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TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION

Signed at Peking, in English, Japanese and Chinese, July 21, 1890 (29th year of Meiji).

Ratified September 29, 1890.

Ratifications exchanged at Peking, October 20, 1890.

Promulgated October 29, 1890.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, having resolved, in pursuance of the provisions of Articles VI, of the Treaty signed at Shimoda on the 17th day of the 4th month of the 29th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 33rd day of the 3rd month of the 31st year of Kuang Hsi, to conclude a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, have for that purpose named as Their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Hayashi Tadasu, Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary; and His Majesty the Emperor of China, Chang Yen Hoen, Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister of the Taungli-yamen, Holding the rank of the President of a Board and Senior Vice-President of the Board of Revenue:

Who, after having communicated to each other their full Powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

- 1 -
ARTICLE I.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, and between their respective subjects who shall enjoy equally in the respective countries of the High Contracting Parties full and entire protection for their persons and property.

ARTICLE II.

It is agreed by the High Contracting Parties that His Majesty the Emperor of Japan may, if he see fit, accredit a Diplomatic Agent to the Court of Pekin, and His Majesty the Emperor of China may, if he see fit, accredit a Diplomatic Agent to the Court of Tokio.

The Diplomatic Agent thus accredited shall respectively enjoy all the prerogatives, privileges and immunities accorded by international law to such Agents and they shall also in all respects be entitled to the treatment extended to similar agents of the most favoured nation.

Their persons, families, suites, establishment, residences and correspondence shall be held inviolable. They shall be at liberty to select and appoint their own officers, couriers, interpreters, servants and attendants without any kind of molestation.

ARTICLE III

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan may appoint Consuls-General,
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Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular Agents to reside at such of the ports, cities and towns of China, which are now, or may hereafter be, opened to foreign residence and trade, as the interests of the Empire of Japan may require.

These officers shall be treated with due respect by the Chinese Authorities, and they shall enjoy all the attributes, authority, jurisdiction, privileges and immunities which are, or may hereafter be, extended to similar officers of the nation most favoured in these respects.

His Majesty the Emperor of China may likewise appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular Agents to reside at any or all of these places in Japan, where Consular officers of other nations are now, or may hereafter be, admitted, and, saving in the matter of jurisdiction in respect of Chinese subjects and property in Japan, which is reserved to the Japanese Judicial Courts, they shall enjoy the rights and privileges that are usually accorded to such officers.

ARTICLE IV

Japanese subjects may, with their families, employees and servants, frequent, reside and carry on trade, industries and manufactures, or pursue any other lawful avocations in all the ports, cities and towns of China, which are now, or may hereafter be opened to foreign residence and trade. They are at liberty to proceed to or from any of the open ports with their merchandise and effects, and within the localities at those places which have already been, or may hereafter be, set apart for the use and
occupation of foreigners, they are allowed to rent or purchase houses, rent of lease land, and to build churches, cemeteries and hospitals, enjoying in all respect the same privileges and immunities as are now, or may hereafter be, granted to the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE V

Japanese vessels may touch for the purpose of landing and shipping passengers and merchandise in accordance with the existing Rules and Regulations concerning foreign trade there at all those places in China, which are now ports of call, namely: Pean-ching, Ta-tung, Hu-kow, Wu-sueh, Lu-chi-kou and Waosung and such other places as may hereafter be made ports of call also. If any vessel should unlawfully enter ports other than open ports and ports of call in China or carry on clandestine trade along the coast or rivers, the vessel with her cargo shall be subject to confiscation by the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE VI.

Japanese subjects may travel, for their pleasure or for purposes of trade, to all parts of the interior of China, under passports issued by Japanese Consuls and countersigned by the Local Authorities. These passports, if demanded, must be produced for examination in the localities passed through. If the passports be not irregular, the bearers will be allowed to proceed and no opposition shall be offered to their hiring of persons, animals, carts or vessels for their own conveyance or for the carriage of their personal effects or merchandise. If they be
without passports or if they commit any offence against the law, they shall be handed over to the nearest Consul for punishment, but they shall only be subject to necessary restraint and in no case to ill-usage. Such passports shall remain in force for a period of thirteen Chinese months from the date of issue. Any Japanese travelling in the interior without passport shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three hundred Taels. Japanese subjects may, however, without passports go on excursions from any of the ports open to trade, to distance not exceeding one hundred Chinese li and for a period not exceeding five days. The provisions of this Article do not apply to crews of ships.

ARTICLE VII

Japanese subjects residing in the open ports of China may take into their service Chinese subjects and employ them in any lawful capacity without restraint or hindrance from the Chinese Government or Authorities.

ARTICLE VIII

Japanese subjects may hire whatever boats they please for the conveyance of cargo or passengers and the sum to be paid for such boats shall be settled between the parties themselves, without the interference of the Chinese Government or officers. No limit shall be put upon the number of boats, neither shall a monopoly in respect either of the boats or of the porters or coolies engaged in carrying goods be granted to any parties. If
any smuggling takes place in them the offenders will of course be
punished according to law.

ARTICLE IX

The Tariffs and Tariff Rules now in force between China
by Japanese subjects or from Japan, or upon exportation from
China by Japanese subjects or to Japan. It is clearly under­
stood that all articles, the importation or exportation of which
is not expressly limited or prohibited by the Tariffs and Tariff
Rules existing between China and the Western Power, may be
freely imported into and exported from China, subject only to
the payment of the stipulated import or export duties. But in
no case shall Japanese subjects be called upon to pay in China
other or higher import or export duties than are, or may be,
paid by the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation;
nor shall any article imported into China from Japan or exported
from China to Japan be charged upon such importation or ex­
portation, other or higher duties than are now, or may hereafter be
imposed in China on the like article when imported from or ex­
ported to the nation most favoured in those respects.

ARTICLE X

All articles duly imported into China by Japanese subjects
or from Japan shall, while being transported, subject to the
existing Regulations, from one open port to another, be wholly
exempt from all taxes, imposts, duties, lekin, charges and
exactions of every nature and kind whatsoever, irrespective of the nationality of the owner or possessor of the articles, or the nationality of the conveyance or vessel in which the transportation is made.

ARTICLE XI

It shall be at the option of any Japanese subject desiring to convey duly imported articles to an inland market to clear his goods of all transit duties by payment of a commutation transit tax or duty, equal to one-half of the import duty in respect of dutiable articles, and two and a half per cent. upon the value in respect of duty free articles; and on payment thereof a certificate shall be issued, which shall exempt the goods from all further inland charges whatsoever. It is understood that this Article does not apply to imported opium.

ARTICLE XII.

All Chinese goods and produce purchased by Japanese subjects in China elsewhere than at an open port thereof and intended for export abroad, shall in every part of China be freed from all taxes, imposts, duties, and exactions of every nature and kind whatsoever, saving only export duties when exported, upon the payment of a commutation transit tax or duty calculated at the rate mentioned in the last preceding Article substituting export duty for import duty, provided such goods and produce are actually exported to a foreign country within the period of twelve months from the date of the payment of the
Do transit tax; all Chinese goods and produce purchased by Japanese subjects at the open ports of China and of which export to foreign countries is not prohibited shall be exempt from all internal taxes, imposts, duties, lekins, charges and exactions of every nature and kind whatsoever, saving only export duties upon exportation and all articles purchased by Japanese subjects in any part of China, may also, for the purposes of export abroad, be transported from open port to open port, subject to the existing rules and Regulations.

ARTICLE XIV
Merchandise of a non-China foreign origin, in respect of which full import duty shall have been paid, may at any time within three years from the date of importation be re-exported from China by Japanese subjects to any foreign country, without the payment of any export duty; and the re-exporters shall, in addition, be entitled forthwith to receive from the Chinese Customs drawback certificates for the amount of import duty paid thereon, provided that the merchandise remains intact and unchanged in its original packages. Such drawback certificates shall be immediately redeemable in ready money by the Chinese Customs authorities at the option of the holders thereof.

ARTICLE XIV
The Chinese Government consents to the establishment of bonded warehouses at the several open ports of China. Regulations on the subject shall be made hereafter.
ARTICLE XV

Japanese merchant vessels of more than one hundred and fifty tons burden, entering the open ports of China, shall be charged tonnage dues at the rate of four mace per registered ton; if of one hundred and fifty tons and under, they shall be charged at the rate of one mace per registered ton. But any such vessel taking its departure within forty-eight hours after arrival, without breaking bulk, shall be exempt from the payment of tonnage dues.

Japanese vessels having paid the above specified tonnage dues shall thereafter be exempt from all tonnage dues in all the open ports and ports of call of China for the period of four months from the date of clearance from the port where the payment of such tonnage dues is made. Japanese vessels shall not, however, be required to pay tonnage dues for the period during which they are actually undergoing repairs in China.

No tonnage dues shall be payable on small vessels and boats employed by Japanese subjects in the conveyance of passengers, baggage, letters or duty free articles between any of the open ports of China. All small vessels and cargo boats, however, conveying merchandise which is, at the time of such conveyance, subject to duty, shall pay tonnage dues once in four months at the rate of one mace per ton.
No fees or charges other than tonnage dues shall be levied upon Japanese vessels and boats, and it is also understood that such vessels and boats shall not be required to pay other or higher tonnage dues than the vessels and boats of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE XVI

Any Japanese merchant vessel arriving at an open port of China shall be at liberty to engage the services of a pilot to take her into port. In like manner, after she has discharged all legal dues and duties and is ready to take her departure, she shall be allowed to employ a pilot to take her out of port.

ARTICLE XVII

Japanese merchant vessels compelled on account of injury sustained or any other cause to seek a place of refuge shall be permitted to enter any nearest port of China, without being subject to the payment of tonnage dues or duties upon goods landed in order that repairs to the vessel may be effected, provided the goods so landed remain under the supervision of the Customs Authorities. Should any such vessel be stranded or wrecked on the coast of China, the Chinese Authorities shall immediately adopt measures for rescuing the passengers and crew and for securing the vessel and cargo. The persons thus saved shall receive friendly treatment, and, if necessary, shall be furnished with means of conveyance to the nearest Consular station. Should

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Any Chinese merchant vessel be compelled on account of injury sustained or any other cause to seek a place of refuge in the nearest port of Japan, she shall likewise be treated in the same way by the Japanese Authorities.

ARTICLE XVII

The Chinese Authorities at the several open ports shall adopt such means as they may judge most proper to prevent the revenue suffering from fraud or smuggling.

ARTICLE XIX

If any Japanese vessel be plundered by Chinese robbers or pirates, it shall be the duty of the Chinese Authorities to use every endeavor to capture and punish the said robbers or pirates, and to recover and restore the stolen property.

ARTICLE XX

Jurisdiction over the persons and property of Japanese subjects in China is reserved exclusively to the duly authorized Japanese Authorities, who shall hear and determine all cases brought against Japanese subjects or property by Japanese subjects, or by the subjects or citizens of any other power, without the intervention of the Chinese Authorities.
ARTICLE XXI

If the Chinese authorities or a Chinese subject make any charge or complaint of a civil nature against Japanese subjects or in respect of Japanese property in China, the case shall be heard and decided by the Japanese Authorities.

In like manner all charges and complaints of a civil nature brought by Japanese Authorities or subjects in China against Chinese subjects or in respect of Chinese property, shall be heard and determined by the Chinese authorities.

ARTICLE XXII

Japanese subjects charged with the commission of any crimes or offences in China shall be tried, and, if found guilty, punished by the Japanese Authorities according to the laws of Japan.

In like manner Chinese subjects charged with the commission of any crimes or offences against Japanese subjects in China shall be tried, and, if found guilty, punished by the Chinese Authorities according to the laws of China.

ARTICLE XXIII

Should any Chinese subject fail to discharge debts incurred to a Japanese subject, or should he fraudulently abscond, the Chinese Authorities will do their utmost to effect his arrest, and enforce recovery of the debts. The Japanese Authorities
will likewise do their utmost to bring to justice any Japanese subject who fraudulently absconds or fails to discharge debts incurred by him to a Chinese subject.

**ARTICLE XXIV**

If Japanese subjects in China, who have committed offences or have failed to discharge debts and fraudulently abscond, should flee to the interior of China or take refuge in houses occupied by Chinese subjects or on board of Chinese ships, the Chinese Authorities shall, at the request of the Japanese Consul, deliver them to the Japanese Authorities.

In like manner if Chinese subjects in China, who have committed offences or have failed to discharge debts and fraudulently abscond, should take refuge in houses occupied by Japanese subjects in China or on board of Japanese ships in Chinese waters, they shall be delivered up at the request of the Chinese Authorities made to the Japanese Authorities.

**ARTICLE XXV**

The Japanese Government and its subjects are hereby confirmed in all privileges, immunities and advantages conferred on them by the Treaty stipulations between Japan and China, which are now in force; and it is hereby expressly stipulated that the Japanese Government and its subjects will be allowed free and equal participation in all privileges, immunities and advantages that may have been, or may be hereafter, granted by His Majesty the Emperor of China to the Government or subjects of any other nation.
ARTICLE XXVI

It is agreed that either of the High Contracting Parties may demand a revision of the Tariffs and of the Commercial Articles of this Treaty at the end of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications; but if no such demand be made on either side and no such revision be effected, within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Treaty and Tariffs, in their present form, shall remain in force for ten years more, reckoned from the end of the preceding ten years, and so it shall be at the end of each successive period of ten years.

ARTICLE XXVII

The High Contracting Parties will agree upon Rules and Regulations necessary to give full effect to this Treaty. Until such Rules and Regulations are brought into actual operation, the Arrangements, Rules and Regulations subsisting between China and the Western Powers, so far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Treaty, shall be binding between the Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE XXVIII

The present Treaty is signed in the Japanese, Chinese and English languages. In order, however, to prevent future discussions, the Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have agreed upon that in case of any divergence in the interpretation between the Japanese and Chinese texts of the Treaty, the difference shall be settled by reference to the English text.

ARTICLE XXIX

The present Treaty shall be ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Peking as soon as possible, and not later than three months from the present date.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Peking this 21st day of the 7th month of the 29th year of Meiji, corresponding to the eleventh day of the sixth month of the 22nd year of Kuang Hsu.

( L. S. )

KAYASHI Tadasu,

Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary.

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(L. S.)

CHANG Yen-hou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister of the Tsung-li-yamen, holding the rank of the President of the Board and Senior Vice President of the Board of Revenue.

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J.R. AND CHINA.

Protocol concerning Japanese settlements, inland navigation, taxes on manufactures, etc. — October 19, 1856.

Baron Hoshina Tadasu, Shoshii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Japan; and Chin, Jung, and Chen, the Ministers Charged with Foreign Affairs of the Empire of China;

have agreed upon and concluded the following four articles:

Art. 1. — It is agreed that settlements to be possessed exclusively by Japan shall be established at the towns and ports newly opened to trade. The management of roads and local police authority shall be vested solely in the Japanese Consul.

Art. 2. — Matters relating to steamboats and chartered or owned vessels referred to in the provisional regulations for the trade conducted by foreign merchants between Foochow, Hangchow, and Shanghai, issued by the Shanghai Customs on the 3rd day of the 8th month of the 22nd year of Hsing Hsiu shall be settled conjointly with Japan, and until such settlement is conjointly arrived at the Yangtze regulations shall be enforced so far as they are applicable.

Art. 3. — The Japanese government will consent to the imposition by the Chinese government of such tax as may be deemed expedient upon articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China, but such tax shall not be different from, or exceed, the amount payable by Chinese subjects.

* Translation from the Chinese text as printed in Customs, vol. 11, p. 615. Other translations printed in Rockhill, p. 39; For. Rel. of the U.S., 1877, p. 97; Recueil, p. 236. See note to this document, post, p. 92.

X September 9, 1856.
Upon the request of the Japanese Government the Chinese Government will promptly give their consent to the establishment of settlements possessed exclusively by Japan at Shanghai, Tientsin, Amoy and Hankow.

Art. 4--Telegraphic instructions will be sent to the Governor of Shantung to the effect that, in accordance with treaty stipulations, no Chinese troops shall be permitted to approach or occupy any ground within a distance of 5 Japanese ri, that is, about 60 Chinese li, from the boundaries of the territory occupied by the Japanese troops.

In witness whereof a Japanese and a Chinese version of the above have been prepared, each in duplicate, and having been compared together have been signed and sealed, each party retaining one copy of each version.

The 19th day of the 10th month of the 29th year of Meiji.

Jayashi Tadanu.

The 13th day of the 9th month of the 22nd year of Kuang Hsu.

Ching Hein.

Jun Li.

Chang Yin Ru.

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CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity


Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of January, 1947

Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Goto
文

大日本国方关于

文書

同

明治二十九年七月二十一日

明治二十二年六月一日

日

同

同

同

日

同

同
ノ物産三箇所

十二条

ノ物産三箇所

十二条
日本に於て日本国民は日本領内に於て日本国法を以て治めた。天皇は日本国を於てこれを統じて治めることを命する。日本国はその土地及び人民を於て独立自主を保つ。
現行条約上

第２５条
日米両国政府は相互間に交渉を重ねて、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府をも含む、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国政府の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結させるとともに、日米両国政府及び日米両国の交渉に関する条約を締結せ
上海外三島ニ帝国

上海外三島ニ於ケル

第四條

日本政府ハ日本國政府ヨリ請求ノ上ハ早速上海ニ於テ

日中政府ハ日本國政府ヨリ請求ノ上ハ早速上海ニ於テ

日本國政府ハ日本國政府ヨリ請求ノ上ハ早速上海ニ於テ
The League of Nations is expected to intervene in the Manchurian crisis. China has made a formal request to the League Council.

The situation in Manchuria is less tense, though still full of dangerous possibilities. There are reports yesterday of a slight clash in Harbin, but the dispatches mentioned only minor incidents directed against Japanese residents.

There are also unconfirmed reports of more Soviet massing on the Chinese border. A Soviet aeroplane flew over Shantung yesterday.

While the cabinet has not sanctioned the dispatch of reinforcements, extra troops have been sent from Korea. The military administration of Mukden has been disbanded.

Re: China's official request to the Council of the League of Nations to intervene in Manchuria.

From Washington it is learned the State Department holds that the situation in Manchuria has failed to present grounds for intervention. A note of Paris, though the Department states that the latest despatches indicate the trouble is more widespread than it was on Saturday. Optimism is seen in official information that the Japanese cabinet has moved to halt aggressive action.

In London authoritative circles are disposed to minimise the importance of the Mukden incident, though a section of the press demands international action.

The Manchester Guardian says the situation demands action by the League of Nations, which should bring the parties to a peaceful settlements. The paper adds, "Unfortunately the Japanese Government forgot to take such action on its own account."
NO MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
ruled.

The Cabinet has ruled against the military administration of the occupied districts. This decision was subsequently wired by General Hibi, Minister of War, to General Hanjo, Commander of the Japanese Garrison in Kwantung province. In consequence, the military administrations inaugurated at Mukden, Antung, Yinkow, Chonnyun and other cities have been abolished. The troops and gendarmes are to attend solely to the maintenance of peace and order.

At the same Cabinet meeting, it was further decided that the present troubles arising out of the blocking up of the S.M.R. track by Chinese soldiers on the evening of the 18th instant should be regarded as illegal incursions. As analogous events are mentioned the calling out of troops at the time of the Kwantung incursions and fires, and the Shantung expedition. It was decided that all killed in the present affair should be regarded as killed in war.

Mukden, Sept. 21.

Another attempt was made by a squad of 15 Chinese soldiers at noon to-day to destroy the South Manchurian Railway line at a point north of Liuchau, but they were driven off by Japanese gendarmes.

TRAIN WRECKERS SHOT

The No. 45 train which left Mukden for Changchun at 12:10 this afternoon narrowly escaped disaster when it was suddenly brought to a stop 640 kilometres from Mukden to avoid running into a pile of stones on the track. Japanese railway guards rushed to the spot and shot five Chinese.
た。春天の早戦は既成された。
中華民国は国際協盟理事会に於て接続の調停は正式に消滅した。
と云ってあるが、同報は最近の出兵は略奪が土口よりも大であると
いわつてある。日本の内局が変節行徳を極める様に行動を取らしたもの
は再に不適ににして日本政府は自国の軍事の為に左借行動を模るか
とを忘れずと云ってある。

この事はハロルドヨーに平和的解決をもたらすべきであると云つてあるに

SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION.

Signed at Shanghai, October 8, 1903.
Ratified December 9, 1903.
Ratifications exchanged at Peking, January 11, 1904.
Promulgated January, 19, 1904.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, in order to give full effect to the provisions of Article 11 of the Final Protocol signed at Peking on the seventh day of the ninth month of the thirty-fourth year of Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-fifth day of the seventh month of the twenty-seventh year of Kung-huai, have resolved to conclude a Supplementary Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, designed to facilitate and promote the commercial relations between Japan and China, and have for that purpose named as Their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Hiko Eiki, Jugo, Fifth Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, First Secretary of Legation, and Odagiri Hayanoske, Shorokui, Fifth Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Consul-General;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, Lu Heihun, President of the Board of Public Works, Sheng Haun-hun, Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent, formerly Senior Vice-President of the Board of Public Works, and Wu T'ingfang, Senior Vice-President of the Board of Commerce;

Who, after having communicated to each other their Full Powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ARTICLE 1.

Whereas China, with the object of reforming its fiscal system, proposes to levy a surtax in excess of the tariff rates on all goods passing through the Custom Houses, whether maritime or inland and frontier, in order to compensate in a measure for the loss incurred by the complete abolition of
likin, Japan consents to pay the same surtax as is agreed upon between China and all the Treaty Powers. With regard to the production tax, consumption tax and excise, and the taxes on native opium and salt, leviable by China, Japan also consents to accept the same arrangements as are agreed upon between all the Treaty Powers and China. It is understood however that the commerce, rights and privileges of Japan shall not, on account of the above, be placed at any disadvantage as compared with the commerce, rights and privileges of other Powers.

ARTICLE 2

The Chinese Government agree to permit Japanese steamship-owners to erect, at their own expense, appliances for hauling through the rapids of that part of the Yang-tze-kiang between Ichang and Chungking. But as the interests of the population of the provinces of Szechuen, Hunan and Kweichow are involved, it is therefore necessary that the approval of the Imperial Maritime Customs be obtained before such appliances may be so erected.

These appliances, which shall be at the disposal of all vessels both steamers and junks, shall not obstruct the water-way nor interfere with the free passage of junks or of persons on the banks of the river. Such appliances shall be subject to special regulations to be drawn up by the Imperial Maritime Customs.

ARTICLE 3

The Chinese Government agree that any Japanese steamer capable of navigating the inland waterways, upon reporting at the Imperial Maritime Customs, may proceed for the purpose of trade from a treaty port to places inland, so reported, on complying with the Original and Supplementary Regulations for Steam Navigation Inland.
ARTICLE 4

In case Chinese subjects conjointly with Japanese subjects organise a partnership or company for a legitimate purpose, they shall equitably share the profits and losses with all the members according to the terms of the agreement or memorandum and articles of association and the regulations framed thereunder, and they shall be liable to the fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the said agreement or memorandum and articles of association and the regulations framed thereunder as accepted by them and as interpreted by Japanese Courts. Should they fail to fulfil the obligation so imposed and legal action be taken against them in consequence, Chinese Courts shall at once enforce fulfilment of such obligations.

It is understood that in case Japanese subjects conjointly with Chinese subjects organise a partnership or company, they shall also equitably share the profits and losses with all the members according to the terms of the agreement or memorandum and articles of association and the regulations framed thereunder. Should such Japanese subjects fail to fulfil any of the obligations imposed by the said agreement or memorandum and articles of association or by the regulations framed thereunder, Japanese Courts shall in like manner at once enforce fulfilment of such obligations by them.

ARTICLE 5

The Chinese Government agree to make and faithfully enforce such regulations as are necessary for preventing Chinese subjects from infringing registered trade-marks held by Japanese subjects.
The Chinese Government likewise agree to make such regulations as are necessary for affording protection to registered copyrights held by Japanese subjects in the books, pamphlets, maps and charts written in the Chinese language and specially prepared for the use of Chinese people.

It is further agreed that the Chinese Government shall establish registration offices where foreign trade-marks and copyrights, upon application for the protection of the Chinese Government, shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of the regulations to be hereafter framed by the Chinese Government for the purpose of protecting trade-marks and copyrights.

It is understood that Chinese trade-marks and copyrights properly registered according to the provision of the laws and regulations of Japan will receive similar protection against infringement in Japan.

This Article shall not be held to protect against due process of law any Japanese or Chinese subject who may be the author, proprietor or seller of any publication calculated to injure the well-being of China.

ARTICLE 6

China agrees to establish itself, as soon as possible, a system of uniform national coinage and provide for a uniform national currency which shall be freely used as legal tender in payment of all duties, taxes and other obligations by Japanese subjects as well as by Chinese subjects in the Chinese Empire. It is understood, however, that all Customs duties shall continue to be calculated and paid on the basis of the Hailian tael.
ARTICLE 7

As the weights and measures used by the mercantile and other classes for general and commercial purposes in the different provinces of China vary and do not accord with the standards fixed by the Imperial Government Boards, thus resulting in detriment to the trade of Chinese and foreigners, the Governors-General and Governors of all the provinces, after careful inquiry into existing conditions, shall consult together and fix upon uniform standards which, after a Memorial to the Throne for sanction, shall be adopted and used in all transactions by officials and people throughout all the Empire. These standards shall be first used in the places opened to foreign trade and gradually extended to inland places. Any differences resulting from divergence between the new weights and measures and those now in vogue shall be equitably settled, whether, by way of increase or decrease, according to the amount of such difference.

ARTICLE 8

The Regulations for Steam Navigation Inland of the fifth moon of the twenty-fourth year of Kuan-hsu and the Supplementary Rules of the seventh moon of the same year having been found in some respects inconvenient in working, the Chinese Government hereby agree to amend them and to annex such new Rules to this Treaty.

These Rules shall remain in force until altered by mutual consent.

ARTICLE 9

The provisions of all treaties and engagements now subsisting between Japan and China, in so far as they are not modified or repealed by this Act, are hereby confirmed; and it is hereby expressly stipulated in addition that the Japanese Government, Officers, Subjects, Commerce, Navigation, Shipping,
Industries and Property of all kinds shall be allowed free and full participation in all privileges, immunities and advantages which have been or may hereafter be granted by His Majesty the Emperor of China or by the Chinese Government or by the Provincial or Local Administrations of China to the Government, Officers, Subjects, Commerce, Navigation, Shipping, Industries or Property of any other nation.

The Japanese Government will do its utmost to secure to Chinese Officers and Subjects resident in Japan the most favourable treatment compatible with the laws and regulations of the Empire.

ARTICLE 10

The High Contracting Parties hereto agree that, in case of and after the complete withdrawal of the foreign troops stationed in the province of Chihli and of the Legation guards, a place of international residence and trade in Peking will be forthwith opened by China itself. The detailed regulations relating thereto shall be settled in due time after consultation.

The Chinese Government agree to open to foreign trade, within six months from the exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty, Ch'angsha-fu in the province of Hunan on the same footing as the ports already opened to foreign trade. Foreigners residing in this open port are to observe the Municipal and Police Regulations on the same footing as Chinese residents, and they are not to be entitled to establish a Municipality and Police of their own within the limits of this treaty port, except with the consent of the Chinese authorities.

The Chinese Government agree that, upon the exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty, Mukden and Tungtingkow, both in the province of Shengking, will be opened by China itself as places of international residence and trade. The selection of suitable
localities to be set apart for international use and occupation and the regulations for these places set apart for foreign residence and trade shall be agreed upon by the Governments of Japan and China after consultation together.

ARTICLE 11

The Government of China having expressed a strong desire to reform its judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Japan and Western nations, Japan agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and will also be prepared to relinquish its extra-territorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant it in so doing.

ARTICLE 12

The present Treaty is signed in the Japanese, Chinese and English languages. In order, however, to prevent future discussions, the Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have agreed that in case of any divergence in the interpretation between the Japanese and Chinese Texts of the Treaty, the difference shall be settled by reference to the English Text.

ARTICLE 13

The present Treaty shall be ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Peking as soon as possible and not later than six months from the present date.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.
Done at Shanghai this eighth day of the tenth month of the thirty-sixth year of Meiji, corresponding to the eighteenth day of the eighth moon of the twenty-ninth year of Kuang-hsu.

(L. S.) Hioki Shi.

(L. S.) Odagiri Kasnoke.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kazuo, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Supplementary Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Signed at Shanghai, October 8, 1903." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
On this 25th day of March, 1947.

Signature of Official

Witness:________________________
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the tables hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 9 pages and entitled "The tables of the Chinese guard strengths along the Manchurian Railway compiled by the Staff Section of the Kwantung Army" are tables which came into my possession in 1931 at Shinko, and which has been thenceforth in my custody.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 20th day of February, 1947

Bako, Junkichi
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: OKUTOTO, Toshio
Disposition of the Chinese garrison power
around the Mukden Provincial Wall
— compiled by the General Staff of Kwantung Army

December, 1930. (5th year of Showa)

Total of forces around the provincial Wall: 22,885
Rifles: 16,286

Regular Army and students corps: 15,324
Police group: 2,984
Detachment, public order bureau: 119
Provincial public order bureau: 1
Prefectural public order bureau: 1
Public order battalion: 2

Remarks:
- Indicates regular army and students corps
- Public order bureau
- Branches of public order bureau

There are ten to twenty branches in one branch center.
在音乐的领域，尤其是器乐与声乐的结合，它是一种十分独特而美妙的体验。通过不同的乐器组合和声乐的融入，可以创造出多样化的音乐形式和风格。

音符、旋律与和声的结合，使得音乐在时间的长河中留下独特的印记。无论是古典音乐、流行音乐还是现代音乐，每一种形式都有着其独特的韵味和魅力。
近附城省天奉

警側那支近附城省天奉

預置備

月二十年五和昭

編部請參用

省城附近兵力

總計三萬三千六百八十五名

正規軍隊及學生隊

統數三萬三千六百八十五名

正規軍

三萬三千八百八十五名

學生隊

三萬三千八百八十五名

備

公安等

名公安等

內

公安等

各公安等

內

公安等

內

公安等
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 61 pages and entitled "COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE CONTROL OF OFFICE-SELLOUT IN THE FAR EAST, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL: VOLUME I, 71 (1930, 1931) "is an official document issued by the League of Nations, duly received by, and in the custody of, the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 28th day of February, 1947.

/s/ H. HAYASHI
signature of official

Witness: K. [signature]
Staff Office of the Kwantung Army.
19th October, 1931.

Particulars on the Activities of Japanese Troops
Immediately after the Blowing up of the Railway Line by Chinese Troops.

As soon as the Chinese troops began to flee, after they had blown up the railway line, Lieutenant K. Ikedo began to fire at them, together with four privates who were operating under his guidance at that time, and two other privates who were accompanying him as guards.

At that time it was quite dark and the field of vision was narrow.

When the Japanese troops shot at the Chinese troops, who were running away, enemy troops who were stationed in a brick-yard and others in the vicinity of a corn field, quickly opened up with a furious barrage. They seemed to be heading toward the vicinity of some detaching barracks at Liutiaokou, southwest of the brick-yard. At this juncture, therefore, our troops returned the fire.

It was not long before a southbound express leaving Changchun for Dairen (it was to arrive at Mukden at 10:30 p.m.) neared. Therefore, some of our troops immediately tried to stop the train by setting up a light signal, but the train continued southward without stopping.

- 1 -
P.S. A section of the rails was damaged. The fish plate, and portions of the connecting rails, a little longer than the fish plate, were completely out, but the rest of the rails were neither bent, nor damaged otherwise. Inasmuch as the destruction of this kind and to this extent does not hinder the movement of trains, the train averted being derailed.

According to the statement of a private the express train passed through leaning a little to one side.

The enemy troops who were entrusted with the explosion sustained injuries by our fire and were lying on a street, after having fled northward along the railway line for about 200 metres.

P.S. It is surmised that they, knowing that the express train was south-bound, purposely avoided the rail road and were now lying on a street.

The foregoing are the particulars on the activities of our troops immediately after the explosion took place, and as the express train arrived at Mukden at 10:30 p.m. it is evident that the explosion took place after 10 p.m., but it is of course inevitable that the exact time or place etc. of the explosion lacks definiteness, owing to the fact that it was quite dark at the time and that the explosion occurred suddenly and during an engagement.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese by the Staff Office of the Kwantung Army on the 19th of October, 1937, consisting of 7 pages, inclusive of the front page, entitles "Particulars on the Activities of Japanese Troops Involved in the Blowing up of the Railway Line by Chinese Workers" in a form in which was delivered to me at that time, and which has been hereafter in my copy.

Certified in F Afro Prefecture
on this 20th day of January, 1947.

/s/ SHINOGO Junichi

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witnesses.

At the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /s/ SHINOGO Junichi

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Richard S. Yonehiro of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate as to the best of my knowledge and belief is correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Richard Yonehiro

Tokyo, Japan
Date 27 February 1947
支那方面電信部長官至當日時表示、支那方面電信部長官至當日時表示、支那方面電信部長官至當日時表示、支那方面電信部長官至當日時表示、支那方面電信部長官至當日時表示。
Def. Doc. 334-A

DIAGNOSIS.

SHIBA, OTTO Shunichi

61 years old.

The above named is suffering from gall-stone and is under treatment. He will require a rest for one month more for convalescence.

14th March, 22nd year of Showa (1947)

Signed. SHIBA. Shunichi (seal)

No. 446, Otsu, Tsukijicho, Sumoto-shi, Hyogo-ken.
昭和二十二年正月三日

防

島

正

六十一年
these circumstances, though it seemed almost unnecessary. Now, I shall come back to the question of the actual situation, and try to make it clear. Though the China Incident did not take the form of declaration of war, it is, at any rate, a sort of war, and is a war on a considerably large scale. It is unavoidable, therefore, that so long as this state of war exists, those rights and interests of the powers in the areas of hostilities in China, would be affected, especially if the foregoing rights and interests turn out to be at the places impeding our military operations.

Therefore, if the powers desire not to sustain any damages that might be inflicted upon their rights and interests in China, they should desire the earliest possible settlement of the Incident. If the Incident is settled, their rights and interests should naturally be safeguarded without any protests. However, some powers have helped and are still helping the Chungking Government by affording the Government various facilities and thus strengthening its power of resistance, and have tried to protract the Incident. Especially they are steadily sending Arms and ammunition and other commodities to areas under the Chungking Government by way of so-called "aid-Chiang routes" such as Hongkong, French-Indo China, Kungchow Bay and Burma; and thus giving the Chiang's regime "corphor-shots," they are trying to strengthen Chiang's power of resistance against Japan and are planning to protract the war even a single day.

It is true, however, the routes through Hongkong and French-Indo China of the above "aid-Chiang routes" have stopped transportation of Arms and other commodities in response to our demand since last June.

As regards the "Burman route," Great Britain promised to stop
transportation of munitions, etc. for three months beginning July 13. And though the term will be up on next October 13, it is doubtful whether this blockade of the "Burma route" will be continued or not.

Since the Hongkong and the French-Indo China routes are blocked up, the Burma route is now the only one which is able to transport a considerable amount of commodities. Therefore, whether that route will be reopened or not after it was once blocked, is a great help for us to ascertain the attitude of Great Britain toward us today when the Tripartite Pact has been formed, and we are now watching with great interest what attitude will be taken by Great Britain. And the French-Indo China route was blocked up, as above mentioned, but afterwards it became necessary for us to send our armed forces there, in order to carry out our military operations toward China. Then, negotiations between myself and the French Ambassador in Tokyo came to an agreement on August 30 concerning the passage of our armed forces through the territory of French-Indo China, and the employment of the aerodromes there. Next, on September 4 a sort of agreement was reached between the military authorities of both countries on the spot. Furthermore, on September 22 after much parley, an executive agreement was effected on the spot which enabled our troops stationed at the frontier districts of South China to march across the border line into the territory of French-Indo China, and on the other hand, enabled some of our units to land in Haiphong from the sea. In the mean while only a few cases of trouble broke out, and the relation between our country and French-Indo China has lately developed amicably, and consequently our residents in that territory, who once tried to evacuate on account of the
threatening situation prevailed, have returned to their residences with our consul general there, and the situation seems to have restored to its former normalcy. However, the governments of Great Britain and the United States have made various protests against our Government because they probably misunderstood that Japan was going to occupy French-Indo China by force of arms. But it is clear, as the joint statement of Japan and France shows, that we respect the territorial integrity of French-Indo China, and have no intention of occupying that territory. Concerning this matter, we made clear to the British and American ambassadors whenever they made protests or asked us for informations. As this affair developed, however, the United States has placed a total embargo upon her export of steel scraps to our country, and has given a new credit amounting to $25,000,000 to Chiang Kai-shek. These policies taken by the U.S.A. seem to justify her protesting attitude toward us.

It goes without saying that our country has absolutely no intention of purposely fighting with any other country, but at the same time we reject and are determined to fight to the end with any nation which tries to stand by Chiang Kai-shek, and thus protract the China Incident, and prevent East Asia from restoring to peace.

Meanwhile, in the European theatre, both Germany and Italy have further intensified their attack on Great Britain, and especially German air forces are engaged in bitter bombing over Great Britain. However, their attacks have not yet reached the critical turning point in the war in their favor. Accordingly, the United States has remarkably increased her assistance to Great Britain. Main events in this period are as follows:
an agreement of joint defense was effected between Canada and the United States on August 17; on September 3 Great Britain took over 50 destroyers from the United States of America on condition that of the British territories along the Atlantic coasts of both North and South America those which are necessary to the United States as bases of her naval and air forces, shall be offered to the United States; and the tendency is that this cooperation between the two countries has lately spread over the areas ranging from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and to the South Seas.

There is also an information reporting that the United States is contemplating to conclude such an agreement of joint defense as effected between the United States and Canada with Australia and New Zealand as well. We should regard that the above will be realized.

This Tripartite Pact is indeed a treaty effected under such circumstances and essentially defensive in its nature. Negatively the Pact aims at checking the aggravation of the world chaos which might be accelerated by the new participation of any country either in the China Incident or in the European War, while, positively, it aims at establishing a new order which enables each nation in the world to live in contentment and peace, and at bringing about permanent peace on the basis of justice and impartiality through the cooperation of the three powers — Japan, Germany and Italy.

The fact is that the lofty spirit of so-called "HANKOKICHIU" (the world as one household), in other words, this great ideal of the "YuuJi" race (Japanese) manifested in the Rescript of Emperor JIMMU at the foundation of our country, has for the first time been given shape in the modern international treaty. It is really a sincere desire of mankind and also a Providence, I believe, for the three peoples of Japan, Germany
The Tripartite Pact is in reality the world's greatest and essentially defensive in its nature—

at checking the aggression of the world aggressors by the new participation of any country other than Italy in the European war, while, positively, it aims at making each nation in the world to love peace and at bringing about permanent peace on the basis of necessity through the cooperation of the three—
The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, and enabling each country, in other words, this "Yamato" race (Japanese) manifested in the Hōgen-ki (the world as one household), in other words, this peace (the world as one household); in other words, this

the foundation of our country, has for the first time agreed to the modern international treaty. It is really a stroke of peace and also a Providence, I believe, for this time.
Italy to unit firmly into one under this great ideal and lofty spirit in
the face of the unprecedented chaotic crisis that the world has ever had.

I think if the Chiang regime, which is still resisting us, should
come to appreciate the intrinsic nature of this strong alliance, the same
regime will realize that the way to assure the Chinese people to recover
and to save the lives of the Chinese masses out of the difficulty is for
her to cooperate with the powers of the Tripartite Pact and the New Chinese
Government in Hankin in the construction of the Greater East Asia co-
prosperity Sphere, rather than to continue to sacrifice a large number of
her innocent people by playing a part in the defensive front of the
western imperialism.

On the other hand, I am not yet in a position to tell you concretely
what response has the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact created, or is
going to create among the powers. It is certain, however, that the great
strength of the Tripartite Pact has given such a deep impression upon the
powers that some of them are taking strong attitude in desperation toward
us, and we should always look out for it. At the same time, it seems that
a reflective view of what made Japan, Germany and Italy effect such a
pact is gradually gaining ground. At any rate, we should always make pre-
parations in anticipation the worst situation.

In the Imperial Rescript promulgated when Japan withdrew from the
League of Nations, His Majesty the Emperor specially declared: "However,
the advancement of international peace is what, as evermore, we desire,
and our attitude toward enterprises of peace shall sustain no change.
By quitting the League and embarking on a course of its own, Our Empire
does not mean that it will stand aloof in the extreme Orient nor that it will isolate itself thereby from the fraternity of nations. It is Our desire to promote mutual confidence between Our Empire and all the other powers and to make known the justice of its cause throughout the world. Furthermore, in the Imperial Rescript issued when the present alliance was concluded, His majesty the Emperor said at the outset: "It is a great instruction of Our Imperial Ancestors which We always observe faithfully to uphold the cause of justice and humanity throughout the world and to change the universe into one household." In conformity with this Imperial will, We should more positively exert ourselves to improve our diplomatic relations with other nations, and to bring about true peace all over the world. However, we are living in an unprecedented turbulent age and are unable to tell what accident will further happen, when, and where. And jealousy and suspicion are commonly associated with the age of wars. For example, when we declare that we intend to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, some states are apt to doubt if Japan, monopolizing the Greater East Asia including the South Seas, is going to shut out other powers from the area and to deny their rightful actions therein. This is not true. The object thereof is to do away with all the improper conducts and measures which the western powers have hitherto practiced as well as all the unnatural restrictions imposed by them upon the rightful actions of human beings in the field of their economic activities such as commerce, enterprise, communications, traffic and the like in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. And our country also wishes to act on the same equal basis with the other powers, in order to promote
the prosperity and stabilization of all the races in the Greater East Asia Sphere, so that they may walk along the path of mutual tolerance and welfare with the prerequisite condition of freedom to cut and decide their own respective way to Fortune.

In short, Japan, unlike the practice hitherto committed by the western powers neither intends to swallow up any territories nor conquer, nor exploit any people in this sphere. On the contrary, Japan wants to free the natives from the imperialistic oppressions, to love them as brothers and sisters instead of treating them as slaves, and to establish a relation of mutual existence and prosperity. The reason why Japan intends to adopt such a policy is not because of the regard for other states, or because she considers it a wise policy under the present trend of the world, but because of her fear of Heaven. That our country is the divine land means, in a sense, that if our state acts in accordance with Providence, we can enjoy divine grace, whereas if not, we shall incur the wrath of Heaven. Therefore, when we carry out our foreign policy, I believe that we must pay attention to the fact that our country is the divine land. Indeed our future is full of difficulties. At the present moment, we should exert ourselves to construct a strong defensive country in which 100,000,000 of us shall be united into one, and at the same time, to consolidate the economic relations in the Greater East Asia Sphere.

With these objectives in view, Mr. KOBAYASHI, Minister of Commerce and Industry, has been specially sent to the Dutch Indies and is now engaged in negotiations with the authorities there, and likewise a special envoy is going to be dispatched to French-Indo China. We want also
to strengthen coalition with Thailand and other countries in the future.

In connection with the present pact, I should like to touch upon how our country should deal with the relations between us and the Soviet Union.

The relations between our country and the Soviet Union, heretofore, have not been friendly for various reasons, but I believe that at this critical moment which might be called the time of a world revolution, both countries should not quarrel with each other at the corner of East Asia. I believe that the time has now come when, if there is any misunderstanding or if there are any pending problems between the two countries, we should now try to remove or settle them and should cooperate for a greater mission. In the Soviet Union they are repeatedly saying that they won't pick up chestnuts in the fire for any other state. This is the same with every nation. Under the present circumstances nothing would be more favourable to other states in the world than conflict between the Soviet Union and Japan. I believe nothing would result more in picking up chestnuts in the fire for others than this. Accordingly in article 4 of the present treaty, we have made it clear that this pact shall not at all affect the relations between the Soviet Union and the contracting powers -- Japan, Germany and Italy. However, we can never tolerate communism to be prevalent in our country or in both Manchuria and China, and it goes without saying that there is further need for the strict control of it. Therefore, one of the objectives of the movement of "SHINTAISEI" (the New Order), for instance, should be to eliminate, on one hand, every social contradiction from which dangerous thoughts are liable to spring
and to strengthen the spirit of the Imperial Way by holding our nation closely together, and practising social justice, and on the other, to root out such ideologies as communism and democracy which do not fit to our national structure. Practically speaking, under the present international situation, we are compelled to handle the question of ideology as a domestic problem, rather than an international and we have to deal with international questions, namely questions between one country and another, apart from the question of ideology. Strictly speaking, this is a very difficult problem, but I believe we should consider it as the actual tendency of the existing international political situation and deal with it accordingly. In this connection, I wish you will have a deep insight into the fact, and consider the two factors separately.

The last point I should like to touch upon on this pact is the fact that although it has been effected, it does not necessarily mean that Japan will take part in the European War, or will immediately make an enemy of any power other than Germany and Italy. So long as the powers which have not yet participated in the European War or the China Incident do not attack any of the three Countries—Japan, Germany and Italy, nor disturb our plan of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, our country is willing to be in friendly terms with them and to share in the godsend benefits. It goes without saying that we have no intention of breeding unnecessary troubles with them. Therefore we should strictly refrain from raising any rash anti-foreign agitation without any justifiable reasons.

By the way, as there are instances in which a trivial matter result-
In a grave consequence or effect, I should like to add a few more words in this connection. I dare say it is not infrequent that the attitude of our policemen in charge of foreign nationals is apt to be unnecessarily irritating toward them. To be frank with you, this state of affair has so far turned out to be unfavourable to our country in dealing with international problems.

As we are in a period of emergency, today, it may be more difficult, I am sure, to deal with this affair than in normal times, but for the very reason that this is an emergency, I hope you will be all the more prudent about this matter. I should like to ask you to stop, as far as possible, any interference or supervision which is apparently not in line with our common sense. At the same time, I should like to ask you to instruct our people to be magnanimous worthy of a great nation in advancing toward our great aim. I believe that the pact which has been concluded this time shows this direction very clearly. I am now feeling that the dark clouds and fog that had long been hanging low before us since the outbreak of the China Incident have now been swept away, and we can now see a bright future full of hope, though the way to it may be very difficult and steep. I earnestly hope and am counting on you that you officials will make our people understand well what I have said today and at this critical moment when the destiny of the "Yahiko" race, (Japanese) may, of the entire human beings of the world may be determined, you will render your service to our country together with our whole 100,000,000 people united as one body.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, [Name], Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 14 pages and entitled "Address of Matsuoka, Foreign Minister, at the Governor's Conference, October 7, 1940." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo

on this 7th day of December, 1946.

/S/ K. [Signature]
Signature of Official

Witness [Name]
Document

December 10, 1936

(The 11th year of S.T.O.A.)

Report on the China Situation No. 72

On the SIAI Incident

General Staff Office

1. Outline of the Incident

Chang Hsueh-lian arrested and imprisoned CHIANG Kai-shek at the "CHANG CHIN Hot Springs at 3:00 A.M. December 12, 1936, detaining at the same time several important Central Government men including CHEN chong, CHIANG Ting-chen, CHEN Tiao-yuan, CHU Shao-liang, CHUN Ta-chur, SHAO Li-tzu and others, and then sent a telegram to the Nanking Government demanding:

(1) national salvation by resisting Japan; (2) alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and admittance of Communism; (3) suspension of the punitive campaign against the Communist Army; and (4) reorganization of the National Government. It is also reported that CHIANG Kai-shek was arrested when he was scheduled to leave by plane on the 12th having known Chang Hsueh-lian's intrigue beforehand.
It seems that the leader directly responsible was Li To-chuan, Chief of Chang Shu-chiang's Guard Troops (former commander of the 16th Division). The facts of CHAI and others is still unknown.

It can be said that China, which is on the way to national unity, is again been thrown into confusion by this incident. It appears that this was not planned and carried out by Chang Shu-chiang alone but the TANG Wu-chien also has complicity in it. Furthermore, there are indications that there are many conspirators in the 'A-WING' Government, the principal ones being TANG Wu-chien, LI Li-chun and CHAI Chi, and it is further said that Yu Yu-jen, SING Fo and SING Tsu-wen (T.Y. Soong) are also in collusion with the plot.

There is also a rumour that 7 champions of the National Salvation League of the Entire Nation and all-circles, including CHAI Fai-chi and others, who previously were arrested as the result of suppression of anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang movements, will soon be released to spur on anti-Japanese and Communistic movements. Moreover, a section of persons in important positions in the 'A-WING' Government regard this incident as resulting from CHAI Fai-shok's insufficient knowledge of the former North-Eastern Army and have come to have less confidence in CHAI's, giving rise to an anti-Chiang feeling within the Government. The situation has now been brought about where the 'A-WING' Government which outwardly
seemed united under CHING T'ai-ko's dictatorship may again be broken up into various sections and is proceeding in the direction desired by them.

2. Cause of the Incident.

In order to get at the real truth whether CHING Hsiao-liang plans to become the vanguard of the army to fight against Japan, being dissatisfied with CHING T'ai-ko's attitude toward Japan and at the instigation of the U.S.S.R., or whether he desires to take the initiative in the anti-China movement in order to recover his own influence which has gradually been reduced since the Manchurian Incident. He was driven beyond the Great Wall by the Japanese forces following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and his views with regard to recovery were not accepted by CHING T'ai-ko so that finally his entire army was forced to withdraw within the Great Wall. For a while he was in north China as chairman of the Peiping Branch of the Military Council but called in-custant by the people as soon as fighting began in Jehol and this being more than he could bear, he tried to go abroad. Six months later, in January, 1934, after things had calmed down within the country, he returned to Shanghai, but the only thing which awaited him was CHING T'ai-ko's commission appointing him Deputy Commander of the Peking 4th National Army at VAHOC. There was no sign of his cherished ambition to recover the lost north-eastern territory being headed at all. However, he could do nothing against CHING who was then at the height of his powers.
In compliance with an order he had to go to HANKOW, and thus began his career of bandit extermination. Thereafter, he fought for two years in one district after another in pursuit of various communist bands, and was finally forced to confess the Central Government's inability to fight them. Meanwhile, military funds not being supplemented by the Central Government, many of his subordinates left him day after day on his influence gradually waned. While he was thus in a state of insubordination, CHIANG started to organize CHIANG's declining forces by further reducing the influence of his men under the pretext of coordinating the military affairs of the entire country. Chang Szech-liang, son of the CHIANG family, which once boasted of a military strength of 300,000 men as a king of Manchuria and whose control extended over seven provinces, was now sustaining his life as just another war lord with a greatly reduced force of only 100,000 men in a remote district where there was no food or houses to be had, carrying the favour of dictator CHIANG Kai-shek, who held his defeat completely in his hand. Anybody, if not Chang Szech-liang, would have complained of such a plight, feeling dissatisfaction and discontent.

As a result of successive years of contact with the communist forces, Chang Szech-liang's forces which were in a state of disorder, indignation, and fear on account of defeats...
were easily saturated by critical Communist propaganda, and
especially, as the extreme leftists among Chang Huch-liong's
retainers gradually became moractive, the majority of the
junior officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or less who
were the minister of his forces, seem to have turned red.
It is reported that those Communist elements counselled Chang
Huch-liong to demand Chiang Yai-shao to declare war immediately
against Japan and on this pretext to imprison CHIANG when he en-
to SIA at the end of last October, but, produced by Chang Huch-
liong, they finally gave up this plan. According to another
version Chang Huch-liong had been in contact with the
U.S.S.R. through CHIEF Shih-tsai of SINGKIANG since six months
ago, kept in touch with PLA Yu-ze-wei, Yu Yu-jen, TANG Tsai-i,
Ho Chung-hen and TSAI Lung (Commander of the assassination unit
compromised with the Communist forces, making a part of KINGSA
a communist basecord alarmed to complete the construction of the
international route, and that in so doing he merely intended
to fighting the communists as an excuse. Therefor, it
may be regarded as a fact that Commander Chang Huch-liong
and the inner circle of his forces have been considerably
Communized. It appears reasonable to regard the present
incident as having been started with considerable determination
to steal the march on Chiang Yai-shao by catching him off guard
as a result of their accumulated discord and Bolshevikization
and they did so taking advantage of the appointment of CHIANG
Jung-wen as Commander-in-chief of the Front Line Bandits.
Extirpation Army and a rumour of the transfer of the forces to SUXIAN, or "YUN", utilizing as excuses such facts as China's rejection at the Nanjing negotiations of the Sino-Japanese Joint Defense against Communism, the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese movement throughout the country in connection with the SUXIAN question, the transfer of the central forces near SIAN, and the losses sustained in "fighting bandits" by the 1st Division which was regarded as the very pick of the Chinese forces.

3. Attitude of the Nanjing Government.

The NANNING Government, which was informed about CHANG Hau-ch-Liang's military rebellion for the first time at 3 p.m. of the 12th, was greatly dismayed and immediately dispatched an aerial reconnaissance Squad to SIAN to ascertain the true situation. Upon receipt at 11 a.m. of a definite report that CHANG Hui-shih was under detention, an Extraordinary Joint Conference of the Standing and Political Councils was hurriedly called and matters as given below were decided. Also as a means to get CHANG Hui-shih's release it was decided to dispatch his personal advisor DONALD and others to SIAN and have them negotiate with CHANG Hau-ch-Liang.

Items decided at the Extraordinary Conference:

1) "YUEH HSING HSU shall take charge as President of the Executive YUAN."

2) The Standing Committee of the Military Council shall be...
First read from 6 to 7, and "HO YING-CHIIV, CHEN HSIH, LI LINH-TCHU, CHU PAI-TSING, FR. 2 MUN-CHI, TANG CHIN-CHIN, and YEN HSIO.

3) The military council shall be asked under the supervision of FR.1, the Chairman, and the above-mentioned Standing Committee with full responsibility.

4) "HO YING-CHIIV, Minister of War, shall assume control of the mobile units.

5) CHANG HSUH-LIANG shall be directed of his regular and concurrently held positions and shall be subject to war punishment by the Military Council. The troops under CHANG HSUH-LIANG shall be asked under the direct command of the Military Council.

Although the above-mentioned decisions appear to show a notably high recognition of the authority of "HO YING-CHIIV and HO YING-HSIIV, subversive activities of the Pro-Soviet faction, including "HO HSUH-LIANG, still remain unblasted, and even after the commencement of the Central Army's punitive actions, they came to a compromise with CHANG HSUH-LIANG under the pretext of rescuing CHANG HAI-SHIH. These actions suspended mopping up operations against bandits, having accepted CHANG HSUH-LIANG's contortions and insisted on waging war against J demean cooperation with CHANG HSUH-LIANG. For this "HO YING-HSIIV flew to SIY and in an attempt to negotiate with CHANG HSUH-LIANG. As they seem to be taking in entirely opposite attitude, judging from all these actions.
their activities in the future and be closely watched.

4. Consequent of actions by the Central Army.

As it shows in the "Consequent of decisions at the extraordinary conference of the KAMIN Government inasmuch as each decision was made by the central authorities to not only carry out a severe punishment to CHUNG FEI-LING. The Military Council considered that a declaration of punitive action need not be specially issued and immediately ordered the Central Army to go into action. Accordingly, an infantry corps and an artillery unit, belonging to the specially trained forces of the KAMIN Military Academy, which constituted the crack troops of the Central Army, were dispatched to SIIF and simultaneously, 3 divisions, garrisoning LOY E, were sent to the vicinity of Tungkwa, 3 divisions at LIUCHIN were made to proceed to the vicinity of LOY E, as 2nd line forces, and several airforce units as a to have been transferred to LOY E. In SIF, heavy r. immediately upon the outbreak of the incident, 60 of the body Guard Unit, of CHUNG FEI-SHAY, were killed and 30 wounded, most being taken prisoners. All the main forces of the Guard Unit, which were within the walls of the city, were also dispersed. Twenty-one airplanes of the 2nd Air Company which were at the airfield as well as the 6 planes which flew from TANING on the 12th were to have been seized by CHUNG FEI-LING's army. Moreover, it is reported that KU TENG-HEI's war in the eastern part of KAMIN clashed
with the YU FEN-SHEN's army on the 12th and entered L. H.W. on the 13th.

In connection to this, YU FEN-SHEN's army totally surrounded and occupied the positions against the Redites south of SHF and its main forces seem to have been concentrating in the north and northwest of SHF. At the time of the incident there was in the vicinity of SHF only the 10th Division of CHUNG HUN-LIEN's army, besides 2 or 3 corps of YU FEN-SHEN's army. Another portion of CHUNG HUN-LIEN's army (including one infantry corps and upward of 10 pieces of artillery), immediately after the incident tried to neutralize the advance of the Central Army by occuring adjacent areas of Yung-wen but was defeated by AN YO-O's army on the night of the 12th, and the western part of the troops is said to have been taken prisoners.

YU FEN-SHEN is said to have established in W.S.I. N. the T'AO-SUN General Headquarters, formerly the T'AO-SUN General Headquarters.

f. Attitude of war-lords in Various Areas

It is difficult to pass any judgment at this moment as to the attitude of the war-lords in various areas but the situation as it has become clear up to now is as follows:

1) EMERGENCY

Yu FEN-SHEN and T'UNG Mu-sung promptly sent a telegram to the central government under joint signatures to the effect
that they would support the central government and maintain local peace and order, but the observation is that Yu Hsi-min's true intention is to watch the course of developments.

2) Hsipai

Supporting the LI Tsung-jen and CHU Hsi-chi or involved in this incident, "HC" Hsi-chi seems to have asked for their opinions on the 13th, but they have yet expressed their views yet. However, it is rumored that their deputy CHU Mo Jan-liu at LIU He-tao, TC Chien and others at HANGCHOW, and discussed about starting a movement to support CHU MO Hsueh-liang in opposition to "CH" Hsi-chi

3) Hsien-ch’ien

On the night of the 13th, SUM GHU-wu ordered local lords in various districts to assemble at PIPIING. It now is that as a result of the conference held at MINGYUAN on the 14th a resolution was adopted that the Hsi-ch’ien government should strengthen its stand for a strict defense of frontiers and keeping the people’s mind at rest by vigorously carrying out the policy of anti-communism and of promoting Sino-Japanese collaboration. There seems to be no change in the attitude of WEN Pu-lin, toward the Hsi-ch’ien regime.

4) SHANTUNG

Having decided its own attitude, the Shantung government proposed to CHIEN TUNGH and HSISI to take the same step and it is said that although telegraphic answer from Shantung was
received shortly afterward, no answer was received from
Hupei until the 15th. Though T'ing Hsi-shih's attitude is
still unknown, it seems that he has ordered his forces
which had been sent to the northern Hupei and Honan area to
return to the place, east of Y Yen, where they were previously
stationed for defense.

6) EVOLUTION

T'ing Fu-chu's reaction must be taken in the light of the situation
judging that the future of the situation unpredictable and it
is considered that he will, for see this, continue his
present attitude of advocating defense of Shensi and Honan
numbers are said at last.

6) REVOLUTION AND ANNEXATION

Concerning the attitude of LIU Hsiang and T'ing Chi-ch'ü, nothing
definite is known yet. However, in view of the fact that they
have always been opposed to being deprived by KUO Hsi-shih of
their sphere of influence and their troops and that, LIU Hsiang
was recalled from his base and ordered to march out to HUPEI,
and further more in the light of the fact that there is a
rumor as stated above that they hold an anti-KUO Hsi-shih
conference with the representatives of WU-MOSI, it is not
difficult to suppose that they are at least willing among
themselves with pleasure even though they may not rise in
support of CHANG Hau-ch'iang.

-11-
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, [Name], hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 12 pages and entitled "On the S.I.N Incident" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Office), certified at Tokyo, on this 12th day of March, 1947

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here in the presence of the Witness.

[Signature]

WITNESS: [Name]
来日々縄波セラレ行ク自己努力達図ノ反震運動ノ萱クトラントセン

モノリヤヒ以カ報撰・シジキモ彼トシテハ羅州幕従勃勞ト共ニ日

ノ木ノ前外へノ鈴在ノキニ登リし北海道ノ容ル前トナラス遂

支ニセシモ総河駅前マルア期民ヨリ無頓呼ハリサレ遂ニ居タタ

ク冷ムルヲ待ち上海ニ進ベセシモ彼ヲ待チアリシモノハ発介石ノー

マラスシテ海ニ亡リセリ其後約半載四和九年一月居内ノ熱り波ヤ

東北矢地ノ後ノ知キハ片鱗タモヲヲ得サリシリ

然レトモ警察処ニ従ヒセシモキシカサニ彼ノ期碇シテハ如何トモスレ能ハス

ハ北嶋ノ北上ニ件之ヲ遞フテ那ノ北ノ谷ニ到リ賠償ノ局ニ排ニ過

昭和ノ年ノハ十分支給セラレス部下ノ
 эффект результатов экспериментов. Основной вопрос, который мы хотели бы выяснить, это вопрос о зависимости между показателями эффективности и определенных условиях эксперимента. Мы исследовали этот вопрос с помощью различных методов, включая анализ данных, статистические методы и моделирование. Результаты показывают, что зависимость существенна и имеет важное значение для понимания процесса в целом.
An Informal Talk of the Chief of the Information Bureau
About the Sian Incident (December, 1936)

On visiting Foreign Minister Arita on the 17th, Ambassador Fan stated that the President CHIANG was still alive and well in Sian according to the report of Adviser DONALD who met CHIANG Kai-shek at Sian. Minister Arita, then told the following to Ambassadorusu, "It gives me a great pleasure to hear that President CHIANG is alive and well. As the truth is not yet known to us concerning the present Sian incident, the Japanese Government intends to consider the matter for some time. The tendency of this incident, however, has a serious influence upon Japan, so the Imperial Government has been keeping its watch on the matter with great concern. According to the paper reports, CHIANG Hshueh-liang appears to stand for communism and anti-Japanese activity, but the bolsheovization of the neighboring countries would bring serious danger to the security of our Empire, and in consequence to the peace of the vast Asia. So should this report be true, our Imperial Government would expect China to take strict and appropriate measures against it."
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, MUNAKI Kogu, who occupy the post of Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereunto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "An Informal Talk of the Chief of the Information Bureau" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,

on the 12th day of March, 1967

MUNAKI Kogu
(Chief)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: [Signature]
(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 16 April 1947
An Informal Talk of the Chief of the Information Bureau
About the Sian Incident (December, 1936)

On visiting Foreign Minister Arita on the 17th Ambassador Han stated that the President CHING was still alive and well in Sian according to the report of Adviser DONALD who met CHANG Kai-shek at Sian. Minister Arita, then told the following to Ambassador Yau, "It gives me a great pleasure to hear that President CHING is alive and well. As the truth is not yet known to us concerning the present Sian incident, the Japanese Government intends to consider the matter for some time. The tendency of this incident, however, has a serious influence upon Japan, so the Imperial Government has been keeping its watch on the matter with great concern. According to the paper reports, CHANG Hakueh-liang appears to stand for communism and anti-Japanese activity, but the Bolshevization of the neighboring countries would bring serious danger to the security of our Empire, and in consequence to the peace of the East Asia. So should this report be true, our Imperial Government would expect China to take strict and appropriate measures against it."
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, Shigeharu Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereeto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "Supplementary Measures to Implement the Chief of the Information Bureau", is an exact and authorized copy of the document in the custody of the Japan Government (Foreign Office).

certified at Tokyo,
on the 10 day of March, 1947

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: [Signature]
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 16 April 1947
Discussion of the Japanese motor vehicle and tank industry; corporate structure and the history of governmental control receive the major emphasis. The capacity and technological aspects of this industry are also discussed.

31 October 1945
III. TOTAL WAR-INDUSTRY

- Production: Physical and Technical Aspects

1. General Background.

The Japanese motor vehicle industry, virtually non-existent prior to 1936, is still extremely small by western standards. Its aggregate capacity has been assessed at from 70,000 to 90,000 vehicles of all types per year. If trucks alone were produced, as recent intelligence suggested, Japanese annual motor vehicle manufacturing capacity was probably of the order of 70,000 one and one-half ton or larger vehicles in 1944. Output for that year was estimated at 15,000 motor trucks. The motor vehicle industry is estimated to have had a capacity of about 3,000 tanks annually (1 January 1945), but no more than 400 tanks were estimated to have been produced in 1944. In spite of considerable conversion of its facilities to higher priority production, the industry apparently was able to fulfill all essential wartime requirements. The Army's losses in combat were small, gains by conquest substantial, and domestic truck requirements negligible. Shortage of fuel and repair parts prevented trucks from securing an important position in industrial transport.

The automobile industry was probably the most backward branch of the metal and machinery group in the country in 1936, and the total number of motor vehicles in use was only 136,094. Nevertheless it had made considerable strides since 1929.

- I -
Tank production was so small as to represent little drain on truck component or assembly facilities. In the year 1944, it is estimated that Japan produced in addition to trucks and tanks, 10,000 motorcycles, 600 trailers, and 200 tractors. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the growth of production for trucks and automobiles respectively. The former table also attempts to show the overall truck position as well as give production data for recent times. The latter table is of historical interest only.

In order to achieve her 1944 level of vehicle production, Japan was devoting a labor force of about 150,000 to that field. (See P.P.I. 2271, *Industrial Distribution of the Population of Japan.* )

2. Importance to the Military.

a. Military Encouragement. The approach of the Japanese to the establishment of a native automotive industry was not based upon economics but upon the opinion of the Japanese Government that reasons of national defense required such a step regardless of the cost. National pride was also
involved. Automobiles were considered an indispensable necessity for the expanding military forces. The Japanese army was the most influential.

**Table 4.**

**JAPAN-Occupation**

JAPAN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

(In thousands of vehicles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registrations (as of 1 Jan)</th>
<th>Raw Production</th>
<th>Imports in Occupied Westerm Territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>111.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>123.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>157.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Less than 500 vehicles*
## Table 5.  
CARS IMPORTED OR ASSEMBLED  
AMERICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY  
1929-1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (est.)</th>
<th>Domestic Production</th>
<th>Cars Imported or Assembled from Imported Parts</th>
<th>Assembled from Imported Parts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>29,336</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td>30,787</td>
<td>27,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>15,082</td>
<td>14,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>9,633</td>
<td>30,997</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and insistent supporter of the government policy in promoting a purely Japanese automotive industry. It insisted that Japan be independent of all foreign makers of trucks. With the aid of a heavy government subsidy, increased import duties, and restricted operations on the part of foreign motor car manufacturers, a domestic automobile industry was established, and two firms were charged with the objective of turning out some 60,000 cars and trucks annually by about 1942. The military, who constituted the only group of consumers in Japan that preferred Japan-made cars to reliance upon any foreign source of supply, were not interested in passenger cars; they were not interested in any export market; they were not interested in styling chances or appearance of the truck. They considered the matter purely from the point of view of military necessity in its most restricted sense.

b. Government Subsidy and Tariffs. Automobiles manufactured in Japan could hardly have been sold without government assistance. Trucks manufactured by military authorities were produced on the basis of government subsidy, the government buying most of the output and subsidizing private business concerns into buying the rest. For example, in the immediate pre-war period, the government provided a subsidy of ¥300 per military motor truck of the six-wheel, one and one-half metric ton type. It cost about ¥2,000 for the Japanese producer to make a standard size car for the small pre-war Japanese market. The Torado truck, which is a combination of the parts of three American cars, was sold to the general public for ¥6,500. According to Japanese sources, it was sold at a loss of ¥3,500. As a result of this cost position, and ignoring differences in quality, it is obvious that no competition with the American
producer was impossible. United, import duties for iron, equivalent to approximately 49 percent ad valorem on both cars and parts.

**Military Equipment on Motor Vehicles.** On the whole the Japanese military forces were relatively less dependent on tanks and motor vehicles than those of the United States or any of the major European powers. Comparative T.O. requirements indicated that in the year 1943 Japanese armored divisions contained approximately one-fifth as many tanks as U.S. armored divisions and slightly more than a third as many tanks as the German and British armored divisions. T.O. requirements for Japanese infantry divisions were correspondingly low. While a German division (15,379 men) had 1,122 cars and trucks and 353 motorcycles, a Japanese infantry division (20,000 men) had only 60 cars and trucks and 20 motorcycles. It is evident, therefore, that the Japanese motor vehicle and tank equipment was far below the scale of other powers.

Table 6 indicates the estimated holdings of the Japanese Army for vehicles of various types.

**Table 6.**

**Estimated Equipment Strength of Japanese Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Vehicle</th>
<th>1 Jan 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Tanks</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Tanks</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Cars</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Trucks</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: All figures are in thousands.*
3. Importance to the Industrial Economy. Japan has always been much less dependent on motor vehicles for transportation than any of the western countries. At the beginning of 1938, for example, Japan had on the average only one truck or bus for 700 people as against one for 38 people in the United States, 81 people in the United Kingdom, and 186 in Germany. Even Italy and the US, ranking next lowest to Japan, had about twice as many trucks or buses per capita.

The Japanese rely for transportation primarily on their excellent railroad system and water-borne conveyances. In certain parts of Japan, human and animal carriage is extensively utilized. Moreover, the available motor vehicles are intensively utilized and, by American standards, heavily overloaded. This reliance on rail and ship transport is in part due to the several following economic factors.

a. Restricted Internal Market. Instances of Japan's disadvantageous cost position could be applied to the manufacture not only of the standard size American-type car but also to manufacture of the Datsun or midget cars. Practically speaking, there was no foreign competitor of the Japanese midget car in the Japanese market. The English Baby Austin and English Baby Ford sold a few units, and they were far superior in quality to the Datsun. But the Japanese people did not take readily to a midget car even when it was priced as low as the Datsun. It would have had to be sold for considerably under ¥ 1,000 to find a substantially larger market, and this would probably result in a loss of ¥ 2,000 or more per unit to the manufacturer. The small output of the Japanese automobile factories is, in turn, the principal cause of the high cost of production.
b. Labor, Materials, and Machine Tool Costs. The labor cost is the only factor which favors Japan in the production of automobiles. Materials, nearly all of which are imported, and machine tools, which until very recently were likewise imported, are more expensive in Japan than in the United States. This was probably true even under the law of 1936 for promoting the Japanese automotive industry, which decreased the cost of materials and machine tools by exempting them from payment of import tariffs. In the past, Japanese producers in addition have not invested heavily in the costly special machine tools which are an important feature of American automobile plants. This fact has made the relative cost of plant equipment lower, but has likewise reduced the mechanical efficiency of the plant. There remains the question of whether Japanese labor and relatively elementary machine tools can reduce the cost of production to a point where Japanese manufacturers can operate on a paying basis in a free market situation.

c. Japan as User of American Techniques. In offsetting subsidiary question concerns patent infringements by Japanese producers through the wholesale copying of American automobiles. In the past, whenever the Japanese automobile manufacturers wished to patent a feature belonging to an American car, the Japanese patent law seemed to have been complied with if public notice of the application for a patent were given in an obscure newspaper published in a distant part of the country where there were no foreigners who were likely to be able to read Japanese. In a matter which was admittedly so vital to the Japanese Government, patent restrictions were never permitted to interfere.
4. Technological Aspects.

a. Tool Capacity. Basic manufacturing processes in the automotive field are light and medium engineering manufacturing processes largely dependent on precision machine tools, heavy presses, and forges. Japan was in the habit of importing the bulk of her specialized and precision tools, largely from the United States, but in the past few years, including the war period, she made a marked and resourceful effort to become self-sufficient in most machine tool lines. It is probable that the recently developed and reasonably adequate machine tool capacity of Japan could in a few months replace even such special and critical tools as cylinder block machines, heavy crankshaft lathes and grinders, gear-cutters, bobbers, grinders, hammers, presses, and auxiliary equipment for forgings and stampings.

What has been said of motor vehicles is also true of tanks. Much of the equipment in tank plants consists of large machine tools, the manufacture of which requires a long time; however, given her present machine tool capacity, Japan could probably retool her present plants in a year. It must also be remembered that a large part of the facilities used in the production of heavy machinery, locomotives, other railway equipment, and tanks is interchangeable.

The manufacture of motorcycles and three-wheelers requires little specialized equipment. If plants were dismantled, production could probably be dispersed to many small shops equipped with standard light machine tools.
5. Principal Raw Materials.

a. Supply. Until very recently most of the raw materials for Japan's automotive industry had to be partially or entirely imported from foreign countries. These materials included such essentials as magnesium, nickel, tin, iron, special steels, aluminum, raw cotton, and rubber. It is understood that fairly heavy stocks of some of these materials were being held in reserve for some time. Most of the supplies of nickel were obtained either directly or indirectly from Canada. Germany normally furnished a large proportion of the special steels. In 1938 Japan imported 70 percent of her rubber from British Malaya; most of the remainder was supplied by the Netherlands East Indies and British Borneo.

Although, because of wartime conditions, Japan may have originally found herself in difficulties for the lack of essential raw materials -- particularly high-grade alloy steels necessary in the manufacture of such critical automotive parts as crankshafts, cam shafts, etc. --
she clearly contrived to improve her situation during the wartime period by development of new installations and techniques and by widespread use of substitute materials.

b. Iron and Steel. Before the war, Japan depended on imported iron ore for 60-90 percent of her ore consumption. The bulk of her steel needs were also imported, mainly from the United States. During the war her iron and steel industry depended almost entirely on iron ore and coking coal mined on the continent. In 1943 Manchuria, Formosa, the Philippines, and Malaya supplied her with the required ore, in that order of importance. Estimates place the effective capacity of the steel producing plants in Japan proper in 1944 at about 12,000,000 metric tons, but capacity almost exceeded output -- so much so that in 1944 output was valued by the Japanese themselves at no more than 2,000,000 metric tons, with a further marked decrease for the first quarter of 1945. Shipping difficulties and air raids were primarily responsible for this trend. Great is this disparity between capacity and production in 1944 may cover, in actuality the 1944 figure (2,000,000 metric tons) is not far from Japan's total pre-war industrial requirements for steel (3,000,000 metric tons).

Of the four or five million metric tons of pig iron approximately equal tonnage of rolled and forged products which were produced in Japan in 1943, about 225,000 metric tons, or less than 6 percent, was allotted to the production of motor vehicles and tanks.
Regional Concentration. The iron and steel industry was heavily concentrated in a few important districts (Tokyo, Yokohama, Tobata, Yanata, and Anshan, Manchuria). Ten localities account for 86 percent of vis iron capacity, 94 percent of steel capacity, and 98 percent of rolled products. The industry is characterized by a few large integrated plants and a host of small plants. The three largest plants account for 30.5 percent of vis iron capacity, 36.2 percent of steel capacity, and 31 percent of rolled steel products. (See Appendix III.3).

(ii) Domestic Mines. Despite claims for iron sands, it is not believed that these resources are of major quantitative significance in the light of the technological difficulties involved in producing iron of an analysis suitable for steel making. Some iron was made from iron sands by a number of small domestic producers. However, only 250,000 tons of ore are attributed to this source, or enough to produce about 100,000 tons of rolled products. Even such limited success may be an indication of possible future developments along these lines, however.

(iii) Stocks. It is not likely that any substantial stock piles of semi-finished steel products existed in Japan at the war's end; accordingly, if production exceeded consumption at any period during the war, stock piles would most likely be in end products. Stocks of pig iron would be determined by the flow of iron ore and by the consumption of steel furnaces. Because of the crisis in Japan's shipping, probably no stocks existed in Japan at the war's end sufficient to carry over an extended interruption of supplies.
Moreover, in order to feed her capacity, it has been necessary for Japan to draw heavily on the limited iron ore resources of Manchuria, China, Korea, Philippines, and New Guinea. The iron and steel industry of Japan has from the outset been one of the most heavily subsidized industries in Japan over, primarily because both coking coal and the ores have had to be imported and the

2. Subsidies for the steel industry in Japan for the years 1937-1943 inclusive totalled ¥ 353,395,000. The coal industry during the same period received ¥ 790,923,000.
nearest ores available in the Far East are predominantly low-grade ores averaging 35 to 45 percent in iron content.

6. Structure of the Motor Vehicle Industry. Japan's motor vehicle industry, like her aircraft industry, draws on a very large number of plants for the various components required. However, automotive production as such is concentrated in five or six principal plants. In the case of tanks and large military tractors only one army arsenal and a small number of private plants have been definitely identified as producers. Those plants which on the basis of indirect evidence, have been credited with the capacity for tank production are restricted to the small number of nine or ten, while the bulk of the production capacity has been allocated to four of the largest. Although there are eleven known makers of motorcycles and three-wheelers ("sanrishos"), six plants account for about 75 percent of the capacity. (See Appendix III for list of plants producing trucks, military tractors, tanks, and other vehicles, their capacities and locations; see also Map II.) Finally the production of tires is also highly concentrated; three plants in Japan and one in Java accounted for over four-fifths of the total in Japanese controlled territories. (See Appendix XXII.)
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TANK INDUSTRY.

1. Brief History. The history of the automotive industry in Japan is a chronicle of military encouragement, government subsidy, and preferential legislation to establish an industry which was considered essential to national self-sufficiency, prestige, and military efficiency.

As early as 1918, motor car manufacture in Japan was encouraged by means of military subsidies to producers of trucks. In 1931 a committee was established to study the firm establishment of the automobile industry in Japan. In 1936 an interdepartmental conference was established, composed of officials of the Ministries of War, Navy, Defence, Home Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Overseas Affairs, and of the Resources Bureau of the Cabinet, to discuss means for the establishment of a national policy for the automobile industry. This interdepartmental conference compiled the basic plan, announced on 9 August 1935, for the control of the industry and worked out the draft of the Automobile Industry Control Law which was approved by the Cabinet on 26 April 1936. This law sought to freeze the expansion of foreign-controlled manufacturing interests and place importations on a rigid quota basis. It licensed certain Japanese companies for exclusive manufacture. In return for government supervision over production, licensed companies received a number of outstanding privileges, not the least of which was a practical monopoly of the Japanese motor vehicle industry. (Sec - 15 -
Appendix II: For full text as published in the Official Gazette, 29 May 1936.) The essential features of this draft Law, cited by the Japanese, are as follows:

1. **Automobile Industry Control Law**

   (1) **Purpose of the Law.**
   
   The purpose of the law is firmly to establish the motor car manufacturing industry in Japan with a view to attaining completion of the national defense and to achieve industrial development.

   (ii) **License System.**

   (a) A license must be held by everyone who assembles motor cars which are designated by order of the Government and everyone who manufactures automobile parts which are designated by the Government, in excess of a certain limit to be fixed by the Government.

   (b) Everyone who receives such a license from the Government must be a joint stock company formed under the laws of Japan, and half or more of the total stock shares and voting privileges in the said company must be in the possession of the Japanese subjects or of companies organized under the laws of Japan.

(ii) **Privileges.**

   (a) Companies to which licenses are granted shall be exempted from certain classes of taxes for a certain period.

   (b) Special provisions will be made in the Commercial Codes in order that facilities may be offered to automobile manufacturing companies in regard to increases of capital and the flotation of debentures.
(iv) Protection of Public Interests.

(a) The government is authorized to issue to the automobile manufacturing companies, when very necessary, such orders as are deemed necessary for supervision of the industry and for protection of the public welfare.

(b) The government is authorized to issue such orders as are deemed necessary for the national defense.

(v) Regulations Governing Importation of Automobiles and Parts.

When the prices of imported automobiles and imported automobile parts are considered sufficiently low to have a harmful effect upon the growth of the automobile manufacturing industry in this country, the government may restrict the importation of, and impose higher import duties on, the said automobiles and parts thereof.

(vi) Automobile Manufacturing Industry Commission.

An automobile manufacturing industry commission shall be organized to consider matters relating to licenses for automobile manufacturing companies and to the enforcement of this law.

(vii) Retroactive Provision.

Those persons who engage the automobile manufacturing business, as defined in this law, prior to 9 August 1935, and who are still engaged in the same business at the time of enforcement of this law, will be permitted to continue such business without holding the aforementioned license but within the limit of their business as it existed prior to 9 August 1935.
by virtue of the Automobile Industry Control Law, the manufacture and assembling of motor cars was made subject to government license. The principal licensees under this law were Nissan Jidosha Seizo K.K. (Nissan Automobile Company) at Yokohama and Toyoda Jidosha Kogyo K.K. (Toyota Motor Car Company) at Aomori (Aomori Prefecture). Both were licensed by the government as mass production manufacturers of so-called popular type cars and trucks. Each of these plants before the war was licensed to manufacture 13,500 units per year.

At the same time Ford was given a production quota of 12,350 cars per annum, and General Motors was given a quota of 9,470.

These quotas were based on average production during the three preceding years. Under the quotas either passenger cars or trucks could be imported. After the end of 1938, however, no passenger cars could be imported commercially or manufactured. Most of the American trucks imported were sold to the Japanese military authorities.

In keeping with their projected program and as a result of the success of the Nissan and Toyota developments and the lack of foreign exchange, the Japanese authorities progressively reduced the issuance of import permits to the two American assembly plants. By 1939 General Motors was practically out of production; Ford was operating at a much reduced rate, and was forced to close down at the end of February 1940.

In February or March 1942 the Japanese took over the Ford plant at Yokohama to ship all of its equipment to Antung, Manchuria, presumably to be used by Hanshu Jidosha K.K.
(Manchurian Automobile Company). The plant itself was occupied by the Mitsubishi Company, and Diesel motors for large-sized boats and submarines were produced in this former Ford plant. Similarly it is rumored that the equipment of the General Motors assembly plant at Osaka was removed and shipped to Toyoda Jidosha.* It is not certain whether the equipment was shipped to its new plant at Koromo or to its old plant at Hakoja.


As a result of the lack of success experienced by various firms in the production of Diesel cars, the authorities decided in January 1941 that one manufacturer should be designated as a "national policy company" for this type of vehicle. This designation means, as a rule, that the companies so chosen are exempt from income, excess profits, and local taxes for a term of years and are the recipients of government subsidies or are permitted to issue bonds up to several times the paid-up capital with principal and interest guarantee. On the other hand, the government supervises organization, output, distribution and prices in varying degrees.

After a series of conferences with producers and the military, it was decided in March 1941 that the Tokyo Jidosha Kogyo K.K. (Tokyo Automobile Industry Company) should be selected as the sole manufacturer of Diesels, and that the trucks to be turned out should consist of 5,000 c.c. and 8,000 c.c. type. After being designated on 9 April, Tokyo Jidosha agreed to change its name to the Diesel Jidosha Kogyo K.K. (Diesel Automobile Industry company). The Nissan and Toyota concerns had received similar designations in 1936 under the Automobile Industry Control Law for the manufacture of gasoline-driven automobiles.

* Another report refers to it as reorganized by Diesel Jidosha.

* Also reported shipped to the Antung plant of Hanshu Jidosha.
C. Administration

1. Munitions Ministry.

Prior to the end of 1943, government supervision of the motor vehicle industry was carried out by the Ministry of Commerce and industry. However, with the formation of the Ministry of Munitions (Kunyu-sho) in November 1943, which took over the functions of the aforementioned Ministry of Commerce and industry, among others, it may be assumed that general jurisdiction over the motor vehicle industry fell into its sphere. This seems even more likely since control over production of motor vehicles was specifically excluded from the functions of the new Ministry of Transportation and Communications (Unyu-Touchin-sho) established at the same time. The Army Ordnance Headquarters and the various army arsenals retained jurisdiction over production of tanks and armored vehicles in their own plants or plants administered directly through them. But general production schedules for the motor vehicle industry emanated from a bureau of the Munitions Ministry, and were administered by the particular semi-official trade organizations involved.

In line with the complete reorganization of transport which was undertaken by the Japanese administration in the early summer of 1945, control over motor and other "small freight transport" was handed over to the Army Ordnance Headquarters (of the War Ministry) by the ministries of Transport and Munitions. This control extended to the actual production and maintenance of motor vehicles. (See Chart 5.)
In the case of the motor vehicle industry, the organization which carries out the details of production, such as allocation of raw materials and orders, is the Automobile Control Society, established in accordance with the Major Industry Association Ordinance of 1 September, 1941. In line with this ordinance, such matters as the production of automobiles, their distribution, production of accessories, and maintenance were placed under one responsible body. The new organization also succeeded the Nippon Jidosha Seizo Kogyo Kumiai (Japan Automobile Manufacturing Association) and presumably the Zenkoku Jidosha Bubunhin Kogyo Kumiai Hengokai (Federation of Automobile Parts and Accessories Industry Associations in Japan Proper), which formerly together controlled the production and distribution of autos, their parts, and accessories in Japan and the southern areas. Through these channels all designated manufacturers were given quotas for the production of each type of part on a quarterly basis.

The Automobile Control Society was divided into six departments. The name of each, in general, indicates the function:

(a) General Affairs.
(b) Planning.
(c) Production.
(d) Distribution.
(e) Technical.
(f) Standards and Specifications.

Its official character was supplied by appointment of high ranking military officers and bureaucrats to top executive positions; most of
The Directors, however, were members of the industry. Thus
its President was Lt. General SUZUKI, Shigeyasu, former diplo­
matic and General Staff member, and its managing director was
SUZUKI Hideo, formerly a Section Chief of the Fuel Bureau of
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and more recently direc­
tor of the Osaka Wine Superintendence Bureau. Among the
Directors was OKANO Lizo, a Director of Toyoda Jidosha.

To the Automobile Control Society there was appended a
Council. The following is the list of councilors and the companies to which they belong:

TOYODA Kiichiro, President of Toyo Jidosha
MUKAKAMI, Masasumi, President of Nissan Jidosha
HAYASHI, Katsura, of Diesel Jidosha
SHIMODA Bungo, Managing Director of Kawasaki Sharyo
YAIJO Soji, President of Manchou Jidosha & Director of Nissan Jidosha
ASHIHARA, Genhichi, Managing Director of Nissan Jidosha
TIRAI, Jinkuchi of Nippon Hainenki (Japanese Internal Combustion)
NOMAGASHI Tadao of Sharin Logyo (Wheel Industry)
IYODA Hyozo of Tire Logyo Kumi (Tire Industry Association)

Three professors of Tokyo Imperial University -- TANAKA
Yoshio, TAOKAWA Jingo, and IKeda Takahachi -- were also
included among the councilors. The inspectors for the Auto­
mobile Control Society also came from major firms. They were
YAMAI Hisayoshi of Toyoda Jidosha and YAMALI Kinichi of Nissan
Jidosha.

The society was organized to do the following things:
increase production; mobilize materials; examine reports of
manufacture and production and the relation of raw material
supplies to production
quotes of individual members; make appropriate manpower allocation and dispose of requests for increased capitalization. It also established a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere automobile enterprise. With Japan, Manchuria, China, and the Southern U.S.S.R. as a nucleus, a fundamental plan for production of raw materials and distribution in various localities was set up. The enterprise studied production plans for each branch of the industry. It established the amount of material and facilities necessary for increased production; and conducted research into the management, scale, and operational methods of the automobile industry.

* * * *

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The Manchukuo Government followed the principle of one company for each industry and established special or semi-special concerns for the development of the industries and resources of each region. With the successive discoveries of various important industrial resources in recent times, the Government, realizing the need for integrating the various so-called 'control companies', one of affecting coordinated development of such resources, had the Nippon Sen'yo K.K. (Nippon Industrial Company -- Nissan), a successful Japanese combine, transferred to Manchuria on 27 December 1937, and re-incorporated it into the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation, a Manchukuo special juridical person, capitalized at 450,000,000 yuan (1940), of which one-half was subscribed by the Government. The authorized capital of the Nangyo's affiliated concerns at the end of January 1940 was 885,000,000 yuan of which 731,850,000 yuan was paid up.

This new company, with its head office in Nanking, was governed by the Law for the Supervision of the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation (20 December 1937, by Imperial Ordinance No. 46). Among other regulations, the law provided that the Government guarantee the company certain returns equivalent to 6 percent dividend on all investments made in the Manchurian enterprise for a period of ten years after its establishment. As an executive organ of the Government in heavy industrial fields, the Nangyo, as this company was popularly called, managed and directed the iron and steel industry, light metals manufacturing,
automobile manufacturing, aircraft manufacturing, and coal mining, and perhaps also invested in gold, zinc, lead, copper, and other mining industries, as well as in other enterprises at home and abroad, on permission of the Ministers concerned. Thus in line with the execution of the Manchurian Five Year Industrial Plans, the Mangyo had the important mission of developing the vast Manchurian natural resources.

In Manchuria, Mangyo's holdings include the Asashu Jidosha and the Sono Jidosha Mangyo K.K., which accounted for practically all motor vehicle production and repair carried on on the continent. These companies which were fused on 24 June 1942, are known (to) have been the officially sponsored monopoly of the automobile industry in Manchukuo.

On the mainland of Japan itself, Mangyo's interests include Nissan Jidosha K.K., which has been credited with as high as 40 percent of the motor truck production of Japanese-controlled territory, and the Diesel Jidosha Mangyo K.K., which was designated as the sole producer of motor vehicles powered by diesel type units, and is credited with about 10 percent of total capacity in Japanese-controlled territory. In addition Diesel is also credited with significant tank and tractor manufacturing capacity. Hitachi Seisakusho, which is listed as having some tank capacity, also falls into the Mangyo sphere.

1. When the report that Mitsui has taken over the domestic properties of Mangyo is confirmed, the interests described above under Mangyo will be assigned to Mitsui (See Chapter II, p. 59.)
Kangyo dominates these firms by direct ownership of the controlling portion of their stock. Thus in 1941 the Japan Linechukuo Year Book listed them all as direct subsidiaries of the Kangyo, which had stock holdings ranging from 100 percent in the case of Sanshu to 20 percent in the case of Hitachi. Its share of Isawa was placed at 57 percent and of Nissan at 29 percent.

Kangyo's control of the motor vehicle industry was further facilitated by the circumstances that members of her subsidiary companies formed a substantial majority on the council of the all-inclusive Automobile Control Society, and together held by far the largest block of shares in the Automobile Distribution Company, which controlled marketing outlets in this field.
Automobile Industry Control Law

(Law no 33, sanctioned 28 May 1936, and appearing in th. Of- ficial Gazette, 29 May 1936)

Article 1. The object of this law is to strengthen national defense and promote industrial progress by establishing the automobile-manufacturing industry in Japan.

Article 2. Automobile manufacturing industry as the term is used in this law, means industries designated by ordinance, which manufacture or manufacture of automobiles or automobile parts.

Article 3. Persons who wish to engage in the manufacture of automobiles shall obtain licenses from the Government, unless the volume of automobiles or automobile parts to be manufactured or assembled is less than a figure to be fixed by ordinance.

The Government shall take into consideration the condition of supply and demand for automobiles and automobile parts and unless it seems that no obstacle to the establishment of the automobile-manufacturing industry will result, the Government shall not grant the license mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Article 4. Persons qualified to receive licenses mentioned in the preceding article shall be only joint stock companies organized under Japanese law of which more than one-half of the shareholders, more than one-half of the directors, more than one-half the capital, and more than one-half of the voting rights are held by Japanese subjects or juridical persons organized under Japanese law.

The juridical persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph must be juridical persons of which more than one-half of the members, shareholders, or officers in such or continuing business and more than one-half of the amount of capital or more than one-half of the voting rights are not or do not belong to foreigner or foreign juridical persons.

If a person who has obtained the license mentioned in the preceding article has ceased to possess the qualifications specified in the preceding two paragraphs, the license granted shall be invalidated.

Article 5. An automobile-manufacturing company which has obtained a license, mentioned in Article 3, shall commence operations within a period prescribed by the Government.

The Government may grant an extension of the period mentioned in the preceding paragraph only in case it recognizes that there is good reason for so doing.
When an automobile manufacturing company fails to commence operations within the period mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, the license prescribed in Article 3 shall be invalid.

Article 6. Subject to the provisions of ordinance an automobile manufacturing company shall be exempted from payment of income and business profit taxes on its business operations during the year that the license mentioned in Article 3 is obtained and for a period of five years beginning the year following the year in which that license was obtained.

Article 7. Hokkaido, prefectures, cities, towns, villages, and similar public bodies shall not levy taxes upon the business or on a basis of the capital, employees, manufactured articles, or supplies consumed, motive power used, or income accruing through the operations of an automobile manufacturing company exempted from income tax and business profit tax, under the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 8. When an automobile manufacturing company imports, with the permission of the Government, tools, machinery, or materials necessary to its business, it shall be exempt from the payment of import duties, subject to the provisions of ordinance, for a period of five years from the date of the enforcement of this law.

Article 9. An automobile manufacturing company, when expanding its business may, with the permission of the Government, increase its capital to defray the cost of equipment even though the value of previously issued shares is not fully paid up.

Article 10. An automobile manufacturing company may, with the permission of the Government, issue debentures to an amount beyond the limits prescribed by Article 200 of the Commercial Code in order to defray the cost of installing equipment necessary to the conduct of its business. The total amount of such debentures may not be greater, however, than twice the amount of the company's paid up capital.

If the value of the company's assets, as shown in the last balance sheet, is not as large as its paid up capital, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply.

Property pertaining to the enterprise of the company must be mortgaged, in accordance with the provisions of the Factory Mortgage Law as security for debentures issued in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this article, unless the Government deems that special circumstances obviate the necessity for such mortgages.
Article 11. If it is found that the importation of automobiles or automobile parts will interfere with the establishment of the automobile manufacturing industry, the Government may issue orders restricting, for a fixed period, the importation of automobiles or automobile parts.

Article 12. If it is found that the price of automobiles will be lowered and the establishment of the automobile manufacturing industry interfered with, due to the importation of automobiles or automobile parts, the Government, after submitting the matter to the consideration of the Tariff Investigation Committee, may issue orders providing for the levying of import duties, for a fixed period, on such automobiles or automobile parts of up to fifty per cent of the value of those imports, in addition to the import duty that is specified in the tariff table annexed to the Import Tariff Law.

Article 13. An automobile manufacturing company shall plan its business program to comply with orders -- and shall obtain the sanction of the Government for its business program or the alteration of that program.

The Government may order an automobile manufacturing company to alter its business program if it is deemed necessary.

Article 14. When an automobile manufacturing company wishes to transfer, discontinue, or suspend all or part of its enterprise, it must obtain the permission of the Government, in accordance with the provisions of ordinance.

A resolution to amalgamate or liquidate an automobile manufacturing company is not valid unless the company obtains the permission of the Government in accordance with the provisions of ordinance.

Article 15. The Government may require an automobile manufacturing company to submit a report on its business and financial condition.

The Government may issue necessary supervisory orders to automobile manufacturing companies or take measures in regard to their business affairs or accounts.

In case it is deemed necessary for purposes of supervision, the Government may order the appropriate officials to inspect the offices or place of business, factories, warehouses, or other sites owned by an automobile manufacturing company and to conduct examinations of its business or financial condition, its books and papers, and other matters. Such officials shall be required to carry a certificate indicating their official status.

Article 16. When it is deemed necessary for reasons of public interest, the Government may order an automobile manufacturing company to alter the sale price and the terms of sale of automobiles or automobile parts, or may issue orders on necessary matters with a view to
adjusting the demand and supply of automobiles and automobile parts.

When it is deemed necessary for reasons of public interest, the Government may order an automobile manufacturing company to expand or improve its equipment.

**Article 17.** When it is deemed necessary for military reasons, the Government may order automobile manufacturing companies to manufacture automobiles or automobile parts for military use, to conduct researches on special matters related to automobiles or to install special equipment, and it may issue orders in regard to other necessary matters connected with military affairs.

**Article 16.** In granting licenses under Article 3, in fixing limitations under Article 2, or in issuing orders under Article 16, the Government shall submit the matter in advance to the consideration of the Automobile Manufacturing Industry Committee.

Regulations relating to the Automobile Manufacturing Industry Committee shall be determined by Imperial Ordinance.

**Article 19.** If an automobile manufacturing company infringes the provisions of this law or orders issued under the authorization of this law, or violates the measures adopted in conformity with such orders, or commits acts prejudicial to the public interest, the Government may suspend or restrict its business or cancel the license issued under Article 3 or dismiss its directors or auditors, who perform the functions of directors.

**Article 20.** Persons coming within the purview of any one of the following categories shall be assessed a fine of not to exceed five thousand yen:

1. A person who, in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has engaged in the manufacture of automobiles without obtaining a license.
2. A person who imported automobiles or automobile parts in violation of the restrictive provisions of Article 11.
3. A person who engaged in the manufacture of automobiles who has exceeded the limits (on production) prescribed in Paragraph 4 of the Supplementary Rules.

**Article 21.** If an automobile manufacturing company has violated the orders issued in accordance with Article 16 or Article 17, the directors or auditors, who perform the functions of directors, shall be assessed a fine of not to exceed three thousand yen each.
1. When a company, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 13, has carried out its business program without obtaining the permission of the Government.

2. When a company, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 13, has carried out its business program without alteration.

3. When a company, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 14, has acted without the permission of the Government in matters requiring such permission.

4. When a company has acted in violation of the orders issued and measures adopted in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article 15.

Article 23. Persons coming within the purview of any one of the following categories shall be assessed a fine of not to exceed five hundred yen:

1. A person who has failed to file the report provided for in Paragraph 1 of Article 15 or has made a false report.

2. A person who has refused, obstructed, or evaded the inspection or examination by the officials concerned as provided for in Paragraph 3 of Article 15, or has failed to answer the questions of such officials or has made false answers.

Article 24. Automobile manufacturing companies or persons engaged in other businesses related to automobiles may not evade responsibility for any act of their representatives, head, or other members of their family, employees, or other persons connected with their business enterprise, which act is in violation of orders issued in accordance with the provisions of this law, on the ground that such actions were not made under their direction.

Article 25. The penal provisions to be applied in accordance with the provisions of this law or of orders issued in conformity with the provisions of this law shall apply, in case the party to receive the penalty is a juridical person, to directors, managing directors, or other officials in charge of conducting the business of such juridical person; and in case the party to receive such penalty is a minor or a person adjudged incompetent, to his legal representative, unless the minor concerned possesses the same capacity as an adult for the purposes of conduction of a business enterprise.
Additional Rules

The date of enforcement of this law shall be determined by
Imperial Ordinance.

Persons who are already engaged in the manufacture of automobiles or have succeeded to such enterprise at the time that
this law takes effect, may continue in business, subject to the rules of
the provisions of Article 3, for a period of three months from
the day when this law takes effect.

If a person, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has ap­plied for a license under Article 3, within the period mentioned
in the preceding paragraph, the provisions of that paragraph shall
continue to apply until his application is either accepted or
rejected.

Persons who begin manufacturing automobiles prior to 9 August 1935, or parties who succeeded to such enterprise and who
are conducting such businesses at the time when this law takes
effect, may continue to conduct such businesses even after the
lapse of the period prescribed in the preceding two paragraphs, regardless of the provisions of Article 3, subject to the pro­visions of ordinance, within the scale of business conducted
by them previously to 9 August 1935.

The provisions of Paragraph 1 and 3 of Article 15 and of
Articles 23 to 25 inclusive, shall apply also to parties
engaged in the manufacture of automobiles by authorization gran­ted in the preceding paragraph.

If persons who have applied for licenses under Article 3
within a period of one month from the date of the enforcement
of this law, import, with the permission of the Government,
tools, machinery, or materials necessary in the manufacture of
automobiles, they shall be exempted, in accordance with the pro­visions of ordinance, from import duties on such imports for a
period of three months from the date of the enforcement of this
law.

In case persons who have been exempted from import duties,
in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph,
fail to obtain a license under Article 3, the unpaid duties shall
be collected from them.

In cases of exemption from import duties in accordance with
the provisions of Paragraph 6, the Government may require the
deposit of security, at the time of importation, to a value
corresponding to the amount of unpaid import duty.
日本、自衛軍及び自衛艦の戦時生産に関し、調査及分析のため、

第三部 自動車及び戦車生産

記者

【日本、自衛軍及び自衛艦の戦時生産に関して調査及び分析のため】

持スルコトノ一層強調セラル

本生産二関スル能力及び技術の方面ニ在テアル

討論サル

一九四五年十月三十一日

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(日本第三社 福音部)
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内容超出了可读范围，无法准确识别。
Section

Discussion

Discussion of the Japanese aircraft industry; current structure and the history of governmental control receive the major emphasis. The capacity, technological aspects of this industry are also discussed.

31 October 1945

II. THE JAPANESE INDUSTRY

1. Aircraft Production: Physical and Technical Aspects

Aircraft commanded top priority in the Japanese war production program. After 1941, strenuous efforts were made to increase plant output by the construction and equipping of new manufacturing facilities, by conversion of plant capacity less essential to the war program, and by diversion of labor and material resources to the aircraft program. Under this stimulus, aircraft production in Japan increased rapidly, but output was always small in comparison with U.S. productions, which reached upward of 3,000 planes a month by the end of 1944.
The origin of the Japanese aircraft industry coincides with World War I. Shortly before the war, Japan sent army and navy officers to France to study European developments in aerial warfare. During the years 1917-18, two private companies, Nakajima and Mitsubishi, and the Naval Arsenal at Hiro, built the first aircraft plants. Because of Japanese technical backwardness, these were based on foreign models. This dependence on copies or adaptations of foreign designs -- British, French, German, and American -- and the employment of foreign engineers and producers, was to continue to a
In December, but still continued until the end of World War II. By the end of 1937, the Japanese had succeeded in creating two or three types of airplanes of their own design.

The companies were organized and the existing ones — Mitsubishi, Hikakaji, and Hanaoki — were ordered. With the conquest of Manchuria, Japan worked hard to create her own models, culminating in the successes of 1937. It was during the latter part of this period, too, that the aluminum and magnesium industries were first developed (1934-35).

According to the Japanese Ministry of the Navy, in 1939, private industry comprised 70-75 percent of the entire Japanese aircraft industry. The relatively satisfactory types produced at this time, formed the nucleus of the Japanese air force at the beginning of the war.


The government's constant interest in the aircraft industry has increased in recent years. As a result, aircraft manufacturers of "doubtful competency and background" began to spring up all over Japan.

Realizing the importance of the industry to the military program and the necessity for its control, the government in 1938 passed the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Law, requiring government license of all firms engaged in the manufacture of airframes weighing over 350 kilograms, or of engines of stroke volume capacity over 3,500 c.c. Licenses were granted only to companies having a minimum capitalization of ¥3,000,000 and an annual capacity of 100 tons of airframes, or 300 engines or propellers. In return for government authority over production, licensed companies were in a position to receive substantial monetary grants, tax exemptions, and import privileges. The salient features of the law are as follows:

**Government Control:**

(i) The Government may determine specifications; control prices, terms, and the supply of planes and parts; merge or dissolve companies; and
to either, the time, or the condition of either part of their products.

(ii) Under a military close, the Government may issue instructions regarding plant expansion, industrial research, training of technicians; connection with other plants, storage of raw materials, drafting of plans, employees, or equipment; works and construction plans.

(iii) Land may be reserved for plants or fields.

Manufacturers' Benefits:

(i) The government compensates the manufacturers for losses. Details are granted for civilian parts and materials not previously produced in Japan.

(ii) Under certain conditions manufacturers are exempt from income tax, business profit tax, and local taxes for six years. Import duties for tools for the industry are to be abolished for five years.

(iii) Capital may be increased for plant expansion and lands may be sold in excess of the local limits for the purchase of equipment.

Miscellaneous Facts:

(i) Licenses are issued separately for aircraft manufacture and assembly.

(ii) The Aircraft Technical Commission was to be organized with 20 members under the Minister of Communications (Tsuchin-sho). Its primary function is the standardization of aircraft. Any violation of the government regulations subjects the firm to fines varying from ¥ 500 to ¥ 2,000. (See Appendix III for text of the above-referenced law).

4. Concentration of Production.

However, the reasons advanced for these measures, the manufacture of all military airplanes and of the relatively insignificant number of airplanes for the civil airlines was then concentrated in the hands of 14 licensed firms. (See Appendix III for details concerning the 14 originally licensed companies). These companies were licensed for the production of complete airframes, engines, and propellers; the subcontracting of component parts to other producers was encouraged.
5. Government Arsenal.

In addition to the production by the license civil companies, the naval aircraft factories at Hiko, Kokuki, and Sasebo had at least a small production capacity. Recently they are believed to have confined their activities principally to research, experimentation, and testing, and to the manufacture of models for later development of private mass production. Sasebo produced a single-engine float type fighter plane; Osaka was equipped to manufacture engines and assemble planes. Attention should also be made of the Tachikawa Army Arsenal in Tokyo prefecture, which was assigned a small percentage of total aircraft manufacture and did considerable research on new models.


The licensed companies were of two types. Some were "integrated" companies -- that is, they produced in their own plants a large portion of the principal components which went into the aircraft they manufactured. Others specialized in particular aircraft components. The most important "integrated" companies were "Mitsubishi Jukogyo, Nakajima Hikoki, Kawasaki Fokoku, and Nishi Tokai Denki. Mitsubishi and Nakajima were the two names most often associated with Japanese aircraft, and the greatest proportion of planes had their final imprint, although they contained parts from many other sources. Companies such as these generally embraced several manufacturing plants. Other licensed companies, by contrast, are known to have been highly specialized. Sumitomo Kizoku and Yorozan Cakki Seizo (Japan Musical Instrument) produced propellers for several different plane types. Ishikawajima Foku Kogyo (Ishikawajima Aircraft) and Hitachi Koku (Hitachi Aircraft) manufactured engines on a smaller

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1/ But they also engaged in mass production of privately developed aircraft and engines. Thus the "Judy" bomber and the new Nakajima Homare engine were made at Hiko.
scale, the latter being trainer aircraft mainly. Nakajima Tokie Kogyo made components and notably assembled planes. Showa Nikko Kogyo (Showa Aircraft Industry) manufactured a transport plane copied from the U.S. D.C.-3 (C-47).

7. Research and Development.

Realizing that Japan's aviation products would continue to be several years behind foreign material unless adequate provision were made for research, design, and testing, the Government set up an Aeronautical Research Institute under direction of Kyokai Imperial University in 1917. Experimental laboratories were similarly instituted by the Army and Navy Air Services. The larger civil producers had their own departments for research and design which worked for either the Army or Navy, or, in a few cases, for both. The Army and Navy made heavy demands upon the aircraft companies for the experimentation and development of new military aircraft and endeavored to allocate their orders to compensate for experimentation undertaken. In theory, all these agencies were to work in close harmony for the advancement of Japanese aviation. Actually, there appears to have been a lack of coordination, and to remedy this the Government in the 1930-39 budget provided an original sum of ¥ 500,000 for the establishment of a Central Institute of Aeronautical Research under the Aviation Bureau (Jukujitsuka) of the Communications Ministry, (Tosho-sho). The object, in addition to providing newer and better equipment, was undoubtedly to provide a central controlling head for the coordination of all research having to do with aviation. The cost of the entire project was to be ¥ 130,000,000.

(a) Institutions operating in 1941.

(1) The Aeronautical Research Institute. Located at Komats, a suburb in the western part of Tokyo, one mile west of the Shiluya station on the Yamanote line. It has confined its work primarily to pure scientific research and secondarily to the practical application of its discoveries to actual airframe design. There are truly sections devoted to physics, chemistry, metallurgy, materials, wind tunnel work, engines, airframes,
Instruments, physiology, construction, diesal engines and propellers. Equipment, while considered modern in 1938, has long been outstripped by that used abroad. Some of the Institute's important work has been in the field of diesel engines, the designs of which were turned over to Mitsubishi for building and into the design for the long-distance "Kamikaze" which flew from Tokyo to London in 1937.

The Ministry having been inaugurated to carry out this policy with particular emphasis on aircraft, an Aviation Ordnance Bureau (Koku Heiki-kyoku) was created within the Ministry to take over from the War and Navy Ministries all their former administrative functions concerning aircraft and related industries. This transfer, which became effective on 15 January 1944, appeared to represent a coordination rather than a shifting of responsibility, because the Bureau was to be staffed principally by officers of the Army and Navy. Lt. Gen. Saburo Uno was designated as Chief of the Bureau.

(ii) Aviation Industrial Association (Koku Kogyo Kai): Semi-official Cartel. When the new Ministry assumed its duties, an Aviation Industrial Association was formed on 16 January 1944 to coordinate the production of aviation supplies. Formation of this Association indicated that the Japanese Government was hoping to expand production of aircraft by unifying direction and centralizing the priority system. The detailed powers of this Association and similar ones in other industries were derived from the National General Reorganization Law of 1938 and, in particular, from the Major Industries Association Ordinance of 1 September 1941.

The division of functions between the Munitions Ministry and the semi-official Aviation Industrial Association was as follows: the Aviation Ordnance Bureau of the Ministry drafted general production schedules to be assigned to the Association; the Association was then responsible within its field for control of production, the supply of funds, material, and labor required, and the allocation of schedules among its member enterprises. Despite its semi-official title and cast, the Association was effectively dominated by
Article I. The aircraft manufacturing industry as mentioned in the present law signifies enterprises of manufacturing the aircraft as specified by ordinance or the fuselages, motors, or propellers of the said aircraft.

The manufacture of parts or accessories of aircraft conducted by persons who are engaged in the enterprises as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph or their manufacture of the materials to be used in their enterprises for manufacturing aircraft or their repair of aircraft shall be regarded as a part of their enterprises.

Article II. Persons desiring to be engaged in the aircraft manufacturing industry shall obtain the permission of the Government.

Article III. Those who may obtain the permission as mentioned in the foregoing article shall be limited to the joint stock companies (known as "krishi") which were established in accordance with the provisions of the law and ordinance of the Empire and which have the majority of the shareholders, the majority of the directors, the greater part of the capital funds, and the greater part of the right to vote represented by the nationals of the Empire, or the juridical persons which were established in accordance with the provisions of the law and ordinance of the Empire.

The juridical persons as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph shall not have the majority of the shareholders, the greater part of the capital funds, or the right to vote represented by the nationals of foreign countries or the juridical persons of foreign countries.

Persons who have obtained the permission as mentioned in the foregoing article, have failed to conduct their enterprises within the period specified by the Government, shall lose all rights to vote represented by the nationals of foreign countries or the juridical persons of foreign countries.

When persons who have obtained the permission as mentioned in the foregoing article have failed to conduct their enterprises within the period specified by the Government, the permission shall become null and void.

Article IV. The enterprises which have obtained the permission as mentioned in Article II shall cease their enterprises within the period specified by the Government.

The Government may permit the prolongation of the periods as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph only when it recognizes that there exist good reasons for such prolongation.

When the enterprises which have obtained the permission as mentioned in Article II have failed to conduct their enterprises within the periods as mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, the permission as prescribed by Article II shall become null and void.
Article 5. The companies which are engaged in the aircraft manufacturing industry (to be referred to as aircraft manufacturing companies hereinafter) shall, in accordance with the provisions of ordinance, determine their plans of enterprises and report to same to the Government. When they desire to change the plans of enterprises, they shall also report the matter to the Government.

The Government may order changes in the plans of enterprises when it deems such measures as necessary.

Article 6. The Government may determine the specifications of the fuselages, motors, propellers, parts, or accessories of the aircraft or materials for manufacturing the aircraft, after referring the matter to the aircraft technical commission.

Aircraft manufacturing companies shall not manufacture or use anything which is subject to the specifications determined in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraph which does not conform to the specifications. However, an exception is made when the permission of the Government has been obtained (for the manufacture or use of such things).

The regulations concerning the aircraft technical commission shall be determined by Imperial ordinance.

Article 7. When aircraft manufacturing companies desire to transfer, discontinue, or suspend the whole or a part of their enterprises, they shall obtain the permission of the Government in accordance with the provisions of ordinance.

Resolution for the transfer or dissolution of aircraft manufacturing companies shall not take effect unless the approval of the Government has been obtained for them in accordance with the provisions of ordinance.

Article 8. The aircraft manufacturing industry shall be regarded as an industry which may export, import, trade, and use the land as mentioned in article 2 of the land appreciaton law and as such shall be subject to the application of the said law.

Article 9. Aircraft manufacturing companies shall, in accordance with the provisions of Imperial ordinance, be exempted from the income tax and the business profit tax in regard to their enterprises for the year during which the permission as mentioned in article 2 was obtained and the following 5 years.

Article 10. The feudal, prefectures, cities, towns, and villages shall not impose taxes upon the aircraft manufacturing companies which have obtained exemption from the income tax and the business profit tax in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing article, against their enterprises which have been exempted from the taxes. However, an exception is made when the permission of the Government has been granted in consideration of special circumstances for the imposition of such taxes.

Article 11. The aircraft manufacturing companies import tools, machinery, or materials necessary to their enterprises with the permission of the Government, an exception from the import duty shall be made for 5 years from the day of the enforcement of the present law under the provisions of ordinance.
Article 12. The Government may grant, under the provisions of ordinance, encouragement money to aircraft manufacturing companies when they are engaged in the manufacture of such kinds of aircraft, fuselages, motors, or propellers which have never been manufactured in this country, within the limits of the budget. Encouragement money may also be granted for the manufacture of such kinds of parts or accessories of aircraft or materials for manufacturing aircraft as have never been manufactured in this country.

Article 13. Aircraft manufacturing companies may, then expanding their enterprises, effect an increase in their capital in order to obtain funds to meet the expenses for establishing facilities belonging to their enterprises, subject to the permission of the Government, even before their capital is fully paid up.

Article 14. Aircraft manufacturing companies may, with the permission of the Government, issue debentures beyond the limits as stipulated by the Commercial law, when obtaining funds to meet the expenses required for establishing facilities belonging to their enterprises. However, the total amount of debentures shall not exceed 20 per cent of the amount of paid stock shares.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applied when the property stated in the last balance sheet to be in the possession of the companies fails to reach the amount of paid stock shares.

Mortgages, on the belongings of the enterprises of the companies, in accordance with the provisions of the factory mortgage law, shall be required for issuing debentures according to the provisions of the first paragraph. However, an exception is made when there exist special circumstances and when the Government recognizes that there is no need for such mortgages.

Article 15. The Government may cause the aircraft manufacturing companies to file reports in regard to the conditions of their business and property.

The Government may issue orders or make disposition, such as are deemed necessary from the standpoint of control, in regard to the business and accounting of aircraft manufacturing companies.

The Government may, when such measures are deemed necessary from the standpoint of control, cause the government officials concerned to inspect the offices of aircraft manufacturing companies, their places of business, factories, warehouses, and other places and examine the conditions of their business or property or documents or books or other articles. In such a case, the government officials concerned shall be caused to carry with them certificates showing their identities.

Article 16. The Government may, when such measures are deemed necessary from the standpoint of public interests, order the aircraft manufacturing companies to change sale prices or all terms of aircraft, fuselages, motors, or propellers and issue orders with reference to matters required in regard to the supply of these products.

Article 17. The Government may, when such measures are deemed necessary from the military point of view, issue orders to the aircraft manufacturing companies in regard to matters enumerated in the clauses given below. The Government also may issue similar orders in regard to matters enumerated in Clauses 1 to 5 when such measures are deemed necessary from the standpoint of public interests.
1. Expansion or improvement of facilities.
2. Manufacture of the aircraft specified by the Government or the fuselages, motors, or propellers of the aircraft.
3. Researches in regard to special motors or accessories for the aircraft and/or establishment of special facilities concerning aircraft.
4. Training of technicians for the manufacture of aircraft or the fuselages, motors, or propellers of aircraft.
5. Joint use of facilities for manufacturing or the fuselages, motors, or propellers of aircraft to be established or used in common with other aircraft manufacturing companies.
6. Preservation of materials for the manufacture of aircraft.
7. Offering of materials or facilities to be used by the Government.
8. Establishment of special planes of training and the necessary drill in regard to such plans.
9. Employment of facilities and/or establishment of facilities for preventing destruction.
10. Presentation of reference material in regard to aircraft.
11. Matters which are not mentioned in the foregoing clauses and which are considered necessary under special circumstances.

The Government shall, in accordance with the provisions of Imperial ordinance, compensate for the losses incurred owing to the orders issued in regard to Clauses 1 to 4 or Clauses 6 to 11 of the foregoing paragraph.

The orders to be issued concerning the compensation as mentioned in the foregoing paragraph shall be issued within the limits of the total amount of compensation which has been approved by the Imperial Diet as required by such orders.

When the parties concerned have failed to reach an agreement between themselves in regard to their shares of expenses required in the case of Clause 5 of Paragraph 1, the Government shall decide the matter. In case of dissatisfaction with the decision of the Government, an appeal may be made to the ordinary law court within three months following receipt of a notice about the decision.

Article 13. When the Government is about to issue orders in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 or Clause 1 of Paragraph 1 of the foregoing article, or decide the amount of the compensation as mentioned in Paragraph 2 of the foregoing article, it shall refer the matter to the commission on the aircraft manufacturing industry, except in the case which are otherwise stipulated by Imperial ordinance.

Regulations concerning the commission on the aircraft manufacturing industry shall be determined by Imperial ordinance.

Article 14. When aircraft manufacturing companies have violated the present law or order issued in accordance with the provisions of the present law or decision made on the basis of the present law, the Government may suspend or restrict their business, cancel the permission granted to them in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 and/or discharge the directors or auditors performing the duties of directors.

Article 20. The present law shall be applied mutatis mutandis according to the provisions of Imperial ordinance in regard to enterprises of manufacturing parts or accessories of aircraft or materials for the manufacture of aircraft, which do not belong to the aircraft manufacturing industry as mentioned in Article 1.
Article 21. Persons who have violated the provisions of Article 2 by engaging themselves in the aircraft manufacturing industry without obtaining the necessary permission of the Government shall be punished with a fine not exceeding ¥ 5,000.

Article 22. Persons who fall under one of the clauses given hereunder shall be punished with a fine not exceeding ¥ 5,000:

1. Persons who have failed to report their plans of enterprises or execute the plans of enterprises in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 5.
2. Persons who have executed their plans of enterprises in violation of the orders for changes in the plans of enterprises issued in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 5.
3. Persons who have transferred, discontinued, or suspended their enterprises in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 7.
4. Persons who have violated the orders issued in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 or Paragraph 2 of Article 17.

Article 23. Persons who fall under one of the clauses given hereunder shall be punished with a fine not exceeding ¥ 500:

1. Persons who have failed to file the report as stipulated in Paragraph 1 of Article 15 or filed false reports.
2. Persons who have violated the orders issued, or the disposition made, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 15.
3. Persons who have refused, obstructed, or evaded the inspection and/or examination by the government officials concerned as stipulated in Paragraph 3 of Article 15, or refused to answer the questions asked by the government officials concerned, or made false statements in reply to their questions.

Article 24. Aircraft manufacturing companies shall not be immune from punishment for the violation of the present law or orders issued in accordance with the provisions of the present law or disposition made on the basis of the present law in regard to their business by their representatives, employees, or other workers, on the ground that the violation was not conducted under their instructions.

Article 25. The penal regulations to be applied on the basis of the present law or orders issued on the basis of the present law shall be applied, in the case of juridical persons, to the directors (社長), directors (副社長), or other officials executing the business of the juridical persons and in the case of minors or incompetent persons, to their legal representatives. However, an exception is made in regard to the minors who have the same capability to acts concerning their business.

Supplementary Rule

The date for the enforcement of the present law shall be determined by Imperial ordinance.

Persons who are actually engaged in the aircraft manufacturing industry or who have succeeded to the aircraft manufacturing enterprises of some other persons, at the time of the enforcement of the present law, may be engaged in the industry, in spite of the provisions of Article 2, for only one year from the day of the enforcement of the present law.
When persons who fall under the foregoing paragraph have applied for the permission as mentioned in article 2 within the period as specified in the foregoing paragraph, they may continue engaging in the industry pending a decision on the issuance or non-issuance of the permission applied for.

When persons who fall under the second paragraph have obtained the permission in accordance with the provisions of article 2, they shall be regarded as having obtained the permission from the year of the commencement of their enterprises and accordingly the provisions of article 9 shall be applied to them only in regard to that portion which follows the day of the granting of the permission.

The provisions of article 11 shall not be applied in regard to the imports made by persons who fall under paragraph 2 before they obtain the permission in accordance with the provisions of article 2.

APPENDIX III

LICENSED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS

The following list shows the aircraft firms licensed under the aircraft industry manufacturing law of 1939, their capitalization, location of factories, activity for which licensed (1 - Complete airplanes; 2 - Assembling of planes; 3 - Airframes; 4 - Engines; 5 - Propellers) and their production for the year ending 30 June 1940.

Mitsubishi Jukogyo (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co.) Yen 120,000,000. (Not exclusively an aircraft firm). Factory at Nagoya. Licensed for 2, 3, and 4. Production 175 airframes, 1,380 engines, chiefly for the Navy.

Nakajima Hikoki (Nakajima Aircraft Co.) Yen 50,000,000. Airframe factory at Ota, Gunma Pref. Licensed factory at Toko. Licensed for 2, 3, and 4. Production 545 airframes, 1,380 engines. Next to Mitsubishi in size and importance.

Kawasaki Jokoki Kogyo (Kawasaki Aircraft Engineering Co.) Yen 50,000,000. Factories at Kobe (airframes and engines) and at Komagoma (engines). Licensed for 2, 3, and 4. Production 120 airframes, 125 engines.

Aichi Tekoki Denki (Aichi Clock and Electric Engineering Co.) Yen 30,000,000. (Not exclusively aircraft). Factory at Nagoya. Licensed for 1. Production 90 airframes, 230 engines.

Tachikawa Hikoki KK (Tachikawa Aircraft Co.) Yen 25,000,000. Factory at Tachikawa, Tokyo Pref. Licensed for 2 and 3. Production 210 airframes, 90 engines.


Kawasaki Jokoki KK (Kawasaki Aircraft Co.) Yen 15,000,000. Factory at Komagoma. Licensed for 2, 3, and 4. Production 60 airframes, 250 engines.

Nippon Kokuuki (Japen Aircraft Co.) Yen 5,000,000. Factory at Yokohama. Licensed for 2 and 3. Production 25 air-planes.

Sumitomo Hinzoku Kogyo KK (Sumitomo Metal Industry Co.) Yen 100,000,000. Not exclusively aircraft. Factory at Osaka. Licensed for 5. Production not known, but the plant probably boosts one of the principal suppliers of propellers.

Nippon Koki Siro KK (Nippon Aircraft Manufacturing Co.) Yen 150,000,000. Not exclusively aircraft. Main factory at Hamanaka. From one factory at Yokohama. Licensed for 5. Definite production figures lacking. The plant is the oldest propeller factory in Japan, and probably divided with Sumitomo the bulk of the production.

Show Kikoki Kogyo KK (Show Aircraft Engineering Co.) Yen 30,000,000 (7,500,000, p. a.). Factories at Tokyo and Osaka. Licensed for 2, 3, and 4. Production 10 air-planes (organized in 1933 — had difficulty getting initial equipment from abroad).

Nippon Koku Seis-kusho KK (Japan Aviation Engineering Co.) Yen 3,000,000. Factory at Hikuta, Southwest of Yokohama. Licensed for 2, 3, and 5. (Organized in 1937 primarily as a propeller factory).

Tokyo Ishikawajima Zosenjo (Tokyo Ishikawajima Dockyard Co.) Yen 16,000,000. Not exclusively aircraft. Factories at Tokyo and Yokohama. Licensed for 4. Production estimated at 300 engines — association with and contiguity to Japan Aircraft Co., increases its strength as a potential producer).

Source: W/ Tokyo #9749, March 27, 1937 - AS 2085-630; Naval Aviation Intelligence Report 1940, 9505.

F/SC Japan: File 15720

Excerpts, pages II-111; II-112; II-113; II-114 - II-124; II-161 - II-169.
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第十四節

条及目三

元来トノヒラ製造工場トシンテ成立ヲ見

メサト

東京石川島造船所

資千六百万円。一航空機 Primitive ルモノ。

工場東京及び横浜。四ニシテ許可。生

産高級航空機

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空機合ツトノ提携ヲ通セリ依リ

ネテ有力ナル。
Details of the Conference of the Nine Power Treaty

Signatories hold in EXCLUSIVELY Concerning China

An Excerpt from Pages 1 to 7, for the Second
November 3 to 7, 1937,

December, the 12th year of Showa (1937)

The Third Section, Bureau of Treaties.

Paragraph One: Details of the calling of the conference and
Japan's attitude towards the conference.

I. Circumstances under which the Government
of Belgium invited to the conference.

On the 16th day of October, in the 12th year of Showa (1937),
the General Assembly of the League of Nations adopted the two
reports and decisions of the Inquiry Commission on the China
problem, holding Japan's actions toward China in violation of the
Nine Power Treaty and the Treaty for Denouncing War, and expressing
moral support for China with the recommendation to investigate the
situation by first of all holding a conference of the League of
Nations consisting of the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty to
solve the present situation in the East Asia. And the Government
of the United States of America officially expressed its agreement
to this decision on the same day.

In accordance with this decision, the League of Nations
seems to have planned to call a Conference of the Nine Power Treaty
Signatories affiliated with the League of Nations. This plan, however, was
apparently changed in process and eventually it was
Decided that the Belgian Government, one of the Nine Power Treaty
Signatories, would ask for a Conference on October 30 in BRUXELLES
in accordance with the Regulation of Article 7 of the Nine Power
Treaty with the active mediation of the British Government and also
the concurrence of the American Government thereto. The Belgian
Government formally invited all Governments concerned on October
16 and delivered a formal letter of invitation to the Imperial
Japanese Government on October 20 through the Belgian Ambassador
at Tok~. (It has become clear that the delay in the invitation to the
Japanese Government was caused by a technical oversight in
the Belgian Foreign office). The letter of invitation reads as follows:

Message

In conformity with the request of the British Government with
the concurrence of the Government of the United States of America,
the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium hereby proposes to the
Signatories of the Nine Power Treaty signed on the 6th day of
February, 1922, in compliance with Article 7 of the Treaty, to
meet at BRUXELLES on the 30th day instant to investigate the
situation in East Asia and to find measures of conciliation to
hasten the termination of the regrettable disputes now prevailing
over the area.

On this 20th day of October, 1937,
at Tok~.
The above message was delivered to Mr. NIREN, the Foreign Ministe
by the Belgian Ambassador at 10 a.m., on 21st day of October.

The foregoing decision of the League of Nations once adopted
the principle that the Nine Power Treaty signatories shall meet in
the capacity of members of the League of Nations. This principle,
however, was changed in the course of preparation in calling the
Conference as exclusively in compliance with the Nine Power Treaty,
instead of the conference of the Nine Power Treaty, signatories
affiliated to the League of Nations. The Imperial Japanese Govern-
ment, however, replied to the foregoing invitation on the 27th
refusing to participate in the said conference.

II. The Imperial Japanese Government's
Reply and Statement.

Although the letter of invitation from the Belgian Government,
mentioned above, had simply referred to Article 7 of the Nine
Power Treaty concerning the Incident, the gist of the Imperial
Japanese Government's reply contended that the Conference in ques-
tion could not be considered as separated from the decision of the
League of Nations, and that in consideration of the fact that the
League had accused the actions of the Japanese Empire as in viola-
tion of the Nine Power Treaty and had already adopted this unfriend
decision towards us, beneficial settlement could not be expected
from the Conference, and as our actions in China are simply defensive
provoked by the Chinese challenge, it lies beyond the scope of the
Nina Power Treaty. The key-note to the settlement lies in China's introspection and conversion to a cooperative policy in her relation with Japan. It is on the contrary rather harmful to try to settle the question in a conference consisting of countries with little or no interest in East Asia.

Furthermore, our Government issued at the time a long statement to make clear the cause of the incident and to make it well understood that the incident arose from peculiar circumstances existing between Japan and China, and had it delivered to the Belgian Ambassador at Tokyo through Foreign Minister (name) in conjunction with the reply of our Government. At the same time instructions by telegraph were sent to our Ambassador to Belgium to formally present the statement of our Government to the Belgian Government.

The full text of the reply and statement of our Government reads as follows: --

1. The Reply of the Japanese Government
   Dated October 27.

The Imperial Japanese Government has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the invitation of the Belgian Government dated 20th of this month which proposed, in conformity to the request of the British Government with the concurrence of the American Government, to the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty of the 6th day of February, 1922, in compliance with Article 7 of the
Fof Loc No. 363

Treaty, to meet at [NAME] on the 30th day instant to investigate the situation in East Sea and to find measures of conciliation to hasten the termination of the regrettable disputes prevailing over the area.

In conformity with the one-sided statement of one of the parties concerned, the General Assembly of the League of Nations concluded in the report adopted on the 6th of this month concerning the Sino-Japanese Incident that our actions in progress in China are in violation of the Sino-Neutrality Treaty.

As our Government has announced, however, our present actions in China are nothing but defensive measures forced upon us by the enforcement of an extreme anti-Japanese policy by the Chinese and especially when the use of force has been used.

The General Assembly of the League, furthermore, expressed its moral support of China in its decision and advised the countries concerned to refrain from action that would cause to weaken the resisting power of China and increase her difficulties in the present dispute and to consider the extent of assistance each would be able to render China. This clearly ignores our fair intention to contribute to world peace by embodying the peace of East Sea, through the sincere cooperation of China and Japan and stimulates the hostility of one party of the disputation countries by assisting it, and does not help at all in facilitating the settlement of the dispute in question.

The invitation of the Belgian Government does not refer to the relationship existing between the present conference and the
League of Nations. However, in consideration of the fact that the League of Nations suggested, in the above mentioned decision, for a Conference of League member Countries concerned with the Nine Power Treaty and that the American Government, who concurred on the request of the British Government to call the present Conference, announced on the 6th day of October to support the decision of the League of Nations, we cannot help but conclude that the present Conference was called in connection with the decision of the League. Furthermore, in consideration of the fact that the League of Nations, as mentioned in the preceding item, reached a conclusion affecting our honor, and adopted an unfriendly decision towards Japan, we cannot help but conclude that expectations cannot be held at least in the presently proposed Conference for adequate and unreserved negotiations between the countries concerned guiding the zino-Japanese Incident to an actual, fair and reasonable settlement.

Moreover, as the present zino-Japanese Incident has arisen from particular circumstances existing in East Asia and has serious bearing upon the existence of both China and Japan, we firmly believe that it will rather incur a complication of the situation and prove hindrance to the normal settlement of the question to try to settle it by a conference of many countries including those having different degrees of or little or no, interest in East Asia.

From the above mentioned point of view, we regret that we cannot accept the invitation of the Belgian Government.
New, the present Incident is indeed nothing but a result of
the national policy of the Chinese government for many years;
acting which its Imperial Ministry of External Affairs and the
people and not only encourage anti-Japanese movements but also
developed anti-Japanese ways to become a fact, acting in concert
with the red influence, menacing the peace of East Asia. Therefore,
the key-note of the settlement consists in the government of China
awakening to the joint-responsibility of Japan and China for
the stabilisation of East Asia and an integrating convert to a
cooperative policy between Japan and China. That we expect of
the peace is that they fully recognize this fact. And an
corperation based on this recognition alone can contribution to
the stabilisation of the East can be achieved.

Dated, 27th day of October of 12th year of Shun (TN: 1937).
CERTIFICATE
statement of source and authenticity

I, YSUTA, Tsuru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese
Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereunto attached
in Japanese consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Details of the
Conference of the Nine Power Treaty Countries in Marrakesh"
is an exact and true extract of an official document of the Japanese
Foreign office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of February, 1947.

(signed) Y. Ysuta
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) U. Umemoto

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defence Language Branch, hereby
certify that the foregoing translation described in the above
certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct
translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the
original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 7 Mar. 1947
閉鎖が行われた核実験場の核実験が行われる。
昭和四十六年十月二十七日

-four

彼等は今日東京に於て써

数万人が会衆として

集められ、その間、温かい言葉が

交わされ、熱心な参加が

見られた。
To: President

Subject: Promulgation of Regulations for Punishing "Fan-min"
* Passed by the Anti-Japanese Terrorist Commission

Despite all our government officials' strong protests and all the Chinese Government officials' efforts, the activities of the Anti-Japanese-goods associations have become more and more vehement under the cloak of patriotism. The Anti-Japanese Terrorist Commission for each association in Shanghai, (T.J. SHANGHAI HINCHI HINCHI KOKO IHW.I) a notorious anti-Japanese association, as you know, passed on the 3rd a bill entitled Regulations for Punishing "fan-min" (T.J. a traitor to China) consisting of 3 articles, which it published in the Chinese papers on the 4th. I beg to submit to your inspection the translation of the foregoing regulations which is enclosed herewith for reference.

* P.I.: "fan-min" meaning literally "wicked people"
Press July 4th 1923

The Regulations for Punishing "Ku-min" issued by the Anti-Japanese Terrorist Commission.

The Anti-Japanese Terrorist Commission for Each Concession in Shanghai passed regulations for punishing "Ku-min" on the afternoon of the 3rd. The following is the text of the Regulation:

I. On the basis of the resolution made by the Anti-Japanese Terrorist Commission for Each Concession in Shanghai, the Regulations for Punishing "Ku-min" have been specially enacted. The offender against the General Principle for Economic Blockade Plan and the rules relative to its application promulgated by this Commission shall be published according to these promulgation.

