has been adduced to prove its perfect independence.

Invoking against Japan the Law of Nations, it collides with the most fundamental doctrine of that law, viz., that a state must possess and continue to possess one supreme government. Since 1916 no single government has ever claimed actual authority over the whole of China.

As a further attempt to prove that Manchuria ought to be regarded as a part of China, the Report relies on the undoubted fact that many or most of the present inhabitants of Manchuria are Chinese immigrants. To this, it is sufficient to remark that, as the Report itself observes, the Chinese have not a keen sense of nationality, and to add that the doctrine of the Report would have very awkward consequences for the territorial status of many countries and for the peace of the world, if applied elsewhere.

B. Misgovernment of the Chang Dynasty.

The independence of the Three Eastern Provinces, and subsequently of the Four North-Eastern Provinces, and the maintenance of that independence subsequently to December 1916, of their administrative unity, does not mean that Manchuria was well governed. The Commission note, while they somewhat extenuate, the maladministration which prevailed under the Changs (p. 31)

"The Government of Manchuria authorities realized that, as before, their power derived much more from their armies than from Peking.

I have received from Hsu Shih-chang's communication giving away Three Eastern Provinces, the special areas, Jehol and Cha Ha-erh, also the Inner and Outer Mongolia. All these are not recognized as territories of the Republic of China.

I, with my special position, cannot but assume all the responsibilities thereof, and do my utmost to protect the lives and properties of all the friendly nations, cultivating friendly relationship with them. All the important treaties which have been made under the Manchu Regime and the Republic of China will be fully recognized and respected. The Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Consuls and Foreign Residents who wish to conduct negotiations on other matters and affairs can communicate with my office at Lanchow. I shall hereafter have closer commercial relationship than ever before with the friendly nations in order to promote the happiness and prosperity of the people. Whatever treaties Hsu Shih-chang will make after the first day of this month with reference to the Three Eastern Provinces, the Inner and the Outer Mongolia, Jehol and Cha Ha-erh, and which do not have my direct permission, will not be recognized by me, and I shall look upon them as something done with bad intention by Hsu Shih-chang. (Signed) Chang Tso-lin Commander-in-chief of Fengtien Troops."
This fact explains the maintenance of large standing armies numbering about 250,000 men, and of the huge arsenal on which more than $200,000,000 (silver) are reported to have been spent. Military expenses are estimated to have amounted to 80 percent of the total expenditure. The remainder was not sufficient to provide for the costs of administration, police, justice and education. The treasury was not capable of paying adequate salaries to the official. As all power rested in the hands of a few military men; office could be owned only through them. Nepotism, corruption and maladministration continued to be unavoidable consequences of this state of affairs. The Commission found grave complaints concerning this misadministration to be widely current. This state of affairs, however, was not peculiar to Manchuria, as similar or even worse conditions existed in other parts of China.

Heavy taxation was needed for the upkeep of the army. As ordinary revenues were still insufficient, the authorities further taxed the people by steadily depreciating the irredeemable provincial currencies. This was often done, particularly of late, in connection with "official bean-buying" operations, which by 1930 had already assumed monopolistic proportions. By gaining control over Manchuria's staple products, the authorities had hoped to enhance their gains by compelling the foreign bean-buyers, particularly the Japanese, to pay higher prices. Such transactions show the extent to which the authorities controlled banks and commerce. Officials likewise engaged freely in all sorts of private enterprise and used their power to gather wealth for themselves and their favourites.

This gloomy picture is a severely edited summary of the material presented by the Japanese Assessor to the Commission in Chapter VIII of "The Present Condition of China", and only imperfectly reflects the true and actual conditions, which were even worse (especially as regards the administration of justice and the police) than the above extract would suggest. But the passage is effective, even in its moderate statements, as showing how the Manchurian people laboured under an oppressive yoke of official and militarist victimization and how unlikely it was that any artificial Japanese stimulus was necessary in order to induce them to break it when the opportunity came.

C. Special Position of Japan

It is in this region that Japan has acquired a "special position." The "special position" of Japan in Manchuria, to which so much mystery is attached, is in reality a very simple matter. It is nothing but the aggregate of Japan's exceptional treaty rights in that country, plus the natural consequences which flow from her close neighbourhood and geographical situation and from her historical associations. Her measures of self-defense must be measured by the extent of her interests and her interests are exceptional, intimate and vital. In the standard case of the Caroline, it was the propinquity to the United States and the extreme importance and disturbed conditions of Canada that led the United States to acquiesce in the action of Great Britain in invading American soil and destroying the instant menace.

Every act of self-defense must depend for its justification on the importance of the interests to be defended, on the imminence of the danger, and on the necessity of the act. Japanese interests in Manchuria are commanding; her territory is contiguous, and Japan can not depend wholly upon the local force.
Her "special position" is at once apparent. It does not give her, nor is it asserted to give her, a general and vexatious right of intervention in the administration of the country. But it certainly creates a position in which she must defend herself with uncommon energy against military attack.

The Japanese Government agree fully with the passages in which the Commission enumerate the rights acquired by Japan in Manchuria by virtue of the treaties of 1905 and 1915, which it is satisfactory to know that they recognize are in full force and cannot be abolished by unilateral action.

At p. 38 they observe:—

"This summary of the long list of Japan's rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between that country and China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighbouring State such extensive economic and administrative privileges."

There is nothing in this "special position" conflicting (as the Report asserts) with the sovereign rights of China.

The powers conferred upon Russia, and secured by Japan, in the extremely limited area known as the South Manchuria Railway Zone did not at all present a conflict with Chinese sovereignty. No exception could have been taken to a cession or lease by China of this Zone to Russia, and through Russia to Japan. It would have been an exercise of sovereignty and not a conflict with sovereignty. That the nominal sovereignty of China was permitted to subsist when the agreement with Russia was made, does not make the rights which China conferred on Russia a conflict with the sovereignty of China: the contrary, derived from the sovereignty of China.

Nor is it possible to imagine that the proximity, and the economic and strategic importance of Manchuria to Japan conflict with the local sovereignty. They make it more possible that Japan might be obliged to resort to self-protection by events in Manchuria than she would be if Manchuria were on the other side of the world. But this is no restriction on the sovereignty of the region; it is only a remote liability to an occurrence to which every state is subject, even the strongest. The sovereignty of the United States was not impaired by the Caroline Case.
The "special position" of Japan, so persistently assailed, has resulted in Japan's accomplishment, in spite of many embarrassments, of a great work of civilization in Manchuria. The principal agent in this development has been the South Manchuria Railway in its multiform activities. But neither in Chapter II nor in Chapter VIII of the Report is any acknowledgement made of the work so accomplished -- in fact, the Railway is scarcely mentioned at all, although great stress is laid on the activities of Chinese immigrants. The present prosperity of Manchuria is no doubt due as the Report says, in no small measure to the influx of a hard-working and plain-living Chinese population. This cannot be ascribed to an official Chinese policy of emigration. The phenomenon is simply and solely due to the attractiveness of Manchuria to the Chinese farmer. And Manchuria was attractive, not because it was well-governed, but because, owing to the presence of Japan, it was free from the scourge of war. The Chinese, as is well known, and as is pointed out in the Report, are highly adaptable to environment and are destitute of any strong national feeling. Their connection, if any, with China is a matter of social and family sentiment. It implies no political attachment whatever. "The ties", as the Report observes (p 125), "between Manchuria and the rest of China remain chiefly racial and social," i.e., they are not political. They are "racial and social rather than economic." (p 123) In view of this, it is difficult to understand the emphasis which is placed by the Report on the political efficiency of this non-political, non-economic tie.

D. Attacks on Japan's Position

Although the Report says little concerning the enterprises and establishments of the Japanese in Manchuria, it is these enterprises and establishments which have been the objects of Chinese direct attack, and in Chapter III of the Report these particular questions are examined, viz:--

1. The encircling policy directed against the South Manchuria Railway.

2. The embarrassments placed in the way of leasing land and of the exercise of other treaty rights.

3. The oppression exercised upon Japanese subjects, and especially on those of Korean origin.

4. The assassination of Captain Nakamura.

But the Report, neither in Chapter III nor anywhere else evinces any condemnation of the deliberate policy of violation and repudiation of treaties and other engagements pursued by China, -- it even inclines to excuse them on the plea of the nationalist programme of emancipation. Nor does the Report touch on the impossibility, by reason of the hostile attitude of China, of arriving at any satisfactory solution of pending questions. It is to be regretted that the Report deals with those matters piecemeal and here again fails to co-ordinate them into one whole. If that had been done, it would have been apparent that one basic cause underlay them all, and that, whatever the precise rights or wrongs of each case, they were manifestations of a fixed intention to annihilate Japanese rights in Manchuria.
That conclusion is more clearly apparent in the summary given in the report (pp 30-31) of the situation as it developed in Manchuria after the alliance of General Chang Hsueh-liang with the Government at Nanking.

"In the domain of foreign policy, the union of Manchuria with the Nationalist Government was to have more important consequences, although in this respect, the local authorities were also left much liberty of action. The persistent assaults of Chang Tso-lin on the position of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, and his disregard of certain rights claimed by Japan, show that in Manchuria a "forward policy" had already been adopted before the union with the Nationalists. However, after the union, Manchuria was opened to well-organized and systematic Kuomintang propaganda. In its official party publications and numerous affiliated organs, it never ceased to insist on the primary importance of the recovery of lost sovereign rights, and abolition of unequal treaties, and the wickedness of imperialism. Such propaganda was bound to make a profound impression in Manchuria, where the reality of foreign interests, courts, police, guards or soldiers on Chinese soil, was apparent. Through the Nationalist school-books party propaganda entered the schools. Associations such as the Liaoning People's Foreign Policy Association made their appearance. They stimulated and intensified the nationalist sentiment and carried on an anti-Japanese agitation. Pressure was brought to bear on Chinese house-owners and landlords to raise the rents of Japanese and Korean tenants, or to refuse renewal of rent contracts. The Japanese reported to the Commission many cases of this nature. Korean settlers were subjected to systematic persecution. Various orders and instructions of an anti-Japanese nature were issued. Cases of friction accumulated, and dangerous tension developed. The Kuomintang party headquarters in the provincial capitals were established in March, 1931, and subsequently branch organizations were set up in the other towns and districts. Party propagandists from China came North in increasing numbers. The Japanese complained that the anti-Japanese agitation was intensified every day. In April, 1931, a five days' conference under the auspices of the People's Foreign Policy Association was held at Mukden, with over three hundred delegates from various parts of Manchuria in attendance. The possibility of liquidating the Japanese position in Manchuria was discussed, the recovery of the South Manchuria Railway being included in the resolutions adopted. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. and her citizens suffered from similar tendencies, while the White Russians, although they had no sovereign rights or exceptional privileges to surrender, were subjected to humiliation and ill-treatment."

Unfortunately, this summary, which gives an adequate picture of the situation as it existed on the eve of 18 September, is only to be found in Chapter II of the Report, and nothing is said about it in connection with the account of the incident of that date (which is dealt with in Chapter IV).

In dealing with that crucial subject in Chapter IV, the Report omits no appreciation of its connection with the long chain of Chinese attacks on Japanese interests. Neither the intensive boycott of Japanese goods, nor the denial of validity to Japanese treaties, nor the destructive competition with the Japanese railways, nor the obstructions put in the way of Korean immigrants, nor the Wanpooshan affair, is referred to; and the case of Captain Nakamura is only incidentally touched upon. The whole background of the incident is cut adrift.
All the evidence of an aggressive determination on the part of Chinese is discarded. It is replaced by a heterogeneous collection of reasons why the Japanese people may be supposed to have been prepared "for a resumption of a positive policy."

Surely an armed attack on a vital nerve of the nation's safety by the regular troops of an aggressive neighbour may be repelled without calling in such factors as Japanese trade depression to explain it. The result of dissociating the swift and complete repulse from the prior evidence of Chinese aggressive disposition is to put before the reader the domestic discontents in Japan, in place of Chinese aggressiveness, as the reason why the final attack on the railway was dealt with as it deserved. It is the reason why the Japanese adopted a "positive policy" in Manchuria that the Commission might well have investigated.

As early as 15 June, 1931, the Japanese Government were pointing out the serious results which would be liable to follow from the conduct of the officials and police in Manchuria, and so far from being impelled by trade depression or military and political discontents to initiate a "positive policy", they endeavoured by all means to lessen the tension. In spite of these efforts, the aggressive attitude of the Chinese continued unabated, and it is notable that when the "North Barracks" were entered by the Japanese troops, there was observed on the walls a placard exhorting the men in garrison to "Look at the railway running along the west side of these Barracks." It is little wonder that at this very spot the explosion of 10 September was engineered by these very men.

This attitude of aggressiveness on the part of the Chinese, and not the resumption of a "positive policy" on the part of Japan, as is suggested in the Report, explains the state of tension which existed in Manchuria. Many other instances of the insolence and truculence prevailing in General Chang Hush-chiang's army in Mukden are given in a pamphlet prepared by the Manchuria Army and laid before the Commission on 24 April, entitled "A Review on Sino-Japanese Clashes in Manchuria", to which their Report has not thought it necessary to allude. The paramount necessity of avoiding the smallest act which might explode the inflammable atmosphere must be apparent to everyone who has followed the march of events so far, and has realised the growing aggressiveness of the Chinese as detailed in the Report.

CHAPTER III
The Incident of 18 September and Subsequent Operations

The Japanese military authorities have furnished to the Commission both in writing and in conversations with the Headquarters Staff of the Kwantung Army, with a complete and detailed information regarding the various phases of this incident. This information is considered by the Japanese Government as accurate and truthful account, and they must sustain it in its integrity.

The Report sums up this information in six paragraphs entitled "The Japanese Version". (pp 67-69) From this summary, many not unimportant details are omitted; accordingly, members of the Council, who wish for further information, are referred to the accounts supplied by the principal actors themselves and inserted in the documents presented by the Japanese Government.
After summing up also the "Chinese version", the Report formulates certain conclusions which cannot but cause surprise, as they are not the logical consequence of the two versions which precede them, and appear, as the Report itself admits, to be especially influenced by information drawn from other and unofficial sources.

The Commission recognize (p.71) the fact of the explosion, but they add that the damage done was not of itself sufficient to justify military action. Here they fail to take into account two other factors, which they nevertheless admit to have existed, viz.; the state of acute tension already existing between the conflicting military forces and the existence of an emergency plan of campaign which the Japanese army, like any other organized force, must necessarily prepare whenever it is stationed on or in the neighbourhood of foreign territory, particularly when repeated occurrences show that prompt measures may become imperative.

This state of acute tension, admitted by the Report to have existed, - general and growing tension between China and Japan and local tension between the military forces in close contact, - is, as has already been observed, insufficiently brought out in the Report.

As respects the assertion that the Japanese had "a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese" (p.71), it is only necessary to look at the facts, to be convinced that no other Power or its armed forces could possibly have acted otherwise.

The Japanese Army in Manchuria before 18 September, in view of its much inferior strength faced as it was by very superior forces provided with a vast supply of material including aeroplanes, reserve munitions and a great arsenal, naturally had to provide for the event of some occurrence or a Chinese attack obliging it to take immediate steps to prevent itself from being overwhelmed by a more numerous adversary. That the Japanese Army had its plans for dealing with such a situation is undoubtedly the case and it would have been a gross dereliction of duty if it had not. Every possible combination had been minutely worked out; frequent manoeuvres helped to make the execution of the plan almost automatic. And although a certain amount of initiative had to be left to those who were on the spot in any given conjuncture, the main objectives in case of any attack were foreseen and well known. It was therefore perfectly natural that after the explosion on the railway line and the firing of the first shots, - all the work of Chinese soldiery - the plan was "put into operation with swiftness and precision." (p.71)

The Report draws a contrast between the preparation of this emergency plan, a most legitimate and necessary measure of security, and the absence on the Chinese side of any plan "of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place." (p.71) They rely, in
support of this attitude, on a telegram supposed to have been sent on 6 September by General Ch'eng Hsieh-liang, instructing the Chinese forces to exercise violence and avoid having recourse to force. Supposing — though the Japanese have no knowledge on the point — that such a telegram was in fact despatched, received and circulated, and further that these orders were not subsequently cancelled or modified by General Ch'eng Hsieh-liang himself, the telegram in itself could not, in the notorious state of indiscipline of a Chinese army, give any guarantee that the Chinese would never have attacked the Japanese, nor could it furnish any decisive proof that they did not make the attack of the 10th of September. And it is to be remarked that in point of fact the Chinese troops did attack on that night and continued to resist by force of arms. The Commission's statement that "the Chinese made no concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces," shows that they do not discard the hypothesis of a Chinese attack, but would limit its burden on the case by refusing to call it "concerted" or "authorized." According to the Report, the attack might be the work of soldiers acting on their own initiative and without orders from their superiors.

But in any event there remains the solid fact that the explosion did take place, and that an attack was launched by Chinese soldiers: in consequence, the Japanese emergency plan was automatically put in motion long before such questions as the extent of the damage could ever be discussed.

In dealing with the events of the night of 18 September, the Commission have thought it their duty further to add that "the military operations of the Japanese troops during this night cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence." (p.71)

It is entirely impossible to accept this opinion, which must be a surprising one to anyone belonging to those countries which are parties to the Briand-Kellogg Treaty for the Outlawry of War.

The paragraph concerning the right of self-defence contained in the Identical Note of Mr. Kellogg, Secretary of State, dated 23 June, 1928, reads:

"(1) Self-defense. There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense.

The Resolution adopted by the Senate of the United States at the time of ratification of that Treaty states:

"It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may, and frequently does, extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it."
The letters of Sir Austen Chamberlain to the American diplomatic representatives in London, dated 19 May and 18 July, 1928, may also be cited.

The first observes:

"4. After studying the wording of Article 1 of the United States draft, His Majesty's Government do not think that its terms exclude action which a state may be forced to take in self-defence. Mr. Kellogg has made it clear in the speech to which I have referred above that he regards the right of self-defence as inalienable, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary.

"10. The language of Article 1, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of security. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government are not disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary.

"I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of the 28th April that the proposed treaty does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self-defence, as also with his opinion that each state alone is competent to decide when circumstances necessitate recourse to war for that purpose."

The Second says:

"I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of the 28th April that the proposed treaty does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self-defence, as also with his opinion that each state alone is competent to decide when circumstances necessitate recourse to war for that purpose."

The French Government in their reply of 14 July, 1928, to the American Ambassador in Paris, similarly remarked:

"rien dans le nouveau Traite ne restreint ni ne compromet d'une facon quelconque le droit de defense personnelle. Chaque nation a cet egard reste toujours libre de defendre son territoire contre une attaque ou une invasion; seule elle est competente pour decider si les circonstances exigent de recourir a la guerre pour sa propre defense."
The German Government in their letter of 27 April, 1928, to the American Ambassador in Berlin, also declare that they start with the presumption that the proposed treaty "would not put in question the sovereign right of any state to defend itself."

The Japanese Government, informed of all these communications, also did not fail to emphasize in their note of 26 May, 1928, to the American Ambassador, that "the proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self-defense."

In the face of these express reserves, the right to pronounce a decisive opinion on an act of self-defence, falls solely within the sovereign appreciation of the interested state. And on this point the finding of the Commission explicitly is that "the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence." (p.71) In the case of this incident of 18 September, no one except the officers on the spot could possibly be qualified to judge whether or not the action undertaken by the Japanese Army was a measure of self-defence.

It is unnecessary here to enlarge on the nature of the right of self-defence. It has never been better defined than by Mr. Daniel Webster when as Secretary of State of the American Republic, he laid down that it demanded for its just exercise a case of "necessity, instant and overwhelming, allowing no choice of means and no instant for deliberation." With those conditions the Incident of 18 September precisely complies. There was the necessity of meeting a great and imminent danger - an overt attack by members of a vastly superior force, capable, if not nipped in the bud, of driving the Japanese into the sea. There was no choice of means - what else was to be done? There was no instant for deliberation - the open attack was launched upon them. It is fortunately unnecessary to consider whether the magnitude of the interests at stake warranted forcible measures. For these interests were nothing less than the whole position of Japan in the Far East.

It is as impossible as it would be unjust to make Japan responsible for the further events which supervened on the Chinese resistance. Measures of self-protection usually meet no resistance and are at once settled by amicable discussion between the governments concerned. If, however, they are met by armed opposition, there is no knowing how far they may develop, and necessarily so.

It may not be inappropriate to recall the case of Navarino, where a conflict was so little desired or expected that one of the governments involved described it as an "untoward event." The Egyptian armament had come to assist the Turks to suppress the revolt in Greece; they were faced by a fleet of English, French and Russians, who were bent on preventing them from doing so. In that state of tension, a chance shot furnished the spark that produced
The conflict. The result destroyed the Egyptian fleet and Turkish hopes, and set the seal on the independence of Greece. Yet it began in mere self-defence -- the return of fire. This illustrates how impossible it is to limit the consequences of self-defensive measures.

The Commission, while drawing attention to the synchronisation of the operations which took place on 18 September throughout the entire extent of the South Manchuria Railway Zone, omit to notice the necessity for such simultaneous action. There was no other alternative for the Japanese Commander, with his 10,400 troops stationed all along an eleven-hundred kilometre line of railway, and faced by 220,000 Chinese troops (without reckoning 110,000 beyond the Great Wall also under General Chang Hsueh-liang's command) at Mukden itself, a single Japanese regiment of reduced strength together with a few railway portrots, 1,500 men in all, were faced by 15,000 Chinese with some forty guns; and a similar situation existed at Changchun and elsewhere. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief was in fact responsible for the protection of over a million Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria. In case of an attack at one point, and with the evident possibility before him of attacks at other points, the only possible way of ensuring that protection was to use all the transport facilities the railway afforded, and to take the Chinese troops by surprise before they could have time to move.

To sum up, the operations which commenced on the night of 18 September were only the putting into active execution of a plan prepared to meet the case of a Chinese attack, and whose prompt and accurate execution had always been considered by the Commander-in-Chief as absolutely essential for the fulfilment of the task of protection which was incumbent on him, in view of the great local superiority of the Chinese. These operations had no relation to anything but self-defence, and the Japanese Government cannot allow either their necessity or their appropriateness to be the subject of dispute.

The Report relates at considerable length the ensuing operations undertaken subsequently to 18 September with a view to effectively ensuring the safety of Japanese life and property. The Japanese Government will not here enter into the numerous points of detail on which observations would have to be made. They are conscious of never having transgressed the due limits of the right of self-defence.

CHAPTER IV
THE NEW STATE

The questions regarding Manchuria considered in Chapter VI of the Report are of first-rate importance, since it is on the conclusions formulated in this Chapter respecting the establishment of Manchukuo, and the attitude of its inhabitants towards the new Government, that the Commission base their general finding in Chapter IX to the effect that "the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria would be equally unsatisfactory."
The conclusion in question appears to have been reached with little reference to proved facts. It is certainly hard, in the course of a brief sojourn, to ascertain the true state of affairs in the case of a new state, only a few weeks old. Such a state is naturally subject to infantile ailments — to all the hostile activities of dissident and discontented elements — to the difficulties necessarily incident to a period of transition, particularly inimical to business and agriculture — and, in an especial measure in the case of Manchoukuo, to an intensely hostile and unscrupulous propaganda.

It is nevertheless regrettable that the Report, declining to accept the solemn declarations of the Chinese Government and attaching too little value to the certified documents presented by them, have, alike in Manchuria and in Peiping, the stronghold of General Chang Hsueh-liang, apparently listened to the opinions of the unidentified persons, and given credence to letters and communications of doubtful or unknown origin.

Accordingly, the Japanese Government think it their especial duty to enable the Council of the League of Nations to acquire a more correct idea of the matters which form the subject-matter of Chapter VI viz., the establishment of Manchoukuo, the views of its inhabitants and the organization and prospects of the new State.

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF MANCHOUKUO.

The Report concludes, in the first place, that nothing was ever heard of the independence of Manchuria before September, 1931 (p. 97)

It has been clearly explained above, however, that Manchuria has always constituted a special territory, geographically and historically distinct from China Proper. It constituted a separate crown domain; there was no power in the Republic or its officers to annex it to Chinese Proper, and its independence at least was proclaimed by Cheng Tso-lin, as the Report itself acknowledges. The oppressive misgovernment of that ruler, and still more, that of his son, General Chang Hsueh-liang, are notorious and are also admitted by the Report. At the expense of Manchuria, their ambition and greed induced them to embark on costly and disastrous invasions of China, and it is matter of history that this led very long ago to the cry of "Manchuria for the Manchurians," embodied in the movement known as "Paoching Annin" (Preserve the frontiers and give us peace). From such a movement to complete independence, in name as well as in fact, was a very small step. The existence of this movement is no supposititious figment; its leaders are perfectly well known; they were Mr. Wang Yung-chiang (Provincial Governor of Fengtien under Chang Tso-lin) and Mr. Yu Chung-han, one of Cheng's counsellors. Both had to resign and give way to Cheng's grandiose schemes. It was this Yu who subsequent to the Incident of 18 September became the organizer of the Self-Government Guiding Board mentioned later. In this he was not yielding to Japanese solicitations; he was merely carrying on his interrupted work. His case is typical.
The point need not be elaborated by citing the other independence movements of different shades which arose in the time of the Chans. But a certain surprise may be evoked that the Report avers that the idea of independence did not exist.

The misgovernment and extortions of Chang Tso-lin and General Chang Hsueh-liang had long driven the educated Chinese and Manchus to consider the necessity of reforms. Dr. Chao Hsin-po, President of the Lawyers Association of Mukden, broached the subject to Chang Tso-lin, but he had refused to listen to him. At the Feng-yung University, in Mukden, a group of professors also took up the study of the political reforms rendered necessary in order to counteract the militarist policy of General Chang Hsueh-liang, and Dr. Chao was in touch with this group.

There was in existence, therefore, at a period prior to September 1931, a movement based on Manchurian independence, and here the Commission appear to have entirely left out of sight all the information supplied then, particularly in the course of conversation in Manchuria with the leading personages in the new Government.

So much for the assertion that Manchurian independence had never been heard of. We now come to the node of the definite establishment of the independent State of Manchouko and the attitude of the Japanese toward it. Here the Report is very far from being in accordance with the facts.

The Report says that the movement to proclaim the independent State of Manchuria was inaugurated, organized and carried through by the Japanese as a solution for the situation which had arisen as a consequence of the events of 18 September, utilizing for this purpose the names and active cooperation of certain Chinese personages; that the activities of the Japanese Headquarters Staff were marked, from 18 September onwards, by political motives; and that the General Staff in Tokio lent the independence movement their assistance and gave directions to its organizers.

But a little thought will show how unfounded is this assumption.

When the authorities who under General Chang Hsueh-liang were responsible for the maintenance of order in Manchuria disappeared, as they mainly did after the events of 18 September, some organization was evidently necessary in order to carry on the normal machinery of daily life; local vigilance committees were formed by the local leaders, and the Japanese Army welcomed their cooperation and assisted them. An army is bound to do as little damage to an occupied territory as possible, and the preservation of the means of civilized life was one of the first cares of the Japanese Army and was accomplished in this way. That these nuclei of government eventually coalesced and developed into a genuine state is no matter for astonishment and offers no occasion for invoking an imaginary Japanese stimulus. The country had been wretchedly governed and was only superior to China in this, - that it had one master and was not ravaged by the conflicts of half a dozen. It is no
wonder that its new administrators decided to be free of the Chang regime. To anyone acquainted with the actual conditions which prevailed in Manchuria before and after the 18th of September, 1931, it will be readily apparent that the widespread determination to get rid of the Chang administration was one which was easily capable of developing into a movement for the proclamation of complete independence. And in this connection, it should also be remembered that another movement - that for the Restoration of the Manchu Dynasty - is as old as the Republic of China, and has been connected throughout in a large degree with Manchuria, once the cradle of that Dynasty and later its own crown domain. The "independence movement," as it actually developed, can have caused no surprise to anyone with an intimate knowledge of these circumstances. And the supposition that it was wholly (p. 97, line 25), or partially (p. 97 line 33), the work of unidentified Japanese or of the Japanese General Staff must then be discarded.

According to the statements of the Report itself, all these movements in favour of local, provincial and state independence were the work of personages of high standing who were all Chinese, Manchus or Mongols. At Mukden, it was Dr. Chao Hsin-po, President of the Lawyers Association, Mr. Yuan Chin-kai, a former Vice-President of the North Eastern Political Committee under General Chang Hau-chi-iang, Mr. Yu Chung-han, Vice-President of the Committee of Peace and Order, General Tsang Shih-yi, Governor of the Province of Fengtien. At Kirin, it was General Hsi Hai, Acting President of the Provincial Government; at Harbin, it was General Chang Chin-hai, Administrator of that Special District. And the persons who worked at the preparation of plans of the establishment of the new State were two Chinese, Mr. Yu Cheng-han and General Tsang Shih-yi. The detailed organization of the state was framed, and the Declaration of Independence drawn up, by the principal men of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Jehol and the Special District, and by various Mongolian bannermen who assembled at Mukden. And Chinese, Manchus and Mongols alone comprised the North-Eastern Administrative Council, which formed the germ of the new State.

The evident inconsistency between the facts and the conclusions of the Commission becomes a sheer contradiction if we consider the dates. The Committee for the Preservation of Order in the region of Fengtien was established on 24 September and already on the 26th it was issuing declarations which contemplated the independence of that province and of the Three Eastern Provinces. On 26 September General Hsi Hai declared the independence of the Province of Kirin. At Harbin, on 27 September, there was established a Committee for the Preservation of Order. On 1 October, General Chang Hai-peng proclaimed his independence at Teumen. On 17 October General Yu Chi-shan, the Commander of the Liaoning Army of Defence, also declared his independence, demanding the foundation of a Marchu-Mongol state with the ex-Emperor as its ruler. Can it be supposed that between 18 September and these various independence movements, Japanese officials can have met together, concerted and agreed upon a programme of initiating independence, and secured its
being at once put in execution by Chinese, Manchus and Mongols as their own? It is more simple and more reasonable to conclude that the aspirations which were already floating in the minds of many of the leading Chinese and Manchu inhabitants spontaneously and naturally found a sphere of action hitherto denied them, upon the disappearance of an administration which presented so many objectionable features.

There can be no doubt that the idea of proclaiming independence, which had also a certain affinity with the idea of restoring the Manchu Dynasty, had its origin, therefore, entirely among the Chinese, Manchus and Mongols. For instance, Mr. Chang Yin-ching (Manchoukuo Minister of Industry, Commerce and Agriculture, a son of Chang Chih-tung, the renowned scholar statesman under the Manchu regime) and Mr. Hei-chien Chih-shih, the present Foreign Minister of Manchoukuo, were both prominent figures in the movement, particularly in the Restoration movement of the Manchu Dynasty. General Hsi Hsiang, a Manchu and a noted monarchist, at present the Manchoukuo Minister of Finance, was also a leading member of the same group. Japanese officials were certainly cognizant of the censure of these ideas; but whatever sympathy may have been felt for such projects by individuals, neither the Japanese Government nor the Headquarters Staff on the spot gave them any encouragement.

It is proper, in this connection, to point out the fact that both Baron Shidehara, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and General Kinsui, Minister of War, issued on the 20th of September instructions to the Japanese officials in Manchuria, strictly forbidding participation by Japanese in the various attempts to establish a new political authority in Manchuria.

Conformably with these instructions the Japanese, civil as well as military, uniformly abstained from interference. When the movement had become a definite one, the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army could evidently not ignore it, and when its leaders had matured and explained their plans, the movement was in a situation to command respect from the ultimately responsible for the preservation of order, as a development calculated to remove all disquieting elements by the definite establishment of a new regime.

As for the "Self-Government Guiding Board," to which the Report appears to attach some importance, this was not created until 10 November, and was under the management of a Chinese. Yet the Report turns it into an organ of the Fourth Department of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, "organized and in large part officered by Japanese." (p. 92) This is a mere repetition of the allegations in the Chinese Memorandum, corroborated, according to the Report, by "reliable" witnesses, who are left unidentified, and it is completely at variance with the facts. There has always been at the Kwantung Army Headquarters a department for the study of political developments in Manchuria, and after 18 September, 1931, when the independence movements began to show themselves, this department in the fulfillment of its functions, had certainly to collect all the information that could be gathered concerning them. But this
department of the Headquarters had no connection whatever with the "Self-Government Guiding Board" organized under the management of Mr. Yu Chung-han, for the purpose of co-ordinating the action of the various committees for the preservation of peace, or for independence, which had already been constituted in the Province of Fengtien since the beginning of October. Dr. Chao Hsin-po recounted to the commission how the association of which he is President set to work, immediately after 18 September, to form an Independence Committee, which sent delegates to the various provincial districts to ascertain the opinions of the leading personages regarding the establishment of a new government.

Finally the Report makes the point that such a movement in favour of a change of government could not have been carried through but for the presence of the Japanese troops. But the Japanese troops were there in the exercise of their just rights. They were stationed in the railway zone in virtue of a right derived from treaty, and they moved out of the zone in the exercise of the right of self-defence. If the independence movement took advantage of the conditions thus created, that altered in no wise the spontaneity of the movement. There are many instances in other Continents where the presence of foreign forces has afforded the possibility of attaining independence, and where that independence has never been questioned.

It may be urged that the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 prevents the Signatory Powers from impairing the sovereignty of China. That is true, but irrelevant. If in the due fulfilment of its lawful rights, a Signatory Power finds herself in Chinese territory, she cannot be held responsible for the consequences. If these consequences impair Chinese sovereignty and integrity, it is not she who is to blame. Even supposing, therefore, that Manchuria under General Chang Hsueh-liang was really an integral part of China, still Japan cannot be answerable for the consequences of her proper and necessary action. If China really were an organized state, exercising an integrity of administration in Manchuria, this would still be true.

In short, to deny that the present regime is to be regarded as the outcome of a natural and spontaneous movement is to admit that all the evidence presented by Manchoukuo has been disregarded. The "Histoire de l'Independence du Mandchoukouo" prepared by the Manchurian Government and presented to the Commission, contains an account of the successive demonstrations in favour of independence which took place in the various districts throughout the country. Here, we have precision and open declarations; names are given; the text of declarations and resolutions is reproduced. Commercial, industrial, agricultural, educational groups, sometimes numbering thousands of adherents, were represented at those demonstrations. For the Constituent Assembly, delegates were appointed in each district, in the accustomed fashion, by the accord of the four leading local associations, so that the General Assembly which on 29 February, 1932, proclaimed at Mukden the establishment of the new State was fully representative of every interest. And
it is singular that the Report, in sketching a practical system by which to ascertain the state of popular opinion on the conduct of a Manchurian Government suggests this very same traditional system of representations of the Chambers of Commerce, the Trade Guild and other civil agencies. (p.134)

In fine, the conclusions of the Commission in this section of Chapter VI run counter to the historic elements which underly the new regime, to the psychological and material causes which have called forth the surge of latent sentiments, and to all the facts which go to prove the spontaneous character of the independence movement among the people of Manchuria, which has had for its result the foundation of the new State.

The Japanese Government repeat, without fear of contradiction, that the movement for the proclamation of the independence of Manchuria was a genuine, spontaneous, popular and natural one. The old crown domain installed the descendant of its ancient chiefs as its ruler, to secure it alike from the oppressions of its quondam militarist tyrants and from the anarchy of China Proper. Why this eminently rational and natural step should be ascribed to the machinations of Japan, it is hard to imagine. The assertions that the chief agency in bringing about independence was an organ of the Kwantung Army Headquarters (p.92); that a group of Japanese officials conceived, organized and carried through this movement (p.97), and that the activities of Japanese officials were a "most effective" factor in the creation of Manchoukuo (ibid) are assertions destitute of foundation, contrary to the express assurance of this Government, and entirely unsupported by evidence. In putting these forward, the Report appears simply to have adopted wholesale the allegations of the Chinese Assessor.

B. ATTITUDE OF THE INHABITANTS TOWARDS MANCHOUKO

The Commission have had placed at their disposal as material upon which to form their opinion:

1. Petitions and declarations emanating from qualified bodies composed of persons of various races (Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese, Koreans, Russians, etc.) representing chambers of commerce, political organizations, agricultural and educational organizations, etc.

2. Letters and other written communications to the number of 1550, transmitted by post or otherwise, and apparently coming from Chinese.

3. Private conversations with businessmen, bankers, professors, physicians, police officers and others.
A striking feature of this part of the Report is the great credit accorded to the letters of unknown Chinese, all but two of which are said to be unfavourable to Manchoukuo and Japan - and the little weight ascribed to official memoranda and to the petitions and declarations of responsible bodies, which enumerate the grievances which the population had against the late administration and which give voice to its aspirations and its hopes.

The Commission have received 1548 letters objecting to the foundation of the new State. Considering the vigour and activity of Chinese propaganda, it is really astonishing that they received no more. There are some 30,000,000 people in Manchuria, and if one in twenty thousand only was moved to communicate his desires to the Commission, the fact is rather a tribute to the credit of Manchoukuo than otherwise. On the other hand, the positive evidence afforded by gatherings of thousands of people in favour of Manchoukuo, supported by the testimony of responsible delegations and leading citizens, is simply dismissed as generally due to the machinations of the Japanese. It is surely intelligible that a people who had admittedly been systematically "squeezed", oppressed and defrauded by their rulers would not need the stimulus of Japanese threats and bribes to induce them to accept and approve a government which at least offered them a chance of security for the produce of their labour. Certainly the attitude of the farmers and workmen cannot be collected from the opinions of "foreigners and educated Chinese".

(p. 109)

As to the other classes of the population (officials, police, soldiers, business men, bankers, etc.), the Report not only carefully takes note of anyone who is hostile, but discredits those who support Manchoukuo as being actuated by self-interest or by fear, and as moved by no patriotic ideals.

Lastly, the Report, insisting on the antagonism of the Chinese to Manchoukuo, tries to explain away the adhesion freely given to the new State by the Koreans, the Russians and the Mongols. The Report admits the welcome given by the Koreans to the new regime, but it cannot bring itself to do so ungrudgingly. It wonders how long the welcome will last. As for the Mongols, while recognizing their generally favourable attitude, the Report gives undue emphasis to one anti-Manchoukuo declaration made by a deputation of Mongol princes at Peiping under the aegis of General Cheng Hauch-liang.

The truth is fortunately more encouraging than the unfavourable picture drawn in the Report. It is needless to recall once more the many great popular demonstrations which immediately preceded the establishment of the new State, described as they are in detail in the document "Histoire de l'Indépendance du Manchou-kuo." Nor need there be enumerated here the signal marks of acceptance which, in spite of the efforts of the enemies of Manchoukuo, the population has continuously accorded to the new regime. It is a civil government, the first of this character that the people of the country have known since the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown, and this civil character stands out conspicuously in comparison with any of the autocratic militarist governments which at present bear rule in China.
C. ORGANIZATION AND PROSPECTS OF MANCHOUKO

The Report, after describing in Chapter VI the organization of Manchouko, its programme, and the various measures it has taken to affirm its independence from China, observes that:

"The programme of this 'government' contains a number of liberal reforms, the application of which would be desirable not only in Manchuria but also in the rest of China; in fact, many of these reforms figure equally in the programme of the Chinese Government. In their interviews with the Commission, the representatives of this 'government' claimed that, with the help of the Japanese, they would be able to establish peace and order within a reasonable time and would thereafter be able to maintain it permanently. They expressed the belief that they would be able to secure the support of the people in time by assuring them an honest and efficient administration, security from bandit raids, lower taxation as the result of reduced military expenditure, currency reform, improved communications and popular political representation," (pp.105-106)

But from this promising material the Report only concludes that "after making every allowance for the short time which has hitherto been at the disposal of the 'Manchoukuo Government' for carrying out its policy, and after paying due regard to the steps already taken, there is no indication that this 'government' will, in fact, be able to carry out many of its reforms. To mention but one example, there seem to be serious obstacles in the way of the realization of their budgetary and currency reforms." (p.106)

The comments of the Commission on Manchouko above quoted present a curious contrast with certain comments offered in Chapter I, where we read:

"The present Government has tried to balance its current receipts and expenditures and to adhere to sound financial principles. Various taxes have been consolidated and simplified. In default of a proper budgetary system, an annual statement has been issued by the Ministry of Finance. A Central Bank has been established. A National Financial Committee has been appointed, which includes among its members influential representatives of banking and commercial interests. The Ministry of Finance is also trying to supervise the finances of the provinces, where the methods of raising taxes are often still highly unsatisfactory. For all these new measures the Government is entitled to credit. ... In many things, no doubt, the Government has failed, but it has already accomplished much." (pp.17-18)

It will be noted that while China is given credit for having accomplished much, in view of the various measures which are enumerated by the Commission, but which in fact have mostly failed to bring about any actual results, judgement on Manchouko is pronounced from Ebol and not from Gerizin.

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The Japanese Government are not disposed to discuss the ground of the pessimistic opinion advanced by the Commission, because facts are more eloquent than words. However, the attention of the Council is called to two important points; namely, the steps for the restoration of peace and order, in which the Japanese Army is cooperating with the Government of Manchoukuo, and the financial condition of that Government.

That in a newly founded state peace and order should be disturbed by reactionaries and malcontents is a common phenomenon in all parts of the world. In the case of Manchoukuo, there is further to be observed the special circumstance that vast forces, enlisted in regular armies under the old regime, were upon the fall of that regime turned adrift to become hordes of bandits. The Government of Manchoukuo in their programme for the restoration of peace and order consider the first stage to be the destruction or dispersal of the major groups formed by these bandits; the second stage being the subjugation of the less important remnants, and of the smaller native bands of brigands, through the police system now in process of complete establishment, as well as by other administrative measures. At the same time they are improving the existing means of communication in order to facilitate the work of restoring order. It should be stated that much progress has been made in the accomplishment of the work of the first stage above indicated since the time when the Commission were in Manchuria. The forces under the command of General Ma Chan-shan, by far the most formidable foe to the new State, have been destroyed. Those under General Li Hai-ting have been beaten. Those under Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu have been driven into the remote regions north of the Eastern Section of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The strong brigand bands which infested an area between the Mukden-Hailung Railway and the river Yalu and constituted the principal source of danger in South Manchuria, have been annihilated by the joint forces of Japan and Manchoukuo. Other major groups in South Manchuria are being driven into remote places along the border between Mukden and Jehol. Generally speaking, the present situation throughout Manchuria, North and South, is such as to make it possible for the Government of Manchoukuo to embark upon the second, or police, part of their programme.

Regarding the present condition of banditry in Manchuria, the significant fact should not be overlooked, that while those major bandits are receiving support from China proper, it is sufficient to point to the public collection of funds for the assistance of the Manchurian bandits, which is conducted in various Chinese cities, without inverting to the many cases in which such support is secretly given.

It should also be noted that of late in proportion to the lessening of that menace to peace and order which arises from the activities of major groups of bandits, the operations of the numerous minor bands have come more and more to display the character of political tactics. For instance, the recent activities of bandits and kidnappers in Manchuria have mainly been directed against foreigners, thus casting discredit upon the newly established nation. This is believed to be a deliberate attempt on the part of the anti-Manchoukuo element in China to make present conditions ap-
pear worse than before.

In reply, the Japanese Government, whilst anticipating that the complete restoration of peace and order in Manchuria will require some considerable time, as indeed it would anywhere in similar circumstances, are content to repeat the expression of their confident belief, quoted in the Report, that the presence of the Japanese troops in the country will enable the principal bandit units to be wiped out within from two to three years, and they adopt as their own the words in which the Commission describe their attitude:

"They hope that the organisation of 'Manchoukuo' police and of self-defence corps in each community will help to put an end to banditry. Many of the present bandits are believed to have been peaceful citizens who on account of the complete loss of their property were induced to take up their present occupation. Given the opportunity of resuming the occupation of farming, it is hoped they will return to their former peaceful mode of life." (p.83)

As regards the financial condition of Manchoukouo, the Council can easily see how unfounded is the gloomy view contained in the Report by referring to the following information supplied by the Government of Manchoukouo.

From the foundation of the State on 1 March, 1932, to 30 June of the same year (the first year of Tatung) the income and expenditure of the Central Government are as follows:

Income: (Income from taxes and from the Salt Gabelle) 9,300,000 yuan.
Paid out: 9,100,000 yuan.

This indicates a far better financial status than existed at the time of the visit of the Commission of Enquiry.

Subsequently, Manchoukouo has taken over the Maritime Customs (in June) and has abolished the Finance offices of the various provinces (in July), thus proceeding rapidly with its task of centralising and strengthening the financial structure. As a result of these measures, its budget for the first year of Tatung (from 1 July, 1932, to 30 June, 1933) is based upon the following estimate:

Annual income: 101,000,000 yuan
Annual expenditure: 113,000,000 yuan

This indicates a very satisfactory condition. (Incidentally the military expenditure in this budget totals 33,000,000 yuan, i.e., about one third of the 100,000,000 yuan expended in 1930; and while the budget shows a deficit of 12,000,000 yuan, it must be noted that the budget allows for an emergency reserve fund of 15,000,000 yuan).
The Central Bank of Manchoukuo, founded with a capital of 30,000,000 yuan, took over from provincial banks of the old regime 142,000,000 yuan in notes in circulation against which it has a specie reserve of 82,000,000 yuan and a guarantee fund of 60,000,000 yuan. It opened for business on 1 July.

In this connection it is interesting to observe that the Bank of Japan opened for business in 1882 with a silver capital of ¥10,000,000 and successfully unified all the paper currency issued by various national banks; and that the capital of the Manchoukuo Central Bank is sufficient if one takes into due consideration the economic status, the trade conditions and the population of Manchuria.

The Manchoukuo Government, respecting the independence of the bank, are taking every precaution not to interfere with the functions of the institution as a note-issuing bank, and therefore it may safely be said that to declare that the basis of the Central Bank and Manchurian currency is unstable is a flagrant error. As a point of fact, the Central Bank, since its establishment four months ago, has maintained its paper currency at par, and has stabilized the currency, the circulation of which is very normal. It may be remarked that this shows a signal contrast to the actual state of things under the Ch'ing Dynasty.

Manchuria, having an excess of exports, receives a large amount of silver from abroad. Therefore, there is no doubt that Manchoukuo will be able to maintain the value of its currency.

The Japanese Government desire, further, to give emphatic expression to their opinion formed upon mature consideration regarding the future prospects of the country.

Manchoukuo has before it a brilliant future. With a great extent of territory and large population, it has the advantage of possessing natural frontiers. Its Government have spontaneously declared that they intend to respect all international engagements made by China, so far as they are applicable to Manchuria, and that they will faithfully observe the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity. They entertain no anti-foreign sentiments. There is no communist peril, such as exists in China. Manchoukuo is still in its infancy, but would it not have been an act of straightforward justice on the part of the Commission, who have shown themselves, in spite of all discouragements, so sympathetic towards China, to exhibit some degree of patience with a state scarcely six months old?

In so far as the Report's observations concern the Japanese Government, they would prefer not to dwell upon the purely gratuitous suppositions contained in the Report, to the effect that all political and administrative power in Manchoukuo is in the hands of Japanese officials and advisers. The Report indeed notes the occasional divergence of opinion between these officials and the Tokio Government, but it states that the Japanese officials possess
all the means of exerting irresistible pressure on the Manchoukuo Government. This, it remarks, flows from the fact of military occupation and through the dependence of Manchoukuo on the Japanese troops for the maintenance of its sovereignty and independence.

These allegations can certainly not command the attention of the League of Nations. There are, and there have been, numerous states, universally acknowledged to be independent, which employ the services of many officials of one or more foreign nationalities, and others which have foreign troops stationed within their territory. The Members of the League of Nations have only recently admitted that the presence of such foreign troops is no obstacle to the admission of a state as a Member of that Society.

Finally, the Report emphasizes (p.106) the difficulty that was experienced by the Commission in defining the relations between Japan and Manchoukuo. That difficulty has now disappeared through the signature of the Protocol of 15 September, 1932, which reads:

"Whereas Japan has recognized the fact that Manchoukuo, in accordance with the free will of its inhabitants, has organized and established itself as an independent State; and"

"Whereas Manchoukuo has declared its intention of abiding by all international engagements entered into by China in so far as they are applicable to Manchoukuo;"

"Now the Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo have, for the purpose of establishing a perpetual relationship of good neighbour-ship between Japan and Manchoukuo, each respecting the territorial rights of the other, and also in order to secure the peace of the Far East, agreed as follows: -

1. Manchoukuo shall confirm and respect, in so far as no agreement to the contrary shall be made between Japan and Manchoukuo in the future, all rights and interests possessed by Japan or her subjects within the territory of Manchoukuo by virtue of the Sino-Japanese treaties, agreements or other arrangements or of Sino-Japanese contracts, private as well as public:

2. Japan and Manchoukuo, recognizing that any threat to the territory or to the peace and order of either of the High Contracting Parties constitutes at the same time a threat to the safety and existence of the other, agree to co-operate in the maintenance of their national security; it being understood that such Japanese forces as may be necessary for this purpose shall be stationed in Manchoukuo."

It is scarcely necessary to point out that nothing in this Protocol, nor in the acts of Japan in co-operating with the new Government thus established, is inconsistent with any of the public engagements of this country. By the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, she joined in an undertaking to respect the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. That undertaking was never intended to exempt China from the usual accidents
of state life, and to deprive the people of China of the right of self-determination and of securing themselves a sound and acceptable government. It is an inevitable corollary from this that the signatories cannot be disabled from recognizing such a fait accompli as required by the necessities of international intercourse. In the same way, the 10th Article of the Covenant of the League of Nations is an engagement to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of Members of the League against external aggression. If by internal developments the territorial integrity of a Member is impaired, there is nothing in the Covenant to interfere with the right and duty of Members to recognize that impairment. To hold otherwise would be to deny the basis on which many European and most American States subsist.

CHAPTER V.
CONCLUSIONS

In the observations advanced above, the Japanese Government have set forth the following positions:

1. That China has, since the Revolution of 1911, fallen into a condition of confusion bordering upon anarchy, and remains in the same condition at the present moment; that so long as such a state of affairs persists, China may properly be considered as in a condition of national disintegration, and that at least under present circumstances it is entirely impossible to tell when China may come to have a strong and permanent central government, even if we grant the ultimate possibility of that event.

2. That, because of the fact that such a state of affairs prevails in China, foreign lives and property cannot be afforded adequate protection, and that especially in recent years the situation has been aggravated as a result of the intensification of internal conflict and the operation of the so-called "revolutionary" foreign policy of the Kuomintang directed against foreign Powers.

3. That consequently foreign Powers have continued to exercise exceptional powers and privileges in China of a character now without parallel elsewhere in the world, such as extraterritorial jurisdiction, settlements and concessions, the maintenance of garrisons and the permanent stationing of warships in inland waters.

4. That while all foreign Powers having interests in China have suffered from the anarchical condition and anti-foreign policy of China, Japan has suffered by far the most severely.

5. That Japan stands in the most intimate relation, geographically and historically, to Manchuria; that she possesses in that region important treaty rights besides vast economic interests, while great numbers of her people are settled there; that, moreover, the question of her own national security makes Japan vitally interested in Manchuria both from a political and a strategic point of view; - in fine, that Japan's position in Manchuria is an altogether exceptional and special one, unparalleled in other parts of the world.

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6. That of late years the former Manchurian authorities resorted to various intrigues with a view to undermining this special position, and that after the rapprochement of General Chang Hsieh-liang with the National Government the encroachments of the Manchurian authorities upon the rights and interests of Japan became increasingly frequent and flagrant, despite Japan’s earnest efforts to ameliorate the situation, producing an alarming state of tension.

7. That it was in this strained atmosphere that the events of 18 September occurred; that none of the measures taken by the Japanese Army at the time of that incident, or subsequently, exceeded the limits of the right of self-defence; and that Japan must on any impartial consideration be pronounced to have done precisely what any other Power would have done in similar circumstances.

8. That Manchuria has always occupied a separate position, historically as well as geographically, in relation to China Proper, and that its inhabitants bitterly resented the tyrannous rule of the Chings, and opposed the latter’s policy which dragged Manchuria into the civil turmoil of China Proper; that from this geographic and historical circumstance, coupled with the popular opposition to the Cheng family, there sprang the movement known as “Preserve the frontiers and give us peace”; that the foundation of Manchoukuo was accomplished by the spontaneous action of the Manchuriens with this movement, coupled with the Manchu Restoration Movement, as its main-spring; that Manchoukuo is making steady progress guided by sound policy, and has a highly promising future before it; and finally, that the attitude of Japan towards the establishment of Manchoukuo and her eventual formal recognition of that State do not violate any international engagement whatever.

In order therefore to understand correctly the questions at issue, it is necessary to bear constantly in mind these positions. First, that the abnormal conditions of China are such as can scarcely qualify her to be a modern organized state, and that because of this abnormal condition other Powers have, in order to protect their own interests by themselves, retained extraordinary powers and privileges which operate as limitations on Chinese sovereignty, and have been accustomed, whenever those rights were threatened or injured, to make use of these extraordinary powers. Second, that this aspect of the foreign relations of China Proper becomes more pronounced in the case of Manchuria as far as Japan is concerned because of her special position there and the special position which Manchuria itself occupies in relation to China Proper. The fact must be thrown into relief that the Chinese problem, and especially the Manchurian problem, are characterized by exceptional complexity and by abnormal features, which are to be found nowhere else. Consequently, in handling the quite abnormal problem it is difficult to apply the formulae commonly employed in dealing with international questions under ordinary circumstances, nor can the procedure employed in handling such an abnormal question or any solution that may eventually be reached thereon establish precedents for ordinary cases of international dispute. With regard to this point the Report contains a significant passage at the beginning of Chapter IX: -
"It must be apparent to every reader of the preceding chapters that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them. This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighboring country, because in Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world." (p.126)

The above are put forward as the fundamental views of the Japanese Government with regard to the Chinese problem, and particularly the Manchurian problem. A few observations may not be offered, on the basis of these fundamental views, on some of the points advanced in Chapters IX and X of the Report.

One paragraph in Chapter IX reads: "It must be clear from everything that we have already said that a mere restoration of the status quo ante would be no solution. Since the present conflict arose out of the conditions prevailing before last September, to restore these conditions would merely be to invite a repetition of the trouble. It would be to treat the whole question theoretically and to leave out of account the realities of the situation." (p.127)

The statement has the unreserved concurrence of this Government. But they cannot agree with the opinion recorded in the same Chapter to the effect that the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria would be an equally unsatisfactory course to adopt. In fact, even if all the passages in the Report bearing on the point were accepted for the sake of argument, it is impossible to shift the burden of such an opinion can be arrived at as a necessary deduction. The Japanese Government's view has already been stated that a solution based upon the maintenance and recognition of Manchoukuo would in no way be in contradiction of the fundamental principles of international obligation. It has further been stated that such a solution would satisfy the aspirations of the Manchurians. Moreover, the expectation may be confidently entertained that the Chinese people themselves will ultimately come to realize that such a solution alone can stabilize relations between Japan and China and ensure peace in the Orient. At any rate, it cannot be supposed that the dissolution of the new State, which has been set up and is making rapid and healthy progress, can really be a course adapted to existing realities. It is the belief of the Japanese Government that in view of the necessity of handling and regulating these matters in accordance with the realities of the situation, it cannot be a commendable policy to ignore the impressive fact of the existence of Manchoukuo, or to leave that State devoid of international intercourse.

-35-
Japan, because of the important and special position which she occupies in Manchuria, cannot afford to leave the country and her relations with it in a state of instability and uncertainty.

For the above stated reasons Japan considers the general recognition of Manchukuo and international co-operation for the purpose of fostering its healthy development, as the only solution which is adapted to existing circumstances and which will stabilize conditions in Manchuria and bring peace to the Far East. It is believed that any other country placed in Japan's position would have come to the same conclusion and would have followed the same course. It was for this reason that the Japanese Government signed the Protocol of 15 September which is based upon the above essential conditions and defines clearly the relations between the two countries. A foundation has thereby been laid down in an amicable manner for the protection of Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria, for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Manchukuo, and for the assurance of Manchurian safety against external and internal menaces; in this way contributing in no small degree to the securities for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

Upon this point a passage, occurring at the beginning of Chapter X of the Report, may be regarded as pertinent.

"It is with this object that, whilst bearing in mind the principles of the League of Nations, the spirit and letter of the Treaties concerning China and the general interests of peace, we have not overlooked existing realities, and have taken account of the administrative machinery existing and in process of evolution in the Three Eastern Provinces. It would be the function of the Council, in the paramount interests of world peace, whatever may be the eventuality, to decide how the suggestions made in our Report may be extended and applied to events which are still developing from day to day, always with the object of securing a durable understanding between China and Japan by utilizing all the sound forces, whether in ideals or persons, whether in thought or action, which are at present fermenting in Manchuria." (p. 132)

The council of the League of Nations, in studying the Report with due regard to the view of the Commission expressed in this passage, must necessarily desire to acquire a full comprehension of and satisfactory information regarding the course of events as it develops from day to day, which will be found to exhibit continued confusion in China Proper and steady progress on the part of Manchukuo. In this connection the Japanese Government are at all times prepared to furnish the Council with any further information at their disposal, so that, in accordance with what was said in the introduction to these observations, the Members of the Council may have a thorough acquaintance with every aspect of the complex situation.

As regards certain suggestions contained in Chapter X of the Report, that Chapter opens with a statement that "it is not the function of the Commission to submit directly to the Governments of China and Japan recommendations for the solution of the present
"Even if the formal recognition of 'Manchukuo' by Japan should take place before our Report is considered in Geneva - an eventuality which we cannot ignore - we do not think that our work will have been rendered valueless. We believe that, in any case, the Council would find that our Report contains suggestions which would be helpful for its decisions or for its recommendations to the two great powers concerned, with the object of satisfying their vital interests in Manchuria."

In other words, the Commission recognized, by the vague terms in which they attached some continuing importance to their suggestions in such an event, that a certain amount of doubt would be cast upon the utility of these suggestions in case the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan should have taken place. It would, therefore, seem unnecessary to enter into detailed discussions of these suggestions. In order further to elucidate the position, however, the following brief remarks on certain features of these suggestions may be ventured.

a) As we shall see, Principle 10 of Chapter IX would be liable to result in an international control of China Proper. In the same way, the still more important suggestions contained in Chapter X would amount in practice to a disguised international control of Manchuria, which is certain to be rejected by Manchoukuo Ncr from the stand-point of Japan can these suggestions be regarded as acceptable.

b) These suggestions appear moreover to be of too refined and intricate a nature. They might prove suitable, if applied to Europe. Anw, but would not prove adaptable to the realities of the Far East as they at present exist. Such a plan as is advanced by the Commission calls for the minimum requirement that the disputant parties shall each possess a strong and reliable central government. To attempt to apply these suggestions to the solution of the Manchurian question, which is one of unprecedented complexity, and one in which one Party does not possess a strong and reliable central government, is to make confusion worse confounded.

c) The Japanese Government cannot persuade themselves that the suggestion of demilitarizing Manchuria, maintaining peace and order there by a special international gendarmerie alone, would adapt itself to the realities of the situation. It is questionable whether even in Europe, peace and order could possibly be adequately maintained throughout a territory as vast as Manchuria by such a system. It could never meet the desires of the Manchurians, and would be a source of great anxiety to the Japanese Government as it would foment unrest and disturbances in that region, which is exactly what Japan desires above everything to avoid. Thus the
The solution is extremely unsatisfactory in that it would make matters worse than the restoration of the status quo ante, which is rejected by the Commission themselves.

So much for the concrete suggestions. We now come to a little more abstract matter, viz., the principles for the solution of the dispute on which those tentative suggestions are based. The Commission took pains to define in Chapter IX "the general principles to which any satisfactory solution would conform," and it was in supposed conformity with these principles, that the plan of settlement in Chapter X was elaborated. Certain of these principles to which the Japanese Government have no fundamental objection, have already found concrete application in the Protocol signed by Japan and Manchukuo. But, in any view of the matter, it must evidently be impossible, so long as the anarchical state of things in China persists, to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the questions at issue on the basis of the first nine of these principles, especially Principles 4-9 inclusive. As is sustained in Principle 10, these nine principles cannot be practically applied "without a strong central government in China." In order to help a strong central government to come into being in China, international co-operation in the task of internal reconstruction is certainly desirable. Any international co-operation (apart from technical assistance), for that purpose is, however, a remote contingency and extremely difficult to attain, unless indeed such co-operation were to take the form of an international control of China. Moreover, even granting that such international co-operation were possible, there would be no assurance that in that way a strong central government would forthwith be brought into being. Japan cannot idly wait for such an uncertain eventuality in order to solve the Manchurian question.

Such being the case, any scheme that might tend to destroy that peace and order which is now in process of restoration will inevitably usher in a new era of disputes and difficulties. Would it not then be better statesmanship to work at least for the stabilization of conditions in Manchuria? Should not the world, which has manifested much patience and sympathy regarding the reconstruction of China throughout these past twenty years, come to entertain sentiments of understanding and hope concerning the new State of Manchukuo? When the Manchurian question shall have once been settled, the settlement of the far greater question of China itself will be materially simplified. It can hardly be the subject of doubt that the advent of peace and a good and efficient administration in Manchuria will set an example which it would be well for China to follow, and will exert a favourable influence upon her attitude and divert her domestic and foreign policies into more moderate channels, not only bringing happiness to the Chinese people, but allowing other nations to share the resultant benefits.
Certificate on Compilation of a Document

T. Horiguchi, the President of the United Nations Study Association, hereby certify that the attached document, printed both in English and in Japanese, consisting of 138 pages and entitled "Observations of the Japanese Government on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry" is a document which was published by the KOKUSEIKAI (or League of Nations) Association, and which is based upon an official document of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of January, 1947.

The President of the United Nations Study Association Incorporated Jurist

HORIGUCHI Kensuke (Seal)

I hereby certify that the above was signed and sealed in my presence

At the aforementioned date and place
(On the same day, at the same place.)

Witness: MATSUSHITA Masatoshi. (Seal)
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奉天軍総司令 張

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中立ヲ確立セルコトヲ明示シ居レリ。
報告書

報告書第二九頁ニ於テ消去ハ一辛勤ノ完全ナル一部ヲリ

問題ルコトナラ

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東三省及別ノ朝鮮日治ノ行政
日本の特殊地位

日本カール特殊地位レナ目指セールハニ此ノ地域ナルリ。消洲ニ於ケル日本ノ特殊地位レニ付ハハ多分ニ精神的ナル観念ヲ附設スルカ如ク見ルモノアルモノアールモノアールモノ精神ハ頑ル簡単ナルモノニシテ同地方ニ於ケル日本ノ条約上ノ特殊条約利益ノ観和ニ、
その際、日本はソビエト連邦、アメリカ、中国などの国々との関係を考慮に入れると、自身の立場を維持することが重要である。

日本は、戦後の一時的な混乱を避けるために、自衛国際的な関係を築くことが必要である。しかし、日本は、自衛国際的な関係を築くためには、自国が行うべき行動が重要である。

このように、日本の自衛国際的な関係を築くためには、自国が行うべき行動が重要である。
日本ノ特徴

ハ軍事的政令ヲ受ケタル場合異常ナルガテテ己之ヲ防護セシム

ルチ得タル地位ヲ正ニ日本ニ対シ賦與スルモノナルリ

日本政府ハ一九〇五年及一九一五年ノ條約ニ依リ日本カ治洲ニ

ルモノニシテ委員会ハ委員会ノ記録ニ對シ全然同意ス

方の行為ヲ以テ廃棄シ得スルモノナルコトヲ認メ居ルハ足ト

スルモノナルリ。
地方ニ於

ノ夫レト異ルモノナリ。一九〇四年乃至五年春期及春陽、南

満州鍛造所線、呉総江及清東半島等満州ノ野ニ於ケルハレタ

日本ノ篤西亜ニ對スル大戰争ノ記憶ハ、結テノ日本人ノ

西亜ノ侵略ノ歴シニ對スル自衛ノ為死ナ賃シタル戰爭ハ接

永久ニ記憶セラルヘク、右ノ一戦ニ十萬ノ将士ナ失ヒ且二十

億可ノ戦記セラルヘク、日本ヒ人ナ計シテるス等ノ犠牲ナ決

シテ無益ニ終ハラシメサラノコトナ決意セメタリト述へ

居リノ

ノ一時休地立ノ報告書ノ主張スルカ如ク支那ノ主張ニ紙射

南満州鍛造所於地トシテ知ヲル類メテ狹隠ナル地域ニ於テ

ノ主権ヲ取メタルモ紙射スルコトナシ。支部ラ此ノ地方ヲ

國ニ斯テシテシル日本ニ對シノ模従シテ同様ノ措置ニ

刺蝟又ハ長期ノ租界シ又ハ築國ヲ通シテ日本ニ對シノ模従シテ同様ノ措置ニ
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シテハ除口在及し居ルス。但シテ今来戦力増加況且質素ナル
事邦人ノ流メニ質フ所領カラサルハ報告書ノ云ベル如クナルモ
流入ノ現象ハ貴ニ彼等ノ流メルヲハ流メルヲナラ
之ヲ以テ支那政府民流民戦力ヲ増強ハ報告書ノ云ベル
如クナルモ此ノ流メルヲナラ
流入ノ現象ハ貴ニ彼等ノ流メルヲハ流メルヲナラ
之ヲ以テ支那政府民流民戦力ヲ増強ハ報告書ノ云ベル如クナルモ
此ノ流メルヲナラ
省南部ニ国王ルノ攘立ヲ見タリ。為ノ宣伝団ニテ支那北上ス
ル者ハ次ノ如キノ数ヲ加へ、日本側ハ抵抗退避ノニハ無化ス
ルヲ詰ヘタリ。一九三一年四月支那ニ於テ人民外交協会主催ノ
下ニ五日間ノ宣伝開催セラレ、澜潤各地ヨリノ代表者三千
餘名ノ参加ヲ期スルヲ以テケル日本ノ地位一新ノ可能性ニ付
譲セラレタルカ、其ノ決定ノ中ニハ澜潤開催遠遊ノ一節ヲ
余メリ。當時謂聴ヲ及バル市民ソ亦共同ノ傾向ニ富マサレ
タルカ、一方白着人ハ何等巡遊スペキ主導ヲハ例外的特庫ヲ
有セサルニ固ラス景観ヲ待スレュリ。

右報聞ハ九月十八日ノ廣箇ノ存在シタル状況ヲ相当久ニ延ス
ルモノ報告書ノ第二章ニノ如キ格ラレ、第四章ニ於テ九月十
日報聞ヲ記述スルニ當リ之ヲ附帯セシメテ何等言及スル所ナ
キハ過ぎナル。
側面に於ル支那ノ進展セル侵害トノ關係ニ関シ何等ノ認識

側面進展ニ對スル政策ノ強烈ナル日貨排斥・日支縛約ノ効力否認・日本

航空事件ノ何レモ言及シ居ラス、偶然中日大戦事件＝傷レ居

ノミノ＝スル九月十一八日事件ハ其ノ全背景ヨリ切確サレ居

レリ。
ノ侵入の態勢ニシテ、報告書中ノメカサラタルガ如キ日本側
ノ密電、軍政ノ政策ラノ復活ヲ非ス。其ノ他戦天ニ於ケル弾薬装薬内
ノ問題セラレタル関東軍作戦ノ為ノ撮影ニ於ケル、四月ニ於ケル支那突ノ首見ノト
発セシムハ、ノ後ノ勇気ハ極メアルも報告書ハノ影響易キ状態ニ在り、菊間ハ
対ニ於テ遲クジルコト前々ナリシコトハ、敵上軍機ノ推移ヲ注視
シテ報告書中ノメカサラタルガ如キ日本側ノ政財の態勢ノ遅々
烈ニ向ヒツツヲリタルコトヲ了解スルモノヲ取リテハ自カラ
明カナルハ。
報信平和電

受ケタル場合如何ニ對照スヘキハ速見セレ且知悉セレ居タリ。従ヲ支那軍ニ依ル絶対禁止及び最初ノ發報アリタル後ニ於テ
ノ計密カ一迅速且正確ニ實施セラレアルー（七一頁）ハ掠メテ

当然ナリ。
示給友關。

計量行目的

何レニセヨ案破力ハレ且支那兵卒力攻撃ヲ為シタルコトハ係
然タル故捷ニシテ其ノ結果損害ノ程度等ヲ問テスルノヲ為
日本焦ノ緊急計量ハ自衛のニ需セルルニ至レルモノノ遙
此ノ政策ハ赤クトモ上部ノ命令ニ依カツル支那兵ノ行ハ
一節ニ一ト付言スルヲ以テ其ノニ務ナリト意せリ。
更に一九二八年五月十九日及七月十八日附サ一オーステン

前者ニ於テハ次ノ如ク携ヘラルヘ

四、英国政府ニ合衆国及び英ノ在英米国外交代表者宛書簡ヲ引用スルニ左

ノ如シ。
文書の画像あり

内容は日本語ですが、読解に必要な情報が提供されていないため、詳細な翻訳や解釈はできません。画像の文書全体を提供していただければ、より正確な内容の理解が可能となります。
結

動

要

ルモノシテ、現地ニ於ケル支那部隊大ノ出撃ヲ急ケタル際、日本軍司令官ハ常ニ右マ左ヲ急ケタル且正規ニ於ケルヲ以テ、右

行動ハ自動以外ニ何ソコトナク、日本政府ハ該行動ヲ必要ナルシ、亦ヨリハ支那軍ヲ向ケルヲ以テ、

スノ報示サテハ九月十八日以後ニ於ケル日本臣民ノ生命財産ノ保護ヲ

有效ニ保羅スルヲ為ノ軍事行動ニ付テ前細ニ記述シ居レル度、

日本政府ハ是等細目ノ點ニ付テテモ意見ヲ述テタルノヲ必要アルモノ

多々アルヲ認ムルモ、ハーゼハ従順セアルヘシ。只何レノ場合

ニ於テテ未可ハテ自衛機ノ範囲ヲ越シタルコトナキヲ確信ス

ルモノリ。
参報者ノ認知ル所ナリ。彼等ノ罪心及貪婪ハ彼等ノツツテ

洲ヲ供シテ高ハ且信念タル支那ハ乙名ヲ企シメタル。而

シテノ結果ヲ所蒞＝保境安定＝運動ヲ進ムシテ米＝元

ル並ヲ名實共ニ元全ナル至ルハ従然タル実ニシテス。斯

ル為＝ナル後ハ彼ノ指スルニ即トレラレシノ取ヲ辞スルニ至

ルノ＝ナルハ實＝于ハ其ノ人ナリ＝即ト彼ノ自ヲ指導ノ部組織

以下ノ次ヲ式＝組織セムカ＝彼家時代ニ於ル他ノ独立運動ヲ

立スルノ＝安ナシ。然ル＝報告書ヲ蓄シテ自ヲ独立ノ思想ヲ存在セ

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電信で、清洲内阁が九月十八日に実施した警察活動を日本に伝え、その内容についての報告です。
一戦ノ時メテシノ洋物ヲ示シタコト明カラヘシ。奉天地方ニ
於テソノ検査ヲ為シセリ。国内ヲ立リ思うヲ宣言セ
リテハ、職員ヲ設セラレタリ。更ニ二十七日、ハ
仏利(/^

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結論

スキーの選挙や宜否の公意に反し、結局のところ、選挙の結果は断然の代表を示さない。大韓民国の地方選挙制度は、選挙の公正性を確保するため、選挙の結果を反映させることが必要である。
日本政府が満洲独立宣言を発表することを、自然の結果として受け入れる必要がある。この宣言は、日本の利益を尊重し、満洲の自発的な動きを支援するものである。

主力同志会（九月）と一部日本官憲部の動きを、満洲国政府に伝えるため、現実の状況を考慮して日本政府に対して提示することを提案する。

主張

八支那反日派は、満洲国政府の主張を採用する必要がある。この問題は、日本官憲部の問題を解決するための重要なステップである。

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情報の開発、情報の提供、情報の管理、情報の利用に関する研究、開発、実践を通じて、社会の発展と個々の生活の向上を図ることです。
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カルル・ミテノノトユタ拉
リモ repell、カ如き外観やヘンツル支那事件を満洲国分子ノ
計画的策動ナルト信セラル。ノ

次の事後ハ日本政府ハ満洲ニ於ケル軍需ニ全然ル戦復ハし相当ノ
状況ニル何レノ地方ヲモノヲ常ニ見ル所ナリ・然レトモ日本

政府ハ之ヲ同時ニ報告スヘキモ授用セルル通、日本軍ノ存在
依リ、満洲ニ於ケル主要戦部隊ヲ二年乃至三年以内ニ一掃
シ得ヘントノ確信ヲ邁退スヲ以テ足レリト思うナルモノナリ。

シムルニ有効ナルヘキコトヲ望ミ居レリ。現在ノ陜陝ノ組織ヲ脅ヲ消滅セ

元来良民ニシテ、其ノ財産ヲ總失ヒタル為現在ノ職業ニ投ス
ルニ至ルモノト信セラレ居レリ。農業ヲ再と営む機会ヲアラハ
モノナルリ。

（八三頁）とト述ヘタル所ヲ既ノ自営トシテ採用セントスル

内＝絶対間威

ハ相當期間威
中央政府

一九三二年三月一日総理及び

入及支出

ノ中央収支状況ハ、入ノ各税

入及支出九百三十万円ニシテ、建設当

当時ニ比ハ良好ナル次第ヲ表示シタリ。ノ財政

於テハノ事業ヲ完了シテハノ事業ヲ行フ等、若々シテ財政

ノ労働ヲ計画ヲ行フノヲ観ハニ、大同元年度ヲ歳算

一九三一年六月三十一日ニテハ、歳入一億三百万円、歳出

歳算三千三百萬円ニシテ、ヘキノ財政ヲ上昇シ、賃金ノ上昇ヲ示

クス、又歳算ハ二千二百萬円ノ歳入不足ヲ示ス居ルモ、

ノ郎中ノ意見カ如何ニ根拠無キモノ

ノ財政

財政

海顧ノ財政ヲ観テハ公開ノ關係ニハ政府ノ提供セル

ノノ郎中ノ意見カ如何ニ根拠無キモノ

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ノ郎中ノ意見カ如何ニ根拠無キモノ
中央銀行

次に沿岸国帯同に付テハ、沿岸中央銀行ハ資本金三千萬円ヲ設

通

貨

資本金額ハ十分ナルコトヲメラル。沿岸国政府ニ於テハ、同銀行ヲ健全性ヲ保シ、發行銀行トシテ

通貨開業以来三ヶ月餘り經過シ、共ノ間紙幣ハ完全ニ本位

在

価値ヲ保特シ、通貨ハ値々安定シ、共ノ流動性メテ順調タリ。
日本政府は、輸出超過が問題になっていた。毎年、過多な銀が流入し、政府の財政を脅かしていた。この問題を解決するため、政府は対策を講じた。

特に、輸出促進策により、輸出量が増加し、政府財政の安定が図られた。このように、政府の方針は、国際経済の変化に直面し、適切な対応が求められた状況であった。
昭和三十二年

易解手稿

日本政府

非

観察

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在

日本
九月十五日

リテ委員会ノ経験シタル困難ヲ呈報シ居ル處（一〇六頁）

ノ調定書

なおニハ日本関ハ中華民國ノ領土ヲ侵攻スルヲ知るノヲ如シ。ノ調定書ノ次ノ如シ。ノ調定書ノ次ノ如シ。ノ調定書ノ次ノ如シ。ノ調定書ノ次ノ如シ。ノ調定書ノ次ノ如シ。ノ調定書ノ次ノ如シ。
ノ録定書

九月十五日

ソテ委員会ノ経過シタル困難ハ法テ調査シ居ル處（ノ頁）ノ

失セリ。本録定書ノ次ノ如シ。

ノ國家ヲ成スニ至ルタル事情ニ端シタルノ因リ

ノ日本國ハ滿洲國カ其ノ住民ノ意思ヲ尊重シテ自由ニ成立シ獨立

滿洲國ハ中華民國ノ有スル國際約定ハ滿洲國ニ適用シ得

ヲ如ク協定セリ

ノ協定ノ其他ノ取扱及公私ノ契約ヲ依リ有スル一切

ノ利益ヲ尊重シテノ関係ヲ保持セシム。
日本ノ主張

第五章 結

自衛艦ノ結果

第三章 從って ケル外因ハ支那ノ常駐ト云フク如ク今日世界ノ他ノ部分ニ於

外因ハ支那ノ常駐ノ維持ニ於

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外因ハ支那ノ常駐ノ維持ニ於
第二章 日本と安全

日本の安全保障

第一、日本の安全保障は、戦後の安全保障体制の建設に伴うものである。

第二、安全保障体制の建設に伴うものは、戦後の安全保障体制の建設に伴うものである。

第三、安全保障体制の建設に伴うものは、戦後の安全保障体制の建設に伴うものである。

第四、安全保障体制の建設に伴うものは、戦後の安全保障体制の建設に伴うものである。

第五、安全保障体制の建設に伴うものは、戦後の安全保障体制の建設に伴うものである。

第六、安全保障体制の建設に伴うものは、戦後の安全保障体制の建設に伴うものである。

(日本政府発表)
日本の軍事行動

第七章 九月十八日事件

右ノ即時緊迫セル空気ヲ起ルレコ

ノ敷地ヲ場合自決ヲ行ハ

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上本ハ測定ノ際ハ

日本ハ測定ニ於テ

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ニノ要路ニ依ルツ簡単ナル意見ヲ附加スヘ。

(1) 推進ノ如ク第十九章ノ原則第十九条ノ推進ハ右ノ超総ノ国際管理ニ

(2) 又は第十九条ノ推進ハ余ノ原則超総ノ国際管理ニ

(3) 超総ノ立場ヲ受諾スルモノノ間テ

(4) 日本政府ハ超総ノ軍隊ヲ消滅シ、特別ノ国際警備ノ

(5) 日本政府ハ超総ノ軍隊ヲ消滅ス。
日本政府は、これに従事するための調査員会を指揮する。調査員会は、日本政府の求める調査を実施し、調査結果を報告する。調査員会は、日本の裁判所に提出された証拠と関係する調査を行い、その結果を報告する。

日本政府の求める調査について、調査員会は、調査のための必要な権限を持ち、調査のための調査員を指揮する。調査員は、調査員会の指示に従って、調査を行なう。

調査員会は、調査のための必要な権限を持ち、調査のための調査員を指揮する。調査員は、調査員会の指示に従って、調査を行なう。

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The "Fancy Incident" was brought to a conclusion with today's reply of the American Ambassador to our Foreign Minister. This is due to the fact that, in spite of the flood of misleading propaganda, the government and the people of America have fairly gained an insight into the facts of the incident, and that they understood our sincerity. The Imperial Navy which is responsible for this incident is greatly disturbed. The Imperial Navy also wishes to express the hearty gratitude towards our people for extending comfort and forbearance ever since the occurrence of the incident.

In the future our navy will, more than ever, exercise discretion so that this type of incident will not recur. At the same time, we desire that the entire Japanese people give full support at this time in "turning a misfortune into a blessing," that is in clearing up the various misunderstandings and suspicions which exist between Japan and other nations in regard to the China Incident and in bringing about better understanding and goodwill.
CERTIFICATE

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, [Name], hereby certify that the document hereto attached in [Language] consisting of [Number of Pages] page(s) and entitled "[Title or Description]" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the [Government Agency or Entity].

Certified at [Location]

on this [Date] day of [Month] [Year].

[Signature]

Witness: [Name]

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, [Name], of the [Department or Branch], hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

[Signature]

[Location]

Date: [Date]
Concerning the deeply regrettable occurrence of the sinking of
the American gunboat PANAY through a mistake on the part of the
Japanese force, the Imperial Japanese Navy have expressed their pro­
found regret and concern over the matter. In connection with this,
they have decided to detail a company of bluejackets on the spot to
honor the dead. In the meantime, the members of the Third Fleet
of the Japanese Navy, who are stationed in the waters in the vicini­
ty of Shanghai, have decided to collect among themselves a sum of
¥ 5,000, to be contributed towards the Naval Fund of the United
States.

The sentiment dominant among the Japanese Navy is that the
sinking of a man-of-war, even though by mistake, is a matter to be
greatly deplored. They further express their heartfelt apprecia­
tion to the American Navy on the spot who are maintaining a calm
attitude with regard to the regrettable affair, and it is their
earnest hope that this unfortunate occurrence will prove in the end
to have served as a step, though grievous in itself, towards a
rapprochement and a still closer understanding and mutual sympathy
between the Navies of the United States and Japan.
STATEMENT OF THE SPokesMAN OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
DECEMBER 18, 1937.

Concerning the deeply regrettable occurrence of the sinking of
the American gunboat PANAY through a mistake on the part of the
Japanese force, the Imperial Japanese Navy have expressed their pro­
found regret and concern over the matter. In connection with this,
they have decided to detail a company of bluejackets on the spot to
honor the dead. In the meantime, the members of the Third Fleet
of the Japanese Navy, who are stationed in the waters in the vicini­
ty of Shanghai, have decided to collect among themselves a sum of
¥ 5,000, to be contributed towards the Naval Fund of the United
States.

The sentiment dominant among the Japanese Navy is that the
sinking of a man-of-war, even though by mistake, is a matter to be
greatly deplored. They further express their heartfelt apprecia­
tion to the American Navy on the spot who are maintaining a calm
attitude with regard to the regrettable affair, and it is their
crnest hope that this unfortunate occurrence will prove in the end
to have served as a step, though grievous in itself, towards a
rapprochement and a still closer understanding and mutual sympathy
between the Navies of the United States and Japan.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Statement of the Spokesman of the Foreign Office, December 18, 1937." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo.
on this 3rd day of December, 1946.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Maehara Odo
Excerpt from the Robert Commission's Report on the Pearl Harbor Disaster

Washington, January 23, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

Sir: The undersigned were appointed by Executive Order of December 18, 1941, which defined our duties as a commission thus:

Findings of Fact III

It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other governments. It was realized by the State, War and Navy Departments of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled war in the Pacific was inevitable.

Findings of Fact IX (Excerpt)

Army Message of November 27

The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had been continued through October and November, and were awaiting further developments. November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, that the negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended with little likelihood of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that hostilities on the port of Japan were momentarily possible; that in the event hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that this nation should not commit the first overt act; the Department commander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense.
The message directed him, even prior to hostile action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was directed to the information contained in the message to the minimum of essential officers and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The purport of this message was communicated by the department commander to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of Military Intelligence sent a message to the Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to inform the commanding general and his Chief of Staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activity might be expected.

On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Eran Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces.

It directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. It stated that Guam, Saipan, and Continental Districts had been directed to take appropriate measures.
against sabotage and that a similar warning was being sent by the
War Department. It ordered the addressee inform naval districts
and Army authorities. The commander in chief of the fleet com-
municated the purport of this message to the general commanding
the Hawaiian Department of the Army.

Findings of Fact XII (Excerpts)
After receipt of the message of November 27, the following
action was taken:

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered Alert
No. 1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27,
and it was maintained in effect until December 7. At the same
time he ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily
from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District, in his capacity as base defense officer, called a con-
ference of all the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol,
advised them that something might happen, and that they should be
on the alert.

The Commander in Chief of the Fleet made certain dispositions of
units of the fleet for the purpose of strengthening his outposts
to the south and west of the Hawaiian Islands, and also issued
an order that any Japanese submarine found in the operating areas
around the island of Oahu should be attacked. This order went
beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department.
Findings of Fact XVIII (Excerpts)

In the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:50 a.m., by the U.S.S. Antares. Between 6:33 and 6:45, this object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and the U.S.S. Ward.

A report of this action by the Ward reached the naval base watch officer at 7:12 a.m., who notified his chief of staff. The ready destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warnings were issued, based upon this report.

Summary of the More Important Facts (Excerpts)

This conviction persisted notwithstanding messages containing warnings and orders, brought to the attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States and were directed to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions in the light of this information.

A significant warning message was communicated to both the local commanders on November 24. On November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities were momentarily possible. The warnings indicated war, and war only.
ロパート於員會報告

職務港

大統領

機關

下之等ハ一九四一年十二月十八日付大統領令ニ依リ委員ニ任命セ

リタリ。...令ハ我が委員ノ任務ニ依リ次ノ如ク規定セリ。

第三

（四頁抜粋）

合衆國財務省及び海軍省ノ關係ノ同観ルラ

ラ

合衆國財務省及

及び海軍省ノ関係ノ
由于图像中的内容不可读，无法提供自然文本的转写。
通告ニ従シ防衛手段ヲ採ルヲ抜可トサレセテニ Mandatory means of defense are taken as necessary.

通報ヲ除クルヲ備ニテハ測度ヲ採ルヲ撥可トセテニ In case of reporting, the necessary means of defense are adopted.

前項ノ事ヲ除クルヲ使用ノ可ノ項ヲ除クルヲ拨可トセテニ In case of the former item, the necessary means of defense are adopted.

前項ノ事ヲ除クルヲ使用ノ可ノ項ヲ除クルヲ拨可トセテニ In case of the former item, the necessary means of defense are adopted.

前項ノ事ヲ除クルヲ使用ノ可ノ項ヲ除クルヲ拨可トセテニ In case of the former item, the necessary means of defense are adopted.
Regarding the incident in which our navy airplanes bombed the American river gunboat "Panay" and the vessels of other nations on 12th December, the Navy Dept. of the Imperial General Headquarters published an interim general outline report. The following facts have been made clear since then, and the Vice Minister of the Navy at six o'clock yesterday, i.e. Dec. 23rd, explained the real circumstances of that incident to the American ambassador to Japan.

1. Circumstances up till the occurrence of the incident. Since the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese Incident, the Japanese Navy has made every effort to protect the interests and lives of third powers, and, especially in the case of attacking ships, we have made the utmost effort not to attack ships except Chinese war vessels or her ships directly contributing to military operations. But China has frequently disguised her forces by flying flags of third powers or using their rights and privileges for her military operations and this has frequently occasioned us great disadvantage. For instance, on 27th December, on the occasion of attacking Chinglang, our Navy air corps, discovering a large Chinese force retreating on board ships, immediately started to attack them, but the enemy instantly swarmed around third powers' merchant ships, so...
our planes were finally obliged to give up the attack.

In view of the situation mentioned above, on 9th, December, the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai made a representation to the consuls-general of other powers to the effect that, under the present situation when the battle is beginning to rage along the whole coast of the Yangtze River, although the Japanese army, of course, would do its best to protect the third powers interests, the other powers also, for their part, were requested to cooperate in their efforts to set their vessels and vehicles apart from the Chinese army forces or Chinese military equipment, and if possible, to withdraw from fighting areas completely.

The American gunboat "Pansy" was lying at anchor two miles up the river from Hankow; but, as the battle in that district was getting serious she was gradually moving to the upper reaches of the river, protecting three American merchant ships. On the day of the occurrence of the incident, she was taking refuge at a place 26 miles up the river from Hankow, taking steps to inform the Japanese authorities of her position. Although we recognize that it was in conformity with our above-mentioned notice, unfortunately her last refuge position also was involved in the midst of a zone in which our forces and the enemy were exchanging fire. To make the matter worse, the information of the last position of refuge was delayed as will be referred to later. It can not be regretted too much that the
efforts of the captain of the Panay could not previously prevent the occurrence of that incident.

II. The information received by the Commander of the Navy Air unit.

The commander of the navy air unit assigned since the 11th with the task of cooperating with army operations, had received the information that the Chinese soldiers in the Nanking area were retreating toward the upper part of the river on board ships and that the ships were going back and forth between Nanking and that part. But at noon (Tokyo time henceforth the same) of the 12th receiving the news that ships of various sizes together with many junks were going up the river between 12 and 25 miles from Nanking, loaded with the retreating enemies, he instantly gave order to annihilate these ships. But unfortunate information from the American consul-general in Shanghai that the Panay and three American merchant ships were staying about 27 miles up the river from Nanking reached the Headquarters of the Japanese Fleet in China at 5 P.M. through the consul-general and it was not until 5.30 P.M. that the news was received by the commander of the air unit. Therefore the aforementioned air unit knew nothing at all about the fact that the former ships were about 27 miles up the river from Nanking, it was owing to unavoidable circumstances that they mistook the ships in that area for Chinese ones.

III. The Circumstances of Bombing.

The bombing by our navy air unit was carried out by from two to six planes at a time, repeated six times in all, from 2.25 P.M. to 5.30 P.M. The four ships all got bombed and two
The American gunboat "Panay" of them were finally sunk. The strafing fire of the machine-gun of the plane was made only once by one of them in the second bombing and that for a short time.

The aviators of the planes know nothing at all about the fact that American vessels were lying at anchor in that area, and they carried away by the desire to cooperate with the friendly forces attacking the enemy capital at Nanking, and encouraged at the news that there were ships loaded with retreating forces of the enemy, left base for the front in high spirit. Moreover the bad visibility on the river from the upper air due to smoke and mist which, in consequence of fires breaking out there about at that time, covered the Yangtze River near Kaiyuc Wharf where the Panay was lying at anchor, together with their preoccupation mentioned above, made the air unit unable to distinguish the American ships from others which resulted in their bombing them. The aviators, perceiving many Chinese taking refuge from these merchant ships by landing ashore mistook them for Chinese soldiers, and, at last, did harm even to the officers and men on board the army motor-boat, which were there rescuing the American sufferers on the spot.

IV. The Circumstances Surrounding the Rescue of the Sufferers.

The commander of the Japanese Fleet in China received information from the Commander of the American Asiatic Fleet at 9 a.m. on 13th December, that the communication with the Panay
had been interrupted since the afternoon of the 12th. After investigation, we came, at last, to find out the fact that the ships which we had attacked with the firm belief that they were Chinese ones were in reality American ships, so we resolved to make our utmost efforts to relieve the sufferers. We at once dispatched the HOZU with a rescue flying-boat, and, by means of wireless telegraphs and leaflets, informed our army forces stationed thereabout of the outline of the incident and that the sufferers were staying in Hohaiou, and asked them to relieve these sufferers.

Due to the interference with our relief activities by Chinese soldiers ashore, the work of picking up the corpses of the captain and a member of the crew on board one of the American ships which had run ashore on the left bank of the Yangtze River was prolonged till the 15th. We at last succeeded in picking them up aboard HOZU, suppressing the enemy by bombardment from our war vessels. The fact that the Chinese soldiers were firing violently from the banks of the river without distinguishing Anglo-Americans from Japanese can not be ignored in the investigation of this incident. In brief, the Panyi incident happened in a district of fierce and complicated fightings between the forces of the two Powers and, it had, relation to both the navy and the army, and was caused partly by the bad conditions of communications. It took a long time to investigate the matter and we are very sorry that some foreign nations, in the
meantime, misunderstood the real facts or made distorted reports and, to make the matter worse, amongst them were nations that, on purpose, made bad propaganda so as to trap Japan. We firmly believe that you will recognize, judging from the real circumstances of the case already mentioned above, that this unhappy incident was entirely due to a mistake and was not a premeditated action based upon our malice.
スル呪リタル如キハソノ例ナリ。右ノ如キ事情ニ鑑ミニ十二月九日上海在労帝國領導ハ各國領導ニ對ノ強行ヲ強行スヘキモ第三副モ亦我方ノ努力ヲ協力シ其ノ接觸ヲ依リ完全ヲ確保セノヲ誓イセリ。上海在労帝國領導ハ其ノ態度ヲ保持スヘキモ亦我方ノ努力ヲ協力シ其ハ接觸ヲ依リ完全ヲ確保セノヲ誓イセリ。
陸軍ノ作戦ニ協力スペキ任務ヲ課セラレタル海軍航空部隊指揮官八十

一日以来～南京方面ノ支那兵ヲ向流トノ間ノ飛行ヲ依リ上流ヲ進むシャッテリ等ノ情報

又～此等架橋ハ爐南へ下さいノ上流ノ間ノ飛行ヲ依リ上流ヲ進むシャッテリ等ノ情報

受領シ居タル處、十二日正午～東京時間以下同様～ノ大小ノ船ヲ十隻

及～我克多數ハ敵退却兵ヲ塔チン南上流十二ノ際スヘキ旨下達セルカ

同日～パネリ～及～米国艦隊三隻カ南京上流ニ効き前進スヘキ旨下達セルカ

通知ハ上海米国艦隊命令ヲ即テ爾ノ乙ヲ照会シルニ於テ

司令部ニ到着シ之ラ航空部隊指揮官ノ通知セルハ後五時我支部方面還絶

ナリキ。従テ右航空部隊ハ南上流ニ効き前進スヘキ旨下達セルハ後五時三十分以後

ハ全然知ル所ナカリシ為該方面ニ在リタル之ヲ還絶ヲ支那艦ヲ駆逐ナルト

確信スルニ至リシハ已ム得ル次第ナリ。
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Statement of the Navy Department of the Imperial General Headquarters concerning the Panay Incident, December 24, 1937" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo.

on this 5th day of December 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nogoharu Odo

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William B. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William B. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 17 January 1947
International Military Tribunal for the Far East  
United States of America, etc.  
against  
Araki, Sadao, etc.,  
Affidavit  
Deponent Kō, Da, Misuko

I hereby make affidavit as under mentioned after taking an oath as appended herewith, following the established form in our Country.

On Hakkō-ichiu

1. I hold the chair of Chinese Classics at the Waseda University and am, at the same time, a non-regular member of the staff of the Cabinet. I have occupied the lectureship for 17 years, namely from the 5th year of Showa (1930) up to the present.

2. The phrase "Hakkō-ichiu" is derived from a clause of the edict issued by Jimmu, the first Emperor, when he had his palace built at Yamato-Kashiwara in April in the very year of his accession to the throne (660 B.C.) The clause says:

"立三神と丘上房と神々と新設をせんはった 立てて奈良."  
"Rikugō o Kamote Miyako o hiraki, Hakkō o site ie to nasut."  
"Found a metropolis ever "Rikugō", Make a house covering "Hakkō"."

The full text of this edict is found in the "Nippon-Shoki."

3. The 'Nippon-Shoki' is an authentic record of Japanese history edited under the Imperial command in the 4th year of Yorō (720 A.D.) in the reign of Gen'ei, the 44th Emperor, by Prince Ippon Tonomi and others.

4. 'Rikugō' means the heaven, the earth and the 4 directions. 'Hakkō' means the 8 directions, the subdivisions of the 4 directions and is a phrase found in the Chinese classics, such as "Rōshi (Rigshu)" "Shishi"
(Chuangtsu), "Wenamji (Wainamtsu)" etc. its synonyms being

The word '許' of the phrase "許文言" (I.to nasu) means "under the oaves", "a sitting room" or "a house?"

5. In this edict, "Rikugo" is to be pronounced "Kuni no uchi" (in the country) and "Hakkô" "ame no shita" (under the heaven). In short, the clause means: "To make all the countries a metropolis and all the people a household". It denotes the pervasion of the virtue of the Emperor and the eternal prosperity of the people.

6. When "八雀 (Hakkô o sito is to nasu)" is changed into a Chino expression, it becomes "八雀 (Hakkô-iu)". However, it is in usage of Chinese composition of both prose and poetry to make an antithesis such as "an hour costs one thousand gold coins", "three Emperors and five Kings", "wind after five days, rain after ten days". If 8 is placed against 1, the phrase sounds rhythmical; therefore in the later period, the phrase was written as "八雀-五 (Hakkô-ichiu)". In China, Wu Shin-tao (Goshido) of the Mongolian Dynasty (1320 A.D.) used in his poetry the phrase:

"今八雀一五同 "

"Konnichi Hakkô-ichiu ni onaji"

"It is the same as "Hakkô-ichiu "Hakkô-ichiu" today"

7. In the edict issued in the 12th year of Aripai (740 A.D.) in the reign of Shômu, the 45th Emperor, there is a clause:

"八雀-五 "

"Hakkô ni Kumrusu"

"Reign in the eight directions!"
In the edict issued in the 22nd year of Yenryaku (803 A.D.) in the reign of Kanmu, the 50th Emperor, there is a clause:

"Hakkō ni ringyōzu"

"Reign and rule in the eight directions"

In the edict issued in the 4th year of Jishō (1180 A.D.) in the reign of Ninomaru, the 81st Emperor, there is a clause:

"Taku shikai o komo, Ka hachiō ni kōmu."

"Grace pervades the four sons and virtuous influence covers the eight directions."

In the imperial declaration issued in the 16th year of Eishō (1519 A.D.) in the reign of Gokashinabara, the 104th Emperor, there is a clause:

"Itton shōhèi, Hakkō solihitsu."

"Peace under the heaven, tranquility in the eight directions."

There are various forms of expression such as "Hakkō" (Hakkō), "Hakkō" (Hakkō-ichiu), "Hachien" (Hachien), "Itten" (Itten), "Shikai" (Shikai), but the meaning is the same. In the beginning, this phrase denoted the four or eight directions of the country, that is, all the parts of the state.

However, as communication with foreign countries was gradually opened, there appeared an idealistic interpretation of this phrase. Namely, this phrase has come to mean that all mankind associate with one another in peace and love, as if they belonged to one household, that is, they were parents and children or were brothers. Especially, the fact that "Hakkō-ichiu" (Hakkō-ichiu) came to be used instead of "Hakkō" (Hakkō-ichiu)."
in recent years upon the above-mentioned interpretation. Synonyms are:

- "四海一家 (Shikai-ikka)" — "The four seas one house"
- "同舟共济 (Udai-ikka)" — "All people under the Heaven in one house"
- "四海一家 (Shikai-dohe)" — "the four seas brethren"
- "世界一家 (Shokai-taihō)" — "world brotherhood"

"world brotherhood" came into vogue.
Written Oath

I hereby take an oath that I will tell the truth, conceal nothing and add nothing in accordance with my conscience.

(Dignitary and seal) KAWADA, Mizuko

At Tokyo, on December 13, the 21st year of Showa (1946)

Deponent KAWADA, Mizuko

I hereby certify that the aforementioned person took an oath and affixed his signature and seal in my presence.

On the same day, at the same place,

Witness KAWAKITA, Konjirō
Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clark, of the Defoneo Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clark

Tokyo, Japan
Date 24 January 1947
ことнестиなせんとある意味で、現在の皆様く行つもり、国民のすべてが
久に紙面する形容詞であります。

四十五代後柏原天応天平十二年（西暦紀元七百四十年）の記事には「
八荒に著書せり」あり、五十代後武天観延暦二十二年（西暦紀元八百
三年」の記事には「八荒に臨収せり」とあり、八十一代安徳天観延四
年の（西暦紀元一千一百八十年）の記事には海西海を粗め、化胡に板

は少しも驚りがなく、初めはいづれも観中の東西方、隅々までを指


2
したところであります。然に数々の外国列国との交通が開けますと共に
之を観念的に解釈して、世界人類が一家同様、即ち親子弟兄弟のやうに
平和親睦の交際を為すと云ふ意味に於て、数々近年八故雑学と云はず
して八故一字と云ふ意味を用ふるやうになったのは、数々此の意味に
取行ふるものでありますとして、同訳詞として四海一家、又は字内一家、
及ぶ同願、又は世界同結等の話など流行するに至ったのであります。
As Cochran explained to me, the Republicans were under heavy obligations to do something about the so-called Far Eastern Question. Moreover, they owed their election largely to this issue. Cochran, of course, admitted that behind this incentive was a desire on the part of some members of the new administration to uphold traditional American policies in the Far East, particularly the Open Door in China. Turning to me he said, "You have lived in China, what about the Open Door?"

I explained that during about 1898-1900 it appeared that China was on the point of being divided among the Powers. Russia had taken advantage of the Boxer incident to overrun Manchuria. Great Britain had established herself in the Yangtze Valley, and had taken steps to develop a naval base at the port of Wei-hai-wei. Germany had seized Kiaochow Bay, and was building a naval base at Tsingtau. The Japanese, who were late at the banquet, were preparing to fight the Russians for a share of Manchuria. The French had Indo-China, and a concession on the South China coast at Kiangchow.

The Americans were definitely left out with no concessions, or spheres of influence, on the continent of Asia. It was at this point that Secretary of State John Hay made his proposal for an "Open Door" doctrine in Asia. Since Hay had been Minister to Great Britain, it was expected that Great Britain was behind the program. And such was the case, as British commercial interests realized that the trade of a unified China was worth more than the exclusive trade of a section of the country.

The British also did not want to face the consequences of carving up a nation of 400,000,000 souls. They feared repercussions in European politics. A mission to the Far East, headed by Admiral Lord Dreadnought, had returned by way of Washington and consulted with the Americans.

Hence the Open Door, proposed in a series of notes to the other Powers by John Hay. It amounted to a repudiation of the "sphere of influence" policies of the other nations. The Open Door in the Far East took its place with the Monroe Doctrine as an American foreign policy.

We had heeded Washington's advice about keeping free of Europe's quarrels (up to World War I), but never hesitated to involve ourselves in Asiatic politics, seemingly without objection on the part of the American public.
日本の資本を活用し、産業を発展させることを目的とした。この政策は、日本国内での経済成長を促進し、国力の強化にも寄与した。また、フランスも同様の政策を採用し、日本の経済発展を支援していった。

この政策の下で、日本は産業技術の発展こそを推進し、国力の拡大を図ってきた。しかし、これは当時周辺諸国に対する圧力の増大をも意味しており、日本はこれに対する反抗を試みた。
この結果生れたのがジョーンズ・ヘイにより列強に対する連絡する覚書の形でした。

政策の中止を意味した。誤解に於ける門戸開放は米国の外交政策として三ポーラー主義と相喰ぶに至った。

我々は欧州の諸紛争に巻込まれる（第一次世界大战まで）といふ米国政府の戒めをよく守ってはあたが、一方アヘンの政治にはたまらぬ言をつった。そしてこれに対しても米国の議論にも反対はないやうであった。
Excerpts from
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. DOHERY's Book
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"

(Shantung and Washington, Pages 73 and 76)

And now to return to the subject of the Conference:

After considerable thought the State Department finally decided to invite the Chinese to send a delegation. It was the first time China had ever sat in an international conference as a "free and independent Power." This element aroused so much enthusiasm in China that the Government sent a delegation of about three hundred persons, including secretaries, stenographers, and assistants; so many in fact that Dr. Sze, the Minister, had difficulty in feeding and housing them.

Since the State Department's invitation was sent to the Peking Government, the Kuomintang regime at Canton immediately raised a tremendous howl and sent a rival delegation which sniped at the Peking delegates throughout the meeting. There was even an attempt to assassinate Dr. Sun at Canton during the conference.

The Japanese were not enthusiastic about the Washington Conference, and approached the meeting somewhat in the mood of a naughty child called to the teacher's desk for a reprimand. They were suspicious of the conference because they knew it was designed primarily to obstruct their schemes for China. But with their potential ally, Germany, out of the running and with Russia involved in a communist revolution at her very back door, the Japanese felt it would be better to attend than stay out. Japan's acceptance of the invitation was actually not received until two weeks after all the other official acceptances were in; and it was widely reported that Japan's decision to attend the conference resulted from assurances from British sources that Japan "would not be treated badly" at the meeting. However, any assurances from British circles could hardly have carried much weight, in view of the fact that one of the chief objectives of the conference, though not stated in the formal invitation, was to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Although strong opposition to the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had developed in the United States during the war, it was the opposition of the Dominion of Canada that forced Great Britain to give serious consideration to the matter of discontinuing the pact. The Canadians felt, as did Americans, that the belligerent clauses in the alliance imposed dangerous obligations on Great Britain in the event of an outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. The Canadians, due to the geographical situation of the two countries, also had experienced complications with Japan over immigration questions. Immigration complications which the United States had experienced with Japan in California in 1908 were paralleled in Canada. Thus, when American-Japanese relations became acute in 1921, the Dominion of Canada was more affected by the so-called "North American" point of view as opposed to the London "imperial" viewpoint. In consequence there developed in Canada a national demand for termination of the alliance.
Arthur Meighen, the Canadian Premier, urged the substitution of a four-Power conference on Pacific affairs, to be participated in by the United States, Britain, China, and Japan. But at the Imperial Conference in London Meighen's efforts met strong opposition not only from Lloyd George, but from Curzon, Balfour, and Lee, all of whom feared the menace of an antagonized Japan toward India and Britain's other territorial and economic stakes in Eastern Asia and the Pacific. In the hot debate which ensued the delegates from Australia, New Zealand and India sided with Britain, while South Africa favored revision rather than abrogation. But Meighen stood his ground, and ultimately brought the Imperial conference around to his point of view. It was this discussion in the Imperial Conference, plus England's desire to reach an understanding with the United States on the limitation of naval construction, that paved the way for the calling of the Washington Conference.

Aside from France and Italy, which possessed naval armament of considerable strength, and also held concessions in China, the other European Powers invited to the conference—Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal—held either concessions in China or colonial territories in the region of the Pacific.

The conference in many ways was of unusual significance; it was America's initial attempt to invoke an international conference for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of questions which had long threatened war in the Pacific. Attendance was entirely voluntary in the sense that the conference was not made up of delegates representing victorious and vanquished nations as had been the case at Versailles. The British delegation was made up of representatives not only of Great Britain but of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

European and Japanese delegates were astonished when Charles S. Hughes, chairman of the American delegation, announced at the opening session that the United States was prepared to stop its naval building program and, more, was prepared to scrap a number of warships which were in an advanced stage of construction. The American proposal was so contrary to professional diplomatic practice that the delegates stared at each other in wonderment, but it was a proposal which the British could hardly afford to contest, since the British Admiralty was already concerned by the American naval construction program.

It was finally agreed that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be abandoned and Japan was persuaded to accept a 5:5:3 naval ratio with the United States and Great Britain. A compensation for Japan was the agreement that the United States would not increase or continue its construction of fortifications on naval and military positions west of the 180th meridian. American naval experts did their best in private to prevent the limiting of our fortifications on naval positions in the Western Pacific, and also to prevent the curtailment of the United States naval building program, but they fought a losing fight.

All of the agreements, resolutions, and proposals at the conference were more or less linked together around the central document, which was the Nine-Power Treaty with China, upon which all commitments depended, including the major issue of limitation of naval armament and curtailment of construction on naval bases in the Pacific area. The Nine-Power Treaty came to be known as the "Chinese Charter of Liberty," because it put an end to the old sphere-of-influence doctrine which had besetted Europe and Japan, and for more than a quarter of a century had threatened
Aside from the Nine-Power Treaty, the Washington Conference also adopted other measures concerned with the future development of China as a unified state. The Japanese were forced to withdraw their troops from Shantung Province and restore the former German interests at Tsingtao, including control of the port and railway running into the interior of the province, to Chinese control. The conference also approved a resolution to send a delegation to China to investigate the relinquishment of extraterritoriality, which had impeded the development of modern Chinese courts and had infringed upon the sovereignty of the country. It also was recommended that steps be taken to assist China in modernizing her currency and her fiscal system, and finally the Powers agreed to withdraw their postal agencies from China and consented to the calling of a conference to revise the Chinese tariff, leading in the direction of tariff autonomy. Also of importance from the standpoint of Russian interests in the Far East, the Japanese were forced to withdraw their troops from Siberia, where they had been stationed since World War I.
Excerpts from
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. POWELL's Book
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA."


Shantung and Washington

The French displayed little enthusiasm for the conference and, while they agreed to restore to China the French-leased territory at Hankow, southwest of Canton, they did so with poor grace and actually never carried out the terms of their agreement.
Excerpts from
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. POWELL's Book
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"

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(NEW YORK, THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, 1945)

Mans in the North

My last interview with General Wu, and probably his last interview with any foreign newspaperman, was in the winter of 1926-27, after he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Allied Anti-Red Army and established his headquarters at Hankow in Central China. Despite his high-sounding title, Wu's position was pathetic, as it constituted the last stand of the reactionary northern militarists against the advancing Nationalist revolutionary forces from the south. I met Wu at breakfast in the garden of an old Chinese home where he had his headquarters. He had been drinking more heavily than usual, and was depressed because of the collapse of his forces in Hunan; they had been completely demoralized by the Russian-trained propaganda corps which preceded the advance of the Nationalist troops. The Communists exerted their best efforts in Hunan and executed their "fifth columnist" work so well that Wu's troops fell back without fighting, and while they put up a strong fight at Wuchang, last remaining stronghold in central China, they ultimately withdrew.
校正 倫人 津山

より切赫へ

○一九二九年以後の実際は、悠音としての外人同士の秘密の会見であった。

それが一九二六年より一九二七年にかけての冬の間であった。

之より先期には同同藤の司令官官に任命せられ、同中政口に司令官を

と云って、その行をと雲へば、同同藤の地位は突き合わせたものであった。

同同藤はその司令官として長官の役ををなすことと云っていた。

同同藤の往来する元は、同同藤の司令官にあたる。

実の方の金子にあたる。

同同藤は同同藤の司令官の役ををなすことと云っていた。

同同藤は同同藤の司令官にあたる。

同同藤は同同藤の司令官の役ををなすことと云っていた。

同同藤は同同藤の司令官にあたる。

同同藤は同同藤の司令官の役ををなすことと云っていた。

同同藤は同同藤の司令官にあたる。
Vara in tho North

Pages 85 and 86

Wu retired after his defeat. He always refused political office, and never profited personally, although for a considerable period he had been the most powerful military man in the country. He always insisted he was a military man and knew nothing about politics—which probably explained his failure, as warfare in China had become more political than military, as the all-conquering Nationalists proved.

General Feng Yu-hsiang, who in 1922 was supporting General Wu, was another unusual character. Feng's army, which marched to the tune "Onward, Christian Soldiers," was the predecessor of the Communist Eighth Route Army in the Chinese northwest. Like the commanders of the present-day Chinese Red Army, Feng Yu-hsiang also received special training in Russia and his soldiers carried Russian rifles, some of them being American-made, sold or given to the Czarist Government in World War I.

Karl Radek, former Soviet publicist and disciple of Trotsky, who was imprisoned in return for his confession, in Stalin's purge, used to entertain his friends with stories about Feng Yu-hsiang, who was in one of Radek's classes in revolutionary technique. He said that Feng, who came from northern Chinese peasant stock, sat stolidly through most of the lectures without evincing any outward interest in the subjects under discussion. One day, however, Feng suddenly pricked up his ears and began asking questions. The particular lecture which had aroused Feng's interest dealt with army finance and the financing of occupied territory, subjects of deep concern to Chinese generals, many of whom managed in one way or another to amass comfortable fortunes out of funds which passed through their hands.

Feng came up through the ranks and learned the art of war the hard way. Somewhere along the line he fell under the influence of an American missionary and was converted to Christianity. While Governor of Honan he once ordered an entire division baptized in the Christian faith by total immersion in the Yellow River. While he was stationed in Peking in 1922 he married the secretary of the Peking Y.W.C.A. Politically Feng was an undependable ally; in 1924, when Marshal Wu Po-fu was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Chang Tso-lin, Feng, who was holding the Peking district, rebelled and seized the capital. He made the then President Tsao Kun a prisoner and chased the Manchu Boy Emperor from the Forbidden City, where he had resided as a government ward since the revolution in 1911.
今日の中局対馬の戦争の調停の案に、為政者もロシアに対する措置を採用してました。その後の

ソビエト政府の任命で、スターリングを通じての交渉が行われました。交渉は、皇帝の即位と

ロシアの皇帝が事実上の新政府を設立した際の、新たな体制を形成するためのもので

ある。

北投の百舌鳥の音が聞こえると、風が吹き荒れる。風が吹くと、草が揺れ動く。

また、ここに何故か感じるのは、この音が聞こえると、心が落ち着いてしまう

のであること。風が吹くと、草が揺れる。草が揺れるとき、風が吹いてしまう。

そうすると、それらの音が、草が揺れる。草が揺れるとき、風が吹いてしまう。

こうして、風と草の音が、心が落ち着いてしまう。
I interviewed the Marshal regarding domestic Chinese politics, and he assured me that his intentions were entirely peaceful; that he was only interested in unifying China—by force, if necessary. He denied that the Japanese had anything to do with his decision.

During my interview I repeated the reports about his relations with Japan. He told me that he had served on the Japanese side during the Russo-Japanese war as a guerilla leader, harassing the communication lines of the Russians, and probably had a great deal to do with the defeat of the Russians in their war with Japan in 1905. No one was in a better position for this work than Chang Tao-lin, or he was a product of the Manchurian mountains and forests.
The full extent and significance of the bandits' demands were not fully realized until the "peace conference" between the outlaws and the Government's representatives got under way. Never was a stranger or more dramatic conference held.

In the little temple on the side of the mountain, visible from the village where the conference was held, sat the little band of captives whose lives hung in the balance as the talks seemed to swing from one side to the other. Most disconcerting to Anderson and me were the frequent "off-side" sessions of little groups, usually held in secret behind the rambling one-story building where the meeting was held.

No rider could tell whether they were breaking out entirely, and we always heaved a sigh of relief when they returned. Each chief naturally demanded that all of his followers be taken into the army and provided with new uniforms. Also there were demands for enormous quantities of rice and flour, the amounts being specified in tons of thousands of piculs, the Chinese unit, equivalent to 113 pounds avoirdupois.

The most significant demand, constituting evidence of political and possibly foreign intrigue, was that the so-called bandit area, embracing a section of several hundred square miles and including portions of the three provinces, Kiangsi, Shantung, and Anhwei, be "neutralized" under some form of international guarantee by the foreign Powers. The area which the bandits demanded included the important railway junction point of Taohromu where the north-south Tientsin-Nanking line crossed the east-west Lung-Kwei line. The bandits insisted that their force, now expanded to possibly a division, be stationed inside the "neutralized" area. The demands included specific conditions regarding collection and apportionment of taxation, exploitation of coal mines and other minerals, and development of communications. It seemed to me that the bandits must have had outside assistance in working out the plan which required to be beyond the capacity of a band of mountain outcasts.

The inspection behind this particular demand, aside from the element of self-aggrandizement, still remains a secret. Some thought it was Japan's method of retaliation for the action of the Powers at the Washington Arms Conference in forcing Japan to return Shantung to China sovereignty. Others thought the bandits were instigated by southern political interests antagonistic to the Peking Government and hoped in this manner to discredit their political enemies. Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, American Minister, told me several months afterward that he had never been able to get to the bottom of the incident, and was surprised when the control government suddenly offered to refund the losses suffered by the passengers and agreed to pay the captives an indemnity figured out on a per diem basis for the time they were held in captivity.
There had been a time in the not too distant past when a foreign power or group of Powers might have taken advantage of the bandit incident to establish control over Chinese territory. Japan had seized the port of Tsin-tung on the Shantung coast twenty-three years earlier in retaliation for the killing of three German missionaries; Russia had seized Port Arthur on the Gulf of Chihli (T'ai-hai), and Britain had established a training station at T'ai-pei on the north side of the Shantung Peninsula. But Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia were temporarily out of the running, and the other Powers with interests in the Pacific had adopted a new program, in their relations with each other and with China, which had gone into effect at the Washington Conference. All of the Powers, including Japan, had agreed to abandon their old spheres of influence and concessions, and had signed a treaty guaranteeing China against just such interference in her domestic affairs as the bandits were inviting. It was certain that the bandits had not originated the foreign-concession idea themselves; there must have been instigation from some outside quarter, possibly for the purpose of testing out the Powers as to their sincerity concerning the Nine-Power Treaty.

After eliminating the ridiculous, the conference finally settled down to the familiar old-fashioned game of bluff and compromise. A door to the hearts of all true Sons of 'Man. The bandits' demands for the release of the foreign captives finally narrowed down to two points: Was the Government willing to take the entire gang into the army and to hand over to the chiefs a sufficient sum to pay the salaries of the army for six months in advance? The Government, under pressure by the Powers, was willing, but it wanted the amount of money involved and the number of bandits taken into the army held down to reasonable proportions. The exact amount paid over and the number of soldiers released upon was never announced, but the debate was long and acrimonious. The conference had a dramatic conclusion when Sven Mo-yoo, the youthful leader, held up his hand and after proclaiming his loyalty to the Government, signed the agreement. The other chiefs then walked up and signed, following which the Government officials affixed their signatures or seals to the document, which was then pushed across the table for Anderson and me to sign as witnesses and guarantors of the good faith of both participants.

One day six months later, Anderson telephoned me and stated in great indignation that he had just received word that the Governor of Shantung had violated the agreement and through some subterfuge had enticed the bandits away from their guns and had massacred some six hundred of them with machine guns. Sven Mo-yoo, the youthful chief, was also executed. Most foreigners approved the action of the Shantung Governor, but Roy Anderson, better versed in current Chinese 'check-the-board' politics, predicted that the action of the Shantung Governor would have tragic results in case other foreigners were kidnapped by bandits or rebel troops in future—a forecast which was borne out by later developments when many foreigners, chiefly missionaries, lost their lives when ransoms were not immediately forthcoming. The missionaries were the chief sufferers, because they generally refused to pay ransoms, on the ground that such payments only invited further kidnapping of mission workers.
As the foreign captives were en route of the negotiations proceeding in the village in the valley, they spent many anxious hours exciting the conclusion. As the dry drew to a close they had practically given up hope when a messenger arrived with a slip of paper ordering the release of the captives. "Thank God," was the involuntary utterance, but there was still further delay; the bandit leaders insisted on providing sedan chairs for all members of the party so that they could depart in a manner befitting foreign guests. We didn't actually get away until after nightfall, and in consequence didn't reach the rescue party at the coal mine until long after midnight. Then we woke up the next morning our train was moving; the government railways had provided us with a special running straight through to Shanghai. When the train arrived the next day Shanghai's entire foreign population, which had been demanding strong punitive measures in reprisal for the bandit outrage, turned out in such a crowd that they blocked the streets leading to the railway station.
政治的な側面を含め、外敵の侵攻の時摂と、保守派の政策を求める
の中央の位置である。

百戦の地獄であり、江戸山真面微に露る所間導戦略を何代かの
形で外敵列強の制圧的保囲を以て中央化せんとするものであった。陣
陸の首長が制圧した地域の中に何十万人の交戦をなしめた。陣
が南北の清掃と、東岸の巽山との交戦をなしめた。陣

自己保全の意図となれば、今にこの特徴の要束の背後にある意図は依然と

Def Loc No. 202-F-9
して秘密をつつめてある。故に我々は、山県の中国外交を日本にacas
するニシントン会談での列挙の工作に対する日本の観察の一途のもと
だと思われるかも知れない。又尾張は北京政府に改編する南方政権勢立の観察
を受けたと見もある。アメリカ公使ジャーミズ・ゴールドマン
に対して抑留期間に対し口利計念にしても報償金の支払をかつのに同意したか
からである。
「四三頁」

連載文庫二〇一一号九話第三节

そのにより余り激しくない以前外敵が樹立に若くは打合して中興烈士に支配
をうたてた為に因縁事件を利用出来るたらうと思われる時期があつた。

ドイツは三人のドイツ人宣教師被害の報復に二十三年前に山東海岸にある
島国に侵略した。ロシアは波蘭（勃蘭地）に近在する長期間に長期間に
列強は彼等相互侵略に支那に近しい。ハノイとトンキンの時既に効力を有する他の
列強を支那に対しその存を表示する条約に調印した。同様の条約を支那に対しその存を
表したのでないことは正確であつた。その他には九国連合条約に関する
談論性に附けて多分列強をためして見た目的で或る外敵方面よりの使用が
あったに過ぎない。

敵につかめを取除いた後、会談は終りにとつけの漢民族の談話ながら敵

の気持にもしみ込んできたやや無味に感じられた故なから、白話の不兼克を気味に

の臨に疑われた。外人捕虜の釋放の交渉条件に出した間諜の詐要求は結局二つ

の道に縛らされた。即ち政府は全魔賊を軍隊に編入し、この新軍隊の六

月前後の編成を支拝にに充分な金を首領に手渡す意志ありや。此ふここ

である。列国の詐迫下にあった政府はその意志はあつたがそれだけの金

を授けておらず、軍隊に編入される匪賊の人数を過度の労に引かされ

た。支拝された正額が金額の決定される兵隊の人数は決して多数され

かたが然し悪行は長く激烈であつた。青年関係者＝ウェン＝マルノ＝お

信頼性の存念人間に俳優人として署名する方を参加者の向これを

印をし、之に従って政府官更かその文書に署名捺印した役役会談者

と私の方にそれを押へやつた。その蔡大々月待つこと、アノンダーソ
が私に言をかけてきて非常に嘔嘔した口吻で山東省長が私が反し
て何か授業な方法で学生から彼等の銃を手掛けて置いて用いて彼等を
った約百名を。殺したと云ふ事実を受けたからかして云って彼等を
東省長の行答を省略した。が然し今の中山の一時殺害条件に元から
したるロイ・アンダーソンに何か外因人が彼等に対する予報に抗され
た場合に山東省長の行答は悲劇的結果を警らすことになつて彼等を
出なかった為に命を失った時に至って問題のなかつたことを醸発された。
宣教師達が主なる即興者であった。二つのは彼等は持代金を更に彼等
は布教席にある人物を更に彼等に授せする様に従助するだけだも云ふ理由で彼等
大抵その支援を拒絶した為であった。
外國人探子は谷間の村で徘徊している交渉のことを知っていたので長い間不安の念にかられながらその結末を待つ。日も暮れ近かったので急におすすめして居た。一斉に呼咲こなすと紙片を持って来た時彼等は既に絵画をこぼれて居た。だが私の手の振動は手間だつた。即ち彼等の頭目は彼等が外隔人の密密にふさはべき方法で出発できる様に一行の会員の職務かとを用意することを主張した。我々は旅立ちを期す御用と到着しなかっただ。政府の新道が上海迄の特別直達列車を営々に提供して来たの旅を貫くことであつた。列車が翌日到着した時、彼等の不法に對於する軽微な懲罰だけで居る旅を諦めず、連日の圧迫に蒙られる様間手を救出したので停車場に達する道を云ふ道は彼等で一杯で満れなかった位であつた。
The Chinese Communists, who were admitted to membership in the Kuomintang on an equal basis as a result of a conference of delegates in Canton on January 20, 1924, had from the first endeavored to exert pressure on the party. The first indication of serious trouble between the Kuomintang and Communist factions was given early in 1926.

Four young military officers, all graduates of the Whampoa Academy, organized an anti-communist movement. The four men, all destined to become prominent in the next few months in the military drive to the Yangtze Valley, were Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-sheng, Chu Peh-teh, and Ts'io Ying-chin. General Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Central Military Academy, steered clear of the Kuomintang-Communist controversy, but his trip to Russia in 1924 caused him to be suspected of pro-Red leanings. A record of his activities in Russia, however, indicated that he had been cold to Soviet blandishments, as a result of pressure by the four young military officers. General Chiang, on March 24, 1926, issued a statement that he would follow the teachings of Dr. Sun's Three Principles (see preceding chapter), and would discontinue all connections with the Communist wing.

General Chiang Kai-shek's disinclination to side with the Communists was due to two factors. First, his birth and environment in industrialized, conservative Chekiang Province and his association with the banking and commercial elements from that province which dominated Shanghai business; second, the advice of a fellow provincial, Chang Ching-kiang, an almost mythical character who had become immensely wealthy in the silk and curio trade between China and France in the latter years of the Ching Dynasty. (Many of the rare Chinese works of art purchased by American millionaires came to this country by way of France.) Chang Ching-kiang, the curio dealer, espoused the revolutionary cause and contributed large sums to Dr. Sun's war chest. He participated in the conferences preliminary to the formation of the Nanking Provisional Government, but refused to accept office. Two years later he again helped Dr. Sun in opposing Yuan Shih-kai's monarchist plot, and as a result was proscribed, along with many others, by the Yuan regime. Chang Ching-kiang fled to Paris, where he opened a profitable curio and art store and also a popular restaurant where Chinese foods, particularly soya bean products, were sold. After the passing of Yuan Shih-kai, Chang returned to Shanghai, where he further increased his fortune in the stock and gold-bar exchanges. It was here that he became acquainted with Chiang Kai-shek, and assisted him financially. In 1925 he went to Canton and became a member of the Constitutional Government. He accompanied General Chiang Kai-shek on the military advance to the Yangtze, and after the split between the Kuomintang and Communist factions he joined the Nanking Government. In his later years his health failed, and it became necessary for him to travel about in a wheel chair. But there was no impairment of his opposition to the Communists.
Hu Han-ming, civilian leader of the right-wing Kuomintang group, also opposed the Communists, but Wang Ching-wei, the other civilian contender for the position held by the late leader of the party, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, sided with the Reds and in company with a number of the Russian and American advisers of the Canton Government departed for Hankow.

By the summer of 1926 the Nationalist army, under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, started its northward advance from Canton. As a result of the anti-imperialist propaganda inspired by the Communist faction of the Kuomintang, foreigners, particularly residing in the interior of the country, particularly in the interior of the country, were seriously affected by the Nationalist Revolution which was sweeping northward. Mission schools, churches and residences were looted and thousands of missionaries were forced to flee to Shanghai.

But the most dramatic developments of the revolution took place at Hankow, Nanjing and Shanghai, where the smoldering hatred and intrigue for power between the Kuomintang and the Communists broke out in furious internecine conflict. General Chiang Kai-shek's charge that the Communists had sent secret emissaries into the cities for the purpose of seizing control prior to the arrival of his troops, was borne out by developments at both Hankow and Shanghai. In both cities Communist activity originally was directed at the control of student and labor organizations.

Students of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution whose sympathies have been on the side of the radical or communist factions have purposely ignored the developments at Hankow which tell the most significant story of the failure of Chinese Communists, and their foreign advisers, to accomplish their ambitious plan of seizing control of the Nationalist movement and establishing a communist government in China. They blame "foreign capitalist-imperialist influence," "now militarism" and native "banker-landlord influence" for their lack of success, but while these elements did contribute, there were other and more fundamental causes.

Of the many causes for the failure of the Red regime at Hankow not the least was the action of the leaders in preaching class warfare and catering to radical student-labor groups in a society which was predominantly agricultural and where there had never been any classes, except the old educated or "literate" group which was, theoretically at least, open to all youths of ability who could pass the official examinations. After the capture of the Pu-Han cities, which had been accomplished largely by the military strategy of General Chiang Kai-shek, the leftist Chinese leaders and their foreign advisers staged a virtual "Chunmou holiday" in celebration of their victory over "capitalistic imperialism." There was a trial of two "war prisoners" staged in the Russian manner, the culprits being two northern generals who were captured at Wuchang. Thousands of laborers employed in the mines, factories, and processing plants (Hankow is popularly known as the Pittsburgh of China) ceased work, and led by radical elements spent the days and nights in speechmaking, parades, and demonstrations. Streets were filled with raging students and laborers carrying bannors inscribed with slogans, "Down with Capitalists and Imperialists," "Support the World Revolution," "Workers of the World, Unite," and similar sentiments. Thousands of young peasants from Hunch Province, where an intense Red propaganda had been conducted for a considerable period, flocked into Hankow to join the festivities.
The industries of the Wu-Han area were forced to close down: press-packing plants where native products were prepared for foreign markets; manufacturing industries, including cotton spinning and weaving mills; vegetable-oil pressing plants, hundreds of small native-owned industries, the great Hun Yeh Ping coal and iron interests (controlled by Japan), large cigarette factories owned by Britons and Americans, the shipping industry operating large sea-going steamers on the lower Yangtze and smaller but more powerful steamers capable of negotiating the rapids of the Upper Yangtze, and an enormous junk trade operated by the Chinese on the great canal system and lakes of central China. Thousands of workers, who had been spending their days celebrating the revolution by holding parades and demonstrations, suddenly found themselves without meal tickets.

Since the Government had catered to the radical elements and encouraged the strikes, the student-labor groups naturally turned to it for support. The Government thus found itself in a vicious circle of its own making, and had to adopt the suicidal method of issuing floods of paper money in order to purchase rice for the hungry multitudes. Prices for food, particularly rice, shot up to prohibitive heights.

In order to save the Government itself from retaliation by the hungry crowds, propagandists attempted to turn the revolutionary sentiment against the foreigners. Here parades were organized, with banners denouncing foreign imperialism, and the British Concession was over-run. No attempt was made to invade the Japanese Concession, which was bristling with machine guns. The British Concession was guarded only by a small naval contingent and a local volunteer corps and police force. Unable to cope with the excited demonstrators who stormed the borders of their Concession, and fearing a debacle, the British Consul-General, an Irishman named O'Malley, ordered the British population to withdraw to British ships in the harbor which was accomplished without incident. Possessed of more political acumen than most of his compatriots, Consul-General O'Malley immediately entered into negotiations with the radical Foreign Minister, Su Jong Chon, and the outcome was the sensational Chen-O'Malley Agreement whereby Great Britain agreed to return the British Concession at Hankow to China. The official release from the Foreign Office in London stated that the action "accorded with Britain's long-existing intention to return her Concessions to Chinese control."

Then the Chinese found themselves in possession of the British Concession; calmer counsels prevailed, the excitement died down, and the parades returned to their quarters.

Another element which had a calming effect on the situation at Hankow was the receipt of alarming reports from Nanking, some four hundred miles down the Yangtze, stating that American gunboats had been forced to fire on a mob of demonstrators, including troops, which were attacking the American community, with officials of the American Consulate and their families. Suddenly realizing the seriousness of the complications in which they had become involved, Foreign Minister Su Jong Chon sent a wire to the State Department disavowing responsibility for the Nanking outrages but offering reparation for damages suffered by foreigners at the hands of Chinese radical elements.
The Chen-O'Melloy Agreement providing for the return of the British Concession at Hankow to Chinese control, and the official telegram from the radical Chinese regime at Hankow to the State Department, marked the high point in the strange career of Eugene Chon, who had figured prominently in Chinese politics for a decade. Born in Trinidad, British West Indies, of Chinese father and a Trinidad woman, Chon was educated as a British barrister in England and had been admitted to practice in Inner Temple, London. But the pull of his Chinese blood was too strong, and he returned to China, along with thousands of his compatriots from the Seven Seas, to participate in the revolution. Having received classical education in English (he could neither read nor speak Chinese), Chon naturally gravitated into newspaper work and on occasion stirred the sluggish English communities in the Far East to white heat with his editorials, filled with classical quotations from English literature. He edited radical papers in Shanghai and Peking, and once when the Chinese authorities in Peking arrested him and threatened him with execution, he remembered his British nationality, through birth in Trinidad, and appealed to the British Minister to save his life. Sir John Jordan, the able, kindly, and influential British Minister, asked the Chinese authorities to release Chon—who, upon obtaining his liberty, fled to the sanctuary of the International Settlement in Shanghai. Later, Chon went to Canton and joined Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary government and participated in the northern advance as a member of the radical faction, becoming Foreign Minister of the Hankow Government.

There was an illuminating incident in connection with the British evacuation at Hankow which was prophetic of later developments in British Far Eastern diplomacy. When the British were evacuating their nationals from the Concession to their ship in the harbor, the British Indian community, consisting largely of Sikhs, was overlooked. After the white Britons were safely aboard the ships, someone thought about the Sikhs, most of whom had been employed as policemen or guards and watchmen by the various foreign and Chinese business houses and manufacturing establishments. Some had become wealthy as money lenders. One of the consular officials went ashore to rescue the missing Sikhs, who had disappeared completely. While returning to his ship the British consular official stopped to observe a parade which had been organized by the students to celebrate the taking over of the Concession. At the end of the procession, also carrying banners denouncing foreign imperialists, were the missing Sikhs. They had "gone over" to the Chinese and Communist revolutionists.

The action of the little group of British Indians in joining the Chinese revolutionists was prophetic of events to come. Events in 1941-42, when British Indian troops at Hong Kong, in Malaya, and in Burma, and the Congress Party in India, either refused to support Great Britain or adopted an attitude of non-cooperation with respect to the war with Japan in the Far East.

The acquisition of the British Concession at Hankow enhanced considerably the prestige of the radical branch of the Kuomintang, but this could not be exchanged for the children to find the hordes of unemployed laborers who had been encouraged to strike and resist against the imperialists and capitalists. With adversity came treachery within the ranks of the radical factions. Wang Ching-wei, who already had a reputation for treachery, grew cold toward the radical Chinese and Russian elements.
Mr. Tao-tung, spokesman of the radical faction, attributed the failure of the
Red regime at Hankow to the weakness or treachery of another Chinese leader, Chen
Tu-hsiu, who allegedly compromised on fundamental policies concerning land re-
distribution. Mr. was quoted in Edgar Snow's "Red Star Over China" as charging th.
Russian adviser Borodin and a British Indian radical named Roy, a delegate of the
Comintern, with joint responsibility with Chen Tu-hsiu, the party dictator, for th.
collapse. According to Mr., Borodin, the official representative of the Moscow
Comintern, had ceased being an "advisor" and had become a dictator of the Kuomintang
Party. Chen Tu-hsiu had concealed the real situation from the party leaders, but
Borodin's activities allegedly were exposed by the Indian delegate Roy. This is
said to have caused the defection of Yang Ching-wei and the split in the Hankow Left
Government which facilitated the victory of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing
faction over the Radical-Communist branch.

Another unexpected element in the situation was that the collapse of the radical
Hankow Government had serious repercussions in Moscow and contributed considerably
in the collapse of Trotsky and advocates of world revolution. Stalin and his group
naised upon the failure of the Chinese adventure, which had cost the Soviets large
sums of money and great effort, to discredit Trotsky and the whole group of
advocates of "permanent world revolution." Borodin returned by a tortuous overland
trip to Moscow in disgrace and became editor of the four-page English-language
LOSCOW DAILY NEWS.

Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who participated in the Hankow Government, but
later withdrew, also confirmed Mr.'s statements, particularly the reference to the
"dictatorial attitude of the Russians." Chen Kung-po, an American returned student
and graduate of Columbia University, New York, who had specialized in economics and
had served as secretary to Yang Ching-wei, wrote a series of articles (published in the
CHINESE WEEKLY REVIEW shortly after the collapse of the Hankow Government) in
which he analyzed the causes of the collapse of the Hankow Red regime. He concluded
by advocating a system of state capitalism and state ownership of industries as a
means of surmounting the complications which develop when privately owned industrial
establishments suspend operations and throw laborers back on the Government for
support. Chen argued that only through the development of state capitalism could
the Chinese Government hope to cope with powerful foreign interests established in the
country, which in times of crisis usually are able to marshal the support of the
large active Chinese industrial and banking interests in opposition to socialist
experiments. Chen Kung-po, formerly a political associate of Yang Ching-wei, later
became head of the Japanese puppet Government of Hankow, following the death of
Yang Ching-wei in Tokyo in 1944. Chen Kung-po was the only Chinese student, educat-
ed in the United States, who voluntarily joined the Hankow puppet. No Chinese
student of any American university, to the writer's knowledge, ever joined the
Chinese Communist faction. Thousands of American returned students are members of
the Kuomintang.
I had received numerous intimations long before the Nationalist armies reached the Yangtze that all was not going well with the Kuomintang-Communist partnership. The information I had received was in the form of two confidential proclamations addressed by General Chiang Ki-shek to the party leaders, in which he charged that the Communists were secretly plotting to seize the Kuomintang and assume control of the party organization and ultimately the government. But I was not prepared for the tragic developments which followed the Nationalist-Communist occupation of Hankow, Nanking, and Shanghai.

American and other Occidental missionaries stationed were in the path of the advancing armies and the first to feel the effect of the Communist hook-up. Every boat and train brought hundreds of refugee mission workers, men, women and children to Shanghai. In most cases they were forced to flee from their homes, which were looted by the disorderly soldiers. Mission churches and religious schools were particular objectives of the Reds and were subjected to wholesale desecration. The missionaries were attacked on two grounds—imperialism and the Christian religion.

I remember attending a press conference called by missionary leaders, at which several of us got up and told of atrocities committed in his district by the political branch of the army. I asked one of the speakers how he accounted for the fact that the communist students and soldiers were able by the use of intensive propaganda to counteract the accomplishments of Christian missionaries extending over a long period of years. He replied, "It is always easier to destroy than to build," explaining that the widespread anti-imperialist and anti-religious propaganda directed at the missionaries was so closely linked with the question of nationalism and political reform that the majority of Christian converts were unable to come to the assistance of their foreign friends and benefactors. Any Chinese who helped a foreign friend was labeled a "running-dog of the imperialists."

Foreigners were wary of Soviet influence behind the Chinese Communists, but few realized that the struggle taking place in China was part of a similar life-and-death struggle which was gaining on the Western world. Stalin and Leon Trotsky, the two rival leaders in the Russian Communist Party, were the two main rivals in the party organization in the East. The struggle involved the fundamental objectives of the communist movement. Stalin had declared, "The struggle is not for the world, but for socialism in one country."

The struggle involved the fundamental objectives of the communist movement. Stalin and Trotsky, the two rival leaders in the Russian Communist Party, were the two main rivals in the party organization in the East. The struggle involved the fundamental objectives of the communist movement. Stalin had declared, "The struggle is not for the world, but for socialism in one country." But the attempt to communize China was the work of the Leon Trotsky faction, which advocated world revolution. Following failures in Germany, Austria, Hungary, and other European countries, the directorate of the Third International decided to attempt the communization of China and the millions of "Japs." But behind the ideology lurked the desire on the part of the Russian Red leaders to even scores with the "imperialist," British, and other European capitalist-imperialists by striking their loosely held colonial dependencies in the Far East.
They argued that if they were successful in China it would mean another communist state and a triumph for the Third International, which had lost prestige as a result of the rebuffs it had suffered in Europe. Also, there was the prospect that such success would put a cramp in the rising political prestige of Joseph Stalin, who was bitterly opposed to the world revolutionary program of Comrade Trotsky. Stalin believed in concentrating power in Russia itself. Finally there was the prospect of blocking or suppressing thousands of Russian emigres who had fled from Russia into Chinese territory after the Red Revolution in 1917. All emigres were anti-Rus.

Rode from all points of the compass—French, German, American, British, Hindu, Turkish—flocked to China to help put over the revolution and, incidentally, participate in the expenditure of the considerable sums which the Third International had collected from the Russian peasants and the world's working classes. Propagandists and political manipulators who had talked to work or had ridden on street cars in their home countries quickly discovered that new American motor cars were a "necessary adjunct" to their activities in China. Shanghai declared American cars did a thriving business while the Red boom lasted. But when Earl Browder, head of the American Communist Party, arrived at Shanghai he quickly put a stop to the reckless spending. At an airborne banquet given in his honor in Shanghai, Browder refused to eat anything but black bread and water, which he said was the fare of the starving Russian peasants who had put up the money for the Chinese revolution. But Browder arrived on the scene too late; the autocratic and dictatorial actions of certain of the Russian advisors had already climaxed the support of many of the Kuomintang leaders.

I interviewed Browder on the subject of the revolutionary situation in China, and heard him denounce in emphatic terms the political agents "who rode around in limousines and went to banquets when the peasants and workers of Russia and China were starving."

The intimate connection between the failure of the Russian communist experiment in China and the ultimate downfall of Commissar Trotsky is revealed in a passage in Trotsky's memoirs (Charles Scribner's Sons) wherein he charged that the Chinese Communist Party had been "forced to join the bourgeois Kuomintang and had been forbidden to create soviets, compelled to hold the peasant revolution in check and close to obtain from organizing the workers." Trotsky alleged that Stalin supported the Kuomintang-Communist hookup and had ordered General Chiang K'ai-shek against attack. After the bloody suppression of the Chinese Communists at Shanghai, Trotsky said he had advised the Chinese to "hold the peasant revolution in check and close to obtain from organizing the workers." Trotsky's expectations and, to quote his words, "after the defeat of the German revolution and the breakdown of the British general strike, the new disaster in China only intensified the disappointment of the masses in the international revolution, and it was this disappointment which served as the chief psychological source of Stalin's policy of national reformism."
It was natural that developments at Nanking and Hankow should arouse deep apprehension on the part of both Chinese and foreigners at Shanghai, China's largest and most Europeanized city. It is one of the world's largest ports, and many industries are concentrated in the Shanghai district, more than any other city on the continent of East Asia. The city then had a population of approximately 3,000,000, of whom some 75,000 or 80,000 were foreigners of almost every nationality and race. It was the Far Eastern headquarters for most of the Protestant and Catholic mission establishments concerned with the propagation of Christianity among the Chinese people. As a result there was a larger investment of American capital in the Shanghai district than anywhere else in Asia, with the exception of the Philippines. British investments at Shanghai were larger than American investments, and were exceeded only by British investments at Hong Kong.

Alarmist reports of events at Hankow which appeared in the foreign press, particularly the leading British paper, the NORTH CHINESE DAILY NEWS, created a situation of near panic among residents of the International Settlement and the French Concession. A well known British journalist at Peking named Putnam making a trip to Hankow and wrote a series of articles regarding the situation there which he entitled "Red Fever on the Yangtze."

I attended a press conference called by the manager of a leading British brokerage firm where it was explained that the foreign chambers of commerce and other organizations had decided to raise a large fund and initiate widespread counter-propaganda against the Communists. The chairman of the meeting asked the cooperation of the local press and suggested that each of the papers publish a special supplement exposing the communist menace. When he asked for comment on the anti-communist program, I expressed the view that any attempt to label the entire Nationalist movement as "Red" would probably defeat the object of the promoters of the campaign because it would categorize all Chinese and tend to throw the entire Nationalist movement into the arms of the Reds. I said that the Nationalist movement in China long predicted the advent of the Russian Communists, and since the objectives of the two movements were antagonistic, the hook-up was not likely to last long unless the Powers adopted a policy of outright opposition.

I also expressed the belief that neither America nor Britain would approve of any program which opposed the Nationalist movement, or any attempt to discredit it by labeling it communist. I therefore refused to cooperate in the campaign, and left the meeting. The NORTH CHINESE DAILY NEWS, senior British paper in China, usually followed custom, and on occasion supercilious, course with regard to Chinese politics; but on this occasion the editor forgot his dignity and went all out editorially against the entire Nationalist movement. With the assistance of two American journalists who were employed for the purpose, the paper issued a supplement on the Red question which still stands as a journalistic curiosity, due to the exaggerated and hysterical articles it contained. One article which aroused considerable comment instructed readers on "How to Spot Communists at Picture Shows and Other Public Gatherings." Later, after the excitement died down, the directors of the paper dropped the American propagandists, employed another editor, and brought the policy of the paper into accord with the changed conditions in China.
As a result of the self-administered propaganda, both foreign areas at Shanghai immediately went on a war basis, and thousands of coolies were employed day and night constructing trenches, barbed-wire barricades, and concrete blockhouses. The panic among the foreigners at Shanghai spread to foreign capitals, and was exaggerated by further alarmist reports dispatched abroad by the foreign consulates and legations. Within a few weeks some 40,000 foreign troops were dispatched to the city, including American marines and soldiers, British soldiers, Japanese soldiers, Italian marines, and French Annamite troops from Indo-China.

The American forces were commanded by General Smedley Butler, a veteran of the Boxer campaign of 1900. Butler, a Quaker, constantly exasperated the other commanders by issuing pacifist declarations to the press. At the height of the excitement I asked Butler, at a press conference, how many troops would be required for a general armed invasion in China sufficiently strong to suppress the Nationalist movement. Without hesitation he replied, "I would not dream of starting an armed invasion in China without a half million troop and it probably would require $ million more before the end of the first year."

General Butler's statement was confirmed a few years later when the Japanese were unable to conquer China with more than two million troops and after years of warfare.

On another occasion General Butler disclosed that his orders from Washington were "not to fire on any organized body of Chinese troops." He declared that his sole purpose was to protect the American community against mob violence. Later, after General Butler had returned to the United States, he declared that his forces had not fired a single hostile shot while they were stationed in China. Following his retirement he delivered speeches advocating the withdrawal of all American and other foreign forces from China.

Another American official who preserved his brimstone and opposed an interventionist policy was Admiral Mark L. Bristol, commander of the United States fleet in Asiatic waters. Admiral Bristol had served as United States High Commissioner to Turkey after World War I, and had observed the futility of an interventionist movement on the part of the Allied Forces with regard to that country.

The first British commander in China, Lord Gort, returned to England in disgust when he discovered that the British Government also had no intention of embarking on a grandiose military adventure in China. Elaborate plans for an invasion of the Yangtze Valley and the creation of a "sanitary zone" fifty miles wide on each side of the Yangtze River between Shanghai and Hankow, a distance of six hundred miles, which had been in the files of the International Settlement for many years, were put back in the pigeonholes to gather more dust. The plans had been prepared by old-guard dyed-in-the-wool imperialists in Shanghai, who thought China could be frightened into submission by a show of foreign force.

The new British commander sent out to replace Lord Gort held a press conference shortly after his arrival. "Exhibiting a new map on the wall of his office, he said, "I want you to see that I have changed the color of the thumb tacks indicating the location of the Chinese Nationalist troops; previously we used red tacks, now they are yellow." He declared that the British Government realized that the Chinese Nationalist movement was a genuine revolutionary effort designed to bring about a new day in China, and was not a "Red Yevo on the Yangtze" designed for the purpose of driving Americans and Europeans out of the country, as had been pictured in the excited propaganda and exaggerated news reports circulated by Shanghai's die-hard imperialists.

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Conservative Chinese commercial and financial interests at Shanghai generally supported the Nationalist movement, but they hoped to bring an end to the political unrest which had prevailed in the country for a decade. They thought it would bring order to a merely normal situation and enable impoverished people, but the bankers and businessmen in the area who realized there would be no permanent relief or reconstruction under the program proposed by the Communist wing of the Kuomintang Party, Delegations of bankers and workers went from Shanghai to Nanjing, and to Kiangsu and Hupeh Provinces, to the purpose of investigating conditions under the Red regime, and visited central and rural villages in order to collect data by radical students bearing placards denouncing Chinese businessmen as "Fawning-Dogs of the Imperialists." And the delegations returned to Shanghai with their reports of the reign of terror which prevailed in Nanking and surrounding areas, and immediately took steps to prevent a recurrence of such developments in the Shanghai area.

The complete story of the Shanghai war between the right-wing Kuomintangists and the left-wing Communists was told because those who were responsible for the suppression of the radical elements obviously did not wish to reveal their methods, while those who were suppressed did not survive to tell the story. For not that the Communists had armed and armed incursions of laborers in Shanghai mills was known to the municipal authorities, who naturally took steps to meet the situation; they were spurred to action by the Communists' seizure of strategic points in the area.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was at his headquarters at Nanking in Kwei Province, hence did not take part in the suppression of the Red elements at Shanghai and the same applied to three of the four outstanding leaders of the conservative wing of the party, General Li Chi-ch’eng, General Li Tsung-jen, and General Ho Ying-chin, as they also were not of Nationalist armies still hundreds of miles from Shanghai.

But the same could not be said of another Nationalist commander, who also had been associated with General Chiang in the advance from Canton. The commander was Chang Ch’ien, who did not participate in the drive on Shanghai, but diverted his troops to the west and moved directly on Nanking. When General Chang Ch’ien’s troops entered Nanking they unexpectedly looted the city, including the foreign quarters, all residences and business properties of both foreigners and Chinese. Acting in accordance with an apparently prearranged plan, they staged a reign of terror, and numerous outrages were committed against foreigners. Evidence pointed to the fact that the Nanking incident had been staged by leftist elements for the purpose of discrediting General Chiang Kai-shek.

Opposed to the advancing Nationalists was the able Northern general, Sun Chun-fang, who controlled the northern provinces of Honan, Shansi, and Shansi from his capital at Nanking, about one hundred miles west of Shanghai.
Conservative Chinese commercial and financial interests at Shanghai generally supported the Nationalist movement, which they hoped would bring an end to the political unrest which had prevailed in the country for a decade. They thought it would bring order to a sorely harassed nation and its impoverished people, but the bankers and businessmen at the same time realized there would be no permanent role for reconstruction under the programs proposed by the Communist Party of the Kuomintang. Delegations of businessmen and workers went from Shanghai to Hankow, and to Kiangsi and Kansu Provinces, in the purpose of investigating conditions under the Red regime, which seemed to promise peace and prosperity through the villages in their shirts-tails by radical students bearing placards and shouting Chinese businessmen as "Fainting-Dogs of the Imperialists." Thus the delegations presented to Shanghai with their reports of the reign of terror which prevailed in Hankow and surrounding areas, they immediately took steps to prevent a recurrence of such developments in the Shanghai area.

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Opposed to the advancing Nationalists was the Kiangsi Northern general, Sun Shuang-fang, who controlled the surrounding provinces of Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu from his capital at Nanking, about one hundred miles southeast of Shanghai.
Before the situation became critical, I had accompanied a group of correspondents to Hangchow to interview General Sun regarding his plans for the defense of the Shanghai district against the Nationalists. The Shanghai or Yangtze delta region embraced a triangular area, the three sides of which were 100, 200, and 250 miles in length respectively. Shanghai was at the eastern apex; Hangkow at the north, and Nanking at the south. Within this triangular area was the richest section of China, embracing fertile agricultural land devoted largely to the production of cotton, silk, wheat, and rice. There also were a number of prosperous industrial cities, chief of which was Nushin, center of cotton, silk and flour manufacturing within this section.

General Sun was one of the more enlightened of the Northern military commanders and had a good record as an administrator. He held a review of his troops, reputed the best equipped in the country, and declared his ability to hold Shanghai against the "Reds." One of the correspondents who represented a New York newspaper story that Shanghai was "impenetrable" and in no danger of occupation by the Nationalists. He was not aware of the fact that the morale of General Sun's well-equipped forces had been completely undermined by propaganda of the Communists.

Since the foreign-administered International Settlement and French Concession were garrisoned by foreign troops and were heavily insulated from contact with the surrounding countryside by a string of fortifications and countless networks of barbed-wire barracking, the population inside had little knowledge of what was going on outside. For many days preceding the arrival of the Nationalist forces there was continuous gunfire in the densely populated areas of Pootung, Chaoei, and Komnan, from which the active-owned industries were located and where most of the laboring population resided.

Shanghai was in such a nervous state that the wildest rumors were constantly in circulation, and most of them were believed. One day there was a report that the authorities of the French Concession had decided not to offer resistance to the advancing Nationalist armies, and would permit the soldiers to enter the Concession without their arms. Since the two foreign zones were separated only by a street, this still further increased the prevailing panic in the International Settlement. That night the Settlement authorities put their army of laborers to work building a new barbed-wire barricade, this time between the International Settlement and the French Concession. I interviewed the French Consul-General about the new turn of events, but he only shrugged his shoulders. I suspected he knew more than he was willing to admit, which was soon found to be correct, for the French had already established contact with the Nationalist (Kuomintang) officers. When the American correspondents learned that two Nationalist officers had arrived on the border of the French Concession, it was the French municipal police who opened the gates and permitted us to pass through for an interview. The Nationalist officers were General Li Peung-shen and General Ho Ying-chin. Both assured us that they had no intention of attacking the foreigners and that they had taken steps to restore order in the native areas about Shanghai. They informed us that the Northern commander at Shanghai had already fled, and that his troops had been disarmed.
Bearing in mind the fact that Shanghai is China’s “key” city, which any political group looking to govern the country must control, it was obvious that both groups in the Kuomintang had made preparations to seize control of the Chinese-administered sections of the city. Propaganda squads attached to the radical branch of the party were first on the scene and had completely undermined the morale of the Northern troops which controlled the lower Yangtse district, in which Shanghai is located. The demoralization of the erstwhile defenders of the city was so complete that their commanders did not wait for the advancing Nationalist armies to get within shooting distance; they evacuated before the Southerners were within a hundred miles of the city. The result was that the Shanghai district experienced an interregnum between the evacuation of the Northerners and the arrival of the Southern armies, which were forced to travel fast as the Northerners had seized all of the railway rolling stock and available shipping along the coast and on the Yangtse River.

The Communists thus had an opportunity to make their preparations. There was no questioning the fact that prevailing sentiment among the student and labor groups favored the leftists and their program of social reform. Preparations had been made for seizure of control of Shanghai in the manner of Hankow; and, as at Hankow, there were parades, mass meetings, speeches, and distribution of literature. The walls of buildings were plastered with posters denouncing foreign imperialists. Any Chinese who helped a foreigner was designated in word and cartoon as a “running dog” of the foreign imperialists. Chinese compradores, or active agents of the larger foreign firms who constituted a powerful group that controlled the native guilds and chambers of commerce, were singled out for special abuse by radical propagandists. The compradores were held up to public ridicule and no term of opprobrium in a language which is rich in such expressions was overlooked in the poster campaign.

It appeared that Shanghai was on the point of experiencing a repetition of the incidents at Nanking and Hankow, particularly when it became known that thousands of rifles had been distributed to the factory workers by the radical leaders.

2--Benovolent Gangster

Out of the confusion then prevailing in Shanghai there emerged a figure, previously unknown, who took on the composite character of an earlier-decade American gangster and political boss. The character was Dou Yu-seng, now listed in the respectable China Who’s Who as a “banker, philanthropist, and welfare worker.” Dou’s early life is not well known, as he was born of peasants in a little fishing village near the seacoast about twenty-five miles from metropolitan Shanghai. The little town, now called Dou’s Village and inhabited by fewer hundred people, was galvanized into sudden prominence in 1934, when Dou celebrated his fiftieth birthday by dedicating a family shrine in the village and adding a two-mile-long pride through the countryside which cost him well over a million dollars. Banners were carried in the pride containing messages of felicitation from leaders throughout the country.)
Dou Yu-sang tested his skill in the Shanghai French Concession as a youthful fruit peddler. He soon discovered the place where opium was sold illicitly, and familiarized himself with the racketeering, hijacking, and other practices which prevailed in Shanghai somewhat as they were practiced in the bootleg industry in the United States during prohibition days. Methods used by Dou Yu-sang in gaining control of the underworld situation followed traditional lines, and Dou shortly emerged from the sidewalks and malodorous gutters of the French Concession and the adjoining native district of Nan-표 as controller of opium, gambling, and the opium industries. In his rise to power Dou solved a local political problem which previously had defied solution: he amalgamated two powerful secret political organizations whose activities extended far back into the era of the Manchu Dynasty. The organizations, known as the Blue Society and the Green Society, originally were engaged in intrigue against the Manchus, but after the creation of the republic they degenerated into gangsterism. The two groups were violently antagonistic, and their rivalries frequently broke out in gun battles similar to early tong wars in the Chinese communities in the United States. But Dou Yu-sang accomplished the seemingly impossible by amalgamating the rival groups, and became head of the rejuvenated organization known as the Blue-Green Society, which performed functions, according to Chinese lights, probably not greatly different from those performed by political groups which dominat the large cities of the United States.

Dou Yu-sang had two trusted lieutenants, one of whom controlled the opium industry and the other the native chambers of commerce and guilds. They previously had been active in the rival Blue and Green societies respectively.

Political conditions in the French Concession facilitated Dou's rise to power. The Shanghai French Concession, although regarded as a "little piece of La Belle France" was governed not directly from Paris, but second-hand through Hanoi, capital of the French Colony of Indo-China. The inefficiency and corruption which prevailed in the French Colony were reported in the French Concession at Shanghai. French officials, particularly chiefs of police, appointed to Shanghai quickly amassed fortunes from underworld activities which provided in the Concession. These conditions were exposed to the world when the French Administration at Hanoi surrendered adversely to the Japanese.

Dou Yu-sang and his associates took advantage of this situation and became the real controllers of the French Concession. Dou ruled his empire from his home in the Concession, which resembled an arsenal, but he was a liberal contributor to charities and he came to hold more chairmanships on directorates of Chinese banks and business houses than any other man in the city. His orders were enforced by hundreds of armed guards, popularly known as "Dou's plain-clothes men."

When conditions became chaotic after the withdrawal of the Northern troops, Dou Yu-sang stepped into the breach and notified the local foreign authorities that he would assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, pending the arrival of the Nationalist troops. It was at this point that the shooting began; it continued without intermission for many days. Preparations which the radicals and Communists had made for seizing the city backfired, and the reign of terror which the Reds had planned was turned against them.
No accurate count was made of bodies which littered the streets of the active zones, but Edgar Snow, who was then on the staff of the CATHAY NEWS, estimated that more than 5,000 leftists were killed. According to Snow's account, Chou En-lai, the Communist leader, had organized 600,000 workers who staged a general strike, completely tying up the industries of the city. Order among the strikers was maintained by some 50,000 trained pickets. Police stations and the local garrison headquarters were seized by some 5,000 armed workers, of whom about 2,000 had been specially trained. A so-called 'citizens' government' was proclaimed, stated Snow's account.

But the Communist coup was short-lived. It could not stand up against the experienced gunners of Dou Yu-sang. When the Nationalist troops under General Li Tsung-jen, General Wei Chiang-hai, and General Yu Ying-chin arrived at Shanghai they found the job already completed; the city was handed over to them by Dou Yu-sang and his lieutenants. Chou En-lai, the Communist leader, was imprisoned and other radical leaders, who were not captured and executed, fled to Hankow. Shortly afterward, when General Chiang Kai-shok arrived and assumed control of the situation he issued an edict expelling the Communists from the Kuomintang and ordering the deportation from China of all Russian Soviet advisers. The enforcement of the expulsion and deportation order at Canton was accompanied by serious rioting and the massacre of many members of the leftist group, including several Russians. The lives of a number of the Russian advisers were saved by American Consul Houston, who permitted them to seek refuge in the American consulate at Canton.

After the collapse of the 'Canton Commune' the Reds attempted to set up a regime at Swatow on the coast of Kwangtung Province, north of Canton, but it could not stand against the Kuomintang troops led by General Chiang Kai-shok. Finally the defeated Rod forces which were scattered over Central and South China combined with those driven from Hankow, and formed a 'Soviet Government of China' in the mountainous areas on the border between Kiangsi and Fukien Provinces, where they held out for several months, but ultimately were ejected by Chiang Kai-shok's air-bombers and forced to flee to the Northwest, where they established another communist government at Yenan, Shensi—which is still in existence.

The last episode staged by the Red wing faction in the Kuomintang was at Nan-k'ing when Communists within the Nationalist army staged the attack on foreign residents. Several Americans and Britons were killed and wounded, and it became necessary for American gunboats on the Yangtze at Nan-kiing to fire on a mob of soldiers attacking members of the American consulate and local American residents, including several women, who were penned on a hill overlooking the city wall. The soldiers were frightened away by the gunboat barrages, and the Americans were evacuated over the wall to the gunboats on the river. After General Chiang Kai-shok's loyal commanders succeeded in restoring order, the leaders of the Communist coup, which was designed to discredit the Kuomintang with the foreign Powers, were tried and several of them were executed.
On the evening of the day following the Nanking incident, the correspondents were summoned to a press conference at the American consulate. I was accompanied to the meeting by Prof. Henry O. Hudson of the Department of International Law at Harvard, and we were introduced to an American missionary who had been in Nanking at the time of the "reign of terror." He told us of the murder of Dr. Williams, President Emeritus of Nanking University, and that of an American woman secretary in one of the mission offices because she refused to hand over the keys to the safe, and also of the shooting and wounding of the British Consul.

These incidents had already been reported, but the intense interest of the correspondents was aroused when the speaker, who was in a highly excited state as a result of his experiences, declared that there had been several instances where foreign women had been raped by the armed Red soldiers. Copies of the missionary statement, which had just been typed by one of the consular staff, were passed out to the correspondents. Before the conference broke up, Dr. Hudson suggested to me that I ask the speaker whether he had personal knowledge of any of the rape cases. He replied with considerable heart that he did not have first-hand information, but had been told of the incidents by persons whom he trusted. This immediately aroused a serious controversy, in the course of which Dr. Hudson explained that he had served on a commission which had investigated World War I atrocities, and that few alleged rape cases had stood up under investigations.

The upshot of the matter was that most of the correspondents who echoed the rape story qualified it as not based on first-hand information. It should be stated that so-called "rape" stories had been freely circulated about the city and had appeared in some of the papers. These stories were exploited by reactionary interests with the object of provoking armed intervention on the part of the foreign powers.

Several weeks after the above happenings I received a letter from an American woman physician who was in Nanking at the time of the incident and had made a first-hand investigation of the rape allegations. She said that there had been only one case, and that it was "attempted" rape. Her account stated that three soldiers had entered a house and, finding an American woman alone, had dragged her to an upstairs room. However, they became frightened and ran away without accomplishing their purpose. This was the only case of the kind which came to my attention in more than a quarter of a century of newspaper work in China.

Dou Yu-song was hailed as the deliverer of Shanghai from the Red menace. Shortly afterward the home French Government became exasperated over the corruption and gangsterism which had prevailed for so many years in the French Concession, sent an admiral and a naval force to Shanghai, and effected a complete clean-up of gangsterism. After that Dou Yu-song became a respectable businessman and philanthropist and was decorated by the Government. However, he kept an anchor to windward by retaining control of his Blue-Green Society and his small army of plain-clothes men.

Then the Japanese intervened at Shanghai early in 1932 in order to suppress anti-Japanese activities which flared up following Japan's seizure of Manchuria. Dou Yu-song's "army" again went into action in the Hongkow section of Shanghai, which the Japanese had occupied. Firing from concealed positions in upper stories and on roofs of buildings, they wreaked havoc among Japan's naval forces as well as civilians. Dou's plain-clothes men aided materially in the defense of the city and made the intervention so costly to the Japanese that they were glad to accept mediation and withdraw their naval forces. Then the Japanese launched their war in China proper in 1937; Dou Yu-song and his followers, after defending the city to the last ditch, withdrew with the Nationalist forces to west China, where they have stayed.
Many months after the suppression of the Communists at Shanghai, Stirling Fossonden, American chairman of the International Settlement and popularly known as the “Lord Mayor of Shanghai,” told me the following story of the “saving” of Shanghai from the Chinese Reds and their Soviet advisers. So far as I know the full story has never appeared in print, as it was “off the record” until Fossonden’s death in Shanghai following the Japanese occupations.

Fossonden said that the authorities of the French Concession were chiefly responsible for bringing Dou Yu-song into the Shanghai “war” between the Kuomintang and the Russian-supported Chinese Communists. Dou had “grown up” in the French Concession, hence it was natural for the French to turn to him for assistance, as all governmental authority had collapsed in the Chinese areas surrounding the foreign districts. Fossonden said:

“The French chief of police phoned one day and asked me to meet him for a confidential talk about the local situation. I went to the address he gave me and was surprised to find it was a Chinese residence surrounded by a high wall, with armed guards at the front gate. I was admitted and immediately ushered into a waiting room. I could not help but notice that the large entrance hall was lined on both sides with stacks of rifles and sub-machine guns. Soon I heard voices, and the French official entered with two Chinese. One was Dou Yu-song and the other was an interpreter. We got down to business immediately, the French chief of police explaining that he had been discussing with Dou the matter of defending the foreign settlement against the Communists, as the local Chinese Government, which was composed of Northerners, had collapsed following the evacuation of the Northern defence commander and his troops. Dou went to the point in a businesslike manner. He was willing to move against the Reds, but he had two conditions: first, he wanted the French authorities to supply him with at least 3,000 rifles and ample ammunition. Then turning to me,” said Fossonden, “he demanded permission to move his military trucks through the International Settlement, something which the Settlement authorities had never granted to any Chinese force. Dou said this was necessary in order to move arms and munitions from one section of the native city to the other.”

Fossonden told Dou he would agree subject to the approval of the Municipal Council. Continuing, Fossonden said:

“I realized we were taking a desperate chance in dealing with a man of Dou’s reputation, but the situation was critical, as an attack by the Communists to seize the Settlement and the French Concession was certain to result in widespread disorder and bloodshed, involving the lives of thousands of Americans, Britons, and other foreign residents as well as tens of thousands of Chinese who resided in the foreign-administered sections of the city. Since the Communists had plotted to seize the foreign areas and defend themselves against the Kuomintang troops, it would mean that the foreigners could be sandwiched between the contending forces. The result would have been international complications far more serious than anything which had occurred since the establishment of the Settlement nearly a century ago. I told Dou about three weeks to complete his job, and by that time sufficient foreign troops had arrived to preserve order within the foreign sections; and also by that time General Chiang Kai-shek had arrived and assumed control in the native areas. He immediately announced that the Kuomintang troops had no intention of attacking the foreigners, as had occurred at Nanking. He also announced that the perpetrators of the Nanking outrages would be punished.”
Many American professional defenders of the Chinese Communists have written tearful paragraphs about the "massacre" of Chinese workers and students by the Chinese "fascists and capitalists" at Shanghai, Canton and elsewhere. They either gloss over or omit entirely the all-important point that the so-called workers and students had been trained in revolutionary methods and terrorism either in Moscow or by Russian agents in China, and that these same workers and students were provided with arms by agents of the Third International operating in China. So long as the Communists maintain the principle of "force" as a means of accomplishing their political designs, they can have no cause for complaint when their enemies use similar methods in opposing them.
外交官の支倉
（ニューヨーク・マクドナルド書房 一九五四五年）

上海に於ける親
帝國主義、國家主義、共産主義

私は敵民軍が揚子江に到達するのを数日も後ろに見送ったが、
大本営把重領袖に宛てた密報の秘密小冊子の形にして払っていた。この小冊子は
共産党の関東、南京及び上海占領後の影響を、特に先に黒田、駒場出身の村田
所長にあったアメリカ及西洋諸国に、共産主義の経験を一冊に収めたのは彼等の進
歩にあたったアメリカ及西洋諸国に、共産主義の経験を一冊に収めたのは彼等の進
歩にあたったアメリカ及西洋諸国に、共産主義の経験を一冊に収めたのは彼等の進
歩にあたったアメリカ及西洋諸国に、共産主義の経験を一冊に収めたのは彼等の進
この人権の大部分は乱暴な兵士達に家を略奪されて餘様なく迫られて来たものであった。師道会堂と宗教学校は時に兵器兵士達の目標になっ
て根こそぎに荒されてしまった。師道は師道の指導者達が偽した新聞記者会議に出席したことを覚え
てゐた。私上の者は交々紛れて自分自身の地域に於て軍政班の者達の
強い宣伝に従って永世に亘るキリスト教宗教師達の努力の結晶を覆へ
て、私上の者が見えたからである。一と答へた。そして彼
は次の議に説明した。一師道師達に向けてられたるの腐く捲れた反帝隔
主権及び宗教宣傳が国民主義と政治的改革の問題と密接に結びつぶられ
その為大半数のキリスト教信仰者達も彼等の外国友人や恩人を助けに来る
ことが出来なかった。外敵人を助ける支那人があつたならば彼は帝國主
義者の犬と云ふ銘印を押さるのであった。
外圏人は支配共産政の背後のソビエトの力に気づいていたが、支配

ノモフ、スターリン、レオン、トロッキーの間の関係の大きさに気づいていたが、支配

レーニンは命じて、支配は立つというものである。

このイデオロギーは支配とアジア数億民衆の関係を企てる事を決した。

ロッパ資本家帝国主義者達に都合のない様な、支配民衆保護を望む為に、ロシアの指導者側が、緊密に統制され

フランス、ハンガリー、及びオングランドに於て失敗した第三インターナショ

の役等は、若し彼等が支配で成功しなければ、共産主義国家がもう一つ出

一四二、一四三、一四四、一四五

共産主義国家がもう一つ出

五
水の外は食べることを拒んで、これこそ支那革命のためには会を寄賛した
無かった。上海で彼のために催されたはやかな宴会の席上彼は黒パンと
殭した。上海の現地に於るのは興奮。支那の危機・労働者か携えてゐるの
・劳働者に於ける支那共産党の危機の失敗と人民委員トロッタの結局
の失敗との密接な関係は、トロッタの思想ツーチャールス・スクリブ
会（ソビエツ）を創設することを余儀なくされたも非難している。
ラ勞働者の組織化を手接することを余儀なくされたも非難している。
トロッタはスターリンが国共提携を支持し、攻撃の矢面に於つ大将軍
南京及漢口に於ける倉庫の設置が支那の最大にしても最も発達させる上海の支那人や在在外国人に急に危険の脅威を及ぼしたのは當然である。上海は世界一大釜の一つであり、この上海地方に於ける支那人の投資家が数多くある。上海は当時人口約三百万人の大都市でありました。この地は支那に於けるイギリスに倉庫に寄付する為に数多くの投資家が集まったものである。上海は当時人口約三百万人の大都市でありました。この地は支那に於けるイギリスに倉庫に寄付する為に数多くの投資家が集まったものである。
民の間に平和を奨進を志した。北京在留のソビエト体団エイフルこと雲々英由知
名の記者は深くに出席いた。揚子江上の赤を波一い根をその傍に見

は有力な一翼を伸ばせ社の支配人は開催した新聞記者会議に出席した。
く一年立たずに三月に宣言が立たせられる。と書いた。パトラヒ大勝の此
間は三年後日本人が二百戸以上の陣容を作りなしして必要の変革
が次第の労働に対しアメリカの米民を保護する者であると打切った。彼は彼の唯一の目的
を主張して去方此方で議論を行った。彼は彼の目的を次第の労働
に対して山手命令オーロック・プリンストン是陸軍の指揮がある。プリンストン大勝は
第二次世界大戦の最行命令の予備であると震動を起こした。
多くの行が外国人に対して行われたのである。随拝は左翼分子が介石委員長の信用を失踏させめる気配を示した事実を示してゐる。地方の指導を支配してゐた。
明治二十二年、香港の何千人ともいう労働者達を武装させ訓練したと言われる。市警局は労働局長が上海経済調査官、陸力生粋が関東軍の最高指揮官、松村平太郎が関東軍の指揮官、赤色分子の指導者は関東軍の司令部に配属され、活動を制した。

蔣介石は関東軍司令官に就任して同様であったと歴史記録に記されている。

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上海に於ける支配階層及び経済界の保守的と思われる人々は、内に接した政治的不安を終結させるために、左翼派が競争した計画下では、永久的な数億円を賄える主導的な行動をとることを考えた。しかし、それらが十年の間に国内に接した政治的不安を終結させるならば、それは大きな期待であった。そして、ひとが従来の農業家と、その紛争を含む国民}&
黒幕派遣する前に、余は配備を増や、夢将軍に西方に、彼の
団民軍派領による上海沿海部隊の動揺に即した改正から、上海を
上海は東方、夢京に北方、杭州は南方、各役に宿題を位置していた。この三
三角地区内部には、敵、生絲、小総及び米の廣出を主とする肥沃なる農作
場と、その繁なるものに無縁にして、この地方に於ける端、生絲及び
存在し、その繁なるものの役場にあって、

あることを宣言した。一級新報を代表せる記者の一人は、上海に一箇

攻不破として同民軍によって占有される危険を示し Craftsman。彼は夢将
LIL DDC 419-1 continued

戦の感覚をもて築きの士類も間接主務者皆儒儒により完全に置かれていた事実を知らぬ事でした。外敵の長年下にあった共同艦界及び其の華界は外戦の事態に依り守備され、一層の全動や、無数の住係向師業を発起追いして、是等の防堵を滅ぼさざる措置が先立っていなかったから、華界内の住民は、外界に起った事件を殆ど知らぬ所があった。

人口稠密なる地域に於て、防衛の役を行うのが難が支へられた。今や上海は人心険々として、流言讒謗が迄へず飛ばされ、しかもその被者は共同郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに国通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞かれた。何れに共通郎界を護りたる証拠を一層拡大した。その住係防務を護った房兵の入替を許すといふことが僅かに聞きれた。
（一九・一五）（一五・一頁）

Category: DLP DOC n 32E-I continued

略奪発展する以前に、実に記者はとえに抗戦に携わり、我將軍に面会し、彼の間某家家に対する上海近郊の市街等に際し取扱し、彼の三書を残して、三角地帯は三角地帯を取き、その三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して、三角形の各辺の長さは三々、三角地帯は三角地帯を残して。
軍の援護を受けて敵の本拠もある指揮者の宣伝により、完全に領土される

外敵の威迫下にあった共産領土及び領土は外敵の威迫により守備さ
れた首都に隠密していたから、領土内の住民は、外敵に起った事件を
温如知らなかった。

今や上海は人心険々として、流言流語が毎日のように飛び交い、しかもその

多くが信じられた。

‎

若旦の攻撃は、一街路により分離されているのだから、この

情報は共産領土を覆う情報を一層と化した。その夜領土の

軍事的防備を築造した。余は領土の防備に役立たず、 событияの発

生を防ぐのに

ー 17 —
会は、皆は承認する以上に奉書の虞相を知っているのだと誤解をかけたが、其の後にそれ故の違りであったことが間違って解った。即も故人には

彼は今、我等を Ebony と呼ぶに至る在としに我等の心に来し、会議に至る在としに我等の心に来し、

彼は今、我等を Ebony と呼ぶに至る在としに我等の心に来し、会議に至る在としに我等の心に来し、
继续

...
上海は中華民国の『要衝都市』であり、この地域を統治せんとする動きを抑え、『鎮民』の防衛を担当した。上海は中国の中葉行政官の直接統制を受けており、この地域は防衛の重要な役割を果たしていた。上海の中心部は、この地域を防衛するための重要な役割を果たしていた。上海は、中国の中葉行政官の直接統制を受けており、この地域は防衛の重要な役割を果たしていた。
上海の政治的影響を受けて、中華民国の政治的な下層も変化した。特に、中華民国の政治的下層も上海の影響を受けて、政治的活動を増やし、より多くの政治的影響を受けてきた。中華民国の政治的下層も上海の影響を受けて、政治的活動を増やし、より多くの政治的影響を受けてきた。中華民国の政治的下層も上海の影響を受けて、政治的活動を増やし、より多くの政治的影響を受けてきた。
ドーは当時上海を去る約二十五週の海岸に近い小漁村の農夫の子として生まれたから。彼の初年度の生活はよくかつかつていなかった。ドーの村は同様の市集を造り立ち、十数の長きにわたる行列を続出して彼の五月に起された誕生日を祝ったからである。その行列には、囲中の要人達からの感謝を含むある幾多の旗があった。

ドー・エーセンは上海の紳士界の一青年異物行商人から身を問した彼は聞き、ゆすり私たち役所に反して阿片の販売所を見つけること、そして米国の楽

闇の社会の状況を支配する彼の近懐方は今迄あり来りの方法であった。彼はやがて紳士界、隣接して居た支部会所や南島の歩道に気を付けたる

細民局に居たのであるが間もなく阿片、鶏卵、他の酒類場の喫者社会
を支配するようになる頭角をあらわした。

ドーが有力になるに及んで前々から解決困難であった地域の政治問題を

解消してしまった。彼は遠く都に居た時代から夢をして居った二つの有力

組織人に対し陰謀を企てた居たものであったが、中華民國が出来てから

この時の大政治結社は暴力的に脅威して居った。かつて米国の支部人

会にあったトング争闘のやや彼等はしばしば歴史的史を交した。然し

ドー、トングは一見不可解と見えた敵対する此二組織の併合をなし

して居る政策問題がやつて居るのと恐らく大差なく、蓋は社会人支配の見

解に穿越して結果を通じて居った。

ドー、トングには借用せる二人の助手があった。一人は支配人商工倶楽部及び商業

組合を支配監視して居た。一人は慶脈事務を

支領し、他の一人は支部人商工倶楽部及商業組合を支配監視して居た。此二

人は以前各々慶脈社及び青社に属して居り互に盛に相反目して居つ

たものである。
仮居屋に於ける政局はドーが有力になり出世するに都合がよかった。上
海の仮居屋はラベルフランスの逆画こそ云われて居たけれど直接パリか
ら絵はされて居たのである。

海市に従事する偽人官吏は常に高級官吏に類近し居る伝統して居る暗潮
界で活埼に暗潮して居る彼から早急に金銭財宝を取り集めたものである
ハノイのフランス政府が日本人に止むを得なかった時此等事が次第に爆
露されたのである。ドー、ユーラシア物と仲間は此状態に促進して仮居
界に於ける真の支配者となつた。}

北方向が衰退して世界が混亂した時ドーは中間にして居られ地元外国入村
当
局に必しも明鏡政府とが到達する進法律と未足の維持に反し責任をもつと通告した。其時犯犯が発生した。数日も間隔なく発生した。進政派と共産派が市街占領の意に用意した軍は却て逆火となつた面して進政派が企てる恐怖時代以降へ彼等に向けられた。
北の土着民地区の町に発生する死体の正確なる数は、四日しかなかったが,

の際にレーチャン・ウィンリーは、五千万人以上の方々の窮困中が残されたといわれる.

の日には、共産主義者の方々が、上海市の警察が完全に制圧していた。
片付いていた。町は、社月没トテの問答紙に代り右三間に楕と冠され
た。共箱主箱後のリゲタたる事風呂は役立させ、他の街物又は荒暴を
示かれた前後折りゲタ一組は極口に無念した。そのか口も無く総介石戦
の有旨を発し、安政から拝付のソガ一戦人間関を放送すべく命令と命
令をうけた。問答に渡る共箱箱箱の関名と頂替の前行は、激甚なる暴
の事実を了解したが同様にこの問答の緊張内に役立せたのであつ
た。

「今宵コンサートニ会場が、共箱主箱箱箱は、問答の北方に控る月に
省警の処置に一政府を設立しようとしたが、総介石戦の措置せる同人
警察部は、戦口から接えられ来た伍聞部隊に代り、白昼警戒を
した。」
六十四頁

総領事館二〇二の一

五六、一五七、一五八頁

南京委員会の起った日の翌日通信員一同はアメリカ領事館を開かれた新聞記者交渉に呼ばれ、私はその会にハドソン氏を以てアメリカ宣教師に紹介された。彼は我々に南京大虐行在當時イタリアン・ハドソン氏が殺害された監事及监狱の護を演ずるを招んだ為に

彼等の真件は時を報道されて居った、けれども居り手は自らの数々の体験に於て大いに異議してゐたのである。外國の婦人が強姦した赤軍兵士のため

侵略を受けた憲兵部は発表した時は通信員一同を激怒し、彼等の勇往に於て又

に反対せられた。侵略の発表前ハドソン博士は私に強姦の例を直接見聞して

に反対せられた。
たしかと帰り手に試して見ると如何言った。帰り手は自分は直接見
みたさけの手に比べて如何と言った。帰り手は自分は直接見
めたかったが、凌辱行いの自立が調査して遂げであった。報
告の所、凌辱行いを打倒した通有人の大多数は之を直
接見に見られたかは知らぬが、それより凌辱行いを
少であったと云ふ趕を説明した。
政府は納税界がいかんも多分の間断続して賄つてギャング行賄が流行して
を

また、

杜月笙は赤旗から上海を救う使命を果たされた。彼は多くの問題を解消し、市民を保護し、

政府は納税界がいかんも多分の間断続して賄つてギャング行賄が流行して
を

中華本土で政事を始めた時、

杜月笙と彼の部下は彼の一家を支えるために、

ギャング行賄を禁止し、

- -
防衛した後、民衆と共に西部方面に引き揚げて其處にて処遇せられた。
上記のエッセンスは数ヶ月経っても、共同研究の米軍人の責任で三上

長官が当局者に語ってもらった。スターク・ロング。エッセンスから

ふたたつの様々な観を明らかにした。私の見解ですが、この出来事の内閣は

一時も混乱となって報道されない、というのではあるません、占拠 cartesian

学がエッセンスが死ぬまで一概に禁止するに至っても、たまたも

凡もなことだ。エッセンスは今も隠された。

12 11...continued
この頃からこの辺の街を訪れる旅人が多くなった。

実に何この街はとんでもないものだ。

外人達は、この街の中心部を一気に横断し、さらに沿線の各地域へと拡張していった。それは、これまでにない新しい形の都市開発がここに起こっていたからだ。

さらに、この街は、ある種の特殊性を持っている。それは、外人達がこの街を訪れるたびにも変わらないもので、それは、この街が持つ、ある種の神秘性があったからだ。

今、この街は、外人達の姿がもっとも豊かなこの街で、多くの外人達がこの街に集まり、この街を存分に楽しんでいる。

この街が持つ特殊性は、この街の魅力をすべてもっている。それは、外人達がこの街を訪れるたびにも変わらないもので、それは、この街が持つ、ある種の神秘性があったからだ。

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今、この街は、外人達の姿がもっとも豊かなこの街で、多くの外人達がこの街に集まり、この街を存分に楽しんでいる。
いろいろ。約三週間かかつて社は自分の仕事に仕掛げたが、その後
には「外務人地区の秩序を維持するため外務の軍隊が到着したが、それ
には、外務人地区の Families を維持するため外務の軍隊が到着した。防衛
石橋が自らもやってきた中国軍の地区を管理した。蔵介石橋は早速軍民
が南京で起こったような外務人地区の軍団を持たないことを表明し、
「南京條約事件の犯人等を匪県する」と表明した。

- 35 -
多くのアメリカについての戦略的な問題共産党関係者には、戦略的、上海

最近の「席談」において重要な役割を果たしている。彼らは、所調労働者及

学徒の「席談」において重要な役割を果たしている。彼らは、所調労働者及

方法やテクニックの確認を重ね、日本の活動の中の第三名イントルーションの手

先から武器の使用を受けたという最も重要な武器を使用するため、中国共産党

中で活動中の第三名イントルーションの手

先から武器の使用を受けたという最も重要な武器を使用するため、中国共産党

中で活動中の第三名イントルーションの手

限り。共産党の武器戦略は美産党に優越する上に同様な手段を除いても今を

へ。
China and USSR at War

The Far Eastern Soviet army invaded Chinese territory for about 200 miles at each end of the Chinese Eastern Railway and also bombarded and occupied most of the Chinese towns along the border. But the Russians did not press beyond the Hsing-Han Mountains, due, it was reported, to a warning from the Japanese not to advance into their sphere of influence.