II. The person who is involved in any of the following acts shall be called "Ku-min".

A. The importer who has purchased any goods made in Japan and has transported and sold them to anyone in China, or who has neglected to register "Japanese goods materials" according to these Regulations and has transported and sold them without having a transportation permit.

B. The wholesale merchant who has purchased unregistered Japanese goods from an importer and put them on the market by reselling them to stores.

C. The carrier or the customs agent who has conveyed
The broker who has secretly sold the Japanese goods to a merchant in China.

3. The retail dealer who has sold directly to consumers any Japanese goods unregistered or those already registered but with no transportation permit attached.

III. The punishment shall be according to the following five categories.

1. Exhibition of Wooden Dragon.
   A wooden dragon on which the name and the details of the criminal of the "Kan-mi" are inscribed shall be exhibited with his picture pasted on its inside at a prominent place in the town.

2. Suspension of Public Rights.
   The name and details of the criminal of the "Kan-mi" shall be reported to the Central Government and the Governments of the Province and the City, and he shall have his public rights necessary to his business suspended.

   In accordance with the cost the Japanese goods which the "Kan-mi" has transported and sold, he shall pay to the "Supervision Fund" as a fine, twice the amount of their cost.
D. Punishment by Dishonor.

The name of the "Kan-min" shall be published in the newspapers of the district which he has committed the crime at his permanent domicile, and at the same time the "Kan-min" records shall be issued and the so-called "Kan-min Sign Board" shall be made and shown at such a place where the people may easily notice it.

E. Punishment by Discredit.

The merchant whose business is the same as that of the "Kan-min" and any firm connected with his business shall be notified of the "Kan-min" whom they will boycott.

IV In accordance with the importance of the matters involved the "Kan-min" who has committed one of the crimes provided for in Article II shall be punished with one of the penalties provided for in respective paragraphs of Article III or with the penalties prescribed in its second and third paragraphs. How to apply these penalties shall be deliberated upon and decided by the Public Decision Committee.

V The man who has acted in collusion with any foreigner and escaped punishment as the result of some special influence shall be deprived of his personal and real estate and have the protection and all rights, granted to him by law, suspended.
VI These regulations shall go into effect at the date of proclamation.
CERTIFICATE

Attestation of Source and Authenticity

I, H. Y. S. I, Kenz, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in Japanese consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Promulgation of the Regulations for Punishment of "Ken-kin" passed by the anti-Japanese Terrorist Commission" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 24th day of February, 1947

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clark, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Dated 20 March 1947
「西国改修概要」の第三巻"より

反日派自治会関連歩民決議会決

-1-
құрметке құдайға құрайым құран сүйінің «Сураты»
（参）

若考虑一个简单的电子系统，我们可分析如下条件：

1. 系统的总能量守恒。
2. 电子的运动受到原子核的约束。
3. 电子的轨道量子数大小有限。

由此可以得出，电子的运动状态是量子化的。
By the middle of 1944, Japan's losses of merchant and naval vessels had so reduced the number of oceangoing ships that she was unable to find the transport required both to supply military forces committed in various areas and to move the volume of raw materials necessary to maintain 1943 levels of industrial output. In order to make ship construction equal losses, Japan would have had to build merchant vessels at the rate of at least 2,500,000 gross tons in 1944.

Latest figures as revealed by the Japanese Diet (5 September 1945) indicate that the nation had no more than 200,000 odd gross tons of operable
merchant tonnage (over 100 tons) left at the cessation of hostilities. 

Net figures for wartime naval building and losses are given in Table 10. 

P. Organization of the Shipbuilding Industry

1. Brief History and Economic Considerations.

a. Review to 1928. In addition to considering the specific questions of security and convertibility in the Japanese shipbuilding industry, it is necessary that we review historically and briefly the economic aspects of the shipbuilding industry in Japan with a view to determining to what extent the industry has been expanded along uneconomic lines.

Ever since the Restoration of 1868, the Japanese Government has paid close attention to shipping problems, and soon after the war of 1895 in China, it embarked on a program of subsidies governed by laws enacted in 1896. The abnormal boom conditions prevailing during World War I, when (in 1919) 612,000 gross tons of merchant ships were launched, diminished the need for subsidies, but soon afterwards the annual amount of operating subsidies tended to revert to dimensions of 1914.

During the 1920's the shipbuilding industry entered a long period of depression. Merchant ship construction dropped to a low of 42,000 gross tons in 1927, and operating subsidies amounted to about ten million yen a year. During this period, the Government did not give direct shipbuilding subsidies, but assisted shipbuilders by means of bounties on domestic steel production and certain exemptions from import duties. In 1929 the Government framed a program for the assistance of shipping in the form of loans on easy terms for shipbuilding. A loan fund of thirty million yen was made available,

1/ This figure may be a little on the low side to gain Allied sympathy and aid for their economic reconstruction. For example, their total does not include tonnage of ships in repair which exceeds operable tonnage.
but owing to the world economic depression which followed, little was made of this facility. A slow increase then began; the rate of increase was greatly accelerated in the early 30's by a government subsidized program of merchant ship construction. Under government direction Japanese lines required fast cargo ships which were the equal of any in their class in the world.

b. Scrap and Build Schemes; Shipbuilding During the 1930's. In 1932, the Japanese Government made an important decision when, with a view to improving the unfavorable age distribution of the Japanese Merchant Marine and to reducing the frequency of marine casualties, it introduced the first of three "Scrap and Build" Schemes. The first scheme, which took effect as of 1 October 1932, provided for the construction of 200,000 gross tons of new shipping, on condition that two tons of vessels of twenty-five years and over were scrapped for each ton of new vessels built under subsidy. Each new vessel had to be 4,000 gross tons or over, capable of at least thirteen and one-half knots speed, and built in a Japanese yard.

The scheme resulted in the scrapping of ninety-four vessels of about 400,000 gross tons and in the building of thirty-one new vessels of about 200,000 gross tons.

It was estimated that the expenditure involved in building the thirty-one ships was a little less than 55,000,000 yen. The total government subsidy was nearly 11,000,000 yen.

The second and third schemes, which took effect in 1935 and 1936 respectively, were on a smaller scale than the first. Their combined result was the scrapping of 100,000 gross tons and the construction of seventeen vessels of about 100,000 gross tons, the rate of subsidy being little more than half that under the first scheme. The vessels built had a gross tonnage of 4,000 tons or more and were capable of over fifteen knots speed.
By the early part of 1937, the three Scrap and Build Schemes had resulted in the scrapping of some 500,000 gross tons of old tonnage and the construction of forty-eight new fast ships of some 300,000 tons gross. These forty-eight included more than four-fifths of the total number of Japanese vessels of over 1,000 gross tons and less than five years old. At that time Japan had more tonnage less than five years old in proportion to her total tonnage than any other country. The following table shows the ships constructed and scrapped in accordance with the three ship improvement plans.

Table 17

Ships Constructed and Scrapped in Accordance with the Three Ship Improvement Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total Tonnage</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total Tonnage</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>193,989</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>399,122</td>
<td>1931-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49,760</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52,798</td>
<td>1935-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50,690</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47,235</td>
<td>1936-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>299,439</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>499,155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: It was not possible to ascertain the number of vessels actually dismantled under the third plan.

The cost of the three ship improvement plans totalled ¥14,000,000 (14,062,800), including ¥11,000,000 for the first plan and ¥1,500,000 for each of the next two plans.

A fourth scheme came into operation in April 1937 and provided for the subsidized construction of superior passenger and passenger-cargo liners of not less than 6,000 gross tons and nineteen knots speed, at rates of subsidy approximating in some cases half the building cost. In a supplement to the Official Gazette of July 1937, it was stated that the subsidies, though payable by installments spread over eighteen years, would be paid during the next four years for the construction of 150,000 gross tons of passenger vessels and 150,000 gross tons of passenger-cargo vessels. It was proposed to spend a total of over fifty million yen on this scheme during the eighteen years beginning with 1937-39.
Tab. 13 gives the total launchings of vessels of 100 gross tons and upwards for selected years between 1913 and 1938:

Table 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>64,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>456,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>151,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>152,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>294,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>551,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>441,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shipbuilding in Japan, 1940 (Japan Economic Federation).

The trend in the middle thirties was towards the construction of luxury passenger liners for deep-sea service, but was reversed after the outbreak of the war with China. The shipbuilding industry directly reflected the change in shipping needs from large-sized vessels for deep-sea service to small and medium-sized bottoms for coastal trade. Of the total orders placed up to the end of May 1939, 165 cargo vessels accounted for 508,670 tons. Of these, thirty-four vessels larger than the 7,000-ton class amounted to 306,600 tons, while 133 under 6,000 tons totalled 302,070 tons. Compared with the figures for 30 November 1938 or six months earlier, the former class showed a decline in number and 27,930 in tonnage, but the latter class gained eighty-five in number and 325,420 in tonnage.

Table 19 shews the ships launched by 1,000 ton classes between 1932 and 1938. Little change in emphasis is visible here.
Naval Construction; Comparison with Merchant Vessel Construction.

Naval vessel construction was of course also stressed during this period, as is shown by the following table (Table 20). Merchant ship launchings are also shown in this table and it will be noted that minor variations exist between these figures and those previously given in Table 19. These differences are not significant, but largely reflect different source material. The information below is carried over into 1940.

**Table 19**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class No. of Ships</th>
<th>No. of Ships 1937</th>
<th>No. of Ships 1938</th>
<th>No. of Ships 1939</th>
<th>No. of Ships 1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36,355</td>
<td>15,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7,900 (10)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36,340</td>
<td>11,050 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>7,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38,300</td>
<td>14,620 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,660 (25)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21,500 (36)</td>
<td>3,150 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39,200</td>
<td>9,164 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,630 (125)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22,150</td>
<td>13,920 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4,160 (165)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17,500 (120)</td>
<td>1,800 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>19,730</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td>1,900 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>55,100 (36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 10,134,180 20,127,120 93,419,665 77,411,090

Source: For First Yearbook, 1941.

**Table 20**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Tonnage of Steel Merchant Ships and Naval Vessels Launched by Yards in Japan and Japanese-Controlled Territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Naval Ships</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Gross tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>157,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>118,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>53,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>52,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>53,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>39,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>38,274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


/ Includes only the output in Japan proper.

1. Shipbuilding Industry Act. The Chinese and European Wars necessitated a large increase in the military shipping of Japan. It was necessary to make up for war losses in shipping as well as for the decreases in neutral and world shipping. For the most part Japan had to rely upon her own power and ability for further shipbuilding.

To cope with this newly arisen situation, Japan enacted several important shipping laws including the Emergency Shipping Control Act, the Shipbuilding Industry Act, and the Shipbuilding Control Act. Of these laws, the most fundamental is the Shipbuilding Industry Act, whose nature and function it will be well to describe in detail. The law has been described by a semi-official Japanese source in this way:

(i) Purpose of the Law. "The purpose of the Law is to increase the supply of vessels at low cost and the maintenance of adequate shipbuilding capacity from the viewpoint of national defense. The Law as passed by the 74th session of the Diet in 1939 provides measures for government protection and control of the shipbuilding industry."

(ii) Government Supervision. "By this Law, the shipbuilding industry is brought under strict Government supervision. The establishment of new enterprises, inauguration, and cessation of work of shipbuilding companies are subject to supervision from the Government."

(iii) Shipbuilding Privileges. "Shipbuilders, however, are given the right of eminent domain and are allowed to issue debentures to an amount twice their paid-up capital. The Government may issue instructions as regards the building of hulls, engines, and equipment not yet made in this country, and may grant subsidies in such cases. It may also order shipbuilders to use domestic products in building hulls, engines, and equipment. The Government may set standards for quality and may disqualify products which do not conform to this standard."

1/Passed by the 74th session of the Diet in 1939.
(iv) Government Subsidy and Indemnity. "The Government may, if necessary, for the promotion of the shipbuilding industry, grant subsidies to
shipbuilders to offset changes in prices for vessels, hulls, engines,
and equipment, as well as in repair costs, etc. The Government may also, when deems necessary in the public interest, order shipbuilders to effect changes in prices for vessels, hulls, engines,
and equipment, as well as in repair costs, etc. The Government may also, when deemed necessary in the public interest, demand the installation, enlargement,
and improvement of equipment, the repair of vessels, hulls, engines, and equipment,
and the establishment of facilities for research on specified subjects.
The Government may indemnify shipbuilders for any losses incurred by shipbuilders in the execution of these orders.

(v) The Right to Organize Compulsory Cartels. "The Law also contains provision for cooperative associations which may be organized by shipbuilders for collective purchasing, administration of materials, establishment
of facilities for common use, control of business activities of members, and
research work for the common benefit. The Government may order members of
these associations to comply with regulations and may instruct outsiders to
join the organizations. Finally, the Government may instruct such organizations
to undertake certain activities for the healthful development of the industry."

b. Fundamental Shipbuilding Regulations. While thus strengthening the
control over shipping and shipbuilding on the one hand, Japan adopted six
measures in 1939 describing the standard for cargo vessels in order to en-
courage construction of these vessels on the other. Out of this a new
national shipping policy grew up, under which a number of plans were put into
execution.

But as an aftermath of 7 December 1941 a demand for more rapid increase
in Japan's shipbuilding arose. To meet the situation, a set of fundamental
systematic shipbuilding regulations were adopted and made public in May 1942.
These regulations were drawn up on the assumption that shipbuilders were to
build, according to government plan and with powerful government assistance, as
many ships within a certain period of time as the demand warranted. For the
realization of this program, the following technical qualifications were con-
sidered essential:
(i) For a determined standard-size ship, certain fixed specifications of the ship's hull, engine equipment, and other parts were to be furnished to the builder along with the necessary drawings. The idea was to help facilitate mass production of ships. It was, in short, to standardize the planning, so that complications would no longer arise as they had in the past when different shipbuilders presented individual ideas, plans, and drawings.

(ii) With regard to the order for a non-standard ship, construction work would not be accepted generally, except in such a special case as the building of a passenger boat.

(iii) In order to obtain the highest degree of efficiency from every individual shipyard, each yard would be assigned the building of a certain class of ship under the standardization plan, and would make the construction of such a type its specialty. There were nineteen classes, all told, running as follows: six classes or grades for cargo vessels, three for oil tankers, one for cargo-carrying ships, five for wooden vessels, and four for wooden barges. The classes were divided as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freighters</th>
<th>Total tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type A</td>
<td>6,300 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type B</td>
<td>4,400 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type C</td>
<td>2,700 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type D</td>
<td>1,900 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type E</td>
<td>830 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type F</td>
<td>495 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tankers: Total tonnage of 10,000 tons, 5,000 tons and 1,000 tons.

Mineral ore freighters: Total tonnage of 5,500 tons.

The above vessels are made of steel. Vessels of smaller types, due to the lack of steel, are made of wood. They are called standard wartime wooden ships. They may be divided into two kinds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wooden freighters</th>
<th>Total tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light wooden ships</td>
<td>Loaded tonnage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type A</td>
<td>250 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type B</td>
<td>200 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type C</td>
<td>150 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type D</td>
<td>100 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type E</td>
<td>70 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Light wooden ships: Loaded tonnage of 300 tons, 200 tons, 150 tons and 70 tons.
c. Other Rationalization Techniques

Aside from the point that individual builders were to come under the standardized shipbuilding scheme, the following points were also stressed:

(i) Standardization of specifications for steel used in shipbuilding, (ii) development to the utmost of the scope within which substitute materials are used, (iii) simplification of the ship's hull, engine, and equipment, (iv) expansion of the scope within which electric welding is applied, and (v) general saving of materials by improving shipbuilding technique.

3. Administration

The Navy Ministry (Kuun-sho). On 5 February 1942, the Government promulgated the Imperial Ordinance relating to the special wartime case of jurisdiction with regard to the business of shipbuilding. This (a) limited the authority of the shipbuilding industry to regulate the supply and demand of important materials used for ships (i.e., set up a priority system); and (b) transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy, for the duration of the war only, jurisdiction (hitherto in the hands of the Minister of Communications (Teishin-sho)) over construction and repair of merchant vessels.

Besides insuring elasticity between materials for naval construction and materials for merchant ship construction, this change made a single system out of the two construction plans, and in general contrived to regulate both. This put the construction of naval and merchant vessels fundamentally on the same footing. For it was desirable that the question of the relative percentage of naval and merchant craft to be constructed should be governed by a unified plan, in accordance with the availability of materials, building facilities, and current requirement.

Only general schedules, however, were to be set by the Navy Ministry, while the allocation of orders and raw materials for specific yards were to be handled by the Industrial Equipment Management Corporation on the one hand, and by the Shipbuilding Control Association (Zosen Tos-ikai), on the other.
b. Industrial Equipment Development Corporation. Under the system of standard production and unified design which we have already described, ordering of ships by a single authority was inescapable, and the machinery that was set up to play the part of the single ordering authority was the Industrial Equipment Development Corporation. This National Policy Company took over the wartime standard-pattern ship program, on the basis of the government ship construction plans, and gave contracts to all the shipyards.

Aside from these activities, the corporation became the main instrument for financing defense shipbuilders and guaranteeing them against loss. In effect, it was, at the same time, a device for subsidizing the industry and for providing it with compensation in the case of loss, all at public expense.

According to the charter of this corporation, the necessary number of ships are to be assured as long as the country needs them. This the Government accomplishes, on the one hand, by making part of the cost of building new ships a direct national burden, and, on the other hand, by supplying floating capital for shipbuilding. By revising the ordinance concerning compensation of losses, the Government raised the limit of the floating capital it would supply from two-thirds to four-fifths of the capital value of any one shipyard. By lowering the sphere of application of these provisions it extends them to all ships classified as small wartime standard-pattern ships. It has also equalized compensation for loss of capital through its monetary organ, the Industrial Bank of Japan. (In connection with shipbuilding firms it is interesting to note that the Bank of Japan allegedly supplied ¥192,000,000 in 1942, in addition to the capital coming from other government agencies).

In the event that there comes to be a national need for the finished ships and the corporation shall have occasion to sell them for private use, it has been decided that the Government shall pay compensation for losses incurred by the corporation and that the standard prices for constructing ships and for transferring them shall be decided by the Government.
Theft activities, basic establishing financial policy, and the ILO responsible for the extensive expansion of shipbuilding through the replication of the pivotal principles, namely, simplification of patterns and unitary construction -- the year, etc. (See Appendix IV for additional details).

c. Shipbuilding Control Society. The Shipbuilding Control Society is the central body directing the control associations in this industry. (To the Society is reported a consultative association which includes the related industrial control associations.) The Shipbuilding Control Society assists in handling the supply of materials under a priority system. Affiliated with the central Shipbuilding Control Society are five national shipbuilding consultative associations made up of the medium and small scale manufacturers.

The president of the society, which was established in 1942, is SHIPA Koshiro (formerly head of Mitsubishi Jukogyo), and the Managing Director is Vice Admiral (Reserve) WAKAMURA Shigeharu.

According to a semi-official Japanese source, the Shipbuilding Control Society has been described as one of the planning agencies for general advancement of national power which has been established in Tokyo in accordance with the Major Industries Association Ordinance of September 1941. Member organizations of this society are designated by the Navy Ministry (formerly by the Ministry of Communications) on the basis of the following requirements:

(i) Any shipbuilding association which builds ships over 100 meters long or constructs engines for ships, or both, may be admitted as a member organization.

(ii) Any shipbuilding proprietor who cannot meet the foregoing requirements is not to be admitted.

(iii) Any proprietor who manufactures or repairs parts for ships of the required length as mentioned above may become a member.

(iv) Exceptions to the above regulations may be made upon the approval of the Navy Ministry (formerly upon approval of Communications Ministry).
The principal aim of the central society is to construct and repair ships within the framework of national planning of the Japanese Government. In order to carry this program into effect the society has also to secure the necessary raw materials and apply expert technique. The leading personnel members of the Shipbuilding Control Society include the President of the Society, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, several Directors, several Supervisors, and several Advisers. The President of the Society is appointed by the Navy Minister (formerly by the Communications Minister). The Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors are appointed by the President of the Society, but with the approval of the same Minister, who, as he sees fit, may order the dissolution of the Shipbuilding Control Society. The Society holds an annual meeting at its General Headquarters within two months following the end of each year. Provisional meetings may be called upon the suggestion of the President.

Each member organization is required to make reports to General Headquarters concerning its construction progress, the condition of ships which it is repairing, the nature of the furnishings of its ships, establishment of new branches or various changes, relating to the ships themselves, labor, capital, and planning. (See Appendix IV for a list of members of the Shipbuilding Control Society).

d. Local associations (kumiai) in wooden shipbuilding. At the outbreak of war, Japan’s wooden shipbuilding industry consisted of over 3,000 yards, most of them employing less than ten workers and building small vessels by traditional handicraft methods. To unify and expand them to an industry capable of building a large fleet of significant dimensions has meant a drastic re-organization of the industry.

The first step was the forced consolidation of these yards under centralized government control. The 3,000 yards were reduced by merger to 600 and these in turn organized into 41 local associations, or kumiai (in all urban and rural prefectures). These wooden shipbuilding associations were further organized into one unit, the Japanese Federation of Wooden Shipbuilding Associations.
Quotas of wooden vessels designed according to standard specifications were then allotted to each firm by the Japanese Federation of Wooden Shipbuilding Associations (later merged into or affiliated with the Shipbuilding Control Society under the "New Economic Structure"), under the direct control of the Ministry of Communications (later probably under the Navy Ministry.) The Navy, which controls steel ship construction, was given supervisory power over the building of vessels under fifty meters, as well as the control over the supply of engines and fittings. Quotas of materials, machinery, tools, etc., were allocated under the national economic mobilization plans. Low-cost financing and bonuses for production afforded financial incentives.

Excerpts, pages IV-259; IV-252 - IV-257; IV-259 - IV-269.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>番号</th>
<th>番目</th>
<th>仮名</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>未定</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
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<td>未定</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>1411</td>
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<td>未定</td>
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</tbody>
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表 "表 6（下）"
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |


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詳述スルコトハ省略タモノト愚フ。凡法ハ日本
Sworn. Le Ikicho (Translation)

Defendant: ISHIIKA KANJI

Having first duly sworn an oath on an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deposes as follows.

I was in charge of operations as a staff-officer of the Kwantung Army from March, 1929 to August, 1932, and concerned with the Manchurian Incident which was touched off by the Mukden Incident in September, 1931. So I shall state hereby on the actions of the Kwantung Army at that time, laying stress on its military movements, as they relate to the Manchurian Incident.

(1) On the General situation with special reference to the military position of Japan before the Manchurian Incident.

At the time when Japan obtained the right to station her troops in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese forces in four northeastern provinces were so weaker that Japan could renge to defend the far-stretching South Manchuria Railway and also to protect her residents with the small force allowed by the treaty. But after the collapse of Ching Dynasty, it happened that CHU-I HSUEH LIN grew powerful and started to have an ambitious eye to things within the Great Wall, gradually increasing his forces. His policy in Manchuria was influenced by the campaign for recovery of list national rights then prevailing all over China and tended to aim at driving out the Russo-Japanese influences from Manchuria. So the movement of his forces became a considerable factor in considering Manchurian affairs.

After CHENG TSOU LIN was killed by bombs, his successor, CHENG HAI HUNG declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang. So, the Kuomintang influence
made a steady inroads on the north-eastern area, instigating and organising
anti-Japanese campaigns, until it affected the North-eastern Army, the im-
portance of which could no longer be disregarded.

Chang Tat-sien, was appointed Vice-commander of the Kuomintang Army
upon his declaration of allegiance to the Nanking government. He attempted
to re-organise his forces, and to reinforce their armaments in both quanti-
ty and quality namely, maintenance of a standing strength amounting to
220,000, enlargement of the munitions factory in Mukden, equipping his
forces with tanks, airplanes and other modern arms, and strengthening of
training systems etc. They were superior in numbers and equipment to our
forces in Manchuria at that time, and were in high spirits and elated
anti-Japanese sentiments. Their disposition was re-arranged into an encir-
cling position so that they besieged these areas occupied by our Army along
the South Manchuria Railway. In the face of such a challenging attitude,
the Kuomintang Army scattered in an extensive area was placed in a dangerous
position from a military point of view. Organized actions against or in
contumacy of Japan were carried out under the leadership of the North-Eastern
Army authorities while our railway-guards were on duty or in training.
In the face of various kinds of successive interruptions and accidents, and
our the distress and misery, from which the Japanese residents were suffered.
Kuantung Army was driven to the extreme limit of indignation.

In order to cope with the threatening situation produced by the change
of fall and winter in general in the north-eastern China, the Kuomintang
Army in the field made a proposal to increase the numbers and re-arrange
its forces to the central military authorities. However, it was not accep-
ted. The Japanese forces remaining in its peace-time disposition, had
to be exposed to the superior Chinese forces burning with anti-Japanese sentiments; on the other hand, no effective diplomatic steps were taken except the lip service to alleviate the situation. The relation between the two forces was on the verge of explosion as if sitting on top of a volcano.

(2) On the outline of operational preparations by the Kwantung Army at the time of the Incident.

Besides its usual duty of guarding the South Manchuria Railway and also of defending the Kwantung Province, the Kwantung Army was in charge of
covering the concentration of our main forces in Manchuria, in the possible event of hostilities between Soviet Russia and Japan, which might be touched by the Soviet encroachment on the Manchurian territory, a duty in view, which, of course, were of necessary preparations were always made for such a defensive nature as to expect to give a blow at the advancing army in the northern part of South Manchuria in case the enemy should attack the south after occupying the northern areas. So the Chinese army was not our original objective of operational preparations. But, as previously stated, the north-eastern situation was steadily growing worse and finally it came to be feared that the Chinese army burning with anti-Japanese sentiments might clash with our forces. So, according to the orders and instructions received from the central headquarters of supreme command preparations for the worst had been made for the preceding several years in order to execute the duty even by force. Our ill-equipped forces of about 10,000 remained at that time in their usual disposition, dispersed along about 1,000 K.m. of the South Manchuria Railway line south of Changchun, encircled by the Chinese forces of 200,000 strength. There were thousands or tens of thousands of Chinese forces stationed in Mukden, Changchun, Chuangte and Fenghuang-cheng, and the commander's notice was posted in every barrack of the Yang I-che's Brigade announcing his firm resolution against Japan to stir up hostile feelings. Under such circumstances the Kwantung Army established an operational plan to settle whatever incident might happen, in the shortest possible time, and finished all the preparations regarding education, training, transportation etc. Our tactics were to forestall the enemy, concentrating all our strength to Mukden to deal a fatal blow to the military centre of Mukden and the pick of the North-eastern Army if our main forces should be
obliged to take actions in the conflict between Japan and China regardless of the place of the conflict.

It required a scrupulous planning and preparation, a strong unity and careful training of troops to discharge this difficult duty with so small a force available. So, every unit was required to maintain strict discipline and strong unity and to conduct education and training to the point and adaptable to actual fightings.

When Commander HONO replaced General KIHARA in August, 1931, he understood the gravity of the situation in view of the Captain HIJIKI's Case, which had been a precedent for armed conflicts in connection with the peace duty. So he issued an order to the effect that his forces should abstain from rashness and impatience on the one hand, and on the other hand should take a positive and resolute action in discharging their duties, especially in the case of a small unit once a clash with the enemy actually occurs should not allow the enemy to aggrandize the incident by despising us.

In his first inspection tour following his arrival at his post the command simultaneously undertook an unexpected inspection with especial reference to the operational preparations of every unit. As the Kwantung Army was inferior in point of numbers and equipment, and was so situated as to expect no reinforcement from the central military authorities, it tried to increase its fighting strength by making the most of operational materials available in Manchuria. For example, two heavy-guns were mounted on the 2nd Battalion's barracks of the Hukoden Independent Garrison, several armored cars were attached to part of infantry forces, and explosive provisions and other wall-attack materials were prepared. It is true that it endeavored to make up the shortage of the fighting strength, but it was
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not in a position to carry out extensive operations for a long time.

As to the transportation of the forces, we had the confidence in our
ability to start it about an hour after the alarm was received, but,
I regret to say that it took in actuality about four hours at the very
moment of the incident. In view of the superiority of the enemy in its
armaments, especially in mortar, tank or airplanes, our forces devoted
themselves to the training in our favorite right or well-attack, with
such intensity as to develop a fighting spirit strong enough to meet
the opposing forces however great the odds might be.

(3) On the relation between the operational preparations of the
Kwantung Army and the outsiders.

At the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the Commander
of the Kwantung Army was Lieutenant-General KITAGAWA, Shigeru, who, as previ­
iously stated, succeeded General KISHIKAWA in August, 1931. The chief
of staff was Major-General HIRAKWA, Koji, the senior staff-officer
was Colonel ITAMARI, Seishiro, who succeeded Colonel KOJOTO after
the latter was obliged to be transferred following the death of Chang
Tsue-lin by bombing; the operational staff-officer was myself. There
were also some other staff officers of the ranks of major or captains.

The chief of the Mukden Special Service Organ was Colonel KITAYAMA,
Kenji, who succeeded Major-General SUZUKI, Yoshinobu in August, 1931,
and the military adviser of Chang Hsu-liang was Lieutenant-colonel
SHIBUYA, Ken shore. There were also some other military instructors
engaged by the "north-eastern army. The Commander of the 2nd Division
was Lieutenant-General TAKAHIRO, Jiro, and the commander of the Independent
Garrison was Lieutenant-General LONI, Ken. None of these officers had
any connection with the so-called "March Incident", nor were they the members of the SA:UKA (Cherry) Association. I had no opportunity to have intimate talks with Colonel KASHIMOTO, Kingoro or Doctor OKAYA, Shumei before the Manchurian Incident. As, sharp criticisms were made in Japan concerning the actions of the Kwantung Army, especially after the death of Chang Tsuo-liin, the leaders of the Kwantung Army, including the former commanders, General HISHIKARI and General KITA (Fusiro), gave the forces a strict warning against rash actions. Colonel ITAGAYI, in particular as the senior staff-officer, had a Perfect-Control over the headquarters' staff officers, so he was confident that no one would dare to attempt an irregular conduct. But, in view of the anti-Japanese atmosphere in China, especially of her troops' hostile feelings and insubordinate movements, and also in the face of the failure of various diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China inspite of our conciliatory attitude the whole army, including its commander, staff officers, force-commanders, officers and men entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable. So the Kwantung Army continued to study, in such great earnest, its peculiar operational preparations for the worst, as well as the measures to be taken in order to maintain peace and order, that there was no staff-officer in the headquarters at Fort Arthur who was absent on private business, even on Sundays. All the units did their best day and night in training and execution of their guard duties.

When the so-called "October Incident" took place after the Manchurian Incident, it was suspected in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army might declare independence and that troubles might be caused in concert with the Kwantung Army. Telegrams in violent tones were received, and General SHIRAKARI came to Manchuria to appease the Army. But the forces in the field which
were quietly striving to do their duties could not help sneering at the confusion in the central authorities. It is true that there were some civilians in the South Manchurian Railway and other circles, who had various opinions on the Manchurian Problems but no member of the Fenghwa Army including myself had ever conspired with them to cause the incident. On the Outbreak of the "Sept. 18th Incident" and the rescue and measures taken by the Commander of the Luantung Army.

On September 20, 1931, General KOBAYASHI ended his occasional inspection in connection with the first round of inspection at Liaoyang and was delivering an address to the 2nd Division, when there came a telegram addressed to Commander HOJO from the chief of staff, HIRAKI at Fort Arthur, requesting him to ask the Staff-officer H.M.K. or ISHII-RAI to stay in Mukden, as Major-General TAKANO was to arrive there from Tokyo. Then Commander HOJO ordered H.M.K. to go to Mukden, and returned to Fort Arthur that night, accompanied by the other members of the staff including myself. At that very mid-night, I was called up by Staff-officer H.M.K., who requested me to go at once to the official residence of the chief of staff. I hurried up to the place, not far from the headquarters, where I found all the members of the staff, including Lieutenant Colonel T.KISHITI, in Japanese clothes, called together by Staff-officer Captain H.TAKURO. Then I was shown the first military top-secret telegram stating that the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison at Mukden was moving to the field upon receiving a report that after 10.00 p.m. on Sep. 18 the outrageous Chinese troops destroyed the S.N.K. Railway at a point on the west side of Fei-tuyin in Mukden, and attacked our guards with a resultant clash.
Then chief of staff, M.Y. E, called up the Commander at his official residence, asking him to come to the headquarters, where we ourselves went to work out remedial measures. At about 0:28 a.m., we received the second telegram from the Mukden Special Service Corps, stating that the enemy in Fei-tayin with three or four company strengths exploded the S.M.R. Railway, that our kiushih Company was fighting with some 5 or 6 hundred enemies after 11 p.m.; that a portion of Fei-tayin was occupied by us; that the one was increasing machine and infantry-guns; that the company was in great difficulty and disadvantage; and that Lieutenant Mld was seriously wounded.

Then appeared the Commander of the army, after a careful study the whole staff arrived at the following conclusion:

"The expected worst has unfortunately come owing to outrageous acts on the part of China; the limit of patience is reached. There is no knowing how the situation may aggravate even during this night unless we take a resolute measure to chastise the enemy. There is no time to lose. We must resolutely mobilize the whole strength of our military might to seal the fate of the enemy within the shortest possible time."

When I expressed my opinion as the operational officer to General HONJC to that effect, he meditated a few minutes with his eyes closed, and then, judging from the general situation, he made a final decision, saying resolutely, "Yes, let it be done on my own responsibility." We were all silent with deep emotion, and felt a great responsibility in the face of such a solemn, weighty resolution. Moreover, inspite of our usual operational plans, Commander HONJC ordered our forces not to concentrate in Mukden but to remain in Chang-chun in preparation against the enemies from Kuan-changtzu and Nanling, or from Kirin. In view of the war situation in the..."
In the neighborhood of Mukden, he adopted the course of gradually increasing our strength in order to make an attack instead of concentrating the main forces in Mukden. According to this decision and the general principle concerning the disposition of our units as indicated by the Commander, the usual operational plans were altered, and the orders were issued by telephone between 1:30 and 2:30 a.m. on September 19, to the following effect: the Commander of the Second Division in Tientsin should make an attack upon Mukden and its neighborhood; the Commander of the Independent Garrison in Fengtien should concentrate its 1st and 5th battalions near Mukden; the commander of the 3rd battalion of the Independent Garrison in Tashichiao should get rid of the enemy in Yinken; the commander of the 4th battalion of the Independent Garrison in Lienshuihwa should sweep the enemies in Fuhsiaotung and Antung; the commander of the 4th battalion of the Independent Garrison in Anchon should go to Mukden with two companies and await orders from the commander of the 2nd Division; the commander of the 3rd infantry brigade in Changchun should guard Changchun with the 4th infantry and the 2nd cavalry regiments. In addition to the above the 30th infantry regiment and the heavy-pan battalion in Port Arthur were ordered to move.

Commander-in-Chief KINJO, accompanied by the greater part of his staff officers including myself, left Port Arthur for Mukden shortly after 3 a.m. on the 19th, leaving KINJO, Chief of the Staff, one staff-officer, and the chiefs of each department temporarily in Port Arthur. On his way, he listened to the cries of officials and people on the railway-line demanding a punitive measure against the Chinese troops, and received reports on the changes of situation of battle. Upon his arrival at Mukden Station about noon
on the 19th, he set up the commanding station immediately at the railway station for this occasion. In the meanwhile, he sent reports to the central military authorities, and requested the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Army to send reinforcements (one mixed brigade) in accordance with the previously arranged plan of operations. Also, he requested a part of the 2nd overseas Fleet to be ordered out to Yingkou.

Previously on September 18, General HONJO had learned at Liyang that General TATSUKA was coming for intercommunication by ray of Mukden, and dispatched Colonel ITAGAKI to Mukden in the same afternoon, after the conclusion of inspection, in order to come in touch with him and also contact the Mukden Military Special Service Organ and the Consulate-General concerning the Mukden case. Colonel ITAGAKI saw Major-general TATSUKA who arrived late at night on the same day, but left him without obtaining the details of the message under agreement that they were to meet again the next day. As the incident took place at that very mid-night, he gave certain directions as occasion required, concerning the war situation in Mukden.

The senior staff-officer, Colonel ITAGAKI was well acquainted with Commander HONJO's intentions, and it was all the more true at that time, because the inspection of operational preparations just before the incident disclosed Commander HONJO's idea rather clearly to him. So, every step he took in coping with the incident was in conformity with the Commander's intention, and as such was approved by the Commander as having contributed to the execution of the operation at about 6 p.m. on September 19, we received a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff to the following effect:

"(1) I believe that the decision and steps taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army since the night of September 18 were quite opportune,"
enhancing the prestige of the Japanese Army.

(2) In view of the attitude on the part of China since the outbreak of the Incident, the cabinet has decided that it should deal with the affairs without going too far beyond necessity. The actions of the forces in the field shall conform to this principle.

(3) On the relation between the measures to be adopted by the central authorities according to the principle of non-aggrandizement and the military movement of the Kwantung Army.

The Japanese government decided upon the principle of non-aggrandizement on September 19, immediately after the outbreak of the Manchuria Incident, and at about 6 p.m. on the same day, a telegram addressed to the Commander of the Army was received from the Minister of War, on the basis of the one already mentioned from the Chief of the General Staff, saying that, as regards the conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces, the Cabinet had decided upon the principle of making every effort to prevent the aggrandizement of the Incident, though it is of the opinion that as it had been caused by the destruction of the S.K.R. Railway by the Chinese, the Chinese were to be blamed, and accordingly, it requested us to act upon this principle in the future. The Kwantung Army understood thoroughly the intention and policy of the government and also of the central military authorities i.e. the policy of non-aggrandizement through the aforementioned telegrams from the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff.

But the objective actuality of an armed clash in the field was contradictory to the policy of non-aggrandizement in the result and severe reprimandings were very often received from the central authorities. It is, firstly, because the central authorities failed to understand the
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real situation in the field. Of course to, the Kantung Army, strive
to act in conformity with the central policy, but it was absolutely
necessary to forestall the Chinese by showing activity, and dealing with
them immediately, as they were inferior in numbers and scattered all over
South Manchuria. However, the central authorities failed to understand
this psychology of the forces in the field and the reverants of the
Chinese, and intended to treat the matter with an optimistic observation or
consideration of a purely diplomatic convention. Secondly, it is because
the Nanjing Government with whom our central authorities entered into
negotiation had no control over the North-eastern Army, and failed to
live up to its promise. Even Chang Hsiu-liang could not control the con­
fused movements of his regional forces. The negotiations at Tokyo, Nanjing
and Peiping failed to be in time, so that there was no other way left
than that of settling the situation regionally in the field.

Toward the end of September, the Kantung Army concentrated its forces
along the S.K.R. Railway to watch the situation. The enemies in Chinchow
and Lushun were showing signs of counter-attacks accumulating a superior
strength. When the Nonkian-chao Bridge was destroyed toward the end of
October in 1931, we negotiated with the Executive Council of the Chinese
Eastern Railway through our consul-general in Harbin, and also with Ma
Chanshan through our consul in Chinchihai, and, with their understanding,
began the repair of the damaged bridge, when the Chinese army stationed
there started firing unreasonably at our repair unit. Our covering force
was thus obliged to return the fire, and was placed in a difficult position.
Ma Chanshan failed to make a concession inspite of sequence of negotiations,
until our central authorities, recognizing the situation, took actions to
meet the Ka Chanshan Forces.

While the Kwantung army was obliged to send its main forces to Chichibab, leaving only 2 companies in Mukden, the Chinese concentrated a great force in Chinchou. The anti-Japanese propaganda from China Proper was constantly made and thus the advance of this reinforced enemy force was a great menace to the South Manchurian Area as well as an irritant to the nerves of the Kwantung Army. Then we came to entertain an opinion that we must stamp out the source of disturbance in Chinchou. In the second Tientsin Incident toward the end of November, our Tientsin Army requested the help of the Kwangtung Army but, in view of the basic policy not to stimulate the Soviet Union after the collapse of Ka Chanshan's main forces, we were ready to send forces to Chinchou by any means, even though we might be obliged to call back forces from the North. However, the attempt was checked by the central supreme command. It seemed that, through the medium of the Chinese diplomatic authorities, a proposal was made to our diplomatic circles, to establish a neutral area in the neighbourhood of Chinchou. But the Chinese attitude was such that if we withdrew our forces, China would immediately withdraw this proposal too. At any rate, it was necessary for our small force situated in an extremely disadvantageous position from a military standpoint, to take the initiative increasing the war-like intention of the enemy at the start.

General KCON, Commander of the Kwantung Army, though a man of mild character, used to take a wide view of things to listen to the positive opinions of junior staff-officers, to take the whole responsibility, for his duties abroad, and to issue orders or point out the general principles. It is true that the Kwantung Army often did not hesitate to make positive
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Suggestions to the central authorities and secretaries had heated arguments with them, but I affirm that it has never acted against an Imperial order or instruction so long as the supreme command was involved.

The actions, if any, taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army without asking instructions from the central authorities, were only the following:

The one was the movement of the main forces of the Kwantung Army at the sudden outbreak of the Mukden Incident. But, in view of the prevailing military situation, it can be learned that General HONJO exercised his authority according to Article 3 of the regulations of the Kwantung Army headquarters, and his usual operational preparations in peace time.

The other was the bombing of Chinchou on October 8. The fact was that six of scout-airplanes of 98-type and five seized FOTOKI's (T.N. phonetic) were flying to reconnoitre the conditions of the North-eastern Army in Chinchou area, when they were fired at, and in self-defence, dropped 75 bombs on the Communications University (Military Government Office), barracks of the 28th Division and Cheng Tsueh-shiang's private residence and so on. These bombs were in the size of 7 c.w. mountain-clay balls, and were dropped by hands having no perfect dropping-apparatus since they might have gone wild. Compared with the bombing of London by the German air forces in the former European war, or the bombing of the Japanese towns by the American B-29s etc. in the present war, or the destruction of the cities of HIROSUSHI or NAGASAKI by the Atomic Bombs, I am sure that the damage caused by our bombing was almost insignificant.
in all other matters the Krantung may went through thorough exchange of views with the central authorities, and never started its operations without receiving the latter's instructions. As to the operations in the North Manchuria, the general relations with the Soviet Union were taken into consideration, and our forces were subjected to restriction in their movements. Hence, lest of the operational disadvantage and inconvenience, lest the Soviet Union should suspect aggressive intention on our part or her rights and interests in North Manchuria should be violated.

(4) "On the settlement of the Manchurian problem and the military point of view". The true situation then existing between Japan and China can be characterized as the conflict of opposing demands, the recovery of national prestige from the Chinese side and the preservation of the rights and interests from the Japanese side. It seemed exceedingly difficult to settle the issue unless one party make a concession or a compromise be reached between the two parties, consequently we could hardly expect to maintain our rights and interests merely through diplomatic negotiations. In order to enable our people to engage in peaceful economic activities in Manchuria, there seemed to be no other way of solution than to give up all our special rights and interests, political, economic and military unless China agreed to compromise. However, judging from the then Foreign Minister ShiL-fu's statement made in the Diet in October, 1931, or Prime Minister S. ch.Ki's made in a provincial meeting in April, government could not carry out such a drastic policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia, nor did the public opinion permit such a course.

As a matter of fact, should the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn from Manchuria, not only our rights and interests would have been
lest imperiling even the lives of our residents but also the Soviet Union which was recovering her influence in the Far East, as was seen in the then "Russo-Chinese dispute," could have encroached upon Manchuria. Then, in view of the traditional policy of the Soviet Union, Manchuria could have become a basis of Communist propaganda, and the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria would have been impossible, involving not only our national defence but jeopardizing China's total defense. It was quite clear judging from the conditions after the Sino-Japanese War and the causes of the Russo-Japanese War. The communist Britain and U.S. supported us in our war with Russia was to check the Russian encroachment upon the Far East. Though the Manchurian Army was not concerned in making demand or current on our diplomatic policy, it was seriously concerned with the establishment of peace and the defense of Manchuria in order to save the situation caused by the collapse of the North-Eastern Army after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. In the face of such a new situation, the Kwantung Army and its commander could not but consider the advisability of establishing a defensive disposition against the Soviet Union from a military standpoint.

Of course it meant only the establishment of our defensive posture toward Russia and it was not our intention to attack the Soviet Union with Manchuria as its basis of operations. In other words, we tried to make the most of this favorable disposition, from a strategic point of view, in perfect concert with China to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding south, and to give a silent assistance to our delegate in negotiation. The founding of Manchukuo was brought about as a result of the new political revolution in the North-Eastern China, following the collapse of...
of the North-Eastern military clique, quite apart from the said military viewpoint. It was anything but the means or object of our military
motions though our military action may have given an opportunity for it.
It is a pity that Manchuria was separated from China as a means of settling
the Incident, but we thought that we must understand the tendencies,
activities, and co-operations of the various races in Manchuria before we
put the rest of disturbances ever many years in order to establish
equilibrium in the East. That is to say, we should seek the co-prosperity
of the races through their cooperation, which, from a military point of
view, would terminate war, and consequently achieve Sino-Japanese co-
operation. So the Kwantung Army was devoted to the speedy establishment
of peace and order, from this military point of view, expecting the situa-
tion to be improved by officials and people themselves of the region and
did not enforce military administration in the occupied areas.

The Army was not concerned much in the politics and economy of the
new state. But, we were confident that, in order to exterminate distur-
bances through racial unity in Manchuria and to realize co-existence and
co-prosperity of Japan and China, Japan herself should set an example, by
abandoning her claims to the rights and interests and contributing to
the stabilization of Manchuria in a new normal basis. With this confidence
we instructed officers and men to watch over their own conduct with great
self-restraint.

As the new state was successfully founded, there appeared afterward
some people, military and civilian, who claimed for themselves the credit
of its foundation, saying that they planned it themselves with the Kwa-
tung Army, etc. But the foundation of Manchukuo was nothing more than
-17-
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a historical product of Manchuria, and I believe that the idea of racial cooperation will live for ever.

On this 16 day of January, 1947, at Yvanfu Prefecture

I, Y...[redacted], hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Le...[redacted], who affixed his signature and seal, herein, in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

at the same place

Witness: (signed) [redacted] (seal)
Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ISHII RA KUNJI (seal)
承知

新莉

板垣大佐

高級参謀

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本庄軍司令官

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和六年十月末、江戸近ノ経緯ヲ查プルノヲ始メシマリト、

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を腸時非難本土方面カラハ盛ジェニ抗日宣伝ヲ行ヒ此ノ敵

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14
ポツしゅ形がトラックを防ぐ形で、各部に拳銃や短刀を用いることにした。この時、各部隊は、各部隊の手配を重視し、特に、錦州方面の兵力を増強し、関東軍に派遣される兵力を増強することを決定した。

### 関東軍

関東軍は、天津方面の兵力を増強し、錦州方面の兵力を増強することを決定した。この時、関東軍は、錦州方面の兵力を増強し、関東軍に派遣される兵力を増強することを決定した。
命令に背く若千者を厳しく処罰し、これを示すための示範として厳しく処罰する。
従来の交渉に於けるソビエト、イギリス、アメリカ、中国、日本五大国は、この交渉を個別に対処し、個別の利益を追求するものである。しかし、今次戦争に於いては、日本は戦略的な立場から、他の四国と比較して劣る立場にある。

従来の交渉は、個別の国家の利益を追求するものであったが、今次戦争には、個別の利益を追求するだけでなく、全体の利益も考慮されるべきである。
Diagnosis

Patient: ISHII, Kenji. Age: 51
Address: SUGAO, TACHIBANA, KOKAYUI YAMAGI Prefecture
Diagnosis: Vesical Papilloma of bladder and degenerated cancrum

Symptoms: (1) Vesicul pain (2) Vesicul hemorrhage
(3) Incontinence of urine (4) Frequency of urination and intense heat and fever. (5) Pussy urine

Medical history of patient: (1) Typhoid fever, in September, 1905. (2) Internal succurative typhus, in February, 1923.

Medical history of family: No hereditary traces of cancer or papilloma in either paternal or maternal lines.

Present Conditions: The patient has been suffering for twenty years from bleeding of the bladder, diagnosed as vesical papilloma. He was operated upon to remove the papilloma in 1906, and thereafter was under doctor's treatment. In a few years, the disease recurred causing the stoppage of urine. Then last year the disease was diagnosed by Doctor KITAGAWA as degenerated cancrum papilloma. Later he was taken to the Imperial University Hospital to undergo galvanocautery treatment.
several times, but without effect. In February of
the same year, he underwent x-ray and radium treatments
in the Communication Hospital, but these treatments
also proved ineffective. In May, he was operated on
for papilloma (ventrotomy), but, in two weeks the
disease recurred with soreness and bleeding of the
bladder, incontinence of urine and fever (37.5 -39.0).
He left the hospital in August. On January 20 of this
year, he was operated upon for papilloma (by Doctor
Hasumi) again at HINOBUKI Hospital in the city of
TSURUOKA, YAMAGATA Prefecture, and is still kept in bed.

Clinical observations: A few papillae and degenerative cancers
of the size of a pigeon-egg or a walnut were found on
the bottom as well as on the anterior surface of the
bladder.

Development: After the operation on January 20, this year, the
suture was favorably progressing, but, in a week an
formed accompanied by fever, causing the wound
to open. By early March the infection healed and the
suture was completed but another recurrence is possible
since the patient suffers occasionally from vesical
hemorrhage and escoriation.
Treatment: There are signs of cerebral anaemia and hematuria when the patient moves. I admit that it will be difficult for him to walk or stand erect, not to mention a train trip. I admit that he must be kept a strict bed-patient till next August. His appearance in court would be naturally impossible.

On this 20th day of March, 1947.

HASUMI, Kichirô, Doctor of Medicine
Chief of the SUGIHARA Surgery, 4-340 S. C. M., SUGIHARA Ward, Tokyo.

I hereby certify that the above was signed in my presence on the same day at the same place.

YĀMADA, Hanzo
(seal)
Treatment: There are signs of cerebral anemia and hematuria when the patient moves. I admit, that it will be difficult for him to walk or stand erect, not to mention a train trip. I admit that he must be kept a strict bed-patient till next August. His appearance in court would be naturally impossible.

On this 20th day of March, 1947.

HASHI, Kichirō, Doctor of Medicine

Chief of the SUGIYAMA Surgery, 4-840 w.s.k., SUGIYAMA Ward, Tokyo.

I hereby certify that the above was signed in my presence on the same day at the ward place.

Yuki Da., Henzo

(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan
Date 29 March 1947
日 日 日 日

日 日 日 日

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日 日 日 日
Japanese authorities today announced that Rear Admiral Teizo Mitsunami, chief of Japanese aerial operations, had been relieved of his post as a result of the bombing of the United States gunboat Panay.

The government thus acted swiftly to carry out its pledge to the United States Government that officers responsible for the Panay attack would be punished, said Domei, the Japanese news agency.

Admiral Mitsunami was recalled since most air bombings in China have been carried out by naval planes.

(Tokyo dispatches at the same time announced that Emperor Hirohito had received the Japanese Naval Minister, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, in audience, according to The Associated Press. Naval authorities declined to say whether the audience was concerned with the Panay attack about which President Roosevelt asked that his deep concern be communicated to the Japanese Emperor.)
Certificate of Source

I hereby certify that the clipping from the "New York Times," dated December 18th, 1937, here attached, consisting of 1 page was sent to me by a friend of mine who was staying in the U.S. at that time, and has been thenceforth in my custody. certified on this 18th day of January, 1947

INAGA, Teizo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the "witness. on the same date at the same place

Witness: INAKAWA, Tatsuo,
Defense Counsel (seal)
三井提督の訓演は中国における空襲が発して以来、密に地下にされるものである。

天皇の御断は、ルーツベルト大統領がそれぞれについて深い関心をもっただけでなく、

この訓演がルーツベルト大統領がそれについて深い関心をもつ旨日本。

否かについては海軍当局は断言してある。

2
When I was about to leave Tientsin for Shanghai I thought it desirable, in view of the former Emperor's long association with British friends, to make his acquainted with two of my nationals on whose disinterested advice he could rely in case of any difficulty. I accepted an invitation to a lunch, at which the introductions were effected, and as I remarked what I thought was my final good-bye to him, little thinking that any significance would attach to my words, that I hoped that next time I met him there would be no formalities to be observed before I could see him, and that I might even have to invoke the assistance of a Foreign Office official. His reply was that he would always be accessible to me, and a few days later he sent a messenger to ask me to tea on my last day in Tientsin. It was really a very touching interview, as he seemed so very reluctant to let me go, telling me again and again how much he would miss me.

In September 1932 I went up to Manchuria to study the situation in the s.o.t. After brief visits to Dairen and Mukden I proceeded to Hangchun, the new capital. I had hardly reached the hotel there when a young Chinese Foreign Office official called to say that the chief Executive, Mr. Fu Yi, had heard of my coming, and would be pleased to receive me at 10:30 next morning. This young man, Mr. Yu, who can converse equally readily in Chinese, English, Japanese and Russian, called for me in good time and escorted me to the former Emperor's residence. After a wait of a few minutes in the official reception-room, a message was received that the Chief Executive would see me in his private apartments, to which I was immediately conducted.

Mr. Fu Yi greeted me with obvious pleasure, taking both my hands and leading me over to a sofa where he invited me to sit beside him. Did I remember, he asked, what I had said when taking leave of him at the Tientsin lunch party? "Well, my prophecy had come true. He was suffering from some affection of his feet, and explained it to me as being due to a special diet, but that he hoped that I would remain for lunch, to which one of his younger brothers would accompany me, and we could talk undisturbed until lunch-time.

I told Mr. Fu Yi the object of my visit to Manchoukuo, and said that later I should like to put some formal questions to him for my newspaper articles. First, however, might I ask him a few personal questions as a friend? He replied that I could ask him any question I wished.

I then said that it would interest his foreign and Chinese friends to know whether he was really happy in his present position. He replied emphatically that he was. He went on to say that he was kept busy, but not so busy as he had been when he first came to Hangchun, as the administrative machinery was now better organized.

Next I informed him that the general belief in China was that he had been coerced into his present position, and was not a free agent in my respect. He not only strongly denied this, but added that he would like to tell me why he had assumed his new office. He had been actuated by two motives—political and personal. First, as to the political. When the Manchu Dynasty abdicated it had been with the avowed intention of restoring the sovereignty to the people. In the twenty years that had elapsed, what had happened? Political power had passed into the hands, not of the people, but of
ambitious and grasping militarists. The welfare of the population had been entirely disregarded; they had been tyrannized and oppressed. China’s relations with the foreign powers steadily worsened, and the pledge that absolute equality would be maintained between China’s five races had been flippantly violated.

Secondly, he was promoted by personal motives. Manchuria was his ancestral home, and it was only natural that he should be specially interested in what was happening in this region. Moreover, every undertaking given to the Manchu Imperial Family in the Abduction Agreement had been wantonly violated. The pension to be paid to him by the republic had been cancelled. His private property had been confiscated. He had been treated with studied insolence by the Kuomintang, and the imperial tombs had been violated and rifled, without any attempt to bring the perpetrators to book or to secure the recovery of the stolen treasures.

It was only natural, then, that when trouble occurred in Manchuria he should follow developments with great attention, and wonder whether he was not destined to play some part in an attempt to improve the condition of his ancestral Provinces. Embassadors of the Separatist movement called upon him at Tientsin and urged him to proceed to Manchuria. And just as he felt that if he was ever to go, he must do so forthwith, or he might find it impossible to leave.

The possibility of a restoration movement was obviously known to and apprehended by the Nanking Government, for an agent of General Chiang Kai-shek offered temporarily to restore the conditions of favourable treatment if he (the ex-emperor) would repudiate it. His reply was that the republic Government could best fulfill its responsibilities by concerning itself with the welfare of the people, by giving them good government, and by restoring internal peace. If it had four million taels annually to spare (the amount of the Imperial pension) let it expend the money on relieving the existing poverty in China, for which it was mainly responsible.

"Then the current report that you were kidnapped and sent to Port Arthur under Japanese escort in a destroyer is not true?" I asked.

Mr. Pu Yi threw back his head and roared with laughter, repeating in English: "Kidnapped! Kidnapped! No! No!"

I then remarked that what he had told me up till then was confidential, but that as a matter of historical interest I should like to know exactly what happened when he left Tientsin.

Mr. Pu Yi replied that nothing he had told me need be considered confidential. He had no secrets to hide, and he would gladly detail his movements previous to coming to Changchun. They had had to be kept secret at the time for two reasons: first, because his departure from Tientsin might have been frustrated; secondly, because he would have been in considerable danger of assassination had his whereabouts been generally known.

He left Tientsin just as the trouble between the Japanese and Chinese in that city broke out, and traveled to Yinkow (Newchwang) direct by the steamer Awachi Maru, leaving a letter behind to the Japanese Consul-General asking him to afford adequate protection to the Empress after his departure. From Newchwang he proceeded by rail to Tong Kung Tau (the hot springs between Liaoyang and Tashihcho), whence he returned to Port Arthur to meet his wife a few days later. She also traveled on an ordinary steamer. The next few weeks he spent quietly in Port Arthur, studying the siege operations of the Russo-Japanese War, and visiting the ruins of the former Russian fortifications. He and the Empress then proceeded once more to Tong Kung Tau, where they lived until he agreed to go
to Chingchun. When he was convinced that it was his duty to go north and assume the office of Chief Executive, he went right through to Chingchun by train. At no time in Tientsin, in the Japanese leased territory, or in Manchuria, had he been under any restraint, nor had any coercion been applied to him.

(I may say here that later the same day the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo, former tutor of the Emperor, gave me a more detailed account of Mr. Fu Yi’s flight from Tientsin. It was decided upon at a few hours’ notice. He was instructed to meet the ex-Emperor, attired in foreign clothes—which he had never previously worn—at a pre-arranged rendezvous. The party went down-river in a fast motor-boat and boarded the YAMCHI-ARU in the roadstead, the weather being so rough that the ex-emperor was almost in a state of collapse when they reached the vessel. There was considerable danger, as heavy firing was in progress when they left the Japanese Concession, and Mr. Fu Yi would probably have been shot if he had been caught and identified by Chinese troops.)

I remained to lunch at Mr. Fu Yi’s residence, in company with Prince Fu Chi, a younger brother, and towards the end of the meal the ex-Emperor limped downstairs and into the room to reintroduce me to my old friend, ‘Mr. Ponto’, his thoroughbred mastiff. Afterwards I was again invited into his sitting-room, where he presented me with a signed photograph, and various souvenirs (a medal, cuff-links, etc.) of cloisonné-work, embodying the flag of the new State.

About seventeen months later I again paid a brief visit to Hsin’ing (Changchun) to be present at the enthronement of Mr. Fu Yi as Emperor of Manchoukuo. The actual ceremony by which he was installed upon the Throne of the earlier members of his Dynasty, took place during the morning of March 1, 1934. The Emperor accorded me a private interview on February 28. I found him looking well and obviously pleased at the turn of events. We conversed with me freely for a quarter of an hour, allowed me to take several snapshot of him, and, in the belief that I should broadcast a description of the ceremony to Great Britain, gave me a message to the British nation. (The arrangements for this broadcast were cancelled.)
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(I may say here that later the same day the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo, former tutor of the Emperor, gave me a more detailed account of Mr. Pu Yi's flight from Tientsin. It was decided upon at a few hours' notice. He was instructed to meet the ex-Emperor, attired in foreign clothes—which he had never previously worn—at a prearranged rendezvous. The party went down-river in a fast motor-boat and boarded the ACHI MARU in the roadstead, the weather being so rough that the ex-Emperor was almost in a state of collapse when they reached the vessel. There was considerable danger, as heavy firing was in progress when they left the Japanese Concession, and Mr. Pu Yi would probably have been shot if he had been caught and identified by Chinese troops.)

I remained to lunch at Mr. Pu Yi's residence, in company with Prince Fu Chi, a younger brother, and towards the end of the meal the ex-Emperor limped downstairs and into the room to reintroduce me to my old friend, "Mr. Fung," his thoroughbred mastiff. Afterwards I was again invited into his sitting-room, where he presented me with a signed photograph, and various souvenirs (a medal, cuff-links, etc.) of cloisonne-work, embodying the flag of the new State.

About seventeen months later I again paid a brief visit to Hsin'ing (Changchun) to be present at the enthronement of Mr. Fu Yi as Emperor of Manchoukuo. The actual ceremony by which he was installed upon the Throne of the earlier members of his Dynasty, took place during the morning of March 1, 1932. The Emperor accorded me a private interview on February 28. I found him looking well and obviously pleased at the turn of events. He conversed with me freely for a quarter of an hour, allowed me to take several snapshots of him, and, in the belief that I should broadcast a description of the ceremony to Great Britain, gave me a message to the British nation. (The arrangements for this broadcast were cancelled.)

I had several interviews with my old friend Mr. Cheng Hsiac-hsu, the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo, during my brief visit on this occasion. He was obviously delighted to witness the consummation of his loyal service to his young master, though he had aged considerably, owing, presumably, to the cares of office, and the sorrow caused by the death of his older son.
miscellaneous material concerning Communist activity
in Various Districts in China

Document of the Foreign Office

Top Secret Document No. 359.

10 April 1935

To: His Excellency H.i.M., Mr., Foreign Minister.

From: Miki Yoshinobu.

Consul-General resident at Manchuria.

Concerning the Plot of the Third International

According to information received by the police station of this consul., the Third International has decided to divide the sphere of activities of the Communist Party in China into Northern and Southern districts, with A. CH.UN (not clear), delegate of the China Communist Party resident in the Soviet Union, as the Chief of the Communist Party in the districts north of the Yellow River; CHEN TUN, HOEI and KINOKURO. As a result, A. CH.UN has come into close contact with Japanese. Therefore, he is said to have employed Japanese ENGIKIN (once worked under K.H. W. SEN and then participated in the Battle of Toshimato in 1914 as an attached interpreter. Afterwards, he joined the mounted bandits. He is about fifty years old) as his advisor. In addition, it was decided that CAI TSE and HAO TSE-TUN continue to assume leadership in the Southern district. So far CAI TSE and HAO TSE-TUN have

-1-
been backed by the Soviet Union, but the results which they achieved have been far from satisfactory. This is the reason why we decided to divide the work of activities of the Communist Party into two districts after the Soviet Union consulted with us. As a result, the Communist Party in the districts north of the Yellow River has apparently begun its activities. At the same time, it has apparently set about the organization of the Communist party in Manchuria. That is to say, four army-corps have been organized for the whole of Manchuria and an army-corps stationed in Lin-Lu, Lintai, Liling-Ling and Jiao-L. In addition, army-corps have been organized and disposed in Huai, su, Tsinan, Honan, Shantung, Shansi, Kansu, Hulin-Ling, Chahar and Mongolia. Thus, for the purpose of establishing a communist state in the north-western district, these armies began their activities on the 1st of the month by acting in concert with Cao Toh and Wang Tung in the southern district.

I report the above to you for your information. If any one to whom this copy has been sent happens to be able to establish the identity of Lintai, please report it to me. Addresses to which these copies shall be sent are as follows:

Minister in China, Lintai, Liling-Ling, Lining, Tsinan, Chahar, Kansu, Shantung, Honan, Huai, Shansi, and Mongolia.
I, a (name), hereby certify that the above signature and seal were arrived hereeto in the presence of the witness,

at the same place,

on this day of

sworn:  

(name)  

I, William A. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William A. Clarke (seal)

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 1 April 1947
Dated January 1935 (Shone 1st)

Miscellaneous Information

Concerning Communist Berdits in Various Sections of China


The Situation of the Communist Party and the Communist Army in North China

Contents

Summary

Text

1. Construction Work on the Lening Line
2. The Number of Communists in North China
3. The Riding Order and Party Expenditures
4. The Relation between the Communist Party and the Communist Army
5. The Organization of the Communist Party in North China
6. The Situation of Parties of the Red Army of Laborers and Peasants
purpose of this plan is to strengthen the communist constituency in the area extending through Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu and Shantung. The Chu Hsao Army and the Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien Army which are active now in the northwest part of Szechwan Province form the main strength to be used for this purpose.

2. The Number of Communists in North China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hopei</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hora</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansu</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On June 10 the Northern Division of the Central Communist Party received notification from the Central Administrative office to the effect that, taking the opportunity given by the withdrawal of Hengk'in influence, they should stimulate activities in the various attached areas and prepare for future aggressive action. At 1:00 p.m. on June 12, twelve party leaders, including Feng Ch'en, Hu Jer-yu, Piao-hua, Yao Shih-yu, etc., held a meeting at Peiping Park in Tientsin and decided to rid themselves thoroughly of the Nationalist Party Section and to acquire the support of the industrial and agricultural labor masses.
3. The Guiding Core and Party Expenditure.

Central leadership is in the hands of the Central Administrative Office of the Communist Party of the Chinese Republic. A board of directors for operations in northern sectors is set up in the "U.S.S.R. Embassy" in Peking, and Fulo (Chortic) is the chief of the board.

It is said that the annual expenditure of the Communist Party in northern China is about 700,000 yuan a year. The sum is sent biweekly from the "Yuentung Bank in Shanghai to the "U.S.S.R. Consulate in Tientsin.

Incidentally, it is said that the total annual expenditure of the Communist Party of the Chinese Republic consists of 7,000,000 yuan for military activity, 2,500,000 yuan for special activities, and 3,000,000 yuan for running expenses of the party. The sum is sent from the 3rd International to the Yuentung Bank in Shanghai.

4. The Relation Between the Communist Party and the Communist Army.

The Communist Party is generally considered to be under the control of the 3rd International, as mentioned above. However, regardless of the superficial or formal corrections of the army, its actual activities are not different from those of bandits or of the Chinese Army in general. Its members murder and rob at will as they please. We must consider the facts that some of them rob or loot rich families of the
country and, by dividing their plunder among soldiers and agricultural and industrial laborers, they have come to be welcomed by the lower classes which makes up 80 per cent of the entire Chinese population.


Oath of Affidavit of Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kiyoshi, do hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Affidavit of the Communist Party of China," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 26 day of March, 1947.

/s/ HAYASHI KIYOSHI (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: /s/ "MATSUKAWA" (seal)

Translation Certificate.

I, CHARLES S. TERRY, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ CHARLES S. TERRY

Tokyo, Japan
Date: JULY 11, 1947
本文

一、

北支における共産党関係要員の状況

日本に関する共産党関係要員の状況

北支における共産党関係要員の状況

関係と共産党との関係

関係の状況

外国省記
中国邮政速递物流股份有限公司

1. 中国邮政速递物流的发展历程

2. 中国邮政速递物流的服务范围

3. 中国邮政速递物流的特色业务

4. 中国邮政速递物流的未来发展

5. 中国邮政速递物流的社会责任

6. 中国邮政速递物流的合作伙伴
赤西 達雄

昭和二十一年四月二十七日

役を任じられた者

役者久保田
Foreign Minister S'TO

No 102

According to the Stan Report dispatched on March 29 the Red Armies centered around Sanyuan, Shihchuan and Chuchchow have been reorganized and transferred to the National Army on April 1, and it has been arranged that these armies, as anti-Japanese allied armies, will receive 2,000,000 yuan for military expenses each month. More than 3,000 young men of various provinces, including 34 foreigners (19 Russians, 5 Americans, 4 Outer-Mongolians, 2 Japanese, 2 Manchurians, 2 Indians) have joined the armies. It is also reported that each of the armies has been organized according to the organizing system of the National Army with the exception that it still retains the Political Committee and the Directing Committee of the former time.

This report has been transmitted by wire to the Ambassador to China, all the Consul-Generals in China, and the Embassy at Peiping.

Chief of the Telegraph Sect. SATO (STA)

Submitted to:

Minister

Vice-Minister (MEMO)

East Asiatic Affairs SATO (STA)

SATO (STA)

European and West Asiatic Affairs

American Affairs
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archive Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "TENTAMEN DESCRIBED FROM GHOST-OPENED VENUS IN UNIDENTIFIED DATE, arrived on April 2, 1937" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 24th day of March, 1947.

HAYASHI, Kaoru

(Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witnesses.

at the same place,
on this same date

WITNESS: WATARI, Katsumo

(Seal)
Information on Communist party activities since that time are as follows:

1. The Communist party and their Army (T.N. representatives of ....) formally attended the Anti-Japanese Allied Military Committee meeting of the North west on the 19th of Dec. of the past year; Ch’u-en-lai is vigorously carrying out his activities to organize the people’s republic in China, and thus the popular movement has come completely under the Control of the Communist party. (According to a newspaper report, it is said that Agnes Smedley, several Russian Officers and English party members are carrying out their activities at Hsian.

2. After the disturbances, the Communist Armies Stationed at southern KANSU and at northern SHENKSI have begun altogether to move their armies southward, and the vanguard of the Chutâ and Mao-tsetung units has already reached a point five miles from Hsian and their main units a point thirty miles by the 12th. All those units stationed in Suiyuan and in the Northern border of Shansi province have again planned to enter Shansi and entered Hochu on the 7th.

3. The advance troops of the Anti-Japanese forces formally led by Fan-tsetung numbering about 4,000 entered Chinning
Def. Doc. # 902

in the southern part of Anhui, and the Cheng-tiehen unit numbering about 1,000 stationed on the borders of Fukien and Canton provinces advanced to Tungkiang and Yeo-ping where they are carrying out propaganda among the people to resist Japan and to save the Country.

4. Immediate problems confronting the party are to organize a democratic government in China, to hasten the unification of the entire country, and to organize an allied army of resistance of entire China.

The above just came to my knowledge and is sent to you for your reference. Already telegraphed to all consul generals in China, and dispatched to Shanghai and Peiping.

Please transmit this message to Fuchow through ...
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram declassified from Ambassador KAWAGOE to Foreign Minister ARITA, Jan. 13, 1937" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 24th day of March, 1947.

/S/ HAYASHI Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ URABE Katsuma (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 14 April 1947
January, 1935, on hand.

Miscellaneous material in relation to Communist-Bandit activities in China.

Record of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A)

Chief of telegram section: AKIYAMA (seal)
YOYOKAWA (seal)

1936 5770.

dispatched from Peiping: 31st p. m.

received at Ministry in Tokyo: night, March 31st

To MIRTA, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

From Secretary ""TC,

Minister.

Vice-Minister. (SHIGENIISHI (seal))

East Asiatic Affairs. (KASHIMA (seal))

European and West Asiatic Affairs.

American Affairs.

Commercial Affairs.

Treaties & Conventions.

Information.

Cultural Affairs.

Investigation.

Personnel Affairs.

Archives.

Accounts.

Private Secretaries.
No. 155-2

Although the working government seems secretly glad to see the invasion of Communist-bandits into Shan-si Province, looking upon it as a golden opportunity to take over that province, this is a great misunderstanding. There is the probability that the Communist Army that invaded the Taihang mountains will consolidate there, and it would be impossible to subjugate them with the Central Army consisting of fifty-sixty thousand men in view of the provincial toponymy, and there is the fear of formation of a hostile state that will trouble the centre for a long time. The Central Government is supplying to Shan-si Province a subsidy for war expenditure of 300,000 yuan monthly beginning from three months ago, and a central representative who went up to north China with me lately in the same train brought with him two million yuan to deliver to Shan-si Province as expenses for the subjugation of Communist-bandits. (It was reported that when SCMDA, a special correspondent of the ASAHI made a business trip to Taiyuan a few days ago and interviewed CPU Huan-kuan about the subsidy for subjugation delivered from the Central Government to Shan-si Province, CPU told him that a small amount of subsidy had been sent on 26th after their repeated demands to the centre.)

4. If the Communist Army occupies the southeast part of Shan-si Province as stated above and makes a strong stand dormant communists in various spots of North China might rise in revolt in concert with the Army taking it as their central.
point, and the south part of Hopei Province and the north part of Honan Province are particularly dangerous areas and are infected with Communism and the Hopei-Chahar Government. With the political situation as it is, it cannot be relied upon to adopt efficient preventive measures. The Communist Party in Peking and Tientsin was kept under control during Ho Ying-Chin's rule, but at present, they are moving very actively taking advantage of the lack of ability of the authorities. It will be apparent, therefore, that there is cause for grave apprehension concerning North China's disorder unless counter-measures are considered at present.

Telegraphed also to:

China-Nanking, Tientsin, Tsinan, Tsinchow, Kalgan, and Wuchow-kuo.

Classification:

Order A, Class 6, Clause 1, Item 5-4.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

Mr. HAYASHI, Kenji, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Telegram to Hinojota, Minister of Foreign Affairs from Secretary "Mr. Received March 21, 1936," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 24th day of March, 1947

HAYASHI, Kenji,
(signed)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here to in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: 
(M. Katsuma, (signed)

- 4 -
I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 April 1949
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>日時</th>
<th>内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1月31日 | 乘客使用ノ所持ノ成立ニナル Nel のサービスプラクティス
| | 日本政府ノ外務省
| | 内閣府ノグリル検査
| | 日本政府ノ外務省
| | 内閣府ノグリル検査

注: この文書は日本語で書かれています。
No. 192

According to a special T.YUN despatch of the "TIENTSIN" dated the 23rd, YEN Hsi-shan reported at the commemorative meeting of the Provincial Government on the 22nd concerning the activity of Communist bandits in Northern SHENSI Province, which may be summarized as follows.

The Communist bandits in the SHENSI area are extremely active, and of all the 23 hsien, not one has remained non-Communist, eight have turned entirely Communist, and more than ten half Communist. It should also be noted that they are increasing their power without resorting to arms. As the Reds occupy a village, they kill almost all the government and civil officials and wealthy merchants, and destroy even wells and ponds; therefore the Nationalists army has
t great difficulty in advancing. Now in Northern KUOII, the number of the
Reds exceeds 700,000, that of those who have joined the Communist army and
Communist guerrilla forces, is 210,000, and that of those killed exceeds 100,000.

The T-NALG, in this connection, is sure that success in brutal
extermination must depend upon the power of the government and an efficient
regular army, and if the army is undisciplined, its result will be only to
convert the people into bandits by furnishing their weapons.

I am transmitting this telegram to ICHING, KAOKEH, LIYAO, TSEHII, and
JEI MIN. China and Inner Mongolia.

Transmit it to SHUHII, China.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, H.I.S. Hayama, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "To: Foreign Office, From: Consul-General in Tokyo, Re: Despatch on July 22, 1919," is an exact and authorized copy from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Foreign Office),
certified at Tokyo,
on this 26th day of March, 1947

(signed) H.I.S. Hayama (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here to in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place,
on this same date
Witness: (signed) Uehara, Katsumi (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language French, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 April, 1947
日本に於ては、各種の業を営むために、必要な資格を取得する必要がある。

これらの資格は、業種や規模によって異なり、 Keepsakes 及び Thrift Shop の場合は、特定の資格が求められる。

業種ごとに詳細を確認し、必要な資格を取得することをおすすめします。
No. 141

As the first step in its anti-Communist activities, the Foping
Charhar Political Council put out two kinds of propaganda leaflets
under the titles of "President Long Assures to the People" and "Kopin
Government Announces to the People" and distributed in various districts
on March 8. The list of the propaganda leaflets is as follows:

The leaflets have deceived the people with honeyed
words, committing murder and arson frequently and at will.
They have brought China to its present miserable state, exploiting
the people with the aid of foreigners. Therefore, we should
make a united effort to exterminate them.

Further, on the 25th, the Political Council issued instructions
to the chiefs of the provinces under its jurisdiction to the
following effect:
May 17th, 1936

SHI HUANG: US PARTIES OF S.H. BANDITS IN VARIOUS QUARTERS OF CHINA

Foreign Office Document

1936 5382 (Mitchell)

The Huipin on 20, Peking

Received May 21st 25, Beijing

Foreign Minister (Hand.)

No. 141

As the first step in its anti-Communist activities, the Hopi-Chiurh political Council, put out two kinds of propaganda leaflets under the titles of "President Enr. Address to the People" and "Hopei Government Announces to the People" and distributed in various districts on March 8.

The list of the propaganda leaflets is as follows:

The Red bandits have deceived the people with honeyed words, committing murder and arson frequently and at will. They have brought China to its present miserable state, exploiting the people with the aid of foreigners. Therefore, we should make a united effort to overcome them.

Furthermore, on the 25th, the political Council issued instructions to the Chiefs of the provinces under its jurisdiction to the following effect:
The activities of the Red Bandits in Shansi have become more and more frequent and it is not unlikely that these bandits may infiltrate into the provinces of Szechuan and Kansu to stir up the people. Therefore, we have to admonish the people in general not to be misled by any of their enticements and point out the crimes of the Red Bandits from time to time in an effort to make the people aware of their evil.

This has already been transmitted to the Ambassador to China, the Consul-General in China, and K.I.M., CHEH-HU and Pin-hung.

The Ambassador will please transmit this to Shanghai.

Chief of the Telegraph Sect. N.I.M. (seal)

Submitted to:

Minister

Vice-Minister S I K E L I T S U (seal)

East Asiatic Affairs K U. S H I N A (seal)

European and East Asiatic Affairs

American Affairs

Commercial Affairs

Treaties and Conventions

Intelligence

Cultural Affairs

- 2 -
Investigation

Domestic Affairs

Archives

Accountant

Custodian

Copies sent to:

(Classification: S-1-5-7)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Koro, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archival Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "PRIVATE MAIL FROM SAGAWA INTO TO MOHEI. LIENOTIEN, March 16th, 1936," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 26th day of March, 1947

Koro (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: Kito (seal)
昭和十年一月現在

昭和

五月二二

外務大臣

昭和

五月廿六日記

外務省記録
文署ノ所持並ニ成立ニ照スル旨

日大ニ於テノ書簡ヲ書クルヲ言ノニ前ノ書簡ナル所更ニ論付ヒラレタル

昭和三十二年五月二十四日

於東京

立会人

備

証

受
Telegram dispatched from Consul-general of CHAMOTO, to Foreign Minister HIROTA, 22 June, 1937.

Chief of Signal Section: Muto (sealed).
Minister: Hikuchi (sealed).
Vice-Minister: Heriuchi (sealed).
East Asiatic Affairs: Ishiya (sealed), Satr (sealed).

Europe-West Asiatic Affairs:
American Affairs:
Commercial Affairs:
Treaties and Conventions:
Intelligence:
Cultural:
Investigation:
Personal:
Archives:
Accounts:
Secretaries:

Copy dispatched to: Grrr.
Premier.
Lord Kinnor.
Chamberlain.

Dispatches finished.
To:    Minister of Foreign Affairs HIROTA.

From:  Consul-general OFAMOTO.

No. 401

With regard to the problem of the compromise between the Nationalists and the Communists, a man who, having connections with the Communists, recently returned from Sian, told the staff of the consulate the following confidential story:

The Communist Party is establishing a policy of changing the Soviet regime into a democratic regime and, by relying on the Hanken Government, maintaining its individuality (viz. to make it a government for a special area), and Chou En-li is doing most of the negotiating. But, as the Hanken Government is requesting even the surrender of that individuality, there is no expectation for the present that the negotiations will be successful. However, at Shensi, the compromise is actually being carried into effect. The movement of troops of both the Red Army and the Nationalists is free, and by changing their cap badges to that of the White
DS?. DCC. 9909

Sun in the Blue Sky, soldiers of the Red Army can enter Tian.
Nationalist, are likewise free to travel within the Soviet
zone. Kails also arrive in the zone. It is expected that the
Communication Ministry will in the near future establish a
telegraphic office at Yanan.
DESAICHEP ALSO TO: Peiping, Tientsin and Hankow.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kacru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Document Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Telegram dispatched from Consul-General OKI NO TO to Foreign Minister Hirata on June 22, 1937" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

certified at Tokyo,

on this ___ day of March, 1947

HAYASHI Kacru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: URIBE Katsumu
(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the language French, hereby certify that the accompanying translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947.

(DEP. DOC. #609)
Recently there has been something of a change in the attitude of the Communist Party toward CHIANG Kai-shek and on the other hand there is room to believe that the authorities are making allowances in their management of the Communist Party. Actually, when Chin Pang-hsien (Poku), the Central General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, came to Hankow and, gathering together members of the party, gave a lecture at Wuchang, recently, (Ref: my letter Ko. Secret 121, dated 12 February), it seemed that the Chinese authorities let it pass almost unnoticed. In this connection a secret agent of this consulate recently heard the following from a member of the Communist Party.
(1). The detention of CHANG Kai-shek at Sian in December last year was carried out according to the complete instructions of the Third International. Its object was to make Chang Kai-shek change his administrative policy and CHIANG, at his interview with CHOU Enlai, complied with a requirement consisting of eight articles. (In his lecture, CHIN Panghsien also stated that CHIANG interviewed CHOU Enlai three times and agreed to the proposal of combined resistance to Japan).

(2). However, some lower class leaders who did not understand the real intention of the Central Chinese Communist Party finally started a riot, looting and killing. Some even tried to kill Chang Kai-shek, for which, however, they lost the world's sympathy. Such military leaders as CHU Teh and MAO Tsetung had themselves to blame for these attempts and these two leaders were reproved at the 7th Session of the Representative Convention. (Chin did not touch on this point, but only pointed out that the leaders of the Red Army were merely engaged in a struggle for power).

(3). According to the secret agreement resulting from several negotiations with the Communist Party on the part of Ku Chu-tung who entered SIAN, the removal of the Communists Army was brought about and, in SIAN, on the presumption
that the compromise between the Communists and Chang
Kai-shek had been effected, posters as below were being
put up within the walls.
a. Protect Chang Kai-shek and object to Wang Chiang's
homecoming.
b. Overthrow Kuomintang and wipe out the Kuomintang
government.
c. Organize each Save the Nation Committee.
d. Carry out the anti-Japanese movement.

This report is being sent to you as information on the
Communist Party.

DESPATCHED ALSO TO: Ambassador Shanghai, Peiping and to each
Consul-general in China.
COUNCIL OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Archivist, Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the newspaper extract hereto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 3 lines and entitled "Telegram Delivered from Consul-General TUKAI, to Foreign Minister W. Y., 21 February, 1957" is an exact excerpt from a newspaper in the custody of our Foreign Office.

certified at Tokyo,
on the 24th day of March, 1947

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

there:    \[\text{signature}\] (seal 1)

4 - 4 -
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15th April 1947.
昭和12年三月三日

陸上

二月廿一日夜

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一五

最近共産党、ロシ

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領八日本政府（外務省）ノ保管ニ依ル公文書ノ正確ニシテ貢賛ナル為シナ

ルコトツ証明ス

昭和二十二年三月二十四日

於東京

同日

於同所

立会人

浦部

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Translated by
Defence Ienue, lrench

TELEGRAPH DELAY GED IN TTERA, ESTAL, FRANCE
TO POULIO II, ACTI, 3, 70 ON MARCH 7, 1937

Chief of the Telegraphe Section .M.,. (seal)

Minister
Vice-minister H., (seal)

Chief of Prest-I~itic Affairs Bureau

European and Prest-I~itic Affairs Bureau
American Affairs Bureau
Commercial Affairs Bureau
Treaties and Conventions Bureau
Informations Section, 3., 3.50, Toshihito (seal)
Culture Section
Research and Investigation Bureau
Personnel Section
Archives Section
Accountant Section
Secretaries

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- I -
DEF. DCC. #911

1/37, No. 4,168 Ordinary, Foreign Ministry P.O. March 5, 1937.

Foreign Minister S.T.0

Ambassador H.T. GOE

Special Instructions, Shanghai No. 17

The Communist party has been continuously negotiating with the Kuomintang party to arrive at a compromise in Funchun, Nanking, and Sian since the Sian Incident. On February 10, the Communists, however, dispatched to the Third National Assembly a lengthy telegram, which contained the gist of the compromise between them. The full text is as follows:

Members of the Third National Assembly of the Chinese Kuomintang,

Dear Sirs, 

It is a matter for national congratulation that the Sian Incident has been brought to an amicable settlement. I hope that we shall be able to realize the welfare of our country and people in the future with an aim of amicable unity by all to protect ourselves from foreign invasions.

Right at the moment when the Japanese are so rampant as to endanger the existence of our nation, we, the Communists, earnestly wish your (Kuomintang's) Third National Assembly to adopt the following points as our national policies:

1. To halt all internal disturbances and concentrate our national power to stand against foreign countries.

2. Freedom of speech, freedom of meeting, freedom of association, and the release of all political offenders.
3. To call a conference of representatives of all parties, factions, circles, and offices, and gather all men of ability and together save the country.

4. To complete speedily all preparations for our coining Japan.

5. To improve the living condition of the people. If your third National Assembly determines to adopt the above-mentioned policies, we are ready to give the following assurance to express our sincerity in uniting to protect ourselves from foreign invasions:

1. To halt any attempt of armed rebellion, which aims to overthrow the National Government, in any part of the country.

2. To change the name of the "Soviet" Government to Special District Government of the Republic of China and the Red Army to National Revolutionary Army, and place them under the direct command of the Nanking Central Government and the Military Committee.

3. In the Special District Government, general election will be held and true democracy be established.

4. To suspend the policy of confiscation, the land from landowners and firmly determine to realize the joint principle of united national front against Japan.

We swear by God our allegiance to the state in this national crisis.

We wish you to appreciate our sincerity and co-operate with us in realizing the united front for national salvation. We are all descendants of Emperor Huang and we are Chinese. At this critical moment, let us forget all that have happened between us and act in concert to accomplish the great task of ultimate liberation of China.
With respect we submit this to you and await your kind answer. Also we salute the social revolution.

on the 10th day of February

Chinese Communist Central Committee
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, H.I.S.I. Kuro, the Chief of the Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram despatched from Ambassador in Washington to Foreign Minister Sato, and arrived on March 5, 1937" is an exact and true copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 24th day of March, 1947.

(signed) H.I.S.I. Kuro (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here to in the presence of the witnesses.

at the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: (signed) G.I.S.I. Utsuro (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Kenjiro, CHIEF of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ Kenjiro, J.W.E.

Tokyo, Japan

Date 11 April, 1947
Copies submitted to:

Minister, Vice-Minister (sd: HORIUCHI)
Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs (sealed),
European and West Asiatic Affairs,
American Affairs,
Commercial Affairs,
Treaties and Conventions,
Intelligence,
Cultural Affairs,
Investigation,
Section of Personnel Affairs,
" Archives,
" Accountant,
Secretaries,
Chief of Telegraph Section (sd: AKIYAMA)
Def. Doc. # 912

Copies submitted to:

Minister, Vice-Minister (sd: HORIUCHI)

Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs (sealed),
European and West Asiatic Affairs,
American Affairs,
Commercial Affairs,
Treaties and Conventions,
Intelligence,
Cultural Affairs,
Investigation,
Section of Personnel Affairs,
" Archives,
" Accountant,
Secretaries,
Chief of Telegraph Section (sd: AKIYAMA)

- 1 -
Telegram despatched from Consul-General MIURA to Foreign Minister SATO March 12, 1937.

Cipher 4713 despatched from Hankow in A.M. on the 13th 1937, reached this department in A.M. on the 13th March.

To the Foreign Minister SATO
From Consul General MIURA
No. 82

The Sian informations dated 8th concerning my telegram No. 81 are as follows:

According to the information of the Communist Party at Sian, it seems that the headquarter of the Chinese Communist Party despatched Bolocky, Colsky, Li-Mufei, the chief secretary of the international affairs of the Central Youth Communist Party, and Shi-suochun, the chief of the Political Division, as the representatives to Nanking and proposed the following assertion of the Chinese Communist Party to Chiang Kai-shek through Sun Ko and the others:

a) Abolition of the plan of the central army to surround and subjugate the Red Army.

b) Suspension of the various anti-Communist propaganda of the central government.

c) Reorganization of the Red Army into the Anti-Japanese.

- ? -
d) Establishment of the Red Army bases in provinces of Kansu, 
    Kansu, and Sinkiang.

e) Change of Ho-lung, Hsi-sharchian and Hsi-haitung corps into the 
    reserve forces to subjugate anti-communistic bandits.

f) Transfer of Chang, and Yang Corps to the eastern area.

g) Denial of all the Japanese rights & interests in China.

This was wired to the ambassadors in Peiping and Shanghai, 
and every consul general in China.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Document Bureau of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages 2nd entitled "Telegram entrusted from Consul General MIURA to Foreign Minister ...P, March 13th 1937," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Department of the Foreign Affairs).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 24th day of March, 1947.

/S/ HAYASHI Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ URABE Katsuma (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, GEORGE Akaba, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ GEORGE Akaba

Tokyo, Japan
Date 11 April 1947
Telegram dispatched from Consul-general MIURA to Foreign Minister SATO, March 16, 1937

Minister:
Vice-minister: Horiuchi (seal)
East-Asiatic Affairs Bureau: SATO (seal)
European and West-Asiatic Affairs Bureau:
American Affairs Bureau:
Commercial Affairs Bureau:
Treaties and Conventions Bureau:
Information Section:
Cultural Section:
Research and Investigation Section:
Personnel Section:
Archives Documents Section:
Accounts Section:
Secretaries:

1937, No. 4961, cipher

Handed: March 16, p.m.
Foreign Ministry, March 16, night.

Foreign Minister SATO

Consul-general MIURA
No. 37

Information from China of March 11, in connection
telegram No. 33, is as follows:

On the 15th and 16th days of March, in the town of
Tehuai, Kweichow, Tzu Fei, and other little cities in
represented 250,000 men, including short-term Russians dispatched
from the Soviet Union of Tungshih in Kiangsi Province of
Outer Mongolia, and decided upon the following future course
for the Chinese Communist Party:

1. To extend the popular front under the guise of an anti-
Japanese campaign and to make it the outer organization of
our party.

2. To organize the popular front irrespective of sections
or classes but with factory workers and farmers as the
nucleus of the organization.

3. This organization shall follow the course of beginning
gradually an anti-government struggle under the label of
"national salvation," based upon the various national salva-
tion bodies organized in accordance with the living condi-
tions of each popular group within the country.

4. The party shall assume the leadership of this organiza-
tion and take occasion to open the secret organization to the
public at a suitable time and to handle it positively in order
to realize its demands in the interests of the masses as a
prerequisite for the anti-Japanese mobilization.

5. It shall utilize this organization in order (1) to oppose Japanese Imperialism, (2) to oppose both the present government and the Nationalist Party, and (3) to take the reins of government or prevent the expansion of the present regime so as to realize its demands in the interests of the masses.

I telegraphed to the Ambassador in Shanghai as well as to the Consuls-general in Peiping and other parts of China.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASUI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Documents Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Telegram dispatched from Consul-general UERA to Foreign Minister SOTO, on March 16, 1937" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo, on the 24th day of March, 1947.

/S/ HAYASUI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ UETA, Katsumu (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 14th April 1947.
昭和十二

四月

十六日

本省

三月十六日

関連

昭和

家

往電

三月

事務

昭和八

電報

本省

十六日

関連

昭和

家

往電

三月

事務
Concerning the compromise problem between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

According to the information obtained from the authorities concerned in the General Headquarters of the South China Army, Yang Ching-wai, taking advantage of his recent trip to Suifu, participated in a preliminary conference with the communist leaders at Shanxi. He returned to Nanking, with the viewpoint of the Communist matters to be settled by the Central Government. However, in response to these matters, it has become necessary for the part of the Central Government to transmit its views to the Communists, again. It is reported that Ch'en Chi, the introduced Li Ta-chao, a communist, to the Kuomintang and made him join this in 1922 (Mingkao II) is to be sent not to Shanxi under the pretext of visiting Emperor Huang's mausoleum, and is to confer with the Communists. It is said that the announcement of the details of the negotiations concerning the compromise between the Kuomintang and the Communists has been prohibited by the Central Government, lest it should create an unfavourable reaction among the Japanese.
China, Lanchukuo, Peiping. The same telegrams were sent to each Consul-general residing in China. One was despatched in code to London.

(Classification A, Chapter 6, Section 1, Passage 5, Item 1.)

Copies despatched:

Already despatched to:

Foreign Ministry,

Vice-Minister HORIUCHI (seal)

Fast-Asiatic Affairs Bureau
Europe and West-Asiatic Affairs Bureau
American Affairs Bureau
Commercial Affairs Bureau
Treaties and Conventions Bureau
Information Bureau
Cultural Affairs Bureau
Research and Documentation Bureau
Personnel Affairs Section
Archives Section
Account Section
Secretary
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, KAWAI, Kaoru, the occupy the post of Chief of Archives, Section of Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Obligations noted from Consul-General to Foreign Minister S.T.C., March 14th, 1937" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government Ministry of Foreign Afflairs.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of March, 1947

(A. KAWAI, Kaoru) (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed while in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: (YAMADA, Katsura) (seal)
Chief of the Department of Telegraphic Service.

12th year of Showa (1937) 6870 Code telegram

Hankow dispatched the afternoon of the 12th. Received this Ministry the evening of April 12th.

SATO (seal)

Minister of Foreign Affairs SATO

Consul-General NTTI

No. 110

An influential communist here delivered us information which, he said, was obtained from the General Political Bureau in Shanghai on 12th. According to it, it is reported that a compromise between the Kuomintang and the Communists will be made on the following terms, and be materialized before lor 1.

1. The Red Army will be reorganized into 3 divisions.

(According to an information obtained from the General Headquarters at Wuhan, it strength is said to be 40,000 strong equipped with 30,000 small arms). These divisions will be formed into 23 brigades. (According to another information, 12 brigades). The commanders of these divisions will be selected from among the Red Army, and the vice-commanders and the Chief of the Political Training School appointed by the Kuomintang.

2. After the reorganization is completed, military expenditure of the Red Army will be provided by the government. The Army will be treated on equality with the

...
DEF. Doc. #815

Units connected with CHANG.

3. After the reorganization is completed, the old Army will be stationed in the Suiyuan, Shanxi and Yunnan districts.

4. Concerning political problem, the four points of the Nanjing Government will be accepted.

5. Each member of the Communist Party may join the Kuomintang in the capacity of an individual but corporate activity, however, will not be permitted.

6. Chu Te, Yao Tse-tung, and Hau yung-chien will be accredited and sent abroad but may, if necessary arise be recalled to China.

This message has been transmitted for circulation to all Consuls General in China.

Foreign Office

To: Minister

Vice-Minister

H. YUCHI (seal)

Western Asiatic Affairs Bureau

Europe and Western Asiatic Affairs Bureau

American Affairs Bureau

Commercial Affairs Bureau

Treaties and Conventions Bureau

Information Bureau

Cultural Affairs Bureau

Research and Documentation Bureau
DPP. DCC. #f15

Personnel Affairs Section
Archives Section
Account Section
Secretary.
国之命是图画

是态之命

形态之态

态之形
Submitted to:

Minister, Vice-Minister: KORIUCHI

Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs (seal),
- European and West-Asiatic Affairs,
- American Affairs,
- Commercial Affairs,
- Treaties and Conventions,
- Intelligence,
- Cultural Affairs,
- Research and Documentation

Section of Personnel Affairs,
- Archives and Documents

Accounts Section

Secretariat

Chief of Telegraph Section, (Akiyama)

12th Year, S.V.Ka., (1937) Code No. 7844.

Despatched from HANKOW, 29th Afternoon.

Received by the Main Office, April 28th evening.

To Foreign minister Sato.

From Consul-General HITA.

No. 120.

According to information received from a certain influential communist

here, the Central Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party is said to have
explained the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party and its future tendency in connection with the cooperation of the Nationalist and Communist Parties at this time, against the Combined Communist Committee of the three Provinces namely : HUNAN, KUFEI and KIAOHSI as follows:

1. We have not been overthrown by, but an acting in concert with the Nationalist Party.
2. We shall act in concert with the leading anti-Japanese elements within the Nationalist Party and with the Anglo-American faction in order to overthrow the pro-Japanese faction.
3. The cooperation with the Nationalist Party may be the best policy under the present conditions but we will try to preserve our influence secretly and continue our activities.
4. We stand against the non-party-autocracy of the Nationalist Party from the standpoint of non-party and non-faction. To attract the mass of its people by adopting the policy of the National Unification Front and aim finally to take over the position of the Nationalist Party. Transmitted by wire to all the Consuls-general in China.

Sent to Foreign Officer.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of Archive Section, hereby certify that the document hereof attached, written in Japanese, consisting of one page and entitled "Treatment of American General MIURA to Foreign Minister SAKAI April 6th, 1947" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office),

certified at Tokyo,

on this 20th day of March, 1947

HAYASHI, Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereby in the presence of the Witness,

of the same place,

on this same date

Witness: HAYASHI, Akira
(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Intelligence Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947
1937 (Shawn 15); Code No. S175.

Arrived at the Lin Office, May 4 afternoon.

To Foreign Ministry. L.A.Y.

From Consul-General H.L.A.

May 11

According to information from Communist sources here, it is said that TANG Hi-lu (Deputy Chief of the Central National Prosecution Board of the Chinese Communist Party), who returned first from Soviet Russia with CHAOS Kai-shek's son, said that the time was ripe for the cooperation of the Nationalist and Communist Parties and came to LIEK on the 16th to receive and reorganize the forces under TANG Channing of the 27th Army of "NAT". TANG and CHAN is said to have talked privately to Communist members here to the effect that the Third International seems to have reached to an agreement with the Nationalist Government on the activities of those Chinese Communist members who after residing in Soviet Russia have returned to China. His impression of what was said seems to be as follows:

1. Party members who have returned shall infiltrate into North China and Kunlun or in the anti-Japanese "Save the Nation" movement.
2. They shall neither interfere with local politics nor propagate communism, but try to intensify the anti-Japanese movement in North
China by disturbing the rear line of the Japanese military program.

3. They shall attempt to unify the volunteer corps in Manchuria and North China and assure their leadership.

4. They shall take charge of the pacification and reorganization of the R.O. armies.

Transmitted to Consul-General in China including PEKING and in LANCASHIRE.

Copies sent to: --          Sent: --          

Foreign Office.
D.f. Inc. # 917

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke (seal)

Tokyo, Japan

Date 15 April 1947
Loi. Dec. # 917

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of one page and entitled "Telegram despatched from Consul-General YITA to Foreign Minister S. TAYA, May 4th, 1947" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office), certified at Tokyo, on this 24th day of March, 1947.

/se/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ I propagate, Katsumata (seal)
昭和二十四年

八 十 七 日

(△)

三・九日及関東北部学生界第1・2・4・7会の

(△)

(△)

(△)
To: Foreign Minister
From: Counsel-General JH.J.
No. 144.

Concerning the problem of the resistance of communists, JH.J. presented me the following information received by him.
(I ask you not to make it public.)

1. It is reported that CIWNG 11-312, while he was in ESM, rejected the demands on the part of the communist army such as the start of the anti-Japanese movement and the like on the ground that he did not possess sovereign rights. Instead, he was reported to have promised that he would take his utmost efforts to achieve the satisfaction of the demands of the communist army after he returned to the capital afterwards, so far as the said demands were concerned. As a result, the problem of the freedom of the press and speech remained to be solved. CIWNG 11-312 would not agree to this matter, because, once he consented to it, it would be utilized as a vehicle for Communist propaganda.
2. The Communist army, with 919th as its base, is using the same standard and badge as before in the same province and Kansu. There are several districts in the frontiers of FUCHI, JUSISCO, and SUGUFE, etc. where various Communist units numbering respectively 2000 -- 3000 are rampant. The Communist army is in radio connection with these units, but they are not influential.

3. The central government authorities have stopped subjugating these Communist units.

4. The central government authorities are giving the same best rations and as those given to the forces connected with CHING HAI-SHEN army and they are also paid subsidies.

5. GPOEN - w. t. is reported to have told that the communist army was maintaining friendly relations with Outer Mongoli on the basis of reciprocity.

I dispatched the above to each Consul general in China and to PSIPIU.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, M.K.S. I. Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Document Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereunto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Toleration dispatched from Consul General Takamura to Foreign Minister Site, April 19, 1947" is an exact and authorized extract from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 24 day of March, 1947.

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: [Signature] (3rd)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarks, of the Defense Language School, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarks

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 April 1947
昭和十二年四月十九日夜
中村總領事

称本関西二本橋ヲ拝領シテ

呼スルヘスノラム

呼スルヘスノラム

呼スルヘスノラム

呼スルヘスノラム

呼スルヘスノラム
Def. Doc. No. 919

SWORN DEPOSITION OF NAGANO, MITSUKI

(Translation)

1. I was formerly a Rear Admiral. In December, 1929, I was placed on the reserve list. (At that time I was a captain). In April of the next year, I enrolled at the Doshisha University as a special student, majoring in history. In January, 1932, when I was still at the college, the first Shanghai incident broke out.

I was dispatched to the front by the Navy Ministry as a civil employee (an official not on the regular staff) to compile a war history. Arriving at Shanghai on 16 February 1932, I carried out extensive research by interviewing Japanese officers and men who saw action, staff members of the Japanese Consulate, Japanese residents and Chinese nationals. I obtained information from the Min Hua Jih Pao (China Daily News) and other Chinese newspapers, the most important of which, China Daily News, which is a newspaper published by a British national, all available books depicting the Incident (including books published by Chinese, Japanese and third power nationals, and also from official and personal documents, telegrams, etc.

I returned to Shanghai toward the end of April 1932 and spent nearly a year in compiling the "Notes on the Incident of 1932 and 1933, Accounts of the Fighting at Shanghai," etc.

2. The outbreak of the Shanghai incident may be summed up thus: that the basic cause of the war lay in the adoption of an anti-Japanese policy by the Chinese National Government which permitted the existence of communism in China whereby the Chinese Nationalists and Communists joined hands. As to
assigned to the Nationalist Party the task of putting the policy into effect.

3. The government gave positive anti-Japanese training to students and military personnel by maintaining connection with local administrative officials and autonomous bodies, the government coercing the masses to participate in anti-Japanese movements.

As a result, the anti-Japanese movement developed into a well controlled and organized movement. Any unlawful actions such as violence, intimidation, plunder, confiscation, etc., were recognized as lawful by the Chinese District Court, as long as they were connected with the anti-Japanese movement.

These facts can be learned through the following Chinese official documents:

- Summary of the Organization of National Anti-Japanese Societies as resolved on 27 July 1928.
- Outlines of the Plan for Severing Economic Relations with Japan as resolved on 18 September 1928.
- The Declaration made at the Extraordinary General Meeting of Representatives of National Anti-Japanese Associations, made on 8 June 1929.
- The Pro-Japanese National Penal Regulations as enacted in September 1923.
- The Law on Collection and Disbursement of National Relief Funds as enacted in September 1923.

Moreover, in July 1931 the Committee for Effecting anti-Japanese Movements and Extending Relief to Chinese Merchants was organized in Shanghai by the joint efforts of the Executive Committee of the Shanghai Branch of the Nationalist Party, the Federation of National Commercial Trade Unions, and the Council to Protect Chinese Goods. The newly organized committee established the Boycott Regulation against Japanese Goods approved on 17 July 1931.
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Passed also were the Japanese Goods Register Regulation, approved on 12 July 1931 and the Anti-Japanese Committee Regulations, approved 24 July 1931.

Thus the anti-Japanese movements were aggravated.

All this took place prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

This movement did not remain as a mere boycott movement but developed a movement advocating an anti-Japanese movement by the use of arms and also by the declaration of war against Japan. This resulted in on the one hand the organization of a students' volunteer corps which aimed at bringing pressure upon the Japanese residents, and on the other, the practice of anti-Japanese military training.

In Shanghai, it led to the dispatching of a circular requesting the declaration of war against Japan. It was intercepted by our side on 28 September.

3. Such unlawful actions by the anti-Japanese associations occurred frequently. That they gave rise to a lawless condition due to improper handling of cases by the Shanghai Special District Court was one of the chief causes of the incident.

This is clear in view of the following speech by Mr. MacNoghten, the Chairman of the Shanghai City Council, at the Foreign National Taxpayers' Conference, held on 23 April 1932 at the Municipality, Shanghai International Settlement:

"There was nothing unusual with the attitude of the District Court (the Shanghai Special District Court) until the latter part of September, last year, when the serious
The boycotting of Japanese goods was started in Shanghai. Since then, however, the intensified movement threw the entire city into an almost lawless state. In dealing with this situation the District Court lost its function to apply the criminal code to cases relating to the boycotting of Japanese goods and other anti-Japanese activities.

"Let me say a few words concerning the movement for the confiscation of Japanese goods as an actual problem without reference to the numerous instances of anti-Japanese propaganda prevalent today in various fields. The Japanese goods in possession of Chinese nationals which were plundered by the so-called "plain clothes bands" totalled 69,000 Yuan. It is said that the greater part of these goods have already been sold and proceeds were disposed of by the members of the plain clothes bands. Meanwhile many Chinese merchants who handled such Japanese goods and were branded as "traitors" were arrested without due proceedings. They were unlawfully imprisoned at such places as the Hou tien Hou Hsing, etc., thus presenting a completely lawless and disorderly state.

"During this period due to either a display of distorted patriotism or of intimidation by the well organized anti-Japanese movement, the Court completely ignored the gravity of the situation.

"All efforts made by our municipality to cope with the situation brought forth absolutely no results.

"This attitude of the Special District Court was what actually led to the present hostilities between Japan and China, and I have no doubt that it constituted an important factor among the complicated circumstances which caused this extreme devastation in the Chapei area."
4. That the Shanghai Incident occurred as a result of anti-Japanese movements and eventually developed into hostile actions has been revealed in the form of a book later published under the title of "Reviewing the Bloody Battle of Sung Hu," (Volume 1; No. 1-No. 3 of the Shen pao monthly). Its author, Hung Chao-yuan, was the Commander of the 156th Brigade of the 78th Division, belonging to the 19th Route Army. He states that "The 19th Route Army was making preparations to fight Japan after 18 January 1932 in the vicinity of the Shanghai area."
Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Ahima, Narisuke (seal)
Attach to: Def. Doc. No. __

on the Registry of ____________ 1947

A. KONDO

[Signature]

I, ARIKWA, KUNAYASU, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

at TOKYO

Witness: (signed) [Signature] (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charles E. Sheldon, Officer of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the English translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles E. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 2 April 1947
略，内容待补充
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document pages ad entitled "Sharing our Fate" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (Information Section, Supreme Headquarter China Expeditionary Forces).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 18th day of Feb., 1947

MUKOGAWA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal here affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

witness: SHIBATA, JUNKICHI (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation contained in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date April 23, 1947
Statement of the Supreme Commander JEMIC

(Oct. 1, 1938, Hankow)

In accordance with our fundamental policy towards the China Incident announced last December, the Japanese Empire has been resolutely proceeding to establish a new order based on morality in East Asia, simultaneously with her consistent effort to completely crush the anti-Japanese regime. Recently, there has been organized the General Headquarters of the Expeditionary Forces in China, in order to cope with the present situation and to bring about the complete settlement of the China Incident. In view of the mission imposed upon us, the Army will do its utmost to attain the desired end following the consistent policy with the Japanese nationals in China under its command. For this purpose, we are determined to stamp out the remaining anti-Japanese elements to the last. Nevertheless, we will protect the innocent people; we will endeavour to restore war devastation; we will positively cooperate in constructing new China hand in hand with intelligent sympathizers. Rights and interests of the third countries in China shall be protected and respected as much as possible. Sincere efforts shall be made to settle unfortunate incidents that will possibly occur during our military operations.
We hope the third countries will recognize the fact that our Army is engaging in extensive military operations, and that there are some inevitable requirements as the result thereof. Further, we hope they will not only understand that the actual circumstances during the Incident are not necessarily binding on them in the future, but will co-operate and participate in the effort to attain our end. If there are those who dare to act for the benefit of the enemy or to disturb our military operations during the Incident, the Army will never hesitate to take decisive measures against them. We hope that, at this time when the sentiment for peace and against communism runs high and the desire of the people for the construction of new China pervades through the country, every man in every field, both native and foreigner, will render hearty co-operation to the Army, for the purpose of realizing the lofty ideal of establishment of a new order, in East Asia. Fully recognizing that the purpose of the despatch of Imperial Army is solely for the eternal peace in East Asia and that the existence of the Imperial Army in the Continent is based on morality, I hereby proclaim our undaunted policy and determination.
疲しては意味を以てこれが解決に倣るべき。第三者においても、特に以
て会力が蓬煌で耀顯なる作業を務行中の者たる、これから伴ふ必要の有り
さを確信し、確保下の現実にして必ずしも将来を観念せんざるるもの
を確信するものあり。故に裏渠下に利益行場を確てし、或は我々作段
行場を訪倣するものなり。今や会場目に亘り和平反共の絵巻を観るに
あり、更に在る為進むに当め、更

の方を産造し努力著心の念を起こさんと退ず。敬に示す。
The Chiang Kai Shek Regime which has fallen to a local political power under the overwhelming military strength of our forces is going to lose its function because of the permeation of the Communist's influence within, and the development of the movement of "Salvation of the nation by peace" led by Wang spreading all over the country. Moreover, the withdrawal of the nations which have been helping him caused by the breakout of the European War is sparing the decay of his government. Chiang Kai Shek who has bogged into difficulties in either going ahead or drawing back is striving after all possible means for the last moment. Put for all his strenuous efforts in propaganda, the general trend of the affairs is unfavourable to him and we feel that a single stay would not be strong enough to bolster up a tumbling mansion. He made a wide
propaganda on a big victory at Hunan area the day before yesterday the so-called the 10th day of the 10th month and deceived the public even by holding a war rejoicing a. Chiang Hsing. But it was simply surprising and astonishing to the public as it had been made known to them by our intelligence that thirty Divisions of the Central Army and some ten odd Divisions of the side forces under the command of Huo Hse Yuch and Yuen Lin Cheng had been utterly annihilated by the tactful operation of our forces in that area.

Lately it is reported among Chinese circles that Chiang K'ai Shek is willing to negotiate peace with Japan directly, but we take this as one of his Characteristic Propagandas by which he is trying to sound our intention, and at the same time it is a seditions plot to check the movement of establishing the central government by Wang Ching-Wei. Japan has already made it clear by the several declaration of the Government, that it is impossible for her to negotiate peace with Chiang K'ai Shek. It is our irrevocable policy for our army to make strenuous efforts to settle the Incident by fully supporting the movement of "Salvation of the Nation by Peace" by Wen Ching, Wei, and also by destructing the Chiang Hsing Government.

Our army shall firmly stand against whoever tries to impede this supreme aim. It would be clear by KONGFZ's declaration as well that our Empire is looking for the cooperation of those who have a foresight and may share the pain with us among the Chinese for the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and that we will not shrink from embracing even
those who have been with the Ch'ing Hsing Regime as long as they become comprehended with the foolishness of "anti-Japen and pro-commintern" principle and are willing to participate in our sacred work by severing connection with Chiang Kai Shek. At present the only way to preserve the four hundred million people of Chine is to bring about the peace and the further dragging on the hopeless hostilities would be only to lead China to ruin which is deplorable for the restoration of East Asia as well as the upholding of the sovereignty of China.
The Seventh Infantry Brigade at PEITAYING commanded by Wang I-che is renowned all over the 4 North Eastern Provinces as the pick unit of all the troops under the direct command of Chang Hsueh-liang. However, on the night of September 13, they acted in violence, and no sooner had they been dealt with by our troops when they took to flight. These fleeing soldiers later gathered at places, and together with the attempt to restore their shattered strength, they grouped at various places and freely conducting atrocity, they raped women, seized money and property, and above all, murdered our Korean comrades at TATIENTZU in particular, over a hundred were killed. When we sent a force to quell them, they quickly raised a white flag and sent forth a parlementaire in surrender. Such barbarous acts are committed even by the unexcelled Seventh Brigade. It is no wonder, therefore, that the other troops of inferior qualities should become bandits when defeated, committing every possible destructive act against peace and order.

Can we say that they are troops of a civilized country,
possible is an urgent relief measure of our Army to exalt neighboring friendly relations. This is the plan to firmly establish ever-lasting peace in the Orient and this is the Imperial way which we shall never be ashamed of in putting it into practice both at home and abroad. It would be quite clear therefore, that all those justice-loving countries in the world will not be unwilling to support for the promotion of happiness of the 30 million masses.
Def. Doc. No. 953

Transcribed by
Defense Language Branch

Official Announcement by the
G.H.Q. of the Kwangtung Army

October 4, 1931
(6th year of Showa)

The Seventh Infantry Brigade at PEITAYING commanded by Wang I-che is renowned all over the 4 North Eastern Provinces as the pick unit of all the troops under the direct command of Chang Hsueh-liang. However, on the night of September 19, they acted in violence, and no sooner had they been dealt with by our troops when they took to flight. These fleeing soldiers later gathered at places, and together with the attempt to restore their shattered strength, they grouped at various places and freely conducting atrocity, they raped women, seized money and property, and above all, murdered our Korean comrades at TATIENTZU in particular, over a hundred were killed. When we sent a force to quell them, they quickly raised a white flag and sent forth a parlementaire in surrender. Such barbarous acts are committed even by the unexcelled Seventh Brigade. It is no wonder, therefore, that the other troops of inferior qualities should become bandits when defeated, committing every possible destructive act against peace and order.

Can we say that they are troops of a civilized country,
or can we say that such displays the qualifications of an independent country?

Let us question: Can we discuss international justice with the old government of the Three Eastern Provinces which has such troops under it on equal footing? Can we hold diplomat negotiations with them?

The movement to establish a new administrative power is now taking place at various places, and the Japanese Army is being welcomed by all the common people. There is no likelihood of restoring the old ruler. Such is but an outcome of resentment against the long continued oppression of avarice of the military caste.

Our Army is keeping aloof from the political and diplomat affairs, strictly performing the task of maintaining peace and order, while keeping its troops in watchful waiting.

It goes without saying that we cannot tolerate any government to be established or any plot to be made secretly within the area of MUKDEN Province where peace and order is being maintained by our Army. However, we are eagerly and anxiously hoping that a paradise of co-existence and co-prosperity be realized for the millions of people of Manchuria and Mongolia, and from the point of view of justice we believe at the same time that to promote unity of these people as soon as
possible is an urgent relief measure of our Army to exalt neighboring friendly relations. This is the plan to firmly establish everlasting peace in the Orient and this is the Imperial way which we shall never be ashamed of in putting it into practice both at home and abroad. It would be quite clear therefore, that all those justice-loving countries in the world will not be unwilling to support for the promotion of happiness of the 30 million masses.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, KATAKURA, Chu, hereby certify that the paper hereto attached and entitled "The Official Announcement of G.H.Q. of the Kwantung Army" (Dated 4 Oct. 1931) is a true and exact copy of the announcement, which was drafted by myself, being then member of staff of the Kwantung Army, in compliance with orders of Commander NOMJU of the Kwantung Army, and made public on 4 Oct. 1931 upon the Commander's approval.

Certified at Tokyo
on the 29th day of March, 1947

KATAKURA, Chu
(Signed and Sealed)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place
on the same date.

Witness: BANNO, Jurichii
(Seal)
Chapter I, Section 1.

The History of the Communist Party in China (excerpt).

I. The Beginning of the Communist Party in China (6-21)

The Communist Party in China held its first meeting of representatives from all China at the French Concession in Shanghai in May, 1921, the year after its formation. It is reported that, at the meeting, wherein more than ten representatives of such districts as Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, Whaian, Shanghai, etc., assembled, the party declared its formal formation and nominated CHEI Tsun-ho chairman and CHOU En-lai assistant chairman of the central committee; at the same time the assembly adopted a resolution to participate, Canton, both before and after the meeting, such influential individuals as LI Ta-chao, YU Sha-ta, LIU Ta-hao, CHU Chiu-sai, CHOU En-lai, LI Li-san, etc. joined the party.

In July, 1922, the following year, the Communist Party held at Canton its and second all China assembly, and clarified the purpose of the formation of the party. The council declared the duties of the party to be the overthrow of the military clique, the
exclusion of suppression caused by imperialism, the accomplishment of complete independence for the Chinese race, the construction of a democratic republic in the form of free federation, the establishment of the right and freedom of laborers and farmers, the enactment of a law concerning laborers, farmers and women, etc.

The assembly stated that its aim was gradually, by forming a united soviet front and by destroying the private property system in class struggle, to establish a communistic society under a despotic soviet form of government. In June, 1923, the party held at Canton its third all-China meeting. This assembly adopted a nine-article platform for the Communist Party in China and announced its decision to take measures to aid the people's revolution movement of the Chinese nationalist party and to collaborate with the nationalists.

On the other hand, in the side of the Chinese Nationalist Party in August President SUN YAT SEN went counter to CHNS Yen-hsiang, the Governor of the Canton province, and retired to his home in Shanghai. The soviet delegate to China, JOFFE, who came to Peking at about the same time, had an interview with SUN Yen at Shanghai in January 1923, the following year. He impressed SUN favourably by telling him that he was prepared to open negotiations between Russia and China pursuant to the announcement of abolition of the Russo-Chinese Treaty concluded during the days of Tsarist regime. He also stated that he intended in these negotiations to settle primarily matters concerning the Chinese
Eastern Railway, and said that China might be able to expect
ardent sympathy and support from the U.S.R. in carrying out
her people’s revolution.

From repeated experience, SUN Wen thought it most difficult
for the Nationalist party to achieve a people’s revolution on its
own. He considered it necessary, in order to accomplish the
object, to get the masses together and train them, after the exam-
ple of the development of the Russian revolution and to ask for
soviet assistance. He seemed to have realized the necessity, un-
der the circumstances, of co-operating with the communist party
to this end. Consequently, upon his return to Canton in February
of the same year and his assumption of the post of Generalissims,
negotiations concerning a Nationalist-Russian alignment policy
were pushed on between L.$. Chung-kai, SUN Wen’s right-hand man,
and J.P.R. When BORODIN came to Canton as an adviser to SUN Wen
in December, the movement toward, materialization of the so-called
policy of admittance to communism was greatly accelerated.

II

Expansion of Communist power due to the Kuomintang’s pro-
Communistische policy.

At the First General Assembly of the Chines Kuomintang
held in February 1924 at Kuangtung, SUN Wen reorganized the Kuomin-
tang on the three principles of pro-Russianism, pro-communism
and laborism and procured a new national revolutionary movement
with the support of the proletariat. Among the domestic policies
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set out in the proposal which was decided upon at the assembly, there were many items relating to the welfare of workers and peasants, such as policies providing for improvement of the living conditions of workers, protection of labor organizations, organizations for peasants, reduction of tenant fees and taxes, agricultural legislations etc. All these show the remarkable influence of the doctrines of the Chinese Communist party upon the policy of the Kuomintang. Moreover, those who were newly appointed members of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang included nine prominent Communists such as Li Ta-chia, Zhu Ting-shan, Liu Tsu-kau etc.

At the same time, the aid extended by the Comintern to the Kuomintang became more positive than ever. Scores of military and political advisors, headed by Sen, o-ale (Disguised name. His real name is Bischel. He is now Supreme Commander of the Far Eastern Army. At the time of the Tolbukin case he presided over the trial), were dispatched to China. Chulung K'ai-shek, who had been sent to Russia in August, 1923, by Sun Yat-sen in order to prepare for the organization of a Kuomintang army, returned to China in January, 1924. In May of that year, with the cooperation of the above military advisors, he established the Kuangco Military Academy and became himself its president. He then undertook the task of training junior officers for the Kuomintang army by means of to revolutionist system of military education after that of the Soviet Army.
Prior to this, there had been a change in post of the Soviet representative to China, and Morzhova, who succeeded Jouffre, opened negotiations with China for the rehabilitation of sino-Soviet relations and the solution of questions pending at that time between the two countries. In May, 1924, an agreement for the solution of various questions was entered into by the two Governments. In this agreement each of the two parties stipulated that it would publish no propaganda opposing the political or social regime of the other. At the same time the U.S.S.R. promised in this agreement to give up the greater part of her rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway; special rights and interests which the Russian imperial government had acquired in China; the Russian share in the Chinese reparations for the Boxer Incident; and extraterritoriality and jurisdiction of the consular courts. These Russian concessions caused a sensation among the Chinese people, and their friendly feeling toward the Soviet Union grew spontaneously. Thus, collaboration between the Communists and the democrats became closer and closer under these circumstances and exercised an epoch-making influence upon national movement of the Chinese young men, which had progressed since the Chin-War. A month after the above-mentioned agreement was concluded, the Anti-Imperialism League was organized in Peiping by combining twenty-two bodies, namely, the Peiping Students' Association, the Prolletariat Association, the League for Peace and Social
Reconstruction, the CHII. Proletarian association, the Young
Patriot's association, the sino-Yuann Diplomatie association,
etc.

Then the second war between M.D. and CHIIH broke out
in September of the same year, the C.O.T. and CHIIH marched
onwomen against CHIIH's so-lin and gave assistance to P.S.
Ho-ching, the s commander of the CHIIH army, inves to the
frontier of J i province. After the success of a coup d'et 1
which was carried through in Shihia, by P.S. Ho-ching according
to a scheme laid by the members of the Kuomintang, subordinate
to him, the Kuomintang's sphere of influence was extended over
the Peking-Ulaiin area. Accordingly the Communists,
who controlled the Kuomintang, joined in strength on this
front. In Shihia, an agreement between a sudden in the U.S.S.R.
was concluded in September of the same year in regard primarily
to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway under the
provisions relating to this railway in the previously mentioned
agreement. As a consequence the Soviet Union gained their
power in North Manchuria to a great extent, particularly,
since most of the employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway Co-
pany were and Russians. With the increase in strength of the
Communist movement labor movement also became active in China and,
as a result, labor disputes became more frequent. There were
forty-nine cases in 1921 nineteen one in 1922, forty-seven in
1023, fifty-six in 1924, and in 1925 the number of cases
suddenly rose to two hundred and eighty following the spinning
strikes already this year.
In April of the same year, on April 30 labor disputes broke out in the Shanghai Huaxian Spinning Company, whereby the general situation gradually took a serious turn. The demonstration of May 30, which was carried out in the International Concession and which included students finally led to a riot, and the firing of Indian policemen against the rioters led directly to the outbreak of the so-called May 30 incident. The said incident spread over the whole of China, creating vehement anti-imperialistic movements in various places, and in the natural course of events brought about a movement in and around Canton for severance of economic relations with England. (As to details of the May 30 incident, they are stated in a sequel to follow) (Refer to Chapter XI, Section 1-5)

We shall now come back and look within the Kuomintang.

Since its adoption of pro-communism, it had been supplied with arms and funds in abundance by the U.S.S.R., and the National Revolutionary Army had been organized, whereby the party had utterly changed both in appearance and substance. However, on the other hand, communist elements had come to hold sway over every field within the party, and nearly every organ of the party was placed under direct control of Russian advisers. Therefore, such rightist members as CH'ING Chi, T'ENG Ts'ai-chu, who were from the very beginning neither unwilling to co-operate with the Communists introduced to the Central Committee in July, 1924, the draft of denunciation of the Communists. Thus, signs of interior disturbances were already to be discerned.
To the good offices of STI then the disturbances were
waited for some time. However, after P. S. Tung-hsiang's coup d'etat
in Peking, STI gave in November to the aim to convene the National Assembly, and on March 19, 1926, he did so.
Thenceforth the disturbances ceased to the surface. The leftists
of the Kuomintang and the Communists resumed their relations
with the rightists and returned to Canton in a group, creating
a committee system they established political committees on
June 24 comprising 16 members with H. K. Ch'ing-chi as chief. This
committee included such men as LIU Chung-k'ai, HU Fan-min and
others. Despite of their statement to the effect that their pro-
communist policy would not mean the crystallization of the Kuomintang,
actual power in the party was placed in the hands of Borodin
LIU Chung-k'ai, and their group. Thus the rift between them
and the rightists at Peking only widened. In August of the
same year, LIU Chung-k'ai was assassinated by rightists, and
HU Fan-min was imprisoned as a result of the coup d'etat executed by C. L. Lo hai-shih against the leftist. These losses
rendered a terrible blow to the right wing. On the other hand,
such men as the right-wing at Peking as T. I. Tung-chou,
CHEN-chi, and CHU Ch'ing, who were called the Neo-Rightists,
resolved on October 24 that Communists should be expelled from
the Kuomintang, that Borodin should be dismissed, and that the
Canton Political Committee should be abolished. As a matter
of fact they expelled H. K. Ch'ing-chi, T. I. Tung-chou and seven other
communist sector of the Central Committee from the accounting. In retaliation for such steps, the Canton leftists held the Second National Assembly of the Kuomintang and discussed matters concerning the amendment of party regulations and enforcement of discipline. Further, they expelled the joining Rightists from the party and punished rebellious and obstructive to them. Subsequently, they conducted an election of committee members. Since the Rightists did not take part in the assembly, the Communists and leftists won great advances in this election, and such thoroughgoing Communists as LI Ta-chao and ZHENG-shun, and LIU Tan-REN, turned out, as before, to hold the most influential positions. Against the above-mentioned steps, the "new Rightists" also convened a "Second National Assembly of the Kuomintang" at Shanghai in the same month, but failed in extending any substantial influence. Shortly after that they were obliged either to revert to the committee in Canton or else be left behind the tide of "disappointed politicians."

As stated above, the Communists, in order to extend their party's influence, supported the leftists with all their might, during the whole period of internal disturbance. They carried out every possible plan, such as convening the "Fourth National Assembly at Canton in January, 1925, organizing the Chinese Communist Youth Association in February, as a subsidiary organ for the party, and establishing the "Chinese National Labor Association" at Canton in May. The "national labor association" under the control of the Communists, played a most active part
in the July 30 incident, mentioned above, which may be said to have been a prelude to events in the history of Chinese social revolution. CHING Kai-shek, who had been appointed President of the Kuomintang in May 1923, and who had since then been absorbed in military education, had 5,000 troops in his command. This army, consisting of picked student soldiers, had a costly increased in strength. CHING cleverly took advantage of the internal disturbances in the Kuomintang, and gradually extended his influence. Upon assumption of the post of Commander in Chief of the National Revolutionary Army he came to hold the reins in military affairs. He then made up his mind, to suppress the Communists. By chance, in March the same year, a plot by the Communists and leftists to assassinate CHING was brought to light and scores of men involved in the case were arrested. Therewith, having become aware of the urgent necessity of halting the expansion of communist influence, CHING Kai-shek passed a bill concerning the appointment of party officials through the General Assembly of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, which convened in July. The bill stipulated as follows:

Communists shall not occupy more than one-third of the posts in the various committees of any grade within the Kuomintang.

Members of the Kuomintang are prohibited from entering the communist party.

By such means CHING succeeded in preventing the breakdown
of the Central Government.

In July of 1926, the Central Government established CHING CHI-shih's Commission of the National Revolutionary Army to carry out a northern expedition. In September, he entered Shansi and in March of the next year, 1927, he at last succeeded in occupying Shansi and a part of Shantung. Consequently, all of central and southern China, was, to be under the influence of the National Revolutionary Army. At the beginning when the plans for a northern expedition were known, the Communists, fearing that the power of the expedition would be increased by a successful northern expedition, opposed the expedition with all their power, but, later, perceiving the definite trend of affairs they reached the conclusion that they had better take the leadership of the national revolution. This they proceeded to do by aggressively rolling the soldiers of the northern army by others, and by devoting their utmost effort to form and lead labor movements. They therefore reversed their policy, dispatched delegates and political councillors to the national revolutionary army, and charged them with the arming of peasants, and the training of soldiers. They also directed the dali to bear on the army in its march northward and, by staking up certain key laborers along the way, to drive the northern military clique into a corner. And they, as well, sent Communist workers secretly into Shansi, Shantung, Shensi, and other important cities beforehand, to incite the labor movements, to destroy old and
consequently to facilitate the entrance of the northern expedition forces. Therefore, in consequence, the northern expedition forces occupied the area as mentioned above. In the short period of only eight months, Chiang Kai-shek, in his capacity, decided that the strength of the communist activities would cause the destruction of communism in his area. In his territory. However, in view of the fact that the National Revolutionary Army, at that time, was fully engaged in the protection of Hankow and Shanghai, he was obliged to concede large freedom of activity to the Communists. Consequently during the time of the above-mentioned northern expedition the power of the communist party increased remarkably with its party members numbering 90,000; its communist young men's party members, 60,000, its communist labor's party members, 3,000,000 and its farmer's association members, 10,000,000.

3. Decline of Communist PartyDr. to the Suppression of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

In February, 1927, the Nationalist Government was established in the Hankow-Hanyang-Yangtze area and the Communists and the leftist members of the Kuomintang participated in it. Chiang Kai-shek, however, whose demand for the establishment of the government in Hankow had been denied, flew away to Hankow, accompanied by his prominent followers, and laid plans to attack Shanghai and Nanjing, thus devoting his energy toward opening a new front.
In the other hand at the national assembly of Kuomintang which was held in March of同一个年份 the leaders of the 'Kuomintang' waving group planned the reorganization of the Kuomintang. They also established the central headquarters of the National Revolution army and decided to let Ch'ing-kai-jen be a member of the military commission.

In the re-organization of the Kuomintang, all important and political offices in the executive were occupied by Communists and left-wing members of the Kuomintang. With the exception of two which were restored to members of Ch'ing-kai's faction. Thus it was evident that the leftists intended to get rid of Ch'ing-kai-jen by strong influence all over the Chang-Wu-Kiang district. Ch'ing-kai-jen, accordingly, took countermeasures, against the Communists in the beginning of April, after the occupation of Shanghai, by mastering moderate members of the Kuomintang in Shanghai, and, at the same time, maintaining strict control over the Communists and left-wing members. On April 3, Ch'en-t'ao, who had been involved in the plot against Ch'ing-kai-jen's life and forcing Ch'ing-kai's removal, had sent orders to Kaohsiung, returned to Shanghai, Ch'ing-kai-jen conferred with him concerning measures which should be taken against the Communists. Moreover, he also made arrangements to organize the left-Shanghai and east section. Thus since April he used his kind to eradicate Communists from the Kuomintang and, at the same time, dissolving the temporary government of the
so called communist city in Shanghai... followed through in the middle of the same month with suppression of communists in Shanghai and Canton. On the 16th of the same month, K. declared the establishment of a non-communist government in Hankow apart from the Hankow-Hanyang Government. He thus clearly demonstrated his intention of breaking away from communism.

In connection to this, the Hankow-Hanyang Government, on the 17th of the same month, expelled CHI SHI from the party, removed him from government service, and gave order for his arrest. At this point relations between the two factions were completely severed.

Prior to this, in the summer of 1926, since the evacuation of Peking by the National army, the communist party, the base of which was in the Soviet Embassy, had secretly been inducing LI Pai-hai, an department chief of the north area, and others to engage in communist movements in North China. On April 6, 1927, however, the Shanghai Government, the head of which was CHI SHI, sent Li to Shanghai to arrest the administrative department of Eastern China, taking the Per Eastern Bank, and the officer's office in a foreign con, east of the Soviet Embassy, and obtain numerous important documents. They also arrested Li Ta-hai in his hiding place. On the following day, the 7th, they surrounded the Soviet Consul-General in Shanghai, and, on the second day, they also searched the labor's & farmers organizations in Tianjin.

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The Peking Government and the Soviet Government were of the opinion that the Chinese and Soviet officials who had participated in the 5th general meeting of the Russian Soviet with the Soviet side were in favor of the renewal of diplomatic relations. Subsequently, the Chinese and Soviet officials, except two, were sent from Peking on April 24. There were clear signs of the expressed such strong opinions, that China should resume diplomatic relations with Russia, but, with a view to all internal affairs and, above all, to withstand the trial of war, with the Nationalist Government, the Peking Government did not take active measures against Soviet Russia. On the 28th of April of 1928, Soviet was sent to China. The 80th party congress of the Chinese Communist Party last summer, which had played an important role in it since its foundation.

After W. J. D. K., the conception of the Communist Party, the influence of the party with a considerable number of influence, especially in the part of Kiangsi province, which In the 5th general meeting of the representatives of the Communist Party from all over the country, which was held at the beginning of the agricultural problems on the theme, and the general principle of a single land owner, the law of large landowners is a new trend. The revolution was adopted. Though the opinion of the Agricultural congress out on this point, in Kiangsi districts, contrary to the opinion of the central headquarters of the party, there was a conclusion.
only from the large landowners, but also from the small landowners. There were not a few violations of confiscation who were connected, with military officers of Kuomintang party. As a result, these military officers continued to oppose the communists. In the middle of May, the officers and men under Chiang Ch'ing-ch'ien's command rose in the military revolt at Suchow, and Changsha, and went out the communist element there.

A great difference of opinion concerning the proper measures to take in a situation arose within the communist party between the right wing, led by T'EH Tsa-huai, and TAI P'ing-shan, and the left wing led by HW LI-shen and TSIANG Ch'ing-fei. As a result, the influence of the communist party grew still weaker, while the Nationalist worker-peasant government became more conservative. Finally, on June 1, the political committee decided to dismiss HORODA and all other Russian advisers. VAN Chao-hsing learned that the Comintern had ordered their special envoy to China, HU (Chen-ch'en), now residing Hankow, to organize the communist forces totalling 70,000, Communists, farmers, and laborers in HUNAN and HUBEI districts in order to confiscate land from the landowners directly, and to wage out the forces subscribing to the old ideas of the Central Committee of the national party. Surprised by the unforeseeable.

Neglecting, of the Communist Party, VAN Chao-hsing changed the attitude which he had heretofore held and at the enlarged assembly of the central committee, which opened on July 9, he strongly resisted the conclusion of the Nationalist and Communist parties. Finally, he caused the assembly to adopt the policy of forbidding communist activity in the Kuomintang and communist propaganda in the National Revolutionary army.
Due to the decision of the Central Committee Meeting of July 9, the Communists ordered the Communists immediately to enter into negotiations secretly but at the same time to remain in the Kuomintang and to make a supreme effort to overthrow its staff. As a result, the Communist members, Tsoo-feng, Tsung Sheng-ju, Li Li-an, etc., sided from the Kuomintang-Hankow-Ryang Government in the middle of July but attempted to influence the future policy of the Kuomintang. Tsoo-feng, in his party's final statement on July 23 declaring that the leaders of national revolution belonged exclusively to the Kuomintang and that Communists were to be denied the right of participation in the future national revolution. At the same time, they instructed every section of the party and every party organ to check communist activities. They thus curbed communist movements in the Kuomintang. Accordingly in July, 1927, Tsoo-feng and his party were obliged to leave the Hankow-Kan-chow-Ryang area. Thereupon they assembled in Kan-chow in Liang-si-province to lay plans for the future.

At that time the force headed by Wu Po (Vice-Commander of the 3rd Army) under the general command of Wei Shao-chi (Supreme Commander of the 3rd group), and the force headed by Wu Lung (Commander of the 26th Army) and Lai Lung (Commander of the 24th Army), both under the general command of Chih Chao-hsi (Supreme Commander of the 2nd District Army of the 4th group) were dispatched to the front by the Kuomintang-Hankow-Ryang Government. Communist Party members, however, induced another military revolt among them on July 31. Then the Communists occupied Kan-chow, established the
Revolutionary Committee and, on August, formed a temporary government led by LIN TAU-Fen and other communists.

The Wuchang-Hankow-Hanyang Government immediately had CHIEN Fei-Kuei and CHIAO Kuo-tu suppress the rebellion. The rebel army abandoned Wuchang on August 6, went south through Shensi to Canton Province, and occupied SHAOCHIN and SHAOJU', but was crushed by the Canton Army led by LI Chi-shun and MENG SHAO-Haian. After that, the rest of the army moved from place to place in Canton, Tukien, Hsin-chii and Lusan, and founded the Red Army of today.

As soon as the Wuchang riot broke out, the Wuchang-Hankow-Hanyang Government issued on August 5 an order to control the Communist Party and a warrant for the arrest of YAW Ping-shan, LIN TAU-Fen, and HSIAO Chang-fei. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party separated entirely. After that, beginning on July 27 with Borodin, about 140 Soviet Russian advisers left China one after another, the influence of Soviet Russia over the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government was broken entirely. Thus, Bolshevism was completely merged from the Wuchang-Hankow-Hanyang Government, which had once been the stronghold of the Communist Party, and the Government changed its policy towards Communists in such a way that it became the same as that of Nanking Government. Thus, the way for amalgamation of the two governments was paved. As a result, the Wuchang-Hankow-Hanyang Government on August 19, 1929 declared its amalgamation with the Nanking Government with the understanding that the two factions would purify the Kuomintang and unify the power of the Party. On September 16 both governments issued by circular telegram a declaration of the
suppression of the northern region. On the 14th they held a
special meeting of the General Committee in Peking, decided to
strike the names of 14 communists including TAI JIN-shen and LIN
Tzu-Hsin off their party roll, and organized the special Central
Committee. The amalgamation of the two governments was by this
step completed.

IV. The Failure of the First Policy of the Communist Party.

As above stated, when the influence of the communist faction
had been entirely lost, the communists became very anxious to
regain their power. At that time there arose among the leaders of
the Chinese Communist Party, an ever-increasing discord between
the right-wing, headed by CHI Tung-ho, TAI JIN-shen, etc., and
the left-wing, represented by LI HSIN, HSU CHU-CHU, CHU Chia-
Ho and others.

The communists, in view of these facts, were convinced of the neces-
sity of bringing about a drastic change in its policy towards
China. After instructing the communists to stop from the
Szechwan-Ke-chuan movement, it took measures to suppress
internal strife within the Chinese Communist Party, and, aban-
doning the compromising opportunistic attitude, brought into
force the Kuching, to carry out exclusively the method of armed
power. It planned thus with one blow to put an end to the communist
revolution, and to take vengeance on the communists. Accordingly it
consequently ordered the communist members of every district to cease
immediately. However, with a number who rose at that time, took

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A negative attitude and recognized that the trend of the times had made such steps obsolete, and that the triumph of the bourgeoisie was an accomplished fact. Therefore, asserted the necessity of adopting a defensive policy to meet the current circumstances and of preserving strength for class struggle. The war ministry immediately excused CHEI for expressing such ideas and issued instructions calling for an emergency assembly under the leadership of CHI Chiu-po. Accordingly, on August 9, the emergency assembly was convened at K'ATING, and, with CHI Chiu-po as their leader, the members adopted a policy of armed riot all over China, and of sovietization of local districts. They secretly sent their members to various districts to incite laborers and farmers. Thus, in a period of four months they caused successive uprisings in SHANTUNG, T'ING-ting, CHAIN-SH, FUKHAI, and other localities. It seemed for a time as though a reign of terror had begun, but these riots were all suppressed by the Kuomao-kuo-Hsing Government.

Again CIU Ho-kuo who had gone south in October of the same year, carried out a coup d'etat at Canton on November 17, and drove away LI Chih-ch'en, but since he sent a greater part of his army to the front line to provide against a possible counter-attack by LI Chih-ch'en to recover Canton, his garrison force at Canton became weak. The Canton provincial committee of the Communist Party, which was already planning to recover Canton, seized the opportunity, organized a military committee for revolution and a general staff.
officers and demanded that Ch'ing Fu-kuei release the Communist
members who had been imprisoned, offering in exchange to collaborate
with him in subjects H. Chi-sheh. Ch'ing Fu-kuei, whose military
strength was rather inferior to that of Li Chi-sheh, was convinced
of the necessity of his obtaining the collaboration of the communist
members. He, therefore released about 700 communists from prison
early in December and at the same time, gave a large sum of money
to cover the expense of dissolving to the committee of strikers of
the provincial ports, who had been uniting against the English
since the May 30 incident. In this way he disbanded about 12,000
workmen. The Communist Party, witnessing this, suddenly commenced
hostilities on December 11 against the army of Ch'ing Fu-kuei. The
Communists took possession of the Public Peace Bureau, disarmed the
Security corps and occupied the administrative and military organs.

On the following day, December 12, a mass meeting of the representa-
tives of the soldiers, farmers and workmen was held in which a
soviet committee led by Su Chao-yi was elected and the Canton
Soviet Government was formed. Ch'ing ordered one of his general, Li
Fu-lin, to subjugate the Communist Army. On the afternoon of the
13th Li Fu-lin recovered Canton, disarmed the greater part of the
Communist Army, and shot to death five thousand and several hundred
men. At the same time the Soviet Consulate-general was searched,
and secret documents concerning this riot were seized. The Soviet
Consul-general and ten other Russians were detained. Eight Russians
who had been detained at the Public Peace Bureau, including a vice-
consul, were shot to death.
Since there was ample reason to suspect intervention on the part of the Soviet Government and of the Government behind the Conto-
riot, the Hankin Government decided to break diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union, and in a note dated December 16th, it informed
the Soviet Consul-general at Shanghai, that it was abrogating its
recognition of the Soviet Union, consulates as well as of the
Soviet Government commercial institutions in all places under the
jurisdiction of the nationalist Government and demanded the with-
drawal of all officials and service men working at the consulates
and commercial institutions to their own country. To this note,
the Soviet Consul-general issued a reply on the 19th of the same
month, in the name of Chicherin (Chen Hsing) a member of the People's
commissariat of Foreign Affairs, strongly protesting that, the
Nationalist Government of Hankin is not the government recognized
by the Government of the Soviet Union, and that the consulates of
the Soviet Union at the various places in China had been establi-
shed with the recognition of the Peking Government, in accordance
with the Peking Convention of 1924. The Russians further retorted
in their reply that neither the Soviet Government nor its consulates
had ever had any connection with the "Red movement". To this, Mr.
Chao-shu, head of the Foreign affairs Department of the Nationalist
Government responded by stating that, just as the Nationalist
Government had not formally acknowledged the U.S.S.R. government, so
the latter had never gone through a diplomatic formality for the
recognition of the former, lest that the consuls of the Soviet
Union had been carrying on their official business in China with
the acknowledgement of the Nationalist Government. However, Chinese feeling toward the Russians grew increasingly hostile and the position of the Russians in China became more insecure in disproportionate degrees. The Russian government thereupon closed its consulates-general in Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton and by the end of December had all their personnel evacuate their posts and return home.

Thus the Russian Communists' concerted attempts at instigating riots all failed, meanwhile, in the Comintern the Trotsky faction, which had opposed the new economic policy of 1921 as well as the opportunist policy taken by Stalin, Bukharin and their followers toward the Chinese revolution profited from this critical situation and rose to power. Simultaneously with this Trotsky movement, there rose also a faction of Chinese Communists led by C.C.L. Chu-hsia and C.C.H. Ping-shen, who had entertained a grudge against the central staff of the Comintern as well as the central staff of the Chinese Communist Party. In this way, a movement against Stalin and the Chinese Communist Party's central staff became quite prominent. It finally called forth a high-handed measure from the Stalinists who, at the 15th general conference of the Russian Communist Party held in December of 1927, expelled Trotsky, Zinoviev, and more than 70 other comrades from the Party in order to stem the unrest recently seen within the Comintern. The Chinese Communist Party directed by the Comintern, also expelled C.C.H. Ping-shen from its membership at its Central Committee Enlargement Conference held in November, 1927. C.C.H. Yu-suu was allowed to stay in the Party, but amid its cold regards he completely lost influence.
V. New Policy Established at 6th General Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party.

The failure of the attempted riot in Canton destroyed all hopes in the possibility of the realization of the revolution by means of armed action, and the Communist movement in China fell to a low level. The Chinese Communist Party found it necessary temporarily to suspend its actual movements, deliberate on the cause of its past failures, and establish a new policy for its future development. When in July 1928, the Comintern held its 6th General Meeting in Moscow, side by side with it in Moscow, under the guidance of the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party held its sixth general meeting of representatives from all China. The meeting passed various wide-spread bills including those containing (1) the general resolutions of the 6th Meeting of representatives from all China; (2) Political resolutions; (3) draft resolutions about the Organization question; (4) resolutions on the question of a Soviet government organization, (5) resolutions on a propaganda program, (6) resolutions on military encroaching, (7) resolution on land questions, (8) resolutions on the farm no question, (9) resolutions on the worker's question, (10) resolutions on the Communist youth movement, and (11) resolutions on the women's movement.

Through those resolutions, the meeting decided, that all paramount duties were (1) the extirpation of the landlord class and the realization of thorough land revolution, (2) expulsion of
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China.

imperialism and unification of China. (...) overthrow by armed
action of the anti-nationalist government, which is a government of the
anti-revolutionary landlord class, and the establishment of a
worker-peasant-soldier’s soviet government. For the Party’s pro-
gress this meeting decided on the following ten points:

1) Overthrow of the imperialist government

2) Confiscation of banks and other enterprises run by foreign
capital.

3) Unification of China and acknowledgment of the right of
self-determination of each race.

4) Overthrow of the landlord nationalist government.

5) Establishment of a worker-peasant-soldier’s soviet government.

6) Establishment of an 8-hour labor system, and of a wage
increase; realization of relief work for the unemployed and
a social security system for workers.

7) Confiscation of all lands from the landlord class and the
complete restoration of these commissions to the peasant class.

8) Improvement of the soldier’s living conditions by giving
them Land and occupation.

9) Abolition of all the old forms of taxation, government, local,
or military; and enforcement of a progressive tax
system.

10) Union with the world’s proletariat and the U.S.S.R.

(Cf. Photograph VII)

The program adopted by this sixth meeting of the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s representatives from all China may be summed up
- 25 -
to continue the Party's two fundamental objectives, overthrow of imperialism and destruction of feudal power. For the realization of these objectives the meeting decided to reject the revolutionary activities of the capitalist class and depend solely on the proletarian, revolutionary force. For that purpose it resolved that the Party had no other means left but revolution, but that observing the fact that their revolutionary force had just passed through its first period of vigorous action, they were compelled to wait for another rise in the communist tide. They also resolved that if the meanwhile, in order to quicken that swelling tide, they must strengthen the Revolutionists' Mutual Aid Association and the Farmers' Association, draw more soldiers into the Party, reinforce their activities among the people, and guard themselves against falling again into the errors of opportunism, blind action, and dictatorial leadership.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity:

I, 444, Chief of the Archives and Documents Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of parts of a document entitled 'The General Condition of the Communist Movement in Japan' is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 14th day of March, 1940.

[Signature of Official]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were utilized here-to in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: TAKUMI, Marum [Signature]

Def. Sec. 1, 443

Transcribed:

Defense Language Branch

Def. Sec. 1, 443

I, CHARLES S. CAMPBELL, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the accompanying translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

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DATE 14 NOVEMBER 1940

/Charles S. Campb
中国共産党ハ国ノ成立ニ至リテハ、獨テニシニニ一九二一年五月上旬、ボルケー州海県ニ於テ
第一次全國代表大会ニ於ケルurgyに於テ，共産党ノ正式成立サシに於テ立場ヲ表明シテ，中央委員会ノ設立ヲ
決定シテ，中央委員会長ニ告テ、東ニ於テ第三次全国代表大会ニ於テ其ノ役職ヲ兼任サリ
之ヲハ共産党ノ革命運動ニ於テハ、共産主義ノ精神ヲ貫クモ、労働者ノ利益ヲ重んずリテ
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Chapter 1.

Part 1. Excerpt from "The History of The Chinese Communist Party"

7. A Clean-up of LI Li-san Railway Line (I24-I23)

Hereupon, the Far East Bureau reported in detail to the Communist International asking for control of the actions of the LI Li-san party. Thus the Communist International held a meeting of the Executive Committee and the Moscow Representatives to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and by a joint decision gave instructions to the Chinese Communist Party pointing out the mistaken actions taken by the LI Li-san Railway Line and the previously mentioned Third National Conference of China in September, 1930. The above instruction also designated the future policy.

This instruction arrived on the 1' of November, 1930:

1) As the process of the revolutionary movement in each part of China is multifarious, we can not regard success in one or only a few provinces as a means to measure completely success in the whole country.

2) The development of labor movements is slower than organizations of farmers.

3) Imperialism has powerful influence centered in industry of country.
The Outlook of Communist Level in China and Manchuria  
(As of December, 1932)

Chapter 1.

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(2) The development of labour movements is slower than organizations of farmers.

(3) Imperialism has powerful influence centered in industry of commerce.
(4) The organization of the Soviet spheres is not good.
(5) Red army organization is insufficient.

Thus it pointed out a mistake of Li Li-san's party, namely, that they were under a vain illusion and were disregarding reality, for it is useless to attack a new style imperialistic army and to plan to capture the largest cities with the strength of the Red army in its present state. Such a course would not only cause a great loss but would be detrimental to us, for it would bring about the useless sacrifice of many able Communists. It indicated the following three points as the measures to be adopted for the future.

(1) To organize an efficient industrial and agricultural Red army immediately and first of all expand its strength somewhere in the neighborhood of forty-five thousand to fifty thousand, while establishing the secure foundation for material resources in one or several Soviet spheres.

(2) To build a Soviet government with constructive capabilities within the Soviet-district and with almost all the positions occupied by Communists; make the best elements of industrial, agricultural and military forces participate in the government and realize a true land revolution. Carry out an authentic economic policy whose data are based upon the middle and lower classes of farmers.

(3) To organize people in non-Soviet spheres so that they may participate in the economic and political struggle, that is, to make all the problems about laborers, such as labor conditions or social legislation, etc., as the starting point in economic strife, and develop a farmers' movement in the provinces with guerrilla wars. Further, by disturbing the nation-
alist government and by increasing the power of communists in the army of the military clique, actual help will be given to the Soviet sphere.

Though Li Li-san resigned from the Political Bureau as a consequence of the decision to obey the above order passed by the Central Political Bureau meeting on the 30th of November, there were not a few in the party who defended the Li Li-san Railway line. So the anti-Li Li-san party held the fourth Central Committee augmented meeting and decided upon new measures, while insisting emphatically to prepare for the seventh augmented meeting of representatives of the whole country, and as a consequence the Communist International ordered to hold the augmented Fourth National Conference of China.

Accordingly, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held the fourth augmented conference of the Central Committee in Shanghai on the 16th of January in 1931, and, after a discussion admitted the orders of the Communist International and decided on a new measure. They also re-elected the leaders of the committee, and excluded Li Li-san, CHOU En-lai and CHU Chiu-pai etc., except HSIAO Chung-fa, the chairman of the committee... The Li Li-san and CHU Chiu-pai took the blame and issued their two statements admitting their mistakes to the Fourth National Conference of China, but soon after this Li Li-san was summoned to Moscow as a member of the representatives to Russia. Also HSIAO Chung-fa, CHOU En-lai, CHU Tsoo-yu and HSIAO Tsoo-fen formed a new group of leaders.

Further, according to the decision of the above mentioned augmented meeting of the representatives of the Soviet sphere in May of 1930, executive members of the Communist Party had led the preparation for the first all-Soviet meeting of representatives since. September of the same year, and
The meeting was expected to be held on the 7th of February in 1931 at Shanghai. However, previous to that, in the early part of January 1931, the office of the above preparatory committee was raided by the police of the engineering bureau in the common concession, and several representatives of the committee as well as all the staff were arrested and they were all executed by shooting. Consequently the postponement of the meeting indefinitely was unavoidable.

The augmented Fourth National Conference of China decided to prepare in the Hankou Soviet square the establishment of the Soviet central government. The preparatory committee for the provisional government, with a committee of the central political bureau and SHANG Ying as its chairman, was ordered to go to Hankou in disguise.

3 An Internal Shake-up and A Blow to the Party through the Opposition of Government Authority

As a consequence of the augmented Fourth National Conference of China, CHI Chiu-peii, CHI Shao-yu and others were eliminated as a group. LI Li-san, who had long been holding the real power in the party, also was removed. Following the 97th plenary session held in 1927, LV Li-xian and others easily and even the new central authority could not dominate the power easily. And in addition to this, at the Third National Conference of China which held, a party of CHANG-lung, CHANG-lung and others who had most strongly opposed to CHI Shao-yu's party, opposed them so that its authority weakened considerably. As a consequence LI Li-san, CHI Shao-yu and
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Especially after secret-information given by CHNK Shao-yu, and having been requested by the Bureau of Public Safety, a Chinese organization, a group of thirty-five members including Lof Leng-shuung were arrested by the police of the engineering Bureau of the Shanghai common association, during the period from the 17th to the 21st of January 1931. Under these circumstances, the internal troubles between these groups continuously increase.

On the other hand, the nationalist government had tried to control the communists semi-official after the recent aggression of the communists in 1927. (The subjugation of the Red Army is stated in another chapter, Sect. II, section 2, clause 6). According to its statement, the government arrested 722 communists in Shanghai, 42 in CHNKW province and others; 1546 members in all in 1930, and in the past captured 345 in Shanghai and 320 in HIKW and other places; making 5000 communist members in all. Particularly, the above a rest of 10 Leng-shuung's affair, which occurred in Shanghai in January 1931, put the original in charge of the nationalist government on the account, and on the 23rd of January Li Shun-fa, a member of the Central Executive Council, was sent secretly from the central authority in order to a new, by deportation order, and the information concerning him was sent secretly to the Li Li-san's party. And on 11 Shun-shang's arrest, they arrested QIALING Cheng-fa, in Shanghai, the head clerk of the police, for only executed him by shooting on the 23rd and also ordered in arresting other important members as well as dis-
In the police of the Engineering Bureau of the common concession in Shang-hai, Chou shen has been secretly informed by the police in Singapore, amongst others. (The phonetic chief of the Far East Administration Bureau of the Communist International as well as chief of the clerical Bureau of the Pacific I bow union (he was saved from the capital punishment by the bull roars by HU Chien-shih, SUN ching-ting and others) and was sentenced for life imprisonment on the 10th of August in 1932 at the high court of justice in HAINAN).

(Sec. 14 Art. 13, section 1, clause 2)

There were not a few of the most important communists in THURSDAY and amongst those were captured by the police of the nationalist government.

These people who were arrested were punished in accordance with the temporary anti-revolutionary code of criminal procedure of the 7th of March in 1929 and the urgent code of criminal procedure for the republic crisis which came into force on the 1st of January, 1931 in place of the above code, however, HU Chien-shih being a secret agent of the nationalist government since then and worked not only for the interest of the communist but also took the lead in driving HU Chien's government of oppressive policy.

In this way the arrest of the important communist members and especially HU Chien-shih's betrayal gave a serious blow together with the internal trouble of the communists which had come from the clean-up of the LI Li-kan-Li-kan line.... as it was inevitable for almost all the members of the central committee to escape temporarily to the Soviet sphere in the interior... seeing that HU Chien-shih disclosed every detail of the internal conditions...
of the Chinese Communist Party to the Nanking government, enabled the latter to arrest many important members, and that he was appointed to an advisory of CHIANG KAI-SHEK in Nanking, as well as the head of the reformatory of the Chinese communists in return for his service, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communists became very much offended with him for this betrayal. They sought vengeance upon KU and strangled his older brother and three other members of the family at the end of June of the same year in French concession. They have also committed ruthless murders twice, victims being three of KU's family and his wife and three others in the French concession and the common concession respectively within a couple of weeks following the above incident.
CERTIFICATE OF LEGAL AND AUTHENTICITY

I, [Name], hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of [number] pages and entitled [title] is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,

on the [date] day of March, 1947

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness

[Signature]

[Seal]
THE OUTLINE OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENTS IN CHINA & MANCHURIA
(as of December, 1932)

The Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Excerpts from "The organization of the Chinese Communist Party and its auxiliary Organs."

(Chapter I, Section 2, Clause 1)

II. Guidance given by the Comintern to the Chinese Communist Party.
(P. 33 - 42)

The Chinese Communist Party usually maintains contact with the Third Internationale through such organs as mentioned follows; the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau at Shanghai, its branch at Tientsin, the Manchuria Province Committee of the Soviet Union's Communist Party at Harbin, the Far Eastern Propaganda Section at Khabarovsk and the Chinese Section in the Far Eastern District Commission of C.P.S.U.(TN: DalikraiKom) at Vladivostok. With the Profintern, (TN: The Internationale of professional unions) the party communicates through the Secretariat of the Pan-Pacific Labor Union in Shanghai. The route of communication mostly utilized by the party members seems to be the one from Shanghai to Moscow via Vladivostok.

However, with the recent progress of bolshevization in the hinterlands it seems that a method of communication by way of Central Asia or Outer Mongolia is now being considered. Meanwhile, representatives of the Chinese Communist Party are permanently stationed in Moscow for maintaining liaison.

Furthermore, the Far Eastern University (which is also called Sun Yatzen or Chungshan University) is a source of constant supply of fresh party members who rendered great services to the development of the Chinese Communist Party as expressly written in the foregoing Section 1.
Among the above-stated liaison organs the Far Eastern Bureau occupies the most important position. The Comintern sent its agents to Shanghai in the beginning, but, later, following the opening of the Sino-Soviet relations, an organ for Bolshevic propaganda in the Far East was established within Soviet Consulate-General in Shanghai, and placing this organ under the leadership of the Comintern's Politbureau had the staff members of the consulate give directions to a large number of agents and "chokas". After the rupture of the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and China, the staff of consulate-general in Shanghai was obliged to evacuate. Before then on May 20, 1927, the first inaugural meeting of the Pan-Pacific Labor Union was held in Hankow under the direction of the Comintern. Since then the Pan-Pacific Labor Union took charge of the control and guidance of communistic labor movements in the Far East. In August, 1928, the second general meeting of the Union was held at Vladivostok. During these years its secretariat continuously was being kept at Shanghai, under the charge of an American communist named Earl Browder.

In the meantime the Comintern came to regard it necessary to create an organ in the Far East similar to the Western European Bureau in Berlin and, set up about the middle of 1929, the Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai. The American communist Earl Browder was concurrently appointed as the secretary of this bureau. As Earl Browder returned to Moscow after having attended the second general meeting of the Pan-Pacific Labor Union held at Vladivostok, a successor by the name of Noulens came over to Shanghai to assume concurrently the posts of the secretary of the Far Eastern Bureau and of the secretariat of the Pan-Pacific Labor Union. He was very active in bolshevizing oriental countries and, above all, China. But on June 15, 1931, Noulens was arrested by the Shanghai Municipal Council police of the International Settlement, the circumstances of which event are related in Section 1.

It is to be noted that the reason why the Comintern located its headquarters for the bolshevic activities in the East in Shanghai and later in
Tsientsin despite various vicissitudes is that those places, being large international cities with foreign concessions, accorded facilities of free circulation and meeting to the party members.

The true aspect and activities of the Far Eastern Bureau are partly shown in the findings against Noulen (See Note) by the Kiangsu High Court of Justice on August 15, 1932. According to the above findings the Bolshevization activities of the Far Eastern Bureau had not been limited to China alone but actually extended over the whole of the Far East, including Japan, Korea, Formosa, Indo-China, the Philippines, the Malay Archipelago and India. The methods of contact between the Far Eastern Bureau and the communist parties in these territories consisted of the exchange of messengers, opening a number of P.O. Boxes at the Shanghai Post Office (as previously mentioned) and receiving cabled telegrams by using cable addresses of business companies or firms. It is reported that the method of direct communication by short-wave between Moscow and Shanghai is also being used recently. It is needless to say that the communications of such nature will become extremely easy after the resumption of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations.

(Note) 1. The passage in the findings of the Kiangsu High Court of Justice with respect to Noulen's career reads as follows:

"Noulen is a former member of the Third Internationals. He was despatched by the same party to China in March, 1930 to become the chief of its Far Eastern Bureau and engage in communistic activities in China. In Shanghai he rented at several places within the city, including No. 235, Ssuchuan Road, No. C-30 upstairs, of No. 49, Naching-lu, No. 74, Hungyeh Garden, Yuyuan Road, and No. 66, Robert Hart Road, in order to use them as dwellings as well as offices. He also obtained eight P.O. boxes had four registrations made at the China Radio Telegram Office all of which were employed as media of communication for Communist Party. In party with such rebels as Chu Ta, Mao Tse-tung and Ho Lung, Noulen instigated riots in..."
Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces as well as corrupted local areas. Noulens dispatched units of the 7th and 20th of the Red Army to Taiho and Sushu (both place names are phonetically spelt) in Kiangsi Province, and also to other provinces such as Fukien, Hunan, Kwangtung and Kiangsi in order to stir up disturbances in those areas and carry out attacks against the Nationalist troops. Furthermore, Communist party members were also sent to Nanking for instigating rebellion among the troops of the Air Station, mechanics, pilots, navigators and members of guard units with a view to strengthening the power of the Communist Party. Noulens also proposed to establish a Soviet district in the intersecting area of Honan, Anhui and Hupei Provinces and divided the money he received from the Third International among those local organs such as the Southern Office, (IN:South China) the Changkiang Office, the Northern Office and the Kiangnan Office.

He also instigated the masses of farmers and workers through those organs to give rise to a new trend for revolution and class strife. Moreover, Noulens stirred up workmen and disturbed public order. He gave publicity to the numerous slogans, such as "Dorn with the Kuomintang!", "Expel puppets of the Kuomintang and Imperialism!", "Protect the Chinese Revolution!", "Protect Soviet China!" Moreover, all communist movements in India, the Philippines, the Malay Archipelago, Korea, Annam and Japan were placed, without exception, under his control.

The S.N.C. police of the International Settlement detected Noulens activities in June, 1931 and arrested him on June 15 in the house at No. 235, Sun Chuan Road. The police then searched every house he rented and in the building at No. 49, Nanking Road, it unlocked the room No. C-30 with a key which Noulens carried with him and took out three iron boxes from a cupboard made into the wall of the apartment. In those boxes were found a great number of documents which constituted evidences of offense in the present case as well as four envelopes. Three of the envelopes contained respectively sums of 800 American dollars, 150 Japanese yen and 6,34 Chinese yuan prior to this, at the time noulens was sent to China to become the head of the Far Eastern
Bureau, the Third Internationale dispatched a female Communist Party member by the name of 'Vanderkreussen and had her reside at the same address with Noulens so that she may watch his activities and participate in his confidential affairs. The police found a letter in French from Vanderkreussen when they searched the room No. C-30 at No. 49, Nanking Road. The letter read to the effect that he would have a conference with Noulens in the above-said room at two o'clock that afternoon. Thereupon, the detectives closed the gate and hid themselves inside the house to wait for Vanderkreussen's arrival. At the time of the appointment, Vanderkreussen arrived as they had expected. The police arrested her immediately as she unlocked the door with her key and went into the room.

(Note) 2. Noulens had the use of eight P.O. boxes and all of them were being used separately for different purposes and for communicating with the communist parties in the regions including Japan, Korea, Formosa, China, the Philippines, Indo-China and the Strait Settlements. For example, of the two boxes "1077" and "1382" were employed solely for communicating with the Japanese Communist Party, the former being used for the purpose of receiving the party's publications and other important documents and the latter for correspondence concerning the comings and goings of messengers and so forth.

Although the sum of money which is being supplied by the Comintern to the Chinese Communist Party is not plainly known, some say that the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party received from the Comintern about a half of its expenses since last year in spite of its principle of self-sufficiency. In other words, it is estimated that about 15,000 U.S. dollars were being received per month.

Judging from the documents found in Noulens' possession, the amount which he had spent during the nine months, between October 1930 and the time he was arrested in June of the next year, seems not to have been less than a million Mexican dollars. The money was remitted from Berlin through the Bank of Italy under the pretense that it was to be used for commercial purposes.
Concerning the Propaganda expenses of Comintern before the outbreak of the Manchuria Incident some say that the Comintern defrayed 650,000 yuan for the expenses of the Chinese Communist Party, 250,000 yuan respectively to its Kiangnan, Chekiang and South China Offices, 120,000 yuan respectively to its North China and Manchuria Offices and 220,000 yuan monthly as the military expenses of the Chinese Red Army. It is said that those expenses were paid through smugglers or traders' associations. It is certain that the financing of the funds of such nature will also be facilitated by the expansion of international trade, which is to be expected following the resumption of the Russo-Chinese diplomatic relations.

(THE END)
感觉您的问题可能与日常工作或学习相关，但由于文档内容是图形图像，我无法直接进行转化为文本的工作。如果您有具体的问题或需要帮助的内容，欢迎详细描述，我会尽力提供支持。
Chapter One.

Paragraph Two. The Organization of the Chinese Communist Party and its Present Status.

Section Three. "Soviet" Government (Excerpt from p. 154 to 163.)

1. Calamities caused by Communist bandits.

Calamities caused by Communist bandits in Hsiangsi Province as made public by the Nan-king Central Daily News, Nationalist Party organ, dated June 25, 1932, read as follows:—

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Statistics on Commutistic Fendit Outrages in Hunan Province.

(published in the Anti-Communist Semi-monthly, August issue)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of prefecture</th>
<th>Times of Occupation by Bandits</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Number of houses burnt</th>
<th>Property, Yuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHILN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHISHUI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>32,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LILIAN</td>
<td>not recovered</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>0,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FENI</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12,996</td>
<td>9,518</td>
<td>4,566,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUKIN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUNHSII</td>
<td>not recovered</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>26,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HULIN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HINGHII</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NINGHSII</td>
<td>not recovered</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. HSU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. HSU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUKIN</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIUKING</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUKUI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI, NO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>4,430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUKING</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUKITSE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENSII</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17,300</td>
<td>23,200</td>
<td>34,001,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Product 1</th>
<th>Product 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tungxu</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Juichiu</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chihsi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanfeng</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuishan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>several hundreds</td>
<td>several hundreds</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuanfeng</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuanfeng</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>not recovered</td>
<td>tens of thousands</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiushui</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>80,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungjen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiyui</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>innumerable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinling</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linfu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shengzi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kungshen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shicen</td>
<td>not recovered</td>
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<td>3,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningtung</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinwu</td>
<td>at time lost and then recovered</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>about 7/10</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinwu</td>
<td>not recovered</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>149,700</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefecture</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Recovered</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUICIIU</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUITI</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.L.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>80,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHUI</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILIYUI</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUNGI</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEICHING</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>33,600,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSINGSHU</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDI</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSWithu</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>11,170</td>
<td>3,130,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*JUICIIU</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FULLING</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSINGSHU</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>90,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TINGHUI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUNSHING</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>scores</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUIXING</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>about 13,000</td>
<td>incalculable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIAXIAN</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>33,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEISUI</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHISUI</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*T.N.: JUICIIU Prefecture is enumerated twice in this table, presumably by mistake.
Furthermore, according to "CANTON Daily News" or "Canton Daily News of Republic of China", dated July 15, 1932, the number of refugees in CANTON Province who appealed for relief amounted to over 570,000 during the period from January to March, 1932. Details are as shown in the following table.
### Statistics of Refugees in KWEILIN Province (Jan. Feb. 1943)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Prefecture</th>
<th>Total Area, KWEILIN, CHINA</th>
<th>Total Number of Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YUNSHIN</td>
<td>Province, in KWEILIN</td>
<td>9,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHISHUI</td>
<td>CHINA, KWEILIN</td>
<td><em>tens of thousands</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINSHAN</td>
<td>Town Area, YUNSHIN</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIHO</td>
<td>KANGCHOW, CHINA</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIKOU</td>
<td>CHINA, KWEILIN</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINFU</td>
<td>CHINA and its adjacent prefecture</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUPFU</td>
<td>KANGCHOW, CHINA</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSINGKOU</td>
<td>KANGCHOW, CHINA, TAIKOU</td>
<td>27,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIUZHOU</td>
<td>CHINA, KWEILIN</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUZHONG</td>
<td>CHINA, FINSHAN</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAISHAN</td>
<td>KANGCHOW, CHINA</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUICHU</td>
<td>KANGCHOW, CHINA, Northern CLANCHEN Province</td>
<td>25,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUIZHOU</td>
<td>YUNSHIN, JIANGCHOW, CHINA</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUZHOU</td>
<td>Town area</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENGSHAN</td>
<td>Prefecture in CHILIAN Province</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The data includes the specific number of refugees in each prefecture and province, with some entries indicate tens of thousands.*
Furthermore, according to the "Kain Ming", Hunan Province Organ Paper, published at the end of 1932, the number of prefectures in Hunan Province which were once occupied by the Red Armies amounts to 31 and the number of the refugees in the occupied area exceeds 3,130,000. Total number of the refugees, including those who had gone out to places outside the province and those who had come from the adjacent provinces, amounts to 4,051,000. The details are shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town Area and adjacent prefectures</th>
<th>not reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiao-Jiu</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang</td>
<td>several thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuningan</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. H. H.</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. C.</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. C.</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungku</td>
<td>several hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ju-chiang</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsia-chang</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan-k'ai</td>
<td>several hundreds</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table showing refugees from the Communist bandits
in HOLEI Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of prefecture</th>
<th>Population in the Communist Area</th>
<th>Refugees gone out</th>
<th>Refugees gone in</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HSIEHNING</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>28,040</td>
<td>2,980</td>
<td>86,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHISHUI</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>7,589</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHINGYANG</td>
<td>12,660</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>14,596</td>
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<tr>
<td>YUNHEI</td>
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<td>45,300</td>
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<td>361,954</td>
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<td>60,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>72,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUAIFO</td>
<td>111,000</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>58,000</td>
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<td>3,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>103,000</td>
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<td>HUANKOU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>1,561</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUNGTZU</td>
<td>244,600</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>251,800</td>
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<td>50,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<td>44,000</td>
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<td>151,600</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>14,983</td>
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<td>29,080</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>200</td>
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- 8 -
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<tr>
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<td>1,891</td>
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<td>HUJU</td>
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<td>TZUKEI</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,139,045</td>
<td>691,523</td>
<td>251,230</td>
<td>4,081,798</td>
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Furthermore, according to a written confession which is attributed to have been made by IBAN-Hsi who surrendered to the Government Army after having harassed it for long as the Chief of Staff of the Third Army Corps (under FENG-Tehui) of the Red Army (Note: published on the N.-CHI-CHIN "Tingkuu Jipao" issued at the end of 1932) it is said that ---

"In the Soviet Area, as a result of numerous massacres by the Red Army, the whole country is so ruined, with houses fallen everywhere and overgrown by weeds, that no one dares to tread on the scene. Though farm lands have been allotted to farmers there is no one seen engaged in cultivation. Various taxes were abolished and a system of progressive single tax was brought in, but monthly political and military expenses for the Soviet Area in KUOHSI Province exceed Yuan 400,000.

As money looted in FUCHOW and CHIANGSAI have been already spent, financial resources are drying up in spite of the issue of war bonds and Agricultural-Industrial Bank notes. Moreover, as the result of the blockade by the Government Army, the routes for replenishing food and salt have been cut and no hope is left of getting winter clothes and medical supplies. Four subjugating battles launched by the Government Army rendered a considerable decrease in picked troops and newly raised soldiers are still not sufficiently trained. Thus, the number of the Red Army decreased so considerably that it was about 8,000 in the Third Army-corps according to the muster for September, 1932 and it was still less in the Second and Fifth Army-corps. In addition, soldiers are paid no wages except ten cents a day as food expenses. The Red Army compels old and weak including women to make clothes and socks and requisitions fruits.
end vegetables so stringently that people conceal all grain and vegetables. Such as the state is, the people's minds are always unsettled and the loss of business capacity and the economical panic are threatening to bring in almost complete devastation."

All of this news from Government sources is supposed to be full of exaggerations through which the true facts of the Soviet political situation cannot be clearly perceived, but the actual state may be considered to lie somewhere between these reports. Namely, at the very beginning of the Soviet construction, the Red Army indulged in types of tyranny such as murder, arson and loot under the name of lend revolution, overthrowing of the capitalist class and so on and realized the reign of terror aiming to suppress the reactionary regime and to supply commodities. It gave rise to many refugees. On the next stage, after the establishment of the Soviet Regime, the Communist autocracy was staged in actuality under the name of the workers, farmers, soldiers and mass people and various reforms were brought in conformance to various regulations. In the borderland of the so-called Soviet Area, however a non-authority zone grew up as the result of the juxtaposition of the two armies. In these zones, lands were deserted and bandit infested. Considerable order was maintained in the Soviet Area, but as a result of the blockade by the Government Army, salt, cotton cloths, petroleum and machines were deficient and finance was so confused that the Soviet Government was forced to issue paper money and various kinds of compulsory bonds (Cf. photograph No. 5, 10, 11 and 13). The Red Army are also believed to have been forced to march out into the fertile zone in order to replenish supplies.
The very difference of Soviet politics from those of military clique or Nationalist Regime lies in the execution of a "Social Revolution" which is asserted to be the vital point of Soviet politics. Its most essential facet seems to be the solution of the so-called "land problem".
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, H.Y. Onoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of eight pages and entitled "The Outlook of Communist Movement in China and Japan," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office), certified at Tokyo, on this 14th day of April, 1947

(signed) H.Y. Onoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: (signed) Ume, Yatsusuri (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language French, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 14 April, 1947
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</table>
峨新的瑞奇异修资南王东南资源川同

江华川仁川水昌及山丘冷溪昌吴政

未恢复

千 万 百 十

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注: 上達が増えるほど、数字は大きくなります。
会议确定大夏河峪满南石经上安

河运大夏河峪满南石经上安

未复   未复   未复

未复   未复   未复
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|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
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この表は、日本の書式で記載されているもので、具体的な意味や内容は解釈が必要です。
江西省之人口變遷統計（1733）年
昌坡城壋昌川平年各臥安山及業

昌坡城壋昌川平年各臥安山及業

昌坡城壋昌川平年各臥安山及業
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根据上述表格，可以推断以下内容：
- 表格中的数据可能涉及到某些标准或规范。
- 蓝色手写文字可能提供了背景信息或注释。
- 表格中可能存在特定的编号或标记，但具体含义需要进一步解释。
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受本階段打倒其他名殺ノ下ニ要殺、放火、反動等ノ凡有暴逆ヲ遅シムスニ
節政治ヲ廃しテ反動政権ヲ強化トしテ物資ヲ補給スルモノノ如ク其ノ結果ノ
ノ下ニ適易ニ於テハ共通ノ穢穢政治ヲ行ヒテ各種ノ法令ニ端中語段ノ改革ヲ
行フモノナルカ所謂ノソヴィエト区域ニ於テハ土地ハ荒廃ニ覆シ共匪ノ他軍
地帯ヲ出シ同地方ニ於テハ共通ノ穢穢政権ヲ強化ヲ成立スフモノノ如ク其ノ結果
状態ナルヘルソヴィエト政府ハ紙頭ノ各種強制公務ハ遂に第一ロト參照
ダ發行シ又招ハハ種
物資補給ノ目的ヲ以テ焦沃ナル地方ニ進出スルノハムナキ狀態ニ在ルモノ
而シテソヴィエト政府ノ所謂地頭改革ニ関ノ政策乃至ノ民営政権ト異ル所ハ
所謂ノ土地問題ノ解決ナルカ如シ。
Charter One:

Section Two:

Item Four: The Red Labour Movement ("Kuoer")

No. 5 May 30th Affair.

Thus it is a natural tendency that as the labour movement developed there were frequent strikes. The number of strikes from 1919 till the "May 30th Affair" in 1927 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Strikes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>1922</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>1923</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>96</td>
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<td>1925</td>
<td>16</td>
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Of these, the following strikes can be considered as major strikes.

Strike of Kuoer Hire Yocks ......................... October, 1922

- 1 -
Strikes of Shanghai cotton: January, 1925
Strike of the Beijing-Tianjin Railway: November, 1925
(The Two-seven Affair)

First strike of Shanghai Spinning Companies: February, 1925
Strike of Taungtse Spinning Companies: April, 1925

Immediately after the recent Labour Convention, the labour movement slowly reached its climax on the result of control by the General Labourers Association and made remarkable progress towards political conflict. Till finally, in May, 1925, there took place the "May 30th affair", as it is called which is the most important in the history of the Chinese Labour Movement.

The "May 30th affair" originated in the strike of February, 1925, by the labourers working in the 3rd plant of the Hai Mai Cotton Spinning Company which was established by the Japanese residents in Shanghai. The strike of this plant came from the comb-out of its bad workers. The strike took place on 3 February, with demand for increase of wages, better treatment of labourers, recognition of the labour union, etc., and immediately spread to the plants of the "Hai Xia Cotton Spinning", "Toyoda Cotton Spinning", and "Yaleo Cotton Spinning" Companies. Though the operations of these plants were resumed for a time as a result of the storm, attitude taken by the authorities of each company, the strikers again acted positively as soon as a strike was called at the Taungtse Cotton Spinning Company in April. The
positive effect on the part of the workers together with the
strong attitude of the authorities of each company quickly
aggravated the situation, so that all companies closed their
plants simultaneously.

However, on 15 April, more than seventy workers who were
rallying in front of the gate of the 7th plant of the "Nipri
Cotton Spinning Company" in opposition to the closing of the plant
clashed with the Japanese and Indian policemen who were guarding
there, and by the firing of the Indian policeman, 26 workers
were wounded, one of whom soon died. The result was that, the
situation rapidly grew worse. Furthermore, with the actual
participation of students in the strike and also by their
demonstration, the situation became more and more acute. On
26 May, five students were arrested and taken before the
Municipal Council on the charge of having distributed propagandist
leaflets. Or learning that these students were not released
at the trial on 30 May at Wushangmen, labourers, students and
masses started demonstrations throughout the city. A herd of
the demonstrators clashed with policeman on guard at linking
road with the final result that four were killed and 10 or
so wounded by a volley from Indian policeman.

On account of the outbreak of this incident, the resentment
of the revolutionary elements among the labourers, students
and masses reached its climax. Ther, on 1 June, calling a
general strike throughout the city of Shanghai, cases of
people clashed everywhere in the city, 4th policeman of the
concessions, and as the result, over forty strikers were
killed and wounded at Chelsea Pond on the same day. That
night near the New World, there was another clash, causing one
killed and more then ten wounded in the crowd. Clashes of this
kind constantly took place till about 10 June meanwhile until
12 June, strikes were called as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Undertakings under Japanese management</th>
<th>Number of strikes</th>
<th>Number of participants in strikes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; British</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; The Municipal Council</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Various plants connected with foreigner</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Plants under Chinese management</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>261,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>112,600</td>
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The "May 30th Movement," so called, which was fired at the
Anti-Imperialistic Strike that was caused by the "May 30th
Affair", spread everywhere under the leadership of the All China
General Labourers Association, and in such cities as Shanghai,
Nanking, Chinsching and Churking, serious clashes were brought
about. In Feiping and Taitei, there were frequent demonstra-
tions with labourers at the center. "without any exception
throughout China. Almost all works and plants manned by
foreigners sustained strikes. During this period, there were
also constant financial difficulties in the cotton mills owned by
the Chinese. Thus the Central Labour Association of Shanghai,
which was virtually the centre of the movement extending all
over China, not only gained control over all labourers in
Shanghai, but also became an important centre of the revolu-
tionary movement extending to all China.

The above is the external development of the May 30th
Affair. If internal affairs are observed, it is clear that the
labour dispute of the United Cotton Spinning Company of 5
February which was the very origin of the May 30th Affair was,
indeed, not a simple affair that arose of itself from the inside,
but it was carried out systematically through
institution from the outside as a part of the plan previously
prepared according to instructions from the Comintern for
 Bolshevikizing Shanghai and causing riots there.

Chen Tu-hsiu, etc., at that time, was the head of both
the Chinese Communist Party and the National Young Men's As-
sociation. He had been making plans in Shanghai up to 20
January of the same year, keeping in touch with the Comintern
Headquarters at Moscow. As soon as the United Cotton Spinning
Company went on strike, the Tientsin University of Shanghai,
which is a private institution established by subsidy from the
Soviet Government, and various other labour schools, were
chased into various labour associations and became strike
headquarters. Professors, students, etc., of these schools took
In the strike there was much support and encouragement from the strikers, and successful strikes were held in various parts of the country. In addition to these, the anti-imperialist press, which had hitherto been against strikes, supported the strikers to the utmost extent, holding a meeting of its executive committee on 24 February at the Central Park of Shanghai to organize strike-supporting associations all over China, and collecting contributions for the associations, etc. Moreover, the Red Labour International Committee of Moscow looked up its branches over the world to send subscriptions to the strikers.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Ambassador to China, Kerscher, made an effort in propagating by sending the diplomatic circles stationed in Peking circular letters in which he supported the demand of the Chinese strikers. On the other hand, the Soviet Consulate-General in Shanghai (which is virtually the Far East Bureau of the Comintern) was strictly censored, and from frequent conferences, increase of visitors, increase of Chinese visitors, as well as control of these Chinese visitors, the activities of "China" (former name of the C.C.), etc., it could only be supposed that some measures were in progress, though the truth could not easily be known. However, the real state of it all finally became clear through the agency of the police attached to our Consulate-General.
Fact is that, the Police Station attached to the Imperial Consulate-General in Shanghai secured one a part of the striking letters which 'Chen Kuosof', chief of the Propaganda Section of the Comintern in Shanghai, dispatched at the end of February, just in the midst of the struggle of the Taipai Silk-milling Company, in answer to enquiries from Peiping about the strike. According to this letter, it is obvious that the strikers had previously been trained in accordance with instructions from the Political Bureau of the Comintern in Moscow. It is stated in the letter that the politicians affiliated with the Kuomintang Party, newspaper, students, etc., were coached by the Chief of the Propaganda Section and had organized the strike committee. The Chief described in detail the fact that while he remained in the back ground he personally coached these people. In this reply, names and addresses of the Japanese concerned were also given, and all of these corresponded to the fact. In the same letter, it is also stated that the above strike was the first trial in China and it was not too much to say that this strike opened the way for the organized labour movement. The same letter revealed that the reason why the Japanese-controlled plants were selected was only for convenience sake. For since the process by which this letter was received and what was stated in it completely corresponded to the truth, there is no doubt that the letter was not a forgery.
Though the proper and final receipt of this letter in the hands of our Consulate-General should be regarded as official, yet since it is a very excellent account for knowing the truth of the day 30th of June, which was one of the most outstanding phenomena in the history of the Chinese workers' movement, and for disclosing the plot of the operation of the Soviet, I will show the translation of this letter as follows:

The translation

In reply to your inquiry about the progress and details of the Chinese labourers' strike, for the present I have the pleasure to report its outline to you. Especially since it is professionally difficult for me to take direct hand in anything, I was obliged to turn to Mr. Scandizzo. However, in the near future, I will let you together with Mr. .... know in detail about the progress of the business of the strike in section. In this report, I am informing you of the essential progress made by the agitating section which concern about the strikes. In accordance with orders and instructions from the political section, I hurriedly made the Chinese labourers draw up the prospectus of a strike committee, and I naturally do this shortly. Together with this, special agents dispatch agents start establishment of the strike committee. And though not so big in amount, funds were advanced and the agitating movement
proposed exactly. And it was successfully impressed on Chinese labourers the idea that, in order (the common out of) a central strike, the labourers could be able to exert much more effect and in particular the strike committee would furnish them with financial aid.

Thus at the outset the Chinese and others in suspicions as to the strike committee, after the agitation, the work of the agitators began to wane, and we were able to make very rapid progress. A kind of unit called "an economic party" was formed out of each of the labourers, one active labourer appointed chief of each such unit. And it was decided to make each chief unit of closely the workers and so on of his party members.

Thus all the technical preparations had been made. Now we were in the stage of only waiting for the result and of sounding out the crowd. It was obtained information that labourers of the Japanese controlled plants had originally entered a state of messiness, there were many people who called for support from the agitators, saying they were willing to carry out a strike. Labour and workers for strikes direct to the strike committee also became frequent occurrence. So the committee told them that it would give the sufficient support for the strike. Apart from this, other news also promised to join in leading the labourers in
the strike. They did not need to - or could not - have an op-
portunity. I thought if I should suggest that time, it only
make the Chinese labourers lose a feeling that our purpose
would be different from what we actually would do, this
creating bad impressions. So I was advised to send to the
local committee meeting - "Meeting" - which was held mostly.
After discussion at the meeting, the strike decision was passed
unanimously. And I have already got for the minutes of that
meeting, I think they are already in your hands.

The next day, the strike committee received the order to
start the strike. This order was not issued simultaneously
but was conveyed in succession to such unit, because we
thought this method was important.

The first day of the strike was very successful because
the labourers were standing solid as the result of the en-
thusiasm by the Chinese labourers. Especially, the strike
committee say the labourers decided on the evening of
that day created strong impression upon them, showing
their ardent so such that the labourers of the packing
plants also took part on the second and third time.

Also from the plants some labourers had not joined the
strike committee, some commission to visit us and ask for
support, but I absolutely refused such proposals, telling the
that till they should have established their committee or
theirs, according to the principle of the state, we should be unable to take any steps for the time being. In all, it is not easy to disagree with the situation of our whole business, so I disposed of the business thus.

This was a very necessary disposal. For example, on the second day, students of the universities came to demonstrate against nationalism and anti-instillation of their principles, with the result that unnecessary tension. I granted permission and had a normal effect upon the plan for all the students.

The method now has already reached so a harmless state that it has finally caused interior not in both for the Chinese police. Then for the purpose of control in the through a consideration, I immediately issued an order of the following nature. That is to say, I made the strikers get their straight financial demand, at the same time, I have distributed leaflets stating that if we hand over the money, we may improve us of their authority against us, I also collected enough documents and not guilty in this, the police made round-ups several times and arrested many, who were striking. Some of our agitators were also taken into custody. This is, however, accomplished and we cannot avoid it. However, this fact can also be regarded as an unexpected fruit, because such incident will show the Chinese government that the Chinese agitators are entirely powerless and if their agitators act in concert with us, the result that

- 11 -
will become the center of the present situation. What I want to mention particularly is that the group of students who are openly expressing their detest for our government, and keeping close connection with us. However, as stated above, a part of the students may express some of their nationalist ideas. This is, in short, and evidence that the discipline of the Communist Party among the students is still lacking. For, such matters will soon disappear.

As the funds of the strike committee are almost nil, I was forced to deliver this thought to the committee. In addition to this, the committee is asking for an appropriation of five thousand dollars, for which I am willing to express my opinion from Mr. Kono Kuroko.

The outline of the progress of the strike is as stated above. As I think you already know well from newspaper reports about the situation, I do not tell you about it. But, I have heard several reports from the Japanese newspapers, the articles which are necessary for us will all be printed. With regard to this, I devised a suitable means when I read it with (Mr. Kono, No. 17, vocal cord), for which I recommend his support. In regard to this, it is to be paid from the expenses of the branch.

As for the trial of the arrested, we are not satisfied at all from the Chinese judges, but there is much of the realtà.
If so, it is thought necessary to give such an issue to the national press which is due to be called the "massacre of Chinese labourers" to press correspondents. When the representatives of the "Sin on Stock" and the press etc. called on me yesterday, I assured them that I had not been concerned with the movement, and rode them a present. Both of them then promised to give a proper report in the papers. As for the Chinese issues, I think it needless to say anything.

In short, our movement has been much more effectual, and it may safely be said an organized labour movement has already been launched in China. "Why, you can ask, have I stopped the movement with the Japanese plants? I have thought it convenient. But the movement should be started from the lines with least resistance. Is the next blow is expected to be more easily noticed by foreigners, it will stir about a serious disturbance; consequently, it will become very hard for us to carry on the movement. Moreover, it is understood that lately a stricter watch has been kept in the foreign factories and our agitators find it most difficult to "work" in such factories, although this is a matter for the future. Therefore, our next step will be to make the factory owners make concessions. It depends solely upon the issue of this step whether the Chinese will become fully aware that, as the outside of
their thorough collaboration, they have not all that is necessary for them. We are now studying how to induce some of these factory owners to make concessions. And for this we are now using third persons in the negotiation, for which I think it will be necessary to pay some amount of money.

And next you may ask why it should give so much temporary assistance to the Shanghai press. The fact is that there are many Japanese secret agents in that press, and we give them money through Mr. Isho. These Japanese take of the printing work according to our instructions.

The above is all that I can report to you. I think now you are well aware of the present situation. About the current in future, I will inform you without delay. Now I have one thing further to say. There are certain Chinese workers at Shanghai who blindly obey the instructions of our leaders. I suggest you send some proper leaders to them.

Yours truly,

From one of your comrades.

(Note) This letter of 6 pages is rewritten in Russian, and the parenthesis contents are written purposely in Cyrillic.
As the above letter shows, the dispute was led by a pro-
teratic strain clotted in directives from the Comintern. The
head of the propaganda section of the Soviet Consul, organi-
dized a committee of strikers and led it in July.
Later it became clear that he had secret communica-
tions with Turkev, supplied funds to the previous committee
in the past.
The amount the Soviet Consulate charged for
this dispute and the following day 30th incident as well-
out funds or for similar aid payments reached $200,000
by the middle of June. Of this, $200,000 was received by General
Consul Gokman from Harbin on June 10, when the Government
into sitting secretly to report the situation. 500,000
were given to the representatives of students on June 1, and the
remaining 500,000 was handed to the Federation of Industrial
Council. These facts were revealed as result of collec-
tion inquiries of our General Consulate. The funds seem to have
been sent to the Shanghai Strikers’ Organization, etc.
In connection with the 3rd incident, there was
something strange in the attitude of Chinese capitalists.
One example is that they tried to block in order to keep up
the price of cotton cloth at the moment of the Hong strike.
After the May 3rd incident, the General Industrial
Society of All China immediately held a secret meeting for the
organization of an anti-British boycott. As a consequence, a
A strike was started in Hong Kong on June 17, and one after another the workers left for Canton. The British authorities took up a counter-measure against this action by stopping the export of foods, gold and silver bars and other currencies. Meanwhile, on June 21, the British authorities in Shao in settlement fired machine guns against the workers demonstration; 80 were killed and a few more than 1,000 were wounded in the accident. Afterwards it was called the Shao In incident. This incident intensified the anti-British boycott in Canton more than ever. The workers held a Hong Kong Strike Council and organized a Strike Council. By taking these steps, they tried to go through the continuing conflict.

Meanwhile, however, as the northward movement of the National Revolutionary Army went on, they were obliged to change their attitude in carrying on the anti-British movement. On account of adopting new measures in the course of the intensifying of economic boycott, they stopped all the actual movement thus far in operation.

Meanwhile, the anti-British movement, backed up by the Soviet Union, largely the Soviet Union, and motivated by the 20th incident, produced a tremendous effect on the British trade supremacy over China. As a result, the British government finally made the well-known pronouncement of a non-interventionist policy toward China, thus removing her former policy.
In spite of this action, the government now has been
interested after the inauguration of the 'national' or local
self-defense diplomacy, and it insisted it lost interest of formal
meaning of the London 'British & Indian' at the beginning
of January, 1927. In response to this situation, on
Jan. 27, 1927, the government issued the second agreement
with the same current as the former one to claim "in favor
not only Britain but other powers also were compelled to
modify their policies, drastically as outcome of the 27th
incident. The reason was that the Soviet power had well learned
to take advantage of the special situation in China, how
the capitalist classes were full in the control of foreign
capital, and they succeeded in the automation of commerce
and rationalism. Thus there was the renewal of national conscio-
siveness and the development of the mass movement. In con-
sidering these facts, we cannot but attribute all the results
to the successful diplomacy of the Soviet Union. However, the
later breach between the Soviet and Japan, prior to oppression
of the communists carried out in the national government,
indicates that the policy of the Soviet union was too static,
an effect not only upon China but upon other countries. On the
other hand, it is noteworthy that the day 27th incident which
was initiated by the anti-Japanese movement and was afterwards
transformed into the anti-British movement, made its advan-
- 17 -
after the restoration of Russo-Iranian friendship. These characteristics also may have important bearing on the recent problems of Russo-Chinese relations.
您提供的图片包含的内容不清晰，无法识别出有效的文本信息。为了更好地帮助您，请提供更清晰或可读的图片，或更明确的文本描述。
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注: 以下は、内外に配慮するための準備要項について述べる。実施の際は、こちらに基づいて行うことが必要です。実施の手順についても説明されています。
文部省所関係成立ニ因スル調査

大日本国文部省文部総務部長ヲ含テハル国際関係ニ関スル事項ヲ交渉スルコトヲ報セラレ

文部省所関係成立ニ因スル調査

昭和二十二年三月十四日
於東京

立会人

内閣印

立場

出席者

署名

17
Section 1

(Excerpt) Situation before the Manchurian Incident

6. Activities the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has displayed in Manchuria (pp. 229 - 240).

In connection with the above-mentioned movement of the Korean and Chinese Communists, the activities of the Russian Communist Party in Manchuria should be taken into consideration.

The Soviet Government, when formed for the first time, not only kept fighting a severe battle with the Menshevik (Constitutional Democrats) in the country but also had to fight against the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Siberia as well as against the strong resistance of the so-called White Government in Siberia. In spite of these circumstances already around 1917, a party organ of the Bolsheviks was set up at Harbin, and it planned to overthrow White Russian General Koltsov who had been conducting anti-Bolshevik activities from his base in North Manchuria. For this purpose a systematic propaganda among his troops was begun. It was perhaps at this time that the Russian Communist Party's influence commenced to infiltrate Manchuria.

Later, these Russian Communists on one hand exerted themselves to keep in touch with the Communist Party at home, and on the other hand laid stress on propagating its movement among labourers in North Manchuria and especially personnel of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In order to effectuate a systematic expansion of their activities, they established the Communist Management Bureau of the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone in March 1920. It soon changed its name and was called the Prefectural Management Bureau of the Communist Party of the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone. Just at that time Shihiliyakev arrived at Harbin, having been clandestinely despatched by the Soviet Government, and his arrival caused a remarkable progress in the movement of the Communists.
But China, who had been planning to recover her rights in North Manchuria ever since the Russian Revolution and especially to regain the Chinese Eastern Railway, first reestablished her police power along that Railway by force in March 1920, and then not only forcibly recovered her judicial power in the Railway Zone in October of the same year but also was able to gain joint control of the Railway with Russia in the so-called Chinese Eastern Renovation Treaty, and besides regained communication privileges along the Railway in January 1921. This was followed by her recovery of the right to administer municipalities within the Railway Zone and that of the coursing of trains between the Railway and the USSR. Because of this, the political influence the Soviet Union had over North Manchuria decreased very much and the Communists there were not a little retarded in their activities.

Hence upon the Russian Communist Party planned to build a so-called "Red Guild" which was outwardly legal and succeeded in having the Chinese authorities approve it by buying them off. Thus under cover of the legality of the guild, they began to be remarkably active. In a result of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of March 1924 and the Russo-Mukden Regime Agreement of October 1924, China succeeded in obtaining various kinds of rights for greater than those obtained under the above-mentioned agreement renewing the Chinese Eastern Railway Treaty, the Soviet Union's political power in Manchuria seemed to decline all the more, but by virtue of these agreements, the interests of the Soviet Union were stabilized to a certain extent and so the Communist Party was able to work all the more freely, till at length, a motion about 1929, that detectable Bolshevism began exerting its influence over the Chinese personnel of the Chinese Eastern Railway, while its plottings against China gave rise to Kuo Sengling's rebellion against Cheng Tao-ling in December of the same year.

Then Kuo rebelled against China, Iverov, Chief of the Chinese Eastern Railway Bureau, who had been bent on sweeping the White Russians out of the Railway by taking advantage of loopholes in agreements among Russia, China and the Mukden Regime, demanded that China pay the fare in advance of troops transported in the Southern Line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and went the length of obstructing the transportation of those troops. The Mukden Regime then used its troops to
Forced on the operation of the railway, upon which the Soviet side went on a
general strike. Affairs were thus highly complicated and finally in December
1925 the operation of the railroad was suspended. Thereupon, in order to be
equal to the occasion, the Chinese authorities enforced martial law and went so
far as to arrest and imprison Ivanov under the charge that he had committed a
breach of the martial law, with the result that the relation between Russia and
China became very strained for a while. It was, however, smoothed away on
the 25th due to the negotiations between the authorities in Harbin and the Consul
of the Soviet Union agreeing that the Chinese troops should be transported as
usual and Ivanov be released.

Since the Har Incident, China has taken strict precautions against the
Soviet Union's plots in Manchuria, and the ensuing one year and a half has
elapsed quietly. In China preparato, Bolshevization was rendered extremely
difficult as the following events succeeded each other: -- the failure of the
Comintern's attempts to Bolshevize North China in April 1927, the search of the
Soviet Embassy area in Peking by the Chinese, closely followed by the suppression
of Comintern members in Hankin and Hankow, and the Nationalist Government's
reversion of diplomatic relations with Russia owing to the riot in Canton in
December of the same year. Thereupon, it became apparent that the Soviet Union
turned her attention to the Bolshevization of Manchuria and Mongolia. In 1928
she appointed the Chief of the Far Eastern Bureau of the People's Commissariat
for Foreign Affairs Kolenikov Consul General and stationed him at Harbin. Since
then that Consulate General has assumed the position of the highest leader of
the Communist movement in North Manchuria behind the curtain besides being
virtually the highest diplomatic organ of the Soviet Union in China.

During this period, the highest organ of the Soviet Communists in North
Manchuria was the North Manchurian Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party
(otherwise known as the Harbin Committee), which was the successor of the above-
mentioned Prefectural Office of the Communist Party in the Chinese Eastern
Railway Zone. This committee, on the one hand under cover of consular organiza-
tions, and on the other hand with the aid of such "Soviet" agents besides its di-
direct calls to the Far Eastern Bank, Far Eastern Forestry Trust, National
Force trade unions, as well as with the aid of various legitimate and publicly recognized Red trade unions, used to carry out the "Red" propaganda in a fairly positive and undisguised manner. But in view of the stiffened attitude of Manchuria and Chinese authorities following the search of the Soviet Embassy in Peking in April 1927, Consul General Molinikov upon his arrival at his post changed the policy hitherto adopted and concentrated intense efforts upon indirect and clandestine movements through such trade unions seemingly unconnected with the Communists.

On the 27th of July 1929, the Chinese authorities at Harbin, under the pretext of exposing Communists' secret gatherings, took such emergency measures as an official inspection of the Soviet Consulate General at Harbin, a confiscation of a large number of documents, taking into custody approximately thirty Soviet nationals, ordering Molinikov to be confined in the Consulate, sending under guard to his residence Kuznetsov, former Soviet Consul General at Harbin, and ordering him to remain confined in the residence. In view of such, the Soviet Government, on the 31st of July, lodged a strong protest with the Chinese Government on the ground that the letter had violated the international law, and demanding that the detained Soviet nationals be released and that the confiscated documents and other objects be restored. At the same time, the Soviet Government declared that no privileges stipulated in the international law be hereafter granted to the Chinese Embassy and consulates in the Soviet Union.

In reality, however, the Soviet Government did not change in any way its treatment of Chinese officials, nor did it make any other reprisals. There is no concealing the fact that the Soviet Government, while ostensibly displaying a considerably firm attitude, had at the bottom intended to settle the case as peacefully as possible. This seemed to be due to the fact that in infiltrating Communism in Manchuria, the Soviet Union was in a very delicate position, from the standpoint of protecting its rights and interests in Manchuria, and that, therefore, it had to be very careful in determining its attitude towards China.
However, taking advantage of the conservative attitude on the part of the Soviet Union, Chinese authorities since July 1929 came to take such high-handed measures as dismissal of the director and the vice-director (Soviet nationals) of the Superintendent Bureau of the Chinese Eastern Railway, dismissed on pretext of the excess of the Soviet nationals working in the main departments and sections of this Superintendent Bureau and those working as railway employees, employees of Chinese or White Russians in their posts, expr pretension of the rail service, the Telegraph and Telephone Bureau, and literate belongings to the same Railway. Compulsory dissolution of the trade unions and the Railway Employers' Unions situated along the said Railway, discontinuance of various Soviet commercial organs, etc. Consequentially, the diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed in the 19th, and all attitude of the Soviet Union became stiffened. The Soviet request for the restoration of the status quo along the Eastern Chinese Railway was followed by positive military operations against the Chinese army in the district of INOWLO in November. The tide of war being entirely against the Chinese army, however, the Manchurian regime first of all surrendered, and was obliged to sign the humiliating Protocol at U.S.-JULY 22, 1929, as well as to promise the restoration of the status quo along the Chinese Eastern Railway. On this occasion, it was decided that a formal conference be convened at Harbin in January 1930 for the settlement of various issues concerning the said Railway for the adjustment of overall diplomatic relations between the two countries and for the settlement of trade problems.

At the formal conference, the two countries disagreed on many points so that the conference was totally prolonged. Namely, the Soviet Union, taking advantage of this pretext, she had joined over the Chinese on the result of the above-mentioned military pretensions, attempted to expel White Russians from North Manchuria and to destroy anti-communist organs. In addition, she did everything in her power to expand Communist organs behind the scenes. Through the instrumentality of commercial organs and in utter disregard of profit, she attempted to Bolshevikize Manchuria, using as her base the Chinese Eastern Railway, stronghold of her influence in Manchuria. On the other hand, as the
result of a local system reform executed in line with the reform of the administrative districts within the Soviet Union (the prefectural system being replaced by county or district system), the North Manchurian Prefectural Committee of All-Soviet Communist Party, highest organ of the Soviet Communist Party in North Manchuria, was renamed the North Manchurian Committee of All-Soviet Union Communist Party. It is also said that in view of the peculiar political conditions in North Manchuria, the Soviet Union, after the settlement of the Russo-Chinese dispute, established as the highest direction organ a triumvirate system, above the North Manchurian Committee, appointing as chief Consul General Y. Y. V. T. O. V. V., vice-director of the Chinese Eastern Railway V. V. V. V. V., and the director of the Superintendency Bureau L. L. I.

In the meantime, the trade union, which used to play the most important part in the Bolshevik movement in North Manchuria, side by side with the regular Communist Party organs, had been reduced to a completely behind-the-scenes existence since its dissolution was ordered by the Chinese authorities on the occasion of the Russo-Chinese dispute. Nevertheless, out of reach of the watchful eyes of Chinese officials, it carried on its underground activities, which became notably positive after 1931. On the other hand, the North Manchurian Committee of the All-Soviet Young Men's Lenin Communist Association, whose chief mission was to bring up Communists, frequently gave secret reading parties and short lecture courses, as well as carrying on its activities also through various clubs and sport associations.

During the Russo-Chinese dispute in 1929, the Volunteers' Fighting Unit, organized as the nucleus of the All-Soviet Young Men's Lenin Communist Association, had frequently disturbed the rear of the Chinese Army by such atrocious activities as assassination, overturn of trains, destruction of the railway lines and various buildings. In view of this fact, the Soviet Union was apparently working out a plan to use those members of the said association, who had formerly been members of the railway units, as the employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to let them defend the Railway to the last, in case of emergency.
Certificate of Authenticity

I, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of five pages and entitled "Outline of the Communist Movement in China and Manchuria" is an exact copy of the excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Certified at Tokyo on this 14th day of March 1947.

YASU, Hayashi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: URABE, Katsumi (seal)
郭松濤事件發生不久，殲共軍隊在奉協定，不
備兵器向前衝。東支南部線，支那軍
隊進退無常。前進，其輸送物防雪
星羅棋布。騷動之重，於奉天側，軍隊
一、二、四年十二月至，運轉中止。狀態
於奉天側，戊戌，而
同月十一日戊鎮令違反之。
郭松齡事件發生後，張綱之軍先於20日進據奉天。
 Defence Doc. 9579F

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Chapter II Paragraph 2. The Situation after the Manchurian Incident (excerpt)

5. The harassing plan against the Japanese Army in the rear was being carried out by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (from page 251 to page 260)

Furthermore, as a result of the arrest of a Korean on April 16th, by a police officer of the Seoul police station in Korea, it was found that, together with the above-mentioned activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in North Manchuria, a harassing plan against the Japanese Army in the rear was being carried out by the Party. That is, on that day as referred above, a certain suspicious Korean was arrested at Sishin, and as a result of an investigation it was discovered, contrary to one's expectation, that he had received secret orders from the Soviet authorities in Vladivostok to blow the bridges on the Yalu, the Deido, the Saisan and other rivers, and also, in order to harass the Japanese Army in the rear, he had landed on the coast of Ryujo, Kyojo County, "mancho Province on April 14th. Six boxes of explosives containing 89 pieces, weighing 56 hon (I.N. approximately 210 kg) and four pistols were found in the sand pile near the seaside where he had landed, and other..."
recipients were also arrested.

All of them were either the regular and candidate members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the members of the Red Labour Association in Vladivostok. On about 16th, of the same year (1932), they were taken to a spot called Torci about two Ri (T.N. about 5 miles) east of Vladivostok by the order of G.P.U. there and they were instructed on the method of how to blast bridges. On 21st, of the same month, after receiving an explanation from Kischelnic, President of the G.P.U to the effect that the Soviet Union would suffer enormous disadvantages as Japan had recently dispatched her forces to Manchuria in succession to invade it, they were entrusted with an important mission to blast the Shinshinu Bridge at first with firm resolution; and if this is impossible, should blast the bridge on the Dido or on the Sisquen in order to check the movements of the Japanese Army, by disturbing the peace in Korea and to propagate the principle of communism by taking the advantage of confusion at that time. On the night of 23rd, accompanied by the vice-president and another, they loaded a G.F. launch with the explosives, pistols etc., and started out from Vladivostok on it. On 24th, they reached Tshulke, the see-coast of about twelve Ri (T.N. about 30 miles) east of Vladivostok, where they took another small-boat. They loaded it with coal, water and rations and left there; they reached Foset after continuing a stormy voyage for nine days and stayed there ten days for a rest. On 21st, of April under cover of the night, they left there and landed at the spot mentioned above (T.N. Ryujo, Kyojo County, Kenkyohoku Province). After landing there, they buried arms and explosives in the
sand and at once, they tried to return the boat, which was also seized by Japanese police officers.

According to the confession made by those criminals, twelve Chinese members of the Party had gone to T'unchurin on the same mission by rail starting from Vladivostok on March 21st. Other communists, who had been entrusted with the similar mission, had entered T'unchurin after they had failed to destroy railways; when the army district fell into confusion in July, of the same year, they gave the "West Secret" Bandits the funds which they had received for blasting project and took activities in combination with the Communist Party.

Though the above-mentioned scheme of the Soviet Communists was negative, and not considered to be a positive one, the suppression of the communists by the Japanese and T'unchurin authorities caused all sorts of terroristic incidents on the whole after that. But the activities of the communists were still continued in secret, in June, Vladimir, Dovernitch, Gusehinov, Konstantin, Shilickev and other leading members of the Party were dispatched from the Comintern to reconvene the Committee of T'unchurin. By order of Special 0.4.1. in Vladivostok, they tried to check the Japanese organ of secret information and to enlarge the espionage activities of the Soviet Union. There was an indication that they gave a secret support to the anti-T'unchurin army and other bandits in the eastern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and that there was a certain doubt that they took rather suspicious actions when Su Ping-ren plotted a treason in T'unchul in September of the same year.
The li liest organ of the Communist Party in 'Yanchiur is the Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in North 'Yanchiur. This organ is under the direct control of the Far Eastern Frontier Committee of the Soviet Communist Party at Vladivostok (the Committee for the Far Eastern District), and it receives orders from the 'Eseror Central Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party through this Committee for the Far Eastern District. It first the U.S.S.R. treated 'Yerbin as a prefecture of her own territory, and the li liest organ of the Party in the 'Yerbin District was once named the 'Yerbin Prefectural Committee. (For some time it was a chapter of the 'Yerbin Province Committee at Vladivostok.) It seems that it was once called the 'Yerbin Prefectural Office of the Far Eastern Purseu.) The reason why the present name of the Committee of the Communist Party in North 'Yanchiur was adopted about 1930 has been stated in the foregoing paragraph. The Committee for the North 'Yanchiur District was established in the Soviet Consulate-General at 'Yerbin, and it consists of 1 responsible clerk, 1 political leader, 1 secretary, 1 organization chief, 1 chief of the agitation propaganda section, 1 chief of the women section, and other 5 commissioners. All members of the committee are officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, consular officials and members of the Bank of the Far East. Under the Committee of the Communist Party in North 'Yanchiur, there are 2 district committees (weeks).
at Herbin and 18 Chinese Eastern railway "cells" (yechikes). The 1st and 2nd precincts also have a total number of 24 cells (yechikes). Every one of these yechikes on the Chinese Eastern railway line is to be formed, when there is a membership of over 3, according to the instruction of the Mukhorovsk Frontier Committee. These yechikes are detailed for the task of ordering the officers of the labor unions and the Young Men's Society of the Communist Party (komsomol) in the vicinity. The organizations of these organs are shown below:

The Committee of the All-Russia Communist Party of North Manchuria

(11 members) (in the Consulate-General at Herbin)

The 1st "Prison" (Herbin Theor' District)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yechikes</th>
<th>Name of Works</th>
<th>Building Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Herbin railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Moscow&quot; Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;36th-Pioneers&quot; Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8th District &quot;Chestnut Street&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Drill Force&quot;</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The 2nd "Prison" (New Town)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yechikes</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Building Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Herbin Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Clan&quot; Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Yehiroku&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Atsura&quot; (in the &quot;Officers&quot; Street)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 3rd Line of the Chinese Eastern Railway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yechikes</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Building Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Froshichimnyy&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Def. Doc. 7957-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yulung</th>
<th>Hangrohotzu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iliowo</td>
<td>'shihhe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The First Line of the Chinese Eastern Railway

Yuchaike   | Yen-chul | Djerriner (?)
Beiler     | Phota (?) |
Chichihier | Inte       |
Teichingshe

The South Line of the Chinese Eastern Railway

Yuchaike   | Yen-heng-tzu | Thel (?)
Kaidimen   | Irohseckuo   |
Shunghchapeo

The auxiliary organs of the Party are the labor unions, the Communist Young Men's Sect., and the Communist Boy Scouts.

The highest organ of the labor unions is the North Manchurian Council which, belonging to the 'Red Laborers' International', is under command of the Yen-brovsk Labor Union Council for the Far East. This Labor Union Council was established in the Soviet Consulate-general at Verhia, and consists of 1 president, 1 chief of the organization section, 1 private secretary and 4 commissioners. Under the Council are 11 labor unions (dorons) which are as follows:
The Labor Union of Railway Workers

The Union of "Soviet" Officials

The Labor Union of Hotel Workers

The Union of "Soviet" Transportation Workers

The Labor Union of Restaurant Workers

The Industrial and Health Unions

The Labor Union of German Workers.

The Labor Union of Traffic Workers

in local districts

The Labor Union of Teachers

The Labor Union of Artists

The Labor Union of press-men

Under each "doroom" are district councils ("Doroom") under which there are local councils ("Westoom"). The most important one of these labor unions is the Labor Union of the Workers of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Its organization is shown below.

Union of the Railway Workers of the Chinese Eastern Railway ("Doroom")
(In the Cellar of the Superintendent Bureau of the Chinese Eastern Railway at Harbin)

Harbin "Shicom"

1. Mechanized Workshop The Eighth District
2. In Engine Shed The Superintendent Bureau

"Doroom"
3. The Commercial Agency Old "Forbin"
4. Hunchengtzu Harbin

7
Def. Doc. 956-C

Panchuli "Communist"

- "Paschnili"
  - "Panchi"
- "Kilin"

Vicunho "Communist"

- "Hunzun" (?)
  - "Kilin"
- "Shihhe" (?) (Chirentun)

Mirotritzu "Communist"

- "Mirotritzu"
  - "Trishen" (?) (Orui

Teermichinuy "Communist"

- "Teermichinuy"
  - "Trishen" (?) (Orui

The highest organ of the Communist Young Men's Association at Erbin is called the Committee in North Panchi of the Soviet Leninism Communist Young Men's Association ("komatson"), and it is in the Superintendent Bureau of the Chinese Eastern Railway at Erbin. It consists of a responsible private secretary, a political leader, a private secretary and three committee men. Under this committee, there are two "vicoms" in the city (these are classified in seventeen "ychekkes") and (sixteen) "ychekkes" along the railway line of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
The "comrade" is an army whose mission is to foster the communism among the youth up to twenty-seven years of age. In Soviet Russia they attach special importance to the guidance and development of "comrades." Particularly in view of the Soviet-Chinese Incident of 1936, the policy of militarization of the Chinese Eastern Railway was adopted since 1930 under the leadership of the workers of the "comrade," which consisted of either discharged soldiers from the railway corps or the technical corps in Soviet Russia in order to defend the Railway desperately by all the workers and to carry and terrorist activities in cases of emergency; and it has completed the organization of the guards, the terrorist corps and the propaganda party to meet any emergency. A short military course and political training, were being conducted in each club and the like under the name of all sorts of "sports" or a "group" of the men sharing the same taste.

And in April 1931, the plotting of the explosion along the Chinese Eastern Railway line was carried out by those young communists as mentioned above.

The communist boy scout is called the Boy's Extraordinary Party or "Pioneer," and is similar to that of the Boy Scout organized in every country. This is an origin in which the boys and girls are conceived with each other and imbued with the sentiment of communism and Pan-Sovietism.
E. O. Dec. 1938

Under the direct guidance of the "Lentsoo," there are

eight units in the area of new street at Harbin, fourteen
units in the 'wong' area at Harbin, twelve units in the western
line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, eight units in the
southern line of it and twelve units in the eastern line
of it.

According to the latest inquiry, it showed that the number
of the Soviet-Russian communists in Harhyn Manchoukuo was
about two thousand and five hundred, and though most of them
were the Soviet Russians, there were some Chinese and
Japs in it, and until recently there were one or
two Japanese communists, but recently there seems to be
no Japanese in the group. The members of the communist
party are divided into three classes, namely, regular members,
candidate members, and sympathizers.

The above-mentioned classification is in the inner organi-
ization, of the communist party of Soviet Union, but its
external organization is classified as follows:

(1) The "Lentsoo".
(2) The Chinese Eastern Railway.
(3) Various economic services.
(4) Schools

Of the above-mentioned organizations, the Soviet-Russian
"Lentsoo" was at Harbin occupied the position as the
highest levels of the Soviet-Russian diplomatic and consular bodies in China during the period of discord between Soviet-Russia and China. It not only has the function of a consular consulates in substance similar to consulates of other countries, but it can be called the central organ of the "Soviet" system which gives orders to whole China. The mission of this consulate is located in the building adjacent to the club of the Chinese Post on Railway, and the functions of all the communications, guards, and the maintenance of secret matters are provided in this building.

Under its control, there are the consulate-general at Mukden, the consulate at Manchuli, Peking, Chinshin, and Haiko; and this is also closely related with the consulate at Peking and Seoul.

The present system of the Post China Railway is based on the agreement concluded between Russia and China, and the条 between Mukden and Russia; It consists of the General Manager's office, the Board of Directors, the Board of Secretaries and the Superintendent Bureau. It is provided with eighteen branch offices of the commercial and industrial section of its Superintendent Bureau in various quarters in Manchuria, Tientsin, Shanghai and Dairen, etc. The number of the railway-workers is about eight thousand and six hundred Chinese and seven thousand and six hundred Soviet-Russians,
but the actual power is controlled mostly by Soviet-Russians.
Besides, there are the labor's organization section, theaters, "Grand Hotel" and the purchasing association of railway-workers of Chinese Eastern Railway controlled by the same railway.
As for the various economic affairs, there are agencies of Commercial affairs, the Far Eastern Bank ("the Dali Bank"), the National Insurance Bureau ("the Daita-room"), the Grain-Export Company ("the Export Bank"), Mutual Railway Insurance, and the charter of the national corps of merchant shipping at Harbin.

And under the control of this agency of Commercial affairs, there are a variety of trusts and companies for shipping, petroleum, Far Eastern Steerage, Far Eastern coal, rubber industry, musical instruments, motion pictures, tobacco, mineral waters and sake-brewing.

As for schools, there are about twenty primary, middle and other schools at various places in Harbin and along the railway-line; and for public opinion, there are various newspapers being conducted. And all these organization should regarded as the external organ of the communist party of Soviet-Russia.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, H.I.YASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "GENERAL CONDITION OF THE COMMUNICATIVE MOVEMENT IN CHINA AND MANCHURIA. Excerpt from "THE SITUATION AND THE HAOFEI INCIDENT" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 14 day of March, 1947.

/s/ H.I.YASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereof in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on this same date.

Witness: /s/ UMEBU, Katsuna (seal)
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(H)
The History of the Chinese Communist Party

Intelligence Section of the Foreign Office

The Internal Discord of the Nationalist Party due to its Cooperation with the Communist Party.

The Communist Party, which had succeeded in wedging into the Nationalist Party by conforming to the instructions of the Comintern, secured a considerable voice in the party indirectly aided by BOCHIN, the representative of the Comintern in China. The party made great efforts to propagate the principles of the party with TAN Ping-shan, Chief of the Organization Section and LIN Tzu-han, Chief of the Former's Section and others as control figures and planned to expand the party. Whenever the Nationalist Party set up a branch in a certain district, the Communist Party immediately set up a branch or sectional division of its own in the same district. As soon as the Nationalist Party appointed a branch committee, the Communist Party likewise appointed its own branch committee. Thus both parties were always in competitive mood and tried not to be behind each other in extending party influence. The aid of the Comintern became more positive after the National Party was reorganized.
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General GAROV (Note 10) as a military adviser and a few dozen about fifty men as military and political advisers were sent to China beside war expenses, munitions and weapons. These advisers assisted CHIANG Ka-shek who returned from Russia in January 1924 in establishing the HUANGFU Military Officer's School in May, with CHIANG Ka-shek as principal of the school and WANG Chao-ming as the representative of the party. Copying the system of the Russian Army, they promoted military education with revolutionary idea and trained capable men who would be leaders in the army of the Nationalist Party. It can be said that the success in fighting the enemies in North China in later days may be attributed greatly to the influence of the HUANGFU Military Officer's School and CHIANG Ka-shek's success in general was the result of his utilizing the school as a step ladder.

(Note 10) The real name of Gen. GAROV was VASSILY CONSTANTINOVICH BUKHTEL. He was born in 1889. He was formerly a labor working in a vehicle manufacturing factory. He was imprisoned in jail for two years on the charge of being the leader of a strike. In 1914 he joined the army, but was released on account of being wounded the following year and returned to labor life again. In 1916 he joined in the Social Democratic Party and after the October revolution, was on this SAMARA revolutionary Committee. Commanding a mixed detachment, he subjugated General DOCTOV and achieved a military merit.
When he became a divisional commander, he again rendered distinguished service in subjugating the armies under generals KOCHANOFF and General VASILYEV. In 1921 he was promoted to the General Commander of the Army of the Far East Republic of Russia and chairman of the Military Council. After serving the post of the commander of the First Siberian Army and the Commander of the Leningrad Garrison, he came to China in 1926 to hold the post of the military adviser.

The agrarian movement which was the real object of the Communist party was also started at this period, CHEN Kung-ro replaced LIM Tsu-hun as the head of the Agrarian Department (CHEN Kung-ro was not in reality a genuine member of the Communist party at this time any more though he was one at the beginning). However, LI Chi-tuan, a man of influence in the agrarian movement among the Communists, was appointed the secretary. P'ING P'ei and W'AN Hsiao-hsien were also appointed as organizing committee and in July a training institute of the agrarian movement was established. Communist education was given to prospective leaders who would engage in the agrarian movement and step by step the program of organizing a farmers association was progressing. Although the members of the Nationalist Party were allowed at first to join the organizing by the younger leaders the farmers association, this was later monopolized by the Communist party and it seems as if the members of the National Party were shut out of the organization. However at this time...
the Communist Party did not sufficiently recognize the importance of the agrarian movement and devoted themselves to organizing labor. Therefore the agrarian movement had not born substantial results, as expected, notwithstanding their land propaganda.

Thus the members of the Communist Party controlled the general trend of the party and all the operations were planned by the Russian advisers, and carried out by the members of the Communist Party and such leaders as JANO Choo-ming and ILIO Chung-kai who supported them. Thereon the rightist members of the Nationalist Party who were not pleased with co-operating with the Communists and were only softened by the assumptive advice of SUN Yat-sen, namely CHANG Chi, HSIP Chi, TUNG Te-ju (Central Inspection commissioners) and their confederates finally showed the clear signs of their astuteness. For the purpose of maintaining the traditional principle of the party, in July they submitted to the Central Committee a bill for impeachment of the Communists. At the meeting CHANG Chi accused ILIO Chung-kai who had thrown the party into the state of disruption by protecting the Communist Party and had given the nationalists an excuse for identifying the members of the Nationalist Party with the members of the Communist Party, and had prevented party propaganda in all provinces and blocked the expansion of the party to spread. CHANG Chi read the impeachment bill at the meeting and producing evidence demanded explanations for the offences of the Communist Party which would
demolish the National Party. But the efforts of CHANG Chi and his comrades did not produce a successful outcome after all, because the attitude of SUN Yat-sen, which was of great importance, was for thoroughly cooperation with Russia. Prior to this toward the end of 1923, WANG Tzu-yen, WANG Wai-er-tsi, YI Su, TUNG Chia-yen and their comrades, extreme rightists of the National Party, flying in the face of SUN Yat-sen, declared their antagonizing opinion that they were absolutely against cooperation with the Communists and left Canton looking disdainfully at the First National Conference. Hereupon the right members including CHANG Chi and his comrades also came to show their attitude of anti-communism. The indications of internal discord appeared outwardly in such a short duration of time as six months after the agreement of cooperation with the Communist Party. However, they managed somehow to conceal this disgrace while SUN Yat-sen was living. Before the lapse of another year SUN Yat-sen died in Peiping in March 1925 and the internal discord of the party was brought out to light.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI Kornu, who occupy the post of the head of the section of correspondence, hereby certify that the document attached, written in Japanese, consisting of three pages and entitled "The History of the Chinese Communist Party (July 1932); The Internal Discord of National Party due to its Co-operation with the Communist Party" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 14th day of March, 1947

HAYASHI Kornu

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness:

at the same place,
on this same date

witness: URAF Katsura

(Seal)


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この時すでに縄張りの県を Tumblr できないうちである。この、その短縮に際し、

期間、市の暴動の形態にある略を挙げ、

農民協会の組織を期した。農民協会も市を犯す前月に、これに参加

する家が出来たのが名に行き、この方々市共産会の中央団体を以て定められ、

三民公文館闘争の形にあったのを農民同盟会が、

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を生き、市の戦争を受持する目を持って、

七月中央農民会闘争について、
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会会の議事は、会合の終了を告げる

会会の議事は、会合の終了を告げる
The news of the establishment of the Kuomintang Government delighted the Comintern very much. The help from the Comintern to the Chinese revolution had been very warm and enthusiastic but they did not seem to have expected the result to be so successful. The violent effort shown in the 5:30 incident in May of 1925 by the labourers in Shanghai now called the attention of the Comintern. The Comintern seemed to begin to think that their help would bring some good results. But as the Comintern was in the hands of Zinoviev whose idea was to carry out the revolution in the western countries first, they did not intend to take up a more positive attitude though they were moved a little by the activities of the Chinese labourers. After a little while Zinoviev fell from power and Stalin and Bukharin who held the idea of maintaining the status quo in the west and advancing eastward, took his place. The Comintern's policy toward China suddenly became very positive. In concert, the Chinese National revolution developed greatly and occupied the Chongqing region at last.
No. 1

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of head of the Archives Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the report hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled, "The History of the Chinese Communist Party" is an exact excerpt from a document in the custody of our Foreign Ministry.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 14th day of March 1947

/s/ AYASHI, FAORU
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: KATSUNI, Katsumaru  
(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Institute, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ WILLIAM E. CLARK (cc.1)

Tokyo, Japan

Date 21 April 1947
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

against

RAI, Suda et al

ST GIACOMONI (Franz, et al)


Having first duly sworn in out as on the attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I
hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is T.D. Senkichi. Although I have had several
occasions to meet the defendant DOMAIA, we two have never
had occasion to work together in the same place.
However, since May, 1933 when he came over to Chung-chi, Shan-
chuku, to stay there as Commandant of the 5th Force of the
Kwantung, army under my command, I came to be intimate with
him.

2. The conditions of Shanchuku in those days, were such that
the national defence was the primary concern of the state.
As it was the basic policy of the Kwantung army neither to
invade nor to tolerate to be invaded, so far as the Russo-
Manchukuo frontier, the concerned Commander DOHIHARA was acting according to this policy.

5. I, as a superior, found him to be a soldier of Bushido (TN: Japanese chivalry) not to be driven by reckless boldness, loving foes as well as friends, commanding but not ferocious not to be scrupulous about trifles always taking a wide view of the things.

In a word, DOHIHARA is a man of noble character and is absolutely trustworthy.

4. I had no occasion to talk with DOHIHARA concerning Chinese policy. On account of our different assignments. But I was told that he was an advocate of militarism and humanitarianism.

5. At the time of the Nomonhan Incident in the summer, 1939, he under my command was stationed at Tung-an, East Manchuria, as Commander of the 5th Force. As that area was an entirely different part of the country from the place of the Incident it was in fact impossible for him to have any connection with the Incident.

6. By the way, I will explain a little about the Army War Councillor.

I myself have an experience in serving as an Army War councillor. During my tenure of office from December 1938 to March 36, an Army War councillor was in reality a perfect sinecure for old soldiers in the Army. Therefore the Army
The Council was nothing but an organ without any authority only to receive reports concerning matters already decided by the higher authorities of the government.

On this 7th day of February, 1947.

No. 143, Oiso, Oismachi, Kan., Ve-Ken.

Deponent: JHD., Kenkichi (s.-1)

I, Kinjiro, J.D.C., hereby certify that the deponent has sworn and affixed his signature and seal in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date at the same place.

Witness: (signed) 07., Kinjiro

O.T.H.

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

JHD., Kenkichi (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 4 April 1947
上次ノ如ノ館式ヲ採用ス

対

徳本 貞夫 其他

吉

領

洋流ノ如何ク兩

亞米利加合衆国其他

村山居館

設所
私等が平和主義・人道主義の精神において何が重要であるかを明確にしました。この観点では、戦争は非人道的であり、人間を無視して行うことは許されません。私等はこの観点を念頭に置いて、平和を実現することを追い求めています。

なお、この問題は、私等が抱えており、特に重要な問題であると考えています。今後もこの問題について詳細を述べることで、皆さんが理解していただけることを願っています。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

AWAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Dependent: FAWABE, Torashiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached oath and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

I, FAWABE, Torashiro, was on duty from March, 1937 (the 12th year of Shōwa) to the end of February of the next year, as a section chief of the General Staff, taking charge of the affairs relative to tactics in the Central Military Supreme Command. During this term, I met with the outbreak of China Incident. I, therefore, desist on the problem concerning tactics of the Central Supreme Command, during the period from the time just prior to the outbreak of the China Incident to its early stages.

1. General survey by the Central Military Supreme Command of the world situation at the time just prior to the outbreak of the China Incident.
The Central Supreme Command, in order to draw up various plans of national defence and tactics, had to take, as a matter of course, a survey of the international situation of the time. In the spring of 1937 (the 12th year of Shôwa) when I took office as a section chief of the General Staff, the Central Supreme Command passed general judgment on the world situation of the time as roughly mentioned below.

"A. The European Powers are indicating their recovery at length from their exhaustion and debility from World War I. Especially, the vivid foreign policies of Germany and Italy have been creating various causes which might give rise to new situations in the world. Various Western nations of the whole world are divided into two opposing groups of great influence. Such circumstances foreshadow that the time will come when both groups must be brought into a large-scale clash ultimately."

"B. The Soviet Union has step by step increased her rational power by effecting the Industrial Five year Plan. She, at the same time, is making her stand clear, setting focus upon the international problem of interests rather than upon ideology or principles with which she has actively propagandized in the early period of foundation.

On the other hand, the military establishments in the eastern part of the Union have rapidly been strengthened of late and the parallel tracking of the Siberian Railway has been completed which has markedly increased its military value.
"C. Although such is the general situation of the Western Powers, any country would not be desirous of bringing about a great war and statesmen of the Powers will make great efforts to prevent a war.

Accordingly, no incident will probably occur in the immediate future, of such magnitude where the various Powers would be willing to stake their existence."

"D. In China, the real controlling power of the Nationalist Regime has grown more and more strong. They, however, refrain for the present as ever from making various sorts of direct anti-alien operations for restoring national rights. They have gradually come to realize the true intention of Japan on the Manchurian problem and have shown a tendency to bring about friendly relations with Japan, trying to make various agreements with Manchuria. Nevertheless, racial consciousness is inclined to become stronger among the intellectual people, students, etc.; anti-Japanese sentiment has gradually permeated students, soldiers, etc. and thus the anti-Japanese measures taken by the Chinese Communists are gaining ground."

11. Views of the Central Supreme Command of the time on national defence.

The Central Supreme Command, on the above judgment relative to the international situation, has the following view concerning the Japanese position in point of national defence:
"A. With a great international struggle which is sooner or later to be expected to break out among various Western nations, Japan has no moral or interested relations to be drawn into its vortex. Japan, therefore, ought to keep aloof from it."

"B. Steady progress of Manchukuo as well as friendly and co-existent relations among the three states of Japan, China and Manchukuo are what secure our national defence, maintaining the peace in the Orient. Either anti-Japanese sentiment or contemptuous feeling towards Japan on the part of China will naturally disappear if the Japanese will reflect on their attitude and be prudent; and if the national strength of Japan becomes replete. As a result, true friendship and mutual respect among the aforementioned three states shall come into existence, by which any of these states can assure the security of national defence."

"C. When we reflect upon the actual conditions of Japanese national strength from the standpoint of national defence, we acknowledge that her strength is extremely inferior in various sorts of material factors necessary for self-defence and self-existence as a modern state. So long as the status quo remains as is, it cannot be guaranteed that the purposes of both first and second items mentioned above will be achieved."
With such a view of national defense, the Central Supreme Command had established the following principle since about half a year before March, 1937, when I took office. Then I assumed my office, the chief of the First Division, a senior in office, fully explained the purpose of this principle, which was as follows:

"In order to insure the country's peace and security in point of national defense at this moment when the new situation of the world has begun to show a delicate world move, the Army should make special efforts to improve itself in quality and efficiency. The military forces stationed in foreign territories should be very cautious in everything and restrain themselves and endeavor not to commit any faults that they might not occasion any international trouble. The Central Supreme Command, in cooperation with the military administrative authorities, should help them, directly or indirectly, in carrying out various rational policies to promote our national power." This was at that time the principle and creed which all the personnel of the Central Supreme Command observed in unity.

3. The measures taken for the purpose of having the military forces understand completely the policy of the Central Supreme Command.

The aforementioned principle and policy were shown and explained by the Central Supreme Command's authorities at the Conference of the Divisional and Army Commander's which was held
in 'cy, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa). Moreover the Central Supreme Command, on consulting with the War Ministry, sent Lt. Col. Oka Yoko, a competent officer, of the War Ministry to North China about June, 1937, for making an investigation of actual conditions of the Japanese forces in China which were in close contact with the Chinese forces in North China which seemed to be especially agitated with anti-Japanese sentiment, and, at the same time, to have the Japanese forces understand completely the purpose of the Central Supreme Command.

According to his report made on his return after having investigated thoroughly the conditions of the Japanese forces there, the principle of the Central Supreme Command was thoroughly understood by the Headquarters in China and every unit under its direct command, and we did not need to worry about the matter so far as the Japanese forces were concerned.

4. The program for operations in China at the time prior to the Chiao Incident.

Japan, who had special relations with China, was often compelled to make a temporary despatch of forces on a small scale to China.

Accordingly, in the program for tactics in China for the year of 1937 (the 12th year of Showa), there was what corresponded to the case of calling for the sending of a part of the forces in order to secure our interests and to protect residents there.
But it was never intended to use military forces on a large scale in China, much less to work out an overall operation plan over the broader range of the whole Chinese territory.

Only a plan was drawn out, for the time being, concerning the estimated number of despatched forces, the name of the home division which shall take charge of despatching the forces, the measure for transporting the forces, the points of embarkation, etc., in case of need of sending forces for the purpose of protecting our interests and residents at every locality such as Tietsin-Fering Province, Tsintao, Shanghai, Shator, Amoi, etc., which were closely connected with our country.
The duty of the Japanese garrison in China, equal to that of the Military Forces of the Views according to the Treaty of the Boxer's Rebellion in 1900 (the 8 year of Meiji), was in "guarding the legation quarters, retarding the communication line from Peking to the Sea port and protecting the residents." And the strength of the garrison in 1907 numbered as at 1,216 in all. All troops stationed in foreign territory, this garrison had a special character as follows:

It was absolutely a unit for guarding in a place, which had no military supplies and was hardly provided with armaments and equipment for military operation.

It was not authorized to draw up a plan for military operation of itself in consideration of war.

Notwithstanding the fact that it was a unit for guarding, stationed in Chinese territory, it was prohibited by the special order of the Central Supreme General to do training with the Chinese army as its object.

6. The attitude of the Central Military Supreme General at the time the Lu-hsien-chiao Incident broke out.

The first report, relating to the Lu-hsien-chiao Incident, which
broke out on the night of July 7th, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa), was received by the Central Supreme Command on the morning of July 8th, and I was notified as soon as I came to the office. The Central Supreme Command, on the whole, was calm, while I was thinking about it as an unpleasant event brought about by the Chinese, I did not take it as a grave matter; for there had so often been such similar trouble in the past that I simply considered that the matter would, as usual be settled soon by mutual negotiation between the authorities of the Japanese and Chinese forces there.

At the Central Supreme Command, we, the responsible persons, without holding any conferences in particular to deliberate on countermeasures for it, kept ourselves in touch with one another on the case as we were accustomed to for ordinary business. All concerned concurred in the opinion that we, in accordance with the aforementioned Central Supreme Command's policy and without any objections among ourselves, would prevent the incident from becoming enlarged, and to have the authorities at the spot settle the matter as soon as possible.

But the report which arrived on the 3th from the armed forces on the spot showed that the Chinese attitude was not necessarily so compromising that it would immediately put an end to the tense situation. Therefore, at about 6:30 p.m. on the same day, the Chief of General Staff gave, before anything else, a telegraphic order saying, "In order to prevent enlargement of the incident, you shall take more positive steps to avoid using military force and required prudence of the
On the following day, the central command's instructions which were necessary for negotiations between both the Japanese and the Chinese forces at the spot to settle the incident was given by telegram to the Commander of the Garrison in China by the Vice Chief of the General Staff—namely, "For the settlement of the Lankowchiao Bridge Incident, refrain from concerning yourselves in any political problem on this occasion and propose, in the main, the following requests to arrange for having the Hopei-Chihli authorities approve and execute them in the shortest time:
(1) Suspension of the stationing of Chinese forces near the Lukouchiao bridge on the left bank of the Yungti River.

(2) Security necessary for the future

(3) Punishment of those directly responsible for the Incident

(4) Apology

VI. Arrangements made by the Central Command in conformity with the change of situation following that of the preceding paragraph.

1. Informed by the report of our forces at the spot of the situation in which uncontrolled defiant actions were committed intermittently by the Chinese, (T.N. Hisenteki is a mistranscription of Chosenteki) up to the morning of July 10th, the Central Command considered it necessary to reinforce to the Garrison in China, and on the evening of the 10th it unofficially decided to reinforce it with two brigades from the Kwangtung Army, with one division from Korea, and with three divisions and other units from Japan proper, and preparation lasted until the following 11th. But on the evening of the 11th, as the Garrison in China reported that the Chinese forces approved all our demands which had been under negotiation since yesterday, the Central Command determined immediately to stop the plan of mobilization of the divisions in Japan proper. Whereas the report of our attache to the Embassy at Nanking reported that the Chinese Central Command ordered the calling of air units and the concentration of four divisions in the northern provincial border regions of Honan Province. The Central Command then could not take an optimistic view regarding the situation in North China and was not confident of the Chinese forces in North China in carrying out their duties based on the conditions.
Therefore it was decided that only the above-mentioned forces from Korea and Manchuria preparing for expedition should take action as already arranged until the execution of the order was confirmed, and this order was issued at about 6:30 on the evening of the 11th.

2. Since then, while observing the situation, the central Command came to know various things from reports from various quarters up to the evening of July 15th, the outline of which were as follows:

1) In North China, the Chinese forces have been not only making such preparations for war as building positions, transporting forces, etc., but also had fired on our forces the were passing in the suburbs south of Liaoning today.

2) The Chinese Central Command ordered armed forces in every province north of the Yangtze river to mobilize and to concentrate in regions along both the Lung-Hai and the Peiping-Hankow Railways.

Facing the situation as mentioned above, the central Command decided on the policy for dealing with these matters concerning the incident at 6 P.M. on the 13th. It was as follows:

1) Our Army will adhere closely to the policy of non-enlargement of the situation or to settle locally and to make the utmost effort to avoid such actions that will lead to a full-scale war. Therefore, our Army will approve the conditions for settlement prepared by the representative of the 29th Army and signed at 8 P.M. on the 13th and watch for the fulfillment of these conditions. Thus the mobilization of armed forces in Japan proper will be subject to a change of situation for the time being.

2) However, in case the Chinese forces ignore the conditions for
settlement referred to in the preceding item and not fulfill them with
sincerity, or if theanking Government attempts to attack our forces
by having the Central Army move northward without any due reason,
our Army will take decisive measures. In such a case, however, the
Garrison in China will receive approval of the Central Command first.

The above-mentioned policy for dealing with matters concerning the
Incident was communicated to the Garrison in China.

(c) Thus, in the further observation of the changes of the situation
the Central Supreme Command learned by the evening of July 16th the fol-
lowing facts from reports from various quarters.

(1) The Chinese Army in North China has been actively making
preparation for a war since then and her soldiers have fired on Japanese
soldiers on the 14th and on this day, the 16th.

(2) The Chinese Central Supreme Command ordered out the air-forces
stationed at Kuantung on the 14th.

(3) On July 15th, the Chinese military strength concentrated in an
area stretching to the north of the Lung-Hai railway and to the east
of the border of the Shensi Province was estimated at approximately thirty
divisions including her peace-time units.

(4) Some units of the Chinese Central Army marched into Hopei Province

Under these circumstances, considering the possible danger that
we might be hampered by this intentional dragging-out policy of the Chinese
authorities and miss the chance of mobilization and dispatch of troops,
our Central Supreme Command decided upon a settlement measure to the follow-
ing effect and instructed our Garrison in China.
D.S. Doc. No. 971

"The Garrison should have Sung Che-yuan affix another signature upon the settlement terms which were signed on July 10th and each term should be shown him concretely (the apology must be made by Sung Che-yuan himself, the punishment of the responsible persons must go as far as the Commander of the 37th Division and the units to withdraw shall be specified) and the fulfilment of these terms must be made by July 16th. In case the Chinese authorities neglect to fulfil our demands, the Garrison shall chastise the Twenty-ninth Army. As the Japanese Government holds to the last the intention to limit the scope of trouble to North China and expects a local settlement, she demands the Nanking Government to draw back the Central Army to the old condition, stop defiant activities towards Japan and not to interfere with the local settlement."

In line with the settlement measures decided in such a way, our Garrison in China has been negotiating with the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army, in North China since the following 17th day, and our diplomatic officials with the Chinese Central Government at Nanking also while the Central Supreme Command proceeded again with preparations for the mobilization of the divisions in Japan Proper which was stopped on July 11th.

(d) On July 18th our Central Supreme Command had a report from the Garrison in China that General Sung Che-yuan of China came to Tientsin to see Lieutenant-General NUKUI, the Commander of our Garrison in China, and expressed his regret. Yet according to the information which came from the Foreign office on the following day, the 19th, the Nanking Government showed no sincerity in its reply. Such being the case, the Central Supreme Command considered that it was unavoidable to chastise the Twenty-ninth Army, for, despite the apology made by Sung Che-yuan in North China, not only had the fulfilment of other terms...
become quite doubtful judging from the Chinese way of doing things shown for more than ten days up to that time, but also the Chinese Central Government had not changed their above-mentioned attitude. So we pushed forward again on the preparation for mobilization orders to the divisions in Japan proper. But on July 21st we learned from a report from the garrison in China that the Chinese authorities had punished her responsible persons, and her units began to transfer. Thereupon we decided to cut off the mobilization orders again.

Thus while expecting the situation at the seat to improve, the Central Supreme Command got reports of the Longfong Incident on July 25th and those of the Joining Kuanganan Gate Incident on the following day of the 26th. On the 27th, the Commander of the Garrison in China reported to us that, having exhausted every means for peaceful settlement, he was determined to start using force for chastising the Twenty-Ninth army on the 29th, and at the same time requested the Central Supreme Command to approve the operation. So the Central Supreme Command gave approval to his plan, but stimulated that the Garrison not carry out operations across the Yunfeting River.

As the situation changed, as has been mentioned above, during the twenty days following the night of July 7th, the Central Supreme Command on July 27th took measures to issue orders for the mobilization of the 5th, 6th and 10th Division, and other required troops. In order to meet the present situation, moreover, the
Central Supreme Command on July 27th formulated its own first outline of program of operations in China to the following effect:

For the purpose of security and stability in Peiing and Tientsin province, about four divisions are to be moved, and their operation areas are roughly restricted to the north of a line between Peoting and Chuolinchon. In preparation for cases where unavoidable circumstances may make it necessary to protect the residents in Peintuo and Shanghai, one division is to be reserved for each city.

and then the Central Supreme Command, after generalizing all reports, estimated the Chinese strength in the North of the Lungenhai Railway (except Shansi province) to amount to approximately 340,000 by the end of July. On the other hand, all the strength sent to Northern China from Japan Proper was expected to concentrate at the front about the end of August, amounting in the aggregate to less than 100,000.

The Japanese operation-progresses during the first eight months of the China Incident.

Having passed through a process of circumstances mentioned in the preceding articles, the Japanese and Chinese came at last to exchange fire with each other in Peiing and Tientsin provinces. After that, the situation gradually became more serious on an unexpectedly enlarging scale. By the end of February in 1938 (the 13th of Shaw) when I resigned my post in the General Staff, hostilities came to extend throughout the whole area of Northern China and in the vicinities of Shanghai and Hankow.
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I do not mention the reason why hostilities extended to these areas and what measures the Central Supreme Command took concerning its extension during the above-mentioned period. Through the various operations progresses during the first eight months of this Incident, however, I can positively say that the Japanese Army's tactics were not carried out on a strategically thorough and systematic program.

On August 30th, a Japanese naval officer was shot down in Shanghai, which led to fighting there between the Japanese and Chinese armies. On account of the hard fighting on the part of our Army, our Settlements nearly got into danger. So, under the necessity of promptly relieving them, two divisions in Japan Proper were prepared for mobilization on the 10th of the same month. On the next day, except for one, the Chinese Central Supreme Command issued orders for the mobilization of all the armies, making ready for an overall war. On the other hand, the Japanese Central Supreme Command had not yet thought of such a thing as an overall war. With the Chinese Central Army in Northern China reinforced, our military strength became inadequate; and so the sending of those two divisions was decided on August 31st.

As can be seen above, the Japanese Central Supreme Command sent their minimum strength for the purpose of coping with the danger of the situation in each field. Not only was this so, but also for the want of munitions which should have been provided for a possible outbreak of a great war, or wanted the Central
Dif. Sec. No. 971

Supreme Command fiercely manipulating troops and made our military commanders at the front yet into great difficulties, too. From the middle of September in 1937 (the 12th of Shota), for example, our army under command of General M. CSSI in the vicinity of Shanghai had to fight, limiting the number of shells to be used daily by each gun to only ten rounds a day.

In fear of a case where, contrary to our own unalloyed principle, fighting might enlarge to an unexpected extent, at the beginning of August I submitted to the War Ministry a proposal that the mobilization of munitions required for approximately 15 divisions to fight about half a year should be carried out. However, the leaders at the War Ministry, especially Lieutenant General UMIKU, Yoshijiro, the Minister of War, maintained the non-enlargement principle so firmly that, they regarded the above figures as excessive and interpreting the possible issue of mobilization order of these munitions as being a further step to a national war, did not give prompt consent to the proposal.
Thus the above-mentioned plan of the China operation set by the Central Supreme Command on July 29th, 1937 (the 12th year of Shinh) was soon frustrated, and met up with the large scale and far-reaching Chinese resistance. For some time, we took provisional measures to reinforce soldiers in each phase of the war and obtained tactical victories to secure the front-lines. It is a plain fact that the Central Supreme Command, hoped to stop the overall hostilities every time a single operation on one field was brought to an end, and prepared in secret such a plan. Such was the case at the end of the military operation in Tientsin districts, at the time the Chinese forces were swept away near FAM TING at the end of the Shanghai military operation, and at the end of the Hankang military operation. Especially, was this so when general peace activity was made by the offices of the German Ambassador in China, before and after the Hankang military operation, and we thoroughly cooperated with the government but unfortunately failed in attaining our object.

(8) The opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the fundamental policy of dealing with the affair.

As stated in the above items, the Central Supreme Command, hoping to localize the incident and to solve it immediately in the local area, was making a study on a general stoppage of resorting to arms and the final dealing with the affair at the end of every operation, and the opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the fundamental policy of settling the affair was in perfect unison with the opinion expressed by the government since the beginning of the incident. Especially the
principle called "Kōdō's Three principle" which stressed morality accorded completely with that which the Central Supreme Command delivered to the government as its opinion, before it was made public.

(9) The opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the problem of the international agreements and the international laws. The motive for the China incident lies only in Japan's exercising its right of self-defence in the local areas after the negotiation between the commanders of the Japanese and Chinese forces of between the authorities of both states in banking for twenty long days, we realized that China had no sincerity in a peaceful solution and we finally resorted to arms. So, as stated above, had no intention in the fundamental policy of dealing with the incident and in the actual process of military operations to injure Chinese sovereignty and the territorial or administrative security therefore we were convinced that our activity did not violate and hurt existing international agreements and our opinion was in accord with what the government often stated to the world on necessary occasions. The Central Supreme Command often called attention to the higher commanders in the front to esteem the interests of the third States, and not to violate the safety of the peoples of third States. I do not remember the exact year and date when I gave such notices. But such notices, as far as my memory runs, were delivered sometimes by wire or sometimes by important figures who were sent from the Central Supreme Command to the front for liaison.

In cases where there were damages to the third States, or the peoples of the third States, the Central Supreme Command was ready to make fair investigation on the damages and to make necessary Compensation for
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them. From the above-mentioned standpoint the 2nd division in the
General Staff Office chiefly cooperated with the Air Ministry in in-
vestigating such matters. The greatest of the accidents of such
kind which took place while I held my post as chief was the bombard-
ment of the "Lady Bird." According to my investigation at that time,
the ship was bombarded under the orders made by Lieutenant General
Y. NAGAI, Army Commander, and Colonel HIKAKU, Infantry, the
intermediate Commander, was not responsible for this accident.
I remember that I strongly insisted upon my opinion at the meeting
where the loaders concerned were assembled to solve the problem.
Concerning the accident itself, I remember, too, that we soon
reached a settlement with Britain.
The opinion of the Central Supreme Command regarding previous notice of armament and regarding declaration of war.

Relating to the Lushouchiao Incident that occurred on July 7, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) the Japanese Government issued on the 11th of the same month following statement:

"In regard to sending the Army to the North China, the Japanese Government has decided that necessary measure must be taken."

On the same date, at 6:30 P.M., the Central Supreme Command issued an order of sending a part of the Japanese troops in Korea and Manchuria to North China.

After August 9, 1937, the situation in Shanghai became so imminent that Japan was compelled to appeal to arms. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government issued on August 8 a statement saying, "Japan has now been forced to take resolute measures against China with a view of demanding reconsideration on the part of the Nanking Government."

On August 23, the head of the Japanese troops landed near Shanghai.

Earlier in the Incident, the Japanese forces stationed in China had frequently notices and negotiated with the Chinese Authorities, but at last it became evident that there was no
promise for a peaceful solution. Then, the commander of the forces, on the 27th of July, sent an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities and at the same time made a statement.

On and from July 28 the Army initiated an offensive movement.

In the beginning of the Incident, as I mentioned above, the Central Supreme Command, in case it recognized the necessity of using force, put it into effect after a statement of the Government was issued. The Commander of the Army in North China initiated an offensive movement after a day's notice and after issuing a statement.

The subsequent situation gradually took an unexpected development and the war situation became unexpectedly serious, so the Central Supreme Command discussed the problem whether Japan should declare war against China or not.

So far as I knew at the time of my resignation, the Central Supreme Command realized the characteristics of the Incident as follows:

I. The Incident was started on the part of Japan as a defensive move for what was only a local problem. Thereafter, Japan against her wish had to increase her forces in each zone of fighting as a temporary expedient. Japan had no intention to wage a war against China. If only the offensive maneuvers on the part of China would be brought to an end, the Japanese army would immediately cease taking the offensive.
II. Japan does not consider China as a whole, that is, the whole Chinese people as an enemy.

III. Japan has primarily no politics-strategic intention against China. What Japan desires is nothing more but to cease the armed conflict at once, which is rather a collision of feelings between the two nations; to conclude Friendly Relations between Neighbouring States," "Mutual Respect of the Sovereignty and Territory", and "Economic Cooperation," all of which are the outcome of natural and essential conditions of their States.

IV To sum up the above four points, to declare war against China is not only to misrepresent Japan's real intention but to be against morality.

V So long as the two states are to a wider extent in a state of war, without declaration of war, Japan can not freely exercise rights based on the International Laws of War, which results in our inconvenience and disadvantage. Japan, however, being influenced by the actual interests, must not lose sight of the substance of the Incident and her basic principles of morality.
VI With declaration of war against China, Japan may be able to justify casualties and the other losses on the part of China. If Japan, however, takes such a measure, she would come to adhere formally and distort the substance of the Incident, and after all to strengthen violence.

This goes against Japan's intention.

From the above mentioned points, the opinion of the Central Supreme Command was that Japan ought not to declare war against China.

On this 28 day of March, 1947
At Tokyo

DEPORTANT Tetsukiiro KATAK (Seal)

I, KANNO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At The same place

Witness: (signed) Junkichi KANNO (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the
whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Terashiro KAYABE (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch,
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the
above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning
of the original document.

/\ Arthur A. Misaki
Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947

- 26 -
カルモノ頃ニ定めタル解決ノ目途トヨニ至ツタ時、同軍司令官ハ七月ニ
ニ十七日最後ノ通告ヲ支那側ニ致シ、同時ニ密ヲ夏収シ七月ニ
十八日カラ攻撃行動ヲ開始シマシク、
以上ノ如ク支那ノ著性、中央統帥部ヲ用侯ノ著昭テハガデツテ
トヨメル場合ニハ政府ノ明ツテ待ツテガラ命令ヲ行シ、北支軍司令
官ハ其ノ攻撃行動ヲ開始セムルナリ、同軍司令官ハ通告ヲ夏収シ、
ナラニ特ノ注意ヲ附セラリ。
人生に得られる最大の宝物は何ですか？
VARA とエコール・ドゥ・ボン対立

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VARA とエコール・ドゥ・ボン対立
中国工农红军革命军事委员会

一九三五年八月一日 中共中央政治局在陕北洛川附近召开的会议上通过的关于目前形势和党的任务的决定

--

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中国工农红军革命军事委员会
安政元年（1854年）に、日本軍が遼東半島に上陸。これにより、日本は遼東半島に居住権を取得し、以後、遼東半島の施政権を握るようになった。明治時代に入ると、遼東半島は日本に対する開国政策の一環として、日本国に帰属されることが決定された。これにより、遼東半島は日本国にとって重要な戦略的重要地方となり、以後、日本が遼東半島の施政権を握るようになることになる。
神聖な革命ノクミハハバラスノ中国ソビエト政府ト共産黨ハモー度宜言スルニ

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時停止シ何レノ部隊こそ問ヲ成スナル度宜言スルニ

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反戦ガリバー外カッハ列雄ノ英魂スル日本寄尚

親衛ニ必死ニ打チテテテララ五信ヨリ

領土保全ノタメニヘ

人権自由ノタメニヘ！

大中華民族抗日救国当局万歳！
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>項目</th>
<th>項目内容</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>日本政府</td>
<td>政府部長</td>
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<tr>
<td>中国地域</td>
<td>主要部長</td>
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日本政府

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- 政策部長
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- 政策部長

中国地域

- 政府部長
- 主要部長
- 政策部長
- 主要部長
- 政策部長
表1．日本の国産玄米栽培面積と収穫量の推移（1960年～2020年）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年度</th>
<th>栽培面積（ha）</th>
<th>収穫量（t）</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,234,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>1,098,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>987,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>876,543</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>765,432</td>
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<td>345,210</td>
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<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>171,090</td>
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</table>
この図は、日本の古文を示しています。特に、日本語の文法や書式に精通していると良いでしょう。
二〇、中共中央北平政府とビキリノ／ソウル通電（1937年1月）

国民政府、国民政府代表者、西安張無頓、楊虎城、
王瑞芳、孫波先生並びに抗日軍民西北臨時事務委員
会議先生馬錫六

西安抗日軍領出後、全団運動を
南呂ノ安

ハノノ歩綱各関係若者等公ノ
ハノノ歩綱各関係若者等

ハノノ歩綱各関係若者等

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ハノノ歩綱各関係若者等
4B
全国人民が長年の努力を経て、参加者を含め多くの人々に感謝の意を申し上げます。

中国が世界に示す力は、中国の独立と長年の努力が結晶として現れたものであり、これは世界の栄光と尊敬をもたらすものです。
日本帝国は、ソ連・アメリカ・中華民国に信頼を示す。

中央軍の戦力は、ソ連・アメリカ・中華民国に信頼を示す。

中央軍の戦力は、ソ連・アメリカ・中華民国に信頼を示す。

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中央軍の戦力は、ソ連・アメリカ・中華民国に信頼を示す。
中華人民共和國

主席江澤民

國務院总理李鵬

國務院副总理兼外交部部长

外交部部长

美國国务院

貿易政策

中華人民共和國

信頼・同盟国家

共産主義中国

友誼・合作关系

日本

财政部

緊急事態宣言

對外貿易

財政部

緊急事態宣言

對外貿易
二六、
中共中央ノ目標トハノ任務ニヨルル

八、
共産黨長ノ指導スル＝ノ政策ノ部分ニシテハ

抗戦ノ最大トナシテ裨大ナル力ヲ以テ抗戦ノ
群衆運動ヲ発展シシメベナラス。一刻ノ時間モ急
ラズ＝一箇ノ指導ノ群衆組織ヲ強しテ抗戦ノ
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民族統一戦線ニ加入セシメルナルヲ抗戦ヲ
利ハ何等疑フ餘地ハナイノデアル。
Certificate

I hereby certify that the book entitled "The History of the People's United Anti-Japanese Front Movement", written in Japanese, consisting of 414 pages and published by the Investigation Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company, was obtained in Tokyo and has been kept by myself.

On this 10th day of March, 1947
At Tokyo
SAITO, Yoshie (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place
On the same date

Witness: INABE, Yasutaro (seal)
On April 26, 1932, the Provisional Government of the Soviet China announced its first declaration of war against Japan and also its declaration to the people. The full texts were as follows:

Text of Declaration of War Against Japan by the Provisional Government of Soviet China

Since Japanese imperialism forcibly took with armed force the three Eastern Provinces on September 18, 1931, it has further occupied Shanghai and other areas with its army and navy; it has stormed into towns and cities along the China Sea and the Yangtse River; it has massacred the Chinese people with airplanes and guns; it has burned down Chinese houses. Untold damage has been done in the North-east regions, Shanghai and Woosung. Massacres have been many and ever now are going on. The anti-imperialist National Government together with the various military cliques associated with it have offered the three Eastern Provinces and Shanghai to Japanese imperialism, in accordance with its habitual practice of submitting to imperialism, and is abandoning the Chinese people to be massacred at will. At present it is engaged through peace negotiations to sell China wholesale and is facilitating the speedy imperialistic division of China. Every means is being taken by it to suppress the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialistic movements throughout the country. It is liquidating all anti-Japanese organizations, suppressing anti-Japanese strikes, massacring people who are anti-Japan, forcing soldiers and volunteers fighting actively on the Shanghai front against Japan to withdraw. It has shot the brave soldiers of the 19th Route Army with machine guns for their refusal to withdraw.

By such means the National Government is manifesting its loyalty to imperialism. Such slogans as the so-called "Long-term resistance" and "Negotiations on the one hand, resistance on the other" used by the Kuomintang Government and their military cliques are nothing more than trickery to delude the people. The Soviet areas in China are now entirely free from the restraints of imperialism. On the other hand, however, the Kuomintang military cliques, daring to offer the three Eastern Provinces, Shanghai and all of China to imperialism, are constantly attacking with their maximum military force the Workers-Peasant Red Army which is truly endeavoring to carry out the people's revolution, thus planning to overthrow the Soviet regime. All the deception of the Kuomintang military cliques, all their plots to sell out China and all acts of outrage against the Chinese people are all actually imperialism's tool to suppress the Chinese revolution and obstacles to the development of the people's revolution. The Provisional Central Government of the Republic of Soviet China hereby declares war against Japan. Heading all the Workers-Peasant Armies of China and the many oppressed people, it will by means of the people's revolutionary war, expel Japanese imperialism from China and oppose imperialism's territorial division of China. It demands the thorough emancipation and independence of the Chinese people.
To all the workers, peasants, soldiers and all the oppressed masses, the Provisional Central Republican Government declares that they shall immediately carry out the people's war of revolution, immediately fight against Japanese imperialism and first of all tear down the reactionary administration of the Kuomintang which suppresses popular revolutionary movements and obstructs the people's war of revolution.
On April 15, 1933, the Central Provisional Government of Soviet China and the Revolutionary and Military Committee of the Red Army announced a declaration of anti-Japanese collaboration under joint signature. They especially presented three conditions for a compromise to the National Government.

These were (a) immediate suspension of attacks against the Soviet areas and the Red Army; (b) immediate granting to the people of the democratic freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association and demonstration; (c) granting of freedom to organize and arm an anti-Japanese volunteer army. The full text of the declaration is as follows:

The Declaration of Anti-Japanese Collaboration by the Government of Soviet China (April 15, 1933)

People of all China! On the occasion of May Day, we pay revolutionary homage to all the working masses of China, to the workers, farmers and people of the cities who are under the bloody administration of the imperialistic nationalists, to the White Army soldiers who have been forced to oppose the workers and farmers, to the revolutionary students and youths who are taking part in the struggle against imperialism and to the revolutionary prisoners who have been locked up and tortured in hundreds and thousands of Kuomintang prisons.

The continuing attacks of Japanese imperialism, the unprecedented enlargement of the crisis of territorial division and the intensification of danger to the masses have made it imperative for us to issue the following declaration to the people fighting for the benefit of China and to the working masses:

The features of the present situation is characterized on the one hand by the fact that Japanese imperialism has invaded the Peiping-Tientsin area with big strides with nothing to stop it, and on the other hand, by the fact that British imperialism is making an attack upon Sinkiang Province and is carrying on the occupation of the western regions of China, through the intermediation of Tibet and other puppet states already under the control of the British Empire.

By secret negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Kuomintang Party, Chiang-kei-Shek has started dealings with the imperialistic burglars. Tang Yu-Jen, secretary of the Central Political Council of the Party, as a representative of the Hankook Government and Chiang-kei-Shek, has had a secret talk with the Japanese representatives at Shanghai. Chiang-kei-Shek, the leader of Chinese laborers and farmers, requested of the Japanese militarists in 1929 the occupation of Shantung. In 1931, he committed the wholesale massacre of inoffensive people of Shanghai, abandoned the northern front and further gave the Japanese a good chance to invade Jehol. Not only did they not fight against Japanese imperialism, but they continued the work of their traitorous colleague, Chiang Hsueh-liang. The south-western...
government and the Fukien military cliques also did not oppose Japan and its imperialism. The slogan, "northward Resistance Against Japan", which they have recently been propagandizing with might and main is nothing more than a fairy tale to deceive the people. They are primarily absorbed in the enlargement of their sphere of influence and are challenging the Soviet Union and the Chinese Red Army.

The traitorous rascals, Chiang-kai-Shek and Weng Ching-wei, noting the recent great victory of the Red Army and the unrest and indignation among the front line soldiers, have again hung up such militaristic propaganda slogans as "To purge the Reds is to resist Japan", "Before the purge, no anti-Japanese movement", etc., and are endeavoring to prevent the soldiers and the masses from turning to revolutionary action. However, such deception and threats can never be successful. On the contrary, it would rather serve to expose their own sins and shortcomings.

In the face of the recent situation and the inevitability of our future victory, we must repeat our old proposition made last January and blow away the lamentations of the Kuomintang which says, "the Red army as well as the workers and farmers in the Soviet area obstruct the effectiveness of the resistance against Japanese imperialism." In the light of this proposition, we recognize the need to resist Japan and all imperialistic aggression. By so repeating, we shall be proclaiming and disseminating our proposition again to the whole nation. Under the conditions as stated below, the Chinese Red Army is prepared to enter into an operational agreement with any armed force and to resist the invasion of Japanese imperialism.

A. The instant suspension of attacks upon Soviet areas.

B. The immediate protection of the Democratic Rights of the People (Freedom of assembly, association, speech, publication and demonstration and the emancipation of political criminals)

C. To wrest back China's independence, unity and territorial integrity and thereby protect and preserve China by immediately arming the people and creating armed volunteer corps.
On July 15, 1934, the Chinese Red Army issued the following "Proclamation of anti-Japanese resistance in the Northern Territory", which was intended to turn the internal conflict into a foreign war.

"The Proclamation of anti-Japanese resistance in the Northern territory of the Chinese Workers and Farmers' Red Army" (July 15, 1934)

Workers, farmers, soldiers and the revolutionary masses of all China! Malignant Japanese imperialism has swallowed our three Eastern provinces, invaded Jehol and Inner Mongolia and has just plundered the whole of North China. Also in South-China, their land, naval and air forces have deliberately planned the occupation of Fukien province. They are about to make China a colony of Japanese imperialism, its people a ruined nation and thus submit then eternally to massacre, rape, pillage and outrage by Japanese bandits. The Kuomintang military cliques, including Chiang-kai-Shek and Cheng Hsueh-Ling, when confronted with Japan's imperialistic invasion, have sold out the Eastern Provinces of Jehol and Inner Mongolia, persistently following the policy of surrender and selling their own country. They have recognized "Menchuko" by entering into a communication and transportation agreement directly with "Manchuko". They also have sold out all of North China and Fukien Province. Furthermore, they have shot Japanese imperialism and suppressed anti-Japanese popular movements of the Chinese masses. They have suppressed guerrilla warfares of the anti-Japanese volunteer army as well as boycotts of the Japanese goods. They recruited more than one million troops from the country under the pretext of "shortage of manpower in the resistance against Japan" and wasted 10,000,000 yuan to collect every available gun and airplane, with which to carry on the encirclement and extermination of the Soviet government and the Red Army of Workers and Farmers, the only organizations in the whole country which aim at resisting Japan and imperialism. All these facts tend to show that the Kuomintang's military cliques are the most faithful watch dogs of Japanese imperialism as well as spies and traitors without any precedents in China's history. The Red army of the government of Soviet China stressed time and again the need of arming the people of China and of the war for national revolution in order to cope with the incessant aggression of Japanese imperialism.

The Red Army of Workers and Farmers also made known to the public its declaration of war against Japan and issued an emergency mobilization order to mobilize the whole population within the Soviet district as a means of preparing directly for a war against Japanese imperialism. The Soviet government and the Red Army of Workers and Farmers further issued a proclamation demanding: (1) cessation of the attack against the Red Army and the Soviet area; (2) Fundamental democratic rights of the people; i.e., freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, strike and demonstration; (3) rapid arming and equipping of the people and establishment of the anti-Japanese volunteer "mob" Army which would be willing to enter into combat agreements with any armed forces in China subject to the three conditions necessary for the security of China. They opposed the Tangku agreement, the direct
negotiations between Japan and China, the recognition of Lanchukuo, a puppet country of Japan, as well as the selling out of China by the Kuomintang party. The publicly assisted all the anti-imperialist revolutionary movements in all China, including that of the North-Eastern Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, and opposed all the restrictions on the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist movements imposed by the imperialistic Kuomintang Party.

Whereas it is time to engage a decisive battle with the powerful Kuomintang army, the Soviet government and the Red Army, overcoming myriad difficulties and with a great resolve, despatched anti-Japanese vanguards to the North to let them fight against Japan. Our main force will follow our vanguards and will cooperate with whatever troops that may accept the three conditions we have set up in the fight against Japan.

All people of China! The vanguards for the anti-Japanese resistance in the northern territory of the Red Army of the Workers and Farmers must gladly cooperate with all people and armies of China in fighting against Japan, wage war for a national revolution and bring about the downfall of Japanese imperialism. All those who oppose Japan should assist our vanguards for the anti-Japanese resistance in the northern territory, unite around them and arm themselves by joining our vanguards in order to wage a decisive battle against the imperialistic Japanese bandits. All people who resist Japan are equally our partners. Let them unite! All those who prohibit and oppress the anti-Japanese activities of individual citizens, organizations and troops are wicked traitors who, therefore, should be overthrown by our united efforts. Only through an armed national revolutionary war shall we be able to defeat Japan and its imperialism and achieve the independence and emancipation of the Chinese race and secure the integrity of the Chinese territory.

The Soviet Government and the Red Army of the Workers and Farmers further proclaim their determination to win the victory in the revolutionary war in a concrete form.

1. We definitely oppose the National Government's selling out of the Eastern three provinces, Jehol, Inner Mongolia, North China, and Fukien province, Sino-Japanese direct negotiations and the recognition of Manchukuo. We must abandon the delusion of expecting aid from the League of Nations, which is nothing but a group of imperialistic burglars and from the United States.

2. We should immediately declare the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan, abrogate the Tangku agreement and all the Sino-Japanese secret treaties, mobilize the land, sea, and air forces of all China to carry out a war against Japan, demand the immediate suspension of the attacks against and blockade of the Soviet district and let the Red Army of the Workers and Farmers prosecute freely a direct war against Japanese imperialism.