I heard one gruesome story of this warfare from a White Russian woman and a boy who ultimately reached Harbin. They had belonged to a White Russian community of several hundred families, located in the so-called Three Rivers District on the Argun River of North Manchuria. This area had been developed by Russian Cossacks, who had emigrated with their families across the border, following the revolution in 1917. The land they occupied was rich and suitable for farming and cattle grazing, and the colony prospered through the sale of dairy supplies to the large Chinese cities. The Soviet authorities in Siberia resented the activities of the White Russians just across their border and, after fighting broke out, charged that the White Russians with Chinese "Fascist" help were attempting an invasion of Siberia.

Fearing for the safety of their families, the White Russians sent their wives and children and all elderly males across country in a long wagon train to the railroad at the town of Heiler, about 500 miles west of Harbin. The caravan, accompanied by a Russian Orthodox priest, had reached a point about fifty miles north of the railway when it was attacked by a force of Red Mongolian cavalry, allegedly led by Red army officers.

The woman and boy to whom I talked and who claimed to be the only survivors of this caravan, having escaped into the forest, told me that the Mongols had slaughtered every other member of the caravan. They then built a vast funeral pyre of the wagons and their contents, consisting of firkins of butter and large fifty-pound cheeses. Upon this pyre they placed the bodies of their victims, with that of the priest at the apex. They ignited the pyre and, yelling and shooting their rifles, rode their ponies in a wide circle about it as it burned. I could picture the troops of Genghis Khan in a similar victory celebration seven centuries ago.

After about six months of fighting, mostly of the guerilla variety, the Young Marshal was forced to capitulate and to restore the control of the railway to the Soviets, since General Chiang Kai-shek was unable to send him reinforcements. Later there was a peace conference in Moscow, but it broke up without reaching an agreement, and the major issues between the two countries remain unsettled to this writing.
null
Russia, China, and Japan

The disclosures concerning the proposed agreement were contained in a manuscript written by Thomas F. F. Millard and entitled *The Watch on the Pacific,* but never published. Mr. Millard was present at the Genova meeting as an advisor to the Chinese delegation to the League of Nations.

The fact that, as stated above, Russia and China—particularly Russia—were willing, in 1932, to join with the United States in a tripartite pact to block Japan is of tremendous interest in World War II, because of Russia’s position of neutral in the first four years of the war in the Pacific, involving Russia’s partners, the United States, Britain, and China. That Russia’s neutrality constituted America’s most serious handicap in our war with Japan is generally recognized. The Soviet Government, in April, 1945, served notice on Japan of its intention to abrogate the neutrality treaty upon its expiration in April, 1946.

According to Mr. Millard’s disclosures, the purpose of the proposed agreement, as stated in the preamble, was “to preserve peace in the Far East and establish and maintain political and economic stability in the Far East and the Western Pacific.” The text provided that if any of the territorial possessions of America, Russia, or China, or their commercial and property rights within the region covered by the agreement or the political rights and safety of their citizens residing in these regions, were invaded or encroached upon by any Power outside of the agreement, the signatory Powers would consult about measures to be taken to preserve the status quo.

In addition to the main agreement providing for common action in the Far East and the Western Pacific, provision was made for three supplementary agreements to come into effect automatically in the event of an outbreak of war with Japan. The first of these, between the United States and Russia, provided that each should respect the existing territory of the other, and that of China as well, unless otherwise agreed upon with China’s consent. Upon the satisfactory conclusion of the war certain readjustments of territories held by Japan were to be made. The southern half of Sakhalin Island was to be returned to Russia. An equitable readjustment of Russia’s railway interests in Manchuria was to be made. The islands in the Pacific mandated to Japan at the Versailles Conference were to be at the disposition of the United States Government. Any arrangements in regard to the Philippines agreed upon by the United States and the Philippines Government were to be respected. And finally, the territory of Japan proper was to remain intact, provided Japan agreed to a satisfactory limitation of her naval power.
In the proposed agreement between the United States and China, each country was to respect the territorial and political independence of the other. The United States would support China in abolishing special privileges and concessions within her borders as well as all agreements with Japan which impaired or infringed on China's sovereignty. The United States would supply China with military and naval advisors to assist in organizing China's military forces, and would supply aviation and other military exports together with munitions, supplies, and the financial assistance necessary to prosecute the war against Japan. China would agree to cooperate in all ways, including the use of China's ports for United States naval bases. She would also respect in the peace terms the territorial allocations agreed upon in the pact between the United States and Russia.

China and Russia would come to an equitable agreement between themselves on all matters in which the United States was not directly interested, but such agreements were not to qualify or contravene the terms of the United States pacts with Russia and China.

A memorandum embodying the proposed U.S.-Russia-China pact which was submitted to the State, War, and Navy departments expressed the opinion that the agreement would checkmate any schemes of the Japanese military party to conquer China or take Russian territory in the Far East. It was thought that the Japanese militarists would scarcely dare to challenge such a combination.

The reason the British Government was not included in the tentative agreement was twofold. First, it was not thought at that time that Japan's program included an invasion of the Southeast Pacific, where Britain's colonial sphere existed; and secondly, Great Britain, when approached, raised objections to certain phases of the proposed pact which she thought might adversely affect certain efforts on her part to bring pressure on Japan through the League of Nations, which had the Manchurian question under consideration at the time.

One of the Soviet delegates at Geneve also proposed that China should recognize Russian sovereignty in Outer Mongolia and cede to Russia all Manchurian territory north of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This would give the Russians a short cut to the sea at Vladivostok and would permit Russia to develop nearby Port Bay at the junction of eastern Siberia, Manchuria, and Korea, which is free from ice in winter. The section of North Manchuria referred to, sparsely populated except by Russian emigrants, had always been regarded as a Russian sphere of influence in Manchuria.
日本の事実上の主権が高められることであり、ソビエト連邦は昭和二十六年四月の後にはそれを無視することなく、既に講じた政策を強化することを示唆した。米、英、仏、聞いた後日、道路上に立った。日本は平和を維持し、国際的に講じた政策を進めることが必要である。

日本は、国際的な平和を維持し、国際的な政策を進めることが必要である。日本は、国際的な平和を維持し、国際的な政策を進めることが必要である。
従来の同案は南西領にせられたものであった。しかし、南西諸島は日本に帰属するという見解から出発し、議会での決定を経て、最終的に決定される形となった。この決定が日本に帰属するという見解から出発し、議会での決定を経て、最終的に決定される形となった。この決定が日本に帰属するという見解から出発し、議会での決定を経て、最終的に決定される形となった。この決定が日本に帰属するという見解から出発し、議会での決定を経て、最終的に決定される形となった。この決定が日本に帰属するという見解から出発し、議会での決定を経て、最終的に決定される形となった。
日本は琉球を取るという計画を秘匿するであろうとの意見を発表した。日本

その要約は、政府がこの場合に対して発表するのをしないだろうと推定され

その当時、日本は言語の中に、政府の補助を求めるための理由を二つある。第一は

入れて間接的協力に近づく日本の政策の一部である。
While in Vladivostok I listened to many accounts of ambitious development projects, one of which nearly caused complications with the Japanese. It also had its humorous elements.

This project was for the construction of a causeway or dam connecting northern Sakhalin Island with the mainland, just north of the mouth of the Amur River. The engineer claimed that the cold weather which prevailed along the coast of the Maritime Province of Siberia was due to a cold ocean current from the Sea of Okhotsk which flowed southward along the coast of the Maritime Province. He argued that this frigid current was responsible for the disagreeable climate which prevails along the southern Siberian coast, and that by damming the narrow strait between Sakhalin Island and the coast, the cold current would be diverted away from Siberia and would flow down along the east side of Japan. The effect of this, according to his analysis, would be to produce a warmer climate along the Siberian coast and at the same time to transform the Japanese islands, particularly the northern islands of Hokkaido and Honshu, into arctic territories which the Japanese population would find unendurable.

News of this novel Russian solution of the Japanese problem, which would congeal them wholesale, naturally reached Japan and created a tremendous commotion. It was only one of many such rumors which were constantly coming out of Siberia and circulating among the Japanese in exaggerated form. I often wondered if this was not an astute form of Russian psychological warfare.
ウラジャストックに対する所は心的揺り動く椒し多くのが話をするのが

その訳の一つ性質と日本と総学を略す可と版のものであった。文

面の訳面は為如々しとらなかった。

面の訳面の目的とするところは、北帰をと無政江口の・北帰るシベリ

ア全とを過渡する遠道瀧く枝葉を追及することであった。訳者者の

主言に到る。シベリ亞政部卒とその枝を進くする枝葉なる天候の眾

面を為るため、シベリ亞政部卒にその風を進む不快を無覚が为するのであるが、

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面を為るため、シベリ亞政部卒を外れて日本政部卒に示下し
日本人がつとまさせる様々な新鮮なコロニーの問題解決に際する報道は、
自然に日本でも帰り、恐る可き過度を論じ迄した。之人は激務の場の中の
事件の一例に於いて行なつたのであつて、所と所せよずペリアをその発端
として日本人の間に誇張されてふつふつとふたつものであつる。之は之はロシ
アの推進熊の巧婦なる一方にしてないかと説明に想ふことが度々あった。
Members of the correspondents corps in Moscow were astonished to learn that I had traveled to Moscow by way of Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railway, as for several years none of them had been permitted to travel in the Ural area or Siberia. The cause for this seemed to me obvious. The Soviet authorities did not want either of their potential enemies, Japan or Germany, to know the details of the industrialization program which was being pushed in these regions. Also, the Soviet authorities were unwilling to have foreigners observe the forced-labor program which was being used in the industrialization process. Most foreigners in Moscow were familiar with the forced labor which had been used in the construction of the "White Sea canal, but they had little conception of the extent to which it was being used in the development of Siberia.
モ「ニに於ける当社製造の案内に於いてダーボルトと及びセベリ

ソ行を許されたもの当社が行なったからであつた。その理由は私に分かれて、といふのはソ聯邦当局としては普通当

たる日本よりドイツの製造の間に此の地方で浮かしてある工業化計画の詳しい内容を知らせていただくことができなかったからである。そして又ソ聯邦当局はこのことを外国人に見られる事も考えなかったからである。
モニーに於ける外国人の裁判の裁判員の団体に用ひられている裁判員の団体についての者に知らされてきたが、シベリアの裁判員の団体についての者も知らなかった。
Unlike Japan, which had started its industrialization program by tackling light industry first, Russia began with the heavy industries and was building tractor plants, and machine plants, was developing iron, coal, and copper mines and building blast furnaces at the expense of all but the most essential consumption goods. Serious mistakes were being made, partly due to the fact that the Russians were sorely lacking in workers possessing mechanical skills.
日本が工業化計画を実施するにあたって、先ず最初に重工業から着手したのは異なり、ロシアは最初から重工業に着手し、トラック工場、機械工場を建設し、鉄、石炭、銅の鉱山を開発し、最も重要な消耗品を殆ど自給した。これにより重大な誤算があったというわけではないが、その一部はロシア人が機械の技術を有した職工に全く知識してあったという事実に出るものである。
I went to Manila in November of that year, planning to cover two important events. One was the inauguration of General Douglas MacArthur's program for the defense of the Philippines.
Excerpts from
Prosecution witness JOHN B. POWELL's Book
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"

*(New York, MacMillan Company, 1945)*

**The Philippines in '36**

Page 250

A small army of carpenters was working night and day putting up temporary barracks. General MacArthur explained his program, which called for the training of 40,000 native troops a year, extending over a ten-year period, providing an army of between 400,000 and 500,000 men by 1946, the year when independence for the islands would come into effect. The men were to receive five and a half months' training the first year, with briefer periods each year thereafter.
页面10

内容

页面11

内容
The Sian Incident

Shanghai was seething with rumors concerning the welfare of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The now Chinese-controlled China Press, in an attempt to make the best of a bad situation, expressed the hope that the mutiny of General Chang Hsueh-liang and the Communists at Sian would result in further consolidating national unity. The same sentiment was expressed by Dr. H. H. Tung, Minister of Finance, who temporarily succeeded Chiang Kai-shek as director of political affairs of the government. He declared in an interview that "those who unfurled the anti-Japanese banner as a pretext for shielding their own questionable political behavior would shortly realize the seriousness of the crisis which they had precipitated."

The Shanghai papers also published a brief dispatch from Tokyo which stressed the critical relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. The dispatch referred to the arrest of two Japanese editors, Katsuhei Zama and Hirokichi Otake, on a charge of turning over confidential documents concerning the situation in Inner Mongolia to a Russian named Boris Rodov, who was an attaché of the Soviet Embassy. The documents allegedly dealt with the activities of a certain Mongolian Prince Teh, who recently had gone over to the Japanese and had been appointed chairman of the new puppet Government which the Japanese army had set up in Inner Mongolia. Prince Teh, it appeared, also had connections in the Russian sphere in Outer Mongolia.
自二十几頁至二十九頁，

審查備話人ジョン・ビショップ・バウエル／著

在支那五年

中拔萃（経図マップ）／堂会社一九五四版

西安事件

上海交際絵貴人安否，電報風聞全報テテレルラデヲテアク。彼

時支那人絵貴人テテアク新聞ハコノ悪態ノ誅者ノ為毎日新報ノ市

後國家統一ノ一虎ノ荒野ナ闘争しテシリ成スルノルデヲウ。蔣介石ニ代

テ政綱ノ臨時執行者トナック財政大臣ノ孔祥熙博士ノ同様ノ意見ヲ

ガテ彼等自カヲ招来シテ危機ノ重天性ノ思想ニ至ルドロウ。レ

上海詔新開ハマヲ日報ノ関係逼迫ヲ強調シテ東京カノ簡単ヲ到報ヲ援

lege=lege
右翼部隊は陝西方面及び大竹部隊の両軍を併せて日本派遣軍総司令官に所属させる処分を取り、内蒙地方の親日勢力を除くことができる程度に調整された。惟一の秘密文書は手交を経たもので、日本派遣軍総司令官が徳王及外蒙古問題についての秘密文書を経て、日本軍総司令官に内蒙地方親日勢力下の地域に従属させる旨の文書を送るものである。
Excerpts from
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. POWELL’s Book
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"


The Nan-ji Incident
Pages 259, 260, 261, 262, 263 and 264.

The Chinese communists had increased their army from about 25,000 in 1928 to approximately 100,000. Opposed to the communists were General Chang Hsueh-liang’s army composed of some 130,000 former Manchurian troops and some 40,000 Shensi provincial troops under General Yang Hu-cheng. Both groups were underpaid and disgruntled, and an easy prey for communist propaganda.

In order to understand the position of the Chinese Communists from the standpoint of domestic Chinese politics, it is necessary to go back to 1927, when the Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang Party and the Government. Unlike the situation in other countries where civilian communist movements exist, the Red faction in China is not only a political party but also possesses a well equipped army.

When Chiang Kai-shek expelled the Communists from the party, overthrew the Soviet regime they had set up in Hankow, and broke off relations with the U.S.S.R., the Red forces withdrew into the inaccessible mountainous districts between Kiangsi and Fukien provinces, south of the Yangtze River. Other Red forces which had operated in the Canton district and had tried (without success) to establish a Soviet Government at the port of Swatow, near Canton, had also withdrawn into the mountains between Kiangsi and Fukien provinces, where they joined the other groups.

The intention of the Communists to continue their defiance of the Central Government was indicated in interviews with various Chinese Red officials and their Soviet advisers, and with American sympathizers who had fled to Moscow after the overthrow of the Red regime at Hankow. Among those who attempted to paint an optimistic future for communism in China were Eugene Chen, former Foreign Minister at Hankow, and Michael Borodin, the former Soviet adviser at Hankow.
But official Moscow had tired of the costly Chinese adventure and furthermore, the U.S.S.R. could spare no military or naval forces in the Far East capable of dispatching relief to the Chinese Communists at their headquarters in the Kiangsi mountains. The Chinese Soviet regime was therefore forced to shift for itself, which it proceeded to do in characteristic fashion by issuing paper money, collecting taxes, and instituting a land-redistribution program among the farmers in Kiangsi Province, where extensive land holdings by the gentry had long been responsible for popular discontent among peasant farmers and villagers. I still have in my possession a silver dollar minted by the Chinese "Soviet Government" which contains the profile of Lenin on one side and the sickle and hammer on the other.

Throughout most of the period from 1928 to 1934, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his associates were occupied in consolidating the position of the Nanking Government and fighting off rival military factions.

The Red factions in Kiangsi thus had a breathing spell in which to reorganize their Soviet Government and re-establish connections with Moscow. But the land-redistribution program which the Communists initiated in Kiangsi precipitated a disastrous famine in Northern Kiangsi and led ultimately to their undoing. Strong opposition developed among the land-owning gentry of Central China and the Chinese bankers in Shanghai, whose loans were defaulted as a result of the socialization (confiscation) program. Generalissimo Chiang, whose Government was also under heavy obligations to the same bankers, was again forced to take action against the Chinese Reds. He finally accomplished their evacuation of the Kiangsi mountains by blockading the coast of Fukien Province, building a chain of blockhouses on the land side which cut off their access to the Yangtze River, and air-bombing their mountain bases.

In mid-October, 1934, the Reds, now numbering approximately 90,000 men, quietly slipped out of their mountain hiding places and set out in search of a new location. Following the mountainous regions along the provincial boundaries in South and Southwest China, their trek developed into an epochal march of approximately 4,000 miles before they reached their new location in the northwest. They were able to make the long trip through generally hostile territory, by marching in small groups and sticking to the provincial boundaries. In this manner they passed through Kweichow and Yunnan provinces in the southwest, then turned north along the narrow mountain valleys of the Upper Yangtze to Szechwan Province, thence over the mountains to Kansu Province, and finally reached northern Shensi, where they re-established their Soviet Government at the town of Yenan, in territory adjacent to Russian-controlled Outer Mongolia. The Reds were led on their long migration by two
well known Communist leaders, Chu Teh and Mao Tseh-tung, both of whom had been trained in Moscow under Trotsky and Radek.

Another Red group under the command of General Ho Lung, which had been established in northern Huna Province, also withdrew and joined the Red Government at Yenan. A third Red force, which styled itself the "anti-Japanese Fourth Army," had established itself in the mountains of Anhwei Province on both banks of the Yangtze River, was broken up by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and part of it was incorporated into the Nanking forces.

The remnants withdrew to the northwest, but not before they had perpetrated one of the worst atrocities against American missionaries since the Nanking Incident in 1927. Two youthful missionaries, the Reverend and Mrs. John Stam, were seized with their two-weeks-old baby girl and were publicly beheaded. The Stams, both recent graduates of the Moody Bible Institute of Chicago, had only recently arrived in China and had been assigned to Anhwei Province. Mrs. Stam, while being led to the hill where execution took place, hastily wrapped her baby in a bundle of old rags and tossed it into a Chinese house along the route of march to the execution ground. The baby was cared for by friendly Chinese peasants and was later restored to its grandparents, the Reverend and Mrs. Charles Ernest Scott, veteran Presbyterian missionaries in Shantung Province.

The execution of the Reverend and Mrs. Stam was staged on a hill before a large crowd of country people and was accompanied by an outburst of posters, banners and oratory, with the bound victims standing by. The speeches and posters denounced the United States and world capitalism, and extolled the Soviet Union. After the helpless victims had been beheaded, the Reds responsible for the atrocity issued a bombastic statement declaring the execution of the young missionary couple had been carried out in retaliation for the action of an American company in soiling to the Nanking Government airplanes which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had used in bombing the Reds out of their base in the mountains of Kiangsi.

It was estimated that not more than 25,000 out of the original Red Army numbering some 90,000 survived the long trek to northwest China. However, their strength was quickly replenished, despite the barren, mountainous, and thinly populated nature of the country to which they had migrated. By the winter of 1936-37 they again claimed to have 100,000 troops.
Indications of impending trouble in the northwest had already appeared in the Shanghai newspapers in the form of dispatches from Sian telling of student parades and demonstrations demanding a cessation of pressure against the Chinese Communists and the formation of a "united front" against the Japanese. The Chinese Reds also utilized the services of an American woman leftist, who delivered speeches which were broadcast in both English and Chinese over the Communist radio stations. The Chinese Communists were desirous of diverting Japanese pressure from their own front and hoped that Chiang Kai-shek could be forced to bear the weight of the Japanese onslaught. In the background was undoubtedly also the hand of Moscow desirous of diverting Japanese pressure from Siberia and Russian-controlled Outer Mongolia, The Russians were anxious for Japan to become involved still more deeply in China, knowing full well that such involvement would ultimately lead to complications with the United States and Great Britain. Although disavowed in Moscow, evidence pointed to Russian influence as a vital factor in the Sian incident.

I first met Chang Hsuch-liang (who played the unheroic role of cat's-paw in the Sian Incident) at Mukden, in 1929 on the occasion of the brief war between China and the Soviet Union.

The Young Marshal was only thirty years old when he fell heir to his father's vast fortune and the position of commander-in-chief of the Government forces in Manchuria. He was ill prepared for this responsible administrative position in the Chinese republic, as most of his life had been spent as a playboy in Mukden, the Manchurian capital, and at the old capital (Peking), or in his father's army. He spent one year in military school in Japan, and upon his return was appointed commander of one of the Manchurian armies. Somewhere along the line he acquired the opium and morphine habits, which remained with him for several years and greatly handicapped his career. He was finally cured by Dr. Miller, an American Seventh Day Adventist missionary physician at Shanghai.

Despite this, Chang Hsuch-liang was an ardent Nationalist and devoted a considerable portion of his fortune to the development of education in the Manchurian provinces. He endowed the National Northeastern University and the Manchurian Military Academy at Mukden, and was in process of developing a system of general education throughout Manchuria when the Japanese intervened in 1931. The Young Marshal had already defied the Japanese in 1928, when he unfurled the Nationalist flag over Government offices throughout Manchuria and announced that the Manchurian provinces had joined the Nationalist Government at Nanking. Again in 1929 he intervened at Peiping to break up a coalition of disgruntled militarists and politicians led by Yang Ching-wei which opposed General Chiang Kai-shek and the new Government at Nanking.
臨時国文書三月二日

（開催サミットの第一部である）

外交警察・ジョン・B、パウェル氏報告書に続いてある

会合

（三月二日）

内政（三月二日）

日本共産党は一九二六年に仏兵を占領して以来、三月二日までの間、日本共産党に増幅した。此の共産党は中間に存在し、共産党の存在のため、共産党の存在のためである。同共

武労労働のため、共産党のため、共産党のためで、共産党のためである。同共

（三月二日）

内政（三月二日）

日本共産党は一九二六年に仏兵を占領して以来、三月二日までの間、日本共産党に増幅した。此の共産党は中間に存在し、共産党の存在のため、共産党の存在のためである。同共

武労労働のため、共産党のため、共産党のためで、共産党のためである。同共
エリート政府を樹立し、ソ連政府との連絡を再開した。

しかし、養殖商業の発展が着実に進む中、北山四郡に悲願が

これほどに散らばる数々の背景が、彼を引いて在野に呑む強烈な反響をもたらした。

これほどに散らばる数々の背景が、彼を引いて在野に呑む強烈な反響をもたらした。

したがって、彼にとつて一般の好意を持たぬ人々においても、遂に

千歳という長い時期の行動となり、遂に西北支那に彼の行動が山中で艱難を密かに脱出しえた新に居所を求めため遊離した。
長崎の一部旅行に成功したが、これは小集団ととても、省境界線を離れ
ようにして行進したのである。折ににして後藤は西南支那の省、雲南省を
巡り、次で山脈を超えて甘肅省に入り、隣に北陝西省に達し、北陝西省
の再興を遂げたのである。この中国共産党員の長崎の郡役の先頭に立つ
のは、モスクーに向けてソヴィエト政府の名を称して毛澤東であった。
 Narrated wire service (November 26th, 1933)

河南省北部に着いた賈宗業指示下の共同進軍部に到着。即ち、安慶会場に到着した。

在華の政客、赤い軍政府に加わった。一反目的第四軍と自詡し、安慶会場揚州沿岸、

南部の山中に陣取った第三事目の赤軍は、賈介石陣地に攻撃され、その

一撃は南京軍に合意した。

余の赤軍は西北方へ退却したが、退却に先立ち友軍はアメー人宣教師達

へ、「公衆の利益に於て首を刎く。この理由で来て安慶会場に還されるば、

 HEAD 理発院を平発し戻く。この理由で来て安慶会場に還されるば、

去りであった。スタム夫人は死刑執行の場所へひかれてゆく途中、その

子をいそいで包み、自分遺の遺品でゆく道路沿ひのたる中道

人の家へ投げ込んだ。
その子供は親切な中僕農民の世話を受け、後日、祖父母に寄る山東省の行した長老宣教師をかえるチャールズ・アーネスト・スコット氏夫妻に手紙された。

ステム氏父子の死刑は小高い丘の上で中頸間民の目次で、大刑に取られた。先づ行いられた死刑の刑者が最初に立たせられ、刀を握り、腹を打撃し、証言書を書かせ、上からそれを読み上げ、共犯者を迫って大刑をした。被疑者は全く音を立てず、厳しく宣教師の約束を立てたものであった。この時、宣教師に直行機を買った行合に対する報復として行なわれたものであり、宣教師は之に対して鰐行を約束して江南の山中にある赤い共柄を……
らが安部の力には調停を望まれた。そして一九三六年から三七年へか
めての参謀に加わり十円の手を払うと公告するに至つかのるのである

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上海の新聞は、中図共産党の戦略を中止し、日軍に指示して「統一戦線」に
張ることを要求する華生の行進その他の示威活動を絹じた西安からの電報
を伝達して、中図共産党も或る程度の反掛けの警報を出し、急を必し、彼女の演説も共産
党の各地放送局を通じて、東京と中図放送局を以って放送した。中図共産党は
日本の圧力を自分の前線から他に移すのである。ソビエト及びその支配下の外國は
日本の強硬に対抗する力を日本の強硬に対抗する力を
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この若い将軍が、父親の遺志を継承した時、彼は僅かに三十才であった。それまでに、藩主の首下に在天、賊国日北京城は父親の影で「おべぶちゃん」として大層を務めて来たので、彼はこの責任ある地位、即ち中華民団で

一層不完全な行政の面を接して来たので、彼はこの責任ある地位、即ち中華民団で

いうのが選えた。彼は彼の幼少な彼が同様数々の難事が来た。然し彼は彼には上海

と在を接して行った。
また一九二九年、軍閥政治家中の不平分子が蔣介石の新南京政府に反響し、汪精衛の下に北京で抵抗を企てた時張明良は之を不成功に終らせた。

11
The Young Marshal was a patient in a Peiping hospital when the Japanese staged the so-called Manchurian "incident" and seized Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931, hence his troops in the vicinity of the Manchurian capital offered little resistance to the invaders on that fatal occasion. After serving in various posts under the Nanking Government, the Young Marshal was appointed director of the so-called "bandit-suppression" headquarters in southern Shensi Province, where his chief job was to watch over the activities of the Chinese Communists, who were again becoming troublesome in the northwest. The Young Marshal had a force of 130,000 troops, made up largely of remnants of defeated Manchurian armies. There were also collected at his headquarters several hundred students and teachers who had been forced to leave Manchuria, due to the wholesale closing of the schools by the Japanese. Since most of his fortune was invested in Manchurian lands, forests, and mines which had been seized by the Japanese army, the Young Marshal soon found himself in straitened circumstances and forced to depend upon the Nanking Government for funds. The result was that his troops were poorly paid and his schools and governmental departments impoverished.

It had been known for several months that instead of opposing the Reds, the Young Marshal's forces were fraternizing with them and permitting them to spread anti-Nanking propaganda among the people in his territory. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had consistently opposed a policy of conciliation toward the Chinese Communists since the original break between the Kuomintang and the Reds at Shanghai, Nanking, and Hankow in 1927. The Generalissimo regarded the Chinese Reds as creatures of the Moscow Comintern and refused to negotiate with them so long as they maintained their Russian connections and their independent position in the northwest. It was thought that the Generalissimo intended to dismiss the Young Marshal as commander of the anti-Communist headquarters at Sian, and to replace him with another member of his staff who would continue opposition to the Reds. Three days before the departure of the Generalissimo for Sian, the Nanking Executive Yuan (Council) had adopted a resolution reaffirming that the Chinese foreign policy laid down by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek should remain as the guiding principle of the Central Government and that the anti-Communist campaign in Northwest China should be continued. Generalissimo Chiang was accompanied on the trip to Sian by ten other high government officials, some of them army commanders.
and a small bodyguard. Among the military officers was General Chiang Ting-wen, Pacification Commissioner for Fukien Province, who was scheduled to replace the Young Marshal as commander of the anti-Red forces in the northwest.

The northwestern frontier town of Sian where the dramatic kidnapping of the Generalissimo and his staff was staged is about seven hundred miles inland, due west from the shores of the Yellow Sea. Aside from its strategic location on the ancient northwest road connecting China and Central Asia, Sian is important historically as it was the seat of the Chou Dynasty, which had its beginnings about 1122 B.C. and continued more than eight centuries. The classical period of Chinese history, which produced the famous scholars Confucius, Mencius, Lao Tzu, and Mo Tzu, fell within the Chou era, and many of the world's finest examples of ancient bronze art have come down to us from the graves of Chou rulers in the vicinity of Sian. In this area also were staged the wars between the houses of Chou and Shang (1460 B.C.) for supremacy over the valleys of the Yellow River and its tributary, the Wei, wherein dwelt the ancestors of the Chinese people of today.

It was a fitting stage for the enactment of a modern drama of Asiatic politics involving the political interests of China, Japan, and Russia, and ultimately of the entire world.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek arrived at Sian by airplane on December 7, and established his headquarters at a hot-springs resort a short distance outside the city. The Generalissimo was welcomed by Shao Li-tze, Civil Governor of Shensi, a former newspaper editor from Shanghai, who had been appointed to the position by the Central Government. Civil Governor Shao had charge of the local police force, which remained loyal to the Generalissimo in the complicated developments of the following days. It was the first important political mission undertaken by the Generalissimo in many months when he was not accompanied by his wife, Mei-ling.

The days immediately following the Generalissimo's arrival at Sian were occupied in conferences between the Generalissimo and his staff and the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, and General Yang Hu-cheng, the provincial military chief. Little was accomplished, as the Young Marshal and General Yang constantly insisted on bringing into the conference local groups which demanded immediate war against Japan. After four days of futile conversation the Generalissimo informed the Young Marshal of the Government's determination to press the campaign against the Communists. He insisted that it would be suicidal to face war with Japan while the Communist army remained in an independent position in the northwest,
The Young Marshal and his associate, General Yang, insisted that it would be better to accept the Reds' terms and form a "united front" of national resistance.

The Young Marshal insisted that the Central Government assume responsibility for the financial support and munitioning of some 270,000 troops in the northwestern territories. He was not, however, in a position to give assurance that the "united front" would accept the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Government. This may explain why the Young Marshal had decided to bring the representatives of the Communists into the negotiations with the Generalissimo.

Following a heated discussion which left the situation at a deadlock, the Generalissimo retired to his private quarters on the outskirts of the city, where he was protected by his small bodyguard and a contingent of local police.

The Young Marshal immediately called a meeting of the divisional commanders of his forces and those of General Yang Hu-cheng, and issued secret orders to move a division of his own troops and a regiment of General Yang's troops into the environs of the city during the night, and by daylight the coup d'état was complete and the city entirely surrounded. The only resistance encountered was from the Generalissimo's small bodyguard and a contingent of loyal police at the hot-springs resort where the Generalissimo was staying. Aroused by the firing, the Generalissimo and one of his guards escaped from his sleeping quarters and climbed over a high wall which surrounded the compound. He might have succeeded in getting away had he not sprained his ankle and been forced to hide in an abandoned tomb. Here he was found by a young Manchurian officer, who escorted him back to the building and ultimately to the city, where he was confined in the private quarters of General Yang Hu-cheng. The Civil Governor, Shao Li-tze, who with his police remained loyal to the Generalissimo, was also arrested and detained with Generalissimo Chiang's staff officers.

The announcement of the detention of the Generalissimo created intense excitement throughout the city and was the signal for demonstrations, mass meetings, and parades. The city was quickly plastered with banners and posters denouncing the Japanese-German-Italian Anti-Comintern Pact and demanding a "united front" against Japan. The radicals were for a Soviet-style public trial of the Generalissimo on the charge of prosecuting the war against the Reds and failing to declare war on Japan. Others favored taking the Generalissimo to some secret hiding place in the northwest and holding him as a hostage until Nanking called off the anti-Red war.
Up to this point there was no outward manifestation of Red participation in the plot to kidnap the Generalissimo. But the hand of the Chinese Communists was soon in evidence after the Young Marshal dispatched a plane to the Communist headquarters at Yenan and transported three of the Red leaders to Sian. They were Chou En-lai, Political Commissar of the First Front Red Army and Deputy Chairman of the Red Military Council; Yeh Chien-ying, chief of staff of the East Front Red Army; and Pao Ku, head of the Red Secret Police. They were accompanied by several secretaries and assistants. Of the three Communist envoys, Chou En-lai was remembered as the organizer of armed laborers, strikers and pickets in the plot to seize Shanghai on behalf of the Communists at the time of the Nationalist Revolution in 1927. Chou was arrested by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek but was released, whereupon he went to Moscow for several months, later returning to join the Red regime in Northern Shensi.

Not many hours elapsed before the perpetrators of the Sian outrage realized the seriousness of their action. Of particular significance were simultaneous disavowals from Moscow and Tokyo, each denying any complicity in the plot but at the same time charging each other with the responsibility. The Moscow papers printed bombastic reports denouncing the kidnaping of the Generalissimo as the work of Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese. Government officials in Tokyo charged that Marshal Chang Hseuh-liang’s action had been inspired by the Communists, and declared it was an “object lesson” demonstrating the necessity of China’s joining the Anti-Comintern Pact immediately.

The Tokyo paper, Hochi, declared that communist propaganda for a “united front” was the same, whether in Spain or China, and threatened that Japan would take action if Chang Hseuh-liang attempted to form an anti-Japanese front with Soviet Russia. The liberal Chinese paper, Ta Kung Pao, charged that the Japanese had taken advantage of the Sian crisis to increase their pressure on China to sign the anti-communist defense agreement. The Tokyo Nichi-Nichi declared that the Chinese Communist Army of Chü Teh and Mao Tseh-tung was steadily gaining in strength and was watching for an opportunity to seize the central power in China.
日本側が所謂満洲「事変」をたくらんで一九三一年九月十八日夜奉
天を占領した當時張學良元帥は北平の故る病院に入院してゐた。その後
に宿命的なその當夜、張學良の軍隊はこの滿洲の首都新京附近に於いて
て撲滅車に対し殆ど抵抗を加へなかった。南京政府の下に在って程々
の地位を歴任した後、張學良は所調陜西省南部に在る剿匪司令部の長に
任命されたが、西北地方で再び手に負へなくなつて来た中国共產黨の活動
を監視するのが張學良の主な役目であつた。張學良には十三万の軍隊が

二六四、二六五、二六六、二六七、二六八、二六九頁

西安事件

「わが中国に於ける廿五年」より抜萃

辻論文章第〇〇一一四
ありその大部分は敗残清洲軍の残部であった。その他の司令部には日

本側が全面的に反攻を開始したため、まだ日本に残した清洲の土地、森根や、山に

、その結果張の軍隊の総数も新建替えとな

り、その学校や行政部も調査した。
抵抗を組織す ケ他の機縁をこれに代え違念がある。考慮されて

華徳石元帥が西安に向けて出発する三日前に南京政府行政院は、華徳石の

発案を採用した中南の対外政策が採用されるように、関府の指定策をたるべく、又は、中

国国民地方における非暴力運動は採用されるべきであることが再び肯定する

の政府高官と、小数の輔助武を伴伴した。この将校の中には、福建省（葉

関）政治主任兼関文も交ってあたが簡単な新代つて西北反共司令官に駐

在することになっても。
この土地とそれでは周の、日本、ロシアの間には世界の政治的利害を絡むアジアの政治的引き合い一つの近代蘭を演ずるちはお読へ向
るの際であった。ノべた。部隊は同地方の努力を冠っていたたがこの大きさはその後
事件の実態を正確に把握することが重要である。日本は、この状況を充分に理解し、対応することが必要である。一方面、満洲国は日本本土との政治・経済的関係を強化するため、南満州日中共同軍事委員会の設置を決定した。これにより、満洲国は日本の影響力を増進させることができた。
人を順に引き上げ、ここで防衛の警備兵と地方警察の防衛隊に守られるの

張紹良は直ちに自分のところと燕京城隷下の駐留の師団長から成る衛兵

を呼び出し、師団の出動を知らせたが、師団長が方から一部隊をその夜の中

に市街の周辺に出動させた旨の秘密命令を受した。防衛は只一度防の隠蔽する温

泉で蔭元流の少数の警備兵と地方警察分隊隊から受けただけであった。

裏屋で蔭元流の少数の警備兵は隠蔽兵と地方警察分隊隊から受けただけであった。
七年の国民大革命の運動が共産党を代表して上海占領を企てて武装した時、

周は蔣介石元帥に捕えられたが、解放されたので、日本代理と称して知られて来た。

既に不法事情の犯人は、大して長時間に経ることもなく自分たちの行動を説明し共犯したことはないとも断し切って相互に責任を負わせ合つた。

政府高官は巣元師隠流は汪精衛と日本側の仕案であると誤動し、東京の

経路的誘導であると宣告した。
東京の協定は日本と並行する「統一戦線」の結成を宣言し、日本でも同様であると述べた。若し張学良がソビエト・ロシアと結び、抗日戦線を結成しようとするとならば日本はその態度を示す必要がある。東京日日新聞はこの主張を唱え、毛沢東は同じような態度をとった。中国に於ける中心勢力を確立する必要が急がしい。
T.V. Soong, former Finance Minister and Shanghai banker, who also played a prominent part in the negotiations for the Generalissimo's release, has likewise remained silent. The size of the check he is said to have handed over in exchange for the release for his illustrious brother-in-law has never been disclosed.

Since the Sian negotiations were conducted in secret and no official report of the outcome was published, there is still speculation as to what actually happened. The most obvious result of the Sian Incident was apparent just seven months later at Peiping. It was written in letters of blood for the world to read—war! War between China and Japan, and ultimately involving the entire world.

One result of the Sian Incident was an unexpected trip abroad for Dr. H.H. Fung, Minister of Finance in the Nanking Government. Dr. Kung's trip resulted from a confidential proposal of the Soviet Government that China take steps to form a military alliance against Japan. Moscow was especially anxious that the United States be brought into the alliance, but Soviet officialdom realized it would be futile for them to make the proposal. The Russians therefore urged China to send a mission abroad to sound out the various Powers, in fear of a Japanese attack, promised China full military support and agreed to send ample military supplies to the Chungking Government by way of the ancient highway across Sinkiang. Moscow also promised Nanking that there would be no further complications concerning the Chinese Communists, who would give their full support to the Central Government in its resistance to Japanese aggression. Dr. Fung did not realize the full import of his mission until he reached Berlin and was apprised of Germany's plans to wage war against the Soviet Union. Dr. Kung was told by the Nazi leaders to advise his government to join the Anti-Comintern Alliance of Germany-Japan Italy without delay.

When Dr. Fung reached Moscow he found the Russians had cooled on their proposal for a Chinese-United States-Soviet anti-Japanese alliance. Moscow now realized that war with Germany was inevitable and did not want to do anything to provoke the Japanese to attack Russia on the eastern flank. It was not long until the Chinese Communists also ceased their attacks on the Japanese army in northwestern China.
西京成田大橋／B・パルクール

（一九四五年ニューヨーク・マックミリヤン会社）

二十六頁及二十七頁

昭和廿五年ノ中「生活」

（私ノ二十五年ノ中「生活」）
ルヨウニ政府ニ迫ルヨウニト云ハレタ

孔拳士ガモスコウニツイタハニハ邦西亞ハ中立合衆ノソビエ

ネタノ対日同盟ブラクル拝啓ニツイテ前親ノ懸心サチㇱナクナッテ

キタモスコウデハ野辺戦争ガ今ハ不可避デアルコトヲ悟り日本

ノデアルソシテ間モナク中日親密姫モ中日ノ亞北部ヲ日本ニチ攻撃ス

ルクト止メタ

ルクト止メタ
Page 278

Contrary to expectations in many quarters the outcome of the Sian Incident greatly enhanced Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's prestige. Influential political and military leaders, particularly in the South, who had refused to give active support to Nanking, now declared their readiness to cooperate with the Generalissimo in opposing the Japanese. One of the Southern politico-military leaders who declared their readiness to support Generalissimo Chiang was General Tsai Ting-kai, famous Cantonese commander who had resisted the Japanese invasion of Shanghai early in 1932, following the Manchurian Incident. Later, General Tsai broke with Nanking and retired to the British Colony of Hong Kong. Two other important military commanders, General Pai Chung-hsi and General Li Tsung-jen of Kwangsi Province, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the Nationalist Revolution, also declared their readiness to support Chiang Kai-shek in resisting Japanese aggression. General Li Tsung-jen declared that in his opinion China could hold out against Japan for ten years.
委任軍と南支府軍の協力者、東三郎、三枝大元帥、東府署を支え、宣伝する。
In mid-January of 1937 there was a report from Sian stating that an American woman "with communist sympathies and having connections with leftist groups in the United States" had arrived in Sian and had delivered several addresses before mass meetings of students. The report said that several Chinese Communist leaders, including Chu Teh, Mao Tseh-tung, Chou En-lai, and others had arrived in Sian to confer with her. The report alleged that the Shensi war Lord, Yang Hu-cheng, had sent an ultimatum to Nanking declaring that if Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "did not open war immediately on Japan, the Communist army would attack the Nanking Government."
Chinese military commanders in Central and South China met at Nanking to consider the threatening situation, and the National Government decided to evacuate all Chinese residents from Japan. On August 7 the Japanese ordered the evacuation of all Japanese nationals from Hankow and other points in the Yangtze Valley and South China.
That evening an officer and a sailor of the Japanese navy were shot and killed as they were trying to enter the Chinese airfield at Hungjao on the outskirts of Shanghai, and a Chinese guard at the airfield was also killed. The Japanese Consul, Okamoto, declared the incident was of a "grave nature" and had been reported to Tokyo for appropriate action. A huge exodus of Chinese residents of the Hungkow and Chapel districts of northern Shanghai began, as a result of rumors that the Japanese were contemplating military action in the next few days. Thousands of Chinese from the country districts to the north of Shanghai poured into the International Settlement and the French Concession.

The situation at Shanghai became rapidly worse. Japanese troops landed at Wonsung, ten miles north of Shanghai, and also in the northern or Hongkow section of Shanghai itself. Heavy fighting of a hand-to-hand nature broke out in the northern district of Shanghai when Chinese troops attacked the invading Japanese. The Japanese battleship Idzumo, which was regarded by the Chinese as a symbol of Japanese aggression, was moved up the Whangpo' and anchored alongside the Japanese consulate, directly in front of the International Settlement. Japanese naval authorities at Shanghai announced that they would be "compelled to adopt defense measures" because of numerous Chinese acts of aggression, including the murder of the Japanese naval officer and his chauffeur on the evening of August 9. They also announced that they were prepared to take "any necessary steps if the situation was further aggravated."

The Chinese mayor of the city, O.K. Yu, demanded that America and Great Britain prevent Japan from using the northern or Hongkow sections of the city as a base of operations against China. Great Britain requested that Shanghai be excluded from the zone of Japanese-Chinese hostilities, but Japan's answer was that the request was "clearly unacceptable—Britain has asked us to do the impossible." Instead, the Japanese expelled the International Settlement Police, including the British, from the Hongkow section. Japanese bombers
had already raided Hankow, Nanking, Hankou, Soochow, Chinkiang, and the Shanghai-Keeling Railway. The Chinese had curtailed railway traffic and decreed martial law in all cities and districts adjacent to the railroads. At the same time, they ordered the lower Yangtze closed to navigation.
二九七頁並に二九八頁

高まりゆく緊迫

異夜日本海軍の一時波と一本兵が上海浦外の虹橋飛行場に入らうとし
て射殺され、同飛行場の一中国官領兵も亦殺された。同兵日本顧問を
問した。事は航空日中軍事行動を執らうと目隠してあるとの流言

昭和四二年一月五日、日東同志社長が大日本帝国大使館に

ただ、時局は更に不可逆的となることを願っているものである」というのが日本
と英領を含めた中国全土の事態で、日本側は英領も含む共同租界の観察官
と両国地域より追撃した。日本の軍用船は既に杭州、上海、南京、蘇州、鎮江
並に京滬線路を確保してある。中国側は租界内を切り裂け路線に割りし
てみる総ての都市や地方に或政令公布を。同時に進子江下流の航路利用
を命じた。
Mounting Tension

Pages 299, 300 and 301.

The worst carnage occurred at a street intersection between the International Settlement and the French Concession, about a mile from the Bund, where some 5,000 refugees had assembled to receive free rice dispensed by an amusement concern known as the "New World." The streets which crossed at this corner were main thoroughfares known as Yu-ya-ching Road and Avenue Edward VII. The traffic light in the center had just turned from green to red when a small motor car with three passengers, a man, woman and little girl, came to a stop, waiting for the traffic light to change. Hearing planes flying low over head, just skimming the tops of the business buildings, the driver of the car opened the door and stepped out in the street to investigate. Just as his feet touched the ground he uttered a cry, threw up his arms and dropped dead on the pavement. A machine-gun bullet had passed through his heart.

The victim, the first foreigner to be killed in the China-Japan war, was the Reverend Dr. Frank Rawlinson, editor of the Chinese Recorder, leading magazine of Protestant missions in China. Dr. Rawlinson was born in England and received his education in the United States, where he became a naturalized citizen. He was the outstanding pacifist in the missionary community in China. He was a strong and fearless opponent of Japanese militarism, and was also opposed to the militarization of China as a means of settling international differences in the Far East. Mrs. Rawlinson and their daughter were stunned at his collapse and, not realizing what had happened, they lifted him into the car and drove to a hospital. The car had just turned the corner when all hell broke loose in the wide crowded plaza at the street intersection behind them.

A Chinese plane, carrying two heavy bombs, had attempted to drop them on the Japanese battleship Idzumo, anchored in the Whangpoo harbor directly in front of the downtown section of the city. Before the Chinese plane could get in position for the delicate bombing operation, it was attacked by a Jap fighter. Badly wounded, the Chinese pilot attempted to return to the Lungjiao Airdrome on the outskirts of the city, which was still
held by the Chinese forces. Realizing his inability to reach the Chinese base with his damn ed plane and heavy load, he attempted to loose the bombs as he flew over the local race course. But the heavy explosives fell short of their mark by about three hundred yards, striking almost in the center of the plaza, crowded with the normally busy noon-time traffic of Shanghai streets, consisting of motor cars, rickshas, and pedestrians, plus the thousands of Chinese refugees who had gathered there for their free bowls of rice and tea.

The first bomb, exploding as it struck the asphalt street, apparently had detonated the second a few feet above the street level, causing its load of death-dealing explosives to spray across the crowded plaza. Dozens of motor cars and their occupants were riddled with shrapnel or incinerated by their exploding gasoline tanks, while hundreds of pedestrians were dropped in their tracks for a block in all directions. The worst carnage was among the crowd of refugees massed in front of the New World Amusement Center, where the food was being dispensed. Mangled bodies of men, women and children, with most of their clothing burned away, were heaped against the building to a height of five feet.
その自立が正に負を負ったとき彼等が誠じにした若の努力にあらためた。

中興の興が二つの大作劇とをなして Yoshidaの下、下野に立つ星

士に松川州の手に期保された。筑波を指し立てたので、実の中部の良い

に日本の一長として改図されている。筑波の上手に在る筑波最上等に彼より

としましたが、その急をいたせば見越を読み、筑波の上手を復ふとその努力を

に到じ否定することを悟り、筑波の上手を復ふとその努力を

下し。

中でとされていることはかなりのものと挙げた数々の中興の

星とその星をなくすものと挙げ

のに、筑波の上手を復ふとその努力を

下し。

より二、三興高を

では珍重し、その努力を指して

筑波の上手を復ふとその努力を

下し。

筑波の上手を復ふとその努力を

下し。
何千機という目指しとそれに従ってみに言葉は横断幕のためにはなけ
れて光る者はそれらの直角を意識したガソリンタタンののために欠
けになった。一方何千人という歩行者はすべての方向の衝撃に乗って其
山村である街を長く走ってみに繊雑最もやられたのが広い
直路を突き当たった。異人では食事の師が行られてあるのであっ
たのが一文ひ
たが、王庭も高く拡張に面ってあら
げられた。
The other tragic happening of Black Saturday occurred within a few minutes of the first bombing. These bombs, five in number, were also aimed by Chinese aviators, flying Northrop bombers, at the Japanese battleship IJN’s in the harbor, but missed their mark by about five hundred yards and crashed into the busiest block of Nanking Road, Shanghai’s main street, and directly in front of the city’s two leading hotels, the Palace and the Cathay. This street was also crowded with Chinese refugees, several hundred being killed and wounded. Several foreigners were killed and others wounded at this point.

The same afternoon, another bomb struck the roof of the six-story office and warehouse of the United States Navy Purchasing Bureau, also located in the downtown section of the city and only about a block from the American consulate. This bomb, a freak hit, crashed through the concrete roof and five concrete floors and landed on the cement floor of the basement of the building without exploding. It contained the mark of a munitions house in Czechoslovakia. The nationality of the plane which dropped this bomb was never established. Some days later, another high explosive missile, either a bomb from a plane or a shell from a naval gun, struck the fronts of, and seriously damaged, Shanghai’s two largest Chinese department stores. Here the casualties were numerous, both within the crowded stores and in the streets.
三〇二三〇三頁並に三〇三頁

三〇二二〇三月の、も一つの悲惨を、出来たのは、敵物の印象があ

てから二、三分と、そのたぬうちであった。官庁の五つの居場所も、ホテルに

ロッパの飛行機を、飛ばした中国人飛行士が、香港に、敵の、過去に

雪を投ったものであるが、五百ヤード前の、ほうぐり、上海の第一ホテルであ

る南京路の、一斉の、爆発街に、しかも上海市の、第一ホテルである。パレス

ホテルと、カーサホテルの、幕前は、絶然破壊した。この広島で、鈴木国人的、第
Excerpts from
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. POWELL's Book
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"

***


American Ships, Japanese Bombs, In 1937

Page 319.

The most complete and connected account of the attack, showing unmistakably that it was deliberate, was given by a young Annapolis graduate, Lieutenant John Willard Geist, who was aboard the Panay at the time of the incident and accompanied the survivors on the long trek along the river bank at night until they were picked up several hours later by the surviving American and British boats. Lieutenant Geist said the Panay was bombed by two flights of Japanese planes, the first consisting of three planes and the second of six planes. He said the first Jan bombs were dropped with remarkable accuracy from an altitude of approximately 7,000 feet. Practically all of the bombs either hit their mark or fell so near as to cause serious damage to the ships.
Excerpts from Prosecution Witness JOHN B. POWELL's Book "MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"

***


The Pressure Increases

Pages 326 and 327.

The chief defender of foreign interests in the midst of these developments was an American citizen named Stirling Fessenden, who occupied the post of secretary-general of the International Settlement, a position resembling that of city manager in the United States. Fessenden was elected chairman of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement in the early 1920's, and was familiarly known as "Lord Mayor" of the city for nearly two decades. He was finally forced to resign, in 1939, as a result of failing eyesight.

Fessenden was born at Fort Fairfield, Maine, and after graduation from Bowdoin College he went to Shanghai as a young law school graduate in 1904 on a mission for the old American Trading Company of New York. He remained to become an important figure in the hectic politics of the International Settlement, wherein lived almost half of Shanghai's 3,500,000 people, including nearly 100,000 foreigners of various nationalities. Fessenden had a wide acquaintance in both the foreign and the Chinese communities and, of particular importance, enjoyed their confidence and respect. During the long period of anti-foreign agitations beginning in 1925, Fessenden was the only foreign official in Shanghai who was in constant contact with the Chinese leaders. On no less than three occasions he was credited with "saving" the Settlement from possible occupation by hostile Chinese factions. The most serious threat was in 1927, when he blocked the Communists' attempt to take over the Settlement. On another occasion he blocked an attempt of the Diplomatic Body in Peking to "take over" the Settlement and abolish its elective form of government.


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數學之被引用之處 "x=1"

數學之被引用之處。
シチーニューヨーク。古伊貿易会社カラ使ッテ等テ上☸キヨミミシテ

共同租界ニハ上淞ノ華人人口三百五十万中ノ殆ンド半が居住シテ居リ

ソノ中ハ凡ソ末ノ倉庫ノ関係ニ関スル外人員ハ仏テキマシタ

ソニフセスセンデンハ外人ノ間ニ中間人ノ間ニ共ニ居イ面職ヲ有ス

彼ハ九二年ハル長イ排外運動ソ期間ニアッテハ共テ国コトテアリマス

共同租界が排外的ニ中国入ノ地ニ占雑サレサウニナツ當時ヲ三度コ

改ツルノハ彼ノ功ヲタイへテ居リマス。隠モ彼ハ共テ録セテアリマスノ

トツ時ノヲ阻止シマッタ

トハハ北平ノ外交関が租界ヲ奪取シテ過ルニヨル政治様式ヲ変務セ
Excerpts from
Prosecution Witness JOHN B. POWELL's Book
"MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA"
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The Pressure Increases

Although the American community in Shanghai, businessmen as well as missionaries, were convinced of the certainty of a general war in the Far East which would involve the United States, there was the equally definite feeling among the members of the community that our people at home did not realize the seriousness of the situation, or its implications from the standpoint of the future welfare and security of the United States.

As a result of this conviction, the American Information Committee was organized for the purpose of disseminating in the United States information regarding the threatening aspects of the crisis created by the Japanese occupation. Headed by a missionary named Edwin Marks, the committee included in its membership a large number of representatives of American business organizations and mission bodies, and two or three journalists. None received pay for his or her services, because everyone was prompted by an intense desire to contribute toward a better home understanding of the crisis. Members of the community who were familiar with various phases of the situation were called upon to prepare authenticated reports dealing with various phases of the Japanese occupation, and its effect on the lives and activities of both foreigners and Chinese. Thousands of booklets were prepared for distribution in the United States to newspapers, chambers of commerce, civic associations, etc. Funds covering the cost of printing and postage were raised in the American community, and members of the committee volunteered their services in smuggling the booklets aboard non-Japanese ships bound for the United States.
石戸の米倉にいれ、即ち宣教師と非教教徒の統一米倉を設けむるなりを夢

この覚悟の結果とし、日本は占領国により憲政されるとところの切

迫せる危機の際は、宣教師及び警備部に適機にて宣告せんとが急に米倉の

の危機中には多数の宗教教団の伝教部及び宣教師の代表者、且二三のジャーナリストを包含して居た。誰も彼も無個体で豊かな、それはこの危機に

に加え、

"No wood"
対する本局の発表を深くなお、人に親しみと感じさせる力のある言葉に書かせることが、各地方局の生活環境に対し、効果ある情報を作成することを奨励される。何千もの小冊子が米国での各地方局の活動を題材に、米国人の間における交流を進め、日本関係の委員会の役割を遂げている。
II. NATURAL RESOURCES OF MANCHURIA

(1) AGRICULTURE

The Garden of China—"Manchuria," says the Encyclopedia Americana (1921), "has one of the richest soils in the world, and, with the development of the soya bean industry, has grown more rapidly than any other Chinese province. In the summer the southern part looks to an American much like Illinois, and one may find on its northern hills lilies-of-the-valley, pink peonies, white and yellow daisies and the fragrant dog roses, as in Wisconsin and Minnesota. With the exception of the four snowbound months, its fields are luxuriant with wheat, barley and millet, so that it has come to be called the "Garden of China."

The "Economic History of Manchuria," published by the Bank of Chosen (an interesting and valuable contribution to the growing literature of Manchuria) states: "Manchuria is yet the most favored spot for agriculture in the Far East, and its opportunities may well be termed "immense". That great mass of level land, extending over the whole of Central Manchuria and comprising the basins of the Liao, Sungari, Nen and Halin, the productivity of which can compare favorably with any part of Japan or Korea, is by itself larger than the whole of the Chinese Peninsula or of the mainland of Japan, and, to those who know how little of level land there is in these two countries that is really arable and actually under cultivation, it will not be all difficult to imagine the wonder in which the two peasants look upon this apparently boundless extension of rich field. An American gentleman, with whom the author had the honor of traveling in Manchuria ejaculated, as the train was drawing near to Mukden, "This is exactly what we see in America," as though relieved at seeing something homelike after a long journey through apparently endless chains of rugged mountains in Japan and Korea."

Area under cultivation—The aggregate area under cultivation in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia is about 30,000,000 acres. The arable land awaiting development is estimated at 34,000,000 acres. The land being reclaimed is estimated at about a million acres a year.

Railways stimulating agricultural production—Until quite recently the crops were transported through inadequate waterways and by primitive Manchurian carts, but the establishment of railways and the highly efficient port of Dairen has made a radical improvement in transportation methods. The Chinese Eastern Railway, the South Manchuria Railway, and the Peking-Mukden Line of the Chinese Government Railways are now carrying annually large numbers of immigrants and great stocks of agricultural produce.

Methods of cultivation—Agricultural methods in many parts of Asia have changed little in centuries. But in Manchuria a great change has taken place since the South Manchuria Railway inaugurated its program of economic development work. Modern methods are taught the native farmers; the fertility of the soil has been increased; the yield and quality of the great staple crops have been improved; and new plants and trees have been introduced.

For this reorganization of Manchurian farming, the Agricultural Experiment Stations instituted by the railway are primarily responsible. These stations, similar in many respects to those in the United States, seek to bring to Manchuria the latest world knowledge of scientific agriculture.

At Kungchuling (in the heart of Manchuria, 400 miles north of Dairen) is the main experiment station. Here are being carried on important experiments in animal breeding. Merinos from the United States have been bred with the native sheep, increasing the quality and yield of wool, and thus giving great impetus to the export trade.

Much has been done to increase the oil content of Manchuria's Chief
product, the soya bean, and better cultural methods have been taught the farmer. Sugar beets are being grown extensively, and beet sugar manufacture has become one of the important new industries of Manchuria.

The arboriculture work at the Ksiungyaochorg experiment station has been productive of most important results in reforestation and afforestation. Much of this country was barren of trees. But now big orchards dot the southern part of Manchuria; American apples and grapes have been successfully introduced, and the fragrant perfume of acacia and pear blossoms fills the air in springtime. In Northern Manchuria there have been planted many Chinese poplars, from the wood of which match stems and pulp are made.

Experiments are going forward at Ksiungyaochorg for the improvement of the cultivation of sugah, or wild silk, from which pongee is made. Wild silk is one of the principal exports.

Agricultural products — The chief agricultural products of Manchuria are soya beans, kaoliang (a sort of sorghum), millet, rye and wheat.

The output of the leading crops in 1913 was as follows (in tons), though it should be mentioned that yields were somewhat below the average on account of unfavorable weather:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Soya Bean</th>
<th>Corn</th>
<th>Farley Wheat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fengtien</td>
<td>2,192,500</td>
<td>832,500</td>
<td>1,122,520</td>
<td>527,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>1,238,820</td>
<td>326,768</td>
<td>766,670</td>
<td>311,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilungiang</td>
<td>430,565</td>
<td>159,500</td>
<td>353,260</td>
<td>182,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>369,140</td>
<td>229,700</td>
<td>109,650</td>
<td>29,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soya beans—The United States Department of Agriculture, in a recent report, made this statement: "The rapid rise of the soya bean to a crop of special importance in the world's commerce in the past few years is one of the most remarkable agricultural developments of recent times."

The soya bean has been an important product of food and general utility in China for 5,000 years, but it is only during the last few years that America and Europe have learned of the importance of this staple of the soil of Manchuria. The Japanese firm of Mitsui & Company made the first shipments abroad in 1908, when 100 tons were exported to England. Huge quantities of soya bean oil were exported to the United States during the World War to supply essential raw materials.

The development of a solid market for Manchuria's chief crop has resulted from the activities of the South Manchuria Railway Company in improving the quality of the soya bean and creating new uses for it through its agricultural research laboratories, and in systematizing the transportation and merchandising of the crop. The growth of the industry has provided employment for hundreds of thousands of the farmers who have been attracted to Manchuria from the neighboring provinces, notably from Shanung.

"With its very high content of protein (40%), the soya bean has been characterized as a "modern manna." Among its many uses the Department of Agriculture has listed these:..."
### From the busy port of Dairen, the gateway to Manchuria and the southern terminus of the railway, merchant ships of many nations carry great cargoes of soya beans and bean oil to leading ports all over the world. Beans are exported mostly to China and Japan, bean cake to Japan, and bean oil most to Europe and America.

In South Manchuria there are about 200 large bean mills, using various methods of oil expression, from the primitive hand press to motor power. Dairen, the chief center of this industry, has 42 mills. A new process to extract oil by means of chemical action was adopted in an experimental bean mill built by the South Manchuria Railway Company in 1936, and in pursuance of the company's policy, when the superiority of the process had been established, it was turned over to private management to develop commercially. Another development in the bean-oil industry is also due to an invention made at the company's laboratory for the hardening of bean oil and the manufacture of stearin, olein, glycerine, etc., which led to the establishment of a private company for its special exploitation.

Soya beans of Manchuria are divided into four classes, according to color—yellow, white eyebrow, green and black. The chemical composition of soya bean, according to analyses made in the Dairen Central Laboratory, is as follows (the figure showing percentage):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Albumin</th>
<th>Curb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moisture</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow Bean</td>
<td>9.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Eyebrow</td>
<td>12.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Bean</td>
<td>12.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Bean</td>
<td>10.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kaoliang (a sort of sorghum)—The staple food of the native population is kaoliang, and it is also the principal grain food of the numerous animals kept for farm work and the carrying trade of the three provinces.

Before soya beans attained their present importance, half the total area of the cultivated land in Manchuria was devoted to kaoliang, and a large amount of it was exported to other provinces of China. Recently the cultivation of kaoliang has given place to that of beans in many places. In Manchuria approximately 26% of the cultivated area is devoted to kaoliang, 20% to beans, 23% to millet, 14% to corn, 8.5% to wheat and 11% to other crops. The acreage of corn runs higher than this average in South Manchuria, and that of wheat higher in North Manchuria.

The average annual production of kaoliang in Manchuria is estimated at about 220,000,000 bushels. It is not only used as a foodstuff for man and beast, but the native spirits which are also made out of it. Not are the grains the only useful part of it; the stalks play a very important role. The outer layers are woven into mats, so much required in the trade of the country, for roofing and packing loads of grains and beans, and for numerous other purposes. The stalks are also utilized for fencing, bridging and housebuilding, and for fuel and pulp. Kaoliang spirits, extensively used in both Manchuria and Mongolia, is colorless and transparent, and possesses a strong flavor, which peculiarly appeals to the taste of the natives.

Millet—As a staple food of the native population, millet ranks next to kaoliang, and in North Manchuria, where kaoliang does not thrive so well, it is the main food of the inhabitants. It is also important as material for distilling huangchou (yellow drink), while its straw is universally used for fodder. Millet is cultivated throughout Manchuria, but more largely in the north than in the south. The annual production is about 160,000,000 bushels. Its importance as an article of trade is growing.

Maize—Maize, or Indian corn, is grown in Manchuria in the same way as kaoliang, and in North Manchuria, where kaoliang does not thrive so well, it is the main food of the inhabitants. It is also important as material for distilling huangchou (yellow drink), while its straw is universally used for fodder. Millet is cultivated throughout Manchuria, but more largely in the north than in the south. The annual production is about 160,000,000 bushels. Its importance as an article of trade is growing.

Wheat—North Manchuria is an ideal wheat field, and this cereal is there grown in considerable quantities. The best wheat fields are around Ningan, Potum, and Harbin, along the right bank of the Sungari, and in the country around Suixian. In South Manchuria wheat fields are mostly around Haifeng and Hailing, and the country lying to the west of the Liao, while Tiehling has one of the largest flour mills in Manchuria. Wheat has been cultivated in Manchuria from very early times, but only recently has the production been sufficient to encourage export. Manchurian wheat has begun to take its place in world trade. In 1920, as the result of an unusually good crop and a keen demand in Europe, 44,000 tons were exported through the port of Dairen. In 1922, however, only about 10,000 tons were so exported. Manchuria imports large quantities of wheat flour.

Barley—The cultivation of barley in large quantities dates from the Russo-Japanese War, when the Japanese army in Manchuria created a demand for it as the grain food for horses. It is now cultivated in considerable quantities around Changchun, Kungchuling, Liaoyang and Weihai. It is used by the natives as food and as food for their animals. It is also used in the distillation of a native drink. Its annual production is estimated at 30,000,000 bushels, in round numbers.

Buckwheat—Buckwheat is an autumn crop which requires only two and a half months to ripen, being sown in July and harvested in September. It is often sown after wheat, or takes the place of other crops when these fail on account of drought or excessive rainfall, so that one harvest at least may be obtained from the soil. It is ground into flour and made into a kind of noodles baked into cakes, or boiled to make gruel.
Rice— Rice in Manchuria is not extensively cultivated in paddy fields, but it is grown on dry land like other cereals. The production has never been very large, for the Chinese in Manchuria do not care much for it. The demand is now fast growing owing to the entry of the Japanese into Manchuria. Just as the Russian entry into the north stimulated the cultivation of wheat, that of the Japanese in the south is encouraging rice cultivation there.

Flax—Though lowland rice was first undertaken by the Korean immigrants, then it was followed by the Chinese, and today many Japanese are engaged in the cultivation of it along the railway lines.

Hemp and Jute—Hemp is grown in all the three provinces of Manchuria, about three-fourths of the total production being in the southern part. Jute is grown along the Liao, Nei Mong, Sungari and Tumen Rivers. About three-quarters of this crop is produced in North Manchuria. A large part of the hemp and jute is consumed where it is grown, but there is some surplus for export. Foreign shipments of hemp, jute and rawhide at Dairen in some years have amounted to more than 2,000,000 pounds. Hemp plants cultivated for seed are not as a rule utilised for fiber, or, if they are, the yield is of a very poor quality. The best hemp, white and tenacious, is produced in Fengtien Province, and is generally woven into cloth, while the next quality is produced in Kirin Province, and is generally made into threads. This quality is made into mats and ropes, and the poorest is used for paper-making. Jute is less flexible than hemp, but because of its waterproof nature it is used in the making of bags, ropes, nets and string, and various shipping and fishing tackle.

Tobacco—Tobacco is one of the staple products of Manchuria. The best leaf is raised around Kirin. It is blended with foreign leaf in making cigarettes. The British American Tobacco Company has a factory at Pukin, and the East Asia Tobacco Company and the Tei Tobacco Company have factories at Yingkou. The export of the native leaf is increasing.

Cotton—Cotton is grown only in the region lying to the south of a line drawn between Tienning and Kungting. Cotton in Manchuria was originally cultivated on a very small scale by the farmer for the use of his own household, and it was only around Liaoyang and Chinkiang that cotton was brought to the market as an article of trade.

Wild Silk—The cultivation of wild silk was begun in China some 1,800 years ago and was introduced into the Manchurian provinces by immigrants from Shantung Province about a century ago. Wild, or tussah, silk is used in the manufacture of pongee. The industry developed year by year, taking into district after district, until its district compass extends from the whole country, including in the south the Liaosk Territory of Kwangtung and, further north, the towns of Kaiyuan, Chantung, Hailing, T'ingha, etc.; in short, nearly all South Manchuria. Antung and Kaiping are the principal centers of this silk trade. More than \( \ldots \),900,000 worth of wild silk was exported from South Manchuria in 1922.

Sugar Beets—The soil is adapted to the sugar beet, and especially around Mukden are large tracts under cultivation for the South Manchuria Sugar Refining Company. The development of the beet sugar industry has been stimulated by experiments conducted at the Agricultural Experiment Station since 1914. The average percentage of sugar in beets is 15.3%.

Other Crops—Manchuria has great possibilities as a fruit-growing country, and it is quite possible that it may develop into a great vine-producing region, owing to its natural fitness for the cultivation of the vine. In the belt from Kwangtung north to Mukden, the orchard industry wines, etc., are now being grown.

Manchurian farms also produce potatoes, oats, red and kidney beans, etc.

Stock Raising—Before the immigration of the Chinese from the south, the chief occupation of the original Manchus was the raising of stock. With the coming of the Chinese, the rich pastoral grounds which then covered a greater part of the country were converted one after the other into grain fields. Thus agriculture rose but stock-farming waned. A shadow of the old pastoral age is still visible on the Mongolian frontier and in the western part of Hailungkiang Province, where the inhabitants are engaged in the brooding of cattle. Besides, the Manchurian farmers generally keep large numbers of horses, mules, donkeys, oxen and pigs.
Rice— Rice in Manchuria is not extensively cultivated in paddy fields, but it is grown on dry land like other cereals. The production has never been very large, for the Chinese in Manchuria do not care much for it. The demand is now fast growing owing to the entry of the Japanese into Manchuria. Just as the Russian entry into the north stimulated the cultivation of wheat, that of the Japanese in the south is encouraging rice cultivation there. The cultivation of lowland rice was first undertaken by the Koreans, then it was followed by the Chinese, and today many Japanese are engaged in the cultivation of it along the railway lines.

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The Chinese have always been skillful in using domestic animals on the farm. Five or six head of cattle, horses, mules or donkeys are often hitched at random to a heavily loaded cart, and this motley team is managed with admirable dexterity by a Chinese driver. Sheep and goats are plentiful, especially in Mongolia, where the inhabitants depend largely upon them for meat, milk and cheese.

Recent estimates of the live stock in Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia gave the following figures: horses, 2,500,000; mules, 600,000; camels, 600,000; cattle, 2,200,000; sheep and goats, 2,600,000, and mules 6,300,000. Nearly every farmer keeps a few domestic fowls. The total number was estimated at about 9,100,000 a few years ago, but it is impossible to give such figures with much exactness.

The horses are principally of Mongolian breeds, rather undersized, but with great endurance. Mules, though in Japan, have long been bred in China. They command higher prices than horses. The donkeys are used in farming and hauling.

The cattle are of Korean, Shantung, ankurian and Mongolian breeds. The Chinese keep cattle as draft oxen, and the Mongolians for the milk they yield, the beef being regarded as a by-product. The cattle in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia have not been properly bred, and there is a great opportunity for improving the different breeds by the mixture of foreign stock. The same is true of sheep and pigs. The native sheep give only about three pounds of wool. With the recent development of the woolen industry in Japan, both wool and goats' hair have been exported in considerable quantities. In south Manchuria, goat raising takes the place of sheep raising among the Chinese. Pig's bristles are exported for brushes. The South Manchuria Railway Company, through its agricultural experiment stations, is importing American and British stock, and in time Manchuria may be expected to develop into one of the finest grazing countries of the world. Crossbreeding the native sheep with Merinos has increased the output of wool of two-year-old mixed sheep from 3.4 to 6.2 pounds. The second breeding with Merinos tripled the output of wool. Bred with Southdown sheep, the output of wool was increased to 4.5 pounds and, with Shropshire, to 5.9 pounds.

The export trade in animals and animal products is bound to grow rapidly as modern breeding methods become more widely practiced. According to statistics compiled by the Research Office of the South Manchuria Railway Company, the principal exports of these products from the three ports of South Manchuria in 1922 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle (number)</td>
<td>2,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool, hair and feathers (lbs)</td>
<td>4,555,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristles (lbs)</td>
<td>794,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather, hides and skins (value)</td>
<td>921,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horns and teeth (lbs)</td>
<td>166,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bones (tons)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry (number)</td>
<td>127,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs (dozen)</td>
<td>141,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Forestry**

Distribution of forests—In South Manchuria, the foot of the Changpaei Mountains, along the upper reaches of the Sungari, the Lutun and the Tumen rivers and also the upper parts of the Yalu and the Hun are densely wooded; while in North Manchuria, the districts about Hailin on the Eastern Section (between Harbin and Pogranichnaya) of the Chinese Eastern Railway and about Sansing in Kirin Province are the principal forest lands. Mongolia is a vast plain consisting of level land grown with grass and dotted with dunes. Nothing like a forest can be seen.

The forest areas are estimated as follows:

a. On the right bank of the Yalu and along the Mun River—1,600,000 acres with 6,900,000,000 cubic feet of timber.

b. On the upper parts of the Sungari, the Lutun and the Tumen—4,900,000
The Chinese have always been skillful in using domestic animals on the farm. Five or six head of cattle, horses, mules or donkeys are often hitched at random to a heavily loaded cart, and this motley team is managed with admirable dexterity by a Chinese driver. Sheep and goats are plentiful, especially in Mongolia, where the inhabitants depend largely upon them for meat, milk and cheese.

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- Cattle (number) .......................... 2,330
- Wool, hair and feathers (lbs.) ................ 4,555,000
- Bristles (lbs.) .......................... 798,000
- Leather, hides and skins (value) ............... $217,660
- Horns and teeth (lbs.) ........................ 106,400
- Bones (tons) .................................. 9,000
- Poultry (number) ........................... 127,900
- Eggs (dozen) ................................ 141,500
- Bones (lbs.) .............................. 106,400
- Hides (tons) .............................. 9,000

Distribution of forests—In South Manchuria, the foot of the Changpai Mountains, along the upper reaches of the Sungari, the Ulun and the Tusun rivers and also the upper parts of the Yalu and the Hun are densely wooded; while in North Manchuria, the districts about Hailin on the Eastern Section (between Harbin and Pogranichnaya) of the Chinese Eastern Railway and about Sungsing in Kirin Province are the principal forest lands. Mongolia is a vast plain consisting of level land grown with grass and dotted with dunes. Nothing like a forest can be seen.

The forest areas are estimated as follows:

a. On the right bank of the Yalu and along the Hun River—1,600,000 acres with 6,900,000,000 cubic feet of timber.

b. On the upper parts of the Sungari, the Ulun and the Tusun—4,800,000
acres with 26,000,000,000 cubic feet of timber.

e. In the Eastern Section (between Harbin and Pogranichnoye)—6,000,000 acres with 18,000,000,000 cubic feet of timber.

f. In Rang and district—13,600,000 acres with fifty-two billion cubic feet of timber.

g. In the forests in and about the Hingan Mountains, as trees can be obtained, except that in the districts within a radius of about 3 miles around Hingan and Hingan Stations, the average timber asset is not at about 1,300 cubic feet to the acre.

Forest conservation.—Forest lands are afforested in many places. Walls andscapes now cover the capability of being covered with pine forests and the benefit of the people. Both from an economic and hygienic point of view, are visible everywhere. This is especially true in Harbin, where it was tremendous, yet with few trees on the mountain. The only trees in that region, when the administration was based over in Japan, were a few willows and also new villages and towns. Nursery gardens were established at Port Arthur, Chanchow and Dairen, to supply replants for afforestation undertaken by the Government. Several million young trees have been planted annually for the last several years.

The Fushun Colliery has instituted a very extensive program of afforestation to provide trees for the mines. It is estimated that 350,000 acres must be planted with 10,000,000 trees, and the progress calls for the completion of this plan in a period of thirty years. In the first year, 1939, an acre of 980 acres was planted with 2,000,000 young trees, and at the same time 44,000,000 acres were seeded in the nursery fields.

Also, to encourage the general public in this useful undertaking, forest lands are rented free of charge to those desiring to afforest them, and seeds and young plants are supplied to them. Regulations have also been published for the protection of forests. These measures have had the desired effect, and, with the increase in the interest taken by the public in the matter of afforestation, many nursery gardens owned by villages have been formed.

Existing of trees—About 300 kinds of trees are grown in Manchuria, but the principal varieties number about 20. About 40 percent of the forests are coniferous, and 60 per cent broad-leaved trees. Korean pines are the most common conifers. They are frequently from four to five feet in diameter, reaching a height of over one hundred feet. Oaks, ashes and poplars are the most common broad-leaved trees.

Lumber industry—As to other areas, Kirin and Antung come foremost, followed by such commercial centers as Harbin, Changchun, Haidong and Dairen. Kirin and Antung were foremost followed by such commercial centers as Kirin, Changchun, Haidong and Dairen. Kirin has long been a timber center. Along the eastern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the railway managers—mainly Russians and Chinese—have set railway sidings near to their lumber yards and are operating saw mills. Both Kirin and Fair timber is carried down the rivers.

Doc. No. 205-3-3

Salt water fisheries—With the Yellow Sea to the east and Gulf of Pechili to the west, and a coast line of 500 miles, the Leased Territory of Kwantung offers an ideal field for the fishing industry. The annual catch is placed at about 25,000 tons, valued at some 620,000. The catch includes tai, cod, swordfish, gachi, smara, sole, Kondikya, maw (muss), shark, nibe, aradhu, shirasu, cuttlefish, octopus, scad, squal, oysters, tarfish, prawns, lobsters, crabs, whales, seals, etc.

The whale fishery about Haiyangtao Island, near which the naval battle took place in the Chinese-Japanese War, is undertaken almost exclusively by the Oriental Whale Fishery Company. The catchers are forwarded to Shimonosoki. Seals are captured on the Ice-Floes in the north of the Yellow Sea and also in the north of the Gulf of Pechili when the ice in the coast-waters breaks up on the return of spring.

Encouragement of fisheries—For the benefit of the fishing community the Kwantung Government established an experimental station for fishery products.
acres with 26,000,000,000 cubic foot of timber.

b. In the Eastern Section (between Harbin and Pogranichnaya) -- 6,000,000 acres with 18,000,000,000 cubic foot of timber.

c. In Sailing districts -- 3,000,000 acres with fifty-two billion cubic foot.

The forests in an about the Hingan Mountains, in all or be obtained, except that in the districts within a radius of about 50 miles around Horgo and Hingan Stations, the average timber asset is at least 1,000 cubic foot to the acre.

Forest conservation-Practically 25 per cent of the present supply of forest products comes from the forests of Manchuria, and the balance from young and unworked stands of virgin forest.

Forest land is considered to be an appreciable and irreplaceable asset of the people, both from an economic and hygienic point of view, and vis a vis everywhere. This is especially true in Kwantung, where it is contiguous with the forests of Japan. The only trees in this region, where the administration has been in charge over 30 years, were a few willows and pine near villages and towns. Nursery gardens were established at Port Arthur, Changchun and Tumen, to supply supplies for afforestation undertaken by the Government. Several million young trees have been planted annually for the last several years.

The Fushun Colliery has instituted a very extensive program of afforestation to provide timber for the mines. It is estimated that 54,000 acres will be planted with 4,500,000 trees, and the program calls for the completion of this plan in a period of thirty years. In the first year, 1909, an acre of 500 acres was planted with 2,000,000 young trees, and at the same time 14,000,000 young trees were started in the nursery fields.

Also, to encourage the general public in this useful undertaking, forest lands are ranked from class one to three, depending on forest class, and seeds and young plants are supplied to them. Regulations have also been published for the protection of forests. These measures have had the desired effect, and, with the increase in the interest taken by the public in the matter of afforestation, many nursery gardens owned by villages have been formed.

Varieties of trees--About 100 kinds of trees are grown in Manchuria, but the principal varieties number about 20. About 40 percent of the forests are conifers, and 49 percent broad-leaved trees. German pines are the most common conifers. They are frequently from four to five feet in diameter, reaching a height of more than one hundred feet. Oaks, elms and poplars are the most common broad-leaved trees.

Tobacco industry--The more important kins are Kirin and Antung near Anshan, followed by such remaining centers in Harbin, Changchun, N Mukden and Uihon. Kirin and Antung are the oldest, followed by such remaining centers in Harbin, Changchun, Mukden and Dairen. Kirin is long been a timber center. Along the eastern and western coasts of the Chinese East and North Sea, Japanese merchants and Russians and Chinese have or railway sidings built to their lumber yards and are operating mule rails. Both Kirin and Yalu timber is carried down the rivers.

Doc 203-6-3

5. FISHERIES

Salt water fisheries--With the Yellow Sea to the east and Gulf of Pechili to the west, and a coast line of 900 miles, the Leased Territory of Kwantung offers an ideal field for the fishing industry. The annual catch is placed at about 25,000 tons, valued at some $620,000. The catch includes tai, cod, swordfish, guchi, amur, sole, prawns, mussels, shrimps, mackerel, nibe, sardines, shirasu, cuttlefish, octopi, sea-slug, oysters, eels, prawns, lobster, crabs, whales, seals, etc.

The whale-fishery about Haiyangtao Island, near which the naval battle took place in the Chinese-Japanese War, is undertaken almost exclusively by the Chinese-Nipponese Company. The catches are forwarded to Shinonosoki, where they are caught on the ice-floes in the north of the Yellow Sea and also in the north of the Gulf of Pechili when the ice in the coast-waters breaks up on the return of spring.

Encouragement of fisheries--For the benefit of the fishing community the Kwantung Government established an experimental station for fishery products.
in 1908 at Rokotan, about a mile south of Dairen. The station is provided
with factories, fishing gear, store rooms, warehouses and drying chambers,
and also with boats to undertake experimental fishing and explore the adjacent
seas. There is also an association organized to protect and develop the com-
on interests of the fishing community.

Fresh water fisheries--Fresh water fisheries are extensively conducted in all
large rivers, notably in the Lin and Yelu in the south, and the lower reaches
of the Sungari and its tributary, the Hurka. The fish consist mostly of salmon,
salmon trout, carp, eels, etc. The Sungari also produces pearls. At one time
no fewer than 7,000 to 8,000 pearls annually are said to have been taken from
that river in the neighborhood of Yerin.

Development of mining.--Mining in South Manchuria is of remote origin.
Local tradition declares that the coal mine at Fushun was worked as early as
the twelfth century, but its working was prohibited by the founder of the
Manchu Dynasty from a superstitious belief in Conghu (Spirit of Nature).
There were evidently some other mines once worked. But, except for some con-
scious ones, traces of their working have been entirely effaced by the
factors, particularly by the landrises caused by the indiscriminate felling
of trees. It seems that most of these were discovered during the course
of this general deforestation, but this same rather does not the fate of the mines
thus discovered, since it deprived them of the wood indispensable in mining.

Even after the removal of the prohibitory law, every possible obstacle was laid
wittingly or unwittingly in the way of mining exploitation.

Mining, in the modern sense was first introduced into the country by the
Russians when they, jointly with the Chinese, undertook to work the Fushun coal
mine. But real progress in the industry began with Japan's succeeding to the
Russian privileges and handing them over to the South Manchuria Railway Company
to be worked.

Principal mines--Chinese authorities have listed some 600 places where
minerals are located in Fungtien and Fushun Provinces, of which 213 are coal,
26 iron, 254 gold, and the remainder silver, copper and lead.

Gold--Before the introduction of foreign capital for the development of
Manchuria's mineral resources, gold was the only metal extensively mined.
Manchurian gold is mostly alluvial, and so can be mined with a very small capital.
Naturally, all the river beds containing gold dust have been ravaged by gold
hunters, and in South Manchuria it is only in these washed-out beds that
alluvial gold is now collected. Extensive traces of such mining are found in
and around the regions of Chinsing, Pungsan and Manch'ing. It is asserted by
experts that the alluvial gold of these regions came from gneiss, which is
abundant everywhere in Manchuria, and which always contains some gold. Beaten
by the weather, the gneiss disintegrated little by little, freeing the gold it
contained, which, washed by the rain, deposited itself in the river beds. The
most extensive alluvial gold deposits in South Manchuria are found in the tribu-
ternaries of the Yalu and the upper reaches of the Sungari. In Heilungkiang
Province there are many gold fields where ore is still obtained in considerable
quantities. Chinsing in Fushun Province was famous for its gold sands years ago
and it is believed that there are still rich veins to be mined.

Iron--Next to coal, iron is the most important mineral product of
Manchuria. It exists mostly in veins in metamorphic rocks, and the best veins
are generally found in northeastern Manchuria along the Yalu. These were worked
by the natives on a very small scale. The ores are generally hematite, and thus
the percentage of iron they contain is not large; being generally about 40 per
cent, they are sufficiently rich to be worked with advantage. Two mines stand
out prominently, Fushun and Anshan. The latter, with 200,000,000 tons of ore
reserves, is being developed by the South Manchuria Railway Company in conjunc-
tion with its new Anshan Steel Works.

9

- 8 -
VI. THE OPEN ROAD IN MANCHURIA

Manchuria is easy of access to the travelers and business men of the world. Beauties of scenery, as wonderful as anywhere in Asia, lure the European and American to this far country. Not only is Manchuria the scene of amazing developments, new cities, modern industries, scientific achievements and vast agricultural areas, but there is in this old Land of the Manchus a wealth of unforgettable beauty. The cities have a twofold charm. Adjoining the principal age-old Chinese towns there have arisen modern cities, thus providing the traveler not only with the delights of ancient Oriental life and scenes but making it possible to live while there as he would live at home.

Dairen, on the Yellow Sea, the wonderful new city of Manchuria, has been described in earlier chapters. Chengchun, at the northern terminus of the railway, has been called the resting place of Manchuria, and through its streets still drive the old Russian dresskies, mingled with the spika wheelless Peking carts, rikishas and the latest models of Western motor cars.

Liaochow, about midway between Dairen and Chengchun, is the greatest point of historical interest in Manchuria. From this city in 1644 the first Manchu emperor of China moved his capital to Peking. Within the massive walls of the ancient city the natives live today in much the same way as they have lived for hundreds of years. The teeming streets give a vista of shops, patomyo, Chinos; theaters, drum towers, temples and palaces. Beyond the walls, in the surrounding forests, stand the historic and magnificent tombs of the emperors of the Manchu Dynasty, China's last imperial line.

Numerous other cities, each with its special claim to the traveler's interest, are reached by the South Manchurian Railway. Manchuria is not all cities, nor all prairies, nor all soybean fields. Mountains with tumbling rivers, ancient temples and fairy-like groves form a background for historic hot springs famous for their curative waters. Along the Yellow Sea charming seaside resorts, unrivaled in the Orient, are known to all Western residents in the Orient and are now beckoning to the tourist passing through the East.

Hoshiguara, or Star Beach, is a seaside resort twenty minutes by motor from Dairen. A modern ocean hotel and picturesque bungalows attract many visitors who enjoy the excellent bathing, tennis and golf of this charming spot.

Ogondai (Port Arthur) is a beautiful beach resort, with pine-clad hills, a historic battlefield, cozy bungalows and a comfortable hotel. An old fishing village adds interest, and little tea houses perched on the cliffs catch the eye.

The Hot Springs at Hsiuapaochang are of great medicinal value. Excellent hotel accommodations are offered to the traveler who takes the cure at this beautiful resort.

At Chionshan, or "The Thousand Peaks," the beautiful mountain range south of Liaochow, cluster Buddhist and Taoist temples where the traveler may find hospitality and enchantment while visiting at the Hot Springs. The green ridges are broken with pagodas and tree-lined roads with alluring roads where walking and horseback riding offer many delights to the traveler. A day or night spent at any of these temples is a page out of China's mystical and gorgeous history.

The hot springs of Tungkangta, near Jinshan, close to the Chianshan mountains, are of great curative value. Known in ancient times, the
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The hot springs of Tungyenfu, near Anshan, close to the Chinshan mountains, are of great curative value. Known in ancient times, the
Wulungpei, called the beautiful sw., is in a mountain valley near Antung. These historic springs have been modernized and scientifically tested, and found excellent for cases of rheumatism. A modern and comfortable hotel is part of the attraction.

Education—In 1907 there were cut two elementary schools, one for Japanese children at Liaoyang under the Y.I.C.A. and one for Chinese children at Chunchin established by the Buddhist Mission. Today the South Manchuria Railway Company maintains 29 elementary schools for Japanese and 13 for Chinese children; 46 schools of practical courses, 11 of them for girls; 2 girls' high schools; 2 commercial schools; 2 high schools; an industrial college; a school of mining; a medical college; and 23 kindergartens and playgrounds. In addition to these schools there are 2 main libraries, 19 branch and 210 circulating libraries, and other educational institutions.

There is no discrimination between Chinese and Japanese scholars, although divisions of schools and classes are frequently necessary, owing to the difference in language. The total number of pupils in the schools maintained by the railway company is in the neighborhood of 15,000.

Elementary education, to reach all classes and spread its civilizing power over a country, must be compulsory. But to force such education on the Chinese, studded in centuries of their own traditions, was not an easy problem.

The South Manchuria Railway Company has followed a policy of making education so attractive that people would practically beg for it. The company provides passes on the railroad for the school children and regulates the time schedule in order that trains may stop at places where there are schools outside of regular station areas. By these special arrangements and by the establishment of dormitories in different schools, there are hardly any children who cannot attend school.

The study of the Chinese language is encouraged and Chinese is taught not only in elementary schools, but in all of the vocational schools.

The high schools are crowded with earnest students. The Mukden high school, established in 1910, is growing in popularity among the young residents of the old Manchuria capital. It admits graduates of the Chinese grammar schools and has preparatory courses for the South Manchuria Medical College.

Two commercial schools, one at Changshun and the other at Yingkou, are educating both Japanese and Chinese pupils in business principles. Connected with these schools is the Fusheun Mining School. In all of these schools, from primary to college, physical development and sports of all kinds are encouraged.

As soon as the educational institutions for Chinese children were established in 1911, the railway company sent three teachers to Peking and Mukden for a period of two years, to make them more familiar with the customs and manners of the Chinese. Since that time teachers have been sent every year to Peking. In 1918 the teachers' training school was established; its name was changed in 1915 to the Educational Research Institution.

The South Manchuria Medical College in Mukden has a twofold mission in Manchuria—first, to supplement the general plan for bringing sanitation and health into Manchuria and Mongolia, and, second, to afford both Chinese and Japanese youth the opportunities of a modern education in medicine and surgery. At first no tuition was charged, but now a nominal fee is charged the Japanese students, and many school scholarships are awarded each year so that ambitious youths may have an opportunity to take the course. All students are required to live in the college dormitories.