3. All people of China should be called together and armed with all the equipment in the Nationalist armory and arsenal as well as see that arms that have been imported are formed into a popular volunteer anti-Japanese army as well as
guerrilla units and made to participate in the anti-Japanese war and in guerrilla warfare and aid the northern anti-Japanese vanguards of the north eastern volunteer army and the Chinese Peasant's Red Army.

4. All enterprises and property of the Japanese imperialists and traitors will be confiscated. The payment of national debts both principal and interests shall be discontinued. Progressives taxes shall be levied and all war funds of the Kuomintang party shall be appropriated for the anti-Japanese war fund.

5. Anti-Japanese societies, anti-Japanese boycott committees, committees for collecting funds for the aid of the volunteer army and the Red Army and various civil anti-Japanese organizations such as anti-Japanese scout units, the traffic destruction units, propaganda units, and transport units shall be organized throughout the country. General masses, including all people irrespective of sex, age, religion or political belief, shall be absorbed into the anti-Japanese organizations and shall oppose the aggression of Japanese imperialism and the treason and capitulation of the Kuomintang government by means of strikes and demonstrations.

The Soviet government and the Red Army of the Workers and Farmers will fight for the foregoing platform notwithstanding any sacrifices. They demand that all the people make utmost efforts for the full realization of this platform. Let the Kuomintang Party, the watch-dog of imperialism and its followers say that "China has not the power to resist Japan." Only through the organization, mobilization and act of all Chinese people for resisting Japan can we overthrow Japanese imperialism and the Kuomintang party, which is a group of traitorous spies.

The Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China
President  Mao Tse-tung
Vice President  Hsiang Ying
The Revolutionary Military Committee of the China Workers and Farmers' Red Army
President  Chu Teh
Vice President  Chou En-lai

Wang Chia-chiang
In the summer of 1935, a series of incidents in violation of the Second-'Anti-Ch'ing' Truce occurred in quick succession. These events led to the formation of a neutral zone east of Langsihe, under the leadership of Ch'en Shun. On 1 August the same year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration entitled: "Lose to all our compatriots to oppose the Japanese and to save our country!" It is a very famous declaration known as the "J. 1. Declaration". The full text of it is as follows:

To our compatriots in various fields of industry, agriculture, military, politics, commerce, and learning:

And with the over-whelming advance of the Japanese imperialism and meat with the virtual surrender of the traitorous "National" government, our eastern provinces are on the brink of social destruction following upon that of the North-eastern four provinces. For years, the Japanese have with several thousand years of classical culture, Hong, Shensi, and Kansu provinces with infinite natural resources, and Chahar and Huijin districts, which are most advantageous from the military standpoint as well as such political and economic life lines as Tsinan-Hunting, Cirinc-Tei, Hunan-Ho and Ning-hsing-Hu, are now completely under the restrictions of the Japanese army. At present the Japanese army commanders is positively carrying out their plan for the establishment of the so-called "Mongolian State" or "North China State". After the 10 September Incident in 1931, they actually took possession of various areas beginning with the eastern three provinces and then Shho, the Great Wall, the Deseased west of Langsihe, Kansu, Chahar, and various provinces in North China. In less than four years, almost all the areas have been either occupied or invaded by the Japanese invaders. The plan for the total destruction of China, which General Tojo submitted to the Emperor, is now being steadily carried into effect. In these areas the provinces on the river plains of Chinn-nan and Chinn-nan, as well as various other provinces, will also be occupied by and by this country with its long history of the 2,000 years will be transformed into a conquered state and our 440,000,000 brethren will then be a wretched mass of defeated people. In recent years, our people have been at the crossroads of life or death. For they choose to be anti-imperialist, they will be saved but if not, they will die. To oppose the Jewels, so whereby to save our country has now become a holy mission for everyone of our brethren. At this moment, it is most deplorable that there still remain among our great people a few heartlessly follow traitors such as Chiang K'ai-shek, Tung Ch'ing-yew, and Chinese "so-called" as well as suchrey agents of the Japanese as Tung T'ao, Tang Yung-t'ai, and Yen, and Chang Chun, advocating a "non-resistance" policy, have sold out our country and have acceded to all the demands presented by the Japanese. They have also prosecuted the civil war, with the militaristic propaganda that exclusion of foreigners must needs be rooted by internal peace. They have further suppressed all the anti-imperialistic movements and advocating such ruthless. To ans as 100 years of public officials, "the ones of cultural improvement" and "preparation for
revenge" they have struck the people's "Oppose the Japanese and Save the Country" movements. The open and shameless conduct in recent years of these knavish traitorous fellow-travellers with such slogans as "Sino-Japanese friendship", "Sino-Japanese cooperation", "Great Sino-Japanese friendship" etc., are the most preposterous conduct ever heard of in history. The Soviet Government and the Communists in China regard the Japanese aggressions against China and the treacherous action of the knavish traitors as the worst disgrace to the Chinese people. "We members of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party in China solemnly declare as follows: "We oppose and protest most strongly not only against Japan's territorial invasion and internal political interference but also against the Japanese demands for the dissolution of the Unification Party and the Blue Shirts Organization.

The point of view of the Soviet Government and the Communists that all the Chinese affairs ought to be settled by the Chinese themselves. "For every country to do things committed by the nationalists, the Japanese have no right whatsoever to meddle in the question of whether or not these should be eliminated. China is our fatherland. So long as we are Chinese we are brothers. You can see the old leeches on when our country and our people are on the brink of ruin. We cannot look forward to save our country and our own selves. The Abyssinians, though theirs is a small country with a population of only 6,000,000 are striving to defend their own country and their people by offering a heroic armed resistance against Italian imperialism. By is it thus, that we of a great country of 140,000,000 people should wait our ruin with folded arms.

The Soviet Government and the Communist party in China firmly believe that except a small number of knavish traitors such as Chang Ching-hai, Chang Tso-lin, Chen Tung-ching, Yu Yi, etc., the majority of our brethren in various fields of industry, agriculture, military, politics, commerce, and learning would never allow themselves to become slaves to the Japanese. The declaration of war against Japan by the Soviet Government; various armies' anti-Japanese common resistance secretly proposed by the Red Army; bitter fighting by the anti-Japanese vanguard of the northward advancing Red Army; the decisive battle at Sung-hu between the 19th Route Army and the general populace; the heroic struggle of soldiers and people at Chahar along the Great Wall and in various districts east of Langhsien; the united resistance against Japan by the Chinese People's government, in accordance with a proposal by the Red Army; sacrifices of lives by national heroes such as Lo Tenghian, Hso-Tinghun, Chi-Funchun, Peng Lung-cheng, Chang-Tichun, Pan Chi-min, etc.; the imprisonment of anti-Japanese patriots such as Chia Fan, Tu Ching-yuan, Liu Chang-wu, etc.; the anti-Japanese resistance of Tsai-Ting-kai, Chang Lung-sing, Chang Ying-su, Yang Chen-wu, etc.; the basic operations plans for the Chinese People's anti-Japanese resistance, and by several thousand people, including Sun Ching-ling, Lo Yehning-yu, Liu, Ta Tsing-so, etc; national salvation movements carried out by all classes of people, such as boycotts, walk-outs in factories, offices and schools; demonstrations, and in particular anti-Japanese armed resistance by some hundreds of thousand people in the North-east; the heroic anti-Japanese uprisings led by such national heroes as Ying Ching-yu, Chao Hsian-Chun, Chao Hsia-chung, Yeich Hsi-ting, etc.; All expressions of
our people's grand spirit for national salvation and will inspire
our people to be victorious in their anti-Japanese national sal­
vation movement, that even now the various attempts of our peo­
ple to save our country by opposing the Japanese have not yet
achieved victory which they fully deserve is firstly due to the
attacks from both flanks by the Japanese army and the Chiang
army and secondly due to the discord and disunity arising out of
isolation and misunderstanding among the various anti-Japanese
and anti-Chiang groups. Hence, the Soviet Government and the
Communist Party hereby stress the pressing need for the formation
of the anti-Japanese joint front and further appeal as follows
their brother throughout the country. Even though various poli­
tical parties at present as in the past are at variance with one
another in their views and interests; and even though various
armies are at present as in the past, hostile towards one another,
it is necessary for all of us to come to the true realisation of
"avoiding the outward danger in spite of the interior strife."
We must first of all suspend all the internal strifes, rise above
all sorts of differences, and concentrate our entire national
strength (man-power, material power, financial potentiality, mili­
tary strength, etc.) upon our fight for the achievement of our
holy mission to save our country through opposing the Japanese.
The Soviet Government and the Communist Party in China once more
declare as follows:

The Nationalists must at once stop attacking the Soviet area
and all their troops must make preparations for a war against
Jpn. It is the desire of the Red Army not to persist in any
feeling of enmity existing between the Nationalist Army and the
Red Army either at present or in the past, not to persist in any
differences regarding internal politics, but immediately to rise
above all disputes and, closely cooperating with each other, to
save the country through joint effort.

Let us take a step further and cordially appeal to you as follows.
All compatriots who do not want to be a defeated people! All the
compatriots who do not want to be a defeated people! All patriots
and conscientious officers and soldiers! Brothers! All comrades
of various parties and organizations who desire to join in the
holy mission of saving the country by opposing the Japanese! All
hot-blooded youths of the Kuomintang Party and the Blue Shirt's
Society, who have awakened to the racial consciousness! All brothers
who are interested in their fatherland! All brothers of the op­
pressed peoples Han's, Ferencs, Mongolians, Tibetans, Yen's,
Miao's, Kuo's, Lin's, Fung's, etc. in China!

Let us come forward bravely to break through the pressure of
the Japanese and Chiang armies, unite the Chinese Soviet Gover­
ment and various anti-Japanese regimes in the Northeast into one
national defensive government, and also unite the Red Army, the
Peoples' Revolutionary Army in the Northeast, and the anti-Japan­
ese volunteers corps in various parts of the country into one
national anti-Japanese volunteers army.

The Soviet Government and the Communist Party wish to sponsor
the establishment of such the national defensive government. The
Soviet Government and the Communist Party will at once negotiate
with various parties, organizations such as industrial and agri­
cultural organizations, students' societies, commercial organiza­
tions, educational associations, journalists' federations, teach­er's federations, Chinese merchants' associations, well-known
scholars, politicians, Racial Self-Defense Association, Anti-
Japanese Society, Fatherland Society, etc. and all the local
military administration as upon the question of the joint establishment of a national defensive government. In our opinion the national defensive government thus established must of necessity be a temporary organ of guidance for the plans of national salvation and a representative organ made up of representatives elected on democratic terms by people in various fields of industry, agriculture, military, politics, commerce, and learning, by municipalities and organizations anxious to save the country by opposing the Japanese, by the Chinese abroad, and by various races within the country, of all compatriots, and various matters concerning the anti-Japanese Save-the-Nation movement shall be made subjects of discussion in the government. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party will spare no efforts or assistance in assembling this people's organ and will execute without fail any decision reached by the organ because the Soviet Government and the Communist Party absolutely respect the people's will. The main responsibility of the National Defensive Government is to save the country through opposing the Japanese and its policies include the following points:

a. To save the country through opposing the Japanese. Restore lost territories.

b. To prevent disasters. To embank rivers. To protect people's lives.

c. All the imperialistic Japanese properties in China shall be confiscated and be appropriated to war expenses against Japan.

d. All properties, provisions, and land belonging to knavish traitors shall be confiscated and shall be not only distributed among the poor but also appropriated to anti-Japanese war expenses.

e. Heavy and arbitrary taxes shall be abolished and there shall be economic and financial adjustment in order to promote industry, agriculture, and commerce.

f. Through an increase in salaries, the living conditions of people in various fields of industry, agriculture, military, politics, commerce, and learning shall be improved.

g. Liberty based upon democracy shall be enforced and all political criminals released.

h. Free education shall be given to youth out of work.

i. The policy of according equal treatment to all races living in China shall be carried out. Life, property, freedom of residence, and freedom of education shall be guaranteed either within or outside the country, for the Chinese living abroad and for other races living in China.

j. All anti-imperialistic people including working classes in Japan, and colonials in France and Ferman shall be united and made allies. All peoples and states in sympathy with the movement for the liberation of the Chinese people shall be united. Friendship shall be established with peoples and states that will, with good intentions, remain neutral in our war against Japan.
k. Anti-Japanese united forces shall be organized by all the troops that aim to saving the country through opposing the Japanese. Under the leadership of the National Defensive Government, the General Headquarters of the Anti-Japanese United Forces shall be established. This headquarters shall be organized by the representatives elected from among the Anti-Japanese chiefs, officers and soldiers of various ranks or by some other method. In any case they will be chosen with the approval of representatives of various ranks or, in addition, with the approval of the common people. The headquarters shall take the lead in joining the united forces and will endeavor to fulfill their mission of saving the country through opposing the Japanese.

1. To enable the National Defensive Government to fulfill their responsibilities for national defense and to enable the Anti-Japanese united forces fulfill their to oppose the Japanese, the Soviet Government and the Communists appeal to the brothers throughout the country as follows:

These who have guns, should offer their guns. Those who have food should offer their food. Those who have power, should offer their power. Those who have special talents should contribute their talents. All compatriots shall be mobilized and millions of peoples shall be fed with weapons, new and old.

The Government of Soviet China and the Communist Party firmly believe that:

If 450,000,000 Chinese are guided by a united National Defensive Government, if the Unified Anti-Japanese Allied armies take the lead, if millions of common people are properly armed, and if we are supported by innumerable proletarians and oppressed peoples not only in the East but throughout the world, we will surely be able to overcome Japanese imperialism which within Japan is being opposed by workers and peasants and which outside Japan is regarded with enmity by all peoples.

All brothers arise!

Fight for the defense of our fatherland!

Fight for the independence of our people!

Fight for the independence of our country!

Fight for our territorial integrity!

Fight for human rights and freedom!

Three cheers for the Great Union for Anti-Japanese National Salvation in China!

The People's Council of the Soviet Chinese Government,
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

1 August 1935

After the publication of this famous declaration, the Chinese people's united front really began to take shape. The anti-Japanese people's united front which is now so powerful, has developed along the lines of this declaration. The powerful should offer their power, the rich should offer their money, common slogan of the whole Chinese people in their present resistance, has been taken from this 8.1 Declaration. The declaration to the anti-
Japanese people's united front showing a definite direction, initiated gigantic operations.

Therefore, we can define the period between the 16 September Incident and the August Declaration as the early stage of the Anti-Japanese Peoples United Front.
On December 25, 1935, the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party passed a decision "concerning the duty of the Party and the present political situation" and took great interest in the movement of the anti-Japanese People's Unified Front. The full text of the decision is as follows:

Decision concerning the duty of the Party and the present political situation as soon from the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (Dec. 25, 1935).


The organization of the National Defence Government and the anti-Japanese United Army are two of the most popular and most excellent cases of all the anti-Japanese and anti-traitors people's fronts. There are some people who do not agree with the Soviet system and the joint reform, but concur with the anti-Japanese and anti-traitors movements. Due to the disagreement of beliefs and organization, the state of local spheres of influence exists and the Chinese Soviet Government has succeeded only in some limited regions of China, and the people's anti-revolutionary movement by betrayers and traitors has been carried on solely by the aid of Japanese imperialism. These facts that the organization of the National Defence Government and the anti-Japanese United Army is not only possible but is a great necessity. The methods adopted by the Chinese in their anti-Japanese and anti-traitors movements are various. The extent of self-consciousness of the elements participating in the anti-Japanese movement is also different. The Communists should train themselves of every opportunity to provoke actions of various sorts and lead them towards establishing the National Defence Government and the Anti-Japanese Unified Army. Every anti-Japanese and anti-traitors element, irrespective of the class, political faction, social group, or whatever unit it may represent, should join in the National Defence Government and the Anti-Japanese United Army.

National Defence Government is a political organization of the anti-Japanese and anti-traitors united front of allChina and also is the unified leading organ of the anti-Japanese and anti-traitors people's revolutionary war. Viewed from the class consciousness, the National Defence Government is a federation of all classes having as their common object the anti-traitors movement.

In order to establish as soon as possible the National Defence Government and the Anti-Japanese United Army and let them expand and develop the fundamental rights of the race and its fighting power, the policy of the communists is not satisfied to leave the above matters with the anti-Japanese groups and the anti-Japanese armed units which have been in existence voluntarily in the past, but it goes forward to put them under a unified organization, supervise the members of these groups and unite to mobilize every patriotic element out of various directions. In other words, patriotic groups, classes, parties, producers and merchants, culturalists and educators, students and
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The new anti-Japanese and anti-traitor armies (such as anti-Japanese revolutionary armies and anti-Japanese federations, etc.) are to be printed; and various anti-Japanese and anti-traitor armies (such as anti-Japanese voluntary armies, people's revolutionary armies, the new 10th Route Army etc.) as well as political powers (such as anti-Japanese governments of cities and municipalities, people's revolutionary governments, etc.) are to be established. Then these groups, armies, and political powers are combined into one and the power of the Soviet Red Army is added to it, and there we will have organized the National Defense Government and the anti-Japanese United Army. Once the National Defense Government and the anti-Japanese United Army are established, the new group, in the course of its daily routine, must cause the new local government and its army to deal constantly with capricious rebels on one hand and to increase the new power on the other, so that the National Defense Government and the anti-Japanese United Army may become everlasting, and become the army with full vigour and fortitude and great fighting power. Some districts do not receive the leadership of the Party because the influence of the Party there is weak, and in others, the Soviet Red Army is unable to participate freely in the establishment of the National Defense Government and the anti-Japanese United Army due to the fact that these districts are too remote from the Red Army or the Soviet area. The Party should extend its positive assistance to these districts, which is the concrete policy of the Communists Party with respect to the realization of the National Defense Government and the anti-Japanese United Army.

Because of the fact that the National Defense Government and the anti-Japanese United Army are the most general and supreme organizations of the people's united front of the anti-Japanese and anti-traitor movements, they must have strict regular general principles of action. These principles are as follows:

1. Anti-Japanese and National Salvation; recovery of lost territories.
2. Confiscate all the property of Japanese imperialism in China and appropriate it to the expenses of anti-Japanese movements.
3. Confiscate all the land and property of traitors and betrayers and distribute them among workers, farmers and poor people.
4. Relief work of sufferers of disasters; river conservancy and stabilization of people's lives.
5. Abolish all unreasonable miscellaneous taxes and develop industry, farming and commerce.
6. Improve the lives of workers, soldiers and teaching staff by the increase of their wages and allowances.
8. In force the people's rights and liberate all political criminals.

9. Help the unemployed intellectuals by the improvement of productive techniques.

10. Organize a strong federation with workers, farmers and all other anti-Japanese elements in Korea, Formosa and Japan. Maintain close relations with races or nations which express sympathy to and approval of the national movement of China and observe bona-fide neutrality.

The Communists must carry out the above principles in the course of their anti-Japanese struggle and must expect to materialize the Party through these principles.

On March 10, 1936, the Northern zone Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, in compliance with the intention of the Central Party announced an "Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Declaration." It is especially significant to note the fact that this is a cry from the North where direct conflict of interests with Japan are taking place. The full text of it is as follows:
XII. Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Declaration of the Northern Area Bureau of the Chinese Communist Central Party (March 10, 1936).

The Northern Area Bureau of the Chinese Communists Party, at the request of Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and President of the Chinese Soviet Central Government, and Chu Teh, Chairman of the Central Military Council of the Chinese workers and farmers Red Army, hereby declare to all military governors, various social organizations, political parties, newspapers and magazines, and fellow countrymen in the fields of workers, farmers, merchants and educators throughout the nation, as well as to all patriots, as follows:

The Chinese Communists Party and the Soviet Government are prepared to dispatch immediately their representatives and open discussions on the organization of the National Defense Government and the Anti-Japanese United Army, together with all the armies, parties, organizations and organs which are in favor of anti-Japanese movements, and in cooperation with all the first class scholars and politicians. We would further hope that the representatives of the above armies, parties, organizations, organs, and individuals will come to the Soviet area to confer with us. The Soviet Government and the Red Army will guarantee the absolute liberty and safety of these representatives.

The Chinese Communists Party and the Soviet Government had once announced the following principles of the administrative measures of the National Defense Government.

1. Anti-Japanese and National Salvation; Recovery of lost territories.
2. Relief work of sufferers of disasters and river conservancy; Stabilization of peoples' lives.
3. Confiscate all the property of Japanese imperialism in China and appropriate it to the expenses of Anti-Japanese movements.
4. Confiscate all the property, provisions and land of betrayers and traitors and distribute them among poor fellow countrymen and anti-Japanese fighters.
5. Abolish all unreasonable miscellaneous taxes; adjust the finances and the money market; and develop industry, farming and commerce.
6. Improve the lives of workers, farmers, soldiers, educators by the increase of their wages and allowances.
7. Enforce democratic freedom and liberate all political criminals.
8. Practice free education and help all young men who have lost work and are unable to attend school.
9. Practice the policy of indiscriminate equality of every race within the boundaries of China, and guarantee the lives and property and the freedom of residence and business of fellow countrymen within and without China.

10. Get in touch with and make friendly armies of all anti-imperialistic masses (the working masses in Japan, and Korean and Formosan races); get in touch with all the races and nations who are in sympathy with the national emancipation movement of China; and conclude friendly relations with all the races and nations who adopt bona fide neutrality in the anti-Japanese emancipation struggle of the Chinese masses.
On June 1, 1936, the National Salvation United Army of all China was organized and at the general meeting of its establishment they passed the "Elementary Political Principles of the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation." The details are as follows:

XIII. Elementary Political Principles of Anti-Japanese and National Salvation (June 1, 1936).

1. Fundamental organization.

As to the external resistance of the national revolution, some advocated, in the past, the general anti-imperialism; some insisted upon the separate anti-British movement at first; but others maintained that the anti-Japanese movement should be carried out separately at first. However, at present, all these divergent opinions have come to be united under the one principle of "anti-Japanese first." With regard to the measures of anti-Japanese movements, some said that war should be avoided while others considered it would be unavoidable. However, at present, all different opinions have come to be united under the one principle that an "anti-Japanese war is inevitable."

2. Common enemies:

Japanese imperialism and traitors are the common enemies of the National Salvation Front.

3. Political system:

The general meeting recognizes that the establishment of democratic system is the fundamental condition for the thoroughgoing collaboration of various parties and factions. The freedom of association, assembly, speech and publication is the demand of the United Front, which makes no concession in this respect. We oppose positively to any measures which may destroy the organization of the masses, although they are carried out under the pretext of leading such an organization, and also to those measures which may suppress public opinion, although carried out under the pretext of controlling it.

4. Diplomacy:

We must apply fully our talent of popular diplomacy to unite all influences of anti-Japanese and anti-war peoples' fronts of the whole world. We must develop the ability of our National Salvation Front and make sure of our victory over the war of resistance.

5. Education:

The general meeting considers that the present education which teaches academic technicalities by reading dead books and makes students self-intoxicated in reading obsolete books is a crime. We are in urgent need of many young fighters who would take leadership in the National Salvation movement, and take charge of the management of National Salvation. We cannot, therefore, waste even in the least degree, the intellectual power of young men other than for the purpose of National Salvation. We cannot afford to destroy the sentiment of National Salvation of young men.

6. Industry and commerce.

We must boycott Japanese goods on a large scale.
7. Soldiers:

We must improve the treatment of soldiers at once and strengthen their anti-Japanese consciousness.

8. Industrial workers:

We demand the immediate disengagement of the present workers' organizations. The reason is to strengthen, on one hand, the anti-Japanese and anti-betrayal fight by several hundreds of thousands of workers who are under the employment of the Japanese capitalistic organization in China, thus we intend negatively to prevent the expansion of the influences of Japanese capitalism, and positively, to create several hundreds of thousands of heroic fighters, and to emancipate the national industry from the oppression of Japanese capitalism. On the other hand, we must, by the power of the nation, improve the treatment of workers under the national capitalistic organization, guarantee their lives, and heighten their national salvation consciousness. In case of necessity, we must provide for the minimum wage, the maximum working hours and the highest and lowest ages of workers. We must do away with all inhuman treatments and unjust oppression and give workers the freedom of reading, talking and assembly, etc., which are required for national salvation.

9. Farmers:

The general meeting recognizes that the state should guarantee the reasonable lives of land owners in so far as their lives are founded upon the common anti-Japanese resistance.

10. Women:

We insist that women should be given an opportunity to join the National Salvation Front on an equal footing with men.

11. Chinese residents abroad.

The general meeting considers that the Chinese residents in the South Sea, Europe and the United States should strengthen their organizations and be engaged in international propaganda and be a powerful source to supply economic aid. Appropriate protection must be given to their legitimate interests. The general meeting recognizes the fact that the Chinese residents in Japan, Korea and Formosa are suffering from heavy oppressions of Japanese imperialism, and that they are the most daring elements of the anti-Japanese front, and they, therefore, should be grouped under some organizations, and relief must be extended to those who return home from these countries due to oppression.

The general meeting considers that the skilled technicians of the national defense industry should be urged politely to return home. Collecting workers in China by aggressive nations should be stopped immediately.
On June 12, 1936, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced the "Resolution on the Present Political Situation." It focused on the internal and external general situation and a direction concerning the development of the anti-Japanese movement. The following is the full text:

XIV. The Resolution on the Present Political Situation.

a. Our party executed the new policy concerning the anti-Japanese United Front with the following favorable results:

1. Since the outbreak of the national salvation movement by the Peiping students on December 9th last year, a large scale movement for the cause of saving the country by opposing Japan started throughout the country. Those who joined the movement were not only workers and farmers, but also common students, soldiers, intellectuals, shop clerks and some native capitalists. Especially as the Japanese militarism dared to increase forces in North China and encouraged piratical smuggling, many manufacturers and merchants and some of the ruling classes in Nanking, North China and especially in the Southwest expressed their sympathy with the anti-Japanese movement, and they are now joining the Front.

The violent invasion of the Japanese imperialism, the shameless betrayal of Chiang Kai-shek, the oppression upon the people and the opposition have enhanced the possibility of a grand scale development of the anti-Japanese Front. All the peoples promoted the fight against traitors under the leadership of the United National Salvation Organization and established anti-Japanese and anti-traitors organizations. A great mass movement is being planned at present among the peoples in North China, especially among intellectual peoples.

The lower class soldiers of the 29th army are extremely indignant avowing publicly their refusal to withdraw in any eventuality. They are plotting to disobey orders from their superiors. Individual politicians also are conferring on the present crisis with the influential people in Peiping. In short, there is a big possibility of touching off a grand scale armed anti-Japanese movement in North China. In addition, the armies in Shansi, the Northeast, and some followers of Liu Hsiang are showing uneasiness with the possibility of their siding with the anti-Japanese front.

Special mention must be made to the following facts:

The Southwest army, confronted with unfavorable oppressions and inspired by the movement, sent a circular telegram on May 26 to the effect that they were against the increase of Japanese forces in North China. Following this, two more telegrams were sent to Nanking urging the anti-Japanese war. On 7th of the same month they sent a circular telegram throughout the country notifying the change of their name from Kuang-si and Canton Armies, to the first and fourth group Armies of the Revolutionary Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army of China. Those armies immediately started the northwest movement and have already advanced to Hengchow in Hunan. Special mention must be made also to the fact that since we proposed on August 1 last year to organize a United National Defense Government and the Anti-Japanese United Army, comprising all parties and all social classes, we have sent frequent circular telegrams advocating this policy, and the calling of the general conference of the representatives of the Anti-Japanese National Salvation movement of the whole country. Especially on May 5 our party and its leaders at the Kuang-te and Chu-Te sent a circular telegram strongly advocating the cessation of internal strife, the opening
of a conference for mutual concessions and a united anti-Japanese war. These arguments were fervently supported by the powerful elements in the armies and the people as a whole. They contributed much to the advancement of the movement. Now the main forces of the Red Army in Shensi and Sikang, the guerrilla troops throughout the country and the Peoples' Revolutionary Army in the Northeast have indicated smooth developments to become central powers of the whole anti-Japanese Army.

The nation wide racial war has broken out in the Southwest region situated far from the military base of the Japanese imperialism. We must recognize the fact that the present war initiated by the Southwestern Military Administrative authorities is not a genuine militaristic civil war, but has the significance of a racial revolution. It is in one sense a war against the leader of traitor Chiang Kai-shek, though it is hard to distinguish the anti-Japanese war from the Anti-Chiang war. If all the people adopt the new policy of our Party with the aid and protection of the Anti-Japanese United Front, the present war will develop into a real and powerful national war. Regardless of whether it is before or after the outbreak of the war, we must adopt the most appropriate measure for the promotion, support and enlargement of this war. For the masses, we must repeat the mission entrusted to the Government and the Army, and mobilize all the anti-traitors forces in order to establish a proper government and an Army around the Soviet Peoples Republic and the Anti-Japanese Red Army.

We must secure the people at large and the revolutionary and self-conscious elements as well. Every possible element among the ruling classes shall be mobilized for the anti-Japanese war. The United Front shall be enlarged and our camps and their powers shall be strengthened. It is the necessary conditions for the execution of a large-scale anti-Japanese armed struggle to impel the Nanking Government and its administration to join the movement. Nevertheless, it does not mean to neglect strict criticisms and fights against the false conduct by the Nanking Government contrary to the national interest.

The enlargement of the Communist Party and the complete independence of its politics and organizations and the unity of the party, are the fundamental conditions for obtaining the final victory of the United Front and the Democratic Republic. It is an absolute necessity to enlist party members in the Soviet and the non-Soviet areas by systematic methods.
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A circular telegram concerning the Hsian Incident
(Dec. 19, 1936)

(From the central authority of the Chinese Communist
Party and the Chinese Soviet Government)

Messrs. Kung Yung-yuan, Sun-Che-Shen, Feng-Huan-chan,
Chen-Li-fu in Nanking; Members of the Nationalist Party
and the Nationalist Government; Chang-Har-chang-shin,
Yung Hu-cheng, Wang Ting Fung, Sun-Ju in Hsian; members of
the Northwest Provisional Military Council of the
Anti-Japanese United Army.

Since the Anti-Japanese programs were proposed at Hsian,
the country was thrown into a turmoil. The "internal
Peace first and expulsion afterwards" policy could no
longer be continued. It is a fair view that the
people in Hsian do not fall behind the others in their
ardent patriotism. They insist on immediate anti-
Japanese actions. The Nanking Government with the
exception of pro-Japanese elements is in favor of
anti-Japanese actions though its pace is rather slow.
They do not want civil wars. In view of the present
situation, without the movement we cannot survive
and without unity and cooperation, the movement cannot
attain its objective. The continuation of civil wars
would lead us to nowhere but to a final collapse.
At this critical moment, our party and our government
offer the following proposals to both sides.

a. Tung Kuan shall be the border between both
armies. Nanking army shall wait for the outcome of
the peace conference within Shensi Province.

b. A peace conference shall at once be called
by Nanking. In addition to the representatives of
both Nanking and Hsian, the members of various parties, factions
and armies shall be invited. Our party and our
government start preparations for dispatching representa­
tives.

c. Prior to the conference, a draft on the
Anti-Japanese Salvation problem shall be presented
and the disposal of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek shall be
discussed. However, the fundamental principle shall
be national unity, the opposition against civil wars
and the united anti-Japanese actions.

d. The conference shall be opened in Nanking.
The above mentioned proposals are the most reasonable
and effective measures for solving the present urgent
problems. We hope that the gentlemen in Nanking
would instantly decide national policies in order not
to give the Japanese an opportunity to take advantage
of our national confusion. Further we hope that all
the parties and factions of the peoples would spur
the opening of a peace conference in order to dis­
cuss definite national policies and face the national
crisis.
21. A circular telegram addressed to the Third General Congress of the Chinese Nationalist Party by the central organization of the Chinese Communist Party, (10 Feb. 1937). Honorables Representatives attending the Third General Congress of the Chinese Nationalist Party. The whole nation congratulates on the peaceful solution of the Hsian Incident, which will open the way to the establishment of a principle on peaceful unification and united effort for defending the national honour. This is a happy event for the country and the people. At this critical moment for the Chinese people caused by the Japanese invasion this party earnestly hopes that the Third General Congress of your party would adopt the following items as the national policies based upon the above mentioned principles.

a. Cessation of all internal strife, concentration of national powers, united actions concerning foreign affairs.

b. Freedom of speech, gathering, and party organization; Release of all political criminals.

c. A conference of representatives from all parties, factions, circles, and armies shall be convened. All competent persons throughout the country shall be called upon to save the country by united actions.

d. All preparations for a war against Japan shall be speedily completed.

e. Betterment of peoples livelihood. In case the Third General Congress of your party decisively adopt the aforementioned national policy, this party swears to the Third General Congress of your party to execute the following as a means to express the seriousness of this party in its effort to defend the national honour by united actions.

1. Cessation of armed revolts aiming at the downfall of the Nationalist Government throughout the country.

2. The name of the Soviet Government will be changed to that of the Chinese Special District Government, and the name of the Red Army will be changed to that of the National Revolutionary Army. Both will be subjected to the direct guidance of the central government in Nanking and the Military Committee respectively.

3. Ordinarily understood system of democracy will be adopted within the district under the Special District Government.

4. Confiscation of lands owned by land owners will be discontinued and the common principles for the united anti-Japanese racial front will be strictly adhered to. The situation is becoming more critical everyday which does not allow us to waste time in waiting. This party can swear to God that it is loyal to the country. If you people accept in earnest the request of this party for the sake of the country,
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the united front for the national salvation by defending the national honour will be realised. We are as much the descendants of the Han Emperor and the children of the Chinese race as you are. It is a great prelude to the final freedom for the Chinese race to make a common effort in intimate collaboration abandoning all old political views at this immediate national crisis. With a greeting worthy of a racial revolution we hereby send this telegram in anticipation of a wise answer.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

The publication of this proposal by the Chinese Communist Party was received favourably by a wide mass of the people and gave good impressions abroad. It was welcome not only to the general patriotic faction but even to some of the influential members of the Nationalist Party. Resolution of three great principles - "alliance with Russia", "collaboration with the Communists", "Protection of industrial workers and farmers" - was proposed publicly to the Third General Congress with joint signatures of central executive committee members of the Nationalist Party, Fong Yu-hsiang, Chang Jen-chih, Li Shih-hueh, Sun Ko, Lu Chung-ling, Shih Ying, Chang Chih-peng, Shih Chin-ting, Li Liah-chun, Chu Chi-chin, Liang Hon-tsao, Ching Ting-yi, Sung Chin-ling, Ho Hsiang-yi etc.,. Heated debates concerning this problem were conducted between the left and right wings of the Third General Congress. However, the preponderance of the right wing influence prevented the Congress from adopting drastic reorientation concerning internal and external policies. On the contrary, the Congress passed a resolution on "annihilation of red vils" instead of collaboration between Nationalists and Communists criticizing severely the Communist Party. It was for the first time during the session of the Third General Congress that the central executive committee of the Nationalist Party took up the question of collaboration with the Communist Party since the rupture of the Nationalists and the Communists in 1927.
Comrades!

After the removal of the intermediate and the third central conference of the Kuomintang, the Chinese revolution has entered a new stage. Our duty in this stage is to consolidate the internal peace already obtained, to achieve the people's association, and to initiate an anti-imperialist war. The completion of this duty requires a sharp and intense mobilization of the entire nation. Our work should fit in for the ideal with a practical spirit and a indomitable will. The Chinese Communist party should present a platform that represents the economic, political, and cultural interests of respective social classes. It is to cope with the present situation and to stir up the people to participate in the war. The party should, moreover, assert itself for its own purposes. Actual practice of such platform will act as a true and viable test for internal unity, but will be advantageous to the cause. Our party is opposed to views that aim at the conflict between class interests and national interest. We stress that complete synchronization of the Chinese people will need the greatest caution to the Chinese farmers, peasants, and petty bourgeois. Accordingly, the party must first of all improve people's livelihood after such improvement, victory in social revolution will be attained. In the meantime, the party pays close attention to the political situation both in China and in the world, with utmost political sagacity and intuitive observation, and tries to reflect the correct viewpoint and attitude. This, our party, is required to analyze actual circumstances in detail according to the methods of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. They are also asked to heed the advice of the masses, to propagate proper slogans, strategies and slogans, and to solve various problems of politics and economy with unity and correctness. The principles of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin are decisive to the success of our actions. Whether the victory of the party or not the actual revolutionary movement in the course will determine the result of the present revolution.
All member officers, comrades, friends, and nationalism party, unite to constitute, unite to council, all brothers in China!

At 10 P.M. on the 7th, the Japanese forces in the war zone rushed, menacing their position to our position. The empire did not stay the decision, and clash occurred. At present, the enemy are in complete control, and other the situation is very bad. China's defense line is very close to Japan's armed invasion.

The time is extremely critical. It is evident that the Japanese provocation may develop into a conflict in China, or result in diplomatic conflicts between China and its neighbors. This hazardous situation calls for all the Chinese to unite in the common cause of national defense, to avoid any conflict or result in diplomatic conflicts.

The Chinese people in China and abroad are faced with the danger of invasion by Japan's aggression. The Chinese people in China are new in China! The Chinese people in China face with the danger of invasion by Japan's aggression. The Chinese people in China face with the danger of invasion by Japan's aggression.

Resistance is the only way to survival. We demand that the Chinese people not accept any negotiation or treaty that is not in the best interest of China. We demand that China's armed forces take action against the Japanese forces. The Chinese people are ready to meet the enemy at the front. We demand that the Chinese people unite, and push for the protection of China's territory.

Our Slogan:
Defend Tientsin with our lives! Defend North China!
Never let Japanese imperialism invade our land! Offer our last drop of blood for the defense of our land!
Unite all brothers in China, the government and the army, in establishing the strongest wall of a united nation. Front, and in resisting the Japanese invasion. United Nationalists and Communists closely for resistance to the new invasion of the Japanese! Drive the Japanese from China!

Central Council of Soviet China.

* arrival incident
On August 15, 1937, the General Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party announced the "New Point-platform of the Anti-Japanese Save-the-Nation Movement". It reads as follows:

I. Oath of Japanese Pacification:

1. We shall declare breaking off of friendship with Japan, drive out Japanese advisors, capture spies, and confiscate their out-Japanese activities. Capture spied and confiscate their out-Japanese activities. Capture spied and confiscate their out-Japanese activities.

2. Declare the end of a treaty of peace and establish a "North China" treaty. We shall use force to end the occupation of North China and the occupation of foreign states and territories. We shall demand the return of the Chinese territories and the return of the Chinese territories.

3. We shall mobilize all the people, carry out anti-Japanese policies, and establish a national defense council.

II. General Mobilization:

1. We shall mobilize all the people, carry out anti-Japanese policies, and establish a national defense council.

2. We shall mobilize all the people, carry out anti-Japanese policies, and establish a national defense council.

3. We shall mobilize all the people, carry out anti-Japanese policies, and establish a national defense council.

III. Mobilization of the Entire Nation:

1. We shall mobilize all the people in the country and the entire Chinese nation shall have freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association relating to the anti-Japanese Save-the-Nation movement and freedom of armed resistance against Japan. Every regulation restricting the people's patriotic movements shall be abolished, every patriotic and revolutionary criminal trial, all the people mobilized to participate in the war, the powerful and rich shall offer their strength, the rich their wealth. The people shall use their weapons, and the intellectuals shall use their knowledge. All the people, such as Kiangtians, Mongolians, Manchus, etc., shall be mobilized for common resistance according to the principle of racial self-determination.

4. Reform of the Political Structure:

1. We shall convene a National Conference, really representative of the people shall be convened to a true democratic constitution adopted, the policy of the Anti-Japanese Save-the-Nation movement decided and the National Defense government elected. The National Defense Government should absorb the revolutionary elements from every party, school and popular organizations and expel the pro-Japanese elements. The Government for the national defense shall be organized according to a democratic federal system.

2. It shall carry out the revolutionary policy of the Anti-Japanese Save-the-Nation movement, execute local self-rule, drive out greedy officials and establish an upright Government.

- 1 -
V. Anti-Japanese Diplomacy.

We will conclude an anti-aggression pact and anti-Japanese military alliance with any state opposed to Japanese aggression, so far as we do not lose thereby our territory or sovereignty. We will defend the peace front and oppose the aggressive front of Japan, Germany and Italy. We will oppose Japanese imperialism by uniting workers and farmers in Korea, Formosa and Japan proper.

VI. War-time Financial and Economic Policy. The principle of the financial policy is to make the rich offer money, to confiscate the property of traitors in order to cover the anti-Japanese war expenses. As regards the economic policy, domestic production shall be reorganized and expanded, agriculture developed, self-sufficiency in wartime farm products secured, consumption of domestic goods encouraged, domestic products improved, consumption of Japanese products prohibited, and greedy merchants and speculation controlled.

g) Improvement of people's living. Treatment of workers, farmers, officials, teachers and anti-Japanese soldiers shall be improved. The families of anti-Japanese patriots shall be well-treated, heavy and futile taxes abolished, rent and interest reduced, provisions controlled, and calamities and disasters compensated.

h) Anti-Japanese Education Policy. Old educational systems and schedules shall be revised and replaced by new ones aiming at the anti-Japanese save-the-Nation movement, uniform and obligatory, educations shall be given free of charge and the social consciousness of the people strengthened. Military drill of patriotic students shall be put into practice.

X. All traitors and pro-Japanese groups shall be purged and the rear shall be consolidated.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
Decision concerning the Duty of the Party in the Present Situation, made by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Aug. 15, 1937)

All the people and the armed forces led by the Communists must stand at the forefront of the national defence resistance. They must develop the anti-Japanese mass movement with the utmost ability. If they stand firm and conduct propaganda among the popular organizations and the armed groups, and organize tens of millions of peoples into the national anti-Japanese front, without will final victory in the war can be achieved. (Aug. 15, 1937)
FROM THE TOYOC AZUMI, DATED JUNE 21ST, 1944

As a result of the conference recently held between the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador in Tokyo concerning the French Concession in Tientsin, the following statement has been issued:

"The French Government fully recognizes the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress and acknowledges, that so far as this situation continues, the Japanese Army in China has special claims for securing their own safety and maintaining peace and order in the areas under their influence, and also that it is necessary to remove every act and cause which may do harm to the Japanese Army and profit their enemy. Having no intention of approving of any acts or measures to prevent the accomplishment of the afore-mentioned object of the Japanese Army, the French Government at this opportunity, definitely instructs the French authorities and nationals in China to refrain from such acts and measures and thereby confirms the above policy."—Takao Tsukiyama, President of the Information Board.

Concerning the question of the British Concession in TIENTSIN, an agreement of views between Japan and Britain has recently been reached after complicated negotiations carried on sinc
Foreign Minister ALITA and British Ambassador Craigie came to an understanding in principles in July last year, and due formalities to confirm the said agreement of views were completed yesterday the 16th, between Foreign Minister ALITA and British Ambassador Craigie. Moreover, as a result of talks with French Ambassador Henri, an agreement of views between France and Japan concerning problems of peace, silver, and currency, has also been reached simultaneously with their coming to an understanding in principles just as between Japan and Britain.

I am firmly convinced that as in consequence of the agreements recently arrived at, the British and French Concessions in TIENTSIN will be safeguarded from activities of anti-Japanese elements through perfect cooperation between the Concession and the Japanese authorities for the maintenance of peace and order in the concessions. The solution of the problems of silver and currency will not only make it possible, though not yet fully, to effect relief of refugees in North China, but also contribute toward economic stabilization in TIENTSIN area.

Under the present situation, the solution of the problem of the TIENTSIN Concessions may only give the impression that what should have been done has been done. But we must not overlook the fact that because of that outstanding problem, the solution of a more comprehensive and more urgent problem had been hindered. Though there are various other problems regarding which Japan must seek the cooperation of Britain and France in
order to attain our national aspirations in East Asia, we are expectant that the good intentions of Britain and France displayed in the solution of the 'TRPMY' problem will be more strongly reflected in dealing with various other problems.
I, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section in the TOYKO ASAHI Press, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Japan also recognized the state of war (Statement of Tokyo Office)" is a copy of a report on our newspaper issued on June 21st, 1942.

certified at Head Office of TOKYO ASAHI Press
on this 27th day of February, 1947

/s/ HISAYA, Yoshiito
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place
on the same date

witness: /s/ KONISHI, Toshio
(seal)

Document Committee of
Japanese Defense Council
Translation Certificate

I, William L. Clark, of the United States branch, hereby certify that the forenamed translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the media, of the original document.

/s/ William L. Clark

Tokyo, Japan
Date 14 April 1947
三月乙巳
晋侯十四年三月乙巳
晋侯

是月晋侯北行，至卫，遂会齐侯于首止，因齐侯之请，告予齐侯文公以下，皆不为后。
情報部長談

『天津英租界問題』について昨年七月有田外務大臣クレーギー英大使

の原則的了解が成立して以来疎少の紛紜折角ある虞涉を免れた所

大使との間に意見の合致を見たので昨十九日有田外務大臣クレーギー英

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大使との間に意見の合致を確認する為話を了すに至った。且アムリ

大使との間に意見の合致を確認する為話を了すに至った。
切なる問題の解決が阻まれて居たことは見逃してはならない。日本が長年に於ける国民的希望を成せんが為英の側前を求むべき同国に付てより強く反映せられんことを期待するものであります。
（七号A）

文書成立

（略）

昭和二十二年二月十七日

於

日本橋

森山

雄

立会人

東京朝日新聞社

昭和十五年六月二十一日

於

東京朝日新聞社

右

証明

昭和

証明

（略）
LOCAL PEACE MOVEMENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

DECISIONS OF CHIEF-EXECUTIVE "K"G

"K"G, Chief Executive of the National Government, had always borne in mind since the founding of the National Government the establishment of public peace and the improvement of economic livelihood, and in order to promote these activities, he newly established a Local Peace Committee (called sweeping away of local unrest). On the day the names of the members of the Committee were made public, that is, on May 11, Chief Executive "K"G announced the following important address concerning the establishment of the Committee and the significance of the movement:

Establishment of public peace and the improvement of economic livelihood are the two important established policies recently by the National Government. I sincerely referred to these in my essay of New Year's Day and also in my broadcast on the first anniversary of the National Government. These two have a mutual relationship of cause and effect, and if economic livelihood is improved, the people will be able to live and work in security and in comfort, and naturally public peace will be maintained. Furthermore, if public peace is secured, the construction of economy can naturally be promoted. The main duties of the Local Peace Committee are basically the establishment of public peace and the improvement of economic livelihood. Its responsibilities are very great and its mission, very important.
In former years, cooperation of political power and military power has been indispensable, and by carrying out these purposes, for the first time, bandits and communists were swept away and dangers to lives were eradicated. In view of the above situation, the National Government specially established a Local Burge Committee consisting of the military committee and the chiefs of the Administrative Yuan. This Committee possesses, an independent function as well as the concurrent duty of carrying on liaison work. Concentrating political and military power, this Committee shall actively perform its functions, bring security to far-villages, make possible the adjustment of arable land and thereby restore communication, and it is expected that industry will be promoted. At the outset of the movement, we do not seek largeness of scale. However, we intend to go steadily and advance step by step. I think that peace must first be established in one area, because if this can be done, peace can be promoted in other areas. If we advance in this way, not only will complete peace be promoted, but also the bases for training in self-government and the execution of constitutional government will be established. Together with my colleagues and my fellow countrymen, I shall continuously strive with all my heart, for the attainment of success.

Arrangements for Peace Completed

we can imagine, by the above statement, how great the expectations of Chief Executive WAJ are in regard to the Committee.
Every newspaper in favor of YANG handled this matter with large newspaper items, and with editorials, each pointed out and explained the reasons for the bright future for the peace group. In the Committee are included the following prominent men who are ministers. In our country, they are said to be of ministerial rank.

Chairman: YANG Ching-wai (Chairman of the Military Committee)

Vice-Chairman: C NW Fan-hao (Chief of the Political Training Section of the Military Committee)

CMW, Fan-hao (Vice President of the Administrative Yuan)

Chief of Confidential Secretaries: LI Shih-chung (Police Administration. This is an abbreviation of Minister of Police Administration. This example is followed hereafter.)

Assistant Chief of Confidential Secretaries: WANG Fan-yun (Vice-Minister of the Agriculture and Mining Ministry)

Committee:

"YANG Ching-wai: C NW, C NW Fan-hao: C NW Chur (Home Administration), LI Shih-chung (Governor of CHING TANG Province), YANG, Fan-hao (Chief of the General Staff Headquarters of the Military Committee—equivalent to the Chief of the General Staff in our country), LI Chur (Mural Administration):"
This Committee was formally organized on Jan. 22nd, and the notice of this organization was dispatched under the date of the 26th from the office at No. 22 in Hsin P’o, WANG TEC, to all heads of central and local government officers. The organs, authorities, matters under the jurisdiction of this Committee, etc., are stipulated as follows in the "Temporary Outline for the Organization of the Local Purge Committee" promulgated on May 16.

**Temporary Outline of the Local Purge Committee**

**Article I.** With the object of actively dealing with local purge matters in each province and city, the National Government shall establish a Local Purge Committee which shall be the highest organ of command.

**Article II.** Concerning military administration matters in the areas to be purged, the National Government shall grant the Local Purge Committee power to directly enact laws and regulations,
procurate Committee regulations and to execute them after informing and consulting the Administrative Chiefs and the Military Committee.

Article VII. A chairman shall be installed in the Local Purge Committee and this post shall be concurrently held by the Chairman of the Military Committee. The two vice-chairmanship shall be held concurrently by a permanent member of the Military Committee and the Vice-President of the Administrative Chiefs. The Minister of Military Administration, the Minister of Home Administration, chairman of committees related to them, as well as governors of provinces concerned shall hold concurrent positions as members of the Committee consisting of ten to sixteen persons.

Article IV. The items to be dealt with and investigated by this Committee are as follows:

1. Matters concerning the enactment of both military and administrative laws and regulations for the local purge.
2. Matters concerning liaison between the various organizations from the standpoint of measures to be taken in the local purge.
3. Matters concerning the demarcation of the areas to be purged.
4. Matters concerning the designation of military and police units to be dispatched from the standpoint of executing the local purge.
5. Matters concerning the advice to submitted.
6. Matters concerning the salaries of military and police.
7. Matters concerning the establishment of the conscription corps and the police corps and the organization of the NKVD (Similar to self-defense organization of the T-Caligian).

8. Matters concerning special education and training of people in the areas to be purged.

9. Matters concerning recommendations for the TIAFAC (a block-out tower with the brightest equipment for protection).

10. Matters concerning traffic, communications, and transportation.

11. Matters concerning the blocking of bandit areas.

12. Matters concerning economic control and the establishment of economy with the areas to be purged.

13. Matters concerning the regulation of personnel connected with the military and the administration in the purge.

14. Matters concerning the raising of ordinary and extraordinary expenditures for the execution of the local purge, and the investigation and examination of the budget and settlement of accounts.

15. Matters concerning the supply of arms, ammunition, machinery, and provisions, and matters related to engineering and construction works.

16. Matters put for deliberation by the Chairman.

Article V. In order to administer the affairs of an area to be purged and in order to command and direct the Peace Preservation
Corps and the police, /the Committee/ may divide the area and in each division/ establish a local purge special inspectors' office to supervise this. The organization of the local purge special inspectors' office shall be provided for separately.

Article VI. In order to deal with matters concerning the command and dispatch of troops in an area to be purged, /the Committee/ may establish a staff officer's group of the Military Committee which shall take charge of this. The organization of the staff officer's group of the Military Committee shall be provided for separately.

Article VII. /The Committee/ shall appoint one chief confidential secretary who shall manage the affairs of the Committee under the order of the Chairman and the direction of the Vice-Chairman or deputy chief confidential secretary shall be appointed to assist in this.

Article VIII. The following departments shall be established in this Committee: The first department: Management of affairs pertaining to general affairs. The second department: Management of administrative affairs. The third department: Management of military affairs. The fourth department: Management of affairs pertaining to social welfare.

The organization of each department shall be provided for separately.

Article IX. The Committee may organize various committees as occasion demands.

Article X. This Outline shall be enforced from the day of its promulgation.
It may be added that this outline introduces fundamental policies adopted at the time of the 5th stepping-up operation against the Communist forces and it emphasizes political activi-
ties.

The Headquarters of this Committee has just been founded but, as the special inspecters' office has not yet been established nor has the staff officer's group been organized, we are only in the stage of preparation. The aim of establishing the Committee is, however, to win the hearts of people by stabilizing their daily livelihood; to attain the goal of general peace by strentthening the political power of the new central govern-
ment; and furthermore, to shoulder a portion of the great task of establishing the new order in East Asia. This should be regarded as the most proper policy of adhering to the usual practice of travelling from the near to the distant. Now, at first glance, it may seem to be far from its goal. Comparing the good adminis-
tration of the Hankin Government to the meaningless sacrifices brought about by the desperate resistance of the Chungking regime, the common people will awaken from the false national consciousness, i.e. from the illusion of establishing the state through resistance, into which they were led by the demogogic propaganda from Chungking. They will realize that there is no alternative for CHINA or Chinese people but to choose general peace. Thus, it is likely that the situation will be improved fundamentally. This is a carefully considered plan most pertinent to the occasion.
Pro. Dots and Linc to General Peace.

Mr. Li Shih-ch'ing, the chief secretary of the Committee, in his talk entitled "Begin with the Local Surge Movement" on the 26th of Nov at the Central LIVING CENTER 604, stated that, "It is the greatest and most difficult movement in which we are engaged with a true revolutionary or fighting spirit. It is most encouraging that the realizes both the correctness and the difficulty of the task. He also stated "Why not recruit peace - realized speedily? There are of course a great many and very complicated cause and reasons for this. But the greatest cause is, I think, that the movement for the peaceful establishment of the state has not been 'demonstrated factually' in the local areas. He seems to believe that it is difficult to win the hearts of the people by merely advocating ideal and sound principles, because of very complicated circumstances, there is no alternative but to attract the people through their daily livelihood by building a country where they can live in peace and work in comfort.

Mr. Li also stated in his talk, "It is necessary for a man who has to fight his way to have pure and honest young comrades. Therefore we are going to appoint as many capable young men as we can to be the leaders of the Local Surge Committee." This is a noteworthy and reasonable argument. In the last phase of his speech he said, "During bright prospects which come after hardships. "In short, the local surge movement is to exchange the ideal bill in the peace movement for cash."

- 9 -
If the local purge movement sets a good standard and a fine example, the spirit of the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty can also be established. In other words, such letters as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and respect for the political independence of China, etc., will be stipulated clearly in the provisions of the said treaty. If our local purge movement proves successful, public order established, and economic life improved, the withdrawal of the Japanese troops will be realized without fail and political independence will be attained. Then only can we talk with Japan about sharing responsibility for establishment of the new order in East Asia. At present the areas which are planned to be burned are not extensive, but it is intended to advance them gradually and systematically. The present purge movement consists of very dots and lines. However, if our local purge movement begins with the dots and lines, and tries hard and patiently to combine them, we can obtain some area of surface and finally all of the surface. .... It can not be denied that as the purge movement has now arrived at the present stage, this will serve as the only bright solution for people and the country. Should we undertake the local purge movement now, we can doubtless achieve favorable realities.

x x x x x x x x x x

LI Shin-chun, the Chief Secretary, gave no definite explanation of the "great many and very complicated" obstacles to remedy, which he mentioned. However, since the CHIANG regime and the Communist Party, as a means of expanding their influence,
have both continued their anti-Japanese movements and have fostered a false national consciousness for many years. Many Chinese are of the belief that Japan is going to invade CHINA. It is clear to any man of common sense that it is much more difficult to advocate before such people the salvation of the nation through peace than the establishment of the state through resistance. Although this point is an obstacle to the movement for the salvation of the nation through peace, the lapse of time has shown the real facts. The opinions of those who understood the real intention of our country are gradually gaining power so that advocates of peace have gradually increased in number even within the CH'INGCH'IU regime. We are sure to attain the desired object of the present local purge movement, exposing the demagogic propaganda of the resistance group.

- 11 -
Certificate As To Source and Nature of Document

I, HAYASHI, Kornu, Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Ministry, certify that the document here-to attached written in Japanese, consisting of 9 pages, and described as Local Prefecture Government of the National Government from Shin'etsu No. 244 is a true and accurate copy of excerpts from an official document in custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

14 March 1947
At: TOKYO
/signed/ HAYASHI, Kornu /seal/

The above signature and seal were affixed in my presence.

On the same day.
At the same place.
Witness: /signed/ KITASAWA, Kita /seal/
国民政府主席汪精衛氏は新国民政府成立以来、常に治安の確立と維持
生活の改善に心を用いてきたが、これを積極的に推進するために今
当広大な方策を講じて、治安の改
善は新国民政府成立以来における施政上の
もので、これを治安生活が改善されれば人民は安心楽業が出来、治安生活は自然に進められ
る。治安委員会の主要な職務は人々の治安を確立、治安生活が確立する
ものは自然に進むが、治安生活を改
善する方策は新国民政府成立以来における
生
善するにあるのであって、その責任は非常に大きく使命は非常に重い。
従来の諸郷は政治上の力と軍事上の力とが助け合って行くことが必要であった。国府政府はこれに鑑みて軍事委員会を設置したがこれは独立の長官を置いて編成分子とし、諸郷委員会を特設したがそれは独立の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させ耕地の整理を可の力とを集中して藩政的に従事し農村を安堵を保証させることが必要である。このようにならゆる自立の訓練、藩政実施もまたその基礎は築かれることが必要である。
この委員会は三月二十二日に至り正式に設立し、この旨を三十六日附布された一時委員会臨時組織大綱に定められた。
第5章 清算委員会の設置及び発足に関する事項

1. 清算委員会の設置
2. 清算委員の選任
3. 清算委員会の運営
4. 清算委員会の報告
5. 清算委員会の解散

第六章 清算委員会の運営に関する事項

1. 清算委員会の運営体制
2. 清算委員会の会議
3. 清算委員会の報告書
4. 清算委員会の決裁
5. 清算委員会の研究

第七章 清算委員会の監査に関する事項

1. 清算委員会の監査制度
2. 清算委員会の監査委員
3. 清算委員会の監査報告
4. 清算委員会の監査手順
5. 清算委員会の監査評価
第七条 本会は必要に応じて組織を作り、これを定む。

第八条 本会は必要に応じて常設の組織を作り、これを運営する [

組織は別にこれを定む。

構成員を置く為に組織を作り、これを定む。
化して全面戦争への目的を達成し、さらに東西新秩序建設のための前進を助け、戦争を結びつけるものである。近き将来遠き将来への常道をとった碁盤の上に思いのままに遊ばれるから懸念される。将来の新しい多様性といわれるものが、南京政府の変政と新歩兵の新陳沈謝により、一役人民は常道をは sklりに思いのままに遊ばれるのを懸念されるものと考えられる。

したがって、戦の終結が基本的には改革される可能性をもって、もし回避に
松原再検事長は、各県の知事に、七月二十六日、反共デモに対し、必要な措置を講じることを要請した。これにより、今後の一週間程度の田舎生活が可能となる。
日本の政策を決定するためには、日本が常時の立場を取ることが必要です。日本はその時に立たなければなりません。これにより日本がその立場をとることで、政策が立てられ、合理的な立場をとることができます。
きれいな水と緑の木々が非常に多く、清潔で穏やかな環境の美しさを保っている。自然の恵みを活かして、持続可能な生活を展開している地域が見受けられる。

一方、地域の先駆けとしての役割を果たしている地域も少なくなかった。その地域は、自然環境の保全と地域の経済発展を両立させるため、持続可能な開発道路を模索していた。この地域の取り組みは、地域の持続可能な発展に向けた重要な一歩といえる。

この地域の取り組みは、地域の持続可能な発展に向けた重要な一歩といえる。
On the night of 7 July, 1931, while a part of the unit stationed at KMBP.I, belonging to our stationary troops in China was having night manoeuvres in the northern part of Marco Polo Bridge (about 6 miles south west of PIPPI), it was suddenly fired upon at about 11:40 p.m. by Chinese troops in Marco Polo Bridge. The unit, therefore, stopped the manoeuvres at once, and gathering its strength together, the unit kept watch over the Chinese and promptly reported the matter to the higher authorities.

Regarding the situation as being very serious, the PIPPI unit despatched Colonel HWIL, Mr. K'G Ling-chi, Chief of Wu T'U Province, Mr. Wu Heng-yu, belonging exclusively to the Diplomatic Commission of the North Part of Wu T'U Province and others also went together with the Colonel. Prior to this, the commander of the KMBP.I unit had immediately made a strong protest against the Chinese troops in Marco Polo Bridge for their unjust acts, and requested that the Chinese troops be withdrawn from the area. While the negotiation was going on, however, the Chinese at a little
In this battle, more than ten of our men were killed or wounded, while we are certain that more than twenty men were killed and no less than sixty were wounded on the Chinese side.

The Japs sent forces entered into a state of truce at the earnest appeal from the Chinese. Our side concentrated its strength, and watched the movements of the Chinese troops.

Every place-gate of Peking was closed at 12:20 p.m. on 8th and communication in and out of the city was cut off. At 3 p.m. the city was placed under martial law, CHIHo Yen-Chai (commander of Peiping) being appointed commander of the unit enforcing the martial law. Moreover, some of our infantrymen stayed in the city to protect the Japanese residents and the city was comparatively peaceful.

Arriving at the aer. on the morning of 9th, colonel ORIT went to Biac to make negotiations, but the diplomatic mission insisted, through our Peking agents, on restoring to both sides, the original state and would not consent. At 2 p.m. of the 9th, the Chinese promised to withdraw by 5:00 p.m.
their entire unit in Marco Polo bridge to the right bank of the
YUHTING River. But the truth is that not only did the Chinese
troops around Marco Polo bridge not withdraw even at 6 a.m., but
they were being increased in strength, and resorted to such
violence as to fire now and then at the Japanese troops on the
watch. The Japanese troops therefore were compelled to fight
back to suppress firing from the Chinese side.

As the Japanese forces filed a strong protest against
the Chinese for their non-fulfilment of the agreed term, the
Chinese were compelled to send their brigade commander and his
staff officer to Marco Polo bridge at 7 a.m. on 9th. They were
again requested to withdraw the Chinese unit. As a result,
the Chinese troops, leaving only a small party behind, completed
evacuation to the right coast of the YUHTING River at 12:10 p.m.
The small party left behind was to be replaced by the Public
Defence Preservation Troops upon their arrival.

The Chinese side however, kept making preparations, by
continually increasing its military strength on the west coast
of YUHTING River and by replenishing its ammunition and other
munitions of war. At four o'clock in the afternoon on this day,
the Army Chief of Staff left Peking for YUHTING for negotia-
tion, accompanied by his staff officers.

After dawn of 10th, the Chinese troops on the opposite
side of the YUHTING river committed reckless acts as to fire
now and then at our unit on watch in Marco Polo Bridge. Toward
Def. Sec. No. 034

Evening of the same day, the Chinese troops marching south from the HUAYANG area outrageously occupied SHANGHAI in violation of the agreement made at 8:00 a.m. of the 1st. Then they began to attack the Japanese troops near KSeco Polo bridge. Thereupon Commander CHUENTIKOI resolutely taking a counter attack, gave a smashing blow, and occupied KECOCHILO at about 9 a.m. In this battle our side lost six men, and ten were injured, slightly or seriously.
The army withdrew from LUNG-WAN-1.0 at dawn of the 11th, and concentrated its main forces near WU-HU-1.2, about two kilometers north-east of Marco Polo bridge. At that time, the Chinese unit numbering 700 or 800, equipped with cannons, at 2-2-0-3 and its southern end. At the same time, they increased the strength at C'ING-SI-12 and Marco Polo Bridge, and built positions on the west bank of TUNG-TENG-1.0 and at the end of C'ING-SI-12. Heights. Although its numerical strength was not known exactly, it appeared to be reinforced gradually. Meanwhile the chief of the staff of our stationary troops strove to negotiate successfully with the leaders of the northern part of the HUPEI Province at PEIPING, but as he found no way to settle the problem because of their firm attitude, and the conduct of negotiation appeared to be unavoidable, he finally left PEIPING for the air-field on afternoon of the 11th.

However, the Chinese leaders, finding that our Government and people were strongly determined as a whole, suddenly changed their attitude. At 3:00 p.m., they met with our Negotiating Committee member, H. TSUI, Chief of the Special Institutions, who had remained in PEIPING, and agreed to accept our demands to punish responsible persons to prevent recurrence of such incidents in the future, to withdraw the military forces from Marco Polo Bridge and LUNG-WAN-1.0 and in place with the Public Peace Preservation Troops for maintenance of Peace and order and to restrain anti-Japanese various groups. The agreement was signed by CH. TSU-CHUNG and CH. TSU-CHUNG.
representatives of the 38th army, and handed to our committee.

Our army keeping non-aggression policy now watching how the Chins will carry out their promises, but the fact is that they are repeatedly committing such defiant actions as shooting at our garrison troops as breaking into the village of Jones Polo Bridge, also the Chinese troops near PERO-SIEN are still taking up their positions and their picket line seem to have advanced a little fast with before. More troops and munitions are being transported to the west side of YUNO-TING-NO by the PIN-IY-N Railroad in connection for war. About 11:00 a.m. on the 16th, when a small unit of our garrison troops riding on trucks was passing through SHAN (about three kilometers south of PIN-IY-N), it was outrageously fired upon with machine-gun by Chinese troops (of 37th Division). Our unit inevitably returned the fire, repulsing the enemy, but some of our soldiers were wounded in this strife. The Chinese army, in the meantime, were constructing threefold positions between SRO-83-N and PIN-IY-N Railroad, each end of the position reaching KSI-PILAN-LIU and YUNO-TING-NO. It is made stronger day by day. It seems that a part of 38-N-17-N's unit which had come up north from PEO-ZING arrived at CHI-SHI-PING and both sides of YUNO-TING-NO, the cavalry unit from the south came to the vicinity of LIANG-SI (about 10 kilometers south-east of YUNO-TING along PING-IY-N Railroad).

In the walled city of PHNO, there was an unforeseen
intense anti-Jap feeling among Chinese soldiers and official and two Japanese military policeman were arrested. Chinese soldiers frequently trespassed the border of our villages and maltreated our women and children. The general feeling of unrest reached its climax and the people successively evacuated for refuge from the West City to the East City or to TIEFSEN.

The above is mainly the status of affairs in the districts concerned. As for the HUNG Government, it has shown an extremely undisguised intention of using force against Japan. Among other things, immediately after the outbreak of the incident, the HUNG government ordered the air forces to get prepared for mobilization and, by announcing that a force consisting of four divisions would be dispatched to the north, encouraged the HUNG authorities to put up a decisive resistance against Japan. The HUNG Government had also been expressing in propaganda campaign, it falsely accused Japan as being responsible for the incident, announced and propagated abroad that the Japanese were preparing for territorial aggression by maneuvering -- an act which was nothing but an exercise of our treaty right -- and demanded the local authorities immediately send photographs showing persons killed and wounded and buildings destructed by Japanese bombardment.

On the other hand, looking into the HUNG Government's policy, it was clear that, the Government, which facially made efforts for a break in the diplomatic deadlock and for negotiation...
Düf. U O C  . i'iO  . Jb-i
Sino-Japanese cooperation, was deliberately acting to the contrary
in the wake of the Japan-Soviet Takuichi treaty and the advanced
preparations for war against excesses. Despite a more violently
than ever, the anti-Japanese feeling among its officials on
people. It must not be forgotten that the arguments coming out
of our internal problems and held that Japan would never take
a decisive attitude against China. But to the divergence of
the views of

As a result, the Chinese people in general were not
illumined to take such as being easy to deal with. The
situation was such that the frequent murder cases of
Japanese nationals have occurred since August last year. The
Central Government again was making persistent effort to provoke
ill-feelings against Japan and conclude by appealing to the
middle-ranking offices of the High Army which was in charge
of maintaining peace and order in North China, as well as the
university students and others. Thus the anti-Japanese movements,
which became more active, now invested with continuous and
war-like nature. All in all, there was no longer any room for
doubt that the present incident had been caused by the combined

Since the outbreak of the incident, the Imperial Government
holding fast to its non-aggressive policy has made strenuous
efforts for bringing the matters to a local settlement. Never-
ever, in the face of the above-mentioned China's attitude, totally
lacking in sincerity, and also in view of the situation in which the safety of lives and properties of foreign nationals have been extremely endangered, the Japanese government deemed it absolutely necessary to take measures to cope with the situation and also to get a positive guarantee against future unlawful, counteractive, and anti-Japanese activities, trusting that this was the only justifiable way for maintaining peace and order in the P.I.R.E.S.T. Thus the Cabinet decided on the 11th to dispatch the troops to North China. Foreign Minister immediately went to E.M.I. to report the matter to the Emperor for his approval. However, as the maintenance of peace in the Orient was the Empire’s sincere desire, it was a matter of course that the Empire would never give up efforts for peaceful negotiation to prevent any aggravation of the situation hoping that the Chinese would promptly dismiss the phantom of pro-Communism and antagonism against Japan and Manchuria, for bringing about an amicable settlement of the situation.

This point as well as the measures taken by the Japanese government for the perfect protection of the Foreign interests in China was made clear to the government’s announcement of the 14th.

Further, on the 18th July it was publicly announced by the Ministry that in view of the present situation in North China, it was decided that our unit of troops would be dispatched there from Japan.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, "X.Y.Z", Ōoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Document Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Circumstances Regarding the Dispatch of Troops to North China," contained in Number 40 of the Soō, is an exact and true copy of an extract from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Foreign Ministry.)

Certified at Tokyo.

On this 37th day of February, 1947

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereafter in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: S. J, Takegorō (seal)
軍は支那軍の退却を追って進むに待つと、長崎の戦いが行われたので、支那軍は

軍参謀長は長崎に共に交渉の為に天津発北平に同った。

十一日尾張以北の河口対岸の支那兵は、時々青海砲附の我軍を攻撃したが、この夜は、高門口方面に進軍せ

我方は護死火大名、木間副大名が去った。

主力は玉名海軍を北方の二李五里呉西

東


大正時代の日本では、社会における女性の地位が大きく変化し、女性の労働が広く認められるようになりました。この変化は、女性の教育機会の増加や、女性労働者の雇用などの形で表れました。女性の労働者としての地位は、社会全体の発展にとっても重要でした。

一方、女性の労働は、社会の経済を支え、家庭の生活を支えることもありました。女性労働者の労働時間は長く、生活の必需品を提供するための努力を払っていました。しかし、女性労働者の生活環境や労働条件は、男性労働者に比べて劣っていました。

今もなお、女性の労働については、さらに改善が求められています。女性の労働者の権利を尊重し、その努力を評価する社会を築くことが重要です。
日敗と戦争を勃発する際策に於て、私は大元流に、末てに保下の自衛を取る。爾に反省し、友に若し、時を守る。
文部省出所観成立ニ於スル証明書

日本

ハ外務省文書課長ニ於テハル者ナルヲテ

ルハ日本政府ニ於テハル者ハルモノ

ルハシナルコトヲ証明ス

昭和二十二年二月二十七日

於東京

佐藤

武五郎

9
The "Shuko" compiled by the Information Bureau and published July, the 11th year of Shawa (1937), as it appeared in Shako No. 45.

The Government Statement on The Deployment of Troops,
(July 11th)

The Japanese army in China, in quiet observation of anti-Japanese acts repeated by the Chinese people, was forced to collide with the Chinese 25th Army which had likewise been arraying with our Army the duty of maintaining the peace of North China, having been provoked by illegal shots fired from it in the vicinity of Shanghai on July 7th at midnight. And this brought about a very strained situation in the districts of Peking and Tientsin with the result that our residents there were driven to the brink of peril. We were, however, not in despair of settling the incident peacefully and made efforts to settle it locally based on following the principle of not allowing the incident to spread. The 25th Army, though it had once agreed to our proposal for peaceful settlement of the matter, and the Opposition to attack our forces abruptly on the night of July 10th resulting in death and injury to quite a number of our soldiers again. Moreover China furthered warlike preparations against us by incessantly increasing the number of troops at the front, moving the force at Shanghai, March South, and ordering the Central Army to the front. At the same time she showed no sincerity in negotiating with us amicably and finally went so far as to
Dec. Dec. 9 985

repeulate all negotiations made between us in Peking. Judging from the facts mentioned above, there is no room for doubt that this incident is nothing but an instance of anti-Japanese movements with arms purposely planned by China.

I think it is not necessary for me to say here that the maintenance of the peace in North China is of course urgently necessary for Japan and Manchuria; it is requisite for the maintenance of peace in East Asia that China make apologies to Japan for her anti-Japanese acts, not to speak of illegal acts that she has committed, and give appropriate assurance against similar acts in the future.

Accordingly, at a Cabinet council held today the government made an important resolution deciding to take requisite measures with respect to dispatching troops to North China.

The maintenance of peace in East Asia is, however, regarded as ever by our empire, and so the government does not despair in peacefully negotiating with China to prevent the expansion of this incident and hopes for smooth settlement of the incident which can be made effective by China's prompt reflection, and again as for the preservation of the interests of the latter's adequate consideration shall be given just as before.
Certificate of Authenticity

I, the undersigned the part of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section in the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Government statement on the Despatch of Troops" which appeared in the weekly (No. 4) on 22nd April 1947 in a correct and true copy of the excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (The Foreign Office) certified at Tokyo on the 27th day of February, 1947.

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed此处 filling the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date.

witness: [Signature]

3
Transl. No. 7985

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Nakamoto, of the Defence Language Branch, hereby
certify that the foregoing translation enclosed in the above certifi-
cate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct trans-
lation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Nakamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date: 11 April 1947
派兵に当たる政専明（七月十一日）
派兵に関わる政専明

相属く文書関の対白行為に対し支那駐屯軍は感忍顧み中の遼海北部と壊滅

した支那の治安に恵じありし第二十九駐の七月七日放牛上遼海附近に於ける
不法射殺に騒を余し、該軍と対立の己をなきに至りし。我方平和遠くの誠を棄てて不
速し見に我軍に相当の死傷を生すれば至らしめ、突如七月十日夜に至り、彼は不法射殺
遠くの誠を棄てて和平的

に至らしつつあり、以上のが支持に到り今次立派は全く支那関の計画的放射

を
思ふに北太陽光の照耀が常に改めてあり、とあり難くの決定をなすべきなり、
若し所要は高等のォローや前件の厚手は必要の仮によらしむるごと
に於て合意はかなるものに決せり、
次に所要は高等の厚手を前件の厚手に合せものなり。
Government Declaration (Issued 1:10 A.M., 15 Aug.)

Our Empire has long been striving to promote national friendship and collaboration between Japan and China with a view to securing permanent peace in East Asia. However, the Imperial Government has been using an anti-Japanese policy to agitate public opinion and to strengthen her political power. Overconfidence in her own strength, her tendency to clip the potentialities of our Empire and her Bolshevistic tendency have caused her to take an extreme anti-Japanese attitude and she is bent on antagonizing Japan. Every unfortunate incident which has occurred during recent years has been due to these causes. The outbreak of the present incident is but a result of China's taking such an attitude. The fact that the incident broke out on the banks of the Yen River is merely incidental. Atrocities not to be countenanced by God or man committed at Trench were motivated by the same causes. Moreover, because of the challenging actions on the part of the Chinese, the life and property of the Japanese nationals in Central and Southern China have been endangered and, regrettably, our residents were forced to leave temporarily their peaceful residential areas which were established after many years of hardship. In the past, as often occurred since the occurrence of the incident, our Empire has been extremely patient and has adopted a policy of not extending the incident. Its intention has been, as much as possible, to localize and bring the incident to a close peace-
fully. Even when dealing with the illegal actions and provocations often made by the Chinese Army in the district of Peking and Tientsin, our frontier army in China acted only in self-defense and were absolutely necessary for maintaining lines of communications and for protecting our residents. In spite of the fact that the Imperial Government continued the Peking Government to discontinue immediately her aggressive words and actions and not to interfere in our attempts to solve the incident locally, the Peking Government not only ignored our advice, but on the contrary made further provocations for us against us, shamelessly violated the still existing military pact, and threatened our frontier troops by moving their army northward.

In Hankow, Shanghai, and other places, they made very clear their defiant attitude by massing soldiers. In Shanghai, they first opened fire on us and went so far as to bomb warships of our Empire.

Since China has thus shown her contempt for our Empire and committed illegal actions and atrocities to such an extent, and inasmuch as the life and property of our residents are endangered, Japan has finally reached the limit of her patience and she is now forced to resort to resolute action to bring sense to the Peking Government by punishing the atrocious Chinese Army. For Japan, to whom peace in East Asia and co-existence and co-prosperity between China and Japan is most desirable, this is most regrettable. Still, what our Empire hopes for is collaboration between Japan and China. That she desires is to eradicate the anti-Japanese and anti-foreign movements in China, root out the
causes of such unfortunate incidents, and effectuate a collaboration of Japan, Manchukuo and China. Japan has no territorial ambitions whatsoever. Japan harbours no hostile feelings towards the innocent common people, but she intends to induce the Peking Government and the Nationalist Party, which have been instrumental in creating the antagonistic attitude of the Chinese people towards Japan, to see the light. It is needless to say that Japan will do her best to respect the rights and interests of all countries.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IN AUTHORITY

I, TAKASHI MECRU, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Document Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Government Declaration and Secret in the Weekly Report No. 20" is an exact and authorized extract from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,
or this 27th day of February 1947.

/s/ TAKASHI MECRU (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, or this same date.

Witness: /s/ SATO Takeshiro (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Arthur A. "Isaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the following translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. "Isaki

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 10, 1947.
昭和十二年八月（一九三七年）

（八月十五日午前十一時十分発電）

支持するものに心をなげり。

支那に於て支那領の消滅的行いに際し支那領民の反逆を助ける陶思は、帝国内の自由を守るべきものである。支那領民の生命を尊重して支那領民に恩を発せたるに換り貧困を支す所に、支那領民は支那領民の生活を守るべきものである。
ガバ、一月十七日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月十六日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月十八日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月十九日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十一日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十二日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十三日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十四日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十五日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十六日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十七日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十八日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月二十九日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭

一月三十一日ニハ中国文化仏設倉ノ主題デ普諭
页码：3

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1. [此项内容]
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4. [此项内容]
日付: 9月27日

[手書きの文書内容]

13
"SNHFC" compiled by the Information Bureau.
Issued in August, 1977.
Contained in the "SNHFC" No. 40.
Anti-Japanese Body in China.
(The Information Section of the Foreign Ministry.)

It was in 1898, forty calendar years ago, when the first boycott of foreign goods broke out in China. This affair was regarding the problem of removing their crew card. The group of the MING-FO people in Shanghai made trouble with the French residents so that trade with France was stopped. Subsequently, the United States was victimized, and in 1906, a group of merchants in Shanghai, the issue of the immigration problem, were the first to spring up and their attitude influenced the Central and South China. This was the outset of the nation-wide boycott. Then in 1909, three years later, Japan was the third target of their boycotts. It was a boycott caused by the well-known "LATE NAVY II Incident". This event occurred when the TATSUWARI II, owned by the KCBP TATSUWA CO. was on her direct route to YACAO from KOREA. She was loaded with arms and ammunition ordered by a five-arms merchant in Yacao at the request of the ATFA CO. in Hongkong and she was anchored temporarily in the Tsuiia Bay because of an unfavorable tidal condition, when she was captured by a Chinese gunboat and towed away to Canton.
It was settled after negotiation through concessions by the Chinese. However, the public opinion in South China blamed the Government for their weak stand, and the boycotting of Japanese goods occurred.

China, who once realized the effectiveness of a boycott has often carried it out ever since. As shown in the following table, 11 nation-wide boycotts have been carried out up to 1931 when the Manchurian Incident occurred.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Boycotted Country</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>The Anti-Chinese Acts Immigration Laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Tatsumaru II Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>AN-FYW reconstruction Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>The so-called 21 Demands Affair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>The Chantung Affair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Zushun and Dairen Recovery Affair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>The May 30th Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>The May 30th Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>The Chantung expedition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-9</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>The Chu-yi Incident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cases out of eleven new anti-Japanese boycotts. The shorter ones lasted for a few months and the longer for a year and a few months. At first, they began with measures such as to refuse to buy Japanese goods, to sell them to Chinese, to use them, and furthermore, to stop all transactions with Japanese. Then they gradually adopted more severe measures to put pressure upon merchants who dealt in Japanese goods, confine them in cells to expose them to the public gaze, parade them through the city, and so on. Besides, they invented such a subtle means as the anti-Japanese education to beat the idea of hating Japan as their enemy into the soft heads of the young generation.

After the Manchurian Incident this tendency became more strong. The name of "the anti-Japanese Society" was changed "the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association". Soon after the Manchurian Incident, the racial jealousy being regarded primary and boycotting, secondary.

It was the adoption of the new principles and the new tactics of the Comintern in 1925, in other words, the formation of the People's Front to resist Japan, that strengthened this tendency.
Of course, the Anti-Japanese leadership by the Comintern is not of recent origin. In the first place, because of the existence of Anti-Imperialistic movement in China, the Comintern fixed its eyes upon China. Because it was the principle of the Comintern practice to actively guide and help this movement, whereby it pressed and organized the people, there has been undoubtedly an institution of the Comintern and their agents in China; that is, the Chinese communists behind the Anti-Japanese movements, since their evil hand reached out to China. For example, we know the fact that at the general strike in Shanghai in May 1925 (the so-called May 30th Incident) the representatives of the Comintern organized the strike committee and took over the leadership, managing to raise strike funds. Though the Comintern was continued to take such obstinate measures for anti-Japanese guidance, their principal efforts have been made to establish the policy of relying upon warlike measures to lead the Chinese Communist party which was their branch in China. In other words, it was their policy to strengthen the Communist Army, to enlarge the Soviet sphere by it and thereby to overthrow the government of the national party. Consequently, the anti-Japanese guidance became secondary.

However, the time came then this principle of relying upon the warlike measures at last failed, because CHANG FAI-SU's obstinate assault against the Communists' Army and the Soviet
Districts had its effect slowly but steadily. The fall of
MINYUN (KINGSI-Province), the seat of the Chinese Soviet,
was realized, and the Communist Army was driven into the
corner of North-western China.

In these circumstances, the Comintern and Chinese
Communists' Party, having perceived that the plan of relying
upon the war-like measures was not dependable, restored their
original aspect of the Communist movement and established a
plan to secure the masses in the cities, reorganizing them and
with their backing to bring pressure against the Kuomintang
and the National Government in order to force them to compromise
and collaborate with the Communists Party.

But to carry out this measure, they had to have some sign
for uniting the people and they had to get hold of something
which the people were universally conscious. Conveniently for
them, the anti-Japanese consciousness prevailed among the
Chinese nation. Having considered that it was the best way to
grasp this consciousness, they decided at the 7th Comintern-
Mass-Meeting to form the People's Front internationally and
proposed that especially in China the Anti-Japanese Front be
emphasized.

To dish out this new policy and new strategy, a pamphlet
entitled "A Note Appealing to the Brethren of the Whole Nation
to Rescue the Country by Opposing Japan" was published by the
Chinese Communists Party in August of 1935. About June of
1936, approximately one year later, Anti-Japanese People's Front
was formed which cut across a broad swath of the people. If
we mention the main Anti-Japanese groups included in the Front
and classified according to social stratum, they are as follow:

(1) Students - Since the 5-4 demonstration incident in
which the home of Tsuy Ju Lin, a pro-Japanese, was burned by
Peking students on 4 May, 1931) the part taken by students in
anti-Japanese social demonstrations has been extremely great. It was the
students who were first to respond to the announcement of the
Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed the great
demonstration of Peking students in December of 1935 was the
warning light for the formation of the Front. There are
organizations of Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association
in every college, university, middle school, and they have gone
so far as to have them even in the primary schools. These are
further banded together by districts in such things as the
League of Peking Student National Salvation Associations.

(2) Cultural Circles - Cultural Circles National

Apart from the students, professors of college and
universities, and teachers of middle and primary schools also
have their National Salvation Associations.

- 6 -
Salvation Associations were formed in all districts under the leadership of professors of colleges and universities, lawyers, and journalists. Among these associations is the Shanghai National Salvation Association of Cultural Circles. The well-known leaders of the People's Front, Wu Han-fu, Chang Fa-chi, etc., took this association as their starting point.

(3) Literary Circles - The association of Chinese writers, the cultural association, etc., which grew up in Shanghai belong to these circles. Literary men, critics, journalists, actors of the new drama, and film people are generally included therein.

(4) Commercial and Industrial Circles - The association of businessmen's National Salvation Association, etc. belong to their circles.

(5) Industrial Circles. There are organizations of workers' National Salvation Associations in Shanghai and in almost all other large cities.

(6) Independent Circles - The National Salvation Association generally has its organ (paper), but beside these professional anti-Japanese magazines managed by anti-Japanese journalists have sprung up like bamboo shoots after a rain-fall. "Education in the National Crisis" by T.C.-37, "Life of the Masses", and "Life Weekly Magazine" by D.C.U.-37, etc. are famous among them. The "National Salvation Review", which is published in Paris is the anti-Japanese leadership organ of the Chinese Communist Party and C.C.-31.
the number one theorist of the party, writes for every number of it.

(7) Military Circles: The 15th and the 20th army corps, north-western army, and the Kungshi army all compose one wing of the front.

(8) Political Circles: Chinese National Revolutionary Alliance and the Chinese National-Revolutionary executive committee both belonging to the Social Democratic party, are a faction of the front. In June of 1926, the All-China National Salvation Association of All Circles was formed. Almost all anti-Japanese groups joined with the exception of the military circles. This is the greatest anti-Japanese group, and has been acting most vigorously at the head of the front since its formation.

The "Big Seven" of the People's Front, FEN QIEN-YU, CHANG MAI-CHI, TENG-TOU-FEN, TENG CHIEN-FU, TAO FENG CHU and SHIH-IU (woman lawyer) who instigated the strike of the Japanese cotton spinning industry in Shanghai last November and were finally arrested for it are all either standing committee members or committee men of the "Ten Kyu Pen" / T. "The Relief Association of the Whole Country /

The above seems to comprehend the principal communist and left-wing anti-Japanese groups, but anti-Japanese groups are not a monopoly of the "left" alone. They are also among the "right". Speaking of the "right" in China, we mean the groups of the Kuomintang and their anti-Japanese leadership
was at first more influential than that of the Communists. It was at its height during the first part of the Manchurian Incident. But at length CHING KAI-SIEN came to carefully consider the relation to Japan, and after that anti-Japanese sentiment became negative for a time. However, it soon regained its original aspect, and today the left and the right are united and are advocates on the same anti-Japanese path. Since the Sian Incident of last year that impression is particularly strong.

The first to be mentioned as a right-wing anti-Japanese group is the Blue Shirt Society. Its principal object being to make China fascist, this secret society was formed in 1932 /SOWA 7/ as a personal party of CHING KAI-SIEN, and at the beginning emphasized the exclusion and oppression of China's political enemies, or the elimination of the Communists. However, it has intensified its anti-Japanese colour since the middle of 1935 /SOWA 8/. One of the most remarkable examples is the incident in which the Blue Shirt Society in North China assassinated MR. PII YU HSIU, head of the pro-Japanese pro-Manchukuo press in Fientsin, and MR. "W. W. H", obtaining the support of the headquarters of the Kuomintang, the Third Division of the Military Police and the Military Training Institution attached to the Military Association, etc. Our North China Garrison Army strongly protested against this, and consequently, the "Man-Po Weng Chin Post" was established. By this post the headquarters of the Kuomintang was closed and
In the wake of the incident, the Blue Shirt Society was driven from North China, but it burrowed underground and reappeared again in North China actively inciting the anti-Japanese movement. One of the reasons why the North China Incident occurred is surely in the activity of this Blue Shirt Society.

The second "right wing machine" is the C.C. group. It consists of literary men led by the brothers, CHUN LI-FU and CHUN KHU-FU. It differs from the Blue Shirt Society, a party of armed men, in that it does not stoop to assassination, but they harbour no less inveterate anti-Japanese sentiment than the former. The construction of Fascist theories and anti-Japanese theories are their strong points.

Here we shall speak further of the anti-Japanese groups in North China where this incident occurred. The chief groups are (1) the National Relief Association of various circles in North China, (2) The Hope Farmers National Relief Association, (3) The Spearhead Force for the Emancipation of the Chinese People (4) The National Relief Association of the Students in Peiping and Tsentsin, (5) The Peiping Minority Students' Front Line Service Group, (6) The National Relief Society of the Culture Circle in Peiping and Tsentsin, (7) The National Relief Society of the Worker in Peiping, (8) The Society for the Study of New Characters, (9) The Literary Discussion Meeting, (10) the Military Committee, etc. Anti-Japanese groups are mostly composed of educational circles.
because Peking is the capital of China. Those which are considered the most powerful are: The national relief Society of the Cultur Circle to which the professors of the Peking University, T.C Chi Chia, and Chou-Chun Chi belong; The Specialised Force for the Participation of the Chinese People, being directly under the "North Section of the Chinese Young Men's Communist Association, and serving as its main propur; and the Military Committee (the best trained element of which are really acting in the midst of the army) that is, doing its best to magnify the anti-Japanese sentiment in the 20th Army, etc. In addition to those, the Blue Shirt Society of the right wing, etc, also joined and made desperate efforts to incite anti-Japanese sentiment. As was expected, the most aggravating back-ground of the "North China Incident" has been derived from their operations.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kenru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Document Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 9 pages and entitled "Kimi-Japanese Body in China", contained in number 42 of the SIHO, is an exact and true copy of an excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of February, 1947

HAYASHI, Kenru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness:

at the same place,
on this same date.

WITNESS: SAITO, Takegoro
(seal)
たちの日暮れに、日本近辺の一切の目を中止する、さぢれた
ような世の中から始まった。日暮れを投げて、最も面倒な
日本近辺を引き拔き、 bergen は大分無能になっているが
日本人民に願望の念を
込めざるをえぬかたち手かけで
日本人民の義筋が
清廃の後になることを
案じて、抗日指導は
抗戦指導תה
のうれずらやうになって
反抗指導とは何の
ものでなかった。

もも バルタルンクが
抗战指導を
したのは、戦争に
反抗するものだけで
ない。

そうしてあったからで
あり、軍の
この四月を
指導、愛助して
立て民家を
等し、これを指導するに
いよいよのが、バルタルンク
の行動を
事業に
あったの
です。
だから、その手が支配に及ぼされているという、支那共産党の活動があるためで、共产
を容れない。一例を挙げると、三〇事変の際、支那共産党の指導が、支那共産党
と呼ばれた外、支那共産党の指導者の多くは大暹にあって、共産党の指導を支
しているさんが、一九二五年五月の上海総監察（所謂五
を指示するに当つって、主力を注ぐのは、先ず大暹を崩し、その後に崩
って来たのだが、やがて共産党の指導者を崩して来たということ。
そして、これらの指導者を指導するに当つて、主力を注ぐのは、先ず支那を崩し、その後に崩
って来たのだが、やがて共産党の指導者を崩して来たこと。
こうした指導者の指導者を指導するに当つて、主力を注ぐのは、先ず大暹を崩し、その後に崩
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って来たのだが、やがて共産党の指導者を崩して来たこと。
文化界、大学教授、教育実務者、記者等が中心となって、各地の文化界関係者の団体が成立した。その中で一等地名のあるのは上海文化界救國団体で、沈約等、

南文界上海に出来る中日文教家協として文教工作家一派、著作人協会などがこれに属する。南文界上海は各種の文化界団体に大抵の激を何より多く持っているが、それ以外に抗日デ

ナリストの発行者の一日報教育、報紙の一大衆生活は中日共産党の抗日指導機関として、
今年の今日に、全国各校教員・労働者等の一分会が組織された。これが最大の抗日団体である。上海邦人総連会会員の筆者がこの日を祝し、終に署名された人民反戦七五反テロ報告書を成立させるために呼びかけている。
右翼系抗日団体として第一に挙げられるのは義勇社である。支部をファッショ化することを第一の目的とし、常備石の私密として「一九三三年に成立したこの秘密結社は、最初の同は現在の政治的派閥乃至雇用、共産系の顕露に貢献をさせていたのであるが、一九三五年の中頃から抗日的色彩を強くして来た。共の最も著しい例は、北支那の義勇社が国民党の義勇社を組織した事件である。これに対し、我が北方部より軍からの義勇性の武人派とは違二、直撃・略奪などに手を下さない。「好戦派」の理論を組織してこり、
General Remarks

The establishment of Manchukuo has brought about a fundamental revolution in the economic organization of Manchuria. Prior to the founding of this state, the old Manchurian economy was subservient and colonial, Manchuria being the so-called three Easter Provinces of China. There was completely lacking a unified will of the state toward economics, an ardent consideration of the popular well-being on the part of the state. It was left in a feudalistic relationship as an object for convenient exploitation by the war lords.

The new state expects to accomplish the historical task of destroying and eliminating the old organization or relationships and of forming a new organically unified, a non-subservient national economy.

An economic structure and plan which we are designing in the effort to realize our lofty ideal should be founded upon a careful study of the inevitable tendencies in various capitalistic countries and in the world economy of which the economy of this country forms a part and also upon an accurate knowledge concerning the possibilities and probabilities contained within the economic society of our own country.

We will modify the capitalistic laissez faire policy in applying it to our domestic economic activities, that is to say, we will place such activities as will greatly affect the peoples' life under the positive state control and supervision and thereby intentionally plan and create a national economy.
which represents a skilful synthesis of laissez faire and control. By such a policy none of the energy of human activities would be exhausted and the selfish desires and monopoly of interest and resources by the few would be restricted.

Recent trends in world economy show a drift away from the principle of free trade to that of autonomous economy and an effort toward self-contained economy. This is not a return to an isolationist economy, but a move toward the formation of a bloc economy with friendly nations.

Harmonious cooperation in the economic field between our country and Japan is but one event in the inevitable process of world economy. It is destined that this will further expand so as to include all the countries of the Orient.

The aims of our industrial policy consist on the one hand of the development of basic national defense resources and, on the other, of promoting the prosperous development of agriculture and live-stock breeding. In order to attain these aims and elevate and refine our stationary society, an industrial revolution is necessary through the development of chemical and manufacturing industries based upon raw material provided by agriculture and live-stock breeding. This is the great possibility as well as probability which this country possesses. A march toward this industrial revolution surely should be our industrial slogan and these two aims provide a field where the economics of Manchukuo and Japan can be made to join and harmonize with each other.

Furthermore, in view of the great influence which the water utilization economy will exercise upon the economic society of this country, a fundamental investigation is being
conducted in regard to the improvement of waterways and public works concerning water utilization. And shortly hereafter, great enterprises are expected to be actualized along these lines.

A plan for the establishment of a large scientific research institute is now being rushed forward for the purpose of furnishing scientific knowledge and technique as are necessary for the successful carrying out of the industrial revolution and also in pursuance of an ideal to promote the culture and happiness of Oriental peoples by the scientific research on the Asiatic continent.

The work of redeeming the old paper currencies which were in a chaotic condition has been progressing satisfactorily, and, with the adjustment of the Ma-tai Yuan and Jehol currencies, the unification of the national currency will soon be completed. And now three tasks of restoration of peace and order, firm establishment of a financial system and unification of currency which were looked upon by the world as most difficult are about to reach their successful consummation. It may be said that with these foundations laid, all business enterprises, large and small, in the fields of economy and industry are now in the process of accomplishing the historic aims of the state.
Except from Fundamental Principles
Administration Promulgated by the
State Council of Honshu, March 1, 1884.

Pages 51 to 62

I. Communication

1. Postal Administration.

With the postal administration of the province of Honshu being
taken over after the pacification thereof in 1883, the government
has accomplished the unification of postal administration. In
addition to restoring the postal organs and their business as well
as to perfect their system, efforts are further being made toward the
improvement of facilities and equipment and reduction of fees in
order to increase the use of services of the postal system.

1. Postal saving service was opened on May 1, 1886, with the
facilities for savings by the common people, the yearly inter-


3. Foreign mail rates have been reduced from two to one five
yen to one for a letter and the to five yen to six yen
for a post card, as of January 1, 1884.

4. Honshu-Japan air mail rates were raised from three to
three to five yen for a letter and from one to five
yen to one to eight yen for a post card, as of January 1,
1884.
Excerpt from Fundamental Principles of Administration Proclaimed by the State Council of Ministers, March 1, 1934.

Pages 41 to 52

IV Communication

1. Postal Administration.

From the postal administration of the province of Sendai being taken over after the pacification thereof in 1933, the government has accomplished the unification of postal administration. In addition to restoring the postal service and their business as well as to perfect their system, efforts are further being made toward the improvement of facilities and equipment and reduction of fees in order to increase the use and services of the postal system.

1. Postal saving service was opened on May 1, 1933, with the facilities for savings by the common people, the yearly interest rate being 3.6 percent for ordinary savings and 5.4 percent for deferred savings accounts.

2. Parcel post rates between Japan and Manchuria were reduced on September 15, 1934.

3. Foreign mail rates have been reduced from two to five fen to one fen for a letter and one to five fen to six fen for a post card, as of January 1, 1934.

4. Manchukuo-Japan air mail rates were raised from three to three to five fen for a letter and from one to five fen to one to eight fen for a post card, as of January 1, 1934.
5. Mail rates have been reduced from four ten to three ten for a letter and from two ten to one and a half ten for a post card as of March 1, 1934.

6. The number of post offices will be increased according to the conditions of development of localities, especially, the enlargement of postal organs in the former and increase in the number of post offices handling foreign mails are to be made.

7. Business handled by the post office will be expanded and adjusted, and by opening the handling telegraphic money orders, money orders and transfers of savings, increased services will be offered to the public.

8. International air mail services and other postal services will be advanced and improved, and efforts will be made to make closer the link with foreign countries.
\[ (\text{Translated by OFT}) \]

The Deep Impression Given by the Imperial Forces.

**Foreman in Hankow:** The Imperial forces to visit its neighbors from Hankow.

**Hankow, 5th, by special correspondent Yano**

Within only two days after the Imperial army had broken into Hankow, their long awaited destination, they completed the rapping-up operations and since the 27th, the city has been placed under the guard of the Sano and Wakahatsu units. Not only the defense of the banks against the enemy's flooding plan but also the protection of the important buildings in the city, sanitation and the preservation of peace are so perfect and ideal that, since the occupation by the Imperial army no fires or looting, spoliation have taken place in the city. Not only the Chinese but also many foreigners shed tears of joy for the kind attitude of the Imperial army.

A pleasant story was told concerning the foreigners who had been so impressed by the outstandingly perfect guarding on the part of our forces and started a movement to have the part of the Imperial army, which was scheduled to be transferred from the foreign settlement there in alternation with another unit, remain in its present place. The details of the story are as follows:

As soon as the Imperial army entered Hankow a certain unit led by captain Hik0 Yoshida (from KAGOSIMA Prefecture) of 360 Butai, commanded the British troops the duty of guarding the third special area (the former British Concession). As to the way their performing their guard duty, discipline was maintained with strictness, and nothing was looted. They treated the foreign residents very properly, and they were far more humane than the Chinese army toward the others. The foreigners, who had not known that the Japanese army might do such thing, to admire the manner of guarding on the 360-Butai who were both humane and helpful.

But 360-Butai was ordered to move to a certain district on a certain mission. At this news, the foreigners sent a formal petition to the Army authorities. It was as follows:

"We respect the group unit which has been so friendly to us should be leaving. Can't anything be done to suspend your move? To ask the favor of you, it least to permit the 360-Butai stay."

This was delivered from the authorities to 360-Butai. It was really a beautiful episode, but this EPMA could do nothing on the movement had already been so decided upon by the military authorities and the foreigners were greatly disappointed.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the article attached, written in Japanese, consisting of one page and entitled, "The deep impression given by the Imperial Forces. Foreigners entreat the Imperial Army to suspend its movement from Hankow" is an excerpt from the MINAI SHUKEI in 1933, Nov. and which has been thereafter in my custody.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 6th day of April, 1947

/s/ S.J.0 torita (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: /s/ M'ANARI Yasutaro (seal)
I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clark (Seal)

Tokyo, Japan
Date 6th May 1947
#### 第二节 现代大写

我们今天介绍的是大写。大写是一种字体，常用于标题、关键词以及正式场合。

大写的特点包括：

- **清晰可读**：大写字母比小写字母更醒目，容易被注意到。
- **正式场合**：在正式文件、公文和出版物中广泛使用。
- **视觉冲击力**：大写可以增加文本的视觉效果，吸引读者的注意力。

在使用大写时，需要注意以下几点：

- **正确使用**：根据语境和需求选择使用大写。
- **避免过度**：过度使用大写可能会影响阅读体验。

通过合理使用大写，可以提升文档的专业性和可读性。
On November 13th I returned to Shanghai and learned from a private telegram that the emperor had left Tientsin for Manchuria.

The Chinese endeavoured to make out that the emperor had been kidnapped by the Japanese and carried off against his will. This statement was widely circulated among Europeans, many of whom believed it; but it was wholly untrue. The extraordinary statements recently published to the effect that the emperor and empress had telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking and to Chang Hsueh-liang at Peking "asserting their loyalty and asking for sanctuary" are equally false. So is the allegation that the emperor had "sworn a pact with his wife to commit suicide before he would consent to be king of Manchuria." I need hardly say that the last persons in the world to whom the emperor would have appealed for sanctuary were Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang; and that had he wished to escape from the danger of being kidnapped and carried off to Manchuria, all he had to do was to walk on board a British steamer bound for Shanghai. His loyal and devoted servant Chêng Hsiao-hsü was most emphatically not his jailor. He left Tientsin and went to Manchuria of his own free will, and his faithful companions were Chêng Hsiao-hsü (now his prime minister) and his son Chêng Ch'ui.
十一月十三日には上海に騒がれ、私は自己の意思に反して被難されたのは、皇帝が既に天津を
出出して数日、向って三日を過ごしたことを知った支那人はつさめて、皇帝が日本人に
誘導された彼の意志に反して被難されたのだろう云はんさせた。然
しそれは全く誤りである。

近臨時近明に依って皇帝と皇后が南京の婿介石と北京の張景良に打
観して彼等の忠誠を明言し、彼等を依頼したさいのことも同様に騒りで
する様なことはあつたからその前に出殺しようとを誓約したさいの言明も発

四 四 九 番 一 頭 五
倫 ロ ン ジ ン ド ニ ャ
レ ギ ナ ル ド・エ フ ジ ョ ニ ス ト ヌ
著
人の間である者であることを知り、彼がさらわれて藩主へ拉致される危険かられんと欲したなら彼の命を守るべきことは上経に向かって赴くに勝てば信濃に乗り出すことであった。彼の息詰なそして欲しきのを貧乏する必要はない。

彼は自負意気で天庭を離れる藩主へ赴いたのであった。そして彼の信頼しゆる兄弟は信長嘗（現信玄）と彼の子息の都をあった。

2
Edgar Shaw was born at Kansas City, Kansas in July, 1895. He is of Irish and English lineage. In his boyhood, it is said that he worked as a farm hand and as a city boy, and also learned printing. From 1913 to 1914 he studied at the Junior College at Kansas City, from 1915 to 1916 at Kansas University and in 1917 at Columbia University (Extension). His first job as a professional was taken at the Kansas City Star, and his varied activities as a Far East correspondent began. It was a period as the assistant editor of the China Weekly Review. After 1920, he visited the Eastern Three Provinces of China, Mongolia, Japan, Korea, Formosa, Dutch India, Burma and India as well as China proper. Namely, in 1924, he toured the Southwest provinces of China for a long period, then visited West Hunan and Kweichow, where he experienced riots. Then he entered India from Burma, and interviewed the leaders of the Indian revolution. At the outbreak of the Sept. 10 Incident, he returned to China, investigated the conditions of the Japanese aggression against China, and sent a great deal of information regarding the Shanghai Incident of 1932, and of the Shanghai Incident of 1935 to American and English papers from the actual spot.

During this period he took the position of lecturer at Peking
Mr. See was born at Kansas City, Missouri, in July, 1908. He is of Irish and English lineage. In his boyhood, it is said that he worked as a farmer, mice a ciler, and also learned printing. From 1923 to 1924, he studied at the Junior College at Kansas City, from 1925 to 1926 at Missouri University, and in 1927 at Columbia University (Extension). His first step as a career was taken at the Kansas City Star, and his varied activities as a Far East correspondent began. In a period as the assistant editor of the China Weekly Review, after 1930, he visited the Eastern Three Provinces of China, Mongolia, Japan, Korea, Formosa, Dutch Indies, Burma and India as well as China proper. Namely, in 1938, he toured the Southwest provinces of China for a long period, then visited West Burma and Burma, where he experienced riots. Then he returned India from Burma, and interviewed the leaders of the Indian revolution. At the outbreak of the Sht. 10 Incident, he returned to China, investigated the conditions of the Japanese aggression against China, and sent a great deal of information regarding the Shanghai Incident of 1932, and of the Jehol Incident of 1933 to American and English papers from the actual spot.

During this period he took the position of lecturer at Peking
Def. Doc. No. 1015

University, but the course in his diary is not known.

His activities, since then, are as described in this book.

In June 1936, he entered into Soviet Territory, north of the Shanxi province, for the first time as a foreigner, and after repeated inspections and investigations, returned to Peking.

At the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he was in Peking but immediately moved to Shanghai to continue his activities as correspondent. (As to details, again, this time, refer to his book "Strife for Asia"). Then he went to Hankow, Wuhan and Chungking, as a result of which journey he published his book "Strife for Asia".

In the same year, he returned to the States, and during World War II visited the U.S.S.R., the details of which are communicated to us through his book "Forms of Influences of the Soviet".

(2)
What are the fundamental policies of the Chinese Reds today? I had a dozen or more talks on this subject with Mao Tse-tung and other leading Communists, but before we can state these policies it is necessary to have some conception of the nature of the long struggle between the Communists and various if we are to comprehend over the recent events in the north-west, we must first look at a few facts of history.

In the following paragraphs I paraphrase, in part, the contents of Lo Pu, the young American-educated secretary of the Communist Central Committee, when I interviewed him in Pao An. It likely to be heavy going, but I believe it will prove worth while.

As is well known, the Chinese Communist Party began only in 1921. It grew very rapidly till 1927, when Dr. Ch'en-ssen, founder of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), made his famous attempt with Soviet Russia. Neither the Kuomintang nor the Kungchuantang (Communist Party) had power, and both clung to struggling to establish democracy. It was easy to reach an understanding. In 1924, the Kuomintang was reorganized with the help of Russian advisers, along lines of the party of Lenin's. In alliance was formed with the Chinese Communist Party, and Communists became very active in leading and organizing the great revolution of 1925-1927, which finally overthrew the communist Peking dictatorship.
For the basis of this co-operation, as far as the Communists were concerned, can be summarized as the acceptance by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang of two major revolutionary principles: the first recognized the necessity of an anti-feudalist revolution -- the recovery of complete political, territorial and economic sovereignty by revolutionary action. The second demanded an internal policy of anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism -- the realization of a democratic revolution against the landlords and warlords, and the construction of new forms of social, economic and political life, which both the Communists and the Kuomintang agreed must be democratic in character.

The Communists, of course, regarded the successful fulfillment of the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution as a necessary preliminary for any Socialist society which might later be established, so their position was logical in supporting a "democratic national independence and liberation" movement.

Unfortunately, Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in 1926, before the revolution was completed. Co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Kungchihutang came to an end in 1927. From the Communist viewpoint, the Nationalist Revolution may also be said to have ended then. The "right" wing of the Kuomintang, dominated by the new militarism, and supported by certain foreign powers, the treaty-port bankers, and the landlords, broke away from the legally elected Government at Hankow. It formed a "government" under Chiang Kai-shek which the Communists and the majority of the Kuomintang at that time regarded as "counter-revolutionary"; that is, against the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" itself.
The Kuomintang soon reconciled itself to theanking commun


doctrine, but Communism became a crime punishable by death that the"reds conceived to be the two main points of nationalism--

anti-imperialist movement and the democratic revolution--were

practice abandoned. Militarists' civil wars and, later, an

intensive war against the rising agrarian revolution ensued.

many thousands of Communists and former peasant-union and labour

leaders were killed. The unions were suppressed. An "unlighted

dictatorship" made war on all forms of opposition. Even so,

quite a number of Communists survived in the army, and the Part

held together throughout a period of great terrorism. In 1937,

despite the expenditure of billions of dollars in civil war

against them, the Red armies occupied in the north-west the

biggest single connected territory ever under their complete

control.

Of course the "reds believe that the decade of history since

1927 has richly validated their thesis that national independence

and democracy (which the Kuomintang also set as its objective)

cannot be achieved in China without an anti-imperialist policy

externally, and an agrarian revolution internally.
Wang Tse-tung, as secretary of the Peasants' Committee of the Kuomintang in 1926 (before the break with the Communists, when he was candidate to the Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang), supervised the collection of land statistics for areas in twenty-one provinces. He asserts that this investigation indicated that resident landlords, rich peasants, officials, absentee landlords and usurers, about 15 per cent of the whole rural population, together owned over 75 per cent of the cultivable land in China. About 15 per cent was owned by middle peasants, but over 65 per cent of the rural population, made up of poor peasants, tenants and farm workers, owned only from 1 per cent to 15 per cent of the total arable land.

"These statistics were supervised after the counter-revolution according to Kao. "Now, ten years later, it is still impossible to get any statement from Wang on land distribution in China."

The Communists think that rural bankruptcy has been accelerated by the disastrous consequences of abandoning the anti-imperialist struggle, which to most Chinese today means the "anti-Japanese struggle."

Of course Wang on could not stop civil war as long as the Reds continued to attempt to overthrow the Government by force. But as early as 1932 the Reds had proposed peace, and offered to unite with Wang, on a common program of resistance to Japan. Their proposals had been rejected. Now, once more, despite the great strategic advantages which the Red Army enjoyed in its developing position in the North-west, the Communist Party, in collaboration
"With anti-Japanese armies and patriotic associations throughout China, had renewed its offer to co-operate to end civil war and create a national "anti-Japanese front" against the aggressor. It promised to submit its Red Army and its Soviet districts to the complete authority of the Central Government provided the Han-
king would agree to establish democratic representative government, resist Japan, enfranchise the people, and guaranteed civil liberties to the masses. In other words, the Reds were ready to "remarry" the Kuomintang if it would return to the "Bourgeois-nationalist" programme of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. Out of these two basic aims they realized that the fight for national survival was paramount, and must be conducted even at the expense of abandoning the internal struggle over the land question that class antagonisms might have to be sublimated in, certainly; could not be satisfied without, the successful solution of theexternal antagonism with Japan.

"I asked the Chinese leaders whether the Soviets were in favour of cancelling unequal treaties. He pointed out that many of these unequal treaties have, in fact, already been destroyed by the Japanese, especially in the case of Manchuria. But as for the future attitude of a representative Government in China, he declared:

"These powers that help or do not oppose China in her war of independence and liberation should be invited to enter close friendly relations with China. Those powers which actively assist Japan should naturally not be given the same treatment. For example, Germany and Italy, which have already established special relations with Manchuria, and cannot be regarded as powers friendly to the
Chinese people.

"With friendly powers, China will peacefully negotiate treaties of mutual advantage. With other powers, China is prepared to maintain co-operation to a much wider scale...As far as Japan is concerned, China must be the net of war and liberation control all unequal treaties, confiscate all Japanese imperialist holdings, and neutral Japan's special privileges, concessions, and influence in this country. Concerning our relations with other powers, we Communists do not advocate any measure that may place us at disadvantage the world position of China in her struggle against Japanese imperialism."
On war with Japan

On July 14-15—Field Line 7

Mao began to answer the first question. His Communist policy towards Japan, which was this: "If Japan is defeated and driven from China, do you think that the main problem of imperialism will in general have been solved?"

"Yes. If either imperialist countries do not act or Japan, or if China defeats Japan, it will mean that the Chinese masses have awakened, have mobilized, and have established their independence. Therefore the main problem of imperialism will have been solved."

"Under what conditions do you think the Chinese people can defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan?" I asked.

He replied: "Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the National United Front against Japan's imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, revolutionary action by the oppressed people at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. Of these, the central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves."

Question: "How can the people best be armed, organized, and trained to participate in such a war?"

Answer: "The people must be given the right to organize and to arm themselves. This is a freedom which Chinese Yang-shan has never been denied to them. The suppression has not, however, been entirely successful—no, for example, in the case of the Red Army."

Also, despite severe repression in Shanghai and other places, the students have begun to organize themselves and have already prepared themselves politically. But still the students and the revolutionary anti-Japanese masses have not yet got their freedom, cannot be mobilized, cannot be trained and armed. When the contrary is true, when the masses have won economic, social and political freedom, their strength will be intensified hundreds of times, and the true power of the nation will be revealed.

"The Red Army through its own struggle has won its freedom from the militarists to become an unconquerable force. The anti-Japanese volunteers have won their freedom of action from the Japanese oppressors and have armed themselves in a similar way. If the Chinese people are trained, armed and organized they can likewise become an invincible force."

**Question:** "What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy and tactics to be followed in this war of liberation?"

**Answer:** "The strategy should be that of war of manœuvre, over an extended, shifting and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale war of manœuvre rather than the simple positional war of extensive trench-work, defiladed lines and heavy fortifications. Our strategy and tactics must be conditioned by the theatre in which the war will take place, and this dictates a war of manœuvre."
"This does not mean the hardening of vital strategic points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as possible. But the overall strategy must be by way of maneuver, and decisive reliance must be placed on guerrilla and partisan tactics. Fortified warfare must be utilized, but it will be of secondary and secondary strategic importance."

P. 126 para. 3 - P. 127 para. 3

"Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create, and politically and militarily equip great numbers of mobile and guerrilla detachments among the peasants, that have been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from this revolution, in percentage of all China. Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy twenty-four hours a day and wear them to death."

"It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to conserve their provisions and guard their own internal communications, and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well."

P. 134 para. 2 - P. 135 para. 1

The curriculum varied in different sections of the School, but the diet of cadets in the First Section may be taken as nearly correct. Political lectures included these courses: Political Knowledge,

Special text-book had been prepared for some of these courses. Some were carried clear from the Soviet publishing house in Vidai, where (I was told) more than eight hundred workers were employed in the main plant. In other courses the methods used were lectures by Red Army commanders and party leaders, dealing with historical experiences of the Russian and the Chinese revolutions, or utilizing material from captured government files, documents and statistics.

These courses of Yung Ta performed an important role in the question, "Do the Reds really intend to fight?" It suffices to show how the Reds foresee and actively plan for China's "war of independence" against Japan—a war which they regard as inevitable, unless, by some miracle, Japan withdraws from the war and China now under the wheels of Nippon's military jow central.
People were already moving down towards the on-stage area, improvised from an old temple, when I set out with the scene official who had invited me to the Red Theatre. It was Saturday, two or three hours before sunset, and all doors seemed to be open.

Across the stage was a big pink curtain of silk, with the words, "People's Anti-Japanese Dramatic Society," in Chinese characters, as well as Latinized Chinese, which the kids were promoting to hasten mass education. The program was to last two hours. It proved to be a combination of skits, dancing, singing, and pantomime—a kind of variety show, or vaudeville, since mainly chiefly by two central themes: anti-Victorian and the revolution. It was full of overt propaganda, wholly unschickicated, and the "props" were primitive. But it had the advantage of being created from cymbal-crashing and falsetto-singing, and of dealing with living material rather than with "cannot-less historical" intrigues that are the concern of the decadent Chinese opera.

The first playlet here was called Invasion. It was in Manchurian village, in 1931, with the Japanese arriving and destroying the "non-resisting" Chinese soldiers. In the second scene, Japanese officers banquet in a peasant's home, using Chinese men as chairs, and drunkenly making love to their wives. Another scene...
shows Japanese dope peddlers selling morphine and heroin and forcing every peasant to buy a quantity. A youth who refuses to buy is singled out for questioning.

"You don't buy morphine, you don't obey "military" rules, you don't love your "divine" Emperor, " chy shu his tormentors. "You are no good, you are an anti-Japanese bandit!"

And the youth is promptly executed.

A scene in the village marks the place where small merchants peacefully selling their wares. Suddenly Japanese officers are searching for more "anti-Japanese bandits." Instructed they demand passports, and those who have forgotten them are shot. Then the Japanese officers gorge themselves on food in a manner, when he asks for payment they look at him in astonishment. "You ask for payment? Why, Chiang K'uai-k'uey gave us "military," John, Chabu, the Tangku Trust, the Kuo-T'ung Agreement, and the Hopei-Chahar Council, without asking a single cent! And you want us to pay for a little pork!" When upon, they called him as a "bandit."

In the end, of course, all this proves too much for the villagers. Merchants turn over their stand and wheeler, for they rush forth with their spears, women and children are with their knives, and all swear to "fight to the death" against the mei-ken-kumi—the "Japanese devils."

The little play was sprinkled with humor and local idiom. Bursts of laughter alternated with oaths of disgust and hatred in the Japanese. The audience got quite irritated. It was not just
political propaganda to them, nor slapstick melodrama, but the poignant truth itself. The fact that the players were mostly youths in their teens and natives of Shansi and Shensi served entirely forgotten in the onlookers' absorption with the ideas presented.
Paper currency in the South, bearing the signature of the
"Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Government State Bank," was
excellently printed, on good bank-paper. In the Northwest,
technical deficiencies resulted in a much coarser issue on poor
paper, and sometimes on cloth. Their designs appeared on all money
notes issued in Shensi bore such exhortations as these: "Stop
civil war!" "Unite to resist Japan!" "Pursue the Chinese
revolution!

Soviet money was accepted everywhere in the stabilized
Soviet states, and had full buying power, prices being generally slightly
lower than in the "white" districts.
The Insurrectionist
P.F. Col. 3 - C.P. Col. 3
During 1926, 1927, and 1928, in Shanghai

way, with Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief, selected jointly
by the Kuomintang and the Communists. Chou En-lai was ordered
to prepare an insurrection and help the "little bourgeoisie"

Shanghai. A youth of twenty-eight, with no formal military train-
ing, little experience with the working class (from which he was
of a big bourgeoisie family, he had been "lost"), without guidance
to show him how to make an insurrection, and none to advise him
(the chief Russian advisor being with Chiang Kai-shek), Chou

arrived in Shanghai equipped only with a revolutionary determi-
nation and a strong theoretical knowledge of Marxism.

Within three months the Communist Party had organized 600,000

workers, and was able to call a general strike. The response was

unanimous, and a terrifying experience to the working class of
this greatest stronghold of foreign imperialism in China. But the
insurrection failed to materialize. Unarmed and note in ed, the

workers did not know how to go about "seizing the city." They

had to learn empirically the necessity of an armed nucleus of

workers. And the militarists accommodated them.

Underestimating the significance of the first one of the two

second strike, the old "bourgeois" workers would cut off a number of

heads, but failed to halt the labour movement. Chou En-lai and the

famous Shanghai labour leaders, Chen Tian-zhou, Ku Shao-ching, and I

Yi-wang, now succeeded in organizing 50,000 rifles, etc. in the

"17"
French concession secured premises where military training was secretly given to 2,000 cadets. With arms so procured into the city, an "iron band" of 300 workers was trained, and this was the only armed force that Shanghai workers had.

On March 21, 1927, the communists called a general strike which closed all the industries of Shanghai, and put 600,000 workers, organized and militant for the first time in their lives, behind the barricades of revolution. They seized first the police stations, next the arsenal, then the garrison, and after that, victory. Five thousand workers were armed, six battalions of revolutionary troops erected, and a "citizens' government" was proclaimed.

It was the most remarkable coup d'état in modern Chinese history.

Thus it happened that Chiang Kai-shek, arriving a few days later at the outskirts of Shanghai, found his bitter enemies vanquished, and was able to enter the Chinese city and accept power from a triumphant workers' army. And thus it happened that when, about a month later, Chiang Kai-shek staged his own rival coup d'état, and the killing of radicals began, Chou En-lai's name did not appear on his list of condemned. This dangerous youth who had given him his victory—this was the Generalissimo realized, might also take it away from him. And thus also began Chou En-lai's life as a fugitive from the Kuomintang, and as a leader of the Third Revolution, the revolution that raised the Red banner in China.
Chao Tse-yen, Yu Shun-ching, Lo Vien, and Ch'en Yen-lun (son of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a founder of the Communist Party of China, and now imprisoned at Hankow), and dozens more of Chou En-lai's close co-workers in the Shanghai uprising, were seized and executed. The toll of the "Shanghai massacre" is estimated at 5,000 lives. Chou En-lai himself was captured by Chiang Kai-shek's Second Division, and General Pai Chung-hsai (now ruler of Kwangsi) issued an order for his execution. But the brother of the division commander had been Chou's student at Wuhan, and he helped Chou to escape.

The Insurrectionist fled to Wuhan, then to Hankow, where he helped organize the famous August First Uprising, the historical beginning of the Red Army of China. Next he went to Canton, where Red workers seized the great seaport of South China, and under Chou En-lai held it for ten days against assaults from both foreign gunboats and the native troops of militarists; and then on to Canton, and the organization of the famous Canton Commune.
D.I. Doc. No. 1115

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by Seshu Sato, consisting of 307 pages, entitled "Red Star over China" and issued on Dec. 27, 1940, is a book which I translated and which I had published by MIRI Publishing Co.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 19 day of April, 1947

MIRI Publishing Co.

/s/ M. G. Tsubo

/s/ Shosho Ono, S. M. Tsubo (Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ O. D. Chigemanu
エドガー・スノウ

中口・赤星（上）

『エドガー・スノウ』

字佐美誠次郎・杉本俊朗共編

1931年

第1章 カンサス、シティ

生来、ソノ家兵ハアイルランド及ピ英米系デアル少年時代ニハ農業務

従事シテリテ次ノ油商サヤリ父印刷輸書ズ而シテハカノカ

シティノジュニア、カレッジニ基础イテ後二二〇年ハカノカ、シティ、スタ

ンノニハバムラノラカノカアリシテ始マルガーネ／二二〇〇年ニハハカノカ、シ

テイアール、ラフォ」ワッハとノンスタント、エデュケイヨソラシテ活躍シテ次ノ

頃ダリテルノ、即チー九三〇年ニハ内南各省サ長期ニ居リラノスノハ中略ハ

非レマガニ、単ヨ三〇年ニハスノハ中略ハ時ハ同地ニ在リツソノ
日本の民主主義を守るための革新を考えるためのシンポジウム

主な議論の要点

・日本が持つ民主主義の特性
・革新の必要性と可能性
・民主主義の実現に向けた具体的な取り組み

参加者からの意見

・革新は単なる代議制の変革ではない
・民主主義の実現は全体の参股と協力に依存

シンポジウムのまとめ

・革新は民主主義の深化を実現する手助けとなる
・参加者の意見を反映した新たな計画を策定する

著者：

担当者：

日時：

場所：

参加者：

お知らせ：

シンポジウムの詳細はウェブサイトをご覧ください。
コトが日本マス。

オフリフリバピューチェン

特勧の役務力ノ dusty サガホニニ過成マセン。過労ニ指シ組織スレバ

二国ハハ二国ハハ

[日本ハハパレラビナハマリマフバイラウトフリケデス。]
次に、図柄のうち、特に色彩の影響が示されているのは、ソレーハのようなものである。ソレーハは、色彩の影響が色の発色に強く及ぼす影響を示しており、特に、ソレーハの色が鮮やかであることから、その色の発色が強力であることが示されている。

この図柄の特徴は、その色の発色が強力であることにあり、特に、ソレーハの色が鮮やかであることから、その色の発色が強力であることが示されている。
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日本の工業技術院を設立し、国立機械研究所の改廃を行なう。この研究機関は、電気、電気機器、化学、土木、建築など、多岐にわたり研究が行われる。研究所は、学士、修士、博士の学位を授与することができ、大学院研究を進めることも可能である。

日本の工業技術院は、国の政策を支援し、産業界を支援するために設立された組織である。研究所は、発酵、食品、農業、海洋産業、化学、素材科学など、多岐にわたり研究が行われる。研究所は、学士、修士、博士の学位を授与することができ、大学院研究を進めることも可能である。
レタッチのため、このページの文脈は不明瞭です。
Excerpt from: "The Chinese Communist Party and the Battle Line for the Unification of the Race" (Published by TAIKAI, Nov. 1945)
NAKAMISHI, Isao and NISHIZAKI, Tatsuo

Paragraph 4, Chapter I — Events leading to the issuance of the August 1st Declaration: (Excerpt from page 40-41).

It was in the "August 1st Declaration" as well as in the December Resolution 1935" that the new policy of the Chinese Communist Party was formally determined and made known to the public. The August 1st Declaration was announced during the session of the 7th Comintern Convention, in which the Chinese Communist Party was represented by a group headed by Chen Shengyu, who explained the new policy in behalf of the central authorities on August 7. His inflammatory speech, entitled "Revolutionary movements in colonies or semi-colonies and tactics of the Communist Party," was received with enthusiastic cheers and applause in the 7th Comintern Convention, and the new policy was approved with expression of hopes for its future success. The August 1st Declaration by the central authorities of the Chinese Communist Party was announced, prior to this convention and, on August 2, 1935, the historic report concerning the movement against wars and Fascism was made by Dimitrov, then Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Comintern". What Dimitrov stated in this report concerning the new policy of the Chinese Communist Party is as quoted below, which shows that he had a clear understanding of the new policy of the Chinese Communist Party at that time. He pointed out, that it was only the Chinese Soviets that could play a leading part in uniting the people for the racial struggle, and that it was necessary to form a united front against the Japanese Imperialism on the widest possible scale. The Comintern Convention gave a whole-hearted approval to his report.
The part in question of his report is as follows:

"In the Republic of China, the mass-movement has already brought about the construction of Soviet districts and the formation of a strong Red army in large part of her territory.

But at the same time, the plundering invasion of Japanese imperialism and the betraying action of the Hankow Government are threatening the very existence of the great Chinese race. The Chinese "Soviet" has come to exist as the unification center of struggles against the partition and slave subjugation of Chinese by imperialism, or in other words, as the unification center of all the anti-imperialistic forces for a real struggle. We give therefore, strong support to the initiative taken by the Chinese Communist Party — a heroic and brotherly party which is attempting to form a most extensive and at the same time unified anti-imperialistic front in order to fight against Japanese imperialism and its tools by uniting the influences of all Chinese organizations aiming at the salvation of the country and its people. We send our most sincere brotherly greetings to the heroic Chinese red army that has gone through countless battles.

And we assure the Chinese people that we extend ceaseless assistance to the struggle for the complete liberation of the Chinese race from all imperialist plunderers and their Chinese tools." (The History of Chinese Communists for the year 1935, p. 92).

To this SNK Sheng Yu added the following explanation:

"What are the tactics which Comrade Dimitrov and the executive committee of the Comintern are supporting?" While the preparation was being made for the opening of the 7th convention, discussing the fundamental principles of how to conduct the convention and summing up its past works and experiences, especially those gained during the past 7 years,
with detailed analysis of domestic as well as foreign conditions, the Chinese Communist Party made a careful study, under the guidance of the central authorities, of the tactical problems concerning the unification of anti-imperialistic organizations. As a result the Chinese Communist Party has come to believe that, under the present condition of ever-increasing racial crisis, there is no other way of saving the country than to execute decisive and at the same time heroic anti-Japanese struggle by mobilizing all the great Chinese race, and that, at the same time, there is no other way of mobilizing all the people of China for a sacred racial struggle for revolution against the Japanese imperialism than to resort to tactics of the Communist Party of forming a united front against the imperialism. The first application of such a new tactic is shown in the publication last August by the central authorities of the Chinese Communist Party of the Chinese Soviet Government of "an appeal to all the people throughout the country for the salvation of the country against Japan."

("A history of the Chinese Communist Party for the year 1936", p. 9495, "The struggle for the united anti-imperialistic front and the urgent duty of the party" by CHEN Shougu.)

Chapter I Section 5

Important Points of the December Resolution and its meaning.

The important points of the December resolution are as follows:

1. The Leading Tactical Policies of the Party

"Therefore, the tactical policy of the party lies in unifying the revolutionary measures of the whole Chinese nation, and in opposing as immediate objectives Japanese Imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the traitors.

"Regardless of individuals or groups, all armed forces and classes opposing Japanese Imperialism and CHIANG KAI-shek, the leader of the traitors should cooperate, ........."
2. United Front—— Its scope concerning the internal situation;

"The Chinese labour class and farmers are still the fundamental driving power of the Chinese revolution and the new middle class and the revolutionary intelligentsia are reliable confederates. Therefore, a staunch union of industrial, farming and middle classes is the basic power in defeating Japanese Imperialism, betrayers, and traitors."

"A part of the propertied class and the military clique——when they show their sympathy toward the struggle of opposing Japan and betrayers maintaining well-intended neutrality, or directly taking part in the struggle, the anti-Japanese front will favourably develop......"

3. The system of the Racial united front——Form "It is usually the best to organize a national defense government and a combined anti-Japanese federation."

"A national defense government is a political body of the joint front opposing Japan and traitors, as well as the central guiding body for the national revolutionary war against Japan and traitors. From the viewpoint of the classes, the national defense government is a union of all the classes, united in opposing traitors as their common objective."

Establishment. How it is to be established, and the parts to be played by the Soviet and the Red Army. After mobilizing parties, classes, and all the people, and organizing patriotic bodies, ranks, parties, political powers, and armies.

(Organizations——anti-Japanese Patriotic Societies and an Association of Patriotic Societies. Armies——the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, the People's Revolutionary Army, the new 19th Route Army, etc. Political Powers——the anti-Japanese Governments for prefectures, wards, and cities, the People's Revolutionary Government and so forth) these bodies, forces and political powers are to be united, and "besides these" the power of the
Soviet Red Army is to be added then the system of the National Defense Government and the combined anti-Japanese Army will be realized.

4. The fundamental principles under 10 articles (identical with the anti-Japanese principles under 16 articles established later) of the united front— or that of the National Defense Government and the combined Army.

5. Mutual Concession Policy on the part of the Chinese Communist Party (1) Change of the name Soviet of "Workers and Farmers" to the Soviet of "the People". (2) Expansion of franchise, suspension of confiscating lands of wealthy farmers, revision of commercial policy (expansion of the scope of free trade) though there are many points to be mentioned about the contents of this "August Declaration" and "the December Resolution," at least mention must be made of the characteristics of the policy adopted in those days, especially the relation between the re-named Soviet of the People and the National Defense Government.

In the "August 1st Declaration" the Chinese Communists insisted that unless "the internal fighting be stopped", and the two parties and all the people unite in confronting foreign countries there would be no salvation of the country by opposing Japan in its true sense and that therefore it was necessary to form an united front with the whole people of the vast country—every political party, every group and every rank. This is the general direction of the new policy adopted by the Chinese Communist Party, and in this regard, there was no change before and after the declaration. The important fact is that as one of the characteristics of "the December Resolution" which embodied the general direction, the National Defense Government and the combined anti-Japanese Army were emphatically advocated as a form of Racial United Front organization. It is characteristic that two items of the National Defense Government and the combined anti-Japanese
Army were adopted for the first time as a form of organization. It is more so when comparison is made with the following two cases:

first, the comparison with the first great Revolution period,

and second, the comparison with the second form of collaboration between the Nationalists and the Communists.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by NAKANISHI, Isamu and NISHIZATO, Tatsuo, consisting of 154 pages, entitled "The Chinese Communist Party and the Racial United Front" and issued on November 5th, 1946, is a book which I had published by our firm.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947

KUKI, Nekita

(seal)

Tokyo Branch-Office of TAIKADO Co. Ltd. No. 12 2-chome FUJIMI-cho KOJIMA-CHI-ku, Tokyo.
Tel: KUDAN(33)-3432

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: OKUWA, Shigemasa

"
张三

2016年12月3日
(Excerpt)

"A History of the Kuomintang"
by
YANAGIHI, Ryoichi, Assistant Professor,
Hikone Commercial High School
Published by
SANSO CO., Tokyo, Sept. 5, 1941.

Chapter VI
The Control of China by the Kuomintang

Section VIII
The Cooperation of the Kuomintang and the Communists and their United Front against Japan.

pp. 208-215.

The Chinese Communists had adopted the policy of creating a soviet area and one of a radical militarism since the Shanghai cour d'etat of CHANG Kai-shek of April, 1927.
They came, however, to realize the mistake of their radical militarism from the result of CHANG Kai-shek's hard-t-clearing operations and began to plan to reorganize the people by utilizing the anti-Japanese feeling which had firmly gripped the Chinese at that time and making the Kuomintang come to a compromise with the Communists by setting against the power of the awakening masses. Accordingly, on Aug. 1st, 1935, they issued their "Fight the Japanese and Save the Nation" declaration, crying for the establishment of a unified government "for national defense" instead of insisting on their...
old policy of destroying the Muemingtang. For this purpose, the Chinese Communists tried first of all to organize the anti-Japanese movements of the whole of China into the "United Pace Front" the direct motive for the formation of this "United front" was the violent opposition of the students in Peiping against the anti-Comintern Western Hopei self-government which was formed under YIK, Tu-keng in December of that same year in the truce zone in North China. Due to the secret activities of the Chinese Communists in the Students National-relief Association was organized in many places. And despite the control of the Nationalist Government, the national-relief movement became increasingly active among various groups along with the students' movement. Late in May, 1936, the inaugural meeting of the All-China National-Relief League was held in Shanghai, and its manifesto was announced. It included the following points:

1. Every party and every group shall immediately cease military clashes.

2. Every party and every group shall immediately liberate political offenders.

3. Every party and every group shall immediately despatch formal representatives.

The Popular Patriotic Front Group shall introduce the above representatives, be responsible for the progress of discussions, establish a platform for common resistance against
the enemy and make efforts for the set-up of a unified political regime for resisting the enemy.