Religious education is provided by many of the Christian denominations who have taken an active interest in the school program of the railway.
Sunday schools and kindergartens are numerous. Japanese Christian institutions in Manchuria and the neighboring districts are increasing in number.

The hospital at Dairen has been made a model institution, comprising nine scientific departments. Construction of a fine new hospital building to cost $1,500,000 was begun in 1925. Besides the regular patients which the Dairen Hospital can take care of, there is a clinic for outside patients. There is a medical college, established in 1911 at Ijubiden, where doctors for these hospitals and medical stations are trained.

The Japanese Red Cross also maintains a number of hospitals throughout Manchuria and Mongolia. Some of these are situated where they may benefit most the poorer and more illiterate class of Chinese; and in Dairen and Port Arthur there are special hospitals for contagious diseases and for women patients.

In most of these institutions a scientific course in nursing is given and in some a school of pharmacy is also conducted for the benefit of those seeking such knowledge. These hospitals are open to everybody in Manchuria and thousands of people who never before were reached by science flock to their doors.

In addition to the hospitals, the company maintains public physicians, who, while practicing on their own account, have been appointed to guard against the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases, to make investigations of epidemics, etc., in the interest of public health and to spread, as much as they can, the knowledge of hygiene and sanitation throughout the districts where so many of the natives have never before realized the necessity even for cleanliness. Such competent medical men are scattered throughout the Manchurian and the old Chinese towns, and outside of the railway area they administer medical relief.

Nothing is left undone toward safeguarding public health in the Kwantung Peninsula. The public health department has charge of the yearly vaccination of the inhabitants, which is done without cost. The record in health, resulting from vaccination, is improving every year.

Epidemic diseases have been a difficult problem. The Chinese and Kwantung Governments, the hospitals, medical stations and doctors under the control of the railway, and the Quarantine Bureau, have all worked to check such epidemics and to protect the people of Manchuria from their ravages. The Quarantine Bureau has been particularly effective in its work in the ports and along the waterfront, transferring any infected people to hospitals or keeping them in quarantine. All of these organizations are cooperating in a warfare on Manchurian files, and are attempting thus to exterminate that method of disease communication.

The Kwantung Government also inspects drinking water throughout the district. The South Manchurian Railway Company, through its inspectors from the Central Laboratory at Dairen, inspects the water along the railroad line once a month, and all well water throughout the Railway Zone is examined twice a year. It also inspects all milk.

All the schools have assigned to them school physicians, and there are visiting oculists, dentists and nose and throat specialists who also guard the health of the school children of Manchuria. This system of inspection, advice and treatment is carried into the railway works, factories and mines.

Manchuria, with its modern railway system, is now easy of access from Japan and from other parts of China. New travelers now include it in their Oriental tours.

The shortest route between Tokyo and Peking, the two great capitals of the Orient, is by way of Chosen (Korea) and Manchuria, where the comforts...
of the South Manchuria Railway make traveling additionally attractive. From the old Manchu capital, Mukden, south to Tientsin, Peking, Nanking, and other cities, the Peking-Mukden Line, and the Peking-Puhlow Line (Chinese Government Railways) offer excellent transportation. From Peking, the Peking-Mukden Line and the Shanghi-Mukden Line connect with Hankow and Shanghai, and the Peking-Puhlow Line runs to Suiyuan and the world famous Great Wall of China. From Dairen, there are delightful sea trips to Tientsin, Shanghai, Tsingtao, and Hongkong. From Changchun, the Chinese Eastern Railway (which forms a part of the Trans-Siberian Route) takes the traveler north to such points as Harbin, and from there either to Vladivostok on the east or to Manchuri on the west on the way to Moscow and Europe.

The Chosen State Railways, which take the traveler from Antung, Manchuria, on the west, through Chosen to Pusan on the Korean Straits, are operated by the South Manchuria Railway Company. From Pusan a ferry steamer carries the tourist to Shimonosaki in Japan, and from there, via the Japanese Government Railways, one may reach any part of Japan—Nagasaki on the south (where a steamship line connects with Shanghai and Hongkong), or northward to Osaka, Kyoto, Tokyo, and Yokohama.
The new industrial era.— Prior to the building of the South Manchuria Railway the Chinese in Manchuria were engaged almost entirely in agricultural pursuits, or primitive manufacturing industries based on agriculture. They pressed oil from soy beans for food and light, ground their meal and flour, distilled native drinks, made coarse silk, wove baskets and produced other necessities of life as a by-product of farming.

But within a very few years, with the coming of American locomotives, steam shovels, mining machinery and electric generators—all the varied labor-saving machines of the modern industrial era—a great change has taken place in this ancient land of the Manchus. Billions of foreign capital, largely from Japan, have poured into Manchuria to be used in developing her rich stores of raw materials, and in establishing new industries for their utilization. The South Manchuria Railway Company, since its establishment has purchased in America more than 75,000,000 worth of railway equipment and materials, and machinery for mining, steel-working and other industries.

The industrial development of Manchuria along modern lines is being fostered by the South Manchuria Railway Company through the Central Laboratory, the Ecological Institute, the Agricultural Experiment Stations, the Bureau for Economic Research, and other similar organizations.

Dairen is the leading industrial center of Manchuria as well as its principal port. Other important manufacturing cities in Kwantung Province and the Railway Zone are Mukden, Fushun, Chingshan, Anshan, Benhsiuh, Tieling, and Antung.

In North Manchuria and along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway are a number of important factories, including flour mills, bean mills, breweries, beet sugar mills and lumber mills.

Soy oil and bran cake—Soy milling ranks foremost in Manchurian manufacturing industry. Since ancient times the Chinese have used the oil of the soy bean as food and a source of light, but only within the last few years, since the South Manchuria Railway Company inaugurated its campaign of industrial development, has the soy bean and its varied products become of importance in world trade.

Native yufang, or oil mills, are found everywhere in Manchuria, and in these the beans are ground by power furnished by mules or donkeys and the oil is expressed by hand labor. The residue is bran cake. The Japanese introduced power presses, driven by steam, electric, gas and water power, and most of the modern mills are of this type.

A much more efficient method has lately been developed through the research department of the railway company. This is the chemical extraction method. The beans are soaked in benzine until the oil is dissolved. Then, by heating the compound, the oil is separated from the benzine. By this method nearly all the oil in the beans is extracted, and not only is there no waste of oil, but the residue, in this case not in the form of cake but meal, is better fitted for fertilizer. By this extraction system, 132 pounds of beans give about 12 pounds of bean oil and two pieces of bran cake each weighing 61 pounds. By the chemical extraction system, the same amount of beans usually gives 172 pounds of bean oil and 106 pounds of bran meal. The new method is employed by Suzuki & Company, in Dairen, which firm operates the largest bean mill in Manchuria. Yingkou was formerly the center of bean milling in South Manchuria, but Dairen is now far in the lead, with 82 mills.

The Chinese have used bran cake largely as cattle food and very little as fertilizer. But recently the cake has found a growing market in Japan and China as a fertilizer as well as cattle food.

To facilitate the shipment and marketing of soy, beans the South Manchuria Railway Company has organized a "mixed storage system." Beans are classified
At receiving points, and receipts, are at the bank, are issued, which call for the delivery of like quantities and qualities at terminal points.

Flour milling—There are two kinds of flour mills in Manchuria called respectively native and power, which literally mean "grinding house" and "fire mill." The former is the native mill which, employing two to ten coolies and four to twelve donkeys, conducts the work on a small scale. This kind of mill is found all over Manchuria, and constitutes the local manufacture next in importance to distilling and oil milling. However, mills of this kind are mostly conducted as a side line by grain merchants, distillers, and oil mills. The "fire mill" is the mill provided with modern machinery to which steam or electricity is applied as the motive power.

Flour mills planned on an extensive modern scale in South Manchuria have come into existence under Japanese management since the close of the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian Flour Mill at Tientsin was the first of the kind to be founded. Since that time other mills have been established at Mukden, Changchun, Tientsin, Harbin, and Dairen. The more important mills and the greater number of them are operated by Japanese companies. The largest of these is the Kishu Flour-Mill Company, with mills at Harbin, Changchun, Tientsin and Mukden. Chinese and Russian companies have a number of important mills, chiefly in South Manchuria. During 1915, 1920, and 1921 more than 500,000 tons of in Manchuria wheat was exported to Europe, but this was an unusual movement due to unusual trade conditions. Normally, Manchuria has an import balance of flour.

Beet sugar—One of the newest industries in Manchuria is the manufacture of beet sugar. An experimental farm was established outside Mukden in 1906, and it was shown that sugar beets could be successfully raised in Manchuria, but the industry was not established until the South Manchurian Railway Company had conducted successful experiments in 1913-1914. The formation of the South Manchurian Sugar Refining Company at Adam in 1916 by Japanese capitalists followed. The Russians had previously built a factory near Harbin, and a Chinese factory had been established at Harbin, also in North Manchuria. The Russian factory was opened with a capital of 1,000,000 yen, and has been a great success. Beets are cultivated over an area of several thousand acres, supplying the refinery during the winter months. Crude sugar is imported for refining during the remainder of the year.

Distilling—The distillation of beverages for domestic consumption has always ranked as an important native industry in Manchuria. The liquors used by the Chinese are chiefly shenshu (sorghum malt), distilled from millet, and huangchiu, made from millet. The distilling of shenshu spirit is native to Manchuria. The grain is mashed and steamed, and there is added to the mash barley malt or corn malt, and a small quantity of yeast or corn. The mash is buried in the ground for 30 days and left to ferment, after which the contents are distilled. The product is similar to whiskey. Harbin and Liaoting are the centers of the distilling industry.

Brewing—From barley and hops raised in Manchuria, beer is now being made. The forming of beer from rice has also been undertaken at various places.

Wild silk—The greater part of the wild-silk cocoons produced in Manchuria have been exported, and Chefoo in Shantung, a center of the silk industry, has reeled much of the Manchurian silk. Small wild-silk factories are operated by many Chinese farmers in Manchuria who use very primitive methods. The Russian silk produced by the natives is not of good quality, and the Russian Central Laboratory for silk has been devoting much attention to improving the manufacturing methods. As a result, the industry has been developing, especially in Kiangsu. Silk spinning should eventually be one of the largest Manchurian industries.

Iron and steel—One of the most ambitious undertakings of the South Manchurian Railway Company has been the building of the steel works at Anshan, to utilize the ore of the Anshan iron mines. Since 1917, when the work
was inaugurated, the development of this plant has gone steadily forward. Millions of dollars' worth of modern equipment and machinery has been imported, and the installation has been made under the most approved engineering practices.

Blast furnace No. 1, with a capacity of about 350 tons a day, was completed in 1918, and the furnace was lighted in April, 1919. Blast furnace No. 2 was completed in 1920, with a daily capacity also of about 350 tons. Two batteries of coke ovens (one battery consisting of 40 ovens), together with the coal washing system, were finished and brought into service early in 1920. Two more batteries were added in the following year.

The South Manchurian Railway Company has recently set aside several million dollars more for the further development of this plant to handle the large deposits of low-grade ores. A closure of the existing works number about 2,500 Japanese and Chinese. An enterprising new town has been developed in what was a wilderness a few years ago.

At Fushun another steel works is in operation by a company composed of Chinese and Japanese. It draws its ores from Hibonko, 24 miles away.

Chemical industry—Notable progress has been made in the development of the chemical industry, as a result of the research work of the Dairen Central Laboratory, and the future holds out great possibilities and opportunities.

As Fushun coal was found to contain a high percentage of nitrogen (1.6 per cent), a gas producing plant was installed in 1914 to recover the ammonia. A second was put up in 1917, and more recently, a third. Coal tar, calcium sulphate, sulphuric acid, calcium carbide, calcium cyanide and other chemicals are produced. Two sets of sulphuric acid plants have been installed.

Installation of thirty sets of by-product recovery coke ovens has been completed at Fushun. These are now producing about 100 tons of coke a day.

Cement—The over-increasing demand for cement in Manchuria, North China and Eastern Siberia on the one hand, and the abundance of the material necessary for its manufacture, limestone and clay, on the other, induced the Chinese Government Company of Japan to establish a branch factory in the small town of Shoushi, a suburb of Dairen, as early as 1905. The factory is ideally situated, the limestone being obtained from the hills right behind it and the clay in the field just in front, and a line of railway has been built to connect the factory with the railroad. The factory output consists of cement, paving bricks and building bricks. At Shoushi is also located the Dolomite Cement Company, and there is another cement plant at Hibonko.

Glassware—With plenty of siliceous rock at hand, glass-making has been stimulated by the Corinna Experimental Institute at Dairen, and progress is being made in the commercial development of the industry.

Pottery—The pottery division of the Corinna Experimental Institute was transferred to the China Corinna Company in 1906. Other pottery factories have been started in Hibonko, Delen, Kangtuling and Shoushi, and in addition there are a number of kilns engaged in making fire-brick. Kirin, in Kirin Province, has long been a pottery center.

Lumber—Many sawmills are now in operation at Itung, near the mouth of the Yalu, and at Kirin on the Sungari River. Owing to the nature of the industry, lumbering is conducted mostly under joint Chinese-Japanese management.

Other industries—Along the lines of the South Manchurian Railway many new industries have been started since the extension of modern transportation facilities and the opening up of new sources of basic raw materials.
Doc 205-C, cont'd

The railway is fostering this industrial development through its research work, a description of which is given in Chapter V. Among other Manchurian industries briefly mentioned here are the following:

Starch is made from beans, kaoliang, corn and potatoes.

Smoking tobacco is manufactured in the Yingkou and Mukden factories of the East Asia Tobacco Company. Similar tobacco factories are also located at Mukden, Dairen and Changchun.

Hard oil, stearine, glycerine, gelatine and soap are made from soya bean oil. Animal and vegetable oils are also used in various other manufactures. Noodles are made from soya beans for the South China and the South Sora trade. Imitation rice is made from kaoliang.

The cereal kaoliang, as a result of research work of the South Manchuria Railway Company, has been made useful in many ways. Calcium lactate is an important by-product. Lactate oil is made from the calcium lactate and is used extensively in fermentation, dyeing, tanning and other industries. The manufacture of paper from kaoliang pulp is another growing industry. The pulp closely resembles wood pulp and makes an excellent grade of paper. From the ash of kaoliang stalk potassium salts are obtained for use in the manufacture of glass, medicines, fertilizers and other products.

Several companies are engaged in the manufacture of bags and other products from hemp and jute. Soy bean are handled mostly in bags, hence there is a large demand for them and they are imported.

Boat building and repair work are undertaken by the South Manchuria Dock Company at Dairen and Port Arthur.

Railroad car and engine shops, equipped with the best American machinery, are operated by the South Manchuria Railway Company at Shinko (now a part of Dairen) and Changhui.

Among other Japanese enterprises may be mentioned the manufacture of matches, gunpowder, fertilizer, dye-stuffs and woorkwear.

Paper mills at Kirin, Liaoyang and Potuna, and dyeing and weaving works at Yingkou, Liaoyang and Chinshuo are among the native industries.

Industries based on wool and leather have been recently started. Hides, bones, wool and other animal products are exported in considerable quantities.
An economic miracle—The American traveler in Manchuria today, who rides in comfort in a Pullman sleeping car behind a Baldwin locomotive, over 100-pound Pittsburgh rails; from the modern port of Dairen, with its beautiful plaza, and its great modern banks, business houses and public buildings; and then northward through cities lighted by electricity, with modern railway stations, paved streets, modern hotels, schools, hospitals and scientific laboratories; past modernly equipped steel works, coal mines and factory buildings—with such a magic transformation before his eyes the traveler finds it difficult to believe that only a few years ago this country was a forbidden land to world commerce.

Trade was a business of the lowest caste of Chinese—and particularly in Manchuria, as the Manchu Dynasty forbade the penetration of their homeland by the Southern Chinese. Manchuria was connected with Shanghai, the economic center of China, for the first time when the port of Lushun (now Yingkou) was opened to trade by the Tientsin Treaty (1858) between England and China. But it was half a century later before Dairen, Antung and the other ports of Manchuria were opened to the trade of the world.

A very slow development of Manchurian trade followed the opening of the port of Lushun. It was not until 1890 that the Russians began the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was to give them, in connection with their Trans-Siberian line, an outlet on the Yellow Sea at Port Arthur. But the real awakening of Manchurian trade came with the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the taking over by the Japanese of the southern portion of the railway line by the British in 1907 under the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Since then Manchurian commerce has grown tremendously.

The gateways of Manchurian trade are Dairen, Yingkou, Antung and Vladivostok. Of these four, the port of Dairen has made the most conspicuous progress. It has now outstripped Tientsin, and leads all other Chinese ports except Shanghai in volume of foreign trade.

Growth of the Port of Dairen—The growth of Dairen as a shipping port is indicated in the following table, showing the number and tonnage of vessels arriving at the Dairen wharves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Vessels</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>1,359,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>2,338,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>2,410,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>2,882,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1,795</td>
<td>3,372,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>3,595,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>3,588,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>2,113</td>
<td>3,461,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,943</td>
<td>3,096,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>3,118,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>2,516</td>
<td>3,475,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,891</td>
<td>4,380,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,942</td>
<td>4,896,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>2,806</td>
<td>5,697,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>7,779,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before the European war the American flag was rarely seen in the port of Dairen, but after the war there was a large increase in American tonnage. German tonnage ranked next to the Japanese and British before the war, reaching 307,000 tons in 1913. Ocean steamers entered and cleared at the British Customs at Dairen under general regulations in 1922 as follows, by countries:
Doo 203-D, cont’d

Shipping at Dairen: By Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>359,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>554,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>61,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>260,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>11,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>45,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>5,598,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>56,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>6,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>9,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>938,291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total.................................................................................................................. 8,201,828

In addition to the above, 74 foreign type sailing vessels with a tonnage of 1,291 entered and cleared, bringing the total for Dairen to 5,149 vessels of 8,203,119 tons. Entries and clearances under inland steam navigation rules totaled 645 of 214,496 tons. Such shipping in 1922 was entirely Japanese and Chinese; the latter predominating with 461 vessels of 137,674 tons. Junk entered and cleared numbered 12,852 of 1,767,207 tons (a ton, or picul, equals 133 1/3 pounds). By far the greater number of these were Chinese. The number included 325 from Korea.

Outgoing passengers at Dairen in 1922 numbered 149,775, incoming 216,756, a total of 366,531. This was more than double the total of ten years before, but was below the record of 1920, when such traffic reached the mark of 453,484. By far the greater number of these were Chinese. Foreign passenger traffic in 1922 totaled 35,842 outgoing and 40,961 incoming.

Trade figures show the extent to which Dairen serves as the gateway to Manchuria. A large proportion of its imports are for the great hinterland. This distribution of imports, including those borne by junks, is shown by the following table (in millions of Taikwai tael*), which compares the figures of 1922 with those of the three preceding years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imported into Leased Territory (free area) by sea -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From foreign countries</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Chinese ports</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-exported</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imported by rail into Man- churia</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumed and stored in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumed and stored in Leased Territory</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chinese customs returns are reported in Taikwai silver taels. The exchange value of the tael varies with the price of silver. From 1908 to 1916 the average value of the tael in United States currency was 67 cents. In 1916 it was 79 cents; 1917, .1.05; 1918, .1.26; 1919, .1.59; 1920, .1.24; 1921, .76 cents, and 1922, .85 cents.
The value of Dairen's foreign trade has greatly increased, the total exports and imports being now about seven times as large as in 1908. The record of the maritime customs trade at Dairen, in Haikwan taels, from 1908 to 1922, is shown in the tables following:

### Value of Imports at the Port of Dairen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>From foreign ports</th>
<th>From Chinese ports</th>
<th>Total imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>17,215,826</td>
<td>3,060,713</td>
<td>20,276,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>15,239,563</td>
<td>5,301,612</td>
<td>17,541,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>15,834,071</td>
<td>4,081,737</td>
<td>19,915,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>24,012,724</td>
<td>5,773,666</td>
<td>30,786,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>27,059,793</td>
<td>7,803,390</td>
<td>34,863,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>28,740,282</td>
<td>8,310,265</td>
<td>37,050,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>28,891,565</td>
<td>9,002,518</td>
<td>37,894,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>26,865,452</td>
<td>16,581,550</td>
<td>43,446,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>33,358,199</td>
<td>19,075,187</td>
<td>52,433,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>58,274,297</td>
<td>22,650,643</td>
<td>81,925,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>66,979,625</td>
<td>28,622,232</td>
<td>95,601,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>89,521,323</td>
<td>37,855,865</td>
<td>127,377,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>71,040,883</td>
<td>22,028,602</td>
<td>93,069,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>67,632,923</td>
<td>32,658,758</td>
<td>100,291,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>65,667,595</td>
<td>27,331,778</td>
<td>92,999,173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Value of Exports at the Port of Dairen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>To Chinese ports</th>
<th>To foreign ports</th>
<th>Total exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>7,342,402</td>
<td>12,411,535</td>
<td>19,753,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>22,303,444</td>
<td>26,744,359</td>
<td>51,047,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>20,115,933</td>
<td>26,193,413</td>
<td>50,309,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>24,006,581</td>
<td>23,730,976</td>
<td>57,737,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>19,795,121</td>
<td>28,885,944</td>
<td>48,681,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>29,749,041</td>
<td>39,047,743</td>
<td>68,796,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>36,604,840</td>
<td>45,168,807</td>
<td>81,773,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>33,171,438</td>
<td>48,836,640</td>
<td>81,998,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>43,151,327</td>
<td>58,708,247</td>
<td>101,859,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>47,058,741</td>
<td>63,107,210</td>
<td>110,165,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>72,393,242</td>
<td>82,958,265</td>
<td>155,351,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>57,271,101</td>
<td>105,192,867</td>
<td>162,463,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>108,262,406</td>
<td>125,056,263</td>
<td>233,318,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>79,385,479</td>
<td>121,603,422</td>
<td>193,988,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>91,191,121</td>
<td>136,922,219</td>
<td>228,113,340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Exports and Imports: Port of Dairen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>20,276,499</td>
<td>12,411,535</td>
<td>32,688,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>17,541,175</td>
<td>26,744,359</td>
<td>44,285,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>19,915,808</td>
<td>26,193,413</td>
<td>46,109,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>30,786,390</td>
<td>28,650,643</td>
<td>59,437,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>34,863,183</td>
<td>22,650,643</td>
<td>57,513,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>37,050,547</td>
<td>27,331,778</td>
<td>64,382,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>43,446,802</td>
<td>28,685,643</td>
<td>72,132,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>52,433,386</td>
<td>48,836,640</td>
<td>101,269,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>58,438,640</td>
<td>54,708,247</td>
<td>113,146,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>65,438,640</td>
<td>63,107,210</td>
<td>128,545,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>81,925,940</td>
<td>82,958,265</td>
<td>164,884,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>81,925,940</td>
<td>105,192,867</td>
<td>187,118,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>98,069,485</td>
<td>125,056,263</td>
<td>223,125,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>100,291,691</td>
<td>121,603,422</td>
<td>221,895,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>92,999,173</td>
<td>136,922,219</td>
<td>232,921,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table below shows, in millions of taels, the value of the direct trade of Dairen with foreign countries in 1922 as compared with that for the previous year and that for 1913, the record year before the World War (exports include re-exports):

**Foreign Trade of Dairen: By Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1913 Imports</th>
<th>1913 Exports</th>
<th>1913 Total</th>
<th>1921 Imports</th>
<th>1921 Exports</th>
<th>1921 Total</th>
<th>1922 Imports</th>
<th>1922 Exports</th>
<th>1922 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hongkong</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Indies</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>22.28</td>
<td>26.42</td>
<td>50.71</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>19.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>21.79</td>
<td>46.93</td>
<td>68.72</td>
<td>86.79</td>
<td>110.52</td>
<td>197.31</td>
<td>40.22</td>
<td>105.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | 28.74 | 50.01 | 78.75 | 67.63 | 101.40 | 169.03 | 65.67 | 95.45 | 161.12 |

Dairen's export trade is largely made up of agricultural products and coal. In tonnage, soya bean products are more than half of the exports. Principal items in the export trade in recent years are shown in the following table:

**Commodities Exported from Dairen (in Piculs*)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>8,831,164</td>
<td>8,511,782</td>
<td>8,506,632</td>
<td>9,205,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean cake</td>
<td>16,630,926</td>
<td>17,566,748</td>
<td>17,944,773</td>
<td>18,756,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean oil</td>
<td>1,961,953</td>
<td>1,888,143</td>
<td>1,682,541</td>
<td>1,507,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other beans</td>
<td>1,035,927</td>
<td>1,081,023</td>
<td>2,600,231</td>
<td>8,440,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaoliang</td>
<td>879,273</td>
<td>1,991,083</td>
<td>2,830,431</td>
<td>8,540,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>1,324,673</td>
<td>6,680,946</td>
<td>5,177,653</td>
<td>149,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>531,263</td>
<td>537,321</td>
<td>746,769</td>
<td>2,581,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemp, jute and ramie</td>
<td>4,292</td>
<td>6,437</td>
<td>5,814</td>
<td>5,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw wild silk</td>
<td>4,292</td>
<td>6,437</td>
<td>5,814</td>
<td>5,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool, hair and feathers</td>
<td>30,655</td>
<td>12,047</td>
<td>6,748</td>
<td>27,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal and coke (15 tons)</td>
<td>914,213</td>
<td>801,008</td>
<td>1,694,529</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign trade of Manchuria—With the development of the port of Dairen, the gateway to Manchuria, the foreign trade of the country has grown apace. Three years after the Russo-Japanese War, when Dairen and Antung were opened to commerce, the total trade reached 30,000,000. In the first year after the close of the European War it had risen to nearly 85,000,000. The foreign trade returns from 1911 on are shown below:

**Foreign Trade of Manchuria (in U.S. Dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports from foreign ports</th>
<th>Imports from Chinese ports</th>
<th>Total imports</th>
<th>Total exports</th>
<th>Total trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>$4,356,000</td>
<td>$17,807,000</td>
<td>$22,163,000</td>
<td>$66,294,000</td>
<td>$88,457,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>56,318,000</td>
<td>11,976,000</td>
<td>68,294,000</td>
<td>63,972,000</td>
<td>132,266,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>54,235,000</td>
<td>15,656,000</td>
<td>69,890,000</td>
<td>68,636,000</td>
<td>138,526,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>49,572,000</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
<td>61,572,000</td>
<td>59,222,000</td>
<td>120,794,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>37,597,000</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>50,597,000</td>
<td>62,972,000</td>
<td>113,569,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>55,620,000</td>
<td>16,655,000</td>
<td>72,275,000</td>
<td>77,815,000</td>
<td>150,090,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>118,150,000</td>
<td>24,371,000</td>
<td>142,521,000</td>
<td>150,594,000</td>
<td>293,115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>127,595,000</td>
<td>42,250,000</td>
<td>169,845,000</td>
<td>150,251,000</td>
<td>319,896,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>209,928,000</td>
<td>56,669,000</td>
<td>266,597,000</td>
<td>252,841,000</td>
<td>519,438,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>156,991,000</td>
<td>50,923,000</td>
<td>207,914,000</td>
<td>221,618,000</td>
<td>429,532,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>87,368,000</td>
<td>71,050,000</td>
<td>158,418,000</td>
<td>163,766,000</td>
<td>322,184,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>100,612,000</td>
<td>54,349,000</td>
<td>154,961,000</td>
<td>108,834,000</td>
<td>353,795,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One picul equals 133 1/3 pounds*
Principal exports and imports—Manchuria exchanges her raw materials for the manufactures of other countries. She imports little raw material, and exports few manufactures. The country is still primarily agricultural, although manufacturing is rapidly developing. The soybean is the foundation of her trade, and beans and bean products comprise about half the value of all exports. The values of the principal exports in 1922 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bean cakes</td>
<td>32,922,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soy beans</td>
<td>45,447,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean oil</td>
<td>15,694,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaoliang</td>
<td>21,041,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other beans</td>
<td>3,966,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>4,041,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>5,494,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>3,735,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal and coke</td>
<td>11,176,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw wild silk</td>
<td>3,331,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wild silk cocoons</td>
<td>2,143,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber and bamboo</td>
<td>4,979,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>5,377,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals and hardware</td>
<td>2,468,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values of some of the principal imports in 1922 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton goods</td>
<td>442,006,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarns</td>
<td>15,373,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel, iron and metals</td>
<td>7,769,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>6,296,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>7,344,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>5,717,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bags</td>
<td>2,853,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td>4,594,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>3,682,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above fabrics, other than cotton, clothing and accessories accounted for many millions of dollars more of imports.

Itemized statistics for the whole of Manchuria are difficult to obtain. In the Chinese customs trade returns reports of the Manchurian ports are given along with those of the other Chinese ports, no separate analysis for Manchuria being made. Japanese analyses generally do not include all of Manchuria, but only the southern part where are their chief interests. But, since the trade of the three ports of South Manchuria (Dairen, Antung and Yingkou, or Honamang) is seen to represent between 80 and 90 per cent of the total trade of Manchuria in 1922, detailed figures for South Manchuria will give a fairly accurate picture of the trade of the entire region. The following record of the imports and exports of South Manchuria is taken from the "Trade Return of North China", compiled by the Research Office of the South Manchuria Railway Company at Dairen (values in Hakwan taols):

**Imports Into South Manchuria, 1922**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton piece goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49,078,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolen goods, and wool and cotton unions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,069,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk piece goods, and silk and cotton unions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>210,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous piece goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,076,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton thread</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>514,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarn, raw</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>382,111</td>
<td>16,090,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton, raw</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>51,040</td>
<td>1,162,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk cocoons, raw silk and silk products</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>1,738,013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous yarns, threads, materials thereof</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>861,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing and accessories thereof</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,426,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>393,162</td>
<td>1,026,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cereals and seeds</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>409,604</td>
<td>1,520,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Imports Into South Manchuria, 1922, cont'd**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>Piculs 1,421,918</td>
<td>6,973,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and Fruits</td>
<td>Piculs 1,092,923</td>
<td>1,940,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugars</td>
<td>Piculs 679,789</td>
<td>4,887,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miso and soy</td>
<td>Piculs 12,850</td>
<td>131,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine products</td>
<td>Piculs 321,067</td>
<td>2,106,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other provisions</td>
<td>Piculs 51,069</td>
<td>2,137,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>Piculs 679,789</td>
<td>5,332,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor and other beverages</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,056,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes, cigars and tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,765,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarette making materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>491,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,354,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical products and medicines</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,912,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyes, colors and paints</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,326,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene oil</td>
<td>Gallons 16,498,209</td>
<td>2,450,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moho oil</td>
<td>Gallons 1,137,587</td>
<td>65,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other oils, fats and waxes</td>
<td></td>
<td>962,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candles</td>
<td>Piculs 14,002</td>
<td>275,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candle making materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>439,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td></td>
<td>670,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match boxes</td>
<td>Gross 679,024</td>
<td>147,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match making materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>205,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood and charcoal</td>
<td>Piculs 28,210</td>
<td>65,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal and coke</td>
<td>Bags 23,075</td>
<td>262,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>Piculs 1,360,386</td>
<td>6,722,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other metals and minerals</td>
<td>Piculs 5,197,995</td>
<td>1,009,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,229,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machines and machinery</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,097,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>Piculs 652,817</td>
<td>734,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber and bamboo</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,462,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>690,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>241,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,077,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine art and toilet requisites</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,047,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather, hides, skins, horns, etc</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,782,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,685,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and stationery</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,565,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass manufactures</td>
<td></td>
<td>351,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potteries</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,621,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bags, gunny and others</td>
<td>Pieces 22,751,676</td>
<td>8,269,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,931,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal parcels</td>
<td></td>
<td>513,983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand total** .................................................. 175,333,657

**Exports From South Manchuria, 1922**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soy beans</td>
<td>Piculs 11,253,429</td>
<td>39,164,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other beans</td>
<td>Piculs 3,052,476</td>
<td>3,345,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maloi</td>
<td>Piculs 3,010,086</td>
<td>6,236,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaoliang</td>
<td>Piculs 10,587,562</td>
<td>25,669,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>Piculs 2,141,985</td>
<td>6,021,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>Piculs 269,021</td>
<td>584,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cereals</td>
<td>Piculs 185,720</td>
<td>425,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesamum seed</td>
<td>Piculs 165,910</td>
<td>1,091,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molon seed</td>
<td>Piculs 127,143</td>
<td>779,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>Piculs 88,409</td>
<td>366,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other seeds</td>
<td>Piculs 589,371</td>
<td>1,712,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable and fruits</td>
<td>Piculs 21,205</td>
<td>172,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>Piculs 37,000</td>
<td>250,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henna and verwamon</td>
<td>Piculs 1,627</td>
<td>18,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>Galllo 1,898</td>
<td>14,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Exports From South Manchuria, 1922, cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine products</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>26,644</td>
<td>261,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smelihu</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>89,175</td>
<td>830,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes, cigars and tobacco</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>35,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other provisions and drinks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>688,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benzolko</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>26,836,040</td>
<td>58,072,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean oil</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>1,863,001</td>
<td>14,367,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnut oil</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>7,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood oil</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other oils, waxes and waxes</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>66,032</td>
<td>377,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemp, jute and rami</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>10,810</td>
<td>95,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton, raw</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk cocoons</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>113,836</td>
<td>3,787,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk, raw, wild</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>18,286</td>
<td>11,242,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk, waste</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>10,911</td>
<td>848,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristol</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>5,350</td>
<td>423,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool, hairs and feathers</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>35,118</td>
<td>734,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather, hides and skins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>361,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horns and teeth</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>18,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bone</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>130,268</td>
<td>171,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>21,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>127,379</td>
<td>8,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal tallow</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber and bamboo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,482,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood and charcoal</td>
<td>Piculs</td>
<td>164,081</td>
<td>155,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal and coke</td>
<td>Lg. Tons</td>
<td>2,104,958</td>
<td>13,462,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other mineral products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>301,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical products and medicines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,250,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyes, colors and paints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>169,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginseng</td>
<td>Catties</td>
<td>231,081</td>
<td>420,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals and hardware</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,942,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,070,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal parcels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>123,353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total of Exports** ........................................ 207,267,748

**Re-exports** ............................................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,605,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,086,586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total of re-exports** ....................... 12,661,709

**Grand total** ................................. 213,929,457

**Trade with the United States—** A very considerable part of the overseas trade of this rapidly developing country is with the United States, because it is to America that the builders of Manchurian industries have turned for modern machinery and railway materials.

American manufacturers have found an open door in Manchuria for their products, and the return tide of Pacific traffic has brought to the United States an increasing flow of the products of the rich soil of Manchuria.

The South Manchuria Railway Company has purchased in the United States more than $75,000,000 worth of locomotives, cars, rails and other materials, and the industries developed by it in the railway zone have imported many more millions of dollars' worth of machinery and materials.

Manchuria, as its latent resources continue to be developed by
modern engineering and agriculture, will offer greater and greater opportuni­ties to American trade.

The record of Manchuria’s trade with the United States in recent years has been as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports from United States</th>
<th>Exports to United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>$1,213,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1,444,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>3,401,000</td>
<td>480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,673,000</td>
<td>1,724,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>6,294,000</td>
<td>16,599,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>15,324,000</td>
<td>55,767,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>27,678,000</td>
<td>14,475,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>15,872,000</td>
<td>16,514,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>12,933,000</td>
<td>3,561,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) FACILITIES FOR COMMERCE

Railways—More than 2300 miles of railway are now in operation in Manchuria. These lines are as follows:

South Manchuria Railway - 686 Miles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mileage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Manchuria Railway, Main Line, Dairen-Changchun</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukden-Antung Line, Suchiatun-Antung</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryojun (Port Arthur Branch, Chusuhitsu-Ryojun)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fushun Branch, Hunho-Fushun</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yingkou Branch, Taishihiao-Yingkou</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yentai Colliery Branch, Yentai-Yentai Colliery</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chinese Government Railways - 591 Miles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mileage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kirin-Changchun Line, Changchun-Kirin</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suipingkai-Taonan Line, Suipingkai-Taonan</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of Peking-Mukden Line, Mukden-Shanhaikwan</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yingkou Branch Line, Yingkou-Koupeutzu</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Railways Under Russo-Chinese Management - 1,078 Miles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mileage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Eastern Railway (Western Section) Manchuli-Harbin</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Eastern Section) Harbin-Pogranichnaya</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Southern Section) Harbin-Kranchongtzu</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalainor Colliery Branch Line</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several other lines and extensions are proposed in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

Waterways—The navigable rivers in Manchuria and Mongolia are the Liao in the south, the Yalu in the east, and the Sungari and the Amur in the north. The Sungari and the Amur admit of the greatest exploitation. Before the railway was built, the Liao served as the only highway of trade in South Manchuria, but now its old glory has vanished. Some 1500 junks are in operation on the Liao and the river is still a chief channel of commerce to Inner Mongolia. The Yalu and Liao Rivers remain ice-bound from December to March, while the ice-bound period on the Sungari and the Amur extends from November to April.

Ocean steamship services—With the rise of the port of Dairen to second place among all the ports on the China coast, and the development of the harbor facilities for berthing ocean steamships and handling freight,

- 20 -
offices of the principal Pacific shipping companies have been established at Dairen.

Postal, telegraph, and telephone systems are organized and operated by the Japanese authorities. Chinese post offices are maintained in all towns outside Kwantung, in which territory the postal service is operated by the Kwantung Government. Communication facilities are constantly being improved and expanded.

Warehousing--A number of warehousing and forwarding companies are in operation in the principal towns along the South Manchuria Railway. The railway maintains warehouses and storage yards at the Dairen wharves and at the principal railway stations.

Insurance--Branches of the leading Japanese, English and American insurance companies are maintained at Dairen. Freight at the Dairen wharves is insured by the railway company, by arrangement with a number of insurance companies, and this insurance is voluntarily effected by the South Manchuria Railway without charge to the owners of the goods.

Banking--Manchuria has adequate, modern banking facilities. The great Japanese and several foreign institutions maintain branches in Dairen and other cities. In addition there are a number of local institutions.

Currency--As in other parts of China, there are many kinds of currency in circulation.

Trade organizations--Chambers of commerce are maintained at Dairen, Mukden, Antung, Changchun, Yingkou and other cities. At every trade center there is a Chinese guild. The Dairen organization publishes periodical reports on the trade and industry of Manchuria.

The Dairen Produce Exchange was established in 1913; in 1915 a produce and currency exchange was opened at Kaiyuan, and another at Changchun in 1916. In 1917, a currency exchange was established in the Dairen Produce Exchange, and now the produce and currency exchanges are known as the Dairen Exchange. In 1919, produce and currency exchanges were opened at Kungohuling, Saopingki and Tsiling, and in 1920, at Mukden, Yingkou and Liaoyang. In addition stock and merchandise exchanges have been founded at Dairen, Mukden and Antung under private management.

On these exchanges there is trading in barns, bean cake, kernels, bean oil, wheat, millet, etc., gold notes issued by the Bank of Chosen, Russian ruble notes, silver notes issued by the Yedan Film Bank, Chinese small silver coins, etc... In Manchuria, owing to the great variety of currency in circulation and the particularly because
of the constant fluctuations in their exchange rates, the currencies have come to be looked upon as commodities. Because of this peculiar feature in the currency situation in South Manchuria, the exchanges are under government management; and in order to guarantee delivery and to settle accounts between sellers and buyers, a trust and guaranty company under private management is attached to each exchange.

For the purpose of providing long-term capital to develop the country, there have been organized the Oriental Developing Company, the Eastern Enterprise Company and the Manchurian Enterprise Company. These financial institutions make loans against lands and buildings.

A commercial museum was established in Tientsin in 1906. Similar institutions were opened later in Changchun, Angung and Harbin. The Kwantung Government has established the Manchuria-Mongolia Production Museum in Port Arthur.
広大な産業街、科学上の産業地、農業の地などを巡り抜けているだけでは、色々な都市は先々の魅力を持つ。古い文脈の主な都市は相たれ、昔の繁華の街で生き石と風情が存在するばかりでなく、また、自分の日で生活するようにに自己に働き掛け、新しい都市を歩くべきもあり、その街路に今もなお古いローカルの前並みが、広大な街の中で行動を起こすだろう。
没有足够的文本内容可以阅读。
松林の丘にまさにしたバンガローに一泊の快適なホテルがあり。古い漁村がこれに連絡をされ、また山林の上に立つ破汁の小さな茶屋が見えさられる。

千本桜の詠花賞を縦め、彼岸はこの暖力を宿る土地の誠隨らしくは水浴。デニ

・・・
一九〇七年頃は、偽かに小学校が三校あった年に近せり、
その一つは、日本人児童のために設けられたリスト教育制度が認められ
たもので、もう一つは支那児童のために教導漢文が開設されたもの
であった。現在、日本国語教育機関が設置されている支那教育機関は、
日本人小学校二十五・支那小学校十三・補習学校四十四・文字脳学校
初中・高等女学校二・商業学校二・中学校二・工科大学二・法政大学
一・哲学校一・幼稚園および幼稚園三十である。これらの学校の他、
中央図書館二、図書館十九、巡閱図書館二百十八など其他的教育施設
がある。

支那学校学生々徒は日本人のそれとの間には全然差別待遇がない。但し
支那監視役の学生・従役は一萬五千人内外である。

言語が異なるため、校規および学級を区別することを任意必要である。
春に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずる。これには日本精神の復興のための教育の役割を論じるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずるもの及び日人青年に於ける近代的教育の役割を論ずる。
なかった何千人もの民衆が今や各病院の門に殺到しつつある。

会社や病院を常備する他、常備の医師をも有している。これらは医師はこれほどの業務に従事することができ、また医師が公衆のための常備医師が従来清潔の必要すら

病院内での指定を受けて、またその多数は常備医師が従来清潔の必要すら

指定されてある。かかる有資格医師が従来清潔の必要すら

支那入門および隊員の病院内において未だ未施されているものは何一つない。

保健康診は従来の健康診は未だ未施されているものは何一つない。

警護院の診所も拝礼して病院・および警護院の診所も拝礼して

止に努め、健康の民衆を病院に移すか又は検診所内に濃縮するなどの方法

を確かめよって、港湾および臨水地において常に効果ある療養を期す。
ぞれに、石の出組織は清演演の同様に協力をつつか、これによつてこの
門高院をまた門戸州全員にわたり飲料水検査を行なう。南清演演道への社会大
水を検査する。為治院附属地全員にわたり井戸水をすべて一年に二回検査され
る。今社の凡ての食肉類の検査も行なう。

すべてこの目的以たはこれに伴う検査を制に設けた。区、巡遊の眼科、歯科、耳鼻
咽喉科にあって従部からした為治院の健康診断に参じてある。この二本

相関、啓発制度は門戸州・門戸市および門戸に設けられ
る。近代的な健康診断を有する門戸には、今社からも奉行方からも
容易に行う事が出来ある。世界旅行者は従部の為治院

入る。
しかし、東京から大阪の間は長距離で、旅行は一層魅力あるものとなる。尚、

京都と大阪は、日本の文化遺産として、世界遺産に登録されています。

上海・南京・北京、南方都市の経済発展にも貢献している。
A REPORT
on
THE COMMUNISTIC MOVEMENTS
in
MANCHURIA

Contents

The Communist Movements in Manchuria

A Diagram showing the distribution of Chinese Communists in Manchuria.

An Outline of the Communist activities in various parts of Manchuria since the Outbreak of the Manchurian Incident (September 1931 - December 1931).

An Outline of the Communist activities in various parts of Manchuria since the Outbreak of the Manchurian Incident (January 1932 - March 1932).

The Communist activities in Manchuria

About 1917, the Communists of Russia started their campaign of Bolshefying Europe, but on seeing the difficulty of successfully carrying out their campaign at every front, they turned their activities to the east, and beginning with Persia, Afghanistan and India, they began Bolshefying the Far East about the time Siberia was subjugated by Soviet Russia in 1919, and after getting the whole of Outer Mongolia in their clutches, stretched their hand to the Kulun--
Buyor region, and continued active in the propagation of communism along the Chinese Eastern Railway and in such places as Mukden, Yingkow, Antung and Chientao.

The Bolshefication of Manchuria, however, was anything but easy at that time owing to the strict surveillance kept by both the Japanese and Chinese authorities, and their efforts, great though they were, were of comparatively little avail, and their activities seemed for a time brought to a standstill.

The diplomatic complications of 1929 in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway afforded the Third Internationale a rare chance to instigate their Manchuria committees to start an anti-war movement to disturb Manchuria, and when the attitude of the Chinese authorities in the northeastern provinces became infirm owing to the conclusion of the Khubersk pact, an outcome of the Chinese Northeastern Army having been overwhelmed by the Russian army, the Third Internationale again quickly seized the opportunity to strictly order Chinese Communists to start activities, and succeeded in strengthening their battle fronts in Manchuria by bringing under the control of their Manchuria headquarters the Kuoli, Korean and other communistic bodies formed by Koreans, which had hitherto been quite independent of the Third Internationale, and went ahead with such work as labour movements, Bolshefication of young men, movements for the mutual aid of workmen, anti-Imperialistic movements, military training of communists, and the instigation of soldiers to revolutionary revolts, with the result that the red unrest became more and more apparent in many places in Manchuria.
The Manchuria Incident occurred under these circumstances. Social unrest and disorder are the most suitable conditions for communistic campaigns to gain in, and reactionary elements and revolting soldiers are the easiest to be made a cat's paw of by the Third Internationale.

The Third Internationale, therefore, gave instructions to their committee at Harbin to the effect that Japan's advance to North Manchuria was quite incompatible with Soviet Russia's Far Eastern policy, and that the communists must use every means to force the collapse of the Japanese army by planting communistic elements among the Japanese military organs so as to cause anti-war agitation from within.

We were also informed that the Far Eastern bolshevik military committee in Vladivostok was inviting Koreans to organize a Baltizen Army with a view to agitating the Japanese army in Manchuria.

On the other hand, the reactionaries opposed to the new State of Menschurie, together with Ch'eng-Hue-liang's followers, in their desire to cooperate with Soviet Russia for the purpose of overthrowing the state of Menschurie and keeping off Japan, tried their utmost not only to bolskify these reactionary soldiers and irregulars but also to instigate the communistic young men to assassinate leading persons and officials of Japan and Menschurie, wreck the railways and attack the cities. The latest overturn of the Japanese military train and the attempt to wreck the Chinese Eastern Railway were but the few instances of their intrigues.

What was most noteworthy, however, was the fact that in January this year they established the so-called Soviet area near Hulin and...
Tumuchuan in Kirin province, and organized a red army, which fact makes us believe that the Third International means to guide the movements for Bolshefying Manchuria with this area as their base, just as they do in China Proper with their base in the boundaries of Kiangsi and Hunan as their base.

Moreover, the Third International tried to make their campaigns more effective by Bolshefying workmen in North and South Manchuria.

The program of their Manchuric provincial Committee speaks very eloquently of their dark intentions. The program, calling attention to the fact that the South Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern, and the Peiping-Mukden Railways were very important, that there were large numbers of workmen at Harbin, Mukden, and Dairen, and that the mines at Fushun and Penshu had a large number of miners, emphasized the necessity of concentrating every available means on enlarging workmen's associations, solidifying their footholds in factories, unifying the lower classes, and putting their vanguards and overseers under arms for self-defence.

The Third International also sent a large number of red officers to Harbin soon after the settlement of the diplomatic complications of 1929, and have them now working in the Chinese Eastern Railway and other institutions that they may at once take up arms in any emergency, and at present the members of the armed Russian Communist organizations along the Chinese Eastern Railway number 5,700 and are equipped with machine guns, pistols and rifles.

It is a custom with the Third International to propagate their ism first, then to form communist organizations, and lastly when they have become somewhat influential, to start rioting, wholesale
In Manchuria, too, their movements seem to be pursuing a similar course.

It is now clear as daylight and admits of no controversy that the activities of the Third Internationale are not only a great menace to the peace, order and welfare of the people and the realization of the noble ideal of turning Manchuria and Mongolia into a Utopia for all nationals, but quite detrimental to the interests of Manchuria and Japan, and of all the other nations as well.
A Diagram Showing
The Distribution of Chinese Communists
in Manchuria

The Chief Executive Committee
Of Chinese Communists
( Shanghai )

The Provincial Committee
For Manchuria
( Mukden )

The Special Committee
For East Manchuria
( Yenchi )
Members are stationed in principal parts of East Manchuria

The Special Committee
For South Manchuria
( Mukden )
Members are stationed in each prefecture of South Manchuria, but their number is not definitely known

The Special Committee
For North Manchuria
( Harbin )
Three members are stationed in each prefecture of North Manchuria
An Outline of Communist Activities in Various parts of Manchuria since the Outbreak of the Manchuria Incident (September 1931 - December 1931)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mukden</td>
<td>1. Manifestos and bearers thereof were discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Some Chinese Communists were arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haichuan</td>
<td>Manifestos were discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairen</td>
<td>Manifestos were discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>Manifestos were discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>1. Bombs were thrown at the Imperial Japanese Consulate-General and other buildings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Manifestos were discovered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chientao</td>
<td>Manifestos of various descriptions and programs were discovered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An Outline of the Communist Activities in various parts of Manchuria since the outbreak of the Manchuria Incident
(January 1932 - March 1932)

Harbin

1. Some propagandists stole into the Northeastern provinces.

2. Orders were issued by the Moscow Government to the Committee at Harbin to take positive measures against Japan, and the Comintern instructed the Soviet organs in China to propagate anti-Japanese agitation.

3. The North Manchuria Anti-Imperialistic League held a mass meeting protesting against Imperialism, and circulated their literature.

4. Funds for propagating communism were collected from the Soviet employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

5. Literature protesting against the entry of the Japanese troops into Harbin and urging their ousting was posted by the Harbin Comintern.

6. Handbills protesting against the new state of Manchuria were strewn by the Chinese Communist Young Men’s League.

Various places

1. Anti-Japanese propaganda was carried on by radio, press, and every means available by the Soviet Communists.

2. A Communist organ was formed and a campaign for the propagation of their ism was conducted by the management of the Manchuria provincial committee.

3. Soviet Russia was energetically active in the east of Kirin province, aiding the Chinese and Korean Communists, organizing the Soviet system, Bolshevizing the anti-Kirin troops, and supplying them with arms and munitions.
Vladivostok

The Bolshevik military Committee plotted to disturb the rear of the Japanese army.

Additional Remarks.

Since the beginning of April, Communist movements have been gaining in vehemence to a degree almost amounting to anarchy, and the communists have been busily engaged in such plots as shooting Japanese policemen, wrecking railways, attempting surprise attacks on Harbin, and supplying the anti-Kirin troops with arms and munitions.
附属者語

遠征に於ける共産党運動に於る報告

遠征監視部颁发以後活動吾等に於ける共産党運動活動

一九三一年八月より十一月まで

一九三二年一月より

一九三七年頃ヨーロッパの共産党はヨーロッパ赤化の運動に着手したが

一方に於て其成功を収める為の困難な途路を取りて其剣先を東に轉じ、

ベルシア・アッガニスト・インドを手始めとして一九三八年ベリリア

がソビエト・ソビエトに征服された極端東の赤化を開始した。
小标题

主要内容

小标题

主要内容
戦線を弱化するのに成功した。かくて労働運動、青年層の赤化、学生反
助運動、反帝主義運動、共産進歩の軍事が報録、兵士に対する革命的反
乱の使命等を行って活動を続け真総前進の多くの所に赤化の不安が益
明らかになって来た。

満洲事変はかかる情勢の下に起こった。社会的不安と秩序紊乱のは共産
主義運動に対して利点をもつ條件があり、反動分子（即註監洲勢
个国家運動に対する）と反乱的傾向を有する兵士とは第三インターナショ
ナルにとって其手足とするのに最も容易なものであった。

本の北緯連出はソビエット・ロシアの遠東政権と相容れるものであり、
共産主義者が支配下に置くか否かを問うてはならない。共産
軍の敵を衆の外にかしこまるものにはあらゆる手段を用ひて努力せば
ならぬ旨を脅へた。

又在ウラジオストクの遠東ポルシェビキ軍事委員会は在朝日本軍を圧倒する
目的でバルサラ軍を組織するよう朝鮮人を誘って居るという情報もあ

DAN LOC p 201 G

5
一方に於ては満洲の新設家に反對して居る反動分子並に張学良の部下は満洲國を倒し日本を滅亡する目的を達する為ソビエト・ロシアの協力の援助を求めて居たのである。これに対しての対抗策と称せぬ如き事は当然に於て居る変動の要因の一つである。
つて彼等の運動と一層効果あるきょうようと試みた。

第三インターナショナル満洲地方委員会のプログラムは彼等の傾向
意図を非常に緊急に配慮して居る。此プログラムは満洲鉄道・軍政
進及軍事機関が非常に重要である事、ハルピン、旅天、大連に多数の
工事が居るが、満洲及満洲の燃料の豊富に於けて注
意を喚起し工人会の発大・工場内に於ける地盤の確立、下層階級の統一
先案及監視に質する者の自衛の為の武装を強調した。

第三インターナショナルは再一九二九年の外交紛争の解決直後ハルピン
に多数の赤色士官を送り今では一朝一夕ある時は直ちに武器を執り得る
ように東支領内他の機関内に備かせて居る。現在東支鉄道沿線に於ける
カウフ委員の武装組織の数は五・七〇〇に達し機関銃、拳銃、小銃
を装備して居る。

第三インターナショナルの慣例の手段は先づ最初に其の主義を宣伝し
次に共産主義的組織をつくり最後に多少の努力を得た時に支部本部・ヨ
ロッス・インド等の例に見るように其場合々々に際して大々的な又は
中國共産黨中央執行委員會（上海）

東部特別委員會（上海）

南部特別委員會（上海）

北部特別委員會（上海）
いよべき程度に違し共産党はるか遠くに日本政官の罪犯、鍵を破壊
ハルピン総統官署、反共抗争に対する武器須要の供給等に從な
つあり。
December 26, 1937

This was an ordinarily happy day and it showed that wisdom and good sense of the Governments which refused to be stampeded into precipitate war in spite of the tendency of the one side to "save face" at almost all costs, and in spite of an outrageous affront offered to the other. The Japanese Government had expressed the most abject apologies for the sinking of the lanny and we, without a moment's delay, accepted those apologies. I thought that our Government's note was a masterpiece; we had observed with satisfaction the remoteness with which the Japanese Government had admitted responsibility, expressed regrets, and offered amends; we accept the Japanese action as responsive to our requests and expectations; we can rely on our own evidence and conclusions as to the details; we express the earnest hope that the steps taken by the Japanese Government will prove effective toward preventing any further attacks on or unlawful interference by Japanese authorities or forces with American nationals, interests, or property in China.

Equally masterly was the Japanese arrangement that its note should get to Washington on Christmas Day and should be dealt with by our Government on Christmas Day (our reply was dispatched from Washington at 3 o'clock on Christmas afternoon). The Japanese could hardly have failed to realize that the Christmas spirit is strong in our country and that the thought "Peace on Earth, good will toward men" must inevitably color and influence our decision. Anyway, I was so profoundly happy at the outcome that when I called on Kireta at noon I entered his room wreathed in smiles (a very different attitude from my call on him on December 17) and told him that I brought good news. Then I had finished reading our note to him, his eyes were really filled with tears and he showed as much emotion as any Japanese is capable of showing; he said: "I heartily thank your Government and you yourself for this decision. I am very, very happy. You have brought me a splendid Christmas present." I think his relief must have been tremendous, as was mine. To have, for the moment, safely passed a difficult, a very difficult, hurdle.
Yet I cannot look into the future with any feeling of serenity. Other hurdles, perhaps even more difficult ones, are almost certain to present themselves, and the patience of the American people is not inexhaustible. War between Japan and the United States will not come through mere interference with or even destruction of our tangible interests in China, or yet from the breach of treaty rights, or the breaking away of principles for which we stand, but war may very easily come from some further act in derogation of American sovereignty or from an accumulation of open affronts. China lies the danger, and it is a real danger which no one with knowledge of the irresponsibility of the Japanese military as distinguished from the Japanese Government can eliminate from the future picture. I left the minister's house realizing only too clearly that our satisfaction at the settlement of the Fanch incident may be but temporary and that the rock upon which for five years I have been trying to build a substantial edifice of Japanese-American relations has broken down into treacherous sand.
1937年12月26日

パネル事件

今日の時局と良調とを発表し、何をともあれ、予備を待つべきである。日本政府はパネル事件の真相を公に報告することなく、事実も公に示さず、戦争の突入を阻止したのである。日本政府はパネル事件の真相を公に報告することなく、事実も公に示さず、戦争の突入を阻止したのである。
我々がクリスマスを近づけることを向かって向かって向かって

政府がクリスマスを近づけるを向かって向かって向かって


gen.doc.  265-20
政府に比し無責任たるが、然し米国の主張を想定して別に考へざるも知れず、向五月間侵略事件の解決に於ては日本の為なり。
First Interview with Foreign Minister
-General Uchiki

May 31, 1938

General Uchiki, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, received
the diplomatic chiefs of mission individually today. Apparently without
knowledge of English, he spoke through an interpreter.

He said that he desired to do his utmost to develop good relations
with the United States, noting that having had no experience in diplomacy
he is unused to the intricacies of that profession and that therefore he will
always speak frankly. I replied that with thirty-four years of experience in
diplomacy I had become steadily more convinced of the stupidity of indirection
and that I could always count on complete frankness from us in our relations.
We had therefore mutually arrived at the same conception by different roads.

I said that it would be helpful if I might report to my government
about his attitude toward the protection of American interests in China. The
Minister replied definitely that he would guarantee the protection of
American interests in China and that if questions should arise in connection
there with I wished to inform him of them.

An officer of liberal leanings who, when later the Emperor chose him as
Prime Minister and directed him to form a cabinet, failed to do so because
the Army regarded him as too liberal and refused to nominate a Minister of
War.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan".
Page 247
and to persuade them to follow policies laid down by the civil elements in the
Government, and whether they can succeed is an open question. At the same
and to persuade them to follow policies laid down by the civil elements in the Government, and whether they can succeed is an open question. At the same
WHY FOREIGN MINISTER HIROTA LOST HIS JOB

June 21, 1933

A prominent member of the Japanese Government, speaking with full knowledge of the situation, has given the following picture of the purposes of the recent change in the cabinet and the intentions of the Government as they shape up at present. Prince Konoe and other members of the Government realized that if progress were to be made in consolidating Japan’s position in China and in avoiding serious friction with Great Britain and the United States the conduct of everything except purely military affairs must be taken out of the hands of the Army and lodged in the civil part of the Government. Hirota had fallen because he was too weak in opposing the Army while at the same time insisting that the Foreign Office has control of Japan’s foreign relations in China. This the Army would not tolerate, and it was for this reason that they were now setting up the so-called “China Organ” to deal exclusively with questions relating to China.

General Ugaki and Finance Minister Ikeda had accepted office only on condition that political and economic affairs in China should be taken out of the hands of the military, and this explains the appointment of General Itagaki as minister of war, because he has the confidence of the younger officers in the Army and at the same time believes that the Army should stay out of politics and should limit itself to its duties as an efficient fighting machine. Both Ugaki and Ikeda realize that the solution of Japan’s problem in China will be impossible unless good relations are maintained with Great Britain and the United States and Ugaki therefore proposes to do everything possible to see that their respective interests are protected. Obviously it is not going to be easy to take these matters out of the hands of the military and to persuade them to follow policies laid down by the civil elements in the Government, and whether they can succeed is an open question. At the same
time the purpose of setting up the North China Development Company and the Central China Renovation Company is to take economic affairs in China out of the hands of the Army. In all these questions "the Big Five" see eye to eye. The foregoing statement of the Government's position "come straight home from the horse's mouth" and is considered entirely reliable.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 248
A friend of mine, who is a doctor, told me that it would not be difficult to design a barrier where the development of the small intestine would soon be settled. However, because our personal relationship is not the most significant factor, we will not discuss this issue further. In fact, it would be best to leave it as is. 

I think that this is the best solution for now. It seems that the situation will not improve significantly in the near future. However, if we continue to procrastinate, things will only get worse. Therefore, I suggest that we take action now to prevent further complications.
therefor . net eJlov th<. incident to :\.w .1er. J know th*t Ctt would not

barring unexpected devclc-.aonts t!> ...ncirlut rould scon be settled.
August 3, 1938

The chief development in July was the Soviet-Japanese fracas at Changkufon on the Soviet-Manchurian border, in which the Soviet forces occupied a strategic hill in disputed territory and, according to local reports, the Japanese drove them back again with considerable casualties on both sides. Similar incidents have been occurring in that general region periodically during the past six years, ever since we came to Japan, but this particular incident seems to have been more serious than usual and reminded us of the trouble over the islands in the Amur River last year, when the Japanese appeared to be trying to cut the Soviet strength. In the present case it may be that the Russians were testing the Japanese strength and determination, or they may have staged the incident in order to draw Japanese troops away from the drive on Hankow, with a view to co-operating with the Chinese. If this was their purpose, they seem to have been at least partially successful, for considerable troop movements to the north are reported, and Japan can now hardly afford to omit preparation for any eventuality in that area.

Being convinced that the Soviets do not want war with Japan at present, and equally convinced that the Japanese cannot now afford any such venture, I was not greatly perturbed by the incident and felt from the beginning that it would be localized. General Ott, the German Ambassador, who has close relations with the highest Japanese military officers, told me that those high officers had said to him that they want no trouble with Russia at present because they are too much occupied in China and that they would therefore not allow the incident to develop. I knew that Ott would not mislead me, because our personal relations are of the friendliest, and that barring unexpected developments the incident would soon be settled.
The Minister then turned to the question of naval limitations and expressed regret that such limitation is not feasible at the present time, as the progressive increase in naval requirements could lead only to bankruptcy or a general explosion and someday an armed race too, which is the only way the United States can keep pace with the rest of the world.
The Minister then turned to the question of naval limitations and expressed regret that such limitation is not feasible at the present time, but navies are "dangerous toys": the progressive increase in naval requirements could lead only to bankruptcy or a general explosion and someday an
more could lead only to bankruptcy or a greater complication and uncertainty.

but not the economic or financial consideration in naval questions.

experienced regret that such limitation do not exist at the present time.

The writer then turned to the question of mutual interest and

correct these attacks, which were now being investigated.
April 19, 1939

After dinner Admiral Yonei took "oomen ruido (the Minister doesn't speak English very fluently) and asked him to tell me that my concern about the possibility of Japan's becoming involved in Europe had come to his attention and that he wished to tell me that I need have no further concern because "Japanese policy has been decided. The element in Japan which desires Fascism for Japan and the consequent linking up with Germany and Italy had been 'suppressed.'" Japan, the Minister said, while cooperating for the maintenance of friendly relations with both the democracies and the authoritarian states, must stand apart from either group, her own ideology being different from both of them.

Yoshizawa, to whom this talk was repeated, said that the decision to stay out of an alliance with Germany and Italy must have just been taken because he had not known of it. The Minister's statement to me might be taken as a definite indication that Japan intended to avoid embroilment in European troubles, and he knew that the Navy had held the balance of power in this important question, but we must not assume that there would be no strengthening of the Anti-Centrist Pact.

In further conversation with Admiral Yonei he said that the need for restoring good relations with the United States was being keenly felt. On his being informed that our difficulties, such, for instance, as the bombing of our property in China, could readily be eliminated, he replied that he knew all about this and that effective steps would be taken to correct those attacks, which were now being investigated.

The Minister then turned to the question of naval limitations and expressed regret that such limitation is not feasible at the present time, but navies are "dangerous toys"; the progressive increase in naval requirements could lead only to bankruptcy or a general explosion and someday an
agreement must be reached. "There must be disarmament," he repeatedly said.

This was one of the most important and significant conversations that we have had, and I regard it as marking a new trend, indeed a milestone, in Japanese-American relations, for Yonai can be trusted.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador Grew, entitled "Ten Years in Japan.
Pages 230 and 231
I have little of evidence that my arguments have contributed to the top -- is this: if a general war breaks out in Europe it is almost inevitable that the United States will be unable to stay out of it; things would be bound to happen which would inflame the American people, and history has shown that the American people are among the most inflamable people in the world. In
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is this: if a general war breaks out in Europe it is almost inevitable that the United States will be unable to stay out of it; things would be bound to happen which would inflame the American people, and history has shown that the American people are among the most influential people in the world. In
The American people are among the most influential people in the world. In the Horn of Africa, the United States will be unable to stay out of it; things will be bound to happen which would influence the American people. The American people are among the most influential people in the world.
May 15, 1939

The high light of the first half of May until we sailed on leave of absence was the effort to keep Japan from tying up in a general alliance with Germany and Italy. Up to our departure this effort was successful and I was given categorical official assurance that there would be no general alliance, although there would be some arrangement by way of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact with applicability only to Soviet Russia. But I know very well that the pressure on the Government will continue, and if Great Britain concludes an alliance with Soviet Russia it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that either the Government will be forced into a totalitarian alliance or will fall, Hirohito to be succeeded possibly by General Minami, Viscount Mido, or Navy Minister Yonai. But the appointment of Yonai would still mean no totalitarian alliance.

I think that the present political situation in Japan is full of dynamite and that further assassinations are possible, if not likely. The country is sick of the hostilities in China, with no outlook for peace, and wants concrete results which do not appear to be maturing. This does not at all mean that Japan is weakening; on the contrary, there is every evidence of determination to see the whole thing through, and there is very little evidence of any financial or economic crisis in the near future. But there is plenty of dissatisfaction with the failure to achieve final results and to get th. "China Incident" over with. The people are restive.

The line that I have taken in talking with Japanese, high and low — and I have plenty of evidence that my arguments have reached to the top — is this: if a general war breaks out in Europe it is almost inevitable that the United States will be unable to stay out of it; things would be bound to happen which would inflame the American people, and history has shown that the American people are among the most inflammable people in the world. In
such a case the pacifists and isolationists would be in the forefront of those supporting war -- at least, the great majority would be. If Germany were to bomb London and Paris and kill a great many civilians, that alone would stir the American people to the depths. And then, even if Germany and Italy had overrun Europe in the first few weeks of the war, the determination and unlimited resources of the United States would with mathematical certainty have won in the long run, as they did in 1918. If Japan were then tied up in the German camp in a general military alliance, it would be almost impossible for the United States to remain at peace with Japan.

It therefore behooves Japan to look into the future and decide where her friendship ought in her own interests to be placed. Japanese-American relations are temporarily strained owing to difficulties arising out of the campaign in China, but these difficulties should eventually be overcome and Japan should look at the long haul rather than at the immediate present. From every point of view -- economic, financial, commercial, sentimental -- the United States can be a better friend to Japan, if Japan plays the game with us, than any other country in the world. A Japanese-American war would be the height of stupidity from every point of view. In the meantime, what can Germany and Italy do for Japan? What concrete results are to be gained from their friendship in the long run? These considerations are worth weighing now, before it is too late.

These arguments, as I have said, appear to have been widely discussed and understood. I have reason to believe that the Emperor, and several highly placed people have encouraged the line I was taking. Some, including the Navy minister on his own initiative, spoke of my "anxiety" and said that I need worry no more as things were going to turn out the way I wanted them to do.
So we leave Japan for these few months of furlough feeling that, whatever the final result, at least nothing has been left undone to steer Japanese-American relations into healthy channels, which, after all, is my job.

A five-month furlough in the United States interrupts the diary at this point.

Extract from "Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador Crow untitled "Ten Years in Japan."

Pages 281-283
解説文書

防共闘争のため、日本に関する問題を解決することを目的とした、国際会議（テーガー会議）が開催された。会議は、日本の攻撃に対して、中国を含む国々が連携して対応するための内容であった。

我々は五月上旬に開催された会議で、日本に対する攻撃を阻止するための措置を講じた。しかし、会議終了後も日本の攻撃は続いている。
日本の国際的な立場は戦争の結果に大きく影響されます。米国は戦争を支持する人々の前線に立ちますが、少なくともその大多数が此のような戦争を支持する人々の最前線に立ちます。

若し日本がロンドン及パリを解放し多数の市民を救すとするならば、米国の講演に於ける言葉は日本が必要とする。日本は、米国が講演に於ける言葉を日本に教えるから、日本は試みるべし。

日本の国際的な立場は戦争の結果に大きく影響されます。米国は戦争を支持する人々の前線に立ちますが、少なくともその大多数が此のような戦争を支持する人々の最前線に立ちます。
ないが、可能である様に自分は考える。国中皆な平和の現実をつかね支那に於ける戦争に懸け早から具体的の結末を附け度いと欲して居る。此事は日本が一場大決して事態を完全に收拾しないものではない。いま却って日本は三大決して以て事態を完全に收拾しあちばち云ふありありとしした議案があり即着将来に於て財政的又は経済的危機が到来せずしようなどと云う事は思ひもよろん事である。併し有件の結果を獲て支配事態を完了した従順でなくなつて居る。自分は上層、下層の日本人と話し合うが之に依つて行な大体の筋は元自は自分の論理が上層階級に浸透して居ると云ふ澤山の議案を提し居る一方の通りである。若し欧州に戦争勃发の場合であろう、事態は亞米利加人は世界中恐れも激しく易き国民の一に歌へられて居る事は歴史が解明して居る。斯様の場合には平和主義者や孤立主義者に相違ない而も亞米利加人は世界中敗者も激しく易き国民の一に歌へられて居る事は歴史が解明して居る。
等は戦争を支持する人々の最前線に立ちます。少数ともその大多数が
若し彼がロンドン及びパリを掃落し多数の市民を殺すとすれば大事故で
米國人を護る願がすら。・場合便令ドイツとイタリアが戦争の最
初の数縁開יהに欧州を侵犯したとしても米国の決定と無限の資源は
果てに日本が平和を維持することは殆ど不可能であるだろう。
若し日本が平和を維持するという日本の當然なるべきことである。日本
従来より占領される経済的、財政的、商業的、感情的、如何なる観点より
するも、若し日本が我々と一様に事柄を運ぶならば米国は世界的他の経済的な
日本に対し良き友であら

Def. Doc. *206(29)
何故から見ても日米戦争は黒の骨頂だ。一方ドイツとイタリーは日本のために何が出るか、結局に於て彼等の英明関係から如何なる具体的結果が得られうるか。此等の考案は今、קטく大きい間に考察に便する。故に云ったように此等の観念は広く前線され評価させられたようで見えかた。其実は我不知の限りを西南に於て意動したと信すべき理由がある。自らの言深意に於いての當軍大臣を含む彼等は私の心地上について然し、若非は私が望んで居る方向にしろ、又それを我等は数月の休暇の間、紛争の結果にどうするかとかも、多くらつたとは何もないと感じて日本に於るのである。

来駅で於ける三ケ月の休暇に、此面に於て中に居る。
The Soviet Ambassador Pays His Respects

November 20, 1933

At 11 Yuzhnev, the Soviet Ambassador, made his official call after our recognition of the Soviet Union. I received him in my study at the Residence and we pledged each other's health in some excellent sherry. I believe he played a prominent part in the revolt of the Russian Navy at the very beginning of the Revolution. He has been Ambassador to Italy and Minister both to Persia and Austria, so must have accumulated considerable diplomatic experience. He says that Russia will not cede an inch on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and gives an impression of pessimism as to the future relations of the two countries. He is clearly overjoyed at our recognition and very very friendly.

...
C/LI! BEFORE TH' STORM

January 24, 1934

Dinner at the Embassy for the Foreign Minister.

Hirota was very friendly as usual but also evidently very tired from the strain of the opening of the Diet and of answering interpellations. Said it was an entirely new and difficult experience for him.

* * * * *
11.11

11.11

11.11
RUSSO-JAPANESE TENSION BEGINS TO EAST
February 8, 1934

(6) The highest influences in the country are pacific. The Emperor is a man of mild and peaceful character. The era of his reign is characterized by the word "shōnô," which he himself chose and which means "enlightened peace." There is no reason to believe that he approved of the Manchurian adventure, for the matter did not lie in his decision. Prince Saionji, the Genro, and Count Makino are profoundly imbued with the horrors of war. Since 1931 they have not been able to make their view publicly felt, but they are constantly working behind the scenes and it is believed that their influence is gradually increasing.

The Prime Minister is personally an influence more peaceful than bollicose. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has displayed unexpected strength and is personally largely responsible for the comparatively mild tenor of the press since he took office and for a new orientation in endeavoring to develop better relations with foreign countries. A strong group of liberals in the country have been steadily working behind the scenes and are, it is believed, developing more strength than they formerly possessed. At a recent dinner at the Tokyo Club in honor of Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador, and Ambassador Debushi, Baron Hayashi, the chairman, in introducing the speakers, said slowly and with firmness, in a tone nearly menacing and emphasizing his remark with a bang on his fist on the table: "To want peace." This is a small detail, but Baron Hayashi is Grand Master of Ceremonies of the Imperial Court and one of the Emperor's favorites.

(7) From the point of view of the Army itself—for in the last analysis the Army is likely to have the last word as to whether it shall be peace or war—new factors may exert a restraining influence. Even in the Army itself there are not lacking some elements who are aware of the seriousness of a Japanese-Soviet conflict and the question whether the end to be attained would justify the risks run—whether the game would be worth the candle.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREY, pages 118-119
彼の効果は「和」という言葉で表されるものである。文化の花咲く平和である。「天皇・上皇」を信仰する人々が心から願っている。やがて、彼の真実なる言葉に、心を揺さぶる力を持つ力の存在が、果たしてどのような影響を及ぼしているのか、それは目前に示されるであろう。
前米国大使グループの日記第一ハ九頁からの抜萃
During a long conversation today with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Yurenev, he first told me the present status of the negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. These negotiations are still confined to pourparlers between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself, the general conference not having yet reconvened. These pourparlers have taken the form of bargaining pure and simple, each side fervently wishing to win a success — especially Mr. Hirota, who will have difficulty in satisfying Japanese public opinion.

In brief, the situation is as follows:

The Soviet Government places the negotiations in two categories, the first comprising (1) replacement of the Russian personnel of the railway and (2) Kunshukusu assumption of the railway's debt, and the second category comprising the actual sale of the railway itself. For the compensation of the personnel the Soviet Government will expect an amount of between nine and ten million yen. The approximate amount of the debt he did not tell me. With regard to the price for the railway, the Kunshukusu authorities have not moved from their original offer of fifty million yen. The Soviet demand, which was originally placed at two hundred and fifty million yen, was later reduced to two hundred million yen. In order to convince the Japanese, the Soviet Government had subsequently agreed to receive 50% of the total amount in morehando and of the other 50%, 15% would be paid in yen immediately on signature and the remaining 75% would be paid within three years by the Kunshukusu Government. The final figure to be agreed upon would be a global amount. Bargaining with regard to the type of merchandise to be received in any going on, the Japanese desiring to make as favorable a deal in this respect as possible.

I asked the ambassador whether he was optimistic as to an eventual favorable outcome of the negotiations. In reply he made the significant remark: "An agreement will be reached if the Japanese wish to avoid war with Soviet Russia." I said to him: "That remark could be interpreted as meaning that if the Japanese do not come to terms the Soviet Union will declare war." He replied that this was not his meaning and that what he wished to convey was that if an agreement for the sale of the railway should not be reached, this fact would be a significant indication that the Japanese intended to bring about a war and would use the failure of the negotiations as an excuse to satisfy public opinion in Japan as to the reasons for such a war.

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EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR GREW, pages 122-23
ソヴェエト大使が日ソ交渉の現状を示し、彼との間の交渉は日本側が未だ接続されないので、外相と彼との間の交渉の形式を取り上げてある。自然に彼氏がうまく取れるとは思えないが、彼氏の所要は円滑である。
日本政府、政府関係の人にさえ、ソビエト政府は、彼役の関係のニズマートに対して五パーセントの不正を示すことを、経済的援助を受ける予定であると、

この文書もあるようである。受取るにあたって、日本政府は、この文書の主張を支持すべきである。ニズマートの口授を受けて、不正が疑われている。

前日、大使グループの日記第百廿二三三頁からの抜粋

二〇一〇年二〇一〇年〇月〇日

ニズマートの不正は、日本政府の援助を受けるために、五パーセントの不正を示すことを、経済的援助を受けることを表明している。

ニズマートの不正は、日本政府の援助を受けるために、五パーセントの不正を示すことを、経済的援助を受けることを表明している。

ニズマートの不正は、日本政府の援助を受けるために、五パーセントの不正を示すことを、経済的援助を受けることを表明している。
Tokyo, May 17, 1934

Confidential
Dear Mr. Gilbert:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of April 5. In answer to your letter and in compliance with the suggestion contained therein I shall endeavor to outline briefly the present political situation here with particular reference to the Japanese attitude toward international co-operation both at present and in relation to the basic Japanese policy of dominating East Asia.

In your letter you remark that "one gains the distinct impression that having achieved to such a large degree their objective in Manchuria, the Japanese are now endeavoring to effect an appeasement of the feeling against them in every direction possible." That is, in fact, the specific task which Hirota has set himself as Foreign Minister. Accordingly -- to use the phrases current in the Japanese press--for the "desperate diplomacy" of Shunt Uchida there has been substituted the "national defense by diplomacy" of Mr. Hirota.

In promoting his policy of consiliation Hirota has shown force and ability. He came into office last September at a moment when the pendulum of public feeling was tending to resume the norm.

* * * * *

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREW, page 135
グーリ氏ヨリ在スイス・ジュネーヴ近地

ト氏宛

アメリカ領事プレンティス・B・ガル

四月五日

貿易有機取扱件

ソノ返信トテ貿易中ノ御提言ニ

従ヒ私ハニルノ取扱件ノ際ハ

ソノ原案ヲ並テ

又東亜征服ト約ノ日本ノ基本政策ニ関テテ

調略ニ創設シマサレ

日本人ハ出来得ル限りアラルル方策デテ

感情ヲ寄せて努力シテルノ

ンテテハ

防壁

テテ取テテラレタノアリマス。
Furthermore, through public utterances and in the Diet, the voice of public opinion revealed dismay at the size of the military budgets and an inclination to blame the Army for the unnecessary and dangerous state of agitation into which the nation as a whole had been led. Businessmen and capitalists wished to be free to reap the profits of the export boom.

During all these months Hirota worked steadily, and I believe sincerely, to create a friendly basis upon which to deal with China, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. His hand was manifest in an immediate toning down of antiforeignism in the press; it was revealed in the renewed efforts to solve the current problems between Japan and Soviet Russia one by one; and it was emphasized to me in conversation in which Hirota showed an eagerness to explore any possible avenue which would lead to an improvement in American-Japanese relations. Certain people considered him a genuine liberal and the strongest Foreign Minister since Kusaka and Kato.
With Soviet Russia Japan is trying to keep the peace at present. Viewing the situation from Tokyo, neither side has now any stomach for war, nor are there indications in Japan or Manchuria of preparations pointing to imminent warfare. For the time being at least we need only fear a frontier incident of unusual gravity. Although Hirota has taken up the Chinese Eastern Railway question, the yen-ruble exchange question, the fisheries dispute, and the boundary problems one by one with an evidently genuine desire to remove them from the slate, progress has been very halting and bids fair to continue so.
ヘルン氏ヨリ在スキス・ジェネヴァ・アメリカ領事ブレントイス・B

ソ独ハ日本ハ現在平和ヲ保タウト故メテキマス。東京ニ於ケル情勢

肖ノ急遠ハハ不適ヲ為大調停ヲテハ見ラレマセント。少クトモ茲シバ

前合議団大便グルーノ日誌三丸頁ヨリノ彼

算金價ヲ斯ノ如キヲデハルデアラット思ハレマス。
HIROTA ON THE 1934 NAVAL CONFERENCE

September 7, 1934

Leave of Absence

I called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs to take leave of him before departure on a month's leave of absence to Peking and told him that if any questions should arise during my absence which he wished to discuss with the Embassy Mr. Neville would be in charge and would be glad to be helpful at any time.

Naval Conference

The Minister, on his own initiative, approached the question of the Naval Conference and said that Japan had definitely decided to abrogate the Washington Treaties toward the end of 1934. Many elements in the Navy wished to abrogate immediately, but Mr. Hirota had insisted on waiting until after the London conversations in October because as soon as one signatory had abrogated, the Washington Treaty would become null and void as regards all the other signatories and Mr. Hirota intended to discuss the matter with the other parties before abrogation in order not to give offense to the other signatories and also in order to avoid, prior to the next naval conference, unfavorable atmosphere which might be created if the abrogation should take place without some preliminary mutual understanding. The Minister said that the discussions concerning abrogation would be conducted with the various powers separately and that owing to Ambassador Saito's absence from Washington the matter is to be taken up with the American delegation to the preliminary conversations in London by Ambassador Matsudaira.

Mr. Hirota said that while the difficulties of solving the Naval problem with foreign powers were no doubt considerable, they were not so difficult as the domestic problem which he had to face dealing with the chauvinists. He said he had great hopes of some solution of the naval problem which would avoid saddling the various countries with future heavy building programs, especially because the younger officers of the Japanese Navy were definitely opposed to the building of big ships and were in favor of small ones.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREY, pages 142-143
一九三四年九月七日

喜田

余は一ヶ月の懸念を待て北京に出発するにさき立ち。外務大臣に勧告の拝啓を行ひ、余の不処中、我が大臣面の意見交流を希望する如何と間接的に主の場合にはネピル氏が代理となる何時にも喜んでお役に立つとゆうと申した。

同大臣は自らすすんで海軍部関の問題に触れ。日本は一九三四年の来頃のシントン條約を発表する次第で固めと申した。外務大臣に勧告の拝啓を希望している同人も多かったか。シントン條約は二個約款が発表されれば、他の締結条約全部に臨して立ちに無効となるもの故、枠月のロンドン条

次期海軍省官を仮前にして、面白い小説空気の生ずるのを遅けんとする策
からであった。面接は更に、欧米に関する意見の交換は各国と個別に交わられた。米国大統領を初めとする各国の指導者、特に日本政府の閣僚も、前日会談の内容を考慮に入れて交渉を進め、互いに理解を深めようとした。
January 22, 1935

On reading back over this diary I really wonder how I have the courage to send it to anyone, it is such a patchwork and crazy quilt and so many of the comments so rapidly set down require further elucidation or discussion. The field of Japanese-American relations, for instance, is so broad and so impossible to cover in a running document of this kind that my day-to-day comment, hastily expressed, might well give erroneous impressions. Our official dispatches, taken as a whole, probably cover the field fairly well, and from the point of view of history they must furnish the criterion. The only thing the diary can do is to supply a few illustrations to the text, but these illustrations, historically, should never be considered without the text. They are too likely to give one-sided and inadequate impressions.

Our dispatches, also, must be read as a whole and over a period of time to get the correct picture. Some of our dispatches, for instance, might be regarded as inconsistent. For instance, one of our dispatches on the naval conversations (No. 1087), which I am told was sent to the President, was based on the idea that the Japanese as a whole are absolutely intransigent regarding the question of naval parity and that there is complete solidarity in the country on that issue. That is absolutely true at present, but a fortnight later I wrote another dispatch (No. 1102) conveying the idea—though only as guesswork and so stated—that when the Japanese eventually find that we mean business in maintaining the present ratios, and that we intend to build and do build up to treaty strength, and propose to continue that policy even if it means a naval race, they, the Japanese, will seek a compromise rather than face such a naval race, and that although they have burned their bridges behind them, they are capable of remolding public opinion and policy over a period of time—even during the two years elapsing before the treaty expires. This, as I said, can be but guesswork, but everybody in the Embassy, including the Counselor and the Naval and Military Attachés, agrees that it is a sound guess. So the two dispatches were not actually inconsistent; the first dealt with the present, while the second had to do with the future if certain things happen, namely, the clear and factual demonstration of our determination to construct and maintain our navy on a 5-3 proportion, I only hope that the President, if he saw both dispatches, will get this point.
日記及び公文書類の説明
昭和十年一月二十二日

昨朝、日記を貸して見て私にはどうしてそれを他人に述ける勇気があるかと。本日は私には日記を紹介の必要なものである。その日記は日記のつぎのように細工であり、寄進集めのあるものである。

前に述べた如く、非常に迅速に書下さられた非常に多くの説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。例へば日本関係の縦談は非常に短くなく説明は更に説明及至し、結果を必要とするのである。
לא ניתן לקרוא את התוכן המוצג ב蛯برج 국내.
しておかなかったのである。最初のは現在のことを扱ひ二番目の公文露は同かの事が若し起るとしたならば将来のことを取り扱はなければならなかったのである。つまり我等を五奨三の比率に調整し論及する為の我々の決議公文露を見られるなら此點を顧みる事を推奨する次第である。元来大使グループの日記より抜

第百五十二頁より百五十三頁

3
I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and told him that having been more than three years in Japan my Government had accorded me a leave of absence and that I was sailing for the United States tomorrow. Said that I expected to return to Tokyo sometime in the late autumn. The Minister was good enough to say that he hoped I would return without fail because changing ambassadors always caused a certain amount of disturbance and an undesirable interim during which the new ambassador and the government to which he was accredited had to get used to each other. He thought it most important that no change should be made especially at the present time. I replied that so far as I was aware there was no intention to make a change at present and I fully expected to return to Tokyo.

I said that on arriving in Washington I would of course report directly to the President and to the Secretary of State and tell them of my observations and impressions concerning the situation in Japan and the situation between our two countries. If the Minister should desire to express any views, I would be only too happy to communicate them to the President and to Mr. Hull. Mr. Hirota replied by reminding me of the statement he had made to me when he first took office, to the effect that he considered good relations between the United States and Japan to be of paramount importance and that he intended to make the improvement of those relations the cornerstone of his policy. He said that while our relations had been difficult two years ago he felt that they were now distinctly good and he saw no reason whatever why they should not remain good. It was his purpose to do everything in his power to contribute to that most desirable result. He added that in his opinion the relations between Japan and certain other countries were very much more difficult and less satisfactory than the present relations between Japan and the United States.

In this connection he mentioned the naval situation and said that unless there was some prospect of coming to an agreement and concluding a treaty this year, he thought it much better to leave matters in abeyance and to maintain the present "peaceful" situation. He said he thought the most important thing to avoid was the bringing of pressure by one country on another, which could only
cause irritation. The Japanese Navy had no plan at present and was content to let things remain as they are for the time being. He thought that a conference would have to be held before the end of the year but it could be a purely formal meeting and could adjourn for a year or two without necessarily stirring up controversy. Mr. Kirotu gave me the impression that the Japanese Navy was in a less exacting frame of mind than it has been but he did not say this in so many words. The idea expressed was that if given sufficient time a good many difficult problems could be smoothed out.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GHOW,
pages 159-160
自分は今朝外務大臣を訪問し、自分は日本に続けて三年以上に亘つたので、今文書より水戸を経て閉目アメリカへ向けて出発する旨を伝へた。そして秋の終り頃には東京で陛下に謁つて来る予定であると述べた。外相は、大典がかかるれば必要と命じられて陛下に謁つて来るに違いない。不審なる言葉を私に述べた。外相は常に私に対して大典の移動のないが知らぬが如き旨を私に語られた。自分は東京に謁つて来るものと考えて居るから、自分ではまず何等の意見を呈すこともない。
外相は、彼が外務大臣就任の際自分に送った贈答品について、「次の様に」と答えた。「自分は、日米関係の友好的な維持を最大の重要事項とし、常に留意している」と彼は述べた。
TO: Secret Washington

36 February 26, 10 A.M. 1936

The military took partial possession of the Government and city early this morning and it is reported have assassinated several prominent men. It is impossible as yet to confirm anything. The news correspondents are not permitted to send telegrams or to telephone abroad.

This telegram is being sent primarily as a test message, to ascertain if our code telegrams will be transmitted. Code room please acknowledge immediately upon receipt.

GSIW

TO: Secret Washington

RUSH

37 February 26, noon. 1936. Section 1.
Embassy’s 36 February 26, 10 A.M.

1. It now appears fairly certain that former Premier Admiral Saito, former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Count Takino, Grand Chamberlain Admiral Suzuki, and General Katayama, Inspector General of Military Education, have been assassinated. It is also reported that Finance Minister Takahashi and the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board have been wounded.*

2. The military have established a cordon around the district containing the Government administration offices and the Imperial palace and do not permit ingress without Army passes. Telephonic communication with the administrative offices has also been stopped. The stock exchange has been closed.

Section 2.

3. It is now reported that Premier Okada, Home Minister Goto, and former Home Minister Hayashi were also assassinated and that Finance Minister Takahashi has died of his wounds. The Embassy cannot confirm any of these rumors.

*See photographs Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7.
4. So far there has been no disorder and no street fighting, as far as the Embassy is aware. The troops taking part in the uprising appear to be under perfect discipline and are not interfering with the normal affairs of the people. Until the nature and probable results of the uprising are better understood by the Embassy, however, the Embassy is advising those who ask to remain at home. There appears to be absolutely no anti-foreign feeling involved in the affair.

Section 3.

5. A mimeographed statement was left by groups of soldiers at each of the principal newspaper offices this morning. The statement alleged that the present government has been drifting away from the true spirit of Japan and that it had usurped the prerogatives of the Emperor. As evidence of this the statement cited the signing of the London Naval Treaty and the dismissal of General Mazaki. It continued rather vaguely with an expression translated by the T.J.P. about as follows: "If this condition is permitted to continue, the relations of Japan to China, Russia, Britain, and the United States will become explosive in nature." The statement was signed by Captain Noneka and Captain Ando, both of the Third Infantry Regiment stationed in Tokyo. According to the soldiers who delivered this statement, another announcement will be made at five o'clock this evening and at that time "a new law of state" will be promulgated. The Embassy's informant believes that certain constitutional prerogatives will be suspended. He likened the existing situation to the Batista coup d'etat in Cuba.

Section 4. (Paraphrase)

6. The uprising, as far as can be ascertained by the Embassy, is in the nature of a coup d'etat engineered by the young Fascist element in the Army and intended to destroy the entire group of elder statesmen who have been advisers to the Throne and thereby effect the so-called "Showa Restoration." Presumably to prevent anyone from obtaining access and securing an Imperial Mandate which would interfere with the plans of the Army group, the Emperor himself is apparently being held in the palace incommunicado. The trial of Aizawa, murderer of General Nagata, which has excised the feeling of the Fascist element in the Army, and the recent election which returned an unexpectedly large number of more candidates who are liberal, appear to be the immediate causes of the uprising. Latest reports indicate that Admiral Osami, Minister of the Navy, has assumed the position of Acting Prime Minister and that General Mazaki is the leading spirit in the affair. The movement, down to the last detail, appears to have been thoroughly organized in advance. (End of paraphrase)

7. The Embassy has just learned from a fairly reliable source that Count Makino is safe.
February 27, 1936

This is a dreadful time and I have just returned from a har­rowing experience—calling at the Saito * house, the very one where he was murdered yesterday, being ushered up to the little room where his body lay on the floor under a sheet, probably the same room where he was killed, kneeling to burn incense and then turning to the mourning family and finding myself face to face with dear Viscountess Saito herself. Yesterday she was in the hospital, recovering from the wounds inflicted on herself; she must have dragged herself out, her arm in a sling, to be with the body of her beloved husband.

She asked if I wished to see his face and then removed the sheet; there was a bullet wound visible (only one of his thirty-six wounds), but he looked peaceful enough. How we loved him and ad­mired and respected him. He had a winning smile, always; and his white hair gave him a distinction quite apart from the distinction he had won in his many high posts and useful life. Only a few hours before the assassinations he sat at our table beside Alice, jolly and gay, and his wife next to me, and opposite me was Admiral Suzuki, who lies at the point of death from his own wounds.

Today, when I had paid my respects, Viscountess Saito said to me while we were both still kneeling in front of each other be­side the body that her husband had never before seen the sound films and that he had loved the picture at our Embassy and that she knew he would wish her to thank us for having given him such a happy last evening. I was really too much moved to do more in reply than to convey Alice’s sympathy too. Who could have foreseen that he was leaving our Embassy that night, and probably Admiral Suzuki too, to go straight to his death by bullet and bayonet in his own peaceful little Japanese home?

These assassinations have stirred us terribly—Saito, Takahashi, Watanabe dead and Suzuki probably fatally wounded. Thank heaven that Count Niidono escaped; he was warned in time and managed to leave the hot-spring hotel where he was staying and find some refuge just before a gang of the insurgents broke in with the intention of killing him in cold blood. Kabayama has talked with him since and telephoned from Iyonosaka to tell me so. Prince Selonji, in the country at Ochita, also escaped in time, but those in Tokyo seem to have had no warning whatever.

* See photograph No. 7
Defense Document No. 206-C(1), cont'd

It is significant that somebody telephoned to our servants during dinner asking that they be informed the moment Saito left our Embassy and when we looked up the number later it was found to be the local police station; they may have had some special warning or it may have been merely the usual precautionary protection, probably the latter. At any rate, Saito's presence under our roof that night made no difference one way or the other; he left well before midnight and was not killed until 5 or 6 o'clock the next morning. It would have been doubly horrible if the murderers had invaded our Embassy, as they could easily have done so far as their force was concerned, and bayoneted him at our table; the international aspects of such a move would probably have weighed little with those young hotheads if they had felt that it would facilitate their object; some and perhaps all of their groups were armed with machine guns; in the case of the Prime Minister several police were mowed down before the building was entered, and at the Isetanebe house his entire family and servants were wiped out.

PIELING TOGETHER THE JOURNAL OF THE MAGIDY

March 1, 1936

Everything that happened before the revolt now seems so trivial in comparison with the events of the past four days that there is no incentive to record the earlier daily notes. Little by little I shall have to try to piece out all that took place between February 26 and 29. The final denouement, namely the sudden reappearance of Prime Minister Okada, alive and uninjured, after we and nearly everybody else believed him to have been assassinated, seors of the most intense melodrama and it has certainly made the insurgents the laughingstock of Japan if not of the world, which is a very healthy thing. Yet sorrow and anger overcome the humor of it.

To begin the story we have to go back to our dinner for the Saitos on the evening of February 25. We sat down to two tables, thirty-six in number, and wishing to give the old gentleman and our other guests something out of the ordinary in the matter of entertainment I had seen several films at the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studio during the past few days. On the last afternoon, Shethin showed me Naughty Marietta, with Jeanette MacDonald and Nelson Eddy and I decided at once that the ideal picture had been found, for it was full of lovely old Victor Herbert music, beautiful scenes, a pretty, romantic story and no vulgarity whatever, almost as good a film as One Night of Love.

Almost immediately after dinner the film began. We put Viscount Seito in a comfortable armchair, knowing that if he was
bored with a film he could comfortably sleep because he had told Neville that he had learned in the Navy to catch a nap at any time and under any circumstances. But I think he enjoyed it too much to sleep. We had a pause with refreshments halfway through and then continued, nearly two hours of film. Betsy Neville said that the Japanese ladies' eyes were distinctly red at the end of it, so I think they were moved by the romantic story. There was supper afterward, but the Seito left at about 11:30, pretty late for them because they generally leave dinners punctually at 10. I saw the old gentlemen out and that was the end of a friendship which began when I made my first call on him as Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in June, 1932.

It is interesting to think that he began his great career with Americans—Admiral Schley and at the Naval Academy at Annapolis—and finished it at the American Embassy. He was a lovable character, gentle, charming, courtly, but with great wisdom and broad liberal views in an age of chauvinistic strife. I had hoped that he would be able to use his influence in settling the school crisis in Korea, arising out of the demands of the petty authorities that both Christian pupils and teachers worship at the Shinto shrines—a demand which may result in the closing of all our mission schools if persisted in. He always supported our missionaries. But now his wise influence has gone and who knows what the future will bring?

The telephone rang early on the 26th—it was Neville, I think—who broke the news of the assassinations during the early morning—wild rumors that the insurgents had taken over the Government and parts of the city—no one knows who had been killed and who survived or how intensive the insurrection might be. Our first telegram was sent in the morning and was acknowledged by the Department, six hours in transmission. During the four days of revolution we had scouts constantly moving about the city, especially our Military Attaché, Colonel Carey Crane, and his language officers, observing developments to the best of their ability. On the very first morning Neville quietly walked through the lines of troops, politely telling the soldiers in Japanese that he wanted to go to the Foreign Office and being passed through with equal courtesy; I think he was probably the only foreigner who got to the Gaimusho that first day—and he did it twice.

That night Alice was nervous lest the American Ambassador might be included in a sort of supplementary program of the revolutionists and insisted on our sleeping in an unusual room and nearer to the baby; I fear she didn't sleep very much at all but I laughed at her fears, well knowing that the last thing the insurgents wanted was trouble with the United States at this particular
juncture. The next day our Embassy was heavily guarded with troops, outposts, and sandbag barricades below the chancery, as well as three detectives (including our friend Iida from the police station) and two soldiers inside the house, and whenever I descended to the chancery they insisted on coming too.

The Mexican Minister came into town from the country the first day and couldn't even get into his Legation and telephoned to me for help; I did my best through Horinouchi, but the Foreign Office was completely powerless and the Minister seemed to be satisfied with my efforts, unavailing as they were. The rebels were situated in the official residence of the Prime Minister and the Sanno Hotel, very near us, and their banners floated from both buildings; we watched developments through glasses from our roof.

The Japanese Government quietly made all military preparations to capture or kill the rebels, meantime maintaining the most perfect discipline and order in the city, and then waited for two days until they surrendered little by little, in small groups, as a result of broadcasts, leaflets dropped from airplanes into the grounds of the Prime Minister's residence and the Sanno Hotel, and a big streamer attached to a balloon, all stating that the Emperor called on the men to return to their barracks, where they would be pardoned because they had been misled, that their parents and brothers and sisters were weeping at the thought of their disobeying the Emperor, and that unless they disbanded they would be shot. This had precisely the desired effect and the whole thing was settled with very little, if any, shooting except for the original assassinations. I should call this anything but barbarism.

We now know that when the last soldiers had left the Prime Minister's residence and the Sanno Hotel, the officers who had engineered the revolt finally surrendered after four days and that the Government gave them two hours to commit hara-kiri. But they didn't commit hara-kiri because they expected civil trials as in the case of former assassins and they fully intended to use the courtroom as a forum to stir up the people against the Government. It must have been a great shock to them when they were tried by court-martial and several of them sentenced to death and shot.

The story of one incident, that of the attempt to kill Count Makino, is deeply moving. The old gentleman was staying at a hot-spring hotel in the country when an officer and several soldiers arrived in the middle of the night to assassinate him. According to the story which reached me, and I believe it to be true, Count Makino's guard shot and killed the officer and was himself killed by the soldiers, who then set fire to the hotel with the intention of forcing Count Makino into the open. Behind the hotel was a precipitous cliff and the old gentleman was led by his granddaughter Kazuko and trained nurse up onto a ledge on the cliff from
which they could climb no higher. They were shortly lit up by the fire as if a flood light had been turned on them and the soldiers raised their guns. At just that moment, however, the little granddaughter, who was a lovely girl and a great friend of our daughter Elsie, spread her own kimono in front of her grandfather and the soldiers, being deeply moved by this heroic gesture, dropped their guns and did not shoot. I have always felt that little Kazuko was one of the real heroines of the February 26 incident and she certainly saved her grandfather from death.

Japan's N.K. Lia Begins

March 1, 1936

The period of the insurrection lasted only four days and yet we in the Embassy feel as if an era had passed since that happy evening when we had the Saitos and Suzukiis under our roof last Tuesday. If time is measured by events, certainly an age has gone by since then. Such things are occurring in many parts of the world from time to time, disasters of one kind or another whether caused by the forces of nature or by the hand of man, and the rest of us look on objectively. We read the morning paper and say "What an awful catastrophe" and pass on to our daily tasks and thoughts, not greatly moved. It is only when such things occur in one's midst and when violent death and heroic action take place among one's friends and almost at one's door that the shock really comes home and remains.

Gradually, from the accounts of friends, we can now reconstruct the way the assassinations took place, and not only do the stories redound to the credit of the man but they show the true stuff of Japanese womanhood—how Viscountess Saito placed herself in front of her husband, said, "Kill me instead; my husband cannot be spared by the country," and actually put her hand on the mouth of the machine gun until her wounds forced her aside, and how Mrs. Watanabe lay down with her husband in her arms so that the assassins had to force the gun underneath her body.

The story of Admiral Suzuki should live in history; Captain Ando, pointing his revolver, discussed the situation with him for ten minutes and when the discussion faltered, Suzuki asked: "Have you anything more to say?" Ando replied: "No, sir." "Then shoot," said Suzuki, and Ando fired the three shots. One grazed his skull but failed to penetrate the brain, one went through the chest and lungs, and the third lodged in the leg. The chest wound was the serious one and the Admiral lost so much blood that only blood transfusions could save his life. It looks now as if he might pull through. Takahashi's murder was the really brutal one: not content with shooting, the rebel officer hacked him with his sword—and then apologized to the household for the "annoyance"
caused.

Well, we must carry on and try to see what it is all going to mean. One thing emerges as absolute certainty: there must be a "New Deal" in Japan or the same thing will happen—again and again. I have confidence in Hirota, but he is saddled with one of the most difficult problems which any man ever faced. He has a tremendous opportunity, in some ways the same opportunity which confronted Franklin Roosevelt when he took office, and if he can deal effectively and successfully with the problem he should go down in history as a very great statesman.

It is easier to understand how such things as the incident of February 26 can occur in Japan if one stops to think that the history books upon which the Japanese youth is brought up are full of the records of just such deeds from the earliest times—assassinations or suicides for motives of revenge or loyalty to one's chief or the assumption of responsibility for a given situation. Paradoxically—and Japan is a country of paradoxes—these young officers held that they were acting in the interests of the Emperor, ridding him of the alleged nefarious influences around the Throne, men whom the Emperor himself had chosen. And there was no personal animosity involved. When they had killed Saito and Watanabe and Matsuo (mistaken for his brother-in-law, the Prime Minister), they called for incense to burn beside the bodies; in the Takahashi house no incense could be found, so they insisted on placing lighted candles beside the murdered statesman. If these things are to be prevented in future, not only will a social and economic New Deal have to be brought about within the country, but Japanese education in the schools and in the Army will have to undergo a radical alteration.

One of the pleasant things which emerged from the incident was the absolute unity of the Embassy staff as a single team both in action and spirit. This included the Naval, Military, and Commercial Attaches, and their several assistants who worked with the rest of us, hour by hour, in the closest co-operation, pooling their observations and information for the good of the whole, without any special thought of their own departments. Although all our nerves had been pretty well tried by the end of the four days, there was never a sign of irritation or friction on the part of anyone. Of course it is easier to weld such a group into a unit in a place like Tokyo than in London or Paris, and we certainly have unity here. Our staff is made up of all sorts of heterogeneous types and characters, yet no club membership could be more congenial. One of the secrets, I think, lies in the fact that any group of men who play together a lot will almost certainly work well together too.

-8-
HOW PRIME MINISTER OKADA WAS ASSASSINATED

March 2, 1936

The facts concerning the escape of the Prime Minister now seem to be fairly well established. Early in the morning of February 26 the alarm bells in the official residence rang (as they once rang by mistake when Alice and I were dining with Viscount Saito when Prime Minister some four years ago and the report got around that we were being assassinated). Admiral Okada looked at his watch and remarked to his brother-in-law, Matsuo, who was sleeping in the same room: "Well, my last hour has come but I won't die in pajamas." Matsuo replied: "Your life is too valuable to be spared," and while Okada dressed, Matsuo ran downstairs and into the garden, shouting "Banzai," where he was pursued and promptly killed, being mistaken for Okada in the early-morning light.

Five of the police guards were shot and killed at the entrance and one wounded. Okada was pushed into the servants' quarters and shut in a closet. There he remained until the next night, when Matsuo's body was removed and Okada, disguised, simply walked out with the mourners. I should say that Matsuo was the real hero of the whole rebellion because, while there were plenty of brave and loyal police who met death in trying to protect their charges, they were acting in line of duty and Matsuo's action was spontaneous altruism.

HIROTA REORGANIZES

March 5, 1936

Cabled to the Department that Hirota has been commanded by the Emperor to form a cabinet. I am very much pleased because I believe that Hirota is a strong, safe man and that he will have to play ball with the Army to a certain extent, I think that he will handle foreign affairs as wisely as they can be handled, given the domestic elements which he will have to conciliate. I think too that he wants good relations with the United States and will do what he is able to do in that direction—in other words, as much as any Japanese Minister could do. If I had had the pick myself, I know of nobody whom I would have more gladly chosen to head the Government, with American interests in view. To have chosen an out-and-out liberal would have been fatal because any Prime Minister at this juncture must absolutely possess the confidence of the Army and Navy if he is not to be hamstrung at the start.

To our astonishment, Hirota immediately announced the make-
up of his new cabinet, including Yoshida as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the press said that Yoshida was acting as his chief of staff in choosing the various ministers. This seemed to us precisely like waving a red flag at a bull because not only is Yoshida a pronounced liberal but he is the son-in-law of Count Hakimo. But naturally the Army wouldn't accept him for a moment, and it was soon announced that Hirota had run into hot water and was having difficulty in forming his cabinet and that General Terauchi, his choice for Minister of War, would not serve unless a radical alteration were made in Hirota's slate.

I can't imagine why Hirota made the announcement because he surely must have known that Yoshida would be impossible and it would seem to put him, Hirota, in a weak position to have to throw Yoshida overboard and revamp his cabinet at the Army's dictation. There must have been some deep-seated purpose in the maneuver, possibly to place squarely on the Army the responsibility for tempering with Hirota's foreign policy. To anticipate a little, it took Hirota four days to smooth out his differences of opinion with the Army and to submit to the emperor his final slate in which he himself is to keep the portfolio of Foreign Affairs for the time being. Throughout all this time very little if anything has been heard from the Navy, publicly that is. It is said that no love is lost between the two forces and that during the uprising the Navy, which brought several ships up to Tokyo, said to the Army: "Settle the affair quickly or we will either settle it for you or pull out," and they did pull out almost immediately. I am told that they are, in fact, thoroughly ashamed of the Army's responsibility for the whole business. The story of Admiral Chumi's going to the palace the first day of the uprising surrounded by a large body of bluejackets and with two machine guns is perhaps significant.

HIROTA DEFINES "POSITIVE DIPLOMACY"
March 13, 1936

At 3 o'clock Mr. Hirota received me in the Prime Minister's official residence and while I was waiting to go in, Kishi, who has now been appointed Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, showed me the room where Okada slept and from which Matsuo ran out into the garden to his death. Hirota saw me alone without an interpreter. He said at the start that the policy which he has been following as Minister for Foreign Affairs would continue unchanged and that now that he was at the head of the Government this policy would always prevail. He said that he had the support of all members of the cabinet and that eventually he would select a Minister for Foreign Affairs upon whom he could count equally to support his policy.

I asked Hirota if he would define the term "positive diplomacy" which was now being aired in the press as the program of the
new Government. Hirota said that this term applied only to China and Soviet Russia and it simply meant a general speeding up of the policy already followed. So far as Soviet Russia was concerned, the Army is dissatisfied with the great difference between the Soviet forces in Siberia and the Japanese forces in Manchuria and they wish the latter-referred to as "defensive forces"--to be built up to a point more nearly approximating the Soviet forces across the border. He said, however, that a Soviet-Japanese war would be stupid because neither party could be expected to accomplish concrete results and he assured me that there would be no war so long as he is in office.

With regard to China, Hirota said that the three points already enunciated would form the basis for future Sino-Japanese negotiations and that these points had already been accepted by the Chinese Government in principle. At my request he defined these points as follows:

a. A stop must be put to anti-Japanese activities and propaganda in China.

b. It is understood that de jure recognition of Manchukuo by China at present would be difficult and it is not demanded, but what is desired is recognition of the existence of Manchukuo and regularization of such factual relations as customs, communications, transit, et cetera.

c. Sino-Japanese co-operation is desired to combat the spread of Communism.

I told Hirota that it would be helpful if he could authorize me to reassure my Government that the pursuance of Japan's policy in China would not interfere with foreign rights and interests, including the principle of the Open Door. The Prime Minister said that there would be no tampering with the principle of the Open Door by Japan and that, so far as he could see, the only possible way in which foreign rights and interests might be indirectly affected by Japan's policy would be through the possible relinquishment by Japan of her extraterritorial rights some time in the future.

Prior to leaving I took occasion to speak to the Prime Minister, on my own initiative and not under instructions, about the difficulties which the Government in Washington is encountering through the increasing flow of cheap Japanese goods into the United States; I spoke of the co-operative efforts which were being made between the Department of State and the Japanese Embassy in Washington to solve these difficulties on a practical and equitable
basis, but said that in spite of all efforts in this direction, our domestic industrial interests were bringing greater and greater pressure to bear on our Government and it might become necessary eventually to ask for more restrictive efforts by the Japanese Government.

Incidentally Hirota said during our conversation that, as he had told me at our first interview, good relations between Japan and the United States were the cornerstone of his policy and would continue to be so.
電報

（昭和三六年二月二日午前十一時）

暗殺事件、即ち東京大本営を占領した日本軍は、東京電報局に電報を出すことで、新聞を発行することを許可されている。

この電報は、日本の暗殺事件が伝わるか否かを確認するため、発信者に知らせたいです。
四大使館の知る限り、我々や市街地はこれ迄かかって、反乱に参加した軍
隊の規律は完全のようである。民の日常業務を妨げてはいない、併し反乱
の住民及びその親族の結果が大使館に一層よく別明する迄は、大使館はそ
かを希望する人達は自宅に留まるよう勤めている。この事件は組織的
に何等特別な感情を持たれていないようである。

今朝各大使館から新聞社に印刷機に取り組む聴聞が各紙を作つた兵卒達によ
つて、配布された。このは聴聞は、現政府が本來の日本利益より越さか
り天皇の大号を要求したと断簡していた。「ヨーロッパ連合国との誤解を
立てている」と告げられた。民政府は一時的に任務を停止し、聴聞を
発行した。この聴聞は、政府が本來の日本利益より越さかったが、同
日、ルンドン連合国諸国は同聴聞を可哀とするとして、向
上民政府との誤解を立てているとのことがあろう。大使館の扱
明が可哀である。
現状をキューバのナポリスア非常手数に類似しているという。

大使館の確認せる斷ては、この反応は職務の命令を受けて、天皇陛下の息訣を存ずるに拘らず、外務省との連絡を断たれて居るため、天皇陛下自身も多分間違に拘留され、外務省との連絡を断たれたる申し送る旨を、届けられて居る。
昭和・戦時下の親子

昭和三十六年 昭和十一年 十二月 二十七日

昨日彼が現に来られた家宅を訪問したのです。私は分かって後は彼が見られた

年の音に、彼女は彼女の言葉をうばうの役を務めました。彼女は非常に彼をかじし、蛇口にす

いのやぎが、彼は彼女の多くの高い役を務め、直後のほんの短い間前に、彼は自分に快適にアリスの

高を彼女に任じ、彼は我に快適にアリスの

りに座位して私共の食卓についていた。そして彼の白髪は

きわめて美しい向いに席を

に座位した。
今日私が敬意を表した時、白屋の子供夫婦が私共二人が来た時、私のそばに寄り近くで坐っている間に、私に次のように言わった。即ち彼女の夫は以前に、

服部映画を見たことがなく、彼は私が大変重でやった映画を面白かった、と

そこで彼はかくも驚いた。最後の興を彼に興へてわかった映画を面白かった。彼がその映画を私共に感動させた。

思うような彼女に感じているに違いないと、私は突然間のことを私共に感動させた。彼は突然間のことを私共に感動させた。

しかし彼女に登んだ以上の星の平和を小さく日本の人々で、映画と映画で、

彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いいた。彼は突然間のことを無敵で見守っていた。彼女が見たのは有眼いた
徳大寺 - 1 - 8-1

「甲府に来たことは凡て今コン見れば不思議の餘分に発表なるもの
常に思額なもので、それをより直の日記を撮すようなる様とうなるもの
何故すればなるべし。少し私は二月二十六日より九月七月に至る等ことを
取り換えてこんど離れても意味されるものと信じられていたのに。生まれて貧弱せす発

を当めから述べるには。私共は二月二十五日の寫実を書籍を主家とし
た。私共の視覚に従いなさればならぬ。主家三十六人は二つの事件につ
いた。そして余共に何か見たことをやる。老紳士とその客類を置いて
と思って、私は過去数日間はメトロポリタン・メイ・ディ・ヌード・コーエ
ル及びビル・ス・エデルの出来の一つに至るまでアリュートを見せて来て
了。私共の小説の書籍は驚嘆に、驚嘆にたより発

・ハーバートの書籍は驚嘆に、驚嘆にたより発

・ハーバートの書籍は驚嘆に、驚嘆にたより発
前に、彼は著しく疲れ、額に汗をかきつつ、黒い風呂敷を持ち込んで来ました。
彼女は黒い風呂敷を持ち込んで来たので、彼女に座り心地のよいと言われた。

彼女は彼女が眠りに落ちてから、顔をひきつむった。
彼女は彼女が眠りに落ちてから、顔をひきつむった。

彼女は彼女が眠りに落ちてから、顔をひきつむった。

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彼女は彼女が眠りに落ちてから、顔をひきつむった。

彼女は彼女が眠りに落ちてから、顔をひきつmu
すもなたに、さちの

最後の兵道が、首相官邸および山王ホテルを引き上げた時、戦乱を

した所長が、望みに心斎の兵道を踏み、兵道を政府に対して戦乱を

私たち今知り、兵道は決して政府の兵道を踏み、兵道が、

では、大きな敵敵だと言われるその力であるが、

軍部が、士兵は決して政府に対して兵道を踏み、兵道が、

兵道を踏み、士兵が、士兵は決して政府に対して兵道を踏み、兵道が、

この兵道は決して政府に対して兵道を踏み、兵道が、

自分の着物を親父の前に立てた。
一九三六年（昭和十一年）三月一日

被害はこの英雄的動作に激しく助かされて銃を穂し、発砲しなかった。私

は可成い和子鎮は二・五大事件の真の英雄の一人であり必ず彼女が

父を死から救ったのだと何時も感じてゐる。

大阪は四日間で終った。併し我々大使館員はこの前の火曜日に齊藤夫

や鈴木夫難とこの建物に共に集しく過した夕以来一時代が過去と

やうに感じた。此のやうな事件に即ちそれが自然の力により成に人為に

より起ったにこそや、何等かの種の災害は世界の名所で次々に起つて

てひどく心を動かされる時を経て存続するのとはこのやうな事件の

努めが無くても存続するのはこのやうな事件の存続的意義ありなら

と申ふもこの

近に家の入口で起つた場合に限る。今や我々は友人達の話から徐々に暗殺の行はれた筋道を巡ることが出

来る。そして諸報道は男子達の名誉をたかめるのならず日本女性の低頭
代りに殺して下さる。Castle gallon in the room and dakeは、手を振ってた。又廃夫人は夫
を自分の腕で抱けて共に臥れたので暗殺者は銃を夫人の

けなければならなかった。

十分間彼は情勢を察じ何は、銃弾が途絶ええた時、鎌倉

答へたので、それから夢で、と銃木が言つた。そこで安藤

ては頭を振ったが、しかし室には無しをいた。胸部の

部の生命を取止めた。現在彼は危険を通り越し

出血したので、黒血で斬く彼の

起した迷惑について申願できないと言つた。

では言足せず、飯綱家、鎌倉家は彼を自分の

妻でつづ刺しその後で家族に。起

15
私たちは、日本に於て新政策の一が行なるべきである。事の如く新政策の如くに同様のあり方をなす、則してこれが為すべきありの如きをはったるる史に於て二の一の如きとさきの如き、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するかねば出来れば、則して彼が其の問題を有効に首尾よく整理するか

16
人々の楽りは、文壇に共に良く顧みてゐる—aというか、貞純に存するかは、私に思い
デフォスオフ・オフデフォスオフ

首相は、昭和十六年三月二日の暗殺を果たした後、自分自身が首相に近づいていたとの説明がある。この暗殺は、彼の暗殺計画を含む資料を遺棄してしまった。

首相は、暗殺計画を実行した後、自らを殺したのは、彼の暗殺計画を含む資料を遺棄してしまった。

首相は、暗殺計画を実行した後、自らを殺したのは、彼の暗殺計画を含む資料を遺棄してしまった。
昭和三六年三月五日、陸軍大本営よりトマス・ク Datos報に宛て次のような電報が送られた。

当面の敵は大連に駐屯する陸軍を基盤にし、その周辺地域を攻撃の対象とする戦術をとっている。したがって、我々の行動にも対処が必要である。我々の作戦は、敵の攻撃に対して迅速に対応し、その強力を破壊するための計画である。特に、大連の防御を強化し、敵の進撃を阻止することが最も重要である。

陸軍大臣 
昭和三六年三月五日
这是一张中文手写文档的图片，内容难以辨识。
人物を外務大臣として選ぶしと彼は語った。

目下折衝府の方針であると須に新聞紙上に発表するよう FOREIGN OFFICE に指揮する上、「ソビエト連邦とソビエト連邦」を定め
るよう私は農田に求めて、農田は此方針は只ち中華とソビエト連邦
だけに適用する意見で彼に今迄の方針を一貫的に保証する意味に過ぎ
ないと農田は言った。

ソビエト連邦に聞く事は、ソビエト連邦の日本との間に他に相違
ないもので、ソビエト連邦とソビエト連邦の防衛上の問題に於て
之を望めばこれ等は関係者の問題で、農田はシベリアのソビエト
連邦は役者を防衛上の問題に於て望めばこれ等は関係者の問題で、農田
在任中は決して为争が起こるのをそれを私に嘆願した。

彼の在任中は決して為争が起きないと農田は語った。
中 国に 関して は 既に 言 明 した 三 点が 今 後の 日本・中 国間 交渉 の 根 査 とな る が
及 び これ 三 点は 既に 原則 とし て 中 国政 府 の 承 認 を みる か ら 私は 廣 田 は
の 求め に 隠さ ぬ、 廣 田は 次の 如く 是 実 の 頃 に 明確 に した。
(1) 現 在の 中 国が 正式 に 満洲 国を 承認 する 役の 規則 は 分る。 それ が 真実 で
ない 異端 の 存在 に 対して は 承認 を 求める。 又 関 要、 順 利、 通行関係 等 の
為 上の 関係 の 規定 が 需要 し 。（中 日 両 国の 協力 して 共産主義 の 擴大 を 防止
する が 真実 か） 若 し 廣田
中 国に 対する 日本の 政策 営行 は 門 門開放 の 原則 を 含 めて 外国の 効益 及 利容
関係 を 容 か れ も ある の で あ る を ア メ リ カ合 繁 国政 府に 向て 再び 保 证
三 箇 旨 確 約 して 願 け る な ら 好 待 合 で あ る も 私は 廣 田り 告 げた。
日本が 門 門開放 主義 を 奉 す か の な り 又 廣 田の 所見 では 日本の 方針 に
て 外国の 權益 及 利容 関係 が 関係 に 影響 を 受ける 場 合 は 必 と さ れ ば 又
は 日本が 将来 何 時 か 治外 法 令 を 放棄 す る か も し け れ の 場 合 で あ る と 廣 田
は 言 つった。
日本の米倉に対する善意や平和を求める意図と米国政府の平和を求める意図を明らかにし、両国間の関係を改善するための努力を進めています。
November 30, 1936

During my call today on the Prime Minister to pay my respects on returning from leave of absence, the conversation at first entered upon the recent election in the United States and the assurance that the general foreign policy of the present administration, including the policy of the good neighbor, would be continued for another four years. I spoke also of the Harvard Tercentenary celebration and the Japanese art exhibition in Boston.

When I asked Mr. Hirota how things were going in Japan, he replied that his greatest difficulty at present was taxation. He said that the Japanese Army and Navy were seriously disturbed at the great increase of armaments in Soviet Russia which exceeded even the military organization of the czarist regime, and it was largely owing to these increasingly heavy Soviet armaments that the Japanese Army and Navy were calling for greater increases of armaments in Japan, which in turn led to the necessity for higher taxation.

Since Mr. Hirota on his own initiative had touched upon foreign affairs, I then asked him concerning the reports in the press about an agreement between Japan and Italy. He replied that no agreement existed. The simple facts were that Italy was going to open a consular office in Manchukuo and Japan would eventually do the same in Abyssinia and that this was all there was to it.

The Prime Minister then said that as regards China the negotiations were proceeding very slowly and that they were still based on the three points which he had formerly enunciated, particularly the demand that anti-Japanese activity in China should cease and that steps would be taken to combat Communism. I asked him about the reports to the effect that the Japanese demands included tariff questions and also the appointment of Japanese advisors. Mr. Hirota said that these points had also come up, that the question of the tariff had already been settled and that as regards Japanese advisors, the simple fact was that other countries had many advisors in China whereas Japan had none and that the Japanese merchants in China were pressing for the appointment of such advisors. Mr. Hirota said definitely that such advisors would be purely economic and not political or military. He said that obviously the Chinese Government was in a difficult position regarding the Bolshevik menace because there were so many Communists in China itself.
一九三六年一月三十日

余は本日けたが、朝鮮総督府の為め総理大臣を往訪の際談は、偶々米国に於

ける最近の進展及亞米利加現政府の贈請政策をも含む一時外交政策は向

後四ヶ月にして依然として確かな引き継ぎ行されるだろうと云ふ事に及び

をした。余は又ハーバード大学三百年祭典やボストンに於ける日本美術

展の事に言及しました。}

下一番苦労して居る事は課税問題であると言へ得日本の領土は従来が

ザバー時代の軍組織をも破壊する様子を草発の肢張を為して居る事に

関し切に頭を悩ませて居る所、而して此軍部の肢張肢張の為の日本の

より公平な課税の必要に迫られて居る事を諸父に述べた。}

廣田氏は自ら進んで外交をも担当して居たので余が自伊協定に際
シュヴァイツェリシムの提携に関し著るしく困難な情勢に置かれてある事等を語

前米国大使グール氏日記一九○頁抜萃

3
これを聴きながら、取引所の処理者に、伊藤太郎が東洋銀行に領事館を設立する手紙を提出した次の日、差支えないという旨の（日本政府による）回答を得た。これは、前日拜訪した伊藤太郎の意見に反するものであり、遂に、彼は対馬に居を定め、東洋銀行に居を定める事となった。
An ambassadorial colleague told me today that there is no doubt in his mind that the German-Japanese treaty includes a secret military agreement.
大使日独合同を破壊

大使の一団が日独条約を秘密軍事協定を含む派に疑を入れたとの

前アメリカ大使グルの日記よりの抜粋

【九三六年十二月三日】
February 12, 1937

This afternoon Alice, having a cold and feeling poorly, stayed at home while I did the family duty by going to a reception at the Chinese Embassy, and it was worth while because it gave me an opportunity for a long and intimate conversation with Amau. Amau said that he thought that Japanese-American relations had undergone a great change in the last two or three years and that Japan's attitude toward America was very different from that of three years ago. He said that there were really no important issues pending between us at the present time and he thought it very significant that the speech which the Minister for Foreign Affairs is about to make in a few days is going to state that Japan desires the most friendly relations with both the United States and Great Britain; so far as the United States is concerned he will stop right there, but so far as Great Britain is concerned he will continue to the effect that current controversies can be settled by diplomatic negotiations. In other words, said Amau, the absence of comment with regard to the United States would indicate that there are no prime issues worth mentioning.

I said I thought that this situation was in large measure due to Mr. Hirota and his efforts in curbing the Japanese press, which had caused so much trouble in times past in its bitter comment about the United States; these comments were repeated by correspondents to America and of course the American press took them up there, causing a vicious circle all around. Amau then told me of his own efforts in this direction and how in the weekly meetings with representatives of Japanese journals he had tried to influence the editorial writers to lay off bickering with the United States. In this respect he had been rather successful. I told Amau that although I had ascribed the credit for our improved relations to Hirota I knew very well that he himself had had an important hand in this development.

* * * * *

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREEW, pages 205-206
せられた米紙も勿論これを採上げて到る處に騒循環を生ずるに至ったも
のであると話した。そこで天羽は此の點に就ての自分の努力を語り、日
本の新聞代表者との毎週会見の席上彼が如何に合衆国に対する努力を
して居た様である。子は我國との固交好隣は廣田の功績に歸するものと
してゐるけれども、貴下御自身も此の好隣に重要なる役目を果され
たこと
I said I thought that Japan was at present in a very critical position and that she really stood at the parting of the ways; Amau agreed with me and said that this was why a moderate cabinet had been appointed at the present time. On the whole this conversation seemed to me significant because Amau emphasized so distinctly the fact that the present cabinet is moderate and it looks at present very much as if this might prove to be the case.
日米関係親善万歳メモ

一九三七年（昭和十二年）二月二日

私が日本へ現在非常危険な立場にあり、成果分岐点に立つナチス・ルト等

命セラレタニダルト語ツタ。天羽が現内閣ハ野村デアルトナルト自分

受ケラレル。

ナにて關鍵ナコロメレハ野村ク野村デアルトナーウル見

グループ元米観大使

日記抜粋

（二〇六頁）
Fighting has broken out at the Marco Polo bridge not far from Peiping between Chinese and Japanese troops. Not clear who started the trouble, but Nelson Johnson says that considering the fact that the Japanese conduct maneuvers close to a Chinese garrison it is only surprising that such an incident had not occurred long ago.
AMERICAN AND BRITISH REPRESENTATIONS

July 14, 1937

The Japanese and Chinese representatives in Washington yesterday celled at the Department and the opportunity was taken to express our hope that both sides would exercise restraint. The British Government was informed of our action and the following press release was issued by the Department:

The Japanese Ambassador and the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy both celled at the Department this morning and communicated information in regard to events in North China. In the course of the conversations which ensued both were given expression of the view that an armed conflict between Japan and China would be a great blow to the cause of peace and world progress.

No reinforcements have yet left Japan.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORGAR UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREW, page 211
米英両国間の交渉

一九三七年七月十四日、

ワシントンに於ける日英両国間交渉は昨日日英両国間交渉会合に於て、

英歴史公開に通知づくと共に次に次の如く新聞に発表した。即ち両両国両国間の両国間の武力衝突は平和と世界の退歩とにとって一大打撃となるるであら

との見解を表明せり。日本の増進軍はまだ出発したにあら

前

米英大使・大葛氏日記抄本（三一頁）
CHINESE BOMBS ON ST. VINCENT HURT CHINA'S CAUSE ABROAD

August 29, 1937

* * * * *

The bombing in Shanghai on August 14 was one of the most horrible episodes in modern times. The bombs fell indiscriminate­ly, hitting the Cathay and Palace Hotels and killing hundreds of Chinese civilians gathered on the Bund and elsewhere. Bob Reischeuer, the son of an American missionary, was fatally injured at the entrance to the Cathay and other Americans may have been killed or injured. I wrote to Dr. and Mrs. Reischeuer in Kerui­zawa. Subsequently we received the most heart-rending first­hand accounts from refugees.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORBR. UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR CREW, page 216
最低温度が示され、110Kの記述が見られる。
HULL DENIES HIROTA'S CHARGES

November 17, 1957

The Department cabled us the full text of the Declaration adopted by the Brussels Conference on November 15.

The Embassy in Rome reports that a Havas dispatch from Tokyo gives the purported terms which Japan intends to impose on China and asks for our comment. We replied to the Department that the Foreign Office spokesman on November 15 described the reports as "entirely groundless."

Referring to my talk with Hirota, the Secretary cabled me that the words "united action" nowhere appear in the Declaration adopted by the Brussels Conference. Mr. Hull assumes that Hirota may have had in mind the last paragraph of that Declaration, which was phrased as follows:

Though hoping that Japan will not adhere to her refusal, the States represented at Brussels must consider what is to be their common attitude in a situation where one party to an international treaty maintains against the views of all the other parties that the action which it has taken does not come within the scope of that treaty, and sets aside the provisions of the treaty which the other parties hold to be operative in the circumstances.

The Secretary also authorized me to tell Hirota from him that there is not an atom of truth in any report that we took the initiative in calling the Conference. Mr. Hull also understands that no Government at the Conference has done more than to assume its share of the common responsibility for an exchange of views and is astonished that any Foreign Office with the information publicly available could have any misunderstanding with regard to these facts. He asked me to tell Hirota of his appreciation of the latter's wish to maintain good relations with the United States, for which he, Mr. Hull, has constantly worked during the past five years, but that he must frankly and in all friendliness express his apprehension lest the cause of developing and fostering these good relations, which both have always in mind, should be injured by the present situation in the Far East.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR GREW, page 227
Defense Document No. 206-D(16)

WHY HIROTA MISUNDERSTOOD HULL

November 20, 1937

Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, told me in private that there had been some misunderstanding about the phraseology and substance of Mr. Hull's message to Mr. Hirota, which I had communicated to the latter on November 18. What happened was this. In order to be sure of conveying Mr. Hull's message precisely as cabled, I had written it down before going to see Hirota and actually read it to him, taking no chances on a casual oral communication. The message said that Mr. Hull sincerely appreciated Mr. Hirota's desire to maintain good relations with the United States; that during the past five years Mr. Hull had constantly striven to that end; and that in all friendliness and frankness Mr. Hull must express his apprehension lest the cause of fostering and developing those good relations which they both have in mind be injured by the present situation in the Far East (paraphrase).

In view of the implied sting in the tail of the message, I was a little surprised when Mr. Hirota expressed great pleasure at receiving it and asked me to thank Mr. Hull. Hirota asked me if I would leave with him the message as I had written and read it to him, but I pleaded that the piece of paper was merely a rough record and that I would send him a neat transcription as soon as I returned to the Embassy. The reason for this was that I could not leave with him the true reading because it had come in confidential code and also because there were other notes on the paper which I didn't want to give him. As soon as I had returned to the chancery I sent him a personal letter with a close paraphrase of the message.

When I saw him at the time of my call with MacMurray * this morning, I asked if he had received my letter. He said no and that he had thought of telephoning me to ask for it. I said that I had sent it two days ago, immediately after our interview and that I would investigate. Just as we came out of Hirota's office we met Yoshizawa going in with my letter. He said that it had gone first to the Archive Bureau and had thus been delayed. Yoshizawa asked Dooman to come to see him this afternoon and said that Mr. Hirota had understood the message quite differently; he thought that Mr. Hull was saying that he was working for good relations with Japan in spite of the situation in the Far East. Apparently Hirota had misunderstood the significance of the word "apprehension."

*Former American Minister to China, at this time Ambassador to Turkey.
Hirota was so pleased with the message, as he had understood it, that he had cabled it to the Japanese diplomatic missions in several capitals abroad. Now that he had received my letter he saw the marked discrepancy between his understanding and the actual meaning of the message and he found himself in something of a dilemma as to whether to correct the misunderstanding by sending a revised version abroad. Yoshizawa thought that it would probably be better to leave the matter as it is. All this arose through Mr. Hirota's inadequate grasp of English and goes to indicate that one can never rely on purely oral communications. I am glad at least that the misunderstanding cannot be attributed to any carelessness on my part because I need to Hirota the actual message from the original text.
農田は彼が理解した知くにそのメッセージを受けとり非常に喜んだそう
してそれを五戸の外局常務に受けとったので彼の紙書と手紙のメッセージの意味の間
に著しい相違のある事を知りました。手紙はその事を知るため彼に送って解説をつけた
 umo思ひました。手紙はその事をその方の知るにしあたがいかうかししつつある
た事を知りましたが、この方はすべて農田氏の不十分な英語の把握から
で３つですに至ります。私は解説のメッセージを是正し、手紙は出来ないという事を
せましたのであります。手紙が私の側の如何なる不注意にも依るものでないという事
を少くとも善びます。

前合衆国大使グループの日記抄録

二二八ニ二二九頁
1. Subject: Excerpts from Diary of Former U.S. Ambassador Grew, Entitled "Ten Years in Japan".

2. Date: 12 October 1939 to 10 June 1940

3. Certificate: Not necessary

4. Translation: Not applicable

5. Excerpts: Not filed under Rule 6-B-1 as required.

6. Comment: The following excerpts are reports of official conferences and communications, some are recordings of actual events. A very few are the personal (recorded as an official) views of the Ambassador. At times he adds speculation without giving reasons, but this is insignificant.

Apparently the Documents are admissible generally, the objectionable matters being harmless.

7. Rebuttal: No comment.

8. SUMMARIES:


Visit by Grew to Mr. de Romor, Ambassador of New Polish Government, where he was informed recognition by U.S. had influenced recognition by Japan. de Romor credited Grew's influence with keeping Japan out of a Military Alliance with Germany to that time (12 Oct. 1939), and said that Japanese were more than ever eager for friendship with United States; that except for a small group the Japanese were now intensely anti-German.
Excerpt 2 — 15 October 1939, Proposed Speech Before America-Japan Society.

Upon learning that Japanese Cabinet and its backers, Hiranuma and Prince Konoye, were anxious to improve relations with U.S., Grew decides against original draft, but not to minimize American resentment against actions of Japanese Army in China, and to avoid seemingly going to the public over the heads of the Japanese Government.

Excerpt 3 — No date, "The New Order in East Asia."

Says American Government and people understand it to mean security, stability, and progress, which Americans desire, but it has also appeared to include, among other things, depriving Americans of their long established rights in China, and to this the American people are opposed.

Excerpt 4 — 19 October 1939, Background of Historical Address Before America-Japan Society.

In memorandum describing background Grew recognizes American public demand for an embargo against Japan and attitude of administration not to allow American interests to be crowded out of China. Also realizes a policy of sanctions may lead to war. However, U.S. position in Far East regarded as important factor in its position in world affairs, and the President and Secretary of State are determined to support that position.

Taken position that facts should be given Japanese people regarding depredations against Americans and American interests by Japanese military in China, and that U.S. will not "back down" from its Far East policy. Also sees necessity of getting this to the military through influential people.

Describes repercussions from speech, being accused of "arrogance, impertinence, and surprising lack of diplomatic propriety".
DEFENSE DOC. Nos. 206E-(1) through -(20) except 206E-(11).

Excerpt 5 -- 25 October 1939. Results of "Speech-making Speech"

Grew informed by Japanoao friends that Prime Minator, Foreign Minator, War Minator, and others who had studied speech would form a team to "keep the ball rolling"; that such now believed the time had come to start improving U.S. - Japanoao relations.

Excerpt 6 -- 1 November 1939. Necessity for Prompt Action.

Speech is released to Japanoao press at request of Foreign Office. Grew sees necessity of getting results promptly by both negative (cessation of brawlings, etc.) and positive (opening Yangtso to foreign trade) stops. Otherwise he sees imposition of embargo, to the downhill movement of relations.

Excerpt 7 -- 1 December 1939. Lack of Statesmanship.

Says the Japanoao Government is weak and "floundering" for lack of strong statesmanship. Most Japanoao want good relations with U.S., but are not grasping the power and taking measures to bring them about. Future outlook does not appear bright.

Excerpt 8 -- U.S. and Nino-Power Treaty. No date.

Mentions solemn commitment of U.S., by Nino-Power Treaty to uphold (a) territorial and administrative integrity of China and (b) the Open Door.

Excerpt 9 -- No date. Japanese Inflation

Mentions inflationary movement reflected in slower absorption of government bonds, large increase in paper currency, mounting commodity prices, and attempt to control prices.


Does not believe economic pressure from without alone can defeat Japan. Psychological factors to be considered.
Excerpt 12 — N. date, Isolation of Japan by Sanctions

Answering arguments that Japan should be brought to terms through isolation and reduced to a second or third-class power to curtail her Pacific expansion, Grew favors the exhaustion of diplomacy, before imposing sanctions which enforced would lead to war.

Excerpt 13 — 4, 18, 22 December 1939, Conversations with Foreign Minister Nomura Re-Japanese-American Relations.

Account of three conversations with Nomura in December, 1939, Nomura gave categorical assurances that American impression that Japan was attempting to expel American interests from China was incorrect, that incidents complained of were "accidents" due to gigantic military operations, and that commercial limitations (sanoods) were temporary.

A long list of questions pending settlement was discussed, as was the expiration of the treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

Opening of the Yangtze river for general navigation as far as Nanking was assured.

Nomura stated that "we" must prevent spread of European War to Far East.

Excerpt 14 — 24 January 1940, Formation of Yonai Cabinet.

Yonai forms new Cabinet with Arita as Foreign Minister. Yonai was the man who had blocked any alliance with Germany in the spring (1939).

Excerpt 15 — 18 January 1940, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation

On assumption of Foreign Office duties Arita discussed with Grew the status of the "treaty merchants", hoping to enlist his support for a continuation of the treaty status. Grew contacted Washington and it was referred back to Tokyo.

Incident of British Cruiser stepping Agano Maru and taking off 21 Gormans liable to naval service in Germany, just off coast of Japan, and explanatory statement of British Ambassador, oxoite Japanso people and preso to high pitch.

Excerpt 17 -- 10 April 1940.

Grow comes to conclusion that the futility of the China campaign is coming home to the majority of thinking Japanese. He bases this on (a) statements of an influential Japanese publicist, who has been vitriolic in denunciation of U.S., and Great Britain, that he believed Mr. Hull's views were right and Japan was wrong, and (b) that Japan should deal direct with Chiang Kai-shek, permit mediation of third powers, and define "New Order in East Asia".

He expresses his views against sanctions and supports them with viewpoint of other Americans, pointing out at length the possible war which might result, as against a solution by allowing time to solve the problem.

Excerpt 18 -- 26 April 1940. Discussions with Foreign Minister ARITA.

In conversation with Foreign Minister ARITA both agree that continued conferences on a new commercial treaty would be futile.

They discuss the continued and aggravated brubbings and indignities against American nationals and interests, with the usual results of hopes and premises.

ARITA urged Grow not to take his anticipated leave to U.S., as it might create impression of diplomatic breach.

Excerpt 19 -- 1 May 1940. Netherlands East Indies Issue.

It is believed a German circulated reports in neutral capitals that U.S. contemplated taking Netherlands East Indies over in event Germany invaded Holland. ARITA made official statement 15 April that Japan wanted no change in the status quo of these islands. Mr. Hull made statement that "we are also interested in the fate of the islands", putting U.S. squarely on record.
Excerpt 20 -- 10 June 1940. Hypothetical Loss of British Fleet

Says from now on future calculations must be based on hypothetical loss of British fleet. Roosevelt knows it and he believes if it were.
THE BEGINNING OF A HISTORIC ADDRESS

October 19, 1939

The background of the speech is described in the following memorandum which I gave to Hooven, Creswell, and Smith-Hutton after my return to Tokyo:

"During my stay in the United States American public opinion was steadily hardening against Japan. The denunciation of the Treaty of 1911 was almost universally approved and there is an almost universal demand for an embargo against Japan next winter. The present attitude of the administration is that we will not allow American interests to be crowded out of China. If Japan retaliates against an American embargo, there is every probability that our Government will counter-retaliate in some form or other.

I have pointed out that once started on a policy of sanctions we must see them through and that such a policy may conceivably lead to eventual war. There is, however, no sign whatever of weakness in the administration's attitude now or in the attitude of the public. The President and the Secretary of State seem determined to support our position in the Far East. The fall naval maneuvers are to take place in Hawaiian waters. There has been talk of landing further American marines in Shanghai, but such a step, just before I left Washington, was held in abeyance. There can be little doubt, however, that if the Japanese military in China continue their depredations against Americans and American interests, and if they progressively take measures to drive them out of China, our Government will take retaliatory measures regardless of the eventual outcome, and the administration will be supported by the great majority of the American public. Very little is now heard of the wisdom of folding our tents and withdrawing gracefully from a possibly untenable position. Our position in the Far East is regarded as an important factor in our position in world affairs at large and not at all as an isolated problem."
Having in mind this attitude of the American Government and people, we must reach the inevitable conclusion that the time for exclusive reliance on the good will and efforts of the Japanese Government, as contrasted with the Japanese military, is past. Hitherto we in the Embassy have aimed to follow, as far as reasonable, a policy of avoiding words or actions which might tend to irritate the military. In view of the determined attitude of the American Government and people, I believe that more is now to be gained by discreetly conveying this present attitude to the Japanese Government and people in order to offset the prevailing feeling in Japan (at least prevailing before my departure in May) that in the last analysis the United States will back down. I do not now think that we will back down, and I believe that the efforts of the Embassy should now be directed toward letting that fact gradually penetrate to the Japanese consciousness. Only danger, and no good, can come from leaving the Japanese under a misapprehension on that score.

But these efforts of the Embassy will have to be carried out with discretion.

During the past summer the Department of State was seriously considering writing another strong note to Japan, but Mr. Numlan advised against it and I supported him, on the ground that such a note would do no practical good and would merely anger the military, and that the record of our position was already complete. I did, however, take the position that something should be done to bring before the Japanese people the facts regarding the depredations against Americans and American interests by the Japanese military in China.

These facts, so far as I am aware, are not generally known even by influential Japanese, who are therefore inclined to regard American opposition to Japan and Japanese policy, and to "the new order in East Asia," as arbitrarily based on what they consider to be obsolete legal technicalities on the one hand and a traditional sympathy for China on the other. If any movement is to be started by influential Japanese to restrain the military in their efforts to force American interests out of China (I have in mind, for instance, the members of the Privy Council, who presumably are influential),
those Japanese must first become aware of the determined attitude of the American Government and public and the facts on which that attitude is based. As long as misapprehension on these points continues to exist, we can hardly expect constructive steps to be taken to improve our relations. It is, of course, questionable whether any constructive steps or effective steps can be taken to curb the military, but we must not let that desideratum go by default.

There must be no tone of threat in our attitude. To threaten the Japanese is merely to increase their own determination. The attitude of the American Government and people must be presented merely as a patent fact which exists and should therefore be given full weight in formulating Japanese policy.

It therefore seemed to me, and the President and the Department concurred, that in my initial address to the America-Japan Society on returning to Tokyo, an effort should be made to get across to the Japanese the real feeling in the United States and the facts on which that feeling is based. The fact that I shall merely be reporting my observations in the United States during the past four months will lend particular force to this opportunity, and I believe that full advantage should be taken of it. Later speeches will not have this advantage. My thought is to present, in as friendly and manner as possible, the points which the Department had intended to include in its proposed but eventually abandoned note. The America-Japan Society is about the only forum that we possess. My speech would be fairly widely discussed and if published at least in the Japan advertiser would come to the attention of a considerable element of influential Japanese both in the Government and out of it. Any complaint that I was going to the Japanese public over the heads of the Japanese Government could be met by the fact that prominent Japanese have in times past used the Society to present the Japanese point of view (cf. Viscount Ishii's speech at the initial dinner after our arrival in Japan in 1932) and that I can properly claim an equal privilege.
After the speech was made, some of the American newspaper correspondents were using such terms as "dumbfounded," "astounded," etc., in describing the reaction of the audience. As a matter of fact, only Thompson of the United Press was present and he scooped all the others, who had expected the usual diplomatic platitudes, but Regis of the A.P. and Hugh Lye very quickly began to receive calls from New York for voluminous reports. The Japanese press reacted just as I had expected, some of the papers accusing me of arrogance, impertinence, and surprising lack of diplomatic propriety. The general trend was that in spite of what I said, the American people simply don't know the facts and have construed a few unintentional "accidents" into wholesale deprecations. Also that we still don't understand the "New Order in East Asia." But a few of the papers, notably the Yomiuri, which in the beginning had censured me personally for arrogance, eventually were courageous enough to intimate in veiled language that there might be some merit in the American point of view and that it should be carefully examined. Such attitudes here are generally regarded as sheer heresy, but they showed that the inoculation was "taking."

Excerpt from Diary of Former U.S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan.
Pages 294-297
私の歴史的遺談の背景

一九三九年一〇月一九日

との遺談の背景については次の覚銘の中に述べてある。これは私

が東京へ帰った終わりにマン・クレーコエル・スミス・ハットンの三

名に詩したものです。

私の滞在中日本に対する労働者に対する不満に悪化して行った。一九一

一年の修習の遺談はほとんどすべての阪民の支持を得たのみならず、

もし合衆国対の経済政策に対し日本が報復するならば、我が政府

は必ずや何等かの形においてそれに際し更に切拠手続を検すであろうに

すでに指摘したと同く、一たび制裁政策にとり出したからには後

不読
を左右する重大な要素であって、決して他の幕府のない国を孤立した問題では、決して

米朝民のこのやうな態度を念頭におくと、幕府は日本政府の好意のみを基盤として、事情に

すでに過去去ったと結論せらるを得ない。現在まで我々大体の傾向は何ら相違

する方針をとつて来たつもりである。しかも米朝宣戦の防止たる態度にいうべき。

は後には結局折れて出るだろう。といつ見通すか往々にしてはがしり、おもに事態に

五月に日本を去つた当時においてはかくして、おもに私ども私からは、この

果をくつがえすようにした付け果てるか、用は支障的である等を待つべき

る。
私同様、米国が示すようなpowersは、もはや存在しない。従ってこれからの全戦争の動向を批判した時、彼らは日本の侵略を恐れることを次のように日本に提案されるようを、おおむね支持されることになったのである。この理由は、反日底辺の数々の言論に基づき、日本を戦略的に使用することを、消極的で一貫的に持続する必要がある。従ってこれからの全戦争が日本の無私の人種の皆に対して、非常に重要であることになる。
我々の態度は虚偽のものがあっては絶対にならない。日本人を
侵略することは嘘彼等の決心を固めるのみである。米国政府及び
人民の態度は唯現存の厳たる事実であってこれによって日本政府
決定に當って十分に考慮されるべきものとして示されなくてはならない
それが故に米日協会に於て東京に隠って初めめてなす演説に於て
努力が懸けねばならぬことを思ったのであつてこれには大破壊及本省
も同感であった。私が過去数ヶ月間の米国に於ける観察を暗報告し
て居るものであると同様に我等は私の話に特別の力を與へるべきであら
し私はこれを充分に利用せねばならぬことを信ずる。先に著者が
於くした態度で本省が日本に當らんとしして遂に取止めとしした公文に賛せ
と申一の附着所たらんと申してある。米日協会は観んで現在吾々に於か
せられるであろう。そしてもう少しともジャパン・アドヴカタイザー
に接触されるならば、政府及在日の日本人有力の言の大部分は注
意を喚起するであろう。私は日本政府を支し討って日本民衆に
働きかけたと語る非難に対して是現今日に於て時に日本の高官が
本協会を日本の見地の発表の用に供したことを以て（一九三二年
吾々が日本に御着後最初の正義に於ける石井子爵の演説を考へよ。
私は亦同様の証拠を是非に要請し得るとして反対出来らであろう

7
演説後、アメリカ新聞記者団の中には聴衆の反応を表すために、示され返された。

それがあっかつ断言した、と云った労な言葉を以てした。実際には、P・P通信社の一連のトランプが一人出席して居っただけであった。そして、彼は裏にして動き

のない外交談話的言葉を下順してかた、他の進中に先んじて、週も早く等

の報じたのであったが、時を移すA・P・通信のモリノ、及びヒューバ

・イア氏等も報道から詳細な記事を発表するにとこの照会に接し始めたので

ある。日本新聞の発行は、私の言にも切れず、米国民は尊厳を誤解せず、二

三の偶然の出来事を取り上げて全面的な虚報行為であると解釈してあるに過

ぎて、ことに共に夫に就いては策度遠町のなかならべき言を聞きしたのであっ

た。
December 1, 1939

A Japanese recently remarked that what Japan most needs at present is a statesman of the caliber of Prince Ito. No such figure, alas, has emerged nor is likely to emerge, and through lack of strong statesmanship Japan is bound to suffer. The Government is weak and is "floundering." Yet to control and unify the heterogeneous forces in Japan today would require a statesman of almost superhuman ability.

The crux of Japanese-American relations lies in the fact that while the Government is prone to give us soothing assurances, no individual or group in Japan is strong enough to bring about the full implementation of those assurances. There is little doubt that the great majority of Japanese, both in the Government and out of it, who know anything about foreign relationships want good relations with the United States, but they have yet to grasp securely the power of directing policy and taking measures in the effective way which alone can bring about good relations. International relations cannot thrive on mere pious expressions of intention. I have told them this, and am steadily continuing so to tell them, but it does little good. The outlook for the future relations between the United States and Japan does not now appear to be bright.

It is this outlook that now requires our most careful study and concern.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U.S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan." Pages 299 and 300
Two Vain Desiderata

The United States is solemnly (to use that somewhat overworked
Alsonian term) committed to uphold the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty,
primarily to uphold the territorial and administrative integrity of China and
the Open Door. Therein lies the point of principle.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 300 and 301
I have already drawn attention to the beginning of an inflationary movement in this country, and I shall later discuss the further development of this movement as reflected in slower absorption of government bonds, a large increase in the paper currency, and mounting commodity prices, along with far-reaching measures designed to control prices. Attempts to control the supply and demand of rice are causing wide agrarian unrest.
Can Japan Be Defeated?

* * * * *

* * * * * The majority opinion in the Embassy, which I myself share, does not believe that an American embargo, even if it covered all American exportation and importation to and from Japan, would bring about such a debacle as would cause the Japanese to relinquish their program in China. Statisticians have proved to their own satisfaction, and will continue so to prove, that Japan can be defeated by economic pressure from without. But the statisticians generally fail to include psychological factors in their estimates.

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Excerpt from Diary of Former J. S. Ambassador Crow entitled "Ten Years in Japan.
Pages 301 and 302
Is an Isolated Japan Desirable?

The argument is often advanced that Japan should and can be brought to terms through isolation. The corollary is furthermore advanced that unless isolated and reduced by economic and financial attrition to the rank of a second- or third-class power, it is only a question of time before Japan continues her continental and overseas expansion, involving the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and other western possessions in the Far East; that the time to restrain her expansion is now.

With regard to this thesis, I raise the following considerations. The resort to methods calculated to bring about the isolation of delinquent nations must presuppose in the final analysis the use of force. Sanctions commenced but not carried through bring in their wake a loss of prestige and influence to the nation declaring them. Sanctions carried through to the end may lead to war. This statement seems to me to be axiomatic and hardly open to controversy. In my view, the use of force, except in defense of a nation's sovereignty, can only constitute an admission of a lack, first of goodwill and, second, of resourceful, imaginative, constructive statesmanship. To those who hold, with regard to the specific situation with which we are dealing, that it is not enough for goodwill and statesmanship to exist only on one side, my rejoinder would be that these factors exist also in Japan, albeit in latent form: until now, and that one of the functions of diplomacy is to bring these factors into full vigor. Shrewd diplomacy has existed; it can exist again.

There will be time enough to speak of sanctions when the resources of diplomacy shall have been exhausted. At the moment of this writing, those resources have not yet been exhausted. By nature not a defeatist, I believe that these resources may yet win the day.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U.S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan." Pages 304 and 305
December 4, 1939

The Foreign Minister, Admiral Nomura, asked me to call on him in his official residence at 2:30 today. Having been elected with the Prime Minister, he came fifteen minutes late, very apologetic for the delay. The interview lasted for one hour and a half.

The Minister said that he was glad to resume our talks, the last of which had occurred on November 4, and that he was sorry for the delay in continuing them. He said that he had carefully studied the statements which I had made at our last meeting as well as the documents left with him. He considered very valuable the suggestions which I have made to him with regard to the importance of furnishing direct evidence of the intention of the Japanese authorities to put an end to the bombings of American property, the insults to American citizens, and the encroachments on American commercial activities in China which must be removed. Admiral Nomura realizes that the impression exists in the United States that these various acts have been deliberate and that there is an intention on the part of the Japanese authorities to exclude American interests from China. He wanted to give me categorical assurances that such an impression is a misunderstanding and contrary to fact. Military operations on an unprecedentedly gigantic scale over extensive areas are going on in China and all of the incidents and cases of which we have complained have been accidents. The Japanese forces have been ordered to pay every possible attention in their power to protect and respect American property and citizens in China. The Minister said that he had discussed this matter with his competent colleagues in the cabinet and he could tell me as a fact that the personnel of the military commands in China has been so arranged as to ensure this protection and respect.

Admiral Nomura went on to say that such limitations to the commercial activities of Americans in China as have occurred are a result of the military
operations, including control of the occupied areas, such operations not being consonant with the peaceful enjoyment of ordinary commercial rights. These limitations are, however, exceptional and temporary and our rights will be restored when peace comes. It will only lead to misunderstanding and confusion to generalize and to forecast future conditions on the basis of these temporary circumstances.

At this point I mentioned some of the different ways in which American commercial rights and interests were being injured, including the setting up of monopolies which ruined the business of various American interests. It seemed to me difficult to explain these monopolies and other restrictions as due to military necessity. The Minister said that in wartime it became necessary to control commodities and that the monopolies and other handicaps could be explained on this basis. I countered, however, with the observation that some of these measures were the American Government and recalled the impression that they were intended to be permanent and that I would welcome concrete evidence to the contrary.

Admiral Kurew repeated the assurance given me by his predecessors that the Japanese forces in China have not the slightest intention to drive out American interests and that they have the strictest orders to the contrary. He said that our commercial problems in China should be dealt with both in Tokyo and in the field and that he requested that American officials in the field should keep in close touch with local Japanese officials.

Admiral Kurew said that the cases both of desecration of American property and insults to American citizens were decreasing. In Peking and Nanjing, for instance, he has heard of no damage to any American property in that city. Constructive measures were also being taken to facilitate American commerce, as in the case of shipments of wood oil from Hankow and of ice and dynamite from Szechwan. The Minister was thus in a position, he said, to point out that possible measures were being taken in line with the valuable suggestions which I had made at our last meeting. He appreciated my honest desire to improve relations and by way of reciprocating this attitude, he was now studying with the proper authorities such measures as could properly be taken.
Admiral Isora expressed the regret that while he and I were asking joint efforts to improve relations these efforts were being injured by the seditious too-liberal expressions of opinion by important people in the United States, including statements with regard to a possible embargo against Japan.

At this point I called his attention to the freedom of the American press and of public discussion. I said that experience had taught us that measures to control the utterances of the press or of individuals often defeated their own object by causing an intensification of those utterances. I added that public statements of individuals outside the Government, even though these individuals might be in close touch with the Government, did not necessarily represent the Government's views. The minister smilingly observed that the same situation, especially with regard to the press, obtained also in Japan.

The minister then said that he desired to present certain figures to meet some of my representations in our last conference and my concrete proposals for the settlement of pending questions. He said that the list of cases which I had presented to him had been carefully analyzed and a resume drawn up on the basis of available documents. He thereupon handed me an inform document in Japanese which he thought I would probably wish to have translated and be read to me as the following resume:

1. Representations acknowledged or answered 179
2. Representations not acknowledged or answered 203
   (1) No acknowledgement or reply required 22
   (2) Not acknowledged but the contents dealt with by communication to the appropriate officials in China 27
   (3) Not answered but settled locally or dealt with 8
   (4) Investigations still going on but not yet answered 110
   (5) Miscellaneous 36
Admiral Nomura expressed regret that some of our representations had not been acknowledged or answered, owing to clerical oversight, but he assured me that all of our representations were receiving attention and that the competent officials were seeking solutions.

Some cases had been settled or were about to be settled, and they amounted to thirty-nine in all. In these cases the investigations had been completed and the Japanese officials were in touch with our own officials in Shanghai, trying to find solutions. The Minister said that Mr. Yoshizawa would explain either to Mr. Doorman or to me the details of the informal document which he had handed to me and would also be glad at all times to discuss pending questions. He said he thought it would be well for us to have periodical and frequent talks with Mr. Yoshizawa and he recommended that the officials of the Foreign Office and the Embassy constitute themselves as a sort of permanent committee to deal with these pending matters. Thus, speedy settlement of these questions could be made or agreement reached as to how to solve them and this should lead to more stable relations between Japan and the United States.

The Minister alluded to the press reports that there are over six hundred cases awaiting solution. Such incorrect reports mislead the public and injure our relations. He thought it would be useful to publish the actual facts and suggested that Mr. Yoshizawa get in touch with us with that end in view.

The Minister then said he would now like to talk "off the record." With regard to our treaty of commerce and navigation he said that "even if the treaty expires, I hope that relations may be maintained in a normal way and that there will be no cause for the people of both countries to get excited about." Japan's trade with the United States represents a very large percentage of Japan's entire trade, and if commerce with the United States should be impaired Japan would obviously have to seek other commercial channels.
As this seemed to me to contain an implied threat and as I felt it might also be interpreted as an indirect move to open negotiations for a new treaty or for a modus vivendi, I read to the Minister a close paraphrase of Secretary Hull's remarks to the Japanese Ambassador on November 24, emphasizing the considerations contained in the last paragraph to the effect that the American Government did not feel it incumbent upon itself to take the initiative in proposing practical measures for removing the obstacles for friendly relations between the two countries.

I then took up with the Minister the following matters:

1. Further attack on August 1 on the Lutheran Brethren Mission at Tungchow, Honan (Nyhus case).
2. Interference with the property of the Catholic Mission at Sinsing.
3. I read to the Minister the pertinent parts of Peking's telegram of October 20 with regard to mob attacks on the Free Methodist Mission at Chenliu.
4. I asked the Minister to give his personal attention and interest to a subject discussed by Mr. Crocker with Mr. Suzuki concerning the setting up in the Embassy of a radio receiving set in order that we might obtain direct information and news bulletins from our Government in Washington. I said that such sets existed in most of our important Foreign Service establishments, Japan being one of the main exceptions; that it was in the interest of both our countries that we should maintain close and rapid communication with Washington, and that while I did not wish to ask permission for establishing such a set in the Embassy (because this was a diplomatic right which we could properly exercise without permission), nevertheless I would prefer to obtain the definite approval of the Foreign Office before proceeding.
5. I told the Minister of the facts concerning the Tucker case and of the widespread interest which the case had aroused in the United States. I said that I had received many telegrams from important people at home.
expressing interest in the case and that our Government also took an official interest in it. I said that Mr. Tucker had been released from prison after some six weeks in jail but that he was to be tried within the next two weeks for what I understood was an alleged indiscretion in passing out certain literature not approved in Japan; that the final result of the case would undoubtedly be published in the United States and might have an important effect on the American public as well as on Mr. Tucker's friends. I added that, not wishing to interfere with the normal process of Japanese justice, I had made no formal representations in the case but I wished the Minister to know of the general interest, including official interest, evoked in the United States by the case. The Minister said that it would be very difficult even for him to interfere in this case, which was in the hands of the Department of Justice, and he felt certain that Mr. Tucker would receive full justice.

The following press release was agreed upon: "The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador today continued their talks covering the general field of Japanese-American relations in a mutually constructive spirit."

December 13, 1939

Chair 1 Nomura asked me to call on him today at the Foreign Office and in a conversation which lasted one hour and a half he read to me, through Mr. Iguchi's interpreter, some lines handed to him the day before that I had conveyed to the Department.

The Minister informed me definitely that the Japanese Government intends to open the Yangtze River to general navigation as far as Nanking "in about two months." The Minister added that for the time being, certain restrictions would probably have to be imposed on such navigation owing to the military operations in China.

The Minister definitely proposed a modus vivendi to carry on
Japanese-American commercial relations after the expiration of the present treaty of commerce and navigation and expressed the hope that, as little time is now left before the expiration of the treaty, negotiations for a new treaty could commence shortly, if possible before Christmas. I replied that I had no instructions with regard to this matter and asked if the Minister desired me to communicate this to my Government as a definite proposal from him. He replied in the affirmative.

The Minister also touched on the following points:

1. Our problems were divided by the Minister into "positive" and "negative" categories. I replied that between our two countries there exist certain differences of opinion involving matters of fundamental principle, which as the Minister conceived them might not fall within either of the above-mentioned categories.

2. In my conversation with the Minister on November 4, I do not recall mentioning the possibility of bringing about in the United States "a speedy" reversal of public opinion.

3. After Nomura had completed his statement and I had expressed my own appreciation of the Japanese Government's efforts to improve relations between our two countries, I conveyed to him, informally and fully, as under my Government's instructions, the reaction of the Department to the statements made to me by the Minister on December 4. This included the observation of the Department that it feels that the efforts of the authorities of Japan thus far have little more than "touched the fringe of the problem."

4. With regard to the two "companies" and monopolies Nomura said that it had become necessary to set up "economic blocs" among Manchukuo, Japan, and China in order to overcome difficulties in questions of national defense. But he declared that Japan has no intention of excluding other countries and is "quite ready to welcome foreign capital." Then I asked the Minister "On a non-discriminatory Basis?" he replied merely that foreign participation would be welcome in these enterprises.
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is "quite ready to welcome foreign capital." Then I asked the Minister "on a
non-discriminatory basis?", he replied merely that foreign participation would
be welcomed in these enterprises.
5. The minister observed that with regard to currency questions they "had to finance the army" but that these discriminations "when the fighting stops and a Government of China is set up will be modified."

6. The minister said, "off the record," at the end of our conversation that we must prevent, in the interests of both our countries, the war in Europe from spreading to the far East and that Japanese-American conciliation will be a powerful factor in avoiding such a contingency.

December 22, 1939

In an interview with the minister for foreign affairs this evening I conveyed to him orally the two separate statements substantially as set forth in two paragraphs from the State Department, dated yesterday. I also quoted the Department's instruction of December 13, which I handed to the minister in the form of a pro memoria.

Admiral Nomura replied orally in Japanese and the interpreter later handed me the following translation of his remarks:

"The fact that the American Government has decided to take measures to facilitate normal commercial relations even after the termination of the effectiveness of the Japan-America commercial treaty and Your Excellency's efforts in this direction are greatly appreciated. However, the question of the commercial treaty is not limited to the commercial relations between the two countries but does, rather, in many ways relate to the general relations between our two countries. For example, even if commercial relations are maintained on a nearly normal basis without specific agreement, it is impossible to forecast day-to-day conditions in such relations. This is an uncertain prospect. In view of these considerations and looking to the improvement of relations between the United States and Japan from the broad viewpoint, I earnestly request that Your Excellency's Government give very careful consideration to the question of concluding a modus vivendi.

"I may inform Your Excellency that, as Mr. Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Bureau, has already communicated to Mr. Hooven, Counselor of Your
Jîxcellency's Embassy, the Japanese Government after careful study of the question from the above viewpoint has prepared a draft *modus vivendi* and has telegraphed this draft to Ambassador Horincuchi in Washington; and has informed him that he may submit the draft plan to the State Department in Washington at a propitious moment during his conversation there."

In our subsequent conversation I repeatedly made clear that Japan now had to give concrete implementation of its assurances that American rights and legitimate interests in China will be respected on a nondiscriminatory basis.

The following press release was mutually agreed upon in substance and definite assurances were given me that no publicity beyond this release would be given out by the Foreign Office:

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador this afternoon continued their conversations with regard to matters of interest to the two countries. Both the Minister and the Ambassador indicated a mutually helpful attitude toward a solution of the problems under discussion. Progress was made. The conversations will be continued."

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 305-312
January 14, 1940

The cabinet resigned and Admiral Yonai formed a new cabinet with Arita as Foreign Minister and my old friend Fujihara as Minister of Commerce and Industry. Yonai was the man who put the blocks to a military alliance with Germany last spring; I got to know him at the time of the visit of the lustrous with Saito's reeins; he dined at our Embassy and I dined with him at the big Navy dinner, after which he told me that I need have no further anxiety about an alliance with Germany.
January 18, 1940

Arita received the ambassadors individually, on assuming office in succession to Admiral Nomura. He told me that he had instructed Morinouchi to call on Mr. Hull to arrange the status of "treaty merchants" after the expiration of the treaty and he hoped that I would support the matter in order to avoid injury to the nationals of both countries. I merely reported the statement of fact. The Department knows my views. Later the Department cabled that the Japanese Counselor who called on Earnbecl, Morinouchi being ill, was told that the conversations regarding the treaty status should be carried on in Tokyo, so I shall most probably be called by Arita and can only cable his proposals back to Washington. This is something like a game of battledore and shuttlecock, but I think the Department is wise in concentrating the conversations in one place. I am to write briefly and informally of the unfortunate publicity in Tokyo which had misled the public into believing that I had given Admiral Nomura assurances that a treatyless situation would not arise. Now, however the situation is being presented by the press in its proper perspective.

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, "THE YEARS IN JAPAN," PAGES 312-313
That is the new order. How it will perform in actual practice remains to be seen. In all probability, since I may well, reflecting on thePresumed attitude of the Emperor and the older statesmen, will exact reasonable control over the "wild men" and will endeavor to move slowly and with some degree of caution, at least until it becomes clear whether Great Britain is going to win or lose the war.
天皇及び元老の態度らしいものを反映して少くとも英軍が意図に何か
親し不可ちらかになる。では近衛公は恐らく近藤を用いて
改め外々に支那戦の進展を以て行うしようと努めるか見えてようか。
August 1, 1940

Among the photo-copies or interesting clippings from the American press received from the Department in the last pouch I note that with one exception these editorials and articles oppose a policy of "a passive" Japan, and that the single exception is an editorial in the New York Daily News, whose arguments were presented by the China Information Service merely as a target to shoot at. It is therefore amply clear, if these clippings represent a fair cross section of the American press and of American opinion, that not many voices are being heard in favor of trying to "coerce" Japan. The feeling emerges from these clippings to be nearly unanimously the other way.

"Opposition" has acquired since which a connotation which should forever bar the word from the vocabulary of good statesmanship. The attitude for which it stands is one from which I utterly and conclusively disassociate myself. That term connotes defeatism. The recommendations which I have made at various times during the last three years were calculated— if acted upon—to avoid need or occasion for the use of "opposition" in any phase of our relations with Japan. The point which has possibly been overlooked by those who share the views described in these clippings is that, in the situation now existing, opposition could be as dangerous to Japan as it would be to the United States. Our policy of
Dcr. Doc. 206-2 ([2]) - continued

tel;ions on Japanese press comment has not overlooked em­
phatic statements to the effect that Japan will not respond

to proposals for adjustment of relations which the United

States may make on grounds of expediency or other considera­
tions growing out of the impact on the United States of the

military situation in Europe. I have before me an editorial

which, commenting on the question as by Sir Robert Creigie
to Dr. T. Takagi whether Great Britain can expect to improve

her relations with Japan, states:

"We know that British desires for improved relations

with Japan are inspired only by British military defeats in

Europe and we cannot expect that approaches in such cir­
cumstances to Japan for improvement of relations will be

entertained."

After reading these editorials, which I seem are a

fair cross section of the American press, I have the im­
pression that the American press and therefore the American

public do not differentiate but can "understand" and that

form of adjustment of mutual problems which should not be be­
yond the wit and good will of men to bring about consistently

with our honor, our interests, and our obligation to third

countries.

325-326

-2-
The opinion has been expressed that were sanctions to be imposed by us, they would have the effect of setting relations between Japan and the United States on a downward trend. Our recently initiated program of national defense, it is true, at present justifies steps not necessarily coming within the purview of cut-and-cut sanctions. We must keep in mind, however, the likelihood that expert embargoes of a drastic nature on products so important as petroleum — which are known to be possessed in abundance by the United States — would be viewed by the Government and people of Japan as imperfectly disguised sanctions, which might, and probably would, cause some sort of retaliatory steps.

Excerpt from Diary of Farmer U. S. Ambassador Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan." Page 336
October 5, 1940

I called on Foreign Minister Ietatsuka today at his invitation, and we talked, for the most part informally and off the record, for two and a quarter hours. As usual Mr. Ietatsuka did about ninety-five per cent of the talking because his continuous monologues can be broken only by forceful intrusion. Although from time to time he brings up points of marked interest, his volubility flows on by the hour with little or no punctuation, and his discourses are therefore difficult to chronicle.

On this occasion Mr. Ietatsuka's main thesis was that the present world situation results logically from the clash between tradition and the machine age. Only once durin- the conversation were heated words evoked, and those came from me when the minister attempted to justify, on the ground of imperative necessity, national expansion by war, especially in the case of Germany. I had, as I pointed out, personally known the old Germany when within its own boundaries it was a happy, contented country, progressive and prosperous. The action of Germany's present leaders in grinding her weaker neighbors into the dust to satisfy their own megalomaniac ambitions could not possibly be condoned on the ground of necessity: to try to do so was utterly preposterous. In the case of Japan, I personally appreciated her economic needs. Japan's relations with the United States have not, however, been brought to their present deplorable pass by the reasonable urge of those needs, but rather by the employment of methods of force in following that urge instead of the methods envisaged in Mr. Hull's logical and practical plans for following orderly processes in the solution of economic troubles. At that point Mr. Ietatsuka characterized the Anglo-Saxon countries as smugly convinced that they are right in everything they do and intrinsically unwilling ever to acknowledge themselves in the wrong. On that point I said that I had never yet found a Japanese willing to acknowledge the patent fact that Japan had violated the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty, to which Mr. Ietatsuka to my surprise said
that he was perfectly willing to admit that fact to me but he added naively that of course he could not do so politically as he had been urged to do before the League of Nations.

The Minister said that he had retired from public affairs for a long time and had thrice refused posts in the last Konoye cabinet, but that he had finally been led by his intensive pondering on the sorry state of his country to urge Prince Konoye to emerge again, as he felt that Konoye was the only person who could rescue Japan from impending revolution and chaos. Konoye was no longer the vacillating politician of his former premiership but an entirely different person, inflexibly determined to save his country, where even now revolution threatens. In answer to my question as to what kind of revolution he feared, Mr. Matsuoka revealed, "political, economic, and social revolution," and expressed his feeling that the danger was by no means past. He then discussed at some length the vacillation and weakness of the former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Matsuoka said that now the alliance with Germany and Italy was consummated and off his mind, he intends to get to work immediately and do all that he can to clear up the accumulation of American complaints which I had presented to him. It had been a sine qua non of his taking office that he was to direct Japan's foreign relations, and he says he does not propose to let the military, particularly the hot-headed younger officers, dictate to him.

In the course of his talk the minister said that Japan has no intention of driving the interests of other nations out of East Asia, but welcomes their co-operation in the development of the New Order. I immediately took him up on this point and said I was delighted to hear him say what he had. As I had clearly indicated in former talks, however, the fact of the matter is that many legitimate American interests built up through generations have already been driven out of Japan, and that the process goes on apace. Mr. Matsuoka's reply was, as usual, that as soon as the hostilities in China are terminated and Chiang Kai-shek is defeated, these questions will
be solved. He also expressed his usual appeal that the United States should cease giving aid to Chiang. Also as usual, I repeated the American position relating to that question.

Then I was just about to leave, the Minister earnestly requested me to urge that my Government impose on further embargoes against Japan. He said that such embargoes "would not seriously handicap us" but would intensely anger the Japanese people. He added that the thought of war between Japan and the United States made him shudder. (I believe that H. Matsumura is right as to the immediate effect of such embargoes as contrasted with their longterm effect.)
松岡事件十五分に互り語る

余は昭和十六年六月松岡外相を訪問の上三時間と十五分に互り大徐で公武
に打診して語り合った。彼に彼が別に話し続けるのを止めるとすれば異状に口破を容れなければ

彼の態度には殆んと切かないので彼の演説を説く事は無理である。

此際の松岡氏の主論は世界の現状は論調変に従従せしめる事であると云ふ事であった。

余の演説の目的が如何に於ける間も共通して文書に依ると云ふ事は不適当である。

時に余の口から演せられたものである。
共通境内に在る時は幸福なり、満足した国であり進歩的で表面も振舞して居る。事を個人として見破き知して居るのであるが、国外に今日の動向における必要ステップを踏みつつある。共行行為は単に必要だからと云う理由で許すべきものではない。日本に関してもは余は共通境界の要求の合理的な追求の前でない。現に日本関係は今日の動向に必むべき状態となっていたのは失敗の要求を認める。日本関係が今日の動向に必むべき状態を踏みつつある。共行行為を果すことはたいそう専門家である。日本に関してもは余は共通境界の要求の合理的な追求の前にある手順として近辺ハルが考え及んだ途の合理的な要求で提案して居る。ル・サロン紛争は自分等の挑む事は何でも正当で居らぬと云ふことは非妥当的に決定して居るなら自憶れて居る。そこで余は日本は九国条約を凌駕して居るのと云ふこともあり余は共通境界の要求を認むことはたいそう専門家である。日本に関してもは余は共通境界の要求の合理的な追求の前にある手順として近辺ハルが考え及んだ途の合理的な要求で提案して居る。ル・サロン紛争は自分等の挑む事は何でも正当で居らぬと云ふことは非妥当的に決定して居るなら自憶れて居る。そこで余は日本は九国条約を凌駕して居るのと云ふこともあり余は共通境界の要求を認むことはたいそう専門家である。日本に関してもは余は共通境界の要求の合理的な追求の前にある手順として近辺ハルが考え及んだ途の合理的な要求で提案して居る。ル・サロン紛争は自分等の挑む事は何でも正当で居らぬと云ふことは非妥当的に決定して居るなら自憶れて居る。
ではない事実を話した。

大臣は矢立氏から申し出て居る最後の近衛内閣に於て三尺問題の地位を拒絶した。併し彼は議院の態度すべき標を立てる意を示し遂に近衛公を退かし

本を数えには近衛を裁いて他に入手したと思ふからなり。近衛は彼が以前

縁であった時の謹に議院を承知すべき政教の決議を呑し御前の近衛と首絶して会って

は一政治的、経済的及び社会的革命一であると答えて即座に承認し同日

に然ざとは彼の感嘆を述べた。余は然らば如何なる議院の革命を為し御前の近衛とは会知別人と

なり長々と物語つた。

松岡氏は今や定伊との同調も完成したし容疑にないから直ちに仕方なく

外務大臣を来し指導する事が其必要条件であったのであり而して彼は今
部多に血散はやる著者の府より等に指図される後序事は新しくないのである。
　　会談中誰がを日本は他国の外相を左右から周旋するか nieu過を含むか述べたが、彼はそれによって折の会談を前回と同様に参加せず、他の国で行なわれるものである。この席で西方面の米英か進めるとして、日本から送付され現状でも見せたが行なわれた多くの席の問題の解決をするものであろうと認識し、又英仏が解決努力を進めて、関係者に努力を進めている。
Def. Doc. No. 206-E (41) to (86) inclusive.

Subject: Excerpts from Ambassador Grew’s "Ten Years in Japan"

Note: To facilitate handling, all summaries of the documents of this series, being from the Grew Diary, are here grouped on one memo. The page of the Diary and date written are shown over each summary, with a comment on the group following the last item.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (41) - 5 Oct. 1940 (pp. 344-345)

Grew gets "off the record" admission from Matsuoka that Japan had violated Nine-Power Treaty, but that Japan had no intention of driving other nations out of East Asia. He urged that the U.S. cease aid to Chiang and stated that further embargos against Japan could "anger Japanese people" rather than create any serious handicap.

Matsuoka says that the Triple Alliance has been consummated and off his mind, but he will do all that he can to clear up the accumulation of American complaints, as he does not propose to let the military dictate Japan's foreign relations.

N.B. Irrelevant unless to prove that such an explanation was refused, linking it up with other proof.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (42) - 9 Oct. 1940 (pp. 346-347)

Foreign Vice-Minister Ohashi asks explanation of U.S. Government "ordering" American citizens in Far East to evacuate, and also of press reports that U.S. has decided to declare a total embargo against Japan. Ohashi speaks of Japan's desire for peace with the U.S. and that she has no thought of attacking America. It gives Grew the clear impression that Matsuoka is disturbed by the course of developments in the United States, and that such action is becoming effective.

N.B. Irrelevant unless linked up to some issue.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (43) - 22 Oct. 1940 (pp. 347)

Grew reports again hearing that the Emperor and Konoye were opposed to the Tripartite "act", that both were forced, the Emperor being told he "might not survive a refusal.

N.B. Irrelevant unless linked up to some issue.
MATSUOKA informs Grew that he has persuaded Admiral NOMURA to accept the post as Ambassador to Washington, that NOMURA is fundamentally friendly with U. S. and he being an ex-Foreign Minister, Grew knows him well and holds him in high esteem.

N. B. Opinion of character - not in issue.

MATSUOKA informally tells Grew that NOMURA had been reluctant about accepting post at Washington fearing he would be making assurances which might later be invalidated.

Mr. Grew tells MATSUOKA that they should read more American press reports and understand American public opinion; also, that Japan's actions in China against our interests will count more than mere assurances.

A general description of the elaborate ceremony in Tokyo of the 2600th anniversary of the Japanese Empire. Grew believes, and French Ambassador confirms, that Emperor was pleased and purposely showed his approval of Grew speech. Grew mentions that the text had been approved in Washington.

Grew concludes from reports on good authority, that it was MATSUOKA who engineered Japan's approval of the Tripartite Pact and got the Emperor's okay on the theory that it would avert war with the U. S.

N. B. Facts and conclusion based on hearsay.

Grew reports death of Prince SAIONJI, that he ordered usual respects and telegraphed condolences.

Grew hears of Japanese peace offer to China instigated by Germany, which, if refused, will necessitate their recognizing Wang Ching-wei.

Grew reports that a prominent unnamed Japanese from the element who fear war wishes to go to America with some undisclosed plan to improve relations. Grew believes this to be merely another attempt to have U. S. mediate for peace with CHIANG Kai-shek and to improve current relations. He believes
that this "Mr. Y" lacks proper understanding of our government
and people; that his group misunderstands our intentions as
they read only Japanese censored news and they are powerless
to accomplish anything in Japan.

Grew calls attention to his September 12th telegram urging
that despite risk, a policy of firmness is much safer than to
pursue a laissez-faire attitude.

N. B. Irrelevant and entirely Grew's opinion.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (51) - 1 Jan. 1941 (p. 358)

Grew reports that time for appeasement has passed; that
we cannot await a British victory, and only by discrediting Jap
extremists can we help matters. He believes they are digging
in over a far-flung area, that the situation is dangerous,
and we must be ready for anything.

Def. Doc. 206-E (52) - 1 Jan. 1941 (pp. 358, 359)

Grew says turning point in the war has come. President
Roosevelt's address of December 29, 1940 is thought by Grew
to have been a great influence.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (53) - 1 Jan. 1941 (p. 359)

Mr. Grew quotes part of a letter he wrote to President
Roosevelt in which he lists what he believes are the chief
factors to settle in the problem of when to have a "showdown"
with the Japanese, (1) Britain's chances to win, (2) handicap
to British if we enter, and (3) our stage of preparedness.

Def. Doc. 206-E (54) - 1 Jan. 1941 (p. 359)

Grew despair over his eight-year endeavor to build endur-
ing relations with Japan now gone. He predicts that Japan will
eventually be seriously handicapped by the embargo but will
push toward economic self-sufficiency.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (55) - 1 Jan. 1941 (p. 360)

Grew reports that our retaliation actions are giving grave
concern to certain Japanese elements, including Matsuoka, but
that those elements are powerless; also, that the Germans are
pushing them to start war with us.

Def. Doc. No. 206-E (56) - 1 Jan. 1941 (no. 360, 361)

Grew warns the danger of following a policy of laissez-
faire and restates that without firm action we risk sudden
strokes by Japan. That despite internal controversy the
totalitarian expansion continues, clothed with righteous slogans.
The President replies to Grew's December 14th letter and agrees with Grew's views and foresees the European conflict as a world conflict. As to hostilities with Japan hindering aid to Britain, he believes that we must first consider the possible hindrance that would result if Japan took the East Indies area. He feels that it is "possible" for us to join in stopping such a move without exceeding our capacity and giving the aid needed. He feels that with our help the British will ultimately win.

Mr. Grew reports on German activities to cause some break in Japanese-American diplomatic relations, their efforts to embroil the two countries, and to propell the advance south. Grew tells of the arguments he uses to draw attention of influential persons, including the Foreign Minister, to the German efforts, and the bad results to expect if continued.

Grew refers to editorial in KOKUMIN which warns Japanese that "war between U. S. and Japan will be necessary" because of Britain's imminent collapse and America's expected entrance into European conflict, which will make the Pacific the major battle scene.

Grew reports that at farewell luncheon for NOMURA, MATSUOKA said American-Japanese relations couldn't be worse. He "practically threatened" U. S. with war. Mr. Grew replied that the American people are peace loving, but determined to defend their rights and obligations in the Pacific.

Grew reports of MATSUOKA's visiting Europe; of his talks with Stalin in which MATSUOKA compared Japanese family life as on a parallel with Communism; of his later telling the German press that he laid the worst ills to Anglo-Saxon domination.

Grew finds the Japanese domestic situation worse; that HIRANUMA is responsible for the April Cabinet change, bringing in OGURA, TOYODA, and SUZUKI; also, that the Axis sentiment is cooling down a bit.

ISHII is reported to have made a flat denial of the hot
rumor that Japan was to attack Singapore. General ISHIHARA retired, and belief is his advocating such an attack was cause of retirement.

Def. Doc. 206-E (74) - 17 Apr. 1941 (pp. 380, 381)

Grew advises that press comment on Japan's pact with Russia is very guarded since the press was given confidential instructions as to what they could say.

He also reports an increase of German fifth column activity and that the Gestapo is causing real concern, searching out anti-Axis sentiment to aid the Japanese police.