4. The Popular Patriotic Front will guarantee with all their efforts that the platform for resisting the enemy will be faithfully carried out by every party and every group.

5. The Popular Patriotic Front Group, regardless of party or group, will place under restraint with all their efforts any action which in violating the platform for common resistance may tend to diminish their resisting force against the enemy.

The Popular Front against Japan which had become a country-wide movement as an outside organization of the Communist party, further pushed its organized operation with the Patriot's Federation as its center, and anti-Japanese spirit became more and more marked. The "Fight the Japanese and Save the Nation" movement of the Popular Front Group became still more intensified by the Sui Yuen problem which broke out in Autumn, 1936. But on account of the instigation of the Patriot's Federation as regards the Japanese spinning-mill workers' walk-out in November in Shanghai and Tsinan, seven leaders of the Popular Front Group were arrested. The Nationalist Government arrested them as having relations with the Communist party, and since then, the Patriots' Federation had to carry out their activities underground, but the activities of the Chinese Communists and the Popular Front Group with regard to CHANG, Hauh-liang and the North Eastern
Army were crowned with success at last in the Usual Incident of December 12th, when CHANG, Huwei-liu and Y. C. Hu-cheng imprisoned CHANG Kai-shek, and at the same time
presented the following demands:

1. Reform of the nationalist Government, and admission into
the Government of members of every party and every
group.
2. Give up all domestic warfare.
3. Immediate release of the patriotic leaders arrested
in Shanghai.
4. Release all the political offenders throughout
the country.
5. Make people's patriotic movements free.
6. Guarantee all political freedom, such as freedom
of people's assembly, association, etc.
7. Strictly observe the will of the President.
8. Immediately call a National Salvation Meeting.

Following this, the Chinese Communists, early in 1937,
dispatched the following message to the nationalist party:

"The peaceful settlement of the Usian Incident is a blessing
to the whole nation, and if this can serve to carry out
peaceful unification of the country and national unity for
defense against foreign invasion, it will be a great happiness
to the state and the people. At this critical moment when
the people of China are being confronted with the Japanese
invaders, this party ardently desires that the Third All-China
- 4 -
Footing of your party will adopt, as fundamental policies of the state, the following items:

1. To put an end to the civil war, and by concentrating national strength, put forth a united front against the foreign enemy.
2. To guarantee freedom of speech, assembly, and association, and release the political offender.
3. To call a meeting of the representatives from each party, group circle, and army, and by gathering up men's ability from all over the country, carry out concerted national salvation.
4. To complete quickly the preparation for the anti-Japanese war.
5. To improve the living conditions of the people.

If the above-mentioned national policies are adopted by the Third All-China Meeting of your party, our party will offer guarantee as follows:

A. We will suspend throughout the country armed and offensive measures against the Nationalist Government.

B. We will change the names of "the Soviet Government" and "the Red Army" respectively to "the Government of the Special Districts of the Republic of China" and "the National Revolution Army", and make them subordinate to the Nationalist Government and its Military Commission.

C. We establish a thorough-going democratic form of Government within the Special District by means of general elections.
D. "We will cease the confiscation of land from landowners.
E. "We will carry out the policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front."

By this statement the Chinese Communist Party suddenly brought to the fore the question of the second "Nationalist-Communist Coalition" which had been the subject of secret negotiations since the Tsian Incident and made it unavoidable for the Nationalist Party to make a reply in some form or another in this respect.

The Nationalist Party held its Third All-China Meeting on February 15, to discuss measures to cope with the situation after the Tsian Incident. This meeting decided on preparing a positive Anti-Japanese plan, and answered to the proposal of the Nationalist-Communist Coalition made by the Chinese Communist Party, namely the eight-point demand of CHUNG and YANG, by the "Draft Resolution for the Annihilation of the Red Peril," which was stated in substance as follows:

1. The unification of organization and command is essential for the army of a nation. So, the Red forces shall be completely dissolved.

2. The unification of a nation requires the unification of the government. So, the Soviet Government as well as all the party organization shall be dissolved.

3. Communism and the Three-People Principle (of Dr. SIT AT-SEP) absolutely contradict each other. Red propaganda, therefore, shall cease completely.
(4) Class strife shall be absolutely stopped for the benefit of all classes.

The Nationalist Party deemed the above four points as the basic conditions of the Nationalist Communist Coalition.

According to this proposition, the complete dissolution of the Communist party and the Red Army was an absolute premise for the realization of the Nationalist - Communist Coalition. But when we compare it with the above-mentioned statement of the Chinese Communist Party, it is quite clear that there remained possibility enough for their reconciliation. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek personally stressed, after the closing ceremony of the Third All-China meeting, the three items, "freedom of speech," "appointment of able men," and "release of political offenders". It may well be said that these three items acknowledged the articles (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of the foregoing eight-point demand made by Chiang and Yen.

Taking the Third All-China meeting as a turning point, the attitude of the Nationalist Government towards the Red Army was changed suddenly to one of negotiation from the armed action previously practiced. Both Nationalist and Communist Parties tried, on one hand, to overcome the objections within their own parties and on the other, to bring concrete results from their coalition negotiations. Consequently, the Chou En-lai, the representative of the Communist Party, came to Nanjing, and Sun Yen and other pro-Russian elements became
active in trying to realize a nationalist Communist coalition, the nationalist Government's policy towards Japan suddenly became uncompromising. It came to insist that "any attempt at the regulation of the Sino-Japanese relations must be premised by the settlement of the eastern Hopei, Northern Chahar and Hopei-Chahar problems." The preparations for hostilities against Japan were enforced and all agreements between Japan and China were disregarded by them. Thus the anti-Japanese feeling spread all over the country beyond any remedy on the part of the Japanese government. Consequently, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on the night of July 7 led up to a thorough collision between Japan and China. At the meeting held at Lushun of leaders in various fields throughout China, three items were decided on, including that of enforcing a nation-wide wartime organization in the three organs, the Kuomintang, the army and the government. At this meeting, CHIANG Kai-shek delivered a speech on "The Cross-road of Life and Death," expressing his bold anti-Japanese feeling. The gist of his speech was as follows: "The time is pressing on for China to stand at the last cross-road of sacrifice. To the country which will violate the sovereignty of China, we can never assume a conciliatory attitude. In order to recover the Three Eastern Provinces, and to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of North China, we are ready to face the worst phase of Sino-Japanese relations." At this time, this anti-Japanese declaration of CHIANG Kai-shek's was
no longer his personal cry. Even the various political parties and groups which had held an anti-Chiang Kai-shek attitude in the past, came to join in a united front on the common feeling of hostilities against the Japanese and a small group of Chinese people urging prudence towards Japan were flatly rejected, and war enthusiasm against Japan spread like wildfire.

From July to August, more than 300 political offenders were released, including seven leading figures, such as leftist writer Kuo Fan-jo, head of the Trotskyists in China, Chu Yu Su-shih, former clerk of the Far East Committee Bureau Yulin and his wife, members of the Popular Front, SUN Chao-ju and CHENG Shui-hi. While the advocacy of war grew to gain ground overwhelmingly and the movement of co-operation between the Nationalists and the Communists began to make rapid progress, with the incident being extended to Shanghai on August 18th; the Communist Army was re-organized as the 8th Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army on August 22 and CHU Teh was appointed its commander-in-Chief. As the three conditions-suspension of the civil war, release of political offenders and reorganization of the Communist Army were fulfilled, the Chinese Communists in Yanan declared on September 22 the following:

(1) Support of Dr. SUN Yat-sen's three people principle,
(2) abolition of rioting and 'relief villager', (3) dissolution of the Soviet government in China, and realization of democratic
administration and (d) abolition of the new and numer
system of the Red Army together with its reorganization into
the National Revolutionary Army. On the other hand, the
Nationalists on the 27th issued a statement in the name of
CHIANG Kai-shek to the effect that "the Nationalist Government
has been fighting with the Red Army for the past ten years,
but the time has come to put an end to it." Thus for the
second time co-operation between the Kuomintang and the
Communists was formally established.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by K. YAMAMOTO consisting of 6 pages and entitled "The History of the Kureminzai" is a book which was published in 1941, by this Company.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 2 day of April, 1947
Representative of the Gausho'o
Shoten, 8,2 Chome Jinbo-Cho,
Kanda-Ku, Tokyo.

[Signature] (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: CHAKO Shigemasa (seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 18 April 1947.
人民衆団日本共産派は火力をもって四面から警戒をたたを同は、共同抗戦の中心として全員へ抗戦力示す切る切るの行動を勧告せんと欲す。

共産員の外にことも抗戦力示す切る切るの行動を勧告せんと欲す。人民衆団日本共産派は火力をもって四面から警戒をたたを同は、共同抗戦の中心として全員へ抗戦力示す切る切るの行動を勧告せんと欲す。
共同国の一切の政治的行動を改廃すること。

人民の自由と権利を保障すること。

総理を指揮し、国民の利益に服すること。

これを互いに中立にして一九三七年に入ることに決した。
三中全会の発表を通じて国民政府の共産軍に対する態度を定めるべきである。

中国軍の抵抗は南京入りを安全に保つために必要な作業力を挙げ、共産軍は河川を向き共産政権に移して共産主導の軍事体制に進化した。共産軍の攻撃に対し、軍事的・外交的・政治的全方針は逐次に変革され、応戦が計画された。共産軍と国民政府の間の対立は激化し、政府の対立政策は絶対に崩壊し、日支間の協定は破壊され、会談の成果が期待されるところである。東亜の局勢はさらに悪化し、再び日本はこの局勢に於て生きるであろう。
"Feney" Incident

On December 12, 1937 the Government and people of the United States were deeply shocked by the news of the bombing and destruction by Japanese aircraft of the United States gunboat Feney and three United States merchant vessels on the Yangtze River in China. The bombing and machine-gunning of the crews and passengers resulted in loss of life to citizens of the United States.

This Government immediately sent a note to the Japanese Government stating that the United States vessels involved were on the Yangtze River "by uncontested and incontestable right", that they were flying the American flag, and that they were engaged in legitimate and appropriate business. The Government of the United States requested and expected of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, an undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications; and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will insure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces.

This note was sent to Japan on the evening of December 13. On December 14 the United States Ambassador to Japan received a note from the Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the Japanese Government regretted "most profoundly" the damage to those vessels and the casualties among the personnel; that it desired to present "sincere apologies"; that it would make indemnifications for all the losses; that it would deal "appropriately" with those responsible for the incident; and that it had already issued "strict orders to the authorities on the spot with a view to preventing the recurrence of a similar incident". Finally, the Japanese Government expressed the "fervent hope" that the friendly relations between Japan and the United States would not be affected by this "unfortunate affair". The Japanese Government later made full indemnification in accordance with the request of the United States.

The overwhelming endorsement given by the people of the United States to the manner in which the Fancy incident was settled attested to their earnest desire to keep the United States out of war.
一九三七年十二月十四日に合衆国政府は人民は支那海子江上に於ける合衆国商船に対する攻撃に対して、敵海軍が発表した連合国政府に対する報復を講じた。合衆国政府はこの連合国政府の報復に対して、その原因を懲治するために挙げた。これにより、敵海軍の艦隊は日本政府に渡る合衆国政府の報復を講じ、合衆国政府はこの報復に対して、その原因を懲治するために挙げた。これにより、敵海軍の艦隊は日本政府に渡る合衆国政府の報復を講じ、合衆国政府はこの報復に対して、その原因を懲治するために挙げた。これにより、敵海軍の艦隊は日本政府に渡る合衆国政府の報復を講じ、合衆国政府はこの報復に対して、その原因を懲治するために挙げた。
この書面は十二月十三日の朝に於て、日本に於ける脈脈なる情事小大、大いに日本の外務大臣よりの相與書面を受取	た。前々日本政府は之に於て、唯覚察との相與、且訴が、若し日本政府、若し他の政府に於いての相與を対等に、努力することを、常に、常、常に常、常に日本政府に於ける一般の相與を表することを、常に、常、常に日本政府に於ける一般の相與を表することを、常に、常、常に日本政府に於ける一般の相與を表することを、常に、常。
Ref. Dec. 1921

The Japanese Army

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF JAPAN, et al.

- vs -

TAKAYASU, et al.

Statement

Present: CHIYOMOTO Yoshizaki

Having first duly sworn to tell the truth or attached sheet and in
cordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby
describe as follows.

1. I, CHIYOMOTO Yoshizaki was formerly a Lieutenant General of the
Kwantung Army, and born on 25 October, 1860. I am now under
medical treatment at Honjô, Yokohama.

2. I was appointed the Command of the Second Infantry Battalion
of the Kwantung Garrison on 1 August, 1921. On 23 August
the same year, I arrived at Yokohama and took up my new post.
Before that, I had been with the First Higher School as the
army officer attached to the school for full three years. If
later to the First Higher School, I was an instructor of the
Motor-car School. Therefore, I went to Tokyo on 23 Aug.
1921, for the first time.

3. On 25 May, 1922, I received a commission as "Army". It.
Colonel was appointed an officer attached to the U.P.Corps of the
Kwantung Army. Taking up that post, I had been in Kweichow till
1 August, 1931, then I was appointed to an Army Colonel, and
was appointed the Command of the 19th Infantry Regiment which
was situated at Tunchow and left Kweichow.

Later, after being gradually promoted, I became an Army
Lieutenant General. And on 30 March, 1940, when I was the
commander of the Yeru Fortress, I retired from the service.
4. Then I was serving as the commander of the above-mentioned the
Second "Defense Battalion" of the Independent Company, on 16
September r, 1931, the "incident incident incident incident incident •

5. Regarding the situation of that time, as the world interests -
that time were concentrated on it. I made the truth clear
to the parties concerned, reported it to the superior, com-
tacted to the press of both Japanese and Foreign and ex-
plained also to the latter "Review Committee.

6. The separate document under the title of "the Truth of the
encounters between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peking:
distributed to the press of both Japanese and Foreign" was
written by me according to the truth in 24 September, 1931,
and I explained it to the press of both Japanese and Foreign
at that time. The contents of this document were the state-
ment of truth that I had personally experienced and seen.

7. The separate document under the title of "Details of the move-
ment of our unit immediately after the breaking up of the rail-
way by the Chinese soldiers" was made by the Staff Department
of the "Ho To Army" on 15 October, 1932. I can certify that
this document is the one distributed to me at that time and
has been thereafter in my custody.

8. The separate sheet of chart under the title of "The Chart
showing the stations of the Independent Company" was the
sheet that I was distributed from the headquarters of the
Independent Company under the necessity of my duty in approx-
imately September 1931, and has been thereafter in my custody.

9. The separate document under the title of "The outline of guid-
ing the "United States "Law") and the report of the inquiry
committee to the court in the "incident" was written by me,
certaining the "social conditions of the "incident on 1st June,
1931, when I guided the "movement, etc. The contents
of this document is true and correct.

- 2 -
In the 5th day of April, 1947
at Tokyo

REPORT OF GUARDIAN, "ibaichi" (seal)

I, IBAI, "ibaichi", hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness,

at the same date
at the same place.

Witness, (stamped) "ibaichi" (seal)


In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing or adding nothing.

/5/ IBAI, "ibaichi" (seal)
白纸黑字,简洁明了。

Affidavit (i.e., f. i., n.)

Certificate in relation to the issuing up of the Document.

I, Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau or the Demobilization Board duly certify that the hereto enclosed pamphlet entitled "Handbook for Soldiers at the Front", printed in Japanese and consisting of 80 pages in the compilation and issue of the Military Department of the Imperial Headquarters.

Tokyo, March 20th, 1947.
Deponent, KIYALA, Yozo
(Signed and Sealed)
Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau.

I hereby certify that the aforementioned person duly executed his signature and seal in my presence.

Date and Place same as above.

Witness, I'KARI, Yasutaro
(Signed and Sealed)
Take a pity on the civilian Chinese masses who are not hostile.

It is indeed a beautiful trait of the national character of the Japanese race from ancient times not to bully the innocent and to take pity upon the weak, especially in the intended holy war, the Chinese masses should not be regarded as our army. Our chief aim and purpose is to overthrow the Chinese National Government which is highly anti-Japanese in collusion with the communistic domination and to save the innocent Chinese population from the perils. We must do all what we can so that they may thoroughly be influenced by the benevolence of the Imperial way. We should never torment them without any reason, especially those who once give up their arms and surrender and are made prisoners should be treated as well as above. It must absolutely be made a point that women may not be outraged, that private property may not be plundered and that no people's houses may be set fire to without any unavoidable reason. Such acts not only cause suspicion of the other Powers on barbarous conduct, but also everlasting grievances of the Chinese masses. In these cases, even if the war should be won, the very purpose of the war itself would be frustrated. Though the saying
"In the fields, plunder and rape are free" or "Armed force is an evil itself" may be called 'in foreign prides, such things can never be admitted in the Japanese army which is sacred to the Imperial God and God. Should such a person be 'sent', he is entirely disloyal to the country and is a traitor to the country and to God and must be rejected. However, in China, the activity of the plain clothes soldiers is reported. Do not fail in exercising your utmost care. In this connection, remember well the wise words of Emperor Meiji.

"Peace between the army hostile to the country by all means, but bear it in mind at all times that men should be loved at heart." Without deserving merit, do not express any superior feeling over others. The Chinese have their own pride as Chinese race. They are the people who place importance in saving "life". Take this into consideration. We must respect their character and show magnanimity of mind in loving the Chinese. As far as we take such an attitude as a great notion and lead them with kindness, they will naturally respect us from the bottom of their heart and follow us.

Bo always manly towards people of the third party nations at the front and pay the utmost respect towards their honours and property.
It is one of our cardinal moral and long tradition to treat all human beings on the equal footing and not to take any impartiality. It is entirely against the spirit of the moral code of Samurai to bully the weak and to court the favour of the strong. We should not necessarily be cowardly merely because we white nor nor should we be arrogant merely because of blacks. We always meanly towards foreigners and treat them with belligerence and show the beautiful Japanese spirit.

Due to the Incident, the people of the third party nations may have surely been much troubled so that so far as they do not take hostile action, treat them with all sympathy and kindness and so far as they do not obstruct our movement, they must be protected and must not be troubled in the least. You should not give any damage to their lives and property without any sensible reason nor should you infringe their right and interests, especially you should all the care not to dis cruise their national flags. Such conducts are belligerence and they not only injure the honour of our Imperial army, but also conflict international relations and the execution of our national policy is greatly to be obstructed. These conducts are indeed disloyal to our country.
Crime of Pillage.

A crime of pillage is most liable to be committed in the battle ground. By pillage it seems that their inhabitants become powerless before the victors and wander out of their army or when they leave their smaller forts as refugees, the property of these refugees is robbed in order to satisfy the private ends of the soldiers. Other personal belongings of the victors or things possessed or stripped off. Of course, on the similar occasion in the home country, these acts are surely punished as crimes of burglary or theft, but in consideration of existence at the front, a crime of pillage under the military criminal law is to be treated. From one year to fifteen years' imprisonment with hard labour or in to be condemned. Besides, at the time of pillage, if woman is outraged or man is injured, seven years' imprisonment with hard labour or under shall be sent. In extreme cases, death punishment is to be sentenced.

Needless to say, when by the command of any superior officer, articles needed by the army may be requisitioned from inhabitants and it is permissible, but even in this, only those who are entitled to such requisition by order are to requisition the needed articles even due payment or compensation therefore, with the milling consent of the suffered inhabitants. Besides, there are some occasions where all inhabitants evacuate the spot and no
compensation cannot be recovered to cover part of, but in no case whatever, for any private purpose, nothing can be refused nor be stolen. In spirit, the former is far different from the latter, so that you must pay your extra attention not to be inhabitant or steal anything under the pretext of requisition on such a time for private ends.
明治天皇御縁

「明日のためあたたかな仇はくだくとも

久留モラク無同ニ誤る横枝感ヲ職リ膜シテハレナナイ被焚ト攘も民
とするノ権会、婦女ヲ弾圧シタリ又ハ人ヲ殺害スレバ七年以上ノ懲役

ナリ或ハ死刑ニ處セラレルノヲデアル、勿論上官ノ命令ヲ仰り軍隊
Defence Document No. 1025

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE Far East

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARIKI, Sadao, et al.

S'CH' DEPOSITION

DEFENDANT: UMEU, Yoshijiro

Having first duly sworn, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deposes as follows:

My name is UMEU, Yoshijiro and I am one of the defendants in the above styled case.

I was the Commander of the KANTO Army between September 1939 (14th Year of Showa) and July 1944 (19th Year of Showa) and after that, the Chief of the General Staff until the time of the demobilization following the conclusion of the war.

KIMURA was the Chief of Staff of the KANTO Army under my control between October 1940 (15th Year of Showa) and April 1941 (16th Year of Showa). The official date of his installation and resignation from the position of Chief of Staff of the KANTO Army is as mentioned above. On account of his attendance at the celebration of the 2600th Anniversary held in TOKYO, however, it was in the middle of November 1940, that he actually arrived at his post. At the end of March 1941, he left TOKYO to attend the Chief of Staff Conference, coming over to TOKYO. While on this business trip, it was officially announced that he was appointed the Vice-Minister of War. Such being the case, his practical tenure of office as the Chief of Staff of the KANTO Army was as short a space of time as about four months I remember.

Before becoming Chief of Staff of the KANTO Army, KIMURA had absolutely no military service experience in JAPAN and had never administered the affairs relative to that country. Moreover, owing to the shortness of his tenure of office (no more than four months) was too short a time for
Defense Document No. 1025

...to take over the duties of the former Chief of Staff and make a tour of inspection through his jurisdiction, I think that he left his post before he could exert himself to the utmost as the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

I recall that during KIMURA's tenure of office as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army there occurred in JAPAN no special incidents concerning the Soviet Union or China.

KIMURA was appointed a member of the Japan-Mexico Economic Cooperation Committee and the Japan-China Colonization Committee. The fact that he was appointed a member of these Committees was not because of his personality but of the regulations of the committees which provided that the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, whoever may take the position, shall be automatically appointed a committee member. By nature, KIMURA took little interest in political, economic and diplomatic policies. Moreover, as mentioned above, he could not exert himself to the utmost even in his main duty as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. I think that in view of these conditions, he did nothing in particular as a member of those committees.

The Japan-China Colonization Committee mentioned above was connected with the Overseas Ministry but was not under the control of the Commander of the Kwantung Army. The reason why the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army was appointed a member of it was for the purpose of forming a connection between the Overseas Ministry and the Army.

A German military attaché is supposed to have said that KIMURA was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army between October 1939 and October 1940, and also worked on behalf of Germany. KIMURA's term in Kwantung, however, was as I mentioned before no more than four months from November 1940 and as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army he had absolutely no connection with Germany as a matter of duty. Moreover, there is no evidence of KIMURA's activity in regard to such a matter.
Defense Document No. 1025

14 February - the 22d Year of SHO'47

At: SUGAMO Prison

/s/ DEPONENT: UZU, Yoshijiro /Seal/

I certify that the above was sworn to and the signature and seal affixed in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.
At the same Place.

/s/ TITUS: SHIOURA, Tokisaburo /Seal/

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ UZU, Yoshijiro /Seal/
Translation Certificate

I, HONGO, Tameo, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Affidavit of YOHIRO, Yo-hijiro is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/3/ Tameo Hongo

Tokyo, Japan
Date 2d May 1947
No.

No. 1025
2022年10月25日

王华

这是一个关于中国历史的报告。在1949年，中国共产党领导全国各族人民取得了新民主主义革命的胜利，建立了新中国。新中国成立后，中国共产党领导人民进行社会主义革命和建设，取得了伟大的成就。

To: All subordinate units thereof.

The military law and trial rules and regulations for the China Expeditionary Force shall be issued according to the following draft:

NICHOLS, Pilot, Commanding General, China Expeditionary Force.
1 October 1915.

———

CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

Art. I. Any individual who violates the provisions of the military law of the China Expeditionary Force shall be tried by a military tribunal.

Art. II. The military tribunal shall be established by the China Expeditionary Force, and the various subordinate armies under its jurisdiction.

Art. III. The military tribunal of the China Expeditionary Force shall have jurisdiction over all cases designated by the Commanding General.

Art. IV. Aside from the provisions of the preceding article, the military tribunals of the various subordinate Armies thereof shall have jurisdiction over such cases of violations occurring — 1 —
within the respective zone of operation of each army.

Regardless of the stipulations of the preceding paragraphs, the Commanding General of the CHINA Expeditionary Force reserves the right to designate the military tribunal which shall have jurisdiction over a special case.

Art. V. The Commanding General of the CHINA Expeditionary Force, or the commanding general of the subordinate Army under its jurisdiction shall be the president of the military tribunal.

Art. VI. The Military tribunal shall consist of three judges. The judges shall be two officers and one judge advocate, under the supervision of the president.

Art. VII. The military tribunal shall be in session with the judges, the prosecutor, and the clerk in attendance.

Art. VIII. In the trial of a foreigner other than a Chinese, the military tribunal shall first obtain the official sanction of the Commanding General of the CHINA Expeditionary Army.

Art. IX. Any point not covered by this law shall be governed as much as possible by the rules and regulations of a special courts martial.

Additional Clause: This law shall be effective as of 1 October 1939.
日本で発行された日本のもの。その内容は、日本の文化や歴史、社会的な問題などの情報を提供しています。特に、日本の現代社会における問題解決策についての論議が中心です。

日本の文化についても詳しく触れられており、観光客や日本に興味のある人々にとって役立つ情報を提供しています。日本文化は、独自の美しさと深さを持ち、世界中で愛されています。この本は、その魅力をより深く理解し、楽しむことができるものです。
General Order No. 538

Matters Relating to Punishment of the American Airmen.

FROM: Hill, Shunroku, Commanding General, CHINA Expeditionary Force.

TO: SHIMOMURA, Sadamu, Commanding General, 13 Army.

14 October 1942.

1. In accordance with he foregoing, the sentences meted out by the 1st Army Military Tribunal on 2 August 1942, against the enemy airmen: Dr. Robert L. Paxton; C. J. KITZ; Robert L. PARR, General; and DESHAW, Jacob will be mitigated.

2. The death sentence shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

3. The prosecutor of the military tribunal will notify the prison warden and the prisoner of this fact, and shall make note of this fact in the trial order.

In making this announcement to the convicted men, special mention must be made of the Emperor's leniency.

When this announcement has been made by the prosecutor, the president of the tribunal will immediately report this fact.

DISPATCHED: 1250 hours
RECEIVED: 1354 Hours, 22 October

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF.

FROM: Chief of General Staff (Dispatch from NANKING).

At present there are various arguments regarding the application of International Law as a basis for the disposition of the American airmen. Moreover, there is always the possibility of the enemy taking advantage of this point in diffusing their propaganda, when the verdict is revealed.

Accordingly, take strict precautionary measures to conceal any information regarding the place of confinement.
General Order No. 538

Matters Relating to Punishment of the American Airmen.

FROM: Shunoku, Commanding General, CHINA Expeditionary Force.

TO: SHIMOMURA, Sadamu, Commanding General, 13 Army.

14 October 1942.

1. In accordance with the sentences meted out by the 13 Army Military Tribunals on 1 August 1942 against the enemy airmen: Robert L. Parr, George E. DeShack, the death sentence shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

2. The death sentence shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

3. The prosecutor of the military tribunal will notify the prison warden and the prisoner concerned of this fact, and shall make note of this fact in the trial record.

In making this announcement to the convicted men, special mention must be made of the Emperor's leniency.

When this announcement has been made by the prosecutor, the president of the tribunal will immediately report this fact.

DISPATCHED: 1250 hours

TO: Chief of General Staff.

FROM: Chief of General Staff (Dispatch from NANKING).

At present there are various arguments regarding the application of International Law as a basis for the disposition of the American airmen. Moreover, there is always the possibility of the enemy trying to gain advantage in diffusing their propaganda, when the verdict is revealed.

Accordingly, take the strictest precautionary measures to conceal any information regarding the place of confinement.
General Headquarters Forces Order No. 4

Military Law Concerning the Punishment of Persons Convicted of High-Treason and Interpretation of Article 1 of the Regulations Concerning the Punishment of Persons Convicted of High-Treason

This article clearly states that all persons, citizens of Japan, who violate the provisions of the International Law governing warfare or the order for military operation, or all persons who violate the provisions of the International Law governing warfare or the order for military operation, are subject to military punishment.

Article XXIII, the regulation concerning the established rules of land warfare, of the supplementary provisions adopted to the regulations governing the recognized rules and regulations of land warfare which states "a defendant is limited in the choice of methods of offense employed against an enemy", constitutes the basic principle of the rules of modern warfare.

Although this article does not clarify the extent of this limitation, it constitutes the basic idea of the international law governing warfare with a view towards bringing the demands of military operations and the claims of humanity into concordance. From a common sense viewpoint, it clarifies such acts contrary to human decency, and it can be said that this article prohibits any and all such actions and measures of warfare absolutely inexcusable in the prosecution of war.

Article XXIII, of the same regulation, lists acts which are specifically prohibited, but the acts that are prohibited under Article XXII are not limited to the aforementioned.
Military Law Concerning the Punishment of Enemy
Violations of the Laws of War (Interpretation of Article 27).

This article clearly states that all persons alien who raid
the Japanese homeland, by (GHQ), in our sense of military
operations, or all persons who violate the provisions of the
International Law governing warfare or the permit so-called war
offence are subject to military punishment.

Article XXII, the regulation concerning the established
rules of land warfare, of the supplementary provisions enacted
to the present governing the recognized rules and regulations
of land warfare which states "A combatant is limited in the
choice of methods or employed against an enemy", constitutes
the basic principle of the rules of modern warfare.

Although this article does not clarify the extent of this
limitation, it constitutes the basic idea of the International
Law governing warfare with a view towards bringing the demands
of military operations and the claims of humanity into concor-
dance. From a common sense view point, it clarifies such acts
contrary to human decency, and it can be said that this articl.
prohibits any and all such actions and measures of warfare
absolutely inexcusable in the prosecution of war.

Article XXIII, of the same regulation, lists acts which
are specifically prohibited, but the acts that are prohibited
under Article XXII are not limited to the aforementioned.
Article II of this military law is an adaptation of Article XIX and XXI of principles for the rule concerning aerial warfare.

If the interpretation is made on the foregoing principles, then the acts enumerated under Article II may be construed as violations of the provisions of International Law governing warfare.

The term "objective" in the clause "with the objective of..." means the principal motive and primary aims of the act, i.e., in union an act was committed with the primary objective of attacking military targets, but with full knowledge of the fact that such an act would in all probability cow, intimidate, kill or maim civilians are included.

The term "carry out an attack" means an attack which can be sufficiently recognized as realizing the foregoing objective, and alludes to those cases in which civilians have been cowed, intimidated, killed or maimed.

The term "objective" in Article II Section 2, Paragraph 1, is similarly interpreted.

The acts listed under Article II, Section 3, Paragraph 1, while not directed against such "objectives" as expressed in Sections 1 and 2, aside from these cases which are inevitable, refer to acts of attack carried out against objectives other than...
there with military significance beyond a degree necessary for the protection of civilians.

The acts listed under Section 4, refer to such acts as, for instance, the use of poison gas, or the employment of weapons for the diffusion of poison, etc.

Paragraph 2 of Article 17 refers to those cases as is also mentioned in which an act was committed with the objective of affecting such acts violating human conventions as listed under Paragraph 1, but which failed to realize its objective; viz., the attack may have been carried out but the bombs may have been dropped onto the houses without causing any damage.
The image contains text written in Chinese, which is not in English. It appears to be a page from a document, possibly containing information or instructions. Due to the nature of the content and the language, it's challenging to provide a meaningful translation or context without additional information.
tbody
デフ DOo NO 1067-E

この国軍中、記載サテリスト行後、例ヘハ毒ガスノ使用スルハ毒散布用ノ武器及サテリアル

タール攻撃

在外ヲ目的トシテ行ハレ

法ヲ奈ルガ故行ヲハナザリー場合テハハ選行サテリアル行ヲハ実行ハレタール

目ヲ裏スル＝ヨヲヲハ毒ノ使用ヲ為シタハ毒ガスノ使用スルハ毒散布用ノ武器

ナリックハ爆弾ガ川ヲ投下サレ何等損害ヲ與ヘバザリシ場合ニ言及セ

アトノデアル
SUPPLEMENTARY
PROCLAMATION

§1

All enemy airmen who raid the Japanese homeland, MANCHUKUO, or our zones of military operations, and come within the areas of our jurisdiction, or who violate the provisions of international law governing war, shall be arrested to trial by military forces, and will be subject to death or severe punishment as war criminals.
Def. Doc. No. 1027 - G

TO: Chief of Staff

FROM: Chief of General Staff (NANKING)

22 October 1942

General Staff Wire No. 452
Staff Wire No. 20 (Transmitted).

In the proclamation 'the military' concerning the punishment of enemy airmen - the terms 'individuals who violate the provisions of International Law governing warfare' mean 'individuals who in flagrant disregard of human decency commit atrocities' and this interpretation shall be as such.

Distribution of telegram:
Ko
Nami
Ro
Sho
(文獻)

(提要)

1944年11月15日

(發函) 送回呈文

(備註) 第110川藤案

(提要) 送回呈文

(發函) 送回呈文

(備註) 第110川藤案

(備注) 第110川藤案

(備註) 第110川藤案

(備註) 第110川藤案
日暮里広域

日暮里イースト

非都市部

日暮里{東京都（港区）}
Def. Doc. No. 1034

Statement of the Spokesmen of the Foreign Office concerning the invitation to the Brussels Conference by the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. (Nov. 3, 1937)

The Note Verbal of the Brussels Conference was received yesterday through the Belgian ambassador. Its contents are practically the same as reported by Rome.

It has been the consistent policy of the Japanese Government to solve all Sino-Japanese questions through direct negotiation between Japan and China. We find no reason to abandon that policy at this time.

Japan's appeal to force of arms in China has been provoked by China herself. Japan had never thought of resorting to force for the purpose of solving Sino-Japanese disputes.

However, the situation having developed as it has, what is most urgently needed is the removal of anti-Japanese forces that have brought on the present Sino-Japanese crisis and that may bring it on at any time in future.

It is unbelievable that this purpose can be achieved at Brussels through the deliberations of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty and other Powers, or even through the negotiations among a few limited Powers as we are not prepared to cooperate with Japan toward the removal of those anti-Japanese forces. We are convinced that there is no other way of affecting a solution of the present situation than direct
negotiation between vassals and China. The most the other powers can do at this juncture is to induce China to enter into direct negotiations with Japan.
Def. Doc. No. 1034

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HATZI, Katsuzo, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Spokesman of the Foreign Office concerning the Invitation to the Brussels Conference by the Signatories of the Mine Power Treaty (Nov. 3, 1937)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April, 1937.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Ueda

- 3 -
「ブラナール」発表の口上を昭和五年三月から受取った。

その内容は昭和の政権に新たな時代が幕引いた。

昭和五年の政権発表を含む日々の県政を指導する役目を果たし、ものだからである。
新装の書道と解読する方法はないことを示すものである。前は下支の書道家を引く以前には

に示らしたことをある

少の異能の問題が示し示する彼のことは支問をしして日本を直指歩歩
May 19, 1940.

In regard to the bombing operations that have been carried on against Chungking, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ikeda, wrote, advised on the 14th of this month the United States and other powers through their ambassadors at Tokyo to withdraw their nationals from Chungking to a zone of safety. To this the United States ambassador, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, under instructions from his Government, communicated to the Foreign Minister on the following day, stating that although the attitude and views of the United States concerning the Chungking bombing have already been made clear on several occasions, it is specially noted by the United States that Japan's forces will avoid such military actions as will jeopardize the lives and property of Americans there.

Foreign Minister Ikeda, therefore, re-nated his request to Ambassador Grew today that the United States will extend cooperation to our advice for the withdrawal of its nationals, in view of the fact that, since Chungking is the most important base against Japan, its bombing cannot but be continued, but that the Japanese forces are never making indiscriminate bombing and that they fully respect the rights and interests of the United States and other powers.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kacru, Chief of the Archivist Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the Bombing of Chungking, June 19, 1940" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of April 1947

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
Your Excellency,

I have the honour or instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to address Your Excellency on the subject of attacks made by Japanese aircraft and land forces on British warships and merchant shipping at 'Wu-hu and near 'Nanking on 12th December. These incidents clearly raise grave issues.

2. At 'Wu-hu a British tug which had conveyed from 'Nanking His Majesty's Consul, the British Military Attaché and the Flag-Captain to the British Rear-Admiral, 'Yangtze, was attacked by Japanese machinegun fire after transferring these officers to H.M.S. Ladybird. The latter proceeded to join the tug in order to protect her, when she observed a Japanese field gun battery firing on merchant ships concentrated above the Asiatic Petroleum Company's installation. Firing continued and was directed at H.M.S. Ladybird herself.

3. There were four direct hits on this vessel: one naval rating was killed, another was seriously wounded and there were several minor casualties including Flag-Captain. A direct hit was also seen to be sustained by the British merchant ship 'Suiwo'. H.M.S. Bee then arrived on the scene
and was also fired on by the shore battery. The Commander of H.M.S. Bee landed to protest and was informed by Colonel Hashimoto, the senior Japanese military officer then at Yuhu, that firing on warships was due to a mistake but that he had orders to fire on every ship on the river. At a later interview the same officer stated categorically that if any ships moved on the river they would be fired on and, despite protests, H.M.S. Bee and Ladybird after berthing remained covered by guns at point-blank range.

4. Near Hsia San-shan above Narking where British merchant ships were concentrated in a part of the river previously designated by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief as a safety-zone, three separate bombing attacks were made by Japanese aircraft on them and on H.M. Ships Cricket and Scarab which were with them.

5. His Majesty's Government have now been glad to receive Your Excellency's note of the 14th December offering the profound apology of the Imperial Japanese Government for the attacks on His Majesty's Ships, stating that measures were immediately taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and adding that they will deal suitably with those responsible and pay the necessary compensation.

6. His Majesty's Government observe that Your Excellency's note makes no mention of the attacks on British merchant vessels
Your Excellency,

I have the honour or instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to address Your Excellency on the subject of attacks made by Japanese aircraft and land forces on British warships and merchant shipping at Wuhu and near Hankow on 12th December. These incidents clearly raise grave issues.

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3. There were four direct hits on this vessel: one naval rating was killed, another was seriously wounded and there were several minor casualties including Flag-Captain. A direct hit was also seen to be sustained by the British merchant ship Suibo. H.M.S. Bee then arrived on the scene.
Your Excellency,

I have the honour on instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to address Your Excellency on the subject of attacks made by Japanese aircraft and land forces on British warships and merchant shipping at Wuhu and near Nanking on 12th December. These incidents clearly raise grave issues.

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profound apology of the Imperial Japanese Government for the
attacks on His Majesty's Ships, stating that measures were
immediately taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents
and adding that they will deal suitably with those responsible
and pay the necessary compensation.

6. His Majesty's Government observe that Your Excellency's
note makes no mention of the attacks on British merchant vessels
and I am instructed to request that an assurance may be
given that all that is said in that note applies equally to
these attacks.

7. His Majesty's Government take particular note of the
statement that those responsible will be suitably dealt with.
Adequate punishment of those responsible for the particular
attacks under discussion seems indeed to His Majesty's Govern-
ment to be the only method by which further outrages can be
prevented.

8. His Majesty's Government cannot but recall the previous
incidents in which the Japanese Government have expressed
regret for attacks made on British nationals and property and
have given assurances that adequate steps had been taken to
prevent any repetition. They call to mind the attack made
on His Majesty's Ambassador to China while travelling by road
from Hankow to Shanghai, the subsequent attack on motorcars
conveying British officials on a similar journey, the attacks
on British civilians and military posts or the defense perimeter
at Shanghai, as well as other incidents, and the repeated
assurances of the Japanese Government of their intention
fully to respect the interests of third Powers in the present
conflict with China. It is clear that the steps hitherto taken
by the Japanese Government to prevent such attacks have so
far failed in this purpose and His Majesty's Government must
now ask to be informed that measures have actually been taken of a character which will put a definite stop to the incidents of which they complain.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HATASU, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "The British Note delivered by Sir Robert Craigie to the Foreign Minister on December 16, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April, 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /S/ K. Uebe
七、英国外相ハ責任者ハ公職ヲ接続サルペシトノ御通知ヲ塩ノニ

政府ハ各々これラ報知スルノヲ勧告セラルルモノナリ。

Regarding the incident of shelling British men-of-war, it is regrettable that, despite earnest endeavours to find out real fact of the case, the investigation has been delayed on account of various troops having been scattered at the time and the consequent difficulty of establishing contact through lack of the means of communication. Immediately after the occurrence of the incident, the Army authorities despatched a staff officer of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters to carry on joint investigations on the spot with the authorities concerned there. The result so far obtained is as follows:

I. GENERAL SITUATION.

1. On December 11, the Japanese forces, in order to win the final victory after the fighting of more than a hundred days, closed in on the capital of China, lacking, and having completed their frontal siege on land, they were waging with one another for the capture of its walls. Heavy fires broke out in the city, especially in the direction of Sinlwan and dense smoke covering the Yangtze River.
On that day the Detachment X crossed the Yangtze to its left bank at a point north of Taiping, and advanced toward Nanking in order to intercept the Chinese forces retreating from Nanking.

Simultaneously the high commander and all his men of the Japanese force which had advanced close to the front line (to Siao-Hang Hill to the south of Wuchang) assuming that the only way open for the retreat of the hard-pressed Chinese at Nanking would be by the river Yangtze, were all concentrating their attention on that direction. and in view of the fact that notice had already been served on the 5th December by the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai to the authorities of other Powers concerning the evacuation of their nationals from the zone of hostilities and that fighting had become so intense as above described, they did not ever dream of the presence of any foreign vessels in the neighbourhood of the fighting area.

2. However, about 3:00 o'clock (Japan Time) on the afternoon of the same day more than ten large steamers were observed fleeing up the river from the direction of Siao-kwan. The said high commander, believing them to be the enemy in retreat, ordered the artillery corps nearby to fire on the ships. But the distance being too great, the shells did not reach the ships which continued their way upstream to the discharge of all the Japanese soldiers.

Thereupon, the high commander sent order to the units which were expected to be in the neighbourhood of where to attack these vessels.
II. THE ACTIONS OF THE DETACHMENT Z.

1. The Detachment Z, which was ordered to intercept the enemy's retreat, made a forced march through the night of the 11th and reached the neighbourhood of 'ulu between 7:30 and 8:00 o'clock on the morning of the 12th and occupied positions there.

On that day the weather was fine but there was some fog from the morning. At about 10:00 a while the commander of the detachment discovered along the right bank of the Vanua at a point about three kilometres to the north from his position four large steamers anchored, which appeared to be landing men by launches. Then, at about 10:30 o'clock he noticed some of these steamers suddenly begin sending up black smoke, whereupon the commander, deciding that the enemy was trying to hide behind smoke screen his sinister plan, ordered firing. Shells were seen striking the first and the second ships in the fore-front. However, the ships in the rear immediately fled downstream and vanished soon out of sight, while one of the ships at the front began to advance toward our forces. As she came nearer, a British flag on her was recognized. The commander of the detachment immediately ordered to cease firing. When the ship came along the pier at 'ulu, it was discovered that she was a British man-of-war, the *Lahinda*. 

2. At about 10:40 o'clock one shell was fired by mistake at a ship hoisting the British flag which was coming from the upper stream, but it seemed to have passed high over the vessel. This ship, when arrived at the pier, was identified as the British man-of-war, the *Hec.*
II. THE ACTIONS OF THE PPT GUN V.

1. The detachment Z, which was ordered to intercept the enemy's retreat, made a forced march through the night of the 11th and reached the neighbourhood of Wuhu between 7:30 and 8:30 o'clock on the morning of the 12th and occupied positions there.

On that day the weather was fine but there was dense fog from the morning. After a while the commander of the detachment discovered along the right bank of the Yangtze at a point about three kilometres to the north from his position four large steamers anchored, which appeared to be landing men by launches. Then, at about 5:00 o'clock he noticed some of these steamers suddenly begin sending up black smoke, whereupon the commander, deciding that the enemy was trying to hide behind smoke screen his sinister plan, ordered firing. Shells were seen striking the first and the second ships in the front. However, the ships in the rear immediately fled downstream and vanished soon out of sight, while one of the ships at the front began to advance toward our forces. As she came nearer, a British flag on her was recognized. The commander of the detachment immediately ordered to cease firing. When the ship came along the pier at Wuhu, it was discovered that she was a British man-of-war, the Lanching.

2. At about 10:00 o'clock one shell was fired by mistake at a ship hoisting the British flag which was coming from the upper stream, but it seemed to have passed high over the vessel. This ship, when arrived at the pier, was identified as the British man-of-war, the Boc.
II. THE ACTIONS OF THE DET CHARGE Z.

1. The Detachment Z, which was ordered to intercept the enemy's retreat, made a forced march through the night of the 11th and reached the neighbourhood of "ahu between 7:30 and 8:30 o'clock on the morning of the 12th and occupied positions there.

On that day the weather was fine but there was dense fog from the morning. After a while the commander of the detachment discovered along the right bank of the vaastar at a point about three kilometres to the north from his position four large steamers anchored, which appeared to be landing men by launches. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock he noticed some of these steamers suddenly begin sending up black smoke, whereupon the commander, deciding that the enemy was trying to hide behind smoke screen his sinister plan, ordered firing. Shells were seen striking the first and the second ships in the fore-front. However, the ships in the rear immediately fled downstream and vanished soon out of sight, while one of the ships at the front began to advance toward our forces. As she came nearer, a British ship on her was recognized. The commander of the detachment immediately ordered to cease firing, when the ship came along the pier at "ahu, it was discovered that she was a British man-of-war, the "Bangara.

2. At about 10:00 o'clock one shell was fired by mistake at a ship hoisting the British flag which was coming from the upper stream, but it seemed to have passed high over the vessel. This ship, when arrived at the pier, was identified as the British man-of-war, the "Ace."
3. Rear-Admiral Holt, who was aboard the "Sun", the British Consul who was aboard the "Indiabird", and several officers including captains of the ships landed and met the commander of the detachment.

At this meeting, the commander of the detachment said that the British flag could not be discerned on account of the chuniks as the ships were hidden behind a black smoke, and he believed the vessels to be enemy vessels. Furthermore, he stated, after explaining the circumstances regarding a large number of defeated Chinese soldiers in the neighbourhood of Whampoa, that they were using the Yangtze for their retreat, he stated that it was the duty of his detachment to sink all enemy vessels on the river. The British thereupon requested the commander not to fire upon them thereafter, to which the commander agreed.

Then the British expressed their desire that, in order to forestall further danger, Japanese officers be put on board the British ships, but the commander declined to accede to this. At the request of the British, a Japanese captain was ordered to go on board the British non-of-war for the purpose of ascertaining the neighbourhood. He saw behind a delta a night boat proceeding down the stream, six steamers and many junks laden full of Europeans and Americans.

The commander of the detachment apologised for the casualties caused aboard the British non-of-war, lent some of his rifles for the holding of the dead and wounded, and sent as his marines an infantry officer and an artillery officer to honour the Briti
dead at the funeral.

The British non-com. stayed at the pier until sent rom-
and then departed.

III. CONCLUSION.

As has been described above, it was not even dreamed of, not
only by the high commander of the sect but by all the units on the
first line, that there might be any vessels of third powers in the
dangerous fighting area and at the time of severe battles, when,
as a matter of fact, with a port of the Japanese forces already
Pukow across the Yangtze, the possible path of retreat for the
Chinese forces was limited only to the Yangtze River.

Contrary to the judgment of our forces, the facts were that
there were British ships in the fighting area. These ships not
only could not be recognized as British on account of the dense fi-
but seemed to be landing retreating Chinese on the shore: conseq-
the movements of the ships were such as to make them appear to be
trying to hide behind a smoke screen. In these circumstances the
commander of the detachment issued orders to fire at the vessels.
The attack, therefore, was not made at all in the knowledge that
the vessels were of British nationality. That the crime was
entirely unintentional will be understood by those who know the
actual conditions in a battle-field where occurrences of unexpected
and extraordinary events are so numerous. All these circumstanc-
not notwithstanding, we sincerely regret that there should have taken
place the present unfortunate affair.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Yamashita, Chief of the Archives, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 3 lines is entitled "The Foreign Office Spokesman made public on the 26th December, 1857, the following Statement of the Military Authorities concerning the Shelling of the British frigate "Hao" at "Uhu." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April, 1847.

/S/ K. Yamashita
Signature of Officer

Witness: /S/ K. Uebi
STATEMENT OF THE SPOKESMAN OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
MADE ON THE 26TH DECEMBER, 1937, CONCERNING THE PAHAJ INCIDENT.

His Excellency Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador to Japan, called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Koki Hirota, at 11:30 o'clock a.m. on the 26th December; and after informing the Foreign Minister that he came to make a happy report, the American Ambassador read essential contents of the Note of the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan, and then said to the Foreign Minister, with special reference to the last paragraph of the American Note, to the effect that the Government of the United States hopes that the steps which the Japanese Government has taken will prove effective toward preventing any further attacks or unlawful interference by Japanese authorities or forces with American nationals, interests or property in China. In response to this the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, giving expression to the profound gratitude of the Japanese Government for the attitude shown by the Government of the United States and the earnest efforts of the American Ambassador Mr. Grew, toward the present incident, said that although it was exceedingly regrettable that an unfortunate incident such as this had happened, it was a matter for congratulation that the incident
had reached an amicable settlement through the friendly spirit existing between the United States and Japan.

The full text of the Note of the Government of the United States is shown in the attached sheets.

EXTRAordinary OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, December 26, 1937.

Excellency:

I have the honor, by the direction of my Government, to address to Your Excellency the following note:

"The Government of the United States refers to its note of December 14, the Japanese Government's note of December 14 and the Japanese Government's note of December 24 in regard to the attack by Japanese armed forces upon the U.S.S. PANAY and three American merchant ships.

"In this Government's note of December 14 it was stated that "The Government of the United States requests and expects of the Japanese Government a formally recorded expression of regret, or undertaking to make complete and comprehensive indemnifications, and an assurance that definite and specific steps have been taken which will ensure that hereafter American nationals, interests and property in China will not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities or forces whatsoever."
"In regard to the first two items of the request made by the Government of the United States, the Japanese Government's note of December 24 reaffirms statements made in the Japanese Government's note of December 14 which read "The Japanese Government regret most profoundly that it (the present incident) has caused damage to the United States' war ships andcasualties among those on board, and desire to present hereby sincere apologies. The Japanese Government will make indemnification for all the losses and will deal appropriately with those responsible for the incident". In regard to the third item of the request made by the Government of the United States, the Japanese Government's note of December 24 recites certain definite and specific steps which the Japanese Government has taken to ensure, in words of that note, "Against infringement of, or unwarranted interference with, the rights and interests of the United States and other third powers" and states that "The Japanese Government are thus endeavoring to preclude absolutely all possibility of the recurrence of incidents of a similar character".

"The Government of the United States observed with satisfaction the promptness with which the Japanese Government in its note of December 14 admitted responsibility, expressed regret, and offered amends.

"The Government of the United States regards the Japanese Government's account, as set forth in the Japanese Government's
Note of December 24, of action taken by it as response to the request made by the Government of the United States in this Government's note of December 14.

"With regard to the facts of the origins, causes and circumstances of the incident, the Japanese Government indicates in its note of December 24 the conclusion at which the Japanese Government, as a result of its investigation, has arrived. With regard to these same matters, the Government of the United States relies on the report of findings of the court of inquiry of the United States Navy, a copy of which has been communicated officially to the Japanese Government.

"It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that the steps which the Japanese Government has taken will prove effective toward preventing any further attacks or unlawful interference by Japanese authorities or forces with American nationals, interests or property in China."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed: Joseph C. Grew.

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KANASHI, Keoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Statement of the spokesman of the Foreign Office, made on the 26th December, 1937, concerning the Panay Incident." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April, 1947.

(signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. Urabe
On the 12th December, Japanese naval aeroplanes, in the course of their pursuit of retreating Chinese forces discovered and bombed at a point about 20 miles upstream from Nanking more than ten steamers which seemed to them to be Chinese military transport ships. Later it was found out that among the bombed vessels were three vessels belonging to the Standard Oil Company and that the American gunboat Panay which was in the neighbourhood was sunk.

The Japanese Government deeply regret the occurrence of the unfortunate incident, although we have not yet received detailed reports regarding it. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Koki Hirota, called at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon on the American Ambassador, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, at the American Embassy and tendered on behalf of the Japanese Government the expression of profound regret and their apologies. Simultaneously, telegraphic instructions were sent to Ambassador Sato in Washington to tender, on behalf of the Home Government, a similar expression to the American Government.

We have received official information to the effect that at Shanghai, Ambassador Kawai, Consul General Chumoto and the chief-of-staff of the Japanese fleet in China waters expressed regret respectively to the American authorities there today.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, *I. O. I.,* Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman, December 13, 1947," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office,

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of April, 1947.

/S/ K. Kayashi (seal)

DEF. DOC. #1041

The Japanese Answer concerning Refusal of the Invitation to the Meeting of the Signatories of the Nine Power Treaty.

(Traduction)

Le Gouvernement Impérial a l'honneur d'accuser réception de la Note verbale en date du 20 de ce mois, par laquelle le Gouvernement Polval, donnant suite à une demande du Gouvernement de Grande-Bretagne, faîte avec l'accompagnement du Gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique, propose aux États signataires du traité du six février 1922 de se réunir à Bruxelles le 30 de ce mois à l'effet d'examiner, conformément à l'article sept de ce traité, la situation en Extrême-Orient et d'étudier les moyens amiables de hâter la fin du conflit regrettable qui y a sévit.

La Société des Nations, dans le rapport adopté le 6 de ce mois a déclaré, en se basant sur les dispositions de l'une seule des Parties, que les opérations militaires auxquelles le Japon se livre en Chine sont contraires aux obligations découlant du Traité des Neuf Puissances. L'action que le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu contraint de prendre en Chine, est un acte de légitime défense à l'égard des actes provocatifs de violence et particulièrement de force armée auxquels la Chine a eu recours en poursuivant une politique extrémiste dirigée contre...
le Japon, et, ainsi que le Gouvernement Impérial l'a déjà déclaré, le Traité des Puissances n'est donc pas en question.

L'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, allant plus loin, assure la Chine de son appui moral et recommande aux membres de la Société des Nations de s'abstenir de toute action de nature à affaiblir le pouvoir de résistance de ce pays, aggravant ainsi ses difficultés dans le présent conflit, ainsi que d'examiner dans quelles mesures ils pourraient assister à titre individuel leur aîné la Chine. C'est là ne tenir aucun compte des rôles et justes intentions du Gouvernement Impérial qui se propose, par l'établissement d'une sincère coopération entre le Japon et la Chine, d'assurer une paix réelle en Aio orientale et contribuer ainsi à la paix du monde. C'est aussi prendre parti pour une seule des Parties et encourager ses dispositions hostiles ce qui ne peut assurément contribuer au règlement du conflit.

Le Gouvernement Royal ne fait, dans son invitation, aucune mention du rapport entre la Conférence envisagée et la Société des Nations. Cependant, on voit du fait que dans sa Résolution, la Société des Nations invite à se réunir les Membres de la Société qui sont parties au Traité des Puissances; que le Gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique qui a donné son approbation à la demande de la convocation de la Conférence faite par le Gouvernement britannique, avait, le 5 octobre,
déclaré appuyer la Résolution, le Gouvernement Impérial ne peut s'empêcher de conclure que la convocation de la Conférence est liée à la résolution de la Société des Nations. Or la Société des Nations, ainsi qu'il a été dit-dessus, a énoncé un avis portant atteinte à l'honneur du Japon et a adopté une résolution incontestablement injurieuse à son égard. Dans ces circonstances, le Gouvernement Impérial se voit contraint de constater que de franches et complètes communications, permettant d'amener une solution juste, équitable et réaliste du conflit entre le Japon et la Chine, ne sauraient être échangées entre les Puissances intéressées au cours de la Conférence proposée.

De plus le présent conflit sino-japonais provient de la situation particulière de l'Asie orientale et revêt un caractère extrêmement important mettant en jeu l'existence même de deux pays. Le Gouvernement Impérial est fermement convaincu de ce que tenter d'en rechercher une solution dans une Conférence composée de Puissances dont les intérêts en Asie orientale varient, ou qui n'y possèdent guère d'intérêts, ne servirait qu'à compliquer encore la situation et apporterait de graves obstacles à un règlement équitable et durable.

Pour des raisons ci-dessus exposées, le Gouvernement Impérial regrette de ne pouvoir accepter l'invitation du Gouvernement Royal.

Le présent conflit résulte de la campagne anti-japonaise.
The Japanese Government have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Note Verbale under the date of the 20th instant, by which the Royal Government, in accordance with the request of the Government of Great Britain, and with the approbation of the Government of the United States of America, propose to the Powers signatory to the Treaty of February 6, 1922, to meet...
at Brussels on the 30th of this month in order to examine, in conformity with the Article VII of the said treaty, the situation in the Far East and to study amicable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which is taking place there.

The League of Nations, in the report adopted on the 6th of the month, has declared on the basis of the declaration of only one of the two parties that the military operations carried on by Japan in China are in violation of the Nine Power Treaty. The action of Japan in China's violent anti-Japanese policy and practice, especially by her "provocative acts appealing to force of arms; and consequently, it lies, as has been declared already by the Imperial Government, outside the purview of the Nine Power Treaty.

The Assembly of the League of Nations has even gone the length of ensuring China of its moral support and of recommending to its members to abstain from any action that might weaken that country's power of resistance and add to its difficulties in the present conflict, and also to study how they might individually give aid to China. This to take no account of the just intention of the Imperial Government, who propose to bring about a sincere co-operation between Japan and China, to assure enduring peace in East Asia, and to contribute thereby to the peace of the world. This is to take sides with one of the parties and to encourage its hostile disposition, but in no way to contribute to an early settlement.
The Imperial Government make in their invitation no mention of the connection between the proposed Conference and the League of Nations. However, in view of the fact that in its resolution, the League of Nations has suggested a meeting of those of its members who are party to the Nine Power Treaty, and that the Government of the United States, who have acquiesced in the request of the Government of Great Britain for the convocation of the conference, have declared on October 6 their approval of the Resolution the Imperial Government cannot but conclude that the convocation of the conference is linked to the Resolution of the League of Nations. Now the League of Nations, as mentioned above, has expressed its views casting reflection upon the honour of Japan, and it has adopted resolution which is ircontrollably unfriendly towards her.

In those circumstances, the Imperial Government are constrained to believe that frank and full discussion to bring about a just, equitable and realistic solution of the conflict between Japan and China, cannot be expected between the Powers concerned at the proposed Conference.

Moreover, the present Sino-Japanese conflict arising from the special situation of East Asia has a vital bearing upon the very existence of the two countries. The Imperial Government is firmly convinced that an attempt to seek a solution at a gathering of so many Powers whose interests in East Asia are of varying degrees, or who have practically no interest there at all, will
only serve to complicate the situation still further and to cut serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper solution. For these reasons explained above, the Imperial Government regret their inability to accept the invitation of the Royal Government.

The present conflict has been caused by none other than the Chinese Government who for these many years have been engaged as a matter of national policy in disseminating anti-Japanese sentiment and encouraging anti-Japanese movements in China, and who, in collusion with the Communist elements, have menaced the peace of East Asia by their virulent agitations against Japan. Consequently, what is most urgently needed for a solution of the conflict is a realisation on the part of the Chinese Government of the common responsibility of Japan and China respecting the stability of East Asia, a revision of their attitude, and a change of their policy to that of cooperation between the two countries. What Japan sets as the Powers is that they comprehend fully this need. Their co-operation must be founded upon such comprehension on Japan, she believes, contribute essentially toward the stabilization of East Asia.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. YAMA'I, Clerk, Chief of the Archives Section,
Japan's Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document
herein attached in French and English, consisting of 7 pages
and entitled "The Japanese Answer concerning Occasion of the
Invitation to the Meeting of the Signatories of the Nine Power
Treaty," is an exact and true copy of an official translation
of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947.

(signed) F. HAYASHI
Signature of Clerk

Witness: (signed) F. UMEDA

- 8 -
Statement of the Japanese Government Regarding
Japan's Non-Participation in the Conference
of the Nine Power Treaty Signatories.

October 27, 1937.

The Japanese Government, having replied to the invitation of the
Belgian Government to the Conference of the Signatories of the Nine
Power Treaty of 1922, takes this opportunity of making public at home
and abroad a statement of their views.

1. China has witnessed the rise and fall of countless regimes since
the Revolution of 1912, but her foreign policy has been consistently one
of anti-foreignism. Especially since 1924, when the Kuomintang set up the
Nationalist Government in Canton and entered into alliance with the Communis
as a means of winning control of the central administration, the anti-foreign
policy began to be pursued with unprecedented vigor and ruthlessness, and
anti-foreign sentiments were kindled ablaze among the populace. The memory
is still fresh of the way in which foreign Powers, one after another, were
victimized and deprived of their vested rights and interests. It happens
that Japan has been made for the past ten years the principal target of
this anti-foreign policy of China.

Japan has always striven to promote friendship and cooperation among
the nations of East Asia, in the firm conviction that therein lies the key
to the stability of the region. Japan welcomed the deepening of Chinese
national consciousness which followed upon the Revolution, believing that
it would conducive to intimate Sino-Japanese collaboration, and she adopted th
policy of meeting the legitimate national aspirations of China to the utmost
possible extra-territorially. Japan, thus cultivating China's good-will,
looked patiently and eagerly forward to a favourable response that would
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In concert with her ideal of friendship and cooperation.

However, China showed no signs of appreciation of this sympathetic attitude on the part of Japan. On the contrary, she insisted still higher the estimate upon their country's fighting power. A belligerent spirit towards Japan came to prevail throughout the land. Long before the present outbreak, Chinese newspapers and magazines were resolute to call Japan the "enemy country" and Japanese their enemies. At the time of the Lushun Incident the Hankow Government, being driven to action against Japan by the internal situation they themselves had created, Japan's cautious attitude and her policy of local settlement were both deemed to utter failure.

With the aggravation of the situation all Japanese residents, not only in North China but also in Central and South China, became exposed to imminent danger, and were compelled to evacuate en masse, abandoning the enterprises that they had toilsomely built up during long years in the past. At the same time the Chinese in Shanghai, in contravention of the 1929 Truce agreement, secretly set out to construct military works in the demilitarized zone and to perfect their war preparations. Accordingly in June last the Japanese Government made a request for a special conference of the Powers concerned, and called the attention of the Chinese Government to the matter. The Chinese refused to alter their attitude, but upon the outbreak of the armed conflict in North China, they moved troops into the prohibited zone in flagrant violation of the Truce agreement, and finally following upon the murder of an officer and a man belonging to the Japanese Landing Party on August 9, they launched an attack upon the International Settlement.

While the Japanese authorities were still engaged in negotiations with the representatives of the Powers concerned, in a desperate attempt to
prevent hostilities with extreme patience and forbearance and bearing serious strategic disadvantages, the Chinese began to shell and bomb the Japanese quarter of the Settlement as well as the Japanese garrison defending it, with a view to annihilating the 30,000 Japanese residents as well as the Japanese forces who were hopelessly outnumbered by the Chinese armies. Thereupon Japan was compelled to take counter-measures in self-defence.

As is clear from the foregoing account, the fundamental cause of the aggravation of the present affair is to be found in the policy of the Nanking Government who moved large, threatening forces into North China in contravention of the Non-Entente Agreement and also tore up the Truce Agreement by marching troops on the International Settlement. Japan was compelled to take up arms in self-defence, and she has chosen this opportunity to make the Nanking Government revise their attitude for the sake of the permanent peace of East Asia. Therefore, the present affair can never be settled until the Nanking Government mend their ways, abandon once and for all their anti-Japanese policy and accept Japan’s policy of cooperation and collaboration between the two countries.

It should be remembered that one of the important factors underlying Nanking’s feverish agitations of more recent years against Japan is the action taken by the League of Nations at the time of the Manchurian Incident. That body then adopted a resolution framed in utter disregard of the realities of the situation in East Asia, which strongly stimulated China in her anti-Japanese policy. Now the League has once more taken up the appeal of the Nanking Government. Without going fully into the real causes of the present affair, it has concluded on the basis of false
Bof. Bee., lCÿS reports 1. -it the bombing of the military works in strongly fortified Nanking and Canton as an attack upon defenseless cities, and adopted the resolution of September 27 condemning Japan. Again on October 6 the Assembly of the League not only concluded that Japan's action constituted a violation of the anti-war pact and the Nine Power Treaty but also adopted a resolution which openly called for assistance to China. Such proceedings on the part of the League only fell in with the cunning scheme of the Nanking Government to exert pressure upon Japan by inviting the intervention of third powers, and serve no useful end but to encourage China in her resolve to oppose Japan to the last and to render a settlement of the affair more difficult than ever. It must be said that the League of Nations is repeating the error that it committed but a few years ago.

Japan's action is a measure of self-defense taken in the face of Chinese challenge, and obviously there can be no question of violation of the Nine Power Treaty. Moreover, as compared with the time when that treaty was concluded, the situation of East Asia to-day has been rendered totally different, owing to the infiltration of Communist influence and the changes of internal conditions prevailing in China. In any case, as regards the conference that has been convened of the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty, it is a foregone conclusion that a majority of the participants will hold themselves bound by the above-mentioned resolutions of the League of Nations, and even if Japan took part in its deliberations, no fair and just results could ever be expected therefrom as in the case of the league meeting at the time of the Manchurian Incident. Especially as this conference is to be attended by Powers which are not directly interested in East Asia, it is calculated to arouse popular feeling both in Japan
and China, thereby complicating the situation still further but contributing nothing toward a solution. The Japanese Government have, therefore, decided to decline the invitation.

The Japanese nation, rising as one man, is united in the determination to surmount all obstacles for the purpose of effecting a speedy settlement. Japan is by no means indifferent toward international cooperation. But the Sino-Japanese difficulties can be solved only through direct negotiations between the two powers on whom falls the common burden of responsibility for the stability of East Asia. That is needed is the elimination of Nanking's anti-Japanese policy and the Communist elements which are identified with it, so that there may be established an enduring peace based upon Sino-Japanese unity and cooperation. Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy, nor does she harbour any territorial designs. It is rather her sincere wish to witness the material and spiritual advancement of the Chinese nation. And it is her desire to promote cultural and economic cooperation with foreign powers regarding China, while at the same time she will respect fully their rights and interests there. Accordingly, as soon as the powers understand the true intentions of Japan, and take suitable steps to make the Nanking Government reconsider their attitude and policy, then and only then will a way have been paved for their cooperation with Japan respecting the settlement of the present conflict.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Iizumidai, Kaku, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Statement of the Japanese Government Regarding Japan's Non-Participation in the Conference of the Nine Powers Treaty Signatories, October 27, 1937" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of April, 1947.

F. Iizumidai
Signature of Official

Witless: K. Ono
最近特に、ロンドン・ニューヨーク等に在住の日本人が、様々な機会を利用して特急電報を発信している。この特急電報は、政治的決定、軍事的情報、経済の動向、文化芸術の動向などを含むものが多く、国際社会に広く知られる範囲を広げている。
民自力作業団は現況を認識し、自給自足の一翼を担うことを目的に、下記の訓練を行なってきた。今後も同様の活動を続け、地域の自立を図りたいと考えている。

【訓練内容】

1. 自然教材の利用
2. 土木作業の基本
3. 生活必需品の作成
4. 自然環境の保護

これらの訓練を通じて、民自力作業団は地域の自立を推進し、その成果は地域住民の生活改善につながる。今後も同様の活動を続けていく予定です。
実験自らスルハ公然修兵特志其当面シテ正規軍ヲ非武装地帯ニ援へ

Note: The text is not transcribed accurately due to the difficulty in discerning the content from the image.
In his interview with Ambassador Grew today, Foreign Minister Nomura explained to the latter to the following effect:

Various restrictions placed on American rights and interests in China in the course of the China affair have arisen either as unavoidable consequence of military operations in China or as natural corollary of the reforms which have been in progress simultaneously with the long-term reconstruction in China.

The Japanese Government have hitherto put forth their sincere efforts for the settlement of the so-called pending questions between Japan and the United States and it is their intention to continue such efforts.

It is greatly regrettable in this connection that Japan is misunderstood in some quarters as if she were intending to act in an exclusive and monopolistic manner. The Japanese Government are not acting with a view to shutting out in the future the economic activities of other powers in China, as a matter of fact they are not reluctant to open even the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers at a proper time and under appropriate conditions.

It is hoped that in the light of the above explanation made by the Foreign Minister Japan's real intention will be understood not only by the United States but by other Powers.
Def. Doc. 1043

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It is hoped that in the light of the above explanation made by the Foreign Minister Japan's real intention will be understood not only by the United States but by other Powers.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity

I, K. Huya, Chief of the archive section in the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereeto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Extracts of the Foreign Office Letter concerning the Interview between the Foreign Minister and Mr. Richard Nishimura, and the American Ambassador Mr. Joseph G. Cigler, December 4th, 1945," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 4th day of April, 1947.

/s/ K. Huya
Signature of official

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe
June 21, 1939.

The operations which the Imperial Japanese forces have just undertaken in South China, like those which have been in progress since last year, are nothing other than an extension of the purely military action for the purpose of destroying the important bases of operations by the Chiang Kai-shek regime against Japan.

The policy hitherto pursued by the Japanese Government of respecting the rights and interests of third Powers remains unchanged. Although the best efforts will therefore be exerted for the prevention of any damage to them in the recent operations, it is earnestly hoped the third Powers will understand the real intentions of Japan and extend cooperation to the efforts of the Japanese forces and thereby preclude the occurrence of any untoward incidents.
Certificate

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. Y. Shi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman, June 21, 1939," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe
To free the world from contentions and conflicts and to make peace and
good will prevail among mankind is an aim consonant with the "great ideal
upon which our Empire was founded. It is to that end that a new order in
East Asia is contemplated. Every country should be enabled to find its
proper place of peace and contentment; there should be amity and harmony
among neighbours, and there should be mutual respect for one another's
natural endowments, and common prosperity and progress for all.

In the performance of the sacred task of reconstructing East Asia,
the first step to be taken is to create and insure a new international
relationship between Japan, Manchoukuo and China. Needless to say this
new relationship should of necessity conform to the ideal underlying the
construction of the new order in East Asia. That is why neighbourly amity
and good will, common defense against the Comintern, and economic co-operation
were advocated in the statement of Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoe.
Our goal is plain as day. The concrete program for the construction of
the new order which the Japanese Government proposes to accomplish in
concert with the new central Government of China is formulated on that
evry statement, it is devoted to no other purpose than that the nations
concerned shall respect one another's racial and national endowments,
and shall cultivate friendly relations of mutual aid and good fellowship,
stand guard against the menace of communism so as to insure the peace of
Just as, and practise the principle of ministering to one another's need by setting up a reciprocally economic system. That Japan will respect China's independence and freedom has been made clear in the successive statements issued by our Government, and it will be proved in fact as the present disturbances subside.

Although Japan and China are now engaged in hostilities, the two peoples retain in their hearts the spirit of mutual sympathy and tolerance. The longer the hostilities last, the greater will be the sacrifice imposed upon East Asia. But certainly the great timeless mission of our Empire can not be abandoned simply because of the sacrifices of this conflict. The determination of our Government and people is firm as ever, and the strength of our nation has been replenished according to plan, so that we are ready to carry on our campaign, no matter how long, until the eyes of China's anti-Japanese and pro-Communist regime are finally opened.

Far-sighted men are not lacking among the four hundred million people of China. Some enlightened leaders have long advocated peace and national salvation. In order to rescue their nation from suffering and distress, they are fearlessly standing for right and dedicating their lives to their case. These men who share in the same solicitudes toward the general welfare of East Asia are our comrades. We can not but admire them for their high purpose and their unselfish enterprise.

Mr. Yang Ching-wei is an outstanding figure of this group. He could not endure to see the actual state of affairs by which his people were needlessly plunged into the depth of misery owing to the mistaken policy
of the Chungking regime, which in the last analysis only hastened the
sovietization of his country. He came out for national salvation through
opposition to Communism and conclusion of peace with Japan. In the face
of all manner of pressure and persecution by Chungking, he pursued the
path of his conviction, bringing light to his people lost in darkness.
Thus has he won the confidence and the following of his nation. His
peace and national salvation movement as well as the preparation for a
new central government have made rapid headway since the Sixth Anhui
National Congress which was held in Shanghai in August last year.

For the sake of the peace of East Asia we are truly grateful to
know that the Central Political Conference is to meet soon, and a new
central government will be brought into being with the united support and
co-operation of both regimes at Peking and Hankow and also of many leaders
representing the various political groups and the various sections of society
Japan will, of course, render whole-hearted assistance toward the formation
of the new government and is prepared speedily to extend recognition follow-
ing its establishment.

In this connection I should like to add that I am deeply impressed by
the fact that in full accord with Mr. Jayc, these leading statesmen in the
Peking and Hankow Governments, who have for the past two and a half years
devoted every ounce of their energy to the reconstruction and rehabilitation
of their respective areas, are now going forward with the work of restoring
peace and building up a new China.
On the eve of the establishment of a new central Government of China, I express my ardent hope that in long and all those other men of vision and leadership, united in purpose and resolute in action, will proceed with the great task for the regeneration of ... I am convinced that their earnest endeavours will meet with popular approval and support, both in and out of China, and that the misfortune brought on by the present Sino-Japanese conflict will be turned into an eternal blessing.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hasegawa, Igaru, Chief of the archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, in English consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Statement of the Prime Minister and War Council concerning the Delegation by Mr. Qian Xuesen of March 12, March 15, 1946" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 6th day of April, 1947.

Signature of Official

Witness: /S/ K. Ueno

Def. Doc. 1048
MARCH 30, 1940

Life is a constant progression, and conditions change from time to time. The prevailing relations between nations are regulated in accordance with these changes. It is in conformity with such necessities that Japan is exerting her utmost efforts for the concrete manifestation of international justice and the firm establishment of peace among mankind.

Now that a new Central Government of China has been established, and the construction of a genuine China begun, the Imperial Japanese Government wish to offer their congratulations. They will extend to this new government their wholehearted co-operation and support for its development, in accordance with their repeated declarations.

It is Japan's earnest expectation that the various Powers will give to a clearer understanding of this solemn reality, and will forthwith contribute toward the establishment of peace in East Asia.

That Japan asks of China is that she restore her independence and freedom on a moral basis, and that she proceed, in co-operation with Japan, toward the construction of a new order in East Asia, thereby mutually participating in the resulting progress and prosperity.

In order that Japan and the other countries of East Asia may preserve their existence, it is only natural that she should show special concern and desire for the development and utilization of the resources of China.
Jenok has no intention, however, of excluding such peaceful economic activities of third Powers as conform with the new situation in East Asia. On the contrary, it is her desire to co-operate with those Powers and to share with them the benefits of international unity. It is for this reason that Japan, despite the abnormal conditions arising out of continued military operations, has endured numerous inconveniences in order to protect the rights and interests of third Powers. The Imperial Japanese Government are confident that the New China will pursue a similar policy.

A representative China has just set out on the road to progress; a new development is about to ensue in East Asia. So long, however, as the remaining pro-Communist and anti-Japanese forces fail to break from their illusory dreams, Japan will not lay down her cross; nor will she relax her vigilance and her firm determination to surmount any obstacles that may arise in the future.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity


Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947.

(signed) L.Y.SII
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. UMEME
The Plenipotentiaries of Japan and China signed today at Nanking the Treaty concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China, the Protocol annexed thereto and the Agreed Terms of Understanding between the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries; following which the Plenipotentiaries of Japan, Manchoukuo and China signed the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

By virtue of the above, the Japanese Government have formally recognized the National Government of the Republic of China headed by Mr. Wang Ching-wei, the National Government of the Republic of China have recognized Manchoukuo, and Government of Manchoukuo have recognized the National Government of the Republic of China.

The documents relating to the above are as follows:
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Y. S., Yacu, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "announcement of the Government, November 30, 1940," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947.

(signed) K. Y. S.
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. W. B.
自分

生ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處ニ於ニ添付

サラニル前ノ日語ニ依ツテ書カレ呈貢ヨリ成ル日華事務省條約並日滿事務共同宣言

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-2-
Statement of the Foreign Office, London, on the Signing of the
Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty, and the Japan-Manchoukuo
China Joint Declaration.

November 27, 1940.

In Nanking, at 11 o'clock this morning, a Sino-Japanese Basic
Treaty between Japan and China was signed between Ambassador Nebuyuki
Abe and Mr. Tang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan (Though
Mr. Tang became the head of the National Government, he signed the
Treaty in the capacity of President of the Executive Yuan), which means
that Japan formally recognized the new National Government at Nanjing
as the legitimate government of China. And at noon General Abe and
Mr. Tsang Shi-hsi, Honomtentiaries of Japan and Manchoukuo, and Mr.
Wang signed the Japan-Manchoukuo-China Joint Declaration, by virtue of
which Manchoukuo and the National Government headed by Mr. Wang Ching-
wei recognized each other. It is most gratifying that the foundation
has thus been firmly laid for the construction of a new order in East
Asia through the co-operation among the three powers.

Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, and with
the advance of Japanese forces, there sprang up societies for the mainte-
ance of peace abroad in various parts of China. These were gradually
absorbed by and amalgamated with the regimes-namely, the Provisional
Government at Peking and the Reformed Government at Nanjing, paving the
way for the construction of a new China, until finally there appeared
the Peace and National Salvation Movement under the leadership of Mr.
Tang Ching-wei.
This was a movement aimed at the construction of a new order in East Asia and at establishing, for that purpose, a government by rehabilita-
tion. The Kuomintang, by rejecting both communism and anti-Japanism
and by joining hands with Japan. On December 18, 1930, Mr. T. C. Chiang
kicked off the world by his flight from Shanghai.

Prime Minister Prime Peace's statement (October 22) concerning
the construction of a new order in East Asia was followed by Mr. Wang's
declaration for peace and against communism (December 30). A few mon-
th later Mr. Wang arrived in Shanghai from Nanking (May 8, 1930), where
he established his headquarters for his peace movement. Shortly after-
wards he visited Tokyo (May 31) and conferred with the Prime Minister
Mr. Hirohito and also Prime Kensei, from whom he learned the true atti-
tude of Japan toward his peace movement and decided to proceed in ear-
nest. On August 28 the 6th Plenary Conference of the Kuomintang was
convened in Shanghai, which adopted the resolutions on the restoration
of Sino-Japanese relations by fundamental adjustment and for the reorganiza-
tion of the Kuomintang and the appointment of Mr. Wang as chairman of
the Central Executive Committee. At the same meeting the much-abused
Three People's Principles were given a proper and authentic interpretation.
The Peace and National Salvation Movement now became a "Peace and
National Construction" movement, and the orthodox Kuomintang, casting
aside its claim of "save the country by the Party," embarked upon the
establishment of a new Central Government of China through the cooperation
of parties and factions and those belonging to no party or faction.
The first important step toward the establishment of a new Central
Government of China through the co-operation of parties and factions and those belonging to no party or faction. The first important step toward the establishment of a new Central Government was the three-day conference at Hankow, attended by Mr. Chiang-wei, Mr. Yang Ke-min representing the Provisional Government and Mr. Liang Hung-chih of the Reform Government. Then, on January 23 this year these three leaders met again at Tsinan-taou. In February 11, Mr. Yang called a meeting at Shanghai, to which were invited men of social prominence as well as representatives of various parties and factions, and at which an agreement of views was reached concerning the general principles for the establishment of a Central Government and its political platform. This led to the closing on March 20 of the Central Political Conference to decide upon the fundamentals for the establishment of the new Government.

The conference was attended by thirty delegates in all, comprising ten from the Kuomintang, five each from the Provisional and the Reform Governments, two each from the Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia, the National Socialist Party and the Young China Party, and four men of recognized influence in society. Twelve important matters, such as the proposal for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, the draft principles for the establishment of a Central Government, the platform of the National Government and the regulation for the organization of Central Executive Committee, were approved, and the conference closed on March 25. On March 30 the rite and ceremonies marking the return of the National Government to its capital were held in Nanking, at which Mr. Yang Ching-wei issued a proclamation. Then and there the National Government made the first forward step.
of historic importance as a part of the construction of a new society.

In parallel and inseparably with the activities for the establishment of a central government, there progressed negotiations for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. These negotiations were especially notable progress on the basis on the three principles of unity and coexistence, non-aggression against Japan and non-expansion of influence, after the sixth Plenary Session of the negotiating committee convened at the end of August of 1939, and in December 30 an inter-agreement on basic ideas regarding the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations was worked out between the negotiators of the two countries.

Upon the establishment of the new central government in March 20 of this year, the Japanese government appointed on April General Tomoyuki Maeda, interpreter of internal and international affairs, who arrived in Beijing on the 22nd of that month. After this, all preparations were completed with regard for the restoration of Sino-Japanese relations. On July 5, the first meeting of the formal conference took place, attended by interpreter for the Chinese President of the Republic of China, Mr. Feng on his occasion spoke of what China expected of the conference, and the interpreter set forth the views of the Japanese government relative to the restrictions that were to be made. Since then the negotiations were continued for almost two weeks. It was either the 22nd of both sides for the construction of the two countries to solve the very complex and vast problem. At the 15th session held on August 28, they agreed upon a draft treaty,
which was initialed on August 31. Upon examination by the two gov-
ernments from the domestic standpoint of their respective countries, this
draft treaty was found to require partial alterations. Accordingly, in
the latter part of September the negotiations were resumed for the necessary
revision, on which an agreement of views was reached, and the treat-
in its final form was initialed on October 10.

On the other hand, with Tientsin and other ports that had always supported with-
out reserve the cause of "pro-French co-operation", negotiations were
conducted concerning a Sino-Melbourne-China Joint Declaration.

Early in November H. Wei Tsin-sheng, director of the Foreign Office
Bureau of Tientsin arrived in Paris, and the Declaration as published
today was initialed on November 8 by the plenipotentiaries of the three
countries. Meanwhile, Ambassador Li, returning to Japan on October 27,
met Prime Minister Prince Take, on December 29 to report on his
mission. Following the Imperial Conference of November 13, the Treat-
ies submitted to the Diet Council, and approved at its full session of
November 27. This in brief is the history of the Sino-French Peace
Treaty that was signed today at Tientsin.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

(Seal)

KI. Fugii, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English, consisting of pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman on the signing of the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan- Manchukuo China Joint Declaration, November 30, 1949", is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 14th day of April, 1947.

I, K. Fugii
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Inaba
非公文

昭和二十八年十二月一日

監理官

渋谷区

昭和二十八年十一月一日

監理官

渋谷区
《遠祖八日目記》所載「新宿御殿のスルクル日」

1923年9月17日、時雨の日、新宿御殿のスルクル日。

防災に関する写真を掲載し、防災の重要性を強調している。
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**タテナル**

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APPEAL OF THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

June 29, 1913

The following statement is issued as a result of the conversations which have recently been held between the Secretary of State of the United States and the French Ambassador:

The Government of the Republic of France fully recognizes the actual situation in China, where restrictions on a large scale are in progress and that, so long as the state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of assuring their security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control and that they have to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct that or interfere with their duty. The French Government have no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by the Japanese forces and they will take any opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to the Japanese authorities and French nationals in China that they should not in any such acts or measures.

-1-
JANUARY 5, 1917

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF F.M.

Jan. 10, 1917.

The following statement is issued as a result of the conversations which have recently been held between the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and the French Government:

The Government of the Republic of France fully recognizes the actual situation in China, where hostilities on a large scale are in progress; and notes that, so long as such state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of maintaining their security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control and that they have to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct their work or benefit their enemy. The French Government have no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the maintenance of the above-mentioned objects by the Japanese forces and they will take every opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to the French authorities and French nationals in China that they should refrain from such acts and measures.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, [Name], Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Announcement of the Foreign Office, June 23, 1940" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 4th day of April, 1947.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: [Signature] (seal)
天皇御雨衣を着用されるに、新に内閣を設立された中の日、

レタル合議所も約を故にトテ左ノ審明ヲナル。
DEP. DCC. #1061

Translators in
Defense language branch

Statement of SWA

Chief of the Information
Branch concerning a Letter to
the Foreign Correspondents
of Chinkiang

(7:30 p.m. 14, June)

Recently, the Japanese air force has carried out on repeated bombing attacks, Chinkiang. The wild Chinese, however, have intentionally built their air-defence batteries and other military constructions side by side with the various establishments of the Third Forces standing in and near the city, thus presenting enormous inconvenience to our attack. Therefore the Imperial Government, for fear of involving casual damage to the governmental as well as civil rights and interests of these Third Forces, has submitted notes on this 14th day to the Governments of Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, U.S.S.R., U.S.A. etc. In those notes the Imperial Government recommended the above governments to take adequate and prompt steps for the lengthen removal of their nationals to some safe area until the termination of the Japanese attack on Chinkiang. At the same time it was also notified formally that the Japanese forces would refrain from not to attack a certain specified number living on the south
Statement of S.T.A.

Chief of the Information Branch concerning an appeal to the Forces of the Government of Chungking

(7:30 p.m., 14, June)

Recently, the Japanese air force has carried out repeated bombing attacks on Chungking. The Allied Chinese, however, have intentionally built their air-raid batteries and other military constructions side by side with the various establishments of the Third Force, standing in and near the city, thus presenting enormous inconvenience to our attack. Therefore the Imperial Government, for fear of involving casual damage to the government as well as civil rights and interests of these Third Forces, has submitted notes on this 14th day to the Governments of Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, U.S.S.R., U.S.A. etc. In these notes the Imperial Government recommended the above forces to take adequate and prompt steps for the protection of internationals to some safe area until the termination of the Japanese attack on Chungking. At the same time, it was also notified officially that the Japanese forces would respect the not to attack a certain specified quarter lying on the west...
bank of the Yangtse River opposite to the city of Chungking, and that however the Imperial Government would not be responsible for unexpected casualties that might happen in places other than this specified quarter.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Bureau of Japanese Affairs, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 April 1947.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Kazuaki Hayashi, who occupy the post of Chief Archives
Section Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto
attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and
entitled "Statement of STAY Chief of Information Division
re notification to the Powers on Bombing of Ching-Wei"
is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document
in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

certified at Tokyo,
on the 4th day of March, 1945.

Hayashi, Kazuaki
(signed)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were
affixed hereto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: Hayashi, Kazuaki
(signed)
L.P. Dec. 20, 1952

Translating by
Liao Pei Liao-Long

The following congratulatory telegrams sent to Dr. Ching-wei, President of the Chinese National Government, and others from Foreign Minister MTSUKA, on the occasion of the Conclusion of Japan-China Basic Treaty and the issuance of the Japan-Moscow-China Joint Declaration... (30 November, 1954)

Foreign Minister MTSUKA sent the following congratulatory telegrams today to President... of the Chinese National Government, Chief of the Foreign Department... and Special Representative of Moscow TSHMAI, on the conclusion of Japan-China Basic Treaty and the issuance of Japan-Moscow-China Joint Declaration.

Telegrams From Foreign Minister MTSUKA to President... of the Chinese National Government.

To Dr. CHING WEI,
President of the National Government of China.

I hereby extend hearty congratulations on the conclusion of the Japan-China Basic Treaty and the issuance of the Japan-Moscow-China Joint Declaration, which have been effected today and have laid the foundation for the lasting peace of East Asia.

With the assurance of my highest consideration for the supreme efforts... in your Excellency... made for the realization of the great ideal of co-existence and co-prosperity of the races in East Asia,
I sincerely wish for the future prosperity of your National Government.

From Foreign Minister MITSUKI, Yosuke

Telegram from Foreign Minister MITSUKI, Chief of the Foreign Department, OCHI.

To Mr. CUN-Shi-i, Chief of the Foreign Department.

National Government of China.

I express my hearty congratulations on the conclusion of the Japan-China Basic Treaty at Peking today and the issuance of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration. Please accept the renewed assurance of my highest consideration for Your Excellency's efforts.

From Foreign Minister MITSUKI, Yosuke.

Telegram from Foreign Minister MITSUKI to the Special Plenipotentiary of Manchukuo.

To MITSUKI Shih-i,

President of Privy Council and Special Plenipotentiary of Manchukuo.

I express my hearty congratulations on the issuance of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration at Peking, which marks a new turning-point in our co-operative efforts for the prosperity of East Asia. May your Manchukuo prosper more and more in the future.

From Foreign Minister

MITSUKI, Yosuke.

- 2 -
D.F. No. 1852

CERTIFICATES OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, T. H. H. Iwai, who occupy the post of Chief of the War History Section in the Document Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Memorandum of Intelligence Fiscs (November 31, 1795)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Affairs). Certified at Tokyo,
on this 13th day of April, 1947

/s/ T. H. H. Iwai (sig)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
in this same date.

Witness: /s/ K. U., Interpreter (sig)
这页没有可读的内容。
Announcement of Foreign Office re
Angle-Japanese Conference (10 a.m. July 24, 1939)

As a result of the conference which has been taking
place since July 15 between the Foreign Minister and the
British Ambassador at Tokyo, the following announcement has
been issued:

The British Government fully acknowledges the actual
condition in China where fighting is in progress on a large
scale, and recognizes that so far as such condition exists,
the Japanese forces in China have special claims in order
to ensure their own safety and maintain order in the
areas under their influence, and that it is necessary for
them to remove all acts and causes which may do harm to the
Japanese forces and profit their enemy. The British Government
has no intention to permit any act or measure which may be an
obstruction to the Japanese forces in attaining the aforesaid
objects, and takes this opportunity of confirming the above-
mentioned policy by expressly printing out to the British
authorities and nationals in China that they should refrain from
such acts and measures.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, H.YOSHII, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Arrangement of Foreign Office re Anglo-Japanese Conference (July 24, 1937)" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April, 1947

H.YOSHII, Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed or borne in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: URIBE, Katsuji
(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the following translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 16 April 1947
With the view of solving various problems concerning the present condition of Tientsin, the Imperial Japanese Government, at the proposal of Britain, has decided upon sending for officials concerned on the spot and carrying on negotiations here at Tokyo.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, (Name), who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Announcement of the Intellec- ages, concerned the British Concession in Tientsin (June 28, 1939) is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April, 1947

(signed) H.Y. Miy: (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: (signed) H. Y. Tatsuno (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defence Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 1st April, 1947.
十一月三十五年復一時

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共同商談

10 月 1 日

コイニナル

ハングダノール

ハングダノール
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The following statement is issued as a result of the conversations which have recently been held between the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and the French Ambassador:

The Government of the Republic of France fully recognize the actual situation in China, where hostilities on a large scale are in progress, and note that, so far, as to the state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control and that they have to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct their military, the French Government have no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the achievement of the above-mentioned objects by the Japanese forces and they will take every opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to the French authorities and French nationals in China that they should withdraw such acts and measures.
STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, [person's name], Acting Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Announcement of the Foreign Office, June 25, 1908" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese foreign office.

Certified at [place],

on this 4th day of April, 1907.

[Signature]

S. Ueda (trans.)
この文書は日本語で書かれています。しかし、具体的な意味を理解することはできません。本文が何を意味しているのかは解読できません。
Statement of S.V.A.

Chief of the Information
Branch concerning a letter to the Foreign Commisioner of Chungking

(7:30, p.m. 14, June)

Recently, the Japanese air force has carried out on repeated bombing attacks on Chungking. The Peking Chinese, however, have intentionally built their air-defense batteries and other military constructions side by side with the various establishments of the Third Forces standing in and near the city, thus presenting enormous inconvenience to our attack. Therefore the Imperial Government, for fear of involving casual damage to the governmental as well as civil rights and interests of these Third Forces, has sent a letter on this 14th day to the Governments of Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, U.S.S.R., U.S., etc. In this letter the Imperial Government recommended the above forces to take adequate and prompt steps for the temporary removal of their nationals to some safe area until the termination of the Japanese attack on Chungking. At the same time it was also notified formally that the Japanese forces would undertake not to attack a certain specified region lying in the south.
DEF. DQC. #1051

bank of the Yangtse River opposite to the city of Chungking, and that however the Imperial Government would not be responsible for unexpected casualties that might happen in places other than this specified quarter.
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William F. Clarke, of the Defense Jorden re
Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation
described in the above certificate is, to the best of
my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is
as near as possible to the meaning of the original
document.

/s/ William F. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 April 1947.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

T. KAYASHI, Maoru, who occupy the post of Chief Archives Section Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document heret
attached, written in Japanese, consisting of [ ] page and
entitled "Statement of Sub-Chief of Information Division re notification to the Powers on Remandment of Chinese Air"
is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

certified at Tokyo,
on the 1st day of April, 19[45]

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: [Signature]

[Seal]
中央要衝ニ陣し對列國対ニスル須眉ナリ為ソ正

戦略動向ニ際シテ制限シテフ敵陸軍部隊ハ遠隔ハタリテシテ実施ヲシテタカ砲製ヲタルヲ非

軍事施設ヲ製限シ「敵」攻撃ヲ制限シテハ不能ノ比率ヲ

府ハ之ヲ第三國官民ヲ难不測ノ途渓ノ必フヲアラトサルヲ

文ヲ以テ英・仏・獨・白・條・米等ノ箇国ノ事態ヲ対シ此事態ヲ迅速ヲ解決ヲノ為ニ必要トサルヲ

地域ニ對シテハ攻撃ヲ加へナイコトヲ明示スルニ為ニ帝国軍トシテハ短縮ヲ為スルヲ

斯コトヲ為スルハ非テレノ政権ニ為シテハ帝國政府ニ於テテノ質ニ存セ

戦略動向ニ際シテ制限シテフ敵陸軍部隊ハ遠隔ハタリテシテ実施ヲシテタカ砲製ヲナルヲ非

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斯コトヲ為スルハ非テレノ政権ニ為シテハ帝國政府ニ於テテノ質ニ存セ

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スコトヲ為スルハ非テレノ政権ニ為シテハ帝國政府ニ於テテノ質ニ存セ

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スコトヲ為スルハ非テレノ政権ニ為シテハ帝國政府ニ於テテノ質ニ存セ
announced by the Intelligence Bureau for the congratulatory telegrams sent to Dr. Yeh Ching-wei, President of the Chinese National Government and Chairman of the Foreign Minister's Office, on the occasion of the conclusion of the Japan-China Basic Treaty and the issuance of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration. (30 November, 1943.)

Foreign Minister Matsuoka sent the following congratulatory telegrams today to President Yeh of the Chinese National Government, Chief of the Foreign Department of the Special Representative of the Manchukuo Government, on the conclusion of the Japan-China Basic Treaty and the issuance of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration.

To Dr. Yeh Ching-wei,
President of the National Government of China.

I express my hearty congratulations on the conclusion of the Japan-China Basic Treaty and the issuance of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration, which have been effected today and have laid the foundation for the lasting peace of East Asia,

with the assurance of my highest estimation for the supreme efforts which Your Excellency have made for the realization of the great ideal of coexistence and co-prosperity of the Races in East Asia,
I sincerely wish for the future prosperity of your National Government.

From Foreign Minister TSUKIYAMA, Yasuji

Telegram from Foreign Minister TSUKIYAMA to Chief of the Foreign Department, OMT.

To Mr. SUHAI-I, Chief of the Foreign Department.

National Government of China.

I express my hearty congratulations on the conclusion of the Japan-China Basic Treaty at Peking today and the issuance of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration. Please accept the repeated assurance of my highest consideration for Your Excellency's efforts.

From Foreign Minister TSUKIYAMA, Yasuji.

Telegram from Foreign Minister TSUKIYAMA to the Special Plenipotentiary of Manchukuo TAHARA.

To Mr. TAHARA SHIBI-I,

President of Privy Council and Special Plenipotentiary of Manchukuo.

I express my hearty congratulations on the issuance of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration at Peking, which marks a new turning-point in our co-operative efforts for the prosperity of East Asia. May your Manchukuo prosper more and more in the future.

From Foreign Minister TSUKIYAMA, Yasuji.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, K. Ito, who occupy the post of Chief of the Document Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Chosei Ban of Intelligence for the Conference (November 31, 1945)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Foreign Office of Japan.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April, 1947

/s/ K. Ito, Chief

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
in this same date.

Witness: /s/ M. Kita, Int. (seal)
松岡大臣ヨリ総務部長宛電報

本日南京＝於テ日華両国ハ約ノ締結ヲ子ヲ更＝日賓館＝於テ日華両国ノ締結ヲ子ヲ改＝

松岡大臣ヨリ総務部長宛電報

本日南京＝於テ日華両国ノ締結ヲ子ヲ更＝日賓館＝於テ日華両国ノ締結ヲ子ヲ改＝
Announcement of Foreign Office re
Anglo-Japanese Conference (10 a.m. July 24, 1939)

As a result of the conference which has been taking
place since July 15 between the Foreign Minister and the
British Ambassador at Tokyo, the following announcement has
been issued:

The British Government fully acknowledges the actual
condition in China where fighting is in progress on a large
scale, and recognizes that so far as such condition exists,
the Japanese forces in China have special claims in order
to ensure their own safety and maintain peace and order in the
areas under their influence, and that it is necessary for
them to remove all acts and causes which may do harm to the
Japanese forces and profit their enemy. The British Government
has no intention to permit any act or measure which may be an
obstruction to the Japanese forces in attaining the abovementioned
objects, and takes this opportunity of confirming the abovementioned policy by expressly pointing out to the British
authorities and nationals in China that they should refrain from
such acts and measures.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HIYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Arrangement of Foreign Office re Anglo-Japanese Conference (July 26, 1938)" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April, 1947

HIYASHI, Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here to in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: URIBE, Katsumu
(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch,
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the
above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a
correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning
of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 16 April 1947

DEF. DOC. #1053
With the view of solving various problems concerning the present condition of Tientsin, the Imperial Japanese Government, at the proposal of Great Britain, has decided upon sending for official concern for the spot and carrying on negotiations here at Tokyo.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, [Name], who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Announcement of the Italian Foreign Office concerning the British Concession in Tientsin (June 29, 1939)" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office),
certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April, 194?

(signed) [Signature] (Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on this same date.
Witness: (signed) [Signature] (Seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William H. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/c/ William H. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 1st April, 194?

[Signature]
Translated by
Defense Language Branch

FOREIGN MINISTER SHIITA'S STATEMENT ISSUED ABOARD THE TRAIN IN REGARD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA LEAD BY JIANG CHINGWEI. (30 March, 1940)

(Telephoned from Shanghai)

...more than pleased to hear that on this day a new central government of the Republic of China has been established which is lead by Mr. Jiang Chingwei. We are happy for both Japan and China for what it means to the peace in East-Asia as well as to the peace of the world.

I wish to express my deep respects to Mr. Jiang Chingwei and others for their courage and effort because they have been awakened to their mission to drive at the peace and development of the East and, in spite of many difficulties, they have accomplished this great historical task of saving 400 million Chinese people.

As to how our Empire should cooperate with the new government, there are various rumors, but it will be proven by facts in future that our basic policy is neither aggressive nor exclusive, as often stated clearly by our Imperial government. I think we do not need to mind any unfounded rumors.

The other powers, too, will gradually appreciate the righteousness of our Empire. Such fears are quite unfounded that they might attempt to prevent the establishment of a new order in the East at this juncture. The new government has just been organized. Even though some may fail to appreciate the general trend, I think we do not need to take it to heart, when our government is firmly determined to establish a new order in the East by all means.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Foreign minister Kito's statement issued aboard the train in re: the establishment of a new central government of the Republic of China with Dr. Jiang Chiu-chi at the head (30 March, 1949)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4 th day of April, 1947

/S/ Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ Katsumu

-2-
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関する

証明

日本

近藤 千葉

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近藤 千葉

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日本
Def. Dec. 1936

Announcement of the Information Bureau Concerning the solution of Problems Pending between Japan and U.S.A.

(February 21)

Our Empire has, according to fixed plans, made efforts to solve with justice the problems pending between Japan and third parties in connection with the recent incident. Among these pending problems, the damage cases concerning U.S.A. which have been solved recently, are as follows.

In Central China, where damage cases concerning U.S.A. are most frequent, investigations on the spot have almost been finished, and arrangements are now being made to enter into negotiation for their solution.

(A) First, regarding the damage cases which have been formally negotiated upon by diplomatic means at Tokyo:

1. While it is impossible for us to investigate the actual places of air raids, because they are almost always outside of our occupying areas, the cases against the life and person which occurred at Tungpai in Honan and at Loting in Hwangtung were solved by handing over the proper sum of money as a solatium.

2. Among damage cases owing to occupation, destruction, transference, as well as impediment to use, the following cases have been settled:

   a. Damages demanded by Coffer (T.N. phonetic) Pharmacy Co., U.S.A. merchant of Huate Street at Shanghai;

   b. Dispute regarding water pipes in the Chapah Station at Shanghai;

   c. Damages demanded by Mr. James Madison Doyle (T.N. phonetic) who was residing at Tansin (T.N. phonetic) Street at Shanghai.
Def. Dec. 1936

d. Damages demanded by foreign Y.M.C.A. at the Shengen Temple at Shanghai;

e. Dispute regarding the requisitioning of steam boats belonging to the "Standard Vacuum" OIl Co. at South Tungchow;

f. Eviction case of the property of an American church at Suzhou.

g. Dispute regarding the closure of the Chingsuan Girls Middle School at Taifeng.

h. Case of the shooting of an American by mistake on Hanchiang River at Lungtung.

i. Case of examining an American at Chin-fu;

j. Insult case of two Americans at Shanghai.

(B) In addition to the above, there are cases which were dealt with exclusively by the local authorities on the actual spot. Among cases of this sort those which are known to us as having been recently settled are mainly as follows:

(Note: Inasmuch as these matters have never come up to the central authorities for negotiation, they are not included in the 73 items presented by the Foreign Minister to the Budget Committee)

1. Dispute concerning use of the cemetery of an American church located in Aohsin Street, Hanchun, Shanghai.

2. Dispute concerning disposal of iron pipes located in C. S. K. and Konkin wharf, Shanghai.

3. Dispute concerning use of the property of an American church located in Toulouen Street, Shanghai.

4. Damages demanded by Alice Allen (T.H. phonetic) residing in Hongchiao, Shanghai.

- 2 -
Def. Doc. 1056

5. Damages demanded by Robert Taylor Timber Co. at Hsiakuan, Nanking.

6. Case concerning use of the property of an American church in Shihchao.

7. Outrage of house attached to an American church located in Haifeng.

8. Arrest of officers of an American church located in Hsinchow.

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, a.Yam, Asst, the acting the post of Chief of the
Archives Section, Japan's Foreign Office, hereby certify that
the document hereof in Japanese, written in Japanese, consisting
of 2 pages and entitled "Announcement of the Inter-Agency Board
concerning the solution of problems pending between Japan and
U.S. . . . (Dec. 11, 1949)" is an exact and authorized official
document in the custody of the Japanese government (Foreign Office).

Certified at . . .
on this 4th day of April, 1947

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were
affixed hereunto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: [Signature] (Seal)
Translation Certificate

I., William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 21 April 1947
Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 21 April 1947
Announcement by the Foreign Office Concerning

Temporary Restriction of Japanese Travel to China.

(Oct 1 p.m. May 7)

It has long been customary practice for any Japanese subject desiring to go to China to obtain identification papers from the chief of his local police station, provided his character and record were not undesirable. The Chinese, who are vigorously going ahead with the colossal undertaking of establishing a new China, are desirous of the influx of Japanese who may prove themselves helpful in this enterprise, but, at the same time, the hope is expressed that those travellers who have barely anything to do with this work and have no urgent letters to attend to in China will by all means refrain at the present time from going visits there. In view of this fact and in order to conform properly with the prevailing situation in China, it has been decided at the Cabinet meeting today that except in the case of persons who are in a position to give direct and positive encouragement to the building up of a new China, tours by ordinary Japanese persons will not be allowed, and that, trips for other purposes than the one above referred to, will be strictly limited, except in those cases where it would be beneficial to the work at hand. The decision is to be put into effect May 20.

According to the Cabinet decision, those persons referred to below can procure from the local police station chief identification papers for
travel in China.

1. Those whose object it is to get to the front to encourage troops, provided they have been granted permission in advance by the War Ministry or the Navy Ministry.

2. Those whose object it is to attend to family duties, or to carry on actual business transactions, or to take up permanent abode, or to work in commercial firms, provided that such persons possess documents with the seal of the Consulate Police Office of the locality concerned, affixed thereto. By extension, however, it is possible that those who are pressed for time in account of family duties, may submit to the local police station chief their reasons and request special consideration.

Now it seems that the recent establishment of the new National Government of China marks a forward step in the work of creating the New Order in East Asia. Japan is according to the new government her positive assistance. In speeding up the solution of the present incident, no step can be more appropriate for Japan to take than the move that she has taken at this time. Governmental employees, when they travel in China on official missions, are of course, to observe the spirit of this governmental policy toward China, and the public at large is expected to cooperate with the government in effecting thorough execution of the ministerial decision, until such time as the situation in China permits a change.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, H.Y.Shi, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of two pages and entitled "Announcement by the Foreign Office concerning Temporary Restriction on Japanese travel to China," is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
this 4th day of April, 1947.

/s/ H.Y.Shi, Kaoru. (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the said place,
on this said date.

Witness: /s/ UME, Itozum (seal)

Translation Certificate

Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Drafted: May 1, 1947
It has hitherto been customary practice for any Japanese subject desiring to go to China to obtain identification papers, from the chief of his local police station, provided his character and record were not undesirable. The Chinese, who are vigorously going ahead with the colossal undertaking of establishing a new China, are desirous of the influx of Japanese who may prove themselves helpful in this enterprise, but, at the same time, the hope is expressed that these travellers who have scarcely anything to do with this work or who have no urgent letters to attend to in China will by all means refrain at the present time from going visits there. In view of this fact and in order to conform properly with the prevailing situation in China, it was decided at the Cabinet meeting today that except in the case of persons who are in a position to give direct and positive contribution to the building up of a new China, tours by ordinary Japanese persons will not be allowed, and that trips for other purposes than the one above referred to, etc., will be strictly limited, except in those cases where it would be impossible for travellers have the most urgent and unavoidable business. The decision is to be put into effect May 20.

According to the Cabinet decision, those persons referred to below can procure from the local police station identification papers for
travel in China.

1. Those whose object it is to go to the front to encourage troops, provided they have been granted permission in advance by the War Ministry or the Navy Ministry.

2. Those whose object it is to attend to family duties, or to carry on actual business transactions, or to take up permanent abode, or to work in commercial firms, provided that such persons possess documents with the seal of the Consulate Police Office of the locality concerned, affixed thereto. By extension, however, it is possible that those who are pressed for time in account of family duties, may submit to the local police station chief their reasons and request special consideration.

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CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, H.Y. Shii, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of two pages and entitled "Announcement by the Foreign Office concerning Temporary restriction on Japanese travel to China," is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 4th day of April, 1947.

/s/ H.Y. Shii, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the said place,

on this said date.

Witness: /s/ Uchida, Hikaru (seal)

Translation Certificate

Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Dated: May 1, 1947
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Def. No. 0. 1006

Weekly News compiled by the Information Bureau published in July, 1907 appeared in No. 1 of the "Weekly News"

From Page after the Escape of troops
(The Minister, Press Section)

Since that time Chinese forces around Hankow have not only strengthened their positions successively but are also assuming a defiant attitude and are continually firing indiscriminately.

On July 14 when our cavalry unit passed the vicinity of "Tun-ho-tien" (about 1 kilometre south of Peising) and was proceeding westward, the main force did not meet any interference but Chinese soldiers around the same village still began to fire at our guard patrol that followed, so our troops flowered with the result that one of our soldiers was killed in the battle.

Again, when one of our units advancing along the road from Taotai, about 5 miles in the morning of the 16th, was about to enter Hukou (about 12 kilometres south of Taotai), was suddenly fired at by several of Peice Preparation forces along the road. Our unit immediately fought back and increased their fire.

Meanwhile the Peking Government is taking its troops successively advance towards the north and the south, and there total 18th, which was about 11 divisions on the 18th, became 24 and half divisions by the 18th. Then there are
Def. Doc. No. 1060

taken together with the usual 29th Army, it is supposed to run up to nearly 8 divisions.

Out of these divisions of the central army, one division between Chineke and Tsingtao, one of field, and one more seems to be advancing towards the vicinity of Hankow-Hankow.

As the main part of the central air forces appears to be passing in the vicinity of Wan-chou, Logan, Tu-hang and vicinity.

As mentioned above, the central army has the 12th tank division in violation of the Jia-ku Tu Hsing-chin, inc. root. For this reason, a reconnaissance plane of ours was dispatched on the morning of the 1st to reconnoiter the situation along the north part of the Reih-Pan-kow railway and confirmed this fact. Again the same plane was fired at from a Chinese military train while flying above Shunto and Kundali (about 60 miles above "out" of Shunto), in the southern part of Hsueh-ho province. So it was unavoidable to fight back and render some damage.

Next, at 1 p.m. on the 12th, Sun Chihmen and Chung Tanchin of the 29th army visited our Commander-in-Chief at the Kuik-si in Tientsin, and expressed their regrets and longed to foster and control the movements of the communist party, "Blue Shirt Society," and other anti-Japanese societies, and also to arrange to promote friendly relations between Japan and China. But on the following day, that is, about 1 p.m. of the 12th, they illegally fired again from the same Polo bridge, at a small unit of ours, which was charged with the duty of hiding the last of
The Japanese army, who had remained at Tientsin for some time without firing back even a shot, kept faithfully observing the treaty, expecting the faithful execution of the planks on the part of China.

Despite this, they kept acting again and again the above, and indeed it became no less possible to be abashed to the inhabitants of our entire force who informed the local Chinese regime authorities that if such faithful deeds be resented, as in our army could take the matter into its own hands as of noon of the 23rd, and at the same time made a general announcement to the public. Moreover, on the right of the 23rd, on the post signal on the 11th, our army conferred with the representative of the 29th Army on concrete methods of enforcement concerning the control of the communist sect and other anti-Japanese societies. The next day, on the 23rd, at 11 a.m., since they fired at us furiously from the neighborhood of Maoshan as well as Chun hsing-tun, our army at Fengchi couldn't keep looking on with indifference, and at last were compelled to engage in an artillery battle. The enemy was silenced for a time by our retaliatory fire, but at 12:30 p.m., they again began to fire at our unit from the neighborhood of the Tienho polo Bridge and Maoshan. Thereupon our army fired back again and silenced them, but we had one man killed and one man wounded. It was with great regret that our desire of not allowing the incident to expand while
Dr. voc. No. 1000

we had strongly maintained was thus resolved.

Furthermore, it was reported that the Tangku Branch of our Army Transportation Division had been constructing a fort within the Japanese military reservation, on the south bank of the Tangku constituting future armage, but the Chinese army destroyed it on the morning of the 16th, looted its materials, constructed shelter two shoes about 300 metres up the Tangku River, and a unit of about 300 men strong with machine guns occupied it. Reports have also been received that Chinese unit stationed at Taiku had constructed positions around the same village, showing hostility towards us. Later, the Chinese side removed the sheltering trenches in compliance to our strong request and offered reparation for the site they had destroyed. On the other hand, when we observe the movement of the Hankow Government, Chiang Kai-shek, at the Lushan Conference, called out to the Nation, announcing that he loved peace only on the basis of the following 4 minimum stipulations namely, a) Strict observance of Sovereignty and Territorial rights, b) No change in the organization of the non-Ch'a-hsiu administration, c) Refusal of change in officials detached from the centre, d) Freedom in Station in the 20th Army.

At 4:20 p.m. on the 23rd, the War Ministry made the following announcement regarding the details concerning the execution of the agreement reached and signed on the 19th inst., as an essential condition for solving the present incident:

"According to the report from the army stationed in China,
Def. Doc. No. 1066

It has been said that, as to the present North China Incident, the Kuo-i-Chen regime has agreed to obtain and destroy and punish the guilty and in addition to take up thorough counter-measures and controls against the so-called Blue-shirt Society, communist party, and various other anti-Japanese societies. As the present incident mainly resulted from the leadership of these societies. Therefore on the 13th of July the Kuo-i-Chen regime offered voluntarily the following concrete items in written form, to carry out its pledge.

a) To exclude obstructors of diplomatic relations between Japan and China.

b) To thoroughly suppress the communist party.

c) Control of various anti-Japanese organizations, groups, movement, and also of anti-Japanese education which was regarded to be the cause of these movements.

In addition to the above, the Hopei-Chahar Government informs us that those who collided with the Japanese army this time were those belonging to the 37th Division, they would move this said division from Peiping to another place in order to avoid the occurrence of any unforeseen incident between the two in the future, and as of 5 a.m. of yesterday the 22nd they have been gradually moving southward by train.

Our garrison army is now strictly watching the execution of this promise.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, NAKASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "North China: After the Retreat of Troops" (published in No. 41 of the Weekly News) is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27 day of February, 1947

NAKASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: SATO, Takogoro (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/T/S/ Yukio Kawamoto
Tokyo Japan
Date 9 April, '47

[Signature]
派遣後の北支
（陸軍省新聞）

その後高麗橋附近の守備軍は、近次進攻を増強しつつあるばかりでは

七月十四日、我が騎兵隊を豆河村（北平南方約十五里）附近に陣

総督府に対し同村附近にあった守備兵は突如射撃を開始したので、之に

貴重な防具千名から突如射撃を受けたので、直ちに部隊取扱に際しての武装

を除きした。

一方南方政府は、南方から陸路の兵士を北上せしめてあるが、之

昭和十二年七月（一九三七年）行

写真情報局発行

（陸軍省新聞）
以上のように中央軍が濃縮、何層級構築を隠蔽して河合岸内に侵入してゐるで、十八日午前八時より十九日午前九時頃の間 корпусの司令官を派遣して侦察し去るのを確認したが、右前進するなら河合岸内に於て実質的役割を果たすものと考えられたが、反則に遠隔に於て中央軍を支払つた。次に十八日午後一时三十分より十九日午前九時頃の間 корпус司令官及び部隊長を派遣して河合岸内に於て実質的役割を果たすものと考えられたり、中央軍が間違つてゐるのを確認した。この場合、中央軍の司令官を派遣して河合岸内に於て実質的役割を果たすものと考えられたり、中央軍が間違つてゐるのを確認した。
近便にあって理由に任じてあった我が小部隊に到し、崩壊から不法射
発射を危し、現が中隊長に宣撃を命を受けた後に行り、
意を認め、我部を鎮め、一帯とし、発射せず、我部は
根拠の陣立を急ぎして突きに楯に前進し、所望を
到達し得ざりに足り、我が命中に宣撃を命を受けた後に入り、
我部は根拠の陣立を急ぎして突きに楯に前進し、我
部を鎮め、一帯とし、発射せず、我部は
近便にあって理由に任じてあった我が小部隊に到し、崩壊から不法射
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我部は根拠の陣立を急ぎして突きに楯に前進し、我
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我部を鎮め、一帯とし、発射せず、我部は
我部を鎮め、一帯とし、発射せず、我部は
我が方の攻撃せる事件不祥事の希望が、無く除せられよに至ったこと

相互交通管制

関係各部発表を重ねて所受告発の使用を遭遇して遂の現在、日本皇

局内に遭難を発見しているのであったが、十九日午前中空襲の行いと

発見を有する約二百名の部隊が之にあり、更に太田時正の支隊とともに

の局内に残存する機械及び予備品を脅威、発見を告げた。当夜支隊部

を次し、破壊した機械の部隊を再用せん。
是をなす。又別に密密除幸、今同日より足実したるは第さしめ第二十七師に属するるに
のためば、後は東方の軍に異なる上に敬生を深くる為、同師を北平より他へ
移動する旨を告し末り、同二十三日午前五時以降列至により深次南方に移
中なりとさ。
文書ノ出所節ニ成立ニ於ケル記載書

自分
ハ外務省文書課長ノ報ニ居ル者ヲナショナルハナレル書
北支那支,</p>
Circumstances subsequent to the Langfang Incident.

As a result of the firm determination of our whole nation, and of the strict attitude of our army in China, the provincial government of the Hopei-Chahar area accepted the demands of our army. On the 1st Sung Cheyuan, representing the Chinese 24th Army, visited the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese army to declare an armistice, then dismissed the company commander who was responsible for the incident, and reprimanded Feng Chihao, the Commander of the 77th Division. Upon our demand he also dismissed Lei Guoshang as an individual prejudicial to good relations between Japan and China, withdrew to Naiyuan the forces of the 37th Division which had been stationed in the left bank area of Yungting River and on the opposite bank of Marco Polo bridge and removed the 21st regiment of the 16th Brigade of the said division (originally stationed at Looting) to Chinhsien, Tanhsien, and to Chowchow by trains which started at 5:30 a.m. of 2nd, and at 7:15, 9:30 and 11:15 a.m. of 23rd. However, the units which had been at Peking showed no sign of withdrawal, and after the 4th not a train was run to carry them, under the pretense of a shortage of railway cars. and forces of the Chinese army in Peking.
were increased all the more as the Independent 37th Brigade of the 1st Division entered Tsinan in violation of the agreement. In addition to these facts, the 2nd Brigade of the same Division arrived at Huan (50 kilometers south of Tsinan), and the 1st Brigade started for Tsinan by the Tsinan-Mukden railway. In short, there was no sign of a sincere attempt to evacuate on the part of Japanese-Chahar Government.

Moreover, though the guard of the fortifications at Furacshan was replaced by the Peaceful (or the Peace Preservation Corps), under Shih Yu-san, reinforcement of the fortifications, was not stopped and the 20th Regiment began to construct new fortifications at Liun, Xun, and main villages, behind the old fortifications, as well as in the northern area of Tsinan. Especially after Liun, in the Vice-Chief of the General staff, came to Tsinan to encourage Chia P'o-jen and Feng Chihuan, the anti-Japanese spirit of the latter seems to have become still stronger.

As it seemed that China was very reluctant to carry out the promises which had formally been made with Japan, our Army, while sending the Vice-Chief of the General staff to Tsinan on the 24th to urge China to put her promises into effect, made preparations, to guard against a sudden change in the situation.

The Japanese military cable between Tientsin and Peking had been frequently cut by the Chinese after the beginning of the incident. Such a mishap happened again on the 22nd, in the neighborhood of Liendan station (70 kilometers northwest of Tientsin). Our Army, having given previous notice to the Chinese, dispatched a part of its
communications unit to repair the cables and the JILOI Unit to protect the communications unit. These units arrived at Langfang at 4:30 p.m. on the 2nd, and after having negotiated with the Chinese army, entered the station in order to discover and repair defects. At about 11:10 p.m., while they were occupied in their work, the Chinese suddenly fired at them with guns and machine guns. Also, a Chinese barracks, 300 feet north of the Langfang Station opened fire with trench mortars. Then the JILOI Unit returned fire, and its small force fought well against the enemy.

Receiving an urgent report from the JILOI Unit, the Japanese army at Tientsin promptly dispatched the main part of the 401TO Unit, from 6:30 a.m. until 7:00 a.m. and at about 3:00 a.m. with the cooperation of our air squadron and of the HINSEI Unit, which came to Peking to protect the Japanese residents, the above named units defeated and dispersed the Chinese army. Our troops began to pursue the enemy at 10:30 a.m. in the direction of Fung (30 kilometers south of Peking). The unit too began the pursuit by train in the direction of Peking. Our casualties in the battle of Langfang were as follows: one non-commissioned officer and three privates dead; one non-commissioned officer and nine privates wounded; total casualties, fourteen. The Chinese force that attacked us was the 236th Regiment of the 36th Division (Division Commander, Chang Tsu-chung).

The evacuation of the 36th Division, as mentioned above, made no progress; moreover, there occurred the Langfang Incident between the 38th Division
and the Japanese army. Therefore, at 3:30 p.m. in the 26th the
Commander of the Japanese army in China handed over to Sun, Choyun
the following note:

"We sincerely regret that last evening (23th) at Langfang a clash
occurred between your army and ours, due to the unlawful firing of
your forces upon ours. The present condition has been caused by the
facts that your army has made no sincere attempt to carry out the terms
of the agreement made between our two forces, and that your army has
persisted in holding a belligerent attitude toward us. If your army
has any intention of localizing the affair, you are requested to order
that part of the 37th Division now stationed at Yreco Polo Bridge and
Beipushan to withdraw to Chanhsien by tomorrow at noon. That part
of the 37th army stationed within the city walls of Peking must be
evacuated and, together with the other units of the same division at
Haiyuan, must first be removed by the noon of the 25th of this month to
the area west of Yunting River, through districts north of the Peking-
Hankow Railway. Afterwards, they must be transported to Fuzhou.

In the event that the above conditions are not fulfilled, we shall
recognize your lack of sincerity and shall take any actions we deem
necessary. All responsibility for such actions or their consequences
must naturally be attributed to your army."

After that, the ninjutsu unit arrived at Paochuan and was about to
enter a Japanese barracks inside of the Peking city wall. Chief of the
"Special service, Kanaji, had negotiated beforehand with the Chinese.
authorities about the unit's passing through the Kwangan-men gate in the outer city wall of Peking, and had got the permission of Major Shine Tejen. Thereupon Major Sahlial, military adviser to the Han-Chahai Government, went to the Kwangan-men gate at 6:00 p.m. for liaison purposes, but found the Chinese guards of the gate unwilling to open it. Therefore, the Japanese army again demanded several times that the Chinese open the gate, and at last they agreed to. The Chinese troops at the gate, however, were still reluctant to open it, and it was only after an extended discussion that the Japanese finally persuaded them to open it at 7:30 p.m. Then, when about two-thirds of the Japanese troops had passed through the gate, the Chinese troops suddenly shut the gate. Thus separating our troops into two parts, one inside of the gate and the other outside of the gate, they fired machine guns and threw grenades at the Japanese troops. Therefore, our troops were compelled to return fire from inside and outside the gate. Our casualties in this skirmish were as follows: five special class privates dead; one major, one captain, one sergeant, two special class privates, one first class private, seven second class privates, two civilians, and two press reporters wounded; total casualties, nineteen. In addition to the above, an interpreter accompanying Major Sahlial died.

In view of the violence and unrepented treachery of the Chinese, we could not abandon hope. Therefore, on the night of July 27, the Commander of the Japanese army in China withdrew his note of the previous
day, and sent a new note to Sung Ch'uyun, as follows:

"Although our army has forborne to suffer, with which you failed to fulfill our agreement and has ignored your challenges, we can no longer forbear and ignore. Above all, we cannot forgive your insidious actions at Kaungan-mon Gate, which so seriously insulted us. We hereby declare that we will freely take such action as we deem suitable." Also, with a view toward avoiding any disaster inside of the Peking city wall, he again recommended the immediate evacuation of all Chinese troops from the area within the wall.

Then, beginning in the early morning of the 20th, the army made troop dispositions necessary to enable it to punish the Chinese army and issued a decree declaring that the Japanese army held no hostile feelings toward the people of Hopeh, that it would respect the rights of the Powers, that it had no intention of trying to dominate North China, and that it would maintain the security of foreign residents and their property.

In view of the above circumstances, on 27, at 1:30 p. m. the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet in Tokyo made a statement to the following effect:

"Japan has always been deeply concerned with the peace of North China more than anything else. Unfortunately however, the unqualified anti-Japanese policy of China often damaged peace in this area and finally led to the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident."
Def. Doc. No 1067

Since then Japan has made every effort to localize the incident and to settle it on the spot with a view to solving the dispute by peaceful means and has demanded of the Hopei-Chahar Government only such moderate and restricted concession as the retreat of the Chinese forces stationed on the left bank of the Juising river near the Marco Polo Bridge, necessary securities for the future, punishment of those directly responsible for the incident, apology, etc. The Hopei-Chahar Government, while having accepted our terms on the night of 11 July, has so far shown no sincere effort to comply with them. Meanwhile, on July 17 the Japanese Government invited the attention of the Nanking Government to Japan's desire that no further aggressive actions be taken which might hinder prompt settlement of the incident on the spot. In spite, however, of the actual circumstances reviewed above, the Nanking Government, far from complying with our demands, has been steadily strengthening its war preparations, thus rendering the present situation even more precarious. However, Japan is still striving patientiy for a peaceful settlement. On July 26 the Chinese lawfully fired upon a Japanese unit which was at the time busy repairing telegraph wires at Lengfang. Again in the evening of the same day, another regrettable incident occurred when a Japanese force, which with the consent of the Hopei-Chahar authorities, was enterin a gate of Peking to protect the Japanese nationals there, was treacherously fired upon by the Chinese, who had suddenly closed the gate.
Inasmuch as the above two incidents were caused outrageously committed by the Chinese forces upon troops carrying out the proper duties of our Garrison to secure the Peking-Mintan line of communication and to protect Japanese residents, the Japanese forces were obliged to take such measures of self-defense as were necessary to the discharge of their duties and to the enforcement of the stipulated terms. It is needless to say that the intention of Japan is not to fight with the innocent Chinese people, but to eliminate causes of deplorable incidents of this sort; that Japan has no territorial ambition; and that she will make unlimited efforts to protect the rights and interests of the other powers.

Although the present situation is extremely tense, as explained above, Japan, whose mission is the maintenance of peace in East Asia, still retains her earnest desire to arrive at a prompt and peaceful settlement of the dispute, by restricting it to the minimum extent. This desire of course cannot be realized without the intelligent cooperation of the Chinese authorities.

Thus, on 23 July at dawn the Japanese Garrison commenced attack on the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Peking.

In areas south of Peking, the KAMISUI, HADA and KAWAJI Units advancing from the east, west and south, respectively, with the cooperation of our air corps opened attack at dawn on the 38th Division of China near Nanyuan, at about 9 a.m. The Chinese forces, unable to resist our overwhelming attack both on land and from the air, began...
Gradually to retreat to the north. This part of the SANSU Unit was sent to attack the enemy at Nanyuan, while the remaining main force of the unit advanced to the neighborhood of Lasurg and reached the north west side of Nanyuan at about 11 a.m. They thus succeeded in cutting off the retreat of the enemy, in cooperation with the KISAZ Unit which had by that time advanced to the north-east side of Nanyuan. On this day, the KISAZ Unit, after crashing the remaining enemy troops, completely occupied Nanyuan at 3 p.m., dealing a decisive blow to the approximately four battalions of enemy in the neighborhood of Nanyuan. Thus, the Chinese soldiers who were able to escape into the enclosure of Peking numbered scarcely more than one hundred.

In the northern areas of Peiping, the SASI Unit dislodged enemy forces from their position at Sha-ho-Chen (20 km. north east of Peiping) at 10:30 a.m. and continued its advance towards Nanyuan. Though it had much difficulty, since the roads were in bad condition, it arrived in the northern areas of "an-shou-shan by sunset.

The main body of the SUZUKI Unit commenced actions at 11:00 a.m. with an attack on the Chinese forces in Sinho-chin, (9 km. north of Peiping), which place it succeeded in capturing at about 3:00 p.m.

Continuing its advance south wards, the unit came by sunset into position to prepare an attack on the enemy at Yuanningyuan and Siyuan.

At the same time, our aircraft units were ordered to go into action in the face of a violent storm. They bombèd Siyuan and Nanyuan at about 5:30 a.m. and 6:20 a.m., respectively, and inflicted great losses on
the enemy. Later these air units co-operated at suitable times with land forces in their attacks.

Though our forces and residents within the walls of Peking were not exposed to immediate danger, the legation quarter of Chaouinholong was completely beset by several companies of the 21st army. Besides it was infested with plain clothes soldiers, trying to detect any signs of movement on our part. The telephone wire connecting us with the outside of Peking was cut off in the morning and we were consequently completely isolated from the outside.

No changes were to be seen in situation of the army around Chaouinholong. Central Government forces in the Ruping area were judged to be moving northwards, but we were yet unable to receive any reliable information.

In the Tangku area, our boat sent to communicate with our transport-ship in port, was suddenly fired on by Chinese trench mortars, and received about 40 shots while passing off Taku. Our man fired back.

In the Tientsin area, while we were keeping strict watch, after having received information that a part of the Chinese forces were scheduled to make a night raid on Tientsin on the evening of the 23th, several parties of the Peace Preservation Corps attempted an attack on us at midnight, in the Tientsin airfield area. However, our forces guarding the place held them in check till dawn, when with the aid of our bombardment by air, we succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and in
The JUBAI Unit advanced into the eastern areas of Peiping, after driving away the enemy forces north of Siyuan, and the KAWAE Unit succeeded completely in the capture of Marco Polo Bridge (Yuaping huiian) by a little after 6:00 p.m.

Thus by driving back enemy forces in the area northwest of Peiping to the right bank of the Yuanting River by sunset on the 29th, our China Garrison Army had in only two days of operations almost completely swept the district round Peiping clean of the enemy.
Translation Certificate.

I, Charlie S. Terry, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/5/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date _________
二十五日午後四時三十分頃前後は、同地にあった支部に対し、委員に

『関係状況に関しての要領を伝える』旨の電報を送っている。支部は、関係者すべてが了解したと報告しているが、その後の詳しい状況は不明である。
手交した。

一昨二十五日彼の手交を受けて、連合国連隊の進駐の為、派遣せる一部部隊に

3月2日 nonprofits

議会に於て彼の手交を受けて、連合国連隊の進駐の為、派遣せる一部部隊に

4月24日

議会に於て彼の手交を受けて、連合国連隊の進駐の為、派遣せる一部部隊に
するに挙げて米軍を面倒に思うものである。敗戦期に何人も

の詰め方をやや小さく詰めたため、表面に気泡を残

に詰り詰めを始めるとの報告のあったが、その報告

的見当にとどまらず、且断面の詰め方には添着の努力

なく、かくして constit。
あった歩兵第四大隊の支部攻撃が成功し、向って北平方面には全くそのような状況が見られなかった。

北平北方方面には、一部の白兵十名が接近し、敵の陣地に至った。この部隊は、前進の方向を固定し、その後に続いた。北平北方方面には、当面の攻撃は行われなかった。

北平北方方面には、白兵十名が接近し、敵の陣地に至った。この部隊は、前進の方向を固定し、その後に続いた。北平北方方面には、当面の攻撃は行われなかった。
三時反対加速附近で水着に急発した。天気万々万で大常の水着を脱したところ、報告があったので水着に急発した。天気万々万で大常の水着を脱したところ、報告があったので水着に急発した。天気万々万で大常の水着を脱したところ、報告があったので水着に急発した。
と開始し共の目的を達した。

大宮方面では前年八時十五分までは部隊は集約してから前進をしたので

陰から陰へと進んだ。北平方面に在っては先は夜間の為とて崩壊を急迫し、街

砲部隊は夕、近の敵を壊壊して北平西門地区に進出しつつ、河邊部隊は午後六時頃完

了したのである。

支那方面軍は作戦開始から朝から二日目にして北平周回の敵の街を壊壊を

完
文部ノ出版ニ成立ニ就テ報告セリ

昭和二十二年二月二十七日
於東京

立甘人
佐原武五郎
THE LAST DANGERS: A CITY IN "BLACK AND WHITE"

The Enemy Forces are advised to surrender just at noon today. Unless it be otherwise, our forces will make decisive attacks on Moscow.

'Fukui' Press Dispatch, Shanghai, December 6:

The announcement of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces to Shanghai at 7:00 a.m., Dec. 6, 1937: ---

"At noon today, General Matsu, the Commanding General, threw from an airplane a note to the commander of Frankin's Army advising him to surrender on 'receiving a reply by noon on the 10th."

THE FULL TEXT OF THE WRITTEN NOTICE TO SURRENDER

The Shanghai is already surrounded by our troops. Further combat is useless.

'Fukui' Press Dispatch, Shanghai, December 6:

Prior to general attacks on Frankin, General Matsu, the Commanding General, released written notice to surrender to be thrown down from airplane at noon Dec. 6, to

Tens Shene-Chin, Commander of the Frankin Defense Army, announcing a reply by midnight on the 10th, that is, within a 24-hour period. The full text of the note of advice is as follows:

-1-
"Japanese forces about 1,000,000 strong have already
tromped down the souther line of China. The walled city
of Nanking is just under our nose. In consideration of the
general war situation, further hostilities are useless.
Chihli-nan is the old capital of the middle Ch'in and is
abundant with famous places and historical spots, such as
the mausoleum of Ch'in-Shih, and Emperor Hsiian of the Ming
house. It seems to be, as it were, the quintessence of
East K'ing's culture.

The Japanese forces will take decisive measures against
those who offer resistance; while, on the contrary, they will
be lenient towards peaceful people and non-resistant Ch'in
troops. Moreover, it is our urgent desire to protect and
preserve East K'ing's culture. If your forces desire to
continue hostile activities, the walled city of Nanking is,
without doubt, destined to meet a frightful calamity of war. The
culture of thousands of years will be reduced to ashes, and ten years
of construction will come to nothing. Accordingly, in the name
of the Japanese army, the commanding general does advise you
to yield up the walled city of Nanking peacefully and to take
such measures as are contained below.

Katsui Iwao, the Commanding General
of the Imperial Japanese Army.

The answer to this advice should be received at noon,
Dec. 10, on the sentinal line of Ch'uyun Street, Chung Shan Road.
If you designate a responsible person as your representative, the necessary adjustments for the evacuation of Nanking will be settled there between you and us. If we have no answer within the 'designated' term of time, the Japanese forces will be compelled to commence attacks on the walled city of Nanking.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHORITY

I, CK DUAJIATIN, the owner of the Imperial Library, hereby certify that the book entitled "The Last Days of Mahdi on Show at Kaid" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an article (in the issue of the FOCUS Examiner for December 10, 1987) in the custody of the Nigerian Government (Imperial Library).

Certified at Ibadan,

on this 4th day of April, 1987.

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereon in the presence of the witnesses:

at this same place,
on this same date.

Witness: [Seal]
[Signature]
下をしめたその全文の大要

下

示

下をしめたその全文の大要
日本が四半世紀に渡る東京を首都に置き、その政治、経済、文化などの発展をもたらし、現在に至るまで大きな影響を及ぼした。その歴史的背景を明らかにすることが必要である。

この詳しい記述は、日本文化史の専門家たちが執筆した『日本文化史』によると、以下の通りである。

大正時代の政治は、軍部の影響を強く受け、政治の不安定さが顕著であり、社会問題の解決に不自由をきたし、経済にも影響を及ぼした。さらに、日清戦争、第一次世界大戦後の影響も大きく、日本社会の変革をもたらした。

一方、文化の発展は、新思潮の勃興、新文化の盛んさ、西洋文化の影響を受けて、日本文化の新しい姿を模索する時代を迎えた。特に文学、美術、音楽などの文化分野で、欧米の影響を受けながらも、日本固有の特色を сохранしつつ、新しい文化を創出する努力がなされた。

このような状況の中で、日本の文化は新たなチャレンジを受けており、今後もその発展を期待したいものである。
Principal Events of the Anti-Japanese Agitation

1. The Tatsu Maru Incident.
   This began with the protest lodged by Japan concerning the seizure of the Tatsu Maru in March, 1908, and ended in November of the same year.

2. The Antung-Mukden Railway Incident.
   In 1909 from August to October, the boycott of Japanese goods in Manchuria was vigorously carried out. The agitation was started in connection with the rebuilding of the railway between Antung and Mukden.

   At the time of signing the Sino-Japanese treaty in May, 1915, the agitation against Japanese goods was first started at Hankow spreading all over China in October.

4. Shantung Problem.
   Owing to the unfavorable settlement of the Shantung problem at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, a great anti-Japanese movement was started all over China on the National Humiliation Day (May 7) and continued till December.

5. The Recovery of Port Arthur and Dairen.
   The boycott against Japan, started in connection with the movement for recovery of Port Arthur and Dairen in April, 1920, continued till August. The centre of activity was in central China and the severance of economic relations with Japan was finally declared.
The May 30 incident, so called because of its origin on May 30, 1923, started from a strike of Chinese laborers at a Japanese cotton mill in Shanghai, and a nation-wide strike and the boycott of foreign goods took place in many localities.

7. The Shantung Incident.
Owing to the outrages in Nanking and Tsian, the Tanaka ministry of Japan dispatched troops to Shantung in 1927 to protect the Japanese nationals there; as a measure of protest against this stop, China conducted a boycott of Japanese goods in many places.

8. Tsian Incident.
The dispatch of troops in 1928 to protect the Japanese nationals at Tsian gave rise to the Tsian incident. A systematic Anti-Japanese organization, the Anti-Japan Society was formed and campaigns against Japanese goods were conducted unscrupulously.

9. Hanpooshen Incident.
This incident was due to the disputes over the right of using river water for the rice-fields of Korean farmers at Hanpooshen in North Manchuria in 1931. A retaliatory riot of the Koreans against the Chinese residing in Korea took place. Anti-Japanese societies were organized in Shanghai and other places, in the middle of July, to agitate against Japan.

10. Manchurian Affair.
The self-defensive action of the Japanese troops, which are stationed in Manchuria according to the Sino-Japanese treaties, against the outrageous destruction of some lines near Mukden of the South Manchurian Railway on
the 18th September, 1931 by the Chinese army has given rise to a vehement Anti-Japanese movement throughout China. The movement is purposely conducted by the Kuomintang (the Chinese Government party), and is not a boycott, but may be called a war against Japan without resorting to arms.

Economic Blockade Against Japan

The cases of Anti-Japanese agitation as cited above in Items 1 to 5 are political in origin, but were treated as economic measures. China resorted to the boycott and non-purchase of Japanese goods. The Chinese, not being satisfied with the boycott and non-purchase of Japanese goods, adopted in 1923 a new policy for the severance of economic relations with Japan as cited in Item 5. The methods adopted are as follows:


This caused directly or indirectly the decrease of Japan's Chinese trade, inactivity of Japan's shipping business in China, the fall in price of Japanese goods for Chinese markets, and the closing of exchange dealing with China. In addition, some Japanese commercial houses in Central China were compelled to close. Since then, this new policy of the severance of economic relations has come to be applied in strikes against foreigners.

Immediately after the Tsincn incident, the Anti-Japan Society was organized under the guidance of the Kuomintang (the Government party) as a permanent institution, and it directed the activities of local Anti-Japan
Societies in various parts of China. This Anti-Japan Society is a Government organization, and its unscrupulous activities are all directed by the Kuomintang Headquarters. Since the advent of the Anti-Japan Society, the situation has changed. The condition is different from the Anti-Japanese boycotts and sentiment that prevailed formerly. It may be summarized as follows:

1. The Anti-Japan Society stands for anti-imperialism in theory, and carries on the anti-Japanese movement as an expression of patriotism. It is neither a temporary movement nor an expression of local anti-Japanese feeling as in the past.

2. The organization is on a national-wide scale, quite unlike the temporary ones which existed in the past.

3. But as a matter of fact, the movement is not carried on in the interest of the people, but as a camouflage movement organized by some business men, students and irresponsible rowdies who aim at promoting their own interests under the name of a national movement.

The Problem of Unfair Tariff and Discriminating Freight Rates

Although Supplement No. 3 to the Customs Agreement concluded by China and Japan in 1928 definitely states that all domestic, native customs duty, coasting trade duty, transit duty and all other duties which hinder the advancement of foreign trade, are to be abolished at the earliest date, no such step has yet been taken by the Republic. For instance, the products of Chinese cotton mills are made exempt from various duties by
the use of a certificate called "yunten," which is obtainable from the Treasury Department of the National Government by paying a certain amount of money. But those products of Chinese and Japanese mills which do not make a similar payment have to meet heavy duties everywhere.

Extremely discriminating freight rates are charged on Japanese goods by the Chinese National Railways. For instance, the Shanghai-Soochow and other lines quote different rates for Chinese and foreign products, charging especially high rates for goods having more distinct foreign elements; Chinese cotton goods, for instance, are charged as 2nd class, while those of Japan, as 4th class, which is strikingly higher than the former. Hats and paper products are also in the same category, and all the national railways, that is, not only the lines around Shanghai but those of the interior, are enforcing these discriminating rates established by the Railway Department of the National Government. The Shantung Railway charges exorbitant rates on Japanese products, as well as on articles manufactured in Japanese factories in China.

The Anti-Japanese Education

The Chinese National Government, which has adopted a permanent Anti-Japanese policy, has been using Anti-Japanese materials in the textbooks of public schools and high schools with the purpose of continuing the Anti-Japanese movement till Japan consents to the revision of treaties, and returns the Fanto Territory and the South Manchuric Railways, and acknowledges the independence of Korea and restores Formosa.

Of more than 500 anti-foreign chapters, more than 320 are Anti-Japanese.
(1) Japan's aggressive policy towards China; (2) Japan's methods of invading China; (3) History of Japan's invasion of China; (4) Japanese power in China; (5) The policy which China should adopt towards Japan; all these are minutely but freely stated. In addition there are numerous anti-Japanese publications.
I hereby certify that the leaflet hereto attached, written in English consisting of one page and entitled "Summary of Political and Economic Relations Between Japan and China, Compiled By The Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1931" was made and published after collecting the results investigated by The Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1931.

Certified at Osaka
on this day of Feb., 1947.

The Corporate Juridical Person
The Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Chief of the business affairs bureau.

(signed) ITO, Toshio (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place

on the same date

Witness: Head of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

(signed) HIGI, Ichirou (seal)
案内及教育に対する反日運動

反日運動の主要事件

大正五年（明治四十二年）八月から十月まで満洲に於ては日貨

イコットが盛に行われた。此の運動は安東奉天開の鉄道の改設に絡

んで開始されたのであった。

一九〇九年（明治四十年）三月辰丸抑留に於て、日本から

安東抑留事件

一九〇九年（明治四十年）五月一日、支條約調印に際し、先づ排日貨

退却が済過に起り、十月には全支に波及した。

山東問題

一九〇九年（大正八年）巴里條約和議に於いて山東問題不利に解決さ
反日ボイコットは、一九三〇年（大正九年）四月、亜細亜大連盟
反日運動が開始され、八月まで続けた。活発の中心は中支であ
った。既に述べた如く、対日貿易を宣告するに及んだ。

本件は一九二三年（大正十二年）五月二十日の所謂五・三〇事件に
源を発し、先ず上海に於ける日本機関団体の支那人労働者のスト
ライキに始まり、企団的ストライキと外資ボイコットが各地方に勃
発した。
出兵したので、海軍事件の勃発となった。組織的な反日勢力が組織され
日本軍は、一九三一年（昭和六年）北満洲事変に対し、日本軍の殺害人
類に対する反日勢力の反日運動が勃発した。七月

中旬頃には、反日運動は各地で起こり、上海及びその他の城市に於ける局所的な反日

運動が組織されると、日本軍は支那軍に依って不法にも破壊されたので、日支事端の

為、関東軍が組織された。
D. f. Dec. 1678

(1) 日本に対する新聞紙の蜂の禁止

(2) 支那事務局及び支那軍の日本人事務

(3) 支那軍に対する新聞紙の蜂の禁止

(4) 日本側の銀行には領金を一切、又日本人の紙幣を使用せよ。
反日会の名称は、地方制度法の第16条の第1項に規定するところにより、地方公共団体の名称を廃止して反日活動を行うことができる。反日会の活動の内容は、反日活動の実行肢拠点としての役割を果たす。反日会の会員は、反日活動に参加するための活動としての役割を果たしている。

(2) 反日会は、地方制の機関により設立され、過去に於けるが著しい地方制感情の執り入れでもある。
中華民國総理府は、日本の工場の製品に対して極端に差別的な運費を課している。これに対し、日本の貿易業者も問題提起してきた。昭和五年には、中華民國総理府は、日本側の要求を無視して、日本の製品を輸出する際の関税を免除することを決定した。これに対し、日本側は、関税の免除を受けて、より多くの製品を輸出することを考えている。

(2) 然しながら、事実上、日本の輸入は、國民的利益のために行なわれるのではなかった。
ある。例えば、上海・蘇州鐵道及びその他の鉄道は、支那製品及び外國製品、特に生産に高値の税金を課している。一例を挙げると、支那製品は第壱段として課税され、後者は前二段として課税され、同種日本製品は第四段として課税される。而して上海附近の別道のみならず、国内の諸路亦同様、在支日本工場に於て製作された商品は勿論日本製造物に於いても課税する。”
以上の事柄の記述は詳しいものであるが正しかからざるものである。加之
Def. Doc. No. 1035

Copy of the memorial to the Throne presented by K430, 殿下, former Commander of the Manchurian Army.

Your Majesty's humble servant 陳柱紹, humbly submit to the Throne the conditions of the Manchurian Army.

On this 9th day of September, 1932.

K430, 殿下
former Commander of the Manchurian Army.

No sooner had the Incident broken out on September 19, 1931 than our army determined positively to take measures of self-defence in order to protect the South Manchurian Railway as well as the lives and properties of the Japanese residents along the railway line. While the main force of our Army was moving away the main force of the old North-eastern Army near Mukden, our small force crushed the enemy near Changchun and disarmed the enemy in Yingkow and Fenghuangcheng. Then the main force of our Second Division occupied Jirin to remove the menace to the right side of the South Manchurian Railway, and another force was dispatched to the vicinity of the Chuliu-ho to keep watch over the area west of the Liao-ho.

With the northward advance of the Chang Hai-wong Army about the middle of November, the unkincl Railway Bridge of the Taoting-
Def. Doc. No. 1095

Any plan being destroyed by the following story. In order to protect our rights and interests, it was decided that the bridge be repaired as quickly and accordingly a small unit of the Second Division was dispatched to begin the repair work at the beginning of November. But because the unit was unlawfully attacked by the "Kilungking army" and for a time was placed in dire straits an additional force was dispatched to the scene and the enemy was crushed near Taising. The military situation, however, further developed and on November 13 our main was obliged at last to take the offensive breaking through the main position of the Kilungking army near Sanhaelingkai south of Angung, and, pursuing the enemy, it entered Tsitaihe in a single stroke.

As soon as the Fourth Mixed Brigade was added to our army, it was dispatched to Tsitaihe to relieve the units of the Second Division, and the main force of the Second Division was concentrated along the South Manchuria Railway to be on the war for any contingency in view of the troop uprising which occurred at Tientsin toward the end of November.

The old north-eastern regime, increasing large forces and occupying strong positions in and around Chinchou, was maneuvering to disturb the peace of South Manchuria. Toward the end of November, the National Government of China proposed the establishment of a neutral zone near Chinchou, in order to restrict our military movement on the one hand and to facilitate the recovery of its lost north-eastern areas on the other. Since then, bandits mixed with the regulars became more and more rampant, and with the freezing of the Liao-
Def. Sec. No. 1095

added to the unrest along the South Manchuria Railways line. Our army therefore determined to destroy the root of the evil and thus eradicate the source of the disturbance and toward the end of December, ordered the Second Division to advance from Lingkou, and other forces from the area along the Tientsin-Jilin line, and carried out the subjugation of bandits in all areas west of the Liaoho. But the enemy, with all its 35,000 troops and about 60 guns, overwhelmed by our display of strength retreated within the Great Wall without any resistance. As a result our army won the admiration and respect of the inhabitants in areas west of the Liaoho.

as the army wished to restore peace throughout Manchuria by the same time and thereby stabilize the people's livelihood, troop disposition was arranged as follows immediately after the occupation of Chinchou: the 20th Division and the Fourth Mixed Brigade in the area west of the Liaoho in Jilin Province; the Second Division in the area south of Tientsin along the South Manchuria Railway; and the main force of the Independent Garrison in the area north of Tientsin along the South Manchuria Railway and the Suihing-Taolan Railway, each having the duty of restoring peace in the assigned to it. In addition the main force of the Fourth Mixed Brigade was still stationed at Taitsihar to guard that district.

The Kirin army started its northward subjugation drive to stabilize the north-eastern area in Kirin Province at the beginning of January, 1932, but being or vented by the Li Tzu or Ting Chai's
forces in the south Kuirin, the situation in that district became increasingly resented that our residents in Kuirin were already in great danger. So we were compelled to dislocate to the area by railway. A small force consisting mainly of two infantry battalions of the Second Division, for the purpose of protecting our residents. However, not only did the transportation of our troops not progress as intended in account of the passive obstructive of the authorities of the Chinese-Tibetan Railway, but the anti-Kirin force did not attack nor Shunlong, although our units prepared it absolutely. Our army therefore determined to take punitive action against the anti-Kirin force, in order to enter Kuirin as quickly as possible and thereby ensure the security of our residents and by occupying the centre of north Manchuria to stabilize the political conditions.

For this purpose, the Second Division and later the 8th Mixed Brigade were dispatched to that district. The Second Division after gradually concentrating its force under difficult of transport conditions, inflicted great blows on Li Yu's and Ting Guo's forces in the south of Kuirin on February 5, and took over the existence of peace in that city. From the end of March, it started further to advance to the Fengchun District to subdue the anti-Kirin force. With most of our main forces, including Chao's, Ma Wai-she and other forces, facilitated the restoration of peace and order in Kuirin Province.
About the middle of April, as a result of the alternation of our army forces, the nick of the 9th and 10th Divisions were attached once to our army and made to alternate with the 20th and 2nd Divisions respectively, following which the 20th Division was ordered home a part of the 2nd Division ordered to alternate with the Tsitsihar guard unit and its main force ordered stationed in the Kirin area. With the progress of the northward subjugation by the Kirin army, our army dispatched a force toward the end of April to assist its movement in Hinku and Hnomoon, as soon as the 14th Division arrived from Shanghai, it was dispatched by railway to the Harbin area to operate in the Kirin area in order to crush the enemy along the Hutan Kirin River, together with the 39th mixed Brigade which had been previously dispatched there, and to cooperate with the 10th Division in its operations along the lower reaches of the Sungari River.

With the arrival of the advance-party of the 14th Division the 10th Division concentrated its forces and began its movement at the beginning of May. Sailing down the Sungari River for Sinkiang, it at last attacked the base of Li Tu's and Ti's forces, putting them to rout. At that time our naval units dispatch there, by working in unison with the army facilitated the difficult operations by water.

In Shanhai, Chief of Heilungkiang Province and its garrison commander, who had at first committed to drive away the anti-Kirin forces, made a secret escape from Tsitsihar prior to the
Def. Doc. No. 1045

Arrival of the League of Nations, Inquiry Commission in Harbin, and called together his devoted men of the Heilungkiang army to maneuver in Harbin in order to prevent confusion and disorder in North Manchuria. The powerful Hu-Chun shen's forces advanced southward from the area along the Heilungkiang Railway, the Kirin army and many soldier bands of Heilungkiang and Kirin provinces acting in concert with them. It being feared that the troubles in North Manchuria might be extended day by day, our army realized the urgent necessity of sweeping out the Hu-Chun-shen army in order to prevent confusion and disorder in North Manchuria.

On May 23 - 24, our forces crashed the enemy's powerful advance unit near Julin, and then the 14th Division from the area along the Heilungkiang Railway, and the 10th Division from the area North-west of Harbin along the Sungari River, in cooperation with each other started operations to subjugate bandit activities in North Manchuria. The field command post was temporarily established in Harbin to lead the Heilungkiang army to cooperate in the operations. Prior to this, the 1st Cavalry brigad was no sooner attached to our army than it started along the Tsitsihur-Kosun Railway, and prepared for operations to advance forward into together with the 14th Division, but, in view of the changed situation as pointed out above, it was ordered to act in concert with the above-mentioned forces, in order to attack the Hu-Chun-shen army from both sides.

North Manchuria was just then in the rainy season and all our force, in the face of burning heat and heavy rainfall and suffering...
from hunger and muddy ground, fought it out for more than 30 days, advancing step by step, the main force of the 8th Chen-shan army before them. On July 27, the 7th Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment, after making an extraordinary circuit, exterminated the enemy at its near Kholition on the Pijun river, culminating one stage in the restoration of order in North Manchuria. Meanwhile, there was a succession of disturbances to public order, such as the provocation of the Patuolu (Big Squad Association) bandits in the Tunjilin Tao area of Bulden Province, the rebellion of a part of the Manchurian forces, and the disturbance of South Manchuria by the volunteers and bandits instigated by the old north-eastern regime. Our forces, therefore, moved out to guard, or to subjugate bandits, and by taking suitable measures succeeded in preventing a great disaster from coming over the good people. It is a matter of regret however, that there are still more than 100,000 bandits overrunning Manchuria at someone's instigation and disturbing the rear, but it is hoped that it will not be long before public order is restored by the activities of our forces as well as the vigilant guard of the Manchurian army and police together with the spread and understanding of the fundamental spirit of the founding of Manchuria. Although the Soviet Union has increased her forces in the Far East by approximately five divisions since the outbreak of the incident, they have engaged mainly in negative actions from time to time. Our army on its part is abstaining from any provocation so long as the Soviet army does not obstruct the restoration of peace in North Manchuria and thus the two countries are now generally on good terms with each other.
2. Thanks to the exertion of the transportation agencies, the supply of rations is steadily progressing in spite of the few organs in charge of an extensive area of operations.

3. Since the outbreak of the incident, all our forces have been engaged in various telluric duties under unhealthy conditions, but their morale condition is excellent. The sick are very few and the wounded are generally taking good care toward recovery. I am filled with deep regret, however, for the loss of 727 men, for the mor. than 1500 wounded, and considerably frost-bitten cases since our actions began.

4. With the advance of our military movement since the outbreak of the incident in September last, and until the beginning of October, Kirin Province and the eastern special district became independent and Chang Haiping rose in the Tiilinaar. At the beginning of November, the Self-Government Board was established to renew the local autocracy. Thus, after the collapse and retreat of the old north-eastern regime radical reforms have steadily progressed to shake off the yoke of the old military cliques' administration, and the movement for the establishment of a new regime also gradually arose. As our forces occupied Tatsibar about the middle of November, peace was restored in that district, also. About the middle of December, Hukden Province became independent with Tsung Chih-Li as its Chief, and early in January, 1932, Chang Shing-hui became Chief of Tiilungkiang Province and con-
Def. Doc. No. 1036

As the independence of that province was, since then, the movement toward the founding of a new state was accelerated, Hulunbuir in Inner Mongolia joined in the autonomy movement. On February 16 the leaders of the various provinces sat together in Mukden and organized the North-eastern Administrative Council and on February 13 they issued a declaration for independence and the founding of a new state. For several days they continued discussions on establishing a state and decided on Pu Yi as the Chief Executive, Manchukuo as the name of the country; Tungch in the name of the port, the new five-colored banner as the national flag and upon an administration based upon democracy to carry out the Kingly Way and issued a circular telegram to this effect. On March 1 the Manchurian government was established and the investiture ceremony of the Chief Executive was held on March 9.

Since then, our army has been assisting the development of Manchukuo as an independent country, in accordance with our national policies, with a view to realizing the coexistence and co-prosperity of Japan and Manchukuo. Manchukuo has now been placed on a firm basis and the political administration generally is taking satisfactory progress.

Her domestic administration has not yet reached the stage where reforms have been completed, but, with the division of several army of the financial, military and administrative departments in every province the central control system was established. As a result, self-government of the towns and lesser localities has been gradually restored and this along with the restoration of law and
order should substantially contribute to good administration.

Her financial conditions have been favorably re-adjusted on a firm basis, through the establishment of the Central Bank of Manchukuo, the unification of its currency, the re-organization of taxation organs, and the taking over of the九龙 Hill offices and so on.

It is feared that the present flood disaster in North Manchuria, the severest on record, might be an obstacle to economic rehabilitation.

The industrial development has not registered any concrete progress as yet, but our military special service department in concert with the South Manchuria Railway Economic Research Council is playing a central part in making basic inquiries into the matter, a part of which is to be materialized before long. The combination of a network of communications, essential for the restoration of peace as well as the development of industry, is now steadily progressing.

The people of Jehol Province are anxious to shake off the yoke of mal-administration, but it is regrettable that the political situation in that province and its relations with Peking and Tientsin are so delicate that, on account of the skilful manoeuvres by Tientsin and Peking Tang Yulin, Chief of the province, it is not willing to be governed by Manchukuo, but assuming generally a neutral attitude so as to maintain his own position. Our army, taking into full consideration the surrounding situation and tangible condition, has endeavoured not to stimulate them but to induce them...
to come of their own accord into the Manchurian fold.

Manchurian officials and people are seeking in the benevolence of the Kingly Way, and, the understanding the real intentions of Japan as well as the mission of our army in Manchuria, in showing the inclination to respect and rely on us.

In short, although Manchukuo cannot but expect to meet with many difficulties in future, if Japan and Manchukuo and their respective peoples strive for mutual cooperation and harmony and our nation unitedly assists in its development in a spirit of neighbour friendship, then the work of founding a new country based on the rule of right (kingly way) will certainly be brought to conclusion, contributing to the welfare of both nations, and leading to everlasting peace in the Orient.

A year has passed since the outbreak of the incident. We have chastised the enemies, subjugated the bandits, and succeeded not only in protecting the lives and properties of our Japanese residents and securing our rights and interests, but also in restoring public order for the sake of the 30 million Manchurian people, increasing their welfare and contributing to the great work of founding Manchukuo. This is of course attributable to the august virtue of His Majesty the Emperor, as well as to the bravery and loyalty of our forces enduring any privations in the face of severe heat and cold and going valiantly into the jaws of death, and the true unity of our people in supporting the movement of our Army in this national crisis.

Now submitting this to Your Majesty, I am deeply moved by a sense of gratitude.
Certificate of Authenticity

I, who occupied the post of a staff-officer of the Kwantung Army in 1932, hereby certify that the printed matter hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of six sheets and entitled "Memorial to the Throne" is a copy of the memorial which Lieutenant-General Hira, former Commander of the Kwantung Army, ordered me to draft and presented to His Majesty in September, 1932.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 22nd day of February, 1947

Tadashi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness
At the same place on the same date.

Junkichi (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/\ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan
Date 9 April 1947
市南側進攻＝於李杜・丁超等ノ詰集＝阻止セルラ該方面ノ形勢頓＝悪化

ハ問題ハ意ヲ決シテ反吉林主カヲ脅威シ連＝ニ市＝進入シテ唐密ノ不

有力＝第ニ師団ノ交代＝伴ヒル八師団＝第十師団＝紛散＝正殿ハ＝進撃＝シテ反吉林

ノ讨伐ス＝預察ノ宜ハ張鄜城＝干戈山＝等ノ詰集＝作戦シテ反吉林

ハ共＝進撃＝シテ唐密ノ方面＝進撃＝シテ反吉林

ハ共＝進撃＝シテ唐密ノ方面＝進撃＝シテ反吉林
ハ報

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ハ報
自分ハ一九三二年（昭和七年）閏四月来居スルモノヲ前提シタルモノヲ考テルノヲ起シ其ノ前同月ニ

于テ天皇陛下ニ上奏セシモノノヲ寫ナルコトヲ識明ス

昭和二十二年二月二十三日

於東京

立会人

阪

表

吉
DOCUMENTATION OF CUSTODY

I, the occupy the rise of Chief of the Library Section, Investigation Branch, Tokyo, my Office, and official, hereby certify that the newspaper report hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 plate is a true copy of newspaper in the custody of our company.

certified at Tokyo,

on this 17 day of April, 1977

[Signature]
(Tatsuo)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

Witness: [Signature]
(Hokusa)
Dec. 20th, 1947

To: Mr. General

I hereby certify that the map hereto attached showing the vicinity of Funshi and Lukszinho is one which I actually used when I was a member of the staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China at the time of the Lukszinho Incident, and that the two photographs attached hereto were taken by me at that time from a point on a hill called "Yamato-mine," looking down in the direction of Lukszinho and Lyuq weng mine.

On the 20th day of March, 1947.
at No. 472, 4-chome, Hikano Jard, Tokyo.

/s/ M.O. Sumikawa (seal)
ex-Ist. General
Def. Sec. No. 1096

EXPLANATION OF 2700, 27000 I.C. DRILLS GIVEN BY FOREIGN OFFICIALS ON OCT. 3, 1927.

We cannot but conclude that the occurrence of the Lukouchiao incident was due fundamentally to the ultimate scheme of the Chinese, especially of the Hankow government. Some of the main reasons are as follows:

1. With the ultimate aim of forcing the Manchuria region to come under the direct control of the Hankow government, the Blue Shirt Society and other elements, under the influence of the "British government authorities", have been secretly endeavouring to alienate the Harbin-Chita Political Council from Japan and thus bring about chaotic conditions in the region under the jurisdiction of that Council.

2. That the Japanese garrison troops in North China are correctly entitled to hold manoeuvres under the provisions of the treaty concluded following the Boxer Rebellion is indisputable. The Chinese troops stationed in the district where the incident occurred had been showing a disagreeable attitude toward such manoeuvres taking place there. This hostile attitude was further aggravated by the agitations of the Blue Shirt Society and of others, anti-Japanese feeling ran high and the general atmosphere became quite tense.

3. In the Tientsin district, rumours had been rampant
from the latter part of June to the effect:

1. That the Japanese would start something.
2. That the upsurge of the Blue Shirt Society would begin to stir the tactics.

From about the 25th of June until the early part of July, an extraordinary execution had been taken nightly in and out of Peking, while the chief authorities of the Peace Preservation Department of the Hoosi-Chahar Council had consultations for making concrete arrangements to meet an emergency, and by July 3, necessary guards had been placed accordingly.

4. Under such concrete arrangements, the Hoosi-Chahar Council showed no sign of perturbation at the time of the outbreak of the Kashu-Chahar incident in Peking, as though it had happened in a matter of course, and out the city of Peking under strict police vigilance. ... correspondingly short sense of time.

5. Facts are established that the Taching Government sent encouraging telegraphic and telephone communications to the Hoosi-Chahar Council as soon as the incident occurred telling them that, if necessary, four divisions of the Central army could be reinforce to the north for reinforcement sent. Thus it is evident that the Peking Government regarded the incident as a joining opportunity for cutting the Hoosi-Chahar region under its authority.
The Japanese forces garrisoned in North China always maintained a calm and patient attitude toward a series of anti-Japanese outbreaks in North China. But unfortunately, on the night of July 7 an inevitable clash occurred when the Japanese troops were wantonly fired upon by soldiers of the 29th Army, which had been cooperating with our forces in maintaining peace and order in that region. As the consequence, the atmosphere in the Peiping and Tientsin districts grew so tense that even the lives and property of Japanese nationals were endangered. However, the Japanese authorities made earnest endeavours to localize and prevent the affair from becoming further aggravated, and succeeded in bringing the 29th Army Authorities to agree to a peaceful settlement.

On the night of July 10, however, the 29th Army, in violation of the agreement, suddenly fired upon the Japanese troops causing considerable casualties. Besides, China has since pushed on warlike preparations by increasing her forces on the first line, by ordering the Chinese troops at Shuyan to advance southward, and also ordering the Central Government troops to the front. China has not only failed to manifest any sincerity to seek a peaceful solution, but has gone the length of flatly rejecting all of Japan's offers for amicable settlement at Peiping, leaving no room for doubt that the present incident has been brought about as the result of well-planned armed operations against Japan.
There is no need of dwelling on the vital importance to Japan and Manchukuo of the maintenance of peace and order in North China. What is most urgently needed is that the Chinese not only apologize for the most recent lawless actions and manifestations of antipathy and opposition to Japan, but give adequate guarantees against the recurrence of such outrages in the future.

An important decision has been reached by the Japanese Government at today's Cabinet meeting to take all necessary measures for despatching military forces to North China.

But, desirous as ever of preserving the peace of East Asia, the Japanese Government has not abandoned its hope that negotiations may yet effect non-aggravation of the situation, and that prompt reconsideration on the part of China may bring about an endurable solution. As regards the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the Koreans in China, the Japanese Government is, of course, prepared to give full consideration.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H.S.H.I. [Name], Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Declaration of the Japanese Government on July 11, 1937" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of July, 1947.

(signed) ____________

K. H. Y. S.E.

Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) ____________

G. U. E.
相談の要請に対して、個々の意見として、アリゾナ州の住民は、多くの議題に対して、公平かつ透明な判断を求める。この機会に、特にアリゾナ州の住民が、民主主義の守護者であることを願う。

なお、今回の住民投票について、詳細は以下のリンクをご覧ください。

http://www.azvotenow.com
Under the provisions of article IX of the joint note of the Allied Powers concerning the Boxer Rebellion, and paragraph 11 of the note exchanged between Japan and China concerning the restoration of Manchuria, the Japanese troops garrisoned in North China have been accustomed to carrying on manoeuvres without being subjected to any restriction as to locality of time. It is provided that with the exception of practice with loaded bullets, no notice need be given for individual cases of manoeuvres. However, as a matter of fact, in order to remove the anxiety of the local inhabitants, notice has been gratuitously served in advance. In the manoeuvre in question, though it was not a practice with loaded guns, notice had been served as usual.

It may be added that other powers maintaining garrisons in China may, as a matter of fact, use to holding similar manoeuvres frequently.

1. The neighbourhood of Langtung village, where troops were illegally fired upon, lies to the north side of Lukouchiao, and having but few houses, is best suited for military manoeuvres. The autumn manoeuvre of last year and many subsequent and small, have been held there, so that the place has come to be regarded as if it were a regular practice field for our troops. Moreover, the river beach of the Langtung above and below the Lukouchiao Bridge has been frequently
used as the ground for target practice with the high land to the east as a mark.

2. Our troops, with the impending annual inspection in view, had been practicing continuously day and night in the locality in question.

3. On January, shortly after 11 o'clock, our troops were fired upon, they had no real bullets with them, save a supply amounting to one cartridge per soldier which was kept by the commanding officer for emergency. There was only one case of ball-cartridges for light machine-guns. Of course, the supply was insufficient for returning the fire, and the commander, to meet the situation, immediately sent for reinforcements to the garrison at Fengtai.

These hastened to the scene with real bullets and infantry guns to oppose the Chinese. It was not until 5 o'clock on the same day morning that our troops used solid shots in exchanging firings with the Chinese.

4. It is claimed by the Chinese that our soldiers had entered inside the village wall of Lihouei. Our troops are always strictly warned against the occurrence of untoward incidents. Moreover, in this particular village our soldiers have been accustomed not to force their way in order to avoid trouble, because the Chinese consider there are in the habit of stopping without reason Japanese soldiers even if they wanted to pass the gate. Finally, in order to approach the gate of the village it is necessary to cross twice a railway track running on an embankment. It would be impossible that a handful of our soldiers should steal inside the gate, and certainly it is absurd that they should court danger purposely by trying to enter the village at night.

- 2 -
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity:

I, HAYASHI, K., (designated officer of the Foreign Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Concerning the recent development of the Japanese Troops from November, when they were last only fired upon by the Chinese Troops, the Public Office Spokesman made the following declaration on Friday, July 9, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 6th day of April, 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Officer

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe
多くの殺意は好んで行われ、そのため新村は次に述べる現在の正規の演習に

３月三十一日前日に直した中度の敵に

当時、私は自力で行っていた水田にて十一時過ぎ遅く、我宣部は踏み板が一歩を

 Audience としてあたった、余りにつきままな宣伝外は、全く宣伝を所持しつつ

宣伝を求めるのである。守備隊は宣伝官を遣したか宣伝及び歩兵側を貼って現地で演行した。本部

日の五時に至って始めて我宣は自力軍の交路に於って宣伝を使用した。
支那側に於ては、我等の兵隊が護送役の部落内に入つたと主張してゐるが、何時も～

その特別な部落に於ては、支那兵の歩兵が日兵を見られぬと云ふ言が持つが、何時

長後に部落の城門に近づくため、決して無理に極らぬ事はせぬのに、たどり到る城門を

後，若しご時として夜半帰還に入らうとし、自ら危険を解くべき如きは我へ

させられぬ事である。
July 17, 1937

(TASK OR CIRCULAR DISTRIBUOVER CONCERNING TRANSPORTATION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT VIA THE MURING-HANCHOW RAILWAY)

(Date public on July 19th, 1937)

According to information received from a most authoritative source, it is said that unusual increases have been noted in the amount of military supplies shipped forth from various stations in Hankow by the Wuhan-Hankow Railway.

July 17.

Chinkou station at 11:00 a.m. for Chinkou.

Incumulatio : 250 cases in six cars.

Water bottles : 1,000 cases.

Rice for army : 5,000 cases in nine cars.

Fodder : 1,000 bags in four cars.

Hankou station at 11:00 a.m. for Hankou:

1 mounded cars.

Cannons : 12.

Rice for army : 4,000 cases in 12 cars.

On the rail-truck : for Hankou:

Tents : 300

Rice for army : 4,000 cases in 12 cars.

Fodder : 2,000 bags in 50 cars.

At Hankou station, 9:00 p.m. for Suichinching:

Cannons : 700 cases in 5 cars.

Army motor cars : 5 in 5 cars.

Rice for army : 6,000 bags in 14 cars.
July 12.

Unloading station : 2:00 p.m. for unloading.

Ammunition : 1200 cases in 3 cars.

Infantry rifles : 250 cases in 8 cars.

Water bottles : 25,000 cases in 1 car.

Flour : 7500 cases in 2 cars.

Nail for oxies : 1000 cases in 2 cars.

Kosulin section : 11,600 cases for maintenance.

Armored cars y 6.

Mines : 110 in cars.

Tents : 250 in 2 cars.

Biscuit : 4600 cases in 4 cars.

Salt : 1100 cases in 2 cars.

Baker : 2500 bags in 6 cars.

On the side-track : for unloading:

Mann-remance : 750 cases in 3 cars.

Rice for oxies : 6000 cases in 15 cars.

Bolter : 1200 cases in 5 cars.
I, K. Hayashi, Head of the Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereeto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Ian. C. Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning Transportation of Military Supplies by the Peiping-Mankow Railways (July 19, 1937)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
外務省スポーツマンの際（一九三七年七月十九日）

最も信頼すべき筋より得たる情報に依れば、平穏線に依り渦口に於け
る各部より北方に向け乾渇される金需品の量が異常の大きさを示すことが

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THE LANG FANG INCIDENT

The Japanese military telephone and telegraph lines between Peiping and Tientsin have been frequently cut by the Chinese. On the 23rd inst., the lines were put out of order in the neighborhood of Lang Fang, which is a small station situated halfway between Peiping and Tientsin. The Japanese contingent which was sent to the spot to do the necessary repair work came back without having accomplished the purpose, owing to Chinese obstruction. On the 24th, another unit was dispatched from Tientsin, and temporary repair work was made. In order to complete the work, the Japanese military headquarters sent on the 25th a communications corps accompanied by a small unit led by Lieutenant Gono, as a covering force, which consisted of less than a company of men. They were sent after an understanding had been reached with General Chang Tauchung, commander of the 5th Division and mayor of Tientsin. At 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon the Japanese arrived at Lang Fang, and found the station occupied by Chinese troops, one company strong. The Japanese negotiated with the Chinese, after which they entered the station and proceeded to repair the lines. At 11:12 p.m. the Japanese had stacked their arms and were taking their evening meal, when they were suddenly attacked by the Chinese nearby who opened fire, with rifles, hand-grenades, and machine-guns. The Chinese unit under Tsai Ching-lin, of about one regiment and belonging to Chang Tauchung's 30th Division of the 2d Army, holding a position 500 meters north of the station, joined in the attack, subjecting the Japanese to a fierce fire with trench-mortars, compelling them to return the fire. The Japanese holding the station and fighting the Chinese, suffered several casualties. They sent for reinforcements, and at
On the 26th, from the Japanese garrison at Tientsin, the train-loads of
troops under Colonel Akito were sent to the same. Meanwhile Japanese war-plan
bombed the Chinese and drove them out of their positions. As soon as the
fighting ceased, the Japanese garrison commander, Lieutenant-General Matsuki
sent a note to General Kuang Yang-Ian demanding the withdrawal within ten days of
the 3rd division from Tientsin, and the withdrawal of the Chinese troops at
sentenced and يكن to positions further south toward Tientsin as a measure for
preventing a recurrence of similar incidents.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of source and authenticity

I, Nakano, Nao, Chief of the archives Section, Japanese foreign Office,
hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of
2 pages and entitled 'The Long-Tan Incident' is an exact and true copy of an
official document of the Japanese foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of April 1941.

/s/ ... Urao
Signature of Official

Witness; /s/ ... Urao
北平市内の日 Went 信倉館等に支倉人により兵々印刷された。二〇月

二月

二十四略

北平市内

二十日、ゴネイ中略

十七日、大略

１

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Ref Doc No. 1100

TALK OF COMING OFFICE SPEAKING ON JULY 20, 1937
CONCERNING FIRE ENGAGED BY CHINESE TROOPS
UPON JAPANESE positions NEAR SU-LI-TIH.

(Issued on July 20 at 5:00 p.m.)

Since July 19 the Chinese repeatedly fired upon Japanese sentry posts near Su-Litih (about 2 kilometres east of Lukouchiao), injuring the commander of our company. For three times -- at 9 o'clock and 4 o'clock a.m., the Chinese attacked the Japanese position with trench-mortars, but the Japanese did not return the fire.

On the 19th the Chinese still continued their provocative action, and at 2 o'clock p.m. they sent a heavy shower of cannon, rifle and machine-gun shots upon our position, and compelled our force to reply. The fighting is now in progress. Moreover, we are employing only artillery force and no infantry has been put to action.

Before commencing bombardment we sent airplanes to distribute handbills warning the inhabitants of the vicinity to evacuate.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. Yamauchi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereinafter attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Talk of Foreign Office Spokesman on July 22, 1937, concerning Japanese Sentinels near Wu-Litien" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

K. Yamauchi
Chief of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
七月十九日以来支那方面は五里店（緊急撤退方のニードリー荷子に囲まれられた）に直ちに取り放題の道を進めて進軍を進めさせた。午後三時以降の三日
に達した。小鬼は右前方に位置を保ちつつ前進を進め、東南面にカールしたが南方は常に攻撃し、かつ
は失敗した。小鬼は右後方の手前東面で打たれた。未ならず步兵のみと連続して、

昭和二年七月

羅 部

五里店附近日本軍歩兵に配する警戒の発動に際し

一九三七年七月二十日（）の外に富樫警部長談

（七月二十日午後五時対談）
FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN EXPRESSES HIS VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN WHICH JAPAN IS COMPelled TO RESORT TO Self-PROTECTING MEASURES. (July 27, 1947)

I regret to say that in account of the increasingly hostile attitude of the 26th Army, the Japanese military authorities on the spot have been finally forced to abandon their hope for a peaceful settlement. The conditions in the Peking and Tientsin areas have become so menacing to the lives and property of Japanese nationals as well as to the comparatively small force of the Garrison forces stationed there, that it has now become necessary to commence operations with a view to impress upon the Chinese soldiers the urgent necessity of keeping pledges and agreements which they themselves have made and failed to observe.

All of you are fully aware, I believe, of the Japanese Government's policy of non-aggravation and local settlement of the incident. In spite of the reported provocative actions of the Chinese army, our local military authorities, in pursuance of that policy, have hitherto always maintained an attitude of utmost patience and restraint.

On July 9, the Chinese, after pledging withdrawal of their troops from Luohuichao, increased their troops there instead, and even went so far as to fire upon the Japanese.
On July 11, the representatives of the 29th Army, Generals Chang Tsuchung and Chang Yunfung, submitted a signed note to the Japanese authorities by which they accepted and promised to execute the 3-point terms of settlement. However, instead of faithfully carrying out these promises, as was expected by the Japanese, the troops of the 29th Army continued to act as if their written pledge were a piece of paper. A series of armed clashes resulting from Chinese provocations caused considerable casualties on our side. The patience of the Japanese Garrison authorities was thus severely tried and nearly exhausted by these continuous Chinese outrages. They therefore notified the Chinese authorities that if such hostilities continued, the Japanese would be compelled to resort to freedom of action in self-defence. This firm attitude seemed for the time being to have impressed the Chinese who signed another agreement on July 19 -- this was made public by the Foreign Office authorities at the time.

With this agreement, we felt quite satisfied that a final settlement on the spot was well in sight. But again the Chinese violated their pledge on the night of July 25 by firing upon our detachment sent to Long Fang for repairing military telegraph wires which had been cut by the Chinese. No sooner had this affair come to an end, there occurred the
Fuang-on Men affair. The 29th Army has now demonstrated beyond any shadow of a doubt their unreliability.

These reported outrages are nothing but the expression of the fundamental hostile anti-Japanese sentiment of the 29th Army and it can never be removed by peaceful persuasion or remonstration. The unceasing firing upon our forces by the troops of the 38th Division under Chang Tsuchung, whom the Japanese had regarded as being trustworthy and capable of cooperation, was the last straw.

The circumstances being such, the only thing that can be done effectively by the Japanese to assure the safety of our rights and interests lies in taking firm and decisive measures.

The time limit set in the demand made on the 26th instant by the commander of the local Japanese Garrison regarding the withdrawal of the Chinese troops was due to expire at noon today. However, mere withdrawal of the 37th Division is now doomed wholly insufficient to insure the safety of the Garrison as well as of the lives and properties of our nationals.

As for foreigners in the Poiping area, our authorities have already taken steps necessary for their protection.
The Japanese Army intends to avoid as far as possible the extension of hostilities to Peiping. The fate of the city depends entirely upon the attitude and action of the Chinese troops there.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kazuo, Chief of the Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Foreign Office Spokesman expressed his views on the Situation in which Japan was compelled to resort to Self-protecting Measures. (July 27, 1937)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 8th day of April 1947.

(signed) HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) UMEME
第二十九の「やぶすけ」の態度のため驚きながら昭和二十七年七月二十七日

「外務省情報部長の当面せる目的をとして写真を利用しことができる

昭和政は長期間にわたる発展を放棄するのを降伏を到達させたが、支那軍についての支配は難倒を経て合野の生命を

三日間の兵力を増員し且つ日本軍に対し発砲することを企画した。

七月十九日支那軍は長期間にわたり発動のため降伏を到達させたが、支那軍の支配は難倒を経て合野の生呑を

研究は長期間にわたる発展を放棄するのを降伏を到達させたが、支那軍についての支配は難倒を経て合野の生呑を
これに応じ、1874年7月19日、大規模な不法行為により大阪と関連して発生した。しかしながら、これにより、日本は外国の制約を遵守するための措置をとるために関与した。
十八師団兵による力は、猛烈な攻撃に備え、敵対する人物を見透かしていった。自分の部隊の訓練下にある第三

日本陸海軍に対し協同で行う人物を見透かしていった。自軍の部隊は、訓練下にある第三

完全に機敏に行動するための準備ができていて、第三

兵を駆使した北平地区に詰める外敵をはね倒した。詳しいことと確認せずに、第三

兵が監視する地域は、日本の安全を確保するもので、今後不十分と感じ

へられた。
Our military authorities at Peking decided upon re-inforcing the Japanese force stationed there in order to protect the lives and property of our residents. Accordingly, they sent for a contingent about the size of a battalion from the Garrison at Wungtsi. The latter arrived in trucks about 6:00 a.m., July 26, and tried to enter the city by the Hsun-an men -- a gate in the outer wall of Peking. But, despite the understanding that had been previously obtained from the authorities of the Koo-t-Chahar Political Council, the Chinese troops obstructed the entry of the Japanese force. After some heated argument the gate was finally opened only to be closed again when two-thirds of the Japanese troops had passed through it. And on the Japanese troops which reached inside the gate, and virtually traversed between the outer and inner walls, the Chinese began to fire furiously with machine-guns and hand-grenades. The Japanese were compelled to return the fire. It appears that our soldiers and the Japanese were 4th ther, not a few were either killed or wounded, though the casualties sustained have not yet been ascertained.
Def. Doc. # 1103

Captain Takedevo, one of the Special Service Mission of the Japanese Army and Mr. Kashi, Adviser to the 29th Army, hurried to the scene, and succeeded in causing the Chinese troops inside the inner wall to be concentrated at a certain point. At 2:00 a.m., July 27, a part of the Japanese troops entered the barracks in the Location Quarter of Felling.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereof attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Aug. 29th, 1931, Incident" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

or this 4th day of April 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
signature of official

Witness: (signed) K. TAKI. T.
六月二十七日午前二時田中軍の一部は、北平会議館臨時の兵舍に入った。
Def. Doc. No. 1105

TROOP CONVOCATIONS AND SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM SHANGHAI.

According to the latest reports from Shanghai, it seems to

since the beginning of the incident approximately 10,000 non-

commissioned officers in the central military academy of that
city have gone north, while students of the Infantry School and

the artillery school have been sent back to their original regi-

and the students of the Military Staff College have been either

back to their original regiments or reassigned to different re-

There is no sign that the artillery area has been mobilized. It
to the 37th and the 38th divisions at Shanghai in theanking, Sea

and Hanchow area, their movements are not clear.

During the past ten days considerable quantities of military

supplies have been shipped to North China by the Shantung-Shen

Railway, all employees of the Shanghai station across the river

having been mobilized to handle the traffic. Ordinary freight

service on the Shanghai-Shanghai railway is almost at standstill

owing to the shipments of military supplies. At least the following

shipments from Pukow by the Shantung-Pukow Railway were noted:

July 19-22. 1,000 infantry rifles; several infantry gun-

machine gun and material for engineering corps, shipped from Pukow
as well as from the Army Base station at Shihking, Shanghai; 3

army trucks; 3 truck-loads of cartridges and shell armor like ex-

plosives for artillery corps; 3 truck-loads of carrier pigeons;
7 truck-loads of automobiles.

July 26 -- 29. 8 wood-boxed cases of rifles, each case containing 40-40 rifles; 5 truck-loads of ammunition; 5 truck-loads of carrier-grenades; 4 truck-loads of gasoline; and unidentified gas in 35 freight cars, weighing 4300 lbs on which were inscribed the characters, "Danger".

July 29 -- 30. More than a dozen small-size tanks; 10 more than twenty cars; 12 motor vehicles; 3 truck-loads of tons more than 100 special service corps -- on, together with 12 horses and 6 carloads of fodder; 5 or 6 car-loads of masks and other articles.

July 31. 7 cars carrying ambulase bodies.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, R. Hidaka, Acting Chief of the Archives Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Government of Japan: Statement of Source andAuthenticity," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 3th day of April 1947

A. Higashi
Signature of Official

Witness: J. Urabe
建議の通りに

手順

0. まず、示されたトピックに基づき、必要な情報を確認してください。
1. 次に、特定の指示に基づき、実行するべきステップを列挙してください。
2. さらに、目標や期待した結果を理解し、必要な情報を収集してください。
3. 最後に、計画を実行し、必要性を判断してください。
きものトラック三段分の方が、及びトラック七段分の状態にテイカ
七月二十日、三段分的小型トラック八段分の小形及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
及び、七段分の三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
七月二十一日、小型トラック八段分の三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
及び、七段分の三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
七月二十九日、三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
及び、七段分の三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
七月三十日、小型トラック八段分の三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
及び、七段分の三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
七段分の三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
及び、七段分の三段及び小型トラック八段分のガソリン
The Japanese air force in Tientsin bombed Chinese positions in and around the city at 2:30 p.m. yesterday. Prior to taking the action the following statement was issued by Consul-General Y. Yorikochi.

"Since last night the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps as well as the regulars with bases at the Municipal Office, the Bureau of Public Safety, Peining Park in Tientsin and Pritschi in the vicinity of the city, continually bombarded the Japanese Concession. To meet the exigency, the Japanese force had no other choice except bombing, in self-defense, these Chinese bases of attack. The Japanese Army has not the slightest intention of giving any harm to the Chinese people themselves. Under the Boxer Protocol, the Chinese regulars are prohibited to enter within 20 Chinese li of the city of Tientsin. Simultaneously with the bombing of other Chinese bases of attack against the Japanese Concession in Tientsin, our air force bombed the head office building of the Peining Railway and the Pritschi University. In this case, all the Japanese action was entirely forced by the ruthless bombarding by the Chinese forces against the Japanese Concession where thousands of Japanese and Chinese non-combatants as well as refugees from other districts live.

The Pritschi University had been occupied by the Chinese Independent 26th Brigade who had come from the direction of Pritschi and converted that institution of learning into a base of obnoxious offense against the peaceful residents of the Concession. As to the Peining Railway Head Office, it had been occup
by the troops of the 38th Division who had driven out all employees of the office. The Chinese used these edifices as bases of bombardment particularly at the Concession, which could be stopped only by instant bombing in order to save the lives and properties of the people. The Japanese action was therefore a perfectly self-defensive measure taken in an extreme emergency.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H.Y. Shira, Chief of the Foreign Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Talk of Foreign Office Spokesman on Tientsin Air-raid (July 30, 1937)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of April, 1937.

(signed) K. H.Y. Shira
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. UEK"E
The latest official report received from Shanghai contains the following details of the unspeakable atrocities committed by the rebellious Chinese Peace Preservation Corps of the Kuomintang Government.

1. Of the 800 Japanese residents of the city, only 120 were refugees in the Japanese military barracks. 150-200 bodies have been recovered, while the actual number of the killed is expected to total 150, or over 800.

2. Most of the refugees were wounded, some quite seriously, attesting to the bitter and desperate resistance put up by the Japanese.

3. The Chinese has planned to slaughter the entire Japanese population, including women and children. Most of the women were carried off and detained and maltreated for 24 hours before they were murdered outside the eastern gate whether they were dragged, with their hands and feet bound, or their noses and throats clamped through with wire. Their bodies were thrown into a pond nearby; in some cases, the faces were mutilated by spreading a poisonous poison upon them.

4. The Chinese robbed every personal belonging of those whom they massacred, and completely looted all the Japanese residences.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAMASHI, Chief of the Japan Section, hereby certify that the document hereinafter referred to is a true copy of an official document of the Japanese government.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 6th day of April 1947.

/s/ H. Hamashi
Chief of the Japan Section

"Witness: /s/ K. Umebe"
STATIONERY OF FOREIGN OFFICE SPEAKMAN ON AUGUST 2 1937 ON PROCTING PEACE PRESERVATION COMMITTE.
1st Phase No. 28

(Official report)

A local Peace Preservation Committee is reported to have been organized at 2:00 p.m. on July 30, and ready to begin its activities from the following day.

According to an official report, Mr. Chiao Chao Tsung became chairman of the Committee, assisted by Mr. Long Chao-chi and 5 other Committee men. The Committee is composed of 5 subcommittees, namely, social, peace preservation, financial, communication, and cultural.

As to the details of administration, they are being considered by the Committee men.

It is understood that Japanese advisors are to assist the subcommittees for the smooth performance of the necessary task.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Taro, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Statement of Foreign Office Spokesman on August 2, 1937 in Pasting Paper Preservation Committee," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 8th day of April 1947.

(Signed) R. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) F. Urabe
OFFICIAL STATEMENT MADE BY FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN
ON AUGUST 2, 1937 ON TUNGHUOT INCIDENT.

According to official report received on the night of July 31, the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps at Tungchow rebelled against the government and massacred the Japanese refugees and residents numbered approximately 3,000. They carried trench mortars, incendiary shells, and machine-guns.

At the end of June this year, the number of Japanese who were living there was 338, of whom 151 were from Japan Proper and 187 were from Chosen. Only about fifty out of this 338 escaped death as they remained within the army barracks.

The attackers surrounded the Japanese army barracks at 4:00 a. m. on July 29 and at the same time they made surprise attacks against the East Hopei government building, the Japanese Military Special Service mission and the branch of the police station, the last named being set on fire and all Japanese policemen and their families killed, excepting the wife and child of one policewoman.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H.Y. Shi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereunto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Official Statement made by Foreign Office Spokesman on August 2, 1937 on Tungchow Incident" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 6th day of April, 1947.

/S/ J. Hayashi

Witness: /S/ K. Ura

Luf. Loc. # 110§
Def. Doc. No. 1110

ERRATA.

Paragraph 6, line 4.
from - demanded the Chinese number of the

to - demanded of the Chinese member of the
1. The strained situation now prevailing in Shanghai between the Japanese and Chinese forces is mainly attributable to the murder by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps of Sub-lieutenant Oyama and First-class Seaman Saito of the Japanese Naval Landing Party.

2. Sub-lieutenant Oyama, accompanied by Seaman Saito who drove the automobile, set out to inspect the district (western section of the City where there are valuable Japanese investments) which was his duty to safeguard as commander of the western outpost. Both of them met brutal death at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps on the Extension Road which is under the jurisdiction of the Concession area. Oyama's face having been half crushed with brains protruding and intestines exposed. In his body were discovered eighteen bullet wounds and sword cuts which testify to the dreadful manner in which his body was subjected to unspeakable insult.

3. It is easily to be imagined how indignant the members of the Japanese Landing Party felt at this outrage committed on their comrades, and this, moreover, in a place where all nations are free to pass. The situation was further aggravated by the persistent provocation of the Chinese forces which greatly
Def. Doc. No. 1110

To meet the emergency, the Commander of the Landing Party deemed it urgent to strengthen the guard measures and cause a reinforcement of the Landing Party.

2. On the very day of the incident, Consul-General Okamoto saw Mayor Yui of Greater Shanghai and strongly requested the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of military works which were quite excessive in their amount and severely endangered the peace and tranquility of the City. While the request reasonable, Mayor Yui agreed and started to carry it out. However, the distance to which the Chinese forces withdrew was not deemed sufficient to insure safety, and Consul-General Okamoto made further request to Mayor Yui on the 11th that the Chinese forces be withdraw to the distance judged necessary by military experts. To this Mayor Yui also replied that he would meet the request.

3. Why does there exist a demilitarized zone in Shanghai?

This zone was established following the Shanghai Incident of 1932 with a view to avoiding clashes between the Chinese troops and the foreign garrisons there. The zone is intended to serve as a cordon sanitaire, and no military works or armed forces are allowed there, peace and order being maintained by the Chinese police or the Peace Preservation Corps. Now, taking advantage of the fact that there is no restriction as to the number or equipment of the police forces, the Chinese have expanded them fully so that they differ from the regular troops in no respect, and increased their numbers.
Dof. Doc. No. 1110

to 20,000, which means a great menace to the International Settlement. Joint Commission representing Japan, China, Great Britain, America, France, and Italy is in existence in order to insure the enforcement of the agreement concerning the demilitarized zone.

6. At the request of Consul-General Okamoto the Joint Commission met on the 12th. At this meeting Mr. Okamoto, supported by the representatives of Great Britain, America, and other Powers, demanded the Chinese number of the Commission, Mr. Yui, Mayor of Shanghai, that the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps be withdrawn as had been previously agreed to by Mr. Yui himself. Mr. Yui replied that though as Mayor of Shanghai he had agreed to the withdrawal on the preceding day, he could, as a member of the Commission, do nothing but refuse to accede to the demand. Thus, the efforts failed towards effecting the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps through peaceful negotiation.

7. On the other hand, the Peace Preservation Corps, which had been rapidly reinforced since the 9th, have made formidable warlike preparations, and their first line has advanced to a point only 150 metres away from the headquarters of the Japanese garrison, creating an extremely dangerous situation.

8. Moreover, the Chinese forces mentioned above are threatening to cut off communication between the Japanese garrison and the Japanese sector of the Settlement. For this reason certain units
of the Japanese forces have been sent out to safeguard the lines
of communication.

9. In the present circumstances, what is most important is
that the Chinese should faithfully observe and carry out the
terms of the agreement of 1938 for the cessation of hostilities.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H.M.S.I., Head, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Official Statement made by Foreign Office on August 12, 1947 on matters of interest of Quarte in Shanghai," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 3th day of April 1947.

(signed) H.M.S.I.

Stem toe of Officer I

Witness: (signed) K. URUI.
この非武装地域なるもののは、一九三二年の上海事変の際設定されたもので、支那軍警と外観守備兵との上海に於ける衝突を避ける為であった。
この処理は安全第一の役割を果たすものであって、軍事的設備を少し以上に発展させる打算を立てることは、日本軍が立入るすることを恐れていて、その安全第一は、支那の事態が軍事的に死亡するだけ、その部隊が決して、本体の安全を守るために、実質的に安全保障を確保していることを示すものである。この部隊の実行が実質的に安全保障を確保していることに、本体の安全を守るために、実質的に安全保障を確保していることを示すものである。
The northward movements of the Chinese Central forces along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway as of August 3rd.

In Heil Provinces:

1. At Lushun (about 80 kilometers south of Tientsin):
   a. The 20th Division.
   b. (The 29th Division of the 20th Army under Chen Tzu-chung.)
2. At Tsingtao:
   The 29th Division.
3. At Tae-ching and its neighbourhood:
   The 31st Division.

According to the statement of General Han Fu-chu, concentration in Heil Provinces of four divisions including a part of the 20th Army has been completed.

In Shantung:

1. At Tae-chou:
   The 32nd Division.
   General Han Fu-chu stated that it has been planned to concentrate two divisions in and around Tae-chou.
2. At Tae-chou:
   The 31st Division.

In the province of Shantung there are already four divisions...
Def. Doc. No. 1111

of the Shantung Army, namely, the 20th, 22nd, 74th and 31st Divisions.

In Kiangsu:

In the neighbourhood of Tuochow are the following divisions: the 17th, 2nd, 61st, 77th and 97th Divisions.

In addition to the forces the National authorities are fast advancing their armies toward the Peiping-Tientsin area from the direction of Suiyuan and Shansi.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, U.S.S.I., Deputy Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of Point Office: Recent events made on August 9, 1937 concerning movement of Chinese Central Army toward North along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway Line, is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 3th day of April 1947

[Signature of Official]

Witness: K. Umeda
白樫中央軍の経路にによる北上路線における
八月九日現在支那中央軍の路線
河北省
三十一師団
（現三十五師団）
三十四師団
三十五師団
呂北州

代議が完了したと
いければ。
山東省にはすでに山東省の四ヶ師団が配駐してある。すなはち第十二、
第十七、第十八、第十七
江蘇省、
徐州近辺には次の師団がある。すなはち第十七、第十八、第十七
右の外、宣統は鎮常、山西方面よりも平津方面に向ってに下官事
所内に

2.
Vivid and blood-curdling accounts of wholesale massacres of non-combatants, destruction of hospitals and schools have been broadcast by the Chinese propagandists of whom the least is not Han-kiang Kaishek himself. The reason for this campaign is clear to all; the Chinese are using this arm as they see no hope of successfully steering off the military measures which their irresponsible attitude has compelled Japan to take, especially our attacks by air on their military establishments and the interruption of traffic enforced along their coast.

The very recklessness of their propaganda has sometimes defeated its end; it is hardly necessary to recall the complaints made by foreign correspondents in Shanghai about the inaccuracy --- to say the least --- of the news given out by the Chinese spokesman. It may be more to the point to recall the orders given by Chiang Kaishek a few days ago that truthful news only should be issued as the reputation of the Chinese had been badly damaged by giving out information which proved to be erroneous.

The Chinese have especially concentrated their propaganda on attacking our air forces. They have stated that Japanese planes
Def. Doc. No. 1112

Know Chinese marks and that two of them had been actually shot down — a clever way of explaining the destruction of their own planes. No Japanese soldier or sailor would consent to fight for his country in an airplane bearing the enemy's insignia. He would consider himself dishonoured and prefer death.

Another example of the Chinese way of handling news was seen when the Cathay Hotel in Shanghai was bombed on August 14. The Chinese censors deliberately replaced the word "Chinese Planes" by "Japanese." The result, however, made the gist of the text to read as if Japanese planes had attacked the battleship "Izumo", which gave away the whole show.

It is well-known that such interference with messages has obliged correspondents to send their reports by rail to Hongkong from where they are relayed to the head offices, and the messages thus forwarded proved to be vastly different from those filed in Shanghai on the same subject.

Another fact to point is the story about Chinese junks having been torpedoed by Japanese submarines causing more than 300 casualties. This is unimaginable as the Japanese submarines have strict orders not to interfere with the junk traffic; further, no Japanese submarine is actually cruising in the adjacent waters where this incident is alleged to have taken place. I can affirm that this story is absolutely untrue.

- 2 -
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. Y. SHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Communications made by Mr. S. I. September 29, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 3rd day of April 1947.

(signed) M. Y. SHI
Signature of Officer 1

Witness: (signed) K. G. G.
非難図書に対する大規模な盗版、翻書の ffiに加え、複製、再出版の
修者に寄与が立派の宣伝着
あるが、他に倣つられる例が見られる。両宣傳が発展の経路を
たる経験を喚起させる見出しき、武庫を用ひつつあるのである。
彼等の最上流宣傳のもののが露々として共宣傳の目的を実現にした。上流
に並げる文献物が著しく劣る、劣るも文献的文献に劣らぬ文献に
られた経験の不正のことが多いにつき著者の工夫を行なった故、彼等はなら
ことである。
くにたたした。これに心を触れ
する。よくよくやって認め
た。
LIST OF BOMBARDMENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE 28TH INSTANT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>PLACED BOMBARDED</th>
<th>CASUALTIES CAUSED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>Fukang Hou (?)</td>
<td>Important buildings were bombarded and fire caused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position Factory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tsungfa (Tsung Hua)</td>
<td>Five hangars and the barracks were bombarded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airdrome</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hankow</td>
<td>Ta Hoien Airdrome</td>
<td>The hangar was bombarded and great damage caused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku Yung (Chu Jung)</td>
<td>Airdrome</td>
<td>The hangar was greatly damaged. Two aeroplanes in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>compound were destroyed, and one fighting-plane was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>brought down in an air duel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Hsi</td>
<td>Airdrome</td>
<td>Five enemy planes in the compound were destroyed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fire set to the fuel warehouse. One enemy plane was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>brought down in an air duel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hang Chow</td>
<td>Airdrome</td>
<td>Great damage was caused to the airdrome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwang Teh</td>
<td>New Airdrome</td>
<td>The hangars and the flying school were greatly damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiu Chow</td>
<td>Station; Military</td>
<td>Greatly damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Goods-train; warehouses for army supplies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Shanghai</td>
<td></td>
<td>In concert with the army, bombardment was kept through the day on important enemy positions, causing great damages to them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HIYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "List of bombardmen which took place on the 28th instant," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

-(signed)- K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. Urabe
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>杭州</th>
<th>句容</th>
<th>京</th>
<th>康</th>
<th>主要飛行場</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>飛行場</td>
<td>飛行場</td>
<td>復化飛行場</td>
<td>官路飛行場</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

格別の必要に大損害を及ぼさぬを期して
場内に火災を生ず
に防ぐため

飛行場に大量の爆発物

月二十八日における大損害

飛行場に大火災を生じ

飛行場に大量の爆発物

場内に火災を生ず
に防ぐため

飛行場に大火災を防ぐ
TALK OF FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN ON BOMBINGS
OF NANKING AND CANTON. (September 27 1937)

We have not received detailed official information such as the
report spread elsewhere regarding the result of the bombing. The
Reuter report from Canton is especially exaggerated due to the fact
that its correspondent at Canton is a Chinese, named Liang,—a fact
which will explain the utter unreliability of the report. (The London
Reuter of very recent date has corrected the false reports). Even if
the facts are not so sensational as reported, it is absolutely im­
possible that the Japanese forces make non-combatants the objectives
of their attacks. That was the very reason the Japanese had given
a previous notice concerning their bombing. This was given in order
to prevent any untoward misfortunes befalling foreign diplomats at
Nanking; and simultaneously, with this notice, Vice-Admiral Hasagawa,
Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet, warned Chinese citizens of
Nanking, urging them to keep away from the military works and establish­
ments which would be made the objectives of the Japanese attack.

In both Nanking and Canton, Chinese military establishments,—
in other words, buildings and other kinds of establishments which are
employed for military purposes, are not segregated from the residential
and business districts of the citizens in general. This fact is not
clearly understood by foreigners, some of whom seem to believe that

- 1 -
TALK OF FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN ON BOMBINGS
OF NANKING AND CANTON. (September 27 1937)

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In both Nanking and Canton, Chinese military establishments,—in other words, buildings and other kinds of establishments which are employed for military purposes, are not segregated from the residential and business districts of the citizens in general. This fact is not clearly understood by foreigners, some of whom seem to believe that
all military establishments are outside the city proper, and that the Japanese forces are deliberately making non-combatants their objectives—which makes unreasonable criticisms against the Japanese forces. We cannot but urge the authorities of Nanking and Canton to give advance notice to those citizens who live in and around those military establishments that are likely to be directly damaged by bombs, to seek safety in areas other than the fighting zone.

Nothing has been settled concerning the law regarding aerial combat. Regarding this, we cannot help recollecting that, in 1922 when the conference having to do with the law concerning aerial combat was held at the Hague, Japan, the United States, Italy and several other countries insisted that the objects of bombardment should be limited and concretely enumerated, while both England and France emphasized that all that could be accepted as military establishments might well be bombed.

Moreover, according to the latest informations, the rate of successful hits of Japanese air raids upon Canton was high; and the military establishments, e.g., the Hailyun Aerodrome, Tien-ho Aerodrome, Tsung-pu powder-magazine, Tsung-hua Aerodrome, Lu-chun Aerodrome, the First Ammunition Factory, Shih-ching Arsenal, Chia-tu Smokeless Powder Factory, Military Academy—all were bombed; and the alleged report (by Reuters) that a large number of non-combatants were killed and wounded was found to be entirely a Chinese fabrication.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, [Name], Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "The Voice of the Foreign Office: Spokesman on the Situation in China and Korea, September 11, 1931" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of April 1937.

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /S/ K. [Name]
日本政府はイテリアルスの輸出を禁止している。しかし、一部の例外是、技術の提供が可能な場合を除き、日本政府は技術の提供を禁止している。この技術の提供は、日本政府の政策により決定される。

この技術の提供が可能な場合、日本政府はその技術の提供を承認する。しかし、この承認は技術の提供が適正に使用されることを前提にしている。

日本政府は、技術の提供が適正に使用されていない場合、その提供を停止する権限を持っている。
**LIST OF BOMBARDMENTS IN AND AROUND NANKING.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Places Bombarded</th>
<th>Casualties Caused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 19</td>
<td>Ta Hsiao Chang airfield</td>
<td>hangars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Munitions factory</td>
<td>considerable damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gendarmerie Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The General Staff Office</td>
<td>proved effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wireless station</td>
<td>slight damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yu Hua Tai fort</td>
<td>considerable damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fu Kui Shan fort</td>
<td>considerable damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ta Hsiao Chang airfield</td>
<td>great damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Air Defense Committee</td>
<td>fire started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Kuomintung Headquarters</td>
<td>many successful hits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Station and warehouses in</td>
<td>bombarded and fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the vicinity</td>
<td>started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shin Tzu Shan fort</td>
<td>2 bombs hit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Kuomintung Nanking Municipal Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wireless station</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications Corps</td>
<td>completely destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Military Affairs</td>
<td>or greatly damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army supply warehouse in the vicinity of Kiang Pei station</td>
<td>}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "List of Bombardments in and around Nanjing," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) K. Urabe.
中国共产党第‑次全国代表大会

中国共产党第十二次全国代表大会

中国共产党第十三次全国代表大会

中国共产党第十四次全国代表大会

中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会

中国共产党第十六次全国代表大会

中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会

中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会

中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会

中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会

中国共产党第二十一次全国代表大会
VIEW OF FOREIGN OFFICE ON CHINA'S APPEAL TO THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

1. As Japan, not being a member of the League of Nations, has maintained a policy of non-cooperation with the League, not being in a position to have any case with arguments made in the League meetings, even though China has made an appeal to the League.

2. As we have not yet received complete texts of the Chinese statement and appeal to the League, we wish to refrain from making any expression of our definite opinion. But even the parts of these texts already known show considerable distortions of facts. That it will only aggravate the situation and bring results contrary to its own expectations if the League, not clearly recognizing the actual situation in East Asia, will interfere with the Sino-Japanese affairs on the basis of documents propagated unilaterally by China, is fully demonstrated by the experience during the Marco-Polo Incident.

The Chinese distortion of facts may be seen, for instance, in the following case:

The Chinese claim that the Japanese attacked non-combatants, but the Japanese forces have never carried on hostilities with non-combatants as objectives. It was the Chinese forces that attacked.
selves which ordered all foreigners, except Japanese, in
Honkow to leave that district and then attacked Japanese non-
combatants remaining there. The bombing of the French Conces­
son and the International Settlement in Shanghai as a result of
which many foreign non-combatants were killed or wounded was
perpetrated by the Chinese, as you all remember.

No consideration is given by the Chinese army to educatio­
al and cultural establishment. They occupy these establish­
ments as bases of hostilities. When this is done, these es­
establishments lose, of course, their neutral status according
to international law. The objectives of Japanese attack are
always combatants and military establishments.

The Chinese allege that Japan is destroying the political
structure of China and interfering with her unification, but
such charges are far from the intention of Japan.

Japan is desirous that China be unified--a pre-requisite
to the establishment of a structure for world peace. But that
unification must be brought about in a sound way.

3. The policy of the Japanese Government vis-a-vis the
present China Affair aims at bringing about China's reconsider­
ation and the abandonment of her mistaken policy of anti-
Japanism, and a fundamental adjustment of Sino-Japanese relatio

- 2 -
Upon the outbreak of the affair, the Japanese Government, in accordance with their policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, did everything to arrive at a speedy settlement. But the Nanking Government manifested no sincerity. They moved division after division of their Central Army north to challenge Japan, while at Hankow and other points in the Yangtze Valley, Japanese subjects engaged in peaceful pursuit of business were menaced by Nanking’s vicious anti-Japanese propaganda—their very existence being jeopardized. That Japan should have taken action to compel such a Government to reconsider their policy is certainly justified from the standpoint of justice and humanity, as well as of self-defense. I am convinced, however, that for the solution of the Sino-Japanese problems, Japan and China will finally succeed in discovering the means suited to the reality of the situation.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 3 pages and entitled "View of Foreign Office on China's appeal to the League of Nations." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /S/ K. Urabe
STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

(August 26, 1937.)

Although Japan has been forced to adopt measures of self-defense in the face of lawless attacks upon her forces by Chinese armies and their wanton disregard of Japanese lives and property and violations of Japan's rights and interests in China, it has always been the desire of the Japanese Government to minimize the scope of the present affair. However, the Chinese armies, by their repeated outrages and provocations, have intensified still further the gravity of the situation.

In these circumstances, with a view to prompting China's reconsideration and to effecting a speedy settlement, the Japanese naval authorities found it necessary to close to traffic of Chinese vessels the Chinese sea coast from 32° 4' north latitude and 121° 44' east longitude, to 23° 14' north latitude and 116° 49' east longitude, beginning at 6:00 p.m., August 25, 1937.

The above measure is solely one of self-defense against the lawless acts of the Chinese, and applies only to Chinese vessels. It may be added that peaceful commerce carried on by the third Powers will be fully respected, the Japanese Navy having no intention of interfering with it.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office, August 26, 1927," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 6th day of April 1937.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) K. Urabe
No. 111-3
二七
帝国政府の二次以降、「ニシノ二七事件」に
久々の政治によるものともいえども、新政
論は特に日本の政治に大きな影響を及ぼし
た。二七事件は、日本帝国政府の政策を
批判し、日本帝国の政治に変革を求める
運動を表すものであった。

ハ       日本帝国政府は、ニシノ二七事件
に反対する運動に対し、政府の暴力的措
置を講じた。政府は、ニシノ二七事件の
参加者に対する暴力的な攻撃を行い、数
百人を傷害した。この事件は、日本帝国
政府の暴力的政策を批判し、日本帝国
政府の改革を求める運動を加速させた。

ハ       さらに、ニシノ二七事件は、日本
帝国政府の政策に対する不満を示すもの
であり、日本帝国の政治に大きな影響を及
ぼした。ニシノ二七事件は、日本帝国政
府の政策に対する不満を示し、日本帝国
政府の改革を求める運動を加速させた。
The Imperial Japanese Government, in its desire to secure permanent peace in East Asia, has always striven to promote friendship and cooperation between Japan and China. However, an atmosphere of hostility towards Japan has been created through anti-Japanese agitation used as an instrument by the Nanking Government to arouse public opinion and to enhance its own political power. The Chinese, over-confident of their national strength, contemptuous of our power, and also in league with the Communists, have assumed toward Japan an increasingly arrogant and insulting attitude. Herein lies the cause of all untoward events which have arisen repeatedly during recent years.

The present incident is but the inevitable outcome of this situation. Dynamite had been ignited; the inevitable explosion merely happened to occur on the banks of the Yinting. The terrible Tungchow massacre is also traceable to the same cause. In South and Central China, Japanese lives and property have been jeopardized that our people have been compelled to evacuate, abandoning everything they had acquired after years of hard toil.

As has been frequently declared since the outbreak of the
present Incident, the Japanese Government, exercising utmost patience and restraint, have steadfastly pursued a policy of non-aggravation of the situation, and has endeavoured to reach a settlement locally and in a peaceful manner. In the Peiping and Tientsin area, our Garrison, in the face of countless Chinese provocations and lawless actions, has done no more than was absolutely necessary to secure lines of communications and to protect Japanese nationals there.

On the other hand, our Government advised the Nanking Government to put an immediate stop to all provocative acts and to refrain from obstructing the negotiations being conducted on the spot. The Nanking Government not only refused to follow our counsel, but proceeded toward the completion of war-like preparations against us. In flagrant violation of solemn military agreements, the Chinese moved vast armies northward, menacing our Garrison, and concentrated troops in and around Shanghai. Their provocative attitude became more clearly defined at Hankow. Finally at Shanghai, the Chinese opened fire upon our Naval Headquarters and bombed our warships from the air.

In this manner have the Chinese insulted our Government, committed acts of unpardonable atrocity against our country, and gravely endangered the lives and property of our nationals throughout China. They have finally exhausted the patience of the Japanese Government. It has thus become imperative to take
drastic measures in order to chastise the lawless Chinese troops
and to impress upon the Peking Government the necessity for
reconsideration of its attitude toward Japan.

That matters should have come to this pass is deeply deplored
by the Japanese Government which earnestly desires the maintenance
of peace in the Orient and sincerely hopes for the attainment of
common prosperity and public welfare in Japan and China. The
aim of the Japanese Government is none other than the realization
of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Their only desire is to eradicate
the anti-foreign and anti-Japanese movement rampant in China,
and completely to eliminate the fundamental causes of unfortunate
incidents such as the present one, with a view to bringing about
truly harmonious collaboration among Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

Needless to say, the Japanese Government harbours no territor-
torial designs. Its sole intention is to bring to reason the
Peking Government and the Kuomintang Party, both of which have
persistently incited anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese
people. The Japanese bear no ill-will toward the innocent
Chinese masses. In conclusion we hereby state that the Japanese
Government will spare no efforts in safeguarding foreign rights
and interests in China.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Koichi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Japanese Government, August 1935 - 1947" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 8th day of April 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) K. Urahe
DECLARATION BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU,
August 14, 1937

It is with feelings of intense horror and distress that the Japanese nation has learned the news of the indiscriminate bombing of Shanghai by the Chinese air force. Then it was learned that the Chinese Government had warned all foreigners, except Japanese, to evacuate the Hankow area, the Japanese forces certainly were prepared for an attack. They were ready to fulfill their duty and the mission they had been entrusted with --to protect the lives and the property of Japanese residing legally and peacefully on Chinese soil -- and to resumed their cooperation with the forces of the friendly Powers in keeping Shanghai free from the insecurity and disorder rampant in other parts of China.

Time and again, the Japanese have had the bitter experience of seeing the Chinese soldiers, roused to fierce anti-foreign frenzy, running out of hand. The Boxer Rebellion, and nearer to our times, the Nanking and Tsingtau outrages, had warned us of what to expect when foreign power was not there to prevent them from playing their will on helpless foreign victims.

We had hoped that the much-vaunted "modern" troops of the Nanking Government would show a fuller measure of discipline, but could not refrain from expressing our misgivings that they might still run true to pattern, especially as we knew how the flame of anti-Japanese sentiments was being fanned by both the Chinese fascists and their recent allies, the agents of the
Comintern. Our fears, alas, were but too well-founded. We were prepared to repulse onslaughts on our forces, but truly we were not prepared to witness the massacre of innocent Chinese refugees by Chinese bombs, the wanton destruction of foreign property that had helped to build the wealth of China, the slaughter of the foreign friends of the Chinese work by airplanes of the Chinese Government.

Constitution and sorrow is in the hearts of the Japanese people -- sorrow and also a rightful indignation for the attempt to wreck our helpless brothers of Shanghai, -- thousands and thousands of refugees driven from their homes on the Yangtze River, -- fanatical fury in possession of moderation of destruction.

The world will recognize that Japan has shown the utmost restraint and moderation in the recent events. She has done her utmost to minimize the effects of untoward happenings, but on each occasion her efforts have been thwarted by the prejudiced and disorderly attitude of the Chinese. Nanking was practically settled the next day. Nanking is now, the Chinese troops got out of hand. The Nanking affair was being discussed. Now Nanking troops enter Shanghai and our airplanes bomb the Settlement.

Japan stands for order. She will insist on the protection of her citizen's legitimate rights. She is conscious of her duty to her friends and to those who put their trust in her. Her troops, if necessary, will fight for it, not flinching.
CERTIFICATE

I, HAYASHI, KIYOMU, Chief of the Archives Section, hereby certify that the enclosed documents consisting of 32 pages, entitled "Certificate of Birth", are true and correct copies of the original documents at the Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 26th day of April, 1947.

Witness: /S/ K. Tanaka

Signature of Official
FOREIGN OFFICE SHOT KUO EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE OF
AVOIDING FURTHER IMPACT AT. (AUGUST 16, 1937)

The indiscriminate wholesale bombing by Chinese aeroplanes
have not only inflicted heavy casualties upon innocent Chinese
themselves but also resulted in considerable casualties among
the foreigners in the French Concession and in the Interna­
tional Settlement.

The misfortunes of the foreign population in Shanghai have
risen to protest against making Shanghai a theatre of war.
It is argued that Japan, regardless of who started the conflict,
should refrain from conducting military operations in and around
the city, merely to avert further base of
defense operation in order to rescue Shanghai foreign quarters
from further calamities.

The grievances of the foreigners are quite understandable,
but their protest to Japan is in justice. It was exactly
to avoid such disastrous developments that at the time of the
Oysma incident Japan exercised utmost patience and restraint and
proposed the withdrawal of Chinese troops to a safe distance.
But the Chinese rejected the proposal and invaded the Settlement.
The Japanese civilian population in Shanghai, swollen with
refugees from 'non-rival' cities, now number over 30,000. In order
to protect the lives and property of our nationals there, it
is obviously impossible for our naval forces to abandon their
positions. How are they to protect the 30,000 Japanese, including women and children, from sure death and destruction at the hands of the less Chinese troops? This very morn-
ing (August 16), when the Chinese airplanes roared over the
French concession, the French garrison opened fire in self-defense
upon them with anti-air guns, it is reported. That is exactly
what the Japanese naval forces are doing.

In the 30th incident of 1927 it was an infuriated mob of
anti-British demonstrators who invaded the International Settle-
ment. The Municipal Council took forceful measures to suppress
that disturbance, and not a word was said about the moral or
legal responsibilities of the British in the matter. At
that time, Britain sent 1,000 men to protect her interests
and the Settlement. It now happens to be large forces of
Chinese regular troops who are attacking the Settlement,
with the Japanese as their objective. The two cases do not
differ except in score, and Javan cannot be held reponsible
for what 30,000 Chinese have done, or my cause having.

A similar, further look in 1927, the Shener incident is surely
a battle between the British and the Chinese. The French and
the Japanese and other nationals on the island suffered frightful;
but no one lodged complaint with the British authorities or
that account. Why then should Javan be made a target of pro-
tests in similar circumstances now?
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAYASEI, Chief of the Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Foreign Office Spokesman expressed his regret of avoiding remarks in Shanghai (August 16, 1927)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April 1947.

(Signed) T. TAYASEI
Signature of Official

Witness: [signature]...
Def. Doc. No. 1182

MOVEMENT OF THE CHINESE CENTRAL ARMY AT ILIS (AUGUST 7) IN SOUTHWEST CHINA AND SHANTUNG.

The forces under the direct command of the headquarters of 20th Division of the 3rd Route Army, together with the 37th Division which had been in Tsinchow, moved to Tainanfu.

The 17th Brigade stationed in Pingshan moved to Tshingchow three days beginning on August 4.

The 39th Brigade in Tshingchow is moving to Tainanfu and thence to eastern Shantung.

The 4th Division of the Central Army has entered Tshingchow to replace the forces left for Tainanfu.

The Central Army forces now concentrated about Tshingchow are four divisions, namely, the 17th, 131st, 114th and 115th Division under General Yu "Szechung."
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 24th day of April 1947

Signature of Official

Witness: K. Imabe
At this 71st session of the Imperial Diet, I have the honour of stating the views of the Government.

At a time when our nation is confronted by serious problems and difficulties, I have been most unexpectedly appointed Premier, and I am keenly aware of the heavy burden I have taken on my shoulders.

I desire to elucidate, first of all, the principle which underlies the endeavours of the Government to fulfill its immense responsibilities. This principle is to make all our policies stem from a single source, namely, the spirit of the solemn and superb polity of our Empire. Expression of this spirit means that externally we should, in concert with other Powers, strive to establish true peace firmly in the world in accordance with international justice and to enhance more and more the prestige of our nation abroad and that internally we should define clearly the relationship between Sovereign and subjects and enable each of the people to find his proper place in accordance with social justice, bringing about thereby a steady and healthy advance of the national fortunes. Such, then, is the principle the Government expects to observe in formulating and carrying out its policies along various lines.

It is a source of profound regret that, with the troublesome question with the Soviet Union brought to a peaceful settlement and relations with other Powers increasingly amicable, there has occurred the present incident in China, and that the Government has been compelled to make an important decision. I am very grateful, however, that the Government has been accorded the united support of the nation at this critical moment.
In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia. I cannot but hope most fervently that reconsideration and self-discipline on the part of the Government and people of China will make as speedily as possible a fundamental adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations.

In view of the current circumstances at home and abroad, it is of the most urgent necessity for us to perfect our national defence and develop the economic power of our country. Accordingly, as the basic means of carrying out our national policy, the Government feels imperative: the need to devise a comprehensive scheme aiming principally at expansion of the nation's productive power, establishment of equilibrium in international accounts and adjustment of the supply and demand of commodities. Investigations are in progress with a view to formulating a concrete programme based on the conception of Japan and Manchoukuo as a single unit.

Various other plans, including reform of the administrative machinery and the parliamentary system, have been reserved for later consideration. There are a few, of course, that have already been worked out definitely or are under investigation. The Government has definitely decided, for instance, to establish the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and the appropriation needed for it is being submitted to the Diet for your approval.

As regards education, I am convinced of the great importance of laying down new foundations of our educational system that will be in accord with the principle of our national policy. But it is extremely difficult...
to accomplish in a brief period reform of our educational system. The Government intends to appoint an educational council and to continue careful deliberations on the question.

Japan is at present passing through one of those trials that will enable it to rise to greater heights of prosperity and power. To achieve such spectacular progress, or to execute the various attendant reform measures, I believe there is no other way than to have all our people act as one with a firm resolve and the utmost perseverance. Internal friction or rivalry not only will frustrate that purpose but is likely to bring national humiliation upon us. At the time of forming the Cabinet, I thus followed a policy calculated to promote as much as possible the unity and cooperation of the nation.

In consonance with the spirit of national unity, the Government is prepared to carry out reforms where reforms are needed and to go the way that is "new and ever new." It is its intention, moreover, to take up and solve, one by one, those questions that hitherto have been considered difficult of solution.

These are what the Government proposes to do. But at this session of the Diet, which follows so closely the formation of the Cabinet, the bills to be submitted for your approval have been confined to some of those on which deliberations were not completed in the past session and to those in which immediate action is required.

I hope that I have made clear to you the outline of the Government's views. Your collaboration is essential in the task of surmounting the present difficulties and promoting the growth of national strength. I appeal to you for generous support and cooperation.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Friendship: Administrative Advice at the 71st Session of the Diet, July 27, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 8th day of April 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K. Utada
TALK OF FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN ON ENGENDERING ACTION ON THE PART OF CHINESE JUNKS. (October 4 1937)

It is pointed out in a report from the commander of a Japanese naval squadron patrolling the Chinese waters that some of the innocent-looking Chinese junks and small crafts are armed with small cannons of the calibre of 7 to 10 centimetres, of old style but of sufficient power, besides machine-guns, rifles and pistols. These armed vessels can not be ignored as other small crafts in general, for they frequently attempt to break through the line of the patrolling Japanese men-of-war with full loads of Chinese military supplies. In some cases the Chinese small crafts thus armed make light of our destroyers and dare to challenge the latter. The following is a list showing cases of such resistances of armed Chinese vessels against the inspection of our warships.

September 4. A large junk being towed by a small steam-boat in Kunghai Bay fired at the Japanese inspection party with machine-guns, wounding an officer and killing a seaman.

September 14. When a Japanese warship sent a party to inspect a junk at Shenhu on the Fukien coast, the crew of the junk landed with arms, and together with the natives there, fired at our party.
September 15. At Tseungshanpu, a Japanese inspection party was subjected to a firing by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps who were in a launch.

September 26. In the neighbourhood of Nar-oa Island, a Japanese patrol-vessel was attacked by Chinese Peace Preservation Corps who were subdued after severe fighting.

September 27. At Tseungshanpu, a small launch fired at a Japanese inspection party. The latter returned the fire and forced the launch ashore in wrecked condition.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASEI, Korni, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Talk of Foreign Office Spokesman on Increasing Action on the Part of Chinese Junks, October 4, 1917" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

(Signed) K. Hayasei
Signature of Official

Witness: (Signed) K. Urabe
月十四日 支那方面船隻の日上浮遊を認め 派遣された時、 戦克乗組員は武器を携へ上陸し、 現地住民と共々我に信
The League of Nations has declared that the actions now being taken by Japan in China are a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and the State Department of the United States has issued a statement to the same purport. However, these steps must be attributed to an unfortunate lack of understanding of the real circumstances as well as the true intention of Japan, a state of affairs which the Japanese Government deem very regrettable.

The present Sino-Japanese affair originated in the unwarranted attack made by Chinese forces on Japanese garrison troops legitimately stationed in North China under rights clearly recognized by treaty. The troop which was maneuvering at the time of the outbreak was a very small unit. The Japanese garrison force was then scattered in different parts, engaged in peace-time duties. After the outbreak of hostilities, Japan did everything in her power to reach a local settlement of the incident, even at the sacrifice of strategical advantages. These facts are sufficient to prove that the action of the Japanese force was by no means premeditated but simply defensive.

China is undoubtedly responsible for the spread of the affair to Shanghai and then to other points of Central China. She openly violated the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities concluded in 1932 by concentrating overwhelmingly numerous forces of more than forty thousand men in the
demilitarized zone and attempted to annihilate our naval invading party, numbering but a scant three thousand, and wipe out our 30,000 nationals living in the Settlement, amongst whom were many women and children.

The subsequent development of the Japanese military action has been but the unavoidable consequence of the hostile operations of China, who, ignoring our policy of non-settlement and non-aggression of the situation, moved and concentrated her large forces against us. The action which Japan is taking at the present time is a measure of defense to which she has been compelled to resort by the premeditated provocative acts of China.

What the Japanese Government seek today is merely the abandonment by China of her anti-Japanese policy and the establishment of enduring peace in Eastern Asia, through sincere cooperation between Japan and China. They have no territorial designs whatever.

In the light of these circumstances, it must be firmly declared that the present action of Japan in China contravenes none of the existing treaties which are in force.

The Chinese Government, lending themselves to Communist intrigue, have brought about the present hostilities by their persistent and malicious anti-Japanese measures and their attempt to do away with the rights and vital interests of Japan in China by force of arms. It is they who should be deemed a violator of the spirit of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War -- a menace to the peace of the world.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hi.Youshi, Kono, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Foreign Office Statement, October 2, 1947" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April, 1947.

(signed) __________  K. Hi.Youshi
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) __________ K. Hi.Youshi
PRESS MATERIAL ISSUED ON OCTOBER 4, BY THE BUREAU OF INFORMATION.

Instances of the return of Japanese aeroplanes to their bases without bombing on account of difficulty of distinguishing the Chinese military establishments, from other objects, are as follows:

(Based on the investigation made on October 1, 1947.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number of aeroplanes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep'tember</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Nanking</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Nanking</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Wuhsing</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Hankow</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Szechuan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Yasu, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 1 page and entitled "Press material issued on October, by the Bureau of Information" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on the 8th day of April 1947.

(signed) HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Y. URAKE

DEP. DCC. #1128
Def. Sec. No. 1113

ANTE-BELLUM

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The Chinese Foreign Office issued a statement alleging that the Japanese forces used poison gas in the engagements on October 6th and 5th around Shanghai. This allegation was most emphatically denied on Monday afternoon, October 11th, by the Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, who described the Chinese charge as utterly absurd.

That the Chinese are resorting to all sorts of false charges and allegations against the Japanese forces is quite understandable, the Spokesman said, because their own forces on land, sea and in the air having proved no match for the strength of the Japanese forces, the last straw to which the Chinese can cling is propaganda based on their own hallucinations.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity

I, Hanako Iwasa, Chief of the Archives Section, Japan Peace
Commission Office, hereby certify that the document hereeto attached
in English consisting of ___ pages and entitled "Statement by the
Director of the Information Bureau to the Press, Oct. 11, 1947."
is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese
Peace Commission Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this ___ day of April 1947.

/s/ K. H. Yoshida
signature of official

Witness: /s/ K. Uraba
The world has been created for mankind. Therefore, all honest and industrious people have the right to live anywhere in the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. But when there is, on the one hand, a group of people living in happiness with amassed fortunes, and on the other hand, another group of people, honest and industrious, being denied such happiness in life, there can be no greater injustice imaginable. There is a Chinese maxim, "when things are unbalanced, the noise of friction arises." The secret of good government is to prevent friction among the people. This is a fundamental truth, both in internal and international politics.

The population of Japan has doubled in the past 50 years. Being cramped in such a limited area, Japan desires to send its people out, but every possible outlet is denied by other countries. The American Japanese Exclusion Law of 1924 is one that is against the natural law of mankind and one which is greatly deplored by the Japanese people.

To hear the heated argument on the question of the unequal distribution of resources as between the "haves" and "have-nots" countries. If the "haves" refuse to concede to the rightful demands of the "have-nots", peace will be very difficult to maintain. But Japan does not make any demands on this point as her right. The idea of right as conceived by the Western people is incompatible to that of the Oriental. Japan's only demand is that her people be entitled to enjoy the freedom of movement and the happiness which is rightly theirs. If the President of
the United States had the present Sino-Japanese affair in mind in making the reported speech, the remarks I have just made will be equally applicable to the present issue. Japan's intention to carry on her peaceful development on the Continent is not for the sake of the happiness of the Japanese alone, but also for that of the Chinese people.

That Japan wants is peaceful cooperation between Japan and China. That cooperation China refused by force of arms, resulting in the present affair. But we are confident that the thinking people of China will realize the true intentions of Japan and the Japanese people and take the course of mutual aid and cooperation for the peace of East Asia -- and for the world.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Kiyoshi, known Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereeto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement made by the Director of the Information Bureau, in an interview... with the Foreign Correspondents Oct. 3, 1937" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of April 1947.

/S/ K. Kiyoshi
Signature of Official

Witness: /S/ K. Urabe
Chinese censors are again manipulating the text of dispatches of foreign correspondents in Shanghai and elsewhere.

Mr. Abend who was hurt by the Chinese bomb which fell upon the Sincere Department Store described the incident in a cable dispatch to the N. Y. Times. As an eye-witness, he reported that he saw the bomb drop from a Chinese airplane which came flying from a south-easterly direction at an altitude of about 4,000 metres, and that both the local British and American authorities have similarly recognized the fact.

Mr. Abend further reported the fact that the Japanese aeroplanes did not fly over that district and that Japan's bombing planes, strictly observing the declaration made a short while ago, absolutely have not flown over the International Settlement south of the Suchow River.

This dispatch of Mr. Abend was so altered by the Chinese censors, that it was made to appear that it was the Japanese plane that dropped the bomb which killed and injured hundreds of innocent civilians, including
Mr. Abend soon discovered the Chinese manipulation and managed to send another article describing the above fact by mail via Hong-Kong.

It may be recalled that the Chinese bomb which hurt Mr. Abend inflicted a mortal wound to his colleague, Mr. Billingham whose condition is reported almost hopeless.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japaneno Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Chinese Censors Manipulate Dispatches of Foreign Correspondents." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. UEBA
Def. No. 1733

I.

United States of America et al.

against


EXHIBIT (Translation)

Defendant: Ali, Ali, Yeuse

having, duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.
I entered the Foreign Ministry shortly after graduating in the 12th year of Meiji (1909) from the Law Department of the Tokyo Imperial University. In the beginning, I served at Peking and certain as an assistant to diplomats and consuls. During this period I made journeys to the Outer Mongolia and Kansu. In the 1st year of Taisho (1912) I returned to the main office of the Foreign Ministry to serve in the China affairs Section of the Political affairs Bureau. In the 4th year of Taisho (1915) I was appointed Secretary of the Commercial affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry and was ordered to concern myself in Chinese affairs. Thereafter I was appointed Consul in Hankow and then in Fuchow. After finishing these services, I served for a certain interval as Secretary of the Embassy at Washington when CHIDUMA, Takujiro was ambassador. In the 11th year of Taisho (1922), prior to the Washington Conference, I returned to Japan and served in the European-American affairs Bureau for about a half year. Subsequently, I was appointed Chief of the 1st Section of the Commercial affairs Bureau, and during this term of office, served concurrently as acting Director of the Commercial Bureau when the Director was absent. It was then that I made a draft of the instructions for the Chinese Tariff Conference. Thereafter, I was
formally appointed Director of the Commercial Affairs Bureau. I was devoting myself to the Chinese and Russian Affairs by the 15th year of Taisho (1926).

In the 1st year of Shōwa (1926), retiring from the Foreign Ministry, I was appointed Director of the South Manchuria Railway Company to deal with the matters concerning foreign countries and foreigners. At the end of the 6th year of Shōwa (1931) I was commissioned as an advisor to the Manchung Army.

Since the 9th year of Shōwa (1934), I was an advisor to the South Manchuria Railway Company and was despatched to China. During this term, I was also temporarily commissioned as a diplomatic advisor to the China Expeditionary Army. During these 7 years in China, I visited almost all the provinces in Central and Southern China.

I was appointed as a diplomatic advisor to the Foreign Ministry when Mr. W. TSUCHIYA, Yosuke became Foreign Minister in the KINOYE Cabinet which was organized in July, the 15th year of Shōwa (1940). After retiring from this post upon the resignation on bloc of the 2nd KINOYE Cabinet in June, the 16th year of Shōwa (1941), I was appointed Supreme Advisor of the South Manchuria Railway Company up to the time just before the termination of war.

Among books I have written on Manchuria and China problems, the principal ones are as follows:

"Legal Bases of Economic Activities of Foreigners in China" 12 volumes in all

"Comments on the Economic Treaties Concerning China"
Vol. I (Only "Nature of Opened Market" published)
Vol. II and following volumes in manuscripts. Not published.

"Outline of International Relations with China"

"Study on the Chinese Guild System"

"Introduction to the Recent History of China's Foreign Policy"

The Main Subject: Vols. I, II, I
It may rightly be said that the Hararic Incident and the China Incident were brought about by the positive diplomatic policy which Japan was compelled to take in order to maintain her national existence, rights and interests. As the basic causes which have led to such incidents, the following must be mentioned:

1. Peculiar conditions existing within China.
2. Peculiar diplomatic trickeries resorted to by the Chinese authorities.
3. Special geographical and economical relations existing between Japan and China.
4. Prohibition or restriction of Japanese immigration and trade by foreign nations.

The truth of the Sino-Japanese conflict can never be fully understood without having sufficient knowledge about these matters. Therefore, I shall further explain the above-mentioned items, basing my explanation on my experience of more than 20 years as a diplomat, on the results of my observations in various parts of China (I have visited various places as far as the Outer Mongolia, Kansu Province, etc.), and on my knowledge acquired by many years' investigation on China problems and so forth.

Chapter I

Peculiar situations existing within China inevitably call for peculiar diplomatic measures to cope with the nature of the incident and the general situation.

A. According to the result of my observation and research, there exists in China no government with sufficient power to control the entire land. Therefore, it is often very difficult to make a diplomatic agreement of great importance and consequently, even when an agreement is reached, we sometimes cannot expect it to be completely enforced.

From old times, there existed in China no strong government able to dominate the entire territory. Every government, since
As time of the Tang and Sung Dynasties, had set up itself after overthrowing the existing government by force and I have heard of no one who had reigned over the land by the will of the people. The government, therefore, is in substance an organization merely composed of civil and military functionaries, and usually has no direct representation of the people's will in respect to its formation and actual policies. All that the government did was to rule the people within the scope of its armed influence. "Unruled regions", as they are called by the Chinese government, are those districts outside the sphere of influence of the government where independent and self-existing administration is conducted.

Although the Republic of China, established in 1912 with democracy as its principle, has carried out considerable reforms in its policy and administration, the long-established people's idea of a government and their time-honored customs cannot easily be changed. The old situation still remains unchanged. The entire China, as a matter of fact, has been controlled by a number of independent political organizations and they have had little time except for fighting civil wars. These are worldly known facts. It was because of these facts that the international treaty of 1922, known as the Nine Powers' Treaty, had to include a clause, "To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity for China to develop and maintain a strong and stable government."

Then, why do such situations still exist in recent China? We cannot overlook that the cause is so deep-rooted and old that they cannot easily be removed. The reasons are innumerable but the main points are as follows:

First, the people's idea of a government is quite different from that of the people of a modern, unified state. That is, the people, as a rule, regard a government as belonging to the...
officials and the little interest in it. A famous proverb of China, "going out in the morning to till the soil and coming home in the evening to sleep, we have nothing to do with an emperor," tells us that clearly the people's idea of a government.

Secondly, extreme lack of communication facilities can be mentioned. It is true that, even in China proper, the time required to reach somewhat distant places is calculated by 'months.' Thus, it is natural that so-called 'preservation of the central political power' could not be expected.

Thirdly, I must point out the lack of homogeneity of language and the variety of races. China has various languages, each coming under an entirely different category. The northern Mandarin and Southern Mandarin which are most widely spoken have different vocal sounds and are not generally understood outside of the officialdom. Furthermore, dialects are spoken besides Mandarin. For instance, Kwangtung has the kung-tung dialect, Shanghai has the Shanghai dialect and in this way each province has its own dialect. It is a well-known fact that only several miles from Peking, the capital of Peking Province, entirely different languages are spoken and that there are many non-literate native dialects. Still more, in the frontier regions the Tibetan language is spoken in Tibet, the archaic Asiatic language in the southern part of Kwangsi, the Mongolian language in Mongolia, and the Russian language in Ili and Sinkiang. The official gazettes of China were at times written in both the Chinese and Persian languages in the south-western districts. Such being the case with the languages and literatures, we frequently come across not a few Chinese in the streets and other places who converse in English with one another. Racial differences intensify the complexity of languages and letters. The majority of populations in Kwangsi and
Kansu Provinces seem to belong to foreign stock in the eyes of Chinese who live in China proper. In such larger regions as Mongolia, Kansu, Tibet, etc., all the inhabitants are of foreign races with very few exceptions. These foreign races are different in their manners, customs and ideas from the Chinese. It is no exaggeration to say that there is none of them who does not harbour a hostile feeling against the Chinese. The lack of homogeneity of language and the variety of races have been great impediments to realizing the political unification of China and it is not at all possible to expect the central political power pervade throughout China. The government of General Chiang Kai-Shek, in view of this condition, has made a great effort to spread the national language and to unify languages. But the results are not noticeable up to present.

The foregoing explains the fact that the lack of control and a strong government in China contributes greatly to the fundamental cause of the situation. Consequently, very often a situation develops whereby, unlike between other civilized nations, unconventional diplomatic negotiation had to be carried out. The first reason is that, occasionally the government authorities, because of inability to fulfil their agreement with other nations in regard to the matters seriously affecting the people's interests especially the matters concerning different races, cannot take full responsibilities.

Secondly, the government, in spite of its intentions, is sometimes influenced by some group who is powerful with a great army at its command. The third is frequent occurrences of civil wars. Fourthly, mass power of the people is so strong as to influence the government policy. Accordingly diplomatic negotiations frequent run into difficulties and the important matters are left unsettled.
The states concerned, in regard to minor matters, can unwillingly drop them. But as a matter of course, they cannot do so when they are confronted with a problem of vital importance. As for matters concluded with the Chinese government, we can expect them to be carried out within those regions to which the government's authority is extended. If an agreement covers the entire of China, the foreign states concerned can only realize that it will be enforced locally, and their only consolation will be the fact that at least it is written on paper. There is an alternative to take up for this and that is to negotiate with the local government. However, their political power does not, as a rule, pervade through the regions which come under them.

B. Military men, with armies at their command, can easily sway the government's intention, and this fact greatly complicates diplomatic negotiations. Successive governments of China had, without exception, secured their power by force of arms. Consequently, in contrast with the influential power of military men, civil officials carry favor with them, and, unless they blindly follow the intention of military men, they could not even expect the security of their lives and properties, not to speak of maintaining their positions. Military men with substantial power meddle in legislation, administration and judicature, according to their own interests, while the government could do nothing about it. This state of affairs has been important to some extent since the establishment of the Republic of China. But speaking of China on the whole, the old situation remains unchanged. China has both the theory and system by which legislation, administration and judicature are made independent of each other but in actuality this does not work out. Often we find it difficult to succeed in diplomatic negotiations when we deal only with the central or local
government. Therefore, while negotiating with the government, it becomes necessary to persuade the military men with power. When powerful military officers did not care to agree with us, we could not, as a rule, hope for bringing any diplomatic matter to a conclusion.

C. When the brutal force of the mass is directed against diplomatic matters, it seems impossible to take a normal course of diplomatic negotiations. There is no modern state, above all, no democratic state, which does not make it an iron rule of politics to have respect for public opinion. In such a nation the people are given an opportunity to lawfully express their will and there is a system through which the people can do so. Furthermore, there is a way to judge and adjust people’s will so as to keep it rational in order to reflect it in the national administration. Thus in such a nation the people’s will and the politics are in line. In China, however, because such organizations and systems are lacking, so-called public opinion becomes confused and inconsistent in the process of its formation or in the process of translating it into action.

I. We hereupon observe the process of forming public opinion in China. A small group of people (leaders at times used to be young and inexperienced students, and other times hooligans) first taking advantage of the Chinese people’s susceptibility to education, spread their opinion among their circles; as soon as they obtain approval of a slightly larger number of people, they try to combine it into one by exercising their group power. As soon after shaping so-called public opinion, they try to realize it by the force of mass movement of the people. Furthermore, such a movement is unconventional, accompanied by violence. Both natives and foreigners made an object of this
movement, were subjected to violence and threat, their livelihood disturbed, their residences burned down or demolished and their possessions destroyed by fire and relinquished. Such offenses were often accompanied by killing and wounding.

And it may be Britain and Japan who suffered the heaviest damage on account of such mass movements. The recent examples are the anti-British riots of 1924 in Hongkong, Canton and other cities, the May 30 Incident of 1925, and the riot of 1926, in an attempt to restore the British Exclusive Settlements in Hankow and Kuikiang. All these violent movements were aimed at encroaching upon the British rights and interests, and consequently the lives and properties of British subjects were at all times subjected to violence. At Shunde and Canton, even a state of hostilities existed. As to those movements which have been so often repeated for the purpose of discrimination of Japanese goods, the Chinese people first took such passive measures as the boycott of Japanese goods and the withdrawal of Chinese employees from the Japanese, then resorted to positive actions as attacking the Japanese lives and properties. Their outrages were undescrivable. Every nation became from time to time an object of the mass movements. Not to mention the Boxer Incident of 1900, the general anti-foreign agitation at the time of the Nanking Incident of 1926 is one of the most outstanding examples.

As to the Chinese Government's attitude towards the above-mentioned movements, they were either unable to do anything or had no plans. With no sincerity to suppress the movements, they always waited with folded hands until the agitation cooled off. When the mass movements against Japanese goods took place, the Government tried to make Japan give in by instigating people or by utilizing them. Although a law to prohibit anti-Japanese movements was
promulgated, (the writer does not remember the date of the first law but the second law was promulgated in 1933) it proved to be ineffective and dead. To know why a Chinese mass movement can be so fervent and disorderly is absolutely necessary in grasping the true nature of such a movement, which has greatly to do with the Chinese conception of politics. The Chinese people have from ancient times been enjoying freedom and unrestrictedness almost unparalleled in any other country of the world. If anyone interferes in any way with their freedom, they stand up and fiercely resist him. Such is their characteristics. On the other hand, they heartily love their own homeland; and in their commercial and industrial business they usually organize a strong guild which is mainly maintained by members coming from the same province. The origin and functions of a 'guild' are quite different from those of an industrial association in other nations. A 'guild' is not stipulated by law and regulation. It has existed from old times as an organization for self-defense and mutual assistance. This organization is unique in the world in that its function is not merely to deal with industrial matters, but also to stipulate the ways of daily life and ceremonious affairs. Moreover, it tries in autonomous manner civil and criminal cases involving its members and even carries out capital punishments. The Government can not usually interfere with their business and they dare to resort to violence in case the Government policy is contrary to their interests or intentions. The Chinese people also have a peculiar and firm conception of self-defense. This conception originates from the fact that they cannot expect much legal protection in spite of disorderliness, repeated civil wars, rampanty of bandits, and the impotence of the administration. A traveler in China will witness that houses even in the interior rural districts
are surrounded by barrier walls with firing ports or high walls. And not a few rural millionaires have private armed guards of their own, numbering from scores to thousands. This is one of the reasons why mounted bandits and thieves form groups and equip themselves with weapons. Private corps, trained and armed in the military manner, are often organized when civil war breaks out. They are called Commercial or Industrial Corps and are out of government control. Meanwhile, the Chinese people think the appearances of these corps to be a natural phenomenon as self-defense measures. In China there is another kind of self-defense corps called a "mixed army". While defending themselves, the numbers of the army protect their leader's life and property as his personal soldiers. In addition the army in response to a request of rural people, especially of wealthy classes, engages in the protection of their lives and properties. And, neither the Chinese army authorities nor the government has nothing to do with the organization and existence of the "mixed army". Units of the mixed army are often enlisted in the regular army under the name of residing armies and come under the control of the regular army. In such cases, however, what the "mixed army" mainly aims is to drive financial support and the employment of personnel and the decision on their provisions are still undertaken by the "mixed army" leaders. There are many peculiarities of self-defense of the Chinese. Firstly, their self-defense is backed up by the use of armed strength. (Self-defense organizations possess swords, rifles, pistols and sometimes guns. It is told that even airplanes are used in the "Delta" zone of Canton.) Secondly, factions are formed and the power of multitude is always exhibited. Self-defense measures are indeed legitimate in any nation, but they are allowed only when an acute situation calls for them and the victim has no
alternative. But in China a collective measure is often resorted to even when there is no necessity. Thirdly, the actions of these self-styled organizations do not always conform to the laws and orders of the government. An evidence in the anti-foreign agitation. These organizations almost always in answer to other mass movements. The above-mentioned peculiarities clearly indicate how mass movements are handled in China and give the reason why they resort to peculiar actions. And these peculiarities have not only helped to develop a special form and system of the Chinese internal administration, but also have fostered a singular conception of diplomatic problems in the minds of the Chinese people. They take it for granted that they deal, on their own accord, with diplomatic affairs which they want to develop in their own favor, not wishing to leave them solely to the government. Hence it follows that they resort to the force of mass in tackling diplomatic matters. Such an instance is never seen in any other nation. The people's resorting to violence in regard to diplomacy and the lack of power and sincerity on the part of the government in suppressing mass movements make it necessary for the nation dealing with China, in respect to problems affecting the very existence of that nation, to stop such violent actions and to take whatever steps necessary to make the Chinese government follow a regular diplomatic procedure.

D. The fact that the Chinese have an intense feeling of discrimination and contempt toward foreigners cannot be overlooked. In the 5,000 years of Chinese history, the "Han" tribe, the backbone of the Chinese people, have enjoyed a higher culture than that of any other tribe. They called other tribes barbarians or regarded them as no better than birds or beasts. In spite of this, the Han tribe have suffered from trickeries played upon them by the neighboring tribes and their entire territory has more than once
been occupied by other tribes. The consequence is that the contempt for and the fear of other races has become a part of their traits. When Europeans and Americans began residing in China for the first time in the 18th century, the Chinese people regarded the white men as barbarians and treated them with contempt and discrimination. The fact that in the Nanjing Treaty of 1842 between Britain and China one article stipulates that foreigners should not be called "barbarians" explains what went on during those days. As the Chinese had more chances to associate with foreigners, their antipathy towards aliens gradually subsided but it still remains unchanged in the interior regions of China. And this antipathy in the interior has mainly been directed to foreign missionaries, who exceptionally had the privilege to make permanent residences in the interior. This attitude of the Chinese was not shown merely because of religion, but was partly prompted by the idea of contempt and discrimination against foreigners. In fact, nearly all Chinese conflicts or wars against foreign nations (the Opium War of 1842 between Britain and China, wars against the Allied Armies of Britain and France in 1856 and 1860, the Yuen Incident of 1874, the Boxer Incident of 1900, the Sino-Japanese Incident of 1932 and 1937, the Nanjing Incident of 1926, etc.) were caused by their attitude of disdaining and excluding foreigners. So were often repeated mass movements. The Chinese people's strong feelings of disdaining and excluding foreign nations made it necessary for any nation negotiating with China to take special measures in diplomacy.

It was Japan that was placed in the most difficult position in confronting the excluding and disdaining attitude of the Chinese. As will be explained in another section, the Japanese relation with China involves not a few conditions which can neither be conceded nor overlooked from the standpoint of maintaining Japan's right of existence. It is because Japan was in such a difficult position th
Chapter II

The peculiarities of the Chinese diplomatic measures call for peculiar means of diplomatic negotiations.

The Chinese policy of checking one nation by means of another makes diplomatic dealings with China complex and difficult. Since the opening of the country in 1842, China has suffered under the oppression of other civilized nations. Whenever she felt it impossible to alleviate a difficult situation by her own strength, she has adopted a makeshift measure which is to check one nation by means of another. And Britain has, for the longest period, been the object of such policy, as she has held a dominant position in China longer than any other nation. Japan has also been often victimized by the same policy. It is because Japan has sought to settle the Sino-Japanese issue smoothly and without causing further complication that she has tried to avoid a third party's intervention or interference. Nothing is further from her intention than to establish the "Monroe" doctrine in the Far East. It was because of such intention that she refused the mediation proposal of America, Britain and France in 1932 concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict, and declined to accept the advice of the Lytton Commission.

Evasion of responsibility by both the Chinese central and local governments makes it extremely difficult to reach an agreement in diplomatic negotiations.

It has so far been Japan's policy towards China to negotiate mainly with the central government in regard to general issues pertaining to the entire China or to more than two provinces, and with the local government as to local matters. The relations of interest between these governments are so complex and intricate that Japan could not always adhere to this policy, and very often had to
receive. In such cases, Japan has often confronted with evasion of responsibility on the part of both of them. The central government refers to the intentions of the local government, while the latter asks Japan to negotiate directly with the former. The complexity and prolongation of negotiations on this account may be formidable; but the writer remembers a number of cases where even matters of greatest urgency and importance have been left unsettled without any sign of agreement in spite of long years' efforts. The lack of unity and other circumstances in China may inevitably cause such a situation but the nations dealing with China had to bear with her for a long time and suffered losses of interests and rights. As to a matter of greatest urgency and importance, a nation dealing with China sometimes comes to feel it impossible to proceed with ordinary diplomatic measures in reaching an agreement in negotiations. This cannot always be judged unreasonable.

C. The fact that the Chinese government made the most of mass movements as a means of executing its policies has become one of the peculiarities in China. China, ranking among the first-rate countries in the art of propelling diplomatic negotiation by smooth words and secret means, has often tried to turn the negotiation to her advantage by making use of mass movements. In making use of them, however, the government is bound to take up such an issue as can win public favor, since the Chinese masses do not always move as the government wishes. Along these lines, the Chinese government was of late succeeded in making good use of the mass movements for "Recovery of Rights". In fact, the "Recovery of Rights" is a matter every Chinese government was deeply interested in and even the government of General Chiang-kuai-Shek adopted this principle as a "right of its diplomacy soon after the capital was removed to Nanking in 1926. We can trace back the origin of the popular sentiment for
"Recovery of Rights" to the Russo-Japanese War and this was the subject most suitable for gaining popular sympathy because it had been so deep rooted in the heart of every Chinese.

On the other hand, our official negotiations by diplomats for "Recovery of Rights" came to a deadlock with difficulties every time when they were carried on. When the Government found it difficult to attain its object concerning the "Recovery of Settlements", "Abolition of Extraterritoriality" and "Reclaiming of Customs Autonomy" on account of (1) the situations existing within China, (for instance, as to the abolition of extraterritoriality, it was agreed to be abolished in principle only with a condition that the Chinese legislation be remolded), (2) of the complication of the interests of other powers, (for instance, concerning the extraterritoriality, every power concerned, for fear of upsetting the equal status of the powers, agreed to abolish it on condition that all the other powers also agree to do so, and (3) of the disapproval of some powers concerned, (for instance, Italy opposed strongly to yielding her exclusive concession), it continued on one hand its diplomatic negotiations, and on the other hand undertook to agitate, utilize and instigate the masses in order to facilitate the negotiations. But the people engaged in the movements did not always move as the government desired and they occasionally went so far as to assault the government authorities concerned, blaming them for their slow and poor tactics in diplomatic negotiations, (for instance, in 1927, Foreign Minister Hsiung Cheng-ting was beaten by a mob in his office). Yet so far as the movements are directed toward the foreign nations, the government tactfully took advantage of them, idly watching at the mobs violate treaties and commit inhuman acts such as assault, threat, setting fire and damaging foreign goods, and forcing their way into foreigners' residences and destroying them.
With this force of violence, the government expected to turn the negotiation to their advantage. Every power concerned, annoyed by the menace of such mass movements, rejected a strong protest to the government in every case. The Chinese government, however, did more than issue a formal admonition to the people or act perfunctorily in checking such movements, lacking sincerity and ability to settle the agitation. As a matter of fact, the Government on many occasions seemed to hope secretly for more violent movements. In an extreme case the Chinese government once dared to declare, as a reply to the protest made by a foreign nation, a mass movement carried out in the spirit of patriotism should not be suppressed. Thus the powers had to make a concession to the Chinese government repeatedly and accept her demands. There are many instances of this kind and one of these is that the United Kingdom, suffering from the outrages committed by the local mobs against her exclusive concessions at Hankow and Chiu-chiang in 1926, had no choice but to sign the agreement, giving up the concessions and announcing the so-called "New Policy towards China". Though the policy of "checkin, a notion by means of another nation" is not right in the way of diplomacy, it cannot be condemned as unlawful. However, it is the most unfriendly and outrageous precedent ever seen in any other country for the government to instigate the people to do grave harm and menace to the foreigners and their properties and interests in China, to do nothing when those violent actions are committed and to use the situation for the advantage of their diplomatic negotiations. The Japanese government and the people are the victims who suffered most from those frequent and extreme atrocities. Harms done in the course of repeated anti-Japanese movements to all of the Japanese residents, including young and old, women and children, are incalculable and the atrocities and outrages committed by the participants of the mass movements are beyond description. The
Japanese government was continuously making protests to the Chinese government to suppress the outrageous masses, to indemnify the sufferers and to guarantee against similar troubles in the future. But the hundreds of these protests brought no result as if they were gravel thrown into deep waters. As a result a great number of Japanese residents had to face a miserable condition, losing their jobs and properties, driven out of their homes, hardly being able to make a living and many being left to die. Under these circumstances to continue to trade with China even within minimum limit was difficult. Needless to say, Japan was driven into a plight in which she could not even dream of such a thing as economical cooperation with China which is a vital problem affecting the life of Japan. In the beginning the situation existed locally and it did not last too long but it spread all over China in time and began to last for a long period. Consequently, Japan found herself in such a plight that she had to resort to something other than a conventional course of diplomacy in order to protect her lawful rights and interests in China and to save herself from being ruined. In studying the causes of the outbreaks of the Manchurian Incident and the China Affairs, one can never make a right judgment unless he bears these things in mind.

Chapter III

The peculiar relation between Japan and China created many important conditions which directly affected the existence of Japan, and none of these conditions could be left unsettled.

Although there are many nations which have great interests in China, Japan alone had many grave problems which had to be settled diplomatically as soon as possible for her to maintain her existence.

It is based, needless to say, on geographical proximity to China that China's problem is a problem of life or death for
The relation between Japan and China is not at all comparable to that between America or European countries and China. The Ishii-Lansing Agreement, concluded between Japan and America in 1917, endorsed the fact that Japan is in a peculiar relation with China because of her geographical position. But when we make a further study on this problem, we find that what really makes the China problem so important is her plight caused by her over-population for the solution of which the special position of China was considered.

Japan was worried about the increase of her population amounting to 500,000 to 600,000 a year, and the inevitable difficulty and uneasiness caused by that in her political, social and economical aspects grew more serious year after year. Thus whether or not an effective measure can be taken in respect to this problem became a grave and burning problem upon which depended the existence of the state. But unfortunately, Japan had practically no room to exploit in her own land. "Birth Control policy" could not be effectively put into practice. There were only two alternatives left; one was emigration and the other was further development of national industries. However, every state and land suitable for immigration closed the door to Japanese emigrants and there was a country, with all her vast territories and limitless resources, that went so far as to deport the Japanese immigrants already settled there. Thus, to solve the problem of over-population by means of emigration became entirely hopeless. Consequently, the only way left for Japan was to develop her industries if she wished to continue her existence. However, Japan not being blessed with natural resources and lands, had to seek outside of her territory those materials essential to the development of her industries. Although a market for Japanese manufactures had also to be found abroad, things were far from what she expected. To speak about industrial materials, as Japan's industries recently increased its productive power and her
manufactures became more active in detouching into the world markets. Many of the productive countries gradually limited their supply of industrial materials to Japan. And just prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Affair, Japan's industries suffered a terrible oppression in some countries, such as restriction or prohibition of export and import, operation of customs systems, denial of making bargains, and other bold steps to restrict Japan's export. Furthermore, as for foreign markets, Japanese goods, soon after the First World War, met with heavy customs duties which increased year by year and with other restrictions or they were totally prohibited. And the Japanese government, with little hope for the future, did all she could to nip out counter-measures to deal with various boycotts.

Consequently, in order to maintain her existence, Japan was obliged to concentrate all her efforts towards the China continent, giving up her industrial policy to trade with the world at large. This ultimately led up to the outbreak of both the Manchurian and the Chinese incidents. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the states which excluded Japanese from emigrating into their countries and oppressed Japan in regard to her trade are partly to blame for the above two troubles. Japan never had a territorial ambition in China. Japan's intention was nothing but to ask China for materials Japan is wanting and to meet the demand of China for goods which China needs and thus, by the combined efforts of the two to bring forth an intimate relation and peace in the Far East, which ultimately contributes to the world peace. This is, of course, not a hypocritical diplomatic eulogy. This is the fundamental principle of Japan towards China which I have been inculcated by the senior authorities and which I have endeavored to realize through my over twenty years of diplomatic service. The reason why Japan had been patient and tolerable in spite of the "anti-Japan and exclude Japan movements", which were insultingly and outrageously repeated
The two nations were destined to cooperate with each other in the end. But between these two nations there were some factors which obstructed the achievement of this ideal. Unequality between Japan and China was important among those factors. There is no cooperation without equality. Japan hoped for a long time that the two states, by discarding inequality, would come to good terms and unite candidly and completely on equal basis. Originally, Japan's privilege of inequality in China had acquired only under the "Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" concluded in 1895, about fifty years later than England and the other countries had come to enjoy a privilege of the kind. But already, in 1911, Japan agreed with China on a principle to abdicate the extraterritoriality by concluding the supplementary treaty of Sino-Japanese Commerce and Navigation. Then she willingly signed the various treaties and agreements concluded or adopted at the Washington Conference in 1922. Furthermore, at the Inter-Imperial conference on the "Chinese Tariff Reform" held at Peking in 1925, she led the meeting by proposing the draft of a most liberal treaty in regard to the restoration of customs autonomy of China in spite of her enormous loss in foreign trade. Thereafter, she always expressed her greatest sympathy towards the desire of the Chinese people to denounced "unequal treaties" and hoped that they could attain their object as soon as possible. Although unfortunately the realization of the Chinese people's desire was delayed because of the complication of rights and interests of other states involved and other reasons, Japan, by concluding several agreements with the pending government in 1940, waived the extraterritoriality, gave back her special concessions and provided a basic principle of economic cooperation. Although these treaties are invalid today, they are evidences through which one can learn what Japan's principle towards China has been.
In those days Japan was ready to go a step further to conclude with China such treaties as would contribute to the welfare of China. Japan would have been willing, as a matter of course, to cooperate with the Ch'iing-k i-shih government if the Ch'iing-k i-shih government had so desired. She would also have been ready to make further concessions if the Ch'iing government had accepted her proposition for economical cooperation between Japan and China. Japan's withdrawal of her troops from every part of China, which was considered most important by the Ch'iing government, was to be realized as soon as an agreement could have been reached on the principle laid down when the troops were first dispatched. Such to our disappointment, however, the frequent negotiations for peace proposed by Japan to the government was unfortunately not accepted in any way and the situation finally developed into what it is today.

World-wide questions are: "If Japan tried to realize, by force, her principle towards China if she liked economical cooperation?"
"Would not the use of arms make economical cooperation between Japan and China impossible?" Although Japan can easily answer in affirmative to these questions in principle, what was there for her to do? The situation in China forced her to take measures other than a conventional course of diplomacy and to resort to a strong method the fact which I have roughly described in Chapters I, II and this chapter. In short, Japan, while obliged to maintain her state to existence, was unable to reach anywhere through years of diplomatic negotiations, hemmed by the peculiar situations in China, but instead, confronted with the challenge of the Chinese mass movements, she was thus compelled to take up arms to protect her vested rights and interests, the lives and properties of the Japanese residents, and to lay a foundation on which Japan and China might be able to realize complete economical cooperation in the future.

The necessity and enthusiasm of the Japanese to depend upon
China has never been so great as during the periods of the Manchu-
rian Incident and the Chink Armir. In such times, why should Japan
voluntarily undertake to do something that might even temporarily
impede the diplomatic relations with China? Primarily, diplomatic
dealings are often carried out by taking advantage of the weak point
of the opposing people. For example, intimidation or use of force
was often applied in order to make the most of the Chinese weakness
in power. It is no exaggeration to say that by such tactics was
concluded the majority of the treaties between China and Britain,
France, Russia, etc., in the 19th century and the first half of the
20th century since China opened her door in 1842. Especially,
the was made by the combined forces of many big powers to conclude
the treaties in settling the Boxer Uprising in 1900. Although Italy
did not hear many instances that European states or America
adversely used such a mean, we can not say that there has not
been any. As a matter of fact, in the "Hay 30 Incident" in 1925,
Britain landed big forces as many as 20,000 in China, and other
powers also landed their marines at Shanghai; in 1926 the British
warship fired on Weihai; in 1929 (?) the Soviet Russia attacked
the Manchurian forces in the border districts of China and Siberia
when Chang Tsoo-lin carried out anti-Russian movements; when the
Namit Incident broke out in 1926, warships of America, Britain,
France, Japan, etc., bombarded the fort of Peking.

For a long time, many powers stationed their garrison troops
in Peking-Tientsin district, and regularly posted many warships with
marines on board in the ports or rivers of China along which princip-
alties were located. And a kind of fighting troops were often
organized by their residents and trained under the leadership of
military officers. The aim of all those preparations was to apply
force in emergency. Of the above, the system of stationing forces
in North China was established according to the decision at the
Washington Conference in 1922, but the others still remained in
practice.

Some powers might consider that these measures were taken for
the protection of their residents in case of emergency. For countries
to them the protection of their interests means no more than the
protection of their residents, forces can be stationed in China
actually for such a purpose only. Japanese interests in China are
much different. Especially, Japanese interests concerning the
economic cooperation between Japan and China as already referred to
were so grave as to affect the very existence of Japan. Therefore,
I believe that the other nations cannot but realize the fact that
Japan, under unavoidable circumstances, must resort to a strong
method at times in order to protect her interests.

Generally speaking, if a nation resorts to arms against
another nation, it usually causes a war; and even if force is not
used, oppression and menace by force constitute the danger of out-
break of a war. What must be taken into consideration also is the
fact that it is not always the case with China because of the
peculiar situation existing there. For instance, Britain concluded
the Tientsin Treaty by concentrating her forces at Hongkong at the
time of the Yunnan Incident but it did not result in an Anglo-Chinese
war. When the "Nanking Incident" broke out in 1925, Britain lends
20,000 forces in China (Britain advised Japan to dispatch her forces
jointly but was rejected by Japan) in settling the problem but that
did not bring about a war between Britain and China. And also when
the Hankow Incident took place in 1926, the bombardment of the fort
of Hankow by America, Britain, France, etc., did not result in a
war against China. In 1929 the Soviet forces attacked Chang-
Khsien-ling's troops but in this case too it was not regarded as
a war.

In view of these facts, it is clear that diplomacy towards
China is something unique and unconventional; and the use of
pressure against China, whether by military power or through
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intimidation thereof, was the common means which many powers adopted in settling important diplomatic affairs.

Therefore, the fact that Japan used force in settling anti-Japanese problems should not be regarded as a deviation from those precedents, and even if her use of force did violate the common international laws, the peculiar situation in China forced Japan, much to her regret, to resort to such measures.

Let me report the real objectives for which Japan mobilized her troops in the Manchurian Incident and the China Affair. What Japan wanted was no more than to protect her own rights and interests guaranteed by the treaties between Japan and China by stopping violent actions on the part of Chinese people and by making Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations follow a normal course and to help to bring about a happy solution in respect to economic cooperation between the two states which was the matter of life and death for Japan. Therefore, it was the Japanese government's intention from the beginning to withdraw all her troops if it was possible to reach such a solution and understanding. The Chungking government under the control of General Chiang-kei-Shek took up the problem of troop withdrawal first of all and declared that no diplomatic negotiations will be carried out as to economic cooperation, etc., unless Japan withdraws her troops. However, it is regretful that the peculiar state of affairs in China, as already explained, did not allow Japan to concede to the intention of the Chinese government.

In short, Japan's dispatch of her troops to China in both incidents was pure self-defense military action without any aggressive intention and such a military action was not a violation of treaties. Upon conclusion of Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, Japan, like America and Britain, attached a reservation to the effect that the said Pact should not be applied in respect to the right of self-defense. Japan naturally had approved the statement, made at that time by the Secretary of State of U.S., to the effect that when and
to what extent the right of self-defense can be used can only be decided by the party concerned. Accordingly, it is no other nation than Japan that can decide the extent and ways of using military forces in the incidents.

There may be differences of opinion as to whether or not the incidents can be regarded as wars. However, we must bear in mind that Japan had no intention to wage a war, that neither Japan nor China declared a war, and that there were many instances in the past when the use of force by other powers against China was not considered as a war. To judge any use of force in China as a war is to disregard the peculiar state of affairs in China. It is quite natural for Japan, who does not consider the China affair and the Manchurian Incident as wars, to insist that none of the laws of war can be applied to these incidents. It is not right to consider the Japanese plan for economic cooperation between her and China as aggressive even though Japan used force in the Manchurian Incident and the China Incident. If the word "aggression" means extension of influence abroad, it is not only Japan that committed economic aggression. But if it means aggression in the true sense of the word, to call Japan an economically aggressive nation is a great slander.

Japan only tried to solve her acute problem of over-population on a mutual understanding with China so as to sustain her existence. Although various powers appealed to their big forces in North China in 1900, no one called their economic expansion to China economic aggression. And although warships of Britain, France, etc. shelled the city of Nanking during the Nanking Incident in 1925, I have never heard of anyone say that their economic activities in China are economic aggressions. It is difficult to see why the Japanese economic activities based upon the rights of treaties and aimed at economic cooperation between China and Japan should be aggressive on the ground that Japan used military forces in the Manchurian...
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Incident and the China Affair.

The above national plan for Sino-Japanese economic cooperation was not carried out to deny the principle of equal opportunities in commerce and industry in China to various powers. Since the acceptance of the U.S. Secretary of State's proposal in 1900, Japan participated in all treaties or agreements which acknowledged this principle of equal opportunities, promised to observe it strictly, and made every effort to conform to the treaties even in those cases in which her economic interests were unfavorably affected. Therefore, Sino-Japanese economic cooperation which Japan advocated was not for Japan to monopolize interests in regard to economic activities in China. However, there is one thing which I must add.