Def. Doc. 206-E (75) - 22 Apr. 1941 (pp. 381-384)

Grew analyzes causes of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: That Japan wanted no trouble at rear if moving south and Russia wanted a free hand to deal with Germany, also that no price had to be paid by Japan.

Def. Doc. 206-E (76) - 22 Apr. 1941 (p. 384)

Grew believes that Germany will attack Russia to get needed grain and oil.

Def. Doc. 206-E (77) - 25 Apr. 1941 (pp. 384, 385)

Grew learns of MATSUOKA's answer to the Black Dragon Society about the Neutrality Pact: that no secret clauses were involved, and that ideal was HAKKO ICHIU, universal peace without exploitation.

Def. Doc. 206-E (78) - 2 May 1941 (p. 385)

Writer thinks that his popular success in concluding the pact with Russia is encouraging MATSUOKA's ambition to become Premier, but the Cabinet is distrusting him more, fearing that he may cause war with U. S.

Def. Doc. 206-E (79) - 15 May 1941 - (op. 387, 388)

Cleavage between HONDA, Japan's Ambassador to NANKING, and MATSUOKA is observed. Grew believes foreign policy is divided in the Cabinet, as MATSUOKA now supports negotiations with CHIANG Kai-Shek.

Def. Doc. 206-E (80) - 27 May 1941 (pp. 388-392)

Grew relates MATSUOKA's verbal opinion stated in Grew's presence that U. S.'s diplomacy toward Germany is "unmanly, indecent and unreasonable", and that in case of a war between Germany and U. S., Japan would be obliged to fight U. S.
MATSUOKA's apology for the above remarks is for his imprudence. He discloses that if Japan really desires peace with U.S., America's self-defense measures should not be regarded as "aggression" by Japan.

Grew says that MATSUOKA's unorthodox opinion does not necessarily represent the Japanese Government's opinion, but Grew reluctantly expresses doubts about MATSUOKA's intellectual and political honesty.

Def. Doc. 206-E (91) - 22 June 1941 (p. 395)

Grew surprised at sudden news of Germany attacking Russia, but says he predicted it.

Def. Doc. 206-E (92) - 26 June 1941 (p. 396)

Grew attempts to determine what Japan's attitude will be toward the German attack on Russia. MATSUOKA hesitates, being surprised. Apparently, their pro-Axis policy must assume a new basis.

Def. Doc. 206-E (93) - 5 July 1941 (p. 396-400)

President Roosevelt seeks assurance from Japan that reports of Japan entering into hostilities against Russia to be a rumor.

KONOYE stalled, required discussions to be with Foreign Minister, who indicated it was only a rumor, but they still resent our helping Britain and do not consider it self-defense. MATSUOKA dies, before clear assurance is given.

Def. Doc. 206-E (95) - 12 July 1941 (p. 403)

Rumors that Japan is mobilizing certain reserves; but considered only precaution.

Def. Doc. 206-E (96) - 12 July 1941 (p. 404)

As mobilization increased rail and sea travel is impeded and by August Jap ships quit sailing to U.S. Americans sailing to Shanghai practically stopped.

Comment as to Excerpts 206-E (41) - (86)

Although these excerpts show that our relation with Japan continued to become worse from October, 1940, to July, 1941, the bulk of these are personal opinions and observations by the Ambassador and few prove any overt act. In their nature the facts reported are mostly hearsay. It would appear that only the conversations reported should be admissible or the excerpts referring directly to actions taken; otherwise the record is burdened with cumulative observations.
January 1, 1941

On December 14 I wrote the following letter to the President:

Dear Frank:

... About Japan and all her works. It seems to me to be increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown some day, and the principal question: issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle, to be:

(1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;

(2) Whether or not getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat;

(3) To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our preparations for war and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and later.

These are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

Excerpt from diary of Amer. S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 299

(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,
(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,
January 1, 1941

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows:

...After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. **Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese toward a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.**

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**Excerpt from Diary of Former U.S. Ambassador Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan." Page 359**

(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,
(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or on the subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite alliance.
(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to harm the conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or my subtleties in phraseology.

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance.
April 22, 1941

I have already written, in the March diary, of Matsuoka's first talk with Stalin on the former's way to Berlin and how he lectured Stalin on Japanese ideology for fifty-eight minutes out of the sixty-minute interview, maintaining that there is a close parallel between Communism and Japanese family life. On returning from Berlin, Matsuoka told Steinhardt that he has little hope of concluding a treaty with Stalin because he was not willing, and the Japanese public would not stand for the concessions which the Russians were asking for a nonaggression pact. But then at the last minute it appears that Stalin suddenly suggested a neutrality pact, which was signed in a few minutes, with no concessions (unless there were secret concessions) on the part of Japan. Nobody, apparently, was more surprised than Matsuoka.

In my analysis of the results of the neutrality pact, in the absence of information as to any secret commitments or understandings, I have come to the following conclusions:

(a) Due to the fact that Japan, at least publicly, was not obliged to pay a price for the pact, it represented a great personal success for Matsuoka.

(b) Instead of defining the policies and obligations of the respective signatories, the treaty was apparently concluded chiefly for the effect which each party believed it would exert on the other party and on third parties (on Germany, from the Soviet point of view, and on the United States and Great Britain, from the Japanese point of view);

(c) The treaty should tend to help rather than to thwart a conclusion of the conflict in China, regardless of any reservations on the part of the Soviets with regard to China or any subtleties in phraseology;

(d) With respect to Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, the treaty will tend to balance the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Alliance,
especially considering the somewhat formalistic Japanese mind;

e) The pact will tend to stimulate and support the Japanese ex­tremists who advocate a vigorous prosecution of the southward advance be­cause it guarantees Soviet neutrality in case Japan gets into war with a third country (i.e., the United States).

During Matsuoka's talks with Steinhardt, who gave a luncheon for him, the following points emerged, and I have no hesitation in setting them down because Matsuoka, if he has time when he returns, will tell me every­thing that he told Steinhardt:

(1) No commitments were made by Matsuoka in either Berlin or Rome.
(2) The chief purpose of Japan in entering the Tripartite /alliance was to preserve peace -- a theme upon which Matsuoka constantly harps both in public and in private.
(3) Japan would be obliged to go to war with the United States only if we should declare war on Germany, but that Japan would of course confer with Germany first.
(4) Matsuoka does not believe that Germany will declare war on the United States, but if that should happen he hopes that Japan will be given time to make her position clear before we make any move in the Pacific.
(5) Japan will strictly carry out her obligations to the Axis.
(6) Matsuoka had been told by both Hitler and Ribbentrop that they did not want war with the United States.
(7) They had also suggested that anti-American agitation in Japan be stopped.
(8) All three of them had expressed a wish for peace but they saw no possibility of peace until England had capitulated.
(9) Hitler had created a personally favorable impression on Matsuoka, who characterized him as a genius. He had been reasonable and calm in all their talks and had shown none of the excitable characteristics generally attributed to him.
(10) Ribbentrop admired the fight that Britain was putting up and realized that she was stronger now, from the point of view of defense, than when the war began. He expressed the opinion that the British Empire should not be destroyed.

(11) Hitler would invade Britain only under necessity and fully expected to win through eviction and the submarine.

(12) Matsuoka did not believe that Britain could drive a wedge between Germany and Italy, the latter being largely under German control while mutual personal admiration existed between Hitler and Mussolini. But the Germans had been instructed not to "look down or talk down" to the Italians. Mussolini showed no discouragement over his recent reverses and was sure that he would shortly stage a "comeback."

(13) Owing to the excessive demands of the Soviets, Matsuoka had made little progress in talking with Molotov.

(14) Japan had the choice of coming to an agreement with Moscow or becoming embroiled with the Soviet Union.

(15) Matsuoka earnestly desired an end of the war in China and felt that this could be brought about if the President would tell Chiang Kai-shek that if he refused to accept reasonable and fair peace terms, American aid would cease. Nevertheless, the Japanese would not accept mediation and peace could be effected only through direct negotiation between the two nations.

(16) Unless the Soviet Union substantially reduced its delivery of supplies to Germany, the Germans would not invade Russia, although they were fully prepared to do so. He thought that it was for the purpose of frightening the Soviets into continuing supplies that the Germans had given out rumors of a possible attack.

(17) Matsuoka hoped that the President and Mr. Hull would have confidence in him.

Steinhardt later took the precaution of reading the foregoing points to Matsuoka, who confirmed them as an accurate record of what he had said.
一九四一年四月二十二日

私は昨年に三月の日記に松村がベルリンに赴く途中スターリンと最初の会

見に至ったことを及ぼし彼を共産主義者と認めた。六十分間の会見の途中十八分間日本のイデオロギー

はスターリンとの論談はスターリンの新体制を支持するよう筋理

とし、そして、とシートハルトに話した。そして、日本

はスターリンにその金を無くとリリカが不可逆的

に近いが会見の前後においてスターリンが突然立論を論じた結果に

して、二、三分間の中に調印された。融

らしく元々自身も信頼しただけで

ある。
この結果を分析して見て次の如き結論に到達した。（a）この条約は、各調約国は同様の観点及び務務調査をすることなく、主として相手方及び第三国にソビエトの立場からすればドイツに日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはけず、日本に日本を圧迫せしめることをはか
エトの中立を示唆するのでそれは両方通じた明力な大行を従ヒル日本に絶
され彼がシュタインハルトに語った高にすべて偽に示るたらうと思る

両国はベルリンに於て何も何能公約はしなかった。

相国はブレヴィ特に降りした主な目的は平和を維持する事であった。そして

日本が三郊同盟に加入した主な目的は平和を維持する事であった。

根據對面国と開戦を諦難なくされるだろう。ひしこれについて日本は勿論

日本は極期面に対し日本を戦正に遂行するだろう。
松岡はヒトラー及びリッペンロップ両者から彼等はアメリカ合衆国と戦争を欲しないと言葉を送ったが、彼等者は全く日本に対する反アメリカ運動を阻止する為に発言していた。

彼等は三人共平和に於ける反アメリカ運動を阻止する為に発言した。彼等はヒトラーを天才と批評した。彼は松岡と会談中始め戦歴をその手に示さなかった。リッペンロップは英翼が再起を表して居るのを貫徹した。そして彼の態度と一致に示されたものに虚偽のないことを貫徹した。彼等は戦勝の見地から英翼は戦歴を貫徹したが現在の方に虚偽のないことを貫徹した。

松岡は英翼がドイツとイタリアとの間に、を打ち込む事が出来得るだろうかと云ふ。
ある限りイタリーは幅広く、ドイツの支配下にあったからである。併しドイツ人はイタリー人に近し見下けており、見下され気味に思ってはならぬと断じられて居た。ムソロフニは最近の敗北に絶望して居った。ソユーズの安来が見出さなかった所、日本はモスクへの面合をつけたか彼の誤解を示さなかった。松岡は不安に於ける韓国に対する軍事的措置を提案した。そして居てアメリカの大樽団が介在して、日本、ソユーズ間の戦略を拒絶するならは、アメリカは援助を中止すると云へば、従来の希望が見出されるだつと申せた。けれども日本人は、ソユーズがドイツへの進攻の端緒を著しく遮らさない限り、ドイツ
松岡は大関信及inskiは彼を指導する解説を説明した。ソウタインハルトは暹の松岡に当って前後の論点を説明した。そして松岡はその日本に於ける十年と論じる前アメリカ合衆国大使ガルナーの日記の抜萃。

三八一頁〜三八四頁
JAPAN ADOPTS A WATCHFUL AVOIDING POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA

June 26, 1941

We learn that on June 24, the Soviet Ambassador did ask the Foreign Minister as to Japan's attitude in the Soviet-German war and was told that the policy of Japan had not yet been formulated. This policy, said Matsuoka, would be largely influenced by a determination as to where the responsibility for the outbreak of war lay, and he added that the fundamental policy of Japan was based on the Axis. Japan must therefore determine whether Soviet-Japanese relations could now be brought into line with this fundamental policy of Japan.

It is clear that when Japan joined the Axis, it was done on the assumption that the close association of Germany with Soviet Russia would continue and that this basic pro-Axis policy has been destroyed by the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. At least in theory. We shall see.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador Crow entitled "Ten Years in Japan." Page 396
日本外交に対し議論的方針を採る

一九四一年昭和十六年六月二十六日

一九四一年昭和十六年六月二十六日

六月二十四日ソ門大使がソ門問題に関する日本の意向に対外務大臣に謳ねた

松岡は、此の方針は懸案弱勢に対する責任如何の決定により大きな影響を受

けてあるうと語り且つ日本の根本方針はむしろに議論を待ってあると附言し

我々は知ってある。

我々は、此の方針は懸案弱勢に対する責任如何の決定により大きな影響を受

けてあるうと語り且つ日本の根本方針はむしろに議論を待ってあると附言し

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けてあるうと語り且つ日本の根本方針はむしろに議論を待ってあると附言し

我々は知ってある。
July 25, 1941

We now learn that the official spokesman in Vichy announced on the 24th that a request had been presented by Japan to occupy bases at strategic points in Indo-China; he said that negotiations were going on both at Vichy and Hanoi and that there had been no ultimatum from Japan nor any German pressure. He added that arrangements would be made within the scope of the Franco-Japanese agreement of August 30, 1940, and that no inconvenience in temporarily extending the military agreement with Japan was seen so long as there was to be no change in French sovereignty over Indo-China and so long as no territorial demands were made by Japan.

When a correspondent asked the Vichy spokesman whether such a decision would not be inconsistent with the announced policy of France to defend her empire against all powers, he replied that the French Government had been obliged to come to this decision as the result of events in Syria. Replying to a question as to whether the assistance of the United States in preserving the status quo in Indo-China had been requested by France, the spokesman was evidently primed for the question because he said at once that France had not bothered to make any further request to the United States at this time since no satisfaction had been received when American assistance in Indo-China had been asked by France in 1940. In this case the spokesman did not take refuge in his usual procedure of saying that he must consult his superiors when some delicate point is brought up.

"Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."" Pages 405 and 406
A Flicker of Hope for Japanese-American Peace

July 27, 1941

This Sunday morning there came an exceedingly important telegram from the Acting Secretary reporting an equally important proposal which the President had made to Admiral Nomura with a view to settling the whole situation in the Far East and avoiding the rapid deterioration of Japanese-American relations as the direct result of Japan's aggressive policies and measures in this part of the world. I shall not at present record the details of this proposal in view of their ultraconfidential nature, but they offer to Japan a reasonable way out of her own alleged difficulties and the alleged encirclement measures of the ABCD powers which she maintains are threatening her own security.

On reading that telegram I thanked my stars that I had remained in Tokyo and had not gone to Karuizawa because it seemed to me of the utmost importance that I should immediately not only make sure that Admiral Toyoda had clearly understood the full purport of the proposal but that I should also exert every ounce of my own influence to secure its acceptance. I said once before in the diary that I had not gone home this summer because a moment might come when such influence could be exerted and this seemed to me to be precisely the sort of juncture which I then had in mind. I therefore immediately telephoned to the Foreign Minister at his private house and asked for an appointment although it was a Sunday morning. I saw him at 11:30 at his official residence and in a long talk made on my own initiative and responsibility the strongest appeal of which I was capable and perhaps the strongest representations that I have ever made.

I told the Department what I had done and said that although I had exceeded all authority I felt after careful thought that three considerations justified my steps: (1) the plain importance that Admiral Toyoda should completely and accurately understand the President's proposal, (2) the importance...
of the time element, which made it impossible for me to ask for authority from
Washington in advance, and (3) my belief that the President would wish nothing
to be left undone to ensure that maximum consideration should be given to his
proposal and that the Japanese Government should fully recognize its far-
reaching and enlightened import because upon its rejection or acceptance
might depend the future peace of the Pacific. To my astonishment Admiral
Toyoda said that he had not received the President's proposal, communicated
to Admiral Nomura three days ago, on the 23rd, and Toyoda confirmed this
after leaving me for some five minutes obviously to telephone to the Foreign
Office. Two days later we learned from Terasaki, Director of the American
Bureau of the Foreign Office, that on the day of his conversation with the
President Admiral Nomura had sent only a very brief telegram to Tokyo and
that after my talk with Toyoda he had immediately instructed Nomura to sub-
mit a comprehensive report without delay.

Two days later I received a very pleasant message from Sumner
Welles stating that he regarded my action at this time as of the greatest
assistance and value and that both the President and he himself had approved
of what I had done. I can't say that I am ever-optimistic as to favorable re-
results, but I told Admiral Toyoda in our talk that he was now presented with
an opportunity to take a step of the highest statesmanship and with a way of
solving the appalling situation which faced him at the outset of his ministry;
I said in fact that he now had an opportunity to go down in history as one of
Japan's greatest statesmen. Whether Japan accepts or not, the President's
step places the United States in an uneassailable position from the point of
view of history and someday history will record this step in full. If the
Japanese fail to avail themselves of it, their own position in history will
not be enviable. On the 30th I sent another telegram to the Department making
some further suggestions on the foregoing subject.
In my recent conversations with Admiral Toyoda it seems to me significant that the only thing which really stirred him up were the allusions which I made to the belief existing in our country that German pressure is responsible for Japan's present policies, and in each case the Minister emphatically denied that Germany now exerts any influence in Japan whatsoever. One of my colleagues, incidentally, had previously told me that Ichikawa himself had confirmed to him the story that he had telegraphed to von Ribbentrop to ask if there were any basis for the reports that Germany was about to attack Soviet Russia, that he had received from von Ribbentrop a categorical denial, and that forty-eight hours later Germany's invasion of Soviet Russia had occurred. Once again it is abundantly clear that the Japanese are getting fed up with the Germans, who have obviously, as usual, overplayed their hand.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 411-413
一九四一年七月廿九日

日本政府，国府，长官，代理より，大統領が野村提督に，満州の全面戦争を解消し，日本の経済に於ける侵略的政策並に手を取る直後の結果として，日本の関係の急激な悪化を固執せんとしてあった重要な提案を説する様に再発する。...

これと戦争の合理に縛りを解き，日本が昭和講る日と自陣する困難なる上で，日本政府は政府の合理的な方策を提案しきものである。...

このように力をつてすべき時を来るやも知れることに今日より，戦争の緩和を実現し，私の大所提供的，政府の日記に，

記したが，その時に心の中に考えたが，その為故に心の中に考えることに，大時機が今正にやって来た。
たかに思われた。そこで私は即時外相の私信に応じて何か、目を止めて
ではあったけれど、会見を申し込んだのである。私は彼に宣部で十一時半
に召した。そして彼が時間の会談中に、私の要望と責任に於て私の申し
最も急い順子を彼に訴へ、又恐らく今頃の中の最も強力な議論をしたので
あった。

私は私の主な事を密詔言に報告し、且つ私の要望を達成する事をしたけれ
ども熱望の後の三つの話に陰気（私の）のとった道が正しいとは感ぜられる門
役えた。

田所務官が完全に且つ正確に大統領の提案を理解する事が第一段階的に監
さしたため、又太平洋の将来の平和はこの提案が陰気さされてるか又相談の
たためにはあらゆる手段を講ずることを認すると私が信じた為に、速い
事に、稲田添官は三日前、即ち二十四日早朝後、何源された大統領の提案
案を受けとつるのないと言った。そして五六人の間明らかに外務省に通話
するため私を待たせたをいた後に、これを確認したのであった。二日後の
外務省アメリカ局政務官から野村太郎が大統領との意見当日東京に返る間
異な確証を受けたのみである経、及び私との意見が命田に通じて野村へ即
時総合的な対話を延出するよう催したとの事があった。
二日後、私はサムナー・ウェルズから、私の場合の私の行動が彼も大き
な助けとなり見込んであると断ったことを、大統領が彼自身が私のたしなめ
に警告された旨を通じて私に通じたのはひどい結果がない、しかし私は常識中登
る意味に、今や彼は最大の政府の手頭を差し出すべきも、大臣兼任早々彼
が面倒した裏からべき暴露を解決する手段に、急きされるからだと告げた。
元案は彼が日本最大の政府として歴史に記録されるべき暴露を差し出すべき、
とった程度はありすべき暴露を絶えず得たものである。日本が受話しようとしなから、つまり大統領の
うる言は、日本が日本最大の政治機として歴史に記録されるべき暴露を差し出すべき、
とった程度はありすべき暴露を絶えず得たものである。日本が受話しようとしなから、つまり大統領の
の措置も利用しなかったなら、彼等の歴史上の立場は違ましくないものと
なるだろう。三十一に私は前進の問題について更に進んだ案を述べた別
の電報を閣務省に送った。

予備研究との最近の諸言葉に於て本当に彼を興奮させた唯一のことは、日
本の現在の政策がドイツの圧迫によるものさの言語に於て米国に出たと彼に
述べた事であつて、証には感謝深い心に思はれたのである。その慶要に於
てはドイツは現在日本に何等の影響をも興へておらないと言つて私の言を破
否定了。

序でながら、外交調停間の一人が以前私に書したことがある。それは、秘
書がフォン・リッペントロップにドイツがソビエトを攻撃せんとしてあるとの
説明に照れずあらぶ谷を尾轢で聞いた受した事。彼がフォン・リッペン
トロップから試論否定の返事を受けとった事。及びその四十八時間の後に
ドイツはソビエトに条約を開始し、といふ事を知聞がその人に確言したとのい
つものである。又しても日本がドイツの要領中を何人としてある事は恐
めぬ明らかである。
September 22, 1941

I called on Foreign Minister Toyoda this afternoon at his request. After reading from a document in Japanese which was then translated into English, he made substantially the following oral statement:

1. The suggestion that the President meet with Prince Konoye was contained by implication in the message received by the President from the Prime Minister.

2. The Japanese Government had intended that the proposed meeting should discuss the questions at issue between the two countries requiring agreement, and that subsequently through normal diplomatic channels the details for executing the understanding reached at the meeting should be worked out. The Government of the United States, however, had adopted the view that the problems which had emerged from the preliminary and informal conversations should be agreed on in advance of the meeting.

3. The Foreign Minister had explained that in his statement made to me on September 4 he had replied to all of the questions raised by the Government of the United States and that his statement of September 4 had widened rather than reduced the field of the negotiations which the Japanese Government is willing to cover.

4. The Foreign Minister then gave me the basic terms of peace which Japan is prepared to offer China, to be communicated to the Secretary of State. The minister emphasized that these terms should not be regarded as a new proposal but as related and supplementary to his statement of September 4 when he confirmed that the Japanese Government still desired to seek the good offices of the President in bringing the conflict with China to an end.

5. Admiral Toyoda told me that great internal changes had occurred during the past month as a result of the publicity that the suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister had received abroad and as a result of the published reports and references on radio broadcasts.
abroad in regard to the conversations in progress between Japan and the United States. Thanks to the efforts of the Japanese Government, public opinion in Japan and the Japanese press in the main are not aware of the developments referred to above, but the publicity abroad is known to certain groups in Japan and has increased the activities of those elements in Japan who are opposed to an understanding with the United States.

6. The Government of Japan will attempt to guard against any incidents or special occurrences in connection with the anniversary on September 27 of Japan's adherence to the Axis and will allow this anniversary to be celebrated by private organizations. However, should a considerable lapse of time occur following the anniversary without any sign as to the attitude of the United States, the groups referred to above who are against an understanding with the United States and who are informed of the Japanese-American conversations might find it possible to inflame public opinion in Japan and thus make it very difficult for these talks to continue.

7. Admiral Toyoda pointed out that the Japanese Government is still awaiting the American answer to the various points set forth by him in his statement of September 4. He expressed his belief that in that statement the Japanese Government had with complete frankness revealed to the American Government its intentions and desires.

In reply to the Minister's question whether any further information had been received from Washington, I conveyed to him the substance of the Department's cable of September 20, which had been decoded immediately before my call on the Minister. Admiral Toyoda was especially struck by the Secretary's remark to the Japanese ambassador that the government of the United States fully shared the desire of the Japanese Government to hasten matters. The Minister expressed the thought that although the desire of the United States Government to confer with other governments in regard to the suggested agreement was clearly recognized, the element of delay which would be involved in such consultations might have a most unfortunate effect.
With reference to the lack of concern felt by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington regarding the anniversary on September 27 of Japan's adherence to the Axis, Admiral Toyoda expressed the view that Admiral Nomura was not in close enough touch with the situation in Japan to perceive the dangers. I told the Minister that I was surprised that he had not conveyed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington his own concern on this point.

With reference to the terms of peace between Japan and China, I told the Minister that I wished to avoid any comment until the Government of the United States had had a chance to examine these terms but that for purposes of clarification I would like to know the exact meaning of the words "existing agreements and usages" mentioned in point three. The Minister in reply stated that these words must be understood as written; however, he referred in this connection to the presence in China of American marines merely by way of an illustration of the phrase in question.

I promised the Minister that I would immediately communicate to the Secretary his statement given above; likewise the proposed terms of peace between Japan and China which he had handed to me. But I added that in view of the communications between the Governments of Japan and the United States I could not be optimistic that a decision on these important matters could be reached before the 27th of September.

Text of basic Japanese terms of peace with China, handed to the American Ambassador by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 22, 1941.

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. Co-operative defense between Japan and China.

Co-operation between Japan and China for the purpose of preventing Communist and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public order in China.
Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.


The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for carrying out the China affair will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said affair, excepting those troops which come under point 3.

5. Economic co-operation.

(a) There shall be economic co-operation between Japan and China, having the development and utilization of essential materials for national defense in China as its principal objective.

(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic activities by third powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.


7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.


Excerpt from Diary of Former U.S. Ambassador Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 432-435
一九四一年九月廿二日

会は朝田外務大臣の申出に基づき本日午後同氏を訪問した。彼は日本語の文書を互いに交わし、それを英語に翻訳した上で概ね左の如き口頭声明を行われた。

日本在所の意図は、右の会見において両国間の係争問題で意見の一致を要する大統領と近衛公の面会に臨むする提案は大統領が首相から受取つた答書

に於て示された。

外務大臣は、九月四日の余に対する pearlの答書に於て米國政府より提起され

か問題の総でに付で同答を来さむに至るべきに、九月四日の彼の答筆書は日本政

府が通じて断却せんとする交涉の範囲を握りこすれ決めるものではなか

Def. Doc. # 206- E (97)
外務大臣は、日本が中国に提案したこれらの平和条件を国
務長官に修譯する様に示した。同大臣はこれ等の条件は新らしい提
案を示したのである。今後中日両国の親しい結び寄せる閲覧

166x804

175x790

186x758

193x712

206x790

214x790

228x790

239x707

240x533

245x499

259x790

263x531

272x164

286x286

291x513

301x301

314x743

314x724

314x712

317x695

317x687

317x669

317x652

317x641

318x447

318x428

318x412

318x392

318x373

318x354

318x336

321x318

321x303

322x287

322x268

322x248

325x223

329x218

333x201

333x182

336x164
本国内の情勢をたどつつすることを可能と見、斯くして会談経緯を回顧しながら

云々要望は非常に不運な結果となつて現われはしまいか、と云ふ彼の憂慮

に如何なる挨拶も認められずに在来相当の日を過ごすならば、米国とこの際

豊田相撲は九月四日の彼の署名書に於て自分の提示した観念項下に対する

米国政府の回答は日本政府は依然存じもっててゐるところを指摘した。日本政府

とすればはの署名書で全く説得なくその意図を希望を米国政府に指摘した。

ワシントンから其の内容が報道を入手したかいうか、云ふ大臣の意図を

に答へて余は大臣訪問の直前に解説した九月二十日関務省関さの内容を

伝達した。豊田相撲は米国政府も日本政府で全く御同様交渉の意図を

を希望するものである。これ日本大使に追へた関務卿所見に於て更に然ら

てゐた。大臣は示唆された提案に関しても関務卿と関係全般に関連して

の希望は明らかに認められるが、その模様相談に必然的に含まれる過程に

を踏襲した。
ワシントン記念日RIEND. DOC. #206-E. (97)

ワシントン勝在日本大使が、日本の都圏制限九月廿七日記念日に関し、間
心を抱いていない点に付しては至極告忱大使は所信を改承して、野村少軍大
将は日本の国情を緊密な関係を保つでないのを危険を感知してあわない旨
大大使に付けてみないのを驚く旨同大臣に告げた。

日本中間の和平条件に付しては、合衆国政府がこれに際して互議条件を検討する意
思を得るまでには如何なる批判も差支へ度く必要条件に記してある。現在
の計画並びに懈例をいう言葉の正確な意味を知る必要を明らかにし余
は同大臣に告げた。同大臣はこれ、の言葉は文字通りに解すべきものと答へたが、これに関諸して、間

日、同大臣に対談の談話並に同大臣が余に手交した日本中間間の和平条件
議案を直ちに副務長官に通達すべく旨約した。然し余は更に日本及合衆
国兩政府間の通訳状況に鑑み、これら重要案件の決定が九月廿七日以前に
到達ししるるこそ殊記念品の旨通べた。
掲載帖文書。二〇六年十一月

現行の既設慣例に従い上記目的の為、必要期間、支那領土の一定地域における

撤兵する事。仮し第三項に該当する軍勢は除く。

(4) 日支間の経済提携をなし。その主なる目的として、支那の国防上必要ならば、軍勢の撤退

領土合併

不協議

大蔵省政策及び汪兆銘政府の合同
GERMAN RELATIONS TO THE TOJO CABINET

October 29, 1941

The following items gathered by members of another country's mission to Tokyo are believed to be a fairly accurate account of the reactions of the German community here to the present situation.

The Germans are not enthusiastic about the new cabinet, which disappointed the hopes of a definitely interventionist government, which they had formed on the resignation of Prince Konoye. Their feelings were cooled still further by the arrest of two Germans immediately the new cabinet had taken office.

In the event of war between the U.S. and Germany, the local Germans from the ambassador down are uncertain of Japan's reactions. They regard the Japanese as untrustworthy opportunists.

* * * * *

Excerpt from Diary of Former U.S. Ambassador Crow entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 653 and 654
The ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary as follows:

He cites a leading article from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi of November 1 (reported in telegram No. 1727 of that date), stating that a banner headline declaring "Empire Approaches Its Greatest Crisis" introduced a dispatch from New York with a summary of a statement the Japanese Embassy reportedly gave to The New York Times regarding the need of ending the United States-Japanese economic war. Both the article and the Nichi Nichi editorial are believed to be close reflections of Japanese sentiments at present.

The ambassador refers to his various telegraphic reports during several months past analyzing the factors affecting policy in Japan and says he has nothing to add thereto nor any substantial revision to make thereof. In his opinion, a conclusive estimate may be had of Japan's position through the application to the existing situation and the immediate future of the following points:

(a) It is not possible for Japan to dissociate either Japan or the conflict with China from the war in Europe and its fluctuations.

(b) In Japan political thought ranges from medieval to liberal ideas and public opinion is thus a variable quantity. The impact of events and conditions beyond Japan may determine at any given time which school of thought shall predominate. (In the democracies, on the other hand, owing to a homogeneous body of principles which influence and direct foreign policy and because methods instead of principles are more likely to cause differences of opinion, public opinion is formed differently.) For example, in Japan the pro-Axis elements gained power following last year's German victories in
Western Europe; then Japanese doubt of ultimate German victory was created by Germany's failure to invade the British Isles, this factor helping to reinforce the moderate elements; and finally Germany's attack on the Soviet Union upset the expectation of continued Russo-German peace and made the Japanese realize that those who took Japan into the Tripartite Alliance had misled Japan.

(c) In an attempt to correct the error of 1940 may be found in the efforts to adjust Japanese relations with the United States and thereby to lead the way to conclusion of peace with China, made by Prince Konoye and promised by the Tojo cabinet. If this attempt fails, and if success continues to favor German arms, a final, closer Axis alignment may be expected.

(d) The Embassy in Tokyo has never been convinced by the theory that Japan's collapse as a military power would shortly result from the depletion and the eventual exhaustion of Japan's financial and economic resources, as propounded by many leading American economists. Such forecasts were unconsciously based upon the assumption that a dominant consideration would be Japan's retention of the capitalistic system. The outcome they predicted has not transpired, although it is true that the greater part of Japan's commerce has been lost, Japanese industrial production has been drastically curtailed, and Japan's national resources have been depleted. Instead, there has been a drastic acceleration of the process to integrate Japan's national economy, in which there might well have occurred the predicted collapse of Japan. That has happened to date therefore does not support the view that continuation of trade embargoes and imposition of a blockade (proposed by some) can best avert war in the Far East.

The Ambassador mentions his telegram No. 327, September 12, 1940 (which reported the golden opportunity seen by Japanese army circles for expansion as a consequence of German triumphs in Europe). He sent this telegram under circumstances and at a time when it appeared wise and futile for the United States to adopt conciliatory measures. The strong policy recommended in the telegram was subsequently adopted by the United States.
This policy, together with the impact of world political events upon Japan, brought the Japanese Government to the point of seeking conciliation with the United States. If these efforts fail, the Ambassador foresees a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan once more back to the former Japanese position or even farther. This would lead to what he has described as an all-out, do-or-die attempt, actually risking national hara-kiri to make Japan insensate to economic embargoes abroad rather than to yield to foreign pressure. It is realized by observers who feel Japanese national temper and psychology from day to day that, beyond peradventure, this contingency not only is possible but is probable.

If the fiber and temper of the Japanese people are kept in mind, the view that war probably would be averted, though there might be some risk of war, by progressively imposing drastic economic measures is an uncertain and dangerous hypothesis upon which to base considered United States policy and measures. It would not be averted by such a course if it is taken in the opinion of the Embassy. However, each view is only opinion, and accordingly, to postulate the correctness of either one and to erect a definitive policy thereon would, in the belief of the Embassy, be contrary to American national interests. It would mean putting the cart before the horse. The primary point to be decided apparently involves the question whether war with Japan is justified by American national objectives, policies, and needs in the case of failure of the first line of national defense, namely, diplomacy, since it would be possible only on the basis of such a decision for the Roosevelt administration to follow a course which would be divested as much as possible of elements of uncertainty, speculation, and opinion. The Ambassador does not doubt that such a decision, irrevocable as it might well prove to be, already has been debated fully and adopted, because the events are running fast.

The Ambassador emphasizes that, in the above discussion of this grave, momentous subject, he is out of touch with the intentions and thoughts of the administration therein, and he does not at all mean to imply
that Washington is pursuing an undeliberated policy. Nor does he intend to advocate for a single moment any "agreement" of Japan by the United States or recession in the slightest degree by the United States Government from the fundamental principles laid down as a basis for the conduct and adjustment of international relations, American relations with Japan included.

There should be no compromise with principles, though methods may be flexible. The Ambassador's purpose is only to ensure against the United States becoming involved in war with Japan because of any possible misconception of Japan's capacity to rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States.

While national sanity dictates against such action, Japanese sanity cannot be measured by American standards of logic.

The Ambassador sees no need for much anxiety respecting the bellicose tone and substance at present of the Japanese press (which in the past several years has attacked the United States intensely in recurrent waves), but he points out the shortsightedness of underestimating Japan's obvious preparations to implement an alternative program in the event the peace program fails. He adds that similarly it would be shortsighted for American policy to be based upon the belief that Japanese preparations are no more than saber rattling, merely intended to give moral support to the high pressure diplomacy of Japan. Action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States now comes with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.

"Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Pages 467-470"


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
日本政府の決定、盟友ナイトのトーキョーで、調印された条約、日本メディアが報道。
電報
大日本政府

電報

御遠拝

本件に関しては、既に二三の意見を

御審議の御便宜を

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御審議の御便宜を


電報
大日本政府

御遠拝

本件に関しては、既に二三の意見を

御審議の御便宜を


Def. Doc. 4206-2(114)

日十年間

日都スル前米国大使デル氏日記

国大七四七〇頁
November 7, 1941

At the Soviet Embassy reception today, to celebrate their national holiday (they are the only diplomatic mission which now holds such receptions), I took occasion to make the strongest representations to every Japanese to whom I talked with regard to the Times and Advertiser editorial, mentioned above, listing seven points as a program for American "restitution" to Japan, and to point out what serious harm the editorial had done, especially at the moment of sending Furusui to the United States to try to bring the current conversations to a successful conclusion. I spoke of the utter stupidity of creating such a hostile atmosphere here and such an unfortunate impression on the American public at a moment when constructive, not destructive, results were desired. I made it clear that it was not my intention to presume to interfere with the Japanese press but only to point out factually the inevitable effects in my country when such editorials, assumed to represent the views of the Japanese Government since the Times and Advertiser is known to be controlled by the Foreign office, were reprinted in the United States.

Togo, the Foreign Minister, appeared to know nothing about the editorial and was sure that it had not been inspired by the Foreign office, but he undertook to look into it and a few moments later he called Toshi Go, editor of the paper, over to him and told him what I had said. I also spoke to Toshi Go, who said that he alone was responsible for the editorial and had written it himself as indicating Japan's maximum demands which would undoubtedly be far beyond what the Government would ask for in the conversations. I told him that he could have no conception of the harm that he had done. Somebody else told me that he had published the editorial as a protest against the secrecy under which the conversations were being held.
Shigemitsu, with whom I talked, was thoroughly sympathetic and said that he would do his best to stop this sort of thing, while Katsumoto, head of Homei, promised me that there would be an immediate change in the tone and substance of the Japanese press, and he was as good as his word because the tone did immediately change for the better. I think I succeeded in stirring them all up considerably, so the gathering at the Soviet party was distinctly useful.

The next time I called on Togo I repeated these representations and he replied that while the Foreign office had exerted no control over the Times and advertiser up to the present, it was jolly well going to exert such control from now on. The editorial may or may not have been dictated by the Foreign office, regardless of what Toshi so said. One informant said that it had been so dictated, but if so, I think it was probably done by some subordinate official without the knowledge of the Minister, who, I am convinced, knew nothing about it.

Perhaps I may have overemphasized the effect of the editorial on the American public, but my guess is that it made the front pages of the papers at home, as the radio commentators talked a good deal about it.

While on the subject of publicity I find pertinent and very interesting the same situation obtaining when James Gallatin (whose fascinating diary I am reading for the second time) was doing his best to bring England and the United States to peace prior to the Treaty of Ghent. He writes from London under date of April 21, 1814, to William H. Crawford, Secretary of War:

'They [The English people] eagerly wish "the punishment of America." They do not even suspect that we had any just cause for war, and ascribe it solely to a premeditated concert with Bonaparte at a time when we thought him triumphant and their cause desperate. That such opinions should be almost universally entertained here by the great body of the people is not at all astonishing. To produce such an effect, and thereby render the American war popular, the Ministerial powers have had nothing more to do than to transcribe American Federal speeches and newspaper. If Jervis, Quincy, Strong, Hanson, etc., have not brought a majority of the American people to their

* Former Japanese ambassador to London, who replaced Togo as Foreign minister in April, 1943.
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* Former Japanese ambassador to London, who replaced Togo as Foreign Minister in April, 1943.
side they have at least fully succeeded here, and had no difficulty in convincing all that part of the English community which derives its information from political journals that we had no cause of complaint in the War of 1812 and acted only as allies of Napoleon.

If we substitute for Ishering, Quincy, Strong, Benson, et cetera, the names of some of our isolationists, the analogy is clear, for it is the speeches of those gentlemen that are splashed across the front pages of the Japanese press, and the Japanese people naturally assume that they represent the great majority of American public sentiment.

The President said today that the Government of the United States is giving consideration to the question of withdrawal of the American marine detachments now maintained ashore in China at Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai.

Excerpt from Diary of former U. S. Ambassador Crow entitled "Ten Years in Japan.

Pages 474-476
内容が即座に適更スペキ旨答ヘタ。一方、同盟ノ経験タル松本ハ日本各紙ノ陰調
直チニ調シ改善サレタ。私ヘ彼ヲ全テ少カラズ動カスコトニ成功シタ
ツァノデアル。
次回ニ東郷ヲ訪問ノ際私ハ右ニ返ベタウナ意志ヲ纏リ返ヘシ表
明シタ。彼ハニ対シ而现在迄ノ外務省ハヨタイムズヲアドバタイザ
レヲ何ラ制ヲ試ミナタガ、是レカラヘ断然加ベルペキ旨答ヘ
タ。卿トシノ言ヲ拘ラズ右ニ語ガ外務省ノ意ヲ断ヲ受ケタモノデアルカ
否カニ問シテハ何レモ判断ガツカス。
或ハ私ハ右社説ノ米國民衆ニ及ボール影ヲ強調し過ダ報ガルカ
モ知レスガ、私ノ想像デハ右社説ヘ母国ノ新聞紙ノ第一ニ當々のニ報
セラテキノノヲ見テモ分割ル考へル。ラデノノ此若家連中ヲ際に分割ノ此ノ問題ヲ取り上

今ノ公表トイヲ問題ニ於テハ私ハテノギャラテイン（彼ノ異味テ株式日記ヲ今 Lesser パスカルデキールヲタガニ前ナリノヲ書セント努力セル最まト金ク同様ノ状況ガ酉米
ハハハ四ハ四月廿一日付デテ、倫敦ヨリ陸軍長官、ロシアフォード
宛左ノ如ク谷キ送ツテキル。

彼ハハノ英国民ニ米国ニテニ現シララシテラコトヲ切望シテキル。彼
等ニハ吾々が正当ナル戦いガテツテ戦フド到達ノハハレズ、奈
ノ数ヲ勘定テ彼等ノ運転ノ自由ナルヲ判断セル時機ニ於テ、労者トノ協
同作戦ヲ前ララシテラコトノ結果ヲ考ヘキテキル。斯カル意見ガ
当地ニ還テハ受ケタルラコトラシテキルシテハテノヨリ離スヲ

ハ單ニ米國ノ聯合派ヲ連絡セラレテ其ノ新聞記ヲナリヲ譲ヲ
内閣當局者

講演スレバ事足リカノ
November 11, 1941

Churchill has come out with the statement that "if the United States
should be involved in a war with Japan, a British declaration of war would
follow within the hour." It does one's heart good to hear such an unquali-
fied statement by the British Prime Minister, leaving nothing whatever to
Japan's imagination.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Greent entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 473
緋翼国文書第二百〇一大戦 (百二十)

発表の宣戦・チャールは、若し米国にして日本との戦争に巻き込まれれんか、英国の
宣戦は、直ちに寸時を出でずに布告されるだろう。といふ要請を共にし
た。斯かる英領海軍に於ける率直なる聴聞を聞くとい、日本が更に職務する所
理がないので、聞く者に居しくなるのである

題して「在日中の十年間」acci前米国大使グルーの日記よりの
抜粋。

第四七八頁より

Def Doc No. 206 E-120

RECEIVED
AUG 7 1947
Telegram dispatched from Ota, Consul General at Shanghai, to Uehida, Foreign Minister, Jun. 10, 1919.

3839
(Cipher)

Dispatched from Shanghai, at 00.50 hrs., June 10, 8th year of Taisho (1919)
Received at the Ministry, at 00.10 hrs., June 11, 8th year of Taisho (1919)
To Foreign Minister, Uehida
From Consul General, Ota
No. 112
Concerning the dispatched telegram No. 25.

It is the consensus of Chinese opinion that the British and American Tobacco Companies have been instrumental in boycotting Japanese goods in an attempt to lead the South Sea Brothers Tobacco Company into bankruptcy and that these companies had a secret deal to do with inciting the riot on the night of the 30th by using numbers of coolies. Nevertheless, it is difficult to obtain definite evidence since such movements are naturally carried out with strict secrecy. However, I will wire you further as soon as I obtain evidence by making private inquiries in all quarters.

Received by the 2ndRecord Section,
January 29, 9th year of Taisho (1920)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram No. 112 from Ota, Consul General at Shanghai, to Ushida, Foreign Minister, despatched on June 10, 1919," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 17th day of January, 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI

Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Megaharu, ODO.

Translation Certificate

I, William E. Cloke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Cloke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 21 Jan. 1947
Translated by Defense Language Branch

Telegram from Ichikawa, Acting-(TN. Consul, at Amoy to Uchida, Foreign Minister June 6, 1919.

6419
(Cipher)

Dispatched from Amoy, at 7,30 p.m., June 6,
8th year of Taishō (1919)

Received at the Ministry, at 2,45 p.m., June 7,
8th year of Taishō (1919)

To Foreign Minister UCHIDA

From Acting-(TN. Consul), ICHIKAWA

No. 34

Incited by the reports that 400 students had been arrested by the authorities in Peking, masses of students have been roaming through the streets since early in the morning with banners prepared last night. Nearly all the shops have closed their doors for fear of ... (missing) ... damage, and the city is generally struck with alarm. The Chinese police are keeping guard at important points but they fail to maintain order.

The Rioters, taking advantage of the situation, are assaulting and threatening anyone seen making a purchase in the Japanese retail stores.

It is difficult to understand why the student riot broke out suddenly.

The Chinese authorities appear, on the other hand, to be almost incompetent. As the Warship CHITOSE is now at anchor,
the marines are ready to land anytime when danger is imminent.

It is, however, realized that careful consideration must be given before carrying out such a landing.

Telegraphed to Peking, Tientsin and Tainan;

Sent by mail in cipher to Fuchow and Swatow.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram No. 34 from Ichikawa, in charge of Consulate at Amoy, to Uchida, Foreign Minister, despatched on June 6, 1919." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 17th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Translation Certificate

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Today, Japan
Date 21 Jan 1947
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram No. 54 from Ichikawa, in charge of Consulate at Amoy, to Uchida, Foreign Minister, despatched on June 6, 1919," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 17th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Hagaharu Odo

"Shantung problem" to carry out their evil designs and agitated a comparatively intelligent class of people. What they preach being what it is, and the leaders coming from the intelligentsia, and furthermore being prompted by the encouraging attitude of the foreigners in China, particularly the British and Americans, the anti-Japanese movement has been carried out in a relatively orderly manner up to date. The foundation of the movement is more solidly established than expected. Unless the Shantung problem can be brought to a solution once and for all,
Telegram from Obata, Minister at Peking to
Uchida, Foreign Minister, June 10, 1919

0536
(Cipher)

Dispatched from Peking on June 10, 8th year of
Taishō (1919)

Received at the Ministry, at 5:35 p.m., June 10,
8th year of Taishō (1919)

To Foreign Minister, UCHIDA

From Minister, OBATA

No. 835

Anti-Japanese campaign which is
already in progress in various parts of this country is being
gradually accelerated lately. As to the motive of the present
anti-Japanese movement, it is practically obvious that a group
of ambitious politicians, particularly those politicians who
belong to the RENSHUKAI, (TN. Study Society) capitalized on the
"Shantung problem" to carry out their evil designs and agitated
a comparatively intelligent class of people. What they
preach being what it is, and the leaders coming from the
intelligentsia, and furthermore being prompted by the encouraging
attitude of the foreigners in China, particularly the British and
Americans, the anti-Japanese movement has been carried out in a
relatively orderly manner up to date. The foundation of the
movement is more solidly established than expected. Unless the
Shantung problem can be brought to a solution once and for all,
this movement may not cease for a while and---(not clear)--- of the agreed particulars between Japan and China may become more and more intense. The anti-Japanese lately shows a tendency gradually to become bolder and stronger especially since June. It is superfluous to say that this was caused by the obviously encouraging attitude of foreigners in China which was indicated by the sympathetic resolutions made by foreign missionaries or in resolutions made by the British American Association.

Another cause---(not clear)--- American leaders in Paris will aid the Chinese Mission as best they can in regard to the Shantung problem---(not clear)---with this the Chinese found some hope and encouragement, (continued)

(Delayed at Mukden, 7 a.m., June 10)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram No. 855 from Obata, Minister at Peking, to Uchida, Foreign Minister, despatched on June 10, 1919." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 17th day of January, 1947.

DK. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Translation Certificate

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 21 Jan, 1947.
在 北京 小 津 夫 先 生 と 飯 民 内 田 外 労 大 臣 と

大 正 八 年 六 月 十 日

法 公 使

内 田

外 労 大 臣

三 阿

内 田 公 使

大 正 八 年 六 月 十 日

小 三 江

本 省 長
The United States of America and his Majesty the Emperor of China, being enkindled by an earnest desire to extend further the commercial relations between them and otherwise to promote the interests of the peoples of the two countries, in view of the provisions of the first paragraph of article vi of the final protocol signed at Peking of the seventh day of September, A.D. 1901, whereby the Chinese Government agreed to negotiate the amendments deemed necessary by the foreign Governments to the treaties of commerce and navigation and other subjects concerning commercial relations, with the object of facilitating them, have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries: ---

The United States of America ---

Iljin N. Gongha, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary of the United States of America
to China ---

John W. H. Dorsey, Consul-General of the United States of

America at Shanghai ---

John F. Shum, a Citizen of the United States of America

resident at Shanghai ---

and his Majesty the Emperor of China ---

Lu I-To-Nan, President of the Board of Public Works ---
Li ~aj G.

Friday, May 3, 1911, Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent.

Formerly Senior Vice-President of the Board of Public Works.

Who, having met and duly exchanged their full powers which were found to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following amendments to existing treaties of commerce and navigation formerly concluded between the two countries, and upon the subjects hereinafter expressed connected with commercial relations, with the object of facilitating them.

Art. 1. --- Diplomatic representatives; rights and privileges. --- In accordance with international usage, and as the diplomatic representative of China has the right to reside in the capital of the United States, and to enjoy there the same prerogatives, privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by the similar representative of the most favored nation, the diplomatic representative of the United States shall have the right to reside at the capital of His Majesty the Emperor of China.

He shall be given audience of His Majesty the Emperor whenever necessary to present his letters of credence or any communication from the President of the United States. At all such times he shall be received in a place and in a manner befitting his high position, and on all such occasions the ceremonial observed toward him shall be that observed toward the representatives of nations on a footing of equality, with no loss of prestige on the part of either.
The diplomatic representatives of the United States shall enjoy all the privileges and immunities enjoyed by international usage to such representatives, and shall in all respects be entitled to the treatment extended to similar representatives of the most favored nation.

In the text authoritative. The English text of all notes or dispatches from United States officials to Chinese officials, and the Chinese text of all notes or dispatches from Chinese officials to United States officials shall be authoritative.

Article II.---Consular officers, rights and privileges.
---A China may appoint consular officers to reside in the United States and to enjoy there the same attributes, privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by consular officers of other nations, the United States may appoint, as its interests may require, consular officers to reside at the places in the kingdom of China that are or that may hereafter be opened to foreign residence and trade. They shall hold direct official intercourse and correspondence with the local officers of the Chinese government within their consular districts, either personally or in writing or the case may require, on terms of equality and reciprocal respect. These officers shall be treated with due respect by all Chinese authorities, and they shall enjoy all the privileges, immunities, and enjoy all the jurisdiction over their actions that are or may hereafter be extended to similar officers of the nation the most favored in these respects. If the officers of either government are
disrespectfully treated or aggrieved in any way by authorities of the other, they shall have the right to make representation of the same to the superior officers of their own government who shall see that full inquiry and strict justice be had in the premises. and the said consular officers of either nation shall carefully avoid all acts of offense to the officers and people of the other nation.

On the arrival of a consul duly accredited at any place in China opened to foreign trade it shall be the duty of the Minister of the United States to inform the Board of Foreign Affairs, which shall, in accordance with international usage, forthwith cause the proper recognition of the said consul and grant him authority to act.

Article III. --American citizens in China; their rights.

Citizens of the United States may frequent, reside and carry on trade, industries and manufactures, or pursue any lawful occupation, in all the ports or localities of China which are now open or may hereafter be opened to foreign residence and trade; and, within the suitable localities at those places which have been or may be set apart for the use and occupation of foreigners, they may rent or purchase houses, places of business and other buildings, and rent or lease in perpetuity land and build thereon. They shall generally enjoy as to their persons and property all such rights, privileges and immunities as are or may hereafter be granted to the subjects or citizens of the nation the most favored in these respects.
Article IV. — Li-king and other transit dues to be totally abolished. — The Chinese government, recognizing that the existing system of levying dues on goods in transit, and especially the system of taxation known as li-king, impedes the free circulation of commodities to the general injury of trade, hereby undertakes to abandon the levy of li-king and all other transit dues throughout the Empire and to abolish the offices, stations and barriers maintained for their collection and not to establish other offices for levying dues on goods in transit. It is clearly understood that, after the officers, stations and barriers for taxing goods in transit have been abolished, no attempt shall be made to reestablish them in any form or under any pretext whatsoever.

Surtax on tariff rates granted in compensation. — The Government of the United States, in return, consents to allow a surtax, in excess of the tariff rates for the time being in force, to be imposed on foreign goods imported by citizens of the United States and on Chinese produce destined for export abroad or coast-wise. It is clearly understood that in no case shall the surtax on foreign imports exceed one and one-half times the import duty levied in terms of the final Protocol signed by China and the Powers on the seventh day of September, A. D. 1901; that the payment of the import duty and surtax shall secure for foreign imports, whether in the name of Chinese or foreigners, in original packages or otherwise, complete
immunity from all other taxation, examination or delay; that
the total amount of taxation, inclusive of the tariff export
duty, leviable on native produce for export abroad shall, under
no circumstances, exceed seven and one-half per centum ad valorem.

China's right to levy taxes. — Nothing in this article
is intended to interfere with the inherent right of China to
levy such other taxes as are not in conflict with its provisions.

Keeping these fundamental principles in view, the High Con­
tracting Parties have agreed upon the following method of proce­
dure.

All barriers to be abolished. Native customs offices
to be retained in certain localities. — The Chinese Government
undertakes that all offices, stations and barriers of whatsoever
kind for collecting likin, duties, or such like dues on goods
in transit, shall be permanently abolished on all roads, rail¬
ways and waterways in the nineteen provinces of China and the
three Eastern Provinces. This provision does not apply to the
native Customs offices at present in existence on the seaboard,
at open ports where there are offices of the Imperial Maritime
Customs and on the land frontiers of China embracing the nine¬
teen provinces and the three Eastern Provinces.

Wherever there are offices of the Imperial Maritime Customs,
or wherever such may be hereafter placed, native Customs offices
may also be established, as well as at any point either on the
seaboard or land frontiers.
Surtax on duties on foreign imports.—The Government of the United States agrees that foreign goods on importation, in addition to the effective five per centum import duty as provided for in the Protocol of 1891, shall pay a special surtax of one and one-half times the amount of the said duty to compensate for the abolition of likin, of other transit dues besides likin, and of all other taxation on foreign goods, and in consideration of the other reforms provided for in this article.

Revision of foreign export tariff.—The Chinese Government may recast the foreign export tariff with specific duties, as far as practicable, on a scale not exceeding five per centum ad valorem; but existing export duties shall not be raised until at least six months' notice has been given. In cases where existing export duties are above five per centum, they shall be reduced to not more than that rate.

Surtax on exports, levied. — An additional special surtax of one-half the export duty payable for the time being, in lieu of internal taxation of all kinds, may be levied at the place of original shipment or at the time of export on goods exported either to foreign countries or coastwise.

Certificate of origin. — Foreign goods which bear a similarity to native goods shall be furnished by the Customs officers, if required by the owner, with a protective certificate for each package, on the payment of import duty and surtax, to prevent the risk of any dispute in the interior.
Junk-borne goods.—Native goods brought by junks to open ports, if intended for local consumption, irrespective of the nationality of the owner of the goods, shall be reported at the native Customs offices only, to be dealt with according to the fiscal regulations of the Chinese government.

Machine-made goods in China; treatment of.—Machine-made cotton yarn and cloth manufactured in China, whether by foreigners at the open ports or by Chinese anywhere in China, shall as regards taxation be on a footing of perfect equality. Such goods upon payment of the taxes thereon shall be granted a rebate of the import duty and of two-thirds of the import surtax paid on the cotton used in their manufacture, if it has been imported from abroad, and of all duties paid thereon if it be Chinese grown cotton. They shall also be free of export duty, cost-trade duty and export surtax. The same principle and procedure shall be applied to all other products of foreign type turned out by machinery in China.

Maritime Customs to oversee native customs affairs.—A number or numbers of the Imperial Maritime Customs foreign staff shall be selected by the Governors-general and Governors of each of the various provinces of the Empire for their respective provinces, and appointed in consultation with the Inspector General of Imperial Maritime Customs, for duty in connection with native Customs affairs to have a general supervision of their working.
Complaints; how investigated. Responsibility for enforcement of provisions of treaty. — Case where illegal action is complained of by citizens of the United States shall be promptly investigated by an officer of the Chinese Government of sufficiently high rank, in conjunction with an officer of the United States Government, and an officer of the Imperial Maritime Customs, each of sufficient standing; and, in the event of it being found by the investigating officers that the complainant is well founded and loss has been incurred, due compensation shall be paid through the Imperial Maritime Customs. The high provincial officials shall be held responsible that the officer guilty of the illegal action shall be severely punished and removed from his post. If the complaint is shown to be frivolous or malicious, the complainant shall be held responsible for the expenses of the investigation.

Idiot to be published when article becomes operative.

—When the ratifications of this treaty shall have been exchanged by the High Contracting Parties hereto, and the provisions of this article shall have been accepted by the Powers having treaties with China, then a date shall be agreed upon when the provisions of this article shall take effect and an Imperial Idiot shall be published in due form on yellow paper and circulated throughout the empire of China setting forth the abolition of all like duties on goods in transit, offices, stations and barriers for collecting the same, and of all
Article V. — Tariff on American Imports. — Most favored na­
tion treatment. — The tariff duties to be paid by citizens of
the United States on goods imported into China shall be as set
forth in the schedule annexed hereto and made part of this
Treaty, subject only to such amendments and changes as are
authorized by article IV of the present convention, or as may
hereafter be agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties hereto.
It is expressly declared, however, that citizens of the United
States shall at no time pay other or higher duties than those
paid by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.
Conversely, Chinese subjects shall not pay higher duties
on their imports into the United States than those paid by the
citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.

Article VI. — Bonded Warehouses. — The Government of China
agrees to the establishment by citizens of the United States
of warehouses approved by the proper Chinese authorities as
bonded warehouses at the several open ports of China, for
storage, re-packing, or preparation for shipment of lawful goods, subject to such necessary regulations for the protection of the revenue of China, including a reasonable scale of fees according to commodities, distance from the custom house and hours of working, as shall be made from time to time by the proper officers of the government of China.

ARTICLE VII. — Mining regulations to be revised and operations encouraged. — The Chinese Government, recognizing that it is advantageous for the country to develop its mineral resources, and that it is desirable to attract foreign as well as Chinese capital to embark in mining enterprises, agrees, within one year from the signing of this Treaty, to initiate and conclude the revision of the existing mining regulations. To this end, China will, with all expedition and earnestness, go into the whole question of mining rules; and, selecting from the rules of the United States and other countries regulations which are applicable to the condition of China, will recast its present mining rules in such a way as, while promoting the interests of Chinese subjects and not injuring in any way the sovereign rights of China, will offer no impediment to the attraction of foreign capital nor place foreign capitalists at a greater disadvantage than they would be under generally accepted foreign regulations, and will permit citizens of the United States to carry on in Chinese
territory. mining operations and other necessary business relating thereto provided they comply with the new regulations and conditions which will be imposed by China on its subjects and foreigners alike, relating to the opening of mines, the renting of mineral land, and payment of royalty, and provided they apply for permits, the provisions of which in regard to necessary business relating to such operations shall be observed. The residence of citizens of the United States in connection with such mining operations shall be subject to such regulations as shall be agreed upon by and between the United States and China.

Any mining concession granted after the publication of such new rules shall be subject to their provisions.

Art. VIII.—Drawback certificates.—Drawback certificates for the return of duties shall be issued by the Imperial Maritime Customs to citizens of the United States within three weeks of the presentation to the Customs of the papers entitling the applicant to receive such drawback certificates, and they shall be receivable at their face value in payment of duties of all kinds (tonnage duties excepted) at the port of issue; or shall, in the case of drawbacks on foreign goods re-exported within three years from the date of importation, be receivable by the Imperial Maritime Customs in full in ready money at the port of issue, at the option of the holders thereof. But if, in connection with any application for a drawback certificate, the Customs authori—
tion discover in attempt to defraud the revenue, the applicant
shall be dealt with and punished in accordance with the stipu-
lations provided in the Treaty of Tientsin, article 1, in the
case of detected fraud on the revenue. In case the goods have
been removed from Chinese territory, then the goods shall in-
flict on the guilty party a suitable fine to be paid to the
Chinese government.

United States protection of trade-marks. Whereas the United
States undertakes to protect the citizens of any country in the
exclusive use within their territory of any lawful trade-
marks, provided that such country agrees by treaty or conven-
tion to give like protection to citizens of the United States:

Therefore the Government of China, in order to secure such
protection in the United States, for its subjects, now agrees to
fully protect any citizen, firm, or corporation of the United
States in the exclusive use, in the territory of China, of any law-
full trade-mark to the exclusive use of which in the United States
they are entitled, or which they have adopted and used, or in-
and to adopt and use in China as registered, for exclusive use
within the territory of China. To this end the Chinese govern-
ment agrees to issue by its proper authorities, regulations, having
the force of law, forbidding all subjects of China from infringing
on, imitating, colorably imitating, or knowingly passing
off an imitation or trade-marks belonging to citizens of the

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the United States, which shall have been registered by the proper authorities of the United States in such offices as the Chinese Government will establish for such purpose, on payment of a reasonable fee, after due investigation by the Chinese authorities, and in compliance with reasonable regulations.

Protection of patents.--The United States Government allows subjects of China to patent their inventions in the United States and protects them in the use and ownership of such patents. The Government of China now agrees that it will establish a Patent Office. After this Office has been established and special laws with regard to inventions have been adopted it will thereupon, after the payment of the prescribed fees, issue certificates of protection, valid for a fixed term of years, to citizens of the United States on all their patents issued by the United States, in respect of articles the sale of which is lawful in China, which do not infringe on previous inventions of Chinese subjects, in the same manner as patents are to be issued to subjects of China.

Protection of copyright.--Whereas the Government of the United States undertakes to give the benefits of its copyright laws to the citizens of any foreign state which gives to the citizens of the United States the benefits of copyright on an equal basis with its own citizens: ---

Therefore the Government of China, in order to secure such
benefits in the United States for its subjects, not agree to
give full protection, in the same way and manner and subject
to the same conditions upon which it agrees to protect trans­
scendents, to all citizens of the United States who are authors,
designers or proprietors of any book, map, print or engraving,
especially prepared for the use and education of the Chinese
people, or translation into Chinese of any book, in the ex­
clusive right to print one sell such book, map, print, engraving
or translation in the language of China, during ten years from
the date of registration. with the exception of the books,
maps, etc., specified above, which may not be reprinted in the
same form, no work shall be entitled to copyright privileges
under this article. It is understood that Chinese subjects
shall be at liberty to make, print and sell original trans­
lations into Chinese of any works written or or maps compiled
by a citizen of the United States. This article shall not be
held to protect against due process of law any citizen of the
United States or Chinese subject who may be author, proprietor
or seller of any publication calculated to injure the well­
being of China.

Article XII.—Navigation of inland waters.—The Chinese
Government having in 1896 opened the navigable inland waters
of the empire to commerce by all sorts vessels, native or
foreign, that may be specially registered for the purpose, for
the conveyance of passengers and lawful merchandise,—citizens,
firms and corporations of the United States may engage in such

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In case either party hereto considers it advantageous at any time that the rules and regulations then in existence for such commerce be altered or amended, the Chinese Government agrees to consider diligently and to adopt such modifications thereof as are found necessary for trade and for the benefit of China.

Mukden and Antung opened to foreign trade. The Chinese Government agrees that, upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, Mukden and Antung, both in the province of Shang-king, will be opened by China itself as places of international residence and trade. The selection of suitable localities to be set apart for international use and occupation and the regulations for these places set apart for foreign residence and trade shall be agreed upon by the Governments of the United States and China after consultation together.

Unif. national coinage. The United States and China agree to the provisions of the national coinage which shall be legal tender in payment of all duties, taxes and other obligations throughout the empire by the citizens of the United States as well as Chinese subjects. It is understood, however, that all customs duties shall continue to be collected and paid on the basis of the taikuan tael.
Christianity, its teachers and followers not to be discriminated against. Rights and duties of missionaries. — The principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, are recognized as teaching men to do good and to do to others as they would have others do to them. Those who quietly profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their faith. Any person, whether citizen of the United States or Chinese convert, who, according to these tenets, peaceably teaches and practices the principles of Christianity shall in no case be interfered with or molested thereafter. No restrictions shall be placed on Chinese joining Christian churches. Converts and non-converts, being Chinese subjects, shall alike conform to the laws of China; and shall pay due respect to those in authority, living together in peace and unity, and the fact of being converts shall not protect them from the consequences of any offence they may have committed before or may commit after their admission into the church, or exempt them from paying, legal taxes levied on Chinese subjects generally, except taxes levied for the support of religious customs and practices contrary to their faith. Missionaries shall not interfere with exercise by the native authorities of their jurisdiction over Chinese subjects, nor shall the native authorities make any distinction between converts and non-converts, but shall administer the
laws without partiality so that both classes can live together in peace.

Property; land purchased by missionary societies. --- Missionary societies of the United States shall be permitted to rent and to lease in perpetuity, as the property of such societies, buildings or lands in all parts of the empire for missionary purposes and after the title deeds have been found in order and duly stamped by the local authorities, to erect such suitable buildings as may be required for carrying on their good work.

Article XV. ---Reforms of judicial system. Extra-territoriality to terminate. ---The government of China having expressed a strong desire to reform its judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of western nations, the United States agrees to give every assistance to such reform and will also be prepared to relinquish extra-territorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant it in so doing.

Article XVI. ---Prohibition of importation of morphia. ---The Government of the United States consents to the prohibition by the Government of China of the importation into China of morphia and of instruments for its injection, excepting morphia and instruments for its injection imported for medical purposes, on payment of tariff duty, and under regulations to be framed by China which shall effectually restrict the
use of such import to the said purposes. This prohibition shall be uniformly applied to such importation from all countries. The Chinese Government undertakes to adopt at once measures to prevent the manufacture in China of morphia and of instruments for its injection.

ARTICLE XVII.—Treaties to remain in force except as here modified. —It is agreed between the High Contracting Parties hereeto that all the provisions of the several treaties between the United States and China which were in force on the first day of January A.D. 1900, are continued in full force and effect except in so far as they are modified by the present Treaty or other treaties to which the United States is is a party.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years beginning with the date of the exchange of ratifications and until a revision is effected as hereinafter provided.

Revision.—It is further agreed that either of the High Contracting Parties may demand that the tariff and the articles of this convention be revised at the end of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications thereof. If no revision is demanded before the end of the first term of ten years then these articles in their present form shall remain in full force for a further term of ten years reckoned from the end of the first term, and so on for successive periods of ten years.

English text authoritative. —The English and Chinese
texts of the present Treaty and its three annexes have been carefully compared; but, in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to be the correct one.

This Treaty and its three annexes shall be ratified by the two High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutions, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in Washington not later than twelve months from the present date.

In testimony whereof, we, the undersigned, by virtue of our respective powers, have signed this Treaty in duplicate in the English and Chinese languages, have affixed our respective seals.

Done at Shanghai, this eighth day of October in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and three, and in the twenty ninth year of Kuang-hsu eighth month and eighteenth day.

[Signed] H. CUNNINH (K)IYUJIN
JOHN GOOCH (bajuj)
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Signatures and seal of Chinese Plenipotentiaries.
(HU MAI-HHUN)
(SHING HOU-HHUN)

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As citizens of the United States are already forbidden by treaty to deal in or handle opium, no mention has been made in this Treaty of opium taxation.

As the trade in salt is a government monopoly in China, no mention has been made in this Treaty of salt taxation.

It is, however, understood, after full discussion and consideration, that the collection of inland dues on opium and salt and the means for the protection of the revenue therefrom and for preventing illicit traffic therein are left to be administered by the Chinese Government in such manner as shall in no wise interfere with the provisions of Article IV of this treaty regarding the unobstructed transit of other goods.

Signature and seal of Chinese Plenipotentiaries.

(EDWIN H. CONGER (SHU))

(JOHN WOOLNER (SHU))

(JOHN F. SHIRAS (SHU))

Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce between the United States and China of this date provides for the retention of the native Customs offices at the open ports. For the purpose of safeguarding the revenue of China at such places, it is
establish and maintain such branch native Customs offices at each open port, within a reasonable distance of the main native Customs offices at the port as shall be deemed by the authorities of the Imperial Maritime Customs at that port necessary to collect the revenue from the trade into and out of such port. Such branches, as well as the main native Customs offices at each open port, shall be administered by the Imperial Maritime Customs as provided by the Protocol of 1901.

JOHN H. CONGER (SEAL)
JOHN GOODNOW (SEAL)
JOHN P. SHADB (SEAL)

Signatures and seal of Chinese Plenipotentiaries.
(LU Hai-huan)
(Sheng Hsuan-Huai)

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ANEXA III.

The schedule of tariff duties on imported goods annexed to this Treaty under Article V is hereby mutually declared to be the schedule agreed upon between the representatives of China and the United States and signed by John Goodnow for the United States and Their Excellencies LU Hai-huan and Sheng Hsuan-Huai for China at Shanghai on the sixth day of September A.D. 1902, according to the Protocol of the seventh day of September A.D. 1901.

JOHN H. CONGER (SEAL)
Signature and seal of Chinese Plenipotentiaries.

(LU HAI-HUAN)

(SHING HOHAN-HU-I)
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合衆国代表者ハ一切ノ通電ヲ採取スルノ手段ヲ以テ同条下ノ効果ヲ表ハレ

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国式商品＝通用セルラメントス

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他ノ譲約ヲ改正セルル限スヲ除キ完全ニ其力ヲ存続スルモトス。略約ハ批進交換ノ時ヨリ起算シテ十年間及び以下所定ノ期間正ノ効力ヲ存続スルモノス

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C R E T I F I C A T I O N

Statement of source, and authenticity

I, K. Y., Chief, Chief of the Treaty Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 12 pages, entitled "Treaty for the Extension of the Commercial relations between United States and China, October 2, 1905" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 17th. day of January, 1917.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Signature]
CONVENTION FOR THE LEASE OF THE
LIAMUGU PENINSULA.

Signed at Peking March 27, 1898.

His Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, being desirous of still further strengthening the friendly relations existing between the two Empires and mutually wishing to insure the means whereby to show reciprocal support, have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, for the purpose of arriving at an agreement on this matter:

His Majesty the Emperor of Russia— Alexander Pavlow, Gentleman of the Court, and His Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires accredited to the Government of H.I.: the Emperor of China;

His Majesty the Emperor of China—Count Li, Chancellor, Member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Senior Proctor of the Heir to the Throne, and Chang, Assistant Minister of Finance, and Member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with Ministerial rank.

The above-named Plenipotentiaries, furnished with due powers, have decided upon the following stipulations:

Art. I.—For the purpose of ensuring that the Russian naval forces shall possess an entirely secure base on the littoral of northern China, H.I.: the Emperor of China agrees to place at the disposal of the Russian Government, on lease, the Ports Arthur (Liau-chounkow) and Ta-lion-wan, together with the water areas contiguous to those ports. This act of lease, however, in no way violates the sovereign rights of H.I.: the Emperor of China to the above-mentioned territory.

Art. II.—The frontier of the territory leased on the above-specified basis, will extend northwards from the Bay of Ta-lion-wan for such
The precise line of demarcation and other details respecting the stipulations of the present Convention will be determined by a separate Protocol which shall be concluded at St. Petersburg with the dignitary Si-tsin-ch'oung immediately after the signature of the present Convention. Upon the determination of this line of demarcation, the Russian Government will enter into complete and exclusive enjoyment of the whole area of the leased territory together with the water areas contiguous to it.

Art. III.—The term of the lease shall be twenty-five years from the date of the signature of the present agreement and may be prolonged subsequently by mutual consent of both Governments.

Art. IV.—During the above-specified period, on the territory leased by the Russian Government and its adjacent water area, the entire military command of the land and naval forces and equally the supreme civil administration will be entirely given over to the Russian authorities and will be concentrated in the hands of one person who however shall not have the title of Governor-General. No Chinese military land forces whatsoever will be allowed on the territory specified. Chinese inhabitants retain the right, as they may desire, either to remove beyond the limits of the territory leased by Russia or to remain within such limits without restriction on the part of the Russian authorities. In the event of a Chinese subject committing any crime within the limits of the leased territory, the offender will be handed over to the nearest Chinese authorities for trial and punishment in accordance with Chinese laws, as laid down in Article VIII of the Treaty of Peking of 1860.
Art. V.—A neutral zone shall be established north of the above-specified frontier of the leased territory. The frontiers of this zone will be fixed by the dignitary Siou-tsin-ch'ang and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg. Within this specified neutral zone the civil administration will be entirely in the hands of the Chinese authorities; Chinese troops will be admitted within this zone only with the consent of Russian authorities.

Art. VI.—Both the Governments agree that Port Arthur, as an exclusively military (naval) port, shall be used solely by Russian and Chinese vessels and shall be considered as a closed port to war-ships and merchant vessels of other States. As regards Ta-lion-wan, this port, with the exception of one of the inner bays which, like Port Arthur, shall be set apart exclusively for the use of the Russian and Chinese fleets, shall be considered open to foreign commerce and free entry to it will be granted to the merchant vessels of all nations.

Art. VII.—The Russian Government takes upon itself at its own expense and with its own resources to erect all buildings necessary for its fleet and land forces on the area leased to it and especially in the ports Arthur and Ta-lion-wan, to erect fortifications, maintain garrisons in them and generally to take all necessary steps for the proper defence of the specified locality from hostile attack. Similarly the Russian Government binds itself at its own expense to erect and maintain light-houses and other precautionary signs requisite for the security of navigation.

Art. VIII.—The Chinese Government agrees that the concessions granted by it in 1896 to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, from the date of the signature of the present agreement shall be extended to the connecting branch which is to be built from one of the stations of the main line to Ta-lion-wan.
and also, if deemed necessary, from the same main line to another more convenient point on the littoral of the Liaotung Peninsula between the town of Intsil and the estuary of the River Yalu. All the stipulations of the contract concluded by the Chinese Government with the Russo-Chinese Bank on August 27 (September 8), 1895, shall apply serenely to those supplementary branches. The direction and points through which the above-mentioned lines shall pass will be determined upon by the dignitary Siutzein-ch'ong and the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Consent to the construction of the railway on the basis indicated shall never under any form serve as a pretext for the seizure of Chinese territory or for an encroachment on the sovereign rights of China.

Art. Lx.—The present Convention shall come into force from the date of exchange of appulse thereof by the Plenipotentiaries of the two States.

The exchange of ratifications will take place in St. Petersburg with the least possible delay.

In virtue of which the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two parties have signed and affixed their seals to two copies of the present Convention in the Russian and Chinese languages. Of the two texts which, upon comparison, have been found to be in agreement, the Russian text shall be that used for the interpretation of the Convention.

Done in duplicate at Peking, this 15th day of March (March 27), 1896, and by the Chinese calendar the 6th day of the 3rd moon of the 24th year of the reign of Kuang-Hsu

(Soal) (Signed) . . F.WOJ

(Soal) (Signed) LI.-CH.LIG

(Soal of the Tsung-li-yamen)
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Convention for the Lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, March 27, 1898," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

On this 17th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Washoru Odo
PRESS RELEASE** ISSUED BY THE JAPANESE EMBASSY ON APRIL 15, 1940

On being questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, Foreign Minister Arita replied as follows:

"With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence.

"Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of co-existence and co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations, the Japanese Government can not but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies."

Foreign Relations II, p. 281
which are some
result of the Netherlands East Indies—
well known, the almost daily reports from abroad about the vi-
ing of the encroachment campaign against Japan. I earnestly hope
that Your Excellency will fully comprehend the disposal at issue
being necessitated by sincere hope for the maintenance of the peace
in the Pacific and cooperate in keeping the door open for my hope
and further efforts directed toward amicable solution of Japanese-
American relations.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 318-31
Between the Japanese Government and the Vichy Government there was amicably reached an agreement of view on the twenty-first of July, 1941, concerning the joint protection of French Indochina, and an announcement on the agreement is soon to be made.

I asked for an appointment with Your Excellency this evening in order to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Japanese Government of informing Your Excellency in advance of the measure just referred to, and of making the situation clear so that there may be no unnecessary misunderstanding which may arise from this question, in view of the foreign press reporting unfounded rumors such as that the Japanese Government had sent the Vichy Government an ultimatum.

The relations between Japan and French Indochina have recently become more friendly by the so-called Metsuoka-Henry Pact of August, last year, and several other Franco-Japanese agreements; and in view of the fact that it is to the common interest of both Japan and France to insure the safety of French Indochina and to prevent the disturbance of peace in the same area under the existing complicated international situation, the Japanese and French Governments have, at this time, as already stated, arrived at an understanding as regards joint protection of French Indochina.

... ... ...
As a matter of fact, we are receiving numerous reports that America should adopt more stringent anti-Japanese economic measures such as the freezing of Japanese capital in America and a complete embargo of petroleum oil as retaliatory steps against the measure just mentioned; and if the above should ever be realized, I deeply apprehend that it will be difficult to prevent the unexpected aggravation of antagonism among the Japanese people against aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the encirclement campaign against Japan which antagonism the government has so carefully repressed until today.

It seems that in the United States there is an element which possesses an unpleasant feeling against the measure which I have just mentioned, but viewing it in a fair and composed attitude from an objective standpoint, such a measure is truly unavoidable from a broad viewpoint of maintaining peace in the Pacific by preventing a more serious aggravation of the feelings of the Japanese people, which are steadily being excited by such facts as the unsatisfactory result of the Netherlands East Indies-Japanese negotiations, and is well known, the almost daily reports from abroad about the tightening of the encirclement campaign against Japan. I earnestly hope that Your Excellency will fully comprehend the disposal at issue as being necessitated by sincere hope for the maintenance of the peace in the Pacific and cooperate in keeping the door open for my hope and further efforts directed toward amicable solution of Japanese-American relations.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 318-31
実際、我々の米国政策が対日報復手段として、在米日
船を対米経済政策の一端とし、アラベイン、幾多の報道や受信
と、反米感情を考慮して実施された。報道が今
日、対日報復政策を慎重に考慮する。実行され
た政府の今、対日政策の報復手段は、
合衆国政策が今、対日報復政策の不快感を
抱く一部人か

観の立場から見え、日敵関係が平和化する様子、
合衆国政策は今、対日報復を平和、平和に持
続する目的です。報道、日本国民の感情、

希望をかなえることを目指す。報道、日本
外務省

外交関係、米国

No. 2
February 6, 1940.

On February 1, in a supplementary remark to my address on Japan's foreign policy, I gave an outline of our negotiations with the British Government concerning the Sena Maru case. Since then we carried on in earnest our negotiations with a view to effecting a speedy settlement of the case. As a result, although we have not yet arrived at a complete settlement, we have reached an important stage in that direction. I desire to avail myself of this occasion to report on the progress so far achieved.

As I have already stated, the reply of the British Government to our protest of January 22 was transmitted to us through Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo under the date of January 27. In their note the British Government expressed their great regret at the occurrence of the incident so near our capital which aroused such profound indignation of our nation, and at the same time dwelt at length on their legal opinions of the case.

To this British note we replied under date of February 1 that we took note with pleasure that the British Government, giving serious consideration to the fact that the incident had aroused public feeling in Japan, expressed their regret. At the same time we made a detailed restatement of the British views from the legal standpoint, and requested for the return of the twenty-one Germans taken out of the Sena Maru, because we could not but arrive at the conclusion that the action of the British man-of-war was illegal under international law.

-1-
regards the divergence of views between the two Governments, all its details will be made available in the official notes to be published this afternoon. However, to give a resume of the matter, the British Government places an interpretation of their own on Article 47 of the Declaration of London, stipulating the category of enemy nationals who may be removed from a neutral ship engaged in peaceful navigation on the high seas, and, moreover, they contend that the said Declaration of London has no binding authority whatever, as it has not been ratified by the signatory Powers. The practice to remove enemy nationals from a neutral ship engaged in peaceful navigation is, the British Government claim, an established principle in international law. But according to the views of the Japanese Government, it is clear from the related documents concerning the Declaration of London that Article 47 should not be construed as it is interpreted by the British Government. Again, although the said Declaration has not been ratified it is considered as constituting rational adjustments and compromises between various principles regarding naval warfare, and it has been incorporated in the internal law of many countries. In the light of this fact we believe that the Declaration of London should be regarded to serve as a criterion in the Law of Nations. Furthermore, if we were to assume that the Declaration is totally invalid as is contended by the British Government, the alternative would rather be that we should observe the general principle that no enemy nationals shall be taken out of a neutral ship engaged in peaceful navigation on the high seas. In brief, the British views have no foundation either in academic doctrines or in precedents for convincing us of their validity.

The Japanese Government maintain resolutely the above-stated views from the legal standpoint. But apart from the legalistic arguments,
our Government, with a view to facilitating an early settlement of the case from political considerations, urged upon the British Government more than once the importance to the Anglo-Japanese relations of the release by the British of the Germans in their hands as soon as possible. We asked the British Government for sincere reconsideration and endeavoured to achieve our objective. As a result, the British Government in a note under date of February 5 communicated to us that they could not alter their views but as an earnest of the British Government to settle the case amicably, they were prepared, while reserving all their legal rights concerning the case, to deliver to the proper Japanese authorities at such a time and place as may be agreed upon hereafter nine of the Germans in retention on the grounds that investigations as to their training and antecedents have disclosed the fact that some are relatively unsuitable for military service than others.

The Japanese Government appreciate the desire of the British Government to effect a speedy and amicable settlement of the case. However, the number of men to be returned being only a portion of those demanded by us, we are by no means satisfied. Therefore, although we intend to take over the said nine men, it is our intention to continue in accordance with our above-mentioned views to insist upon the delivery by the British Government of the rest of the Germans in retention.

As for the future, the Government have decided, in order to eliminate uneasiness on the part of Japanese vessels in navigation hereafter, to issue instructions to various Japanese shipping companies not to allow the persons who are embodied in the armed forces of the belligerent Powers (including those who are suspected as such) to
take passage on board their vessels, and the necessary steps there­
for have been called to the measures above stated. The circumstances
being such, it is my firm belief that in the future the occurrence
of an incident similar to that of the Lancro Moru will be prevented.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hi.Y. Shi, Keoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached (in English) consisting of 3 pages and entitled "An Explanation of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hashiro Sota, who before the Diet on February 6, 1940 regarding the sexism Moru Incident," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo

on this 14th day of January 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
次のように結論を絞り込み、最終的には以下に示す那些事項を完全に認め得る

[見解はここで省略]
次紙ラ講来ニ於テハ議制丸略似ノ報告ノ發生ハ之ヲ通シ略ノ確信

パララテ

以上の略テ議制丸略件ニ於テル通過報告ヲ第リナレ

5
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Koaru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 5 pages and entitled "An Explanation of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro Irie, made before the Diet on February 6, 1940 regarding the Hagv Wany Incident." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 14th day of January 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
ARTICLE FROM THE JAPAN CHRONICLE

THE SINO-KOREAN TROUBLE
CHINESE MOB EXPECTED TO MAKE MOONLIGHT ATTACK... INCENSED BY JAPANESE. ROCIO TO CHRONICLE. CHANCHUNG, JULY 3.

Taking advantage of the moonlight, the Chinese mobs who are incensed at the arrival of a Japanese machine-gun squad are likely to make a raid on the Koreans at Wanpaoshan tonight.

Every precaution has been taken by the Japanese authorities, who have arranged to maintain communications with the policemen at Wanpaoshan through mounted officers. At seven tonight Mr. Kuramoto of the Japanese Consulate left Wanpaoshan on horseback with a mounted officer. They are expected to return by midnight.

CHINESE OFFICIAL ATTITUDE.

Nanking, July 3.

Mr. Tang Chia-cheng, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave an interview to Japanese newspapermen today on the collision between Chinese and Koreans at Wangpaoshan, 15 miles north west of Changshun. He said the government would take action upon the receipt of an official report on the case, declaring that it is unwarrantable for Japanese policemen to fire shots in Chinese territory.

Talking of the foreign concessions question, he intimated that a memorandum containing a general demand for the return of concessions and settlements had been drafted and would be sent to the powers concerned at an appropriate time.

Dr. Pang, the Foreign Minister, is scheduled to visit Tientsin by the end of this month to attend a meeting of the board of the Shantung Railway. After visiting Pei-hsi-wei he will proceed to Peltaiho, a summer resort where he will meet foreign diplomats in connection with the extrality and foreign concessions problems.
The Manual of Wartime International Law and Regulations
May, the 12th year of Showa (1937)
The Navy Minister's Secretariat

Regulations for treatment of prisoners of war

ARTICLE I. When enemy combatants or those who are to be treated as prisoners of war according to the treaties or customs are captured, their personal belongings should be examined immediately.

ARTICLE II. Among their personal belongings, arms, ammunition and other articles which may be used for military purposes should be confiscated and all other things be specially placed in custody kept by owners, whichever is convenient.

In the case of those prisoners of war permitted to retain their swords the navy commander may allow them to wear their swords. In this case their names and the reason for such action will be reported to the navy minister.

These swords allowed to be worn under the foregoing clause, should be placed in custody in the detention camp.

ARTICLE III. When the procedures mentioned in the foregoing two articles are completed, each prisoner shall be questioned as to his name, age, position, rank, domicile, the ship and the government of the country to which he belongs, and the date.
and the place that he was wounded in order to make a roster of prisoners and a diary of prisoners. Also, a list of properties confiscated or placed in custody shall be made.

ARTICLE IV. Prisoners shall be divided into officers or those officers ranking with them, petty officers and men for the purpose of giving them treatment proper to their positions and ranks except those who do not answer honestly to the questions asked as to their names and ranks, or those who violated other regulations.

ARTICLE V. If prisoners act disobediently, imprisonment, physical restriction, and other necessary steps may be taken, and in case prisoners try to escape, they may be prevented by force of arms as the case may be.

ARTICLE V, CLAUSE 2. If prisoners try to escape or act against order and discipline, they may be punished.

The foregoing punishments shall be carried out according to the Navy Punishment Regulations stipulated under ARTICLES XIXIV, XXII-XXIV and XXVI-XXVII. The punishment of prisoners shall be carried out by the chief of the naval office which actually interned them.

ARTICLE VI. A navy commander shall deliver prisoners to a navy yard or a navy station, with a roster of prisoners, a diary relating to the prisoners, a list of personal belongings placed in custody, a list of their properties. However, he may deliver them to any other naval office as a matter of expedience under unavoidable circumstances.

If the prisoners die before delivery is completed, their personal property, their roster and all other documents and
articles shall be delivered.

ARTICLE VI. Clause 2. The naval office which has received prisoners, documents or other matters relating to them may transfer them to a Navy yard or a Navy station as the case may be.

ARTICLE VII. A navy commander, if he deems it necessary, may confer with an army unit, a commissariat, or a transport and communication office, and deliver to it the prisoners they entered with a roster of prisoners, a diary relating to them, their personal belongings placed in custody and a list of their properties. In this case the prisoners will be divided into officers and those ranking with them, and petty officers and men. The number of prisoners delivered should at once be reported to the Navy Minister.

ARTICLE VIII. When a Commander of a Navy yard, a Commander of a naval station, or a chief of any other naval office receives or has them transferred, he shall divide the prisoners into officers and those ranking with them, and petty officers and men, and their number will be reported to the Navy Minister at the earliest convenience. In case the Navy Minister should receive the report mentioned in the foregoing clause, he shall appoint the place and the date on which the prisoners are to be delivered to the army officers in charge.

ARTICLE IX. When prisoners are delivered to a Navy yard, a Navy station, or any other naval office, they will be temporarily interned in a building substantial enough to prevent their escape until they are to be transported or delivered.
ARTICLE X. The place in which prisoners are interned shall be supervised by keepers under the direction of naval officers.

ARTICLE XI. If prisoners apply to buy articles of their liking or other commodities at their own expense, they shall be afforded due facility provided that the supervisor finds no difficulty in doing so.

ARTICLE XI CLAUSE 2. If prisoners are allowed an interview, sufficient restriction shall be given as to the place and time of the meeting and a guard shall attend.

ARTICLE XII. Telegrams and mail sent and received by prisoners will be censored beforehand by supervising officers. If no difficulty is occasioned, this may be permitted. In case any secret code is used or there is any suspicion, they shall be forbidden to be sent or be confiscated.

ARTICLE XIII. Mail sent and received by prisoners is privileged to be exempt from postage dues according to the treaties.

Any naval office which receives prisoners shall confer with a local post office as to make necessary arrangements.

ARTICLE XIII CLAUSE 2. When the sick and wounded prisoners are placed under the medical care of a navy hospital or any other infirmary, a list of prisoner-patients shall be made in accordance with the list form given in appendix.

ARTICLE XIII CLAUSE 3. The funerals of prisoners shall be observed with ceremonies in due consideration of their positions and ranks.
DEF LOC 228

ARTICLE XIV The testaments of prisoners shall be dealt with the same care as is paid to those of the men of our Imperial Navy.

ARTICLE XV §2 Prisoner's personal properties and testaments shall be sent to the Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau from the authorities who had them delivered and transferred in accordance with ARTICLE VI AND ARTICLE VI, Clause 2. In case there are any perishable things among the personal properties, they shall be sold and the proceeds by remitted. When the articles stated in the foregoing clause have been sent, a report shall be made to the Navy Minister.

ARTICLE XV A commander in chief of a Naval yard, a commander of a naval station and chiefs of other naval offices shall deliver prisoners with a roster of them, a diary relating to them, articles placed in custody, a list of properties and all other documents, to army officers in charge of prisoners at an appointed place.

(The lists given in appendix are omitted.)

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Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

(signed) William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 Jan. 1947
 Null
Excerpts from "The Case For Manchoukuo"  
by George Bronson Rex  

Manchoukuo Is Not Chinese  

Pages 114-116  

The legal relationship of Manchuria to China was never in question before 1911. No rational being would dispute the absolute right of the Manchus to sovereignty over their homeland up to that year; no arguments can set aside the legality and binding force of the Abdication Agreements between the Manchus and the Republic, sworn and solemn contracts incorporated into the fundamental law of the Republic, and thus callously violated as to every clause; no proof can be adduced to support the contention that the Manchus have died out; so the claim of China to sovereignty over the territory of the Manchus reduces itself to the contention that since the Russo-Japanese War (1905) the influx of immigrants settling on the land has determined the ownership of the soil and that the right of sovereignty is coexistent with this occupancy.  