It is the fact that during the Manchurian and China Incidents, certain situations did not permit the principle of equal opportunities to be observed strictly. These situations were, generally speaking, attributable to the following causes:

(a) In purchasing goods which were absolutely necessary for military use, the quantity involved was so large that there was very little left for foreigners to buy,

(b) Owing to fighting, etc., general transactions were exceedingly cut down for a certain interval,

(c) As to small order in the areas in which battles were fought were, for a certain term, disturbed so much that foreigners in general were compelled to hold off their business,

(d) On account of the strategic necessity of operation, foreigners were, for a certain term, prohibited from travelling in some districts.

Sometimes privileges similar to monopoly were granted to some Japanese firms, but they were limited only to specified enterprises and it was never denied to foreigners to run the same kinds of enterprises.
Def. Doc. 1133

But such situations as resulted from Japan's use of military forces against China were quite unavoidable, temporary and abnormal. They were of such nature as would be gradually brought back to normalcy with improvement of the condition. It is an extreme slander to say, judging from these matters, that Japan refused to give other powers equal opportunities in commerce and industry. Considering that Japan did intend to withdraw all her forces from China from the beginning, it is not justifiable to put too much stress upon the temporary measures referred to above. There are many precedents where the rights of foreigners granted by treaties were unavoidably restricted or suspended temporarily due to incidents, civil wars and conflicts. In such cases, the states concerned used to tolerate these things even when they could not but regard them as infringements of treaties. Why can it be that a generous attitude cannot be assumed towards Japan alone?
Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Hisaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Hisaki

Tokyo, Japan
22 April 1947
Def Dec. 9 1943

On this day of Dec. 9, 1943

This is true

LEONARD J. LOPEZ (ser)

I, LEONARD J. LOPEZ, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at the same place.

Witness: (signed) LEONARD J. LOPEZ (ser)

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth witholding nothing and adding nothing.
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見解の文書がありません。
Excerpt from article by General George C. Marshall, entitled
The Situation in China, published in Department of State
Bulletin Vol. XVI, No. 394, January 19, 1947

A very harmful and immensely provocative phase of the
Chinese Communist Party procedure has been in the character
of its propaganda. I wish to state to the American people
that in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the
action, policies, and purposes of our Government this propaganda
has been without regard whatsoever for the facts, and has
given plain evidence of a determined purpose to mislead the
Chinese people and the world and to arouse a bitter hatred of
Americans. It has been difficult to remain silent in the midst
of such public abuse and wholesale disregard of facts, but
a denial would merely lead to the necessity of daily denials;
an intolerable course of action for an American official.
In the interest of fairness, I must state that the Nationalist
Government publicity agency has made numerous misrepresenta-
tions, though not of the vicious nature of the Communist
propaganda. Incidentally, the Communist statements regarding
the Anping incident which resulted in the death of three
Marines and the wounding of twelve others were almost pure
fabrication, deliberately representing a carefully arranged
ambuscade of a Marine convoy with supplies for the maintenance

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of Executive Headquarters and some UNRRA supplies as a defense against a Marine assault. The investigation of this incident was a tortuous procedure of delays and maneuvers to disguise the true and privately admitted facts of the case.
I hereby certify that the document here attached, written in English by George C. Marshall, consisting of 1 page and entitled "The situation in China" is a document excerpt from the book entitled "The Department of State Bulletins" which was published in 1947 at such a v. and which was hereinafter in my custody.

certified at Wash.,
on this 3rd day of April, 1947

[Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereunto in the presence of the witness:

at the same place,
on the same date

WITNESS: __________________________
元閣の詫びよりの挨拶
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一九三七年十一月十九日発行
国務院公布案一第十号同前三次昭明

に破裂された協定にかかれる情勢とならせるジョージ・ヘンリー・マーシャル

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に破裂された協定にかかれる情勢とならせるジョージ・ヘンリー・マーシャル
給与と支払いの結果、彼の家族にとって、彼の生活は安定していた。彼の家族は彼の支払いについての情報を提供し、その支払いにかかわる情報であることを示している。

したがって、彼の生活は、支払いに関する情報に基づいて安定していた。彼の家族は、支払いに関する情報により、彼の生活が安定していたことを示している。
Errata Sheet

Of the two documents in English already distributed as Doc. No. 1161, the one which consists of 42 pages will be used. The parts of the above document to be offered to the Tribunal are as follows:

English.
Page 18, 1st paragraph.
Page 32, 4th paragraph.
From page 34, 2nd paragraph to page 40, 1st paragraph.
DOCUMENT IV

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Roizo Otsuka
Member of the Staff of the South Manchuria Railway Company

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese Communist Party was established at Shanghai in 1920 with Chen Tu-hsiu as the central figure. In the following year its First National Congress was held at Shanghai. The three succeeding congresses were called at Canton in 1922, 1923, and 1924; the fifth was convoked at Harbin in 1927, and in the following year the sixth was held in Kecuo.

Revised and greatly abbreviated by the editors from the original data-paper The Red Influence in China. Because of the controversial nature of the subject the editors wish to emphasize the fact that neither the Japanese Council nor the Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations assumes any responsibility for the author’s statements and interpretations. The paper is printed in the belief that it provides useful information on a relatively little-known question, and because it illustrates some of the views held by certain sections of the Japanese public.
After 1923 the Communist Party, as a branch of the Comintern, launched upon the task of sovietizing the Far East. During the period from 1925 to 1927, when the party was at the height of its power, the number of members was said to have reached five hundred thousand. The acquisition of such a large number of members at that time was due, however, to the adoption of Sun Yat-sen's three great policies for the execution of the National Revolution, namely, the China-Soviet Union confederacy, the toleration of the Communists in the Kuomintang, and the acquisition of the support of the peasants and the workers. After the 'Purification' coup d'état of April 1927 (executed by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai on April 12 and by Li Chi-shen in Canton on April 15) the party gradually lost its influence until finally it was compelled to become an illegal organization resorting to underground tactics. But by the outbreak of such extraordinary incidents as the Canton Commune and the establishment of the Changsha Soviet of August 1930, it proved that its influence had by no means vanished and that its latent power was not a negligible factor in Chinese politics. The Red Army and the Soviet area which were formed early in 1928 repulsed the five general drives of the National Army under Chiang Kai-shek, and in 1931 even went so far as to organize at Juichin a proletarian regime called the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The large-scale campaign which exhausted the greater half of the annual military expenditures of the Nanking Government finally succeeded in driving the main forces of the Red Army out of Juichin, but this expulsion of the Communist Army may be said to have been a strategic retreat on the part of the Red forces. The fact that without engaging in any pitched battle with the Nanking Army, and consequently without suffering any serious losses in the fighting force, the Red forces proceeded westward in a vast contingent points to the likelihood of their future recovery. One part of this army entered Shansi from Kansu after marching through the provinces of Hunan, Kiangtung, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Szechwan. Finally, at the end of February 1936, the Red forces invaded Shansi. The Red Army which invaded Shansi withdrew to Shensi as soon as the Central Army had completed its
military preparations, and is now making raids in Shensi and Kansu. Furthermore, in districts of Szechwan and Sikang Provinces there are strong divisions of the Red Army, and their movements are such as to merit particular attention.

Concerning the communist movement in China the Report of the League Commission on the Sino-Japanese dispute has mentioned a few characteristic points and has indicated the fact that the Chinese Communist Party is a strong adversary of the Nanking Government.

"Communism in China not only means, as in most countries other than the U.S.S.R., either a political doctrine held by certain members of existing parties, or the organization of a special party to compete for power with other political parties. It has become an actual rival of the National Government. It possesses its own law, army and government, and its own territorial sphere of action. For this state of affairs there is no parallel in any other country. Moreover, in China the disturbance created by the communist war is made more serious by the fact that the country is going through a critical period of internal reconstruction, still further complicated during the last eleven months by an external crisis of exceptional gravity. The National Government seems to be determined to regain the control of the districts under communist influence, and to pursue in these districts, once their recovery is achieved, a policy of economic rehabilitation; but in its military campaigns, apart from difficulties already mentioned, both internal and external, which weaken its position, it is hampered by lack of funds and defective communications. The problem of communism in China is thus linked with the larger problem of national reconstruction."

In order to understand the process in the development of the Chinese Communist Party and its Red Army, it is necessary to consider whether or not the social situation of that time was adapted to that progress. The clarification of the social situation which fostered the progress of this communist movement is the key to which great importance must be attached in forecasting the future of the party and the Red Army.
After the People's Revolution in 1911 struggles among the cliques of militarists arose; peace and order disappeared, and bandit raids became exceedingly prevalent. Furthermore, due to the development of capitalistic economy in the cities which accompanies the entrance of foreign capital, the economy of the rural communities with their remnants of feudalism gradually collapsed and as a result a proletariat was created. It was only natural that the various movements of the proletarians should respond to communism, which has for its motto the complete overthrow of imperialism, the warlords, and the gentry. But even though there existed ample room for the diffusion of communistic ideals in China, it is doubtful whether the activities of the Chinese Communist Party alone could have brought about such a remarkable progress. The chief motive power of this rapid development was in all probability furnished by the spiritual and material support rendered by the Comintern. In discussing the Chinese Communist Party it is therefore necessary to attach much importance to its relation with the Comintern and the Soviet Union.

The communist movement in China originated in the cities, but did not develop there. Rather, the movement took root in the rural communities and intensified the peasants' revolution. When viewed from the standpoint of Marxism the course that this revolution followed is decidedly unorthodox.

Among the reasons for the failure of the movement to progress in the cities the following are most noteworthy: (1) the influence of the various foreign Powers in the major cities (foreign concessions and their garrisons) and their suppression of sovietization; (2) the lack of cooperation among the regimes in various localities, and the various hostile measures against one another for maintaining their power; (3) difficulty in enlisting the support of factory workers and ordinary workers; (4) the lack of balance and different degrees of development in the revolutionary movement in the various districts; (5) the habitual policy of suppression by the Nanking Government.
The reasons for the success in the rural communists after the failure in the cities are the following: (1) Fraudulence on the part of the local government officials and the arrest of the peasants; (2) communist sympathies of the native bandits, "Red Ewars" (Hong Chiau-Hui) and "White Flowers" (P-Li Hui); (3) strife among the cliques of militarists and the frequent occurrence of civil war; (4) ignorance and simplicity of the peasants themselves.

But, generally speaking, what induced the peasants to embrace the ideas of communism and to approve the activities of both the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army was the adoption of the policy to liberate the peasants from debts and lack of land. This emancipation attracted the peasants more than any other economic policy and won them over whole-heartedly.

Although it is difficult to ascertain to what extent the policies of the Chinese Communist Party are enforced in the Soviet districts a summary of the economic, social, educational, and religious programs will serve to illustrate one phase of the activities.

In the Juichin Soviet Government's labor policy the eight-hour working day was enforced (six hours for minors of 16-13 years, four hours for children of 14-16 years). Each laborer was allowed at least forty-six hours of continuous rest every week. Furthermore, under special articles and clauses relative to minimum wages, health, security, unemployment, and other social insurances, the Soviet endeavored to ameliorate the living conditions of the people.

In the domain of economic policy the confiscation and nationalization of all banks, factories, mines, communication, and transportation enterprises was enforced. In accordance with an agreement, foreign industrialists were allowed to continue their production under the compulsory condition that they submit to the enforcement of all laws of the Soviet Government. But in case these enterprisers acted contrary to this condition, they were to be treated as counter-revolutionists and their enterprises immediately confiscated and nationalized.
The industrial and manufacturing enterprises of Chinese capitalists were left in the hands of the former proprietors, but controlled through the Factory Committee and the Labour Union. In case of a sabotage in production, a black-out, a breach of a Soviet law, or a participation in anti-revolutionary activity, their enterprises were to be confiscated.

Freedom of commerce was guaranteed, but the Soviet authorities fought against the raising of prices on the part of the merchants. By abolishing the old taxation system and establishing a unified graduated system, the Soviet made the burden on the wealthier classes much heavier. It is also strove further to ameliorate the living conditions of the workmen, the poor people in the cities, and the masses of both the poor and the middle-class peasants.

With a view to guaranteeing the complete emancipation of women, the abolition of the system of selling daughters as wives, freedom of marriage and divorce under the condition that registration be made in the 'State Organ', and the prevention of the Ten-yanghai system (adopting of young girls for future daughters-in-law) were enforced.

Much attention was paid by the Soviet to the educational and cultural elevation of the populace, and, what is more, it looked upon the widespread enforcement of free education as a duty of the state. Expenses for education were borne by the state. Primary, secondary, and normal schools were established for the young, while clubs and libraries were founded for the education of the adults.

The people under the Soviet did not lose their freedom of worship, but politics and religion were separated. Furthermore, the state did not protect religion, and the people had the right to propagate anti-religious ideas.

The right of the self-determination of various peoples in China was recognized. Furthermore, these peoples were permitted to establish 'independent self-governing states' and participate freely in the Chinese Soviet Union.

Foreign labourers in the Soviet districts were granted the same privileges as the Chinese wage-earning masses.
Needless to say, these policies of the Soviet Government won the interest and the support of the peasant masses which had long suffered under the yoke of warlords and bureaucrats. Consequently, the enforcement of the policies by the establishment of Soviet areas, the distribution of land, and the abolition of debts worked the peasants up to a high pitch of enthusiasm and evoked praise of the communist creed. Although it was exceedingly difficult to imbue the ignorant populace with the ideas of communism, the propaganda of realistic and practical education had a huge success.

What policy did the Nanking Government adopt to counteract this communist movement? From the military standpoint, Chiang Kai-shek's five campaigns against the communist forces did not progress satisfactorily in spite of the vast expenditures incurred by the Nanking Government. In one way this was due to the lack of discipline and organization within the army itself, but in another way the organization and the discipline of the Red Army were far superior, and, in addition to this, there was the support of the peasants. Concerning the means by which the Red Army procured its supplies of arms and ammunition there are various opinions. They were for the most part captured from the anti-communist army during the period when the Red forces had the upper hand. Besides this, there were the purchase by 'bribery' of arms and ammunition from deserters or prisoners of the National Army (for example, one rifle and a hundred cartridges were bought for 20 yuan), the robbing of military goods during their transport (mostly upon secret information from the peasants), and finally the support of the Soviet Union.

Today, when the Red Army has withdrawn from Central China to the wilderness of the north, the National Government is still underrating the strength of the Communist Army and is endeavouring to advance its punitive programme, but, as was revealed on the occasion of the Red Army's invasion into Shanxi in February 1936, the power of the Reds still has to be reckoned with. Judging by the raids of the Red Army in the north-western regions, the danger of sovietization is extremely grave.
Imagine the completion of the co-ordination between the Red Army and the Russian invasion into China from the north and the west. That the Nanking Government is well-nigh powerless against this, politically and from the point of view of military force, has already been proved. Here lies the vital reason for hastening the formation of a co-operative system of defence against the sovietization of the north-west.

THE RED ARMY

Most of the information concerning the actual movement of the Chinese Communist Army is based on reports from two sources. The first of these is the literature of the Red Army itself, the other is the announcements of the Nanking Government -- the reports of the head of a Provincial Government or the commander of the anti-communist troops. The former contains much propagandist material which aims at agitation and provocation. In contrast, the reports of the Nanking Government strive to make one believe that the government forces are always victorious. These reports become the material for propaganda throughout China in that they are allotted to the various newspapers through government news agencies and inserted in the journals by compulsion. Both sources of information are therefore unreliable, but unfortunately there are practically no other sources or documents upon which one might rely. Actually, the districts where the Red Army has its base, or ever which it passed, are those which were Soviet districts in the past or those in which the Soviet regime is established at present. Otherwise they are in remote regions where scarcely any one ventures to enter except the Red Army and its pursuers, the anti-communist troops -- regions where even newspaper correspondents and missionaries dare not enter.

However, by following the intelligence from the two sources mentioned above, an endeavour is made in the following pages to depict in brief the present condition of the Red Army.
Westward March of the Red Army after its Abandonment of Jui-chin.

In explaining the recent movements of the Red Army it is necessary to commence with its abandonment of Jui-chin in October 1934. After the Commune at Canton in December 1927, which is called the final decisive battle of the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party, which completely lost its bases of activities in the cities, turned the spear-head of its policy towards rural society. Assembling the defeated soldiers of the 'Hankow Violence' and the Canton Commune, the Chinese Communist Party made preparations for the Red Army in the frontier regions of the provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, Kiangsi, and Hunan, and attempted to establish a Soviet Area. That is more, this policy of the Chinese Communist Party succeeded, for the Hankow Government was pre-occupied in executing its campaign against the northern militarists and in ridding the Government Army itself of the disquieting warlords. A vast Soviet Area extending over the above-mentioned provinces and an army exceeding one hundred thousand were formed. Furthermore, in Chekiang, Anhwei, Hupeh, Henan, Shensi, and Szechuan Soviet districts were established and Red forces organized.

In November 1931, at Jui-chin in Kiangsi Province, the First National Congress of the Soviet Representatives was held, at which such statements were made:

'Now there are two governments in China. One is the Bourgeois Government of Hankow, the other is the Proletarian Government of Jui-chin.'

According to the statement made public by the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet in 1931:

'The sphere of influence of the Jui-chin Government extends throughout the eleven provinces in central and southern China. The inhabitants in the Soviet Area number approximately sixty million and the troops which possess artillery and aeroplanes total three hundred thousand. Besides the various administrative headquarters, there is in Jui-chin a university of the Red Army, and it is said that this city which had a population of less than ten thousand has now expanded into a city of over one hundred thousand inhabitants.'

These are in all probability exaggerated figures, but at the same time they furnish a picture of one phase of the Soviet regime at that time.
Needless to say, the attitude of the Hankow Government towards this Soviet regime is hostile. Nevertheless, even Chiang Kai-chek, who gained a brilliant victory in his struggle for supremacy with the various warlords and who had virtually become the dictator of the Hankow Government, was at a loss as to what to do in the Soviet Areas and in the face of the steadfast resistance of the Red Army within those districts. Then the government forces came, the Reds became peasants; upon their departure they again took up their arms and resumed fighting. For a long time this guerrilla warfare has been a source of constant anxiety for the Hankow Government. The five general drives since 1928 were fruitless, and in spite of the fact that the greater half of the expenditures for military operations were lavished upon the preparation for the anti-communist campaign and the mobilization of one million troops, the Government Army was powerless against the guerrilla warfare tactics of the Red forces. After the appropriation of huge sums, chains of blockhouses were built, and the policy of the large-scale construction of roads for speedy transportation of troops was adopted. Towards the summer of 1934 the Hankow Army was finally able to drive the main forces of the Red Army to the south of Kiangsi Province.

Consequently, the Red Army, which was now in a state of disorder, avoided committing itself to a decisive battle with the Hankow forces. It abandoned Juichin and withdrew westwards. At the end of October 1934 the Chu-Mac Army, which numbered one hundred thousand, moved westward to the frontier of Hunan Province. (This army was originally known by the names of Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, and Mao Tse-tung, representatives of the Political Department.) Then, pursued by the government forces, the Red Army entered Kweichow from Hunan; thence under pretext of entering Szechuan Province by way of the Yangtze River it executed a great march and advanced to Kweiyang in Kweichow Province. Following this it made an attack upon Kunning, the capital of Yunnan Province. In Kweiyang and Kunning it was preceded by Chiang Kai-shek, who was directing his army by the intelligence received from
his air scouts. Due to air-tight defense, the Red Army was unable to break through, and as a result the communist forces marched northward from Yunnan Province, crossed the Kinsha River, and proceeded to the Huili Region in the mountains of southwestern Szechwan. Through the district of Sichang they traversed the Tatuho, and in the spring of 1935 arrived at Tatsienlu or Kungtien, the capital of Hsinan Province. When the westward march of the Red Army is followed on a map, the length of the journey is seen to be really astonishing. The report of the Szechwan Provincial Government on the movement of the Red Army, saying that by the time the Red forces arrived at Tatsienlu they were in want of supplies, must have been true. For ten months after their withdrawal from Juichin the westward march of the Red forces took a zigzag course, and the fact that they marched from six to ten thousand kilometres must be considered as an astonishing feat. It was thought that the Red forces which reassembled in the districts north and west of Chengtu would make preparations to conquer the plains of Szechwan after establishing a Soviet Area, but, first of all, Mao Tse-tung with the whole of his troops succeeded in uniting with the troops of Hsu Hsiang-chien. Hsu Hsiang-chien's army was called the Fourth Red Army. It was an exceedingly strong army which had stayed in the north of Szechwan Province for many years, and its Political Commissioner, Chang Hsueh-tao, was one of the oldest leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. The union of this army and the Chu-mai Army has become historical, and for the first time since the abandonment of Juichin the Red Army was in battle array. But in August 1935 this Red Army, which had united, split again as the result of a disruption at a meeting held by the leaders as to the course to be followed in future by the Red Army. Mao Tse-tung, who contended for the northward march, crossed Peishuliang and entered Kansu Province, while Cheng Kuo-tao, who adhered to the policy of proceeding southward, advanced towards the Yenan Region with the majority of the troops of Chu Teh and Hsu Hsiang-chien.
Attack upon Shen-si in the North Shen-si Detachment.

It is said that the troops which followed Tse-tung to Kansu numbered between nine and ten thousand. They formed their base in the south of Kansu and were reorganized into the Shen-si-Kansu Detachment. Peng Teh-hui, who was honored as the "Voroshilov of China" for the heroic part he played in the establishment of the Soviet Government at Shanghai, became its Commander-in-Chief, and Liu Pan, Peng Pao-chung, and Tang Po assumed command of the various divisions, with Yen Chien-yung as Chief of Staff and Hsu Tse-tung as the Political Commisar. This reorganization was executed in September 1935, and soon the Shen-si-Kansu Detachment turned its march towards Kansu Province and commenced its activity. The movements of the divisions under Hsu Hui-tung and Liu Tou-tan, which were in the north of Shen-si Province, suddenly became more active, and the danger of the north-west sovietization became more and more acute.

Thereupon the Shen-si-Kansu Detachment of the Red Army under Liu Tou-tan and Peng Teh-hui advanced to Shen-si Province, picking up associates wherever they could during their journey. In the winter of 1935, or early in the spring of 1936, they united with the division under Hsu Hui-tung, extended the sphere of influence of the Shen-si Soviet Government, and completed the establishment of communications with the divisions under Liu Tou-tan. Liu Tou-tan's army consisted of three divisions, or approximately twenty thousand soldiers, and the three parties under Hsu Hui-tung consisted of about five thousand troops. All these troops had their base in the north of Shen-si Province for a long time, and after their union with the Shen-si-Kansu Detachment were able to adopt active measures in their attacks.

Most alarmed by the above-mentioned offensive of the Red Army in Shen-si Province was General Yen Pei-sen, who controlled the adjoining, Shen-si Province. The Province of Shen-si is strategically located in that it is bordered in by precipitous ridges in the north and bordered by the River Hwang in the south and west. Here the "Shen-si Source Doctrine" was maintained for decades.
Attack upon Shensi by the North Shensi Detachment.

It is said that the troops which followed Tse-tung to Kansu numbered between nine and ten thousand. They formed their base in the south of Kansu and were reorganized into the Shensi-Kansu Detachment. Feng Teh-hui, who was honored as the 'Shoeshilov of China' for the heroic part he played in the establishment of the Soviet Government at Shangsha, became its Commander-in-Chief, and Lin Piao, Peng Pucheng, and Teng Fo assumed command of the various divisions, with Y.M. Chiao-ying as Chief of Staff and Hsu Tso-tung as the Political Commissioneer. This reorganization was executed in September 1935, and soon the Shensi-Kansu Detachment turned its march towards Shensi Province and commenced its activities. The movements of the divisions under Hsu Hsi-tung and Liu Tsu-tan, which were in the north of Shensi Province, suddenly became more active, and the danger of the north-west sovietization became more and more acute.

Thereupon the Shensi-Kansu Detachment of the Red Army under Lin Tse-tung and Feng Teh-hui advanced to Shensi Province, picking up associates wherever they could during their journey. In the winter of 1935, or early in the spring of 1936, they united with the division under Hsu Tch-i-tung, extended the sphere of influence of the Shensi Soviet Government, and completed the establishment of communications with the divisions under Liu Tsu-tan. Liu Tsu-tan's army consisted of three divisions, or approximately twenty thousand soldiers, and the three parties under Hsu Tch-i-tung consisted of about five thousand troops. All these troops had their base in the north of Shensi Province for a long time, and after their union with the Shensi-Kansu Detachment were able to adopt active measures in their attacks.

Most alarmed by the aforementioned offensive of the Red Army in Shensi Province was General Yan Pei-sen, who controlled the adjoining Shansi Province. The Province of Shensi is strategically located in that it is hemmed in by precipitous ridges in the north and bordered by the River Hwang in the south and west. Here the 'Shensi-Mongol Frontline' was maintained for decades...
and the inhabitants continued to prohibit the entrance of strangers. Even after the Nanking Government succeeded in exercising its influence throughout China, Shensi did not always obey the decrees of the Government. Its representative in the Kuomintang is but a camouflage of its independence. In reality, it is just as it was under the dictatorship of Yen Hsi-shan. After returning to Shensi from his refuge in Dairen, Yen Hsi-shan himself had originated the ten-year plan for the economic construction of Shensi and did his best in his struggle for the attainment of the principle of benevolent rule. To him the advance of the Chinese Communist Party and the increase in Red forces were serious threats. In the autumn of 1935, when he heard of the reorganization of a portion of the Red forces into the Shensi-Kansu Detachment and its attack upon Shensi, he foresaw the gravity of the danger of the sovietization of North Shensi and appealed loudly to the whole nation that, in the near future, Shansi too would be sovietized. As a counterplan for the 'Land Policy' of the Communist Party he promulgated the 'plan to make all land the property of the State', and thereby endeavoured to secure the support of the populace so as to prevent sovietization. He also adopted other measures for the positive prevention of sovietization by constructing blockhouses and other fortifications and employing the 'advance slowly, fight cautiously' method.

In spite of this the vanguard of the North Shensi Red Army began the attack upon Shensi in the last ten days of February 1936. Already in the hsien of Chungyang, Shihlou, Waagho, Liulin, and Shih in the south of Shansi Province - Soviet Area has been formed. On March 2 even Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi Province, was captured by the Reds. Upon piecing the various reports together, it is possible to learn that on the arrival of information concerning the approach of the Red Army the inhabitants along the Tatung-Puchow Railway began to seek refuge in Taiyuan and Shihchenchuang. Martial law was enforced within the walls of Taiyuan, and the Red Army advanced wherever it pleased, as the morale of the anti-communist troops was completely undermined. It has been said that the execution of the so-called guerrilla warfare put the anti-communist forces into confusion.
As to the number of the Red troops which attacked Shansi, reports vary, saying that from five to thirty thousand took part. But that which reported that the new troops should be used in Shansi without crossing the Ganges seems to be erroneous, as that so many troops engaged in the attack upon Shansi may be met at any time and New to six thousand. Early in March, perceiving that the situation with over one hundred thousand soldiers would be insufficient for either the defense of Shansi or the occupation of the communist troops, Yen Pei-shan asked the support of the National Government and Sung Che-yaun of the Chinese Region (Comrade-Chinese Political Council). It was forecast that this request for support would result in the formation of a joint policy between Yen Pei-shan and Sung Che-yaun as a measure for the prevention of the sovietization of the northwest, but the Chinese region's support of Shansi was not realized. After some negotiations, the Central Army and the Provisional Forces came to the support of Shansi from the National Government. With due respect to the Chinese Doctrine of Shansi, Yen Pei-shan had only assembled military funds and drew from the National Government and opposed the actual entrance of the Central Army into Shansi. Without a reply, Chiang Kai-shek sent troops into Shansi by way of Yuncheng and the Chengtai and the Taokow-Chinghua Railways. Judging by his action on the occasion of the westward return of the Com-Red Army, when he deprived the two provinces of Hupeh and Kiangsi of their military rights, the pouring in of troops into Shansi Province was inarguable conclusion. From this action of Chiang Kai-shek it is possible to foresee his control over Shansi. In the negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Pei-shan it was quite natural that close communication as regards military tactics was lacking between the Central Army under Yang Mi-yuan and the troops dispatched by Chiang Kai-shek.

Taking advantage of the weakness in the military operations of the anti-communist forces, the R. F. Army was making attack after attack in the various localities, but towards the end of March, when the distribution of the anti-communist forces was perfected, the communist forces returned to Shansi Province, and conditions at present are such that only a few are left in Shansi.
Province. As to the Red advance to Shanxi, various conjectures have been made. Some maintain that the Red Army foraged in order to replenish its supplies, while others maintain that the Reds endeavored to form a Soviet area in Shanxi in preparation for the opening of the Connecten Route (International Route) to Suiyuan and Outer Mongolia. The reason for the Red Army's avoidance of conflict with the anti-communist army in Shensi Province and its advance into Shanxi was only the manifestation of the tactics for 'Defense against Attack', for which purpose the Reds endeavored to use Shensi Province as the scene of their defensive operations. The aim was to replenish supplies. Consequently, it is more appropriate to conjecture that, for this reason, the main forces did not move. It is to be noted that the aim of the Red Army in north Shensi is the anti-Japanese movement, and the causing of disturbances on the Manchoukuo frontier. This is in accordance with the propagandist statement, "Under the name of the Confederate Army for the struggle against Japan and the overthrow of Ch'ing K'ai-shek, rise in one accord and combat the outside enemies", which is being spread in the various districts of Shensi. This explains the new stratagem of the Chinese Communist Party. The Peking-Tientsin Times of March 5 reports as follows:

'The Red Armies have long eliminated the purely communist catchwords of the Third International from their propaganda and manifestoes. The silence on the subject of the domestic political issues has turned from the negative to the positive approach. They no longer censure those whom they have regarded as their enemies in this country. They openly advocate, on the contrary, the organization of a united front of all patriotic elements for a struggle against Japan.'

Concerning the limits of the sovietized area of Shanxi, it is difficult to obtain accurate accounts. Actually, there is logical contradiction between the report which states that the Communist Army enforced communism after establishing a Soviet area, and that which stresses the elimination of the purely communist slogans from the propaganda and manifestoes. Furthermore, it is said among the tradesmen in Taiyuan that the peasants in the sovietized district are whole-heartedly welcoming the introduction and enforcement of the financial and economic policy of the Chinese Communist Party.
Union of the Chu-Hsu and the Chu-Hsing Provinces.

As we mentioned previously, the North Shanxi Red Army returned to Shanxi Province after forming 'cells of communist organization,' and realizing their aim to replenish their bases in the north of Shanxi and in the south of Kansu where, in the face of the attacks of the anti-communist army, it seems they are striving to maintain their influence by the skillful employment of their favorite guerrilla tactics and the support of the present army. The new course of the march of the Red Army appears to lie in the direction of Suiyuan Province, where the line of defense is comparatively weak. It would be erroneous to conclude that the danger of the sovietization of Shanxi Province was removed with the withdrawal of the North Shanxi Red Army. On the contrary, the 'cells of communist organization' which the Red Army planted by the skillful execution of its 'defense against attack' strategy will, in all probability, increase the danger of the sovietization of Shanxi. This has been done by the Shanxi Red Army so that it might again have the opportunity of invading Shanxi, and thus the menace of sovietization in China, either from the rear or the flank, has by no means diminished.

After separating from Mao Tse-tung, the main forces of the Red Army under Chu Teh and Hsu Hsiang-chien, which had proceeded southward, were moving in the Tienchuan, Yuan, Faching, and Lushan districts in Szechwan Province, and in the Tszienlu Region on the Hanking border with the hope of occupying the plains of Chengtu. It is said that the plan of the Chu-Hsou Army was either to establish the Szechuan-Chwenzien Soviet Area or to unite with the forces under Hsia and Ho and proceed northward for the second time. This naturally attracted much attention at the time.

By the Hsiao-Ko Army is meant the joint forces of the troops under Hsia and Ho. This contingent of thirty thousand troops lingered in the northwestern part of Hwun Province. With the progress in the policy of the concentration of all the main and rear's in Hwun Province this army was driven out by all towards the frontier of Hualien Province by the anti-communist forces of the Nanking Government. At the end of November 1935, after
abandoning Yunnan Province, it began its march towards Kwangchow Province. It was expected to follow the route taken by the Chu-Iao Army in its westward march and proceed to Szechuan, but it lingered for almost six months in the various districts of Yunnan. Finally, in April 1936, it succeeded in uniting with the Chu-Iao Army in the extreme western part of Szechuan after crossing the hazardous Kinsha River.

According to the statement of Tsu-tch Yao (Commander of the Second Route anti-Communist Army) to the various newspaper reporters:

'The main forces of the Red Army are in the Taofu and the Tanpa districts with Chen Chang-kao, Chang Kuo-tao and Liu Fo-chung directing their activities. The Tsiao-Ho army proceeded to north-western Szechwan after crossing the Kinsha River. One division advanced to Lihua by way of Tinghsiang and the other division proceeded towards Tehjung and Paoan. The total number of troops in the two divisions is about fifty thousand.'

In the territory west of Tatsienlu is a grassy district called Kwanwai. The geographical position is such that the dividing ridges are high and rugged. Horseback and ox-carts are the only means of communication with the outside world. The climate is extreme; food-supplies are by no means plentiful, and the anti-communist forces cannot adopt positive measures due to the inconvenience they encounter in transporting supplies and ammunition. Particularly, the presence of the Tayuan Mountain Range on the frontier of Hsi Kang and Szechwan Provinces renders bombardment from aeroplanes impossible for the government troops. Taking advantage of this since the invasion of Hsi Kang Province, the Red Army has crushed the influence of the Lama priests, who had for many years held control over the province under the pretext of supporting the independence of the weaker races, and has established a special Soviet Government with the existing organ of Lamaism as its foundation. That is to say, the communists are striving to consolidate the foundation for their activities by executing the various policies for the exploitation of the Lama priests—propagating the slogan to protect Lamaism, to respect the markers and customs of the people, to prevent murder, and to exempt them from taxation. But the real aim of the Red Army is not to stop here, but to cross Szechwan and enter Kansu so as to unite with the North Shensi Army, and thereby consolidate the united front for the struggle against Japan.
Sovietization of Heilungkiang in North China.

When the Red Army occupies a district, it first of all assembles the populace and holds a meeting at which a Soviet Government will be formed and the land distributed. But in reality the good tracts of land are reserved as 'public land' for the Soviet Government and the Red Army. This land is cultivated by the destitute peasants, and the remaining tracts are distributed to the peasants. Land is granted to the people, but it must be taken into consideration that in order to execute the policy of the Red Army, some 'pulling of the wires' is put into practice. After the distribution of the land, the young men under thirty years of age are recruited into the flying column, the youths ranging from fourteen to twenty are compelled to become vanguards, while the boys under fourteen must join the Pioneer (boy scout) organization. The boys in the Pioneers are given instruction in communism so that the flying column and the youthful vanguards may later form an independent body and become reserves for the Red Army. From the old men and the young women transport corps are organized to aid in the transportation of supplies or the cultivation of the 'public land' or scouting and sentry duty. It is said that the poor peasants, who are given only bad tracts of land, are compelled not only to enlist in the Red Army, but also to present four-tenths of their harvest for the public supplies.

THE GAPING OF THE NATIONAL TROOPS AGAINST THE COMMUNIST ARMY

First Stage.

...after Chiang Kai-shek's coup d'etat of March 1927, which was really the first systematic attack of the Nanking Government against the Red forces, drive after drive was organized for the extermination of the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Army, which were rapidly increasing and gaining influence. The campaign may be divided into three stages:
The First Stage -- from the formation of the National Government (1929) to directly before the Manchurian Incident (1931); that is to say, the period in which the first, second, and third drives were executed.

The Second Stage -- from the outbreak of the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents (1931-2) to the westward retreat of the Communist Army (1934); that is to say, the period in which the fourth and fifth drives were attempted.

The Third Stage -- after the westward retreat of the Red Army at the end of 1934. It was the stage during which was proposed the new strategem of the 'united front' of the so-called National Defense Government or the 'anti-Japanese Confederate Army' in connexion with the northward march of the Communist Army -- the period in which the conflict heightened between the Nanking Government and the Red Army.

For the first drive against the Red forces the Nanking Government entrusted Lu Ti-ping with the leadership of the Twelfth, Thirteenth, Eighteenth, and Fiftieth Divisions. But due to a revolt elsewhere, Lu Ti-ping was compelled to send the Twelfth and the Fiftieth Divisions to the scene of the revolt, and as the government forces guarded Hsing-ti with only the Eighteenth and the Thirteenth Divisions, the communist forces increased daily. At the close of 1929, when the troops against Yen and Fung had completed their first step, the Red army was already playing havoc in the southern hsien (counties).

Thus in 1930 the Government ordered the return of the Twelfth and the Fiftieth Divisions to Kiangsi Province and also dispatched the Seventeenth Division further to reinforce the forces in Kiangsi. The troops of the Nanking Government Army now totalled one hundred thousand and were placed under the command of Lu Ti-ping. The drive executed by this army subjugated Hsing-ti and the adjoining hsien, but the Eighteenth Division was completely annihilated and Chang Hui-tien taken prisoner by the Red forces, because it had proceeded far into hostile territory. The Fiftieth Division also suffered a terrible defeat and lost the majority of its forces.
That in 1930 commenced the second drive. The Government, which had learned that the cause of the failure of the first drive lay in the lack of cohesion in the command, finally appointed Ho Ying-chin, the Chief of the Military Department, as Commander-in-Chief of the campaign. In February Ho proceeded to Kiangsi Province, and in view of the fact that his predecessor had failed, due to the careless advancing of troops far into hostile territory, he restored order in the districts by the adoption of the "gradual" military policy of Tseng Kuo-fan. Then, reasoning the garrisons that the various hells had organized, he executed his plans with rapidity. In military affairs, too, certain progress was made, but in May the Canton Government was formed and, with the rise of antagonism and rivalry between the two governments, the strength of the Communist Army augmented. As a result the National forces under Sun Lien-chang, Hsing Ping-fan, Weng Chin-yu, and others were defeated in succession and fell on the battle-field. Thus ended the second drive.

Chiang Kai-shek from the end of June became Commander-in-Chief of the campaign against the Red Army. After mobilizing as many troops as possible he dispatched them to Kiangsi. This recruited army consisted of three hundred thousand soldiers, and the prospects of success were bright indeed for the third drive. On June 15 the Nineteent Route Army, which had been attacking from the south, penetrated into Hsingkao. Three days later Kian, which had been the base of the National Army for a long time, was recovered, and on June 22 Chiang Kai-shek personally directed the attack upon Hanchang. At first the campaign appeared to be in the favour of the National Army; but later the turn of affairs became rather disadvantageous to the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, so that directly before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident it became possible to forecast that the third drive would end as disastrously as the first one.

At the conference held on January 9, 1932, by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a statement was made to the following effect:
In the three drives against the Soviet Government and the Red Army, the Kuomintang militarists have been vanquished. The Red Army has defeated the Kuomintang Army which consisted of more than fifteen divisions. The Red Army has succeeded in procuring in the south of Kiangsi Province more than 20,000 rifles, 5,000,000 rifle shells, more than 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition...

There is ample reason for believing that some difference existed in the report of the Red Army and that of the Kuomintang, but at any rate there was no argument whatever to the fact that the third drive did not bring about any significant results. Especially convincing was this fact when, at the close of 1931, a mutiny occurred among the soldiers of the whole of Sun Li-eh-chung's Twenty-sixth Army of approximately twenty thousand, and completely nullified what little the drive had accomplished. This revolt also led to the capture of Fuchuan (Lin-chuan), the strategic spot of Fulien and Kiangsi, by the Communist Army.

Second Stage.

The second stage of the campaign marked the period when China encountered many disasters both politically and economically. In addition to the famines among the peasants, frequent floods, and poor crops, the storm of industrial depression swept the cities. Repeatedly, rumors of a financial crisis in the National Government were to be heard, and even among its leaders waverings could be discerned. During this period the army of the Communist Party, which used this social instability as the background of its activities, strengthened to a remarkable degree, and in at least one-sixth of China Soviet districts were formed. For this reason the Government under Chiang Kai-shek, after calling upon the entire financial capacity and ability of the Kuomintang, launched its desperate drive against the Communist Army. Chiang Kai-shek spent most of these days either at Nanchang or Hankow, for the National Government deemed it most urgent to combat the communist bandits, even though at this time China's relations with Japan were rather strained.
Early in the year 1932, when the smoke of battle had not yet cleared in Jehol, Chiang Kai-shek spoke to the following effect at Panchang, from the chair at the Anniversary Week of the "Enlargement of the Various Departments of the Provincial Branch of the Committee":

"On the outcome of this forthcoming drive against the bandits, depends the existence of the Nation. It also is the supreme test of whether or not our race can protect and consolidate itself. Responsibility for the fact that the Communist bandits are not yet wiped out of Kiangsi naturally rests with the Government and ourselves. This I venture to say is a disgrace to the people of Kiangsi. In order to exterminate the bandits we must first of all be thoroughly convinced that if we are to exist there shall be no bandits, and if the bandits are to exist, we shall cease to exist..."

From this speech a deduction may be made as to Chiang Kai-shek's decision at this stage of the campaign against the bandits.

Third Stage.

This third stage takes in the fourth and the fifth drives. The fourth commenced at the end of May 1932, and continued until the end of September. The fifth was executed in two stages, the first of which was begun early in 1933 and terminated at the close of the year, and the second occupied the whole of the year 1934. This fifth drive, in which well-prepared political and economic policies were executed, was divided into two stages, not only for military reasons or the magnitude of its scale, but because, as its slogans stated, it was three-tenths military and seven-tenths political.

At the end of May 1932, when military operations were brought to a close at Shanghai, preparations commenced for the fourth drive against the Communist Army. On June 5, Chiang Kai-shek summoned to Lushan Ho Ying-chin, Commander-in-Chief of the army against the bandits in the Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien districts, Hsia Tu-yin, Head of the Government of Hupeh Province, Ho Chung-han, Head of the Shuching Office in Hupeh, Hsiung Shih-huai, Head of the Government of Kiangsi Province, Ho Chien, Head of the Government of Hunan, Hu Min-chun, Commander of the Tenth Army, Chien To-chun, Commander of the Thirteenth Army, and Chan Cheng, Commander of the Eighteenth Army, to hold a conference for the extermination of the communist forces in the five provinces.
of Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, Kiangsi, and Anhwei. At this conference the following items were decided: (1) During the months of June and July the Finance Department shall appropriate 350 million yuan for the campaign; Kiangsi shall collect and pay 4 million yuan at the end of June; Hupeh, 3 million; Honan and Anhwei, each 2½ million, and Hunan, 2 million yuan, respectively. (2) The Communist army shall be concentrated before the end of June, and the general attack upon it shall begin on July 1. (3) The military commander of each province shall obey the orders of the Chairman of the Military Committee and report on the progress of the drives and on the conditions of the Communist army. (4) The plan of the campaign shall be as follows: (a) organize an army of volunteers against the Red forces; (b) unify the armed forces of the populace; (c) restore order in the territory of the bandits; (d) rehabilitate the rural communities; (e) relieve the refugees; (f) regulate the local governments; (g) encourage meritorious service of the native magistrates; and (h) construct roads in Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Fukien Provinces and thereby make two 'enveloping attacks' upon the communist forces.

The army that took the field in the next drive consisted of 51 divisions, 29 brigades, and 29 parties, and the number of soldiers exceeded 630,000. First of all the major attacks were directed at the Red forces which had their bases in the north of Kiangsi, Hupeh, Anhwei, and Hunan. But for the first three months (from June to September) the morale of the punitive forces was weak, and many of the National soldiers deserted their ranks and went over to the enemy. As a result the communist troops took the offensive, and it was reported that in the Kuechung-Changhsu Railway region and in Hunchang the National Army was often in grave danger.

Greatly agitated by the general trend of affairs, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to the effect that none were to retreat. Through the efforts of meritorious service of the native magistrates; and (h) construct roads in Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Fukien Provinces and thereby make two 'enveloping attacks' upon the communist forces.

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Greatly agitated by the general trend of affairs, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to the effect that none were to retreat. Through the efforts of the general, the attacks of the invading army gradually became fruitful at the beginning of September. By the middle of September, the Red troops were driven back as far as Hunghu, and towards the end of the month Kinkiachai in Anhwei came under the sway of the government forces.
To be sure, the fourth drive succeeded in checking the direct menace to the Soviet Government, but when considered from the point of view of the whole of China, no concrete results were brought about, thus necessitating the fifth drive.

The fifth drive was concentrated upon the attack on the district under the 'Central Soviet Government', but in ferocity and length the drive was unexcelled in this campaign. For reasons mentioned in a preceding paragraph, it was executed in two stages. In the first stage, forces were advanced from Nanchang, Pukian, and Canton. In Fukien T'ai-Ting-Wei took command of the 'Left Route' army, in Nanchang Chen Cheng assumed command of the 'Central Route' army, in Canton Yu Kan-mac was chosen to lead the 'Right Route' army, and Chiang Kai-shek personally gave orders as Commander-in-Chief of the expedition, with Chen Chi-tang assisting him as Vice-Commander.

For about one year before the Fukien Incident the National Army advanced foot by foot against the enemy after establishing a firm economic blockade. Day after day furious see-saw battles were exchanged, but, even according to the report of the National Army, the numerical ratio of the National and the Communist armies, which was six to three at the beginning of the year, became six to eight in favour of the Red Army. Furthermore, the National-Revolutionary Government was established at Fukien, and as a result of the reconciliation between it and the Chinese Soviet Government the battle lines of the punitive forces collapsed, together with its economic blockade.

The second stage of the drive began early in 1934. In this drive Chiang Kai-shek planned an enveloping attack from four directions. After appointing Lu Cho-tung, Chiang Ting-chen, Chen Chi-tong, and Ho Chien as commanders of the North, East, South, and West Route Armies, he himself gave orders to the forces from the head-quarters at Nanchang. To the North Route Army, which was assigned the most difficult task, the pick of the soldiers was allotted. Then, setting up an economic blockade and adopting the most cautious methods, Chiang Kai-shek gradually bore down upon the Red forces,
and finally in October the main forces of the Communist Army were compelled to withdraw towards the west. In forcing the Red Army to move, the national forces succeeded, but apart from this no other fruits were reaped from their strenuous efforts, for the Communist Army merely made long marches towards the north-west without any apparent loss in the strength of its troops. The escape of the Red Army from the projected enveloping attack of the National Army may be considered to be a military success on the part of the communist forces, but when viewed from a different angle, the fact that with thorough preparation the forces of Chiang Kai-shek executed the 'Szechwan plan' and prevented the Red Army from establishing its base in Szechwan is a success on the part of the National Army. But when considered from the present critical political situation in China, it was a decided failure, as far as the military strategy was concerned, for the government forces to have allowed the Communist Army to proceed northward.

Political and Economic Policy in the Campaign against the Communist Army.

'The reason for our not being able to exterminate the communist bandits does not lie in the fact that our forces are insufficient. It is due to the lack of moral force on our part.' These were the words with which Chiang Kai-shek began his address to the graduating class of the 'Short Term Military School' for the officers of the Government Army. To be sure, that which caused the unsatisfactory progress of the government forces under Chiang Kai-shek, even at the time when they out-numbered the Red troops tenfold, had its root in the fact that morally and politically the national forces were far inferior to the communist forces. The chief reason for the failure lay in the dissension within the army itself; the second reason was that the peasants were in favour of joining the Communist army, and thirdly, the Communist Army was, in spite of the scarcity of its troops, gradually able to wear the superior forces of the Government to exhaustion by the clever employment of guerrilla warfare, which can only be executed with the support of the peasants. As the campaign proceeded, the tactics of the punitive forces became more
prudent, and carefully prepared, political and military policies were adopted.

'Three-tenths military and seven-tenths political' was the slogan proposed by Chiang Kai-shek early in the campaign. Consequently, the plan of the national forces was to 'advance slowly and fight with the utmost care; construct roads and fortifications, establish an economic blockade and adopt various other political policies'. These tactics were extraordinarily effective.

(1) 'Advance slowly, Fight cautiously.' By this is meant the tactics which forbid the rapid pursuit of the enemy and the deep penetration into hostile territory. Upon capturing a certain point, efforts were made to consolidate it so as to frustrate all attempts of recovery by the enemy. Not until this consolidation was completed should an attack on another point be attempted.

For example, when a point was taken, a military railroad was to be constructed to that point and fortifications constructed against counter-attacks. The ultimate aim of the adoption of these tactics was to exterminate the communist forces by advancing step by step against them (not giving them an opportunity to increase in number) after the construction of roads and fortifications, and the establishment of an economic blockade. The superiority in the number of troops was to decide the outcome. This strategy may be said to form the fundamental basis for the various measures adopted later in the campaign.

(2) Construction of Roads and Blockhouses. Motor roads for military purposes were constructed in the wake of the advancing troops so as to open a means of rapid communication with the reinforcing troops in the rear and thereby enable effective use of the excellent arms they had in their possession. In Kiangsi Province the length of the completed roads exceeded one thousand six hundred kilometres in 1934, and if projected roads were to be considered, the total will reach four thousand kilometres.

In the campaigns that followed, the fortification consisting of chains of blockhouses played an enormous part in the success of the National Army. The construction of blockhouses is an effective measure in anti-communist operations. Constructed for the most part of bricks and rocks, these
Fortifications are usually erected on the summit of hills at such convenient distances from each other that the occupants of one can go to the assistance of another in case of necessity. As a rule, the height of the blockhouses is about thirty feet; they are usually three- or four-storied and have loopholes for the snipers. According to military experts, if one of these fortifications is guarded by ten soldiers, it can withstand an attack of five hundred foot soldiers. Against modern ones such fortifications are of no avail, but for the communist troops, which are comparatively poorly armed, these ramparts are objects of great inconvenience. They do not fall before the artillery and the storming guns of the Red Army, and, what is more, it is said that in the event of being captured by the Red Army they will easily be recovered by the national forces. Consequently, these fortifications were constructed either in chains or in small groups at strategic points. The aim in building them in chains was to envelop the sovietized districts and prevent the Red Army from crossing this line.

Chains of blockhouses to encircle the districts under the Soviet Government were constructed in concentric circles. In Kiangsi Province three enveloping lines of blockhouses were formed. In Yungchih Hsien, which had been until recently the base of the anti-communist forces, there are 329 of these ramparts. In Lianghsue Hsien, too, approximately 500 are to be found. According to He Chier, almost seven thousand of these blockhouses can be counted on the frontier of the Kwantung and Kiangsi provinces which penetrates from the south of Hupeh Province. Older statistics reveal that in Kiangsi alone three thousand could be found. The Red Army, which had practically never been defeated in scores of desperate battles, could not help but be defeated ignominiously when they marched into this chain of blockhouses. The defeat of the Feng Cheh-min Division, the only disastrous defeat recorded by the communist forces in Kiangsi, occurred when they entered this enveloping battle line of the Government Army by mistake.
(3) Economic Blockade. It was blockading the districts under the Soviet Government by employing chains of blockhouses and cutting their trade relations with non-communist localities, the government forces endeavoured to crush the Reds by completely stopping the entry of supplies of salt, ammunition, and other necessities of the army into the Red area. This is the economic blockade which Chiang Kai-shek applied in his campaign. It enabled the government forces to strike a decisive blow at the communist-bandit forces which have their base in the mountains, and endangered the economic life of the sovietized areas. The regulations and the rules concerning this economic blockade were prepared to the minutest detail. On March 4, 1934, the 'Regulations for the Economic Blockade of the Communist Bandits' were issued, followed by the regulations for the 'Purchase of Salt', and the 'Systematic Discrimination of the Sovietized Areas'. Of these three sets of regulations, the final was prepared most minutely.

First of all, the whole area was classified into the 'safe', the 'non-bandit infested', the 'adjoining', and the 'bandit infested' zones. In the 'adjoining' and the 'non-bandit infested' zones a rigid economic blockade was to be established; blockhouses were to be constructed and a supervision office for the anti-bandit Economic Blockade founded in each walled town in the hills. Sub-supervision offices were to be established at the strategic points in the transportation areas. The chiefs of these offices were appointed either by the government of the province or the masters of the boroughs, and were directly responsible to the administrative commissioner. The responsibility of the enforcement of the blockade rested with the highest officer in the army stationed in the particular locality, and the officials of the local government were to execute under the highest officer. In this way transportation, trade, and purchase of goods were strictly regulated.

Generally speaking, all except those who have special duties are strictly forbidden from entering or leaving the 'bandit zone', and passports are required for those who come from or go into the 'adjoining' and the
'semi-bandit' communities. Furthermore, an office for the examination of mail is established in a 'semi-bandit' infested community.

Transport in 'semi-bandit' and 'adjoining' regions is strictly regulated; all articles of military use must be accompanied by a certificate of the highest military officer; articles of daily necessity must be accompanied by a certificate either of the 'Public Law Commission' or the 'Committee of Public Sales'. In case there was no appropriate warehouse for articles of military purpose, the storing of surplus articles was not permitted. Furthermore, the purchase of goods was strictly controlled, the purchase of commodities by each individual being made through the chief of police or the 'Committee of Public Purchases'. In this way free trade was prohibited, and as a result no surplus permitted for the people. Particularly in the case of such an important commodity as table salt, its sale has been monopolized (Regulation for the Transaction of Table Salt) and each individual allowed to procure three cash worth for daily use (children one and a half cash). The 'Public Store' sells the salt in accordance with the 'Salt Sale Law', and the sale is therefore strictly controlled.

The sovietized area in Kiangsi suffered as a result of this firm blockade, and a great shortage occurred in the commodities of daily necessity. According to the Kiangnun Bulletin:

'The import of the commodities of the people, be it oil, salt, or cloth, is almost prohibitive, due to the rigid enforcement of the economic blockade by the East and the South Route Armies. The result is that the price of salt has soared to even three yuan per catty. Even so, all would be well if it were procurable, but as it stands it is sold in very few places. The people of this district have spent years almost without tasting salt.'

(4) Political Policy and Centralization. By the political policy is meant chiefly the rehabilitation of the land, rationalization of the rural communities, establishment of a system for the preservation of peace, and the

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1/ One cash is one-thousandth of a yuan or standard dollar.
special educational campaign among the people, so as to re-establish order and normal conditions in the sovietized areas and its adjacent districts, relieve distress, and re-establish normal conditions in the rural communities. This was employed in counteraction to the 'Land' and the 'Economic' policies of the Soviet Government.

The measure which played an important part in the campaign against the Red Army was the unification of the administrative organs. In order to make the punitive forces act in a compact body and at the same time execute the economic blockade, a national political unification became vitally necessary. In attaining this centralization many endeavors were made both politically and financially, but one of the direct results of these was the amelioration in the system of the preservation of peace in the various provincial governments and the provincial commissions. In August 1932, on the occasion of the fourth drive, the system of provincial commissions was established by Chiang Kai-shek in the three provinces of Honan, Hupeh, and Anhwei. Each province was divided into a few districts, and Bureaux of administrative commissions were established which not only reorganized official discipline, but also became the pivot in the policy of the campaign against the Red bandits. A commissioner was directly appointed by the Chairman of the Military Committee (Chiang Kai-shek) and held additional posts of the magistrate of the region or the chief of the area in which he was stationed, and the Chief of the Bureau of the Preservation of Peace to administer the military and civil affairs. In this way Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in regulating local administration in consolidating the centralization and in maintaining the economic blockade which tended to break down under the poor collaboration among the warlords.

The system of the Preservation of Peace, which had been in a state of chaos in the various localities, was now reformed and unified. The Peace Preservation Commissions were further unified by the Administrative Committee, and in June 1934 a Peace Preservation Conference by the eight provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien was held...
at the Nanchang head-quarters. In this way unification was realized among the eight provinces. This unification was to play an important role in making the locals come more and more under the influence of Chiang Kai-shek.

(5) Support of the Powers. The fact that Chiang Kai-shek was able to secure the aid of foreign powers was decidedly an important reason for facilitating the campaign. A deputy of the League of Nations guided the National Economic Council and planned the 'read policy', and, what was more, many military advisers and airmen were invited from Italy and Germany. It is said that during the five months between November 1933 and March 1934, nearly eighty aeroplanes were sold to China by the foreign powers; of these France sold eleven, Britain five, and America over fifty (according to the report of the Japanese Government in June 1934).

(6) Results of the Various Policies Adopted. What were the results of the policies executed with so much care? In spite of careful preparations the chains of blockhouses and the economic blockade were on the verge of failure due to the disputes among the warlords, the rising of the peasant soldiers in the various districts, and the penetration of the blockade by the communist forces. Finally, at the end of 1934, the communist forces broke through the economic blockade and moved in great numbers towards Szechwan. The reason for the comparatively easy movement of the Red forces lay in the non-co-operation among the various warlords and the support rendered to the communist troops by the local peasant forces. This is clear from the fact that the Red Army made its movements by following the frontiers of the provinces. It may have been a success on the part of the government forces to have compelled the communist bandits to abandon their base in Kiangsi, but the very fact that they were unable to crush the enemy troops by trapping them may be interpreted as a great failure for the forces of the Nanking Government.

Even in the political policy for the peasants many measures proved unreasonable. The construction of roads and blockhouses was accomplished through the adoption of the curve system; the peasants who were unable to offer
labour were forced to pay taxes with per day. For example, of the 329 fortifications constructed in Yushan Heihe only 15 blockhouses were built by the army. Besides the remaining 299 blockhouses 15 trenches were built by the peasants.

The application of the economic blockade, too, often lacked smoothness. This naturally caused an unreasonable rise in the price of commodities and provoked the oppressed peasants, who were greatly inconvenienced by the return of the landlords after the restoration of land to the former owners.

Contradictions began to arise in the political policy itself, and in the districts where normal conditions had been temporarily restored peace and order could no longer be maintained. Conditions are such that everywhere in the province of Kiangsi travelling into the remote regions is strictly prohibited. This situation is due to the fact that the life of the peasants is not stabilized, and that the agrarian policy of the Karching Government is in striking contrast to that of the Soviet Government.

PRESENT SITUATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S ANTI-IMPERIALISM MOVEMENT

At the Sixth Conference of the Chinese Communist Party, which was held at Moscow in July 1928, the two great tasks of the party were decided upon: (1) Drive out the Imperialists from China and complete a real unification of China. (2) By the democratic system abolish the private ownership of land by the landholding class and execute a 'land revolution' so that the peasants may shatter the semi-feudalistic bonds in the existing land system.

Thus, the anti-imperialist movement is not the only fundamental aim of the Chinese Communist Party. The combination of these two policies has varied greatly during the changing times that followed. During the revolution of 1925-7 the anti-imperialism movement advanced before the other; later the two were again brought together by the Land Revolution; and in the stages of the so-called 'Soviet Revolution' the two were united in the Soviet Government.
When the movement of the Chinese Communist Party entered the stage of the so-called 'Soviet Revolution', the anti-imperialism movement became vitally connected with the struggle of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army against the Kuomintang Government. The strife intensified, and in sequence to various material developments many changes were brought about in the two policies of the Chinese Communist Party. This development became manifest particularly after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, and finally in 1935 it culminated in the epochal formation of the so-called 'New Strategy'. The outstanding events which ensued were: (1) the transmission of the telegram for the 'Declaration of War Against Japan'; (2) the transmission of the telegram relative to the 'Agreement for Joint Strategy Against Japan', and (3) the 'Formation of the Northern Army against Japan'.

Taking advantage of the anti-foreign atmosphere created by the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents which followed, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Soviet Government combined together the drives for anti-imperialism and the defence against the government forces. The aim of the Chinese Communist Party in executing this action was to utilize the anti-foreign atmosphere created throughout China as its weapon against the fifth drive of the Kuomintang.

In January 1933, just before the large-scale fifth drive of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Soviet Government telegraphed the 'Joint Manifesto for the Resistance against Japan'. This action was repeated in April, and the substance of the manifesto was as follows:

'Under the following conditions the Red Army of China will enter into an agreement on the plan of campaign with any armed forces and prepare to confront the aggression of Japanese Imperialism. (1) Immediately cease the attacks upon the Soviet Areas. (2) Protect the democratic rights of the people (liberty of meeting, union, speech, publication, and demonstration on the release of those imprisoned on political offences. (3) Arm the people, form armed bodies of volunteers and thereby defend China, preserve its independence and territorial integrity and strive for the unification of China.'
In this way the Chinese Communist Party endeavoured to confront the fifth drive of the Kuomintang by forming an alliance with any armed forces regardless of whether they might be those of warlords. That reinforced this measure was the establishment of the 'People's Revolutionary Government' in Puchen. As a result of this, the fifth drive of the Nanking Government had to be abandoned for some time.

On July 15, 1934, when the fifth drive was in its second stage, the Chinese Communist Army issued the 'Manifesto for the Northward March of the Red Army of Workers and Peasants', and after organizing a vanguard army for the anti-Japanese campaign to the north dispatched it with all possible speed. Simultaneously with this move, anti-foreign demonstrations called the 'People's Armed Self-Defence Movement' were originated in Shanghai and in the other leading cities proposing the 'Fundamental Policy for the Chinese People's anti-Japanese Military Operations'. In answer to the call of the Communist Army in its anti-imperialism movement, extensive activities were begun in the various localities. These were the anti-imperialism activities of the Red Army during its stay in Kiangsi. The noteworthy characteristic of these movements is that the main activity of the Red Army at this time was to fight off the campaign of the Nanking Government; in reality the anti-Japanese movement was of secondary importance. Directly after dispatching the army for the Northern Campaign against the Japanese, Chu Teh, the leader of the Red Army, during the course of his speech which stressed the urgency of repulsing the government forces, said:

'The Red Army consists of peasants and workmen is the only armed force to deliver China from the outrage of Japanese Imperialism. For this reason, our second task is to carry on direct military operations against Japan.'

But in the so-called 'New Strategy', which was made public in August 1935, the mutual relation has been completely changed.
Present Position of the Anti-Imperialist Movement.

What is the "New Strategy"?

Briefly it is the method by which the Chinese Communist Party is trying to solve its problems through turning the upper-head of the anti-foreign movement towards Japan. Primarily, this measure is directed against Japan; secondly, the policy towards the Kuomintang will be decided therefrom. This is the change of policy of the Communist Party based on the resolutions passed at the seventh congress of the Comintern. The new policy was made public on August 1, under the names of the People's Commissariat of the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The difference between this policy and the others is that all parties are to join and form a united front, for which purpose a proposal was made for the organization of a National Defence Government and the formation of a Confederate Army against Japan. Consequently, the party which formerly advocated the overthrow of the Kuomintang is now opposed to the dissolution by a foreign Power of the Kuomintang and the 'Blue Shirts' Organization' in North China. In this way the Communist Party is endeavouring to win the warlords and the financiers in one division of the Kuomintang over to the National Defence Government. This may be interpreted as a great change indeed.

Did this change lead to the abandonment of the initial political policy of the party? The answer is in the negative -- the Chinese Communist Party adhered to its fundamental political policy; the change merely indicates the development of the policy. Simultaneously with the change in its policy, the Chinese Communist Party has made partial modifications in the domain of the agrarian and the economic policies. That is to say, certain parts of the various conditions of the land reforms have been moderated. The reason for this is that for the Chinese Communist Party the struggle for the formation of the united front in the anti-imperialist movement is now all important. The party is thoroughly convinced that as long as it follows this line the other problems will either be solved of their own accord or else be easily realized. Wang Min
(Chen Shae-yu), who was one of the central figures of the Chinese Communist Party attending the seventh congress of the Comintern, made a statement to the

"It is necessary to believe firmly that under such conditions as exist in China at the present day, where there exists a Soviet regime in one part of its territory, the adoption of the tactics for the formation of the anti-imperialistic people's united front by no means weakens but rather consolidates the strength of the position of the Communist Party in its struggle for the future victory of the Soviet Revolution and the consolidation of the proletarian hegemony."

Again, in connexion with the Soviet Government and the National Defence Government whose task it is to form a united front against imperialism, Teng F'ing has stated:

"The policy of the National Defence Government is not only coincident with the duties of the Soviet Government. For this reason the Soviet Government can and must set an example to the followers of the National Defence Government. But the Soviet Government has for its chief task the complete racial and social liberation of the Chinese, thus it will not be able to restrict its activity merely within the frame of the policy of the National Defence Government. For instance, in order to let the Agrarian Revolution develop, the Soviet Government will, as part of the constitution of the Agrarian Revolution and as its starting point, execute the National Defence Government's policy, by confiscating the land of traitors to the country and endeavour to distribute it to the people. At the same time the Soviet Government will abolish the feudal system of land possession and strive for the realization of the fundamental aim of the Communist Party."

Thus, simultaneously with its protection of the Communist Party's right to guide, the "New Strategy" is making it possible for the Chinese Communist Party to win over the people gradually in its plan for the realization of the anti-imperialism movement and the land revolution.

The essential point of the "New Strategy" is that the full force of the Chinese Communist Party against the so-called 'international imperialism' is

1/ Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and the Tactics of the Communist Party.
directed towards Japan. This situation is similar to that in 1925, when the spearhead of anti-imperialism was pointed at Britain. In the tactics of the Communist Party, the struggle which the Chinese Communist Party terms 'Resist Japan' is no different from the general anti-imperialist movement of the students, inhabitants of the cities, and the labourers. Secondly, there is the recent manifestation of the anti-Japanese movement created by agitators in the Kuomintang and a part of the capitalists and financiers; and thirdly, there is the failure of the Government army to extirpate the Reds in Kiangsi, thus permitting the main forces of the Red Army to proceed northward to Szechwan without suffering much loss. Having occupied a vast territory where no economic blockade and no chains of blockhouses exist, the Red Army, which moved towards the north, is now in a position to engage in any sort of warfare and take part in any revolutionary movement. This is indeed a great blow to the Nanking Government.

The Chinese Communist Party is now forming a united front under such favourable circumstances; how is the Nanking Government going to control this movement?

Student Movements. Since the close of 1935, even Chiang Kai-shek’s instructions to the representatives of the schools have not been successful in preventing the development of student movements throughout China. In Peiping on December 9, 1935, the students of Tsinghau and Yenching Universities, who were enraged by the resolution passed against self-government by the presidents of the universities in Peiping on December 8, visited Sung Chih-yun at Yansheen and held a demonstration. Upon attempting to enter the city they were stopped by the police at one of the west gates. Within the city, six thousand secondary school and university students rose and finally overcame the patrols after much bloodshed and disorder. Then on December 16, eight thousand students, with those of the National Normal University acting as the pivot, commenced a demonstration after meeting in secrecy. From this movement was formed the Federation of the Students of Peiping consisting of representatives from more than thirty schools. The federation has mobilized the students and is doing its utmost to create an anti-Japanese atmosphere.
In addition, a student movement was formed, and in Shanghai students rose in co-operation with their fellows in North China. On December 19, the students of Peking University presented a petition to the Municipal Government. Furthermore, on December 22, with the students of Peking University in the central position, the "Preliminary Petition for the Entrance of Students to Peking" converted the West Station into the base of their activities. In sympathy with these, approximately two thousand students held a "sympathy demonstration" on the 24th. In Beijing (Hunan), also, fourteen thousand students from thirty-eight schools, under the pretext of proceeding to Peking to present a petition, held up the traffic by occupying the station and the passenger trains. Canton, too, was the scene of a student demonstration. On January 3 of the present year, the students attacked the police and incurred ten casualties. On March 21, in order to form a unification of the student movements throughout China, the "Preliminary Group for the Students' Federation for National Salvation" was formed, and a two-day struggle which followed produced ten casualties. With the nationwide union of the students, the Student Movement is spreading over the country like wildfire, as if mocking at the powerlessness of the Peking Government; needless to say, the Chinese Communist Party is its guiding influence.

National Salvation Societies. "Panned either directly or indirectly by the Chinese Communist Party, anti-imperialism associations have begun to be formed in all parts of China in co-operation with this student movement. Particularly active among these is the National Cultural Salvation Association in Shanghai, which occupies the position of the highest guiding core of the National Salvation Associations. The formation of this society was in co-operation with the student movement in Peking. It began with the issuance on December 22, 1935, of the so-called "Manifesto of National Salvation", which bore the signatures of more than two hundred and fifty intellectuals of Shanghai, including Communists, Socialists, Nationalists, and members of the Kuomintang. But these personalities were all utilized to advantage by the Chinese Communist Party. This fact was revealed by the "Statement to the
Furthermore, there exist the following in Shanghai: the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Union, the National Salvation Union of the Trade Unions of Shanghai, the Shanghai Workers' National Salvation Union, the National Salvation Association of Primary School Teachers of Shanghai, the Shanghai Motion Picture Artists' National Salvation Association, the Shanghai Newspapermen's National Salvation Association, the Shanghai Young Artists' National Salvation Association, and others. With these various associations, the aforementioned Shanghai Students' National Salvation Federation has joined to form the Shanghai National Salvation Federation of all classes of people.

Union of the Chinese Peasants' Revolution. The participation of some of the wealthy people may be observed in the National Cultural Salvation Association. Furthermore, in answer to the call of the Chinese Communist Party for cooperation in national defence, some of the military people, especially the 'anti-Chiang' group, are now endeavouring to form a united front with the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Ming-shu and Li Chi-shen, the chief leaders of the Fukien Independence Movement, and Tsai Ting-kai, Chu Shou-nien, Chao Chuan, and Chiang Kun-nai, the dauntless generals of the Nineteenth Route Army, had either taken shelter in foreign countries or had made their abodes in Hongkong, Kwantung, and Kwangsi, where they continued their 'anti-Chiang' work. On the occasion of the fifth congress of the Kuomintang, which was held in November 1935, they telegraphed Tsou Lu, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Yen Hsi-shan, who were at that time in Nanking, and demanded: (1) that the Kuomintang abandon its arbitrary one-party rule, (2) the release of all those imprisoned for political offences, (3) the enforcement of the freedom of democracy, and (4) the establishment of a special organ to supervise the finances and national defence programme of the Government.

More recently, with the Shanghai Federation as a pivot, the All China National Salvation Federation has been organized.
However, they later followed the proposal of the Chinese Communist Party and formed the "Union of the Chinese National Revolution". With the publication of its journal, the Journal of National Salvation, the union is doing its utmost in persuading the Hu Han-min Party and the Kwangsi Party to join in forming a "united front". Thus, even influential men in the Kuomintang are now accepting to the proposal of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Communist Army in the North and the Campaign against it. The activities of the Communist Army which was dispatched to the north-western regions form a fundamental part of the 'New Strategy' of the party. By about June 1936 the main force of the Red Army was gradually moving northward. The movements of the Red army in the north are to play an important role in the formation of the united front against imperialism. With Szechuan, Hoikang, Kansu, and Shensi as the bases of their activities, the Red forces have raided Shansi and Shansi and are striving to form a united front by establishing communication with the peasant forces and the defence troops of the rural communities which are scattered in the various regions.

Against these Red forces the anti-communist forces in Shansi are at a loss as to when to strike a decisive blow. Among the national troops there are many who desert their ranks to join the Communist Party in opposition to the North China Autonomy Movement.

In the face of these obstacles the anti-communist drive has shown exceedingly poor results, the poorest in the history of the anti-bandit campaign. It was said that the government forces succeeded in preventing the Red troops from entering Szechuan by the execution of Chiang Kai-shek's plan, but later developments proved that they did enter Szechuan. In September 1935 Chiang Kai-shek personally assumed command of the campaign against the Red bandits in the north-west and appointed Chiang Hsueh-liang as Vice-Commander-in-Chief. Then when the former North-east army and the forces under Yu Hau-chung entered Shensi and Kansu the Red Army increased from nine divisions to eleven. The campaign was extremely unsuccessful. In the middle of September 1935 the 110th Division was completely defeated in the vicinity of
Yenan, and the two brigades of the army of Yang Hu-cheng which were stationed
in the two parties of each of the divisions under Feng Chin-tesai and Kao Kun-tze were disarmed. In December Ching Yo-hsiu, the Commander of the
26th Division, committed suicide, and the Commander of the 130th Division died
during the battle when his forces were suddenly attacked. Furthermore, one
brigade of the army under Yu Hau-cheng deserted to join the Red forces with­
out fighting. This drive has been a decided failure for the national anti-
Kuomintang forces, and the reputation of the Government has suffered considerably.

In addition to these developments in the north-west, there is the
growth of the 'Federated Anti-Japanese Army of the North-eastern Volunteers'.
The so-called 'North-eastern People's Revolutionary Army under the direction
of the Chinese Communist Party' has changed its name and affiliated itself to
this Federated Army of Volunteers. The Chinese Communists in Manchoukuo are
inferior both in number and power to those in China, but nevertheless they form
a great obstacle to the growth of Manchoukuo.

The anti-Japanese movement under the 'new strategy' of the Chinese
Communist Party is being steadily continued. As has been mentioned previously,
the present anti-Japanese movement is not only the concentrated expression of
the anti-imperialism movement, but also part of the drive against the Kuomintang
and it must be admitted that the situation brought about by such a state of
affairs is extremely grave.

In view of its ignominious failure to check the Red forces, Japan pro­
posed to the Nanjing Government a co-operative plan for defence against the
smuggling of the north-west, and emphasized the vital fact that if swift
measures were not executed it would be extremely difficult for the inhabitants
of North China to be guaranteed safety. In truth, Japan's proposal was not
merely for the sake of protecting the boundary of Manchoukuo and the safety of
Yunnan, and the two brigades of the army of Yang Ku-cheng which were stationed in Szechwan and Yunnan were disarmed. In December Ching Yo-hsiu, the Commander of the 26th Division, committed suicide, and the Commander of the 180th Division died on the battle-field when his forces were suddenly attacked. Furthermore, one brigade of the army under Yu Hsiuch-ching deserted to join the Red forces without fighting. This drive has been a decided failure for the national anti-British forces, and the reputation of the Government has suffered considerably.

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its people, but also for the preservation of the security of the eighty million inhabitants of North China. For the prevention of the sovietization of the north-west, the subjugation of the Red Army is essential from the military point of view, while, as a political measure, a policy for the rehabilitation of the rural communities is a vital necessity.
Errata Sheet

Of the two documents in English already distributed as Def. Doc. No. 1161, the one which consists of 42 pages will be used. The parts of the above document to be offered to the Tribunal are as follows:

English.
Page 18, 1st paragraph.
Page 32, 4th paragraph.
From page 34, 2nd paragraph to page 40, 1st paragraph.
瑞金には行政各官署のほか、紅軍大学あり、レーニン大学あり、營て人

□二萬弱の縣城瑞金が、十萬万の都市に膨脹したと言ふ。勿論これは宣

傳的意味を多分に有つに誇大なる數字ではあらうが、尚所當時に於けるソ

ヴェート政権の一班を語るものである。

紅軍の山地進攻の意図が部隊に在るやに続いては、その當時全く不可

解で、物質の散発を行って軍糧の補充を行ふとた、山国にソヴェート系

域を組織して総頃・外蒙へ出る新コメンテルン・ルート（國際路線）の準備工作を行ふとたの諸説が唱へられた。紅軍が陝西省にあつて中央

軍の討伐部隊との接觸を避け、進んで山西へ出てゐのは、陝西省を遊撃

北区ならしめやうとする攻勢防禦に戰術の現れで、その目標は粛ら軍

種の補給にあり、従つて主力部隊が動かなかつたを見るのは至當な観測
下に於いては、反帝邦主義的人民戦線の軍備の正しい適用は、ソヴェー

t革命の向後の勝利のため、プロレタリアートのヘーゲミー強化のため

の際事における共産党的地位を認めず、却つて強めでないと、こ

とを強く確信する必要がある。ソヴェー

ンド政府はこの従部の頑強の規範のために戦ひつつあり、且つ戦はね

ならぬ。故にソヴェー

ンド政府はその統治下にあらる凡ある地域において

この軍領を實施し得るに、且つ要部を戦せねばならぬ。ソヴェー

ンド政府は

それによって国防政府の躍進者に戦を示さねばならぬ。しかし支那全

邦の完全なる民族的革命的解放をはかる任務とするソヴェー

ンド政府は、そ
平では、翌年三月二日の中華民国政府は、日本軍の占領を

平には、同日十二月八日の北平学生抗議行動の

現実をあらためて認識し、北平市に在住する北平学

者など、抗議行動を実行した。この抗議行動は、北平

中華民国政府の声明を受け入れたが、この声明は、北平

市の学生を動員し、反日を促進する

（9）
政府の無力を顕著に示すものとなり、これに乗じて、この事件は全国的蜂起と共に、南亜、東亜、台湾を含め、東アジアの戦局が拡大してゆく。これに対し、日本政府は対応を模索しながら、中国共産党の直接的攻撃は間接的援助もしくは中立的態度である。この事件の影響は、後に中国革命の発展に大きな影響を与え、日本軍の占領下での中国の抵抗運動が活発化することをもたらす。
这页内容包含中文字符，但无法准确识别其意义。内容看起来像是一个复杂的文本，可能涉及科学或技术领域。
この戦争の経過を説明するたびに、我々はその結果をどのように考えればよいか、非常に困難な状況に置かれる。両国が互いに攻撃を続けて、現在の状況では戦争が永続するかもしれません。 }

(27)
Trade negotiations between the United States and Japan have thus far been confined to the control of individual items imported from Japan. As Japanese have pointed out, only a very small proportion of the total Japanese imports to the United States offer substantial competition to American manufacturers, and the articles which have become subjects of negotiation and agreement are chiefly sundries such as cotton rugs, pencils, matches, potteries, tuna fish, etc. Despite their relatively small absolute value, the rapid increase in these import items has been accorded wide and unfavourable publicity by American business interests which felt themselves subject to unfair competition. The adjustments made by the two countries have involved not only increased protective tariffs by the United States, but also the development of a system of voluntary export control by Japan. Examples of the various forms of trade control adopted by Japan, either through agreement with the United States or voluntarily, are described in a Japanese data paper as follows:
The United States Tariff Commission reported to the Government that they considered it necessary to levy a further duty of considerably higher rate on the Japanese pencils imported into the United States. The Japanese Government, however, requested that the proposed tariff increase should not be effected as they would undertake to restrict the quantity of pencils to be exported to the United States on their own responsibility. Their negotiation was successful. 1 April 1934, an unofficial gentlemen's agreement was reached by the two Governments under which Japan contracted to limit exports of pencils to America within 125,000 gross per year, 25,000 gross per month, and 4,166 gross per three months. The agreement went into force on May 1, 1934. The following is an outline of the control scheme of pencil-export and production practised in Japan.

Control of pencil-production: (a) The Japan Federation of Manufacturers' Associations of Pencils for Exportation has the power, under governmental supervision, to fix a maximum quantity of production of pencils for exportation to the United States. (b) A control-certificate issued by the Federation shall be attached to every package of pencils manufactured by members of the associations for exportation to the United States. (c) Members of the associations shall not sell pencils for exportation to the United States without the above certificate. (d) Members of the associations shall limit the sales of pencils for exportation to the United States exclusively to members of the Exporters' Association of Pencils for the United States.

Control of pencil-export: (a) The Exporters' Association of Pencils for the U.S. shall be established to which every exporter of pencils for the United States shall belong. (b) As regards the pencils which are shipped to the United States, a control-certificate issued by the Japanese Federation of Manufacturers' Associations of Pencils for Exportation shall be attached to every package of such pencils; no pencils without such certificate shall be exported to the United States. (c) As regards the pencils exported after April 1, 1934, a written expert-approval by the said Federation, together with invoice and export declaration, shall be presented to the Customs Office. (d) After April 1, 1934, definite quota for the exportation to the United States shall be agreed upon among members of the Exporters' Association. Japan proposed some alterations, but the agreement was renewed from May 1, 1935, without any important alterations, as Japan's proposal was not presented sufficiently in advance to allow thorough discussions.
Cotton piece-goods.

As imports of Japanese cotton piece-goods gave rise to a widespread outcry against Japanese competition by cotton manufacturers in the United States, both Japanese importers in New York and the manufacturers and exporters in Japan agreed that something must be done to remedy the situation. Accordingly, in April 1935, an Exporters' Association of Cotton Tissues for the United States was organized with a view to undertaking a voluntary control of the export quantity and price. On the part of the United States, the Cabinet Committee on Cotton Textiles drafted a report after four months' study, and the President introduced this report before the Congress in August 1935. One of the recommendations put forward therein was an attempt to adjust the trade relations between the two countries without resorting to a tariff action. In due course, the American Government proposed a scheme to limit imports of Japanese cotton piece-goods. But, as a result of governmental negotiations, it has been agreed that the manufacturers in Japan should undertake to control the exportation of the goods on a voluntary basis. It seems that the manufacturers in the United States, too, are satisfied with this arrangement, expecting to see an agreement on concrete figures be reached in due course.

Canned and frozen tuna fish.

In January 1936, the American Government raised the duty on canned tuna fish to 50 per cent. ad valorem and further threatened to prohibit its importation altogether. In order to meet the situation, a voluntary quota-plan was attempted in Japan and, at the same time, the representatives of both the canned and frozen tuna fish industrialists were sent to the United States with a view to working out a compromise with the American interests. They met the Californian canning industrialists at San Pedro on March 6 and after. At first the American representatives proposed 7,000 tons and 3,000 tons as import quotas of canned and frozen tuna fish respectively, but, as opinion within the Japanese delegation itself was divided, later they proposed another set of figures: canned fish, 5,000 tons, and frozen fish, 5,000 tons, with the same total of
10,000 tons. Replying to this proposal, the Japanese side asked for 6,500 tons (325,000 boxes) and 3,500 tons (250,000 boxes) for canned and frozen fish respectively, and also proposed that this arrangement should be continued for two years. But as soon as the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act was put into effect on June 12, the American attitude became noticeably uncompromising, and at the meeting of the delegates held on the same day, American rejected the Japanese proposal. Since this breakdown of the negotiation, the atmosphere in the United States has become more unfavourable than ever; but Japan is keeping up the efforts to appease the American feeling by restricting the exports.

Potteries.

'At a public hearing held by the Tariff Commission, the American manufacturers of potteries demanded that import quotas should be applied, on the basis of about one half of the imports in 1933 to those items of Japanese potteries which were competing with theirs. The Japanese Government pointed out, however, that since November 1933, a voluntary export-control had been effected by the Japan Federation of Exporters' Associations of Potteries. After a series of negotiations, the American Government conceded and handed an unofficial memorandum, stating that they would not resort to a tariff-increase or quota regulations, but would inform the Japanese Government of such steps beforehand, should it be found necessary to adopt such in the future.

Furthering the export-control, the Japan Federation of Exporters' Associations of Potteries in November 1935 put into force a regulation for the minimum export price of soup-plates for exportation to the United States, and also provided for a regulation for export-control of certain specific plates for the use of hotels and restaurants in that country.

Matches.

'On the one hand, the United States Tariff Commission decided provisionally to increase the duty on Japanese matches by 20 per cent, and, on the other, the American manufacturers intimated that this proposed tariff action
would be avoided, if Japan was willing to limit matches exports within 40,000 tons a year and also to raise their price to such a level as would not unduly depress the market price in the United States. The Japanese manufacturers counter-proposed to fix the export-quota at 60,000 tons or 3,000,000 gross per year, on the basis of Japan's exports in the year 1933. In the meantime, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in view of the decidedly unfavourable atmosphere among the American manufacturers against Japanese matches, promoted the organization of an Exporters' Association of Matches for the United States in January 1934, and this organization began to control both the quantity and the price of the exports from July onward. Finding, however, that the Association had little power against outsiders the Ministry on August 7, 1934, ordered that every exporter of matches to America, irrespective of whether he was a member of the Association or not, should, under the provision of Article 8 of the Exporters' Association Law, be bound after August 10 by the regulation of the Association as regards the general export rule, export quantity, export price, and export agency. Further, as it was considered necessary to arrange for an agreement with countries like Sweden and the U.S.S.R. which are main suppliers of matches to the United States, Japan sponsored a Japan-Sweden-U.S.S.R. tripartite parley in New York in November 1934. The three countries agreed on a quantity- and price-control. However, America has not shown any signs of lowering the high protective tariff on matches.  

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Excort, pages 29-32
日本側が発表した資料は、日本商品に特化したアメリカの貿易逆差を説明するためのものであり、日本商品は合水産に導入される日本商品の会社からして見ると、日本の輸出許可は不適切であるとしている。なお、日本政府は合水産の輸入を見過ごしているとして、日本政府を批判している。
一九三四年四月一日以後は合併両個組合間の発足発行においては後に述べる一所見の通りであるが、前記の組織の減増はらないで了るためにより若干の時期を経てから調整に協定したという。

この協定の実施に当っては合併両個組織者から本所の場合、発行約一個月前に日経新聞に於て報告することを発表し、その発行される日経新聞に於て組織発表を依頼し、これに次の略案を作成して御起念下さした。
は局を訴え、の間関係は関係急をより、その間関係を方法を通じてお
行われつつあったが、日本政府から交渉団を派遣して、日本の
ようなある形かゆくて合衆国政府から、日本政府による、合衆国
の態度を示すことを特異に緊急に於て取ることが、合衆国政府
に於いてある。
一九三九年の三月にアメリカ政府は、日本政府に意見を伝えた。その理由は、三月の未明に日本が満州に進攻したためであった。こうした事態は、アメリカ政府が日本政府に警告を行ったきっかけであった。
デュオウニル (1)

一九三六年

日本評論

日独外交の最近の変容

百八頁－百十頁

二十九頁－三十二頁

代理店関する協議調約によって、何処を示し、他を警告した。常に合

田要次郎

派

#1
特例が選出される地域を占領する場合の民衆を統合して監視を開始し、ソビエト政府を組織して、土地の分配を行う。而し、実際は、上等の土地は紅軍に残り、下等の土地は戦時政府の公田として分配される。故にソビエト政府の公田など、これを貧困者をして耕作せしめるが、従来の政府を運行する際には、断じしたカリクリがあると、考慮に入れねばならぬ。

土地の分配が行けると、二十歳から三十歳以下の青年は、十八歳から十四歳以下の青年は（パイオニアー）少年団を手柄けしめたり、或は公田代耕を助けせしめたり。前者は、戦時政府が賦税を減免しながら、後者は、戦時政府が賦税の補充部作を課せざるを助ける。
中日の非戦議第六回大会（一九二八年七月、モスクワ）に於て、衆の中心的
任務を一概同主主義を問途し、支部の権正の統一を完成するに於て、民主
的方式によって地方階級の土地私有制度を廃止し土地革命を貫きし、支
部の農民の為も土地制度の一切の封建的束縛を粉碎せるところに
の中心任務に決定している。
第五次討伐第二期については、中華総統は一九三五年七月十五日何を以つて一戦東北連紅軍北上宣言を発布し北上抗日先姦を組織し以至の速度で一民族武裝自衛運動をと称する排外運動が生じ、これが一九三五年八月に到る直後、中華総統の首領黎玉は政府軍を戦争される戦争を呼べる,</p>
ではその「新戦略」は如何なるものか。一言にして言へばその破壊主義の日本に向けた事により自画の問題を解決せんとする方策である。仰は抗日が第一でその次にこれに従属して封国民党の政策が決されるわけである。これ中共共産党中央委員会の方針に八月一日に発表されたものである。この内容が従前のものと異なるとは組織を提唱するにあたる。従って彼に於ける監督社、国民運動部の解散が本部の再編に於ける中華国軍部の自部の軍
ではこの共産党の解散は必要ではないのか？否、中国共産党は現在その体制の転換を放棄し、政策の根本的な転換を放棄したのである。

勿論中国共産党はこの解散を同時に政策転換の要件の一部で、共産党の政策の変革の必要性を示してある。

この理由は単一反帝統一戦線のための国共の軍事的比較的最近の戦争の重要で、共産党の政策の変革が軍事的、他者のものは自らの軍事的変革を強く確信する必要がある。

居り且つ予備は反帝統一戦線を主導する「国防政府」とソビエト政府に及ぼして次
ソビエト政府は国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しかし、ソビエト政府の政策は、国防政策を立てるべきである。しか
北平に於ける昨年十二月八日の北京各大学、京師の「自決反応」発露の際、

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社説をした真に誠にこれについても学生は示威的に行ない本年一月三日の示威的に行ないこれは示威的に行なったものである。

而して三月二十八日金曜の学生運動を統一する目的で金曜日学生教職員共立会議が開催され二日に亘る関係者に於ける十五名の死絶を出してしたところ、

 calcium に於いてこの学生の含む的統合と共に、関東政府の無力を嘲笑するが如く学生運動は進延しつつある。
この学生運動と呼応して、中囯共産党の運動的成績は直接的運動に依つて反帝圏線が各地に確々と成立した。特にそのうち、上海に根拠を持たない文化教育の成立は、他の教育者により活発に活動し、反帝圏線の最高指標として昨年十二月十二日附を以って上海の知識階級分子二百五十名の署名とで所謂一教国宣言一を出したのに始まる。民主党系、民主党系等の寄合世帯であるが、金道として中華民国中央政府を中心にし中華全囯各界教育聯合会が成立して各界教育者等が存在したが以前の上海学生教団の上海新華労働者教育者等上海小学校師範職業教育者等上海教育界教育界等が成立した皆は更に成立したとするに至った。
上海文化救亡运动

中华民族革命同盟

十一月的五全大会中，

是海外帝国主义者

在寻求妥协，在寻求妥协。

十一月的五全大会中，

是海外帝国主义者

在寻求妥协，在寻求妥协。

十一月的五全大会中，

是海外帝国主义者

在寻求妥协，在寻求妥协。

十一月的五全大会中，

是海外帝国主义者

在寻求妥协，在寻求妥协。

十一月的五全大会中，

是海外帝国主义者

在寻求妥协，在寻求妥协。

十一月的五全大会中，
(2) 生活標準及び社会的制度に類似する地域に於て 生活標準及社会的制度に類似する地域に於て

(3) 彼等ノ生産力ノ発達 ロハノ生産力ノ発達

(4) 工業革命 ロハノ生産力ノ発達
Key Dec 1161 (4)

近閲トハ露切ヲ前トテ

⑾ 1月11日付（大正10年）}
1月11日付（大正10年）
十号）みとれる（国税庁）受ける（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁） 受け入れる（国税庁）
ソコテ未近四年間ノ日本産出＝顧大部五分へ
小規模工場＝所得アールハ оборタガ分々。コレ
ハ勿論シテ生産セラシモノガ小規模工業発展品＝於
てデ労クラル事ヲキタル。然デアルデアル＝
食品工業＝医療工業他類ノ工業デアル。前ノ
三者ニ至リテハ常謄工業ノ全使用人八割六分
原八割四分九厘トヲ占メタリ。印可見必要
工業＝金属工業＝サメテデ小規模工業ヲ
於テデハレラ三＝四割レテヘテリオ
ソノ小規模工業ノ数ノ增加＝以テノ
業＝会社ヲ設ケタルノ必要ヲ
知ヘタノ＝ヘセテリオ。
三、労働条件の改善

労働者の労働条件を改善し、安全・健康を確保するため、以下の取り組みを実施する。

1. 健全な安全管理
2. 健全な健康管理
3. 健全な労働環境の整備

これらにより、労働者の健康を確保し、労働条件を改善することができる。
(ドラマ又不話)

(ドラマ又不話)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>工  休</th>
<th>休 (甲)</th>
<th>累積工 (甲)</th>
<th>小規模工 (甲)</th>
<th>累積工 (乙)</th>
<th>小規模工 (乙)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>日</td>
<td>21.297</td>
<td>19.739 96.7</td>
<td>881.459 332.759 38.7</td>
<td>23.088 697.269 31.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>4.651</td>
<td>4.537 87.3</td>
<td>97.469 56.608 60.1</td>
<td>301.135 236.113 39.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>6.738</td>
<td>6.494 96.4</td>
<td>194.578 82.065 42.6</td>
<td>598.640 101.413 32.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>3.345</td>
<td>3.148 59.9</td>
<td>81.313 39.036 64.1</td>
<td>161.716 53.701 33.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>3.695</td>
<td>3.181 86.1</td>
<td>136.021 42.982 51.1</td>
<td>937.956 248.888 26.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>5.434</td>
<td>5.202 91.4</td>
<td>60.616 55.357 91.3</td>
<td>158.756 161.08 88.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>2.386</td>
<td>2.322 97.8</td>
<td>52.332 37.400 71.4</td>
<td>177.797 81.288 45.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>12.728</td>
<td>12.618 99.1</td>
<td>137.433 118.660 66.3</td>
<td>601.476 633.476 73.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>666 91.7</td>
<td>7.968 4.195 52.6</td>
<td>282.294 152.780 64.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>休</td>
<td>6.034</td>
<td>5.856 97.8</td>
<td>103.806 68.881 66.4</td>
<td>287.284 152.780 64.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合計</td>
<td>67.318</td>
<td>64.402 95.7</td>
<td>1735.511 849.883 48.5</td>
<td>5969.069 3458.810 41.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

工 休日数等合計

日本工業会による規模企業の活動（契約売出数）
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>性別</th>
<th>全職</th>
<th>小業</th>
<th>中小業</th>
<th>小業</th>
<th>中小業</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>男</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>女</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合計</td>
<td>5,290,300</td>
<td>5,340,642</td>
<td>5,255,124</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>2,965,766</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

出所：内閣府製造業統計報告書「デパート業」 postpon
製造業の範囲は、工場建築三十一から五十名（含）を含マル
全業及び対象工場（含）を製造業の範囲に含むものと工場（含）を工場（含）を含マル

(乙) = 原工業団体连合会(会) = 製造工業 = 含テヘ工場五名乃至五十名工場へ(同)を含マル
K  \( \mathcal{V} \) と \( \mathcal{U} \) が互いに独立で、かつ \( \mathcal{V} \) が \( \mathcal{U} \) に含まれる。このとき、\( \mathcal{U} \) が \( \mathcal{V} \) の \( \alpha \)-次元二次元である。

\[
\mathcal{V} = \{ v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_n \} \quad \text{かつ} \quad \mathcal{U} = \{ u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_n \}
\]

ここで、\( \alpha \) は \( \mathcal{V} \) の \( \alpha \)-次元を表す。

\[
\mathcal{V} \subseteq \mathcal{U}
\]
第三表 勞働者及び農民一人当たり月収入及支出

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>家族</th>
<th>一戸営業</th>
<th>二戸営業</th>
<th>労働</th>
<th>非労働</th>
<th>労働金入</th>
<th>一人営業</th>
<th>生活費</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>人數</td>
<td>人數</td>
<td>人數</td>
<td>人數</td>
<td>人數</td>
<td>人數</td>
<td>人數</td>
<td>人數</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>勞働</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>総計</td>
<td>3,210</td>
<td>13,196</td>
<td>4,111</td>
<td>1,23</td>
<td>2,86</td>
<td>92.92</td>
<td>75.54</td>
<td>51.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>工場労働者</td>
<td>2,929</td>
<td>8,321</td>
<td>4,101</td>
<td>1,21</td>
<td>2,80</td>
<td>95.84</td>
<td>79.00</td>
<td>54.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>転出労働者</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>1,985</td>
<td>4,37</td>
<td>1,35</td>
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（編纂八）内閣統計局発表家計調査報告（1926年度9月—1927年度6月）＝依り
自作兼 半自作兼 小作兼 別家統計調査＝収入支出調査＝場合＝於テ労働ノラズ
但シソノ差べ核少テアルカラノ価トス。
（この箇所西へ）
このノートの内容は以下の通りです。

1. 現在の法律による社会的労働条件
2. 現在のノートの内容
3. 現在のノートの内容
4. 現在のノートの内容
5. 現在のノートの内容
6. 現在のノートの内容
7. 現在のノートの内容
8. 現在のノートの内容
9. 現在のノートの内容
10. 現在のノートの内容

以上が本ノートの内容です。


这是一张无法辨认的图片，无法提取有效的文本信息。

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日本銀行発行（銀行合併後下記同様） 鳥居
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工場内

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備考

工場内内設行（工場統計表）エノル
The remarkable development of Japanese industry in recent years, though sometimes described by casual observers as a phenomenon abruptly taking place, is really an outcome of a natural course of development for a long period in the past, only its final stage emerging with a striking suddenness encouraged by various factors to be expounded below. The true and fundamental explanation of the development should be sought not so much in the depreciation of the yen or low labour costs in Japan as the following facts. First, the efforts undertaken both by the Government and by the industrialists since the Russo-Japanese War to promote industrial development have now borne fruit. To analyse this statement further, (1) the investments in the past have come to...
the stage of yielding a return, (2) all the trials and experiments have contributed to the establishment of what we may call the Japanese way of conducting manufacture and business, and (3) the results of rationalization and other sacrifices have come to bear.

Second, various shortcomings of Japanese industry have been overcome. In the past, Japanese industry suffered from (1) the lack of capital and a high rate of capital-interest, (2) lack of skill and experience in making and repairing machinery, (3) poor technical training and low productivity of labour, and (4) difficulty in selling goods on markets already occupied by the industrially advanced countries.

But in recent years the interest-rate on industrial capital has greatly been lowered; the difference between the Japanese interest-rate and that of Great Britain, which was as much as 3 per cent. in the pre-war days, has been decreased to 1 per cent. and is likely to be made still smaller. This tendency is reflected in the change of Japan from a capital importing country to a capital exporting country. In this connexion, we must not overlook the fact that the financial panic of 1929 in Japan taught her valuable lessons, for since then both the country's financial organization and the financial basis of various capitalistic enterprises have greatly been improved.

The disadvantages as to machinery have also been overcome almost completely. The fact that the cost of machinery was unusually high compared with that of labour has induced Japanese industrialists to concentrate their attention on improvements in machinery. Moreover, to such an industrially backward country as Japan, the introduction and improvement of machinery meant a greater competitive power against the advanced countries both in home and overseas markets and therefore an increased industrial activity. Unlike the position in Western countries, it meant more employment instead of unemployment. Thus, not only has improvement in machinery been achieved to a greater extent than in Western countries, but a large measure of self-sufficiency in machinery has been attained. Next, the low efficiency of labour in the past
was due to the lack of mechanical equipment rather than the inherent productive capacity of the labourer himself. Consequently, as experience has grown in dealing with advanced machinery, the labourer has come to acquire a greater skill and, inasmuch as machinery has been improved, the efficiency of labour has gradually been increased. Lastly, the narrowness of markets due to the backwardness of Japanese industry has compelled Japan to take great pains in seeking constantly for better methods of purchasing raw materials and marketing goods; in short, in improving the organizational side of industry. Fruits of these efforts are now being amply reaped.

The strong points of Japanese industry which have come to make themselves felt in recent years may be enumerated as: (1) Geographical advantages. The situation of Japan in the middle of the vast East Asiatic region producing agricultural raw materials and purchasing manufactured goods is very advantageous both from the point of view of access to raw materials and the marketing of industrial goods. Moreover, being an island country, Japan can rely solely on the sea-transportation, which is considerably less expensive than land-transportation. (2) Advantages in relation to standards of living and social customs. In so far as standards of living and customs are concerned, agricultural countries which import manufactured goods such as British India, South East Asia, Latin America, and the Near East are much nearer to Japan than to the advanced industrial countries in the West. This must be one of the big reasons for the success of Japanese industry in recent years. (3) Density of population. Though a serious shortcoming from the social point of view, from the capitalistic viewpoint over-population can serve as a powerful competitive weapon in the form of abundant cheap labour. Especially so, when the productive capacity of labour has been raised. (4) Inborn qualities of the industrial labourer. Unlike some low-living-standard peoples, Japanese are endowed with quite high qualities mentally, physically, and industrially. One notable example is that girls working in cotton mills can master the technical requirements, in the case of better ones, within one month, and even
in the case of inferior ones within three months. And this period has always been on the decline ever since the Sino-Japanese War. (2) Advantages peculiar to a late-comer. Taking lessons from the experience of advanced countries, Japanese capitalists have successfully proceeded in relationship between capital and labour from becoming too rigid. They have gone further than those in the West in undertaking deliberate and progressive reforms in the matter of industrial organization. They have freely drawn on advanced machinery and other equipment, and in building factories and other establishments have imitated or even improved on the most efficient scale and arrangements theretofore existing.

On account of the special circumstances to be referred to below, the rise in wages and other improvements in labour conditions which ought otherwise to have accompanied industrial development did not occur in Japan. In consequence, a decline in the price of manufactured goods coupled with an increase in profits of capitalists has accelerated the competitive power of Japanese industry. Lastly, the slowing up of industrial development in older Western countries has given an opportunity to Japanese industry to attain some of its potential development.

IMMEDIATE FACTORS

To these underlying factors have been added more direct causes in recent years, namely, first, the world depression which started in 1929; second, the budgetary expansion of the Japanese Government and the development of Manchoukuo; and third, the depreciation of the yen.

The world depression provided a chance for Japanese economic expansion, for Japanese industry possessed a greater adaptability to the decline of the price level than other countries in the West, especially Great Britain, where the rigid economic relationships proved an almost fatal obstacle in overcoming the depression. Consequently, the competitive power of Japanese industry has substantially increased relative to these countries.
Then, the Manchurian Incident brought in its train the budgetary expansion on the part of the Japanese Government and the depreciation of the yen, both of which have furnished Japanese industry with very effective stimuli. During the period between 1932 and 1935 government expenditures for relief purposes were 660 million yen, while those for military purposes were 1,750 million. The annual average of these expenditures, 600 million yen, was equivalent to 40 per cent. of the total expenditures of the Government for 1930, and these were raised mostly by government borrowings. The present Japanese investment in Manchoukuo is approximately 900 million yen. The fact that the Manchurian market has been secured to Japan should also not be overlooked, although whether this means a net gain or a loss remains yet to be ascertained.

It is true that currency depreciation particularly favoured Japan, for between 1931 and 1935 the yen depreciated by 60 per cent, while the depreciation of the dollar and the pound sterling was respectively 41 and 35 per cent. At the same time there is a still greater reason why currency depreciation was particularly advantageous to Japan: in European countries and the United States the gold embargo and currency depreciation were essentially means of readjusting the industrial and financial dislocations resulting from the collapse of prices, but in Japan, where depression started earlier than in these countries, it was after a wholesale readjustment had nearly been completed in the business world that the gold standard was abandoned and the yen began to fall. Consequently, while in Western countries the effect of currency depreciation was of negative nature, consisting as it did in relieving the burden of depression, in Japan it was a positive one almost wholly serving to consolidate her competitive power in the economic sphere.

THE FACTOR IN THE JAPAN DEPRESSION

One very important fact which must not be overlooked in observing the recent industrial development of Japan is that the depression visited Japan considerably earlier than Western countries, for in 1927, when the United States
was still enjoying 'eternal prosperity', Japan was in the middle of one of the
biggest financial panics which had ever hit the country. By the time the
depression which started in 1929 was raging all over the world Japan was well
on its way towards consolidating effective means to overcome the depression,
thanks to the drastic rationalization and other methods of readjustment forced
upon her in the previous years. It was natural from the viewpoint of view,
therefore, that Japan should have been the first to emerge prosperous out of
the depression.

This time-difference between the Japanese depression and the world
depression may be indicated by a comparison of indices of stock-market quotations in Japan, the United States, and Great Britain. Fitting the figures for
1921 in these countries all at 100, the figures for 1929 will be found to be
for Japan 71.4, while for the United States and Great Britain they are
respectively 301.3 and 147.1. Between 1921 and 1929 the prices of shares were
on the decrease in Japan, but they were going up in the other two countries.
This tendency has rather been altered since 1931, when the Japanese stock price
index reached its bottom and began an upward trend somewhat rapidly. It is
ture that the indices in the United States and Great Britain have also turned
upward, but the rise is much smaller. If 1931 is made a base year, the
Japanese figure for 1935 will be found to be much higher than the American and
the English, but, if on the basis of 1921, the Japanese index will be only 84.9
as compared to 129.9 and 114.4 for the United States and Great Britain,
respectively.

In Japan the period of economic hardships and sacrifices extended
from March 1920 to the end of 1931. The various adverse events which Japanese
industry had to encounter in that period are (1) the panic in March 1920, (2)
the banking failures in November and December 1922, when, despite the Govern-
ment's emergency measures, as many as seventeen banks failed, (3) the earthquake
of September 1923, (4) the financial panic in February and March 1927, when the
Government declared a moratorium and guaranteed payments up to 700 million yen
through the Bank of Japan, but the number of banks which had to close their doors amounted to fifty, and (5) the premature return to the Gold Standard in 1929.

During that period the liquidation of financially weak banks was carried out on an extensive scale, the number of ordinary banks in the country registering 1,774 in 1921, 1,407 in 1926, and only 421 in 1930. The amount of capital liquidated in this period of 1921-31 was: authorized capital, 6,060 million yen, and paid-up capital, 3,360 million yen. Reduction of capital has also widely been enforced: the total sum thus reduced in the same period being 1,310 million yen (paid-up capital). The average rate of dividend of industrial firms, which was as high as 33.2 per cent. in 1918, was reduced to 12.7 per cent. in 1921, 8.8 per cent. in 1928, and only 5 per cent. in 1931. In that same year, it must be noted, the interest rate on fixed deposits was 4.2 per cent. at the first-class banks and 4.7 per cent. at the second-class.

SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES OF JAPAN

A knowledge of the peculiar characteristics of Japanese industry is essential for understanding the recent industrial development in Japan as well as the labour conditions which are a powerful force in Japan's trade expansion. One of the more outstanding characteristics is the prevalence of so many small-scale industries which constitute both in the number of establishments and workers employed more than one-half of all Japanese industries. Unlike the small-scale industries in Western countries, these small-scale establishments in Japan are not the beginnings of an industry which will grow into a large-scale industry. Rather are they units of industry which, though small in size, are fully matured, and not small units of a potentially large-scale industry. These small-scale industries are an indigenous growth resulting from the social and economic conditions prevailing in Japan. Their unique and lasting continuance may, therefore, be expected.
According to the definition adopted by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, generally a 'small-scale' factory means a factory employing less than 100 workers, and in the case of chemical and the gas and electricity industry, in which machinery is a more important factor of production than labour, it means a factory employing less than 50 and 30 workers respectively. Adhering to this definition and in accordance with the Factory Statistics published by the same Ministry, we may indicate the importance of small-scale industries in Japan by the following figures (1932): the number of the small-scale factories constitutes 99.7 per cent., the number of workers employed 48.5 per cent., and the value of the products 41.2 per cent., respectively, of the total number of factories, the total number of workers, and the total amount of products of the country. But we must not forget that these statistics cover only factories employing more than 5 labourers. There is no direct information regarding the workers employed in those factories which are too small to be included in the statistics. Let us, therefore, deduct the number of factory labourers, shown in Table 1, from the number of people engaged in manufacturing industries of some kinds, shown in the Census Report by the Government Bureau of Statistics (see Table 2). Then, referring to the 1930 figures, the remainder, 2,440,000, may be regarded roughly as the number of workers in these ultra-small factories combined with that of small independent industrialists. This figure is equivalent to 46.1 per cent. of the whole industrial population. If this number is added to that of the small-scale factory workers as defined in the Factory Statistics (370,000), the total number of people engaged in small industries in Japan will be found to be 3,310,000, or approximately 62 per cent. of the whole industrial population.

The importance of the small-scale industries in the export trade of the country is even greater. Deduct the value of the products manufactured by the large-scale industries and that of agricultural and marine products from the total value of Japanese exports as shown in the Foreign Trade Statistics, and regard the rest as the value of the export goods produced by the small-scale
industries. Then we find that in the last three years about 65 per cent. of the total exports from Japan have been coming from the small-scale plants.

This is, of course, only a rough figure, especially because silk, which is produced substantially in the large-scale factories, is included in the category of small-scale industry exports while such important small-scale industry goods as cotton tissues are included in large-scale industry products.

As to individual industries, those industries in which the small-scale units predominate are the food-preparing, timber, and other miscellaneous industries. Especially in the first two the number of workers employed amounts to 86.3 and 91.3 per cent., and the value of products constitutes 73.4 and 88.9 per cent., respectively, of the total workers and the total products in the respective industries. In the printing and bookbinding, metal, and cement industries the number of small-scale factory workers occupies about 60-70 per cent. of the workers engaged in the respective industries, but the percentage of the value of products in each case does not exceed 30-40 per cent.

Among the factors which have caused or contributed to the growth of the small-scale industries in Japan and to which their unique and lasting development may also be ascribed are:

1. Certain essential advantages which they possess over the large-scale industry arising from such factors as technique of production, special channels for securing raw materials, and methods of marketing the manufactured goods. The extent to which the market for goods is limited to Japan contributes in no small measure to the existence of these small-scale industries.

2. Changes in the type of motive power employed. In the age of steam-power, the large-scale industry was advantageous because the minimum size of the plant necessary to supply the requisite motive power was comparatively large. The necessity of establishments of such immense size was dispensed with when electric power came into use. Electric power can be easily transmitted to small unit factories, and hence, the small-scale industry can hold its own against the large one in this respect. This is particularly true in Japan, where the use of electric power is so extensively diffused.
3. The advantages coming from the vast source of cheap labour. This is probably the main raison d'être of so many small-scale factories and deserves somewhat more extended consideration.

From the point of view of the small-scale industry competing with the large one this advantage as regards labour consists not only of the absolute low level of wages and other costs of labour, but also of the greater ease with which both the number of employees and labour conditions can be adjusted to changes in demand.

In the last analysis the fundamental cause of the small-scale industry in Japan is the state of over-population which results in an over-abundant supply of labour. There are so many people that, no matter how far from ideal the working conditions may be, there are at all times many people eager for work in order that they may earn the minimum sustenance necessary for life. The income from one's main calling is so meagre that additional income must be derived from some source, and that source is in many cases supplied by the small-scale factories. Typical of this situation is the necessity on the part of farmers to undertake some kind of subsidiary work during the non-farming seasons or that of the families of small-factory workers or low-salaried city employees to seek jobs for supplementing the income of the main earner of the family. In other words, even where the head of the household is employed, his earning alone cannot meet the minimum family budget. Doing piece-work for these small-scale factories is peculiarly adapted to meet the condition of these people. Labour in such circumstances cannot stop to consider whether the working conditions are good or bad. Hence the small factories are able to employ these people at very low wage levels.

In so far as labour conditions are concerned, therefore, the Japanese small-scale industry means the particular type of industry in which labour conditions are bound to be poor, for it is the cheapness of labour that enables the small-scale industry to compete with machine-employing large-scale industry. From the point of view of the present population problem in Japan, these
### Table 1: Production of Industrial Mill J.P.I.I. in the Industry (End of 1932)

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**Source:** Factory Statistics by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
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<td>3,719,354</td>
<td>2,140,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,583,285</td>
<td>752,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,302,639</td>
<td>2,892,277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Census Report by the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics (Vol. 1).

Note: Figures cited by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (end of year).

In the case of the chemical industry, factories employing 30-50 workers are included in (C).

In the case of the textile industry, factories employing 15-30 workers are included in (C).
small-scale establishments performing the function of absorbing and sustaining the over-abundant supply of labour.

An inevitable result of such prevalence of small-scale industry is the constant pressure brought to bear upon labour conditions. Under normal circumstances, better machinery would mean higher productivity of labour and a higher standard of living, but under the social circumstances obtaining in Japan, it rather means, theoretically at least, still worse labour conditions, simply because otherwise the small-scale industry could not successfully compete with the large one. And yet the survival of the small-scale industry is, in a sense, a necessity to Japan. Thus, an increased competitive power of large-scale industry would mean a degradation of labour conditions in the small-scale industry and consequently a general degradation of labour conditions throughout the country.

CHEAPNESS OF JAPANESE LABOUR

It is true that labour standards in Japan are considerably lower than those of advanced countries in Europe and America. The nature of this cheapness, however, is not always fully comprehended by the Occidental, and hence his comparisons do not seem reasonable to the Oriental. We must not forget that labour in Japan is by no means cheap in the light of the standards which generally prevail in the West. Even when compared with labour in the Western countries, Japanese labour is not so cheap as direct money wages would indicate.

From our point of view, any comparison of wage should be that of real wages. Of course, this comparison would be difficult because there is such a wide gap in the social conditions and mode of living between Japan and Western countries. At the present time, a common criterion by which to compare real wage levels has yet to be found. Indeed, the sums expended on welfare work and family allowances in addition to money wages in Japan seem to exceed expenditures for similar purposes in Europe and America. Surging late into the circle of industrialized nations, the Japanese cost lists, profiting from the experience of labour troubles through which their Western seniors went, have taken the initiative in undertaking welfare work to forestall any labour
movements. This is not work in the nature of additional wages in kind. If these factors are taken into account, it is likely that the prevailing western conception of the cheapness of Japanese labour and of the lowness of the Japanese standard of living will be considerably altered.

The cheapness of Japanese labour may be regarded as a result of the following causes rather than that of either inattentiveness on the part of the Government or sweating on the part of capitalists: (1) Factors within the country fundamentally affecting the conditions of labour, such as the meagre supply of natural resources and the shortage of capital. (2) Factors within the country which relatively affect the conditions of industrial workers, such as the low income of the nation as a whole, especially among lower government officials, office-workers, and farmers. (3) Factors outside the country indirectly affecting Japanese labour conditions, such as the immigration policies of Western countries against oriental immigrants, and the trade policies pursued by these nations with respect to Japanese goods. (4) The difficulty of improving labour conditions through labour legislation and labour combinations or movements.

Of all the factors affecting labour conditions in Japan, the most powerful is her poor command of natural resources. Starting out with a restricted amount of natural resources available in the homeland, Japan's command of natural resources was further checked by the artificial barriers erected against the emigration of her people and the export of her commodities by the Western nations. Moreover, various restrictions are placed upon the development of natural resources in the neighbouring territories of Japan.

The various aspects of this poor command of natural resources may be enumerated as follows: (1) over-population, (2) low productivity of labour and a consequent low per capita earning power, (3) low standard of living of the nation as a whole, especially of the working population, (4) longer and harder work required to attain the same standard of living as that which prevails in countries bounding with natural resources, (5) expensiveness of raw materials and foodstuffs, and (6) high costs of production other than labour, including
high land prices and rent, the high cost of installing machine equipment and
construction costs in general, and high interest rates.

All these factors combined tend to exert a powerful depressing force
upon labour conditions in Japan. Recently, however, it is the low standard of
living prevailing among the agricultural population that drives Japanese labour
conditions down.

Labour is almost entirely supplied by the excess agricultural
population, and therefore in estimating labour conditions in industry both
labour and capital look at the income of the rural people. The rural worker
decides whether he or she should join the ranks of industrial workers by con­
trasting the prospective labour conditions with his or her customary ones. The
capitalist on his part keeps his wages on more or less the same level as the
earnings of tenant farmers with just enough difference to attract the rural
population. The standard of living in these rural communities therefore acts
as the base from which the labour conditions are gauged, and since this rural
standard is indisputably the lowest in Japan, the condition of the industrial
worker cannot be any too good (see Table 3).

The reason why the standard of living of these farmers is so low is
not because their ability is low, nor because they are idle. It is not so much
because their organization is poor, nor is it so much because they are
exploited by their landlords. Rather it is simply due to the fact that the
land is insufficient for the population. The cultivated area per capita is too
small. Without a solution of this problem of over-population, there can be no
hope of raising the living standard of industrial workers. For a solution of
this problem, Japan is dependent to a large degree upon the attitude of other
countries endowed with larger territories in proportion to the size of their
respective populations.
### Table 3. E.I.CAPEL. MONTHLY INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No. of Families</th>
<th>No. of Persons</th>
<th>No. of Persons per Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total or Average</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td>13,196</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Workers</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining Workers</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Workers</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual Workers</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total or Average</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>4.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Owners</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled on the basis of Report on Family Budget Investigation. Classification of Owners, Part-Owners, and tenants of the income and expenditure investigation, but...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Non-Working</th>
<th>Actual Living Ex-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>per Person</td>
<td>per Person</td>
<td>per Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(yen)</td>
<td>(yen)</td>
<td>(yen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>82.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>97.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>75.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>68.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>81.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>72.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>81.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>76.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>60.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Investigation (Sept. 1926-Aug. 1927) by the Central Bureau of Tournaments is not identical in the case of the Family investigation with the difference, which is small, is ignored here.
LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND LEGISLATION

Improvement of the conditions of labour through either legislation or labour movements is ineffective at the present time. The peculiar composition of the Japanese industrial labouring class must be taken into consideration. Over 50 per cent of the total number of factory operatives is composed of female workers, a majority of them being young girls who work at factories for only two or three years previous to their marriage. It would hardly be possible to induce such persons to join labour unions.

There are other factors tending to discourage labour movements in Japan, namely the fact that any organization encompassing the small-scale units is out of the question. On the other hand, the peculiar circumstances which exist in Japan tend to make the workers in the large-scale establishments side with the capitalists. Because of the extremely low level in the conditions of labour in the small-scale industries, the conditions in the large-scale establishments appear comparatively attractive even though they may not be ideal in the absolute sense. Thus the conditions in the large-scale industries with respect to wages, security of continued employment, working hours, and facilities in general appear superior to those in the small establishments. Rather than join a labour union to oppose the capitalist, the worker prefers to seek the security of living within the sheltering fold of paternalism of his employer. The capitalist, on his part, profiting from the difficulties of capitalists in other countries, tries to stimulate this attitude among the workers by increasing facilities for welfare and recreation in addition to the money wages paid out. Thus such things as co-operative consumers' societies, employment relief, and various other allowances in kind are common in the large-scale industries.

In better establishments, such as the Kōyafuchi Cotton Mills, it is said that, because of these additional allowances, for one yen paid out in money wages the worker actually enjoys the benefits of two yen in cash, were he to pay for the various services and facilities which his employer provides for him.
Thus, what labour movements there are in Japan are most likely to be found in the small-scale industries. Such movements, however, have certain peculiar qualities which are not paralleled in foreign countries.

1. The movement is not directly toward securing for the workers a greater portion of the profit which goes to the owners. They are rather in the nature of attempts on the part of capital and labour combined, or more accurately, employer and employee combined, to improve the general condition of the small-scale establishments in general. The situation in the small-scale electric lamp factories is typical. The movement was directed toward the elimination of cut-throat competition among the small-scale factories. Strikes were called against the factories which had violated the minimum selling-price agreements.

2. The social position between employer and employee in the small-scale industries is not marked by a great gap. Most of the employers themselves are from the ranks of workers, while others still continue to work alongside their employees.

3. In addition to the pecuniary tie between employer and employee, there are additional ties, and in fact more important ties, such as the paternal tie of the family system and the feudalistic bond between ruler and ruled, master and apprentice, or leader and follower. These are actual facts and not mere myths. These ties as well as the factor in (2) above are certainly not conducive in exciting labour movements. The duty imposed by these additional relationships often cause the employees themselves to make offers to work for reduced pay or to work longer for the same pay when their master is faced with financial difficulties.

4. The object of the labour movement in Japan is not to promote the welfare of just one type of worker, but that of all workers in common. Japanese industry did not develop by stages as in the European countries. In England there was a stage when the several types of craftsmen had their own guilds, but in Japan industry took the revolution at one jump. Labour
movements therefore take the form of movements to benefit all the workers including the agricultural condition as well.

What goes under the name of a labor movement is not confined to a trade union movement. Economic and social conditions are favourable to organizing labor into units for the purpose of bettering the condition of workers in each branch of industry. The immediate needs of workers as well as other ties alluded to above tend to discourage a movement which is essentially a long-time affair.

Can the conditions of labor be improved by labor legislation? At least that must be the purpose of labor legislation, and a certain amount of success was achieved in the past. But today to apply the existing laws so as to better labor conditions seems well-nigh impossible. Here again the predominance of the small-scale industries plays a vital part in this problem.

We direct our attention first to the fact that the basic cause of the ineffectiveness of labor legislation was in the premise on which such legislation had been drafted. Consciously or unconsciously, legislation in the past seems to have been based on the following hypotheses:

1. That the agricultural population, together with the industrial, would eventually become a proletariat. If this had been the true state of affairs, even such labor legislation as would disregard the peculiar situations obtaining upon the agricultural population would have succeeded in improving the condition of the rural people and of the labouring classes as a whole. In countries like England this was true not only in theory but in reality.

2. If the condition of the industrial worker was worse than that of the farmer, the main emphasis should be directed toward alleviating the condition of the former first.

3. That the small-scale industries would gradually become large ones with the passage of time and their development. Labor legislation should therefore be drafted so as to be applicable to the large-scale industries.
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1. That the agricultural population, together with the industrial, would eventually become a proletariat. If this had been the true state of affairs, even such labour legislation as would disregard the peculiar situations obtaining among the agricultural population would have succeeded in improving the condition of the rural people and of the labouring classes as a whole. In countries like England this was true not only in theory but in reality.

2. As the condition of the industrial worker was worse than that of the farmer, the main emphasis should be directed toward alleviating the condition of the former first.

3. That the small-scale industries would gradually become large ones with the passage of time and their development. Labour legislation should therefore be drafted so as to be applicable to the large-scale industries.
Naturally legislation drafted upon the foregoing postulates concentrated upon the condition of the industrial workers and left the problem of the farmers out of consideration. As long as the actual situation was in accord with the premises, these laws did some good. But there has been a change in that background and drastic revisions of the laws are now considered necessary.

In the light of later developments it was learned that any solution of the industrial workers' problems was so interrelated with the alleviation of the poor condition of the farmers that any legislation leaving the condition of the farmers out of consideration was not tackling the problem from its real roots. It was further learned that the small-scale industries were not infant stages of large-scale industries, but were full-grown adults representing a development indigenous to the conditions which existed in Japan where over-population was a necessary evil, and that as long as over-population existed the small-scale factory was here to stay.

Failure to recognize these unique traits of economic and social conditions in Japan has rendered the present laws ineffective so far as the improvement of the general conditions of labour is concerned. One obvious shortcoming of the present Factory Law is that it has but limited operation, small factories hiring less than ten workers falling outside the scope of the law. To enforce such a law would encourage the growth of small factories outside its purview, and as the labour conditions in these ultra-small factories are necessarily poor, labour conditions in industry as a whole tend to be depressed. Besides, even among the factories to which the law is applicable, its enforcement is by no means an easy matter because there are so many small-scale factories among which supervision and inspection are extremely difficult.

On the other hand, the administration of the minimum-wage and maximum-hours laws that would include all factories of all sizes and types would be, by itself, an impossibility. Especially would this be true in view of the excess supply of labour in the rural districts which would be more than glad to work for wages below the minimum legal standard.
Depreciation of the yen had been anticipated. But hardly anybody in Japan had predicted such a fall as actually took place. With the serious development of the Manchurian Incident, the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident, and the threatening relations with the League of Nations, together with the increase in government borrowings, Japan was thrown into a political and financial crisis of unprecedented magnitude. The fear was that the yen might collapse irretrievably. Far from soliciting the fall, the Government went to great lengths to stop it. This is clearly indicated by the large amount of gold exported in the period of one and three-quarters years immediately following the departure of Great Britain from the gold standard. As the result of the gold rain, by the end of July 1933 the gold reserve of the Bank of Japan had decreased from 600 to 425 million yen. But, inasmuch as the political outlook became more serious than ever, the value of the yen was further forced down to the point of barely $20 per hundred yen. Finally, on May 1, 1928, the Japanese Government put the Foreign Exchange Control Act into operation. Since then the yen has been stabilized around one shilling and twopence.

The present value of the yen in international markets does not seem to be unduly low or unwarranted. The extent to which the yen depreciated was undoubtedly greater than any other currency if calculated on the basis of the respective values prevailing in 1930. But inasmuch as the 1930 standard or level was an artificial one kept at an unduly high point, the level at that time does not seem to be a proper basis for comparison. If we calculate the present value of the yen, in terms of the pound sterling and the dollar, with the purchasing-power parities which prevailed in the pre-war days, we shall find it somewhere in the neighbourhood of 14.32 pence and 28.76 cents, respectively, which is not far off from the current exchange rates of 14.00 pence and 29.01 cents, respectively.

A more accurate summary of the depreciation of the yen would be to say that the value of the yen, which had been kept at an unduly artificial and unduly high level during the period 1920 to 1930, has at least found its normal level of stabilization. It is merely because this stabilization was effected
so quickly that it did have some disturbing influences on the equilibrium of world trade, and hence created an impression abroad that the yen was being purposefully depreciated to an undue extent.

CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF JAPANESE INDUSTRY

In terms of output, Japanese industry has expanded from 100.0 in 1921 to 180.0 in 1934. If the fall in prices is taken into calculation, it actually amounted to 269.0 in 1934.

But apart from the total output point of view, there are other characteristics which mark the present development as the shift in emphasis placed on the various kinds of industries. It was the textile industry which had led the way to industrial development in Japan. Within the past few years, however, the center of activity has been shifted to the heavy industries (metallurgical, machine-making, and chemistry). In terms of output these so-called heavy industries now constitute 44 per cent. of the total industrial output, whereas it was only 25 per cent. in 1921. The output of the cotton industry in the same period has fallen from a position where it once represented 44 per cent. of the total output of Japanese industry to 32 per cent. In terms of ratio to the total industrial output, therefore, the cotton industry has taken a downward trend. To a certain extent Japan is making her appearance as a heavy industry country, and this must largely account for her great purchases of scrap-iron and other metal.

Another characteristic in the present development of industry in Japan is the advance from the stage of low-grade manufactures to that of higher and more complicated manufactures. The export of finished goods now occupies 60 per cent. of the total amount of exports.

The last characteristic is that industry is now producing with foreign markets in view. It is becoming more dependent than ever for its raw materials and for sale of its manufactured products on overseas markets. This is especially true in the case of the textile industry, which exports more than 55 to 80 per cent. of its output to foreign countries.
TABLE 4. CAPITAL FLATION IN DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES
(In millions of yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industries</th>
<th>1921-22</th>
<th>1923-24</th>
<th>1924-25</th>
<th>1925-26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average of</td>
<td>per cent.</td>
<td>per cent.</td>
<td>per cent.</td>
<td>per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>4/6 (11.7)</td>
<td>398 (25.3)</td>
<td>273 (16.7)</td>
<td>133 (9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>226 (5.9)</td>
<td>39 (2.5)</td>
<td>178 (13.3)</td>
<td>118 (8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>363 (9.0)</td>
<td>354 (22.5)</td>
<td>213 (16.6)</td>
<td>103 (7.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>200 (5.3)</td>
<td>125 (7.9)</td>
<td>211 (15.8)</td>
<td>400 (28.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>110 (2.9)</td>
<td>23 (1.5)</td>
<td>67 (5.0)</td>
<td>55 (3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>61 (1.6)</td>
<td>18 (1.1)</td>
<td>77 (5.8)</td>
<td>80 (5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>371 (9.7)</td>
<td>166 (10.5)</td>
<td>555 (36.6)</td>
<td>535 (37.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>341 (9.0)</td>
<td>66 (4.2)</td>
<td>102 (7.6)</td>
<td>32 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>435 (11.4)</td>
<td>200 (12.7)</td>
<td>93 (7.0)</td>
<td>116 (8.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,147 (30.1)</td>
<td>431 (27.4)</td>
<td>550 (41.2)</td>
<td>682 (47.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,644 (43.2)</td>
<td>353 (22.4)</td>
<td>171 (12.8)</td>
<td>390 (27.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Total</td>
<td>3,806 (100.0)</td>
<td>1,575 (100.0)</td>
<td>1,334 (100.0)</td>
<td>1,427 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Capital Flotation of Banks and Companies, by the Bank of Japan.

TABLE 5. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Capital of Joint-stock Companies (in millions of yen)</th>
<th>Value of Products (in millions of yen)</th>
<th>Workers Employed (in thousands)</th>
<th>No. of Factories (in thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>8,116 (100)</td>
<td>5,227 (100)</td>
<td>1,636 (100)</td>
<td>49 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>9,525 (117)</td>
<td>6,789 (130)</td>
<td>1,908 (111)</td>
<td>49 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>11,754 (145)</td>
<td>7,759 (148)</td>
<td>1,825 (122)</td>
<td>60 (122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>11,854 (166)</td>
<td>5,175 (99)</td>
<td>1,660 (101)</td>
<td>64 (131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>11,890 (147)</td>
<td>5,982 (114)</td>
<td>1,734 (106)</td>
<td>67 (137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>12,339 (152)</td>
<td>7,871 (151)</td>
<td>1,901 (116)</td>
<td>72 (167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>13,441 (166)</td>
<td>9,390 (180)</td>
<td>2,163 (132)</td>
<td>80 (163)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 6. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, BY INDUSTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Textile Industries</th>
<th>Machinery and Tool Manufacturing</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Wood</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value of Products (1,000 yen)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>2,336,907</td>
<td>3,167,756</td>
<td>1,496,793,500,322</td>
<td>1,159,166,936</td>
<td>1,460,764,1,327,209,4,130,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>3,167,756</td>
<td>741,142</td>
<td>132,362,175,720</td>
<td>192,270,139,617,691,621</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Orders Employed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>20,196</td>
<td>24,399</td>
<td>6,610</td>
<td>4,646</td>
<td>10,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Factories</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,493,793</td>
<td>563,320</td>
<td>184,562,175,720</td>
<td>192,270,139,617,691,621</td>
<td></td>
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#### Percentages

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<th>Textile Industries</th>
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<td><strong>Value of Products</strong></td>
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<td>15.9</td>
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<td>1934</td>
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<td>1934</td>
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Source: Factory Statistics, by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
My name is Jinsaburo MASAKI. I was formerly a General of the Imperial Japanese Army.

I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff from January 1932 to June 19th 1933, a War Councillor from January 1934 to July 16th 1935, a Vice Councillor again and was then transferred to the First Reserve in March 1936.

When I became the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the General Staff was H.R.H. the Prince KAN-AN and the War Minister was Lieutenant-General ARAXI Sadno.

When I assumed this post, the Minister APAXI explained to me the internal and external situations of Japan which existed at that time, the gist of which, as far as I remember, was as follows:

"The state of affairs of our country, both internal and external, is quite alarming. There have already been many internal incidents and our relations with the League of Nations is far from being satisfactory.

As far as Manchuria in spite of the non-expansion policy of the former cabinet, the situation has simply become more aggravating.

As there is every danger that it will develop into a regular war, we must leave no stone unturned in immediate saving of this complicated situation. When I (ARAXI) was appointed Minister of War, the CHICHOU district was in a critical condition. Unless we saved it, our residents and troops would be endangered. The diplomatic negotiations were at a standstill; the situation was aggravated, and the KUANTUNG Army was in a difficulty. The Government, therefore, was obliged to decide to liquidate that district for self-defence and protection of the residents. The General Staff Office ordered the KUANTUNG Army to that effect. The liquidation campaign has just finished. I think there will be no need of further operations unless our Army is challenged. At any rate, we will try to cease hostilities within the smallest possible scope. The Government is on principle dealing with Chang Hsuelliang who is still disturbing peace and order. Therefore, our scope of operation is limited under any condition within his sphere of influence. Bearing this in mind, please control the Army strictly."

At my appointment, my predecessor told me almost the same thing.

At the time when I assumed the post as the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Premier HUKAI. While he has explained chiefly our political difficulties that Japan was experiencing at that time, he also made some remarks on the situation which was more or less similar...
to that of War Minister ARAI. The Premier did not in any way suggest that he had any intention of petitioning to the Throne for an Imperial Order, by virtue of which to withdraw all the troops from Manchuria, nor did I ever hear from anyone that Premier LIDAI had any such intention.

I reported to H.R.H. the Prince SHU-IKI, Chief of General Staff, what I had heard from the Premier and the War Minister respectively, and with his assent, I managed and conducted the matters in accordance with the Government's policies and orders of the Minister ARAI. While I was doing so, it was a rule, decided by the Ministry that troops be dispatched immediately to Shanghai which were requested by many authorities for the purpose of reinforcing the navy and to protect Japanese nationals there.

Having in mind what I had heard from the War Minister I took every precaution to observe his principle so that the dispatched troops would not exceed the scope of their primary object. Divisional Commander ISHII, Commander of the dispatched troops, also followed closely this principle and endeavoured to settle the situation without resorting to the means of bloodshed. I should first make a proclamation requesting reconciliation by the opponent over their action. However, contrary to his expectation, the opponent increased their preparation for fighting and added difficulties. In fact, there were sign that an over all clash between Chinese and Japanese was inevitable.

Under these circumstances, further reinforcement was decided from the point of view of strategic importance with the purpose of solving the situation quickly. When the vanquish of the second reinforcement made their landing at CHIANGKO along the VALONG, the 19 Route Army began to retreat, and as it was driven beyond the expected line, attack was ceased. Thus hostilities ended in three days, with almost negligible casualties.