The claim is so far-reaching, involving rights and interests and imposing titles which have never been questioned in centuries, that they cannot possibly be disposed of by a commission which, instead of acting as mediators, constituted itself into a court from whose decision there was no appeal. To go back only to the Manchu conquest of China in 1644, we find that those strong men of the North, throughout their long rule over China, with their Mongol and Manchurian-Chinese allies, have occupied and held by right of possession all the territory north of the Great Wall as part of their homeland. It has been a reservoir from which to draw troops for replacements to hold their conquest and a safe retreat in the event of defeat. Sitting enthroned in Peking, they proclaimed their homeland a Crown Area, a closed preserve, and enacted stringent immigration laws to keep the Chinese out. They then prohibited intermarriage between the Hanchun (the Manchu Military Establishment) and the Chinese and enforced these laws up to within a few years of the abdication of their emperor as sovereign of China. Then they had their rights stipulated and recognized in solemn treaties which became the fundamental law of the new Republic.  

The Chinese claim to sovereignty, based on the records of ancient history, have no force in law. Whatever rights they may have enjoyed in the dim and distant past to certain fringes in Southern Manchuria are lost, forgotten and invalidated by three centuries of Manchu occupation and sovereignty. Any Chinese claim to sovereignty over Manchuria must therefore be based on its nominal incorporation into the so-called Republic at the time of the abdication as defined by the terms of the Abdication Agreements. This basic charter has been ignored by the foreign Powers who, in subsequent treaties with the Republic, have agreed to recognize and respect the territorial and administrative independence of a state that has never been properly delimited, defined or constituted, a perpetuation in perpetuity of an empire which collapsed and disintegrated into its component entities with the dissolution in 1911 of the Manchu authority....
Excerpts from "The Case For Manchoukuo" by George Bronson Rea

Manchuria Always Independent

Pages 208-209

It is necessary to stress certain absolute truths which require no exposition and which no outside nation acting as judge is called upon to challenge. Up to 1911, Manchuria was indisputably Manch territory. That it was permitted to come even nominally under the rule of the Republic is traceable solely to the Abduction of the Manchu emperor and the fact that the Manchu Imperial Clan, the princes and the Manchurian residents in Peking, confining in the binding quality of the agreements written into the Fundamental law of the Republic, did not perceive the necessity of retiring at once to their homeland. The people of Manchuria saved their country from the fate of the rest of China by empowering General Chang Tso-lin to defend their frontiers against an invasion of the Republican armies. No Chinese war-lord from districts south of the Wall has exercised authority over Manchuria since the advent of the Republic. Its ruler has always been a Manchurian who not only kept the others out but, true to tradition, invades China Proper and brought the northern half of the country under his rule. That Chang Haukliang conquered North China in 1930, making Peking his capital, and then entered into a pact with the war-lord of Hankou to divide the country between them while to feel the foreign Powers, Hankou was permitted to pose as the recognized government, in no way brought Manchuria even nominally under the rule of Hankou. Chang Haukliang was never the subordinate. He was the "Co-Ruler of China", equal in rank and prestige to Chiang Kai-shek, a fact he impressed upon all foreigners who met and talked with him. When Chang Haukliang's military power was broken, and he could no longer terrorize the people of Manchuria into submission, the right to rule did not pass to his nephew despot in Hankou, but to the people of Manchuria from whom his father originally derived his powers. When the people of Manchuria declared their independence they committed no injury or injustice to China or the Hankou war-lord, who had never even visited Manchuria, cannot speak the language, and would probably be mobbed if he stopped foot in the territory without an army at his back....
化した支那人と同様して長城以北の土地全般を占領し満洲の一部として所有し、また満洲自体を保持して居たのである。ましてこの土地は征伐地支那を保持して行う上に於て必要なり故難を破壊すべき府水地でもあり又一旦北せる暗合には安全なる退却地でもあるのである。斯くして満洲人は北京に於て王位に即くや組織満洲を王冠地及封粟地としし陳盛なる移民法を設けて支那人の入国を禁じたのである。次で八旗と支那人との間より昇進を急ぎ清朝退位数年前に彼東の標を以て退位の儀を努められ、支那人が開国史の困難を支持しして如何に精神を振興し故満洲人の占領及主権に依つて無敵となり籠絡さ

朝退位の際退位規定の定める所に按つて満洲が名義上支那共和國に合併され其の際無視し其の後支那共和國に於て法を＜改訂＞<br>

朝退位の際退位規定の定める所に按つて満洲が名義上支那共和國に合併され其の際無視し其の後支那共和國に於て法を＜改訂＞<br>
して各華人分子に遂元した清帝退位経過を紙上に於て引続き水在し申もとの行
為である。
第二十七章
清帝退位は昔から独立国である。
二〇八二〇九頁

一九〇一年の辛亥革命まで清帝が清帝の領土であったことは稀ではない。こ
の放が毎もともに出来ないものである。清帝退位は誇ることを許さ
れたのは全く清帝の退位に基くものである。清帝退位協定の拘束力を信じて退
立ちに清の祖識たる清帝に退廃する必要を認めなかったのである。支那共和
帝の側の地方と同一運命に陥らなかった所以である。清帝退位協定の拘束
の統治者は恒に清帝であって清帝外界の来ることを防ぐのみならず其の
伝統に従ひ支那政府を攻略し支那の北半を其の支配下に置いたものである。
一九三〇年張新良が北支を攻略して首都を北京に求め次第南京の軍閥と交戰
して支那を二分し之と同時に清帝外界の生物を篤実に南京政府を進める承認した政
府に仕立てたからと云って夫れが発断して清帝が練今名義上と雖、南京の治

3
下に入った燕院にはならないのである。張孝良は省て南京政府の部下となって
たことはないのである。彼はその資格及び権威において MediaQueryと対等であって支
部の共治者である。彼は此の権威を面談させる有する外関人に強調して居
るのである。故に張孝良の Emanuel が破格させられ最終 彼を漢籍化に於て彼の職
などである故に漢籍化が延立を宣言したからと云つて彼等は支部に対し
将又南京の軍艦に対して何等指揮を與へ合い又不正懲を行つたことも
なんないのである。彼等南京軍艦は省て漢籍を訪問したこともあつ
れれば恐らく暴動に頼むのである。
COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE INFORMATION BUREAU OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE REGARDING THE INTERVIEW BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER NOMURA AND AMERICAN AMBASSADOR GROW:

December 18, 1939.

The Foreign Minister, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, requested the American Ambassador, Mr. Joseph C. Grow, to call on him at 3:30 p.m. today, December 18. Continuing their discussion of the various questions which have arisen between Japan and the United States in the course of the China Affair for one hour and a half, they held conversations in a mutually constructive spirit for the purpose of surmounting obstacles of Japanese-American friendly relations.

In the interview Foreign Minister Nomura communicated to Ambassador Grow that, in view of the fact that the absolute military requirements calling for the closure of the lower Yangtze River area have become amenable to gradual modification, the Japanese forces have accordingly decided to make preparations with a view to lifting the ban on the navigation of the Yangtze from Nanking downward under certain restrictions for the maintenance of peace and order and for military operations.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Communique issued by the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office regarding the interview between Foreign Minister Nomura and American Ambassador Reitveld," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of January, 1947

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
REMARKS OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN CONCERNING THE INTERVIEW
BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER ADMIRAL KICHIUSA KOMURA
AND THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR MR. JOSEPH O. GOW.

December 18, 1939.

In his interview with Ambassador Grow today, Foreign Minister
Nomura explained to the latter to the following effects:

Various restrictions placed on American rights and interests
in China in the course of the China Affair have arisen either
unavoidable consequences of military operations in China or as a
natural corollary of the reforms which have been in progress
simultaneously with the long-term reconstruction in China.

The Japanese Government have hitherto put forth their sincere
efforts for the settlement of the so-called pending questions be-
tween Japan and the United States and it is their intention to con-
tinue such efforts.

It is greatly regrettable in this connection that Japan is
misunderstood in some quarters as if she were intending to act in
an exclusive and monopolistic manner. The Japanese Government are
not acting with a view to shutting out in the future the economic
activities of other Powers in China. As a matter of fact they are
not reluctant to open even the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers at a proper
time and under appropriate conditions.

It is hoped that in the light of the above explanation made by
the Foreign Minister Japan's real intention will be understood not
only by the United States but by other Powers.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kenru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Remarks of the Foreign Office Spokesman concerning the interview between the Foreign Minister Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura and the American Ambassador Mr. Joseph C. Grew, December 18, 1939" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness; T. Sato
野村格子大臣「グループ」実國大臣会談内容及意義

（昭和十四年十二月十八日）

須藤情報部長ハ左ノ通りヲタ。野村格子大臣ハ本日「グループ」実國大臣会談ニ於テトノ豪ハ長期間建設ニ伴行シテハルルノ建設問題ハ従来共解決ノ為ノ結果テアルカ「又ハ長期間建設ニ伴行シテハルル労働者ニ依ルノ所望ニ照ラシテハ従来共解決ノ為ノ結果テアルニ為ハ

本ツヲモトセルハ欲占領中ノ日本政府ハ今後共協力スル意向テアルノ然ルニ従来日

関東スル目的ヲ以テ行動シテルノテハ無イ。例へば揚子江及珠江ノ関

南ヲモト當時條件ヲ下ニ開放スルニと共にカナルノロモトヲ恐切ニ説明セ

レントモノヲ恐れテ米国政府ハ勿論真ノ他ノ諸盟ノ我主張ヲ疏通セ勿論

望シテルノ。
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. YASHI, Naoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese
Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached
in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Remarks of the
Foreign Office Spokesman concerning the interview between the
Foreign Minister Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura and the American
Ambassador Mr. Joseph C. Grew, December 16, 1939," is an exact
and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign
Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 13th day of January, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: T. Sato
Excerpt from a Treatise on International Law concerning the Land Warfare between Russia and Japan

Compiled by ARIGA, Nagao, LL. D., Litt. D., an official attached to the regular staff of the general Staff Office

Treatise on International Law concerning Land Warfare between Russia and Japan

Published by the KAIKO-SHA (TF; Military club)

(From P. 196 to P. 201)

CLAUSE 34 -- The Treatment of Prisoners of War ON the Japanese Mainland

Those prisoners of war to be sent back from Manchuria to Japan proper were mustered in Dairen for the time being and transported by water to Ujina, the military anchorage headquarters. Near Ujina they were landed for disinfection on the island of Nijima situated in the picturesque Inland Sea. The wounded and invalid were transported by Japan Red Cross ships or by army hospital ships with Red Cross relief members on board.

The healthy prisoners of war were sent by water from Nijima or by rail from Ujina to Matsuyama, Hamadera, Himeji, Fushimi, Osafa, Sendai and Narashino, and interned in detention camps, army barracks, official residences, Buddhist temples or in private villas.
The places for the war prisoners' detention were all selected, the chief considerations being the healthfulness and ease of supervision. Some of the wounded and invalids were interned in hospitals specially set up for prisoner patients and some were received in the reserve hospitals in the remaining divisions as mentioned later. Their medical treatment, in most cases, was entrusted to the Japan Red Cross relief members. At the time of the Russo-Japanese war, there were no definite regulations for treating war prisoners captured in Naval battles. Japan did not like to discriminate with them whether they participated in sea or land warfare, consequently, by the ordinance of the Navy Ministry, a system of entrusting naval prisoners of war to the army was enforced. Notification No. 33 of the Navy Ministry issued on Feb. 17, the 37th year of Meiji. (1904)

Several Russian officers who were accustomed to an everyday life of luxury, discontented with Japanese treatment, gave vent to their dissatisfaction in a Russian newspaper, but according to the testimony of Councillor AKIYAMA, prisoners of war in general expressed their satisfaction with their food and clothing. The article given under P. 83 of the International Law Journal, March issue, the 37th year (of Meiji) (1905) comments: "The daily maintenance expenses for one prisoner of war as stipulated by the Japanese Maintenance Regulations, are small if compared with the cost of living in Europe".
the expenses are sufficient as the prices of commodities in Japan are so cheap. Among prisoner officers in Port Arthur there was once a certain officer who had much money with him. By illegal means he sent a message to Russia, in which he mocked at the ridiculously poor amount of war prisoners' allowance. But officers and soldiers in general did not complain on the point at issue.

In regard to observing one's religion, utmost freedom was given to all prisoners of war. Bishop NIKOLAI whom we mentioned under CLAUSE 15, was permitted by our government to dispatch his Japanese priest to every detention camp all over the country to observe Greek Orthodox church service. All other prisoners of war who did not belong to the Greek Church were allowed to observe their services according to their creeds. The two instances that the author learned, were those of rare services, which were equally allowed to be observed as well as other religions. The first instance is that of a group of prisoners who belonged to a certain sect whose name is unknown. As the feast came, for a week they ate no food cooked by persons of another sect, but received rations of meat and vegetables as raw materials which they cooked by their own fire and ate in new vessels never used before by persons of another sect.

They applied for permission to do this, and it was granted. The second instance was that of a few soldiers who belonged to a certain sect.
When the moon reached a certain phase, they sat up all night and prayed outdoors. All these services were authorised in accordance with the Hague Regulations.

**ARTICLE XVIII.**

The prisoner officers or those ranking with them who had their families, were permitted to live with members of their families in private houses within a certain precinct outside a detention camp, after getting an approval of the War Minister and swearing not to escape. All prisoners of war also were allowed to take a free walk within a certain area, after taking an oath not to escape and getting permission of the commanders of garrison headquarters who were to exercising surveillance on them. In MATSUYAMA there were sixteen houses in which prisoners lived with their family members. Among their families, there were some who came over from Russia, and others who stayed in Port Arthur before its capitulation. There was one prisoner of war who was allowed to live in a private house, though his rank was that of a non-commissioned officer, after special consideration because of repeated supplications on the part of his wife. A matter worthy of special mention here is that there were several prisoners of war, interned at MATSUYAMA, who were released with their families, and living there and returned to their country for a while but came back to MATSUYAMA to settle down after the peace treaty. They are still living there at present. Councillor AKIYAMA says, there was hardly any Russian prisoner of...
war who understood the Japanese language. For those prisoners of war who were interned in Japan proper so far away from their homeland, it was necessary to attach detention camp interpreters who were versed in the Russian language, in order to lessen their melancholy during their internment and satisfy their daily wants. The Imperial Government was most careful in this respect, and, besides appointing officers commissioned and non-commissioned who were versed in English, French, and German, as staff members and other officers of detention camps, they attached 182 Russian interpreters to all detention camps over the country, even though they found it very hard to get those interpreters as many of them were needed for expedition detachments. (The International Law and Comparative Jurisprudence Journal, 1906, P. 711 f.·

The Russian prisoners of war were permitted to take in foreign newspapers. Among those issued in Japan, "the Japan Times", "the Japan Mail" and "the Japan Gazette" were allowed. "The Times", issued in London, England, "Le Temps", France, "the Sun", U.S.A., "Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", Germany and "the Neue Freie Presse", Austria were also permitted. And in the name of so-called presents in ARTICLE XVI of the Hague Treaties, they were allowed to receive books and pamphlets. As the Japanese Government did not desire to have writings violently opposing the enemy government propagated among the prisoners of war, they prohibited the prisoners receiving the magazine...
entitled 'the Russian Revolution' and the magazine named 'the OSGOGENI'. (?) The Russian prisoners of war were also allowed to send and receive mail and telegrams written in one of Japanese, Russian, English, French or German languages through the censorship of the army authorities. They were permitted to receive and send money by postal orders. Their letters, post-cards, parcel post and postal orders were all exempted from duties. As to the prisoners' intelligence service, our Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau informed the French Minister in Tokyo of a Russian war prisoners' roster every week since March 30, 37th year of Meiji (1904). In August of the same year, direct communication was commenced between the Japanese and Russian Intelligence Bureaus; the Russian Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau was to inform the Japanese Legation in Berlin of a Japanese prisoners' roster, while the Japanese Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau was to send a Russian Prisoners' roster to the Russian Legation in Peking. Our Intelligence Bureau gave information of rosters very punctually three times (on the 5th, 15th and 25) of every month until the end of the war. The Bureau handed over a bunch of these identification cards kept in their office as referential materials for reports concerning, the Russian prisoners and deceased in Japan to General D. MARTENS who was dispatched to Japan to receive Russian prisoners of war.

Dr. MARTENS, with a fairness which we are pleased
to mention here, praised Japan's service in regard to
the prisoners of war whenever he found an opportunity.
Above all, at the Red Cross Treaty Revision Conference
held at Genova in the 39th year of Meiji (1906), and
also at the 8th International Red Cross General Meeting
held in London in June, 40th year of Meiji (1907), he
expressed his views, and called on the Japanese Minister
in Russia to express special thanks in his capacity as
Director of the Russian Intelligence Bureau.

This is clearly shown in the following official letter
[dated Dec. 14, 39th year of Meiji (1906)] transmitted
from the Foreign Minister to the War Minister.

"We beg to inform you of the following message from
Minister MOTONO in Russia: Dr. MARTENS, Adviser to the
Russian Foreign Office and Director of the Russian
Prisoners' Intelligence Bureau during the Russo-Japanese
War, called on the Minister requesting him to convey his
thanks in his official capacity as Director to the Japanese
Government for the cordial treatment of Russian Prisoners
of war in Japan during the war."

...... (Omitted) ......
No. 52 Zohomodi, Keijima-ku, Tokyo

The Publisher: SHIKAWA, Kamo Meatc

No. 52 Zohomodi, Keijima-ku, Tokyo

The Publishing Office: The Tokyo FAIKO-SHA

(TN: Military club)

No. 2 Kidocho, Keijima-ku, Tokyo

The Printer: NAKAMURA Sadami

No. 2 Kidocho, Keijima-ku, Tokyo

The Printing Office: The GENSHIN-SHA

- 8 -
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KABE, Fujii, who was in charge of relating to international law in the secretariat of the Navy Department as a councillor, or as professor with the concurrent post of secretary, from 1915 to 1925, and who afterwards assumed office in the Second Demobilization Department, and now in the Second Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 69 pages and entitled "International Law in the Russo-Japanese War" was obtained by me for official reference and has been in my custody thenceforth.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 14th day of January 1947.

Witness: YUNJI, Shinji

Signature of Officer

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William L. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William L. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 20 January 1947
日野に生じた当時における院内小児リハビリテーション

平生会

平生会は、小児リハビリテーションにおける院内小児リハビリテーションの一部として機能する。平生会は、小児リハビリテーションの基礎を成し、小児リハビリテーションの一部として機能する。平生会は、小児リハビリテーションの一部として機能する。平生会は、小児リハビリテーションの一部として機能する。平生会は、小児リハビリテーションの一部として機能する。
明治四十四年六月廿五日印刷

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自己退役後より、昭和四年四月より、若年退職官及次等退職官募集を目標に、海軍省へ報告した。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST.

The United States of America, etc.
versus
ARAKI, Sadao, etc.

Affidavit under Oath. (7/28/10)

Affidavit ENDO, Saburo

According to the form employed in our country, after taking oath as set forth in the accompanying paper, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am ENDO, Saburo.
2. My present address is Irimagavamachi Irima County, Saitama Prefecture.
3. My birthplace is Komatsumachi, Hirashi-Okitaama County, Yamagata Prefecture.
4. I was born on January 2, 26th year of Meiji (TN: 1893).
5. The main points of my academic career are as follows:
   Graduated from the Military Academy in May, 3rd year of Taisho (TN: 1914).
   Graduated from the advanced courses of the Artillery and Engineering School in November, 6th year of Taisho (TN: 1917).
   Graduated from the Military Staff College in November, 11th year of Taisho (TN: 1922).

- 1 -
Graduated from the Military Staff College of Paris in October, 4th year of Showa (TN: 1929).

6. The main points of my personal history are as follows:
Commissioned a Sub-Lieutenant of Artillery (Class 7F) in December, 3rd year of Taisho (TN: 1914).
Worked at the General Staff Office from December, 12th year of Taisho (TN: 1923).
Became a member of the General Staff Office from August, 13th year of Taisho (TN: 1924).
A resident-officer in France from March, 15th year of Taisho (TN: 1926).
A member of the General Staff Office from December, 4th year of Showa (TN: 1929).
A staff-officer of the Kwantung Army from August, 7th year of Showa (TN: 1932).
Became a professor of strategy at the Military Staff College from August, 9th year of Showa (TN: 1934).
The head of a section of the General Staff Office, a staff-officer of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters from November, 12th year of Showa (TN: 1937).
Vice-Chief of the Staff of the Kwantung Army, participated in the Nomonhan Incident, in September, 14th year of Showa (TN: 1939).
President of the Army Aviation Academy, in January, 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943).
Chief of the Executive Department at the Headquarters of the Army Aviation in May, 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943)
Promoted to the first rank of the higher civil service.
Director of the General Ordnance Bureau for Aviation in
November, 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943).
Relieved of his post in August, 20th year of Showa (TN: 1945).

7. As it is stated above, with the exception of my duty abroad
from March of 15th year of Taisho (TN: 1926) to December
of 4th year of Showa (TN: 1929) I served at the Second Section
of the General Staff Office and participated in the operations
plan of that office since 17th year of Taisho (TN: 1923) to
August, 7th year of Showa (1932). During this period, the
Manchurian Incident arose on September 18, 6th year of Showa
(TN: 1931). I was then a major and tried to perform my
duties. In August, 7th year of Showa (TN: 1932), I was
appointed a staff-officer of the Kwantung Army and went to
Manchuria with General MUTO, Chief of the Kwantung Army (deed),
General KOISO, Chief of the Staff, both assuming new posts,
and others. At the time when Manchurian Incident arose, the
General Staff Office was composed of such members as General
KANAYA, Hanzo (dead), Chief of the General Staff, Lt. General
NINOMIYA, Harushige (dead), Vice-Chief, Major General TATEKAWA,
Yoshitsugu (dead) Head of the First Department (operations),
Major General UEZU, Yoshijiro (later General), Chief of the
Executive Department, Major General HASHINOTO, Toranosuke
(later Lt. General), Head of the Second Department (information),
Colonel IFAMAURA, Isao (later General), Head of the
Second Section (operations), etc.

8. As it is clear in the foregoing statements I was involved in,
and therefore I know very well that various circumstances
which dominated the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command before and after the rise of Manchurian Incident, the development of the Incident and the relations between the Central Authorities in Tokyo and the Kwantung Army up to August, 9th year of Showa (TY: 1934).

I shall at first speak on a summary of the general phase of the operations plan. As there is no country without an operations plan so long as there is an army, so Japan always had her own operations plan also. Namely, every year the operations plan was renewed for the following year according to the estimate made of the prevailing situation, and the Second Department of the General Staff Office was responsible for estimating the situation, while the Second Section of the First Department of the same office was responsible for the operations plan. Thus the plan which was drawn up by the Second Section would go through channels before it received approval of the Chief of the General Staff; when it became a definite program, the operations plan for the year concerned was established around August or September. This program covered the period from April 1 of next year to March 31 of the following year. Then this Annual operations plan was established, the "orders" based upon this program were sent out to each stationary troop. Hence this order set the standard by which to decide the operations plan of each troop within the framework of the above plan. Each out-post army (for example like the Kwantung Army) drew up its own operations plan according to the above order and submitted it to the
Chief of the General Staff on the whole before the end of September of each year.

The foregoing was the actual circumstances by which the operations plan of the Japanese Empire was drawn up, and this was done so purely on the assumption that if by any chance a war should arise during that current year, and, therefore, its execution was entirely another question. Namely, it was executed only by the Imperial Command after the Cabinet decision was made upon declaration of war. Of course, when this was put into motion, the Chief of the General Staff as the highest staff-officer had to make a direct appeal to the Throne. It is a great mistake, therefore, if the above plan should be interpreted as a definite operations plan to be put into execution. Furthermore, it should be added that even though there was no possibility of the outbreak of war during that current year judging from the situations both within the country and abroad, the army might draw up by necessity an annual operations plan on the basis of military education and as the standard of arms that the Imperial Empire should have maintained, because by its own specific feature it was impossible for the army to have its armaments completely equipped in a short time.

10. The operations plan for the year when Manchurian Incident occurred was drawn up in 5th year of Showa (TN: 1930) as the operations plan for the current year of 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931). Had it been possible to submit this plan, it was obvious that the Central Authorities for the Supreme
Command had no plan for Manchurian Incident or aggressive intention in those days. It is to be regretted, however, that all these papers were burnt up at the close of the War. By following up the memories of those days, I shall attempt to state the internal conditions regarding the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command and a summary of the operations plan in the following. The 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931) was the year in which "Gonova" Armament Reduction Conference was held and enthusiasm for reduction of armament in those days was extremely high. Even those of us who were engaged in planning operations were deeply absorbed in the problem of limitation of armaments. Our concern, therefore, was how to cope with this period of reduction of armaments and to ensure the minimum military preparation necessary for the national defense rather than pondering on the question of war with foreign countries. Therefore, the operations plan was based considerably upon the fact that the military forces of Japan were planned in accordance with those of other countries concerned so that only an outline which permitted a certain degree of operations necessary for the national defense was considered. The operation plan drawn by the General Staff Office against China in those days was aimed at safeguarding our interests in Manchur and China, and at protecting our nationals resident in those districts affected, its primary objective being operations covering North China and the shores of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River (the Chang Chiang), especially the east.
of Nanking. The soldiers belonging to the Kwantung Army in Manchuria merely numbered around 10,000; one half of which was an independent garrison and its duty was to protect the South Manchurian Railways, the other half was a resident army division whose duty was to escort the detached forces which were sent over from Japan.

As to the operations plan against U.S.S. Russia the point of concentration was south of the Second Sungari River and the chief scene of the battle was to take place at the south of Harbin and near Taonan. There never was the case where an active operations plan in Manchuria was drawn up; still less, to say nothing of, the case to draw up an aggressive operations plan against U.S.S. Russia, because the national strength of Japan in those days did not allow it.

In fact, the Imperial Army reduced just then four divisions automatically, and, in spite of the opposition by the younger officers and others, the man who gave approval for the reduction of armaments was Major General HATA, Shunroku (later Marshal), then Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff Office. I believe, therefore, these incidents will indorse that the Japanese Empire was loyal to the reduction of armaments and had no intention of starting an aggressive war.

11. The circumstances concerning the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command at the time when Manchurian Incident arose were as I have stated in the foregoing statements, and there was no thought on the part of the Central Authorities of
carrying into effect of a grand campaign for the entire China. This is also clear how Japan despatched her troops at the time of the first Shanghai Incident in the following year, that is in February, 7th year of Showa (TN: 1932). Namely, when an attack was made by the Chinese troops near Shanghai, our Naval landing forces stationed there did their best to protect our nationals, attempting solely to check the expansion of the battlegrounds. Pressure of the 19th Army was increasingly strengthened, however, and as the Navy alone could no longer sustain the situation, we decided, by the request of the Navy but inevitably in self-defense, to send our army troops to aid the urgent need; and yet in order to avoid the aggravation of the war we landed in Shanghai in front of the enemy expecting to lose many lives for it, and did not land at the back of the enemy, though we were fully aware of its strategic disadvantage, and the duty of our troops was limited to the protection of our nationals resident there.

By this fact alone it can readily be understood that we had no aggressive intention nor did we act under the totally controlled plan.

12. Just before to the Incident of September 18 (TN: 1931) the relation between the Kwantung Army and that of CHANG Haueh-liang was strained to such a degree that it was exposed to the point of explosion at the slightest touch, as it was stated in the Lytton Report, and among the hot-headed group there were some who felt very strongly that unless something
was done to repulse the pressure made by the Chinese Authority (CHANG Hsueh-liang), Japan would finally be led to destruction.

13. Because the despatch of Major General TATEKAWA to Manchuria incidentally coincided with the date of Liutiaokou Incident, it was misunderstood by some as though there had been some direct connection between the two, but this was entirely unfounded.

As previously stated, the insult against Japan by Hsueh-liang's force developed into resistance to Japan, infringement of interests and oppression of Japanese nationals, furthermore the insult against Japanese armed forces was greatly aggravated as time went on, but because of the national policy of peace through diplomacy, we were strongly urged to be patient and prudent, and consequently even the morale of the army was in danger of being influenced (was depressed). Therefore, in August, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931), in order to warn against rash acts and to encourage the morale, War Minister MIMAHT made an address of instruction concerning resolution of the Army. But unfortunately Captain FAKAMURA's incident was also announced, and this unexpectedly produced such a strong response that an unofficial information such as the Japanese Army in Manchuria would start an active move at any moment was issued. The Central Authorities, therefore, despatched Major General TATEKAWA in order to make clear concerning the source of such unofficial information and to convey to the Kwantung Army their real intention.

14. When the Incident arose on September 18, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931), I was suffering from gastric ulcer and on the
19th I was scheduled to be sent to the hospital of the Army Medical College. On that morning, however, as I received the news which reported the rise of the Incident, I was obliged to change my plan and hastily went to my office. It was wholly such an unforeseen occurrence. Therefore, the opinion concerning the despatch of a portion of the military forces of the Japanese Army in Korea, for instance, differed between the Ministry of War and the General Staff Office so that the regular order was issued at last on September 22 as a ratification of an act.

15. Soon after the rise of the Incident, the Imperial Government had decided upon a policy of non-aggravation of the situation. In conformity with that policy, therefore, the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command held a conference of the leaders of the General Staff Office and of the War Ministry on the morning of September 19, and recognized the action of the Kwantung Army as exercising the right of self-defense based upon its duty. On the same day a report was received that a brigade of the Japanese Army in Korea would be despatched to Manchuria for the purpose of reinforcement, but the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command acted firmly to check it. For that reason that brigade was unable to pass the boundary of the Yalu River, and was detained for two long days (48 hours) in the train in the midst of the hottest season. The sudden change in the situation in Kilin, however, did not allow a moment of delay, and therefore on September 21, it finally crossed the boundary by arbitrary decision. Again we found out that its trespassing the
boundary by arbitrary decision as a ratification of an act was by no means to abandon the policy of non-aggravation, but rather was necessitated by the circumstances in the district affected. Moreover, from the standpoint of commanding an army it was impossible to have the brigade return right away to its place. To leave it alone, however, would be liable to leave the root of calamity and evil practices in future. Hence the order was issued. Such being the case the brigade was ordered to return to Korea as soon as the conditions in Manchuria came to a state of lull at a time.

Since then efforts towards the settlement of the Incident were continually made through negotiations by the Central Authorities. Due to, however, the lack of the real grasp of the urgent situation at the district affected by the Central Authorities on the Japanese side, and on the Chinese side still worse situation in addition to the special circumstances (lack of control as an independent nation), etc., the negotiations did not progress and were unwillingly brought to a deadlock. The Kwantung Army in Manchuria, however, ardently desired to fulfill its duties to the very end, because it faced the actual circumstances that should the Incident be left unsettled, the more than 200,000 CHANG'S troops, which had already been out of control, would become bandits over the entire Manchuria and would provoke serious problems that would not only threaten our interests but ignore humanity.

The Central Authorities seemed merely to advocate the abstract policy of non-aggravation and restlessly attempted to resume...
the situation which prevailed before the outbreak of the Incident (the trend of the U.S.S. Russia was feared then to the extent that they were almost seized by a Soviet-phobia), and they seemed not to have any concrete policy for the settlement. As there was a lack of complete understanding between the Kwantung Army and the Central Authorities, men were despatched several times in order to grasp the real situation in Manchuria and to convey thoroughly the real intention of the Central Authorities.

18. In the first place, as soon as we were informed of the outbreak of Liutiaokou Incident, we sent Colonel ANDO, Rikichi (later General), then Chief of Military Service Section of the War Ministry to investigate the actual facts of the case. We made him investigate thoroughly if Liutiaokou Incident was started by the Kwantung Army, if the military action then taken was not arbitrary and in excess of its vested powers, if it intentionally set aside the Chinese proposal for complete peace and took one-sided action, etc. And we received a report in the negative over all those questions.

19. Second was the despatch of HASHIMOTO section. This section had its group leader Major General HASHIMOTO, Toranosuke, Chief of the Second Department of the General Staff Office, and included three other members: myself, a member of the Second Section of the First Department (Operations) of the same office, IMAI, Takeo (then captain) of the China Section and NISHIHARA, Issaku (then major), a member of Military
Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry from the field of military administration. The chief duty of this section was to act as liaison officers between the Central Authorities and the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, and therefore we tried to convey to the Kwantung Army that it should consider the national policy of the Japanese Empire thoroughly and that matters which would have grave influence upon it should not be decided upon merely by the judgment of the Kwantung Army but it should try to seek for instructions from the Central Authorities. The Central Authorities in those days were not well informed of the real state of affairs concerning the Incident, and concerning the action of the Kwantung Army on important matters, it was considered necessary to have the Kwantung Army seek for instructions from the Central Authorities. Thus the above party left Tokyo on September 24, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931) and arrived at Mukden on September 28 and stayed there until November 3 of the same year discharging its duties.

Upon arriving at Manchuria we were in touch with the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, and after investigating the state of affairs, we clearly understood the situation. We understood well what the Kwantung Army considered and acted upon, all of which had justifiable reasons. Moreover we strongly felt that how the Central Authorities lacked understanding and grasp of the situation and we thought something must be done.

During our stay there, I travelled in North Manchuria in
order to investigate the situation there, especially the possibility of a clash between the U.S.S. Russia and Japan. And the conclusion I arrived at after this travel of investigation was as follows: in order to settle this Incident quickly it was necessary to stabilize early the conditions in North Manchuria before confusion took place there, as the Kwantung Army considered, and as Commander HONJO said, I felt very keenly that unless we subjugated North Manchuria immediately, it might give an opportunity to the U.S.S. Russia to march into that district and would offer a great probability of a clash between Russia and Japan. And therefore I wired a message to that effect from Harbin to Tokyo. This was disapproved by the Tokyo Authorities, because they thought I was Manchurianized since I came to Manchuria and discarded the non-aggravation policy (then Manchuria was looked upon as our Cleopatra, because any one who visited there was charmed by the circumstances prevailing there and assumed a positive view of the matter). I was immediately ordered to return to Tokyo.

During my stay in Manchuria, I had the privilege of seeing HONJO, Shigeru, the Commander of the Army frequently, and I clearly learned that the Commander had an excellent opinion concerning the settlement of the Incident, and that he was a man who led the Kwantung Army according to his own conviction and opinions. I learned that the popular judgment that the Commander HONJO was a puppet was entirely unfounded.
20. The third was the despatch of General SHIRAKAWA (dead). General SHIRAKAWA was then a supreme war councillor and an elder general of the Japanese Army. On October 16, 6th year of Showa (1931) the so-called October Incident was discovered in Tokyo. The Central Military Authorities were greatly surprised, and especially as the rumor was rampant as to the rebellion of the young officers of the Kwantung Army, the general was despatched to persuade them and he arrived at Mukden on October 21. I was then staying at Mukden as a member of HASHIMOTO Section. I went to Antung to meet him and reported the fact that it was a pure demagogism and baseless fears and that the Kwantung Army was very indignant at the lack of understanding of the situation on the part of the Central Authorities, because at that time the Kwantung Army was solely devoted in the discharge of its duties. General SHIRAKAWA seemed ashamed of, but at the same time felt relieved of the matter and returned to Tokyo.

21. The fourth was the despatch of the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, NINOMIYA in the latter part of November, 6th year of Showa (1931). As stated above the policy of the Central Authorities concerning the present Incident was of complete non-aggravation which viewed from the authority in charge of the district affected was extremely conservative and negative. Especially there was no territorial ambition in the least and no active intentions. The military factions of Hsueh-lung were then scattered all over North Manchuria and the public feeling was in turmoil. While the Kwantung
Army considered it an absolute necessity to occupy Chichihar in order to stabilize the situation in North Manchuria, the Central Authorities thought it necessary to withdraw troops from Chichihar without losing time for fear of the Russo-Japanese clash, and the opinions did not agree. Therefore with the intention of having the troops withdraw, upon investigating the true situation, even by the issue of an Imperial command, if necessary, the Central Authorities sent the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, NINOMIYA to Manchuria with this order with him. Upon his arrival, however, it was found that the action taken by the Kwantung Army was appropriate and the idea of withdrawing the troops was given up.

22. As seen in the above statements with the shifting of the Incident, the Central Authorities passively assumed the policy of non-aggravation which was not practicable, and was particularly afraid (almost to the extent of morbid fear) of the action that might be taken by the Soviet taking advantage of this Incident, and merely thought of resuming the conditions prevailed previous to the Incident, whereas the Kwantung Army based its policy on the fulfillment of its duties according to the prevailing circumstances, in order to recover public peace and order in Manchuria and insure our life line. The objective was one but the method was not always the same. As the officers on these missions clarified the real circumstances, however, the opinions of the Central Authorities and the Kwantung Army at last came to an agreement.

I may mention here incidentally a few words concerning non-
aggravation. At the time when Manchurian Incident broke out, the word "non-aggravation" was thought a kind of a cant but its real meaning or its concrete policy was not known clearly at all, and it was rather thought to be extremely abstract and to stand for a negative policy. When General ARAKI became the War Minister however, he told me in person on the point of "non-aggravation" that it was necessary to consider the word analytically. Namely, if we sought to avert the expansion in area and in military force, it might likely lead to an expansion in time as a result; if we averted protraction of time, the numerical strength of an army and area might expand. What was needed most at that moment was to settle the Incident swiftly. Thus he said that non-aggravation in time was our chief concern and if necessary expansion in area and numerical strength of the army might be unavoidable.

I was deeply impressed by his far-sightedness. Since the rise of the Incident the numerical strength of the army was increased and the area was expanded, but this by no means meant forsaking the non-aggravation policy, but was the natural result of the event. The reason why it took such a long time could be explained by the fact that we were dazzled by the word "non-aggravation of the situation" and were too much constraint in regard to the military forces and area.

23. As previously mentioned, I clearly understood that judging from the objective situation prevailing, the military action of the Kwantung Army, which had its initial start in Liutiaok Incident, was an inevitable act of self-defense, because as
a member of HASHIMOTO Section I went to Manchuria and became thoroughly acquainted with the actual circumstances there. I understood that even if Liutiaokou Explosion Incident had not occurred, the actual condition was on the critical point of explosion at some or other occasion. As to the true cause of Liutiaokou Incident, even the Lytton Committee was unable to examine into it closely, and I suspect that it might remain as an eternal mystery, and I consider such an incident as this is a mere occurrence which is not very important compared with the development of a fundamental and fatalistic state of affaire.

24. The action taken by the Kwantung Army since Liutiaokou Incident was so swift and successful that it was at time viewed as deliberate, but this is a layman's idea. A military expert would say that there were many errors and that for a permanently stationed army they made very poor operations plans. I can give an example to illustrate this from what I saw as a member of HASHIMOTO Section: in the case of the attack at Kuanchengtzu a certain corps mistook it for mere maneuvers and got underway accordingly; again the mountain-guns were dismounted on that day for the purpose of repair and they could not assemble them and therefore they summoned to the battleground the reservists of mountain artillery from Changchun and at last the guns were assembled and the firing was started. The corps in that district, therefore, had to go through a bitter contested battle and had sustained a loss that was unnecessary.

25. During the Incident the Kwantung Army was restricted in the
The use of the forces by the Central Authorities and was often driven to serious difficulties. For example, due to the fact that the reinforcement from the Japanese Army in Korea was halted, there was no force available to guard Mukden and was obliged to form a volunteer corps of reservists and others for its helpless guard; in the pursuit battle to Chichihar it was frequently limited in its advanced lines; in crossing the North Manchurian Railway it was prohibited to pass other than railway crossings; and in advancing toward Chinchow and Harbin it was ordered to discard the plan and was obliged to send its troops back.

26. The Kwantung Army on its part made a representation concerning the circumstances to the Central Authorities and at time acted upon its own authority, because it could not wait for the order from above, but this is not necessarily be taken as acting beyond its vested powers; rather most of it should be given approval.

27. I should like to state here concerning the arbitrary action of the Kwantung Army. Of course it was the duty of the commander of the Kwantung Army to obey absolutely when he received the Imperial Order, but otherwise the army commander acted properly and arbitrarily on his own responsibility and this was recognized as military common sense in our Army. As the result there was sometimes differences of opinions between the Army and the General Staff Office. The understanding of the Central Authorities was inadequate, hence delay in taking proper action, and the local army was obliged at
times to take arbitrary action, because it could not wait
long for the Imperial Command. Therefore since the General
Staff Office established a closer relation with the local
army on one hand, and the Chief of the General Staff attained
a certain degree of power enabling him to issue orders direct
to the commander of the Kwantung Army since November 5, 6th
year of Showa (TN: 1931) on the other, the control of the
Central Authorities was put in a perfect state.

28. Then I shall state on the conception of the founding of
Manchurian State at that time. At the time when Mar
churian Incident arose the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command
had no definite plan as to its disposal, and opinions were
divided. Much time was spent before the final conclusion
was reached. I do not think there was any one who had conce
such an excellent opinion as that of establishing an independen
dent state then. When I was in Manchuria as a member of
HASHIMOTO Section, General MINAMI, the War Minister, even
pointed out to HONJO, the Commander of the Army that "On such
an internal question as who should assume the administrative
power, the army stationed there should not be concerned."
HONJO, the Commander of the Army was desirous of the establish
ment of a pro-Japanese Government strong enough to stabilize
Manchuria in order to discharge his duty of maintaining public
peace and order in Manchuria immediately and of protecting
our interests and nationals there.

In the middle of October, I heard Mr. YU, Chung-han's (dead)
ideal of the founding of an empire. He said that history
shows that the Chinese people was a race which was unable to employ force of arms properly. From time immemorial soldiers had been regarded as destructive weapons, and when employed they were likely to assume military rule, and therefore Manchuria should be made a land of peace without military force and based upon the principles of royalty; namely, it should be established to be a paradise for the five races living in harmony. This coincided with my ideal I had then as I already stated before in connection with disarmament problem, and I thought very highly of and was wholly in sympathy with Mr. Yu, Chung-han's opinions. When I visited the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army to take my leave for Tokyo at the early part of November, KATAKURA, a staff-office told me for the first time that viewed from the circumstances thus developed, it was ideal to settle the matter by establishing an independent state, and I was asked to convey that when I returned to Tokyo, along with the atmosphere prevailing in Manchuria to the high officials and at the same time to make efforts to materialize it. After my return to Tokyo, I conveyed these messages to people at various quarters, but even Major General TATEKAWA, Chief of the First Department of the General Staff Office and Lieutenant Colonel NEMOTO, Leader of the China Section, who were considered as holding the most positive opinions at that time, did not pay much attention to it and said that an independent administrative power would probably be the most we could expect. Thus in the Central Authorities no one had such a farsighted conception as the
establishment of an independent state, but everybody was concerned with the idea of immediate and peaceful settlement of the Incident.

Nevertheless, starting with the Incident there arose a sentiment among the people in Manchuria for independence which developed and at last a sovereign state was established.

As stated above there was absolutely no intentional plan or common deliberation of founding Manchurian State previous to the Incident, to say nothing of the establishment of a fictitious state artificially planned which was based upon territorial ambition. The founding of Manchurian State was a natural course of the event based upon a true ideal, and if I am allowed to express my own opinion, I still believe that it was accomplished by the divine will, and by having Manchu as an ideal sovereign state can we really maintain peace in the Orient, and it can be a great foundation stone for the world peace.

October 12, 21st year of Showa (TN: 1941)
Tokyo
Affidavit: ENDO, Saburo

I hereby testify that the aforementioned had taken an oath before this witness and affixed his signature.

The same day.

Tokyo

Witness: BANNO, Junkichi.
OATH

I hereby swear that according to my conscience I shall
state truth, conceal nothing and add nothing.

ENDO, Saburo
(his seal affixed)
昭和四年（一九二九年）十二月

部ノ作戦計画ヲ参創シテ居マテ。其ノ間＝昭和六年九月十八日満洲
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中止シテ急送ス

中止シテ急送ス

中止シテ急送ス
旅行シマチ、ソシテ観客ノ随伴ハ今度ノ場所ヲ運ぶヲ係ニしてセリメ

為ニ電鉄ヲ考へテ居ル如く北御ノ御田セサルノ先年ク北御ノ地

定スルノ要アルコト及本庄軍司令官ノ言ハルノ如ク省府ヲ現

定セザルベ却トテソノ談ヲテテ北御ニ進入スルノ模ヲ作ヘトキ

行矣ノ公事ヲ大々ラシムルモノデアルコトヲ顧慮シテ北御ニ進入

地ニ就ルト望其ノ宣諭ニ属セラレタル旨意ニナルト云ハレル

ハノテリデハリマス。ノ直ナミ旨達方ヲ命セラレマス。ニ

右ノ事件ラ該監しさル本庄軍司令官ノ意ハレニ接シ司令官ガ故

輝二之課ナテハ卓抜ナル意見ラ持テ居ラレバ、己ノ信念ト意図ニ於

テ頒布テナリセラレルモノヲハハ点ヲイシタリマシテ、本庄司令官ハ

ロハツテデアルモノヲ會議ノ知りマシテ、白川大尉ハ當時

軍事ヲ顧問ヲ當時長老デアリマス。昭和六年十月十六日東京ニ於

十ニ、其ノ第三ハ白川大尉ハ死亡ノ時進デアリマス。。白川大尉ハ當時

の
テ所調十月号パノノテ発足シテハ、昭和七年十月二十一日ニ於テハ【参照】

三十一、其ノ二百八昭和六年十一月下旬ニ於テ第一サテナノバノテハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハデハ、デハDe
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メテ抽象的サ治策政策ノ代名詞ヲテテソテリマストナリマス。所デ現不

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又兵力のニ過ぎ大へ逆トセバ却ツテ時間ニ必要ガアル即チ地域のニ

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リマスガハ其ノ卓見ニ敬意ヲ表シテノデアリマス。す

章ヲ別発以来遂次兵力ソ増加セラレ地域ニ過大セラレマシテソレハ

決シテ不過ぎ大へ逆ヲ放棄シテノデハハナク自然ノ勢ガソウテテナル

地域ヲ解消ニ長時間ヲ要シテコトハ等ロノ事態ヲ過大へ逆ノ事態ヲ

兵力ニ過ぎ大へ逆ニ地域ヲ通過シテ結果トサへ考ヘラト、次第デアリマス。
十六経本部長藤川少将を支那班長藤本佐佐山ダと云ハレタ程デアリマス。呉

戦ハ獨立政権ヲ実現ノ為ノ山ダト云ハレタ程デアリマス。呉

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昭和二十年（一九四六年）十月十二日於東京

御名立会人ノ面前ニテ宣言シ且ツ署名ヲテ印シタルコトヲ証明シマス

同日

於同志

立会人

仮

淳

吉
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE F.R. E.S.T.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.
against
AKAI, Saburo, et al.

Sworn Deposition

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

/S/ H.I.Y.Da., Nobukatsu.
The outline of my personal history and my present post are as follows:

Graduated from the Arts Faculty of the Tokyo Imperial University. (Majored in Indian Philosophy) (March 1921)

Studied Japanese Buddhism in the post-graduate course of the Tokyo Imperial University (From April 1921 to March 1924)

Residing mainly in England, carried out research on Buddhism in European countries and America (From March 1924 to April 1926)

Lectured on the History of Japanese Buddhism in the Tokyo Imperial University, the Tohoku Imperial University, the Kyushu Imperial University, the Tokyo Literature and Science College, the Toyo University, the Kokugakuin College, and the Wipson University etc. (From April 1926 to 1946)

Was granted an Imperial reward by the Imperial Academy for my study of "HOKKE GISO" (T.N. An Commentary on the HOKKE scriptures) written by Crown Prince SHOTOKU. (May 1935)

Received a Doctorate degree in the Tokyo Imperial University (April 1932)

Deliver a Buddhist sermon to the Japanese War Criminal suspects four times a week in SUGAMO Prison.

(as a prison chaplain. From February 1946 up to present)

Present post

Assistant Professor of the Tokyo Imperial University.
1) Buddhism is the religion which was propagated by the edict of the 33rd Emperor SUIKO in the second year of his reign (A.D. 594) and was followed by the successive Emperors as well as the majority of the Japanese people for about 1,300 years until the latter part of the 121st Emperor KOMEI's reign (A.D. 1866). As many as a half of the Emperors who ascended the throne during this period abdicated to enter the Buddhist priesthood and left their homes, pursuing in solitude and quiet the way to become a Buddha (T.N. cf. two classes of Buddhistic faith explained, later) There were, therefore, not a few Emperors, Empress Dowagers, Crown Princes, Princes, and Princesses who, following those Emperors, left their homes and became priests or priestesses. This custom naturally prevailed among the nobility, the military class, and the common people. Consequently, prominent Buddhist priests appeared from among them. Japanese Buddhism has thus always served to promote the progress of Japan as a cultured nation aiming at peace. The result is that even now there remain many Buddhist temples and works of Buddhist art not only in Kyoto and Osaka, but also all over the country, and also that Buddhist customs are now deeply rooted in many phases of the daily life of the nation. In the year of the Meiji Restoration (A.D. 1867,) moved by the
spirit of restoring Japan to the state of the ancient times when Emperor JIMMU reigned before the introduction of Buddhism (A.D. 552), Buddhist services or ceremonies which had been held for a long time in the Imperial House were abolished and those princes who had been in priesthood returned to secular life. Thus the Buddhist formalities which had been maintained for 1,300 years in the Imperial House were replaced by those of Shinto. The above mentioned fact is clearly proved by the fact that we cannot, until the reign of Emperor KOMEI, find any pictures of the successive Emperors in arms, but only in Buddhist priest garb or Scholars dress. Although eighty years have elapsed since Buddhism disappeared from the Imperial House in the early years of MEIJI, a greater part of the people still remain Buddhists just as their ancestors were.

2) The doctrines of Buddhism which have developed in Japan have not always been similar for 1,400 years. Various kinds of doctrines have been preached in accordance with the feature of an age and the individuality of the preacher. Today, they are divided into thirteen sects, which have many more branches. But they are, after all, reduced to two main classes: one is a "Way to bring the actual self to perfection as a human being and become a Buddha or an enlightened one" (writers note, Buddha, the enlightened one) and the other is the "Way to reflect on one's present sins and to ask Amitā Buddha
(The writers note. The enlightened one who accomplished the
immensurable life and wisdom) for salvation.

The former is called "The way of a saint" or "the doctrine of
salvation by works." The latter, "The way of the common
people" or "the Buddhistic doctrine of salvation by faith".

It goes without saying that either of those two main doctrines
not only aim at self-completion, but also at making all other
perfect at the same time. As for those to be led into the
faith, Japanese Buddhism makes no distinction between the
wise and stupid, the rich and poor, and the male and female, not
to speak of race and nationality. It makes it a goal to have
all creatures equally, being unrestricted by time and space.

However, it might be natural that Japanese Buddhism teaches
the multitude, by painting to the "Height of Truth", to
practice justice and to tread the path of humanity for elevating
and developing the culture of the State as a spontaneous
manifestation of gratitude for the land and the State were th
were born.

3) I believe that Shintoism is not a religion. It is because o
is unable to believe in religions of different nature at the
same time. It must have been impossible to worship Shintoism
which have been followed for 1,300 years by the whole nation
as well as the successive Emperors. Today, every Buddhist
family in Japan has 1'amidana (T.N. a miniature of a shrine) in
its house and worships it day and night. Those devout Bud-
dhist who visit temples worship at Shinto shrines as WIGAW
(T.N. Tutelary Gods) at the same time and yet do not feel any contradiction. From these facts it can be said that Shintō is not a religion, but an object or a place of a kind of ritual for ancestor-worship.

4) In Japan, since the Constitution was promulgated by the Emperor MEIJI, freedom of faith as every one knows, had been admitted and generally put into effect. Accordingly, to belong in Buddhism, Christianity or Shūhō Shinto (T.N. Shintoism of various sects) as a religion has been left to the option of individuals of the nation, while Shintoism has been followed by the whole nation as something different from a religion.

5) In some overseas areas where a great many Japanese had immigrated, there were Shinto Shrines erected by them, I am told, but even in this case, as mentioned before, they were erected not as what we call a religion, but for the worship of those Japanese immigrants of their ancestors.
December 25th, 1946.

At the International Military Tribunal

/S/ H.Y.M., Nobukatsu (seal)

I certify that the above mentioned person took an oath in my presence and affixed his signature and his seal.

Witness: /S/ Soichiro Ono (Seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 23 Jan 1941

(Affidavit of HANAYAM., Nobukatsu)
自分発動戦行ハルノ方式ニ従ヒ先づ別紙ノ新附テ効果ヲ増シテ上

荒木貞夫
他

西神利加合家國

西

花

山

信

勝

昭和二十三年六月四日
十 三

（未完）

（未完）

（未完）

（未完）

（未完）
佛教ハハ三十三代遙古天亀ノ第二年（1538）ニ同天亀ノ札助ニ

此ノ間ニ即位サレタ天亀ノ数ノ約半数ハ、寄ノ譜位シテ仏教ノ僧トナリ、家庭ヲ去ツテ避難カニ仏トナル道ヲ修セラレタモデアル。

家庭ヲ去ツテ避難カニ仏トナル道ヲ修セラレタモデアル。
徳島市に住所を移した後、彼は早速、徳島市役所に赴任し、行政の仕事に取りかかった。彼の新たな職場は、市内の役所本庁舎であり、ここでは市民サービスの窓口として機能していた。

徳島市の行政機関は、市役所、警察署、消防署、保健所など、様々な役所が集まっていた。彼は、これらの機関との連絡をはかることは重要だと考え、仕事の中心であった。

彼の新しい課題は、市民からの意見聴取と、行政の効率化だ。徳島市の行政は、旧来の体制を打破し、市民とのコミュニケーションを強化するため、彼の積極的な取り組みが求められていた。

彼は、市民から寄せられた意見を真剣に考え、行政の改善策を考案した。その努力は、市民の満足度を上げ、行政の効率化を進めるのに貢献した。

徳島市の行政は、彼の取り組みにより、一層の改善が見られ、市民の生活環境が向上した。彼の貢献により、徳島市の行政機関は、より市民に親しむことができた。

徳島市の町並みは、彼の在任中も変わらなかったが、行政の改革により、市民の生活はより快適なものになった。彼の努力は、市民のためであり、その成果は、彼の後世に伝わるであろう。
ルトノ復古精神カラ、永年宮中に採用サルチャ数発教的法令儀
式ハ都セラレ、法親王等復飾子命サルチャトヲナニテキテ、一千三
百年間用ヒラテキた仏教ニ代ルニ、宮中デハ神社ノ仏教式ヲ採
用サラレコトナツテノデアル。然シヲ明仏ミマデノ歴代仏天ノ
運用ヲ武蔵シタ仏天ノ魔像＝マキ＝僧形ヲ仏天カ、文人トテ
テノ仏天ノ魔像ヲコンカ見ラレナイトガ知實ニ上ノ事実ヲ示シ
テ歴リアル＝明治初年ニ宮中カラ仏教ハ消々ヘルチャトヲナ
テナリ＝八十年ヲ経過スルケレドモ、調民ノ多数ハ今モナホ、先祖以
来ノ仏教信仰ヲアルモテノ仏天ニハ、過去一千四百年ノ間＝必メシモノ模デハ
日本ニ営滅シタ仏教ハ、過去一千四百年ノ間＝必メシモノ模デハ
ロノ数ヲ説カレテキタ。ソレガ現在十三宗トモラリ、更＝多クノ
仏教ヲ西僧ヨリトシテ現在ノ自己ヲ完成シテ佛
時テナル演トモ、現在ノ自己ヲ罪ナ
シテ日来ニコレチ禮拝シテオルシ、又仏教ノ寺院ニ崇拝スルノ儀禮ノ対象又ハ場所デアルト云ッテフヨイト思フ。

又、我が語デハ明治天皇ノ法律制定以来、仏教ノ自由ハコレチ承認シテ来タノデアツテ、且ツコレチ指示ニ実行シテ来タモナタリミノヲカセキリヲニ

 repositories.returns.reading.natural
昭和二十二年十二月二十五日
於防東関係諸所

以上

同日同所於テ

立命人
小野清一郎

5

祖先崇仰ノタメニ建テモノデアタト自分八信メル。
Excerpts from Division Headquarters Order

Army Regulation No. 13
July 10th of the 15th year of
Showa (T.N. 1939)

Article 3 Page 149 of Classification No. 2 of the First Volume of Regulations

Art 1. A lieutenant-general shall be appointed by His Majesty to the post of division commander, who, under the command of an army commander, shall be the head of the army units under his control and shall control matters concerning military affairs in compliance with orders of the army commander.

Art 2. The division commander shall conduct the mobilization plan of the respective forces under his command.

Art 3. The division commander shall assume the responsibility for the training of forces under his command.

Art 4. The division commander shall assume the defense of the divisional district in his charge in compliance with regulations decided upon by the army commander.

(The rest is omitted)

Art 5. The division commander can make use of forces stationed in the area of defense in his charge but not assigned to...
his command, for the sake of defense maneuvers.

In the case of the preceding paragraph the division commander should, in advance, consult with commanders of the forces concerned.

Art 6. The division commander, when asked for armed forces by a prefectural governor to maintain tranquility in the district concerned, is authorized immediately to comply with the demand, if the situation is critical.

When the situation is too imminent to expect the governor's demand, the division commander is authorized to take adequate measure by means of using troops.

Art 7. Omitted.

Art 8. Omitted.


Art 10. The division commander shall supervise affairs concerning discipline and morale, administration, equipment, intendance, hygiene, and veterinary services of the forces under his command.

The division commander shall supervise the morale and discipline of forces stationed in his divisional district. (This regulation is applicable only to the forces designated by the army commander or to units which are other than armed forces, in case said units are under direct command of the army commander.)
Art 11. As regards military administration, and personnel, affairs of the division commander shall be conducted them in accordance with instructions of the Minister of War; as regards the mobilization plan, of the Chief of the General Staff; as regards education, of the Inspector General of Military Education.

Art 12. The division commander should report on the state of affairs of the division in his charge to the army commander usual at the end of every year's training term.

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 Jan 1947
第七條 師団長八部下諸部隊ノ推紀

第八條 師団長八部下諸部隊ノ推紀

第九條 師団長八部下諸部隊ノ推紀

第十條 師団長八部下諸部隊ノ推紀

第十一條 師団長八部下諸部隊ノ推紀

第十二條 師団長八部下諸部隊ノ推紀

第十三條 師団長八部下諸部隊ノ推紀
Statement of the Japanese Government in
virtue of Paragraph 5 of Article 16 of the Covenant
of the League
Part I.

Japan's co-operation with the League of Nations.

Japan has taken the greatest interest in the development and success of the League from the days of its inception. Her successive governments have extended to it for nearly 14 years their hearty cooperation, and her statesmen have devoted their best efforts to the extension of its influence and the enhancement of its prestige. Japan takes pride in recalling the active participation of her representatives in the work of the League. As an original and permanent Member of the Council, she has had many opportunities of co-operation in its beneficent activities, and of these opportunities she has fully availed herself. She regards the League as a most powerful instrument for the good of humanity, and she is only anxious, in the interest of this great experiment in the establishment of universal peace, that the Members of the League shall fully appreciate the situation in the Far East and deal with it in a practical way rather than by formulae and principles.

The present dispute was first brought by China to the consideration of the Council of the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant in September 1931. In spite of the fact that Japan in this case was obliged to act solely in self-defence against aggression on the part of China, Japan, from the very beginning, has spared no effort in explaining to the League the facts and background of this unfortunate incident, and at the same time she has constantly and without waiting for the
Resolution passed by the Council on September 30, endeavoured as far as possible not to aggravate the situation. Japan has also from time to time communicated to the League all information relative to the development of the situation so that the League might be enabled to understand the actual conditions prevailing in the Far East.

Unfortunately, however, the condition of Manchuria showed no immediate improvement in the matter of peace and order owing to the continued activities of Chang Hsuhliang, while the feelings of the Chinese and the Japanese peoples became further strained with the result that there was no possibility of withdrawing the Japanese troops within the railway zone under the then existing circumstances. When the Council met again in October, Japan realized the importance of allaying the excited national feelings of the two peoples as the first essential condition of securing the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects and of making possible the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. She was convinced that for this purpose it was necessary for the two parties concerned to pave the way for direct negotiations with the object of restoring normal relations between the two countries. Japan took pains to explain this view to the President and certain Members of the Council, but the proposal to initiate direct negotiations was not accepted.

Moreover, the Council formed a plan to invite a representative of the United States, a non-Member State of the League, to participate in its deliberations as an observer. To this proposition Japan raised an objection, contending that participation
proceedings of the Council by a state not a Member of the League is contrary to its constitution, but the other Members of the Council insisted on regarding the stop as a matter of procedure and they invited a United States observer to the Council. Japan remained convinced that this was a matter which concerned the constitution of the League and that the action of the majority constituted a clear case of violation of the Covenant. It became apparent that if the opinion of her fellow members was that such an important matter of substance could be decided by a majority as a matter of procedure, she had ratified the Covenant under an error. However, owing to her strong desire to uphold the cause of the League, she continued to participate in the activities of the Council.

The discrepancy between the views of the other Members of the League and those entertained by Japan arose from a lack of understanding of the Far Eastern situation on the part of the League. In her desire to assist the League and to maintain its legitimate influence and usefulness, Japan proposed at the Council meeting held in November, 1931, that the League should dispatch a Commission of Enquiry to China so that its members might be able to understand fully the actual conditions prevailing in that country. This proposal was adopted by the Council in its Resolution of December 10.

The Commission of Enquiry
In March, 1932, by way of Japan and entered Manchoukuo in April. Japan rendered every facility to the Commission in order to assist its investigations. Through the establishment of the new State of Manchoukuo, especial difficulty was encountered in the matter of the entrance of the Chinese Assessor into the territory of that State. Japan therefore exerted her good offices with Manchoukuo in order to smooth over this difficulty and enabled the Commission to carry out its investigations.

The Report of the Commission of Enquiry was made public on October 1, 1932. On account of the brief period allowed for the investigation of the Commission, much remained to be desired for the Report to claim to present a true picture of the actual condition of China. Accordingly, Japan, on November 18 last, handed to the League her observations on the Lytton Report in order to provide it with accurate material for coming to a fair conclusion on the questions involved.

The Lytton Report was the subject of deliberation by the Council from November 21 and by Assembly from December 6, 1932. The Committee of Nineteen appointed by the Assembly without the concurrence of Japan drafted on December 15 a Resolution and a Statement of Reasons concerning the procedure to be followed in performing the duty of conciliation which devolved upon that body in accordance with Paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant. Japan proposed the deletion from the Draft Resolution of passages regarding the participation of states which were not Members of the League and also the modification of certain points relating to the competence of proposed Committee of Conciliation as well.
as the entire deletion of the last Paragraph of the Statement of Reasons which declared in particular that the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria could not be considered as a solution.

At the same time, considering that Paragraph 3 of Article 15 represents the final resort provided for in the Covenant for conciliatory solution of a dispute, Japan endeavoured to discover some compromise which would enable her to continue her cooperation with the League.

As stated in Part II, ii of the Report, the President of the Committee and the Secretary General were authorised to enter into conversations with both the Japanese and Chinese Delegations. The conversations between the Japanese Delegation and the Secretary General were carried on from the first part of January, 1933. As a result of those conversations, a draft was drawn up and it was referred with the knowledge of the President of the Committee to the Japanese Government for their approval. Subsequently, when amendments of the Japanese Government to this draft were communicated to the Committee of Nineteen, it was made known to the Japanese Delegation that the said draft could not be taken up as a basis of further negotiations. This caused a great surprise to the Japanese Government as they had every reason to believe that the President of the Committee who together with the Secretary General was authorised to conduct negotiations with both Delegations was also fully aware of the conversations and raised no objection to the preparation of the draft.

Though the Committee finally agreed to the deletion from the
Draft Resolution of passages relating to the participation of Non-Member States in the work of the proposed Committee of Conciliation, but proposed that the Japanese Government accept the rest of the text of the Resolution and the Statement of Reasons of December 15 and make a reservation in regard to the last Paragraph of the Statement of Reasons to which Japan had taken objection. The declaration contained in this Paragraph would, as is stated elsewhere in the present statement, not only constitute an action ultra vires on the part of the League but prejudice the whole question and imply a direct attack on the policy followed by the Japanese Government with respect to the existence of Manchukuo. Furthermore, such an attitude on the part of the League was in no way in accord with the idea of conciliation advocated by the Committee of Nineteen as well as by the Japanese Government. For these reasons, Japan found it impossible to accept the proposal of the Committee.

Upon the refusal of the Japanese Delegation to agree to the Committee's proposal in this regard, the latter set out to the procedure of drafting a Report under Paragraph 4 of Article 15.

However, the Japanese Government refused to give up the hope for conciliation and in their final efforts to achieve this end they agreed to withdraw the various amendments which they had presented when the text of December 15 was communicated to them and consented to accept as the basis of conciliation the principles and conclusions of Chapter 9 of the Lytton Report, in so far as they were applied in a way to "harmonize with the events which have taken place," which phrase is an almost literal
quotation from that Report itself. Further they agreed to the maintenance of the last Paragraph of the President's Declaration (formerly called the Statement of Reasons) on the condition that its wording be modified in such a way that it would not appear to constitute a prejudice and an attack directed against the policy of the Japanese Government vis-a-vis Manchukuo.

The Committee of Ninoto found this final proposal likewise unacceptable. Thus the Committee rejected all the Japanese proposals and came to the conclusion that conciliation under Paragraph 3 was impossible. The Committee forthwith proceeded with the drafting of a report under Paragraph 4 of Article 15 of the Covenant. The Draft Report thus prepared was submitted to the Assembly on February 21 and, in spite of the negative veto on the part of Japan, it was adopted by the Assembly on February 24.

Part II

Errors in the Report concerning the chief characteristics of the dispute.

The Report sets forth in Part III what are termed the "chief characteristics of the dispute". It is most regrettable that this part of the Report is substantially based upon the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. As stated in that Report, "the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts as well as of their historical background should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them". It must be remembered that the Commission of Enquiry spent only six weeks in Manchuria and fifteen in China, most of which was passed in Peiping and their trip covered only a very
limited area of China a few open ports where the real condition of China could not have thoroughly been studied. In those circumstances it was impossible for them to acquire "an intimate knowledge of all the facts as well as their historical background." Hence the document is not as complete and impartial as it should be. It is quite natural that there should be not a few errors in the Report of the Assembly which was drafted upon the basis of the Lytton Report. Those errors might have been avoided if the Committee of Nineteen had taken into consideration the Observations of the Japanese Government presented to the Council on November 18, 1932. At any rate, it must be said that the Lytton Report, admirable and praiseworthy as it is, is not a document which one can look upon as containing all the facts as well as all the historical background upon which alone final judgment should be based. The errors in the Report of the Assembly are numerous. Let only the most salient be cited:

(1) The Report appears to cling in Part III to the fiction that China exists today as a single organized state to be dealt with on the same footing as any country in Europe or America. The fiction happens to be merely a convenient formula which embodies in a concise form the generous aspirations of the Powers for the recovery of China as a unified and orderly state. Japan has worked hard to act upon that formula during those many years, and she is prepared to continue on the same lines in cases where ordinary matters alone are concerned. But where her vital necessities come into play as in Manchuria, she is forced to reconsider that fiction and to ask herself what are the actual facts and who are the actual
rulers. States which are Members of the League of Nations and have little interests in China can afford to preserve the convenient fiction intact without serious difficulty. But Japan in a totally different position economically and strategically is compelled, however, reluctantly to examine and set a limit to the fiction and to direct her course according to realities.

It is the view of the Japanese Government that the erstwhile Chinese state ceased to rule in Manchuria when “the fall of the United Republic after the death of Yuan Shi-kai in 1916 signalized the break-up of all unity of government in China”. (Observations of the Japanese Government, p. 15).

As a matter of fact, none of the Governments including the Nanking Government maintains authority over China save over the limited areas which it actually controls. That is why the Japanese Government in their Observations insist that Manchuria is not naturally and necessarily an integral part of China. It will then be asked, as it has been asked, why did Japan invoke the Nanking Government at the outset of the Manchurian incident? Why did Japan negotiate with Peking in 1915? Why did she declare Manchuria to be a part of China in 1922? The answer is that Japan clung until the last moment to the fiction of Manchuria being an integral part of China. She had excellent opportunities of departing from it, is she had wished, afforded by the chaotic state of the country. She steadily refrained from availing herself of the opportunities. But when crises come to threaten her whole position in Manchuria, it became necessary for her to take measures to protect her various interests and important rights.
It should be observed at this point that Japan is not setting
a precedent for defying the existence of a neighbor state merely
because it is weak or disturbed by internal disruption. It is
needless to say that as long as the government of a state which has
actually ruled the whole area maintains its authority in any part
of its territory, as long does the state continue to subsist and to
remain inviolable. The peculiar circumstances of China do not re­
side in the fact that its common government is weak or distracted
by disruption. They reside in the unique fact that no authority
which now exists has ever been a common government of China at all
and none therefore has title to rule the entire country.

The League of Nations should not forget that fact overrides
form and that a state must possess a single and continuous
government.

(2) The Report, in agreeing that the Chinese boycott against
Japan imposed after the September 18 Incident falls within the
province of retaliatory measures, sows the seeds of incalculable
future trouble for each and every Power interested in China. All
the Major Powers conduct military operations in China under certain
circumstances and maintain armed forces in Chinese territory for
that specific purpose. If the adoption by the Powers of any
forcible measure for the protection of their rights and interests
is on each occasion to be the subject of a retaliatory boycott, the
application of force will of necessity be extended without limit.

By their acceptance of the Resolutions of September 30 and
of December 10, 1931, China and Japan agreed that they should take
the necessary measures to prevent any aggravation of the situation.
The Japanese Government desire to call the attention of the League
to the fact that it was the conscious failure on the part of China to take such proper measures that led to the regrettable Shanghai Incident. It should also be added that in any discussion of the boycott the fact of anti-foreign education in schools and the "revolutionary foreign policy" (admitted by the Nanking Government) should not be left out of consideration, as these three subjects are inseparably bound together.

(3) The Report quotes and adopts from the Lytton Report the reference to the possibility of an arbitral settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute. But arbitration presupposes a normal organized state with a government supreme throughout its territory and capable of enforcing an award. China, as has been stated above, has not for years been in such a state at any rate as far as to render it possible to arbitrate with her in vital matters concerning Manchuria. With whom would the arbitration have proceeded? With Chang Huoch-liang whom the League does not recognize? Or with the Nanking Government whose authority (as the Report of the Commission of Enquiry showed) he did not obey? Japan with her vital interests at stake could not and cannot possibly resort to arbitration in such a matter with such a country as China.

(4) The Report again quotes and adopts the refusal of the Commission of Enquiry to recognize as measures of self-defence the military operations of the Japanese army on the night of September 18, although it does not exclude the possibility that the Japanese officers on the spot might have thought they were acting in self-defence. This is simply another case of a facile and uncritical acceptance of the opinions of the Commission of Enquiry, utterly
ignoring the emphatic contradiction contained in the Observations of the Japanese Government. On what grounds can the League or any other third party pronounce a verdict in the case contrary to the judgement of the Japanese officers on the spot? The right of self-defense is one of those inalienable rights of a state which may be duly exercised in certain specific circumstances, and the question of on what occasion and to what extent that right should be exercised is a matter which can be determined only by the state concerned.

In this connection the Japanese Government in their Observations have referred to the reservations made by both France and the United States in concluding the Pact of Paris; a reference which the Assembly found it possible to pass over in silence.

The Report in stating that the operations of the Japanese army, viewed as a whole as they developed through the entire period of the conflict, cannot be regarded as an act of self-defense, fails to take into consideration the tension which existed, the overwhelming forces by which the Japanese were faced and the utter uncertainty which prevailed as to the probable action of those forces. Above all, it fails to take into account the vital rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria, which are not confined to the leased territory and the railways, but involve mining and forestry, consular police and consular jurisdiction, residence and trade throughout the entire region. When those rights and interests are threatened, the measures for their protection may have to be extended throughout Manchuria. But never have Japanese military operations exceeded the bounds of necessity for self-protection.
In order that it may not be supposed to have been passed over
sub silentio, the Japanese Government take this opportunity of
explicitly denying the specific conclusion reached in the Report
that no question can arise of Chinese responsibility for the
development of events since September 18, 1931, and that the use of
boycotts by China subsequent to that date falls under the category of
reprisals. Even if the theory that the Japanese military action
did not constitute lawful self-defence should be accepted, that
clearly would not invest the Chinese with an unlimited license to
behave as they choose to, and to enter upon a career of unrestricted
violence and wrong. Much more is this the case if, as Japan contends
the actions of her troops were urgently called for by the necessity
of self-defence. How can reprisals possibly be exercised against a
lawful act? The proper reply to acts of self-defence is negotiation
and explanation, and not reprisals which generally lead to war.
Had the United States exercised reprisals in the Caroline case, war
with England must have ensued. Again, it must be noted that the
Resolution of September 30 precludes either party from aggravating
the situation, and it would seem strange to hold that this meant
that China might take steps which would certainly aggravate it, leav-
ing Japan alone responsible for any untoward development.

That appears to be a most curious statement is found in Part
III of the Report which reads: "adoption of measures of self-defence
does not exempt a state from complying with the provisions of
Article 12 of the Covenant".

As has already been observed by the Japanese Government, the
right of self-defence is exercised upon the occasion "of an urgent"
--to quote Webster's definition---"and overwhelming necessity allowing no choice of means and no instant for deliberation." To require the observance upon such an occasion of Article 12 of the Covenant, which stipulates that the right of self-defence may be exercised three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the Report by the Council of the League has been made public is to deny the right of self-defence itself.

(6) The Report says that the declaration of independence by Manchoukur was not spontaneous. Since the statement is based upon no fresh investigation conducted at a later date, it may be readily gathered that the Report has here again adopted the erroneous conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry contained in Chapter VI of the latter's Report, the baselessness of which has been fully exposed in the observations of the Japanese Government.

It must strike an impartial observer as extraordinary that the Assembly repeats this finding of the Commission of Enquiry in face of the emphatic denials of Japan. There are two factors which may partly account for this. First, the movement during the tyrannous regime of the Ch'ang for the keeping of Manchuria aloof from all participation in the affairs of China jeoper was subterranean, and had no repercussions in the outside world; and the authors of the Report may therefore have been sceptical of its existence. Secondly, they appear to be misled by giving implicit policy of Japan, and her supposed plan to seek a political solution of the Manchurian issue as a step towards the execution of that policy. It is unnecessary to repeat that the Japanese "continental policy" is a more Chinese fabrication, and that Japan harbours territorial designs in any part of the world. But all this, though it
may explain the rejection by the Assembly of the uncompromising denial made by Japan, can hardly be thought to excuse it.

The simple fact is that, as has so often been explained on the disappearance of all the administrative organisations, such as they were, which had existed under the Chungs, spontaneous local organisations naturally sprung up, and the Japanese troops which were responsible for the maintenance of order necessarily co-operated with them. It was a proper and necessary step, and in the circumstances an unavoidable one. Such was the whole significance of the presence of Japanese troops, and such was the sole aim of the activities of Japanese civil and military officers. Unfortunately the Commission of Enquiry, and consequently the Assembly, in their implicit reliance on the assumption that there had never existed any independence movement in Manchuria, have been obliged to attribute to the activities of Japanese civil and military officers the independence which was actually proclaimed, and to do so upon no solid grounds whatever.

As to the assertion that the people of Manchuria are hostile to the new state, again there's no valid evidence beyond fifteen hundred letters of dubious origin received by the Commission of Enquiry. The Japanese Government desire to point out the fact that within less than a year since its foundation, Manchoukuo has achieved a marked and healthy progress in the restoration of law and order, and that no criticism or complaint has been heard of regarding its conduct of affairs, whether domestic or foreign.

Regardless of the attitude of the Assembly to the new state of Manchoukuo, she has gone forward steadily on the road of progress. Freed from the yoke of misgovernment under the tyrannous rule of...
the Chongs, the thirty million inhabitants of Manchuria, and Chinese all alike, have already begun to reap the benefits of their labours which were denied them in former days. Throughout most of the country banditry has been suppressed. Those hostile elements, largely composed of the remnants of Chang Hauh-liang's troops and receiving not inconsiderable assistance from their former war lord, had constituted an obstacle to the establishment of peace throughout the territory. Thanks however to the combined efforts of the Japanese and Manchukuo forces, they have been practically cleared out of the Provinces of Fungt'ien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang, and the security of life and property has been re-established in those Provinces. It is only in the Province of Jehol that the organized operation still continues.

In the domain of finance, something entirely unknown in the history of China has been realized in Manchukuo. Though the State is still in its infancy, a sound budgetary system has been initiated, and is being carried out with utmost satisfaction. The establishment of the central bank, which is functioning on the same lines as those of the advanced countries of the world, has contributed much to the stabilization of state finances and to the economic and industrial development of the country. A similar progress has also been noted in the domain of railway administration, commerce, and industry, and with abundant resources with which she is endowed, there is every prospect of this country achieving, in days to come, a still greater progress along these lines to the benefit of her inhabitants and foreigners.

All this could not have been the case had the population of the country been hostile or even sullenly submissive. It is to be
regretted therefore that the Assembly should have, without referring to the Observations submitted by Japan, accepted the assumption of the Commission of Enquiry, which, here again, has no foundation in fact.

(6) The Report dwells upon the need of international cooperation in the reconstruction of China, and mentions the provision of technical assistance as one form of that international cooperation. Obviously, the reconstruction of China cannot be accomplished by any such superficial and inadequate means. It could only be rendered possible by some forceful international intervention of such a nature as would at once prove incompatible with the stipulations of the Nine Power Treaty regarding the administrative integrity and political independence of China. That is another proof that it is necessary to allow ample elasticity by taking due account of changing conditions in the application of the Nine Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League as far as China is concerned.

Part III.

Impracticabilities of the Recommendations.

(1) Japan recognizes that the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris constitute the basic principles of the settlement of international disputes in so far as international relations in general are concerned. But a certain degree of elasticity must be allowed in the application of those principles to such special and entirely abnormal conditions as prevail in China.

(2) As to the proposal for the withdrawal of troops, contained in Section II, (1), (A) of Part IV of the Report, it is to be noted that the presence of Japanese troops outside the Railway Zone, so far from being incompatible with legal principles, has from the very beginning been due entirely to the sheer necessities.
of self-defense, and is in no way derogatory to the accepted principles regarding the settlement of international disputes.

It is further to be noted that those Japanese troops are now responsible, in accordance with the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo. It is true that by the resolutions of September 30 and of December 10, 1931, Japan undertook to withdraw her troops within the Railway Zone in so far as the safety of the lives and property of her subjects was assured, but the condition attaching to that undertaking, namely the assurance of safety of life and property, has never been satisfied; and the undertaking itself has now become inexpedient on account of the independence of Manchukuo and the conclusion of the agreements embodied in the Protocol signed on September 16 last. Should the Japanese troops be withdrawn within the Railway Zone in accordance with the recommendation contained in the Report, it would be inevitable that unrest and disturbances would ensue in the evacuated territory. Those Members of the League that have but little direct interest in the affairs of the Far East can afford to maintain that the upholding of abstract formulae is more important than the maintenance of peace in this part of the world. But Japan, vitally concerned in the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, cannot tolerate that region again be plunged into disorder. It cannot be supposed that a gendarmerie system as proposed by the Lytton Report would remove all apprehensions in this score. There is no precedent in the history of the world in which the security of such a vast territory was assured by gendarmerie. The proposition is absurd and cannot be put into practice. If the Japanese troops were withdrawn, the country would be quickly overrun by bandits and by
Chang Mu-chi-hung's troops resulting in anarchy and disorder.

(3) As to Section 2, (1) of Part IV of the Report where it is stated that the sovereignty over Manchuria belongs to China, it has to be noted that at any rate since the year 1916 Manchuria has never been subject to the authority of China and that, in the final analysis, the present difficulty has been caused by the supposition that the sovereignty of China actually extended and extends to that region. It is entirely superfluous to say that the enforcement of this fiction will never ensure the protection of Japan's rights and interests and the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

Inasmuch as the Report repudiates the restoration of the old regime as leading merely to a repetition of disorder and friction, so any return to the fiction in question must equally be repudiated. Nor is it possible for Japan to admit any policy which is incompatible with the simple fact of the existence of the State of Manchukuo and the provisions of the Japanese-Manchukuo Protocol.

(4) With regard to the ten principles set out in the Lytton Report and cited in Section I of Part IV of the Report, apart from the observations made above, the Japanese Government deem it sufficient to quote the following passage from their Observations presented to the League in November last:

"Certain of these principles to which the Japanese Government have no fundamental objection have already found concrete application in the Protocol signed by Japan and Manchukuo. But, in any view of the matter, it must evidently be impossible, so long as the anarchical state of things in China persists, to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the questions at issue on the basis of the first nine of these principles, especially principles 4-9, inclusive. As
is sustained in Principle 10, these nine principles cannot be prac-
tically applied 'without a strong central government in China'."

(5) In Section 2, (3) of Part IV of the Report, the Assembly
contemplates the establishment of a committee to assist in the nego-
tiations which are to be opened between the two parties in accordan-
with the method specified in the Report. This, however, is directl
contrary to the insistence of Japan not to allow any third party to
intervene in the Manchurian problem, and Japan find it absolutely
impossible to accept such a proposal. As, moreover, the Recommend-
tions referred to as (1), (a) and (1), (b) of Section 2, Part IV
of the Report, must be dismissed as unpractical, and those made und:
(2) of the said Section 2 are equally inapplicable in the present
state of China, there would seem to be no scope left for the activi-
tions of the proposed Committee.

(6) The Report states in effect in Section 3 of Part IV that
the maintenance and recognition of the existing regime in Manchuri
is no solution and that the Members of the League should, after
having adopted the Report, abstain from recognizing the present
regime either de jure or de facto. Further it expresses the hope
that the states non-Members of the League who are signatories of t
Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty will associate themselves
with the view set forth in the Report in this regard. The Japanese
Government cannot but consider that the Assembly, in proposing in
such a manner to influence or to bind, if only morally, both Membe
and non-Member states in the matter of recognizing or not recogniz
another state is exceeding its powers conferred upon it by Article
15 of the Covenant. In any case, in making a proposition of this
nature the League of Nations whose primary duty is the preservat
of peace throughout the world would not surely contribute to the
maintenance of peace and security not only in Manchukuo, but also
in the Far East. Such an action on the part of the League would
prove to be an obstacle to the good understanding and friendly rela-
tions between nations upon which peace depends.

Part IV.

Conclusion.

The Japanese Government are fully convinced that the action of
the Japanese army on the night of September 18, 1931, and thereafter
has never exceeded the limits appropriate to measures of self-protec-
tion, and that Manchukuo has been founded by the spontaneous will of
the people of Manchuria. Accordingly, they consider that neither
the action of the Japanese army in Manchuria, nor the conclusion of
the Japan-Manchukuo Protocols is in violation of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty, the Pact of Paris, or any
other international treaties. The Japanese Government maintain that
in view of the quite abnormal condition of China, where no existing
authority has overruled the entire country, and particularly in
view of the unparalleled complexity and peculiarity of the Manchuria
problem, and also having regard to antiforeign character of the poli-
cy of the National Government it is impossible to think of applying
to the present dispute the general formulas applicable to an ordinary
international question, and they maintain moreover that neither any
procedure which may be adopted for such an exceptional case, nor
any solution thereby attained, can ever establish a precedent for
ordinary cases of international dispute. Were it possible to apply
ordinary formulas, the plans adumbrated by the Assembly would them-
selves be ruled out of consideration as interferences with what the
-21-
Assembly regards as Chinese several a rights.

Unfortunately, the Assembly, through the refusal of its Member to face facts, and their uncrical acceptance of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, has only indulged in academic and inadequate principles. The Assembly stands, if it may be said, for more formulae; Japan for solid reality. Japan takes her stand on established principles; the Assembly on preconceived hypotheses. It results from the refusal of the Assembly to go beyond the Lytton Report.

As printed out in the proceedings, part of the present statement, the new State of Manchoukuo has made rapid progress. Peace and order are superseding banditry. Commerce and industry have responded to the improved situation, to the benefit of foreigners and the people of Manchoukuo alike. This is a concrete proof of the truth of the Japanese contention that the recognition and encouragement of the Manchurian State is the only road to a satisfactory solution of the Manchurian question and to the maintenance of lasting peace in the Orient.

On the other hand, it appears impossible to look for any improvement in the Chinese situation in the near future, and China is likely to remain a chronic anxiety to the rest of the world. Communism has already invaded China, and the alarming extent and success of the invasion is far too seldom realized. A communized China would constitute a problem for Europe and America beside which other questions would pale into insignificance. But a Manchou free from Chinese connection constitutes a barrier to the communist danger in the Far East. Its value ought surely to be apparent to every statesman. It is earnestly hoped that the League of Nations will soon be led to change its attitude, to discard reliance on
adhere to and inapplicable doctrine and to respect and recognize the
forces that are actually rendering possible the maintenance of peace
in the various regions of the world. The Covenant of the League of
Nations itself provides in Article 21 for the due recognition of
regional understandings, and the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol of
September 15, 1932, falls incontestably within the category of under-
standings such as those, as the special interests of Japan in Manch-
uria have again and again been recognized. At the same time, Japan
takes this opportunity of repeating her disclaimer of all desire for
territorial gains or commercial advantages.