In due course, an agreement was signed to ensure the future safety. This agreement provided Japan the right of stationing certain part of her troops there, but in view of War Minister ARAI's principle, which was completely identical to ours, we decided to evacuate all the troops from China and I think the complete withdrawal was made within a month of signing the agreement. JIMO and HULUNBEIRH campaigns were and the task of the Japanese Army through the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukoo Protocol and because of constant disaffections of law and order in and around Jehol chiefly by Tan TUN and in HULUNBEIRH Chiefly by SU PENG CHI. It becomes necessary for the Japanese and Manchoukoo forces to resort to military action based on the provisions of the Protocol. It took place after the formal recognition of the State of Manchoukoo, and as the evacuation was taken throughout the campaign not to divert from the primary principle of bringing about law and order the operation called for extreme difficulties; nevertheless, as to HULUNBEIRH our object was achieved through good relations of the Soviet Union and as to Jehol efforts were made to limit the action within the line of the Cret Wall and observance of this fundamental policy was sternly requested to the troops in the front at the risk of suffering considerable operational inconveniences. There was an occasion when the troops advanced beyond this limit, but they were immediately ordered to return and further action was stopped at that. Then the hostilities were finally settled by the conclusion of Tengku agreement.
I believe that War Minister ARAKI was one of the persons who were most seriously worried about the Manchurian Incident. Because of this worry, he had made a firm determination to settle it, which finally led to the Tengku Agreement. No sooner had the Agreement been signed than he strove to settle the overall situation of Japan by adjusting foreign as well as domestic affairs.

He often told me in those days that he was devoting his effort toward letting the people live up to the original teachings of Japan, enhancing by so doing the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor among the people, and externally, toward improving aggravated international relations by realizing the already advocated International Peace Conference.

The natives' wishes for the Independence of Manchukuo were ardent, when I was appointed the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff did not on principle interfere with it as it was a political problem. Minister of War ARAKI assumed the most prudent attitude toward it. He was in accordance with the decision of the Government based on the opinion of the Foreign Office and the real situation. During this time the General Staff was devoting itself to security of peace and order there.

The opinion of War Minister ARAKI toward the League of Nations was quite clear. He fully explained his opinion at the cabinet meeting and induced the meeting to the decision that Japan would not withdraw from the League.

I was under the impression that the War Minister had been prepared with an opinion with which he hoped to persuade the League of Nation. It also seemed to me that the War Minister had had a firm belief of getting the complete understanding of powers over Japan's position if once restoration of law and order in Manchuria were attained which he thought above everything else.

War Minister ARAKI stressed importance on quality than on quantity of troops from the viewpoint of armament. He endeavored to recover the armament which had fallen behind since World War I up to that of other Powers at the time of the War. He had his own ideal on national defence, which was all based on morality. He was particularly concerned in promoting the character and moral standard of the commissioned officers.

War Minister ARAKI also exerted to calm the mind of young officers who, indignant at the current situation, had already caused considerable troubles. He did his best to develop the immaculate spirit of those officers without being distorted so that they may devote their unshuttered attention to their duty. While devoting his whole hearted attention for this purpose, he also let his subordinates spare no time in teaching and guiding the younger officers, and so they began to show the sign of composure in due course. On the occasion of Hay 15th Incident, it turned out that every commissioned officer participated in it.
私は元軍大将新崎三郎でありました。

私は昭和七年十一月十四日より昭和七年七月十六日まで当職なしで、

元軍大将新崎三郎。

[以下省略]
面衝突となり相手は即座に軍を加けて作戦上困難を頓々とされ、必ずしも安全を求めた。しかし、相手の意を察し、無理を以て目的に達せぬ彼の意を遂げる読取りを試みた。初期には我相の立場、立場を占める相手の反応を明らかにした。
満洲国独立の気運は私が次第に着任した時には現地における政治、問題である民の熱望が盛んになって居た。参謀本部はこの問題は政治、問題であるから千秋しない為に日に満洲の治安問題が第一である。これで出来て居た。十一陸相は意匠の軍備の進捗しめて大戦時の裁定をせしめて日本立場を解消せしめ居た。陸相の意匠の軍備を進捗しめた方針をとつれて居た。
昭和二十二年（一九四七年）
八月二十五日
於市谷区東円山軍事裁判所

右

名

其三郎

押印

タル

明

同日

於

立會人

高岡

訂
Comment Made by The Director of The Information Bureau For Interview with the Foreign Correspondents

Oct. 6, 1937

My attention has been drawn to an editorial of the New-York Times of October 4, purporting to impress its readers as if the Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office issued a belated statement on October 1 without giving any facts. Such a comment appearing in a newspaper of wide reputation is to be regretted. When the Spokesman of the Foreign Office formally gives out a statement, he is basing it on actual facts, although he may not give detailed explanations on each of the individual points mentioned.

I suggest first to note this: What were the respective strengths of the Japanese and Chinese forces when the hostilities took place in Shanghai on August 13? The Chinese forces numbered well over 30,000 against a small unit of Japanese marines counting not more than three thousand. Even by stretching our imagination, we can not conceive of such a small Japanese unit making an attack on the overwhelmingly large Chinese forces.

The writer of the New-York Times editorial charges that the Spokesman failed to give concrete evidence to support his presumption that the affair in Shanghai was caused by a well-procrastinated plan of the Chinese, who wanted to annihilate the Japanese there. But that is not actually the case and that the Shanghai affair is the outcome of well-considered Chinese provocations is clear to all who are willing to
study the affair calmly and dispassionately, we can deny the still
acceptable fact on the night of August 12, the lives of 30,000 Japanese
residents and refugees in Shanghai were at the verge of a terrible slaughter
when the vast number of Chinese forces vigorously attacked our naval Landing
party, attempting to break through the thin line of our defense and
cut off completely the contact between the northern sector and the Hongkow
district and then annihilate the entire defenseless Japanese civilians
before our reinforcements reached Shanghai. The enemy unfurled the confi­dence
the very fact that the Chinese had notified all foreign residents
in Hongkow district through their respective embassies stationed in
Shanghai, as well as Chinese who lived in that part of the settlement,
which lies east of the so-called Creek, including Hongkow, and urged them
to move out of that district for safety by the nightfall of August 12,
and that when the Chinese forces commenced attacks from both air and
land the only remaining inhabitants in the attacked area were non-resident
Japanese. Suppose the Chinese succeeded in breaking through the Japanese
defense-line on that night, the fate of the lives of thousands of defenseless
Japanese nationals in that area would certainly have been the same as
that which had befallen the Japanese sailors, men and children numbering
above three hundred a short time before at Shanghai. What saved them
from the dread of massacre was nothing but the courageous resistance
offered by our Landing Party, such outstanding and undeniable facts
should never be lost sight of by those who wield the power of the press.
The Chinese are busy engaged in propaganda to influence the opinion of
European and American publics in China's favour by making appeals to the
humanitarian sentiment of those Western peoples. The Chinese are good
The New York Times editorial further casts doubt on the purpose of the concentration of a number of Japanese warships in Shanghai harbour before the outbreak of hostilities there. Our gunboats and destroyer were assembled there, of course, but these were the ships that had protected the vessels carrying the Japanese nationals who had evacuated from the upper reaches of the Yangtze to Shanghai in view of the menacing attitude of the anti-Japanese elements. We fail to find the reason why such a comment as that of the editorial writer of the New York Times is being directed against the unquestionable duty of the Navy.

Although we naturally wish to refrain from saying something on the duty of newspapers, we can not help expressing our earnest desire that a newspaper of such world-wide reputation for fairness and accuracy as the New York Times will avoid making hasty judgments on the important affair which vitally concerns a friendly Power.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. Umeda, the Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in English consisting of 7 pages and entitled "Comment Made by The Director of The Information Bureau In An Interview With The Japanese Correspondent Oct. 5, 1936," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
this 11th day of April, 1947.

/s/ K. Kayachi
Signature of Official.

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe
It is a matter of sincere regret that a series of armed clashes occurred between the Japanese and Chinese troops in North China since July 7, when the Japanese troops were unlawfully upon by the Chinese troops at Luokou. From the very beginning of this unfortunate incident, the Japanese army, in the face of utterly unwarrented and clearly premeditated provocation on the part of the Chinese troops, have exerted every effort for a peaceful settlement of the whole affair in accordance with our fixed policy of strictly localizing and peacefully settling the present complications on the spot.

Unfortunately however, this sincere attitude on the part of the Japanese army has only had the result of inviting further acts of challenge and repeated breaches of faith by the Chinese troops, who have revealed no sign of abandoning their attitude of resis-

and insult to the Japanese, even after they had definitely expressed their compliance with the Japanese demands and signed an agreement to that effect.

The Chinese troops, meanwhile, have become so arrogant and challenging as to have not only caused the frequent obstruction of our lines of communication and traffic but also dared to launch actions of proved premeditated provocation toward the Japanese troops.
Def. Doc. No. 116

Particularly contemptible are the acts of the Chinese troops, who, violating the definite pledge given by them beforehand to the Japanese Military Mission, have repeatedly carried on surprise attacks on the Japanese troops. On October 25, when a Japanese detachment was sent there to repair the military telegraph lines, and again at Hananchow, an outer gate of Peking, on July 26, when another Japanese contingent was dispatched for the protection of the Japanese residents in Peking.

The frequent repetition of these unwarranted and unlawful actions on the part of the Chinese troops evidently proves that they have been deliberately carrying out a plan of provocation, thereby clearly showing their attitude of defiance and contempt toward the Japanese troops.

Moreover, China has committed a serious and unpardonable breach of faith in rushing northward a formidable number of Central army troops in utter violation of the Sino-Japanese Agreement and steadily perfecting preparation for action against the Japanese troops.

The above circumstances clearly indicate that peace and order in North China has not been completely disrupted and that the lives and property of the Japanese residents are exposed to imminent danger. Needless to say, the maintenance of peace and order in North China is a matter of serious concern to both Japan and Manchoukuo, but every means at our disposal for a peaceful settlement of the present complications have not been exhausted.

There not only remains the resolute step of meting out a
Deserved punishment to the challenging Chinese troops.

We deeply regret that things have come to such an unfortunate pass in spite of the sincerity and goodwill of the Japanese Army to localize and peacefully liquidate the present Sino-Japanese collaboration in North China.

The Japanese punitive expedition, of course, is aimed solely at these Chinese forces who have been persistently challenging the Japanese troops and we have no intention whatever of making the 100 million Chinese population in North China the objective of our punitive action. Furthermore, in taking this step, we intend to exert our best in restoring peace and order in North China as speedily as possible with a view to promoting the welfare of the people in this part of China. We desire also to make it clear that our troops have no intention of using force inside the walled city of Peking unless the Chinese troops remaining there should try to challenge the Japanese troops, thereby precipitating an armed clash.

It goes without saying that, recognizing the rights and interests of foreign nationals in China, we will try our best to accord adequate protection to the lives and property of the foreign nationals and, last but not least important, take this opportunity of affirming that we entertain absolutely no territorial designs on North China even if we take necessary military actions for the punishment of recalcitrant Chinese troops.
Def. Doc. No. 1124

CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, FAYASHI ASORI, the Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "A Statement issued by the Japanese garrison headquarters in China (July 24, 1947)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certify at Tokyo,
on this 11th day of April 1947.

________________________
F. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
Def. No. 89

In response to our demand, the Chinese units in Marco Polo bridge finally evacuated and withdrew to the right side of the Yang Tin; we at 12:20 p.m., accordingly, our own concentration of forces on the north and east sides of Marco Polo bridge and we decided to open negotiations for the settlement of the incident suspending all hostilities. The willful delay in withdrawing Chinese units in Marco Polo bridge as well as the willful shooting by the Chinese unit in the neighborhood of Ling Tai Siao which happened on the night before last was not but to be considered as a result of the anti-Japanese propaganda conducted by the Nanjing Government and the Communist Party. Earlier towards the Chinese armies and especially towards junior officers and downward which recently seem to become even more serious, it will have no other effect than to hinder mutual understandings between the upper and lower parts among the Chinese army which lead the Nanjing and Chongqing political council to a dissatisfactory position. It will be really regrettable for the sake of both in general in case these tendencies should result in helping the
Def. Doc. No. 1166

so-called people's Frontists in their attainment of long cherished aims. The Japanese Army is greatly interested in the future development of the situation.
Cerificate of Authenticity

I, the occupant the post of the Chief of the censor in the Aoki Press, hereby certify that the document hereon attached, written in Japanese, consisting of a paper entitled "Chin Garrison Headquarters Communique" in a copy of a report in our newspaper issued on July 12th, 1926.

certified at Osaka,
on this 12th day of July, 1926

(\[signature\])

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here on in the presence of the above.

at the said place

on the said date

Witnesses: [\[signature\] (left)]
東京対日軍事顧問委員会

昭和元年二月三日

安部武雄 智

（昭和二年三月二十日）
Excerpt from the Asahi Shimbun, July 27, 1937.  

Full text of the notification to the 29th Army, (July 26, 1937)

It is a matter of great regret that a clash between Japanese and Chinese forces took place on the 25th at Langfang touched off by unlawful shootings by your forces at a part on our forces sent for the purpose of covering communications. It is the result of insincerity on your part in the execution of the agreement with our forces as well as your unmitigated challenging attitude. If your side still has the intention not to aggravate the Incident, the 37th Division which is stationing in the vicinity of Langfang Bridge and Pa-ko-chan should be quickly withdrawn to Changchun by noon to-morrow, viz: the 27th, the 37th Division inside the wall of Peiping should be withdrawn and, along with the unit of the 37th Division at Hsii-yuan, be transferred to the area west of the Yung Ting Ho through the area north of the Peiping Hankow Railway. The transportation of all these forces to Paching area should be commenced without any lapse of time. In case your army fail to execute the above, our army will regard it as lack of sincerity on your part and will be obliged to take the regrettable course of resuming to independent actions. All responsibility resulting from the above shall rest with your army.

Reference

Ref Doc. No. 1136
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICATION

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the document here attached, titled in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Full text of the notification to the 20th Army" is a copy of a report in our newspaper issued on July 27th, 1957.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 1st day of March, 19-67

[Signature: [Signature]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereafter in the presence of the witnesses.

[Signature: [Signature]

Witness: [Signature] (seal)
今田 槍九郎 （昭和十二年）七月二十八日 我の

昭和二十六年七月二十八日頃は 持器

昨二十五日頃放砲しつつ、水陸交錯甚篤の為め 行守する一船就軍に到すること

被害の不測射時 封鎖し、途中に軍船の壁突を見に曳りしは遮撃に増へ

新くの部隊を増大するために 客に大不撃の要領を有するに於ては先づ過去に至る数橋及

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以上の為に 水陸交錯甚篤の為め 行守する一船就軍に到ること
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. Naid, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereof attached is English, consisting of 11 pages and entitled "Address of Mr. Korekiro Hirota Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Seventy-Third Session of the Imperial Diet delivered on January 22, 1928" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 9th day of April 1947.

[Signature of Official]

Witness: K. [Signature] (sec.1)
At the last session of the Diet I had the honour to speak on the policy of the Japanese Government regarding the China Affair. Today I desire to address you on the subsequent developments which have occurred in the Chinese situation as well as on our foreign relations in general.

The attitude of the Japanese Government towards the present Affair has been clearly set forth in their statements made public from time to time in the past. Japan has no territorial ambitions in China, nor has she any intention of separating North China from the rest of the country. All she wants is that China, taking a broad view of the situation, will collaborate with Japan toward the fulfilment of the ideal of Sino-Japanese co-operation for the common prosperity and well-being of the two countries. Accordingly, even after the outbreak of the present Affair, we eagerly looked forward to joining forces with China for the purpose of securing peace in East Asia as soon as the Nationalist Government should have discarded their policy of opposition to Japan.

We have been convinced since the desire to work together for this idea of Japan. However, the Nationalist Government has misunderstood our true intention, and has been caught, as it were, in the trap set by themselves, being bound by their commitments to the anti-Japanese that they had fostered over long years. Unable to act wisely and well with a calm judgment, but relying upon third parties, or allying

themselves
There lives with Communists, they are even now calling for a prolonged resistance, regardless of the pliant of the 400 million people of China, who now have plunged into the depth of suffering and desolation. Not the heroic operations of our loyal and valiant forces in the north and in the south, have forced the Nationalist Government to abandon Nanking, their capital, and to flee far up the Yangtze River. Still unrepentant, they persist in their desperate opposition. It is a most lamentable thing for the sake of East Asia as a whole. It will be for the people of China.

Some time ago, when the Japanese Government received a plea for good offices by the German Government to act as an intermediary for bringing about direct negotiations between Japan and China, they proposed, with a view to affording the Nationalist Government a last opportunity for reconsideration, the following four points as the basic conditions for the solution of the affair:

1. China to abandon her pro-Communist and anti-Japanese and anti-Manchoukuo policies to collaborate with Japan and Manchoukuo in their anti-Comintern policy.

2. Establishment of de-militarized zones in the necessary localities, and of a special regime for said localities.

3. Conclusion of an economic agreement between Japan, China, and Manchoukuo.

4.
4. China to pay Japan the necessary indemnities.

These items summarised the minimum requirements which were considered absolutely indispensable by the Japanese Government. It was my earnest hope that the Nationalist Government would sue for peace on the basis of these fundamental conditions. However, that Government, blind to the welfare interests of East Asia, and ignoring both our magnanimity and Germany's friendly intention, exhibited no readiness to ask frankly for peace, but only sought to delay the matter and ultimately failed to send a reply that could be regarded in any way as sincere. The Nationalist Government having thus wilfully thrown away the last chance placed at their disposal by the Japanese Government, it became clear that there would be no hope of ever arriving at a solution by waiting indefinitely for any reconsideration on the part of the Nationalist Government. It is because of these circumstances that the Japanese Government issued on the 10th of this month the statement that they would forthwith cease to deal with the Nationalist Government. As is made plain in that statement our Government now look forward to the establishment and the growth of a China reformed, capable of unitive co-operation with Japan, which it is their intention to assist in the building of, of a new and rehabilitated China. I am fully convinced that is the only way of realising, our ideal of securing the stability of East Asia through Sino-Japanese co-operation.
I desire to avail myself of this occasion to say that in Europe and America there are some who are apt to entertain misgivings regarding Japan's intentions as though she were trying to close the Chinese door, and expel the interests of the Powers from China. Let me state explicitly that not only will Japan respect to the fullest extent the rights and interests of the Powers in the occupied areas, but she is prepared, for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Chinese people, to leave the door wide open to all Powers and to welcome their cultural and economic cooperation there. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Powers, by recognizing the new conditions prevailing in China, and by appreciating the propriety of such Japanese demands for necessary and national adjustments as have been submitted, or may be submitted hereafter, in order to meet those conditions, will cooperate for the establishment of a new order in the Far East.

As regards our relations with Manchoukuo, it is the fundamental principle of our national policy to help that country to achieve a healthy progress as an independent state, maintaining all the while its intimate and inseparable association with our own. In accordance with this basic principle our Government decided, on the abolition of the extraterritoriality long enjoyed by Japan and transfer of her administrative rights in the South Manchurian Railway zone,
And in the execution of that programme the first treaty was concluded in June, 1936, and the second treaty in November last year, the operation of both of which has proved exceedingly satisfactory. As for the international status of Manchoukuo, because of the various governmental reforms and improvements accomplished through her strenuous efforts exerted with the help of Japan for their materialization, the Powers have come to revise their appraisement of the new state. Italy, first of all, extended formal recognition towards the end of November last, and the mutual extension of formal recognition with the French Government of Spain took place in the early days of the following December.

Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union has always been guided by our conviction of the urgent need of placing the relations of the two countries upon a normal footing for the sake of the peace of East Asia. It is in accordance with this policy that we endeavoured within the past year to solve the long pending issue of the revision of the Fishery Treaty; but unfortunately, owing to the attitude of the Soviet authorities, we were obliged to conclude a tempus vivendi at the year one as in the year before last. I should add, however, that since the Soviet Government are proceeding with the necessary internal preparations for the conclusion of an agreement providing for a revision of the treaty now in force, we are taking steps for the continuance of the negotiation and the signing of the new agreement at the earliest possible date.

This
This Government attach great importance to a smooth operation of the Japanese concession enterprises in North Sakhalin. Let us say that the Japanese Government will never allow these rights and interests derived from the Soviet-Japanese Basic Treaty to be nullified through unreasonable means. Again, the relations between the Soviet Union and China are attracting the special attention of our nation. China concluded in August last a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, while members of the Comintern International have penetrated all classes of the Chinese, destroying the social order of the country and endangering the stability of East Asia.

Japan, ever solicitous for the civilization of East Asia and the welfare of its people, cannot but view the situation with the gravest concern.

In conducting military operations in China, Japan has been exercising special care lest the nationals and the rights and interests of third powers should suffer. But incidents have occurred, I regret to say, toward the end of last year the Wann Incident and the Latsun Incident, involving the Soviet Union and the United States. While it is needless to say that their occurrence was entirely unintentional, it was for a time that these incidents might lead to an alienation of feeling between Japan and those two countries. In view that thanks to the calm and fair-minded attitude taken by the Governments of both countries and the sincerity of our Government and people, the incidents have been brought
Since the outbreak of the present Affair, the United States has always maintained a fair and just attitude, acting on all occasions with such careful regard for the cause of Japan-American friendship, that, despite such difficulties as the present, the relations of the two countries, I am happy to say, have suffered no impairment. The importance to the world of our foreign affairs of American understanding needs scarcely to be mentioned. We shall continue to do our best towards the furtherance of Japan-American unity and good feeling.

As regards Great Britain, there has been no change in the policy of the Japanese Government, which aims at the maintenance of the traditional friendship between the two countries. I hope that the British Government and people, grasping fully the importance of Anglo-Japanese relations, will endeavour to comprehend correctly Japan's position in East Asia and to cooperate with Japan for the furtherance of peace and good understanding between the two nations. At the same time, I desire to urge upon our own people to stand solidly behind this policy of the Government, in view of the seriousness of the general situation.

I am glad to say that Japan and America have been brought closer together than ever through such auspicious events as the visit of H.I.M. Prince Chichibu and his pleasure to make a tour of that country on his way home from England last year, and also the cruise of the H.I.M.E. Asagiri, which included a call
At Fiume. Especially to this Government appreciate the friendly and most sympathetic attitude Japan has taken in accordance with the spirit of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement. We will strive to strengthen further the cooperation between the two countries.

From the beginning of the present affair, Italy, understanding our true motives, has collaborated with us along all lines. It is well known to you how consistently and intensely the Italian Government supported our country in November last year at the Brussels Conference of the Signatory Powers to the Nine Power Treaty. In connection with the question already mentioned of the settlement of the present affair, the Italian Government again manifested their sympathetic concern. This Government are most grateful for these efforts of Italy, which had taken actually the same position as Japan in the matter of combating the Comintern, joined in the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement in November last. It is a subject for congratulation from the standpoint of securing world peace that Japan, Germany and Italy have come to join forces under the Anti-Comintern banner. This Government will seek to extend further the effective operation of this agreement in concert with Germany and Italy.

In Spain, the civil war which broke out in July 1936 has developed steadily in favour of the régime under General Franco, which has now succeeded in bringing the greater part of the country under its control, and in consolidating its foundations. Moreover, the Franco Government is identified
with the Government of this country in the policy adopted against the Comintern. In the light of these facts we have decided to recognize that Government, and the necessary step to that end was taken early in December last year.

A survey of our foreign trade shows that there has been in the past year a notable increase, as compared with the preceding year, of more than 35 per cent. in value as regards imports and 18 per cent. in value as regards exports — the total value of imports and exports together exceeding 7,070,000,000 yen, which is an unprecedented sum in the history of our foreign commerce.

Nevertheless, there still remain the economic barriers which were set up by the various countries in a spirit of self-interest to diminish the volume of our foreign trade. While taking every means to eliminate these obstacles through diplomatic means by dealing individually with the various countries according to their respective circumstances and the measures employed by them, the Government are exerting on the other hand unremitting efforts to promote our foreign trade by every means available.

During the past year trade agreements have been concluded with British India, Burma, and Turkey. There were also signed in December a Treaty of Commerce with Siam and a supplementary agreement to the Italo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce relating to the Italian colonies. Negotiations are now in progress with other countries for the conclusion of the necessary trade agreements covering both old and new markets.

A boycott of Japanese goods has been initiated in certain countries
with the Government of this country in the policy adopted against the C movement. In the light of these facts we have decided to recognize that Government, and the necessary steps to that end were taken early in December last year.

A survey of our foreign trade shows that there has been in the past year a notable increase, as compared with the preceding year, of more than 35 per cent. in value as regards imports and 18 per cent. in value as regards exports -- the total value of imports and exports together exceeding 7,270,000,000 yen, which is an unprecedented sum in the history of our foreign commerce.

Nevertheless, there still remain the economic barriers which, while tending on the one hand to eliminate these obstacles through diplomatic means by dealing individually with the various countries according to their respective circumstances and the measures employed by them, this Government are exerting on the other hand unremitting efforts to promote our foreign trade by every means available. During the past year trade agreements have been concluded with British India, Burma, and Turkey. There were also signed in December a Treaty of Commerce with Siam and a supplementary agreement to the Italo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce relating to the Italian colonies. Negotiations are now in progress with other countries for the conclusion of the necessary trade agreements covering both old and new markets.

A boycott of Japanese goods has been initiated in certain
countries owing to misleading Chinese propaganda concerning
the present affair and to the machinations of the Chinese
who reside there in large numbers. However, nowhere has it
developed into any serious proportions, thanks to the united
efforts of the Government and people and the fair attitude
of the general public in the countries concerned.

The Japanese Government believe it to be one of the
necessary conditions of the peace and harmony and the pros-
perity of Japan, Manchukuo and China, and consequently of
the entire world, to increase rationally the productive
power of these three countries, and to strengthen their
economic ties, and at the same time to promote their trade
with the rest of the world. For the realization of this
purpose the Government are now carefully preparing appropi-
rate plans at home and abroad.

Finally I desire to say a few words on cultural work.
In order to promote international friendship and to bring
about a real peace among mankind it is necessary that nations
should form intimate cultural bonds and cultivate a full
understanding of one another's ideals and aspirations.

The present Affair is traceable in no small degree to Chinese
lack of understanding in this regard. If Japan and China are
to build up a lasting friendship they should understand
each other's national conditions and characteristics, and
cooperate culturally according to the fundamental spirit of
the Allied. Taking this attitude, the Government intend
to carry on in China nor intensively than therefore the cultural work which will serve as a foundation for the permanent peace and prosperity of the two nations. At the same time the Government will not relax their cultural work elsewhere since there is a special need, in the face of the present international situation, of making other peoples better acquainted with our unique culture and the national traits of our people who love justice and peace.

I hope that from what I have now said you have been able to understand the views of the Government regarding the present China Affair and foreign questions in general. In brief, the underlying aim of the foreign policy of the Government is to eradicate the root of evil in East Asia, to make known throughout the world the justice of our cause, and to contribute toward laying the foundations of world peace. To that end the Government are doing their very utmost. And I trust that you will appreciate the intentions of the Government and will extend your co-operation for the attainment of the objectives of our foreign policy in dealing with the grave emergency that confronts the nation today.
No. 23376

Notice to Third Powers Concerning
Military Operations in South China

(Published by the Information Bureau)

(October the 1st, 1938)

The following official document concerning military operations in South China has been sent this 17th day from Foreign Minister KOKU to Ambassadors and Ministers from various countries in Tokyo.

Sir,

1. With the object of protecting the rights and interests of subjects of third powers, the Japanese Government in an official document dated June 12, previously communicated the following matter as a request of the Japanese Government concerning persons and property of foreign powers in the area which is most likely to become a theater of land military operations in the future, that is, the area south of the Hsiang, and east of the line connecting SuLin, ICHEI, HAOHAI and HADOL:

(a) Persons who are subjects of third powers shall not approach Chinese military establishments.

(b) Property of third power subjects shall be distinctly marked so that it can be seen from the sky and from the ground, and this shall be promptly notified to the Japanese authorities.

(c) In case Chinese forces make use of the property of third power subjects located within a fighting zone, the Japanese army will be forced to attack it. In such an case, the Japanese forces
will not accept the responsibility of protecting foreign subjects or their properties.

D) From a point of view of preventing various kinds of incidents, it is most desirable that as far as possible the third country people withdraw from the actual fighting zone to a safety zone.

Before the commencement of the forthcoming military operation in the South China area, the Japanese Government again calls your attention again to the above mentioned request and has the honour to request the government of your country to take appropriate measures, especially with regard to the following points.

2. Experience in fighting at SIKOKI and CHUCHING shows that the Chinese army deliberately established its defence positions adjacent to property of the third powers, or used property of third powers in resisting Japanese forces. Therefore the Japanese forces found extremely difficult to protect the property of the third country. Accordingly, the Japanese government requests the government of your country to take effective and proper measures to prevent the Chinese forces from resorting to such actions as mentioned above during the coming military operation in the South China area.

In this connection, the Japanese Government takes the view that if Chinese forces are found next the properties of the third countries, naturally, the Chinese army shall be held responsible for the damages done.

Furthermore, the Japanese Government, although thinking it most
unlikely, hereby desires that your country will especially
enforce to avoid any act which might lead the Japanese army
to suspect that your country is assisting the Chinese side.
3. If the troops, warships, ships, or air-planes of third powers take
a move in the territorial waters and in the territorial air of
the Chinese territory all over South China from 14th to 15th of
during the military operation of the Japanese army in the South
China area, this may lead to unexpected trouble between the Japanese
army, warships, ships, and air-planes and those of third powers.
Therefore, the Japanese government requests the said countries to
avoid this as much as possible. The Japanese government also desires
that in case the army, warships, ships, or air-planes of your
country must of necessity make moves in the abovementioned area,
you will notify the Japanese authorities, more than ten days
beforehand, if possible, so as to allow for delay in communi-
cation and liaison.
4. Finally, considering that the Chinese army may attempt to make
use of territory, territorial waters or the territorial air of
third powers, the Japanese government requests that the government
of your country never allow such a plan on the part of the
Chinese army and firmly believes that you will comply with this
request. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your
Excellency the assurance of my highest regard.

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Def. Doc. / 1175

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, Mr. M. Kuro, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives, Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Note on the third Powers concerning Military Order in South China. (Published by the Information Bureau) (October the 12th, 1938)," is an exact and authorized extract from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947.

/s/ M. M. Kuro (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ W. M., Katsumura (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 29, 1948.
南支作戰

昭和十五年十月十二日

（昭和三年三月二日公報）

南支作戰

昭和十二年六月三十日

（昭和十三年十月十二日）

以南西、南東、政府、重要作戦に従属し、上作戦、東南地域

昭和十五年十月十二日

（昭和十三年十月十二日）
クハラ各種事件発生防止ノ見地ヨリ御検覧マシテ次第ナルコト

ノ至近距離ヲ保障シテナレル我が方今次支方面ニ於ケル作戦ニ於テハ支那軍ヲ第ニ作戦ヲ進突テハ其部隊ヲ撃滅シスルモ有之候

此ノ際於テハ支那軍ヲ強力ニ於テハ支那政府ヲ並ヲ持ちスルモ有之候

コトトヲ要請致しますベンノ候

一、上海、九江ニ於ケル仏ヲ間ノ南支事変二、支那政府ヲ於テハ支那軍ヲ第ニ作戦ヲ進突テハ其部隊ヲ撃滅シスルモ有之候
I have the honour to state the views of the Japanese government concerning the situation in East Asia—a task that has been made possible by the Emperor Meiji whose illustrious memory is reverenced today.

Following upon the capture of Canton, hence, the heart of China, was also taken, so that the so-called "Middle Plain", with its seven great cities, which virtually sustain the life of modern China, has now fallen into our hands. There is an old Chinese saying to the effect that "no one controls the Middle Plain controls the whole land". That the Chinese régime is no longer anything but a local régime. Japan has achieved these results without overstretching her fighting power, which has always been kept at a level sufficient to ward off any intervention from the outside. We are moved, as never before, by the consciousness that this has been made possible by the august virtue of His Majesty, the Emperor, and the heroic efforts of his valiant officers and men.

In thinking of the glorious victories, our deepest gratitude goes out first to the tens of thousands of those who have been killed and wounded. Their noble sacrifices impose upon us, I feel, a two-fold obligation: first, we follow in the footsteps of those willing martyrs, and to achieve at all costs the ends for which they have fought, and secondly, to repay their services by doing all in our power for their relatives...
Let us now consider the key to China's future: What then do we want? ... What not the destruction of China ... the salvation of China but co-operation with her. Working hand in hand with the Chinese people awakened to a new consciousness of themselves as a nation of the Orient, a want to build up an East Asia which is truly peaceful and settled. Let me say, no country is better able than Japan of the Orient national aspirations of the Chinese, nor feels more keenly the need that China should vindicate her position as a completely independent state.

It is a historical necessity that the three great neighbour nations -- China, Manchoukuo and Japan -- while fully retaining their sovereign independence should coexist closely united in their common duty of safeguarding East Asia. It is deeply to be explored not only for the sake of Japan but for that of all Asia that the attainment of goal has been thwarted through the mistaken policy of the government. The policy of the government was borrowed from a transient fashion of the period that followed the Great War. It did not originate in the native intelligence and good sense of the Chinese people. In particular, the conduct of that government, which in its efforts to stay in power exerted not whether the action was left a prey to Communism or relegated to a minor colonial status, cannot but be regarded as treason toward those many patriotic Chinese who had risked...
their lives in order to erect a new China. It was in those circumstances that Japan, reluctant as she was to be involved in the tragedy of two great minded nations fighting against one another, was compelled to take up arms against the Chinese anti-Communist regime.

Japan fervently desires the awakening of China. Let us hope that wise and foreseeing Chinese will be built to assume leadership and to guide their nation back to the right path, and lead the rejuvenated state forward in the fulfillment of our common mission in East Asia. Already in Peiping and Nanking, signs of reform have appeared. And in the wide plains to the north and west, Mongolia is springing to life. Let the wonderful Chinese people, who in the past 5000 years of their history have again and again illumined the annals of civilization, prove once more their greatness by sharing in the stupendous task of creating a new Asia. Participation even by the Nationalist government need not be rejected if, returning to the true spirit of China, it should repudiate its past policy, remodel its personnel and offer to join in the work of a thoroughly regenerated regime.

The nations of the world must surely be able to have a clear comprehension of these new developments in East Asia. It is undisputed history that China heretofore has been a victim of the rivalry between the powers whose imperialistic ambitions have constantly imperilled her tranquility and in independence,
Japan realizes the need of fundamentally rectifying such a state of affairs and she is eager to see a new order established in East Asia -- a new structure of peace based on true justice.

Japan is in no way opposed to collaboration with foreign powers nor does she desire to impair their legitimate rights and interests of the powers, understanding her true motives, will formulate policies suited to the new conditions, Japan will be glad to cooperate with them. Japan's zeal for combating Communism is certainly well known by this time. The aim of the Comintern is to sovietize the Orient and to overturn the world. Japan is firmly determined to eradicate the communist influence which is behind the so-called "long term resistance" of the Chinese regime.

Germany and Italy, our allies against Communism, have manifested their sympathies with Japan's aims in East Asia and we are profoundly grateful for the great encouragement that their moral support has given our nation during this crisis. In the present emergency, it is necessary for Japan not only to strengthen still further her ties with those countries but also to collaborate with them in a common world outlook towards the reconstruction of international order.

What the world needs to-day is a lasting peace based upon a foundation of justice and fair dealing. It cannot be denied that the principles governing international relations in the recent past have in practice tended only to preserve and perpetuate with cast-iron rigidity an inequitable state of affairs.

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In this irrational origin lies the fundamental cause of the collapse of the Covenant of the League of Nations, along with many other pacts and treaties. We should not allow international justice to remain merely a beautiful phrase, but we should strive to create a new foundation of peace, in accordance with a comprehensive view of all human activities—commerce, industry, natural resources, culture, etc.—and in keeping with the actual conditions and the progress of events, I firmly believe that this is the only way to overcome the universal crisis which confronts us today.

Placing absolute trust in the men at the front, the Japanese at home are silently engaged in speeding war-time production and in taking precautions for protracted hostilities. Here we have a modern reflection of the old Japanese spirit. History shows that our national fortunes waxed or waned in proportion to the degree in which the whole people were consciously aware of Japan's national policy. Knowing that a lasting peace in the Orient has always been the aim of our sovereign, we cannot but be deeply conscious of our moral obligations as His subjects. It is high time that all of us should face squarely these responsibilities—namely, the mission to construct a new order on a moral basis—a union of all the nations of East Asia, in mutual reliance and complete self-determination. What does this mean? What sacrifices does this call for? What preparations are required? These are matters of which we must obtain a clear understanding and concerning which we cannot afford to make any mistake. If there is anyone
who believes that the fall of Canton and Nan-tou marks a turning point and that an immediate return to normal conditions is soon to arrive, he simply has not grasped the significance of the present affair. There could be nothing more dangerous than that. Japan's undertaking to erect a new Last Ark implies that she has entered upon a long period of creative work in all the activities of her national life. In that sense the real war has just begun. If we are to make of ourselves a truly great nation, we must stand united as one man and pursue with firm conviction the work of consolidation and construction as well as at home.
Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1947.

K. Ui
Signature of official

Witness: K. Urabe (seal)
日本首相近衛公のラブォ放送

三月一日

おっしゃったとおり、近衛公の肩を落としました。しかし、その事実は、政治界でも大きな反感をもたらすものです。

近衛公の永続的な政策の基礎に建立しているのは、民主主義の原則に則る政府形態であり、そのあり方を守るためには、政治家たちの協力が必要です。

近衛公の政策がもたらす影響は、国内外で大きく伝わっています。民主主義の実現を願う全ての日本人に、近衛公の政策を支持することをお願いします。

この放送は、近衛公の政策の理解を深めるために行われました。皆さん、近衛公の政策を支えるために、一緒に頑張りましょう！
日本の政府の為、めのうち、大統領の前後の要、国に於いてのものであって、日本に於ては、これから国家が独立主権を於ける所である。特に、日本政府が、指揮力を持たことが必要である。この如き中立かつ、日本は、二大頂点に於て、立派な立場を於ける所である。特に、日本政府が、指揮力を持たることが必要である。
日本の態度は、日本が他に軍事的危機に直面している。日本が他に軍事的危機に直面している。
香人は、国際上の正義を単に口にして置いてはならぬ。両国の会話を、
一転怒を叫ぶものだより、人正常決断への復活が遅くに達せられる、も

一転怒を叫ぶものだより、人正常決断への復活が遅くに達せられる、も
Statement of the Japanese Government

November 2, 1938

By the sacred virtue of His Majesty, our naval and military forces have captured Canton and the three cities of Wuhan; and all the vital areas of China have thus fallen into our hands. The Kuo-min-tang Government exists no longer except as a mere local regime. However, so long as it persists in its anti-Japanese and pro-communist policy, our country will not lay down its arms -- never until that regime is crushed.

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign.

This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and coordination between Japan, Manchoukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defence against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This indeed is the way to contribute toward the stabilization of East Asia and the progress of the world.

What Japan desires of China is that that country will share in the task of bringing about this new order in East Asia. She confidently expects that the people of China will fully comprehend her true intentions and that they will respond to the call of Japan for their cooperation. Even the participation of the Kuomintang Government would not be rejected, if, repudiating the policy which has guided it in the past and remolding its personnel, so as to translate its rebirth into fact, it were to come forward
to join the establishment of the new order.

Japan is confident that other powers will on their part correctly appreciate her aims and policy, and adapt their attitude to the new conditions prevailing in East Asia. For the cordiality hitherto manifested by the nations which are in sympathy with us, Japan wishes to express her profound gratitude.

The establishment of a new order in East Asia is in complete conformity with the very spirit in which the Empire was founded; to achieve such a task is the exalted responsibility with which our present generation is entrusted. It is, therefore, imperative to carry out all necessary internal reforms, and with full development of the aggregate national strength, material as well as moral, fulfill at all costs this duty incumbent upon our nation.

Such the Government declares to be the immutable policy and determination of Japan.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Japanese Government, November 3, 1938", is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 9th day of April, 1947.

/s/ K. HAYASHI

Witness: K. URABE

Translation Certificate

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 18 April 1947
The agreement of the Government of the
United States concerning the problem of the return of
American citizens in China and other problems
(17 July 1943)

Negotiations between the United States concerning
the problem of the return of American citizens in China
and other areas invaded by the Japanese forces have
continued for some days past. The Imperial Govern-
ment, in view of the friendly relations between both
countries and in consideration of the kind
efforts of the United States, issued the following
official letter dated July 6th, addressed to the United
States Ambassador in Tokyo, which contains the solution
to this problem.

I have the honor of informing you that I am in receipt of your
letter of July 1st containing reference to your letter of May 17th
which was addressed to the former Foreign Minister "From,
and which states, as per instruction from your Government, that your
Government is deeply interested in making it possible for American
citizens in China to return again to, or possess their own property
from which they were forced to leave by the Japanese forces which
once occupied it or now occupy it.

As to the University of SAMPCHA, taken as an example in your
letter, since the Chinese forces at the outset of the battles in
SAMPCHA and vicinity used that University as a base for resistance,
the Japanese forces as a result of the fighting to repulse the
Chinese/undoubtedly damaged it. It is due to military requirements
that the Japanese forces have since then continued to occupy the said
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University. However, of late the Imperial Government, in consideration of various situations and in accordance with its fundamental principles to respect the rights and interests of third countries, has decided to stop this military use of the said University and to evacuate army and navy forces from it by July 5th on these conditions: that it shall not be opened until it is no longer an obstacle to our military requirements; that friendly consideration be given in connection with the residence of watchmen and the repair of the buildings, insomuch as concrete proposals from the owner of the said University do not hinder military operations; and that as to the damage caused by its use by the Japanese Army, consideration shall be given in the future as in the case of damage of the same kind inflicted upon property owned by nationals of third countries.

The Imperial Consul-general on the spot has already informed your Consul-general of this.

In the next place, regarding the return of nationals of your country to the various lower areas watered by the KAWA River, the said district is still infested with defected troops lurking in various places, and we cannot forecast when an unforeseen incident may break out. Since the police of the Imperial Consulate alone are not enough to protect nationals of third countries, soldiers must be spared from units that are duty-bound to take part in fighting. This is a great burden to the Japanese troops.

It is true that about 300 Javanese live at NAKUN under such circumstances, but they are only men who are permitted to live there.
Def. Sec. No. 111:

From military necessity, there are many instances of how these Japanese suffered from violence and robbery at the hands of recalcitrant Chinese, in spite of rigorous measures of protection and security given them. However, as these who suffered wrongs were the same, they do not attract as great attention as in the case of foreigners.

In the said district the Imperial Government is at present carrying out military operations which are unavoidable from the standpoint of self-defense. Today SHANGHAI and NANKING seem apparently to enjoy tranquil peace, but as bases of operations, they are in a state under which not only special considerations must be taken for protecting military secrets, but also many dangerous elements crowd in to hatch plots. Therefore, we cannot but take a view fundamentally different from that of your country which contends, on a basis of pure external appearance, that the said district is not a dangerous one.

You understand that it is extremely difficult to permit nationals of third countries to return to the aforesaid districts under such conditions of public order. Nevertheless, we have given every possible friendly consideration to satisfy the desires of the citizens of your country. There are many cases already wherein return was permitted in May and June, and there is absolutely no intention on our part to refuse such desires. It is our policy to permit gradual return hereafter in keeping with circumstances in various places.

Henceforth I express renewed assurance of my esteem to your Excellency.
6 July 1941

Mr. W - Minister of Foreign Affairs to His Excellency,
United States Ambassador
TOKYO, at 00:00

As regards the problem of returning British nationals to
HANKING, a problem was raised by six employees of the HOKI Company who went to HANKING without our previous knowledge. The Imperial Government, however, taking a wide view of war-time-Commonwealth relations and especially commending the efforts of British Ambassador SRIGIE in TOKYO to promote friendly relations between
the two countries, and partially hoping to rejoin him therefore, has
determined to grant access to HANKING to the said six British
nationals upon their once returning to SHANGHAI. Furthermore, it
is decided that our local authorities will issue the same, if the
British guarantee the trust-worthiness of those individuals. Thus,
the trouble has been settled smoothly.

By the way, that the Imperial Government takes sufficient consideration of the rights and interests of third countries and
their citizens in HANKING and is always endeavoring to take fair and
competent measures may be said to be shown in the following two or
three instances:

1. The J. T. T. troops withdrew from the University of
SHANGHAI on July 5th.

2. We agreed at the end of last month to issue visas
permitting two American businessman, employees of the
Standard Oil Company and the Texas Oil Company, to go...
It is widely known that prior to the above, between May 31st and June 16th, 35 American ministers, physicians, and nurses came back to "WHITE" and to other lower areas situated by the YANGTZE River.

There are 30 of those Americans who received the above permission according to the American report. This difference in number is due to the fact that some of them seem to have made direct application to the Imperial authorities instead of the United States Consul-general.

As regards the 14 American ministers' return to SH-OAH, the local authorities have reported that they are to issue passes to all of them by the end of June. So six of them, however, passes have already been issued.
Def. Doc. No. 1135

Certificate to

Certificate as to source and nature of document (No. 2)

I, H. NASHI, Acting Chief of the Archives Section of the
Japanese Foreign Office, certify that the document hereto attached
in Japanese consisting of 6 pages and entitled "The Announcement
of the Information Concerning the Problem of the Return of
English and Americans in China and Other Problems (17 July 1931)"
is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese
Government (Japanese Foreign Office).

9 April 1947
at: TOKYO

H. NASHI, Acting Chief (seal)
signed

The above signature and seal were affixed in my presence.
On the same date at the same place.

Witness: M. W. KOTSDIM (seal)
THE TALK OF THE CHIEF OF LEGATION BUREAU OF
THE JAPANESE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE CHIEF
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EARLY
OF MARCH (November 2, 1934 (Showa 13))

Since the Chinese Incident broke out last year and China took up matters
concerning it with the League of Nations on September 12th, the Assembly
and the Council, recognizing that Japan's actions towards China is a violation
of the Nine-Power Treaty and the "Anti-Boxer Pact," promised moral assistance
to China and advised the Members of the League to support China individually.
Several resolutions were adopted censuring the Empire, saying that the
Japanese forces bombéd unfortified cities, or used poison gas. Because of
this or otherwise the Council in this autumn session, complying with China's
demand to apply Article 17 of the Covenant to the China Incident, came to
adopt finally, according to Dr. Fevre 1 of the same article on September 30th,
the report that each Member of the League might take up separately the
sanction stipulated in Article 16 of the Covenant against the Empire.

Now, on taking a view of recent activities of the League, it is clear
that it has gone astray from the ideals which it held in the days of its
foundation, and has become a hot-bed for behind-the-scenes maudlinings of the
for Fevre. I cannot help recognizing it really as not only undue interference
but also a malicious intrigue against the Empire that the League, blind to its
Since the China Incident broke out last year and China took up matters concerning it with the League of Nations on September 12th, the Assembly and the Council, recognizing the Empire's actions toward China as a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the 'Anti-Comintern,' provided moral assistance to China and advised the Members of the League to support China individually. Several resolutions were adopted also denouncing the Empire, saying that the Japanese forces bombed unfortified cities, or used poison gas. Because of this or otherwise, the Council in this autumn session, complying with China's demand to apply Article 17 of the Covenant to the China Incident, came to adopt finally, according to Paragraph 1 of the same Article on September 30th, the report that each Member of the League might take up separately the sanction stipulated in Article 16 of the Covenant against the Empire.

Now, on taking a view of recent activities of the League, it is clear that it has gone astray from the ideals which it held in the days of its foundation, and has become a hot-bed for behind-the-scene maneuverings of a few Powers. I cannot help recognizing it really as not only undue interference but also malicious intrigue against the Empire that the League, blind to its
lack of power, has been to apply the provisions, including the Sanction against a Non-emb R of the League, of the Empire for the first time since the foundation of the League. In view of the substance of the League and its attitude toward Japan as mentioned above, the Government decided on a policy of terminating existing cooperative relations with every organ of the League and after having received Imperial rescript, had Chief of the Japanese Secretariat at the International Conference UDU communicate to that effect under the datr of the 2nd, to the Secretary-General of the League.

On the occasion when the Empire notified the League of her secession, an Imperial Rescript was graciously issued to indicate whether the Empire should go. Since then, the Government, in obedience to Imperial wishes, has participated in every work of the League in connection with peace and humanity even after the Empire seceded from the League. Unfortunately, as a result of the recent decision of the League, however, the Empire has had to abandon such cooperation from now on. However, this does not mean more than the abandonment of our participation in international matters which are being carried on through the organs of the League. Therefore the second purport of the Rescript above referred to still remains shining and the Imperial Government, in obedience to it, will not change in further cooperation with all sorts of projects concerning peace and will endeavor to participate and to cooperate in international matters which aim at promoting peace and the welfare of mankind.
The note concerning the 'Bundling' of cooperation with every organ of the League and the Results of the 'Bundling' of Cooperation.

"I have the honor to inform you under the instructions of the Imperial Government that the Empire of Japan after reflecting upon the circumstances arising from the situation which has been recently brought about between the Empire and the League of Nations as a result of September 30th, when the Council of the League adopted the report that the provision of Article 16 might be applied to the Empire as a result. Paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the Covenant, has decided to abandon her cooperation with the various organs of the League, which had been continued even after the withdrawal from the League by the Empire."

Consequently, among the various commissions of the League, the representatives appointed by the Government who had been attending the Permanent Commission on the Administration of Mandates, the Opium Inquiry Commission and the Social Problems Inquiry Commission and our committees or associate committees who have cooperated in individual capacities with the Permanent Commission on the Administration of Mandates, the Art and Science Cooperation Commission, the Central Opium Commission, the Geometric Commission, and the Health Commission will be dismissed in the case of the letter former and in the case of the resignations will be soon. And cooperation with the Oriental Epidemic Information Bureau, the labor organizations and the Permanent International Court of Justice will also probably be terminated.

These measures of course, have nothing to do with the administration of
the mandates and the present arrangements will be continued, but the
government will not be able to have our representatives participate in the
government work of the permanency in the administration of mandates.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HIYOSHI, Keoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The Talk of the Chief of Information Bureau of the Foreign Office Concerning the Abandonment of cooperation with Every Group of the "Race of Nations." (November 2, 1938) is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April, 1947

(signed) HIYOSHI, KEORU (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: (signed) YASUHE, TSUYU (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio, KAWAMOTO, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation, as set in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Yukio, KAWAMOTO

Tokyo, Japan

Date 22 April, 1947

5
The present military operations of the Imperial Japanese forces in South China are purely military operations for the purpose of intercepting the principal arms and munitions supply route of the Chinese forces and destroying the important points of hostile machinations against Japan.

The policy hitherto pursued by the Japanese Government of respecting the rights and interests of the third powers in China remains unchanged. Accordingly the utmost efforts will be exerted for the prevention of any damage to the third powers in the present operations. It is requested that the third powers take special consideration and understand the real intentions of Japan and cooperate with the efforts of the Japanese forces and thereby preclude the occurrence of any untoward incidents.
Def. Doc. No. 1189

CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of one page and entitled "Statement of the Intelligence Bureau Chief on Military Operations in South China, October 12, 1938", is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1937.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
你讲的都是一些非常重要的观点。
The Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman
Concerning the Assistance of U.S.S.R. to China.

(Dec 3 of the 13th year of Showa (1938))

It seems that the "1"-15 type and "1"-16 type fighters, the 'S.B.' bombers, etc., sent by U.S.S.R. to China between about last October and about the middle of April of this year, make a total of approximately 500, the Russian fliers and engineers amounting to some 200. As the majority of these aircraft were either shot down or blasted by our air forces, the balance may be only 100 or so. The U.S.S.R.'s supply of the arms and personnel to China, as illustrated in the above examples, can be expected to continue steadily in future.

2 passengers (fell to death) on the airplane which, on January 26, made an air-raid on Peipking and were shot down by our force proved to be Russians. The airplane which, on March 14, air-raid on T'hu and was also shot down by our force was an 'S.B.' bomber and its passenger taken prisoner by our forces was identified, through his statement, as an air lieutenant attached to the 'Leningrad' Air Corps. Those positive evidences concerning the assistance of U.S.S.R. to China were produced as was previously announced. 'Minister HIROTA, accordingly, strongly called the attention of U.S.S.R. to these facts on the occasion of his conversation with U.S.S.R. Ambassador at
Tokyo on March 28 and, at the same time, instructed Ambassador SHIGEITSU to U.S.S.R. to make strict representations to the U.S.S.R. Government.

Ambassador SHIGEITSU, in his interview with Foreign Commissar LITVINOV, on April 4, after giving full particulars of the positive evidences concerning the assistance of U.S.S.R. to China as mentioned above, made the following representations to him: "Such Assistance to China, in the light of the actual conditions and systems of U.S.S.R., cannot but be considered to be hostile actions of U.S.S.R. herself, waged against Japan throughout China under the direct orders of the Soviet Government; The Soviet Government must take the whole blame for any eventual situation caused by such actions; representation is, hereby, made in accordance with the Government's instructions." M. LITVINOV, to this representations, made the lame excuse that: "It is not U.S.S.R. alone who is selling arms to China. U.S.S.R. has sent neither an army nor an individual soldier to China to have them participate in a hostile act. The alleged statement of the said prisoner or flier is not worth believing. Japan does not complain whatever of the existence of various foreign volunteers among the Chinese army fighting against the Chinese Government." Ambassador SHIGEITSU argued against this, saying, "You seem to be misunderstanding the grave nature of my representations of to-day. The situation in China, however, has no room for discussion
as you are well aware. It is only natural that the Japanese Government should make such strong representations to your Government against the Soviet military men in active service, in such a serious phase, proceeding to China to take hostile actions against the Japanese army in China by order of the Government.

Since it is irrefutable that the U.S.S.R. should have such system as that of volunteers, they including both airplanes and fliers, so abroad by order of the Government without exception. It is beyond imagination, so far as other states are concerned, that any military men in active service should go to China to participate in hostilities against Japan. Should any state happen to take similar actions to those of U.S.S.R., the Japanese Government would probably assume the same attitude toward the state concerned as toward U.S.S.R."

Thus the Ambassador urged him to make serious reconsideration.

As to the assistance of U.S.S.R. to China, Director of the European and Asiatic Affairs Bureau INOKYE pointed out thereafter to the Councillor of the U.S.S.R. Embassy at Tokyo on April 11th, on the occasion of the negotiations concerning the settlement of various questions pending between Japan and U.S.S.R., that the Soviet airplanes and fliers in the Chinese army were continuing hostile actions against the Japanese army, the fact of which was too serious a problem for the Japanese people to pass over, thus calling again the careful attention.
of U.S.S.R. to it. Every Japanese has a grave concern with
the Soviet Government which, since the outbreak of the present
China Incident, has hitherto assisted China materially and
mentally and has been arousing public opinion against Japan
just as she would against a hostile power. We strongly demand
of U.S.S.R. that she may correctly understand the Japanese
position in East Asia, changing her attitude toward China as
soon as possible.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Section of Archives of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 4 pages and entitled "The Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the Assistance of U.S.S.R. to China (May 3 of the 14th year of Showa)" is an exact and authorized official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 8th day of April, 1947
/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.
Witness: /S/ URABE, Katsuma (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, WILLIAM E. CLARKE, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ WILLIAM E. CLARKE
Tokyo, Japan
Date 21 April 1947
D.S. No. 1191

Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning
the military action in South China
November 15, 1939

In regard to the recent military operation off the coast of South
China, the Imperial Government has not in the least altered its previous
attitude towards the third powers.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, [Name], Secretary of the [Official Office], do hereby certify that the document or attachment is English, consisting of [number of pages] page(s) and entitled "[Title or Description]." This document, signed [Date], is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at [City],

on this [Date] of [Month] [Year].

[Signature of Official]

witness: [Signature of Witness]
The U.S. Government has made some inquiries in an official note dated October 6 and addressed to Foreign Minister KONOYE concerning (1) control of exchange in Tsinan; (2) Revision of Customs tariff in North and Central China; (3) establishment of Communications, transportation, wharf and development companies; and (4) restrictions based on military necessity of the Japanese forces.

To this note, Foreign Minister ARITA answered as follows in an official note addressed to Mr. Grew United States Ambassador to Japan, on 18th inst.

Your Excellency:

We acknowledge receipt of your note of October 6, addressed to the former Foreign Minister KONOYE, in which you made representations concerning the rights and interests of your country in China. Citing many instances based on the information in the hands of your government, you state in the said note that the Japanese authorities in China are treating your nationals with discrimination and infringing upon the rights
and interests of your country. In the following we set forth the views of the Japanese Government on these instances.

(1) The circumstances which necessitated adoption of such measures for the control of exchange as are now being taken in Tsingtao and the present condition of the matter are as follows as far as the Imperial Government knows, and we understand that these measures make no discrimination against your nationals:

The Federal Reserve Bank of China was established some time ago in North China. It was decided that the notes of the bank should have an international value of one shilling and two pence per yen. They are now widely in circulation, the amount of issue already running up to more than one hundred million yen. Being the compulsory currency of the Provisional Government, the maintenance of the value of the F.R.P. notes and their smooth circulation were deemed indispensable as the foundation for the operation and development of economic activity in North China. The Japanese Government has therefore been assuming an attitude of cooperation in this matter and all Japanese residents are using the notes. Consequently, in carrying on export trade, the F.R.P. notes are being changed into foreign currency at the rate of one shilling and two pence to one yen. On the other hand, as the for...
of the old fapi circulating in the same areas, has actually fallen to about eight pence, the exporters using this currency in their transactions are making great illegal gains, compared with those who carry on trade properly by using the P.R.E. notes at the legal rate of one shilling and two pence. Thus the Japanese nationals and others who are using the P.R.E. notes are placed at an unduly great disadvantage, compared with those who live and engage in business within the jurisdiction of the raw North China Government and yet use only the old fapi.

Besides, the fact that there is such a difference of exchange value between the old fapi and the P.R.E. notes which are being charged by the P.R.E. authorities at a nearly same rate unfavorably affects the international value of those notes and in consequence the value of Japanese yen. Therefore, the Japanese Government cannot be indifferent and leave the matter as it is. The measures adopted concerning this export exchange problem in Tsinan was taken as an attempt to make the users of the old fapi who had been gaining undue profits deal on the same footing as the users of the P.R.E. notes, and at the same time, to support the maintenance of the foreign value of the latter notes, moreover, as the measures do not vary in application according to the nationality, they mean no discrimination whatever. On the contrary, the position of the users of the
F.R.B. notes who had in a sense been treated discriminatingly has become equal to that of others, and they are now able to compete on a perfectly equal basis.

(2) The new Chinese regimes in North and Central China have recently revised the customs tariff. It was an attempt to effect a rational reform of the tariff rates which had been enforced by the National Government but were thought to be unduly high and unfit for promoting the reconstruction of economy and the welfare of the people. In the revision they adopted for the time being the tariff rates of 1931, which had already been approved by other nations concerned, and the interest of no special country has been considered. Consequently no voice of dissatisfaction with the reform has been heard from any foreign residents in China. The Japanese Government, too, has approved of the motive of this reform, and considers that the reform will promote the development of every other nation's trade with China.

(3) As regards the establishment of some Companies for carrying out certain enterprises in China, we are of the opinion that the reconstruction and development of economy, finance and industry in China after the Incident is of the most urgent necessity for the welfare of the Chinese people, and our government, deeply interested in the prompt commencement and progress of those reconstructional as well as developmentary
enterprises in order to establish a new order in East Asia, is concentrating every possible efforts for that purpose. The establishment of reinvestment companies such as the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company has been effected solely to render assistance necessary for the above-mentioned reconstruction as well as to contribute towards developing the resources of China. It neither infringes on the rights and interests of your nationals in China, nor makes any discrimination against their enterprises. Accordingly, the Japanese Government has not only no intention of objecting to, but is ready to welcome, the participation of any third country who is willing to cooperate with us with due regard for the new situation.

The establishment of the Electric Communication Companies in North and Central China, the Inland River Steamship Company in Shenchai, and Tsingtao Harb Company was also prompted by the urgent necessity of speedily reorganizing the communication and transportation services and harbour facilities which were damaged during the Incident. The electric communication is in nature a public enterprise and it is natural that it is undertaken by some specified companies from the viewpoint of public safety and national defense. But the other companies are all undertaken by ordinary Chinese or Japanese corporations, and none of them aim to monopolize profits nor to make any
discrimination against your country or any other third country.
with regard to the wool trade, although control over purchasing
agencies was exercised once in Nanking, it has since been
abolished. As to tobacco, there is no plan now of making it
government monopoly.

(4) As for the return of your nationals to the areas
occupied by the Japanese forces, no restriction is placed,
except in such special cases as, for instance, the return
jeopardizes their safety. As you know, although in the districts
along the Yangtze River many of your countrymen have already
returned, it is not yet permitted in general. The reason is,
as we have often informed you, either that it is considered
to be dangerous because public order is not yet restored, or
that the nationals of third countries cannot be allowed to enter
due to the necessity of keeping military secrets or to the
requirements of military operations. Other minimum restrictions
placed on the residence, travelling, business and commerce of
the people of your country in the occupied areas are also
recessitated by the present state of peace and order and military
requirements. The Japanese Government is expecting to restore
a normal condition as quickly as circumstances permits.

(5) It is quite a surprise to the Japanese Government to
hear that there is some fundamental differences between the
treatment given to our people in the territory of your country
and the treatment your nationals receive in our Empire. It is true that under the present extraordinary situation various economic restraints are being put upon your citizens in Japan. But these restraints are imposed not only upon our nation and your citizens but also upon all other foreigners. It is needless to say that these restraints are not placed particularly upon your nationals. And as to your views expressed in your note concerning the treatment of Japanese in the territory of your country, the Japanese Government reserves the statement of our opinion for a later occasion.

As repeatedly mentioned above, the Japanese Government has been doing its utmost to look after the rights and interests of your country in China. However, now that military operations on an unprecedentedly large scale are in progress in East Asia, we hope you will understand that we may sometimes be unavoidably hindered from carrying out our intention to respect your rights and interests in the East Asia. At present our Empire is making every possible effort for the construction of a new order in East Asia based on true international justice. The attainment of this object is not only indispensable for the existence of our Empire, but will lay the foundations for an eternal peace in East Asia. Now that a new situation is developing in this part of the world, we believe that the application of concepts and principles which held good for
the pre-incident situation to the present and future situation would not only fail to bring the outstanding problems to a solution, but would also hinder the establishment of an eternal peace in East Asia.

If, however, your country and other Powers acknowledge the purpose of our note set forth above and that will take part in the great work of reconstructing East Asia in the various fields of industry and trade not only the Japanese Empire has no intention of objecting to it, but we also believe that we are ready to accept even the government now being formed in China.

Accept, Your Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration,

Yours respectfully,
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Announcement of the Information Section re the Japanese Government's Answer to the United States concerning the latter's Rights and Interests in China" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo, on this 6th day of April, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ URASE, Katsuma (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan
Date 28 April, 1947
外務省電報

1909年5月6日

米国政府

件名：二月十一日米国政府大秘書長公文より

件名：二月十八日

国務省

件名：米国政府

件名：米国政府

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シテ事特定ノ制シテ全企戦シタルノニ非スヲ伴社設立ニ付ハ今次戦後持ニ於ケル支那財政及産業等ノ役有民ノ為ヲ為ノ急務ナルノニテラズ帝国政府"}

[続く]
The statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman

Regarding the Evacuation of the Chinese

Ambassy in Japan. June 7, 1932

On the 10th of January the Japanese Government issued a statement saying that Japan would have no more dealings with the Chinese National Government. Nevertheless, even after that the Japanese authorities have treated Chinese diplomatic and consular agents and Chinese residents in Japan with utmost generosity. In particular, the staff of the Chinese Embassy at Tokyo just as those of the other foreign embassies and legations have been allowed special privileges, such as permission to receive code telegrams, exemption from taxation, and permission to visit the Diet in session; also Chinese property and buildings been under adequate protection by the Japanese authorities.

It may well be unparalleled from the Standpoint of International Law that despite the present disturbance the diplomatic agents of the Manchow Regime have been given such generous treatment as mentioned above.

However, it has recently been reported that the Manchow Government has decided to close the Chinese Embassy at Tokyo in the near future. We do not know the reasons for this measure. Such a step, is quite an arbitrary one on the part of the Manchow Government and is no concern of the Japanese Government. It is needless to say that after the evacuation of the Embassy, its buildings will be placed under the complete protection of the Japanese authorities.
CERTIFICATE OF SOLENCY AND AUTHENTICITY

I, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of one (1) pages and entitled "The Statement of the Foreign Office spokesmen regarding the Evacuation of the Chinese Embassy in Japan. (July 7, 1933)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese government (the Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April, 1947

/S/ Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ Hatsumi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 2, 1947
Lef. Dec. 1194

Oral Representation Made by Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. K. Asano, Acting to the British and American Ambassadors at Tokyo
Regarding the Question of the Conrinued Settlement in Shanghai.

Nov 3, 1932

(a) The administrative structure and system of the Settlement including the Land Regulations, on which the administration of the Settlement is based, are defective in many respects rendering them wholly unsuitable to the present situation. The provisions of the Land regulations, now in force, save on a few minor points, remain exactly the same as those of the Land Regulations of 1866. In other words, the Settlement is still governed by a set of basic regulations enacted seventy-three years ago when the Settlement was less than one-third of its present area, and foreigners residing there numbered no more than 2,200 and there were only about 90,000 Chinese residents. Unquestionably the existing administrative structure and system of the Settlement are in many respects inadequate to meet the new situation which has developed in the ensuing 70 odd years.

(b) To enable the Settlement to adopt itself to the actual conditions now obtaining and to discharge properly its functions, not a few improvements and innovations should be introduced into its administrative machinery and its operation. Several years ago the question of the reform of the Municipal Council was eagerly discussed in the press of Shanghai. It was then pointed out that the system of election for
the Municipal Council was undemocratic; that the British monopolized important offices in the Municipal Council held an overwhelming majority in its other offices; and tended to be oligarchical in administering its affairs. It further asserted that administrative expenses were excessive, and therefore, a considerable retrenchment of expenditure was required in regard to the Volunteer Corps, the orchestra and education, and in other respects; and that the budgetary expenditure of the Municipal Council, especially that relating to education, was not fairly distributed among the different national communities. All those assertions were generally justified.

(c) To make smooth the working of the administrative machinery of the Settlement, it is imperative that the Structure of the Municipal Council should be remodelled with a view to meeting the requirements of the present day. It is also necessary that the nationals of all the countries interested should have a fair and just voice in the affairs of the Municipal Council. The voice of the Japanese Community, despite the enormous Japanese interests there, is not given a due and fair expression in the administration of the Settlement. This is evident from the small number of the Japanese Councillors, from the position of Japanese officers in the Municipal police Department, or from how Japanese officials stand in the other departments of general administration. A reasonable adjustment of the present conditions, which are so unfair and unsatisfactory, is therefore, imperatively necessary.
In considering the statute and administration of the Settlement it should be borne in mind that a radical change has come over the general situation in China since the outbreak of the China Affair. Especially in Shanghai and its neighbourhood, the situation has completely changed. New regimes, distinct and separate from the Chinese Nationalist regime, have come into existence and are functioning, the Special City Government in Shanghai and the Reihain(m.v.) Government in central China. It is most desirable, therefore, that the Settlement authorities should closely cooperate with the Special City Government for the maintenance of peace and order and for the safeguarding of general public welfare in Shanghai and its vicinity. For that purpose some measures must be immediately taken. For instance, practical consideration should be given to the position of the Chinese Court of Justice existing within the Settlement, and the question of restitution of the old City Government's Land Registers held in custody by the Municipal Council must be speedily settled.

The Japanese Government cannot allow to pass unnoticed the reappearance of anti-Japanese elements or those elements hostile to the new regime in China, who are taking advantage of the special statutes of the Settlement in carrying on their lawless activities. It is incumbent upon the Settlement authorities and upon all the interested countries to accord serious consideration to the necessity of directing a thorough control of the terrorism, anti-Japanese propaganda and all other malignant acts of these elements, and to take requisite steps accordingly.
Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1947.

K. Urabe

Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
Statement by the Chief of the Board of Information, SUMA, Concerning the Announcement, by the Secretary of State Hull, in Disapproval of the New Chinese Central Government (April 1, 1940)

The Chief of the Board of Information SUMA, answered to the following effect, when he was asked as to his opinion concerning the so-called Hull's statement, during the regular interview with foreign newspapers on the first of April.

Foreign Minister SUMA has already expressed his views on the train concerning Hull's statement. But generally speaking, we can regard Mr. Hull's recent statement as the natural consequence in view of American attitude up to this time. Nevertheless I wish to point out now two points.

First, though the American ambassador Gray said last year in an interview with the Foreign Minister SUMA, that American Government was ready to negotiate with Japan concerning issues between the two countries with a constructive spirit. Mr. Hull's statement, however, discovers the New Chinese Central Government by Tang Ching-wai and others, which was established to bring a new order and to appearance in the East Asia. At the same time he recognizes, instigates, or supports the Chungking Government which is
...
administrative districts...all under the jurisdiction of the new Government. Nobody can overlook such a reality.

As to the new situation in the East Asia, American Government stated extremely in its note to Japan at the end of December, 1953, that American Government was well aware of the fact that situations were changing. There is no reason therefore for them to disregard the new situation which has taken place in the East Asia. I wish to make these points clear on this occasion when I am asked for my views as to Mr. Bull's statement.
Def. Doc. 1115

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, ISAIKHAYA, hereby certify that the document here attached written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages entitled "The Speech of the Chief of the Intelligence Department on the occasion of the announcement of the new General Government of Japan on April 17th, 1947," is an exact and true copy in the custody of our Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 5th day of April, 1947.

/s/ M. Iwami, Karo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereon in the presence of the witnesses,

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: /s/ M. Iwami (seal)
经文

经文

经文
Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman

December 1, 1937

Two news items appearing in the Japan Advertiser of December 10 have coincidentally brought into sharp relief the contrasting attitudes of Japanese and the Chinese forces toward those things which are dear to mankind. One is the report of the New York Times correspondent in Nanking describing the utter destruction of that Chinese capital by the Chinese forces themselves. The report says that the correspondent was informed by neutral military observers who spent several days inspecting the war zone that the Chinese soldiers have been recklessly razing towns and villages surrounding Nanking, not only destroying cultural establishments and institutions representing billions of yuan's of wealth accumulated by their ancestors and by the sweat of their own labor, but ruthlessly slaugthering innocent inhabitants who are simply considered by the vandalism of their own countrymen.

The other news item is the report concerning the advice which General Iwane Hatsumi, Commander of the Japanese forces in Shanghai area, sent to the Commander of the Chinese forces defending Nanking, in which the Japanese commander, expressing his desire of preserving intact the cultural and historic establishments in the ancient walled city out of respect to the civilization of the East, and preventing unnecessary sacrifice of human lives urged the Chinese to surrender peacefully.

Latest reports from the front say that the Chinese refused the Japanese advice. What this refusal will mean will become apparent as we get further news from the battlefield. But it is a city that, by the stubborn and futile attempt of the Chinese forces to resist the onslaught of the besieging forces, tens of thousands of innocent people in that area, already deprived by their own soldiers of their homes and means of subsistence are to be left to the mercy of the elements when the rigorous cold of the winter is approaching. That the Japanese forces will mete out thoroughgoing punishment to those recalcitrant Chinese forces is a foregone conclusion.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of three pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman. December 1, 1957", is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1957.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
Def. Doc. 1199

The Statement of The Chief of the Intelligence Department Concerning the Peace Negotiations between China and Japan by the Intermediation of the German Government (made or January 15, 1939)

Our government's policy not to refuse it if the national government expresses a desire to settle the matter sincerely, has been already explained to the Ambassadors of the countries concerned who were in Tokyo. In the early winter of last year there was a friendly proposal from the German Ambassador in Tokyo stating that the German Government was willing to act as intermediary in the negotiation between China and Japan, as the National Government wanted to make peace with Imperial Japan. The Imperial Government, in view of the above-mentioned policy, accepted these kind intentions and gave the National Government the last chance of reflecting by presenting through the German Ambassador the equitable terms which Japan considered absolutely necessary for the settlement of this incident in order to establish eternal peace in East Asia. But the said government, disregarding our generosity as well as the kind intentions of the German Government, never gave us any sincere reply. Therefore the Imperial Government has been forced to deal...
Def. Doc. 1196

with the incident from an independent standpoint without
paying any attention to the said government, as shown in the
statement made on 1st of January, though the Imperial
Government is deeply grateful for the well-intended mediation
of the German Government as well as the considerable
services of the German Ambassadors in Tokyo and China.
Certificate

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, m. Imazeki, Director, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document here attached in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "The Statement of the Chief of the Intelligence Department Concerning the Peace Negotiations between China and Japan by the Intercession of the German Government (made on January 19, 1938)" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April 1945.

Signature of Officer:

Witness:

- 3 -
January 16, 1938

Even after the capture of Nanking, the Japanese Government has till now continued to be patient with a view to afford a final opportunity to the Chinese National Government for a reconsideration of their attitude. However, the Chinese Government, without appreciating the true intention of Japan, blindly persisted in their opposition against Japan, with no consideration either for the people in their miserable plight within the country or externally for the peace and tranquility of All East Asia.

Accordingly, the Japanese Government will cease from henceforward to deal with the national Government, will look forward to the establishment and development of a new Chinese regime, with which we can harmoniously cooperate and genuinely rely upon. With such a regime the Imperial Japanese Government will fully co-operate for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, and for the building up of a rejuvenated new China. It is needless to state that this involves no change in the policy adopted by the Japanese Government of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China as well as the rights and interests of other Powers in China.

Hence, Japan’s responsibilities for the maintenance of peace in East Asia are heavier now than ever before.

It is the fervent hope of the Government that the people will put forth still greater efforts toward the accomplishment of this important task incumbent on the nation.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, [Name], Chief of the Archive Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of [pages] and entitled "[Title]" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this [Date] day of April 1947.

/s/ K. [Signature of Official]
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K. [Signature of Witness]
文書の出所及び成立ノ関スル説明書

自分ノ名誉高ハ外務省文書課長ノ誠ノ居ラル為スルノ為スル...

同日於首都...

箇部...

1932年4月9日

於東京

署

'-
August 23. The Seventeenth Congress of the Communist International resolved to create the broadest united front in the struggle for peace and against the instigators of war and against fascism, against militarism and nationalism, against chauvinism, to support the national liberation struggles and wars of national liberation. ("In face of the war provocations of the German Fascists and Japanese militarists, in the making up of armaments by the war-parties in the capitalist countries .... The concentration of forces against the chief instigators of war at any given moment...... constitute .... most important tactical task..... It is the duty of the Communists actively to support the national liberation struggles of the oppressed peoples of the colonial and semicolonial countries .......")

Doc. Int. Affairs 1936, p. 437 ff.)

August 25. United States called attention to and protested against the activities involving interference in the internal affairs of the United States, which took place in Russia in connection with the Seventh All-World Congress of the Communist International.

State Release 1935, No. 309, pp. 147 ff.)

August 27. Russia declined to accept the United States protest of August 25.

State Release 1935, No. 309, pp. 148 f.)
（電子日記に大変に携わった続編）

月日：四月

日付：五日

月日を追記するには、前回の大変さを再現した

一方、時間を必要とすれば、日付による記録に当て

もまた、この記録に当てはまる。

月日を大変に携わった。
Talks of Spokesman of the Information Department of the
Foreign Office Concerning the Right and Interests of Nationals
of Third Powers. (Nov. 10, 1937)

The measures taken by the Japanese forces in Shanghai
for the protection of the lives and property of foreigners
have been widely recognized as completely effective by
authoritative neutral observers there. Major General
Smollett, the commander of the British Forces at Shanghai
made a tour of inspection of Fungjao area on the 13th and
found out that all residences of foreigners stood virtually
undamaged despite the fact that the Japanese forces attacked
the Chinese troops and their establishments there. General
Smollett is reported by the North China Daily News to have
expressed his special satisfaction that the Japanese forces
had put up a notion of no admission at every house owned by a
foreigner, and that no Japanese had entered any of the foreign
houses in the area.

A group of foreign newspaper correspondents also visited
Fungjao area on the 14th and were quite satisfied that the
Japanese forces had effectively protected foreign properties.

According to English language papers of Shanghai the
French consul at Shanghai made an inspection tour of Nantao.
Def. Doc. # 1217

Dissecting and after minutely investigating the conditions
of residence and other properties belonging to foreign
vessels, he expressed his satisfaction that no damage to
any of them had been caused by the Japanese forces on French properties
in their attack on Canton and that the institution for
charity work, "Les Petites Soeurs de Panvres", as well as
Kousin Dockyard and the establishments of water works
had been kept intact.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, NAGAIYU, Yaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Talk of Spokesman of the Information Department of the Foreign Office concerning the Right and Interests of Nationals of 3rd Powers, Nov. 16, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of April 1947.

(signed) F. FIJISAWA
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ F. "RICE"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, etc.  

V.  

A.N.R., N.A.R., etc.  

STATED DISPOSITION

Deponent: N.A.R., notaro

Having first duly sworn an oath as in attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
V. O. 1923

Translated by
Defence Language Branch

Affidavit (no. 2)
by
Kotaro Nakamura

1. My name is Kotaro Nakamura.

2. My present address is:

   No. 106, Imazato-chō, Shirokane, Shiba-ward, Tokyo.

3. I was born on August 28, 1881.

4. The outline of my career is as follows:

   On Nov. 22, 1901 I graduated from the Military Academy (the 13th class).
   On Dec. 3, 1906 I graduated from the Army Staff College.
   On Dec. 22, 1930 I was appointed Chief of the Personnel Affairs Department of the War Ministry.
   On April 11, 1932 I was promoted to Lieutenant General.
   On March 1, 1937 I was appointed a War Counsellor.
   On June 23, 1938 I was promoted to General.
   On July 15, 1938 I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army.
   On July 7, 1941 I was relieved of the position of the said Commander-in-Chief and appointed a War Counsellor.
   On Sept 30 of the same year I retired from the position.

5. I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army on July 15, 1938. I left Tokyo on the 17th of the same month for Seoul by plane and arrived there in the afternoon of the same day.

   By predecessor was General Koike (Funaki).

6. Prior to my appointment to this post, namely on July 11 while my predecessor Koike was still Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army, the first trespassing of the border by the Soviet Army occurred at Changkufong near the Manchurian-Soviet frontier. Our garrison guards at the front, however, waited patiently and on a strict watch hoping for an amicable
solution of the problem by diplomatic negotiations between Japan, Manchukuo and Russia. In view of the gravity of the situation, I visited the central army authorities on the 16th of the same month as soon as I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean army after having been relieved of my former position of a war Councillor, and heard the explanation about the situation from the officer in charge.

7. I could see from the foregoing that the central authorities had a policy to bring the matter to a rapid and amicable settlement through peaceful means. The central authorities instructed me accordingly, and I hurried for my new post as I said before.

8. When I arrived at Seoul, I found that an order from Tokyo dated July 16 had been waiting for me there. The gist of the order was as follows:

"You are authorized to concentrate, if required, the forces under your command in Korea to the very border, in view of the Soviet army's unlawful trespassing near Changkufen."

In compliance with this order I instructed a part of my forces to move, but restricted their movement to the west of the Tumen River in order to avoid aggravating the situation.

9. At that time the 20th Division belonging to the Korean Army under my command was in action at the north front and only the 13th Division (the divisional commander was Lieutenant-General SUMIta, kamaezo) was staying at the peace-time original position.

10. The state unit as well as the general situation in Korea showed nothing unusual and were quiet and peaceful.

11. This incident was also a concern to the Kwantung Army, because the
Changkufeng area was situated within the Manchukuo-Russian Border, in other words in Manchukuo. But viewed from the practical standpoint of the general topography, villages, communications etc., the district was most closely connected with the Korean Army and Korea. This was the reason why the Korean Army was made responsible for the guard duty at the border in this area and the frontier-guard of the 19th Division under my command was in charge of it.

12. The Korean Army strictly obeyed the instruction of the central authorities and was hoping for a settlement through diplomatic negotiations, but there was no prospect of immediate settlement.

13. Changkufeng is a hill, one hundred and several scores metres above the sea-level, but in the neighbourhood only small pine-trees or various kinds of scrubberies are growing here and there so that the bare hill, floating above them commanded a panoramic view of that district.

The railway line, connecting Manchukuo with Korea is only 6 miles from the hill and can be seen clearly from there, while even Rashin Harbour, which is situated some 18 kilometres from there, is also within sight.

14. On July 20, the 19th Division tendered its opinion, to the Army headquarter stating that it was its earnest desire to have a part of its frontier guard posted on a hill about 800 metres west of Changkufeng as it offered a nice position for the reconnoitering purposes. Yet, however, checked it by a telegram, fearing that an untoward incident which are apt to happen might touch off a real fighting thus aggravating unnecessarily the whole situation.

15. On July 23 a telegram was received from the Army General Staff to the following effect:
Diplomatic negotiations concerning the settlement of the Changchufeng Incident will be continued. The negotiations will be discontinued whenever the chance of success cease to exist, and the matter is now being considered along the line of evacuating the bulk of the forces, concentrated at the frontier-area to their original positions as soon as possible.

You are requested to take sufficient care not to aggravate the trouble by careless mistakes." And on July 26 a telegram was received from the Imperial General Headquarters, in which we were ordered as follows:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army is requested to order his troops concentrated in the area near the frontier to withdraw to their original positions. But, if required, a part of them may be used to strengthen the defence of the frontier."

16. On July 27 I ordered the troops of the 19th Divisions at the front (one infantry battalion at Chingsin, the same unit at Kuchen, 2 infantry battalions and 2 artillery battalions at Anchi and in the area west of it) to withdraw to their original positions in Ranan. Starting from the 28th of the same month the transportation of the troops were commenced from the Anchi station by rail.

17. On July 29, at about 9:30 a.m., the Soviet Army advanced to a hill about 1,000 metres south of Shatsenfeng (it lies on the line about 350 metres west of the border-line between Hanfan and Kaiyakn) and began to fortify the hill. Consequently our guards in front of the hill were forced to repulse them and occupy the line since our patrol were fired upon by the Soviet machine-guns. But our troops withdrew immediately to their original position (about 1,000 meters west of the frontier line) in order to avoid further troubles. The Soviet army began, however, to attack...
D.D 1223

us at about 4:30 p.m. and invaded the area about 500 metres across the frontier-line. Things having come to such a pass, our troops had no other way than to strengthen the forces at the front, in order to confront them. This new situation being obviously an outcome of a violation of the frontier-line, it is too serious a matter for the army to sit tight and let the matter take its own course. Therefore, Lieut. General SUEZ., the Divisional Commander of the 19th Division, ordered a part of his troops (the bulk of the 75th Infantry Regiment) to withhold their fire and wait in the rear of the frontier guard as an emergency stop in view of the rapid change of the situation.

I was of the opinion that the only solution was to repulse the Soviet troops outside of the Manchukuo territory. Therefore I approved the action on the part of the Division and issued an order at about 1,00 a.m. on July 30 to the following general effect:

"We must be satisfied if the Soviet army not attacking our troops stationed on the closed curve hill south-west of Shatsaofeng be repulsed from the Manchukuo territory, and in that event your troops are requested to withdraw to the mentioned closed curve line hill to keep watch on the Soviet army's movements. But in order to avoid to aggravate the situation you must act carefully abstaining from attacking them if they have already withdrawn to the hill south of Shatsaofeng."

At the same time I made a report to the central authorities, the gist of which was as follows:

"This incident was caused by the unlawful trespassing of the border by arrogant Soviet army in spite of the self-restraint exercised by our troops..."
at Chungkufong, and was touched off by an unlawful challenge by the Soviet army. Therefore I am convinced that this case must be settled separately from the Chungkufong Incident. I will manage to localize the matter, making it a fundamental principle to be satisfied if the Soviet army confronting us is repulsed from the Manchukuo territory.

And further in the afternoon of the 30th I issued an order to the Division to the effect that it should not resort to arms unless specific orders to that effect are issued with the exception that it is free to do so in case of an attack by the enemy.

Then in the afternoon of the same day we received a telegram from the General Staff as follows:

"It is our policy to leave the handling of the Shatsaoferchungkufong Incident to the forces at the front, which are acting on the principle of non-agrandize etc."

In the same night another telegram came, which stated as follows:

"Regarding the incident of Shatsaofeng-chungkufeng area we have decided to leave the matter to local negotiations in order to avoid a further aggravation of the situation. You are to act along the following lines:

(a) Our forces must abstain from any further activity unless challenged by the enemy.

(b) Status quo is to be maintained as to the Disposition and action of our forces for the present except be ready for the enemy's counter-attack.

Our actions are to be guided by utmost prudence.

18. Our troops at the front occupied before dawn of the 30th several hills about 800 to 900 metres from the enemy position at Shatsaofeng and Chungkufeng, under a camouflage and kept a strict watch on the enemy action.
But about 1:40 a.m. on the 31st the Soviet Army started to advance, in spite of the pitch darkness, accompanied by tanks and under cover of bombardments. Our troops responded to this at once and successfully repulsing completely occupied by 6:00 a.m. on the 31st, all the Russian fortresses in the area between Changkufeng and Shatsaofeng in Manchukuo territory, and Shatsaofeng. Our troops, however, remained within the border-line and strictly observed non-agrandizement policy.

19. In the afternoon of August 1st, received a telegraphic order from the Imperial General Headquarters as follows:

"Your forces shall keep the existing position in the Changkufeng and Shatsaofeng area for the present and keep a strict watch on the Manchukuo-Soviet border facing your forces. And another to the following effect:

1. Your forces shall refrain from expanding actions in the Chungkufeng and Shatsaofeng area, as long as the Soviet forces do not challenge us. The Disposition and action of the forces must be maintained status quo except to be ready for the enemy's counter-attack.

2. As to the Manchukuo-Soviet border district facing our troops beside the said area you must keep it in mind not to irritate the enemy by our action, although a strict watch for them should be specifically required.

3. You must exercise the utmost care with regard to the activities of your forces in general.

At the same time the following telegram reached me from the War Ministry:

"Non-agrandizement policy is still to be followed. We are going to refer the matter instantly to diplomatic negotiations in order to settle
it rapidly as a local question, viewed in the light of justice and propriety and for the sake of peace."

20. Our Korean Army observed the afore-going order faithfully and sticking to the non-aggrandizement policy, exercised the greatest care with regard to its own action.

21. In spite of this the Soviet Army continued to increase their forces from the rear positions day by day and made a heavy attack on our troops. He only defended the border-line with stubborn resoluteness in a purely passive way.

22. Since August 1 the Soviet Army began to bomb our front line directly using about 2 Brigades of Air Forces. At the same time the North Korea Railway-line, the Tumen River-bridge and several places in Korea were attacked. As the result our casualties at the front mounted and the people's feeling in the North Korea was disturbed day after day.

Such being the case, I suggested to the central authorities to use our own Air Forces limiting their sphere of action within our territory. It was not accepted, so none of our planes appeared at the front throughout the period.

23. The Russian artillery forces had more than 90 guns. As the result of their steady bombardment the repeated raids on us with some 100 tanks and the bombing by planes our casualties at the front were calculated to amount to 200 on the average per day around the period of August 9 and the strength of the 19th Division (under peace-time organization) was quite exhausted.

24. As explained before the non-aggrandizement policy, was, however,
a strict order from the central headquarters of command. The Korean Army obeyed this policy faithfully to the last in spite of the difficulties and disadvantages suffered by our troops at the front in strategy as well as in command.

I am of the opinion that once the enemy is defeated it is most advisable to pursue it without losing time to assure that it will not regain power. Our troops at the front near Changkufeng, however, could not pursue the enemy in spite of their gain and remained in the same position (within the border-line) as before as they were obeying the non-aggrandizement policy. Consequently, the Soviet Army made continuous counter attacks on us from every directions quite obstinately ever increasing their strength so that our casualties at the front increased very much and our position was very difficult.

The Divisional Commander of the 19th Division suggested that he might be allowed to use all the troops of the Division at his liberty, in view of the difficult situation at the front and our mounting casualties. In spite of my sympathy I did not accede to his request throughout the period fearing that he might go over the limit of the non-aggrandizement policy unawares, if a superior force were placed under his command.

Our Changkufeng-front area was divided by the Tumen River. The front nearest to the enemy was so narrow in its configuration that the troops could barely cover themselves. I thought it unadvisable to repeat frontal battles in the Changkufent-Shatsae area if we want to settle the matter rapidly. I was of the opinion that we better settle the matter once for all by a flank attack on the right side of the Soviet Army's
back starting from the upper stream of the Tumen River on the opposite
bank of Chingsing. And I consulted with the central authorities about
the foregoing plan. But I could not succeed to get their approval because
of the non-aggrandizement policy.

27. The only way to settle the matter rapidly and locally was to make
the Soviet army give up their intention of the trespassing the border.
In order to attain this objective we had many plans, but they were not ap­
proved as I explained above, because of the fear of going over the limit
of the non-aggrandizement policy.

Such being the case, our Army, especially the troop at the front had
to adopt a passive attitude, the most unadvisable in battles, enduring
unfavorable conditions of every description, in order to do their best
to settle the matter locally. In other words, our troops at the front
never initiated an attack on the Soviet Army. On the contrary, they always
acted defensively and did not act outside the area where the enemy attack
 commenced never pursuing it over the border-line. All this was done in
order to avoid the expansion of the battle zone and the loosening of the
application of the non-aggrandizement policy. They did their best in order
to fracture the Soviet army's intention limiting their activities within
the local district.

28. About August 8 the strength of the enemy at the front was estimated
to be 3 divisions of sharp-shooters, one cavalry division, one tanks
brigade and 2 air force brigades. To cope with this enemy we fought only
with the strength of the 19th Division, deploying in a wide field. Our
infantry unit at the front had only three thousands men.

29. And in the midst of the hard battle the truce-agreement was concluded
and at noon on August 11 both forces were ordered to cease fighting.
On this 25th day of December, 1947
at TOKYO.

DEponent  |  (seal)

I, WAKO, JUNICHI hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at same place.

Witness: (signed)  |  (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing, and adding nothing.
石舞名命命前部川原の司命官時代は、月十一日ソノ行

環境

未

行

日本

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月

日

月

日
石ノ岱令南部・前任者小嶋朝村司令官
時代・七月十一日・ソ・登園

前言

選挙・大名ヌ・受ケルヤ石ノ
南部・選挙・同月十六日・陸軍中央部
出頭セリ

事実

選挙・大名ヌ・受ケルヤ石ノ
南部・選挙・同月十六日・陸軍中央部
出頭セリ

仮想戦争

選挙・大名ヌ・受ケルヤ石ノ
南部

実験

選挙・大名ヌ・受ケルヤ石ノ
南部

実験

選挙・大名ヌ・受ケルヤ石ノ
南部
三十三
ソーウ専攻兵
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

v.

S.N. D., et al

Sworn Deposition
Deponent, S.N. D., Shigara

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached oath and in accordance with the procedure followed in our country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was born at No. 4, Kamoda, Kamoda-Hara, Toean-Gun, Hyogo Prefecture on 27 March 1887 (the 20th year of Meiji). My permanent domicile is No. 47, S. Chome, Angaya, Suginami Ward, Tokyo City, where I am still living.

2. The outline of my life history is as follows:

June 1905: Appointed Sub-lieutenant
March 1915: Appointed Major General
March 1936: Appointed Lieutenant General
July, the same year: Appointed Commander of the 4th Division
October 1939: Appointed Vice Chief of the Army General Staff
December 1940: Appointed Commander of the 13th Army (stationed at Shanghai)

October 1942: Relieved of duties as the Commander of the 13th Army
15 November 1942: Placed on the reserve list.

In the period of my active service, I served mainly in the Army General Staff, the War College, and as an officer attached to the Japanese Embassy abroad.

3. From December 1940 till October 1942, I was at Shanghai as Commander of the 13th Army. The military occupation by the Japanese troops of the International Settlement at Shanghai, following the outbreak of the Pacific War on 8 December 1941, was effected in an orderly manner and under perfect discipline, amidst the admiration and praise of the whole citizens. There were no unfortunate happenings; nor was there a single shot fired.

Every precaution was taken to prevent any unfortunate happenings that often accompany the military occupation of a city. The following are the major steps taken:

a. The strength of the occupation force was reduced to a minimum, and it is my recollection that the number of soldiers did not exceed 500 at the most.

b. The occupation took place in the daytime. In other words, since we thought that the general office hour of workers fell in various professions and belonging volunteers, Ltd. in the International Settlement began at about 9 a.m., we conducted the occupation hour later, that is, at 10 a.m.

c. Prior to the advance of troops, our mixed military envoy composed of army, navy and foreign office personnel, visited the Shanghai Municipal Office and notified in advance of our military occupation in order that the authorities of the settlement might take all possible measures to prevent disturbances and unrest among the citizens.

- 1 -
The police units of the settlement were promptly stationed at various security positions, and in their presence the advance of the Japanese troops was started.

The troops, marching in orderly formation without being subdivided, reached the turf and the barracks formerly used by the U.S. Marine Corps, and there quickly closed up. Soldiers were strictly prohibited from dispersing.

Whenever there was any special duty to be performed, either a corps commanded by an officer or a group of specially chosen non-commissioned officers were appointed for the task.

Patrol parties were very frequently despatched to make a round of inspection with a view to preventing wrongs and misdeeds being committed.

Everywhere in the city notices were posted telling the citizens to set their minds at rest.

I summoned up all the commanders and gave them instructions that every possible precaution be taken against wrongs and misdeeds, and that military discipline be enforced with great strictness and severity. I also instructed them to discharge their duty without resort to arms.

Banks were not closed and were under special orders to carry on their business as usual.

Japanese nationals were prohibited from entering the city, except those with certificates issued by the Japanese Consul.

Because of such precautionary measures, not a single incident occurred.

I started for a round of inspection through the city at about 3 p.m. and found nothing unusual. There was much traffic. Shops were carrying on their business as usual, not a single shop being closed.

The newspapers in Shanghai unanimously extolled the behaviour of the Japanese troops and went so far as to call them exemplary behaviour.

There were some 1,500 or 1,600 American and British prisoners of war under the charge of the 13th Army under my command. I used to instruct the Chief of the POW Camp to be above all compassionate, fair and just in his treatment of prisoners of war. Major General YUSE, Camp Commandant, meticulously bore my instructions. When prisoners were assigned to some labour inside the camp, he used to share the work with them, thereby setting an example.

Major General YUSE, on his own initiative, used to come to my quarters once a week to report on the conditions in the camp. He was so devoted to his work that he at length succumbed to a disease and died while he was still in the same position.

The POW Camp was properly equipped and properly managed. Mr. Egley (TI: Y), a Swiss, deputed by the International Red Cross to inspect the camp, was highly delighted after he had inspected the camp and reported faithfully his visit to the camp, took the trouble of writing me a letter of thanks.

Although it is regrettable that one of the interpreters at the camp has been involved in a war crime on the charge of manslaughter, yet the general conditions in the camp may be gathered from the fact that with the exception of this interpreter, neither a man nor a woman, let alone one of his subordinates has been put to trial.
We tried to be fair and just also in our treatment of hostile nationals. It was my intention to place no restraint upon peaceful citizens, who offered us no resistance, and to let them lead a normal life. Upon this line, we decided on the methods of treating these citizens. Consequently, during my tenure of office hostile nationals such as Americans, Britishers and so on were under no restraint whatsoever and were at liberty to reside and make a living in the city. They were allowed to follow their respective occupations. Even in the case of the officials in the Shanghai Municipal Office, those occupying leading positions were not removed but were allowed, in the interests of the settlement, to carry on their work until they themselves tendered their resignations on their own initiative (as I remember, towards March 1942).

Furthermore, bank deposits were not frozen, and for each individual person’s living expenses a certain amount per month could be drawn from the bank. With regard to the treatment of hostile nationals and their properties, there was a committee consisting of delegates from the War Ministry, the Navy Ministry, the Foreign Office and the Asiatic Development Bureau, which after deliberation decided on various measures so that no one could take arbitrary and high-handed steps.

The authorities of the Foreign Office, I believe, know better than anyone else that in the Shanghai district a fair and just treatment was accorded to hostile nationals.

On this 16th day of January 1947
At the Sugamo Prison
Deponent: /s/ Shido, Shigoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At the same place
Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Shido, Shigoru (seal)
By His Majesty the Emperor, I, Ichiro, such as I am, have now been appointed to the responsible post of commanding the 11th Army which has hitherto distinguished itself by meritorious services. I esteem it the greatest honor and impression to be entrusted with such an important duty.

It is three years since the outbreak of the Holy War, and now, in the significant 2600th year of the Imperial reign, is the time when a rapid progress in the future situation of the war should be expected by harmony and co-operation between both tactics of the government and army. At this moment, our Army, stationed at the foremost front of the whole Japanese army, directly bear the brunt of the enemy to crush their attempts of resistance. Really important is the mission of our Army. I, trusting wholly to loyalty and bravery of the officers and men under my command, have determined to meet the Imperial desire by concentrating our energies on fulfilling the entrusted duty of importance.

I earnestly desire that you officers and men, complying with my wish, with inexhaustible perseverance and harmonious co-operation, shall better maintain the military discipline, raise the martial spirit, bring the traditional power of our Army into full play with perfect unity of the Army.
and make sincere efforts to overcome hardships, in order to shed still more
lustre on the brilliant war career of our Army.

March 17 in the 15th year of Showa (1940)

Commander of the "K6" Group

SUKIJI, Teichiro
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupied the post of the then Staff-officer of the 11th Army, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled 'The Instructions' is a document compiled by the Headquarters of 11th Army on March 17, 1940.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of Feb., 1947

(signed) [signature] (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: (signed) [signature] (seal)
Instruction of OKAMURA, Koji, the Commander of the 11th Army

December 22, 1938

Instruction

I cannot suppress my joy in welcoming many prominent generals at this time when, in accordance with the Imperial order, the fresh and active forces stationed hitherto in areas north of the Yangtze river have been newly placed under my command in order that our firm position in the Wuhan-Hankow area might be further consolidated.

I believe that central China has already been subdued. However, the enemy still retains part of its force and beaten as still exists here and there, continuing to offer resistance to us. It, therefore, must go a long way before attaining our final victory. In view of the function of our 11th Army, which is to accomplish the lofty task of creating a stepping stone for the Imperial plan for construction of a New East Asia, and as an operational army, to annihilate the enemy’s resistance at the front, I cannot but deeply feel the tremendous importance of our mission and desire that all the members of our Army will unite themselves to fulfill the above aim.

Though the Army will engage for the time being in consolidating its defense positions, further active operations at a proper time in the future are now being planned. I heartily desire that all my officers will strive to elevate the morale and prestige of our army and to perfect the training of their men, through strict discipline, thus obeying the precept, “teach as well as fight”.

- 1 -
I hope also that they will take every step to exterminate remaining enemies, to maintain peace and order, and thereby to prepare for future operations.

I have ever emphasized my desire that our military forces should fix in their minds the true purpose of the whole war, which is to overthrow Chiang while treating the people of China with charity and benevolence. Again, on this occasion, I express my desire that those forces which have newly come under my command will observe this purpose.

On this 22nd day of December, 1938

CYNHUR, Neiji
Commander of the 11th Army
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, AMIE, Shoichi, who occupies the post of Staff Officer of the 11th Army, hereby certifies that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "Instructions" is a document drafted at the 11th Army Headquarters on 22nd of December 1936.

certified at Tokyo
on this 27th day of February 1941.

/s/ AMIE, Shoichi

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place
on this same date

Witness: KAIYAMA, Tashio

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date: April 28, 1947
Instructions of Okuma, Heiji,
the Commander of the "Ro" Group, June 10, 1939.

Instructions

It gives me a great pleasure to meet together with you, the generals of various services, at the time when, thanks to their activities, the fighting in the south, the north and the central provinces have been successfully pacified and cleared of the enemies.

In accordance with my instructions given at the end of the last year, you have trained your forces, strengthened their fighting power, displayed the special ability of our forces in the battles of Hankow, Nanking and Jiangning as well as in stemming out the enemy from Lushan and Canton-Hankow Railway area, and thus by trust in you we have preserved by your brilliant achievements and the prestige of our army, was infinitely glorified.

The enemies, though defeated by a series of defeats, are still found around us continuing maneuvers to no purpose.

We have recently been reinforced by two more new army corps in Kweilin and Harbin and are intending to dispatch a part of our picked and experienced forces to the other fields before long to make a new army, at this time of alternation of forces, I should like to lay bare some points to which I expect you to conform, with a desire to have the whole army try to realize them in one accord.
1. You should keep in your heart the true meaning of the supreme command and thoroughly aware of the dignity of the commands, thereby enabling yourselves solemnly and quickly to display the essence of our imperial army and maintain its morale for long.

As commander, you should never in contradiction to the principles of command, neglect the lives of your men who are supposed to share their lot with you.

2. In view of the special environment of our army, you should deliberately develop the fighting power, secure and stabilize the operation areas, save power for the time when it is actually needed and be ready for the offensive operations at a moment’s notice.

3. In accordance with the experiences and lessons of many battles, you should complete the training of your men under an appropriate program, by seizing and utilizing any possible opportunity.

Above all, leading officials should train their character as commanders, develop their commanding ability and acquire confidence in performing their duties.

4. As for the concealment of intention, as well as in the maintenance of secrecy and prevention of espionage, the ideas of officers and men should be changed, and fostered fundamentally, and in its method of superintendence, a thorough reform and devise must be carried out in order to be in a perfect state.

5. You should treasure and organize the ammunition materials, make inquiries into the way of supplying articles at the front, and at the
same time overcome the climate and plague peculiar to Central China to keep up men and horses as healthy as possible.

6. You should clarify the significance of carrying out this sacred war, strive yourselves to defeat CHING K'ai-shek on the one hand, and extend the spirit of loving the people on the other in order to win their heart completely, thereby making them rely upon us and cooperate with us in the great task of establishing a new China.

I expect that the forces under my command will, by recognizing their deserving position of being the advance guards of all in China, devote to battle formation to be ready for the future activities, and strive strenuously to attain the objects of this sacred war in answer to the responsibility to support the Imperial policy.

In conformity to my intention, you should cooperate, high and low, to attain the objects in view though we are yet far from such objects.

On this 10th day of June, 1939.

Oh. Sh., Koo,i,
Commander of the "20" Group.
CONFIDENTIAL

I, who occupy the post of a staff-officer of the then 11th Army, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 6 sheets and entitled "Kokushikiho" is a document issued by the 11th Army Headquarters on June 10, 1939.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of February 1947.

/s/ Shoichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /s/ Nakayama, Yoshio
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立會人

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Strictly Confidential.

Instructions.

I am very much pleased to have completed here the formation of the 1st Military Tank Regiment in the central "D'-N region.

In my opinion, the goal of the front line is still a long way off. All efforts should be made to develop the full potential of the particular unit's spirit and efficiency of armored troops and create a glorious tradition for the regiment through the maintenance of rigorous military discipline, the achievement of a trained and solid unit, and being the full complement of practical training and planning for the rapid extension of fighting power.

With appreciation in the 14th year of Showa.

YOSHIKICHI WATARI

Commander of "5° Groups."
O. Doe, Dec. 20, 1942

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, the officer in the rank of staff officer of the then eleventh
army, hereby certify that the document hereunto attached, printed in
Japanese consisting of 1 page, and entitled "Instructions" is a
document so called and issued by the Headquarters of the Eleventh Arm
on the date of November at the time and year of above.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 26th day of February, and year
of there.

[Signature of Official]

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were
fixed hereon in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date.

[Signature of Witness]

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William C. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby
 certify that the foregoing translation described in the above
certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct
translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original
document.

/s/ William C. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 25 April 1947

- 2 -
Instruction

Now that you have almost finished preparing for action after going through all sorts of hardships in the rainy season continuing more than a month, I believe in your full conviction of victory.

I expect your excellent service in the principal operation; intentionally charged you with this difficult and dangerous task in view of the general war situation as I have confidence in the Sixth Division’s strength.

All officers and men shall fight heroically and prove their traditional worth.

March 16th, 1939

OKAZURA, Meiji,

the Commander of the "Red Group."
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who then occupied a post on the staff of the 11th Group, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Instruction" is a document compiled by the headquarters of the 11th Group on March 16th, 1943.

Certified at Tokyo,
on the 27th day of February 1947.

AKIKO, Soichiro (seal)
Signature of Official

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on the same date.

Witness: MORIYAMA, Toshi

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Tokyo, Japan /S/ William E. Clarke
Date 1 May 1947

- 2 -
The Instructions of CHIANG, K'ai-fêng, the Commander of the "AC" Group

2 December 1939

INSTRUCTION

The holy war has already lasted more than two years and although the important districts of Central China have been subjected, Chiang K'î-shêk's Party maintains a feeble existence in the rear and the defeated enemy is still wriggling around and does not cease hostile acts. I deem it a great pleasure at this juncture to see the organization of the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade completed, and realize that its military prowess is about to be raised even higher now that the military mission is assuming increasing importance in the task of crushing the enemy's fighting plan as the general vanguard of the expeditionary forces to China.

I believe that the Brigade was created as a body from staunch and lusty men from Kyushu who have passed through many valuable experiences and have had a brilliant war career in the successive battles. You are so strong that you cannot be compared with others in strength and I am especially relying upon you. Hereupon, officers and men should be as one body to complete the union of steel of the finest temper. You should devote
yourselves to the utmost to practical training carried out in accordance with sound military principles. You should view expansion of fighting power immediately as the every endeavor with heart and soul, day and night, as a reflection of the purpose of the movement and so you must expect to create a brilliantbrigade tradition and to achieve victory in the early stages.

The Commander of the "A" Group, CHEOTA, Mei-ji, 2 December 1939.

They were proud of their own foresightedness and held their Seventh Enlarged Management conference on 22 November with Bukharin as chairman. Since then they had discussions about the Chinese problem until the 16th of December, with Bukharin and Roy (an Indian and a communist) and Tan Fine-shan leading the conference mainly. And as the result 'The resolutions toward China of the Seventh Conference of the Bureau' Council of the Executive Committee of the Communist International was announced. As it shows the Comintern's policy towards China most concretely and is the most important historic document in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, we extracted it as above in spite of its being long. By the way, the most important of the documents which were found by the Cheng
Tsuehching government in Peking when they raided the Russian embassy was this "December Resolutions of the Comintern."
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, KIANO, Shoichi, who occupy the post of Staff Officer of the 11th Army at that time, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Instructions" is an official document drawn up at the Headquarters of the 11th Army on 2 December 1939.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 27th day of February 1947.

KIANO, Shoichi (Seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place
On this same date

Witness: MCGIYAMA, Toshio (Seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date: 21 April 1947

Defense Document 1270
It gives me great satisfaction in welcoming you that our Army’s power has been increased greatly with the draft of the fresh and active troops of the 33rd and 34th Divisions entering into our field.

Though m-thinks the central area has already been subdued, better does still stir, and continue to offer resistance to us. Therefore, our Army should be said to be burdened with the important duty of bringing its energy to bear upon fracturing the Army’s intent to continue war against us, and the reliance I place upon the bravery and vigour of the Army under my command is in good great.

Our officers and men are about to start for the central district of Wuchang and Hankow inclusive that they may occupy long-seeked posts of importance. You, officers and men, should perfect as soon as possible, unbroken union among you all while you are all fresh and in high spirits, and commanders of all grades and subordinates should avail themselves of every opportunity to attain perfection in practical discipline and training till at length your fighting strength is increased. at the same time you should familiarize yourselves with the actual situation and leave nothing to be done in rising to the occasion.
This commander has over emphasized his desire that our military forces should raise their countless morals under sublime military discipline fixing in their minds the true purpose of the holy war, aimed at overthrowing Chiang while treating the people of China with love and benevolence.

Taking this opportunity, this commander recons the commend to both groups which have arrived at this time.

In conclusion, this commander heartily wishes that you men and officers will soon adopt yourselves to the client ever maintaining full vigor of soul and body and will materialize initial glory since the formation of the groups, creating a splendid and honorable tradition.

On this 10 day of April, 1939

[Signature]

Commander of the NCO Group.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, who occupied the post of Staff Officer at the 11th Army at the time, hereby certify that the document hereby attached, written in Japanese, consisting of one page and entitled "Instructions" is a document which was drawn up at the Headquarters of the 11th Army on April 10th, the 14th year of Showa (1939).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of February, the 22nd year of Showa (1947)

Keiio, Shichi ( seal )

I, hereby certify that the above-mentioned seal and seal were affixed hereon in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place,on the same date

Witness: MORIYAMA, Toshio ( seal )
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, YUKIC KAWAMOTO, of the Defense Language Institute, hereby certify that the following translation described in this certified copy, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible the true meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukic Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan
Date 21 April 1947

"Instructions of OKI-URA, Kiiji"
昭和十四年四月十日
呂集四司令官
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略
The Instructions

I have previously delivered instructions, at the conclusion of the battle in eastern part of SHANGHAI, which consisted of six principal articles and in which the principle of commanding our army thereafter to be followed was clearly stated. Since then, each of the army corps has encouraged military training, intensified their fighting power. Again, by exercising the strong power characteristic of their army in the wilderness of KIANGSI and KUANTU, they have distinguished themselves; they have achieved the task of securing stability within the fields of campaign by manifesting the true value of the Imperial army in guarding their fields of operations.

However, if we reflect upon ourselves about the actual conditions within the military circle, further efforts should be required to maintain military discipline and public manners. Again, in view of the fact that there are many things which are left to be accomplished in realizing my belief "to overthrow Chiang's power and love people", and to amplify such belief, I earnestly request for unreserved cooperation of officers and men in attaining such end.

(1) The lax military discipline is mostly due to indiscretions on the side of leaders, or due to the lowering of standard in their quality, and is such to the insufficiency of their power to perform...
Military duties. Therefore, in view of the importance of their grave responsibilities, they should hereafter do everything within their power to set a fair and just example and to overcome environmental difficulties. It is necessary, on the other hand, to enforce the principle of paying tribute to those who are worthy of praise and punish those who deserve punishment without fail; to aim drastic renovation of military discipline, and especially elevate at all cost the commanding ability of lower class leaders; thus awakening them to the pride of being commanders as well as to protect their status, and consistently seek to attain a perfect unity by iron will of superiors and subordinates.

(II) There still remains among us some whose misconducts as burning civilians for no purpose irrespective of actions or guard, plunder peaceful people and committing violence over them regardless of the existence of their hostilities in cooperation with bandits.

The real aim of the "holy war" lies in soothing peaceful people, rehabilitate their private enterprise and by relieving people who have suffered from long years of looting by bandits, and thereby accomplishing actual results of having these people truly respect the Imperial Army.

Although the establishment of a new central government is near at hand, it is rather difficult to expect a pro-Japanese cooperation of Chinese forces and civilians who have been implanted with ideas of
If in war, we cannot, in the final analysis, look forward to carry out the aim of "holy war", unless such acts as the disregard of morality, the interfering estrangement in people's minds are to be improved thoroughly. In view of the pressing need to seek an accord between political move and strategic move, we, each one of us, must act righteously with strict attitude taking in detail, the present situation into serious consideration; and it should definitely be remembered that the object or the true enemy of this war is, to the end, that atrocious power antagonistic to Japan.

Since the outbreak of this holy war, three years have already elapsed, and the Chinese expeditionary force was organized. To sum the drastic change in international situation, and though Chiang's force is facing a steady road to ruin, the task to establish a new East Asia is very far from being accomplished and filled with many difficulties.

In this connection, therefore, the mission of our Imperial army is becoming more important as the time passes. Hence I earnestly desire that the whole army will devote its unreserved energies, in obedience to my wishes often expressed before you, in order to achieve the object of this war.

On this 12th day of November, 1939,

O Hara, Uji,

Commander of the 11th army

[End of Document]
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHORITY

I, the occupied person of the 11th Army, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 4 sheets and entitled "Instructions", is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (the 11th Army Headquarters), certified at Tokyo, on this 27th day of February, 1947.

/S/ AVANO, Kichi. (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness, at the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /S/ MABUYA, Toshio. (seal)
"With regard to the incidents of attacks made upon the British gunboat "Ladybird" and other British merchant vessels by mistake on December 12 at Thu and in the vicinity of Hankow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Koki, HIROZ... in a note dated December 14th, addressed to His Excellency the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Creigie, extended profound apologies on behalf of the Japanese Government. On December 16th, the British Ambassador sent a note concerning the matter to the Foreign Minister, to which the latter handed a reply to the British Ambassador on December 28th.

The contents of the above-mentioned notes have already been made public.

On the morning of December 31st, the British Ambassador sent a final note on the matter to the Foreign Minister informing the latter that the British Government note with appreciation the assurances contained in the Japanese note of December 28 and have learned with satisfaction that the statements of the Japanese note of December 14 apply to merchant vessels as well as to warships and also that the Japanese Government have taken or prepared to take the necessary disciplinary measures and to prevent any repetition.

It is indeed deeply to be deplored that these unfortunate incidents occurred but it is at the same time a matter of congratulation that they should..."
have been settled amicably through the traditional spirit of friendship
existing between Great Britain and Japan, supported by the attitude of calm
and the sincerity which prevailed in both countries in connection with this
matter.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nogeharu, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman on the British Note with respect to the Incidents of attacks made upon British Warships and other merchant vessels, Jan. 3, 1933" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 30th day of December, 1946.

(signed) Nogeharu ODO
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) H. Ishida.
凡例の不思議な仕様の発生を観たこととは、前には絶対に考えられなかったことによる。
具備の不時な欠件の発生を見たことに対して、
改めて追及を懸命にすることである。

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

vs.

HIJIKI, Soichi, et al.

STONE DEPOSITION

Dependent: TETSUKA, Kichiuro
Born: April 21st, 1899
No. 17 K.M.-Nachi H.K.W.-ku, Tokyo

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby deposes as follows:

I was appointed Commander of the Third Combined Air Corps in July 1937. The above mentioned Air Corps was stationed in Taihoku, Formosa and CULIAT IJAL.

On August 14, 1937, the Chinese Air Corps carried out an attack on the cruiser "YUBARI" in Shanghai Harbor as well as the Marine Headquarters. In retaliation, we bombed the Chinese Air Base in Nanking on August 15, 1937.

In the early part of September 1937, the Chinese Air strength was transferred southward to Canton and they bombed the cruiser "KUBUJI" in the South China coast. We therefore bombed the Air Base in Canton in an attempt to wipe out the Chinese Air Force.

Subsequently we undertook the destruction of railways and communications after receiving reports that the Chinese Army was moving northward.

We received instruction and orders from the Third Fleet as to the objectives to be bombed. Those instructions were to bomb only airfields,
arsenals, military installations, munition dumps, military schools, and other military targets. At no time did we bomb any city or town indiscriminately without a military objective in view.

The air corps had reconnaissance planes bringing in reports and we consulted our maps for objectives to be bombed. To make use of aerial photographs in an effort to bomb accurately.

Of course, on occasion we did not succeed in scoring a direct hit on our targets and some unavoidable accidents occurred. At times the Chinese anti-aircraft was extremely effective and we were forced to fly at high altitudes over our objectives. As soon as we bombed, we took photographs and studied the results of our bombing for the purpose of achieving greater accuracy. We never at any time intentionally bombed non-military objectives or installations. On any occasion when we failed to achieve accurate bombing and damaged some non-military installations, we were warned by the General Staff to exercise more care. I constantly instructed the pilots and commander to exercise caution in their bombing missions.

On some occasions, even though we suspected the Chinese displaying the flag of a third power, we refrained from bombing in order to be doubly sure. Giving an example here, in August 1938 when the Chinese soldiers were fleeing up the Yangtze river from Hankow, and just as our planes were about to bomb, a French flag was hoisted on the ship which we knew for sure they were on, therefore our planes returned without bombing.

In some instances of our bombing missions, we would not use the bomb
sight, and resorted to the hand-operated device and a stop watch in order to make certain of our target before releasing the bombs.

The pilots are initially furnished maps by the General Staff for the purpose of determining military objectives and showing general location of the third power's installations. Maps indicating installations of the third powers based on informations, maps furnished directly by the third powers were distributed later for our guidance. Therefore, it greatly aided us in directing our attacks on enemy positions and installations only.

On this 15th day of April 1947
at Tokyo

DEPARTMENT TETSUKA, Michitaro (a.e.a.

I, TETSUKA, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Lieutenant, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo

Witness: (signed) TATSUKA, Inagawa

C. T. H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth with-holding nothing and adding nothing.
Translation Certificate

I, KANJIRÔ AKUNE, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of affidavit of TOSHIYA, Michiteru in, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

KANJIRÔ AKUNE

Tokyo, Japan

Date 17 April 1947
The Instruction of OKAMURA, Keiji, the Commander of the "RO" Group  
October 19, 1939

Instructions

It gives me great satisfaction in welcoming you that our power has been increased greatly with the advent of the active troops of the 39th and 40th Divisions coming into... 

Though methinks Central China has already been subdued, our foes still stir and continue to offer resistance to us. Therefore, our Army should be said to be burdened with the important duty of bringing its energy to bear upon fracturing the enemy's intent to continue war against us, and the reliance I place upon the bravery and vigor of the Army under my command is indeed great.

Our officers and men are about to start for the central district of Wuchang, and Hankow inclusive, that they may occupy long-sought posts of importance. You, officers and men, should perfect an adamantine, unbroken union while you are all fresh and in high spirits, and commanders of all grades and subordinates should avail themselves of every opportunity to attain perfection in the practical discipline and training till at length your fighting strength is increased. At the same time, you should familiarize yourselves with the actual situation and leave nothing to be desired in rising to the occasion.

This commander has ever emphasized his desire that our military forces should raise their dauntless morale under sublime military discipline, fixing in their minds the true purpose of the holy war, aimed at overthrowing Chiang while treating with love
and benevolence the people of China. Taking this opportunity, the commander repeats the same desire to both groups which have arrived at this time.

In conclusion, this commander heartily wishes that you men and officers will soon adapt yourselves to the climate, ever maintaining full vigor of soul and body and will materialize initial ideal since the formation of the groups, creating a splendid and immortal tradition.

On this 19th day of October, 1939.

OKABE, Keiji, Commander of the Kō Group
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, who occupied the post of Staff Officer of the 11th Army at the time, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled, "Instructions" is a document which was drawn up at the Headquarters of the 11th Army on October 17, 1939.

Certified at Tokyo

On this 27th day of February 1947.

AMANO, Shoichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place

On this same date

Witness: MORIYAMA, Toshio (Seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan

21 April 1947
The sudden outbreak of the Marco Polo incident, at a time when China was carrying out her fundamental policy of maintaining international peace and national unity, has plunged the whole nation into a state of deep indignation and has given an ominous foreboding to the whole world. The consequences of this incident have seriously threatened the very existence of China as well as the peace of East Asia. At this moment of emergency, I wish to clarify our position in response to various questions put forth to us.

The Chinese have always been a peace-loving people. The policy of the National Government is maintenance of national unity in domestic affairs and the mutual respect and co-existence with other Powers in foreign relations. The aforementioned policy is clearly enunciated in the Declaration of the Third National Assembly of February this year. The irrefutable facts during the past two years testifies beyond doubt that the National Government has tried to adjust its relations with Japan and has always resorted to universally recognized channels of diplomatic negotiation for the settlement of all disputes pending between the two Governments.

The Chinese people must first of all understand the
position of their country. We must be aware of the situation we are in. We must frankly estimate our strengths as the people of a weak nation. During the serious national crises of the past few years, we have made great efforts to secure peace, in spite of unendurable sufferings, hoping thereby to revive the Chinese soul. It was for this reason, that in reporting on diplomatic affairs at the Fifth General Assembly held a year before last that I stated: "we will never give up hope so long as there is hope left for its maintenance. We will not speak of the sterilities until we have exhausted our patience." Our earnest desire for the maintenance of peace is further clarified in a statement I made later at the Central Executive Council.

While admitting our weakness as a nation, we firmly believe in one thing we must do in case of extreme emergency and that is, to fight with all our strength for the existence of our country. And once we fight, we should not by any means seek halfway peace because of time or situation. If we seek peace in midst of war, we shall be forced to accept terms which will mean enslavement of our country and complete annihilation of our race. I desire that the Chinese people will be fully aware of the limit of their patience, and the extent of sacrifices expected to be made when that limit is exceeded. Once we reach that stage, we must fight it out at all costs in hopes of our final victory. If we hesitate and give way to momentary ease, we must perish for ever.
Some vocal voices suggest that the Kwan Polo incident is in any sense an exceptional occurrence. However, gathering from the newspaper reports of Japan and direct as well as indirect statements made by the Dutch diplomatic agency, it is clear that from a month before, that some sort of an incident was going to take place. However, just before and after the incident I received informations at time that the Japanese were alarming to extend the unrecognised South Korean government to drive out the 20th Army and Sung Tsu joint army, to force upon us various demands of this sort. Therefore, it is clear that the Kwan Polo Bridge incident was not a mere accident. From this incident, we can see that the Japanese have assumed a firm attitude towards us and therefore, once is going to be very difficult to maintain.

According informations gathered on our part, it is without doubt that the only way in which we could have prevented the outbreak of the Kwan Polo Bridge incident was to suffer the foreign forces to enter our territory and let them behave as they pleased, and further more to limit the activities of our own forces. From another viewpoint, it was at allowing the Japanese forces to fire upon us and to sustain on our part from returning the fire. No self-respecting nation in the world would have been able to stand such humiliation. Six years...
Def. Dec. No. 1783

have already lost the four north-western provinces, then
Zungku agreement followed, as in the south of the
Marco Polo Bridge. Indeed it is a reality, the city of Peking. If
we allow the army to occupy the Marco Polo Bridge by
force, then the 200-year-old capital of our country, the politi-
cal and strategic centre of North China will fall into the
hands of the enemy, and this is bound to ruin the four
north-western provinces in the west will probably be set again
to Peking and the provinces of Honan and Shantung. Moreover, if
Peking is to become the capital of the new China, how can we prevent
Shantung from becoming a second Peking? Therefore, the destiny
of the whole nation now depends upon the security of the Marco
Polo Bridge, and the prospect of peaceful settlement of the inci-
dent will be determined by the limit of our national
In case we reach a point where the worst situation is unavoidable
we must fight with firm determination even at the greatest cost.
This war can be said to be forced upon us from outside. We
do not want war. However, we were compelled to fight back the at-
tacks threatening our existence.

I wish the whole country understand that the Central
Government is not merely engaged in preparing for national
defence. Although in action, we cannot fail to take means
to ensure the existence of our people and the integrity of our
country. It is our duty to exhaust all possible efforts to keep
intact what we have inherited from our forefathers. Once again,
we must fully understand that once we fight, we must never hesitate and fight it out to the very end. If we lose further, even a small piece of our beloved land, we shall be responsible for a serious crime, unforgivable against our own people. At such a critical moment, I report, the only alternative is to resist the enemy with all our might and look forward to final victory.

III

At this serious moment, Japan is placed in the position to decide whether the Soocho Polo Bridge Incident will be so fatal as to expand into large-scale armed hostilities between the two nations. It all depends on future actions of the Japanese forces, whether we may yet be hopeful of peaceful solution between Japan and China. We shall endeavor to settle the matter through channels of diplomatic agents as before until all hope for peace is abandoned. Our course of action to be pursued in this incident may be summarized in the following four points.

1) No proposal for solution, which infringes China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, shall be admitted.

2) The Central Government reserves the right to decide the status of the Honan-Gansu Political Committee, and no illegal change shall be admitted.

3) We cannot consent to the dismissal of any local officials appointed by the Central Government such as the Chief of the Honan-Gansu Political Committee, through outside pressure.
D) We cannot accept any association to the end in which the 30th Plent. Army is stationed at or near.

Moreover, we can no more abandon the essential four points on the minimum possible terms for an independent state to see it as the basis of a negotiation.

If that should be true in our situation, and moreover, if she is really serious in maintaining peace in East Asia so as to avoid stress to place both nations in the vortex of war, Japan would surely admit that the foregoing four terms are the minimum possible to be taken into consideration. In brief, the Central Government, in fact of the crisis of this serious Sino-Japanese incident, is firmly adhering to those clear and decisive standpoint to insure the existence of China. China is an independent state.

We are desirous of peace but have not the intention to cling to peace at any cost. We do not want war but it can not be denied that we may be obliged to defend ourselves. In face of this urgent crisis, the government is going to insist the people with stability and serenity. The people, as well, should keep perfect order with serious attitude. In order to fulfill the duty imposed upon our race, I wish that the people would follow the directions of the Government, keeping control solid as iron, without distinction of age or sex, and uniting ourselves in a body.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY


Certified at Tokyo,
on this 1 day of April, 1947.

M.Y. Shi, Kamu
Signature of Official

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: M. K. Akira (seal)

THE SECOND CERTIFICATE

I, Kenjiro Akira, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

Kenjiro Akira
Tokyo, Japan
Dated: 15 April 1947
参考文献

資料番号: 1283

日付: 二二三二年三月八日

立命館

於: 京都

立命館大学

参考文献

資料番号: 1283
At Geneva, the bombing by Japanese air forces, especially the attack on
Nanking and Canton was condemned. The Advisory Committee of the League of
Nations approved a resolution to "condemn solemnly" the Japanese air forces
on the ground that they had attacked "open cities." However, there is
absolutely no reason why Japan should be interested in the measures of the
League of Nations. The Japanese, however, cannot but resent most bitterly
the attitude of such an organization as the League of Nations to condemn
Japan irresponsibly without positive proof relying upon very partial and
inaccurate newspaper reports.

In the first place, the grounds of the resolution of the Committee of
the League of Nations to insist that Nanking and Canton are open cities are
false views. It is a well known fact that these cities are defended with
fortresses and other military installations. We cannot help but hope
therefore, that in the name of fairness and its prestige, the League of
Nations would take actions only on concrete proof.

It is very clear from the article appearing in the "South China Morning"
At Geneva, the bombing by Japanese air forces, especially the attack on Nanking and Canton was condemned. The Advisory Committee of the League of Nations approved a resolution to "condemn solemnly" the Japanese air forces on the ground that they had attacked "open cities." However, there is absolutely no reason why Japan should be interested in the measures of the League of Nations. The Japanese, however, connect but resent most bitterly the attitude of such an organization as the League of Nations to condemn Japan irresponsibly without positive proof relying upon very partial and inaccurate newspaper reports.

In the first place, the grounds of the resolution of the Committee of the League of Nations to insist that Nanking and Canton are open cities are false views. It is a well known fact that these cities are defended with fortresses and other military installations. We cannot help but hope therefore, that in the name of fairness and its prestige, the League of Nations would take actions only on concrete proof.

It is very clear from the article appearing in the "South China Morning
Post of Hongkong dated the 27th of September, has absurdly the news are
reported with regard to the activities of our air forces. That is to say, on
the 26th of September, the Post dispatch from Canton reported that as a
result of the attack of Japanese air forces, several thousands innocent people
of Canton were either killed or wounded, but the South China Morning Post
pointed out that the above news were grossly exaggerated. According to the
reporter of the Post who visited the Canton authorities in person and asked
foreign residents there of the fact, the casualties of Canton people were no
more than 100. Furthermore, although air raid alarm was sounded throughout
Saturday and Sunday at Canton, no bomb was dropped in the city by the
Japanese air force. The Japanese Government have issued statements on several
occasions that the air raid by the Japanese Army and Navy is a part of
military operations that Japan has been compelled to take in order to cope
with the challenge on the part of China, and that the objectives of our air
forces are never non-aggressive but the Chinese army and their installations.

This is confirmed by the incident of Canton above referred to as well as
later operations adopted by the Japanese force.

Furthermore, it is hardly necessary to recall that, with regard to a
general problem of air raid, Japan maintained together with America in the
Bruges Conference in 1922 that the objectives of air raid be limited, but our
contention was defeated by the opposition of Britain and France.

Now that things have come to such a pass, it is imperative that our
Army and Navy should destroy enemy's fighting power by taking every and all
opportunities, and they are now courageously fulfilling this duty. From the
beginning of the current incident, the Japanese air forces are strictly ordered to limit their objectives only to troops and military installations. Unlike the Chinese air force which attacked the "President Hoover," our air forces never attacked non-combatants purposely, nor did they ever drop bombs indiscriminately from a high altitude. Owing to targets being limited only to military objectives, the Japanese air forces when bombing, had to dive, in spite of the danger of the Chinese defensive fire, and thereby sustained greater sacrifices; and there have been not a few cases, in which Japanese air forces after taking off from their base had to come back with all the bombs they had taken because they could not find out their objective due to bad weather. These facts prove very clearly that the bombing by the Japanese air force was limited only to the Chinese Army and their installations.

In spite of the fact that the Canton-Hankow Railway transported a large number of Chinese troops and munitions to the north front for several days and nights, and the consequent sacrifice of our troops was naturally expected, nevertheless, it was not until the transportation of Chinese refugees was completed safely that the destruction of railroads and bombing of freight-cars transporting munitions were carried out by our air forces.

It is a great regret that under the present state of air fighting, the air unit, no matter how superior they are in the art of bombing, cannot be expected to have absolute accuracy in its bombing. Such being the case and in order to prevent injury to life, the Japanese air headquarters, when carrying out a bombing attack, sent a warning, as early as possible prior to
it, to the responsible authorities concerned for the safety of non-combatants, so that they may be enabled to take all necessary steps against our attack. This, of course, caused much strategic difficulties on our part, which, however, we were willing to forbear.

Under the present circumstances, Japan is prepared to take decisively every necessary step to destroy enemy's fighting power. It must, however, be noted that this measure is a result of the expansion of the incident which has been brought about inevitably by the challenge on the part of China. It was indeed the Chinese air force that attacked Shanghai on the bloody August 14th and dropped bombs on the International Settlement, the Japanese consulate-General and the Japanese warships. And, in defiance of our draft peace settlement and also in spite of efforts being made to avoid hostilities, China sent a large number of troops to the border of the Settlement and violated her solemn pledge.

Japan declares again in this connection that no nation has any right to attack non-combatants. With this principle in mind, Japan goes straight forward to attain her objectives, and is not shy of the responsibility due to her, but she firmly rejects partial and unfair blame.

The Chinese are very active of late in disseminating false propaganda over radio accusing the Japanese army of mass-slaughter of non-combatants and of destroying hospitals and schools, etc. Madame Chiang Kai-shek is also playing an important role of "propagandists" behind the scene. The fact that China came to employ such a method in propaganda means
nothing but the loss of her position of resistance against Japan on account of our military operations especially our bombing on her military installations and the blockade of her coast line navigation by Japan.

The absurd propaganda of China, however, has brought about an effect which is contrary to her expectation. Foreign correspondents in Shanghai are very much complaining of the inaccuracy of information supplied them by Chinese spokesmen. Even Chinese Wei-shih for fear of losing public confidence in China through spreading false reports, ordered a few days ago proper control over disseminating unfounded information.

Chinese propaganda seems to be centered on operations of our air forces. They have broadcast that our airplanes abused the Chinese insignia or that the Japanese planes were brought down; however, this was nothing but a Chinese way of propaganda intended to cover the crash of Chinese planes. The Imperial Japanese army which is openly raising a punitive expedition against the injustice and impropriety on the part of China can hardly think of surreptitiously using enemy's emblem or insignia, especially the Japanese soldier would rather die than to commit disgraceful conduct. The manners in which information was concocted by the Chinese are perfectly exhibited when an air raid on the Cathay Hotel, Shanghai, took place on August 14. The Chinese newspaper censors changed the term "Chinese planes" in the cablegram into "Japanese planes." To their surprise, however, owing to the context of the cablegram, it turned out to mean ridiculously that Japanese planes bombed the U.S.S. "Texas."
Due to such interference on the part of China with newspaper cables, foreign correspondents came to mail their dispatches, to Hongkong to cable them therefrom. There was all the difference in the world between such telegrams and those despatched from Shanghai.

Another good example was the false report—that a Japanese submarine torpedoed a Chinese junk and caused a casualty of 300 people. However, the Japanese submarines have been strictly ordered not to attack junks. So that such an attack on a junk can neither be real nor be possible to imagine. Furthermore, there was no Japanese submarine cruising in the waters where the alleged sinking of the said junk was reported. I do not hesitate to declare positively that this information was absolutely nothing but a fabricated report.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives and Documents Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Statement of the Director of the Information Bureau concerning the bombing of Nanking and Canton as well as the alleged attack on Chinese fishing-boats (at a foreign press conference) (September 29th, 1947)", is an exact and true copy of the official document in the custody of the Foreign Office.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 8th day of April, 1947

(signed) (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereon in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place
on the same date

Witness: (signed) (seal)
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**備考**

- 二子玉川台は、東京都墨田区北浦に位置する郵便局です。
- 郵便番号は110-8501で、住所は二子玉川台です。
- 二子玉川台は、二子玉川台と呼ばれる地域にあります。
- 二子玉川台は、東京都の南西部に位置する地域です。
**United Nations Archives**

**Camera Operator's Report and Certificate**

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**Date:** 7/July/1989

**Signature of Camera Operator:** [Signature]
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