February 25, 1933.
日本政府は時見に難し昭和十四年に急り調査の協力を要へ、日本の為政

以上の策を日目せた信望の相関における指導の努力を要せり。日本は其

目の代表が昭和の信望を廖しい時前に協力を要せり。日本は其

多の総合を有し信望の信望を充分に調査せり。日本は信望を人領の通

野する大義の信に周間の信望を充分に信望せんとを信望することなく

拘泥することなく略略的方法に依り略略せんとを信望することなく

なり。
日本はなお事件について支配国の攻撃に対する自著の徴に行動を常時を欠くせしめられたるに過ぎざるに拘らず、懇願より此の不善なる事件の原因及び背景に対する限り限り周知に留し
して常に出発する限り重大な大を防止するに勢の衰り、日本は又事態に
するに何らしめたり、
然に再懇再懇命令付の寄府内に日本被災の感情を反映するときは誠に不必要なり
日本政府の要求を可ならしむるにある一般希望に於いて一部平和門外の関与を目的
するに如何に及ばすべきかを問うて必要なりしに、右見信を照会命令門長
及び干預調停に説明するに始めて一層切実実務問題の提案は aseguredされ
右図は十二月十日の洞内東門に取り締まるため、リットン顕応がイタリア連合軍随行を
指揮する要領を発布し、日本は自らその点を控え、その警戒警務の為を
告げた。日本は洞内十二月に取り締まるため、リットン顕応が

（続く）
日本帝国に於ける境界部分の武頂及び和議時題全の合間並びに和議成立後の防務及実務為の明細を細述せり。一
方略十五等第三項が當初軍の征伐的解決に到する目的の手続た
るに値み。日本は二明かの職を摂局し領へべき防務を措定するに努め
たり。

保甲條條二部（ロ）に照則せられたる加く十九人防案母節及実務繋
展は日本軍問代表さ再見の官文を湯すべき都門に頭へられ
たり。日本大領事
保甲條條の要領は一九三三年二月初月より改行せられ
たり。保甲條條の
要領を改める為の都門に頭
せられたるが、日本軍問代
は有機防案文を獲来
たる十九人分用事上
の下に日本政府に
報せんを以て之を保

軍国例示し日本軍問
案の作中に反対せがりしもの
報せんを是外の理由あ
日本政府は特にハイチが東京に派遣した軍事使節団を認めることはないと述べたが、テヘラン条約の精神を尊重するという日本政府の姿勢を示すものと解せられる。
告示の四部が多分に、在籍者に報告すべきであると述べるものの発表を検討されることを配慮し、
したがって是方の告示は十五日までに公表されるべきであると述べるための要旨に沿
した十四日日の中告示に相違するものとして、
告示の四部について四月に於て一九日の告示の主要部分に一する四月の告示に
告示の四部に相違することを配慮し、
告示の四部について十四日日の中告示に相違するものとして、
一类の事実及びその歴史的背景に対する定義性の考察

この場合においても、大体同じ問題は拡大され、概ね以下のものをに掲

1. 自然的法規を表示したがる基盤ありと詰込むべきなり。特に

2. すべての配計を充分に検証する目的があるが、前の事実及

3. 本の基盤たるべき一切の事実及び歴史的背景を示して検証するため

4. 前の報告書中の調査・多様であるが、もする妨げる残高左右の如し。
一、 済状が第三部に於て支那が現在征服米国と同盟に困絶するべき
に右われは完全なる統一観念としての支那の精神に於ける植民地
と列強に表現する便宜的一形式であり、日本は今以上に更に右進
に従って行つてせんと積み重ね、今後も同にこれの精神ののちに
於て、

日本は今後於て常に米国に於ける敵、富士の夷佔丹駒状況の如き
者を顧みて、支那の精神を中国の精神に於て、

何人たるかを民間させると歴史。支那に利用する民家を削除し外

故に於て、

日本は来し更にゝ中で非自然の地位にある日本は、顧て後の所を

故に於て、

日本は一切の統一の精神を示す。
ことを示すとして該当邦の存在を証拠とする先例を作ることをつつねる
に非ざることに注意し従くの要らぬ。凡て該国の政軍の事情を観に
支那の間の間事情は軍の領域の如何なる地方たるを問はさせず如何に
為し遂げる政軍が共の領域の如何なる地方たるを問はさせず如何に
支軍の間の間事情は軍の領域の如何なる地方たるを問はさせず如何に
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支軍の間の間事情は軍の領域の如何なる地方たるを問はさせず如何に
支軍の間の間事情は軍の領域の如何なる地方たるを問はさせす

11
の部隊近接的ポイコットを以て対抗せられるものとせば強力手段の適
用は無階級に及ばずるに至るべきことと必然なり。

日本政府は一九三一年九月三十日及十二月十日の決議案際に於る向
政府は支配側に於て右の如く適宜なる措置に目とすべきことと為せり。

尚ポイコットを絶ずるに當りて之と不可分の関係に在る諸学校に於け
る外教育及南政府の容認せ。一革命外交政策一を併せ、右三者な
る一略案依するに要する事として言之する要あり。

三、革命家は已に革命政府が編成裁判に依り解決し海海かりしことに於けるリ
ンク堂等の定例の引用し且てこれを施用し居れり。然れども純然裁判は
其の全備士を用じて至上的懇願に有し且裁判を履行する殆々なる政府を
有する正當の政府の国家を前提とす。既述の如く支那に於ける極要なる問題に於テ革命裁判の
相手と為し得るが如く、国家に非ざりけ、何人を相手として仲介裁判手段

12
四、該當者は徳川十八年の彼がたる日をもって、日本政府が言及の行
動をつづえるのと最もしたるなおべのとの可能法は之を譲渡せざるも、
同の日本政府の手に非ず、更に之を譲渡せざるるを勧告せざる也、
更に於て強制せる反対者を全く招致し同国政府の面について言及
に於て強制せる反対者を全く招致し同国政府の面について言及
を覚悟することなく共の利益に変更せる届出なるも、若くする
返事を下しべきべか、其し日本政府は一切に於ける日本国
政府の条約ベカもどる一意により、如何なる場合に於て行
使せられ得べや国がすることなく共の利益に変更せる届出
のみが決定すべき事項なり。右に関し帝囯政府は共の意見書に米
国
両国が巴望の調和の謝罪に至った場合、交渉に言及され、然らに調和は之を
暗延延に持ち去ることを。

報告書は紛議の経過を踏まえて述べる日本の軍事行動も重要として
はて自衛の行動とされるものに限る。報道する日本の軍事行動を重要
の宣伝を伝え、敵側の兵力及びこれを凝縮せる日本の軍事行動を重要
しに hunts に対する認識を Craw 赤を知る。報告書は常に調和に於ける日本
の必要のない事態に直る賊兵、報導、領事護箇等、報道に於て
教育の必要を合せたものなり。比等報導が作成せらるるとき
是等の保有者は、観測者を更に面に直り更に徹底した。然故
の必要活動は未だ官で自衛の必要ある降を超えたものなり。報道
の必要性の媒介は、調和の必要を超えた日本政府
の必要を媒介し、同目以後に於ける支那側のモット使用に復仇の都
に入るものなり。報告書の明白なる結論を、日本政府が暗延した
と推定させる之が調和日本政府は此の機会を捉って調和を明かに否認す

の仮説が受論されるとするものは、明かに右は支那側に対し真の欲するものは行わずに行動し且よりなる暴行不正を始むることを無制限に許容するものに非ざるべし、若し日本が主張する如く日本軍の行動が自衛の必要に依り緊急に要求されたものなるとせば尚更なり、又如何にして合法的なる行行為において復仇を行うことを得べきや、自衛手段にに対する正當なる懲報は交渉及び説明に在りて裁判を誘致すべき復仇に在らず、米国がカルルイン事件に於て復仇を行ひたるに於て米国が行ひたるに於て日本ののみが如何なる不詳事件の発露に对于て何等の責任を負るべきかを意味せるものと為すが如き是妥当なる主張と言ふべし。

現れて奇恥なる紀違と認めべきもの報告書第三部中に在り、即ち誤より一国は自衛手段に除るに當り規約第十二條の規定を遵守するのに非ざるべし、とせらるる言之なり。
日本の政権が、日本を滅ぼすという、私が言ったことを、実際の行動として実行するためには、まず日本に敗北の可能性を示すこと、および、日本に敗北を引き起こすための手段を講じる必要がある。}

日本が敗れる可能性を示すために、まず日本に敗北の実感を与えることが必要である。日本が敗北を恐れることによって、日本は敗北を回避するために、努力を倍にすることを強いられる。}

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ならいうる日本の計画なるものとを妄想せるの理論を
し。\n
終に一日本の大政経一なるものが異なる支配側の意味に変わり
日本が世界の制圧なる側分に置して他の列国領土の勢力を包囲させる我々
派に巻きするのは必要し、一方は日本を圧力する苦痛を覚念させる

観念的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導的と指導의
旧政の在民が新仮家に帰し所領を有す者の問に問しては新仮家

が差し出させる出所の根拠なる千五百選の経書以外に依頼等有する根拠

かし。旧仮政府は調査毎の在民を差し出せられ共に我等せんざす。

新仮家仮政府に居在する関係の在民に関係なく問答させしして接続

の流連を演えり。旧仮政の言葉より我等させられた根拠の在に依

し問に至れり。旧仮政の外分に於くで時時は未定させられたが、此

に因る相談を受けられるににして、仮政政の当所の為を以て

は

然れども日本及び朝鮮為の既に依り向に依考慮され

者。此等各分に於ける仮政政の為は
日本は一貫した国際関係に関する限り外交機関の要務は国際的なルールに従うことである。従っても外交の前提に従うルールの存在が必要である。
一遊に認せられた距離紛争の外務に講ずる際風の決して受損する必要。日本は一九三一年九月三十一日及十二月十二日の議定においても依り、の意民の生命財産の安全に於ける治安維持の任に當るべき為を有する。

日ソ議定書に基づき満洲国内に於ける治安維持の任に於けるべき責任を有するものに非ざることに注目させるべきなり。更にこれ等日本軍隊は今や

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再び混戦に陷るが、これは元結の恐る恐れる、リップトン報告書の提案せる
が如き憲兵隊制度が此の點に隠する悪々を除くものは、是と為すを得
致し、済洲の如く広大なる領域の安寧が漸次際依に依り保たれると併
る所となれり。添政府及び満洲情形を知体すべし。

三、済洲の主権が支那に隠する旨文書たる報告書第四部第二節（一）

ハ、乙）に付ては、済洲地方に於て一九三六年以後の報告書第四部の主権に
於ても間際を秘域に及べりとの前報と依り、図に示りたるものに
於ても間際を秘域に及べりとの前報と依り、図に示りたるものに
しく、何等異言を依りたくなるべきに、既に報告書が添政府に
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四、実産を論ずる報告書に記載され且経営四部第一節に引用され
たる十四条に関当は、帝国政府は上記述べた意見の外は去る十一
月間観に提出せる意見抄の中の一部、即も一比等原則中日本政府に於て
格別の反則なきものには既に日本政府規定に於て之三之適用を見たり。

第一章

幕府の規定と同立せざるが如き方針は如何なるものと雖も之を容認す
る事不可能なり。

第五章

報告書第四部第二節（三）に於て経営は一委員会を設置し、右委員
会を又は報告の定める方針に依り商務相国間に開かれるべき交渉を授助
せしめんと企図し居り。然れども右は溜州問向に於て如何なる第三
日本の介入を許すと、日本の主張に直接反対するものにして、
必要性の如き提案を受信することを決断不可能なり。加之報告書
四節の内容（一）の（甲）及び（乙）は実際に適合させるものと
して拒否させるべく、右第二節の報告（二）も実際には結合させるものと
為められた所地は全然之ならさるもの如し。

六、報告書は第四部第三節に於て、策定に於ける現在の維持及び承認
解決に非ず、且同盟国は報告書の提案後法律に於ても或事実上に於
ても現政策を承認することを差事人ペアとの懇談を講ずべきものと
に入れ報告書の中於て表示せられたる見解に同志せんことを希望し居
る、日本政府は既に一国家の承認又は非承認の問題に関し、聯盟
のなりと思惟せざるを得ず。何れにせよ全世界の平和維持を第一
任
普通法の問題に適用し得べき一般方式を適用せんとするのは不可能なる
と共に、新嘗の繰則的事件に対し執らることあるべき手続も、又その
結果到達せらるべき解決も、普通の事件紛争に対する先例となるべき
ことを主張せんとするものなり。

假に普通の方式を適用することを可能ならしめるも、総会の採択せる
不鮮明なる案は夫れ自備総会の所谓支部主催に対する干渉として排除
せらるべきものなり。

不幸にして各聯盟国が現実に直面することを拒否し且報告書を無批判
に容認したる結果、総会は問題であり得る方針不適当なる原則を従にその
のみならす。総会は問題は普通の方針不適当なる方針を従へ日本は確定
のものなり。本稿論旨中は既に述べたるが如く総会は総会は既に述べたるが
現実の方針不適当なる方針を従へ日本は確定
のものなり。
唯一の方策として、日本を主導とする遠東問題の解決における日本の主張の前提を明確にすることを必要とする。こうした問題は、朝鮮、満洲、蒙古などの支配の下で、日本が自身の利害を追求し、他国を脅迫することなく、平和に解決されるべきである。

一方、一方の行動が他国に影響を与える場合においても、日本はその影響を最小限に抑えるため、他国との協力の必要性を強調する。この観点から、日本は他国との協力の必要性を認識し、平和に解決されるべきである。

日本は、これらの観点から、他国の理解と協力の必要性を強調し、平和に解決されるべきである。
PART III. -- SUPPLEMENTARY TRAVELS AND PREPARATION OF REPORT.

Chapter I. Peiping and Tsingtao.

Peiping was quiet and well-ordered, and very fine as to weather. As an Army Transport was expected later that month, the city was overrun by the usual number of our Army people, on leave from Manila, preparatory to sailing for home. Colonel Taylor of the 15th Infantry was also in town on leave, and Commander C. L. McCooy had arrived as Naval Attaché. The Minister, Colonel Drysdale, and Captain Mahor, had returned from Shanghai.

The Commission immediately put itself to the problem of drafting an outline for its Report, and the experts commenced the preparation of their studies. Besides, the choice of a spot for writing the Final Report was seriously considered. The Commission had in mind a place where there would be quiet and comfort an escape from the heat of summer, adequate facilities for offices, and reasonable proximity to the archives of the legations in Peiping. The Chinese had strongly recommended Peking, and the Commission, especially after its visit there, rather favored this selection. The Japanese, however, strongly objected, on the ground that Peking was very much under the influence of the Young Marshal, and that it would be in the exact path of the invading armies, should the Young Marshal attempt to recapture Manchuria by way of Shanhaikwan during the summer. It was suspected by some that the Japanese themselves were contemplating operations in the Tientsin area and that this was the real reason for their objection.

The Japanese had recommended Tsingtao, the former German concession on the southern coast of the Shantung Peninsula, as well as Nonsagura, near Dairen. The latter had been considered unsuitable, but the Commission felt obliged to investigate the situation at Tsingtao. Accordingly, a small group, consisting of Lord Lytton, Count Aldrovandi, and Dr. Schnee, and accompanied by Mr. Charrere and myself, started for Tsingtao on June 8. We arrived in Tsingtao the following morning and then proceeded down the Shantung Peninsula, in terrific heat, over the fine German-constructed Kiao-chow-Tsianen Railway.
On its arrival in Tsingtao that evening, the party was greeted by Mayor Shon Hung-lieh, who is also an active Admiral in the Chinese Navy. He was a cheerful sort, rather untidy in appearance, but seemed to have considerable ability. Tsingtao had a large Japanese community, as a result of the Japanese occupation during and after the World War, and there had been occasional difficulty from anti-Japanese riots and demonstrations. The Admiral had appeared to be the only one able to handle the task of Mayor, under the existing conditions, and so he had been appointed by the Nationalist Government, with the approval of General Hsu Fu-chu, the military governor of Shantung.

Tsingtao still showed clearly the signs of its thorough development by the Germans. Most of its buildings are in Western, rather than Chinese style, with stucco walls and red roofs predominating. It is not a beautiful city, but has a certain charm and cleanliness and covers a considerable area, both on the shore facing the Yellow Sea and along the edge of the large Kiao-chow Bay.

On the coast side, it had been well fortified by the Germans; and on the land side, rugged mountains, on the east, spring directly from the sea and run parallel to the eastern shore of the Bay, leaving, for defense, a relatively narrow strip, with secure flanks. It was remembered that the Japanese, in capturing Tsingtao, had attacked by land, from the north, and met considerable resistance from a very inferior force. All German fortifications have, as far as known, been dismantled.

The harbor of Tsingtao, while possibly the best in North China, was badly in need of improvement, being satisfactory for small vessels but not so for larger ones. Plans for systematic improvement existed but had not been consistently followed since the Chinese had resumed control, and therefore silt had gradually filled the channel. With its fine beaches, Tsingtao is a popular summer resort, and a favorite port of call of war vessels of foreign fleets; and, during our visit, Admiral Taylor arrived from Shanghai aboard the "Houston."
Before returning to Peiping, the party visited Tei-Shan, the "Sacred Mountain," south of Tsincn. The ascent, which had been arranged through General Kan Fu-chu, was made on June 11. From the summit, which had been visited by Chinese Emperors, soldiers, and pilgrims for centuries, a rare view was commanded. That portion of Shantung is mountainous, with broad valleys, shallow, meandering river and arid soil. No effort was made to interview Marshal Fong Yu-hsiang, although this had been suggested; and the latter later announced that he had refused to receive the Commission.

Upon the return of the party from Tsingtao, the Commission as a whole decided that the only practicable place for writing the Report was Peiping itself.

During the Commission's stay in Peiping, it took the opportunity of hearing the Chinese version of the Incident of September 18, as explained by General Wang I-choh of the 7th Brigade, who had been in command of North Barracks, as well as his Chief of Staff, Regimental Commanders, and other subordinates. Two interviews were held with them, the records of which appear in Annex A, J4-27. On the whole, the Chinese officers made a very poor impression, both as to mentality and spirit and the contrast between them and the high class of Japanese officer with whom we had been in contact was very marked.

Pursuant to its basic plan of procedure, the Commission, upon its return from Manchuria, took steps towards renewing its contacts with the Governments of China and Japan. A trip to Nanking became unnecessary because the Nationalist leaders themselves agreed to travel to Peiping. General Chiang Kai-shek was at that time in Kiu-kang, on route to Nanking where he was to assume personal direction of anti-communist campaigns. The other leading men of the Government, however, came north headed by Mr. Wang Ching-wei. Pertinent extracts of the Commission's conversation with these gentlemen appear in Annex A, J4-28. The most interesting feature of the information received was their frank admission that the Nationalist Government was doing all in its power, both as to money and arms, to assist the Chinese regular and "Volunteer" forces fighting in Manchuria.
Chapter 2. Second visit to Japan.

The next stop for the Commission was to revisit Japan. Its departure was considerably delayed due to the fact that no Foreign Minister had yet been appointed in the new Saito Cabinet, although it was generally known that Count Uchida had been selected. He had been busy winding up his affairs as President of the South Manchuria Railway, as well as conferring at great length with General Honjo and others in control in Manchuria. Then the date of his probable appointment became known, the Commission arranged its trip so as to arrive immediately thereafter.

The day before our departure, the U.S. Army Transport "Republic" arrived off Taku Bar, below Tientsin, from Manila. Army transports generally dock at Chinwangtao, but there is no lighterage service there and the draft of the "Republic" is too great to allow her to come in to the pier. Among those arriving was Colonel R. J. Burt, as now commanding officer of the 15th Infantry.

On the night of June 28, the Commission left Peiping for Japan, by rail, by way of Mukden and Korea. This route had been selected principally because the Commission felt it would be useful to get an impression of the Japanese administration in Korea. The party consisted of all of the Commissioners, and certain of the exports and members of the Secretariat. However, the main group of exports remained in Peiping, to continue the preparation of their studies. As usual, the Young Marshal was at the station to see us off.

In Shanhaikwan, General Ho Chou-luo again took us to the Wall. Shanhaikwan was still the meeting place of Chinese and Japanese forces, the latter being now both from the Tientsin command and from the Kuantung Army. We had received information from neutral sources of the existence of Chinese trenches, outside of the Wall but within the boundary of Hopei Province; but we saw none of these, either from the train or from the top of the Wall.

At about 8 o'clock, we changed trains and entered Manchuria. For the first hour of the trip, practically the entire railroad was lined at intervals of several hundred yards by armed peasants, not in uniform, and carrying long, hammer-lock rifles, mostly with plugged muzzles. It seemed probable that those
Weapons had been but recently issued, and most of the men appeared unfamiliar with their use. Mounted and dismounted "Henchukuo" soldiers and police, of disreputable appearance, were seen at all stations, and, at some, White Russian guards, similarly uniformed, armed, and equipped.

At each station, Japanese barricades and fortifications were seen, in greater strength than on our previous journeys on this railroad. Generally, there was a high wire entanglement, either single or double, and often very recently constructed, about the entire station, with the exception of the railway side. The blocking of the station platforms was provided for by means of moveable barbed-wire barricades, which were placed along the wall of the station and could be easily and rapidly swung into position. As before, sandbags were used in great abundance, both on the ground and on the roofs of stations and billets. At many stations, there were log machine gun emplacements, built with sandbags and heavy timbers and scarcely raised above the ground. These usually had overhead protection, constructed of timbers and covered with earth. As a rule, billets were more heavily fortified than stations, many of the former being, in fact, small forts. An all-round field of fire was generally sought and was always obtained in the direction of the mountains, from which "Volunteer" attacks were apt to come.

River crossings on route were fortified with machine gun emplacements or "pill boxes," usually, in this region, made of timbers and sandbags. Japanese soldiers were always seen in the vicinity of these emplacements, though occasionally it was noticed that they were attempting to conceal themselves. In several towns between Chinchow and Mukden, stone-work towers of modern construction, with loopholes for rifles and machine guns, were observed on the corners of the town walls. Some of these towers may have been built by the Chinese before the Incident, although, in Takushan, one tower was seen in actual construction. The workmen were Chinese, or, rather, "Henchukuo," and no Japanese were in evidence.

We saw several small armored-trains and sometimes individual armored railway cars. Some of these cars had loopholes for rifles and machine guns, and others carried light cannon, similar in caliber to our one-pounder, and mounted on revolving turrets. One flat-car carried a large searchlight, roughly protected
and held in place with sandbags. Each armored train had a repair car as part of its regular equipment.

Sometime after dark, we arrived in Mukden. The usual sights of Japanese soldiers, although not in great numbers, and Railway Zone Police, were seen in the streets of the Japanese Municipality. Major General Hashimoto and Major Fujimoto met us at the station. General Honjo was in Harbin, giving personal attention to the operations then in progress in North Manchuria.

About noon the following day, June 30, we left Mukden for Antung, on a train of the South Manchuria Railway. The route was that which Kuroki had used in the Russo-Japanese War, though of course he had traveled in the opposite direction, building his railroad as he advanced. The country became hilly and green -- by far the most beautiful we had seen in Manchuria. The farms were neat and fresh looking, the soil rather rocky, and the hills at first terraced and cultivated and later quite heavily wooded.

Japanese fortifications on this line, as on all parts of the South Manchuria Railway, were naturally of a more permanent character, since the Japanese had kept Railway Guards here ever since the Russo-Japanese War. While stations were generally protected by sandbags, timbers, and wire entanglements, permanent barracks of brick or stone construction, and well fortified, were often seen nearby. Bridges and tunnels, both of which were frequent, since the country was quite rugged, were protected, on either end, by concrete or stone circular blockhouses. Japanese soldiers, and Railway Zone Police, were seen at each station, but "Manchukuo" police or troops were very scarce. At a small station called Chumuchuan, we stopped for about a half an hour and heard the story of an attack made upon this station on December 18, 1931, by about 80 bandits. The station master had been killed and several others wounded, but the bandits had retreated upon the arrival of Railway Guards.
In the evening, we arrived in Antung, on the Yalu. From a high point above the city, we commanded a view up and down stream, and Colonel Watarai and Captain Kabota pointed out the place where the Japanese had crossed the river, both during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. Opposite us lay Korea, looking extremely mountainous and heavily wooded. We crossed the river and entered Korea that night.

The following morning, we arrived in Seoul, called “Kojio” by the Japanese, the seat of the “Government General for Korea.” This city has a most picturesque location, almost completely surrounded by superb mountains, the Han River blocking that opening the mountains leave. At the station we were met by representatives of the Governor General and by Major General Kodama, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Garrison in Korea, a son of General Kodama of the Russo-Japanese War. He was quite young in appearance, very neat and handsome, and had distinctly Western features. Japanese soldiers were not much in evidence in Seoul. The Army headquarters and barracks were outside of the city, and Japanese police and a few gendarmes seemed to be in charge in the city. Many of the police were mounted on large, fine-looking horses.

In the morning, we called on the Governor General, General Ugaki, a retired Army officer and former Minister of War. He was a heavy, solid man, apparently able and a very strong character. It was said that he was actively involved in politics, and might some day be Premier. At dinner at the Governor General’s residence in the evening, we met Lieutenant General Kawashima, commanding the Japanese Garrison. He had just recently arrived, succeeding General Harak, who had been prominently mentioned as Minister of War when a successor for General Arak in the new Cabinet was being considered. General Kawashima seemed quite old. He was very quiet and had a kindly and philosophical expression. The following morning, when we left for Fusan, both he and General Kodama were at the station to see us off.
The route lay through lovely pastoral country, intensely cultivated. The usual crop was rice, in the growing of which, by the paddy system, the Korean farmer is an acknowledged artist. In fact, his superiority to the Northern Chinese in this respect was one of the reasons why he had been so oppressed by Chinese in Manchuria. The people wore white clothes and seemed fairly clean, and their towns and farms were comparatively neat. The crowds of natives who viewed us in Seoul and en route to Fusan were curious, but orderly. No troops of any sort were seen along the railroad, the stations being guarded only by police.

In the portions of Korea which we saw, perfect peace and order existed, although it was said that in the less settled districts there was frequent trouble. The Japanese seemed to be giving a conscientious administration, but they were probably not encouraging development in self-government to any great extent, the administration being wholly Japanese, down as far as the heads of prefectures. Over a course of centuries, the Koreans seem almost entirely to have lost their spirit, and they probably endure Japanese administration, rather than appreciate it. Officials themselves admitted that, while there was peace and a measure of prosperity in Korea, there was little real loyalty among the people.

At dusk, we arrived at Fusan, the leading port of southern Korea, with a fine natural, although not large, harbor. After dinner, we sailed for Japan aboard a ferry, the "Shosei Maru," and the following morning, July 3, arrived in Shimonoseki, at the western end of the Inland Sea.

The party soon boarded a train and left for Tokyo. The country through which we passed was considerably like Korea, with many farms and rice paddies, but the houses were entirely different and the people distinctly showed the higher standard of living which makes them unable to compete agriculturally with Koreans and Chinese, and therefore has made colonization of Manchuria by Japanese impracticable. There were generally a few gendarmes at each station, but, otherwise, the Army was not in evidence.

Prior to our arrival in Tokyo, the Chairman became ill, and, from that moment until the completion of our work, he suffered frequently. Several times, it appeared as if he would be unable to continue, but his dogged determination carried him through; and, except for several short periods, he was able to retain control.
and do invaluable work. During the few periods of his complete prostration, Count Aldrovandi acted as Chairman.

The Commission arrived in Tokyo on the morning of July 4. Among those who met us at the station were General Koiso and Colonel Millroy. Mr. Grow, the new Ambassador, had arrived, and, about noon, we accompanied him and Colonel Millroy to several American gatherings, where we did honor to the day. Late that afternoon we saw most of the members of the American community, as well as many others, at a large reception at the Embassy.

On the day of our arrival, the military members of the party paid their respects at the Palace of Prince Kanin. Two days later, the Commission as a whole called on the Premier, Admiral Soito. The Admiral is an elderly retired Naval officer, who had preceded General Ugcki as Governor General of Korea, in which capacity he had made a marked success. To us he appeared a honorable and sound statesman, without any particular spark or force. He speaks English well and had, many years ago, on duty in Washington as Assistant Naval Attache.

As Count Uchida's appointment had been delayed, it was not possible to interview him for over a week. However, this period, as well as the days which followed, were filled with a variety of other activities. Chief among these were two short but delightful trips to the Hakone District and Nikko, two beauty spots of Japan. Also, there was considerable entertainment. Prince and Princess Chichibu entertained our entire party at dinner, and Prince Kanin honored both General Claudel and General McCoy at separate luncheons. The luncheon for General McCoy was a particularly friendly gesture, as the guests were all men who had been associated with the General in the relief work at the time of the Great Earthquake in 1923. Count and Countess Uchida gave a dinner for the Commission and had present the Premier, the War and Navy Ministers, and high officials of the Foreign Office and Imperial Household. The Minister of Navy, Admiral Okada, who has since been succeeded by Admiral Osumi, made a rather negative impression. As for private entertainment, a luncheon for General McCoy by Colonel Millroy was particularly pleasant, and gave us an opportunity to meet Colonel Tanaka, who had just returned from service as a regimental commander in the 14th Division at Shanghai, and in Manchuria, and was about to sail for America for duty as Military Attache.
There was a variety of other events. He spent several hours one morning at
the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police, where was given an exhibition of
Japanese fencing and jujitsu, which, for the Army, Navy, and police forces, are
the principal means of developing speed and aggressiveness and maintaining physical
fitness. On another afternoon, General McCoy visited Yokohama as guest of the
Mayor, was shown the extensive reconstruction work accomplished there, and was
again made to feel a warmth of appreciation of American help in a great emergency.
Through the courtesy of the military authorities, and the interest of Colonel
Matari, I was, myself, able to spend an entire day at the Japanese Cavalry School
at Narashino, outside of Tokyo.

An interview was held with General Araki on July 9, several days before the
Foreign Office conversations began. He had lost much of the debonair manner and
free speech of our earlier acquaintance, and, in other ways, there was a marked
change in his manner. The Commission got the impression that the responsibilities
of his position had weighed heavily on him. As for his statements, they con­
tained nothing particularly new, but the record appears in full in Annex A, 4-29.

During this period, the Commission was able to consider the internal political
situation in Japan. The conservative element was still hoping for a change in the
fanatical politics of those at the helm, but not expecting it at any time in the
near future. Not long before, the Lower House of the Diet had passed a resolution
demanding immediate recognition of "Manchuria" -- a resolution very embarrassing
to the new Cabinet, which was a compromise affair, without great strength. It
seemed likely that the Government would either have to recognize "Manchuria" or
fall. The Commission's feeling, of course, was that, for Japan to recognize this
new regime before the Report had been considered, would be a marked discourtesy,
not only to the Commission but to the members of the League, particularly since
Japan had herself made the proposal which had resulted in the Resolution of
December 10 (1931), providing for the inquiry. As days went on, however, it grew
more and more evident that Japan was not to be moved from her intent, and the
Commission's two interviews with the Foreign Minister, which finally were held on
July 12 and 14, were convincing in this regard. Because of their special interest,
although they do not concern strictly military matters, the records are reproduced in full, in Annex A, p. 30.

It was apparent, then, that nothing could be gained by remaining in Japan, and accordingly, arrangements were made to return to Peiping. On the night of July 16, we left for Kobo, with General Koiso and Colonel McIlroy among those who saw us off.

The following morning, until sailing time, was spent in Kobo, where the Army was engaging in a simulated air attack and defense of the city. Most of the many airplanes, flying in formation overhead, were bi-planes of medium size. There were also a number of heavier, high-wing monoplanes. The activities in the air were well matched by the actions of the ground troops. In Chure Park, the firing of antiaircraft guns was being simulated at frequent intervals, although we did not see the guns themselves. However, there were many soldiers about; and on a point overlooking the city and just below a monument erected in the memory of the man after whom the Park is named, we came upon a great sound-locating device, in operation. It appeared to be an up-to-date affair, with four large "ears," and was handled by a small detachment of soldiers who were engaged in following a low-flying plane. We saw no searchlights, but no doubt there were some in the neighborhood. A prominent industrialist of Kobo, who was accompanying us, said: "They (referring to the Army) are always doing those foolish things," showing that at least some Japanese civilians feel the same slight contempt and amusement concerning the Army, during times of peace, as do many of our people. However, certainly the great mass of Japanese have a real respect, even worship, for the Army.

To sailed about noon, on the N. Y. K. Liner "Chichibu Maru," which had agreed to take us to Tsingtao instead of Shanghai, its normal destination. The entire day was spent in the Inland Sea, which contains several fortified areas.

We arrived off Tsingtao about noon on July 19. As we sailed up the channel, between the several guarding islands, we saw numbers of war craft, both foreign and Chinese. In the inner harbor were some ships of our Asiatic fleet, including the "Houston," and a French cruiser was also there. The "Chichibu Maru" was too large to come to a pier, and so we were brought ashore on a tug and greeted by Admiral Shon Hung-lich, the Mayor, as well as by the Chinese Assessor and Colonel
Chang, Captain Tchong, and others of his staff. Later, Admiral Shan entertained for us at a luncheon at the official residence of the former German Governor. In the afternoon, General McCoy saw Admiral Taylor and Captain F. J. Fletcher of the "Houston," and Commander P. T. Wright, commanding the "Canopus."

That afternoon we boarded our familiar train and started for Peiping. Tsingtao had been strangely free of soldiers, although of course there had been the usual extraordinary number of police. At Haichow, the first station beyond Tsingtao, Chinese sailors, instead of soldiers, were on guard. Thereafter, throughout Shantung, the usual disreputable-looking sort of Chinese soldiers guarded each station. However, as we crossed the border between Shantung and Hopei, Major Chang Wai-pin met the train with the fine-looking picked detachment of train guards provided by the Young Marshal — a marked contrast. Even the average soldier of the Young Marshal's Army appeared to be slightly superior to the ordinary soldier of Shantung Province. That evening, we arrived in Peiping, where we were to remain for the next six weeks. At Tsianan, in the morning, Lord Lytton and General Caudal had left the party and continued by air, in one of Marshal Chang's fine tri-axled Ford airplanes.
Chapter 3. Final Stay in Peiping

During this final stay in Peiping, the Commission, of course, devoted itself to the problem of preparing its Final Report. It had decided to accomplish this task carefully and thoroughly but at the same time as rapidly as possible, because of the speed with which events were moving in the Far East and the necessity of providing early information to the Council of the League of Nations.

In fact, the advisability of the immediate preparation and submission of an interim report, to deal only with the subjects of the Incident of September 18 and the establishment of "Manchukuo", was seriously considered, as a possible means of preventing early Japanese recognition of the new government; but it was decided that such a step might have the opposite effect. To pass judgment on these two points alone, without the context of the entire Report, could not have been done without irritation, and the effect might have been to destroy what little opportunity there was left for reaching a conciliation. While there was no wish to avoid truths, the Commission felt that, throughout its work, its mission was that of finding a way to peace, and that, therefore, indictments should be avoided as far as possible.

These two subjects, the Incident of September 18, and the establishment of "Manchukuo", were, of course, the most important which the Commission had to consider, and they were the ones on which it had the most difficulty in reaching agreement. While general impressions had been clear, some details were controversial, and the task of expressing convictions in language satisfactory to all was not easy. It had been impossible to determine the exact course of these events, and the precise responsibility of particular Japanese military, or other official, elements, for their occurrence. Moreover, it had been unquestionable that all Japanese Army ranks in Manchuria had considered a clash there imminent and inevitable, and it had seemed probable that the alleged explosion, whatever its nature, had been willingly taken as a pretext, if not as a signal, to put into effect carefully laid plans. It had seemed quite likely, on the other hand, that the exact nature of this pretext or signal, and the day and hour of its occurrence, had not been generally known in the Manchung Army, even among senior officers, but that, instead, a small, extreme group -- in all probability the political service
group — had taken matters in hand, very likely with a more definite understanding with the General Staff in Tokyo than with Mongolia Army Headquarters. The Japanese charge of Chinese responsibility for the alleged explosion of the railway had appeared utterly unfounded, no reasonable cause motive for such an act being conceivable. In the establishment of the new government, the same political group, with the same backing and understanding, had seemed unquestionably to have played the leading part. Of course, however, whatever the particular activities of various military elements may have been, it was impossible to absolve the Japanese Army from a large degree of basic responsibility for both occurrences. In the end, conflicting considerations, and standpoints of idealism and realism, were successfully reconciled and general conclusions reached.

In connection with the actual writing of the Report, a drafting committee was formed soon after our return from Peiping. This committee took the various studies of the experts, and either prepared them for incorporation into the Report as separate chapters, or extracted from them the material which was desired. The Chairman did much of this work himself, and was greatly assisted by Dr. Blakesloe. Drafts were circulated, considered, and revised daily and Commission meetings were held frequently, in the German Hospital in the Legation Quarter, where the Chairman was a patient. At the same time, a map office was established and drawings prepared — a work carried on in close cooperation with experts and drafting committee.

During the period of our stay in Peiping, the most important military development concerned the reported impending Japanese invasion of Jehol. Ever since its establishment, the state of Manchukuo had claimed the Province of Jehol as a part of the new nation. This claim, of course, originated from Japanese sources, and on our last visit to Japan the Foreign Minister had assured us that Japan considered Jehol to be a part of Manchukuo.

Japan's immediate interest in controlling Jehol seemed related to her efforts to establish peace and order in Manchuria. It was well-known that personnel, arms, and money for Chinese regular and irregular forces were entering Manchuria through Jehol. As long as Jehol remained Chinese, this traffic, and the resultant disturbances, would continue. Thereon, with Jehol under Japanese control,
Defense: group — Health

In the General State, a

charge of

had appeared

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carries of various developments we have been, it was necessary to

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occurrence. In consideration, considerations, the consequences of idealism

and realism, for possibly reconciled, and was largely

connection with the actual reality of the event, a drafting committee was

formed soon after our return to Peking. This committee had, among others,

of the experts, and scholars, among those who, according to the Report on
Chairman did not use this book himself. I am not familiar with it. Your reference to the
rabbinic circular is important. The circular was created to provide guidance to the Jewish community during the
period of the Second Temple. It is a collection of regulations and laws that were
meant to help people live according to Jewish principles.

Dr. Wechsler, while visiting China, observed that the Chinese had a great respect for
the book and that it was considered a source of wisdom and guidance. He also noted
that the Chinese were very careful to follow the laws and regulations outlined in
the circular, and that they believed that doing so would lead to a better life.

Dr. Wechsler also mentioned that the book was translated into many languages,
including Chinese, and that it was widely read and studied. He noted that the
book's teachings were still relevant today, and that they could be applied to a
variety of situations.

Despite the importance of the book, Dr. Wechsler also expressed some
concerns. He noted that the book was often misinterpreted and that its
teachings were sometimes used to justify discriminatory actions.

Dr. Wechsler ended his remarks by saying that he believed the book was a
beautiful example of the importance of maintaining a connection to one's
heritage and traditions. He encouraged everyone to study the book and
try to understand its teachings in their own way.
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the passes leading from China could be blocked and the infiltration largely stopped. But beyond this were probably economic interests, based principally on mineral wealth, as well as vital strategic considerations, envisaging a line of defense for the Empire from possible encroachment from the west. From the former conception to the possibility of the establishment, under the former Emperor, of a vast domain of North China, including Manchuria, parts of Inner and Outer Mongolia, and the Peking-Tientsin road, was a short step, and stories in support of this eventuality, and in expectation of a Japanese occupation, were already current. The existing unrest and bad feeling were being intensified by the uncalled behavior of the Japanese Legation Guard, which was holding frequent and realistic exercises and maneuvers, both by day and at night, in various parts of the city.

The position of General Tung Yu-lin, the Governor of Jehol, was somewhat in doubt at this time. Entranced in his domain, where he enjoyed a lucrative profit from a flourishing opium industry, he seemed, so far, to have resisted successfully, the advances and offers to join the new state which had no doubt been made to him. Towards China proper, through the Young Marshal, he appeared to feel no strong allegiance or loyalty, but, up to this time, popular nationalism, inspired by Japanese encroachment, had had an unabated influence.

It was generally believed, of course, that the Japanese would seize upon some pretext before commencing operations in Jehol. At about this time, this pretext seemed to have been presented by the capture, by soldiers of General Tung Yu-lin, of a certain Ishimoto, connected in some way with the Japanese Army. Threatening movements by Japanese troops were reported; and on the other hand it was known that the Young Marshal had dispatched strong reinforcements to support the troops of Governor Tung.

To finance his preparations for resistance, the Young Marshal requested and received financial assistance from the Nationalist Government. While in Peiping, his handling of these funds received severe criticism, and resulted in his being censured by Nanjing and having to turn over his authority to a commission of Northern generals, who had assembled in Peiping to consider ways
and means to meet the emergency. This was a typically Chinese solution of the
problem and seemed to make for greater, rather than less, confusion. The Young
Marshal’s personal position became very precarious and it was rumored that he
had made plans to leave, on a moment’s notice, by airplane. However, he stayed
on and assisted in the period of transition; and he seems to be still the con-
trolling figure in North China.

Reports from Manchuria during this period indicated that the Japanese Army,
as had been expected, was facing the most serious phase of its efforts to
establish peace and order in North Manchuria. Attacks by “Volunteers” and bandits
were occurring in South Manchuria, also, and Japanese garrisons in Shudan and
Yin-kow were several times reported in danger. The Army successfully
weathered the storm, and since then has methodically pursued its program and
consolidated its position.

As August wore on, the Commission began to make plans for its departure.
Certain members of the party wished to travel over the Trans-Siberian Railway,
and others by way of the Suez Canal. The former route was, of course, normally
the more rapid, but excessive floods and bandit disturbances in North Manchuria
had interrupted traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and so made travel by
air or by boat, between breaks in the railroad necessary. General McCay first
planned to return through Russia, having never been over that route, and because
of the interest of visiting Russia at this particular time. Furthermore, no
difficulty had been met in obtaining authority for the travel. However, he later
decided to accompany Lord Lytton by steamer, and, therefore, only General
Claudel, Dr. Schnee, and Major Jouvalot arranged to travel over the Trans-
Siberian Railway. The main group planned to sail from Shanghai on September 5.

As that date approached, time seemed very short. During the last ten days,
the Commission met several times a day and sometimes at night, and the final
meeting did not terminate until midnight of September 3. The Secretariat con-
tinued the work throughout the night, and, the following morning, the Commission
assembled in the hospital where the meetings had been held and signed the Report.

Immediately thereafter, the group sailing from Shanghai drove to the Young
Marshal’s airport, over roads entirely lined with cavalry soldiers, the
invited particular notice because of their very erect posture and correct manner
of holding the reins — the only evidence of instruction or interest in horse-
manship noted in Chinese or "Manchurian" mounted troops during our stay in the Far
East. At the airport itself, an infantry battalion, of excellent appearance, was
drawn up as an escort.

The Young Marshal, and the many others who were there, bade us farewell,
and we presently entered his fine Ford plane and took off for Shanghai, with an
American pilot. The trip, which was made without stop and required about six hours,
was over intensely cultivated land, except in the region of Tei-San. Individual
fields or plots were very small, and, in Kiangsu Province, there were many lakes
and canals, and much of the country appeared to be flooded.

We landed at Shanghai about 4:30 o'clock and were greeted by General Wu, the
Mayor, General Fan, the Police Commissioner, and others. There had just been a
recent outbreak of anti-Japanese feeling here, and the following morning we were
interested to see a Japanese cruiser arriving at about the same moment when we
ourselves boarded the Italian steamer *Sanro,* of the Lloyd-Triestino Line, and
sailed for Venice.
STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN

(December 15, 1937)

With regard to the reported incident in which the British man-of-war, the Ladybird, was shelled by the Japanese force at Wuhu on the 12th December, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Koki Hiroto, called this afternoon on the British ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, at the British Embassy and, on behalf of the Japanese Government, tendered the expression of profound regret for the happening of the unfortunate incident.
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CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section
Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here
attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman, December 15, 1937" is an:
and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign
Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of December, 1946

Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Officer

Witness: H. Ishida
外務省

スポーツマン

の事話

昭和三十六年二月十日

暗館の十二月十二日事件に於ける日本官の密接なる策反レバード

棄易八折をその大使館に訪問、右の不意なる事件の発生したことに突き

日本政府を代表して、叮喚に都督の愛を逆命した。
To: Foreign Minister Baron SHIDEHARA, Kijuro
From: Consul General ARITA Hachiro in Tientsin
Subject: Report on details of conversation with KANG, Yu-Wei

Tientsin, September 14, 1926

On September 7 Kang Yu-Wei visited me and thanked me for Japan's goodwill concerning the Emperor Huantung, and asked my view on the current situation. Taking this opportunity, I thought it proper to get confirmation of his true views on the question of the restoration of the Emperor and to exchange views relating thereto. I, therefore, invited him to my official residence on September 10, and talked with him about two hours before and after the dinner. Below is a gist of Kang's story.

"The present condition of China is one of utter confusion. No peaceful day has passed since the establishment of the Chinese Republic. In Canton, for instance, more than two hundred and fifty evil taxes have been imposed on the people, and taxes have been collected more than fifteen years in advance. Such being the case, the people are cursing the government. The same situation prevails not only in Canton, but also in any part of China. Once you step into the interior, you will find that almost all the people are longing for the Ching dynasty. Though China has become a republic, we do not recognize it. The people
were opposed to the imperial rule of Yuan Shih-Kai, not to the imperial rule itself but because of Yuan being the emperor.

Endless disturbances have been occurring in China since the revolution, because the people fight each other to become the ruler by elections by which any person may become the ruler. As the emperor system is suitable to China, peace will be brought about by the restoration of this system. The people may say that the republican form dominates the world, but this is by no means true. This question must be decided by the circumstances in which each country finds itself. When the British Minister MacClay and the Portuguese and Netherlands ministers visited me in Shanghai, they told me that it is natural for China to come back to imperial rule. The Portuguese minister said that his country has been in endless troubles since it changed from a monarchical to a republican government. As to the attitude of the warlords in China, Sun Chuan-Fang, along has not clarified his stand. Such persons as Chang Tar-Lin, Wu Poi-Hu and Chang Tsung-Chang are supporting the reinstatement of monarchy. Chang Tar-Lin donated 100,000 dollars and Wu Poi-Hu 20,000 dollars to the Emperor Huan-tung. When they are received by the Emperor, they bow carefully. They receive the Emperor's photograph secretly and worship it. What they mean is clear without questioning. Needless to say, extreme care must be taken as to the time of restoration, no matter how it may be desirable. Care must also be taken as far as
possible not to be utilized by one or two warlords. I shall
never be played by warlords, as I am confident of my ability
to read the militarists' minds. As to the time, we must
wait until peace reigned in the south. As the hostile
fooling toward Chiang Kai-Shek is unusually strong even
in Canton, he will not be able to stand up again if he once
loses in fighting in the Wuhan area. When such time arrive,
there is no doubt that the northern warlords will naturally
become united in support of the Emperor Hauantung. This will
be the time for imperial restoration. It was the Japanese
Legation into which the Emperor fled, and it is the Japanese
concession in Tientsin where he receives protection now.
What does this fact suggest? We must say that it is based
upon intimacy among the Oriental people. No explanation
will be required what will be the Sino-Japanese relations
if the Emperor Hauantung who is under Japanese protection
is restored in future. Whenever I think of this I feel
great pleasure. I wish you will convey my views to the
Foreign Minister, minister in Peking and other Japanese
holding important positions."

The foregoing story was told as refutation to my private
view (the same view as I mentioned to Cheng Hsiao-Hsu as report-
ed by confidential letter Fr. 255 dated June 3). Kang Yu-Wei
purposely avoided commenting on what I have stressed: "From
the standpoint of the future happiness of the Emperor
Hauantung, a monarchist movement is extremely dangerous.
Even if it is successful temporarily, who can guarantee its
possible not to be utilized by one or two warlords. I shall
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Hsuantung, a monarchist movement is extremely dangerous.
Even if it is successful temporarily, who can guarantee its
durability? The old royalists of the Ching dynasty should make effort for the permanent peace and happiness of the Emperor". He simply stated that China must adopt a monarchical government and that, in his view, such a time will come in the near future.

Enclosed herewith for your reference a translation of the editorial of Ta Kung Pao of this city (owned by Hu Lin of National Press Agency) of 11th (Enclosure No. 1), and Chinese Times (owned by the group of Li Yuan-Hung) (Enclosure No. 2).

Copy sent to: Japanese Minister in China and Consul General in Shanghai
DEF DOC # 254

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "REPORT OF THE INTERVIEW WITH FENG YU-WEI" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of December 1946.

K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: T. SATO

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

data 27 Jan., 1947
On the Appointment of Extraordinary Diplomatic Advisers to the Foreign Office.

Imperial Ordinance No. 632 of Sept. 9, 1938.

Less than three diplomatic advisers may extraordinarily be appointed so that they may participate in diplomatic service relating to the China Incident.

The diplomatic advisers shall be appointed from among those who have attained a special proficiency in diplomacy.

The diplomatic advisers shall be rated as "shin-nin" officials (TN Imperial appointees). Supplement: This ordinance shall be in force as from the date of promulgation.
街道名称：

厦门市思明区中山路

近景街

道路长度：500米

周围设施：

购物中心

公园

学校

医院

交通状况：

步行5分钟到达地铁站

公交车可直达周围主要景点

车位数量：

公共停车场：100个

路边停车位：50个

交通提示：

限速：每小时30公里

禁止停车时间：晚上10点至早上7点

备注：

街道清洁度：良好

安全隐患：无

周围居民反馈：

对交通状况满意，但停车较为困难。
On the Appointment of Extraordinary Diplomatic Advisers to the Foreign Office.

Imperial Ordinance No. 632 of Sept. 9, 1938.

Less than three diplomatic advisers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may extraordinarily be appointed so that they may participate in diplomatic service relating to the China Incident.

The diplomatic advisers shall be appointed from among those who have attained a special proficiency in diplomacy.

The diplomatic advisers shall be rated as "shin-nin" officials (TN Imperial appointees) Supplement: This ordinance shall be in force as from the date of promulgation.
STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese, consisting of 1 page, marked "SHIRATORI DOCUMENT No. 1" and entitled "Appointing Diplomatic Advisers ad interim to the Foreign Ministry" is an exact and true copy of the Japanese original.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of August, 1946

(signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu Odo

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 23 Jan. 1947
(泰文) 有关技术分析的报告

技术分析报告

报告内容包括...

报告日期：

报告人：
J most unexpectedly have I been appointed since long, that to fills my truly with. In the face of an unprecedented situation, it is my humble wish to do all in my power to discharge the heavy duties of an interim in the affairs of state, and I consider it a great honour to have this opportunity of appearing before the 75th Session of the Diet to state the views of the Government.

I am greatly moved that His Majesty the Emperor was pleased to grant a most gracious assent to the opening ceremony of the Diet. I hope to do our Sovereign's heart at ease by joining you gentlemen in a faithful service in accordance with His Majesty's earnest command.

It is now 2600 years since the Emperor Jimmu ascended the Imperial Throne. Looking up to the lofty ideal on which our Empire was founded, and retracing the glorious course of our national history, the whole nation with the accord should render a loyal and patriotic service to guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. It is now, I believe, to clarify more than ever the concept of our national policy that enhances the fundamental spirit of our action, and deepen the people's national consciousness. Since a firm concept of the national policy is the basis of all national policies, the clarification of that concept is an obvious necessity--which is felt all the more keenly in this 2,600th year of our nation's founding and at this grave hour our country's history.

Two and a half years have passed since the outbreak of the China affair. Our sincere gratitude is due to the officers and men of our Imperial forces for their heroic and brilliant achievements on all
fronts, while we mourn from the depth of our hearts those who have
given their lives to the country. At the same time the Government
desire to express their profound thanks also to the people at home
who by their enthusiastic and unflagging labours have fed our soldiers
from the acres and anxieties about hope.

Japan's basic policy that have already been formulated for the
settlement of the China affair is irrevocable. The Government are
determined to dispose of the present situation in accordance with this
policy, by taking into consideration the various circumstances both
at home and abroad, and by putting forth positive efforts in every
possible direction.

With the development of the present affair, there has arisen a
movement in various parts of China for "Peace and National Salvation,"
and a new Chinese Central Government under the leadership of
Mr. Wang Ching-wei is expected to be established in the not very
distant future. Japan is ready to extend a wholehearted support
and co-operation toward facilitating the formation of this new
Government.

The international situation of the world has become extremely
complex since last September when war broke out in Europe. It is
by no means an easy task to foretell the outcome of this conflict.
The Japanese Government have early declared their policy not to be
involved therein but to concentrate on a settlement of the China
affair, and as will adhere firmly to this policy in the future. It is
our intention to adjust our relations with other Powers, while main-
taining firmly our independent standpoint. All questions that may
arise in connection with the European War will be dealt with accord-
ingly.
In order to fulfill our mission of establishing a new order in East Asia in accordance with our conviction, it is imperative that we should concentrate, total power of the nation and seek to strengthen the national defense power. To that end, the repletion of armaments, the enhancement of national morale, and the assurance of the wartime livelihood of the people are indispensable.

It is hardly necessary to say that the repletion of armaments is essential in order to meet the present international situation. History shows that whenever an emergency arises, our national spirit is most emphatically manifested to advance the prestige and fortune of the nation. It is incumbent upon us to leave no stone unturned in order to promote loyalty and bravery on the home front as well as to replenish and demonstrate our nation's powers, for which are required the inculcation of the spirit of reverence for deities and respect for ancestors, the renovation of national education and the improvement of the people's physical strength. The Government will exert their utmost efforts to attain these ends.

For the purpose of developing our economic strength we must seek to expand our production power and promote our foreign trade, and at the same time to expedite the enforcement of a comprehensive planned economy, covering Japan, Manchukuo and China. For a successful operation of the current wartime economy it is essential that we should, under the low prices policy, to take measures of various kinds for both increased production and proper distribution of goods for which it is necessary that the nation in unity should put forth even greater efforts, while the various measures of economic control must be strengthened and executed smoothly through the co-operation of both the Government and people.
The Government will do their utmost for assuring the wartime livelihood of the people. With regard to rice and other necessities of life, we are planning to insure their production to the required amounts, and to revise proper means of distribution as to insure the supply of these commodities. However, it is quite natural that today when we are engaged in the accomplishment of a stupendous enterprise unparalleled in history the people should be forced to endure a curtailment of consumption that may well be intolerable in normal times. I hope that the entire nation will keep alive their wartime consciousness to the fullest degree, resolve to observe the ethics of wartime economy, and exercise frugality in their daily lives, and otherwise to meet any contingency that may arise.

With regard to the 1940 budget, the Government have adopted the one which was compiled by the previous Cabinet, and which is submitted to you for approval. As for the taxation system, we have decided to carry out the necessary revisions in all lines of national and local taxes with a view to readjusting and consolidating the system in consonance with the financial and economic conditions of our country in the midst of a long-term construction.

In order to carry out the various policies I have mentioned, the Government must rely on the understanding and the support of the people who are really united and resolute in their conviction. It is most important that in order to accomplish the colossal task of building up a new Japan, our people should rise as one man and fortify their wartime stand and manifest fully their traditional spirit of loyalty and patriotic feeling. The budget and the various bills submitted to you are all based upon the immediate needs of the day. In deliberating on them you will, I hope, appreciate the intentions of the
Government, and give a speedy approval.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I. HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Address by the Prime Minister, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, at the 75th Session of the Diet, delivered on February 1, 1940," is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 14th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi,
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Nagasharu Ogo
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kato, Naoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereeto attached in Japanese consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Address by the Prime Minister, Itagawa Yosui, at the 75th Session of the Diet, delivered on February 1, 1940." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 14th day of January, 1947.

(Signed) K. Hiyoshi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) Ichijuro Odo
The Map of distribution of Japanese (including Korean) Manchuria and Mongolia. 
(in December, 1928) 
Extracts from the "References to the Problems of Manchuria and Mongolia" 
Edited by G.H.Q. of the Kwantung Army in July, 1929. 

Remarks:
1. It is showed the population by Prefectures in the map. 
2. It is showed the Koreans with round brackets. 
3. • is meant the Residence in where more than one thousand Japanese live; 
4. It is only showed the well known number of Koreans in Manchuria, and it is said that their population there about 700,000-800,000 including not registered at Japanese authorities.
Certificate of Source of a Document

I, BANNO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the book written in Japanese hereto attached, compiled by the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, consisting of 3 pages and 9 sheets of diagrams, and entitled "Reference to the Problems of Manchuria and Mongolia" was obtained by me in printing in 1936 and has been owned by me ever since.

On this 4th day of February, 1947,

At Tokyo

(Signed) BANNO, Junkichi (Sealed)

I, OHARA, Shinichi, hereby certify that the above was signed and sealed thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: (signed) OHARA, Shinichi (Sealed)
図布分ロ廿人邦ルケ於＝蒙満
（在現月二十年三和昭）
Extract from the "Asahi Shinbun.*

Statement of the Japanese Government on April 20, 3\textsuperscript{rd} year of Shō\textsuperscript{v}o (1920)

The Government issued the following statement on April 20 concerning the expedition to China.

Japan, of course, will not support one particular party in the upheaval in China, but if there is danger that public peace should be broken in the districts where many Japanese live and they might be injured, she will be obliged to take appropriate measures for self-protection, as she specially declared before at the time of the Shantung Expedition's withdrawal.

Now with a sudden change of the situation in Shantung, the influence of the upheaval is extending to the districts where Japanese live. Inevitably it was decided that in accordance with the above statement, she should despatch from Japan a troop of about 5,000 men along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railroad by way of Tsingtao to protect the Japanese residents and as an emergency measure, she is obliged to send immediately 3 companies of Japanese Garrison Troops to Tsinan till the Division arrives.

Thus she was forced to despatch troops to Shantung District again as a self-protecting measure, but of course she has no unfriendly intention towards China and her people, nor has she any idea of intervening in the military actions of both Arimas, North and South.

When it is considered, however, that there is no longer need to station troops there from the viewpoint of protecting Japanese residents in that district, she will withdraw the Expedition without delay, as she did in the last expedition.
CERTIFICATE

Certificate Concerning Preparation of a Document (No. 7.1)

I, Chief of the Inspection Branch of the .sahi Shimbun-Sha hereby certify that the document attached consisting of two pages written in the Japanese language entitled Statement of Japanese Government 20 April 1926 is a copy of an excerpt from an article published in the .sahi Shimbun of 6th January 1947 at Tokyo Head Office .sahi Shimbun.

/s/ NISHIJIMA, Shigoji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed in my presence.

Same mate
Same place

Witness: Assistant-Chief, Inspection Branch .sahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo Head Office.

/s/ S. K. ITO, Isumi (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarko, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clark

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 27 Jan 1941
昭和三年四月二十日政府声明

政府は対支出兵につき二十日未記の通り声明を発表した。

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然して同地方在留邦人保護の要地より軍政滅絶の必要なしと親しむに
至らば直に派遣軍を撤退せらるべきこと前同出兵と異なる處なし。
然して同地方在留邦人保護の見地より軍政準備の必要なしと認むるに
至らば撤に派遣軍を撤退せらるべきこと前回出兵と異なる處なし。
文書成立ニ関スル認定書

（七号）

昭和二十二年四月二十二日
於白話新聞東京本社

立会人
朝日新聞東京本社

調査部次長
坂本

泉

右署名捺印ハ私ノ同意ニ於テサレタルモノナルトヲ照明ス

昭和
昭和二十二年一月六日
於朝日新聞東京本社

調査部次長

坂本

泉

（七号）
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America, et al.

-Against-

Affidavit

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

I, OKAWA, Kane, wife of the accused OKAWA, Shumei, do swear on my conscience that the following is true; I have known OKAWA and his family since he was 28 years of age, we were married when he was 40 years of age, and he is now 61 years of age. I saw my husband on 29 Sept. 1946. At which time he seemed to recognize me, but acted very unusual, laughing loudly, boisterously chattering about-singing-and dancing and was very talkative, but would not stick to any one subject and would not discuss matters or carry on or complete any conversation in reference to property, money or household matters.

My husband's property and money, of which there is only a small amount, has been frozen by the Finance Ministry of the Government, and I cannot sell or move any property until his trial is finished. Special permission has been given to use a small amount of money but it is not sufficient as I must pay his hospital fees and for his food as well as for my own living.

My husband was a teacher and writer and taught history of colonization as a professor at the University. He is normally very proud and correct in his attire, behavior and manners. He would not accept offers of money from other persons but lived on his
Def. Doc. # 265

He refused offers of ministerial appointment in 1932 and again in 1933 but recommended some one else be selected, as he said he is not a person at all, and though he saw a need for bettering the conditions in Japan, yet if he got position and power it would cause him to be corrupted, as he thought of himself as not having any selfish interests and he did not want to be contaminated by money or position so he could be free to say anything and speak freely without fear or misunderstanding.

He wrote Japanese History of 2600 and was criticized by newspapers as being anti-nationalistic for lack of respect to the Imperial Household and was called before the court but was acquitted by the prosecutor, who asked my husband "what do you want to do?", OKA replied "he had no time to do anything", and would not take this matter seriously.

He expressed the view that 70 % were against his teaching and that only 30 % were friendly on occasions when he had been drinking but never explained what he meant.

In 1932 he was charged with aiding and abetting the rebellion in May 15th Incident. He was imprisoned 15 June, 1932 and held until 12 Nov. 1934 when he was released on bail until his case was heard and he was sentenced 16 June 1936 to 5 years imprisonment and placed in Ichigaya Jail for execution of the sentence. He was discharged 14 Oct. 1937 on good behavior, also being given credit for time served in jail prior to sentence.

For 15 or 16 years we have noticed his peculiar reactions to
a very small amount of alcohol and as this came more and more pronounced we tried to persuade him to avoid drinking as there was such a change in his attitude and actions that we were scared and I would run away to keep from being hurt when he had these dangerous spells. At the time I thought it was his age and drink that made him act like a crazy person but now recognize that his mind was affected, and looking back recall many incidents of abnormal behavior similar to those of his present state.

He would complain of his head not feeling clear and got out of bed very frequently after retiring for the past 10 years. When I visited him at the hospital recently he attacked me several times, tried to choke me and grabbed me by my hair and tried to pull me down blaming me for actions of doctors in tying him in bed.

I remember especially in 1943 when we moved from Tokyo as I was very unhappy because of the change in my husband's behavior. He became more and more unreasonable and moody and changed quickly from good humor to ill humor and was very forgetful and careless in his manner and dress which was very unusual as he was normally so patient, neat and correct in manners and dress and had an accurate memory.

(signed) OKA'WA, Kane

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above named OKA'WA, Kane, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 17 Dec, 1946.

(signed) Bernard A. HARGADON
1st Lt. Inf.
Administrative Officer
Excerpt from "Youth and Culture"

by General HittKI, Sadao

Then, how to achieve this ideal? Emperor JIMMU's August rescript is written in the NIHON SHOKI (Records of Japan): "we will establish our capital at the centre of NIHOKO (universe), making NIHOKO U." The careful reading of this rescript will show the way of us Japanese. NIHOKO scans the world, and U a house.

Let me explain it more explicitly. In the world as well as in a country, each of us should try to secure everlasting welfare of mankind by harmonious intimacy, as if in the same family, not transgressing upon one another, and under a strict order, each holding his own proper position. That is my humble interpretation of the rescript.

It is true that you young men should always be brave and high spirited, but I would like to say out of kindness that you should be careful not to display reckless and personal courage nor to satisfy your own personal enmity, which is very harmful not only to yourselves but to society and the country you live in. Therefore, we earnestly advise you to shun such action and pursue genuine moral courage developed from the cause of justice and humanity. With it you can never be in the wrong and can look at the main issue of things. Then, please bear in mind the difference between the former and the latter.

For instance, if you resort to brutal force on the spur of the moment, driven by your personal feelings and injure others, it does not mean courage. On the other hand, if you can fight as fierce as a tiger in case of emergency, though you are usually gentle as a cat, then you are truly courageous. That is, even if you are looked upon as a coward and despised as such by others at ordinary times, yet you have moral courage if only you can sacrifice yourselves with determined courage in an emergency for what you believe to be the cause of justice and humanity.

"Knightly Benevolence"

Courtesy is the primary basis of human relationships. Courtesy between sovereign and subject, father and son, elder and younger brothers and sisters, endows human relations with order and a distinction. Otherwise, there can be neither sovereign nor subject, and neither father nor son, and no distinction whatever between older and younger brothers and sisters.

So a man without propriety is no better than a beast. Even the crow observes filial piety to parents by feeding them in return when the parent birds get old, and the pigeon is said to be so polite to parents as to stay in lower positions than the parents do. The
men without propriety may be regarded as an inferior being to birds and beasts.

In the Imperial Rescript granted to soldiers it is desired that "soldiers shall be decorous." Should soldiers lack propriety, they would merely constitute a mob or a gathering of vagabonds; no distinction of rank may be observed whereby no orders shall be obeyed. Thus the military spirit shall be lost.

Then what is propriety? The Imperial Rescript graciously defines it as "to be respectful toward your superiors and considerate toward your subordinates." This is the essence of propriety. That is to say, merely revering superiors is not sufficient. True propriety is displayed only when the superior and the subordinate conduct themselves with due respect and consideration toward each other.

From the old times propriety has been appreciated as a virtue of "Bushido" along with loyalty, courage and faith. One must be wholly sincere toward not only his superiors but also toward his colleagues and subordinates and even toward his enemies. This sincerity in associating with people is propriety. The term "Knightly Benevolence" also means this. In our country a man is not respected, no matter how excellent a tactician he may be in battles, unless he adheres to the principle of "Knightly Benevolence".

The principle of "Knightly Benevolence" is something that great military leaders of our country have always adhered to. Without exceptions, the warriors, such as UESUGI, Konshin or U.S.0, Kiyomasa in olden times, and more recently SUGA, Takeguchi, who were called great commanders and heroes, strictly adhered to this principle. If one opens the pages of Japanese history of war he will find numerous examples.

The warm courtesy shown by Fleet Admiral ITO, Yasuke to the enemy admiral, Ting Ju-chang is a good example of this. On September 27, 1894, on board the flagship "Natsushima" as the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, the Admiral engaged in battle with the North Ocean Fleet of the Chinese Navy in the Yellow Sea. Commanding the main force of the Combined Fleet and the First Divisional Squadron, he smashed the enemy fleet, firing three warships, causing fire on the "Ting-yuang" and the "Lei-yuang", and putting the other ships out of commission. Although this remarkable victory was, of course, attributable to the august virtue of His Majesty, much credit was due to those brave officers and men who did splendid work under the command of the Admiral.

After suffering this crushing blow, the Chinese Navy staggeringly retreated to Weihaiwei to make a stand. The Admiral who had been acquainted with Ting Ju-chang in the past was deeply impressed with the loyalty of the enemy expressed in his continued brave defense on the small island of Liukung Tao. In January the following year the Admiral wrote a letter to Ting Ju-chang advising him to surrender. Even such a brave admiral as Ting Ju-chang was said to be moved to tears by the courteous Admiral's letter which expressed his heart-warming feeling. Let us now cite a passage from the letter,

"I had the honor to be on intimate terms with Your Excellency for many years. The change of situations between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of China unfortunately forced us to face each other as enemies in the battle field. This was, however, due to the
fact that each of us had duty to serve our respective
countries, but the friendship between us remains
unchanged as in bygone days. So I would like to venture
to state a few words to Your Excellency for your kind
consideration. That the military forces of your
esteemed country continue to lose and that Weihaiwei is a
about to fall are entirely the result of many years of
corrupt administration. Unless the root of the evil
country will never be saved from
inevitable ruin. Why does your Excellency not wait for
a proper time to undertake a great renovation and save
your country from the crisis so that you can truly
fulfill your duty as a subject? It is not the way for a
man of honor to be particular about a trivial matter
and not to be able to bear minor disgrace. Hence,
with the worldly known chivalry of the Samurai in mind,
I sincerely plead with Your Excellency to visit Japan
for the time being and do your utmost so that Your
Excellency may be of service to your country in the future.
I shall greatly appreciate Your Excellency's acceptance
of the advice of Your faithful friend."

Ting Ju-ohang, however, turned down this offer of a
surrender. Accordingly, our torpedo boat flotilla
made an attack on the night of February 5th and follow-
ing this, our fleet opened fire simultaneously from
every ship, sinking or capturing the enemy battleships.
Ting Ju-chang then sent his delegation to negotiate
for peace with the condition that all the remaining ships
and arms be surrendered and that at least his
subordinates will be saved. As for himself he
was to commit suicide bravely. Meeting this delegation,
Fleet Admiral Ito willingly accepted all the propositions
and sent "sake", confections, etc. to Admiral Ting to
comfort him for his long struggle. Soon afterwards
the Admiral received the news of the suicide of Ting
Ju-chang. He immediately ordered the fleet to observe
silence and expressed his sincere condolence.

When he heard that Ting Ju-ohang's coffin would be
sent to Chofoo by a small junk, he released the warship
"Kangchi" and allowed them to send the coffin aboard
the warship. This was done with his following remark:
"Admiral Ting was our enemy but he certainly was a
praiseworthy man of loyalty. If he had died in peace
time, the deceased would be sent escorted by battleships.
He who died for his country is about to be sent instead
by a small and humble boat. The Samurai of Japan from
respect to his spirit can not allow this to happen."
Furthermore, he expressed his true sentiment of
benevolence, adding that: "should there be any room on
board the ship, I have no objection to embarking
surrendered officers of the Chinese army and navy provided
that while she passes the area under occupation of the
Japanese fleet who bear a white flag. We shall never
fire on her."

The Chinese officers and soldiers were said to
have been deeply impressed by this and tendered their
sincere appreciation. Does not this story truly illustrate
the characteristics of the Japanese soldier who lives on
the principle of "Knightly Benevolence". Propriety
should be observed to this extent.
Regulations Governing the Services of Government Officials

Imperial Ordinance No. 39, July 30, 1894

Article I. Officials shall be primarily loyal and diligent to the Emperor and the Emperor's Government, and execute their respective official duties in accordance with the laws and commands.

Article II. Officials shall obey the orders of their direct senior official concerning their official duties although opinions relative to the orders may be expressed.

Article III. Officials shall esteem integrity and refrain from any base conduct, be it on duty or off duty. Officials shall never abuse their official authority, be it on duty or off duty, but shall endeavor to be upright and kindly.

Article IV. Officials are prohibited from revealing any official secrets, whether obtained in connection with official duties or from other officials. This is applicable even after retirement from office.

When summoned by a judicial court as a witness or an expert and questioned on official secrets, one can depose only on such matters regarding which permission has been obtained from his section chief.

 Officials are prohibited to show in privacy any unreleased official document to any interested party.
article VI. An official shall not arbitrarily leave his duties or leave his officially fixed place of residence without the permission of his section chief.

article VII. Government officials shall not become presidents or officials of business concerns outside of cases where permission has been obtained from the section chief.

article VIII. Outside of cases where permission has been obtained from the section chief, officials shall not receive gifts from people in connection with his official duties, be it directly or indirectly whether it be made in the name of a gift of appreciation, remuneration, or in any other name. Then an official is to receive any medal, honors, salary, or gift which a foreign sovereign or government is contemplating granting, permission shall be required.

article IX. Any official whose duties place him in direct contact with the following mentioned persons shall not receive any entertainment from any of them.

1. Construction contractors of government work.
2. Persons in charge of remittances, or, receiving and paying of accounts of government officials.
3. Entrepreneurs receiving subsidy from any government office.
4. Those who handle supplies of a government office.
5. Those who make contracts of various kinds with government officials.

article X. Senior officials shall not receive any present from any of their subordinates, be it when on duty or off duty.

article XI. Outside of cases where permission has been obtained from the section chief, an official as well as his family shall not engage in business directly or indirectly.
Article XII. An official shall not become a member of any exchange corporation; neither shall he have any relation with the stock business, even indirectly.

Article XIII. Outside of cases where permission has been obtained from the section chief, officials shall not engage in any other work with a salary other than those of his position.

Article XIV. The official who goes bankrupt on account of extravagance and incurs debt in excess shall be considered culpable.

Article XV. Officials shall not receive free pass privileges from a private steamship company, or from a private railway company.

Article XVI. The official who is a chief or director or head of any group shall oversee the various officials under him and shall give warning to any who has committed a misdemeanor not within the bounds of appealing to a disciplinary action. In cases where disciplinary action is deemed necessary he shall submit a full account of the case to his direct senior official. Should he conceal it despite his knowledge of the circumstances and fail to report the matter then he will be considered guilty of negligence.

Article XVII. These disciplinary regulations apply to officials of FCTO rank (TN: higher civil service), HARRIN rank (T.N. clerical), and others performing public duties and receiving remuneration.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, T.M.K.H. Michitoshi, Secretary of Cabinet, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages, marked "SHIWO DOCUMENT No. 4" and entitled "Regulations Governing the Services of Government Officials," is an exact and true copy of the Japanese original.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of August, 1946

(signed) I. T.M.K.H./FR
Signature of Official

Witness:_____________________

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language French, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/a/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 22 Jan., 1947
第五条
官吏八本局長官ノ許可ヲ得ルニ非サレハ其ノ職務ニ関ス

第六条
官吏八本局長官ノ許可ヲ得ルニ非サレハ其ノ職務ニ関ス

第七条
又ハ役員トナルコトヲ得ス

第八条
官吏八本局長官ノ許可ヲ得ルニ非サレハ其ノ職務ニ関ス

官吏外ノ君主ハ政府ヨリ授與セントスル所ノ労者ヲ職員ニ列シ

第九条
左ノ受クルコトヲ得ス

官屬ノ工員ヲ請負フ者

官屬ノ為当方又ハ出納ヲ引受クル者
官職に附属金を受ける者

一 官督ノ物品ヲ購進スル者

二 官務ヲ廃止ノ契約ヲ結フ者

第十條 凡ソ上官ヲ村ル者ハ職務ノ内外ヲ問ノハスヲ命ヲ與エるノヲ助 Lenovo.

第十一條 官吏ハ本局長官ノ許可ヲ得ルニ非サレハ

第十二條 官吏ハ取引相場ヲ就ケルノヲ許可ヲ得ス

第十三條 官吏ハ本局長官ノ許可ヲ得ルニ非サレハ本局ノ外ヲ給

第十四條 携帯シテ salty 破リ其ノ分二澱セサル貸貸ヲ為ス者ハ過

失ノシタルヘシ

第十五條 官吏ハ私立郵船会社ヲ私立印刷会社ヨリヲ使用シ

符ヲ受クルヲ得ス
第十六條
凡本局長所長及他一部ノ長ハ各所屬官吏ヲ監督シ其過
若シ該處ヲ行フノ區域ノ内ニ在ラサル者ハ之ヲ訓示スル
コトヲ務ヘシ若シ該處ヲ要ストルトキハ事ヲ具ヘテ
亦過失ヲルニテヲ免レス

第十七條
本局長ハ高等官ノ判任官及俸給ヲ得テ公務ヲ奉スル者
ニ適用ス

DEF. DOC. #870
April 27, 1935 (the 10th year of Showa). 6412 Code telegram, Kirin

Foreign Minister

Telegram

Strictly confidential No. 27
Sent on April 25, 1935,
Received on April 25, 1935.

To: Foreign Minister
From: Consul General MORIOKA
Telegram addressed to Manchuria
No. 43
Telegramed to Councillor TAN as follows:

YONEZAWA, chief of the Telegraph Section, (signed)
SHIGEMITSU, Vice-Minister, (signed)
KUWAJIMA, member, East Asia Board, (signed)
April 27, 1935 (the 10th year of Showa). 6412 Code telegram, Kirin
Foreign Minister

Telegram
Strictly confidential No. 27
Sent on April 25, 1935,
Received on April 25, 1935.

To: Foreign Minister dHOKa
From: Consul General MORIOKA
Telegram addressed to Manchuria
No. 43
Telegramed to Councillor TANI as follows:

YONEZawa, chief of the Telegraph Section, (signed)
SHIOZAWA, Vice-Minister, (signed)
KUWAJIMA, Member, East Asia Board, (signed)
As you well know, after the Manchurian incident and before the establishment of the imperial government, there was a secret movement led by the central figure, Hsi Hsia, to invite the regent Pu Yi to Peking and to reinstate the Ching Dynasty in the whole area of North China. Some people recently are rumoured to have gone a step further in making such an argument:

The Chinese people, especially young men, have been so deeply imbued with anti-Japan feeling fostered by anti-Japan education for the past thirty years and stimulated by the Manchurian Incident, that there is no hope of maintaining future friendly relations between China and Japan-Manchukuo. Moreover, China will again be disorganized after the death of Chiang Kai-shek. Previous to this, Hu Chieh, one of the members of the Ching family, should be invited to Peking to reinstate the Ching dynasty. If this reinstatement succeeds, the Emperor of Manchukuo shall be invited to Peking and Manchukuo shall be placed under Japanese mandate.

Ihsii Lu-Sheng (having at present no connection with political affairs) arrived here from Tientsin on business, visited me and in the discussion of the problem said:

"In Manchukuo, LO Chen-yü, the president of the Inspection Board, supports the above plan most enthusiastically, and in the Tientsin district, Chou Ts'ao-min, of the Ching Cheng Bank, and Lu Tsung Yü support it also, and there are many supporters among the influential civilians. However, these people haven't enough power to effect this. At least 100 million yen is necessary to successfully effect this plan. Though such a movement may remain only a dream, the effective diffusion of such an idea is not to be overlooked." Please keep this information strictly confidential.

The same telegram was sent to the Foreign Minister.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "TELEGRAM NO. 27 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) SENT FROM CONSUL GENERAL MOTOYA AT KIRIN TO FOREIGN MINISTER HIROTA" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of December 1946.

Witness: T. SETO

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Translation Certificate

I, RICHARD S. YONEHIRO of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\/ Richard S. Yonehiro

Tokyo, Japan
Date 30 January 1947
Viscount FUTAARA, Yoshinori:

"I, should like to make another interpellation on a quite different matter and it is about the ideal of our national inauguration. True, I have been in doubt about it for a long time. It is a matter of no small importance. Recently the words HAKKO ICHIU are almost unconditionally being used. But as a matter of fact we find no such words in the rescript of Emperor Jimmu. What we find in it are the words 八政 皇極 HAKKO O U TO NASA Fundamentally Emperor Jimmu's ideal was in this, "I will make a house (C.N. it is not clear whether it is a singular or plural) covering the firmament". Importance in it lies in the words "will make", as it involves the spiritual power or efforts for attaining it. But as time went on, the verb 作 (Hasan) has been replaced by the noun ichi(one), so as to read 八政 一 HAKKO ICHI or
HACHI KO ICHIU. The Education Ministry, too, is using this changed phrase. So is the Bureau of Information of the Cabinet. Is it due to a certain specific reason that this change phrase is used even by Government Offices? Or, is it simply because it is generally in use? Since this is a very important matter, I do not necessarily want to receive a reply here right now. I shall be satisfied if the reply be made some day later on after a thorough being made.

Minister of State (HASPIDA, Kunihiko):

"I shall state now first a few words, about what I understand on that question. It seems to me that the phrase 八紘 — 天
HAK KO ICHIU began to be used since quite long ago. As for from when, I shall explain after a thorough study has been made.

According to my present knowledge however, when Emperor Jimmu said 八紗 — 天 Hak KO O U TO NASU be had had in view, so far as his fundamental stand at that time is concerned, the notice that the 八紘 — 天 HAK KO (T.N. the world according to the colu version) is — 天 I CHI U (T.N. one house according to the popu version), viz."the world is a house" It was from such a version of the phrase 八紘 — 天 HAK KO ICHIU began to be employed. So I interpret it. Thus, in my judgment the term — 天 ICHI is an ideology itself, while the phrase U TO NASU 天卜磐 玄 suggests an action of the thought, I shall, however, make a thorough study about this question, about how and when it began to be so and wish to endeavor to adopt the correct one".
CERTIFICATE

I, KONDO Hidoki, Chief of the General Affairs Section, Administrative office, House of Peers, hereby certify that the enclosure of 2 papers in Japanese is a true copy of the short Records No. 3 of the 3rd Sub-Committee Meeting of the Budget Committee (Ministers of Interior, Education and Welfare) House of Peers, 76th Session of the Imperial Diet, which are in the keeping of the Japanese Government (House of Peers).

/S/ KONDO Hidoki ( SEAL )

Tokyo, December 14, 21st year of Showa
I certify the above was signed in my presence

/S/ ONODER. Goichi ( Seal )

Same Place, and same date

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 23 Jan 1947
略

昭和十六年二月十三日（木曜日）午前十時八分開会

○ 伯爵二荒芳徳君

私モノ一太郎遺物問送デチヨット调查ヒシェ見タイト

リ

(1)
Announcements of the Foreign Office Concerning the Lady Bird and the Panay Incidents (Dec., 14)

Regarding the bombing and sinking incident of the Panay, an American gunboat, along with three American merchantmen, Foreign Minister HIROTA immediately called on Mr. Grew, American Ambassador resident in Tokyo, and expressed regret on behalf of the Japanese Government on Dec 13.

At the same time he sent a telegram to Ambassador SAITO in the United States instructing him to take similar steps. On Dec. 14 he sent Ambassador Grew the Imperial Governments official note of apology. Further in the United States Ambassador SAITO called on Secretary of State Hull on Dec. 13 and expressed sincere regrets according to instructions from the Imperial Government. The Secretary of State thereupon stated that although he made it a rule to handle all international affairs with restraint and to obtain results, he had been unable to contain his alarms at the Panay Incident. The case has already been reported to the President who has also shown great concern over the matter.

Concerning the incident where our Imperial troops fired a volley of small arms fire against the British gunboat "Lady Bird" at Wuhu, Foreign Minister HIROTA immediately called on British Ambassador Craigie resident in Tokyo on the afternoon of Dec. 13 and, representing the Imperial Government, expressed deep regret for the outbreak of this unfortunate affair. It was further discovered on Dec. 14th.
that besides the above named gunboat, the British gunboat "Pee" at Wuku and two other British gunboats the "Cricket" and the "Scallop" at Nanking had also been fired upon so on the same day, MIROTA, representing the Imperial Government, sent an official note of apology addressed to Ambassador Craigie.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office regarding the Incidents of Ladybird and Panay, December 14, 1937." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 30th day of December 1946.

Nagaharu ODO
Signature of Official

Witness: H. Ishida

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 29 Jan. 1947

Announcements of the Foreign Office Concerning the "Lady Bird" and "Panay" Incidents (Dec. 14)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODC, Nagaharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office regarding the Incidents of Ladybird and Panay, December 14, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of December 1946.

Nagaharu ODC
Signature of Official

Witness: H. Ishida

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 29 Jan. 1947

Announcements of the Foreign Office concerning the "Lady Bird" and "Panay" Incidents (Dec. 14)
According to a confidential statement made by CHFNG Chui to Goto the 16th:

In view of experiences during the nineteen years following the establishment of the Chinese Republic, the military leaders of Szechwan and Kweichow Provinces and the Dalai Lama of Tibet have come to the conclusion that China must be governed by a constitutional monarchy. As a result of secret conferences, they recently dispatched as their representatives, Liu Jen-Li (Commander of Chengtu) and others to the Emperor Hauantung here, and conveyed him a secret agreement of the Southwestern Provinces mentioned above. A message was also transmitted to the effect that they wish to clarify their anti-Chiang Kai-Shek attitude and support the Emperor Hauantung, waiting for the opportunity of Chiang Kai-Shek's advancing his troops to Szechwan Province on the pretext of mopping up Communist-bandits. The Emperor, however, found no reply on account of an unexpected formal negotiations will be opened shortly between Mr. Ishii, the Japanese Consul-General at Kirin, and Mr. Chung, the Chinese foreign commissioner at Harbin. In these parleys, measures for the settlement of the Wanghoshan affair will first be discussed and then debate on other issues will be proceeded with.
シツネ川ノトル観ノ意ヲ発明シテル考ニ於テ十四日右ノ外英貿易ノビハノハハ其ノ英従ヲハハノハハハハハノハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハハ哈
Chief of Telegraph Branch SHIBA, Kumanobu (Seal)

Strictly secret No. 539
Code: Tientsin-Foreign Office

Shows 5 18016 Cipher
Despatched December 17, 1930 (Morning)
Tientsin Main Office
Received December 17, 1930 (Afternoon)

To: Foreign Minister SHIDHARA

From: Acting Consul General TAJIRI

According to a confidential statement made by CHENG Chui to Goto on the 16th:

In view of experiences during the nineteen years following the establishment of the Chinese Republic, the military leaders of Szechwan and Kweichow Provinces and the Dalai Lama of Tibet have come to the conclusion that China must be governed by a constitutional monarchy. As a result of secret conferences, they recently dispatched as their representatives, Liu Jen-Li (Commander of Chengtu) and others to the Emperor Hsuantung here, and conveyed him a secret agreement of the Southwestern Provinces mentioned above. A message was also transmitted to the effect that they wish to clarify their anti-Chiang Kai-Shek attitude and support the Emperor Hsuantung, waiting for the opportunity of Chiang Kai-Shek's advancing his troops to Szechwan Province on the pretext of mopping up Communist-bandits. The Emperor, however, found no reply on account of an unexpected formal negotiations will be opened shortly between Mr. Ishii, the Japanese Consul-General at Kirin, and Mr. Chung, the Chinese foreign commissioner at Harbin. In these parleys, measures for the settlement of the Wanpo Shan affair will first be discussed and then debate on other issues will be proceeded with.
proposal from unforeseen quarters. He simply thanked them for their goodwill and made the messengers return home, giving them good care and offering them a large sum of money. It is also reported that Liu Wen-Hui, Lu Yun, Mao Kuang-Hsiang jointly names and confidentially communicated by telegram their determination to support the Emperor.

Telegram transmitted to: Minister in China, Shanghai, Peiping, Mukden, Hankow, Canton and Tsingtao.
Formal negotiations will be opened shortly between Mr. Ishii, the Japanese Consul-General at Kirin, and Mr. Chung, the Chinese foreign commissioner at Harbin. In these parleys, measures for the settlement of the Manchoshan affair will first be discussed and then debate on other issues will be proceeded with.
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formal negotiations will be opened shortly between Mr. Ishii, the Japanese Consul-General at Kirin, and Mr. Chung, the Chinese foreign commissioner at Harbin. In these parleys, measures for the settlement of the Wanpaoshan affair will first be discussed and then debate on other issues will be proceeded with.
EXCERPTS FROM AN ARTICLE IN THE JAPAN CHRONICLES OF JULY 19, 1931

THE KOREAN AFFAIR

TRAVOUR TO SETTLE IT AT MUKDEN

According to the Asahi, Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, interviewed General Chang Hsueh-liang at Mukden during the latter's illness, on the 16th instant, and proposed the opening of negotiations for the cessation of the prosecution of Korean peasants in Manchuria and for the establishment of the right of residence for these Koreans. He expressed the wish of his home Government for the conclusion of a provisional agreement for the settlement of these matters. He further suggested that in view of the local nature of the issues, negotiations should take place between the Japanese authorities and the local Chinese authorities. He had no objection to the basic terms of negotiation being formulated by the Chinese side.

In reply, General Chang Tso-hsiang assured the Japanese Consul-General that the Chinese authorities share the wish of the Japanese Government for a speedy opening of parleys and that he had had repeated consultations with General Chang Haush-liang on the matter. The Mukden authorities also agreed with Japan in the view that these issues should be settled locally. He nevertheless stated that the regular negotiations should be deferred until the recovery of General Chang Hsueh-liang from his present illness.

Mr. Hayashi further informed General Chang that, not in any way affected by the recent unhappy incidents, the Japanese Government is determined to adhere to its policy of disposing of all issues pending between the two countries in the spirit of justice and peace.

In consequence of this interview, it is expected that informal negotiations will be opened shortly between Mr. Ishii, the Japanese Consul-General at Kirin, and Mr. Chung, the Chinese foreign commissioner at Harbin. In these parleys, measures for the settlement of the Wangpooshan affair will first be discussed and then debate on other issues will be proceeded with.
日本の関与

朝鮮事務要旨

今月一日、米朝事務局長・奥村木雄が、朝鮮事務要旨を発表した。要旨は次の通り。

1. 朝鮮事務局長は、朝鮮事務に関し、米朝関係の持続に努め、平和的解決を望む。　
2. 今後の米朝関係は、平和的解決を前提に、対話の場を設けることが必要である。　
3. 朝鮮事務局長は、米朝関係の持続に努め、平和的解決を望む。　

現在の情勢は、平和的解決を望むが、双方の立場が一致しないため、対話の場を設けることが必要である。
不公と和平の精神を以て両国間の懸案の一切を処理する政策を固守する。 決意なることを更に示す事に告げた。
particularly, the generals of the so-called KODO (T.N. Literally, the Imperial Way) doctrine were of the opinion that we must not wage a war which we cannot justify. We must not wage a war unless we can justify it and unless we can fight it out with our country alone. Much less should we be prompted by greed. Furthermore, they pointed out the fact that the Emperor had only recently sanctioned the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR. This was certainly the correct view. I felt so happy that I wished to thank Heaven and earth that the best of JAPAN had not yet perished.

Page 33

The characteristic of the group of Generals MASAKI, ARAKI, HOSHI, and OHTA, was most distinct; they consistently assumed an entirely opposing attitude to the CHINA AFFAIR and the WORLD WAR.
Translated by
Defense Language Branch

Excerpt from "SHOWA Era Political Tragedies"
by
SASSA, Hiroo

Page 14

Particularly, the generals of the so-called KODO (T.N. Literally, the Imperial Way) doctrine were of the opinion that we must not wage a war which we cannot justify. We must not wage a war unless we can justify it and unless we can fight it out with our country alone. Much less should we be prompted by greed. Furthermore, they pointed out the fact that the Emperor had only recently sanctioned the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR.

This was certainly the correct view. I felt so happy that I wished to thank Heaven and earth that the best of JAPAN had not yet perished.

Page 33

The characteristic of the group of Generals MASAKI, ARAKI, Y.M.G.F., and OBATA, was most distinct; they consistently assumed an entirely opposing attitude to the CHINA AFFAIR and the WORLD WAR.
CERTIFICATE

on
Compilation
of a Document

I, SAKI, Masao, hereby certify that the Japanese book attached to this certificate, entitled "SPOT: Em Political Tragedies" consisting of 76 pages, published on June 1st, 1946, is one of the books published by the Japan Broadcast Press Association.

Certified at Tokyo
on January 16th, 1947

SAKI, Masao (seal)
Director of the Japan Broadcast Press Association, Ltd.,
floor
The K.0 Building, fourth
2-chome B.KUNO-cho NISHIABASHI
ku, Tokyo.

Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 22 Jan 1947
The first demand did not seem to bear any significance.
In its first demand did not seem to bear any significance.
Chapter XXII Indemnity Payment for the "Panay" incident.
(From page 141 line 8 to page 143, line b.)

Regarding the "Panay" Incident, which occurred on December of 12th, 1937, at the time of the occupation Nanking our expression of apology was immediately sent out. The Americans also, not wishing to have any unfavorable effects inflicted upon the diplomatic relations between both countries on account of such an incident of affair, quickly responded to settle the matter. And on the 26th of the same month, they replied to the effect that they will accept our apology. However, while this incident itself was quickly settled, the payment of the indemnity still remained unsettled.

On March 21st of this year (T.N. 1938), the U.S. demanded an indemnity amounting to over $2,211,000.

A statement was also added that this sum only covered the actual amount of property damaged and a reasonable estimate for those killed and wounded, also that it did not include any payment for exemplary damages. But since there were no details attached we requested the forwarding of such a statement.

On April 9th, they complied with our request, and thereupon, on the 29th of April, we made full payment to the amount demanded. Thus, the incident was completely settled.

The fact that the U.S. Government failed to attach a detailed account in its first demand did not seem to bear any significance.
whatever and as a result it caused the American press circles to mock the easy-going attitude of the U.S. Government, merely bringing about an amusing topic of conversation.

With regards to the settlement of this case, our Foreign Office issued the following statement on April 22nd.

"In connection with the sinking of the U.S. Gunboat "Penny" by our naval aircrafts, negotiations and correspondence have been carried out with the U.S. Government since the end of last year, and leaving the question of the above indemnity to a later date, the case was settled. However with regards to the matter of indemnity, it stated in the official document from the American Embassy at Tokyo dated March 21st, that (1) property damage amounted to ¥1,945,670.01 and (2) casualty compensations amounted to ¥268,337.35 totaling ¥2,214,007.36 (F.N. G.O.).

Thereupon, our Foreign Office conferred on the matter with each respective department concerned, but due to our accounting procedure, we decided to request a detailed account of the indemnity and this was forwarded to the American Embassy at Tokyo. On the 9th of April, the American Embassy sent over a statement containing the following particulars. Therefore, our Government, completed necessary procedures, and on April 22, at 5 p.m. at our Foreign Office, a check for the aforesaid amount in full in favour of the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull was handed over to Mr. Lamman (T.N.) Counsellor of the American Embassy by Mr. Josn. W., Chief of the American bureau of our Foreign Office. Thus the whole matter was peacefully settled.
Complete Statement of Damages, in the "Panay" Incident.
(Calculated in U.S. dollars)

1. Damage to Properties (Navy Dept)
   Damage to Panay ------------------------- $ 465,727.87
   Damage to Equipment & Munitions ------------ 97,766.48
   Personal Properties of Crews ------------ 40,263.00
   Total $ 593,757.35

2. Damage to Properties (Postal Dept)
   Postage stamps & supplies ------------ $ 74.27

3. Damage to Properties (State Dept)
   Personal Properties of the Embassy Staff $ 6,400.80

4. Damage to Properties (Standard Vacuum Oil Co.)
   Sinking of 3 ships of approximately 1,000 tons each, and
   2 small ships, and damage to 2 other ships, total $ 1,287,942.06

5. Personal properties of 13 Americans, other than the personnel
   of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Embassy and of the Standard Vacuum
   and Oil Co.) ------------ $ 57,495.59
   Total amount of property damaged $ 1,945,600.01

6. (Amount of Indemnity for Casualties)
   Indemnity for 2 members of the "Panay" crews and the captain
   of the "Meiping", totaling 3 killed, and 74 crews members of
   the "Panay" and other ships wounded. Total $ 269,337.35
   Grand total $ 2,214,007.36

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CERTIFICATE
Dec. 3, 1946

I, hereby state that I am the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the United Nations Study Association Inc.
(Kokusai Rengo Kenkyu Kai).

This Association was formally called the International Association of Japan (HIPPON KOKUSAI KYOKAI) and it is certain that the book entitled "International Affairs of 1938," written in Japanese, consisting of 662 pages, was published by the above Organization, the International Association of Japan, the Manuscripts of which were gathered by the Association from various authors.

Horinouchi Kensuke (seal)
Chairman of the Board of Directors United Nations Study Association
No. 12 Marunouchi 2-chome, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo.

It is certified that the above document was signed and sealed in my presence.

Matsuzoshi
Witness: MATSUSHITA
No. 5 Shimoigusa Machi, Suginami-ku, Tokyo.

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE
I, William L. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William L. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 20 January 1947
United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC)

Member Governments, other National Authorities and Military Tribunals  PAG - 3/2.3.5 boxes 436-439

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials):
Defense Statements and Documents

- Opening Statement of the Defense by Dr. Ichiro Kiyose and Kenzo Takayanagi
- Defense requests and Court orders
  Request Nos. 25-720
  Order Nos. 48-1702
- Defense Documents rejected or not used
  Document Nos.:
  51 - 281

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CERTIFICATION

I certify that the micrographs appearing in this reel of film are true copies of the original records described above.

Date: 7 Jul 1949
Signature of Camera Operator: [Signature]
REEL

no.

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